Case Title: Clark v. Rideway

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mary CLARK v. Robert D. RIDGEWAY, Jr.

95-695                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 12, 1996


1.   Civil procedure -- when A.R.C.P.Rule 12(b) motion treated as
     one for summary judgment -- matters considered in summary
     judgment proceedings. -- When matters outside the pleadings
     are presented and not excluded by the trial court in
     connection with an A.R.C.P. Rule 12(b) motion, the motion is
     treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
     Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure; matters which will be
     considered in summary judgment proceedings are limited to
     affidavits, depositions, admissions, and answers to
     interrogatories. 

2.   Civil procedure -- affidavits were presumably considered by
     the trial court -- dismissal order treated as one for summary
     judgment. -- Because the two affidavits by appellant were not
     excluded by the trial court and were presumably considered by
     the court, the dismissal order was treated as one for summary
     judgment; the supreme court refused to consider the exhibits
     attached to the appellee's brief as evidence.
  

3.   Attorney & client -- asserted contract did not relate to
     attorney's performance of professional services for appellant
     -- privity of contract was lacking. -- The immunity granted by
     Ark. Code Ann.  16-22-310(a) (Repl. 1994) clearly refers to
     contracts for professional services performed by the attorney
     for the client; here, the asserted contract did not relate to
     appellee's performance of professional services rendered to
     appellant, rather, the alleged breach appeared to relate to
     appellee's representation of appellant's ex-husband in matters
     concerning the divorce, which he agreed not to do; the alleged
     contract did not involve appellee's legal representation of
     appellant; privity of contract was lacking, though the
     appellee could still be liable under the statute for
     intentional misrepresentations and fraud.


4.   Fraud -- promise cannot be made false by subsequent events and
     still be considered intentional fraud unless party making the
     promise knew it would not be kept at the time the promise was
     made. -- A promise or averment cannot be made false by
     subsequent events and still fall under the umbrella of
     intentional fraud unless the party making the promise knew it
     would not be kept at the time of the promise. 

5.   Fraud -- no factual basis found for the conclusory allegation
     that appellee intentionally misrepresented his neutrality in
     the divorce case -- court's finding that appellee was immune
     from appellant's complaint was correct. -- Where neither
     lawsuit could have been foreseen with any degree of certainty
     when the 1989 affidavit was made by appellee in that both
     developed from circumstances arising after the divorce decree,
     the appellate court found no factual basis for the conclusory
     allegation in appellant's amended complaint that appellee
     intentionally misrepresented his statement of neutrality in
     the divorce case on August 11, 1989; thus, no genuine issue of
     material fact had been presented on the immunity question with
     respect to negligence and fraud and the trial court's finding
     and conclusion that appellee was immune from appellant's
     complaint under  16-22-310 was correct.

6.   Statutes -- statute did not usurp court's authority to
     regulate the practice of law -- arguments meritless. -- 
     Arkansas Code Annotated  16-22-310 does not usurp the court's
     authority to regulate the practice of law; the statute
     enunciates the parameters for litigation by clients against
     attorneys and does not conflict with any rule or decision by
     the supreme court; the arguments of legislative usurpation and
     violation of the separation of powers were meritless.

7.   Contracts -- existence for the trier of fact to determine --
     where a fact question is raised the issue then becomes whether
     the cause of action is precluded by prior litigation where
     breach of contract could have been raised. -- Whether a
     contract exists or not is for the trier of fact to determine;
     where the allegations and affidavits were sufficient to raise
     a fact question as to whether a contract was made, the issue
     then became whether the cause of action was precluded by prior
     litigation where breach of contract could have been raised.  

8.   Appeal & error -- appellant entitled to have her claim heard -
     - trial court's order as it pertained to appellant's breach of
     contract complaint reversed and remanded. -- Where it did not
     appear that a decision on appellant's allegation of breach of
     contract had been made, appellant was entitled to have the
     claim heard; the trial court's order was reversed, solely as
     it pertained to appellant's complaint of breach of contract,
     and remanded for trial.

