Case Title: D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co., Inc. v. Donald Anderson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2007AP000046

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 126 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP46 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co., Inc., M. 
Scott Statz and Steven Statz, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Donald Anderson and Anderson Marine, LLC, 
          Defendants-Appellants-Cross 
Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2007 WI App 269 
Reported at:  306 Wis. 2d 470, 744 N.W.2d 300 
(Ct. App. 2007-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 2, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 10, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Shelley J. Gaylord   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Kevin J. Palmersheim, Teresa K. Kobelt, and Haley 
Palmersheim, S.C., Middleton, and oral argument by Kevin J. 
Palmersheim. 
 
For the defendants-appellants-cross petitioners there were 
briefs by Michael B. Van Sicklen, Bree Grossi Wilde, and Foley & 
Lardner LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Michael B. Van 
Sicklen and Bree Grossi Wilde. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 126
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP46  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV3034) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co., Inc.,  
M. Scott Statz and Steven Statz, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Donald Anderson and Anderson Marine, LLC, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Cross 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 2, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part, and remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals decision1 concerning breach of 
contract and tradename infringement claims related to a business 
purchase agreement.  The court of appeals affirmed the jury 
verdict finding breach and infringement but reversed the award 
of compensatory and punitive damages for tradename infringement, 
                                                 
1 D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co. v. Anderson, 2007 WI 
App 269, 306 Wis. 2d 470, 744 N.W.2d 300. 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
2 
 
and remanded to the circuit court with an order that the 
attorney fee award be reduced.   
¶2 
Petitioners Scott and Steven Statz (the Statzes)2 
sought review of the court of appeals' decision on damages and 
attorney fees.  Cross-petitioners Donald Anderson (Anderson) and 
Anderson Marine, LLC, sought review of those portions of the 
court of appeals' decision that affirmed the jury's finding of 
tradename infringement, breach, and damages from the breach, as 
well as the circuit court's award of attorney fees related to 
the breach. 
¶3 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and 
reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals.  We agree 
with the court of appeals that there was sufficient evidence for 
the 
verdict 
that 
Anderson 
breached 
the 
Asset 
Purchase 
Agreement's 
noncompetition 
clause, 
and 
for 
the 
award 
of 
compensatory damages on that claim.  We agree, too, that once 
the jury found breach, the circuit court properly extended the 
duration of the noncompetition clause in accordance with the 
purchase agreement.  We also agree with the court of appeals 
that there was sufficient evidence on which the jury could find 
that Anderson infringed on the Statzes' tradename.  
¶4 
However, we disagree with the decision of the court of 
appeals holding that there was insufficient evidence to support 
compensatory and punitive damages on the tradename infringement 
                                                 
2 D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co., Inc., is also a 
party to this case.  We will refer to all of the plaintiffs-
respondents-petitioners collectively as "the Statzes." 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
3 
 
claim.  We are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to 
support the compensatory and punitive damage awards, and we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals in regard to those 
matters.  We also reverse the court of appeals' decision to 
limit the attorney fees award to those attributable only to the 
contract claim.  Our decision has the effect of reversing the 
court of appeals' actions on compensatory and punitive damages 
for tradename infringement and its reasons for remand, and 
approving the circuit court's original rulings. 
¶5 
On remand, the circuit court is to determine whether, 
under the purchase agreement, the Statzes are entitled to 
attorney fees incurred in connection with the appeal, and if 
entitled, then in what amount. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶6 
In the late 1970s, Anderson began building the 
business that would eventually become D.L. Anderson Co.  He 
started with sailboat rentals and soon expanded to selling and 
installing piers and boatlifts.  By 1982 he was operating under 
the name D.L. Anderson Co.  The business grew to offer a range 
of marine services and products, including marine contracting; 
shoreline 
restoration; 
rip 
rapping;3 
landscaping; 
and 
                                                 
3 In testimony at the trial, "rip rapping" was described as 
"dumping crushed rock on the shoreline."  
No. 
2007AP46   
 
4 
 
manufacture, sales and service of marine accessories, docks, 
piers, lifts and hoists.4  
¶7 
In 2000 Anderson sold the business to the Statzes for 
$891,000.  The Asset Purchase Agreement (Agreement) stated, "The 
Purchased Assets being transferred by Seller to Buyer pursuant 
to this Agreement include, but are not limited to, equipment, 
tools, inventory, the trade name D.L. Anderson Co., customer 
lists, customer history, customer contracts, vendor lists, 
vendor 
contracts 
and 
agreements, 
protected 
territories, 
franchises, business telephone and fax numbers, business e-mail 
addresses, internet web site and addresses, and goodwill."  The 
purchase price consisted of $400,000 for restrictions on 
competition,5 $200,000 for goodwill and use of the tradename, and 
$291,000 for equipment and inventory.   
                                                 
4 "[M]arine contracting, shoreline restoration, rip rapping, 
landscaping, 
manufacture, 
sales 
and 
service 
of 
marine 
accessories, docks[,] piers, lifts, and hoists" are collectively 
referred to as "the Pier and Lift Business" in the purchase 
agreement later entered by Anderson and the Statzes.  
5 The Agreement's noncompetition clause provided that: 
a. [F]or a period of seven (7) years from the 
Closing 
Date 
[Anderson] 
will 
neither 
permit 
Anderson's name to be used by nor engage in or 
carry on, directly or indirectly, either for 
itself or as a member of a partnership, limited 
liability company, or as a stockholder, investor, 
officer or director of a corporation (other than 
Buyer or a subsidiary or affiliate of Buyer) or 
as an employee, agent, associate or consultant of 
any person, partnership or corporation (other 
than Buyer or a subsidiary or affiliate of Buyer) 
any business in competition with the Pier and 
Lift Business as carried on by Buyer. 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
5 
 
¶8 
The Statzes formed a corporation called D.L. Anderson 
Lakeside Leisure Co., Inc., but operated the business under the 
name D.L. Anderson Co.  They advertised the business as D.L. 
Anderson and D.L. Anderson Co. Marine Contractors.   
¶9 
Anderson told the Statzes at the time of the sale that 
he intended to get out of the marine contracting business and go 
into real estate.  But beginning in 2002, he made a series of 
business deals that the Statzes saw as violating the Agreement.  
¶10 In August 2002, Anderson entered an agreement with 
Kann 
Manufacturing 
Corporation 
relating 
to 
"products, 
technologies and marketing strategies regarding an invention 
relating to a work boat for boatlifts . . . ."  In November 
2003, Anderson was observed using the prototype of the work boat 
on his property.  In May 2004, Anderson submitted a patent 
application for a "work boat for installing and removing 
boatlifts."6  At trial Anderson testified that he had planned to 
mass-produce and sell the work boat.  
¶11 Sometime in late 2002 or early 2003, Anderson took a 
job with Pier Pleasure, a Minnesota-based manufacturer and 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
b. The restrictive covenant in this Section 6.5 
shall apply within a 120-mile radius of the City 
of Waunakee, Wisconsin. 
6 Anderson testified at trial that the patent application 
eventually expired.  
No. 
2007AP46   
 
