Case Title: Sheri J. Storm v. Legion Insurance Company

Citation: 2003 WI 120

Docket Number: 2001AP001139

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 120 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1139 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Sheri J. Storm, Tiffany J. Storm, by her 
guardian ad litem, William Smoler, and Justin S. 
Storm, by his guardian ad litem, William Smoler,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Self Insured Services Company,  
 
Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
Joe Leean, Secretary, Department of Health and 
Family Services, State of Wisconsin,  
 
Subrogated-Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
Legion Insurance Company, Kenneth C. Olson, 
M.D., Joanne Cooper, Cooper Resource Center, 
Inc. and Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
ABC Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant, 
Marcelo Castillo, M.D.,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 18, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 8, 2003 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce Schmidt   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by William 
Smoler, Pamela J. Smoler and Smoler Law Office, LLC, Madison, 
and oral argument by William Smoler. 
 
For defendants-respondents, Legion Insurance Company and 
Kenneth C. Olson, M.D., there was a brief by Patricia C. White 
 
 
2
and David D. Patton & Associates, P.C., Bloomfield Hills, 
Michigan, and Virginia L. Newcomb and Borgelt, Powell, Peterson 
& Frauen, Madison, and oral argument by Virginia L. Newcomb. 
 
For defendant-respondent, Dr. Marcelo Castillo, there was a 
brief by Michael J. Hogan, Ellen L. Wiesner, and Hogan, Ritter, 
Minix & Pasholk, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Michael J. 
Hogan. 
 
 
2003 WI 120 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1139   
(L.C. No. 
98 CV 57) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Sheri J. Storm, Tiffany J. Storm, by her  
guardian ad litem, William Smoler, and  
Justin S. Storm, by his guardian ad  
litem, William Smoler,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
Self Insured Services Company,  
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff, 
 
Joe Leean, Secretary, Department of  
Health and Family Services, State of  
Wisconsin,  
 
          Subrogated-Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
Legion Insurance Company, Kenneth C.  
Olson, M.D., Joanne Cooper, Cooper  
Resource Center, Inc. and Wisconsin  
Patients Compensation Fund,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
ABC Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
Marcelo Castillo, M.D.,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 18, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Winnebago 
County, Bruce Schmidt, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification by the court of appeals.  Sheri Storm appeals a 
decision of the Winnebago County Circuit Court, Bruce K. 
Schmidt, Judge, dismissing a number of the defendants in this 
action on the basis that her claims alleging medical malpractice 
were not timely filed.1 
¶2 
Storm's suit alleges that various psychiatric and 
psychological health care providers negligently treated her or 
negligently supervised her treatment between 1990 and 1993.  
Some of these care providers assert that Storm's suit is time-
barred under both the three-year statute of limitations in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(a) (2001-02)2 and the five-year statute of 
repose in § 893.55(1)(b) for medical malpractice actions.  Storm 
argues that the statute of repose applies only to the discovery 
rule of accrual in paragraph (b) of § 893.55(1) and is 
inapplicable to the injury rule of accrual in § 893.55(1)(a), 
upon which she relies.  She also maintains that she was mentally 
ill at the time her causes of action accrued, permitting the 
                                                 
1 At the time this action was commenced, Storm's two 
children were minors and were added as plaintiffs pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 655.007 (2001-02) with claims of loss of society 
and companionship. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
2002 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 01-1139 
 
3 
 
three-year period to file an action under § 893.55(1)(a) to be 
extended up to five additional years by application of the 
disability tolling provision in Wis. Stat. § 893.16.  Storm's 
last day of treatment from the two mental health care providers 
who are the subject of this appeal was more than five years——but 
less than eight years——before she filed claims against each of 
them. 
¶3 
We address multiple issues in accepting certification 
of this appeal.  First, does the five-year statute of repose in 
§ 893.55(1)(b) 
apply 
to 
the 
injury 
rule 
of 
accrual 
in 
§ 893.55(1)(a)?  Based on the plain language of § 893.55(1), we 
conclude that the five-year repose period in paragraph (b) of 
that subsection is limited to the discovery accrual rule in 
§ 893.55(1)(b) and has no application to the injury accrual rule 
in § 893.55(1)(a). 
¶4 
Second, can any of the periods of limitation in 
§ 893.55(1) be extended by application of the disability tolling 
provisions in § 893.16(1)?  We conclude that a person who is 
mentally ill at the time his or her cause of action for medical 
malpractice 
accrues 
under 
§ 893.55(1)(a) 
may 
toll 
the 
limitations period under the strictures of § 893.16.  We do not 
reach the issue of whether, or how, the tolling provisions in 
§ 893.16 may extend the periods of limitation defined in 
§ 893.55(1)(b), including its statute of repose. 
¶5 
Third, since § 893.16(1) may toll the period of 
limitation in § 893.55(1)(a), does use of § 893.16(1) require a 
factual finding that the plaintiff's mental illness caused him 
No. 01-1139 
 
4 
 
or her to fail to understand a claim so as to timely file it.  
We conclude that such a finding is required.  A mental illness 
for purposes of § 893.16 is a mental condition that renders a 
person functionally unable to understand or appreciate the 
situation giving rise to the legal claim so that the person can 
assert legal rights or functionally unable to understand legal 
rights and appreciate the need to assert them.  Because this 
determination is factual in nature and was not addressed by the 
circuit court, we remand this action to permit the submission of 
evidence 
regarding 
(1) 
whether 
Storm 
suffered 
from 
a 
functionally debilitating mental illness; (2) if she did, when 
such an illness commenced; (3) whether the illness ever ceased; 
and (4) if the illness ceased, when it ceased.  In addition, we 
hold that neither the retention of legal counsel by a mentally 
ill person nor such counsel's filing of a claim on the mentally 
ill person's behalf causes, as a matter of law, that person's 
mental illness to cease for purposes of § 893.16. 
¶6 
In all, we conclude that, if Storm was mentally ill at 
the time her causes of action accrued against each defendant, 
and if her illness did not cease more than two years before she 
filed a claim against any of the individual defendants, then 
Storm timely filed her action alleging medical malpractice 
against Doctors Olson and Castillo. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶7 
The facts are taken from the summary judgment record.  
On January 22, 1990, Sheri Storm began receiving psychiatric 
treatment from Kenneth Olson, M.D.  Doctor Olson provided 
No. 01-1139 
 
5 
 
periodic inpatient and outpatient treatment to Storm after that 
date.  In early 1991, Dr. Olson diagnosed Storm as suffering 
from a multiple personality disorder, which is referred to in 
the 
psychiatric 
nomenclature 
as 
a 
dissociative 
identity 
disorder. 
¶8 
The last day that Storm received treatment from Dr. 
Olson was August 3, 1992, at which time Olson moved his practice 
out of 
Wisconsin. 
 Four 
days later, 
Storm 
applied for 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits related to her 
mental disability, for which she was eventually deemed eligible, 
retroactive to the date of her application.  After August 3, 
Storm also received treatment from a social worker named Valerie 
Hamilton at the same offices where Dr. Olson had treated Storm.  
Hamilton had previously assisted Dr. Olson with some of Storm's 
treatment.  The last session between Storm and Hamilton occurred 
on September 9, 1992.  Shortly after Storm discontinued her 
visits to Hamilton, she briefly received treatment from two 
other mental health care providers, neither of whom is a subject 
of this action. 
¶9 
Near 
the 
end 
of 
1992, 
Storm 
began 
receiving 
psychological treatment at the Cooper Resource Center (the CRC).  
On January 22, 1993, Dr. Joann Cooper, Ph.D., a psychologist who 
owns the CRC, evaluated Storm and diagnosed her as possessing a 
multiple personality disorder.  In February 1993 Dr. Marcelo 
Castillo, a physician and the alleged medical director of the 
CRC at the time, allegedly admitted Storm for inpatient 
psychiatric treatment to be performed by Dr. Cooper.  After 
No. 01-1139 
 
6 
 
Storm was discharged in March 1993, Cooper continued to treat 
Storm for her disorder on an outpatient basis until September 
24, 1993.  This was Storm's last day of any relevant involvement 
with the CRC and Doctors Cooper and Castillo. 
¶10 On 
September 
9, 
1997, 
Storm 
filed 
a 
medical 
malpractice suit alleging, among other instances of malpractice, 
that Doctors Olson and Cooper negligently treated her by using 
hypnosis to recover memories of childhood sexual abuse that were 
later found to be untrue.3  According to Storm, these false 
memories formed the basis of a multiple personality disorder and 
caused her suffering.  The complaint also named the CRC and 
Legion Insurance Company, Dr. Olson's professional liability 
insurer, as defendants.4  On June 14, 2000, while the case was 
still undergoing discovery, Storm filed an amended complaint 
naming Dr. Castillo as an additional defendant.  Storm sought a 
variety of damages alleged to have resulted from the negligent 
care or supervision of the defendants. 
¶11 Doctors Olson and Castillo each filed a motion for 
summary judgment in the fall of 2000, asserting that Storm's 
action was untimely filed under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1).  Section 
                                                 
