Case Title: Marraccini v. Ryan, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 115  
Anthony Marraccini,
            Appellant,
        v.
John Ryan, et al.,
            Respondents,
et al.,    
            Defendants.
Jonathan D. Kraut, for appellant.
Robert A. Brodsky, for respondents.
SMITH, J.:
We hold that a licensed home improvement contractor who
enters into a contract using a name other than the one on his
license is not barred from enforcing the contract unless the
other party is deceived or otherwise prejudiced by the misnomer.
Plaintiff, Anthony Marraccini, filed a certificate with
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No. 115
the clerk of Westchester County on May 19, 1993, saying that he
was transacting business under the name "Coastal Construction
Development."  The following day, Marraccini applied to the
Westchester County Department of Consumer Protection for a home
improvement license.  He designated his ownership as
"Individual," but wrote "Coastal Construction Development" after
"Name of Company," and did not fill in the blank for a "D/B/A"
name.  After "Name of Applicant (President or Owner)" he wrote
"Anthony Marraccini."  The license was issued to Coastal
Construction Development.  Marraccini's own name does not appear
on the license, but it is undisputed that Marraccini and Coastal
are not separate legal entities.  Thus Marraccini was personally
licensed to do a home improvement business, though under a name
other than his own. 
Eleven years later, in 2004, Marraccini did
construction, rehabilitation and maintenance work for defendants,
John and Pam Ryan.  In dealing with the Ryans, Marraccini used
his own name, not Coastal Construction Development.  The record
does not show why he did not use the company name, but there is
no indication that he was trying to or did deceive the Ryans.  It
is undisputed that, if the Ryans had gone to the Department of
Consumer Protection website and searched for "Anthony
Marraccini," they would have found his license, which was indexed
under both names.
After the work was done, a dispute arose between
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No. 115
Marraccini and the Ryans over whether he had been fully paid, and
Marraccini brought this lawsuit against them.  The Ryans moved
for summary judgment on the ground, among others, that Marraccini
was not licensed to do home improvement business in his
individual name.  Supreme Court denied the motion, but the
Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint,
observing that, by doing business in his own name and not the
name on his license, Marraccini violated Westchester County
Administrative Code § 863.319 (1) (b).  We granted leave to
appeal, and now reverse.
Marraccini may indeed have violated section 863.319 (1)
(b) of the County Code, which says in relevant part: "It shall be
a violation to . . . [c]onduct a home improvement business in any
name other than the one in which the person is licensed."  The
Code provides civil and criminal penalties, not to exceed $1,000,
for such a violation (Westchester County Code §§ 277.171 [1],
277.181).  Repeat violators may incur larger fines, and
imprisonment for up to 15 days (id.).  The County Code does not,
however, say that a violator is barred from bringing suit under a
contract entered into under the wrong name.  The question here is
whether New York common law imposes such a sanction.
We conclude that it does not.  The forfeiture of the
right to be paid for work done is an excessive penalty for what
seems to have been an inadvertent and harmless violation of the
County Code.  The case would be different if Marraccini had no
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No. 115
license at all.  B & F Bldg. Corp. v Liebig (76 NY2d 689, 693
[1990]) holds that a contractor who was unlicensed at the time a
contract was executed or work performed may not maintain a cause
of action.  We see no reason, however, to extend the strict rule
of B & F Bldg. Corp. to the much less serious violation at issue
here.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division,
insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, with costs, and
defendants' motion for summary judgment denied.
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Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed, with costs, and
defendants' motion for summary judgment denied.  Opinion by Judge
Smith.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read,
Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided June 2, 2011
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