Case Title: RICHARD J. SHELEST V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0026

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD J. SHELEST V. STATE OF WYOMING,  ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2010 WY 3222 P.3d 167Case Number: S-09-0026Decided: 01/11/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
RICHARD 
J. SHELEST,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE 
OF WYOMING,  ex rel., WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Donna 
D. Domonkos, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; John William Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, J., files a dissenting opinion, in 
which KITE, J., joins.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]        
Richard 
J. Shelest was injured in a motorcycle accident.  At the time, he was an employee of the 
Wyoming Department of Transportation, and he filed a claim for worker's 
compensation benefits.  The claim 
was denied by the Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division on the basis 
that Mr. Shelest was not acting within the scope of his employment when he was 
injured.  Mr. Shelest objected, 
and the matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings, which 
upheld the Division's determination.  
Mr. Shelest appealed to the district court, which affirmed the 
decision.  Mr. Shelest now 
brings his appeal before this Court.  
We affirm. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Shelest states his two issues this way:

 
 
1.         
Whether the Office of Administrative Hearing's decision denying benefits 
was supported by substantial evidence.

 
 
2.         
Whether the Office of Administrative Hearing's decision denying benefits 
was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Mr. 
Shelest was employed by the Department of Transportation in Evanston, 
Wyoming.  On June 20, 2006, his 
employer required him to attend a training program in Rock Springs.  He went with his supervisor and a 
co-worker, and because it was a nice day, all three decided to ride their 
motorcycles.  They left Evanston at 
about 7:00 a.m., Mr. Shelest's normal starting time, and the three 
travelled to Rock Springs on Interstate Highway 80, a distance of approximately 
100 miles. 

 
 

[¶4]        
The 
training finished around noon.  Over 
lunch, the three discussed taking an alternate route home, one they thought 
would be more scenic and pleasant.  
The alternate route they discussed followed Interstate Highway 80 from 
Rock Springs to Green River, then took Wyoming State Highway 530 to the south 
and southwest, crossed into Utah on Utah State Highway 43, turned back to 
the west and northwest into Wyoming on Wyoming State Highway 414, and rejoined 
Interstate Highway 80 near Mountain View, Wyoming.  The alternate route was approximately 150 
miles, and took about an hour longer than the direct route.  Although the three talked about the 
alternate route, they did not reach any decision about which route to 
take.

 
 

[¶5]        
The 
three left for Evanston and approached Green River on Interstate Highway 
80.  The supervisor was in the lead, 
the co-worker second, and Mr. Shelest in the rear.  The supervisor took the exit for the 
alternate route, and the co-worker and Mr. Shelest followed.  While in Utah, Mr. Shelest lost control 
of his motorcycle and wrecked.  He 
suffered broken bones and other injuries.

 
 

[¶6]        
Mr. 
Shelest applied for worker's compensation benefits for his injuries.  The Division denied the claim on the 
basis that Mr. Shelest's injuries did not occur while he was acting within the 
course of his employment.  More 
specifically, it determined that when Mr. Shelest "chose to travel an 
alternate route into the state of Utah rather than travel directly back to 
Evanston, [he] stepped out of the course of [his] employment."  Mr. Shelest's objection to this 
determination was the subject of a contested case hearing before the Office of 
Administrative Hearings.  The 
hearing examiner upheld the Division's determination that Mr. Shelest was 
not entitled to worker's compensation benefits because he was acting outside the 
scope of his employment when the accident occurred.  Mr. Shelest appealed that decision, 
first to the district court, and now to this Court.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶7]        
"When 
we consider an appeal from a district court's review of an administrative 
agency's decision, we give no special deference to the district court's 
decision."  Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 
84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008).  We review the case as though it had come 
directly from the administrative agency.  
Id.  We review an administrative agency's 
decision pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, which provides in 
pertinent part that the reviewing court shall:

 
 
(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

 
 
(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

 
 
(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

 
 
(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

 
 
