Case Title: Knox v. State

Citation: 404 Md. 76

Docket Number: 30/07

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Derrick Irwin Knox v. State of Maryland
No. 30, September Term 2007
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - WAIVER OF COUNSEL - RULE 4-215 - ADVICE
OF PENALTIES - SUBSEQUENT OFFENDER: “Allowable penalties,
including mandatory penalties, if any” as stated in Rule 4-215
includes notice of subsequent offender penalties.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SENTENCING - WAIVER OF COUNSEL - RULE 4-
215 - ADVICE OF PENALTIES - SUBSEQUENT OFFENDER: It is error
for a circuit court not to advise a defendant of mandatory or
enhanced penalties that may apply because of the defendant’s
subsequent offender status. In the Circuit Court for Wicomico County
Case No. K00-1380
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 30
September Term, 2007
DERRICK IRWIN KNOX
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M.
(Retired, specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R.
(Retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:   March 20, 2008
In this criminal case, we must interpret the language of Maryland Rule 4-215, Waiver
of Counsel, and the meaning of the requirement of the Rule that the court shall “advise the
defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties,
including mandatory penalties, if any.” The question in this case is whether the mandatory
penalties for a subsequent offender fall within the requirement of the Rule.  We shall hold
that they do and that such notice is required before a court may find that a defendant waives
the right to be represented by counsel.
I.
Petitioner, Derrick Knox, was charged in a criminal information filed by the State’s
Attorney for Wicomico County with the criminal offenses of possession with intent to
distribute controlled dangerous substances and possession of controlled dangerous
substances.  He was arrested and then released on bond; he failed to appear for his initial
appearance before the trial court on several occasions.  Counsel entered his appearance as
counsel for petitioner, and trial was scheduled for March 20, 2001.  Pursuant to Md. Rule 4-
245, the State served on defense counsel a “Revised Notice of Intent to Seek Enhanced
Punishment for Subsequent Offender” on March 5, 2001.  The notice informed petitioner,
through counsel, as follows:
“YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the State of Maryland
will seek enhanced punishment as authorized by law, against the
Defendant, on the basis that the Defendant is a subsequent
offender as defined by law.  The prior convictions relied upon
by the State of Maryland are as follows:
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JURISDICTION           DATE                                 OFFENSE
Circuit Court for          02/07/97            Distribution of Cocaine
Wicomico County, Maryland                Distribution of Marijuana
(97CR0604)                           Felonious Possession of Marijuana
On March 20, petitioner again failed to appear for trial, the court issued a bench warrant, and
counsel moved to strike his appearance.  On May 2, 2001, the court signed an order granting
counsel’s motion to withdraw; the docket entries indicate that counsel’s appearance was
“removed” on August 1, 2001.
Ultimately, petitioner appeared before the court for an initial appearance on July 13,
2001.  He appeared without counsel.  The court advised petitioner of his right to counsel, that
if he could not afford private counsel, he could apply to the public defender, and that if he
appeared for trial without an attorney, the court could find that he waived his right to counsel.
As to the “allowable penalties” advice required by Rule 4-215, the court stated as follows:
“You understand that you’re charged with possession — excuse
me — I guess possession of cocaine, possession of CDS with
intent to distribute which carries a maximum penalty of
incarceration of up to 20 years, a fine of up to $25,000 or both;
charged with possession of controlled dangerous substance, not
marijuana, but carries a maximum penalty of incarceration of up
to four years, a fine of up to $25,000 or both; and you’re
charged with possession of marijuana which carries a maximum
penalty of incarceration of up to one year, a fine of up to a
thousand dollars, or both.”
Petitioner was held without bail until his trial date, September 13, 2001.
On the trial date, petitioner appeared essentially pro se.  His former counsel was
present, but had not re-entered his appearance as he had not been paid and he had other court
1 Section 4-305 of the Correctional Services Article, Md. Code (1999, 2001 Cum.
Supp.) addresses the procedures for parole from the Patuxent Institution.
2 The relevant provisions of Article 27, § 286 have been repealed and reenacted as
Criminal Law Article, § 5-608, effective October 1, 2002.  At the time of petitioner’s
sentencing, the statute read, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(c) Sentencing — (1) A person who is convicted under
subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section, or of
conspiracy to violate subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 10 years
and subject to a fine not exceeding $100,000 if the person
previously has been convicted: 
(i) Under subsection (b) (1) or subsection (b) (2)
of this section . . . 
(2) The prison sentence of a person sentenced under subsection
(b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section, or of conspiracy to
violate subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section or
any combination of these offenses, as a second offender may not
be suspended to less than 10 years, and the person may be
paroled during that period only in accordance with sec 4-305 of
the Correctional Services Article.”
Md. Code, Art. 27, § 286 (1957, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2001 Cum. Supp.).  Section 4-305 of the
Correctional Services Article, Md. Code (1999, 2001 Cum. Supp.) provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
“(a) In general. — After transfer of an inmate to the Institution
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obligations for that day.  The court denied petitioner’s request for a continuance and
concluded that petitioner had waived his right to counsel.  Petitioner proceeded to trial pro
se and waived his right to a jury trial.  He was convicted of all the charges and sentenced to
twenty years at the Maryland Department of Corrections, five years suspended, with ten years
of the sentence subject to parole only in accordance with § 4-305 of the Correctional Services
Article1 as provided by Article 27, § 286 (c) (2).2
for treatment as an eligible person but before expiration of the
inmate’s sentence, the Board of Review may grant a parole from
the Institution for a period not exceeding 1 year if the Board of
Review concludes that the parole:
(1) will not impose an unreasonable risk on
society; and
(2) will assist in the remediation of the eligible
person.”
3 Petitioner’s first, timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals raised only the issue
of whether the trial court erred in imposing an enhanced mandatory sentence where the
State’s notice of intent to seek enhanced penalties was served on counsel who subsequently
withdrew and there was no showing that petitioner had been served personally with the
State’s notice at least 15 days prior to sentencing.  In a post-conviction proceeding, petitioner
was granted leave to file this belated appeal.
-4-
Petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.3  Before that court,
petitioner challenged primarily his waiver of counsel.  He argued that because the trial court
did not advise him of the mandatory penalties he faced as a subsequent offender, Rule 4-215
was violated and the court could not find that he waived counsel validly.  The court rejected
his argument, holding that “Rule 4-215 does not require the court to advise an unrepresented
accused at his first appearance in court without counsel of enhanced penalties that his status
as a subsequent offender may portend, or at anytime thereafter.”  Knox v. State, 173 Md.
App. 246, 253, 918 A.2d 556, 560 (2007).
In rejecting petitioner’s argument, the intermediate appellate court considered the
interplay of Rule 4-215, waiver of counsel, and Rule 4-245, mandatory penalties, and
reasoned that only Rule 4-245 governed mandatory penalties.  The court noted, correctly, that
Rule 4-215 is silent as to mandatory penalties and Rule 4-245 is specific.  The court also
4 Rule 4-245 (2001) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(d) Disclosure of the notice.  After acceptance of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere or after conviction, a copy of the
notice shall be filed with the clerk and presented to the court.
The allegation that the defendant is a subsequent offender is not
an issue in the trial on the charging document and may not be
disclosed to the trier of fact without the consent of the
defendant, except as permitted in this Rule.  Nothing herein
shall prohibit the use of any prior conviction for impeachment
purposes, if the evidence is otherwise admissible. 
