Case Title: County of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family Limited Partnership

Citation: 120 Haw. 400

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIBRARY

***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER"™*

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT‘T

‘o00---

 

 

COUNTY OF HAWAI'I, a municipal corporation,
Plaintif£/Counterclain Defendant~Appellee

kg COUPE FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant /Counterclaimant-Appellant

oats

 

and

196 hy 22 vw sone

ROBERT NIGEL RICHARDS, TRUSTEE UNDER THE 3}
MARILYN SUE WILSON TRUST; MILES HUGH
WILSON; JOHN DOES 1-100; JANE DOES 1-100;
DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-100; DOE CORPORATIONS
1-100; DOE ENTITIES 1-100; and DOE

GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-100, Defendants

 

C&3 COUPE FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
‘Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant

1250 OCEANSIDE PARTNERS aka HOKULI'A,

Third-Party Defendant~Appellee
(00-1-0182K)

(CIV. NO.
COUNTY OF HAWAI'I, a municipal corporation,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant~Appellee

CéJ COUPE FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant /Counterciaimant /Cross Claimant-Appellant

and

1250 OCEANSIDE PARTNERS aka HOKULI‘A,
Defendant /Cross Claim Defendant-Appellee

and
“*°*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER"

 

ROBERT NIGEL RICHARDS, TRUSTEE UNDER THE MARILYN
SUE WILSON TRUST; MILES HUGH WILSON; JOHN DOES 1-100;
JANE DOES 1-100; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-100; DOE
CORPORATIONS 1-100; DOE ENTITIES 1-100; and
DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-100, Defendants
(CIV. NO. 05-1-015K)

 

 

No. 28822

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S REQUEST FOR STATUTORY DAMAGES
(CIV. NOS, 00-1-0181K; 05-1-015K)

May 22, 2009

MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, DUFFY, JJ.» AND

CIRCUIT JUDGE CHAN, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY
AMENDED OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

In County of Hawai'i v, Cid Coupe Family Ltd.
Bartnership, 119 Hawai'i 352, 198 P.3d 615 (2008), issued on
December 24, 2008, this court held that Defendant-Appellant Céy
Coupe Family Limited Partnership (Appellant) “is entitled to seek
statutory damages [from Plaintiff-Appellee County of Hawai'i (the
County)] pursuant to (Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)] § 101-27
(1993) because it prevailed in [Civil No. 00-1-181K (Condemnation

1)]," and “the property in question was not finally taken in

+ HRS § 101-27 provides in ite entirety that

nad

  

judgment, oF

> wie would have
Been entitlea to compensation or damages nad the property
been finally taken, shall be entitled. in such proceedings,
‘to decover from the Slaintiff-all such damage as may have

Teontinved...)
 

‘FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

Condemnation 1.” Id. at 361, 364, 198 P.3d at 624, 627. On
January 20, 2009, Appellant filed its Request for Statutory
Damages (the Request) and memorandum in support. The County
filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant’s Request for
Statutory Damages on January 30, 2009 (Opposition). Third-Party
Defendant-Appellee 1250 Oceanside Partners (Oceanside) joined the
County's Opposition and also filed a separate memorandum in
opposition to the Request on January 30, 2009. On February 19,
2009, pursuant to this court’s February 9, 2009 order, Appellant
filed its Responses to Objections re: Request for Statutory
Damages (the Response). The County filed a reply to the Response

on March 2, 2009 (Reply), in which Oceanside joined on March 2,

 

‘1. seontainuea)
been sustained by the defendant by reason of the bringing of
broperty concerned if the cossessicn has been axarded
‘including the detendant’s costs of court, a reasonable
‘aout to cor 7 ein

and the
possession of the property concerned shall be restored to
the defendant entitied thereto, Issues of fact arising in
connection with any claim for such damage shall be tried by
the court without a Jury unless a trial by jury is denanded
by either party, purguant to the rules of court, within ten
Says from the dete of the entry of an order or Judgment
Allowing the discontinuance of the proceedings, oF
Geniscing the proceedings or denying the right of the
plaintsft to take the property concerned for public use. In
The event judgment 1s entered in favor of the defendant and
Against the plaintsff, sny moneys which nave been paid, and
any additional security which has been furnished, by the
plainesff to the clerk of the court under sections 101-28
find 101-29, shail be applied or enforced toward the
Gatisfaction of the judgment. In the case of the State or 2
Gounty, if the moneys #0 paid to the clerk of the court are
Insufficient, then the balance of such judgnent shail be
paid from any moneys available or appropriated for the
Sequlaition of the property concerned, or if that 1s
[naufficienc then the sane shall be paid from the general,
fund of the State or county, ae the case may be.

 

 

 

  

 

 

added.)

 
 

/-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’
2009 (Joinder). On March 5, 2009, Appellant filed an Errata to

Responses to Objections re: Request for Statutory Damages
(Errata), purportedly to correct certain errors in the Request
and in the Response. For the reasons stated herein, Appellant is
awarded $25,676.21 in fees and $1,206.35 in costs.

1

a.

Appellant’s Request asked for $45,383.50 in attorneys’

fees plus $2,098.07 in general excise tax on those fees,

and

 

$5,775.59 in costs, and prejudgment interest on those fe
costs in the amount of $1,900.35, all of which it claims to have
incurred pursuant to its appeal in Condemnation 1. In addition
to those fees and costs, Appellant requests that it recover for
the fees and costs incurred in preparing the Request and the
court-ordered Response.
2

The County does not dispute that Appellant is entitled
to recover fees and costs on appeal pursuant to HRS § 101-27.
However, the County objects to the total amount of fees and costs
requested on the grounds that (1) “attorneys’ fees and costs for
[the] January 24, 2008 bill should be denied{,)” because they
“involved only those services provided prior to the filing of the
Notice of Appeal,” (2) under DES Group LP, v. Baiea Properties,
110 Hawai'i 217, 131 P.3d 500 (2006), “costs for computer legal

research should be denied{,]” (3) “messenger fees, general excise
+*POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
tax, and interest should be denied,” (4) “photocopying costs are

excessive,” and (5) Appellant should receive “no attorney's fees
for unsuccessful claims.”
c.

As noted previously, Oceanside joins in the County's
opposition and Reply and, additionally, seeks to clarify that
“HRS § 101-27 only allows a condennation defendant to ‘recover
from the plaintiff{.]'* (Quoting HRS $ 101-27.) (Emphasis
supplied by Oceanside.) Because “Oceanside was not the plaintiff

in [Condemnation 1] or [in Civ. No, 05-1-015K (Condemnation 2)

 

and Appellant's Request was filed “only against the County and
not against Oceanside[,]” Oceanside urges that this court
“expressly rule that [Appellant] is not entitled to relief under
RS § 101-27 from Oceanside.”

11.

