Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Jacqueline Marie Kinsella

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC17-55

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-55 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
JACQUELINE MARIE KINSELLA, 
Respondent. 
 
December 20, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before us on the review of a referee’s report recommending that 
Respondent, Jacqueline Marie Kinsella, be found guilty of various violations of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct arising from her theft of money from Kohl’s 
Department Store, where she worked as an employee.  After finding numerous 
mitigating factors, the referee recommended that Kinsella be suspended from the 
practice of law for ten days.  Neither party contested the findings of guilt, but The 
Florida Bar sought review of the ten-day suspension, arguing in favor of a 
rehabilitative suspension of ninety-one days.  After reviewing the referee’s report, 
we suspended Kinsella immediately and issued an order to show cause why she 
 
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should not receive a more severe sanction up to and including disbarment.  Having 
considered the record, the responses to the order to show cause, and our prior case 
law, we conclude that a more severe sanction than a ninety-one day suspension is 
required and hereby suspend Kinsella from the practice of law for three years.  
FACTS 
 
Kinsella was admitted to The Florida Bar in February 2016.1  On three 
separate occasions between April 21, 2016, and May 6, 2016, Kinsella stole money 
from three different cash registers at the Kohl’s Department Store where she 
worked.  She stole $140 on April 21, 2016, $100 on April 25, 2016, and $520 on 
May 6, 2016. 
In May 2016, she was arrested and charged with grand theft of $300 or more 
but less than $5,000.  On September 1, 2016, Kinsella entered a no contest plea to 
the first-degree misdemeanor charge of petit theft, and the remaining charges were 
dismissed by the State.  Adjudication of guilt was withheld and she was placed on 
probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections for a period of 
twelve months.  Kinsella was further ordered to pay court costs and restitution to 
                                          
 
 
1.  Prior to becoming an attorney, Kinsella had two misdemeanor traffic 
cases brought against her, which were the subject of inquiry by the Florida Board 
of Bar Examiners. 
 
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Kohl’s, perform fifty hours of community service, complete a Vital Life Skills 
Class, and not to enter or go upon the premises of any Kohl’s store.    
On January 11, 2017, The Florida Bar filed its formal complaint against 
Kinsella in these proceedings.  On January 31, 2017, Kinsella filed her Answer 
wherein she admitted the alleged facts and rule violations.  On April 27, 2017, a 
sanction hearing was held before a referee to determine the appropriate disciplinary 
sanction.  Because Kinsella admitted all allegations contained in the Bar’s formal 
complaint, no evidentiary testimony was presented to establish findings of fact or 
guilt. 
The referee found that Kinsella fully cooperated with law enforcement and 
the Bar, her misconduct was not related to alcohol or drug abuse or a gambling 
addiction, and none of the stolen funds were related to the practice of law.    
Kinsella testified during a sworn statement and at the sanction hearing that she 
voluntarily entered into a treatment contract with Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc. 
(FLA) and has made progress in addressing the issues that led her to engage in 
these acts of misconduct.  She reported that her treatment involves debt 
management and financial counseling.  Kinsella admitted that she took the funds 
from Kohl’s because she had unresolved debt.  The referee found that Kinsella’s 
financial problems existed at the time she applied for membership to The Florida 
 
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Bar and continue to persist today.  Lastly, the referee found that Kinsella 
demonstrated significant remorse during her testimony at the sanction hearing. 
 
The referee’s report found Kinsella guilty of violating multiple Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar including: Rules 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor 
Misconduct); 3-4.4 (Criminal Misconduct); 4-8.4(b) (Misconduct–Criminal 
Conduct that Reflects Adversely on Honesty, Trustworthiness, or Fitness as a 
Lawyer); and 4-8.4(c) (Misconduct–Conduct Involving Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, 
or Misrepresentation). 
 