-5-
noted that Rule 4-245 requires the State’s Attorney to give the required notice of intent to
seek the mandatory and enhanced penalties, fifteen days before sentencing, and that neither
rule requires the State’s Attorney to inform the court of the defendant’s prior convictions or
intent to seek enhanced penalties before the defendant is found to have waived counsel by
inaction.  The court noted that “Rule 4-245 appears to prohibit such an early disclosure to the
trial court because, in the words of the Court of Special Appeals, ‘the defendant might elect
a bench trial . . . .’”  Id. at 255, 918 A.2d at 562 (internal citation omitted).  The court
reasoned that the trial court would have no notice of the defendant’s subsequent offender
status because Rule 4-245 makes it clear that any notice to the trial judge of a defendant’s
past criminal history would be improper.4  The intermediate appellate court concluded that
“the court has no obligation, under Rule 4-215, to advise the defendant of that which it has
not been informed.”  Id.  The court then found that the State’s Notice of Intent to Seek
Enhanced Punishment for Subsequent Offender, sent to petitioner’s counsel, advised
petitioner adequately of the mandatory penalties he might face as a subsequent offender.
5 Because we reverse based upon question one, we will not address whether
petitioner’s reason for appearing without counsel was “meritorious” under Rule 4-215(d). 
-6-
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before this Court, which we granted
in order to answer the following questions:
“1.  Did the Court of Special Appeals err in concluding that
Rule 4-215's requirement that an accused be advised of “the
allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any,” does
not contemplate the allowable and mandatory penalties for
subsequent offenders?
“2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that
Petitioner did not have a meritorious reason for appearing for
trial without counsel and that he waived counsel by inaction?”5
Knox v. State, 399 Md. 595, 925 A.2d 634 (2007).
II.
Before this Court, petitioner argues that the requirements of Rule 4-215, i.e., that an
accused be advised of “the allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any,”
includes the allowable and mandatory penalties for subsequent offenders.  His argument is
based on the plain language of the Rule, and the underlying purpose of the Rule, i.e., to
protect the right to counsel.  Inasmuch as petitioner was not advised of the applicable
mandatory penalties as a subsequent offender, he continues, he did not properly waive his
right to counsel.
-7-
The State maintains that the plain language of Rule 4-215 (a) (3) does not require the
court to advise a defendant of penalties that may be imposed because of a defendant’s
subsequent offender status.  The State’s interpretation requires the trial court to inform a
defendant only of the penalties allowed for the charged crime.  In an effort to protect
defendant’s right of self-representation, the State argues that “advising the defendant at his
first appearance without counsel of the potential for enhanced punishment, if the defendant
is a subsequent offender and the State’s Attorney seeks an enhanced sentence as the result
of a prior crime is cumbersome and may chill the defendant’s exercise of his right to self-
representation.”  The State embraces the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals and
finally, maintains that even under petitioner’s interpretation of Rule 4-215, petitioner was
advised properly.
III.
The resolution of the issues in this case hinge on the interpretation of Rule 4-215 and
its relationship to Rule 4-425.  Rule 4-215 (2001) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(a) First appearance in court without counsel. At the
defendant’s first appearance in court without counsel, or when
the defendant appears in the District Court without counsel,
demands a jury trial, and the record does not disclose prior
compliance with this section by a judge, the court shall:
(1) Make certain that the defendant has received
a copy of the charging document containing
notice as to the right to counsel.
(2) Inform the defendant of the right to counsel
and of the importance of assistance of counsel.
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(3) Advise the defendant of the nature of the
charges in the charging document, and the
allowable 
penalties, 
including 
mandatory
penalties, if any.
(4) Conduct a waiver inquiry pursuant to section
(b) of this Rule if the defendant indicates a desire
to waive counsel.
(5) If trial is to be conducted on a subsequent
date, advise the defendant that if the defendant
appears for trial without counsel, the court could
determine that the defendant waived counsel and
proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented
by counsel.
The clerk shall note compliance with this section in the file or
on the docket.
