Case Title: LAMAR OUTDOOR ADVERTISING v. FARMERS CO-OP OIL COMPANY OF SHERIDAN, WYOMING and MAVERIK COUNTY STORES

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0131

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAMAR OUTDOOR ADVERTISING v. FARMERS CO-OP OIL COMPANY OF SHERIDAN, WYOMING and MAVERIK COUNTY STORES2009 WY 112Case Number: No. S-08-0131Decided: 09/11/2009NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
LAMAR 
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.FARMERS 
CO-OP OIL COMPANY OF SHERIDAN, WYOMING and MAVERIK COUNTRY 
STORES,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Timothy 
M. Stubson of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee Farmers Co-Op Oil Company of Sheridan, Wyoming:

Clint 
A. Langer of Davis & Cannon, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee Maverik Country Stores:

Steven 
T. Waterman of Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C., Salt Lake City, 
Utah

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      During litigation 
among Lamar Outdoor Advertising (Lamar), Farmers Co-Op Oil Company of Sheridan, 
Wyoming (Farmers), and Maverik Country Stores (Maverik)1 concerning Lamar's claim that the 
other parties had not honored Lamar's lease-based right of first refusal that 
provided Lamar the opportunity to purchase certain property upon which Lamar 
maintained an advertising sign, the parties executed a settlement agreement, the 
meaning of one provision of which is now before us in this appeal.  Lamar appeals the district court's 
summary judgment order that under the terms of the parties' unambiguous 
settlement agreement the City of Sheridan had failed to act on Lamar's variance 
application within eight weeks from the date the variance application was 
submitted and, consequently, the parties remained bound by the terms of their 
settlement agreement.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court's 
order.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Lamar states 
these issues:

 
 
1. 
Whether the district court erred by misinterpreting the plain and unambiguous 
language of a conditional settlement agreement between the parties to this 
litigation.

 
 
2. 
Whether the language in the parties' agreement was ambiguous and requires 
additional factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the 
agreement.

 
 
Farmers 
and Maverik jointly state this issue:

 
 
Whether 
the trial court properly enforced the settlement agreement of the parties, 
dismissing the case and ordering Lamar to remove its billboard 
sign?

 
 
[¶3]      In Lamar's reply 
brief, it states these new issues were raised in its opponents' 
brief:

 
 
1. 
Whether the governing standard of review requires this Court to accept all 
allegations of the prevailing party below as true.

 
 
2. 
Whether reading the terms of the settlement agreement with their plain meaning 
renders portions of the agreement meaningless.

 
 
3. 
Whether the record supports the conclusion that an affidavit of notice was not 
required in order to consider the variance request.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Lamar initiated 
litigation to enforce a right of first refusal contained in a lease agreement 
for an outdoor advertising sign, that right requiring the lessor-owner of the 
property on which the sign was located to provide lessee Lamar with notice of a 
proposed sale of the leased property and the opportunity to purchase the leased 
property.  Following protracted 
negotiations, the parties executed a settlement agreement which contains the 
provision which is the subject of this appeal.  In the settlement agreement, the parties 
agreed to cooperate and submit an application for a variance to the City of 
Sheridan which, if granted, would permit a new sign location near the sign in 
question and permit a relocation of the sign.  In addressing the timeframe for the 
submission of the variance application and the City's action on that variance 
application, the parties included in their settlement agreement the following 
paragraph five, the contested meaning of which now drives this 
appeal:

 
 
            
The parties agree that the City of Sheridan shall have eight weeks 
from the date that the variance application contemplated in Paragraph 4 
is submitted with all accompanying documentation required by the City of 
Sheridan. If the City of Sheridan denies the Variance application the 
agreements, obligations, releases and all other commitments contained in this 
agreement are null and void. If the City of Sheridan approves the application or 
fails to act on the application within the eight week period provided for herein 
the parties will be bound to the agreement contained herein. If the City of 
Sheridan fails to act upon the application because of any action or inaction by 
Lamar the parties will be nonetheless bound by the terms of this agreement to 
the extent permitted by law.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  

 
 
[¶5]      Lamar's counsel 
submitted the variance application to the City by letter dated Wednesday, August 
2, 2006.   The passage of eight 
weeks would have fallen on or about Thursday, September 28, 2006.  On Wednesday, September 27, 2006, Lamar 
submitted to the City an affidavit executed by its agent, William A. Mentock, 
which stated:

 
 
AFFIDAVIT 
OF POSTING OF PUBLIC NOTICE SIGN, AND NOTIFICATION BY U.S. MAIL TO CONTIGUOUS 
PROPERTY OWNERS

 
 
STATE 
OF WYOMING

COUNTY 
OF SHERIDAN

 
 
            
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared, who, after 
having first been duly sworn and put upon oath, says as 
follows:

            
1.         
That he is the    agent    (owner, agent for owner, attorney in fact 
for owner, etc.) of the property identified in the application for VAR 06-09 at 
1251 First Ave E., to be heard before the Board of Adjustment at a public 
hearing to be held on October 12, 2006 and as such, is authorized to execute and 
make this Affidavit and is familiar with the matters set forth herein, and they 
are true to the best of his knowledge, information and 
belief.