‘As set forth supra, because “the property in question
was not finally taken in Condemnation 1,” CéJ Coupe, 119 Hawai'i
at 364, 198 P.3d at 627, BRS § 101-27 provides that the
defendant, ies, Appellant, “shall be entitled, in such
proceedings, to recover from the plaintiff[, i.e., the County,]
all such damage as may have been sustained by the defendant by
reason of the bringing of the proceedings . . . including the
defendant’s costs of court, a reasonable amount to cover
attorney's fees paid by the defendant in connection therewith,

and other reasonable expenses{.]” ‘Thus, the threshold question
‘***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**

 

for this court to determine is whether “all such damage” under
HRS § 101-27 provides adequate authority for Appellant's request
for attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal and, if so, to what
extent.
A.

Appellant asserts that “(t]he present request is for
damages incurred by [Appellant] in the appeal of [Condemnation 1}
and does not include damages incurred by {Appellantl in the trial
or remand of {Condemnation 1*1, or in the trial, appeal, or
kemand of (Condemnation 21.” (Emphasis added.) Appellant
further maintains that “(t)his request is limited to the costs
and attorney's fees incurred in the appeal of [Condemnation 1],
and Appellant’s attorneys’ fees “reflect only attorney's fees
incurred in the appeal of [Condemnation 1].” (fmphasis added.)

Appellant also indicates that it has made sufficient
efforts to specifically identify which fees and costs on appeal
Were associated with Condemation 1, as opposed to Condemnation
2. In that regard, Appellant states that “[t)he cost of
transcripts in the consolidated trial were [sic] apportioned
between [Condemnation 1] and [Condemnation 2],” and that although
“(t)he Intermediate Court of Appeals [(ICA)] consolidated the

separate appeals of [Condemnation 1] and (Condemnation 2,)”

+ appellant notes in its Request that it will seek damages incurred
in the trial or remand of Condemnation 1 from the Circuit Court of the Third
Cirovit (the court)
‘+1 HOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***
“ [t]he working attorneys roughly apportioned the time between the

two matters and the matters were billed separately.” Hence, on
the face of the Request, Appellant does not petition for any
damages associated with the appeal of Condemnation 2.” this
court, then, must consider whether HRS § 101-27 provides an
appropriate basis for awarding to Appellant fees and costs on
appeal associated with Condennation 1.
2

By its plain language, HRS $ 101-27 appears to provide
a sufficient basis for the award of damages in the form of costs
and attorney's fees sustained as a result of Appellant’s appeal
of the automatic denial of fees in Condemnation 1.‘ the
statutory language “all such damage . . . sustained . . . by
reason of the bringing of the proceedings(,)” on its face would
appear to encompass what Appellant seeks herein. Due to the
court's failure to timely rule on the issue, Appellant was denied
the HRS § 101-27 reimbursements it was owed by the County by

virtue of Appellant's success in Condemnation 1, and thereby

 

> Appellant apparently has not requested costs under Hawai'i Rules
of Appeliate Procedure {HRAP) Role 39 for the appeal of Condemnation 2. As
for attorneys’ fees, Appellant has properly recogaized that, at Least at this
point, there is no basis for recovery of fees in Condemnation 2. HRS § 101-27
Eilous recovery only where the land ia “not finally taken.” Considering that
Condemnation 2 nae been remanded for a determination of whether the Land was
Condemned pursuant to. proper public purpose, it is yet to be determined
Sihether the land in that’ case will be “finally taken.” RAP Rule 39 only
Provides for recovery of costa on appeal and, ‘therefore, offers no authority
[hand of itself for the Fecavery of attorney’ s fees, although it governs the
Procedure by which to move for those fees in this court where they can be
Claimed on 2 separate basis.

 

 

 

+ ‘the damage issue was the only issue on appeal to this court that
was ascociated with Condemnation 1. Appellant's other claims, regarding
abatement and public purpose, were both associated solely with Condemnation 2.

 

?
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appealed to this court in order to recover the danages owed. Had
the County not brought the unsuccessful proceedings in
Condemnation 1, Appellant would never have had cause to move for
fees and to subsequently appeal. ‘Therefore, the “damage”
sustained by Appellant in seeking the fees and costs owed and in
appealing the denial of such fees and costs, was part of the
damage resulting from the County having brought the unsuccessful
proceedings in Condemnation 1. Consequently, under HRS § 101-27,
the County should be held liable for “such damage.”
m1.
Having determined that HRS § 101-27 provides a proper
basis for fees and costs incurred on appeal in Condemnation 1,
the next question is whether this court is the appropriate venue
in which to request such damages. As Appellant points out,
although the authority for the damages requested is HRS $ 101-27,
HRAP Rule 39 governs the procedure for requesting fees and costs
in the appellate courts. Because HRAP Rule 39 requires that “[a]
request for fees and costs . . . must be filed with the appellate
clerk,” Appellant appears to be correct that “damages incurred by
{appellant} on appeal may only be awarded by this (clourt
pursuant to [HRAP Rule] 39.” (Emphases added.)
HRS § 101-27 does not specify where a request for
damages under that section should be filed. However, it does
+ ane County nas not argued to the contrary, nor is there anything

in the legislative nistory or case law interpreting ARS § 10I-27 to indicate
that fees and costs should not be recovered Zor thie appeal
‘***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

provide that, “Lilssues of fact arising in connection with any
claim for such damage shall be tried by the couxt without a jury

 

unless a trial by jury is demanded by either party[.]” (Emphases
added.) Despite that language, there is no irreconcilable
conflict between the requirement in HRAP Rule 39 that the Request
must be filed with the appellate clerk” and the requirement in
HRS § 101-27 that “[iJssues of fact . . . shall be tried by the
court.” This court has held that where a statute and a rule
merely overlap, but do not irreconcilably conflict, effect should
be given to both if possible. See Chock v, Gov't Emplovees Ins.
Cos, 103 Hawai'i 263, 269, 81 P.3d 1178, 1184 (2003) (although
recognizing that “where there is a ‘plainly irreconcilable’
conflict between a general and a specific statute concerning the
same subject matter, the specific will be favored|,]” applying
the rule that “where the statutes simply overlap in their
application, effect will be given to both if possible,” and
thereby holding that “(tJ)his court can give effect to both
Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(d) and HRS
§ 431:10-242"). Therefore, if HRS § 101-27 and HRAP Rule 39 can
be read in pari materia without conflict, then this court must
give effect to both.

RS § 101-27 does not include any language dealing
expressly with the issue of damages incurred pursuant to an
appeal. Because HRS § 101-27 is silent as to which court a

request for damages should be directed, the procedure as set
/ HOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

forth in HRAP Rule 39 should apply. That rule specifically
requires that requests for fees and costs on appeal should be
applied for in this court. Moreover, HRS § 101-11 (1993)
provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this
part, the procedure shall be the same as in other civil actions.”
(Bnphases added.) Therefore, HRS chapter 101 manifests an intent
that where that chapter is silent, normal procedures should be
followed. An 4n pari materia reading of HRS § 101-27 and HRAP
Rule 39 then, dictates that HRAP Rule 39 provides the procedure
to be followed in this court in applying for fees and costs on
appeal, because HRS § 101-27 is silent on that issue. This court
under HRAP Rule 39 generally exercises jurisdiction over all
requests for fees and costs incurred on certiorari, and HRS
$ 101-27 does not countenance a departure from that procedure.
Furthermore, the requirement in HRS § 101-27 that
“[1}ssues of fact . . . shall be tried by the court” with or
without a jury based on the demands of the parties, is most
logically construed as a reference to the procedure to be
followed when a defendant moves for damages in the circuit court,
which, according to Appellant, it has every intention of doing
with regard to the damages incurred by virtue of the proceedings
that court. As for Appellant's request for damages incurred
as a result of the appeal, the procedures for requesting
attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal are outlined in HRAP Rule 39,

and are normally followed by this court in civil actions such as

10
 

/OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER***

the eminent domain proceeding here. Accordingly, HRAP Rule 39
should govern.
W.

Having determined that HRS § 101-27 is the appropriate
basis for damages and that this court is the appropriate venue in
which to request fees and costs incurred on appeal, Appellant’ s
specific requests and the County's objections thereto must be
considered in seriatin.

v
A.
1
According to Appellant, its $5,775.59 in court costs

Were incurred as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NECESSARY EXPENSES REQUEST
Copies at $.20 per 32,369.00
page

2. Courier Services for 24.63
filing

3.__ Postage 80.23

Long Distance 46.04

5. Fax 27,50

6. Transcripts 778.83

7. Color Copies 16.75

8. Filing Fees 245.00

9. Parking 10.00

10. Messenger Fees 60.00

11. Legal Research 2,115.61

TOTAL COSTS 5,775.58

 

u
“+*SFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

Although Appellant apparently has moved for statutory damages

under HRS § 101-27, and not for costs under HRAP Rule 39, it

asserts that some of the costs requested are those also set forth

in HRAP 39(c), which provide

(c) costs defined.

 

Sosks in the appellate courts are
defined aa! (1) the cost of the original and one copy of the

feporter's transcripts if nect

 

lary for the determination of

the appeal; (2) the premiuns paid for supersedeas bonds or

 

for filing the Sppesly

Jive rights pending appeal?
(4) the Gost of printing or others:

(3) the fee

 

producing necessary copies of briefs and appendices,
Provides that copying costs shall not exceed 20¢ per pager
(5) necessary postage, cost of facsiniles, intrastate

 

yong distance telephone charges) and (6) anyother

(emphases added.) However, Appellant argues that HRS § 101-27

authorizes recovery of costs not ordinarily granted:

Under (HRS §) 101-27, the property omer ia Tentitied” to be
ade economically whole and shell recover "all such damage

as may have be

Bringing of the pro

costa of court

cose? eae tana’ eine

Sedndnes” (ats) bOScia) thus coare has noted’ Cha
Seon

55 pula by": property owned ins

Fesearch expeni
expenses ineury,

 

 

 

 

 

 

ble cost

 

 

 

‘sustained by the defendant by reason of the
including the

endant’s|

 

  

Condemnation action in which its property is not taken,
[are]. «recover (able)

expensas” Under [HRS §) 103-27,

(Bmphases supplied by Appellant.)

2.

af "other reasonable

(Citation omitted.)

As for attorneys’ fees, Appellant claims that “in its

successful appeal of [Condemnation 1,]” it incurred $45,383.50 in

attorneys’ fees, allocated as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Professional Tine Rate Total
Kenneth R. Kupchak 30.3 | 335-350 $3,729.54
Robert H, Thomas (RAT) 66.6 | 300-325 21,375.95
Mark M. Murakami (MM) 33.8 | 220-230 7,594.90

 

 

 

12
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Robert D. Harris 2.5 190 475.00
Christi-Anne H. Kudo- 64.4 | 145-250 9, 382.61
Chock (CHKC)

Cherise Agua-Andrews 30.7 145) 1,551.50
Eugenie-Mae Kincaid 28 130 1,274.00
TOTAL 45,383.50
Excise Tax 2,098.07
(GRAND TOTAL, 47,481.57

 

 

 

 

 

 

As to the foregoing fees, Appellant argues that the “lodestar”
method, whereby “the [cJourt determines the nurber of hours
worked and multiplies the hours by @ reasonable rate of
compensation(,]” is the “presumptively reasonable fee(.”
Appellant asserts that “(t}he rates charged by (Appeltant’s)
counsel are consistent with the prevailing rates in the community
for attorneys of like experience.” As to the number of hours
expended, Appellant claims that “this appeal case presented an
Assue of first impression with a complex constitutional
dimension, and a massive Record on Appeal spanning multiple
volumes and nearly a decade of litigation.”* According to
Appellant, as observed before, in order to determine the nunber
of hours spent exclusively on the appeal of Condennation 1,
“(t]he working attorneys roughly apportioned the time between the

two matters and the matters were billed separately.”

 

 

+ mss court notes that the “complex constitutional dimension” was
actually part of Condemnation 2, for which Appellant does not request, and is
ot a of yet entitied, to recover fees and costs. However, the County does
ot argue that the number of hours spent on any particular task is
Unreasonable, and, therefore, except where otherwise noted, the claimed nunber
of hours expended’ is considered reasonable,

3
“**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™™

 

B,
‘The County does not argue that the hourly rate

requested is out of line with “the prevailing market rates in the
relevant community[,]” (quoting Blum v, Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
895 (1984), or that the number of hours expended on any
particular task is unreasonable, Because the rates requested
appear to be reasonable, for those invoices that are determined

1 of Condemnation 1, attorneys’

 

to properly relate to the app!
fees must be awarded at the rates claimed by Appellant, and for
the nunber of hours requested. See Chun v. Bd. of Trustees of
Emplovees’ Ret. Sve., 106 Hawai'i 416, 423, 106 P.3d 339, 346
(2008) (recognizing that “(t]he value of an attorney’s time
generally is reflected in his normal billing rate[,]” which
should be “applied to the actual hours worked”).

vr.

A

As to its first objection, the County argues that the

fees ($11,999.00) and costs ($910.87) from the January 24, 2008
bill should be denied because they are incident to “services
provided prior to the filing of the [nJotice of [alppeal, which
is, prior to February 8, 2008{,]” and “involved the proceedings
that was [sic] still before the trial judge.” The County
specifically identifies five entries from that bill to

demonstrate their unrelatedness to matters on appeal:

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++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER"

 

1. Attorney Kudo-Chock billed 7.5 hours and $1,087.50 in
Connection with a Notion to OLsburae Deposit. Se entries
12708707, 12/07/07, and 12/10/07.