* * *
“(d) Waiver by Inaction--Circuit Court. If a defendant
appears in circuit court without counsel on the date set for
hearing or trial, indicates a desire to have counsel, and the
record shows compliance with section (a) of this Rule, either in
a previous appearance in the circuit court or in an appearance in
the District Court in a case in which the defendant demanded a
jury trial, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the
appearance without counsel. If the court finds that there is a
meritorious reason for the defendant's appearance without
counsel, the court shall continue the action to a later time and
advise the defendant that if counsel does not enter an appearance
by that time, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant
unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds that there is no
meritorious reason for the defendant's appearance without
counsel, the court may determine that the defendant has waived
counsel by failing or refusing to obtain counsel and may proceed
with the hearing or trial.”
Rule 4-245 (2001) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
-9-
“(a) Definition. A subsequent offender is a defendant who,
because of a prior conviction, is subject to additional or
mandatory statutory punishment for the offense charged.
“(b) Required notice of additional penalties.  When the law
permits but does not mandate additional penalties because of a
specified previous conviction, the court shall not sentence the
defendant as a subsequent offender unless the State’s Attorney
serves notice of the alleged prior conviction on the defendant or
counsel before the acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere or at least 15 days before trial in circuit court or five
days before trial in District Court, whichever is earlier.
* * *
“(d) Disclosure of the notice.  After acceptance of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere or after conviction, a copy of the
notice shall be filed with the clerk and presented to the court.
The allegation that the defendant is a subsequent offender is not
an issue in the trial on the charging document and may not be
disclosed to the trier of fact without the consent of the
defendant, except as permitted in this Rule.  Nothing herein
shall prohibit the use of any prior conviction for impeachment
purposes, if the evidence is otherwise admissible. 
When we interpret the Rules of Procedure, we use the same canons and principles we
use to construe statutes.  State v. Williams, 392 Md. 194, 206, 896 A.2d 973, 980 (2006);
Brown v. Gress, 378 Md. 667, 676, 838 A.2d 362, 367 (2003).  In Brown, Chief Judge Bell,
writing for the Court, summarized the principles we apply as follows:
“In our effort to discern the meaning of a rule, we look first to
the words of the rule.  When the words are clear and
unambiguous, ordinarily we need not go any further.  Only when
the language of the rule is ambiguous is it necessary that we
look elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent.  We are also to
give effect to the entire rule, neither adding, nor deleting, words
in order to give it a meaning not otherwise evident by the words
actually used.  Finally, we seek to give the rule a reasonable
interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with
common sense.”
6 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”.
-10-
Id. at 676, 838 A.2d at 367 (internal citations omitted).
We turn first to the question of whether the language, that the circuit court must
“advise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the
allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any,” is ambiguous.  Rule 4-215 does
not mention enhanced or mandatory penalties based upon subsequent offender status.  Rule
4-245, on the other hand, specifically addresses these enhancements.  The omission of the
subject reasonably could suggest that the legislative intent was to treat subsequent offender
penalties separately from the general advice provision of Rule 4-215.  In contrast, the general
language of Rule 4-215 may be read as inclusive of subsequent offender penalties because
it uses broad, unlimited language.  We conclude that given these two reasonable
interpretations, Rule 4-215 is ambiguous. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature of the charges against him or her and to
have the assistance of counsel for a defense.6  Similarly, Article 21 of the Maryland
7 Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights reads as follows:
“That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be
informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the
Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for his
defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have process for his witnesses; to
examine the witnesses for and against him on oath; and to a
speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous
consent he ought not to be found guilty.”
.
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Declaration of Rights 7 protects these same rights.  These constitutional provisions guarantee
the right to counsel, including appointed counsel for an indigent, in any criminal case
involving incarceration.  See Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 262, 523 A.2d 597, 598 (1987).
