Case Title: Thomas Gritzner v. Michael R.

Citation: 2000 WI 68

Docket Number: 1998AP000325

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 68 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0325 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Thomas Gritzner and Sandra Gritzner,  
parents and guardians of Tara G., a minor,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Michael R., a minor, and Karen Rosetti,  
as parent of Michael R.,  
 
Defendants, 
Roger Bubner, as custodian of Michael R.,  
and American Family Mutual Insurance Company,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  228 Wis. 2d 541, 598 N.W.2d 282 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 23, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 9, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
James L. Carlson 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
 
BABLITCH, BRADLEY, CROOKS AND SYKES, J.J., join 
 
 
concurrence. 
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Steven J. Watson and Steven J. Watson Law Office, 
Elkhorn, and oral argument by Steven J. Watson. 
 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Thomas M. Devine, JoAnne M. Breese-Jaeck, and 
Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C., Racine, and Phillip C. Theesfeld 
and Baxter, O’Meara & Samuelson, Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Thomas M. Devine. 
 
2000 WI 68 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0325 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Thomas Gritzner and Sandra Gritzner,  
parents and guardians of Tara G., a  
minor,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael R., a minor, and Karen Rosetti,  
as parent of Michael R.,  
 
          Defendants, 
 
Roger Bubner, as custodian of Michael R.,  
and American Family Mutual Insurance  
Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part and cause remanded.  
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The plaintiffs in this case are 
the parents of a four-year-old girl, Tara, who was sexually 
abused by her ten-year-old neighbor, Michael.  The abuse 
allegedly took place while Tara was visiting Michael's home, 
where Michael lived with his mother and his mother's boyfriend 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
2 
Roger Bubner.  After learning about this incident, Tara's 
parents filed civil suits against various parties, including 
Bubner. 
¶2 
The case at hand involves the plaintiffs' suit against 
Roger Bubner.  The plaintiffs allege that Bubner was entrusted 
with the care of Tara while she was in his home, that Bubner had 
custody and control of Michael, and that Bubner knew or should 
have known that Michael might engage in inappropriate sexual 
acts if left alone with Tara.  On the basis of these 
allegations, the plaintiffs brought claims against Bubner for 
(1) negligent failure to warn them of Michael's propensity to 
engage in inappropriate sexual acts, and (2) negligent failure 
to control Michael's conduct.  
¶3 
The circuit court granted Bubner's motion to dismiss 
these claims.  In reaching its decision, the circuit court 
relied on Kelli T-G. v. Charland, 198 Wis. 2d 123, 542 N.W.2d 
175 
(Ct. 
App. 
1995), 
which 
held 
that 
public 
policy 
considerations barred a claim for negligent failure to warn in a 
case involving an ex-wife who did not warn another child's 
mother about her ex-husband's pedophilic propensities.   
¶4 
The plaintiffs appealed.  In a published opinion, the 
court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.  
Gritzner v. Michael R., 228 Wis. 2d 541, 598 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. 
App. 1999).  With some reluctance, the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court's decision that the claim for negligent 
failure to warn was barred by the reasoning of Kelli T-G..  Id. 
at 549-551.  However, the court of appeals reinstated the claim 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
3 
for negligent failure to control.  Id. at 555-57.  Both parties 
petitioned this court for review.   
¶5 
Upon review, all members of the court agree that the 
case should be remanded to the circuit court.  Those justices 
who join the lead opinion would affirm the court of appeals on 
both counts.  We would hold that public policy considerations 
preclude the plaintiffs' claim for negligent failure to warn.  
We would recognize the Gritzners' claim for negligent failure to 
control only because liability for failure to control can be 
imposed on distinct, narrow grounds that do not raise the same 
public policy considerations that preclude liability for failure 
to warn.   
I.  FACTS 
¶6 
Because this case arises on a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, we must accept as true all facts 
alleged in the complaint and all reasonable inferences from 
those facts.  Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 
320, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997).  The material facts alleged are as 
follows. 
¶7 
In 1996 the defendant Roger Bubner was living in Lake 
Geneva with his girlfriend Karen R. and her ten-year-old son 
Michael.  Some time before May 1, 1996, Michael engaged in 
inappropriate sexual acts with another child or children, 
including his half-sister.  Bubner knew that this had occurred. 
¶8 
Thomas and Sandra Gritzner and their four-year-old 
daughter Tara lived on the same street as Bubner.  Bubner knew 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
4 
that Thomas, Sandra, and Tara were his neighbors and that Thomas 
and Sandra were Tara's parents.   
¶9 
At relevant times between approximately May 1, 1996 
and July 7, 1996, Tara visited Bubner's home to play with 
Michael and other children.  Bubner consented to Tara's presence 
in his home, and the Gritzners entrusted Tara to Bubner's care 
during these visits.  Bubner also assumed custody and control 
over Michael at these times.  Bubner knew or should have known 
that there was a danger Michael would engage in inappropriate 
sexual acts if left unsupervised with Tara.   
¶10 On July 7, 1996, Bubner and Karen R. informed Thomas 
and Sandra Gritzner that Michael had sexually abused Tara while 
the children were unsupervised at Bubner's home.  On August 21, 
1996, a child abuse investigator from the local Department of 
Human Services confirmed Michael's alleged sexual abuse of Tara. 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶11 In June 1997 the Gritzners filed a complaint against 
Bubner1 claiming (1) negligent failure to warn them of Michael's 
propensity to sexually abuse Tara, and (2) negligent failure to 
control Michael.2  In his answer to the complaint, Bubner denied 
                     
1 The Gritzners also sued Michael's mother, Karen R., and 
Bubner's mother, Georgia, who owned the home in which Bubner, 
Karen R., and Michael lived.  The claim against Georgia has been 
dismissed.  Only the suit against Bubner is at issue in this 
appeal.   
2 The Gritzners also brought a claim against Bubner for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.  The Gritzners did 
not appeal the dismissal of that claim. 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
5 
the allegations and argued that in any case the complaint failed 
to state a claim for which relief could be granted.   
¶12 Bubner subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the 
Gritzners' claims, arguing that (1) Kelli T-G. barred the 
failure to warn claim, and (2) the romantic relationship between 
Bubner and Karen R. did not impose on Bubner a duty to supervise 
or control Michael's conduct.  In response, the Gritzners argued 
that for purposes of the motion to dismiss, it must be assumed 
that Bubner had custody and control over Michael as alleged in 
the complaint.  The Gritzners further argued that under Shannon 
v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989), their claims 
were viable based on Bubner's duty to exercise ordinary care 
toward all persons who came upon his property with consent.  
Finally, 
the 
Gritzners 
argued 
that 
Kelli 
T-G. 
was 
not 
dispositive because it was factually distinguishable.   
¶13 The Circuit Court for Walworth County, James L. 
Carlson, Judge, granted Bubner's motion to dismiss.  Judge 
Carlson determined that Bubner had no legal duty to warn the 
Gritzners about Michael's alleged propensities or to control 
Michael's conduct.  The judge further concluded that Shannon did 
not apply and that Kelli T-G. was dispositive.   
¶14 The Gritzners appealed.  The court of appeals first 
noted that under Shannon an occupier of premises generally owes 
a duty of ordinary care towards all persons who come onto the 
premises with consent.  Gritzner, 228 Wis. 2d at 548 (quoting 
Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d at 443-44).  With regard to the claim for 
negligent failure to warn, the court indicated that although it 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
6 
was "not enthusiastic about the holding in Kelli T-G.," it was 
nonetheless bound to follow existing precedent, and affirmed the 
circuit court's decision to dismiss the claim.  Gritzner, 228 
Wis. 2d at 551. 
¶15 Turning to the claim for negligent failure to control, 
the court concluded that Kelli T-G. was distinguishable.  The 
court determined that under the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
and Wisconsin law, Bubner had a special relationship with both 
Michael and Tara and that because of these special relationships 
Bubner had a duty to control Michael's conduct for the purpose 
of protecting Tara.  Id. at 554-56.  The court further noted 
that the duty imposed under a failure to warn claim is 
"manifestly different" from the duty imposed under a failure to 
control claim.  Id. at 558.  Because no public policy 
considerations precluded liability, the court reversed the 
circuit court's decision to dismiss the claim for negligent 
failure to control.  Id. at 559-60.   
¶16 Both parties petitioned this court for review. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests 
whether the complaint is legally sufficient to state a cause of 
action for which relief may be granted.  Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 
331.  The legal sufficiency of the complaint is a question of 
law that this court reviews de novo.  Wausau Tile, Inc. v. 
County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 245, 593 N.W.2d 445 
(1999).  In examining the legal sufficiency of the complaint, 
the court assumes that the facts alleged in the complaint are 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
7 
true.  Id.; Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 331.  However, the court does 
not assume that the legal conclusions pleaded in the complaint 
are true.  Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 331.   
¶18 A court may not grant a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim unless there are no conditions under which 
relief could be granted.  Id.; Wausau Tile, 226 Wis. 2d at 245. 
IV.  GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF NEGLIGENCE LAW IN WISCONSIN 
¶19 The Gritzners' claims invoke principles of common law 
negligence.  To establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must 
prove:  (1) the existence of a duty of care on the part of the 
defendant, (2) a breach of that duty of care, (3) a causal 
connection between the defendant's breach of the duty of care 
and the plaintiff's injury, and (4) actual loss or damage 
resulting from the injury.  Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 
Wis. 2d 250, 260, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998) (quoting Rockweit v. 
Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 418, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995)).   
¶20 The first element, a duty of care, is established 
under Wisconsin law whenever it was foreseeable to the defendant 
that his or her act or omission to act might cause harm to some 
other person.  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 420 (quoting Rolph v. 
EBI Cos., 159 Wis. 2d 518, 532, 464 N.W.2d 667 (1991)).3  At the 
                     
3 Thus, Wisconsin does not follow the majority view in 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99-101 (N.Y. 
1928), under which the existence of a duty of care depends upon 
whether injury to the particular victim was foreseeable.  See 
Schilling v. Stockel, 26 Wis. 2d 525, 531, 133 N.W.2d 335 
(1965)(discussing this court's adoption and subsequent rejection 
of the majority "no-duty" formula in Palsgraf).  
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
8 
very least, every person is subject to a duty to exercise 
ordinary care in all of his or her activities.  Rockweit, 197 
Wis. 2d at 419. 
¶21 The Gritzners' claims against Bubner are based on 
Bubner's duty to take certain affirmative actionsto warn Tara's 
parents about Michael and to control Michael's behavior.  Bubner 
frames his response to the Gritzners' claims under the rules 
governing affirmative duties to act in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, which provide that in the absence of a special 
relationship, a person does not have a duty to take affirmative 
action to help or protect another person.  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts §§ 314-324 (1965).   
¶22 This court has considered and relied on some of these 
Restatement 
provisions 
in 
evaluating 
negligence 
claims.  
However, this court has not expressly adopted this framework.  
See Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 238 and n.3, 424 
N.W.2d 159 (1988).  Instead, the general framework governing the 
duty of care in Wisconsin negligence actions is that:  
 
A person is negligent when [he or she] fails to 
exercise ordinary care.  Ordinary care is the care 
which a reasonable person would use in similar 
circumstances.  A person is not using ordinary care 
and is negligent, if the person, without intending to 
do harm, does something (or fails to do something) 
that a reasonable person would recognize as creating 
an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person 
or property. 
Wis JICivil 1005.  See also Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 419 
("'Each individual is held, at the very least, to a standard of 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
9 
ordinary care in all activities.'") (citing Coffey v. Milwaukee, 
74 Wis. 2d 526, 537, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976)).  
¶23 In Wisconsin, although a person does not commit 
negligence simply by being present at the scene of an accident, 
McNeese v. Pier, 174 Wis. 2d 624, 632, 497 N.W.2d 124 (1993), 
failure to take an affirmative action may constitute negligence 
when it is inconsistent with the duty to exercise ordinary care. 
 See Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 423 (suggesting that during the 
time that a social guest was sitting at a campfire, her duty of 
ordinary care might include an affirmative duty to protect the 
child from the fire).   
¶24 Of course, even when a duty of care exists and the 
other elements of negligence have been established, public 
policy 
considerations 
may 
preclude 
liability. 
 
However, 
Wisconsin courts address public policy concerns directly, rather 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
10
than asking whether the defendant owed a "duty" to the 
particular victim.4  Thus, this court has observed: 
 
[W]ithin the framework of a negligence case the 
particular conduct of a defendant is not examined in 
terms of whether or not there is a duty to do a 
specific act, but rather whether the conduct satisfied 
the duty placed upon individuals to exercise that 
degree of care as would be exercised by a reasonable 
person under the circumstances. 
Walker v. Bignell, 100 Wis. 2d 256, 264, 301 N.W.2d 447 (1981). 
  
                     
4 As the defendant notes, some Wisconsin cases have examined 
liability limitations in terms of duty.  See Estate of Becker v. 
Olson, 218 Wis. 2d 12, 579 N.W.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1998); Zelco v. 
Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 74, 527 N.W.2d 357 (Ct. 
App. 1994); Erickson v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 
166 Wis. 2d 82, 479 N.W.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1991).  This 
formulation of the analysis is incorrect under Wisconsin law.  
In Wisconsin, everyone has a duty to act with reasonable care.  
Liability for breach of that duty is limited on public policy 
grounds.  See Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 425, 541 
N.W.2d 742 (1995) (explaining that although some cases have 
denied liability on the basis that an actor had no "duty" to the 
injured party, the decision to deny liability is essentially one 
of public policy and not duty or causation).  See also Bowen v. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 644-45, 517 N.W.2d 
432 (1994)(explaining that in deciding whether to impose 
liability for negligence, Wisconsin courts use a public policy 
formulation 
rather 
than 
a 
foreseeability 
or 
duty 
formulation)(citing Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 
176, 183, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956)); Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 
2d 
223, 
266, 
424 
N.W.2d 
159 
(1988) 
(Steinmetz, 
J., 
concurring)(noting that Wisconsin has a distinct approach to 
negligence under which liability is limited through policy 
considerations after the elements of duty and causation have 
been established); Klassa, 273 Wis. 2d at 183 ("Whenever a court 
holds that a certain act does not constitute negligence because 
there was no duty owed by the actor to the injured party, 
although the act complained of caused the injury, such court is 
making a policy determination.").  
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
11
¶25 In sum, the crucial question in evaluating the 
Gritzners' claims is not whether Bubner had any "duty" to take 
affirmative actions but whether Bubner's alleged failure to take 
certain actions was consistent with his duty to exercise a 
reasonable degree of care.    
¶26 Moreover, even if the plaintiff is able to establish a 
duty of care and the other elements of a negligence claim, the 
court 
may 
nonetheless 
determine 
that 
public 
policy 
considerations preclude liability.  Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 
Wis. 2d 124, 141, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999); Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 
264-265; Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 425-26; Schuster, 144 Wis. 2d 
at 240.  Before determining whether public policy considerations 
preclude liability, it is usually a better practice to submit 
the case to the jury.  Sawyer, 227 Wis. 2d at 141; Miller, 219 
Wis. 2d at 265; Schuster, 144 Wis. 2d at 241.  However, when the 
facts are not complex and the relevant public policy questions 
have been fully presented, this court may determine whether 
public policy precludes liability before trial.  Sawyer, 227 
Wis. 2d at 141; Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 265; Schuster, 144 Wis. 
2d at 241.   
¶27 The question of whether public policy considerations 
preclude liability is a question of law that this court 
determines without deference to any other court.  Rockweit, 197 
Wis. 2d at 425.  The public policy reasons that may preclude 
liability include:  (1) the injury is too remote from the 
negligence, (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to 
the tortfeasor's culpability, (3) in retrospect it appears too 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
12
highly extraordinary that the negligence should have resulted in 
the harm, (4) allowing recovery would place too unreasonable a 
burden on the tortfeasor, (5) allowing recovery would be too 
likely to open the way for fraudulent claims, and (6) allowing 
recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just 
stopping point.  Id. at 426.   
 
