Case Title: Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce

Citation: 2007-Ohio-2877

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 114 Ohio St.3d 47, 2007-Ohio-2877.] 
 
 
HUGHES, APPELLANT, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,  
DIVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce,  
114 Ohio St.3d 47, 2007-Ohio-2877.] 
Administrative appeal — An administrative agency must strictly comply with the 
procedural requirements of R.C. 119.09 for serving the final order of 
adjudication upon the party affected by it before the 15-day appeal period 
prescribed in R.C. 119.12 commences. (R.C. 119.09; Sun Refining & 
Marketing Co. v. Brennan (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 306, 31 OBR 584, 511 
N.E.2d 112, followed.) —  A party aggrieved by an administrative 
agency’s order must file the original notice of appeal with the agency and 
a copy with the court of common pleas.  R.C. 119.12. 
(No. 2006-0107 – Submitted January 24, 2007 – Decided June 27, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 04AP-1386, 2005-Ohio-6368. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  An administrative agency must strictly comply with the 
procedural requirements of R.C. 119.09 for serving the final order of 
adjudication upon the party affected by it before the 15-day appeal 
period prescribed in R.C. 119.12 commences.  (R.C. 119.09; Sun 
Refining & Marketing Co. v. Brennan (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 306, 31 
OBR 584, 511 N.E.2d 112, followed.) 
2.  A party aggrieved by an administrative agency’s order must file 
the original notice of appeal with the agency and a copy with the 
court of common pleas.  R.C. 119.12. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This case poses 
two 
questions 
concerning 
jurisdictional 
requirements for appeal of an agency’s final adjudication order.  First, must an 
agency strictly comply with the requirements of R.C. 119.09 before the 15-day 
appeal period prescribed in R.C. 119.12 commences; and second, must the 
original notice of appeal be filed with the agency rather than the common pleas 
court.  Answering both questions in the affirmative, we reverse and dismiss this 
case. 
Background 
{¶ 2} Natalie Hughes, a director of the United Telephone Credit Union 
in Rocky River, Ohio, appeals from a decision by the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals that failure to file the original notice of appeal with the agency required 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.  On May 28, 2003, the Ohio Department of 
Commerce, Division of Financial Institutions (“the agency”), had issued a notice 
of intent to remove Hughes as a director.  She did not request a hearing,1 and the 
agency issued a final order removing her from office and prohibiting her further 
participation (“removal order”) on July 23, 2003.  The removal order contained a 
“Notice of Appeal Rights,” which explained that Hughes had a right to appeal by 
filing a notice of appeal with the agency and a copy with the Franklin County 
Court of Common Pleas within 15 days from the mailing of the removal order. 
{¶ 3} Hughes filed her original notice of appeal with the Court of 
Common Pleas of Franklin County and a photocopy of the notice of appeal with 
the agency.  The agency filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that R.C. 119.12 
requires that the original notice of appeal be filed with the agency rather than the 
court of common pleas.  Hughes responded with several arguments: first, that the 
                                                 
1.  Hughes alleges that she was never served with a copy of the notice of intent.  
January Term, 2007 
3 
removal order was void because it was not signed by the superintendent as 
required by R.C. 1733.181; second, that the agency invited any alleged error in 
filing the notice when it rejected the tender of an original notice of appeal,2  third, 
that the agency failed to comply with R.C. 119.09 because it did not send her a 
certified copy of the removal order; and fourth, that the removal order failed to 
correctly state the method for perfecting an appeal. 
{¶ 4} The common pleas court initially granted the motion to dismiss on 
the ground that the original notice of appeal was not filed with the agency.  On 
reconsideration, however, the court determined that R.C. 119.12 does not specify 
that the original notice of appeal must be filed with the agency.  Nevertheless, 
because the order was not signed by the superintendent, and thus was not final or 
appealable, the common pleas court remanded the matter to the agency for 
issuance of a final, appealable order. 
{¶ 5} The agency appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals and 
argued that because Hughes had not properly filed the original notice of appeal 
with the agency, the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the 
administrative appeal.  Hughes disputed the agency’s claim that the failure to file 
an original with the agency was a jurisdictional defect and once again raised 
issues of deficiencies in the notice of appeal rights, as well as the remainder of the 
removal order. 
{¶ 6} The Tenth District determined that compliance with R.C. 119.09 
was not raised in the assignments of error and was not germane to its review.  
Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Fin. Institutions, Franklin App. No. 
                                                 
