Case Title: State v. Batchili

Citation: 2007-Ohio-2204

Docket Number: 20052420

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BATCHILI, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204.] 
Criminal law — Search and seizure — Constitutionality of prolonged traffic stop 
— Totality of the circumstances — Legal relevance of the issuance of a 
citation. 
(No. 2005-2420 — Submitted December 12, 2006 — Decided May 23, 2007.) 
APPEAL from Court of Appeals for Lucas County,  
No. L-04-1039, 2005-Ohio-6001. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. A traffic stop is not unconstitutionally prolonged when permissible background 
checks have been diligently undertaken and not yet completed at the time 
a drug dog alerts on the vehicle. 
2. The “reasonable and articulable” standard applied to a prolonged traffic stop 
encompasses the totality of the circumstances, and a court may not 
evaluate in isolation each articulated reason for the stop. United States v. 
Arvizu (2002), 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 
applied. 
3. The constitutionality of a prolonged traffic stop does not depend on the 
issuance of a citation. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are called upon to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment is violated when a police officer conducting a traffic stop calls for a 
canine “walk around” while waiting for the results of a criminal background 
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check. We conclude that constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment 
were not violated by the police action in this case. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} Lacina Batchili was convicted after a jury trial of one count of theft 
and one count of receiving stolen property. The evidence produced at trial 
resulted from a traffic stop on the Ohio Turnpike on January 29, 2003.  Before 
trial, Batchili had unsuccessfully moved to dismiss all evidence resulting from the 
warrantless detention and arrest.  Batchili appealed his conviction, arguing in part 
that the evidence should have been suppressed because it was found during a 
routine traffic stop that became an unconstitutionally lengthy search and seizure.1  
{¶ 3} Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Stacey Arnold testified that 
prior to the stop, she had decided to follow the van that Batchili was driving.  
After observing Batchili commit a marked-lanes violation, see R.C. 4511.33, she 
activated her overhead emergency lights to signal Batchili to pull over. He did not 
do so for two miles. 
{¶ 4} Trooper Arnold observed that Batchili’s van had tinted windows 
and a cargo hold containing boxes in disarray, which were covered with blankets.  
She asked for and received Batchili’s driver’s license and registration, which 
indicated that Batchili did not own the vehicle.  Batchili gave conflicting answers 
as to who owned the vehicle, did not make regular eye contact, and had shaking 
hands.  In addition, Trooper Arnold smelled deodorizer in the vehicle. 
{¶ 5} Trooper Arnold returned to her cruiser to check the validity of the 
driver’s license and to determine whether there were any warrants against 
Batchili.  She also called for backup from her partner, Trooper Alejo Romero, 
whom she asked to conduct a “walk around with the canine” to detect drugs. 
Trooper Romero arrived, and the dog immediately alerted on the vehicle. 
                                                 
1.  Finding merit in this assignment of error, the Sixth District declined to address the remaining 
assignments. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶ 6} Because of the dog’s response, the troopers conducted a 
warrantless search of the van, in which they found boxes of pirated videotapes 
and DVDs, but no drugs. Batchili was then arrested and later indicted on one 
count of theft, one count of receiving stolen property, one count of trademark 
counterfeiting, one count of money laundering, and one count of forgery. 
{¶ 7} The Sixth District Court of Appeals agreed with Batchili’s 
argument that the evidence should have been suppressed. State v. Batchili, 6th 
Dist. No. L-04-1039, 2005-Ohio-6001.  It held that the state did not present 
evidence of “specific and articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity beyond that which prompted the stop.”  Id., ¶ 14.  As a result, the 
court held that the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution 
because “[n]one of those factors [that had concerned the state trooper], when 
considered alone, would be sufficient to support a finding of reasonable 
suspicion.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 8} The legality of the traffic stop is not disputed. The officers' 
suppression-hearing testimony that Batchili was pulled over for a marked-lane 
violation is uncontroverted and served as the lawful basis for the stop. Dayton v. 
Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091, syllabus.  The focus of the 
inquiry, therefore, is whether there was an illegally prolonged detention of 
Batchili, given the trooper’s observations. 
{¶ 9} The Sixth District’s opinion strays from clearly established 
precedent in three ways. First, it fails to conduct any analysis as to whether the 
length of the stop was impermissible before the dog arrived at the scene of the 
stop. Second, it misapplies the “reasonable and articulable suspicion” standard to 
conclude that the request for the dog was unconstitutional. Finally, it describes the 
failure to issue a citation for the marked-lane violation as a troubling factor. 
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{¶ 10} The Sixth District found merit in Batchili’s assertion that Trooper 
Arnold did not have sufficient cause to prolong the traffic stop until another 
trooper responded with the dog and that Batchili’s continued detention for that 
purpose constituted an illegal seizure. The essential argument is that the arrival of 
the canine unit took longer than it should have taken Trooper Arnold to write a 
traffic citation for a marked-lane violation.  However, the Sixth District never 
analyzed whether the length of the stop prior to the dog’s alert was reasonable. 
{¶ 11} The Fourth Amendment imposes a reasonableness standard upon 
the exercise of discretion by government officials. Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 
440 U.S. 648, 653-654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed 2d 660. “Thus, the permissibility 
of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the 
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.” Id. at 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660.  To justify a 
particular intrusion, the officer must demonstrate “specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889. 
{¶ 12} The facts of this case are almost directly aligned with those of the 
Twelfth District Court of Appeals case State v. Howard, Preble App. Nos. 
CA2006-02-002 and CA2006-02-003, 2006-Ohio-5656, ¶ 15, which held, 
“[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the 
motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning. State v. 
Keathley (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 130, 131 [562 N.E.2d 932].  This measure 
includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver's 
license, registration, and vehicle plates. State v. Bolden, Preble App. No. CA2003-
03-007, 2004-Ohio-184, ¶ 17, citing Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 
659, 99 S.Ct. 1391 [59 L.Ed.2d 660].  ‘In determining if an officer completed 
these tasks within a reasonable length of time, the court must evaluate the 
January Term, 2007 
5 
duration of the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances and consider 
whether the officer diligently conducted the investigation.’ State v. Carlson 
(1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 598-599 [657 N.E.2d 591], citing State v. Cook 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521-522 [605 N.E.2d 70], and U.S. v. Sharpe (1985), 
470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568 [84 L.Ed.2d 605].” 
{¶ 13} The record establishes that at the time the dog alerted, eight 
minutes and 56 seconds into the stop, Trooper Arnold was still waiting for the 
results of the criminal-background check. She further testified that it would take 
her approximately five to ten minutes to issue a warning, and anywhere from ten 
to 20 minutes to issue an actual citation. 
{¶ 14} There simply is no evidence to suggest that Batchili’s detention for 
the traffic violation was of sufficient length to make it constitutionally dubious.  A 
traffic stop is not unconstitutionally prolonged when permissible background 
checks have been diligently undertaken and not yet completed at the time a drug 
dog alerts on the vehicle.  There is no showing that the detention was delayed so 
that the dog could conduct its search, and therefore, there was no constitutional 
violation. 
{¶ 15} Moreover, assuming the detention was actually prolonged by the 
request for a dog search, “the detention of a stopped driver may continue beyond 
[the normal] time frame when additional facts are encountered that give rise to a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity beyond that which prompted 
the initial stop. State v. Myers (1990), 63 Ohio App.3d 765, 771 [580 N.E.2d 61]; 
State v. Venham [1994], 96 Ohio App.3d [649,] 655 [645 N.E.2d 831].”  Howard, 
2006-Ohio-5656, at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 16} It is here that the Sixth District’s reasoning takes a drastic turn 
from established law. It noted that an extended investigation must be justified by 
an “objective manifestation that the person stopped is, ‘or is about to be, engaged 
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in criminal activity.’ ” Batchili, 2005-Ohio-6001,¶ 11, quoting United States v. 
Cortez (1981), 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. 
{¶ 17} It failed to note, however, that the “reasonable and articulable” 
standard applied to a prolonged traffic stop encompasses the totality of the 
circumstances and that a court may not evaluate in isolation each articulated 
reason for the stop. United States v. Arvizu (2002), 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 
744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740. 
{¶ 18} The Sixth District here did exactly what the United States Supreme 
Court prohibited in Arvizu: it substituted its own judgment as to each of the 
reasons listed supporting Trooper Arnold’s justification for her articulable 
suspicion and concluded that because each had an innocent explanation, her 
suspicion was not reasonable.  Batchili, 2005-Ohio-6001, ¶ 14.  The court even 
concluded, “[N]one of those factors, when considered alone, would be sufficient 
to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
{¶ 19} Terry “precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.” Arvizu, 
534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740.  The “reasonable and articulable 
suspicion” analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual 
factors themselves. Here, Trooper Arnold listed a number of causes for suspicion 
(failure to stop for two miles, nervous interaction, multiple statements as to who 
owned the vehicle, tinted windows, cargo compartment in disarray and with 
blankets covering boxes, and a vehicle smelling of deodorizer), which 
cumulatively provided a sufficient reason for additional detention for the purposes 
of a canine walk-around. Therefore, even if the length of the detention had been 
unreasonable for the sole purpose of issuing the citation, Trooper Arnold was 
justified in extending the stop for a canine search. 
{¶ 20} The Sixth District also noted that it was “troubled” that Trooper 
Arnold never cited Batchili for the traffic offense that prompted the stop. Batchili, 
2005-Ohio-6001, ¶ 15.  This observation suffers from logical and legal 
January Term, 2007 
7 
difficulties. First, Trooper Arnold was interrupted by the dog alert while receiving 
the criminal-background check.  The failure to issue a traffic citation when there 
is an indication of a potentially far more significant crime is easily excused when 
more pressing issues are being addressed. 
{¶ 21} Further, as two other districts have recognized, the constitutionality 
of a prolonged traffic stop does not depend on the issuance of a citation.  State v. 
Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 596-597, 657 N.E.2d 591; Keathley, 55 
Ohio App.3d at 132, 562 N.E.2d 932. This reasoning is well supported by our 
prior holding: “Where a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause 
that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution * * *." Dayton v. 
Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091, syllabus. 
{¶ 22} There has been no challenge to the probable cause regarding the 
stop. As discussed above, the canine walk-around was not the product of an 
unreasonably long detention relating to the ultimate issuance of the citation. Even 
if the traffic stop had been prolonged, reasonable suspicion under the totality of 
the circumstances justified the ongoing detention. Therefore, the judgment of the 
court of appeals is reversed, and the matter is remanded for consideration of 
Batchili’s remaining assignments of error. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., WALSH, LUNDBERG STRATTON and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., would dismiss the cause as having been improvidently 
accepted. 
 
