Case Title: James Gumz v. Northern States Power Company

Citation: 2007 WI 135

Docket Number: 2005AP001424

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 135 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1424 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Grace Gumz, James Gumz, Michael Gumz and Susan 
Gumz, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants, 
     v. 
Northern States Power Company d/b/a Xcel Energy, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 165 
Reported at: 295 Wis. 2d 600, 721 N.W.2d 515 
(Ct. App. 2006-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 6, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Gregory E. Grau   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J. (opinion filed) 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendant-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner 
there were briefs by Michael J. Happe, J. Drew Ryberg, and 
Ryberg & Happe, S.C., Eau Claire, and Jordan J. Hemaidan, John 
D. Wilson, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Madison, and oral 
argument by J. Drew Ryberg. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-cross appellants there was a 
brief by Scott Lawrence and Lawrence & Des Rochers, S.C., St. 
Nazianz and Gregory J. Cook and Greg Cook Law Offices S.C., 
Milwaukee, and Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Scott Lawrence. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Trevor J. Will, G. 
Michael Halfenger, and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee on behalf 
of Wisconsin Public Service Corporation. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lynn R. Laufenberg and 
Laufenberg & Hoefle, Milwaukee, and William C. Gleisner, III, 
Milwaukee on behalf of Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by O. Thomas Armstrong, 
William P. Croke, and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee on 
behalf of Wisconsin Electric Power Company. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by H. Dale Peterson, 
John J. Laubmeier, and Stroud, Willink & Howard, LLC, 
Madison on behalf of Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation, 
Cooperative. 
 
 
 
 
2007 WI 135
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1424  
(L.C. No. 
2001CV998) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Grace Gumz, James Gumz, Michael Gumz and Susan 
Gumz, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Northern States Power Company d/b/a Xcel 
Energy, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 6, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Northern 
States Power Company ("Northern States"), seeks review of a 
published court of appeals decision affirming a judgment of the 
circuit court for Marathon County entered in favor of James, 
Grace, Michael, and Susan Gumz.1 In this private nuisance action 
                                                 
1 See Gumz v. Northern States Power Co., 2006 WI App 165, 
295 Wis. 2d 600, 721 N.W.2d 515, affirming a judgment of the 
circuit court of Marathon County, Gregory E. Grau, Judge. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
2 
 
based on negligence, the Gumzs alleged that stray voltage from 
Northern States' distribution system caused damage to their 
dairy herd and also resulted in an invasion of and interference 
with the use and enjoyment of their property. After a jury 
trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the Gumzs 
for damages in the amount awarded by the jury.  
¶2 
Northern States contends that the circuit court erred 
in the formulation of the special verdict. It asserts that the 
circuit court erroneously (1) failed to include a special 
verdict question asking whether the Gumzs commenced their 
lawsuit within the statute of limitations; (2) declined to give 
a special verdict question regarding whether the Gumzs were 
contributorily negligent in the management of their farm; and 
(3) refused to limit the damages only to those that occurred 
after Northern States had notice that stray voltage was harming 
the Gumzs' cows. 
¶3 
We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in the formulation of the special 
verdict. Following precedent, we determine that the circuit 
court did not err in failing to include in the special verdict a 
question addressing the statute of limitations. Based on the 
facts of this case, the circuit court correctly concluded as a 
matter of law that the Gumzs' action was not time barred because 
they had exercised reasonable diligence in discovering that 
stray voltage from Northern States' distribution system was a 
cause of damages to their herd.  
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
3 
 
¶4 
We also determine that the circuit court did not err 
in declining to give Northern States' proposed special verdict 
question 
regarding 
whether 
the 
Gumzs 
were 
contributorily 
negligent in the management of their farm. Finally, we determine 
that the circuit court appropriately allowed damages to be 
awarded for the period before Northern States had notice that 
stray voltage from its distribution system was harming the 
Gumzs' cows. Accordingly we affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶5 
In 1981 James and Michael Gumz purchased a dairy farm 
from their parents, who had farmed at the location for many 
years. Northern States owns the electrical distribution system 
that serves the Gumzs' farm. Approximately the last mile of 
Northern States' distribution line to the farm consists of the 
original Copperweld conductor wire installed in 1937. 
¶6 
Around 1991, the Gumzs began to notice behavioral and 
physical problems with their herd. The cows showed signs of 
increased aggravation, "jumping" and "stepping around" during 
milking. The problem got worse over the next three years. The 
cows stopped drinking normally and appeared hesitant to drink 
out of their drinking cups. They exhibited nervous tail 
twitching and "dancing" (lifting their feet off the ground) 
during milking. The herd did not breed successfully enough to 
maintain its size, and milk production suffered. 
¶7 
In 1992 the Gumzs consulted their herd nutritionist, 
Dwight Tolk, regarding the health of their cows. Tolk observed 
that the cows did not come to the barn easily, walked stiff-
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
4 
 
legged, were thin, seemed sluggish, and did not lay down much. 
He monitored their behavior and worked with their nutrition. By 
approximately the summer of 1993 Tolk had ruled out the 
possibility that the problems were due to nutrition. Instead he 
believed that some "outside phenomenon . . . was causing the 
cows to be stressed and uncomfortable." He suggested to the 
Gumzs that the problem was due to stray voltage. 
¶8 
From 1994 through 1996 the Gumzs continued to work to 
improve the health of their herd. In the fall of 1994, the Gumzs 
began 
using 
Dr. 
Theresa 
Peterson 
as 
their 
primary 
herd 
veterinarian. Dr. Peterson testified that she was aware of some 
of the behavioral and health problems in cows that can result 
from exposure to stray voltage. However, she recommended that 
the Gumzs engage in a process of elimination of other causes 
before initiating testing for stray voltage. She testified that 
"I try to rule other things out before I get to the point of 
thinking about requesting electrical testing." 
¶9 
Around the same time they hired Dr. Peterson, the 
Gumzs also sought help for the herd's problems by hiring Rick 
Guralski to be the nutritionist for their milk cows. Tolk 
continued to work with the Gumzs' heifers. 
¶10 Consistent 
with suggestions, the Gumzs tried to 
address the problems by changing their farming practices. They 
changed milking equipment, installing automatic take-off devices 
for their milking machines. The Gumzs also tried using different 
feeds and feed mills. In 1994, they switched to a new total 
mixed ration system designed to improve their feeding methods. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
5 
 
An electrician who wired the barn addition for the ration system 
also checked the farm's wiring at that time. He determined that 
it was in good condition. 
¶11 Despite 
these 
efforts 
the 
herd 
continued 
to 
deteriorate. At trial, Dr. Peterson testified that in late 1995 
and 1996 she observed numerous health problems, including poor 
body condition, feet and leg problems, infections and mastitis, 
pneumonia, and weakened immune systems.  
The cows had poor body condition, a lot of feet and 
leg problems. They started to look crippled. They had 
problems getting up, walked very slow, were lame, 
limping around. A lot of infections started, like 
mastitis outbreaks, . . . where the cow would become 
physically sick, and, without treatment, would go down 
and die. There was quite a bit of pneumonias at that 
time. A few uterine infections or nutritis cases. So 
their immune systems were becoming weakened. 
In addition, she observed that there were numerous abortions and 
the herd had a poor fertility rate. 
¶12 Dr. Peterson further testified that the problems with 
the Gumzs' herd were more difficult to alleviate than in other 
herds, and recently purchased animals that were healthy and 
vaccinated would get sick when they came to the Gumzs' farm. She 
ordered testing on blood and tissue but was still unable to 
isolate a particular disease causing the herd's problems. 
¶13 In early 1996, after eliminating other potential 
causes, Dr. Peterson suggested to James Gumz that the farm be 
tested for stray voltage. On May 6, 1996, Dr. Peterson wrote a 
letter to Northern States listing the herd's health problems and 
stating her opinion that the problems were due to stray voltage. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
6 
 
