Case Title: LUCKY GATE RANCH, L.L.C., a Wyoming Limited Liability Company V. BAKER & ASSOCIATES, INC., a Nebraska Corporation, and JOHN T. BAKER, an individual

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0096

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
LUCKY GATE RANCH, L.L.C., a Wyoming Limited Liability Company V. BAKER & ASSOCIATES, INC., a Nebraska Corporation, and JOHN T. BAKER, an individual2009 WY 69208 P.3d 57Case Number: S-08-0096Decided: 05/28/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
LUCKY 
GATE RANCH, L.L.C., a Wyoming Limited Liability Company,

 
 
Appellant

 
 
(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
BAKER 
& ASSOCIATES, INC., a Nebraska Corporation, and JOHN T. BAKER, an 
individual,

 
 
Appellees

 
 
(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

 
 
The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Lucas 
Buckley, Matthew Kaufman, and Michael Rosenthal, Hathaway & Kunz, PC, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Buckley.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

 
 
Richard 
Mincer and Lindsay Woznick, Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Woznick.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C., filed suit against Appellees, John Baker, and Baker 
and Associates, Inc., ("Baker"), seeking damages resulting from Baker's failure 
to provide engineering and surveying services.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Baker finding that the litigation was not commenced within 
the statute of limitations mandated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-107 (LexisNexis 2007).  Lucky Gate challenges that 
decision.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Lucky 
Gate states the issues presented for our review as 
follows:

 
 
1.   Whether the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees based on an alleged failure to 
timely file suit.

 
 
      a.   Whether the cause of action accrued 
and suit was filed within the applicable statute of limitations 
period.

 
 
      b.   Whether the district court erred in 
determining that equitable estoppel does not bar Appellees' statute of 
limitations arguments.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Baker 
is a Nebraska corporation that provides engineering and surveying services.  John Baker is an officer of Baker and is 
a civil engineer licensed as a Professional Engineer by the Wyoming Board of 
Registration for Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors.  Lucky Gate engages in farming and 
ranching operations in Goshen County, Wyoming.  Historically, Lucky Gate has farmed 
corn, alfalfa, and soy beans using flood irrigation supplied by a water right in 
Horse Creek.  To make more efficient 
use of its water, Lucky Gate wanted to switch from flood irrigation to a center 
pivot sprinkler system and offset some of the costs of that switch by 
participating in the federal government's Environmental Quality Incentives 
Program, under which part of the cost of conversion would be paid for by the 
Department of Agriculture.  This 
conversion required authorization from the Wyoming State Engineer to change the 
point of use.  

 
 

[¶4]        
Lucky 
Gate hired Baker to perform a land survey and to prepare the materials required 
to change the point of use.  Lucky 
Gate entered into a written contract with Baker on March 29, 2004.  According to the terms of the written 
contract, the parties agreed that:

 
 

Deliverables: 
Upon completion of this project, Baker & Associates will provide the Client 
the following:

 
 
a.         
A map suitable for submission to the Wyoming State Engineer's Office. 
(Exhibit)

 
 
b.         
Property corners marked in accordance with State Law and corner records 
will be filed at the County Court House.  
(Note: This survey requires the subdivision of Sections 30 and 31 and the 
location of canal easements)

 
 
c.         
A petition for the State Engineer's Office to change the point of use. 
(Exhibit)

 
 
 . . .

 
 

Scheduling: 
The above-described Scope of Work will be completed within 30 working days from 
authorization to proceed. . . .

 
 

Baker 
estimated the total cost for this project to be between two and five thousand 
dollars.  Baker began the project 
shortly after the agreement was signed.  
On April 24, 2004, Lucky Gate received a bill from Baker in the amount of 
$1,326.40.  Lucky Gate paid the bill 
in full.  Although the contract 
required Baker to provide Lucky Gate a "map suitable for submission to the 
Wyoming State Engineer's Office" and a "petition 
for the State Engineer's Office to change the point of use," it is undisputed 
that Baker never provided those documents to Lucky Gate.  Instead, Baker told Lucky Gate that it 
had submitted the documents directly to the State Engineer's Office.  Throughout the summer, Lucky Gate asked 
Baker about the status of the application.  
Baker repeatedly assured Lucky Gate that a decision from the State 
Engineer's Office would be forthcoming in the near future.  As time passed with no action, Lucky 
Gate became increasingly concerned and, in the fall of 2004, contacted the State 
Engineer's Office directly to determine the status of the application.  They were told that no application had 
been filed.

