Case Title: Waukesha County v. E.J.W.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP000370

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 85 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP370 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the mental commitment of 
E.J.W.: 
 
Waukesha County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
E.J.W., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 395 Wis. 2d 295,953 N.W.2d 122 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 23, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Paul Bugenhagen, Jr.   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Lauren J. Breckenfelder, assistant state public 
defender. There was an oral argument by Lauren J. Breckenfelder. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Zachary M. Bosch, assistant corporation counsel. There was an 
oral argument by Zachary M. Bosch. 
 
 
 
2021 WI 85 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP370 
(L.C. No. 
2014ME227) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the mental commitment of 
E.J.W.: 
 
 
 
Waukesha County, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
E.J.W., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 23, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the 
Court, in which DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROGGENSACK 
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, E.J.W., seeks 
review of an unpublished, authored decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's order extending his 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
2 
 
involuntary commitment.1  He argues that the circuit court 
incorrectly determined that his jury trial demand was untimely. 
¶2 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a), "A jury trial 
is deemed waived unless demanded at least 48 hours in advance of 
the time set for final hearing."  E.J.W. did not request a jury 
trial before the first time set for his final hearing, but that 
hearing was adjourned and rescheduled.  He demanded a jury trial 
more than 48 hours before the rescheduled date, and he argues 
that this request was timely under § 51.20(11)(a) so as to 
entitle him to a jury trial. 
¶3 
We conclude that E.J.W.'s jury demand was timely.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) does not limit the filing of a 
jury demand to only the first time that a final hearing is set.  
Rather, we determine that when a final hearing is rescheduled, 
§ 51.20(11)(a) allows a jury demand to be filed up until 48 
hours prior to a rescheduled final hearing. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
¶5 
E.J.W. was initially committed on April 15, 2014, for 
a period of six months.  The circuit court determined that he 
                                                 
1 Waukesha County v. E.J.W., No. 2020AP370, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2020) (affirming the order of the 
circuit court for Waukesha County, Paul R. Bugenhagen, Jr., 
Judge).  The appeal was decided by one judge, then-Chief Judge 
Lisa Neubauer, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(d) (2019-20). 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
3 
 
was mentally ill, dangerous, and a proper subject for treatment.  
Shortly before the expiration of the initial commitment, the 
circuit court extended E.J.W.'s commitment for a period of 12 
months, and his commitment was subsequently extended four 
additional times. 
¶6 
On February 7, 2019, Waukesha County (the County) 
filed a petition to again extend E.J.W.'s commitment, which was 
set to expire on March 12, 2019.  A notice sent to E.J.W. and to 
the Office of the State Public Defender indicated that the final 
extension hearing was scheduled for March 5, 2019, at 1:15 p.m. 
¶7 
The March 5 hearing did not proceed as scheduled.  
Instead, at the hearing E.J.W. stated that his appointed 
attorney was unprepared and had never called him.  E.J.W. 
requested that his counsel withdraw from representation and that 
the court appoint him new counsel.  The circuit court granted 
E.J.W.'s request for new counsel and adjourned the hearing until 
March 12, 2019, at 1:15 p.m.   
¶8 
Additionally at the March 5 hearing, the County raised 
the fact that E.J.W. had not filed a jury demand and asked the 
circuit court to make a finding that E.J.W., by the failure to 
file such a demand, had waived his right to a jury trial.  The 
County noted that E.J.W. was aware of the jury demand procedure 
because he had made a jury demand in one of his previous 
commitments.  It further argued that although E.J.W. was unable 
to connect with his lawyer, E.J.W. did not comply with his 
obligation to keep his contact information updated, which caused 
his attorney to have the wrong phone number.  In response to the 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
4 
 
County's argument, E.J.W. orally demanded a jury trial.  After 
hearing argument on March 5, the circuit court declined to rule 
on E.J.W.'s oral demand. 
¶9 
The public defender's office appointed new counsel for 
E.J.W. on March 7, 2019, and one day later, the newly appointed 
counsel filed a written jury demand.  On March 11, 2019, the 
circuit court denied E.J.W.'s demand for a jury trial in a brief 
order.  It reasoned:  "The demand for a Jury Trial is hereby 
denied pursuant to § 51.20(11)(a) Wis. Stat.  The matter was set 
for a final hearing on March 5, 2019 and no jury demand was made 
prior to the hearing." 
¶10 At the March 12, 2019 final hearing, the circuit court 
reiterated its ruling from the prior day.  It stated, "Regarding 
the time set for hearing, the Court does find that the date was 
set as a week ago and that is the time that triggers that 48-
hour notice."  The circuit court explained: 
To find otherwise is going to cause an absurdity in 
the statutes.  It would allow someone to come in, ask 
for new counsel, send a letter saying I'm sick, I 
can't make it there today.  I need to have some more 
time to come and have the hearing and another hearing 
would get set for the convenience of an individual and 
it would reset the clock.  The Court finds that that 
would be an absurd way for us to handle it because 
there would be no reason to have the time limit of 48 
hours before the final hearing. 
¶11 Ultimately, E.J.W. reached an agreement with the 
County to waive the hearing and accept an eight-month extension 
of his commitment.  When questioned by the circuit court, E.J.W. 
explained that he was entering this agreement "because I am 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
5 
 
going to lose no matter what."  The circuit court subsequently 
extended E.J.W.'s commitment for the agreed-upon eight months. 
¶12 E.J.W. appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court.  Waukesha County v. E.J.W., No. 2020AP370, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2020).  The court of 
appeals relied on Marathon County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, 
¶41, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898, which had recently 
addressed the issue before the court in this case.  E.J.W., No. 
2020AP370, ¶¶9-10.  It rejected E.J.W.'s challenge consistent 
with 
the 
R.J.O. 
court's 
determination 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a) "requires a subject individual to request a jury 
trial at least forty-eight hours before 'the time set for final 
hearing,' not at least forty-eight hours before the final 
hearing actually occurs."  R.J.O., 392 Wis. 2d 157, ¶41.  E.J.W. 
petitioned for this court's review. 
II 
¶13 We must determine first whether E.J.W.'s challenge to 
his recommitment is moot.  Mootness presents a question of law 
we review independently of the determinations of the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, 
¶16, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901. 
¶14 This case additionally requires us to interpret and 
apply Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a).  Statutory interpretation and 
application 
are 
likewise 
questions 
of 
law 
we 
review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  Southport Commons, LLC v. DOT, 
2021 WI 52, ¶19, 397 Wis. 2d 362, 960 N.W.2d 17. 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
6 
 
