Case Title: Allen v. Rae

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 53

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 53 
Docket: 
Wal-18-267 
Submitted 
On Briefs: January 17, 2019 
 
Decided: 
April 11, 2019 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Majority: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Dissent: 
GORMAN and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
LAURIE ALLEN 
 
v. 
 
MARK RAE 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Mark Rae appeals from a protection from harassment order entered 
against him in the District Court (Belfast, Sparaco, D.C.J.) on the complaint of 
Laurie Allen.  See 5 M.R.S. §§ 4652, 4655(1) (2018).  Rae contends that the court 
erred in finding that he had committed “[t]hree or more acts” of harassment 
pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4651(2)(A) (2018).  Although we agree that there were 
not three or more acts of harassment, we affirm the judgment because the facts 
as found by the court are sufficient to prove that Rae’s actions constituted 
 
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criminal mischief, which can stand alone as a “single act” of harassment.  See 5 
M.R.S. § 4651(2)(C) (2018);1 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A) (2018).   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  A trust controlled by Rae’s family purchased property abutting 
Allen’s home in Belfast.  Thereafter, a boundary dispute arose between Rae and 
Allen.  Both parties claim to own a strip of land approximately twenty-feet wide 
situated between Allen’s yard and what is now a garage on the trust’s property.  
Despite attempts to resolve the dispute, including numerous visits from local 
law enforcement, the strip of land remained, at the time of the hearing, a source 
of considerable tension between the parties.   
[¶3]  On April 24, 2018, Allen filed for a protection from harassment 
order pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4652, alleging that Rae had harassed her.  On 
May 14, 2018, the court held a contested hearing and heard testimony from 
both parties.  The court found that Allen’s testimony was credible and that Rae’s 
testimony was “not particularly credible.”   
[¶4]  Allen testified that she parked her boat trailer on the disputed strip 
of land to guard against what she believed was Rae’s unlawful claim to the 
                                         
1  Title 5 M.R.S. §§ 4651, 4653 were amended during the pendency of this case, though not in any 
way that affects the present appeal.  See P.L. 2017, ch. 455, §§ 1-2 (effective Dec. 13, 2018) (codified 
at 5 M.R.S. §§ 4651(2)(C), 4653(1)(B) (2018)).   
 
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property.  Rae testified that he asked Allen to remove the boat multiple times 
so he could more conveniently move construction equipment onto his 
property; when Allen refused, Rae responded by saying, “if [the boat is] not 
gone by Sunday, I will move it for you.”  When Rae attempted to move the boat, 
he discovered that Allen had placed a boot lock on one of the tires of the boat 
trailer, rendering it immobile.  Allen testified that she personally observed Rae 
“cut” and “slice” the valve stem off the boat trailer’s tire.  Rae denied cutting the 
valve stem but admitted he attempted to move the boat trailer.   
[¶5]  The court found, based on Allen’s testimony, that Rae committed an 
act of “fear and intimidation” by cutting off a tire valve stem on Allen’s boat 
trailer, which Allen parked in the disputed area, and that Rae did it “to be . . . 
mean and harass [Allen] because of this dispute.”2   
[¶6]  After the hearing, the District Court entered an order of protection 
from harassment in favor of Allen and against Rae for one year.  See 5 M.R.S. 
§ 4655(1), (2).  The court made clear that it was not resolving the ownership of 
the disputed property or determining the boundary lines of the properties.  Rae 
                                         
2  The court also found that Rae “[drove] across the corner [of either the disputed area or the 
trust’s property]” in a manner intended to be “intimidating” to Allen, and “unnecessarily plow[ed] 
snow towards [Allen’s] house.”  However, because the court did not find that these actions by Rae “in 
fact cause[d] fear, intimidation or damage to personal property,” they are not acts of harassment 
within the meaning of 5 M.R.S. § 4651(2)(A).  In addition, the court found that Rae “scrape[d] and 
damage[d]” Allen’s boat; however, the record does not support this finding.   
 
