Case Title: Vermont v. Kinney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 VT 74













State v. Kinney (2009-265)
 
2011 VT 74
 
[Filed 22-Jul-2011]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to notify
the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier,
Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that corrections may be made before
this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2011 VT 74
 
No. 2009-265
 
State of Vermont
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
     v.
District Court of Vermont,
 
Unit No. 2, Bennington Circuit
 
 
Jeffrey R. Kinney
August Term, 2010
 
 
 
 
David
  Suntag, J.
 
Michael S. Munson and Robert F. Plunkett, Bennington County
Deputy State's Attorneys,
  Bennington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
 
Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Anna Saxman,
Deputy Defender General,
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.
 
 
PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and
Burgess, JJ.
 
 
¶ 1.            
DOOLEY, J.   A jury convicted defendant Jeffrey Kinney
of driving while intoxicated, third offense, and attempting to elude an officer
while operating a vehicle.  On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the trial
court erred in admitting defendant's refusal to take a preliminary breath test;
(2) the prosecutor, in closing, impermissibly injected personal opinion about
defendant's credibility and commented on defendant's failure to testify; and
(3) the State failed to introduce sufficient identity evidence to support the
verdict.  We affirm.
¶ 2.            
The facts may be summarized as follows.  A Bennington police
officer was patrolling in his cruiser at about ten o'clock at night when he
observed an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) being driven on the street in
Bennington.  Although it was dark, the officer was able to observe the
driver, whom he recognized as defendant from prior contacts and from his
knowledge that defendant owned that particular model of ATV.           
¶ 3.            
As the ATV sped away, the officer followed with his blue lights flashing
and siren sounding.  The officer testified that he saw a profile of the
operator's face when the ATV made a turn onto another road and again when the
ATV fishtailed, and that there was sufficient illumination to observe that it
was defendant.  At trial, the prosecution played a video recording of the
pursuit taken by a fixed camera located on the officer's cruiser.  The camera,
activated when the blue lights are turned on, is located near the rearview
mirror and films straight ahead from its mounted position.  Although the
State later acknowledged that the video, with its "grainy, dark" image, did not
offer a good view of the ATV operator, the officer agreed that he "[got] a
better look at the [ATV] at that intersection than what [could be seen] on the
video" from its fixed position.      
¶ 4.            
The ATV ultimately went over an embankment and the police pursuit
continued on foot.  Another officer testified that he found the abandoned
two-seat ATV in the woods,   followed voices, and found two men,
defendant and another individual.  Defendant appeared to be intoxicated;
he was unsteady on his feet, had slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol.  Defendant's
clothes generally matched the clothes worn by the driver of the ATV. 
Defendant told the officer that a third person named Jason Webb had been
driving the ATV, and had since taken off running.  Defendant also said
that he was in the area for a bonfire.  The officer saw no signs of a
bonfire, and no third person was ever located in the area.    The
officers recovered the key to the ATV from defendant's pocket. 
¶ 5.            
Defendant was asked at the scene to take a preliminary breath test (PBT)
but declined.  A later-administered Datamaster test measured defendant's
blood alcohol level at .208 and .221, indicating levels of .232 and .245three
times the legal limitat the time of operation.  The jury returned a verdict
of guilty on the charges of driving while intoxicated, third offense, and
attempting to elude, and defendant was subsequently sentenced to two to five
years imprisonment.  This appeal followed.     
    
