Case Title: Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp.

Citation: 2008-Ohio-546

Docket Number: 20061914

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546.] 
 
 
 
GROCH ET AL. v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION ET AL. 
[Cite as Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546.] 
Workers’ compensation subrogation statutes — R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931 do 
not violate Takings Clause, Due Process and Remedies Clauses, or Equal 
Protection Clause of Ohio Constitution – Statutes of repose – Products 
liability – R.C. 2305.10 and former 2305.10(F) (now (G)) do not violate 
open-courts provision, Takings Clause, Due Process and Remedies 
Clauses, Equal Protection Clause, or one-subject rule of Ohio 
Constitution – Former R.C. 2305.10(F) (now (G)) is unconstitutionally 
retroactive to extent that it provides unreasonably short time to bring suit 
for plaintiffs whose injuries occurred before 2004 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80 
amendments to R.C. 2305.10. 
(No. 2006-1914 — Submitted September 19, 2007 — Decided  
February 21, 2008.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
Western Division, Certifying Questions of State Law, No. 3:06-CV-1604. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931 do not violate the Takings Clause (Section 19, 
Article I), the Due Process and Remedies Clauses (Section 16, Article I), 
or the Equal Protection Clause (Section 2, Article I) of the Ohio 
Constitution, and are therefore facially constitutional. 
2. 
R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F) do not violate the open-courts 
provision (Section 16, Article I), the Takings Clause (Section 19, Article 
I), the Due Process and Remedies Clauses (Section 16, Article I), the 
Equal Protection Clause (Section 2, Article I), or the one-subject rule 
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(Section 15(D), Article II) of the Ohio Constitution, and are therefore 
facially constitutional. 
3. 
To the extent that former R.C. 2305.10(F) (now (G)) affects an accrued 
substantive right by providing an unreasonably short period of time in 
which to file suit for certain plaintiffs whose injuries occurred before the 
amendments to R.C. 2305.10 enacted by 2004 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80 
became effective, and whose causes of action therefore accrued for 
purposes of R.C. 2305.10(C), former R.C. 2305.10(F) is unconstitutionally 
retroactive under Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} This case comes to us as certified questions of state law from the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division.  
For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified questions by holding that R.C. 
4123.93, 4123.931, 2305.10(C), and former 2305.10(F) (now (G)) are all facially 
constitutional on the challenges to those statutes asserted in this case.  However, 
we determine that Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution (the ban on 
retroactive laws) prevents R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F) from applying 
to the specific facts of this case.  We therefore uphold an “as applied” challenge to 
those statutes and invalidate former R.C. 2305.10(F) in part. 
I 
Relevant Background 
A.  The Certification Order and the Questions to Be Answered 
{¶ 2} The federal district court’s initial certification order reads as 
follows: 
{¶ 3} “There are issues of Ohio law that may be determinative of the 
present case and for which there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the 
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3 
Supreme Court of Ohio.  Therefore, this Court finds it appropriate to certify 
questions of Ohio law to the Supreme Court of Ohio. 
“A. 
NAME OF THE CASE AND NAMES OF ALL PARTIES 
{¶ 4} “The name of this case is Douglas Groch, et al. v. General Motors 
Corporation, et al. case number 3:06-CV-1604.  The parties in this case are:  
Plaintiffs Douglas Groch and Chloe Groch versus Defendants General Motors 
Corporation, Kard Corporation and Racine Federated, Inc.  The Attorney General 
of Ohio is a party for purposes of defending the constitutionality of the Ohio 
statutes at issue. 
“B. 
BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS 
{¶ 5} “The Amended Complaint alleges the following:  Plaintiff Douglas 
Groch (‘Groch’) was injured on March 3, 2005 when the trim press he was 
operating came down on his right arm and wrist.  At the time of his injury 
Plaintiff Douglas Groch was acting in the course and scope of his employment 
with Defendant General Motors Corporation.  The trim press that he was using 
was manufactured by Defendants Kard Corporation and Racine Federated, Inc. 
{¶ 6} “Groch brought an action in the Court of Common Pleas, Lucas 
County, Ohio seeking damages from Defendant General Motors Corporation 
(‘GM’) based on a theory of employer intentional tort and from Defendants Kard 
Corporation and Racine Federated, Inc. (respectively, ‘Kard’ and ‘Racine’) based 
on a theory of product liability.  Plaintiff Chloe Groch (‘Chloe’) sought damages 
for loss of consortium. 
{¶ 7} “The action was removed to federal court by GM.  Federal 
jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. 1332 because there is diversity between the 
Plaintiffs and the Defendants, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 
{¶ 8} “GM has asserted a subrogation interest in Groch’s recovery for its 
payment to him of workers’ compensation benefits.  Groch asserts that the Ohio 
statutes granting GM subrogation interests—R.C. 4123.93 and R.C. 4123.931—
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are unconstitutional.  To fully adjudicate this matter and determine the rights and 
liabilities of each party, this Court needs a determination by the Ohio Supreme 
Court regarding the constitutionality of the statutes under the Ohio Constitution.  
The Supreme Court of Ohio has not yet had opportunity to issue a decision on the 
constitutionality of R.C. 4123.93 and R.C. 4123.931, passed as Senate Bill 227 
and made effective in April 2003.  Therefore, this Court certifies questions 1 
through 3 to the Supreme Court of Ohio. 
{¶ 9} “Kard and Racine assert that they are immune from liability based 
on the statute of repose for products liability claims provided at R.C. 2305.10.  To 
fully adjudicate this matter and fully determine the rights and liabilities of each 
party, this Court needs a determination by the Ohio Supreme Court regarding the 
constitutionality of the statutes under the Ohio Constitution.  The Supreme Court 
of Ohio has not yet had opportunity to issue a decision on the constitutionality of 
R.C. 2305.10, passed as Senate Bill 80, and made effective in April, 2005.  
Therefore this Court certifies [an additional five questions] to the Supreme Court 
of Ohio.” 
{¶ 10} Shortly after issuing that order, the district court issued an 
amended order that certified an additional ninth question regarding the 
constitutionality of 2004 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80. 
{¶ 11} This court reviewed the parties’ preliminary memoranda and 
determined that it would answer all nine certified questions, numbering them as 
follows: 
{¶ 12} “1.  Do the statutes allowing subrogation for workers’ 
compensation benefits, R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931, violate the takings clause, 
Article I, Section 19, of the Ohio Constitution? 
{¶ 13} “2.  Do R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931 violate the due process and 
remedies clause, Article I, Section 16, of the Ohio Constitution? 
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{¶ 14} “3.  Do R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931 violate the equal protection 
clause, Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution? 
{¶ 15} “4.  Do R.C. 2305.10(C) and (F) violate the open courts provision 
of Article I, Section 16, of the Ohio Constitution? 
{¶ 16} “5.  Do R.C. 2305.10(C) and (F) violate the takings clause, Article 
I, Section 19, of the Ohio Constitution? 
{¶ 17} “6.  Do R.C. 2305.10(C) and (F) violate the due process and 
remedies clause, Article I, Section 16, of the Ohio Constitution? 
{¶ 18} “7.  Do R.C. 2305.10(C) and (F) violate the equal protection 
clause, Article I, Section 2, of the Ohio Constitution? 
{¶ 19} “8.  Do R.C. 2305.10(C) and (F) violate the ban on retroactive 
laws, Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution? 
{¶ 20} “9.  Does Senate Bill 80 violate the one-subject rule, Article II, 
Section 15, of the Ohio Constitution?”  112 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2006-Ohio-6712, 
859 N.E.2d 556. 
{¶ 21} Plaintiffs Douglas and Chloe Groch are the petitioners in this 
matter.  The respondents are defendants General Motors Corporation, Kard 
Corporation, and Racine Federated, Inc., and the state of Ohio, represented by the 
attorney general.  A number of amicus curiae briefs ably support their arguments. 
B.  Introduction of Analysis 
{¶ 22} 
The first three questions focus on whether the General Assembly’s 
statutory response to this court’s decision in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co. 
(2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 115, 748 N.E.2d 1111, which held the previous workers’ 
compensation subrogation statute unconstitutional, complies with several cited 
provisions of the Ohio Constitution.  These questions are answered in Part II of 
this opinion.  The next five questions focus on the constitutionality of R.C. 
2305.10, the statute of repose for products-liability actions, enacted as part of the 
tort-reform legislation of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80 of the 125th General Assembly 
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(“S.B. 80”), effective April 7, 2005.  These five questions, along with the ninth 
question concerning whether S.B. 80 violates the one-subject rule of the Ohio 
Constitution, are answered in Part III of this opinion. 
{¶ 23} 
This court’s recent decision in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 
Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, is useful in setting the stage.  
Arbino provides extensive background and establishes some important concepts 
that play a significant role in resolving the final six questions.  Therefore, a brief 
review of Arbino is in order at this point, with more extensive consideration in 
Part III. 
{¶ 24} 
Arbino, like the present case, was before this court on certified 
questions from a federal district court.  In Arbino, we resolved questions on the 
constitutionality of two tort-reform statutes enacted by S.B. 80—R.C. 2315.18, 
limiting noneconomic damages in tort actions, and R.C. 2315.21, limiting 
punitive damages in tort actions.  Before analyzing the facial constitutional 
challenges, this court reiterated the well-established standard of review, stating at 
¶ 25: 
{¶ 25} 
“It is difficult to prove that a statute is unconstitutional.  All 
statutes have a strong presumption of constitutionality.  See Sorrell [v. Thevenir 
(1994)], 69 Ohio St.3d [415] at 418-419, 633 N.E.2d 504.  Before a court may 
declare unconstitutional an enactment of the legislative branch, ‘it must appear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are 
clearly incompatible.’  State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 
142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus.” 
{¶ 26} 
In addition, a party raising a facial challenge must demonstrate that 
there is no set of circumstances in which the statute would be valid.  Arbino at ¶ 
26, citing Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 
1165, ¶ 37, and United States v. Salerno (1987), 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 
2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697.  “ ‘The fact that a statute might operate unconstitutionally 
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under some plausible set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly 
invalid.’ ”  Arbino at ¶ 26, quoting Harrold at ¶ 37. 
{¶ 27} 
These considerations apply to most of the certified questions in this 
case.  However, petitioners also raise an “as applied” constitutional challenge in 
one of the certified questions, which is governed by a different standard, and 
which we will address in Part III. 
II 
Constitutionality of R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931 
{¶ 28} In Holeton, 92 Ohio St.3d 115, 748 N.E.2d 1111, this court held 
that former R.C. 4123.931, a workers’ compensation subrogation statute enacted 
in 1995, was unconstitutional on a number of grounds.1  After our decision in 
Holeton, the General Assembly repealed the 1995 statutes and enacted the 
subrogation statutes at issue in this case in 2002 Sub.S.B. No. 227.  149 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 3716.  The statutes became effective on April 9, 2003.  See 
Modzelewski v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 102 Ohio St.3d 192, 2004-Ohio-2365, 
808 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 7, fn. 1. 
{¶ 29} Five days after S.B. 227’s effective date, a mandamus action 
challenging the constitutionality of the subrogation statutes at issue here was filed 
in the Tenth District Court of Appeals.  In State ex rel. United Auto., Aerospace & 
Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp, 108 Ohio 
St.3d 432, 2006-Ohio-1327, 844 N.E.2d 335, we affirmed the judgment of the 
court of appeals dismissing the complaint in mandamus because the relator had 
adequate remedies by way of declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction.  
Id. at ¶ 62. 
                                                 
1.  Because Holeton held the 1995 statute unconstitutional, the previous subrogation statute, 
enacted in 1993, then became effective.  See Modzelewski v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 102 Ohio 
St.3d 192, 2004-Ohio-2365, 808 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 7, fn. 1.  In Modzelewski, at the syllabus, we held 
that the 1993 statute was unconstitutional as well. 
 
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{¶ 30} In United Auto., this court discussed the statute held 
unconstitutional in Holeton and summarized that decision at ¶ 2-13: 
{¶ 31} “Under R.C. 4123.931(A), the payment of workers’ compensation 
benefits ‘creates a right of recovery in favor of a statutory subrogee against a third 
party, and the statutory subrogee is subrogated to the rights of a claimant against 
that third party.’  The ‘statutory subrogee’ is ‘the administrator of workers’ 
compensation, a self-insuring employer, or an employer that contracts for the 
direct payment of medical services.’  R.C. 4123.93(B). 
{¶ 32} “Former R.C. 4123.931(A) specified:  ‘A statutory subrogee’s 
subrogation interest includes * * * estimated future values of compensation and 
medical benefits arising out of an injury to or disability or disease of a claimant.’  
See 1995 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 278, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3596. 
{¶ 33} “Former R.C. 4123.931(D) further provided: 
{¶ 34} “ ‘The entire amount of any settlement or compromise of an action 
or claim is subject to the subrogation right of a statutory subrogee, regardless of 
the manner in which the settlement or compromise is characterized.  Any 
settlement or compromise that excludes the amount of compensation or medical 
benefits shall not preclude a statutory subrogee from enforcing its rights under 
this section.  The entire amount of any award or judgment is presumed to 
represent compensation and medical benefits and future estimated values of 
compensation and medical benefits that are subject to a statutory subrogee’s 
subrogation rights unless the claimant obtains a special verdict or jury 
interrogatories indicating that the award or judgment represents different types of 
damages.’  Id. at 3596-3597. 
{¶ 35} “In June 2001, in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co. (2001), 92 Ohio 
St.3d 115, 135, 748 N.E.2d 1111, we held that former R.C. 4128.931 [sic, 
4123.931] violated Sections 2, 16, and 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
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9 
{¶ 36} “More specifically, we held:  ‘By giving the subrogee a current 
collectible interest in estimated future expenditures, [former] R.C. 4123.931(A) 
creates the conditions under which a prohibited taking may occur.  This would 
happen in those situations where the amount of reimbursement for “estimated 
future values of compensation and medical benefits” proves to be substantially 
greater than the subrogee’s eventual compensation outlay.  In other words, 
[former] R.C. 4123.931(A) requires the claimant to reimburse the bureau or self-
insuring employer for future benefits that the claimant may never receive.  In that 
event, the statute operates not to prevent the claimant from keeping a double 
recovery but to provide the statutory subrogee with a windfall at the expense of 
the claimant’s tort recovery.’  Id. at 123, 748 N.E.2d 1111. 
{¶ 37} “In addition, we held: 
{¶ 38} “ ‘[Former] R.C. 4123.931(D) establishes a procedural framework 
under which an unconstitutional taking of the claimant’s property or a denial of 
remedy by due course of law can occur.  This framework distinguishes between 
third-party claims that are tried and third-party claims that are settled.  In the case 
where an award or judgment is rendered in the third-party action, [former] R.C. 
4123.931(D) allows the claimant to obtain jury interrogatories segregating 
damages that do not represent workers’ compensation or medical benefits and, 
therefore, are not subject to the reimbursement right of the statutory subrogee.  In 
contrast, the entire amount of any settlement or compromise is deemed subject to 
the reimbursement right of the statutory subrogee, and the claimant is precluded, 
under any circumstances, from showing that his or her settlement or portions 
thereof do not represent or duplicate workers’ compensation or medical benefits. 