As part of the implementation and protection of this fundamental right to counsel, the
Court adopted Rule 4-215.  See, e.g., Broadwater v. State, 401 Md. 175, 180, 931 A.2d 1098,
1100 (2007).  The Rule “provides an orderly procedure to insure that each criminal defendant
appearing before the court be represented by counsel, or, if he is not, that he be advised of
his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his
correlative constitutional right to self-representation.”  Id. at 180-81, 931 A.2d at 1100-01
(quotation omitted).  Before a court may find that a defendant has waived the right to
counsel, the court must be satisfied that the defendant is informed of the risks of
self-representation, and of the punishments which may be imposed.  The Rule “exists as a
‘checklist’ that a judge must complete before a defendant's waiver can be considered valid;
as such, it mandates strict compliance.”  Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 426, 735 A.2d 1003,
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1006 (1999).  Failure to comply with the Rule constitutes reversible error.  Broadwater, 401
Md. at 182, 931 A.2d at 1102; Moten v. State, 339 Md. 407, 411, 663 A.2d 593, 596 (1995).
The requirements of Rule 4-215 “are mandatory and must be complied with,
irrespective of the gravity of the crime charged, the type of plea entered, or the lack of an
affirmative showing of prejudice to the accused” because the right to counsel is a
fundamental right.  Broadwater, 401 Md. at 182, 931 A.2d at 1102 (quotation omitted).  We
explained in Broadwater as follows:
“As part of the implementation and protection of this
fundamental right to counsel, we adopted Maryland Rule 4-215,
which explicates the method by which the right to counsel may
be waived by those defendants wishing to represent themselves,
the modalities by which a trial judge may find that a criminal
defendant waived implicitly his or her right to counsel, either by
failure or refusal to obtain counsel, and the necessary litany of
advisements that must be given to all criminal defendants before
any finding of express or implied waiver of the right to be
represented by counsel may be valid.  The Rule ‘provides an
orderly procedure to insure that each criminal defendant
appearing before the court be represented by counsel, or, if he
is not, that he be advised of his Sixth Amendment constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his correlative
constitutional right to self-representation.’  Any decision to
waive counsel (or to relinquish the right to counsel through
inaction) and represent oneself must be accompanied by a
waiver inquiry designed ‘to ensure that [the decision] is 'made
with eyes open’ and that the defendant has undertaken waiver in
a ‘knowing and intelligent’ fashion.
Id. at 180-81, 931 A.2d at 1100-01 (internal citations omitted).
We hold that “allowable penalties, including mandatory penalties, if any,” as stated
in Rule 4-215, includes notice of subsequent offender penalties.  We need not decide this
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issue on a constitutional basis because it is required by Md. Rule 5-215.  Absent information
as to mandatory or enhanced penalties, it could hardly be said that a defendant makes a
knowing and voluntary decision to waive counsel with eyes open or with full knowledge of
the ramifications of the choice.  See Broadwater, 401 Md. at 181, 931 A.2d at 1101.
The purpose of Rule 4-245 is closely related to the purpose of Rule 4-215, but it does
not substitute for Rule 4-215's requirement to inform a defendant of the penalties.  We have
stated that the purpose of Rule 4-245 is “to permit a realistic assessment of the consequences
of defending the current offense at trial or pleading guilty.”  King v. State, 300 Md. 218, 229,
477 A.2d 768, 774 (1984).  Although Rule 4-245 is aimed at fully informing a defendant of
the risks inherent at trial, it is not targeted towards the specific goal of insuring that a
defendant understands the risks inherent in proceeding without counsel.  Rule 4-245 only
requires that the State’s Attorney “serve a notice of the alleged prior conviction” on the
defendant.  In contrast, Rule 4-215 requires that the admonishments be given by a judge,
even if they were given previously by the District Court Commissioner.  See Broadwater, 401
Md. at 199-200, 931 A.2d at 1112; Johnson, 355 Md. 420, 455, 735 A.2d 1003, 1022.  Rule
4-245 cannot be a substitute for Rule 4-215 because it does not provide for advice from a
judge or advice of the actual severity of the penalties a defendant may face as a result of a
prior conviction.
There is one concern, articulated by the Court of Special Appeals that merits further
attention.  The court may not know if a defendant is a subsequent offender at the time it is
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required to give the advice of penalties.  Rule 4-245(d) provides as follows: “The allegation
that the defendant is a subsequent offender is not an issue in the trial on the charging
document and may not be disclosed to the trier of fact without the consent of the defendant,
except as permitted in this Rule.”  Md. Rule 4-245 (d).  This provision was designed to
protect the defendant from the State imparting knowledge of prior convictions to the court
in case a defendant elects a bench trial.
