Case Title: Bonnie Wehle et al. v. Thomas H. Bradley III, as Co-personal Representative of the Estate of Robert G. Wehle, deceased, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 10/30/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1101290
____________________
Bonnie Wehle et al.
v.
Thomas H. Bradley III, as co-personal representative
of the estate of Robert G. Wehle, deceased, et al.
Appeal from Bullock Circuit Court
(CV-2007-000022)
On Application for Rehearing
MURDOCK, Justice.
This Court's opinion of March 14, 2014, is withdrawn, and
the following is substituted therefor.
1101290
Bonnie Wehle, Penny Martin, and Sharon Ann Wehle ("the
daughters") appeal from the Bullock Circuit Court's order on
final settlement of the estate of their deceased father,
Robert G. Wehle ("the estate").  In this "final order," the
circuit court denied the daughters' claims against Thomas H.
Bradley III, James H. McGowan, and Grady Hartzog, as the co-
personal representatives of the estate ("the personal
representatives"); the order also denied the daughters'
request that McGowan be removed as a cotrustee of the family
trust created under Robert G. Wehle's will and awarded
attorney fees to the personal representatives.  We affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand.  
I.  Facts and Procedural History
This is the second time this case has come before us.  In
the previous appeal, Wehle v. Bradley, 49 So. 3d 1203 (Ala.
2010) ("Wehle I"), this Court summarized the facts as follows:
"Robert G. Wehle died on July 12, 2002.  His
will was admitted to probate, and [in August 2002]
letters 
testamentary 
were 
issued 
to 
Bradley,
McGowan, and Hartzog as co-personal representatives
of Wehle's estate.  The will created a marital trust
for Wehle's wife, Gatra Wehle, and a family trust
for the daughters and Wehle's granddaughter, Debbie
Kloppenberg.  The personal representatives were
named as cotrustees of both the marital trust and
the family trust.
2
1101290
"In October 2005, the personal representatives
petitioned the probate court for final settlement of
the estate.  They also filed an accounting of their
administration of the estate.  The accounting
indicated that the personal representatives had paid
themselves total compensation of $1,964,367.82,
which, they allege, amounts to 5% of the value of
Wehle's estate at the time the petition for final
settlement was filed.  The personal representatives
argue that the amount of their fees is consistent
with the statutory allowance for such fees.  They
also argue that Wehle told his attorney that he
intended for the personal representatives' fees to
be approximately 5% of the value of his estate.
"The daughters filed an objection to the
accounting, arguing, among other things, that,
pursuant to § 43-2-844(7), Ala. Code 1975, the
personal representatives were required to obtain
prior court approval before compensating themselves
out of the assets of the estate.  The daughters also
argued that the amount of the compensation exceeded
the 
'reasonable 
compensation' 
allowed 
by
§ 43-2-848(a), Ala. Code 1975.
"In March 2007, Gatra Wehle petitioned to have
the administration of the estate removed to the
circuit court.  The petition was granted.
"The personal representatives moved the circuit
court for a partial summary judgment on the
daughters' objections, arguing (1) that the will
authorized the payment of the compensation to the
personal 
representatives 
without 
prior 
court
approval, and (2) that the statute of limitations
barred the daughters' claim that the fees of the
personal 
representatives 
were 
excessive. 
 
On
July 17, 2009, the circuit court granted the
personal representatives' motion for a partial
summary judgment, stating:
3
1101290
"'As to the claim that the Personal
Representatives paid fees to themselves
without 
obtaining 
Court 
approval, 
the 
Court
finds that the terms of the Will expressly
exempt the Personal Representatives from
obtaining Court approval before payment of
their fees.  As to the claim that the fees
paid were excessive, it is without factual
dispute that [the daughters] had knowledge
of the amount of these fees more than two
years before they filed their contest of
the fees and thus this claim is time
barred.'
"On July 24, 2009, the daughters appealed to
this Court from the circuit court's judgment
pursuant to § 12-22-4, Ala. Code 1975."
49 So. 3d at 1205-07.
In Wehle I, this Court concluded that "[b]ecause the
payment of compensation to the personal representatives
without prior court approval was not expressly authorized by
Robert G. Wehle's will, the circuit court erred in entering
its partial summary judgment in favor of the personal
representatives."  49 So. 3d at 1209; see also Ala. Code 1975,
§ 43-2-844(7).  This Court reversed the circuit court's
judgment and remanded the case on that basis; it did not
decide the issue whether the daughters' "claim as to the
excessiveness of the compensation is barred by the statute of
limitations."  Id.
4
1101290
On remand, the circuit court held a hearing at which
evidence was presented ore tenus as to the petition for final
settlement of the estate.  Thereafter, the circuit court
entered its final order  approving the compensation the
personal 
representatives 
had 
paid 
themselves, 
i.e.,
$1,964,367.82, as "reasonable compensation" under § 43-2-
848(a), Ala. Code 1975.  The order denied the daughters' claim
seeking to have the personal representatives pay interest on
the compensation because they had paid it without prior court
approval.  Also, in regard to other issues raised by the
daughters, the order denied the daughters' petition to remove
McGowan as a cotrustee of the family trust, denied the
daughters' request to tax costs relating to Wehle I against
the personal representatives, and awarded attorney fees and
costs to the personal representatives in the amount of
$383,437.31 as to their defense against the daughters' claims
on final settlement.   The daughters appeal.  
1
The circuit court also approved a payment of $20,000 to
1
Hartzog & Company, P.C., for work the daughters alleged Grady
Hartzog also was compensated for as a 
personal 
representative. 
The daughters have not challenged on appeal the payment to
Hartzog & Company, P.C.; however, they do include this payment
in connection with their argument that the compensation
awarded Hartzog for his services as a personal representative
was unreasonable.  
5
1101290
II.  Standard of Review
To the extent the circuit court made factual findings
based on oral testimony, those factual findings are entitled
to deference by this Court under the ore tenus standard of
review.  Under that standard, "'we must accept as true the
facts found by the trial court if there is substantial
evidence to support the trial court's findings.'"  Allsopp v.
Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 959 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Beasley v.
Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp., 569 So. 2d 389, 393 (Ala. 1990)). 