{¶ 39} “ ‘* * * [Former] R.C. 4123.931(D) operates unconstitutionally * * 
* because it allows for reimbursement from proceeds that do not constitute a 
double recovery.’  Id., 92 Ohio St.3d at 125-126, 748 N.E.2d 1111; see, also, 
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Modzelewski v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 102 Ohio St.3d 192, 2004-Ohio-2365, 
808 N.E.2d 381, holding former R.C. 4123.93 unconstitutional. 
{¶ 40} “In Holeton, 92 Ohio St.3d at 135, 748 N.E.2d 1111, despite 
holding the statute unconstitutional, we expressly noted that workers’ 
compensation subrogation statutes are not per se unconstitutional and that we 
were addressing only the specific provisions in former R.C. 4123.931: 
{¶ 41} “ ‘We hold * * * that [former] R.C. 4123.931 does violate Sections 
2, 16, and 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  In so holding, we do not accept 
the proposition that a workers’ compensation subrogation statute is per se 
unconstitutional, and nothing in this opinion shall be construed to prevent the 
General Assembly from ever enacting such a statute.  We hold only that [former] 
R.C. 4123.931, in its present form, is unconstitutional.’ 
{¶ 42} “We also recognized that ‘virtually every jurisdiction provides 
some statutory mechanism enabling the employer or fund to recover its workers’ 
compensation outlay from a third-party tortfeasor.’  Id. at 120, 748 N.E.2d 1111.” 
{¶ 43} United Auto., 108 Ohio St.3d 432, 2006-Ohio-1327, 844 N.E.2d 
335, at ¶ 14-17, also cogently summarized current R.C. 4123.931: 
{¶ 44} “Following Holeton, the General Assembly enacted 2002 Sub.S.B. 
No. 227 (‘S.B. 227’), which amended the subrogation provisions in R.C. 4123.93 
and 4123.931, effective April 9, 2003. 
{¶ 45} “S.B. 227 repealed the former provisions in R.C. 4123.931(A) and 
(D) that we had found unconstitutional in Holeton and set forth a new settlement 
procedure in which a claimant would receive ‘an amount equal to the 
uncompensated damages divided by the sum of the subrogation interest plus the 
uncompensated damages, multiplied by the net amount recovered.’  R.C. 
4123.931(B).  The statutory subrogee would receive ‘an amount equal to the 
subrogation interest divided by the sum of the subrogation interest plus the 
uncompensated damages, multiplied by the net amount recovered.’  Id.  The 
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claimant and statutory subrogee can instead agree to divide the net amount 
recovered on a more fair and reasonable basis.  Id. 
{¶ 46} “In addition, S.B. 227 permits claimants to ‘establish an interest-
bearing trust account for the full amount of the subrogation interest that represents 
estimated future payments of compensation, medical benefits, rehabilitation costs, 
or death benefits, reduced to present value, from which the claimant shall make 
reimbursement payments to the statutory subrogee for the future payments of 
compensation, medical benefits, rehabilitation costs, or death benefits.’  R.C. 
4123.931(E)(1). 
{¶ 47} “The manifest objective of the General Assembly in enacting S.B. 
227 was to comply with our holding in Holeton.  See, generally, Legislative 
Service Commission, Bill Analysis of 2002 S.B. 227.” 
{¶ 48} Petitioners in this case argue that the current subrogation statutes 
violate the same constitutional provisions cited in Holeton.  The key statute 
challenged is R.C. 4123.931, which sets forth the right of subrogation and which 
details how that right is implemented.  The other statute at issue, R.C. 4123.93, 
defines terms appearing in R.C. 4123.931. 
A.  The Takings Clause and the Due Process and Remedies Clauses  
(Section 19, Article I, and Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution) 
{¶ 49} The first certified question is whether the subrogation statutes 
violate Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which provides, “Private 
property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.  
[W]here private property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor 
shall first be made.” 
{¶ 50} Section 19 requires that “ ‘legislation must be reasonable, not 
arbitrary, and must confer upon the public a benefit commensurate with its 
burdens upon private property.’ ”  Holeton, 92 Ohio St.3d at 121, 748 N.E.2d 
1111, quoting Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton (1941), 138 Ohio St. 540, 
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546, 21 O.O. 422, 38 N.E.2d 70.  See, also, Froelich v. Cleveland (1919), 99 Ohio 
St. 376, 391, 124 N.E. 212 (laws “must be suitable to the ends in view, they must 
be impartial in operation, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, must have 
a real and substantial relation to their purpose, and must not interfere with private 
rights beyond the necessities of the situation”). 
{¶ 51} The second certified question is whether the subrogation statutes 
violate the Due Process and Remedies Clauses, Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution, which provides that “every person, for an injury done * * *, shall 
have remedy by due course of law.” 
{¶ 52} The rights encompassed by the “remedy” aspect of Section 16, 
Article I are well settled.  “ ‘When the Constitution speaks of remedy and injury 
to person, property, or reputation, it requires an opportunity granted at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ”Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 
2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 44, quoting Hardy v. VerMeulen (1987), 32 
Ohio St.3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626. 
{¶ 53} This court has recognized the “due course of law” aspect of 
Section 16, Article I as the equivalent of the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution.  Arbino at ¶ 48. 
{¶ 54} The Holeton court determined that the former subrogation statute 
violated Section 19, Article I, and that an improper taking had occurred, because 
the “estimated future values” provision of the statute too often gave the statutory 
subrogee a windfall.  Id., 92 Ohio St.3d at 123, 748 N.E.2d 1111.  The Holeton 
court reviewed several scenarios in which the statute required the claimant to 
reimburse the subrogee for future benefits that would never be received.  Id. at 
123-124, 748 N.E.2d 1111. 
{¶ 55} The Holeton court additionally held that the former subrogation 
statute violated the takings, right-to-a-remedy, and due-process provisions by 
forcing the claimant to fully reimburse the subrogee in many situations in which 
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the claimant had not been made whole.  For instance, the statute required full 
reimbursement when the claimant settled with a tortfeasor for the limits of an 
insurance policy and thus was not made whole even when workers’ compensation 
benefits and the settlement amount were combined, and even when the settlement 
included damages that should not have been reimbursable.  Id. at 126, 748 N.E.2d 
1111.  In reaching this conclusion, the court considered that while the former 
statute allowed a successful plaintiff to submit jury interrogatories to reduce the 
subrogee’s right to reimbursement, the plaintiff who settled with the tortfeasor 
was required to fully reimburse the subrogee with no opportunity to show that full 
reimbursement was unwarranted.  Id. 
1.  Subrogation Recovery of Estimated Future Benefits 
{¶ 56} As mentioned above, after Holeton determined that the former 
subrogation statute unconstitutionally allowed a statutory subrogee to take a 
claimant’s estimated future benefits, the General Assembly responded by 
allowing the claimant to establish an interest-bearing trust account.  R.C. 
4123.931(E)(1).  Using this trust account, the claimant reimburses the subrogee 
periodically for amounts paid upon the claimant’s behalf.  R.C. 4123.931(E)(3).  
R.C. 4123.931(E)(1) provides that once the statutory subrogee’s duty to pay ends 
and full reimbursement has occurred, any money remaining in the account shall 
be “paid to the claimant or the claimant’s estate.”  If the claimant chooses not to 
establish such an account, the claimant must pay the statutory subrogee “the full 
amount of the subrogation interest that represents estimated future payments.”  
R.C. 4123.931(F). 
{¶ 57} Petitioners argue that the current subrogation statutes still authorize 
an unconstitutional taking because such an account is “unrealistic” (fees and 
expenses will deplete the principal in most cases), and thus the account’s benefits 
are “illusory.”  They further argue that a claimant who does not establish a trust 
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account must fully reimburse the subrogee for the estimated future payments, just 
like under the former statute struck down in Holeton. 
{¶ 58} We disagree with petitioners’ argument.  The trust option affords 
the claimant an opportunity to avoid the consequences of overestimating future 
benefit values.  The claimant who invokes the trust option is no longer required to 
reimburse the subrogee up front for estimated future payments that may never 
materialize.  Whereas the former statute allowed the subrogee to retain any 
overpayment, the current trust option ensures the return to the claimant of all 
funds remaining after the “final reimbursement” of the subrogee.  R.C. 
4123.931(E)(1). 
{¶ 59} This court in Holeton, 92 Ohio St.3d at 124, 748 N.E.2d 1111, 
discussed with approval a Minnesota statute that “does not give the employer or 
the fund any immediate right of subrogation or reimbursement with regard to 
future payable compensation or medical benefits.  Instead, the Minnesota statute 
provides a formula under which the employer or fund can obtain reimbursement 
for compensation paid and then provides that certain remaining tort proceeds shall 
be paid to the employee and constitute a credit to the subrogee against future 
compensation payments.”  (Emphasis sic.)  See Minn.Stat. 176.061(6).  Although 
R.C. 4123.931(E) differs from the Minnesota statute, the Ohio statute implements 
some of the same features approved by the Holeton court. 
{¶ 60} Furthermore, the Ohio subrogation statute in Holeton required 
immediate reimbursement to the subrogee of the entire amount of the estimated 
future benefits, subject to certain exceptions, such as the claimant’s attorney fees 
and expenses.  See former R.C. 4123.931(A), (D), and (E), set forth in Holeton, 
92 Ohio St.3d at 117, 748 N.E.2d 1111.  The current statutes contain the same 
exceptions.  See R.C. 4123.93(E).  However, the current statutes (as will be 
discussed in the next part of this opinion) contain a new formula for calculating 
January Term, 2008 
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estimated future benefits that significantly reduces the imbalances condemned in 
Holeton.  See R.C. 4123.931(B) and (D). 
{¶ 61} We find petitioners’ arguments regarding the practical difficulties 
and supposedly prohibitive costs of a trust account to be too speculative.  For one 
thing, current R.C. 4123.931(E)(2) allows the claimant to use interest from the 
trust account to pay for expenses.  For another, the statute does not require the 
claimant to establish a fully managed trust account with a highly compensated 
trustee. 
{¶ 62} Although the General Assembly could have responded differently 
to the deficiencies identified in Holeton, the current statutes governing estimated 
future benefits are reasonable and do not, on their face, effect an unconstitutional 
taking. 
2.  The Statutory Formula for Allocating the Net Amount Recovered  
Between the Claimant and the Statutory Subrogee 
{¶ 63} As mentioned above, this court in Holeton determined that the 
subrogation statute in that case violated the takings, right-to-a-remedy, and due-
process provisions by failing to adequately correlate the subrogee’s 
reimbursement amount to any amount recovered by the claimant that can be 
characterized as duplicative or double when the claimant settled with the 
tortfeasor.  The General Assembly responded by enacting a new formula for 
dividing between the claimant and the subrogee the “net amount recovered” by 
the claimant from a third party.  The formula is the same for claimants who settle 
with the tortfeasor (see R.C. 4123.931(B)) and for claimants who recover 
damages after a trial (see R.C. 4123.931(D)). 
{¶ 64} Under those statutes, a claimant receives “an amount equal to the 
uncompensated damages divided by the sum of the subrogation interest plus the 
uncompensated damages, multiplied by the net amount recovered,” and the 
statutory subrogee receives “an amount equal to the subrogation interest divided 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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by the sum of the subrogation interest plus the uncompensated damages, 
multiplied by the net amount recovered.” 
{¶ 65} Under R.C. 4123.93(D), the “subrogation interest” includes only 
“past, present, and estimated future payments of compensation, medical benefits, 
rehabilitation costs, or death benefits, and any other costs or expenses paid to or 
on behalf of the claimant by the statutory subrogee.”  Furthermore, under R.C. 
4123.93(E), the “net amount recovered” by the claimant against a third party 
excludes from the formula “attorney’s fees, costs, and other expenses incurred by 
the claimant in securing” the recovery, as well as punitive damages.  Finally, 
under R.C. 4123.93(F), “uncompensated damages” are the “demonstrated or 
proven damages minus the statutory subrogee’s subrogation interest.” 
{¶ 66} A hypothetical example taken from the Legislative Service 
Commission Bill Analysis of 2002 S.B. 227 illustrates how the formula works: 
{¶ 67} “The required calculations * * * can be expressed in formulas as 
follows, where ‘NAR’ means the ‘net amount recovered,’ ‘UD’ means the 
‘uncompensated damages,’ and ‘SI’ means the ‘subrogation interest’: 
{¶ 68} “● The claimant receives an amount equal to: UD/(SI + UD) x 
NAR. 
{¶ 69} “● The statutory subrogee receives an amount equal to: SI/(SI + 
UD) x NAR. 
{¶ 70} “The following is a hypothetical example of this formula: 
{¶ 71} “If the net amount recovered = $70k; the subrogation interest = 
$60k; and the uncompensated damages = $50k, the claimant would receive 
$31,818,18.  This is calculated as follows: 50k/(60k + 50k) x 70k.  The statutory 
subrogee would receive $38,181.82, which is calculated as follows: 60k/(60k + 
50k) x 70k.  The claimant’s and statutory subrogee’s amounts total $70k, which is 
the net amount recovered.  These formulas apply both to settlements (R.C. 
January Term, 2008 
17 
4123.931(B)) and * * * also to cases that proceed to trial (R.C. 4123.931(D)).”  
Id. at 4. 
{¶ 72} As a practical matter, the formula divides the “net amount 
recovered” by the claimant from a third party in such a way that the subrogee 
receives a proportionate share based on its “subrogation interest” and the claimant 
receives an amount proportionate to his “uncompensated damages.” 
{¶ 73} Petitioners argue that under the current statutes, the statutory 
subrogee may still take a portion of nonduplicative damages, so that the current 
statutes remain unconstitutional.  Petitioners’ arguments, however, overlook a key 
provision of the statutory formula, which we will explain using the same figures 
as the hypothetical discussed above. 
{¶ 74} Because R.C. 4123.93(F) defines “uncompensated damages” as 
“the claimant’s demonstrated or proven damages minus the statutory subrogee’s 
subrogation interest,” it necessarily follows that in the hypothetical, the claimant’s 
“demonstrated or proven damages” are $110,000 (a UD of $50,000 plus an SI of 
$60,000).  The formula allows the claimant to retain the subrogation benefits (in 
the hypothetical, the subrogation benefits are $60,000).  In addition to the 
subrogation benefits, the claimant also receives a portion of the NAR when it is 
divided in accordance with the formula (in the hypothetical, the claimant’s portion 
of the NAR is $31,818.18).  Therefore, in the hypothetical, the claimant receives a 
total of $91,818.18 toward his $110,000 proven damages. 
{¶ 75} From the NAR, the subrogee recovers $38,181.82 of the $60,000 it 
paid in benefits.  Under the former statutory scheme held unconstitutional in 
Holeton, the subrogee might have recovered the full $60,000 even when the 
claimant was undercompensated.  On the other hand, if there were no subrogation 
at all, the claimant would have received a total of $130,000 (an SI of $60,000 plus 
an NAR of $70,000), and of course the subrogee would have received nothing.  It 
must also be remembered that under R.C. 4123.93(E), the subrogee does not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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recoup any portion of the claimant’s attorney fees, costs, expenses, or punitive 
damages, because the formula excludes those amounts from the “net amount 
recovered.” 
