Case Title: Mooring v. Virginia Wesleyan College

Citation: 

Docket Number: 981270

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
ANTONIO MOORING, A MINOR WHO SUES 
BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND,  
PATRICIA MOORING, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 981270     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
April 16, 1999 
VIRGINIA WESLEYAN COLLEGE, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge 
 
 
Antonio Mooring, a minor, suffered a traumatic amputation 
of his right thumb when John Braley closed a door while 
Mooring had his hand on the portal of the doorway.  The 
incident occurred at the Boys and Girls Club of Hampton Roads 
(the Club).  Mooring, through his next friend, sued Braley and 
his employer, Virginia Wesleyan College.  The trial court 
dismissed Mooring's motion for judgment finding that Braley 
was a volunteer at the Club and entitled to charitable 
immunity as a result of the Club's status as a charity.  
Because we find that Braley was not engaged in the charity's 
work at the time of the alleged negligence, we conclude that 
the trial court erred in dismissing Mooring's motion for 
judgment. 
 
Braley is a professor at Virginia Wesleyan College, 
teaching in a recreation and leisure studies program.  The 
Club contacted Braley seeking volunteers to work in its 
programs.  In response, Braley established a program with the 
Club in which students in Braley's recreation programming 
class were required to spend six hours observing the children 
and volunteering at the Club.  The students were required to 
return to the classroom, design recreation programs for the 
children they observed, and then implement those programs at 
the Club.  Braley would go to the Club to observe the students 
conducting the programs and would "help the students out" when 
they needed it.  The students were not graded directly on the 
basis of their work at the Club, but on the basis of a report 
they submitted to Braley describing their learning experience. 
On the day Mooring was injured, one of Braley's students 
was conducting a wellness and body-conditioning program for 
thirteen to eighteen-year-olds in the Club's weight room.  The 
student was giving a talk to the participants and Braley was 
observing her.  At the student's request, Braley went to the 
door to keep younger children not involved in the student's 
program out of the room.  While Braley was tending the door,  
Mooring was injured. 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the 
defendants' joint motion to dismiss.  The parties stipulated 
that the Club was a charity entitled to charitable immunity 
and that Mooring was a beneficiary of the charity.  The trial 
court held that because Braley received no extra compensation 
from the Club or Virginia Wesleyan College for the services he 
 
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rendered, and because Braley's role at the Club was both 
supervising his students and "helping the Club perform its 
good work," he was "a volunteer at the Club" and thus entitled 
to charitable immunity under Moore v. Warren, 250 Va. 421, 463 
S.E.2d 459 (1995).*
In Moore, an American Red Cross volunteer was sued for 
negligence allegedly committed while transporting the injured 
party to a routine medical visit in a car owned by the Red 
Cross.  Providing transportation for such medical visits was a 
service of the Red Cross.  The driver contended that he was 
"'cloaked with the immunity of the charity'" and that 
charitable immunity was not limited to the charity itself.  
Id. at 422, 463 S.E.2d at 459.  In resolving this issue of 
first impression, we stated: 
Like any organization, a charity performs its work 
only through the actions of its servants and agents.  
Without a charity's agents and servants, such as the 
volunteer here, no service could be provided to 
beneficiaries.  Denying these servants and agents 
the charity's immunity for their acts effectively 
would deny the charity immunity for its acts. 
 
Id. at 423, 463 S.E.2d at 460.  Based on this rationale, we 
included the driver in the immunity of the charity and held 
that he was immune from liability to the charity's 
                     
* In dismissing the motion for judgment against both 
defendants, the trial court did not specifically address 
whether Virginia Wesleyan College was entitled to charitable 
immunity, and this issue is not before us on appeal. 
 
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beneficiaries for negligence while he was "engaged in the 
charity's work."  Id. at 425, 463 S.E.2d at 461.  Thus, Moore 
requires an individual seeking the cloak of a charity's 
immunity to establish that he was an agent or servant of the 
charity at the time of the alleged negligence and that the 
alleged negligence for which he seeks immunity occurred while 
he was actually doing the charity's work.  
Assuming, without deciding, that the "role" Braley had at 
the Club identified by the trial court satisfied the 
requirement that Braley be an agent or servant of the Club, 
Braley qualifies for protection under the Club's charitable 
immunity only if the alleged negligence occurred while he was 
doing the charity's work.  Mooring contends that at the time 
of the injury Braley's "presence did not directly benefit the 
Club," and that Braley presented no evidence that "he was 
doing anything in particular for the Club at the time of the 
incident."  We agree. 
While Braley testified that he "helped out" at the Club 
whenever he could, the record shows that at the time of his 
alleged negligence, Braley was at the Club to observe the 
activities of his student.  He was not there to directly 
perform any of the Club's work; rather he was carrying out his 
duties as a professor at Virginia Wesleyan College.  He was 
observing his student and acting as "doorkeeper" at the 
 
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student's request to allow his student to properly conduct the 
wellness class.  Under these facts, we conclude that Braley 
was not entitled to charitable immunity because he was not 
engaged in the work of the charity at the time of his alleged 
negligence. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand the case for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded.
 
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