III 
¶15 We begin by briefly addressing the threshold question 
of whether this appeal is moot.  Subsequently, we address 
whether E.J.W.'s jury demand was timely pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a). 
A 
¶16 Generally, appellate courts decline to reach moot 
issues.  Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶12, 386 
Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509.  "An issue is moot when its 
resolution will have no practical effect on the underlying 
controversy."  PRN Assocs. LLC v. DOA, 2009 WI 53, ¶25, 317 
Wis. 2d 656, 766 N.W.2d 559.  If all issues are moot, an appeal 
should be dismissed.  J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶12.   
¶17 The County argues that this case is moot.  It contends 
that the subject commitment order is long expired, and two 
subsequent extension orders have been entered by the circuit 
court since its expiration.  See id., ¶14 ("An appeal of an 
expired commitment order is moot.").   
¶18 E.J.W. responds that the case is not moot because of 
the collateral consequences that outlast the commitment order 
itself.  He specifically cites the restriction on his right to 
possess a firearm, potential liability for the costs of his 
care, the loss of legal rights, and the restriction of his 
employment options.  If the case is moot, E.J.W. further argues 
that several recognized exceptions to mootness apply and that 
the court should nevertheless address the merits of his 
contentions. 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
7 
 
¶19 This court may decide to address an otherwise moot 
issue if the issue (1) is of great public importance; (2) 
involves the constitutionality of a statute; (3) occurs so 
frequently that a definitive decision is necessary to guide 
circuit courts; (4) is likely to arise again and a decision of 
the court would alleviate uncertainty; or (5) will likely be 
repeated, but evades appellate review because the appellate 
review process cannot be completed or even undertaken in time to 
have a practical effect on the parties.  Id., ¶12; Winnebago 
County v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶32, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 
N.W.2d 109. 
¶20 Assuming without deciding that this case is moot, 
applicable mootness exceptions indicate that we should address 
the merits.2  First, this case presents an issue that is of great 
public importance, particularly to members of the public subject 
to commitments.  Second, the issue is capable of repetition yet 
evades review due to the short timelines that attend ch. 51 
commitment proceedings.3  See Christopher S., 366 Wis. 2d 1, ¶32 
                                                 
2 Because mootness exceptions apply that allow us to reach 
the merits of E.J.W.'s argument, we need not address his 
contention that collateral consequences of his commitment render 
the issue not moot. 
3 In Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 
927 N.W.2d 509, the court determined that no mootness exceptions 
applied.  J.W.K. raised a fact-specific sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge unlikely to have any impact outside the 
bounds of the factual circumstances of that case.  Id., ¶30.  In 
contrast, here E.J.W. raises a legal question regarding the 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) that will affect 
mental health commitment proceedings across the state. 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
8 
 
(citing Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶80, 349 
Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607) (concluding that an otherwise moot 
issue should be addressed due to its likelihood of evading 
appellate review where "the order[s] appealed from will have 
expired before an appeal is completed").  Accordingly, mootness 
does not serve as an obstacle to our review of the merits of the 
issue raised in E.J.W.'s petition for review. 
B 
¶21 Having determined that at least one exception to 
mootness applies, we turn next to address the merits of E.J.W.'s 
argument. 
¶22 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a) 
"confers 
upon 
individuals facing civil commitment a right to a jury trial."  
S.B. v. Racine County, 138 Wis. 2d 409, 413, 406 N.W.2d 408 
(1987).  It further sets the parameters and requirements for 
jury trials in ch. 51 mental health commitment cases.   
¶23 Section 51.20(11)(a) provides in relevant part:4   
                                                 
4 In full, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) provides: 
If before involuntary commitment a jury is demanded by 
the individual against whom a petition has been filed 
under sub. (1) or by the individual's counsel if the 
individual does not object, the court shall direct 
that a jury of 6 people be selected to determine if 
the allegations specified in sub. (1)(a) or (ar) are 
true.  A jury trial is deemed waived unless demanded 
at least 48 hours in advance of the time set for final 
hearing, if notice of that time has been previously 
provided to the subject individual or his or her 
counsel.  If a jury trial demand is filed within 5 
days of detention, the final hearing shall be held 
within 14 days of detention.  If a jury trial demand 
is filed later than 5 days after detention, the final 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
9 
 
