Case Title: Commonwealth v. Chukwuezi

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11579

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11579 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  XZENIYEJU CHUKWUEZI. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 12, 2016. - September 29, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Evidence, Computer simulation, Prior 
consistent statement, Alibi.  Alibi.  Constitutional Law, 
Sentence.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, 
Argument by prosecutor, Sentence, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 1, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
 
Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant. 
 
Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court 
jury of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation, and of unlawful possession of a firearm, in 
                     
 
1 Justices Spina and Duffly participated in the deliberation 
on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
connection with the 2009 shooting death of Soheil Turner, a 
fifteen year old boy.  The defendant was eighteen years old at 
the time of the shooting.  On appeal, the defendant argues that 
the trial judge abused her discretion in excluding from evidence 
a computer-generated simulation that was intended to assist the 
jury in determining the shooter's height.  He also asserts error 
in several other respects, described in greater detail below, 
and seeks relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having reviewed the 
entire record, we affirm the convictions and discern no reason 
to exercise our authority to grant extraordinary relief. 
 
1.  Background and procedural posture.  We recite the facts 
the jury could have found, reserving certain details for later 
discussion.  At approximately 7:20 A.M. on May 7, 2009, Turner 
was shot in the back of the head and in the right shoulder while 
waiting for a school bus in the Roxbury section of Boston.  He 
died later that day as a result of the shooting.  Police 
recovered two shell casings from the scene of the shooting that 
appeared to have been fired from a semiautomatic firearm. 
 
Several video surveillance cameras recorded the shooting 
and the surrounding circumstances.2  Shortly after 7 A.M. on the 
morning of the shooting, the shooter, an African-American male 
                     
 
2 Police obtained video recordings from three surveillance 
cameras in the vicinity of the shooting.  None of the recordings 
was of sufficient quality to allow for identification of the 
shooter. 
3 
 
carrying a yellow umbrella, walked north on Adams Street from 
the direction of Forest Street, and stopped at the northeast 
corner of Dudley Street and Adams Street.  The shooter was 
wearing a black hooded sweatshirt with the hood up, and a loose 
fitting T-shirt and pants.  A few minutes later, a young woman, 
later identified as Amari Figueroa, arrived at the southeast 
corner of the intersection, talking on her cellular telephone.  
She and the shooter waved to each other.  Shortly thereafter, 
Turner arrived in the area and went into a convenience store on 
Dudley Street near the southwest corner of the intersection.  
After Turner returned outside, the shooter walked diagonally 
across the intersection towards him, and stood with him in front 
of the store.  The two had a short conversation.  The shooter 
then drew a gun that he had been concealing and shot Turner 
twice.  The shooter ran around the corner onto Adams Street, 
tucking the gun into his waist area as he did so, then ran up 
the east side of Adams Street and out of view. 
 
Figueroa eventually told police that the person she had 
waved to on the morning of the shooting was the defendant.  She 
had known the defendant for several years, socialized with him 
occasionally, and lived two houses away from him on Forest 
Street, a short walk from the intersection where the shooting 
took place.  After hearing the gunshots, Figueroa saw the 
defendant "speed walking" down Adams Street in the direction of 
4 
 
Forest Street.3  She then telephoned 911.  At some point in the 
weeks after the shooting, Figueroa met with the defendant and 
asked him why he shot Turner.  The defendant told her that a 
fifteen year old recently had shot and injured one of his 
friends.  The defendant explained that "[i]f he didn't kill 
[Turner] then he was going to be next."  The defendant also 
urged her not to say anything to police. 
 
Other witnesses corroborated Figueroa's testimony about the 
shooting.  Raymona Hartepps walked out of the convenience store 
shortly before the shooting, and overheard part of the shooter's 
brief conversation with Turner.  She recalled hearing Turner ask 
the defendant where he was from and what his name was.4  As soon 
as Hartepps had walked past the store, she heard two gunshots, 
and saw the shooter run around the corner onto Adams Street in 
the direction of Forest Street, tucking a black object into his 
right pocket.  Isaiah Grant also saw the shooter run down Adams 
Street onto Forest Street.  Grant further observed the shooter 
run up a set of steps and around to the right side of a duplex 
house on Forest Street.  The defendant, who was in high school 
                     
 
3 Forest Street is at the southern end of Adams Street, and 
perpendicular to it. 
 
 
4 The shooter identified himself as either "Jonathan from 
Wayne Wood" or "Robert from Norwood." 
5 
 
at the time, lived with his family on the right side of that 
house. 
 
