Case Title: In re N. M-O

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
PAW LIBRENY

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAH REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

no. 27361

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

IN THE INTEREST OF N. N-O
(No. 27361; FC-S NO. 03-09097)

 

 

WwW 4 90002

oan

IN THE INTEREST OF AWC. M-o 3
(No. 27362; FC-S NO. 02-0802)

   

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(FC-S NOS. 03-09097 and 02-08022)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ.
and Acoba, J., concurring and dissenting)
The present matter concerns the decision of the
Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to place Daughter and Son
with non-relative Foster Parents following termination of

Mother's and Fathers parental rights. Appellants, the maternal

grandparents of the children, were deemed an unsuitable placement
by DHS because of their difficulty parenting three children from
Mother's earlier marriage. Foster Parents have since relocated
to Florida with Daughter and Son. Appellants were granted leave
to intervene, and the first circuit family court! considered
their request to bring the children back to Hawai'i. The family
court ultimately affirmed DHS’ placement decision based upon a
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.

On appeal, Appellants assert that the children have a
constitutional right to be placed with family members after

 

termination of their natural parents’ parental rights and that
interference with that right (i.e., placement with non-relative

+The Honorable Paul 7. Murekani presided.
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Foster Parents) is justified only if DHS can establish, by clear
and convincing evidence, that available relative placements were
unsuitable. Accordingly, Appellants urge this court to hold that
the family court affirmed OHS’ placement decisions based upon an
insufficient standard of proof.?

upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments and the issues raised, we hold that Appellants,
grandparents who are not the legal custodians or guardians of the
children, lack standing to assert the children’s constitutional
rights as a basis for arguing that a clear and convincing
evidence standard of proof was required.

It is well-established that, ordinarily,

“S{[clonstitutional rights may not be vicariously asserted.’”

Freitas v. Admin, Dir, of the Courts, 104 Hawai'i 483, 486, 92
P.3d 993, 996 (2004) (citing Kaneohe Bav Cruises, Inc, v. Hirata,

75 Haw. 250, 256, 861 P.2d 1, 9 (1993) (quoting State v. Marlev,
54 Haw. 450, 457, $09 P.2d 1095, 1101 (1973))); see also Powers
Ye Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) ("In the ordinary course, a

Litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests,

+ in their opening brief, Appellants assert the following five
points of error: (1) the family court erred by failing to recognize a child
Constieutionally protected due process interest in being placed with
Felatives if a quolified placenent is available; (2) the family court
failing to require proof by clear and convincing evidence that the non-

fe of each child; (3) the family
‘authorized to determi
(a) the family coure
Concluding that Appellants, grandparents who were not the leg:
the children, die not have’ standing to assert the constitutional right to
Blacenent with fantly nenbers; (5) the family court erred by concloding that
fo appropriate placement with extended relatives was avellable as of the
Conclusion of trial. However, the argusents asserted do not align with the
foregoing points of error. ence, we address coly those points actually
argues. see Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure ole 28 (b) (7) (2008)

ft argued may be deened waived.) ~

   

 

 

 

 

 
    
          

         
  

 

 

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and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or

interests of third parties.”

 

However, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized certain exceptions to the foregoing
Limitation. In particular, the Court has approved

the rights of 1itigants to bring actions on behalf of third
parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: The
Sleigant must have suffered an “injury in fact,” thus giving him
or her's "auéficiently concrete interest” in the outcome of the
Sssve in dispote .. - 7 the litigant must have a close relation
tothe thire party | | |} and there must exist some hindrance to
the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests.

 

‘Id, at 410-11 (internal citations omitted). The Court has also,
in the past, considered “the impact of the litigation on third~
party interests.” in 6 br ve 2
491 U.S. 617, 624 n.3 (1989).

In the case at bar, standing must be rejected inasmuch
as Appellants have failed to demonstrate a sufficient injury in
fact. In order to secure standing, Appellants were required to
demonstrate an injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest --
due., a recognized legal right.

Comm'n, $40 U.S. 93, 227 (2003) (unanimously concluding that the
failure to show injury to a recognized “legal right” precluded
satisfaction of the injury in fact component of the standing
doctrine); Smith v, Frye, 488 F.3d 263, 272 (4th Cir. 2007); Salt
Institute v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 2006); Bowen ws
First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 233 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir.

2000); Curry v, Regents of Univ, of Minnesota, 167 F.3d 420, 422

(8th Cir. 1999); Lanadon v. Google, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 622, 629
(D. Del. 2007); Beople v. Clark, 869 N.E.2d 1019, 1034 (I11. Ct.
App. 2007); In-re Petition for Decertification, 730 N.W.2d 300,
304 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita,

458 F.Supp.2¢ 775, 813 n.S7 (S.D. Ind, 2006); Wimberly v
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Ettenbera, 570 P.2d 535, $39 (Colo. 1977).

