Case Title: Colley v. Dyer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Colley v. Dyer1991 WY 153821 P.2d 565Case Number: 90-210Decided: 12/02/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
ALICE IONE HALSTEAD 
COLLEY, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF JODY GLENN DODGION, DECEASED, AND AS 
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF JODY GLENN DODGION, DECEASED, AND ON BEHALF OF 
ALICE IONE HALSTEAD, AS GUARDIAN AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR JORDAN JODY HALSTEAD; 
AND ON BEHALF OF JUDY BUTLER, GLENN DODGION, BRYAN LEE BUTLER, AMANDA COLLEEN 
BUTLER, AND KAYLA DAWN BUTLER, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

 TEDDY RAY DYER, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Jere Ryckman, 
J.

 Daniel M. Hesse of Meyer 
and Williams, Jackson, for appellant.

 David B. Hooper of Hooper 
Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, for appellee.

 Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and KALOKATHIS, District Judge.

 KALOKATHIS, District 
Judge.

 [¶1.]     This case concerns an 
appeal in a wrongful death action taken by appellant, Alice Ione Halstead Colley 
and those she represents, against appellee, Teddy Ray Dyer, from a district 
court order dismissing the complaint upon the grounds of insufficiency of 
service of process. Dyer was the driver of the vehicle involved in an accident 
resulting in fatal injuries to his passenger, Jody Glenn Dodgion, when the 
vehicle struck a cable strung across the exit road from the Green River, 
Wyoming 
landfill. A heavy steel chain attached to the end of the cable came through the 
back window of the vehicle, striking Dodgion in the head.

 [¶2.]     Soon after filing her 
complaint, Colley unsuccessfully attempted to make personal service of process 
upon Dyer at "
B & R Trailer 
Court, Rock Springs, Wyoming82901
." The return on the summons 
indicated that the deputy sheriff was "[u]nable to locate" Dyer. Colley then 
pursued service of process under Wyoming's non-resident motorist statute, Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-6-301 (1988). That statute provides for substitute service of process 
on the secretary of state and requires that notice of such service, along with a 
copy of the process, be served upon a defendant either personally or by 
certified mail to his last known address. The plaintiff must file an affidavit 
of compliance with the clerk of the court.1 Colley's attorney filed an 
affidavit stating that notice was sent to Dyer at "B & R Trailer Court, Rock 
Springs, Wyoming 82901;" to an insurance adjuster in care of State Farm 
Insurance Company; and, to Dyer's and Dodgion's employer who, at the time of the 
accident, owned the vehicle involved in the accident.

 [¶3.]     An answer was filed by 
Dyer through counsel hired by the insurance company to defend him. That answer 
raised various affirmative defenses, including allegations that process and 
service of process were defective.

 [¶4.]     W.R.C.P. 12(h) affords 
an option as to certain defenses. The defenses of insufficiency of process and 
insufficiency of service of process may be asserted in a responsive pleading or 
made by motion. The defenses at issue were properly raised in the answer. These 
defenses were preserved throughout the proceeding as evidenced by Dyer's 
pretrial memorandum and were never waived.2

 [¶5.]     Thus, the issue 
presented for resolution involves the question of whether the certified mailing 
of notice to Dyer at "B & R Trailer Court, Rock Springs, Wyoming 82901," 
without any reference to trailer space # 57 where Dyer once resided, satisfies 
the requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 1-6-301. Before this question can be answered, 
the requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 1-6-301 must be defined. This exercise 
necessarily implicates federal due process.

 [¶6.]     In Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 
276 U.S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446 
(1928), the court held that a non-resident motorist statute which contained no 
provision for attempted notice to a non-resident defendant violated due process. 
The due process standard required notice to the defendant, "so as to make it 
reasonably probable that he will receive actual notice." Id. at 19, 48 S. Ct.  at 
260.

 [¶7.]     After Wuchter, Mullane 
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950) refined the federal due process 
standard.

 [¶8.]     Mullane involved the 
sufficiency of notice by publication. Recognizing that an absent defendant does 
not have an absolute right to be notified of the proceedings, a qualified right 
emerged which placed into the balance the interest of the state. The application 
of the balancing test led to the conclusion that statutory publication notice 
was sufficient for those, "whose interests or whereabouts could not with due 
diligence be ascertained * * *." Id. at 317, 70 S. Ct.  at 659. Thus, the court, 
in effect, held that substitute service was available only upon an initial 
showing of a diligent effort to locate the absent defendant.

 [¶9.]     This approach was 
affirmed in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 
490, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1347, 99 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988) (quoting Mennonite Bd. of 
Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 n. 4, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2711 n. 4, 77 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1983)), and was extended to protect creditors in a probate proceeding which 
required the personal representative to make "`reasonably diligent efforts'" to 
identify creditors of the estate, rather than relying on publication notice 
alone.

 [¶10.]  Since federal due process requires that a 
diligent effort be made to locate an absent defendant before means of substitute 
service become available, we must interpret Wyo. Stat. § 1-6-301 in light of 
this requirement.

 [¶11.]  In other jurisdictions, non-resident 
motorist statutes providing that notice be sent to a defendant's last known 
address have been interpreted to require the plaintiff to exercise due diligence 
in attempting to locate the absent defendant, or in ascertaining the defendant's 
last known address. The cases applying a diligence requirement have done so to 
comply with the Wuchter standard, i.e., that it be reasonably probable that the 
defendant receive actual notice. See Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 573 (1971) and Drinkard v. Eastern 
Airlines, Inc., 290 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. 1956).