            
2.         
That the Affiant has caused the mailing of the required letter of 
notification to property owners within 140 feet of the project boundary by U.S. 
Mail, on or before the 28th day of September, 2006, and attaches 
hereto, as part of and incorporated herein, a complete list of the names and 
addresses of the persons entitled to notice.

            
3.         
That Affiant is aware of and understands that failure to execute the 
required public notice may cause the above identified hearing to be postponed 
and rescheduled only upon compliance with the public notice 
requirements.

 
 
[¶6]      Farmers and 
Maverik assert, and Lamar does not disagree, that the City denied Lamar's 
variance application on October 12, 2006.

 
 
[¶7]      On February 7, 
2007, Farmers and Maverik filed their joint motion to dismiss with prejudice 
Lamar's litigation to enforce its lease-based right of first refusal, asserting 
that the City had failed to act on Lamar's variance application by October 2, 
2006, which was eight weeks past August 2, 2006, the date on which Lamar had 
submitted it and, therefore, by operation of paragraph five of the settlement 
agreement, that agreement had become fully binding on the parties. In support of 
their joint motion, Farmers and Maverik attached a copy of the parties' 
settlement agreement and a copy of the letter from Lamar's counsel to the City 
of Sheridan, dated August 2, 2006, which stated that the variance application 
was attached. We note that the referenced variance application is not in this 
record; however, Lamar agrees that it submitted the variance application on that 
date.

 
 
[¶8]      Lamar filed its 
response to Farmers and Maverik's joint motion to dismiss on February 23, 
2007.  In support of this response, 
Lamar attached, as Exhibit A, a copy of the affidavit of its agent, William A. 
Mentock, set out earlier in this opinion.  
Lamar's response argued that (1) the critical language of paragraph five 
of the settlement agreement was the City "shall have eight weeks from the date 
the Variance Application . . . is submitted with all accompanying documentation 
required by the City . . . ." (emphasis in original); (2) the variance 
application submitted by Lamar on August 2, 2006, did not include an affidavit 
of posting of public notice sign which document, according to follow-up meetings 
with the City, the City required in order to consider the variance application; 
(3) Lamar submitted the required affidavit document to the City on September 27, 
2006; (4) the eight-week time frame stated in paragraph five of the settlement 
agreement began running on September 27, 2006; (5) the City's action denying the 
variance application on October 12, 2006, was within the eight-week time frame 
which started running on September 27, 2006; and, consequently, (6) the 
settlement agreement is null and void under paragraph five of that agreement 
because the City denied the variance application within that eight-week time 
frame.  

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court held a hearing on Farmers and Maverik's joint motion to dismiss with 
prejudice and Lamar's response on February 27, 2008. In its brief, Lamar informs 
this Court that the district court without notice converted the joint motion to 
dismiss to a summary judgment motion by the court's consideration of material 
outside the pleadings; however, Lamar did not object to conversion and does not 
raise that as an issue here.  Cranston v. Weston Cty. Weed & Pest 
Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 254 (Wyo. 1992).  
Neither party designated a transcript of the motion hearing for our 
appellate record.  On April 28, 
2008, the district court entered its order granting summary judgment to Farmers 
and Maverik based upon the parties' evidentiary submissions, namely, the 
parties' settlement agreement, Lamar's counsel's letter dated August 2, 2006, 
and Lamar's Mentock affidavit, and based upon the parties' acknowledgement that 
the City of Sheridan acted on October 12, 2006, to deny Lamar's variance 
application.  In relevant part, the 
district court's order stated: 

 

1.         
Applying the summary judgment standard of review, the Court finds that 
there are no questions of material fact.

 
 
2.         
The affidavit attached to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Joint 
Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice does not raise material questions of fact, 
particularly since the hearing occurred more than eight weeks after the variance 
application was submitted to the City and since the affidavit could not have 
been submitted with the variance application.  

 
 
Lamar 
timely filed its notice of appeal.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   The district court converted 
Farmers and Maverik's joint motion to dismiss to a summary judgment proceeding 
in light of the exhibits attached to their joint motion to dismiss and the 
affidavit which Lamar attached to its response to their joint motion.  Lamar correctly argues that we must 
review this appeal under our well-known summary judgment standard of 
review.  In relevant part, W.R.C.P. 
56(c) provides:

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.   

 
 
Concerning 
affidavits submitted in a summary judgment proceeding, W.R.C.P. 56(e) provides 
in relevant part:

 
 
Supporting 
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.  Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. 

