Case Title: Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. John J. Farmer, Jr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-52-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2000-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Poritz, C.J., writing for a majority of the Court. This appeal requires the Court to consider plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to a State statute, the Parental Notification for Abortion Act (N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.1 to -1.12), that conditions a minor's right to obtain an abortion on parental notification unless a judicial waiver is obtained. The Parental Notification for Abortion Act ( Act ) was signed into law on June 28, 1999. The Act sets forth the Legislature's findings that there exist compelling and important State interests in protecting minors from the consequences of decisions that are not fully informed, in fostering the family structure and in protecting the rights of parents to rear their children. To effectuate these State interests, the Act requires a physician to wait at least forty-eight hours after written notice has been given to the parent of an unemancipated minor before performing an abortion. Notice is not required when a parent certifies in writing before a notary that he or she has already been informed of the impending abortion or when the attending physician certifies in the minor's medical records that the abortion is necessary due to a medical emergency. Alternatively, a minor may seek a judicial waiver of the notification requirement by filing a petition or motion with a judge of the Superior Court. In seeking a judicial waiver, the minor is entitled to court-appointed counsel and all proceedings are confidential. Absent the granting of an extension, a judge must rule on the petition or motion for waiver within forty-eight hours or the application is deemed granted. The judge must authorize the waiver of notification if he or she finds by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is sufficiently mature to make the decision, that the minor is being subjected to a pattern of abuse, or that notification of the parent is not in the minor's best interests. If the judge does not make findings permitting waiver, the physician must comply with the Act's notice provisions before performing the abortion or face potential civil liability in an action by the parents or civil penalties ranging from $1,000 to $5,000. The Act further requires the Department of Health and Senior Services ( DHSS ) to promulgate rules that physicians must follow in complying with the Act, and to prepare a fact sheet for distribution to pregnant minors seeking abortions in which the Act's provisions and requirements are explained, including the procedure for petitioning the court for a waiver of notification. On September 8, 1999, the Administrative Office of the Courts issued a Directive regarding implementation of the judicial waiver provisions. The Directive provides that a minor seeking judicial waiver of the notice requirements must file a petition in the Chancery Division, Family Part, in a county where the minor resides or is being sheltered, or where the abortion will take place. It further provides that the minor must appear at a waiver hearing or the petition will be dismissed. A Supplemental Directive establishes expedited procedures for appellate review of denied waivers. Prior to the effective date of the Act, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction precluding its enforcement. Proceeding by Order to Show Cause, the trial court dismissed the challenge for failure to demonstrate the likelihood of success on the merits. The Supreme Court stayed implementation of the Act on September 27, 1999, and remanded to the Chancery Division for an expedited disposition on the merits to be followed by direct certification to the Supreme Court. On December 10, 1999, after considering the merits of plaintiffs' challenge, the Chancery Division held that the Act was constitutional. HELD: The State's interests fail to override the substantial intrusions that the Act imposes on a young woman's fundamental right to choose an abortion, and therefore the Act is unconstitutional under the equal protection principles set forth in the Constitution of the State of New Jersey. 2. Other states have enacted legislation similar to New Jersey's Act. Most of the state courts that have considered those statutes applied federal case law to uphold the legislation. Massachusetts and California, however, recently struck down statutes that required parental consent, rather than notification, despite the availability of judicial bypass procedures. California's highest court grounded its decision in the guarantee of privacy provided by that state's constitution. (Pp. 27-30) 3. Article I, paragraph 1, of the New Jersey Constitution incorporates within its terms the right of privacy, including a woman's right to make certain fundamental choices. This provision provides broader protection than the corresponding federal provision. Unlike the multi-tiered, federal constitutional analysis, which generally considers equal protection challenges under either a rational-basis or strict-scrutiny standard, equal protection analysis under the New Jersey Constitution weighs the governmental interest in the statutory classification against the interests of the affected class. Using this balancing test, the Court considers the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction. New Jersey's Act imposes restrictions on minors who seek an abortion, treating them differently than it treats young women who choose to carry to term. Applying the balancing test, the Court must consider whether that differential treatment unfairly burdens only one class of minors, thereby violating the State Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. (Pp. 30-33) 4. The importance of a woman's right to make reproductive decisions requires that the Act's classification receive exacting scrutiny. The Court finds that the Act significantly burdens unemancipated minors seeking abortions by imposing requirements that create time delays affecting the cost and availability of abortion and the associated medical risks. These consequences of the Act may cause minors to leave the State to obtain help, or use unlicensed doctors or unorthodox procedures in procuring abortions. The statute may also operate as a functional bar against minors exercising their constitutional rights to make reproductive decisions. The procedures to obtain judicial waiver of the notification requirements impose far greater burdens on minors who are unable to communicate with their parents about their decisions to obtain abortions. These burdens include delay in obtaining the abortions and risk to minors' anonymity because of the need to contact and be contacted by court officials and attorneys, absence from school, and the presence of the public at the courthouse. These burdens may prevent the exercise of that fundamental right altogether. Such a result is unacceptable absent substantial adequate justification for the classification created by the Legislature. (Pp. 34-43) 5. The Court finds that the Act does not advance the justifications offered by the State, i.e., that it protects minors from their own immaturity, fosters