6 
 
distributor of piers and boatlifts.7  As a factory representative 
for Pier Pleasure, he established three new dealerships within 
the region covered by the noncompetition clause, provided 
display 
and 
marketing 
support 
for 
dealerships, 
set 
and 
maintained 
sales 
performance 
levels 
for 
each 
dealership, 
obtained sales forecasts, and assisted with warranty issues and 
product training.  His responsibilities covered a four-state 
area, including Wisconsin.  He also received commissions on 
sales.  
¶12 In 2003, Anderson formed Anderson Marine, LLC, and 
acquired a business known as The Sailboat House near the 
Statzes' business.  Anderson operated the business under the 
name The Sailboat House at Anderson Marine, and maintained 
websites and phone book listings as both The Sailboat House and 
Anderson Marine.8  Anderson's new business sold, stored, and 
repaired motorboats and sailboats, and sold marine accessories.  
¶13 On at least one occasion in 2003, Anderson publicized 
his capability for doing shoreline restoration and landscape 
work.  In November 2003, the Middleton Times-Tribune newspaper 
printed a photo of a brush cutter being used to cut down brush 
along the edge of a pond.  The photo identified the operator as 
"Don Anderson of Anderson Marine, LLC."  
                                                 
7 Prior to selling the business to the Statzes, Anderson 
sold Pier Pleasure products at D.L. Anderson Co., and the 
Statzes continued to sell Pier Pleasure products after they 
purchased the business.  
8 In 2005, after the Statzes filed suit, Anderson changed 
the name of his business to The Boathouse of Madison.  
No. 
2007AP46   
 
7 
 
¶14 In September 2004, the Statzes filed suit against 
Anderson and Anderson Marine, LLC, alleging breach of the 
noncompetition 
provisions 
of 
the 
purchase 
agreement, 
infringement of tradename, unfair competition, and breach of 
contract.  The Statzes requested permanent injunctive relief 
prohibiting Anderson from competing in the pier and lift 
business, and from using their tradename or any similar name.  
They also requested compensatory damages, punitive damages, 
attorney fees, and costs.   
¶15 Following a jury trial in Dane County Circuit Court in 
April 2006, the Honorable Shelley Gaylord presiding, a jury 
returned a special verdict finding that Anderson had breached 
the noncompetition clause and awarding $15,000 in compensatory 
damages.  The jury also found Anderson had infringed on the D.L. 
Anderson 
tradename 
and 
awarded 
the 
Statzes 
$75,000 
in 
compensatory damages.  In addition, the jury awarded $160,000 in 
punitive damages against Anderson and $20,000 in punitive 
damages against Anderson Marine, LLC.  
¶16 The 
Statzes 
then 
filed 
motions 
after 
verdict, 
requesting injunctive relief and also requesting extension of 
the restrictive covenants by 591 days, from the date on which 
the complaint was filed to the date the motion was filed, 
pursuant to the Agreement.9  A motion requesting attorney fees 
and costs in the amount of $95,515.91 was also filed.  
                                                 
9 The Agreement contained a provision in the section on 
“Noncompetition” that stated: 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
8 
 
¶17 Anderson filed motions after verdict requesting an 
order to change the answers to the verdict questions, a new 
trial, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  
¶18 The circuit court denied Anderson's motions.  The 
circuit court extended the restrictive covenants, granted the 
injunctive relief, and awarded the attorney fees requested by 
the Statzes.  
¶19 Anderson appealed.  As noted above, the court of 
appeals affirmed the verdict as to the findings of breach, 
damages awarded for breach, and tradename infringement; it 
reversed the jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages 
for tradename infringement; and it remanded to the circuit court 
for a determination of attorney fees only for the breach claim.10  
D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co. v. Anderson, 2007 WI App 
269, 306 Wis. 2d 470, 744 N.W.2d 300.  
¶20 The Statzes petitioned this court for review; Anderson 
cross-petitioned for review.  Review was granted on March 18, 
2008. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The term of the covenants contained in Section 6.5 
shall be tolled for the period commencing on the date 
any successful action is filed for injunctive relief 
or damages arising out of a breach by Seller or 
Anderson 
of 
Section 
6.5 
and 
ending 
upon 
final 
adjudication (including appeals) of such action. 
10 It also upheld the injunctive relief granted by the 
circuit court, slightly modifying the injunction to include the 
words "within 120 miles."  D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure, 306 
Wis. 2d 470, ¶¶49-55.  The injunction is not before us because 
Anderson no longer challenges it.  
No. 
2007AP46   
 
9 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶21 The jury found that Anderson breached the Agreement and 
infringed the tradename, and it awarded the Statzes damages on 
both claims.  We start by setting forth the general standard of 
review governing jury verdicts.  When we come to issues for 
which other standards of review are applicable, we will note the 
appropriate standard prior to addressing the issue.  
¶22 When reviewing a jury verdict, we affirm if the record 
contains "any credible evidence" to support the verdict; this is 
"even more true when the trial court gives its explicit approval 
to the verdict by considering and denying postverdict motions."  
Radford v. J.J.B. Enter., Ltd., 163 Wis. 2d 534, 543, 472 N.W.2d 
790 (Ct. App. 1991).  The reviewing court has a "duty to search 
for credible evidence to sustain the jury's verdict."  Id.  "We 
afford special deference to a jury determination in those 
situations in which the trial court approves the finding of a 
jury.  In such cases, this court will not overturn the jury's 
verdict unless 'there is such a complete failure of proof that 
the verdict must be based on speculation.'"  Morden v. 
Continental AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶40, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659 
(citations omitted).  A challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence is evaluated in light of the jury instructions.  
Kovalic v. DEC Int’l, Inc., 161 Wis. 2d 863, 873 n.7, 469 N.W.2d 
224 (Ct. App. 1991).  
No. 
2007AP46   
 
10 
 
III.  THE AGREEMENT’S NONCOMPETITION CLAUSE: 
BREACH, DAMAGES AND EXTENSION 
¶23 Anderson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict of the jury on its award of damages related 
to the noncompetition clause of the Agreement.  We review that 
challenge under the standard recited above. 
A. 
Breach 
¶24 On this issue, we briefly address the underlying 
breach.  The Statzes ask us to affirm the court of appeals' 
holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's 
verdict that Anderson breached the Agreement.  In his brief, 
Anderson concedes that, given the applicable standard of review, 
sufficient evidence was presented to uphold that determination. 
¶25 The court of appeals cited evidence the jury heard 
about Anderson's work establishing three competing Pier Pleasure 
dealers within the 120-mile radius covered by the noncompetition 
agreement, and said it was sufficient to support the verdict 
that he violated the business noncompetition clause.  The court 
of appeals also noted evidence on which the jury could have 
based its noncompetition verdict as to the use of the Anderson 
name, citing both documents and testimony concerning marine 
accessories sold by The Sailboat House at Anderson Marine, the 
business Anderson opened one mile from the Statzes' business.  
We agree with the court of appeals that there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury’s finding that Anderson breached 
the Agreement in regard to noncompetition.  
No. 
2007AP46   
 
