Case Title: Billups v. Carter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 040268

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
PAULA BILLUPS 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
v.  Record No. 040268            November 5, 2004 
 
CAMERON CARTER, et al. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FLUVANNA COUNTY 
John R. Cullen, Judge 
 
 
Paula Billups (the plaintiff), a prisoner at the Fluvanna 
Correctional Center for Women (the center), brought an action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the trial court against the Virginia 
Department of Corrections (VDOC) and Cameron Carter, formerly 
a supervisor in the kitchen at the center and an employee of 
VDOC.  The claim against Carter included a count for assault 
and battery.  That action was filed on December 23, 2002.  On 
January 24, 2003, the plaintiff filed a second § 1983 action 
in the same court against Robert C. Armstrong and E.R. 
Barrack, investigators employed by VDOC.  The two actions were 
never formally consolidated, but the parties and the trial 
court treated them as one. 
 
The defendants in both cases filed demurrers, pleas in 
bar and motions to dismiss, all of which the trial court 
sustained.  We granted appeals in both cases, which present 
questions concerning the requirements of notice under the 
Virginia Tort Claims Act (the Act), the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies as a prerequisite to filing suit, the 
 
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applicable statute of limitations, and the amendment of 
pleadings to correct misnomer or to add parties. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
Because the cases were decided on the pleadings, 
supplemented by affidavits, we will summarize the facts as set 
forth in those filings.  While incarcerated at the center, the 
plaintiff was assigned to work in the kitchen, where Cameron 
Carter was employed as a supervisor with authority to direct 
her work and report her for any misconduct that could lead to 
her punishment.  Under duress (Carter’s threat of false 
reports of misconduct on her part), the plaintiff unwillingly 
engaged in sexual acts with him during the latter part of 2000 
and early 2001.  The last such act occurred on February 12, 
2001, which was Carter’s last day of employment with VDOC.1 
 
The plaintiff reported Carter’s conduct to “appropriate 
departmental officials” in February 2001, and “cooperated with 
[them] as they conducted their investigation.”  On January 11, 
2002, the plaintiff’s attorney wrote a letter to the warden of 
the center, requesting compensation for the injuries inflicted 
on her by Carter during the time of his employment by VDOC.  
                     
1 Carter left his employment because of reports of similar 
misconduct with other female prisoners.  He was indicted for 
his abuse of the plaintiff, entered a plea of guilty, and was, 
on October 12, 2001, convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fluvanna County of a felony under Code § 18.2-64.2.  He was 
sentenced to incarceration for a term of two years, four 
months. 
 
3
The warden responded by letter dated January 27, 2002, 
stating: 
Fluvanna Correctional Center’s administrative staff is 
very familiar with this situation and appropriate 
administrative action has been taken to address this 
issue.  However, if Ms. Billups is not satisfied with 
this action, she is encouraged to utilize the Inmate 
Grievance Procedure by filing a formal grievance with the 
Institutional Grievance Coordinator.  The Grievance 
process must be exhausted prior to seeking legal 
remedies. 
 
 
In response, the plaintiff, on February 1, 2002, filed a 
grievance on a form provided by the center, claiming 
“compensation for [her] injuries.”  The center’s grievance 
coordinator returned the form to the plaintiff without taking 
action on it “due to an expired filing period.”  Plaintiff’s 
counsel again wrote to the warden on April 12, 2002, 
requesting that the coordinator’s decision regarding lack of 
timeliness be appealed in accordance with VDOC’s internal 
rules governing prisoner grievance procedures.2  This resulted 
in a “Level I Warden’s Response” addressed to the plaintiff 
and dated May 21, 2002, stating: 
                     
2 VDOC’s Inmate Grievance Procedure, as pertinent here, 
specifies three levels of review, first to the warden of the 
institution involved, second to the Regional Director and 
finally to the Director or Deputy Director of VDOC in certain 
cases.  Many cases, including this one, are ineligible for the 
third level of appeal.  In that event, the response to the 
inmate from the second level must state that this was the last 
level of appeal and that all administrative remedies have been 
exhausted.  Virginia Department of Corrections, DOP 866: 
Inmate Grievance Procedure § 866-7.15 (Nov. 20, 1988) (DOP 
§ 866-7.15). 
 