¶ 6.            
Defendant first contends the court erred in admitting the investigating
officer's testimony that defendant declined to submit to the PBT.  The
State maintains that the claim was not properly preserved and that the evidence
was admissible in any event.  Whatever the merits of these arguments, we
conclude that the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and
therefore provides no basis for reversal.  As we have often held, error in
the admission of evidence does not compel reversal of a criminal conviction
where it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless,
considered in light of the strength of the State's case apart from the
offending evidence and the strength of the offending evidence itself.  State
v. Kulzer, 2009 VT 79, ¶¶ 16-17, 186 Vt. 264, 979 A.2d 1031.  Both
factors compel affirmance here.    
¶ 7.            
The officer testified that he was able to see the ATV driver on more
than one occasion during the pursuit and was certain of defendant's identity;
this evidence was unequivocal.  That the surveillance videotape from the
camera on top of the officer's cruiser failed to show the driver as clearly as
the officer's visual observations does not seriously undermine this testimony,
as the evidence showed that the camera's perspective was stationary and the
officer's was not.  Thus, the officer's best view of the driver occurred
when the ATV slowed and took a sharp turn and the officer could see the side of
the driver's face.  The view could not be captured by the stationary video
camera.  
¶ 8.            
Even apart from eyewitness identification, the circumstantial evidence
was compelling.  The ATV matched the one owned by defendant; the officer's
description of the driver's clothing matched that worn by defendant; and
defendant was found with the key to the ATV in his pocket.  Defendant's
claims that another person was driving the ATV and that he was  attending
a bonfire had no evidentiary support beyond defendant's mere assertion. 
In short, the evidence identifying defendant as the driver was overwhelming. 
A limited videotape and a claim that the real driver was a third man who was
never found do not undermine this conclusion.
¶ 9.            
As noted, in assessing whether any error was harmless, we must view the
strength of the proper evidence in relation to the strength of the evidence
claimed to be inadmissible.  The evidence in dispute consisted of a brief
question and answer in the middle of the investigating officer's extensive
trial testimony.  The subject was not mentioned again in the testimony of
the remaining witnesses, and neither party brought it up in closing
argument.  Thus, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, and
the substantial evidence of guilt, the testimony was clearly harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, and does not warrant reversal of the judgment.  See State
v. Curavoo, 156 Vt. 72, 75, 587 A.2d 963, 965 (1991) (holding that
introduction of evidence of defendant's refusal to take PBT was harmless error,
if error at all, because "the remaining evidence overwhelmingly establish[ed]"
the required elements of the charge).
¶ 10.         Defendant's
remaining claims relate to the prosecutor's closing argument.  He contends
the prosecutor improperly injected his personal views of defendant's guilt
during closing argument in stating that defendant "lied" to the police about
several matters, including defendant's claim that a third person was the ATV
operator.  He also contends the prosecutor improperly commented on his
right to remain silent in observing that defendant failed to "offer any
explanation as to where this third person had gone" or other details "about the
identity and the whereabouts of this mystery third person."  Defendant
acknowledges that he failed to object to any of the statements below, and that
we review solely for plain error to determine whether the circumstances are so
"exceptional [that] . . . a failure to recognize error would result in a
miscarriage of justice, or . . . strike[] at the very heart of the defendant's
constitutional rights."  State v. Yoh, 2006 VT 49A, ¶ 39, 180 Vt.
317, 910 A.2d 853 (quotation omitted).
¶ 11.         The
alleged errors fall short of this exacting standard.  Although we have
cautioned against statements that might be construed as expressions of personal
belief that the defendant was a liar, the brief statements at issue here were
made in the context of a general and impersonal critique of the veracity of
defendant's story.  See State v. Gates, 141 Vt. 562, 567, 451 A.2d 1084, 1086 (1982) (observing that prosecutor's remarks went beyond permissible
 "general attack on veracity, consistency, or bias").  Indeed, there
is nothing here to suggest that the prosecutor was expressing any personal view
or belief in defendant's veracity.  Rather, the record shows that the
prosecutor simply compared defendant's statements made at the scene with the
surrounding evidence to demonstrate the obvious incongruities: defendant
claimed that a third individual was the driver but, as the prosecutor
accurately noted, defendant did not explain "where this third person had gone,"
and no third person was observed by the officer during the pursuit or was
visible in the video recording; defendant claimed to be in the woods for a
"bonfire" but no bonfire was found in the vicinity; defendant claimed that a
friend had the key to the ATM when, in fact, the key was found in defendant's
pocket.  The prosecutor was relying on the evidence, not his personal
beliefs, to characterize defendant's remarks.  Cf. State v. Ayers,
148 Vt. 421, 425, 535 A.2d 330, 333 (1987) (finding error in prosecutor's
statements that "I think . . . [complainant's] story . . . is the truth" and "I
believe the believable testimony here").    
¶ 12.         Moreover,
this was not a pure "credibility contest" between the defendant and his
accuser, as in State v. Rehkop, 2006 VT 72, ¶ 2, 180 Vt. 228, 908 A.2d 488, where we found that the prosecutor not only "blatantly" stated his
personal belief that defense witnesses were lying, but also that his comments
may also have affected the verdict.  Id.  ¶ 38; see also State
v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 300, 561 A.2d 392, 394 (1989) (noting danger of
prosecutor's personal expression of belief that defendant is lying where case
turns strictly on credibility assessments).  Here, as noted, the
circumstantial evidence that defendant was the operator of the ATV was
overwhelming, and we cannot conclude that any conceivable error in the
prosecutor's remarks resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
¶ 13.         Similarly,
viewed in context, the prosecutor's additional remarks concerning defendant's
failure to explain the third man's whereabouts conveyed nothing about
defendant's right not to testify or to remain silent.  Indeed, as noted,
defendant readily responded to the officer's inquiries when confronted in the
woods, asserting that a third person had driven the ATV.  The prosecutor
here simply noted certain inconsistencies and omissions in the explanation,
such as where the man supposedly went and why he allegedly gave the ATV key to
defendant.  The prosecutor's remarks do not amount to plain error that
strikes at the heart of defendant's fundamental rights.  Accordingly, we
find no basis to disturb the judgment. 
Affirmed.
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 
 
