Case Title: In re D.T.

Citation: 170 Vt. 148, 743 A.2d 1077

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re D.T. (99-052); 170 Vt. 148; 743 A.2d 1077

[Opinion Filed 29-Oct-1999]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 22-Nov-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as  formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the  Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609- 0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-052

In re D.T.	                                      Supreme Court

	                                              On Appeal from
     	                                              Franklin Family Court

	                                              June Term, 1999

David A. Jenkins, J.

       Michael Rose, St. Albans, for Appellant-Mother. Charles Martin of
  Martin & Associates, Barre,  for Appellant-Father.

       William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Howard W.
  Stalnaker, Assistant   Attorney General, Waterbury, for Appellee, SRS.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.  Mother appeals from a family court decision that held
  D.T. is a child  in need of care and supervision (CHINS).  She claims that
  the family court did not have  jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody
  Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) over the merits of the  CHINS proceeding.  She
  further claims that the court's determination that D.T. was a child in 
  need of care or supervision was unsupported by the court's findings and
  that the findings of the  court have no support in the record.  Father
  joins in mother's appeal.   Although we conclude  that the trial court
  failed to make adequate findings in deciding the jurisdictional issue, we 
  nonetheless affirm because the record contains sufficient evidence to
  support a finding of  jurisdiction.  We affirm the determination of CHINS
  as well.

       When D.T. was ten weeks old, he was taken into protective custody by
  the Department  of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) after he was
  hospitalized for bronchial distress.  At  the detention hearing, both
  mother and father agreed to temporary custody with SRS.  See 33 

 

  V.S.A. § 5502(12)(B).  Prior to the merits hearing, parents filed a motion
  to dismiss for lack of  jurisdiction on the basis that Vermont was not the
  child's home state under the UCCJA.  See 15  V.S.A. § 1032(a)(1).  The
  State did not argue that Vermont was the home state; rather, it posited 
  that the court had jurisdiction under 15 V.S.A. § 1032(a)(2), i.e., that it
  would be in the best  interest of the child for a court in Vermont to
  assume jurisdiction based on the child's and the  parents' significant
  connection with this state and because substantial evidence concerning the 
  child's present or future care and protection was available here.  For
  purposes of deciding the  jurisdictional issue, the parents agreed that the
  court could consider the facts alleged in the  affidavits submitted in the
  case, but reserved the right to contest certain allegations of abuse and 
  neglect.  They further stipulated that they were in Vermont temporarily,
  but had not decided to  leave.  

       The affidavits informed the court of the following.  D.T. was born
  prematurely on April  9, 1998, in Worcester, Massachusetts, weighing only
  2.2 pounds.  D.T. remained hospitalized  on a ventilator for two months
  prior to his being released to the parents on June 9, 1998.   Mother,
  father and child left directly from the hospital to Vermont where they had
  arranged to  live temporarily with father's ex-wife.  Based on a referral
  from the Massachusetts hospital,  services had been pre-arranged for the
  family.  On the evening of the family's arrival in Vermont  (the four hour
  trip took the family eight and one half hours to complete), the child was
  seen by a  home health nurse.  Home health nurses came daily to check
  D.T.'s condition, to give  instruction to the parents on the specialized
  care D.T. required, including the need for a  respiratory monitor and to
  reinforce previous training.  The home health nurses determined that  the
  baby lost two ounces in his first twenty-four hours out of the hospital.  A
  healthy-baby  coordinator also had daily contact with the parents and the
  child.  On June 16, 1998, D.T. was  hospitalized due to respiratory
  problems, and was then under the care of a physician.

       The affidavits noted that father's two children with his ex-wife had
  previously been taken  into SRS custody in Vermont, and that his parental
  rights to these children were terminated by 

 

  a Vermont court.  No evidence was presented to the court concerning the
  parent's ties to  Massachusetts, except for the undisputed fact that the
  child was hospitalized there for the first  nine weeks of his life.  One
  affidavit further alleged that mother has three other children that the 
  State of New York took into custody in 1985. 

       On June 18, 1998, SRS took custody of D.T. and filed a CHINS petition. 
  The court held  a detention hearing the following day.  The sole purpose of
  a detention hearing is to determine if  continued detention is in the
  child's best interest and welfare.  See 33 V.S.A. § 5515(a).  The   court
  continued detention and the parents agreed to SRS's temporary custody of
  D.T.  The child  remained in the hospital.  The parents were appointed
  counsel and filed a motion to dismiss for  lack of jurisdiction in response
  to the State's CHINS petition, arguing only that Vermont was not  D.T.'s
  "home state."  On July 22, 1998, the court held a hearing, at which no
  evidence was  taken.  The court ruled from the bench based on the
  stipulated facts, concluding that it could  exercise jurisdiction under
  either the significant-connections provision or the emergency  provision of
  the UCCJA.  See 15 V.S.A. § 1032(a)(2), (a)(3).  SRS specifically requested
  that  the court assert jurisdiction solely under the
  significant-connections provision of the UCCJA, but  the court declined to
  do so.  It found that the petition alleged an emergency situation and that 
  there were sufficient contacts to exercise jurisdiction because:  (1) the
  child was in the state and  receiving medical treatment, (2) the parents
  were in the state, (3) the court was not informed of  any proceeding
  pending in another state, (4) the court was not aware of any other state
  that  would "have a better grasp" of the case (by which we assume the judge
  meant that no other state  had more substantial evidence concerning the
  child's situation), and (5) no other state would be a  more convenient
  forum.  

       A hearing on the merits of the CHINS petition was held on September 1
  and November  10, 1998.  On February 2, 1999, the court issued an order
  finding D.T. was CHINS.  Following  a motion on behalf of D.T. to correct
  judgment, the court amended the judgment to correct  mother's name and to
  clarify that the findings were made by a preponderance of the evidence.  

 

  Mother appeals.  Father has joined mother's brief.  D.T. has joined SRS's
  brief.

       Mother argues that, under the UCCJA, the family court did not have
  jurisdiction to  proceed to the merits of the CHINS proceeding.   The UCCJA
  specifically includes neglect and  dependency proceedings, such as CHINS
  proceedings, under the definition of "custody  proceedings."  See 15
  V.S.A.§ 1031(3).  It provides four bases for jurisdiction to make a child 
  custody determination.  See In re A.L.H., 160 Vt. 410, 413,