Case Title: State v. Ketterer

Citation: 2006-Ohio-5283

Docket Number: 20040485

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. KETTERER, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld. 
(No. 2004-0485 — Submitted February 7, 2006 — Decided October 25, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County,  
No. CR 2003-03-0309. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In the late afternoon on February 24, 2003, defendant-appellant, 
53-year-old Donald Ketterer, beat and stabbed 85-year-old Lawrence Sanders to 
death in Hamilton, Ohio.  Ketterer then stole money and other property and drove 
Sanders’s car away.  Ketterer pleaded guilty to burglary, aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and aggravated murder and 
was sentenced to death. 
{¶ 2} According to his confession, Ketterer went to Sanders’s home on 
Shuler Avenue in Hamilton, Ohio on February 24, 2003, to borrow $200 so he 
could pay a court fine.  Ketterer claimed that Sanders “swore up and down to 
[him] that he did not have the money” and asked Ketterer to leave.  Ketterer felt 
that Sanders “was being very disrespectful,” and he hit Sanders in the head with a 
skillet three times.  Ketterer remembered thinking, “[I]f I just knocked him out, he 
would know who did it, so I thought I should stab him,” which Ketterer did.  
Ketterer further stated that after Sanders “quit moving,” Ketterer took $60 to $70 
out of Sanders’s wallet, searched the house for more money, and found loose and 
rolled coins.  Then he drove away in Sanders’s 1995 Pontiac Grand Am. 
{¶ 3} Mary Gabbard, a friend of Ketterer’s, said that Ketterer was at her 
East Avenue residence on the evening of February 24, wearing yellow gloves that 
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appeared to have blood on them.  When Gabbard asked about the blood, Ketterer 
said that he had been in a fight.  According to Gabbard, latex gloves that police 
found at her residence were similar to those that Ketterer had worn on February 
24.  A forensic scientist concluded that DNA extracted from blood on these 
gloves contained a mixture of DNA that belonged to Sanders and Ketterer. 
{¶ 4} Gabbard also reported that around 11:30 p.m. on February 24, 
Ketterer again stopped by her residence.  Both Gabbard and Ketterer used drugs, 
often together, and Gabbard had supplied drugs to Ketterer.  At that time, Ketterer 
told Gabbard that “he had some stuff that he had stolen,” including “crosses, 
rosaries, costume jewelry” and “a couple hundred dollars worth of change.”  
Ketterer wanted “to trade [these items] for crack cocaine.”  Ketterer also 
explained that “he wanted to go back over there [to Shuler Avenue] because he 
had [by mistake] * * * gotten the woman’s stuff and he wanted the man’s stuff.”  
The evening before, Gabbard had left her home and had bought cocaine for 
Ketterer, using $40 that he had given her.  When Gabbard woke up around 5:30 
a.m. on February 25, Ketterer left her residence.  In his confession, Ketterer 
admitted that at around 4:00 p.m. on February 25, he had returned to Sanders’s 
house for an hour and a half and had stolen silverware and other items. 
{¶ 5} Around 7:00 p.m. on February 25, Hamilton police officer Christy 
Collins impounded Sanders’s abandoned 1995 Pontiac Grand Am, which had 
struck a garage near East Avenue, where Gabbard lived.  After Officer Collins 
traced the car, she went to Sanders’s home, but got no response.  At about that 
same time, Lisa Lawson, a bartender, saw Ketterer at Cindy’s Pub.  When 
Ketterer got up to leave, he dropped a bag, and “stuff [was] laying all over the 
floor,” including coins.  Lawson helped Ketterer put the items into another bag, 
and Ketterer told her, “I’ve got to get out of here.  I have heat on me.”  A cab 
driver then drove Ketterer over to East Avenue. 
January Term, 2006 
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{¶ 6} Shortly after 7:00 p.m. that same evening, police officers seeking 
to interview Ketterer about an unrelated matter found him outside Gabbard’s 
home and asked him to voluntarily come to the station.  Ketterer was carrying a 
plastic bag, which he brought to the station.  Around 8:30 p.m., police advised 
Ketterer of his Miranda rights, which he waived.  Ketterer consented in writing to 
a search of his person and the plastic bag he carried.  Police found a large quantity 
of loose change and rolled coins in Ketterer’s possession, as well as papers that 
mentioned Sanders. 
{¶ 7} That evening, police went to Sanders’s home and discovered his 
mutilated body inside.  The contents of drawers had been dumped on the floor, 
and Sanders’s pants pockets were inside out.  The back of Sanders’s wristwatch 
case was loose, and his watch had stopped at 5:18 or 5:20.  A broken skillet was 
found in the kitchen.  In the alley behind Sanders’s house, police found silverware 
that Ketterer had dropped. 
{¶ 8} Dr. James Swinehart, a pathologist, concluded after an autopsy that 
Sanders had died of “multiple traumatic injuries,” including “a severe 
craniocerebral injury with extensive skull fractures,” nine distinct “stab wounds 
with penetration * * * of the left lung,” and “multiple bilateral rib fractures.”  In 
addition, “two forks, a knife, and a pair of scissors” had been stuck in Sanders’s 
face.  Dr. Swinehart also discovered multiple defensive wounds on Sanders’s 
hands and arms. 
{¶ 9} Around 12:30 a.m., on February 26, after Sanders’s body had been 
found, police returned to the police station.  Police again advised Ketterer of his 
Miranda rights, which he waived.  Ketterer initially denied recollection of 
Sanders’s death.  But during a later interview that morning, Ketterer orally 
confessed and then signed a written confession.  At 5:05 a.m., Ketterer signed 
another statement admitting that he killed Sanders. 
Charges and Verdict 
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{¶ 10} The grand jury indicted Ketterer in Count One for the aggravated 
murder of Sanders in the course of an aggravated robbery.  Count One included 
three death specifications: specification one, R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) (murder to 
escape detection or apprehension), specification two, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) (murder 
during an aggravated robbery), and specification three, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) 
(murder during an aggravated burglary).  The grand jury also indicted Ketterer for 
aggravated robbery in Count Two, aggravated burglary in Count Three, grand 
theft of a motor vehicle in Count Four, and burglary in Count Five.  Count Five 
reflected Ketterer’s return to the crime scene on February 25, the day after the 
murder.  Ketterer waived a jury and pleaded guilty, as charged, before a three-
judge panel.  Following the state’s presentation of evidence, the panel found 
Ketterer guilty as charged. 
{¶ 11} After a penalty-phase hearing, the three-judge panel sentenced 
Ketterer to death for the aggravated murder of Sanders and to prison terms, as 
well as fines, for the other felonies. 
{¶ 12} The case is now on direct appeal to our court, and Ketterer presents 
15 propositions of law for our consideration.  We find no merit in any of his 
propositions.  Hence, we affirm the findings of guilt.  We have independently 
weighed the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors and have 
considered the appropriateness of the death sentence.  For the reasons that follow, 
we affirm the judgment of the trial court, including the death sentence. 
Jury Waiver and Guilty Plea (II) 
{¶ 13} In proposition II, Ketterer argues that he did not “knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily” waive a jury trial and enter a guilty plea.  Ketterer 
further argues that the trial court did not adequately inform him of his rights, 
particularly in view of his mental illness and medication. 
{¶ 14} Contrary to Ketterer’s claims, the record establishes that Ketterer 
consulted with his lawyers and was competent to be tried, plead guilty, make 
January Term, 2006 
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decisions about his case, and communicate with his attorneys.  Further, the record 
is clear that Ketterer understood what he was doing by waiving a jury trial and 
pleading guilty as charged to the indictment.  The following transcript of the 
proceedings at the trial court supports these conclusions: 
{¶ 15} “JUDGE ONEY: Mr Ketterer, I have in front of me where you 
have signed a jury waiver. 
{¶ 16} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
{¶ 17} “JUDGE ONEY: And have you consulted with your attorneys on 
this procedure? 
{¶ 18} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am, I have. 
{¶ 19} “JUDGE ONEY: And you talked with them several times leading 
up to also talking with them last night and talking with them this morning; is that 
correct? 
{¶ 20} “THE DEFENDANT: That’s correct. 
{¶ 21} “JUDGE ONEY:  And * * * did you receive advice from your 
attorneys in regard to the procedure?  
{¶ 22} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
{¶ 23} “JUDGE ONEY: And you understand that—what the function of 
the jury would be that you have a potential to go to a jury, and they would be 
making a decision as to guilt or innocence on the charges.  Do you understand 
that? 
{¶ 24} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
{¶ 25} “JUDGE ONEY:  And then if they found [you] guilty on the Count 
One, the aggravated murder, then they would also be making a decision as to the 
proper sentence to impose.  Do you understand that? 
{¶ 26} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.” 
{¶ 27} “* 
* 
* 
 
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{¶ 28} “JUDGE ONEY: And with these discussions with your attorneys, 
are you satisfied with their advice? 
{¶ 29} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
{¶ 30} “JUDGE ONEY: And are you satisfied with their preparation on 
their case on your behalf? 
{¶ 31} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am, I am. 
{¶ 32} “JUDGE ONEY: When you discussed with the attorneys, the pros 
and cons—did you discuss the pros and cons of going to a jury or going to a 
three-judge panel? 
{¶ 33} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, we did. 
{¶ 34} “JUDGE ONEY:  And did you discuss * * * with your attorneys 
that if you waived the jury, that there is a three-judge panel, and the matter could 
be even tried to the three-judge panel.  Do you understand that? 
{¶ 35} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
{¶ 36} “JUDGE ONEY: Or a guilty plea could be entered? 
{¶ 37} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
{¶ 38} “JUDGE ONEY:  And if a guilty plea was entered or if and there 
was a trial and the three-judge panel found that you were guilty of aggravated 
murder, there would be a second trial phase on the aggravating factors and 
mitigating circumstances, do you understand that? 
{¶ 39} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
{¶ 40} “JUDGE ONEY: And it is your intention then to * * * continue 
with your jury waiver and go with a three judge panel? 
{¶ 41} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.” 
{¶ 42} “* 
* 
* 
 
{¶ 43} “JUDGE ONEY: Mr. Ketterer, can you read and write? 
{¶ 44} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
{¶ 45} “JUDGE ONEY: I have here a jury waiver, did you read this? 
January Term, 2006 
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{¶ 46} “THE DEFENDANT: I just signed it about ten minutes ago. 
{¶ 47} “JUDGE ONEY: Did you read it beforehand though? 
{¶ 48} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
{¶ 49} “JUDGE ONEY: And did you discuss this with your attorney? 
{¶ 50} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
{¶ 51} “JUDGE ONEY: And did you understand that you are waiving the 
right to have this matter go to trial by the jury that is upstairs? 
{¶ 52} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 
{¶ 53} “JUDGE ONEY:  Are you entering – doing this waiver 
voluntarily?  Have any threats been made to you to get you to do this? 
{¶ 54} “THE DEFENDANT: No. 
{¶ 55} “JUDGE ONEY: Have any promises been made to you to get you 
to do this? 
{¶ 56} “THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am. 
{¶ 57} “JUDGE ONEY: Do you have any problems with the English 
language? Do you understand this? 
{¶ 58} “THE DEFENDANT: I understand it perfectly. 
{¶ 59} “JUDGE ONEY:  Are you * * * knowingly and intelligently and 
voluntarily waving your right to a jury trial? 
{¶ 60} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am, I am.” 
{¶ 61} Further, Ketterer personally acknowledged that he understood that 
the three-judge panel would decide the sentence if he waived a jury trial. 
{¶ 62} “JUDGE ONEY:  You understand that if [this case] goes to a 
three-judge panel, not only will they be determining guilt, but they will also be 
determining the sentence that would be involved? 
{¶ 63} “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am, I do.” 
{¶ 64} Later that afternoon, before accepting his guilty plea, the court 
conducted a further inquiry of Ketterer to ensure he understood his jury-trial 
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waiver, how the case would proceed before a three-judge panel, and the 
ramifications of a guilty plea. 
{¶ 65} Jury waiver.  Ketterer’s complaint about the extent of the court’s 
inquiry into his jury-trial waiver lacks merit.  In State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio 
St.3d 22, 559 N.E.2d 464, paragraph one of the syllabus, we held: “There is no 
requirement for a trial court to interrogate a defendant in order to determine 
whether he or she is fully apprised of the right to a jury trial.”  Further, “[t]he 
Criminal Rules and the Revised Code are satisfied by a written waiver, signed by 
the defendant, filed with the court, and made in open court, after arraignment and 
opportunity to consult with counsel.”  Id. at 26, 559 N.E.2d 464.  Accord State v. 
Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 N.E.2d 836, ¶ 53; State v. 
Baston (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 421, 709 N.E.2d 128; State v. Spivey (1998), 
81 Ohio St.3d 405, 408-409, 692 N.E.2d 151. 
{¶ 66} Moreover, in State v. Turner, 105 Ohio St.3d 331, 2005-Ohio-
1938, 826 N.E.2d 266, ¶ 25, we held, “[A] written jury waiver is presumed to 
have been voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,” citing United States v. Sammons 
(C.A.6, 1990), 918 F.2d 592, 597.  Accord State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 
321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 41. 
{¶ 67} In this case, Ketterer has presented no basis to rebut that 
presumption.  The inquiry previously quoted reflects that Ketterer’s decision to 
waive a jury was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision.  In addition, Dr. 
Bobbie Hopes, a clinical psychologist, concluded on January 16, 2004, 11 days 
before the jury waiver, that Ketterer was competent to stand trial and make 
decisions about his case.  On January 20, the trial court found Ketterer competent 
to stand trial. 
{¶ 68} Contrary to Ketterer’s claim, the trial court was not required to 
specifically advise Ketterer on the need for juror unanimity.  We rejected similar 
claims in State v Bays (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 19-21, 716 N.E.2d 1126, citing 
January Term, 2006 
9 
 