 
 
In 
our review:

 
 
We 
treat the summary judgment movant's motion as though it has been presented 
originally to us.  Havens [v. Hoffman], 902 P.2d [219] at 220 [(Wyo. 
1995)].  We use the same materials 
in the record that was before the district court.  Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 WY 151, 
¶ 8, 148 P.3d 8, 12 (Wyo. 2006).  
Using the materials in the record, we examine them from the vantage point 
most favorable to the nonmoving party opposing the motion, giving that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
materials.  Rino [v. Mead], [2002 WY 144,] ¶ 12, 55 P.3d 
[13] at 17 [(Wyo. 2002)]. . . . If doubt exists about the presence of genuine 
issues of material fact after we have reviewed the record, we resolve that doubt 
against the movant.  Jacobson [v. Cobbs], [2007 WY 99,] ¶ 7, 160 P.3d 
[654] at 656 [(Wyo. 2007)].   
The nonmoving party opposing the summary judgment motion has no 
obligation to counter the motion with materials beyond the pleadings until the 
movant has made a prima facie showing that genuine issues of material fact do 
not exist.  Rino, ¶ 23, 55 P.3d  at 20.   We review questions of law de novo without giving any deference to 
the district court's determinations.  Hatton, ¶ 8, 148 P.3d  at 
12.

 
 

Bangs 
v. Schroth, 
2009 WY 20, ¶ 20, 201 P.3d 442, 452 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   Based upon the two exhibits 
attached to their joint motion to dismiss, Farmers and Maverik's straightforward 
argument is that Lamar submitted its variance application on August 2, 2006, 
which started the eight-week clock as provided in paragraph five of the parties' 
settlement agreement; the parties agree that the City acted on Lamar's variance 
application when it denied it on October 12, 2006; the eight-week clock from 
August 2, 2006, expired on or about October 2, 2006; therefore, that eight-week 
clock had expired before the City's October 12, 2006, denial action and, 
consequently, under the language of paragraph five of the parties' agreement, 
the settlement agreement becomes fully binding.

 
 
[¶12]   Lamar counters Farmers and 
Maverik's argument by relying upon the Mentock affidavit attached to Lamar's 
response.  We have examined that 
affidavit in light of the requirements of W.R.C.P. 56(e) that an affidavit (1) 
be made on personal knowledge; (2) set forth facts which are admissible in 
evidence; (3) demonstrate the affiant's competency to testify on the subject 
matter of the affidavit; and (4) have attached to it the papers and documents to 
which it refers.  Bangs, ¶ 15, 201 P.3d  at 449.  We find this affidavit to fall short of 
these requirements.  The affiant 
states he "is familiar with the matters set forth herein, and they are true to 
the best of his knowledge, information and belief."  That statement does not meet the 
"personal knowledge" requirement.  
Lopez-Carrasquillo v. 
Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 414 (lst Cir. 2000) (affidavit stating "it is 
correct in all its parts to the best of my knowledge" is insufficient as a 
proffer of evidence because not based on affiant's personal knowledge); Wuliger v. Eberle, 414 F. Supp. 2d 814, 
818 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (information averred to the best of the affiant's knowledge 
or belief is insufficient to meet the requirements of F.R.C.P. 56(e)); Pace v. Copobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1278 
(11th Cir. 2002) (same); Wyant 
v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1272-73 (N.D. Ala. 
2002) (collecting cases); and 11 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice, § 56.14[1][c] 
(3rd ed. 2006).  Because the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal 
court interpretations of their rules are highly persuasive in our interpretation 
of the corresponding Wyoming rules.  
Rawlinson v. Wallerich, 2006 
WY 52, ¶ 12, 132 P.3d 204, 208 (Wyo. 2006).  Moreover, the affiant has not attached 
"the application for VAR 06-09 at 1251 First Ave. E" or "the required letter of 
notification to property owners" to which he refers in the affidavit.  In addition to this deficient affidavit, 
we also note that in Lamar's memorandum response it baldly asserts, without 
evidentiary support attached to its response, that "in follow-up meetings with 
the City of Sheridan the City required" an affidavit of posting of public notice 
sign in order to consider the variance application.  A party's assertion, without evidentiary 
support, is meaningless in summary judgment procedure.  In passing, we note that the parties in 
their briefing disagree about the applicable City of Sheridan ordinance 
governing the variance application procedure, Lamar claiming it is Appendix A-1, 
Section 14, and Farmers and Maverik claiming it is Appendix A, Section 14.  This is the kind of disagreement that 
the parties should have sorted out long before this Court docketed the 
appeal.

 
 
[¶13]   In light of the above and foregoing 
discussion, we hold that Farmers' and Maverik's straightforward argument 
prevails, and Lamar's argument has no evidentiary support.  We affirm the district court's summary 
judgment order.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Throughout 
the record in this case, and in the Notice of Appeal filed with this Court, an 
apostrophe has been placed either before or after the "s" in "Farmers".  Also, a "c" has been placed in 
"Maverik".  Upon further review, we 
believe both are incorrect.  We take 
this opportunity to remind the parties and counsel to be more diligent in 
assuring that proper names in captions and pleadings are 
correct.