Case Title: Beckerman v. Pooler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015 ME 80

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2015 ME  
80 
Docket: 
Ken-14-249 
Argued: 
May 13, 2015 
Decided: 
July 2, 2015 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
PETER M. BECKERMAN 
 
v. 
 
BRUCE POOLER et al. 
 
 
HJELM, J. 
[¶1]  Peter M. Beckerman appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Kennebec County, Wheeler, J.) denying his motion for contempt and determining 
that he does not have an easement by deed over the property of Ricky and Monica 
Conant.  Beckerman alleged in his motion that, in a prior consent order, the court 
(Studstrup, J.) had recognized an easement in favor of Beckerman over the 
Conants’ driveway and that the Conants were in contempt of that order by 
interfering with his use of the driveway.  On appeal, Beckerman argues that the 
court erred by denying the motion for contempt and by exceeding the scope of the 
motion when it adjudicated the issue of whether he had a deeded easement to use 
the driveway.  We affirm the denial of the motion, but because we conclude that 
the contempt motion did not call for the court to determine separately whether 
Beckerman has a deeded easement, we vacate that portion of the court’s order.   
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  When “[v]iewed in the light most favorable to the judgment,” the 
record evidence establishes the following facts.  Waltz v. Waltz, 2013 ME 1, ¶ 2, 
58 A.3d 1127.  Beckerman owns a waterfront parcel of land located on Great Pond 
in Rome.  Ricky and Monica Conant own an abutting waterfront lot (“the Conants’ 
lot”), which was previously owned by Rodney Pooler.  Ricky Conant also owns a 
second lot, which abuts the Conants’ lot on one side and is located between 
Beckerman’s lot and a private access road called South Crane Lane.  Conant 
currently rents that lot (“the Poolers’ lot”) to Bruce and Cynthia Pooler, who 
owned it prior to 2010.  South Crane Lane runs along one side of both the Conants’ 
lot and the Poolers’ lot, but it does not abut Beckerman’s lot, so the only vehicular 
access to Beckerman’s lot is over the Conants’ or the Poolers’ driveways.  
[¶3]  In March 2000, before the Conants purchased any property in the area, 
Beckerman filed a complaint in Superior Court against Bruce, Cynthia, and 
Rodney Pooler,1 seeking, among other things, to establish the locations of the 
common boundaries among the three properties.  In the complaint, Beckerman did 
                                         
1  Nettie Pooler, who was the prior owner of both Bruce and Cynthia’s property and Rodney’s 
property, was also named as a defendant.  During the pendency of this appeal, we received notice of her 
death from her attorney, and she was removed as a party because any of her remaining interests were 
extinguished by her death.  See M.R. Civ. P. 25(a)(2); Estate of Mouckerezi, 468 A.2d 993, 995-96 
(Me. 1983) (noting that we follow the procedure in M.R. Civ. P. 25 when the death of a party occurs 
during the pendency of a civil appeal).  
 
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not assert a right to cross over the Conants’ lot, which was then owned by 
Rodney Pooler, to gain access to South Crane Lane.   
[¶4]  The parties settled their claims through mediation, and in August 2002 
the court entered a consent order.  The order operated as a final judgment and, 
among other issues, resolved Beckerman’s right to access South Crane Lane by 
requiring the Poolers to grant Beckerman an easement over their driveway.  That 
provision of the consent judgment also stated, “This conveyance shall not in any 
way limit the deeded right-of-way in favor of the Beckerman lot across [the 
Conants’] lot,” and included a citation to the deed to that lot.  The consent 
judgment did not otherwise mention Beckerman’s use of the driveway located on 
the Conants’ property.  
[¶5]  On July 16, 2012, Beckerman filed a post-judgment motion for 
contempt against the Conants as Rodney Pooler’s successors-in-interest, alleging 
that they were in contempt of the consent order by blocking Beckerman’s access to 
their driveway.  Additionally, Beckerman commenced a separate action seeking a 
declaratory judgment to establish his right to use the Conants’ driveway, alleging 
that he had an easement by deed and by prescription.  At oral argument, the parties 
advised us that the declaratory judgment action remains pending. 
[¶6]  A two-day testimonial hearing on the contempt motion was held in 
April 2014.  At the hearing, Beckerman argued that the statement in the consent 
 
