Case Title: Williams, Dekota v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 082477

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., 
and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
DEKOTA WILLIAMS 
 
v.  Record No. 082477 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   November 5, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Dekota Williams (“Williams”) was convicted of robbery in 
violation of Code § 18.2-58 in a bench trial in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Newport News and was sentenced to 15 
years in prison with 10 years suspended.  In this appeal, we 
consider the sufficiency of the evidence to convict Williams 
of robbery. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On January 15, 2007, James Fox (“Fox”), who was 15 years 
old at the time of trial, and three of his friends, including 
17 year old Robert Brown (“Brown”), Nick Nance (“Nance”), and 
another boy identified only as “Julius,” were skateboarding in 
the parking lot of an abandoned automobile dealership in 
Newport News.  Brown was using his digital camera to film his 
friends while they were skateboarding. 
The boys stopped to eat lunch and were subsequently 
approached by three young men, one who wore a “black hoodie,” 
another who wore a “red hoodie,” and Williams who was 
identified as wearing a “green and black plaid jacket.”  One 
of the men took Nance’s bike and began riding it.  Fox and his 
friends directed the man to get off the bike.  In the ensuing 
moments, the man in the “red hoodie” ran behind Brown and 
“snatched” his camera from where Brown had laid it.  The man 
in the “red hoodie” ran at “full sprint” away from the scene.  
Fox pursued him for approximately 150 feet before giving up 
the chase. 
Fox had placed his cellular telephone (“cell phone”) on a 
“ledge” a few feet away from where the boys had been eating 
lunch.  As Fox was returning, his friend, Brown, told him that 
he saw Williams take his cell phone.  Williams admitted that 
he was using the cell phone when Fox and Brown confronted him. 
 
Fox demanded that Williams return the cell phone to him.  
Williams refused and stated, “[t]his is not yours.  How do you 
know this is yours?”  As Fox and Brown approached Williams, 
Williams put the cell phone in his pants pocket.  Fox demanded 
that Williams return the cell phone to him.  At that time, 
Williams reached into the waistband of his pants and, 
according to Brown, appeared to be retrieving a “flat, black 
object” that Fox thought was a gun.  Brown testified that when 
Williams pulled the “flat, black object” out of his pants he 
asked Brown and Fox if they “had a problem.”  The boys 
abandoned their attempt to retrieve Fox’s cell phone and ran 
 
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away.  Brown used his cell phone to call his mother, who, in 
turn, called police. 
Approximately four minutes later, Fox’s cell phone was 
returned to him by Julius.  Fox testified, “[m]y friend Julius 
had walked back and, I guess, talked to them and had gotten it 
back for me.”  Brown testified and corroborated Fox’s 
testimony in every significant aspect. 
Police Sergeant Frank Novack (“Novack”) apprehended 
Williams, who spontaneously exclaimed, “I know what this is 
about . . . It’s us f**king with those skateboarders.”  
Williams was subjected to a pat down search and a pair of 
black pliers was found in the waistband of his pants.  
Williams admitted to Detective W. T. Filer (“Filer”) that 
although Fox’s cell phone had been returned, Williams had 
pawned Fox’s cell phone charger at a nearby pawnshop.  Also, 
Filer testified that he recovered Brown’s camera that had been 
“pawned along with a cellular phone charger by Mr. Williams.” 
At trial, Williams testified that he did take the cell 
phone from the “ledge” and used it to make a telephone call.  
He admitted responding to Fox’s demand for the return of the 
cell phone by saying, “[t]his is not yours.  How do you know 
this is yours?”  Williams’ version of what happened next was 
quite different from the testimony of Fox and Brown.  Williams 
testified that he passed the cell phone to his brother who 
 
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handed the phone to Fox.  Williams stated that Fox had the 
cell phone when he walked away.  Williams was impeached at 
trial and admitted having been convicted of “a crime involving 
lying, cheating or stealing.”  Williams’ brother, Dion 
Williams (“Dion”), testified at trial that even though 
Williams used the cell phone, Williams gave it to Dion and he 
“gave it to the boy.” 
The trial court found Williams guilty of robbery.  
Williams appealed to the Court of Appeals, which denied his 
petition by per curiam order on the grounds that the evidence 
was sufficient to sustain the judgment.  Williams v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 0041-08-1 (Sept. 30, 2008).  A three-
judge panel of the Court of Appeals thereafter denied 
Williams’ petition for the reasons stated in the per curiam 
order.  Williams v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0041-08-1 (Nov. 
17, 2008).  We granted Williams an appeal on the following 
assignments of error: 
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellant’s 
conviction of robbery as the taking did not occur in the 
presence of the victim, who was one hundred and fifty feet 
away from the telephone when the taking occurred. 
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming appellant’s 
conviction of robbery as no threat nor intimidation occurred 
prior to or concomitant with the taking. 
 