 
 

[¶5]        
When 
confronted, Baker did not deny that it had failed to submit the 
application.  Baker assured Lucky 
Gate that the point of use would be changed in time for the 2005 growing 
season.  In an apparent attempt to 
fulfill their obligation to Lucky Gate, Baker hired High Plains of Wyoming to 
complete the project.  High Plains 
submitted an invoice to Baker, dated February 18, 2005, for $3,609.67 for the 
work it had performed through that date.  Baker forwarded the invoice to Lucky Gate 
with an accompanying letter dated March 1, 2005.  The letter stated:

 
 
The 
work has been completed on the above listed project and a final bill from High 
Plains of Wyoming is enclosed along with a copy of the invoice from us, which 
has been paid.

 
 
In 
the agreement that was between Baker & Associates and . . . 
Lucky Gate Ranch the fee would be between $2,000 and $5,000.  As you will see Baker & 
Associates['] bill which has been paid was in the amount of $1,326.40 and the 
invoice from High Plains of Wyoming is for the amount of $3,609.67 these two 
figures add up to $4,936.07.  We 
would ask that you forward your payment [directly] to High Plains of 
Wyoming.

 
 

[¶6]        
On 
March 3, 2005, Lucky Gate's attorney sent Baker two letters.  The first letter generally requested more 
specifics regarding the work performed by High Plains and reflected in its 
invoice.  The second letter stated, 
in relevant part:

 
 
This 
letter is to put you on notice that by failing to timely complete its work, as 
required by its contract with Lucky Gate, Baker & Associates has caused 
Lucky Gate at least a year's delay in relocating its use of irrigation 
water.  Because the 2005 crop year 
is just beginning, we do not know if Baker & Associates' breach of contract 
will damage Lucky Gate, and result in a claim. . . .  [I]f 2005 is not an unusually wet year, 
there is a good chance that such damages will occur. . . .  At the appropriate time, we will notify 
you if damages have occurred, and the extent of any such 
damages.

 
 
In 
a letter to Lucky Gate's counsel dated March 24, 2005, Baker requested 
additional detail "as to how exactly these future damages' may be incurred and 
why."  On April 5, 2005, Lucky 
Gate's counsel, by letter, responded that possible damages included the 
difference between the receipts from the sale of the actual 2005 crop and the 
receipts from what the 2005 crop would have been if the new irrigation system 
had been used.  The letter also 
raised the possibility of an increase in the purchase price of the irrigation 
equipment between the expected and actual install dates.  On April 7, 2005, Baker sent Lucky Gate 
itemized invoices for High Plains' work.  On May 5, 2005, Lucky Gate's attorney 
sent Baker the following letter:

 
 
[Lucky 
Gate] has reviewed the itemized invoices that you sent to me with your letter of 
April 7, 2005.  It appears to [Lucky 
Gate], and I agree, that High Plains of Wyoming had to duplicate all of the work 
that your firm did on the project.  
This was not the fault of Lucky Gate Ranch, LLC, but solely the fault of 
your firm.

 
 
[Lucky 
Gate] tells me that [it] has already paid $1,326.40 to your firm, and Lucky Gate 
is therefore entitled to a refund of that amount.  Rather than have you send a refund, 
however, [Lucky Gate] is going to deduct the $1,326.40 from High Plains' bill of 
$3,609.66, and pay $2,283.26 to High Plains.  With this letter, we request that you 
pay the remaining $1,326.40 of High Plains' invoice directly to High 
Plains.  After that payment, all 
future charges, if any, from High Plains will be paid directly by Lucky Gate to 
High Plains. 

 
 
In 
response, Baker sent Lucky Gate the following letter dated May 10, 2005, 
accompanied by a check for $1,326.40:

 
 
We 
received your letter dated May 5, 2005 in regards to the detailed invoices 
provided to you.  As you are aware, 
when the original contract between Lucky Gate, LCC and Baker and Associates was 
signed in 2004 we had a licensed Wyoming Surveyor . . . on staff, and shortly 
after initiation of this contract [he] ceased to work for Baker & 
Associates.  All work to that point 
was turned over to High Plains of Wyoming.  
Their ability to turn around or convey our work to that point into a 
final petition is beyond our control.  
We made a good faith effort to complete the terms of our agreement by 
soliciting the services of High Plains to complete services we could not . . . 
provide based on [our] current staff.  
We recommend that any further services be handled directly with High 
Plains of Wyoming or another firm.