Based on his findings of fact, recommendations as to guilt, the aggravating 
and mitigating factors, the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and 
case law, the referee recommended that Kinsella be suspended from the practice of 
law for ten days, followed by a one-year period of probation with additional 
conditions, and that she be ordered to pay the Bar’s costs of $1,616.60.  On 
February 15, 2018, this Court issued an order suspending Kinsella from the 
practice of law and commanding her to show cause why the referee’s 
recommended sanction should not be disapproved and a more severe sanction, up 
to and including disbarment, be imposed.   
 
 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
Neither Kinsella nor the Bar contest the appropriateness of the referee’s 
findings of fact or recommendations as to guilt.  Accordingly, we approve the 
referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to guilt.  
 
As for the appropriateness of the recommended sanction, Kinsella contends 
that this Court should approve the referee’s recommended discipline.  The Bar, 
conversely, contends that this Court should disapprove the referee’s recommended 
sanction and instead impose a suspension of at least ninety-one days.  We 
conclude, based on the extensive mitigation presented in this case, Kinsella’s 
remorse, and the referee’s finding that Kinsella voluntarily sought out, consented 
to, and is making progress in treatment with FLA, that a three-year suspension, 
rather than disbarment, is the appropriate sanction. 
The standard of review for a referee’s recommendation as to discipline is as 
follows: 
In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, the Court’s 
scope of review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings 
of fact because, ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the 
appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 
(Fla. 1989); see also art. V, §15, Fla. Const.  However, generally 
speaking, this Court will not second-guess the referee’s recommended 
discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing caselaw and 
the [Florida] Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar 
v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  
Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 46 So. 3d 35, 39 (Fla. 2010). 
 
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In determining the appropriate sanction in this case, the referee considered 
several Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  Standard 5.1 provides that 
disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in intentional conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on 
the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.  Standard 5.12 provides that suspension is 
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct not included in the 
standard for disbarment and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness 
to practice law.  Lastly, Standard 5.13 provides that a public reprimand is 
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any other conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law. 
 
We conclude that Standard 5.12 is the most appropriate standard for this 
case.  The critical distinction between Standard 5.12, which calls for suspension, 
and Standard 5.1, which provides for disbarment, is whether the conduct “seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.”  Fla. Stds. Imposing 
Law. Sancs. 5.1.  In this case, both the State Attorney and the referee found that 
Kinsella’s conduct warranted mercy.  Although Kinsella was originally charged 
with grand larceny, a felony, she was allowed to enter a plea to petit theft, a 
misdemeanor, and received probation with adjudication withheld.  Additionally, 
despite Kinsella’s three acts of theft, the referee concluded that only a ten-day 
 
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suspension was appropriate in this case.  While we disagree with the length of 
suspension recommended by the referee, we agree that suspension, rather than 
disbarment, is appropriate.  
The referee found three aggravating factors—(1) Kinsella acted with a 
dishonest or selfish motive; (2) she engaged in a pattern of misconduct; and (3) she 
committed multiple offenses—and seven mitigating factors: (1) Kinsella did not 
have a prior disciplinary record; (2) she suffered personal or emotional problems 
not related to alcohol or drug abuse; (3) she made a timely good faith effort to 
make restitution or rectify the consequences of her misconduct; (4) she made a full 
and free disclosure to the Bar or had a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; 
(5) she is inexperienced in the practice of law; (6) other penalties or sanctions have 
been imposed for the same conduct; and (7) she showed remorse.   
This Court has stated: “Like other factual findings, a referee’s findings of 
mitigation and aggravation carry a presumption of correctness and will be upheld 
unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record.  A referee’s failure to 
find that an aggravating factor or mitigating factor applies is due the same 
deference.”  Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 621 (Fla. 2007) (citation 
omitted).  Kinsella did not challenge the aggravating factors and in fact admitted 
that she understood that what she was doing was illegal; however, the referee also 
found that Kinsella fully and freely disclosed her misconduct to the Bar and took 
 
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steps on her own accord, including entering into a contract with FLA, to address 
her financial situation.  
 
The case law also supports imposing a lengthy suspension rather than 
disbarment in this case.  Florida Bar v. Anderson, 594 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1992), and 
Florida Bar v. Del Pino, 955 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2007), are instructive.  In Anderson, 
like this case, the attorney misappropriated funds from her employer for personal 
use.  594 So. 2d at 303.  Anderson pled no contest to three third-degree felonies; 
adjudication of guilt was withheld and she was placed on probation for three years.  
Id.  The referee recommended a three-year suspension; however, the Court found 
that disbarment was warranted.  Id. at 304.  Like Kinsella, Anderson 
misappropriated her employer’s funds, and her crimes were not committed in her 
capacity as an attorney.  Unlike Kinsella, however, Anderson was ultimately 
convicted of three counts of felony theft, while Kinsella pled no contest to one 
count of misdemeanor theft, with adjudication withheld.  Again, it is significant 
that the State chose not to pursue the more severe sanction of grand larceny against 
Kinsella.  
In Del Pino, the attorney was suspended for three years after she participated 
in the fraudulent transfer of a condominium, which resulted in a conviction for 
mail fraud and tax evasion.  955 So. 2d at 558-59.  Del Pino pled guilty to both 
charges and was sentenced to three years of probation with conditions.  Id. at 559.  
 
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In imposing a three-year suspension, the Court noted several mitigating factors 
significant to its analysis including evidence of an emotionally and physically 
abusive romantic relationship.  Id. at 562.  Unlike Del Pino, this case involves less 
severe crimes; however, similar to Del Pino, the referee found multiple, 
compelling mitigating factors and decreased Kinsella’s recommended sanction 
accordingly. 
Florida Bar v. De la Torre, 994 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2008), is also helpful.  In 
De la Torre, the Court held that engaging in felonious conduct warrants suspension 
from the practice of law, even where adjudication of guilt is withheld.  994 So. 2d 
at 1034.  The attorney in that case entered no contest pleas to five criminal offenses 
(possession of cocaine, battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer 
without violence, unlawful possession of cannabis, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia), two of which were felonies; adjudication of guilt was withheld.  Id.  
Like this case, none of the criminal actions in De la Torre were related to the 
practice of law.  Finding substantial mitigation, the referee recommended that De 
la Torre be suspended from the practice of law for ninety-one days followed by 
three years of probation.  Id.  The Court found De la Torre’s evidence in mitigation 
significant but ultimately imposed an eighteen-month suspension from the practice 
of law.  Id. at 1037-38. 
   
 
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Although this Court has begun to impose harsher sanctions for attorney 
misconduct, even this Court’s most recent cases do not justify disbarring Kinsella.  
See Fla. Bar v. Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 2002).  For example, this Court 
disbarred attorney Randall Lawrence Gilbert for negligently supervising an 
employee who stole millions of dollars from Gilbert’s trust account.  Fla. Bar v. 
Gilbert, 346 So. 3d 196 (Fla. 2018).  In concluding that disbarment was the 
appropriate sanction in Gilbert, this Court held, “As an attorney, he owed a duty to 
the public and to his clients to safeguard their money.  Instead, he flouted the 
system by lying to a federal probation officer and allowing a nonattorney to hold 
himself out as a law school graduate and a certified public accountant (CPA).”  Id. 
at 197.  While her misconduct was inexcusable, Kinsella’s theft did not involve 
client funds and was unrelated to the practice of law.  Moreover, Kinsella 
cooperated with authorities in the aftermath of her crime. 
The Court has stated that it expects “members of The Florida Bar to conduct 
their personal business affairs with honesty and in accordance with the law.”  Fla. 
Bar v. Baker, 810 So. 2d 876, 882 (Fla. 2002); see also Fla. Bar v. Hosner, 520 So. 
2d 567, 568 (Fla. 1988) (“[L]awyers are necessarily held to a higher standard of 
conduct in business dealings than are nonlawyers.”).  Here, Kinsella’s flagrant 
abuse of the law merits a severe sanction.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Hall, 49 So. 3d 
1254, 1261 (Fla. 2010).   
 