9.   Attorney & client -- allegation of purposeful concealment of
     affidavit meritless -- appellant presumably had a copy of the
     affidavit. -- Appellant's allegation that appellee
     purposefully failed to disclose his 1989 affidavit to the
     chancellors who denied his disqualification as counsel was
     without merit where appellant presumably had a copy of the
     affidavit, as it was part of her divorce proceedings.

10.  Negligence -- issue of proximate causation for damages not
     relevant where appellee found to be immune from negligence
     claim -- appellant's point without merit. -- The appellant's
     question as to whether sufficient facts supported proximately
     caused damages was no longer relevant; proximate causation is
     an essential element for a cause of action in negligence and
     appellee was determined to be immune from a negligence claim
     due to lack of privity; the only viable claim was breach of
     contract, and proximate causation is not an essential element
     to a finding of damages due to contractual breach.

11.  Attorney & client -- appellant's allegations of breach of
     fiduciary duty and conflict of interest without merit --
     appellee had no duty to appellant based on legal
     representation. -- Appellant's assertion of breach of
     fiduciary duty and conflict of interest on appellee's part was
     without merit; there was no duty flowing to appellant from
     appellee based on legal representation; this claim had no
     merit, and the trial court's order on this point was affirmed.
     

     Appeal from Garland Circuit Court; Walter G. Wright, Judge;
affirmed in part; reversed in part.
     Timothy O. Dudley and Sloan, Rubens & Peeples, by:  Kent J.
Rubens , for appellant.
     D. Scott Hickam, for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, JusticeAssociate Justice Robert L. Brown
February 12, 1996 *ADVREP8*






MARY CLARK,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

ROBERT D. RIDGEWAY, JR.,
                     APPELLEE,

95-695




APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CIV 94-310,
HON. WALTER G. WRIGHT, JUDGE,




AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN
PART AND REMANDED.






     On May 23, 1994, appellant Mary Clark sued appellee Robert
Ridgeway Jr. for legal malpractice premised on a conflict of
interest and breach of fiduciary duty.  Ridgeway moved to dismiss
the complaint on several grounds, including the lawyer immunity
statute, Ark. Code Ann.  16-22-310 (Repl. 1994).  He further moved
for Rule 11 sanctions and attorney fees under Ark. Code Ann.  16-
22-309 (Repl. 1994).  Clark then amended her complaint to include
allegations of professional negligence, breach of contract, and
fraud.  The precise allegations read:
          12. In August of 1989, Plaintiff and Defendant
     entered into a contract.  Under the terms of the
     contract, Plaintiff agreed not to object to the
     appointment of Defendant as a Master in Plaintiff's
     divorce proceedings.  In return, the Defendant agreed
     that he would not represent either party to the action in
     the divorce case.  The terms of the contract are set
     forth in Defendant's affidavit, which is attached hereto
     as Exhibit "A".
                              ....
          15. Defendant represented to the Plaintiff that he
     would not represent either Plaintiff or her husband in
     the divorce proceedings if Plaintiff did not object to
     his appointment as Master in the divorce proceedings. 
     Plaintiff conditioned her approval of Defendant's
     appointment as Master upon Defendant's execution of an
     affidavit stating that he would not represent either
     party in the divorce proceedings.  That affidavit is
     attached as Exhibit "A".  As set forth above, Defendant
     later represented Plaintiff's ex-husband in child custody
     matters and other matters in the divorce proceedings. 
     Plaintiff relied upon Defendant's representation to her
     detriment and has sustained damages as a proximate result
     of her detrimental reliance upon Defendant's material
     representations.  Defendant knew or should have known
     that his representations were false when made.
Exhibit A to the complaint is an affidavit by Ridgeway which was
executed on August 11, 1989, and was part of the divorce action
between Mary Clark and Harvey Clark in Garland County Chancery
Court.  The affidavit reads in pertinent part:
          1. I am Robert D. Ridgeway, Jr., an attorney
     licensed and practicing in Garland County, Arkansas, and
     I have acted as the attorney for Clark Industries, Inc.,
     since its incorporation in 1985.  I have advised both
     parties to this divorce that it would be improper for me
     to do anything but remain neutral in this case, and that
     it is my desire to continue to act as attorney for the
     company.
          2. During the time in which I have acted as attorney
     for the corporation, I have had numerous conversations
     concerning corporate activities with both Harvey Clark
     and Mary Clark, some of these conversations occurring in
     person and some of them by telephone.
          3. Although most of my communications have been with
     Mary Clark concerning corporate business, it has always
     been my impression from my discussions with them that
     they were both directly involved in the day to day
     management of the business.  I say this from
     conversations with both of them, in which they mentioned
     the other at work and involved at the business, and from
     my telephone calls to the business asking for either of
     them, and they would both would (sic) be on the job site.
          4. From my knowledge of the corporation and the
     corporation's business, as mentioned above, it would
     appear to me that Mrs. Clark is every bit as involved in
     the day to day management of the business as is Mr.
     Clark.
A second motion to dismiss the amended complaint was filed by
Ridgeway, and that motion reasserted the grounds previously made.
     The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.  In doing so,
it found:
                               I.
          This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the
     subject matter of this case.
                               II.
          The Defendant is immune from the Plaintiff's cause
     of action pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated  16-22-
     310.
                              III.
          The Defendant, a licensed attorney, cannot be held
     civilly liable for conduct carried out in reliance on a
     Court Order.
                               IV.
          The Plaintiff's action seeks to re-litigate an issue
     which has already been decided three (3) times in the
     Courts, and twice before the committee on Professional
     Conduct.  As such, the Plaintiff's actions are barred by
     the Doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel.
                               V.
          The Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts
     to establish any proximate causation or any other
     connection between the alleged behavior of the Defendant,
     and any alleged damages suffered by the Plaintiff.