¶14 Later in May 1996, she prepared a report detailing the 
herd's health problems and her efforts to determine the cause of 
those problems. She described the management practices at the 
Gumzs' dairy farm as "above average," and stated that those 
practices "should allow a herd to remain healthy, produce 
quality milk, and have good production records." Ultimately Dr. 
Peterson concluded that the problems were not due to poor 
management, nutrition, or a specific disease. Rather, she stated 
that the poor health and performance of the herd were due to 
stray voltage and recommended that the farm be tested. 
¶15 Consistent with Dr. Peterson's suggestion, the Gumzs 
had their farm checked for stray voltage by Northern States on 
May 7, 1996, and by an independent electrician, John Ritchie, on 
May 14, 1996. Northern States' tests showed that the "cow 
contact voltage" was below the "level of concern." Using 
different testing equipment, Ritchie found much higher levels of 
voltage flowing onto the farm and determined that it was coming 
from off-farm. 
¶16 Upon Ritchie's recommendation, the Gumzs installed an 
isolation transformer. After installing the device, the herd 
improved. Fewer animals died, the herd's food consumption 
improved, and the overall herd health increased.  
¶17 In 1998 and 1999, the herd's health began to decline 
again. The Gumzs again asked Northern States to test for stray 
voltage, and again Northern States did not find voltage over the 
level 
of 
concern. 
They 
then 
hired 
another 
independent 
electrician, David Stetzer. Stetzer provided the Gumzs with 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
7 
 
equipment that monitored voltage on the barn floor. Measurements 
taken with that equipment indicated that as voltage decreased, 
milk production increased, and as voltage increased, milk 
production decreased.  
¶18 On December 21, 2001, the Gumzs filed suit against 
Northern States for damages resulting from stray voltage from 
Northern States' system. Northern States moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that the Gumzs had not filed suit within 
the six-year period of limitations imposed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.52.2 The circuit court denied the motion.  
¶19 The case was tried to a jury. The Gumzs' causation 
expert 
testified 
that 
exposure 
to 
stray 
voltage 
had 
a 
substantial 
adverse 
effect 
on 
the 
herd's 
production. 
An 
agricultural economist testified that the total economic damages 
due to lost productivity were $901,183.  
¶20 An expert for Northern States testified that the 
estimates of productivity adduced by the Gumzs were unrealistic, 
and maintained that the Gumzs' productivity levels were likely 
due to a variety of factors, not just stray voltage. He 
testified that there were a number of ways in which the herd was 
managed that likely harmed productivity. These included problems 
with 
herd 
nutrition, 
inconsistent 
feeding, 
inadequate 
biosecurity and disease prevention, and animal discomfort. 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
8 
 
¶21 The jury found that Northern States was negligent with 
respect to the electrical service or facilities it provided to 
the Gumzs, and that Northern States' negligence caused damages 
attributable to harmful levels of electricity. It also found 
that Northern States' negligence caused damages to the Gumzs due 
to invasion of or interference with the use and enjoyment of 
their land. It awarded the Gumzs total damages of $532,336. 
¶22 The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the 
Gumzs, and Northern States appealed. The court of appeals 
affirmed, and Northern States petitioned for review. 
II 
¶23 This case requires that we address whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion in the formulation of 
a special verdict. A circuit court has wide discretion in 
determining the words and form of a special verdict. Hannemann 
v. Boyson, 2005 WI 94, ¶30, 282 Wis. 2d 664, 698 N.W.2d 714. We 
will not disturb a circuit court's determination unless the 
court has erroneously exercised its discretion.  
¶24 A court erroneously exercises its discretion if the 
special verdict questions fail to cover all issues of fact or 
are inconsistent with the law. Estate of Hegarty v. Beauchaine, 
2006 WI App 248, ¶46, 297 Wis. 2d 70, 727 N.W.2d 857. Whether a 
special verdict reflects an accurate statement of the law 
applicable to the issues of fact in a given case presents a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals. Id. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
9 
 
III 
¶25 We 
turn 
first 
to 
Northern 
States' 
statute 
of 
limitations argument. The period of limitations for the Gumzs' 
lawsuit is governed by Wis. Stat. § 893.52. It provides that an 
action to recover for injury to property "shall be commenced 
within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be 
barred . . . ."3 This court adopted the discovery rule in Hansen 
v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983). 
Under the discovery rule, tort claims  "accrue on the date the 
injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence should be 
discovered, whichever occurs first." Id. at 560. Actions for 
negligence in stray voltage cases are subject to the discovery 
rule. Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light Co., 162 Wis. 2d 1, 27, 
469 N.W.2d 595 (1991). 
¶26 Accrual requires that plaintiffs discover, or with 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, "not only the fact 
of injury but also that the injury was probably caused by the 
defendant's conduct . . . ." Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 
Wis. 2d 397, 411, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986). Plaintiffs can rely on 
the discovery rule only if they have exercised reasonable 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.52 provides in full: 
Action for damages for injury to property. An action, 
not arising on contract, to recover damages for an 
injury to real or personal property shall be commenced 
within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be 
barred, except in the case where a different period is 
expressly prescribed. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
10 
 
diligence in the discovery. Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 
638, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989).   
¶27 Northern States maintains that there is a question of 
fact as to whether the Gumzs exercised reasonable diligence in 
discovering 
that 
stray 
voltage 
from 
Northern 
States' 
distribution system was the cause of damage to their herd. It 
argues that under the discovery rule, there is a question of 
fact as to whether the Gumzs' action is barred by the statute of 
limitations. Northern States therefore claims that the circuit 
court erred in not providing a separate special verdict question 
regarding whether the Gumzs knew, or with reasonable diligence 
should have known or discovered, that electricity from Northern 
States caused damage to the dairy herd by December 21, 1995, six 
years before the Gumzs commenced this action. 
¶28 We disagree. The statute of limitations question falls 
squarely within the scope of Kolpin and Allen v. Wisconsin 
Public Serv. Corp., 2005 WI App 40, 279 Wis. 2d 488, 694 
N.W.2d 420.  
¶29 Like the present case, Kolpin involved the application 
of the discovery rule in a lawsuit for damages to a dairy herd 
caused by stray voltage. 162 Wis. 2d at 7-8. In March 1977 the 
Kolpins first noticed behavioral problems in their herd, 
including refusing to enter the milking parlor, poor eating and 
drinking, increased milking time, and a dramatic increase in 
mastitis. Id. at 11.  
¶30 The Kolpins consulted their veterinarian and had 
experts check their equipment, but they did not find any 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
11 
 
problems. In 1980, after reading about stray voltage in a 
magazine, Mr. Kolpin and an electrician checked for voltage in 
the milking parlor. Although they found voltage, they did not 
know what the readings meant. Id. at 12. Mr. Kolpin then 
contacted 
the 
utility 
company, 
Pioneer, 
which 
sent 
a 
representative who did not know how to measure for stray 
voltage. Shortly after, a representative of the Public Service 
Commission took voltage readings on the farm, but did not 
communicate the results to the Kolpins. Id. at 12-13.  
¶31 The Kolpins made some changes to electric motors and 
circuitry 
suggested 
by 
the 
Public 
Service 
Commission 
representative, and Pioneer made changes in its system that led 
to a drop in voltage in the Kolpins' barn. However, the herd's 
problems did not abate. Id. at 13. In 1983, the Kolpins hired an 
electrical contractor to install a grounding device, after which 
the herd's behavior and milk production returned to normal. The 
Kolpins filed suit against Pioneer in 1987. Id. at 14.  
¶32 The case was tried to a jury, which found Pioneer 
liable for damages. Id. at 15. The jury also answered "yes" to a 
special verdict question asking whether the Kolpins knew, "or 
should they with the exercise of reasonable care have known, 
prior 
to 
February 
17, 
1981, 
that 
Pioneer's 
electrical 
distribution system was a cause of damage to their dairy 
operation?" Id.  
¶33 On review, this court concluded that the jury's answer 
to the question of discovery should be changed as a matter of 
law. Relying on Borello, 130 Wis. 2d 397, the court determined 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
12 
 
that for the Kolpins' action to accrue, "they must have 
objectively known, at that time, the cause of their injuries and 
Pioneer's part in that cause." Kolpin, 162 Wis. 2d at 25-26. 
¶34 The court recognized that by 1980 Mr. Kolpin knew of 
the possibility of stray voltage, had discovered voltage 
readings on his farm, and had a hunch that stray voltage was his 
problem. However, it was not until the Kolpins installed the 
grounding device and the herd improved that the Kolpin's 
"objectively knew that Pioneer's distribution system, and not 
their own farm operation, was the cause of their problem." Id. 
at 26. Because of the difficulty of identifying the cause of 
stray voltage, "[t]he 'discovery' was more of a process of 
elimination of possible causes rather than a process of 
determination of the cause." Id. at 27. The court therefore 
concluded that as a matter of law, the Kolpins neither 
discovered nor with the exercise of reasonable care should have 
discovered, prior to February 17, 1981, that stray voltage from 
Pioneer's distribution system was the cause of the damage to 
their herd. Id. 
¶35 The court of appeals recently applied Kolpin to 
another stray voltage action in Allen, 279 Wis. 2d 488. The 
plaintiff in Allen first experienced problems with his dairy 
herd in 1976. He suspected stray voltage by 1988 and asked 
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPS) to check his farm. 
WPS did not discover any stray voltage. Id., ¶3. Between 1984 
and 1997, Allen worked with nutritionists, purchased a new mixer 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
13 
 
feed wagon, and installed a new milking parlor. However, the 
problems persisted. Id., ¶13.  
¶36 In 1997 Allen hired an electrician who concluded that 
stray voltage from WPS was present on the farm. Id., ¶5. WPS 
again checked the farm, but it could not find the stray voltage. 
Id. Also in 1997, Allen installed an isolation unit, which 
improved production for just a few days. Id. The following year, 
he installed a different isolation unit, and herd behavior and 
production finally improved. Id., ¶14. Allen filed suit in 
November 2000. Id., ¶7. 
¶37 WPS argued that Allen's claims were barred by the 
statute of limitations. It maintained that had Allen acted with 
reasonable diligence, he would have discovered that stray 
voltage from WPS was the cause of his problems more than six 
years prior to the date he filed the lawsuit. Id., ¶9. Relying 
on Kolpin, the court of appeals determined that Allen exercised 
reasonable diligence because he went through a reasonable 
process of elimination to find the source of the problem. Id., 
¶16. Thus, it concluded that Allen "did not know nor could he 
have known through reasonable diligence that WPS was the cause 
of the herd's problems" until the isolation unit was installed 
and herd health improved in 1998.  Id., ¶12. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
14 
 