V.  PUBLIC POLICY PRECLUDES THE GRITZNERS' CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT 
FAILURE TO WARN 
¶28 We first consider the Gritzners' claim that Bubner 
negligently failed to warn them of Michael's propensity to abuse 
Tara.  In Kelli T-G., the court of appeals determined that 
public policy considerations barred a somewhat similar claim.  
Kelli T-G., 198 Wis. 2d at 130-31.  A closer look at Kelli T-G. 
is helpful to understanding our determination that public policy 
concerns should bar the Gritzners' claim. 
¶29 After Kelli T-G. was sexually abused by Gerald 
Charland, Kelli's mother and guardian ad litem filed suit 
against Charland's ex-wife, Patricia Neubauer, on the basis that 
Neubauer breached her duty to warn Kelli's mother about 
Charland's pedophilia.  Id. at 125-26.   
¶30 Neubauer and Charland were married in 1985 and had a 
daughter, Geri.  Id. at 126.  The couple separated approximately 
eight months after their marriage, and Neubauer filed for 
divorce a few months later.  Id.  Neubauer did not learn about 
Charland's convictions for sexually assaulting children until 
after the couple separated.  Id.   
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
13
¶31 Immediately following the couple's divorce, Charland 
was not allowed to have unsupervised visitation with Geri.  Id. 
 By 
approximately 
January 
1991, 
Charland 
had 
completed 
counseling and probation for his prior convictions and was 
allowed unsupervised visitation.  Id.   
¶32 In April or May 1991 Neubauer became aware that Geri's 
friend Kelli sometimes played with Geri at Charland's home.  Id. 
 Neubauer was concerned about the risk that Charland might 
sexually abuse Kelli and intended to say something about it to 
Kelli's mother.  Id. at 127-28.  Neubauer testified that she 
asked Kelli's mother to call her at home, but that she did not 
take the affirmative step of telling Kelli's mother about 
Charland's convictions.  Id.  On July 15, 1991, Charland 
sexually abused Kelli.  Id. at 125. 
¶33 Neubauer moved for summary judgment against Kelli's 
claim, arguing that Wisconsin law imposes no duty to warn a 
third party about another person's dangerous propensities in the 
absence of a special relationship, and that no such special 
relationship had been established.  Id. at 128.  The trial court 
agreed.  Id.  
¶34 In its review, the court of appeals first noted that 
Wisconsin law is in conflict regarding what kind of relationship 
is necessary to establish a duty to warn about the dangerous 
propensities of third parties.  Id. at 129.  However, in a 
unanimous opinion, the court determined that it did not need to 
resolve that issue "because the issue in this case is clearly 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
14
resolved on public policy grounds."  Id.  We quote the court's 
discussion of the relevant public policy considerations in full: 
 
[R]ecovery [against Neubauer] would enter a field not 
only with no definable, sensible stopping point, but 
no sensible starting point as well. 
 
Slight variations on the facts of this case 
illustrate the virtual impossibility of defining a 
sensible starting or stopping point.  Would Neubauer's 
duty to warn depend on whether she knew of Charland's 
progress in counseling or compliance with probation?  
Would her duty depend on her assessment of whether the 
criminal justice system had adequately addressed the 
dangers Charland posed?  Would Neubauer's duty have 
varied if she had been a mental health or criminal 
justice professional?  If so, would her duty have 
further varied according to her opinion about the 
appropriateness and adequacy of the probation and 
conditions ordered by the criminal court?  If Charland 
had been charged but never convicted of child sexual 
abuse, and if Neubauer believed, nonetheless, that 
Charland was a pedophile, would she still have had a 
duty to warn?  And if Neubauer had been wrong in her 
forecast of Charland's potential danger, would she 
have been liable to Charland for warning Carolyn T.? 
 
Moreover, who would Neubauer have a duty to warn? 
 Neubauer answers that she would have a duty to warn 
only 
those 
"where 
foreseeability 
of 
harm 
is 
clear . . . and 
where 
the 
foreseeable 
victim 
is 
known."  Would that extend to the next door neighbor? 
Would that include every one of Kelli's close friends 
or classmates?  To protect herself from potential 
liability, would Neubauer need to remain as ignorant 
as possible of Charland's activities and associations 
so that she would not come to know of his "foreseeable 
victims?"  If so, ironically, any moral duty to warn 
that Neubauer otherwise might have felt would be 
undermined by potential liability for the legal duty 
she no longer could avoid. 
 
Tragically, sexual abuse has brought devastating 
consequences to countless children and their families. 
 Sadly, 
our 
society 
has 
discovered 
that 
many 
pedophiles elude the control of the criminal justice 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
15
system.  Many seem unchanged despite psychotherapeutic 
intervention 
and 
the 
rehabilitation 
efforts 
of 
corrections, probation, and parole.  As pedophiles 
sexually abuse children again and again, some state 
legislatures, in a desperate effort to locate new 
methods to stop the assaults, debate whether to enact 
"neighborhood notification" laws to warn citizens of 
paroled child molesters living in their communities.  
Thus, legislatures debate the appropriate scope of 
government's duty to warn and they struggle to define 
sensible 
starting 
and 
stopping 
points. 
 
For 
government, the struggle is extremely difficult as a 
matter of public policy.  For an individual citizen, 
the struggle is extremely difficult as a matter of 
morality, and virtually impossible as a matter of law.  
Id. at 130-132. 
¶35 In essence, the court of appeals determined that 
allowing recovery would impose liability for failure to warn in 
situations in which the decision whether to warn is fraught with 
difficulty and in which no just and sensible legal guidelines 
are available to limit liability.   
¶36 For similar reasons, we conclude that in this case 
there are no just and sensible guidelines for defining liability 
for negligent failure to warn.  Indeed, allowing recovery for 
failure to warn in this case would create liability with far 
fewer limiting guidelines than were available in Kelli T-G..   
¶37 To begin with, Charland was an adult who had been 
convicted of three offenses of sexually assaulting children and 
was known to possess child pornography.  Michael, on the other 
hand, is a ten-year-old child who had previously engaged in 
unspecified "inappropriate sexual acts" with one or more 
children including his half-sister.  It is not alleged that 
Michael was adjudicated delinquent based on his previous 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
16
conduct.5  If Bubner's knowledge that Michael had previously 
engaged in an unadjudicated, inappropriate sexual act with 
another child is sufficient to support a claim for failure to 
warn, it is difficult to imagine what level of knowledge would 
be insufficient to support liability.   
¶38 Worse yet, allowing recovery in this case would extend 
a duty to warn to a much larger group of people than in Kelli T-
G..  Unlike Charland, Michael is a child himself and is 
therefore in near-constant contact with other children.  If 
liability for failure to warn is recognized under the facts 
alleged by the Gritzners, the same liability would extend to any 
child with whom Michael might play unsupervisedhis classmates 
at school, children at a birthday party, children at family 
gatherings, or children on a playground.  There is no just or 
sensible reason to allow Tara to recover but to limit liability 
for these other children.6  The practical effect would be to 
                     