2.  There are dueling affidavits on this point.  Hughes’s attorney states that he talked with someone 
at the agency and asked if the original notice had to be filed with the agency.  The agency 
representative’s affidavit states that the timing of the filing (where the attorney should file first) 
rather than where the original had to be filed was discussed.  Hughes’s attorney also states in his 
affidavit that he tried to tender a second original to the agency but that the agency representative 
insisted that a copy of the document filed with the court be filed with the agency.  The agency 
denies that this occurred.  
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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04AP-1386, 2005-Ohio-6368, ¶ 7.  Observing that parties must strictly adhere to 
the filing requirements of R.C. 119.12 to properly perfect an administrative appeal 
and to invoke the jurisdiction of a common pleas court, the court of appeals held 
that Hughes’s filing of a copy of her notice of appeal with the agency was a 
jurisdictional defect because the filing did not strictly comply with R.C. 119.12.  
Id. at ¶ 12, 15.  The court of appeals reversed and instructed the common pleas 
court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 7} We accepted Hughes’s discretionary appeal.  Both parties argue 
that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over the administrative appeal, 
but for different reasons.  Hughes contends that there was no final, appealable 
order from which to appeal because the agency failed to strictly comply with R.C. 
119.09.  The agency asserts that Hughes failed to properly perfect her appeal 
under R.C. 119.12; by filing the original notice of appeal with the agency, the 
common pleas court did not have jurisdiction to consider whether the removal 
order complied with R.C. 119.09.  There are two statutes to address. 
{¶ 8} Adjudication hearings for certain state agencies, including 
appellee, are governed by R.C. 119.09.  The last paragraph of R.C. 119.09 
explains how an agency must notify a party affected by an administrative order: 
“After such order is entered on its journal, the agency shall serve by certified 
mail, return receipt requested, upon the party affected thereby, a certified copy of 
the order and a statement of the time and method by which an appeal may be 
perfected.  A copy of such order shall be mailed to the attorneys or other 
representatives of record representing the party.” 
{¶ 9} The rights of a party who wishes to appeal from an administrative 
order are found in R.C. 119.12: “Any party desiring to appeal shall file a notice of 
appeal with the agency setting forth the order appealed from and the grounds of 
the party's appeal. A copy of such notice of appeal shall also be filed by the 
appellant with the court.  Unless otherwise provided by law relating to a particular 
January Term, 2007 
5 
agency, such notices of appeal shall be filed within fifteen days after the mailing 
of the notice of the agency's order as provided in this section.” 
{¶ 10} We have already addressed whether an agency must fully comply 
with the procedural requirements of R.C. 119.09 before the time for appeal in 
R.C. 119.12 begins to run.  Sun Refining & Marketing Co. v. Brennan (1987), 31 
Ohio St.3d 306, 31 OBR 584, 511 N.E.2d 112.  In Sun Refining, the board of 
building appeals upheld an order to shut down an unfired pressure vessel.  The 
board never sent a copy of the order to the company but sent an uncertified rather 
than certified copy of the order to the company’s attorney.  The common pleas 
court denied both the board’s motion to dismiss, which was based on the 
company’s failure to perfect the appeal within the time allowed, and the 
company’s motion to dismiss, which was based on the board’s failure to comply 
with R.C. 119.09.  The court of appeals held that the common pleas court did not 
have jurisdiction over the appeal because the company had failed to file a notice 
of appeal with the board within the 15-day period set forth in R.C. 119.12.  We 
reversed and dismissed the case, holding that the procedural requirements of R.C. 
119.09 are a condition precedent to the running of the 15-day appeal period.  We 
stated, “The fifteen-day appeal period provided in R.C. 119.12 does not 
commence to run until the agency whose order is being appealed fully complies 
with the procedural requirements set forth in R.C. 119.09.”  Sun Refining, 31 Ohio 
St.3d 306, 31 OBR 584, 511 N.E.2d 112, syllabus. 
{¶ 11} The agency argues that Sun Refining does not apply, because the 
same due process concerns do not exist since the agency did send a copy of its 
decision to Hughes.  A similar issue was presented to us in Cleveland Elec. Illum. 
Co. v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Revision, 96 Ohio St.3d 165, 2002-Ohio-4033, 772 N.E.2d 
1160.  In Cleveland Elec. Illum., a certified copy was sent to the aggrieved party, 
but the board of revision did not certify notice of its action to the tax 
commissioner, as required by R.C. 5715.20.  We stated that compliance with the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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statutory requirement for the board to certify notice of its action to the tax 
commissioner was mandatory.  Cleveland Elec. Illum. at ¶ 13.  We also held that 
“as long as R.C. 5715.20 requires a board of revision to certify notice of its action 
to the Tax Commissioner, notices must be mailed to the Tax Commissioner 
before the R.C. 5717.01 appeal time will begin to run.”  Id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 12} We see no reason to depart from Sun Refining’s holding that the 
time for appeal does not begin to run until the agency complies with R.C. 119.09.  
The plain language of the statute informs an agency what it must do when it 
issues a final order.  We will, therefore, examine whether the agency strictly 
complied so as to trigger Hughes’s time for appeal.3 
{¶ 13} R.C. 119.09 requires an agency to serve, by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, a certified copy of the order upon the affected party.  The order 
must include a statement of the time for appeal and the method for perfecting an 
appeal.  Hughes contends that the agency failed to send her a certified copy of its 
decision and also failed to inform her of the correct method for perfecting an 
appeal because it did not state that R.C. 119.12 requires the original notice of 
appeal to be filed with the agency.  Certification of the administrative order and 
the content of the notice of appeal rights are two separate issues. 
Certified Copy 
{¶ 14} R.C. 119.01, the definitional section for the chapter on 
administrative procedure, does not define the term “certified copy.”  Unless words 
are otherwise defined or a contrary intent is clearly expressed, we give words in a 
statute their plain and ordinary meaning.  Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emps., 
Chapter No. 672 v. Twin Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1983), 6 Ohio 
St.3d 178, 181, 6 OBR 235, 451 N.E.2d 1211; Coventry Towers, Inc. v. 
                                                 
