Case Title: Forster v. Office of Public Defender

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92/11

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Nancy S. Forster v. State of Maryland, Office of the Public Defender, No. 92, September
Term, 2011.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES - When
a State employee in the executive service is terminated, § 11-305 of the State Personnel and
Pensions Article applies, whether the termination was for misconduct or for no reason at all.
The doctrine of administrative exhaustion requires that a terminated executive service
employee avail himself or herself of the administrative appeal procedure provided by State
Personnel and Pensions Article, § 11-113.  Failure to do so in a timely manner will bar a
subsequent action filed in a Circuit Court on the same matter.   
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-005942
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 92
September Term, 2011
                                                                             
NANCY S. FORSTER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND, OFFICE OF THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Battaglia and Adkins, JJ., Concur and Dissent
                                                                             
Filed:   May 22, 2012
Appellant, Nancy Forster, challenges her termination from the position of State Public
Defender.  A year-long disagreement between Forster and the Board of Trustees (the Board)
of the Office of Public Defender (“the Office”) (collectively referred to as “the State”) over
operation of the Office culminated penultimately in a letter from the Board to Forster
demanding a suite of management and personnel changes in the Office, accompanied with
a warning that, if the changes were not implemented by a date certain, Forster would be
terminated.  Forster refused to acquiesce to the Board’s demands, contending that the Board
lacked the authority to issue such edicts, their implementation would harm indigent clients,
cost more money than would be saved, and would violate provisions of the Public Defender
Act.  True to its threat, the Board terminated Forster.  In response, Forster filed a wrongful
discharge action against Appellee, the State of Maryland, Office of the Public Defender, in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  The Circuit Court, on the State’s motion, dismissed
Forster’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, one of the
two grounds advanced by the State in its motion.  The Court did not reach the merits of the
State’s other assertion that Forster failed to exhaust her available administrative remedies
under the State Personnel and Pensions Article.  
Forster maintains before us that the Circuit Court granted erroneously the State’s
motion to dismiss because, under our jurisprudence regarding wrongful discharge, she
pleaded properly the elements of that cause of action, including that the Board’s demands of
her for action were ultra vires and illegal.  We do not reach, however, the merits of this
claim.  As a threshold matter, we conclude that Forster failed to exhaust the available and
primary administrative remedy provided to at-will, executive service State employees under
1 Because this matter reaches us in the procedural posture of the grant of a motion
to dismiss in the Circuit Court, we accept the well-pleaded specific facts alleged by
Forster in her complaint (and any reasonable inference drawable therefrom), which, in
any event, are undisputed by the State.  
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Maryland Code (1994, 2009 Repl. Vol.), State Personnel & Pensions Article, § 11-305, even
though she was not given written notice by the Board of the availability of that avenue of
appeal.  By parity of reasoning with our opinion in Smack v. Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 835 A.2d 1175 (2003), and the rule of statutory construction
that when two statutory provisions appear to conflict, that the more specific statute serves as
an exception to the more general one, we conclude that § 11-305 applies to a termination of
an at-will State employee, whether for misconduct or for no reason at all.  Section 11-106
applies to at-will State employee misconduct where the disciplinary action taken is other than
termination.  Because § 11-305 does not require the appointing authority to provide notice
of the available administrative appeal, and Forster failed to appeal administratively her
termination, we conclude, as a matter of law, that Forster’s complaint was barred by the
doctrine of administrative exhaustion.
I.  FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND1
On 21 August 2009, Forster was terminated as Maryland’s State Public Defender.
Forster served as the State Public Defender for five years.  She was employed by the Office
of the Public Defender for twenty-five years in sum.  The General Assembly established the
Office, a semi-autonomous agency within the Executive Branch of State government, in
1971.  See 1971 Md. Laws 209, § 1; Maryland Code (1971), Art. 27A, § 3(a) (the “Public
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Defender Act”).  The stated policy of the Public Defender Act is to
(1) provide for the realization of the constitutional guarantees of
counsel in the representation of indigent individuals, including
related necessary services and facilities, in criminal and juvenile
proceedings in the State; (2) assure the effective assistance and
continuity of counsel to indigent accused individuals taken into
custody and indigent individuals in criminal and juvenile
proceedings before the courts of the State; and (3) authorize the
Office of the Public Defender to administer and assure
enforcement of this title.
Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Crim. Proc. Art., § 16-201.  The State Public Defender
is the executive head of the Office, and is appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of, the
Board of Trustees.  Crim. Proc. Art., § 16-203(a).  The primary duty of the State Public
Defender is to “provide representation for indigent individuals.”  Crim. Proc. Art., § 16-
207(a). 
The State Public Defender is empowered to appoint a Deputy Public Defender,
District Public Defenders, and other personnel to assist him or her in performing the duties
of the Office.  Crim. Proc. Art., § 16-203(c), (e).  The State Public Defender must maintain
the Office within its appropriation in the State budget.  Crim. Proc. Art., § 16-203(g).
Additional duties of the State Public Defender include: general responsibility for the
operation of the Office; coordination with “professional groups about the causes of criminal
conduct and the development of effective means to” reduce crime and rehabilitate those
charged and convicted of crimes; and adoption of regulations and programs to carry out the
purpose of the Public Defender Act.  Crim. Proc. Art., § 16-207.  Panel attorneys (attorneys
in private practice appointed to represent certain, select indigent individuals) are supervised
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by the State Public Defender.  Crim. Proc. Art., § 16-208(a).  Each year, the State Public
Defender must submit a report to the Board, the Governor, and the General Assembly
providing data regarding the projected needs of the Office, the number and types of cases
handled, the disposition of its cases, and recommendations for statutory changes.  Crim. Proc.
Art., § 16-401.
The Board is comprised of three members appointed by the governor.  Crim. Proc.
Art., § 16-301(b).  The duties of the Board are to “(1) study and observe the operation of the
Office; (2) coordinate the activities of the regional advisory boards; and (3) advise the Public
Defender on panels of attorneys, fees, and other matters about the operation of the public
defender system.”  Crim. Proc. Art., § 16-302.  In addition to appointing the State Public
Defender, the Board may exercise veto power over the State Public Defender’s appointment
of the Deputy Public Defender and the District Public Defenders.  Crim. Proc. Art., § 16-
203(b).  Two members of the Board constitute a quorum for taking action.  Crim. Proc. Art.,
§ 16-301(f).  In 2008, Governor Martin O’Malley re-appointed T. Wray McCurdy (a prior
Chair of the Board) to a three-year term as the Chair, re-appointed Margaret Mead to a three-
year term, and appointed Theresa Moore to a three-year term.  
Forster was appointed to the position of State Public Defender in 2004.  For a year or
so preceding her termination in August 2009, Forster and the Board engaged in a dispute
over management of the Office.  The dispute may be traced most clearly to 10 July 2008,
when the freshly re-appointed/appointed Board notified Forster that they wanted to meet and
discuss issues, including “[t]he status and role of the Juvenile Defenders program” and
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“upper level management positions” at the Office.  The Board noted concerns, during a
meeting on 5 August 2008 attended by Forster, specifically about the incumbent Deputy
Public Defender and the District Eight Public Defender.  
In the fall of 2008, as she foresaw pressing against the limits of the Office’s budget
appropriation, Forster wrote a letter to the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals alerting him
that the Office would cease, after its funds were projected to become depleted in April 2009,
referring to panel attorneys cases where the Office had a conflict of interest with existing
representation of an indigent defendant; thereafter, judges would have to appoint private
attorneys to handle such cases, paying them as best as they could (if at all).  The Department
of Budget and Management requested that Forster reduce the fiscal year 2010 budget by $3
million and, on 3 October 2008, Forster ceased paneling cases to private attorneys in all
cases, except juvenile matters.
On 8 October 2008, Forster met with the Board to explain her budgetary and
operations actions.  The Board approved the actions.  The Chair indicated he would speak
to the Governor about getting additional funds for the Office.  No additional funds
materialized, however.  On 23 December 2008, Chair McCurdy emailed Forster requesting
a line-by-line budget analysis for the next Board meeting.  The Board met with Forster and
the Office’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) on 7 January 2009 to discuss budget issues.
At the meeting, the Board questioned the effectiveness of the Office’s Juvenile Protection
Division (“JPD”).  Moreover, the Board expressed a view that private panel attorneys should
be used in Child in Need of Assistance (“CINA”) cases, rather than Office staff attorneys.
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The Director of the JPD, in testimony, defended the JPD’s effectiveness at the next Board
meeting on 11 February 2009.  In response to a Board request at the meeting, Forster emailed
the Board an outline of fiscal year 2008 salary information for all Office attorneys and the
JPD staff.  
At the next Board meeting on 11 March 2009, Board members McCurdy and Meade
pressed further for private panel attorneys in CINA cases and requested that the JPD and
Capital Defense Division be disbanded.  McCurdy requested that Forster, in her name, send
to all Office employees an email that he authored.  The draft email stated, in relevant part,
that “[t]he Board’s goal is to assist the attorneys and staff to better streamline office
procedures [and] to make [the Office] more efficient . . . it is imperative to . . . eliminate
redundancy within the agency.”  The email stated further that “[t]he Board requests input
from you as to what programs could be eliminated or merged into other existing programs,”
and encouraged the staff to speak directly with the Board and offered that their
“communication with the Board [would] be held in strict confidence and . . . without
repercussion.”  Forster told the Board that sending such an email would undermine her
authority and invite complaints from disgruntled employees.  Nonetheless, she offered to
attempt to re-write the draft email in a way such that its content would be acceptable to her.
She withdrew later that offer, however.  She informed the Board further that she would not
implement the requested changes to the Office because to do so, in her estimation, would
increase costs, harm indigent clients, and violate the Public Defender Act. 
At the next Board meeting, on 8 April 2009, the Office’s CFO provided budget
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analyses for the preceding four years and answered Chair McCurdy’s questions as to “which
budget items over the past four fiscal years have run deficits and by how much each year.”
The Board notified Forster that the May meeting was canceled.  No meeting was held in
June.