{¶ 76} From the above, we observe that a key part of the formula’s 
operation is that it allows the claimant to keep the benefits received from the 
subrogee.  Petitioners’ arguments fail to account for that very important fact. 
{¶ 77} We recognize that under the current statutes, claimants may have 
to reimburse the subrogee out of recovered damages that are not duplicative and 
may have to prove that they have not received a double recovery.  However, for 
the reasons that follow, we are convinced that the procedure is facially 
constitutional and does not constitute an impermissible taking or a violation of 
due process.  Our decision on this point is further supported by the discussion in 
Part II B below. 
{¶ 78} In those situations in which a claimant is not fully compensated, 
the statutory formula is applied, and the claimant and subrogee share in a pro rata 
division of the net amount recovered.  The claimant and subrogee share the 
burden of the undercompensation, but that undercompensation is caused by 
extrinsic factors (e.g., the tortfeasor may be underinsured) beyond the control of 
either party and not by any of the statutory deficiencies identified in Holeton.  
Although both the claimant and the subrogee obviously would prefer to be made 
whole, that is not possible when the third party is unable to fully compensate the 
claimant.  Rather than forcing either the claimant or the subrogee to shoulder the 
full burden of the undercompensation, the General Assembly chose to have them 
share the burden equally. 
{¶ 79} Under the pro rata formula, in some cases, the subrogee will not be 
able to recover all of the proceeds that are actually duplicative, while in other 
cases, a claimant may have to yield some proceeds that are not duplicative.  
Although the Holeton court focused on the claimant’s perspective, the subrogee’s 
January Term, 2008 
19 
perspective should also be considered.  It is not inequitable for the subrogee to 
obtain some level of reimbursement, and the formula significantly reduces the 
excessive reimbursement that occurred too often under the previous legislation. 
{¶ 80} Again, while the General Assembly could have structured the 
subrogation statutes in a different way, the formula enacted in R.C. 4123.931(B) 
and (D) is a reasonable approach that withstands constitutional scrutiny on its face 
under Sections 16 and 19, Article I.  To the extent that this court in Holeton was 
concerned that the prior statute was fundamentally unfair in too many situations, 
that unfairness has been addressed and the imbalances adjusted to such a degree 
that the constitutional infirmity has been eliminated. 
B.  Equal Protection (Section 2, Article I, Ohio Constitution) 
{¶ 81} The third certified question is whether the subrogation statutes 
violate the Equal Protection Clause, Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, 
which provides, “All political power is inherent in the people.  Government is 
instituted for their equal protection and benefit.” 
{¶ 82} No fundamental right or suspect class is involved in this case, and 
therefore, we review the subrogation statutes under the rational-basis test.  See 
Holeton, 92 Ohio St.3d at 131, 748 N.E.2d 1111.  Under this test, a challenged 
statute will be upheld if the classifications it creates bear a rational relationship to 
a legitimate government interest or are grounded on a reasonable justification, 
even if the classifications are not precise.  Id.  See, also, Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 
468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 49. 
{¶ 83} This court in Holeton held that the former subrogation statute 
violated equal protection by distinguishing between claimants who go to trial and 
claimants who settle.  This court reasoned that the former statute “essentially 
create[d] a presumption that a double recovery occurs whenever a claimant is 
permitted to retain workers’ compensation and tort recovery.  Claimants who try 
their tort claims are permitted to rebut this presumption, while claimants who 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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settle their tort claims are not.  Such disparate treatment of claimants who settle 
their tort claims is irrational and arbitrary because, as demonstrated in [the part of 
the opinion discussing Sections 16 and 19, Article I], there are situations where 
claimants’ tort recovery is necessarily limited to amounts that if retained along 
with workers’ compensation cannot possibly result in a double recovery.”  
Holeton, 92 Ohio St.3d at 132, 748 N.E.2d 1111. 
{¶ 84} As we extensively discussed in Part II A above, the General 
Assembly responded to Holeton’s concerns by enacting a formula for dividing the 
claimant’s “net amount recovered” that applies to both classes of claimants.  See 
R.C. 4123.931(B) and (D). 
{¶ 85} When a claimant settles with a tortfeasor, current R.C. 
4123.931(B) allows the claimant and subrogee several options:  they may use the 
formula to determine the division of the “net amount recovered,” agree to divide 
that amount “on a more fair and reasonable basis,” request a conference with the 
administrator of workers’ compensation (see, also, R.C. 4123.931(C)), or resort to 
an “alternative dispute resolution process.” 
{¶ 86} When a claimant recovers from a tortfeasor at a trial, R.C. 
4123.931(D) specifies that a judge in a nonjury action shall make findings of fact, 
and the jury in a jury action shall answer interrogatories, that specify the total 
amount of compensatory damages and then divide that amount into damages 
representing economic loss and those representing noneconomic loss.  Petitioners 
argue that because the statutory formula for dividing the net amount recovered 
does not specifically take into account those findings of fact or answers to 
interrogatories for claimants who recover at trial, the current statutes violate equal 
protection by treating claimants who settle differently from claimants who prevail 
at trial.2  For the following reasons, we disagree with petitioners’ arguments. 
                                                 
2.  {¶ a} We specifically note the following discussion of R.C. 4123.931(D) from respondent state 
of Ohio’s brief, which responds to petitioners’ equal-protection arguments: 
January Term, 2008 
21 
{¶ 87} First and foremost, the current statutory formula for dividing the 
“net amount recovered” applies both to claimants who settle and to claimants who 
recover at trial.  As mentioned above, this new formula has satisfactorily 
addressed the Holeton court’s concern that the disparate treatment of these two 
types of claimants offended Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  For 
the same reasons, the formula also rectifies the Section 2, Article I violation 
identified in Holeton stemming from this same disparate treatment. 
{¶ 88} We determine that the statutory formula for dividing the net 
amount recovered itself provides the rational basis required to pass equal-
protection scrutiny.  In light of the formula, further concerns about a claimant’s 
ability to retain any nonduplicative damages have lost their force.  Therefore, 
even though R.C. 4123.931(B) and 4123.931(D) do not treat the two classes of 
claimants identically, that differing treatment is not grounded upon an 
unreasonable justification. 
{¶ 89} Furthermore, claimants may have alternatives beyond those 
specifically recognized in R.C. 4123.931 for demonstrating that a recovered 
amount is not entirely duplicative, as recognized in decisions of other courts that 
have considered this issue.  For example, in Fry v. Surf City, Inc., 137 Ohio 
Misc.2d 6, 2006-Ohio-3092, 851 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 24, the court stated that a claimant 
may bring a separate declaratory judgment action, through which the claimant 
who settled with a tortfeasor may show that not all of the recovery from the 
                                                                                                                                     
    {¶ b} “For a claimant who tries his case, the judge or jury must specify the amount of 
compensatory damages and the amount of those damages that are economic and non-economic in 
nature.  This is to allow calculation of the ‘claimant’s demonstrated or proven damages’ for 
purposes of the formula.  Having the jury or judge specify the amounts allows the claimant to 
determine whether the fact-finder was discounting economic or non-economic parts of the award 
because of an assumed collateral source such as workers’ compensation or insurance.  If the award 
was so discounted, the claimant’s ‘demonstrated or proven damages’ can be adjusted accordingly 
for purposes of the formula.  R.C. 4123.931(D)(2).  And, contrary to Groch’s assertion, R.C. 
4123.931(D) does not prevent the claimant or other parties from requesting interrogatories on 
subjects other than economic and non-economic damages.”   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
tortfeasor was a double recovery.  The court in Fry also stated:  “In a trial, 
evidence may be presented and jury interrogatories may be submitted, under 
Civ.R. 49, to determine what parts of the damages represent[] workers’ 
compensation benefits and what parts represent the claimant’s unreimbursed 
interests.”  Id. at ¶ 25.  See, also, McKinley v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 170 
Ohio App.3d 161, 2006-Ohio-5271, 866 N.E.2d 527, ¶ 26 and 36, which also 
recognized the possibility of a declaratory judgment action for settling claimants, 
and of findings of fact (in a nonjury trial) or interrogatories beyond those 
expressly mentioned in R.C. 4123.931(D) (in a jury trial) to establish the possible 
duplicative nature of a claimant’s award from a third party. 
{¶ 90} Because we have already determined that the subrogation statutes 
do not on their face violate the Equal Protection Clause, there is no need for us to 
review Fry and McKinley, and we decline to rely on the availability of declaratory 
judgment as an additional reason to uphold the statutes.  Those considerations are 
more appropriate in an as-applied challenge and so are beyond the scope of our 
analysis here, which involves a facial challenge only. 
C.  Conclusion of Part II 
{¶ 91} The brief of respondent state of Ohio states that the General 
Assembly, in responding to Holeton, enacted the current subrogation statutes as a 
compromise between business interests and plaintiffs’ interests.  That brief also 
states that the General Assembly took into account the negotiations between those 
factions, along with input from the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and other 
interested parties, when it drafted the legislation. 
{¶ 92} The current subrogation statutes do bear all the earmarks of 
compromise legislation that attempts to balance the legitimate, competing 
interests of claimants and statutory subrogees.  See United Auto., 108 Ohio St.3d 
432, 2006-Ohio-1327, 844 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 17 (“The manifest objective of the 
January Term, 2008 
23 
General Assembly in enacting S.B. 227 was to comply with our holding in 
Holeton”). 
{¶ 93} Based on the foregoing, we hold that R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931 
do not violate the Takings Clause (Section 19, Article I), the Due Process and 
Remedies Clauses (Section 16, Article I), or the Equal Protection Clause (Section 
2, Article I) of the Ohio Constitution and are therefore facially constitutional. 
III 
Constitutionality of R.C. 2305.10(C) and Former 2305.10(F) 
{¶ 94} R.C. 2305.10(C)(1), the products-liability statute of repose, 
provides: 
{¶ 95} “Except as otherwise provided in divisions (C)(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), 
and (7) of this section or in section 2305.19 of the Revised Code, no cause of 
action based on a product liability claim shall accrue against the manufacturer or 
supplier of a product later than ten years from the date that the product was 
delivered to its first purchaser or first lessee who was not engaged in a business in 
which the product was used as a component in the production, construction, 
creation, assembly, or rebuilding of another product.” 
{¶ 96} R.C. 2305.10(C)(2) through (7) lists six exceptions to the operation 
of that statute, none of which apply in this case. 
{¶ 97} Former R.C. 2305.10(F) (now 2305.10(G)) applies to this case.  
That statute provided: 
{¶ 98} “This section shall be considered to be purely remedial in 
operation and shall be applied in a remedial manner in any civil action 
commenced on or after the effective date of this amendment, in which this section 
is relevant, regardless of when the cause of action accrued and notwithstanding 
any other section of the Revised Code or prior rule of law of this state, but shall 
not be construed to apply to any civil action pending prior to the effective date of 
this amendment.” 
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{¶ 99} A central fact in this case is that the trim press that injured Douglas 
Groch was “delivered” for R.C. 2305.10(C) purposes to the end user, General 
Motors, more than ten years prior to his injury.  Another central fact is that 
petitioners filed suit “after the effective date of this amendment” for purposes of 
former R.C. 2305.10(F).  Therefore, if R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F) 
are constitutional, those statutes prevent petitioners from recovering from Kard 
Corporation and Racine Federated. 
{¶ 100} Petitioners’ arguments that R.C. 2305.10 is unconstitutional are 
largely based on past decisions of this court holding other statutes of repose 
unconstitutional.  That this court has struck down statutes of repose in the past, 
however, does not necessarily mean that the products-liability statute of repose in 
this case must meet the same fate.  Indeed, in Arbino we upheld as constitutional 
other tort-reform measures that were, like the provisions of R.C. 2305.10 we 
review today, contained in S.B. 80, which became effective April 7, 2005. 
{¶ 101} In Arbino, we provided context for discussion of the 
constitutional challenges posed in that case by examining the recent history of 
major tort-reform laws and by summarizing a number of cases in which this court 
declared unconstitutional former statutes that were “similar in language and 
purpose to those at issue” in Arbino.  See 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 
880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 10.  Parts of that discussion are very pertinent to our analysis 
today. 
{¶ 102} The first key point from Arbino is that the legislative branch of 
government is “ ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy,’ ” and, in fulfilling that 
role, the legislature continually refines Ohio’s tort law to meet the needs of our 
citizens.  Id. at ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett 
Satellite Information Network v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 
781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 21. 
January Term, 2008 
25 
{¶ 103} The second key point is that “even considering the numerous 
opinions by this court on this issue, the basic constitutionality of tort-reform 
statutes is hardly settled law.  Our prior review has focused on certain 
unconstitutional facets of the prior tort-reform laws that can be addressed to create 
constitutionally valid legislation.  We have not dismissed all tort reform as an 
unconstitutional concept. 
{¶ 104} “While stare decisis applies to the rulings rendered in regard to 
specific statutes, it is limited to circumstances ‘where the facts of a subsequent 
case are substantially the same as a former case.’  Rocky River v. State Emp. 
Relations Bd. (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 539 N.E.2d 103.  We will not apply 
stare decisis to strike down legislation enacted by the General Assembly merely 
because it is similar to previous enactments that we have deemed unconstitutional.  
To be covered by the blanket of stare decisis, the legislation must be phrased in 
language that is substantially the same as that which we have previously 
invalidated.”  Id. at ¶ 22-23. 
{¶ 105} Because the ultimate conclusion reached in this portion of Arbino 
is of critical importance, and applies with equal force, to the issues we address in 
this case, we reiterate it here: 
{¶ 106} “A careful review of the statutes at issue * * * reveals that they 
are more than a rehashing of unconstitutional statutes.  In its continued pursuit of 
reform, the General Assembly has made progress in tailoring its legislation to 
address the constitutional defects identified by the various majorities of this court.  
The statutes before us * * * are sufficiently different from the previous 
enactments to avoid the blanket application of stare decisis and to warrant a fresh 
review of their individual merits.”  Id. at ¶ 24. 
{¶ 107} With the stare decisis doctrine and Arbino’s principles in mind, 
we turn to petitioners’ several challenges to the constitutionality of R.C. 
2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
A.  Open Courts and Right to a Remedy  
(Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution) 
{¶ 108} Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides, “All 
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, 
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have 
justice administered without denial or delay.”  This provision contains two 
distinct guarantees.  First, legislative enactments may restrict individual rights 
only “by due course of law,” a guarantee equivalent to the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Sedar v. Knowlton 
Constr. Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 199, 551 N.E.2d 938.  That aspect of 
Section 16 will be addressed later in this opinion, in Part III B. 
{¶ 109} The second guarantee in Section 16 is that “all courts shall be 
open to every person with a right to a remedy for injury to his person, property or 
reputation, with the opportunity for such remedy being granted at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner.”  Sedar, 49 Ohio St.3d at 193, 551 N.E.2d 938.  
It is this second guarantee that we address at this point.  In considering this aspect 
of Section 16, it is necessary to discuss our prior decisions in two cases that are 
significant here, Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. and Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 460, 639 N.E.2d 425. 
1.  Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. 