(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2009).  We affirm an agency's findings of fact 
if they are supported by substantial evidence.  Dale, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 561.  "Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions."  Id., ¶ 11, 188 P.3d  at 558, quoting 
Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 2002), quoting 
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div. v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 
2001).  We review an agency's 
conclusions of law de novo.  
Dale, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 
561.  We employ the arbitrary and 
capricious standard as a "safety net" against agency action that is contrary to 
law but not readily correctible under the other applicable standards of 
review.  See id., ¶¶ 23-24, 188 P.3d  at 
561.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶8]        
The 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation and benefits for 
work-related injuries, as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-102(a)(xi):

 
 
"Injury" 
means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and 
includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course of 
employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.

 
 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Interpreting this statute, 
particularly the emphasized language, we have explained that there must be "a 
causal nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or 
requirement of the employment."  Quinn v. Securitas Sec. Servs., 2007 WY 
91, ¶ 11, 158 P.3d 711, 714 (Wyo. 2007); In re Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 250 (Wyo. 
1977).  

 
 

[¶9]        
Consistent 
with the requirement that the injury must arise out of and in the course of 
employment, the statutes further provide that the term "injury" does not 
include 
"[a]ny injury sustained during travel to or from employment unless the employee 
is reimbursed for travel expenses or is transported by a vehicle of the 
employer."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-102(a)(xi)(D).  Under 
this statutory provision, an injury sustained by an employee while commuting to 
or from work is generally not compensable. 
 Willey, 
571 P.2d  at 250.  An 
injury sustained by an employee during a trip taken as part of his work, and for 
which he is reimbursed or eligible for reimbursement, is generally 
compensable.  See Lloyd v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div., 2004 WY 85, ¶¶ 18, 22, 93 P.3d 1001, 
1005-06  (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 

[¶10]     
When 
an employee is on a work-related trip for which he is reimbursed, but takes a 
side trip for personal reasons, he is no longer acting within the scope of his 
employment.  See Boode v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 458 P.2d 653, 657 (Wyo. 1969).  
Accordingly, when an employee is on a business trip, but sustains an 
injury during a personal side trip or deviation, he is not entitled to worker's 
compensation benefits.  See Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. 
Workmen's Comp. Dep't v. Boston, 445 P.2d 548, 549-50 (Wyo. 1968).  As explained by an often-quoted 
authority on worker's compensation, "An identifiable deviation from a business 
trip for personal reasons takes the employee out of the course of employment 
until the employee returns to the route of the business trip, unless the 
deviation is so small as to be disregarded as insubstantial."  1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 17, 
at 17-1 (2009).  

 
 

[¶11]     
In 
the case before us now, the Office of Administrative Hearings found that 
Mr. Shelest's injuries were not compensable because they occurred while he 
was on "a side trip that was an abandonment of the employer's business and a 
substantial deviation from the work."  
"Whether an employee's injury occurred in the course of her employment is 
a question of fact."  Goddard v. 
Colonel Bozeman's Restaurant, 914 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Wyo. 1996); Hepp v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 881 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Wyo. 
1994).  Applying the pertinent 
standard of review, we will uphold the hearing examiner's findings of fact if 
the record contains substantial evidence to support the 
findings.

 
 

[¶12]     
The 
record in Mr. Shelest's case contains substantial evidence to support the 
hearing examiner's findings.  The 
alternate route was approximately fifty miles longer than the direct route, and 
took about an hour longer to travel.  
Mr. Shelest, his supervisor, and his co-worker agreed that there was no 
business purpose for taking the alternate route.  Taking the alternate route rather than 
the direct route provided no benefit to Mr. Shelest's employer, and to the 
contrary, kept Mr. Shelest and the others from returning to work for an 
extra hour.  The only reason 
Mr. Shelest gave for taking the alternate route was the personal one of 
enjoying the scenery and the pleasant weather.  Together, this evidence is sufficient 
for a reasonable 
mind to accept as supporting the hearing examiner's decision.