United States v. Martin (C.A.6, 1983), 704 F.2d 267.  In Bays, we noted that “a 
defendant need not have a complete or technical understanding of the jury trial 
right in order to knowingly and intelligently waive it.”  Id. at 20, 716 N.E.2d 
1126.  Nor is the trial court “required to inform the defendant of all the possible 
implications of waiver.”  Id.  Accord Sowell v. Bradshaw (C.A.6, 2004), 372 F.3d 
821, 833-836; State v. Turner, 105 Ohio St.3d 331, 2005-Ohio-1938, 826 N.E.2d 
266, ¶ 24-25;  Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, 
¶ 44-46 (accused need not be told of jury unanimity to convict and to impose 
sentence). 
{¶ 69} Thus, the trial court need not explain a wide variety of legal 
concepts, such as reasonable doubt, to secure a valid jury waiver.  As the United 
States Supreme Court has noted, “the law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, 
intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of 
the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances—even 
though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of 
invoking it.”  (Emphasis sic.)  United States v. Ruiz (2002), 536 U.S. 622, 629, 
122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586. 
{¶ 70} Moreover, “[s]ince Jells holds that no inquiry is required, the trial 
court’s failure to make specific inquiries of the defendant cannot be error.”  State 
v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 238, 714 N.E.2d 867; Baston, 85 Ohio 
St.3d at 422, 709 N.E.2d 128 (colloquy on the standard of review on appeal not 
needed).  Further, the court’s reference to a jury’s deciding “guilt or innocence” 
was not misleading, but reflected simply a shorthand explanation. 
{¶ 71} Ketterer also challenges his jury waiver on the grounds that the 
trial court did not adequately inquire into medication that he was taking.  
However, we hold that the trial court did conduct an adequate inquiry into 
Ketterer’s medication and determined that it did not affect Ketterer’s 
understanding of the proceedings or his decision-making ability.  The fact that a 
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defendant is taking antidepressant medication or prescribed psychotropic drugs 
does not negate his competence to stand trial.  See Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 
321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 36-39; State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 
350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 38. 
{¶ 72} Further, Dr. Hopes had found Ketterer competent in this case and 
noted at the time of the evaluation that Ketterer “was receiving psychotropic 
medication, which may have been controlling many symptoms of mental illness, 
but he continued to exhibit residual symptoms.”  The trial court had found 
Ketterer competent, and the court could rely upon its own observations because 
Ketterer had appeared before the court on several occasions.  Also, Ketterer’s 
counsel never challenged their client’s ability to understand the jury-waiver or 
guilty-plea process. 
{¶ 73} The fact is that “nobody on the spot thought [defendant’s] behavior 
raised any question as to his competence.” (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Cowans 
(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 68, 84, 717 N.E.2d 298.  Cf. State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 309, 2002-Ohio-6624, 779 N.E.2d 1017, ¶ 39; State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 184, 2003-Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 303, ¶ 27-34.  “[F]actual determinations 
are best left to those who see and hear what goes on in the courtroom.”  Cowans, 
87 Ohio St.3d at 84, 717 N.E.2d 298. 
{¶ 74} Ketterer voluntarily signed his waiver, and his signed waiver is in 
the case file.  “Pursuant to Jells, no more was required.”  Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 
at 238, 714 N.E.2d 867.  Accord Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-
3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 43; State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 309, 2002-Ohio-
6624, 779 N.E.2d 1017, ¶ 26. 
{¶ 75} Guilty plea.  In challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea, 
Ketterer again challenges the sufficiency of the trial court’s inquiry into the 
medication he was taking.  Again, we find no error.  Ketterer also asserts 
deficiencies in his understanding of the legal process based on the pretrial 
January Term, 2006 
11 
 
competency report.  But that report was issued 11 days before Ketterer pleaded 
guilty.  Thus, that report was issued before counsel had lengthy discussions with 
Ketterer and before the trial court’s inquiry on his jury waiver and guilty plea. 
{¶ 76} Here, the trial court fully complied with the requirements to accept 
a guilty plea.  See State v. Turner, 105 Ohio St.3d 331, 2005-Ohio-1938, 826 
N.E.2d 266, ¶ 33-34; State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 20 O.O.3d 397, 
423 N.E.2d 115, paragraph one of the syllabus; Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).  We hold 
that the inquiry was adequate.  Cf. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-
3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 57 (aside from specific duties of the court delineated in 
Crim.R. 11(C), if counsel has informed a defendant of the statutory and 
constitutional rights that a guilty plea would forgo, the court need not); State v. 
Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 62-85. 
{¶ 77} In this case, the trial court conducted a thorough inquiry in open 
court to ensure that Ketterer’s guilty plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily.  The court informed Ketterer at length of the possible sentences that 
could be imposed on the aggravated murder charge as well as the other charges, 
that a separate hearing would be held to determine the penalty on the aggravated-
murder charge, and that the three-judge panel would determine, after hearing 
evidence, what penalty to impose. 
{¶ 78} Ketterer agreed that no threats or promises had been made to 
induce his plea.  Further, Ketterer acknowledged that he understood that he was 
waiving his right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
his right to confront witnesses, his right to subpoena witnesses, and his right to 
remain silent or to testify, as he chose.  He further asked that the court accept his 
guilty plea to all charges and specifications. 
{¶ 79} Ketterer acknowledged that he had discussed his jury waiver and 
guilty pleas with his attorneys and was satisfied with their advice and “with the 
efforts that they have made in representing” him.  Further, when asked whether he 
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had any questions about the plea or needed to talk with his lawyers more, Ketterer 
responded, “No, we talked it over last night for quite a bit and talked it over today 
quite a bit.  And I wish to go on with it.”  Ketterer also signed written guilty pleas 
that fully acknowledged his rights.  For the foregoing reasons, we reject 
proposition II. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Guilty Plea (I) 
{¶ 80} In proposition I, Ketterer contends that when defense counsel 
advise their client to plead guilty to a capital offense without first securing an 
agreement that a life sentence be imposed, they are per se ineffective. 
{¶ 81} Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance requires that the 
defendant show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair trial.  Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 
373, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that the “two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges 
to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.”  Hill v. Lockhart 
(1985), 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203.  Accord State v. Bird 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 582, 585, 692 N.E.2d 1013. 
{¶ 82} Ketterer claims that counsel were ineffective because they advised 
him to plead guilty without attempting to negotiate a life sentence.  But the record 
does not reflect whether Ketterer, through counsel, attempted to exchange a guilty 
plea for a life sentence.  Further, nothing in the record supports Ketterer’s claim 
that his counsel instructed Ketterer to plead guilty. 
{¶ 83} In addition, the record contradicts Ketterer’s claim that counsel 
“did not talk with their client” about proceeding with a guilty plea after the court 
ruled that a guilty plea before a panel precluded jury sentencing.  In addition to 
the dialogue quoted earlier, the record contains the following additional dialogue: 
January Term, 2006 
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{¶ 84} “[Defense counsel] MR. HOWARD:  It’s our intention, Judge, to 
present or enter our guilty plea to a three-judge panel, and we have discussed that 
with Mr. Ketterer.  We discussed that with him yesterday afternoon and quite 
lengthy discussion at the jail, and we discussed it with him here again this 
morning. * * * [I]f he does waive the right to have a jury hear the trial phase, then 
he also waives that right to have the jury * * * hear the sentencing phase, and he 
is aware then that if he pleads to a three judge panel that the mitigation evidence 
will also be presented to the three judge panel * * *.” 
{¶ 85} Second, even assuming that Ketterer’s counsel had advised their 
client to plead guilty, a fact not established, that advice does not reflect ineffective 
assistance of counsel per se.  “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Accord 
Bird, 81 Ohio St.3d at 585, 692 N.E.2d 1013 (judicial scrutiny of counsel’s 
tactical decisions, including recommending to the client a no-contest plea, must 
be highly deferential). 
{¶ 86} Counsel may have reasonably believed that a guilty plea could 
minimize the effect of gruesome facts and a brutal murder, especially before a 
three-judge panel.  By pleading guilty before a three-judge panel, counsel 
obtained the benefit of substantial mitigation evidence, namely remorse and a plea 
of guilty.  See, e.g., State v. Ashworth (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 72, 706 N.E.2d 
1231 (“guilty pleas are traditionally accorded substantial weight in imposing a 
sentence”).  Further, there was overwhelming evidence of Ketterer’s guilt.  
Forensic evidence linked Ketterer to the crime, and he confessed, was found in 
possession of the victim’s personal property, and admitted the crime to Gabbard. 
{¶ 87} Counsel’s advice therefore reflects reasonable representation under 
Strickland.  In Shaw v. Martin (C.A.4, 1984), 733 F.2d 304, 316, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that counsel’s recommendation of a guilty plea in a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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capital case “was the product of their sound deliberation and judgment that [the 
defendant’s] prospects were better with the sentencing judge than with a jury, 
especially considering the brutal and utterly sadistic facts of the case.”  See, also, 
Reid v. True (C.A.4, 2003), 349 F.3d 788 (counsel’s deficient performance not 
shown in guilty plea to capital offense); Carpenter v. State (Okla.Crim.1996), 929 
P.2d 988, 999 (counsel not ineffective when accused pleaded no contest in capital 
case). 
{¶ 88} In Wilson v. State (1983), 99 Nev. 362, 372, 664 P.2d 328, the 
Nevada Supreme Court noted that counsel “encouraged [their clients] to plead 
guilty [to capital murder] so that they would be sentenced by a three judge panel 
rather than be exposed to a jury.”  The Nevada court held that such “advice and 
recommendation * * * are largely tactical decisions.  We * * * will not second 
guess such matters when they relate to trial strategy.” 
{¶ 89} Third, the record does not demonstrate that Ketterer pleaded guilty 
based on any deficient advice from counsel.  In ineffective-assistance claims in 
guilty-plea cases, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial.”  Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 
203.  Cf. Bird, 81 Ohio St.3d at 585, 692 N.E.2d 1013 (no prejudice shown by 
guilty plea); State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 525, 584 N.E.2d 715 
(defendant failed to prove he would not have pleaded guilty if attorney’s advice 
had been correct); State v. Brooks (Iowa 1996), 555 N.W.2d 446, 448 (“where a 
factual basis exists for the plea, counsel usually will not be found ineffective for 
allowing the defendant to plead guilty”). 
{¶ 90} Moreover, as the Supreme Court recognized, “[i]n many guilty 
plea cases, the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by 
courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through 
a trial.”  Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203.  In view of the 
January Term, 2006 
15 
 
