Case Title: Crook v. Allstate Indemnity Company, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1180996

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:  June 26, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180996
____________________
Kevin Crook
v.
Allstate Indemnity Company, The Barker Agency,
and Allstate Insurance Company
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court
(CV-16-900626)
MENDHEIM, Justice.
Kevin Crook appeals a summary judgment entered by the
Tuscaloosa Circuit Court in favor of Allstate Indemnity
Company ("Allstate Indemnity"), Allstate Insurance Company
1180996
("Allstate Insurance"), and The Barker Agency (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "the defendants").  We affirm the
summary judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
Crook owns lake-front property in Tuscaloosa County.  The
property consists of a house, a bathhouse, a garage, a deck,
and a boat dock.  The deck is not directly connected to the
house; an exterior stairway connects the house to the deck. 
The boat dock is, in turn, connected to the side of the deck
opposite the stairway and house.1  A portion of the boat dock
is covered with a roof supported by pilings, but the boat dock
has no walls.
In 2006, Crook, through The Barker Agency,2 obtained
property insurance on the house and other structures from
Allstate Indemnity.  Allstate Indemnity issued a policy to
Crook ("the policy") and provided uninterrupted insurance
coverage of Crook's house from 2006 through 2015.  Crook's
1Crook maintains that the deck and the boat dock are
essentially the same structure.  See Crook's reply brief,
p. 11.  It is unclear why this is significant to Crook's
argument.
2At that time, The Barker Agency was known as the Michael
Gray Agency.
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1180996
deposition testimony indicates that, during that time,
although Crook was sent a renewal policy each year with the
details of the policy and specific instructions to read the
renewal policy and determine if the policy limits were
sufficient, Crook was not aware of the actual policy limits
provided by Allstate Indemnity and did not read the renewal
notices.  Crook answered in the affirmative when asked if he
"simply trust[ed] that the limits supplied by [Allstate
Indemnity were] exactly what [he] need[ed]."
The policy provided that the "limits of insurance" for
"Coverage A Dwelling Protection" ("Coverage A") was $56,049
and for "Coverage B Other Structure Protection" ("Coverage B")
was $11,455.  The policy stated, in pertinent part:
"Property we cover under Coverage A:
"1. Your dwelling including attached
structures. Structures connected to your
dwelling by only a fence, utility line, or
similar connection are not considered
attached structures.
"....
"Property we cover under Coverage B:
"1. Declarations separated from your
dwelling by clear space.
3
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"2. 
Structures 
attached 
to 
your
dwelling by only a fence, utility line, or
similar connection."
The term "dwelling" is defined in the policy as "a one, two,
three or four family building structure, identified as the
insured property on the Policy Declarations, where you reside
and which is principally used as a private residence."  The
term "building structure" is defined in the policy as "a
structure with walls and a roof."
On February 12, 2015, Allstate Indemnity conducted an
inspection of the property for underwriting purposes.  After
the inspection, on February 23, 2015, The Barker Agency sent
Crook the following letter (Allstate Insurance's name was 
also
on the letter):
"Re:  Property Inspection Results
"As you may recall, we previously informed you
of an upcoming inspection of [the property's]
exterior. We have completed the inspection and want
to share the results with you.
"Congratulations!  We did not find any issues
that impact your current coverage* and you do not
need to do anything further. If you have any
questions about the inspection, please give us a
call at the number below.
"We value your business and hope you are
satisfied with the insurance coverage we provide.
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1180996
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to help
protect what's important to you.
"____________________
"*We want you to know that our inspection of
your property is limited. It focused only on
identifying certain types of hazards or conditions
that might impact your future insurance coverage. 
It may not have identified some other hazards or
conditions on your property."
On April 14, 2015, a storm damaged the deck and the boat
dock; the amount of the damage caused "was at or greater than
the coverage provided by" Coverage B.  Crook reported the
storm-caused damage.  On April 24, 2015, Kevin Smith, a
"claims service analyst" employed by Allstate Insurance,
inspected the damage reported by Crook.  Smith concluded that
the deck and the boat dock had been damaged by the storm and
that the damage was covered under Coverage B, rather than
Coverage A.  Accordingly, on April 28, 2015, Allstate
Indemnity paid Crook the Coverage B policy limit of $11,455. 
On June 7, 2016, Crook sued the defendants, asserting
claims of breach of contract, bad-faith failure to pay a
claim, 
negligent/wanton 
procurement 
of 
insurance, 
and
estoppel.3  Concerning Crook's breach-of-contract and bad-
3In his complaint, Crook asserted his claims against all
the defendants.  Before this Court, however, Crook makes
5
1180996
faith claims, Crook alleged that the damage to the deck and
the boat dock should have been covered under Coverage A, which
has a higher limit of insurance in the amount of $56,049. 
Concerning Crook's negligent/wanton-procurement-of-insurance
claim, Crook alleged that he relied upon the defendants to
provide adequate coverage for the property and that the
defendants "knew or should have known that [Coverage B] ...
would be insufficient to cover damages to [the] deck and [the]
boat [dock]."  Concerning his estoppel claim, Crook alleged
that the defendants, in the February 23, 2015, letter set
forth above, "assur[ed] [Crook] that his insurance coverage
was sufficient" and that the defendants should have known that
the alleged assurances in the February 23, 2015, letter "would
cause [Crook] to not take further actions to procure
additional or different insurance coverage."  Crook asserted
that the defendants "are estopped from asserting a position
inconsistent with the representations in the February 23,
2015, letter."
arguments as if certain claims were asserted against specific,
and not all, defendants.  For purposes of this opinion, we
have treated Crook's claims in the same manner he has treated
them before this Court.