JAMES E. WALSH, J., of the Twelfth Appellate District, was assigned to sit 
for RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
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CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 23} The majority opinion characterizes the traffic stop that occurred in 
this case as routine.  A review of the arresting trooper’s testimony suggests that if 
this was a routine traffic stop, we should all be very afraid. 
{¶ 24} Trooper Arnold testified that she was parked at mile marker 53 on 
the Ohio Turnpike when a van driven by Lacina Batchili passed her.  The trooper 
testified that the van was not in violation of any traffic laws when it passed her 
and that nothing about the van attracted her attention.  For no reason other than 
“[b]ecause I wanted to,” the trooper decided to leave her parked position and 
drive on the highway to observe traffic.  The trooper caught up with the van 
driven by Batchili as the van approached mile marker 55.  Based on her stationary 
starting position and the van’s speed of approximately 65 miles per hour, the 
trooper testified she would have had to travel in excess of 100 miles per hour, 
possibly as fast at 120 miles per hour, to catch up to the van by mile marker 55.  
When asked whether she often left a stationary starting position and drove that 
fast to observe traffic when no violation had occurred, the trooper responded:  “It 
happens quite frequently.” 
{¶ 25} After catching up with the van driven by Batchili, the trooper 
observed the van “drift over the dotted center line by approximately the width of 
the driver’s side tires.  * * *  The vehicle then drifted back into the driving lane 
proceeding eastbound.”  Drifting across a marked lane on a roadway can be a 
violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1), which states, “A vehicle or trackless trolley shall 
be driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic 
and shall not be moved from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained 
that such movement can be made with safety.” 
January Term, 2007 
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{¶ 26} First, there is no indication in the record that the van’s drifting 
across the center line was unsafe.  If there was little or no traffic, the drifting 
would not have endangered anyone. 
{¶ 27} Second, it’s a bit ironic that a trooper would drive over 100 miles 
per hour for no apparent reason, behavior that is surely more unsafe than an 
inadvertent lane drift, and then pull over a driver for a de minimis violation.  
{¶ 28} Third, imagine if every driver (or even ten percent of them) who 
drifted across a lane were pulled over.  There would be no time for troopers to do 
anything else.  Traffic and commerce would move more slowly, courts would be 
more crowded, and the residents of this state would not be safer. 
{¶ 29} It is inconceivable to me that this court would sanction the 
trooper’s conduct in this case.  The trooper never mentioned a reason for pulling 
over the van besides the putative violation of R.C. 4511.33.  Had the trooper 
noticed a pattern of erratic lane changes, the traffic stop would have been 
warranted.  Had the trooper articulable reasons to be suspicious of the van or its 
driver, the traffic stop would have been warranted.  I respect Trooper Arnold and 
her dedication to duty.  According to Ohio State Highway Patrol media releases, 
she has a tremendous record of felony arrests.  I suspect that her instincts told her 
something was amiss, but instincts are not enough to justify a pretextual traffic 
stop.  And given the de minimis nature of the possible violation and the trooper’s 
failure to cite Batchili for violating R.C. 4511.33, I am forced to conclude that this 
traffic stop was a pretext and, therefore, that the traffic stop was unreasonable.  
Consequently, there is no need to determine whether the length of the detention 
was unreasonable because the traffic stop itself was unjustified.  I would affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals, though for reasons different from those 
discussed by the court of appeals. 
{¶ 30} In Blue Ash v. Kavanagh, 113 Ohio St.3d 67, 2007-Ohio-1103, 862 
N.E.2d 810, ¶ 30, this court sanctioned the deployment of a drug-sniffing dog 
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whenever a driver is pulled over and his or her license or registration has expired.  
In this case, this court sanctions the deployment of a drug-sniffing dog whenever 
a driver drifts across a marked lane.  I wonder what this court will sanction next.  
I dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kevin A. Pituch, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Douglas A. Wilkins, for appellee. 
______________________