11 
 
 
B. 
Compensatory damages 
¶26 The standard for reviewing a jury award of damages is 
similar to the standard for other types of jury verdicts.  "If 
there is any credible evidence which under any reasonable view 
supports the jury finding as to (the amount of) damages, 
especially when the verdict has the approval of the trial court, 
this court will not disturb the finding."  Wis. Natural Gas Co. 
v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 96 Wis. 2d 314, 340, 291 
N.W.2d 825 (1980)(citations omitted). 
¶27 Even though breach may have been proved, Anderson 
argues there was insufficient evidence to support the award of 
$15,000 in damages for such breach.  Anderson asserts, for 
example, that the sales data provided as to the Statzes' pier 
installation sales did not differentiate between various pier 
manufacturers and, thus, could not fairly reflect any lost sales 
that resulted from his work as a representative for a single 
pier manufacturer.  
¶28 The Statzes say the damages from the violation of the 
noncompetition clause included not only lost profits, but also 
their loss of the benefit of the bargain they made, i.e., the 
difference between the value of the noncompetition clause that 
Anderson violated and the amount they paid for it.  They 
describe their position as analogous to that of a buyer of a 
defective car, who had, this court recognized, "ordinary loss of 
bargain damages: the difference between the actual value of the 
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
12 
 
been as warranted."  Mayberry v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 2005 
WI 13, ¶23, 278 Wis. 2d 39, 692 N.W.2d 226 (quoting Beyond the 
Garden Gate, Inc. v. Northstar Freeze-Dry Mfg., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 
305, 309 (Iowa 1995)).  
¶29 The jury was given the standard instruction on damages 
in general,11 and a slight variation of the standard instruction 
on contract damages.12 
                                                 
11 "[T]he burden of proof rests upon each person claiming 
damages to satisfy you by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence, to a reasonable certainty, that the person sustained 
damages with respect to the element or elements mentioned in the 
question and the amount of the damages. . . .  Credible evidence 
means evidence you believe in light of reason and common sense.  
'Reasonable certainty' means that you are persuaded based upon a 
rational consideration of the evidence.  Absolute certainty is 
not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of 
proof."  Wis JI—Civil 1700. 
12 The instruction given to the jury varied slightly from 
Wis JI——Civil 3735; e.g., the standard instruction uses the word 
"because" rather than "as a result" and defines benefit as "the 
net gain he or she would have realized from the contract."  The 
jury was instructed as follows: 
The measure of damages for a breach of contract is the 
amount which will compensate the plaintiff for the 
loss suffered as a result of the breach.  A party who 
is injured should, as far as it is possible to do by 
monetary award, be placed in the position in which he 
or 
she 
would 
have 
been 
had 
the 
contract 
been 
performed.  The fundamental basis for an award of 
damages for breach of contract is just compensation 
for losses as a result of the breach.  A party whose 
contract has been breached is not entitled to be 
placed in a better position because of the breach than 
the party would have been had the contract been 
performed.  The injured party is entitled to the 
benefit of his or her agreement, but for the failure 
of the other party to perform. 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
13 
 
¶30 In its ruling denying Anderson's motions after the 
verdict, the circuit court noted, "[T]he bottom line in this 
case 
is 
that 
some 
of 
this 
amounted 
to 
credibility 
determinations, but a lot of it was an accumulation of 
defendant's own testimony and some of the exhibits that bore on 
what he was doing with various items."  The circuit court also 
observed, in a post-trial hearing on injunctive relief, "This is 
a jury that did not believe [Anderson].  It was palpable during 
the trial.  It was clear to me they didn't believe him."  The 
circuit court affirmed the jury's verdict on this and all 
points, saying, "There was more than adequate evidence put in at 
trial for the responses of the jury verdicts on all the 
questions that the defendant moved to change."  
¶31 The court of appeals reviewed evidence presented to 
the jury, including the difference in the Statzes' gross 
receipts for new pier installation in 2002 and 2003, and Scott 
Statz's testimony attributing the decline to the new pier 
dealers established by Anderson in areas where the Statzes had 
previously made sales.  D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure, 306 
Wis. 2d 470, ¶23.  It also noted that the jury saw evidence of 
the 2003 retail sales of the new pier dealers with whom the 
Statzes competed.  Anderson argues that "the most likely reason 
for the coinciding increase in merchandise sales and the 
decrease in labor sales is that more purchasers were buying 
piers that they can self-install."  That is a theory the jury 
was free to consider and reject.  We agree with the court of 
appeals that sufficient evidence was presented to sustain the 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
14 
 
jury's verdict awarding the Statzes $15,000 for Anderson's 
breach of the Agreement in regard to noncompetition. 
C. 
Extension of the noncompetition clause 
¶32 This issue involves construction of a contract, which 
presents a question of law and is therefore subject to 
independent appellate review.  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. 
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶30, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257. 
¶33 As 
noted 
previously, 
the 
Agreement 
contained 
a 
provision in the section on “Noncompetition” that stated, 
The term of the covenants contained in Section 6.5 
shall be tolled for the period commencing on the date 
any successful action is filed for injunctive relief 
or damages arising out of a breach by Seller or 
Anderson 
of 
Section 
6.5 
and 
ending 
upon 
final 
adjudication (including appeals) of such action. 
¶34 The analysis of the court of appeals on this point is 
concise and complete:   
Based on the jury's findings of a breach of the 
noncompete clause and damages, the court extended the 
noncompete clause by 678 days.  The defendants object 
to this order on the ground that Anderson did not 
breach the noncompete but raise no other objection.  
Because 
we 
have 
concluded 
there 
was 
sufficient 
evidence for the jury to find both a breach of that 
clause and to award $15,000 in damages, we conclude 
the court's extension was proper.   
D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure, 306 Wis. 2d 470, ¶29. 
¶35 We 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
that 
the 
noncompetition clause was properly extended. 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
15 
 
IV.  THE TRADENAME INFRINGEMENT CLAIM 
¶36 The jury unanimously found that Anderson had infringed 
the tradename.  As noted above, the circuit court denied 
Anderson's motion to change that answer.  
 
¶37 There is a preliminary question on this issue as to 
whether we review this question de novo or with deference to the 
jury's verdict.  Anderson argued in the court of appeals that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of the 
tradename infringement.  The court of appeals, noting that a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is evaluated in 
light of the jury instructions, first looked at the instructions 
given and then looked at the evidence.  The court of appeals 
construed Anderson's corollary arguments——that the contract's 
noncompetition clause governed the limits of the tradename sale 
and that Anderson's use of his own name could not constitute 
tradename infringement——as a challenge to the jury instructions.  
Given that Anderson neither directly challenged the jury 
instructions on appeal nor cited to any objection in the record 
against them, the court of appeals deemed that argument waived 
and disregarded it.  D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure, 306 Wis. 
2d 470, ¶33. 
 
