Case Title: BORNS v. VOSS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
BORNS v. VOSS2003 WY 7470 P.3d 262Case Number: 02-139Decided: 06/06/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

CARMEN 
BORNS, a minor, by and through

her 
next best friend and mother,

MICHELLE 
GANNON,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

CLAYTON 
VOSS and MITSY VOSS,

individually 
and d/b/a LAZY TX OUTFITTERS,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
James L. Edwards and Patrick E. Carpenter of Stevens, Edwards & 
Hallock, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

 

            
Patrick J. Murphy and Jason A. Neville of Williams, Porter, Day & 
Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an 
appeal from an order granting summary judgment to the defendants in a dog bite 
case.  The district court concluded 
that there were no genuine issues of material fact, that the defendants had no 
prior knowledge that their dog was vicious or possessed other dangerous 
propensities, and that the defendants, therefore, owed no duty to the 
plaintiff.

 

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

 

ISSUES

 

1.         
Was summary judgment improper because of the existence of genuine issues 
of material fact?

 

2.         
Were the appellees entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law?

 

            
3.         
Should the "one free bite" rule be abrogated?

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶3]      Summary judgment 
motions are governed by W.R.C.P. 56.  
We review summary judgments under the following 
standard:

 

            
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material 
fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Matlack v. Mountain West 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 2002 WY 60, ¶ 6, 44 P.3d 73, ¶ 6 
(Wyo.2002).  A genuine issue of 
material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action 
or defense which the parties have asserted.  Id.  We examine the record from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Id.  We evaluate the propriety of a summary 
judgment using the same standards and materials as the lower court used.  Id.  We do not accord deference to the 
district court's decisions on issues of law.  Id.

 

T.M. 
ex rel. Cox v. Executive Risk Indem., Inc., 2002 
WY 179, ¶ 7, 59 P.3d 721, 724 (Wyo. 2002).

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Clayton Voss and 
Mitsy Voss do business as Lazy TX Outfitters.  Collectively, they are the appellees in 
this case.  As part of their 
business, the Vosses had established the "Down's Fork" camp in the Wind River 
Mountains.  Jim Borns (Borns) was 
employed by the Vosses.  At the time 
of the incident that gave rise to this case, Borns had been camping with his 
children, Carmen and Sam, at Down's Fork for a week or two.  Carmen, who was seven years old at the 
time, is the appellant herein.

 

[¶5]      On July 18, 1999, 
the Vosses, along with their male Red Heeler dog, Tramp, arrived in camp.  They were accompanied by another 
employee, Ron Penny (Penny).  
Clayton Voss testified that he had been in and out of the camp several 
times in the preceding days.1  Both of the Vosses testified that on at 
least two prior occasions in the camp, they had seen Carmen mistreating 
Tramp.  Clayton Voss testified that 
twice he had seen Carmen hitting Tramp on the back, at least once with a stick, 
and that on both occasions he had told her "not to do that."  Mitsy Voss testified that she had seen 
Carmen both kick the dog "in the rear end" and hit him on the face, and that she 
had told Carmen "that was not something we do."  Penny testified similarly, indicating 
that on five or six occasions he had seen Carmen slap the dog and "tell him 
no."  He further testified that, 
while he had said something to Carmen at least once about her conduct, he 
doubted that he had mentioned the incidents to the Vosses.

 

[¶6]      As proof that the 
Vosses had prior knowledge of Tramp's dangerous propensities, Carmen submitted 
the affidavit of her father, who described both an initial warning about Tramp 
from Clayton Voss and a later experience he had with 
Tramp:

 

3.         
That shortly after becoming employed by the defendants, Clayton Voss 
warned me to be careful around his dog, Tramp.  Mr. Voss indicated that it might take 
his dog some time to become accustomed to me.  I understood my conversation with Mr. 
Voss to mean that I should be careful around his dog until I get acquainted with 
the dog.  It was also my 
understanding that until the dog became accustomed to me, there was a chance 
that the dog might act aggressively toward me.

 

4.         
That about August 1998, I was attempting to unload some gear from the bed 
of Clayton Voss' pickup truck.  The 
defendants' dog was standing on my gear in the bed of the truck.  When I attempted to move the dog so that 
I could retrieve my gear, the dog spun around toward me and tried to bite my 
hand.  Fortunately, after my 
conversation with Mr. Voss, I was prepared for such an event and I was able to 
move my hand before the dog could bite me.  
Mr. Voss was present at the time this happened.

 

[¶7]      Witness accounts 
of the biting incident, itself, differ.  
Carmen testified that she was standing at Tramp's side and was leaning 
down and petting him.  She had just 
told Tramp that he could not go into the cook's tent when he suddenly growled, 
lunged at her, and bit her on the face.  
Carmen's father had to pry Tramp's jaws open to release his grip on her 
face.  Penny testified that he saw 
the kids playing with a Frisbee and saw Tramp trying to play with them.2  Carmen was slapping Tramp on the head 
and telling him no when Tramp bit her.  
A third witness, Marette Nagel, who was also employed by the Vosses, 
testified that she saw Carmen scolding or reprimanding Tramp for about two full 
minutes before Tramp bit Carmen.  
Nagel described watching Carmen lean down and shake her finger in Tramp's 
face, but she did not see Carmen hit Tramp.