¶38 In the present case, the circuit court followed the 
reasoning in Kolpin and Allen.4 In its decision on Northern 
States' motion for summary judgment, the court described the 
Gumzs' efforts to "root out the cause of the problems" prior to 
1996 as a "process of elimination" similar to that of the 
plaintiffs in Kolpin. Accordingly, it determined that the Gumzs 
"exercised reasonable diligence in determining the cause of 
their injuries and the defendant's role in that cause." Further, 
it concluded that the cause of action did not accrue until 1996, 
when the farm was tested for stray voltage and the Gumzs 
installed the isolation transformer.  
                                                 
4 The dissent distinguishes the present case from Kolpin and 
Allen on the ground that "[u]nlike the plaintiffs in [Kolpin and 
Allen], the Gumzs failed to contact the utility until long after 
they had concerns about stray voltage." Dissent, ¶85. However, 
it is unclear when the dissent believes that the Gumzs actually 
suspected that their problem was due to stray voltage. It is 
also unclear how the dissent has come to a conclusion about how 
long it was after having concerns about stray voltage that Allen 
contacted the utility. See dissent, ¶88. The opinion states only 
that Allen first experienced problems in 1976 and that "by 1988" 
he suspected stray voltage. Allen v. Wisconsin Public Serv. 
Corp., 2005 WI App 40, ¶3, 279 Wis. 2d 488, 694 N.W.2d 420. It 
says nothing whatever about whether he suspected stray voltage 
as early as 1976.  
The dissent also contrasts this case with Kolpin and Allen 
on the ground that the plaintiffs in those cases "asked the 
utility to test for stray voltage as part of the process of 
elimination, [and i]n those cases, the utility's testing 
indicated the farmer had no excess stray voltage from off-farm 
sources." Dissent, ¶85. Yet the Gumzs too asked the utility to 
test for stray voltage as part of the process of elimination, 
and 
as 
in 
Kolpin 
and 
Allen 
"the 
utility's 
testing 
indicated . . . no excess stray voltage from off-farm sources." 
We therefore do not see the distinctions between the present 
case and prior stray voltage cases that the dissent seeks to 
draw. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
15 
 
¶39 At the jury instruction conference the circuit court 
reiterated 
its 
view 
regarding 
the 
plaintiffs' 
reasonable 
diligence.  Northern States requested a special verdict question 
asking "Did the Gumzs know or with reasonable diligence should 
they have known or discovered that electricity from [Northern 
States] was a cause of damage to their dairy herd by December 
21st, 1995?"  The court recounted the Gumzs' efforts to pinpoint 
the cause of the problems and determined as a matter of law that 
they had exercised reasonable diligence. It also noted that, 
similar to Allen, Northern States had conducted tests but was 
unable to find the stray voltage. The court therefore concluded 
that under Kolpin and Allen the special verdict question 
addressing the statute of limitations should not be given. 
¶40 Northern States contends that the Gumzs failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence because they were alerted to the 
possibility that stray voltage was a cause of damage in 1993, 
but failed to test for stray voltage until 1996. This argument 
misses the mark.  
¶41 The Gumzs were advised about the possibility of stray 
voltage by their nutritionist, Dwight Tolk. At the time Tolk 
suggested stray voltage, there were still many possibilities to 
be eliminated before they would know that stray voltage from 
Northern States was causing the problems. The Gumzs exercised 
reasonable diligence in ruling out the other possibilities. 
Declining to follow the advice of a single non-expert in such 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
16 
 
circumstances does not demonstrate a failure to exercise 
reasonable diligence.5  
¶42 Northern States also urges this court to examine the 
court of appeals decision insofar as it based its statute of 
limitations determination on the answer to a special verdict 
question pertaining to negligence. In Allen, the court of 
appeals offered two rationales for its conclusion that the 
plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in investigating his 
herd's problems. First, as discussed above, the court determined 
that under Kolpin, Allen exercised reasonable diligence as a 
matter of law. 279 Wis. 2d 488, ¶16.  
¶43 In addition, the court determined that the jury 
instruction and special verdict had adequately addressed the 
issue. The jury instruction stated: 
The failure to exercise ordinary care to discover an 
unsafe electrical condition on the farm, even if it 
does not involve his own equipment, can also be 
negligence. 
However, 
if 
the 
defective 
electrical 
condition on the farmer's equipment or facilities is 
such that it was not known or would not have been 
discovered by the exercise of ordinary care, the 
farmer is not negligent in permitting it to exist in 
such condition. 
Id., ¶17. The special verdict asked whether Allen was "negligent 
in the use of electricity on his farm," to which the jury 
answered "no." Id.  
                                                 
5 The dissent is incorrect that this paragraph implies "that 
an expert opinion is required for discovery to occur . . . ." 
Dissent, ¶89 n. 5. The question at hand is reasonable diligence, 
not discovery. See ¶55 n. 7; Schmidt v. Northern States Power, 
2007 WI 136, ¶3 n.5., __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.  
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
17 
 
¶44 The court of appeals reasoned that for the jury to 
reach its conclusion, it would have to have determined that 
Allen exercised ordinary care to discover an unsafe electrical 
condition on his farm, as per the jury instruction. Id. Thus, 
the court concluded, the jury had in effect answered the 
question of whether Allen had exercised reasonable diligence 
with 
respect 
to the discovery rule and the statute of 
limitations. Id. 
¶45 In the present case, the jury was given a similar 
instruction, followed by special verdict question 3, which asked 
whether the Gumzs were "negligent in the use and/or discovery of 
electricity on the farm." As in Allen, the jury answered the 
question "no." Following Allen, the court of appeals concluded 
that the instruction and special verdict question "effectively 
asked whether the Gumz[s] acted with reasonable diligence." 295 
Wis. 2d 600, ¶13. 
¶46 The court of appeals' approach in Allen and in this 
case is problematic. It infers that an answer to a negligence 
special verdict question provides an answer to a statute of 
limitations special verdict question. In Allen, the answer to 
whether the plaintiff was negligent in the "use" of electricity 
does not provide an answer to whether the plaintiff was 
negligent in the discovery of electricity.  
¶47 With respect to the present case, the special verdict 
question asking whether a plaintiff was "negligent in the use 
and/or discovery of electricity" asks three questions: (1) is 
the plaintiff negligent in the use of electricity, (2) is the 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
18 
 
plaintiff negligent in the discovery of electricity, and (3) is 
the plaintiff negligent in both the use and discovery of 
electricity?  
¶48 Here, the jury answered the special verdict question 
"no," which implies a negative answer to each of the three sub-
questions.  However, if the jury had answered the special 
verdict question "yes," it would have been unclear which of the 
three sub-questions the jury was addressing. That is, the jury 
could have answered "yes" to the special verdict question 
because the plaintiff was negligent in the use of electricity, 
in the discovery of electricity, or in both the use and 
discovery of electricity. Thus, an affirmative answer to the 
special verdict question here does not necessarily provide an 
answer to the question of whether the plaintiff was negligent in 
the discovery of electricity.6 
¶49 Statute of limitations defenses based on failure to 
exercise reasonable diligence will often present questions of 
fact appropriate for a jury. When they do, courts should provide 
separate questions for negligence and reasonable diligence in 
discovery. To the extent that Allen and the court of appeals 
decision in this case imply otherwise, they are incorrect.  
¶50 In the present case, however, the circuit court did 
not include special verdict question three to determine whether 
                                                 