2. “Attorney Kupchak billed 1 hour and $335.00 to review
the Motion for release of deposit. See entry. 12/07/07.

5c “attorney Marakam{ billed 3.9 houre and 9858.00 for
Sdevelop iscuee and strategy for applying for funds
deposited with court.” gag entry 12/10/07.

 

In the Response, Appellant answers that “(the] County complains
about the inclusion of five entries on the January 2008 invoice
denoting work done on a disbursement of deposit funds issue that
was not before this (clourt” and admits that Appellant “errantly
included this tine and modifies its request to exclude the
$2,280.50 (plus tax) invoiced for that work.”

However, it appears that the County's specific
objection to those entries relating to the disbursement issue vas
merely exemplary of the fact that ali fees and costs in the
January 2008 bill appear to have been incurred in connection with
the circuit court proceedings. For example, many of the entries
have to do with “supplemental briefing” regarding the danages
issue. To this court's knowledge, that supplemental briefing was
directed at the circuit court. Therefore, it appears that none
of the entries in the January bill should be included in the
award of fees and costs on appeal.

Accordingly, in its Errata Appellant claims that,
although the invoice for the January 24, 2008 bill was attached
to its Request, “the lodestar was not just a summary of the
charges on the invoices, but vas based on entries fron

January [15], 2008 to January 20, 2009.” That would mean that

1s
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none of the entries from the January 24, 2008 bill were included
in the original lodestar, or the amount of attorneys’ fees
requested in the original Request. Appellant argues that
therefore, it erroneously “withdrew its request for $2,280.50
(plus tax) responding to [the] County’s objections about the
January 2008 invoice[,]” as “the lodestar in the original request

was date-sorted and the offending entries were not included in

 

the lodestar.” Consequently, in its Errata, Appellant requests
the total amount requested in the original Request, less a few
erroneous inclusions it claims to have found through an
additional audit.

The lodestar in the original Request was $45,383.50,
whereas, based upon the audit, Appellant has revised that amount

to $44,696.88 in its Erra

 

‘The revised amount appears to
include amounts incurred in preparing Appellant’s Request for

fees and costs (which the Request did not), and to exclude any

 

fees and costs incurred by Appellant prior to January 15, 200
Therefore, it appears that all entries from the January 24, 2008
bill objected to by the County are properly excluded from the
revised lodestar amount set forth in Appellant’s Errata.
5.

As to its second point, the County argues that
*{njedther [HRAP Rule 39], nor HRS § 101-27 specifically allow(s)
for costs associated with legal research searches on-linel.)"

The County points out that “[iJn Biornen v, State Farm Fire and

16
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Casualty co., 81 Hawai'i 105, 109, 912 P.2d 602, 606 (App. 1996),
the [ICA) concluded ‘that disbursements for computerized legal
research such as Westlaw are a component of attorney fees and are

not taxable’” because tho

 

costs “*are properly reflected as
part of the law firm's overhead and, as such, are a factor to be
included in the setting of attorneys fees as opposed to ordinary
costs.’” (Quoting id. at 107, 912 P.2d at 604.) According to
the County, this court has also “adopted the position that
‘disbursements for computerized legal research . . . are a
component of attorney fees and are not taxable costs.’” (Quoting
DES Group, 110 Hawai'i at 224, 131 P.3d at 507.)

Appellant acknowledges that this court has held that
legal research expenses are not recoverable as court costs, as
they are more appropriately considered part of the overhead that
is already subsumed within an attorney's hourly rate. See DES
Group, 110 Hawai'i at 224, 131 P.3d at 507 (agreeing with the
ICA's ruling and thereby “conclud[ing] that the computer-assisted
research charges in the present case are not recoverable as
separately billed attorneys’ fees”). Appellant maintains,
however, that it is “entitled to recover those [legal research)
expenses as ‘other reasonable expenses’ under [HRS $] 101-27[,]”
because “the property owner is ‘entitled’ to be made economically
whole.”

Appellant's rationale disregards this court's and the

ICA's reasoning for not allowing computer-assisted research

uv
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

charges, such as by Westlaw and by Lexis, to be taxed to losing

parties as costs. This court in DFS Group agreed with the ICA

 

that legal research costs are already “subsumed within an
attorney's fee and therefore such costs may not be awarded in
addition to attorneys’ fees.” Id, at 223, 131 P.3d at 506.
Appellant argues to the contrary that HRS § 101-27 “establishes
an ‘actual causation’ standard for measuring damages - meaning
that if a property owner actually incurs damages ‘by reason of
the bringing of the [condemnation] proceedings,” then that
damage should be recoverable

Because “{Appellant) is separately obligated to pay for

 

computer-assisted legal research accomplished by counsel related
to the appeal of Condemnation 1[,]" Appellant maintains it should
recover its actual costs in order “to be restored to the position
it would have been in had [the] County not instituted
[Condemnation 1]. However, under this court’s rationale in DES
Group, if Appellant collects an appropriate attorney's fee
pursuant to HRS § 101-27, it will have already been “made . -
whole” for its research costs, and any additional taxation of
those costs to the County would provide Appellant with a
windfall. Thus, departure from the rule established in DES Group
is not warranted, and any separate recovery for legal research
costs as “other reasonable costs” under HRS § 101-27 is denied.
c.

‘The County's third objection is that Appellant's

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/OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**

   
 

argument that messenger fees, excise tax, and interest should be

included as costs is without support.
1

First, as to messenger fees, the County maintains that
“falbsent extraordinary circumstances, the cost of ‘messenger
fees for the routine task of delivering a party's documents to
court is categorically outside the concept of costs(,]’" (quoting
Hawai'i Ventures, LUC v. Otaka, Inc,, 116 Hawai'i 465, 479, 173
P.3d 1122, 1136 (2007)}, and because “[Appellant) has failed to
establish any extraordinary circunstances in using a messenger,
this [cJourt should deny [Appellant's] request for messenger
fees.” In Hawaii Ventures, this court agreed with a previous
opinion of the ICA that “the function of delivering documents, as
a general proposition, [is] akin to the other tasks performed by
support staff[,]” and, therefore, “except in the rare
circumstance where the need in a particular case is extraordinary

in its volume or nature, the cost of this function. . . is

 

treated as overhead.” Id. at 480, 173 P.36 at 1137 (quoting
Kikuchi v. Brown, 110 Hawai'i 204, 213, 130 2.34 1069, 1078 (App
2006)).

