Case Title: State ex rel. Corinne Reif v. The Honorable Michael T. Jamison

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC88987

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
State ex rel. Corinne Reif,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Relator, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC88987 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
The Honorable Michael T. Jamison, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
Original Proceeding in Mandamus  
 
The issue in this writ proceeding is whether a corporate representative designated 
for deposition pursuant to Rule 57.03(b)(4) can limit his or her deposition testimony to 
personal knowledge instead of testifying about facts that are known or reasonably 
available to the organization.  The circuit court erroneously overruled relator’s motion to 
compel production of a substitute corporate representative.  The alternative writ of 
mandamus is made peremptory. 
FACTS
 
Corinne Reif (Relator) filed a wrongful death action against Missouri Baptist 
Medical Center (Defendant).  Relator alleged that her husband died as a result of injuries 
sustained when he tripped over an unmarked electrical box located on the floor of a 
rehabilitation facility owned by Defendant.   
Relator served Defendant with a notice requesting the deposition of a corporate 
representative.  The notice identified five topics to be covered during the deposition.  At 
issue in this case are the first and third deposition topics.  The first deposition topic was 
“Defendant’s knowledge of decedent, Irwin Reif’s fall on February 2, 2001.”  The third 
deposition topic was “[t]he reason and/or basis for the presence of the electrical plug 
and/or electrical plug box on the aisle floor of the premises … at the time of plaintiff’s 
fall on February 2, 2001.”   
Relator deposed Defendant’s corporate representative on all five deposition topics.  
With respect to the first and third deposition topics, the corporate representative testified 
that she had no personal knowledge of how the decedent fell or of the design and 
placement of the electrical box.  The representative also testified that she did not review 
documents or consult with Defendant to establish Defendant’s position with respect to 
these issues. 
 
Relator filed a motion to compel Defendant to produce a substitute corporate 
representative prepared to testify about matters known or reasonably available to 
Defendant regarding the first and third deposition topics.  The circuit court overruled the 
motion.  This Court issued an alternative writ of mandamus.  Relator asserts that the writ 
should be made peremptory because the circuit court misapplied Rule 57.03(b)(4) by not 
requiring Defendant to produce a corporate representative to testify regarding facts that 
are known or reasonably available to Defendant.  
 
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ANALYSIS 
"A writ of prohibition [or] mandamus is the proper remedy for curing discovery 
rulings that exceed a court's jurisdiction or constitute an abuse of the court's discretion."  
State ex rel. White v. Gray, 141 S.W.3d 460, 463 (Mo. App. 2004) (quoting State ex rel. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. O'Malley, 888 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Mo. App. 1994)).  
The purpose of a writ of mandamus is to execute a clear, unequivocal and specific right, 
not to adjudicate.  State ex rel. Chassaing v. Mummert, 887 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Mo. banc 
1994).   
Rule 57.03(b)(4) provides that a party may name a corporation, agency or other 
organization as the deponent.  After being served with a notice of deposition, the 
organization “shall” designate a corporate representative to testify on its behalf.  Rule 
57.03(b)(4) provides that “persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or 
reasonably available to the organization.”   
The purpose of Rule 57.03(b)(4) is to permit a party to depose an opposing 
corporation's representative under circumstances in which the statements made by the 
witness on the identified topics will be admissible against and binding on the corporate 
party.  State ex rel. Plank v. Koehr, 831 S.W.2d 926, 928  (Mo. banc 1992).  This 
procedure places “natural persons and corporations on a level playing field in the taking 
of the depositions of parties.”  Id.   In other words, the testimony of the corporate 
representative designated pursuant to Rule 57.03(b)(4) is not the deposition of that 
individual for his or her personal recollections or knowledge but is instead “the 
deposition of the corporate defendant.”  Annin v. Bi-State Development Agency, 657 
 
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S.W.2d 382, 386 (Mo. App. 1983).  If the representative can state simply that he or she 
has no personal knowledge of the matter, then a party engaged in litigation against a 
corporation would be placed at a significant disadvantage, subject to deposition by the 
corporate defendant but left with little access to what knowledge could be imputed to the 
corporation.   
The underlying purpose of Rule 57.03(b)(4) is reflected in the mandatory language 
employed.  The rule provides that the corporate representative “shall testify as to matters 
known or reasonably available to the organization.”  Rule 53.07(b)(4)’s plain language 
does not contain any provision permitting the representative to avoid testimony on the 
identified topics by stating that he or she has no personal knowledge of the subject 
matter.  
In this case, Defendant identified several of its employees who witnessed 
decedent’s fall.  The electrical box was on Defendant’s premises.  The circumstances 
regarding the fall and the presence of the electrical box were matters known or 
reasonably available to the organization.  Nonetheless, the corporate representative 
testified that she had no personal knowledge of decedent’s fall or the presence of the 
electrical box. The purpose of deposing a corporate representative is not to uncover the 
representative’s personal knowledge or recollection of the events at issue.  Instead, Rule 
57.03(b)(4) required the representative to testify regarding the Defendant’s knowledge of 
these matters.  
The circuit court abused its discretion by overruling Relator’s motion to compel 
production of a substitute corporate representative prepared to testify regarding 
 
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Defendant’s organizational knowledge of the identified deposition topics.1  The 
alternative writ of mandamus is made peremptory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge  
All concur. 
                                             
 
1 Defendant also argues that the circuit court properly overruled the motion to compel because 
the deposition topics included information subject to the attorney-client privilege and the work 
product doctrine.  Defendant did not raise these objections before or during the deposition or in 
opposition to the motion to compel.  There is no basis for reviewing Defendant’s assertions 
because, in a writ proceeding, the reviewing court is limited to the record made in the court 
below.  State ex rel. Dixon v. Darnold, 939 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Mo. App. 1997) (citing State ex rel. 
Terry v. Holtkamp, 51 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Mo. banc 1932)).   
 
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