If before involuntary commitment a jury is demanded by 
the individual against whom a petition has been filed 
under sub. (1) or by the individual's counsel if the 
individual does not object, the court shall direct 
that a jury of 6 people be selected to determine if 
the allegations specified in sub. (1)(a) or (ar) are 
true.  A jury trial is deemed waived unless demanded 
at least 48 hours in advance of the time set for final 
hearing, if notice of that time has been previously 
provided to the subject individual or his or her 
counsel. 
¶24 Our analysis in this case centers on the meaning of 
the statutory phrase, "time set for final hearing."5  E.J.W. 
argues that the adjournment of a final hearing resets the 48-
hour deadline for filing a jury demand.  In other words, he 
contends that the phrase "time set for final hearing" does not 
mean "first time set for the final hearing" and that the March 
12 date was a "time set for final hearing" just as much as the 
March 5 date was. 
                                                                                                                                                             
hearing shall be held within 14 days of the date of 
demand.  If an inmate of a state prison, county jail 
or house of correction demands a jury trial within 5 
days after the probable cause hearing, the final 
hearing shall be held within 28 days of the probable 
cause hearing.  If an inmate of a state prison, county 
jail or house of correction demands a jury trial later 
than 5 days after the probable cause hearing, the 
final hearing shall be held within 28 days of the date 
of demand. 
5 Although we focus on the "time set for final hearing" 
language, we observe also that Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) 
contains conditional language as follows:  "if notice of that 
time has been previously provided to the subject individual or 
his or her counsel."  There was no argument presented that 
improper notice was given for the rescheduled hearing in this 
case. 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
10 
 
¶25 On the other hand, the County asserts that 1:15 p.m. 
on March 5 was the only "time set for final hearing" to which 
the statute refers.  It contends that once 48 hours before that 
time passed without a jury demand, no rescheduled hearing date 
could "revive" E.J.W.'s waived right to a jury trial.  In the 
County's view, E.J.W. is asking the court to rewrite "time set 
for final hearing" as "time the final hearing is held."  The 
County further argues that E.J.W.'s interpretation creates an 
opportunity for manipulation and delay of final hearings, which 
would cause the County to have to reschedule witnesses on short 
notice.6 
¶26 In evaluating the parties' competing arguments, we 
begin by examining the language of the statute.  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we need not inquire further.  Id. 
¶27 "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id.  We also interpret statutory 
                                                 
6 The dissent begins with a recitation of "what is not 
disputed in this case."  Dissent, ¶43.  It observes that E.J.W. 
is not challenging that he was mentally ill or a proper subject 
for commitment.  Id.  True enough.  But whatever the ultimate 
result, the process by which a commitment is obtained matters.  
See Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶43, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 
942 N.W.2d 277 ("With such an important liberty interest at 
stake, the accompanying protections should mirror the serious 
nature of the proceeding.") 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
11 
 
language "in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
¶28 At first blush, both parties' interpretations may 
appear reasonable, but guided by the above principles, we agree 
with E.J.W.'s reading of the statute.  Beginning with an 
examination of the language of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a), there 
is no restriction in the phrase "time set for final hearing" 
that limits its meaning to the first time set for the final 
hearing.  Here, there were two final hearings set and both had a 
"time set for final hearing."  The first scheduled final hearing 
was adjourned and rescheduled, which simply means there was a 
new "time set for final hearing."  
¶29 E.J.W.'s interpretation also fits in with the context 
of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) and ch. 51 as a whole.  See State 
v. Williams, 2014 WI 64, ¶17, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852 N.W.2d 467 
("In determining a statute's plain meaning, the scope, context, 
structure, and purpose are important.").  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a)'s context in the statutory scheme indicates that 
the legislature has determined that a minimum of 48 hours' 
notice is sufficient for the circuit court to secure the 
presence of jurors and the County to prepare for a jury trial in 
a mental health commitment case.  Had a timely jury demand been 
filed prior to the March 5 time set for hearing, the circuit 
court and County would have had at least 48 hours' notice to 
secure a jury and prepare.  With the jury demand timely filed 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
12 
 
before the March 12 time set for hearing, the circuit court and 
County likewise received at least 48 hours' notice.  There is no 
additional hardship placed on the circuit court and no prejudice 
to the County in accepting the jury demand for the rescheduled 
hearing because in both cases the minimum advance notice they 
would receive is exactly the same. 
¶30 Further, E.J.W.'s reading is more in line with the 
larger context of ch. 51.  Both the statutes and case law 
recognize the significant liberty interests at stake in a ch. 51 
proceeding.  See Wis. Stat. § 51.001; Langlade County v. D.J.W., 
2020 WI 41, ¶¶42-43, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.   
¶31 As such, ch. 51 contains many provisions designed to 
offer procedural and substantive protections to the person 
subject to commitment.  See State ex rel. Watts v. Combined 
Cmty. Servs. Bd. of Milwaukee Cnty., 122 Wis. 2d 65, 91, 362 
N.W.2d 104 (1985) (referring to the "procedural protections" 
afforded by Wis. Stat. §§ 51.15 and 51.20).  For example, 
"manifest in the language of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am)" is the 
requirement that the circuit court make specific factual 
findings tied to a standard of dangerousness.  D.J.W., 391 
Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶40-41.  This requirement "provides increased 
protection to patients to ensure that recommitments are based on 
sufficient evidence."  Id., ¶43.  Likewise, the purpose of the 
time 
limit 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(7)(a) 
"is 
to 
prevent 
individuals from being detained any longer than necessary before 
holding a hearing to determine probable cause."  Dodge County v. 
Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71, ¶11, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592.   
No. 
2020AP370   
 
13 
 
¶32 It is consistent with these provisions to read Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) as providing another such protection to a 
person subject to commitment——the protection of a jury trial.7  
The County's reading would restrict jury trials, contrary to ch. 
51's contextually manifest purpose to afford due process 
protections including jury trials.  See Wis. Indus. Energy Grp., 
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2012 WI 89, ¶15, 342 Wis. 2d 576, 819 
N.W.2d 240 (setting forth the principle that "courts will favor 
an interpretation of statutory language that fulfills the 
statute's purpose").    
¶33 The County's concerns about potential manipulation do 
not alter our conclusion.  Specifically, the County argues that 
E.J.W.'s 
position 
would 
allow 
individuals 
to 
manipulate 
timelines and delay final hearings, risking the unavailability 
of witnesses at hearings that are rescheduled on short notice.   
¶34 However, the County's argument ignores the fact that 
any adjournment request must go through the circuit court.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(e) (setting forth that "[a]t the request 
of the subject individual or his or her counsel the final 
hearing under par. (c) may be postponed" no more than seven 
calendar days (emphasis added)).  Whether to grant or deny an 
adjournment 
is 
a 
decision 
left 
to 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretion.  State v. Leighton, 2000 WI App 156, ¶27, 237 
                                                 