 
 

[¶13]     
Mr. Shelest 
asserts that the trip did have a business purpose because he was returning to 
his regular workplace after attending a required training session.  In further support of this assertion, he 
points out that he 
was paid his normal wage for the day he attended the training, including the 
time spent travelling to and from the session.  He also notes that he was expected to 
return to work after the training, and that he could have submitted a request 
for reimbursement of travel expenses.  
He concedes that his reimbursement would have been limited to the mileage 
for the most direct route, not the additional mileage of the alternate 
route.

 
 

[¶14]     
In 
this argument, Mr. Shelest fails to recognize that a 
trip can have mixed business and personal purposes, and different purposes at 
different stages of the journey.  In 
Standard 
Oil. Co. v. Smith, 
56 Wyo. 537, 546, 111 P.2d 132, 135 (1941), for example, the employee had been 
travelling on vacation.  While 
returning home, he picked up supplies for his business.  He suffered a fatal accident while 
hauling the supplies back to his business.  
We held that his widow was entitled to worker's compensation 
benefits.  His trip was outside the 
scope of his employment during his vacation, but when he picked up the supplies 
for work, "he was again within the area of employment" and "acting with the 
intention of serving the business of the employer."  Id.  Mr. Shelest's situation is the 
converse.  He was initially on a 
business trip, and acting within the scope of his employment.  While returning home, he took an 
alternate route for personal reasons.  
Although part of the trip was undisputedly business-related, the evidence 
supports the hearing examiner's finding that, at the time of the accident, 
Mr. Shelest was no longer within the scope of his employment, and not 
acting to serve any business interest of his employer.

 
 

[¶15]     
Mr. 
Shelest insists that a journey becomes a side trip or deviation only if there is 
an identifiable, concrete, personal errand to be accomplished.  In support of this assertion, he cites 
Boode, 458 P.2d  at 655, in which the 
purpose of the side trip was to inspect and possibly purchase a horse.  He also cites Boston, 445 P.2d  at 549, in which the 
employees took a side trip to drink beer and play games, and Lloyd, ¶ 5, 93 P.3d  at 1002, in 
which the issue was whether a trip to pick up a personal vehicle was a 
deviation.  Based on his 
interpretation of these cases, Mr. Shelest asserts that the alternate route 
was not a deviation because he did not take it in order to accomplish any 
identifiable personal errand.

 
 

[¶16]     
These 
cases indicate that a specific personal errand makes it more apparent that a 
trip is a deviation.  However, they 
do not hold that an identifiable personal errand is a requirement in determining 
that a trip is a deviation.  As the 
hearing examiner found in Mr. Shelest's case, all of the witnesses "agreed 
that while they had no person[al] errand or business to be accomplished by 
taking the alternate route, the sole reason for taking the scenic route was 
their personal pleasure and there was no benefit to the employer."  Enjoying the scenery and weather may not 
be a specific, identifiable errand, but it is sufficiently personal in nature to 
support the hearing examiner's finding that Mr. Shelest was acting outside 
the scope of his employment while travelling the alternate 
route.

 
 

[¶17]     
In 
addition, the extent of the deviation should be considered when determining if a 
business trip has been converted into a personal side trip.  As noted earlier, Larson's treatise explains that a small 
deviation should be disregarded as insubstantial.  There is no precise formula to apply in 
evaluating this factor, but the greater the difference between the alternate 
route and the direct route, the more likely an alternate route will be deemed a 
deviation.  The fact finder must 
apply judgment in assessing the extent of deviation, making this just the sort 
of question in which the hearing examiner's decision is entitled to 
deference.  The evidence here 
indicates, and the hearing examiner found, that the direct route from Rock 
Springs to Evanston was approximately 100 miles, while the alternate route was 
about 150 miles and took about an hour longer to travel.  This evidence concerning the extent of 
the deviation is sufficient to support the hearing examiner's finding that the 
alternate route was a personal side trip or deviation. 

