Case Title: LaFage v. Jani, M.D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-65-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The issue raised in this medical malpractice-wrongful death case is whether the Wrongful Death Act permits equitable tolling of its two-year statute of limitations for minors whose wrongful death claims were filed twenty-seven days late. Richard LaFage went to the Salem Hospital on March 6, 1995, complaining of extreme pain in his right shoulder and chest. The hospital diagnosed a pulled muscle and prescribed Percocet and other medication before sending LaFage home. The next day, LaFage visited Dr. Salem, who also diagnosed a pulled muscle and prescribed medication, but LaFage continued to experience severe pain. LaFage returned to the hospital later that morning and was diagnosed again with a muscle pull. Later that day, Mrs. LaFage gave the nurse a cup of Mr. LaFage's phlegm and asked how a muscle pull could cause the production of such phlegm. The nurse explained that phlegm sometimes resulted from the medication LaFage was taking, but that she would contact the doctor. That night, LaFage's condition worsened, and he was transferred to a Philadelphia hospital where he was placed on a life-support system. He died two days later, on March 8, 1995. LaFage is survived by his wife and three minor children between the ages of four and eight. Mrs. LaFage was three-months pregnant at the time of her husband's death. A few days after the death, Mrs. LaFage's father contacted Angelo Falciani, an attorney, regarding a possible malpractice suit. Mrs. LaFage met with Falciani on several occasions and was under the impression he would handle the case and file a lawsuit on her behalf. In addition to speaking to Falciani on or about March 13, 1995, Mrs. LaFage spoke with her cousin, Dr. Romano, on March 22, 1995. Dr. Romano informed her that he believed she had an overwhelming case of malpractice against all of the health care providers, including the nurses. A wrongful death and survivorship complaint was filed by Falciani on April 4, 1997, two years and twenty seven days after LaFage's death. Defendant, Dr. Jani, filed a motion to dismiss because the complaint was filed more than two years after the date of death. In opposition to the motion, Falciani argued that the statute of limitations should not commence to run until June 29, 1995, the date on which he received LaFage's autopsy report. That report indicated that the cause of death was a massive bacterial infection of unknown origin in LaFage's chest cavity. In response to Dr. Jani's motion to dismiss the complaint, Falciani moved to intervene because he was now facing a legal malpractice claim. The trial court granted his application. The trial court ultimately decided that under the reasoning of Negron v. Llarena, 156 N.J. 296 (1998), the discovery rule could be applied to Wrongful Death Act claims. However, the trial court found that even under the discovery rule, the two year limitations period began to run on March 22, 1995, when Mrs. LaFage spoke to Dr. Romano. Thus, the trial court held that Mrs. LaFage's wrongful death and survival claims were barred because her April 4, 1997, complaint was filed more than two years after her cause of action accrued. Concerning the wrongful death claims of LaFage's children, the trial court held that although there is no statutory tolling for minors pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act, Negron permits equitable tolling until the minors reach their eighteenth birthdays. The trial court barred the Survival Act claims of the children, however, holding that those claims belonged to the estate and no distinction could be made between the children and the estate. The Appellate Division declined to intervene on an interlocutory basis. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. HELD: The Wrongful Death Act's statute of limitations may be equitably tolled for minors. 1. The Court agrees with the trial court's conclusion that even if she could invoke the discovery rule, Mrs. LaFage's wrongful death claim was untimely. It therefore declines to address the broader question whether the discovery rule generally should be applicable to wrongful death claims. (Pp. 6-9) 2. Historically, the Court has made a distinction between a procedural statute of limitations and a substantive one. A substantive statute is found in legislation creating a cause of action that did not exist at common law. Because the prevailing view has been that a wrongful death claim was not recognized under New Jersey common law, the Wrongful Death Act's statute of limitations would be substantive. Substantive statutes of limitation have been applied strictly, while procedural statutes of limitations were flexibly construed, subject to equitable principles. More recent decisions such as Negron, however, have marked a retreat from the inflexible approach to interpreting substantive statutes of limitation. These decisions recognize that the application of substantive statutes of limitation depends on statutory