{¶ 110} In Sedar, the plaintiff, Michael Sedar, a Kent State University 
student, was severely injured when he passed his hand and arm through a panel of 
wire-reinforced glass in a door in his dormitory in 1985.  Construction of the 
dormitory had been completed in 1966.  Sedar sued the architectural engineers 
who had designed the building and the general contractor who had built it.  The 
trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on former R.C. 
2305.131, a ten-year statute of repose covering architects and builders, and the 
January Term, 2008 
27 
court of appeals affirmed, upholding the constitutionality of that statute.  Sedar, 
49 Ohio St.3d at 194, 551 N.E.2d 938. 
{¶ 111} This court in Sedar, in a thorough and concise opinion, upheld 
the constitutionality of former R.C. 2305.131 in the face of a challenge based on 
the open-courts and right-to-a-remedy guarantees of Section 16, Article I, as well 
as on other grounds.  This court stated the overall issue as “whether R.C. 
2305.131 may constitutionally prevent the accrual of actions sounding in tort 
against architects, construction contractors and others who perform services 
related to the design and construction of improvements to real property, where 
such action arises more than ten years following the completion of such services.”  
Id. at 194, 551 N.E.2d 938. 
{¶ 112} In opening the analysis in Sedar, the court explained the key 
difference between a statute of repose and a statute of limitations.  “Unlike a true 
statute of limitations, which limits the time in which a plaintiff may bring suit 
after the cause of action accrues, a statute of repose * * * potentially bars a 
plaintiff’s suit before the cause of action arises.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id., 49 Ohio 
St.3d at 195, 551 N.E.2d 938.  The court then discussed the history of 
construction statutes of repose, noting that they were first enacted in the late 
1950s and early 1960s as a response to the expansion of common-law liability of 
architects and builders who historically had not been subject to suit by third 
parties who lacked privity of contract.  Id.  Under the privity doctrine, once a 
contractor’s work was completed and accepted by the owner of the property, the 
responsibility for maintaining the building and protecting third parties from harm 
shifted to the owner, so that liability was limited to those who were in actual 
control or possession of the premises.  With the demise of the privity doctrine, 
architects and builders were increasingly subjected to suits brought by third 
parties long after work on a building had been completed.  Id. at 195-196, 551 
N.E.2d 938. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 113} The court in Sedar noted that former R.C. 2305.131, by its terms, 
did not apply to persons in actual possession and control of premises when a third 
party allegedly was injured, did not apply to suppliers of construction materials, 
and did not apply to actions on a contract.  Id., 49 Ohio St.3d at 196-197, 551 
N.E.2d 938.  We then explained the governing standards, applied them to the 
particulars of the statute, and held that former R.C. 2305.131 did not violate due 
process.  Id. at 199-201, 551 N.E.2d 938. 
{¶ 114} Then, in considering the argument that former R.C. 2305.131 
violated the open-courts and right-to-a-remedy provisions of Section 16, Article I, 
the court in Sedar first distinguished previous decisions of this court striking 
down a statute of repose for medical malpractice actions: 
{¶ 115} “[T]he situation presented in the medical malpractice cases, 
particularly in Hardy [v. VerMeulen (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626], is 
clearly distinguishable from the situation presented by the operation of R.C. 
2305.131.  Operation of the medical malpractice repose statute takes away an 
existing, actionable negligence claim before the injured person discovers it.  Thus, 
‘it denies legal remedy to one who has suffered bodily injury, * * *’ in violation 
of the right-to-a-remedy guarantee.  Hardy, supra, at 48, 512 N.E.2d at 629. 
{¶ 116} “In contrast, R.C. 2305.131 does not take away an existing cause 
of action, as applied in this case.  ‘* * * [I]ts effect, rather, is to prevent what 
might otherwise be a cause of action, from ever arising.  Thus injury occurring 
more than ten years after the negligent act allegedly responsible for the harm, 
forms no basis for recovering.  The injured party literally has no cause of action.  
* * *’  (Emphasis sic.)  Rosenberg v. North Bergen (1972), 61 N.J. 190, 199, 293 
A.2d 662, 667.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Sedar, 49 Ohio St.3d at 201-202, 551 
N.E.2d 938. 
{¶ 117} In Hardy v. VerMeulen (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 49, 512 N.E.2d 
626, this court rejected the notion that “causes of action as they existed at 
January Term, 2008 
29 
common law or the rules that govern such causes are immune from legislative 
attention.”  In Sedar, we reiterated that position and noted further that “ ‘ “[n]o 
one has a vested right in rules of the common law.  * * * The great office of 
statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to 
adapt it to new circumstances.” ’ ”  Sedar, 49 Ohio St.3d at 202, 551 N.E.2d 938, 
quoting Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner (1917), 95 Ohio St. 232, 248, 116 N.E. 104. 
{¶ 118} We also observed that “ ‘ “[t]his court would encroach upon the 
Legislature’s ability to guide the development of the law if we invalidated 
legislation simply because the rule enacted by the Legislature rejects some cause 
of action currently preferred by the courts.  * * * Such a result would offend our 
notion of the checks and balances between the various branches of government, 
and the flexibility required for the healthy growth of the law.” ’ ”  Sedar, 49 Ohio 
St.3d at 202, 551 N.E.2d 938, quoting Klein v. Catalano (1982), 386 Mass. 701, 
712-713, 437 N.E.2d 514, and Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co. 
(1978), 476 Pa. 270, 280-281, 382 A.2d 715. 
{¶ 119} Sedar ultimately concluded: “The right-to-a-remedy provision of 
Section 16, Article I applies only to existing, vested rights, and it is state law 
which determines what injuries are recognized and what remedies are available.  * 
* *  R.C. 2305.131, as applied to bar the claims of appellant here, whose injury 
occurred over eight years after the expiration of the statute of repose, does not 
violate Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.”  Sedar, 49 Ohio St.3d at 
202, 551 N.E.2d 938. 
{¶ 120} The Sedar court then thoroughly analyzed whether former R.C. 
2305.131 violated equal-protection principles, noting that “the vast majority of 
states have upheld similar architect-builder statutes of repose, holding the 
legislative classifications therein were based on valid distinctions,” and finding 
that authority persuasive.  Id. at 203, 551 N.E.2d 938.  Specifically, the court 
stated: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
{¶ 121} “Owners, tenants and others actually in possession of 
improvements to real property, who are expressly excluded from operation of the 
statute, have continuing control of the premises and are responsible for their 
repair and maintenance.  In contrast, architects and builders have no control over 
the premises once they are turned over to the owner, after which time” the 
possibilities of neglect, abuse, poor maintenance, mishandling, improper 
modification, or unskilled repair of an improvement can arise.  Id., 49 Ohio St.3d 
at 203-204, 551 N.E.2d 938. 
2.  Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. 
{¶ 122} In Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 460, 639 
N.E.2d 425, this court entertained a constitutional challenge to the same statute, 
former R.C. 2305.131, that we upheld in Sedar.  Brennaman involved a 
defendant, Bechtel Corporation, that had performed engineering and construction 
services related to the construction of a facility in which sodium was unloaded 
from railroad cars and piped to storage tanks.  Bechtel’s work on the project was 
completed in 1958.  Id. at 461, 639 N.E.2d 425. 
{¶ 123} The injuries at issue in Brennaman occurred in 1986 when 
workers at the plant were replacing a leaking valve in the piping system.  A 
stream of molten sodium escaped from the system, splashed the workers, and 
ignited, killing two employees and seriously injuring another.  Id. at 461-462, 639 
N.E.2d 425. 
{¶ 124} Among the claims raised by the employees and their families 
were claims against Bechtel for the design and construction of the sodium-
handling system.  The trial court granted summary judgment to Bechtel.  Id., 70 
Ohio St.3d at 462, 639 N.E.2d 425.  In affirming, the court of appeals primarily 
followed Sedar to hold that the claims against Bechtel were barred by former R.C. 
2305.131, because Bechtel’s work had been completed more than ten years prior 
to the injuries and the statute had recently been upheld as constitutional in Sedar.  
January Term, 2008 
31 
See Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. (Dec. 11, 1992), Ashtabula App. Nos. 92-A-1689 
and 92-A-1690, 1992 WL 366982.  This court agreed to review that decision. 
{¶ 125} In doing so, we first resolved a preliminary issue, determining 
that the sodium-handling area qualified as “an improvement to real property” so 
that former R.C. 2305.131 applied to the claims against Bechtel.  Brennaman, 70 
Ohio St.3d at 463-466, 639 N.E.2d 425. 
{¶ 126} The court then addressed the plaintiffs’ argument that former 
R.C. 2305.131 was unconstitutional.  After acknowledging that Sedar had 
recently upheld the constitutionality of that statute, the court stated, “We revisit 
our conclusion in Sedar.”  Brennaman, 70 Ohio St.3d at 466, 639 N.E.2d 425.  In 
an abbreviated discussion devoid of any in-depth analysis, a majority of this court 
simply set forth the text of Section 16, Article I; cited one case, Burgess v. Eli 
Lilly & Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 59, 61, 609 N.E.2d 140, for the proposition that 
the General Assembly is constitutionally precluded from depriving a claimant of a 
right to a remedy before the claimant knew or should have known of the injury; 
and summarily declared that the statute, because it was a statute of repose, 
deprived the plaintiffs of the right to sue those who had negligently designed or 
constructed improvements to real property once ten years elapsed after the 
negligent service, and was thus unconstitutional.  Brennaman, 70 Ohio St.3d at 
466, 639 N.E.2d 425. 
{¶ 127} The Brennaman court then stated that a plaintiff must have a 
reasonable period of time to see to seek compensation after an accident under 
Section 16, Article I, and that former R.C. 2305.131 conflicted with this right.  Id.  
The court quoted the dissent in Sedar to make the point:  “ ‘R.C. 2305.131 
effectively closes the courthouse to [Brennaman] and individuals like [her] in 
contravention of the express language of Section 16, Article I, thereby violating 
constitutionally protected rights.’ ”  Brennaman, 70 Ohio St.3d at 466, 639 
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N.E.2d 425, quoting Sedar, 49 Ohio St.3d at 205, 551 N.E.2d 938 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
{¶ 128} The court completed its discussion of the issue by stating: 
{¶ 129} “Today we reopen the courthouse doors by declaring that R.C. 
2305.131, a statute of repose, violates the right to a remedy guaranteed by Section 
16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is, thus, unconstitutional.  We overrule 
Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 551 N.E.2d 938.”  
Brennaman, 70 Ohio St.3d at 466-467, 639 N.E.2d 425.  See, also, paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  The court concluded in Brennaman that the plaintiffs had filed 
their complaints within one year after their causes of action arose and that this had 
been within a reasonable time, and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remanded the cause for trial.  Id. at 466-467, 639 N.E.2d 425. 
{¶ 130} The preceding summary of Brennaman is essentially the court’s 
full opinion regarding the unconstitutionality of former R.C. 2305.131.  
Brennaman’s entire discussion of this issue, which culminated in the holding that 
the statute violated Section 16, Article I, and which overruled Sedar, spans one 
page of the Ohio Official Reports.  The analytical portion of the court’s opinion is 
a mere four paragraphs long. 
3.  Application of Sedar and Brennaman 
{¶ 131} Petitioners’ principal argument that R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 
2305.10(F) are unconstitutional on open-courts and right-to-a-remedy grounds is 
based on Brennaman.  Their argument relies in large part on Brennaman’s broad 
implication that all statutes of repose violate Section 16, Article I, and on the stare 
decisis value of that decision. 
{¶ 132} Respondents Kard Corporation and Racine Federated assert that 
Sedar properly analyzed and upheld the constitutionality of the statute of repose at 
issue in that case and propose that “[t]o the extent this court finds Brennaman and 
Sedar in irreconcilable conflict, Brennaman should be overruled consistent with 
January Term, 2008 
33 
the required presumptions of constitutionality and the holdings of a clear majority 
of sister state courts.”  Kard Corporation and Racine Federated further contend 
that the factors set forth in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 
2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 48, lead to the conclusion that Brennaman 
should be overruled. 
{¶ 133} In Galatis, we explained when the principle of stare decisis must 
yield:  “The doctrine of stare decisis is designed to provide continuity and 
predictability in our legal system.  We adhere to stare decisis as a means of 
thwarting the arbitrary administration of justice as well as providing a clear rule 
of law by which the citizenry can organize their affairs.  * * *  However, a 
supreme court not only has the right, but is entrusted with the duty to examine its 
former decisions and, when reconciliation is impossible, to discard its former 
errors.”  Id. at ¶ 43. 
{¶ 134} Given the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis, we set forth 
in Galatis a tripartite test for considering whether a previous decision of this court 
should be overruled:  “A prior decision of the Supreme Court may be overruled 
where (1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or changes in 
circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision, (2) the 
decision defies practical workability, and (3) abandoning the precedent would not 
create an undue hardship for those who have relied upon it.”  Id. at paragraph one 
of the syllabus. 
{¶ 135} The explicit purpose of the Galatis test, which was developed 
after Brennaman was decided, is to provide a “well-structured method of ensuring 
a disciplined approach to deciding whether to abandon a precedent.”  Id., 100 
Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, at ¶ 47.  Brennaman 
illustrates the pitfalls of a court’s application of an unstructured approach to 
overruling a precedent. 
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34 
{¶ 136} Although Sedar was a thorough and concise opinion that fully 
sustained each of its specific conclusions with extensive reasoning, Brennaman is 
the classic example of the “arbitrary administration of justice” that Galatis 
cautions against. 
{¶ 137} Brennaman cavalierly overruled Sedar with virtually no analysis.  
In the process, Brennaman failed to accord proper respect to the principle of stare 
decisis.  See 70 Ohio St.3d at 468, 639 N.E.2d 425 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“A mere four years ago this court affirmed the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2305.131 in Sedar * * *.  However, * * * the majority 
ignores the doctrine of stare decisis and the policy of consistency underlying it, to 
strike down a valid exercise of the General Assembly’s power”).  Brennaman 
illustrates why it is imperative that the Galatis factors be applied.  Otherwise, the 
principles of predictability and stability are sacrificed for the sake of personal 
judicial whims. 
{¶ 138} The problem with Brennaman is not that it overruled Sedar, but 
rather, the way in which it did so.  Sedar presented a measured and reasoned 
analysis of why the particular statute of repose at issue in that case differed from 
some other statutes of repose, demonstrating that the constitutionality of any 
specific statute of repose should turn on the particular features of the statute at 
issue, and that such a statute should be evaluated narrowly within its specific 
context.  In contrast, Brennaman gave scant justification to support any of the 
court’s reasoning.  Brennaman’s imprecise analysis not only overruled Sedar, but 
also led to a sweeping repudiation by implication of not just the specific statute of 
repose before it, but of all statutes of repose in general, including presumably 
those enacted after Brennaman was decided. 
{¶ 139} This case involves a different statute of repose than was at issue 
in Sedar and Brennaman and thus stands in its own light before this court.  The 
constitutionality of the statutes at issue here certainly is not governed by the broad 
January Term, 2008 
35 
but hollow Brennaman analysis.  Indeed, Brennaman’s lack of any meaningful 
analysis makes it impossible for us to consider even the first Galatis factor 
(whether a previous decision was wrongly decided) in evaluating Brennaman’s 
treatment of Sedar.  Instead of a targeted approach that systematically explained 
the flaws in Sedar, Brennaman reached its conclusion without deigning to explain 
why Sedar was wrongly decided, other than to employ a short quote from the 
Sedar dissent. 
