Case Title: State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div.

Citation: 1995-Ohio-96

Docket Number: 19950896

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1995-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. LIPINSKI ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY COMMON 
PLEAS COURT, PROBATE DIVISION, ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate 
Div. (1995), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Prohibition to prevent probate court from exercising jurisdiction over a 
declaratory judgment action — Writ denied, when. 
 
(No. 95-896 — Submitted September 26, 1995 — Decided November 1, 
1995.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 68188. 
 
In February 1991, Joan Ingle, as administrator of the estate of Madeline 
Kruzel, and Joan Ingle and Marie Ford, as attorneys-in-fact for Louise LaFord, 
filed a complaint for an accounting, temporary restraining order and temporary 
injunction, compensatory and punitive damages, and equitable relief in the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, against appellant Gayle J. Lipinski and 
Third Federal Savings & Loan Association of Cleveland (“Third Federal”).  In an 
amended complaint, appellants Joseph Lipinski, Jeffrey Lipinski, Karen Vondreau, 
Daphne Zarefoss, and Doreen Marie Riggs were added as defendants. 
 
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Kruzel and LaFord were elderly sisters who lived together.  Gayle J. 
Lipinski was a friend of Kruzel, and Ingle was the stepdaughter-in-law of LaFord.  
See Ingle v. Lipinski (Feb. 11, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 61961, unreported, 1993 
WL 35590.  Kruzel and LaFord held several joint and survivorship accounts at 
Third Federal.  Prior to her death and while at a hospital, Kruzel transferred these 
accounts to Gayle J. Lipinski.  After Kruzel died soon thereafter, Ingle instituted 
the common pleas court action seeking, inter alia, to set aside the transfers.   
 
The common pleas court case proceeded to jury trial and, at the close of the 
plaintiffs’ case, the court directed a verdict in favor of defendants.  Pending an 
appeal from the court’s ruling, LaFord died.  The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga 
County determined that the trial court had erred in directing a verdict in favor of 
defendants, and reversed and remanded the case for a trial on the merits.  Ingle, 
supra.  Upon remand, on May 11, 1993, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the action, 
specifying that their dismissal was “without prejudice to their right to refile their 
claims against the defendants within one year from [the] date of dismissal of this 
complaint.” 
 
On May 11, 1994, Joan Ingle, as executor of the estate of LaFord and 
administrator of the estate of Kruzel, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment 
 
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and other relief in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, 
against appellants and Third Federal.  Ingle requested a declaration that none of 
appellants had acquired any interest in the joint and survivorship accounts that had 
been in the names of Kruzel and LaFord and that the funds were the property of 
the decedents’ estates. 
 
Appellants subsequently filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ 
of prohibition against appellees,  Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Probate 
Division, and Judge John E. Corrigan of the probate court, to prevent them from 
exercising jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action filed by Ingle.  While 
the writ proceeding was pending, a referee in the probate case recommended that 
the court overrule defendants’ motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.  
There is no indication in the record whether the probate court adopted that 
recommendation.  In the writ proceeding, the court of appeals granted appellees’ 
motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment and denied the 
writ. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
___________________ 
 
Charles C. Redmond, for appellants. 
 
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Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carol 
Shockley, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
___________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellants assert in their first proposition of law that the court 
of appeals erred in denying the writ of prohibition because the dismissal of the 
previous common pleas court action barred Ingle’s subsequent declaratory 
judgment action in probate court based on res judicata. 
 
In order to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, appellants must establish (1) 
that the probate court and Judge Corrigan are about to exercise judicial or 
quasijudicial power, (2) that the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and 
(3) that denying the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy 
exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Fowler v. Smith (1994), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 357, 359, 626 N.E.2d 950, 952.  Here, it is uncontroverted that unless 
restrained, appellees will exercise judicial power in the declaratory judgment 
action brought by Ingle in her capacity as representative of the decedents’ estates. 
 
As to the remaining elements that appellants had to prove in order to be 
entitled to a writ of prohibition, appellants’ main claim both below and on appeal 
is that res judicata divested the probate court of jurisdiction over the declaratory 
 
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judgment action.  Appellants contend that the dismissal of Ingle’s prior complaint 
following commencement of jury trial, appeal, and remand operated as an 
adjudication on the merits which barred the subsequent declaratory judgment 
action which involved the same parties and claims.  See Civ.R. 41(A)(1) and 
(B)(3); see, also, State ex rel. Avellone v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1989), 60 
Ohio App.3d 127, 574 N.E.2d 577. 
 