interpretation focusing on legislative intent and purpose. The Court's examination of the issue whether there should be equitable tolling of wrongful death claims leads it to conclude that the Legislature would not have intended to preclude it. (Pp. 9-25) 3. More importantly, the view that there was no common law cause of action for wrongful death in New Jersey is based on the mistaken application of dictum from an old English case. The Court is convinced that an action for wrongful death did exist at common law prior to the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3 and its predecessor statute. Thus, the statute of limitations contained in the Wrongful Death Act is really procedural and indisputably subject to equitable principles. Tolling for minors therefore will apply to the Wrongful Death Act in this and other appropriate cases. (Pp. 25-39) As MODIFIED, judgment of the Law Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE STEIN concurs in that portion of the majority opinion holding that the limitations period for filing a wrongful death claim is tolled during the infancy of minors. He does not join Part III of the opinion, which recognizes a common law cause of action for wrongful death, expressing the view that the Court need not resolve that issue to decide this appeal. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA concurs in that portion of the majority's holding affirming the dismissal of Mrs. LaFage's wrongful death and survivorship claims, and dissents from the holding applying equitable tolling to the minor children's wrongful death claims. She is of the view that the statutory wrongful-death cause of action is authorized with the clear prescription that it be brought within two years of death, not two years from some later date as determined by tolling notions; and that it is for the Legislature to provide relief from the two-year limitation period, not the Court. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate concurring opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA has filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE VERNIERO joins. CARMELLA R. LAFAGE, individually; CARMELLA R. LAFAGE, as Executrix of the Estate of Richard A. LaFage, deceased, Plaintiff, v. DEVENDRA JANI, M.D.; DIANA MATHIAS, R.N.; DIANE KLEIN, R.N.; KAREN MARTIN, R.N.; JOHN HOBSON, R.N.; D.L. SEALS, R.N. and VICTORIA MILLS, R.N.; Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, and JANE DOE, R.N. being a name/names fictitious (No. 1 through No. 6), Defendants, v. ANGELO J. FALCIANI, PA and ANGELO J. FALCIANI, ESQUIRE, Intervenors-Respondents and Cross Appellants. On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Salem County. Timothy P. O'Brien argued the cause for appellants and cross-respondents Diana Mathias, R.N.; Diane Klein, R.N.; Karen Martin, R.N.; John Hobson, R.N.; D.L. Seals, R.N.; Victoria Mills, R.N.; (Paarz, Master, Koernig, Crammer, O'Brien, Bishop & Horn, attorneys; Mr. O'Brien and Mary Ann C. O'Brien, on the letter briefs). Stacy L. Moore, Jr., argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent Devendra Jani, M.D. (Parker McCay & Criscuolo, attorneys). William J. Martin argued the cause for intervenors-respondents and cross-appellants (Martin, Gunn & Martin, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. This is a medical malpractice-wrongful death case. The critical issue raised is whether our Wrongful Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 to -6, permits equitable tolling of its two-year statute of limitations for minors whose wrongful death claims were filed twenty-seven days late. The trial court held that the Wrongful Death Act permits such tolling. The Appellate Division declined to intervene on an interlocutory basis. We granted leave to appeal and hold that the Wrongful Death Act may be equitably tolled for minors. We do not reach the issue whether our discovery rule applies to Wrongful Death Act claims. Under the statute, if a personal injury claimant is less than eighteen when the cause of action accrues, the statute of limitations is tolled for two years after the person reaches his or her majority. Ibid. As noted previously, the Wrongful Death Act contains no tolling provision. The decisional law in New Jersey has not been uniform in respect of equitable tolling for minors. Some cases have declined to allow minority tolling. See, e.g., Scharwenka v. Cryogenics Mgmt., Inc., 163 N.J. Super. 16, 21-22 (App. Div. 1978) (refusing to extend minority tolling to untimely petition for workers' compensation benefits because statute did not provide for it); Lombardi v. Simon, 266 N.J. Super. 708, 712 (Law Div. 1993) (refusing to toll wrongful death statute of limitations). More recently, in Cockinos v. GAF Corp., 259 N.J. Super. 204 (Law Div. 1992), the court specifically held that tolling for infancy does not apply to wrongful death claims because our wrongful death statute does not include a minority tolling provision. Id. at 207-09. However, a more enlightened approach was applied in Barbaria v. Township of Sayreville, 191 N.J. Super. 