 
 
We 
regret that this endeavor did not work out as we had intended and we regret any 
shortcomings that resulted as a result of [the surveyor]'s actions.  Because of the current situation and 
dissatisfaction of our services we have enclosed a check for the amount 
requested in your letter, $1,326.40.  
We hope you understand that we have made every effort to try to comply 
with the terms of our Agreement but because of circumstances and work completed 
by others to this point we feel that there is little more that we can 
do.

 
 
The 
record does not reveal when this letter was received by Lucky 
Gate.

 
 

[¶7]        
Meanwhile, 
High Plains sent Baker a letter dated May 11, 2005.  The letter stated that "the research 
documentation High Plains of Wyoming received at the beginning of the project 
[was] not adequate to prepare the proper documentation."  High Plains informed Baker that 
completing the project would require starting over again, and that doing so was 
not cost effective.  The letter also 
cited undisclosed "billing problems."  
Baker did not forward this letter to Lucky Gate.  Lucky Gate discovered that High Plains 
had withdrawn from the project on or about June 28, 2005 during a telephone 
conversation with High Plains.  High 
Plains told Lucky Gate that the data from Baker's work was not acceptable for 
submission to the State Engineer's Office, that the project had been "left 
hanging" by Baker, that the original cost estimate by Baker was too low given 
the nature of the project, and that the work done by Baker up to that time had 
no value.  Later, upon 
recommendation from High Plains, Lucky Gate contacted another individual for 
assistance with the application to the State Engineer's Office.  A new application to change the point of 
use for the water rights was prepared and submitted to the State Engineer's 
Office in December 2005.  The 
application was approved in February 2006.

 
 

[¶8]        
On 
May 11, 2007, Lucky Gate filed suit.  Baker moved for summary judgment based 
upon its contention that Lucky Gate failed to commence the action within the 
applicable limitation period.  Lucky 
Gate resisted the motion.  It 
contended that the limitation period had not elapsed, and alternatively asserted 
that Baker should be estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a 
defense.  The court granted the 
motion for summary judgment stating the reasons for its ruling in a decision 
letter.  The court 
determined:

 
 
Without 
question, by May 5, 2005, Lucky Gate knew it had a claim against Baker and that 
it had suffered at least $1,326.40 in damages.  The statute of limitations . . . would 
have run from at least May 5, 2005.  
Lucky Gate argues that it did not know all of its damages until later, 
and that it later discovered more detail about Baker's failure to properly 
perform the work.  Neither of these 
facts, even if true, prevent[s] the statute of limitations from beginning on May 
5, 2005.  Lucky Gate filed this case 
on May 11, 2007, more than 2 years after May 5, 2005.  Based on the undisputed facts, Lucky 
Gate failed to file its case within the time allowed . . . . 

 
 
(Paragraph 
breaks omitted.)  Regarding Lucky 
Gate's assertion of equitable estoppel, the court 
concluded:

 
 
Although 
Baker's total failure to meet its contractual and professional responsibility is 
incredibly egregious, such conduct does not support estoppel.  Lucky Gate knew it had a claim against 
Baker, knew some of its damages, and failed to file suit within the statute of 
limitations.  Nothing in the 
evidence indicates that Baker induced that delay after May 5, 2005.  Estoppel does not 
apply.

 
 
An 
order granting Baker's motion for summary judgment was entered on April 8, 
2008.  Lucky Gate 
appealed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶9]        
"Because 
summary judgment involves a purely legal determination, we undertake de novo review of a trial court's 
summary judgment decision."  Jacobs Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal 
Co., 2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 129 (Wyo. 2008).  Our standard for determining if summary 
judgment was properly granted is well settled.

 
 
Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c). Accord, e.g., Jacobs Ranch Coal 
Co., ¶ 8, 191 P.3d  at 128; Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).  "A 
genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, 
would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense 
that the parties have asserted." Id.  We view the record in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment and give that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the record. 
E.g., Stevens v. Elk Run 
Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 2004 WY 63, ¶ 11, 90 P.3d 1162, 1165 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 

Hull 
v. D'Arcy, 
2009 WY 30, ¶ 7, 202 P.3d 417, 420 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Statute 
of Limitations

 
 

[¶10]     
Lucky 
Gate filed its complaint on May 11, 2007.  
The district court determined that Lucky Gate's claim was barred by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107.  Lucky Gate 
agrees that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 is the relevant statute of limitations but 
contends that its cause of action accrued on or after May 11, 2005 and that its 
complaint was timely filed within the two-year limitation period provided by 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107.1  

 
 

[¶11]     
The 
district court, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lucky 
Gate, described Baker's failure to meet its professional and contractual 
obligation as "incredibly egregious."  
The existence of a potentially meritorious claim, however, does not 
prevent dismissal of an untimely lawsuit. 

