Case Title: HILL BY AND THROUGH WEBB v. Allen

Citation: 495 So. 2d 32

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1986-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
495 So. 2d 32 (1986)
Tamara "Tammy" HILL, a minor, who sues By and Through her mother and next friend, Linda WEBB, etc., et al.
v.
Ed ALLEN, et al.
85-100.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 1, 1986.
*33 Winston V. Legge, Jr. of Patton, Latham, Legge & Cole, Athens, for appellants.
Donna S. Pate and J.R. Brooks of Ford, Caldwell, Ford & Payne, Huntsville, for appellees.
BEATTY, Justice.
This is an appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment on the pleadings granted to certain defendants in plaintiffs' action to recover damages. That judgment on the pleadings was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P. We affirm.
Plaintiffs are six mentally retarded children who sued pro ami. The appellees are the members of the Cullman City Board of Education, the special education coordinator, the superintendent of the City Board of Education, and Stanley Johnson, principal of the John C. Cullman Middle School, all being sued in their official capacities.
The gist of plaintiffs' complaint was that these plaintiffs were enrolled at the John C. Cullman Middle School as special students, and that they were subjected to "numerous incidents of abuse, physical, mental, and sexual [by certain other defendants described as] instructors and aides ... charged with the responsibility of instructing and educating these ... children, under the laws of the State of Alabama." The complaint against the appellees alleged:
By amendment, plaintiffs added these charges:
By another amendment, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief by requiring the promulgation of "rules and regulations designed to insure the protection from physical and mental abuse of the mentally retarded students in the City Schools of Cullman, Alabama," and other relief.
The defendants in question moved for judgment on the pleadings. After a hearing and due consideration, the trial court entered an order, which we quote in part:
We note here that the original complaint charged these defendants with negligent, wanton, or intentional misconduct. In Deal v. Tannehill Furnace & Foundry Commission, 443 So. 2d 1213 (Ala.1983), the scope of discretionary function immunity was expanded to include immunity from allegations of wanton conduct against state officials sued in their individual capacities where there was no evidence of bad faith on their part.
Under the pleadings, the gist of the charges against the defendants here is that they failed to exercise their statutory authority to take whatever appropriate action was available. But whatever that action *35 was, it relates here to the performance of their statutory duties, which, under the authorities cited by the trial court, were discretionary functions for which they possessed constitutional immunity. In this connection, we take note that plaintiffs did not allege any fraud or bad faith on the part of these defendants. Cf. Donahoo v. State, 479 So. 2d 1188 (1985) and Unzicker v. State, 346 So. 2d 931 (Ala.1977).
Having found that these defendants were entitled to discretionary function immunity, we need not reach the issue of injunctive relief.
Let the judgment on the pleadings as to these defendants be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.