This standard is based on a recognition of the trial court's
unique position of being able to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses and to assign weight to their testimony.  See, e.g.,
Justice v. Arab Lumber & Supply, Inc., 533 So. 2d 538, 543
(Ala. 1988).  The deference owed a trial court under the
ore tenus standard of review, however, does not extend to the
trial court's decisions on questions of law.  Appellate review
of questions of law, as well as whether the trial court has
properly applied that law to a given set of facts, is de novo. 
See, e.g., Ex parte Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215, 1221 (Ala. 1997).
III.  Analysis
A.  Reasonableness of the Personal Representatives' Fees
6
1101290
Under Alabama law, 
"[a] 
personal 
representative 
is 
entitled 
to
reasonable compensation for services as may appear
to the court to be fair considering such factors
that may include, but are not limited to, the
novelty 
and 
difficulty 
of 
the 
administrative
process, the skill requisite to perform the service,
the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment, the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar
services, the amount involved and the results
obtained, 
the 
requirements 
imposed 
by 
the
circumstances and condition of the estate, the
nature and length of the professional relationship
with the decedent, the experience, reputation,
diligence, and ability of the person performing the
services, the liability, financial or otherwise, of
the personal representative, or the risk and
responsibility involved, which shall not exceed two
and one-half percent of the value of all property
received and under the possession and control of the
personal representative and two and one-half percent
of all disbursements."
Ala. Code 1975, § 43-2-848(a).  Although the allowance of
compensation for the 
personal 
representative and the amount of
that compensation are mixed questions of law and fact, our
cases state that decisions as to these issues are largely
within the discretion of the trial judge.  See Armstrong v.
Alabama Nat'l Bank of Montgomery, 404 So. 2d 675, 676 (Ala.
1981).  The amount of compensation to be allowed under § 43-2-
848(a) "'below or up to the maximum limit prescribed [thereby]
is to be determined according to the circumstances of each
7
1101290
particular case.'"  Armstrong, 404 So. 2d at 676 (quoting
Smith v. McNaughton, 378 So. 2d 703, 704-05 (Ala. 1979)).  In
determining whether the trial court exceeded its 
discretion 
as
to a compensation award under § 43-2-848(a), we must consider
the amount of the award "in view of all the circumstances" of
the administration of the estate.  Ruttenberg v. Friedman, 97
So. 3d 114, 122 (Ala. 2012); see also, e.g., Armstrong, 404
So. 2d at 676 (discussing the deference owed a determination
of a personal representative's fee made after the trial court
heard ore tenus evidence).
Discussing the predecessor statute to § 43-2-848(a), this
Court in Armstrong explained that the statute creates
"'a maximum limit to compensation to be
allowed 
[personal 
representatives], 
for 
the
ordinary services performed by them, and
what shall be allowed, below or up to this
limit, is to be determined according to the
circumstances 
of 
each 
particular 
case. 
"The
court in making the allowance is to look to
the loss of time, risk and responsibility,
which are demanded .... and which is
actually incurred, and to allow ... such a
reasonable remuneration as a prudent and
just 
man 
would, 
in 
view 
of 
the
circumstances, 
consider 
a 
fair
compensation, 
without, 
however, 
being
governed by business charges usually made
for like services."  When thus allowed, the
compensation is not, and should not be, but
8
1101290
little, if anything, more than liberal
indemnity.'"
404 So. 2d at 676 (quoting  Kenan v. Graham, 135 Ala. 585,
595, 33 So. 699, 701 (1902)).
The estate was "very large and complex."  The estate was
valued at more than $35,000,000 at the time of Robert G.
Wehle's death, and the estate contained some unusual assets,
including competition-trained hunting dogs, partial ownership
interests in thoroughbred horses, and artwork.  The estate
also included other business entities owned by Robert G.
Wehle, and his estate plan included multiple trusts.  It is
undisputed 
that 
Robert 
G. 
Wehle 
chose 
the 
personal
representatives because of his  longstanding business and
personal relationships with each of them and because of each
personal representative's expertise:  McGowan is a lawyer who
practices law in New York; Hartzog is a certified public
accountant who practices accounting 
in Alabama; and Bradley is
an expert in dealings with thoroughbred horses and hunting
dogs.  Also, there was evidence indicating that Robert G.
Wehle desired that the personal representatives receive "the
5% maximum" for their services. 
9
1101290
As 
noted 
above, 
the 
circuit 
court 
approved 
the
compensation 
of 
$1,964,367.82 
the 
personal 
representatives 
had
paid themselves.  The total receipts of the estate (assets and
income during administration) through the time of final
settlement were $40,477,724.08; the total disbursements were
$40,452,262.23.  Based on the receipts and disbursements, the
maximum fee the circuit court could have awarded the personal
representatives under § 43-2-848(a) was $2,023,249.66.   Thus,
2
the compensation award does not exceed the statutory maximum
prescribed in § 43-2-848(a).   
The daughters argue that the circuit court exceeded its
discretion in awarding the compensation to the personal
representatives, raising issues as to each of the factors in
§ 43-2-848(a).  We note that the final order includes a review
of each of the § 43-2-848(a) factors, the daughters arguments
as to each of those factors, and a summary as to some of the
evidence the circuit court accepted or rejected as to each
factor.  Further, the circuit court noted in the order:
We note that the circuit court opined that the personal
2
representatives 
were entitled to the statutory maximum, but it
awarded them only what they had paid themselves.  Had the
circuit court awarded the personal representatives the
statutory maximum award, they would have received an
additional $58,881.84.  
10
1101290
"In 
analyzing these 
factors, 
the 
court 
took 
into
consideration the exhibits provided and agreed upon
by the parties, as well as the testimony of each of
the 
Personal 
Representatives, 
and 
the 
expert
witnesses who testified for both sides.  The court
considered the credibility of the expert witness
testimony, as well as the weight to be afforded to
that testimony, particularly in light of apparent
limitations in the knowledge of the [daughters']
expert, Daniel Markstein, who admitted to having
reviewed 
only 
a 
fraction 
of 
the 
available
documentation describing the services performed by
the Personal Representatives." 