¶38 Anderson 
vigorously 
denies 
having 
waived 
his 
opportunity to challenge the jury instructions.  At oral 
argument before this court, Anderson's counsel called the 
tradename infringement instruction "clearly the wrong jury 
instruction."   
No. 
2007AP46   
 
16 
 
¶39 A few principles guide us when a challenge is made to 
jury instructions.  Whether a jury instruction is appropriate is 
a legal issue subject to independent review.  Root v. Saul, 2006 
WI App 106, ¶13, 293 Wis. 2d 364, 718 N.W.2d 197.  A circuit 
court has broad discretion in instructing a jury but must 
exercise that discretion in order to fully and fairly inform the 
jury of the applicable rules of law.  State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 
2d 199, 212, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996).  "Only if the jury 
instructions, as a whole, misled the jury or communicated an 
incorrect statement of law will we reverse and order a new 
trial."  State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, ¶29, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 
N.W.2d 784 (citation omitted).  Counsel's failure to object at 
the jury instruction and verdict conference constitutes a waiver 
of any error in the proposed instructions or verdict.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 805.13(3)(2005-06).13  However, this court may, in its 
discretion, review waived issues.  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 
1, 11, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990); Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 
96 Wis. 2d 607, 617, 292 N.W.2d 630 (1980). 
                                                 
13 "Instruction and verdict conference. . . .  The court 
shall inform counsel on the record of its proposed action on the 
motions and of the instructions and verdict it proposes to 
submit.  Counsel may object to the proposed instructions or 
verdict on the grounds of incompleteness or other error, stating 
the grounds for objection with particularity on the record.  
Failure to object at the conference constitutes a waiver of any 
error in the proposed instructions or verdict."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.13(3). 
 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
17 
 
¶40 It is clear that, in the circuit court, Anderson's 
counsel repeatedly objected to treating this action as a 
tradename infringement claim on the grounds that the language in 
the noncompetition clause essentially qualified the transfer of 
the tradename.  We note, however, that a tradename instruction 
was one of three non-standard instructions included in the 
"Defendant’s Proposed Jury Instructions."  Anderson's proposed 
instruction closely tracked the jury instruction eventually 
given, including sections on secondary meaning, likelihood of 
confusion, and, most relevantly, language about an infringement 
action being appropriate against a non-competitor and language 
about conveying by contract a party's family name as part of a 
tradename.  For example, Anderson's proposed jury instruction 
included 
the 
following 
language 
that 
was 
in 
the 
final 
instructions given by the circuit court: 
Ordinarily a party has a right to do business under 
his or her own name.  The right may, however, be 
voluntarily limited by contract.  When a family name 
is part of a trade name, the family name may be 
transferred to the purchaser the same as any other 
asset of the business. . . .  Infringement actions, 
even against a noncompetitor, protect the reputation 
and goodwill exclusively appropriated to the trademark 
holder. 
¶41 While the court of appeals was correct that the issue 
was waived since explicit objection was not made at the 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
18 
 
instructions conference as required by Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3),14 
we will nevertheless address the question.  In this case, we 
exercise our discretion to review the waived challenge to the 
jury instructions because that challenge involves important 
issues that we wish to address.  
¶42 The tradename infringement jury instructions given by 
the circuit court were based directly on language in Wisconsin 
case law.15  In First Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee v. 
Wichman, 85 Wis. 2d 54, 270 N.W.2d 168 (1978), this court 
adopted the approach enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §§ 715, 716, 717 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1963).  There 
this court said, "[T]he user of [a] tradename is entitled to 
protection against infringement of that tradename."  Wichman, 85 
                                                 
14 Both parties submitted jury instructions as to tradename 
infringement.  During the jury instructions conference, the 
court and counsel for the two parties methodically worked 
through the exact wording of each of the instructions, including 
the proposed tradename instruction.  The transcript of the 
conference runs 78 pages.  Earlier in the day, the court had 
asked 
counsel 
to 
review 
together 
their 
own 
submitted 
instructions:  "At a minimum, it seems the Tradename and Unfair 
Competition you agree on. . . .  And I also think if you read 
your Damages ones, I'm not sure they're that terribly far apart, 
so see what you can merge and then what you can't."  When the 
jury instructions conference began, the court said, "We're going 
to start with areas of disagreement with the tradename proposal.  
Did you come close?  Any closer?"  The record reflects no 
objection by Anderson either at the end of the discussion of the 
tradename instruction or at the end of the jury instruction 
conference. 
15 There is no Wisconsin standard jury instruction for 
tradename infringement.  Perhaps the Civil Jury Instructions 
Committee might consider an instruction on this matter as well 
as one on the matter of damages for tradename infringement. 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
19 
 
Wis. 2d at 62-63.  Spheeris Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Spheeris on 
Capitol, 157 Wis. 2d 298, 459 N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1990), which 
like this case dealt with a tradename in connection with the 
purchase of a business, appears to be the source of the sections 
in the jury instructions on tradenames that include family 
names:  "Ordinarily, a party has a right to do business under 
his or her own name.  The right may, however, be voluntarily 
limited by contract. . . .  [W]hen a family name is part of a 
trade name, the family name may be transferred to the purchaser 
the same as any other asset of the business."  Id. at 308 
(citations omitted). 
¶43 Anderson disputes that the instruction given, even if 
accurate, is the "applicable rule of law" in this case.  Like 
the circuit court and the court of appeals, we disagree. 
¶44 Anderson contends that when the Agreement's clauses 
are read together, the noncompetition clause restricted the 
tradename rights the Statzes purchased; thus, any action against 
Anderson must be controlled by contract law, not tort law.  The 
Statzes point to the language of the Agreement concerning the 
Purchased Assets, one of which is "the tradename D.L. Anderson 
Co.": "Seller has, and Buyer is receiving, good and marketable 
title 
to 
the 
Purchased 
Assets, 
free 
and 
clear 
of 
all . . . covenants, reservations, restrictions or encumbrances 
of any nature whatsoever, except as otherwise contemplated 
herein.  None of the Purchased Assets is subject to any 
restrictions with respect to the transferability thereof."  The 
Statzes argue that the tradename conveyance established an 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
20 
 
absolute right to the tradename.  The noncompetition clause 
prohibited other commercial use of Anderson's name not covered 
by tradename protections, e.g., Anderson's commercial use of his 
name to advertise affiliation with a competing business, and the 
limitations on that clause (seven years, a 120-mile radius, 
applicable only to businesses in competition with the Statzes) 
have nothing to do with the transfer of the tradename.  
¶45 The question of how to analyze tradenames conveyed by 
contract was answered by the Spheeris court.  "Although [the 
tradename purchaser's] right to use 'Spheeris' was granted in 
the 1979 agreement, we do not look only to the agreement for 
controlling law.  Because it is a corporate name, 'Spheeris 
Sporting Goods' is a trade name, entitled to protection against 
unfair competition."  Spheeris, 157 Wis. 2d at 307 (citation 
omitted).   
¶46 We believe Spheeris controls here.  There is no 
indication in the contract that the sale of the tradename was 
restricted or limited.  It is not reasonable to read the 
noncompetition clause language as Anderson asks; to do so would 
mean that the expiration of the noncompetition clause after 
seven years would render the tradename purchase meaningless. 
¶47 The Spheeris court correctly stated the law.  The 
tradename infringement claim arises under the contract only in 
the sense that the contract is the instrument by which the 
tradename was purchased.  A separate tort may be perpetrated 
once the tradename belongs to the purchaser, just as a separate 
tort would exist for tortious conversion if Anderson had 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
21 
 
