Case Title: Showtime Ent., LLC v. Town of Mendon

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11770

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11770 
 
SHOWTIME ENTERTAINMENT, LLC  vs.  TOWN OF MENDON & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 5, 2015. - July 8, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Alcoholic Liquors, Entertainment.  Constitutional Law, Alcoholic 
beverages, Public entertainment, Freedom of speech and 
press.  Municipal Corporations, By-laws and ordinances.  
Zoning, Validity of by-law or ordinance. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of questions of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit. 
 
 
 
Thomas Lesser (Michael Aleo with him) for the plaintiff. 
 
Robert S. Mangiaratti (Brandon H. Moss with him) for the 
defendants. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  We consider in the present case a challenge 
brought against a bylaw adopted by the town of Mendon (town) 
prohibiting the sale or presence of alcohol at adult 
entertainment establishments.  Showtime Entertainment, LLC 
                     
 
1 Mike Ammendolia and Lawney Tinio. 
2 
 
(Showtime), seeks to operate such an establishment within the 
town and to serve alcohol on the premises.  It brought suit in 
Federal court seeking to invalidate the bylaw.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has certified the 
following questions to this court, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, 
as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981)2: 
 
"1.  Do the pre-enactment studies and other evidence 
considered by [the town] demonstrate a 'countervailing 
State interest,' Cabaret Enters., Inc. v. Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Comm'n, 393 Mass. 13, 17 . . . (1984) 
sufficient to justify [the town's] ban on alcohol service 
at adult-entertainment businesses? 
 
 
"2.  If the ban is so justified, is it adequately 
tailored?" 
 
See Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 82-83 
(2014) (Showtime). 
 
The certified questions presented to us by the Court of 
Appeals focus on two parts of the test employed to determine the 
constitutionality of "content-neutral" restrictions on 
expressive behavior as first outlined in United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).  See Commonwealth v. Ora, 451 
Mass. 125, 129 (2008).  The four factors of the test are:  (1) 
                     
 
2 Supreme Judicial Court Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 
Mass. 700 (1981), provides:  "This court may answer questions of 
law certified to it by . . . a Court of Appeals of the United 
States . . . when requested by the certifying court if there are 
involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this 
State which may be determinative of the cause then pending in 
the certifying court and as to which it appears to the 
certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the 
decisions of this court." 
3 
 
the regulation must be within the power of the government to 
enact; (2) the regulation must further an important or 
substantial governmental interest; (3) the government interest 
must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) 
the restriction must be no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of the government interest.  O'Brien, supra.  We 
answer the first question in the affirmative.  We answer the 
second question in the negative. 
 
1.  Background and procedure.  We summarize certain 
undisputed facts set forth by the First Circuit, see Showtime, 
769 F.3d at 66-69, and in the record before us.  In May, 2008, 
at its annual town meeting, the town created an adult 
entertainment overlay district pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 9, 
within which an adult entertainment business is allowed to 
operate.  After the creation of this district on June 10, 2008, 
Showtime applied for a license to operate an adult entertainment 
business featuring live nude dancing.  A hearing on Showtime's 
application was scheduled for September 15, 2008. 
 
In the meantime, a group of residents citing traffic 
concerns petitioned the board of selectmen to enact and amend 
bylaws further regulating adult entertainment businesses in the 
town.  These proposed bylaws sought to regulate the physical 
structure of a business, to control the operating hours, to 
forbid the presence or sale of alcohol on the premises of any 
4 
 
adult entertainment business, and to forbid any adult 
entertainment at an establishment currently licensed to serve 
alcohol.  The citizen group, Speak Out Mendon, gave a 
presentation to a special town meeting on October 7, 2008, 
called to consider the proposed bylaws.  In the presentation, 
the group highlighted two studies that concluded that the 
presence of alcohol in physical proximity to sex-oriented 
businesses increase the incidence of crime.3  Showtime's 
application was denied on October 1, 2008. 
 
The town enacted and amended the bylaws as proposed by the 
citizen group.  The text of the bylaw restricting the service of 
                     
 
3 The group cited two studies that specifically referenced 
crime and adult entertainment businesses in its presentation.  
The first was a 1991 study that analyzed the effect on adult 
businesses, an undefined term, on crime rates over a period of 
ten years in the city of Garden Grove, California.  See McCleary 
& Meeker, Final Report to the City of Garden Grove:  The 
Relationship Between Crime and Adult Business Operations on 
Garden Grove Boulevard, October 23, 1991.  The other study 
analyzed the effects of sexually oriented businesses in Los 
Angeles, California.  McCleary, Crime-Related Secondary Effects 
of Sexually Oriented Businesses:  Report to the City Attorney, 
May 6, 2007.  The presentation also referenced another study 
that included crime as a secondary effect of sexually oriented 
businesses, but the presentation did not cite the study for this 
point.  Hecht, Report to the American Center for Law and Justice 
on the Secondary Impacts of Sex  Oriented Businesses, 
ERG/Environmental Research Group, March 31, 1996.  Only the 1991 
Garden Grove report explicitly concluded that the presence of 
alcohol in physical proximity to adult businesses heightened 
crime rates. 
 
5 
 
alcohol is set forth in the margin.4  The Attorney General issued 
an opinion approving the new bylaws but noted their 
                     
 
4 "CHAPTER XXV[:]  ADULT ENTERTAINMENT ESTABLISHMENTS AND 
LIQUOR LICENSES 
 
 
"The following provisions apply to all Adult 
Entertainment or Use establishments consisting of an 'adult 
bookstore', 'adult motion picture theater', 'adult 
paraphernalia store', 'adult video store', and an 
'establishment which displays live nudity for its patrons' 
as defined by [G. L. c. 40A, § 9A,] located within the 
layout lines of the Adult Entertainment Overlay District 
created by the voters of the Town of Mendon on May 2nd, 
2008 as set forth in the Mendon Zoning Bylaws: 
 
 
"1.  The Town of Mendon shall not grant any license 
for the sale of alcohol for consumption in accordance with 
the provisions of [G. L. c. 138, § 12,] to any Adult 
Entertainment or Use establishment, as defined by [G. L. 
c. 40A, § 9A,] as the presence of alcohol is documented to 
exacerbate negative secondary crime effects at sexually-
oriented businesses. 
 
 
"2.  The Town of Mendon shall not grant any special 
licenses for the sale of alcohol for consumption in 
accordance with [G. L. c. 138, § 14,] to any establishment 
as defined as an Adult Entertainment or Use per [G. L. 
c. 40A, § 9A,] as the presence of alcohol is documented to 
exacerbate negative secondary crime effects at sexually-
oriented businesses. 
 
 
"3.  The Town of Mendon shall not allow patrons of 
Adult Entertainment or Use establishments to consume 
alcoholic beverages within any Adult Entertainment or Use 
establishment, even if such beverages are brought to the 
premises by the patrons as a presence of alcohol is 
documented to exacerbate negative secondary crime effects 
at sexually-oriented businesses. 
 
 
"4.  In the event that an establishment already in 
possession of a license in accordance with [G. L. c. 138, 
§ 12 or 14,] applies for a license to operate an Adult 
Entertainment or Use, such establishment shall only be 
granted a license to coincide with the expiration of its 
6 
 
susceptibility to a constitutional challenge.  Showtime 
submitted a new application to operate an adult entertainment 
business that addressed the new bylaws. 
 
The town approved the application on May 3, 2010.  Showtime 
then filed suit in Federal District Court seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the restrictions placed on the license are 
unconstitutional limitations on expressive activity that is 
constitutionally protected.  On cross motions for summary 
judgment, the Federal District Court judge found in favor of the 
town.  Showtime appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit.  The Court of Appeals determined that the 
limitations on the physical plant and operating hours were 
unconstitutional but that the outcome of the challenge to the 
bylaw regulating the sale of alcohol centered on unresolved 
questions of Massachusetts constitutional law better suited for 
determination by this court.  See Showtime, 769 F.3d. at 74-75, 
78-83.  We now consider the questions presented. 
 
2.  Level of scrutiny.  We need not engage in an extended 
discussion of the parties' first point of disagreement regarding 
the appropriate level of scrutiny.  We accept the approach taken 
by the Court of Appeals.  In answering the questions presented 
we analyze the restrictions using intermediate scrutiny as if 
                                                                  
[G. L. c. 138, § 12 or 14,] license(s) and this license 
will not be renewed." 
7 
 
the bylaws are content neutral.  See Showtime, 769 F.3d at 71.  
As we will explain, we conclude that the bylaws do not survive 
intermediate scrutiny. 
 
3.  Countervailing State interest.  In California v. LaRue, 
409 U.S. 109, 118-119 (1972), the United States Supreme Court 
held that the right to freedom of expression at the heart of the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution did not extend 
to protect the existence of nude dancing in an establishment 
licensed by the State to serve alcohol.  At issue were 
regulations prohibiting the service of liquor in an 
establishment that featured nude dancing.  Id. at 111-112.  In 
considering the question of the State's power to revoke the 
license, the Court started from the premise that the First 
Amendment protected expression and that nude dancing may be 
considered a form of expression.  Id. at 116-117.  The Court's 
analysis then considered the effect of the Twenty-first 
Amendment to the United States Constitution on the right to 
freedom of expression.  Id. at 118-119.  The Twenty-first 
Amendment returned to the States the ability to regulate 
alcohol.  Id. at 114.  This absolute grant of power meant that 
at times the First Amendment right to freedom of expression in 
the form of conduct could come into conflict with the State's 
power to regulate alcohol.  Id. at 118.  The Court reasoned that 
as this conduct moved toward the "commission of public acts that 
8 
 
may themselves violate valid penal statutes, the scope of 
permissible [S]tate regulations significantly increases."  Id. 
at 117.  As the State was not restricting the conduct across the 
board but rather only in locations licensed to serve alcohol by 
the glass and the Twenty-first Amendment expressly gave the 
States the power to regulate the supply of alcohol, the State 
could ban nude dancing in a licensed establishment because the 
Amendment gave an added presumption in favor of the validity of 
State regulation in this area.  Id. at 118-119. 
 
The Supreme Court would later disavow the reasoning in 
LaRue.  In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 
515-516 (1996), the Court reconsidered the interplay of the 
First and Twenty-first Amendments.  It concluded that the State 
clearly had the inherent police power to control "bacchanalian 
revelries" and it was thus unnecessary to seek the source of 
this power in the existence of the Twenty-first Amendment.  Id. 
 
Our jurisprudence regarding nude dancing and licensed 
establishments developed in the interval between LaRue and 44 
Liquormart, Inc.  In Commonwealth v. Sees, 374 Mass. 532, 537 
(1978), we acknowledged that a city ordinance prohibiting nude 
dancing in an establishment licensed to sell alcoholic beverages 
would not run afoul of the First Amendment following LaRue.  Yet 
we did not reach the same conclusion when asked if the free 
speech provision of art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
9 
 
Rights allowed the same prohibition.  Id.  Instead, we differed 
from the Supreme Court in LaRue because "no provision of our 
Constitution gives a preferred position to regulation of 
alcoholic beverages."  Id.  Accordingly, we said that "the 
artistic preferences and prurient interests of the vulgar are 
entitled to no less protection than those of the exquisite and 
sensitive esthete."  Id. 
 
Our cases following Sees continued to recognize that "the 
Federal rule does not adequately protect the rights of the 
citizens of Massachusetts under art. 16," Mendoza v. Licensing 
Bd. of Fall River, 444 Mass. 188, 201 (2005), despite the fact 
that "analysis under art. 16 is generally the same as under the 
First Amendment."  Id.  Our statements were not intended to 
undermine attempts of communities to regulate the "explosive 
combination" of nude dancing and liquor.  Blue Canary Corp. v. 
Milwaukee, 251 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 2001).  Rather, we 
recognized that the regulation of alcohol at adult entertainment 
establishments was inevitably intertwined with the right to free 
speech.  Cabaret Enters., Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control 
Comm'n, 393 Mass. 13, 17-18 (1984).  We likened the analysis to 
restrictions on speech regulating "time, place, and manner."  
Mendoza, supra at 197-198.  We stated that those communities 
wishing to restrict adult entertainment establishments would be 
required to show some "demonstrated countervailing State 
10 
 
interest" to justify the otherwise impermissible restriction.  
Cabaret Enters., Inc., supra at 17. 
 
The countervailing State interest cannot concern the 
content of the speech at issue, as that would impermissibly 
transform the restriction from content neutral to content based.  
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).  
Instead, the municipality can attempt to address the "secondary 
effects" of adult establishments in crafting regulations.  Id. 
at 47-48.  The appropriate secondary effects to be considered 
make an exhaustive -- but not surprising -- list.  Id. at 48 
(crime prevention, protection of retail trade, maintenance of 
property values, protection and preservation of community life); 
D.H.L. Assocs., Inc. v. O'Gorman, 199 F.3d 50, 57-58 (1st Cir. 
1999) (controlling number of police calls); Mendoza, 444 Mass. 
at 198-199 ("curbing crime, including prostitution and rape, 
preserving property values, and minimizing danger to public 
health"); Cabaret Enters., Inc., 393 Mass. at 17 (crime 
prevention); D.H.L. Assocs., Inc. v. Selectmen of Tyngsborough, 
64 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 257 (2005). 
 
The demonstration of this countervailing State interest in 
the form of the mitigation of negative secondary effects need 
only be shown by evidence in the judicial record or legislative 
history sufficient to conclude that the restraint on speech is 
11 
 
required for the protection of the public.5  Cabaret Enters., 
Inc., 393 Mass. at 17.  The municipality cannot rationalize the 
restriction post hoc but must show the evidence it actually 
considered in enacting the restriction.  T & D Video, Inc. v. 
Revere, 423 Mass. 577, 581 (1996).  Neither is it necessary that 
the municipality demonstrate these secondary effects by evidence 
specifically studying its own unique circumstances.  Renton, 475 
U.S. at 51-52 (municipality need not "conduct new studies or 
produce evidence independent of that already generated by other 
cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is 
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city 
addresses"). 
 
The town argues that it had sufficient evidence to believe 
that the presence of adult entertainment and alcohol at the same 
location would lead to increased crime, a secondary effect that 
the town could have a substantial interest in curtailing.  It 
points to studies mentioned or outlined in a presentation by 
Speak Out Mendon to the special town meeting that passed the 
bylaw.  We agree with the town that the findings of the studies 
                     
 
5 In determining that the municipality has sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate the countervailing State interest, we 
characterize the evidentiary bar a public entity must pass when 
restricting expression.  Clearly, the State interest need not be 
perfectly demonstrated, but the evidence before the municipality 
must lead to the reasonable conclusion that a countervailing 
State interest exists in fact.  This requirement ensures that 
the identified interest is not a spurious one. 
12 
 
offer evidence sufficient to conclude that increased crime is a 
secondary effect when adult entertainment and alcohol service 
are in physical proximity.  Showtime attempts to undermine this 
determination by arguing that, although crime prevention is 
indeed a significant countervailing State interest, the evidence 
before the town meeting did not support the conclusion that 
alcohol at adult entertainment establishments increases crime or 
that banning alcohol at such establishments would decrease the 
rate of crime.6 
 
Showtime offers no affirmative evidence to counter the 
town's determination that a countervailing State interest 
exists.  Its criticisms of the data relied on by Mendon are the 
product of an article that highlights statistical inaccuracies 
in specific studies relied on by other municipalities to 
demonstrate a countervailing State interest.  See Bryant Paul, 
Government Regulation of "Adult" Businesses Through Zoning and 
Anti-Nudity Ordinances:  Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative 
Secondary Effects, 6 Comm. L. & Pol'y 355, 389 (2001).  None of 
                     
 
6 Showtime also attempts to make the distinction between 
service of alcohol "at" an adult entertainment establishment, as 
regulated by the alcohol restriction, and the service of alcohol 
in physical proximity to the establishment, as it claims the 
Garden Grove study examined.  This argument has no merit.  The 
Garden Grove report concluded that the service of alcohol within 
a radius of 1,000 feet of an adult business had a statistically 
significant effect on crime rates.  Contrary to Showtime's 
argument, this necessarily includes the center of the circle 
determined by the radius. 
13 
 
the studies at issue in that article was utilized by the town in 
the instant case.  Therefore, we are satisfied that evidence 
exists within the cited studies sufficient to support the 
conclusion that the town has reached in this instance.  
Accordingly, we answer the first certified question in the 
affirmative.  The town utilized evidence sufficient to 
demonstrate a countervailing State interest. 
 
4.  Narrowly tailored.  Having concluded that the town has 
sufficient evidence to believe that alcohol and adult 
entertainment businesses lead to an increase in crime and that 
crime prevention is a substantial government interest, we turn 
to the question whether the bylaw is "adequately tailored."  
"The 'essence of narrowly tailoring' is that 'the guideline 
. . . focuses on the source of the evils the [town] seeks to 
eliminate . . . and eliminates them without at the same time 
banning or significantly restricting a substantial quantity of 
speech that does not create the same evils.'"  Boston v. Back 
Bay Cultural Ass'n, Inc., 418 Mass. 175, 182 (1994), quoting 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 n.7 (1989).  "So 
long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than 
necessary to achieve the government's interest, however, the 
regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes 
that the government's interest could be adequately served by 
some less-speech-restrictive alternative."  Ward, supra at 800.  
14 
 
Put simply, we first examine if the restriction is overbroad.  
If it is not overbroad, then the restriction is not 
unconstitutional even if a less restrictive alternative remains 
available.  To determine if the restriction is overbroad, we 
look not to the effect of the restriction on the speech at issue 
but rather to the effect on any other speech encompassed by the 
restriction and ask if the sweep is "substantially broader than 
necessary" to achieve the town's goal of crime prevention.  Id. 
 
The town argues that the complete ban of alcohol on the 
premises of establishments identified and defined in G. L. 
c. 40A, § 9A, is not substantially broader than necessary to 
prevent crime because adult entertainment and the service of 
alcohol remain available to the public but simply not in the 
same place.  We have previously rejected this rationale in 
Cabaret Enters., Inc., 393 Mass. at 17-18.  In that case, we 
declined to view a statute revoking a liquor license at an 
establishment featuring nude dancing as one only regulating 
liquor sales.  Id. at 18.  Instead we stated that the statute 
prohibited nude dancing at establishments that served alcohol, 
and thus was an impermissible restriction on speech.  Id. 
 
The alcohol restriction here acts in the same manner as the 
statute in Cabaret Enters., Inc., and therefore cannot stand 
because it is substantially broader than necessary.  The bylaw 
on its face bans the service of alcohol at any establishment 
15 
 
that displays live nudity to its patrons and that is located 
within the adult entertainment overlay district.  We consider a 
hypothetical establishment licensed to serve alcohol, such as a 
theater, theoretically located in the adult entertainment 
overlay district, that wishes to show "the rock musical 'Hair,' 
the play 'Equus,' and Richard Strauss's opera 'Salome' and Oscar 
Wilde's play of the same name."  Mendoza, 444 Mass. at 200.  
These mainstream performances feature live nudity and thus fall 
under the alcohol restriction.  Yet this hypothetical theater 
cannnot be said to be an adult -- or sexually oriented -- 
business identified as the source of negative secondary effects 
in the studies utilized by the town.  Accordingly, the sweep of 
that ban encompasses "work[s] of unquestionable artistic and 
socially redeeming significance" that might be displayed at an 
establishment serving alcohol in the overlay district but have 
not been shown to cause the disorderly conduct the town seeks to 
prevent.  Mendoza, supra, quoting Sees, 374 Mass. at 537. 
 
The town protests that the alcohol restriction cannot be 
read in this manner.  We are not so confident.  The bylaw would 
forbid the issuance of a permit for any of the above 
performances in the spirit of crime prevention.  Banning all 
manner of expression at establishments licensed to serve alcohol 
on the basis that the expression features nude dancing is not 
the logical response to the determination that alcohol service 
16 
 
in physical proximity to adult businesses increases the 
incidence of crime.  Accordingly, such a ban would clearly 
violate art. 16 no matter the interest in crime prevention.  See 
Sees, 374 Mass. at 537.  The town must seek other, narrower 
means to pursue its goal of crime prevention.7  Accordingly, we 
answer the second certified question in the negative. 
 
5.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, we answer the 
first reported question in the affirmative and the second in the 
negative.  The Reporter of Decisions is directed to furnish 
attested copies of this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The 
clerk in turn will transmit one copy, under the seal of this 
court, to the clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, as the answers to the questions certified, 
and will also transmit a copy to each party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
7 Showtime does not contest the town's right to further its 
interest in crime prevention through security and other 
regulations.  We particularly note that efforts to completely 
ban the service or provision of alcohol pose a different 
question from attempts to regulate its consumption.