6
1180996
On October 9, 2017, Allstate Indemnity and The Barker
Agency filed separate motions for a summary judgment, and on
September 27, 2018, Crook filed a response.  Following a
hearing, the circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor
of Allstate Indemnity and The Barker Agency as to all claims
against them on February 27, 2019.
On April 10, 2019, Allstate Insurance filed a motion for
a summary judgment, and on July 24, 2019, Crook filed a
response.  Following a hearing, the circuit court entered a
summary judgment in favor of Allstate Insurance as to all
claims against it on July 29, 2019.  The circuit court
incorporated its February 27, 2019, order into the July 29,
2019, order and further stated that the policy "was issued by
Allstate Indemnity ..., not Allstate Insurance ...; and that
Allstate Indemnity ... ultimately investigated and issued
payments on [Crook's] claim."  Crook appealed.
Standard of Review
Our standard  of review of a summary judgment is well
settled:
"'The standard of 
review applicable to 
a 
summary
judgment is the same as the standard for granting
the motion....' McClendon v. Mountain Top Indoor
Flea Market, Inc., 601 So. 2d 957, 958 (Ala. 1992).
7
1180996
"'A summary judgment is proper when
there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3),
Ala. R. Civ. P. The burden is on the moving
party to make a prima facie showing that
there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that it is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. In determining whether the
movant has carried that burden, the court
is to view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and to
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
that party. To defeat a properly supported
summary judgment motion, the nonmoving
party must present "substantial evidence"
creating a genuine issue of material fact
-- "evidence of such weight and quality
that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial 
judgment 
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."
Ala. Code 1975, § 12–21–12; West v.
Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547
So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).'
"Capital Alliance Ins. Co. v. Thorough–Clean, Inc.,
639 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (Ala. 1994). Questions of law
are reviewed de novo. Alabama Republican Party v.
McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 342 (Ala. 2004)."
Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 935
(Ala. 2006).
Discussion
First, Crook argues that the circuit court erred in
entering a summary judgment in favor of Allstate Indemnity on
Crook's breach-of-contract claim.  Crook argues that "[t]he
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1180996
plain language of the policy provides that the deck [and] boat
[dock are] covered under Coverage A," rather than Coverage B. 
Crook's brief, p. 34.
This 
Court 
applies 
the 
following 
principles 
of
construction in interpreting an insurance contract:
"The rules of contract interpretation are well
settled. 'The issue whether a contract is ambiguous
or unambiguous is a question of law for a court to
decide.' State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747
So. 2d 293, 308 (Ala. 1999).
"'"If a word or phrase is not
defined in [an insurance] policy,
then the court should construe
the word or phrase according to
the meaning a person of ordinary
intelligence 
would 
reasonably
give it. The court should not
define words it is construing
based 
on 
technical 
or 
legal
terms."
"'Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama, Inc. v.
Herrera, 912 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Ala. 2005)
(citations omitted).'
"Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Alabama Gas Corp., 117
So. 3d 695, 700 (Ala. 2012).
"'"'When analyzing an
insurance 
policy, 
a
court gives words used
in 
the 
policy 
their
c o m m o n ,  
e v e r y d a y
meaning and interprets
them as a reasonable
person in the insured's
9
1180996
position 
would 
have
u n d e r s t o o d  
t h e m .
Western World Ins. Co.
v. City of Tuscumbia,
612 So. 2d 1159 (Ala.
1992); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Edge
Mem'l Hosp., 584 So. 2d
1316 (Ala. 1991). If,
under 
this 
standard,
they 
are 
reasonably
certain 
in 
their
meaning, they are not
ambiguous as a matter
of law and the rule of
construction in favor
of the insured does not
apply. Bituminous Cas.
Corp. v. Harris, 372
So. 2d 342 (Ala. Civ.
App. 
1979). 
Only 
in
cases 
of 
genuine
a m b i g u i t y  
o r
inconsistency 
is 
it
proper 
to 
resort 
to
rules of construction.
Canal Ins. Co. v. Old
Republic Ins. Co., 718
So. 2d 8 (Ala. 1998). A
policy 
is 
not 
made
ambiguous by the fact
that 
the 
parties
interpret 
the 
policy
differently or disagree
as to the meaning of a
written provision in a
contract. 
Watkins 
v.
United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 656 So. 2d
337 
(Ala. 
1994). 
A
court must not rewrite
a 
policy 
so 
as 
to
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1180996
include 
or 
exclude
coverage that was not
intended. 
Upton 
v.
Mississippi 
Valley
Title Ins. Co., 469 So.
2d 548 (Ala. 1985).'
"'"B.D.B. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 814 So. 2d 877,
879–80 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001).
However, if a provision in an
insurance policy is found to be
genuinely ambiguous, 'policies of
insurance should be construed
liberally in respect to persons
insured and strictly with respect
to the insurer.' Crossett v. St.
Louis Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 289
Ala. 598, 603, 269 So. 2d 869,
873 (1972)."
"'State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown,
26 So. 3d 1167, 1169–70 (Ala. 2009)....'
"Travelers, 117 So. 3d at 699–700 (emphasis
omitted)."
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Britt, 203 So. 3d 804, 810-
11 (Ala. 2016).
As set forth above, the policy states that Coverage A
applies to Crook's "dwelling including attached structures.
Structures connected to your dwelling by only a fence, utility
line, or similar connection are not considered attached
structures."  It is undisputed that the house is a dwelling
and that the deck and the boat dock are structures; the issue
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1180996
to be decided is whether those structures are "attached
structures."  Crook argues that the exterior staircase
attaches the deck to the house and that the deck, in turn,
which is attached to the boat dock, attaches the boat dock to
the house.  Accordingly, Crook argues, Coverage A, rather than
Coverage B, applies to cover the damage to the deck and the
boat dock.  The defendants argue that the damage is covered by
Coverage B, which applies to "[s]tructures ... separated from
your dwelling by clear space."  The defendants argue that the
deck and the boat dock are separated from the dwelling by
"clear space," so as to qualify only for Coverage B.
No Alabama appellate court has published a decision
interpreting the particular policy language at issue.  As a
result, the parties have cited various cases from foreign
jurisdictions in making their arguments.  We find Dahms v.
Nodak Mutual Insurance Co., 920 N.W.2d 293 (N.D. 2018), the
most instructive; in that case, the Supreme Court of North
Dakota summarized and addressed all the authorities relied
upon by the parties in the present case.  In Dahms, the
insureds had a property-insurance policy identical to the
policy at issue in this case in all material respects:
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1180996
"A.  Coverage A – Dwelling
"1.  We cover:
"a. 
The 
dwelling 
on 
the
'residence premises' shown in the
D e c l a r a t i o n s ,  
i n c l u d i n g
structures 
attached 
to 
the
dwelling; ...
"....
"B.  Coverage B – Other Structures
"1.  We cover other structures on the
'residence premises' set apart from the
dwelling by clear space. This includes
structures connected to the dwelling by
only a fence, utility line, or similar
connection."
Dahms, 920 N.W.2d at 295.  The property insured included a
dwelling and a detached garage.  The insureds constructed a
deck between the dwelling and the garage, connecting the two
structures.  It was undisputed that the deck was attached to
the dwelling and to the garage.  Subsequently, the garage was
completely destroyed by a fire.
The insurer determined that the loss was covered under
Coverage B of the insureds' policy and paid the insureds the
policy limit of that coverage, which did not cover the total
amount of damage suffered by the insureds.  The insureds
disagreed that Coverage B applied and sued the insurer,
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claiming that Coverage A of the insureds' policy, which
provided greater coverage, applied "because the garage was
'attached' to their dwelling by the deck."  920 N.W.2d at 296. 
The trial court ruled in favor of the insurer, and the
insureds appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the
trial court's judgment.  In so doing, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota provided the following analysis of the relevant
authorities cited by the parties in the present case:
"Whether Coverage A or Coverage B insurance
policy limits apply under the circumstances present
in this case is a question of first impression in
North Dakota. The parties do not cite, and we have
not found, any cases construing similar insurance
policy provisions from other jurisdictions that are
factually on point. In deciding this issue the
district court found persuasive a hypothetical posed
by the Texas Supreme Court in Nassar v. Liberty Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 508 S.W.3d 254, 260 (Tex. 2017):
"'To illustrate using a hypothetical,
a stand-alone barn on a residence premises
set apart from the dwelling by clear space
would clearly be covered under subsection
(2). Yet without the second sentence in
subsection (2), a barn that was connected
to the dwelling by only a fence would
qualify as a "structure attached to the
dwelling." This is because the fence,
acting as a "structure attached to the
dwelling" and a "connection" to the barn
that would otherwise be "set apart by clear
space," acts to negate the clear space
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requirement that places the barn neatly in
the first sentence of subsection (2). An
insured could simply use some fencing (or
a "utility line or similar connection") and
attach his or her dwelling to every barn,
garage, or other building on the residence
premises 
and 
secure 
coverage 
under
subsection (1) instead of subsection (2).
What protects the insurer from an insured
determined to secure coverage for his or
her other structures in such a way? The
second sentence of subsection (2) provides
the answer, and it does so with the
distinction between "dwelling" and "other
structures." In the above illustration,
applying the second sentence of subsection
(2) would cause the barn, connected to the
dwelling by only a fence, to not be
considered "attached to the dwelling" but
rather as effectively "separated by clear
space." The second sentence of subsection
(2) operates to prevent a fence (or similar
connection) attached to the dwelling from
doing exactly what the court of appeals
contemplated the Nassars' interpretation
would do: cause structures attached to the
fence to be covered under subsection (1).
Stated differently, the first sentence of
subsection (2) identifies what is to be
covered, and the second sentence limits
that 
coverage. 
Applying 
this 
interpretation
to our hypothetical, the barn would be
covered as an "other structure" even though
it is connected to the dwelling by a
fence.'
"Courts 
in 
other 
jurisdictions 
construing 
nearly
identical policy language are in accord and have
concluded, as did the district court here, that
decks and concrete patios connected to a dwelling
and other structures constitute 'clear space' which
do not functionally differ from a lawn or garden,
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1180996
rendering Coverage B limits applicable. The most
extended discussion of the issue appears in Porco v.
Lexington Ins. Co., 679 F. Supp. 2d 432, 434
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), which involved an insured's attempt
to claim Coverage A limits applied to damage to a
swimming pool connected to the dwelling by a patio,
stairs, and a pool deck, none of which was covered
by a roof. The pool's filtration system was located
in the dwelling and was connected to the pool by
pipes. Id. The court relied on ordinary dictionary
definitions of 'attached,' meaning '"joined or
fastened to something,"' and 'connected,' meaning
'"joined or linked together,"' to resolve the issue.
Id. at 437. The court determined the language used
in Coverage A and Coverage B was not ambiguous and
explained:
"'The plain language of "attached"
renders 
unpersuasive 
Plaintiff's 
claim 
that
the dwelling is connected to the pool via
the back patio, the steps, and the pool
deck. In essence, Plaintiff asserts that
because the house is "connected to" the
patio, and the patio is "connected to" the
steps, and the steps are "connected to" the
pool deck, and the pool deck is "connected
to" the pool, by some transitive property,
the pool is "attached" to the house and,
therefore, Coverage A applies. If the patio
is joined or fastened to the dwelling, as
it would seem to be, then that might
distinguish the patio from a lawn or other
obviously clear space separating the house
from other structures. However, a dwelling
might well be connected to a patio, and the
patio to a walkway, and a walkway to a dog
house or a mail box, but it would be absurd
to conclude that the dog house and mail box
are 
"attached" 
to 
the 
dwelling. 
Plaintiff's
implicit argument that manmade structures
that are all connected to each other have
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a property of being "attached" must,
therefore, be limited in some way.
"'That limitation is found in the
language of the Policy as applied to the
relationship 
between 
the 
structure 
at 
issue
and the dwelling. ... Even granting that
the patio and stairs are attached to the
dwelling and that the pool deck is attached
to the pool, it strains the ordinary use of
"attached" to argue that the steps, fence,
and elevation do not set the dwelling apart
from the pool. Put another, simpler way,
the pool is indisputably not joined or
fastened to the dwelling, and the fact that
the pool deck is between the stairs and the
pool, even if they touch each other, does
not change the analysis.'
"Id. at 438. The court reasoned that 'the pool deck
is clear space separating the dwelling (even if
defined to include the stairs from the back patio)
from the swimming pool' because the 'Court is at a
loss to understand how cement is any more of a
restriction of the space than grass would be.' Id.
at 
439. 
The 
court 
granted 
summary 
judgment
concluding the pool was an 'other structure' and
Coverage B applied. Id. at 441.
"Two unreported decisions applying the same
policy language are in accord. See Mentesana v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 07-0456-CV-W-ODS
[May 28, 2008] (W.D. Mo. 2008) [(not selected for
publication in F. Supp.)] ('Plaintiff's pool and
waterfall are separated from his house by clear
space. While this clear space is a concrete patio,
rather than grass, it still provides separation from
the house. Plaintiff's interpretation ... would
allow for any structure to be brought within the
"Dwelling" coverage merely by placing it on a
concrete slab and connecting that slab to the
foundation of the house.'); Arch v. Nationwide Mut.
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1180996
Fire Ins. Co., CIV. A. No. 88-5421 [Nov. 10, 1988]
(W.D. Pa. 1988) [(not selected for publication in
F. Supp.)] (unroofed twelve-foot concrete patio
between pool and dwelling was clear space because 'a
patio merely comprises part of one's yard as does
any lawn or garden').
"The [insureds] rely on Lazechko v. Auto Owners
Ins. Co., No. 276111 [July 10, 2008] (Mich. Ct. App.
2008) [(unpublished decision)], where the court
ruled Coverage A limits applied to a garage
connected to the dwelling by a breezeway based on a
dictionary 
definition 
of 
breezeway 
as 
'"an
open-sided roofed passageway for connecting two
buildings, as a house and a garage."' Id. But the
present case does not involve a roofed breezeway,
and the insured in Lazechko was attempting to invoke
Coverage B limits to obtain additional insurance
proceeds."
920 S.W.2d at 297.  Based on the above analysis, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota affirmed the trial court's judgment,
concluding that the damage to the insureds' garage was covered
under Coverage B of the insureds' policy, rather than
Coverage A.
As is made clear by the above analysis, the various
jurisdictions that have considered the issue before us have
determined that Coverage B applies to cover damage to an
"other structure" when there is "clear space" between the
dwelling and the other structure, even if the dwelling and the
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damaged other structure are connected by a structure such as
a deck.
In the present case, the deck is connected to the house
by an exterior staircase.  It is evident from the pictures
provided by the parties that there is "clear space" between
the house and the deck and the boat dock.  The fact that the
exterior staircase spans the clear space between the house and
the deck and the boat dock is inconsequential according to
Dahms.  The fact remains that neither the deck nor the boat
dock is attached to the house, but there exists clear space
between the structures.4  Accordingly, applying the plain
language of the policy, the circuit court properly determined
that the damage to Crook's deck and boat dock is covered under
Coverage B, rather than Coverage A.5
4Crook notes that Smith's deposition testimony indicates
that the exterior staircase and the deck do not constitute
"clear space" because "[t]here's something there."  However,
as thoroughly explained above, the simple fact that there is
"something there" does not mean that there is not "clear
space" as that term is used in the policy.  The interpretation
of the policy is a matter of law to be decided by the Court,
not a matter of fact to be decided by Smith.  Smith's
testimony in this regard is irrelevant.
5Crook notes that, in determining that Coverage B applied
to the damage in the present case, the circuit court relied
upon the fact that the deck and the boat dock are actually
located on public land and that Crook's deck does not provide
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1180996
Next, Crook argues that the circuit court erred in
entering a summary judgment in favor of Allstate Indemnity on
Crook's bad-faith claim.  As Crook notes in his brief, the
following elements must be established to prevail on a bad-
faith claim:
"(a) an insurance contract between the parties
and a breach thereof by the defendant;
"(b) 
an 
intentional refusal to 
pay 
the 
insured's
claim;
"(c) the 
absence of 
any 
reasonably legitimate or
arguable reason for that refusal (the absence of a
debatable reason);
"(d) the insurer's actual knowledge of the
absence of any legitimate or arguable reason;
"(e) if 
the 
intentional failure to 
determine the
existence of a lawful basis is relied upon, the
plaintiff must prove the insurer's intentional
failure to determine whether there is a legitimate
or arguable reason to refuse to pay the claim."
National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 417 So. 2d 179, 183
(Ala. 1982) (emphasis added).  The very first element of a
bad-faith claim is that there must be a breach of an insurance
structural support to the house.  See Crook's brief,
pp. 44-46.  Crook argues that these facts are irrelevant to
interpreting the plain language of the policy.  We agree, and
we have not relied upon those facts in our analysis.  As
demonstrated above, however, the circuit court's judgment may
be affirmed without reliance upon those superfluous facts.
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1180996
contract between the parties.  As discussed above, Crook has
failed to establish that the circuit court erred in
determining that Allstate Indemnity did not breach the 
policy. 
Crook has thus failed to establish the first element of his
bad-faith claim.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's
summary judgment in favor of Allstate Indemnity as to Crook's
bad-faith claim.
Next, Crook argues that, even if Allstate Indemnity did
not breach the policy by applying Coverage B, "Crook has
trial-worthy 
claims 
[against 
Allstate 
Indemnity and 
The 
Barker
Agency] for negligence in procurement of insurance, negligent
inspection, and estoppel."  Crook's brief, p. 50.  Crook's
negligence arguments appear to be intertwined.  
He 
essentially
argues that Allstate Indemnity and The Barker Agency
negligently inspected the property, which caused them to
negligently procure the policy.  In other words, Crook appears
to be arguing that the alleged negligent inspection led
Allstate Indemnity to provide an inadequate limit for
Coverage B.  Based on Crook's argument, the alleged negligent
inspection matters only insofar as it informed the policy
limits.  Although Crook has divided his negligence claim into
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two separate theories, the gravamen of Crook's negligence
claim is one of negligent procurement of insurance, and we
will treat it as such.  Furthermore, we note that Crook does
not cite this Court to any authority indicating that such
negligence theories constitute separate claims.
In Alfa Life Insurance Corp. v. Colza, 159 So. 3d 1240,
1248 (Ala. 2014), this Court, relying on Kanellis v. Pacific
Indemnity Co., 917 So. 2d 149 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), set forth
the elements of a negligent-procurement claim and also noted
the applicability of the doctrine of contributory negligence
to such a claim, as follows:
"In Kanellis v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 917 So. 2d
149, 155 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), the Court of Civil
Appeals set forth the elements a plaintiff asserting
a 
negligent-procurement 
claim 
is 
required 
to
establish:
"'Like any negligence claim, a claim
in tort alleging a negligent failure of an
insurance agent to fulfill a voluntary
undertaking 
to 
procure 
insurance 
...
requires demonstration of the classic
elements of a negligence theory, i.e.,
"(1) 
duty, 
(2) 
breach 
of 
duty,
(3) proximate cause, and (4) injury."
Albert v. Hsu, 602 So. 2d 895, 897 (Ala.
2002). 
Under 
Alabama 
law, 
however,
contributory negligence is a complete
defense to a claim based on negligence.
Mitchell 
v. 
Torrence 
Cablevision 
USA, 
Inc.,
22
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806 So. 2d 1254, 1257 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000).'"
Crook argues that Allstate Indemnity and The Barker Agency
negligently procured the insurance limits of the policy. 
Crook states that he relied upon the expertise of Allstate
Indemnity and The Barker Agency in setting the insurance
limits and that they negligently failed to properly set those
limits as evidenced by the fact that the policy limits of
Coverage B were inadequate to fully compensate him for the
damage to the deck and the boat dock.
The defendants, on the other hand, argue that Crook was
contributorily negligent.  In Colza, this Court stated:
"With regard to establishing contributory negligence
as a matter of law, this Court has stated:
"'The question of contributory negligence
is normally one for the jury. However,
where 
the 
facts 
are 
such 
that 
all
reasonable persons must reach the same
conclusion, contributory negligence may be
found as a matter of law. Brown [v.
Piggly–Wiggly Stores, 454 So. 2d 1370, 1372
(Ala. 1984)]; see also Carroll v. Deaton,
Inc., 555 So. 2d 140, 141 (Ala. 1989).
"'To 
establish 
contributory 
negligence
as a matter of law, a defendant seeking a
[judgment as a matter of law] must show
that the plaintiff put himself in danger's
way and that the plaintiff had a conscious
appreciation of the danger at the moment
23
1180996
the incident occurred. See H.R.H. Metals,
Inc. v. Miller, 833 So. 2d 18 (Ala. 2002);
see also Hicks v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 652 So. 2d 211, 219 (Ala. 1994). The
proof 
required 
for 
establishing
contributory negligence as a matter of law
should 
be 
distinguished 
from 
an 
instruction
given to a jury when determining whether a
plaintiff has been guilty of contributory
negligence. A jury determining whether a
plaintiff has been guilty of contributory
negligence must decide only whether the
plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable
care. We protect against the inappropriate
use of a summary judgment to establish
contributory negligence as a matter of law
by requiring the defendant on such a motion
to establish by undisputed evidence a
plaintiff's 
conscious 
appreciation 
of
danger. See H.R.H. Metals, supra.'
"Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d
839, 860–61 (Ala. 2002)."
Colza, 159 So. 3d at 1248-49.
In Colza, this Court, relying upon the Court of Civil
Appeals' decision in Kanellis, supra, held that the doctrine
of contributory negligence applies in the context of an
insured's failure to read an insurance contract.  A discussion
of these cases is helpful.
In Kanellis, Gus and Maria Kanellis engaged the service
of an insurance agent to obtain from an insurance company
automobile insurance for their vehicle.  The agent was able to
24
1180996
secure automobile insurance for the Kanellises' vehicle, a
2001 Porsche 911 valued at $121,000.  It is undisputed that
the 
Kanellises 
did 
not 
read 
the 
insurance 
policy. 
Subsequently, the Kanellises' vehicle was damaged, and they
filed a claim.  The insurance company paid to repair the
Kanellises' vehicle, but the insurance company did not pay for
the alleged diminution of the overall value of the vehicle as
a result of the repaired damage.  The Kanellises' insurance
policy did not provide for such coverage.  Accordingly, the
Kanellises sued the agent, among others, asserting a claim of
negligent procurement of insurance.  The trial court ruled in
favor of the Kanellises.
On appeal, the agent argued that the Kanellises had been
contributorily negligent based on their failure to read the
insurance policy and to understand the specific coverages and
limits set forth in the policy.  The agent argued:
"[H]ad the Kanellises read their policy, they would
have been placed on notice that the ... policy
procured for them by [the agent] did not provide
coverage for diminution in value resulting from a
covered loss.  Therefore, argue[s] [the agent], the
Kanellises' failure to discover that the ... policy
did 
not 
provide 
coverage 
for 
consequential
diminution in their Porsche's value resulting from
a 
covered 
collision 
amounts 
to 
contributory
negligence as a matter of law."
25
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Kanellis, 917 So. 2d at 154.  The Court of Civil Appeals
agreed.  The Court of Civil Appeals stated:
"Foremost [Insurance Co. v. Parham, 693 So. 2d 409
(Ala. 1997),] describes Hickox [v. Stover, 551 So.
2d 259 (Ala. 1989),] as having altered the law so as
to 'eliminate[] the general duty on the part of a
person to read the documents received in connection
with a particular transaction.' Foremost, 693 So. 2d
at 421. As Foremost indicates, the abrogation of
that general duty in Hickox was a 'deviat[ion] from
this State's public policy' (id.); moreover, that
abrogation undercut the legal basis for the
presumption that 'a person receiving a written
instrument in the transaction of business, as, for
example, the ... recipient of an insurance policy,
is acquainted with its contents.' 31A C.J.S.
Evidence § 192 (1996) (footnotes omitted); see also
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Shapiro, 270 Ala. 149,
155, 117 So. 2d 348, 354 (1960) (if an insurance
policy is accepted by the insured, the insured is
bound thereby despite divergence from preliminary
negotiations, because 'an insured is presumed to be
familiar with the provisions of his policy').
Post-Foremost, it is again the law that '[a]n
insured who is competent in intelligence and
background to understand insurance policy language
is charged with knowledge of language in a policy
received by that insured.' Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Ware, 824 So. 2d 739, 745 (Ala. 2002)."
917 So. 2d at 154.
With the above principles established, the Court of Civil
Appeals determined that the Kanellises' insurance policy did
not provide coverage for a diminution of the value of the
vehicle as a result of a covered loss.  Moreover, the Court of
26
1180996
Civil Appeals stated that "the Kanellises adduced no evidence
that would tend to indicate that they were anything less than
'competent in intelligence and background to understand
insurance policy language.'  Allstate Ins. Co. [v. Ware], 824
So. 2d [739] at 745 [(Ala. 2002)]."  Kanellis, 917 So. 2d at
155.  Finally, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded 
"that in light of the clear language of the ...
policy issued to the Kanellises, the record is
susceptible only to the conclusion that, as a matter
of law, the Kanellises '"put [themselves] in
danger's way"' and had a '"conscious appreciation of
the danger"' of suffering a monetary loss in the
event 
of 
a 
collision 
involving 
the 
Porsche
automobile resulting in a diminution of the value of
the Porsche. See Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry,
Inc., 840 So. 2d 839, 860 (Ala. 2002)."
Kanellis, 917 So. 2d at 155.
This Court relied upon Kanellis in Colza.  In Colza,
Dante Colza submitted an application for a life-insurance
policy to an insurance company, naming his wife, Kimberly
Colza, as the beneficiary of the applied-for policy.  An agent
of 
the 
insurance 
company 
helped 
Dante 
complete 
the
application.  Upon completion of the application, the
insurance 
company 
provided 
Dante 
with 
documents 
that 
indicated
that several conditions had to be met before the life-
insurance policy went into effect.  It is undisputed that the
27
1180996
conditions were not met before Dante's death; the insurance
company, accordingly, did not pay Kimberly the 
benefit defined
in the life-insurance policy.  Kimberly sued the insurance
company and the agent, asserting, among other things, a claim
of negligent procurement.  The trial court ruled in favor of
Kimberly on this claim, and the agent appealed.
Before this Court, the agent, relying upon Kanellis,
argued that, regardless of whether he was negligent in
procuring 
the 
life-insurance 
policy, 
the Colzas 
were
contributorily negligent because they failed to read the
relevant documents and to meet the requirements for the life-
insurance policy to go into effect clearly set forth therein. 
This Court summarized and relied upon Kanellis:
"In ... Kanellis, ... the Court of Civil Appeals
held that an insurance agency and its agent were
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the
plaintiffs' negligent-procurement claim because the
insurance policy issued to the plaintiffs clearly
stated the extent of the coverage provided by the
issued policy and the plaintiffs should have
therefore been aware that the policy did not provide
the coverage they subsequently alleged that the
insurance agent failed to procure. 917 So. 2d at
154–55. Thus, the Court of Civil Appeals reasoned,
a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of
law was warranted for the following reason:
"'[I]n light of the clear language of the
[insurance] 
policy 
issued 
to 
the
28
1180996
Kanellises, the record is susceptible only
to the conclusion that, as a matter of law,
the 
Kanellises 
"'put 
[themselves] 
in
danger's way'" and had a "'conscious
appreciation of the danger'" of suffering
a 
monetary 
loss 
[if 
the 
event 
the
Kanellises allege they sought insurance to
protect themselves from occurred].'
"917 So. 2d at 155. Applying Kanellis to the facts
of 
this 
case, 
[the 
agent] 
argues 
that 
the
[documents] apprised the Colzas that there was no
guarantee of immediate coverage based on Dante's
application for coverage and that they accordingly
should have had a conscious appreciation of the
danger they faced if Dante died before a completed
policy issued."
Colza, 159 So. 3d at 1249-50.  This Court concluded:
"The documents in this case clearly apprised the
Colzas that Dante was not guaranteed immediate
coverage upon submitting his application for life
insurance to [the agent]. By not reading the
documents, they took a risk and put themselves in
danger's way. We do not think it unreasonable to
conclude as a matter of law that, in this day and
age, any adult of sound mind capable of executing a
contract necessarily has a conscious appreciation of
the 
risk 
associated 
with 
ignoring 
documents
containing essential terms and conditions related to
the transaction that is the subject of the contract.9
Thus, we agree with the rationale of the Court of
Civil Appeals in Kanellis and hold that, because the
Colzas '"'put [themselves] in danger's way'" and had
a "'conscious appreciation of the danger'" of
suffering a monetary loss,' Kanellis, 917 So. 2d at
155, in the event Dante died before the conditions
for 
immediate 
coverage 
were 
met, 
any
negligent-procurement 
claim 
is 
barred 
by 
the
doctrine of contributory negligence.
29
1180996
"____________________
"9Indeed, it would seem more unreasonable to
allow plaintiffs to prevail on negligent-procurement
claims in spite of their failure to read documents
that put them on notice of the extent of their
insurance coverage when that same failure to read
already bars a fraud or breach-of-contract claim
based on the same essential facts. See, e.g.,
Locklear Dodge City, Inc. v. Kimbrell, 703 So. 2d
303, 306 (Ala. 1997) ('[The plaintiff] is capable of
reading; she simply chose not to read this contract
because her husband was ill and because she trusted
[the defendant]. In light of these factors, it is
understandable that [she] might choose not to read
the contract before signing it. She took a risk.
However, [she] should not be excused from her
contractual responsibilities because she took that
risk. To hold otherwise would turn the concept of
"sanctity of contract" upside down.'). See also
Nance v. Southerland, 79 So. 3d 612, 619 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2010) (recognizing that 'a party capable of
reading 
and 
understanding 
English 
given 
the
opportunity to review an insurance application
cannot avoid the legal consequences of signing that
document, indicating his or her assent to its terms
on the basis that he or she did not read it').
Nothing in the evidence established that Dante
requested to review the application and that Morris
denied him that opportunity."
Colza, 159 So. 3d at 1252-53.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Crook did not
read the policy or the numerous policy-renewal notices sent to
him from 2006 to 2015 that explicitly set forth the policy
limits and explicitly requested that he read them.  Had he
done so, Crook would have discovered that the policy limit for
30
1180996
Coverage B was only $11,455 and could have, had he desired,
requested additional coverage.  Crook failed to do so and,
thus, "'"put [himself] in danger's way"' and had a '"conscious
appreciation of the danger"' of suffering a monetary loss." 
Kanellis, 917 So. 2d at 155.  Crook was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law.
Crook argues that "his failure to review his policy
limits is irrelevant because nothing in the coverage limits
informed Crook of how Allstate Indemnity classified [the] deck
[and the boat dock]."  Crook's brief, p. 53.  Essentially,
Crook argues that he could not have been contributorily
negligent for failing to read the policy because, he says, the
policy did not indicate whether Coverage A or Coverage B
applied to the deck and the boat dock.  However, as explained
above, the plain language of the policy indicates that
Coverage B applies to the deck and the boat dock because those
structures are not attached to the dwelling.  Crook's argument
is not convincing.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's summary
judgment in favor of Allstate Indemnity and The Barker Agency
31
1180996
as to Crook's negligence claim against Allstate Indemnity and
The Barker Agency.6
Next, Crook argues that the circuit court erred in
granting Allstate Indemnity's summary-judgment motion as to
his estoppel claim.  In his estoppel claim, Crook alleged that
Allstate Indemnity is estopped from taking a position
inconsistent with its February 23, 2015, correspondence with
Crook.  In the February 23, 2015, letter, which is set forth
in full above, Crook was informed that an inspection of the
property had been completed and that no issues had been
discovered impacting his current coverage.  The 
letter further
expressly stated that the "inspection of [the] property [was]
limited. It focused only on identifying certain types of
hazards or conditions that might impact [Crook's] future
insurance coverage."  According to Crook, he relied upon the
February 23, 2015, letter as a representation from Allstate
6Crook 
argues 
that 
the 
doctrine 
of 
contributory 
negligence
is not available to The Barker Agency because, in its internal
records, The Barker Agency had noted that there were only two
"other structures," the bathhouse and the garage.  However,
there is nothing indicating that that information was ever
communicated to Crook or that he relied upon that information. 
Further, Crook provides no analysis or authority indicating
that that fact strips The Barker Agency of its ability to
argue that Crook was contributorily negligent.  Crook's
argument is not supported by authority and is not convincing.
32
1180996
Indemnity that the insurance limits of his policy were
adequate.  Crook claims that Allstate Indemnity could not,
after making such an assertion in the February 23, 2015,
letter, later refuse to provide coverage under Coverage A for
the damage to the deck and the boat dock.
Crook's argument in this regard before this Court is very
brief.  Crook cites authority to indicate that the doctrine of
estoppel applies "against an insurer to preclude the insurer
from denying coverage in a case where the insurance policy
issued by the insurer did not cover the claim of the insured
but where the insurer's agent mistakenly thought and
represented that there was coverage at the time of the policy
issuance."  Crook's brief, pp. 60-61 (citing Fidelity & Cas.
Co. of New York v. Watts Realty Co., 500 So. 2d 1126 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1986)).  After setting forth that authority, Crook's
entire argument is as follows:  "Crook's estoppel claim arises
from the February 23, 2015, letter ... that told Crook that
his property inspection had been completed and that 'we did
not find any issues that impact your current coverage.'" 
Crook's brief, p. 62.  Crook gives no further explanation of
his argument.
33
1180996
Crook's argument does not demonstrate reversible error on
the part of the circuit court.  First, Crook does not even set
forth the legal standard for demonstrating estoppel that he is
required to present on appeal.  Second, no assurance was made
in the February 23, 2015, letter that the insurance limits of
Coverage B would cover all possible damage to his deck and/or
boat dock.  In fact, Allstate Indemnity sent Crook notices
every year with the actual insurance limits of Coverage B and
specifically asked him to read them, which he admittedly never
did.  Allstate Indemnity very clearly informed Crook of his
policy limits; Crook simply chose ignorance.  
Crook's argument
does not satisfy Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.,7 and is not
based on the complete factual picture of this case. 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's summary judgment in
favor of Allstate Indemnity as to Crook's estoppel claim.
Lastly, Crook argues that the circuit court erred in
granting 
Allstate 
Insurance's 
summary-judgment 
motion. 
Crook's claims against Allstate Insurance are the same as
7Rule 28(a)(10) requires that an appellant present "[a]n
argument 
containing 
the 
contentions 
of 
the
appellant/petitioner with 
respect 
to 
the 
issues 
presented, 
and
the reasons therefor, with citations to the cases, statutes,
other authorities, and parts of the record relied on."
34
1180996
those against Allstate Indemnity and The Barker Agency; in
fact, the circuit court incorporated its February 27, 2019,
order granting Allstate Indemnity's and The Barker Agency's
summary-judgment motions into its order granting Allstate
Insurance's summary-judgment motion.  We have provided
extensive analysis of Crook's arguments explaining that the
plain language of the policy indicates that 
Allstate Indemnity
properly applied Coverage B to the damage to the deck and the
boat dock, that Crook was contributorily negligent, and that
the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to bar Allstate
Indemnity from providing coverage under Coverage B.  Crook
raises no new theory of breach of contract, negligence, or
estoppel against Allstate Insurance; he simply argues that
Allstate Insurance is also liable because Smith, an employee
of Allstate Insurance, determined that Coverage B, 
rather than
Coverage A, applied to the damage to the deck and the boat
dock and because Allstate Insurance's name was on the
February 23, 2015, letter, which forms the basis of his
estoppel claim.  However, as thoroughly explained above, Crook
has failed to demonstrate that the circuit court erred in any
respect.  Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we
35
1180996
affirm the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of
Allstate Insurance.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's
summary judgment in favor of Allstate Indemnity, The Barker
Agency, and Allstate Insurance.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, and
Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Shaw and Stewart, JJ., concur in the result.
36