Case Title: State v. Neumann

Citation: 2013 WI 58

Docket Number: 2011AP001044-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Dale R. Neumann, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
------------------------------------------------ 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Leilani E. Neumann, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 4, 2012   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Vincent K. Howard   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants, there were briefs in the 
court of appeals by Steven L. Miller and Miller & Miller, River 
Falls, and Byron C. Lichstein, Erin K. Deeley, with assistance 
from law student practitioner Willam R. Ackell, and Frank J. 
Remington Center, Madison. Oral arguments by Mr. Lichstein and 
Mr. Miller.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Maura 
F.J. Whelan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
in the court of appeals was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
   
 
 
2013 WI 58
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF324 & 2008CF323) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Dale R. Neumann, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
________________________________ 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Leilani E. Neumann, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from judgments and orders of the Circuit Court for 
Marathon County, Vincent K. Howard, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   Eleven-year-old Madeline 
Kara Neumann died tragically on Easter Sunday, March 23, 2008, 
from diabetic ketoacidosis resulting from untreated juvenile 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
2 
 
onset diabetes mellitus.1  Kara died when her father and mother, 
Dale R. Neumann and Leilani E. Neumann, chose to treat Kara's 
undiagnosed serious illness with prayer, rather than medicine.  
Each parent was charged with and convicted of the second-degree 
reckless homicide of Madeline Kara Neumann in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 940.06(1) (2009-10),2 in separate trials with different 
juries.  
¶2 
Each parent appealed from the judgment of conviction 
of the Circuit Court for Marathon County, Vincent K. Howard, 
Judge.3   
¶3 
The court of appeals consolidated the cases for 
appellate decision only.4  The appeals are before us on 
certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
1 Madeline Kara Neumann was called Kara during her life and 
throughout the trials and will be referred to as Kara in this 
opinion.  
2 Although the jury trials occurred in 2009, all references 
to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless 
otherwise indicated, as it is the same as the version of the 
statutes in effect at the time of trial. 
The cases were tried separately upon the State's motion. 
3 Each parent also sought postconviction relief pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 809.30 and 974.02.  The circuit court denied the 
motions for postconviction relief.  These orders are also the 
subject of this appeal.  
4 The parents were each represented by their own counsel at 
their separate trials and in this court, and their respective 
counsel filed separate briefs.  Counsel for the parents divided 
their 35-minute oral argument, each attorney handling an issue 
on behalf of both parents as well as the issues distinctive to 
the parent whom counsel represented. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
3 
 
§ 809.61 to "determine the scope of the prayer treatment 
exception and to inform trial courts regarding the appropriate 
jury instructions when that exception is raised in a reckless 
homicide case."5 
¶4 
The first issue, common to both parents, is whether 
their convictions should be reversed (and the charges dismissed) 
on the ground that the prosecutions for second-degree reckless 
homicide under Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1) were unconstitutional, 
when Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) permitted them to treat Kara's 
illness with prayer and protected them from a criminal charge 
under § 948.03, the criminal child abuse statute.6         
¶5 
The parents contend that their treatment through 
prayer is expressly protected by one statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.03(6) (protection for treatment through prayer),7 but 
                                                 
5 State v. Dale R. Neumann, No. 2011AP1044-CR, & State v. 
Leilani E. Neumann, No. 2011AP1105-CR, unpublished certification 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 1, 2012). 
This consolidated appeal raises several issues.  Some 
issues are common to the convictions of both parents, although 
each parent has employed different arguments or reasoning in 
this court.  To the extent that an issue affects both parents, 
we take into account both of their positions in discussing and 
deciding the issue.  To the extent that an issue affects only 
one parent, we identify and decide the issue accordingly. 
6 Wis. Stat. § 948.03.  The title of the statute is 
"Physical abuse of a child."  We will refer to § 948.03 as the 
criminal child abuse statute to distinguish it from other state 
or federal statutes that relate to child abuse. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.03(6) reads: 
Treatment through prayer.  A person is not guilty of 
an offense under this section [§ 948.03] solely 
because he or she provides a child with treatment by 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
4 
 
criminalized by another, § 940.06(1) (second-degree reckless 
homicide), and that the statutes fail to provide them with fair 
notice, in violation of their due process rights, that they 
could be held criminally liable should their treatment through 
prayer fail and their child die.8   
¶6 
Each 
parent 
also 
argues 
alternative 
grounds 
of 
prejudicial trial error.  The arguments for reversal of the 
convictions and for a remand for new trials are as follows: 
• 
Both parents argue that the real controversy was not 
fully tried because of erroneous jury instructions and 
because of counsels' defective performance. 
• 
The father argues that the jury was objectively biased 
because it was informed that Kara's mother had 
                                                                                                                                                             
spiritual means through prayer alone for healing in 
accordance 
with the religious method of healing 
permitted under s. 48.981(3)(c)4. or 448.03(6) in lieu 
of medical or surgical treatment. 
The attorneys referred to Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6), the 
provision protecting treatment through prayer, as a privilege, 
although they acknowledged it could be characterized as an 
exception, a defense, or an immunity.  We view it as a 
protection from prosecution under Wis. Stat. § 948.03. 
8 The father's brief appears to argue that the reckless 
homicide statute is facially unconstitutional in combination 
with the treatment-through-prayer provision, although at times 
his argument appears to be an "as-applied" challenge.  The 
mother's brief argues that the reckless homicide statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to her circumstances.  An as-applied 
argument was made at oral argument.  Nevertheless, at times the 
implication of the mother's as-applied argument is that the 
interplay 
of 
the 
statutes 
renders 
the 
statutes 
facially 
unconstitutional. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
5 
 
previously been convicted of second-degree reckless 
homicide for Kara's death.  
¶7 
For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
second-degree reckless homicide statute and the criminal child 
abuse statute provide sufficient notice that the parents' 
conduct could have criminal consequences if their daughter died.  
We further conclude that the jury instructions were not 
erroneous; that trial counsels' performance was not ineffective 
assistance of counsel; that the controversy was fully tried; and 
that the jury in the father's case was not objectively biased. 
¶8 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of convictions 
and orders denying postconviction relief. 
¶9 
Here is a roadmap of this decision for ease of 
reference:   
 
I. 
The facts.  ¶¶10-30. 
II. Due Process Fair Notice Challenge.  ¶¶31-86. 
 
A. 
Due process requires fair notice of the crime.  
¶¶32-37. 
 
B. 
The four statutes at issue are Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.06(1), 948.03(3)(a), 948.03(3)(c), and 
948.03(6).  ¶¶38-46. 
 
C. 
The parents' challenge to the constitutionality 
of the statutes is that the statutes do not 
provide a definite enough standard of conduct 
and that one criminalizes the same conduct the 
other protects.  ¶¶47-61. 
 
D. 
The statutes fulfill the due process fair 
notice constitutional requirement.  ¶¶62-86. 
III. The Real Controversy Was Fully Tried.  ¶¶87-147.  
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
6 
 
 
A. 
The challenge to jury instructions on parent's 
duty to provide medical care.  ¶¶93-121. 
 
1. 
A parent has a legal duty to provide 
medical care to his or her child.  ¶¶103-
111. 
 
2. 
The instructions on a parent's legal 
duty 
do 
not 
violate 
a 
parent's 
constitutional right to direct the care of 
his or her child.  ¶¶112-117. 
 
3. 
The 
statutory 
provision 
protecting 
treatment 
through 
prayer, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.03(6), does not negate the legal duty 
to provide medical care in a second degree 
reckless homicide prosecution.  ¶¶118-121. 
 
B. 
The challenge to jury instructions on religious 
belief.  ¶¶122-127. 
 
C. 
The challenge to the circuit court's refusal to 
instruct on sincere religious belief.  ¶¶128-
140. 
 
D. 
The Challenge that counsels'  performances were 
ineffective assistance of counsel and resulted 
in the real controversy not being fully tried.  
¶¶141-147. 
 
IV. The Father's Claim That the Jurors Were Objectively 
Biased.  ¶¶148-160. 
I 
¶10 According to the undisputed testimony, the facts 
relating to the child's health and the parents' conduct were 
essentially the same in each jury trial and are set forth here. 
¶11 Madeline Kara Neumann died at 3:30 p.m. on Sunday, 
March 23, 2008, from diabetic ketoacidosis resulting from 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
7 
 
untreated juvenile onset diabetes mellitus.9  Kara had suffered 
gradually worsening symptoms for a few weeks before her death, 
leading to frequent thirst and urination, dehydration, weakness, 
and exhaustion, yet to the casual observer, as the State and 
parents stipulated, Kara would have appeared healthy as late as 
the Thursday before she died.   
¶12 On the Friday night before she died, Kara was too 
tired to finish her homework and ate her dinner in her bedroom.  
On Saturday, the day before her death, Kara slept all day after 
asking to stay home from work at the family's coffee shop.  When 
her mother returned home from work Saturday afternoon, Kara was 
pale and her legs were skinny and blue.  Her mother knew that 
something was wrong and called her husband into the room.  The 
parents began rubbing Kara's legs and praying for her.  
¶13 The Neumanns do not belong to any identifiable church 
or religious organization, but identify as Pentecostals.  They 
believe that there are spiritual root causes to sickness and 
                                                 
9 Although the instant cases are the first in Wisconsin to 
consider the effect of a treatment-through-prayer provision on 
the criminal culpability of a parent for a child's death, 
numerous other jurisdictions have considered this issue.  Three 
of these jurisdictions have considered the issue when the child 
died of the same illness as Kara, diabetic ketoacidosis.  See, 
e.g., Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992); State v. 
McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1991); Commonwealth v. Nixon, 718 
A.2d 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
This court has once before considered a case in which this 
illness had fatal consequences, but that case involved a 
physician's liability for medical malpractice for failing to 
diagnose and treat the disease in a five-year-old child.  See 
Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
8 
 
that their prayer and strong religious beliefs will cure any 
health problems they encounter. 
¶14 Kara's parents had not always relied only on spiritual 
healing in the past.  All of their children were born in a 
hospital and vaccinated.  The father went to a chiropractor for 
some ten years for back pain but believed that he was relieved 
of his pain through prayer.  The parents decided not to go to 
doctors for treatment anymore, out of a belief that they would 
be "putting the doctor before God," amounting to idolatry and 
sin.   
¶15 The father testified that he believed that his 
family's overall health had improved since the family had 
stopped going to doctors, and thus, when the parents realized 
that Kara was ill on Saturday afternoon, they began to pray.   
¶16 Soon after the parents began to pray, they enlisted 
the help of others, calling family and friends asking them to 
pray for Kara as well.  The father sent a mass e-mail at 4:58 
p.m. on Saturday to a listserv of like-minded people, which 
read: 
Subject:  Help our daughter needs emergency prayer!!! 
We 
need 
agreement 
in 
prayer 
over 
our 
youngest 
daughter, who is very weak and pale at the moment with 
hardly any strength. 
¶17 The 
parents 
testified 
that 
they 
did 
not 
know 
specifically what was wrong with Kara, thinking it could be a 
fever or the flu, but they knew it was serious and needed 
attention, so they prayed.  When informed of Kara's condition, 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
9 
 
Kara's maternal grandmother suggested they take her to a doctor.  
The mother replied, "No, she'll be fine, God will heal her." 
¶18 When the family took a break from prayer to eat dinner 
Saturday evening, Kara remained in bed.  While the family ate, 
Kara went to use the bathroom.  She fell off the toilet.  Her 
father picked her up and carried her to the couch in the living 
room where they could watch her.  The family stayed up late 
praying over Kara, until finally, the parents went to sleep 
because they "were exhausted . . . [from the] non-stop praying 
and just continually trusting in the Lord." 
¶19 According to trial testimony, by the time the family 
went to sleep Saturday night, Kara was unable to walk or talk.  
Kara's brother Luke testified that he believed Kara was in a 
coma.  Kara's siblings stayed with her throughout the night 
while she lay limp and unresponsive on the couch. 
¶20 When her father awoke early Sunday morning, around 
5:00 
a.m., 
Kara 
was 
still 
pale, 
limp, 
unconscious, 
and 
unresponsive, although she sometimes moaned in response to 
friends and family members calling her name.  Her breathing was 
less labored than it had been the previous night.   
¶21 Kara's mother continued to call friends and relatives 
to tell them about Kara's condition and ask for prayers.  
Various people came by the home on Sunday to pray and later, in 
trial testimony, witnesses characterized Kara's condition as a 
coma.  Still, family and friends testified that everyone was at 
complete peace and did not sense any danger in Kara's condition. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
10 
 
¶22 Kara's father testified that death was never on their 
minds.  He testified that he knew Kara was sick but was "never 
to the alarm of death," and even after she died, her father 
thought that Jesus would bring Kara back from the dead, as he 
did with Lazarus.  
¶23 The parents and friends testified that the parents 
took tangible steps to help Kara.  The mother tried to feed Kara 
soup and water with a syringe, but the liquid just dribbled out 
of Kara's mouth.  The father tried to sit Kara up, but she was 
unable to hold herself up.  At some point, Kara involuntarily 
urinated on herself while lying unresponsive on the couch, so 
they carried her upstairs and gave her a quick sponge bath while 
she lay on the bathroom floor. 
¶24 At one point, Kara's maternal grandfather suggested by 
telephone 
that 
they 
give 
Kara 
Pedialyte, 
a 
nutritional 
supplement, in order to maintain the nutrients in her body.  The 
mother responded that giving Kara Pedialyte would be taking away 
the glory from God.  Kara's mother had told another visiting 
friend that she believed that Kara was under "spiritual attack." 
¶25 Friends Althea and Randall Wormgoor testified that 
they arrived at the Neumanns' home on Sunday at approximately 
1:30 p.m.  The Wormgoors saw that Kara was extremely ill and 
nonresponsive.  Her eyes were partially open but they believed 
she needed immediate medical attention.  Randall Wormgoor pulled 
Kara's father aside and told him that if it was his daughter, he 
would take her to the hospital.  The father responded that the 
idea had crossed his mind, and he had suggested it to his wife, 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
11 
 
but she believed Kara's illness was a test of faith for their 
family and that the Lord would heal Kara.      
¶26 During this conversation, Althea Wormgoor noticed a 
distinct twitch from Kara's mouth, which startled her.  Thinking 
that Kara had stopped breathing, Randall Wormgoor called 911.  
Unbeknownst to those in the home, police and emergency medical 
personnel were already en route to the Neumann home, having 
received a call from Ariel Neff, the mother's sister-in-law in 
California, explaining that Kara might be in a coma and that her 
parents refused to take her to a doctor.  Ariel Neff's call was 
recorded at 2:33 p.m. on Sunday 
¶27 Police and emergency medical personnel arrived to find 
the parents praying over their extremely skinny, pulseless 
daughter.  The paramedics transported Kara to the hospital, 
where attempts to revive her were unsuccessful.  In the 
ambulance, the paramedics noticed a fruity odor, a known symptom 
of untreated diabetes.  They took a blood sample to measure her 
blood sugar but her blood sugar level was too high for the 
monitor to read.  Reports from emergency medical personnel and 
doctors indicated that Kara appeared extremely skinny and 
malnourished, with a bluish-gray skin color, and was dehydrated 
and skeleton-like, with a pronounced pelvic bone, eye sockets, 
cheekbones, and ribs.   
¶28 According to the emergency room doctor's testimony, 
Kara was "cachetic", which is a term normally used to describe a 
cancer patient——very malnourished, thin, and smaller than you 
expect of the age.  The emergency room doctor diagnosed Kara's 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
12 
 
cause of death as diabetic ketoacidosis, which was later 
confirmed by the medical examiner's autopsy. 
¶29 The emergency room doctor also testified that if a 
child is brought into the emergency room suffering from diabetic 
ketoacidosis but is still breathing and still has a heartbeat, 
the 
prognosis 
for 
survival is very good.  A pediatric 
endocrinologist 
testified 
that, 
if 
treated, 
diabetic 
ketoacidosis has a 99.8% survival rate.  He testified that 
Kara's disease was treatable and her chances of survival were 
high until "well into the day of her death." 
¶30 Each parent was charged with, and convicted of, 
second-degree reckless homicide in connection with Kara's death.  
Each was sentenced to 180 days in jail and ten years of 
probation.  Each was sentenced to serve 30 days in jail each 
year for six years, alternating the months of March and 
September with the other parent.  The circuit court granted a 
motion to stay the jail sentence pending this appeal. 
II 
¶31 The parents argue that their convictions for choosing 
treatment through prayer violate due process fair notice 
requirements.  In Part A., we first explain the constitutional 
due process fair notice requirement.  In Part B., we then set 
forth the four statutes at issue, Wis. Stat. §§ 940.06(1), 
948.03(3)(a), 948.03(3)(c), and 948.03(6).  Next, in Part C., we 
lay out the parties' challenge to the constitutionality of the 
statutes.  Finally, in Part D., we conclude that the statutes 
fulfill the constitutional due process fair notice requirement.  
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
13 
 