 
 

[¶18]     
Mr. Shelest 
also contends that the alternate route was not a deviation because it was 
authorized by his supervisor.  The 
supervisor's decision to take the alternate route could be considered implicit 
approval.  It is not clear, however, 
that the supervisor had the authority to approve the alternate route.  In fact, the evidence indicates that the 
supervisor was reprimanded for taking the alternate route, suggesting that he 
did not have that authority.  But we 
do not need to explore the details of the supervisor's actual or apparent 
authority, because it makes no difference whether the alternate route was 
authorized or not.  Even if 
Mr. Shelest had permission to take the alternate route, the facts remain 
that he had purely personal reasons for taking the alternate route, that taking 
the alternate route rather than the direct route was of no benefit and some 
detriment to his employer, and that the alternate route was a substantial 
deviation from the direct route.

 
 

[¶19]     
As 
his second issue, Mr. Shelest claims that the hearing examiner's decision 
is arbitrary and capricious because it is inconsistent.  He points out that the hearing examiner 
found, on the one hand, that Mr. Shelest had taken a side trip or deviation, but 
on the other hand, that there was no personal errand to be accomplished by 
taking the alternate route.  We do 
not agree that these are inconsistent findings because, as discussed above, it 
is not necessary to identify a specific personal errand as the purpose of a 
deviation.  The purpose identified 
by Mr. Shelest  that of enjoying the scenery and the weather  was purely 
personal.  As the hearing examiner 
found, when pursuing that personal purpose, Mr. Shelest was acting outside the 
scope of his employment.  Because 
the findings are not inconsistent, the decision cannot be considered arbitrary 
or capricious.

 
 

[¶20]     
Affirmed.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice, 
dissenting, with whom KITE, Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶21]     
I 
respectfully dissent because the majority opinion has applied an incorrect 
standard of review.  I dissent as 
well because I am convinced that the more enlightened authorities in point, 
given the totality of the circumstances of this case, hold that merely because a 
worker uses a longer alternative route to reach a location while traveling 
either to or from a work location, and absent there being any personal errand, 
business, visit, etc., which motivated the use of that alternative route, that 
worker's entitlement to receive worker's compensation benefits, if he/she is 
injured while traveling that longer alternative route, is not 
affected.

 
 

[¶22]     
I 
begin by restating the standard of review.  
Dale v. S & S Builders, 
LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 21-22, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 2008), 
provides:

 
 
Section 
16-3-114(c)(ii) provides only one evidentiary standard of review.  Under the plain language of the statute, 
reversal of an agency finding or action is required if it is "not supported by 
substantial evidence."   
Because contested case hearings under Wyoming's Administrative Procedures 
Act are formal, trial-type proceedings, use of the substantial evidence standard 
for review of evidentiary matters is more in keeping with the original intent of 
the drafters of the administrative procedures act.  33 Fed. Prac. & Proc., Judicial 
Review §§ 8333, 8334.

 
 
            
Thus, in the interests of simplifying the process of identifying the 
correct standard of review and bringing our approach closer to the original use 
of the two standards, we hold that henceforth the substantial evidence standard 
will be applied any time we review an evidentiary ruling.  When the burdened party prevailed before 
the agency, we will determine if substantial evidence exists to support the 
finding for that party by considering whether there is relevant evidence in the 
entire record which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  If the hearing examiner determines that 
the burdened party failed to meet his burden of proof, we will decide whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the agency's decision to reject the 
evidence offered by the burdened party by considering whether that conclusion 
was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record as a 
whole.  See, Wyo. Consumer Group v. Public Serv. Comm'n 
of Wyo., 882 P.2d 858, 860-61 (Wyo.1994); Spiegel, 549 P.2d  at 1178 (discussing 
the definition of substantial evidence as "contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence").  If, in the 
course of its decision making process, the agency disregards certain evidence 
and explains its reasons for doing so based upon determinations of credibility 
or other factors contained in the record, its decision will be sustainable under 
the substantial evidence test.  
Importantly, our review of any particular decision turns not on whether 
we agree with the outcome, but on whether the agency could reasonably conclude 
as it did, based on all the evidence before it.