¶ 14.         JOHNSON,
J., concurring.   I agree that, given these circumstances, the
admission of the officer's testimony regarding defendant's refusal to submit to
the preliminary breath test (PBT) was harmless.  I write separately to
emphasize my belief that the trial court committed error.[1]  I would hold that
23 V.S.A. § 1203(f), the statutory section governing preliminary
breath alcohol screening tests, prohibits the introduction of PBT refusal
evidence.  
¶ 15.         The
trial court, however, relied on our decision in State v. Blouin to rule
that defendant's refusal was admissible.  168 Vt. 119, 716 A.2d 826
(1998).  In Blouin, we held that evidence of a defendant's refusal
to take the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, a physical field sobriety
test in which a police officer moves an object across the subject's field of
vision to observe the manner in which the subject's eyes follow the object, was
admissible.  Id. at 122-23, 716 A.2d  at 828.  We stated that,
barring any statute or rule of law requiring exclusion, evidence of a driver's
refusal to perform a physical field sobriety test is probative of guilt, making
it relevant and therefore admissible.  Id. at 121-22, 716 A.2d  at
828.  Because there is statutory silence regarding physical sobriety tests
like the HGN test and thus no statutory language prohibiting introduction of
refusal evidence, we concluded that the defendant's refusal to perform the HGN
test was admissible to raise a consciousness-of-guilt inference.  Id.
at 122-23, 716 A.2d  at 828.  The trial court noted that Blouin
"[s]eems quite parallel" to the instant case, particularly because "the issue
is consciousness of guilt as opposed to, necessarily, the accuracy of the
test."  The trial court saw no difference between a refusal to submit to a
PBT and a refusal to perform an HGN test and ruled that evidence of defendant's
refusal to take the PBT was admissible.  
¶ 16.         In Blouin,
our decision to admit the HGN test refusal evidence relied heavily on the
complete statutory silence surrounding physical field sobriety tests such as
the HGN.  Id. at 122, 716 A.2d  at 828 ("[T]he [implied consent]
statute is silent with respect to physical sobriety tests such as the
HGN.").  Thus, we broadly concluded that "[i]n the absence of statutory
language prohibiting introduction of the [HGN test] refusal evidence, we will
not invent it."  Id. at 122-23, 716 A.2d  at 828.  Because the
HGN test results are admissible, refusal to take the HGN test prevents relevant
evidence from being admitted.  See V.R.E. 402.  The implication is
that a refusal in those circumstances raises an inference that the evidence
gained from taking the test would be prejudicial.  See State v. Curavoo,
156 Vt. 72, 74-75, 587 A.2d 963, 964-65 (1991) (concluding that because there
is no statutory basis for defendant to refuse to submit to field dexterity
test, refusal should be considered evidence of consciousness of guilt). 
Therefore, we held in Blouin that the refusal was probative of guilt and
could be admitted to show defendant was guilty.  168 Vt. at 122-23, 716 A.2d  at 828.
¶ 17.         In
contrast, a specific statutory provision governs the use of preliminary breath
tests.[2] 
Section 1203(f) of Title 23 sets forth the purpose and procedure for PBTs:
  When a law
enforcement officer has reason to believe that a person may be violating or has
violated section 1201 of this title [by driving under the influence], the
officer may request the person to provide a sample of breath for a preliminary
screening test . . . .  The person shall not have the
right to consult an attorney prior to submitting to this preliminary breath
alcohol screening test.  The results of this preliminary screening test
may be used for the purpose of deciding whether an arrest should be made and
whether to request an evidentiary test and shall not be used in any court
proceeding except on those issues.  
 