 

WYOMING'S 
DOG BITE LAW

 

[¶8]      This Court has 
applied Wyoming's dog bite law several times in the past.  In doing so, we have recognized three 
distinct theories of recovery:  (1) 
the common law theory of strict liability of an owner who keeps an animal 
knowing of its dangerous propensities as articulated in Restatement (Second) 
Torts § 509 (1977);3 (2) the common law theory of 
negligence in the care and control of a domestic animal; and (3) a theory of 
negligence based on the violation of a duty created by statute or ordinance not 
to allow a domestic animal to run at large.  Williams v. Johnson, 781 P.2d 922, 923 (Wyo. 1989).  Because we have not always been careful 
to maintain the distinctions among these causes of action, especially as to the 
scienter element, and because we are being asked to modify the existing 
law, we will address each major case, so that we may first establish what the 
existing law is.

 

[¶9]      In McCarthy v. 
Croker, 549 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo. 1976), 
dismissal was granted at the end of the plaintiff's case on the ground that the 
defendant's knowledge that his dog had nipped at a neighbor's horse did not 
create an inference that the plaintiff knew the dog had a propensity to bite 
humans.  The allegation in the 
complaint had been that the defendant "wrongfully kept a dog, well knowing him 
to be of a ferocious, vicious and mischievous disposition and accustomed to 
attach [sic] and bite man kind [sic].'"  
Id. at 324.  In 
affirming the dismissal, this Court agreed with the statement that "[t]he 
determinative factor in the present case is knowledge of vicious propensities . 
. ..'"  Id.  While we did not, in support of that 
statement, specify the particular cause of action to which it applied, it is 
clear that the theory to which it applies is strict liability.  In discussing the knowledge or 
scienter requirement, we cited to Prosser, Torts, § 76 at 501 (4th ed. 
1971), 
which contains a discussion of animals within a chapter entitled "Strict 
Liability."  McCarthy, 549 P.2d  at 325.  In that discussion, 
Professor Prosser clearly states the difference between the two torts in this 
context:  "And scienter is of 
course not required where any negligence can be shown in the keeping or control 
of the animal."  Prosser, Torts, 
supra, § 76 at 502.

 

[¶10]   A second case in the 1970's, if not 
read carefully, may seem to blur the line between the strict liability and 
negligence causes of action.  The 
plaintiff in Endresen v. Allen, 574 P.2d 1219, 1220-21 (Wyo. 
1978), 
was injured when his motorcycle struck the defendants' dog while the dog chased 
the motorcycle down the street.  The 
plaintiff sought to recover under theories of common-law negligence and 
violation of an ordinance forbidding dogs running at large.  The opinion reversing summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants was based on the negligence theory, but a discussion 
of the defendants' prior knowledge of their dog's propensity to escape from 
their yard sounds much like a discussion of the scienter element under 
strict liability.  Id. at 
1221-22.4  Indeed, the defendants cited 
McCarthy in support of their argument, causing us to comment that this 
"misses the point that we are not concerned with the vicious propensities of the 
dog but only whether defendants" could have foreseen the plaintiff's 
injury.  Endresen, 574 P.2d  at 1222.  Unfortunately, the confusion among 
causes of action is heightened by the fact that, while later discussing whether 
both defendants could be liable when only one of them left the dog untied, we 
did state that "the common-law duty to protect against harmful propensities of 
the animal is one that is imposed upon the owners or keepers of the animal 
without regard to negligence except that there must be knowledge of the 
propensities."  Id. at 
1226.  That, of course, is a 
statement of the strict liability cause of action.  Since that cause of action was not 
raised in Endresen, the statement is, at most, obiter 
dictum.

 

[¶11]   Three years after Endresen, 
we decided Larsen v. City of Cheyenne, 626 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 
1981).  The primary issue in Larsen was 
whether a city dog pound should be liable for releasing a dog known to be 
vicious.  The action was founded in 
negligence, based upon the alleged violation of certain city ordinances.  Id. at 560.  Our affirmance of the summary judgment 
entered in favor of the defendant city was based upon the conclusion that the 
particular ordinances had not created a duty on the part of the city.  Id. at 560-61.  In reaching that conclusion, however, we 
noted that a duty on the part of the city to conduct the pound activities in a 
manner that would protect the general public was not just inferable from the 
ordinances, but could arise under a standard negligence 
theory:

 

            
Appellant's argument also pertains to a contention that there was a 
failure on the part of appellees to act reasonably under the circumstances.  The question of reasonableness comes 
into play in a negligence action in connection with the violation of a duty. 
 If there is no duty, the 
proposition is not reached.  The 
elements of a negligence action are:  
a duty on the part of the defendant, failure to perform the duty, 
proximately causing damage to plaintiff.  
Danculovich v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187 
(1979).

 

Larsen, 
626 P.2d  at 560 n.2.  Finally, in a brief analysis of the 
strict liability theory of recovery, we also found that the city was neither the 
owner nor the keeper of the dog at the time of the biting incident.  Id. at 560.  As with Endresen, this 
interposing of a discussion of strict liability in the midst of a case brought 
in negligence did not help to keep the causes of action 
distinct.