 
 
            
The arbitrary and capricious standard remains as a "safety net" to catch 
agency action which prejudices a party's substantial rights or which may be 
contrary to the other W.A.P.A. review standards yet is not easily categorized or 
fit to any one particular standard.  
Newman, ¶ 23, 49 P.3d  at 
172.  Although we explained the 
"safety net" application of the arbitrary and capricious standard in Newman, we will refine it slightly here 
to more carefully delineate that it is not meant to apply to true evidentiary 
questions.  Instead, the arbitrary 
and capricious standard will apply if the hearing examiner refused to admit 
testimony or documentary exhibits that were clearly admissible or failed to 
provide appropriate findings of fact or conclusions of law.  This listing is demonstrative and not 
intended as an inclusive catalog of all possible circumstances.  Id.

 
 
            
There will be times when the arbitrary and capricious standard appears to 
overlap with some of the other standards.  
For example, a decision against the great weight of the evidence might 
properly be called arbitrary or capricious in everyday language.  However, the words "arbitrary" and 
"capricious" must be understood in context as terms of art under the 
administrative review statute and should not be employed in areas where the more 
specifically defined standards provide sufficient relief.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 

[¶23]     
The 
Division and the hearing examiner determined that Shelest failed to meet his 
burden of proof and thus we apply this standard of review:  "whether there is substantial evidence 
to support the agency's decision to reject the evidence offered by Shelest by 
considering whether that conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of 
the evidence in the record as a whole."  
I note that this was the standard of review applied by the district court 
upon review in the district court.  
The only evidence in the record is the testimony of the three WYDOT 
employees involved in the occurrence at hand.  After reviewing the record as a whole, I 
conclude that the overwhelming weight of the evidence establishes that Shelest's 
choice of a longer alternative route was not so substantial as to disqualify him 
from the benefits provided by our worker's compensation statutes.  Once Shelest established that he was 
injured in an accident that arose out of and in the course of his work, in a 
place where the employer's business required his presence, and which subjected 
him to extrahazardous duties incident to his work, he had met his burden of 
proof.  Here, Shelest's work day 
consisted of driving to Rock Springs, attending a training session of about 
three hours duration (ending at lunch time), and then driving back to Evanston 
to his home base.  Because of the 
accident, Shelest did not make it back to his home base.  I consulted 1 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 
17.06[1] (1999) for the principle that one factor that weighs heavily on the 
side of non-compensability is the presence of inherent risks in the longer 
alternative route.  Shelest had the 
choice of returning to Evanston on his motorcycle on I-80, or on the longer, 
lower speed, less traveled, and "so-called," scenic route.  The Division made no effort to prove 
that the alternate route was inherently more risky than the more direct route. 
Because Shelest proved he merely was taking an alternate route home (and that 
route was really the only alternative route available), I am persuaded that the 
burden shifted to the Division to prove that the alternate route at issue was 
unreasonable and that it posed an inherent safety hazard that Shelest was 
obligated to avoid.  The Division 
did not undertake to offer such proof.

 
 

[¶24]     
Shelest 
submitted his claim for benefits to the Division.  The Division determined: "The incident, 
as reported to the Division, does not meet the definition of injury.  When you chose to travel an alternate 
route into the State of Utah rather than directly back to Evanston, you stepped 
out of the course of your employment (Wyo. Statute 27-14 
102(a)(xi))[.]"