23 V.S.A. §
1203(f) (emphasis added).  This language specifically prohibits the
introduction of PBT results at trial for any purpose except on the issues of
making an arrest and requesting an evidentiary test.  While individuals
may refuse to take a non-evidentiary preliminary breath test, see State v.
McGuigan, 2008 VT 111, ¶ 17, 184 Vt. 441, 965 A.2d 511 ("Defendant is
correct that he may refuse to submit to [the PBT].  The trooper may not
physically force him . . . to blow into the PBT device."), the statute does not
explicitly address the admissibility of such a refusal.  See Curavoo,
156 Vt. at 75, 587 A.2d  at 965 (declining to decide whether statute prohibits
admission of preliminary breath test refusal evidence).  I would conclude
that the language and purpose of § 1203(f) prohibit the introduction of
PBT refusal evidence.    
¶ 18.         As §
1203(f) demonstrates, the sole purpose of preliminary breath alcohol screening
tests is to help police officers in the field develop evidence to support an
arrest for driving while intoxicated.  See In re Jones, 2009 VT
113, ¶ 7, 187 Vt. 1, 989 A.2d 482 (explaining that plain meaning of statute is
most basic expression of Legislature's reasonable intent); Delta Psi Fraternity
v. City of Burlington, 2008 VT 129, ¶ 7, 185 Vt. 129, 969 A.2d 54
(recalling that Court's goal when interpreting a statute is to give effect to
intent of Legislature).  Indeed, we have acknowledged the limited role and
substantive inadmissibility of PBTs in our previous cases.  McGuigan,
2008 VT 111, ¶ 14 (noting that PBTs are used only to determine whether probable
cause exists to believe that an individual has been driving while intoxicated);
State v. Orvis, 143 Vt. 388, 391, 465 A.2d 1361, 1362 (1983) (holding
that results of PBT indicating impairment are inadmissible as evidence but may
provide reasonable grounds to believe person is under influence of
alcohol).  
¶ 19.         Like
physical field sobriety tests, such as the HGN test or field dexterity tests,
PBT results may be used as an investigative tool.  Unlike physical field
sobriety tests, for which a police officer observes a suspect's behavior, a PBT
scientifically measures a person's body chemistry at the site of the traffic
stop with a handheld instrument to determine its blood alcohol content.  A
preliminary breath test is not as accurate as an evidentiary breath test, which
is taken with a more sophisticated instrument in a formal office setting. 
See Orvis, 143 Vt. at 391, 465 A.2d  at 1362 (explaining that
inadmissibility of PBT results at trial reflects determination that more
sensitive measurements are easily available and should be used). 
Accordingly, the PBT statute limits the application of PBT results in court
proceedings.  See State v. Hull, 143 Vt. 353, 355, 465 A.2d 1371,
1372 (1983) ("[H]aving made a determination of the preliminary test's
reliability,  the [L]egislature chose to limit its use to that of a
screening device only, and provided that its results are inadmissible as
substantive evidence of intoxication." (citation omitted)); see also State
v. LeBeau, 144 Vt. 315, 319, 476 A.2d 128, 130 (1984) (noting that results
of PBTs are inadmissible as evidence of impairment and may be used to determine
whether more accurate testing is appropriate). 
¶ 20.         The
key distinctionignored by our colleaguesbetween a PBT refusal and the Blouin
case is that an individual who refuses a PBT does not prevent relevant
substantive evidence from being admitted at trial because the statute prohibits
any results from being introduced as substantive evidence of intoxication.[3]  It thus undercuts the statutory
purpose to admit the refusal to take the nonevidentiary test and would be
contrary to the Legislature's reasonable intent to prevent the inaccurate PBT
from being used substantively.  See Hull, 143 Vt. At 355, 465 A.2d 
at 1372 (explaining that Legislature chose to limit admissibility of PBT
results).  Moreover, admitting the refusal elevates it to a level of
evidentiary significance that is unwarranted when the statute bans the results
themselves for that purpose.  Cf. Curavoo, 156 Vt. at 74-75, 587 A.2d  at 964-65 (deciding that refusal to perform field dexterity tests is
admissible because no statute or rule requires refusal to be excluded). 
Courts in other states that have considered this issue have barred the
admission of PBT refusal evidence.  See People v. Brooks, 778 N.E.2d 336, 341 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding PBT refusal evidence inadmissible
where PBT results inadmissible); State v. Friedman, No. 2006AP2916-CR, 2007 WL 1486085, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App.
May 23, 2007) (unpub.) (holding evidence of PBT refusal inadmissible on issue
of guilt or innocence in prosecution's case in
chief).           
¶ 21.         PBT
refusal evidence would have particularly limited probative value when
introduced to demonstrate consciousness of guilt because of both the variety of
possible motivations for such a refusal and the multiple inferential steps
required.[4] 
See Friedman, 2007 WL 1486085, at *5 ("[R]efusal to take a PBT is
improperly admitted when it is intended to weigh on the guilt or innocence of
the [suspect].").  We have stated previously that consciousness of guilt
evidence has weak probative value when a chain of inferences is required. 
See, e.g., State v. Onorato, 171 Vt. 577, 579, 762 A.2d 858, 859-60
(2000) (mem.) (noting that evidence of attempted suicide not necessarily
"indicative of guilt" because "underlying reasons" can be "numerous and highly
complex"); State v. Perrillo, 162 Vt. 566, 570, 649 A.2d 1031, 1034
(1994) (observing that evidence of flight weakly probative of consciousness of
guilt because of multiple inferential steps required).  Just as the Legislature
determined that the results are insufficiently accurate for admission at trial
on substantive issues, an individual with no consciousness of guilt whatsoever
may refuse simply because of the test's inaccuracy.  See Brooks,
778 N.E.2d  at 341 ("Evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a test, the
results of which are inadmissible, is not relevant evidence of a defendant's
innocence or guilt and could lead a jury to draw unwarranted inferences that
the defendant declined the test because he or she was guilty.").  In the
context of an unreliable test with results that the Legislature deemed
inadequate for substantive admission, it is not always the case that
"[e]vidence that a motorist refused to perform a sobriety test is probative of
guilt, and therefore relevant."  Blouin, 168 Vt. at 121, 716 A.2d 
at 828.  For example, an innocent person may choose not to take the test
because an inaccurate result may falsely provide an officer with probable cause
to arrest.  See Onorato, 171 Vt. at 579, 762 A.2d  at 859
(explaining that evidence of flight to avoid prosecution has limited value as
consciousness-of-guilt evidence because there are many reasons to explain
flight of innocent person).  Defendant's refusal to submit to the
preliminary breath test is far from the "confession" that the State claimed it
to be before the trial court, and allowing a jury to hear evidence of a
refusal to take a test whose results would be barred introduces confusion and
potential prejudice.  See Brooks, 778 N.E.2d  at 342 ("The fear is
that the jury could infer defendant's guilt from his refusal to submit to a
test, even though the results of the test are inadmissible to prove defendant's
guilt."); see also Onorato, 171 Vt. at 579, 762 A.2d  at 860 ("Because it
is highly equivocal and circumstantial, the admissibility of attempted suicide
evidence [to show consciousness of guilt] may introduce remote, secondary
concerns that might confuse a jury.").  To hold otherwise would contravene
the Legislature's intent in crafting a specific statutory scheme for
PBTs.    
¶ 22.         If we
allow admission of PBT refusals to prove consciousness of guilt, we have
eviscerated the statutory prohibition on the admission of PBT results found in
§ 1203(f).  See Friedman, 2007 WL 1486085, at *4 ("[E]vidence of .
. . refusal to take the PBT . . . , the results of which would have been
inadmissible for the purpose offered, is equally inadmissible.").  To do
so would give a refusal far more weight than the Legislature deemed appropriate
for the results themselves.  I therefore would hold that evidence of a
defendant's refusal to submit to the PBT is inadmissible under § 1203(f), and
the trial court's admission of testimony concerning defendant's refusal to take
the PBT was error, albeit harmless in this case.
¶ 23.         I am
authorized to state that Justice Skoglund joins this concurrence.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate Justice
 