4
It is noted that you met with the Institutional 
Investigator and the incident was referred to the 
Department of Corrections Investigative Unit.  
Conclusion of the investigation revealed that Mr. 
Carter did violate the Department of Corrections 
Policy 5-22 and was removed from employment. 
 
Based on the above, this issue is deemed FOUNDED.  An 
appropriate administrative remedy was provided. 
 
 
If you are dissatisfied with the Level I response, you may 
appeal within (5) calendar days to the Regional Director 
. . . . 
 
(Emphasis in original). 
 
 
The plaintiff appealed to the second level, eliciting a 
response from VDOC’s regional director, dated June 18, 2002 
and received by her on June 28, 2002, stating: 
Your grievance appeal has been reviewed along with 
the original complaint and the Level 1 response. 
 
The decision of the Level 1 respondent is UPHELD. 
 
When you reported the incident, it was referred to 
the Investigative Unit and, at the conclusion of the 
investigation, the case was referred for criminal 
prosecution. 
 
In accordance with DOP 866 governing the Inmate 
Grievance Procedure, this is your last level of 
appeal. 
 
(Emphasis in original). 
 
 
The trial court’s ruling sustaining the defendant’s 
demurrers, pleas and motions was premised upon four underlying 
conclusions:  that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate 
compliance with the notice requirements of the Virginia Tort 
Claims Act, that she had failed to exhaust her administrative 
 
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remedies before filing suit, that her actions were barred by 
the statute of limitations, and that she had sued VDOC rather 
than the Commonwealth, the only proper party to such suits. 
Analysis 
A. Notice 
 
The Commonwealth and its agencies are immune from 
liability for the tortious acts or omissions of their agents 
and employees in the absence of an express constitutional or 
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.  The Rector and 
Visitors of UVA v. Carter, 267 Va. 242, 244, 591 S.E.2d 76, 78 
(2004).  The General Assembly has provided an express, limited 
waiver of sovereign immunity by enacting the Virginia Tort 
Claims Act, Code §§ 8.01-195.1 through 195.9.  This enactment, 
being in derogation of the common law, is strictly construed.  
Carter, 267 Va. at 245, 591 S.E.2d at 78. 
 
Code § 8.01-195.6 provides, in pertinent part: 
The claimant or his agent, attorney or 
representative shall, in a claim cognizable against 
the Commonwealth, mail the notice of claim via the 
United States Postal Service by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, addressed to the Director 
of the Division of Risk Management or the Attorney 
General in Richmond. . . . 
 
In any action contesting the filing of the notice of 
claim, the burden of proof shall be on the claimant 
to establish mailing and receipt of the notice in 
conformity with this section. 
 
 
The defendants contended, and the trial court held, that 
the foregoing provisions impose, as a jurisdictional 
 
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prerequisite, a requirement that there be appended to a motion 
for judgment seeking relief under the Act a copy of the 
original certified mail return receipt, or an affidavit to the 
effect that the notice had been sent and received as specified 
by the statute.  We do not agree.  The statute merely places 
upon the claimant the burden of proving proper mailing and 
receipt of the notice of claim in cases in which its filing is 
contested.  The defendants here made no contention that the 
plaintiff, as claimant, had in fact failed to give notice as 
required, but contended only that the motions for judgment 
were insufficient for failure to contain “required 
documentation” to that effect.  In the absence of a contest 
concerning the giving of actual notice, such “documentation” 
at the pleading stage was unnecessary. 
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
 
Code § 8.01-195.3(7) provides that tort claims by 
prisoners against the Commonwealth are excluded from the 
operation of the Act  
. . . unless the claimant verifies under oath, by 
affidavit, that he has exhausted his remedies under 
the adult institutional inmate grievance procedures 
promulgated by the Department of Corrections.  The 
time for filing the notice of tort claim shall be 
tolled during the pendency of the grievance 
procedure. 
 
