Case Title: YELLOWSTONE VALLEY ELECTRIC v OSTE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 79-024

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
79-24- IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 YELLOWSTONE VALLEY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, THE MONTANA POWER COMPANY, a corporation, Intervenor and Appellant, DUANE OSTERMILLER, THE MILWAUKEE MOTOR TRANSPORTATION CO., a colrporation, and GETTER TRUCKING, INC., a corporation, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, County of Yellowstone. Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Olsen, Christensen & Gannett, Billings, Montana Paul Olsen argued, Billings, Montana John Carl argued, Butte, Montana For Respondents: Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones, Billings, Montana Joseph Gerbase argued, Billings,, Montana Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Submitted: February 22, 1980 ~ecided :MAk 2 1 9 8 a M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. c his i s an appeal from a p o r t i o n of a judgment of a Yellowstone County D i s t r i c t Court r u l i n g t h a t s e c t i o n 69-4- 603, MCA, does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a taking of property without due process though it r e q u i r e s e l e c t r i c u t i l i t i e s and r u r a l e l e c t r i c cooperatives t o provide wire-raising s e r v i c e s without reimbursement. P l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t , Yellowstone Valley E l e c t r i c Cooper- a t i v e , Inc. i s a r u r a l e l e c t r i c cooperative providing e l e c t r i c s e r v i c e t o r u r a l customers by means of a n e l e c t r i c transmis- s i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n network. Many of t h e l i n e s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h i s network c r o s s p u b l i c highways and s t r e e t s . Respondents each conduct e n t e r p r i s e s involving t h e moving of oversized equipment o r s t r u c t u r e s upon public highways and s t r e e t s . The moving a c t i v i t i e s of respondents o f t e n r e q u i r e t h e r a i s i n g of e l e c t r i c transmission l i n e s . Section 69-4-603, MCA, provides t h a t u t i l i t i e s and cooperatives a r e required t o r a i s e o r remove t h e i r transmission and d i s t r i b u t i o n l i n e s , when oversized equipment and s t r u c t u r e s a r e moved, i n o r d e r t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e passage of such oversized loads. P l a i n t i f f p e t i t i o n e d t h e Yellowstone County D i s t r i c t Court f o r d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f regarding respondents' moving e n t e r p r i s e s . P l a i n t i f f sought t o have s e c t i o n 69-4-603, MCA, declared u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l as a d e n i a l of equal p r o t e c t i o n and due process. The Montana Power Company was granted permission t o intervene and a l s o p e t i t i o n e d f o r s i m i l a r d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f . An e v i d e n t i a r y hearing w a s waived by t h e p a r t i e s and b r i e f s were submitted t o t h e court. On September 1 0 , 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court r u l e d t h a t a p o r t i o n of t h e challenged s t a t u t e v i o l a t e d equal p r o t e c t i o n require- ments and was, t h e r e f o r e , unconstitutional. The unconstitu- t i o n a l p o r t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e was a 1951 amendment which provided t h a t persons, firms, o r corporations engaged i n moving oversized s t r u c t u r e s within t h e l i m i t s of a c i t y o r town pay a l l necessary and reasonable expenses of r a i s i n g o r c u t t i n g w i r e s and removing poles. The amendment was held u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because it d i f - f e r e n t i a t e d between i n s i d e and o u t s i d e c i t y o r town l i m i t s with r e s p e c t t o c o s t s . While determining t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , the c o u r t a l s o held t h a t t h e remaining p o r t i o n s of t h e s t a t u t e