Case Title: University of Fla. Bd. of Trustees v. Carmody

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2023-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2022-0068 
____________ 
 
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES, et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
LAURIE CARMODY, 
Respondent. 
 
July 6, 2023 
 
COURIEL, J. 
 
The Medical Malpractice Act1 sets requirements that anyone 
contemplating a medical malpractice case must meet before filing 
suit in Florida.  One of these presuit requirements is to select an 
expert witness who meets certain criteria and will corroborate the 
basis of the plaintiff’s claim.  In this case, the petitioners moved to 
dismiss a medical malpractice action against them, asserting that 
the respondent’s proposed expert did not meet these statutory 
requirements.  The trial court denied the motion.  
 
1.  Chapter 766, Florida Statutes.  
 
- 2 - 
Is that trial court decision subject to certiorari review?  That 
is, can an appellate court, exercising its authority2 to issue an 
interlocutory writ of certiorari,3 immediately review a trial court’s 
ruling in this regard?  No, said the First District Court of Appeal in 
University of Florida Board of Trustees v. Carmody, 331 So. 3d 236 
(Fla. 1st DCA 2021), certifying conflict with Clare v. Lynch, 220 So. 
3d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), and Riggenbach v. Rhodes, 267 So. 3d 
551 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).4  We agree with the First District that, 
while Florida courts “have recognized exceptions” to the general rule 
that “certiorari review is an inappropriate means of challenging a 
 
2.  See art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const. (“A district court of appeal 
or any judge thereof may issue writs of . . . certiorari . . . .”); Fla. R. 
App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(A) (“The certiorari jurisdiction of district courts 
of appeal may be sought to review [] nonfinal orders of lower 
tribunals other than as prescribed by rule 9.130 . . . .”). 
 
3.  “[C]ertiorari relief is available when a lower court has 
departed from the essential requirements of the law or when a lower 
court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and no appeal or direct 
method of reviewing the proceeding exists.”  Williams v. Oken, 62 
So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011).  This version of certiorari relief 
should not be confused with its cousin, so-called “second-tier” 
certiorari, which allows district courts of appeal to review “final 
orders of circuit courts acting in their review capacity.”  Fla. R. App. 
P. 9.030(b)(2)(B). 
 
4.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
- 3 - 
trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss,” this is not one of them.  
Carmody, 331 So. 3d at 237. 
And yet we acknowledge that the Medical Malpractice Act 
changed the law such that an interlocutory remedy for parties 
facing claims that fail to satisfy its presuit requirements is 
warranted.  Accordingly, in a concurrent opinion, we amend Florida 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to provide for interlocutory 
review of nonfinal orders that deny a motion to dismiss on the basis 
of the qualifications of a corroborating witness under subsections 
766.102(5)-(9), Florida Statutes.  In re Amend. to Fla. Rule of App. 
Proc. 9.130, No. SC2023-0701 (Fla. July 6, 2023). 
I 
William Friedman, M.D.—a neurosurgeon—performed a 
cervical disc fusion on Laurie Carmody at Shands Teaching 
Hospital and Clinics, Inc.  Carmody subsequently experienced 
worsening pain, hardness, and redness at the incision site, as well 
as neurological symptoms, all of which she reported to Dr. 
Friedman and Yolanda Gertsch-Lapcevic, A.R.N.P.  When Carmody 
eventually became paralyzed, she sought treatment at an 
emergency room.  The doctors there discovered that Carmody had 
 
- 4 - 
developed an abscess on her spine that would ultimately require 
two additional surgeries, neither of which would fully restore her 
health. 
Carmody decided to sue Shands and the University of Florida 
Board of Trustees (UF) for medical malpractice allegedly committed 
by Dr. Friedman and Nurse Practitioner Gertsch-Lapcevic.  But 
first, Carmody had to satisfy the Medical Malpractice Act’s presuit 
requirements. 
While several sections of chapter 766 govern these presuit 
requirements, the provisions most relevant here require that 
the claimant shall conduct an investigation to ascertain 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: 
(a) 
Any named defendant in the litigation was negligent 
in the care or treatment of the claimant; and 
(b) 
Such negligence resulted in injury to the claimant. 
 
Corroboration of reasonable grounds to initiate medical 
negligence litigation shall be provided by the claimant’s 
submission of a verified written medical expert opinion 
from a medical expert as defined in s. 766.202(6) . . . . 
 
§ 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added).  Section 
766.202(6) defines a medical expert as “a person duly and regularly 
engaged in the practice of his or her profession . . . and who meets 
 
- 5 - 
the requirements of an expert witness as set forth in s. 766.102.”  
§ 766.202(6), Fla. Stat. (2016). 
Section 766.102, in turn, provides that “[a] person may not 
give expert testimony concerning the prevailing professional 
standard of care unless the person is a health care provider who 
holds an active and valid license and conducts a complete review of 
the pertinent medical records and meets [certain] criteria . . . .”  
§ 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2016).  These certain criteria depend on the 
type of health care provider “against whom . . . the testimony is 
offered.”  Id. § 766.102(5)(a). 
If the provider accused of malpractice is a specialist like 
Dr. Friedman, the corroborating expert must satisfy 
subsection (5) and: 
1. 
Specialize in the same specialty as the health care 
provider against whom or on whose behalf the testimony 
is offered; and 
2. 
Have devoted professional time during the 3 years 
immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is 
the basis for the action to: 
a. 
The active clinical practice of, or consulting with 
respect to, the same specialty; 
b. 
Instruction of students in an accredited health 
professional school or accredited residency or clinical 
research program in the same specialty; or 
c. 
A clinical research program that is affiliated with an 
accredited health professional school or accredited 
 
- 6 - 
residency or clinical research program in the same 
specialty. 
 
§ 766.102(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016). 
If the provider accused of malpractice is a health care provider 
other than a specialist or a general practitioner—like Gertsch-
Lapcevic, a nurse practitioner—the corroborating expert must 
satisfy both subsections (5)(c) and (6).  Under subsection (5)(c), an 
expert may testify if he or she has “devoted professional time during 
the 3 years immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is 
the basis for the action” to: 
1. 
The active clinical practice of, or consulting with 
respect to, the same or similar health profession as the 
health care provider against whom or on whose behalf 
the testimony is offered; 
2. 
The instruction of students in an accredited health 
professional school or accredited residency program in 
the same or similar health profession in which the health 
care provider against whom or on whose behalf the 
testimony is offered; or 
3. 
A clinical research program that is affiliated with an 
accredited medical school or teaching hospital and that is 
in the same or similar health profession as the health 
care provider against whom or on whose behalf the 
testimony is offered. 
 
§ 766.102(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016).  And under subsection (6), a 
physician “may give expert testimony in a medical negligence action 
with respect to the standard of care of . . . medical support staff,” 
 
- 7 - 
including “nurse practitioners,” if the physician is licensed, qualifies 
as an expert under subsection (5), and, “by reason of active clinical 
practice or instruction of students, has knowledge of the applicable 
standard of care for . . . nurse practitioners . . . .”  § 766.102(6), Fla. 
Stat. (2016). 
To satisfy these requirements, Carmody included within her 
presuit notices the affidavit of James DeStephens, M.D.  In the 
affidavit, Dr. DeStephens attested that he was a “licensed medical 
doctor specializing in the practice of Internal Medicine, Hospital 
Medicine, and Cardiology.” 
Shands and UF moved to dismiss the complaint on the 
grounds that Dr. DeStephens did not satisfy subsection (5)(a) 
concerning a neurosurgeon like Dr. Friedman or subsections (5)(c) 
and (6) concerning a nurse practitioner like Gertsch-Lapcevic.  
Carmody provided a supplementary affidavit from Dr. DeStephens—
who was also deposed—and the circuit court held hearings on the 
subject.  The upshot of this litigation was that Carmody conceded 
that Dr. DeStephens did not meet the subsection (5)(a) 
requirements pertaining to Dr. Friedman—dropping him from the 
suit—while maintaining that Dr. DeStephens did meet the 
 
- 8 - 
subsection (5)(c) and (6) requirements pertaining to Nurse 
Practitioner Gertsch-Lapcevic. 
 
The circuit court ultimately denied the motion to dismiss, 
finding that Dr. DeStephens was qualified to render standard-of-
care opinions against Nurse Practitioner Gertsch-Lapcevic under 
both subsections (5)(c) and (6). 
 
Shands and UF filed a certiorari petition, asking the First 
District to quash the circuit court’s order.  They asserted that the 
First District had jurisdiction under article V, section 4(b)(3) of the 
Florida Constitution and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 
9.030(b)(2)(A).  To meet this Court’s standard for certiorari relief, 
Shands and UF argued that the circuit court’s order departed from 
the essential requirements of the law and caused them irreparable 
harm.  See Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Am. Educ. 
Enters., LLC, 99 So. 3d 450, 454 (Fla. 2012) (“The petitioning party 
must demonstrate that the contested order constitutes ‘(1) a 
departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting 
in material injury for the remainder of the case[,] (3) that cannot be 
corrected on postjudgment appeal.’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 
 
- 9 - 
2004)); see also Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, Inc., 
104 So. 3d 344, 351 (Fla. 2012) (“[W]hether there is a material 
injury that cannot be corrected on appeal [is] otherwise termed as 
irreparable harm.”).  Carmody did not question the availability of 
certiorari review, but instead reiterated the points she had 
successfully made to the circuit court as to Dr. DeStephens’s 
qualifications. 
Following oral argument, the First District issued an opinion 
dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that 
Shands and UF had not established irreparable harm.  Carmody, 
331 So. 3d at 237.  The First District grounded its decision in 
Williams v. Oken, a case in which we held—on similar facts—that a 
district court had “exceeded the scope of certiorari review” by 
weighing the evidence as to whether an expert was qualified under 
the Medical Malpractice Act instead of merely “ensur[ing] that the 
procedural aspects of the presuit requirements [were] met.”  62 So. 
3d 1129, 1137 (Fla. 2011).  The First District noted that Carmody 
“complied with the presuit procedural steps necessary to go forward 
with her medical negligence claim, including filing a corroborating 
medical expert opinion under § 766.203(2),” and that the “trial 
 
- 10 - 
court complied with the procedural requirements of the law.”  
Carmody, 331 So. 3d at 238. 
 
The First District also rejected Shands and UF’s argument that 
the Legislature’s 2013 deletions of subsection (14)5 and portions of 
subsection (5)(a)6 fundamentally changed how Williams governed 
certiorari requirements.  See ch. 2013-108, § 2, Laws of Fla.  But 
the First District did acknowledge that other courts had reasoned to 
different conclusions, certifying conflict with two post-Williams 
decisions: Clare and Riggenbach.  In these decisions, the district 
courts granted certiorari relief from trial court rulings on medical 
malpractice expert qualifications. 
 
Shands and UF unsuccessfully moved for rehearing, rehearing 
en banc, and certification of a question of great public importance.  
 
5.  Subsection (14) had stated that “[t]his section does not 
limit the power of the trial court to disqualify or qualify an expert 
witness on grounds other than the qualifications in this section.”  
§ 766.102(14), Fla. Stat. (2012). 
   
6.  The Legislature deleted all references to “similar specialty” 
from subsection (5)(a), thus shrinking the pool of physicians who 
could serve as corroborating experts to those within the “same 
specialty” only.  We consider the impact of these amendments in 
Section III. 
 
 
- 11 - 
They then successfully sought review of the certified conflict in this 
Court. 
II 
The First District correctly found that Shands and UF failed to 
satisfy the requirements articulated in Williams for certiorari review.  
But it was not the petitioners’ failure to demonstrate irreparable 
harm that kept them from establishing entitlement to relief; it was 
their failure to show that the trial court had departed from the 
essential requirements of the law. 
The common law writ of certiorari is an “extraordinary 
remedy.”  Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen O’Connor, PLC, 346 So. 3d 
577, 579 n.6 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 
509 So. 2d 1097, 1098-99 (Fla. 1987), superseded by statute on 
other grounds, § 768.72, Fla. Stat. (2021)).  It “gives [an] upper court 
the prerogative to reach down and halt a miscarriage of justice 
where no other remedy exists.”  M.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 
189 So. 3d 134, 138 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Broward Cnty. v. G.B.V. 
Int’l, Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 842 (Fla. 2001)).  Certiorari review is not 
a substitute for an appeal and “is intended to be available only in 
very limited circumstances.”  Nader v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety 
 
- 12 - 
and Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 3d 712, 722 (Fla. 2012).  Likewise, the 
scope of certiorari review is more constrained than that of direct 
appellate review, for “[t]he writ never was intended to redress mere 
legal error . . . .”  Broward Cnty., 787 So. 2d at 842. 
Generally, certiorari review is unavailable “to review an order 
denying a motion to dismiss,” and appellate review of such nonfinal 
orders is limited to “those specified under rule 9.130.”  Citizens, 104 
So. 3d at 352.  Here, the order denying the motion to dismiss does 
not fall within any of the classes of orders enumerated in Florida 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130.  As for the availability of 
certiorari review, Florida courts have created an “exception . . . 
when the presuit requirements of a medical malpractice statute are 
at issue” since the “purpose” of the Medical Malpractice Act is “to 
avoid meritless claims and to encourage settlement for meritorious 
claims.”  Williams, 62 So. 3d at 1133-34. 
As we said in Williams, for a district court to “determine 
whether the circumstances” constitute “one of the rare cases . . . in 
which certiorari review is appropriate,” id. at 1134, the district 
court must answer  “yes” to these questions: Has there been “(1) a 
departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting 
 
- 13 - 
in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be 
corrected on postjudgment appeal[?]”  Id. at 1132 (quoting Reeves, 
889 So. 2d at 822).  The last two prongs together are “referred to as 
irreparable harm.”  Nader, 87 So. 3d at 721.  They are also 
“jurisdictional and must be analyzed before the court may even 
consider the first [prong].”  Williams, 62 So. 3d at 1132. 
In Williams, we did not closely analyze whether the petitioner 
had satisfied the irreparable harm prongs but rather “concern[ed] 
ourselves with the first [prong]—whether the trial court departed 
from the essential requirements of the law.”  Id. at 1132-33.  We 
noted that  
[s]ince it is impossible to list all possible legal errors 
serious enough to constitute a departure from the 
essential requirements of law, the district courts must be 
allowed a large degree of discretion so that they may 
judge each case individually.  The district courts should 
exercise this discretion only when there has been a 
violation of clearly established principle of law resulting 
in a miscarriage of justice. 
 
Id. at 1133 (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 
523, 527 (Fla. 1995)).  This Court then concluded that certiorari 
review was unavailable to the petitioner because “[w]hether the trial 
court erred in finding that [the doctor] was a qualified expert under 
 
- 14 - 
the statute is an issue of mere legal error . . . [and] does not amount 
to a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a 
miscarriage of justice.”  Id. at 1137.7 
Like the petitioners in Williams, Shands and UF cannot show 
that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the 
law by denying their motion to dismiss.  As we explained in 
Williams, “Florida courts have permitted certiorari review solely to 
ensure that the procedural aspects of the presuit requirements are 
met.”  Id.  At a general level, such procedural aspects include 
whether a plaintiff—before the filing of the medical malpractice 
lawsuit—gave the defendant “advance notice” and provided an 
“opportunity [for the defendant] to examine [the] claim.”  Id. at 
1136.  Thus, a district court can grant certiorari review to verify 
that the plaintiff submitted the corroborating affidavit of an expert 
 
7.  Although we found that there had not been a “departure 
from the essential requirements of the law”—which is a 
determination on the merits—we concluded that the district court 
should have “dismissed” the petition for certiorari.  Williams, 62 So. 
3d at 1137.  That language, however, we generally use when 
disposing of a matter prior to reaching its merits.  See State Farm 
Fla. Ins. Co. v. Seville Place Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 74 So. 3d 105, 109-
10 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (Shepherd, J., concurring) (discussing this 
distinction in a similar context). 
 
- 15 - 
witness.  Id. at 1137.  But here there is no disputing that Carmody 
checked that box.  See Carmody, 331 So. 3d at 238 (“Respondent 
complied with the presuit procedural steps necessary to go forward 
with her medical negligence claim, including filing a corroborating 
medical expert opinion . . . .”). 
Instead, Shands and UF seek certiorari review of the circuit 
court’s determination that Dr. DeStephens is a qualified expert.  
See id. at 237 (“Petitioners assert that the trial court should have 
dismissed Carmody’s medical malpractice lawsuit because her 
medical doctor expert was unqualified to address the standard of 
care applicable to the certified nurse practitioner who rendered care 
. . . .”).  But this, we have said, the district courts cannot do.  See 
Williams, 62 So. 3d at 1137 (“[W]e conclude that the First District 
exceeded the scope of certiorari review when it granted the petition 
to determine whether [the doctor] was a qualified expert.”). 
III 
Shands and UF argue that the 2013 amendments to the 
Medical Malpractice Act fundamentally changed the applicability of 
 
