Case Title: Board of Sup. Loudoun County v. Town of Purcellville

Citation: 

Docket Number: 071424

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Goodwyn, 
JJ., and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS  
OF LOUDOUN COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 071424 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
September 12, 2008 
TOWN OF PURCELLVILLE 
 
 
COUNTY OF LOUDOUN 
 
v.  Record No. 071425  
 
TOWN OF PURCELLVILLE 
 
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS  
OF LOUDOUN COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 071426  
 
TOWN OF PURCELLVILLE 
 
 
TOWN OF PURCELLVILLE 
 
v.  Record No. 071505  
 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS  
OF LOUDOUN COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
 
MARTHA MASON SEMMES,  
DIRECTOR OF PLANNING  
AND ZONING FOR THE  
TOWN OF PURCELLVILLE 
 
v.  Record No. 071506  
 
TOWN OF PURCELLVILLE  
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 
Thomas D. Horne, Judge 
 
 
In these consolidated appeals1 we consider various issues 
involving a dispute between the Town of Purcellville (“Town”) 
and Loudoun County (“County”) regarding the interpretation of 
an annexation agreement dated November 16, 1994 (the 
“Annexation Agreement”) and a joint comprehensive plan known 
as the “Purcellville Urban Growth Area Management Plan” (the 
“PUGAMP”). 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
In 1994, the Town and the County entered into an 
Annexation Agreement defining the Town’s future rights in the 
3,100-acre “Urban Growth Area” (“UGA”)2 surrounding the Town’s 
corporate limits.  Under the Annexation Agreement, the Town 
received the right to annex areas within the UGA in exchange 
for relinquishing its right to seek city status.  Although 
both the Town and the County had previously adopted 
comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances governing land use 
within their respective jurisdictions, the Annexation 
Agreement also provided for the development of a joint 
comprehensive plan for the UGA.  The plan would address, among 
                     
1 These five consolidated appeals are from two related 
judgments of the Circuit Court of Loudoun County. The first 
rendered a declaratory judgment; the second involved appeals 
from the County Board of Zoning Appeals and the Town Board of 
Zoning Appeals.  In this opinion, “BZA” will be used for 
convenience in referring to the Boards.  
 
2 The UGA is also referred to as the Joint Land Management 
Area or JLMA. 
 
2
other things, proffer guidelines and allocations, 
transportation networks, schools and other public facilities, 
land uses, density, environmental policies, and phasing.  The 
County and the Town agreed that once a joint comprehensive 
plan was adopted, development within the UGA would “be in 
conformance with the Plan.”   
Thereafter, a joint comprehensive plan committee 
comprised of Town and County representatives drafted a plan.  
After formal review by the Town and the County Planning 
Commissions and a revision by Town and County Planning 
Commissioners, both Planning Commissions formally certified 
the final draft.  This final draft, known as the PUGAMP, was 
separately adopted by the Town Council and the County Board of 
Supervisors in 1995 and was implemented as an element of both 
the Town’s and the County’s respective comprehensive plans.   
Prior to implementation of the PUGAMP, the Town’s 
comprehensive plan did not address land outside its corporate 
limits.  The PUGAMP, however, expanded upon the Town’s 
Comprehensive Plan by accommodating future development in the 
UGA.  Although the County’s previously adopted General Plan 
provided guidelines for land use in the UGA, these policies 
were superseded by the policies included in the PUGAMP.  The 
County’s Revised General Plan reiterates that development 
within the UGA will comply with the PUGAMP and the County will 
 
3
work with Town officials on annexation, development, and other 
issues within the UGA. 
Once “a local planning commission recommends a 
comprehensive plan” and it is “approved and adopted by the 
governing body,” the plan controls “the general or approximate 
location, character and extent of each feature shown on the 
plan.”  Code § 15.2-2232(A).  If a proposed development is not 
already a feature shown on the plan, then the proposal must be 
“submitted to and approved by the commission as being 
substantially in accord with the adopted comprehensive plan.”  
Id.  Both the Town and the County refer to the approval of a 
proposed development not shown on their comprehensive plans as 
a “commission permit,” and both localities have established 
within their respective zoning ordinances a commission permit 
procedure consistent with the language of Code § 15.2-2232. 
The PUGAMP’s “Existing and Proposed School Locations” map 
identifies the “preferred location” for four new schools 
within the UGA: an elementary school designated by an “E” 
located southeast of the Town, another elementary school 
designated by an “E” located northwest of the Town, a middle 
school designated by an “M” located north of the Town, and a 
high school designated by an “H” located northeast of the 
Town.  Although subdivisions were subsequently developed in 
the areas designated for the proposed middle school and the 
 