continued i n f u l l f o r c e and e f f e c t . Without t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l proviso, t h e s t a t u t e returned t o i t s pre-1951 amendment posture and was i n t e r p r e t e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court a s r e q u i r i n g u t i l i t i e s and cooperatives t o provide wire-raising and c u t t i n g s e r v i c e without reimbursement i n a l l circumstances. I t i s from t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f and intervenor appeal. Three i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d f o r our consideration upon appeal: (1) Was t h e D i s t r i c t Court c o r r e c t i n i n t e r p r e t i n g s e c t i o n 69-4-603, MCA, a s r e q u i r i n g u t i l i t i e s and coopera- t i v e s i n a l l circumstances t o provide wire-raising and c u t t i n g s e r v i c e s without reimbursement? ( 2 ) Does s e c t i o n 69-4-603, MCA, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y allow property t o be taken f o r t h e p r i v a t e use of a p r i v a t e party? (3) Is s e c t i o n 69-4-603, MCA, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because it i s an unreasonable e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power? Section 69-4-603, MCA, i s set f o r t h below i n i t s e n . t i r e t y with t h e 1951 amendment, which w a s held u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, underscored: " ( 1 ) It s h a l l then be t h e duty of any person, f i r m , o r corporation owning o r operating s a i d poles o r wires a f t e r service of notice, as re- quired by 69-4-602, t o furnish competent workmen o r linemen t o remove such poles o r r a i s e o r c u t such wires a s w i l l be necessary t o f a c i l i t a t e removing such house, building, d e r r i c k o r o t h e r s t r u c t u r e . " ( 2 ) N o person, f i r m , o r corporation engaged i n moving any house, building, d e r r i c k , o r other s t r u c t u r e s h a l l r a i s e , c u t o r i n any way i n t e r - f e r e with any such poles o r w i r e s , unless t h e persons o r a u t h o r i t i e s owning o r having c o n t r o l of the same s h a l l r e f u s e t o do s o a f t e r having been n o t i f i e d , a s required by 69-4-602; then, only competent and experienced workmen o r l i n e - men s h a l l be employed i n such work, and i n such case t h e necessary and reasonable expense s h a l l be paid by t h e owners of the poles and wires handled; provided, however, -- t h a t any person, firm o r corporation engaged i n moving such strut- -- t u r e within t h e l i m i t s of a n y c i t y o r town s h a l l --- -- pay a l l necessary and reasonable expense of -- - 7 r a i s i n g or c u t t i n q such w i r e s o r removing such poles. The work s h a l l be d o n e i n a c a r e f u l and workmanlike manner, and the poles and w i r e s s h a l l be promptly replaced and damages t h e r e t o promptly repaired." The D i s t r i c t Court i n t h i s case characterized t h e above s t a t u t e a s an e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power, and, accordingly, held t h a t t h e burden of any expenses created by t h e s t a t u t e could be imposed upon u t i l i t i e s and cooperatives without reimbursement. I n reaching i t s conclusion, t h e c o u r t noted t h a t the s t a t u t e " w a s p a r t of a 1929 enactment . . . which made no express provision as t o who w a s t o stand t h e c o s t of wire-raising s e r v i c e s except i n t h e instance when the mover d i d the work because of t h e owner's r e f u s a l t o do it when properly requested." Faced with determining the question of c o s t s where t h e r e was owner compliance, however, the c o u r t found t h a t c o s t s could be imposed upon u t i l i t i e s and coopera- t i v e s because t h e s t a t u t e was an e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power. There w a s no need f o r compensation. The D i s t r i c t Court, speaking of t h e s t a t u t e , s t a t e d : ". . . Having t h e purpose of preventing uncon- t r o l l e d and unsafe i n t e r f e r e n c e with e l e c t r i c s e r v i c e , it i s w e l l within t h e l i m i t s of a per- m