 

[¶12]   In Abelseth v. City of Gillette, 
752 P.2d 430, 431 (Wyo. 1988), 
the plaintiff was bitten by a police dog and sued the city.  This Court clearly indicated that strict 
liability and negligence are separate theories of recovery in dog bite cases, 
and that an allegation of harboring a dog known to be dangerous is a claim under 
the former theory.  Id. at 
431-34.  The plaintiff's negligence 
claim against the city was allowed to proceed, while dismissal of the strict 
liability claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-39-101 through 1-39-120 (Michie 1987), was affirmed.  We held that use of the phrase "strict 
liability" is not determinative of the nature of a claim; rather, the question 
is whether the complaint raises the elements of a cause of action under 
Restatement (Second) Torts, supra, § 509.  Abelseth, 752 P.2d  at 
434.

 

[¶13]   We previously herein cited 
Williams, 781 P.2d  at 923, 
as recognizing the three distinct theories of recovery in dog bite cases in 
Wyoming.  Unfortunately, rather than 
clarifying those theories of recovery, Williams continued to muddy the 
waters.  The plaintiff in 
Williams was a mailman who was attacked by the defendants' dogs on a 
neighbor's porch.  He was not 
bitten, but he injured his knee in trying to escape from the attack.  Id.  His complaint generally alleged 
liability but did not rely upon any particular theory of recovery.  Id.  That omission led to this Court's 
analysis of the three separate causes of action.  To the extent that part of that analysis 
was wrong, it must now be overturned.

 

[¶14]   In Williams, we correctly 
identified the two common law causes of actionstrict liability and 
negligence.5  Id.  However, we then went on to make the 
following mistaken statement as to the law:

 

            
Common to both of these causes of action are certain facts which must be 
put in issue to defeat defendant's summary judgment motion, i.e., (1) the owner, 
(2) of an animal with a propensity for potentially harmful behavior, (3) must 
know of that propensity, and (4) such behavior must be the proximate cause of 
injury to the plaintiff.  In this 
case, appellees denied knowledge of harmful propensities.  Appellant claimed knowledge of dangerous 
propensities was unnecessary to a common law cause of action.  Appellant therefore failed to assert 
facts, by affidavit or otherwise, which would place in issue appellees' 
knowledge of the vicious nature of their dogs.  This was fatal to his maintaining a 
cause of action under these common law theories.  His suit was premised on these theories, 
and the district court, therefore, correctly granted appellees' summary judgment 
motion.

 

Id. 
at 
924.  As pointed out by Justice 
Urbigkit in his dissenting opinion in Williams, this formulation of the 
law is incorrect because "the requirement of knowledge of propensity is confined 
to a strict liability basis for asserted recovery."  Id. at 927 (Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting).  This is consistent 
with Professor Prosser's view of these torts, as cited above.  The majority's requirement of the 
scienter element in the negligence claim was contrary to 
law.

 

[¶15]   The 1997 case of Turcq v. 
Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47 (Wyo. 1997), 
once again clearly recognized the three separate causes of action.  In Turcq, the plaintiff was an 
animal control officer who was severely bitten by the defendant's dog when she 
responded to a barking dog complaint.  
She had previously responded five times to similar complaints involving 
the same dog.  Id. at 
49-50.  A strict liability claim was 
dismissed via summary judgment, and the case went to trial strictly as a 
negligence case.  Id. at 
50.  For our present 
purposes, the most significant feature of Turcq is its application of 
standard negligence law:

 

            
By our decisions, the elements of a negligence claim are firmly 
established as:  1) a duty owed by 
the defendant to the plaintiff; 2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; 3) 
the breach is the proximate cause; 4) of injuries to the plaintiff.  Vasquez By and Through Vasquez v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 913 P.2d 441, 443 (Wyo.1996); Downen v. Sinclair 
Oil Corp., 887 P.2d 515, 520 (Wyo.1994).

 

Turcq, 
950 P.2d  at 51.  Clearly, common law negligence in a dog 
bite case is no different than in any other case.  In Turcq, as in Endresen, 
the key issue was the foreseeability of injury.  Specifically, the issue was whether the 
defendant's failure to prevent her dog from barking was a proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries.  Turcq, 
950 P.2d  at 52.  We must reiterate that it is important 
to distinguish between the analysis of knowledge of a dangerous propensity, 
which applies to strict liability cases, and the analysis of foreseeability of 
harm, which applies to negligence cases.

 

[¶16]   Our most recent precedent involving 
a dog bite is Roberts v. Klinkosh, 986 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1999).  In Roberts, a tenant's social 
guest sued the tenant's landlord after the guest was bitten by another tenant's 
Pit Bull.  Id. at 155.  The plaintiff raised both strict 
liability and negligence claims.  
The defendant obtained summary judgment on the grounds that he had no 
duty toward the plaintiff because he had no knowledge of the dog's 
dangerousness, and because the attack took place at the tenant's doorstep, an 
area not under the landlord's control.  
Id.  We affirmed the 
summary judgment as to the negligence claim through the application of standard 
landlord-tenant law.  As to the 
strict liability claim, we concluded that neither the landlord's knowledge that 
the dog had previously growled at one person nor his knowledge that Pit Bulls, 
as a breed, are dangerous, was sufficient to create a duty in him to protect the 
social guest.  Id. at 
157.

 

[¶17]   Roberts is of limited 
precedential value for our present purposes because its holdings are stated in 
the context of landlord-tenant liability rather than in the context of an owner 
or keeper of a dog.  Specifically, 
the discussion in Roberts about knowledge of a dangerous propensity 
focuses upon what a landlord must know about a tenant's dog before the 
landlord's failure to have the dog removed from the premises becomes a breach of 
a duty owed to a social guest.  
Furthermore, as with some of our earlier cases, neither the parties nor 
this Court maintained a clear line between the strict liability and negligence 
theories.  Id. at 157.  To the extent that Roberts may 
suggest that knowledge of dangerous propensities is an element that must be 
proved in a common law negligence case, it is in error and must be 
overruled.

