Case Title: Jordan v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR95-94-2

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Alvis A. JORDAN v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 95-942                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 11, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- argument cannot be raised for first time on
     appeal -- argument waived if not argued in original brief. --
     Where appellant admitted that he was not convicted of
     attempted capital murder and attempted to change his argument
     to one alleging error for failure to grant a directed verdict
     on the charge of first-degree murder, the attempt to change
     arguments was ineffective; if counsel omits to argue an
     assignment of error in his original brief, such assignment
     must be treated as waived and abandoned by him unless
     permission to amend his brief is asked and granted by the
     court for good cause before the case is submitted.

2.   Jury -- jury may convict on some counts and not on others --
     defendant may not attack his conviction on one count because
     it is inconsistent with his acquittal on another count. --
     Appellant's argument that the conviction for attempted first-
     degree murder of Daniel Williams should be reversed because it
     was inconsistent with the conviction of only second-degree
     murder for killing Broderick Shavis was without merit; a jury
     may convict on some counts but not on others, and may convict
     in different degrees on some counts, because of compassion or
     compromise, and not solely because there was insufficient
     evidence of guilt; a defendant may not attack his conviction
     on one count because it is inconsistent with an acquittal on
     another count; res judicata concepts are not applicable to
     inconsistent verdicts; the jury is free to exercise its
     historic power of lenity if it believes that a conviction on
     one count would provide sufficient punishment.

3.   Appeal & error -- argument procedurally barred -- defendant
     was required to address lesser-included offenses in his motion
     for directed verdict to preserve challenge to sufficiency of
     evidence necessary to support conviction for lesser-included
     offense. -- Where appellant's motion at the close of the
     State's case addressed only capital murder, and did not
     address second-degree murder either by name or by the
     culpability required for the crime, appellant's failure to
     question the sufficiency of the evidence for lesser-included
     offenses, either by name or by apprising the trial court of
     the elements of the lesser-included offenses, at the close of
     the State's case constituted a waiver of the argument; a
     defendant is required to address the lesser-included offenses
     in his motion for a directed verdict to preserve a challenge
     to the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to support a
     conviction for a lesser-included offense.

4.   Appeal & error -- no ruling on motion obtained from trial
     court -- point not preserved for appellate review. -- Where,
     before trial, appellant filed a motion to quash the jury
     panel, but he did not bring the motion to the attention of the
     trial court, and he did not obtain a ruling on the motion, his
     argument was not preserved for appellate review; in order to
     preserve a point for appellate review, a party must obtain a
     ruling from the trial court. 

5.   Trial -- trial court has wide latitude in controlling
     arguments of counsel -- its rulings will not be overturned
     absent clear abuse. -- The trial court has a wide latitude of
     discretion in controlling the arguments of counsel, and its
     rulings in this regard are not overturned in the absence of
     clear abuse. 

6.   Trial -- appellant merely objected to appellee's closing
     argument without requesting limiting instruction or mistrial -
     - trial occur did not abuse its discretion. -- Where appellant
     objected to the prosecutor's closing argument, but did not ask
     for a limiting instruction or a mistrial and the the trial
     court nonetheless gave a limiting instruction that closing
     arguments by counsel were not to be considered as evidence,
     appellant did not ask any relief that was denied by the trial
     court, and there was no abuse of discretion in the rulings by
     the trial court.
   
7.   Evidence -- rebuttal evidence presented during sentencing
     phase of trial -- trial court had discretion to allow such
     evidence. -- A trial court has discretion to allow rebuttal
     evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial.  

8.   Witnesses -- one witness's identification objected to, but
     other witnesses gave similar evidence -- objection without
     merit. -- Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in
     allowing one witness to identify him in court was devoid of
     merit where the day after the crimes, the witness accurately
     described appellant and his clothing, described the co-
     defendant, and accurately picked appellant out of a photo
     line-up and at trial she testified that she observed appellant
     at the crime scene at close range under a street light and was
     certain of his identity, and identified him as the person who
     shot and killed Shavis; additionally, a police officer
     testified without objection that, the day after the crime, the
     witness identified appellant from a photo line-up as the one
     who shot Shavis; yet another witness testified that he had
     known appellant all of his life, that he saw appellant shoot
     Shavis, and he also identified appellant in the courtroom; the
     co-defendant testified that he was at the scene with appellant
     and appellant shot Shavis; appellant took the stand and
     testified that he was at the crime scene and fired a pistol
     when Shavis was killed; identification simply was not an
     issue; even if in some manner the trial court had erred in
     allowing the witness's in-court identification of appellant,
     it would be harmless in light of the other identification
     testimony, especially since appellant testified in court that
     he was at the crime scene with a pistol.


     Appeal from Ashley Circuit Court; Don E. Glover, Judge;
affirmed.
     Lee R. Watson, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  David R. Raupp, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert H. Dudley, Justice. 
     March 11, 1996   *ADVREP2*





ALVIS A. JORDAN,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE.



CR95-942


APPEAL FROM THE ASHLEY COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR94-48-1A,
HON. DON E. GLOVER, JUDGE,




AFFIRMED.



                   Robert H. Dudley, Justice.


     Appellant Alvis Jordan and co-defendant Cedric Harris were
charged with capital murder for shooting and killing Broderick
Shavis and with attempted capital murder for shooting and injuring 
Daniel Williams.  Appellant and Harris were tried separately. 
Appellant was found guilty of second-degree murder for killing
Broderick Shavis and guilty of attempted first-degree murder for
shooting Daniel Williams.  There was substantial evidence that
appellant was guilty of both crimes.  We affirm both judgments of
conviction.
     In his opening brief, appellant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of
attempted capital murder of Daniel Williams.  He argues the
required proof of his culpable mental state for attempted capital
murder was lacking.  We need not address the point in any detail. 
As appellee's brief points out, the ruling could not have been
prejudicial to appellant since he was not convicted of attempted
capital murder, but rather was convicted only of a lesser-included
offense, attempted first-degree murder.  See Hickson v. State, 312
Ark. 171,