Appellant has not made any claim that the messenger
services necessary in this case were for sone reason
extraordinary. Instead, Appellant makes the sane argunent

regarding messenger fees as it does in support of legal research

costs, that “Appellant is entitled to all damages actually

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‘+**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

‘expended, and [the] County does not dispute that the fees were
actually incurred." However, this court has come to the same
conclusion regarding messenger fees as it has with regard to
legal research costs - that they are properly seen as a part of a

firm's overhead and, therefore, should be reflected in attorneys’

 

foes
It follows that this court has already determined that

a reasonable hourly rate for attorneys in the community is

inclusive of overhead costs such as research and messenger fees

and Appellant does not argue that HRS $ 101-27 damages are not

 

subject to a reasonableness requirement. See HRS § 101-27
(allowing recovery for “a reasonable amount to cover attorney's
fees paid by the defendant in connection therewith, and other
reasonable expenses” (emphases added)). Therefore, Appellant's
request for taxation of messenger fees to the County is denied.
2

Second, although the County argues that Appellant lacks
authority for its request to include excise tax in the assessment
of fees, it is common practice in this jurisdiction to include an
excise tax in the amount of the fee avard. See, e.a., DES Group,
110 Hawai'i at 223, 131 P.3d at 506 (“Accordingly, applying a
rate of $215/hour to a sum of 105 hours, we conclude that DFS has
shown that it has incurred $22,575.00 in reasonable and necessary
attorneys’ fees, and $940.70 in taxes [and wje therefore award

DFS $23,515.70 in attorneys’ fees.” (Bmphasis added.)); Blair v.

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“s*+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

 

Ing, 96 Hawai" 327, 336, 31 P.3d 184, 193 (2002) (“Thayer is

 

awarded $21,370.00 for attorneys’ fees, $898.82 for general
axcise tax, and $740.01 for costs, for a total of $23,008.83, as
against Plaintiffs.” (Emphasis added.)); Chun v. Bd, of Trustees
of Emplovees’ Ret. Sys., 92 Hawai'i 432, 448, 992 P.2d 127, 143
(2000) (vacating award of attorney’s fees because court should
have considered both the percentage and lodestar methods, but
without comment on the court's award of an excise tax). The
County eites no authority to the contrary and does not offer any
rationale as to why the excise tax should not be granted.
‘Therefore, to the extent Appellant is awarded attorneys’ fees,

inclusion of the accompanying excise tax is allowed as part of

that award.”

> RS $ 237-1316) (A}_ (Supp. 2008) provides in relevant part as
follows with regard to excise tax:

 

There is hereby levied and shall be assessed and
collected annually privilege taxes against persons on
account of their business snd other activities in the State
Ressured by the application of rates against values of
Products, gross proceeds of sales, cr gross income,
Shichever is specified, ae follow

 

 

 

i6) " Tax on service busine
TA) "upon every person engaging or continuing

within the State in any service business
Dr calling including professional services
not otherwise specifically taxed under
this chapter, there is likewise hereby
Tevies and shall be assessed and collected
2'tax equal to four

 

  

 

 

According to Department of Taxation Announcement 2006-15, as of January 2,
2007, the general excise tax in the City and County of Honolulu is €.54, which
Inclides @ -5¢ County surcharge. Appellant seeas to have used a different
rate in caloulating the amount of general excise tax. Because 4.5 percent is
the amount designated by the Oepartsent of Taxation, that ancunt will be
appiied.

 

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3.
‘Third, as to pre-judgment interest, the County argues
that "HRS § 101-27 does not specifically allow prejudgment
interest.” Appellant asserts that it is entitled to interest
from the date of each invoice for attorneys’ fees and costs “[a)s
a form of damage, pursuant to (HRS § 101-27]." Appellant further
urges that “{t]he purpose of a damage avard is to put a party in
the position they would have been in had not harm occurred” and
that “[Appellant) suffered ‘damage . . . by reason of’ the appeal
of the denial of damages in Condemnation 1 each tine it had to
pay its lawyers.” According to Appellant, “[iJaterest from the
date of hazm is an element of damage and this (cJourt is
authorized to award prejudgment interest in all civil actions”
under HRS § 636-16. Appellant argues that it must only show
that “there was a delay, for whatever reason, between the date of
injury and the date of payment(,]" (citing rizs Corp, v. Ww,
World Ins. Co., 110 Hawai'i 473, 498, 135 P.3d 82, 107 (2006)),
and therefore, it should receive “interest at the rate of 10%

from the date of each invoice[.]”

+ HRS § 636-16 (1993) provides that

(4]n awarding interest [on a judgment] in civil cases, the
Judge is authorized to designate the commencement date to
Zonform with the circunstances of each cass, provided that
the earliest commencement date in cases ariaing in tort, may
be the date when the injury first occurred and in cases
arising by breach of contract, it may be the date when the
breach first occurred.

 

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‘The County counters that “[bJoth HRS § 636-16 and the

ruling in the Tri:S Corp, case are inapplicable in this instant
condemnation case” because “HRS § 636-16 allows prejudgment
interest in civil cases ‘provided that the earliest commencement
date in cases arising in tort, may be the date when the injury
first occurred and in cases arising by breach of contract, it may
be the date when the breach first occurred.’” Therefore, the
County asserts that, because “[t]his present condemnation case
could not reasonably be considered a tort or contract case[,]

|. prejudgment interest cannot be based on HRS § 636-16.”

Pre-judgment interest may be avarded under HRS § 636-16

in the court's discretion “when the issuance of judgment is
areatly delaved for any reason.” TrizS Corp., 110 Hawai'i at
498, 135 P.3d at 107 (emphasis added). Because HRS § 636-16
allows specifically for the “awarding [of] interest in civil
cases” (emphasis added), the County’s argument that it should be
limited to those arising from tort or contract is belied by the
plain language of the statute. Sse Metcalf v. Voluntary
Employees’ Ben, Ass'n of Hawaii, 99 Hawai'i 53, 61, 52 P.3d 623,
831 (2002) (stating that, “(ulnder HRS § 636-16, courts in all
civil cases have the discretion to avard pre-judgment interest”
and because the instant case “was a civil case, nothing in the
statute prohibits avarding pre~judgment interest” (emphasis
added). This court has recognized that “[t]he purpose of [HRS

§ 636-16] is to allow the court to designate the commencement

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date in order to correct injustice when a judgment is delayed for
@ long period of time for any reason, including litigation
delays.” Tric$ Corp, 110 Hawai‘ at 498, 135 P.3d at 107
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellant has
not asserted that there has been any lengthy delay in the
issuance of the judgment of attorneys’ fees or costs in this
appeal. Therefore, Appellant’s request for prejudgment interest
is denied.

D,

The County's fourth objection is that Appellant's
requests for “photocopying costs in the total amount of
$2,369.00" at 20 cents per page “are excessive” and “seemingly
out of line for this appeal.” The County notes that “{HRAP Rule
39(c)(4)] allows recovery for ‘the cost of printing or otherwise
producing necessary copies of briefs and appendices,’” and that
“[A}t 4s doubtful that the 11,845 pages or 6,802 pages [claimed

by Appellant] would be the cost of printing the necessary copies

 

of briefs and appendices.” ‘Therefore, the County argues that,
“(Blecause [Appellant] has failed to establish the reasonableness
of the appropriate taxable costs for photocopying costs,
(Appellant’s] request for such costs should be denied.”
Appellant maintains in response that it should be
reimbursed for copying costs in order to “make [Appellant]
whole.” Appellant asserts that “‘a lot of sheets of paper’ alone

is not a responsive objection to copying expenses, especially

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‘**"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER***

when considering the consolidated multivolume record in the two
appeals, which covered nearly a decade of Litigation in two
circuit court cases with multiple parties” and that “[tjhe rule
in [HRAP Rule) 39 limiting a request for costs to copies of
briefs and appendices is not applicable to requests for damages
under (HRS §) 101-27, since the successful landowner is entitled
to all copying costs actually incurred|.]” (Emphasis added.)
Appellant’s argument again fails to acknowledge that
despite what “actual” costs Appellant may have incurred, recovery
of damages under HRS § 101-27 is subject to a reasonableness
requirement. The phrase regarding fees and costs in HRS § 101-27
states that the award shall include “the defendant’s costs of
court, a reasonable amount to cover attorney's fees paid by the
defendant in connection therewith, and other reasonable
expenses(.]” (Emphasis added.) That portion of the statute is
essentially a list of items that are to be included in the damage
award. Thus, the phrase “and other reasonable expenses,”
(emphasis added), assumes that the previous items listed are also
types of reasonable expenses. Appellant’s argument that it must
be granted all costs “actually incurred,” regardless of
reasonableness, renders the term “other” superfluous. See
Carlisle v. One (1) Boat, 119 Hawai'i 245, 255, 195 P.3a 1177,
1187 (2008) (stating that “(i]t is a cardinal rule of statutory
construction that courts are bound, if rational and practicable,

to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that no clause,

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‘**+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAF' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER™

will _give force to and preserve all the vords of the statute”
(emphasis added)). Hence, under the plain language of the
statute, costs, attorney’s fees, and other expenses are all
subject to a reasonableness requirement.”

‘The County's argument that “11,845 pages . . . is a lot
of sheets of paper” is essentially an argument that the volume
seems unreasonable. While Appellant’s argument that the record
in this case was voluminous is well taken, this court is aware

that the record was available in electronic format. Although the

 

county’s objection to the copying costs is vague, in response to
that azgunent, Appellant did not identify which costs were
associated solely with “producing necessary copies of briefs and
appendices,” nor did it make any argument as to why any
additional photocopying costs requested are reasonable.
considering the foregoing circumstances, Appellant's photocopying

costs are denied."

+ furthermore, although Appellant had termed its photocopying
expenses as “costs,” to’ say that $2,369.00 in photocopying costs quality as
SCosta of coure” under HRS § 101-27 is fot persuasive.” WRAP Rule 39 18
entitles “civil costs” and refers to “costs,” not "costs of court.” A review
Of the statutory materials using the term “costs of court” reveals that that
term is typically linited to costs actually paid to the court, and, therefore,
Appellant's photocopying costs are more properly considered "other reasonable
‘Oepenses," leaving no doubt that those costs are subject to a ressonablene
Fequirencnt.

 

       

% therefore, this court has left undecided the question of whether

photocopying costs in addition to thove allowed under HRAP Rule 39 might be
lowed under HRS § 101-27 either as costs or “other reasonable expenses” in a
fe where the novant showed that those expenses were reasonable.

     

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Finally, the County objects to Appellant's recovery of
any attorneys’ fees for “unsuccessful claims.” The County
asserts that under Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd.,
96 Hawal's 408, 445, 32 P.3d $2, 89 (2001), “time spent on
unguecessful claims unrelated to [Appellant’s) successful claims
could not be part of any award of ‘reasonable attorney's fees
under Hawai'i fee-shifting statutes.’” Accordingly, the court
must “consider whether [Appellant’s] successful and unsuccessful
claims ‘involved a common core of facts or were based on related
tegal theories(.]’" (Quoting id.) (Other citation omitted.)
Applying those legal theories, the County argues that
although Appellant “prevailed on two out of the three” points it
raised on appeal, “the abatement point that [Appellant] did not
prevail on was a point that [it] discussed extensively in its
briefs” and is “totally unrelated and do[es] not involve the sane
common core of facts or legal theories to the HRS § 101-27
statutory damages issue or the pretext public purpose issue.”
‘Therefore, the County argues that, “all of the attorneys’ fees
expended on the abatement issue should be excluded [and] those
billings that are not clear enough to identify what issue they
relate to should be excluded because [Appellant] has the burden
of proving any entitlement to reimbursement for attorneys’ fees

and costs.”

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To the contrary, Appellant maintains that “[its]
request only seeks damages for the appeal of Condemnation 1.”
(Emphasis added.) The appeal in Condemnation 1 related only to
damages, an issue upon which the County concedes that Appellant
eas successful on appeal. Appellant thereby maintains that
“(t]he fees to Litigate the second and third points of appeal
(abatement and pretext) were invoiced separately, and were not
Ancluded in the present Request.” (Emphases added.) Thus,
according to Appellant, the County's objection on this point is
misplaced, inasmuch as Appellant has only requested fees as to
one of the issues on appeal, the issue of damages, a point on
which it is undisputed that Appellant was successful.

However, the County argues in its Reply that in fact,
“upon review of all of the invoices, [Appellant] has sought
attorneys’ fees for matters not related to the appeal of
Condemnation 1.” Specifically, the County objects to the

followin

 

 

 

 

BILL [Date of [attorney | Description [Hours] Reason to
pate | service Exclude
February [1/14/08 | mam Review of 80 [Matsuda wv
20, 2008 Ninth Circuit Honolulu had
case -60 |no relevance
1/14/08 | RAT Review on issue of
Matsuda case damages

 

 

 

 

 

 

28
‘°° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER™

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

June 25, | 9/23/08 [RAT Review 7.30 |Mateuda ve
2008 Matsuda cert Honolulu and
petition and abatement
opposition have no
5/26/08 | CHK Review 3.00 | relevance on
County's issue of
brief; damages
research on
abatenent
July 23, | 6/17/08 | RAT County's -10 [case
2008 Application transferred,
to Transfer County
case to prevailed on
Hawai'i its
Supreme Court Application
6/234/0 | RAT Meno in 80 |to Transfer
8 [sic] Opposition to case
Transfer
october [9/3/08 [mm Develop and | .20 [Consolidation
21, 2008 Strengthen is not a
Arguments re damage issue
consolidation
and danages
9/30/08 | mae Abatement 70 | county
Issues prevailed on
RT Research for |1.00 | Abatement
Abatement Issue
Novenber | 10/1/08 | mm Research and | .40 | County
14, 2008 Review of prevailed on
Record of Abatement
Appeal Issue
regarding
Abatement

 

Additionally, the County claims that “[iJn billings dated May 22,

June 25, July 23, August 21, and October 21, a substantial amount

of time was spent in supplementing the Record on Appeal, and

there is no clear indication that that time was solely spent for

the damages issue[; a]nd in billings dated October 21 and

November 14, 2008, a substantial amount of time by two attorneys

was recorded for the preparation and presentation of oral

29

 
 

**°FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’

 

argument without identifying the specific amount of time spent
for the damage issue.” Therefore, the County argues that the
“billings that is [sic] not clear enough to identify what issue
they relate to should be excluded because [Appellant] has the
burden of proving any entitlement to reimbursement for attorneys!
fees and costs.”

Appellant maintains in its Errata that its audit
“identified entries that require correction in the original
request” and that the “new lodestar, as supported by the attached

spreadsheet (built off the earlier submitted invoices), is as

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

follows":
Professional Time | Rate Total

Kenneth R. Kupchak 10.4 | 335-350 3,764.54
Robert H. Thomas 70.1 | 300-328 22,518.58
Mark M, Murakami [35.2 _| 220-230 7,913.09
Robert D. Harris 2.5 190 475,00
Christi-Anne H. Kudo- w3.1__ | aas-is0 7,239.17
Chock

Cherise Agua-Andrews 10.7 us 1,551.50
Eugenie-Mae Kincaid io 130 1,235.00
Total [ieee 44, 696.88

 

 

 

As to the County’s specific objections, Appellant claims that

(ehe} County objected to entries on 1/14/08 for ma and RUT
Ag notea above, [Appellant's] lodestar Gid pot inolude time
Before 1/15/08, Therefore, this tine was oh eought in the
original Request

‘The 5/23/08 and §/26/08 entries are hereby withdrawn
from (Appeliant’s| ‘Request and the damages sought are
Feduced appropriately in the above lodestar.

‘The 6/17/08 and 6/234(aie]/08 entries are appropriate
as they were incurred in the course of the Condennaticn |
ape:

 

 

 

 

 

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The 9/3/08, 9/30/08 and 10/01/08 ent rien are hereby
withdvawn from [Appellant's] Request and the danages sought
re reduced in the above lodestar:

As discussed aupra, Appellant appears to have excluded
all fees and costs incurred prior to January 15, and, therefore,
the contested 1/14/08 entry has been excluded. Additionally, the
5/23/08, 5/26/08, 9/3/08, 9/30/08 and 10/01/08 entries have been
excluded from the final revised lodestar amount, as Appellant
concedes that those entries were erroneously included in the
original amount. Furthermore, Appellant protests that the
contested 6/17/08 and 6/23/08 entries, regarding the County's
motion to transfer, “were incurred in the course of the
Condemnation 1 appeal.” Although the County prevailed on that
motion, it appears that Appellant has properly included
attorney's fees incurred in defending the motion to transfer in
its Request, inasmuch as such fees are encompassed under HRS
§ 101-27 as part of “all such damage as may have been sustained
by the defendant by reason of the bringing of the proceedings” in
Condemation 1. Therefore, those entries will be included in the
fee award.

[As to the County's objections to entries attributed to
supplementing the Record on Appeal and preparing for oral
argument, Appellant does not address those objections or provide
‘this court any guidance as to whether the time claimed for those
entries actually applies only to Condemnation 1, or also to
Condemnation 2, Upon reviewing Appellant's revised entries as

set forth in its Errata, following the internal audit, it appears

31
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that 18.9 hours of attorney time were devoted to supplementing
the Record on Appeal, and 30.6 hours were spent preparing for and
attending oral argument in this court. Although Appellant has
claimed that it is only including in the lodestar time spent on
the damages issue, it has conceded to have erroneously included
other itens unrelated to Condemnation 1. Therefore, because
Appellant has failed to argue that the specific entries regarding
supplementing the Record on Appeal and those regarding oral
argument are related in their entirety to Condemnation 1, the
‘amounts claimed for those entries are excluded from the lodestar
amount.
van.

Additionally, Appellant, in its Response, requests “the

damages it incurred in filing (or preparing] the Request and this

Response” as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Professional Time Rate Total
Kenneth R. Kupchak 66 350 2,310.00
Robert H. Thomas 13.4 325 4,355.00
Mark M. Murakami 24.1 230 5,543.00
Matthew 7. Evans 1.2 150 180.00
TOTAL 12, 388.00
Excise Tax 515.34
GRAND TOTAL 32, 903.34

 

 

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NECESSARY EXPENSES REQUEST
1. Copies at $.20 per page 159,

2, Postage 9.90)

3. Long Distance 7.96

4, Fax 2.00

5. Messenger Fees 6.00
TOTAL COSTS 185.26

 

‘The amount of total fees requested has been amended in
the Errata, as Appellant realized that it had already included
the time spent preparing the Request in its original lodestar
amount, and thereby had double-counted that time by requesting it
again in the subsequent Response. The revised amount, as set
forth in Appellant’s Errata, apparently is limited to time

expended in preparing Appellants Response as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

Professional Tine Rate Total
Kenneth R, Kupchak 4.0 350 2,500.00
Robert H. Thomas 5.9 325 1,917.50
Mark M, Murakami 10.0 230 2,300.00
Matthew 7. Evans 35 150 525.00
TOTAL 6,242.00

 

 

 

 

 

 

In response to Appellant’s request for such fees and
costs, the County urges that the “additional request for
attorneys’ fees and costs should be denied.” As the County
correctly points out, HRAP Rule 39(d) (1) requires that “fal party
who desires an award of attorney's fees and costs shall request

them by submitting an itemized and verified bill of fees and

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costs, together with a statement of authority for each category
of items and, where appropriate, copies of invoices, bills,
vouchers, and receipts.” According to the County, it “did not
receive any itemized and verified bill of fees and costs for
(appellant!) request for attorneys’ fees and costs for filing
its (Request and] Responses” and “[w]ithout the itemized and
verified bill of fees and costs, the County is unable to
reasonably provide objections to {Appellant's} additional
requests for [s]tatutory (d]anages.”

Although it appears that the fees and costs incurred in
filing the Request and the subsequent Response had not been
invoiced at the time the Response was filed, Appellant haa
included an itemized bill, at least for attorneys’ fees, in its
Errata. Exhibit B to the Errata appears to include time spent on
the Request, whereas, Exhibit C includes the time expended on the
court-ordered Response. However, Appellant did not expressly
request attorneys’ fees for preparing the Request in its original
Request, nor did it provide supporting documentation for those
fees. Moxeover, upon filing its court-ordered Response and
requesting fees for preparing that Response, Appellant again did
not provide any supporting documentation as required by HRAP Rule
39(d) (1). Although Appellant has now filed the requisite
itemized account of attorneys’ fees in its Errata, Appellant does
not provide this court with any rationale as to why it should be

permitted to essentially raise new substantive arguments for the

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first time in an Errata, See Taomae v, Lingle, 110 Hawai'i 327,
333, 192 P.3d 1238, 1244 (2006) (*Plaintiffs’ arguments that

fees should be awarded pursuant to (1) HRS § 602-5(7),

 

attorney!
(2) this court’s inherent equitable powers, and (3) the private
attorney general doctrine, were raised for the first time in
their reply memorandum{, and, accordingly, we deny the request
for fees on such grounds.”). Furthermore, waiting until the
Errata to provide the appropriate support leaves the County
without an opportunity to make specific objections to those
items. Therefore, Appellant's request for attorneys’ fees for
preparation of the Request and the subsequent Response is denied.
Additionally, Appellant has not provided an itemized and verified
bill for the $185.26 in costs expended in preparing the Request
and the Response, and, therefore, Appellant is denied recovery
for the costs it incurred in preparing the Request and the
Response.

vinr.

Finally, Oceanside advances a meritorious argument
that, because “Oceanside was not the plaintiff in [Condemnation
1,]" it should not be held liable for damages under HRS § 101-27.
Appellant has not moved to recover damages against Oceanside, and
it does not appear that Oceanside, as a third-party defendant,
can be held liable for danages under HRS § 101-27, as it did not
Institute the condemnation proceedings. Hence, damages are

inside

 

recoverable only against the County and not against Oc

35
 

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I.

In accordance with the foregoing, Appellant is entitled
to recover the amount requested in its corrected lodestar, less
(1) the amounts claimed in the 6/17/08 and 6/23/08 entries
regarding the County's Application to Transfer, (2) the amount
requested for those entries related to (a) supplementing the
Record on Appeal, and (b) preparing for and attending oral
argument in this court, and (3) the amount of prejudgment
interest on those fees. Further, Appellant is awarded the anount
of costs requested less (1) costs associated with legal research:
(2) messenger/courier fees; and (3) one-half of the clained
photocopying costs. As to the fees and costs claimed for
preparing the Request for fees and costs and the subsequent
Response, those fees and costs are denied.

Therefore, as to fees, Appellant is entitled to recover

$25,370.55 as follows:

 

 

 

 

NATURE OF REQUEST REQUEST ‘AWARD NOTES
‘Attorneys’ fees 36,498.38 | 24,570.54 amount
for appeal of requested
Condemnation 1 less
$12,220.06

 

 

 

 

 

 

HN this amount was calculated by subtracting from the total amount
requested, the anounts for those entries that appsared to relate to the
preparation of the Request, which ancunted to $6,198.50, and are analyzed
Separately.

 

the following itens were excludes because, as explained supss, it
wae not clear that they were related in their entirety to Appellant's
Successful appeal of Condemnation 1: 05/23/08 405-00, 08/26/08 225.00,
06/02/08 225-00, 06/02/08 198.00, 06/05/08 234.00, 06/06/08 150.00, "06/09/08
380.00, 06/24/08 330.00, 06/25/08 30.00, 07/09/08" 30.00, 08/26/08 65.00,
(continues. .

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2. Attorneys’ fees 8,198.50 °
for preparing
Request for fees
and costs

 

3. Excise tax on 2,084.97 | 1,105.67 [At a rate of
attorneys’ fees 4.5%
for Condemnation 1
and Request

 

4. Attorneys’ fees 6,424.50 0
for Response

 

5. Excise tax on 259.69 °
attorneys’ fees
for Response

 

 

6. Pre-judgment 2,109.41 °
interest
TORAL FEES 55,363.45 | 25,676.21

 

 

 

 

 

 

As to costs, Appellant is entitled to recover $1,206.35

as follows:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NECESSARY EXPENSES REQUEST AWARD

1. Copies at $.20 per page 2,369.00 0

2. Courier Services for 24.63 °
filing

8 (, . continued}

08/27/08 57.30, 09/05/08 408.28, 09/10/08 13.62, 09/17/08 408.28, 02/22/08
206.41, 08/24/08 149.43, 09/25/08 459.03, 03/28/08 583.74, 10/03/08 115.00,
{9706/08 $65.00, 10/07/08 422.50, 10/07/08 75.00, 10/08/08 357.50, 10/09/08
82,50, 10/10/08 1,007.50, 10/13/08 69,00, 10/13/68 180-00, 10/i4/08 483.00,
Yori4/ée 735.00, 10/25/08" 150.00, 10/15/08 975.00, 10/16/08 239.00, 10/16/08

 

37
 

-FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3. Postage” 80.23 80.23
4. _Long Distance 46.04 46.04
5S. Fax 27.50 27.50
6. Transcripts 778.83 778.83
7. Color Copies 18.75 18.75)
8. Filing Fees 245.00 245.00
9. Parking 10.00 10.00
10. Messenger Fees 60.00 0

li. Legal Research 2,115.61 o

TOTAL COSTS 5,775.58 | 1,206.35

x.

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant is awarded

$25,676.21 in attorneys’ fees and $1,206.35 in costs from the

county. Gor

Kenneth R. Kupchak, Nua & an

Robert H. ‘Thomas,
Mark M. Murakami, and

Christi-anne i. Kudo

Chock (Damon Key Leong aN
Kupchak Hastert) for

defendant -appel lant Gune Daltpith,

cis Coupe Family Limited

Partnership. s

Joseph K. Kanelanela,
Michael J. Udovic,
Ivan M. Torigoe, and

% the County did not object to the costs requested for postage, Long
distance, fax, transcripts, color copies, filing fees, or parking. Therefore
those costs ave granted a# part of a reasonable award under HAS 3 101-27. Sea
Blais, 96 Hawai: at 335, 31.34 at 192 ("In the absence of opposition, we
resume that the remaining costs wore reasonable.” (Olecussing costs under
BRS § 607-9 and HRAP Rule 39(c) (2000).)); Hong ¥, Takeuchi, 88 Hawai'i 46,

53, 961 F.2d 611, 618 (1998) (*Usless there is a specific objection to sn
expense item, the court ordinarily shoula approve the item.” (Discussing
Costs onder ARS § 607-9.)

 

 

    

 

 

38
‘+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER***

Katherine A. Garson,
Deputies Corporation
Counsel, County of
Hawas's, for Plaintite~
Appellee County of Hawai'i.

William Meheula and
Derek T. Mayeshiro
(Winer Meheula &
Devens, LLP) for Third-
Party Defendant 1250
Oceanside Partners aka
Hokulia.

39