compelling evidence of Ketterer’s guilt, any rational jury or panel of three judges 
would have convicted him whatever his plea.  Thus, Ketterer has failed to 
establish “a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result 
of the trial would have been different.”  Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 
373, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Accordingly, we reject proposition I. 
Sufficiency of Evidence (III) 
{¶ 91} In proposition III, Ketterer argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove his guilt as to the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) (murder to escape 
detection, apprehension, or punishment) death-penalty specification.  Hence, he 
argues that because the state did not prove the (A)(3) death-penalty specification, 
the three-judge panel considered an invalid aggravating circumstance, a flaw that 
renders his death sentence invalid. 
{¶ 92} Under Crim.R. 11(B)(1), “[t]he plea of guilty is a complete 
admission of the defendant’s guilt.”  Accord State v. Wilson (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 
52, 12 O.O.3d 51, 388 N.E.2d 745, paragraph one of the syllabus (“a counseled 
plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt which removes issues of factual guilt 
from the case * * * ”). 
{¶ 93} Nonetheless, when the offense charged is a capital offense, R.C. 
2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3) require the state to prove guilt of an aggravated-
murder charge with death specifications even when an accused pleads guilty.  See 
State v. Green (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 100, 689 N.E.2d 556, syllabus.  Hence, in 
Ohio, “[c]hallenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are therefore expressly 
permitted on aggravated murder charges” even when the accused pleads guilty.  
Carpenter v. Mohr (C.A.6, 1998), 163 F.3d 938, 946, reversed on other grounds, 
Edwards v. Carpenter (2000), 529 U.S. 446, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518.  
Accord State v. Taylor (1972), 30 Ohio App.2d 252, 258-259, 59 O.O.2d 398, 285 
N.E.2d 89 (sufficiency challenges permitted in guilty-plea aggravated-murder 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
cases); State v. Wright (Apr. 30, 2001), Allen App. No. 1-2000-71, 2001 WL 
454670, *2, following Taylor. 
{¶ 94} We hold that the evidence was sufficient to establish Ketterer’s 
guilt of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) specification.  In reviewing a record for 
sufficiency, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. 
Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259-260, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  We will not disturb a verdict on appeal on sufficiency grounds unless 
“reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.”  
State v. Dennis (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683 N.E.2d 1096. 
{¶ 95} In this case, the trial court had ample evidence from which to find 
that Ketterer had struck Sanders, thereby committing a felonious assault, and that 
Ketterer then had decided to kill Sanders so that Sanders did not live to identify 
Ketterer as his assailant.  In his pretrial confession, Ketterer recalled, “I remember 
then when I hit him with the skillet I was thinking if I just knocked him out, he 
would know who did it, so I thought I should stab him.  And I don’t think he 
moved anymore after I stabbed him.” 
{¶ 96} Moreover, Ketterer admitted that he had assaulted Sanders because 
he felt that Sanders “was being very disrespectful” to him.  Then Ketterer 
repeatedly used considerable force to ensure that Sanders did not live to identify 
him.  Dr. Swinehart, the pathologist, noted that Sanders had a “cranial cerebral 
injury of significant nature” with numerous lacerations and contusions, skull 
fractures at the top and base of the skull, and extensive brain hemorrhages under 
the skull fractures.  Sanders also suffered from “nine distinct stab wounds,” and in 
addition, “two forks, a knife, and a pair of scissors” were stuck in his face.  
Sanders also had multiple rib fractures. 
January Term, 2006 
17 
 
{¶ 97} Further, Ketterer’s assault on Sanders was not a single act.  In fact, 
the multiple blows with the skillet, nine distinct stab wounds to the chest, four 
distinct objects stuck in Sanders’s face, and multiple rib fractures establish that 
Ketterer systematically and repeatedly assaulted Sanders. 
{¶ 98} In view of Ketterer’s admission that he killed Sanders in order to 
silence him as a witness, as well as the evidence of Sanders’s injuries, we hold the 
evidence sufficient to prove the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) violation.  In other cases, we 
have found similar evidence sufficient to prove a R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) violation.  
See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 98 Ohio St.3d 514, 2003-Ohio-2284, 787 N.E.2d 1185, ¶ 
94 (jury could infer defendant killed victim “to eliminate the only witness against 
him”); State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 684 N.E.2d 668 (defendants 
decided to kill the robbery victims because they “didn’t want [the victims] to tell 
on them”); State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 24, 544 N.E.2d 895 (victim 
discovered name of accomplice during crime and was killed for that reason). 
{¶ 99} Because the evidence proved the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) death-penalty 
specification, we reject Ketterer’s claim that the death penalty rests upon an 
invalid aggravating circumstance.  We further hold that the (A)(3) specification 
represented a separate and distinct aggravating circumstance from the (A)(7) 
specifications alleging murder during a burglary and robbery.  See State v. Noling, 
98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 81. 
Ineffective Assistance in General (IV) 
{¶ 100} In proposition IV, Ketterer claims that his attorneys provided 
ineffective assistance in maintaining the attorney-client relationship and in failing 
to secure the suppression of evidence, obtain DNA testing, object to death 
specifications, and assist effectively in presenting mitigation evidence.  We will 
discuss these ineffective-assistance claims separately. 
{¶ 101} Essential attorney-client relationship.  Ketterer claims that his 
attorneys were ineffective “for failing to establish the essential attorney-client 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
relationship” because his lawyers failed to earn his trust or keep in close contact.  
However, the “Sixth Amendment does not guarantee ‘rapport’ or a ‘meaningful 
relationship’ between client and counsel.”  State v. Henness (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 
53, 65, 679 N.E.2d 686, quoting Morris v. Slappy (1983), 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 
S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610.  Instead, “[t]here is only a right to professionally 
competent, effective representation.”  State v. McNeill (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 
452, 700 N.E.2d 596.  In this case, the record does not establish deficient 
representation or prejudice. 
{¶ 102} Ketterer, a difficult client, fixated on pleading not guilty by 
reason of insanity (“NGRI”) and complained that his lawyers did not spend time 
with him or follow his advice on how to proceed.  According to Dr. Bobbie 
Hopes, Ketterer “tended to jump to incorrect conclusions and to make poor 
decisions, due to impaired judgment and reasoning ability.”  Ketterer also 
solicited legal advice from fellow prisoners, conduct that caused problems.  
According to Dr. Hopes, Ketterer also misinterpreted efforts by his lawyers to 
represent him.   We find, however, no credible evidence that counsel spent 
insufficient time with their client, failed to expend appropriate effort to 
communicate with or advise their client, or provided deficient representation.  In 
fact, at several points during Ketterer’s jury waiver and guilty plea, Ketterer 
asserted that he had talked with his lawyers at length and was satisfied with his 
attorneys and with their efforts to assist him.  Further, Ketterer has not 
demonstrated that “a reasonable probability [exists] that, were it not for counsel’s 
errors, the result of the trial would have been different.”  Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 
136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.  We reject Ketterer’s claims 
that the trial court should have replaced his counsel, as we discuss later in 
connection with proposition VII. 
{¶ 103} Ineffective assistance relating to suppression motion.  We also 
reject Ketterer’s contention that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
January Term, 2006 
19 
 
representation when counsel argued that Ketterer’s pretrial statements to police 
should have been suppressed. 
{¶ 104} First, Ketterer’s guilty plea waived any complaint as to claims of 
constitutional violations not related to the entry of the guilty plea.  See 
Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 78; State v. 
Spates (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 595 N.E.2d 351, paragraph two of the syllabus 
(guilty plea waives defendant’s right to challenge deprivation of counsel at 
preliminary hearing stage); State v. Kelley (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 
658, paragraph two of the syllabus (a plea of guilty “effectively waives all 
appealable errors” at trial unrelated to the entry of the plea). 
{¶ 105} Second, Ketterer has failed to show deficient performance from 
the lack of testimony from a substance-abuse expert at the suppression hearing.  
“[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  Further, Ketterer’s claim that he was 
prejudiced by the lack of such testimony is entirely speculative.  Ketterer has no 
proffer in the record to support that claim.  See Clark v. Mitchell (C.A.6, 2005), 
425 F.3d 270, 283 (neither deficient performance nor prejudice established 
although counsel did not secure services of neuropsychologist or pharmacology 
expert at pretrial suppression hearing). 
{¶ 106} Third, even if counsel had used different tactics in pursuing the 
suppression motion, such as objecting to hearsay or pointing out that Ketterer had 
lied in his pretrial statements, no evidence exists that a different result would have 
occurred.  Thus, Ketterer has not established prejudice, which Strickland requires. 
{¶ 107} DNA testing.  Counsel’s decision not to more vigorously pursue 
DNA testing of hairs allegedly found in the victim’s hands also reflected a 
reasoned tactical judgment and reasonable professional judgment.  Ketterer 
confessed to the crime and pleaded guilty.  Moreover, Ketterer cannot establish 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
prejudice on this claim, as counsel concedes, because the record does not reflect 
the DNA results.  Cf. State v. Foust, 105 Ohio St.3d 137, 2004-Ohio-7006, 823 
N.E.2d 836, ¶ 98-99; State v. Hartman (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 298-299, 754 
N.E.2d 1150. 
{¶ 108} Objections to specifications.  Ketterer claims that his counsel 
were ineffective for failing to object to the death-penalty specifications.  Here, 
Ketterer recasts meritless arguments that we have rejected elsewhere.  As we 
discuss in connection with proposition VI, murder during a robbery and murder 
during a burglary are not duplicative death specifications.  Further, the evidence 
proved Ketterer’s guilt of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) death-penalty specification, as 
we discussed in connection with proposition III.  Thus, Ketterer has shown neither 
deficient performance nor prejudice pursuant to Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 109} Ineffective assistance in mitigation.  Ketterer claims that his 
counsel provided ineffective representation in the mitigation phase by failing to 
present testimony from a substance-abuse expert, by allowing their client to admit 
he deserved the death penalty, by failing to argue the contributory roles of others 
in Sanders’s death, and by not objecting to prosecutorial misconduct.  However, 
we reject Ketterer’s claims because Ketterer establishes neither deficient 
performance nor prejudice. 
{¶ 110} First, we find no evidence in the record as to what a substance-
abuse expert would have said in the penalty phase.  Thus, Ketterer has not 
demonstrated prejudice from missing such testimony.  Further, Ketterer had 
available two psychologists who were competent to testify about Ketterer’s 
extensive drug-abuse problems and did so. 
{¶ 111} Second, Ketterer claims that counsel were ineffective because 
Ketterer, in reading his written unsworn statement, said, “I know I should be put 
to death.”  But the record does not show that counsel coached or agreed to what 
January Term, 2006 
21 
 