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filed a motion for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law and a motion 
to amend the judgment; both motions were summarily denied.  Rae timely 
appealed.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶7]  “We review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and will 
affirm those findings if there is competent evidence in the record to support 
them, even if the evidence might support alternative findings of fact.”  Preston 
v. Tracy, 2008 ME 34, ¶ 10, 942 A.2d 718 (quotation marks omitted).  This 
deferential standard is “particularly appropriate” in actions for protection 
orders, “where the trial court’s ability to observe the witnesses invariably plays 
a part in its assessment of the impact a particular person’s words and actions 
had upon another person.”  Smith v. Hawthorne, 2002 ME 149, ¶ 16, 804 A.2d 
1133.  Although on appeal we cannot infer findings from the evidence in cases 
where, as here, a motion for further findings is denied, Douglas v. Douglas, 2012 
ME 67, ¶ 27, 43 A.3d 965, the fact-finder may nevertheless have drawn 
reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence presented at trial, such as 
whether the accused intended to harass, intimidate, or cause fear.  See Cates v. 
Donahue, 2007 ME 38, ¶ 15, 916 A.2d 941.   
 
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[¶8]  A court is authorized to grant a protection from harassment order 
based upon “a single act . . . constituting a violation” of certain enumerated 
criminal offenses, including criminal mischief.  5 M.R.S. § 4651(2)(C); 17-A 
M.R.S. § 806.  A person commits criminal mischief when he intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly damages, destroys, or tampers with the property of 
another “having no reasonable grounds to believe [he] has a right to do so.”  
17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A).  In a protection from harassment proceeding, a court 
need only find that a person committed one of the enumerated statutory 
offenses by a preponderance of the evidence to make a finding of harassment 
under section 4651(2)(C).  See Patane v. Brown, 2002 ME 47, ¶¶ 11, 14, 792 
A.2d 1086.   
 
[¶9]  The court’s findings, based on competent evidence in the record, are 
sufficient to establish the elements of criminal mischief.  17-A M.R.S. 
§ 806(1)(A).  Allen testified that she personally observed Rae “slice[] the valve 
off” and “cut it off to try and get the tire to go down so he could get the boot lock 
off.”  Although Rae denied damaging Allen’s boat or attempting to cut the valve 
stem, he admitted that he attempted to move the boat but was unable to do so 
because of the boot lock.  The court specifically found Allen’s testimony credible 
and Rae’s testimony not credible.  Because a trial court is not bound to accept 
 
6 
testimony and evidence as fact, and because determinations of the weight and 
credibility of testimony and evidence are “squarely in the province of the fact-
finder,” we will not second-guess the trial court’s credibility assessment of 
conflicting testimony.  Sloan v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 33, 43 A.3d 978.  The 
court’s finding is sufficient to establish that Rae damaged, destroyed, or 
tampered with Allen’s property.  17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A).   
 
[¶10]  The court also found, again based on the record evidence, that Rae 
cut the valve stem to “try to resolve” the property dispute “through fear and 
intimidation” and to be “mean and harass [Allen] because of [the] dispute” over 
the property, establishing that Rae committed this act intentionally or 
knowingly.  Id.   
[¶11]  Finally, Rae contends that, even if he damaged the boat while 
trying to remove it, he had “reasonable grounds to believe that [he] ha[d] the 
right to do so” because his actions in trying to stop what he believed was an 
ongoing criminal trespass by Allen against his property were “protected by 
law.”3  17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A); 5 M.R.S. § 4651(2).  Whether Rae harassed  
                                         
3  Rae’s assertion that, pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 104(1) (2018), he was justified in attempting to 
remove Allen’s boat to terminate a criminal trespass by Allen is unavailing, for two reasons.  First, 
Rae’s reliance on section 104(1) is misplaced.  Section 104(1) is a defense to criminal prosecution 
that refers to use of force “upon another person . . . to prevent or terminate . . . a criminal trespass by 
such person,” id. (emphasis added), and does not serve as a blanket defense when a person damages 
the personal property of another while trying to remove the property from a disputed area.  See, e.g., 
 
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Allen does not turn on whether Rae had the right to remove Allen’s boat from 
the property that he claims the trust owns, but rather on the manner in which 
he attempted to remove it.  “[E]ven when an individual may have a legal right 
to do something, the manner in which a legal act is performed can constitute 
harassment.”  Cates, 2007 ME 38, ¶ 11, 916 A.2d 941; see also Patane, 2002 ME 
47, ¶ 10, 792 A.2d 1086.   
[¶12]  Regardless of whether Rae had a valid property interest in the 
disputed strip of land,4 either personally or through the trust, his act of cutting 
the valve stem in an effort to remove the boat from the property qualifies as a 
single act of criminal mischief that constitutes an act of harassment.  17-A M.R.S. 
§ 806(1)(A); 5 M.R.S. § 4651(2)(C).  This dispute should have been resolved by 
a reasonable and rational conversation between Rae and Allen or by Rae 
                                         
State v. French, 2018 ME 21, ¶ 9, 179 A.3d 303; State v. Neild, 2006 ME 91, ¶¶ 12-13, 903 A.2d 339; 
State v. Dyer, 2001 ME 62, ¶ 11, 769 A.2d 873.   
Second, ownership of the land on which the boat was located was in dispute, and the court made 
clear that it was not resolving the boundary dispute.  Even to the extent that Rae believed that he was 
licensed or privileged to act on behalf of the trust to defend the disputed area, the court was well 
within the bounds of its discretion to disregard a 2016 survey that Rae referenced—but did not 
produce—that purported to demonstrate that the trust owned the disputed property and conclude 
that Rae’s testimony about the location of the boundary line was “not particularly credible.”  See Sloan 
v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 33, 43 A.3d 978.    
 
4  We express no opinion on the ownership of the disputed strip of land.     
 
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seeking a declaratory judgment or other court-ordered remedy to establish title 
and ownership to the disputed strip of land.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HJELM, J., with whom GORMAN, J., joins, dissenting. 
 
 
[¶13]  I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the evidence presented at 
trial is sufficient to support a finding that Mark Rae had engaged in an act 
against Laurie Allen that rises to the level of “harassment,” as the Legislature 
has defined that term, see 5 M.R.S. § 4651(2)(C) (2018).  I also agree with the 
Court’s conclusion that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding 
that Rae engaged in two additional acts of harassment.  See 5 M.R.S. 
§ 4651(2)(A) (2018).  Although the trial court could have granted judgment for 
Allen and issued an order of protection from harassment against Rae on the 
basis of the single act of harassment, that is not why the court issued the order.  
For that reason, I respectfully dissent and would remand for the court to 
reconsider whether the order should issue based on the one act of 
harassment—namely, damaging a tire valve—that Allen proved at trial. 
 
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[¶14]  Maine’s statutes governing actions for protection from harassment 
vest the trial court with discretion in determining whether to issue a 
harassment order once harassment is proven.  Pursuant to those statutes, if, 
after holding a hearing on the complaint for protection from harassment, the 
court finds that the plaintiff has proved that the defendant committed the 
harassment alleged, the court “may” issue a protection order.  5 M.R.S. 
§§ 4654(1), 4655(1) (2018).  This plain language calls for the court to exercise 
its sound discretion in determining whether to issue a harassment order in 
those actions where the party seeking such an order has proved her case.  See 
Fitzpatrick v. McCrary, 2018 ME 48, ¶ 16, 182 A.3d 737 (noting that, in general, 
the word “may” used in a statute is permissive and discretionary). 
 
[¶15]  Particularly in the context of harassment proceedings, such a grant 
of discretionary authority to the court is eminently sensible, and the exercise of 
that discretion is important.  As defined by the Legislature, “harassment” can 
take many shapes across a broad continuum, from acts of violence against a 
person that would constitute some of the most serious forms of criminal 
conduct, to acts that result in minor property damage.  See 5 M.R.S. § 4651(2).  
Yet any harassment order, which can be effective for one year, 5 M.R.S. 
§ 4655(2) (2018), can impose significant restrictions on the defendant.  The 
 
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order may enjoin the defendant from having contact with certain persons or 
being present at certain locations; the order may award damages and attorney 
fees; and the order in fact may provide anything else “determined necessary or 
appropriate in the discretion of the court.”  5 M.R.S. § 4655(1).  Once the court 
issues a harassment order, a violation of some types of its provisions is a Class D 
crime, which can draw nearly one year in jail.  See 5 M.R.S. § 4659(1) (2018); 
17-A M.R.S. § 1252(2)(D) (2018) (stating the maximum jail term for a Class D 
crime). 
 
[¶16]  For these reasons, the trial court must be entrusted with making 
sound and careful determinations, tailored to the unique circumstances of each 
case, about whether and in what way it is appropriate to intervene through the 
imposition of judicial relief.  That discretion may be properly exercised only by 
the trial judge, who is in the position to listen first-hand to the witnesses and 
watch them as they testify, and who can acquire an appreciation for the very 
human dynamics that are central to a harassment proceeding.  As the Court 
points out, see Court’s Opinion ¶ 7, we have said as much in the context of 
protection from abuse cases, where the court also is given the same discretion 
in determining whether to issue a protective order.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(1) 
(2018) (stating that “[t]he court, after a hearing and upon finding that the 
 
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defendant has committed the alleged abuse or engaged in the alleged 
conduct . . . may grant a protective order” (emphasis added)).  We have said, 
the trial court’s ability to observe the witnesses invariably plays a 
part in its assessment of the impact a particular person’s words and 
actions had upon another person.  Appellate review is naturally 
limited by the written record’s inability to fully convey each 
witness’s appearance, body language, stature, speech patterns, 
degree of eye contact, and numerous other nonverbal cues. 
 
Smith v. Hawthorne, 2002 ME 149, ¶ 16, 804 A.2d 1133. 
 
 
[¶17]  Here, the court found that Rae had committed three acts of 
harassment against Allen and determined, on that basis, that it was appropriate 
to issue an order for protection from harassment against him.  In fact, two of 
the grounds underlying the court’s decision to issue the order are not 
supported by the record.  This leaves only one act of “harassment,” see 5 M.R.S. 
§ 4651(2)(C)—namely, when Rae cut a valve stem off a wheel on Allen’s boat 
trailer she had parked on the disputed strip of land.  The Court is willing to 
affirm the issuance of the harassment order against Rae based on this limited 
aspect of the record.  But for the reason I have discussed, such a result would 
not obtain as a matter of law, and beyond that, it is impossible for us to know 
whether, in exercising its discretion, the trial court would have issued a 
protective order based on the one remaining ground.   
 
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[¶18]  If the court had found only that Rae harassed Allen by cutting off 
the tire valve stem, and if the court had then issued a harassment order on that 
limited basis, my analysis would be very different and I would agree with the 
Court’s conclusion that the judgment should be affirmed.  But to affirm the 
judgment here, we would be required to speculate that the court would have 
issued a harassment order against Rae based on the one instance of limited 
property damage.  Rather than engaging in that speculation, I would vacate the 
judgment and remand for the court to determine whether, pursuant to section 
4655(1), an order for protection from harassment should be issued based on 
the one episode of harassment that Allen proved at trial. 
[¶19]  It may be that, on a remand, the court nonetheless would issue the 
order even on that more limited ground.  Or maybe not.  That is not a principled 
determination we can make on our record, and the Court’s decision to affirm 
the issuance of the harassment order based on a very different predicate than 
the trial court used constitutes an intrusion into the discretion that is the trial 
court’s—and not ours—to exercise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
Joseph W. Baiungo, Esq., Belfast, for appellant Mark Rae 
 
Laurie Allen did not file a brief 
 
 
Belfast District Court docket number PA-2018-58  
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY