Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Eva E. Ritter

Citation: 2013 WI 3

Docket Number: 2011AP001469-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-01-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 3 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1469-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Eva E. Ritter, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
        Complainant, 
     v. 
Eva E. Ritter, 
          Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RITTER     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 4, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J. dissenting in part. 
PROSSER, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: GABLEMAN, J. did not participate.  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
2013 WI 3 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1469-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Eva E. Ritter, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Eva E. Ritter, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 4, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review Referee James G. Curtis's 
report recommending that Attorney Eva E. Ritter be publicly 
reprimanded for professional misconduct and recommending a 
reduction in costs.  No appeal has been filed in this matter so 
our review proceeds pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).1  After reviewing 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) states: 
 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
2 
 
the matter, we adopt the referee's findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and recommended sanction.  We conclude, however, that 
Attorney Ritter should be required to pay the full costs of this 
proceeding, which were $6,978.68 as of September 17, 2012. 
¶2 
Attorney Ritter was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin on April 20, 1993.  In 2007 Attorney Ritter received a 
public reprimand for failing to maintain records documenting the 
receipt and disbursement of fiduciary funds she handled for a 
client; making cash disbursements from a fiduciary savings 
account such that she was unable to document what she did with 
the funds; holding client or fiduciary funds outside of a trust 
account; and failing to promptly deliver funds to the client 
that he was entitled to receive.  Public Reprimand of Eva E. 
Ritter, No. 2007-9. 
¶3 
The facts giving rise to this complaint stem from 
Attorney Ritter's representation, obtained through a State 
Public 
Defender 
(SPD) 
Appointment, 
of 
A.A., 
a 
criminal 
defendant.  Attorney Ritter hired Mary Jane Kernosky of Central 
Wisconsin Sentencing Advocates & Investigations, LLC (Kernosky) 
to conduct an independent presentence investigation (PSI) report 
for A.A.  On May 8, 2009, Kernosky completed her PSI report and 
sent it to Attorney Ritter with a $1,500 invoice for Kernosky's 
services.  
                                                                                                                                                             
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
3 
 
¶4 
In July or August of 2009, Attorney Ritter duly 
submitted an invoice for representing A.A. to the SPD.  That 
invoice included her own attorney fees and Kernosky's fee.  On 
or around August 17, 2009, the SPD sent Attorney Ritter a check 
for $2,947.54, which included $1,500 for Kernosky.  
¶5 
Although the SPD check was comprised partially of 
funds belonging to Kernosky, Attorney Ritter neither deposited 
the funds into her trust account nor notified Kernosky that she 
had received the funds.  Instead, on or around August 21, 2009, 
Attorney Ritter endorsed the SPD check and deposited it into her 
personal business account, and she proceeded to use the funds 
for her own expenses.  
¶6 
Between November of 2009 and January of 2010, Kernosky 
repeatedly contacted Attorney Ritter seeking payment.  Attorney 
Ritter made promises to pay, but failed to do so.  Kernosky 
eventually filed a small claims action against Attorney Ritter 
and, in June of 2010, obtained a default judgment against 
Attorney Ritter in the amount of $2,107.96.  On August 30, 2010, 
Attorney Ritter paid the small claims judgment.  
¶7 
On June 27, 2011, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) filed a complaint seeking a 60-day suspension of Attorney 
Ritter's license to practice law alleging that Attorney Ritter's 
conduct in connection with the Kernosky invoice violated three 
separate rules of professional conduct.  
¶8 
The OLR alleged that (1) by receiving funds from the 
SPD that belonged to Kernosky and then depositing those funds 
into a non-trust account used for business expenses, Attorney 
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
4 
 
Ritter failed to hold in trust, separate from her own property, 
that property of a third person that was in her possession in 
connection 
with 
a 
representation, 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:1.15(b)(1)2 (Count One); (2) by failing to notify Kernosky 
promptly in writing that Attorney Ritter had received funds 
belonging to Kernosky, and failing to deliver promptly to 
Kernosky those funds, Attorney Ritter violated SCR 20:1.15(d)(1)3 
(Count Two); and (3) by converting to her own use funds received 
from the SPD as payment for Kernosky's work, Attorney Ritter 
engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c)4 (Count Three).  
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) states:  Separate account. 
 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation.  All funds of 
clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm 
in connection with a representation shall be deposited 
in one or more identifiable trust accounts. 
3 SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) provides:  Notice and disbursement. 
 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has 
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client 
or 3rd party in writing.  Except as stated in this 
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 
with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to 
the client or 3rd party any funds or other property 
that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive. 
4 SCR 20:8.4(c) says it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
5 
 
¶9 
Attorney Ritter filed an answer admitting some of the 
allegations and disputing others.  She also asserted, "that 
[she] was extremely ill and not able to communicate or react in 
a meaningful fashion to the needs of the complainant.  That she 
suffered lung and other problems a lack of oxygen [sic] which 
affected her mental process all of which has now been resolved."  
¶10 Scheduling of this case was delayed because of 
Attorney Ritter's poor health.  The evidentiary hearing occurred 
on May 24, 2012.  
¶11 The referee made extensive factual findings relating 
to Attorney Ritter's handling of the invoice.  He found that 
Attorney Ritter's practice was limited to criminal defense, 
noting 
that 
she 
mainly 
worked 
for 
Native 
Americans 
and 
appointments obtained through the SPD.  The referee considered 
this relevant because Attorney Ritter had little reason to 
utilize her trust account.  She primarily relied on her clients 
making minimal monthly payments.  The referee also noted that 
Attorney Ritter had never previously utilized an expert such as 
Kernosky on an SPD case.  
¶12 The referee found that Attorney Ritter had four 
separate accounts with Wells Fargo bank: a personal account with 
an ATM access card, a business account, a trust account, and a 
savings account designed to provide overdraft protection.  She 
typically used her personal account to pay routine expenses and 
obligations. 
¶13 The referee found that since 1997 Attorney Ritter has 
been afflicted with chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL) and had 
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
6 
 
undergone chemotherapy on multiple occasions.  This disease and 
the course of medical treatment resulted in multiple and serious 
symptoms including shortness of breath, hypoxia, cough, general 
malaise, 
and 
recurrent 
bouts 
with 
pneumonia. 
 
Various 
medications were prescribed, as well.  
¶14 More specifically, the referee found that in December 
2008, Attorney Ritter was hospitalized for five days at Mayo 
Clinic's 
St. Mary's 
Hospital in Rochester, Minnesota, for 
pneumonia with complicated left pleural effusion.  Following 
discharge, she was directed to follow up in the pulmonary 
clinic.  
¶15 In January of 2009 Attorney Ritter was struck by a car 
as 
a 
pedestrian and suffered injuries.  She was again 
hospitalized at St. Mary's Hospital for five days with multiple 
diagnoses including right lower lobe pneumonia.  She had 
worsening shortness of breath and malaise and was placed on 
oxygen therapy at home.  
¶16 Attorney Ritter testified, and the referee found, that 
from late 2008 through 2010, including the period of time the 
Kernosky invoice was an issue, Attorney Ritter was severely 
limited 
by 
her 
medical 
conditions 
and 
she 
has 
little 
recollection of what occurred during that time.  Attorney Ritter 
developed pneumonia six times during that period and lost 
significant weight.  
¶17 Attorney Ritter, contrary to medical recommendations, 
attempted to perform some legal work during this period.  The 
referee found that when she received the check from the SPD in 
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
7 
 