 

[¶18]   Before we attempt to discuss the 
parties' factual and legal contentions in the present case, it is necessary that 
we now summarize existing dog bite law in Wyoming.  There are three theories of 
recovery:  (1) common law 
negligence; (2) common law strict liability as articulated in Restatement 
(Second) Torts, supra, § 509; 
and (3) negligence based upon violation of a duty created by statute or 
ordinance.  The elements of the 
common law negligence cause of action are the same as the elements of a standard 
negligence claim; that is, duty, breach, cause and resulting damage.  This theory has often been described as 
negligence in the care and control of a domestic animal.  Turcq, 950 P.2d  at 52; 
Williams, 781 P.2d  at 923.  The nature of the duty is as 
follows:

 

Even 
in the absence of any known viciousness in a domestic animal, its owner is 
obliged to exercise over it a certain degree of care depending upon the kind and 
character of the particular animal concerned, the circumstances in which it is 
placed, and the purposes for which it is employed or kept.  The owner or keeper of a domestic animal 
is charged with knowledge of the natural propensities of animals of the 
particular class to which this animal belongs, and, if these propensities are of 
the kind that might cause injury he must exercise the care necessary to prevent 
such injuries as may be anticipated.

 

4 
Am.Jur.2d Animals § 102 at 439 (1995).  A concise statement of this duty is 
found in Restatement (Second) Torts, supra, § 518:

 

Except 
for animal trespass, one who possesses or harbors a domestic animal that he does 
not know or have reason to know to be abnormally dangerous, is subject to 
liability for harm done by the animal if, but only if,

 

            
(a)       
he intentionally causes the animal to do the harm, 
or

 

            
(b)       
he is negligent in failing to prevent the harm.

 

As 
in other negligence actions, the degree of care required is that which is 
reasonable under the circumstances.  
Larsen, 626 P.2d  at 560 n.2; 
Slack v. Villari, 59 Md.App. 462, 476 A.2d 227, 231, cert. denied, 
301 Md. 177, 482 A.2d 502 (1984).

 

[¶19]   The distinguishing feature of 
strict liability is that a possessor of a domestic animal that he knows or has 
reason to know has a dangerous propensity is liable for harm done by the animal 
that results from that dangerous propensity, even if negligence cannot be 
proven.  And the distinguishing 
feature of negligence based upon violation of a statute or ordinance is simply 
that the duty allegedly breached is a legislatively created duty rather than a 
duty recognized at common law.  
Williams, 781 P.2d  at 923.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶20]   We have concluded that the summary 
judgment granted to the Vosses in this case must be reversed.  To begin with, the Vosses are wrong 
about the law, as is evidenced by three contentions in their appellate 
brief.  First, the Vosses state that 
"because Appellees had no prior knowledge that their dog might react to 
Appellant's mistreatment, they were charged with no legal duty to protect 
Appellant from this unknown risk."  
Next, the Vosses contend that "[b]ecause Appellees possessed no 
scienter of Tramp's viciousness or propensity to cause harm, it was 
wholly unforeseeable that their dog would bite any human being, and consequently 
Appellees had no legal duty to protect Appellant Carmen Borns."  Third, the Vosses contend that "[w]hat 
Appellant fails to understand is that, under the common law negligence standard, 
a dog owner is not charged with a duty until he possesses 
scienter of his dog's dangerous propensity to cause harm."  The first statement erroneously says, in 
effect, that if strict liability does not apply, there can be no negligence 
claim.  The second statement fails 
to recognize the Endresen and Turcq distinction between knowledge 
of dangerous propensities under strict liability and foreseeability under 
negligence.  And the third statement 
completely negates any distinction between negligence and strict liability.  The summary judgment should not have 
been granted because it is based on these same erroneous 
conclusions.

 

[¶21]   The second reason that this summary 
judgment must be reversed is that there are genuine issues of material fact 
related to both claims.  As to the 
strict liability claim, the affidavit of Jim Borns sufficiently places at issue 
the question of whether Clayton Voss was or was not aware of Tramp's alleged 
"attack" upon Borns, especially because Borns testified that Voss specifically 
warned him about Tramp.  The facts 
necessary to defeat summary judgment do not have to be conclusive or unopposed; 
it is enough that they are competent and material and there are sufficient 
specific facts to indicate the presence of a genuine issue of material 
fact.  Blackmore v. Davis Oil 
Co., 671 P.2d 334, 336 (Wyo. 1983); 
Cantonwine v. Fehling, 582 P.2d 592, 598 (Wyo. 1978).  As to the negligence claim, the evidence 
viewed in the light most favorable to Carmen suggests that the Vosses were aware 
of Tramp's unfriendly disposition, were aware of Carmen's repeated inappropriate 
interaction with Tramp, were aware that Carmen was in camp when Tramp was 
brought into camp, and were aware at the time of the attack that Carmen was at 
that moment mistreating Tramp, yet they did nothing to prevent Tramp from biting 
Carmen.