{¶ 140} The deficiencies underlying Brennaman’s overruling of Sedar 
are clear. 
{¶ 141} Any constitutional analysis must begin with the presumption of 
constitutionality enjoyed by all legislation, and the understanding that it is not this 
court’s duty to assess the wisdom of a particular statute.  See Brennaman, 70 Ohio 
St.3d at 468, 639 N.E.2d 425 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  Brennaman did not even mention in passing the presumption of 
constitutionality, and it accorded no deference to the General Assembly’s 
determination of public policy as expressed in the statute under review. 
{¶ 142} In addition, Brennaman did not consider the critical distinction 
between statutes of repose and statutes of limitations.  The Brennaman dissent, on 
the other hand, explained why the distinction is critical:  “ ‘Unlike a true statute of 
limitations, which limits the time in which a plaintiff may bring suit after the 
cause of action accrues, a statute of repose * * * potentially bars a plaintiff’s suit 
before the cause of action arises.’  (Emphasis sic.)  Sedar, supra, 49 Ohio St.3d at 
195, 551 N.E.2d at 941.  A statute of repose does not deny a remedy for a vested 
cause of action but, rather, bars the action before it ever arises.  Id. at 201, 551 
N.E.2d at 946.  Therefore, no right of action ever accrued to appellants in which 
their constitutional rights to damages or jury determination arose.”  Brennaman, 
70 Ohio St.3d at 468, 639 N.E.2d 425 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  The Brennaman court made no attempt to explain why 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
Sedar’s conclusion on the very important point emphasized in the Brennaman 
dissent was wrongly determined.  Rather, the Brennaman court sidestepped this 
question entirely. 
{¶ 143} As the dissent in Brennaman also observed, the statute at issue in 
that case did not necessarily deprive a plaintiff of a right to a remedy, because 
injured parties potentially had recourse through other avenues, such as through 
workers’ compensation (if the plaintiff was an employee), an intentional-tort suit 
against an employer, or possibly under a premises-liability theory (if the plaintiff 
was not an employee).  Id.  The majority in Brennaman did not explain why the 
plaintiffs’ right to a remedy was violated even though additional avenues of 
recovery were potentially available to them. 
{¶ 144} Moreover, as the dissent in Brennaman noted, at common law 
the actions of the plaintiffs in that case would have been barred by the privity 
doctrine.  The statute of repose at issue struck a rational balance between the 
rights of injured parties and the rights of architects and engineers and guarded 
against the risk of stale litigation.  Id., 70 Ohio St.3d at 469, 639 N.E.2d 425 
(Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The majority in 
Brennaman did not address these concerns. 
{¶ 145} The majority’s decision in Brennaman also ignored the 
predicament of builders, who have no legal right to enter an owner’s property to 
correct a defect that is discovered after the builder’s work is completed and turned 
over to the owner, but who may be subject to suit even though they had no ability 
to correct a problem that arose subsequent to their work and without their 
knowledge.  Id. (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The 
Brennaman majority failed to address the concern that a builder who is subject to 
suit has no ability to correct a problem that arises later. 
{¶ 146} Given all of the deficiencies in Brennaman, and the context in 
which it arose, Brennaman cannot control here.  Because Brennaman did not 
January Term, 2008 
37 
involve a challenge to a products-liability statute of repose, as the instant case 
does, that decision is not directly on point and can arguably apply only because of 
its overexpansive language. We confine Brennaman to its particular holding that 
former R.C. 2305.131, the prior statute of repose for improvements to real 
property, was unconstitutional.  It is entitled to nothing more.  To the extent that 
Brennaman stands for the proposition that all statutes of repose are repugnant to 
Section 16, Article I, we expressly reject that conclusion. 
{¶ 147} In so doing, we find that the fundamental weaknesses of 
Brennaman limit its value.  For that reason, we do not overrule Brennaman; we 
simply decline to follow its unreasoned rule in contexts in which it is not directly 
controlling.  We find that the statutes at issue in this case “are sufficiently 
different from the previous enactments to avoid the blanket application of stare 
decisis and to warrant a fresh review of their individual merits.”  See Arbino, 116 
Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 24.  We therefore decline 
respondents’ invitation to overrule Brennaman. 
{¶ 148} We find that the interpretation of the open-courts and right-to-a-
remedy provisions by this court in Sedar is more fully developed and appropriate 
than that set forth in Brennaman.  We specifically adopt Sedar’s rationale here, 
finding its holding is based on proper construction of the requirements of Section 
16, Article I. 
{¶ 149} Although R.C. 2305.10(C) is different from the statute of repose 
at issue in Sedar and Brennaman, it is similar in a key respect.  As with the statute 
of repose at issue in those cases, R.C. 2305.10(C) operates to potentially bar a 
plaintiff’s suit before a cause of action arises.  Thus, the statute can prevent claims 
from ever vesting if the product that allegedly caused an injury was delivered to 
an end user more than ten years before the injury occurred.  This feature of the 
statute triggers the portion of Sedar’s fundamental analysis concerning Section 
16, Article I that is dispositive of our inquiry here.  Because such an injured 
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38 
party’s cause of action never accrues against the manufacturer or supplier of the 
product, it never becomes a vested right. 
{¶ 150} As this court stated in Sedar, 49 Ohio St.3d at 202, 551 N.E.2d 
938:  “The right-to-a-remedy provision of Section 16, Article I applies only to 
existing, vested rights, and it is state law which determines what injuries are 
recognized and what remedies are available.”  Here, the General Assembly has 
established through the enactment of R.C. 2305.10(C) the injuries that are 
recognized and the remedies that are available.  As in Sedar, the statute at issue 
here does not violate Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 151} We emphasize a distinct practical concern that was discussed by 
the Sedar court when it held the statute in that case constitutional.  A plaintiff’s 
right to a remedy is not necessarily extinguished when a particular statute of 
repose might apply to foreclose suits by that plaintiff against certain defendants.  
In Sedar, the construction statute of repose at issue expressly did not cover those 
in control of the property such as owners and tenants, so that an owner or tenant 
could be held liable for using the premises for a purpose it was not designed for, 
or for making defective alterations.  Id., 49 Ohio St.3d at 203-204, 551 N.E.2d 
938.  See, also, Brennaman, 70 Ohio St.3d at 468, 639 N.E.2d 425 (Moyer, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (former R.C. 2305.131 did not violate 
Section 16, Article I because plaintiffs had recourse through other avenues of 
redress). 
{¶ 152} Although R.C. 2305.10(C) may prevent some suits against 
product manufacturers, in many situations, an injured party may be able to seek 
recovery against other parties.  For example, if an employer modifies a machine 
after it is acquired, the employer could be liable for the consequences of a 
negligent alteration.  As will be discussed in Part III B below, the General 
Assembly specifically recognized in Sections 3(C)(3) and (4) of S.B. 80 that after 
a product is delivered, a manufacturer or supplier lacks control over the product, 
January Term, 2008 
39 
over its uses, and over the conditions of its use, and concluded that it is more 
appropriate for the party that controls the product to be responsible for any harm 
caused. 
{¶ 153} Petitioners also cite three cases from 1986 and 1987 in which this 
court struck down different aspects of a medical malpractice statute of repose on 
various grounds and as applied to various factual circumstances—Mominee v. 
Scherbarth (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 270, 28 OBR 346, 503 N.E.2d 717; Hardy, 
supra, 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626; and Gaines, supra, 33 Ohio St.3d 54, 
514 N.E.2d 709.  However, as explained in Sedar, 49 Ohio St.3d at 202, 551 
N.E.2d 938, those cases are distinguishable because the medical malpractice 
statute of repose interpreted in them took away an existing, actionable negligence 
claim before the injured person discovered the injury (when the injury had already 
occurred) or gave the injured person too little time to file suit, and therefore 
denied the injured party’s right to a remedy for those reasons.  The three medical 
malpractice cases petitioners rely on therefore do not support a contrary result 
here. 
{¶ 154} For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that R.C. 2305.10(C) and 
former 2305.10(F) do not on their face violate the open-courts and right-to-a-
remedy guarantees of Section 16, Article I. 
B.  Due Process and Equal Protection  
(Section 16, Article I and Section 2, Article I, Ohio Constitution) 
{¶ 155} Petitioners assert that R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F) 
violate the “due course of law” guarantee of Section 16, Article I.  Petitioners 
urge this court to apply strict scrutiny in evaluating the statutes because they 
restrict fundamental rights. Under such an analysis, a statute restricting 
fundamental rights “will be considered unconstitutional unless it is shown to be 
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.”  Sorrell v. Thevenir, 
69 Ohio St.3d at 423, 633 N.E.2d 504. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
40 
{¶ 156} As we did in Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 
N.E.2d 420, ¶ 49, however, we reject a strict-scrutiny approach to the due-process 
challenge raised in this case.  R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F) do not 
impinge upon fundamental rights.  See Part III A, above. 
{¶ 157} We will instead employ a rational-basis review, under which the 
statute will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose 
and is not unreasonable or arbitrary.  Mominee, 28 Ohio St.3d at 274, 28 OBR 
346, 503 N.E.2d 717.  In conducting this review, we must consider whether the 
General Assembly’s purposes in enacting the legislation at issue provide adequate 
support to justify the statute’s effects. 
{¶ 158} Petitioners also assert that R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 
2305.10(F) violate the “equal protection and benefit” provision of Section 2, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  Petitioners propose that “R.C. 2305.10 
arbitrarily and capriciously differentiates between plaintiffs injured by a defective 
product ten years or more after it was sold to an end-user, and plaintiffs sustaining 
comparable injuries less than ten years after the sale to an end-user.” 
{¶ 159} We apply a rational-basis review here also, for the statutes 
involve neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class. 
{¶ 160} Because the due-process and equal-protection challenges both 
require us to review legislative purpose, we will address that issue first. 
{¶ 161} In Section 3 of S.B. 80, the General Assembly made a “statement 
of findings and intent” explaining certain provisions of the bill.  We will 
concentrate here on those findings relating to the products-liability statute of 
repose. 
{¶ 162} Section 3(C) of S.B. 80 states: 
{¶ 163} “In enacting division (D)(2) of section 2125.02 and division (C) 
of section 2305.10 of the Revised Code in this act, it is the intent of the General 
Assembly to do all of the following: 
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41 
{¶ 164} “(1) To declare that the ten-year statute of repose prescribed by 
division (D)(2) of section 2125.02 and division (C) of section 2305.10 of the 
Revised Code, as enacted by this act, are specific provisions intended to promote 
a greater interest than the interest underlying the general four-year statute of 
limitations prescribed by section 2305.09 of the Revised Code, the general two-
year statutes of limitations prescribed by sections 2125.02 and 2305.10 of the 
Revised Code, and other general statutes of limitations prescribed by the Revised 
Code; 
{¶ 165} “(2) To declare that, subject to the two-year exceptions 
prescribed in division (D)(2)(d) of section 2125.02 and in division (C)(4) of 
section 2305.10 of the Revised Code, the ten-year statutes of repose shall serve as 
a limitation upon the commencement of a civil action in accordance with an 
otherwise applicable statute of limitations prescribed by the Revised Code; 
{¶ 166} “(3) To recognize that subsequent to the delivery of a product, 
the manufacturer or supplier lacks control over the product, over the uses made of 
the product, and over the conditions under which the product is used; 
{¶ 167} “(4) To recognize that under the circumstances described in 
division (C)(3) of this section, it is more appropriate for the party or parties who 
have had control over the product during the intervening time period to be 
responsible for any harm caused by the product; 
{¶ 168} “(5) To recognize that, more than ten years after a product has 
been delivered, it is very difficult for a manufacturer or supplier to locate reliable 
evidence and witnesses regarding the design, production, or marketing of the 
product, thus severely disadvantaging manufacturers or suppliers in their efforts 
to defend actions based on a product liability claim; 
{¶ 169} “(6) To recognize the inappropriateness of applying current legal 
and technological standards to products manufactured many years prior to the 
commencement of an action based on a product liability claim; 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
{¶ 170} “(7) To recognize that a statute of repose for product liability 
claims would enhance the competitiveness of Ohio manufacturers by reducing 
their exposure to disruptive and protracted liability with respect to products long 
out of their control, by increasing finality in commercial transactions, and by 
allowing manufacturers to conduct their affairs with increased certainty; 
{¶ 171} “(8) To declare that division (D)(2) of section 2125.02 and 
division (C) of section 2305.10 of the Revised Code, as enacted by this act, strike 
a rational balance between the rights of prospective claimants and the rights of 
product manufacturers and suppliers and to declare that the ten-year statutes of 
repose prescribed in those sections are rational periods of repose intended to 
preclude the problems of stale litigation but not to affect civil actions against 
those in actual control and possession of a product at the time that the product 
causes an injury to real or personal property, bodily injury, or wrongful death.” 
{¶ 172} For purposes of both due process and equal protection, we 
determine that the above findings adequately demonstrate that the statutes bear a 
real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare 
of the public and are not unreasonable or arbitrary.  “[A]n intensive 
reexamination” of the General Assembly’s findings “is beyond the scope of our 
review.  * * * [W]e noted in State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531, 
728 N.E.2d 342, that ‘we are to grant substantial deference to the predictive 
judgment of the General Assembly’ under a rational-basis review.  Further, as the 
United States Supreme Court has stated, ‘it is not the function of the courts to 
substitute their evaluation of legislative facts for that of the legislature.’  
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. (1981), 449 U.S. 456, 470, 101 S.Ct. 
715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659.”  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 
420, ¶ 58. 
{¶ 173} In Sedar, 49 Ohio St.3d at 199-201, 551 N.E.2d 938, this court 
upheld former R.C. 2305.131, a ten-year statute of repose, in the face of a due-
January Term, 2008 
43 
process challenge, finding that legislative objectives similar to those enumerated 
in Section 3(C) of S.B. 80 were sufficient to satisfy due-process concerns.  The 
same conclusion applied to the equal-protection challenge.  Id. at 202-205, 551 
N.E.2d 938.  For the reasons set forth in Sedar, we uphold the statutes challenged 
in this case as not unreasonable or arbitrary.  Although some of the legislative 
findings may be open to debate, we will not second-guess their validity. 
{¶ 174} Petitioners’ equal-protection argument further charges that the 
legislature has acted irrationally in choosing a ten-year period of repose.  
Although the Sedar court discussed the reasonableness of a ten-year period only 
in its due-process discussion, that analysis is equally relevant to equal protection.  
The Sedar court, 49 Ohio St.3d at 200, 551 N.E.2d 938, concluded that “[t]he 
legislature’s choice of ten years to achieve its valid goal of limiting liability here 
was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.  * * *  Indeed, a substantial majority of 
states have found no due process violations in similar statutes, some of which 
afford periods as brief as four years.”  (Footnote omitted.) 
{¶ 175} In light of the above, we determine that R.C. 2305.10(C) and 
former 2305.10(F) do not violate principles of due process or equal protection and 
are constitutional on their face. 