3 Also originally included as plaintiffs were the Self 
Insured 
Services 
Company, 
as 
an 
involuntary 
subrogated 
plaintiff, and the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family 
Services, 
as 
a 
subrogated 
plaintiff 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 49.89 and 803.03.  Self Insured Services was later 
voluntarily dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the 
parties. 
4 In addition, the Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund was 
named as a defendant pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 655.27(5). 
No. 01-1139 
 
7 
 
893.55(1) prohibits the commencement of a medical malpractice 
action more than three years from the date of injury or one year 
from the date of discovery of an injury, whichever is later, 
but, with respect to discovery, an action may not be filed more 
than five years from the date of the act or omission giving rise 
to the alleged injury.  Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1).  Doctor Olson 
asserted that Storm was required to commence her action against 
him by either August 3, 1995, or, assuming that Storm did not 
discover her injury until on or after August 3, 1996, by August 
3, 1997.  Similarly, Dr. Castillo claimed that Storm had until 
either September 24, 1996, or September 24, 1998, to bring her 
claim against him. 
¶12 Storm 
argued 
that 
the 
statute 
of 
repose 
in 
§ 893.55(1)(b) applies only to the discovery rule of accrual in 
paragraph (b) and is inapplicable to the injury rule of accrual 
in paragraph (a), upon which she relies.  She also contended 
that Wisconsin's disability tolling statute, § 893.16, applies 
to actions brought under § 893.55(1)(a) and that she was 
"mentally ill" at the time her causes of action accrued.  
Therefore, adding the five-year maximum tolling period provided 
under § 893.16 for someone with a mental illness to the three-
year limitations period in § 893.55(1)(a), Storm reasoned that 
she had until August 3, 2000, to bring her claim against Dr. 
Olson and until September 24, 2001, to bring suit against Dr. 
Castillo. 
¶13 On February 15, 2001, the circuit court granted the 
defendants' summary judgment motions, determining that § 893.16 
No. 01-1139 
 
8 
 
does not apply to medical malpractice actions and that Storm 
failed to commence her suit within either the three-year statute 
of limitation in § 893.55(1)(a) or the five-year statute of 
repose in § 893.55(1)(b).  By a written judgment dated April 30, 
2001, the court dismissed all claims against Dr. Olson, Legion 
Insurance, and Dr. Castillo.5  Storm appealed this decision and 
the court of appeals requested certification, which we granted. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 The 
parties 
do 
not 
dispute 
the 
relevant 
dates 
catalogued above or that Storm has stated claims for negligence.  
There are, however, disputed issues regarding these claims.  For 
purposes of the summary judgment motion, the parties contest 
only the legal effect of the applicable dates.  Therefore, 
summary judgment dismissing these defendants is appropriate if, 
based on the undisputed facts, the defendants establish that the 
claims were not timely filed as required under all applicable 
limitation periods.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2); Paul v. Skemp, 
2001 WI 42, ¶¶8-9, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860; Smith v. 
Milwaukee County, 149 Wis. 2d 934, 937, 440 N.W.2d 360 (1989).  
This issue is one of statutory interpretation, which is a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo.  Paul, 242 
Wis. 2d 507, ¶10.   
                                                 
5 Dr. Cooper and the CRC did not file motions for summary 
judgment, did not join either of the other defendants' motions, 
and did not participate in the summary judgment motion hearing.  
At the end of the motion hearing, Judge Schmidt directed that 
Storm's action with regard to Cooper and the CRC be held in 
abeyance pending the conclusion of this appeal. 
No. 01-1139 
 
9 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶15 Storm's medical malpractice claims are procedurally 
governed 
in large 
part 
by 
Chapter 
655, 
while 
the 
time 
limitations for bringing her claims are circumscribed by 
§ 893.55.  To assess the appropriateness of the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment, we are required to interpret 
§ 893.55(1) and its interplay, if any, with § 893.16, which is 
the 
limitations 
tolling 
provision 
for 
persons 
under 
a 
disability, including the disability of mental illness.  The 
fundamental goal of our statutory interpretation is to discern 
the intent of the legislature in drafting these provisions.  See 
Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2001 WI 86, ¶14, 
245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893. 
¶16 The parties' arguments on appeal track those made 
before the circuit court, as discussed above.  Therefore, our 
inquiry requires four primary determinations. 
¶17 First, we address whether the statute of repose in 
§ 893.55(1)(b) applies to all medical malpractice actions, 
including those brought under § 893.55(1)(a), thereby barring a 
medical malpractice action from commencing more than five years 
after the last act or omission giving rise to the claim.  
Second, we look to whether the disability tolling statute, 
§ 893.16, applies to the periods of limitation in § 893.55.  
Third, if § 893.16 does toll a limitations period for medical 
malpractice, we must define "mental illness" under the statute 
and the standard by which a court determines if a plaintiff is 
mentally 
ill 
and 
qualifies 
under 
the 
tolling 
provision.  
No. 01-1139 
 
10 
 
Finally, we address Dr. Castillo's argument that, however the 
foregoing matters are decided, Storm's disability ceased as a 
matter of law when she retained or utilized legal counsel. 
A.  Scope of the Statute of Repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) 
¶18 The time limitations for filing medical malpractice 
actions are provided in subsection (1) of § 893.55, which reads: 
(1) Except as provided by subs. (2) and (3), an 
action to recover damages for injury arising from any 
treatment or operation performed by, or from any 
omission by, a person who is a health care provider, 
regardless of the theory on which the action is based, 
shall be commenced within the later of: 
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or 
(b) One year from the date the injury was 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been discovered, except that an action may 
not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 
years from the date of the act or omission. 
The parties dispute the preclusive effect of the five-year 
statute of repose in paragraph (b).  In particular, Doctors 
Olson and Castillo contend that the repose period absolutely 
required Storm to file her action against Dr. Olson no later 
than August 3, 1997, and against Dr. Castillo no later than 
September 24, 1998 (five years, respectively, after each doctor 
ended his involvement with Storm). 
¶19 We conclude under a plain reading of § 893.55(1)(b) 
that the five-year repose period applies only to actions brought 
pursuant to the discovery rule in paragraph (b).  Paragraph (b) 
is an alternative limitations period.  It permits a claimant, 
irrespective of the three-year limitations period for injury 
No. 01-1139 
 
11 
 
accrual in § 893.55(1)(a), to file a medical malpractice action 
up to "one year from the date the injury was discovered or, in 
the 
exercise 
of 
reasonable 
diligence 
should 
have 
been 
discovered."  It then creates an exception, which states that 
"an action may not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 
years 
from 
the 
date 
of 
the 
act 
or 
omission."  
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
The 
term 
"paragraph" governs the scope of this five-year period of 
repose, which, as we have previously held, serves to bar medical 
malpractice actions even if a claimant has yet to discover a 
latent injury.  See Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 
98, ¶¶26, 47, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849. 
¶20 To ascertain the meaning of the term "paragraph" in 
§ 893.55(1)(b), we look to whether there is any applicable 
statutory definition of that term.  Chapter 35 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes codifies the rules of publishing and interpreting 
public 
documents, 
including 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 35.18(3) explains how the numbers and sections 
of statutory provisions are designated.  It states: 
All chapters and sections of Wisconsin statutes 
shall retain their present numbers and titles until 
changed by the revisor or by statute.  Each section 
shall be designated by a mixed, decimal number, the 
whole number corresponding to the chapter and the 
decimal to the section's place in the chapter.  The 
numbers and titles of chapters and sections shall be 
printed in boldface type.  Each subsection shall be 
designated by a number, or by a number and a letter of 
the alphabet, enclosed in parentheses.  Each paragraph 
shall be designated by a letter or letters enclosed in 
parentheses.  Each subdivision shall be designated by 
a number or by a number and a letter.  Each paragraph 
No. 01-1139 
 
12 
 
of a subdivision shall be designated by a letter or 
letters. 
(Emphasis added.)  By virtue of this statute, the reference to 
"this paragraph" in § 893.55(1)(b) pertains only to paragraph 
(b), as § 893.55(1) is a "subsection" of the statute, not a 
paragraph, and § 893.55(1)(a) is a wholly separate "paragraph" 
from § 893.55(1)(b).  As this court has previously noted, 
legislative drafters understood the 
term "paragraph" 
when 
§ 893.55(1) was being created 
in 
1979.  
See 
Paul, 242 
Wis. 2d 507, ¶49 (discussing Wisconsin Bill Drafters Manual 
(Oct. 1976)). 
¶21 Adoption of the defendants' argument would require 
this court to ignore the phrase "under this paragraph" in 
§ 893.55(1)(b).  The language is plain and unambiguous with 
respect to its scope.  As we stated in Czapinski v. St. Francis 
Hosp., 2000 WI 80, 236 Wis. 2d 316, 613 N.W.2d 120, "A court 
will not ordinarily engage in statutory construction unless a 
statute is ambiguous.  'When a statute is plain and unambiguous, 
interpretation is unnecessary and intentions cannot be imputed 
to the legislature except those to be gathered from the terms of 
No. 01-1139 
 