 

[¶22]   The primary difficulty with the 
Vosses' position is their belief that the "one free bite rule" creates immunity 
from any liability for their dog's behavior absent knowledge of that first 
bite.   In truth, the 
appellation "one free bite" is quite a misnomer, inasmuch as itbeing the 
scienter element of the strict liability cause of actionactually creates 
liability where it would not otherwise exist.  The "one free bite" rule takes nothing 
away from the common law negligence theory of recovery.  Consequently, if Carmen can prove that, 
under all the circumstances, the Vosses violated their duty to her of reasonable 
care in the control of Tramp, liability may result even if they had no knowledge 
of Tramp's propensity to bite people, or indeed, even if Tramp had no such 
propensity.6  In the instant case, a jury could find 
that the Vosses did not do enough to control Tramp to prevent injury to 
Carmen.  Summary judgments are not 
favored in negligence actions where the question is whether the defendant's 
conduct violated the required duty.  
Bancroft v. Jagusch, 611 P.2d 819, 821 (Wyo. 1980).

 

[¶23]   We have determined that this case 
must be reversed because summary judgment was improper.  Genuine issues of material fact exist 
and the Vosses were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  That leaves only the third issue 
presentedwhether the "one free bite" rule should be abrogated.  We will begin to answer that question by 
again quoting Professor Prosser:

 

[T]he 
often repeated statement that "every dog is entitled to one bite" is not and 
never has been the law.  It is 
enough that the dog has manifested a vicious disposition, and a desire to attack 
or annoy people or other animals.

 

Prosser, 
Torts, supra, § 76 at 501-02 (footnote omitted).  "One free bite" has simply become 
shorthand for the proposition that strict liability does not arise until the 
animal's owner has knowledge of a dangerous propensity in the animal.  In other words, what we are really 
talking about when we talk about abrogating the "one free bite" rule is 
abrogating the scienter element of the strict liability cause of 
action.  Such abrogation would 
result in true strict liabilitythe owner of any dog that bit would be liable 
for the damage.  Needless to say, 
such a change would fundamentally alter the gist of the tort, which presently is 
"the keeping of a thing known to be dangerous . . .."  Id. at 502.

 

[¶24]   This Court repeatedly has stated 
that the common law is dynamic, rather than static, and that it may be modified 
by judicial decision to meet the changing needs of society.  Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1368 (Wyo. 1986); 
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 410-11 (Wyo. 1983); 
Collins v. Memorial Hosp. of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Wyo. 
1974).  Modification of the common law, however, 
runs counter to the doctrine of stare decisis.  "Stare decisis" is Latin for "to 
stand by things decided."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1414 (7th ed. 1999).  That concept is the basis of 
Anglo-American common law.  Stare 
decisis is implemented through reliance on "precedent," the latter term 
referring to "[a] decided case that furnishes a basis for determining later 
cases involving similar facts or issues."  
Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at 1195.

 

[¶25]   This Court has previously 
considered the tension between stare decisis and the needs of a changing 
society:

 

"Today's 
decision is supported, though not compelled, by the important doctrine of 
stare decisis, the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely 
change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible 
fashion.  That doctrine permits 
society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in 
the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our 
constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact.  While stare decisis is not an 
inexorable command, the careful observer will discern that any detours from the 
straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for articulable 
reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged "to bring its opinions into 
agreement with experience and with facts newly 
ascertained."'"

 

State 
v. Carter, 714 P.2d 1217, 1228 (Wyo. 1986) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting, with which Cardine, J. 
joined)  (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & 
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412, 52 S. Ct. 443, 449, 76 L. Ed. 815 (1932) 
(Brandeis, dissenting) and  Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S. Ct. 617, 624-25, 88 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986)). 
Similarly, in Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 804 (Wyo. 
1979), 
we declared that "[w]ithout exercise of judicial restraint in this area, the law 
would lose its stability and certainty, which is the basis of a well-ordered 
society and the keystone of a stable and orderly system."  In recent years, we have often cited 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991), 
for the proposition that stare decisis "furthers the "evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on 
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process."'"  State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Wyo. 
1999) (quoting Goodrich v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1995) and Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 
1353 (Wyo. 1992)).

 

[¶26]   We have not, however, adhered 
blindly to the principles of stare decisis and applied precedent.  We have also recognized the need for the 
common law to keep pace with the times:

 

"That 
court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law which grew up 
in a remote generation may in the fullness of experience be found to serve 
another generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that 
another rule of law represents what should be according to the established and 
settled judgment of society, and no considerable property rights have become 
vested in reliance upon the old rule.  
It is thus great writers upon the common law have discovered the source 
and method of its growth, and in its growth found its health and life.  It is not and it should not be 
stationary.  Change of this 
character should not be left to the Legislature.'"

 

Jivelekas 
v. City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419, 428 (Wyo. 1976) (quoting Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 
89 Conn. 74, 99, 92 A. 883, 891 (1915)).  As often as we have cited Payne, 
we have also said that stare decisis is not a law, but a policy, and 
we should depart from precedent when necessary ""to vindicate plain, obvious 
principles of law and remedy continued injustice . . .."'"  Barker, 978 P.2d  at 1161 
(quoting Goodrich, 908 P.2d  at 420 and Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 692-93 (Wyo. 1995)); 
Dunnegan v. Laramie County Com'rs, 852 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Wyo. 
1993); 
Cook, 841 P.2d  at 1353.  Simply stated,

 

"[w]e 
can agree that a rule of law which is merely the product of judicial decision, 
born of the necessities of particular circumstance, is subject to judicial 
repudiation when the reasons which gave rise to its judicial adoption have 
failed or no longer exist . . .."