 
 
¶ 24.         REIBER,
C.J., concurring.  I agree that the officer's testimony here
concerning  defendant's refusal to submit to the PBT had no effect on the
verdict.  Thus we need notand do notdecide whether the evidence was
admissible.  Nevertheless, in light of the separate concurring opinion
advocating exclusion of the evidence, I am compelled to state my views to the
contrary.  
¶ 25.         The
analysis begins, as always, with the statutory language.  See State v.
O'Dell, 2007 VT 34, ¶ 7, 181 Vt. 475, 924 A.2d 87 (in discerning
legislative intent we look first the plain, ordinary meaning of the statutory
language).   The DUI statute at issue provides that the "results of
[a PBT] may be used for the purpose of deciding whether an arrest should be
made and whether to request an evidentiary test and shall not be used in any
court proceeding except on those issues."  23 V.S.A. § 1203(f).  In
reviewing the statute, the trial court here made the sensible observation that
the State was not seeking to admit the "results" of a PBT, since  it was
never administered, and thus the plain language of the statute did not appear
to bar evidence of defendant's refusal.     
¶ 26.         Plain
language to the contrary notwithstanding, it is asserted that admitting
evidence of a suspect's refusal eviscerates the statute's underlying
purpose.  This is a claim that warrants close examination.  We
addressed the nature and purpose of PBTs in State v. McGuigan,
explaining that they "are common tools in the investigatory kit officers use to
ascertain whether probable cause exists to believe that an individual has been
driving under the influence of alcohol."  2008 VT 111, ¶ 14, 184 Vt. 441,
965 A.2d 511.  Although the statute reflects a legislative judgment that a
PBT's utility consists principally in its use as "a screening device" to
determine whether more accurate testing is appropriate, id. (quotation
omitted), we have recognized that their substantive inadmissibility "does not
deprive them of all utility, but merely reflects a [legislative] determination
that more sensitive measurements are easily available" for later use.  State
v. Orvis, 143 Vt. 388, 391, 465 A.2d 1361, 1362 (1983).  Thus, we have
held that the "results of a preliminary breath alcohol screening test which
indicate impairment, although inadmissible as evidence, may alone provide the
reasonable grounds to believe a person is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor."  Id. at 391, 465 A.2d  at 1363.  
¶ 27.         Ifas
both the Legislature and this Court have recognizeda PBT bears sufficient utility
to establish probable cause to believe that a suspect has been driving while
intoxicated, a suspect's refusal to submit to the test certainly implies
some awareness that the test would reveal the suspect's intoxication, or, in
other words, some "consciousness of guilt" of the offense relevant for
admission at trial.  Indeed, this was precisely our reasoning in State
v. Blouin, where we considered the analogous situation of a suspect's
refusal to perform an HGN test, a standard field sobriety test used for
determining probable cause to arrest for DUI.  168 Vt. 119, 716 A.2d 826
(1998).  As we there explained, "inasmuch as defendant's refusal to
perform the HGN test goes to consciousness of guilt, the refusal evidence is
admissible."  Id. at 122, 716 A.2d  at 828 (citation omitted);
accord State v. Curavoo, 156 Vt. 72, 75, 587 A.2d 963, 965 (1991). 
Numerous other courts have reached the same conclusion.  See, e.g., State
v. Ferm, 7 P.3d 193, 204 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000) (observing that an "inference
of consciousness of guilt" is a "reasonable and permissible inference[] from
evidence of [a] refusal" to submit to field sobriety tests); Thompson v.
State, 65 P.3d 534, 537-38 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) (holding that defendant's
failure to submit to field sobriety tests "which could have confirmed or
dispelled the suspicion of intoxication" supports "inference of consciousness
of guilt" of DUI); State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-109, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 446
("The State can use evidence of a driver's refusal to consent to the field sobriety
testing to create an inference of the driver's consciousness of guilt."). 
¶ 28.         It is
claimed, nevertheless, that Blouin is distinguishable and indeed
supports a contrary conclusion because the HGN testunlike the PBTis not