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However, on the whole, the referee also found substantial mitigation.  First, 
though Kinsella stole a total of three times, the total amount of her thefts was less 
than $1,000.  Kinsella pleaded no contest to one count of misdemeanor petit theft, 
and the State dismissed the felony grand theft charge and the other misdemeanor 
petit theft charge.  Additionally, Kinsella successfully completed her one year of 
probation in this case and completed all of the other tasks assigned by the court, 
including payment of costs, payment of restitution to Kohl’s Department Store, 
performance of fifty hours of community service, completion of a Vital Life Skills 
Class, and not entering any Kohl’s location.  Not even The Florida Bar suggested 
that disbarment is the appropriate sanction, arguing in its brief in this Court that a 
91-day suspension is the appropriate sanction.  Accordingly, given all of these 
circumstances, we conclude that the disciplinary sanction of a three-year 
suspension, rather than disbarment, is warranted and appropriately serves the three-
pronged purpose of attorney discipline: (1) it is fair to society; (2) it is fair to the 
Respondent; and (3) it is severe enough to deter other attorneys from similar 
misconduct.  See Fla. Bar v. Lawless, 640 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 1994). 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Kinsella is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a 
period of three years.  Because Kinsella is currently suspended, the suspension is 
effective immediately.   
 
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Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Jacqueline Marie 
Kinsella in the amount of $1,616.60, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which LEWIS, J., concurs. 
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion. 
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED 
ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER 27, 2018.  A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION 
FOR REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MAY BE FILED ON OR BEFORE 
JANUARY 2, 2019.  THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL 
NOT ALTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
CANADY, C.J., dissenting. 
 
I agree with Justice Lewis that Kinsella’s misconduct requires disbarment.  
There is no reason to believe that a lawyer who has betrayed her employer by 
stealing from the employer will not betray her clients by stealing from them.  There 
should be no place for thieves in The Florida Bar.  As explained by Justice Lewis, 
Kinsella’s misconduct falls squarely under Standard 5.11, which provides that 
disbarment is the appropriate sanction.  We should follow that standard; Kinsella 
should be disbarred for her multiple acts of theft from her employer.   
 
I dissent from the imposition of a sanction less than disbarment. 
LEWIS, J., concurs. 
 
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  PARIENTE, J., dissenting. 
 
I begin with the acknowledgment that the conduct of Ms. Kinsella, freshly 
out of law school and having passed the Florida Bar Exam, cannot be excused 
when she stole $140, $100, and $520 from Kohl’s Department store where she was 
working over a two-week period.  But, as Kinsella does not attempt to justify her 
actions, has shown extreme remorse, and never contested the charges filed by The 
Florida Bar, the only question in this case is the appropriate sanction: Should 
Kinsella be given a ten-day suspension, as recommended by the referee who 
observed Ms. Kinsella, a ninety-one day suspension as requested by The Florida 
Bar, a three-year suspension as held by the majority of this Court, or disbarred as 
urged by the dissent?   
I agree with the per curiam opinion that any act of theft requires a sanction 
more severe than a short nonrehabilitative suspension.  In fact, Ms. Kinsella has 
already been suspended by order of this Court.2  However, the circumstances of 
this case do not compare to other theft cases where this Court has imposed three-
year suspensions or disbarment.  A three-year suspension is simply 
                                          
 
 
2.  Order to Show Cause (Fla. Feb. 15, 2018) (“[T]he Court has determined 
that Respondent should receive at least a 91-day rehabilitative suspension. . . . 
[T]he Court hereby commands Jacqueline Marie Kinsella to show cause on or 
before March 19, 2018, why the referee’s recommended sanction should not be 
disapproved and a more severe sanction, up to and including disbarment, be 
imposed.”). 
 