interfered with the Statzes' right to the heavy equipment, 
vehicles, and other tangible property that the Agreement also 
transferred to them.  The fact that a contract underlies the 
transfer of property does not limit all subsequent claims 
concerning the property to contract claims.  Anderson would read 
the noncompetition clause as diluting the Statzes' tradename 
rights, but the noncompetition clause actually supports the 
protection the Agreement affords them because it prohibits 
additional commercial use of Anderson’s name.  As legal 
authorities have noted:  
[W]hile a person may sell the right to commercial use 
of his personal name, a court will not bar the seller 
from all commercial use of the name unless the 
intention to convey an exclusive right is clear in the 
contract of the sale.  Unless the contract provides 
otherwise, a person is not precluded after the sale 
from taking advantage of his individual personal 
reputation (vis-à-vis the reputation of the business 
that bore his name) in advertising a competing 
product.  
3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition § 18:33 (4th ed. 2008). 
¶48 Here, "the intention to convey an exclusive right is 
clear in the contract" in more than one place.  In addition, 
while Anderson would not ordinarily be "precluded after the sale 
from taking advantage of his individual reputation," the 
noncompetition clause is the part of the contract that provides 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
22 
 
otherwise and limits Anderson's other commercial use of his name 
under its specific terms.16  
¶49 We are satisfied that the tradename infringement 
instruction was appropriate, based on the Spheeris case and the 
language of the Agreement discussed herein. 
A. 
Secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion 
¶50 Next we proceed to the question of whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.  The jury 
was instructed as follows regarding tradename infringement: 
When a tradename has acquired a secondary meaning, the 
name is entitled to protection from unfair competition 
based on tradename infringement. . . .  If you find 
that Plaintiff’s tradename has acquired secondary 
meaning, you must then determine whether there is a 
likelihood of confusion between Plaintiff's tradename, 
"D.L. Anderson Co." and Defendant's name, "Anderson 
Marine". . . .  It is not necessary to constitute an 
infringement that every word of the tradename be 
appropriated.  It is sufficient that enough be taken 
to deceive the public.  If one word of the tradename 
is the salient portion, it may be given greater weight 
than surrounding words. 
¶51 The jury instructions thus lay out the two elements a 
plaintiff must establish to prevail on a tradename infringement 
                                                 
16 Anderson cites to 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 18:33 (4th ed. 2007), for 
the proposition that "[w]hile the buyer of a business obtains 
the right to the seller's name as a mark, the seller can 
continue such usage also, unless there is express language in 
the contract giving the buyer the exclusive right to use the 
personal name as a mark."  He omits the introductory words to 
that sentence: "Some courts imply that . . . ."  The cases that 
imply that, according to the treatise, are cases from Texas, 
Illinois, and New Jersey decided in 1968, 1959 and 1918, 
respectively.  
No. 
2007AP46   
 
23 
 
claim: that the name had secondary meaning and that a second 
party's use created a likelihood of confusion. 
¶52 Secondary 
meaning 
"describes 
the 
function 
of 
identifying goods or services with a particular or single 
source. . . .  Key to establishing secondary meaning for a trade 
name is evidence that the relevant target group mentally 
identifies the trade name as the single source for the product."  
Spheeris, 157 Wis. 2d at 312 (citations omitted). 
¶53 As the court of appeals pointed out, the evidence 
shows that the Statzes paid Anderson a substantial fee for the 
name; D.L. Anderson Co. had been in business for approximately 
20 years; there was evidence of extensive advertising; and 
Anderson testified that in 2000 he had between 300 and 500 
"regular customers."  D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure, 306 Wis. 
2d 470, ¶36.  In his brief, Anderson conceded that the tradename 
had acquired a secondary meaning. 
¶54 We next turn to the evidence for the second element, 
likelihood of confusion.  The jury was given a list of factors 
to consider when determining likelihood of confusion.17  Anderson 
                                                 
17 The jury was instructed that: 
Likelihood 
of 
confusion 
is 
also 
determined 
by 
evaluating the following factors:  The degree of 
similarity between the names, the similarity of the 
products and overlap of marketing channels, area and 
manner of concurrent use, the degree of care likely to 
be 
exercised 
by 
consumers, 
the 
strength 
and 
distinctiveness of plaintiff's——it's name, not mark, 
evidence of actual confusion, and defendants' intent 
when selecting the name "Anderson Marine." 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
24 
 
contends that the question of likelihood of confusion cannot 
apply where there is no competing business, another argument 
rooted in the view of this case as a contract case, not a 
tradename infringement case.  He argues, therefore, that the 
Statzes cannot show likelihood of confusion.  The Statzes argue 
that there was evidence not only of likelihood of confusion but 
also of actual confusion. 
¶55 The court of appeals listed the evidence of the 
likelihood of confusion:  the similarity of "D.L. Anderson Co." 
and "Anderson Marine, LLC"; essentially the same target market; 
similar 
marketing 
plans; 
and 
the 
proximity 
of 
the 
two 
businesses.  Id., ¶38.  There was evidence of actual confusion 
as well, including phone calls, mail, and deliveries intended 
for one business that went to the other. 
¶56 The jury instructions accurately state Wisconsin law 
on tradename infringement.  We agree with the court of appeals 
that from the evidence presented a jury could reasonably 
conclude that the name "D.L. Anderson Co." had acquired 
secondary 
meaning, 
and 
that 
"Anderson 
Marine" 
created 
a 
likelihood of confusion with the name "D.L. Anderson Co."  We 
agree with the court of appeals that sufficient evidence existed 
                                                                                                                                                             
No one factor or consideration is conclusive, but each 
aspect should be weighed in light of the total 
evidence 
at 
the 
trial. 
 
However, 
while 
actual 
confusion or deception is not essential to a finding 
of tradename infringement and unfair competition, such 
evidence is entitled to substantial weight. 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
25 
 
to support the jury's verdict that Anderson infringed the 
tradename. 
B. 
Compensatory damages 
¶57 As noted previously, we evaluate the challenge to the 
award of compensatory damages in terms of whether there was any 
credible evidence to support the award and whether the award was 
within reasonable limits.  
¶58 "Under our judicial system, we rely primarily upon the 
good sense of jurors to determine the amount of money which will 
compensate an individual for whatever loss of well-being he has 
suffered as a result of injury."  Olson v. Siordia, 25 Wis. 2d 
274, 283, 130 N.W.2d 827 (1964) (quoting Makowski v. Ehlenbach, 
11 Wis. 2d 38, 41-43, 103 N.W.2d 907 (1960)).  "It is not [the 
reviewing court's] purpose to determine whether damage awards 
are high or low, nor to substitute [its] judgment for that of 
the jury or the trial court but rather to determine whether the 
award is within reasonable limits."  Id. at 286. 
¶59 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.14(1) provides:   
No motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
as a matter of law to support a verdict, or an answer 
in a verdict, shall be granted unless the court is 
satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion is 
made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a 
verdict in favor of such a party.   
This standard is used both by the circuit court and the 
appellate court.  Weiss v. United Fire and Cas. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 
365, 388, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995).  "Because a circuit court is 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
26 
 
