Case Title: In re D.N.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S268437

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re D.N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
D.N., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S268437 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F080624 
 
Fresno County Superior Court 
19CEJ600384-1 
 
 
December 12, 2022 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Guerrero concurred. 
 
1 
In re D.N. 
S268437 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
After determining that D.N., a minor, was within the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court because of his violation of 
criminal laws (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602),1 the court adjudged 
D.N. (hereafter minor) to be a ward of the court and ordered him 
to reside in his parent or guardian’s home under several 
conditions of probation.  The court further ordered:  “Probation 
is authorized to offer the minor up to 50 hours of community 
service, or up to a cumulative total of 10 days on the community 
service work program as an option to work off alleged probation 
violations.”    
On appeal, minor attacks this provision of the court’s 
dispositional order as a constitutionally improper delegation of 
judicial authority to the probation department and as a 
deprivation of due process.  Both challenges rest on the premise 
that the court’s order allowed the probation department itself to 
determine that the minor had violated his probation and to 
impose community service as a sanction for the violation.  We 
reject that premise and the constitutional challenges based on 
it.  The juvenile court did not authorize the probation officer to 
adjudicate violations or impose sanctions for them, but only to 
“offer” minor the “option” of performing community service 
when a violation is “alleged.”  In effect, the juvenile court gave 
 
1  
All further unspecified statutory references are to the 
Welfare and Institutions Code.   
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
its advance approval to an agreement that might be reached 
between minor and the probation officer for the performance of 
a certain amount of community service in lieu of having an 
alleged probation violation adjudicated in a judicial proceeding.  
The court’s order did not thereby improperly delegate any part 
of the judicial function to the probation officer, nor did it deprive 
minor of any judicial process constitutionally due him.  Under 
the challenged provision, minor remained free to reject any offer 
the probation department made and to invoke the ordinary 
statutory procedures for adjudication of an alleged probation 
violation.   
I.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The People brought a juvenile wardship petition under 
section 602, subdivision (a), alleging minor had committed one 
count of violating Penal Code section 288.5 (continuous sexual 
abuse of a child under 14 years of age).  The juvenile court found 
the allegation true after a contested jurisdictional hearing.  At 
the hearing on disposition, the court adjudged minor a ward of 
the court and determined his maximum period of confinement 
was 16 years.  In order that minor could enter a sex offender 
treatment program as soon as possible, however, the court 
declined to impose any initial period of confinement.  Instead, 
the court placed minor on probation, ordered him to remain on 
G.P.S. supervision for at least three months, and imposed other 
conditions of probation including participation in a long-term 
sex offender program, school attendance, a curfew, a restitution 
fine, restrictions on his association with others, and search 
conditions.  
In the portion of its disposition at issue here, the court 
orally ordered:  “The Court is granting probation in this matter.  
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
And the Court is authorizing the Probation Department [to] 
offer the minor community service, up to 50 hours of community 
service, up to a cumulative total of 10 days, to work off any 
alleged probation violations.  That can also include the GPS 
system as a sanction, up to 30 days, but he’d already be on that 
program.”  The court continued:  “I would anticipate if there’s 
any significant violation of any term and condition of the grant 
of probation here, that he would be brought back to court for 
additional recommendations, which most likely would include 
[a] substantial amount of time in custody.”  The court’s written 
dispositional order included the same provision for community 
service, though with some additional language, italicized below:  
“Probation is authorized to offer the minor up to 50 hours of 
community service, or up to a cumulative total of 10 days on the 
community service work program as an option to work off alleged 
probation violations.  Minor to remain on GPS for 3 months.”  
This provision appears to have been drawn from a standard 
order option on the juvenile court’s delinquency minute order 
form (not selected by the court in this case), which reads:  “The 
Court authorizes the Probation Department to offer the minor 
community service up to 50 hours as an option to work off 
alleged probation violations in lieu of being brought back before 
the court.”   
The Court of Appeal rejected minor’s claims that the 
community service provision violated separation of powers 
principles and infringed his due process rights.2  Citing In re 
 