i s s i b l e e x e r c i s e of p o l i c e power. A s such, t h e f a c t t h a t it r e s u l t s i n an imposition upon t h e use of t h e u t i l i t y owner's property o r imposes a burden of expense upon the u t i l i t y does not i n i t s e l f v i o l a t e due process o r c o n s t i t u t e t h e taking of p r i v a t e property f o r p u b l i c purposes without j u s t compensation. . ." Appellant and intervenor a t t a c k t h e holdings of t h e D i s t r i c t Court here on two a l t e r n a t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l grounds. O n one hand, they argue t h a t , i f t h e s t a t u t e i s an e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power, it i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because it i s an unreasonable regulation: it unreasonably and a r b i t r a r i l y imposes c o s t s upon p a r t i e s which do n o t occasion t h e need f o r r a i s i n g o r c u t t i n g e l e c t r i c transmission l i n e s . It is contended t h a t it i s more reasonable t o impose c o s t s upon t h e movers and t h e i r c l i e n t s . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , a p p e l l a n t and intervenor argue t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l be- cause it allows f o r a "taking" of u t i l i t y property f o r t h e p r i v a t e use of another. I t i s submitted t h a t t h e a c t i v i t y of wire-raising o r c u t t i n g c o n s t i t u t e s a temporary depriva- t i o n of property which i s conducted s o l e l y f o r t h e b e n e f i t of moving companies and t h e i r c l i e n t s . The s t a t u t e , there- f o r e , i s an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e x e r c i s e of t h e power of eminent domain. The threshold i n q u i r y i n considering t h e s e arguments i s i n determining whether s e c t i o n 69-4-603, MCA, i s an e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power o r , r a t h e r , sounds i n t h e p r i n c i p l e s of eminent domain. The p o l i c e power of t h e state, of course, i s t h a t which enables s t a t e s t o pass r e g u l a t i o n s f o r t h e h e a l t h , s a f e t y and general welfare of t h e people. N. 0. Public Service Comrn. v. New Orleans (1930), 281 U.S. 682, 50 S.Ct. 449, 74 L.Ed. 1115; S t a t e v. Penny (1910), 42 Mont. 118, 1 1 1 P. 727; B i l l i n g s P r o p e r t i e s , Inc. v. Yellowstone Co. (1964), 1 4 4 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182. I n t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power, due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment may be m e t without j u s t compensation. Eminent domain, however, i s t h e r i g h t of t h e s t a t e t o take p r i v a t e property f o r p u b l i c use. Helena Power Transmission Co. v. S p r a t t (1907), 35 Mont. 108, 88 P. 773; s e c t i o n 70-30-101, MCA. I n t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e power of eminent domain, j u s t compensation is required. I n determining whether our s t a t u t e i s an e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power o r eminent domain, w e note a s p l i t of a u t h o r i t y among o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s facing t h e same i s s u e with r e s p e c t t o s i m i l a r s t a t u t e s and ordinances. See Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 464 (1962). I n one l i n e of cases, ordinances and s t a t u t e s allowing f o r t h e adjustment of wires and poles i n moving oversized o b j e c t s have been upheld a s v a l i d exer- c i s e s of t h e p o l i c e power. See, Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Sproul (Kan. 1916), 162 P. 293; S t a t e v. Omaha & C. B. S t . Ry. Co. (Neb. 1916), 161 N.W. 170; Weeks v. Carolina T e l & T e l . Co. (N.C. 1915), 84 S.E. 812; Indiana Ry. Co. v. C a l v e r t (Ind. 1907), 80 N.E. 961. The moving of buildings and o t h e r oversized o b j e c t s i n t h e s e cases has been recognized a s a reasonable and necessary public use, and t h e r i g h t s of t h e people t o use t h e s t r e e t s have been held superior t o t h e r i g h t s of u t i l i t i e s t o l o c a t e t h e i r f a c i l i t i e s