A 
¶32 The 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution assures that no person shall be deprived of "life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law."10  Whether 
state action constitutes a violation of due process presents a 
question of law, which this court decides independently of the 
circuit court but benefiting from its analysis.11 
¶33 The due process issue in the instant case, as we 
explained previously, is whether the applicable statutes are 
definite enough to provide a standard of conduct for those whose 
activities are proscribed.12  Fair notice is part of the due 
process doctrine of vagueness.  "[A] statute which either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that 
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning 
and differ as to its application violates the first essential of 
due process of law."13  
                                                 
10 Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution has 
been interpreted as a due process provision.  Reginald D. v. 
State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 306-07, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995). 
11 State v. Sorenson, 2002 WI 78, ¶25, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 
N.W.2d 354. 
12 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, 409 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Elections Bd. v. 
Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 676-77, 597 N.W.2d 721 
(1999); State v. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124, ¶36, 294 Wis. 2d 578, 
718 N.W.2d 168. 
13 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
14 
 
¶34 A challenged statute "need not define with absolute 
clarity and precision what is and is not unlawful conduct."14  "A 
certain amount of vagueness and indefiniteness is inherent in 
all language and, if not permitted, nearly all penal statutes 
would be void."15  "A fair degree of definiteness is all that is 
required."16   
¶35 Justice Holmes observed, "[T]he law is full of 
instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, 
that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of 
degree."17  The Justice wisely wrote that statutes cannot be 
exactly precise in drawing lines:  
Wherever the law draws a line there will be cases very 
near each other on opposite sides.  The precise course 
of the line may be uncertain, but no one can come near 
it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and 
if he does so, it is familiar to the criminal law to 
make him take the risk.18  
¶36 The United States Supreme Court has explained that the 
degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates and the 
relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement depend 
                                                 
14 State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 276-77, 496 N.W.2d 74 
(1993) (quoting State v. Hurd, 135 Wis. 2d 266, 272, 400 
N.W.2d 42 (Ct. App. 1986)).     
15 State v. Ehlenfeldt, 94 Wis. 2d 347, 355, 288 N.W.2d 786 
(1980). 
16 State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 710, 247 N.W.2d 714 
(1976) (quoted source omitted). 
17 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913). 
18 United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930).   
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
15 
 
in part on the nature of the enactment.19  Enactments with civil 
rather than criminal penalties are often granted greater 
tolerance 
because 
the 
consequences 
of 
imprecision 
are 
qualitatively less severe.20   
¶37 Relevant to our inquiry in the present case, the Court 
has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's 
vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to 
the actor that his or her conduct is prohibited.21  A scienter 
requirement may mitigate a criminal law's vagueness by ensuring 
that it punishes only those who are aware their conduct is 
unlawful.22  Nevertheless, "criminal responsibility should not 
attach where one could not reasonably understand that his 
contemplated conduct is proscribed."23 
B 
                                                 
19 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1962). 
20 Id. (citing Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 
137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., & 
Douglas, J.); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948)). 
21 Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 (citing Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979); Boyce Motor Lines v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952); Screws v. United States, 325 
U.S. 91, 101-103 (1945) (plurality opinion); Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 
87 n.98 (1960)). 
22 United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 
1988) (citing Screws, 325 U.S. at 101-04 (plurality opinion)). 
23 United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 
32-33 (1963). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
16 
 
¶38 In considering whether the criminal statutes at issue 
satisfy the requirements of due process fair notice, we begin by 
setting forth the texts of the statutes involved.         
¶39 The parents were convicted of violating Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.06(1), the second-degree reckless homicide statute. This 
statute is a single sentence that governs all persons, not only 
parents, and provides as follows:  
Sec. 
940.06(1) 
Second-degree 
reckless 
homicide. 
Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human 
being is guilty of a Class D Felony (emphasis added).   
¶40 "Recklessly" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1) to 
mean 
that the actor creates an unreasonable and substantial 
risk of death or great bodily harm to another human 
being 
and 
the 
actor 
is 
aware 
of 
that 
risk . . . (emphasis added). 
¶41 "Great 
bodily 
harm" 
is 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.22(14) as "bodily injury which creates a substantial risk 
of death, or" other enumerated physical injuries.    
¶42 We now turn to Wis. Stat. § 948.03, the criminal child 
abuse statute. 
¶43 The text of the criminal child abuse statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 948.03(1), (3)(a), and (3)(c), reads as follows: 
(1) Definitions.  In this section, "recklessly" means 
conduct which creates a situation of unreasonable 
risk of harm to and demonstrates a conscious 
disregard for the safety of the child. 
. . . . 
(3) Reckless causation of bodily harm.   
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
17 
 
(a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm 
to a child is guilty of a Class E Felony. 
. . . . 
(c) Whoever recklessly causes bodily harm24 to a 
child 
by conduct which creates a high 
probability of great bodily harm is guilty 
of a Class H Felony (emphasis and footnote 
added). 
¶44 The last statute at issue is Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6), a 
provision in the criminal child abuse statute that protects 
persons who engage in treatment through prayer from prosecution 
for criminal child abuse under Wis. Stat. § 948.03.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 948.03(6) provides as follows: 
948.03(6) Treatment through prayer.  A person is not 
guilty of an offense under this section [§ 948.03] 
solely because he or she provides a child with 
treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone for 
healing in accordance with the religious method of 
healing 
permitted 
under 
s. 
48.981(3)(c)4.25 
or 
448.03(6)26 in lieu of medical or surgical treatment.  
(Footnotes added.) 
                                                 
24 "'Bodily harm' means physical pain or injury, illness, or 
any impairment of physical condition."  Wis. Stat. § 939.22(4).  
25 The legislature limited this exception to religious 
healing methods permitted in Wis. Stat. § 48.981(3)(c)4., which 
provides that the government's "determination that abuse or 
neglect has occurred may not be based solely on the fact that 
that the child's parent . . . in good faith selects and relies 
on prayer or other religious means for treatment of disease or 
for remedial care of the child."  
26 This provision refers specifically to the practice of 
Christian Science.  The parents are not practitioners of this 
religion.   
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
18 
 
¶45 Section 948.03(6) was enacted in 1987 at the behest of 
the Christian Science Committee on Publication in Wisconsin.27  
Provisions protecting persons who resort to treatment through 
prayer from prosecution for child abuse had previously been 
adopted in the 1970s by numerous states, including Wisconsin, at 
the behest of the federal government.28     
                                                 
27 See Letters from George E. Jeffrey, Christian Science 
Committee on Publication for Wisconsin, to Assemblyman John D. 
Medinger, Wis. State Assembly (Feb. 27, 1987) & Senator Brian D. 
Rude, Wis. State Senate (July 15, 1987) (suggesting language 
very similar to the current Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) be included 
in an amendment to Senate Bill 203 relating to the abuse of 
children); 
Memorandum 
from 
Laurie 
E. 
Smith, 
Legislative 
Assistant to Senator Brian D. Rude, Wis. State Senate, to Bruce 
Feustal, Senior Attorney, Legislative Reference Bureau (July 22, 
1987) (requesting an amendment to Senate Bill 203 "which uses 
the language included in Mr. Jeffrey's letter") (Drafting File, 
1987 Act 332, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.). 
28 The protection of persons who resort to treatment through 
prayer, Wis. Stat. § 48.981(3)(c)3., was adopted in 1977.  § 4, 
ch. 355, Laws of 1977.  Many states, including Wisconsin, 
complied with the 1974 federal Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act (CAPTA), which in part required states to amend 
their child abuse and neglect statutes to include an exemption 
for spiritual healing.  If a state failed to amend its statutes 
to include such an exemption, it would be ineligible to receive 
the 
funds 
appropriated 
by 
Congress 
to 
fulfill 
various 
objectives, including establishing preventative programs to 
reduce the incidence of child abuse.    
A 
counter-campaign 
urging 
repeal 
of 
such 
statutory 
exemptions ensued, and Congress revised the law in 1983, 
revoking the requirement that states enact these treatment-
through-prayer provisions in order to receive federal funding.  
Still, the laws have remained on the books in many states. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
19 
 
¶46 In order to compare the four statutes more easily, we 
insert the defined terms into the text of each statute and 
reprint the four statutes below:        
Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1) Whoever creates an unreasonable 
and substantial risk of death or bodily injury which 
creates 
a 
substantial 
risk 
of 
death, 
or 
other 
enumerated physical injuries, to another human being 
and is aware of that risk and causes the death of 
another human being is guilty of a Class D Felony.   
Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) Whoever creates a situation 
of unreasonable risk of harm to and demonstrates a 
conscious disregard for the safety of the child and 
causes bodily injury which creates a substantial risk 
of death, or other enumerated physical injuries, to a 
child is guilty of a Class E Felony. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(c) Whoever creates a situation 
of unreasonable risk of harm to and demonstrates a 
conscious disregard for the safety of a child and 
causes bodily harm to a child by conduct which creates 
a high probability of bodily injury which creates a 
substantial 
risk 
of 
death, 
or 
other 
enumerated 
physical injuries, is guilty of a Class H Felony. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) Treatment through prayer.  A 
person is not guilty of an offense under this section 
[§ 948.03] solely because he or she provides a child 
with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone 
for healing in accordance with the religious method of 
healing permitted under s. 48.981(3)(c)4. or 448.03(6) 
in lieu of medical or surgical treatment. 
                                                                                                                                                             
For discussions of the federal law and the responses of the 
states, see, e.g., Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick 
Kids and the Law: Inequities in the American Healthcare System, 
29 Am. J.L. & Med. 269, 277-80 (2003); Paula A. Monopoli, 
Allocating the Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New 
Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief and a Child's Right to 
Medical Treatment, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 319, 330-34 (1991); Rebecca 
Williams, Note, Faith Healing Exceptions Versus Parens Patriae: 
Something's Gotta Give, 10 First Amend. L. Rev. 692, 694-96, 
698-713 (2012). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
20 
 
C 
¶47 We now set forth the parties' due process fair notice 
challenge.      
¶48 The parents do not assert that Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6), 
the treatment-through-prayer provision, applies in and of itself 
to the second-degree reckless homicide statute.  Such an 
argument would fly in the face of the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.03(6).   
¶49 The text of the treatment-through-prayer provision 
carefully limits its application only to charges under the 
criminal 
child 
abuse 
statute, 
that 
is, 
to 
child 
abuse 
prosecutions under Wis. Stat. § 948.03.  The treatment-through-
prayer provision explicitly states it applies only to "an 
offense under this section."  
¶50 This treatment-through-prayer provision by its very 
terms thus applies only to charges of criminal child abuse under 
Wis. Stat. § 948.03.  On its face, the treatment-through-prayer 
provision does not immunize a parent from any criminal liability 
other than that created by the criminal child abuse statute.  
There is no cross-reference between the criminal child abuse 
statute and the second-degree reckless homicide statute.  No one 
reading the treatment-through-prayer provision should expect 
protection from criminal liability under any other statute.29  
                                                 
29 The parents do not claim that they read and relied on the 
statutes before treating Kara with prayer.  Indeed the unstated 
premise of the parents' arguments is that the parents' actual 
knowledge of the statutes before Kara's death is irrelevant.   
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
21 
 
¶51 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6), the provision 
protecting parents for treatment through prayer, is written in 
narrow language.  It includes the limiting word "solely."  "A 
person is not guilty of an offense under this section [§ 948.03] 
solely because he or she provides a child with treatment by 
spiritual means through prayer alone . . . ."  The word "solely" 
has not been interpreted in Wisconsin in this context, but other 
jurisdictions have interpreted similar provisions as signifying 
that treatment through prayer does not create blanket protection 
from criminal prosecution for child abuse for a parent who 
treats his or her child with prayer.30 
                                                                                                                                                             
The accepted legal fiction is that every person is expected 
to know the law.  Ignorance of the law is not ordinarily a 
defense.  Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of S.E. Wis., 2002 WI 108, 
¶13 n.4, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626 (Wisconsin employs the 
mistake of law doctrine which says that every person is presumed 
to know the law and cannot claim ignorance of it as a defense); 
Byrne v. State, 12 Wis. 519 (1860) ("[D]efendants are presumed 
to know the law, and ignorance of the law, even if proved, would 
be no excuse"). 
Actual notice of the statutes may be irrelevant in applying 
the concept of fair notice.  Courts require the law be clear so 
that those who consult the law are not confused or misled.  
Justice Holmes observed that "[a]lthough it is not likely that a 
criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he 
murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should 
be given to the world in language that the common world will 
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is 
passed."  McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). 
30 The word "solely" has been interpreted to signify that 
treatment through prayer is not necessarily an absolute defense 
for the crime in which the treatment-through-prayer protection 
applies.  One interpretation of "solely" is that the severity of 
the child's illness may render the protection inapplicable.  
Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 612 n.4 (Mass. 1993).  
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
22 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Supreme Court of Colorado explained the language "for 
that reason alone" in its statute as follows:  
[T]he meaning of the statutory language, "for that 
reason alone," is quite clear.  It allows a finding of 
dependency and neglect for other "reasons," such as 
where the child's life is in imminent danger, despite 
any treatment by spiritual means.  In other words, a 
child who is treated solely by spiritual means is not, 
for that reason alone, dependent or neglected, but if 
there is an additional reason, such as where the child 
is deprived of medical care necessary to prevent a 
life-endangering 
condition, 
the 
child 
may 
be 
adjudicated 
dependent 
and 
neglected 
under 
the 
statutory scheme.   
In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 274-75 (Colo. 1982).  See also 
Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 131 (1988) (citing the 
Colorado decision with approval). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
23 
 
¶52 Provisions regarding treatment through prayer appear 
in several instances in the Wisconsin statutes.31  Taken 
together, these statutes evidence the legislature's balancing in 
each instance of the interests of persons who rely on treatment 
through 
prayer 
and 
the 
State's 
interest 
in 
protecting 
individuals. The statutes demonstrate that the legislature has 
carefully considered under what circumstances it is willing to 
allow reliance on treatment through prayer for those who believe 
in the efficacy of such treatment and when it is not.  If the 
legislature intended a treatment-through-prayer provision to 
apply across the board to all criminal statutes, the legislature 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 46.90(7) (nothing in § 46.90 
creating an elder abuse reporting system "may be construed to 
mean that a person is abused, financially exploited, neglected 
or in need of direct or protective services solely because he or 
she consistently relies upon treatment by spiritual means 
through prayer for healing in lieu of medical care in accordance 
with his or her religious tradition"); Wis. Stat. § 48.82(4) (no 
person shall be denied adoption because of religious belief in 
the use of spiritual means through prayer for healing); Wis. 
Stat. § 102.42(6) ("Unless the employee shall have elected 
Christian Science treatment in lieu of medical . . . treatment 
no [workers] compensation shall be payable for the death or 
disability of an employee, if the death be caused or insofar as 
the 
disability 
may 
be aggravated . . . by an unreasonable 
refusal or neglect to submit to or follow any competent and 
reasonable 
medical . . . treatment . . . ."); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.505(2)(a)1. (a court "may not determine that a parent's or 
guardian's 
consent 
[to the administration of psychotropic 
medication to a juvenile under the supervision of the Department 
of Corrections] is unreasonably withheld solely because the 
parent or guardian relies on treatment by spiritual means 
through prayer for healing in accordance with his or her 
religious 
tradition"); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.285(1m) 
(excepts 
treatment through prayer from criminal prosecution for abuse of 
"at-risk" individuals). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
24 
 
could have used different language or placed a treatment-
through-prayer provision in Chapter 939 with other defenses to 
criminal liability.32            
¶53 Thus, 
the 
text of the treatment-through prayer-
provision, Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6), does not and cannot lead 
parents to expect that they are immune from criminal prosecution 
for second-degree reckless homicide.33   
                                                 
32 See Wis. Stat. ch. 939, subchapter III, Defenses to 
Criminal Liability (Wis. Stat. §§ 939.42-.49). 
33 In 1993, two bills were introduced in the Wisconsin 
Senate, one repealing and the other extending treatment-through-
prayer provisions.  1993 Senate Bill 107 attempted to eliminate 
the prayer treatment protection provisions by repealing Wis. 
Stat. § 948.03(6) and striking the related text in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.981(3)(c)4.  1993 Senate Bill 544 attempted to extend 
coverage to provide a treatment-through-prayer exception for 
crimes involving criminal negligence and criminal recklessness. 
Both of those bills failed to pass. 
The Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau regarding 
1993 Senate Bill 544 explains, as follows, that the second-
degree reckless homicide statute does not except treatment 
through prayer:  
Current law provides a treatment through prayer 
exception to the crime of physical abuse of a child.  
A person is not guilty of physical abuse of a child 
because the person relies on treatment of the child 
through prayer for healing.  This bill extends this 
coverage 
to 
provide 
a 
treatment 
through 
prayer 
exception for crimes involving criminal negligence or 
criminal recklessness.  
Drafting File for 1993 S.B. 544, Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
25 
 
¶54 Rather than rely on the statutory treatment-through-
prayer provision as explicitly protecting them from prosecution 
under the second-degree reckless homicide statute, the parents 
assert that the interplay of Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1), the second-
degree reckless homicide statute, and § 948.03, the criminal 
child abuse statute (including the treatment-through-prayer 
provision), creates a lack of "fair notice" of prohibited 
conduct.   
¶55 The parents' fair notice argument turns on the phrase 
"great bodily harm," which appears in the three statutory 
provisions at issue: Wis. Stat. §§ 940.06(1), 948.03(3)(a), and 
948.03(3)(c).  "Great bodily harm" means bodily injury that 
creates a substantial risk of death or other enumerated physical 
injuries.  Wis. Stat. § 939.22(14).   
¶56 The parents contend that there is no legal difference 
between the conduct governed by the three statutes:  "This 
'substantial risk of death' that creates criminal liability 
under reckless homicide is the same 'substantial risk of death' 
explicitly protected in the prayer treatment exception."34  Even 
if there is a line between the statutes in theory, the parents 
aver that the line is too difficult to define or conceptualize.    
                                                                                                                                                             
Although 1993 S.B. 544 was never enacted, its introduction 
tends to show that the legislators who introduced it, and the 
Christian Science Committee on Publication that suggested it, 
did not believe that the treatment-through-prayer provision in 
the criminal child abuse statute provided protection from 
prosecution for crimes involving criminal recklessness. 
34 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Leilani E. 
Neumann at 12. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
26 
 
¶57 Accordingly, the parents maintain that a prayer-
treating parent is protected up to and including the point at 
which the child experiences great bodily injury that means, 
among other things, a substantial risk of death.  The parents 
read Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) as telling prayer-healing parents 
that until a child's medical condition progresses "to at least 
some point beyond a 'substantial risk of death,' they are immune 
from prosecution."35  
¶58 The parents interpret "the point beyond a 'substantial 
risk of death'" in the present cases as being the exact moment 
that Kara died.  The parents assert that up until Kara stopped 
breathing, their choice of treatment through prayer was a 
statutorily protected response to the "substantial risk of 
death" that Kara was experiencing.36  They assert that "[a]s 911 
                                                 
35 Defendant-Appellant's 
Brief 
and 
Appendix 
(Dale 
R. 
Neumann) at 16. 
36 The parents acknowledge that they could be liable under 
the second-degree reckless homicide statute if death was 
imminent.  The word "imminent" is not in the statute.  The 
parents explain that an "imminent risk of death," is for 
example, respiratory failure, severe bleeding, or severe trauma.  
Such circumstances, they concede, would arguably lie beyond a 
substantial risk of death and would give clear notice to a 
parent that immunity under Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) no longer 
applies.   
According 
to 
the 
parents, 
Kara's 
condition 
had 
not 
progressed beyond "a substantial risk of death" and did not 
involve "imminent" death.  The parents contend the imminence of 
death did not occur in the present case until Kara stopped 
breathing. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
27 
 
was called as soon as Kara stopped breathing," the "line" 
protecting prayer-treating parents "was never crossed."37   
¶59 The parents assert there is no boundary, no clear 
moment when they were on notice that their failure to provide 
medical care had crossed the line between the protection offered 
under Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) and liability under Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.06(1).  The parents argue that the only dividing line 
between legality and illegality of the parents' conduct is the 
happenstance of death, and that this dividing line is too vague 
and unclear to provide sufficient notice in the present case.      
¶60 Using this reasoning, the parents conclude that due 
process fair notice has been violated because they were 
convicted for conduct that the State told them was protected.38  
They allege that the conflicting legal provisions violate due 
process by failing to furnish fair notice of what conduct is 
illegal.39 
¶61 Both the State and parents cite case law from other 
states that have addressed a due process fair notice challenge 
to support their respective positions.  Most cases lend support 
                                                 
37 Defendant-Appellant's 
Brief 
and 
Appendix 
(Dale 
R. 
Neumann) at 16 n.5; see also Brief and Appendix of Defendant-
Appellant Leilani E. Neumann at 14. 
38 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965); 
United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1952); Raley v. 
Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1959). 
39 Cardiff, 344 U.S. at 176-77. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
28 
 
to the State's position.40  A minority of cases lends support to 
the parents' position.41  The parents distinguish the cases 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 
763 P.2d 852, 873 (Cal. 1988) (The Supreme Court of California 
held that a prayer treatment exemption did not provide a defense 
to prosecution for involuntary manslaughter; the statutes there 
provided sufficient notice that "the provision of prayer 
alone . . . would be accommodated only insofar as the child was 
not threatened with serious physical harm or illness."  This 
aspect of the Walker case may have been overturned by a federal 
district court; see Walker v. Keldgord, No. CIV S-93-0616 LKK 
JFM P (E.D. Cal. 1996)); Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 
1986) (The trial court's finding that the parents acted 
recklessly in failing to seek medical care for their sick child 
was sufficiently supported by the evidence.  Reckless homicide 
does not have a statutory defense excusing responsibility for a 
death that resulted from what our legal system has defined to be 
reckless acts, regardless of whether these acts were conducted 
pursuant 
to 
religious 
beliefs. 
 
The 
legislature 
had 
distinguished between child neglect that results in serious 
bodily injury and child neglect that results in the child's 
death.  Prayer is not permitted as a defense when a caretaker 
engages in omissive conduct that results in the child's death.); 
Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993) (Parents 
have a duty to seek medical attention for a seriously ill child.  
Wanton or reckless conduct could support a conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter.  The spiritual healing provision did 
not bar prosecution for manslaughter in those circumstances.); 
State v. Hays, 964 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (The 
statutes permit a parent to treat a child by prayer or other 
spiritual means so long as the illness is not life-threatening.  
Once a reasonable person should know that there is a substantial 
risk that the child will die without medical care, the parent 
must provide that care, or allow it to be provided, at the risk 
of criminal sanctions if the child dies.  It may be impossible 
to define in advance all the ways in which a person's actions 
can be a gross deviation from the standard of care of a 
reasonable person, and thus criminally negligent under Oregon 
law; "[t]hat difficulty does not mean, however, that the 
legislature 
may 
not 
penalize 
such 
a 
gross 
deviation."); 
Commonwealth v. Nixon, 718 A.2d 311, 313 (Pa. 1998) (A plain 
reading of the statutes shows that an act that does not qualify 
as child abuse may still be done in a manner that causes death 
and thus qualifies as involuntary manslaughter.  The Nixons were 
not considered child abusers for treating their children through 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
29 
 
favoring the State's position, and the State distinguishes the 
cases 
favoring 
the 
parents' 
position, 
each 
noting 
the 
differences in the statutes of other states and in the facts of 
the cases.  The laws and facts are different in these non-
Wisconsin cases, but the discussions and applications of the due 
process fair notice requirements by other state courts have been 
helpful in our analysis.      
D 
                                                                                                                                                             
spiritual healing, but when their otherwise lawful course of 
conduct led to a child's death, they were guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter.). 
For a discussion of these cases, see articles cited at note 
28, supra, and note 59, infra.  See also Jennifer L. Rosato, 
Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole:  Procedural Due Process and 
the Effect of Faith Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of 
Faith Healing Parents, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 43, 103-16 (1994).  
41 Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 782 (Fla. 1992) (When 
considered 
together, 
the 
spiritual 
treatment 
accommodation 
provision and child abuse statutes failed to give parents notice 
of the point at which their reliance on spiritual treatment lost 
statutory approval and became culpably negligent.  The statutory 
scheme in place failed to establish a line of demarcation at 
which a person could know his conduct was criminal.); State v. 
McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 68-69 (Minn. 1991) (The manslaughter 
statute failed to give the prayer-treating parents fair notice 
of the prohibited conduct. "[W]here the state had clearly 
expressed its intention to permit good faith reliance on 
spiritual treatment and prayer as an alternative to conventional 
medical treatment, it cannot prosecute respondents for doing so 
without violating their rights to due process.").  
See Baruch Gitlin, Parents' Criminal Liability for Failure 
to Provide Medical Attention to Their Children, 118 A.L.R. 5th 
253 (2004) (made current by weekly addition of released cases) 
(collecting cases including cases on the spiritual treatment 
defense).  
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
30 
 
¶62 Having 
set 
forth 
the 
parents' 
constitutional 
challenge, we now determine the constitutionality of the 
statutes.  Interpreting and applying a statute, as well as 
determining the constitutionality of a statute, ordinarily 
present 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
this 
court 
determines 
independently of the circuit court but benefiting from its 
analysis.42  
¶63 The parents acknowledge, and we agree, that the 
protection 
for 
treatment 
through 
prayer 
explicitly 
and 
exclusively applies to the child abuse statute.  See ¶¶48-53, 
supra.  
¶64 The issue we are left to consider is the parents' due 
process fair notice challenge based on the interplay of the four 
statutes and the application of the statutes to the facts of the 
instant cases.   
¶65 The parents' challenge hinges on the fact that the 
texts of Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1) and § 948.03(3)(a) and (3)(c) 
all incorporate, in one way or another, the phrase "great bodily 
harm," which is defined by § 939.22(14) for all three statutes.  
It is apparent, however, in reading the text of the statutes, 
that the phrase "great bodily harm" is used in different ways in 
these statutes.   
¶66 The second-degree reckless homicide statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 940.06(1), requires the State to prove the following:  
                                                 
42 Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 
2012 WI 39, ¶60, 340 Wis. 2d 31, 813 N.W.2d 627. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
31 
 
• 
First, the reckless nature of the conduct.  The actor 
creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death 
or great bodily harm, as defined in § 939.22(14),to 
another human being.   
• 
Second, the actor's subjective mental state.  The 
actor was subjectively aware of the risk.  
• 
Third, the harm caused by the actor.  The actor caused 
the death of another.   
¶67 No one argues that the second-degree reckless homicide 
statute is so vaguely worded that it fails to provide fair 
notice of what conduct is prohibited and what conduct is 
protected. 
¶68 For one to recklessly cause great bodily harm to a 
child, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a), the State must 
prove the following: 
• 
First, the reckless nature of the conduct.  The 
actor's conduct creates a situation of unreasonable 
risk of harm to a child. 
• 
Second, the actor's mental state.  The creation of the 
unreasonable risk of harm demonstrates a conscious 
disregard for a child's safety. 
• 
Third, the harm caused by the actor.  The actor caused 
great bodily harm, as defined in § 939.22(14),to a 
child.   
¶69 For one to recklessly cause bodily harm to a child, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(c), the State must prove the 
following: 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
32 
 
• 
First, the reckless nature of the conduct.  The 
actor's conduct creates a situation of unreasonable 
risk of harm to a child and a high probability of 
great bodily harm as defined in § 939.22(14). 
• 
Second, the actor's mental state.  The creation of the 
unreasonable risk of harm demonstrates a conscious 
disregard for a child's safety.  
• 
Third, the harm caused by the actor.  The actor caused 
bodily harm to a child. 
¶70 No one argues that Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) and 
(3)(c) of the criminal child abuse statute are so vaguely worded 
that they fail to provide fair notice of what conduct is 
prohibited.   
¶71 It is evident that the parents' failure to provide 
medical care is the conduct penalized in each of the three 
statutes.  It is also evident that although the three statutes 
incorporate the same phrase, "great bodily harm," they do so in 
different ways.  The second-degree reckless homicide statute 
differs from Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) and (3)(c) of the 
criminal child abuse statute in three important respects:  the 
reckless nature of the conduct governed, the mental state 
required, and the harm caused by the actor. 
¶72 The second-degree reckless homicide statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 940.06(1), governs reckless conduct, that is, conduct 
that creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or 
great bodily harm to another.  Wisconsin Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) 
governs reckless conduct, that is, conduct that creates a 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
33 
 
situation of unreasonable risk of harm to a child.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 948.03(3)(c) governs reckless conduct, that is, conduct  
that creates a situation of unreasonable risk of harm to a child 
that creates a high probability of great bodily harm.  
¶73 Perhaps most important for this discussion of due 
process fair notice is the different mens rea in the statutes at 
issue.  The word "recklessly" is defined differently in the 
second-degree reckless homicide statute (Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1)) 
and in the criminal child abuse statute (§ 948.03(1)), resulting 
in requiring different mens rea.   
¶74 As the Judicial Council Note to Wis. Stat. § 939.24 
explains, the second-degree reckless homicide statute requires 
"both 
the 
creation 
of 
an 
objectively 
unreasonable 
and 
substantial risk of human death or great bodily harm and the 
actor's subjective awareness of that risk."43  This is the only 
statute at issue that requires the State to prove that an actor 
has a subjective mens rea, that is, the actor is subjectively 
aware of the risk he or she creates.   
¶75 The criminal child abuse statute, Wis. Stat. § 948.03, 
has no subjective mens rea component.    
¶76 The court of appeals explained the difference between 
the mental states in Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1) and § 948.03(3)(a) 
                                                 
43 Judicial Council Note, 1988, Wis. Stat. § 939.24.  
"[R]ecklessness requires a subjective mental state: the 
defendant must actually (in her own mind) be aware of the risk 
created by the conduct."  Walter Dickey et al., The Importance 
of Clarity in the Law of Homicide:  The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 
Wis. L. Rev. 1323, 1352. 
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34 
 
and (3)(c) in State v. Williams, 2006 WI App 212, ¶26, 296 
Wis. 2d 834, 723 N.W.2d 719, as follows: 
[R]eckless 
child 
abuse 
requires 
the 
defendant's 
actions demonstrate a conscious disregard for the 
safety of a child, not that the defendant was 
subjectively aware of that risk.  In contrast, 
"criminal recklessness" is defined as when "the actor 
creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death 
or great bodily harm to another human being and the 
actor is aware of that risk."  Thus, "recklessly" 
causing 
harm 
to 
a 
child 
under 
§ 948.03(b) 
is 
distinguished from "criminal recklessness," because 
only the latter includes a subjective component.  We 
therefore conclude that recklessly causing harm to a 
child, unlike criminal recklessness, does not contain 
a subjective component (citations omitted).   
¶77 A subjective scienter requirement, as we explained 
previously, can alleviate vagueness because an actor who knows 
what he or she is doing and is aware of the unlawful risk cannot 
be heard to claim that he or she did not know his or her conduct 
was prohibited.44 
¶78 The final distinction between the statutes at issue is 
the harm caused by the actor's conduct.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.06(1), the State must prove that the actor caused the 
death of another.  In contrast, under the child abuse statutes 
the State must prove that the actor caused great bodily harm 
                                                 