and preserves the family structure, and protects parents' rights to raise their children in a manner they deem appropriate. The State has recognized the maturity of minors in matters relating to decisions on sexuality, reproduction, substance-abuse treatment, and placing children for adoption, and the State does not require parental notification when minors must undergo cesarean sections, a procedure which is more dangerous than normal delivery and more difficult than abortion. The available evidence indicates that minors choosing abortions do not suffer greater psychological problems than minors carrying pregnancies to term. Furthermore, applications for waiver of notification in Massachusetts and Minnesota, two states brought to the Court's attention, are granted by the courts almost without exception, suggesting that the waiver process serves only to delay the abortion rather than advance the State's asserted interests. Nor does the Court find that the Act fosters family communications. Abortion providers already encourage minors to consult their parents, and the record shows that it is the pre-existing relationships between the parents and minors that determine whether minors will involve the parents in their decisions. Many minors are justified in not doing so because of abusive home environments. Finally, although the Court acknowledges the right of parents to raise their children with limited government interference, the Act unjustifiably prevents minors from exercising a fundamental right independent of parental involvement. (Pp. 44-50) 6. The State having failed to show that the proffered statutory reasons are furthered by the Act or that the asserted need is capable of realization through the Act's provisions, and the State having failed to offer adequate justification for distinguishing between minors seeking abortions from those seeking medical and surgical care relating to their pregnancies, the Court finds no basis on which to impose a special burden on the class of minors seeking abortions. As such, the Act violates the equal protection principles of the New Jersey Constitution. (Pp. 50-51) Judgment of the Superior Court, Chancery Division, is REVERSED. JUSTICE O'HERN, dissenting, is of the view that the repugnancy of the Act to the New Jersey Constitution is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt. He believes that the Act does not offend the State Constitution's equal protection requirements because it involves a reasonable classification of different medical procedures. JUSTICE VERNIERO, dissenting, is of the view that the Act does not unduly regulate or forbid any form of abortion procedure. He would remand the matter to permit the parties to develop a full record before invalidating the Act based on asserted flaws in the waiver process. JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, and LONG join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN filed a separate, dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE VERNIERO joins. JUSTICE VERNIERO filed a separate, dissenting opinion. Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOHN J. FARMER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, in his official capacity, and his successors in office; CHRISTINE GRANT, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH and SENIOR SERVICES OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, in her official capacity, and her successors in office; HON. RICHARD S. WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, in his official capacity, and his successors in office, Defendants-Respondents. On certification to the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Bergen County. Jennifer Dalven, a member of the New York bar, argued the cause for appellants (Lenora M. Lapidus, Director, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, attorney; Ms. Lapidus, Ms. Dalven, Catherine Weiss and Julie Sternberg, a members of New York bar, on the brief). Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Michael Patrick Carroll submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Right to Life. James Katz submitted a brief on behalf or amici curiae American Medical Women's Association, Inc., The Society for Adolescent Medicine, and Physicians for Reproductive Choice and Health (Tomar, Simonoff, Adourian, O'Brien, Kaplan, Jacoby & Graziano, attorneys). Russell J. Passamano submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Life Education and Resource Network - New Jersey, LifeNet, Inc., Abortions Aftermath, League of American Families and New Jersey Family Policy Council. Ann R. Bartlett submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association. A. The Parental Notification for Abortion Act We have previously adverted to the legislative findings that provide the underlying rationale for the Parental Notification Act. More specifically, the Act states: The Legislature finds that there exist compelling and important State interests in protecting minors against their own immaturity, in fostering the family structure and preserving it as a viable social unit, and in protecting the rights of parents to rear their children. The Legislature further finds that minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take into account both immediate and long-range consequences of their actions; that the medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of abortion are serious and of indeterminate duration, particularly when the patient is a minor; that parents ordinarily possess information essential to a physician's exercise of his best medical judgment concerning their child; and that parents who are aware that their minor daughter has had an abortion may better insure that the minor receives adequate medical attention after her abortion. The Legislature further finds that parental consultation regarding abortion is desirable and in the best interests of the minor. notice may be made by certified mail addressed to the parent at the parent's last known address with return receipt requested and restricted delivery to the addressee, which means a postal employee may only deliver the mail to the authorized addressee. At the same time that notice is mailed by certified mail, it shall also be sent by first class mail to the parent at the parent's last known address. The 48 hour period for notice sent under the provisions of this subsection shall begin at noon on the next day on which regular mail delivery takes place following the day on which the mailings are posted. The Act explains that a parent means a parent with care and control of the unemancipated minor, unless the parent has no custodial rights; or if there is no parent with care and control, then the foster parent or the guardian of the unemancipated minor; or a person standing in loco parentis to the unemancipated minor, and a person standing in loco parentis shall be confidential and insure the anonymity of the minor and [that] shall be given precedence over other pending matters so that the court may reach a decision promptly and without delay so as to serve the best interests of the minor. Where provisions of the federal and state Constitutions differ, . . . or where a previously established body of state law leads to a different result, . . . we must determine whether a more expansive grant of rights is mandated by our state Constitution. We recognize, however, that caution is required when we extend the protections of our State Constitution beyond the limits set by the United States Supreme Court for parallel provisions in the Federal Constitution. Id. at 301 (citing State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 344-45 (1982)). Under the Federal Constitution, a woman has a fundamental right to choose whether to carry her pregnancy to term or to choose an abortion. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 93 S. Ct. 705, 727, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 177 (1973); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2604, ___ L. Ed.2d ___, ___ (2000) ( [T]he Constitution offers basic protection to the woman's right to choose. ); Casey, supra, 505 U.S. at 853, 112 S. Ct. at 2808, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 699 (reaffirming Roe). A woman also has a constitutional right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion in making that personal and life-altering decision. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 1038, 31 L. Ed. 2d 349, 362 (1972). Most important in this case, those rights belong equally to adults and to minors. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2937, 111 L. Ed. 2d 344, 360 (1990). As stated by the Supreme Court: Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. [Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2843, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788, 808 (1976).] Nonetheless, as recognized by the court below, the State may place certain restrictions on a minor's exercise of her rights in order to protect her from her own immaturity. Farmer, supra, 1 999 WL 1138605, at *7 (citing Bellotti, supra, 443 U.S. at 635, 99 S. Ct. at 3044, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 808). Various restrictions relating to both parental consent and parental notification have been discussed by the United States Supreme Court in a series of cases beginning with Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, supra, 428 U.S. at 52, 96 S. Ct. at 2831, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 788. Because they are instructive to our consideration of the state constitutional challenge, we review them here. A. Consent Statutes In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the constitutionality of a state statute that contained a mandatory parental consent provision, and rejected that part of the statute prohibiting unmarried minors from procuring abortions during the first trimester of their pregnancies without a parent's consent. Id. at 75, 96 S. Ct. at 2844, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 808. Five members of the Court determined that a state could not subject a minor's right to terminate her pregnancy to a parent's absolute veto without a sufficient justification for the restriction. Id. at 74-75, 96 S. Ct. at 2844, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 808. Shortly thereafter in 1979, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a Massachusetts parental consent statute. Bellotti, supra, 443 U.S. at 622, 99 S. Ct. at 3035, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 797. The statute in Bellotti required unmarried minors to obtain consent from both parents before a physician could perform an abortion. Id. at 625, 99 S. Ct. at 3038, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 802. If the parents refused consent, however, a state court judge could, but was not required to, give judicial consent to an abortion without involving the young woman's parents. Ibid. A plurality of the Court announced that states requiring parental consent from one or both parents had to provide an alternative process in which a minor could obtain a waiver by demonstrating either that she is sufficiently mature to make the decision on her own with her physician, or that an abortion is in her best interests. Id. at 643-44, 99 S. Ct. at 3048, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 813-14. The process, said Justice Powell, must guarantee anonymity and occur expeditiously so that the minor has a realistic opportunity to procure an abortion. Id. at 644, 99 S. Ct. at 3048, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 814. The Massachusetts statute was deemed unconstitutional by four members of the Court because it failed to meet those essential conditions. Id. at 651, 99 S. Ct. at 3052, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 818. Four other justices concurred in the judgment of the plurality by application of Danforth but expressed reservations regarding the burden imposed under a bypass process. Id. at 655-656, 99 S. Ct. at 3054, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 821.See footnote 33 B. Notification Statutes In H.L. v. Matheson, the Supreme Court approved a Utah statute that required a physician to '[n]otify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor . . . .' 450 U.S. 398, 400, 101 S. Ct. 1164, 1167, 67 L. Ed. 2d 388, 393 (1981) (quoting Utah Code Ann. 76-7-304(c)(2)). The Court determined that the statute was constitutional as applied to an unemancipated minor who is living with and dependent on her parents and has not made any showing as to her maturity or as to her relations with her parents. . . . Id. at 407-11, 101 S. Ct. at 1171-72, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 397-401. Nine years later, the Court invalidated as unduly burdensome a provision in a parental notification statute that mandated written notice to both parents of an unemancipated minor without providing judicial bypass procedures. Hodgson, supra, 497 U.S. at 450, 110 S. Ct. at 2945, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 370-71. An alternative section of the statute that contained a bypass process was sustained by a five-member majority. Id. at 461, 110 S. Ct. at 2951, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 378 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part); id. at 499-501, 110 S. Ct. at 2971-72, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 403 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Subsequently, the Court approved an Ohio one-parent notification statute that provided for judicial bypass and met the Bellotti criteria for a consent statute. Akron II, supra, 497 U.S. at 510-13, 110 S. Ct. at 2978-81, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 416 18. The Ohio statute permitted abortions for unemancipated minors: (1) if the physician provided a minimum twenty-four hours actual notice to a parent; (2) if the minor and an alternative relative certified that the minor feared abuse from one of her parents; (3) if one parent provided written consent to the abortion; or (4) if the juvenile court granted a judicial bypass. Id. at 507-08, 110 S. Ct. at 2977, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 416. Akron II concluded that a bypass procedure that will suffice for a consent statute will suffice also for a notice statute. Id. at 511, 110 S. Ct. at 2979, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 418. In Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 293-94, 117 S. Ct. 1169, 1169-70, 137 L. Ed. 2d 464, 468 (1997) (per curiam), the Court evaluated a Montana notification statute that was virtually identical to the statute approved in Akron