13 
 
the statute itself.'"  Id., ¶17 (citing and quoting Harris v. 
Kelley, 70 Wis. 2d 242, 249, 234 N.W.2d 628 (1975)).6 
¶22 The 
preceding 
interpretation 
of 
§ 893.55(1) 
was 
signaled by this court in Paul v. Skemp, 242 Wis. 2d 507.  In 
Paul, we recognized the potential conflict between the periods 
of limitation and period of repose located in § 893.55(1), 
observing that "[t]he plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1) 
does not indicate whether the five-year statute of repose in 
§ 893.55(1)(b) applies to actions governed by the injury rule of 
accrual in § 893.55(1)(a)."  Id., ¶49.7  The court surmised that 
the statute of repose did not limit the injury rule of accrual 
and that: 
                                                 
6 The defendants point to language in the Judicial Council 
Committee Note to Wis. Stat. § 893.55 stating that "Subsection 
(1) further provides that in no event may a malpractice action 
be commenced later than 6[5] years from the time of the alleged 
act or omission."  However, the actual language in subsection 
(1) does not accomplish this result.  It fails to do so in 
certain 
instances 
under 
the 
injury-occurrence 
rule 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(a) established by Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 
42, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860, or when tolling provisions 
apply to extend the periods in § 893.55, such as in Landis v. 
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2001 WI 86, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 
628 N.W.2d 893.  If the legislature had intended an absolute bar 
to any medical malpractice action more than five years after the 
act or omission giving rise to the injury, then the statute 
would not have expressly limited the statute of repose created 
in paragraph (b) to actions commenced under paragraph (b).  
There is no ambiguity in the wording of the medical malpractice 
limitations statute that would permit any other reading. 
7 Indeed, the court in Paul urged the legislature to provide 
guidance regarding how to resolve the "possible conflict between 
actions that arise under the injury rule of accrual and the 
discovery rule of accrual."  Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶49. 
No. 01-1139 
 
14 
 
a medical malpractice action might be able to be 
timely filed more than five years after the act or 
omission under the injury rule of accrual where, for 
example, the injury occurs more than two years after 
the negligent act or omission and the action is filed 
within three years from the injury. 
Id., ¶48.  The Paul court ultimately decided the issue presented 
in that case on other grounds, determining that the actionable 
injury was not the physician's faulty diagnosis but instead was 
the date of the patient's death.  Id., ¶45.8  While Paul did not 
settle the scope of the repose period in § 893.55(1)(b), its 
reasoning on this matter conforms with the understanding that we 
presently adopt. 
¶23 Because 
the 
five-year 
statute 
of 
repose 
in 
§ 893.55(1)(b) does not affect a plaintiff's ability to bring a 
claim 
under 
§ 893.55(1)(a), 
Storm 
can 
rely 
solely 
upon 
§ 893.55(1)(a) in determining the effective limitation periods 
within which she needed to bring her claims. 
B. 
Applicability 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
893.16(1) 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1) 
¶24 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 893.16 
permits 
a 
period 
of 
limitation in Chapter 893 to be extended for an additional five 
years if a claimant is mentally ill at the time a cause of 
action accrues.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1), (3).  Subsection 
(1) of § 893.16 provides in full: 
                                                 
8 In Paul, the decedent's estate filed its suit within three 
years of the date that an actionable injury occurred and, 
therefore, it was timely pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(a).  
Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶45.  In addition, the suit was filed 
less than five years after the alleged negligent omission.  Id., 
¶49. 
No. 01-1139 
 
15 
 
If a person entitled to bring an action is, at the 
time the cause of action accrues, either under the age 
of 18 years, except for actions against health care 
providers; 
or 
mentally 
ill, 
the 
action 
may 
be 
commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases, 
except that where the disability is due to mental 
illness, the period of limitation prescribed in this 
chapter may not be extended for more than 5 years. 
¶25 Storm asserts that she was mentally ill at the time 
her causes of action accrued and, further, that she continued to 
be mentally ill until she filed her claims against all the 
defendants in this action.  Therefore, she maintains, the time 
for her to file suit under § 893.55(1)(a) was extended up to 
five additional years by application of § 893.16.9  If this view 
is correct, Storm had three years from her injury to bring her 
action under § 893.55(1)(a), plus, by operation of § 893.16(1), 
an additional five years to bring her claims.  As a result, she 
would have eight years from the date of any alleged injury to 
bring her action.  This would mean she had until August 3, 
                                                 
9 Storm ultimately asks this court to follow the court of 
appeals' reasoning in Robinson v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 
127 Wis. 2d 285, 379 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1985).  In Robinson, 
the court of appeals held that the 1977 version of the "persons 
under disability" statute tolls the statute of limitations for 
filing a medical malpractice claim, by up to five years, if the 
plaintiff was insane when his or her cause of action accrued.  
Id. at 292.  On review, this court upheld the decision on other 
grounds and we did not reach the applicability of the disability 
tolling provision.  Robinson v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 137 
Wis. 2d 1, 10 n.7, 402 N.W.2d 711 (1987). 
No. 01-1139 
 
16 
 
2000,10 to file her action against Dr. Olson and September 24, 
2001, to bring her claims against Dr. Castillo.  Storm brought 
her action against Dr. Olson on September 9, 1997, and impleaded 
Dr. Castillo in this action on June 14, 2000——both events 
occurring less than eight years from when she contends the last 
                                                 
10 In the alternative, Storm argues that she had five years 
from her last session with Valerie Hamilton, a social worker and 
former aid to Dr. Olson, to bring her claim against Dr. Olson.  
That session occurred on September 9, 1992, and Storm's initial 
complaint naming Dr. Olson was filed on September 9, 1997.  
Hamilton is not a defendant in this action.  Storm's theory is 
that her claims against Dr. Olson were brought within five years 
of the last negligent treatment performed against her, in 
conformity with the repose period in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), 
based on the continuum of negligent care rule expressed in 
Tamminen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 109 Wis. 2d 536, 327 
N.W.2d 55 (1982), and Robinson, 137 Wis. 2d 1.  She argues that 
Hamilton's care was a continuum of negligent care shared with 
Dr. Olson. 
We do not reach this issue for two reasons.  First, we 
substantially rule in Storm's favor on her primary argument——
that her action is timely under § 893.55(1)(a)——and determine 
that Storm had until August 3, 2000, to timely commence her 
action against Dr. Olson if she was mentally ill at the time of 
Olson's last treatment of her on August 3, 1992.  Second, the 
circuit court did not adequately address Storm's argument on 
this ground or attempt to apply the controlling law on this 
subject matter, as outlined by the four-factor test in Robinson.  
The court seemingly ruled either that the matter was not a 
question to be resolved on summary judgment or that the doctrine 
cannot apply to a statute of repose.  If it is determined on 
remand that Storm was not mentally ill during the periods 
required for her to benefit from § 893.16, then Storm will be 
allowed to reassert her continuum of negligent treatment theory 
regarding Dr. Olson and Hamilton. 
No. 01-1139 
 
17 
 
negligent act or omission was undertaken by each of these 
defendants.11 
¶26 In determining whether § 893.16 applies to any of the 
limitation periods in § 893.55, we first observe the absence of 
any language in either statute that precludes them from 
operating in concert.  To the contrary, language in § 893.16 and 
in § 893.56——which is a companion limitations statute to 
§ 893.55——strongly indicates that they are meant to apply in 
tandem. 
¶27 When the legislature revised and recreated Chapter 893 
in 1979, the newly created disability tolling statute was 
expected to subject all limitation periods in the chapter to its 
provisions.  This intention is manifested by the declaration 
that its tolling provision will affect the "period of limitation 
prescribed in this chapter" affecting a plaintiff's claim.  
Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1) (emphasis added).  Of course, "this 
chapter" is Chapter 893, where § 893.55 is located. 
¶28 This observation is especially important, because 
subsection 
(5) 
of 
§ 893.16 
explicitly 
exempts 
certain 
limitations periods located within Chapter 893 from its tolling 
requirements.  Subsection (5) reads, in its relevant portions: 
                                                 
11 For purposes of our analysis, the last date of alleged 
negligent conduct by Olson is August 3, 1992, and by Castillo is 
September 24, 1993.  When continuous negligent treatment is 
alleged to have been provided to a patient, the statute of 
limitations on a medical malpractice claim begins to run from 
the last date of alleged negligent conduct.  See Westphal v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 192 Wis. 2d 347, 369, 531 
N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995). 
No. 01-1139 
 
18 
 
This section applies only to statutes in this 
chapter limiting the time for commencement of an 
action or assertion of a defense or counterclaim 
except it does not apply to: 
 
. . . .  
(b) Extend the time limited by s. 893.33 [actions 
concerning real estate], 893.41 [breach of contract to 
marry], 893.59 [damage to highway or railway grade], 
893.62 [usury], 893.73 to 893.76 [certain actions 
against 
governments], 
893.77(3) 
[municipal 
power 
district bonds], 893.86 [recovery of legal fees paid 
for indigents] or 893.91 [actions related to forest 
fires] or subch. VIII for commencement of an action or 
assertion of a defense or counterclaim[.] 
As part of the overall structure of this statute, subsection (5) 
demonstrates that the legislature understood exactly how to 
enumerate those limitation periods in Chapter 893 that would not 
be affected by § 893.16.  Section 893.55 is not one of those 
listed.12 
¶29 Moreover, when the legislature enacts a new statute, 
it is presumed to know the new statute's relationship with 
existing and contemporaneously created statutory provisions, 
especially those directly affecting the statute.  See City of 
Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 183-84, 532 N.W.2d 690 
(1995).  A disability tolling statute substantively equivalent 
to current § 893.16 existed at the time the legislature created 
                                                 
12 If there were any remaining doubt about the applicability 
of § 893.16 to § 893.55, we observe that a 1979 Judicial Council 
Committee Note accompanying § 893.17 reads in part: "The general 
disability provisions in s. 893.16 applicable to all statutes of 
limitation in ch. 893 apply to all causes of action which accrue 
on or after July 1, 1980."  (Emphasis added.) 
No. 01-1139 
 
19 
 
§§ 893.55 and 893.56.13  Therefore, it is difficult to conceive 
how 
the 
legislature, 
fully 
aware 
of 
§ 893.16's 
general 
applicability, would not have undertaken some overt action to 
exempt § 893.55 from the disability tolling provision, if it so 
intended. 
¶30 The legislature has indicated an express intent to 
curtail the application of § 893.16 to medical malpractice 
actions with respect to minors.  Section 893.16 excludes 
children under the age of 18 that are bringing actions against 
health care providers from the tolling provisions of the 
statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1).  The reason for this 
exclusion is that there is a specific statute for medical 
malpractice actions by minors.  Wis. Stat. § 893.56.  The 
grammatical structure of subsection (1) makes clear that any 
exception "for actions against health care providers" does not 
apply to the disability of mental illness.14  If such a result 
                                                 
13 Prior to the repeal and recreation of Chapter 893 in 
1980, the following sections operated to toll actions based on 
the disabilities now listed in § 893.16: Wis. Stat. §§ 893.135 
(actions for recovery of real property), 893.33 (general 
disability tolling statute), 893.37 (requiring that a disability 
exist when a right of action accrued), and 893.38 (dealing with 
more than one disability) (1977).  A disability tolling statute 
that includes insanity as a disability has existed since 
statehood.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 127, § 12 (1849). 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.16(1) states: "If a person entitled 
to bring an action is, at the time the cause of action accrues, 
either under the age of 18 years, except for actions against 
health care providers; or  mentally ill, the action may be 
commenced . . . ."  The use of a semi-colon and the placement of 
the exception preceding the identification of mental illness as 
a qualifying disability lead us to conclude that the mentally 
ill are not governed by this exception. 
No. 01-1139 
 
20 
 
had been intended, it could have been easily accomplished.  The 
exception for claims by minors against health care providers was 
added when § 893.56 was created.  See Ch. 390, Laws of 1977.15  
Hence, the exception for minors in § 893.16(1) creates symmetry 
between these 
two 
statutes——a 
correlation 
entirely 
absent 
between §§ 893.16 and 893.55. 
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.56 provides insight for another 
reason. 
 
Its 
language 
demonstrates 
how 
the 
legislature 
contemplated 
that 
the 
disability 
tolling 
provisions 
of 
§ 893.16(1) generally apply to medical malpractice claims.  The 
immediate predecessor to section 893.56 was added in 1978, three 
years after Chapter 655 was created.  See Ch. 37, Laws of 1975, 
& Ch. 390, Laws of 1977.  The new statute was premised on a 
legislative finding that the number of suits and damages arising 
from medical malpractice actions commenced by minor claimants 
had "increased tremendously" and needed to be restrained.  See 
§ 1(a), ch. 390, Laws of 1977; see also Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 
¶22.  Prior to this change, time limitations for medical 
malpractice suits brought on behalf of minors were governed by 
                                                 
15 To be precise, the change to Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1) was 
actually made to § 893.33(1) (1977), see § 3, ch. 390, Laws of 
1977, which was the primary predecessor to § 893.16 as it 
existed after the 1980 revisions to Chapter 893.  Furthermore, 
the limitations on actions by minors against health care 
providers was first codified as Wis. Stat. § 893.235, see ch. 
390, Laws of 1977, but was renumbered to Wis. Stat. § 893.56 in 
1980.  See § 28, ch. 323, Laws of 1979.  Former § 893.235 
specifically 
cross-referenced 
the 
time 
limitation 
in 
§ 893.205(1), which was the state's three-year statute of 
limitations for personal injury actions, which at that time 
included medical malpractice actions. 
No. 01-1139 
 
21 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.33 
(1977), 
the 
relevant 
predecessor 
to 
§ 893.16, which allowed claims until children were one year 
beyond the age of majority.  See Wis. Stat. § 893.33(3) (1977).   
¶32 Section 893.56 was created to decrease the time 
otherwise available to minors for bringing medical malpractice 
actions.16  However, the statute specifically exempts minors 
suffering under a disability by reason of mental illness from 
this new limitation.17  If § 893.16 did not, and does not, apply 
to medical malpractice cases, there would be no reason to create 
§ 893.56 for purposes of limiting the time in which minors could 
                                                 
16 The legislature declared in its legislative findings that 
"the interests of minor children can be adequately and fully 
protected by adopting the same time limit for bringing actions 
as applies to adults, except in the case of very young 
children."  § 1(d), ch. 390, Laws of 1977.  Furthermore, the 
Legislative Reference Bureau's analysis of the law states rather 
clearly, "This bill makes minors subject to the 3-year statute 
of limitations for the initiation of court actions for personal 
injury which currently applies to adults.  An exception is made 
for very young children . . . ."  Legislative Reference Bureau 
Drafting File for Chapter 390, Laws of 1977.   
17 The entire provision states: 
Health care providers; minors actions.  Any 
person under the age of 18, who is not under 
disability 
by 
reason 
of 
insanity, 
developmental 
disability or imprisonment, shall bring an action to 
recover damages for injuries to the person arising 
from any treatment or operation performed by, or for 
any omission by a health care provider within the time 
limitation under s. 893.55 or by the time that person 
reaches the age of 10 years, whichever is later.  That 
action shall be brought by the parent, guardian or 
other person having custody of the minor within the 
time limit set forth in this section. 
Wis. Stat. § 893.56 (emphasis added).  
No. 01-1139 
 
22 
 
bring an action and little reason to include the language 
regarding insanity.  Moreover, if § 893.16 does not apply to 
claims against health care providers governed by §§ 893.55 and 
893.56, then minors under the age of 10 who are insane would be 
governed by some unknown limitations period.  This whole 
statutory context reveals that, for one specific class of people 
who 
are 
accorded 
filing 
extensions 
because 
of 
their 
"disability," 
namely, 
minors——the 
legislature 
consciously 
incorporated a provision that modified the tolling provision 
when they file medical malpractice actions.18  The same cannot be 
said about the class of people disabled by mental illness. 
¶33 Despite the foregoing analysis, Dr. Olson asserts that 
Chapter 655 exclusively governs medical malpractice claims and, 
therefore, § 893.16 must have no applicability.  We believe that 
Dr. Olson overstates the exclusivity of Chapter 655 in the 
context of the disability tolling statute. 
                                                 
18 Doctor Castillo reasons that § 893.56 supports a view 
that no general tolling exception to persons under a disability 
for mental illness applies to medical malpractice limitations.  
Because Castillo assumes that the disability tolling provision 
for minors in § 893.16 never applied to §§ 893.55 or 893.56, or 
the latter's predecessor, he sees the effect of § 893.56 as 
relieving a set of minors (those under the age of 10) from the 
effect of the five-year repose period.  Castillo sees the lack 
of any "reprieve" for mentally ill claimants as forcing them 
into the general restrictions of § 893.55, with no exceptions.  
What 
this 
view fails 
to 
recognize 
is that 
the special 
limitations period for medical malpractice actions brought by 
minors preceded the creation of the five-year repose period in 
§ 893.55.  Compare ch. 390, Laws of 1977 (creating the 
predecessor to § 893.56), with ch. 323, Laws of 1979 (creating 
§ 893.55). 
No. 01-1139 
 
