Case Title: Miller v. Hand

Citation: 187 Kan. 352, 356 P.2d 837

Docket Number: 42,090

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1960-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
187 Kan. 352 (1960)
356 P.2d 837
EMERY A. MILLER, Appellant,
v.
TRACY A. HAND, Warden, Kansas State Penitentiary, Appellee.
No. 42,090

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 12, 1960.
The appellant was on the briefs pro se.
J. Richard Foth, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and John Anderson, Jr., attorney general, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
*353 The opinion of the court was delivered by
WERTZ, J.:
This is an appeal in a habeas corpus case. As Emery A. Miller, appellant, was about to be arraigned on an information in the district court of Morton county and although fully advised of his right to counsel, he refused to accept the appointment thereof and insisted upon entering his plea of guilty without counsel. The court thereupon found that the appointment over appellant's objection would not be to his advantage. A transcript of the proceedings was made and appellant affixed his signature thereto, certifying that it was true and correct. A portion of the transcript reads:
The transcript in the case was filed of record on the same day.
The original journal entry failed to reflect the finding made by the court that the appointment of counsel over appellant's objection would not be to his advantage. Subsequently, on motion of the county attorney, duly served on appellant, a hearing was held and the journal entry was duly amended nunc pro tunc to make the judgment speak the truth as disclosed by the record.
Appellant contends, first, that the trial court failed to comply with G.S. 1959 Supp., 62-1304, in that appellant did not waive counsel in writing and the court did not make a finding that the *354 appointment of counsel would not have been to appellant's advantage; and, second, that he was deprived of due process of law at the time the nunc pro tunc order was entered, in that he was not afforded an opportunity to be present at the hearing thereon.
In the instant case, instead of having the appellant sign a previously prepared waiver of counsel, the court caused a record of the proceedings, wherein the appellant expressed a desire to waive counsel, to be transcribed and signed by him, which document, entitled "Transcript of Oral Proceedings," is clearly a statement by the appellant that he did not want counsel to represent him, and is, just as clearly, "in writing." The Morton county district court merely made the same document serve two purposes; i.e., waiver of counsel in writing and the transcript of the arraignment proceedings required to be filed in the case. Appellant contends that the lower court failed to find appointment of counsel over his objection would not be to his advantage, but it may be noted that the transcript recites such an express finding and the appellant himself certified the transcript was a true and correct record of the proceedings. This question is thoroughly treated this day in the case of Griffin v. Hand, No. 42,080, 187 Kan. 350, 356 P.2d 812, and is controlling herein. Appellant's contention is without merit.
Appellant next contend that after he commenced his habeas corpus proceeding the Morton county district court could not amend its journal entry to speak the truth, and that because he could not be present at the time the nunc pro tunc order was entered, he was deprived of due process of law. In both aspects of this contention appellant confuses what actually transpired at the time of his arraignment with what the record showed. The validity of his conviction depends not on whether the journal entry was perfect in all respects, but on whether his rights were adequately protected by the court. The inherent right and duty of a court to make its records speak the truth was examined at length by this court in Tafarella v. Hand, 185 Kan. 613, 617, 618, 347 P.2d 356, wherein we discussed the nature of a nunc pro tunc order and held:
In the instant case the trial court had before it a transcript of the proceedings, certified as correct by the appellant, showing that the court had made a finding that the appointment of counsel over appellant's objection would not be to his advantage. The journal entry of judgment failed to reflect the fact that such a finding was made. It may be conceded that if the court had attempted to modify the judgment as to substance the appellant would have been entitled to notice and the right to be heard, but here, as in Tafarella v. Hand, supra, and Ramsey v. Hand, 185 Kan. 350, 343 P.2d 225, the amendment did not go to the substance of the judgment but only to the correction of a clerical omission of the recital of an already existing fact. Under the principles announced in Tafarella v. Hand, supra, and the host of authorities cited therein, the correction of the journal entry could have been made without notice to appellant, as he had no unqualified right to be present when the nunc pro tunc order was entered. The judgment is affirmed under authority of Griffin v. Hand, supra, and Tafarella v. Hand, supra.
It is so ordered.