As to the circuit court's consideration of the § 43-2-
848(a) factors, the daughters make the same arguments on
appeal that the circuit court rejected or discounted in light
of its consideration of the totality of the evidence and its
credibility determinations.  We see no need to discuss the
daughters' arguments in detail because they would be of no
benefit to the bench and bar.  The daughters essentially urge
this Court to reweigh the evidence and the circuit court's
balancing of the § 43-2-848(a) factors in a manner that favors
the daughters and that would mandate a lower compensation
award.  It is not the role of an appellate court, however, to
reweigh testimony and other evidence or to substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court as to such matters.  See,
e.g., Ex parte Blackstock, 47 So. 3d 801, 805 (Ala. 2009). 
Based on our review of the evidence presented to the circuit
11
1101290
court, we cannot conclude that the compensation awarded by the
court was without sufficient supporting evidence or that the
circuit court exceeded its discretion in making the award. 
See Ruttenberg, supra.  
In addition to discussing the § 43-2-848(a) factors, the
daughters 
also 
argue 
that 
a 
comparison 
between 
the
compensation awarded in the present case and the compensation
approved for the personal representative in Armstrong v.
Alabama National Bank, supra, demonstrates that the personal
representatives' compensation in the present case was
excessive.  The Armstrong Court affirmed a compensation award
of 
$304,000 
for 
a 
large, 
complex 
estate 
valued 
at
$7,469,273.92.  The award in Armstrong was below the statutory
maximum, but the daughters note that the award was equal to
approximately 4.08% percent of the value of the estate.  404
So. 2d at 676.  According to the daughters, a similar award in
the present case would have yielded a compensation award of
$1,645,273.22, rather than the $1,964,367.82 awarded by the
circuit court.   
We are not persuaded by the daughters' comparison
argument.  First, we note that the formula for the maximum fee
award under § 43-2-848(a) is not five percent of the value of
12
1101290
the estate (though it is sometimes referred to in that
manner); rather, it is "two and one-half percent of the value
of all property received and under the possession and control
of the personal representative and two and one-half percent of
all disbursements."  As noted above, the award in the present
case is less than the maximum permissible award under § 43-2-
848(a).  More importantly, however, as the Armstrong Court
acknowledged, "[t]he award of [personal-representative] fees
is largely within the discretion of the trial judge," and
"'what shall be allowed, below or up to [the maximum] limit, 
is to be determined according to the circumstances of each
particular case.'" 404 So. 2d at 676 (quoting Kenan, 135 Ala.
at 595, 30 So. at 701 (emphasis added)).  All large, complex
estates are not equal, and this Court did not intend for its
holding in Armstrong to establish a benchmark as to what
constitutes a reasonable compensation award for a personal
representative of a large, complex estate.  
3
Indeed, the Armstrong Court stated that, "though we
3
consider the fees awarded to be somewhat high, nevertheless,
under the applicable standard of review, we cannot conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion."  404 So. 2d at
677.  
13
1101290
Based on the evidence presented to the circuit court and
the arguments made by the daughters, we cannot conclude that
the circuit court exceeded its discretion in awarding the
amount 
of 
compensation 
it 
awarded 
the 
personal 
representatives
in the present case. 
B.  Interest on Payments Made Without Prior Court Approval
Section § 43-2-844(7), Ala. Code 1975, provides that
"[u]nless expressly authorized by the will, a personal
representative, only after prior approval of court, may ...
[p]ay compensation of the personal representative."  It is
undisputed that the personal representatives paid  themselves
compensation before obtaining court approval for that
compensation.  The daughters contend that the circuit court
erred by denying their claim seeking interest from the
personal representatives from the date of the compensation
payments through the date those payments were approved by the
circuit court.  
The daughters first note that, in contradiction of the
decision in Wehle I, the circuit court concluded in its final
order that Robert G. Wehle's will "expressly allowed advanced
payments to be made to the Personal Representatives." 
According to the circuit court, because the will authorized
14
1101290
the payments and because the payments were made in good faith
and upon the advice of counsel, there was no basis for
imposing 
an 
interest 
charge 
against 
the 
personal
representatives.  The circuit court quoted several provisions
of the will that it concluded "expressly give[] the Personal
Representatives the right to advance themselves money."  
In Wehle I, this Court noted several provisions of Robert
G. 
Wehle's will upon which the personal representatives 
sought
to rely as justification for making compensation payments to
themselves without first obtaining court approval.  We
concluded that those provisions did "'not satisfy the
requirement in [§ 43-2-844] that there be an "express
provision"' 
authorizing the payment of such fees without 
court
approval."  49 So. 3d at 1209 (quoting Green v. Estate of
Nance, 971 So. 2d 38, 42 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)).  
As the daughters correctly observe, the circuit court's
conclusion on remand that no prior court approval was
necessary  violates the doctrine of the law of the case.  
"'Under the doctrine of the "law of the case,"
whatever is once established between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of
that case, whether or not correct on general
principles, so long as the facts on which the
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of
the case.'  Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So.
15
1101290
2d 922, 924 (Ala. 1987).  See also Titan Indem. Co.
v. Riley, 679 So. 2d 701 (Ala. 1996).  'It is well
established that on remand the issues decided by an
appellate court become the 'law of the case,' and
that the trial court must comply with the appellate
court's mandate.'  Gray v. Reynolds, 553 So. 2d 79,
81 (Ala. 1989)."
Southern United Fire Ins. Co. v. Purma, 792 So. 2d 1092, 1094
(Ala. 2001).  It does not matter that the circuit court in
some instances in its order quoted provisions of the will this
Court did not quote in Wehle I.  The personal representatives
could have cited those provisions as authority for the
premature payments in their appeal in Wehle I; they did not do
so.  Moreover, whether they did so or not, the issue at hand
-– 
whether 
the 
will 
contained 
"express 
provisions" 
authorizing
the payment of fees to personal representatives without prior
court approval -– was before this Court and was decided by
this Court in Wehle I.
"'Under the law of the case doctrine, "[a] party
cannot on a second appeal relitigate issues which
were resolved by the Court in the first appeal or
which would have been resolved had they been
properly presented in the first appeal."'  Kortum v.
Johnson, 786 N.W.2d 702, 705 (N.D. 2010) (quoting
State ex rel. North Dakota Dep't of Labor v.
Riemers, 779 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 2010) ...); see also
Judy v. Martin, 381 S.C. 455, 458, 674 S.E.2d 151,
153 (2009) ('Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a
party is precluded from relitigating, after an
appeal, matters that were either not raised on
appeal, but should have been, or raised on appeal,
16
1101290
but expressly rejected by the appellate court.
C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 991 (2008)....')."
Scrushy v. Tucker, 70 So. 3d 289, 303-04 (Ala. 2011)(emphasis
omitted); see also Schramm v. Spottswood, 109 So. 3d 154, 162
(Ala. 2012) (applying the law-of-the-case doctrine where a
party attempted to "advance a new argument in order to revisit
an issue already decided by the trial court" and affirmed in
a previous appeal).  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court did not
expressly determine in Wehle I whether the personal
representatives owed the estate interest for making the
compensation payments to themselves without prior court
approval.  As to that issue, the circuit court listed several
other reasons for rejecting the daughters' interest claim. 
Among those reasons was the threshold determination that the
daughters' interest claim was barred by the statute of
limitations.  The circuit court noted that it is undisputed
that in 2003 the daughters received a copy of the estate-tax
return filed by the personal representatives.  That tax return
reflected 
compensation 
for 
the 
personal 
representatives 
in 
the
amount of $1,763,459.  The daughters did not file any
objection to the payment of compensation until February 20,
17
1101290
2007, when, in response to the personal representatives'
petition for final settlement of the estate, the daughters
filed 
their "Objection to Accounting and Application to 
Remove
Personal Representatives."  As the circuit court noted, the
daughters' objection to the payments was filed over three
years after they allegedly became aware that payments had been
made to the personal representatives.  The circuit court found
that the daughters' claim for interest therefore ran afoul of
the two-year limitations period prescribed in § 6-2-38(l),
Ala. Code 1975, which the circuit court found to be applicable
in this case.  
4
We reject the circuit court's conclusion that the
daughters' claim for interest was barred by the statute of
limitations prescribed by § 6-2-38(l).  The daughters' claim
is based on § 43-2-509, Ala. Code 1975, which states that,
"[i]f any executor or administrator uses any of the funds of
the estate for his own benefit, he is accountable for any
profit made thereon or legal interest."  This statute does not
state when the interest must be paid, only that the personal
In light of our disposition of this issue and the
4
discussion that follows, we do not address the issue whether
the circuit court was correct as to the applicability of the
two-year statute of limitations found in § 6-2-38(l).
18
1101290
representative eventually is to be held "accountable" for 
such
interest.  That is, there is no requirement that the personal
representative must begin paying the prescribed interest
immediately after advancing to himself or herself the fees in
question.  Instead, in cases where it is determined that the
statute requires the payment of interest by the personal
representative, that obligation, like any other obligation of
the personal representative, must be ordered by the trial
court as part of the accounting on final settlement of the
estate.  See Ala. Code 1975, § 43-2-500 et seq.  We therefore
reject the notion that the daughters somehow ran afoul of a
statute 
of limitations when, in connection with the 
settlement
of the estate, they made a claim for an appropriate
"account[ing] for ... legal interest" alleged by them to be
owed by the personal representatives for the misuse of funds
of the estate during its administration.
The circuit court also concluded that the daughters
"should be equitably estopped from asserting a claim for
interest against the Personal Representatives in this case." 
The circuit court erred as to its ruling on equitable estoppel
in at least two respects.
19
1101290
First, in making payments to themselves without obtaining
prior court approval, the personal representatives violated
their statutory duty under  § 43-2-844(7).  Their "dereliction
in duty" precluded them from using equitable estoppel as a
defense to the daughters' interest claim.  As this Court has
explained:
"'The purpose of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel is to promote equity and justice
in an individual case by preventing a party
from asserting rights under a general rule
of law when his own conduct renders the
assertion of such rights contrary to equity
and good conscience.  Mazer v. Jackson Ins.
Agency, 340 So. 2d 770 (Ala. 1976).  The
party asserting the doctrine of equitable
estoppel may not predicate his claim on his
own dereliction of duty or wrongful
conduct.  Draughon v. General Finance
Credit Corp., 362 So. 2d 880, 884 (Ala.
1978).'
"Pierce v. Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves &
Johnston, 678 So. 2d 765, 768 (Ala. 1996).
"In 
order 
for 
the 
doctrine 
of 
equitable estoppel
to apply, a party must demonstrate:
"'"(1) That '[t]he person against
whom estoppel is asserted, who
usually must have knowledge of
the facts, communicates something
in a misleading way, either by
words, conduct, or silence, with
the 
intention 
that 
the
communication will be acted on';
20
1101290
"'"(2) That 'the person seeking
to assert estoppel, who lacks
knowledge of the facts, relies
upon [the] communication'; and
"'"(3) That 'the person relying
would be harmed materially if the
actor is 
later 
permitted 
to
assert a claim inconsistent with
his earlier conduct.'"
"'Lambert v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan,
682 So. 2d 61, 64 (Ala. 1996), quoting
General 
Electric 
Credit 
Corp. 
v. 
Strickland
Div. of Rebel Lumber Co., 437 So. 2d 1240,
1243 (Ala. 1983).'
"Allen v. Bennett, 823 So. 2d 679, 685 (Ala. 2001)."
BSI Rentals, Inc. v. Wendt, 893 So. 2d 1184, 1187-88 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2004)(emphasis added).   
Second, the circuit court based its conclusion on the
daughters' having received a copy of the estate-tax return. 
The estate-tax return, however, described the amount the
personal 
representatives 
intended 
to 
claim 
as 
compensation 
for
their services as of the date of the filing of the return. 
The estate-tax return did not indicate whether the personal
representatives had actually paid themselves at the time the
return was filed.  Accordingly, the doctrine of equitable
estoppel provides no basis for the circuit court's decision. 
21
1101290
Although none of the above-discussed grounds supports the
circuit court's decision to deny the daughters an award of
interest in connection with the premature payment by the
personal 
representatives 
of fees to themselves in violation of
§ 43-2-844(7), the personal representatives have submitted to
this Court a supplemental filing in which they invoke this
Court's recent decision in Ruttenberg v. Friedman, 97 So. 3d
114, 122 (Ala. 2012), a case decided after briefing was
completed in the present case.  The personal representatives
argue 
that Ruttenberg 
supports the circuit court's decision to
deny the daughters' interest claim.