On 2 July 2009, the Board sent a letter to Forster informing her that it was dissatisfied
with her performance as the State Public Defender and her failure to make “progress toward
reorganization of the OPD operations.”  The letter stated that the Board would terminate
Forster if she did not make the following changes within the ensuing 60 days:
a.  Disband the Capital Defense Division and disperse the
clerical staff and personnel into the District Public Defender
offices;
b.  Disband the Juvenile Defender Division and disperse the
clerical staff and attorneys into District Public Defender offices;
c.  Close Northwest Community Defenders operations and
merge them into the traditional district operations;
d.  Prepare an annual report pursuant to Criminal Procedure
Article, § 16-401 that breaks down by district the information
required by the Annual Report;
e.  Begin paneling CINA representation in no less than two
districts, reassigning CINA attorneys to district operations and
administration of CINA paneling operations;
f.  Reorganize and justify which, if any, social workers are
necessary;
g.  Rehire law clerks as needed; and
h.  Remove [the incumbent] District Eight District Public
Defender.
2  Although not relevant to our decision, we note that, apparently as a result of the
public controversy generated by the Board’s firing of Forster, the General Assembly
enacted amendments to the Public Defender Act changing the composition of the Board
(continued...)
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One Board member, Moore, did not concur with the conclusions in the letter and expressed
her disagreement directly to the Governor.
On 13 July 2009, Forster wrote a letter to the Governor asking for a meeting in light
of what she described as the “Board’s ultra vires demands” that would require her to “violate
the law.”  Forster sent a letter to the Board on 16 July 2009 contending that the Board’s
orders, if executed, were unlawful because they violated the rights of merit-system State
employees, demoted State employees without basis, contravened a State hiring freeze, and
would cost more than they would save.  In her letter, Forster told also the Board effectively
that “you are not the boss of me,” e.g., it did not have the legal authority “to order me, as you
do in your letter, to demote, fire and hire various personnel, or, in fact, to order me to do
anything at all.”  On 29 July 2009, Forster met with the Governor and his staff about her
concerns.  On 11 August 2009, Forster emailed the Board inquiring whether there would be
a meeting that month.  Chair McCurdy responded “no.”  
On 20 August 2009, the Board met with its legal advisor from the Office of the State
Attorney General concerning Forster’s position.  The Board voted, two-to-one, to terminate
Forster.  Later that day, the Board appointed an Acting Public Defender.  The next morning,
Forster was notified, in a hand-delivered letter, that she was terminated, effective
immediately.2  Forster did not pursue an administrative appeal of her termination.  Instead,
2(...continued)
from three to 13 members and restricting the removal of the State Public Defender for
misconduct, persistent failure to perform duties, or conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.  Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2011 Supp.), Crim.
Proc. Art., §§ 16-203, 16-301.
-9-
on 27 January 2010, she filed a claim with the State Treasurer, under the Maryland Tort
Claims Act (“MTCA”).  Md. Code (1984, 2009 Repl. Vol.), State Gov’t Art., § 12-107.  On
the MTCA claim form, Forster indicated that she was terminated “for refusing to obey a
negligent, unlawful, and ultra vires order from the Board to violate numerous statutory
obligations.”  Forster sought four million dollars in damages.  
On 16 August 2010, Forster filed a complaint against the State in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City advancing one count of wrongful discharge.  The complaint alleged that the
Board was authorized by statute only to “study and observe the operation of the Office” and
to advise; therefore, the Board’s demand of specific actions to be taken by Forster was ultra
vires, required Forster to violate State law (the Public Defender Act and the State Personnel
and Pensions Article), and was contrary to Maryland’s public policy.  She asserted that her
refusal to comply with the Board’s unlawful orders rendered her termination wrongful.  
On 15 October 2010, the State moved, in writing, to dismiss the complaint.  The
State’s motion argued that Forster’s complaint was barred because she failed to exhaust the
available administrative remedies under Title 11, Subtitle 3 of the State Personnel and
Pensions Article, before seeking recourse in court.  Alternatively, the State contended that
Forster’s complaint failed to state a viable claim for the tort of wrongful discharge because,
3  The State argued also that Forster failed to comply with the service requirements
of the MTCA.  Neither party briefed or argued this ground before us.
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as an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time, she served at the pleasure of the
Board.  Assuming the truth of Forster’s allegations for the sake of argument, the State argued
that her complaint failed to plead the element of wrongful discharge that requires that the
termination violate a clear mandate of public policy.3  After receiving respective rejoinders
from the parties, the Circuit Court, without a hearing (none was requested), granted, on 25
February 2011, the State’s motion to dismiss.  A memorandum opinion memorialized the
reason for the court’s ruling.
The Circuit Court’s opinion addressed the alleged public policy violations stemming
from the Board’s ultimatum to Forster.  The court accepted the truth of Forster’s well-
pleaded facts and allegations in her complaint, and  reasonable inferences drawn from them.
Quoting from McIntyre v. Guild, 105 Md. App. 332, 344, 659 A.2d 398, 404 (1995), the
opinion stated that Forster needed to assert 
clear, specific allegations of fact tending to show that the
employer either (1) violated the legal rule at issue, or (2)
punished the employee for exercising some legal right . . . . A
claim for wrongful discharge may also be asserted in cases
where the employee has been discharged for refusing to violate
the law, or refusing to violate the legal rights of some third
party.
Characterizing the dispute between Forster and the Board as “passionate
disagreements about the conduct of Office operations between an at-will executive employee
and members of her Board,” the Circuit Court concluded that there was nothing in the
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complaint that reflected “unlawful or particularly reprehensible conduct of the Board.”
Observing that the primary responsibility of the State Public Defender is to provide
representation to indigent defendants, the opinion noted that Forster did not allege that the
“Board instructed or required her, or anyone else with the Office, not to provide
representation of indigent individuals.”  The opinion concluded that Forster’s “allegations
do not raise even the spectre of a violation of law such as denying legal representation to any
individual qualified for [the Office’s] services.”  Alluding again to McIntyre, 105 Md. App.
at 345, 659 A.2d at 404,  as well as Lee v. Denro, Inc., 91 Md. App. 822, 832, 605 A.2d
1017, 1022 (1992), the Circuit Court resolved that “[s]uch differences in opinion, between
an executive and members of a board to which the executive answers, without allegations of
actual statutory breaches, are too general, too vague, too conclusory as to constitute a prima
facie claim of wrongful discharge.”  In a footnote, the Circuit Court said it “need not reach
and does not address” the State’s administrative remedy exhaustion ground for dismissal.
On 17 March 2011, Forster filed timely a notice of appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals.  We issued a writ of certiorari on our initiative, Forster v. State, 424 Md. 54, 33
A.3d 981 (2011), before the intermediate appellate court could decide the appeal.  Appellant
poses two questions for our consideration:
1.  Did the lower court err in granting the motion to dismiss
Forster’s wrongful discharge cause of action where she clearly
alleged that her employment was terminated because she refused
in implement ultra vires orders from the Board of Trustees?
2.  Did the lower court err in granting the motion to dismiss
Forster’s wrongful discharge cause of action where she plainly
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alleged that her employment was terminated because she refused
to engage in unlawful activity as ordered by the Board, she
refused to violate clear public policy and because she exercised
her statutorily prescribed duties as the Maryland Public
Defender?
The State re-introduced in its brief the failure to exhaust available administrative
remedy ground advanced to, but undecided by, the Circuit Court:
3. Is Forster’s wrongful discharge action barred by her failure to
exhaust administrative remedies that were available to her as a
State employee in the executive service under Title 11 of the
State Personnel and Pensions Article?
We hold that a termination of an at-will State executive service employee triggers the
primary administrative remedy provided by State Personnel and Pensions Article § 11-305,
which requires terminated at-will State employees to appeal assertedly illegal or
unconstitutional terminations through the administrative mechanism of § 11-113.  Forster
failed to do so, thus, she failed timely to exhaust the primary and available administrative
remedy for her termination and her Circuit Court complaint for wrongful discharge is barred.
Therefore, we do not reach the merits of whether the trial court erred in dismissing Forster’s
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, we assume the truth of
all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint, as well as the reasonable inferences
drawn from them, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.  RRC Ne., LLC v. BAA
-13-
Md., Inc., 413 Md. 638, 643, 994 A.2d 430, 433 (2010) (citing Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
397 Md. 108, 121-22, 916 A.2d 257, 264-65 (2007)); Sprenger v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.,
400 Md. 1, 21, 926 A.2d 238, 249-50 (2007); Pendelton v. State, 398 Md. 447, 458, 921 A.2d
196, 203 (2007).  
Appellate review of the grant of the motion to dismiss evaluates whether the trial court
was correct legally.  Pendelton, 398 Md. at 459, 921 A.2d at 203 (citing Benson v. State, 389
Md. 615, 626, 887 A.2d 525, 531 (2005)).  To determine whether the trial court’s judgment
was correct legally in the present case, we encounter a question of statutory interpretation.
We consider the interpretation of a statute without deference.  Breslin v. Powell, 421 Md.
266, 286, 26 A.3d 878, 885 (2011) (citing Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d
609, 612 (2001)).
The goal of statutory interpretation is to “‘ascertain and implement, to the extent
possible, the legislative intent.’”  Smack, 378 Md. at 304, 835 A.2d at 1178 (quoting Witte
v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002)). An appellate court interprets a
statute by first looking to its plain language, giving the words their natural and ordinary
meaning.  Breslin, 421 Md. at 286, 26 A.3d at 891 (citing State Dep’t of Assessments and
Tax’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 348 Md. 2, 13, 702 A.2d 690, 696
(1997)).  To determine the plain meaning of language, we consider also the statutory scheme
in which the particular provision or provisions appear.  State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133,
669 A.2d 1339, 1341 (1996) (citing Kaczorowksi v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 309 Md.
505, 514, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987)) (“[The meaning of the plain language] is controlled by
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the context in which it appears.”).  If the language is clear and unambiguous on its face, our
inquiry ends.  Id. (citing Marriot Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 445, 697
A.2d 455, 458 (1997)).  When two provisions of the large scheme appear to conflict, “the
statutes may be harmonized by viewing the more specific statute as an exception to the more
general one.”  Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Comm’r of Md., 332 Md. 124, 133, 630 A.2d 713,
718 (1993).
III. FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
We consider the State’s contention, as a threshold question, that Forster’s complaint
was barred because she failed to exhaust an available and primary administrative remedy.