 
 
Statutes 
of limitation have long been a part of the jurisprudence of the United States, 
all its states and the State of Wyoming.  
They are pragmatic devices to save courts from stale claim litigation and 
spare citizens from having to defend when memories have faded, witnesses are 
unavailable by death or disappearance and evidence is lost.  Statutes of limitation are arbitrary by 
their very nature and do not discriminate between the just and unjust 
claim.  They are not judicially made 
but represent legislative and public policy controlling the right to litigate. . 
. . The statutes operate against even the most meritorious of claims and courts 
have no right to deny their application. . . .  When considering the statute of 
limitations, the nature of injury, its extent, the amount of money damages 
involved, social considerations, and the emotional appeal the facts may have 
must pass to the background.  The 
circumstances are only significant in the bearing they may have on where the 
cause of action arose, when it arose and when the time expired for pursuing the 
applicable judicial remedy.

 
 

Duke 
v. Housen, 
589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1979).  

 
 

[¶12]     
Lucky 
Gate contends that the limitation period could not have started before May 11, 
2005, because none of the damages that it sought in its complaint had occurred 
by that time.  In its complaint, 
Lucky Gate sought the following damages: 1) Increased costs for the purchase and 
installation of the center pivot sprinkler system, due to the lengthy delay in 
purchasing the center pivot sprinkler system; 2) Lost income from crop loss 
and/or substantially diminished crop production due to an inability to use the 
center pivot irrigation during one or more growing seasons; and, 3) Other 
damages to be proven at trial.  
Essentially, Lucky Gate contends that its cause of action did not accrue 
until after the 2005 growing season had been completed.  Lucky Gate argues that its cause of 
action is not time barred under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 until two years from 
that date.  We disagree for two 
reasons.  First, pursuant to the 
plain language of the statute, Lucky Gate's cause of action is time barred if 
not commenced within two years of the "act, error or omission" giving rise to 
the cause of action.  Second, if the 
two-year time limit starts to run upon "accrual" of the cause of action, Lucky 
Gate's claim is still time barred because the cause of action accrued on or 
before May 5, 2005.

 
 

[¶13]     
It 
is undisputed that the contract obligated Baker to perform its services within 
30 working days and that time period would have ended in May 2004.2  The contract required Baker to conduct a 
survey and mark property corners, to file the corner records at the "County 
Court house," to provide Lucky Gate with a map suitable for submission to the 
State Engineer's Office, and to provide Lucky Gate with a petition for the State 
Engineer's Office to change the point of use.  It does not appear that Baker met any of 
its contractual obligations.  It is 
undisputed that Baker never provided Lucky Gate with the petition to change the 
point of use.  The record suggests 
that Lucky Gate may have been initially unaware of Baker's non-performance 
because Baker assured Lucky Gate that the petition had been filed with the State 
Engineer's Office.  It is 
undisputed, however, that Lucky Gate learned from the State Engineer's Office in 
the fall of 2004 that the petition had not been filed.

 
 

[¶14]     
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107  states, in 
pertinent part:

 
 
(a)       A cause of 
action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or 
certified professional or health care services shall be brought within the 
greater of the following times:

 
 
(i)         
Within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, 
except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years 
after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can 
establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

 
 
(A)       Not 
reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

 
 
(B)       The 
claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two 
(2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

 
 
. 
. .

 
 
(iv)       If under 
Paragraph (i) or (ii) of this subsection, the alleged act, error or omission is 
discovered during the second year of the two (2) year period from the date of 
the act, error or omission, the period for commencing a lawsuit shall be 
extended by six (6) months.