In Ruttenberg, the widow and two of the three children of
the decedent, Harold Ruttenberg, argued that the personal
representatives in that case had "breached their fiduciary
duty by violating § 43-2-844(7)," specifically by paying
themselves $800,000 in compensation without obtaining prior
court approval.  97 So. 3d at 134.  When addressing whether
the personal representatives in Ruttenberg had breached their
fiduciary duty by not obtaining court approval before making
compensation payments to themselves, this Court reasoned:
"Section 
43-2-844(7), 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
states, 
in
part:  'Unless expressly authorized by the will, a
personal representative, only after prior approval
22
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of court, may ... [p]ay compensation to the personal
representative.'  However, in this case, any error
in the prior payment of coexecutors' fees for
ordinary services without prior court approval is
moot.  Here, the probate court took evidence and
heard argument about the reasonableness of the
requested fees, considered the statutory factors
applicable to determining a reasonable fee, and
credited the total fee awarded by the amount the
coexecutors 
had 
previously 
paid 
themselves. 
Specifically, 
the 
probate 
court 
awarded 
the
coexecutors $1,165,937 in fees for ordinary services
and said: '$800,000 has been properly paid.  ... 
The remaining $365,937 is due to be paid in equal
shares of $182,968.50.'  Therefore, any error was
remedied when the probate court issued its final
award, after taking into consideration the statutory
factors set out in §§ 43-2-848 and -682, Ala. Code
1975, and then crediting the amount the coexecutors
had paid themselves against the total fee awarded to
the coexecutors for ordinary services."
97 So. 3d at 134-35 (emphasis added).  
This Court in Ruttenberg did not specifically discuss the
issue whether personal representatives who pay themselves
compensation 
without prior court 
approval must pay interest to
the estate on such payments.  As noted above, § 43-2-844(7)
states that, "[u]nless expressly authorized by the will, a
personal representative, only after prior approval of court,
may ... pay compensation of the personal representative." 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, where the will does not authorize the
personal representative to make compensation payments to
himself or herself without prior court approval and the
23
1101290
personal representative makes such payments, he or she
violates § 43-2-844(7) and deprives the estate of funds before
being legally authorized to do so.  
Section 43-2-509 provides that a personal representative
who "uses any of the funds of the estate for his own benefit
... is accountable for any profit made thereon or legal
interest."  Our courts have long held that, pursuant to § 43-
2-509 or its precursor, a personal representative must pay
interest from the date he or she pays himself or herself
compensation without court approval to the date he or she
obtains court approval for the compensation amount at issue. 
See, e.g.,  McCraw v. Cooper, 218 Ala. 186, 190, 118 So. 333,
337 (1928) (affirming an award of interest against a personal
representative 
who 
had 
paid 
himself 
compensation 
without 
prior
approval by the trial court, where the trial court eventually
allowed the compensation, "as to the reasonableness of which
in amount there [was no dispute]"); see also, e.g., Walsh v.
Walsh, 231 Ala. 305, 307-08, 164 So. 822, 824-25 (1935) ("[I]n
the case of Kenan v. Graham, 135 Ala. 585, 33 So. 699
[(1903)], the court held that an executor is not entitled to
anticipate his fees and use the money.  If he does so, he is
chargeable with interest for the time the money was thus
24
1101290
appropriated to the date of settlement.").  The same legal
principle has been applied to other fiduciaries who were
required to obtain court approval before paying themselves
compensation.  See  Gordon v. Brunson, 287 Ala. 535, 542-43,
253 So.2d 183, 189 (1971) ("[T]rial court erred in charging
only 4% simple interest on the wards' money wrongfully
advanced by the guardian to himself [for his compensation],
and should have calculated such interest at the rate of 6% per
annum, compounded annually from date of the advance to the
date of the decree ....").  
Also, we note that in enacting the Probate Procedure Act,
§ 43-2-830 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, of which § 43-2-844 is a
part, 
the 
legislature 
made 
numerous 
changes 
and 
clarifications
regarding probate procedure in Alabama.  See Act No. 93-722,
Ala. Acts 1993.  The legislature made no change, however, that
would call into question this Court's precedents holding that
a personal representative must pay interest on compensation
payments made by the personal representative to himself or
herself without prior court approval.  Indeed, the enactment
of the Probate Procedure Act supports the conclusion that the
legislature did not approve of personal representatives'
paying 
themselves 
compensation 
without 
prior 
court 
approval 
in
25
1101290
that the legislature chose to reaffirm the statutory language
at issue in this appeal:  "Unless expressly authorized by the
will, a personal representative, only after prior  approval of
court, 
may 
... 
[p]ay 
compensation 
of 
the 
personal
representative."  § 43-2-844(7).
Furthermore, in regard to the history behind § 43-2-844,
that section references seven actions of a personal
representative that require "prior court approval."  Section 
43-2-844 thereby stands in contrast to § 43-2-843, Ala. Code
1975, which authorizes a personal representative to take
numerous actions without prior court approval.  In addition,
§ 43-2-843 is substantially a verbatim adoption of § 3-715 of
the Uniform Probate Code, with one glaring exception:  Under
§ 3-715 the seven items enumerated in § 43-2-844 are included
in the list of actions a personal representative may take
without obtaining prior court approval.  In other words, the
Alabama Legislature clearly acted purposefully in departing
from § 3-715, a proposed uniform law, when it required "prior
court approval" for the actions listed in § 43-2-844.
Because the legislature has clearly indicated its
disapproval 
of 
compensation 
payments 
to 
personal
representatives without prior court approval and because the
26
1101290
legislature has indicated no disapproval of this Court's
precedents requiring payment of interest where compensation
payments are made without such prior approval, we reaffirm the
principle recognized in the above-discussed precedents.    
5
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit
court erred by denying the daughters' interest claim.   
C.  Circuit Court's Failure to Remove McGowan as a Cotrustee
of the Family Trust
The daughters requested that the circuit court remove 
McGowan as a cotrustee of the family trust created under
Robert G. Wehle's will.  As to that claim, the circuit court's
order states:
"[T]he record is devoid of any reference to such a
claim during the course of the trial.  The
[daughters] simply offered no evidence to support a
conclusion that McGowan should not continue to serve
as trustee, as required by the express wishes of the
testator, Robert Wehle.  While the [daughters]
question the amount of compensation paid to each of
the Personal Representatives, at no point did the
In Ruttenberg, we discussed whether the court may, in
5
effect, 
"ratify" 
such 
compensation 
payments 
when 
assessing 
the
reasonableness of the personal representatives' compensation. 