Ketterer said.  Moreover, Ketterer’s personal and genuine remorse, as well as his 
honest recognition of the severity of his own crimes, may reflect an astute tactical 
move by counsel before a three-judge panel.  “Representation is an art, and an act 
or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in 
another.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. 
{¶ 112} Third, Ketterer claims that counsel should have presented 
evidence and argument concerning “Butler County’s and Donald Williams’s 
contributory roles in events leading to the victim’s death.”  According to evidence 
at the suppression hearing, Donald Williams was a drug dealer, the owner of 
premises where Gabbard stayed, and an alleged police informant.  Nonetheless, 
defense counsel’s decision not to attempt to blame others for crimes that Ketterer 
confessed to committing alone clearly fell “within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.”  Id. at 689, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  Moreover, we find no basis to believe that such an approach would have 
produced different results. 
{¶ 113} Fourth, we reject Ketterer’s claim that counsel failed to make 
appropriate objections.  As we discuss in connection with propositions VII and 
IX, these claims have no merit. 
{¶ 114} Finally, we reject Ketterer’s claim that the “cumulative effect of 
defense counsel’s errors establishes ineffective assistance.”  Ketterer’s counsel 
provided competent advice and representation.  Moreover, compelling evidence 
of guilt left counsel no reasonable opportunity to contest guilt, other than by a 
motion to suppress, which counsel filed and vigorously pursued.  As to 
mitigation, we find no particular deficiencies in counsel’s performance.  In sum, 
counsel did the best they could with what they had.  Cf. State v. Ballew (1996), 76 
Ohio St.3d 244, 256, 667 N.E.2d 369.  Ketterer has not established either 
deficient performance or prejudice, both of which Strickland requires in order to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.  For the foregoing reasons, we 
overrule proposition IV. 
Suppression Issues (V, XII) 
{¶ 115} In proposition V, Ketterer argues that the trial court erred “by 
denying defense counsel’s pretrial motion to suppress Ketterer’s involuntary and 
coerced statements to the police.”  In proposition XII, Ketterer argues that the 
police failed to honor Ketterer’s rights by not clarifying his comment about 
counsel before continuing to question him. 
{¶ 116} At the outset, we reject propositions V and XII because 
Ketterer’s guilty plea waived his right to contest these issues on appeal.  “[A] 
defendant who * * * voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently enters a guilty plea 
with the assistance of counsel ‘may not thereafter raise independent claims 
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry 
of the guilty plea.’ ”   Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 
N.E.2d 927, ¶ 78, quoting Tollett v. Henderson (1973), 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 
S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235.  In Fitzpatrick, we applied this principle to preclude 
challenges to rulings on various pretrial motions.  102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-
Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 79.  Accord Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 595 N.E.2d 
351, paragraph two of the syllabus (guilty plea waives defendant’s right to 
challenge deprivation of counsel at preliminary-hearing stage); Kelley, 57 Ohio 
St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658, paragraph two of the syllabus (a plea of guilty 
“effectively waives all appealable errors” at trial unrelated to the entry of the 
plea). 
Duplicative Counts and Circumstances (VI) 
{¶ 117} In proposition VI, Ketterer argues that aggravated robbery 
(Count Two) and aggravated burglary (Count Three), as well as the death 
specifications charging aggravated murder in the course of aggravated robbery 
(specification two) and aggravated burglary (specification three) are duplicative 
January Term, 2006 
23 
 
counts and specifications.  Thus, Ketterer argues that these offenses and 
specifications reflect an indivisible course of conduct and are allied offenses of 
similar import pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(A) (multiple counts); See, e.g., State v. 
Mitchell (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 416, 417-418, 6 OBR 463, 453 N.E.2d 593. 
{¶ 118} However, we have consistently held that “[a]ggravated burglary 
and aggravated robbery are separate offenses and constitute separate aggravating 
circumstances because they do not arise from the same act.”  State v. Williams 
(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 580, 660 N.E.2d 724.  See, also, State v. Fears (1999), 
86 Ohio St.3d 329, 344, 715 N.E.2d 136; State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 
670, 681, 687 N.E.2d 1358; State v. Murphy (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 554, 577-578, 
605 N.E.2d 884; State v. Barnes (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 203, 207, 25 OBR 266, 
495 N.E.2d 922; State v. Frazier (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 253, 256, 12 O.O.3d 263, 
389 N.E.2d 1118. 
{¶ 119} As we recently held in State v. Monroe, 105 Ohio St.3d 384, 
2005-Ohio-2282, 827 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 68, “[t]he aggravated-burglary and 
aggravated-robbery specifications were also not subject to merger, since they 
were committed with separate animus.  The burglary was complete as soon as [the 
defendant] entered the apartment by deception with the intent to commit a theft 
offense.  [The defendant] then attempted to rob [the victims]. * * * Thus, the 
aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery were separate offenses and 
constituted separate aggravating circumstances because they did not arise from 
the same act.”  Accordingly, we reject proposition VI. 
Miscellaneous Trial Issues (VII) 
{¶ 120} In proposition VII, Ketterer cites various constitutional 
provisions and raises eight separate challenges to his conviction and death 
sentence.  However, we reject each of these challenges. 
{¶ 121} Separate penalty-phase jury.  Ketterer first argues that the trial 
court denied his constitutional right to have a jury determine the penalty to be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
imposed.  See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona (2002), 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 
L.Ed.2d 556, interpreting Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 
2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, which reiterates a defendant’s right to have a jury find the 
facts relevant to sentencing. 
{¶ 122} However, we reject Ketterer’s argument because Ketterer 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.  Later, he 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pleaded guilty as charged.  On both 
occasions, Ketterer acknowledged that he was waiving any right to have a jury 
decide what penalty to impose for the aggravated murder.  Having freely 
relinquished his right, he cannot now argue that the trial court denied that right.  
“When a defendant pleads guilty he or she, of course, forgoes not only a fair trial, 
but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees.”  Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628, 
122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586, citing Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 
243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274.  Accord United States v. Bradley (C.A.6, 
2005), 400 F.3d 459, 463 (a plea agreement “most pertinently [waives] the right 
to a trial by jury”). 
{¶ 123} Further, the applicable statute, R.C. 2945.06, as well as Crim.R. 
11(C)(3), contains no provisions permitting an accused charged with aggravated 
murder to waive a jury, request that three judges determine guilt upon a plea of 
guilty, and then have a jury decide the penalty.  Instead, R.C. 2945.06 directs, “If 
the accused pleads guilty of aggravated murder, a court composed of three judges 
shall examine the witnesses * * * [and determine guilt] and pronounce sentence 
accordingly.”  (Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 124} Moreover, in State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin, 104 Ohio St.3d 279, 
2004-Ohio-6384, 819 N.E.2d 644, we issued a writ of prohibition against a trial 
judge who had created “a hybrid procedure—a jury sentencing hearing to make 
certain findings upon which [the trial judge] would base his sentencing decision.” 
Id. at ¶ 17.  We held that by creating a nonstatutory procedure to convene a jury, 
January Term, 2006 
25 
 
the trial court “proceeded in a manner in which he patently and unambiguously 
lacked jurisdiction to act.”  Id.  For the foregoing reasons, we reject Ketterer’s 
complaint about the failure of the trial court to convene a sentencing jury. 
{¶ 125} Evidence at plea hearing.  Ketterer asserts that in view of his 
guilty plea, the trial court erred to his prejudice in admitting the following at the 
plea hearing: (a) evidence that a knife, two forks, and a scissors had been stuck in 
Sanders’s face, (b) blood and DNA evidence, and (c) evidence of other acts 
committed by Ketterer reflected in his pretrial confession. 
{¶ 126} However, as we noted earlier, when a defendant pleads guilty to 
aggravated murder in a capital case, a three-judge panel must receive evidence in 
order to make a Crim.R. 11 determination as to the guilt of the defendant.  Green, 
81 Ohio St.3d 100, 689 N.E.2d 556, syllabus.  Moreover, “[t]he admission or 
exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”  
State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 31 OBR 375, 510 N.E.2d 343, paragraph 
two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 127} Here the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting, over 
objection, evidence that a knife, two forks, and a scissors had been stuck in 
Sanders’s face.  Evidence of the victim’s wounds was relevant to establish 
Ketterer’s intent to kill, an essential element of the offense.  Also, the state was 
required to prove the facts and circumstances of the offenses, including the 
victim’s injuries.  Further, the trial panel was required to examine the nature and 
circumstances of the aggravated murder to determine whether any mitigating facts 
exist.  See State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 354, 662 N.E.2d 311 
(“the court is required to review this factor”); R.C 2929.04(B). 
{¶ 128} Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence 
of blood and DNA analysis that linked Ketterer to the killing of Sanders.  The 
state was required to establish Ketterer’s identity as the killer, and the blood and 
DNA evidence helped to prove that fact.  Evid. R. 401. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
{¶ 129} Ketterer also complains that the state, over objection, introduced 
improper evidence of other acts that Ketterer briefly mentioned in his second 
pretrial confession to police.  But the statement in question contained Ketterer’s 
admission that he had killed Sanders.  Moreover, the trial court specifically noted, 
“We will admit the exhibit and we will not consider anything that is irrelevant to 
the proceedings and consider it as [redacted].”  Thus, no prejudice occurred.  A 
three-judge panel “is presumed to consider only relevant, competent and 
admissible evidence in its deliberations.”  State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 
48, 584 N.E.2d 1192; State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384, 513 N.E.2d 
754. 
{¶ 130} Finally, Ketterer cannot realistically argue that this evidence 
prejudiced his plea hearing, for he pleaded guilty.  See Wilson, 58 Ohio St.2d 52, 
12 O.O.3d 51, 388 N.E.2d 745, paragraph one of the syllabus (“counseled plea of 
guilty is an admission of factual guilt which removes issues of factual guilt from 
the case”). 
{¶ 131} Evidence at penalty hearing.  Ketterer also asserts that the trial 
court erred in permitting the state to reintroduce at the penalty phase all of the 
trial-phase evidence.  Ketterer claims this evidence was inadmissible because it 
did not relate to the charged aggravating circumstances.  However, counsel did 
not object and thereby waived all but plain error.  State v. Williams (1977), 51 
Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus; 
Crim.R. 52(B). 
{¶ 132} No error, plain or otherwise, occurred.  A capital penalty-phase 
hearing is not limited to evidence that pertains only to the aggravating 
circumstances.  See State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d at 352-354, 662 N.E.2d 
311; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 653 N.E.2d 253, syllabus.  
Further, “[a] trial court may properly allow repetition of much or all that occurred 
in the guilt phase pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(D)(1).”  State v. Vrabel, 99 Ohio St.3d 
January Term, 2006 
27 
 
184, 2003-Ohio-3193, 790 N.E.2d 303, ¶ 73.  Accord State v. DePew (1988), 38 
Ohio St.3d 275, 282-283, 528 N.E.2d 542 (Revised Code “appears to permit 
repetition of much or all that occurred during the guilt stage”). 
{¶ 133} Finally, Ketterer has not established prejudice.  A panel of judges 
is presumed to “consider only relevant, competent and admissible evidence in its 
deliberations.”  Davis, 63 Ohio St.3d at 48, 584 N.E.2d 1192; Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 
at 384, 513 N.E.2d 754.  Accordingly, we reject Ketterer’s complaints. 
{¶ 134} Gruesome photos.  Ketterer argues the trial court erred by 
admitting gruesome photographs that prejudiced both the trial and penalty phases.  
Ketterer’s arguments lack merit. 
{¶ 135} Guilt phase.  In view of Ketterer’s guilty plea, the admission of 
gruesome crime-scene or autopsy photographs could not have affected the guilty 
verdict.  Also, Ketterer’s guilty plea waived all appealable errors at trial unrelated 
to the entry of the plea.  Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658, paragraph 
two of syllabus; Crim.R. 11(B)(1). 
{¶ 136} Penalty phase.  Ketterer did not object to the reintroduction of 
the crime scene or autopsy photographs at the penalty phase, and thus waived all 
but plain error.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, 
paragraph one of the syllabus; Crim.R. 52(B). 
{¶ 137} Here, the trial court did not create plain error by readmitting the 
photographs in the penalty phase.  The crime-scene photographs as well as the 
photographs taken of Sanders’s body on a gurney are not repetitive or cumulative 
and portrayed the nature and circumstances of the crime.  Cf. State v. Issa (2001), 
93 Ohio St.3d 49, 64-65, 752 N.E.2d 904; State v. Tibbetts (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
146, 155-157, 749 N.E.2d 226; State v. Biros (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 443-446, 
678 N.E.2d 891.  Finally, the panel is presumed to “consider only relevant, 
competent and admissible evidence in its deliberations.”  Davis, 63 Ohio St.3d at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
48, 584 N.E.2d 1192.  Accord State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-
Ohio-3167, 810 N.E.2d 927, ¶ 66. 
{¶ 138} Hearing on counsel.  In proposition VII, Ketterer further argues 
that the “trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing when Ketterer announced in 
court that he wanted to ‘fire’ his lead counsel.”  Ketterer relies upon State v. Deal 
(1969), 17 Ohio St.2d 17, 46 O.O.2d 154, 244 N.E.2d 742, syllabus, wherein this 
court held that when “an indigent accused questions the effectiveness and 
adequacy of assigned counsel, * * * it is the duty of the trial judge to inquire into 
the complaint and make such inquiry a part of the record.”  See, also, State v. 
King (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 434, 437, 662 N.E.2d 389 (“inquiry may be brief 
and minimal, but it must be made”); State v. Prater (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 78, 
83, 593 N.E.2d 44 (on particular facts, “the trial court breached its duty to 
inquire”). 
{¶ 139} However, the record of the December 9, 2003 hearing, when this 
issue arose, shows that the trial court knew about the conflict between client and 
counsel over the NGRI plea, and further inquiry was unnecessary. 
{¶ 140} At the December 9, 2003 hearing, Ketterer complained that his 
attorney, J. Gregory Howard, had disregarded Ketterer’s desire to enter an NGRI 
plea.  Ketterer then stated, “I wish, for the record, to change my plea today to 
what I originally wanted it to be, not guilty by reason of insanity.”  Ketterer also 
claimed that his lawyers had not spent enough time with him and that his bond 
had not been reduced. 
{¶ 141} The trial court advised Ketterer that he had the best attorney in 
the county for the case and that clients do not always like their attorneys because 
they tell them what the clients do not want to hear.  Ketterer responded by 
discussing the medication he had taken at the time of the crime and by saying that 
he had known the victim, Sanders, since he was nine years old and did not 
January Term, 2006 
29 
 
remember killing him.  At that point, the trial court advised Ketterer not to talk 
further about his case, but to discuss these issues with his attorney. 
{¶ 142} Defense counsel then advised the court that counsel had 
reviewed medical records from VA facilities throughout the country where 
Ketterer has been treated.  Counsel assured the court, “Based upon our 
investigation in the case as well as other things, it [NGRI] is not a viable option at 
this point in time.  * * * I’m not going to file it just to be filing it if I don’t have a 
reason to back it up.”  Ketterer then declared to Howard, “You’re fired.”  But the 
context reflects that the court and counsel did not question Ketterer further at the 
time because of concern about Ketterer’s tendency to discuss the facts of his 
crimes on the record. 
{¶ 143} At a further hearing on January 5, 2004, the trial court, 
respecting Ketterer’s pro se request, ordered a competency evaluation and a report 
on an NGRI plea.  The court also rejected Ketterer’s request that his counsel, 
Howard, be fired.  By then, Ketterer had changed his mind and told the court: “I 
would like to personally apologize to Mr. Howard for saying what I said last week 
or whatever that was, about firing him.”  Ketterer was satisfied because his NGRI 
plea was being explored. 
{¶ 144} At the plea hearings, Ketterer stated that he was satisfied with his 
attorneys and that he had had numerous discussions with counsel.  Then Ketterer 
acknowledged that certain pro se filings in the court of appeals were a mistake. 
{¶ 145} Finally, because the differences between Ketterer and his counsel 
involved whether to enter an insanity plea, no basis existed to find a conflict 
between counsel and client.  The trial court had approved the appointment of Dr. 
Jeffrey Smalldon, a psychologist, to assist Ketterer’s defense.  Thus, counsel’s 
tactical decision not to pursue an NGRI defense was an informed decision, and no 
such plea was pursued at trial.  “Decisions about ‘the viability of certain defenses’ 
are ‘within the exclusive province of defense counsel to make after consultation 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
with his client.’ ”  State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 524, 747 N.E.2d 
765, quoting Lewis v. Alexander (C.A.6, 1993), 11 F.3d 1349, 1354. 
{¶ 146} In view of Ketterer’s withdrawal of his request to fire Howard, 
we hold that no prejudicial error resulted from the trial court’s decision not to 
further inquire into the relationship between Ketterer and his counsel in December 
2003. 
{¶ 147} Failure to provide new counsel.  Ketterer also argues that the 
“trial court erred when it denied Ketterer’s request to remove appointed lead 
defense counsel and replace him with new counsel.”  However, we reject 
Ketterer’s complaint for the following reasons. 
{¶ 148} In State v. Coleman (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 286, 525 N.E.2d 792, 
paragraph four of the syllabus, we held: “To discharge a court-appointed attorney, 
the defendant must show a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship of such 
magnitude as to jeopardize the defendant’s right to effective assistance of 
counsel.”  Accord State v. Henness, 79 Ohio St.3d at 65, 679 N.E.2d 686.  
Moreover, “ ‘[a]n indigent defendant has no right to have a particular attorney 
represent him and therefore must demonstrate ‘good cause’ to warrant substitution 
of counsel.’ ”   Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d at 72, 717 N.E.2d 298, quoting United 
States v. Iles (C.A.6, 1990), 906 F.2d 1122, 1130. 
{¶ 149} Further, we review the trial court’s decision as to replacement of 
counsel “ ‘under an abuse-of-discretion standard.’ ”  Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 
523, 747 N.E.2d 765, quoting Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d at 73, 717 N.E.2d 298.  If 
the complaint is unreasonable, the trial court may “require the trial to proceed 
with assigned counsel participating.”  Deal, 17 Ohio St.2d 17, 46 O.O.2d 154, 244 
N.E.2d 742, syllabus.  Accord Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 523, 747 N.E.2d 765.  
“Disagreement[s] between the attorney and client over trial tactics or approach 
also do not warrant a substitution of counsel.”  State v. Evans, 153 Ohio App.3d 
226, 2003-Ohio-3475, 792 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 32. 
January Term, 2006 
31 
 
{¶ 150} In this case, Ketterer’s primary complaint, that his counsel failed 
to pursue an NGRI plea, was unreasonable because Ketterer offers no evidence 
that an NGRI plea was credible.  Moreover, the testimony of Dr. Hopes and Dr. 
Smalldon during the mitigation phase, as well as Dr. Hopes’s competency report, 
does not reveal any basis for an NGRI plea.  As we held in Cowans, “ ‘ “A lawyer 
has a duty to give the accused an honest appraisal of his case. * * * Counsel has a 
duty to be candid; he has no duty to be optimistic when the facts do not warrant 
optimism.” ’ Brown v. United States (C.A.D.C.1959), 264 F.2d 363, 369 (en 
banc), quoted in McKee v. Harris (C.A.2, 1981), 649 F.2d 927, 932.  “ ‘If the rule 
were otherwise, appointed counsel could be replaced for doing little more than 
giving their clients honest advice.” ’ ”  Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d at 73, 717 N.E.2d 
298, quoting McKee, 649 F.2d at 932, quoting McKee v. Harris (S.D.N.Y.1980), 
485 F.Supp. 866, 869. 
{¶ 151} Ketterer also argues that a total breakdown in communication 
existed between himself and counsel.  To make this claim, Ketterer cites his 
letters of December 4, 2003, December 26, 2003, and January 13, 2004.  
However, we find no support in the record for this claim.  While the letters reflect 
Ketterer’s obsession with an NGRI plea, they do not reflect a total breakdown in 
communications. 
{¶ 152} By January 5, 2004, Ketterer had changed his mind about 
Howard.  At the January 5 hearing, Ketterer apologized for attempting to fire 
counsel and offered no further complaints.  Ketterer later stated that he had talked 
at length with his attorneys and was satisfied with their efforts. 
{¶ 153} Therefore, we hold that any lack of communication between 
counsel and Ketterer was temporary, and no complete breakdown in 
communications occurred.  See Cowans, 87 Ohio St.3d at 73, 717 N.E.2d 298 
(trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting substitution of counsel when 
any breakdown in communications was temporary); State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio 
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St.3d 27, 2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 35 (“the record reflects many 
instances where appellant continued to confer with counsel throughout the 
proceedings, thus belying his claim that there was a total breakdown in the 
attorney-client relationship”).  For the foregoing reasons, we reject Ketterer’s 
claim of error for failing to replace counsel. 
{¶ 154} Release of grand-jury transcripts.  In proposition VII, Ketterer 
also argues that the trial court erred when it refused to disclose a grand-jury 
transcript relating to a criminal case against a prosecution witness, Donald 
Williams, whom the grand jury declined to indict after Williams assisted law 
enforcement in this case.  Defense counsel wanted the transcript in an effort to 
impeach Williams. 
{¶ 155} However, Ketterer pleaded guilty as charged and thereby 
waived any basis to complain about the pretrial refusal to release a grand-jury 
transcript.  See Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 595 N.E.2d 351, paragraphs one and 
two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 156} Record of proceedings.  In proposition VII, Ketterer refers to 
seven unrecorded side-bar conversations and argues prejudicial error because the 
“trial court failed to keep a complete record of all proceedings.” 
{¶ 157} Crim.R. 22 specifies that for serious offenses, “all proceedings 
shall be recorded.”  Moreover, R.C. 2929.03(G)(1) and (2) and 2929.05 mandate a 
complete record in capital cases.  State ex rel. Spirko v. Judges of the Court of 
Appeals, Third Appellate Dist. (1986), 27 Ohio St.3d 13, 18, 27 OBR 432, 501 
N.E.2d 625.  However, we have recognized that this foregoing requirement “does 
not mean that the trial record must be perfect for purposes of appellate review.”  
State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 687 N.E.2d 685, syllabus.  Accord 
State v. Spirko (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 1, 15-16, 570 N.E.2d 229. 
{¶ 158} In this case, the record is adequate for appellate review.  Five of 
the conferences occurred during the pretrial suppression hearing, and Ketterer’s 
January Term, 2006 
33 
 
guilty plea waived any issue about that suppression hearing.  The sixth occurred 
during juror excusals.  Ketterer’s jury waiver and guilty plea waived any issue as 
to that conference.  See Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, 810 
N.E.2d 927, ¶ 79, fn.1.  The last conference that Ketterer cites appears from 
context to concern a five-minute recess. 
{¶ 159} In any event, counsel never requested that the unrecorded bench 
conferences be recorded.  Nor has Ketterer attempted to reconstruct these 
conferences or to establish their importance or that material prejudice resulted.  
Palmer, 80 Ohio St.3d at 554, 687 N.E.2d 685.  We have repeatedly refused to 
reverse convictions or sentences on the basis of unrecorded conferences when a 
defendant has not taken these steps.  Id.  Accord State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 
54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 182-184; State v. Nields (2001), 93 Ohio 
St.3d 6, 27, 752 N.E.2d 859; State v. Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 340, 
703 N.E.2d 1251. 
Proportionality Evidence (VIII) 
{¶ 160} In proposition VIII, Ketterer claims that his right to a fair 
sentencing hearing was compromised when the trial court excluded relevant 
sentencing evidence, namely testimony on proportionality in capital sentencing.  
A witness from the State Public Defender’s Office would have testified that in 
only nine percent of capital indictments was a death sentence actually imposed. 
{¶ 161} Under the Eighth Amendment, an accused is entitled to 
individualized sentencing in determining whether the death penalty is imposed.  
See Lockett v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 586, 601 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973; 
Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 
944.  “In Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, mitigating factors are facts about the 
defendant’s character, background, or record, or the circumstances of the offense, 
that may call for a penalty less than death.”  State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 
433, 448, 709 N.E.2d 140, citing Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988), 487 U.S. 164, 108 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155.  Moreover, R.C. 2929.04(C) grants great latitude to 
the defendant in the presentation of mitigating evidence during penalty-phase 
proceedings.  See, e.g., State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 115, 559 
N.E.2d 710 (hearsay statement of accomplice wrongfully excluded). 
{¶ 162} Nonetheless, we hold that the trial court did not err, because 
“[t]he proportionality review mandated by R.C. 2929.05 is reserved for appellate 
courts.”  State v. Dixon, 101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, 
¶ 68, which upheld the trial court’s refusal to allow comparison evidence relating 
to other capital offenses.  See, also, State v. Roe (1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 18, 25, 535 
N.E.2d 1351 (evidence of disposition of other capital cases in county not relevant 
to sentencing decision); State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 
509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Glenn (1986), 28 Ohio 
St.3d 451, 458, 28 OBR 501, 504 N.E.2d 701 (newspaper articles debating the 
death penalty not relevant); State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 189-190, 
15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264 (testimony of defense witnesses on capital-
punishment statistics was “clearly irrelevant”).  Therefore, we reject proposition 
VIII. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct (IX) 
{¶ 163} In proposition IX, Ketterer contends that the prosecutor’s 
misconduct in making improper arguments relative to mitigation proceedings 
violated his constitutional rights.  Whether a prosecutor’s remarks constitute 
misconduct depends upon (1) whether the remarks were improper and, (2) if so, 
whether the remarks prejudicially affected an accused’s substantial rights.  State 
v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 14 OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883.  Accord 
State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 165, 555 N.E.2d 293.  The touchstone of 
this analysis “is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”  
Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78. 
January Term, 2006 
35 
 