August 2009 she was experiencing medical issues that affected 
her functioning.  It is undisputed that on or about August 17, 
2009, the SPD issued a check payable to Attorney Ritter, which 
Attorney Ritter promptly endorsed and deposited into her 
personal account.  Attorney Ritter did not deposit the SPD 
payment in her trust account and, despite knowing that the SPD 
payment included the $1,500 payment for Kernosky, failed to pay 
Kernosky.  Attorney Ritter used the funds to pay for things like 
house payments, rent, and utilities.  
¶18 Attorney Ritter testified that her illness contributed 
to the time it took for her to eventually pay Kernosky.  The 
referee 
explicitly 
found 
that 
Attorney 
Ritter's 
medical 
condition and illness were causes of her failure to promptly pay 
Kernosky.   
¶19 Meanwhile, the record reflects, and the referee found, 
that Kernosky was persistent in her efforts to be paid.  She 
made frequent requests for payment, reported the matter to the 
OLR, pursued a grievance, pursued an open records request with 
the SPD, and filed a small claims action against Attorney Ritter 
in Marathon County.  Attorney Ritter was hospitalized when 
Kernosky filed suit and, although Attorney Ritter was not 
properly served due to her hospitalization, the small claims 
court entered a default judgment against her on June 2, 2010, in 
the sum of $2,107.96.  
¶20 Attorney Ritter was hospitalized again from June 14, 
2010, to June 25, 2010.  Around this time, Attorney Ritter 
recalled that she had inherited some stock that was kept in a 
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
8 
 
safe-deposit box.  In July 2010 Attorney Ritter arranged for the 
sale of the stock and, with part of the proceeds, Attorney 
Ritter reimbursed Kernosky in full.   
¶21 The referee concluded the OLR had proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that by receiving funds from the SPD that 
belonged to Kernosky and then depositing those funds into a non-
trust account used for business expenses, Attorney Ritter failed 
to hold in trust, separate from her own property, that property 
of a third person that was in her possession in connection with 
a representation, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) (Count One).  
The referee also concluded that by failing to notify Kernosky 
promptly in writing that Attorney Ritter had received funds 
belonging to Kernosky, and failing to deliver promptly to 
Kernosky those funds, Attorney Ritter violated SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) 
(Count Two). 
¶22 However, the referee concluded that the OLR had failed 
to demonstrate by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence 
that Attorney Ritter engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation 
in 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:8.4(c) (Count Three).  
¶23 In reaching this conclusion the referee noted that a 
medical condition may be considered in mitigation of discipline 
if the condition is explicitly found to have caused the 
misconduct.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schwartz, 
134 Wis. 2d 18, 22, 397 N.W.2d 98 (1986).  In the present case, 
the referee explicitly determined that Attorney Ritter's medical 
condition 
was 
a cause of her misconduct.  The referee 
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
9 
 
acknowledged that Attorney Ritter's prior public reprimand was 
an aggravating factor, but recognized additional mitigating 
factors, observing that "[w]hile payment to Ms. Kernosky was 
delayed, she ultimately received full payment of her billed 
charge and the substantial costs taxed as a part of the small 
claims action.  There was no attempt at personal gain on 
[Attorney] Ritter's part and no intent to cheat or defraud 
another."  
¶24 Ultimately, the referee, emphasizing that he heard 
Attorney Ritter testify, carefully considered and discussed the 
case law presented by the OLR and deemed distinguishable the 
cases the OLR cited in support of its requested 60-day 
suspension.  Noting that Attorney Ritter's medical situation has 
stabilized and her medical prognosis is positive, the referee 
stated that "suspension of her license would be personally 
devastating to [Attorney] Ritter and is not necessary to protect 
against repetition of the misconduct, . . . ."  The referee 
strongly recommended a public reprimand as sufficient discipline 
for Attorney Ritter's misconduct and recommended that she be 
required to pay the costs of this proceeding. 
¶25 Both 
the 
OLR 
and 
Attorney 
Ritter 
sought 
reconsideration of certain aspects of the referee's report and 
recommendation.  The OLR asked the referee to revisit the 
conclusion that Attorney Ritter did not violate SCR 20:8.4(c), 
citing a myriad of cases for the proposition that a finding of 
wrongful 
intent is 
not needed to prove a violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c), and that a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) can be 
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
10 
 
based on an attorney's "carelessness and neglect."  See, e.g., 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, 248 
Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Usow, 214 Wis. 2d 596, 571 N.W.2d 162 (1997).  Attorney 
Ritter requested a reduction in costs, citing her financial 
circumstances and the fact that she was exonerated on the most 
serious charged filed against her.   
¶26 The 
referee 
thoroughly 
considered 
both 
motions, 
maintaining that under the facts of this case, the OLR had not 
proven a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  The referee acknowledged 
that in the proper case, reckless conduct in derogation of what 
the attorney knew or should have known under the circumstances 
can qualify as conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit.  
Here, however, the referee was persuaded, in part by Attorney 
Ritter's own testimony and by the medical evidence adduced on 
her behalf, that Attorney Ritter's conduct did not rise to the 
level of dishonesty, fraud, or deceit that constituted a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).  The referee added that even if the 
OLR had proved a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), it would not alter 
his recommendation for discipline because "this case essentially 
concerns one focused incident of how the SPD check was handled. 
 . . . There are no multiple acts of misconduct in this case and 
no pattern of misconduct has been shown."    
¶27 Regarding Attorney Ritter's request that the referee 
reconsider his recommendation that Attorney Ritter pay the full 
costs of the proceeding, the referee said it is "apparent that 
any cost award will be a financial burden on [Attorney Ritter]," 
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
11 
 
and since the OLR's motion to reconsider only added to the costs 
involved, the referee recommended the court exercise its 
discretion and consider a reduction in the costs assessed 
against Attorney Ritter. 
¶28 When reviewing a referee's report and recommendation 
in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, we affirm a referee's 
findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous, 
but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo 
basis.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 
126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine the 
appropriate level of discipline given the particular facts of 
each case, independent of the referee's recommendation, but 
benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶29 Here, we adopt the referee's findings of fact.  We 
also agree with the referee that those findings of fact support 
a legal conclusion that Attorney Ritter committed the first two 
counts of professional misconduct alleged by the OLR.  We accept 
the referee's conclusion——derived in part from his assessment of 
Attorney Ritter's credibility, evidence of her serious medical 
issues, and the referee's explicit finding that her medical 
condition caused the misconduct——that the OLR has failed to 
establish a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) in this case.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Wood, 122 Wis. 2d 610, 363 
N.W.2d 220 (1985).  We agree with the referee that under the 
facts presented, a public reprimand is sufficient discipline in 
this case.   
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
12 
 
¶30 Finally, we turn to the issue of the costs of this 
proceeding.  Attorney Ritter questioned imposition of full costs 
in a motion for reconsideration before the referee, but she has 
not formally objected to the imposition of costs as set forth in 
SCR 22.24(2).  Our general policy is to impose the costs of a 
disciplinary proceeding against the respondent attorney whose 
misconduct necessitated the proceeding.  SCR 22.24(1m).  We see 
no reason to deviate from that policy in this case.  There is 
nothing on the face of the OLR's statement of costs that would 
suggest the requested costs are unreasonable.  We are aware that 
Attorney Ritter has significant financial obligations, and we 
suggest Attorney Ritter work with the OLR to reach an agreement 
by which the cost assessment may be paid over time.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Konnor, 2005 WI 37, ¶50, 279 
Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) ("If 
a lawyer cannot pay the full costs immediately, an agreement may 
be reached to enable the lawyer to pay the costs over time"). 
¶31 IT 
IS 
ORDERED 
that 
Eva 
E. 
Ritter 
is 
publicly 
reprimanded for her professional misconduct. 
¶32 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Eva E. Ritter shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding or advise the court of 
an agreement reached with the Office of Lawyer Regulation by 
which the cost assessment may be paid over time.   
¶33 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 
of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 
been full compliance with all conditions of this order. 
No. 
2011AP1469-D   
 
13 
 
¶34 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2011AP1469-D.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶35 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting 
in 
part).  
Consistent with the recommendation of the referee, I would not 
impose the full costs of this proceeding on Attorney Ritter.  
¶36 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this opinion dissenting in part.