 
The Federal Civil Rights Act, of which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
is a part, also prohibits suits by prisoners “until such 
 
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administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”  42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  The one-year statute of limitations 
applicable to the assault and battery count against Carter, 
Code § 8.01-243.2, also contains a requirement that “all 
available administrative remedies” be exhausted before a 
prisoner may sue, and further provides that the limitation 
period shall be extended until six months after such remedies 
are exhausted. 
 
The defendants contended, and the trial court held, that 
the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative 
remedies because she had not filed her initial grievance on a 
printed form prescribed by VDOC within 30 days of Carter’s 
last assault upon her.  VDOC’s inmate grievance procedures 
provide that grievances “are to be filed within 30 calendar 
days of the occurrence/incident . . . ,” DOP § 866-7.14, and 
that “[i]nmates are to use the Regular Grievance Form 
(Attachment 2) to file their own grievances.”  Id.  It is 
uncontested that the plaintiff did not file such a form until 
after the warden recommended, in a letter to her attorney, 
that she should do so. 
 
Nevertheless, the question presented on appeal is not 
whether the plaintiff filed her grievance upon the prescribed 
form within 30 days but whether she exhausted her 
administrative remedies before filing suit. 
 
8
 
We adhere to the rule that the principles of waiver and 
estoppel do not apply to the Commonwealth and that when acting 
in its governmental capacity it cannot be bound by the 
unauthorized acts or representations of its employees and 
agents.  E.g., Ellis v. Commissioner, 206 Va. 194, 201, 142 
S.E.2d 531, 536 (1965); Main v. Department of Highways, 206 
Va. 143, 150, 142 S.E.2d 524, 529 (1965).  The present appeal, 
however, does not turn upon the intentional waiver of a known 
right by the agents of the sovereign, or upon misleading 
conduct by such agents giving rise to the principles of 
estoppel.  Rather, it turns upon whether the plaintiff, before 
filing suit, had in fact exhausted such administrative 
remedies as were available to her. 
 
Within 30 days of Carter’s last assault upon her, the 
plaintiff reported his conduct to the prison authorities and 
cooperated in their investigation, leading to his discharge, 
indictment and felony conviction.  When her attorney wrote to 
the warden, asking for compensation for her, the warden 
replied that the center’s staff was “very familiar with this 
situation” and that “appropriate action has been taken.”  The 
warden then “encouraged” the filing of a formal grievance 
proceeding if the plaintiff was unsatisfied with the action 
already taken.  When that step was taken, it failed and was 
appealed.  The appeal resulted in a finding that the grievance 
 
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was “founded” but that the administrative action already taken 
against Carter was sufficient.  That determination was then 
appealed to the second and final level of appeal provided 
under VDOC’s grievance procedures, resulting in an affirmance 
of the finding in the first appeal.  At both levels of appeal, 
the grievance was found to be valid and supported by the 
facts, but the requested remedy was denied.  The letter to the 
plaintiff conveying the final ruling on the grievance 
concluded with the words: “this is your last level of appeal.” 
 
In a different but analogous context, we recently held 
that reasonable compliance with the requirements of the Act, 
not perfect compliance, was sufficient to invoke its statutory 
waiver of sovereign immunity.  Bates v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 
387, 394-95, 593 S.E.2d 250, 254-55 (2004).  There, we found a 
description of the “place of injury” in the plaintiff’s notice 
in a medical malpractice case sufficient where it simply named 
the hospital in which the alleged malpractice had occurred, 
rejecting the argument that the notice should have named the 
precise building, floor and room.  Id.  In the circumstances 
of the present case, we are unable to say that the plaintiff 
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and hold that 
she took all reasonably necessary steps to do so. 
C. Statute of Limitations 
 