 

Jivelekas, 
546 
P.2d at 431 (quoting Maffei v. Incorporated Town 
of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808, 816 (1959), overruled on other 
grounds by Collins, 521 P.2d at 1344)).

 

[¶27]   Not surprisingly, Carmen urges us 
now to take the expansive view that we espoused in 
Weaver:

 

"* 
* *  The main characteristic of the 
common law is its dynamism.  It does 
not remain static.  The common law 
is not a thing of chiseled marble to be left unchanged for 
centuries.

 

            
"Inherent in the common law is a dynamic principle which allows it to 
grow and to tailor itself to meet changing needs within the doctrine of stare 
decisis, which, if correctly understood, was not static and did not forever 
prevent the courts from reversing themselves or from supplying principles of 
common law to new situations as the need arose.  If this were not so, we must succumb to 
a rule that a judge should let others "long dead and unaware of the problems of 
the age in which he lives, do his thinking for him."  . . .'"

 

Weaver, 
715 
P.2d at 1368 (quoting Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 
567, 596 P.2d 705, 706 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Ontiveros 
v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200, 208 (1983)).  Also not surprisingly, the Vosses argue 
to the contrary the important role of stare decisis, as set forth in 
Adkins v. Sky Blue, Inc., 701 P.2d 549, 551 (Wyo. 1985):

 

            
The common law has served us well because it is flexible, able to grow 
and meet the requirements of changing conditions and a different society.  There are times when change is 
necessary; but the doctrine of stare decisis is also important in an 
organized society.  Change, 
therefore, should occur slowly, deliberately after much experience, and if 
possible so as not to affect vested rights or things in the 
past.

 

[¶28]   Several states have repudiated the 
scienter element in dog bite law.  
See, for example, Mulcahy v. Damron, 169 Ariz. 11, 816 P.2d 270 
(1991); 
Stroop v. Day, 271 Mont. 314, 896 P.2d 439 (1995); 
Nickell v. Sumner, 1997 OK 101, 943 P.2d 625 (Okla. 1997); 
S.H. By and Through Robinson v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376 (Utah 
1996); 
State v. Bash, 130 Wash. 2d 594, 925 P.2d 978 (1996); 
and Ward Miller, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule of Absolute or Strict 
Liability for Dogbite, 51 A.L.R.4th 446, §§ 4, 7-10 (1987).  While it is true that these states have 
abandoned the scienter element and have adopted a "pure" form of strict 
liability, it is also true that they did so by statute, and not by court 
decision.  See, 4 Am.Jur.2d 
Animals, supra, § 101 at 438-39.  Oklahoma's statute is a typical example 
of such a statute:

 

The 
owner or owners of any dog shall be liable for damages to the full amount of any 
damages sustained when his dog, without provocation, bites or injures any person 
while such person is in or on a place where he has a lawful right to 
be.

 

4 
O.S. 1991 § 42.1 (cited in Nickell, 943 P.2d at 
627).  Other statutes pointedly reject the 
scienter requirement:

 

Every 
person owning or keeping a dog shall be liable in damages for injury committed 
by such dog, and it shall not be necessary in any action brought therefor to 
allege or prove that such dog was of a vicious or mischievous disposition or 
that the owner or keeper thereof knew that it was vicious or mischievous . . 
..

 

Utah 
Code Ann. § 18-1-1 (cited in S.H. By and Through 
Robinson, 923 P.2d at 1380); 
see also Mulcahy, 816 P.2d at 272 and Stroop, 896 P.2d  at 
441.

 

[¶29]   Statistics indicate that 4.7 
million people are bitten by dogs annually in this country, and that 800,000 of 
those victims require medical attention.  
Mary Randolph, Dog Law § 11/1 (4th ed. 2001).  In Larsen, 626 P.2d  at 
561, 
we acknowledged our awareness of the serious injuries and even death caused by 
dogs.  Nevertheless, we concluded 
that "correctional action is a legislative matter," and we noted that in 1979 
the state legislature had passed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-31-301 (Cum.Supp. 1980), 
which provided as follows:

 

"(e)      Any dog attacking 
any person in a vicious manner may be destroyed and the owner or custodian of 
the dog may be fined not more than two hundred dollars ($200.00).  Proof of the fact that the dog has 
bitten or attacked any person at any place where a person is legally entitled to 
be is evidence that the dog is vicious within the meaning of this 
act."

 

Larsen, 
626 P.2d  at 561 n.3.  This language remains in the statute 
today.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-31-301 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Clearly, the 
legislature has not seen fit to create a tort duty of pure strict liability 
beyond the common law rule.  As we 
recognized in Larsen, one of the considerations when a court is asked to 
modify the common law is whether the constitutional separation of powers 
doctrine requires that the matter be left to the legislature where the 
legislature has taken action.  
Worthington, 598 P.2d  at 804.

 

[¶30]   In an appropriate case, the common 
law may be judicially modified to create a new tort duty.  Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 
2002 WY 105, ¶¶ 11-12, 44-45, 49 P.3d 1011, 1014, 1024-27 (Wyo. 
2002); 
Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 195-96 (Wyo. 1986).  ""Duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, 
but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy 
which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.'"  Andersen, 2002 WY 105, ¶ 44, 49 
P.3d at 1024 (quoting Gates, 719 P.2d at 
195).  Whether a duty exists is a question of 
law.  Davis v. Black Hills 
Trucking, Inc., 929 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1996).  A duty may arise by contract, statute, 
common law, "or when the relationship of the parties is such that the law 
imposes an obligation on the defendant to act reasonably for the protection of 
the plaintiff."  Hamilton v. 
Natrona County Educ. Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo. 1995).  The legal question to be answered by the 
court is

 

""[w]hether, 
upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the 
community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the 
otheror, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered 
invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant.  This is entirely a question of law, to 
be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and 
precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined only by the 
court."  . . 
.'"