C.  The Takings Clause (Section 19, Article I, Ohio Constitution) 
{¶ 176} Basing their argument in large part on the discussion of the 
Takings Clause in Holeton, supra, 92 Ohio St.3d at 121-130, 748 N.E.2d 1111, 
which we reviewed extensively in Part II of this opinion, petitioners argue that 
R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F) constitute an improper taking under 
Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  Petitioners propose that a person 
who has sustained bodily injury through the fault of another has a property 
interest in a claim for relief and that R.C. 2305.10 materially interferes with that 
property interest, so that a taking occurs when an injured party is “divested of his 
cause of action.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
{¶ 177} We reject this argument.  Holeton is readily distinguishable.  An 
existing, identifiable property interest was at stake in that case—a claimant’s tort 
recovery from a third party through a trial or through a settlement.  In contrast, as 
discussed in Part III A above, the statute of repose at issue in this case involves a 
cause of action that never accrues and thus is prevented from vesting once the ten-
year repose period has passed.  Because there is no property right, there can be no 
taking.  Consequently, we determine that R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F) 
are constitutional on their face under Section 19, Article I. 
D. The Retroactivity Clause (Section 28, Article II, Ohio Constitution) 
{¶ 178} Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides, “The 
general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws.” 
{¶ 179} Petitioners assert that former R.C. 2305.10(F) is unconstitutional 
as applied to them because it retroactively extinguishes a substantive right in 
violation of Section 28, Article II.  Petitioner Douglas Groch was injured on 
March 3, 2005.  The effective date of the S.B. 80 amendments to R.C. 2305.10 
was April 7, 2005, after the injury.  Pursuant to former R.C. 2305.10(F), R.C. 
2305.10(C) applies to all actions “commenced on or after” April 7, 2005.  For 
their suit to be timely, and to avoid the bar of R.C. 2305.10(C), petitioners had to 
commence their suit prior to April 7, 2005.  Petitioners filed their complaint after 
that date.  Therefore, if former R.C. 2305.10(F) and current 2305.10(C) are valid, 
they combine to prevent petitioners from recovering on their accrued cause of 
action. 
{¶ 180} Petitioners’ argument, because it is based on the specific facts of 
this case, is an “as applied” challenge to the constitutionality of R.C. 2305.10, 
rather than a facial challenge.  Therefore, the standard here is different from the 
standard governing the other certified questions presented by this case. 
{¶ 181} “[W]here statutes are challenged on the ground that they are 
unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of facts, the party making the 
January Term, 2008 
45 
challenge bears the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of a 
presently existing set of facts that make the statutes unconstitutional and void 
when applied to those facts.”  Harrold v. Collier, supra, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-
Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 38, citing Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. 
(1944), 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629, paragraph six of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 182} The first question that must be answered under Section 28, 
Article II is whether the General Assembly intended its enactment to apply 
retrospectively.  Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 
106, 522 N.E.2d 489, and at paragraph one of the syllabus.  See, also, State v. 
Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 410, 700 N.E.2d 570. 
{¶ 183} The General Assembly has expressed the clear intent in former 
R.C. 2305.10(F) that current 2305.10 is meant to apply retrospectively to 
plaintiffs in petitioners’ position.  Therefore we must proceed to the second 
question, which is whether the statute violates Section 28, Article II as applied to 
petitioners. 
{¶ 184} In State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 410-411, 700 N.E.2d 570, we 
described this inquiry: 
{¶ 185} “ ‘ “Every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights 
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or 
attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, 
must be deemed retrospective or retroactive.” ’  Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 
106, 522 N.E.2d at 496, quoting Cincinnati v. Seasongood (1889), 46 Ohio St. 
296, 303, 21 N.E. 630, 633. 
{¶ 186} “In order to determine whether [a statute] is unconstitutionally 
retroactive under Van Fossen, we must determine whether [the statute] is 
substantive or merely remedial.  See Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 
489, paragraph three of the syllabus.  A statute is ‘substantive’ if it impairs or 
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takes away vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, imposes new or 
additional burdens, duties, obligation[s], or liabilities as to a past transaction, or 
creates a new right.  Id. at 107, 522 N.E.2d at 496.  Conversely, remedial laws are 
those affecting only the remedy provided, and include laws that merely substitute 
a new or more appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an existing right.  Id. at 
107, 522 N.E.2d at 497.  A purely remedial statute does not violate Section 28, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution, even if applied retroactively.  See id. at 107, 
522 N.E.2d at 496.” 
{¶ 187} The General Assembly expressly states its intent in former R.C. 
2305.10(F) that “this section shall be considered to be purely remedial in 
operation.”  However, whether the statute is remedial depends upon its operation 
and not upon a label placed upon it by the General Assembly.  Furthermore, the 
statute may be remedial in some contexts but not in all. 
{¶ 188} As discussed above, R.C. 2305.10(C) prevents a cause of action 
from accruing if the product that caused an injury was delivered to an end user 
more than ten years before the injury occurred.  Because the injured party’s cause 
of action never accrues, it never becomes a vested right.  For that reason, for most 
plaintiffs, there is no “substantive right” affected by R.C. 2305.10(C), and that 
statute on its face does not violate Section 28, Article II. 
{¶ 189} Petitioners’ situation, however, is different.  Pursuant to former 
R.C. 2305.10(F) (now (G)), R.C. 2305.10(C) does not apply “to any civil action 
pending prior to the effective date of this amendment [April 7, 2005].”  Thus, a 
cause of action based on an injury that occurred prior to April 7, 2005, does 
“accrue,” and petitioners’ cause of action did vest for purposes of Section 28, 
Article II.  For plaintiffs in petitioners’ situation, former R.C. 2305.10(F) operates 
as a true statute of limitations that restricts the time for filing a cause of action that 
has validly accrued.  See Sedar, 49 Ohio St.3d at 195, 551 N.E.2d 938.  As with 
any statute of limitations, R.C. 2305.10(F) prevents a plaintiff from recovering on 
January Term, 2008 
47 
a cause of action if the limitations period expires and if the defendant interposes 
the statute of limitations as a defense. 
{¶ 190} Douglas Groch’s injury occurred on March 3, 2005.  By 
operation of former R.C. 2305.10(F), petitioners had only 34 days to commence 
their suit before the effective date of R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F) 
(April 7, 2005), or their cause of action was barred by R.C. 2305.10(C)(1).  
Petitioners did not commence their suit until June 2, 2006. 
{¶ 191} Respondents Kard Corporation and Racine Federated argue that 
petitioners do not have a vested right that is being impaired by R.C. 2305.10(C) 
for purposes of retroactivity analysis.  However, respondents cannot have it both 
ways.  If, as we have said, the principal grounds for upholding R.C. 2305.10(C) is 
that it prevents a products-liability cause of action from accruing once ten years 
have passed since the product’s delivery to an end user, it cannot also bar a cause 
of action that accrued – and therefore vested – prior to the statute’s effective date.  
Once vested, such a cause of action clearly becomes a substantive right for 
purposes of Section 28, Article II.  See Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 107, 522 
N.E.2d 489. 
{¶ 192} Respondents 
Kard 
Corporation 
and 
Racine 
Federated 
additionally assert that even if petitioners’ cause of action vested when Douglas 
Groch was injured, former R.C. 2305.10(F) provided “a reasonable window of 
time” for filing suit.  But we cannot agree that 34 days is “reasonable.” 
{¶ 193} To determine what is a reasonable time, we note that R.C. 
2305.10(C)(4) provides a two-year limitations period for commencing a suit for 
injuries occurring before the expiration of the ten-year repose period of R.C. 
2305.10(C)(1), “but less than two years prior to the expiration of that period.”  
For example, under R.C. 2305.10(C)(4), if the product was delivered to the end 
user nine years prior to the injury, the injured plaintiff would still have two years 
in which to file suit. 
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48 
{¶ 194} Similarly, R.C. 2305.10(C)(5) provides that “[i]f a cause of 
action relative to a product liability claim accrues during the ten-year period 
described in division (C)(1) of this section and the claimant cannot commence an 
action during that period due to a disability described in section 2305.16 of the 
Revised Code [i.e., minority or unsound mind], an action based on the product 
liability claim may be commenced within two years after the disability is 
removed.” 
{¶ 195} Both R.C. 2305.10(C)(4) and (C)(5) recognize that once a 
products-liability cause of action accrues, a plaintiff should have no less than two 
years in which to commence a suit.  This recognition is consistent with R.C. 
2305.10(A), the general products-liability statute of limitations, which states that, 
subject to certain exceptions (including those in R.C. 2305.10(C)), such a claim 
“shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.” 
{¶ 196} In Gaines, 33 Ohio St.3d at 60, 514 N.E.2d 709, this court stated:  
“[A] legislative enactment may lawfully shorten the period of time in which the 
remedy may be realized ‘as long as the claimant is still afforded a reasonable time 
in which to enforce his right.’  Adams v. Sherk (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 37, 39, 4 
OBR 82, 84, 446 N.E.2d 165, 167.  A ‘reasonable time’ in which to bring a 
medical malpractice claim was defined in Adams as ‘one year after the discovery 
of the malpractice.’  Id. at 40, 4 OBR at 85, 446 N.E.2d at 168.  In the instant 
cause, appellant had approximately six and one-half months in which to pursue 
her claim * * *.  * * * Thus, [the statute at issue] cannot lawfully be applied to 
appellant and others similarly situated, since it affords them less than a reasonable 
time in which to bring a claim, Adams, supra * * *.” 
{¶ 197} This court determined that one year is a reasonable time to bring 
a medical malpractice action because the general medical malpractice statute of 
limitations provides one year.  See R.C. 2305.113(A), formerly 2305.11(A).  See 
Adams, 4 Ohio St.3d at 38-39, 4 OBR 82, 446 N.E.2d 165.  See, also, Baird v. 
January Term, 2008 
49 
Loeffler (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 533, 535-536, 23 O.O.3d 458, 433 N.E.2d 194 
(“the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions * * * provided appellee 
a reasonable time of one year in which to bring his suit”), overruled on other 
grounds in Mominee, 28 Ohio St.3d 270, 28 OBR 346, 503 N.E.2d 717, at the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 198} We hold that former R.C. 2305.10(F) operates unreasonably as 
applied to petitioners because it provided them with only 34 days to commence 
their suit, with the consequence that they lost their cause of action if they did not 
file suit within 34 days.  When we look to the other provisions of R.C. 2305.10 
referred to above, we determine that a reasonable time to commence a suit in this 
situation should have been two years from the date of the injury.  See Adams, 4 
Ohio St.3d at 38, 4 OBR 82, 446 N.E.2d 165.  Under this approach, because 
petitioners filed their suit within two years of the date of the injury, their suit was 
timely.  To the extent that former R.C. 2305.10(F) mandates a different result, we 
hold that petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating that the statute as 
applied to them is unconstitutional under Section 28, Article II. 
{¶ 199} In light of the foregoing, we hold that to the extent that former 
R.C. 2305.10(F) (now (G)) affects an accrued substantive right by providing an 
unreasonably short period of time in which to file suit for certain plaintiffs whose 
injuries occurred before the S.B. 80 amendments to R.C. 2305.10 became 
effective, and whose causes of action therefore accrued for purposes of R.C. 
2305.10(C), former R.C. 2305.10(F) is unconstitutionally retroactive under 
Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. 
E. The One-Subject Rule (Section 15(D), Article II, Ohio Constitution) 
{¶ 200} Petitioners assert that S.B. 80, which enacted the provisions of 
R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F) at issue in this case, violates the one-
subject rule of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  Section 15(D), 
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50 
Article II provides:  “No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be 
clearly expressed in its title.” 
{¶ 201} The petitioners in Arbino also attempted to assert a challenge to 
S.B. 80 based on the one-subject rule.  In Arbino, we stated: 
{¶ 202} Section 15(D) “exists to prevent the General Assembly from 
engaging in ‘logrolling.’  State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 141, 
142, 11 OBR 436, 464 N.E.2d 153.  This practice occurs when legislators 
combine a disharmonious group of proposals in a single bill so that they may 
consolidate votes and pass provisions that may not have been acceptable to a 
majority on their own merits.  See id. at 142-143, 11 OBR 436, 464 N.E.2d 153.  
‘The one-subject provision attacks logrolling by disallowing unnatural 
combinations of provisions in acts, i.e., those dealing with more than one subject, 
on the theory that the best explanation for the unnatural combination is a tactical 
one – logrolling.’  Id. at 143, 11 OBR 436, 464 N.E.2d 153.  Arbino argues that 
S.B. 80 violates this provision by combining a variety of vastly different subjects 
under one title, lumping such subjects as Board of Cosmetology membership 
(R.C. 4713.02) and practice protocols for retired dentists (R.C. 4715.42) with the 
tort reforms discussed herein. 
{¶ 203} “However, unlike in [State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers v.] Sheward [(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062], where we 
were asked to examine H.B. 350 in its entirety, the review here is limited to three 
specific statutes within S.B. 80.  Because the entire enactment was not made an 
issue in this case, we cannot determine whether it violates the single-subject rule 
as a whole, and therefore decline to rule on this issue.”  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 
468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 78-79. 
{¶ 204} Petitioners’ challenge is limited to two specific statutes within 
S.B. 80—R.C. 2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F).  Therefore, Arbino applies.  
January Term, 2008 
51 
However, we now go further and explain in more detail why petitioners’ 
challenge must fail. 
{¶ 205} Many of petitioners’ principal arguments regarding the one-
subject rule are based on this court’s decision in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062.  In 
Sheward, at paragraph three of the syllabus, this court held that “Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 350 violates the one-subject provision of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution, and is unconstitutional in toto.”3 
{¶ 206} In Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, 
¶ 17, we discussed Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, the legislation struck down in Sheward, 
as part of our review of the recent history of tort-reform efforts in Ohio: 
{¶ 207} “[T]he General Assembly passed substantial reforms in 1997 
with Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3867 (‘H.B. 350’).  The 
legislation amended, enacted, or repealed over 100 sections of the Revised Code 
contained in 18 titles and 38 chapters.  Among other things, it modified the 
collateral-source rule in tort actions to require the trier of fact to consider but not 
automatically set off collateral benefits (former R.C. 2317.45), capped punitive 
damages and allowed the trier of fact to determine damages up to the cap in tort 
and products-liability claims (former R.C. 2315.21(D)(1)), and capped 
noneconomic damages at different levels, with higher limits for permanent 
injuries (former R.C. 2323.54).” 
{¶ 208} In holding H.B. 350 unconstitutional for violating the one-
subject rule, this court in Sheward focused on the sheer disunity of its many and 
diverse subjects to find a “manifestly gross and fraudulent violation” of Section 
                                                 
3.  Some of petitioners’ arguments on the other questions regarding the products-liability statute of 
repose are based on Sheward.  However, because that decision held H.B. 350 unconstitutional in 
toto on separation-of-powers and one-subject-rule grounds, see paragraphs two and three of the 
syllabus, any substantive discussion of the merits of particular tort-reform legislation within that 
case was dicta.  See Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 52. 