7 The importance of a jury trial in the mental health 
commitment context is evidenced by the fact that a commitment 
order can be temporarily extended up to 14 days to accommodate a 
jury demand.  See G.O.T. v. Rock County, 151 Wis. 2d 629, 633-
34, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1989). 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
14 
 
Wis. 2d 709, 616 N.W.2d 126; see also State ex rel. Collins v. 
Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis. 2d 477, 483, 451 N.W.2d 429 
(1990) ("Circuit courts possess inherent discretionary authority 
to control their dockets with economy of time and effort.").   
¶35 When faced with a motion for adjournment, the circuit 
court may evaluate the circumstances under which an adjournment 
is sought and make its own determination as to whether a person 
subject to commitment is attempting to manipulate the system 
and, if so, it may deny the motion.  If witnesses are scheduled 
to come in on a certain day and a jury demand has not been 
filed, the circuit court has discretion to deny the adjournment 
and proceed in the name of convenience to the County and its 
witnesses.  In other words, if the County is prejudiced by an 
adjournment, it is free to argue that on a case by case basis.8 
                                                 
8 The dissent raises the specter that this decision will 
cause ch. 51 proceedings to be "delayed for weeks at a time, 
administrative schedules could be turned upside down, a not 
insignificant amount of judicial resources could be expended, 
and an individual may be unnecessarily kept in detention for a 
longer period of time."  Dissent, ¶61.  This argument ignores 
the additional statutory deadline as set forth in the latter 
half of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a), which counters the dissent's 
speculative consequences. 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
15 
 
¶36 Thus, we conclude that E.J.W.'s jury demand was 
timely.  Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) does not limit the 
filing of a jury demand to only the first time that a final 
hearing is set.  Rather, we determine that when a final hearing 
is rescheduled, § 51.20(11)(a) allows a jury demand to be filed 
up until 48 hours prior to a rescheduled final hearing.  
Consequently, the recommitment at the center of this case must 
be vacated.  
¶37 We recognize that our conclusion is at odds with the 
court of appeals' determination in R.J.O., 392 Wis. 2d 157.  In 
R.J.O., the court of appeals addressed a similar situation where 
a scheduled final hearing was adjourned and rescheduled.  No 
jury demand was filed at least 48 hours prior to the first time 
set for the final hearing, but counsel filed two jury demands at 
least 48 hours before the time set for the rescheduled hearing.  
Id., ¶¶39-40. 
¶38 The court of appeals rejected R.J.O.'s argument that 
her jury demands were timely.  It concluded that Wis. Stat. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Specifically, "If a jury demand is filed later than 5 days 
after detention, the final hearing shall be held within 14 days 
of the date of demand."  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a).  This 
subsection "necessarily implies that a commitment is extended to 
accommodate a demand for a jury trial, as long as the final 
hearing and jury trial are held within fourteen days of the 
demand.  Without the implied extension, the demand for a jury 
frequently could not be accommodated."  G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d at 
634.  Due to this statutory constraint, even where a jury trial 
is demanded in advance of a rescheduled final hearing, the 
maximum "delay" is 14 days from the date of the demand.  But see 
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) (setting forth a 28-day timeframe for 
incarcerated individuals).  
No. 
2020AP370   
 
16 
 
§ 51.20(11)(a) "requires a subject individual to request a jury 
trial at least forty-eight hours before 'the time set for final 
hearing,' not at least forty-eight hours before the final 
hearing actually occurs."  Id., ¶41.  The court of appeals 
reached this conclusion without engaging in the statutory 
analysis we conduct above, and it accordingly arrived at an 
erroneous conclusion.  We therefore overrule the R.J.O. court's 
conclusion as reflected in paragraphs 38 through 41 of that 
opinion.9 
¶39 In sum, we conclude that E.J.W.'s jury demand was 
timely.  Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) does not limit the 
filing of a jury demand to only the first time that a final 
hearing is set.  Rather, we determine that when a final hearing 
is rescheduled, § 51.20(11)(a) allows a jury demand to be filed 
up until 48 hours prior to a rescheduled final hearing. 
                                                 
9 Generally, "when the supreme court overrules a court of 
appeals decision, the court of appeals decision no longer 
possesses any precedential value, unless this court expressly 
states otherwise."  Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 2010 WI 
78, ¶42, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78.  To be clear, we are 
expressly stating otherwise, and overrule the R.J.O. court's 
conclusion in paragraphs 38 through 41 only.  See Marathon 
County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, ¶¶38-41, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 
N.W.2d 898.  We do not disturb its determinations on any other 
issues before the court in that case, including the central 
holding that "R.J.O. received proper notice of the recommitment 
hearing because the requisite notice was provided to her 
attorney."  Id., ¶3. 
No. 
2020AP370   
 
17 
 
¶40 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals.10 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
                                                 
10 We simply reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
rather than remanding for a jury trial because the specific 
recommitment at issue in this case has expired and accordingly 
the circuit court has lost competency to act.  See G.O.T., 151 
Wis. 2d at 631 (determining that person subject to commitment 
extension was entitled to jury trial but that the circuit court 
lost competency by failing to hear and decide the petition 
before the commitment had expired and that as a result the 
petition should be dismissed); J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶20 
(explaining that "[t]he circuit court must hold a hearing on the 
petition for extension before the previous order expires or it 
loses competency to extend the commitment").  This determination 
does not affect the validity of any subsequent extensions of 
commitment.  J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶21 (setting forth that 
the reversal of a commitment order "does not retroactively 
deprive the circuit court that issued a subsequent commitment 
order of competency"). 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
1 
 
¶41 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.  (dissenting).  The 
majority in this case has replaced a clear jury waiver standard 
in chapter 51 commitment proceedings with a shifting and 
unpredictable rule.  Because this departure from sound judicial 
administration is not supported by the plain text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a), I respectfully dissent. 
¶42 In February and March 2019, E.J.W. was subject to a 
mental health recommitment proceeding under Wis. Stat. ch. 51.  
After several notices, his final recommitment hearing was set 
for March 5, 2019.  E.J.W. did not file a jury demand by 
March 3, 2019, 48 hours prior to the hearing, and under Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(11)(a), his right to a jury trial was "deemed 
waived."  
I 
¶43 Before discussing the merits, it's worth noting what 
is not disputed in this case.  First, neither E.J.W. nor the 
majority dispute that E.J.W. was mentally ill at the time of the 
recommitment hearing in March 2019.  Outside E.J.W.'s right to a 
jury, no one disputes that he was a proper subject for 
commitment under chapter 51.  See Langlade Cnty. v. D.J.W., 2020 
WI 41, ¶29, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277 (citing Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a)1.-2.) ("For a person to be subject to a chapter 51 
involuntary commitment, three elements must be fulfilled: the 
subject individual must be (1) mentally ill; (2) a proper 
subject for treatment; and (3) dangerous to themselves or 
others."); 
Kriesel 
v. 
Kriesel, 
35 
Wis. 2d 134, 
139, 
150 
N.W.2d 416 (1967) (citation omitted) ("A judgment rendered by a 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
2 
 
court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, 
unless reversed or annulled in some proper proceeding, is not 
open to contradiction or impeachment, in respect of its 
validity, verity, or binding effect . . . .").  Qualification 
for commitment under chapter 51 could have been challenged by 
E.J.W. at the circuit and appellate court levels, but E.J.W. 
chose not to pursue that claim.  There is no indication under 
law or fact that E.J.W. was improperly placed into compelled 
mental health treatment.  
¶44 Second, 
this 
case 
does 
not 
present 
claims 
of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.1  The majority accurately 
cites the allegations E.J.W. made at the final hearing scheduled 
for March 5, 2019.  E.J.W. alleged that he gave his attorney his 
phone number and the attorney "never called [him] and [E.J.W. 
and his attorney] never prepped."  According to E.J.W., his 
attorney was "unprepared for court."  
¶45 Such allegations, and their potential implication for 
fundamental fairness, due process, and E.J.W.'s right to 
counsel, have no relevance to the issues in this case.  E.J.W. 
has not presented a legal claim that his counsel was incompetent 
or constitutionally deficient.  Further, E.J.W.'s counsel has 
never been given the opportunity to respond and defend his 
professional performance; there was never a need for the County 
                                                 
1 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
noted 
this 
fact 
but 
it 
is 
conspicuously missing from the majority decision.  See Waukesha 
Cnty. v. E.J.W., No. 2020AP370, unpublished slip op., ¶11 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2020).   
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
3 
 
to investigate and produce evidence contradicting E.J.W.'s 
allegations.  
¶46 Third, this case does not involve a legal challenge to 
the chapter 51 jury demand deadline established under Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a).  E.J.W. does not argue, nor does the majority 
contend, that requiring potential committees to file a jury 
demand by a given time violates any right established under 
Wisconsin or federal law.  All parties agree that some deadline 
for chapter 51 is appropriate and that E.J.W. had an obligation 
to file a jury demand or have it deemed waived. 
¶47 Thus, 
the 
only 
question 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a) presented to the court is procedural:  at what 
time and date was E.J.W.'s deadline to submit a jury demand or 
have it deemed waived?2  Section 51.20(11)(a) provides a 
straightforward and rational answer:  "[A]t least 48 hours in 
advance of the time set for final hearing . . . ." 
II 
¶48 There is no dispute that the County and circuit court 
provided E.J.W. and his attorney several notices of the 
recommitment hearing date and time.  On February 7, 2019, the 
circuit court notified E.J.W. in a letter that his extension of 
commitment hearing was scheduled for "Tuesday, March 5, 2019 at 
1:15 p.m."  The next day, on February 8, 2019, the circuit court 
issued an order appointing E.J.W.'s counsel.  The order again 
stated that the hearing was set for March 5, 2019, at 1:15 p.m.  
                                                 
2 As the majority explains in a footnote, "the process by 
which a commitment is obtained matters." Majority op., ¶25 n.6.  
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
4 
 
Finally, on February 18, 2019, 15 days prior to the final 
hearing, both E.J.W. and the Office of the State Public Defender 
were provided a list of witnesses the County intended to call.  
The notice also stated that the recommitment hearing would take 
place "on Tuesday, March 5, 2019."  
¶49 It is apparent that the defense was made well aware of 
the date and time of final hearing.  Predictably, the circuit 
court opened E.J.W.'s recommitment proceedings at or around 1:15 
p.m. on March 5, 2019. 
¶50 Under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a), "the time set for 
final hearing" was March 5, 2019, at 1:15 p.m.  E.J.W., as 
represented by counsel, had the obligation to file a jury demand 
"48 
hours 
in 
advance" 
of 
that 
time. 
 