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The defendants argued, and the trial court held, that the 
statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions was one 
year, as prescribed by Code § 8.01-243.2, which governs 
personal actions brought by inmates of correctional 
institutions relating to the conditions of their confinement.  
Congress has not adopted a statute of limitations governing 
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Rather, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) 
authorizes the federal courts to borrow state limitation 
periods when not inconsistent with federal law.  Owens v. 
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239 (1989).  The United States Supreme 
Court specifically held that “courts considering § 1983 claims 
should borrow the general or residual [state] statute for 
personal injury actions.”  Id. at 250.  Our general or 
residual statute of limitations provides, in pertinent part, 
that every action for personal injury, “whatever the theory of 
recovery . . . shall be brought within two years after the 
cause of action accrues.”  Code § 8.01-243(A).  We hold that 
§ 1983 actions brought in Virginia courts are governed by the 
two-year limitation prescribed by that section.  Accordingly, 
the plaintiff’s § 1983 actions were timely because they were 
brought within two years after Carter’s last assault upon her. 
 
The plaintiff’s common-law assault and battery count 
against Carter is governed by the one-year limitation period 
prescribed by Code § 8.01-243.2 but, as noted above, that 
 
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section also provides for an extension of up to six months 
after all administrative remedies have been exhausted.3  The 
record shows that the plaintiff received notice of the final 
determination of her grievance appeal on June 28, 2002 and the 
time period after her exhaustion of administrative remedies 
runs from that date.  Her suit against Carter was instituted 
on December 23, 2002, within the six month period.  Thus, the 
trial court erred in holding the plaintiff’s claims barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
D. Misnomer or Amendment to Add Party. 
 
After this case was decided in the trial court, we held, 
in Carter, 267 Va. at 245, 591 S.E.2d at 78, that the 
Commonwealth was both a necessary party and a proper party to 
actions brought under the Act, because the Act had the effect 
of creating a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the 
Commonwealth but not of its agencies.  On January 27, 2003, 
the plaintiff moved the trial court to “correct a misnomer” by 
changing the name of VDOC in the caption of the suit to the 
Commonwealth, or in the alternative, to add the Commonwealth 
as a party defendant.  The court denied the motion because the 
plaintiff’s suits were to be dismissed on other grounds. 
                     
3 All counts in both motions for judgment are based upon 
§ 1983 claims except for the assault and battery count against 
Carter. 
 
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Because we conclude that the actions should not have been 
so dismissed, the motion to add the Commonwealth as a party 
defendant should have been granted.4  The motion to add was 
made within the two-year limitation period applicable to 
§ 1983 claims and there was no danger of prejudice to the 
Commonwealth by reason of late notice.  The Attorney General 
has defended both actions from their inception and continues 
to represent all parties defendant, except Carter, on appeal. 
 
Code § 8.01-7 provides: 
In any case in which full justice cannot be done, or 
the whole controversy ended, without the presence of 
new parties to the suit, the court, by order, may 
direct the clerk to issue the proper process against 
such new parties, and, upon the maturing of the case 
as to them, proceed to make such orders or decrees 
as would have been proper if the new parties had 
been made parties at the commencement of the suit. 
 
“Leave to amend shall be liberally granted in furtherance of 
the ends of justice.”  Rule 1:8.  Had the trial court not 
dismissed the cases on other grounds, a denial of the motion 
to add the Commonwealth as a party defendant would have 
constituted an abuse of discretion, given the circumstances 
discussed above.  See Kole v. City of Chesapeake, 247 Va. 51, 
57, 439 S.E. 2d. 405, 409 (1994). 
Conclusion 
                     
4 Code § 8.01-6, relating to the correction of a misnomer, 
is inapplicable.  It applies when the right person is wrongly 
named, not where the wrong entity is named. Swann v. Marks, 
252 Va. 181, 184, 476 S.E.2d 170, 172 (1996). 
 
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Because the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s 
motion to add the Commonwealth as a party defendant, in 
sustaining the defendants’ demurrers, pleas and motions to 
dismiss, and in dismissing the actions, we will reverse the 
final orders in both cases and remand them to the trial court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.