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3. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
appellant’s conviction of robbery as no asportation occurred 
as the appellant never moved from the site from which he had 
picked up the cell phone from the ledge. 
4. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
appellant’s conviction of robbery as appellant never left the 
site from which he had taken the cell phone prior to returning 
the cell phone to its owner, thus he had no intent to deprive 
the owner of his property.   
II.  Analysis 
 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
 
On appeal, “[w]e must view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.”  
Commonwealth v. Jones, 267 Va. 284, 286, 591 S.E.2d 68, 69 
(2004).  Furthermore, “[w]hen reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a conviction, the Court will affirm the 
judgment unless the judgment is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.”  Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 
148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008). 
B. 
 Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
“Robbery, a common-law offense, is defined as ‘the 
taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property of 
another, from his person or in his presence, against his will, 
 
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by violence or intimidation.’ ”  Jones, 267 Va. at 286, 591 
S.E.2d at 70 (quoting George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 
277, 411 S.E.2d 12, 20 (1991) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).  Williams argues that the evidence was insufficient 
to convict him of robbery because the taking was not from the 
victim’s person, the perceived threat or intimidation occurred 
after the taking, there was no proof of asportation, and the 
Commonwealth failed to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt.  
We disagree and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
In Jones, the defendant entered a store, put a pair of 
boots in his pants, and walked out of the store without paying 
for the boots and without permission to take the boots.  267 
Va. at 286, 591 S.E.2d at 69.  The store manager, who was 
watching Jones via video camera and recognized him as having 
previously stolen items from the store, “walked down to the 
floor to watch Jones” and saw Jones put the boots in his pants 
and leave the premises.  Id.  The store manager “followed 
Jones out of the store and approached him in ‘the [store’s] 
parking lot’” when Jones “withdrew a firearm from a pocket of 
his jacket, pointed it at [the store manager] and said, ‘You 
better back . . . off me.’ ”  Id. at 286, 591 S.E.2d at 69-70. 
Jones “fled in a nearby car.”  Id. at 286, 591 S.E.2d at 70. 
The store manager “was frightened, and he ran and hid behind a 
parked vehicle.”  Id. 
 
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In Jones we held that the defendant 
originally intended to commit larceny.  While 
Jones was in the process of carrying out that 
intention and the larceny was continuing, the 
store manager interposed himself to prevent Jones 
from taking the merchandise.  At that time, Jones 
produced the firearm to overcome the manager’s 
opposition to the taking, and his crime became 
robbery, not merely larceny. 
 
Id. at 289, 591 S.E.2d at 71.  We also stated that 
[w]hen Jones seized and hid the boots, he had 
custody of them, not possession.  The store 
manager, as he observed Jones, retained 
constructive possession of the merchandise.  As 
Jones’ larceny was continuing, but before his 
custody was converted into possession, the 
manager interposed himself to prevent the 
theft. When Jones introduced force and violence 
by producing the firearm, his crime was 
transformed into robbery. 
 
Id. at 290, 591 S.E.2d at 72. 
 
As in Jones, here, Williams’ actions started as a larceny 
but became a robbery.  When Williams took Fox’s cell phone 
without permission from a “ledge” where Fox had left it, 
Williams committed a larceny.  Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 
569, 574, 667 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2008) (Larceny is a common law 
crime defined as “the wrongful or fraudulent taking of 
another’s property without his permission and with the intent 
to permanently deprive the owner of that property”).  We have 
held that larceny is a continuing crime.  Jones, 267 Va. at 
287, 591 S.E.2d at 70; Smolka v. Second Dist. Comm. of Va. 
State Bar, 224 Va. 161, 165, 295 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1982); 
 
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Dunlavey v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 521, 525, 35 S.E.2d 763, 765 
(1945).  However, as Jones demonstrates, larceny may ripen 
into robbery. 
Here, Williams’ larceny became a robbery when Fox and 
Brown confronted Williams, demanded return of the cell phone, 
and Williams reached into his waistband and pulled out a 
“flat, black object.”  Brown testified that Williams asked 
them if they “had a problem.”  Fearing that Williams had a 
gun, the boys quickly left and called Brown’s mother to tell 
her they had just been robbed. 
While Williams argues that he cannot be found guilty of 
robbery because he did not take the cell phone from Fox’s 
person or in Fox’s presence, his argument fails because he 
first committed larceny, a crime that does not require the 
element of taking from the victim’s person or presence.  
Britt, 276 Va. at 574, 667 S.E.2d at 765.  However, as in 
Jones, Williams’ larceny was continuing, and before Williams’ 
custody of the cell phone converted into possession, Fox 
interposed himself to prevent the theft.  Further, when 
Williams introduced the threat of force or violence by 
reaching into his waistband, showing a “flat, black object” 
and asking if Fox and Brown “had a problem,” his offense 
matured into robbery. 
 
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Williams also argues that there was insufficient evidence 
to convict him because there was no evidence of asportation 
and the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Williams had the requisite intent to commit robbery.  
Williams is correct that under Virginia law, “in robbery, as 
in larceny, there must be an asportation.”  Green v. 
Commonwealth, 133 Va. 695, 699, 112 S.E. 562, 563 (1922).  
Asportation is defined as “carrying away of the goods.  
Severance of the goods from the owner and absolute control of 
the property by the taker, even for an instant, constitutes an 
asportation.”  Mason v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 256, 105 
S.E.2d 149, 151 (1958).  Here, the evidence demonstrates that 
the cell phone was taken by Williams from a “ledge” and put 
into Williams’ pocket.  At this point the object was severed 
from the owner and in the absolute control of Williams.  This 
act constituted asportation sufficient to satisfy this element 
of the offense.  Furthermore, the evidence taken in its 
entirety, including the asportation of the object, was 
sufficient to prove intent to deprive Fox of his property. 
 
The record also reveals sufficient evidence of intent to 
commit robbery.  We have held that “‘an intent to commit 
robbery does not have to exist for any particular length of 
time.  It may occur momentarily.’ ”  Jones, 267 Va. at 289, 
591 S.E.2d at 71 (quoting Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 
 
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169, 198 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1973)).  Here, as in Jones, Williams 
originally intended to commit larceny; however, as the larceny 
was continuing and as the circumstances changed, his mens rea 
changed to an intent to deprive Fox of his cell phone by 
intimidation. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we hold that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court’s conviction of Williams 
in the bench trial for the crime of robbery.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
Affirmed. 
 
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