better positioned to decide the weight and relevancy of the 
testimony, an appellate court 'must also give substantial 
deference to the trial court's better ability to assess the 
evidence.'"  Id. at 388-89 (citing James v. Heintz, 165 Wis. 2d 
572, 577, 478 N.W.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
¶60 Anderson argues that:  (1) the Statzes failed to 
present any evidence that there was a diminution of the goodwill 
attributable 
to 
the 
alleged 
tradename 
infringement; 
(2) 
confusion as to the tradename is insufficient to establish 
injury; and (3) the $200,000 purchase price of the goodwill 
cannot be the basis for any calculation of damages because it is 
imprecise and because tax considerations affect the price 
allocated to goodwill in asset sales.  
¶61 The Statzes counter that when they paid $200,000 for 
goodwill, and that goodwill was damaged by infringement, they 
were entitled to a compensatory damage award up to the full 
purchase price.  That the jury awarded something less than that, 
they argue, is a rational approach because it recognizes that 
the value of the goodwill was diminished by the infringement.   
¶62 As we noted, the jury was instructed here that the 
party claiming damages must "satisfy [the jury] by the greater 
weight of the credible evidence, to a reasonable certainty, that 
the person sustained damages . . . and the amount of the 
damages."  Wis JI——Civil 1700. 
¶63 In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence on a 
damage award in tort, there is thus a two-step analysis:  the 
fact of damages and the amount. 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
27 
 
¶64 "[T]he fact of damage need only be proved with 
reasonable, not absolute, certainty.  And once the fact of 
damage is established with reasonable certainty, the amount of 
damages need only be shown with as much certainty as the nature 
of the tort and the circumstances of the case permit."  4 Rudolf 
Callmann, 
Callmann 
on 
Unfair 
Competition, 
Trademarks 
and 
Monopolies § 23:55 (4th ed. 2003). 
¶65 This is consistent with Wisconsin case law on damages 
where "the nature of the tort and the circumstances of the case" 
make precise determinations of damages impossible.   
[T]here is no absolute requirement of mathematical 
precision, and the fact that the full extent of the 
damages is a matter of uncertainty by reason of the 
nature of the tort is not a ground for refusing 
damages.  It is generally held that the uncertainty 
which prevents recovery is uncertainty as to the fact 
of the damage and not to its amount.  This rule is 
applied where, from the nature of the case, the extent 
of injury and the amount of damage are not capable of 
exact and accurate proof.  
Eden Stone Co. v. Oakfield Stone Co., 166 Wis. 2d 105, 125, 479 
N.W.2d 557 (Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted).  
¶66 The court of appeals found the absence of testimony of 
customers who had a negative view of the Statzes' company 
resulting from confusion fatal to the claim of damages based on 
diminution of goodwill.  D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure, 306 
Wis. 2d 470, ¶43.  However, that requirement is too narrow to 
square with the principle set forth in Eden Stone.  The court of 
appeals acknowledged that there might be other bases for damages 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
28 
 
but did not believe that any were established by the evidence.  
Id., ¶45.  We disagree. 
¶67 The value of the goodwill to the Statzes is readily 
established, as a preliminary matter, by the $200,000 purchase 
price negotiated by the parties.  Further, there was testimony 
from the Statzes as to the value of the goodwill after the 
infringement.  Steven Statz testified that:  "We purchased the 
name knowing that it was a very valuable asset. . . .  If I 
thought there was a chance they were going to confuse us with 
him at another location, I certainly wouldn’t have paid as much 
for it."  Testifying about the value of the tradename and the 
noncompetition clause, Scott Statz said, "The value of the 
business was in the name, its reputation . . . .  No, I would 
not have offered any money.  The business would have no value."  
"Wisconsin case law is clear that an owner of property may 
testify as to its value and that such testimony may properly 
support a jury verdict for damages, even though the opinion is 
not 
corroborated 
or 
based 
on 
independent 
factual 
data."  
Mayberry, 278 Wis. 2d 39, ¶42. 
¶68 As the circuit court noted, the jury made credibility 
determinations, which are within the province of the jury.  The 
jury could reasonably have credited the Statzes' testimony 
concerning the diminution of value of the goodwill, which was 
their property. 
¶69 Further, 
there 
was 
testimony 
about 
customer 
frustration concerning mixed up invoicing.  For example, Sue 
Statz 
testified 
that 
one 
customer 
had 
confused 
the 
two 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
29 
 
businesses and paid an invoice due to the Statzes by sending a 
check to Anderson Marine, LLC.  She testified about what 
happened next: 
I sent him an invoice and that remained unpaid.  Then 
I sent him another invoice for something else.  He 
paid that one so I sent him a statement saying you 
still owe for this past invoice[,] and then he called 
me, and he was not happy, to say that he had paid it.  
I could not find anything in the computer so I had to 
get back to him.  Then I finally did, and I said I'm 
sorry, I still don't see your payment and he was not 
happy.  I said couldn't you just send me a copy of the 
check so that I could get this cleared up and then he 
did, and I believe that's the copy he sent. 
When she received the copy of the check, she saw that it had 
been made out to and cashed by Anderson Marine. 
¶70 Here the jury was given the standard instruction on 
damages in general, which says in part, "[c]redible evidence 
means evidence you believe in light of reason and common sense."  
The jury was instructed concerning the compensatory damages on 
tradename infringement that "[t]he goodwill of a company is an 
intangible business value that reflects the basic human tendency 
to do business with merchants who offer products and services of 
the type and quality the customer desires and expects." 
¶71 Having 
heard 
testimony 
from 
Sue 
Statz 
about 
uncomfortable interactions with customers and confusion relating 
to payment of invoices, the jury was entitled to rely on the 
common experience that people who have had to sort out billing 
errors, especially when they have rightfully paid the invoice, 
do not generally feel a sense of goodwill toward the business 
that has accused them of not paying.  The jury could further 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
30 
 
reasonably have inferred from the testimony about such customer 
frustration that there was indeed a diminution in the value of 
the goodwill purchased for $200,000.  
¶72 But even beyond those real but difficult to quantify 
losses, there was evidence of other, more tangible losses as 
well.  Sue Statz’s testimony mentioned repeated billing mixups 
caused by customers' and vendors' confusion about the two 
companies; as office manager she had to devote time to 
straightening these errors out.  Scott Statz testified that on 
multiple occasions, he incurred labor costs due to mistaken 
deliveries intended for Anderson's company.  He gave the example 
of a semi truck arriving at his company with a load of product, 
and having his employee leave the work he was doing to unload 
the truck with a forklift.  Only after he had emptied the truck 
and the driver had left did the employee discover that the 
entire contents would have to be reloaded and arrangements would 
have to be made to get it delivered to Anderson Marine, the 
intended recipient.  Scott Statz also testified that there were 
times when parts intended for their business were mistakenly 
delivered to Anderson Marine, and the delays in getting the 
needed 
parts 
cost 
unnecessary 
downtime 
and 
"considerable 
expense" to the business.  Certainly jurors familiar with 
everyday costs incurred by a business to reroute deliveries, 
track down wrongly delivered parts, and pay labor costs for 
unproductive time could have found evidence in the testimony to 
support an award of compensatory damages.  
No. 
2007AP46   
 