 [¶12.]  In two recent opinions, the Washington 
and Utah Supreme Courts, seeking to meet the constitutional requirements of 
Mullane, have concluded that a diligence requirement is a necessary component to 
their respective non-resident motorist statutes. See Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 
1987) and Martin v. Meier, 111 Wn.2d 471, 760 P.2d 925 (1988) (statute included 
a due diligence requirement).

 [¶13.]  As set out in Mullane, a balancing test 
must be applied which weighs the interests of Dyer against the interests of the 
state in order to determine the proper form of notice. The state has an interest 
in ensuring safe highways and streets. The legislature has expressed the state's 
interest in making certain that its residents have available to them a local 
forum in which to resolve their legal disputes with non-resident motorists.3 Dyer's interest is to receive 
notice of the pending action against him and to have the opportunity to defend 
against that action. Thus, we interpret Wyo. Stat. § 1-6-301 to implicitly 
require the plaintiff to exercise due diligence in attempting to locate an 
absent defendant.

 [¶14.]  Knowing that diligent efforts to locate 
Dyer are required, we must ask what comprises the "diligent efforts" needed to 
satisfy federal due process.

 [¶15.]  Concerning the concept of due diligence, 
the Supreme Court of Utah stated:

      "The diligence to be 
pursued and shown . . . is that which is reasonable under the circumstances and 
not all possible diligence which may be conceived. Nor is it that diligence 
which stops just short of the place where if it were continued might reasonably 
be expected to uncover an address . . . of the person on whom service is sought. 
. . . Due diligence must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each case. It 
is that diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is 
reasonably calculated to do so."

 Carlson, 740 P.2d  at 1277 
n. 13 (quoting Parker v. Ross, 117 Utah 417, 217 P.2d 373, 379 
(1950)).

 [¶16.]  We apply this concept in the instant case 
to determine whether diligent efforts were taken to locate Dyer.

 [¶17.]  After an unsuccessful attempt to 
personally serve Dyer at the B & R Trailer Court, Colley resorted to Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-6-301 for substitute service, relying on information obtained through 
an investigator who, almost two years after the accident, contacted Dyer's 
sister, Cherryl McVicker. McVicker informed him that a month or two after the 
accident, Dyer left the state and that she had not seen or heard from him 
since.

 [¶18.]  The record does not show that anything 
else was done to ascertain Dyer's present whereabouts. The investigator and 
Colley were apparently content that Dyer could not be found and that his last 
known address was "
B & R 
Trailer Court, Rock Springs, 
Wyoming82901
." If no further investigation was 
undertaken, then mailing notice to this address, with or without designating 
space # 57, falls short of the diligence required by federal due process. 
Moreover, this mailing, in lieu of further efforts to ascertain Dyer's 
whereabouts, did little if anything to assure that Dyer would receive notice of 
the pending action. The diligence requirement of due process means more than a 
simple ascertainment of the last known address. Diligence must be applied in 
locating the absent defendant. This necessarily involves an attempt to develop 
and exhaust leads which a person normally leaves behind in the course of living. 
Whether Dyer had friends and/or family (parents, brothers, sisters, ex-wives, 
children); where these people were located; whether they had heard from Dyer or 
knew of his recent whereabouts, are matters for Colley's investigator. The 
record is not clear whether such efforts were undertaken. We will afford Colley 
the opportunity to develop this portion of the record.

 [¶19.]  The record shows that notice was sent to 
the insurance company which was the insurer of the vehicle owned by Dyer's 
employer and which vehicle was involved in the accident. At best, such notice is 
evidence of due diligence. Service of notice on the insurance company is not 
notice to the absent defendant. The insurance company is not the real party in 
interest, nor a designated agent for service of notice.

 [¶20.]  Notice to the insurance company, standing 
alone, will not satisfy due diligence. The plaintiff has a duty to exercise due 
diligence as federal due process requires. The plaintiff cannot expect the 
insurance company to carry out that duty.4 

 [¶21.]  This is not to say that we discourage a 
plaintiff from forwarding notice to an insurance company. The insurance company 
might be able to locate the absent defendant, and this would solve the notice 
problem. We merely caution plaintiffs not to rely on this notice as an exclusive 
means of due process.

 [¶22.]  Since the enactment of Wyo. Stat. § 
1-6-301, this court has not been called to pass upon its interpretation. Hence, 
a plaintiff seeking to perfect process under that statute might well be led to 
believe that service mailed to the last known address suffices, without regard 
to the requirement of due diligence. We note that the requirement of due 
diligence was not explored in the district court. It is for this reason that the 
matter will be remanded for a determination of whether Colley exercised due 
diligence in locating the absent defendant.5 See Carlson, 740 P.2d 1269.

 [¶23.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 URBIGKIT, 
C.J., 
files a specially concurring opinion.