6 Because we determine as a matter of law that the Gumzs 
exercised reasonable diligence, we need not address the question 
of whether the special verdict question provides an answer to 
the statute of limitations question in the present case.  
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
19 
 
the 
Gumzs 
exercised 
reasonable 
diligence 
in 
discovering 
electricity. Rather, it determined as a matter of law that they 
exercised reasonable diligence and that the action was not time 
barred. Having determined the statute of limitations question as 
a matter of law, there was no need to include such a question in 
the special verdict. 
¶51 The circuit court's analysis is correct. The Gumzs 
were as diligent in their efforts to learn the cause of their 
herd's problems as the plaintiffs in Kolpin and Allen. They 
worked with different nutritionists, tried different feeds, and 
changed feeding systems. They changed milking equipment. They 
had an electrician check the barn's electrical system to see if 
it was the cause of problems. They sought the help of Dr. 
Peterson, who looked for underlying diseases. 
¶52 After ruling out these possibilities, the Gumzs had 
Northern States and another specialist check for stray voltage. 
They installed an isolation transformer when a single test 
indicated that stray voltage from Northern States was present. 
Because the herd's health improved after the installation of the 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
20 
 
isolation transformer, the Gumzs were finally able to pinpoint 
the cause of the problems.7 
¶53 As in Kolpin, the Gumzs' discovery "was more of a 
process of elimination of possible causes rather than a process 
of determination of the cause." 162 Wis. 2d at 27. Further, the 
Gumzs' efforts constitute "a reasonable process of investigating 
the cause of [their] problems by eliminating other possible 
causes." Allen, 279 Wis. 2d 488, ¶16.  
¶54 Also like Kolpin, the Gumzs did not have objective 
knowledge that stray voltage from Northern States was a cause of 
damages to their herd until the herd improved upon the 
installation of the isolation transformer in 1996. See Kolpin, 
162 Wis. 2d at 27.  Further, similar to Allen, the defendants 
had the opportunity to discover the stray voltage on the Gumzs' 
farm. Their inability to do so is at odds with the claim that 
with reasonable diligence the Gumzs should have known that stray 
voltage was a cause of damages.  
¶55 In sum, we determine as a matter of law that the Gumzs 
exercised reasonable diligence. Prior to May 1996 the Gumzs did 
not know, nor with reasonable diligence should they have known, 
                                                 
7 The dissent states that we "seem[] to create or approve of 
a bright-line rule that discovery cannot occur in a stray 
voltage case until the farmer finds a remedy for the stray 
voltage problem." Dissent, ¶91. We do not create such a bright-
line rule. Rather, the rule for discovery remains the rule 
enunciated in Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 
N.W.2d 140 (1986). However, under the facts of this case, it was 
not until a remedy was found for the problems that it could be 
determined 
that 
"the 
injury 
was 
probably 
caused 
by 
the 
defendant's conduct . . . ." Id. at 411.  
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
21 
 
that stray voltage from Northern States was a cause of damages 
to their herd. Accordingly, we determine that the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion in declining to 
include a special verdict question concerning the statute of 
limitations.8 
                                                 
8 Here, we affirm the circuit court's determination that 
there is no question of fact with respect to the statute of 
limitations question. However, another case involving discovery 
of stray voltage, Schmidt v. Northern States Power, 2007 WI 136, 
__ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, is also released today. In Schmidt 
we reverse the circuit court's determination that there is no 
question of fact with respect to the statute of limitations 
question. The apparent difference stems from the different 
aspects 
of 
the 
discovery 
rule 
involved 
and 
the 
factual 
differences in the cases.   
Under the discovery rule, tort claims "accrue on the date 
the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence should be 
discovered, whichever occurs first." Hansen v. A.H. Robins, 
Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).  In the 
present case, the date of actual discovery is not at issue. 
Rather, the issue is whether the Gumzs exercised reasonable 
diligence. For the reasons outlined in the text, we determine 
that as a matter of law the Gumzs exercised reasonable 
diligence.  
In contrast, whether the Schmidts exercised reasonable 
diligence is not at issue. Rather, the issue is when they 
actually discovered that stray voltage from Northern States was 
causing problems to their herd.    
Moreover, there are important factual differences between 
the Gumzs' and the Schmidts' actions in discovering stray 
voltage and its link to damages to their respective herds. The 
Gumzs began their process of elimination by looking for problems 
in nutrition, machinery, farming practices, personnel, disease, 
and on-site electricity before narrowing the cause of their 
problems to Northern States' lines. That process was reasonable, 
and did not result in isolating the source of the problem as 
electricity from Northern States until they installed the 
isolation transformer in 1996.  
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
22 
 
IV 
¶56 We 
consider 
next 
Northern 
States' 
contributory 
negligence argument. Northern States contends that the circuit 
court erred by framing a special verdict question that was 
limited to the Gumzs' negligence "in the use and/or discovery of 
electricity on the farm." It argues that it was entitled to a 
broader question of whether the Gumzs were "negligent in the 
operation, maintenance or management of their dairy enterprise." 
¶57 At the jury instruction conference Northern States 
asserted that a negligence question limited to electricity was 
too narrow. It maintained that the case is primarily about all 
of the Gumzs' lost productivity, that the Gumzs' management of 
the farm was negligent, and that their negligence contributed to 
their overall lost productivity. In contrast, the circuit court 
determined that the case is about damage caused by stray 
voltage. The court explained its position as to the form of the 
question as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                             
In contrast, the Schmidts looked at electricity problems 
early in their process of elimination. They had Northern States 
check for stray voltage multiple times, installed plastic water 
tanks, attached rubber tires to their feed bunks, had an 
electrician test the farm, sought test results from Northern 
States' monitors, and installed a device to isolate their herd 
from stray voltage. Schmidt, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶6-19.  The 
question is whether the improvement in herd health after the 
installation of the equipotential plane, which occurred more 
than six years prior to suit being filed, constitutes an 
objective basis for a belief that the stray voltage was the 
cause of damage to the Schmidts' herd. No such question exists 
in the present case, for the isolation device in the present 
case was installed less than six years prior to the Gumz filing 
suit. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
23 
 
It seems to me that where this case is at is there is 
the 
argument 
that 
the 
electrical 
services 
and 
facilities have caused damage, and in large part the 
defense is that it was not the electrical services or 
facilities that caused the damages, rather it was a 
litany 
of 
things . . . . 
The 
number 
of 
cows, 
lactation, 
history, the management of the herd, 
genetics, feed, water intake, herd health, mastitis, 
and perhaps other things. But that captures the 
essence of a significant part of the defense put 
forward. And it seems to me that the jury is going to 
be asked to answer what, if any, damage electricity 
caused, and certainly the defense is free to argue 
that there was none, or it was minimal. It was all of 
these factors.  
¶58 The court emphasized that the defense could argue that 
any damages sustained were caused by the Gumzs' negligent 
operation of the farm and not by stray voltage:  
[M]y ruling on that is that the issue in this case is 
damages that were caused, if any, by electricity -- 
and the defense can argue from a cause standpoint that 
the electricity didn't cause any damage or was minimal 
and these other factors went into it, but in terms of 
contribution, I'm not instructing that those other 
factors that we've talked about earlier can enter into 
a determination as to contribution. It's just the 
Gumzs' responsibility concerning the electricity that 
figures into the contribution. 
 . . . . 
I think you can still explore your theory, argue your 
theory that electricity didn't cause these damages, 
that something else did, and you reinforce to the jury 
that the only thing that the plaintiffs can recover 
for  . . . are damages caused by the negligent service 
or facilities provided relative to electricity.  
¶59 The circuit court's reasoning is reflected in the 
negligence questions in the special verdict, which concern 
negligence regarding electricity and electrical service. The 
special verdict provides in relevant part: 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
24 
 
Question 
1: 
Was 
Northern 
States 
Power 
Company 
negligent with respect to the electrical service or 
facilities which it provided to the Gumz farm?  
[Jury answered "Yes."] 
. . . . 
Question 2: If you answered Question 1 "yes," then 
answer this question: Was this negligence a cause of 
damages, 
attributable 
to 
harmful 
levels 
of 
electricity, to the Gumzs? 
[Jury answered "Yes."] 
Question 3: Were the Gumzs negligent in the use and/or 
discovery of electricity on their farm? 
[Jury answered "No."] 
Question 4: If you have answered Question 3 "yes," 
then answer this question: Was the Gumzs' negligence a 
cause of damages, attributable to harmful levels of 
electricity, to the plaintiffs? 
[Jury did not answer.] 
 . . . . 
Question 7: If you have answered Questions 2 and 4 
"yes," then answer this question: Assuming that the 
total cause of damages attributable to harmful levels 
of electricity is 100 percent, what percentage of the 
causal 
negligence 
which 
you 
have 
found 
do 
you 
attribute to: 
A. Northern States Power Company   ____% 
B. The Gumzs 
 
 
 
 
____% 
[Jury did not answer.] 
With respect to damages, the special verdict explicitly limited 
the potential damages to those resulting from electricity: 
Question 8: What sum of money will fairly and 
reasonably 
compensate 
the 
Gumzs 
for 
damages 
attributable to harmful levels of electricity as to: 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
25 
 