44 Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 (citing Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979); Boyce Motor Lines v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952); Screws, 325 U.S. at 101-03 
(plurality opinion); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in 
the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 87, n.98 (1960)).  See 
also United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 
1988) (citing Screws, 325 U.S. at 101-04 (plurality opinion)). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
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under Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) or bodily harm under Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.03(3)(c).45 
¶79 If we were to accept the parents' interpretation and 
application of the four statutes to the facts of the present 
cases, all prayer-treating parents would in effect be immunized 
from second-degree reckless homicide.  If we were to adopt the 
parents' reasoning, no prayer-treating parent would know what 
point is beyond "a substantial risk of death" until the child 
actually stopped breathing and died.   
¶80 Each statute must be read in its entirety and in 
combination with the other statutes.  The phrase "great bodily 
harm" cannot be disembodied from the entire text of each statute 
and considered in isolation to render the statutes violative of 
due process.  The parents' emphasis on the phrase "great bodily 
harm" ignores the distinction in the reckless nature of the 
conduct, the mental state, and the harm in the criminal child 
abuse and second-degree reckless homicide statutes.  Each 
statute read as a whole, and in combination with the other 
statutes at issue, gives actors (including the parents in the 
instant case) fair notice of when the actor may be held liable 
or may be protected under the statutes.   
                                                 
45 The different legislative treatment of criminal conduct 
on the basis of whether death results is not unique to these 
statutes.  Criminal charges are inevitably reliant on the result 
of the actor's conduct.  An actor cannot be guilty of any 
homicide unless the victim dies.  If the victim lives despite 
the actor's conduct, the actor is not guilty of homicide but may 
be guilty of attempted homicide or some other crime. 
No. 
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¶81 We conclude that the second-degree reckless homicide 
statute and the criminal child abuse statute are sufficiently 
distinct that a parent has fair notice of conduct that is 
protected and conduct that is unprotected.  The statutes are 
definite enough to provide a standard of conduct for those whose 
activities are proscribed and those whose conduct is protected.46  
A 
reader 
of 
the 
treatment-through-prayer provision cannot 
reasonably conclude that he or she can, with impunity, use 
prayer treatment as protection against all criminal charges.  
The four statutes are not unconstitutional on due process fair 
notice grounds. 
¶82 In sum, when a parent fails to provide medical care to 
his or her child, creates an unreasonable and substantial risk 
of death or great bodily harm, is aware of that risk, and causes 
the death of the child, the parent is guilty of second-degree 
reckless homicide.47 
                                                 
46 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, 409 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Elections Bd. v. 
Wisconsin Mfrs. & Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 676-77, 597 
N.W.2d 721 (1999); State v. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124, ¶36, 294 
Wis. 2d 578, 718 N.W.2d 168. 
47 The dissent raises a concern about whether a parental 
duty will arise in cases when a parent is confronted with 
similar symptoms that do not arise from diabetic ketoacidosis.  
Dissent, ¶188.  The parents in this case knew that Kara was 
severely ill but did not specifically know that she was 
suffering from diabetic ketoacidosis.  The ultimate, underlying 
diagnosis is of little consequence to the analysis.  Rather, in 
applying the statute's conduct and mens rea components, the 
focus is on the severity of the symptoms displayed, the parents' 
awareness of the severity of the symptoms, and the parents' 
subsequent failure to seek medical care. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
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¶83 This crime is substantially different from the crimes 
punished under the criminal child abuse statute.  When a parent 
fails to provide medical care when there is a duty to act, 
creates a situation of unreasonable risk of harm to and 
demonstrates a conscious disregard for the safety of the child, 
and causes great bodily harm, the parent is guilty of violating 
Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a). 
¶84 When a parent fails to provide medical care when there 
is a duty to act, creates a situation of unreasonable risk of 
harm to and demonstrates a conscious disregard for the safety of 
the child, and causes bodily harm to a child by conduct that 
creates a high probability of great bodily harm, the parent is 
guilty of violating Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(c). 
¶85 A parent is not guilty of violating Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.03(3)(a) and (3)(c) "solely because he or she provides a 
child with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone for 
healing in accordance with the religious method of healing 
permitted under s. 48.981(3)(c)4. or 448.03(6) in lieu of 
medical or surgical treatment."  Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6).       
¶86 The juries could reasonably find that by failing to 
call for medical assistance when Kara was seriously ill and in a 
coma-like condition for 12 to 14 hours, the parents were 
creating an unreasonable and substantial risk of Kara's death, 
were subjectively aware of that risk, and caused her death.  On 
the record before it, each jury could reasonably find that the 
State proved the elements of second-degree reckless homicide 
under Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1).  
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
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III 
¶87 The parents assert that their convictions should be 
reversed and new trials should be ordered in the interest of 
justice under Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  They maintain that the real 
controversy was not fully tried because of erroneous jury 
instructions and ineffective assistance of counsel.  If this 
court determines that the real controversy has not been fully 
tried, it may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, enter 
such order as is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice.48   
¶88 The real controversy, according to the parents, is 
whether the parents' sincere belief in prayer treatment negated 
the subjective element of second-degree reckless homicide.  This 
affirmative defense was not fully tried, they contend, because 
the circuit court gave an erroneous jury instruction about a 
parent's legal duty to care for a child and an erroneous jury 
instruction about religious beliefs, and the circuit court did 
not instruct the jury about the effect of a sincere religious 
belief.   
¶89 A circuit court has broad discretion in issuing jury 
instructions based on the facts and circumstances of the case 
and in deciding whether to give a specific jury instruction 
requested by the parties.49  A circuit court must, however, 
"exercise its discretion in order 'to fully and fairly inform 
                                                 
48 Wis. Stat. § 751.06.   
49 State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 212, 556 N.W.2d 701 
(1996) (quoted source omitted); State v. Vick, 104 Wis. 2d 678, 
690, 312 N.W.2d 489 (1981). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
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the jury of the rules of law applicable to the case and to 
assist the jury in making a reasonable analysis of the 
evidence.'"50  When jury instructions are challenged as not 
correctly informing the jury of the law applicable to the 
charge, as they are in the present case, the challenger has 
presented a question of law that an appellate court determines 
independently of the circuit court but benefiting from its 
analysis.51 
¶90 The following jury instructions were given in the 
father's trial regarding the elements of the crime.  The 
instructions follow Wis JI——Criminal 1060.  The instructions 
about a parent's legal duty to protect the child and religious 
belief are not part of Criminal Jury Instruction 1060. 
Second degree reckless homicide, as defined in section 
940.06 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, is committed 
by one who recklessly causes the death of another 
human being. 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of second-
degree reckless homicide, the State must prove by 
                                                 
50 Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d at 212 (internal citations omitted). 
51 State v. Gonzalez, 2011 WI 63, ¶22, 335 Wis. 2d 270, 802 
N.W.2d 454 (Abrahamson, C.J., lead op.) (citing State v. 
Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶9, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187).  
The jury instructions are also challenged as confusing or 
misleading.  An appellate court should order a new trial only if 
upon review of the instruction, the court determines that the 
defendant has shown that "'there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury was misled and therefore applied potentially confusing 
instructions in an unconstitutional manner.'"  Gonzalez, 335 
Wis. 2d 270, ¶23 (Abrahamson, C.J., lead op.) (quoting State v. 
Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 194, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996)).  
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
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evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the following two elements are present: 
First, the defendant caused the death of Madeline Kara 
Neumann.  Cause means that the defendant's conduct was 
a substantial factor in producing the death.  Conduct 
can be either by an act or omission, when the 
defendant has a duty to act.   
One such duty is the duty of a parent to protect their 
children, to care for them in sickness and in health. 
Second, the defendant caused the death by criminally 
reckless conduct.  Criminally reckless conduct means 
the conduct created a risk of death or great bodily 
harm to another person.  Great bodily harm means 
serious bodily injury.  It is an injury which creates 
a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm. 
In addition, the risk of death or great bodily harm 
was unreasonable and substantial, and the defendant 
was aware that his conduct created the unreasonable 
and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant caused the death of Madeline Kara 
Neumann by criminally reckless conduct, you should 
find the defendant guilty of second-degree reckless 
homicide.  If you are not satisfied, you must then 
find the defendant not guilty. 
The constitutional freedom of religion is absolute as 
to beliefs but not as to the conduct, which may be 
regulated for the protection of society. 
¶91 The following jury instructions regarding the elements 
of the crime were given in the mother's trial.  Again, the 
instructions follow Wis JI——Criminal 1060.  The instructions 
about a parent's duty to protect the child and religious belief 
are not part of Criminal Jury Instruction 1060. 
Second-degree reckless homicide is defined in Section 
940.06 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, and it's 
committed by one who recklessly causes the death of 
another human being.  Before you may find the 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
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defendant guilty of second-degree reckless homicide, 
the defendant [sic] must prove by evidence which 
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
following two elements were present. 
First, the defendant caused the death of Madeline Kara 
Neumann.  "Cause" means that the defendant's conduct 
was a substantial factor in producing the death.  
Conduct can be either by an act or an omission when 
the defendant has a duty to act. 
One such duty is the duty of a parent to protect their 
children, to care for them in sickness and in death 
[sic], and to do whatever is necessary for their 
preservation, 
including 
medical 
attendance, 
if 
necessary. 
Second, the defendant caused the death by criminally 
reckless conduct.  "Criminally reckless conduct" means 
the conduct created a risk of death or great bodily 
harm to another person.  "Great bodily harm" means 
serious bodily injury.  It is an injury which creates 
a substantial risk of death or other serious bodily 
injury. 
In addition, the risk of death or great bodily harm 
was unreasonable and substantial and the defendant was 
aware that her condition created the unreasonable and 
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant directly committed all of the two 
elements of second-degree reckless homicide or that 
the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the 
commission 
of 
that 
crime, 
you 
should 
find 
the 
defendant guilty.  If you are not so satisfied, then 
you must find the defendant not guilty. 
The Constitutional Freedom of Religion is absolute as 
to beliefs but not as to conduct which may be 
regulated for the protection of society. 
¶92 We shall in Part A. discuss the "duty" instruction and 
in Part B., the "religious belief" instruction.  We then examine 
in Part C. the circuit court's refusal to instruct the jury 
about the effect of a parent's sincere belief in prayer 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
42 
 
treatment on the subjective awareness element of second-degree 
reckless homicide.  Finally, Part D. addresses whether counsel 
provided ineffective assistance. 
A 
¶93 The prosecutions of the parents for second-degree 
reckless homicide were based not on the affirmative acts of the 
parents that allegedly caused Kara's death but rather on the 
parents' omission, that is, their failure to provide Kara 
medical care, which allegedly caused her death.  
¶94 Although the second-degree reckless homicide statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1), does not include specific language 
criminalizing an omission, the parties agree, as do we, that an 
actor may be criminally liable for a failure to act if the actor 
has a legal duty to act.52  
¶95 The second-degree reckless homicide statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 940.06(1), requires that a defendant "cause" the death 
of another.  An actor causes death if his or her conduct is a 
"substantial factor" in bringing about that result.53  An actor's 
                                                 
52 State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 255-56, 385 
N.W.2d 145 (1986) (criminal liability based on an omission may 
be possible when a special relationship exists between the 
accused and the victim creating a legal duty to act); State ex 
rel. Cornellier v. Black, 144 Wis. 2d 745, 758, 425 N.W.2d 21 
(Ct. App. 1988) (employer could be prosecuted for reckless 
homicide by omission). 
See also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.1 
at 422, § 6.2(a) at 434-437 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing a legal 
duty based on a relationship). 
53 State v. Oimen, 184 Wis. 2d 423, 435, 516 N.W.2d 399 
(1994). 
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2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
43 
 
"conduct" can be an act or a failure to act (an omission).  The 
parents are charged with a failure to act, that is, a failure to 
provide medical care to Kara. 
¶96 The parents argue that they did not have a legal duty 
to act and that the jury instructions that imposed such a legal 
duty were prejudicial error warranting a reversal of the 
convictions.54 
¶97 Whether a parent has a legal duty to provide medical 
care to a child is a question of law that this court determines 
independently of the circuit court but benefiting from its 
analysis.55   
¶98 The instruction regarding a parent's duty to provide 
medical care was given in the instant cases as part of the 
instruction explaining the causal element of the offense of 
second-degree 
reckless homicide.  The following causation 
instruction, as noted above, was given in the father's case: 
First, [the State must prove that] the defendant 
caused the death of Madeline Kara Neumann.  Cause 
means that the defendant's conduct was a substantial 
factor in producing the death.  Conduct can be either 
                                                 
54 The parents claim, as we explained previously, that the 
State's theory of the case and its closing argument depend in 
part on the legal duty that exists when one suffers great bodily 
harm.  They argue that according to the jury instruction and the 
State's argument, guilt was proven as soon as the parents 
observed any symptom that met the definition of great bodily 
harm, thus contravening the treatment-through-prayer protection 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6). 
55 Antwaun A. ex rel. Muwonge v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 228 
Wis. 2d 44, 54, 596 N.W.2d 456 (1999) (citations omitted). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
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by an act or omission, when the defendant has a duty 
to act. 
One such duty is the duty of a parent to protect their 
children, to care for them in sickness and in health.56 
¶99 A slightly different duty instruction, as noted above, 
was given in the mother's case, again as part of the instruction 
on the element of causation:   
First, [the State must prove that] the defendant 
caused the death of Madeline Kara Neumann.  "Cause" 
means that the defendant's conduct was a substantial 
factor in producing the death.  Conduct can be either 
by an act or an omission when the defendant has a duty 
to act. 
One such duty is the duty of a parent to protect their 
children, to care for them in sickness and in death 
[sic], and to do whatever is necessary for their 
preservation, 
including 
medical 
attendance, 
if 
necessary.57 
¶100 Although the parents characterize the instructions as 
requiring them to provide "conventional medicine," the jury 
instructions do not refer to conventional medicine.  The jury 
instructions are more general in terms of care "in sickness and 
in health" and "medical attendance, if necessary." 
¶101 The circuit court prepared these instructions on the 
basis of State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 255-56, 385 
N.W.2d 145 (1986), which drew language from Cole v. Sears 
                                                 
56 The father's defense counsel objected to this language. 
57 The circuit court incorrectly substituted the word 
"death" for the word "health."  The mother's defense counsel 
preserved any objection to the instruction about the mother's 
duty. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
45 
 
Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970), a civil 
products liability tort case.  
¶102 The 
parents 
have 
three 
objections 
to 
the 
duty 
instructions:  (1) Neither Wisconsin statutes nor Wisconsin case 
law establishes a parent's legal duty to provide medical care to 
his or her child; (2) The duty instruction given violates a 
parent's constitutional right to direct the care of his or her 
child; and (3) The statutory provision protecting treatment-
through-prayer (Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6)) negates any legal duty 
to provide medical care up to, and including, the point at which 
a child suffers great bodily harm, which includes a substantial 
risk of death. 
1 
¶103 We first determine whether Wisconsin law imposes a 
legal duty on a parent to furnish medical care to his or her 
child and, if so, under what circumstances.   
¶104 We are not aware of any single Wisconsin statute that 
describes the legal duty a parent owes to a child for medical 
care.  We are aware, however, that the statute books are replete 
with provisions imposing responsibility on parents for the care 
of their children, including the requirement that they provide 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
46 
 
medical care when necessary.58  These statutes demonstrate the 
legislature's recognition of the legal duty of parents to 
                                                 
58 See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.13(10) 
(the 
court 
has  
jurisdiction over a child whose parent, guardian, or legal 
custodian neglects, refuses, or is unable for reasons other than 
poverty to provide necessary care, food, clothing, medical or 
dental care, or shelter so as to seriously endanger the physical 
health of the child.); Wis. Stat. § 767.41(1m)(f), (g) & (i) 
(upon divorce, parents seeking custody of a child must file a 
parenting plan that prescribes which doctor will provide medical 
care for the child, how the child's medical expenses will be 
paid, and who will make the decisions about the child's medical 
care); Kuchenbecker v. Schultz, 151 Wis. 2d 868, 874-76 n.2, 447 
N.W.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1989) (the child support statute requires 
that the responsibility for the child's health care be assigned 
to a specific parent and that there be adequate funding to 
fulfill the child's health care needs). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
47 
 
support and protect their children, including providing them 
with medical care, when necessary.59   
                                                 