II. Lambert repeated the Akron II conclusion that when a state mandates notice, but also provides for a bypass process that is acceptable in a consent statute, the notice provisions are a fortiori constitutional. Id. at 295-97, 117 S. Ct. at 1171-72, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 467-69. Thus, although the Court has not decided that a parental notification statute must contain a judicial bypass provision, Lambert teaches that if a notice statute has a bypass procedure that satisfies Bellotti, it must necessarily withstand constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 295, 117 S. Ct. at 1171, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 467-68. The confidentiality provisions, the expedited procedures, and the pleading form requirements, on their face, satisfy the dictates of minimal due process. We see little risk of erroneous deprivation under these provisions and no need to require additional procedural safeguards. [Akron II, supra, 497 U.S. at 517, 110 S. Ct. at 2982, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 422.] Nor were the burdens of the judicial bypass thoroughly examined by the majority in Hodgson. There, the Court reviewed Bellotti and decided that notifying one's parents about an abortion, as in Hodgson, is a far less taxing undertaking than obtaining consent for an abortion, as in Bellotti. Hodgson, supra, 497 U.S. at 499-500, 110 S. Ct. at 2971, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 403. As noted, the two-parent notification statute in Hodgson was found to be constitutional because it satisfied the prerequisites for a parental consent statute. Id. at 497-98, 110 S. Ct. at 2970, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 401-02. Most recently, the Court repeated that theme in Lambert, which concerned a statute identical to the one upheld in Akron II. Lambert, supra, 520 U.S. at 295-97, 117 S. Ct. at 1171-72, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 468-69. Even in Bellotti, the case that described the bypass requirements for a parental consent statute, there is no discussion of the burdens imposed by those requirements. Bellotti, supra, 443 U.S. at 643-4, 99 S. Ct. at 3048-49, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 813-14. Finally, we observe that the United States Supreme Court has reviewed states' consent and notification statutes on due process grounds without discussion of the parties' equal protection arguments. As a consequence, that body of caselaw offers little guidance concerning the treatment of different classes of young women under equal protection principles -- i.e., those who seek an abortion and those who seek medical and/or surgical care (related to pregnancy and childbirth). [t]he burden [it] places on a minor to seek and obtain the consent of both parents can force her, even when one parent consents, to turn to the judicial bypass for relief. . . . To require that a minor follow such a process when the purpose of parental consent is fulfilled by the consent of one parent is to burden the minor's constitutional rights without adequate justification. In Lungren, however, California's highest court relied on that state's explicit constitutional guarantee of privacy in determining whether California could require parental consent before a minor could obtain an abortion. Lungren, supra, 940 P.2d at 816. Under California law, when a statute impinges upon a constitutional right, legislative findings with regard to the need for, or probable effect of, the statutory provision [are not] considered determinative for constitutional purposes. Id. at 824. Thus, the court examined the state's claim that the restrictions imposed by [the] statute upon a minor's constitutionally protected right of privacy are necessary to protect the physical and emotional health of a pregnant minor [and held that those restrictions were] undermined by the circumstance that California law authorizes a minor, without parental consent, to obtain medical care and make other important decisions in analogous contexts that pose at least equal or greater risks to the physical, emotional, and psychological health of a minor and her child as those posed by the decision to terminate pregnancy. The court was unable to reconcile California's alleged interest in a minor's emotional or psychological health in respect of the abortion decision with the state's silence on a minor's decision to give birth or to give her child up for adoption. Id. at 827. In the same vein, the existence of a variety of medical emancipation statutes applicable to minors further undermined the state's claim that the parental consent statute was necessary . . . to sustain the parent-child relationship. Ibid. Ultimately, Lungren held that the State had failed to put forward adequate justification for the statute's intrusion on a pregnant minor's right to privacy under the California Constitution. Id. at 831. All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness. The language of that paragraph is more expansive . . . than that of the United States Constitution . . . . Right to Choose, supra, 91 N.J. at 303. It incorporates within its terms the right of privacy and its concomitant rights, including a woman's right to make certain fundamental choices. Thus, in New Jersey, we have a long-standing history that begins even prior to Roe v. Wade, see Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 62-63 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part), demonstrating a commitment to the protection of individual rights under the State Constitution. Right to Choose, supra, 91 N.J. at 304 (citing, among other cases, Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 66 (1981) (holding that mother, after giving birth to child with cystic fibrosis, had right to choose whether to conceive second child who might suffer from same genetic defect)); see Grady, supra, 85 N.J. at 249; Saunders, supra, 75 N.J. at 210; Quinlan, supra, 70 N.J. at 38. It is with that body of caselaw in mind that we turn to plaintiffs' equal protection challenge. A. Right to Choose v. Byrne Right to Choose v. Byrne is this Court's seminal case addressing equal protection and abortion rights under the New Jersey Constitution. 91 N.J. 287 (1982). The New Jersey Legislature had restricted state Medicaid funding of abortions to only those abortions necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Id. at 294. The statute thereby premised funding on the distinction between an abortion necessary to preserve a woman's life and an abortion necessary to protect a woman's health. Id. at 292. At the time the Court decided Right to Choose, the Supreme Court of the United States had recently handed down Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2693, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784, 811 (1980), which held that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit Congress from proscribing the use of Medicaid funds for an abortion except when required to save the life of the mother. We held to the contrary under equal protection principles found in our State Constitution. Right to Choose, supra, 91 N.J. at 310. Right to Choose, in considering the state equal protection claim, first applied the analytical framework developed by the United States Supreme Court in parallel cases under the