In addition to Maryland Rule 8-131(a) indicating generally that we may consider issues
“raised in or decided by the trial court,” we may consider, sua sponte, whether available
administrative remedies have been exhausted.  See, e. g., Md. Reclamation Assocs. v. Harford
Cnty., 342 Md. 476, 490 n.10, 677 A.2d 567, 574 n.10 (1996) (“‘[T]he exhaustion or
exclusivity of an administrative remedy is . . . an issue’ which ‘an appellate court ordinarily
will address even though [it was] not raised by a party’” (quoting Moats v. City of
Hagerstown, 324 Md. 519, 525, 597 A.2d 972, 975 (1991))).  
In the present context, the issue of administrative remedy exhaustion was raised by
the State, but the Circuit Court declined to reach this threshold issue in its memorandum
opinion, preferring to grapple directly with the sufficiency of Forster’s pleading of her sole
claim.  This posture, however, does not preclude us from making the jurisdictional
determination whether the claim is barred by the doctrine of administrative remedy
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exhaustion.  In the interest of judicial efficiency, we may affirm the judgment of a trial court
to grant a motion to dismiss on a different ground than that relied upon by the trial court, as
long as the alternative ground is before the Court properly on the record.  See City of
Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 424, 897 A.2d 228, 235 (2006) (stating that an appellate
court can “affirm the dismissal ‘on any ground adequately shown by the record, whether or
not relied upon by the trial court’” (quoting Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 263, 518
A.2d 726, 728 (1987))); Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502, 403 A.2d 1221, 1223 (1979)
(citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S. Ct. 454, 459, 87 L. Ed. 626, 633
(1943)) (“Considerations of judicial economy justify the policy of upholding a trial court
decision which was correct although on a different ground than relied upon.”).  The
administrative remedy exhaustion question is fleshed out sufficiently in the record of the
present case and the parties’ briefs. 
There is a general rule in Maryland courts that if there is an available primary
administrative remedy provided by the Legislature, it must be exhausted before a party may
seek relief from a court.  Sprenger, 400 Md. at 24, 926 A.2d at 252 (citing Prince George’s
Cnty. v. Ray’s Used Cars, 398 Md. 632, 651, 922 A.2d 495, 506 (2007)); Zappone v. Liberty
Life Ins. Co., 349 Md. 45, 63, 706 A.2d 1060, 1069 (1998) (stating that there is a
“presumption that the administrative remedy is intended to be primary, and . . . a claimant
cannot maintain the alternative judicial action without first invoking and exhausting the
administrative remedy”).  
A.  The Relevant Statutory Scheme
4  A “‘principal unit’ means: (1) a principal department or other principal
independent unit of State government; or (2) for an employee of a county board of
elections whose employees are covered by this article, the county board of elections.” 
Maryland Code (1994, 2009 Repl. Vol.), State Pers. & Pens. Art., § 1-101(k).  Section 6-
404(a)(1) of the State Personnel and Pensions Article provided that “the chief
administrator of a principal unit or a comparable position that is not excluded from the
State Personnel Management System under § 6-301 of this title as a constitutional or
(continued...)
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The administrative remedy available to Forster was provided by Title 11 of the State
Personnel and Pensions Article, available to all State employees within the Executive
Branch, with the exception of temporary employees.  State Pers. & Pens. Art., § 11-102.
Section 11-104 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article empowers generally an
appointing authority to take disciplinary action against a State employee, including written
reprimands, suspension without pay, and termination.  Prior to disciplining an employee for
misconduct, however, the appointing authority must “(1) investigate the alleged misconduct;
(2) meet with the employee; (3) consider any mitigating circumstances; (4) determine the
appropriate disciplinary action, if any, to be imposed; and (5) give the employee a written
notice of the disciplinary action to be taken and the employee’s appeal rights.”  State Pers.
& Pens. Art., § 11-106.  
If an employee fails to appeal disciplinary action in accordance with Title 11, the
action is considered accepted by the employee.  State Pers. & Pens. Art., § 11-108(b)(1).
Appeals for employees in the management service, in the executive service, or who are
appointed specially are governed specifically by § 11-113.  As the head of a principal unit
of State government,4 the Public Defender is a position in the executive service.  State Pers.
4(...continued)
elected office . . .” is a member of the executive service.  State Pers. & Pens. Art., § 6-
404(a)(1).  
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& Pens. Art., § 6-404(a)(1).  Under § 11-113, an appeal must be filed within 15 days after
the employee receives notice of a disciplinary action taken against him or her.  State Pers.
& Pens. Art., § 11-113(b)(2)(i).  Appeals under this section may challenge the disciplinary
action based only on grounds that the discipline was illegal or unconstitutional; the employee
bears the burden of proof.  State Pers. & Pens. Art., § 11-113(b)(2)(ii), (b)(3).  The appeal
is taken to the head of the principal unit where the employee is, or was, employed, whose
decision on the appeal is the final administrative decision.  State Pers. & Pens. Art., § 11-
113(d)(3).
Termination of State employees in the management and executive services, as well
as special appointees, is governed also by State Personnel & Pensions Article, § 11-305.
This provision states that employees subject to its terms are at-will employees who serve at
the pleasure of the appointing authority and “may be terminated for any reason that is not
illegal or unconstitutional, solely in the discretion of the appointing authority.”  State Pers.
& Pens. Art., § 11-305(b).  When executive branch employees are terminated under § 11-305
they may file a written appeal under § 11-113.  State Pers. & Pens. Art., § 11-305(d).  No
notice by the appointing authority to the fired employee of the availability of the appeal right
is required under § 11-113.
B.  Relevant Cases
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We explored the statutory cross-currents of State employee terminations in Smack,
concluding that a probationary employee could be terminated without regard to the pre-
termination procedural/substantive requirements of § 11-106.  378 Md. at 314, 835 A.2d at
1184.  Stephanie Smack was a social worker still in her mandatory six-month probationary
period required by State Personnel & Pensions Article, § 7-402(a), when she was terminated
for failing to attend and conduct a weekly group therapy session with clients in her charge.
Smack, 378 Md. at 302, 835 A.2d at 1177.  Smack appealed her termination under § 11-110,
but an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of the Maryland Office of Administrative
Hearings (acting by delegation for the Secretary of the Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene) concluded that termination of a probationary employee, because of the nature of
the probationary class of employment, could not be for “misconduct” and, therefore, Smack
was not entitled to the protective pre-termination requirements provided by § 11-106.  Smack,
378 Md. at 303, 835 A.2d at 1177-78.  The Circuit Court for Worcester County and the Court
of Special Appeals agreed with the ALJ.  Smack, 378 Md. at 303-04, 835 A.2d at 1178. 
Before this Court, Smack argued that § 11-106 applied to disciplinary actions based
on misconduct taken against any category of State employee, except a temporary employee;
thus, her purported termination was subject to the preliminary procedures of § 11-106 not
followed by the employer.  Smack, 378 Md. at 303, 835 A.2d at 1177-78.  We noted that the
termination, demotion, or removal of a probationary employee is governed specifically by
two subsections, §§ 11-303 and 11-304.  Smack, 378 Md. at 309, 835 A.2d at 1181.  Relying
on the precept of statutory construction that when two statutes appear conflicting, and one
-19-
is general and the other specific (“‘the statutes may be harmonized by viewing the more
specific statute as an exception to the more general one’”), we determined that § 11-303
governed Smack’s termination.  Smack, 378 Md. at 306, 835 A.2d at 1179 (quoting Gov’t
Emps. Ins. Co., 332 Md. at 133, 630 A.2d at 718).  Section 11-303 contains stand alone
procedures (notice, appeal, suspension) for the termination of probationary employees and
does not refer to any other sections of the State Personnel and Pensions Article to layer
additional procedures.  Smack, 378 Md. at 312, 835 A.2d at 1183.  Section 11-106 applies
also to disciplinary procedures generally, including termination, against probationary
employees, creating the appearance of a conflict with § 11-303.  Id.  
Chief Judge Bell, writing for the Court in Smack, noted that, because § 11-303 is
focused narrowly on only one form of discipline, termination, the two sections “can be
reconciled by treating § 11-303, the more specific of the two, as an exception to § 11-106,
the more general.”  Id.  He concluded that where “there is a provision that specifically, and
without any doubt, addresses the termination, as opposed to the discipline generally, of
probationary employees, that provision must control over a provision that applies, but only
generally, as § 11-106 does.”  Smack, 378 Md. at 313, 835 A.2d at 1183.  Providing a
separate procedure for termination of probationary employees does not render § 11-106
illogical or inconsistent because the General Assembly permitted the appointing authority
“to take disciplinary action against a probationary employee or to terminate that employee,
both in accordance with Title 11.”  Smack, 378 Md. at 314, 835 A.2d at 1183 (internal
quotations omitted).  Thus, whenever a probationary employee is disciplined, short of
-20-
termination, § 11-106 applies as pre-discipline required steps.  Smack, 378 Md. at 315, 835
A.2d at 1184-85.  
In Public Service Commission v. Wilson, 389 Md. 27, 34, 882 A.2d 849,
853 (2005), Chrys Wilson, a management service employee with the Maryland Public
Service Commission (“PSC”), was terminated purportedly (along with four other employees)
by the then-Chair of the PSC, Kenneth Schisler.  Shortly after the terminations, at the request
of the terminated employees, an Assistant Attorney General authored an opinion letter
concluding that the Chair, acting without the authorization of the other Commissioners of the
PSC, could not alone terminate a management service employee.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 35, 882
A.2d at 854.  Wilson filed an administrative appeal, under § 11-113, contending her
termination was illegal and unconstitutional. Wilson, 389 Md. at 36, 882 A.2d at 854.  Chair
Schisler, as head of the principal unit, presided over and rejected Wilson’s appeal, explaining
that Wilson was an at-will employee not fired “for cause” and, therefore, not entitled to a pre-
termination hearing under § 11-106.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 37, 882 A.2d at 855.  Schisler
explained that Wilson “did not possess sufficient skills, judgment, or work ethic to perform
in her position” and, although he suspected previously Wilson may have misrepresented her
time sheet hours, there was insufficient evidence of wrongdoing on that score and this was
not a reason for Wilson’s termination.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 35, 882 A.2d at 854. Schisler
concluded also that he did not need the approval or delegation of the other Commissioners
of the PSC to fire Wilson.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 37, 882 A.2d at 855.  
