Case Title: City of Henderson v. Wolfgram

Citation: 137 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 79

Docket Number: 80982

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
437 Nev., Advance Opinion "7
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

CITY OF HENDERSON; AND CCMSI, No. 80982

we FILED

BRIAN WOLFGRAM, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Respondent. DEC 23 2021

spoun,

 

x ane

Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial
review in a workers’ compensation matter. Eighth Judicial District Court,
Clark County; William D. Kephart, Judge.

Affirmed.

‘Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, and Daniel L. Schwartz and Joel P.
Reeves, Las Vegas,
for Appellants.

Greenman Goldberg Raby & Martinez and Jason D. Mills, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

BEFORE HARDESTY, C.J., STIGLICH, J., and GIBBONS, Sr. J.!

*The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.

Zil- 36620

 

 
OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, C.J.:

Nevada's workers’ compensation statutes place limitations on a
claimant's ability to reopen a closed claim. One limitation is that a claimant
must file an application to reopen a claim within one year of the claim's
closing unless the injury incapacitated the claimant from earning “full
wages” for a specified amount of time. NRS 616C.400(1); see NRS
616C.3904)(5). In this case, we are asked to determine whether
respondent's inability to earn overtime due to his industrial injury equates
to being incapacitated from earning “full wages,” such that he can seek to
reopen his claim more than one year after its closing. For the reasons stated
below, we agree with the district court and appeals officer that respondent
was incapacitated from earning “full wages” and therefore affirm the order
denying the employer and its insurer's petition for judicial review.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

While working for appellant City of Henderson as a firefighter,
respondent Brian Wolfgram filed a workers’ compensation claim for issues
related to his hands and elbows. The City, via its insurer, appellant CCMSI
(collectively, the City), accepted the claim. During Wolfgram's medical
treatment, his doctor placed him on light-duty restrictions for a little more
than two weeks. While the City paid Wolfgram his normal base salary
during that time, it prohibited him from volunteering for overtime.
Wolfgram sought no other benefits, and his claim closed on January 26,
2015.

 

*Pursuant to NRAP 34(f(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted in this appeal.

 

 
 

On February 6, 2017, based on medical advice that his hand
and elbow issues may be recurring, Wolfgram requested to reopen his claim.
‘The City denied the request and Wolfgram appealed. The appeals officer
ultimately found that Wolfgram’s inability to earn overtime while on light
duty meant that he was incapacitated from earning full wages for the time
specified under NRS 616C.400(1). And, because Wolfgram satisfied NRS
616C.400(1)'s period of incapacitation, the appeals officer concluded that
‘NRS 616C.390(5) permitted Wolfgram to submit an application to reopen
his claim more than a year after it had closed, otherwise referred to as
“lifetime reopening rights.” However, due to a lack of supporting medical
evidence, the appeals officer denied Wolfgram’s request to reopen his claim
at that time. The City petitioned for judicial review of the appeals officer's
finding that Wolfgram’s inability to earn overtime while on light duty meant
that he had not earned his full wages under NRS 616C.400(1). The district,
court denied judicial review after a hearing, concluding that Nevada law
provided overwhelming support for the appeals officer's decision. The City
now appeals.

DISCUSSION

We, like the district court, review administrative agency
decisions “for clear error or an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion”
and defer to an agency's findings of fact and “fact-based conclusions of
law . .. ifthey are supported by substantial evidence.” Law Offices of Barry
Levinson, P.C. v. Milko, 124 Nev. 355, 362, 184 P.3d 378, 383-84 (2008)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence
exists if a reasonable person could find the evidence adequate to support the
agency's conclusion.” Id. at 362, 184 P.3d at 384; see also NRS 233B.135(3)-
(4) (defining substantial evidence and discussing judicial review of agency
decisions). We review purely legal questions, such as statutory

3

 
4

 

interpretation issues, de novo. City of N. Las Vegas v. Warburton, 127 Nev.
682, 686, 262 P.3d 715, 718 (2011).

‘The City argues that the appeals officer erred in concluding
Wolfgram did not receive his “full wages” under NRS 616C.400(1) because

he received the entirety of his base pay while on light duty. It asserts that

 

overtime is voluntary and therefore speculative and points out that
Wolfgram never made a claim for lost wages. Wolfgram responds that the
appeals officer's decision is a correct statement of the law and supported by
substantial evidence. He further asserts that it does not matter if overtime
was voluntary when the record shows that he regularly worked overtime
immediately before the injury and that the City prohibited him from
working overtime while on light duty.

NRS 616C.390 addresses the reopening of closed workers’
compensation claims. As pertinent here, the statute provides that a
claimant must seek to reopen a claim “within 1 year after the date on which
the claim was closed if... {t]he claimant did not meet the minimum
duration of incapacity as set forth in NRS 616C.400 as a result of the
injury."* NRS 616C.390(5Xa). If the claimant meets NRS 616C.400's
mi

 

imum duration of ineapacitation, however, then an insurer must reopen
the claim, despite more than a year passing since its closing, if the claimant
‘meets other enumerated criteria. NRS 616C.390(5) (“If an application to

°The statute sets forth conjunctive requirements. If a claimant fails
to meet the minimum duration of incapacity and did not receive a
permanent partial disability rating, he must seek to reopen the claim within
one year. NRS 616C.390(5Xa)(b). The parties agree that Wolfgram did not
receive a permanent partial disability rating for his claim but dispute
whether he met the minimum duration of incapacity.