2  
The appellate court determined that because minor’s 
challenge presented a pure question of law that could be 
resolved without reference to any disputed fact, the claim was 
 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
Gabriel T. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 952, 958, the appellate court 
acknowledged that a juvenile court may not delegate to a 
probation officer the authority to determine that a minor is in 
violation of probation.  But in this case, the court held, the 
juvenile court’s order did not permit the probation department 
“to decide if and when a violation of probation had occurred. . . .  
Instead, the court permitted the probation officer to offer 
appellant the option of community service for an alleged 
violation.  The juvenile court set the basic condition, but it left 
the specific details to the probation officer and appellant to 
resolve.”  The Court of Appeal also rejected minor’s challenges 
to several other probation conditions but struck an AIDS testing 
condition subject to presentation of additional evidence 
concerning its validity.  In all other respects, the appellate court 
affirmed the dispositional order. 
We will affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The challenge here is to a juvenile court order authorizing 
the probation officer to offer a minor on probation the option of 
performing community service, in an amount chosen by the 
probation officer up to a maximum set by the court, in the event 
the minor is alleged to have violated a term of probation.  Minor 
contends this provision “not only permits the probation officer 
to unilaterally find appellant in violation of probation, but also 
to choose the appropriate sanction for any alleged violation.”  He 
maintains that the juvenile court’s delegation of these 
assertedly judicial functions — adjudicating violations of 
 
