Case Title: NMC v. JLW

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-03-7

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
NMC v. JLW2004 WY 5690 P.3d 93Case Number: C-03-7Decided: 05/15/2004
April 
Term, A.D. 2004

 

 

NMC,

 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

JLW, 
ex rel., NAW, a minor child,

 

Appellee(Petitioner).

 

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Niobrara County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

F. 
Scott Peasley of Peasley Law Office, Douglas, WY.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

No 
appearance.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

   LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellee 
JLW (Father) petitioned to establish paternity, custody, child support, and 
visitation in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District of 
Wyoming.  The district court 
initially assumed jurisdiction under the emergency provision provided in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-5-104(a)(iii) ( LexisNexis 2003).1  Following a November 18, 2002 hearing, 
the district court concluded that emergency jurisdiction no longer existed.  However, the district court found that 
significant connections with the state of Wyoming and substantial evidence 
concerning the minor child's present or future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships warranted the continued exercise of jurisdiction under 
§ 20-5-104(a)(ii).   
Mother claimed the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or, 
in the alternative, jurisdiction in Wyoming constituted a forum non 
conveniens.  Mother appeals the 
district court's denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  We reverse and 
remand.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mother 
presents the following issues on appeal:

 

I.  Does 
the [Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)] preclude a Wyoming court from 
asserting jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding, under the significant 
contacts provisions of the [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)], 
when there is a similar action pending in the child's home 
state?

 

II.  Can 
a court establish subject matter jurisdiction under the "significant 
connections" provisions of W.S. § 20-5-104(a)(ii), when initial jurisdiction was 
assumed under its emergency powers of W.S. § 
20-5-104(a)(iii)?

 

III.  Did 
the district court abuse its discretion by failing to make prompt and meaningful 
contact with the Texas court to facilitate resolution of this jurisdictional 
conflict?

 

Father 
did not file a brief.

 

 

FACTS

[¶3]      Mother 
and Father never married.  Together 
they have one child, NAW, born June 20, 1997.  Mother and Father lived together and 
separately in Wyoming.  In May 1999, 
Mother and NAW moved to Houston, Texas.  
Mother and the minor child were separated on May 24, 2002, as a result of 
Mother's overdose on prescription medication.  Father traveled to Texas at that time 
and returned to Wyoming with the child while Mother received medical 
treatment.  

[¶4]      On June 6, 2002, 
Father filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, child support, and 
visitation in the District Court, Eighth Judicial District.  In his petition, Father requested that 
the district court assume jurisdiction under the emergency provisions of the 
UCCJA.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-5-104(a)(iii).  Father also filed 
a motion with the district court requesting an order for temporary custody of 
the minor child.  The district court 
granted temporary custody to Father on June 12, 2002, and held a hearing on June 
26, 2002, regarding temporary custody, child support, visitation, and 
jurisdiction.  

[¶5]      After considering 
the evidence, the district court held that Texas was the child's "home state" as 
defined by the UCCJA and that Texas would have jurisdiction over custody 
issues.  The court declined to 
exercise jurisdiction under § 20-5-104(a)(ii) citing insufficient evidence 
to establish significant connections.  
Although the Wyoming court lacked home state and significant connections 
jurisdiction, it assumed jurisdiction pursuant to § 20-5-104(a)(iii).  In doing so, the court found that the 
May 24, 2002 overdose satisfied the requirements for emergency 
jurisdiction.  The court thus 
concluded that it was in the best interest of the minor child to remain in 
Father's custody subject to Mother's rights of visitation.  

[¶6]      Mother filed an 
objection to the district court's jurisdiction contesting subject matter 
jurisdiction and alleging forum non conveniens.  Mother agreed with the district court 
that Texas was the minor child's "home state" and that insufficient evidence of 
significant connections required the court to decline jurisdiction under § 
20-5-104(a)(ii).  However, Mother 
specifically alleged that the emergency initially used to grant the Wyoming 
court jurisdiction had abated and she was no longer a threat to herself or the 
minor child.  In addition, Mother 
claimed that Texas was the more convenient forum.  

[¶7]      While the action 
was pending in the Wyoming district court, Mother filed a petition to establish 
parentage in Harris County, Texas.  
In support of her challenge to Wyoming's jurisdiction, Mother claimed 
that pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-108 (LexisNexis 2003) it was in the 
best interest of the minor child that Wyoming decline to exercise 
jurisdiction.  In support of 
dismissing the Wyoming action, Mother again claimed that Texas was the minor 
child's "home state," the majority of evidence concerning the best interests 
would come from Texas, and that the emergency condition initially supporting 
jurisdiction in Wyoming no longer existed.   