 
 
Based 
upon the plain language of the statute, unless an exception applies, a lawsuit 
must be commenced "[w]ithin two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-107(a)(i).  Lucky Gate's cause 
of action in this case is premised upon Baker's failure to fulfill its 
contractual obligations.  Paragraphs 
35 and 36 of the complaint are illustrative:

 
 
35.       Defendants 
did, by their acts and omissions, breach the contract as set forth above, by 
failing to timely and professionally complete the survey and submit it with the 
appropriate paperwork to the SEO.  
In so doing, Defendants failed to exercise professional care that met the 
accepted standard of care that would be observed by professional engineers, 
professional land surveyors, and engineering and surveying corporations, in the 
same line of practice.  Accordingly, 
Defendants' breach of the contract constituted a violation of the duty of care 
owed to Lucky Gate.

 
 
36.       Defendants' 
breach of the terms of the Contract and the resulting professional negligence 
was the proximate cause of the damages incurred by Lucky Gate, as set forth 
under "DAMAGES," below.

 
 

[¶15]     
The 
"act, error or omission" that provides the basis for Lucky Gate's cause of 
action is the breach of contract that occurred in May 2004.  Lucky Gate learned definitively, in the 
fall of 2004, that Baker had not submitted the petition to the State Engineer's 
Office.  Based upon the plain 
language of the statute, Lucky Gate's claim was barred when litigation was not 
commenced within two years of the contractual breach.  The limitation period would have expired 
in May 2006.  From a practical 
perspective, the fact that Lucky Gate learned in the fall of 2004 that the 
petition had not been filed with the State Engineer's Office does not change the 
expiration date of the limitation period.  
If the alleged "act, error or omission" was discovered in the second 
year, "the period for commencing a lawsuit shall be extended by six (6) 
months."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-107(a)(iv).  Because Lucky Gate 
discovered the breach in the first year, however, the limitation period is still 
measured from "the date of the alleged act, error or omission."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-107(a)(i).

 
 

[¶16]     
Lucky 
Gate asserts that its cause of action did not accrue until it incurred damages 
related to the 2005 growing season.  
Even if we considered that time to be the date of discovery, under the 
plain language of the statute, the time to file suit would only have been 
extended for an additional six months from the "act, error or omission."  If the cause of action had been 
discovered in the second year, the limitation period would have expired in 
November 2006 (two years and six months from May 2004).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(iv).  The statute also provides an extended 
limitation period when the cause of action was not "reasonably discoverable" or 
not discovered within the two-year period "despite the exercise of due 
diligence."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-107(a)(i)(A),(B).  Lucky Gate 
does not claim that the statutory exception applies here.

 
 

[¶17]     
Lucky 
Gate contends that the limitation period set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 
does not begin until the cause of action "accrues," rather than the date of the 
act, error or omission.  According 
to Lucky Gate, the cause of action did not accrue until it had incurred damages 
related to the 2005 growing season.  
Under this approach, Lucky Gate asserts that the limitation period would 
not have expired until sometime in the summer or fall of 2007, and the May 11, 
2007 filing of the complaint was timely.  
Baker asserts that the cause of action had accrued, at the latest, by May 
5, 2005 when Lucky Gate's attorney demanded reimbursement for the $1,326.40 
paid to Baker.

 
 

[¶18]     
In 
conducting a statute of limitations analysis, determination of the date when a 
cause of action has accrued is often conclusive.  Many statutes specifically state that 
litigation must be commenced within a specific timeframe after the cause of 
action accrues.  For example, a 
claim for the recovery of real property must be brought "within ten (10) years 
after the cause of such action accrues."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-103.  
The date when the cause of action accrues also starts the applicable 
limitation periods for actions founded upon breach of contract, fraud, personal 
injury and a myriad of other claims.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105.  

 
 

[¶19]     
We 
note at the outset, that the term "accrues" does not appear in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-107.  The omission of that term 
is potentially significant.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-102 provides: "Civil actions can only be commenced within the 
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action accrues, but where 
a different limitation is prescribed by statute, that shall govern."  It appears from a plain reading of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 that the time for filing suit is governed by the date when 
the "act, error or omission" occurs, rather than the date when the cause of 
action accrues.  The result in this 
case, however, does not change if the limitation period begins on the date when 
the cause of action accrues.3

 
 

[¶20]     
A 
cause of action accrues for statute of limitation purposes when all elements of 
the cause of action are present, including damages.  McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 979 
(Wyo. 1999).  As it relates to the 
damage element of the cause of action, the limitation period begins when the 
injured party knows or reasonably ought to know that some damage has resulted 
from the wrongful act.  Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 337 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 
As 
a general rule, where an injury, although slight, is sustained in consequence of 
the wrongful act of another, and the law affords a remedy therefor, the statute 
of limitations attaches at once. It is not required that all the damages 
resulting from the act shall have been sustained at that time, and the running 
of the statute is not postponed by the fact that the actual or substantial 
damages do not occur until a later date. The act itself is regarded as the 
ground of the action, and is not legally severable from its consequences. 