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disproportionate to the conduct in this case and I would impose the sanction sought 
by The Florida Bar—a ninety-one day suspension.   
While certainly not dispositive, the prosecutor in Kinsella’s criminal case 
determined that Kinsella should be able to enter a no contest plea to only the first-
degree misdemeanor charge of petit theft.  Additionally, the prosecutor requested 
that adjudication be withheld and the court impose probation with specific 
conditions—all of with which Kinsella complied.3  Additionally, the referee found 
multiple mitigating factors, which the per curiam opinion acknowledges stating, 
“In this case, both the State Attorney and the referee found that Kinsella’s conduct 
warranted mercy.”  Per curiam op. at 6.  However, the per curiam opinion uses this 
and other mitigating factors to justify the imposition of a three-year suspension 
rather than disbarment.  I, conversely, would conclude that the extensive mitigation 
in this case warrants the imposition of a rehabilitative suspension of one year, 
which is far closer to the Bar’s request for a ninety-one day suspension.    
While neither the referee’s recommendations nor The Florida Bar’s 
requested sanctions are binding on this Court, in my view, they should not be 
                                          
 
 
3.  In order for the trial court to agree to adjudication being withheld, there 
would have been a finding that “the defendant is not likely again to engage in a 
criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society 
do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law.”  
§ 948.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2018).  
 
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ignored.  I know this Court has become increasingly tough on attorneys who 
violate the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, but we must keep in mind the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case and the purposes of Florida Bar 
discipline.   
A Three-Year Suspension Is Not Warranted 
 
As noted by the per curiam opinion, the referee found seven mitigating 
factors, including that Kinsella showed remorse, made a timely good faith effort to 
make restitution, made a full and free disclosure to the Bar, and had a cooperative 
attitude toward the proceedings.  In addition, she has taken substantial steps to 
avoid problems in the future.  All of these factors paint Kinsella as a young 
attorney who exercised extremely poor judgment and has taken full responsibility 
for her actions.  Additionally, though the referee found three aggravating factors, 
two of those factors—a pattern of misconduct and multiple acts of misconduct—
arise from the same underlying conduct. 
 
Moreover, in her response, Kinsella indicated that she had spent the majority 
of her brief legal career before her suspension volunteering for the Legal Aid 
Foundation, “providing legal advice through a helpline to those who cannot afford 
a private attorney.”  Resp. to Order to Show Cause at 4.  Indeed, Kinsella “hopes to 
continue work as a legal aid or non-profit attorney when the Court deems [her] 
able.”  Id.  Kinsella “believes this is the best way for her to serve the public.”  Id.   
 
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Our case law also supports this conclusion.  The cases cited by the per 
curiam opinion are distinguishable and consequently unhelpful in this case.  First, 
the misconduct in all three cases is significantly more egregious than the 
misconduct in this case.  For example, the attorney in Florida Bar v. Anderson, 
594 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1992), pleaded no contest to three third-degree felony 
charges, for which adjudication was withheld, while the attorney in Florida Bar v. 
De la Torre, 994 So. 2d 1032, 1033-34 (Fla. 2008), entered no contest pleas to five 
criminal offenses, two of which were felonies, and adjudication was withheld.  
Anderson, 594 So. 2d at 303; De la Torre, 994 So. 2d at 1033-34.  Conversely, in 
this case, Kinsella pled no contest to one misdemeanor charge of petit theft and 
adjudication of guilt was withheld.  Additionally, the attorney in Florida Bar v. 
Del Pino, 955 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2007), was suspended for three years following a 
conviction for mail fraud and tax evasion.  Id. at 558.  Certainly Kinsella stealing 
less than $1,000 from her employer, while serious, is not the same kind or degree 
of misconduct as that of Del Pino.   
Indeed, there does not appear to be a case from this Court that is directly on 
point.  However, examining the conduct in the following cases illustrates that 
Kinsella’s misconduct does not rise to that of attorneys who have historically been 
suspended from the practice of law for three years.  Kinsella’s misconduct is 
 
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considerably less severe than that of other attorneys who have received equal or 
even lesser sanctions.  
For example, in Florida Bar v. Arcia, 848 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2003), this Court 
held that an attorney’s theft of funds from his law firm employer warranted a three-
year suspension, followed by a three-year probationary period.  Specifically, while 
Arcia was employed as an associate at the law firm of Zarco and Pardo, P.A., he 
formed his own one-man law firm, which was in direct competition with Zarco and 
Pardo, P.A.  Id. at 297.  Arcia solicited clients from Zarco and Pardo for his own 
benefit by intercepting telephone calls directed to the firm.  Additionally, on 
several occasions he deposited fees he had obtained representing Zarco and 
Pardo’s clients or prospective clients into his solo-firm’s bank account.  Id.  Arcia 
admitted “to depriving the firm of about $62,000 in legal fees.  During the 1 ½ to 
2-year span of Arcia’s misconduct, the firm paid him bonuses.”  Id.  
 
Likewise, in Florida Bar v. Winters, 104 So. 3d 299 (Fla. 2012), two 
attorneys participated in the following misconduct: 
Winters and Yonker made secret plans to leave the Mulholland Firm 
and begin practicing together, and that in the process, Winters and 
Yonker: (1) themselves and through a former paralegal for the 
Mulholland Firm, solicited Mulholland Firm clients to terminate 
representation by the Mulholland Firm and be represented by Winters’ 
and Yonker’s new firm; (2) made misrepresentations to the 
Mulholland Firm and to Mulholland Firm clients; (3) made copies of 
and took possession of Mulholland Firm client files without 
authorization; and (4) improperly used a third attorney’s name, who 
 
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never actually joined the new firm, in their new firm name on 
documents. 
 
Id. at 300.  Ultimately, the Court imposed a ninety-one day suspension for Winters 
and a sixty-day nonrehabilitative suspension for Yonker.  Id. at 303. 
 
Most recently, this Court imposed a one-year suspension for an attorney who 
converted $500 in client funds for his own use.  See Fla. Bar v. Wynn, 210 So. 3d 
1271, 1272 (Fla. 2017).  In doing so, we noted that “misuse or misappropriation of 
client funds is one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can commit.”  Id. at 1274.   
Likewise, just this year, we approved an eighteen-month suspension for an 
attorney who knowingly signed and provided to a lender a real estate closing 
statement containing incorrect statements about closing funds.  Fla. Bar v. Perez, 
No. SC16-111, 2018 WL 2731612, at *1 (Fla. Jun. 7, 2018).  In that case, Perez 
prepared a closing statement reflecting that approximately $3 million in cash 
would be brought to the closing by the buyer, when, in fact, the total of the buyer’s 
contribution consisted of $1.5 million in cash and a promissory note in favor of the 
seller of approximately $1.5 million.  Order at 1, Fla. Bar v. Perez, No. SC16-111 
(Fla. Oct. 20, 2017) (disapproving referee’s report and remanding back to the 
referee for additional proceedings).  Perez acknowledged that he purposely 
reflected the down payment inaccurately, but did not see a problem with doing so 
because he was directed to do so by the loan officer.   Id.  Certainly, Kinsella’s acts 
of dishonesty are not so much more egregious than Perez’s to warrant double the 
 
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length of suspension.  Additionally, there is far more mitigation in this case than 
was present in Perez.  
Disbarment Is Not Warranted 
I also disagree with the dissenting views that disbarment is warranted in this 
case and take particular issue with the assertion of Justice Lewis that “[t]he 
imposition of a three-year suspension, rather than disbarment, is a black eye on this 
Court’s attorney misconduct jurisprudence.”  Dissenting op. at 22 (Lewis, J.); see 
also dissenting op. at 12 (Canady, C.J.).  For obvious reasons, the facts in this case 
are far from analogous to cases where we have disbarred lawyers for trust account 
violations.  Indeed, the majority of the cases upon which Justice Lewis relies 
involve just that—trust account violations, misappropriation of client funds, or 
other kinds of theft related to the practice of law.  See dissenting op. at 22-24 
(Lewis, J.).4  While Kinsella’s conduct cannot and should not go unpunished, this 
                                          
 
 
4.  The dissenting opinion of Justice Lewis relies on Anderson, because the 
theft there was not related to the practice of law.  594 So. 2d at 303.  Indeed, 
Anderson involved an attorney who “converted publicly owned funds to pay off 
her personal credit-card debt” while working as an executive assistant with the 
Tampa Housing Authority.  Id.  However, in that case, The Florida Bar specifically 
requested disbarment and the referee recommended a three-year suspension.  Id. at 
302.  Additionally, and significantly, this Court held that it was the theft of public 
funds that made it analogous to the theft of trust account funds.  Id. at 303.  In 
addition, the illegal conduct in that case was far more sophisticated as the attorney 
“forged a signature on two checks and submitted three Housing Authority money 
orders in payment for debts [she] owed” her credit card company.  Id.  The total 
amount involved in that case was $4,500 in public money.  Id.   
 
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case of a young woman who made a serious mistake unrelated to the practice of 
law, has made full restitution, and has exhibited extreme remorse is not 
comparable to cases involving misuse of client or law firm funds where this Court 
has disbarred attorneys.   
In fact, the three-year suspension that the Court imposes is the longest 
rehabilitative suspension before disbarment, which is a five-year period and then 
requires the attorney to retake The Florida Bar examination and demonstrate 
rehabilitation.  This harsh sanction requires that Kinsella would have to apply to 
The Florida Bar for reinstatement following the suspension and prove significant 
rehabilitation.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(e).  There is no guarantee that 
Kinsella would be reinstated, especially where there were acts of dishonesty.  See 
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10(f)(1) (“A record manifesting a deficiency in the 
honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, or reliability of a petitioner may constitute a 
basis for denial of reinstatement.”).  Finally, Kinsella would not be reinstated 
absent positive action showing rehabilitation and “personal assurances, supported 
by corroborating evidence, of a desire and intention to conduct [herself] in an 
exemplary fashion in the future.”  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10(f)(3)(E). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s imposition of a three-year suspension is simply not supported 
by this Court’s precedent.  Moreover, I cannot agree that the harsh sanction 
 
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imposed in this case serves the three-pronged purpose of attorney discipline: (1) it 
is fair to society; (2) it is fair to the respondent; and (3) it is severe enough to deter 
other attorneys from similar misconduct.  See Fla. Bar v. Lawless, 640 So. 2d 
1098, 1100 (Fla. 1994).   
Kinsella was punished in a criminal court of law and has paid her debt to 
society.  Both the State Attorney and the referee concluded that Kinsella’s 
misconduct did not warrant a severe sanction.  Even the Bar has not advocated for 
a suspension greater than ninety-one days in this case.  In light of all of these 
findings, it is clear that the Court’s imposition of a three-year suspension is 
unnecessary and overly harsh.  And, certainly, the findings do not justify the 
dissents’ view that disbarment is warranted.  Thus, I would follow the Bar’s 
recommendation and impose a suspension ranging anywhere from ninety-one days 
to one year.   
Accordingly, I dissent. 
 LEWIS, J., dissenting.  
 
I dissent to this Court’s imposition of a mere three-year suspension.  In my 
view, Kinsella’s unethical conduct warrants disbarment.  Attorneys who commit 
the egregious act of theft or misappropriating monies are appropriately disbarred.  
See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 594 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1992).  The majority attempts 
to minimize Kinsella’s conduct as somehow soluble given her student loan debt.  I 
 
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find such flimsy mollifications to be unavailing.  The “extensive” mitigation cited 
by the majority does not and cannot overcome the serious nature of the offenses 
that Kinsella committed.  See majority op. at 5.5  The imposition of a three-year 
suspension, rather than disbarment, is a black eye on this Court’s attorney 
misconduct jurisprudence.  The overwhelming majority of cases involving theft 
have resulted in disbarment.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Spear, 887 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 
2004); Fla. Bar v. Shanzer, 572 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 1991).  The majority’s sanction 
of suspension is not authorized under the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions (“the Standards”) and does not have a reasonable basis in existing case 
law.   
 
Kinsella was employed at Kohl’s Department Store and was entrusted with 
handling the store’s cash register.  The fact that none of the stolen funds were 
related to the practice of law is irrelevant; Kinsella stole from those who entrusted 
her to handle money.  See Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 848 So. 2d 296, 300 (Fla. 2003) 
(“[F]or purposes of attorney discipline, theft of firm funds is serious enough to 
warrant disbarment under most circumstances.”).  Further, Kinsella was entrusted 
with handling Kohl’s money in the same way that she would be entrusted to handle  
                                          
 
 
5.  To this point, the majority’s characterization of Kinsella’s post-arrest 
conduct as constituting “substantial” mitigation is misguided.  An individual’s 
completion of probation should not be characterized as “substantial” mitigation.  
 
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client funds; and, where conversion of client funds is concerned, the standards are 
clear: 
4.11 Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer intentionally or 
knowingly converts client property regardless of injury or potential 
injury. 
 
Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.1; see also Fla. Bar v. Bloom, 972 So. 2d 172, 
178 (Fla. 2007) (holding disbarment was the appropriate sanction for misconduct 
that included misappropriation of funds and criminal charges of theft).   
 
Likewise, Standard 5.1 provides that disbarment is appropriate when a 
lawyer engages in intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law.  Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 5.11 (“Disbarment is appropriate 
when . . . a lawyer engages in . . . theft.”).  This Court has repeatedly held that 
misuse of funds is one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can commit and that 
disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate punishment.  Shanzer, 572 So. 2d at 
1383 (citing Fla. Bar v. Farbstein, 570 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1990); Fla. Bar v. 
Newman, 513 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1987)); see also Fla. Bar v. Spears, 786 So. 2d 516 
(Fla. 2001) (disbarment was warranted sanction for attorney who misappropriated 
client funds while under investigation for other similar misconduct); Fla. Bar v. 
Travis, 765 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. 2000) (disbarment was warranted for deliberately 
misappropriating clients’ funds over a substantial period of time and noting that 
 
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“[t]he presumption of disbarment is exceptionally weighty when the attorney’s 
misuse is intentional”); Fla. Bar v. Fitzgerald, 541 So. 2d 602, 606 (Fla. 1989) 
(disbarment ordered where attorney misappropriated trust funds despite unrebutted 
evidence of attorney’s rehabilitation).  Here, Kinsella stole money from Kohl’s 
cash registers on three separate occasions.  She was later arrested and charged with 
felony grand larceny.  Thus, the presumptive sanction under the Standards is 
disbarment, not suspension. 
 
Again, the fact that Kinsella’s theft from her employer was not related to the 
practice of law is irrelevant.  In my view, Justice Pariente’s attempt to draw 
distinctions between where criminal conduct occurs and different levels of criminal 
sophistication is fanciful at best.  An individual physically removing money from a 
cash register and an individual conducting an electronic credit card scam are both 
thieves.  Further, the notion that Kinsella’s conduct is not comparable to other 
cases involving misuse of client or law firm funds is severely misguided.  Attempts 
to distinguish thefts related or unrelated to the practice of law ignore the common 
denominator at issue—theft.  A thief is a thief.  Kinsella’s conduct was dishonest 
and unlawful and hollow explanations pointing to an individual’s circumstances 
cannot diminish the fact that such a deceitful act occurred on three separate 
occasions. 
 
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Let it be clear, debt can be no excuse for such egregious conduct—many 
recent law school graduates have unresolved debt.  Negative public sentiment 
toward the legal profession would surely increase if those who make the perilous 
mistake of engaging in this type of behavior are not rightly punished.  An 
individual cannot be both a lawyer and a thief.   
This Court has a responsibility to protect the public’s trust and confidence in 
the legal profession.  Those who are guilty of theft tarnish all of us.  To impose 
anything other than disbarment is a disservice to Florida’s court system and 
democracy.  Kinsella’s three-year suspension undermines professionalism and 
creates fertile ground for public distrust.   
Kinsella should be disbarred.  For these reasons, I dissent. 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar  
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Tallahassee, Florida, Kenneth H. P. Bryk, 
Bar Counsel, Orlando, Florida, and Adria E. Quintela, Staff Counsel, The Florida 
Bar, Sunrise, Florida,  
 
for Complainant  
 
Jacqueline Marie Kinsella, pro se, Goldenrod, Florida,  
 
for Respondent