4
proposed high school, the need for new school sites remained.  
Partly to address this need, in 2000 the County purchased a 
230-acre tract of land lying northwest of the Town known as 
Fields Farm.  Excepting 2.6 acres, Fields Farm is located 
entirely within the UGA. An elementary school was constructed 
on this property in the area previously designated for such 
use by the PUGAMP. 
A. 
 The Declaratory Judgment Action 
 
On May 15, 2006, the County School Board requested a 
“pre-application conference” with the County Planning 
Department to discuss the construction of a high school (“HS-
3”) at Fields Farm.  Among other things, the School Board 
sought to confirm that a commission permit was not needed 
prior to HS-3’s development.  At the pre-application 
conference, held on May 24, 2006, the County Planning 
Department indicated that no commission permit was necessary 
for the Fields Farm proposal.  However, this matter was deemed 
an “open issue to follow up on,” because the Town contended 
that a commission permit was required.  On June 1, 2006, the 
County Board of Supervisors met with the School Board to 
discuss HS-3.  At the meeting, Julie Pastor (“Pastor”), the 
County’s Planning Director, stated that a commission permit 
was not required for the proposed high school, subject to a 
 
5
determination by the County Zoning Administrator.3  On June 19, 
2006, the Town appealed the County’s determination that no 
commission permits were necessary for HS-3’s development to 
the County BZA.  On the following day, the Board of 
Supervisors authorized the County to seek a special use 
exception for construction of HS-3 at Fields Farm. 
On June 21, 2006, the Town filed a Complaint and 
Application for Declaratory and Temporary Injunctive Relief in 
the Circuit Court of Loudoun County “as a result of the 
County’s ultra vires and illegal action.”  The Town alleged 
that “the County [had] completely ignored the Town’s rights to 
be involved with, review and approve new development in the 
UGA as outlined by the PUGAMP, the Annexation Agreement, and 
Code §§ 15.2-2233 and –2232,” and further, that “the County’s 
continuation of the land development process violate[d] the 
procedural requirements of the . . . Annexation Agreement and 
the [PUGAMP as well as] the statutory stay of action imposed 
as a result of” the Town’s June 19 appeal to the County BZA.  
                     
3 In a March 8, 1999 memorandum, the County Zoning 
Administrator, Melinda Artman, designated the Chief of 
Comprehensive Planning as her agent in the determination of 
whether a use requires a Commission Permit.  Artman reiterated 
her designation of authority in this respect at a hearing 
before the County BZA held on September 28, 2006, stating, “I 
delegated my authority for determining whether a commission 
permit is required to the . . . Chief of Comprehensive 
Planning,” whom she also referred to as “the Director of 
Planning.” 
 
6
The Town sought a declaration that “the Town’s appeal was 
properly filed and . . . pending before the [County] BZA;” 
that the County’s “participation . . . in the [s]pecial 
[e]xception process and authorization to proceed with the 
. . . development” of HS-3 at Fields Farm was “in furtherance 
of the matters appealed from by the Town” and “violate[d] the 
stay imposed . . . as a result of the Town’s [a]ppeal;” and 
that no other proceedings related to HS-3 take place until the 
Town’s appeal concluded.  The Town also requested “such other 
and further relief as may be required to ensure the County’s 
strict compliance with the governing law.” 
On the following day, Melinda Artman (“Artman”), the 
County Zoning Administrator, notified the Town by letter that 
its June 19 appeal to the County BZA was not accepted because 
the appeal was premature.  Artman reasoned that the record of 
the pre-application conference specifically provided that no 
matters discussed would be binding on either the applicant or 
the County, and that no determination was made with regard to 
the commission permit by anyone acting on Artman’s behalf at 
the pre-application conference.  Artman stated, however, that 
based upon the pre-application conference she had been asked 
to render a determination on whether a commission permit was 
required, and a copy of her determination was enclosed.  In 
 
7
her letter, Artman communicated her decision that no 
commission permit was necessary for the construction of HS-3. 
The County subsequently filed a demurrer and an answer 
denying the merits of the Town’s claims.  The County filed a 
plea in bar and a motion to dismiss thereafter, asserting the 
circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Town’s 
claims.  The circuit court held a hearing on the matter on 
March 8, 2007, wherein the County contended that the case was 
moot because the Town’s complaint sought relief specifically 
related to its June 19 appeal to the County BZA, which had 
been dismissed as premature, and further, that a declaratory 
judgment was not “an appropriate method of seeking relief.”  
The Town responded that the claim was not moot because 
the fundamental issue, based on both the May 24 pre-
application conference and on Pastor’s June 1 statement to the 
Board of Supervisors, concerned the County’s ability to 
proceed with HS-3’s construction in disregard of the Town’s 
claim that it had the authority to review any proposed 
development within the UGA under the PUGAMP, the Annexation 
Agreement, and the Code. 
The circuit court refused to dismiss the case, stating, 
“first, that the public interest exception would apply,” and 
second, that the Town’s request for “such other and further 
relief as may be required to ensure the County’s strict 
 
8
compliance with the governing law” was “sufficient when read 
in context with all the other remaining allegations in the 
pleading to put the case before the [c]ourt properly for 
declaratory judgment . . . with respect to the issuance of [a] 
commission permit.” 
On March 13, 2007, the circuit court rendered its opinion 
on the declaratory judgment.  The circuit court ruled that the 
Annexation Agreement and the PUGAMP created a “joint 
comprehensive plan” entered into by the County and the Town 
pursuant to Code § 15.2-2231, and that through this agreement 
the County had “consented to the extension of the Town’s 
comprehensive planning authority into the [UGA].”  Continuing, 
the circuit court determined that it “was unnecessary for the 
parties to address the commission permit review process . . . 
because the right to review was inherent in the right to 
participate in the planning process.”  As a result, the 
circuit court declared that “the Town and [the] County have 
joint and concurrent authority to review and approve the 
location of public facilities within the [UGA]” under Code 
§ 15.2-2232.  The circuit court entered a final order on April 
18, 2007, wherein it incorporated its March 13 letter opinion 
and further ruled that “the County’s authority to undertake 
commission permit reviews for public facilities within the 
 
9
[UGA] ceases when a property is annexed into the corporate 
limits of the Town.” 
B. 
The BZA Appeals 
 
While the Town’s declaratory judgment action was pending, 
the County BZA and the Town BZA rendered three related 
decisions4 concerning authority over new development within the 
UGA.  These decisions were appealed to the Circuit Court of 
Loudoun County, which rendered a single opinion on the matters 
within one week of the declaratory judgment. 
1. 
Semmes’ Appeal from the Town BZA 
 
On May 24, 2006, Martha Semmes (“Semmes”), the Town’s 
Director of Planning and Zoning, informed the County that 
pursuant to the PUGAMP, both localities would have to apply 
for a commission permit for HS-3 because it was not a “feature 
shown” on the plan.  The School Board and the Board of 
Supervisors subsequently appealed Semmes’ determinations to 
the Town BZA.  Following a hearing, the Town BZA determined 
that it did not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal 
arising from matters in controversy outside of the Town’s 
corporate limits. 
Semmes filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 
circuit court pursuant to Code § 15.2-2314, seeking review of 
                     
4 One decision involved the consolidation of two matters 
making a total of four separate BZA cases. 
 
10
the Town BZA’s decision.  Specifically, Semmes contended that 
the PUGAMP had been implemented as part of the Town’s 
comprehensive plan and, pursuant to Code § 15.2-2232 as 
incorporated into the Town’s Zoning Ordinance, she had the 
authority as the Town Zoning Administrator to determine 
“whether a proposed public use [within the UGA] is a feature 
shown on the adopted comprehensive plan.”  Semmes asserted 
that the Town Zoning Ordinance gives the Town BZA the 
authority to decide appeals “where an error is alleged in any 
. . . determination made by an administrative official in the 
administration or enforcement of [the Town Zoning] Ordinance,” 
and therefore, the Town BZA erred in determining that it 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  
2. 
The Town’s First Appeal from the County BZA 
 
Artman’s June 22, 2006 letter denying the Town’s June 19 
appeal to the County BZA also contained the following 
determinations: 
1. 
Development of Fields Farm is exclusively governed 
by the Loudoun County Zoning Ordinance and only the 
County Zoning Administrator may make binding 
determinations regarding the applicable zoning 
regulations. 
2. 
No Town official “is authorized to make any . . . 
determination . . . concerning property in the 
unincorporated portion of the County, 
[s]pecifically, no Town official has authority to 
make determinations regarding [c]ommission [p]ermit 
requirements incorporated as part of the [Loudoun 
County Zoning Ordinance]. 
 
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3. 
Even where a commission permit may be required for a 
school facility within the UGA, no commission permit 
is required from the Town under the Loudoun County 
Zoning Ordinance. 
4. 
HS-3’s development does not require a commission 
permit in any event because the location of a public 
high school at Fields Farm is a feature shown on the 
PUGAMP. 
 