statutorily inadmissible.  The argument is not sustainable.  Claims
to the contrary notwithstanding, Blouin was not based on the absence of
statutory language barring the admission of a suspect's HGN test; it was based
on the absence of statutory language barring a suspect's refusal to
submit to the test.  As we explained: "In the absence of statutory
language prohibiting introduction of the refusal evidence, we will not invent
it."  Blouin, 168 Vt. at 122-23, 716 A.2d  at 828.  The statute
at issue here contains no language prohibiting the admission of a suspect's
refusal to submit to a PBT, and we should be similarly disinclined to invent
it. 
¶ 29.         Our
colleagues also maintain that Blouin is critically distinguishable
because the reliability of an HGN test allows the fact finder to infer from a
suspect's refusal that "the evidence gained from taking the test would be
prejudicial," ante, ¶ 16, whereas the purported unreliability of a PBT
bars any such inference.  Thus, they conclude that allowing evidence of a
refusal would undermine the statutory purpose of preventing the PBT from being
used substantively.  As noted, however, its substantive inadmissibility
"does not deprive [a PBT] of all utility, but merely reflects a determination
that more sensitive measurements are easily available and therefore should be
used."  Orvis, 143 Vt. at 391, 465 A.2d  at 1362.  Indeed, the
PBT is sufficiently reliable and probative of intoxication that a result "which
indicate[s] impairment, although inadmissible as evidence, may alone
provide the reasonable grounds to believe a person is under the influence of
intoxicating liquor" in violation of the DUI statute.  Id. at 391,
465 A.2d  at 1363 (emphasis added).  It is therefore reasonableand
entirely consistent with the statuteto infer that a suspect's refusal to
submit to a PBT indicates some concern that the test would reveal his or her
intoxication and is therefore relevant and admissible to show consciousness of
guilt.
¶ 30.         Our colleagues
also claim that refusal evidence in this context would have "limited probative
value" because an individual might refuse the test on the basis that he or she
distrusted its accuracy or for other reasons not indicative of guilt.  Ante,
¶ 21.  This is an argument for countervailing evidence, however, not for
exclusion.  As in all contexts, the weight to be accorded the refusal
evidence lies with the trier of fact, and a defendant remains free to argue
that it is worth little because the refusal was for reasons unrelated to
guilt.  See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1995)
(rejecting claim that refusal to perform field sobriety tests was not probative
of guilt because the refusal may have been "motivated by a factor other than
guilt, such as a simple desire to end the encounter," and holding that
defendant was "free to offer that explanation in court").  Indeed, this is
no different from evidence of flight or other conduct commonly recognized as
indicative of a consciousness of guilt, and does not undermine its essential
relevance.  See State v. Perrillo, 162 Vt. 566, 570, 649 A.2d 1031, 1034 (1994) (recognizing that where prosecution presents evidence of flight to
show consciousness of guilt, "defendant should in fairness be afforded the
opportunity to explain why his absence was consistent with his
innocence").  Thus, as the trial court here correctly concluded, the
probative weight of the refusal evidence was for the jury, not for the court,
to determine.           
¶ 31.         The
concurring opinion also notes that other state courts have barred the admission
of PBT refusal evidence.  The case law in this area, however, is not
entirely uniform.  See, e.g, State v. Cruselle, 694 S.E.2d 707, 710
(Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that defendant's refusal to submit to preliminary
alco-sensor test was "admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and
together with other evidence would support an inference that [defendant] was an
impaired driver" (quotation omitted)).  In any event, the cases cited
merely repeat the arguments for exclusion discussed above, and are no more
persuasive. 
¶ 32.         Therefore,
if the issue were properly presented, I would hold that evidence of a refusal
to submit to a PBT is not barred by 23 V.S.A. § 1203(f).  
¶ 33.         I am
authorized to state that Justice Burgess joins this concurrence.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice
 

[1] 
Although the State argues that defendant's challenge of the PBT refusal
admission was not preserved, I find the record here sufficiently supports
preservation.  See V.R.Cr.P. 51; State v. Brink, 2008 VT 33, ¶ 7,
183 Vt. 603, 949 A.2d 1069 (mem.) (explaining that trial court's definitive
ruling on admissibility eliminates need for a renewed objection). 
  
[2] 
Our colleagues' concurrence glosses over the Legislature's choice to create a
specific and unique statutory mandate for the adminissibility of PBT resultsunlike
the statutory silence regarding physical field sobriety testsin its eagerness
to equate this situation with that of Blouin and to use the broad
language of that decision to counsel on this issue.  In Blouin, we
were not faced with the particular statutory language before us now, and we do
not "invent" language prohibiting the admission of a suspect's refusal to
submit to a PBT when we respect the Legislature's choice to render PBT results
substantively inadmissible.  See post, ¶ 28.  
[3] 
Contrary to our colleagues' assertion, a refusal to perform an HGN test and a
refusal to perform a PBT are not "analogous," post, ¶ 27, because no
statute prevents admission of HGN test results.  The physical HGN test, like
other field sobriety tests, is based on the subjective observations of an
officer who may be cross-examined and does not carry the aura of scientific
certainty that surrounds the chemical PBT.  The Legislature acknowledged
this difference, electing to treat PBTs with specific statutory
instructions.  We emphasized in Blouin that there are no statutory
directives regarding physical field sobriety tests such as the HGN.  168
Vt. at 122, 716 A.2d  at 828.  Our colleagues thus disregard the crucial
difference between PBTsresults barred from admission by statuteand standard
field sobriety testsresults are admissible as substantive evidence of
intoxication.  The majority of cases from other states cited to support
the contention that a refusal to submit to a PBT is admissible because it goes
to consciousness of guilt are, like our Blouin decision, situations in
which a defendant refused to submit to standard field sobriety tests with
admissible resultsnot preliminary breath tests with statutorily inadmissible
results.  See State v. Ferm, 7 P.3d 193, 196 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000); Thompson
v. State, 65 P.3d 534, 536 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003); State v. Sanchez,
2001-NMCA-109, ¶ 2, 36 P.3d 446.  The one case cited allowing
admission of a defendant's refusal to submit to a preliminary alco-sensor test
involves a state statute that, in contrast to 23 V.S.A. § 1203(f), specifically
allows admission of a defendant's refusal to submit to state-administered
chemical tests.  See State v. Cruselle, 694 S.E.2d 707, 710 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2010) (under statute in effect at that time).  Although they
purport to adhere to the statutory text, our concurring colleagues fail to
reconcile allowing admission of the PBT refusal with the statutory prescription
that the "results of this preliminary screening test may be used for the
purpose of deciding whether an arrest should be made and whether to request an
evidentiary test and shall not be used in any court proceeding except on those
issues."  23 V.S.A. § 1203(f).     
[4] 
The concurrence ignores our precedent regarding the weak probative value of
consciousness of guilt evidence where, as in this instance, multiple
inferential steps are required, stating instead that "a suspect's refusal
to submit to the test certainly implies some awareness that the test
would reveal the suspect's intoxication, or, in other words, some
consciousness of guilt' of the offense relevant for admission at trial." 
Post, ¶ 27 (second emphasis added).  Unlike a refusal to submit to
a test whose results are admissible, a refusal to submit to a test with inadmissible
results may stem from a variety of circumstantially-dependent
motivations.  The probative value of such a refusal to show consciousness
of guilt evidence is weak.  Our colleagues suggest that the defendant
"remains free to argue that [refusal evidence] is worth little because the
refusal was for reasons unrelated to guilt."  Post, ¶ 30.  The
issue before us is whether it is fair to present a refusal to submit to a PBT
as evidence of consciousness of guilt in the State's prima facie case when
there are multiple reasons for a defendant to refuse to submit to this invasive
test.  It is the State's burden to prove that a defendant is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubtnot the defendant's burden to prove that he is not
guilty.  The concurrence's solution improperly shifts that burden. 
Furthermore, it elevates the significance of the refusal over the significance
of the test itself, which could lead the jury to elevate the refusal evidence
beyond its probative value.