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15(D), Article II.  Id., 86 Ohio St.3d at 498, 715 N.E.2d 1062; see Dix, 11 Ohio 
St.3d 141, 11 OBR 436, 464 N.E.2d 153, at the syllabus (a manifestly gross and 
fraudulent violation of the one-subject rule will cause an enactment to be 
invalidated).  In addition to the provisions of H.B. 350 cited in Arbino, the 
Sheward court noted that H.B. 350 “attempts to combine the wearing of seat belts 
with employment discrimination claims, class actions arising from the sale of 
securities with limitations on agency liability in actions against a hospital, recall 
notification with qualified immunity for athletic coaches, actions by a roller skater 
with supporting affidavits in a medical claim, and so on.”  Id., 86 Ohio St.3d at 
498, 715 N.E.2d 1062. 
{¶ 209} The Sheward court stated that “any suggestion of unity of subject 
matter [in H.B. 350] is illusory,” that the various provisions of the act were 
“blatantly unrelated,” and that the act’s denominated subject of “laws pertaining 
to tort and other civil actions” was “a ruse.”  Id. at 498 and 499, 715 N.E.2d 1062.  
Furthermore, in holding H.B. 350 unconstitutional in toto, this court in Sheward, 
86 Ohio St.3d at 499-501, 715 N.E.2d 1062, declined to follow previous decisions 
that had severed portions of an act that violated the one-subject rule in order to 
save the portions that complied with the rule.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Hinkle v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 580 N.E.2d 767 
(primary subject of act was state judicial system, so parts of act concerning that 
subject survived; provision that was not part of that subject was severed); see also 
In re Nowak, 104 Ohio St.3d 466, 2004-Ohio-6777, 820 N.E.2d 335 (bill held to 
violate one-subject rule by inclusion of statute governing mortgages; mortgage 
statute severed, remaining provisions saved). 
{¶ 210} In contrast, although S.B. 80 did contain a considerable number 
of provisions, the core of the bill, concerning amendments to this state’s tort law, 
is sufficiently unified to comply with the one-subject rule.  The products-liability 
statute of repose is part of that core subject.  Therefore, even were we to agree 
January Term, 2008 
53 
with petitioners that S.B. 80 contained provisions so unrelated to its primary 
subject as to violate the one-subject rule, we would sever the unrelated provisions 
and retain the core provisions intact consistent with our precedents, and R.C. 
2305.10(C) and former 2305.10(F) would not be affected.  See, e.g., Hinkle and 
Nowak. 
F.  Conclusion of Part III 
{¶ 211} In upholding the facial constitutionality of R.C. 2305.10(C) and 
former 2305.10(F), we join the considerable number of state and federal courts 
that have upheld the validity of products-liability statutes of repose.4  We 
additionally note that many courts have also upheld various other types of statutes 
of repose as constitutional.  See Annotation, Validity of Medical Malpractice 
Statutes of Repose (2005), 5 A.L.R.6th 133, 150 (listing cases and observing that 
“the facial validity of medical malpractice statutes of repose has been frequently 
litigated.  Most courts, however, have upheld these statutes.  * * *  In a small 
                                                 
4.  See, e.g., McIntosh v. Melroe Co. (Ind.2000), 729 N.E.2d 972, 977 (upholding Ind.Code Ann. 
34-20-3-1(b) and stating that “the General Assembly must have the authority to determine what 
injuries are legally cognizable, i.e., which injuries are wrongs for which there is a legal remedy”); 
Love v. Whirlpool Corp. (1994), 264 Ga. 701, 705, 449 S.E.2d 602 (upholding Ga.Code Ann. 51-
1-11(b)(2) and stating that “abolishing a cause of action, before it has accrued, deprives the 
plaintiff of no vested right”); Spilker v. Lincoln (1991), 238 Neb. 188, 191, 469 N.W.2d 546 
(upholding Neb.Rev.Stat.Ann. 25-224(2) and stating, “ ‘The immunity afforded by a statute of 
repose is a right which is as valuable to a defendant as the right to recover on a judgment is to a 
plaintiff; the two are but different sides of the same coin’ ” [quoting Givens v. Anchor Packing, 
Inc. (1991), 237 Neb. 565, 569, 466 N.W.2d 771]); Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co. (1990), 117 Idaho 
706, 719, 791 P.2d 1285 (upholding Idaho Code 6-1403 and stating “it is the province of the 
legislature to modify the rules of the common law”); Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., Inc. (1985), 314 
N.C. 44, 59, 332 S.E.2d 67 (upholding N.C.Gen.Stat. 1-50(6), a six-year products-liability statute 
of repose, and stating, “ ‘[T]he General Assembly is the policy-making agency of our government, 
and when it elects to legislate in respect to the subject matter of any common law rule, the statute 
supplants the common law rule and becomes the public policy of the State in respect to that 
particular matter’ ” [quoting Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp. (1983), 308 N.C. 419, 444, 302 S.E.2d 
868]); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chem. Co., Inc. (C.A.5, 2005), 419 F.3d 355, 
361 (upholding Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. 16.012(b) because a plaintiff has no vested right 
to a cause of action).  For a survey of the cases, which includes some that have held products-
liability statutes of repose unconstitutional, see Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute 
Terminating Right of Action for Product-Caused Injury at Fixed Period after Manufacture, Sale, or 
Delivery of Product (1995), 30 A.L.R.5th 1. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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number of states, however, such a statute has been found to violate constitutional 
requirements”); Annotation, Validity, as to Claim Alleging Design or Building 
Defects, of Statute Imposing Time Limitations Upon Action Against Architect, 
Engineer, or Builder for Injury or Death Arising out of Defective or Unsafe 
Condition of Improvement to Real Property (2005), 5 A.L.R.6th 497 (listing 
cases). 
{¶ 212} It is not this court’s role to establish legislative policies or to 
second-guess the General Assembly’s policy choices.  “[T]he General Assembly 
is responsible for weighing [policy] concerns and making policy decisions; we are 
charged with evaluating the constitutionality of their choices.  * * *  Using a 
highly deferential standard of review appropriate to a facial challenge to these 
statutes, we conclude that the General Assembly has responded to our previous 
decisions and has created constitutionally permissible limitations.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 113. 
{¶ 213} Consistent with the foregoing, we hold that R.C. 2305.10(C) and 
former 2305.10(F) do not violate the open-courts provision (Section 16, Article I), 
the Takings Clause (Section 19, Article I), the Due Process and Remedies Clauses 
(Section 16, Article I), the Equal Protection Clause (Section 2, Article I), or the 
one-subject rule (Section 15(D), Article II) of the Ohio Constitution, and are 
therefore facially constitutional. 
IV 
Conclusion 
{¶ 214} Based on the above analysis, we answer the nine certified 
questions as follows: 
{¶ 215} In response to questions one through three:  R.C. 4123.93 and 
4123.931 do not violate the Takings Clause, the Due Process and Remedies 
Clauses, or the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution. 
January Term, 2008 
55 
{¶ 216} In response to questions four through seven:  R.C. 2305.10(C) 
and former 2305.10(F) do not violate the open-courts provision, the Takings 
Clause, the Due Process and Remedies Clauses, or the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 217} In response to question eight:  As applied to petitioners, former 
R.C. 2305.10(F) does violate the ban on retroactive laws of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 218} In response to question nine:  S.B. 80, insofar as R.C. 2305.10(C) 
and former 2305.10(F) are concerned, does not violate the one-subject rule of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
So answered. 
 
MOYER, C.J, and LUNDBERG STRATTON and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the answers to the certified questions only. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the answers to the certified questions and 
concurs in the opinion in part. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in part. 
{¶ 219} I write separately to question the continued vitality of Westfield 
Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, in 
light of the manner in which today’s majority addresses, and ultimately disposes 
of, our decision in Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 460, 639 
N.E.2d 425. The majority claims only to limit Brennaman to its facts while 
leaving the decision intact, instead of forthrightly overruling a bad precedent. 
{¶ 220} In Galatis, we set forth a three-part test to serve as a guide for 
when previous decisions should be overruled.  We stated that a decision may be 
overruled only when “(1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, or 
changes in circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision, 
(2) the decision defies practical workability, and (3) abandoning the precedent 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
56 
would not create an undue hardship for those who have relied upon it.” Id. at 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 221} However, as a result of strict, unwavering adherence to this test, 
Galatis jurisprudence has itself become unworkable.  Over the past year, there 
have been numerous instances where, rather than relying on Galatis to overrule a 
prior case, we have instead chosen to limit or otherwise distinguish that case, 
thereby avoiding a Galatis analysis.  See Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio 
St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420 (distinguishing but not overruling our 
decision in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062); State ex rel. Shelly Materials v. Clark Cty. Bd. 
of Commrs., 115 Ohio St.3d 337, 2007-Ohio-5022, 875 N.E.2d 59 (limiting but 
not overruling our decision in State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 98 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2002-Ohio-6716, 780 N.E.2d 998); and Cleveland Mobile Radio Sales, Inc. v. 
Verizon Wireless, 113 Ohio St.3d 394, 2007-Ohio-2203, 865 N.E.2d 1275 
(distinguishing but not overruling our decision in Rosette v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., 105 Ohio St.3d 296, 2005-Ohio-1736, 825 N.E.2d 599). 
{¶ 222} I am now persuaded that we should move away from the rigid 
rules of Galatis as a “hopelessly random and formulaic approach to overruling 
precedent,” State ex rel. Shelly Materials, 115 Ohio St.3d 337, 2007-Ohio-5022, 
875 N.E.2d 59, ¶50 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting), and instead adopt a more flexible 
approach.  Currently, decisions to which everyone has adjusted (they do not 
“def[y] practical workability”) and on which anyone has relied (their 
abandonment would not “create an undue hardship”) may not be overruled as bad 
precedent, no matter how wrongly decided.  This “legalistic straitjacket,” Gliozzo 
v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 141, 2007-Ohio-3762, 870 
N.E.2d 714, ¶ 19 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting), should yield to a broader system of 
analysis that would also allow us greater freedom and enable us to be 
straightforward about overruling wrongly decided cases when it is necessary. 
January Term, 2008 
57 
{¶ 223} In this case, the majority describes in many pages of the opinion 
the reasons why Brennaman was wrongly decided.  Brennaman’s lack of detail in 
overruling Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 551 N.E.2d 
938, is compared to Galatis’s “well-structured” approach.  But given a prime 
opportunity to apply Galatis and state that Brennaman is overruled, the majority 
does not actually do so.  It seems strange that an opinion that goes to such great 
lengths to praise Galatis ultimately fails to apply it.  If Galatis constrains our 
decisions so greatly that we cannot acknowledge cases that have clearly been 
wrongly decided and require overruling, then it is of questionable value itself. 
{¶ 224} To serve the need for predictability, consistency, and clarity in 
the law, we must be forthright about overruling cases when that is our true intent 
and is the practical effect of a decision.  Choosing to draw distinctions in order to 
avoid the stringent requirements of Galatis does not create stability. Instead, it 
leads to confusion, leaving parties to struggle to determine what law is 
controlling. 
{¶ 225} Because I view our decision as effectively overruling 
Brennaman, I respectfully concur only in part. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 226} I dissent from this court’s holding that R.C. 2305.10 is facially 
constitutional.  I concur with the majority that R.C. 2305.10 is unconstitutional as 
applied to the appellant and that R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931 are facially 
constitutional. 
I 
{¶ 227} It is hard to decide what is more offensive about the majority 
opinion regarding the facial constitutionality of R.C. 2305.10: how it arrives at its 
decision or what the decision means for Ohioans.  How the decision will affect 
Ohioans is speculative at this point, but how the majority reaches its decision 
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demonstrates a continued disdain for stare decisis and a propensity to engage in 
legal mumbo jumbo to obscure that fact. 
{¶ 228} Today, the majority bases its decision on Sedar v. Knowlton 
Constr. Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 551 N.E.2d 938, a case that has been 
overruled.  It remains overruled.  The case that overruled Sedar and declared 
statutes of repose unconstitutional pursuant to Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution, Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 460, 639 N.E.2d 
425, remains in effect.  Somehow, it does not control this case.  This court’s 
decision in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062, which reiterated our holding in Brennaman 
when the General Assembly once again imposed statutes of repose, is ignored.  
What has changed since this court last overruled statutes of repose in 1994 and 
1999?  Not the language of the statutes in question and not the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 229} That this court was clear and blunt in Brennaman was no sin.  
Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is also clear and blunt: “All courts 
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice 
administered without denial or delay.” 
{¶ 230} As we said in Brennaman, “This section of the Ohio Constitution 
protects the right to seek redress in Ohio’s courts when one is injured by another.” 
70 Ohio St.3d at 466, 639 N.E.2d 425.  Brennaman relied in part upon this court’s 
decision in Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 59, 609 N.E.2d 140, 
in which “this court held that the General Assembly is constitutionally precluded 
from depriving a claimant of a right to a remedy ‘before a claimant knew or 
should have known of her injury.’ ” Brennaman, 70 Ohio St.3d at 466, 639 
N.E.2d 425, quoting Burgess, 66 Ohio St.3d at 61, 609 N.E.2d 140.  Burgess, in 
turn, relied upon “a line of cases including Mominee v. Scherbarth (1986), 28 
Ohio St.3d 270, 28 OBR 346, 503 N.E.2d 717, Hardy v. VerMeulen (1987), 32 
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59 
Ohio St.3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626, and Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. (1987), 33 
Ohio St.3d 54, 514 N.E.2d 709, [in which] this court established a threshold point 
at which government may impose a statute of limitations on a potential claimant. 
That line of decisions established that a statute of limitations could not begin to 
run before a claimant knew or should have known of her injury.” Burgess, 66 
Ohio St.3d at 60-61, 609 N.E.2d 140. 
{¶ 231} As recently as two months ago, Brennaman was cited as 
authority by this court.  In Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 
2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 44, the majority opinion cited Brennaman as 
an example of how this court has defined the rights associated with Section 16, 
Article I.  The majority called this court’s interpretation “well settled”:  
{¶ 232} “The definition of these rights is well settled. ‘When the 
Constitution speaks of remedy and injury to person, property, or reputation, it 
requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.’ Hardy v. VerMeulen (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626. We 
have interpreted this provision to prohibit statutes that effectively prevent 
individuals from pursuing relief for their injuries. See, e.g., Brennaman v. R.M.I. 
Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 460, 466, 639 N.E.2d 425 (finding a statute of repose 
unconstitutional because it deprived certain plaintiffs of the right to sue before 
they were aware of their injuries) * * *.” 
{¶ 233} For good measure, the Arbino majority cited Brennaman yet 
again later in the opinion:  
{¶ 234} “This right [to a remedy in an open court] protects against laws 
that completely foreclose a cause of action for injured plaintiffs or otherwise 
eliminate the ability to receive a meaningful remedy. See Brennaman, 70 Ohio 
St.3d at 466, 639 N.E.2d 425.” Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 
N.E.2d 420, ¶ 96. 
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{¶ 235} The preceding paragraph should have controlled this case.  But, 
in two months, Brennaman has morphed from a case worthy of citation as part of 
this court’s well-settled jurisprudence regarding Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution to an object of derision by basically the same majority that relied 
upon it in Arbino. 