not forfeited by his failure to object in the juvenile court to this 
part of the order.  The Attorney General does not dispute this 
holding. 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
probation and imposing sanctions for them — violates both due 
process and separation of powers principles. 
Before addressing minor’s arguments, we outline the roles 
of the court and the probation officer regarding juvenile 
offenders on probation supervision. 
When a minor has been adjudged a ward of the juvenile 
court because of delinquency under section 602 and placed 
under the supervision of a probation officer, the court “may 
impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it 
may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be 
done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward 
enhanced.”  (§ 730, subd. (b).)  A few basic conditions involving 
education and curfew are generally required, absent a finding of 
inappropriateness, of all wards who are not removed from their 
parent or guardian’s physical custody (§ 729.2), while other 
conditions are specifically mandated or authorized under 
certain circumstances or for violations of certain criminal laws 
(see, e.g., §§ 729, 729.1, 729.3, 729.6, 729.8).  Aside from those 
required conditions, the juvenile court retains significant 
flexibility to fashion its rehabilitative mandates and conditions.  
“The statutory scheme governing juvenile delinquency is 
designed to give the court ‘maximum flexibility to craft suitable 
orders aimed at rehabilitating the particular ward before it.’ ”  
(In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 411.) 
After disposition, the juvenile court retains the authority 
to modify its orders regarding a minor under its jurisdiction 
(§ 775), and a parent, the minor through a guardian ad litem, or 
another person having an interest in the minor may petition the 
court for a modification (§ 778).  The probation officer or public 
prosecutor may also seek a modification from the court.  (§ 777, 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
subd. (a)(2).)    A modification that involves removal of the minor 
from the custody of a parent, guardian, relative or friend and 
placement in foster care or commitment to confinement must be 
pursued by the notice and hearing procedures set out in 
section 777.  At the hearing, the facts alleged in the notice must 
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  (Id., subd. (c).)  If 
the probation officer proposes a modification that does not call 
for removal from parental custody or commitment to 
confinement, the officer may seek modification through a 
petition under section 778.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.560(e)(1); 
In re Glen J. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 981, 984–986.) 
Under California’s general municipal law, a county’s chief 
probation officer is appointed by the judges of the superior court, 
and the charter of Fresno County, where this case arises, is to 
the same effect.  (§ 270; Gov. Code, § 27770; Fresno County 
Charter (as amended June 5, 2018), § 21.)  The probation 
officer’s duties include “[c]ommunity supervision of offenders 
subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to 
[Welfare & Institutions Code] Section 602” (Gov. Code, § 27771, 
subd. (a)(1)), and in performing that function the probation 
officer plays a dual role, serving as both an arm of the juvenile 
court and, in some circumstances, as an aide to law enforcement.  
(See In re Arron C. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1372 
[considering juvenile probation department to be “effectively an 
arm of the juvenile court”]; id. at pp. 1377–1378 (conc. & dis. 
opn. of Jones, J.) [emphasizing probation officer’s status as a 
limited-powers peace officer].)  On the one hand, the probation 
officer qualifies as a peace officer for purposes of enforcing 
compliance with the conditions of probation.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 830.5, subd. (a)(1).)  On the other, the probation department 
aids the juvenile court by “furnish[ing] to the court such 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
information and assistance as the court may require” (Welf. and 
Inst. Code, § 280), including a social study and recommended 
disposition (ibid.), which the court must read and consider 
(§ 706).  And as noted, the probation officer supervises offenders 
subject to the court’s jurisdiction and may, in the course of that 
supervision, petition the court to address violations of a 
probationer’s conditions by ordering a more restrictive 
disposition (§ 777, subd. (a)(2)) or another form of modification 
(§ 778).  
In light of the probation officer’s close links to the juvenile 
court, and the impracticality of juvenile courts themselves 
supervising juvenile probationers on a day-to-day basis, 
California courts have recognized that a juvenile court may 
place significant supervisory discretion in the probation 
department’s hands, at least when the department’s decisions 
are subject to judicial review.  (See, e.g., In re I.M. (2020) 
53 Cal.App.5th 929, 933–936 [no improper delegation when 
length of detention depends on minor’s completion of 
rehabilitative program supervised by probation department, but 
court retains ultimate authority to determine whether minor 
has completed program and to release minor from detention]; In 
re J.C. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 741, 747–748 [same:  noting that 
the minor can bring any issue of unfair delay in certification of 
rehabilitative progress to the court’s attention through a 
petition 
under 
section 
778]; 
In 
re 
Robert 
M. (2013) 
215 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1185 [noting that ward in rehabilitative 
program “is answerable on a daily basis to those who operate 
the program, but that does not change the ultimate 
responsibility of the juvenile court for the ward’s supervision 
and control”].) 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
In the related context of dependency proceedings,3 courts 
considering orders for visitation have permitted a similar degree 
of delegation to public officers, or even private actors, so long as 
the juvenile court retains ultimate control.  In In re Chantal 
S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 213, the juvenile court ordered that the 
dependent child’s father could have visits with the child, but 
visitation would not begin until “father’s chosen therapist 
determined father had made ‘satisfactory progress for a time.’ ”  
We upheld the order, which we explained “does not vest 
therapists with ‘absolute’ discretion to determine whether 
visitation should occur.”  (Ibid.)  We noted that any parties who 
believed themselves prejudiced by the therapist’s decision 
“would be permitted to raise those claims in the family court, 
and a family court judge would make the final decision as to 
whether visitation should begin.”  (Id. at p. 214; see In re Moriah 
T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374 [“the juvenile court may 
delegate to the probation officer or social worker the 
responsibility to manage the details of visitation, including time, 
place and manner thereof”]; In re Jennifer G. (1990) 
221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757 [court may delegate “the ministerial 
tasks of overseeing the [visitation] right as defined by the 
court”]; see also In re James R. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 413, 435–
438 [surveying dependency case law on this point].)  As one 
Court of Appeal explained, “The nature of the task of the 
juvenile court system in responding to the rapidly changing and 
complex 
family 
situations 
which 
arise 
in 
dependency 
proceedings and the interests of judicial economy require the 
 
3  
A dependency proceeding is one brought pursuant to 
section 300, generally because of abuse or neglect by a parent or 
guardian. 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
delegation of some quasi-adjudicatory powers to a member of the 
executive branch dedicated to the dependent child’s welfare.  As 
long as that role is limited and subject to supervision, as it was 
here, there is no violation of the separation of powers doctrine.”  
(In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1237.)   
In contrast, courts have found an improper delegation 
when the juvenile court has given nonjudicial persons or 
institutions complete discretion over a significant aspect of the 
court’s legal control of the minor.  In In re Gabriel T., supra, 
3 Cal.App.5th at page 958, the juvenile court had committed the 
minor to a correctional academy for 12 months, the last six to be 
in “aftercare under the supervision of the probation officer,” and 
had added that “[a]t any time during the aftercare component 
you may be returned to the Correctional Camp for a one-time 
remediation of 30 days due to a violation of probation or program 
rules.”  The Court of Appeal held the last provision violated the 
statutes defining the procedures for finding a probation 
violation:  “Here, the condition imposed upon appellant vested 
absolute discretion in the probation officer to determine if and 
when a violation of probation occurred during the aftercare 
program.”  (Id. at p. 960.)  The court further noted that, in 
contravention of the statutory framework, the challenged 
condition failed to “require a judicial finding that appellant 
violated a condition of probation or that his continuance in the 
home was contrary to his welfare” and that the order did not 
guarantee the minor “notice or an opportunity to be heard” 
before being sanctioned for a violation.  (Id. at pp. 960–961; see 
also In re Jennifer G., supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 757 [holding 
dependency orders giving county agency the power to determine 
the right to and frequency of visitation were improper 
delegations of the judicial function]; In re Pedro Q. (1989) 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1371–1372 [condition restricting the 
minor’s travel improperly imposed by the probation officer 
without judicial approval]; In re Danielle W., supra, 
207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1237 [“a visitation order granting the 
Department [of Children’s Services] complete and total 
discretion to determine whether or not visitation occurs would 
be invalid”]; cf. In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 
[probation condition forbidding a minor from associating with 
“ ‘anyone disapproved of by probation’ ” is impermissibly vague 
in absence of requirement that the minor know of probation’s 
disapproval]; id. at pp. 889–892.)4 
 
4  
In the context of adult felony probation, as well, courts 
have disapproved provisions purporting to completely delegate 
the setting of a condition to the probation department.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 901–903 [order 
delegating 
to 
probation 
department 
decision 
whether 
probationer was to attend a residential drug treatment 
program, as opposed to an outpatient program, violated 
separation 
of 
powers 
doctrine]; 
People 
v. 
Cruz (2011) 
197 Cal.App.4th 
1306, 
1311 
[statute 
giving 
probation 
department sole discretion to require G.P.S. monitoring violates 
the 
separation 
of 
powers]; 
People 
v. 
O’Neil (2008) 
165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358–1359 [striking stay-away order for 
delegating to probation department all specification of persons 
to be avoided:  “The court may leave to the discretion of the 
probation officer the specification of the many details that 
invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation.  
However, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended”]; 
People v. Cervantes (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 353, 356–361 
[striking order giving probation department power to set 
amount of restitution]; but see People v. Penoli (1996) 
46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307–308 [no improper delegation in order 
permitting probation department to select a particular 
residential drug rehabilitation program].)  
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
Minor contends that the order here falls on the 
impermissible side of the line — violating both separation of 
powers and due process — because it gives the probation officer 
the power to determine whether minor has violated his 
probation and to impose community service as a sanction.  The 
order, minor argues, went well beyond those endorsed in the 
case law:  “[T]he juvenile court delegated to the probation officer 
not simply the specific details of a particular probation 
condition, but rather the authority to determine whether 
conditions of probation had been violated, as well as the 
authority to impose sanctions for such violations without the 
necessity of a court hearing or due process.”   
If the provision minor challenges did what he says it 
does — if it permitted the probation officer to find a violation of 
probation and impose a sanction without minor having notice, 
an opportunity to be heard, or any form of judicial process — it 
would raise constitutional concerns of the type minor posits.  
But as we read it, the juvenile court’s order did not delegate any 
such judicial power to the probation officer.  Instead, as the 
Court of Appeal below explained, the juvenile court merely 
“permitted the probation officer to offer appellant the option of 
community service for an alleged violation.”  When the contested 
provision of the juvenile court’s order is read together with the 
court’s caution that minor would be returned to court for “any 
significant violation” of his probation and would face the 
probability of “substantial amount of time in custody” (impliedly 
invoking section 777), it is clear the provision does no more than 
authorize the probation officer to reach a consensual 
arrangement with minor for performance of community service 
as a means of addressing allegations of relatively insignificant, 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
technical violations of probation.5  Under that grant of 
authority, if minor wishes to contest an allegation that he has 
violated his probation or the probation officer’s determination 
that community service hours are warranted, he is free to 
decline the offer.  As the Attorney General explains, the 
probation department would then be free to decide whether the 
alleged violation warrants seeking a modification of the juvenile 
court’s probation order under section 777, or under section 778 
if no more restrictive disposition were sought.   
Minor disputes this reading of the order’s provision, 
maintaining that “[a]side from the single word ‘offer,’ the plain 
language of the court’s order contains no mention or hint of a 
consensual arrangement.”  We cannot agree.  Even by itself, the 
word “offer” clearly indicates the contemplated arrangement 
was a consensual one, as an offer by its nature may be accepted 
or declined.6  But beyond that, the juvenile court’s order refers 
to community service as an “option” for minor.  Again, an option 
necessarily involves a choice7 — in this context, minor’s choice 
 
5  
As the Attorney General suggests, these might include a 
violation of curfew, a failure to report to the probation officer, or 
an absence from school.  For alleged low-level violations such as 
these, the probation officer was authorized to offer minor an 
appropriately limited sanction, up to 50 hours of community 
service.  We do not address in this case the validity of a 
probation order that would authorize a probation officer to offer 
more serious sanctions, such as time in custody, presumably for 
correspondingly more significant violations of probation. 
6  
See Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2nd ed., 
1993), page 1344 (defining “offer” as “1. to present for acceptance 
or rejection; proffer”).    
7  
See Random House Unabridged Dictionary, supra, at page 
1360 (defining “option” as “1.  The power or right of choosing.  
2.  Something that may be or is chosen; choice”).    
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
between agreeing to perform a certain number of hours of 
community service, or not agreeing and facing potential 
modification of his probation through judicial process.8 
In contrast, minor’s own interpretation of the juvenile 
court’s order — as an authorization for the probation 
department to unilaterally adjudicate and sanction violations of 
probation — is inconsistent with the order’s actual language.  It 
does not account for the court’s references to the probation 
department “offer[ing]” minor community service as an “option.”  
Nor does it fit with the reference to “alleged” violations (as 
opposed to violations found to have been committed).  In effect, 
minor reads the court’s order as saying:  “Probation is 
authorized to mandate the minor perform up to 50 hours of 
community service, or up to a cumulative total of 10 days on the 
community service work program to work off probation 
violations found to have been committed.”  But the order’s actual 
language cannot support that reading. 
“A probation condition should be given “ ‘the meaning that 
would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’ ”  (People v. 
 
8  
That this is the nature of the choice is made especially 
clear in the standard, preprinted form of this provision, which 
specifies that community service would be “in lieu of being 
brought back before the court.” 
The juvenile court did not say on the record why it did not 
use the preprinted provision.  It may have been because that 
preprinted form did not include the specification that the 
up-to-50 hours of community service could be served as “up to a 
cumulative total of 10 days on the community service work 
program,” language ultimately included in the court’s order and 
(in a slightly different form) in a provision — checked as 
accepted by the court — on the recommendation form submitted 
by the probation department.  
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382.)  Following that precept, we 
read the challenged provision here not as delegating 
adjudicatory powers to the probation officer but as indicating 
the court’s advance approval of an agreement that the probation 
officer might reach with minor — and that minor has the power 
to decline — to settle allegations of probation violations, in lieu 
of a petition to the court for modification under sections 777 or 
778.  So understood, the provision neither delegates any 
essentially judicial function to the probation department nor 
deprives minor of due process. 
We consider the separation of powers question first.  “The 
powers of state government are legislative, executive, and 
judicial.  Persons charged with the exercise of one power may 
not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this 
Constitution.”  (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.)  Although the 
separation of powers doctrine “does not prohibit one branch from 
taking action that might affect another, the doctrine is violated 
when the actions of one branch defeat or materially impair the 
inherent functions of another.”  (Steen v. Appellate Division of 
Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1045, 1053.)  “Separation of 
powers does not mean an entire or complete separation of 
powers or functions, which would be impracticable, if not 
impossible.”  (In re Danielle W., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 1236.)   
The challenged provision takes effect when the probation 
department makes an allegation that the minor has violated his 
or her probation.  This function — assessing a delinquent 
minor’s performance on probation and reaching conclusions 
about probable violations — is squarely within the ordinary 
statutory role of the probation department.  If, in the course of 
supervising a juvenile probationer, the probation officer 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
observes or learns of an apparent probation violation, the officer 
may petition the court for a modification of its order, “alleg[ing]” 
the violation in the petition.  (§ 777, subd. (a)(2); see also § 778 
[petition for modification not involving more restrictive 
disposition].)  In this respect, the juvenile court’s order made no 
delegation of judicial authority; alleging a violation is a function 
statutorily belonging to the probation department (and the 
prosecuting attorney (see § 777, subd. (a)(2))), not to the court. 
Moreover, when an alleged violation of criminal law or 
probation conditions is deemed insufficiently serious to warrant 
a delinquency proceeding under section 602 or a proceeding for 
modification under section 777, the statutes assign to the 
probation officer the duty to fashion an appropriate course of 
action.  When a petition under section 777 is dismissed on 
motion of the prosecuting attorney, the matter may be “referred 
to the probation officer for whatever action the prosecuting or 
probation officer may deem appropriate.”  (Id., subd. (a)(3).)  
More analogous to the present order is the diversion program 
established by section 654.  This statute authorizes the 
probation officer, “after investigation of an application for a 
petition or any other investigation the probation officer is 
authorized to make” and in lieu of asking the prosecuting 
attorney to file a section 602 petition, “with consent of the minor 
and the minor’s parent or guardian, [to] refer the minor to 
services provided by a health agency, community-based 
organization, local educational agency, an appropriate non-law-
enforcement agency, or the probation department.”  (§ 654, 
subd. (a); see Charles S. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 741, 
746–747 [explaining roles of probation department and court 
under § 654].)   
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
To be sure, the challenged provision here did not invoke a 
statutory diversion program such as section 654’s, and did not 
include the procedural detail of such a statutory program.9  We 
nonetheless agree with the Attorney General that the provision 
here “functions in the spirit of diversion and informal 
probation.”  Like a program of informal probation under section 
654, a juvenile court’s authorization for informal resolution of 
less significant violation allegations, without the court’s 
renewed involvement, serves to keep minor probationers in 
compliance with their rehabilitative program, consistent with 
the rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile delinquency system 
(In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 411) and the probation 
officer’s statutory role.  And like a section 654 diversion, it was 
intended for situations where “all can agree to a program of 
rehabilitation.”  (Charles S. v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d 
at p. 749.)  Insofar as the present order authorized the probation 
department, in its role of supervising a minor’s rehabilitative 
program, to offer minor community service for alleged violations 
in lieu of pursuing a judicial proceeding, it invoked a type of 
power that was already within the probation department’s core 
function, and in that respect involved no delegation of any 
uniquely judicial authority. 
 
9 
Diversion statutes like section 654 include a requirement 
of parental concurrence to ensure that the minor’s choice to 
accept diversion is made knowingly and voluntarily.  (See § 654, 
subd. (a).)  As a policy matter, a parental-consent requirement 
or similar safeguard might be appropriate in this context, too, to 
ensure the minor’s effective consent to the probation officer’s 
proposed sanction.  Whether such a requirement is necessary, 
however, is beyond the scope of the issues presented and briefed 
here. 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
Under the challenged provision, the probation department 
also was empowered to decide how many hours of community 
service to offer minor, up to the maximum set by the court.  We 
conclude that the court’s delegation to the probation department 
of the number of hours to offer lay within constitutional limits.  
Having determined that community service would be an 
appropriate response to a relatively technical or insignificant 
probation violation by minor, and that 50 hours was the most 
that minor might appropriately serve for such a violation, it did 
not violate the separation of powers doctrine for the juvenile 
court to assign the probation department to fix — with minor’s 
agreement — the precise number of hours appropriate to the 
alleged violation.  (See In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
pp. 213–214 [approving visitation order in dependency case that 
left open exactly when visits could begin]; In re I.M., supra, 
53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 933–936 [delinquency court may delegate 
to probation department, in first instance, supervision of 
minor’s completion of rehabilitative program]; In re Moriah T., 
supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374 [delegation of “time, place and 
manner” of visitation permitted].)  The court’s order here gave 
the probation department a very limited discretionary power:  to 
set the details of a community service program that would be 
agreed upon with minor in lieu of filing a formal petition in 
juvenile court alleging probation violations.  Even viewed as a 
delegation of a judicial function, this limited delegation of 
discretion is not comparable to a statute giving the probation 
department complete authority to decide whether to impose a 
particular condition of probation (People v. Cruz, supra, 
197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311), or a juvenile court’s attempted 
delegation of the authority to return a minor to confinement 
without any judicial determination of violation (In re Gabriel T., 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pp. 958–961).  We stress, again, that 
under the challenged provision participation in community 
service was merely an option that the probation officer could 
offer to minor.  Minor was free to refuse the offer, and potentially 
return to juvenile court, if he believed the probation department 
was proposing an inappropriate level of community service for 
the alleged violation of probation (or, for that matter, if he 
contested the allegation itself). 
Because community service was, under the challenged 
provision, to be performed only with minor’s agreement, we also 
find no deprivation of due process here despite the lack of 
judicial procedure.  When a minor is accused of violating a 
criminal law (§ 602) or the terms of probation (§ 777), due 
process requires that the minor receive notice of the allegations 
and that the burden be on the People to prove the violation, 
though the constitutionally mandated standard of proof differs 
in these two circumstances:  beyond a reasonable doubt for 
allegations of criminal violations, and preponderance of the 
evidence for allegations the minor has violated the terms of 
probation.  (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 503–508; In re 
Arthur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 234–235.)  A juvenile court order 
that permitted the probation officer to make a finding of a 
probation violation and impose a sanction for the violation 
without providing the minor notice or an opportunity to be 
heard, and without a requirement that the People prove the 
violation by a preponderance of the evidence would, at the least, 
raise serious due process questions.  But no such issues are 
present here; the probation department was authorized only to 
offer minor community service as an option, in lieu of returning 
to court, to clear alleged violations of his probation.  The 
challenged provision deprived minor of no judicial process he 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
would otherwise receive; it merely authorized providing him 
with another option for resolving allegations of probation 
violations that, in practice, are likely to be relatively 
insignificant.  If he declined that option, the ordinary procedures 
under sections 777 or 778 would come into play:  The probation 
officer would be required to give formal notice, and judicial 
proceedings for modification of probation would commence.  (See 
§ 777, subds. (a), (c); § 778, subd. (a).)  Minor raises no claim of 
constitutional insufficiency against those statutory provisions 
for notice and hearing. 
The record is unclear concerning whether the juvenile 
court intended to authorize probation to offer additional G.P.S. 
monitoring, as well as community service, as an option to clear 
an alleged violation.  To the extent it did, however, there is no 
indication that the terms of that provision were any different 
from the community service provision — that is, an offer that 
the minor could accept or reject.  Our constitutional analysis of 
the G.P.S. monitoring would therefore be the same. 
In conclusion, the challenged provision of the juvenile 
court’s probation order merely authorized the probation 
department to offer minor a community service option for 
nonjudicial resolution of alleged probation violations.  In 
authorizing an option for informal resolution of such allegations, 
the court neither delegated judicial functions in an improper 
manner to the probation officer nor deprived minor of any 
judicial process due him.   
 
 
 
 
In re D.N. 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
 
III.  DISPOSITION  
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
We Concur:   
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re D.N. 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 3/23/21 – 5th Dist. 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S268437 
Date Filed:  December 12, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Fresno 
Judge:  Gary D. Hoff 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and 
Sangeeta Sinha, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant 
Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Kari 
Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Elizabeth Campbell 
Attorney at Law 
3104 O Street 
PMB 334 
Sacramento, CA 95816 
(530) 786-4108 
 
Kari Ricci Mueller 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA 94244 
(916) 210-7731