Wilson sought judicial review in the Circuit Court, which ordered her reinstatement
based on its determination of an unlawful termination by the Chair acting alone.  The court
-21-
opined that only a majority of the PSC Commissioners could terminate Wilson.  It directed
that any subsequent administrative appeal on remand could not be presided over by Schisler
or his staff.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 38-39, 882 A.2d at 856.  Compliant with the judgment of the
Circuit Court, the PSC sent a letter to Wilson reinstating her; however, the same letter re-
terminated her by a majority vote of the Commissioners and gave her notice of her rights to
appeal administratively the new termination action.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 39, 882 A.2d at 856.
Wilson did not appeal administratively the second termination.  
The PSC sought concurrently an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from the
Circuit Court judgment and filed contemporaneously a motion with the Circuit Court to
reconsider that aspect of its judgment awarding back pay and benefits to Wilson.  Wilson,
389 Md. at 39, 882 A.2d at 856-57.  Wilson, for her part and in response to the PSC’s
escalation, sought from the Circuit Court an order of contempt against the PSC based on her
re-termination.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 40, 882 A.2d at 857.  The Circuit Court issued a second
order reiterating the findings of its prior order and adding that Wilson’s re-termination was
illegal because she was fired “for cause” as the result of alleged misconduct, without the
proper statutory pre-termination protections of § 11-106 and that the firing was
unconstitutional due to biased decision-makers.  Id.  The PSC filed a second notice of appeal
with the Court of Special Appeals from this action, but we issued a writ of certiorari before
the intermediate appellate court decided the case.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 41, 882 A.2d at 857.
Wilson argued that although her second termination was effected by a majority of the
PSC Commissioners, it was illegal because she was not afforded the required pre-termination
-22-
notice when an employee is terminated “for cause” and, alternatively, that if she was fired
for no reason as an at-will employee, the appeal process offered to her was unconstitutional
because Chair Schisler (who fired her initially) would preside over the appeal and could not
be impartial. Wilson, 389 Md. at 49, 882 A.2d at 868.  As a starting point in analyzing at-will
employee termination generally, we noted that courts and juries may not review the
motivation or factual basis behind an employer’s decision to terminate, and that decision,
absent a “contravening public policy,” may be unreviewable even if arbitrary, capricious, or
even fundamentally unfair.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 61 n.21, 882 A.2d at 869 n.21 (citing Towson
Univ. v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 82-83, 862 A.2d 941, 949 (2004)). 
We assumed, rhetorically (without deciding) for the purposes of analyzing Wilson’s
claim, that the appointing authority’s actions were constrained by § 11-106 when an at-will
employee is disciplined for misconduct.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 61, 882 A.2d at 869 (citing
Danaher v. Dep’t of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 148 Md. App. 139, 166, 811 A.2d 359,
375 (2002)) (holding that § 11-106 applies to at-will employees in the management service).
“Misconduct” is not defined in the State Personnel and Pensions Article.  We looked to the
statutory history of the State system governing terminations, related regulations, dictionary
definitions, and other cases to evaluate Wilson’s claim that she was terminated for
misconduct.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 61, 882 A.2d at 869.  Examining the Code of Maryland
Regulations governing professional service with the State, we noted that “misconduct”
involves “negligence, willful disregard of one’s duties, failure to comply with employer
regulations, knowingly violating a statute, or the commission of a criminal act,” while
-23-
discharge for performance implicated incompetence or inefficiency.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 74-
75, 882 A.2d at 877.  Adopting a definition from an unemployment compensation case, we
concluded that “misconduct,” for the purposes of analyzing Wilson’s claim, meant 
“a transgression of some established rule or policy of the
employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an
employee, within the scope of his employment relationship,
during hours of employment, or on the employer’s premises.”
Wilson, 389 Md. at 77, 882 A.2d at 879 (quoting Dep’t of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v.
Hider, 349 Md. 71, 85, 706 A.2d 1073, 1079 (1998)).  Under these assumptions, we
concluded that nothing in Wilson’s alleged, on-the-job behavior rose to the level of
misconduct, nor could the performance issues alleged regarding her employment constitute
a “dereliction of duty.”  Wilson, 389 Md. at 78, 882 A.2d at 879-80.  Dereliction of duty
involves “lacking a sense of duty; in breach of a legal or moral obligation.”  Id.  The Court
concluded that “in order to rise to the level of ‘employee misconduct,’ the alleged conduct
would need to involve some element of wrongdoing, culpable negligence, or breach of a
legal or moral obligation.”  Wilson, 389 Md. at 78, 882 A.2d at 880.  Based on the record
before us, we determined that Wilson’s termination was not due to misconduct and she was
not entitled on that basis to the pre-termination procedural protections of § 11-106.  Wilson,
389 Md. at 78-79, 882 A.2d at 880.
Acknowledging that § 11-106 serves to protect at-will employees from discipline on
the basis of unsubstantiated accusations, however, we concluded that “if it appears that a
disciplinary action may have been based, even sub silentio, on alleged facts constituting
-24-
“employee misconduct,” the “appointing authority” must be held accountable to follow the
procedures outlined in § 11-106.”  Wilson, 389 Md. at 82-83, 882 A.2d at 882.  We noted
further that when management service employees are disciplined, they bear the burden of
proof to show that the proper procedures were not followed, and absent “such a
demonstration, a termination or other discipline of an at-will employee, without a reason
being given and without obeisance to the statutory procedures in § 11-106, is not unlawful
necessarily.”  Wilson, 389 Md. at 84, 882 A.2d at 883.  
We declined to decide whether Wilson’s unpursued administrative appeal from the
second termination would have been futile or unfair in a constitutional sense because Chair
Schisler might preside over it.  Our declination to reach this issue was because Wilson failed
to pursue, i.e., exhaust, “the specific administrative remedy provided by statute when a
management service, at-will employee of the PSC is terminated for other than misconduct.”
Wilson, 389 Md. at 88-89, 882 A.2d at 885-86.  Quoting from SEFAC Lift & Equipment
Corporation v. Mass Transit Administration, 367 Md. 374, 380, 488 A.2d 192, 196 (2002),
we reiterated that
[w]e have long held, and have recently confirmed, that
where an administrative agency has primary or exclusive
jurisdiction over a controversy, the parties to the controversy
must ordinarily await a final administrative decision before
resorting to the courts for resolution of the controversy.
Wilson, 389 Md. at 89, 882 A.2d at 886 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  We noted
that § 11-113 allowed Wilson to challenge the illegality or constitutionality of her second
termination in an administrative appeal taken within 15 days of receiving notice of the action.
-25-
Wilson, 389 Md. at 92, 882 A.2d at 888.  We concluded that Wilson was barred by the
doctrine of administrative exhaustion from seeking alternative redress in the Circuit Court.
Id.  Wilson urged this Court, if we determined she was not terminated “for cause,” to remand
the case back to the trial court for further discovery to determine whether she was terminated,
as she claimed, by the Republican-dominated PSC Commissioners because of her political
affiliation as a Democrat.  Wilson, 389 Md. at 93, 882 A.2d at 888-89.  This request too was
barred because Wilson failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.  Id.
C.  The Present Case
Forster argues that this Court cannot decide the issue of administrative remedy
exhaustion because the trial court did not dismiss her complaint on this ground.  As discussed
supra in Part III, we may consider and decide this issue regardless of whether the trial court
relied upon this basis to dismiss Forster’s complaint.  Forster contends also that additional
fact-finding, after discovery, must be allowed to determine what notice of her administrative
appellate rights she was provided and whether she was terminated for misconduct,
specifically insubordination.  Smack guides us in deciding these contentions. 
In Smack, we concluded that, because a provision, § 11-303, in the State Personnel
and Pensions Article, applied specifically to termination of probationary employees, rather
than to discipline of State employees generally, § 11-303 regulated terminations of
probationary employees exclusively.  Smack, 378 Md. at 313, 835 A.2d at 1183.  Employee
misconduct that is the gravamen of disciplinary proceedings up to, but not including
5  We note that under our definition of employee misconduct, explored in-depth in
Wilson, Forster’s actions leading to her termination would not rise to the level of
misconduct.  Forster advances the theory that her refusal to implement the Board of
Trustee’s demanded changes could be classified as insubordination.  This theory is
unpersuasive, however, because it is eroded by Forster’s equally passionate contention
that the Board did not have the legal authority “to order me, as you do in your letter, to
demote, fire and hire various personnel, or, in fact, to order me to do anything at all.”  
-26-
termination, however, was governed by § 11-106.5  Smack, 378 Md. at 315, 835 A.2d at
1185.  
Section 11-305, which governs termination of at-will employees, including those in
the executive service, is analogous to § 11-303, governing termination of probationary
employees.  Like § 11-303, § 11-305 applies only to  targeted categories of State employees.
The categories targeted by § 11-303 and § 11-305 are employees with limited rights to
continued employment.  Section 11-305(b) makes clear that executive service employees,
like Forster, are at-will employees that may be terminated for any (or no) reason as long as
the action was not infected by illegality or unconstitutionality, which grounds are recognized
expressly in the statutory scheme as having to be raised initially and decided in an
administrative appeal.  This is the fundamental structure of an at-will employment
relationship that we cautioned against disrupting in Wilson, 398 Md. at 83, 882 A.2d at 882.
The plain language of § 11-305 covers all terminations of at-will employees for any
cause, or no cause at all.  At-will employees may be terminated at any time, so long as the
termination is not politically-motivated, illegal, or unconstitutional.  Section 11-305 contains
no provision exempting terminations due to misconduct, nor any reference to § 11-106.
6  Our holding does not conflict with Wilson, discussed supra.  In Wilson, we
assumed rhetorically (without deciding), for the sake of evaluating Wilson’s argument,
that § 11-106 applied to executive service employees terminated for misconduct, noting
as a basis for the arguendo assumption the Court of Special Appeals’s holding in
Danaher.  Our ultimate conclusion in Wilson, however, was not based on this assumption. 
Our commentary on § 11-106's arguable applicability was obiter dictum and does not
foreclose our holding here.  Smack directs the analysis employed in the present case.