{¶ 236} The majority states that stare decisis is “ ‘limited to 
circumstances “where the facts of a subsequent case are substantially the same as 
a former case,” ’ ” quoting Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1989), 43 
Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 539 N.E.2d 103.  In considering R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931, the 
workers’ compensation subrogation statutes at issue in this case, the majority does 
indeed describe the significant differences between those statutes and the statutes 
reviewed in Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 115, 748 
N.E.2d 1111.  However, the majority makes no attempt to distinguish the statute 
of repose contained in R.C. 2305.10 from the one at issue in Brennaman — 
because there is no significant difference, and because Brennaman so clearly and 
so inconveniently spells out that statutes of repose are unconstitutional in Ohio. 
{¶ 237} The majority cites Brennaman as an illustration of the kind of 
“unstructured approach to overruling a precedent” that led to the more 
“disciplined” approach set forth in Westfield v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 
2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256.  That approach necessarily includes an 
application of the talismanic Galatis factors.  But the majority, in its attempted de 
facto overruling of Brennaman, employs none of the Galatis factors.  Instead, it 
resorts to jurisprudence by insult.  The author, who calls for civility in judicial 
opinions not her own (State ex rel. Ohio Gen. Assembly v. Brunner, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 386, 2007-Ohio-3780, 872 N.E.2d 912, ¶ 87), calls Brennaman “the classic 
example of the ‘arbitrary administration of justice’ that Galatis cautions against” 
and claims that “personal judicial whims” drove the result.  Does the majority 
really believe that this court decided Brennaman arbitrarily, on a whim?  Does the 
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61 
majority really mean to suggest that Brennaman was written on impulse, resulting 
from a sudden, capricious idea?  Or is the majority simply forced to insult this 
court’s work in Brennaman because it has no basis to overrule it given the 
“judicial straitjacket” the majority zipped itself into in Galatis?  Does the majority 
mean to likewise insult the supreme courts of other states that have found statutes 
of repose unconstitutional? See Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1983), 123 N.H. 
512, 464 A.2d 288; Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty (Ala.1982), 416 So.2d 
996; Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co. (1993), 176 Ariz.340, 861 P.2d 625; 
Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. (Fla.1980), 392 So.2d 874; Perkins v. 
Northeastern Log Homes (Ky.1991), 808 S.W.2d 809; Hanson v. Williams Cty. 
(N.D.1986), 389 N.W.2d 319; Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng. Co. (R.I.1984), 471 
A.2d 195; Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (Utah 1985), 717 P.2d 670. 
{¶ 238} The majority repeats the bromide that “the legislative branch is 
‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy,’ ” quoting Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 
2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 21.  The governor, with his role in setting the 
public policy agenda and armed with a veto, might dispute that characterization.  
This court, as the steward of the ever-developing common law, also plays a vital 
role.  But even accepting the majority’s characterization of the legislature’s role, 
the General Assembly may reach only as far as the Constitution allows.  This 
court is the ultimate arbiter of what is constitutional. 
{¶ 239} I do not agree that this court owes all legislation passed by the 
General Assembly the presumption of constitutionality.  This presumption, 
regrettably employed even by me in a few majority opinions, has no basis in the 
Constitution.  Our role is to determine constitutionality, and we undermine our 
constitutional role by accepting any impingement on that power by any other 
branch of government. 
{¶ 240} In Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062, this court held 
that the General Assembly’s attempt to subvert this court’s decision in 
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Brennaman by again passing statutes of repose was unconstitutional.  In 1996 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, the collection of statutes at issue in Sheward, the General 
Assembly reenacted the statute overturned in Brennaman as a 15-year statute of 
repose with certain exceptions, provided for a 15-year statute of repose for 
wrongful-death actions involving a products-liability claim, a 15-year statute of 
repose for products-liability claims, a six-year statute of repose for professional 
malpractice claims other than medical, and a six-year statute of repose for medical 
malpractice claims. See Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 476, 715 N.E.2d 1062.  This 
court wrote that “[i]n enacting and/or amending these sections, the General 
Assembly chose to usurp this court's constitutional authority by refusing to 
recognize our holdings in Brennaman, Cyrus [v. Henes (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 
640, 640 N.E.2d 810], and Ross [v. Tom Reith, Inc. (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 563, 
645 N.E.2d 729].” Id. 
{¶ 241} In rejecting the General Assembly’s attempt to reintroduce 
statutes of repose, the Sheward court wrote: 
{¶ 242} “The following language from Bartlett [v. State (1905), 73 Ohio 
St. 54, 58, 75 N.E. 939], has particular force here: 
{¶ 243} “ ‘It is sufficient to say that we adhere to [our prior] ruling 
[declaring acts to be in violation of the constitution]; and that the sections of the 
statutes now under consideration do not stop short of being a mandate to all of the 
courts [to accept as legal that which we have declared unconstitutional].  This we 
regard as wholly beyond the power conferred upon the general assembly by the 
constitution. The power conferred upon the general assembly is legislative power, 
and that body is expressly prohibited from exercising any judicial power which is 
not expressly conferred by the constitution. Article 2, section 32. 
{¶ 244} “ ‘At this time, the limits of the power invested in the respective 
co-ordinate branches of the government [are] so well defined and so generally 
understood, that we are constrained to believe that, whatever may have been the 
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63 
thought of the persons who drafted them, the enactment of these sections was an 
inadvertence on the part of the general assembly; for it is well settled that the 
legislature cannot annul, reverse or modify a judgment of a court already 
rendered, nor require the courts to treat as valid laws those which are 
unconstitutional.  If this could be permitted the whole power of the government 
would at once become absorbed and taken into itself by the legislature.’ ” 
Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 477-478, 715 N.E.2d 1062. 
{¶ 245} Sheward’s discussion on statutes of repose concluded with an 
admonition ignored by the majority in this case: “While some members of this 
court, now and in the past, may disagree with the holding in Brennaman, no 
member of this court can, consistent with his or her oath of office, find that the 
General Assembly has operated within the boundaries of its constitutional 
authority by brushing aside a mandate of this court on constitutional issues as if it 
were of no consequence. Indeed, the very notion of it threatens the judiciary as an 
independent branch of government and tears at the fabric of our Constitution.” 
Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 478, 715 N.E.2d 1062. 
{¶ 246} And so it goes. 
{¶ 247} I would also hold that R.C. 2305.10 violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Ohio Constitution.  Section 2, Article I guarantees that citizens shall 
not be denied equal protection of the law.  When the legislation at issue creates 
classifications involving a fundamental right, it becomes the subject of strict 
judicial scrutiny and will be upheld only upon a showing that it is justified by a 
compelling state interest. Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 423, 633 
N.E.2d 504. 
{¶ 248} In R.C. 2305.10(C), the General Assembly allows a person 
injured nine years after purchasing a product to assert a cause of action against the 
manufacturer, but bars a person injured ten years after purchasing a product from 
bringing the same claim.  R.C. 2305.10 takes from one class of potential plaintiffs 
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a fundamental right – the right to a remedy.  The General Assembly has failed to 
assert a compelling state interest to legitimize that distinction. 
{¶ 249} The majority applies a rational-basis review to R.C. 2305.10, 
finding that the statute does not implicate a fundamental right.  Even under that 
standard of review, R.C. 2305.10 fails.  In its “statement of findings and intent,” 
found in Section 3(C) of 2004 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 80, the General Assembly 
unsuccessfully attempts to articulate a rational basis for the statute’s distinctions.  
The majority seems satisfied that the General Assembly bothered to create a 
“statement of findings and intent,” applying no analysis to the statement itself, 
other than quoting it and essentially saying, “Sounds good to us.” 
{¶ 250} The statement proclaims that subsequent to the delivery of the 
product, the manufacturer or supplier loses control over the product and that it is 
more appropriate for the party in control of the product during the intervening 
time period to be responsible for any harm caused by the product.  But that loss of 
control happens immediately, not at the ten-year mark. 
{¶ 251} The General Assembly attempts to legitimize the ten-year 
distinction by stating, without any support, that more than ten years after delivery, 
“it is very difficult for a manufacturer or supplier to locate reliable evidence and 
witnesses regarding the design, production, or marketing of the product.” S.B. 
180, Section 3(C)(5).  However, the expiration of the statute of repose is an 
affirmative defense.  Thus, the burden will still be on the manufacturer to produce 
records showing that the product in question has been out of its hands for a period 
of more than ten years.  In the absence of such a showing, there can be no 
affirmative defense.  Thus, manufacturers will need to continue to maintain 
records.  Second, the absence of records regarding a product is a greater handicap 
to a plaintiff trying to prove a defect than it is to the manufacturer.  In a products-
liability case, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the product in 
question is defective. 
January Term, 2008 
65 
{¶ 252} The General Assembly suggests that the statute of repose will 
prevent the inappropriate application of current technological standards to older 
products. S.B. 80, Section 3(C)(6).  This is a solution to a problem that does not 
exist.  There is no statutory or case law that requires an older product to conform 
to current technological standards in a products-liability case. 
{¶ 253} The General Assembly also claims that the statute of repose will 
“enhance the competitiveness of Ohio manufacturers.”  Section 3(C)(7).  
However, one of the actual effects of the statute of repose in this case is to allow 
an out-of-state manufacturer to escape liability.  Meanwhile, Groch’s Ohio 
employer, General Motors, remains completely liable and without any way to 
seek indemnification or contribution from the out-of-state manufacturer of the 
product that caused Groch’s injuries.  Thus, in this case, the statute of repose is 
actually harming a company manufacturing in Ohio. 
{¶ 254} Any serious review of the General Assembly’s “statement of 
findings and intent” would show that the statement is devoid of factual findings.  
Whether the statement is honest about the General Assembly’s real intent is 
dubious.  In any case, it does not set forth a rational basis for discriminating 
against certain victims of defective products. 
II 
{¶ 255} We do not know yet the full impact of this case on Ohioans.  We 
only know of its potential.  Potentially, R.C. 2305.10 affects anyone who drives a 
car, crosses a bridge, rides an elevator, flies or rides in an airplane, utilizes a 
medical device, paints, mows grass, uses tools, or depends at all on any product in 
his or her daily existence.  As an example, we can look to Minnesota and the 
aftermath of the recent I-35 bridge collapse.  Early indicators are that the bridge’s 
collapse may have originated with the failure of gusset plates that were sized too 
thin in the bridge’s original 1960s design.  http://www.startribune.com/local/ 
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66 
13796646.html.  The bridge collapse presents an example of a design that was 
flawed ab initio; the bridge’s eventual collapse was built into it and was not the 
result of degrading materials.  In Ohio, under the majority’s view, none of the 
victims of the collapse could recover against the designer of the bridge or the 
supplier of the gusset plates.  In Ohio, if the collapse were due to substandard 
concrete or steel, those suppliers would escape liability if the bridge were able to 
remain standing for merely a decade. 
{¶ 256} We can look to the past to the infamous Ford Pinto, which had an 
alleged design flaw that made the car susceptible to bursting into flames upon a 
rear-end collision.  In reviewing a jury verdict that found Ford liable for injuries 
suffered in such an accident, the court in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (1981), 
119 Cal.App.3d 757, 813, 174 Cal.Rptr. 348, found:  
{¶ 257} “Through the results of the crash tests Ford knew that the Pinto's 
fuel tank and rear structure would expose consumers to serious injury or death in 
a 20- to 30-mile-per-hour collision. There was evidence that Ford could have 
corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer 
correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing 
human lives and limbs against corporate profits.  Ford's institutional mentality 
was shown to be one of callous indifference to public safety. There was 
substantial evidence that Ford's conduct constituted ‘conscious disregard’ of the 
probability of injury to members of the consuming public.” 
{¶ 258} Again, with the Pinto, the injury-causing flaw was part of the 
original design of the vehicle.  It was not Ford’s lack of control over the product 
that led to the plaintiff’s injuries; rather, the accident exposed the flaw that was in 
the Pinto to begin with.  In Ohio, no matter what Ford knew or when it knew it, if 
the accident occurred after ten years from delivery, a plaintiff could have no 
recovery. 
January Term, 2008 
67 
{¶ 259} Finally, we can look to the details of R.C. 2305.10, and the 
exceptions the General Assembly has carved out for certain products.  The statute 
of repose contained in R.C. 2305.10(C) does not apply to certain claims — where 
symptoms tied to exposure often arise beyond ten years after exposure — 
involving the products described in R.C. 2305.10(B)(1) (hazardous or toxic 
chemicals, ethical drugs, or ethical medical devices), (B)(2) (chromium), (B)(3) 
(chemical defoliants or herbicides, including agent orange), and (B)(4) 
(diethylstilbestrol or other nonsteroidal synthetic estrogens). R.C. 2305.10(C)(7).  
Presumably, the General Assembly excepted these products because they have 
been proven to cause injuries years after a potential plaintiff was exposed to them.  
Products causing delayed injuries exist.  Can we assume that the limited list of 
products in R.C. 2305.10(B) accounts for all such products?  We should not.  
What is the product used by Ohioans today that will fail a decade from now?  
What is the product used by Ohioans today that is causing damage that will not be 
revealed until a decade from now?  We cannot know.  It is a harrowing thought 
that the products we use today that may be ticking time bombs – be they food 
additives, cell phones, automobiles – after ten years can leave us profoundly 
injured with no hope of recovery against the tortfeasor.  For manufacturers, the 
bomb stops ticking at ten years.  For Ohio’s consumers, once but no longer 
protected by the Ohio Constitution, the ticking continues. 
______________________ 
Gallon, Takacs, Boissoneault & Schaffer Co., L.P.A., Kevin J. 
Boissoneault, Theodore A. Bowman, and Russell Gerney, for petitioners. 
Kerger & Associates and Kimberly Conklin; Lathrop & Gage L.C. and 
Patrick N. Fanning, for respondent General Motors Corporation. 
Gallagher Sharp, Robert H. Eddy, and Colleen A. Mountcastle, for 
respondents Kard Corporation and Racine Federated, Inc. 
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Marc Dann, Attorney General, Elise W. Porter, Acting State Solicitor, and 
Stephen P. Carney, Deputy State Solicitor, for respondent state of Ohio. 
Paul W. Flowers, Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, in support of 
petitioners for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy, and Marc J. 
Jaffy, in support of petitioners for amicus curiae Ohio AFL-CIO. 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., Steven M. Loewengart, and 
Johnathan E. Sullivan, in support of respondents for amicus curiae COSE Group 
Services, Inc. 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Victor E. Schwartz, and Mark A. Behrens, 
in support of respondents for amici curiae National Federation of Independent 
Business Legal Foundation, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America, National Association of Manufacturers, American Tort Reform 
Association, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, American 
Chemistry Council, National Society of Professional Engineers, NPES 
Association for Suppliers of Printing, Publishing and Converting Technologies, 
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, and Association of 
Equipment Manufacturers. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell, and Anne Marie Sferra, in 
support of respondents for amicus curiae Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice. 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Carolyn A. Taggart, and J.H. 
Huebert, in support of respondents for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil 
Trial Attorneys. 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey, in 
support of respondents for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Thomas R. Sant, in support of respondents 
for amici curiae Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business 
and Ohio Manufacturers Association. 
January Term, 2008 
69 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, in support 
of respondents for amicus curiae Ohio Self-Insurers Association. 
______________________