59 Other jurisdictions have also recognized a parent's legal 
duty to care for his or her child, including the duty to provide 
medical care.  Some base this duty on statutes explicitly 
defining the duty; others base this duty on common law; and 
still others base this duty on numerous statutes recognizing a 
parent's obligations, such as child support statutes.  See, 
e.g., Faunteroy v. United States, 413 A.2d 1394, 1299-1300 (D.C. 
1980) (parents had a common law natural duty, as well as a 
statutory duty to provide medical care for their minor dependent 
children) (compiling cases from other jurisdictions); Scott 
County School Dist. 1 v. Asher, 324 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ind. 1975) 
(a parent has a common law, and in some instances a statutory 
duty, to support and maintain his child, which includes the 
provision of necessary medical care); Craig v. State, 155 A.2d 
684, 691 (Md. 1959) (Christian Science parents find themselves 
under the same statutory duty to provide medical care for their 
minor children when the circumstances require such care, as do 
all other parents.  Treating their child in accordance with the 
tenets of Christian Science did not render such treatment the 
legal equivalent of medical care.); People v. Steinberg, 595 
N.E.2d 845, 847 (N.Y. 1992) (parents "have a nondelegable 
affirmative duty to provide their children with adequate medical 
care" and thus, the failure to perform that duty can form the 
basis of a criminal charge); Commonwealth v. Foster, 764 A.2d 
1076, 
1082 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) ("The law imposes an 
affirmative duty on parents to seek medical help when the life 
of a child is threatened, regardless, and in fact despite, their 
religious beliefs."); State v. Morgan, 936 P.2d 20, 22 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1997) (Washington has long recognized a natural 
parental duty, existing independently of the statutes, to 
provide medical care for minor children).  
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
48 
 
¶105 We turn next to the case law, which is instructive.  
The lead case is State v. Williquette, which discusses and 
recognizes a parent's legal duty to protect his or her child.  
Although the case does not involve the second-degree reckless 
homicide statute or medical care, the case is important because 
of its wide-ranging discussion of the parental duty owed to 
one's child.60  In Williquette, a mother was prosecuted under a 
now-repealed statute that criminalized "subject[ing] a child to 
cruel maltreatment."61  The allegation was that the mother, 
knowing of her husband's abuse of the children, continued to 
leave the children in her husband's care and did nothing to stop 
the abuse.  The Williquette court considered the mother's 
leaving the children with the husband under these circumstances 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also D.C. Barrett, Homicide: Failure to Provide Medical 
or Surgical Attention, 100 A.L.R. 2d 483 (1965) (made current by 
weekly addition of released cases) (collecting cases on the duty 
to provide medical care); Baruch Gitlin, Parents' Criminal 
Liability for Failure to Provide Medical Attention to their 
Children, 118 A.L.R. 5th 253 (2004) (made current by weekly 
addition of released cases) (collecting cases including cases on 
the spiritual treatment defense); Donna K. LeClair, Comment, 
Faith-Healing 
and 
Religious-Treatment 
Exemptions 
to 
Child-
Endangerment Laws:  Should Parental Religious Practices Excuse 
the Failure to Provide Necessary Medical Care to Children?, 13 
U. Dayton L. Rev. 79 (1987). 
60 For a discussion of the Williquette case, see, e.g., 
State v. Rundle, 176 Wis. 2d 985, 995-999, 500 N.W.2d 916 
(1993). 
61 The statute under which Williquette was prosecuted was 
repealed.  The legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 948.03(4) to 
codify the case law and create criminal liability for failing to 
act to prevent child abuse.  See Comments——1987 Act 332, Wis. 
Stat. Ann. § 948.03 (West 2005). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
49 
 
to be overt conduct.62  Nevertheless, the court also concluded 
that if there were no overt act, the mother still could be 
convicted of the crime because "[t]he relationship between a 
parent and a child exemplifies a special relationship where the 
duty to protect is imposed."63 
¶106 The Williquette court explained that a parent has a 
duty "to do whatever may be necessary for [a child's] care, 
maintenance, and preservation, including medical attendance, if 
necessary."64  It explained that a parent's omission to fulfill 
this duty is a public wrong, which the State may prevent using 
its police powers.65 
¶107 The Williquette court adopted the following language 
from Cole as the rule of the legal duty applicable to the 
parent-child relationship: 
It is the right and duty of parents under the law of 
nature as well as the common law and the statutes of 
many states to protect their children, to care for 
them in sickness and in health, and to do whatever may 
be 
necessary 
for 
their 
care, 
maintenance, 
and 
preservation, 
including 
medical 
attendance, 
if 
necessary.  An omission to do this is a public wrong 
which the state, under its police powers, may prevent. 
The child has the right to call upon the parent for 
the discharge of this duty, and public policy for the 
good of society will not permit or allow the parent to 
                                                 
62 Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d at 250. 
63 Id. at 255. 
64 Id. at 255-56 (quoting Cole v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 
Wis. 2d 629, 634, 177 N.W.2d 886 (1970)). 
65 Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d at 255-56 (quoting Cole, 47 
Wis. 2d at 634). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
50 
 
divest himself irrevocably of his obligations in this 
regard or to abandon them at his mere will or 
pleasure. . . . 39 Am. Jur., Parent and Child, p. 669, 
sec. 46.66   
¶108 The Cole court also defined the parents' duty to 
provide medical services and the necessities of health as 
follows:  
The 
legal 
obligation to provide food, clothing, 
housing, medical and dental services deals with the 
necessities of health, morals and well-being with 
which a child must be provided, or the parents' 
failure in this regard may be prevented by the state.67 
¶109 A parent's legal duty to provide medical care to a 
child has been acknowledged in numerous court of appeals 
decisions.68  Still, despite the longstanding case law on the 
subject of the legal duty of parents, Kara's parents suggest 
that the circuit court drew the duty instruction given in the 
instant case from inapposite case law.  We do not agree with the 
parents.    
¶110 The 
Williquette 
court 
engaged 
in 
an 
extensive 
discussion and explanation of how a parent's omission may 
constitute an element of a crime, even when the criminal statute 
is silent regarding omissions.  The case established that when a 
                                                 
66 Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d at 255-56 (quoting Cole, 47 
Wis. 2d at 634). 
67 Cole v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 634, 177 
N.W.2d 866 (1970) (emphasis added). 
68 See, e.g., Gardner v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2002 WI 
App 85, ¶21, 252 Wis. 2d 768, 642 N.W.2d 646; Thomas C. v. 
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 180 Wis. 2d 146, 151-52, 509 
N.W.2d 81 (1993); Kuchenbecker v. Schultz, 151 Wis. 2d 868, 875-
76, 447 N.W.2d 80 (1989). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
51 
 
special 
relationship 
exists 
between 
persons, 
like 
the 
relationship between a parent and a child, Wisconsin law imposes 
a duty on the parent to protect the child.  
¶111 We therefore reaffirm the parental duty adopted in 
Williquette and Cole and confirm that a parent has a legal duty 
to provide medical care for a child if necessary. 
2 
¶112 We next consider the parents' alternative position 
that in any event the jury instructions imposing a legal duty on 
a parent to provide medical care for their child violate a 
parent's fundamental right under the United States Constitution 
to direct the care of his or her child.   
¶113  We accept the parents' premise that the Due Process 
clause "protects the fundamental right of parents to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their 
children."69  Nevertheless, as the United States Supreme Court 
explained in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), a 
parent's fundamental right to make decisions concerning his or 
her child is not unlimited:   
[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the 
public interest, as against a claim of religious 
liberty.  And neither rights of religion nor rights of 
parenthood are beyond limitation.  Acting to guard the 
general interest in youth's well being, the state as 
parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by 
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting 
the child's labor, and in many other ways.  Its 
authority is not nullified merely because the parent 
grounds his claim to control the child's course of 
                                                 
69 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).  
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
52 
 
conduct on religion or conscience.  Thus, he cannot 
claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the 
child more than for himself on religious grounds.  The 
right to practice religion freely does not include 
liberty to expose the community or the child to 
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or 
death.70 
¶114 In Prince, the parents claimed their religious beliefs 
required their children to sell religious tracts.  They asserted 
a free exercise of religion claim justifying their violation of 
a state child labor law.  The Court concluded that a right to 
freely exercise one's religion did not absolve the parents from 
their responsibility to obey child labor laws.  The Court 
explained that "[t]he right to practice religion freely does not 
include liberty to expose the . . . child to . . . ill health or 
death."71   
¶115 Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court, limited the 
scope of a parent's fundamental right to make decisions 
concerning his or her child, pointing out that in the name of 
religion,  
[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves.  
But it does not follow they are free, in identical 
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children 
before they have reached the age of full and legal 
discretion 
when 
they 
can 
make 
that 
choice 
for 
themselves.72  
                                                 
70 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) 
(internal citations omitted).  
71 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67.  See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972). 
72 Prince, 321 U.S. at 170. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
53 
 
¶116 The parents' fundamental right to make decisions for 
their children about religion and medical care does not prevent 
the State from imposing criminal liability on a parent who fails 
to protect the child when the parent has a legal duty to act.73 
¶117 We conclude that the jury instructions imposing a 
legal duty on a parent to provide medical care for his or her 
child when necessary do not violate a parent's fundamental 
constitutional right to direct the care of his or her child.  
"[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are 
beyond limitation."74   
3 
¶118 The parents' final challenge to the jury instructions 
echoes themes similar to the due process fair notice arguments 
discussed 
above. 
 
According 
to 
the 
parents, 
the 
jury 
instructions explaining that a parent has an affirmative duty to 
provide medical care to his or her child are legally incorrect 
because the protection for treatment through prayer defines a 
                                                 
73 The parents also argue that the jury instructions 
regarding their legal duty to provide medical care are both 
unconstitutionally vague and conflict with the protection for 
treatment through prayer set forth in Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6).   
The parents assert (without significant development) that 
the concepts of "protecting one's children," caring for them in 
sickness and in health (and death), and providing "medical 
attendance, if necessary," are simply too general to give 
sufficient guidance to either the parents or the juries.  Again, 
we note that only a fair degree of definiteness is required.  
This language is sufficient when read with the other jury 
instructions. 
74 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
54 
 
parent's legal duty and permits a parent to fulfill a legal duty 
of medical care by treating his or her child through prayer.  
¶119 The parents' principal argument is that § 948.03(6) 
negates any general legal parental duty to provide medical care 
in the present cases because under Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) they 
had no legal duty to provide medical care until Kara's condition 
progressed beyond a substantial risk of death.  They assert that 
until Kara's condition went beyond great bodily harm, that is, 
until Kara's condition went beyond a substantial risk of death, 
that is, until Kara stopped breathing, the parents complied with 
their legal duty to provide medical care.   
¶120 We disagree with the parents' approach.  The jury 
instructions correctly define a parent's duty to provide medical 
care.  The Williquette decision does not say that parents must 
provide medical care under any and all circumstances, even when 
medical care is not necessary.  
¶121 Thus, we conclude that the jury instructions about a 
parent's legal duty to provide medical care were not in and of 
themselves erroneous.  We discuss below the parents' contention 
that because the instructions on legal duty make no exception 
for religious beliefs or practice, the juries would have been 
misled to believe that a sincerely held religious belief in 
prayer treatment was not available to the parents as a defense 
to second-degree reckless homicide. 
B 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
55 
 
¶122 We now turn to the parents' challenge to the jury 
instructions 
regarding 
religious 
belief 
and 
government 
regulation of conduct.       
¶123 The parents do not claim that the second-degree 
reckless homicide statute violates their free exercise of 
religion by not explicitly protecting treatment though prayer.75  
Rather, the parents claim that the religious belief instructions 
misled the jury about the elements the State had to prove for 
convictions of the charged crime of second-degree reckless 
homicide.   
¶124 The circuit court explained that the religious belief 
instruction in each of the present cases "correctly describes 
the limits of the religious freedom by distinguishing between 
beliefs and actions."        
¶125 We agree with the circuit court that the religious 
belief instructions in and of themselves are not erroneous.  The 
United States Supreme Court has held, as the circuit court 
instructed, that "the constitutional freedom of religion is 
                                                 
75 At oral argument the parents explained that they did not 
make this argument because they did not think it a strong 
argument under federal law.  The mother noted that the circuit 
court's failure to give a sincere belief instruction makes it 
likely that the jury will assess the objective reasonableness of 
prayer treatment and encourages the violation of First Amendment 
rights.  The First Amendment, the parents argue, prohibits 
juries from assessing the truth or falsity of a defendant's 
religious beliefs.  Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant 
Leilani E. Neumann at 34 n.10.   
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
56 
 
absolute as to beliefs but not as to the conduct, which may be 
regulated for the protection of society."76 
¶126 As we explained earlier, the Due Process clause 
"protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children,"77  
but a parent's fundamental right to make decisions concerning a 
child's care has limitations.  The state's authority is not 
nullified merely because a parent grounds his or her claim to 
control the child in religious belief.  
¶127 We conclude that the circuit court's instructions 
regarding religious belief were not in and of themselves 
erroneous.  We discuss below the parents' contention that 
because the instructions make no exception for religious beliefs 
or practice the juries would have been misled to believe that a 
sincerely held religious belief in prayer treatment was not 
available in the present cases to the parents as a defense to 
second-degree reckless homicide.        
C 
¶128 Even though we conclude that the jury instructions 
about legal duty and religious belief were not erroneous, we 
                                                 
76 See, e.g., Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources 
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) ("We have never 
held that an individual's beliefs excuse him from compliance 
with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State 
is free to regulate."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 
(1963) (collecting cases); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 166 (1878) (prohibiting plural marriage even though the 
prohibition infringed on the free exercise of religion). 
77 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
57 
 
must address the parents' central contention that these jury 
instructions, combined with the circuit court's refusal to 
instruct the jury about the effect of a parent's sincere belief 
in prayer treatment on the subjective awareness element of 
second-degree reckless homicide, undermined the parents' ability 
to defend themselves.  According to the parents, a sincere 
belief in prayer treatment may negate the subjective awareness 
element.  They contend that the instructions told the jury that 
the parents had a legal duty to provide medical care (regardless 
of religious belief) and that religious-based conduct could be 
criminalized, but that the jurors were not instructed that a 
sincere belief in prayer treatment may negate the subjective 
awareness element of second-degree reckless homicide.   
¶129 The 
parents 
contend 
that 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
instructions that were and were not given, the jurors did not 
understand that they could find a parent not guilty of the crime 
if they found that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the parent in his or her own mind was aware of the 
risk of death or substantial harm.78   
                                                 
78 Professor LaFave observes:   
As for the defense of religious belief, it is no 
interference with one's freedom of religion to convict 
of manslaughter one who, for religious reasons, fails 
to call a doctor when to fail to do so constitutes 
criminal negligence [sometimes referred to in some 
statutes as criminal recklessness].  Yet an honest 
religious belief that prayer is a better cure than 
medicine, 
that 
Providence 
can 
heal 
better 
than 
doctors, might serve to negative the awareness of risk 
which is required for manslaughter in those states 
which use a subjective test of criminal negligence. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
58 
 