To read Ruttenberg as addressing the issue of interest would
mean, among other things, that this Court sub silentio
overruled the line of precedents discussed in this opinion and
that we have turned § 43-2-844 from a statute disallowing such
payments unless preapproved into a statute allowing such
payments unless subsequently disapproved.  We decline to so
read Ruttenberg.
27
1101290
[daughters] offer any evidence of impropriety with
respect to McGowan's presiding over the Family
Trust.  Without evidence suggesting some notion of
impropriety, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty or
self dealing, there is simply no basis upon which
this Court can entertain such a position.  Thus, the
Court finds that the [daughters] have simply failed
to present any evidence, much less sufficient
evidence, justifying removal of Mr. McGowan from his
position as Trustee.
"Despite 
failing 
to 
offer 
any 
evidence 
at 
trial,
the [daughters] argue in post-trial briefing that
Mr. McGowan should be removed as a trustee simply
because he is no longer needed to serve in that
role.  However, this is an insufficient basis upon
which to remove a trustee.  The final Will &
Testament of Robert G. Wehle specifically called for
Mr. McGowan to serve in this capacity.  The Court
will not disturb the wishes of the testator simply
based upon the argument that a single trustee rather
than multiple trustees is sufficient to manage the
affairs of the Trust.
"The [daughters] also argue that the trustees
participated in a decision that was detrimental to
the taxation of the trust beneficiaries.  However,
the Court will not consider these post-trial
arguments that were never raised at trial.  The
trustee was not provided with an opportunity to
defend himself from these claims or provide any
explanation.  It is fundamental that a litigation
defendant be informed of the allegations against him
before being required to defend himself.  Because
Mr. McGowan was not properly informed of these
allegations nor given an opportunity to defend
himself during the course of the trial of this
matter, those allegations are rejected as improperly
and untimely made and will not be considered.  Thus,
the Court finds that there is no basis to remove Mr.
McGowan from his position as trustee over the Family
Trust."  
28
1101290
"The removal of a trustee has long been established as a
matter which rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.
Our scope of review is therefore limited to determining
whether the court has abused its discretion."  In re Estate of
Amason, 369 So. 2d 786, 789 (Ala. 1979).  
The daughters refer us to § 19-3B-706(b), Ala. Code 1975,
which provides that a court may remove a trustee where
"(1)  the trustee has committed a serious breach
of trust; [or]
".... 
"(3)  because of unfitness, unwillingness, or
persistent failure of the trustee to administer the
trust effectively, the court determines that removal
of the trustee best serves the interests of the
beneficiaries."6
Section 19-3B-706(b) also provides that a trustee may be
6
removed where
"(4)(A) there has been a substantial change of
circumstances or removal is requested by all of the
qualified beneficiaries; 
"(B) the court finds that removal of the trustee
best 
serves 
the 
interests 
of 
all 
of 
the
beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a
material purpose of the trust; and 
"(C) a suitable co-trustee or successor trustee
is available."
The daughters make no argument as to whether § 19-3B-706(b)(4)
might apply in the present case, and we therefore express no
29
1101290
The daughters offer two arguments as to why they believe
the circuit court exceeded its discretion in refusing to
remove McGowan as a cotrustee of the family trust.  First,
they contend that McGowan's presence as a cotrustee is no
longer desired or needed and adds no value to the management
of the family trust and that he thus should be removed.  The
fact that the daughters may no longer consider McGowan's
services as necessary, desired, or valuable to the family
trust, 
however, is not sufficient to satisfy § 
19-3B-706(b)(1)
or (3).  Even if those allegations were true, they do not
establish that McGowan committed a serious breach of trust,
that he was unfit to serve as a cotrustee, that he was
unwilling to serve as a cotrustee, or that he had persistently
failed to administer the trust effectively.   
Second, the daughters argue that McGowan committed a
serious breach of trust by participating in a decision to
treat all cash received from shares held by the estate in
thoroughbred race horses as income rather than creating a
depreciating reserve.  The circuit court noted that the
daughters did not raise this argument until their posttrial
opinion with respect to that argument.
30
1101290
brief; thus, it considered the argument untimely.  The
daughters do not respond to the reason the circuit court gave
for rejecting their argument.  Instead, they argue on appeal
the merits of the issue, which the circuit court did not
reach, and they provide no legal authority as to the
timeliness ground on which the circuit court relied.  Based on
well settled principles of appellate review, we will not
reverse a judgment of a trial court under such circumstances. 
See, e.g.,  Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.
1983)(holding that, in order to secure a reversal, "the
appellant has an affirmative duty of showing error upon the
record").     
D.  Award of Attorney Fees to the Personal Representatives
The circuit court awarded the personal representatives
$383,437.31 for attorney fees and costs relating to their
defense of the daughters' claims.  Section 43–2–849, Ala. Code
1975, states:
"If any personal representative or person nominated
as personal representative defends or prosecutes any
proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not,
the personal representative is entitled to receive
from 
the 
estate 
necessary 
expenses 
and
disbursements, including, but not limited to,
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred."
31
1101290
"An award of attorney's fees is within the trial court's
discretion, subject to correction [only when the court
exceeds] that discretion."  Clement v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of
Mobile, 493 So. 2d 1350, 1355 (Ala. 1986).
The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
personal
representatives 
defended 
against 
the 
daughters' 
claims 
in 
good
faith and that the personal representatives were entitled to
attorney fees and costs "from any available funds of the
Estate."   The circuit court explained:
7
"In approving this fee request, the Court considered
the criteria established by the Alabama Supreme
Court used for determining the reasonableness of
requested attorney's fees, including the nature of
the employment, the labor required for the discharge
of the services, the time consumed, the professional
experience and reputation of the attorneys, the
weight of their responsibilities, the success
achieved, the reasonableness of the expenses, the
fact that the charges were reasonable hourly
charges, the nature and length of the professional
relationship, the customary fees charged in the
locality, the preclusion from other employment
required by the time spent on this case, and the
time limitations imposed by the circumstances of the
According to the personal representatives, at the time
7
of the hearing on final settlement, they had disbursed the
estate's assets and had no funds with which to pay their claim
for reimbursement of attorney fees and costs.  They
nonetheless sought an award of attorney fees and costs so as
to be in a position to reimburse themselves should additional
assets of the estate become available. 