On July 1, 2009, a grand jury returned two indictments, 
charging the defendant with murder in the first degree, G. L. 
c. 265, § 1, and unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a).  The defendant's theory of the case was one of 
mistaken identity.  He sought to impeach Figueroa's credibility 
on cross-examination, and called alibi witnesses.  The 
defendant's mother and younger brother both testified that the 
defendant was at home getting ready for school at the time of 
the shooting.  The defendant also testified in his own defense, 
stating that he did not shoot Turner.  In addition, the 
defendant sought unsuccessfully to introduce a computer-
generated simulation in evidence. 
 
On October 19, 2010, the jury found the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation.5  They also found him guilty of unlawful 
possession of a firearm.  The defendant was sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole for the conviction of 
murder in the first degree, and to a term of from four to five 
                     
 
5 The jury were instructed with respect to murder in the 
first degree both on the theory of deliberate premeditation and 
on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  They also were 
instructed on murder in the second degree. 
6 
 
years of incarceration for the conviction of unlawful possession 
of a firearm, to run concurrently.  This appeal followed. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that the judge erred 
with respect to several evidentiary rulings:  excluding the 
computer-generated simulation from evidence; admitting testimony 
that the Commonwealth offered as a prior consistent statement by 
Figueroa; and allowing the Commonwealth to impeach an alibi 
witness for not volunteering his knowledge about the defendant's 
whereabouts to police, without providing appropriate 
instructions on alibi to the jury.  The defendant further argues 
that the Commonwealth improperly invoked sympathy for the 
victim's family during its closing argument.  Moreover, the 
defendant contends that he should not have been sentenced to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole because he was 
only eighteen at the time of the shooting.  The defendant also 
seeks relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.6 
                     
 
6 In addition, the defendant asserts error in the judge's 
decision to permit Figueroa, over objection, to enter the court 
room through a side door in the presence of the jury, rather 
than via the main door used by other witnesses.  The defendant 
asserts that that decision violated his constitutional rights to 
due process and a fair trial because it intimated to the jury 
that he was "a bad and dangerous person whose guilt [could] be 
virtually assumed."  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471, 
475 (1973).  That argument is without merit, because there is no 
evidence in the record that the jury would have understood a 
witness's method of entry into the court room to be related to 
the defendant's dangerousness, thereby creating an unacceptable 
risk of prejudice against him.  See id. at 476 (burden is on 
 
7 
 
 
a.  Computer-generated simulation.  Whether the shooter was 
the same height as the defendant was a matter of dispute at 
trial.7  To aid the jury in making that determination, the 
defendant commissioned a computer-generated simulation of the 
crime scene, based on two photographs from the surveillance 
camera closest to the shooting,8 in which the shooter was 
standing relatively upright on a level surface.9 
                                                                  
defendant to show judge's decision in imposing security measure 
was "arbitrary or unreasonable"). 
 
 
7 Immediately after the shooting, Figueroa told police that 
the shooter was six feet, one inch tall, while other witnesses 
stated that he was five feet, nine inches tall.  The defendant's 
height around the time of the shooting was not measured, but 
police estimated that he was between five feet, eleven inches 
and six feet tall.  Photographs taken at the time of the 
defendant's arrest similarly indicate that he was approximately 
six feet tall. 
 
 
8 The video recording comprised a series of time-lapsed 
photographs. 
 
 
9 An engineer identified fixed points in the background of 
the photographs, and visited the crime scene in person to 
measure their locations relative to each other and to the 
camera.  A graphic designer then used those measurements and 
computer software to create a three-dimensional virtual model of 
the crime scene. 
 
