Case Title: STATE v ROBEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13793 I N T H E SUPREME COURT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1978 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, JIMMY RICHARD ROBEY, DAVID JOHN PETEREIAN, and JOAN SMITH TUTEN, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh Jud.icia1 D i s t r i c t , Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Daley and Sherlock, K a l i s p e l l , Montana P a t r i c k D. Sherlock argued, K a l i s p e l l , &Iontana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Atterney General, Helena, Montana Brenda G i l m e r , A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana P a t r i c k M. S p r i n q e r , County Attorney, K a l i s p e l l , Montana R u s s e l l Jones, Deputy County Attorney, argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Submitted: January 2 0 , 1978 Decided: APR 2 4 1978 ApP 3 I 'I??? F i l e d : M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendants Robey, Peterman and Tuten have f i l e d con- s o l i d a t e d appeals from t h e i r convictions i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Flathead County, f o r p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n card games w i t h i n premises n o t l i c e n s e d f o r gambling. Defendant Robey a l s o appeals from convictions i n D i s t r i c t Court, Flathead County, f o r operating a n unlicensed premises f o r t h e purpose of conducting card games and f o r possession of i l l e g a l gambling paraphernalia. O n t h e morning of December 1, 1976, an informer tele- phoned t h e Flathead County s h e r i f f ' s department and t o l d Chief Detective Robert Soderstrom he suspected t h a t " t h e r e would be a game t h a t evening a t t h e Stagecoach Inn." The informant s t a t e d defendant Jimmy Robey would h o s t t h e poker game t h a t evening u p s t a i r s a t t h e Stagecoach Inn. The informant a l s o named various people who would p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e game, a l l of whom t h e d e t e c t i v e s knew a s ','poker p l a y e r s , d e a l e r s , licensed establishment operators". Later t h a t day, t h e same informant telephoned Detective Soderstrom and reaffirmed h i s e a r l i e r a s s e r t i o n t h a t a poker game was t o be held a t t h e Stagecoach Inn i n Somers, Montana. I n t h e second telephone c a l l , t h e informant s t a t e d t h e game would s t a r t between 10:OO and 1 1 : O O p.m. Shortly a f t e r t h e informant's second phone c a l l , Detec- t i v e Soderstrom summoned t h r e e o t h e r d e t e c t i v e s t o t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e t o meet with him and t h e Flathead County a t t o r n e y . The group met a t about 9:00 t o 1 0 : O O p.m. The county a t t o r n e y gave one of t h e d e t e c t i v e s , Allan Harkins, $300 " f l a s h money" t o be used t o attempt t o buy i n t o t h e supposed i l l e g a l poker game. The d e t e c t i v e s , accompanied by one uniformed o f f i c e r , a r r i v e d a t t h e Stagecoach Inn parking l o t s h o r t l y a f t e r mid- n i g h t on December 2 , 1976. While t h e t h r e e d e t e c t i v e s remained i n t h e parking l o t , Detective Harkins entered t h e Stagecoach Inn where he assumed t h e r o l e of a high r o l l i n g Alaskan i n search of some gambling t h r i l l s . Although upon a r r i v a l a t t h e Stagecoach Inn t h e detec- t i v e s had seen approximately twenty c a r s i n t h e parking l o t , Detective Harkins observed only f o u r people i n t h e down- s t a i r s bar area. Detective Harkins t e s t i f i e d t o hearing t h e sound of poker c h i p s and voices emanating from an u p s t a i r s room a s he passed an unmarked stairway c l o s e t o t h e entrance of t h e Inn on h i s way t o t h e bar. A f t e r approximately t e n minutes, Harkins l e f t t h e bar t o r e p o r t h i s f i n d i n g s t o Detective Soderstrom. Soderstrom d i r e c t e d Harkins t o r e t u r n t o t h e Inn and t o attempt t o e n t e r t h e card game. Detective Harkins re-entered t h e Inn and t o l d t h e barmaid t h a t he w a s a n Alaskan looking f o r a poker game. Defendant Robey, t h e owner of t h e Stagecoach Inn, entered t h e bar a r e a while Harkins w a s t e l l i n g h i s s t o r y t o t h e barmaid, and t o l d t h e barmaid "we d o n ' t play poker here." Harkins, who was i n t h e bar from approximately 12:15 t o 1:45 a.m., observed a man twice c a r r y t r a y s of s i x d r i n k s up t h e unmarked stairway and r e t u r n with empty g l a s s e s . The d e t e c t i v e s i n t h e parking l o t observed a man on two occasions move c a r s from t h e f r o n t parking l o t of t h e Inn t o some l o c a t i o n behind t h e bar. About an hour and a half a f t e r t h e i r a r r i v a l a t t h e Stagecoach Inn parking l o t , a t approximately 1:45 a.m., t h e d e t e c t i v e s and t h e uniformed o f f i c e r entered t h e Inn, r a n up t h e s t a i r s , entered an u p s t a i r s doorway and a r r e s t e d eleven people playing poker i n an u p s t a i r s room. The d e t e c t i v e s seized various checks, cash and I . O . U . ' s , playing c a r d s , poker c h i p s , punch boards, and a f e l t covered poker t a b l e , a l l of which were found i n t h e u p s t a i r s room of t h e Inn a t t h e time of defendants1 a r r e s t . The d e t e c t i v e s a l s o took numerous photographs of t h e gambling paraphernalia they found i n t h e room. The d e t e c t i v e s had n e i t h e r a warrant f o r defendants1 a r r e s t nor a warrant t o search t h e room. The Flathead County a t t o r n e y f i l e d two informations i n D i s t r i c t Court. I n counts one and two of one information, t h e county a t t o r n e y charged defendant Robey with operating an unlicensed premises f o r t h e purpose of conducting card games and with possession of i l l e g a l gambling paraphernalia, both v i o l a t i o n s of Flathead County Gambling Commission Regulations, enacted pursuant t o t h e Montana Card Games Act, s e c t i o n 62-701 e t seq., R.C.M. 1947. I n count t h r e e of t h e second information each of t h e defendants, including Robey, was charged with p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n card games within premises licensed t o dispense i n t o x i c a t i n g beverages but not licensed f o r gambling a s required by Regulation 3.10, Rules and Regulations of t h e Flathead County Gambling Commission. Defendants submitted a motion t o dismiss based on a claim t h a t t h e a c t s charged took place w i t h i n a p r i v a t e residence, and w e r e thereby excluded by s e c t i o n 94-8-403, R.C.M. 1947, from t h e coverage of t h e Montana Card G a m e s Act o r l o c a l gambling r e g u l a t i o n s . The c o u r t denied t h e motion, r u l i n g a s a matter of law t h a t Robeyls u p s t a i r s apartment was n o t a p r i v a t e residence. The D i s t r i c t Court a l s o denied defendants1 motion t o suppress evidence seized i n t h e course of t h e warrantless search of obey's apartment. obey w a s t r i e d before a jury and convicted of operating an unlicensed premises and possession of i l l e g a l gambling paraphernalia. I n a separate nonjury t r i a l , defendants Robey, Peterman and Tuten w e r e t r i e d and convicted of p a r t i - c i p a t i n g i n a card game on an unlicensed premises. Defendants r a i s e t h e following s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r on appeal: 1. Did t h e d e t e c t i v e s have probable cause t o e n t e r t h e u p s t a i r s room of t h e Stagecoach Inn, a r r e s t defendants, and search t h e room? 2. Were t h e d e t e c t i v e s required by Montana s t a t u t o r y law o r by t h e Montana o r United S t a t e s Constitutions t o o b t a i n an a r r e s t warrant p r i o r t o defendants' a r r e s t ? 3 . W a s t h e room i n which t h e poker game was conducted a " p r i v a t e home" within t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 94-8-403, R.C.M. 1947? 4. Was defendant Robey subjected t o double jeopardy by being convicted of conducting a poker game on unlicensed premises and by subsequently being convicted of p a r t i c i - pating i n t h e same game? 5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court commit numerous e r r o r s a t t r i a l denying defendants a f a i r t r i a l ? I n our view, t h e f i r s t i s s u e is d i s p o s i t i v e of t h i s appeal. United S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements govern searches and a r r e s t s without warrants and f u r n i s h t h e answers t o t h i s issue. H e r e , t h e r e was n e i t h e r probable cause t o a r r e s t these defendants nor t o search t h e apartment under united S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l standards. These requirements f o r deter- mining probable cause t o search o r a r r e s t without a warrant are e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same. S p i n e l l i v. United S t a t e s , (1969), 393 U.S. 410, 417, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L ed 2d 637. The probable cause requirements f o r a w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t , i f n o t more s t r i n g e n t , " * * * s u r e l y cannot be l e s s s t r i n g e n t than where an a r r e s t warrant i s obtained * * * ." Wong Sun v. United S t a t e s , (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 479-80, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L ed 2d 441. This Court has noted t h a t " * * * when hearsay information forms t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a finding of probable cause * * * t h e two-pronged t e s t s e t o u t i n Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 1 1 4 , 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L ed 2d 723, must be applied and s a t i s f i e d * * * ." S t a t e ex rel. Townsend v. D i s t r i c t Court, (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 360-61, I n i n v a l i d a t i n g a search warrant i n S p i n e l l i v . United S t a t e s , supra, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court applied t h e two-pronged t e s t of Aguilar v. Texas, (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1 2 L ed 2d 723, and f i r s t considered t h e weight of t h e informant's t i p a p a r t from o t h e r a l l e g a t i o n s of probable cause: " * * * Though t h e a f f i a n t swore t h a t h i s confidant was ' r e l i a b l e , ' he o f f e r e d t h e m a g i s t r a t e no reason i n support of t h i s conclusion.* * *" S p i n e l l i , 393 U.S. a t 416. I n t h i s c a s e Detective Soderstrom s t a t e d " I have g o t t e n information [from t h e informant] t h a t was r e l i a b l e " and t h a t he had known t h e informant f o r a number of years. Detective Soderstrom l a t e r t e s t i f i e d he d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h e informant's t i p alone provided probable cause t o a r r e s t , and t h e S t a t e , i n a b r i e f t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court, s t a t e d t h a t t h e c i t i z e n who gave t h e t i p s was " * * * n o t known t o be a r e l i a b l e informant." I t i s t h e second prong of t h e Aguilar t e s t , however, which t h e a r r e s t most completely f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y . " * * * The t i p does n o t contain a s u f f i c i e n t statement of t h e underlying circumstances from which t h e informer concluded t h a t S p i n e l l i was running a bookmaking operation. W e a r e not t o l d how t h e FBI's source received h i s informa- t i o n - - i t i s n o t a l l e g e d t h a t t h e informant personally observed S p i n e l l i a t work o r t h a t he had ever placed a b e t with him. Moreover, i f t h e informant came by t h e information i n d i r e c t l y , he d i d n o t explain why h i s sources w e r e r e l i a b l e . * * * " S p i n e l l i , 393 U.S. a t 416. Here, Detective Soderstrom t e s t i f i e d n e i t h e r d i d he himself know how t h e informant acquired t h e information nor d i d t h e informant t e l l him where he had acquired h i s informa- t i o n . Under such circumstances, t h e r e i s no way of d e t e r - mining whether t h e informant was simply repeating a c a s u a l rumor o r whether h i s t i p was based on personal observations. Nor d i d t h e informant d e s c r i b e with p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h e accused's a c t i v i t i e s on t h e n i g h t of t h e arrest s o a s t o permit corroboration of t h e d e t a i l s t o g i v e rise t o t h e inference t h a t t h e informant had gained h i s information i n a r e l i a b l e way. I n Draper v. United S t a t e s , (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L ed 2d 327, t h e informant reported t h e defendant had gone t o Chicago t h e day before by t r a i n and he would r e t u r n t o Denver by t r a i n with t h r e e ounces of heroin on one of two s p e c i f i e d mornings. The informant i n Draper a l s o described t h e c l o t h e s t h e defendant would be wearing and t h e bag he would be carrying, and s t a t e d t h a t he ha- b i t u a l l y "walked real f a s t " . When t h e p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n corroborated t h e s e d e t a i l s they could reasonably conclude t h e informant had personal knowledge of defendant's h a b i t s and criminal a c t i v i t y . I n c o n t r a s t , t h e informant i n t h i s c a s e s t a t e d merely t h a t t h e r e would be a poker game hosted by Robey u p s t a i r s a t t h e Stagecoach Inn s t a r t i n g between 10:OO and 1 1 : O O p.m. I t is n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t Robey would be a t t h e Inn s i n c e he owned t h e Inn and l i v e d u p s t a i r s . The p o l i c e a r r i v e d a t t h e Inn t o o l a t e t o corroborate t h e a l l e g e d s t a r t i n g time. The only information gathered i n t h e p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n which was more i n d i c a t i v e of a poker game than merely a p r i v a t e p a r t y was Detective Harkins' statement t h a t he became suspicious when he heard what he thought t o be t h e sound of poker c h i p s being shuffled u p s t a i r s as he entered t h e bar. Given t h e f a c t t h e door t o t h e u p s t a i r s apartment where defendants w e r e playing cards i s approximately 30 f e e t from t h e bottom of t h e s t a i r s , t h i s evidence l o s e s much of i t s v i t a l i t y . The weight of t h e poker chips testimony under t h e s e circumstances, i s hardly enough t o g i v e r i s e t o probable cause t o e n t e r t h e apartment and a r r e s t defendants. The a c t i o n s of t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s i n d i c a t e they themselves were highly doubtful t h e r e was probable cause t o e n t e r Robey's room and a r r e s t defendants. The o f f i c e r s q u i t e c o r r e c t l y d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h e r e was probable cause t o a r r e s t a s i s evidenced by Detective Soderstrom's testimony t h a t he d i d n o t f e e l t h e informant's t i p provided probable cause t o a r r e s t . Nor d i d t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s by t h e i r a c t i o n s appear t o b e l i e v e t h e r e was probable cause t o a r r e s t when Detective Harkins returned t o t h e parking l o t , a f t e r having been i n t h e bar f o r about t e n minutes, and r e l a t e d t o t h e d e t e c t i v e s t h a t t h e r e were few people i n t h e downstairs bar a r e a , b u t he had heard what he thought t o be t h e sound of poker chips and had seen d r i n k s being c a r r i e d u p s t a i r s . Detective Soderstrom, upon receiving t h i s information, merely i n s t r u c t e d Detective Harkins t o r e t u r n t o t h e bar and attempt t o e n t e r a poker game. Detective h ark ins re-entered t h e b a r , and he remained t h e r e i n excess of an hour--without r e p o r t i n g any a d d i t i o n a l observations t o t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s - - i n an unsuccessful attempt t o join t h e supposed card game. The a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s themselves, while s i t t i n g i n t h e parking l o t observing t h e b a r , saw nothing t h a t would add t o probable cause. The S t a t e emphasizes t h e o f f i c e r s ' observa- t i o n of a man who twice moved c a r s from t h e f r o n t l o t t o t h e r e a r of t h e bar. This, however, i s hardly an a c t i o n i n which poker players r a t h e r than party-goers a r e more l i k e l y t o engage. I t appears from t h e evidence t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s stormed t h e stairs t o defendant Robey's apartment and a r - r e s t e d defendants a t 1:45 a.m., not because of an accumula- t i o n of f a c t o r s c r e a t i n g probable cause, b u t merely because t h e bar would soon c l o s e and t h e doors would then be locked. "* * * mere unconfirmed suspicion i s n o t t h e c r i t e r i a upon which probable cause i s based. Something more was needed, and even t h e agents recognized t h i s . * * *" United S t a t e s v. Jackson, ( 6 t h C i r . 1976), 533 F.2d 314, 319. Nor d i d t h e f a c t t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s saw gambling paraphernalia and a card game i n progress as they entered defendant Robey's room provide probable cause t o j u s t i f y an otherwise i l l e g a l a r r e s t , search and s e i z u r e . "Thus t h e Governiient is obliged t o j u s t i f y t h e arrest by t h e search and a t t h e same time t o j u s t i f y t h e search by t h e arrest. This w i l l n o t do. A n o f f i c e r gaining ac- c e s s t o p r i v a t e l i v i n g q u a r t e r s under c o l o r of h i s o f f i c e and of t h e law which he per- s o n i f i e s must then have some v a l i d b a s i s i n law f o r t h e i n t r u s i o n . Any o t h e r r u l e would undermine ' t h e r i g h t of t h e people t o be secure i n t h e i r persons, houses, papers, and e f f e c t s , ' and would o b l i t e r a t e one of t h e most fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n s between our form of government, where o f f i c e r s a r e under t h e law, and t h e p o l i c e - s t a t e where they are t h e law." Johnson v. United S t a t e s , (1948), 333 U.S. 1 0 , 16-17, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.ed. 436. This Court has previously a p p l i e d t h e same a n a l y s i s of United S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements i n a c a s e involving a n i l l e g a l e n t r y without a s e a r c h w a r r a n t i n t o a p r i v a t e r e s i d e n c e where contraband was discovered. "As a n e n t r y i s lawful o r unlawful a t t h e t i m e it i s made, t h e subsequent s e a r c h has t h e same l e g a l c h a r a c t e r a s t h e e n t r y which made it p o s s i b l e . ( C i t a t i o n omitted.) Thus where, a s here, t h e e n t r y i n t o d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s i d e n c e was unlawful, t h e s e a r c h was l i k e w i s e unlawful a s it was t h e product of t h e i l l e g a l e n t r y . And a s e a r c h i s lawful o r unlawful when it s t a r t s and does n o t change t h a t c h a r a c t e r from i t s success. ( C i t a t i o n omitted.) Thus a s e a r c h unlawful i n i t s i n c e p t i o n i s n o t v a l i d a t e d by what it t u r n s up. ( C i t a t i o n omitted.) * * * " S t a t e v. Langan, (1968), 151 Mont. 558, 567, 445 P.2d 565. Because t h e r e w a s no probable cause e i t h e r t o s e a r c h without a warrant o r t o arrest defendants without a w a r r a n t , t h e a r r e s t s and s e i z u r e of t h e evidence i n c i d e n t t o t h e a r r e s t s v i o l a t e d t h e Fourth Amendment, United S t a t e s Consti- t u t i o n . Accordingly, t h e evidence s e i z e d should have been suppressed, and i t s i n t r o d u c t i o n a t t r i a l c o n s t i t u t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Absent t h e evidence i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d , t h e r e w a s i n s u f f i - c i e n t evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e convictions. Thus a new t r i a l cannot be granted, and t h e c a s e must be dismissed. S t a t e v. Langan, supra. I n view of o u r holding, t h e remaining s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of e r r o r need n o t be discussed a s t h e i r determination would n o t a f f e c t t h e r e s u l t i n t h i s c a s e . Reversed and dismissed. 2 W - k Chief J u s t i c e b ? @ d & M r . J u s t i c e John C , Sheehy ~ u s t i c e s d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e . i n t h i s -10- case. M r . John Conway Harrison dissenting: I dissent. Here the informant gave Detective Soderstrom ' 1 the names of kno-m poker players, dealers and licensed establish- ment operators" who were t o l a t e r p a r t i c i p a t e i n the game a t the Stagecoach Inn. This added t o the f a c t t h a t on the same c a l l the informant told the police the game was on f o r t h a t night, plus the a r r i v a l of the cars a t the inn and the l a t e r sound of poker chips coming from the second f l o o r , a l l a r e i n m y opinion s u f f i c i e n t cause t o sustain the convictions . In Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L ed 2d 327, 332, the Court speaking t o whether there was probable cause noted: "* * * Probable cause e x i s t s where ' t h e f a c t s , and circumstances within [the a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s ' ] knowledge and of which they had reasonable t r u s t - worthy information [are] s u f f i c i e n t i n themselves t o warrant a man of reasonable caution i n the b e l i e f t h a t ' an offense has been or i s being com- mitted." I would affirm the convictions.