-27-
Section 11-305, like § 11-303 discussed in Smack, contains a separate appeal provision,
which limits to illegality or unconstitutionality the grounds upon which an appeal may be
maintained.  Section 11-305 is a specific statutory provision providing procedures available
only to termination of at-will employees and, therefore, as in Smack, is an exception to the
more general disciplinary procedures in § 11-106.6
Forster’s termination, as an executive service employee, was governed by § 11-305
exclusively.  Forster’s argument that her termination was illegal and unconstitutional would
have been in the wheel-house of an administrative appeal challenging an at-will employee
termination; however, her claims were asserted too late and in the wrong forum in the present
litigation.  Forster did not appeal administratively (in writing and within 15 days) her
termination under § 11-113, as directed by § 11-305(d).  Because she did not appeal her
termination, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies bars her complaint for
wrongful discharge in the Circuit Court.  Forster’s claim that she did not receive written
notice of her appeal rights fails also because § 11-305 does not contain a notice provision and
no notice is required by § 11-113. 
Forster argues alternatively that because she was the head of a principal unit, when
7  We note also that the Maryland Administrative Procedures Act allows the Office
of the Public Defender to delegate hearing authority to the Office of Administrative
Hearings (“OAH”).  Md. Code (1984, 2009 Repl. Vol.), State Gov’t Art., § 10-205.  In
the event that an at-will employee, who is also the head of a principal unit, challenges
his/her termination and argues that the interim head or appointing authority cannot be
unbiased, the OAH can provide a neutral forum for an appeal.  We concluded in Spencer
v. Maryland State Board of Pharmacy, where a pharmacist asserted that the Board of
Pharmacy must refer her case to the OAH because it was biased impermissibly when
certain Board members participated in settlement discussions prior to a hearing, that the
Board was not required to send the case to the OAH, but it could take steps to remove or
replace the allegedly biased Board members, or send the case to the OAH for fact-finding,
but retain final decision-making authority.  380 Md 515, 532-33, 846 A.2d 341, 351
(2004).  Referral of a case to the OAH is a discretionary action by an administrative
agency that is reviewed under the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard according
to the relevant circumstances of each case.  Spencer, 380 Md. at 532-33, 846 A.2d at 351-
52.
-28-
she was fired she could not file an appeal to herself.  This claim has no merit.  When the
Board majority voted to terminate Forster, it appointed (virtually concurrently) an interim
Public Defender.  Forster’s 21 August 2009 termination letter from the Board provided this
information to her.  Forster does not dispute that there was an interim head of the principal
unit and does not explain why she did not appeal to that person or the Board.7
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-005942
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 92
September Term, 2011
                                                                             
NANCY S. FORSTER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND, OFFICE OF THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
Cathell, Dale R. 
(Retired, Specially Assigned)
JJ.
                                                                             
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 
by Adkins, J., which Battaglia, J., joins.
                                                                             
Filed:    May 22, 2012
1Forster’s argument is based on the portion of the statute providing that a Section 11-
113 appeal goes to the head of the principal unit.  See Maryland Code (1994, 2009 Repl.
Vol.), Section 11-113(b)(1) of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (“An employee or
an employee’s representative may file a written appeal of a disciplinary action with the head
of the principal unit.”).  Forster, of course, was the head of the principal unit in this case.  See
(continued...)
I concur with the Majority’s judgment, in the sense that I agree Nancy S. Forster
should not prevail in her appeal, but I disagree that her appeal should be dismissed on
grounds she failed to exhaust administrative remedies.  I would affirm the Circuit Court on
the grounds used in its decision—that Forster has not stated a claim for wrongful discharge.
Although the Majority devotes much attention to Forster’s notice argument, it gives
short shrift to her statutory interpretation argument.  Forster contends that Maryland Code
(1994, 2009 Repl. Vol.), Section 11-113 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article should
not be read to require that, when the head of a principal unit is disciplined, her road to
judicial review must include an appeal to herself or her replacement.  Such an interpretation,
she says, would violate the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation precluding results that are
“absurd” and “nonsensical.”  See City of Bowie v. Prince George’s County, 384 Md. 413,
426, 863 A.2d 976, 983 (2004) (“In discerning the legislative intent absurd results in the
interpretive analysis of a statute are to be shunned.” (citation and quotation marks omitted));
Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985) (“[R]ules of statutory
construction require us to avoid construing a statute in a way which would lead to absurd
results.  In other words, we should reject a proposed statutory interpretation if its
consequences are inconsistent with common sense.” (citations and quotation marks
omitted)).1 
1(...continued)
Maj. Slip Op. at 17.
2
As Justice Stone said in United States v. Katz, a statute should be construed narrowly
“where the literal application of the statute would lead to extreme or absurd results, and
where the legislative purpose gathered from the whole Act would be satisfied by a more
limited interpretation.”  United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 362, 46 S. Ct. 513, 516 (1926).
Bowie applied this rule to an administrative exhaustion issue, see 384 Md. at 424–27, 863
A.2d at 982–84, and other jurisdictions have used it to deny motions asserting failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, see, e.g., United States v. Dorsett, 308 F. Supp. 2d 537, 544
n.10 (D.V.I. 2003) (“In this case, however, it would be absurd to find that Dorsett did not
exhaust administrative remedies[.]”); Gwinn v. Collier, 443 S.E.2d 161, 163 (Va. 1994)
(declining to require administrative exhaustion because it would “involve a manifest
absurdity”).  Thus, this basic rule of statutory interpretation clearly applies in this case and
should receive our full attention.
The Majority’s Reliance on Wilson
Instead of addressing the statutory interpretation question, however, the Majority falls
back on Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wilson, 389 Md. 27, 882 A.2d 849 (2005), in which we
rejected a terminated employee’s claim that she should have been excepted from the
administrative appeal requirement because her appeal would have been decided by the same
person who terminated her.  To be sure, both Wilson and Forster alleged bias in the
administrative appeal, but Wilson does not control here because we based that holding on a
3
different rule.
A. Wilson’s Constitutional Rule is not Applicable Here
As we explained, Wilson mounted a constitutional challenge to the exhaustion
requirement, arguing that “under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (‘Article
24’), she was entitled to a fair and impartial agency adjudicator.”  Wilson, 389 Md. at 88, 882
A.2d at 885.  She argued that, because the hearing officer was the same person who fired her,
“she need not exhaust the administrative process following re-termination because he was
unconstitutionally biased against her.”  Id. at 91, 882 A.2d at 887.  We declined to address
the merits of that argument, however, citing a rule specific to constitutional challenges:
Although we recognize that a constitutional challenge to a
statute or regulation on its face may provide an exception to the
normal application of the exhaustion doctrine, we conclude that
that exception is not applicable here because Wilson’s
constitutional challenge is framed as an “as applied” one. 
Id.
Thus, our holding in Wilson was based on a narrow rule pertaining specifically to
constitutional challenges to exhaustion requirements.  See also Arnold Rochvarg, Principles
& Practice of Maryland Administrative Law (2011) (“The first step in the constitutional
exception analysis is that the attack must be made to the constitutionality of a statute as a
whole.” (citing Goldstein v. Time-Out Family Amusement Ctrs., Inc., 301 Md. 583, 483 A.2d
1276 (1984)).  Because the constitutional rule decided the case, we did “not reach or decide
the issue of whether Wilson was deprived unconstitutionally of a fair and impartial agency
adjudicator[.]”  Wilson, 389 Md. at 88–89, 882 A.2d at 886.  We simply held that when the
4
alleged constitutional bias takes the form of an “as applied” challenge, it must be raised in
the administrative forum first.  Id.  Indeed, our discussion suggested that Wilson could have
shown unconstitutional bias if she had raised the issue in the administrative appeal.  See id.
at 90, 882 A.2d at 887 (“Had the Chairman decided the appeal . . . [Wilson] would have
taken from the Chairman and the Commission the argument they make here that the
Commission intended to delegate that responsibility to another.”).
Wilson does not apply here because we are not faced with any constitutional issue.
Forster, instead of raising constitutional arguments, simply argues that Section 11-113 cannot
rationally be interpreted as applying to the head of a principal unit.  Indeed, she refers to the
Respondent’s (and the Majority’s) interpretation of Section 11-113 as “nonsensical,”
“absurd,” and “legally baseless,” but never calls the procedure “unconstitutional” or “illegal.”
Our application of the constitutional rule in Wilson, therefore, presents no obstacle to
Forster’s statutory interpretation argument.
B. Wilson did not Involve a Direct Pecuniary Conflict of Interest
Wilson is distinguishable for a second, more important reason, which is that the
conflict of interest here is direct and pecuniary, whereas the bias alleged in Wilson was not.
Wilson asked us to hold that any employer responsible for a termination decision would not
be able to fairly review that decision in an administrative appeal.  This Court rejected that
notion, refusing to assume that “some kind of blind pride of authorship or hubris of power
renders an administrative decision-maker ipso facto unable to assess fairly and objectively
arguments that his or her decision should be revisited, changed, or abandoned.”  Wilson, 389
2Moreover, in the case of discipline short of dismissal, the unit head would remain in
her position, thus being forced to adjudicate her own grievance.  Both situations create a
conflict of interest by giving the hearing officer a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of
the case.
5
Md. at 92, 882 A.2d at 888.  We also observed that “the record in this case does not reveal
a factual predicate for specific personal bias against Wilson[.]”  Id.  
Here, in contrast, we are not merely dealing with “some kind of blind pride of
authorship or hubris,” but instead must address a specific conflict of interest, in which the
adjudicator has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case.  If we interpret
Section 11-113 to apply to the head of a principal unit, then in the case of a dismissal, as
here, the hearing officer would be asked to decide whether to reinstate Petitioner, thereby
ejecting herself from her new job.  See, e.g., Bruno v. Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355, 360 (7th
Cir. 1991) (holding that it is proper to restore an employee to her rightful position “even
where incumbents are bumped from their jobs because those incumbents would not have
been hired if the [unlawful employment action] had not occurred.”).2  The inherent bias of
the adjudicator is much more invasive in cases like this, where the status of the adjudicator’s
job cannot be separated from the status of the appellant’s job.  This sort of built-in bias is
qualitatively different from, and much more powerful than, any leaning a neutral arbiter
(such as that in Wilson) might bring to bear upon reconsidering his decision.  When a hearing
officer has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, fair adjudication is
3See, e.g., Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59–60, 93 S. Ct. 80, 83 (1972) (holding
that an administrative hearing officer who received a portion of the “fees and costs levied by
him against alleged violators” had a conflict of interest because he “occupie[d] two
practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial”); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535, 47 S. Ct. 437, 445 (1927) (holding that a litigant “was entitled
to halt the trial because of the disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of
his direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and
to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village”); Noriega-Perez v. United
States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1187 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no
escaping the fact that the ALJ who is deciding the case necessarily has a conflict of interest
because any fine levied by the ALJ will go to the branch of government controlling the
ALJ.”).