395, 404 (App. Div. 1983), where the Appellate Division permitted minority tolling in a wrongful death cause of action. The court reasoned that the death of a parent was essentially an injury to the child, much like a child's own physical injury, and therefore the child's wrongful death claim should be tolled, in the same way that his or her injury would be tolled under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. Id. at 401-02. That approach is consistent with the approach followed in other jurisdictions. Other states also have extended minority tolling to their wrongful death statutes despite an absence of statutory language explicitly adopting such tolling. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, for example, has held that minority tolling applies to its wrongful death statute. Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229-31 (Mass. 1972). The Massachusetts wrongful death statute in effect at the time of the decedent's death in Gaudette stated: An action to recover damages under this section shall be commenced within one year from the date of death or within such time thereafter as is provided [in the tolling provisions of another chapter]. Id. at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted). Those tolling provisions, however, applied only to actions that the deceased could have brought, and therefore did not apply to wrongful death actions. Ibid. Significantly, the court used a different approach to permit equitable tolling of the wrongful death claims. Despite precedents to the contrary, the court determined that Massachusetts law had evolved to the point where it may now be held that the right to recovery for wrongful death is of common law origin. Id. at 229. On that basis, the court held that the state's wrongful death statute, in appropriate cases, may be tolled. Ibid. The Alaska Supreme Court has held that the disability of a minor statutory beneficiary tolls the running of the two year time limit for commencing a wrongful death action until the disability is concluded. Haakanson v. Wakefield Seafoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Alaska 1979). Alaska's wrongful death statute stated that an action shall be commenced within two years after the death. Id. at 1088 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court had to decide whether Alaska's general tolling statute applied to extend the two-year limitation contained in the wrongful death statute. The Alaska court noted that [t]he primary purpose of the wrongful death statute is to compensate those who suffer a direct loss. Id. at 1090. It found that [d]enying recovery to the [deceased parents'] children would defeat this purpose. Ibid. The court could think of no good reason why the public policy favoring protecting the interests of minors, evident in Alaska's general tolling statute, should not apply to wrongful death actions. Id. at 1090-91. Therefore, the court decided to allow a minority toll of its wrongful death statue. The Illinois Supreme Court also has determined that the two-year statute of limitations contained in its wrongful death statute did not apply to the claims of minors. Wilbon v. D. F. Bast Co., 382 N.E.2d 784, 790-91 (Ill. 1978). At that time, Illinois's wrongful death statute required: Every such action shall be commenced within 2 years after the death of such person. Id. at 784-85 (internal quotation marks omitted). After an examination of the history of wrongful death actions in this country and of the legislative intent underlying the Illinois wrongful death statute, the court concluded that logic and justice required it to allow the minor plaintiffs to proceed. Id. at 790-91 (explaining that '[a] child with a meritorious cause of action but incapable of initiating any proceeding for its enforcement will not be left to the whim or mercy of some self-constituted next friend to enforce its rights' ) (quoting McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 120 N.E. 476, 478 (Ill. 1918)). The recognition of a common law basis for wrongful death actions is not limited to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has explicitly held that its wrongful death statute is, contrary to previous precedents, a codification of the common law. Gaudette, supra, 284 N.E.2d at 229 (holding that the right to recovery for wrongful death is of common law origin ). Several other courts have cited the common law approach with approval. See Haakanson, supra, 600 P.2d at 1092 n.11 (finding that Alaska's wrongful death statue is not in derogation of its common law, but stating that if there was no statute, the court would follow the lead of Moragne and Gaudette); Wilbon, supra, 382 N.E.2d at 785 (allowing minor plaintiffs' action to toll wrongful death statute of limitations despite precedent stating that there was no common law right to recover for wrongful death and quoting with approval assertion that Baker v. Bolton rule was 'obviously unjust, . . . technically unsound . . . and based upon a misreading of legal history' ) (quoting 3 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 336 (3d ed. 1927)); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 619 P.2d 826 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (noting existence of common law right to recover for wrongful death in New Mexico). Hawaii has always held that a common law right of action for wrongful death exists. 65 Am. Jur. Trials 4 (1997) (citing Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 369 P.2d 96 (Haw. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, Greene v. Texeira, 505 P.2d 1169 (Haw. 1973)). Georgia began to recognize a right to sue for wrongful death before it passed its wrongful death statute, without explicitly acknowledging that the right derived from the common law. Id. 6 (citing Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854)). A recent case indicates Georgia's continued willingness to recognize a common law basis for wrongful death actions. Id. 7 (citing Velez v. Bethune, 466 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. 1995) (allowing cause of action for wrongful death where plaintiffs asserted that defendant physician terminated life support for their nine day-old child without their consent)). At least three other cases recognized a common law action for wrongful death prior to 1848. Dennis M. Doiron, A Better Interpretation of the Wrongful Death Act, 43 Me. L. Rev. 449, 468 (1991) (citing Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No. 11234) (D. Me. 1825); Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1794); Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838)). Further, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that it gives all statutes a fair construction, with the purpose of its enactment in view, not narrowed or restricted because it is a substitute for the discarded common law. Teders v. Rothermel, 286 N.W. 353, 354 (Minn. 1939) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, while today's decision does not require us to base minority tolling to the Wrongful Death Act on the common law, we are now convinced that an action for wrongful death did exist at common law, prior to the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3 and its predecessor. At common law, statutes of limitations were considered to be procedural in nature because they limit only the procedural remedy and not the right. Willis L. M. Reese and Maurice Rosenberg, Conflict of Laws 3 at 425 (8th ed. 1984); Sam Walker, Forum Shopping for Stale Claims: Statutes of Limitations and Conflict of Laws, 23 Akron L. Rev. 19, 22 (1989). We hold that because N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3 is a procedural statute of limitations that relates to a cause of action cognizable under our common law, an additional reason exists to allow tolling based on equitable principles. CARMELLA R. LAFAGE, individually; CARMELLA R. LAFAGE, as Executrix of the Estate of Richard A. LaFage, deceased, Plaintiff, v. DEVENDRA JANI, M.D., DIANA MATHIAS, R.N.; DIANE KLEIN, R.N.; KAREN MARTIN, R.N.; JOHN HOBSON, R.N.; D.L. SEALS, R.N. and VICTORIA MILLS, R.N.; Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, and JANE DOE, R.N. being a name/names fictitious (No. 1 Through No. 6), Defendants, v. ANGELO J. FALCIANI, P.A. and ANGELO J. FALCIANI, ESQUIRE, Intervenors-Respondents _____________________________ LaVECCHIA, J., concurring and dissenting. As Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed, in the judicial construction of a statute there is a difference between reading what is and rewriting it. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 43, 68 S. Ct. 1375, 1397, 92 L. Ed. 1787, 1812 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). At times the difference is elusive, but not this time. The New Jersey Wrongful Death Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 to -6, contains some simple, yet emphatic, words: Every action brought under this chapter shall be commenced within 2 years after the death of the decedent, and not thereafter. N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3. Undoubtedly, the Court is benevolently motivated when it concludes that equitable tolling principles, specifically infant tolling, are applicable to the two-year limitation period for commencing a wrongful-death action. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 10). But, I must disagree because there is no place for such considerations in this statute. The statutory wrongful-death cause of action is authorized with the clear prescription that the action be brought within two years of the date of death, not two years from some later date as determined by tolling notions. It is for the Legislature to provide relief from the two-year limitation period, not the Court. The plaintiff there argued that if subparts (a) and (b) are not interpreted consistently it will result in the absurdity of allowing a defendant to be exonerated for conduct which kills but held liable for conduct which merely maims. Id. at 350-51. The Texas Supreme Court rejected that argument, stating that subpart (b) specifies