                               VI.
          The Plaintiff has failed to state facts upon which
     relief can be granted.
                              VII.
          There are no justiciable issues of law or fact.
Clark contends that the dismissal was error.
     A history of this case is necessary to establish the context
in which this litigation arose.  Ridgeway had apparently performed
some legal services for Mary Clark, Harvey Clark (her husband), and
the family business, Clark Industries, Inc., during the time frame
of 1985 to 1989.  In 1990, Mary Clark and Harvey Clark were
divorced, with the Property Settlement and Child Custody Agreement
being filed on January 25, 1990.  As part of the divorce
proceedings, Ridgeway executed the quoted affidavit on August 11,
1989, and during the divorce proceedings, he was appointed Master
of Clark Industries.
     In August 1990, after the divorce decree was entered, Ridgeway
represented Harvey Clark and Clark Industries in foreclosure
litigation brought by One National Bank against the two clients and
Mary Clark.  A motion to disqualify Ridgeway as counsel was filed
by Mary Clark, and the chancellor denied it.
     In 1991, Ridgeway next represented Harvey Clark in a change of
custody proceeding involving Clark's children which was resolved. 
In 1993, the question of whether Clark had complied with a court
order concerning therapy sessions was raised by Ridgeway on behalf
of Harvey Clark.  In 1993, Clark filed suit against Ridgeway and
her divorce attorney, but she later dismissed Ridgeway from the
suit without prejudice.
     In her appeal in the instant case, Clark contests the findings
and conclusions by the trial court in its order: (1) that Ridgeway
was immune from civil liability, (2) that he justifiably acted in
reliance on a court order, (3) that the suit is barred by issue or
claim preclusion, (4) that Clark failed to establish proximate
causation, and (5) that there are no justiciable issues of fact. 
We note initially that some of Ridgeway's defenses are affirmative
defenses (res judicata and collateral estoppel), which are more
typically raised by answer and not by a motion to dismiss.  Clark
does not object to the procedure followed by Ridgeway, however; nor
does she contend that she was prejudiced by the process.  We have
permitted affirmative defenses to be raised by a motion to dismiss
in the past.  See Amos v. Amos, 282 Ark. 532,