 

Thomas 
By Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts, § 37 at 206 
(4th ed. 1971) and Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Wyo. 1983)).

 

[¶31]   In deciding whether to adopt a 
particular tort duty, a court's focus must be much broader than just the case at 
hand:

 

"[T]he 
courts have merely reacted to the situation in the way in which the great mass 
of mankind customarily react,' and that as our ideas of human relations change 
the law as to duties changes with them.  
Various factors undoubtedly have been given conscious or unconscious 
weight, including convenience of administration, capacity of the parties to bear 
the loss, a policy of preventing future injuries, the moral blame attached to 
the wrongdoer, and many others.  
Changing social conditions lead constantly to the recognition of new 
duties.  No better general statement 
can be made than that the courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable 
persons would recognize it and agree that it exists."  Prosser & Keaton on Torts, § 53, pp. 
357-359 (5th ed.1984).

 

"* 
* *  The judge's function in a duty 
determination involves complex considerations of legal and social policies which 
will directly affect the essential determination of the limits to government 
protection.  Consequently, * * * the 
imposition and scope of a legal duty is dependent not only on the factor of 
foreseeability ([Cunis v. Brennan] 56 Ill. 2d 372, 375, 308 N.E.2d 617) 
but involves other considerations, including the magnitude of the risk involved 
in defendant's conduct, the burden of requiring defendant to guard against that 
risk, and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant.  [Citations.]"  Nelson by Tatum v. Commonwealth 
Edison Company, 124 Ill.App.3d 655, 662, 80 Ill.Dec. 401, 465 N.E.2d 513, 
519 (1984).

 

Mostert 
v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Wyo. 1987).  In Gates, 719 P.2d  at 
196, 
we further detailed the factors to be considered:

 

            
Some of the key policy factors to be considered are:  (1) the foreseeability of harm to the 
plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered 
injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy 
of preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) 
the consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) the 
availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.  Tarasoff v. Regents of University of 
California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 83 A.L.R.3d 
1166 (1976).

 

[¶32]   These discussions of duty have been 
in the context of a negligence cause of action, but we see no reason that the 
same principles would not apply to a cause of action for strict liability.  In adopting strict products liability, 
this Court considered similar policy factors and found, in particular, that the 
risk of harm should fall on the person best able to prevent that harm.  Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
716 P.2d 334, 342-44 (Wyo. 1986).  Other factors, such as the extent of the 
burden on the defendant, the policy of preventing future harm, the magnitude of 
the risk, and the availability of insurance are equally applicable to strict 
liability.

 

[¶33]   According to one authority, twenty 
states have statutorily adopted some form of dog bite strict liability.7  To the contrary, only one state appears 
to have judicially abandoned the scienter element of the strict liability 
cause of action.  In Hossenlopp 
By and Through Hossenlopp v. Cannon, 285 S.C. 367, 329 S.E.2d 438, 441 
(1985), 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina stated the following rationale for its 
holding:

 

In 
1978 in the case of McQuaig v. Brown, [270 S.C. 512, 242 S.E.2d 688 
(1978)], the court alerted the bench and bar to the fact that the dog-bite law 
in this state was antiquated.  See 
dissent in McQuaig.

 

The 
dog-bite law is of common law origin.  
It may be changed by common law mandate.  The time has come when our rule must 
give way to the more commonly accepted rule of law indicated in other states by 
both case law and by statute.

 

When 
a child, as in this case, has been injured by the dog of another, the burden of 
damages, medical expenses, hospital, etc. must be paid by either the owner of 
the dog or the parents of the child.  
It is common knowledge that dogs have a tendency to bite.  The owners know this and should be made 
to respond in damages when the dogs they keep do injuries to others regardless 
of whether the injury is a result of the first bite, the second or other 
bite.

 

Having 
made those pronouncements, the court adopted the following statement of law, 
which statement had its origin in a statutorily-based California jury 
instruction:

 

[T]he 
owner of any dog which bites a person while such person is on or in a public 
place or is lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the 
owner of such dog, is liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person 
bitten regardless of whether or not the dog previously had been vicious, 
regardless of the owner's knowledge or lack of knowledge of any such 
viciousness, and regardless of whether or not the owner has been negligent in 
respect to the dog, provided, however, that if a person knowingly and 
voluntarily invites attack upon himself [herself], or if, when on the property 
of the dog owner, a person voluntarily, knowingly, and without reasonable 
necessity, exposes himself [herself] to the danger, the owner of the dog is not 
liable for the consequences . . ..