that a cause of action accrues at a certain time _ the date of death. Id. at 351. In contrast, when the legislature uses the term accrues without an accompanying definition, as in subpart (a), the courts must determine when that cause of action accrues and thus when the statute of limitations commences to run. Ibid. The court went on to note that in three previous cases it had adopted and relied on the principles announced in Fernandi, supra, 35 N.J. at 449. Moreno, supra, 787 S.W.2d at 351. Taking the lesson gleaned from Fernandi, the court restated that the discovery rule is a judicially constructed test which is used to determine when a plaintiff's cause of action accrued and that the rule has been applied to a statute of limitations which left the phrase 'accrual' undefined. Ibid. In contrast, subpart (b) specifically defines accrual as the date of death. Ibid. Moreno presented the question of whether the discovery rule should be applied to a limitations statute which has clearly and unequivocally prescribed that a cause of action accrues upon the occurrence of a specified event. Ibid. The court held that it should not for three reasons. The plain meaning of the statute evidences the legislative intent to fix the only date of accrual. . . . Id. at 353; see also Morano v. St. Francis Hosp., 420 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94-95 (App. Div. 1979) (examining wrongful-death statute requiring that action must be commenced within two years after decedent's death, and finding conclusion inescapable that the clearly expressed intention of the Legislature . . . was to provide that an action for wrongful death must be commenced within two years after the date of death ). Second, the judicially created discovery rule applies only to accrual limitation statutes, i.e., statutes which have failed to define when a cause of action accrues. Moreno, supra, 787 S.W.2d at 353. Finally, [t]he overwhelming majority of states construing absolute statutes with similar or identical language to that found in [the Texas statute] have held that the discovery rule does not apply. Ibid. The Texas Supreme Court summarized its conclusion as follows: The language used in [subpart (b)] reflects a clear legislative intent to adopt an absolute two-year limitations period for wrongful death actions. The legislature could have either left accrual undefined in [that subpart] or could have stated that the cause of action accrues on the death of the injured person or upon discovery of the cause of death ; either route would have allowed the discovery rule to be applied to [subpart (b)]. Instead, the statute unambiguously specifies one event _ death _ and only that one event as the date upon which the action accrues. By specifying that date, the legislature has foreclosed judicial application of the discovery rule. If we concluded otherwise, we would be disregarding the plain meaning of [subpart (b)], distorting the clear function of the discovery rule, frustrating the legitimate purposes of limitation statutes, and ignoring the well-reasoned opinions of most other jurisdictions. Similar views are found in Chief Justice Moyer's dissent in the four-to-three decision in Collins v. Sotka, 692 N.E.2d 581, 586 (Ohio 1998)(Moyer, C.J., dissenting). Stating that the judicial branch must temper its empathy and exercise restraint in those cases in which emotion tempts members of courts to expand the use of their judicial powers, the dissent suggested that [t]he expansive holding adopted by the majority today could not be more illustrative of the harm effected upon our jurisprudence when the judiciary does not follow the principle that courts are ill suited and not designed to substitute their policy judgment for that clearly stated by the legislature. Ibid. Like the majority, I would acknowledge that application of the wrongful-death statute of limitations may occasionally be unfair. But, I do not believe that the remedy is to employ equitable notions of tolling developed to explicate ambiguous terms of accrual. There is no ambiguity here to invite our judicial intervention. The Wrongful Death Act is clear and should be enforced. The duty of a self-restrained judiciary is to give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise defined. Ibid. Accordingly, I perceive no role for equitable tolling notions in the face of the New Jersey Legislature's apparent preference for the public policy of finality concerning a decedent's affairs. A plaintiff must bring a wrongful-death action within two years of the date certain of the decedent's death, and not thereafter. The Legislature's specific delineation of causes of action for which infant tolling applies bespeaks deliberation; noticeably absent is any reference to a wrongful-death cause of action. As a launching point for its consideration of whether wrongful-death claims should be tolled for minors, the majority notes that [i]n Negron, we observed that equitable tolling or the discovery rule 'in appropriate circumstances . . . can be relevant in determining whether the statute of