 
 

Duke, 
589 P.2d  at 343.

 
 

[¶21]     
Unquestionably, 
Lucky Gate knew on May 5, 2005, at the latest, that it had incurred damages as a 
result of Baker's failure to perform.  
Its attorney, on that date, demanded a refund of the $1,326.40 that Lucky 
Gate had previously paid Baker.  
Unquestionably, as of that date, Lucky Gate had discovered the wrongful 
conduct and was aware that it had been damaged.  The statute of limitations had 
"attached" and the cause of action had accrued on or before that date.  The limitation period began by May 5, 
2005 and was not extended because other damages had not yet occurred.  Id. 

 
 

[¶22]     
The 
fact that Baker reimbursed Lucky Gate for the $1,326.40 does not impact our 
analysis.  Neither does the fact 
that Lucky Gate did not claim the $1,326.40 as damages in its complaint.  All of Lucky Gate's damage claims are 
founded upon the breach of contract that occurred in May 2004.  Future damages arising from that breach 
do not create new causes of action.  
Id.  "To 
allow successive actions as additional damages arise would nullify the statutes 
of limitation and defeat their very purpose."  Id. at 344.

 
 

[¶23]     
In 
summary, whether the statute of limitations set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-107 begins to run on the date of the "act, error or omission" or on the date 
the cause of action "accrued," the lawsuit was untimely.  The district court properly found that, 
as a matter of law, Lucky Gate's complaint was barred by the statute of 
limitations.  

 
 
Equitable 
Estoppel

 
 

[¶24]     
Lucky 
Gate next claims that equitable estoppel prevents Baker from raising the statute 
of limitations as a defense.  The 
doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes the defendant from asserting the 
statute of limitations in appropriate circumstances.  "The elements of an equitable estoppel 
claim are 1) a delay in filing an action that is induced by the defendant; 2) 
the defendant misled the plaintiff; and 3) the plaintiff must have acted on the 
misinformation in good faith to the extent that he failed to pursue his action 
in a timely manner."  Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, ¶ 
22, 118 P.3d 429, 436 (Wyo. 2005).  
We conclude that the undisputed facts presented here do not satisfy the 
elements of equitable estoppel.  

 
 

[¶25]     
In 
determining whether equitable estoppel applies, our focus is not on the date 
when the cause of action accrued or the date of the act, error or omission 
giving rise to the lawsuit.  Rather, 
Lucky Gate must establish that its delay in filing suit was induced by 
Baker.  We agree with the district 
court that Lucky Gate failed, as a matter of law, to satisfy that burden.  Although Baker may have misled Lucky 
Gate regarding performance of the contract, there is no evidence that Baker took 
any action between June 2005 and May 2007 that induced Lucky Gate to delay 
initiating this litigation.  The 
district court properly granted summary judgment to Baker on Lucky Gate's claim 
of equitable estoppel.

 
 

[¶26]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
contract contained a choice of law provision mandating application of Nebraska 
law to disputes involving the contract.  
Baker contends that Lucky Gate's claim is time barred under both Nebraska 
and Wyoming law.  In spite of the 
potential conflict of law issue, the district court applied the Wyoming statute 
of limitations because the Wyoming statute appeared to provide Lucky Gate with 
the longest time to commence litigation.  
We will take the same approach.

2The 
phrase "working days" is not defined in the contract, but is presumably meant to 
exclude weekends and any legal holidays within the relevant period.  The contract was signed by both parties 
on March 29, 2004.  Thirty working 
days would have expired in early May 2004.

3Both 
parties in this appeal use the date when the cause of action "accrued" as the 
date the limitation period began.  
Neither party analyzes the facts in terms of the "act, error or omission" 
language contained in the statute.  
We have, on occasion, used the date when the cause of action has 
"accrued" to determine whether the litigation was timely commenced under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107. See Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, ¶¶ 24-26, 118 P.3d 429, 437 (Wyo. 
2005); Murphy v. Housel & Housel, 955 P.2d 880, 883 (Wyo. 1998); 
Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1996).  Because the result is the same under 
both approaches we need not determine here whether the limitation period begins 
on the date of the "act, error or omission" or when the cause of action 
"accrued."