23 
 
¶34 Chapter 655 is not exclusive in the sense that it is a 
comprehensive set of procedural rules for medical malpractice 
claims.  Numerous statutes, including civil procedure and 
discovery statutes, that are not located in Chapter 655 apply to 
claims brought for medical malpractice.  See Hoffman v. Memorial 
Hosp. of Iowa County, 196 Wis. 2d 505, 513-14, 538 N.W.2d 627 
(Ct. App. 1995).  As one example, rules governing the service of 
a summons under Wis. Stat. § 801.02 apply to medical malpractice 
tort claims as they do to other civil actions.19  In addition, 
the limitations periods in § 893.55(1)-(3) are nowhere mentioned 
or expressly incorporated by reference in Chapter 655.  Section 
893.55 supplements the procedures prescribed by Chapter 655. 
¶35 The cases that Dr. Olson cites to support his 
exclusivity argument deal with issues of damages, which are 
matters that Chapter 655 and § 893.55 have expressly addressed 
by modifying the common law or other statutory law.  For 
example, in Rineck v. Johnson, 155 Wis. 2d 659, 456 N.W.2d 336 
(1990), overruled in part by Chang v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 182 Wis.2d 549, 514 N.W.2d 399 (1994), we stated that 
Chapter 655 "modif[ies] general civil law in instances where 
                                                 
19 As the court of appeals explained, in rejecting the 
assertion that Wis. Stat. § 801.52's venue provisions are not 
applicable to actions against health care providers, despite 
§ 655.009(3), "If we accept the view that ch. 655, Stats., is 
self-contained, subject to no outside rules of practice and 
procedure, there would be no discovery, summary judgment, or 
amendment of pleadings in medical malpractice cases because ch. 
655 does not mention these procedures."  Hoffman v. Memorial 
Hosp. of Iowa County, 196 Wis. 2d 505, 514, 538 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. 
App. 1995). 
No. 01-1139 
 
24 
 
[it] speak[s] to a given subject."  Rineck, 155 Wis. 2d at 665.  
The court noted that Chapter 655 "expressly delineates the 
damages limitation imposed in medical malpractice actions," id., 
superseding the more-restrictive limits found in Wisconsin's 
general 
wrongful 
death 
statute. 
 
Rineck 
stands 
for 
the 
proposition that if general statutory provisions conflict with 
Chapter 655, the latter will trump the general statute.  Neither 
§ 893.55 nor Chapter 655 includes any tolling provision that 
conflicts with § 893.16.20 
¶36 The defendants contend that the two exceptions to the 
limitation periods in § 893.55(1), namely, subsections (2) and 
(3) of § 893.55,21 denote that the legislature did not intend to 
                                                 
20 Similarly, Olson oversimplifies the analysis by which the 
court of appeals concluded in Lund v. Kokemoor, 195 Wis. 2d 727, 
537 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1995), that punitive damages were not 
allowed under Chapter 655 and § 893.55.  The court engaged in a 
thorough statutory construction analysis in concluding that "the 
legislature intended subsec. (e) [of § 893.55] to be read as 
limiting the recovery of damages to those that are 'economic' in 
nature," which the court determined excludes punitive damages.  
Id. at 734.  Moreover, the parties in Lund had stipulated that 
the statutory scheme set forth in Chapter 655 and § 893.55(5) 
provided the exclusive remedy for their action and all medical 
malpractice actions.  Id. at 732 n.1.  We do not understand 
Storm as disputing that Chapter 655 and § 893.55 limit the 
remedies available to her; she merely argues that these statutes 
do not exclusively define the procedure by which she can achieve 
those remedies. 
21 Subsections (2) and (3) of Wis. Stat. § 893.55 provide: 
(2) If a health care provider conceals from a 
patient a prior act or omission of the provider which 
has resulted in injury to the patient, an action shall 
be commenced within one year from the date the patient 
discovers the concealment or, in the exercise of 
reasonable 
diligence, 
should 
have 
discovered 
the 
No. 01-1139 
 
25 
 
provide any additional exceptions, including those for persons 
disabled by mental illness.  We do not find this contention 
persuasive.  First, the exceptions granted in subsections (2) 
and (3) plainly relate to actions taken by a health care 
provider that obfuscate the availability of a claim.  They have 
no relation to a patient's mental capacity to understand rights 
and file an action.  They operate to extend the discovery rule 
in § 893.55(1)(b), not as tolling provisions. 
¶37 Second, the legislature chose to place the periods of 
limitation for medical malpractice actions in Chapter 893, not 
in Chapter 655.  It made this placement without expressing any 
intent that the tolling statute in § 893.16, which is written to 
apply to all periods of limitation in Chapter 893 unless 
expressly excluded by § 893.16(5), not apply to § 893.55.22 
¶38 In sum, we conclude that the legislature intended for 
§ 893.16 to toll the period of limitations in § 893.55(1)(a) for 
medical 
malpractice 
actions 
involving 
qualified 
claimants.  
                                                                                                                                                             
concealment or within the time limitation provided by 
sub. (1), whichever is later. 
 
(3) 
When 
a 
foreign 
object 
which 
has 
no 
therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect has been 
left in a patient's body, an action shall be commenced 
within one year after the patient is aware or, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have been aware of 
the presence of the object or within the time 
limitation provided by sub. (1), whichever is later. 
22 Moreover, 
in 
Landis 
we 
recognized 
that 
additional 
statutes besides subsections (2) and (3) could operate to 
effectively override the statute of repose in § 893.55(1)(b).  
See Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶41. 
No. 01-1139 
 
26 
 
Therefore, if Storm qualifies for a disability under § 893.16, 
she may extend the three-year limitations period up to five 
additional years.23 
C. 
Mental Illness under Wis. Stat. § 893.16 
¶39 In applying § 893.16 to medical malpractice actions, 
we must interpret the meaning of "mental illness" in § 893.16.  
The term is not defined in § 893.16 or anywhere else in Chapter 
893 and, since it is capable of being understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons in more than one way, it is ambiguous.  
See Landis, 245 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15.  Therefore, the court must 
"ascertain the legislative intent from the language of the 
statute in relation to a number of extrinsic factors including 
the legislative object intended to be accomplished."  Reyes v. 
Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 2d 357, 365, 597 N.W.2d 687 (1999) 
(citing Kelley Co., Inc. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 248, 493 
N.W.2d 68 
(1992), 
and 
Terry 
v. 
Mongin 
Ins. 
Agency, 
105 
Wis. 2d 575, 584, 314 N.W.2d 349 (1982)). 
¶40 Storm suggests that "mental illness" in § 893.16(1) 
merely requires a diagnosis that a claimant suffers from a 
                                                 
23 Storm has maintained that her argument regarding the 
applicability of § 893.16 to § 893.55 needs only to be applied 
to § 893.55(1)(a)——and not to § 893.55(1)(b)——for her to survive 
summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.  Because of 
our conclusion in Part III.A that the statute of repose in 
§ 893.55(1)(b) does not affect § 893.55(1)(a), we do not have to 
reach the issue of whether § 893.16 tolls any of the limitations 
periods in § 893.55(1)(b), including its statute of repose.  The 
answering of this issue requires a deeper analysis of whether 
the legislature intended its reference to "the period of 
limitation prescribed in this chapter" to include a statute of 
repose in addition to statutes of limitations.   
No. 01-1139 
 
27 
 
clinically recognized mental illness.  She suggests that, since 
the other two disabilities to which § 893.16 has recently 
applied——imprisonment24 and minority (under 18 years of age)——do 
not require any functional incapacity to qualify under the 
statute, her undisputed clinical diagnosis of having a multiple 
personality disorder should mean that she is mentally ill under 
§ 893.16. 
¶41 We disagree that a professional diagnosis of a 
clinically recognized mental illness is sufficient to establish 
a mental illness for purposes of § 893.16.  In other contexts in 
which 
a 
person's 
insanity 
affects 
legal 
rights 
and 
responsibilities, such as the insanity defense in a criminal 
case, the standard rule is that insanity is a legal term, not a 
medical standard.25  While we do not adopt the standard for 
insanity found in these other contexts, we agree that a 
statutory term requires a legal standard that may not be 
equivalent to a medical diagnosis.  Likewise, the receipt of SSI 
benefits based on mental disability, which Storm has been 
                                                 
24 Imprisonment was removed as a disability under § 893.16 
in 1998.  See 1997 Wis. Act 133, § 37.  1997 Wis. Act 133 was 
the Wisconsin Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. 
25 See Treglown v. DHSS, 38 Wis. 2d 317, 323 n.5, 156 
N.W.2d 363 (1968) (quoting Simecek v. State, 243 Wis. 439, 447, 
10 N.W.2d 161 (1943), and citing Kwosek v. State, 8 Wis. 2d 640, 
651, 100 N.W.2d 339 (1960)); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 359 (1997) (stating that "the task of defining terms 
of 
a 
medical 
nature 
that 
have 
legal 
significance" 
is 
legislative, and that these definitions "do not [often] fit 
precisely 
with 
the 
definitions 
employed 
by 
the 
medical 
community");  21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 50 (1970). 
No. 01-1139 
 
28 
 
qualified to receive since August 7, 1992, is not sufficient to 
prove mental illness under § 893.16.  The disbursement of SSI 
benefits to someone who claims a mental impairment is based on 
whether the person is unable to engage in substantial gainful 
activity, including employment, for an extended period of time.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2000).  It does not require 
that a person be unable to understand and act upon his or her 
legal rights.  In fact, a person's act of applying for SSI 
benefits may be an indication that the person understands his or 
her legal rights. 
¶42 We must therefore search for the meaning of the term 
"mental illness" through its common understanding and usage, 
along with the context and purpose of § 893.16.  We note at the 
outset that, in 1998, the legislature replaced the terms 
"insanity" and "insane" with "mental illness" and "mentally ill" 
in § 893.16.  1997 Wis. Act 133, § 37.  However, we do not see 
that any substantive change was intended or accomplished by this 
revision.  Therefore, for the purpose of interpreting § 893.16, 
we take these terms to be synonymous. 
¶43 Both lay and legal dictionaries provide definitions of 
mental illness and insanity that involve an examination of the 
actual state of mind of an individual and his or her ability to 
function at a reasonable level of conduct.  For example, "mental 
illness" is defined as a "disorder in thought or mood so 
substantial that it impairs judgment, behavior, perceptions or 
reality, or the ability to cope with the ordinary demands of 
No. 01-1139 
 
29 
 
life."  Black's Law Dictionary 999-1000 (7th ed. 1999).26  A 
common usage of the term "insanity" is a "persistent mental 
disorder or derangement."  The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 933 (3d ed. 1992). 
¶44 Wisconsin statutes define insanity and mental illness 
in several places.  Even though the statutory contexts in which 
these definitions occur are unrelated to § 893.16, they provide 
some insight.27  The common denominator in these varying 
                                                 
26 Similarly, Black's defines "mental capacity" as "[t]he 
mental ability to understand the nature and effect of one's 
acts."  Black's Law Dictionary 199 (7th ed. 1999). 
27 The only definition applicable to the totality of the 
Wisconsin Statutes is Wis. Stat. § 990.01(16), which directs 
that the phrase "insane persons" in Wisconsin laws includes 
"every idiot, non compos, lunatic and distracted person," unless 
such an interpretation is inconsistent with the manifest intent 
of the legislature.  This somewhat dated definition has existed 
in Wisconsin since statehood.  See Wis. Stat. ch. 4, § 1(7) 
(1849). 
Wisconsin's Mental Health Act, Chapter 51, provides two 
definitions of the term, depending on how it is used in a 
statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 51.01(13) states: 
(a) "Mental illness" means mental disease to such 
extent that a person so afflicted requires care and 
treatment for his or her own welfare, or the welfare 
of others, or of the community. 
(b) "Mental illness", for purposes of involuntary 
commitment, means a substantial disorder of thought, 
mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly 
impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize 
reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of 
life, but does not include alcoholism. 
No. 01-1139 
 
30 
 
definitions 
of 
mental 
illness 
entails 
an 
evaluation 
or 
assessment of an individual's ability to function and to 
comprehend his or her actions.  These definitions also reinforce 
                                                                                                                                                             
One or both of these definitions are incorporated by 
reference 
into 
numerous 
statutes, 
which 
include 
Wis. Stat. §§ 46.04 (relating to the "Anchorage program" for 
treatment of adolescent drug abusers), 48.415 (relating to 
grounds 
for 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights), 
50.04(2r) 
(restricting admission of persons into nursing home), 50.36 
(relating 
to 
hospital 
staff 
privileges 
for 
psychologists 
treating mentally ill patients). 
Under 
Wisconsin's 
Protective 
Services 
System, 
mental 
illness is defined as a "mental disease to the extent that an 
afflicted person requires care, treatment or custody for his or 
her own welfare or the welfare of others or of the community."  
Wis. Stat. § 55.01(4m).  This definition is incorporated by 
reference into Wis. Stat. § 940.285 (relating to crimes of abuse 
against vulnerable persons). 
In determining a person's suitability for the state's sex 
offender registration system, inquiries are made into whether 
the victim of a defendant's act "suffered from a mental illness 
or mental deficiency that rendered him or her temporarily or 
permanently 
incapable 
of 
understanding 
or 
evaluating 
the 
consequences 
of 
his 
or 
her 
actions."  
Wis. Stat. §§ 971.17(1m)(b)3.d., 973.048(3)(d). 
Section 971.15(1) governs an insanity defense in Wisconsin 
for criminal matters, and it provides: "A person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct 
as a result of mental disease or defect the person lacked 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his or her conduct or conform his or her conduct to the 
requirements of law." 
Finally, on occasion, mental illness had been defined 
consistent with federal law definitions of the term.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 49.45(6c)(a)7., 49.498(g) 
(stating 
that 
under 
Wisconsin's medical assistance program "mental illness" is given 
the meaning in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r(e) and 1396r(e)(7)(G)(i) 
(2000), respectively). 
No. 01-1139 
 
31 
 
the notion that when "mental illness" is used in the statutes, 
it is a legal term of art and not a medical standard. 
¶45 If 
we 
combine 
these 
general, 
definitional 
understandings 
of 
insanity 
and 
mental 
illness 
with 
the 
legislative purpose of § 893.16, it is apparent that a mental 
illness under § 893.16 implicates a functional incapacitation.  
The definitions speak of a person's inability to function at an 
ordinary level of conduct in civil society.  Meanwhile, § 893.16 
serves to extend limitation periods for persons that have an 
actual or legal incapacity to bring a claim while they are under 
the disability recognized by the statute.  See Scott v. First 
State Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 608, 615, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990); 
Korth v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 340 
N.W.2d 494 (1983).  It follows, therefore, that the disability 
must relate to one's inability to bring suit.28 
¶46 We 
hold, 
for 
purposes 
of 
§ 893.16(1)'s 
tolling 
provision, that a "mental illness" is a mental condition that 
renders a person functionally unable to understand or appreciate 
the situation giving rise to the legal claim so that the person 
can assert legal rights or functionally unable to understand 
legal rights and appreciate the need to assert them.29 
                                                 
28 We note that the marginalia located next to the state's 
disability tolling statute in older versions of the Wisconsin 
Statutes characterize the section as the "provision [applicable] 
in cases of disability to sue."  Wis. Stat. ch. 127, § 12 (1849) 
(emphasis added). 
29 A person who wishes to claim mental illness under 
§ 893.16(1) must prove the condition by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
No. 01-1139 
 
32 
 
¶47 Each of the elements of this standard requires 
comment. 
¶48 "Mental illness" under the statute is a seriously 
disabling 
mental 
condition. 
 
The 
condition 
may 
overlap 
developmental 
disability, 
but 
it 
is 
not 
congruent 
with 
developmental disability.  See Wis. Stat. § 880.01(2).  In 
addition, because "insanity" has been defined since statehood to 
include "idiots," the statute may include a person of such low 
intelligence and comprehension that the person is unable to 
appreciate and protect his or her interests.  However, an 
impaired ability to assert legal rights resulting from aging is 
not sufficient to toll a statute of limitations, not because 
senility is always less incapacitating than mental illness, but 
because, historically, senility has not been equated with 
"insanity" or "mental illness."  Cf. Fiandaca v. Niehaus, 570 
S.W.2d 714, 717 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("That a person is old, 
infirm, has a weakened mind, impaired mental capacities and is 
subject to influence and domination by her children does not 
establish that she is insane."). 
¶49 A person is functionally unable to appreciate the 
situation giving rise to the legal claim when the person is 
unable to make a rational assessment of his or her own 
circumstances.  If a person does not realize that he or she is 
delusional or mentally unstable or does not understand and 
appreciate that he or she has been wronged, the person cannot be 
expected to protect his or her interests.  A person that is 
mentally ill may have a basic grasp of lawyers, lawsuits, and 
No. 01-1139 
 
33 
 
the legal process but not recognize that his or her own 
situation requires the invocation of legal rights. 
¶50 A person that is functionally unable to understand or 
appreciate the situation at issue will probably be unable to 
relate the situation to the need to assert legal rights.  On the 
other hand, a person that is functionally unable to understand 
his or her legal rights may realize that something is amiss but 
be unable to relate the problem to a remedy in the law or be 
unable to reach out for assistance to assert legal rights.  In 
short, the person's mental condition leads to an inability to 
bring suit. 
¶51 The standard for mental illness that we articulate 
today is consistent with Burnham v. Mitchell, 34 Wis. 117, 135 
(1874), which after more than 125 years is still the most 
relevant Wisconsin decision interpreting "insanity" for purposes 
of Wisconsin's disability tolling statute.  Burnham involved a 
suit brought by the administrator of an estate to recover an 
amount due on a promissory note unpaid by a debtor of the 
decedent.  Id. at 119.  The debtor raised a statute of 
limitations defense.  The estate replied that Wis. Stat. ch. 
138, § 29 (1858),30 the progenitor of § 893.16, provided an 
                                                 
30 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 138, § 29 (1858) read in its relevant 
portions: 
If a person entitled to appeal or bring an action 
mentioned in this chapter . . . be at the time the 
cause 
of 
action 
accrued, 
either,—— . . . 2. 
Insane; . . . The time of such disability is not a 
part of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action, except that the period within which the action 
No. 01-1139 
 
34 
 
extended time in which to file the claim because of the 
decedent's "insanity."  The parties disputed the degree of 
"insanity" required for tolling to occur, with the debtor 
advocating a total loss of understanding and the estate arguing 
that the decedent need not have had a total deprivation of mind 
but rather an insufficient mental ability to know what he was 
doing and the nature of the act done.  Id. at 120-21.  The trial 
court granted an instruction along the lines advanced by the 
estate.  Id. at 127. 
¶52 In answering "what constitutes insanity within the 
sprit and meaning" of the tolling provision, id. at 134, the 
Burnham court approved the less-restrictive instruction given to 
the jury.  Id. at 136.  Our court approved inquiry into whether 
a person had become so enfeebled and disordered by disease that 
the person did not act rationally, did not recognize the obvious 
and ordinary relation of things, but acted without such 
understanding or from delusion or insane impulse.  Id. at 135.  
The court added, "when the capacity to do a certain act is in 
issue, the question is whether or not the alleged insane person 
had sufficient mental ability to know what he was doing, and the 
nature of the act done."  Id.  If he did not, then the 
limitations statute was tolled during his insanity, which in 
Burnham's case ultimately lasted until his death.  Id. at 137.  
                                                                                                                                                             
must be brought, can not be extended more than five 
years by any such disability, except infancy; nor can 
it be so extended in any case longer than one year 
after the disability ceases. 
No. 01-1139 
 
35 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the court alluded to an equivalency 
between the mental capacity requirements demanded by law to 
execute a will, to enter into a contract, or to otherwise 
transact business.  Id. at 136-37. 
¶53 Surprisingly, 
no 
Wisconsin 
appellate 
cases 
since 
Burnham appear to have addressed the issue of what degree of 
mental illness or insanity is required for someone to benefit 
from Wisconsin's disability tolling statute.  We believe that, 
on balance, Burnham accurately described the nature of a mental 
illness that is required to toll limitations periods, and its 
holding that a total deprivation of mind is not required remains 
fully valid.  The standard we describe above is an effort to 
restate and contemporize our understanding of Burnham in the 
context of the modern disability tolling statute. 
¶54 Our standard resembles those used by numerous other 
jurisdictions that have interpreted analogous tolling rules for 
persons under a disability of mental illness or insanity.  The 
consensus definitions in other states usually include one or 
more of the following elements: (1) the mental disability must 
No. 01-1139 
 
36 
 
result in the inability to manage one's own personal affairs;31 
(2) a claimant must possess "an overall inability to function in 
society that prevents plaintiffs from protecting their legal 
rights," McAfee v. Cole, 637 A.2d 463, 466 (Me. 1994); the 
inability to understand and protect one's legal rights is at the 
heart of most state definitions of insanity or mental illness 
for purpose of a tolling statute;32 and (3) a person must fail to 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Walker v. Pac. Basin Trading Co., 536 F.2d 
344, 346 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying Oklahoma law and quoting 
from Roberts v. Stith, 383 P.2d 14 (Okla. 1963)); Phillips v. 
Sugrue, 800 F. Supp. 789, 791 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (applying 
Arkansas law); Smith v. City of Reno, 580 F. Supp. 591, 592 (D. 
Nev. 1984) (applying Nevada law); Graboi v. Kibel, 432 F. Supp. 
572, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (applying New York law); Adkins v. 
Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 609 P.2d 15, 23 (Alaska 1980); 
Allen v. Powell's Int'l, Inc., 518 P.2d 588, 589 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1974); Pearl v. Pearl, 177 P. 845, 846 (Cal. 1918); McCracken v. 
Walls-Kaufman, 717 A.2d 346, 354 (D.C. 1998); Curlee v. Mock 
Enters., Inc., 327 S.E.2d 736, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Rigazio 
v. Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1993); Harrington v. Ramsey County, 279 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Minn. 
1979); Dunkley v. Shoemate, 465 S.E.2d 319, 321 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1996); Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476, 488 (R.I. 2002); Wiggins 
v. Edwards, 442 S.E.2d 169, 170 (S.C. 1994) (quoting 54 C.J.S. 
Limitations of Actions § 117 (1955)); In re Kindle, 509 N.W.2d 
278, 280 (S.D. 1993). 
32 See, e.g., Walker, 536 F.2d at 346; Adkins, 609 P.2d at 
23; Allen, 518 P.2d at 589; McCracken, 717 A.2d at 354; Langner 
v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 523 (Iowa 1995); Boudreau v. Landry, 
536 N.E.2d 339, 341 (Mass. 1989); Geisland v. Csutoras, 261 
N.W.2d 537, 538 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Harrington, 279 N.W.2d at 
796; Sacchi v. Blodig, 341 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Neb. 1983); BASF 
Corp. v. Symington, 512 N.W.2d 692, 695 n.2 (N.D. 1994); Kyle v. 
Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 207 A.2d 513, 521 (N.J. 1965); 
Gaspar v. Village Missions, 961 P.2d 286, 289 (Or. App. 1998); 
Wiggins, 442 S.E.2d at 170; Kindle, 509 N.W.2d at 283; Collicott 
v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 20 P.3d 1077, 
1080 (Wyo. 2001). 
No. 01-1139 
 
37 
 
understand the nature and effect of his or her actions.33  The 
definition of "mental illness" in § 893.16 that we announce 
today is consistent with, though not identical to, this 
consensus view. 
¶55 Having 
defined 
"mental 
illness" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.16, we conclude that summary judgment on this 
question is inappropriate at the present time.  This factual 
issue was not addressed by the circuit court, nor was it 
otherwise adequately developed in the record before this court.  
It is an issue yet to be decided by the fact-finder.  
Specifically, a functional analysis of Storm's illness must be 
undertaken to determine whether she was mentally ill under the 
meaning of § 893.16(1).  In addition, any disability that 
qualifies under this standard must have existed when her cause 
of 
action 
accrued 
against 
each 
defendant.34 
 
See 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Pearl, 177 P. at 846; Boudreau, 536 N.E.2d at 
341; Wiggins, 442 S.E.2d at 170; Kindle, 509 N.W.2d at 283. 
34 In oral argument, counsel for Dr. Olson and Legion 
Insurance argued that Storm could not have been mentally ill 
when her cause of action accrued.  Counsel's reasoning, 
apparently, is that the disability did not exist at the time of 
the negligence, since it was Dr. Olson's alleged conduct that 
made Storm mentally ill.  What matters for purposes of § 893.16 
is that Storm was mentally ill when she received her last 
negligent treatment from Dr. Olson.  Even if her mental illness 
was the result of Dr. Olson's earlier negligent treatment, "the 
question of [Storm's] insanity must be determined as of the end 
of the continuum of negligence."  Robinson, 127 Wis. 2d at 291-
92. 
No. 01-1139 
 
38 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.16(3).  Finally, she must also have remained 
mentally ill until at least two years before she filed each of 
her 
claims 
against 
each 
of 
the 
defendants. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1). 
D. 
Mental Illness under Wis. Stat. § 893.16 and the Retention 
of Legal Counsel 
¶56 Regardless of how the foregoing issues are resolved, 
Dr. Castillo contends that Storm's disability ceased, as a 
matter of law, when she obtained legal counsel in April 1997 or 
no later than when she filed her initial compliant on September 
9, 1997.  The initial complaint failed to name Dr. Castillo.  
Doctor Castillo was not added as a defendant in the complaint 
until June 14, 2000.  If Dr. Castillo's view were accepted, then 
§ 893.16(1) required Storm to file her claims against Dr. 
Castillo within two years of September 9, 1997, at the latest, 
which she failed to do. 
¶57 Doctor Castillo's argument is premised on the notion 
that Storm had the necessary mental capacity to understand her 
legal rights as of the time that she hired an attorney to 
represent her and to investigate her claims.  He suggests that 
allowing Storm's action to be deemed timely against him would be 
                                                                                                                                                             
We also reject the proposition, again made in oral 
argument, that Storm needed to plead in her complaint that she 
was "mentally ill" in order to avail herself of § 893.16.  As 
this court has previously stated, the expiration of a statute of 
limitations is an affirmative defense that must be raised by a 
defendant, and a plaintiff is not required to anticipate this 
defense by pleading against it in a complaint.  See Robinson, 
137 Wis. 2d at 16-17. 
No. 01-1139 
 
39 
 
contrary to the purpose of § 893.16 and would be inequitable.  
Storm contends that while a mentally ill person's act of 
contacting an attorney to investigate a lawsuit may trigger a 
"discovery" after which a claim must be brought within a 
specified time, see Awve v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 
181 Wis. 2d 815, 824, 512 N.W.2d 216 (Ct. App. 1994), such as 
under § 893.55(1)(b), it does not alter a plaintiff's mental 
illness for purposes of § 893.16. 
¶58 We conclude that the retention of legal counsel does 
not automatically cause a plaintiff's mental illness, as we have 
defined it, to cease for purposes of § 893.16.  This would hold 
true even if the retained counsel filed some cause of action on 
behalf of the mentally ill client.  However, we also conclude 
that such legal consultation and filing are probative of a 
plaintiff's mental health and functional ability to appreciate 
and act upon his or her legal rights. 
¶59 We reject Dr. Castillo's bright-line rule on this 
issue 
for 
several 
reasons. 
 