 THOMAS, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 FOOTNOTES

 1 Wyo. Stat. § 1-6-301 
states in part:

 (a) The use and operation 
of a motor vehicle on any street or highway within Wyoming by any person upon 
whom service of process cannot be made within Wyoming either personally or by 
service upon a duly appointed resident agent is deemed an appointment of the 
secretary of state of Wyoming as the operator's lawful attorney upon whom may be 
served all legal processes in any proceeding against him * * *. Such operation 
constitutes the operator's agreement that any process served in any action 
against him * * * has the same legal force and validity as if served upon him * 
* *. Service shall be made by serving a copy of the process upon the secretary 
of state * * *. Within ten (10) days after the date of service, notice of such 
service and a copy of the process shall be served upon the defendant * * * 
either personally or by certified mail addressed to the last known address of 
the defendant * * *. The plaintiff shall file with the clerk of the court in 
which the action is brought an affidavit that he has complied with such 
requirement.

 2 Historically, counsel 
would have been required to make a special appearance for the single purpose of 
attacking insufficiency of process or lack of in personam jurisdiction. This is 
no longer required. As W.R.C.P. 12 indicates, the distinction between general 
and special appearances has been eliminated. Counsel has the option of raising 
the defense by motion or by raising the defense by answer. See 5A Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1362 at 451 
(1990).

 3 See n. 1, 
supra.

 4 Some jurisdictions allow 
service on a party's insurer. However, such jurisdictions have statutory 
provisions authorizing this procedure. See Annotation, Validity of Substituted 
Service of Process Upon Liability Insurer of Unavailable Tortfeasor, 17 
A.L.R.4th 918 (1982). Absent statutory authorization, which is the case in 
Wyoming, 
service of notice cannot be effected in this manner.

 5 Upon a determination 
that due diligence has been exercised, the next question is whether the "last 
known address" requirement of Wyo. Stat. § 1-6-301 necessitated the designation 
of space # 57. We adopt the view that a party may rely upon the address given to 
the investigating authorities. See Swift v. Leasure, 285 A.2d 428 (Del.Super. 
1971); Kraft v. Bahr, 256 Iowa 822, 128 N.W.2d 261 (1964); and Sorenson v. Stowers, 251 Wis. 398, 29 N.W.2d 512 (1947). In this case, 
the accident report shows the address as "
B & R Trailer Court, Rock 
Springs, Wyoming82901
" without designating space # 
57.

 URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

 [¶24.]  I concur with the majority that the 
district court dismissal should be reversed. I do not agree, however, that 
notice to the motor vehicle owner's liability insurance carrier, as the real 
party in interest, is insignificant or ineffective under these circumstances, 
and would also perceive that the diligence requirement for service was 
realistically satisfied. This is the third appearance in this court of this 
case, very different in subject, following the fatal injury of Jody Glenn 
Dodgion who was killed after personnel of the City of Green River unexpectedly 
put up a cable at the entrance to the city's landfill dump while decedent and 
the vehicle driver were in the facility unloading trash. On exit, the restrung 
cable caused the fatal injury. SeeState ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1990) and Butler v. Halstead By and Through Colley, 770 P.2d 698 
(Wyo. 1989). 
Here we consider how to sue the negligent driver who disappeared shortly after 
the fatal drive out of the city dump.

 [¶25.]  The procedural events deserve 
consideration since this appeal addresses jurisdiction and proper service of 
process. The broad issue presented is the efficacy of the Wyoming non-resident 
motor statute where the defendant vehicle driver, Teddy Ray Dyer, disappeared 
very shortly after the fatal accident. The liability insurance carrier defended 
for several years in behalf of Dyer until, in the late stages of the proceeding, 
a motion to dismiss was granted on the basis that proper service of process to 
provide jurisdiction was never obtained.1

 [¶26.]  Sequentially, the events developed 
following the September 24, 1985 fatal accident with the filing of a lawsuit on 
September 23, 1987 against both the City of Green River, which ultimately settled out, and 
the vehicle driver, Dyer. The vehicle was owned by the employer, Steven Boyd; 
driven by Dyer, age twenty-seven; occupied by Jody Glenn Dodgion, age sixteen; 
and insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for liability 
coverage. Non-resident motorist statute service, W.S. 1-6-301, through actual 
service on the Secretary of State was initiated by summons served in Cheyenne, Wyoming and filed on October 27, 1987. State 
Farm, following receipt of the non-resident motorist service notice on its 
resident adjuster, employed counsel who filed an answer in behalf of Dyer on 
November 12, 1987. That answer, in addition to the normal vehicle accident 
admissions and denials, included as an affirmative allegation, "Process and 
service of process are defective."

 [¶27.]  The affidavit in support of the 
non-resident motorist statute service stated in part:

      3. That to the best of 
my knowledge, Teddy Ray Dyer, a Defendant in the above-captioned action, is a 
non-resident of the State of Wyoming and that the specific place and 
address and whereabouts of said Defendant are unknown to me.

      4. That I have 
attempted to serve Defendant Teddy Ray Dyer with a Summons and Complaint in the 
above-captioned action by delivering same to the Sheriff's Office in and for the 
County of Sweetwater, State of Wyoming, and that said Sheriff's Office has 
returned said Summons and Complaint to my office after unsuccessfully attempting 
to serve said Defendant at his last known address.

      5. That pursuant to 
Section 1-6-301, W.S. (1977, as amended), I have served a Summons and Complaint 
in the above-captioned action upon the Secretary of State of Wyoming, who is 
deemed to be the lawful attorney of Defendant Teddy Ray Dyer pursuant to Section 
1-6-301, W.S. (1977, as amended).

      6. That within ten 
(10) days after the above-described service on the Secretary of State of 
Wyoming, I mailed, by certified mail, notice of said service, in the attached 
form, together with a copy of the Summons issued to the Secretary of State and a 
copy of the Complaint in the above-captioned action upon the Defendant Teddy Ray 
Dyer at his last known address which is as follows:

 Teddy Ray 
Dyer

 B & R Trailer Court

 Rock Springs, Wyoming82901

      7. That within ten 
(10) days after the above-described service on the Secretary of State of 
Wyoming, I mailed, by certified mail, notice of said service, in the attached 
form, together with a copy of the Summons issued to the Secretary of State and a 
copy of the Complaint in the above-captioned action to: Mr. Frank Rolich, c/o 
State Farm Insurance Company; P.O. Box 2131; Rock Springs, WY 82902. Mr. Rolich 
is an insurance adjuster for State Farm Insurance Company, which I believed to 
be the insurance carrier which will provide a defense and coverage to the 
Defendant Teddy Ray Dyer for the accident which forms the basis of Plaintiff's 
Complaint.

      8. That within ten 
(10) days after the above-described service on the Secretary of State of 
Wyoming, I mailed, by certified mail, notice of said service, in the attached 
form, together with a copy of the Summons issued to the Secretary of State and a 
copy of the Complaint in the above-captioned action to: Mr. Steven Boyd; 1136 
6th Avenue, Southeast; Albany, OR 97321. Mr. Boyd was the owner of Rock Springs 
Roofing, the employer of Defendant Teddy Ray Dyer and Plaintiff's decedent, Jody 
Glenn Dodgion, at the time of the accident in question. Mr. Boyd and/or his 
business, Rock Springs Roofing, was the owner of the vehicle involved in the 
accident in question.

      [Signed and sworn to 
by an attorney for Colley.]

 [¶28.]  The next action on service and 
jurisdiction during the time the case proceeded through discovery and trial 
preparation followed nearly two years later on August 8, 1989. Counsel employed 
by State Farm to represent Dyer then filed a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for 
Defendant Teddy Ray Dyer" which, after reciting the status of the parties and 
noting a possible co-employee insurance policy exclusion, stated:

      5. Approximately two 
years after the accident this suit was filed. Defendant Teddy Ray Dyer had 
departed the State by that time and since the inception of this suit no one has 
been able to locate Dyer. Dyer was served under the long arm statute through the 
Secretary of State.

      6. Upon receipt of the 
Complaint, State Farm was certain that it had no coverage for Dyer under the 
Boyd/Rock Springs Roofing policy but to be certain no rights were prejudiced, 
State Farm hired the undersigned to defend Dyer until a judicial determination 
of coverage could be obtained. State Farm then caused United States District 
Court for the District of Wyoming Civil Action C88-148-B to be filed for 
declaratory relief.

      7. A final decision in said civil 
action has now been obtained and a copy of the Declaratory Judgment is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. According to said Judgment 
Defendant Dyer has no coverage under the Boyd/Rock Springs Roofing policy and 
State Farm has no obligation to defend Dyer in this action.

      8. Further, none of 
the other parties to this case have a claim against State Farm.

      9. Defendant Dyer 
cannot be given notice of this Motion because he cannot be located (see 
Affidavit of Frank Rolich also attached and incorporated herein by this 
reference) but Defendant Dyer has never been aware the undersigned has been 
defending him to the best knowledge and belief of the undersigned.

      10. Pursuant to the 
attached Declaratory Judgment State Farm has requested the undersigned to 
terminate representation of defendant Dyer.

 [¶29.]  The affidavit of insurance adjuster Frank 
Rolich2 stated relative to 
Dyer:

      1. I have been 
employed by plaintiffState Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as a 
field claim representative in its Rock 
Springs, Wyoming, office 
at all times pertinent to the above-entitled action. I make this affidavit in 
support of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56.

      2. Following 
notification to plaintiff of the September 24, 1985 accident involving a 1978 
Chevrolet pickup truck owned by plaintiff's insured, Steven Boyd, I was assigned 
to investigate the accident on plaintiff's behalf.

      3. During the course 
and scope of that investigation, I met with Teddy Ray Dyer (Dyer) on October 15, 
1985 at which time he refused to discuss the factual circumstances surrounding 
said accident, although he did discuss his employment status, and that of Jody 
Dodgion, by Steven Boyd. On that date, at my request, he signed a nonwaiver 
agreement in my presence, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A.

      4. On or about Nov. 6, 
1985 I again spoke with Mr. Dyer and requested that he furnish a factual 
statement of the circumstances surrounding the September 24, 1985 accident, 
which he refused to do.

      5. Thereafter, and 
sometime prior to January 18, 1986, I was informed that Mr. Dyer had left his 
last-known address in Rock 
Springs, Wyoming. I have 
not seen or spoken with Mr. Dyer since 11-6-86 or about.

      6. In November 1987 in 
the course of my employment with plaintiff, I was directed by plaintiff to 
attempt to locate Mr. Dyer. To that end:

      a. I located Mr. 
Dyer's sister, Mrs. Scott McVickers [sic], and personally interviewed her at her 
Rock Springs, Wyoming, residence on Jan. 12, 1988. Mrs. 
McVickers [sic] informed me that she did not know Mr. Dyer's whereabouts at that 
time; that she had last heard from him about one year previously when Dyer was 
living in Payette, Idaho; that she thought Dyer had voluntarily left the 
Rock Springs 
area, among other reasons, in order to avoid possible criminal 
prosecution.

      b. Thereafter I made 
referrals to Idaho and Oregon in an effort to 
locate Mr. Dyer. As a result I received information from the Oregon Department 
of Motor Vehicles records, that, as of September 25, 1986, Dyer's Oregon driver's license showed his address as General 
Delivery, Vernonia, 
Oregon. Mr. Dyer was not, however, 
successfully located in either Oregon or 
Idaho.

 [¶30.]  An order was entered by the district 
court permitting withdrawal by the attorney representing Dyer on August 8, 1989 
and then later, he was directed by his client, the insurance company, to 
re-enter an appearance in behalf of Dyer which was accomplished by general 
appearance filed September 7, 1989 without any reservation.

 [¶31.]  A joint pretrial memorandum of the 
parties was filed August 14, 1989 which addressed the jurisdiction and service 
of process issues. The joint pretrial memorandum was not signed by counsel for 
Dyer. The memorandum addressed the coverage question:

 By the Defendant Teddy 
Ray Dyer:

 a. Whether plaintiff's 
process and service of process are defective as to Defendant Dyer.

 b. Whether counsel for 
Defendant Teddy Ray Dyer should be allowed to withdraw from his representation 
of said defendant by reason of the Declaratory Judgment entered in United States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming, Civil No. C88-148-B, State Farm v. 
Teddy Ray Dyer, et al.

 [¶32.]  Counsel for Dyer followed the filing of 
the pretrial memorandum with a comprehensive Motion in Limine on August 18, 
1989.

 [¶33.]  Appellants then made an apparent mistake 
in filing a motion to strike the answer of Dyer who failed to appear for a 
deposition (since no one knew where he was and obviously he did not know the 
deposition was scheduled). In response to the motion, counsel representing Dyer 
stated in part:

      1. This action was 
commenced by plaintiffs attempting to make service on defendant Dyer through the 
Secretary of State. However, plaintiffs have been unable to complete such 
service as they were unable to provide the Secretary of State with a current 
address for defendant Dyer. As such, defendant Dyer has never received notice of 
this law suit. Plaintiffs served Dyer's former employer and Frank Rolich, 
adjuster for State Farm instead of defendant Dyer.

      2. The undersigned 
filed an Answer on behalf of said defendant because the allegations in the 
Complaint raised an issue as to the duty to defendant said defend [sic] under 
the provisions of the State Farm insurance policy maintained on the vehicle 
operated by said defendant at the time of the accident complained of in the 
Complaint filed by plaintiffs.

      3. In the Answer filed 
on behalf of said defendant, the failure to obtain personal service was noted or 
was the issue of whether this Court can exercise in personam jurisdiction over 
the defendant Dyer without affecting personal service.

      4. The undersigned has 
never learned the location of defendant Dyer, and, thus has been unable to 
advise him of any deposition settings including his own, a fact well known to 
plaintiffs' [sic] before they noticed said defendant for deposition.

      5. It is improper 
under Rule 37 WRCP to strike pleadings without a showing that said defendant 
would provide new and relevant evidence not already know[n] to plaintiff from 
other sources Waldrop v. Weaver, 702 P.2d 1291 (Wyo. 1985).

 [¶34.]  The district court responded to the 
deposition taking conflict and pleading filings by a letter of January 3, 1990, 
which stated in part:

      It appears that prior 
to ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion, the Court must rule on the question of proper 
service on Defendant Dyer. This defense was raised in his answer, in the Joint 
Pretrial Memorandum, as well as at the attempted deposition. It would seem that 
this issue should be resolved sooner than 30 days prior to trial.

      The Court will reserve 
ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion until the service issue is resolved. Furthermore, I 
would want confirmation from Mr. Hooper whether Mr. Dyer is, or is not, 
testifying as a witness. It appears from the pretrial memo that he is testifying 
and a summary of his testimony is given, but from the Response to the Motion, it 
appears his whereabouts have not been known to Mr. Hooper.

 [¶35.]  A motion to dismiss was filed February 6, 
1990 stating:

      COMES NOW the 
defendant Teddy Ray Dyer, through counsel, and moves the Court to dismiss the 
Complaint filed herein for the reason that process, service of process and proof 
of process are all defective under Rule 4, WRCP and W.S. § 1-6-301 (1977, as 
amended) and the Court is, therefore, without jurisdiction over said 
defendant.

 [¶36.]  This pleading came nearly two and 
one-half years after the litigation had been started following two entries of 
appearance by counsel employed by State Farm to defend in behalf of Dyer. Each 
party filed briefs with supporting documentation addressing the jurisdiction and 
service of process issues and the district court then ruled:

      The above matter is 
before the Court on Defendant Dyer's Motion to Dismiss on the issue of defective 
process, service of process and proof of process.

      The Court agrees with 
Defendant's argument and authorities cited in his brief and reply letter dated 
March 7, 1990. In reading the affidavits attached to Plaintiff's brief, it is 
quite apparent that Mr. Dyer was neither personally served nor was he attempted 
to be served by certified mail at his last known address.

      Mr. Tennyson's 
affidavit places Mr. Dyer's last known address as "
B & R Trailer Court, Rock Springs, Wyoming82901
." [Plaintiff's 
Exhibit A.] However, Cherryl McVicker, sister of Teddy Dyer, stated that Mr. 
Dyer's last known address was "B 
& R Trailer Court, # 57, Rock Springs, Wyoming82901." [Plaintiff's Exhibit D.] Even 
disregarding the fact that B & R Trailer Court is not in Rock Springs, there 
is a big difference in naming a trailer court as an address and naming a 
specific trailer space in that court. The "# 57" does distinguish that space 
from the other 140 plus spaces in B & R.

      Although Deputy Pappas 
does not state that he went to # 57, the Court accepts the conclusion that he 
did go to the correct space. His affidavit is lacking in facts, such as how the 
Sheriff's Office knew the correct number of Mr. Dyer's sister's trailer number. 
[Plaintiff's Exhibit G.] It would appear that if the Deputy knew the correct 
number, the Plaintiff also could have discovered the "last known 
address."

      The affidavits are 
full of conclusions, such as "he (Teddy Dyer) left the state of Wyoming." [Plaintiff's 
Exhibit D.] But Cherryl McVicker goes on to say Dyer did not inform herself or 
anyone in her family where he was going.

      Since we know Mr. Dyer 
was not personally served, that 
B 
& R Trailer Court, Rock Springs, 
Wyoming82901
, was not his last known address, 
and that it is questionable whether, or not, he was a non-resident, the Court 
finds that service is defective. Mr. Hooper shall prepare the Order and submit 
it to Mr. Hesse for approval as to form.

 [¶37.]  The facts in this record are essentially 
uncontroverted, but seem confused in recitation and decision.3

 [¶38.]  What did happen to Dyer is best stated in 
the uncontroverted affidavit of his sister, Cherryl McVicker:

      1. That I am a sister 
of defendant Teddy Ray Dyer and I presently reside at 
1638 Elk St., # 55, Rock Springs, Wyoming82901
. 

      2. That prior to 
9/24/85 I was always aware of the whereabouts of my brother Teddy Ray Dyer and 
knew him to be residing at the Imperial Apartments # F2 in Rock Springs, Wyoming up until 9/24/85.

      3. That on the night 
of 9/24/85, my brother Teddy Ray Dyer moved in with me at the B & R Trailer 
Court # 57 in Rock Springs, Wyoming and stayed there for approximately a month 
and a half to two months at which time he left the state of Wyoming without 
informing myself or anyone in my family where he was going and to the best of my 
knowledge has not returned to the state of Wyoming since that time.

      4. That at the time my 
brother left the state of Wyoming, his last known address was B & R Trailer 
Court, # 57, Rock Springs, Wyoming 82901.

 The accident report 
reveals an address of "
B & R 
Trailer Ct., Rock Springs, 
WY82901
" with a listed telephone number. 
The record also reveals within the affidavit of Rolich that "sometime prior to 
January 18, 1986," he was informed that Dyer had left his last known address in 
Rock Springs, Wyoming to never be seen or heard from again. 
He reported that Dyer left, among other reasons, in order to avoid possible 
criminal prosecution (apparently involving the facts of the fatal accident). The 
record reveals a 1986 driver's license address found in Vernonia, Oregon.

 [¶39.]  The factual progression is clear and 
uncontradicted. On the night of the accident, Dyer moved in with his sister at 
the B & R Trailer Court in Rock Springs, Wyoming, stayed with her for a 
couple of months, was contacted by the insurance adjuster twice for statements 
but refused to cooperate, moved out of his sister's trailer, left the state and 
was once in Vernonia, Oregon, but has not been physically located by anyone 
since he left Wyoming sometime after November 6, 1985 and prior to January 18, 
1986.

 [¶40.]  What we do not know from the record is 
when appellants obtained a copy of the State Farm file demonstrating 
inability of the insurance company to locate Dyer and, as noted, we do not have 
the file in the record. We certainly cannot judicially notice or recognize what 
may be attached to the appellate briefs which was never incorporated in the case 
record. Cockreham v. Wyoming Production Credit 
Ass'n, 743 P.2d 869 (Wyo. 1987); Nicholls v. 
Nicholls, 721 P.2d 1103 (Wyo. 1986).

 [¶41.]  I am left with doubt as to what any 
competent and diligent attorney could or should have additionally done to locate 
Dyer.4 There is no question in this record 
that Dyer left Wyoming, left his sister without notice or 
later contact and disappeared from his last known address which was his sister's 
address at the trailer court. Due diligence in this case would conform to the 
standard of effort approved in Sommers v. Gaston, 295 A.2d 578 (Del.Super. 1972) 
where plaintiff checked all available sources but with no success. See also Duke 
v. Paul, 20 Ill. App.3d 500, 314 N.E.2d 517 (1974) and 
Pelay v. Ploog, 281 Or. 59, 573 P.2d 1229, 1231 n. 2 (1978).

 [¶42.]  There is a distinction between the 
technical act of service in this case, personal service on the Secretary of 
State, and the subsequent notice to be given to the defendant of such service. 
"In the first instance, the service is clothed with certain formalities which 
are not required in the second instance." Allen v. Campbell, 141 So. 827, 829 
(La. App. 
1932). The first is jurisdictional and the second is to provide an opportunity 
to defend. Powell v. Knight, 74 F. Supp. 191 (E.D.Va. 1947).

 [¶43.]  The "departed for parts unknown" rule is 
stated in Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74, 154 A. 255, 258 (1931):

 The requirement that the 
copy be mailed to the defendant at his "last-known address" does not mean the 
last address known to the plaintiff, but does mean the last address of the 
defendant so far as it is known, that is, by those who under the ordinary 
circumstances of life would know it. Unless the defendant has departed for parts 
unknown, it means his actual address; if he has disappeared, it means his last 
address so far as it is reasonably possible to ascertain it.

 The duty of the defendant 
was considered in Swift v. Leasure, 285 A.2d 428 (Del.Super. 1971) when 
jurisdiction was obtained within proof of actual notice of service on the 
Secretary of State. The notice requirement was then reasonableness and a duty 
for the defendant was perceived to "keep his address current." Id. at 430. The court 
then said:

 The defendant was 
involved in an accident which obviously was of a relatively serious nature and 
he certainly must have been aware of possible future litigation. Having once 
submitted an address to the public authorities wherein legal process could be 
served upon him, he was under a continuing duty to keep this address current for 
a reasonable period of time. He apparently did not do this as it would appear 
that well within the statute of limitations period he moved without leaving with 
the Post Office authorities any forwarding address. The burden of furnishing the 
Post Office with a forwarding address was negligible compared with the 
difficulties imposed upon the plaintiffs to establish defendant's whereabouts by 
means of an independent and, perhaps, expensive search. Under these 
circumstances the Court will not impose upon plaintiffs the obligation to ferret 
out the actual location of defendant. Certification that delivery was attempted 
at the address furnished by the defendant at the time of the accident will 
satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites. In this view support may be found in a 
number of cases in other jurisdictions. Kraft v. Bahr, 256 Iowa 822, 128 N.W.2d 261 (1964); Skinner v. Mueller, 1 
Wis.2d 328, 84 N.W.2d 71 (1957); Sorenson v. Stowers, supra [251 Wis. 398, 29 N.W.2d 512 
(1947)].

 Id.

 [¶44.]  I particularly disagree with the majority 
about the significance or lack thereof of notice to the insurance carrier. Who 
better than the insurer could be called to locate the missing driver? State 
Farm, in this case, had the resources and the incentive. An attorney 
representing the decedent's family cannot fairly compete in effort. 
Additionally, the economic interest in this case is that of the insurance 
company and not the long gone, footloose driver of the involved 
vehicle.

 [¶45.]  We are provided a case of similar 
authority and example in Duke, 314 N.E.2d  at 521-22, except that the insurance 
carrier for the driver, after receiving notice, let a default be entered while 
it had an address for its insured:

 The record in the case at 
bar shows that the defendant's insurance carrier, Preferred, knew of the 
pendency of the suit and as of May 5, 1968, knew that the defendant was leaving 
the State of Illinois. Preferred also knew in late August 
of 1969 the new address of defendant in Hawaii. There was also correspondence between 
the plaintiff's attorney, Preferred, and the attorneys for the defendant as to 
whether proper service had been made upon the defendant. In addition, 
plaintiff's attorney contacted Mr. Beece, the claims manager of Preferred, in 
regards to locating the defendant. Preferred had a contractual obligation with 
the defendant to defend this suit and indeed Preferred retained attorneys on 
defendant's behalf. However, having all the knowledge previously cited, 
Preferred chose to do nothing until a default judgment was entered. * * * A 
defendant's insurance carrier cannot embark upon its contractual obligation to 
defend a suit and then do nothing until a default judgment is entered and then 
seek to utilize [a default vacation section of the Illinois non-resident 
motor statute].

 [¶46.]  A case similar in service effort 
involving an insurance company notice is Saucedo v. Engelbrecht, 149 Ariz. 18, 
716 P.2d 79 (1986), where, however, the carrier could not locate the driver and 
the record revealed efforts made by both parties. Trial court dismissal was 
reversed when the appellate court first stated, "[a] finding of due diligence is 
a jurisdictional prerequisite," id., 716 P.2d  at 80, and then found plaintiff 
met the test in conjunction with the carrier's unsuccessful and concurrent 
efforts to find the missing driver. See also Gibson v. Salvatore, 102 A.D.2d 861, 476 N.Y.S.2d 930, 932 (1984).

 [¶47.]  The court in Proulx v. Goulet, 315 F. Supp. 622, 624-25 (D.Vt. 1970) first found jurisdiction by substituted service 
on the commissioner of motor vehicles and then recognized:

 Moreover, someone - 
presumably the defendant's insurer - has received sufficient notice to appear 
and file the motion to dismiss, a motion wherein the defendant, Rene Goulet, 
says that "the present whereabouts of Rene Goulet is unknown." By having 
notified Goulet's insurer, the plaintiffs here have given it the opportunity to 
defend at least to the extent of its policy coverage. * * * To that extent, at 
least, the "fair play" called for by McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91, 37 S. Ct. 343, 343, 61 L. Ed. 608 [(1917)], has been had. To that extent also the 
constitutional demands of notice "reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action * * 
*," Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950), have been met, perhaps to an even greater extent 
than in cases where there has been mistaken delivery of process to the wrong 
party.

 [¶48.]  Although concurring in the reversal of 
the order of dismissal, I perceive no omission in proper service to proscribe 
existent jurisdiction. The presence of State Farm, with an opportunity to defend 
as it has in two courts, is self-evident. Consideration of a judgment against 
the driver in excess of liability insurance coverage is, on this record, totally 
inconsequential for anyone. The real party in interest with more than 
appropriate notice is the insurance carrier who has been available and has fully 
participated. I would not find the disappearance of an automobile driver to 
defeat the purpose of required liability insurance under Wyoming law or the 
validating processes for jurisdiction afforded by W.S. 1-6-301. See 13 P. Kelly, 
Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice § 452.4 (3rd ed. rev. 1990).

 [¶49.]  In agreement with Justice Thomas in his 
dissent, I would remand the case for trial to be held.

 FOOTNOTES

 1 The district court 
determined that a motion to dismiss should be granted on the basis of defective 
process, service of process and proof of process and stated in opinion 
letter:

      Since we know Mr. Dyer 
was not personally served, that 
B 
& R Trailer Court, Rock Springs, 
Wyoming82901
, was not his last known address, 
and that it is questionable whether, or not, he was a non-resident, the Court 
finds that service is defective.

 2 As a matter of academic 
interest, the adjuster, Frank Rolich, succeeded this writer as staff adjuster 
for State Farm in the Rock 
Springs office more than thirty-five years 
ago.

 3 Attached to appellant's 
brief filed in this court is extensive material from State Farm's records 
reflecting efforts to locate the driver. Those materials are not 
contained in the present record by affidavit, attachment, or otherwise and 
likely were not considered by the district court in decision. They do not 
create any real factual conflicts. The search reports and insurance company 
details are more comprehensive than other documentation, but essentially define 
the same efforts described by the adjuster in the unsuccessful effort to find 
Dyer.

 4 I am also left with the 
question about waiver at some point in the technical aspects of service of 
process by entry of appearance and pretrial pleading activities as a participant 
in the litigation. Cf. Midway Oil Corp. v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 1986) and Vanover v. Vanover, 77 Wyo. 55, 307 P.2d 117 
(1957). Waiver of improper service or by entry of an appearance and general 
participation is a subject which was not addressed in briefing in district court 
or for this appeal.

 THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

 [¶50.]  I must dissent from the disposition of 
this case according to the majority opinion. In my judgment, the case should 
either be reversed or affirmed. A remand for the purpose of effecting a 
determination as to whether Colley exercised due diligence in locating Dyer 
strikes me as an exercise in futility that can only lead to frustration for all 
concerned. I would hold that Colley did pursue and show the diligence "which is 
reasonable under the circumstances." Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1277, n. 13 
(Utah 1987). 
Consequently, I would reverse the order granting the motion to dismiss and 
permit the case to go forward to trial.

 [¶51.]  It is my understanding that the majority 
of the court would not find that the failure to allude to "# 57" in the 
affidavit filed in support of substitute service was a fatal defect in the 
proceedings. The order of the trial court was not affirmed on that narrow 
ground. Instead, the case is reversed and remanded for a further showing of due 
diligence.

 [¶52.]  I rely upon the factual discussion by 
Chief Justice Urbigkit, in his specially concurring opinion, in my analysis of 
the effort that may be attempted on remand. In light of that discussion, I 
cannot conceive of anything that Colley might now do or could have done before 
service upon the Secretary of State to locate Teddy Ray Dyer. It is obvious that 
Dyer has chosen to avoid any attempt to communicate with Colley either 
personally or officially. Like Chief Justice Urbigkit, "I am left with doubt 
as to what any competent and diligent attorney could or should have additionally 
done to locate Dyer." (Conc. op. at 574.) In the language of Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 317, 70 S. Ct. 652, 658, 
94 L. Ed. 865 (1950), it is clear that as a matter of fact Dyer is one "whose . . 
. whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained. . . ." If that 
perception of fact is sound, then it should follow that any effort of Colley or 
her counsel, diligent or otherwise, was doomed to failure.

 [¶53.]  Without denigrating the authority cited 
in the majority opinion in any way, I would permit the party attempting 
substituted service to either demonstrate due diligence in endeavoring to locate 
the absent defendant or, in the alternative, to rely upon a record that 
demonstrates, like this one does, that the absent defendant could not be found 
by anyone, including his own insurance carrier. This alternative would avoid an 
open-ended standard with respect to what efforts should be undertaken to 
manifest due diligence. (Is it enough to demonstrate that there was no 
forwarding address, or must the plaintiff engage a private investigator in every 
possible place and produce a negative report?) Instead, it would permit the 
plaintiff to prove the facts with respect to whether the defendant could be 
located. Those facts are present in this record; they demonstrate that Dyer 
could not be found; and they fully satisfy the question as to whether it was 
possible to give such notice to Dyer "as to make it reasonably probable that he 
will receive actual notice." Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19, 48 S. Ct. 259, 260, 72 L. Ed. 446 (1928). If it is not possible to give that notice, 
then there is no reason to require a demonstration of due diligence to satisfy 
the test of due process under the federal constitution. The law should not 
require any futile endeavors.

 [¶54.]  I would reverse the order granting the 
motion to dismiss, and remand the case for trial.