Case Title: SHERWIN-WILLIAMS CO. v. BORCHERT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHERWIN-WILLIAMS CO. v. BORCHERT2000 WY 6994 P.2d 959Case Number: 97-297Decided: 01/14/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS 
COMPANY, Appellant (Petitioner), v.CEDRIC W. BORCHERT, Appellee 
(Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Sheridan County, Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge.

Steven R. 
Helling, Casper, Wyoming, representing appellant.John Fenn, Sheridan, 
Wyoming, representing appellee:

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR,* JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
expedited conference; retired November 2, 1998.

Golden, 
Justice.

[¶1] Employer, 
The Sherwin-Williams Company (Sherwin-Williams), appeals the decision by a 
hearing examiner finding Cedric Borchert's claim for worker's compensation 
benefits and request for hearing were filed timely and awarding partial medical 
benefits.

[¶2] We 
reverse.

ISSUES

[¶3] The 
Sherwin-Williams Company, as appellant, presents the following 
issues:

Was it error to award 
Appellee (Employee/Claimant below) worker's compensation 
benefits?

[¶4] Under the 
facts of this case, this issue includes the following subissues: 

Was there a failure by 
Appellee to timely report his alleged injury and to timely file a report of 
injury, thereby creating a presumption of denial of benefits which should have 
precluded the awarding of benefits herein?

Were the claims of 
Appellee barred by the applicable statute of limitations?

Were the claims of 
Appellee barred as a result of a failure to timely file a request for 
hearing?

Was there sufficient 
evidence to support a finding Appellee suffered any injury at 
work?

[¶5] Cedric 
Borchert, as appellee, contends the following:

1. Did Employee/Borchert 
timely request a hearing upon receiving notice of denial of benefits 
claimed?

2. When did 
Employee/Borchert's injuries become compensable?

[¶6] a. Did 
Employee/Borchert timely report his injuries pursuant to W.S. § 27-14-502 after 
they became compensable?

[¶7] b. Did 
Employee/Borchert timely make a claim for benefits pursuant to W.S. § 
27-14-503(b) after they became compensable?

[¶8] 3. Is the 
hearing examiner's award of partial benefits supported by substantial evidence 
of record?

FACTS

[¶9] In April, 
1995, Cedric W. Borchert was employed by Sherwin-Williams as assistant manager 
of the Sherwin-Williams store in Sheridan, Wyoming. His duties included 
unloading, stacking and distributing freight by hand. On April 22, 1995, while 
unloading a roll of carpeting weighing approximately 550 to 660 pounds, Borchert 
experienced aches and pains. In the spring of 1996, he was required to perform 
more lifting and unloading than usual because of the absence of another employee 
for nearly two months, and his hip and knees began to bother him. In May, 1996, 
Borchert resigned his position with Sherwin-Williams for reasons unrelated to 
the issues presented here.

[¶10] Borchert 
had previously separated both shoulders in a fall in 1968 and received treatment 
by orthopedic surgeon, Edwin Clyde Biddulph, M.D. Surgery to repair a torn 
rotator cuff and degenerative arthritis in Borchert's left shoulder was 
performed on March 10, 1993. Borchert recovered well following the surgery and 
was able to play softball from 1993 to 1995. Borchert also suffers from 
conditions of cervical spondylosis and arthritis which cause him frequent 
pain.

[¶11] Borchert 
returned to Dr. Biddulph on June 17, 1996, with complaints of pain in both 
shoulders. Borchert reported to Dr. Biddulph he had been doing very well until 
he unloaded a 600-pound carpet in April of 1995, heard a pop in his left 
shoulder and had had pain ever since, aggravated by lifting five gallon pails of 
paint in May. Other than possible arthritis on both shoulders, Dr. Biddulph 
suspected Borchert had retorn his left rotator cuff and experienced a tear in 
the right rotator cuff as well. An arthrogram was recommended to determine the 
extent of injury but was not performed at that time.

[¶12] On June 
20, 1996, Borchert submitted a report of occupational injury to his employer, 
claiming injury to both shoulders and a hernia, resulting from "excessive strain 
from unloading [a] large roll of carpet, then weekly continued aggravation from 
unloading freight by hand." Borchert's hernia claim was later withdrawn and is 
not at issue here. In an attachment to the injury report, Borchert gave the date 
of injury as on or about April 22, 1995, while unloading a full roll of carpet 
by hand. The injury report was received by the Division of Workers' Compensation 
on July 8, 1996, and on July 12, 1996, the Division issued a Final Determination 
denying Borchert's claim for benefits because the injury report was not filed 
within the time allowed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-502(a) and 27-14-503(a) and 
(b). The document required either the employee or employer to file an objection 
to the final determination by August 7, 1996, or be barred under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-601(k), from further administrative or judicial review. A letter from 
Borchert dated August 2, 1996, objecting to the Division's determination was 
date stamped as received by the Division on August 9, 1996. 

[¶13] On June 2, 
1997, a hearing was held before the Office of Administrative Hearings. Borchert 
initially stated, upon receiving the Final Determination, he had only a day or 
two to respond before the August 7 deadline. Later, he testified he could not 
recall when he received the document, but thought it was sometime after July 12 
and could have been as long as a week before he formulated his response. He 
testified he wrote the objection on August 2 and sent it via Federal Express on 
August 5, 1996.

[¶14] Borchert 
testified he heard his left shoulder pop while unloading the carpet in April, 
1995, and had immediate sharp stabbing pain in four areas. In a deposition given 
before the administrative hearing, Borchert apparently indicated he experienced 
no pain when moving the carpet and heard no unusual noises. When asked whether 
he thought he had torn his rotator cuff in April, 1995, Borchert stated he 
didn't know, "but something happened." He further testified he thought he had 
pulled some muscles and was unaware of any specific injuries to his shoulder at 
that time. In later testimony, Borchert could not recall hearing a pop in his 
shoulder, then stated it was probably his right, not left, shoulder that 
popped.

[¶15] Dr. 
Biddulph opined, based on the history given him by Borchert, any possible injury 
to Borchert's left shoulder probably happened in April, 1995, when Borchert was 
lifting and heard his shoulder pop, aggravated by subsequent lifting. When asked 
whether an injury would have been readily apparent to Borchert in April, 1995, 
Dr. Biddulph stated, "The way he described it to me, he was sure aware that 
something happened at that point." Dr. Biddulph acknowledged his opinions 
regarding causation of Borchert's injuries "relied very heavily on the 
truthfulness of the history" reported by Borchert.

[¶16] An 
intra-office memo written by Sherwin-Williams' store manager on July 17, 1996, 
indicated the store manager had no knowledge of a work-related claim for 
injuries by Borchert until June 17, 1996; that Borchert had complained of his 
shoulders and hands hurting from the time he began work at the Sheridan store in 
April, 1995; and that at no time did Borchert inform the store manager his pain 
was work related. The store manager testified when Borchert did complain about 
pain, he related the pain to his arthritis.

[¶17] The 
hearing examiner concluded Borchert's request for hearing was timely filed 
because of conflicting testimony and evidence regarding dates the Final 
Determination was written, mailed to, and received by Borchert. The hearing 
examiner determined Borchert's injury was not readily apparent on April 22, 
1995, but occurred over a substantial period of time and thus his claim was 
timely filed within one year after the preliminary diagnosis was made known to 
him on June 17, 1996. Borchert was awarded partial medical benefits. 
Sherwin-Williams' appeal of the hearing examiner's decision to the district 
court was certified to this Court, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶18] 
Sherwin-Williams argues Borchert suffered injury in April, 1995, rendering his 
July 8, 1996, claim for benefits time-barred as beyond the one year statute of 
limitations. It further contends the hearing examiner's determination of 
Borchert's request for hearing as timely filed is not supported by substantial 
evidence.

[¶19] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999) provides, in pertinent part, this Court's 
standard for review of agency decisions:

(c) . . . the court shall 
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account 
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