A: Lost milk production  [Jury answered $249,086.] 
B. Loss of fair market value to their dairy herd [Jury 
answered $33,250.] 
C. Excess costs [Jury answered $50,000.] 
 . . . . 
D. For annoyance, inconvenience, and loss of use and 
enjoyment 
of 
their real property [Jury answered 
$200,000.] 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶60 The jury instruction also was explicit that damages 
could be awarded only for harms due to electricity. The 
instruction provides in relevant part: 
As to [special verdict questions] 8A, 8B and 8C,  
If you are satisfied that plaintiffs have in the past 
experienced damages because their dairy herd was 
exposed to harmful levels of electricity, you shall 
award such sum of money as will reasonably compensate 
plaintiffs for the loss attributable only to that 
electricity. You cannot award any damages for any 
condition of the Gumzs' herd except insofar as you are 
satisfied 
that 
the 
herd's 
condition 
has 
been 
aggravated by harmful levels of electricity. If you 
find that the plaintiffs had a condition which was 
aggravated because of harmful levels of electricity, 
then you should include an amount which will fairly 
and reasonably compensate the plaintiffs for such 
damages the plaintiffs suffered as a result of such 
aggravation.  
Any damages that the plaintiffs may have suffered, or 
have, which is not the natural result of harmful 
levels of electricity, is not to be considered by you 
in assessing damages. You cannot award damages for any 
condition which has resulted from consequences which 
are attributable to causes other than harmful levels 
of electricity. . . .  
If livestock has been damaged, and the injury to the 
livestock has ceased, the compensation to be awarded 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
26 
 
to the owner is the difference between the fair market 
value of the cattle had the herd not been exposed to 
harmful levels of electricity, and the value of the 
dairy herd after the harmful levels of electricity 
ceased. . . . 9  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶61 The jury instruction was carefully tailored to match 
the special verdict questions. The instruction advised the jury 
eight times that damages due only to harmful electricity could 
be awarded.10  
¶62 While the special verdict did not ask whether the 
Gumzs were negligent in managing their farm, neither did it 
allow that damages could be awarded for any injury due to their 
farm management. Similarly, the jury instruction explained 
repeatedly 
that 
damages 
were 
limited 
to 
damages 
from 
electricity. Thus, the special verdict was tailored to allow the 
Gumzs to recover for damages due to Northern States' negligence 
                                                 
9 The instruction is a modified version of Wis JI——Civil 
1804/1806.  
10  We note that question 3 would have been better stated 
had the use of "and/or" been avoided. It is preferable to divide 
the question into separate inquiries rather than asking a 
compound question in a single inquiry. We do not conclude that 
the question was misleading or could have caused jury confusion 
such that a new trial is warranted here. See Runjo v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 594, 603, 541 N.W.2d 173 
(Ct. App. 1995).   
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
27 
 
while preventing them from receiving any award for lost 
productivity due to their farm management.11  
                                                 
11  The dissent inaccurately describes the positions of both 
the circuit court and the majority. The circuit court explicitly 
advised the jury that when considering damages, it could take 
into consideration the testimony regarding the Gumzs' farm 
practices. Thus, the circuit court instructed the jury to 
consider all of the evidence presented. Nevertheless, the 
dissent avers that the majority "provides no reason for 
excluding those matters from the jury's consideration." Dissent, 
¶94. We provide no reason for excluding those matters from jury 
consideration because the jury did consider them, as the circuit 
court directed in the special verdict and jury instruction. 
In addition, the dissent maintains that the jury should 
"consider all relevant harms causing damages and then detail its 
findings in the special verdict," and that "relevant harms" 
include lost productivity due to farm management. Dissent, ¶96. 
Surprisingly, the dissent cites as support a case in which the 
question of a plaintiff's contributory negligence was limited to 
whether 
the 
plaintiffs 
were 
negligent 
"in 
the 
design, 
maintenance, and operation of their electrical equipment." Vogel 
v. Grant-LaFayette Elec. Coop., 201 Wis. 2d 416, 420, 548 
N.W.2d 829 (1996)(emphasis added). Further, it provides no 
reason for determining that the "relevant harms" include 
decreased productivity due to farm management rather than being 
limited to damages caused by electricity.  
The dissent also maintains that limiting the contributory 
negligence question to electricity is an error of law and 
advocates the view that "a circuit court must ask a comparative 
negligence question, which is not limited to use of electricity, 
unless it can determine as a matter of law that the plaintiff 
could not have contributed to the herd's condition." Dissent, 
¶93. It reasons that if the plaintiffs are at least 51 percent 
negligent, then they are not entitled to recover at all. 
Dissent, ¶¶98-99, 101. The dissent simply assumes that whether 
the plaintiffs were at least 51 percent negligent pertains to 
all lost productivity. However, the scope of contributory 
negligence and whether the relevant harms in the case include 
all lost productivity are the very issues before this court. 
Thus, the dissent's approach merely begs the question. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
28 
 
¶63 Nonetheless, Northern States contends that the circuit 
court's approach is erroneous. Relying on this court's decision 
in Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 275 
N.W.2d 660 (1979), Northern States maintains that there can be 
multiple "causes in fact" of an injury and that the Gumzs' poor 
management of the farm is a "cause in fact" of the damages. 
Northern States argues that it is therefore entitled to a 
special verdict question on negligent management. 
¶64 Northern States' argument is unpersuasive. To begin, 
the primary case Northern States adduces for support is not on 
point. Morgan involved property damage caused by a motorist who 
ran into the plaintiff's trees. Following the advice of the 
motorist's insurance adjuster, the plaintiff drove stakes into 
the ground next to the damaged trees for support. Id. at 728-29. 
In doing so, the plaintiff suffered a hernia. Id. The circuit 
court dismissed the complaint, but this court reversed. It 
determined that if the adjuster's conduct was a substantial 
                                                                                                                                                             
Finally, despite advocating for an expansive comparative 
negligence question, the dissent expresses no similar concern 
for the scope of the jury instruction regarding damages. As 
discussed in the text, it is important that both the comparative 
negligence question and the damages were limited to electricity. 
Given that the circuit court defined the relevant damages as 
"damages attributable to harmful levels of electricity," it 
would be error for the contributory negligence question to 
address negligence other than that associated with electricity.  
The dissent's view appears to require a circuit court to both 
limit damages to those caused by electricity and then to divide 
any damage award by a percentage of comparative negligence not 
attributable to electricity. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
29 
 
factor in producing the injury, it could constitute cause-in-
fact for the purpose of negligence. Id. at 735. 
¶65 The issue presented here, however, is not whether poor 
farm management could be a substantial factor in producing an 
injury or whether there can be multiple causes in fact for an 
injury. Rather, the issue is whether the relevant inquiry in 
this case can focus narrowly on management of the electricity or 
must look more broadly at the Gumzs' management of their farm. 
Morgan provides no guidance whatever on that question.  
¶66 Next, Northern States argues that it is entitled to a 
special verdict question on negligent management because the 
damages cannot be separated. It asserts that there is a single 
injury caused "concurrently" by electricity and the Gumzs' farm 
management, 
and 
that 
the 
Gumzs' 
management 
is 
therefore 
contributory to the damages sought.  This argument is also 
unpersuasive. It is common in Wisconsin law that juries must 
differentiate damages due to the defendant's negligence from the 
plaintiff's prior condition or from damages caused by other 
parties.  
¶67 For example, medical malpractice cases often require 
that juries separate the damages caused by a physician's 
negligence from damages that are "the result of the natural 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
30 
 
progression" of the condition or injury.12  Where negligence 
aggravates a plaintiff's pre-existing injury, Wisconsin juries 
must separate out the prior injury and provide compensation only 
for the aggravation.13 In enhanced injury cases, juries must 
distinguish damages from a plaintiff's initial accident from the 
damages caused by a defendant's actions that "produc[e] injuries 
over and above what probably would have been sustained in the 
[accident]."14  
                                                 
12 Wis 
JI——Civil 
1023; 
see 
Fischer 
v. 
Ganju, 
168 
Wis. 2d 834, 854, 485 N.W.2d 10 (1992)(allowing instruction 
requiring the jury "to separate the damages flowing from the 
defendant's negligence and the damages flowing from [the 
plaintiff's] 
original 
physical 
condition"); 
Young 
v. 
Professionals Ins. Co., 154 Wis. 2d 742, 749-50, 454 N.W.2d 24 
(1990)(concluding that a jury instruction implying that there 
may be only one cause of an injury in a medical malpractice case 
is error). 
13 Wis JI——Civil 1710, Wis JI——Civil 1715, Wis JI——1720; see 
Coryell v. Conn, 88 Wis. 2d 310, 316, 276 N.W.2d 723 (1979) 
(upholding 
jury award for injury aggravating pre-existing 
condition despite "[t]he fact that the doctors could not 
specifically delineate the pain [plaintiff] claimed resulted 
from the accident, as opposed to the pre-existing" injury.); 
Kablitz v. Hoeft, 25 Wis. 2d 518, 523-25, 131 N.W.2d 346 
(1964)(determining 
that 
the 
extent 
to 
which 
injury 
is 
attributable to accident and to pre-existing condition is an 
appropriate question for jury). 
14 Wis JI——Civil 1723; see Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales 
U.S.A., 
Inc., 
121 
Wis. 2d 338, 
366, 
360 
N.W.2d 2 
(1984) 
(upholding circuit court determination that there was sufficient 
evidence for jury to discern injuries plaintiff would have 
received in an accident if defendant's product had been properly 
engineered and those caused by defendant's defective product); 
see also Farrell v. John Deere Co., 151 Wis. 2d 45, 60-62, 443 
N.W.2d 50 (Ct. App. 1989). 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
31 
 
¶68 Similarly, the special verdict in the present case 
requires the separation of damages to the herd stemming from 
different conduct. The damages to the Gumzs' herd caused by 
Northern States' negligence may be "concurrent" with damages to 
the herd resulting from the Gumzs' management of their farm. 
Nonetheless, 
the 
jury 
was 
required 
to 
assess 
damages 
attributable only to harmful levels of electricity.  
¶69 Generally we accord wide discretion to the circuit 
court in framing the special verdict as long as it covers all 
issues of fact in the case and is consistent with the applicable 
principles of law. Hegarty, 297 Wis. 2d 70, ¶46. While we 
acknowledge that the circuit court could have framed the 
question more broadly, it was not required by the facts or law 
to do so here. Instead, the court exercised its discretion by 
carefully tailoring the questions to have a consistent focus. 
Both the negligence and damage questions were focused on 
electricity. Accordingly, we determine that the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion in declining to give 
Northern States' proposed question regarding the contributory 
negligence of the Gumzs' management of their farm. 
V 
¶70 Finally, we turn to Northern States' argument that the 
circuit court erred in refusing to limit damages only to those 
that occurred after Northern States had notice that stray 
voltage could be harming the Gumzs' cows. The Gumzs contend that 
Northern 
States 
has 
waived 
the 
issue 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
32 
 
§ 805.13(3) because 
it failed to raise it at the jury 
instruction conference.  
¶71 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.13(3) provides in relevant part: 
(3) Instruction and Verdict Conference 
 . . . . 
The court shall inform counsel on the record of its 
proposed action on the motions and of the instructions 
and verdict it proposes to submit. Counsel may object 
to the proposed instructions or verdict on the grounds 
of incompleteness or other error, stating the grounds 
for 
objection 
with particularity on the record. 
Failure to object at the conference constitutes a 
waiver of any error in the proposed instructions or 
verdict. 
¶72 In 
our 
review 
of 
the 
transcript 
of 
the 
jury 
instruction conference we could not discern that Northern States 
sought a special verdict question limiting damages. Further, our 
review indicates that Northern States did not raise an objection 
based on failure to limit damages. We therefore conclude that 
Northern States' failure to preserve the issue at the jury 
instruction conference constitutes a waiver under § 805.13(3). 
¶73 This court has the discretion to review an issue that 
has been waived when it involves a question of law, has been 
briefed by the opposing parties, and is of sufficient public 
interest to merit a decision. Apex Elecs. Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 
2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998); Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 
433, 444, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980). The present issue is one of 
law, the parties have briefed it, and stray voltage cases are of 
substantial public interest. We therefore address the issue to 
provide guidance to litigants in future cases.  
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
33 
 
¶74 Northern States contends that under Snyder v. Oakdale 
Co-op Elec. Ass'n, 269 Wis. 531, 69 N.W.2d 563 (1955), a utility 
is not required to inspect customer premises unless the utility 
has notice of a problem, and that a utility may be liable for 
damages only when it supplies electricity knowing of a condition 
that causes injury. Snyder, however, is inapt.  
¶75 The plaintiff in Snyder requested electrical service 
from the defendant utility. An inspection report filed with the 
defendant indicated that there were defects in the plaintiff's 
electrical system. However, the defendant provided service, 
causing a fire which damaged the plaintiff's property. Id. at 
531-32. 
The 
court 
determined 
that 
a 
company 
providing 
electricity "for use in a private wiring system is not under 
obligation to inspect such system before supplying the current 
nor is it obligated to respond in damages for injuries sustained 
by reason of the defective condition of such system" unless the 
company knew of the defects. Id. at 533.  
¶76 Thus, Snyder concerns obligations of utilities in 
supplying electricity to defective private wiring systems. The 
present case, however, does not involve a defective private 
wiring system. Rather, the stray voltage causing damage to the 
Gumzs' herd came from Northern States' system. The fact that a 
utility must have notice of defects in private electrical 
systems in order to be responsible for damages is irrelevant to 
the question of whether notice is required for a utility to be 
responsible for damages caused by the utility's system. 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
34 
 
¶77 Moreover, Northern States' argument that it cannot be 
liable for negligence without notice of a problem understates 
the standard of care. As stated in the jury instruction, the 
electric company must exercise "ordinary care to discover any 
unsafe 
or 
defective 
condition 
of 
its 
distribution 
system . . . ." It is contradictory to predicate the requirement 
to exercise ordinary care in discovering unsafe or defective 
conditions in its distribution system on having notice of those 
unsafe or defective conditions. 
¶78 Northern States' argument is also inconsistent with 
Kolpin, Allen, and Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Elec. Coop., 201 
Wis. 2d 416, 548 N.W.2d 829 (1996). In each of those cases, 
utilities were found liable for damages caused by stray voltage, 
even though the utilities did not know that stray voltage from 
their systems was causing damage to the plaintiffs. Kolpin, 162 
Wis. 2d at 11-14; Allen, 279 Wis. 2d 488, ¶¶3-7; Vogel, 201 
Wis. 2d at 419-21. Consistent with these cases, we determine 
that the circuit court appropriately allowed damages to be 
awarded for the period before Northern States had notice that 
stray voltage from its system was harming the Gumzs' cows. 
VI 
¶79 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in the formulation of the 
special verdict. Following precedent, we determine that the 
circuit court did not err in failing to include in the special 
verdict a question addressing the statute of limitations. Based 
on the facts of this case, the circuit court correctly concluded 
No. 
2005AP1424   
 
35 
 
as a matter of law that the Gumzs' action was not time barred 
because they had exercised reasonable diligence in discovering 
that stray voltage from Northern States' distribution system was 
a cause of damages to their herd.  
¶80 We also determine that the circuit court did not err 
in declining to give Northern States' proposed special verdict 
question 
regarding 
whether 
the 
Gumzs 
were 
contributorily 
negligent in the management of their farm. Finally, we determine 
that the circuit court appropriately allowed damages to be 
awarded for the period before Northern States had notice that 
stray voltage from its distribution system was harming the 
Gumzs' cows. Accordingly we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶81 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  Two 
possible 
defenses——statute 
of 
limitations 
and 
contributory 
negligence——have not been considered by the jury even though the 
record contains competing evidence regarding those issues. 
¶82 The majority opinion endorses the conclusion that the 
Gumzs were reasonably diligent in attempting to discover their 
injury and its cause and that no reasonable jury could have 
found otherwise.  I respectfully disagree because competing 
inferences can be drawn from the record with regard to whether 
the Gumzs were reasonably diligent in attempting to discover 
their injury and its cause.  A majority of this court further 
concludes that a comparative negligence question was unnecessary 
because special verdict questions were limited to inquiries 
regarding electricity.  However, because the record contains 
facts that support both poor farm management and excess stray 
voltage as causes of the herd's poor health, the circuit court 
should have asked a comparative negligence question, which was 
not limited to use of electricity, in order to allow the jury to 
assess cause and damages fairly. 
I 
¶83 The relevant inquiry here pertains to whether the 
Gumzs, subject to a six-year statute of limitations, were 
reasonably diligent in discovering their injury and its cause, 
i.e., discovering excess stray voltage from Northern States, 
prior to December 21, 1995.  In 1987, Northern States sent the 
Gumzs, as well as its other customers, general information about 
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
2 
 
stray voltage including information about free investigation by 
Northern States, financial assistance from Northern States, and 
possible on and off-farm causes of stray voltage.  In 1991, the 
Gumzs began to notice problems with their herd.  In 1992, Mr. 
Gumz hired a nutritionist to evaluate his herd, and Mr. Gumz 
inquired with the nutritionist about possible stray voltage 
problems on his farm.  In 1993, the nutritionist eliminated any 
nutrition-related problems, and he told the Gumzs that they had 
a 
stray 
voltage 
problem 
and 
thus 
referred 
them 
to 
an 
electrician.  In 1994, an electrician wired the barn addition 
and concluded that the Gumzs' on-farm wiring was very good.  
However, they did not ask the utility to conduct stray voltage 
testing until 1996 and did not file suit until December 21, 
2001, despite a six-year statute of limitations.   
¶84 While a reasonable person could conclude that the 
Gumzs were reasonably diligent in their actions and did not 
discover their injury and its cause until after December 21, 
1995, a reasonable person could also conclude that the Gumzs 
should have called the utility prior to December 21, 1995.  A 
jury should have considered whether the Gumzs' chosen course was 
a reasonable process of elimination.  A determination as a 
matter of law is not proper when reasonable inferences leading 
to conflicting results can be drawn from the undisputed facts.  
See Cameron v. City of Milwaukee, 102 Wis. 2d 448, 459, 307 
N.W.2d 164 (1981). 
¶85 Unlike the plaintiffs in previous stray voltage cases, 
the Gumzs failed to contact the utility until long after they 
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
3 
 
had concerns about stray voltage.  In Kolpin1 and Allen,2 the 
plaintiffs asked the utility to test for stray voltage as part 
of the process of elimination.  In those cases, the utility's 
testing indicated the farmer had no excess stray voltage from 
off-farm sources.  Thus, the farmers continued to look elsewhere 
for a solution.  In the case now before the court, the Gumzs did 
consult with an electrician, a nutritionist, a veterinarian, and 
had suspicions about stray voltage; however, they did not make 
an inquiry with the utility before December 21, 1995.  One can 
receive the benefit of the discovery rule only if that person 
has been reasonably diligent in discovering the injury and its 
cause.  Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 638, 436 N.W.2d 308 
(1989).  Whether the Gumzs exercised reasonable diligence 
depends on a jury's view of the strategy they pursued prior to 
December 21, 1995.  
¶86 The majority asserts that the statute of limitations 
question falls squarely within the scope of Kolpin and Allen.  
See majority op., ¶28.  This case, however, is distinguishable 
from those cases because the Gumzs did not ask the utility to 
test for stray voltage until long after they had concerns that 
stray voltage might be a problem on their farm.  In Kolpin, the 
court determined that the plaintiffs did not know, nor should 
the plaintiffs have known with the exercise of reasonable 
                                                 