31 
 
¶73 It is true that there is not a mathematical precision 
to the determination of the damages here, but in cases like 
this, we do not hold plaintiffs to that standard.   
¶74 The question presented here requires us to apply two 
standards together:  the acknowledgement that where the damages 
are uncertain "by reason of the nature of the tort" they will 
not be refused, combined with the deference to the jury award of 
damages where there is any credible evidence to sustain such 
award.  That combination requires us to uphold the jury's 
compensatory damage award.  Given a "within reasonable limits" 
standard of review, we find that the jury could reasonably have 
awarded $75,000, which was well within the $200,000 the Statzes 
and Anderson established as the purchase price of the goodwill 
of the business. 
C. 
Punitive damages 
¶75 The court of appeals' ruling on compensatory damages 
had the effect of reversing the award of punitive damages as 
well.  Because we approve the compensatory damages award, we 
must consider the jury's award of punitive damages.  
¶76 The United States Supreme Court has held that:  
Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a 
State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful 
conduct and deterring its repetition.  In our federal 
system, 
States 
necessarily 
have 
considerable 
flexibility in determining the level of punitive 
damages that they will allow in different classes of 
cases and in any particular case.  Most States that 
authorize exemplary damages afford the jury similar 
latitude, requiring only that the damages awarded be 
reasonably 
necessary 
to 
vindicate 
the 
State's 
legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence. 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
32 
 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (citations 
omitted). 
¶77 Wisconsin law permits an award of punitive damages "if 
evidence 
is 
submitted 
showing 
that 
the 
defendant 
acted 
maliciously toward the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard 
of the rights of the plaintiff."  Wis. Stat. § 895.043(3).  The 
law "requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant acted 
maliciously toward the plaintiff or intentionally disregarded 
the rights of the plaintiff, not that a defendant intended to 
cause harm or injury to the plaintiff."  Wischer v. Mitsubishi 
Heavy Indus. Am., Inc., 2005 WI 26, ¶61, 279 Wis. 2d 4, 694 
N.W.2d 320.  
¶78 This court has shown deference to jury awards of 
punitive damages.  "According to Wisconsin law, the award of 
punitive damages in a particular case is within the discretion 
of the jury, and '[w]e are reluctant to set aside an award 
merely because it is large or we would have awarded less.'" 
Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church and School-Freistadt v. 
Tower Ins. Co., 2003 WI 46, ¶46, 261 Wis. 2d 333, 661 N.W.2d 789 
(quoting Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 626, 
563 N.W.2d 154 (1997)).  
¶79 However, when the punitive damages are challenged as 
excessive, this court has said, 
[A] de novo standard of review is appropriate when 
reviewing a circuit court's determination of the 
constitutionality of punitive damages awards. 
Although de novo review is the appropriate standard of 
review, we nevertheless acknowledge that the Due 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
33 
 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes 
substantive limits on the size of a punitive damages 
award.   
An award is excessive, and therefore violates due 
process, if it is more than necessary to serve the 
purposes of punitive damages, or inflicts a penalty or 
burden on the defendant that is disproportionate to 
the wrongdoing. 
Trinity Evangelical, 261 Wis. 2d 333, ¶¶48-50 (citations 
omitted). 
¶80 The rules we apply in making that determination are 
"those factors which are most relevant to the case" from a list 
of factors considered by Wisconsin courts in prior cases:  
1. The grievousness of the acts; 2. The degree of 
malicious intent; 3. Whether the award bears a 
reasonable relationship to the award of compensatory 
damages; 4. The potential damage that might have been 
caused by the acts; 5. The ratio of the award to civil 
or criminal penalties that could be imposed for 
comparable misconduct; and 6. The wealth of the 
wrongdoer.   
Id., ¶53 (citations omitted). 
¶81 Anderson argues that there is no evidence of the 
required maliciousness or intentional disregard of rights and 
that the award is excessive.  He also argues that such an award 
is improper because there was no explicit assessment of his 
ability to pay such an award. 
¶82 The Statzes argue that credible evidence shows that 
Anderson deliberately used an infringing name and that public 
policy supports punitive damages to deter unlawful infringement.  
They counter Anderson's last point with evidence in the record 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
34 
 
of Anderson's real estate holdings and the price they paid for 
the business itself——$891,000. 
¶83 Here the factors most relevant to the case are the 
intent to disregard the rights of the Statzes and the award's 
relationship to the compensatory damages. 
¶84 Anderson's own testimony was that he chose to use the 
name Anderson Marine, LLC, because he knew it would be familiar 
to his potential customers.  He was asked in a deposition, "So 
when you started a different business, you knew that by signing 
your name to it, it would breed some familiarity with customers 
or former customers?"  And he answered, "Correct."  That 
deposition testimony was referred to during Anderson's testimony 
at trial, and Anderson again agreed.18 
¶85 There was evidence from which the jury could have 
found, as they did find unanimously, that Anderson "act[ed] in 
an intentional disregard of the rights of [the Statzes]."  
¶86 The court in the best position to judge the intent of 
the tortfeasor is the circuit court.  There is evidence in the 
record that, based on the trial testimony, the circuit court 
found Anderson's conduct totally unacceptable.  At a post-
verdict motion hearing, the circuit court denied one request by 
the Statzes but then stated to Anderson: 
[Y]ou've got a world of hurt coming at you, sir.  He's 
going to win on everything he requested with respect 
                                                 
18 Q: "And when you started Anderson Marine, you knew that 
by naming it Anderson Marine that your former customers would be 
familiar with that name and would associate you with Anderson 
Marine?"  A: "They would associate me, yes."  
No. 
2007AP46   
 
35 
 
to everything else.  I don't know what it's going to 
take to stop, but every time there's a line drawn, you 
seem to go right up to it and over it. . . .  I'm 
basing it on the trial record.  I'm not sure I can put 
in language [in the injunction] that adequately 
expresses what needs to stop here. 
¶87 In Trinity Evangelical, this court upheld a punitive 
damage award that had a 7:1 ratio to the compensatory damages.  
Trinity Evangelical, 261 Wis. 2d 333, ¶65.  Here the award of 
punitive damages totaled $180,000, twice the total compensatory 
damages awarded on both the contract claim ($15,000) and the 
tradename infringement claim ($75,000). 
¶88 In light of the forceful endorsement of the jury 
verdict by the circuit court in this case, we cannot say that 
where a unanimous jury verdict finds intentional disregard of 
the injured parties' rights, punitive damages that are two times 
the compensatory damages are excessive.  
V.  INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
¶89 Two clauses of the Agreement guaranteed the Statzes 
injunctive relief if Anderson breached the contract.  In his 
brief to this court, Anderson abandoned any challenge to the 
injunction.  
VI. AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
¶90 As we noted earlier, construing the terms of a 
contract is a "matter[] of law, subject to . . . independent 
review" by an appellate court.  Kasten v. Doral Dental USA, LLC, 
2007 WI 76, ¶19, 301 Wis. 2d 598, 733 N.W.2d 300. 
¶91 The Agreement, as it relates to attorney fees, states 
as follows: 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
36 
 