[¶20] We must 
examine the entire record and consider conflicting and contradictory evidence to 
determine whether, in light of all the evidence before it, the hearing examiner 
could have reasonably concluded as it has in this case. Carrillo v. State of 
Wyoming ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 987 P.2d 690, 693 (Wyo. 
1999). Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind can 
accept as adequate to support an agency's conclusions." Shereman v. Div. of 
Workers' Safety and Comp. Internal Hearing Unit, 956 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo. 1998) 
(citing Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 224 (Wyo. 1995)). This Court 
will not substitute its judgment for that of an agency and defers to an agency's 
findings of basic fact provided there is substantial evidence supporting such 
findings. Matter of Zielinske, 959 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1998). However, if an 
agency's decision is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
presented in the record, we will overturn the decision. Nissen v. Cheyenne 
Frontier Days, 983 P.2d 722, 724-25 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶21] The burden 
of proof for worker's compensation benefits is on the claimant to prove all 
essential elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Carrillo, 
987 P.2d  at 692. In other words, the claimant "has the burden of following 
procedures and rules contained within the Workers' Compensation Act before he is 
entitled to worker's compensation benefits." Pittman v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Comp. Div., 917 P.2d 614, 617 (Wyo. 1996). "To prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence, the claimant must bring forth `proof which leads the trier of 
fact to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its 
non-existence.'" Carrillo, 987 P.2d  at 692 (citing Thornberg v. State, ex rel 
Workers' Comp. Div., 913 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1996) quoting Scherling v. Kilgore, 
599 P.2d 1352, 1359 (Wyo. 1979)).

Timeliness of 
Claim

[¶22] We first 
address Sherwin-Williams' contention of error in the hearing examiner's 
conclusion that Borchert's injury occurred over a substantial period of time, 
resulting in his claim being timely filed within the statute of limitation. The 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act in effect at the time of Borchert's injury 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

§ 27-14-502. Employee's 
report of accident to employer and clerk of court; presumption raised by failure 
to file report; release of information.

[¶23] (a) As 
soon as is practical but not later than seventy-two (72) hours after the general 
nature of the injury became apparent, an injured employee shall report the 
occurrence and general nature of the accident to the employer and within ten 
(10) days after the injury became apparent, file the report in the office of the 
clerk of court of the county in which the accident occurred. Within one (1) 
working day after receipt of the employee's report, the clerk shall transmit a 
copy of the report to the division and the employer. . . .

[¶24] (c) 
Failure of the injured employee, any dependent or personal representative to 
report the accident to the employer and to file the report with the clerk of 
court in accordance with subsection (a) of this section is a presumption that 
the claim shall be denied. The presumption may be rebutted if the employee 
establishes by clear and convincing evidence a lack of prejudice to the employer 
or division in investigating the accident and in monitoring medical 
treatment.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-502 (Michie 1991 Repl. Vol.).

§ 27-14-503. Statute of 
limitations; transfer of claim.

[¶25] (a) A 
payment for benefits involving an injury which is the result of a single brief 
occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time shall not be 
made unless in addition to the proper and timely filing of the reports of the 
accident, an application or claim for benefits is filed within one (1) year 
after the date of the accident occurred or for injuries not readily apparent, 
within one (1) year after discovery of the injury by the employee. The report of 
accident is not a claim for benefits.

[¶26] (b) The 
right of compensation for an injury which occurs over a substantial period of 
time is barred unless a claim for benefits is filed within one (1) year after a 
diagnosis of injury is first communicated to the employee, or within three (3) 
years from the date of last injurious workplace exposure to the condition 
causing the injury, whichever occurs last, . . .

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-503 (Michie 1996 Cum. Supp.)

[¶27] When the 
discovery of a compensable injury and causal relationship between the injury and 
employment is at issue, we have previously noted "a claimant is required to use 
due diligence in pursuing his claim." Pittman, 917 P.2d  at 617 (citing Olheiser 
v. State ex rel. Workers' Comp. Div., 866 P.2d 768, 773 (Wyo. 1994). We have 
recognized due diligence as:

Such a measure of 
prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and 
ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent [person] under the particular 
circumstances; not measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the 
relative facts of the special case.

Id. at 618 
(quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)).

[¶28] The 
question becomes, when would a reasonable person in Borchert's circumstances. 
have understood the full extent and nature of the injury and that the injury was 
related to his employment? Id. at 617. On the injury report and accompanying 
attachment completed by Borchert, he attributed the cause of his shoulder 
injuries to unloading the carpet in April, 1995. He reported the same to Dr. 
Biddulph at the time of his examination in June, 1996, with enough accentuation 
to cause Dr. Biddulph to state he felt Borchert had been "sure something 
happened at that point." Only under oath does Borchert's testimony become 
equivocal. His testimony ranged from hearing a pop in his left shoulder and 
experiencing pain, to hearing no pop and experiencing no pain, to believing the 
pop was from his right shoulder.

[¶29] We do not 
find substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's finding that 
Borchert's injury was not readily apparent on April 22, 1995. By his own report, 
Borchert attributes his shoulder injuries to the incident in April, 1995. We 
have stated, "[I]f a person fails to exercise due diligence in the pursuit of 
his claim, then he has failed to act as a reasonable person under the 
circumstances and his claim will be barred if the one-year time limit has 
expired." Pittman, 917 P.2d  at 618 (citing Olheiser, 866 P.2d at 773). We do not 
find substantial evidence to support the conclusion Borchert's injury was not 
apparent until June, 1996. Borchert's report of injury on July 8, 1996, was time 
barred under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-503(a) as beyond the one year time period 
provided by law.

[¶30] Borchert 
failed to notify his employer within seventy-two hours after the general nature 
of his injury became apparent as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a). To 
overcome a presumption of denial of his claim for failure to timely report to 
his employer, it becomes Borchert's burden to show, by clear and convincing 
evidence, a lack of prejudice to his employer or the Division in investigating 
the injury and monitoring medical treatment. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(c) 
(Michie 1991 Repl. Vol.) "Without such evidence in the record, an employee 
cannot rebut the presumption of prejudice." Nissen, 983 P.2d  at 725 (citing 
Clark v. State ex rel. Workers' Comp. Div., 968 P.2d 436, 439 (Wyo. 1998)). 
Borchert failed to submit any evidence showing Sherwin-Williams and the Division 
were not prejudiced by a lack of opportunity to investigate and monitor 
Borchert's injury. We note Borchert continued to work for Sherwin-Williams, 
unloading freight and moving five gallon pails from the time his injury became 
apparent in April, 1995, until he resigned in May, 1996. With no notice of the 
injury, Sherwin-Williams had no opportunity to modify his work duties and 
minimize his lifting activities. Likewise, the Division was afforded no 
opportunity to investigate the injury. As such, Borchert has failed to rebut the 
statutory presumption that his claim should be denied. Matter of Zielinske, 959 P.2d  at 711.

Timeliness of request for 
hearing

[¶31] Finally, 
we address the timeliness of Borchert's objection to the Division's denial of 
benefits and request for hearing. The July 12, 1996, Final Determination 
required Borchert to respond in writing by August 7, 1996. The Division received 
Borchert's written response on August 9, 1996, two days beyond the deadline. In 
review of the record and Borchert's testimony on this point, we again find his 
statements to be equivocal. He alternately testified he received the document 
with only a day or two to respond, could not recall when he received it or had 
as long as a week to respond. The Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act in effect at 
the time of the injury clearly states, in pertinent part, as 
follows:

(vi) If timely written 
request for hearing is not filed, the final determination by the division 
pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to further administrative or 
judicial review.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-601(k)(vi) (Michie 1996 Cum. Supp.).

[¶32] We find 
the Division's Final Determination provided Borchert the required notice of a 
right to a hearing before a hearing examiner and correctly calculated the 
deadline for receipt of his response by the Division in order to secure this 
right. Consequently, we find the hearing examiner's determination of Borchert's 
request for hearing as timely filed to be unsupported by substantial evidence. 
Sheneman, 956 P.2d  at 352.

CONCLUSION

[¶33] Borchert's 
injury was apparent to him on April 22, 1995, at the time he unloaded the carpet 
for Sherwin-Williams. Borchert failed to file his claim for worker's 
compensation benefits within the one year limitation provided by statute and has 
not shown his failure to do so resulted in a lack of prejudice to either his 
employer or the Division. Borchert's request for hearing on the Division's 
initial denial of benefits was not received within the timeline correctly 
calculated and required by the Division, and as such, he is not entitled to 
administrative or judicial review of his claim on the merits. The hearing 
examiner's decision awarding medical benefits is not supported by substantial 
evidence, is contrary to law, and is reversed.

[¶34] LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice, dissenting, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.

[¶35] Because I 
believe the hearing examiner's decision awarding benefits is supported by 
substantial evidence, I respectfully dissent.

[¶36] Applying 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603 (LEXIS 1999)1, the hearing examiner found that Borchert's shoulder injury 
had occurred over a substantial period of time. Disregarding this finding, the 
majority redecides the issue, concluding Borchert's injury resulted from a 
single occurrence on or about April 22, 1995. This finding in hand, the majority 
then applies the statute of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-503(a) 
(Michie 1996 Supp.) (amended 1996)2 to reverse the hearing examiner's award of benefits. 
Because I believe the hearing examiner's finding - that Borchert's injury was 
one occurring over a substantial period of time - is supported by substantial 
evidence, I would conclude his claim was timely under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-503(b) (LEXIS 1999).3

[¶37] In Big 
Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187, 188 (Wyo. 1972), this court 
wrote:

[W]here an employee in 
the course of his employment sustains an apparent trivial injury which does not 
result in present disability and which would not reasonably be expected to cause 
future disability, but which injury in fact over a period of latency does cause 
future disability, the time for giving notice of the occurrence of the injury to 
the employer runs from the time when it becomes apparent that such injury has 
resulted in, or is likely to cause, compensable 
disability.

[¶38] See also 
Mitchell v. State Recreation Comm'n Snowmobile Trails, 968 P.2d 37, 40 (Wyo. 
1998). The determination of whether an injury was a single occurrence injury or 
an injury which appeared over time is one of fact. Murray v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation Div., No. 99-76, slip op. at 6 (Wyo. 
Dec. 29, 1999). We

"afford respect and 
deference to an administrative agency's findings of fact if they are supported 
by substantial evidence. Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Wyo. 1992)). `Substantial 
evidence' is a term of art, best described as `relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind can accept as adequate to support an agency's conclusion.' 
Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 224 (Wyo. 1995). Further, we consider 
only that evidence favoring the party prevailing below, leaving out of 
consideration conflicting evidence. Wyoming Steel and Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 876 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Matter of Injury to Carpenter, 736 P.2d 311, 
312 (Wyo. 1987))."

Haagensen v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 949 P.2d 865, 867 (Wyo. 1997) 
(quoting Coleman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 915 P.2d 595, 598 (Wyo. 1996)).

[¶39] The 
hearing examiner made the following findings:

5. The Division and the 
Employer contend that the general nature of Claimant's injury, if caused by the 
incident in April of 1995 would have been readily apparent to him at that time. 
However, Claimant testified at the hearing that he did not realize he suffered 
an injury while lifting the heavy carpet and other materials, as it was a common 
occurrence for him to feel and hear "popping" in his shoulders. Although he 
initially suffered some soreness from the incident the soreness went away after 
a weekend of rest.

6. Claimant underwent a 
periodical company physical in May 1995 pursuant to the practice of the company 
to conduct regular physicals. The examining phys[ician] indicated that the 
Claimant was able to continue working.

7. After April 1995, the 
Claimant began experiencing increasing aches and pains in the area of his 
shoulders, culminating in quite severe pain in the summer of 1996. Although 
Claimant's testimony at the hearing does not comport in all respects with the 
accident report, the Office will find that, based upon the deposition of the 
treating physician Dr. Biddulph, the alleged injury is one occurring over a 
substantial period of time and that the application of benefits was filed within 
one year after the preliminary diagnosis was made known to the 
Claimant.

[¶40] Instead of 
deferring to the hearing examiner on these findings, the majority writes: "We do 
not find substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's finding that 
Borchert's injury was not readily apparent on April 22, 1995." However, Borchert 
testified that he did not believe he had reinjured his shoulder at that time. 
When asked why he did not think he had reinjured himself, Borchert attributed 
his soreness and pain to his arthritis - which leaves him in constant pain - and 
the effects of the weather. Although he testified he knew he had overexerted 
himself and he was sore for the weekend, the soreness went away after a few 
days. He also testified he thought he had just pulled some muscles and did not 
think the pain was significant enough to seek medical treatment. There is ample 
evidence to support the hearing examiner's finding that the injury was one 
occurring over a substantial period of time.