1 Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light Co. Inc., 162 Wis. 2d 1, 
469 N.W.2d 595 (1991). 
2 Allen v. Wisconsin Public Serv. Corp., 2005 WI App 40, 279 
Wis. 2d 488, 694 N.W.2d 420. 
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
4 
 
diligence, their injury and its cause prior to February 17, 
1981.  Kolpin, 162 Wis. 2d at 27.  Prior to this date, the 
Kolpins 
read 
articles 
about 
stray 
voltage, 
called 
their 
veterinarian, had experts evaluate their equipment, conducted 
their own voltage testing, called an electrician to conduct 
stray voltage testing, and called the utility company to conduct 
stray voltage testing.  Id. at 12-13.  There was no doubt as to 
whether the Kolpins were reasonably diligent at that time.  
Unlike the Gumzs, the Kolpins pursued possible electrical (on 
and off-farm) and non-electrical causes to their problems.  
¶87 In addition, information regarding stray voltage was 
not as prevalent in the 1980s, when the Kolpins undertook these 
efforts.3  We should recognize that the reasonable diligence 
analysis can change over time as the phenomenon of stray voltage 
becomes 
less 
elusive 
and 
more 
generally 
understood 
or 
recognized.4 
                                                 
3 The plaintiff in Kolpin undertook a diligent investigation 
to find the cause of his problem.  It may be significant that 
the Kolpins did more than the Gumzs at a time when the stray 
voltage "phenomenon" may not have been as widely known.  See 
Kolpin, 
162 
Wis. 2d 
at 
12 
(describing 
how 
neither 
the 
electrician nor the utility's representative knew how to test 
for stray voltage or how to read the measurements taken).  See 
also R.D. Appleman and R.J. Gustafson, Sources of Stray Voltage 
and Effect on Cow Health and Performance, 68 J. Dairy Sci. 1554, 
1554 (1985) (stating that "[a]bout 1980, problems from stray 
voltages were being identified throughout much of the U.S. and 
Canada")(emphasis added).  
4 See PSC Docket 05-EI-115, at 1-8 (updating the docket in 
1996 in light of new research on stray voltage); see also R.D. 
Appleman and R.J. Gustafson, Sources of Stray Voltage and Effect 
on Cow Health and Performance, 68 J. Dairy Sci. 1554, 1565-66 
(1985) (identifying several questions about stray voltage that 
remain unanswered). 
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
5 
 
¶88 In Allen, the plaintiff suspected stray voltage in 
1988 but did not file a lawsuit until 2000.  Unlike the Gumzs, 
when the Allens had concerns about stray voltage, they called 
the utility company to conduct testing.  Allen, 279 Wis. 2d 488, 
¶3.  When the utility company found no stray voltage problem, 
Allen looked to other possible avenues for relief, such as the 
cows' nutrition, on-farm electrical problems, and off-farm 
electrical problems.  Id., ¶13.  Hence, Allen is distinguishable 
because, in Allen, the plaintiff promptly called the utility 
after there were indications and he had suspicions of stray 
voltage problems.  
¶89 The majority asserts that declining to follow the 
advice of a single non-expert does not demonstrate a failure to 
exercise reasonable diligence.  See majority op., ¶41.  However, 
while a nutritionist alone may not be an expert in stray 
voltage, 
he 
or 
she 
may 
supply 
information 
worthy 
of 
consideration in the analysis.5  Moreover, the record indicates 
that the Gumzs had more than just a single non-expert pointing 
them towards a stray voltage problem from off-farm sources.  
Their herd was sick, Northern States reportedly sent them 
                                                 
5 The majority opinion seems to assert that an expert 
opinion is required for discovery to occur and that failing to 
follow a non-expert's opinion cannot demonstrate a failure to 
exercise reasonable diligence.  See majority op., ¶41.  However, 
an expert opinion is not required for discovery to occur.  See 
Fritz v. McGrath, 146 Wis. 2d 681, 690, 431 N.W.2d 751 (Ct. App. 
1988) (concluding that an expert opinion is not a prerequisite 
to discovery).  A farmer need only have what a court would 
conclude as an objective basis as to the injury and its cause.  
This may occur in a number of different ways, and it does not 
necessarily follow that an expert opinion is required.    
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
6 
 
information regarding stray voltage, Mr. Gumz inquired about 
stray 
voltage 
with 
his 
nutritionist, 
and 
an 
electrician 
concluded that their on-farm wiring was in good condition.  
Nonetheless, they waited two years from the electrician's 
conclusion that their on-farm wiring was in good condition 
before they contacted the utility to do off-farm testing.    
¶90 The majority asserts that the Gumzs undertook a 
process of elimination, which is not subject to question.  See 
majority op., ¶41.  The Gumzs' efforts may be commendable; 
however, it is a jury question as to whether they exercised 
reasonable diligence in the discovery of stray voltage when they 
did not contact the utility company for approximately two years 
after the electrician's conclusion, three years after the 
nutritionist's conclusion, and four years after they became 
concerned about stray voltage.   
¶91 The majority opinion seems to create or approve of a 
bright-line rule that discovery cannot occur in a stray voltage 
case until the farmer finds a remedy for the stray voltage 
problem.  See majority op., ¶¶34, 37, 50-51.  While in some 
stray voltage cases discovery may not occur until one finds a 
remedy, this is not always the case.  A plaintiff need only have 
what a court would view as an objective basis as to the injury 
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
7 
 
and its cause.6  Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 300, 562 
N.W.2d 584 (1997). 
¶92 Here, competing inferences can be drawn from the 
undisputed facts in the record about whether the Gumzs were 
reasonably diligent in discovering their injury and its cause.  
I make no determination as to whether the Gumzs were reasonably 
diligent or when discovery occurred; I merely conclude that the 
record does not support only one conclusion as a matter of law. 
II 
¶93 The majority also concludes that the circuit court 
correctly declined to ask a comparative negligence question, 
which would have included the jury's consideration of the 
testimony 
it 
heard 
with 
regard 
to 
poor 
farm 
management 
practices.7  The majority endorses the circuit court's limitation 
of the special verdict questions, which addressed only those 
damages arising out of electricity, rather than a question that 
would have addressed all of the evidence presented.  See 
                                                 
6 For example, if a farmer asks the utility to test for 
stray voltage and the utility finds excess stray voltage 
attributable to the utility, the plaintiff has likely discovered 
his or her injury and its cause.  No reason exists for the exact 
remedy to be found, implemented, and successful before discovery 
could occur. 
7 The majority concludes that question three of the special 
verdict, which can be found in ¶59 of the majority opinion, is 
problematic——but not an error——because the circuit court was 
addressing only negligence in question three and not the statute 
of limitations.  See majority op., ¶¶46-49.  Because I conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court should have given a statute of 
limitations question, I conclude special verdict question three 
is deficient.  However, I agree with the majority's conclusion 
in ¶¶46-49; circuit courts should separate questions addressing 
statute of limitations and negligence.   
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
8 
 
majority op., ¶68.  The majority can only reach the result it 
sets forth by refusing to give the jury a question based upon 
the testimony presented.  Because of the testimony in this case, 
I disagree with the majority and conclude that a circuit court 
must ask a comparative negligence question, which is not limited 
to use of electricity, unless it can determine as a matter of 
law that the plaintiff could not have contributed to the herd's 
condition.  To conclude otherwise may lead to an economic 
windfall for the plaintiff because it could eliminate the jury's 
response to a significant defense.  
¶94 The majority opinion approves of the circuit court's 
decision 
to 
withhold 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.045(1) 
(2005-06), 
Contributory 
negligence——as 
it 
pertained 
to 
poor 
farming 
practices——from the jury's consideration.  In the case at issue, 
the jury heard testimony about poor farm management, and it 
heard evidence that the Gumzs' farm practices contributed to the 
poor health of the herd.8  Despite that evidence, the majority 
                                                 
8 Relevant testimony of Northern States' expert, Dr. Richard 
Huston: 
Q:  Do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of 
certainty as to whether or not this herd is adversely 
affected by electricity? 
A:  Yes, I do. 
Q:  What is your opinion? 
A:  That it was not. 
Q:  Why do you say that, Dr. Huston? 
A:  Well, for multiple reasons.  First of all, what 
we're looking at up there, if you're going to have a 
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
9 
 
opinion provides no reason for excluding those matters from the 
jury's consideration.   
¶95 The jury heard evidence from Northern States' expert, 
Dr. Huston.  He identified several problems on the Gumzs' farm, 
besides the alleged stray voltage, that caused poor milk 
production. 
 