 
 

[¶25]     
Shelest's 
employer did not object to the claim he submitted to the Division.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
            
(xi)  "Injury" means any harmful change in the human 
organism other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any 
artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course of employment 
while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the 
employer and incurred while at work in places where the employer's business 
requires an employee's presence and which subjects the employee to 
extrahazardous duties incident to the business.   "Injury" does not 
include:

            
(A)  Any illness or communicable disease unless the risk of 
contracting the illness or disease is increased by the nature of the 
employment;

            
(B)  Injury caused by:

            
(I)  The fact the employee is intoxicated or under the 
influence of a controlled substance, or both, except any prescribed drug taken 
as directed by an authorized health care provider.  The division shall define "intoxicated" 
and "under the influence of a controlled substance" for purposes of this 
subparagraph in its rules and regulations; or

            
(II)  The employee's willful intention to injure or kill 
himself or another.

            
(C)  Injury due solely to the culpable negligence of the 
injured employee;

            
(D)  Any injury sustained during travel to or from 
employment unless the employee is reimbursed for travel expenses or is 
transported by a vehicle of the employer; [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 

[¶26]     
Shelest 
sought a hearing.  At that hearing 
he presented unrebutted evidence that his trip from Evanston to Rock Springs was 
undertaken while "at work."  
Specifically, On June 20, 2006, Shelest was traveling from Evanston to 
Rock Springs to be trained in the use of a new computer program associated with 
his work as a lead mechanic for WYDOT.  
Travel by means of use of his personal vehicle (in this case a 
motorcycle) was authorized by his immediate supervisor/employer.  It was also the employer's policy that 
he was to be reimbursed for his travel expenses, but that policy did not go on 
to say that, if you do not submit a voucher for your travel expenses, then you 
will forfeit worker's compensation coverage.  Shelest and another employee traveled 
from Evanston to Rock Springs, for the training, in the company of their 
supervisor/employer.  They opted to 
take their motorcycles that day because the weather was nice.  The group traveled to Rock Springs on 
I-80 which is the most direct route between the two cities, a distance of about 
101 miles.

 
 

[¶27]     
However, 
on the return trip from Rock Springs to Evanston, the three men decided to take 
a longer alternative route that was approximately 50 miles longer than the I-80 
route.  The position argued by the 
Division at the hearing was that Shelest should be denied an award of benefits 
because he substantially deviated from a direct route.  Evanston is located south-south-west of 
Rock Springs.  The group left their 
westward travel on I-80 near Green River and traveled south and west along the 
west side of the Flaming Gorge Recreation Area.  As that highway turns westward and 
northward, it briefly crosses over the Utah border and traverses extreme 
northern Utah for a few miles before going back into Wyoming.  It was in this very area where Shelest 
lost control of his motorcycle and went off the road, suffering significant 
physical injuries.  Shelest 
remembered very little about what caused him to have the accident, or his 
transport from the accident site to a hospital in Utah.  Evanston is located just a few miles 
inside the western boundary of Wyoming with Utah, and about 15 miles north of 
the Utah border to the south of Evanston.  
The route taken was really the only alternate route between Rock Springs 
and Evanston.

 
 

[¶28]     
The 
hearing examiner found that the employer did not have a policy prohibiting the 
use of personal vehicles in such circumstances as those presented here, and that 
if a personal vehicle was used, then the employee was entitled to reimbursement 
for map mileage via the most direct route. The record does not contain a copy of 
WYDOT's travel policies.  However, 
the testimony of the three WYDOT employees supports the hearing examiner's 
findings.  My perception of that 
policy is only that direct-route, map-mileage is paid to employees for 
travel.  However, that policy is not 
encumbered by a concomitant requirement that the most direct route must be used 
in all instances.  SAO Accounting 
Policies & Procedures, § 61.07 (Mileage) (2006); Wyoming Business 
Council Travel Policy, D. 3.a. (September 2003); State of Wyoming Executive 
Department Executive Order, Order 2008-1 (Replaces Executive Order 2007-1) 
PRIVATE VEHICLE USE REIMBURSEMENT; (this is also the policy followed by the 
Wyoming Supreme Court).  Likewise, 
WYDOT did not have a specific policy requiring employees to take a particular 
route or a direct route for business travel.  After summarizing the relatively brief 
and simple facts of this case, the hearing examiner concluded that the use of 
the longer alternative route did not benefit the employer and that the route was 
taken solely for Shelest's pleasure.  
Thus, the hearing examiner concluded, Shelest was not within the course 
or scope of his employment at the time of the injury.