3.   The agency urges that if we decide that the R.C. 119.09 analysis should precede the R.C. 
119.12 issue, then remand would be appropriate because neither court has reviewed Hughes’s R.C. 
119.09 objections.   
January Term, 2007 
7 
Strongsville (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 18 OBR 151, 480 N.E.2d 412.  
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) defines “certified copy” as “[a] duplicate 
of an original (usu. official) document, certified as an exact reproduction usu. by 
the officer responsible for issuing or keeping the original.”  Id. at 360.  This 
definition is similar to the definitions of “certified copy” the General Assembly 
has used in R.C. 305.31,4 731.32,5 and 3705.23.6 
{¶ 15} The agency argues that the removal order was certified by the 
attestation statement “Witness my hand” which appeared at the end of the order 
after the notice of appeal rights.  This attestation, however, is on the original order 
and therefore does not serve as a certification that the document sent to Hughes is 
an exact reproduction of the original.  Because the removal order served on 
Hughes does not contain a signed statement that it is a true and exact reproduction 
of the original document, the agency failed to comply with R.C. 119.09. 
Content of Removal Order 
{¶ 16} We next consider Hughes’s contention that the removal order was 
deficient because it did not properly explain the method of appeal.  The notice of 
appeal rights contained in the removal order stated: “Respondent is hereby 
notified that this Order may be appealed pursuant to Revised Code Section 119.12 
by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Division setting forth the Order appealed 
from and the grounds of the appeal.  A copy of such Notice of Appeal shall also 
                                                 
4.  R.C. 305.31 provides, “As used in this section, ‘certified copy’ means a copy containing a 
written statement attesting that it is a true and exact reproduction of the original resolution or 
rule.” 
 
5.  R.C. 731.32 provides, “As used in this section, ‘certified copy’ means a copy containing a 
written statement attesting that it is a true and exact reproduction of the original proposed 
ordinance or measure or of the original ordinance or measure.” 
 