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order that it did “not . . . limit the deeded right-of-way . . . across [the Conants’] 
lot” was an affirmative recognition of Beckerman’s right to use the Conants’ 
driveway and that the Conants were therefore in contempt of the order when they 
prevented him from exercising that right.  On May 21, 2014, the court issued a 
written order denying the motion for contempt and finding that the consent order 
did not recognize an easement over the Conants’ lot.  Although the hearing on the 
contempt motion had not been consolidated with the declaratory judgment action, 
the court then went on to find that Beckerman also did not have an easement by 
deed and concluded that “[b]ecause Beckerman has not shown that he has an 
easement, the Court cannot find contempt.”2  Beckerman timely appealed the 
order.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶7]  Beckerman contends that the court erred in denying his motion for 
contempt because the consent order recognized that he had a right to use the 
Conants’ driveway.  “We review a judgment of civil contempt for an abuse of 
discretion, and the court’s underlying factual findings for clear error.”  
Waltz, 2013 ME 1, ¶ 6, 58 A.3d 1127.  A party moving for a contempt order must 
prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor failed or 
                                         
2  Although the consent order referred to a “deeded right-of-way,” the court used that term 
interchangeably with the term “easement.”  For clarity, we will refer to the rights asserted by Beckerman 
as an easement. 
 
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refused to comply with a court order and presently has the ability to comply with 
that order.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted); see M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(D).  Evidence 
is clear and convincing when it “provides the fact-finder with an abiding 
conviction that the truth of the proponent’s contentions is highly probable.”  
Grondin v. Hanscom, 2014 ME 148, ¶ 11, 106 A.3d 1150.  To prevail on appeal, 
Beckerman must demonstrate that a contempt finding “was compelled by the 
evidence.”  Cf. Handrahan v. Malenko, 2011 ME 15, ¶ 13, 12 A.3d 79.  
[¶8]  The court found that the language of the consent order was ambiguous 
and was not clearly intended to recognize an easement in favor of Beckerman over 
the Conants’ driveway, and that Beckerman therefore had not proved clearly and 
convincingly that the Conants were in contempt.  The evidence does not compel a 
different conclusion, for two reasons.   
[¶9]  First, the court did not clearly err in finding that the parties to the 
consent order did not intend to affirmatively recognize that Beckerman had an 
enforceable easement over the Conants’ lot.  In his complaint, Beckerman did not 
assert that he had a right to use the Conants’ driveway, and the evidence does not 
compel a finding that the parties intended to settle that issue when they entered into 
the consent order.  Rather, the plain language of the order simply limits the order’s 
effect by granting Beckerman new rights over the Pooler’s lot without affecting 
any existing rights he may have had to use the driveway on the land now owned by 
 
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the Conants.  The court therefore did not err in concluding that any right that 
Beckerman had to use the Conants’ driveway did not flow from the consent order.  
[¶10]  Second, the consent order did not direct Rodney Pooler in definite 
terms to take any action with regard to the driveway or enjoin him from engaging 
in any conduct that could form the basis for finding that the Conants, as his 
grantees, are in contempt.  See M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(D); White v. Nason, 
2005 ME 73, ¶ 7, 874 A.2d 891 (“It is well established that before a person may be 
held in contempt for violating a court order, the order should inform him in definite 
terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him.” (Quotation marks omitted.)).  
Rather, the order is directed at Bruce and Cynthia Pooler, requiring them to convey 
an easement to Beckerman and enjoining them from interfering with that easement.  
Therefore, at the very least, the consent order did not clearly impose any duty or 
responsibility on Rodney Pooler, and the Conants cannot be held in contempt for 
violating the consent order.  See Banker v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 507 A.2d 602, 
604-06 (Me. 1986) (vacating an order of contempt where the original court order 
was ambiguous). 
 
[¶11]  Once the court found that the consent order was ambiguous and did 
not recognize an easement in favor of Beckerman, it erred by reaching beyond the 
consent order to address the separate question of whether Beckerman had an 
easement by deed.  To adjudicate the motion for contempt, the limited question 
 
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before the court was whether the consent order prohibited the Conants from 
interfering with Beckerman’s use of their driveway.  See M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(D).  
Once the court concluded that the consent order did not prohibit the Conants from 
doing so, the question of whether Beckerman had a deeded easement to the 
driveway became irrelevant to the disposition of the motion.  Even if Beckerman 
did have a deeded easement, the Conants could only be found in contempt if the 
consent order clearly prohibited them from interfering with Beckerman’s access, 
and the court had already concluded that it did not.   
[¶12]  Because the court found that the consent order did not acknowledge 
that Beckerman had a right to use the Conants’ driveway, any other property rights 
he may have had outside of the consent order had to be adjudicated in a separate 
action to clarify his rights.  See Hodgdon v. Campbell, 411 A.2d 667, 669-70 
(Me. 1980) (noting that “[a] proceeding for declaratory relief brought in 
accordance with the civil rules of procedure is a particularly efficacious method for 
quieting title to real property”).  In fact, Beckerman had already commenced such 
an action.  By reaching the question of whether Beckerman had an easement by 
deed, the court therefore erroneously exceeded the scope of the motion for 
contempt, see M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3), and issued an opinion that could only have an 
advisory effect, see Dodge v. Norridgewock, 577 A.2d 346, 347 (Me. 1990) 
(affirming the trial court’s decision not to grant declaratory relief on the grounds 
 
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that it “would serve no useful purpose in the context of this case and would 
constitute an advisory opinion”); Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. 
Alexander, 411 A.2d 74, 78 (Me. 1980) (stating that, “aside from opinions properly 
rendered on solemn occasions, the judiciary has no power to issue advisory 
rulings” (citation omitted)).  
[¶13]  Although parties may expressly or impliedly agree to litigate issues 
not raised in the pleadings, see M.R. Civ. P. 15(b), they did not do so here.  During 
the hearing, the parties engaged in a number of colloquies with the court about the 
parameters of the contempt hearing in relation to Beckerman’s separate declaratory 
judgment action, and Beckerman objected that the court was veering into issues 
that were relevant only to the declaratory judgment action.  The court repeatedly 
stated that the hearing would be limited to the issues raised in the contempt motion 
and that it would not address issues bearing only on the declaratory judgment 
action.3  The parties therefore did not consent to resolving the issues raised in the 
declaratory judgment action at the contempt hearing.  See DiBiase v. Universal 
Design & Builders, Inc., 473 A.2d 875, 877 (Me. 1984).  
                                         
3  For example, the court described the relationship between the two cases as follows: “[O]ne of the 
directions I could go in . . . is find that there is a right there but it’s not specific enough to hold anyone in 
contempt of it and that you need to explore more.  And that brings us to the other case.”  Beckerman then 
stated, “But my understanding was when we came here today . . . we were coming only on the contempt 
motion because I certainly didn’t prepare to try the other [case].”  In response, the court stated, “That’s 
right and I’m not buying into his suggestion that we take up all the other stuff.”  A few minutes later, 
Beckerman again raised his concern that they were “litigating the underlying issue.”  In response, the 
court stated, “I understand[,] and to the extent [the Conants’ attorney is] taking us beyond what I need to 
do—what I need to decide, this motion for contempt, he will be shot down.” 
 
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[¶14]  We note that any confusion about the scope of the contempt hearing 
could have been avoided had any of the parties sought to consolidate the hearings 
on the contempt motion and Beckerman’s separate declaratory judgment action.  
See M.R. Civ. P. 42(a).  As was suggested by the ongoing discussions at the 
motion hearing among the parties and the court about the scope of the hearing, the 
issues in the two actions are closely linked and involve many of the same issues of 
law and fact.  See id. (allowing consolidation “[w]hen actions involving a common 
question of law or fact are pending before the court”).  Consolidation would have 
preserved judicial resources and reduced the prospect that the court’s analysis 
would extend to issues extrinsic to the contempt motion.  At oral argument, 
Beckerman stated that he chose to litigate the two actions separately in the hopes 
of obtaining relief on the motion for contempt without having to litigate the other 
action, thus reducing his exposure to further litigation.  Instead, the process chosen 
by the parties has achieved the opposite result, generating a two-day motion 
hearing, at least one appeal, and the remaining possibility of another trial.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶15]  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of the motion for 
contempt but vacate the court’s determination that Beckerman does not have a 
deeded easement, leaving that issue to be resolved in the separate declaratory 
judgment action.   
 
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The entry is: 
Judgment vacated as to the determination that 
Beckerman does not have a deeded easement 
(sections 2(b) and 3 of the judgment).  Judgment 
affirmed in all other respects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs and at oral argument: 
 
Alton C. Stevens, Esq., Marden, Dubord, Bernier & Stevens, 
P.A. LLC, Waterville, for appellant Peter M. Beckerman 
 
André G. Duchette, Esq., Taylor, McCormack & Frame, LLC, 
Portland, for appellees Rick and Monica Conant 
 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number RE-2000-13 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY