Case Title: Reese v. City of Blackfoot

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49590

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2023-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 49590 
 
 
ROBERT SCOTT REESE, CINDY R. 
REESE, RONALD P. REESE, KAREN H. 
REESE, THOMAS VEA JAMES, DONNA D. 
JAMES, ALLEN L. BENCH, NATHAN D. 
ELY, PAULA C. PARKS, SHELLEY 
PARKS, HUGH M. HORTON, RONALD 
CRAIG REESE, DIANA PAULINE REESE, 
LADDIE CURRAN, IARIO COLOMBO, 
 
     Petitioners-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF BLACKFOOT, a municipality, 
 
     Respondent-Respondent on Appeal, 
 
and 
 
KENDALL MURDOCK and KATHERYN 
MURDOCK, husband and wife, 
 
     Respondents. 
_______________________________________ 
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Boise, February 2023 Term  
 
Opinion Filed: June 13, 2023 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Bingham County. Stevan H. Thompson, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed.  
 
Olsen Taggart, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for Appellants. Nathan M. Olsen argued.  
 
Garrett H. Sandow, Blackfoot, for Respondent, City of Blackfoot. Garrett H. 
Sandow argued. 
_____________________ 
BRODY, Justice. 
This case addresses the standard for demonstrating prejudice to a substantial right under 
Idaho Code section 67-5279 of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. The Reeses and their 
neighbors (Appellants, collectively referred to as the “Reeses”) challenged the Blackfoot City 
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Council’s decision to approve a Planned Unit Development (“PUD”) in a “Residential Ranchette” 
zoning district. The district court dismissed their petition for judicial review after holding the 
Reeses did not demonstrate prejudice to a substantial right. We affirm the decision of the district 
court. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Murdocks own a 2.78-acre parcel of land in Blackfoot, Idaho. The Murdocks’ parcel 
is zoned “Residential Ranchette.” The City of Blackfoot created the Residential Ranchette zoning 
district through an ordinance adopted in March 2019. Residential Ranchette zoning allows a 
homeowner who has at least one acre of land to keep a specified number of domestic farm animals 
on the property. Around the time the Residential Ranchette zoning district was adopted, the Reeses 
and their neighbors (which include the Murdocks’ predecessors in interest) applied for, and were 
granted, the Residential Ranchette designation, replacing their prior R-1 designation (single family 
residential zone). The Murdock parcel remains zoned as a Residential Ranchette parcel today.  
In January 2020, the Murdocks presented a proposal to the Blackfoot Planning and Zoning 
Commission (the “PZC”) for approval of a PUD to build a subdivision consisting of sixteen homes 
with small yards for people over the age of fifty-five, referred to as the “Camas Street Subdivision.” 
There is no transcript of the public hearing in the record, but the minutes from that initial meeting 
show that Appellant Scott Reese voiced concerns over lot sizes, transient home ownership, and 
irrigation ditches. Appellant Ronald P. Reese also made comments about the irrigation ditches and 
the danger of drowning they presented. The PZC voted to table the proposal and continued to table 
the Murdocks’ proposal through the spring of 2020.  
The PZC again took up the merits of the Murdocks’ PUD proposal at a public hearing on 
June 23, 2020. The minutes from that meeting indicate that twelve neighbors, several of whom are 
Appellants in this case, made comments opposing the project. However, there is no transcript of 
the hearing in the record and the minutes of the meeting do not reflect the substance of the 
comments. The minutes also show that the city attorney read a letter from another neighbor who 
opposed the project. Again, the letter does not appear in the record and the minutes do not reflect 
the substance of the letter. There was a motion to recommend approval of the project to the 
Blackfoot City Council. The motion failed by a vote of 3-4, and the meeting adjourned without 
further action on the Camas Street Subdivision PUD. 
The PZC took up the Camas Street Subdivision PUD again at its meeting on August 25, 
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2020. The minutes reflect a discussion among the board members and administrative staff 
concerning whether the project would violate the density requirements of the Residential 
Ranchette zone. There was a motion to recommend that the Blackfoot City Council approve the 
PUD, but that motion again failed by a vote of 3-4. When that motion failed, there was a subsequent 
motion to recommend that the Blackfoot City Council deny the PUD. That motion passed and the 
PZC adopted written Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Resolution. The prefatory paragraph 
contained a brief description of the adverse testimony presented at the June 23 PZC meeting: 
At the regularly scheduled meeting of the Planning and Zoning Board of the 
City of Blackfoot on June 23, 2020, the Board held a public hearing on the request 
of the [sic] Kendall Murdock for a proposed Planned Unit Development located on 
Camas Street, Blackfoot, Idaho. This request was for 16 homes to be built on 
approximately 2.6 acres. See the Application attached hereto as Exhibit “A,” and 
made a part hereof by this reference. At the public hearing testimony in favor was 
provided by the Applicant. No one else appeared in favor of or neutral to the 
proposal. Approximately 12 people provided in person testimony against the 
proposal. Most testimony against the proposal focused on traffic, density of 
homes, parking availability, and other similar concerns. 
(Emphasis added.)  
The PZC also concluded in its formal findings and conclusions that the Murdocks’ parcel, 
which is zoned Residential Ranchette, requires a minimum lot size of one acre and that the 
proposed density of the Camas Street Subdivision did not meet that requirement. The PZC’s 
findings and conclusions also stated: “The Board also has concerns regarding the street widths and 
parking ability near the homes in light of the proposed density.” 
 
A week after the PZC adopted its findings and conclusions, the Blackfoot City Council 
took up the matter at its September 1, 2020, meeting. There were discussions between city council 
members, administrative staff, and the city attorney concerning the density requirements of the 
Residential Ranchette zone.  
The Blackfoot City Council also allowed Murdock and Scott Reese to address the Council. 
While much of Reese’s testimony focused on the density requirement for the Residential Ranchette 
zone, he briefly addressed other aspects of the project. He testified that the street sizes were 
inadequate for fire trucks. He also testified that the proposed houses might turn into rental houses, 
which would affect his property’s value:  
 
I’m directly affected, Mr. Horton is directly affected, and there’s nothing in 
the HOA that can stop them from turning that all into landlords. People could come 
in, buy them, and rent them out. And in 10 or 15 years you’re going to have a Camas 
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Street apartment situation. That directly affects my value. I bought that because we 
love horses. We still raise horses. I will be breeding them there tomorrow. 
 
 
Reese also testified that he has problems with children in the neighborhood that will be 
magnified by the PUD: 
And I don’t – I have a problem with kids next door. I have one family live 
to the west of me. We finally took a little vacation, went to Yellowstone, I came 
back, and my palomino mare had been shot through the hind leg with an arrow. 
Well, I found arrows a lot out irrigating that pasture. That’s one neighbor boy. My 
1931 AA Ford, headlights shot out. One neighbor boy. Windshield shot out. One 
neighbor boy. 
 
When questioned by a council member about how his problems with children are connected to the 
PUD, his response was that an additional 16 homes in the PUD would magnify the problem:  “So 
we put 16 – 16 homes in 2.6 acres, that’s only going to magnify it.” Reese also testified that an 
irrigation ditch feeding pastures in the area would be an attractive nuisance: 
We have a concrete ditch that feeds a lot of those pastures. The water is an 
attractive nuisance. That’s a concern. I’m on that board. We won’t allow that to be 
buried because we have trouble, as it is, getting the water.   
 
 
The Council approved the PUD despite Reese’s concerns and the recommendation of the 
PZC. The Reeses subsequently filed a petition for judicial review with the district court, 
contending they were entitled to “declaratory relief invalidating the approval of the PUD under 
[Idaho Code section] 67-5278.” Further, they argued that the PUD was illegal spot zoning.  
The district court held that while the City did in fact violate its own code by approving the 
PUD, the Reeses failed to show prejudice to a substantial right as required under Idaho Code 
section 67-5279(4). Specifically, the district court held the Reeses failed to address the prejudice 
issue in their opening brief. The Reeses petitioned for rehearing solely on the prejudice issue. After 
examining the agency record, the district court held that conclusory allegations of harm were not 
sufficient to establish prejudice to a substantial right. Appellants timely appealed.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“The Local Land Use Planning Act (‘LLUPA’) allows an affected person to seek judicial 
review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as provided for in the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act (‘IDAPA’).” 917 Lusk, LLC v. City of Boise, 158 Idaho 12, 14, 343 
P.3d 41, 43 (2015); I.C. § 67-6521(1)(d). “For the purposes of judicial review of LLUPA decisions, 
a local agency making a land use decision, such as the Board of Commissioners, is treated as a 
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government agency under IDAPA.” In re Variance ZV2011-2, 156 Idaho 491, 494, 328 P.3d 471, 
474 (2014).  
When a district court acts in its appellate capacity under IDAPA, this Court “review[s] the 
district court’s decision as a matter of procedure.” Lusk, 158 Idaho at 14, 343 P.3d at 43 
(quoting Williams v. Idaho State Bd. of Real Estate Appraisers, 157 Idaho 496, 502, 337 P.3d 655, 
661 (2014)). When doing so, we conduct an independent review of the agency 
record. Id. (citing Dry Creek Partners, LLC, v. Ada Cnty. Comm’rs, ex rel. State, 148 Idaho 11, 
16, 217 P.3d 1282, 1287 (2009)). “There is a strong presumption that the zoning board’s actions 
were valid and that it has correctly interpreted its own zoning ordinances.” Hawkins v. Bonneville 
Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 151 Idaho 228, 231, 254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011) (citing Sanders Orchard 
v. Gem Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 137 Idaho 695, 698, 52 P.3d 840, 843 (2002)). When 
the district court has affirmed a board’s actions, this Court will uphold the district court’s decision 
provided the Board’s findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence; however, 
we freely review the district court’s conclusions of law. Id.; see Hungate v. Bonner Cnty., 166 
Idaho 388, 392, 458 P.3d 966, 970 (2020). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The district court did not err when it held that the Reeses had not shown prejudice to a 
substantial right.  
 
After considering the Reeses’ petition for rehearing, the district court held that, although 
the Blackfoot City Council violated its own zoning code by approving a PUD that did not comply 
with the density requirement of the Residential Ranchette zone, the Reeses failed to show that their 
substantial rights had been prejudiced. After examining the agency record and the parties’ 
arguments on appeal, we agree.  
Section 67-5279 of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act sets forth the scope of judicial 
review of agency actions. I.C. § 67-5279; 917 Lusk, LLC v. City of Boise, 158 Idaho 12, 14, 343 
P.3d 41, 43 (2015) (applying section 67-5279 to agency action under the Local Land Use Planning 
Act). The Act limits the grounds upon which agency actions may be reversed. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 
67-5279(2)(a)-(d) and 67-5279(3)(a)-(e). In addition, it provides that even if there are grounds 
upon which to reverse an agency action, the action decision “shall be affirmed unless substantial 
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” I.C. § 67-5279(4) (emphasis added).  
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The Reeses take a novel approach to the prejudice issue on appeal. Based on this Court’s 
recent decision in Hungate v. Bonner County, 166 Idaho 388, 458 P.3d 966 (2020), and other 
authorities cited in that decision, the Reeses contend there are two different standards for 
determining prejudice to a substantial right depending on the type of land use decision that is at 
issue. First, there are those situations in which an agency decision “upholds” the status quo and, 
second, there are situations in which an agency decision “upends” the status quo. The Reeses argue 
that if an agency decision “upholds” the status quo, the petitioner in a judicial review action has 
an additional evidentiary burden to show “something more” to demonstrate prejudice. In contrast, 
if an agency decision “upends” the status quo—like in this case where the Murdocks’ Residential 
Ranchette parcel will be developed into 16 homes—the petitioner in a judicial review action only 
has to show “rational prospective prejudice wherein prospective concerns, i.e., changes from low 
density to high density housing, meet the requisite proof of substantial prejudice caused by the 
entity’s violation of the LLUPA.” The Reeses’ analysis is fundamentally flawed. 
To understand the problems with the Reeses’ position, we must go back to this Court’s 
decision in Hawkins v. Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, 151 Idaho 228, 245 P.3d 1224 
(2011), a case cited in Hungate. In Hawkins, a family owned two neighboring parcels, each with 
a home on it. The original dwellings, built around the 1930s, did not conform to the county’s road 
frontage ordinance but were grandfathered in because they preceded the ordinance. Id. at 230, 245 
P.3d at 1226. The landowners, wanting to build new homes on the parcels, filed for two variances 
because their new homes would not comply with the frontage requirement. Id. Although the 
Bonneville County Planning and Zoning Commission determined the variances were unnecessary 
because of the prior permissible nonconforming uses, it nevertheless granted the variances. Id. 
The Bonneville County Board of Commissioners held a de novo hearing on the 
landowners’ requests for variances. Id. The Board decided to issue the variances, reasoning that 
the landowners’ properties had been “grandfathered in” so the frontage requirement did not apply. 
Id. Hawkins, a neighbor who objected to the variances, filed a petition for judicial review. Id. The 
district court held that Hawkins did not have standing and that he had not shown that the variances 
issued by the Board prejudiced his substantial rights. Id. 
On appeal, Hawkins argued “the Board prejudiced his substantial rights in three general 
ways: (1) the Board, as a matter of law, misapplied its variance policies by finding that the Meyers 
had a grandfathered right to continue not complying with the frontage ordinance; (2) new housing 
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on the Meyers’ land will generate more traffic across his property, potentially exceeding the scope 
of any easements there and increasing the risk that his cattle will escape through an open gate; and 
(3) emergency vehicles may not be able to reach the Meyers’ property in case of a fire.” Hawkins, 
151 Idaho at 232, 254 P.3d at 1228.  
Before examining Hawkins’ claims of prejudice, this Court explained that it had not 
attempted to articulate any universal rules governing what constitutes prejudice to a substantial 
right because “each procedural irregularity, legal error, and discretionary decision is different and 
can affect the petitioner in varying ways.” Id. (citations omitted). We observed that when it comes 
to procedural matters, all parties involved in a land-use decision (i.e., the applicant and the 
objectors) have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process: 
Generally, as a procedural matter, all the parties involved in a land-use 
decision have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process. 
Governing boards owe procedural fairness not just to applicants but also their 
interested opponents. Both should expect proceedings that are free from procedural 
defects that might reasonably have affected the final outcome. See Noble v. 
Kootenai Cnty., 148 Idaho 937, 942–43, 231 P.3d 1034, 1039–40 (2010) (holding 
that, even though the county board disallowed the public from participating in a site 
visit, doing so did not likely affect the decision); Eacret v. Bonner Cnty., 139 Idaho 
780, 787, 86 P.3d 494, 501 (2004) (vacating a county board’s decision due 
to a commissioner’s likely bias). This includes the right for all interested parties to 
have a meaningful opportunity to present evidence to the governing board on 
salient factual issues.  Cnty. Residents Against Pollution from Septage Sludge v. 
Bonner Cnty., 138 Idaho 585, 588–89, 67 P.3d 64, 67–68 (2003); Sanders Orchard 
v. Gem Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 137 Idaho 695, 702, 52 P.3d 840, 847 
(2002). 
Id. at 232–33, 254 P.3d at 1228–29 (emphasis added). 
 
 
 
Conversely, when it comes to legal errors made by an agency, it is the applicants who have 
a substantial right in having the agency adjudicate their applications by applying correct legal 
standards: 
Of course, assuming that a decision is procedurally fair, applicants for a 
permit also have a substantial right in having the governing board properly 
adjudicate their applications by applying correct legal standards. Lane Ranch 
P’ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007); cf. 
Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 842, 70 P.3d 669, 
680 (2003) (remanding because the agency misstated the relevant legal standard 
and denied an application to transfer water rights). Landowner applicants, however, 
also have a substantial right to develop their own property. Terrazas v. Blaine Cnty. 
ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs, 147 Idaho 193, 198, 207 P.3d 169, 174 (2009). 
 
Id. at 233, 254 P.3d at 1229 (2011). 
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Critically, when a neighbor or other party opposes an agency’s decision, the neighbor must 
show something more than just a legal error has been made: 
On the other hand, when a petitioner opposes a governing board’s decision 
to grant a permit authorizing development, as Hawkins has, the petitioner must still 
show, not merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or her substantial rights. 
I.C. § 67–5279(4). Since a party opposing a landowner’s request for a development 
permit has no substantial right in seeing someone else's application adjudicated 
correctly, he or she must therefore show something more. The petitioner opposing 
a permit must be in jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project goes 
forward, such as a reduction in the opponent’s land value or interference with his 
or her use or ownership of the land. See Price v. Payette Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 131 Idaho 426, 431, 958 P.2d 583, 588 (1998) (vacating a board decision 
because it could impact property value or the petitioners’ use and enjoyment of 
their land). It would be instructive to look to law relating to property rights, 
nuisance, and trespass when determining if a substantial right is at stake in a case 
such as this. 
 
Id. at 233, 254 P.3d at 1229 (emphasis added).  
This Court held that the harm alleged by Hawkins—that increased traffic across his 
property and that emergency vehicles might not be able to reach the neighbor’s property in case of 
a fire—was not a sufficient showing of “something more” to prove prejudice to a substantial right. 
Id. at 234, 254 P.3d at 1230.  
 
Thus, the dichotomy that exists in our case law is not based on whether an agency action 
“upholds” or “upends” the status quo as the Reeses contend. Rather, the dichotomy is based on 
whether the party bringing the petition for judicial review is the applicant or the objector. 
Applicants have a substantial right in having their development rights adjudicated in accordance 
with applicable law. However, when it comes to an objector, like the Reeses, it is not enough to 
demonstrate that the agency made a legal error by granting an application. The objector must show, 
not merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or her substantial rights if the project moves 
forward.  
 
This Court applied the requirement to demonstrate real or potential prejudice to a 
substantial right in 917 Lusk, LLC v. City of Boise, 158 Idaho 12, 343 P.3d 41 (2015). In 917 Lusk, 
this Court considered whether the grant of a conditional use permit (“CUP”) for an apartment 
complex adjacent to a property owned by Lusk violated Lusk’s substantial rights. 158 Idaho at 15, 
343 P.3d at 44. The proposed project involved a 622-bedroom student apartment building with 
only 280 parking spaces. Id. at 18, 343 P.3d at 47. In its argument, Lusk contended that the new 
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complex “will devalue Petitioner’s property, require time and expense for Petitioner to police 
parking on its own property, [and] inconvenience employees and visitors to Petitioner’s building.” 
Id. at 19, 343 P.3d at 48. Contrary to the Reeses’ position, this Court did not accept conclusory 
statements of harm from Lusk to show substantial prejudice:  
The record before the Commission sets forth substantial evidence 
supporting Lusk’s claim of potential prejudice to its substantial rights. The project 
calls for 622 bedrooms to house students at Boise State University. The Parking 
Chapter requires only 280 parking spaces for the project. Without even attempting 
to evaluate the impact of guests who arrive by automobile, if only half of the River 
Edge tenants have an automobile, there will be significant numbers of residents 
looking for parking in the vicinity. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence 
that Lusk is in jeopardy of economic harm from the project to satisfy the 
requirements set forth in Hawkins. 
 
917 Lusk, 158 Idaho at 19, 343 P.3d at 48.  
 
Recently, in Hungate v. Bonner County, this Court considered whether the Board of County 
Commissioners for Bonner County erred when it granted three variances on three different parcels 
for buildings that had been on the parcels for nearly twenty years. 166 Idaho at 391, 458 P.3d at 
969. The Hungates alleged that the variances would diminish their property values and create 
issues with “increased intensity of use,” increased traffic, excessive lot coverage and unsightly 
architecture, reduced privacy, safety concerns, and reduced enjoyment of wildlife and views. Id. 
at 394-5, 458 P.3d at 972-3. The district court held that the Board erred when it approved the 
variances because it violated Bonner County Revised Code section 12-234(B), which prohibits the 
grant of variances when the special conditions required for a variance resulted from the actions of 
the applicant. Id. at 393, 458 P.3d at 971; Bonner County Revised Code section 12-234(B). Despite 
that finding, it ultimately determined that the Hungates had not shown that their substantial rights 
were prejudiced. Id. at 390, 458 P.3d at 968. This Court affirmed, ultimately holding that the 
Hungates did not provide evidence supporting their claims that the variances would prejudice their 
property values or interfere with the use of the property, especially since the structures in question 
had been in place for twenty years. Id. at 396, 458 P.3d at 974. 
In this case, most of the evidence presented by the Reeses was either conclusory or 
cursory—neither of which leads us to a finding that the Reeses have shown prejudice to a 
substantial right. In the Reeses’ opening brief to the district court, they did not address prejudice 
at all. They did mention it in their reply brief to the district court, but it was in the context of 
standing rather than an analysis of prejudice to a substantial right under Idaho Code section 67-
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5279(4). In their motion for reconsideration, the Reeses pointed to the minutes of a hearing before 
the PZC and the transcript of the testimony of Scott Reese before the Blackfoot City Council.  
However, the agency record before this Court does not contain transcripts of the hearings 
that took place before the PZC. Instead, the Reeses rely on the minutes from those meetings that 
describe the testimony and the people who testified. The PZC summarized the testimony: “most 
testimony against the proposal focused on traffic, density of homes, parking availability, and other 
similar concerns.” The Reeses also rely on the testimony given by Scott Reese before the City 
Council to show prejudice. Scott Reese voiced concerns that the PUD was inconsistent with the 
surrounding Residential Ranchette parcels and the population density it would cause in the area, 
concerns with the street size for firetrucks, the PUD turning into a “Camas street apartment 
situation” if owners could lease the units, and the danger that would come from an increase in 
children in the area. 
In response to the motion for reconsideration, the district court held that these conclusory 
statements of harm were not sufficient to establish prejudice to a substantial right. As the district 
court explained:  
The planning and zoning board noted concerns about parking and street 
widths, but the City Council found the restrictive covenants for Camas PUD’s HOA 
and parking on only one side of the street to be sufficient remedies to avoid parking 
or street widths becoming an issue. The “apartment situation” concern is not well 
founded since the Camas PUD’s restrictive covenants require the owner or 
immediate family member to occupy the property, but it is unclear why an 
“apartment situation” would impact any substantial rights of the Petitioners in the 
first place. As to the danger from increased children in the area, Mr. Reese pointed 
to numerous examples of a child who already lives in the neighborhood causing 
harm to Mr. Reese’s property and provided the idea that more homes in the area 
meant more children which would amplify the harm that the one child is already 
causing. The Camas PUD is set to be housing for adults over 55, a demographic 
that is generally not associated with small children. Even so, the [c]ourt is not 
willing to accept the argument that increasing the number of children in a residential 
area is a substantial injury to existing homeowners. There are factors limiting the 
potential harm of each of the conclusory concerns raised by Petitioners. 
The most significant concern raised by Petitioners is that Camas PUD will 
impact their property values. It is important to note that the entire area at issue here 
is residential, but a small number of parcels throughout the area elected to become 
Rl-R, residential ranchette, to preserve the individual parcel's agricultural rights. 
However, it is not clear how the Camas PUD, an increase in the number of houses, 
would negatively impact the property values in an already residential area. 
 
(Internal citations omitted).  
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We agree with the district court’s analysis and conclude that the Reeses have failed to show 
that the PUD will prejudice their substantial rights. The Reeses have also argued that the PUD 
constitutes illegal spot zoning. We need not address that argument because, regardless of whether 
the PUD was illegal spot zoning, unless the Reeses’ substantial rights have been prejudiced the 
agency action must be affirmed. See I.C. § 67-5279(4); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74–
75, 73 P.3d 84, 87–88 (2003) (stating that the appealing party must show that the Board erred and 
that a substantial right had been prejudiced). Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district 
court.  
B. Neither the Reeses nor the City are entitled to attorney fees on appeal.  
 
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-117. We hold 
that neither party is entitled to attorney fees.  
Section 12-117 authorizes an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in a case involving 
the review of an agency decision when the court finds that the nonprevailing party acted without 
reasonable basis in fact or law. See I.C. § 12-117. The Reeses have not prevailed here and thus 
they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees.  
Next, although the City of Blackfoot is the prevailing party, it also is not entitled to attorney 
fees. This Court has explained that “[t]he standard for evaluating whether a party’s conduct was 
‘without a reasonable basis in fact or law’ under section 12-117 is substantially similar to 
the standard for evaluating whether a party pursued an action ‘frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation’ under section 12-121.” S Bar Ranch v. Elmore Cnty., 170 Idaho 282, 313, 510 
P.3d 635, 666 (2022), as amended (June 14, 2022) (quoting Galvin v. City of Middleton, 164 Idaho 
642, 647, 434 P.3d 817, 822 (2019)). While the City of Blackfoot has prevailed on appeal, the 
question of law presented by the Reeses was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 
Thus, we decline to award attorney fees to the City. Costs are awarded to the City pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the decision of the district court. We decline to award attorney fees to either 
party. Finally, we award costs to the City. 
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices STEGNER, MOELLER, and ZAHN CONCUR.