 

 
reopen a claim . .. is made pursuant to this subsection, the insurer shall
reopen the claim if the requirements set forth in . . . subsection 1 are met.”).
RS 616C.400(1) sets forth the minimum duration of

 

incapacitation as when “an injury... ineapacitate(s) the employee for at
least 5 consecutive days, or 5 cumulative days within a 20-day period, from
earning full wages.” Both parties present reasonable arguments as to
whether “full wages” includes the ability to earn overtime, and we therefore
conclude the statute is ambiguous in this respect. See Banegas v. State
Indus. Ins. Sys., 117 Nev. 222, 225, 19 P.3d 245, 247 (2001) (holding that a
statute is ambiguous if it “is susceptible to more than one natural or honest
interpretation”), We therefore will construe it “consistently with what
reason and public policy would indicate the Legislature intended,” as “the
Legislature's intent is the controlling factor.” Id. And we will avoid
constructions that would lead to an absurd result. Gallagher v. City of Las
Vegas, 114 Nev. 595, 599-600, 959 P.2d 519, 521 (1998) (holding that the
interpretation “should be in line with what reason and public policy would
indicate the [Llegislature intended, and should avoid absurd results”).
“(Full wages” is not defined in the workers’ compensation
statutes or in the Nevada Administrative Code, and the phrase predates
any available legislative history. We faced a similar lack of legislative
history in interpreting a workers’ compensation statute in Banegas. 117
Nev. at 226, 19 P.3d at 247-48 (noting that the statutory language before
the court “remainled) largely unchanged since the original industrial

“The parties agree that the time period within which the City
prohibited Wolfgram from earning overtime exceeded 5 days within a 20-
day period. See NRS 616C.400(1). We therefore need not address that
portion of the statute.

 

 
insurance statutes were adopted in 1913” and that committee minutes
related to the statutory provision were “virtually nonexistent’). Regardless,
‘we concluded in Banegas that we could still discern the Legislature's intent
behind the language at issue “by reviewing the [statutory scheme] as a
whole.” Id. at 228, 19 P.3d at 249. We take the same approach to confront
the statutory interpretation issue in this case.

To that end, we find the definitions of “Iwlages” and “average
monthly wage” in the workers’ compensation scheme informative. The
statute addressing the reopening of claims defines “{wlages” as “any
remuneration paid by an employer to an employee” to include
“{clommissions and bonuses.” NRS 616C.390(11\(¢X1). This suggests that
“fall wages” may include more than just an employee's base pay. Similarly,
NAC 616C.420 defines a claimant's “average monthly wage” as “the total
gross value of all money, goods and services received by an injured employee
from his or her employment to compensate for his or her time or services.”
(Emphasis added.) And NAC 616C.423(1Xn) explicitly includes
“{playment{s] for overtime” as money that must be included when
calculating an employee’s ‘average monthly wage.” See also NRS
233B.040(1Xa) (providing that the Nevada Administrative Code has “the
force of law"); Banegas, 117 Nev. at 227, 19 P.3d at 248 (recognizing that
“the Legislature may authorize administrative agencies to make rules and
regulations supplementing legislation”). To conclude that “full wages” as
used in NRS 616C.400(1) is always limited to the employee's base pay would
therefore be contrary to how “wages” is used elsewhere in the statutory
scheme, leading to an absurd result. It appears, instead, that the

Legislature's intent was that “full wages” could include more than just a

 

 
oo

 

claimant's base pay. We therefore hold that “full wages” as used in NRS
616C.400(1) can include overtime pay.

We now turn to the appeals officer's conclusion that Wolfgram’s
injury incapacitated him from earning full wages within the meaning of
NRS 616C.400(1) because he could not work overtime. Despite overtime
being voluntary, the City does not dispute that it precluded Wolfgram from
working overtime while he was on light duty due to his injury. And evidence
in the record shows that, in the 12 weeks preceding his industrial injury,
Wolfgram worked 96 hours of overtime, making up approximately 15
percent of his pay in that time period. This constitutes substantial
evidence supporting the appeals officer’s conclusion that Wolfgram
regularly worked overtime in the time period immediately preceding his
injury such that, by not being able to work overtime while on light duty, he
was incapacitated from earning his full wages. See Law Offices of Barry
Levinson, 124 Nev. at 362, 184 P.3d at 384; see also Look’s Case, 185 N.E.2d
626, 628 (Mass. 1962) (holding that an injury incapacitates an employee
when it causes “an impairment of earning capacity” and, thus, the question
is whether the record supports a finding that the employee's “injury has
lessened his ability to work"); Phipps v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon
Foundry, Div. of Textron, Inc., 197 N.W.24 297, 305-06 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972)
(holding, under a similar statute, that an employee did not earn full wages
when his average daily wage decreased during the period of incapacitation).

"This would be the time period used to calculate a claimant's average
monthly wage. See NAC 616C.435(1) (providing that, generally, “a history
of earnings for a period of 12 weeks must be used to calculate an average
monthly wage”),

 
Accordingly, the appeals officer did not err in concluding that Wolfgram had
lifetime reopening rights for his claim.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Legislature intended that “full wages” as
used in NRS 616C.400(1) may include payments for overtime. And, because
substantial evidence otherwise supports the appeals officer’s findings in
this case, we affirm the district court's order denying the petition for judicial

review.

 

Gibins