Case Title: William E. Moseley et al. v. Leona Marie Onderdonk Cook et al. (Appeal from Washington Circuit Court: CV-10-0071). Affirmed. No Opinion.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1120887

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 02/28/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120887
____________________
William E. Moseley et al.
v.
Leona Marie Onderdonk Cook et al.
Appeal from Washington Circuit Court
(CV-10-0071)
STUART, Justice.
AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.
Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Moore, C.J., dissents.
1120887
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
In my view the Washington Circuit Court improperly
certified its judgment in this case as final and appropriate
for appeal under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Accordingly, this
Court does not have jurisdiction, and the proper disposition
is to dismiss the appeal.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In December 2005, the Washington Probate Court appointed
William E. Moseley executor of his mother's estate, which
consisted of 2,740 acres of timberland and which was worth
$4.4 million. The mother's will also created trusts for her
four granddaughters and appointed Moseley as trustee of the
trusts. The will granted Moseley discretion in managing the
lands and allowed him to receive compensation for his duties.
Three of the granddaughters removed the administration of the
estate to the circuit court in October 2006. See § 12-11-41,
Ala. Code 1975. In November 2010, the removing granddaughters
filed a complaint seeking Moseley's removal as executor and
trustee and the assessment of damages against him.
On November 14, 2012, the removing granddaughters also
filed a motion asking the circuit court to require Moseley to
repay the estate for any fees he had received without court
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1120887
approval and to deny him attorney fees for defending the
removal action. At the hearing on November 20, 2012, Moseley
appeared and requested a continuance because he was without a
lawyer. The court refused, noting that Moseley had had several
lawyers in the matter and that on August 22, 2012, the court
had given him 30 days to find an attorney. After asking to be
excused, Moseley left the hearing and did not return. The
court heard the matter without him, found he had violated his
fiduciary duty, and entered an order removing him as executor
of his mother's estate and as trustee of the three
granddaughters' trusts. The court also ordered Moseley to
reimburse the estate for fees and commissions he had received
in the amount of $389,183.21, and disallowed any attorney fees
for defending the removal action.
On November 26, 2012, the circuit court entered a Rule
54(b) order rendering final the judgment on the claims heard
on November 20, 2012. On December 18, 2012, Moseley filed a
postjudgment motion requesting the court to vacate its order
because of its failure to allow him a continuance to hire
counsel. On March 5, 2013, he filed a supplement to the
motion, arguing that the circuit court had improperly tried
the damages issues and thus had denied him a jury trial on
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1120887
that count.  Moseley's answer, however, did not contain a jury
1
demand. The Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion was denied by
operation of law.
Moseley did not appeal the trial court's order of
November 20, 2012, but only its denial of his Rule 59(e)
motion to vacate the judgment.
II. Analysis
In its order of November 20, 2012, the circuit court
stated that it was trying count one of the complaint to remove
Moseley as executor and count two to remove him as trustee.
"[T]he rest of the case," the court stated during the hearing,
"depending on my ruling, will be severed." The court thus did
not try counts three and four seeking damages and an
accounting. Moseley raises three issues on appeal: 
(1) 
whether 
he was wrongfully denied a continuance to obtain counsel, (2)
whether the court acted beyond its jurisdiction in awarding
reimbursement for fees and commissions when the issue before
the court was limited to Moseley's removal as executor and
A court may permit an amendment to a timely filed Rule
1
59(e) motion, even if made after the 30-day period for filing
the motion. Forester & Jerue, Inc. v. Daniels, 409 So. 2d 830,
831-32 (Ala. 1982).
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1120887
trustee, and (3) whether the court erred in denying him a
hearing on his Rule 59(e) motion to vacate its order.
I believe that the circuit court acted within its
discretion in denying the continuance and the hearing on the
Rule 59 motion. However, I do not believe we have appellate
jurisdiction to review the circuit court's order requiring
that Moseley reimburse the estate for what he terms "a small
fortune" in fees and commissions.  
Rule 54(b) provides that a court may enter a final
judgment on particular claims or against particular parties
even though other claims and other parties remain in the
action. But such a judgment is final only if it "has
completely disposed of one of a number of claims, or one of
multiple parties." Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption 
of 
Rule
54(b). 
The 
circuit 
court's 
adjudication 
of 
Moseley's 
liability
for commissions and fees was only an interim determination. In
ordering that Moseley repay to the estate all moneys he had
paid himself, the court cited McGallagher v. Estate of DeGeer,
934 So. 2d 391 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). In that case the Court
of Civil Appeals held that an order to remove an executrix
could also include a requirement that she return funds she had
paid herself from the estate. The court reasoned that "the
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1120887
repayment order was aimed at maintaining the status quo until
the final settlement." Id. at 402. 
Although McGallagher approves the issuance of an
ancillary order of repayment in a removal hearing, it does not
provide grounds for certifying such an order as final under
Rule 54(b). Because the repayment order was merely an interim
order subject to modification upon final settlement, it has
not "completely disposed of" the removing granddaughters'
monetary claim against Moseley nor his claims against the
estate.  "An order that does not dispose of the entire claim
2
is inherently interlocutory in nature," and thus "was
ineffective to transform [the] ... order into a final
judgment." Tanner v. Alabama Power Co., 617 So. 2d 656, 657
(Ala. 1993). Moseley does not appeal his removal as executor
and trustee but only the repayment portion of the circuit
court's order. Because that part of the removal order, though
formally 
certified 
for 
appeal 
under 
Rule 
54(b), 
is
interlocutory, I would not affirm the circuit court's order
In a motion to this Court, Moseley states that he has
2
"valid and substantial claims" still pending against the
estate.
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1120887
but would instead vacate that portion of the order and dismiss
the appeal as premature.  
3
Had this appeal arisen from the probate court 
rather than
3
the circuit court, my analysis would be different. This Court
may hear an appeal from an order of the probate court
"removing an executor or administrator." § 12-22-21(3), Ala.
Code 1975. This express statutory authority renders a Rule
54(b) 
certification 
of 
finality 
unnecessary. 
But 
no 
comparable
statute provides jurisdiction to hear such an appeal from the
circuit court. (McGallagher was an appeal from the probate
court.) Although this Court has stated that it "has
traditionally treated such orders of the circuit court as
though they were orders of the probate court," Tate v.
Kennedy, 578 So. 2d 1079, 1080 n.2 (Ala. 1991), that statement
cited no authority. See also Eustace v. Browning, 30 So. 3d
445, 449-50 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (following Tate); Brown v.
Brown, 21 So. 3d 1, 2-3  (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (same).
I believe the Tate Court erred in construing a statute
that by its express language applies only to appeals from the
probate court to also encompass appeals from the circuit
court. We are not at liberty to rewrite a statute. "[W]e deem
it inappropriate to engraft by judicial fiat a change the
legislature has apparently not chosen to make." Dale v.
Birmingham News Co., 452 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (Ala. 1984). In
fact, "traditionally" this Court has recognized that an order
of removal of an estate administrator is appealable from the
probate court but not from the circuit court. Brewer v.
Brewer, 250 Ala. 658, 35 So. 2d 557 (1948). Although § 12-22-
4, Ala. Code 1975, provides for an appeal to this Court from
a judgment of the circuit court "on a partial or annual
settlement of an estate of a deceased person," the circuit
court did not partially settle a portion of the estate; it
only entered an interim repayment order.
7