[¶41] The only 
way the majority can avoid affirmance is to question Borchert's credibility: 
"Only under oath does Borchert's testimony become equivocal." It first seizes on 
Borchert's injury report, where he reported his injury was caused by unloading 
the roll of carpet on April 22, 1995. However, when Borchert's statement on the 
injury report is taken in its entirety, the majority's position becomes far less 
persuasive. On his injury report, Borchert wrote that his injury was caused by 
"[e]xcessive strain from unloading large roll of carpet, then weekly continued 
aggr[a]vation from unloading freight by hand." On an attachment to the injury 
report, he wrote that the "initial strain" occurred April 22, 1995. Because 
Borchert refers to the events of April 22, 1995, as the initial strain, and 
because he asserted that continued aggravation caused his injury, his injury 
report, when viewed in his favor, can be read to support the hearing examiner's 
finding that the injury was sustained over a substantial period of 
time.

[¶42] Even when 
viewing the injury report as the majority does, it merely presents questions of 
credibility and of the weight to be given evidence - questions traditionally 
reserved for the hearing examiner, not for this court upon review of a cold 
record. It is well settled that the hearing examiner, as the trier of fact, is 
charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses. 
Bando v. Clure Bros. Furniture, 980 P.2d 323, 331 (Wyo. 1999); Morgan v. Olsten 
Temporary Services, 975 P.2d 12, 15 (Wyo. 1999); Gonzales v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 970 P.2d 865, 870 (Wyo. 1998); E.H. Oftedal 
& Sons, Inc. v. Thompson, 966 P.2d 977, 981 (Wyo. 1998); Everheart v. S 
& L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 852 (Wyo. 1998); Pederson v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997); Corman v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 1996); 
Latimer v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 902 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo. 1995); Hepp v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 881 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Wyo. 
1994). Even if Borchert equivocates, I cannot accept the majority's entry into 
the business of reweighing evidence and redetermining 
credibility.

[¶43] The second 
issue involves the timeliness of Borchert's request for a hearing. The hearing 
examiner wrote:

Due to the conflicting 
testimony and evidence concerning the dates that the Final Determination was 
written, mailed by the Division, received by the Claimant, the date that the 
Claimant prepared his response and mailed the same, the Office will conclude 
that the Claimant's request for hearing was made in a timely 
manner.

[¶44] There are 
two important facts that support the hearing examiner's determination. First, 
there is Borchert's testimony that he did not receive the Final Determination 
until a few days before a response was due and that he sent it overnight mail, 
via Federal Express, two days before the deadline. Second, there is nothing in 
the record to establish when the Division mailed the final determination to 
Borchert. Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 27-14-601(k)(iv) (LEXIS 1999). Again, only by 
disbelieving or ignoring Borchert's testimony can the majority find that the 
hearing examiner's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. My review 
of the record satisfies me that the hearing examiner's determination - that 
Borchert's request for a hearing was timely - is supported by substantial 
evidence.

[¶45] I 
respectfully dissent.
Footnotes
Footnotes

1 Section 
27-14-603(a) provides:

(a) The 
burden of proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a 
substantial period of time is on the employee to prove by competent medical 
authority that his claim arose out of and in the course of his employment and to 
prove by a preponderance of evidence that:

(i) There is 
a direct causal connection between the condition or circumstances under which 
the work is performed and the injury;

(ii) The 
injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a 
result of the employment;

(iii) The 
injury can fairly be traced to the employment as approximate 
cause;

(iv) The 
injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have been equally 
exposed outside of the employment; and

(v) The 
injury is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the 
relation of employer and employee.

2 Before its 
amendment in 1996, § 27-14-503(a) provided:

(a) A 
payment for benefits involving an injury which is the result of a single brief 
occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time shall not be 
made unless in addition to the proper and timely filing of the reports of the 
accident, an application or claim for benefits is filed within one (1) year 
after the date the accident occurred or for injuries not readily apparent, 
within one (1) year after discovery of the injury by the employee. The report of 
accident is not a claim for benefits.

3 Section 
27-14-503(b) provides:

(b) The 
right of compensation for an injury which occurs over a substantial period of 
time is barred unless a claim for benefits is filed within one (1) year after a 
diagnosis of injury is first communicated to the employee, or within three (3) 
years from the date of last injurious workplace exposure to the condition 
causing the injury, whichever occurs last, excluding injury caused by ionizing 
radiation to which the three (3) year limitation does not apply. If death 
results from ionizing radiation within one (1) year after a diagnosis of the 
medical condition is first communicated to the employee or if death occurs 
without the communication of a diagnosis to the employee, a claim shall be filed 
within one (1) year after the date of death.