limitations [N.J.S.A. 2A:31-3] should be tolled.' Ante at ___ (slip op. at 9). Examination of that dictum from Negron v. Llarena, 156 N.J. 296 (1998), in its original context reveals, however, that the underpinnings for that statement in Negron are not present here. Stated in its entirety, the Court's decision in Negron observed that equitable tolling or application of the discovery rule in appropriate circumstances, such as those presented by this case, can be relevant in determining whether the statute of limitations should be tolled. See, e.g., Galligan v. Westfield Centre Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 412 A.2d 122 (1980) (holding that the statute of limitations for a survivorship case would be equitably tolled by the timely filing of an action in federal court improperly based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction); Mitzner v. West Ridgelawn Cemetery, Inc., 311 N.J. Super. 233, 709 A.2d 825 (App. Div. 1998) (applying Galligan). [Negron, supra, 156 N.J. at 307 (emphasis added).] The definition of appropriate circumstances in Negron hinged on the timely filing of a complaint. In Negron, although there was a question whether strict or substantial compliance with the statute of limitations was required, plaintiff in any event had complied fundamentally with the statute by filing a complaint prior to the expiration of the two-year limitations period. The cases the Court in Negron cited also define appropriate circumstances by reference to a complaint filed within the two- year limitation period set by the Act. In Galligan, supra, 82 N.J. at 190, the plaintiff filed a timely wrongful-death complaint in the Federal District Court of New Jersey, and, based on the absence of diversity, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff then filed the same cause of action in the Superior Court of New Jersey while the motion was pending, but twenty-two days after the statute of limitations had run. Ibid. The Court concluded that the second complaint should not be time barred because a timely, albeit jurisdictionally deficient, federal complaint had been filed. Id. at 195. Galligan thus stands for the proposition that, where a timely action is dismissed by the federal court for lack of jurisdiction, the same action filed prior to the federal court dismissal, but brought out of time in state court, will not be dismissed when dismissal will not further the legislature's purpose of insuring repose. Knight v. Brown Transp. Corp., 806 F.2d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Young v. Clantech, Inc., 863 F.2d 300, 301 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding that Court in Galligan held that filing of a complaint in a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case will toll the New Jersey statute of limitations if, in the particular circumstances of the case, the purposes underlying the statute are not compromised ); Byrd v. Manning, 253 N.J. Super. 307, 314 (App. Div. 1992) (concluding that statute of limitations in the Act could not be tolled because, in sharp contrast to Galligan, both complaints filed by plaintiff were filed beyond the two-year statutory period . . . ). Negron simply does not support the expansive application of equitable principles to a wrongful-death action that the majority ascribes to it. To this point New Jersey case law has rejected the application of equitable tolling principles to wrongful-death actions brought on behalf of minors. The courts have considered the fact that the Act specifically sets forth a two-year limitation period and does not provide for minority tolling within its provisions. See, e.g., Lombardi v. Simon, 266 N.J. Super. 708, 712 (Law Div. 1993) (refusing to toll wrongful-death statute of limitations); Cockinos v. GAF Corp., 259 N.J. Super. 204, 208 (Law Div. 1992) (holding that infant tolling does not apply to wrongful-death actions because statute does not include minority tolling provision). The New Jersey Legislature, unlike other state legislatures, has not amended the Act to provide tolling for infants. See, e.g., Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 18012 (West 2000) ( Every such action shall be commenced within 2 years after the death * * *. However, if [an omitted person] is, at the time the cause of action accrued, within the age of 18 years, he or she may cause such action to be brought within 2 years after attainment of the age of 18 ); see also Taylor v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 486 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that if legislature intended to change wrongful-death statute of limitations which requires that a cause of action be brought within two years after decedent's death, it would have amended the wrongful death statute so as to provide for such a change ). Notwithstanding those formidable impediments to its reasoning, the Court finds support for its conclusion concerning infant tolling in the Appellate Division's decision in Barbaria v. Sayreville, 191 N.J. Super. 