6
impossible.3
Wilson does not support or justify the incestuous process that is condoned by the
Majority.  This analysis does not change simply because, in this case, Forster’s immediate
successor was an interim replacement.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 29.  Interim replacements often
seek to make their positions permanent, and in any case, a permanent replacement could have
been installed by the time Forster’s appeal would have been considered.
For these reasons, I submit, an interpretation of Section 11-113 that requires the head
of a principal unit to appeal to herself or her replacement is “inconsistent with common
sense” and would “lead to absurd results,” and I would reject it.  Blandon, 304 Md. at 319,
498 A.2d at 1196.
The Office of Administrative Hearings
The Majority suggests that this absurd result was avoidable because Forster’s
replacement could have delegated the hearing to the Office of Administrative Hearings
(“OAH”).  See Maj. Slip Op. at 29 n.7.  I disagree that a Section 11-113 appeal may be
4Maryland Code (1994, 2009 Repl. Vol.), Section 11-110 of the State Personnel and
Pensions Article provides:
(b) Action required by Secretary after receiving appeal. —
Within 30 days after receiving an appeal, the Secretary or
designee shall:
(1) (i) mediate a settlement between the employee and the unit;
or
(ii) refer the appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings;
and
(2) advise the employee in writing of the Secretary’s action.
(c) Action required by Office of Administrative Hearings after
receiving appeal. — (1) Within 30 days after receiving the
appeal, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall schedule a
hearing and notify the parties of the hearing date.
(2) The Office of Administrative Hearings shall dispose of the
appeal or conduct a hearing on each appeal in accordance with
Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article. The Office
is bound by any regulation, declaratory ruling, prior
adjudication, or other settled, preexisting policy, to the same
extent as the Department is or would have been bound if it were
hearing the case.
(d) Additional action by Office of Administrative Hearings; final
administrative decision. — (1) Except as otherwise provided by
this subtitle, the Office of Administrative Hearings may:
(i) uphold the disciplinary action;
(ii) rescind or modify the disciplinary action taken and restore
to the employee any lost time, compensation, status, or benefits;
or
(iii) order:
1. reinstatement to the position that the employee held at
dismissal;
2. full back pay and benefits; or
3. both 1 and 2.
(continued...)
7
referred to OAH.
Title 11 allows for referral to OAH under one section only, Section 11-110, which
describes in some detail the procedures applicable at OAH.4  In contrast, the sections of
4(...continued)
(2) Within 45 days after the close of the hearing record, the
Office of Administrative Hearings shall issue to the parties a
written decision.
(3) The decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings is the
final administrative decision.
(4) The principal unit that employs the employee shall pay all
costs related to the appeal that are incurred by the Office of
Administrative hearings.
5Section 11-110 appeals must be preceded by a decision in a Section 11-109 appeal,
which is available to “employees in the skilled service or the professional service.”  See
Section 11-109 (a)(1); Section 11-110(a)(1) (“Within 10 days after receiving a decision under
§ 11-109 of this subtitle, an employee or an employee’s representative may appeal the
decision in writing to the Secretary.”).
6See Chapter 347 of the Acts of 1996.
8
Title 11 at issue here (Sections 11-305 and 11-113) do not mention OAH at all.  Rather, as
the Majority observes, the procedure at issue here is a unique and narrowly specified appeal
right, limited to (1) grounds of illegality or unconstitutionality and (2) “targeted categories
of State employees . . . with limited rights to continued employment.”  Maj. Slip Op. at
27–28.  Appeals under Section 11-110, on the other hand, are available generally to
employees in the skilled or professional services and are not limited to any specific grounds.5
The distinction between Section 11-110 and Section 11-113 is further confirmed by
legislative history.  Both appeal rights were created by the State Personnel Management
System Reform Act of 1996,6 and from the outset they were meant to be separate.  The task
force that studied the implementation of the Act observed that “employees in the
Management or Executive Service, or who are special appointees, have different
9
disciplinary appeal procedures.”  See Task Force to Reform State Personnel, Highlights
of the State Personnel Management System Reform Act of 1996 (1997) (emphasis added).
In 2002, the Legislature singled out Section 11-113, limiting it to special appointees and
employees in the management and executive services.  See Chapter 296 of the Acts of 2002.
No such limitation was applied to Section 11-110.  The Legislature returned to Section 11-
113 in 2007, limiting the grounds for appeal to illegality or unconstitutionality.  See Chapter
592 of the Acts of 2007.   No such limitation was applied to Section 11-110.  Indeed, in 2006
the Legislature expanded OAH’s authority under Section 11-110, allowing it to reinstate
employee benefits and impose costs upon the principal unit.  See Chapter 553 of the Acts of
2006; Chapter 600 of the Acts of 2006.  No such powers were added under Section 11-113.
With two separate appeal procedures, and only Section 11-110 mentioning OAH, the
clear message is that the Legislature did not intend for Section 11-113 appeals to be referred
to OAH.  See Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 11, 20 A.3d 801, 807 (2011) (“[W]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion
or exclusion.” (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208, 113 S. Ct. 2035,
2040 (1993)) (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, as the Court of Special Appeals explained in Dozier v. Dep’t of Human
Res., 164 Md. App. 526, 533–37, 883 A.2d 1025, 1029–31 (2005), it would not make sense
to refer a Section 11-113 appeal to OAH, because it is not a “contested case.”  Only
“contested cases,” as defined in the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, may be referred
7See Arnold Rochvarg, Principles and Practice of Maryland Administrative Law
(2011), § 9.4 (“OAH exists as a central hearing agency to hold contested case hearings for
other agencies. . . . [A]gencies not governed by Subtitle 2 of the Maryland APA [titled
“Contested Cases”] are not covered by the statutes that set forth OAH powers.” (emphasis
added)); see also Maryland Code (1984, 2009 Repl. Vol.), § 10-205 of the State Government
Article (providing that the “agency head authorized to conduct a contested case hearing
shall: (i) conduct the hearing; or (ii) delegate the authority to conduct the contested case
hearing to [OAH or another person approved by OAH]” (emphasis added)).
8The definition of “contested case” under the State Government Article is found in
Section 10-202(d):
(1) “Contested case” means a proceeding before an agency to
determine:
(i) a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege of a
person that is required by statute or constitution to be
determined only after an opportunity for an agency hearing; or
(ii) the grant, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, or
amendment of a license that is required by statute or constitution
to be determined only after an opportunity for an agency
hearing.
(2) “Contested case” does not include a proceeding before an
agency involving an agency hearing required only by regulation
unless the regulation expressly, or by clear implication, requires
the hearing to be held in accordance with this subtitle.
9In a contested case, “each party is entitled to . . . (1) call witnesses; (2) offer
evidence, including rebuttal evidence; (3) cross-examine any witness that another party or
(continued...)
10
to OAH.7  As Dozier correctly observes, Section 11-113 does not contain the elements
traditionally associated with “contested cases,” including “trial type” procedures and
mandatory hearings.  Id. at 534–36, 883 A.2d at 1029–31 (quoting Sugarloaf v. Ne. Md.
Waste Disposal Auth., 323 Md. 641, 651 n.5, 594 A.2d 1115, 1119 n.5 (1991) (“contested
case” means “a hearing which provides trial type procedures, such as cross-examination”)).8
9  An appeal under Section 11-113, on the other hand, accords the appellant no trial or
9(...continued)
the agency calls; and (4) present summation and argument.”  Maryland Code (1984, 2009
Repl. Vol.), § 10-213(f) of the State Government Article.  
10See Section 11-113(a) (“This section only applies to an employee (1) in the
management service; (2) in the executive service; or (3) under a special appointment
described in § 6-405 of this article.”); Section 6-404 (“executive service” means the
following high-ranking positions in the Executive Branch: “(1) the chief administrator of a
principal unit or a comparable position that is not excluded from the State Personnel
Management System under § 6-301 of this title as a constitutional or elected office; and (2)
a deputy secretary or assistant secretary of a principal unit or a position that the Secretary
determines has similar stature.  (b) Other positions. — The executive service includes any
other position that is determined by the Secretary to be in the executive service”); Section
6-403 (“management service” means any position in the Executive Branch that “(1) primarily
involves direct responsibility for the oversight and management of personnel and financial
resources; (2) requires the exercise of discretion and independent judgment; and (3) is not
in the executive service. (b) Other positions. — The management service includes any other
position that is determined by the Secretary to be in the management service”); Section 6-
405(a) (listing the high-ranking appointments that qualify as “special appointees”).
11Moreover, as the Majority observes, the decision to refer a hearing to OAH is within
the sole discretion of the agency, and is reviewed under the deferential “arbitrary and
capricious” standard.  Maj. Slip Op. at 29 n.7.  Thus, practically speaking, it would be
impossible for an aggrieved employee to demand that an administrative appeal be referred
to OAH.  See Spencer v. State Bd. of Pharm., 380 Md. 515, 533, 846 A.2d 341, 351 (2004)
(“The reviewing court, absent some showing of fraud or egregious behavior on behalf of the
(continued...)
11
hearing rights, and merely gives the head of the principal unit the option to confer with the
employee before making a decision.  See Section 11-113(c) (“The head of the principal unit
may confer with the employee before making a decision.”).  Thus, quite sensibly, the
Legislature has provided only a limited right of appeal for those persons holding the highest
management positions in each agency.10  Without the option of referral to OAH, Forster’s
appeal would have come before her replacement, who would have had a direct conflict of
interest.11  Again, I believe this result is patently absurd, and therefore not a legitimate
11(...continued)
agency, will be hard pressed to articulate a reason why the agency acted arbitrarily or
capriciously when it did not send the case to the OAH. . . .  Even conceding the error of the
Board’s failure to recuse certain members from the panel, that alone does not suffice to
render arbitrary or capricious the Board’s decision not to refer to the OAH.” (emphasis
added; citations and quotation marks omitted)); see also Rochvarg, § 9.4 (“Agencies can
choose whether to use or not use OAH.”).
12The Majority also suggests that Forster’s administrative appeal could have gone to
the Board instead of her replacement, see Maj. Slip Op. at 29, but that option is not in the
statute because, as the Majority observes, the statute provides for appeal to the head of the
principal unit only, and the Public Defender is the head of the principal unit in this case, see
Maj. Slip Op. at 17.
13See Rochvarg, § 14.9; Adamson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 359 Md. 238, 271, 753 A.2d
501, 518–19 (2000) (explaining that agency expertise, although it is a goal of administrative
(continued...)
12
interpretation of the statute.  See Bowie, 384 Md. at 426, 863 A. 2d at 983.12
Goals of Exhaustion
The goals of administrative exhaustion are not advanced by the Majority’s holding.
The central goal of administrative exhaustion—conservation of judicial resources—would
not likely be advanced because the agency ruling would likely be adverse to Forster, and she
would be left to seek relief in the courts.  Indeed, forcing Forster to explain and argue the
hearing officer’s conflict of interest, in addition to the merits of her case, has created
additional, unnecessary work for the courts.  This runs contrary to the goal of conserving
judicial resources.  See Rochvarg, § 14.14 (explaining that when “the case will most likely
require judicial involvement to obtain the proper remedy . . . one of the main goals of the
exhaustion doctrine—judicial economy—would not be served by requiring exhaustion”).
Agency expertise, another goal,13 is not a compelling factor if the agency’s decision maker
13(...continued)
exhaustion, does not always support requiring exhaustion).
14See Rochvarg, § 14.9; Wilson, 389 Md. at 89, 882 A.2d at 885–86 (legislative intent
supports administrative exhaustion).
15See Matthew Bender, Administrative Law (2011), § 43.02[3]; Arroyo v. Bd. of Educ.,
381 Md. 646, 658, 851 A.2d 576, 583–84 (2004) (“[J]udicial interference is withheld until
the administrative process has run its course.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
13
is a person in the same position as the fired employee, with less experience.  Nor is
legislative choice14 persuasive, when the statute does not explicitly address whether Section
11-113 applies when a head of a principal unit is terminated.  A fourth goal, “prevent[ing]
the courts from interfering with the administrative process until it has run its course,”15 is not
a persuasive reason when the “administrative process” necessarily involves a conflict of
interest.
Finally, I find it telling that no one sent Forster a notice advising her that she must
appeal to the new Public Defender or Acting Public Defender.  Likely, neither the Board of
Directors nor anyone in leadership at the agency interpreted the statute the way the Majority
does.  In short, enforcing administrative exhaustion in this case simply creates more “gotcha
jurisprudence” of the kind I objected to in Hansen v. City of Laurel, 420 Md. 670, 697–98,
25 A.3d 122, 139 (2011) (Adkins, J., dissenting), and Smith v. County Comm’rs, 418 Md.
692, 720, 18 A.3d 16, 32–33 (2011) (Adkins, J., dissenting).  I respectfully dissent from the
Majority’s resting its decision on exhaustion grounds.
Yet I concur with the Majority’s decision that Forster does not prevail in her appeal.
Rather than holding that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, I would rest our
14
decision on Forster’s failure to state a claim of wrongful discharge.
Failure to State a Claim
The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, holding that Forster’s
complaint failed to state a claim of wrongful discharge because none of the Board’s demands
violated the law or public policy.  The court reasoned that Forster’s primary legal duty,
providing representation to indigent individuals, was not contravened by any of the Board’s
instructions.  Thus, it held that the complaint simply evidenced
a disagreement . . . about how best to accomplish the important
work of the Office of Public Defender. . . .  Such differences of
opinion, between an executive and members of a board to which
the executive answers, without allegations of actual statutory
breaches, are too general, too vague, too conclusory as to
constitute a prima facie claim of wrongful discharge.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, this Court views the factual allegations in the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but reviews whether the trial court’s
conclusions of law were “legally correct.”  RRC Ne., LLC v. BAA Md., Inc., 413 Md. 638,
643–44, 994 A.2d 430, 433–34 (2010).  As we said in Parks v. Alpharma:
On appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we
must assume the truth of, and view in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and allegations
contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may
reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the
allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford
relief to the plaintiff, i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of
action for which relief may be granted.  We must confine our
review . . . to the four corners of the complaint and its
incorporated supporting exhibits, if any.  The well-pleaded facts
setting forth the cause of action must be pleaded with sufficient
specificity; bald assertions and conclusory statements by the
15
pleader will not suffice.  Our goal, in reviewing the trial court’s
grant of dismissal, is to determine whether the court was legally
correct. (Citations and quotation marks omitted.)
Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 421 Md. 59, 72, 25 A.3d 200, 207 (2011).
Generally, an at-will employee may be terminated for any reason or no reason, but
there are certain exceptions to this rule.  See id. at 73–74, 25 A.3d at 208.  Terminating an
employee because of her “race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, marital status, or
physical or mental handicap” is one exception.  Id.  Another exception is when the
termination violates a clear mandate of public policy, which triggers a cause of action for
wrongful discharge.  Id. at 74–75, 25 A.3d at 208–09.  If the termination does not contravene
a clear mandate of public policy, however, no cause of action for wrongful discharge is
stated.  Id.; see also Porterfield v. Mascari II, Inc., 374 Md. 402, 434, 823 A.2d 590, 609
(2003) (“[T]here is no sufficiently clear mandate of public policy that has been violated on
the facts alleged here such that vindication by bringing a wrongful discharge action is
required to protect the public interest.”); Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 45–46,
432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981) (“The bald allegations of Adler’s complaint do not provide a
sufficient factual predicate for determining whether any declared mandate of public policy
was violated. . . .  The allegations are therefore legally insufficient to state a cause of action
for wrongful discharge.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Chapter 223 of the Acts
of 1993, as recognized in Wholey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 Md. 38, 68–69, 803 A.2d
482, 500 (2002).
Forster alleges that the Board’s decision to terminate her contravened the public
16Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references below are to the Criminal
Procedure Article.
16
policy outlined in the Title 16 of the Criminal Procedure Article,16 which governs the Office
of the Public Defender.  Specifically, Forster contends that her termination violated the
policies outlined in Section 16-201, which provides:
It is the policy of the State to:
(1) provide for the realization of the constitutional
guarantees of counsel in the representation of indigent
individuals, including related necessary services and facilities,
in criminal and juvenile proceedings in the State;
(2) assure the effective assistance and continuity of
counsel to indigent accused individuals taken into custody and
indigent individuals in criminal and juvenile proceedings before
the courts of the State; and
(3) authorize the Office of the Public Defender to
administer and assure enforcement of this title.
Forster alleges that her termination violated these public policies in three ways.  First,
she argues the Board made demands that would have prevented her from carrying out the
statutorily mandated mission of the Office.  Because failing to carry out the Office’s mission
would have been “unlawful,” she says, she was terminated for “refus[ing] to engage in
unlawful activity as ordered by the Board[.]”  Second, she says, carrying out the Office’s
mission was her statutory duty, which means that she was also terminated for “exercis[ing]
her statutorily prescribed duties as the Maryland Public Defender.”  Finally, she alleges that
her termination violated the public policy stated in Section 16-302, which lists the duties of
17Section 16-302 provides that the Board shall:
(1) study and observe the operation of the Office;
(2) coordinate the activities of the regional advisory boards; and
(3) advise the Public Defender on panels of attorneys, fees, and
other matters about the operation of the public defender system.
18Forster also argues that the trial court erred by performing a “legal interpretation of
[her] allegations instead of accepting her allegations as true.”  Yet a trial court must always
perform legal analysis to determine if the facts in the complaint, plus all reasonable
inferences drawn from them, are legally sufficient to constitute the wrong alleged.  See, e.g.,
Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 421 Md. 59, 72, 25 A.3d 200, 207 (2011) (“Our goal, in reviewing
the trial court’s grant of dismissal, is to determine whether the court was legally correct.”).
17
the Board,17 because her termination was premised on her failure to comply with demands
that the Board had no authority to make.18
The State responds that nothing in the complaint shows that Forster’s termination
contravened a clear mandate of public policy.  Rather, the State asserts that Forster’s
allegations, and any reasonable inferences drawn from them, at most show that Forster was
fired because of the Board’s “dissatisfaction with her job performance,” particularly its “view
that she was engaging in fiscal mismanagement to the detriment of the mission of the
[O]ffice and the administration of justice[.]”
The Public Policy Against Unlawful Acts
After reviewing the cases that address the public policy against requiring an employee
to commit unlawful acts, it is apparent Forster’s allegations do not fit the classic mold.  As
we said in Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 610, 561 A.2d 179, 182 (1989),
this public policy is most often implicated when an employee is fired for refusing to give
false testimony.  It has also been implicated when an employee refused to provide sexual
19See Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 359 Md. 560, 573, 755 A.2d 1080, 1087
(2000).
20See Magee v. Dansources Tech. Servs., Inc., 137 Md. App. 527, 572–73, 769 A.2d
231, 257–58 (2001).
21See Kessler v. Equity Mgmt., Inc., 82 Md. App. 577, 589, 572 A.2d 1144, 1150
(1990).
22Child in Need of Assistance proceedings under Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl.
Vol.), § 3-801(f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  See Cosby v. Dep’t of
Human Res., ___ Md. ___ (No. 74, September Term, 2011) (Filed Apr. 25, 2012).
18
favors amounting to prostitution,19 commit fraud by submitting false claims for health
insurance,20 or commit torts and violate others’ privacy rights.21 
Here, on the other hand, the alleged “unlawful activity” is better characterized as
managerial decisions that Forster believed would not have best accomplished the mission of
the Office.  For example, Forster claims that it would have been “unlawful” for her to begin
using panel attorneys in CINA proceedings,22 because Section 16-204(b)(1) requires the
public defender to provide representation.  Yet Section 16-204(a) specifically provides that
the representation mandated by subsection (b) may be provided by panel attorneys.  See
Section 16-204(a).  Indeed, Section 16-208(b)(2) provides that panel attorneys “shall be used
as much as practicable.”  Using panel attorneys, therefore, clearly was not unlawful.
The same is true of Forster’s allegation that 
the Board’s demands that she disband the Capital Defense
Division, the Juvenile Protection Division and close the
Northwest Community Defenders would have forced her to
violate the Public Defender Statute, requiring [the Office] to
provide representation in “a criminal or juvenile proceeding in
which a defendant or party is alleged to have committed a
23Nor was it made unlawful by Forster’s bald allegation that the Board’s directives
would have resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel, as that question cannot be
determined until each case occurs.  Indeed, Forster’s allegation about ineffective assistance
of counsel demonstrates even more strongly that what her complaint really alleges is her
belief that the Board’s directives were not the best course of action for the Office, not that
any clear mandate of public policy was violated.
19
serious offense,” § 16-204(b)(1)(i), and “in all stages of a
proceeding,” § 16-204(b)(2).
As the State points out, it is not reasonable to infer, from the facts alleged in the complaint,
that the Board intended to prevent the Office from representing indigent defendants.  Instead,
I agree with the State that the Board’s demands were simply a “request[] that she reorganize
the Office by merging programs and that she utilize more panel attorneys in order to
maximize resources.”  This is not unlawful activity.23
The serious budget shortfall underlying this case must inform any reasonable
inference drawn from Forster’s allegations.  The complaint reveals that, as early as 2008,
Forster wrote to Chief Judge Bell regarding the “severe budget shortfalls” affecting the
Office.  In 2010, she “requested an emergency meeting with the Governor regarding [the
Office’s] desperate budget situation.”  The complaint also references a hiring freeze instituted
by the Governor.
Forster claims that her mandate to operate within the budget and follow the hiring
freeze would have been violated if she had complied with the Board’s demands to empanel
more attorneys and rehire law clerks.  Yet it is obvious that the Board was not demanding
that Forster violate her mandate to operate within the budget or contravene the Governor.
20
On the contrary, in the context of the “desperate budget situation,” the only reasonable
inference is that the Board believed its changes were part of a necessary response to the
budget crisis, to ensure that the Office continued to fulfill its mission while also operating
within its squeezed budget.  It would be unreasonable to interpret the facts, as alleged in the
complaint, as showing that the Board instructed Forster to violate the law by overspending.
Forster comes close to alleging a violation of law when she posits that the Board
instructed her to violate the rights of merit system employees by demoting them without
basis.  The complaint does not specify, however, which of the Board’s demands would have
required her to do this, or indeed which law would have been violated.  The complaint simply
makes a general, conclusory statement that the Board’s demands would have “violated the
rights of merit-system state employees” and the “constitutional rights of [Office]
employees[.]”  I think this statement is “too general, too conclusory, too vague and lacking
in specifics to mount up to a prima facie showing that the claimed misconduct . . . violated
the public policy of this state.”  Adler, 291 Md. at 44, 432 A.2d at 471.  Rather, in the context
of the ongoing dispute regarding how to deal with the budget crisis, the Board’s demands
look less like a mandate to break the law and more like an honest attempt to ensure that the
Office would continue to fulfill its mission.
Statutory Duties
In addition to arguing that the Board’s demands would have required her to commit
unlawful acts, Forster argues that those same demands interfered with her statutory duties as
Public Defender, and thus implicated the public policy against firing employees for
21
exercising a specific legal right or duty.  See, e.g., Makovi, 316 Md. at 611, 561 A.2d at 183.
As with the public policy against illegal acts, however, reviewing the cases that have
implicated this public policy suggests that Forster’s claim does not fit.
To begin with, this public policy is typically implicated when an employee exercises
a personal right or privilege, not a legal duty.  See Stanley Mazaroff & Todd Horn, Maryland
Employment Law (2d ed. 2011), § 5.01[2][c] (observing that “[m]ost of the reported wrongful
discharge cases in Maryland fit within” the “category of cases . . . involv[ing] the discharge
of an employee for exercising a legal right or privilege”); see also Watson v. Peoples Sec.
Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 469, 588 A.2d 760, 760–61 (1991) (employee fired for suing a
co-worker for sexual harassment and assault and battery); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md.
45, 50, 537 A.2d 1173, 1175 (1988) (employee fired for filing a workers’ compensation
claim).  Forster does not allege that she was fired for exercising any statutory right or
privilege.
Moreover, when a wrongful discharge involves the exercise of a statutory duty,
instead of a right or privilege, it is typically the duty to report the illegal activity of others in
the organization.  See Mazaroff & Horn, § 5.01[2][b] (referring to the “public interest in
protecting employees from retaliatory discharge when they inform law enforcement officials
of suspected criminal behavior by their employer or its managers”); Makovi, 316 Md. at 611,
561 A.2d at 183 (1989) (“Illustrating the . . . category [of] cases where the employee was
fired for performing an important public obligation, are Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods,
Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (employee fired for insisting that employer comply
22
with state and federal product labeling and licensing law); Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 52 Ill. Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (employee discharged
for reporting the suspected criminal activity of co-employee to law enforcement authorities);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Ore. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (en banc) (employee fired for serving jury
duty).”); Bleich v. Florence Crittenton Servs., Inc., 98 Md. App. 123, 135–36, 632 A.2d 463,
469 (1993) (employee punished for fulfilling the duty to report child abuse or neglect).
Here, the facts are nothing like the above cases.  Forster cites the same Board
directives that she claimed were demands to break the law, now alleging that they were
demands to stop exercising her statutory duties.  She claims that she was fired for “refusing
to implement operational and personnel changes demanded of her . . . that were contrary to
[her] duties and obligations as the Public Defender.”  Yet the Board’s instructions, for the
same reasons they did not require her to break the law, clearly did not require her to refrain
from exercising her statutory duties.  Rather, the Board’s instructions simply represented its
opinion regarding how best to fulfill those duties in a cash-strapped situation.
At the heart of this case is Forster’s belief that the Board—because Section 16-302
provides that it shall “study,” “observe,” “coordinate,” and “advise” the Office—could not
make specific demands of her and then fire her for failing to comply with those demands.
To be sure, the history and structure of the statutory scheme, as Forster well explains,
suggests that the Legislature did not intend for the Board to manage the operations of the
Office.  That job was given to the Public Defender, the head of the principal unit.  See
Section 16-207; Maryland Code (1994, 2009), § 6-404(a)(1) of the State Personnel and
23
Pensions Article.
The problem with Forster’s argument, however, is that it proves too much, as she
provides no limiting principle on her discretion over the Office’s operations.  Under her
interpretation, she is free to manage and direct the Office with complete impunity, subject
to no check on her power to interpret and implement the Office’s statutory directives.  Yet
the Legislature created an important check on her power when it invested the Board with the
ability to fire her.  As the Ninth Circuit has explained, it is a well-recognized principle of
administrative law that the power to terminate necessarily implies some modicum of control:
The power to remove is the power to control. The truth of this
statement was recognized by the Supreme Court in Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 79 L. Ed. 1611, 55 S.
Ct. 869 (1935). “For it is quite evident that one who holds his
office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended
upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s
will.” Id. at 629. In Bowsher the Court maintained that the
removal power need not be exercised to exert effective control,
the mere existence of removal authority is likely to influence
behavior. 478 U.S. at 727 n. 5. “In Constitutional terms, the
removal powers over the Comptroller General’s office dictate
that he will be subservient to Congress.” Id. at 730.
Silver v. U.S. Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55
S. Ct. 869 (1935)); see also Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 590, 907 A.2d 175, 183 (2006)
(“By placing the responsibility for execution of the . . . Act in the hands of an officer who is
subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execution
of the Act[.]” (quoting Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733–34, 106 S. Ct. at 3191–92)); City of Balt.
24This conclusion is not disturbed by the only three cases Forster cites on this point,
which are inapposite.  See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 345–46, 75 S. Ct. 790, 797 (1955)
(discussing a review board that had no power to make an initial determination to fire an
employee); Balt. Transit Co. v. Flynn, 50 F. Supp. 382, 386, 389 (D. Md. 1943) (dismissing
a complaint for injunctive relief against an order of the National War Labor Board that had
ordered a company to reinstate an employee, because the complaint did not state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, and observing in dicta that courts should keep in mind
the distinction between the Board’s power to “take over” an industry and its lack of power
to control the industry “by indirect control . . . of internal management”); Wadman v. City
of Omaha, 438 N.W.2d 749, 755 (Neb. 1989) (defining “insubordination” under Nebraska
law).
24
Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299, 326, 910 A.2d 406, 422 (2006)
(“[T]hrough the nomination, removal, and appointment process, the Mayor controls the City
of Baltimore Development Corporation.”).
It is not necessary, in reviewing this dismissal, to determine exactly how the
Legislature intended to apportion the division of labor between the Public Defender and the
Board.  Suffice it to say that Forster cannot be right in her claim that any “interfere[nce] with
her performance of statutory duties” by the Board constitutes an ultra vires act that she has
a duty to ignore.  This is because, in light of the Board’s ability to terminate her at will, her
duty must include, to some extent, working out agreements with the Board.  As in Bowsher,
“the [Board’s] removal powers over the [Public Defender] dictate that [s]he will be
subservient to [the Board].”  478 U.S. at 730, 106 S. Ct. at 3190.24 
Conclusion
Because I believe that Forster’s claim should not have been dismissed under
25
exhaustion principles, I would decide this case on the grounds used by the trial court, i.e.,
that the complaint does not state a cause of action for wrongful discharge.  Although this
Court, in the context of a motion to dismiss, is required to assume the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,
even the most generous inferences do not suggest that Forster’s termination violated a clear
mandate of public policy.  There is simply nothing to suggest that the Board fired her for
refusing to break the law or for exercising her duties as Public Defender.  Rather, her
termination was simply the culmination of a long-running disagreement with the Board about
how best to deal with the financial crisis plaguing the Office.  Because Forster’s termination
did not violate a mandate of public policy, it does not state a cause of action for wrongful
discharge, and should be dismissed.  For this reason, I concur with the Majority’s judgment.
Judge Battaglia has authorized me to state that she joins in this concurring and
dissenting opinion.