First, 
the 
legislature 
has 
determined that mentally ill persons may extend the time within 
which to file their causes of action to a maximum of five 
additional years, so long as the disability continues.  While 
the overarching purpose of § 893.16 is to ensure that rights are 
not lost because of a person's inability to comprehend or assert 
a claim, see Scott, 155 Wis. 2d at 615; Korth, 115 Wis. 2d at 
332, and the hiring of legal counsel evinces a degree of legal 
wherewithal, 
a 
mentally 
ill 
person 
may 
acquire 
legal 
representation 
through 
means 
unrelated 
to 
an 
ability 
to 
No. 01-1139 
 
40 
 
appreciate or act upon his or her rights.  We can envision 
instances in which a client's mental illness could significantly 
hinder his or her ability to assist retained counsel in timely 
filing a claim or naming all defendants. 
¶60 Second, under Dr. Castillo's view, the retention of an 
attorney would cause a mentally ill person to lose the ability 
to raise claims at an earlier time than if counsel had not been 
retained.  It is not sound policy to devise a rule whereby newly 
retained legal counsel for a mentally ill person must rush to 
review all possible claims held by the disabled plaintiff——no 
matter how distant in time or distant in subject matter the 
claims are from the claims inspiring the attorney's retention——
simply to avoid being cut off.  Although the facts of this case 
involve a claim closely related to those for which counsel was 
hired, Dr. Castillo's proffered rule would not be limited to 
such a circumstance. 
¶61 Third, Dr. Castillo offers scant legal authority in 
support of his argument.  He relies principally on Todish v. 
Cigna Corp., 206 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2000), a decision finding 
that a plaintiff did not possess the requisite mental illness 
for purposes of Indiana's tolling statute for insane persons.  
We believe that Dr. Castillo misreads the import of the Todish 
decision.  The Third Circuit did not hold that a mentally ill 
plaintiff's retention of legal counsel and/or that counsel's 
filing of a claim on a plaintiff's behalf would alone signal the 
cessation of the plaintiff's mental illness for purposes of the 
tolling statute.  Rather, the court noted numerous indicia for 
No. 01-1139 
 
41 
 
why no reasonable jury could find that that plaintiff was 
"insane" during the time the applicable limitations period for 
her action expired.  Id. at 306.  Many of these indicia were 
unrelated to any contact that she had with legal counsel.  Id.35  
The court concluded that all "[t]hese actions demonstrate that 
despite Todish's mental impairments, she retained an ability to 
understand her legal rights and to institute legal action within 
the six-year statutory period."  Id.36 
¶62 Overall, an attorney's appreciation of legal rights 
and competency in bringing legal claims cannot be applied 
vicariously to a mentally ill client for purposes of timely 
filing actions.  There may be situations in which a mentally ill 
                                                 
35 Among the factors found to exist during Todish's alleged 
insanity were: (1) she applied for and was accepted to law 
school; (2) while attempting to hire legal counsel to represent 
her at a grievance hearing, she attempted to obtain a transcript 
of the hearing on two occasions and she actively requested 
information from the union representative at the hearing about 
taking an appeal if the results were unfavorable; (3) she 
applied for Social Security benefits on three separate occasions 
(including one instance where she sought reconsideration of a 
denial and retained counsel to represent her on appeal); (4) she 
aggressively pursued disability pension benefits from her former 
employer; (5) she worked as a teacher in three community 
colleges; and (6) she completed all requirements for a Master's 
of Arts degree except for the thesis.  Todish v. Cigna Corp., 
206 F.3d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 2000) 
36 The other cases Dr. Castillo cites deal in their relevant 
portions with the effect of retaining counsel and the filing of 
a suit on the discovery of an available claim, not on the 
termination of a mental illness for purposes of a tolling 
statute.  See Groom v. Prof'ls. Ins. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 241, 507 
N.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1993); Awve v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 
Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 815, 512 N.W.2d 216 (Ct. App. 1994).  They are 
therefore inapposite. 
No. 01-1139 
 
42 
 
plaintiff is unable to assist his or her attorney in the same 
manner as a sane person.  Therefore, absent anything in the 
tolling statute to the contrary, we do not find that the 
retention of legal counsel by itself ends a person's mental 
illness under § 893.16 as a matter of law. 
¶63 Even if the retention of counsel does not mark the end 
of 
the 
disability, 
Dr. 
Castillo 
maintains 
that 
Storm's 
disability must have ceased in this case when her legal counsel 
filed an action on her behalf.  He argues that when Storm's 
counsel filed suit against the other defendants in this action 
on September 9, 1997, she faced no impediment in asserting her 
legal rights and that she had all the information necessary to 
pursue additional claims against Dr. Castillo.  We agree that, 
under these circumstances, any fears that newly retained legal 
counsel will be obligated to review all legal claims of the 
mentally ill person they represent are diminished.  In this 
case, the claims that Storm could be deemed "capable" of 
advancing against Dr. Castillo were directly related to the 
reason that counsel was retained. 
¶64 However, the filing of a lawsuit in behalf of a 
mentally ill person does not invariably establish a plaintiff's 
capacity to understand and act upon his or her legal rights.  
Nor is such a finding appropriate as a matter of law in this 
case.  Rather, we believe that when an attorney acts on a 
plaintiff's behalf, as in filing a lawsuit, such an occurrence 
serves as one of the many possible indicia that the plaintiff's 
actual mental state is sufficient to appreciate the availability 
No. 01-1139 
 
43 
 
of her legal rights and her means of legal recourse.  See 
generally Bestwina v. Village Bank, 767 P.2d 338, 340 (Mont. 
1989) 
("Retention 
of 
counsel 
is 
evidence, 
although 
not 
conclusive, of a person's legal capacity for purposes of tolling 
the statute of limitations.") (citing cases).  It is for the 
trier of fact to determine if, under the circumstances of each 
case, such activity does or does not exhibit the requisite level 
of mental health. 
¶65 Therefore, as part of our remand to determine whether 
Storm possessed a mental illness that made her unable to 
understand and act upon her legal rights, her activity regarding 
the hiring and use of legal counsel may serve as evidence of her 
mental capabilities, but it will not alone be dispositive. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶66 Based on the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
five-year statute of repose in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) does 
not apply to the injury accrual rule in § 893.55(1)(a).  In 
addition, the tolling provision in § 893.16 may operate to 
extend the time for filing a medical malpractice action beyond 
the three-year period in paragraph (a), provided that a factual 
finding is made that the person was mentally ill at the time her 
causes of action accrued.  This finding of "mental illness" 
requires that the person possess a mental condition that renders 
her 
functionally 
unable 
to 
understand 
or 
appreciate 
the 
situation giving rise to the legal claim so that she can assert 
legal rights or functionally unable to understand legal rights 
and appreciate the need to assert them.  We also hold that 
No. 01-1139 
 
44 
 
retention of legal counsel by a mentally ill person does not, as 
a matter of law, cause that person's mental illness to cease for 
purposes of § 893.16. 
¶67 Applying these principles, we reverse the circuit 
court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal of Dr. Olson, 
Legion Insurance, and Dr. Castillo from this action.  We remand 
this action to the circuit court for factual determinations 
regarding Sheri Storm's mental health on the dates relevant to 
her use of Wis. Stat. § 893.16.  If Storm was mentally ill at 
the time her causes of action accrued against each defendant, 
and if her illness did not cease at a time more than two years 
before she filed a claim against any of the individual 
defendants, then Storm timely filed her claims alleging medical 
malpractice against Doctors Olson and Castillo. 
 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
 
No. 01-1139 
 
 
 
1