Case Title: Magaw v. State

Citation: 537 So. 2d 564

Docket Number: 72419

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1989-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
537 So. 2d 564 (1989)
Barbara Ann MAGAW, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 72419.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 12, 1989.
Keith D. Cooper, Pensacola, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Gary L. Printy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
*565 GRIMES, Justice.
We review Magaw v. State, 523 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), in which the district court of appeal certified a question to be of great public importance. Our jurisdiction is predicated upon article V, section 3(b)(4), of the Florida Constitution.
Magaw was convicted of manslaughter by intoxication as a result of an accident which occurred on July 2, 1986. She complained that the court denied her request to argue causation to the jury. The district court of appeal relied upon Armenia v. State, 497 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1986), to reject this argument and affirmed the conviction. The court said:
523 So. 2d  at 763. However, because of a 1986 amendment to the statute, the district court certified the following question:
523 So. 2d  at 764.
In Baker v. State, 377 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1979), this Court sustained the validity of the manslaughter by intoxication statute (then section 860.01(2), Florida Statutes (1977)) against the contention that it was unconstitutional because it did not require a causal connection between the intoxication and the resulting death. The Court observed:
377 So. 2d  at 19. While recognizing that strict criminal liability statutes were not favored, the Court reasoned that the legislature had not acted irrationally in enacting the statute as a deterrent to the serious social problem of drunken driving. In a sharp dissent, Justice Boyd argued that the statutory language should be construed to require for conviction a causal connection between the intoxication and the death.
In response to a certified question, this Court in Armenia reaffirmed the holding in Baker that it was unnecessary to prove a causal relationship between the manner of operation of the defendant's motor vehicle and the death of the victim in order to sustain a conviction for manslaughter by intoxication. The Court observed that nothing had occurred since the decision in Baker which would warrant receding from that case.[1]
By 1986, the manslaughter by intoxication statute construed in Baker had been renumbered as section 316.1931, but its wording remained essentially the same. Immediately before the 1986 amendment, the statute read, in pertinent part:
The pertinent portion of the manslaughter by intoxication statute, as amended by chapter 86-296, Laws of Florida, now reads:
Not surprisingly, Magaw contends that the amended statute has added an element of causation to the crime, whereas the state suggests that the amendment was merely cosmetic and made no substantive changes. There is some merit in both arguments because the meaning of the statute both before and after the amendment has not been entirely clear. In order to convict under the new statute, it is necessary to prove that the operation of a vehicle by a person under the influence caused the death of another, thereby suggesting the requirement of causation. On the other hand, the old statute which provided for conviction if the death of any human being was caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by an intoxicated person has been consistently construed as not requiring proof of causation.
In construing a statute which is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is often helpful to refer to legislative history. Foley v. State ex rel. Gordon, 50 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1951). In this case, the legislative history is most persuasive. The staff analysis prepared by the House of Representatives Committee on Criminal Justice with reference to the 1986 amendment stated in part:
Staff of Fla.H.R.Comm. on Crim.Just., DUI [HB 8-B] Staff Analysis 4, 7-8 (June 18, 1986). The debate on the floor when the Senate adopted this bill on June 19, 1986, is also instructive.
Fla.S., transcript of proceedings at 4 (June 19, 1986) (HB 8-B). We also note that Senate Bill 1218 which specified that negligence and proximate cause were not elements of manslaughter under section 316.193 was introduced during the 1986 legislative session but failed to pass.
In view of the history of chapter 86-296, the legislative intent is clear. We conclude that the 1986 amendment introduced causation as an element of the crimes proscribed by section 316.193(3).[2] We caution, however, that the statute does not say that the operator of the vehicle must be the sole cause of the fatal accident. Moreover, the state is not required to prove that the operator's drinking caused the accident. The statute requires only that the operation of the vehicle should have caused the accident. Therefore, any deviation or lack of care on the part of a driver under the influence to which the fatal accident can be attributed will suffice.
Notwithstanding our interpretation of the new statute, Magaw cannot prevail. The amendment to the statute did not become effective until October 1, 1986, almost three months after the date of Magaw's accident. Magaw's contention that, in passing the 1986 amendment, the legislature simply made clear what it always intended the statute to mean is totally unpersuasive. On several occasions this Court specifically ruled that the old statute did not require causation and invited the legislature to make the change if it were deemed advisable. By amending the statute in 1986, the legislature has now chosen to do so. This does not affect accidents which occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment.
We answer the certified question in the negative but affirm Magaw's conviction.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
[1]  Actually, the amendment to the statute at issue in the instant case became effective the day before the Armenia opinion was released. However, the amendment was not mentioned in the opinion because it did not bear on the disposition of the case.
[2]  While this opinion has discussed only manslaughter by intoxication, our construction of the current statute necessarily encompasses the proof required to convict of the lesser crimes under section 316.913(3).