¶130 The circuit court rejected the mother's following 
proffered instruction on the mother's religious belief:  
If Leilani Neumann believed that prayer would heal her 
daughter, Madeline Kara Neumann, then you must find 
her not guilty. 
¶131 The 
circuit 
court 
rejected 
this 
instruction 
as 
inaccurately reflecting the law.  The focus of a defense to the 
charged crime, ruled the circuit court, should be on the 
parent's subjective awareness of the risk involved, not on the 
parent's subjective belief in the effectiveness of prayer.    
¶132 The father did not proffer an instruction relating to 
religious belief or the effect of a belief in faith-healing on a 
finding of guilt.  During jury deliberations, the jury did 
submit a question relating to the issue: 
Was Dale's belief in faith-healing something that 
makes him not liable for not taking Kara to the 
hospital, even though he was aware to some degree she 
was not feeling well?    
¶133 Unfortunately, the record does not reflect exactly 
what the circuit court told the jury in response to this 
question.  According to the transcript of the proceedings 
relating to the jury's questions, the father and the State could 
not agree on a response for the circuit court to make to the 
jury's question but did agree to have the circuit court advise 
the jury to reread the instructions and consider them as given.  
The father contends that the jury's question demonstrates the 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 15.4(a) at 525 
n.28 (2d ed. 2003). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
59 
 
jury's uncertainty as to whether it could consider his defense 
of his subjective belief in prayer treatment to the element of 
subjective awareness.     
¶134 As we said in State v. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, ¶57, 313 
Wis. 2d 1, 752 N.W.2d 839, "the necessity for, extent of, and 
form of reinstruction" is within the trial court's discretion.  
If the given instructions as a whole correctly state the law, 
the circuit court's discretionary decision to redirect the jury 
to those instructions does not warrant a new trial.79 
¶135 Still, the parents urge that the circuit court's 
refusal to give any jury instructions about the parents' 
subjective 
religious 
belief, 
combined 
with 
the 
duty 
and 
religious 
belief 
instructions 
given, 
led 
to 
each 
jury's 
inadequate understanding of how the sincere belief in prayer 
treatment could negate a parent's subjective awareness of the 
risk of death or great bodily harm.  They assert that the 
instruction given——that the parent must be aware that his or her 
conduct created the unreasonable and substantial risk of death 
or great bodily harm——is not specific enough for a juror to have 
understood that the parent's sincere belief in faith healing 
could be a complete defense.  Indeed, the parents claim that the 
two instructions that they challenge and the failure of the 
circuit court to instruct on a subjective belief about prayer in 
                                                 
79 State v. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, ¶57, 313 Wis. 2d 1, 752 
N.W.2d 839 (internal citations omitted). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
60 
 
effect told the jury that no such defense existed.  Thus the 
parents conclude that the real controversy was not fully tried. 
¶136 The parents do not offer in their briefs in this court 
a specific instruction on the defense of subjective religious 
belief.  Rather, they explain the relationship between the 
requested 
specific 
religious 
belief 
instruction 
and 
the 
subjective awareness element in terms of causation.   
• 
The mother claims that the parents "must be aware not 
only that their daughter was experiencing great bodily 
harm, but that their conduct was causing the great 
bodily harm."80  
• 
The mother maintains that "the reckless homicide 
statute requires more than mere awareness of the 
illness; it requires that the defendant is aware that 
her conduct is causing the illness.  There can be no 
such awareness of causation if a person believes that 
prayer, not conventional medicine, is the most likely 
healing method."81  
• 
The father espouses a similar position:  "The [S]tate 
had to prove that Dale was subjectively aware 'that 
his conduct created the unreasonable and substantial 
risk 
of 
death 
or 
great 
bodily 
harm.' . . . The 
defense, in essence, was that if Dale sincerely 
                                                 
80 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Leilani E. 
Neumann at 35 (emphasis in original). 
81 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Leilani E. 
Neumann at 40 (emphasis in original). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
61 
 
believed treatment through prayer was the best means 
by which to heal his daughter, he could not, at the 
same 
time, 
have 
been 
subjectively 
'aware' 
his 
treatment by prayer was causing her death.  The issue, 
essentially, 
is 
the 
subjective 
awareness 
of 
causation."82   
¶137 The parents err in stating the subjective awareness 
element of the second-degree reckless homicide statute in terms 
of causation.   
¶138 The second-degree reckless homicide statute does not 
require, as the parents claim, that the actor be subjectively 
aware that his conduct is a cause of the death of his or her 
child.  The statute and the jury instructions require only that 
the actor be subjectively aware that his or her conduct created 
the unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily 
harm.  
¶139 Proper jury instructions are crucial to the fact-
finding process.83  Jury instructions must accurately convey the 
meaning of the statute as applied to the facts of the case.84  
This court may reverse a conviction pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06 when a jury instruction "obfuscates the real issue or 
                                                 
82 Defendant-Appellant's 
Brief 
and 
Appendix 
(Dale 
R. 
Neumann) at 32 (emphasis and bold in original). 
83 State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ¶41, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 626 
N.W.2d 762. 
84 State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶¶14, 31, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 
Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
62 
 
arguably caused the real controversy not to be fully tried."85  
We view the jury instructions in light of the proceedings as a 
whole and do not review a single instruction in isolation.86 
¶140 We conclude that a specific instruction on the sincere 
religious beliefs of the parents, as counsel request on appeal, 
was 
not 
required. 
 
The 
jury 
instructions 
regarding 
the 
subjective awareness element of second-degree reckless homicide 
were not erroneous when read with the statute or when read in 
combination with the other jury instructions.  The juries were 
instructed to consider all the instructions and to consider them 
as a whole.  The instructions adequately instructed the juries 
about the subjective awareness element.  The juries reasonably 
could have concluded on the basis of the instructions and the 
record that the parents were subjectively aware that their 
conduct created the unreasonable and substantial risk of death 
or great bodily harm and were guilty of second-degree reckless 
homicide.  We therefore will not exercise our discretion to 
reverse the convictions on the basis of the jury instructions. 
D 
¶141 The parents next argue that the real controversy was 
not fully tried because their counsels' performances constituted 
                                                 
85 Perkins, 243 Wis. 2d 141, ¶12. 
86 State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 194, 556 N.W.2d 90 
(1996). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
63 
 
ineffective assistance of counsel.87  They maintain that their 
counsel did not ensure that the jury was properly instructed to 
make clear that a "sincere belief" in treatment through prayer 
was a defense to the subjective awareness element of second-
degree reckless homicide and did not, in their arguments to the 
jury, explain the connection between prayer and the subjective 
awareness 
element 
of 
the 
second-degree 
reckless 
homicide 
statute. 
                                                 
87 Review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
review of a mixed question of law and fact.  Thus, the circuit 
court's findings of fact will not be overturned unless clearly 
erroneous.  The ultimate determinations of whether counsel's 
performance was deficient and prejudicial to the defendant are 
questions of law which this court determines independently of 
the circuit court but benefiting from its analysis.  State v. 
Johnson, 
153 
Wis. 2d 121, 
127-28, 
449 
N.W.2d 845 
(1990) 
(internal citations omitted). 
The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
in 
Strickland 
v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), set forth a two-part test for 
determining whether counsel's actions constitute ineffective 
assistance.  The first test requires the defendant to show that 
his counsel's performance was deficient.  This requires showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment.  Review of counsel's performance gives great 
deference to the attorney and every effort is made to avoid 
determinations of ineffectiveness based on hindsight.  Rather, 
review is from counsel's perspective at the time of trial, and 
the burden is placed on the defendant to overcome a strong 
presumption that counsel acted reasonably within professional 
norms. 
Even if counsel's performance is found deficient, a 
judgment will not be reversed unless the defendant proves that 
the counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense.   
The parents appear to join their ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim with their argument that counsels' ineffective 
performances justify reversal in the interest of justice. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
64 
 
¶142 We have concluded that the jury instructions were not 
erroneous and that trial counsel were not deficient for failing 
to ensure that an additional instruction was given to the jury 
as requested here.  
¶143 The parents also maintain that counsel were deficient 
for failing to adequately explain the relationship of the 
sincere religious belief defense and the subjective awareness 
element.   
¶144 The father's counsel did make a sincere religious 
belief argument in closing.  The mother argues that her trial 
counsel planned to present a "sincere belief defense," but did a 
poor job of it and did not make the defense clear enough to the 
jury.   
¶145 Although neither the words "sincere religious belief" 
nor similar words are in the mother's counsel's closing 
argument, the mother's counsel did tell the jury that the mother 
did not understand the severity of Kara's condition; that the 
mother lacked awareness that her choice of prayer over medical 
care was life-threatening to Kara; and that as soon as the 
mother understood that Kara's condition was perhaps beyond 
prayer, the mother acted.  We agree with the mother that these 
comments were not a major part of counsel's closing argument.  
¶146 Although trial counsel might have explained more fully 
how the sincere belief defense related to the subjective 
awareness element, this court will not second-guess trial 
counsel's selection of trial tactics in the face of alternatives 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
65 
 
that have been weighed in hindsight.88  This court approaches a 
request for a new trial "with great caution," and we are 
"reluctant to grant a new trial in the interest of justice.89  
"The [interest of justice] statute [Wis. Stat. § 751.06] was not 
intended to vest this court with power of discretionary reversal 
to enable a defendant to present an alternative defense at a new 
trial merely because the defense presented at the first trial 
proved ineffective."90  
¶147 We have reviewed the record and considered the 
parents' and the State's arguments on reversing the convictions 
in the interest of justice.  In light of the jury instructions, 
which were not erroneous, and in light of counsels' closing 
arguments relating to the subjective awareness element of 
second-degree reckless homicide, we will not exercise our 
discretion to reverse the convictions.  We conclude that the 
real issue in controversy was fully tried.    
IV 
¶148 The final issue is whether the father's jurors were 
objectively biased because they were informed that the mother 
                                                 
88 State v. Elm, 201 Wis. 2d 452, 464-65, 549 N.W.2d 471 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
89 State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, ¶114, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 
700 N.W.2d 98.  See also State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶38, 345 
Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60.  
90 State v. Hubanks, 173 Wis. 2d 1, 29, 496 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. 
App. 1992). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
66 
 
had previously been convicted of the same crime for which they 
now had to determine the father's guilt. 
¶149 The mother's trial was held first.  She was convicted 
on May 22, 2009.  The father's trial was scheduled to begin on 
July 23, 2009.   
¶150 The mother's trial had generated immense publicity in 
Marathon County.  Concerned about the father's right to a fair 
trial, the circuit court suggested two possible solutions: 
change of venue or postponement of the trial.  The father 
rejected both suggestions, asserting his right to a speedy trial 
in Marathon County.   
¶151 On the morning jury selection began, the circuit court 
held an in-chambers conference.  No record was made of this in-
chambers conference.   
¶152 Later that morning, the assistant district attorney 
and the father's counsel stipulated on the record that each 
prospective juror would be informed of the mother's prior 
conviction during individual voir dire.  The father and the 
State apparently feared some jurors would know about the 
mother's conviction and others would not.  The State and the 
father preferred that all jurors have the same information.  
Also, the father apparently believed that the circuit court had 
determined, in chambers and off the record, that knowledge of 
the mother's conviction alone would not disqualify a person from 
serving on the father's jury.   
¶153 The father now argues that the jurors were objectively 
biased and that the circuit court erred by not automatically 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
67 
 
disqualifying any person from the jury pool who knew of the 
mother's conviction.91   
¶154 A criminal defendant's right to be tried by impartial 
and unbiased jurors is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.92  Prospective jurors 
are presumptively impartial, and the challenger to a juror bears 
the burden of proving bias.93  An inquiry into objective bias of 
a juror asks whether a reasonable person under the circumstances 
could be impartial.94      
                                                 
91 The State argues that the father did not properly 
preserve this issue in the circuit court and forfeited or waived 
the issue on appeal.  See State v. Lewis, 2010 WI App 52, ¶26, 
324 Wis. 2d 536, 781 N.W.2d 730 (a failure of a defendant to 
object on the record to an allegedly prejudicial communication 
to the jury venire waives the issue for appeal); State v. 
Williams, 2000 WI App 123, ¶¶19-21, 237 Wis. 2d 591, 614 
N.W.2d 11 (failure to object to the impaneling of a biased juror 
waives the issue for appeal). 
We need not address this argument.  Because a record was 
not made of conversations between the circuit court and counsel 
on this issue and because of the importance of an unbiased jury, 
we exercise our discretion to address the issue of jury bias.  
See State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶44, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 
N.W.2d 737 
("Juror 
bias 
seriously 
affects 
the 
fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and is 
per se prejudicial."). 
92 State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 715, 596 N.W.2d 770 
(1999). 
93 State v. Meehan, 2001 WI App 119, ¶35 n.7, 244 
Wis. 2d 121, 630 N.W.2d 722 (citing Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 
723, (1961)). 
94 State 
v. 
Kiernan, 
227 
Wis. 2d 736, 
747 
n.7, 
596 
N.W.2d 760 (1999). 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
68 
 
¶155 The question whether a juror is objectively biased is 
a mixed question of fact and law.  A circuit court's findings of 
fact will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.  Whether 
those facts fulfill the legal standard of objective bias is a 
question of law.  This court ordinarily decides questions of law 
independently 
of 
the 
circuit 
court. 
 
A 
circuit 
court's 
conclusion on objective juror bias is, however, intertwined with 
the facts of the case.  Consequently, "it is appropriate that 
this court give weight to the circuit court's conclusion on that 
question."95  This court will "reverse [the circuit court's] 
conclusion [on a juror's objective bias] only if as a matter of 
law 
a 
reasonable 
court 
could 
not 
have 
reached 
such 
a 
conclusion."96     
¶156 The circuit court made inquiry of each juror to 
determine whether the person was reasonable and would be willing 
to set aside knowledge of the mother's conviction in assessing 
the father's guilt.  The circuit court informed each juror about 
the mother's conviction; told each juror that the information 
could be used only to assess the mother's credibility, if she 
testified; and obtained from each juror an assurance that he or 
she would decide the father's case solely upon the evidence 
presented.  The circuit court told the jurors that "the evidence 
as to this defendant and how he reacted to the situation may be 
                                                 
95 Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 720. 
96 Id. at 721. 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
69 
 
different, therefore there may be a different result.  Do you 
understand that?"  
¶157 The circuit court concluded on postconviction motions 
that it was extraordinary to inform potential jurors of a prior 
conviction of a co-defendant; that these were extraordinary 
cases and circumstances; and that the law did not require 
automatic disqualification of a juror who knew of a co-
defendant's conviction.  The circuit court ruled that it "cannot 
find that trial counsel's agreement [to inform the jurors of the 
mother's conviction] to be defective performance."  Had the 
circuit court concluded that the jurors were objectively biased, 
the circuit court would have had to conclude that trial 
counsel's stipulation to inform the jurors of the mother's 
conviction amounted to ineffective assistance by trial counsel.  
¶158 We recognize that evidence of a co-defendant's guilt, 
under some circumstances, can be prejudicial to the defendant on 
trial, and in cases in other jurisdictions, convictions have 
been overturned on this ground.   
¶159 In the present case, the same charges were brought 
against the mother and father.  The circumstances of the father 
and 
mother 
were 
substantially 
the 
same. 
 