5 The Gritzners do not allege that Michael's previous 
inappropriate sexual act or acts were the subject of any 
juvenile court proceedings.  In her answer to the Gritzners' 
complaint, Michael's mother admits that Michael had previously 
engaged in inappropriate sexual acts but states that an employee 
of the local Department of Human Services dismissed Michael's 
behavior as normal and recommended that no action be taken.   
6 For this reason we reject the Gritzners' argument that 
they may recover for negligent failure to warn under the 
rationale that a land possessor owes a duty of ordinary care 
toward guests.  See Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 443-44, 
442 N.W.2d 25 (1989).  Although this rationale offers some 
limits on liability, those limits are not just or sensible in 
the context of the Gritzners' claim.  If Bubner's failure to 
warn Tara's parents about Michael constitutes negligence, it is 
not just or sensible to disallow recovery simply because the 
abuse took place at Tara's home rather than Michael's.   
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
17
require any adult who cared for a child who had previously 
engaged in any conduct that could be characterized as an 
"inappropriate sexual act" to stigmatize this child in all of 
his or her relations with other children.  We are greatly 
hesitant to impose such a limitless duty to warn. 
¶39 The Gritzners urge that there are just and sensible 
stopping points for liability in this case because (1) Wis. 
Stat. § 48.01 (1997-98)7 establishes an overriding public policy 
in favor of protecting a child from sexual abuse over protecting 
an adult from liability, and (2) Wis. Stat. § 48.981 authorized 
Bubner to report to the local Department of Human Services that 
Tara was at risk of being abused.  According to the Gritzners, a 
common law cause of action for negligent failure to warn would 
further the public policies embodied by these statutes. 
¶40 Although Wis. Stat. § 48.01 codifies a general public 
policy in favor of protecting children from all forms of abuse, 
it does not provide the just and sensible stopping points that 
are necessary before a civil cause of action in negligence may 
be recognized in Wisconsin.  Similarly, although Wis. Stat. 
                                                                  
Furthermore, Shannon did not involve the issue of failure 
to warn about a third party's alleged propensities, and the 
limits provided by Shannon are not sufficient to resolve the 
public policy considerations in this case.  Under Shannon, 
liability would extend to the parents of all children who came 
onto Bubner's property.  The practical effect would still be to 
require Bubner issue broad warnings about Michael.  We conclude 
that the Gritzners cannot recover for negligent failure to warn 
under the rationale of Shannon.  
7 Subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
1997-98 volumes unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
18
§ 48.9818 authorizes private parties to report about abuse and 
the risk of abuse, it provides no basis for civil liability in 
this 
case. 
 
Section 
48.981(2) 
requires 
that 
certain 
professionals 
in 
positions 
of 
authority, 
such 
as 
health 
professionals, teachers, childcare workers, and law enforcement 
personnel, report suspected abuse of a child.  Persons who are 
subject to this mandatory reporting requirement may be fined and 
imprisoned for failure to report.  Wis. Stat. § 48.981(6).  All 
other persons "may" report abuse, but are not required to do so, 
and are not subject to any penalties for failure to report.  
§§ 48.981(2) and (6).  Thus, § 48.981 does not provide a basis 
for a civil cause of action for negligent failure to warn. 
¶41 Furthermore, requiring that adults give such broad 
warnings about a child seems contrary to the policy established 
in Children's Code provisions, which provide that juvenile law 
enforcement and court records are held confidential and may only 
be released by court order.  See Wis. Stats. §§ 48.396,9 48.78; 
State ex rel. Herget v. Waukesha County Cir. Ct., 84 Wis. 2d 
435, 450-52, 267 N.W.2d 309 (1978).  Confidentiality of juvenile 
records is considered 
to 
be "essential to 
the goal of 
                     
8 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.981 
has 
been 
amended 
by 
the 
legislature since the publication of the 1997-98 volumes.  See 
1999 Wis. Acts 192, 149, 84, 56, and 32.  In particular, see 
1999 Wis. Act 149 and 1999 Wis. Act 56 (amending § 48.981(2)).  
These changes do not affect this analysis. 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.396 has been amended.  1999 Wis. Acts 
89 and 32.  These amendments do not change this analysis. 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
19
rehabilitation."  Id. at 451.  These confidentiality concerns 
weigh against the Gritzners' claim.   
¶42 We also note that the Wisconsin Legislature has 
confronted the issue of the need to warn the public about sex 
offenders in the community and has specifically provided for 
circumstances 
under 
which 
public 
protection 
outweighs 
confidentiality concerns.  The State of Wisconsin maintains a 
sex offender registry and provides notice and access to 
information 
about 
sex 
offenders 
as 
necessary 
for 
public 
protection.  See 1993 Wis. Act 98 § 116; 1995 Wis. Act 440; Wis. 
Stats. §§ 301.45 and 301.46.10  These provisions apply not only 
to adult sex offenders but also to juvenile offenders who have 
been adjudicated delinquent.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45(1g)(a)11 
and 301.46; In the Interest of Jason J.C., 216 Wis. 2d 12, 18, 
573 N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1997)(rejecting a juvenile's argument 
that courts are empowered to expunge juvenile records because 
having to register as a sex offender under § 301.45 will have a 
stigmatizing effect).  However, none of these provisions 
establishes a procedure under which the state issues warnings 
about a juvenile's unadjudicated acts of inappropriate sexual 
conduct, and none of these provisions imposes a duty to warn on 
                     
10 Wisconsin 
Stats. 
§§ 301.45 
and 
301.46 
have 
been 
renumbered and substantially amended.  See 1999 Wis. Acts 186, 
156, 89, and 9 §§ 2714d-2717m.  These amendments do not affect 
this analysis. 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1) (1997-98) has been renumbered 
(1g) and has been amended since publication of the 1997-98 
volumes of the Wisconsin Statutes.  1999 Wis. Act 89.   
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
20
private individuals.  We would decline to impose such an 
obligation judicially. 
¶43 Many courts have struggled with whether and under what 
conditions individuals may be held liable for failing to warn 
other individuals about the sexually abusive propensities of 
third parties.12  We would not foreclose the possibility that 
under different circumstances a plaintiff could recover based on 
negligent failure to warn about a known risk of sexual abuse.  
                     
12 For cases allowing recovery, see, e.g., Pamela L. v. 
Farmer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)(holding that a 
wife who invited and encouraged children to visit her premises 
even though she knew that her husband had molested women and 
children in the past and might do so again could be held liable 
in negligence); J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998)(holding 
that a wife could be held liable for negligent failure to 
prevent or warn about her husband's sexual abuse when the wife 
had actual knowledge or special reason to know that the husband 
was likely to abuse a particular person or persons); Doe v. 
Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App. 1996)(holding that a 
grandmother could be held liable for failure to protect her 
granddaughter from a known risk of sexual abuse by the 
grandfather).   
For cases not allowing recovery, see, e.g., Eric J. v. 
Betty M., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)(holding that 
family members of a parolee could not be held liable for failure 
to warn the parolee's girlfriend that he had been convicted of 
felony child molestation even though the girlfriend's son was 
allegedly abused on the family members' premises); Doe v. Goff, 
716 N.E.2d 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)(holding that the Boy Scouts 
of America could not be held liable for failure to prevent the 
sexual assault of a Boy Scout when the assault was not 
foreseeable); 
H.B. 
v. 
Whittemore, 
552 
N.W.2d 
705 
(Minn. 
1996)(holding that a trailer park manager did not have a duty to 
warn or protect children whom she knew were being sexually 
abused by another resident of the trailer park); T.A. v. Allen, 
669 A.2d 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)(holding that a stepmother did 
not have a duty to protect her husband's grandchildren from 
sexual abuse by the grandfather). 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
21
We would merely hold that under the circumstances of this case, 
liability for failure to warn is barred by public policy. 
¶44 In reaching this conclusion, we are very mindful of 
the permanent and devastating consequences of child sexual 
abuse.  Nonetheless, we determine that a cause of action for 
negligent failure to warn should not provide a remedy under the 
circumstances of this case.  Because allowing recovery would 
enter a field in which there are no just and sensible stopping 
points for liability, we would hold that the Gritzners' claim 
for negligent failure to warn is barred as a matter of law. 
 
VI.  PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT BAR THE GRITZNERS' CLAIM FOR 
NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO CONTROL 
¶45 Next, we are asked to decide whether the Gritzners' 
claim against Bubner for negligent failure to control Michael's 
conduct13 is a claim for which relief may be granted.  Bubner 
                     
13 This claim was entitled "negligent failure to control" in 
the Gritzners' initial complaint against Bubner.  However, in 
their pleadings and at oral argument before this court, the 
parties have often referred to this claim as "negligent 
supervision."  See also Gritzner v. Michael R., 228 Wis. 2d 541, 
551, 598 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 1999)(labeling the claim "failure 
to supervise").  
This court has recognized a tort of negligent supervision 
relating to an employer's "negligent supervision" of its 
employees.  See Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 287, 580 
N.W.2d 245 (1998) (citing Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 
Wis. 2d 250, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998)).  In order to avoid 
confusion, we believe that the Gritzners' claim is more 
appropriately labeled negligent "failure to control" a minor 
child.  See Bankert v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Wis. 2d 
469, 477, 329 N.W.2d 150 (1983).  Although we label the claim 
"negligent failure to control," the claim encompasses both 
failure to control and failure to supervise the conduct of a 
child. 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
22
argues that the complaint is not sufficient to establish the 
first element, the existence of a duty on the part of Bubner to 
exercise ordinary care to control Michael's conduct.  Bubner 
also contends that even if the complaint is legally sufficient 
to 
state 
a 
claim, 
public 
policy 
considerations 
preclude 
liability.  
¶46 Because we conclude that public policy precludes the 
Gritzners' claim for failure to warn, we would not permit the 
failure to control claim to proceed unless there is some 
distinct, well-defined basis that will permit liability for 
failure to control but will not permit liability for failure to 
warn.   
¶47 We conclude that there are two well-defined bases upon 
which Bubner might be held liable for failure to control 
Michael's conduct.  Either of these legal theories is narrow 
enough to permit liability for failure to control without 
permitting liability for failure to warn.  We also conclude that 
public policy considerations do not bar a narrowly defined claim 
for negligent failure to control under these theories.   
 
A.  A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO CONTROL A MINOR 
CHILD MAY BE BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF IN LOCO PARENTIS 
¶48 In the Gritzners' complaint, the claim against Bubner 
for negligent failure to control Michael is based on Bubner's 
relationship with Michael.  The complaint claims that as the 
boyfriend of Michael's mother, Bubner assumed custody and 
control over Michael and that he negligently failed to exercise 
his control over Michael for the protection of Tara.   
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
23
¶49 This court has adopted the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 316, Duty of Parent to Control Conduct of Child, as an 
applicable standard of conduct in negligence actions.  See 
Nieuwendorp v. American Family Ins. Co., 191 Wis. 2d 462, 473, 
529 N.W.2d 594 (1995); Bankert v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 
110 Wis. 2d 469, 477, 327 N.W.2d 150 (1983).  Section 316 
provides: 
 
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care 
so to control his minor child as to prevent it from 
intentionally harming others or from so conducting 
itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily 
harm to them, if the parent 
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the 
ability to control his child, and 
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and 
opportunity for exercising such control. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316.  Wisconsin's civil jury 
instructions restate this standard of conduct as follows: 
 
A parent must use ordinary care to control his or 
her minor child so as to prevent the child from 
intentionally 
harming 
others 
or 
from 
conducting 
himself or herself so as to create an unreasonable 
risk [of] bodily harm to others, if the parent knows 
or should know: 
 
(1) that [he or she] has the ability to control 
the child; 
 
(2) that there is a necessity for exercising such 
control; and 
 
(3) that there is an opportunity to do it. 
Wis JICivil 1013.   
¶50 If Bubner were Michael's legal parent, this standard 
of conduct would clearly apply to Bubner's failure to control 
Michael's conduct.  See Nieuwendorp, 191 Wis. 2d at 473, (citing 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
24
Seibert v. Morris, 252 Wis. 460, 463, 32 N.W.2d 239 (1948)); 
Bankert, 110 Wis. 2d at 477.   
¶51 Although Bubner is not Michael's legal parent, the 
Gritzners' complaint alleges facts that imply that Bubner was in 
a parent-like relationship with Michael.  The complaint alleges 
that Bubner and Michael's mother were in a romantic relationship 
and that Bubner, Michael, and Michael's mother lived together in 
the same home.  Furthermore, the complaint states that as a 
result of Bubner's relationship with Michael's mother, Bubner 
assumed custody and control over Michael.  From these facts it 
seems reasonable to infer that although there was no formal 
legal relationship between Bubner and Michael, Bubner may have 
assumed parental responsibility and authority over Michael. 
¶52 This court has recognized that an adult who is not a 
child's legal parent may sometimes stand in the position of a 
parent to that child.  See In re Custody of D.M.M., 137 Wis. 2d 
375, 384-86, 404 N.W.2d 530 (1987)(considering whether the word 
"parent" in Wis. Stat. § 767.245 includes persons standing in 
loco parentis); McManus v. Hinney, 31 Wis. 2d 333, 143 N.W.2d 1 
(1966); In Interest of L.L. v. Circuit Ct. of Washington County, 
90 Wis. 2d 585, 596, 280 N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1979)(describing 
the state's authority to supervise children during school hours 
as its position in loco parentis); Fuerst v. Fuerst, 93 Wis. 2d 
121, 286 N.W.2d 861 (Ct. App. 1979).   
¶53 We have described the in loco parentis relationship in 
this manner: 
 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
25
A person stands in loco parentis to a minor child if 
he has assumed the status and obligation of a parent 
without a formal adoption.  Whether or not this 
relationship exists is a matter of intent to be 
deduced from the facts of a particular case.  In 
determining whether a person stands in loco parentis, 
factual considerations may include the children's 
ages, their dependence upon the person claimed to be 
in loco parentis, and whether such person in fact 
supports the children and exercises the duties and 
obligations of a natural parent. 
McManus, 31 Wis. 2d at 337.  In essence, an in loco parentis 
relationship is created when a person who is not a child's legal 
parent stands in the position of a parent towards the child. 
¶54 The parental duty to control described by Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 316 and WisJI Civil 1013 requires that 
parents, who by the nature of their relationship have the 
ability to supervise and control a child's conduct, take 
reasonable 
steps 
to 
control 
the 
child's 
behavior. 
 