Dr. 
Huston 
testified 
that 
the 
Gumzs 
were 
responsible for the herd's low milk production in the following 
ways: (1) poor bio-security in that the Gumz did not properly 
isolate new animals coming to the farm, used dirty needles, did 
not wear rubber gloves, and failed to disinfect milking 
equipment between cows; (2) poor feeding practices because of 
low relative feed value of hay, lack of food in front of cows, 
and no transition ration; (3) poor record keeping such as no 
reproduction records and no individual records for cows; 
(4) poor breeding practices because the Gumzs used inexpensive 
bulls, untested bulls, and a bull with physical defects that 
were not conducive to producing good animals; (5) poor cow 
comfort because the Gumzs used stanchion stalls instead of tie 
stalls, 
and 
no 
bedding 
such 
as 
sand 
or 
straw; 
and 
(6) inconsistent milking practices among workers.  Based on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
stray voltage problem, you would expect things to get 
better, and they do.  I've seen that many times, that 
things get better when you correct the problem.  So 
that would be the purest and most simple answer. 
In addition to that, there's a lot of management 
things that have gone on in this farm that are 
contributing to the production levels that are in 
place and have been in place throughout this entire 
period of time. 
(Emphasis added.)  
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
10 
 
verdict submitted to the jury, we can only speculate as to what 
the jury may have done with this information.   
¶96 The 
majority 
opinion 
assumes 
that 
a 
jury 
will 
appropriately focus only on "electrical" damages and thus reduce 
the total damages to only those due to electrical problems.  
However, to allow for appropriate judicial review and a fair 
verdict, it is a better practice for the jury to consider all 
relevant harms causing damages and then detail its findings in 
the special verdict.  For example, in another stray voltage 
case, 
Vogel 
v. 
Grant-Lafayette 
Electric 
Cooperative, 
the 
defendant-utility argued the plaintiffs were negligent in 
design, 
maintenance, 
and 
operation 
of 
their 
electrical 
equipment.  Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Elec. Coop., 201 Wis. 2d 
416, 420, 548 N.W.2d 829 (1996).  The jury awarded $300,000 in 
damages and found the Vogels were one-third negligent.  Id. at 
421.  The circuit court appropriately reduced the damage award 
by one-third to $200,000.  Id.9   
                                                 
9 The circuit court's action on contributory negligence was 
not called into question in Vogel.  However, it is seemingly 
common practice to allow such apportionment.  See Fox v. 
Interstate Power Co., 521 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) 
(finding that the jury's apportionment of fault, 80 percent to 
plaintiff-farmer and 20 percent to defendant-utility, was 
supported by the record because the evidence showed poor bio-
security such as failing to wash hands, sanitize milking 
equipment between cows, provide clean environment for cows, and 
the farmer failed to keep mastitis records); Case v. Consumers 
Power Co., 615 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Mich. 2000) (stating that the jury 
heard evidence on stray voltage and problems on the plaintiff's 
farm, and it found the plaintiff-farmer 55 percent at fault and 
thus the defendant-utility 45 percent at fault); Otte v. Dayton 
Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 837-38 (Ohio 1988) (stating 
that the jury found the plaintiff-farmer 49 percent at fault and 
the defendant-utility 51 percent at fault).   
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
11 
 
¶97 The outcome of the case at hand illustrates why a jury 
must consider both the plaintiff and defendant's conduct.  
Northern 
States 
claims 
the 
Gumzs 
were 
negligent 
in 
the 
management of their farm, which led to decreased milk production 
and poor herd health.  Northern States produced evidence and 
testimony at trial to support its assertion.  On the other hand, 
the Gumzs claimed their problems were due to stray voltage from 
Northern States.  An agricultural economist testified that the 
total economic damages due to lost productivity were $901,183.   
¶98 However, the jury awarded only about one-half of that 
requested figure, $532,336.  Why?  Did the jury conclude that 
the Gumzs' farm practices contributed to the herd's harm in that 
percentage?  Did the jury award the entire amount for lost 
productivity that it thought was proven by the evidence?  What 
did the jury do, if anything, with the information regarding 
poor herd management?  We do not know why the jury awarded about 
half of what the Gumzs requested.  This case illustrates that 
the respective responsibility for negligence may be close to 
that critical 51 percent threshold, which could result in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045, 
Contributory 
negligence, 
barring 
or 
reducing the plaintiffs' damage award.   
¶99 Consider the following hypothetical:  A dairy herd is 
harmed because of both electricity——i.e., stray voltage from the 
utility——and poor farm practices by the farmer.  Damages total 
$100,000 and the plaintiff is 75 percent at fault due to poor 
farm management, while the defendant is 25 percent at fault for 
providing 
stray 
voltage. 
 
Under 
this 
scenario, 
if 
the 
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
12 
 
comparative negligence question is not asked, the plaintiff 
recovers $100,000, but if the comparative negligence question is 
asked, the plaintiff recovers nothing. 
¶100 One may argue that if the special verdict questions 
address only electricity, the jury awards damages only arising 
out of electricity.  E.g., under the above hypothetical, 
$25,000.  However, this may not be the appropriate legal outcome 
if a plaintiff is more responsible for the harm than the 
defendant.  As a result, the circuit court should have given a 
comparative negligence question to the jury that was not limited 
to the use of electricity: an overall damages question and then 
calculate damages accordingly.  
¶101 To allow for appropriate judicial review, a jury must 
consider the different causes and specify on the special verdict 
each party's responsibility, if any, for the harm.  Allowing a 
jury to focus narrowly on electricity may create an economic 
windfall for the plaintiff, unless the court determines as a 
matter of law that the plaintiff could not have been negligent.  
Moreover, while a verdict limiting the inquiry to electricity 
does account for the utility's negligence with respect to stray 
voltage, it does not account for a defense relating to the 
owners' negligent treatment of the herd.  Finally, it leaves the 
jury without an adequate accounting of its reaction to the 
testimony concerning the plaintiffs' farm practices.  These 
issues directly relate to cause and damages; thus, they are 
important for a jury to assess.   
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
13 
 
¶102 The Gumzs' lawsuit is distinguishable from a medical 
malpractice lawsuit.  In a medical malpractice suit, a jury must 
distinguish and separate the natural result in damages that flow 
from the plaintiffs' original injury from the damages that 
naturally resulted from the doctor's treatment.  See Wis JI——
Civil 1023.  In a medical malpractice action, the court 
instructs the jury to "entirely exclude" from its consideration 
"all damages which resulted from the original injury" and 
consider only the damages plaintiff sustained because of the 
treatment by the doctor.  Id.  Here, we have no original injury 
to exclude.  Rather, we have two competing, simultaneous causes 
for the same harm——lost milk production.  
¶103 In medical malpractice, the jury is instructed to find 
that the doctor's negligence was a cause of the present 
condition if it concludes that the present condition was caused 
jointly by the doctor's negligence and the natural progression 
of the plaintiff's injury.  Id.  We have no "natural 
progression" of the plaintiff's injury in this case.  Rather, 
the evidence seemingly supports two competing, simultaneous 
causes for the herd's health problems.  The testimony in this 
case supported the possibility that both the farmer and the 
utility contributed to the injury.  The majority decision 
eliminates the traditional assessment of negligence and damage 
that has stood the test of time in tort law.  I would not carve 
out such a niche in stray voltage cases.  
III 
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
14 
 
¶104 Two possible defenses——statute of limitations and 
contributory 
negligence——have 
been 
taken 
from 
the 
jury's 
consideration.  Because competing inferences can be drawn from 
the undisputed facts in the record about whether the Gumzs were 
reasonably diligent in discovering their injury and its cause, 
the statute of limitations issue should not have been determined 
as a matter of law.  Moreover, because the record contains facts 
that could support both poor farm management and excess stray 
voltage as causes of the herd's poor health, the circuit court 
should have asked a comparative negligence question, which was 
not limited to electricity, in order to allow the jury to assess 
cause and damages fairly. 
¶105 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
¶106 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this dissent. 
 
No.  2005AP1424.akz 
 
 
 
1