{¶ 164} Nature and circumstances of the offense.  Ketterer first argues 
that the prosecutor improperly argued the nature and circumstances of the offense 
as an uncharged aggravating circumstance.  Admittedly, “[i]t is improper for 
prosecutors in the penalty phase of a capital trial to make any comment before a 
jury that the nature and circumstances of the offense are ‘aggravating 
circumstances.’ ”  State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 311, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 165} Nonetheless, “it is perfectly acceptable for the state to present 
arguments concerning the nature and circumstances of the offense.”  Id. at 355, 
662 N.E.2d 311.  Moreover, Wogenstahl noted, “R.C. 2929.04(B) specifically 
provides that the * * * three-judge panel ‘shall consider, and weigh against the 
aggravating circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the nature and 
circumstances of the offense * * *.’ (Emphasis added.)”  Id.  See, also, State v. 
Stumpf (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 512 N.E.2d 598, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 166} Viewed in the light of these controlling principles, the prosecutor 
committed no misconduct by referring to “the nature and the circumstances of this 
aggravated robbery, and this aggravated murder”; or “the nature and 
circumstances of a robbery[,] burglary and a murder.” See Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio 
St.3d at 356, 662 N.E.2d 311.  Moreover, Ketterer did not object to the 
prosecutor’s references to the physical details of the crime during the penalty 
phase, and no plain error occurred.  Crim.R. 52(A) and (B). 
{¶ 167} Further, the context of the prosecutor’s remarks demonstrates 
that the prosecutor was not trying to argue that the facts were an aggravating 
circumstance, but was attempting to challenge Ketterer’s claimed mental status as 
a R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor.  “A prosecutor can respond to issues 
raised by an accused.”  State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751, 772 
N.E.2d 81, ¶ 101. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
{¶ 168} Finally, the three-judge panel is presumed to have “ ‘considered 
only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment 
unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary.’ ” Post, 32 Ohio St.3d at 384, 513 
N.E.2d 754, quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151, 44 O.O.2d 
132, 239 N.E.2d 65. 
{¶ 169} Misstatement as to record.  Ketterer also argues that the 
prosecutor misstated the record when he asserted:  “There is no evidence before 
this panel that this violent act or acts were produced by mental illness.  No 
evidence that the cause of the aggravated robbery, the cause of the aggravated 
burglary and the fact that this gentleman * * * was killed in his own home to 
escape apprehension, detection, trial or punishment was a direct result of any 
mental illness.” 
{¶ 170} Ketterer claims that the prosecutor misstated the evidence 
because Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon tied Ketterer’s criminal acts directly to his mental 
status.  However, Ketterer failed to object to the prosecutor’s comment and 
thereby waived all but plain error.  Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d at 117, 5 O.O.3d 98, 
364 N.E.2d 1364.  We find no plain error. 
{¶ 171} Both Dr. Hopes and Dr. Smalldon testified during the mitigation 
hearing that Ketterer suffered from bipolar disorder.  Dr. Smalldon called it “one 
of the most severe kinds of mental illness.”  Further, according to Dr. Smalldon, 
Ketterer “because of his bipolar disorder lacked substantial capacity at the time * 
* * this offense was committed to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law.”  But neither Dr. Smalldon nor Dr. Hopes testified specifically that the 
crimes were “a direct result of any mental illness” or that mental illness caused 
Ketterer to commit the crimes. 
{¶ 172} The prosecutor was entitled to argue the state’s interpretation of 
the evidence.  “Prosecutors are entitled to latitude as to what the evidence has 
shown and what inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”  Smith, 
January Term, 2006 
37 
 
80 Ohio St.3d at 111, 684 N.E.2d 668.  Accord State v. Richey (1992), 64 Ohio 
St.3d 353, 362, 595 N.E.2d 915. 
{¶ 173} Inflaming the passions of the court.  Also in proposition IX, 
Ketterer argues that the prosecutor sought to “inflame the passions of the trial 
panel.”  As an example, Ketterer refers to the prosecutor’s comment that “some of 
the [crime-scene] photographs are gory and some of the photographs are 
gruesome but so, too, were the acts of the defendant in this case.” 
{¶ 174} We reject Ketterer’s claim of prejudicial error.  Ketterer 
“received a fair trial before trained jurists” notwithstanding claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 167, 555 N.E.2d 293.  The three-
judge panel is presumed to have “ ‘considered only the relevant, material, and 
competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to 
the contrary.’ ”  Post, 32 Ohio St.3d at 384, 513 N.E.2d 754, quoting White, 15 
Ohio St.2d at 151, 44 O.O.2d 132, 239 N.E.2d 65.  For the foregoing reasons, we 
reject proposition IX. 
Execution of the Mentally Ill (XIII) 
{¶ 175} In proposition XIII, Ketterer argues that the execution of a 
severely mentally ill person is cruel and unusual punishment and is thus 
constitutionally prohibited.  However, we reject proposition XIII on the basis of 
our decision in State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 
1032, ¶ 154-158. 
Cumulative Error (XV) 
{¶ 176} In proposition XV, Ketterer makes a generalized claim that the 
cumulative effect of errors in his trial necessitates reversal of his conviction and 
death sentence.  However, Ketterer received a fair trial and a fair sentencing 
determination, and no errors occurred that prejudiced his substantial rights.  
Moreover, “[s]uch errors cannot become prejudicial by sheer weight of numbers.”  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 212, 661 N.E.2d 1068; see, also, State v. 
Hooks (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 83, 85, 748 N.E.2d 528. 
Settled Issues (X, XIV) 
{¶ 177} Proportionality.  We summarily reject Ketterer’s proposition X, 
which challenges Ohio’s system of proportionality review.  See State v. LaMar, 
95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 23; State v. Steffen, 31 
Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of the syllabus; 
State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus. 
{¶ 178} Constitutionality.  We also summarily reject Ketterer’s 
proposition XIV, which challenges the constitutionality of Ohio’s death-penalty 
statute.  State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 606-608, 734 N.E.2d 345; 
State v. Clemons (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 438, 454, 696 N.E.2d 1009; State v. 
Poindexter, 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus.  Finally, we reject 
Ketterer’s international-law challenge.  See State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 
487, 502, 709 N.E.2d 484; State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 103-104, 
656 N.E.2d 643. 
Sentence Appropriateness (XI) 
{¶ 179} In proposition XI, Ketterer argues that the aggravating 
circumstances do not outweigh significant mitigating evidence, particularly his 
mental problems.  We will consider this claim during our independent sentence 
evaluation. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
Penalty-Phase Evidence 
{¶ 180} At the penalty phase, the defense presented a variety of witnesses 
and documentary evidence to establish various mitigating factors. 
{¶ 181} Dr. Bobbie Hopes, a clinical psychologist, evaluated and tested 
Ketterer to determine his competency to stand trial and to evaluate a possible plea 
of not guilty by reason of insanity.  Dr. Hopes also described Ketterer’s history 
January Term, 2006 
39 
 
and background.  Ketterer, born in May 1949 in Hamilton, Ohio, was raised by 
his parents, along with three brothers.  As a youth, Ketterer developed rheumatic 
fever and was frequently hospitalized during his first 12 years.  His father, who 
physically abused him, died when Ketterer was 13 years old.  Ketterer did poorly 
in school and quit in the 11th grade. 
{¶ 182} Ketterer entered the Army in 1968 and was honorably discharged 
in 1971.  In 1973, he was sentenced to prison for three years for an armed robbery 
involving a toy pistol.  For over 20 years, Ketterer lived and worked as an 
itinerant house painter in various parts of the country.  In 1996, while living in 
California, a van struck Ketterer, and he has since suffered from serious neck and 
back pain despite hospitalization and therapy. 
{¶ 183} According to Dr. Hopes, Ketterer’s extensive psychological 
history extends back to 1979, with treatment and hospitalizations in Veterans 
Administration facilities throughout the country, including California, Arizona, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Ohio.  His treatment has included at least three in-
house drug-treatment programs.  Over the years, physicians and psychologists 
have diagnosed Ketterer as suffering from alcohol dependency, polysubstance 
dependency (amphetamines, cocaine, opiates, and other substances), chronic 
depression, major depressive disorders, and bipolar disorder.  Ketterer also has a 
personality disorder with antisocial and borderline traits and an extensive history 
of suicide attempts and gestures. 
{¶ 184} In Dr. Hopes’s view, Ketterer does have a “severe mental disease 
or defect.  He suffers from bipolar disorder, and he has symptoms of both manic 
and depressive disorders * * * [and] features of personality disorders.”  His 
mental disease or defect has “psychotic features” in that he has “auditory 
hallucinations” and is “paranoid.”  According to Dr. Hopes, a genetic component 
exists as to Ketterer’s mental status in that Ketterer’s family is “filled with people 
with depression, bipolar disorder, and suicides.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 185} Mary Johnson, a drug addict, had known Ketterer for 27 years, 
and he befriended her many times, tried to get her to stop using drugs, and 
provided food and shelter for her when she was living on the street and 
committing prostitution.  Johnson testified that she loves and wants to marry 
Ketterer, who “was very good to [her], nice, gentle, kind.” 
{¶ 186} Jacklyn Lutes, another drug addict, testified that she has been 
Ketterer’s friend for 21 years and that she is like a sister to him.  At various times, 
when Lutes was living on the street, Ketterer provided housing and food and 
discouraged her from using drugs.  In 1997 and 1998, they both attended 
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, but when she started using drugs again, she 
would lose contact with Ketterer.  At times, Ketterer was sober and did not use 
drugs, but he often relapsed. Lutes described Ketterer as a nice guy, whom she 
loves like a brother. 
{¶ 187} Norman Lewis, the county jail warden, testified that Ketterer was 
never a problem inmate, and Lewis never received any complaints against 
Ketterer. 
{¶ 188} Thomas Ketterer, the defendant’s younger brother, testified that 
he is on a variety of medications and has a depression/anxiety disorder.  The 
defendant has two other brothers, George and Michael, both of whom also have 
mental problems.  George was in Lima State Hospital for the criminally insane for 
a few years.  When the Ketterer brothers were being raised, their father regularly 
beat his three older sons with a razor strap, sometimes for no reason.  Thomas 
loves his brother Donald, and he does not want him to receive the death penalty. 
{¶ 189} Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon, a board-certified forensic psychologist, 
evaluated Ketterer and administered a battery of psychological tests.  Dr. 
Smalldon also reviewed other relevant records, including records of 13 different 
psychiatric hospitalizations of Ketterer between 1995 and 2002.  Common themes 
of diagnosis at different facilities show a prominent mood disorder, namely 
January Term, 2006 
41 
 
depression or bipolar disorder, a long-standing history of alcoholism, a chronic 
history of polysubstance dependence, and a personality disorder with borderline 
and anti-social features. 
{¶ 190} Ketterer began drinking when he was 14 years old and drank 
more heavily after joining the Army when he was 19 years old.  He also began to 
use methamphetamines.  For 30 years, Ketterer has been a chronic alcoholic, and 
he has used different drugs, including marijuana, amphetamines, cocaine, and 
barbiturates.  During his life, he has tried at times to remain drug- and alcohol-
free and has periodically succeeded, once for four and one-half years. 
{¶ 191} Dr. Smalldon tested Ketterer’s IQ at 72, or borderline, while Dr. 
Hopes tested Ketterer’s IQ at 84.  Dr. Smalldon noted, however, that Dr. Hopes 
did not conduct one particular subtest on which Ketterer performed very poorly, 
and a low-70s IQ would be more accurate.  School records reflected Ketterer’s IQ 
as 80 when he was 11 years old, and a later test at age 15 showed a verbal IQ of 
74 with a vocabulary IQ of 62. 
{¶ 192} In Dr. Smalldon’s view, Ketterer has a severe bipolar disorder, 
“one of the most severe kinds of mental illness.”  At times, Ketterer’s disease 
manifests in major depression, at “other times manifesting in a manic episode or 
highly elevated energy and extreme problems [in] self-regulation and impulse 
control.”  Dr. Smalldon concluded that Ketterer “because of his bipolar disorder 
lacked substantial capacity at * * * the time this offense was committed to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”  Smalldon agreed, however, 
that a viable defense of not guilty by reason of insanity did not exist and that 
Ketterer was competent to be tried. 
{¶ 193} In an unsworn statement, Ketterer lamented, “I stand before you 
as a shamed and saddened man having to deal with all the bad terrible things that I 
have done because of my mental illness and alcohol and drug abuse.”  According 
to Ketterer, Sanders treated him as a “real father.”  He said, “[Sanders] never beat 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
42 
me, always had patience for me and treated me like a son and took me fishing and 
played ball with me and listened to my problems like a father should be.”   
Because of Sanders, Ketterer “was clean and sober for 40 some months.” 
{¶ 194} Ketterer expressed strong regrets to the trial panel: “I’m so sorry, 
so sorry[,] * * * please forgive me.”  He added, “[A]ll I can ask is that the Lord 
please forgive me, that the Court try to show some kind of mercy.”  He asked 
forgiveness from the family and friends of Sanders and prayed that at least one 
judge would vote for life imprisonment. 
{¶ 195} The defense also offered several exhibits into evidence, including 
Ketterer’s school records, a military-discharge form reflecting his Army service 
from October 1968 until his honorable discharge in June 1971, and extensive 
medical-treatment records from psychiatric facilities.  These exhibits provide 
detail on Ketterer’s background and psychiatric history and support testimony 
from Dr. Hopes and Dr. Smalldon. 
Sentence Evaluation 
{¶ 196} After independent assessment, we hold that the evidence proves 
the aggravating circumstances—i.e., that Ketterer killed Sanders in the course of 
an aggravated burglary, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), during an aggravated robbery, R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7), and to escape detection or apprehension, R.C. 2929.04(A)(3). 
{¶ 197} As to mitigation, we hold that the nature and circumstances of 
the offense offer no mitigating features.  In the course of an aggravated burglary 
and aggravated robbery, Ketterer murdered his 85-year-old friend, Sanders, by 
beating and stabbing him to death.  Then Ketterer looted Sanders’s home and 
stole his car. 
{¶ 198} In contrast, Ketterer’s history and background do provide modest 
mitigating features, although his character offers nothing mitigating.  When 
Ketterer and his three brothers were being raised, their father beat them with a 
razor strap, and all of the brothers suffered from various mental problems.  
January Term, 2006 
43 
 