6.   R.C. 3705.23(A)(2) provides, “A certified copy of a vital record may be made by a mechanical, 
electronic, or other reproduction process.  It shall be certified as a true copy by the director, state 
registrar, or local registrar who has custody of the record and shall include the date of issuance, the 
name of the issuing officer, the signature of the officer or an authorized facsimile of the signature, 
and the seal of the issuing office.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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be filed with the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County.  Such Notice of 
Appeal must be filed within fifteen (15) days after the date of the mailing of this 
Order.”  This statement tracks the language of R.C. 119.12 and sufficiently alerts 
Hughes that she must file the original notice of appeal with the agency and a copy 
with the court of common pleas.  The failure to use the word “original” in the 
notice of appeal rights and in R.C. 119.12, when describing the notice of appeal to 
be filed with the agency, does not create an ambiguity in the statute.  R.C. 119.12 
clearly states that “A copy of such notice of appeal shall also be filed by the 
appellant with the court.” (Emphasis added.)  We have recognized that the notice 
of appeal filed with the agency and the notice of appeal filed with the common 
pleas court are distinct documents.  Nibert v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. 
(1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 100, 702 N.E.2d 70.  There, we held that the 15-day filing 
requirement expressed in the statute applies both to the notice of appeal filed with 
the agency and to the copy of the notice filed with the court.  Id. at 102, 702 
N.E.2d 70.  We also determined that applying the 15-day deadline to each filing 
simplifies the requirements of R.C. 119.12 and promotes procedural efficiency.  
Nibert, 84 Ohio St.3d at 102-103, 702 N.E.2d 70.  The content of the notice 
explaining the method of appeal to Hughes was sufficient. 
{¶ 17} Just as we require an agency to strictly comply with the 
requirements of R.C. 119.09 a party adversely affected by an agency decision 
must likewise strictly comply with R.C. 119.12 in order to perfect an appeal.  As 
the proverb states, what is good for the goose is good for the gander.  Because the 
agency’s description of Hughes’s appeal rights tracks the language of the statute, 
Hughes was properly informed that the original notice of appeal was to be filed 
with the agency and that a copy of the notice of appeal was to be filed with the 
common pleas court. 
Conclusion 
January Term, 2007 
9 
{¶ 18} The common pleas court lacks jurisdiction over this administrative 
appeal because a certified copy of the final order was never served on Hughes.  If 
a certified copy had been served, and the appeal time had started to run, the 
common pleas court still would have lacked jurisdiction because Hughes did not 
properly file her notice of appeal. 
{¶ 19} We hold that an administrative agency must strictly comply with 
the procedural requirements of R.C. 119.09 for serving the final order of 
adjudication upon the party affected by it before the 15-day appeal period 
prescribed in R.C. 119.12 commences.  A party aggrieved by an administrative 
agency’s order must file the original notice of appeal with the agency and a copy 
with the court of common pleas.  Here, since the agency failed to properly serve 
Hughes with a certified copy of the removal order, her appeal period never started 
to run.  Once Hughes is properly served, she may perfect an appeal by filing the 
original notice of appeal with the agency and a copy of the notice with the court 
of common pleas. 
{¶ 20} The judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals is reversed 
and the cause is dismissed. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  
{¶ 21} I concur in judgment and in paragraph one of the syllabus.  I write 
separately to dissent from paragraph two of the syllabus because it and the 
concomitant discussion elevate procedure over substance. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 22} The whole point of a notice of appeal is to put the opposing party 
on notice that an appeal has been filed.  In this case, it is incontrovertible that the 
agency was on notice that an appeal had been filed.  Yet a majority of this court 
focuses on a distinction without a difference – whether a copy or an original had 
been filed with the court or the agency.  Either way, both are on notice that an 
appeal was filed. 
{¶ 23} To support its foray into undue legalism, the court states that “what 
is good for the goose is good for the gander.”  But “[w]hat is sauce for the goose 
may be sauce for the gander but is not necessarily sauce for the chicken, the duck, 
the turkey or the guinea hen.”  Toklas, The Alice B. Toklas Cookbook (1954) 5.  
In this case, the fouls are not the same.  R.C. 119.09’s requirement to serve a 
“certified copy” of its order serves a legitimate purpose: to inform the affected 
party of the agency’s determination; R.C. 119.12’s requirement to file an 
“original” notice of appeal with the agency serves no purpose.  Further, the word 
“original” does not appear in R.C. 119.12, though it has been inserted into the 
statute by a majority of this court in contravention of the most basic precept of 
statutory construction.  Rice v. CertainTeed Corp. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 417, 419, 
704 N.E.2d 1217.  The majority opinion justifies inserting “original” into the 
statute by acknowledging that the word isn’t in the statute.  That is a strange 
rationalization.  I concur in judgment and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 24} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 25} Two propositions of law have been presented to the court in this 
appeal.  The first concerns the requirements for filing an administrative appeal 
pursuant to R.C. 119.12, which is jurisdictional, and the second concerns agency 
compliance with R.C. 119.09, which affects the validity of the agency’s action. 
January Term, 2007 
11 
{¶ 26} R.C. 119.12 sets forth the requirements for perfecting an appeal 
from the decision of an administrative agency:  “Any party desiring to appeal 
shall file a notice of appeal with the agency setting forth the order appealed from 
and the grounds of the party's appeal. A copy of such notice of appeal shall also 
be filed by the appellant with the court.  Unless otherwise provided by law 
relating to a particular agency, such notices of appeal shall be filed within fifteen 
days after the mailing of the notice of the agency’s order as provided in this 
section.” 
{¶ 27} As this court stated in Ramsdell v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm. 
(1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 24, 27, 563 N.E.2d 285, “We have always considered it to 
be fundamental that when the right to appeal is conferred by statute, the appeal 
can be perfected only in the mode prescribed by statute.”  See, also, Zier v. Bur. of 
Unemp. Comp. (1949), 151 Ohio St. 123, 38 O.O. 573, 84 N.E.2d 746, and 
Proctor v. Giles (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 211, 15 O.O.3d 227, 400 N.E.2d 393.  
Furthermore, we emphasized in Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Ins. Guar. Assn. 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 525, 634 N.E.2d 611, that “[t]here is no need to 
liberally construe a statute whose meaning is unequivocal and definite.” 
{¶ 28} The Tenth District Court of Appeals has regularly reviewed cases 
involving R.C. 119.12 appeals and has consistently held appellants to a standard 
of strict statutory compliance in order to perfect such an appeal.  See, e.g., 
Harrison v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 317, 659 N.E.2d 368; 
In re Namey (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 322, 659 N.E.2d 372; Colonial, Inc. v. 
Ohio Liquor Control Comm., Franklin App. No. 02AP-1019, 2003-Ohio-3121; 
Berus v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Servs., Franklin App. No. 04AP-1196, 2005-Ohio-
3384. 
{¶ 29} In this instance, Hughes filed her notice of appeal with the court 
and a copy with the agency, thereby failing to adhere to the statutory requirements 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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of R.C. 119.12.  Accordingly, the trial court never obtained jurisdiction over her 
appeal.  The appellate court said as much in its opinion and ruled accordingly. 
{¶ 30} The predicate issue therefore presented to this court is one of 
jurisdiction:  Did Hughes properly file her notice of appeal, or, stated differently, 
did the trial court obtain jurisdiction over this administrative appeal?  I am not 
able to join my colleagues who appear to reach behind this jurisdictional issue to 
consider a different issue — that of agency compliance with R.C. 119.09 — 
which the appellate court declined to address because its ruling with respect to 
R.C. 119.12 rendered the R.C. 119.09 issue moot.  It is therefore reviewed for the 
first time in this court. 
{¶ 31} Regardless of whether or not the agency has complied with R.C. 
119.09 in removing Hughes from her position as a director of the United 
Telephone Credit Union, courts cannot exercise jurisdiction unless procedural 
requisites are satisfied.  The threshold issue before this court concerns whether the 
trial court ever obtained jurisdiction over the parties in this case.  After Hughes 
filed the notice of appeal with the common pleas court, and a copy with the 
agency, the agency moved to dismiss the appeal for failing to comply with R.C. 
119.12.  The common pleas court granted that motion, thereby dismissing the 
appeal.  Hughes subsequently moved to reconsider, claiming that the agency 
failed to comply with R.C. 119.09 in attempting to remove her from her position, 
and further claiming that R.C. 119.12 does not require the filing of an original 
notice of appeal with the agency.  The court granted the motion to reconsider and 
remanded to the agency with instructions to issue a final, appealable order in 
compliance with R.C. 119.09.  The agency then appealed, asserting that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction because of noncompliance with R.C. 119.12.  The 
question of the proper filing of a notice of appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12, 
however, should not be clouded with allegations of noncompliance regarding R.C. 
119.09. 
January Term, 2007 
13 
{¶ 32} The legislature has prescribed the manner of filing a R.C. 119.12 
appeal.  No challenge has been presented in this appeal to the legislative authority 
in that regard, such as is made pursuant to the Modern Courts Amendment; 
further, whether or not the legislature should revisit R.C. 119.12 is a policy 
question not before us.  The practicality of the appellant’s argument is appealing; 
nevertheless, a body of case law has developed in Ohio that compels a strict 
interpretation of statutory requirements for filing an administrative appeal 
pursuant to R.C. 119.12. 
{¶ 33} In my view, today’s decision will further confuse the body of case 
law that has existed in this field for at least a dozen years.  This is a relatively 
routine case of failing to strictly comply with statutory directives necessary to vest 
a court with jurisdiction.  I believe the appellate court correctly adjudicated the 
issue consistent with its own precedent and rulings from this court.  The trial court 
never obtained jurisdiction over these parties because Hughes filed the notice of 
appeal with the court instead of the agency and filed a copy with the agency 
instead of the court.  Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court should be 
affirmed, and the question of agency compliance with R.C. 119.09 was not 
properly presented to the court. 
 
CUPP, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Jones Day and Fordham E. Huffman; and Sidley Austin L.L.P., Scott 
Mendeloff, and Gabriel Aizenberg, for appellant. 
 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, and Stephen Carney, Senior Deputy 
Solicitor; and Porter Wright Morris & Arthur, Kathleen Trafford, and Polly 
Harris, for appellee. 
______________________