395, 404 (App. Div. 1993). The majority states that the Barbaria court reasoned that the death of a parent was essentially an injury to the child, much like a child's own physical injury, and therefore the child's wrongful death claim should be tolled, in the same way that his or her injury would be tolled under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 [the general statute of limitations for wrongful acts]. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 19). But, reliance on Barbaria is misplaced. In fact, the Appellate Division in Barbaria declined to address the issue of whether the infant tolling statute applied to wrongful-death actions. Barbaria, supra, 191 N.J. Super. at 403 ( The only issue before us is the timeliness of the claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. ). Moreover, the seeming acceptance of the Barbaria court's broad language is at odds with the Court's view of the next-of- kin's status as stated in Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412 (1988). In Giardina, the Court unequivocally concluded that a wrongful-death action is not an opportunity for next-of-kin to be compensated for injuries suffered to themselves. Id. at 423-24. The Court specifically stated that the wrongful-death action is based on the harm done to the decedent, and is thus differentiated from personal injury actions brought by . . . survivors resulting from injuries they directly suffered due to the wrongful death. Ibid. New Jersey courts historically have held that exceptions may not be made for minors when the statutory language itself is silent. See, e.g., Uscienski v. National Sugar Ref. Co., 19 N.J. Misc. 240, 242 (1941) (finding that no exception can be claimed in favor of minors in a statutory provision limiting the time for commencing actions given by such statute, unless they are expressly mentioned by statute as excepted). More recently in Cockinos, supra, 259 N.J. Super. at 206-07, the Appellate Division held that application of the equitable principles of infant tolling would be contrary to the clear terms of the Wrongful Death Act. Further, the Appellate Division stated, The factor which distinguishes Barbaria from the [wrongful death] case sub judice is that the Legislature provided a specific extension for filing on behalf of infants in the Torts Claim Act. Id. at 208. The court continued: The Legislature has unambiguously stated that a claim for wrongful death must be brought within three years from the date of death. Application of a rule which would delay accrual until discovery would be in clear contravention of the legislative directive that the period of limitation runs from the date of death. Furthermore, it must be understood that the discovery rule grew out of the need to determine when a cause of action accrued. When the Legislature limits the time within which suit can commence from the date of accrual, it leaves to the court the determination of the precise meaning of the term accrued. That court reiterated that 'Gaudette does not stand for the proposition that the requirements of the statute may be disregarded.' Ibid. (quoting Hallet v. Wrentham, 499 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Mass. 1986)). The wrongful-death claim may be of common-law origin, but the statute still specifies the recovery and procedure. Pobieglo, supra, 521 N.E.2d at 731. The Legislature might reasonably choose to put a wrongful-death claimant on different footing from one claiming injury, and it cannot be said that such a result is absurd or illogical. Id. at 731-32. Although arguments regarding hardship are appropriate in relation to the enactment of legislation, such arguments are noncontrolling when interpreting existing statutes. Id. at 732. Thus, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that, the common-law background of wrongful-death actions notwithstanding, when the Legislature has specifically provided that claims for wrongful death must be brought within three years from the date of death, it would be inappropriate for this court to vitiate that legislative determination and apply a discovery rule to claims brought pursuant to [the wrongful death statute]. Ibid.; see also Ratka v. St. Francis Hosp., 378 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (N.Y. 1978) (holding statutory entitlement to wrongful-death action in New York renders it neither necessary nor appropriate to change established law as a means of saving [a] cause of action for wrongful death from the bar of the Statute of Limitations ). A later decision of the United States Supreme Court also contradicts the expansive support the majority finds in Morange. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S. Ct. 2010, 56 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1978), the Supreme Court stated: In Moragne, the Court recognized a wrongful- death remedy that supplements federal statutory remedies. But that holding depended on our conclusion that Congress withheld a statutory remedy in coastal waters in order to encourage and preserve supplemental remedies. . . . There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted. In the area covered by statute, it would be no more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of damages than to prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different class of beneficiaries. . . . [W]e have no authority to substitute our views for those expressed by Congress in a duly enacted statute. [Id. at 625-26, 98 S. Ct. at 2015, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 587 (emphasis added).] See also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27, 111 S. Ct. 317, 323, 112 L. Ed. 2d 275, 287 (1990) ( Congress retains superior authority in these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation. These statutes both direct and delimit our actions. ). Similarly, the court in Holzsager v. Warburton, 452 F. Supp. 1267 (D.N.J. 1978), found that there was no common-law right of action for wrongful death in New Jersey, but stated that the extended discussion of this alleged historical error was immaterial in any event: Since the States supposedly labored under an erroneous view of the common law, they created remedies by statute. Thus, even if it be said now that there really was an action at common law (which no one knew), the statutes replace it, and so the result at the State level is the same either way. The court continued: Whether they create new actions or modify existing ones, legislatures have the authority to specify conditions and prerequisites that must be satisfied, as essential ingredients of the cause of action. Whatever freedom courts have to modify decisional law, the equal status of these two branches of government acts as a restraint _ a check and balance _ on what one or the other might do alone. Common-law action or not, the analysis remains the same, according to the very courts cited for the proposition that the common law allowed a wrongful-death cause of action. The strength of the majority's position is not advanced by a pronouncement of the existence of a wrongful-death action at common law. As previously noted, many jurisdictions have rejected the approach that a common-law wrongful death action did exist. Those courts have adhered to the view that the wrongful-death cause of action is statutorily created and best left to the Legislature to decide the preconditions of its existence. Nicholson, supra, 179 So. 2d at 78-79 (concluding that statutorily created cause of action is fixed in Wrongful Death Act; limitation goes to essence of right, affecting liability itself, not merely remedy); Sandusky v. First Elec. Coop., 587 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Ark. 1979) (finding it well established in Arkansas that right of action for wrongful death of statutory origin only because no such cause of action existed at common law; therefore limitation time fixed by wrongful death statute is limitation on right of action and thus essential element of right to sue); Taylor, supra, 486 N.E.2d at 1177; Short, supra, 374 A.2d at 789 ( We are not persuaded by the Massachusetts court's resort to the device of creating a common law right of action as a means of supplying a remedy for otherwise remediless minors. ). Similarly here, the pronouncement of a common-law wrongful death action does not bolster the majority's determination that deviates from the plain language of the Act. The Act's language does not compel a result that is absurd or illogical. In my view, the majority's holding, altering a considered choice of the Legislature on a matter of policy, is compelled by a premise that the Court's resolution is one which produces a fairer or more just result than the Act's plain terms. But, the Act is unambiguous and emphatic in its terms, thus we need delve no further than the statutory words to understand the legislative intent and then give it effect. See State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 226 (1982) (observing that where statute is clear and unambiguous on its face and admits of only one interpretation, we need delve no deeper than the act's literal terms to divine the Legislature's intent ). SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-65/66/ 92 September Term 1999 CARMELLA R. LAFAGE, individually; CARMELLA R. LAFAGE, as Executrix of the Estate of Richard A. LaFage, deceased, Plaintiff, v. DEVENDRA JANI, M.D.; DIANA MATHIAS, R.N.; DIANE KLEIN, R.N.; KAREN MARTIN, R.N.; JOHN HOBSON, R.N.; D.L. SEALS, R.N. and VICTORIA MILLS, R.N.; Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, and JANE DOE, R.N. being a name/names fictitious (No. 1 through No. 6), Defendants, v. ANGELO J. FALCIANI, PA and ANGELO J. FALCIANI, ESQUIRE, Intervenors-Respondents and Cross Appellants. NO. A-65/66/92 CARMELLA R. LAFAGE, individually; CARMELLA R. LAFAGE, as Executrix of the Estate of Richard A. LaFage, deceased, Plaintiff, v. DEVENDRA JANI, M.D.; DIANA MATHIAS, R.N.; DIANE KLEIN, R.N.; KAREN MARTIN, R.N.; JOHN HOBSON, R.N.; D.L. SEALS, R.N. and VICTORIA MILLS, R.N., Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, DECIDED February 22, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz