Case Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Mahoney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90-52

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Mahoney1990 WY 112798 P.2d 836Case Number: 90-52Decided: 10/11/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. 
WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION,

 APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER),

v.

JERRY MAHONEY, 

APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT).

Petition for review from 
the Workers' Compensation Division.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., and Larry Donovan, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for 
appellant.

George Santini, 
argued, of Graves, Santini & Villemez, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Jerry Mahoney, a 
Wyoming state employee, was injured when she slipped and fell on a boat dock. 
After a contested case hearing before the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division, a hearing officer awarded Ms. Mahoney worker's compensation benefits 
for her injuries. The State filed a petition for judicial review which the 
district court certified for our consideration under W.R.A.P. 
12.09.

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

[¶3]      The State's brief 
raises two issues:

"I. Whether the 
administrative hearing in this case met the standards required by the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedures Act. "

II. Whether the 
administrative hearing officer erred as a matter of law when he granted worker's 
compensation coverage to a state employee who slipped and fell on a boat 
dock."

[¶4]      Jerry Mahoney was 
employed as a senior insurance examiner by the Wyoming Insurance Department. She 
traveled frequently in connection with her employment to audit out-of-state 
insurers conducting business within the State of Wyoming. She was paid both 
mileage and a per diem rate for such trips.

[¶5]      On July 29, 1988, 
she was returning to Cheyenne from one such trip to Kansas City, Missouri in her 
motor home, a vehicle in which she was authorized to travel on state business. 
She pulled off the highway at approximately 7:30 p.m. to stop for the night. She 
parked her motor home near the cabin of a friend in the area of Louisville State 
Recreation Area in eastern Nebraska.

[¶6]      That evening, she 
decided to swim in a nearby lake. While approaching the lake, she slipped and 
fell on a boat ramp and injured her wrist. Her injury required a night's 
hospital stay in Papillion, Nebraska, after which she recuperated for a few days 
at her daughter's house in Omaha.

[¶7]      Ms. Mahoney filed 
a claim for worker's compensation for the injury to her wrist. The State 
disputed her claim. After a contested case hearing held on March 1, 1989, the 
hearing officer held that Ms. Mahoney was, at the time of her injury, a 
"traveling state employee" within the meaning of W.S. 27-14-103(c) and that her 
injury arose out of, and in the scope and course of, her employment. The hearing 
officer then entered an award of worker's compensation 
benefits.

[¶8]      We address 
appellant's second issue first. Our holding on this issue is dispositive, which 
makes it unnecessary for us to consider the procedural grounds for reversal 
urged by appellant.

[¶9]      In reviewing a 
worker's compensation determination, we apply the standard of review for agency 
decisions. Hohnholt v. Basin Electric Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233, 234 (Wyo. 
1989). Our review of administrative action is confined to the factors set forth 
in W.S. 16-3-114(c) and W.R.A.P. 12.09. Employment Security Commission v. 
Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 870 (Wyo. 1990). Wyoming Statute 
16-3-114(c) provides as follows:

"To the extent necessary 
to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

"(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

"(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

"(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

"(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

"(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

"(D) Without observance 
of procedure required by law; or

"(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

[¶10]   In this case, we are called on to 
determine whether W.S. 27-14-103(c) was correctly interpreted as providing 
coverage for Ms. Mahoney's injuries. The relevant portion of W.S. 27-14-103(c) 
reads as follows:

"This act also applies to 
all other state employees, officers or persons working for the state * * * 
while traveling by state owned vehicles or a duly authorized private vehicle, 
but only when the travel occurs in the performance of the employees' 
duties." (emphasis added)

[¶11]   Under the scheme of the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act, employees are afforded coverage only if their 
occupation or activity falls within one of the enumerated categories of 
extrahazardous activities listed in W.S. 27-14-103. Ms. Mahoney's employment is 
not within any of the enumerated categories and therefore she is not ordinarily 
covered by worker's compensation. Coverage may be extended to her when she is 
traveling in a vehicle as provided in W.S. 27-14-103(c). Thus, at issue in this 
case is the interpretation of the last clause of subsection (c), extending the 
protections of the Act to state employees traveling by state-owned vehicle or a 
duly-authorized private vehicle.

[¶12]   Initially, we note it is undisputed 
that Ms. Mahoney's motor home was a "duly authorized private vehicle" within the 
meaning of the statute. In dispute is whether Ms. Mahoney's injuries occurred 
while "traveling by * * * private vehicle" within the performance of her duties 
as contemplated by the statute. In order to determine whether Ms. Mahoney falls 
within the statute, we must determine the meaning of the phrase "while traveling 
by * * * vehicle."

[¶13]   In reaching our conclusion, we are 
mindful of the principle that the worker's compensation statutes are to be 
liberally construed in favor of compensation for the injured claimant. Seckman 
v. Wyo-Ben, Inc., 783 P.2d 161, 165 (Wyo. 1989). We normally accord some weight 
to the construction of a statute by an administrative agency unless the agency's 
construction is clearly erroneous. Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board of 
Control, 647 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Wyo. 1982). We will not, however, under the guise 
of statutory construction, extend coverage to situations which are not 
reasonably contemplated by the statutory language. Matter of Van Matre, 657 P.2d 815, 818 (Wyo. 1983); Randell v. Wyoming State Treasurer, ex rel. Worker's Comp. 
Div., 671 P.2d 303, 309 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶14]   Coverage under the last clause of 
W.S. 27-14-103(c) is extended to circumstances in which an employee is traveling 
by an authorized private vehicle. The phrase in question has two distinct 
elements: while traveling and by vehicle. In interpreting a 
statute, every word, clause and sentence must be considered so that no part will 
be rendered inoperative or superfluous. Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 (Wyo. 
1988). Each element must be given meaning.

[¶15]   We hold that by using the words 
by vehicle in this context, the legislative intent was to cover the 
particular dangers connected with transportation by a motor vehicle. Had the 
legislature intended to provide coverage for the dangers associated with 
traveling on state business in general, it need not have used the phrase 
traveling by vehicle. Coverage under a particular provision of the Act is 
not limited to those risks which caused the legislature to enact it. In re 
Gimlin, 403 P.2d 178, 182 (Wyo. 1965). However, an injury must result from a 
duty which is at least incidental to covered employment. Rocky Mountain Tank 
& Steel Co. v. Rager, 423 P.2d 645, 647 (Wyo. 1967). Thus, we hold that 
injuries to be covered under the relevant clause of W.S. 27-14-103(c) must be at 
least incidental to travel by motor vehicle.

[¶16]   This interpretation is consistent 
with our holding in Randell, 671 P.2d 303. In Randell, a claim similar to the 
present one was made by a former director of the State Board of Nursing who 
tripped and fell on a curb in a parking lot while approaching her vehicle. Ms. 
Randell was on her way home and was carrying a stack of testing materials which 
she planned to review there. She claimed coverage under the "traveling in state 
owned vehicles" language of W.S. 27-12-107(b) (December 1977 Repl.), a 
predecessor to W.S. 27-14-103(c). We noted, in affirming denial of benefits, 
that "there was no evidence that at the time of the fall the appellant was doing 
anything with respect to the vehicle other than walking across the parking lot 
to it." Randell, at 309.

[¶17]   Turning to the facts of this case, 
we find that Ms. Mahoney's injuries were not related to motor vehicle 
transportation at all, but to recreational swimming. She had already stopped her 
motor home for the night. Her accident occurred at an undetermined distance from 
the roadway and was unrelated to the fact that she had been driving earlier in 
the day on state business. Therefore, she failed to satisfy the requirement that 
her injury occur "while traveling by * * * vehicle."

[¶18]   Appellee correctly points out that 
injuries sustained by an employee traveling to and from a jobsite are covered 
where the employee is reimbursed by his employer for the cost of such travel. 
Matter of Willey, 571 P.2d 248 (Wyo. 1977). Ms. Mahoney claims that because she 
was paid a per diem allowance to cover her expenses while traveling, pursuant to 
W.S. 9-3-102 (June 1987 Repl.), that the Willey coverage rule applies to the 
entire day on which she was traveling.

[¶19]   We note that the per diem 
provisions in W.S. 9-3-102 (June 1987 Repl.) deal with reimbursement for 
lodging, meals, and gratuity expenses. These expenses are not incidental to 
travel by motor vehicle. Thus, they are irrelevant to Ms. Mahoney's claim under 
our reading of W.S. 27-14-103(c). In any case, we decline to read Willey so 
broadly.

[¶20]   Appellee also relies on our 
decision in Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Comp. Dept. v. Boston, 445 P.2d 548 (Wyo. 1968). In Boston, employees, engaged in a side trip which did not 
constitute abandonment of their travel to and from work, were covered when 
injured in an accident which occurred after they had returned to their appointed 
route. Boston involved an accident which occurred while the claimants were 
driving. Thus, it is factually distinguishable from this 
case.

[¶21]   Appellee points to no decision of 
this court relating to transportation to and from work in which we have upheld 
compensation for non-vehicle related injuries.

[¶22]   The hearing officer's finding that 
Ms. Mahoney was entitled to benefits based on W.S. 27-14-103(c) was erroneous as 
a matter of law.

[¶23]   Reversed.