§ 51.20(11)(a).  
Indisputably, E.J.W. did not do so.  Instead, he arrived at the 
hearing and directed his attorney to make an oral motion to 
withdraw.  With minimal inquiry and no dispute from the County, 
the circuit court granted the request for withdrawal.  After the 
withdrawal was granted, the instant dispute over E.J.W.'s jury 
demand deadline began. 
¶51 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.  Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(citations and quotations omitted).  In addition, "statutory 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
5 
 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
¶52 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) states:  "A jury trial 
is deemed waived unless demanded at least 48 hours in advance of 
the time set for final hearing, if notice of that time has been 
previously provided to the subject individual or his or her 
counsel."  The statute required E.J.W. to file a jury demand 48 
hours prior to "the time set for final hearing."  "The" is 
defined as "denoting one of a class of persons, things, events," 
while "set" is defined as "[t]o put . . . in a definite place" 
and "fix."  The, Oxford English Dictionary (2021); Set, Oxford 
English Dictionary (2021).  Thus, under a plain reading of the 
statute, chapter 51 jury demands must be made 48 hours prior to 
the individual time fixed by the circuit court.  The facts in 
this case indisputably show that the circuit court set March 5, 
2019, at 1:15 p.m. as the time of E.J.W.'s final recommitment 
hearing.  E.J.W. knew the time of his final hearing, he did not 
file a jury demand, and, therefore, he waived his right to a 
jury.  
¶53 Simply because, in its discretion, the circuit court 
allowed E.J.W.'s counsel to withdraw and provided E.J.W. with 
additional time to consult with his new attorney, does not mean 
that E.J.W.'s waiver did not take place on March 3.  See State 
v. Robinson, 145 Wis. 2d 273, 278, 426 N.W.2d 606 (1988) ("The 
question of whether an appointed counsel should be relieved and 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
6 
 
another appointed in his place is a matter of trial court 
discretion."); Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(e) (emphasis added) ("At 
the 
request 
of 
[the 
individual 
potentially 
subject 
to 
commitment] or his or her counsel the final hearing . . . may be 
postponed.").  By the time the court proceedings began on 
March 5, 2019, the jury demand deadline had already passed, and 
E.J.W.'s right to demand a jury was under statute "deemed 
waived."  § 51.20(11)(a). 
¶54 The majority asserts that requiring E.J.W. to submit a 
jury demand 48 hours prior to the time set for final hearing 
imputes the additional statutory language: "48 hours in advance 
of the first time set for final hearing."  See majority op., ¶2.  
In this case, the addition of "first" would be entirely 
unnecessary.  It is undisputed that the circuit court set 
March 5, 2019, at 1:15 p.m. as the time of the final hearing, 
E.J.W. did not file a jury demand ahead of that deadline, and 
court was called on March 5, 2019, only to have E.J.W. request 
an adjournment.  The deadline passed, and E.J.W.'s jury right 
was permanently waived.  Further, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) also 
does not state "48 hours in advance of the first and rescheduled 
time set for final hearing."  See majority op., ¶3.   
¶55 More 
significantly, 
the 
legislature 
intentionally 
chose "the time set" for hearing as the statutory deadline, not 
the hearing itself.  In numerous other statutory contexts, the 
legislature has chosen to set jury demand deadlines based on the 
occurrence of an event or hearing.  See Wis. Stat. § 805.01(2) 
(stating that, in civil cases, a jury demand must be made "at or 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
7 
 
before 
the 
scheduling 
conference 
or 
pretrial 
conference, 
whichever is held first"); Wis. Stat. §§ 48.422(4), 48.31(2) 
(establishing that a party to a termination of parental rights 
proceeding must file a jury demand "before the end of the 
initial hearing"); Wis. Stat. § 980.05(2) (stating that a jury 
demand in a sexually violent person commitment proceeding must 
be submitted "within 10 days after the probable cause hearing").  
The legislature deliberately drafted § 51.20(11)(a), and we must 
give effect to the statute's plain meaning.  See Augsburger v. 
Homestead Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 133, ¶17, 359 Wis. 2d 385, 856 
N.W.2d 874 (citation omitted) ("When the legislature chooses to 
use two different words, we generally consider each separately 
and presume that different words have different meanings."); 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44 ("We assume that the legislature's 
intent is expressed in the statutory language."). 
¶56 The plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 51.20 has been 
consistently applied by the court of appeals.  See Marathon 
Cnty. v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, ¶41, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 
N.W.2d 898 ("Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) requires a subject 
individual to request a jury trial at least forty-eight hours 
before 'the time set for final hearing,' not at least forty-
eight hours before the final hearing actually occurs."); 
Waukesha Cnty. v. E.J.W., No. 2020AP370, unpublished slip op., 
¶11 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2020) ("[W]e see no basis in [§ 
51.20] for concluding that an extension excuses the failure to 
timely file a jury demand before the 'time set for the final 
hearing.'"); 
Waukesha 
Cnty. 
v. 
M.J.S., 
No. 
2021AP105-FT, 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
8 
 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶9, 11 (Wis. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2021) 
(holding that the "time set" under § 51.20(11)(a) means the time 
at which the hearing is "set," not the time at which the hearing 
is "held," and reasoning that, because chapter 51 proceedings 
have "strict procedural guideline[s]," allowing an adjournment 
to delay a jury trial demand "would neuter the strict statutory 
time limits our legislature has imposed").   
¶57 The requirement that individuals file a jury demand 48 
hours prior to the scheduled time of final hearing, not merely 
by requesting an adjournment, M.J.S., No. 2021AP105, ¶2, by 
lodging an oral motion at the hearing to replace appointed 
counsel, or by flagrant absenteeism, R.J.O., 392 Wis. 2d 157, 
¶7, provided consistency and predictability to all those 
involved.  It allowed circuit courts to adequately schedule and 
manage resources, confident that a final jury demand deadline 
meant a final demand deadline.  And the standard provided both 
the government and individuals potentially subject to commitment 
with a clear and final deadline.  Furthermore, the standard 
ensured that chapter 51 proceedings were handled quickly and 
efficiently.  Given the "significant liberty interest" at play 
in chapter 51 proceedings, the swift disposition of chapter 51 
proceedings ultimately inured to the benefit of the individuals 
potentially subject to commitment.  Marathon Cnty. v. D.K., 2020 
WI 8, ¶28, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901; see Jefferson Cnty. 
v. S.M.S., No. 2020AP814, unpublished slip op., ¶11 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Mar. 11, 2021) (citing Dodge Cnty. v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI 
App 71, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592) ("The reason for strict 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
9 
 