 

Hossenlopp 
By and Through Hossenlopp, 
329 S.E.2d  at 441.  Two of the five justices on the South 
Carolina Supreme Court concurred in the result in Hossenlopp, but 
disagreed with adoption of the California law.  One justice argued that existing law 
should remain in effect "until the General Assembly sees fit to liberalize 
it."  Id. at 442 (Harwell, 
J., concurring).  The second justice 
contended that "[t]his case is not the proper vehicle for such a far-reaching 
change in the law."  Id. 
(Gregory, J., concurring).  
Apparently, the South Carolina legislature agreed with Justice 
Harwell.  In 1986, it passed S.C. 
Code Ann. § 47-3-110 (1987), 
which is a detailed strict liability statute.8  See Elmore v. Ramos, 327 S.C. 
507, 489 S.E.2d 663, 664-65 (1997).9

 

[¶34]   For several reasons, we conclude 
that, at least for this particular case at this particular time, the correct 
position is that taken by the dissenting justices in Hossenlopp.  We decline to abrogate the 
scienter element of common law strict liability in dog bite cases.  To begin with, we continue to believe 
that it would be better for the matter to be addressed by the legislature, just 
as it has been in many other states.  
The legislature is a deliberative representative body, designed for 
policy debates, and designed for constituent input.  As is evidenced by the cases and 
statutes cited herein, there are many ways to fashion a dog bite law.  In some states, for instance, the 
statute applies only in cities and towns.  
See Stroop, 896 P.2d at 441 and Nickell, 943 P.2d  at 
627.  Given Wyoming's vast rural areas and its 
numerous working ranch dogs, that is a feature our legislature might want to 
contemplate.

 

[¶35]   The second reason that we have 
determined in this case not to create judicially a pure form of strict liability 
is that this is not a situation where the appellant is left without any 
remedy.  There are three existing 
theories of recovery in dog bite cases and this case will be remanded for trial 
on two of those theories.  The 
appellant will have her day in court.

 

[¶36]   Finally, although both sides in 
this case have mentioned and discussed to some extent the Gates factors, 
we do not feel that there has been sufficient factual development concerning 
many of those factors.  We do not 
know how many dogs there are in Wyoming.  
We do not know how many of those dogs are kept in cities and towns or how 
many of them are kept in rural areas.  
We do not know how many dog bites there are each year in Wyoming.  We do not know the nature and extent of 
the injuries caused by dog bites in Wyoming.  We do not know whether liability 
insurance is available, whether it covers both negligence and strict liability, 
or what it costs.

 

[¶37]   We are not insensitive to the 
plight of dog bite victims who cannot prove negligence on the part of the dog's 
owner and who cannot prove the owner's prior knowledge of the dog's 
dangerousness.  We are also mindful 
of the fact that the common law may be judicially modified under appropriate 
circumstances.  But for all the 
reasons set forth above, we will not in this case abrogate the scienter 
element of strict liability.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶38]   The summary judgment entered in 
this case must be reversed because there are genuine issues of material fact in 
regard to both causes of action and because the Vosses were not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.

 

[¶39]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The witness testimony described 
herein is deposition testimony.

  2There were other children in the 
camp besides Carmen and Sam Borns.

  3Restatement (Second) Torts, 
supra, § 509 reads:

 

(1)  A possessor of a domestic animal that he 
knows or has reason to know has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is 
subject to liability for harm done by the animal to another, although he has 
exercised the utmost care to prevent it from doing the 
harm.

 

(2)  This liability is limited to harm that 
results from the abnormally dangerous propensity of which the possessor knows or 
has reason to know.

 

  4Endresen, 574 P.2d  at 
1222-26, 
goes on to analyze the cause of action for violating a city ordinance.  Because that issue is not raised in the 
present case, we will not address it further.

  5A cause of action based on violation 
of a city ordinance was also discussed, but its resolution is not pertinent to 
the present issue.

  6A rule to the contrary would be 
ludicrous.  For example, the owner 
of a dog should not be allowed idly to sit by and watch a small child abuse that 
dog to the point that the dog bites the child, simply because the dog has never 
bitten anyone before.  Similarly, an 
owner who fails to feed his dog, to the point of starvation, should not be 
immune from liability if that dog kills and eats a neighbor's chickens, just 
because the dog has never before killed and eaten a chicken.  

  7Arizona, California, Connecticut, 
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, 
Washington, and Wisconsin.  
Annotation, supra, 51 A.L.R.4th, 
§§ 7-9 at 457-62.  As we have noted herein, Utah should 
also be added to that list.  There 
may be others.

  8The statute 
reads:

 

Whenever 
any person is bitten or otherwise attacked by a dog while the person is in a 
public place or is lawfully in a private place, including the property of the 
owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care or keeping, the 
owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care or keeping is liable 
for the damages suffered by the person bitten or otherwise attacked.  For the purposes of this section, a 
person bitten or otherwise attacked is lawfully in a private place, including 
the property of the owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care 
or keeping, when the person bitten or otherwise attacked is on the property in 
the performance of any duty imposed upon him by the laws of this State, by the 
ordinances of any political subdivision of this State, by the laws of the United 
States of America, including, but not limited to, postal regulations, or when 
the person bitten or otherwise attacked is on the property upon the invitation, 
express or implied, of the owner of the property or of any lawful tenant or 
resident of the property.  If a 
person provokes a dog into attacking him then the owner of the dog is not 
liable.  [(1986 Act No. 
343)]

 

S.C. 
Code Ann. § 47-3-110.

  9In 2001, South Dakota declined an 
invitation to follow Hossenlopp on the ground that the "overwhelming 
majority of states that impose strict liability for injuries caused by dogs have 
done so through legislative mandate."  
Gehrts v. Batteen, 2001 SD 10, 620 N.W.2d 775, 779 (S.D. 
2001).