The Town appealed these determinations to the County BZA.  
The County BZA held a public hearing on the matter, but 
limited its review of the Town’s arguments to the extent they 
related to the Loudoun County Zoning Ordinance, determining 
that its authority was “restricted to . . . the interpretation 
of zoning.”  The County BZA subsequently denied the Town’s 
appeal and upheld Artman’s June 22 determinations. 
The Town filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 
circuit court pursuant to Code § 15.2-2314, seeking review of 
the County BZA’s decision.  Specifically, the Town contended 
that the County BZA incorrectly concluded that only the County 
Zoning Administrator and the Loudoun County Zoning Ordinance 
control determinations regarding the issuance of commission 
permits for public uses in the UGA; that the PUGAMP requires 
the Town engage in consistency determinations of proposed 
public uses in the UGA; that HS-3 is not a feature shown on 
the PUGAMP; and that, consequently, “the commission permit 
process mandated by Code § 15.2-2232 and the Town and County 
Zoning Ordinances must be followed.”  The Board of Supervisors 
 
12
and the School Board filed an answer as intervening 
defendants, asserting the Town did not have the authority to 
make decisions concerning new development within the UGA. 
3. 
The Town’s Second Appeal from the County BZA 
 
On June 23, 2006, Semmes sent a letter to the School 
Board regarding the proposed construction of an elementary 
school within the UGA.  Semmes stated that both the County and 
the Town Planning Commissions would have to approve the site 
by commission permit before development could proceed.  Artman 
responded on June 30, 2006 by letter, in which she stated that 
no Town official is authorized to make such determinations.  
Artman reasoned that, as a result, Semmes’ June 23 letter was 
“null and void ab initio.” 
The Town appealed Artman’s June 30 determinations to the 
County BZA.  The County BZA held a public hearing on the 
matter, wherein it again indicated that it could “simply make 
determinations with regard to County zoning.”  Whether the 
Town could engage in the review of new development within the 
UGA under the PUGAMP, which “is not a zoning instrument,” was 
deemed outside of the County BZA’s jurisdiction.  
Consequently, the County BZA denied the Town’s appeal and 
upheld Artman’s determinations. 
The Town filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 
circuit court pursuant to Code § 15.2-2314, seeking review of 
 
13
the County BZA’s decision.  Specifically, the Town contended 
that the PUGAMP is the relevant comprehensive plan governing 
proposed uses within the UGA; that the commission permit 
process contained in the Town Zoning Ordinance required the 
Town to review new development within the UGA; that Code 
§ 15.2-2286(4), as well as the Town Zoning Ordinance, specify 
that a locality’s zoning administrator shall have all 
necessary authority on behalf of the Town; and that, 
consequently, whether the elementary school “is a feature 
shown on the PUGAMP was a necessary preliminary determination 
properly made by [Semmes] on behalf of the Town in the 
administration and enforcement of . . . the Town Zoning 
Ordinance, as well as in the implementation of the 
requirements of Code § 15.2-2232.”  The Board of Supervisors 
and the School Board filed an answer as intervening 
defendants, asserting the Town did not have the authority to 
make decisions concerning new development within the UGA. 
4. The Circuit Court’s Decision regarding BZA Appeals 
 
The three BZA appeals were consolidated for one hearing 
before the circuit court, and on March 19, 2007, the circuit 
court rendered its decision by a single letter opinion.  
First, with respect to Semmes’ appeal, the circuit court found 
that no authority exists within “the Annexation Agreement or 
state statute” pursuant to which the Town BZA could render 
 
14
decisions affecting property located outside the Town’s 
corporate limits.  Second, the circuit court affirmed the 
County BZA’s decision upholding Artman’s determination that 
Semmes lacked authority “to make commission permit 
determinations respecting properties outside the corporate 
limits of the Town” because “no such power exists.”  Third, 
the circuit court held that the County BZA’s decision that 
commission permit review was not required before proceeding 
with HS-3’s development was “not erroneous” because it is 
“indisputable” that HS-3 is a feature shown on the PUGAMP.  
Fourth, the circuit court reversed the County BZA’s decision 
upholding Artman’s determinations “respecting the right of the 
Town to participate in the compliance review process with the 
County outside the corporate limits of the Town but within 
[the] PUGAMP” because the decision was inconsistent with the 
circuit court’s March 13 opinion declaring that the Town and 
the County have joint and concurrent authority to review and 
approve the location of public facilities within the UGA.  The 
circuit court affirmed the decision only “[t]o the extent that 
the [County BZA] rejected any claim by the Town that it might 
exercise zoning jurisdiction within the PUGAMP but outside the 
limits of the Town.”  The circuit court entered final orders 
on the three appeals on April 18, 2007, for the reasons stated 
in its March 13 and March 19 letter opinions. 
 
15
II. ANALYSIS 
Both the County and the Town present several assignments 
of error that challenge the circuit court’s interpretation of 
the PUGAMP and its subsequent rulings.  Specifically, the 
County argues the circuit court erred in declaring that the 
Town has joint and concurrent authority to review and approve 
the location of new development within the UGA, and in holding 
that the County’s authority to engage in the review process 
ends once unincorporated property is annexed by the Town.  The 
County also assigns error to the circuit court’s refusal to 
dismiss the Town’s declaratory judgment action for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
The Town contends that the circuit court erred in 
determining in the BZA appeals that neither the Town nor 
Semmes have the authority to engage in consistency review 
within the unincorporated portion of the County, and that HS-3 
is a feature shown on the PUGAMP.  Since the denial of the 
County’s plea in bar and motion to dismiss present threshold 
issues, we will consider them first. 
A. Plea in Bar and Motion to Dismiss 
1. Mootness 
According to the County, a fair reading of the Town’s 
initial complaint reveals that the entire case was premised 
upon an appeal to the BZA that was premature. Therefore, the 
 
16
County maintains, the matter before the BZA was moot and there 
was no jurisdictional basis upon which the trial court could 
entertain the Town’s requested declaratory judgment and 
temporary injunctive relief.  Additionally, the County asserts 
that the Town’s general prayer of “such other further relief 
as may be required” was an insufficient basis for the circuit 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction notwithstanding the lack of 
an underlying BZA appeal. 
In response, the Town argues the case was not moot 
because the denial of the Town’s initial BZA appeal did not 
resolve the underlying issues in the case.  “The intent of the 
[Declaratory Judgment Act] is to have courts render 
declaratory judgments which may guide parties in their future 
conduct in relation to each other, thereby relieving them from 
the risk of taking undirected action incident to their rights, 
which action, without direction, would jeopardize their 
interests.”  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 211 Va. 414, 
421, 177 S.E.2d 519, 524 (1970).  The Act “is to be liberally 
interpreted and administered with a view to making the courts 
more serviceable to the people,” Code § 8.01-191, but courts 
may only issue declaratory judgments “in cases of actual 
controversy when there is antagonistic assertion and denial of 
right.”  Treacy v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 256 Va. 97, 103, 
500 S.E.2d 503, 506 (1998) (quotation marks and citations 
 
17
omitted).  “Thus, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not give 
trial courts the authority to render advisory opinions, decide 
moot questions, or answer inquiries that are merely 
speculative.”  Id. at 104, 500 S.E.2d at 506 (citations 
omitted). 
 
By its terms, the PUGAMP is a comprehensive plan adopted 
by the County and the Town governing development within the 
UGA. However, the County’s Planning Department and Planning 
Director maintained that HS-3’s development would not require 
Town approval, and the Board of Supervisors subsequently 
authorized the County to seek a special use exception so that 
HS-3’s development could proceed.  Conversely, the Town 
consistently asserted that it had an equal right to determine 
whether the proposed school site was consistent with the 
PUGAMP. 
Clearly, a justiciable controversy existed between the 
County and the Town as to their rights under the terms of 
their joint agreement. See Criterion Ins. Co. v. Grange Mut. 
Cas. Co., 210 Va. 446, 449, 171 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1970) (“When 
a justiciable controversy exists between two insurance 
companies as to their obligations under the terms of their 
respective policies, a declaratory judgment proceeding may be 
maintained by one of the companies against the other”).  The 
fact that the County BZA denied the Town’s initial appeal as 
 
18
premature does not indicate that an actual case or controversy 
within the contemplation of the Declaratory Judgment Act did 
not exist.  See Tazewell Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Brown, 267 Va. 150, 
157-58, 591 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2004) (neither reinstatement nor 
resignation of school administrator mooted his claim of 
unfounded information in his personnel file). 
Furthermore, the Town alleged in plain and explicit 
language that the County’s actions violated the Annexation 
Agreement, the PUGAMP, the localities’ zoning ordinances, and 
Code §§ 15.2-2223 and –2232, and the Town fully set forth its 
supporting reasoning in its complaint.  The Town’s request 
that the County be “required to . . . comply with the 
governing law” was therefore sufficient to allow the circuit 
court to determine whether the County could proceed with HS-
3’s development within the UGA without the Town’s approval by 
adjudicating the localities’ respective rights under the 
PUGAMP.   
2. Appropriateness of Declaratory Relief 
The County also contends that a declaratory judgment was 
not the “proper vehicle for providing relief” because “the 
County had already acted and, therefore, the Town’s rights, if 
any, had already accrued.”  We disagree.  The Town sought a 
declaration of its rights under its written agreements with 
the County and the dispute presented would not be resolved 
 
19
upon a dispositive factual question.  Therefore, declaratory 
judgment was a proper vehicle for relief. 
Although “this [C]ourt and lower courts have . . . given 
a liberal interpretation to the Declaratory Judgment Act, they 
have nevertheless recognized that the power to make a 
declaratory judgment . . . will not as a rule [be] exercised 
where some other mode of proceeding is provided.”  Bishop, 211 
Va. at 421, 177 S.E.2d at 524.  “Where a declaratory judgment 
as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues, rather 
than a construction of definite stated rights, status, and 
other relations, commonly expressed in written instruments, 
the case is not one for declaratory judgment.”  Williams v. 
Southern Bank of Norfolk, 203 Va. 657, 663, 125 S.E.2d 803, 
807 (1962) (quoting 16 Am. Jur., Declaratory Judgments, § 20 
at 294-95). 
For example, in USAA Casualty Insurance Co. v. Randolph, 
255 Va. 342, 344-45, 497 S.E.2d 744, 745 (1998), an employee 
filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the 
Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act would bar him from 
instituting a tort action for injuries sustained while he was 
at his place of employment.  We held that declaratory judgment 
was inappropriate “because the case [did] not involve a 
determination of rights, but only involve[d] a disputed issue 
to be determined in future litigation between the parties, 
 
20
namely, whether [the employee’s] injuries arose out of and in 
the course of his employment.”  Id. at 347, 497 S.E.2d at 747. 
Similarly, in Green v. Goodman-Gable-Gould Co., Inc., 268 
Va. 102, 108, 597 S.E.2d 77, 81 (2004), Goodman-Gable-Gould 
filed a declaratory judgment action to “determine whether it 
had substantially performed its obligations under [its] 
contract with [Green]” when Green requested Goodman-Gable-
Gould withdraw from adjusting Green’s fire loss claim.  268 
Va. at 108, 597 S.E.2d at 81.  We held declaratory relief was 
inappropriate because Goodman-Gable-Gould’s “actual objective 
in the . . . proceeding was a determination of that disputed 
issue rather than an adjudication of the parties’ rights,” an 
issue which “should have been litigated in the context of a 
breach of contract claim.”  Id. 
In contrast, rather than a determination of a disputed 
factual issue, the Town sought a declaration of its rights 
under its written agreements with the County.  Therefore, this 
was “a classic case where declaratory judgment [was] 
appropriate to ‘guide parties in their future conduct in 
relation to each other.’ ”  Reisen v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co., 
225 Va. 327, 335, 302 S.E.2d 529, 533 (1983) (quoting Bishop, 
211 Va. at 421, 177 S.E.2d at 524).  The trial court did not 
err by deciding the question. 
B. The Trial Court’s Judgment 
 
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The trial court held that: 
 
 
Being a joint plan, both the County and 
Town, are initiators of the Plan.  The 
Annexation Agreement provides that the planning 
commissions of both jurisdictions would 
participate in the review of the document 
prepared by the unique Joint Comprehensive Plan 
Committee provided for in the Agreement.  It 
was unnecessary for the parties to address the 
commission permit review process in the 
Annexation agreement or PUGAMP, because the 
right to review was inherent in the right to 
participate in the planning process. 
 
For several reasons, we disagree. 
 
 
In City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 
684, 101 S.E.2d 641, 645 (1958), we stated the general 
“Dillon’s rule” as follows: 
It is a general and undisputed proposition 
of law that a municipal corporation possesses 
and can exercise the following powers and no 
others: First, those granted in express words; 
second, those necessarily or fairly implied in 
or incidental to the powers expressly granted; 
third, those essential to the declared objects 
and purposes of the corporation, not simply 
convenient but indispensable. Any fair, 
reasonable doubt concerning the existence of 
the power is resolved by the courts against the 
corporation and the power is denied. Winchester 
v. Redmond, 93 Va. 711; 25 S.E. 1001, 57 Am. 
St. Rep. 822 [1896]; Wallace v. Richmond, 94 
Va. 204, 26 S.E. 586, 36 L.R.A. 554 [1897]; 
Railway Co. v. Dameron, 95 Va. 545, 28 S.E. 951 
[1898]; Duncan v. City of Lynchburg, 2 Va. Dec. 
700, 34 S.E. 964, 48 L.R.A. 331 [1900]. 
 
However, we also stated the specific rule to be followed when 
the question is narrowed to consider the scope of a municipal 
corporation’s extraterritorial powers. “A municipal 
 
22
corporation is a mere local agency of the State and has no 
powers beyond the corporate limits except such as are clearly 
and unmistakably delegated by the legislature.”  Id.  In this 
instance, there is no clear and unmistakable delegation of 
concurrent power of the Town to engage in zoning 
determinations in the unincorporated portion of the County. 
Section 15.2-2232 and any reviews provided therein pertain to 
the planning function and not zoning.  
 
Code § 15.2-2232(A) provides in part: 
 
Whenever a local planning commission recommends 
a comprehensive plan or part thereof for the 
locality and such plan has been approved and 
adopted by the governing body, it shall control 
the general or approximate location, character 
and extent of each feature shown on the plan.  
Thereafter, unless a feature is already shown 
on the adopted master plan or part thereof 
. . . no . . . public building or public 
structure . . . shall be constructed, 
established or authorized, unless and until the 
general location or approximate location, 
character, and extent thereof has been 
submitted to and approved by the commission as 
being substantially in accord with the adopted 
comprehensive plan or part thereof. 
 
The “commission” referred to in Code § 15.2-2232 is the local 
planning commission referenced in Code § 15.2-2223:  “The 
local planning commission shall prepare and recommend a 
comprehensive plan for the physical development of the 
territory within its jurisdiction.”  (Emphasis added).  While 
the Town and the County jointly engage in planning, zoning 
 
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determinations within the unincorporated territory of the UGA 
remain under the exclusive authority of the County.  The Town 
may participate in the process; however, zoning authority is 
left with the commission where the territory is located – in 
this case, in the County. 
 
The trial court also held that once previously 
unincorporated territory in the UGA is annexed by the Town, it 
is no longer subject to commission permit review by the 
County.  This partial holding by the trial court is correct 
and recognizes the “mirror image” of the County’s zoning 
authority for territory in its jurisdiction. Each governmental 
entity retains zoning authority for territory in its 
jurisdiction.  If the land encompassed by the PUGAMP remains 
in the County, it is the County that retains the power to 
decide.  If the land in the PUGAMP is annexed by the Town, it 
is no longer in the County and it is the Town that has the 
power to decide. 
 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding that “the 
right to review was inherent in the right to participate in 
the planning process.”  The planning process is distinct from 
zoning determinations.  Pursuant to Code § 15.2-2232 and -
2223, zoning authority remains exclusively with the commission 
that has “the territory within its jurisdiction.” 
C. The BZA Appeals 
 
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The various BZA cases took convoluted paths to the trial 
court upon certiorari from decisions of the County BZA and the 
Town BZA.  The County asserts that the Town and the County 
agreed that the appropriate standard of review by the trial 
court is to uphold the BZA’s disposition unless it is “plainly 
wrong or without evidence to support” the decision.  The Town 
disagrees.  The record does reveal some discussion between 
counsel regarding the appropriate standard of review upon 
certiorari to the circuit court.  Assuming without deciding 
that the parties had an agreement regarding this matter, the 
trial court utilized the standard of review contained in Code 
§ 15.2-2314, giving deference to findings of fact incidental 
to BZA review of decisions of the zoning administrator.  Under 
this standard, “the findings and conclusions of the [BZA] on 
questions of fact shall be presumed to be correct.  The 
appealing party may rebut that presumption by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence . . . that the [BZA] erred in 
its decision.”  Code § 15.2-2314.  Conclusions of law reached 
by the BZA are not afforded the same presumption of 
correctness.  See id. (“The court shall hear any arguments on 
questions of law de novo”).  Because the trial court utilized 
the statutory standard of review and the County does not 
assign error to this determination, we will not utilize a 
 
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different standard purported to have been agreed upon by the 
litigants. 
 
Both the Town and the County engaged in BZA review of 
issues relating to the underlying controversy.  The Town 
Zoning Administrator determined that a commission permit must 
be obtained from the Town Planning Commission prior to 
locating HS-3 on the property in question because she 
determined that this feature was not depicted on the PUGAMP.  
The County appealed this determination to the Town BZA.  The 
Town BZA concluded that it had no authority to make a ruling 
regarding whether the feature was on the PUGAMP, agreeing with 
the County that because the property in question was beyond 
Town corporate limits, the Zoning Administrator did not have 
authority to make such a determination and consequently, the 
Town BZA had no jurisdiction to review the matter. 
On appeal, the trial court affirmed the Town BZA’s 
decision that it did not have such authority.  For the reasons 
previously stated herein concerning the declaratory judgment 
action, the trial court’s holding was correct.  The Town does 
not have extra-territorial jurisdiction concerning zoning 
decisions in the unincorporated area of the County that 
constitutes the UGA.  Nothing in the Code, Annexation 
Agreement or the PUGAMP provides such authority. 
 
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The County Zoning Administrator also considered whether a 
commission permit was required to permit the construction of 
HS-3.  The County Zoning Administrator made the following 
determinations: 
1. 
Development of the property is exclusively governed 
by the Loudoun County Zoning Ordinance and only the 
County Zoning Administrator is authorized to make 
binding determinations regarding the applicable 
zoning regulations. 
2. 
No official from the Town is entitled to make a 
determination that commission permits are required 
for the location of a high school on the property. 
3. 
A high school for the property is a feature shown on 
PUGAMP, the governing comprehensive plan. 
4. 
Even if a commission permit is required under the 
County Zoning Ordinance, no concurrence in that 
determination is required from the Town Planning 
Commission. 
 
The Town appealed these determinations to the County BZA, 
which upheld each of the Zoning Administrator’s decisions. 
 
On appeal, the trial court affirmed the BZA’s 
determination that the Zoning Administrator correctly 
determined that HS-3 is a feature shown on the PUGAMP and the 
trial court further held that no commission permit was 
required for the development of HS-3. The trial court reversed 
the remaining decisions of the County BZA declaring that those 
decisions were inconsistent with the trial court’s ruling in 
the declaratory judgment action. 
 
Herein we have held that the trial court erred in its 
judgment in the declaratory judgment action.  Flowing from 
 
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that holding, the trial court also erred in reversing the BZA 
decisions 1, 2, and 4 above.  As previously stated in the 
portion of this opinion dealing with the declaratory judgment 
action, only the County has zoning authority involving the 
development of HS-3 on the subject property.  The Town may 
participate in the process, but the County has zoning 
authority over the commission permit question. 
 
With regard to the trial court’s ruling that HS-3 is a 
feature shown on the PUGAMP and that no commission permit is 
required for its development, we disagree. Code § 15.2-2223 
states that a “comprehensive plan shall be general in nature, 
in that it shall designate the general or approximate 
location, character, and extent of each feature . . . shown on 
the plan and shall indicate where existing lands or facilities 
are proposed to be . . . changed in use.”  Under Code § 15.2-
2232, unless already shown on the plan, a feature’s “general” 
or “approximate location, character, and extent” must be 
“submitted to and approved by the commission as being 
substantially in accord with the adopted comprehensive plan” 
before being constructed.  The trial court determined that HS-
3 is a feature that is shown on the plan; consequently, 
commission permit review is not required in order to proceed 
with development.  
 
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Code § 15.2-2232 anticipates construction of features 
that are not shown anywhere on the comprehensive plan, in this 
case, the PUGAMP.  Clearly, if a feature is not even 
mentioned, a commission permit is required to determine 
whether the proposal is “substantially in accord with the 
adopted comprehensive plan.”  However, the statute, standing 
alone, does not anticipate a feature being mentioned but later 
proposed to be constructed in a location significantly removed 
from the planning site. 
When engaged in statutory construction, we must harmonize 
statutes as much as possible to give effect to all of their 
provisions. LZM, Inc. v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 269 Va. 
105, 111, 606 S.E.2d 797, 800 (2005).  The determination 
whether a feature is “already shown on the adopted master 
plan” pursuant to Code § 15.2-2232 must be made in light of 
the requirement that a “general or approximate location” of 
the feature is required in Code § 15.2-2223.  The location of 
HS-3 on the PUGAMP is in the northeast corner of the UGA.  The 
County’s proposed location for building HS-3 is in the 
northwest corner of the UGA.  The UGA is approximately three 
miles wide and the proposed location is two miles from the 
location of the feature on the PUGAMP.  Because the proposed 
location is not in accordance with the “general or approximate 
location” requirement for the plan, the proposed location of 
 
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HS-3 amounts to the functional equivalent of no feature at 
all.  Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court 
erred in determining that the proposed construction of HS-3 is 
a feature shown on the PUGAMP and the trial court further 
erred in holding that no commission permit was required for 
the development of HS-3. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
The trial court did not err in holding that the 
declaratory judgment action was properly before it and that 
the matters in controversy were not moot.  However, we hold 
that the trial court erred in the declaratory judgment action 
by holding that with respect to the implementation of the 
PUGAMP, “the right to review was inherent in the right to 
participate in the planning process.”  For the reasons stated 
herein, this error affected the trial court’s judgment in the 
BZA appeals.  Finally, the trial court erred in holding that 
HS-3 is a feature shown on the PUGAMP and that no commission 
permit is required for its development. 
 
With regard to these consolidated appeals, we will affirm 
in part and reverse in part as stated herein and remand these 
matters for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
 
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