32
1101290
case.  See, Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 530
So. 2d 740 (Ala. 1988).  With that criteria in mind,
there is no question that the fees and costs
requested by the Personal Representatives are
reasonable."
The circuit court's order references criteria that have
been identified by this Court as relevant to an award of
attorney fees.   As this Court noted in Van Schaack v. AmSouth
Bank, N.A., 530 So. 2d 740 (Ala. 1988): 
"[T]he criteria to be considered by the trial court
in determining a reasonable attorney fee in Alabama
are set forth in Peebles v. Miley, 439 So. 2d 137
(Ala. 1983).
In  Peebles, this Court added five more criteria
to the seven that had been enumerated in [previous]
cases.  The complete list of criteria used in the
estimation of the value of an attorney's services
now includes the following:  (1) the nature and
value of the subject matter of the employment; (2)
the learning, skill, and labor requisite to its
proper discharge; (3) the time consumed; (4) the
professional experience and reputation of the
attorney; (5) the weight of his responsibilities;
(6) the measure of success achieved; (7) the
reasonable expenses incurred; (8) whether a fee is
fixed or contingent; (9) the nature and length of a
professional relationship; (10) the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(11) the likelihood that a particular employment may
preclude other employment; and (12) the time
limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances.  Of course, not all of the criteria
will be applicable.  'Indeed, there would hardly
ever be a case where the [determination] of
attorney's fees brought into play every criterion.' 
33
1101290
Graddick v. First Farmers & Merchants National Bank
of Troy, 453 So. 2d 1305, 1311 (Ala. 1984)."
530 So. 2d at 749. 
"The determination of whether an attorney fee is
reasonable is within the sound discretion of the trial court
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that
discretion."  Ex parte Edwards, 601 So. 2d 82, 85 (Ala. 1992).
The daughters contend that the circuit court exceeded its
discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to the personal
representatives because the personal representatives did not
submit any evidence to document the attorney fees and costs
for which they were seeking reimbursement.  They contend that
the circuit court's award of attorney fees and costs was made
based solely on a simple oral motion from counsel for the
personal representatives and a two-page argument in the
personal representatives' post-hearing brief.  The daughters
contend that this was not sufficient to support the award
because "[i]t is well settled that 'the statements of counsel
in a pleading or brief are not evidence.'"  Watson v.
Whittington Real Estate, LLC, 16 So. 3d 802, 809 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2009) (quoting State Dep't of Revenue v. Wells Fargo Fin.
34
1101290
Acceptance Alabama, Inc., 19 So. 3d 892, 897 (Ala. Civ. App.
2008)).
Although there is significant merit in the daughters'
argument, it fails to acknowledge certain aspects of the
record that provide support for the circuit court's decision
that an attorney-fee award is appropriate in this case.  It is
true that "[a]pplicants for an attorney fee bear the burden of
proving their entitlement to an award and documenting their
appropriately expended hours."  City of Birmingham v. Horn,
810 So. 2d 667, 682 (Ala. 2001).  As in most cases, however,
the applicants in the present case were not required to meet
this burden unaided by the trial judge's familiarity with the
case and other matters germane to the decision at hand.
First, the circuit court in this case heard and observed
the attorneys "in action" in the courtroom at hearings and at
trial and no doubt in chambers at various conferences.  As a
starting point, therefore, the court at least knew the time
spent by the attorneys in those appearances and the quality of
the representation rendered by the attorneys in the same.
Second, the circuit court received and, we must presume, read
the attorneys' motions, briefs, and other written submissions
35
1101290
throughout the course of this very lengthy and involved case. 
In addition, at trial the personal representatives introduced
testimony of an expert witness who testified that, in his
opinion, an attorney fee was due to be awarded in this case. 
We therefore think it incorrect to posit that the circuit
court was without any "evidence" upon which to consider the
fee request.  And, in light of such "evidence" as the circuit
court did have, as well on the circuit court's general
experience and its particular knowledge of this case, we
cannot agree that it was without any basis on which to
conclude that a substantial attorney fee was due.  The circuit
court had information from which it could at least partially
assess several of the Peebles v. Miley, 439 So. 2d 137 (Ala.
1983), factors, namely: (1) the nature and value of the
subject matter of the employment, (2) the learning and skill,
and to some extent the labor, requisite to its proper
discharge, (3) to some extent, the time consumed, (5) the
weight of responsibilities undertaken by the attorneys, and
(6) the measure of success achieved.  The circuit court may
not have had full knowledge of the "labor requisite to the
proper discharge" of the services needed or the "time
36
1101290
consumed."  And the circuit court may or may not have had
adequate knowledge of the professional experience and
reputation of the attorneys involved or the actual amount or
reasonableness of the expenses incurred.  There is no basis in
the record, however, from which to conclude that the circuit
court had any knowledge of whether the fee was fixed or
contingent, what fee was customarily charged in the locality
for the type of work performed, whether the employment was
likely to or did preclude other employment, and what time
limitations were imposed by the client.  That said, we should
note that it is not necessary in every case for the trial
court to have evidence of every one of the Peebles factors. 
See, e.g., Graddick v. First Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank of
Troy, 453 So. 2d 1305, 1311 (Ala. 1984).
In this case, however, it does not appear that the
circuit court had an adequate factual record for making the
particular award it made.  Without implying any limitation on
the relevance of other Peebles factors, we note the lack of
any evidence of the time consumed outside appearances before
the circuit court, and no evidence of the total amount of time
consumed both in and out of the courtroom.  Although such
37
1101290
information is not always of itself determinative of a fee
request, it typically is an important consideration.  Indeed,
"it has been generally recognized that the amount of time
consumed should be the first yardstick used by the trial
court."  Clement, 493 So. 2d at 1355.   And although the
aforesaid expert did testify that, in his opinion, attorney
fees should be awarded in this case, that testimony was
conclusory.  There was no testimony as to the total fee that
should be awarded; no proposed amount or other details were
discussed; and the 
record 
contains no evidence indicating that
the witness was aware of how much time the attorneys had spent
in performing their duties, whether that time was reasonable,
or at what rate to value the time spent by the attorneys in
and out of the courtroom.  