Here, Appellants assert the following ha:

 

Q) “the
Court determined that the children would remain with their (non-
related) foster parents and thus effectively terminated the
possibility of any future contact between the children and the
members of their biological family (including Appellants)”
(emphasis added); and (2) “applying an incorrect standard of
Proof caused them an injury-in-fact in that the relationship
between them and their grandchildren was terminated based only
upon a preponderance of the evidence and not by clear and
convincing evidence.” First, Appellants have no common law or
constitutional right to “the possibility of future contact” with
their grandchildren. See Mullins v. State of Oregon, 57 F.3d
789, 794 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[WJe are certain that [a grandparent’s
interest in @ potential, undeveloped relationship with his or her
grandchild) does not rise to the level of a fundamental liberty
interest."); Graham dren’ ir. Yt of Hu

Res., 991 P.2d 375, 379 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (“In summary, we
conclude that grandparents have no liberty interest herein and no
rights superior to @ nonrelative applying for permission to
Robichaud v, Pariseau, €20 A.2d 1212, 1216 (Me. 2003)
(Grandparents do not have a conmon law or constitutional right
of access to their grandchildren."); In re Schmidt, 496 N.E.2¢
982, 958 (Ohio 1986) (concluding that grandparents "had no legal
right to custody or visitation with their grandson, and they held
no legally protectable interest that was related to [their

adopt."

 

grandson’s] care and custody").’ Appellants also do not assert

2, Other Jurisdictions have held that extended relatives may hi

interest in preserving an existing family relationship. See Heare w-_City of

 
 

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any statutory basis for recognition of such a right.‘ Second,
although Appellants appear to claim a deprivation of a
preexisting “relationship” with the children based upon an

insufficient standard of proof, they do not elaborate upon, and
the

 

cord lacks evidence of, the extent of that “relationship.”
See discussion supra at n.3. Given the lack of evidence, we may
presume that the “relationship” referred to is either (1) the
fact of consanguinity, and/or (2) another reference to the future
relationship Appellants wish to have with the children. As
mentioned, neither produces a legally cognizable interest.

To the extent that Appellants have failed to

 

scontinued)
}, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("The tradition
Of uncles, aunts, cousins, a cially grandparents sharing a household
long with parente snd chileren hae roots aqually venersble and equally
Geserving of constivutional recognition.) Malling, 37 F.3d at 194 ("A
negative right to be free of governnental interference in an already existing
familial relationship does not translate into an affirmative right to create
an'entizely new family unit out of whole cloth.")7 Osborne vy. City of
Hiverside, ‘305 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1054" (C.D. Cal. 2008) ("the court conclude:
that; + grancparencs have no liberty interest in famiiial integrity oF
sssociation with their grandchildren by virtue of genetic link alone, but
Grandparents who have a long-standing custodial relationship with thesr
Grandchildren such that together they constitute an existing family unit do
Possess a liberty interest in fenilial integrity and ssscciation.)
{Quotation narks onittes.); iver v. Marcus, E96 F.2d 1016, 1024-25 (2d cir.
1962) ("We believe that custodial Felstives iike Mrs. Rivers are entitled to
due process protection when the state decides to renove s depencent relative
fron the fanily environment.*). Relatedly, the Suprene Court has explained
that “the inportance of the familial relationship . «+ stens from the
entional attacmnents that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and
From the role it plays sn ‘promot (ing) a way of life’ through the instruction
of children, . . + ag well as from the fact of blood relaticnship.”” Sith v
Srq.of Fostex families For fouel. é Reform, 451 0.5. 816, 864 (1977)
(citation omitted) (alteration in original). Although Appellants share
blood relationship with chilaren, @ fundanental inadequacy exists insemoch ae
Appellants do not sesert, and the record 1s devoid of, any evidence ef the
fenoticnal attachnents that serve as the cornerstone of the fanily relationship
(Liss, Gaily association, attributes of custody or guardianship, oF @ shared
househoid).” Under these circunstances, we do not perceive e fomily unit the
integrity Of which Appellants may have had a Liberty interest in.

  

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

«For example, Appellants do not sesert, this jurisdiction's

grendparent visitation statute, codified as Hawai"! Revived Statutes $ $71-
46.3, as 2 statutory basis for determining that Appellants hove 0 legally
Cognizabie interest in future visitation.

 

 

 

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demonstrate an injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest,
they lack standing to assert a jus tertil claim on behalf of
Daughter and Son. A fortiori, they also lack standing to assert
the children’s constitutional rights as a basis for requiring an
elevated standard of proof. Therefore,

IT TS HEREBY ORDERED that the fanily court's May 6,
2005 Decision and Order and May 31, 2005 Order denying
Appellants’ motion for reconsideration are affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 5, 2007.
on the briefs:

for Intervenors-Appellants

Susan Barr Brandon and beg Delicnse~

Mary Anne Magnier,

Deputy Attorneys General,

for Respondent-Appellee Beste CO eerenyarre.

Department of Human Services

Ken 6. Oust «