time limits is to protect the significant liberty interests at 
stake 
when 
an 
individual 
is 
detained 
for 
mental 
health 
treatment.").  
¶58 The 
majority's 
decision 
now 
leaves 
chapter 
51 
proceedings in uncharted waters.  It holds that, despite 
E.J.W.'s right to a jury trial having been "deemed waived" on 
March 3, his jury trial rights were revived through an 
adjournment on March 5.  Neither E.J.W. nor the majority dispute 
that if the recommitment hearing had been completed on March 5, 
2019, as intended, E.J.W. would have had no right to a jury.  
Just as Schrödinger's cat was both alive and dead, when court 
was called on March 5, 2019, E.J.W.'s right to jury trial was at 
the same time viable and waived.  It was waived under the plain 
text of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) but according to the majority 
opinion, it remained potentially alive, if the individual at 
issue obtains an adjournment before the final hearing occurs. 
¶59 Yet "waiver," under the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a), is not conditional or subject to revocation. It 
is a final extinguishment of a right.  See Brunton v. Credit 
Corp., 2010 WI 50, ¶35, 325 Wis. 2d 135, 785 N.W.2d 302 
(defining waiver in terms of a "relinquishment or abandonment"); 
State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶31, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 
(describing a waived right as "lost"); Waiver, Black's Law 
Dictionary 
(11th 
ed. 
2019) 
(stating 
that 
waiver 
is 
a 
"relinquishment or abandonment — express or implied — of a legal 
right or advantage"); 31 C.J.S., Estoppel and Waiver § 93 (2021) 
(footnotes omitted) ("A waiver when once made cannot be 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
10 
 
recalled, revived, expunged, or revoked, nor can the right 
waived be reclaimed, at least not without the consent of the 
adversary."); 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 186 (2021) 
(footnote omitted) ("It is well settled that a waiver once made 
is irrevocable even in the absence of consideration or of any 
change in position of the party in whose favor the waiver 
operates."); United State v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 
2001) ("Waiver extinguishes [an] error and precludes appellate 
review.").  The majority does not cite a single case where a 
statutorily mandated waiver has occurred, and a party "revived" 
its rights through actions completely distinct from the original 
waiver.3  
¶60 This legal reality only emphasizes the error of the 
majority's decision.  If an individual subject to chapter 51 
commitment hearings lets the 48-hour deadline expire, but he for 
some reason wishes to re-exercise his right to a jury, he can do 
so by obtaining an adjournment.  The majority suggests that 
abuse will be easy to police because the circuit court can deny 
adjournment requests that are made to "manipulate the system."  
But this theory implicitly assumes that most requests for 
adjournment or for attorney substitution will be facially 
inadequate.  What is a circuit court to do if the individual 
subject to the chapter 51 proceedings asserts that he cannot 
attend the hearing due to mental health concerns and requests a 
                                                 
3 It is noteworthy that the majority neither analyzes nor 
discusses the significance of the term "deemed waived" in Wis. 
Stat. § 51.20(11)(a), even though waiver is central to this 
dispute. 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
11 
 
short adjournment?  What if there is a breakdown of the 
attorney-client relationship, potentially begun by an individual 
not calling his attorney for weeks at a time?  What if the 
individual's attorney states that he needs to be more fully 
prepared and discuss significant legal issues with his client?  
All these events can realistically occur and, if need be, can be 
utilized to revive a jury trial right that already has been 
"deemed waived."  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a).  In many cases, the 
circuit court would be hard pressed to deny the motions to 
adjourn.  It strains credulity that manipulative intent can be, 
in the real world, detected easily and resolved quickly without 
risking reversal on appeal.  
¶61 In the past, while there were limits to adjournments 
in chapter 51 proceedings, the consequences for giving the 
parties a little more time was minimal.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(10)(e) (permitting postponement of a final hearing for 
at most seven calendar days).  Now circuit courts are faced with 
the prospect that, if more time is given, the potential 
committee could revive his jury trial right.  Proceedings could 
be delayed for weeks at a time, administrative schedules could 
be turned upside down, a not insignificant amount of judicial 
resources 
could 
be 
expended, 
and 
an 
individual 
may 
be 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
12 
 
unnecessarily kept in detention for a longer period of time.4  
Circuit courts rationally may not be as willing to entertain 
motions to adjourn or motions for withdrawal of counsel.5  
Circuit 
courts 
have 
substantial 
discretion 
over 
the 
administration of their proceedings.  See Hefty v. Strickhouser, 
2008 WI 96, ¶¶29, 31, 312 Wis. 2d 530, 752 N.W.2d 820 (noting 
that a circuit court's "discretion to manage the court's 
calendar" is of "critical importance" and is "inherent to [the 
circuit court's] function"). It is certainly possible that 
chapter 51 litigants will now face courts less flexible and 
tolerant in their scheduling.  
¶62 When 
drafting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a), 
the 
legislature was wise not to create perverse incentives that may 
                                                 
4 The majority implies in a footnote that the monetary costs 
and administrative challenges of a jury trial are "speculative."  
Majority op., ¶35 n.8.  Circuit court judges, balancing at times 
extraordinary caseloads, and chapter 51 practitioners may 
disagree with that contention.  To the extent the majority 
implies 
that 
keeping 
individuals 
detained 
without 
formal 
adjudication 
for 
multiple 
weeks 
is 
inconsequential, 
respectfully, the majority should consider its own statements on 
the liberty interests implicated in chapter 51 proceedings.  See 
id., ¶25 n.6, ¶30 (noting the "important liberty interests at 
stake" (quoting Langlade Cnty. v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶43, 391 
Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277)). 
5 If the subject individual simply refuses to attend the 
hearing, as occurred in Marathon Cnty. v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 
20, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898, the circuit court has the 
option 
of 
rescheduling 
the 
hearing 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(10)(d) or entering a default judgment without further 
proceedings.  See Waukesha Cnty. v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶43, 387 
Wis. 2d 333, 
929 
N.W.2d 140. 
 
Presumably, 
individuals 
participating in chapter 51 proceedings would prefer not having 
their case decided in abstentia.  However, after the decision in 
this case, circuit courts may think differently. 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
13 
 
increase the number of unnecessary motions and decrease court 
approval of meritorious motions.  Now that the court has moved 
away from the plain meaning of § 51.20(11)(a), only time will 
tell how these perverse incentives will play out in future 
chapter 51 litigation.  
¶63 The majority mentions statutory context.  It cites a 
perceived purpose in chapter 51 proceedings to "offer procedural 
and 
substantive 
protections 
to 
the 
person 
subject 
to 
commitment."  Majority op., ¶31.  However, laws often exhibit 
more than one purpose.  See, e.g., Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 
Wis. 2d 352, 357-59, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983) (describing five 
purposes of a tenant-landlord law); Force ex rel. Welcenbach v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶57, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 
N.W.2d 866 (stating that Wisconsin's wrongful death statute has 
two purposes).  Like legislative history, considerations of 
purpose, even if it is in some ways tied to statutory text, may 
have "a tendency to become . . . an exercise in looking over a 
crowd and picking out your friends."  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (quotations 
omitted); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 
525-26 (1987) ("But no legislation  pursues its purposes at all 
costs.  Deciding what competing values will or will not be 
sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the 
very essence of legislative choice . . . ."). 
¶64 Of course, the driving purpose of commitment is to 
provide needed medical help to the "mentally ill . . . drug 
dependent 
[and] 
developmentally 
disabled." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
14 
 
§ 51.20(1)(a)1.  At its core, chapter 51 is also designed to 
protect individuals from "physical harm to [themselves]" and to 
prevent 
"physical 
harm 
to 
other 
individuals."  
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-b.  While protecting the liberty interest of 
the 
wrongly 
accused 
is 
of 
great 
importance, 
chapter 
51 
commitment proceedings undoubtedly protect the safety and health 
of thousands throughout Wisconsin.  The quick and efficient 
adjudication of mental health commitments ensures dangerous 
individuals, in need of treatment, are not left to face the 
world on their own devices.  
¶65 Further, Wis. Stat. § 51.20 is littered with deadlines 
and tight timelines.  For example, if an individual is detained 
pending resolution of a chapter 51 case, an initial probable 
cause hearing must take place "within 72 hours after the 
individual is taken into custody."  § 51.20(7)(a). Although the 
individual can request an extension, presumably only for his 
best interest, "the postponement [cannot] exceed 7 days from the 
date of detention."  Id.  After a probable cause hearing, the 
circuit court must schedule the final hearing "within 14 days 
from 
the 
time 
of 
detention 
of 
the 
subject 
individual."  
§ 51.20(7)(c).  The final hearing may be postponed "[a]t the 
request of the subject individual," but for no more than "7 
calendar days."  § 51.20(10)(e).  Furthermore, in cases of 
recommitment, "[t]he circuit court must hold a hearing on the 
petition for extension before the previous order expires or it 
loses competency to extend the commitment."  Portage Cnty. v. 
J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶20, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
15 
 
¶66 These "strict procedural guidelines" vindicate the 
personal liberties of individuals by ensuring an expedited 
adjudication 
process; 
individuals 
are 
confined 
pending 
adjudication for as little time as possible.  Milwaukee Cnty. v. 
Louise M., 205 Wis. 2d 162, 171, 555 N.W.2d 807 (1996).  The 
sound and efficient administration of justice is a clear purpose 
of chapter 51.  The majority, by rejecting a clear jury demand 
deadline, and thereby inviting delays and potential abuse, has 
undermined this purpose.    
¶67 Ultimately, 
while 
"[a] 
plain 
meaning, 
text-based 
approach to statutory interpretation certainly does not prohibit 
the interpretation of a statute in light of its textually 
manifest scope, context, or purpose," devised purpose cannot 
"subordinate[] the statutory text."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49 
n.8.  "If [the] process of analysis yields a plain, clear 
statutory meaning, . . . the statute is applied according to 
this ascertainment of its meaning."  Id., ¶46.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 51.20(11)(a) sets the deadline for jury demands as "48 hours 
in advance of the time set for final hearing."  E.J.W. did not 
submit a jury demand 48 hours ahead of the time set for his 
recommitment hearing, and his right to a jury trial was 
statutorily waived.  
III 
¶68 E.J.W. was provided a deadline to file a jury demand.  
Under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a), that deadline passed March 3, 
2019, at 1:15 p.m., 48 hours prior to the time set for the final 
hearing.  Instead of enforcing a straightforward application of 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
16 
 
§ 51.20(11)(a), the majority has concluded that individuals 
subject to chapter 51 commitment proceedings can revive their 
waived rights to a jury trial. 
¶69 In this decision, the majority has replaced a rational 
and clear deadline with a loose and ever shifting rule.  This 
will reduce predictability for all those involved, and, likely, 
it will reduce the quality of judicial administration in our 
circuit courts.  Because the majority's decision is not 
supported by the plain text of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a), I 
respectfully dissent.  
¶70 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2020AP370.akz 
 
 
 
1