The tension between this concern for the defendant’s protection under Rule 4-245 and
the requirement that the defendant be advised of mandatory penalties under Rule 4-215 is not
insurmountable.  To satisfy Rule 4-215, the court need only advise a defendant of the
mandatory penalties set out in the statute under the offense charged, or, advise the defendant
that if the defendant is a subsequent offender, that there may be enhanced penalties, and to
recite the possible enhanced penalties.  The court does not need actual knowledge of the
defendant’s status in order to give the advice.
In the instant case,  petitioner was subject to the penalties then found in Art. 27, §286
(c)(1), which read, in pertinent part, as follows:
(c) Sentencing — (1) A person who is convicted under
subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section, or of
conspiracy to violate subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this section
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 10 years
and subject to a fine not exceeding $100,000 if the person
previously has been convicted: 
(i) Under subsection (b) (1) or subsection (b) (2) of this section;
(ii) Of conspiracy to violate subsection (b) (1) or subsection (b)
(2) of this section; or 
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(iii) Of an offense under the laws of another state, the District of
Columbia, or the United States that would be a violation of
subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section if
committed in this State.
(2) The prison sentence of a person sentenced under subsection
(b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section, or of conspiracy to
violate subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section or
any combination of these offenses, as a second offender, may
not be suspended to less than 10 years, and the person may be
paroled during that period only in accordance with § 4-305 of
the Correctional Services Article.”
The court must inform the defendant of the peril he or she faces to permit a “knowing and
intelligent” waiver of counsel, with eyes open to the consequences of that decision.
The State postures that advising all defendants of potential penalty enhancements
applicable to subsequent offenders would impermissibly chill a defendant’s right to self-
representation.  To be sure, the right to self-representation is an integral aspect of the right
to counsel.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed.2d 562 (1975).  The
right to self-representation, however, presumes that defendant has waived counsel
“knowingly and intelligently.”  Id. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541.  A defendant cannot effectively
waive counsel without an “apprehension. . . of the range of allowable penalties.”  Von Moltke
v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316 323, 92 L. Ed. 309 (1948).  A defendant cannot
have full understanding of the consequences of the waiver of counsel if the defendant is
unaware of the more severe potential penalties because of prior convictions.  A chilling
effect, if any, is de minimis compared to the surprise at the end of the day when a defendant
learns of the mandatory penalty, after trial and just before sentencing.  Moreover, the fact that
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a defendant has prior convictions should not surprise the defendant and advice of enhanced
penalties as a result of prior convictions could hardly chill an election to waive counsel and
to proceed pro se.
IV.
It is undisputed that the trial court never advised petitioner of the additional penalties
he was exposed to as a result of his subsequent offender status prior to his waiver of counsel.
Petitioner was faced with the possibility of twenty years incarceration, with a mandatory
minimum of ten years, because of his status as a second-time offender, and he was sentenced
to twenty years incarceration.  Ten years were with parole limitations based on his
subsequent offender status.  The State argues that because petitioner was advised that the
charges against him carried the possibility of a twenty year term of imprisonment, he was
advised adequately.  The State contends that because parole is always discretionary,
petitioner faced the same peril— twenty years imprisonment without parole—regardless of
his subsequent offender status.  We disagree. 
A valid waiver of counsel presumes that defendant makes the decision “with eyes
wide open.”  A defendant may not evaluate the risks of forgoing the assistance of counsel
effectively without knowing that there is a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment
attached to his potential conviction.  The Circuit Court erred when it did not inform
defendant of the penalties he was subject to as a result of his subsequent offender status.
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
REVERSED.
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENTS OF
CONVICTION AND REMAND THIS
CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR WICOMICO COUNTY FOR A
NEW TRIAL.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
WICOMICO COUNTY.