Ketterer’s father died when he was 13 years old.  When Ketterer was 14 years old, 
he began drinking and later dropped out of high school.  We accord some 
mitigating weight to evidence of his deprived childhood and dysfunctional family 
upbringing. 
{¶ 199} As to Ketterer’s background, we also accord mitigating weight to 
his service in the United States Army from 1968 until 1971 and his honorable 
discharge.  See State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 130, 734 N.E.2d 1237.  
We accord only minimal mitigating weight to his sporadic history of employment 
as an itinerant painter from 1976 until his arrest.  Cf. State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 183, 194, 631 N.E.2d 124.  As to “other factors,” R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), we 
accord minimal mitigating weight to his friendship with and assistance to two 
women in distress who think highly of him.  We also recognize as mitigating that 
Ketterer has not been a disciplinary problem while incarcerated and that he 
expressed remorse in his unsworn statement.  Cf. State v. Rojas (1992), 64 Ohio 
St.3d 131, 143, 592 N.E.2d 1376.  Further, we regard Ketterer’s assistance to 
police, and particularly his guilty plea, as a significant mitigating factor.  See 
Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d at 72, 706 N.E.2d 1231. 
{¶ 200} In evaluating this case, we note that Ketterer has been a chronic 
alcoholic and drug abuser for over 30 years.  At times, he maintained sobriety and 
then relapsed.  Considering his ability at times to remain sober and drug-free, we 
accord only minimal weight for his status as an alcoholic and chronic drug user. 
{¶ 201} We regard evidence of Ketterer’s severe mental problems as a 
significant mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  Both Dr. Smalldon and 
Dr. Hopes diagnosed Ketterer as suffering from a bipolar disorder, which was 
described as “one of the most severe kinds of mental illness.”  From 1995 to late 
2002, Ketterer was hospitalized for his psychiatric problems on 13 occasions in 
Tennessee, Texas, Oklahoma, Ohio, Arizona, and California, and his psychiatric 
records corroborate their diagnosis.  In addition to alcoholism, polysubstance 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
44 
dependence, and the bipolar disorder, Ketterer has a personality disorder with 
prominent borderline and antisocial features.  Further, Ketterer has a limited IQ, 
which has been tested between 72 and 84, and we accord that factor weight in 
mitigation.  Cf. State v. Thomas, 97 Ohio St.3d 309, 2002-Ohio-6624, 779 N.E.2d 
1017, ¶ 115-119. 
{¶ 202} In Dr. Smalldon’s view, Ketterer “because of his bipolar disorder 
lacked substantial capacity at the time * * * this offense was committed to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”  Although Dr. Hopes did not 
specifically confirm this finding, her testimony was consistent with finding this 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) factor.  No evidence contradicted this finding.  Thus, we 
regard the R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) factor as proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
{¶ 203} As to other statutory mitigating factors, Sanders did not induce or 
facilitate the offense, R.C. 2929.04(B)(1), nor did Ketterer act under “duress, 
coercion, or strong provocation,” R.C. 2929.04(B)(2).  Ketterer cannot claim 
tender years, R.C. 2929.04(B)(4), or lack of a criminal record, R.C. 
2929.04(B)(5), or accomplice status, R.C. 2929.04(B)(6).  Under R.C. 
2929.04(B)(7), we consider as mitigating factors Ketterer’s remorse, his 
assistance to others, his adaptability to a structured environment, his assistance to 
police, and his guilty plea to the offenses charged against him. 
{¶ 204} After weighing the aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating evidence, we conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
collective mitigating factors.  In the course of an aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary, Ketterer savagely beat and stabbed his friend, an 85-year-old 
man.  Although Ketterer suffers from a major mental illness, his condition is “one 
of the most treatable of the major mental illnesses.” 
January Term, 2006 
45 
 
{¶ 205} Further, Ketterer has received extensive medical treatment, the 
benefit of many hospitalizations, and many opportunities to take control of his 
life.  He has repeatedly failed to do so. 
{¶ 206} Further, we hold that the death penalty is proportionate when 
compared with other aggravated murders committed during the course of an 
aggravated burglary and an aggravated robbery.  See, e.g., State v. Noling, 98 
Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 151; State v. Jones (2000), 90 
Ohio St.3d 403, 423, 739 N.E.2d 300; State v. Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 
280, 301, 731 N.E.2d 159; State v. Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405, 424, 429, 
692 N.E.2d 151; State v. Berry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 366-367, 650 N.E.2d 
433; State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 614, 605 N.E.2d 916; State v. 
Murphy, 65 Ohio St.3d 554, 586, 605 N.E.2d 884; State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 
160, 177, 555 N.E.2d 293; and State v. Barnes, 25 Ohio St.3d 203, 213, 25 OBR 
266, 495 N.E.2d 922. 
{¶ 207} We also conclude that the death penalty is proportionate when 
compared with cases involving killings to escape detection.  See, e.g., State v. 
Sheppard (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 230, 232, 241, 703 N.E.2d 286; State v. Burke 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 399, 407, 653 N.E.2d 242. 
{¶ 208} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the common pleas court. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur separately. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
{¶ 209} Ketterer is not a sympathetic defendant.  He brutally murdered a 
family friend because he felt that his friend had been disrespectful to him when 
Ketterer asked to borrow some money.  After the ruthless murder, Ketterer stole 
whatever he could find and traded the ill-gotten goods for cocaine. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
46 
{¶ 210} However, there are other facts also vital to understanding this 
apparently senseless murder.  Ketterer is a person with a serious mental illness.  
His family also has had a long history of mental illness and suicide attempts.  
Ketterer himself was hospitalized repeatedly and attempted suicide several times.  
His mental illness was fueled by drug and alcohol abuse.  Two psychologists 
testified that Ketterer had a serious mental illness, known as bipolar disorder, 
which makes it difficult for him to control impulses normally.  Not even the state 
disputed that he was seriously mentally ill.  But the state argued that Ketterer 
could have controlled his behavior.  The three-judge panel accepted the state’s 
position.  Ketterer has now been sentenced to death. 
{¶ 211} Ketterer did not meet the standard for being found not guilty by 
reason of insanity.  Under our current law, the evidence supported a finding of 
guilt.  However, we can never truly know whether Ketterer would have 
committed this senseless crime against a long-time friend had he not been 
seriously mentally ill.  The undisputed testimony regarding Ketterer’s serious 
mental illness places him in a very different category from persons without a 
mental illness.  One expert clearly testified that Ketterer was not able to control 
his impulses.  The facts of the crime seem to show that Ketterer had the ability to 
plan and act.  But how can we truly judge the effect of this terrible illness?   
{¶ 212} I believe that the time has come to reexamine whether we, as a 
society, should administer the death penalty to a person with a serious mental 
illness. 
{¶ 213} Although the majority opinion deals mostly with guilt-phase 
issues, the court does acknowledge that Ketterer suffers from an undisputedly 
serious mental illness.  However, a deeper exploration of the facts yields greater 
insight on this issue. 
{¶ 214} The defense presented solid, unrefuted evidence at trial that 
Ketterer had been afflicted by lifelong mental illness.  Dr. Bobbie Hopes, a 
January Term, 2006 
47 
 
clinical psychologist testifying for the defense, completed a forensic evaluation of 
Ketterer’s competency.  At trial, she testified, “As a child, [Ketterer] was severely 
physically abused by his father.  His two older brothers and his mother were also 
physically abused.  His father died when Ketterer was 13 years old, and despite 
years of physical abuse, Ketterer found this death very traumatic.  And he started 
hearing voices, his father’s voice, within about a year after his father died, so 
around age 15 he started hearing his father’s voice.  Primarily what he would hear 
would be his father threatening to beat him or telling him to assume the position 
for a beating.” 
{¶ 215} In preparing for her evaluation, Dr. Hopes reviewed psychiatric 
records from at least 13 different cities and hospitals where Ketterer had been 
admitted.  He had had at least one hospitalization in each in these facilities and 
some private hospitalizations.  According to Dr. Hopes, Ketterer’s history of 
mental illness dates to 1979, with treatment and hospitalizations in Veterans 
Administration (“VA”) hospitals in at least five states.  In addition, his treatment 
included at least three in-house drug-treatment programs. 
{¶ 216} Dr. Hopes testified that Ketterer has had different diagnoses 
throughout his life.  For many years, the primary diagnosis was major depressive 
disorder.  More recently, from about 1997 on, the more common diagnosis has 
been bipolar disorder.  In addition, various reports refer to personality-disorder, 
antisocial, and borderline-personality traits. 
{¶ 217} Dr. Hopes testified that Ketterer also has a long history of 
chemical abuse.  His voluminous hospital records refer to a long history of drug 
and alcohol dependency and “multi-drug abuse,” including abuse of marijuana, 
amphetamines, cocaine, and narcotics.  Narcotics abuse followed his 1996 spinal 
injury. 
{¶ 218} According to Dr. Hopes, in the months preceding the crimes, 
Ketterer had deteriorated so much that he attempted suicide after his landlord 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
48 
would not fix the windows immediately.  He drank half a bottle of whiskey and 
took his entire month’s supply of Klonopin, an antianxiety drug, and Elavil, an 
antidepressant.  In the opinion of Dr. Hopes, Ketterer was so embarrassed by his 
relapse that he did not tell his psychiatrist at the VA hospital about his relapse, so 
he went for a month without his medicine, deteriorated further, began another 
drinking binge, started using cocaine, and was again mixing Klonopin with 
alcohol. 
{¶ 219} In Dr. Hopes’s opinion, Ketterer suffers from bipolar disorder, a 
severe mental disease or defect, with symptoms of both manic and depressive 
disorders and features of personality disorders.  Dr. Hopes opined that Ketterer’s 
mental illness includes psychotic features, including auditory hallucinations and 
paranoia. 
{¶ 220} Dr. Hopes testified that when she interviewed Ketterer, he was 
experiencing five symptoms of depression: crying, lack of appetite, insomnia, 
fatigue, and diminished ability to concentrate.  He was distracted by his own 
thoughts and could not concentrate on any one topic.  Dr. Hopes testified that it 
normally takes her two hours to do a competency evaluation, but in Ketterer’s 
case, it took her three hours, and she obtained less information from him than she 
obtains in two hours during the usual evaluation. 
{¶ 221} Dr. Hopes noted that the primary characteristics of mania are 
poor impulse control and impaired judgment.  “People with this disorder tend to 
do things that are inappropriate, unethical and illegal, and things that they 
wouldn’t normally do if they weren’t in a manic phase.”  Moreover, Ketterer’s 
use of alcohol and illicit drugs seriously intensified his mental illness and 
accelerated his poor judgment and lack of impulse control. 
{¶ 222} Dr. Hopes also noted that Ketterer fell into the category of about 
20 to 30 percent of people with bipolar disorder who have residual symptoms that 
never go away.  Dr. Hopes testified that there is a genetic component to mental 
January Term, 2006 
49 
 