Finally, we emphasize that a "trial court's order
regarding an attorney fee must allow for meaningful review by
articulating the decisions made, the reasons supporting those
decisions, 
and 
the 
performance 
of 
the 
attorney-fee
calculation."  City of Birmingham, 810 So. 2d at 682.  The
circuit court's order in this case, conclusory in nature,
fails to meet this standard.  
38
1101290
Considering all the foregoing, we believe the correct
result in this case is to reverse the circuit court's order
insofar as it determined the amount of the attorney fees and
to remand this case for the circuit court (1) to conduct a
hearing in which both sides can introduce the evidence
necessary to allow the circuit court to more fully consider
the Peebles factors and (2) to issue an order that is
consistent with this opinion and that "allow[s] for 
meaningful
review by articulating the decisions made, the reasons
supporting those decisions, and the performance of the
attorney-fee calculation."  City of Birmingham, 810 So. 2d at
682; see also Lolley v. Citizens Bank, 494 So. 2d 19 (Ala.
1986); Van Schaack, supra.  
8
E.  Taxing of Costs of the Appeal in Wehle I
In May 2010, the daughters filed a timely motion in the
circuit court asking that court to tax certain costs of the
appeal in Wehle I against the personal representatives.   In
9
Van Schaack and Lolley appear to serve at least as
8
examples of cases where this Court remanded the case for
reconsideration of the attorney-fee issue. 
The 
daughters 
filed 
the 
motion 
and 
supporting
9
documentation within 14 days of the issuance of this Court's
certificate of judgment in Wehle I.  See Rule 35(c), Ala. R. 
39
1101290
support of the motion, the daughters filed an itemized and
verified bill of costs.  The circuit court denied the
daughters' motion.  
The certificate of judgment issued by this Court in
Wehle I ordered that, "unless otherwise ordered by this Court
or agreed upon by the parties, the costs of this cause are
hereby taxed as provided by Rule 35, Ala. R. App. P." 
Rule 35(a), Ala. R. App. P., provides, in pertinent part,
that, "if a judgment is reversed, costs shall be taxed against
the appellee unless otherwise ordered."  Also, this Court has
stated:
"'When this Court reverse[s] a trial
court's judgment and awards costs to the
appellant, 
the 
trial 
court 
has 
no
discretion in awarding costs.  Ex parte
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 473
So. 2d 1045 (Ala. 1985).  The trial court
must award the appellant those costs of
appeal 
that 
the 
appellant 
properly
incurred.  Rule 35(a), [Ala.] R. App. P.'"
Kirkley v. United Methodist Church, 765 So. 2d 626, 627-28
(Ala. 1999) (quoting Smith v. Player, 630 So. 2d 400, 401
(Ala. 1993)).  
App. P.
40
1101290
Although the resolution of this issue in favor of the
daughters appears to be straightforward, the personal
representatives argue that in Kirkley, Smith, and other cases
that 
have 
stated 
the 
above-quoted 
propositions 
the
certificates of judgment expressly stated that the costs of
the appeal were to be taxed against the appellees.  In this
instance, they note, the certificate of judgment simply 
stated
that costs were to be taxed in accordance with Rule 35, Ala.
R. App. P.  The personal representatives contend that the
difference in wording means that the circuit court was free to
"interpret" the appropriate taxation of costs.  The personal
representatives' position is patently without merit.
There is no ambiguity in this Court's certificate of
judgment in Wehle I.  It states that costs are to be taxed "as
provided by Rule 35, Ala. R. App. P."  Rule 35 unequivocally
states that costs are to be taxed against the appellee when a
trial court's judgment is reversed, and this Court has not
expressly ordered otherwise.  Therefore, the circuit court
violated this Court's mandate in failing to tax the costs of
the appeal in Wehle I against the personal representatives.
IV.  Conclusion
41
1101290
We affirm the circuit court's order insofar as the amount
of compensation awarded to the personal representatives and
insofar as it refused to remove McGowan as a cotrustee of the
family trust.  We reverse the circuit court's order insofar as
the amount of attorney fees and costs it awarded the personal
representatives and insofar as it denied the daughters'
interest claims and failed to tax the costs of the appeal in
Wehle I against the personal representatives.
We once again remand this case to the circuit court for
the purposes of conducting an evidentiary hearing as to the
personal representatives' claim for attorney fees and costs,
of taxing the costs of the appeal in Wehle I against the
personal 
representatives, 
and 
of 
awarding 
interest 
against 
the
personal representatives and for the entry of a judgment
consistent with this opinion.    
APPLICATION FOR REHEARING GRANTED; OPINION OF MARCH 14,
2014, WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED IN PART;
REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Moore, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
42
1101290
MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
I respectfully dissent from Part III.B of the majority
opinion; I concur with the remainder of the opinion.  I do not
believe the trial court erred by rejecting the daughters'
claim that the personal 
representatives 
should pay interest on
the compensation they had paid themselves without prior court
approval.
The majority quotes Ruttenberg v. Friedman, 97 So. 3d
114, 134-35 (Ala. 2012), for the proposition that "'any error
in the prior payment of [a personal representative's] fees for
ordinary services without prior court approval is moot'" once
the court "'issue[s] its final award, after taking into
consideration the statutory factors'" for making such an
award.  ___ So. 3d at ___ (emphasis omitted).  The Court in
Ruttenberg did not specifically discuss whether personal
representatives who pay themselves compensation from the
estate without prior court approval must, as a consequence,
pay interest on that compensation to the estate.  However, by
upholding the "ultimate fee approved by the probate court," 97
So. 3d at 135, and by stating that "any error was remedied
when the probate court issued its final award," 97 So. 3d at
43
1101290
134, Ruttenberg implies that the personal representative in
that case was relieved of any legal consequences he would have
suffered under § 43-2-844(7), Ala. Code 1975, for failing to
obtain court approval before paying himself from the estate.
In other words, not only the payment itself, but also the
interest accrued thereon, became moot.  Any attempt to extend
Ruttenberg to the present case must reach the same result: 
The issue regarding interest on the compensation the personal
representatives paid themselves from the estate became moot
when the circuit court approved the compensation. If the Court
does not like that result, it must overrule Ruttenberg. 
44