 
Although the judge did not make an explicit finding that 
the camera continued to be positioned in the same place and at 
the same angle at the time the measurements were taken as at the 
time of the shooting, we infer this fact from testimony at the 
voir dire hearing that the camera was "locked down" and "mounted 
to a wall," from photographs of the camera's location that were 
admitted in evidence, and from the Commonwealth's decision to 
point out the location of the camera during a view of the crime 
scene. 
8 
 
 
Using principles of photogrammetry,10 the simulation 
superimposed human-shaped figures of increasing height over the 
shooter as he appeared in the photographs.  The figures were to 
scale with the photographs, and were shown standing rigidly 
upright, wearing hooded sweatshirts with the hoods up.  They 
increased in height in one inch increments from five feet, nine 
inches to six feet, as measured from the soles of their feet to 
the tops of their hoods.  In effect, the simulation attempted to 
facilitate a comparison between actual height of the figures and 
the shooter's apparent height in the photographs.  The 
Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to exclude it from 
evidence on the ground that it was misleading. 
 
i.  Voir dire.  The judge conducted a voir dire hearing at 
which she questioned the graphic designer who produced the 
simulation, an engineer, and a forensic photographer who worked 
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  The graphic 
designer described in detail how he had produced the simulation.  
At the judge's request, he used the simulation to estimate that 
the shooter was between five feet, nine inches and five feet, 
                     
 
10 "Photogrammetry is the process of obtaining information, 
usually measurements, from images" (citation omitted).  Edmond, 
Cole, Cunliffe, & Roberts, Admissibility Compared:  The 
Reception of Incriminating Expert Evidence (i.e., Forensic 
Science) in Four Adversarial Jurisdictions, 3 U. Denv. Crim. L. 
Rev. 31, 50 n.156 (2013). 
9 
 
ten inches tall -- several inches shorter than the defendant, by 
most accounts.11 
 
The engineer testified that he was familiar with two 
techniques for assessing a suspect's height from a video 
recording.  The first technique was the one the graphic designer 
had used.  The second technique, which the judge referred to as 
a "height analysis," involved directly measuring the suspect's 
height from the video recording, and could take the suspect's 
posture into account.  This second technique, however, required 
using high-quality video footage from multiple camera angles; 
such footage was not available.  The forensic photographer who 
worked for the FBI described a third technique that similarly 
could account for a suspect's posture.12  In the forensic 
photographer's opinion, the defendant's simulation was 
misleading because it compared rigid figures with a person of 
normal posture. 
 
In light of this testimony and her own viewing of the 
simulation, the judge concluded that the simulation was 
"hopelessly misleading."  She noted that the jury generally 
                     
 
11 See footnote 7, supra. 
 
 
12 The third technique involved placing a person whose 
height was known next to a ruler in roughly the same place as 
the suspect was standing at the time of the crime.  By using the 
same camera that recorded the crime to recreate the scene, the 
technique allowed forensic investigators to take a suspect's 
posture into account in estimating his or her height. 
10 
 
should be allowed to consider simulation evidence "in a close 
case," and suggested that a "height analysis" in accordance with 
one of the other techniques described might have been 
admissible.  Nonetheless, she expressed concern that the 
simulation would confuse the jury into thinking that the 
shooter, who was not standing as rigidly upright as the 
computer-generated figures, was shorter than he actually was.  
She declined to allow its admission in evidence, over the 
defendant's objection. 
 
ii.  Review for abuse of discretion.  The defendant argues 
that the judge's evidentiary ruling deprived him of a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense, a right guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  See Pixley 
v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827, 834 (2009).  That right, 
however, is not unfettered; it is subject to the limitations set 
forth under standard rules of evidence.  See Montana v. 
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996), and cases cited.  In 
determining whether to admit a computer-generated simulation 
like the one at issue here, a trial judge must determine whether 
the simulation is relevant evidence; whether the simulation's 
conditions correspond to those of the original incident, see 
Commonwealth v. Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 456 (2015); and whether 
the evidence will confuse or mislead the jury.  See Commonwealth 
11 
 
v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 25 (1996); Lally v. Volkswagen 
Aktiengesellschaft, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 332 (1998). 
 
Although "[w]e have consistently held that lower court 
findings based on documentary evidence available to an appellate 
court are not entitled to deference," Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 
Mass. 262, 266 (2004), S.C., 449 Mass. 84 (2007), the judge's 
decision in this case was based both on her viewing of the 
simulation itself and on witnesses' explanations of the 
simulation during the voir dire hearing.  We therefore review 
the judge's decision to exclude the simulation for abuse of 
discretion.  See Commonwealth v. McGee, 469 Mass. 1, 9 (2014).13 
 
The defendant argues that the judge did not understand that 
the figures were created precisely to scale based on principles 
of photogrammetry, and could be presented with any desired 
height or posture.  In his view, the Commonwealth would have had 
the opportunity to emphasize on cross-examination and during its 
closing argument that the figures were standing rigidly upright 
                     
 
13 But see Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 Mass. 320, 327 (2014) 
(reviewing judge's decision to exclude third-party culprit 
evidence "independently" and under "a standard higher than that 
of abuse of discretion" because of "[the] constitutional 
dimension" of exclusion of such evidence [citations omitted]).  
Because the defendant sought to use the simulation to call into 
question whether he was the same height as the shooter, and not 
to identify specifically another person as the culprit, the 
higher standard does not apply in this case.  See Commonwealth 
v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800-801 (2009) (defining 
third-party culprit evidence). 
12 
 
while the shooter was not, so there was no danger that the jury 
would be misled or confused.  The defendant further argues that 
the simulation should have been admitted because it was highly 
relevant to the identity of the shooter, a "central issue in the 
case."  See Commonwealth v. Jaime, 433 Mass. 575, 579 (2001).  
Accordingly, he contends that the judge abused her discretion in 
excluding the simulation. 
 
We do not agree.  In Commonwealth v. Corliss, supra at 456, 
in considering a simulation produced by the graphic designer who 
was involved in this case, we determined that it was an 
appropriate exercise of judicial discretion to exclude that 
simulation from evidence.  We deferred to the trial judge's 
finding that the defendant had not proved satisfactorily that 
the simulation's conditions matched those of the incident being 
simulated.14  Id.  Similarly here, we cannot say the judge made 
"a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to 
the decision, . . . such that the decision [fell] outside the 
range of reasonable alternatives" (quotations and citations 
                     
 
14 There was evidence in that case suggesting that the 
surveillance camera that had recorded the incident had been 
moved during a renovation after the incident, and that the level 
of the floor also had been changed.  See Commonwealth v. 
Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 455 (2015). 
13 
 
omitted).  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014), and cases cited.15 
 
The judge's determination was not, as the defendant 
contends, based on a misunderstanding of the principles of 
photogrammetry.  Rather, the judge concluded reasonably that the 
simulation could not be explained with sufficient clarity to 
avoid confusing the jury, and did not take into account 
important factors that would have affected the shooter's 
apparent height.  By the judge's own account, it took her 
"almost an hour . . . to figure [out] what [the graphic 
designer] [was] saying."  Furthermore, it is evident that the 
"height analysis by comparison" that the simulation facilitated 
was inexact at best.  The photographs used in the simulation 
showed the shooter wearing loose-fitting clothing and a hood 
that obscured his posture and the location of the top of his 
head.  In one of the photographs, the shooter appeared to be 
mid-stride.  In the other, the shooter may have been hunched or 
leaning forward under his umbrella.  In both, the shooter was 
addressing a victim who was only five feet, four inches tall, 
and thus was likely to be tilting his head downward.  In light 
                     
 
15 Cf. Commonwealth v. Caruso, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 24, 32-33 
(2014) (judge declined to admit simulation created by graphic 
designer as newly discovered evidence, and questioned 
simulation's ability accurately to establish suspect's height). 
14 
 
of these concerns, the judge did not abuse her discretion in 
excluding the simulation. 
 
Moreover, even if the exclusion had constituted error, it 
would not have been prejudicial.  See Commonwealth v. Corliss, 
supra at 456-457.  While the defendant's height around the time 
of the shooting was not measured, most estimates placed him 
between five feet, eleven inches and six feet tall.  The jury 
also may have been able to assess for themselves the defendant's 
height at the time of trial.16  Eyewitnesses placed the shooter's 
height within a narrow range, from five feet, nine inches tall 
to six feet, one inch tall.  In addition, one of the 
surveillance videos showed Hartepps, who was five feet, nine 
inches tall, walk past the shooter, allowing the jury to compare 
their apparent heights.  In his closing argument, defense 
counsel discussed at length the possible difference between the 
defendant's height and the shooter's.  Given that the 
Commonwealth would have explored the limitations of a "height 
analysis by comparison" on cross-examination, the simulation was 
unlikely to have supplemented the other evidence of the 
shooter's height in any meaningful way.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Perito, 417 Mass. 674, 684 (1994) (judge did not abuse 
                     
 
16 The record does not indicate whether the defendant, then 
a teenager, grew in height between May 7, 2009, and his trial in 
October, 2010. 
15 
 
discretion in concluding that failure to produce low-quality 
video recording of suspect's height and build did not prejudice 
defendant where same information was available from eyewitness). 
 
b.  Prior consistent statement.  Although she had had 
several earlier opportunities to do so, Figueroa did not tell 
police that the defendant was the shooter until they interviewed 
her on May 19, 2009.17  At trial, Figueroa explained that she 
initially declined to identify the defendant because she was 
concerned for her safety.  During cross-examination, however, 
the defendant elicited testimony that police had told Figueroa 
during an interview on May 8, 2009, that they thought she knew 
more about the shooting than she had disclosed; that police told 
Figueroa during that interview that they would require her to 
testify before the grand jury, where lying would constitute 
perjury; and that by May 8, 2009, Figueroa believed that people 
in the community were aware that she had seen the shooting.  The 
Commonwealth then introduced, over objection, testimony from 
Figueroa's mother that Figueroa had confided in her on the night 
of May 7, 2009, that "[s]omeone had got shot and she knew who 
                     
 
17 When interviewed at the scene immediately after the 
shooting on May 7, 2009, and at the police station later that 
day, Figueroa told police that she did not recognize the 
shooter.  During an interview on the evening of May 8, 2009, 
however, Figueroa learned that police believed she had waved to 
the shooter shortly before the shooting.  When police asked her 
at that interview whether she knew who the shooter was, she 
responded that she wanted to "pass the question." 
16 
 
did it," and that the shooter lived "[t]wo houses down" from 
them.  The defendant argues that Figueroa's mother's testimony 
should not have been admitted. 
 
"A witness's prior statement that is consistent with that 
witness's trial testimony is usually inadmissible" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Novo, 449 Mass. 84, 93 (2007).  If, 
however, a judge 
"makes a preliminary finding that there is a claim that the 
witness's in-court testimony is the result of recent 
contrivance or a bias, and the prior consistent statement 
was made before the witness had a motive to fabricate or 
the occurrence of the event indicating a bias, the evidence 
may be admitted for the limited purpose of rebutting the 
claim of recent contrivance or bias." 
 
Mass. G. Evid. § 613(b)(2) (2015).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 613 
note, at 215, citing Commonwealth v. Novo, 449 Mass. at 93. 
 
Here, the judge found that the defendant had claimed that 
Figueroa's identification of him as the shooter was the result 
of recent contrivance or bias, because the defendant had 
suggested on cross-examination that Figueroa felt pressure from 
both police and the community falsely to identify a specific 
individual as the shooter.18  The defendant does not contest that 
                     
 
18 The jury were not instructed regarding the proper use of 
the prior consistent statement.  Because the defendant did not 
request such an instruction, however, there was no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rivera, 430 Mass. 91, 100 (1999) ("While the defendant was 
entitled, on request, to a limiting instruction, there is no 
 
17 
 
finding.  Nonetheless, he argues that Figueroa's motive to 
fabricate already existed before she told her mother, on the 
night of May 7, 2009, that the shooter was their neighbor, 
because she would have felt pressure from the community to 
identify someone immediately after the shooting earlier that 
day. 
 
Police did not mention the possibility of criminal 
prosecution for perjury, however, until May 8, 2009, the day 
after Figueroa confided in her mother.  Thus, the mother's 
testimony properly was admitted as a prior consistent statement 
to counter the defendant's suggestion of police pressure.  See 
Commonwealth v. Andrews, 403 Mass. 441, 455 (1988); Commonwealth 
v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615, 629-630 (1986).  Given this 
conclusion, we need not consider when Figueroa's other supposed 
motive to fabricate, pressure from the community, first arose. 
 
c.  Alibi witness.  The defendant called his younger 
brother, Cjaillon Andrade, to testify as an alibi witness that 
he had seen the defendant at home getting ready for school at 
the time of the shooting.  Over objection, the Commonwealth 
impeached Andrade's testimony on cross-examination on the ground 
that Andrade had not reported this alibi to police.  The 
defendant argues that the judge should not have allowed this 
                                                                  
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because the 
judge did not give such an instruction sua sponte"). 
18 
 
impeachment.  In addition, the defendant argues that the jury 
instructions regarding alibi witness testimony were incorrect. 
 
Because "[a] person ordinarily has no legal obligation to 
provide exculpatory information to the police," Commonwealth v. 
Hart, 455 Mass. 230, 238 (2009), the Commonwealth may impeach a 
witness for failing to provide such information only if it 
establishes a sufficient foundation.  We previously have 
required the Commonwealth to establish "[1] that the witness 
knew of the pending charges in sufficient detail to realize that 
he possessed exculpatory information, [2] that the witness had 
reason to make the information available, [and] [3] that he was 
familiar with the means of reporting it to the proper 
authorities."  Commonwealth v. DaSilva, 471 Mass. 71, 82 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Hart, supra.  The defendant concedes 
that the Commonwealth established each of these facts, but 
argues that the judge additionally should have considered that 
police were aware that Andrade might have relevant information, 
yet never contacted him.19  In the defendant's view, this 
additional consideration would have led the judge to conclude 
that the impeachment of Andrade was unfairly prejudicial. 
                     
 
19 Police knew from speaking with the defendant's mother 
that Andrade had been at home with her on the morning of the 
shooting. 
19 
 
 
In Commonwealth v. Hart, supra, we noted that there are 
some circumstances "in which it would not be natural for a 
witness to provide the police before trial with exculpatory 
information," including when the witness "thinks that [his or] 
her information will not affect the decision to prosecute."  It 
is possible that Andrade assumed as much; he was still a 
teenager at the time the defendant was accused, and testified 
that he believed police "probably" had spoken with his mother 
when they executed a search warrant, providing them with the 
same alibi that was the subject of his testimony.  Nonetheless, 
the defendant had an opportunity to rehabilitate the 
Commonwealth's efforts at impeachment by eliciting this 
information from Andrade on redirect, and did so effectively.  
No more was required to protect against the possibility of 
prejudice.  See id. at 242 ("If the impeachment evidence is 
admitted, the defendant is free to elicit on redirect 
examination the witness's reason for prior silence"). 
 
The defendant's arguments regarding jury instructions 
pertaining to alibi witnesses similarly are without basis.  He 
argues that the judge should have sustained his objection to the 
judge's instruction that, in considering the credibility of a 
given witness, the jury could consider "whether or not he or she 
has any interest in the outcome of the case."  Although the 
contested instruction might have been problematic if it had 
20 
 
targeted specifically the credibility of only the defendant's 
alibi witnesses, it was included within a long list of standard 
factors that the jury could consider in assessing any witness's 
credibility.  Because "[t]he charge was a general comment, 
stated an obvious point, and did so only once," it was not 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Roderick, 411 Mass. 817, 821 (1992). 
 
It also was not error for the judge to deny the defendant's 
request for an instruction that the Commonwealth had the burden 
of disproving the defendant's alibi.  "[J]udges are not required 
to deliver their instructions in any particular form of words, 
so long as all necessary instructions are given in adequate 
words."  Commonwealth v. Sinnott, 399 Mass. 863, 878 (1987).  
Here, the judge instructed the jury "that the Commonwealth has 
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant committed the offense as charged," which included 
"proving that the Defendant was present at the scene and not 
somewhere else at the time."  She added, "[I]f you have a 
reasonable doubt about whether the defendant was present at the 
time and place of the offenses, or about any other element of 
the crimes, then you must find him not guilty."  These 
instructions conformed with the model instruction on alibi then 
in effect, see Instruction 9.120 of the Criminal Model Jury 
Instructions for Use in the District Court (2009), and 
21 
 
adequately described the burden the defendant sought to 
emphasize in his requested instruction. 
 
The defendant also argues, for the first time on appeal, 
that the jury should have been instructed that a person has no 
obligation to provide exculpatory information to police.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hart, supra at 238.  Recognizing that 
"[o]rdinarily judges are not required, sua sponte, to instruct 
juries as to the purposes for which evidence is offered at 
trial," Commonwealth v. Roberts, 378 Mass. 116, 126 (1979), 
S.C., 423 Mass. 17 (1996), we discern no error in the absence of 
such an instruction. 
 
d.  Closing argument.  The defendant contends that the 
Commonwealth improperly invoked the jury's sympathy during 
closing argument.  Over objection, the Commonwealth described 
the victim's family as being "summoned to the hospital that 
morning after he was shot, forced to bear witness to the 
[carnage] that this man [inflicted] on his body."  The judge 
declined to give a requested curative instruction.  In the 
defendant's view, the Commonwealth's closing placed too much 
emphasis on the suffering of the victim's family, and deprived 
him of his Federal and State constitutional rights to due 
process and a fair trial. 
 
A prosecutor "should not play on the sympathy or emotions 
of the jury," but is entitled to "tell the jury something of the 
22 
 
person whose life [has] been lost in order to humanize the 
proceedings" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
437 Mass. 554, 566 (2002).  Although the Commonwealth's 
reference to the "carnage" witnessed by the victim's family 
likely invoked some sympathy, it was presented as part of a 
broader, humanizing description of the victim's life.20  In 
context, the statement was not the "focal point" of the 
Commonwealth's argument, and was not excessive.  See id. at 567.  
In any event, the jury were instructed to "confine [their] 
deliberations to the evidence and nothing but the evidence," to 
"determine the facts based solely on a fair consideration of the 
evidence," and "not to be swayed by prejudice or sympathy."  
These instructions helped to ensure that any sympathy the jury 
felt for the victim's family did not influence their decision.  
                     
 
20 The prosecutor stated in full, 
 
 
"Soheil Turner was a son, a grandson, a nephew and a 
friend to many people.  Because of the actions of this 
Defendant he is none of those things anymore. 
 
 
"Forever fifteen years old, the lasting image of his 
short life will be standing innocently, defenseless and 
unaware.  A school kid waiting at his bus stop and eating 
his honey bun.  Unaware that his executioner was waiting 
across the street and watching.  Unaware that in moments 
his life was going to end on the morning of May 7th of 2009 
as he waited for his school bus. 
 
 
"His family summoned to the hospital that morning 
after he was shot, forced to bear witness to the [carnage] 
that this man [inflicted] on his body." 
23 
 
Cf. Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 Mass. 587, 608-609 (2015) 
(context of summation, evidence at trial, and jury instructions 
prevented improper closing from creating substantial likelihood 
of miscarriage of justice). 
 
e.  Sentence of life without the possibility of parole.  
The defendant received the statutorily required sentence of life 
in prison without the possibility of parole for his conviction 
of murder in the first degree.  See G. L. c. 265, § 2, as 
amended by St. 2014, c. 189, § 5 (providing parole eligibility 
for person convicted of murder in first degree only if person 
was younger than eighteen at time of offense).  The defendant 
argues that this sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate 
to his crime because he was only eighteen years old at the time 
of the shooting.21  The age of eighteen, however, "is the point 
where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood 
and adulthood."  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).  
                     
 
21 The defendant also argues that his sentence violates his 
rights to equal protection under both the United States 
Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 
because of his age at the time of the shooting.  That argument 
is without basis, as there is a rational basis for making 
determinations of parole eligibility based on age, and age is 
not a suspect classification requiring heightened scrutiny.  See 
Commonwealth v. Weston W., 455 Mass. 24, 30 (2009).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503, 508 (2015) ("We have 
repeatedly said that those who challenge the constitutionality 
of a statute that does not burden a suspect group or a 
fundamental interest carry a heavy burden in seeking to overcome 
the statute's presumption of constitutionality" [quotations and 
citations omitted]). 
24 
 
That such line-drawing may be subject "to the objections always 
raised against categorical rules," id., does not itself make the 
defendant's sentence unconstitutional. 
 
f.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
examined the record carefully pursuant to our duty under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E,22 and discern no basis on which to grant the 
defendant extraordinary relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
                     
 
22 We note that, during cross-examination by the defendant, 
one of the detectives who executed a search warrant to search 
the defendant's house testified that a rifle was seized from the 
house.  That testimony was not relevant to the charges before 
the jury, and had the potential to lead them to believe that the 
defendant had a propensity for violence or was affiliated with a 
gang.  Nonetheless, the defendant elicited from the detective 
that there was no indication that the rifle "had anything to do 
with" him, and the judge properly instructed the jury that the 
charge of unlawful possession of a firearm referred only to a 
semiautomatic handgun, not a rifle.  Thus, it did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.