This Agreement shall be given the broadest, lawful and 
enforceable scope permissible for the protection of 
the parties. . . .  In any action concerning this 
Agreement, the party obtaining the monetary judgment, 
after all offsets, shall also be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs.  The remedies 
mentioned herein shall be cumulative and in addition 
to any other remedies which the non-breaching party 
may have at law or in equity. 
¶92 Following the verdict, the circuit court granted the 
Statzes' motion for reasonable attorney fees under the terms of 
the contract.  
¶93 The court of appeals examined the contract's language 
about "the party obtaining the monetary judgment . . . [being] 
entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs."  The 
court of appeals noted that under Hunzinger Construction Co. v. 
Granite Resources Corp., 196 Wis. 2d 327, 340, 538 N.W.2d 804 
(Ct. App. 1995), parties are entitled to attorney fees under 
contract only where the language "clearly and unambiguously so 
provides."  D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure, 306 Wis. 2d 470, 
¶66.  As noted above, the court of appeals reversed the monetary 
judgment on the tradename infringement claim and, therefore, 
could not find that the Agreement's language "clearly and 
unambiguously" 
provided 
for 
an 
award 
of 
attorney 
fees 
attributable to claims for which monetary damages were not 
awarded.  Id.  The court thus remanded the matter to the circuit 
court for the purpose of reducing the attorney fees award.  Id., 
67. 
¶94 Since we are reversing the court of appeals on the 
monetary judgment for the tradename infringement claim, it makes 
No. 
2007AP46   
 
37 
 
little sense to deny recovery of the attorney fees awarded by 
the circuit court.  
¶95 Anderson argues that attorney fees must be limited 
because the Agreement's language concerning entitlement to 
attorney fees applies in "any action concerning this Agreement," 
a limitation that excludes non-contract claims such as the 
tradename infringement claim.  We are not persuaded. 
¶96 First, the provision in question begins by stating 
that it is to be "given the broadest, lawful and enforceable 
scope permissible for the protection of the parties."  
¶97 Second, other provisions in the Agreement clearly 
contemplate 
that 
"[t]he 
remedies . . . shall 
be 
cumulative. . . ." 
¶98 Third, in light of the language about "any other 
remedies [available] . . . at law or in equity," we read the 
phrase "non-breaching party" as referring to the party not at 
fault.  In this context, we do not read "non-breaching party" to 
limit recovery to contract actions. 
¶99 Finally, the tradename infringement claim is clearly 
in the category of "any action concerning this Agreement" 
because the Agreement was the instrument by which ownership of 
the tradename in question was transferred. 
¶100 Our conclusion is consistent with the analysis of the 
Radford court, which faced a similar claim by defendants who 
objected to the award of the entire amount of attorney fees.  
There, unlike in this case, the jury had rejected some of 
plaintiffs' arguments; even so, the court held: 
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We hold that the entire amount of the plaintiffs' 
attorney's fees was properly assessed against the 
defendants.  Under federal law, the losing party is 
not entitled to a reduction in attorney's fees for 
time spent on unsuccessful claims, if the winning 
party 
achieved 
substantial 
success 
and 
the 
unsuccessful claims were brought and pursued in good 
faith.  This rule is particularly applicable where, as 
here, all of the plaintiffs' claims arise out of a 
common core of facts.  
Radford, 163 Wis. 2d at 550 (citations omitted). 
¶101 Giving the terms of the Agreement the "broadest, 
lawful and enforceable scope permissible," we view the Agreement 
as one intended to procure and protect the right to the 
tradename, and we are satisfied that the tradename infringement 
claim fits within the category of "any other remedies which the 
non-breaching party may have at law or in equity" and within the 
category of "any action concerning this Agreement."  Therefore, 
we hold that awarding the entire amount of the fees and costs 
pursuant to the Agreement is appropriate. 
 
¶102 Of course, appeals cost money, too, and the Statzes 
have continued to incur attorney fees and costs in defending the 
circuit court judgment on appeal.  They, therefore, ask this 
court to sustain the award of attorney fees and costs, order 
that it include fees and costs incurred on appeal, and remand 
for a determination of the additional reasonable attorney fees 
and costs incurred on appeal.  In support of this, they cite 
Chase Lumber and Fuel Co. v. Chase, 228 Wis. 2d 179, 186, 596 
N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1999), generally for the proposition that 
"[a] [c]ompany is entitled to additional attorney fees for 
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2007AP46   
 
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defending . . . appeal of the trial court's award of attorney 
fees."  
¶103 The Statzes raised the same issue in their brief to 
the court of appeals.  Anderson did not address this argument in 
the response briefs, either in the court of appeals or before 
this court.  The court of appeals did not address the question 
either, perhaps because the resolution of other questions made 
it unnecessary to reach this issue.  On this record, we are not 
in a position to resolve this issue.   
¶104 For one thing, the holding in Chase Lumber is narrower 
than the Statzes imply.  The court of appeals there held only 
that where a circuit court awards attorney fees as a result of 
frivolous action, the prevailing party is entitled to attorney 
fees if it is forced to defend that award on appeal.  Chase 
Lumber, 228 Wis. 2d at 213 ("[W]e conclude that the Company is 
entitled to a further award of attorney fees under § 814.025 for 
its defense of the trial court's 'Order Awarding Attorney's 
Fees.'").  Unlike Chase Lumber, this case involves attorney fees 
and costs awarded under an agreement, not as a result of a 
frivolous action.  There is nothing in the record on which we 
can base a determination of whether the Agreement's language 
concerning attorney fees necessarily contemplated attorney fees 
on appeal.  Under such circumstances, the circuit court is the 
proper 
court 
to 
take 
evidence 
in 
order 
to 
make 
that 
determination.  We, therefore, remand for the circuit court to 
decide whether, under the Agreement, the Statzes are entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal in defending the 
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verdict of the jury and the circuit court's decisions, and the 
amount of such fees and costs. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
¶105 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm in part and 
reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals.  We agree 
with the court of appeals that there was sufficient evidence for 
the 
verdict 
that 
Anderson 
breached 
the 
Asset 
Purchase 
Agreement's 
noncompetition 
clause, 
and 
for 
the 
award 
of 
compensatory damages on that claim.  We agree, too, that once 
the jury found breach, the circuit court properly extended the 
duration of the noncompetition clause in accordance with the 
purchase agreement.  We also agree with the court of appeals 
that there was sufficient evidence on which the jury could find 
that Anderson infringed on the Statzes' tradename.  
¶106 However, we disagree with the decision of the court of 
appeals holding that there was insufficient evidence to support 
compensatory and punitive damages on the tradename infringement 
claim.  We are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to 
support the compensatory and punitive damage awards, and we 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals in regard to those 
matters.  We also reverse the court of appeals' decision to 
limit the attorney fees award to those attributable only to the 
contract claim.  Our decision has the effect of reversing the 
court of appeals' actions on compensatory and punitive damages 
for tradename infringement and its reasons for remand, and 
approving the circuit court's original rulings. 
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¶107 On remand, the circuit court is to determine whether, 
under the purchase agreement, the Statzes are entitled to 
attorney fees incurred in connection with the appeal, and if 
entitled, then in what amount. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to 
the circuit court. 
 
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