[¶8]      On September 25, 
2002, the Wyoming district court conducted a hearing to determine if the 
emergency condition warranting jurisdiction still existed.  The district court found insufficient 
evidence to establish that the emergency had abated, and denied the motion to 
dismiss.  The Wyoming court agreed, 
however, to contact the district court in Harris County, Texas and notify the 
parties with the results of the conference.  On October 10, 2002, Mother filed a 
second motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, again contesting subject 
matter jurisdiction and alleging forum non conveniens.  The court heard Mother's motion to 
dismiss on November 18, 2002.  The 
court reiterated that, at the time this action was filed, Texas was the minor 
child's "home state."  In addition, 
the court noted that the emergency jurisdiction previously exercised under § 
20-5-104(a)(iii) was no longer appropriate.  However, the Wyoming court found that it 
was in the best interest of the child that Wyoming retain jurisdiction under § 
20-5-104(a)(ii).  Specifically, the 
district court found that Wyoming should retain jurisdiction because the child 
and at least one parent had significant connection with the state and there was 
substantial evidence in Wyoming concerning the child's future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships.  
The court denied Mother's motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Mother seeks review 
of this order.

  

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 

[¶9]      In reviewing a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction:

 

We 
conduct a de novo review of jurisdictional questions pursuant to "the inherent 
power, and the duty, to address jurisdictional defects on appeal . . . ."  Gookin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1992).  
If a lower court acts without jurisdiction, "this court will notice the 
defect and have jurisdiction on appeal, not on the merits, but merely for the 
purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in maintaining the 
suit."  Gookin, at 
232.

 

Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 
925 P.2d 240, 242 (Wyo. 1996) (citation omitted).  Further, "[i]n child custody 
proceedings, the determination of whether to exercise jurisdiction or to defer 
to the courts of another state is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."  Steele v. Neeman, 6 P.3d 649, 653 (Wyo. 
2000) (citing Ritter v. Ritter, 989 P.2d 109, 111 (Wyo. 1999)).  

  

DISCUSSION 

[¶10]   Mother contends the district court 
improperly exercised subject matter jurisdiction.  In support, Mother argues that "home 
state" jurisdiction should take priority over jurisdiction based on significant 
connections.2  We are persuaded by Mother's 
argument. 

[¶11]   Wyoming's statutes concerning child 
custody jurisdiction are modeled on the UCCJA.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-104.  When the Wyoming Legislature adopted the 
UCCJA, it made the purposes for doing so clear.3  The uniform act was intended to help 
avoid conflict and competition among jurisdictions and instead focus on the 
well-being of affected children.  
Additionally, the uniform act promotes cooperation and communication 
among states to determine which jurisdiction can most effectively determine the 
best interests of the child.  In 
situations where a child satisfies more than one jurisdictional criteria, the 
intent of the act is to direct litigation to the state with the "closest 
connection and where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, 
training and personal relationships is most readily available[.]"  § 20-5-102(a)(iii). 

[¶12]   The PKPA is a federal counterpart 
to state laws concerning child custody jurisdiction.  Like the UCCJA, the PKPA was enacted to 
limit jurisdictional conflict over child custody issues and to deter parental 
kidnapping for the purpose of receiving custody awards.  Peterson v. Peterson, 464 A.2d 202, 204 
(Me. 1983); Tufares v. Wright, 644 P.2d 522, 525 (N.M. 1982); Sams v. Boston, 
384 S.E.2d 151, 156 (W.Va. 1989).  
The legislative findings regarding the PKPA indicate that Congress 
intended to "promote cooperation between State courts to the end that a 
determination of custody and visitation is rendered in the State which can best 
decide the case in the interest of the child[.]"  Congressional Findings and Declaration 
of Purposes, Pub.L. No. 96-611, §7(c)(1), 94 Stat. 3569 (1980).  Further, Congress sought to "expand the 
exchange of information . . . between States which are concerned with the same 
child" and to "discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody 
in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family 
relationships for the child."  Id. 
at §§ 7(c)(2), 7(c)(4). 

[¶13]   This court addressed both these 
acts and their respective purposes in State ex rel. Griffin v. Dist. Court of 
Fifth Dist., 831 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1992).  
We found that "[a] fundamental purpose of both the UCCJA and the PKPA is 
to avoid conflict and promote cooperation."  Id. at 237.  Furthermore, both acts are intended to 
limit forum shopping, deter interstate abductions and unilateral moves, and 
promote decisions in the best interest of the child.  Id.  The UCCJA and PKPA also share the 
fundamental jurisdictional concept "that the child's home state' should have 
preeminent authority to determine custody and visitation and that authority 
should be respected elsewhere."  
Bruner v. Tadlock, 991 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Ark. 1999) (citing 
Robert A. Leflar, American Conflicts of Law § 
243 (4th ed. 1986)).  We noted that "the UCCJA significant 
connection' criteria is eliminated as a ground for jurisdiction under the PKPA 
where, as here, there is a home state[.]'"  Griffin, at 239 n.8.  Ignoring Texas' "present home state' 
status to determine custody by recognizing Wyoming jurisdiction under tenuous . 
. . reliance on one of the overlapping UCCJA/PKPA jurisdictional criteria would 
circumvent the purposes of both Acts."  
Griffin, at 237.   

[¶14]   From the outset, the record 
indicates that the Wyoming district court considered Texas to be the minor 
child's "home state" under § 20-5-104(a)(i), and Mother does not contend that 
the Wyoming court improperly exercised emergency jurisdiction under § 
20-5-104(a)(iii).  Emergency 
jurisdiction under the UCCJA is, however, temporary.  Trader v. Darrow, 630 A.2d 634, 638-39 
(Del. 1993).  Indeed, the district 
court subsequently assumed jurisdiction under the significant connection 
provisions in § 20-5-104(a)(ii), following a finding that the condition 
initially warranting emergency jurisdiction had abated.  The district court then evaluated the 
respective connections with both Wyoming and Texas and determined them to be 
roughly equivalent.  Consequently, 
the Wyoming court continued to exercise jurisdiction based on the significant 
connections provision, regardless of "home state," and entered a temporary 
custody arrangement.  No formal 
custody determination has been made by any court.   

[¶15]   In formulating a formal custody 
arrangement, "[b]oth the PKPA and the UCCJA provide a jurisdictional preference 
for the child's home state' immediately preceding an application for an 
original custody determination."  
Griffin, 831 P.2d  at 238; see also 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)(ii); 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-104(a)(i).  
In the present case, Texas has been the child's "home state" for the 
minimum six-month period immediately preceding commencement of the custody 
proceeding in Wyoming.  The child 
was absent from Texas only because of Father's removal of the child to 
Wyoming.  Consequently, the "home 
state" initial child custody provision of the Texas statutes is satisfied, 
granting jurisdiction to that state.  
Vernon's Texas 
Codes Ann., 
Family Code § 152.201(a)(1) (2002).   

[¶16]   "A foreign state which is neither a 
decree state nor a home state may not assume jurisdiction in contravention to 
the UCCJA and PKPA preference for home state' jurisdiction."  Griffin, 831 P.2d  at 240.   Furthermore, Wyoming's exercise of 
jurisdiction would be contradictory to the intent of the Wyoming legislature 
when adopting the UCCJA to avoid the jurisdictional competition and direct the 
litigation to the state where the child and his family have a closer 
connection.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-5-102.  Thus, the Wyoming 
district court is required to relinquish jurisdiction to the Texas court for a 
determination of child custody.  
Because our 
resolution of Mother's first issue is determinative, we need not address 
Mother's remaining issues. 

 

CONCLUSION 

[¶17]   Remanded to the district court for 
entry of an order in accord with this opinion.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-5-104 (LexisNexis 2003) provides in pertinent 
part:

 

(a)  A 
court of this state competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction 
to make a child custody determination by initial decree or modification decree 
if:

 

(i)  This 
state is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the 
proceeding, or was the child's home state within six (6) months before 
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from the state because of 
his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, 
and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this 
state;

 

(ii)  It 
is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume 
jurisdiction because the child and his parents, or the child and at least one 
(1) contestant, have a significant connection with the state and there is 
available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training and personal 
relationships;

 

(iii)  The 
child is physically present in this state and has been abandoned or if it is 
necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to 
or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or 
dependent[.]

 

2The 
Wyoming Statutes, the UCCJA, and the PKPA all define "home state" 
as:

 

[T]he 
state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his 
parents, a parent or a person acting as parent, for at least six (6) consecutive 
months, and in the case of a child less than six (6) months old the state in 
which the child has lived since birth with any of the persons mentioned.  Periods of temporary absence of any of 
the named persons are counted as part of the six (6) month or other 
period[.]  

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-5-103(a)(v); see also Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act § 
2(5) (1968); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (2003).

 

3The 
Wyoming Legislature specifically provided in § 20-5-102:

 

(a)  The 
general purposes of this act are:

 

(i)  To 
avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in 
matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of 
children from state to state with harmful effects on their 
well-being;

 

(ii)  To 
promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody 
decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest 
of the child;

 

(iii)  To 
assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily 
in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and 
where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training and 
personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state 
decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer 
connection with another state;

 

(iv)  To 
discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of 
greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the 
child;

 

(v)  To 
deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain 
custody awards;

 

(vi)  To 
avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as 
feasible;

 

(vii)  To 
facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other 
states;

 

(viii)  To 
promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual 
assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states concerned 
with the same child; and

 

(ix)  To 
make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

 

(b)  The 
provisions of this act shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated 
in this section.