 
 

[¶29]     
My 
careful review of the record in this case convinces me that Shelest's principal 
purpose in being on the alternative route was to get back to work in 
Evanston.  If the employer had an 
objection to the three employees' decisions to take the longer route, then that 
was readily vindicated by docking their pay by one hour (something the employer 
did not do), or some other disciplinary action.  I see no justification for denying 
worker's compensation benefits in such circumstances.  With respect to "The Long Alternative 
Route," Larson's treatise on workman's compensation benefits says 
this:

 
 
Taking 
a somewhat roundabout route, or being off the shortest line between the origin 
and destination does not in itself remove the traveler from the course of 
employment; it must be shown in addition that the deviation was aimed at 
reaching some specific personal objective.

If 
the employee for some reason having nothing to do with a private purpose, but 
perhaps merely in the exercise of a personal judgment or preference as to the 
most desirable route, takes a route other than that prescribed by this employer, 
this should not be considered a deviation.

This 
type of case, there being no personal deviation involved, should not be treated 
as a deviation problem at all, but rather as a problem of violation of the 
employer's instructions, a subject which is examined in detail in a later 
chapter.

 
 

1 
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 
17.05[1], at 17-29 through 17-30 (1999).

 
 

[¶30]     
Larson 
cites a number of cases to support this point and each such case has its 
individual characteristics.  
Likewise, many such cases are collected in an annotation and they also 
turn on their individual facts.  
W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Deviation from Employment in Use of 
Employer's Car during Regular Work Hours, 51 A.L.R.2d 8, §16 (Choice of 
alternative, longer route) (1957 and Later Case Service 
2006).

 
 

[¶31]     
Given 
the record on appeal before us, I would also conclude that occurrences, such as 
the one at hand, must be viewed in light of "scale," the geography of Wyoming, 
and the differences between I-80 and Wyoming Highway 530, while riding on a 
motorcycle.  Shelest's return route 
was almost 50% longer, or about 50 miles, or about one hour, depending upon how 
it is quantified.  If this had been 
a case about blocks, then an alternate route which extended six blocks to nine 
blocks would operate to deprive a worker from worker's compensation 
benefits.  Likewise, if a "direct" 
route was extended from 20 minutes to 30 minutes that could serve to deprive the 
worker of worker's compensation benefits.  
Perhaps WYDOT, as well as all other employers, want to institute internal 
rules to the effect that the most direct route must be taken, unless there is a 
documented and acceptable reason for the deviation.  For example, from Cheyenne there are 
three or more competing routes to Jackson.  
An employee might choose one over the other because of weather, highway 
construction delays, traffic patterns, etc., but it would be a deviation unless 
documentation was kept by each and every employee.  I cannot accept that as good policy, or 
a rational construction of the governing law in the field of worker's 
compensation jurisprudence.  The 
route Shelest took was the only alternate route available, and I do not think he 
should have to forfeit his right to worker's compensation benefits for having 
taken it.  Moreover, this is Wyoming 
and our geography of distances and terrain features often commands a conclusion 
that distances which might seem unreasonable in those jurisdictions/states so 
small that they readily could fit into either Uinta or Sweetwater Counties, 
cannot be considered unreasonable here.

 
 

[¶32]     
I 
conclude that the record does not support the Division's decision to reject the 
evidence offered by Shelest, and that the overwhelming weight of the evidence in 
the record as a whole does not support the hearing examiner's approval of the 
Division's denial of benefits.  
Therefore, I would reverse the order of the district court which affirmed 
the order of the hearing examiner, with directions that the district court 
reverse the order of the hearing examiner with further direction that the 
hearing examiner remand this case to the Division with directions that Shelest 
be awarded the benefits to which he is entitled.