Federal Constitution -- a tiered equal protection analysis generally using either a rational-basis or strict-scrutiny review. Right to Choose, supra, 91 N.J. at 305-06 (citing, e.g., San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1293 94, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 39-41 (1973); Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. at 163-65, 93 S. Ct. at 731-33, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 182-84). We observed, however, that in cases involving a classification that indirectly infringes on a fundamental right, Right to Choose, supra, 91 N.J. at 310, the inflexibility of the tiered framework prevents a full understanding of the clash between individual and governmental interests. Id. at 308-09. Rather, we adopted a test that weighed the governmental interest in the statutory classification against the interests of the affected class. Subsequently, in Greenberg, we explained: In striking the balance, we have considered the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction. In Right to Choose, the Court placed a woman's health and privacy on one side of the scale and weighed those interests against the State's interest in potential life. Supra, 91 N.J. at 310. The Court held that the government had unreasonably interfered with a woman's fundamental right to choose an abortion when necessary to protect her life or health. Ibid. The Court declined, however, to hold that all statutory funding restrictions on abortion are unconstitutional. Ibid. Instead, it decided that the State's equal protection guarantee barred discrimination against a particular class of pregnant women because it could not be justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 308, 310. In lieu of striking the entire statute, the State was required to fund those abortions medically necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. Id. at 312; cf. Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 94 (1995) (applying equal protection balancing test enunciated in Right to Choose); Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 576 (same). That holding, consistent with New Jersey's more expansive constitutional provision, gave women seeking to exercise their right to choose greater protection than the protection afforded in Harris v. McRae. [m]any minor women will encounter interference from their parents after the state-imposed notification. In addition to parental disappointment and disapproval, the minor may confront physical or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support, or actual obstruction of the abortion decision. [Matheson, supra, 450 U.S. at 438-39, 101 S. Ct. 1186 87, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 416-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).] In many cases, [a]s a practical matter, a notification requirement will have the same deterrent effect on a pregnant minor seeking to exercise her constitutional right as does a consent statute. Akron II, supra, 497 U.S. at 526, 110 S. Ct. at 2985, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 428 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Hodgson, supra, 497 U.S. at 472, 110 S. Ct. at 2956, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 385 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ( A parent who objects to the abortion, once notified, can exert strong pressure on the minor . . . to block her from getting an abortion. . . . In such circumstances, the notification requirement becomes, in effect, a consent requirement. ); Indiana Planned Parenthood v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983) ( Although notification requirements do not give parents the legal power to veto their daughter's abortion decision, as a practical matter they may. ). The State responds to those concerns by pointing to the waiver provision, in essence arguing that if there are young women who feel that notification is inappropriate, then those young women can petition a judge of the Superior Court to grant a waiver from the notification requirement. But the judicial waiver provisions impose far greater burdens on minors who, for very good reasons recognized by the statute, are unable to communicate with their parents about their decision. In the first instance, a young woman must find a way to place the initial call to the courthouse to begin the waiver process. Next, if she chooses to have an attorney, as provided by the Act, she must find a time when she can take his or her telephone call without the knowledge of her parents or siblings. Then the young woman must get to the courthouse, which may be difficult depending on distance and access to transportation. To complicate matters further, she may well have to be absent from school and risk her parents finding out that she has been truant in order to attend a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding itself presents a danger that the young woman's anonymity will be breached. A realistic concern is that a minor could be recognized by members of the community who know her while she is at the courthouse to attend the hearing. A Minnesota judge who has handled waiver proceedings concurs in that observation, adding that the young woman may happen on schoolmates attending their own juvenile court hearings. The same judge reports that one teenager's parents received an anonymous letter informing them that their daughter had been seen in the courthouse seeking a judicial bypass. For the young woman whose relatives or friends are employed in or visiting the courthouse, the Notification Act may seriously compromise her anonymity because those persons who see her will likely become suspicious about why she is not in school on a weekday. See Anna Quindlen, Mom, Dad and Abortion, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1990, 4, at E17 (noting that director of Duluth, Minnesota, abortion clinic recalls transporting young women to bypass hearings in freight elevator to avoid neighbors and relatives working in courthouse). Even assuming a confidential and expeditious waiver hearing, the process will nonetheless cause significant delay. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that a pregnant adolescent . . . cannot preserve for long the possibility of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy. Bellotti, supra, 443 U.S. at 642, 99 S. Ct. at 3047, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 813. A similar bypass process in Massachusetts causes a delay of about two weeks and sometimes as much as a month. That means a first trimester abortion can become a more difficult and more costly second trimester abortion, or even, if it is far enough into the gestation period, that an abortion will no longer be available. We are not surprised to learn that the Massachusetts law drives young women to neighboring states to find help elsewhere. With time running out, it is inevitable that some minors will seek an alternative solution rather than tell an abusive parent or a judge who is a stranger about their decision to procure an abortion. In theory, the AOC could promulgate less burdensome procedures for obtaining a waiver. However, with any procedure, problems will arise. Video-conferencing, suggested by Justice O'Hern in his dissent, post at __ (slip op. at 14), is not generally accessible and may be cost