See 
Nieuwendorp, 191 Wis. 2d at 474 (stating that parents had a duty 
to take reasonable steps to control their son's behavior).  
Persons who stand in loco parentis to a child have a similar 
authority and obligation to supervise and control the child's 
behavior.  It is therefore reasonable to subject them to the 
standard of conduct set forth in § 316 and Wis-JI Civil 1013.  
We hold that a person who stands in loco parentis to a minor 
child may be held liable for failure to exercise ordinary care 
in controlling that child's conduct.  If Bubner stood in loco 
parentis to Michael, Bubner's alleged failure to control 
Michael's conduct may be evaluated under the standard of conduct 
set forth in § 316 and Wis-JI Civil 1013. 
 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
26
B.  A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO CONTROL MAY ALSO 
PROCEED ON THE THEORY THAT BUBNER VOLUNTARILY 
UNDERTOOK TO PROTECT TARA 
¶55 The court of appeals recognized the Gritzners' second 
cause of action based not only on Bubner's duty to control 
Michael but also on Bubner's voluntary undertaking to protect 
Tara under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A.  Gritzner, 
228 Wis. 2d at 551-52.  We conclude that Bubner's alleged 
failure to supervise or control the children at his home may 
also be evaluated under the standard of conduct in § 324A. 
¶56 This court has adopted the theory of negligence set 
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, Liability to 
Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking.  See 
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. 
Co., 48 Wis. 2d 305, 313, 179 N.W.2d 864 (1970)(expressing 
agreement with the rule of law set forth in § 324A).  Section 
324A provides: 
 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, 
to 
render 
services 
to 
another 
which 
he 
should 
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third 
person or his things, is subject to liability to the 
third person for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his 
undertaking, if  
 
(a) his 
failure 
to 
exercise 
reasonable 
care 
increases the risk of such harm, or 
 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by 
the other to a third person, or 
 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of 
the other or the third person upon the undertaking. 
This rule does not require a contractual or legal obligation to 
provide services.  American Mut. Liab., 48 Wis. 2d at 313.  
Instead, this standard of conduct applies to anyone "who, having 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
27
no duty to act, gratuitously undertakes to act and does so 
negligently."  Id. 
¶57 The Gritzners' complaint alleges that Bubner consented 
to Tara's presence on his property and that Tara's parents 
entrusted Tara to Bubner's care.  If these facts are true, a 
reasonable jury could infer from them that Bubner voluntarily 
agreed to care for Tara while she was in his home without her 
parents.  The complaint also alleges that Bubner failed to 
supervise or control Michael despite his knowledge that there 
was a risk that Michael would engage in inappropriate sexual 
acts with Tara if left unsupervised.  Taken together, all of 
these allegations could reasonably support the conclusion that  
Bubner "under[took] . . . to render services to [Tara's parents] 
which [Bubner] should recognize as necessary for the protection 
of [Tara] . . . ," and that Bubner should be liable to Tara "for 
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable 
care to protect his undertaking," because Bubner's failure to 
exercise reasonable care increased the risk of physical harm to 
Tara.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals' holding that 
Bubner's alleged failure to control Michael's conduct may be 
evaluated under the principles of § 324A.14 
                     
14 The Gritzners urge us to hold that Shannon provides an 
additional basis for imposing liability on Bubner for failure to 
control Michael's conduct. See also Gritzner v. Michael R., 228 
Wis. 2d 541, 548, 598 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 1999)(citing Shannon 
v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 443-44, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989)).  We 
decline to do so because evaluating Bubner's liability under the 
principles of Shannon would allow liability to be imposed not 
only for failure to control but also for failure to warn. 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
28
 
C.  PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE GRITZNERS' 
CLAIM BASED ON BUBNER'S FAILURE TO CONTROL MICHAEL  
¶58 We hold that the Gritzners' claim for negligent 
failure to control may proceed to trial on two theories:  
(1) under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 and Wis JI-
Civil 1013, together with the in loco parentis doctrine, Bubner 
had a duty to exercise reasonable care to control Michael's 
conduct; and (2) under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, 
Bubner voluntarily agreed to take care of Tara in his home and 
then failed to take reasonable care to supervise and control 
Michael's conduct for Tara's protection.  We conclude that these 
legal theories provide narrow, well-defined guidelines for 
evaluating 
Bubner's 
alleged 
negligent 
failure 
to 
control 
Michael's conduct.  
¶59 Bubner argues that the Gritzners' claim for negligent 
failure to control cannot succeed under either of these 
theories, or any other theory.   
                                                                  
Shannon holds that a possessor of land "fails to exercise 
ordinary care when, without intending to do any wrong, he does 
an act or omits a precaution under circumstances in which a 
person of ordinary intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to 
foresee that such act or omission will subject him or his 
property, 
or 
the 
person 
or 
property 
of 
another, 
to an 
unreasonable risk of injury or damage."  Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d at 
443-44.  Thus, Shannon states a broad standard of conduct under 
which liability could be imposed not only for Bubner's failure 
to control Michael's conduct but also for his failure to warn 
Tara or her parents about Michael.  Having already determined 
that public policy concerns preclude liability for failure to 
warn, we hold that liability under Shannon is precluded under 
the circumstances of this case.    
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
29
¶60 First, Bubner contends that the Gritzners cannot 
establish liability for negligent failure to control under 
either of the theories we have recognized because the complaint 
does not specifically allege that he stood in loco parentis to 
Michael or that he entered into an express agreement to 
supervise or control Michael's conduct.  Bubner cite Kara B. v. 
Dane County, 205 Wis. 2d 140, 555 N.W.2d 630 (1996); McNeese, 
174 Wis. 2d at 633-34; Estate of Becker v. Olson, 218 Wis. 2d 
12, 15-18, 579 N.W.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1998); Kramschuster v. Shawn 
E., 211 Wis. 2d 699, 707-708, 565 N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1997); 
and Zelco v. Integrity Mutual Insurance Co., 190 Wis. 2d 74, 78, 
527 N.W.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1994), as standing for the principle 
that "Wisconsin courts have historically required an agreement 
to assume responsibility before a duty to protect is found." 
(Br. of Defs.-Resp'ts-Pet'rs at 9.)   
¶61 None of the cases cited by Bubner holds that Wisconsin 
courts require the existence of a formal legal agreement to 
assume responsibility before imposing a duty to protect a third 
party.15  See Gritzner, 228 Wis. 2d at 553 (explaining that none 
                     
15 Zelco holds that a social host does not breach the duty 
to exercise ordinary care by failing to protect one guest who 
voluntarily confronts another guest.  Zelco v. Integrity Mut. 
Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 74, 78-79, 527 N.W.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 There were no allegations in Zelco that the social host was in 
a parental or supervisory relationship with her guests. 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
30
of the cases cited by Bubner requires a legal relationship).  As 
already discussed, liability for negligence in Wisconsin depends 
not so much on whether there is some legal relationship that 
imposes a duty of care, but on whether a person's conduct was 
                                                                  
Neither Becker nor Kramschuster is inconsistent with our 
holding that if Bubner was acting in loco parentis for Michael 
or had voluntarily agreed to take care of Tara, he had a duty to 
exercise ordinary care to control Michael's conduct.  Becker 
reaffirmed Zelco's holding but recognized that the defendant's 
failure to prevent her boyfriend from keeping a sawed-off 
shotgun in the bedroom closet of her home could constitute 
negligence.  Estate of Becker v. Olson, 218 Wis. 2d 12, 18, 579 
N.W.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1998).  Kramschuster held that an adult 
hunter did not create an unreasonable risk of injury by failing 
to warn or supervise a twelve-year-old child when facts did not 
suggest that a duty of supervision was necessary. Kramschuster 
v. Shawn E., 211 Wis. 2d 699, 707-708, 565 N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 
1997).  
Kara B. is entirely consistent with our holding in this 
case.  In reaching its holding that a professional judgment 
standard rather than a deliberate indifference standard should 
be used to evaluate whether government officials violated foster 
children's rights to a safe and secure placement, the Kara B. 
court noted government officials who place children in foster 
care are acting in the place of the children's parents. Kara B. 
v. Dane County, 205 Wis. 2d 140, 159-60, 555 N.W.2d 630 (1996). 
Finally, the holding in McNeese is consistent with our 
holding in this case.  The court of appeals determined that a 
woman who picked up a child for school did not breach the duty 
to exercise reasonable care by parking across the street from 
the child's home. McNeese v. Pier, 174 Wis. 2d 624, 631-36, 497 
N.W.2d 124 (1993).  The court noted that simply being at the 
scene of the accident was not negligence and stated that there 
is no general duty to protect others from hazardous situations. 
 Id. at 632.  However, the court closely examined the facts to 
determine 
whether 
under 
the 
particular 
circumstances 
the 
driver's failure to escort the child across the street was a 
breach of the duty of ordinary care.  Id. at 632-35.  This 
approach is consistent with our approach in the case at hand. 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
31
consistent with the duty to exercise ordinary care and whether 
liability is consistent with public policy.   
¶62 Furthermore, under either of the legal theories we 
recognize, Bubner will only be held liable for negligent failure 
to control if there is some reasonable basis for concluding that 
he was aware of the need to protect Tara, and had assumed the 
responsibility and authority to control Michael for Tara's 
protection.  The first legal theory we recognize, negligent 
failure to control under the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 316, will succeed only if the Gritzners can establish that 
Bubner stood in loco parentis to Michael, knew of the need to 
control Michael's conduct, and had the ability and opportunity 
to do so.  Likewise, the claim for negligent failure to control 
under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A is well defined; 
it will not succeed unless Bubner voluntarily agreed to take 
care of Tara and failed to take reasonable care to do so.  
¶63 Bubner also contends that he should not be subject to 
a duty to exercise ordinary care to control Michael's conduct 
because non-parents who are prosecuted for physical abuse of a 
child may not rely on the parental discipline privilege set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 939.45(5).  State v. Dodd, 185 Wis. 2d 
560, 567, 518 N.W.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1994).  This argument seems 
to assume that to avoid liability under the theories we 
recognize in this case, Bubner might need to engage in physical 
abuse of a child.  We reject this assumption.  In order to avoid 
liability for negligent failure to control a minor child, an 
adult need only exercise ordinary care to control the child.  In 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
32
the case at hand, Bubner's mere presence in the room where the 
children were playing may have been sufficient to prevent 
Michael's alleged inappropriate sexual conduct.  Had any 
physical restraint been necessary, it seems likely that it could 
have been accomplished without engaging in physical abuse. 
¶64 Bubner 
also 
argues 
that 
several 
public 
policy 
considerations preclude liability.  Bubner first argues that, 
like the failure to warn claim, the claim based on negligent 
failure to control should be barred because allowing recovery 
would enter a field that has no just or sensible stopping point. 
 We reject this argument because, unlike the claim for negligent 
failure to warn, the claim for negligent failure to control that 
we have recognized is very narrow and well defined.   
¶65 In both of the theories of negligence that we 
recognize in this case, the basis for liability and the group of 
persons who may become liable are narrowly defined.  Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 and the doctrine of in loco 
parentis, liability is imposed only on parents or people who are 
in a parent-like relationship with a child; who have the ability 
to control the child; who know or should know that it is 
necessary to control the child; and who know or should know that 
they have the opportunity to control the child.  Under the 
Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Torts 
§ 324A, 
only 
people 
who 
voluntarily undertake to provide services and then fail to 
exercise ordinary care in the performance of those services may 
be held liable for negligent failure to control.  Thus, both 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
33
theories provide just and sensible guidelines for limiting 
liability. 
¶66 Moreover, imposing liability for failure to control is 
fundamentally different from imposing liability for failure to 
warn because liability for failure to control does not require 
the issuance of broad warnings to all of a child's peers.  Thus, 
the failure to control claim does not compel private parties to 
choose between stigmatizing 
children 
and facing 
potential 
liability for negligence.  Instead, parents and persons in loco 
parentis are charged with taking reasonable steps to supervise 
and control a child as necessary for the safety of others.  
Although some parties may determine that issuing warnings is an 
effective method of fulfilling this obligation, a party will not 
be held liable for failing to issue any warnings.  We therefore 
hold that the public policy concerns that should preclude 
liability for failure to warn do not preclude liability for 
failure to control. 
¶67 Next, Bubner argues that liability is barred because 
recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the negligent 
tortfeasor.  The cause of action we recognize is narrowly 
tailored to avoid any such unreasonable burden.  If the 
plaintiffs proceed under the first theory, they will succeed 
only if they can establish that Bubner (1) stood in loco 
parentis to Michael, (2) had the ability and opportunity to 
control Michael, (3) knew or should have known of the need to 
control Michael, and (4) failed to exercise ordinary care to 
control Michael.  We believe that imposing liability under these 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
34
circumstances 
is 
consistent 
with 
reasonable 
expectations.  
Similarly, if the plaintiffs proceed under the second theory, 
they will not succeed unless Bubner agreed to care for Tara 
while she was in his home and then failed to exercise ordinary 
care to protect her from Michael.  This burden is also a 
reasonable one. 
¶68 In addition, Bubner contends that recovery should be 
barred because the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the 
culpability of the negligent tortfeasor.  We cannot agree.  The 
complaint alleges that Bubner was aware that Michael might abuse 
Tara 
if 
the 
children 
were 
left 
unsupervised, 
that 
he 
nevertheless left the children unsupervised, and that Tara was 
abused as a result.  Assuming, as we must, that these 
allegations are true, we cannot conclude that the injury is out 
of proportion to Bubner's culpability.   
¶69 Finally, 
Bubner 
urges 
that 
a 
bright-line 
rule 
precluding 
liability 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
a 
formal 
legal 
relationship would provide better protection for children.  
Bubner asserts that recognizing liability for negligent failure 
to control under the facts alleged in the complaint will cause 
parents to become confused about who has the duty to control and 
protect children.  Parents therefore could become less vigilant 
in protecting and controlling their own children.  We do not 
agree.  Holding adults to the well-defined, reasonable standards 
of conduct we recognize in this case will provide increased 
protection for children.   
 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
35
VII.  CONCLUSION 
¶70 In 
conclusion, 
we 
would 
hold 
that 
under 
the 
circumstances of this case, the Gritzners' claim against Bubner 
for negligent failure to warn them about Michael must be 
dismissed 
because 
it 
is 
precluded 
by 
public 
policy 
considerations.  However, the Gritzners' claim against Bubner 
for negligent failure to control Michael's conduct may proceed 
on two grounds.   
¶71 Under the first theory we recognize, Bubner may be 
held liable for negligent failure to control if (1) he stood in 
loco parentis to Michael, (2) he knew or had reason to know that 
he had the ability to control Michael, (3) he knew or had reason 
to know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising his 
control over Michael, and (4) he nevertheless failed to exercise 
reasonable care to control Michael's conduct so as to prevent 
Michael from intentionally harming Tara or conducting himself so 
as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to Tara.  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316.   
¶72 Under the second theory we recognize, Bubner may be 
held liable to Tara for the physical harm she suffered because 
of Bubner's alleged negligent failure to control Michael if 
(1) Bubner undertook, gratuitously or for consideration, to 
render 
services 
to 
Tara's 
parents 
which 
he 
should 
have 
recognized as necessary for the protection of Tara, (2) he 
failed to exercise reasonable care to protect Tara, and (3) his 
failure to exercise reasonable care increased the risk of harm 
to Tara, or he undertook to perform a duty owed by Tara's 
No. 
98-0325 
 
 
36
parents to Tara, or the harm was suffered because of Tara's or 
her parents' reliance upon Bubner's undertaking.  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 324A.  
¶73 For these reasons, the justices who join this lead 
opinion would affirm the decision of the court of appeals on 
both counts.  We would hold that the Gritzners' claim for 
negligent 
failure 
to 
warn 
is 
barred 
by 
public 
policy 
considerations as a matter of law.  At the same time, we would 
permit the Gritzners' claim for negligent failure to control to 
proceed under the two theories described above.  However, the 
lead opinion is not the opinion of the court with respect to the 
claim for negligent failure to warn.  It is only the opinion of 
the court with respect to the claim for negligent failure to 
control.  See concurrence at ¶ 86.   
¶74 Accordingly, the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings on both of the Gritzners' claims 
against Roger Bubner. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is 
remanded. 
 
 
  
 
 
No. 98-0325.ssa 
 
1 
¶75 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).  I 
agree with Part VI of the lead opinion that the Gritzners' 
complaint states a claim against Roger Bubner for negligent 
failure to control Michael's conduct.  The Gritzners' complaint 
also states a claim against Roger Bubner for negligent failure 
to warn Tara's parents.  But, in contrast to the lead opinion, I 
would not have this court conclude, after applying public policy 
considerations, "that the Gritzners' claim for negligent failure 
to warn is barred as a matter of law."  Lead op. at ¶ 44.  I 
conclude that the circuit court, not this court, should first 
apply public policy factors after a full factual resolution.  I 
would therefore not dismiss the claim for negligent failure to 
warn.  I would remand the cause on both claims.  
¶76 As the lead opinion explains, every person has a duty 
to use ordinary care in all of his or her activities, and a 
person is negligent when that person fails to exercise ordinary 
care.  In Wisconsin a duty to use ordinary care is established 
whenever it is foreseeable that a person's act or failure to act 
might cause harm to some other person.  A person is not using 
ordinary care and is negligent if the person fails to do 
something that a reasonable person would recognize as creating 
an unreasonable risk of injury to another.  Lead op. at ¶¶ 20, 
22, 23, 24.  Failure to warn, depending on the circumstances, 
may be a breach of the duty of ordinary care. 
¶77 The facts stated in this complaint, if proved, may 
constitute a claim against Bubner for negligent failure to 
No. 98-0325.ssa 
 
2 
warn.16  Under the alleged facts, it was foreseeable that 
Bubner's failure to warn might cause harm to Tara.  A reasonable 
person would have recognized that Bubner's failure to warn 
Tara's parents created an unreasonable risk of injury to Tara.17 
 This conclusion comports with our case law that recognizes that 
a failure to warn may constitute negligence under numerous, 
diverse circumstances.18  
                     
16 The lead opinion recognizes that a number of states have 
allowed a claim for negligent failure to warn in cases with 
circumstances similar to those in the present case.  See lead 
op. at ¶ 43, n.12. 
See also Doe v. Batson, 523 S.E.2d 909 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) 
(under facts similar to those in this case, court allows a 
negligent failure to warn claim against the mother of an adult 
son who sexually assaulted girls). 
17 In this case, unlike in Kelli T-G v. Charland, 198 
Wis. 2d 123, 129, 542 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1995), it is 
undisputed that the defendant had a special relationship with 
Michael and Tara.  Both had been entrusted to his care. 
18 For example, owners and occupiers of land may be found 
negligent if they fail to warn firefighters of hidden perils on 
their property.  See Haubolt v. Union Carbide Corp., 160 Wis. 2d 
662, 674-76, 467 N.W.2d 508 (1991); Wright v. Coleman, 148 
Wis. 2d 897, 436 N.W.2d 864 (1989); Clark v. Corby, 75 Wis. 2d 
292, 298, 249 N.W.2d 567 (1977). 
Also, if a passenger in an automobile sees a danger and it 
is apparent that the driver does not see the danger, the 
passenger's failure to warn the driver constitutes negligence.  
See Teas v. Eisenlord, 215 Wis. 455, 253 N.W. 795 (1934); 
Delmore v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 510, 524-25, 
348 N.W.2d 151 (1984) (discussing Teas). 
No. 98-0325.ssa 
 
3 
¶78 I disagree with Part V of the lead opinion that states 
that "under the circumstances of this case, liability for 
failure to warn is barred by public policy."  Lead op. at ¶ 43 
(emphasis added).  The lead opinion goes on to state that it 
"would not foreclose the possibility that under different 
circumstances a plaintiff could recover based on negligent 
failure to warn about a known risk of sexual abuse."  Lead op. 
at ¶ 43 (emphasis added).  The lead opinion does not tell us 
what these different circumstances might be. 
¶79 Because the lead opinion stresses the circumstances of 
this case, I examine the circumstances of this case. 
¶80 This case is here on a motion to dismiss.  The 
complaint in this case alleges that Bubner, who was entrusted 
with the care of Michael and Tara, "knew that [Michael] had 
engaged in inappropriate sexual acts with another child or other 
children," that Bubner "knew or should have known that Michael 
had a propensity to engage in inappropriate sexual acts with 
female children," and that Bubner "failed to warn the parents of 
[Tara] of [Michael's] propensity."  
¶81 The 
lead 
opinion 
repeatedly 
emphasizes 
that its 
decision to preclude liability for negligent failure to warn on 
                                                                  
A psychotherapist may be negligent for failure to warn a 
patient about a medication's effect on driving, if it was 
foreseeable that an accident could result causing harm to the 
patient or third persons.  See Schuster v. Alternberg, 144 
Wis. 2d 223, 232-33, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988).  See also State v. 
Agacki, 226 Wis. 2d 349, 358-59, 595 N.W.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(recognizing that psychotherapists have duty to warn in certain 
cases). 
No. 98-0325.ssa 
 
4 
public policy factors is based on the circumstances of this case 
and that under different circumstances a plaintiff might recover 
damages based on negligent failure to warn about a known risk of 
sexual abuse.  Yet we know very little of the circumstances and 
facts of this case.  We do not know, for example, about 
Michael's 
prior 
"inappropriate 
sexual 
acts" 
with 
female 
children, or how many victims were involved.  We do not know 
whether Michael was adjudged a delinquent.  Lead op. at ¶ 37.  
We do not know whether Michael's previous inappropriate sexual 
act or acts were the subject of any juvenile court proceedings. 
 Lead op. at n.5. 
¶82 The lead opinion concludes that "the facts are not 
complex," lead op. at ¶ 26, and therefore it may determine 
before trial whether public policy considerations preclude 
liability.   
¶83 Public policy considerations should not, I believe, be 
considered at the motion to dismiss stage in this case.  Any 
public policy decision should await the resolution of the facts 
and circumstances that the lead opinion considers so important. 
 Indeed, it is usually better practice to require a full factual 
resolution before a court applies the public policy factors.  
Lead op. at ¶ 26.19 
                     
19 See Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 141, 595 N.W.2d 
423 (1999); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 
754, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994); Schuster v. Alternberg, 144 Wis. 2d 
223, 241, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 
Wis. 2d 526, 542, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976); Boles v. Milwaukee 
Cty., 150 Wis. 2d 801, 818, 443 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1989).  
No. 98-0325.ssa 
 
5 
¶84 According to the lead opinion, this case is going back 
to the circuit court on the negligent failure to control claim. 
 By waiting to decide the public policy considerations regarding 
the 
negligent 
failure 
to 
warn 
issue 
after 
full 
factual 
resolution, the court would not be delaying resolution of the 
dispute or increasing the expenses of litigation.   
¶85 For the reasons stated, I would not dismiss the claim 
for negligent failure to warn.  I conclude that the public 
policy factors should be applied first by the circuit court 
after a full factual resolution.  
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. 
BABLITCH, ANN WALSH BRADLEY, N. PATRICK CROOKS, and DIANE S. 
SYKES 
join 
this 
concurring 
opinion. 
 
Accordingly 
this 
concurrence is the opinion of the court on the issue of 
negligent failure to warn and the lead opinion is the opinion of 
the court on the issue of negligent failure to control Michael's 
conduct.  Thus the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings on both of the Gritzners' claims against 
Roger Bubner. 
No. 98-0325.ssa 
 
1