Case Title: Aguilera v. Christian

Citation: 

Docket Number: 091493

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Goodwyn, Millette, and 
Mims, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
BENJAMIN AGUILERA 
 
v.  Record No. 091493 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
JOHN ANDREW CHRISTIAN     
 
    SEPTEMBER 16, 2010 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Craig D. Johnston, Judge 
 
In this case we consider whether a party who is acting pro 
se may authorize a person who is not licensed to practice law in 
this Commonwealth to sign a complaint on behalf of the pro se 
party. 
I. FACTS 
 
On November 12, 2008, Benjamin Aguilera filed a complaint 
against John Andrew Christian for personal injuries sustained in 
an automobile collision that occurred on November 13, 2006. 
Aguilera did not personally sign the complaint but asked B. 
Marian Chou, his neighbor and friend, to sign his name on the 
complaint for him.1  Chou signed Aguilera’s name on the complaint 
and placed her initials “bmc” directly above the signature. 
Christian filed an Answer and Grounds of Defense in 
response to Aguilera’s complaint and propounded Requests for 
Admission requesting that Aguilera admit (1) that the signature 
                                                 
1 Chou is an attorney licensed to practice law in 
Washington, D.C., but Chou is not licensed to practice law in 
the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
 
 
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on the complaint was not his signature; (2) that the complaint 
was signed by a person other than himself; (3) that the 
complaint was signed by Bwo Marian Chou; and (4) that the 
complaint was signed by an attorney not licensed to practice law 
in the Commonwealth of Virginia.  Y. T. Hung, an attorney 
licensed in Virginia, entered his appearance as counsel for 
Aguilera2 and filed an objection to Christian’s Requests for 
Admission on the grounds of relevance and attorney-client 
privilege. 
 
Christian filed motions to deem the requests for admission 
admitted and for summary judgment.  At a hearing on those 
motions, Aguilera stipulated that Chou signed Aguilera’s name on 
the complaint.  The court entered summary judgment in 
Christian’s favor.  Aguilera filed a motion for reconsideration 
and on April 24, 2009, the trial court heard oral arguments on 
Aguilera’s motion.  At this hearing, Hung conceded again that 
Chou signed Aguilera’s name on the complaint and that Chou 
drafted the complaint for Aguilera.  Hung argued that the 
signature was valid because Aguilera authorized Chou to sign his 
name to the complaint.  The trial court dismissed the complaint 
by order holding that the complaint did not comply with Code 
                                                 
2 Hung also filed a motion to associate Chou pro hac vice 
for the purpose of appearing and participating with Hung in 
Aguilera’s litigation which the trial court declined to grant 
because it appeared likely Chou would or could be called to 
testify.  
 
§ 8.01-271.1 because it was not signed by the plaintiff or by an 
attorney licensed to practice law in Virginia and, therefore the 
complaint was a nullity.  Aguilera filed a timely appeal. 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
Aguilera argues in this appeal that authorizing another 
person to sign pleadings on his behalf as a pro se plaintiff 
complies with the signature requirements contained in Code 
§ 8.01-271.1 and Rule 1:4 and, therefore, the trial court erred 
in concluding the signature was a nullity and dismissing the 
complaint. 
Code § 8.01-271.1 provides in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise provided in §§ 16.1-260 and 
63.2-1901, every pleading, written motion, and 
other paper of a party represented by an attorney 
shall be signed by at least one attorney of 
record in his individual name, and the attorney's 
address shall be stated on the first pleading 
filed by that attorney in the action.  A party 
who is not represented by an attorney, including 
a person confined in a state or local 
correctional facility proceeding pro se, shall 
sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and 
state his address. 
 
Rule 1:4 provides in relevant part: 
(c) Counsel or an unrepresented party who files a 
pleading shall sign it and state his address. 
 
Aguilera asserts that a signature “represents an endorsement or 
approval of the document.”  Thus, Aguilera continues, as long as 
his signature was placed on the pleading with his permission and 
with his intent “to authenticate it” as his act, he has complied 
 
 
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with the requirements of Rule 1:4(c) and Code § 8.01-271.1.  We 
disagree. 
Both the statute and the rule unambiguously state that a 
party not represented by an attorney “shall sign” a pleading.  
Nothing in this language permits a person other than a licensed 
attorney to sign a pleading on behalf of an unrepresented party.  
The policy underlying this requirement is clear.  Our legal 
system allows parties in litigation to proceed either pro se or 
through representation by a duly licensed attorney.3  As we 
explained in Kone v. Wilson, 272 Va. 59, 62-63, 630 S.E.2d 744, 
746 (2006), the party with the cause of action may proceed on his 
own behalf but pleadings signed by a person acting in a 
representative capacity for the party with the cause of action 
are a nullity unless such person is licensed to practice law in 
this Commonwealth.  See also Shipe v. Hunter, 280 Va. ___, ___, 
S.E.2d ___, ___ (this day decided) (signing attorney must be 
licensed to practice law in this Commonwealth), Wellmore Coal 
Corp. v. Harman Mining Corp., 264 Va. 279, 283-84, 568 S.E.2d 
671, 673 (2002) (notice of appeal signed by attorney not licensed 
to practice law in Virginia invalid and has no legal effect). 
Accordingly, in this case, Aguilera’s signature on the 
complaint was invalid and a nullity because it was not signed by 
                                                 
3 Exceptions have been created by statute allowing non-
attorneys to file pleadings on behalf of another, but they are 
not relevant here.  See Code §§ 26-106, 16.1-260, 63.2-1901. 
 
Aguilera, the party with the cause of action, or by an attorney 
licensed to practice law in this Commonwealth.  Therefore, the 
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint and we will 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
 
 
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