upon such streets. I n another l i n e of cases, ordinances and s t a t u t e s have been held t o be takings under t h e law of eminent domain. Ex P a r t e Ashworth (Ala. 1920), 86 So. 84; Edison Elec. Light & Power Co. of S t . Paul v. ~ l o m q u i s t (Minn. 1911), 185 F. 615; Kibbie T e l . Co. v. Landphere (Mich. 1908), 115 N.W. 2 4 4 ; Northwestern T e l . Exch. Co. v. Anderson (N.D. 1904), 98 N.W. 706. I n t h e s e cases, t h e moving of oversized o b j e c t s has been held t o be a use which i s p r i v a t e , permis- s i v e , and extraordinary, conducted only f o r t h e b e n e f i t of a mover and h i s c l i e n t and s u b j e c t t o t h e vested and s u p e r i o r r i g h t s of u t i l i t i e s . Having reviewed t h e s e a u t h o r i t i e s , w e f i n d t h a t our s t a t u t e i s an e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power and does n o t sound i n eminent domain. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s characteriza- t i o n of s e c t i o n 69-4-603, MCA, w a s c o r r e c t : t h e s t a t u t e i s a r e g u l a t i o n enacted by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power aimed a t p r o t e c t i n g t h e p u b l i c h e a l t h , s a f e t y and general welfare. Here, t h e s t a t u t e serves s e v e r a l v i t a l public i n t e r e s t s . F i r s t , public s a f e t y i s concerned. The s t a t u t e is an obvious attempt t o avoid t h e occurrence on t h e p a r t of t h e general p u b l i c of high v o l t a g e e l e c t r i c a l accidents. The s t a t u t e s t a t e s t h a t "only competent and experienced workmen o r linemen" may r a i s e o r c u t w i r e s . Second, t h e s t a t u t e confers a p u b l i c b e n e f i t . Where t h e s t a t u t e provides f o r a c o n t r o l l e d method of accommodating a mover's need so t h a t t h e r e i s prompt replacement and r e p a i r , t h e r e i s minimal i n t e r f e r e n c e i n providing e l e c t r i c a l ser- v i c e t o t h e public. Third, t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s a l s o served i n t h a t t h e s t a t u t e allows f o r a reasonable and necessary p u b l i c use, t h e moving of oversized o b j e c t s upon t h e public highways of t h e s t a t e . F i n a l l y , t h e s t a t u t e recognizes t h e r i g h t of t h e public t o use t h e highways. See, Hawn v. Kansas G a s & E l e c t r i c Co. (Kan. 1927), 252 P. 245; S i p u l t v. C i t y of P r a t t (Kan. 1949), 212 P.2d 221. The s t a t u t e does n o t involve t h e appropriation of a property r i g h t o r a 'taking' under t h e laws of eminent domain i n any t r a d i t i o n a l sense. I n l o c a t i n g t h e i r f a c i - l i t i e s upon a p u b l i c right-of-way, u t i l i t i e s and coopera- t i v e s a r e conferred a property r i g h t which, by its very nature, i s s u b j e c t t o o t h e r competing f r a n c h i s e s and p r i v i - leges. The easement which i s obtained i s n o t an a b s o l u t e property r i g h t ; t h e r e is no r i g h t conferred upon u t i l i t i e s t o have t h e i r f a c i l i t i e s occupy a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n . New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comr~~'s of N e w Orleans (1905), 197 U.S. 453, 25 S.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831; Jones v. Burns (1960), 138 Mont. 268, 357 P.2d 22. Where o t h e r competing i n t e r e s t s and f r a n c h i s e s become involved, a u t i - l i t y may be forced t o g i v e up a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n of i t s f a c i l i t i e s , and reasonable i n t e r f e r e n c e may be necessary and proper. Southern B e l l Tel. & T e l . Co. v. Williams Bros. ( L a . c w 1932), 1 4 1 So. 835. The s t a t u t e i s t h e r e f o r e an e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power and eminent domain is inapplicable. Appellant and intervenor urge t h a t t h e s t a t u t e is un- c o n s t i t u t i o n a l even i f it i s deemed an e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power. They contend t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i s a n unrea- sonable r e g u l a t i o n because it a r b i t r a r i l y imposes t h e c o s t s of wire-raising and c u t t i n g upon p a r t i e s who do not occasion t h e need f o r t h a t a c t i v i t y . They submit t h a t it would be much more reasonable t o r e q u i r e respondents and t h e i r c l i - e n t s t o pay f o r t h e c o s t s of wire-raising and c u t t i n g . It i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a p o l i c e power r e g u l a t i o n must be reasonably adapted t o its purpose and must i n j u r e o r impair property r i g h t s only t o t h e e x t e n t reasonably necessary t o preserve t h e p u b l i c welfare. Garden Spot Market, Inc. v. Byrne (1963), 1 4 1 Mont. 382, 378 P.2d 220; Freeman v. ~ o a r d of Adjustment (1934), 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534. he standard of reasonableness i s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l measure of t h e proper e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power. B i l l i n g s P r o p e r t i e s , Inc. v. Yellowstone Co., supra; Bettey v. C i t y of Sidney (1927) , 79 Mont. 314, 257 P. 1007; Leischner v. C i t y of ~ i l l i n g s (1959), 135 Mont. 109, 337 P.2d 359. It is a l s o w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t , a s a general r u l e , a c t s conducted i n t h e proper e x e r c i s e of p o l i c e power do n o t c o n s t i t u t e a taking of property and do n o t e n t i t l e t h e owner of such property t o compensation f o r t h e r e g u l a t i o n o r impairment thereof. Compensation i s due, however, i n cases which exceed regula- t i o n o r impairment and t h e r e i s a n a p p r o p r i a t i o n of property which amounts t o a taking o r deprivation of property f o r p u b l i c use. 16 Am.Jur.2d C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law S586. I n t h i s case, t h e l i n e s of a u t i l i t y o r cooperative a r e momentarily r a i s e d o r severed t o allow t h e passage of build- i n g s o r o t h e r oversized o b j e c t s upon t h e p u b l i c streets. Though t h e r e may be a temporary i n t e r f e r e n c e o r i n t e r r u p t i o n t o customer s e r v i c e and inconvenience o r hardship t o t h e u t i l i t y , t h e property of t h e u t i l i t y o r cooperative i s i n no way condemned i n any permanent sense. Appellant and i n t e r - venor r e l y on two c a s e s f o r t h e proposition t h a t a temporary d e p r i v a t i o n of property may c o n s t i t u t e a "taking". See, Fuentes v. Shevin (1972), 407 U.S. 67, 92 S e c t . 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. (1969), 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d Those cases, however, involve personal property being attached under garnishment o r r e p l e v i n s t a t u t e s simply upon an ex p a r t e a p p l i c a t i o n t o a c o u r t c l e r k without a hearing and are f a c t u a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e s i t u a t i o n here. I n t h i s case, t h e s t a t u t e amounts t o a r e g u l a t i o n o r an impairment of u t i l i t y property and n o t an a c t u a l taking o r appropria- t i o n of property f o r t h e p r i v a t e use of another. W e f i n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i s a reasonable e x e r c i s e of t h e p o l i c e power. F u r t h e r , w e f i n d t h a t it i s n o t unreasonable t o impose t h e c o s t s of w i r e - r a i s i n g o r c u t t i n g upon u t i l i t i e s and cooperatives. Imposing c o s t s upon u t i l i t i e s and c o o p e r a t i v e s i s perhaps t h e most e f f e c - t i v e way of spreading t h e burdens c r e a t e d by t h e s t a t u t e . I n t h i s way, consumers s h a r e both t h e burdens and t h e g e n e r a l b e n e f i t s which t h e s t a t u t e intended and i s c a l c u l a t e d t o secure. Imposing c o s t s upon respondents and o t h e r moving companies would be too burdensome and would, i n e f f e c t , make t h e a c t i v i t y of moving b u i l d i n g s and o t h e r oversized o b j e c t s c o s t - p r o h i b i t i v e . Accordingly, w e a f f i r m t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. W e concur: C/ Chief J u s t i c e Q d h % J u s t i c e s