illness and that many of Ketterer’s family members suffer from depression and 
bipolar disorder.  Ketterer’s brother was diagnosed with and treated for major 
depressive disorder for many years, and more recently, he has been treated for 
bipolar disorder.  Another brother was hospitalized at a state mental hospital, and 
a cousin was treated for depression.  A cousin and an uncle both committed 
suicide. 
{¶ 223} Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon, a respected board-certified forensic 
psychologist, also interviewed Donald Ketterer and testified for the defense.  In 
addition to his clinical evaluation, Dr. Smalldon administered IQ tests.  Ketterer’s 
verbal IQ estimate was 76, his performance IQ estimate was 73, and his full-scale 
IQ estimate was 72.  According to Dr. Smalldon, 72 falls within “the borderline 
range of IQ.  And what that means is that typically IQs 70 and below are 
associated with diagnosis of mental retardation. * * * So [Ketterer] falls toward 
the bottom of that borderline range that comes between mild and mental 
retardation and low average.”  Although Dr. Hopes estimated a verbal IQ of 84, 
Dr. Smalldon noted that Dr. Hopes failed to administer the “vocabulary subtest, 
which was one of the verbal subtests on which Ketterer obtained his lowest score.  
Had she administered that subtest, that would have significantly lowered his 
verbal IQ estimate from 84 to somewhere within the 70s.” 
{¶ 224} Dr. Smalldon counted 13 different psychiatric hospitalizations 
between 1995 and 2002.  Dr. Smalldon testified that Ketterer suffers from a major 
mental illness:  “Certainly in my diagnostic impression, the most severe, the most 
significant mental illness is bipolar disorder mixed meaning at various times 
manifesting periods of major depression and other times manifesting in a manic 
episode or highly elevated, energy and extreme problems in self-regulation and 
impulse control.  Certainly the bipolar mixed with at least fluctuating psychotic 
symptoms over time is the most significant mental health problem that I have 
diagnosed him as having.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
50 
{¶ 225} As for Ketterer’s substance-abuse problems, Dr. Smalldon 
testified that Ketterer’s mother told Ketterer that his alcoholic father had put 
alcohol in his baby bottle to make him sleep.  Ketterer began drinking by choice 
at around age 14, shortly after his father’s death.  He continued to drink 
throughout his adolescence.  When he entered the Army at age 19, he began 
drinking more heavily and using speed more heavily.  For over 30 years, he was 
chronically alcohol dependent and abused a wide variety of substances, such as 
marijuana, speed, barbiturates, and cocaine. 
{¶ 226} Dr. Smalldon testified that because of Ketterer’s bipolar disorder, 
Ketterer “lacked substantial capacity at the time or around the time this offense 
was committed to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” 
{¶ 227} The defense testimony regarding Ketterer’s severe mental illness 
was unrefuted.  Even the majority acknowledges that no evidence contradicted 
these findings, and it gave his mental illness weight in mitigation.  See R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3).  However, the majority relied on Dr. Smalldon’s description of 
bipolar disorder as “one of the most treatable of the major mental illnesses,” 
despite Dr. Hopes’s conclusion that Ketterer was in the category of persons with 
bipolar disorder whose recurrent symptoms never go away. 
{¶ 228} The issue here is not Ketterer’s guilt.  The three-judge panel had 
sufficient evidence for its finding.  In light of the evidence presented, the panel 
could choose to discount the expert’s testimony regarding Ketterer’s lack of 
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the law, even though no 
professional refuted that testimony.  And under our current law, the court’s 
sentence of death is also supported.  It is, however, the current law, I believe, that 
we as a society should reexamine. 
{¶ 229} Our law requires “a system of capital punishment at once 
consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the 
individual.”  Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982), 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 
January Term, 2006 
51 
 
L.Ed.2d 1.  In Atkins v. Virginia (2002), 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 
L.Ed.2d 335, the United States Supreme Court concluded that executing mentally 
retarded offenders constituted cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The court determined that 
“evolving standards of decency” dictated that conclusion.  Id., quoting Ford v. 
Wainwright (1986), 477 U.S. 399, 405, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335. 
{¶ 230} Atkins identified “ ‘retribution and deterrence of capital crimes 
by prospective offenders’ ” as the social purposes served by the death penalty.  Id. 
at 319, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, quoting Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 
U.S. 153, 183, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859.  Atkins noted that there was a 
serious question as to whether either justification applied to mentally retarded 
offenders.  Id. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335.  I too question whether 
either justification applies to severely mentally ill offenders. 
{¶ 231} Deterrence is of little value as a rationale for executing offenders 
with severe mental illness when they have diminished impulse control and 
planning abilities.  As for retribution, capital punishment still enjoys wide public 
support among Americans, but a Gallup Poll conducted in October 2003 found 
that while almost two thirds of Americans surveyed support the death penalty,  75 
percent of those surveyed in 2002 opposed executing the mentally ill.  Kevin 
Drew, Arkansas Prepares to Execute Mentally Ill Inmate, CNN.com, Jan. 5, 2004, 
at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/05/singleton.death.row/index.html. 
{¶ 232} Society’s discomfort with executing the severely mentally ill 
among us is further evidenced by the American Bar Association’s formation of a 
task force in 2003 to consider mental disability and the death penalty.  After 
studying the issue, the task force made recommendations that were adopted by the 
ABA House of Delegates in August 2006:    
{¶ 233} “RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association, without 
taking a position supporting or opposing the death penalty, urges each jurisdiction 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
52 
that imposes capital punishment to implement the following policies and 
procedures:  
{¶ 234} “1.  Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, 
at the time of the offense, they had significant limitations in both their intellectual 
functioning and adaptive behavior, as expressed in conceptual, social, and 
practical adaptive skills, resulting from mental retardation, dementia, or a 
traumatic brain injury. 
{¶ 235} “2.  Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, 
at the time of the offense, they had a severe mental disorder or disability that 
significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate the nature, consequences, or 
wrongfulness of their conduct; (b) to exercise rational judgment in relation to 
conduct; or (c) to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law.”  See 
ABA Report with Recommendation No. 122A, Adopted August 2006, at 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2006/annual/dailyjournal/hundredtwentytwoa.d
oc.  See, also, Symposium: The Death Penalty and Mental Illness, 
Recommendations of the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights 
& Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty (2005), 
54 Cath.U.L.Rev. 1115. 
{¶ 236} The National Alliance on Mental Illness (“NAMI”) adopted both 
of these recommendations as part of its public policy platform.  Public Policy 
Platform of NAMI (7th Ed.Rev.) Sections 9.6.1.1 and 9.6.1.2.   The American 
Psychological Association adopted both recommendations, and the American 
Psychiatric Association adopted the second recommendation.  Tabak, Overview 
of Task Force Proposal on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty (2005), 54 
Cath.U.L.Rev. 1123, 1125-1126, fn. 11 and 12.1   
                                                          
 
1.  This information was obtained prior to the final adoption of ABA Recommendation No. 122A 
by the ABA House of Delegates in August 2006; presumably, these groups will also now adopt 
the final recommendations. 
January Term, 2006 
53 
 
{¶ 237} Over the past 30 years, the number of people on death row with 
mental illness and other disabilities has steadily increased.  Although precise 
statistics are not available, it is estimated that five to ten percent of people on 
death row have a serious mental illness.  National Mental Health Association, 
Death Penalty & People with Mental Illnesses (2006), http://www.nmha.org 
/position/deathPenalty/deathpenalty.cfm. 
{¶ 238} Moreover, Ketterer suffers from co-occurring disorders: a serious 
mental illness and substance-abuse issues.  Research has shown that co-occurring 
disorders are very common.  The NAMI website cites reports published in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association, finding, “Roughly 50 percent of 
individuals with severe mental disorders are affected by substance abuse.”  
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=ByIllness&template=/ContentMana
gement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=10333. 
{¶ 239} Further, NAMI cites two surveys as the best data available on the 
prevalence of co-occurring disorders:  the Epidemiologic Catchment Area 
(“ECA”) Survey, administered between 1980 and 1984, and the National 
Comorbidity Survey (“NCS”), administered between 1990 and 1992.  Id.  
“Results of the NCS and the ECA Survey indicate high prevalence rates for co-
occurring substance abuse disorders and mental disorders, as well as the increased 
risk for people with either a substance abuse disorder or mental disorder for 
developing a co-occurring disorder. For example, the NCS found that: 
{¶ 240} “▪ 42.7 percent of individuals with a 12-month addictive disorder 
had at least one 12-month mental disorder. 
{¶ 241} “▪ 14.7 percent of individuals with a 12-month mental disorder 
had at least one 12-month addictive disorder.”  Id. 
{¶ 242} In addition, “[t]he ECA Survey found that individuals with 
severe mental disorders were at significant risk for developing a substance use 
disorder during their lifetime. Specifically:  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
54 
{¶ 243} “▪ 47 percent of individuals with schizophrenia also had a 
substance abuse disorder (more than four times as likely as the general 
population). 
{¶ 244} “▪ 61 percent of individuals with bipolar disorder also had a 
substance abuse disorder (more than five times as likely as the general 
population).”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
{¶ 245} Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Supreme Court 
majority in Atkins, concluded, “Mentally retarded persons* * * have diminished 
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract 
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.  There is no evidence 
that they are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is 
abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a 
premeditated plan* * *.  Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from 
criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.”  Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335.  There seems to be little distinction 
between executing offenders with mental retardation and offenders with severe 
mental illness, as they share many of the same characteristics. 
{¶ 246} However, mental illness is not as easily quantified as mental 
retardation.  Mental retardation is a fixed condition with more objective 
symptoms.  Mental illness is a much broader category, with wide ranges of 
diagnoses and periods of decompensation and remission.  Treatment options vary 
widely, including counseling, behavior modifications, group therapy, and 
medication.  Some treatments and medications are controversial as to 
effectiveness and side effects.  Mental illness as a defense is a difficult issue to 
quantify in a court of law. 
{¶ 247} However, we have made enormous medical and scientific 
advances in both diagnosis and treatment that are now supported by solid 
January Term, 2006 
55 
 
research.  Therefore, while I personally believe that the time has come for our 
society to add persons with severe mental illness to the category of those excluded 
from application of the death penalty, I believe that the line should be drawn by 
the General Assembly, not by a court.  Some would argue that Atkins was the 
product of an activist court in basing its decision on “evolving standards of 
decency.”  Trop v. Dulles (1958), 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630.  
However, nothing prevents the legislature from examining and using those same 
evolving standards.  In fact, it is the legislature’s role to do so.  Therefore, I urge 
our General Assembly to consider legislation setting the criteria for determining 
when a person with a severe mental illness should be excluded from the penalty of 
death.  Unlike mental retardation, which can be determined by a number on an IQ 
test and other basic criteria, mental illnesses vary widely in severity.  The General 
Assembly would be the proper body to examine these variations, take public 
testimony, hear from experts in the field, and fashion criteria for the judicial 
system to apply. 
{¶ 248} “ ‘[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress 
of the human mind.  As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new 
discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change 
with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace 
with the times.’ ”  Furman v. Georgia (1972), 408 U.S. 238, 409, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 
33 L.Ed.2d 346, fn. 7, quoting Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, 15 The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 40-42 (Memorial Ed.1904). 
{¶ 249} The time has come for our society to reexamine the execution of 
persons with severe mental illness.  Until the General Assembly does so, under 
our current law, they will continue to be executed.  As I am bound to follow the 
law as it stands today, I reluctantly concur in the affirmance of Ketterer’s sentence 
of death. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
56 
__________________ 
Robin N. Piper, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Daniel G. 
Eichel, First Assistant Prosecuting Attorney and Chief, Appellate Division, 
and Michael A. Oster Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Ruth L. Tkacz and 
Timothy R. Payne, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
______________________