Nevertheless, 
circumstances in the present case justified informing the jury 
about the mother's status.  A speedy trial in the county was 
requested.  The mother's case had been given immense publicity 
in the county.  It was important to prevent the jury from 
inferring that the mother went unpunished or that the father was 
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
70 
 
being singled out for prosecution.97   Furthermore, in order to 
convict the father, the jury had to find that the State proved 
the father had a subjective awareness that his conduct created 
an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily 
harm to Kara.  The jury was admonished that the mother's and 
father's circumstances are not precisely the same, that their 
reactions may be different, and the results of the two trials 
may be different.   
¶160 On our independent review of the record and giving 
weight to the circuit court's consideration of lack of juror 
bias, we conclude that the father has not sustained his burden 
to show that reasonable persons in the juror's position under 
the circumstances of the instant case could not set aside their 
knowledge of the mother's conviction.     
* * * * 
                                                 
97 United States v. Sanders, 893 F.2d 133, 136-37 (7th Cir. 
1990) (after a limiting instruction that co-defendant's guilty 
plea was not to be considered as evidence against defendant, 
admission of evidence of co-defendant's guilty plea was proper 
so that jury was not left to infer that co-defendant went 
unpunished or that defendant on trial was singled out for 
prosecution); United States v. McGrath, 811 F.2d 1022, 1024 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (even when no limiting instruction was given, 
informing jury of co-defendant's guilt was not prejudicial 
error; important that jury not infer that defendant had been 
singled out for prosecution while co-defendant was permitted to 
go free); United States v. Barrientos, 758 F.2d 1152, 1156 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (when co-defendant is absent, or disappears mid-trial 
after 
pleading 
guilty, 
better 
practice 
is 
for 
court 
to 
acknowledge absence and instruct jury that absence is to have no 
effect on the verdict regarding remaining defendants).   
No. 
2011AP1044-CR & 2011AP1105-CR   
 
71 
 
¶161 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
second-degree reckless homicide statute and criminal child abuse 
statute provide sufficient notice that the parents' conduct 
could have criminal consequences if their daughter died.  We 
further conclude that the jury instructions were not erroneous; 
that trial counsels' performance was not ineffective assistance 
of counsel; that the controversy was fully tried; and that the 
jury in the father's case was not objectively biased. 
¶162 Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of convictions 
and orders denying postconviction relief. 
¶163 By the Court.—The judgments of conviction and orders 
denying postconviction relief are affirmed. 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶164 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Dale and Leilani 
Neumann are not likely to be viewed sympathetically by people 
who read the statement of facts in the majority opinion.  The 
Neumanns' 
reaction 
to 
their 
daughter's 
illness 
was 
so 
inconsistent with the normative behavior of most contemporary 
parents that it is hard for people to identify with them or to 
understand their thinking and values.   
¶165 It would be easy to look away from such unconventional 
defendants and say nothing.  But the issues involved in these 
cases are too important for me to remain silent.  First, the 
facts are not as black and white as they initially appear.  
Second, the law governing the facts is imprecise and quite 
confusing.  Finally, the trials of the two defendants were 
problematic in several respects. 
¶166 The primary purpose of this writing is not to try to 
change the result but to encourage the bench, the bar, and the 
Wisconsin Legislature to revisit some of the troublesome 
questions these cases present. 
I 
¶167 Madeline 
Kara 
Neumann, 
11, 
died 
from 
diabetic 
ketoacidosis resulting from untreated juvenile onset diabetes 
mellitus.  Majority op., ¶1.  The theory of the prosecution and 
of the majority is that Kara would still be alive if her parents 
had provided her with medical care. 
¶168 Diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) is one of the most serious 
complications of diabetes.  Michelle A. Charfen & Madonna 
Fernández-Frackelton, Diabetic Ketoacidosis, 23 Emergency Med. 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
Clinics N. Am. 609, 609 (2005).  It is a life-threatening 
condition that requires prompt hospitalization and treatment.  
Malcolm Nattrass, Diabetic ketoacidosis, 34 Med. 104, 104 
(2006).  Even minor delays in recognizing the condition can have 
an effect on survival.  Id.  DKA results from insulin deficiency 
and excess insulin counter-regulatory hormones.  Charfen, supra, 
at 609.  Before the discovery of insulin in 1921, DKA caused 
death in 100 percent of cases, but now that insulin is available 
for treating diabetes, DKA's rate of mortality has declined to 
between four percent and ten percent.  Id.  However, mortality 
rates are higher when patients seek treatment from non-
specialists.  Lynne Jerreat, Managing diabetic ketoacidosis, 24 
Nursing Standard 49, 50 (Apr. 28, 2010).  Every year, there are 
approximately 100,000 hospitalizations for DKA in the United 
States, and new-onset diabetics make up 30 percent of patients 
who develop DKA.  Charfen, supra, at 610. 
¶169 DKA often causes vague symptoms like fatigue, nausea, 
vomiting, and abdominal pain.  Id.  In addition, patients often 
complain of excessive urination, thirst, and hunger, which are 
more suggestive of DKA.  Id.  Roughly 25 percent of patients 
produce vomit with a coffee ground appearance.  Id.  Patients 
with DKA appear exhausted and dehydrated and may have Kussmaul 
respirations, a "pattern of deep, sighing respirations."  Id. at 
613.  Also, the breath of DKA patients may have a fruity odor 
due to acetone in their breath.  Id.  However, not everyone can 
smell ketones, so the fruity smell is not always a reliable way 
to diagnose the condition.  Jerreat, supra, at 49.  DKA patients 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
may not be entirely conscious as the condition progresses, and 
in severe cases, the patient may slip into a coma.  Charfen, 
supra, at 613-14.  Symptoms such as acute abdominal pain could 
result from a variety of conditions, and non-specialists, as 
opposed to endocrinologists, may be more likely to order extra 
diagnostic tests and procedures that delay diagnosis.  Claresa 
S. Levetan, Kathleen A. Jablonski, Maureen D. Passaro, & Robert 
E. Ratner, Effect of Physician Specialty on Outcomes in Diabetic 
Ketoacidosis, 22 Diabetes Care 1790, 1793 (1999).   
¶170 DKA is more common in children under five years of age 
and in children whose families lack access to proper health 
care.  Joseph Wolfsdorf, Nicole Glaser, & Mark A. Sperling, 
Diabetic Ketoacidosis in Infants, Children, and Adolescents, 29 
Diabetes Care 1150, 1151 (2006).  A recent survey revealed that 
children are at a higher risk of developing DKA if their parents 
have low incomes and low educational achievements.  Id.  DKA is 
also more prevalent when the family does not have health 
insurance because the parents delay seeking treatment.  Id.   
¶171 In this case, the majority opinion explains that "Kara 
had suffered gradually worsening symptoms for a few weeks before 
her 
death, 
leading 
to 
frequent 
thirst 
and 
urination, 
dehydration, weakness, and exhaustion."  Majority op., ¶11.  The 
parties 
stipulated, 
however, 
that 
"to 
the 
casual 
observer, . . . Kara would have appeared healthy as late as the 
Thursday before she died."  Id. 
¶172 According to the majority, Kara did some of her 
homework on Friday, March 21, 2008, but was too tired to finish.  
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
Id., ¶12.  She ate dinner in her bedroom.  Id.  The majority 
does not state whether either of the Neumanns remained at home 
during the day on Friday, but one of the briefs asserts that 
Leilani Neumann came home from work about 6:00 p.m.   
¶173 On Saturday, Kara had the capacity to ask her parents 
whether she could stay home instead of going to work at the 
family's coffee shop.  Id.  Leilani left to work at the shop, 
returning home Saturday afternoon.  Id.  According to his brief, 
Dale stayed home to work on the family's taxes.  When Leilani 
arrived home she "knew that something was wrong [with Kara] and 
called her husband into the room.  The parents began rubbing 
Kara's legs and praying for her."  Id.   
¶174 From the facts set out in the majority opinion, it 
appears that the critical time period to examine is the period 
from Saturday afternoon, when Leilani returned from work, to 
Sunday afternoon when Kara died.   
¶175 When Leilani returned home, "Kara was pale and her 
legs were skinny and blue."  Id.  She had slept all day.  Id.  
The parents realized that their daughter was ill and they began 
to pray, and to enlist others to pray as well.  Id., ¶¶13, 15–
16. 
¶176 Paragraphs 17–27 of the majority opinion describe the 
last 23–24 hours of Kara's life.  There are facts and 
descriptions in the State's briefs that paint an even more 
disturbing picture of events than the account in the majority 
opinion.  However, there are representations of fact in the 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
briefs of the two defendants that lay out a different, more 
optimistic view of the situation. 
¶177 There is some dispute about when Kara went into a 
coma. 
 
A 
coma 
is 
a 
"state 
of 
deep, 
often 
prolonged 
unconsciousness . . . in which an individual is incapable of 
sensing or responding to external stimuli and internal needs."  
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 376 (3d 
ed. 1992).  A coma is often described as a state in which a 
person cannot be awakened and does not respond normally to 
light, sound, or painful stimuli.   
¶178 The majority states that the Neumann juries could find 
that Kara was "in a coma-like condition for 12 to 14 hours."  
Majority op., ¶86.  The statement appears to be consistent with 
representations in Dale's brief that, on Sunday morning, Kara 
moved her head and moaned in response to attempts to communicate 
with her.  It is not consistent with representations that Kara 
was in a coma for many hours before her death.   
¶179 In the majority opinion, there is no assertion that 
Kara vomited or that any vomit had a coffee ground appearance.  
There is no representation that the Neumanns suspected or were 
told that their daughter had a diabetic condition or that they 
detected a fruity odor on Kara's breath. 
¶180 The majority acknowledges the Neumanns' continuing 
(though clearly mistaken) belief that Kara had a fever or the 
flu, and their mistaken perception that, on Sunday morning, she 
was marginally better than she had been.  See id., ¶¶17, 20.  
The majority emphasizes the Neumanns' reservations about their 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
conduct and the advice of those who suggested that they do more 
for their daughter.  It does not mention that such advice was 
not universal.   
¶181 DKA is a very dangerous condition but it is not always 
a condition whose gravity is quickly recognized.1  To illustrate, 
DKA was at issue in a medical malpractice case decided by this 
court in 2004.  Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 
N.W.2d 866, overruled by Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. 
Fund, 2006 WI 91, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216.   
¶182 During the first few days of March 1996, five-year-old 
Shay Leigh Maurin had not been feeling well.  Id., ¶10.  "She 
was lethargic, drinking fluids all day and eating poorly."  Id.  
Shay's mother took her to a clinic on March 5 where a physician 
assistant examined her.  Id.  He diagnosed the child as having 
an ear infection and prescribed antibiotics.  Id.  However, he 
"advised that Shay should have a fingerstick blood test——used to 
check for diabetes——if her symptoms did not improve."  Id.   
¶183 "Shay's condition worsened rapidly over the next 24 
hours.  She was unable to eat, she vomited and dry-heaved, and 
the fruity odor of her breath led her mother to fear she might 
have diabetes."  Id., ¶11.  The mother brought Shay to a 
                                                 
1 By contrast, other life-threatening conditions are more 
easily recognized.  See, e.g., Shawn Francis Peters, When Prayer 
Fails: Faith Healing, Children, and the Law 136–39 (2008) 
(discussing Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1985)).  Two-year-old Justin Barnhart had an abdominal tumor 
that grew over the course of the summer and left his abdomen 
distended.  Peters, supra at 136.  Justin's parents treated him 
with prayer even as Justin grew so thin that his bones were 
visible through his skin.  Id.  Justin's parents were convicted 
of involuntary manslaughter.  Barnhart, 497 A.2d at 630.   
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
hospital late in the evening of March 6.  Id.  At this point, 
according to the opinion, "Shay's diabetes had progressed to 
acute diabetic ketoacidosis."  Id.  However, the hospital 
physician who examined her failed to diagnose any diabetic 
condition.  Id.   
¶184 The following morning, March 7, when Shay returned to 
the hospital, she was in serious pain.  Id., ¶12.  A different 
doctor diagnosed acute DKA "and attempted treatment before 
transferring Shay to Children's Hospital of Wisconsin.  Shay 
lost consciousness during the ambulance ride to [the hospital] 
and died the next day," March 8.  Id.   
¶185 In retrospect, it is hard to imagine how the first 
doctor at the hospital failed to diagnose the situation, but he 
did.  According to the facts in the opinion, the child was 
placed in an ambulance before she lost consciousness.  Because 
she died the next day, she must have been under medical care for 
at least 12 hours.   
¶186 The facts in Maurin are at odds with the majority's 
black and white narrative here and suggest that DKA does not 
manifest the same symptoms or follow the same timeline in every 
case. 
¶187 I do not read the majority opinion as faulting the 
Neumanns for failing to diagnose Kara as having DKA.  I read the 
majority opinion as holding that the Neumanns, after observing 
Kara's condition, had a duty to provide her with medical care 
because the failure to do so created an unreasonable and 
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm (that is, bodily 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
injury which creates a substantial risk of death or other 
enumerated physical injuries).  According to the majority, the 
Neumanns were aware of "that risk," and their failure to provide 
medical care caused Kara's death. 
¶188 The overriding issue in this case is whether the 
Wisconsin Statutes gave the Neumanns fair notice of their "duty" 
to act.  A larger issue is how this parental "duty" will be 
interpreted in cases where a parent is confronted with similar 
symptoms that do not arise from DKA. 
II 
 
¶189 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 940.01(1)(a) 
reads 
in 
part: 
"[W]hoever causes the death of another human being with intent 
to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A felony."  
Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1)(a) (emphasis added).  This statute, which 
has no relationship whatsoever to the present case, is generally 
regarded as the most serious homicide statute.  It is cited here 
merely to highlight the element of intent.  The phrase "with 
intent to" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 939.23 (Criminal intent) 
in subsection (4) as follows: "'With intent to' or 'with intent 
that' means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing 
or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her 
conduct is practically certain to cause that result."  Wis. 
Stat. § 939.23(4). 
 
¶190 Proving intent can be a challenge for prosecutors, but 
establishing criminal intent demonstrates culpability. 
 
¶191 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.21 is the child neglect statute.  
This statute reads, in part: 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
(1) Any person who is responsible for a child's 
welfare who, through his or her actions or failure to 
take action, intentionally contributes to the neglect 
of the child is guilty of one of the following: 
 
(a) A Class A misdemeanor. 
 
(b) A Class H felony if bodily harm is a 
consequence. 
 
(c) A Class F felony if great bodily harm 
is a consequence. 
 
(d) A 
Class 
D 
felony 
if 
death 
is 
a 
consequence. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1). 
¶192 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 948.21(1)(d) 
does 
have 
a 
relationship to this case.  It is directed toward "[a]ny 
person," including a parent, "who is responsible for a child's 
welfare."  Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1) (emphasis added).  It 
specifically contemplates a "failure to take action" that 
"contributes to the neglect of the child."  Id.  Wisconsin 
juries have long been told that "[a] child is neglected when the 
person responsible for the child's welfare fails for reasons 
other than poverty to provide necessary care, food, clothing, 
medical or dental care, or shelter so as to seriously endanger 
the physical health of the child."  Wis JI——Criminal 2150; see 
also State v. Evans, 171 Wis. 2d 471, 481, 492 N.W.2d 141 
(1992); cf. Wis. Stat. § 48.02(12g) (defining neglect).   
¶193 The penalty for child neglect that results in a 
child's death is a Class D felony.  Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1)(d).  
This is the same as the penalty for a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.06, second-degree reckless homicide. 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
¶194 Unlike Wis. Stat. § 940.06, however, Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.21, the child neglect statute, contains an intent element.  
A person cannot be convicted under the child neglect statute 
unless the person "intentionally contributes to the neglect of 
the child." (Emphasis added.)   
"Intentionally" means that the actor either has a 
purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, 
or is aware that his or her conduct is practically 
certain to cause that result.  In addition, . . . the 
actor must have knowledge of those facts which are 
necessary to make his or her conduct criminal and 
which are set forth after the word "intentionally[.]"  
Wis. Stat. § 939.23(3).   
¶195 In 
prosecuting 
the 
Neumanns, 
the 
State 
either 
overlooked or consciously chose not to prosecute under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.21(1)(d). 
 
The 
State's 
decision 
avoided 
the 
necessity of proving intent.  Instead, the State charged the 
defendants, in separate cases, with second-degree reckless 
homicide: "Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human 
being is guilty of a Class D felony."  Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1).   
¶196 This statute requires a lot of interpretation.  To 
explain "recklessly," the majority turns to the definition of 
"criminal recklessness" in Wis. Stat. § 939.24(1): "'[C]riminal 
recklessness' means that the actor creates an unreasonable and 
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another human 
being and the actor is aware of that risk." (Emphasis added.)  
The defined term is then converted to an adverb for use in Wis. 
Stat. § 940.06.   
¶197 The statutory definition of "criminal recklessness" 
contemplates an actor creating an unreasonable and substantial 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
risk of death or an unreasonable and substantial risk of great 
bodily harm and being "aware of that risk."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.24(1).  This requires consideration of the definition of 
"great bodily harm," which is defined, in part, as "bodily 
injury which creates a substantial risk of death."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.22(14).   
¶198 There is no statutory definition of "creates" or 
"substantial risk" or "aware" to turn to in applying "criminal 
recklessness." 
¶199 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.06, the second-degree reckless 
homicide statute, appears to be simple enough to apply when a 
person is creating an unreasonable risk of serious harm to 
another by the person's action.  For example, shooting a gun in 
the direction of a crowd of people creates an unreasonable and 
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm.  The statute is 
more difficult to apply when the person is not acting but 
failing to take action. 
¶200 In the present case, many people failed to act: Kara's 
parents, her siblings, her grandparents, some of the people who 
visited the Neumann family at their home.  All these people 
could have acted to alert authorities or summon medical care, 
but they did not.  Only the Neumanns have been prosecuted 
because, presumably, only the Neumanns had a "duty" to act.  
Thus, enforcement of the statute requires us to determine who 
had a duty to act and what that duty was.  These elements must 
be imported into the reckless homicide statute. 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
¶201 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.23(2)(a) is the second-degree 
reckless injury statute.  It reads: "Whoever recklessly causes 
great bodily harm to another human being is guilty of a Class F 
felony."  This statute also requires us to examine definitions 
of "recklessly" and "great bodily harm."  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 939.24(1), 939.22(14).  The majority appears to believe that 
the Neumanns could have been prosecuted under § 940.23(2)(a) for 
their failure to take action to provide medical care for Kara 
even if she had lived.   
¶202 What is confusing, however, is that Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.23(2)(a) 
appears 
to 
be 
very 
close 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.03(3)(a), which reads: "Whoever recklessly causes great 
bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class E felony."  The 
former statute refers to the victim as "another human being," 
whereas the latter refers to "a child."  Otherwise, the two 
statutes use the same words and reach at least some of the same 
conduct.2 
¶203 Significantly, subsection (6) of Wis. Stat. § 948.03 
then provides: 
Treatment through prayer.  A person is not guilty 
of an offense under this section solely because he or 
she provides a child with treatment by spiritual means 
through prayer alone for healing in accordance with 
the religious method of healing permitted under s. 
48.981(3)(c)4. or 448.03(6) in lieu of medical or 
surgical treatment.  
                                                 
2 See also Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(c) ("Whoever recklessly 
causes bodily harm to a child by conduct which creates a high 
probability of great bodily harm is guilty of a Class H 
felony."). 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
13 
 
¶204 The majority is undaunted by the clear overlapping of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.23(2)(a), the second-degree reckless injury 
statute, and Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) in terms of a person's 
action or inaction.  The majority points out that the immunity 
granted in § 948.03(6) applies only to § 948.03.  Majority op., 
¶50.  It asserts that the definition of "recklessly" in Wis. 
Stat. § 940.06 and, by implication, § 940.23, is different from 
the definition of "recklessly" in § 948.03 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.24(1). 
 
Id., 
¶73. 
 
It 
declares 
that 
it 
"is 
apparent . . . in reading the text of the statutes, that the 
phrase 'great bodily harm' is used in different ways in these 
statutes."  Id., ¶65.   
 
¶205 It is true that the immunity granted by Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.03(6) applies only to § 948.03.  But as long as that 
immunity exists, it creates uncertainty about whether specific 
conduct is immune from prosecution. 
 
¶206 The majority attacks this uncertainty, first, by 
declaring that "[n]o one reading the treatment-through-prayer 
provision should expect protection from criminal liability under 
any other statute," majority op., ¶50, which would include the 
unmentioned, overlapping Wis. Stat. § 940.23(2)(a), and, second, 
by hinting that the immunity in Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) should be 
limited through judicial construction.  Id., ¶51.  But there is 
still confusion in the law. 
 
¶207 The different definitions of "recklessly" demonstrate 
how "great bodily harm" operates differently in the two separate 
statutory schemes.  In Wis. Stat. § 940.06, "great bodily harm" 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
14 
 
is incorporated into the definition of recklessness to describe 
the nature of the prohibited conduct, whereas in Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.03(3)(a) "great bodily harm" is used to describe the 
result of the prohibited conduct.  Section 940.06(1) prohibits 
reckless conduct that results in death, where the reckless 
conduct means an action that "creates an unreasonable and 
substantial risk of death or great bodily harm."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.24(1) (emphasis added).  In contrast, § 948.03(3)(a) 
prohibits reckless conduct that causes great bodily harm, where 
the reckless conduct means "conduct which creates a situation of 
unreasonable risk of harm."  Wis. Stat. § 948.03(1) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, the difference is that Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1) 
prohibits behavior that creates a greater risk (great bodily 
harm), whereas Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) prohibits behavior that 
creates a smaller risk (harm).   
 
¶208 If the difference between the use of "great bodily 
harm" in Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1) and Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a) 
saves the two statutes from a collision, the same cannot be said 
of § 948.03(3)(c).  Section 948.03(3)(c) inexplicably states, 
"[w]hoever recklessly causes bodily harm to a child by conduct 
which creates a high probability of great bodily harm is guilty 
of a Class H felony."  Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(c).  This section 
is severely flawed because it contains a double description of 
the prohibited conduct.  Section 948.03 uses "recklessly" to 
mean conduct that "creates a situation of unreasonable risk of 
harm," § 948.03(1), but the statute goes further to define the 
prohibited conduct as that "which creates a high probability of 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
15 
 
great bodily harm."  Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(c).  It is this 
definition of prohibited conduct within § 948.03(3)(c) that 
destroys fair notice. 
 
¶209 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 940.06(1) 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.03(3)(c) regulate the same conduct and therefore do not 
provide fair notice.  The "high probability of great bodily 
harm" in § 948.03(3)(c) is almost identical to the "substantial 
risk of death or great bodily harm" in Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1).  
See Wis. Stat. § 939.24 (defining criminal recklessness as it 
applies to § 940.06(1)).  It is possible to quibble over whether 
"high probability of great bodily harm" is more or less severe 
than "substantial risk of great bodily harm," but criminal 
liability should not depend on an unwinnable battle over 
semantics.  Therefore, Wis. Stat. § 940.06(1) and Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.03(3)(c) prohibit the same conduct and differ only by the 
prohibited result.  Since § 948.03(6) provides a treatment-
through-prayer immunity for the conduct in § 948.03(3)(c), the 
parents should not be liable for that same conduct under Wis. 
Stat. § 940.06(1). 
 
¶210 In addition to the different uses of "great bodily 
harm" and different definitions of "recklessly," the majority 
suggests that the subjective awareness requirement in Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.06(1) mitigates any vagueness because it requires the 
actor to be aware of the unlawfulness of the conduct.  Majority 
op., ¶77.  However, that reasoning is not persuasive where the 
vagueness makes it impossible for parents to know what conduct 
is unlawful.  Under the Neumanns' interpretation of the statute, 
No.  2011AP1044-CR& 2011AP1105-CR.dtp 
 
16 
 
it was perfectly lawful for them to create a high probability of 
great bodily harm because the treatment-through-prayer immunity 
in Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) allowed that conduct.  Therefore, it 
is hard to see how being subjectively aware of a risk that the 
parents believed was lawful could assuage vagueness that makes 
it impossible to determine when conduct is not lawful. 
 
¶211 The word "aware" in the Wis. Stat. § 939.23 definition 
of "intentionally" (that is, "aware that his or her conduct is 
practically certain to cause [a] result") should be contrasted 
with the word "aware" in the Wis. Stat. § 939.24 definition of 
"criminal recklessness" ("aware of that risk").  When "that 
risk" is not definite, the awareness of "that risk" cannot be 
definite, either. 
 
¶212 The majority opinion explains that the due process 
issue in these prosecutions is "whether the applicable statutes 
are definite enough to provide a standard of conduct for those 
whose activities are proscribed."  Majority op., ¶33.   
Fair notice is part of the due process doctrine of 
vagueness.  "[A] statute which either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that 
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application[,] 
violates the first essential of due process of law." 
Id. (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1926)).   
 
¶213 The Neumanns claim that the reckless homicide statute 
is too murky to give sufficient notice as to when parental 
choice of treatment through prayer becomes illegal.  Given the 
nature of Kara's illness, as well as the imprecision in the 
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statutory language, I agree.  There is a due process problem 
here.  On the facts before us, the statutes are very difficult 
to understand and almost impossible to explain.  Indeed, the 
statutory scheme is so difficult to explain that if a prayer-
treating parent were to consult an attorney on how he or she 
could prayer treat and stay within the bounds of the law, 
virtually any attorney would be at a loss to reasonably advise 
the client.  The concerns stated would not have been so 
pronounced if the Neumanns had been prosecuted under the child 
neglect statute, Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1)(d).   
III 
 
¶214 The second-degree reckless homicide statute (Wis. 
Stat. § 940.06) is different from the child neglect statute 
(Wis. Stat. § 948.21) in that it does not include any explicit 
language 
authorizing 
the 
prosecution 
of 
death 
caused 
by 
omission.  The Neumanns concede, however, that defendants may be 
prosecuted for reckless homicide if they violate a known legal 
duty to act.  State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 144 
Wis. 2d 745, 758, 425 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1988).   
 
¶215 In Cornellier, the court said:   
It is just as much an "act" to deliberately or 
recklessly refrain from performing a known legal duty 
as it is to negligently perform that duty.  We 
conclude, therefore, that the statute, impliedly, if 
not directly, acknowledges that the crime of reckless 
homicide may be committed by omission, as well as 
commission.   
Id. 
 
¶216 This principle may be sound but the truth is that 
Cornellier was decided under a statute that was repealed and was 
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different from the current statute.  The former statute read as 
follows: 
Homicide by reckless conduct. (1) Whoever causes 
the death of another human being by reckless conduct 
is guilty of a Class C felony. 
 
(2) Reckless conduct consists of an act which 
creates a situation of unreasonable risk and high 
probability of death or great bodily harm to another 
and which demonstrates a conscious disregard for the 
safety of another and a willingness to take known 
chances of perpetrating an injury.  It is intended 
that this definition embraces all of the elements of 
what was heretofore known as gross negligence in the 
criminal law of Wisconsin. 
Wis. Stat. § 940.06 (1985–86). 
 
¶217 Cornellier also was heavily influenced by an alleged 
omission case, State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 385 
N.W.2d 145 (1986).  Williquette also was decided under a 
different 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.201 
(1983–84), 
which 
provided, in part, "[w]hoever . . . subjects a child to cruel 
maltreatment, 
including . . . severe 
bruising, 
lacerations, 
fractured 
bones, 
burns, 
internal 
injuries 
or 
any 
injury 
constituting great bodily harm . . . is guilty of a Class E 
felony."  Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d at 242 n.1 (quoting Wis. 
Stat. § 940.201) (emphasis added).  The word "subjects" can mean 
"[t]o expose to something"3 in contrast, say, to bruise, cut, 
fracture, or burn.  "Exposing" a person to danger may be viewed 
as an "act" or as a failure to act through passivity. 
                                                 
3 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
1788 (3d ed. 1992).   
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¶218 In any event, both Williquette and Cornellier speak, 
directly or indirectly, of a defendant's failure to perform a 
"known legal duty."  This inevitably presents the question of 
what "known legal duty" the Neumanns failed to perform. 
 
¶219 The Neumanns' "known legal duty" had to be inserted 
into the standard jury instruction for second-degree reckless 
homicide.  See Wis JI——Criminal 1060.  The jury instruction in 
Leilani Neumann's case read as follows: 
Second-degree reckless homicide is defined in 
Section 940.06 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, and 
it's committed by one who recklessly causes the death 
of another human being.  Before you may find the 
defendant guilty of second-degree reckless homicide, 
the [State] must prove by evidence which satisfies you 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the following two 
elements were present. 
First, the defendant caused the death of Madeline 
Kara Neumann.  "Cause" means that the defendant's 
conduct was a substantial factor in producing the 
death.  Conduct can be either by an act or an omission 
when the defendant has a duty to act. 
One such duty is the duty of a parent to protect 
their children, to care for them in sickness and in 
[health], and to do whatever is necessary for their 
preservation, 
including 
medical 
attendance, 
if 
necessary. 
(Emphasis added.)  The emphasized language was added by the 
circuit court to the standard jury instruction.   
¶220 The instructions in Dale Neumann's case changed the 
explanation of duty: "One such duty is the duty of a parent to 
protect their children, to care for them in sickness and in 
health." 
¶221 There is obviously a distinction between the two 
instructions.  Dale's instructions do not use the word "medical" 
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at all.  Neither instruction uses the phrase "provide medical 
care when necessary."  See majority op., ¶¶100, 104.  Neither 
instruction refers to a "known legal duty."  There was 
imprecision in the circuit court's instructions because these 
cases were breaking new ground. 
¶222 An unresolved question is whether the prayer treatment 
immunity provision in Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) modifies a parent's 
"duty" to provide medical care and, if so, when and how. 
¶223 The duty question would have been answered in a 
prosecution under the child neglect statute.  But here, in 
prosecutions for second-degree reckless homicide under Wis. 
Stat. § 940.06, the court had to make up an answer, suggesting 
that a "legal duty" was not clear.  See Majority op., ¶¶109, 
111.  This underscores the inadequate notice provided to the 
Neumanns.    
IV 
¶224 There are several aspects of the Neumann trials that 
are problematic. 
A. Jury Instructions 
 
¶225 As noted above, the jury instructions with respect to 
"duty" are not consistent and may not provide a clear, accurate 
statement of parental duty. 
 
¶226 The 
standard 
jury 
instruction 
for 
second-degree 
reckless homicide reads in part: "If you are satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of (name of 
victim) by criminally reckless conduct, you should find the 
defendant guilty of second degree reckless homicide.  If you are 
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not so satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty."  Wis 
JI——Criminal 1060.   
¶227 The circuit court followed the instruction closely in 
Dale Neumann's case.  In Leilani Neumann's case, however, the 
key paragraph is substantially rewritten to read: 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant directly committed all of the two 
elements of second-degree reckless homicide or that 
the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the 
commission 
of 
that 
crime, 
you 
should 
find 
the 
defendant guilty.  If you are not so satisfied, then 
you must find the defendant not guilty. 
¶228 The revised paragraph's reference to intentionally 
aiding and abetting "the commission of that crime," combined 
with the deletion of the phrase "caused the death of [name of 
victim]" muddles an already confusing legal analysis. 
¶229 The jury instructions make no reference to the 
religious motivation of the defendants.  It may be true that the 
defendants were not entitled to rely——in the jury instructions——
on 
the 
treatment-through-prayer 
provision 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.03(6).  However, the sole reference to religion in the 
jury instructions——"The Constitutional Freedom of Religion is 
absolute as to beliefs but not as to conduct which may be 
regulated for the protection of society"——can only be viewed as 
a repudiation of the defendants' position and a legal ruling 
that any "duty" imposed upon parents to provide medical care for 
their children is the same for prayer-treating parents as it is 
for other parents. 
B. Decisions on Dale's Jury 
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¶230 Prior to voir dire in Dale Neumann's case, counsel for 
the defendant and the State met in Judge Vincent Howard's 
chambers and had an off-the-record discussion about how a jury's 
knowledge of Leilani Neumann's prior conviction for the same 
crime would be treated.  Dale Neumann's counsel claimed that he 
objected to allowing any jurors with knowledge of the prior 
conviction to be on the panel, reasoning that "knowledge of the 
prior conviction would have to influence" a juror's decision in 
Dale Neumann's case.   
¶231 Again, 
there 
is 
no 
record 
of 
this 
in-chambers 
discussion, and thus no record of counsel's objection to jurors 
with prior knowledge of Leilani Neumann's conviction.  In his 
written decision on Dale and Leilani Neumann's joint post-
conviction motion, Judge Howard acknowledged that he probably 
"remarked off the record that prior knowledge alone does not 
necessarily disqualify a juror."  Faced with what appeared to be 
a ruling from the judge and the possibility that some jurors had 
knowledge of Leilani Neumann's conviction while some did not, 
Dale Neumann's counsel and the State agreed that all jurors 
should be informed of the wife's conviction rather than risk 
this fact being revealed during deliberations.   
 
¶232 It is troubling that Dale Neumann's jury was informed 
of Leilani Neumann's conviction, especially since the underlying 
facts were the same, the law was the same, and the parents 
appear to have made their decisions jointly in the last 24 hours 
of Kara's life.  It is hard to believe that a reasonable person 
in a juror's position at Dale Neumann's trial could have avoided 
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being influenced by the result in Leilani Neumann's trial.  Cf. 
State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 718–19, 596 N.W.2d 770 
(1999).   
 
¶233 Another concern arising out of the absence of a 
transcript of the in-chambers meeting is that we do not know 
whether Dale Neumann was present at that meeting.  If he was not 
present, he did not hear vital discussion about potential jurors 
having knowledge about Leilani's prior conviction.  That 
discussion could have affected his strategy and decision and 
might have changed the result of his trial. 
V 
 
¶234 This case is a tragedy in virtually every respect.  I 
cannot say that the result of the Neumann trials is unjust.  
Nonetheless, there were and are serious deficiencies in the law 
and they ought to be addressed by the legislature and the 
courts.  Failing to acknowledge these deficiencies will not 
advance the long-term administration of justice. 
¶235 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
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