Case Title: Pennison v. Pennison

Citation: 187 So. 2d 747, 249 La. 587

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1966-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
187 So. 2d 747 (1966) 249 La. 587 Vera TOOLEY, Divorced Wife of Ronald J. PENNISON v. Ronald J. PENNISON. No. 48021. Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 6, 1966. Rehearing Denied June 30, 1966. *748 E. Howard McCaleb, III, James J. Morrison, New Orleans, in pro. per. Marcel J. Meunier, Jr., of Meunier, Martin & Meunier, New Orleans, for appellee. SANDERS, Justice. Seeking recognition as a community creditor in this partition proceeding is an attorney who represented the husband in his successful divorce action. He seeks payment of his fee from the community funds before they are disbursed to the former wife in partial satisfaction of her community interest. On September 14, 1961, Mrs. Vera Tooley Pennison sued her husband for a separation from bed and board. On September 26, the husband appeared through attorney James J. Morrison and filed exceptions to the demand. The attorney also represented the husband in rule nisi hearings for the issuance of a preliminary injunction related to the community property. On November 3, 1961, the husband filed an answer and reconventional demand for a divorce from his wife on the ground of adultery. Alleging the existence of some community property and "many debts", the husband also prayed for a partition of the community. After a long and acrimonious trial, the trial court rendered judgment June 1, 1962, dismissing the wife's petition and granting the husband a divorce. The judgment further provided: "[Items 1-4 list community properties]. * * * "5. A credit for all community debts. On May 29, 1963, the Notary Public secured an order to inventory the community property. Later, he filed the inventory of the community property but asked to be discharged because the parties could not agree on a partition. The trial judge signed an ex parte order discharging the Notary Public. Through his attorney, the husband objected to the inventory because it "failed to list the community debts." On the wife's motion, the court ordered a sale at public auction of the community real estate. From the sale, the sum of $3,492.78 was deposited in the court's registry. On April 7, 1965, the court rendered a partition judgment assessing several community debts against the husband, awarding to the wife the cash on deposit in the court's registry and giving the wife judgment against her husband for $2,131.61, the balance due her by the husband's separate estate. The judgment further decreed "all attorney fees shall be borne by the respective parties hereto." Neither husband nor wife appealed the partition judgment. But the husband's attorney *749 "intervened" and sought a suspensive appeal. He alleged his unpaid attorney fee of $3500.00, for representing the husband until the divorce judgment, constituted a community debt and he was aggrieved by the judgment disbursing all community funds to the wife without paying the debt. After appellate proceedings, the trial court granted the appeal. See La.App., 176 So. 2d 196.[1] On appellant-attorney's appeal from the partition judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of the community funds to the wife. The court denied payment of the attorney fee from community funds. 185 So. 2d 532.[2] We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The amount of the attorney fee is undisputed. During the partition proceeding, the attorneys jointly stipulated the fee to be $3500.[3] Strongly contested, however, is appellant's assertion that his unpaid fee is a community debt, payable out of community funds before their disbursement to the former wife. The Court of Appeal rejected appellant's contention that the attorney fee was a community debt payable out of community funds, stating: We disagree with this holding. LSA-C.C. Article 2403 decrees: Initially, therefore, we must determine whether appellant's attorney fee is a "debt contracted during the marriage." The divorce judgment was rendered on June 1, 1962. Article 155, LSA-C.C. then provided: Under this Article, the community of acquets and gains was dissolved on the date of the divorce judgment. LSA-C.C. Art. 159; Tanner v. Tanner, 229 La. 399, 86 So. 2d 80; Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169. Since appellant's professional contract was made before the divorce judgment and even before the filing of the reconventional demand for divorce, the debt was clearly contracted during the marriage. Hence, the attorney fee is a community debt, unless other Codal or statutory provisions prohibit the husband from contracting such a debt. Respondent relies upon Article 150, LSA-C.C.: Respondent contends this Article prohibited the husband from obligating the community for an attorney fee after her suit for separation had been filed. She points out her petition was filed September 14, 1961, and the husband engaged his attorney thereafter. The court, as we have noted, rendered judgment dismissing the separation petition. Appellant contends the dismissal of the separation petition rendered it ineffectual, as though it had never been filed. Hence, he reasons the Codal provision did not bar the husband from contracting the attorney fee as a community debt. He relies upon Sciambra v. Sciambra, La.App., 153 So. 2d 441, Cert. denied 244 La. 900, 154 So. 2d 768, holding the husband's attorney fee a community debt under similar circumstances. After carefully considering Article 150, we have concluded it is inapplicable to a husband's contract with an attorney to represent him in a pending separation or divorce action. The Article is designed to protect the wife from the husband's obligating the community in transactions foreign to the matrimonial litigation. See, e. g., Landreneau v. Ceasar, La.App., 153 So. 2d 145, Cert. denied, 244 La. 901, 154 So. 2d 769, and Ohanna v. Ohanna, La.App., 129 So. 2d 249, Cert. denied. It does not apply to a legal fee arising from the litigation itself. Such a fee is a normal incident of the adversary proceeding. It enables the husband to take necessary legal action to protect marital and community interests. The amount of the fee is, of course, subject to judicial review. This Court has consistently classified the husband's attorney fee for legal representation in a divorce action as a community debt. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12; Uchello v. Uchello, 220 La. 1061, 58 So. 2d 385; Talbert v. Talbert, 199 La. 882, 7 So. 2d 173; Vicknair v. Terracina, 168 La. 417, 122 So. 276; Munchow v. Munchow, 136 La. 753, 67 So. 819. *751 In Talbert v. Talbert, this Court said: In Vicknair v. Terracina, the Court held the husband's attorney fee was a community debt, stating most succinctly: We hold the husband's attorney fee is a community debt, although contracted after the wife brought suit for separation from bed and board. But this holding cannot end our consideration of the case. Relying on the Court of Appeal's decision, respondent raises other defenses. Respondent first contends the community obligation to pay the attorney fee existed only in favor of the husband. The attorney himself has no right of action for the fee. Hence, respondent reasons, collection of the fee from the community is barred unless the husband sues and recovers judgment for it in the divorce action. This argument lacks merit. As head and master of the community, the husband contracted a community debt when he engaged the attorney's professional services. The attorney became a community creditor. There are cases, it is true, in which the judgment for the attorney fee has been rendered in favor of the husband. See, e. g., Thigpen v. Thigpen, supra. These cases, however, do not hold the attorney may not in his own right assert his debt in the partition of the community estate. He may do so, for he is an actual creditor. Because it failed to recognize the attorney's creditor status, the Court of Appeal erred in interposing the husband's indebtedness to the community as a bar to the payment of the attorney fee. Respondent next asserts the husband's attorney fee should be paid from community funds only when the wife's attorney fee is also paid from the same source. She reasons the lower court's judgment was entirely proper, because it ordered both husband and wife to pay their own fees. It is true in most cases both fees are paid from the community. But no rule makes payment of the husband's attorney fee dependent upon payment of the wife's. In Thigpen v. Thigpen, supra, for instance, only the husband's attorney fee was paid from the community in the partition.[5] Such a contingency argument finds no support in legal theory. We reject it. Finally, respondent asserts the attorney as a community creditor has no right to require payment of his debt before division and disbursement of community funds. This contention is groundless. The wife's claim to one-half of the community is subordinate to the claims of community creditors. The creditors must be satisfied before final distribution of the assets. Fundamentally, the existence of community gains is determinable only after the community debts have been paid. LSA-C.C. Arts. 2403, 2409; Daigre v. Daigre, 230 La. 472, 89 So. 2d 41; Demoruelle v. Allen, 218 La. 603, 50 So. 2d 208; Tomme v. Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139 So. 901; 25 Louisiana Law Review 224-226. In Tomme v. Tomme, this Court enunciated the basic principle: Following Tomme v. Tomme, the Court stated in Demoruelle v. Allen: In Daigre v. Daigre, the Court said: We conclude appellant's attorney fee, which we have recognized as a community debt, must be acquitted out of community assets in accordance with established procedures for the liquidation and partition of the community estate. Hence, in accordance with the prayer of the appellant, the partition judgment must be reversed. The appellant also prays that the case be remanded to the district court with instructions. Since the record suggests other community debts exist, which may necessitate proration, justice requires that we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the judgment of the district court is reversed and set aside and the case is remanded to the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans for further proceedings according to law and consistent with the views herein expressed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the appellees in equal proportions, and all other costs shall await the final disposition of the case. HAMITER, J., concurs in the result. HAWTHORNE, J., dissents with written reasons. McCALEB, J., recused. HAWTHORNE, Justice (dissenting). It is my view that the judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the judgment of the district court is correct and should be affirmed. See Tooley v. Pennison, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal Docket No. 1931, decided May 2, 1966, 185 So. 2d 532. [1] The Court of Appeal judgment maintaining the right of appeal is now final. [2] The Court of Appeal granted a rehearing as to the companion appeal of Robert M. Pennison, another alleged creditor. [3] "BY MR. MEUNIER: "* * * At the same time your Honor stated that you were going to take up the matter of attorney's fees at this time, and you said we would not be required to file a separate motion for that. * * * You said that we would hear it today. * * * (italics ours). "BY THE COURT: "All right. * * * "BY THE COURT: "All right. Why can't you agree, gentlemen, stipulate? I know how much time you spent in here. I think the fees that you both have suggested are certainly reasonable. I think the record will bear out the number of visits that you made to this Court and innumerable times you've been here. The nature of the case in itself justifies the type of fee that you gentlemen have placed and put into the record or have charged for your services. * * * "BY MR. MORRISON: "Yes, and I would like a similar stipulation to the effect of the same fee $3500.00 representing my own services up until the date of the judgment of divorce. "BY THE COURT: "Is that stipulated? "BY MR. MUENIER: "Yes, sir. "BY THE COURT: "All right. * * *" [4] This Article was subsequently amended by Act No. 178 of 1962. [5] The court had rendered a judgment against the husband, individually, for the wife's attorney fee in the separation judgment.