Appellants’ contention is meritless because res judicata is an affirmative 
defense which does not divest the jurisdiction of the second tribunal to decide the 
validity of that defense.  State ex rel. Flower v. Rocker (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 160, 
162, 6 O.O.3d 375, 376, 370 N.E.2d 479, 480 (writ of prohibition did not lie, since 
court had jurisdiction to rule on affirmative defense of res judicata); State ex rel. 
LTV Steel Co. v. Gwin (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 245, 251, 594 N.E.2d 616, 621 (writ 
of prohibition denied where issue of res judicata did not attack appellate court’s 
jurisdiction); see, generally, 63A American Jurisprudence 2d (1984) 180, 
Prohibition, Section 48 (“The fact that the defense of res judicata based on a 
decision in a former action is available in a second action involving the same 
issues does not deprive the court in which the second action is brought of 
jurisdiction to try the case again, so as to warrant the issuance of a writ of 
 
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prohibition to prevent such court from proceeding with the suit, and the only 
remedy of the aggrieved party is to set up the res judicata plea as a defense in that 
suit and to appeal from an adverse decision therein.”).  In addition, this case does 
not involve the repeated and vexatious abuse of the judicial process which at times 
warrants the issuance of a writ of prohibition.  See State ex rel. Stark v. Summit 
Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 324, 325, 31 OBR 599, 600, 
511 N.E.2d 115, 117; State v. Steffen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 408, 639 N.E.2d 
67, 74. 
 
In that appellees possess jurisdiction to decide appellants’ affirmative 
defense of res judicata and appellants have an adequate remedy by appeal to 
challenge any adverse decision, appellants are not entitled to a writ of prohibition 
based on this contention.  In fact, when the court of appeals decided the issue, the 
probate court referee had merely recommended overruling a motion to dismiss 
filed by appellants in the declaratory judgment action based upon the same 
“jurisdictional” claim.  There is no indication of any final judgment in the 
declaratory judgment action by appellees.  Prohibition may not be employed as a 
substitute for appeal from an interlocutory order.  State ex rel. Keenan v. 
 
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Calabrese (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 178, 631 N.E.2d 119, 121.  Appellants’ first 
proposition of law is overruled. 
 
Appellants assert in their second proposition of law that the probate court 
and Judge Corrigan do not have jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action 
because it is in reality an action for wrongful conversion of assets filed by a 
personal representative of the deceased owner of the assets where the owner 
unconditionally and validly completed the transfer of the funds to the transferee. 
 
Although appellants did not raise this claim in the court of appeals or in the 
declaratory judgment action, it is not waived on appeal because it is not 
completely inconsistent with the general argument below that the probate court 
lacks jurisdiction, see State ex rel. Jones v. Hendon (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 115, 
118, 609 N.E.2d 541, 543, fn. 2, and the issue of a court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived.  State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 46, 652 
N.E.2d 196, 200. 
 
A writ of prohibition will issue where there is a patent and unambiguous 
restriction on the jurisdiction of the court which clearly places the dispute outside 
the court’s jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Koren v. Grogan (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 590, 
593, 629 N.E.2d 446, 449.  Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, 
 
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a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own 
jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court’s jurisdiction has an adequate 
remedy by way of appeal.  State ex rel. Enyart v. O’Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 
655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112. 
 
Since the probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction, probate 
proceedings are restricted to those actions permitted by statute and by the 
Constitution.  Corron v. Corron (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 531 N.E.2d 708, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(k), 2721.03, and 2721.05(C) 
vest probate courts with jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions upon 
questions relating to the administration of an estate.  Zuendel v. Zuendel (1992), 
63 Ohio St.3d 733, 735-736, 590 N.E.2d 1260, 1262; see Wozniak v. Wozniak 
(1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 400, 407-408, 629 N.E.2d 500, 505.  It has been held that 
a declaratory judgment action may be brought in the probate court to determine the 
validity of inter vivos transfers where the property transferred would revert to the 
estate if the transfers are invalidated.  Bobko v. Sagen (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 
397, 406-407, 572 N.E.2d 823, 829; see, also, Corron, supra, 40 Ohio St.3d at 79, 
531 N.E.2d at 712; Carlin v. Mambuca (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 500, 505, 645 
 
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N.E.2d 737, 740; Eger v. Eger (1974), 39 Ohio App.2d 14, 18, 68 O.O.2d 150, 
153, 314 N.E.2d 394, 400.  We agree. 
 
The allegations of the complaint for declaratory judgment filed by Ingle, in 
her capacities as executor and administrator of the decedents’ estates, are of 
sufficient breadth so that appellees do not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction.  See, also, State ex rel. Lewis v. Moser (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 25, 647 
N.E.2d 155.  As in Bobko, Ingle claims that the inter vivos transfers were 
ineffective and that the transferred assets were the property of the decedents’ 
estates.  Like State ex rel. Fenwick v. Finkbeiner (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 457, 459-
460, 650 N.E.2d 896, 898, appellees have at least basic authority to proceed in the 
declaratory judgment action. 
 
The court of appeals did not err in relying on Bobko to hold that the probate 
court and Judge Corrigan did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction and 
that appellants had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise the jurisdictional issue.  
Appellants failed to establish entitlement to extraordinary relief in prohibition.  
Accordingly, appellants’ second proposition is overruled, and the judgment of the 
court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and 
COOK , JJ., concur.