- 16 - 
Williams.8  They contend that the 2013 amendments erased 
whatever discretion trial courts had in making presuit expert 
qualification determinations, meaning that all such determinations 
are now so mechanical as to be “procedural” and thus subject to 
certiorari review.  See ch. 2013-108, § 2, Laws of Fla. 
We do not agree.  The amendments limited—but did not 
erase—trial court discretion in assessing the qualifications of 
proposed expert witnesses.  By deleting subsection (14)—which had 
provided that nothing in section 766.102 “limit[ed] the power of the 
trial court to disqualify or qualify an expert witness on grounds 
other than the qualifications in this section”—the Legislature 
eliminated an explicit and substantial basis for trial court 
discretion.  And by simultaneously amending subsection (5)(a)9 
 
8.  Likewise, the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal 
cited the 2013 amendments when deciding the conflict cases.  See 
Clare, 220 So. 3d at 1261 (“The trial court’s ruling in this case, 
which effectively resurrects the prior statutory language . . . 
constitutes a clear departure from the essential requirements of the 
law . . . .”); Riggenbach, 267 So. 3d at 554 n.1 (discussing the “effect 
of the [2013] amendment[s]”). 
 
9.  Section 766.102(5)(a) is no longer at issue in this case 
because Carmody dropped Dr. Friedman—a specialist—from the 
suit. 
 
 
- 17 - 
such that any corroborating expert who is to testify against a 
specialist must specialize in the “same”—as opposed to “same or 
similar”—specialty, the Legislature eliminated language that 
implicitly empowered the courts to exercise discretion in a 
significant subset of medical malpractice actions. 
Yet section 766.102 still calls on the trial courts to make some 
discretionary decisions.  For example, under subsection (5)(c)—
which applies here—the trial court must determine whether an 
expert who is to testify against neither a specialist nor a generalist 
has “devoted professional time” to (1) “[t]he active clinical practice 
of, or consulting with respect to, the same or similar health 
profession” as the defendant; (2) “[t]he instruction of students . . . in 
the same or similar health profession” as the defendant; or (3) “[a] 
clinical research program . . . in the same or similar health 
profession” as the defendant.  § 766.102(5)(c)1.-3., Fla. Stat. 
(emphasis added).  A trial court cannot make a “same or similar 
health profession” determination without considering evidence and 
using its discretion.  And even under amended subsection (5)(a), 
there are and will continue to be borderline cases where trial courts 
 
- 18 - 
must weigh evidence in determining if an expert is a practitioner 
within the “same specialty”10 as the defendant.11 
Because trial courts must continue to exercise discretion in 
making some of these presuit qualification determinations, not all of 
their findings qualify as “process-related deficienc[ies]” subject to 
certiorari review.  See Carmody, 331 So. 3d at 238.  Instead, some 
of these findings are “sufficiency of the evidence” determinations, 
and “granting a petition for writ of certiorari to review” them 
remains “inappropriate.”  Williams, 62 So. 3d at 1136. 
IV 
While the burden of defending against litigation under 
ordinary circumstances does not constitute irreparable harm, in 
 
10.  Neither “specialty” nor “same specialty” is defined in 
chapter 766. 
 
11.  In its amicus brief, the Florida Justice Association 
identifies several such cases, including Patides v. Johns Hopkins All 
Children’s Hospital, Inc., No. 19-008484-CI (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct.) 
(involving whether an expert certified in the specialty of pediatrics 
and the subspecialty of pediatric cardiology satisfies the “same 
specialty” requirement vis-à-vis a defendant certified in the 
subspecialties of pediatric neonatology and pediatric interventional 
cardiology), and Dontineni v. Sanderson, 346 So. 3d 169, 170-71 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (involving whether an expert certified in 
internal medicine can testify under subsection (5)(a) against a 
defendant certified in internal medicine and as a hospitalist). 
 
- 19 - 
enacting the presuit requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act, 
the Legislature elected to treat differently the burden of defending 
against meritless medical negligence claims.  See § 766.201(2), Fla. 
Stat. (“It is the intent of the Legislature to provide a plan for prompt 
resolution of medical negligence claims.”).  Before and after the 
2013 amendments, the Medical Malpractice Act’s presuit 
requirements have served a jurisdictional purpose, for “no action 
shall be filed . . . unless the attorney filing the action has made a 
reasonable investigation . . . to determine that there are grounds for 
a good faith belief that there has been negligence . . . .”  
§ 766.104(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).  And when an action has 
been filed but the plaintiff has failed to comply with the presuit 
requirements, the Legislature demands that “the court shall dismiss 
the claim.”  § 766.206(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).  Subject to all 
other federal and state constitutional requirements, the Legislature 
may generally limit what tort claims can be brought at state law, 
and how they are brought, as long as it does not run afoul of article 
1, section 21 of Florida’s Constitution (“The courts shall be open to 
every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be 
administered without sale, denial or delay.”).  See Sebring Airport 
 
- 20 - 
Auth. v. McIntyre, 783 So. 2d 238, 244-45 (Fla. 2001) (“Where a 
statute does not violate the federal or state Constitution, the 
legislative will is supreme . . . .”) (quoting City of Jacksonville v. 
Bowden, 64 So. 769, 772 (Fla. 1914)).  Carmody does not argue 
that the Legislature has exceeded its constitutional authority. 
And it is within our constitutional authority to ensure that 
Florida’s procedural rules of court manifest the substantive legal 
enactments of the Legislature.  See State v. Gaines, 770 So. 2d 
1221, 1225 (Fla. 2000) (“[T]his Court alone has the power to define 
the scope of interlocutory appeals . . . .”); see also Osceola Cnty. v. 
Best Diversified, Inc., 830 So. 2d 139, 140-41 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) 
(“[T]he Florida Constitution does not authorize the Legislature to 
provide for interlocutory appeals. . . .  [O]nly if the Florida Supreme 
Court incorporates the statutory language into the appellate rules 
can appellate jurisdiction be broadened.”).  We cannot say that, in 
its current form, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 
adequately identifies all nonfinal orders appropriate for 
interlocutory review.  Therefore today, on our own motion, we have 
also amended Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to 
provide for interlocutory review of nonfinal orders that deny a 
 
- 21 - 
motion to dismiss on the basis of the qualifications of a 
corroborating witness under section 766.102(5)-(9), Florida 
Statutes.12 
V 
Because the circuit court’s allegedly erroneous determination 
that Dr. DeStephens satisfied the Medical Malpractice Act’s presuit 
requirements does not constitute an “essential departure from the 
law,” certiorari relief is unavailable.  We therefore approve the First 
District’s decision below to the extent that it is consistent with our 
decision here, and we disapprove the Second and Fifth Districts’ 
decisions in Clare and Riggenbach, respectively. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, GROSSHANS, and FRANCIS, JJ., 
concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result and dissents in part with an 
opinion. 
SASSO, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
12.  The specific amendment is reflected in the appendix to In 
re Amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, No. 
SC2023-0701 (Fla. July 6, 2023). 
 
- 22 - 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that “the circuit court’s 
allegedly erroneous determination that Dr. DeStephens satisfied the 
Medical Malpractice Act’s presuit requirements does not constitute 
an ‘essential departure from the law.’ ”  Majority op. at 21.  Thus, I 
concur in the result to that extent. 
However, the majority opinion further explains that in deciding 
this case, the majority determined it appropriate to unilaterally 
“amend[] Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to provide 
for interlocutory review of nonfinal orders [in medical malpractice 
cases] that deny a motion to dismiss on the basis of the 
qualifications of a corroborating witness.”  Id. at 20-21. 
This unilateral amendment via separate opinion, see In re 
Amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, No. 
SC2023-0701 (Fla. July 6, 2023), will permit interlocutory review of 
such nonfinal orders in the future.  I believe that an amendment of 
this significance should receive the appropriate rules committee 
referral and consideration beforehand.  Consequently, I dissent to 
this portion of the majority’s analysis, consistent with my 
 
- 23 - 
dissenting opinion in the separate opinion amending rule 
9.130(a)(3). 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District – Case No. 1D21-634 
 
 
(Alachua County) 
 
Christine R. Davis of Davis Appeals, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Kennan G. Dandar and Timothy M. Dandar of Dandar & Dandar, 
P.A., St. Petersburg, Florida; and Adam Richardson of Burlington & 
Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Andrew S. Bolin of Bolin Law Group, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae Florida Hospital Association, Florida Medical 
Association, and the Litigation Center of the American Medical 
Association 
 
Kansas R. Gooden of Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Miami, Florida; and 
Jessica N. Cochran of Bush, Graziano, Rice & Platter, P.A., Tampa, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida Defense Lawyers Association 
 
Bryan S. Gowdy and Dimitrios A. Peteves of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., 
Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae the Florida Justice Association