prohibitive. Tele conferencing could create due process concerns arising from the form and extent of the proceeding, particularly when the minor's testimony -- and credibility -- is important. Representation by an attorney may be critical and is provided by the statute. N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.7(b). We understand that lists of attorney volunteers have been compiled, but even so, attorneys must be contacted in each case and some may not be immediately available. See AOC Directive No. 10-99 II(D)(2) (Sept. 8, 1999). Moreover, the attorney must schedule a consultation with his or her client, even when that consultation is to take place by telephone. Legal representation takes time that can only be shortened so much if counsel is to be adequately prepared with clear and convincing evidence to support the young woman's waiver request. N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.7(d). Indeed, the appointment of a guardian ad litem may be needed to protect the minor's best interests. Id. II(E). Finally, the right to appeal to our intermediate courts is constitutionally based, N.J. Const. art. VI, 5, 2, and also takes time. The dissent notwithstanding, few if any of those requirements can be further truncated. Justice O'Hern further argues that it is somewhat facile to complain about burdens and delays created by the judicial bypass process when young women seeking an abortion without parental notification now travel to a physician and exchange telephone calls with medical personnel. Post at __ (slip op. at 15). Although it is irrefutable that burdens and delays already exist in a minor's pursuit of an abortion, we are concerned only with those burdens that are created by state action. In any case, additional impediments added to existing impediments may well prevent the exercise of a fundamental right altogether. That would be unacceptable without substantial adequate justification for the classification created by the Legislature. The American Medical Association, the Society for Adolescent Medicine, the American Public Health Association, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the AAP, and other health professional organizations have reached a consensus that minors should not be compelled or required to involve their parents in their decisions to obtain abortions, although they should be encouraged to discuss their pregnancies with their parents and other responsible adults. These conclusions result from objective analyses of current data, which indicate that legislation mandating parental involvement does not achieve the intended benefit of promoting family We are also informed that the younger the minor, the more likely it is that she will notify and seek guidance from an adult in her life. In fact, ninety percent of minors under age fifteen notify at least one parent about their intent to obtain an abortion. Those numbers suggest that the Notification Act places burdens on minors in furtherance of a goal that is illusory for some families and unnecessary for many others. Finally, the State contends that the Act protects the right of parents to direct the care and custody of their children. See N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.2. We do not dispute the right of parents to raise their children with limited government interference as described in cases decided by the United States Supreme Court such as, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1534, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 27 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 1078 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626-27, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 1045-46 (1923). Here, however, minors wish to exercise a fundamental right independent of parental involvement. As one commentator has observed: Taken together, the Supreme Court decisions [referenced above] stand for the proposition that the State may not interfere with a parent's upbringing of a child, but they say nothing about a parent's right to prevent or even be informed about a child's exercise of her own constitutionally protected rights. [Catherine Grevers Schmidt, Where Privacy Fails: Equal Protection and the Abortion Rights of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 597, 630 (1993).] The evidence presented in plaintiffs' certifications leads inexorably to the conclusion that the proffered statutory reasons for requiring parental notification are not furthered by the statute. Justice Blackmun found similarly in his Akron II dissent, wherein he stated that the state has failed utterly to show that it has any significant state interest in deliberately placing its pattern of obstacles in the path of the pregnant minor seeking to exercise her constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy. The challenged provisions of the . . . statute are merely 'poorly disguised elements of discouragement for the abortion decision.' 497 U.S. at 525-526, 110 S. Ct. at 2985, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 428 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CENTRAL NEW JERSEY, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOHN J. FARMER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ETC., ET AL., Defendants-Respondents. O'HERN, J., dissenting. By casting this statute as one that strikes at the fundamental right of a woman to control her body and destiny, ante at ___ (slip op. at 3), the Court finds the uncomplicated act of parental notification or waiver thereof to create an undue burden on reproductive rights. The Court's language gives a misleading impression that the statute unduly regulates or forbids the abortion procedure itself. The statute does not. By characterizing the issue in such broad terms, the Court has forsaken traditional constitutional analysis. As Justice Breyer recently observed in Stenberg v. Carhart: We understand the controversial nature of the problem. Millions of Americans believe that life begins at conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the death of an innocent child; they recoil at the thought of a law that would permit it. Other millions fear that a law that forbids abortion would condemn many American women to lives that lack dignity, depriving them of equal liberty and leading those with least resources to undergo illegal abortions with the attendant risks of death and suffering. Taking account of these virtually irreconcilable points of view, aware that constitutional law must govern a society whose different members sincerely hold directly opposing views . . . [is a considerable task.] [___ U.S. ___, 2 000 WL 825889, *4 (U.S.).] Yet, [t]o declare a statute unconstitutional is a judicial power to be delicately exercised. Harvey v. Essex County Bd. of Freeholders, 30 N.J. 381, 388 (1959)(quoting Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 133 N.J. Eq. 447, 487 (Ch. 1943)). A legislative act should not be declared void unless its repugnancy to the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 10 (1957). Although the Court has declared unconstitutional the State's Parental Notification for Abortion Act, I dissent because the repugnancy of the law to the Constitution of the State of New Jersey is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt. I. In reviewing a similar legislative pattern, the United States Supreme Court has held that there is no federal constitutional impediment to the law. Initially, the Court had struck down state laws requiring parental consent and notification before a pregnant minor may have an abortion. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 49 L. Ed. 788 (1976), the Court's first ruling on the issue, a one-parent consent requirement was held unconstitutional. The Court held that a state might not impose this type of blanket provision because the statute gave a third party a veto over the abortion decision. Id. at 74. On the same day, however, the Court handed down its initial holding in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 96 S. Ct. 2857, 49 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1976). Bellotti explained that a statute that prefers parental consultation and consent, but that permits a mature minor capable of giving informed consent to obtain, without undue burden, an order permitting the abortion without parental consultation would be fundamentally different from a statute that creates a parental veto. Id. at 145. In Bellotti II, the Court explained that a parental consent requirement accompanied by an alternative procedure that permits a pregnant minor to bypass her parents' involvement would pass muster: [E]very minor must have the opportunity _ if she so desires _ to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents. 443 U.S. 622, 647, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3050, 61 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1979). In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 408-09, 101 S. Ct. 1164, 1171, 67 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1981), concerning a Utah statute requiring parental notification, the Court again expressed its view that a valid bypass option must accompany parental involvement requirements. Three later cases illustrate that the Court's acceptance of parental consent and notification requirements rests on the availability of an effective judicial bypass option. In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2931, 111 L. Ed. 2d 344, 353 (1990), the Court held that Minnesota's two-parent notification requirement, without the option of judicial bypass, was unconstitutional. However, a different majority of the Court also held that the law's judicial bypass option was constitutional. Id. at 423. On the same day, the Court ruled in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 506 07, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2977, 111 L. Ed. 2d 405, 416 (1990), that an Ohio statute that prohibited the performance of an abortion on a minor without the consent of a parent or a judicial bypass was constitutional. Finally, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992), the Court found Pennsylvania's parental consent requirement with its judicial bypass alternative to be constitutional. The Court summarized its reasoning in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, stating that the woman's right to seek an abortion, while constitutionally protected, is not absolute. Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 874. Finally, in Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 117 S. Ct. 1169, 137 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1997), the Court approved a notification statute much like the New Jersey Act. The Minnesota statute prohibited a physician from performing an abortion on a minor unless the physician had notified one of the minor's parents or the minor's legal guardian forty-eight hours in advance. Id. at 293. The statute, like the New Jersey law, also provided for a judicial bypass procedure under which a court could waive the notification requirement if certain statutory criteria, similar to New Jersey's Act, were met. Id. at 293-94. The Court held that this statute, providing a judicial bypass procedure that is indistinguishable from New Jersey's, passed constitutional muster. Id. at 299. The Court found that result to be fully consistent with its previous decisions in Bellotti, supra, and Akron Center, supra. Id. at 295-98. From those decisions, we derive the principle that only state regulations that place an undue burden on a woman's right to seek an abortion are unconstitutional. A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, supra, 505 U.S. at 877. Such a burden would be imposed on minors, the Court has held, should parental involvement requirements fail to include a bypass alternative of the sort elaborated in Bellotti II, supra, 443 U.S. at 647-48. II. Acting pursuant to the guidance provided by the United States Supreme Court, the New Jersey Legislature has crafted a law that fully complies with constitutional requirements. It has provided for one-parent notification with a speedy judicial bypass option. A judge considering such a request must make a determination within forty-eight hours or the application will be deemed to be granted. An expedited and confidential appeal is available. No filing fees are required. Every effort has been made to facilitate the implementation of the Act. On September 8, 1999, the Administrative Director of the Courts issued Directive No. 10-99 to all Superior Court judges, setting forth specific and detailed procedures for implementation of the Act. If there is any problem with those procedures, the Court should correct its procedures rather than to invalidate the law. The trial court found that New Jersey's law provided even more protections than the Lambert statute by, for example, providing for a faster resolution of the appeal process through immediate mail notice and by permitting a minor's guardian, rather than a parent, to be notified in appropriate cases. 1 999 WL 1138605, *15-16 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div.). The Chancery Division upheld the law in all respects. [Id. at 562 (citations omitted).] Justice Pollock explained: Insofar as most rights are concerned, a state statute does not violate [federal] substantive due process if the statute reasonably relates to a legitimate legislative purpose and is not arbitrary or discriminatory. Id. at 563. Constitutional analysis concerning fundamental rights demands a more exacting . . . standard, while equal protection analysis traditionally involves different tiers or levels of review. Id. at 564. This Court has generally eschewed a multi-tiered approach to constitutional analysis. Such an analysis weaves a veil of tiers which shrouds [the] essential issue. Matthews v. Atlantic City, 84 N.J. 153, 175 (1980)(Clifford, J., dissenting). We simply balance the interests at hand. The analysis of fundamental rights under the New Jersey Constitution differs from analysis of those rights under the United States Constitution. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 308-09 (1982). Starting with our decision in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 491-92, (1973), we began to develop an independent analysis of rights under article 1, paragraph 1. Thereafter, we rejected two-tiered equal protection analysis, Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350, 370, and employed a balancing test in analyzing claims under the state constitution. Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Township v. Weymouth Township, 80 N.J. 6, 43 (1976). In striking the balance, we have considered the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction. Right to Choose v. Byrne, supra, 91 N.J. at 308-09; Robinson v. Cahill, supra, 62 N.J. at 491-92. Nowhere in that paragraph do the phrases "equal protection" or "due process" appear. Nonetheless, article 1, paragraph 1, like the fourteenth amendment, seeks to protect against injustice and against the unequal treatment of those who should be treated alike. To this extent, article 1 safeguards values like those encompassed by the principles of due process and equal protection. In the future, as in the past, we shall continue to look to both the federal courts and other state courts for assistance in constitutional analysis. The ultimate responsibility for interpreting the New Jersey Constitution, however, is ours. [Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 567-68.] B. Applying its flexible balancing test, the Court concluded in Right to Choose v. Byrne, supra, 91 N.J. 287, that a provision in a state's Medicaid program that restricted Medicaid funds for abortion was invalid under article 1, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey State Constitution. Id. at 293. This provision, the Court found, protected both the individual's right to privacy and a guarantee of equal protection. Applying the balancing test in analyzing equal protection claims under the State Constitution, the Court concluded that the statute had to be construed to permit funding of medically necessary abortions to poor women. Id. at 309-10. The Court found that the State's interest in protecting potential life represented legitimate state interests but that it did not outweigh the superior interest in the life and health of the mother. Id. at 310. Significantly, however, the Court concluded that the balance came out differently in the case of elective, non-therapeutic abortions, the same type of procedures that are covered by the Parental Notification Act. Ibid. Concerning non-therapeutic abortions, the Court specifically held that no similar right to privacy or equal protection violation outweighed in significance the State's determination not to fund those abortions. Ibid. The Legislature further finds that minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take into account both immediate and long-range consequences of their actions; that the medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of abortion are serious and of indeterminate duration, particularly when the patient is a minor; that parents ordinarily possess information essential to a physician's exercise of his best medical judgment concerning their child; and that parents who are aware that their minor daughter has had an abortion may better insure that the minor receives adequate medical attention after her abortion. The Legislature further finds that parental consultation regarding abortion is desirable and in the best interests of the minor. [N.J.S.A. 9:17A-1.2] The State interests listed here are supported by this Court's numerous decisions protecting the rights of minors and preserving the family structure. See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264 (1981) (advising child in decisions concerning reproduction); In re Adoption of Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 132 (1993)(describing parents' fundamental rights); New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986)(emphasizing inviolability of the family unit ); In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 7 (1992)(stating that the law governing New Jersey's Division of Youth and Family Services clearly favors keeping children with their natural parents and resolving care and custody problems within the family ). Perhaps the strongest public policy support for parental notification can be found in N.J.S.A. 9:17A-5, a law that has been in effect since 1968: Upon the advice and direction of a treating physician or, if more than one, any one of them, a member of the medical staff of a hospital, public clinic, or physician licensed to practice medicine, may, but shall not be obligated to, inform the spouse, parent, custodian or guardian of any such minor as to the treatment given or needed, and such information may be given to, or withheld from the spouse, parent, custodian or guardian without the consent of the minor patient and even over the express refusal of the minor patient to the providing of such information. Our final consideration is the extent of the restriction. The law is at once criticized because it does too little and criticized because it does too much. Those opposed to the law argue that it is ineffective and therefore unnecessary. See Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, supra, 1 999 WL 1138605 at *11 ( About ninety-eight percent of the [judicial] bypasses are granted on findings that the minor is mature enough to consent to her own abortion. ) How then can it be persuasively stated that the law will be an undue burden on a young woman's reproductive rights? The Court reasons that the Act places an undue burden on minors seeking an abortion in part because of the need for the child to play truant and the burdensome necessity to make phone calls to courts and lawyers. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 40). Yet, the Act does not require actual presence of the minor in a court room before a Superior Court judge. Procedures, such as video conferencing, even after-school hours, could be made available to the minor. Presumably, the minor has traveled to a physician and exchanged telephone calls with nurses or medical assistants who have affirmed the minor's pregnancy without her parents' involvement. It seems somewhat facile to claim that the judicial bypass creates a greater burden on young women than the effort involved in seeking the abortion itself without her parents' knowledge. See, e.g., . . . Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972) ( The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition ); . . . In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. [Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2 000 WL 712807, *5-6, (U.S. Wash. June 5, 2000).] The Act does not offend equal protection requirements because it involves a reasonable classification of different medical procedures. It does not create a suspect class of women. In Right to Choose v. Byrne, supra, Justice Pollock explained that the State may pursue its interest in potential life by excluding [non-therapeutic] abortions from the Medicaid program. 91 N.J. at 309. For purposes of equal protection analysis there is a vast difference between the minor's decision to abort her pregnancy, which this Court has already concluded implicates a potential life and her decision to carry to term. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CENTRAL NEW JERSEY, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOHN J. FARMER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ETC., ET AL., Defendants-Respondents. VERNIERO, J., dissenting. NO. A-52 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CENTRAL NEW JERSEY, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOHN J. FARMER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ETC., ET AL., Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED August 15, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz