Case Title: Murphy v. Burch

Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 157

Docket Number: S159489

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 4/27/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CHERYL C. MURPHY, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S159489 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/2 A117051 
ROGER BURCH et al., 
) 
 
) 
Mendocino County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 
 
 
) 
SCUK-CVG-0493420 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
This is a quiet title action between owners of adjoining properties.  In 1998, 
the plaintiff purchased property having no vehicular access to or from any public 
road.  Because her property is “landlocked,” she seeks to establish, without 
payment of consideration to the defendants, an “easement by necessity” over an 
existing private road that crosses the defendants’ property and connects to a public 
highway.  Under California common law, such an easement requires examination 
of the circumstances of the original conveyance by the “common owner” that 
severed what is now the defendants’ property from what is now the plaintiff’s 
landlocked property.  In this case, the federal government was that common 
owner, and it first conveyed the defendants’ property without expressly reserving a 
right of access to the plaintiff’s property, which it retained.  The question is 
whether a right of access nonetheless arose by implication based on the 
circumstances surrounding that conveyance, including whether or not a strict 
1 
necessity for access resulted and the inferences reasonably drawn regarding the 
parties’ intent. 
Given the distinctive nature and history of federal land grants and the 
government’s power of eminent domain, we hold that extreme caution must be 
exercised in determining whether an access easement arises by implication when 
common ownership is traced back to a federal grant made without an express 
reservation for access.  We conclude, based on the stipulated facts presented at 
trial, that the circumstances here fail to support an easement by necessity.  We 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The parties to this matter are plaintiff Cheryl C. Murphy, Trustee of the 
Murphy Children Education Trust dated June 11, 1998, and defendants Roger 
Burch and Michele Burch, Trustees of the RMB Revocable Family Trust dated 
February 5, 1999. 
In their respective capacities as trustees, Murphy and the Burches are 
owners of certain adjoining real property in Mendocino County.  The “Murphy 
property” consists of four parcels located east of the “Burch property,” which 
consists of two parcels.  The only public road that has ever existed in the vicinity 
of the Murphy and Burch properties is California State Highway 162 (Highway 
162), which is located to the south and runs in a generally east-west direction 
without intersecting either property.  The sole means of vehicle access between 
Highway 162 and the Murphy property is a private road (the Access Road) that 
extends north from the highway and crosses over the Burch property and other 
privately owned land before entering the four parcels of the Murphy property. 
As relevant here, Murphy filed this action seeking to quiet title to an 
easement along the portion of the Access Road located on the Burch Property.  
The Burches also seek to quiet title and to permanently enjoin use of the Access 
2 
Road by Murphy and any successors.  The parties submitted this matter to a bench 
trial upon the following agreed statement of facts. 
Prior to 1876, the federal government owned all of the properties at issue in 
this case.  Over the course of time between 1876 and 1929, it deeded the parcels 
now making up the Burch property, by patent, to various private owners.1  The 
federal government conveyed these parcels without expressly reserving an 
easement over the Access Road to Highway 162 for the benefit of the parcels it 
retained, including the adjoining parcels to the east. 
On December 28, 1932, the federal government conveyed to John Bridges, 
also by patent, the four landlocked parcels now constituting the Murphy property.  
The conveyances to Bridges did not include any express grant of an easement over 
the Access Road to Highway 162 for the benefit of the conveyed property.  In 
1998, Murphy purchased these parcels from Bridges’s successors in interest. 
As indicated, the Access Road provides the only roadway access between 
the Murphy property and Highway 162.  Consequently, without an easement over 
the Access Road across the Burch property, the Murphy property has no vehicular 
access to or from any public road.  At the bench trial, the parties agreed that 
Murphy has no right to cross the Burch property by virtue of a prescriptive 
easement, but contested whether Murphy is entitled to an easement by necessity.  
The trial court resolved the matter in Murphy’s favor, and entered judgment 
accordingly.  The Burches appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed. 
                                              
1  
As used herein, a patent refers to a government grant that confers on an 
individual fee simple title to public lands, or the official document of such a grant.  
(See Kellogg v. Garcia (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 796, 800, fn. 1 (Kellogg).) 
3 
DISCUSSION 
The central issue is whether the federal patent conveyances to Murphy’s 
predecessors in interest and to the Burches’ predecessors in interest included a an 
easement by necessity over the Burch property for the benefit of the Murphy 
property. 
Generally, an easement by necessity arises from an implied grant or implied 
reservation in certain circumstances when a property owner (the grantor) conveys 
to another (the grantee) one out of two or more adjoining parcels of the grantor’s 
property.  When there is no express provision for access, and the parcel conveyed 
is either landlocked entirely by the parcels retained by the grantor or landlocked 
partly by the grantor’s retained land and partly by the land of others, the grantee 
may claim an implied grant of a right-of-way of necessity over the land retained 
by the grantor.  (See generally 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2006) 
§ 15:27, p. 15-104 (6 Miller & Starr).)  Conversely, when the grantor conveys 
adjoining property without an express agreement for access to a retained parcel 
left landlocked, the grantor may seek an implied reservation of a right-of-way of 
necessity over the conveyed property for the retained parcel’s benefit.  (6 Miller & 
Starr, supra, § 15:27, p. 15-107.)  In both situations, the landlocked parcel 
benefitted by the implied right-of-way is called the dominant tenement or 
dominant estate, while the burdened property is referred to as the servient 
tenement or servient estate.  Remote grantees in the chain of title may assert the 
easement long after its creation by the original common grantor, and despite the 
failure of a prior grantee to exercise the right.  (Lichty v. Sickels (1983) 149 
Cal.App.3d 696, 700-701; see Kripp v. Curtis (1886) 71 Cal. 62, 65 [an easement 
by necessity “pass[es] as appurtenant to the estate when sold”].) 
Easements by necessity originated in the common law and are “ ‘the result 
of the application of the presumption that whenever a party conveys property, he 
4 
conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of that property and retains 
whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of land he still possesses.’ ”  (Daywalt 
v. Walker (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 669, 672-673.)  The rationale driving this 
presumption is that “the demands of our society prevent any man-made efforts to 
hold land in perpetual idleness as would result if it were cut off from all access by 
being completely surrounded by lands privately owned.”  (Roemer v. Pappas 
(1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 201, 205.)  Hence, easements by necessity are grounded in 
the public policy that property should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or 
successful cultivation because access to the property is lacking.  (Daywalt v. 
Walker, supra, 217 Cal.App.2d at p. 672.) 
In California, the easement arises by implication based on the inferred 
intent of the parties to the property conveyance, as determined from the terms of 
the relevant instrument and the circumstances surrounding the transaction.  
(Daywalt v. Walker, supra, 217 Cal.App.2d at p. 673; County of Los Angeles v. 
Bartlett (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 523, 529.)  Two circumstances are indispensable 
to the implication and must be shown:  (1) a strict necessity for the claimed right-
of-way, as when the claimant’s property is landlocked; and (2) the dominant and 
servient tenements were under common ownership at the time of the conveyance 
giving rise to the necessity.  (Reese v. Borghi (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 324, 332-333 
[and cases cited]; see Kellogg, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 803; Daywalt v. 
Walker, supra, 217 Cal.App.2d at p. 672.)  The implication will not be made, 
however, where it is shown to be contrary to the parties’ intentions.  (Daywalt v. 
Walker, supra, 217 Cal.App.2d at p. 674; County of Los Angeles v. Bartlett, supra, 
203 Cal.App.2d at p. 529.) 
To satisfy the strict-necessity requirement, the party claiming the easement 
must demonstrate it is strictly necessary for access to the alleged dominant 
tenement.  (Kripp v. Curtis, supra, 71 Cal. at p. 65.)  No easement will be implied 
5 
where there is another possible means of access, even if that access is shown to be 
inconvenient, difficult, or costly.  (See ibid.)  Moreover, such an easement 
continues only as long as the need for it exists.  (Ibid.; Lichty v. Sickels, supra, 149 
Cal.App.3d at p. 699; see generally 28 Cal.Jur.3d (2004) Easements and Licenses, 
§ 70, pp. 221-222.)  Thus, if adequate alternative access becomes available, the 
easement terminates because it no longer serves to promote the underlying public 
policy considerations.  (See generally Bruce & Ely, The Law of Easements and 
Licenses in Land (2008) Creation of Easements by Implication, § 4:12, p. 4-41.) 
To meet the common-ownership requirement, the party seeking the 
easement must establish that the lands composing the alleged dominant and 
servient estates were once under common ownership and that a conveyance by the 
common owner gave rise to the necessity for a right-of-way.  In the absence of 
common ownership, an easement by necessity will not be implied based solely on 
a showing of necessity.  (Daywalt v. Walker, supra, 217 Cal.App.2d at p. 673, 
relying on County of Los Angeles v. Bartlett, supra, 203 Cal.App.2d at p. 529.) 
Decisions stress the significance of strict necessity and common ownership 
as circumstances from which the intent of the parties may be inferred.  As one case 
explained, “ ‘[a]n implication of the grant of a way of necessity may arise from the 
transaction, but the necessity does not of itself create a right of way, though it may 
be evidence of the grantor’s intention to convey one and raise an implication of a 
grant.’ ”  (County of Los Angeles v. Bartlett, supra, 203 Cal.App.2d at p. 530.)  
Another decision similarly concluded:  “[t]he fact that there is no way to the land 
sold except over the remaining land of the grantor, or that the remaining land of 
the grantor is not accessible except over the land granted by him, is only a 
circumstance resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties 
to the grant or reservation of a way . . . .”  (United States v. Rindge (S.D.Cal. 
1913) 208 F. 611, 620.)  As these authorities recognize, the common law doctrine 
6 
does not exist to ensure a right of access to any and all landlocked property; rather, 
the doctrine is properly applied only when the circumstances establish that an 
access easement was intended at the time of the common owner’s conveyance. 
When federal or state land patents are at issue, strict necessity and common 
ownership remain requirements of an easement by necessity.  In contrast to private 
party conveyances, however, conveyances involving a sovereign as the common 
owner typically do not give rise to implied reservations of easements or other 
property interests in conveyed land.  (E.g., Leo Sheep Co. v. United States (1979) 
440 U.S. 668, 679-681 (Leo Sheep) [easement by necessity]; Hash v. United States 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) 403 F.3d 1308, 1313-1318 [fee interest in land underlying 
abandoned railroad easements]; State v. Black Bros. (Tex. 1927) 297 S.W. 213, 
217-218 [way of necessity].)2  Courts have come to this result based on various 
considerations. 
First, all patents, particularly those of federal origin, play a significant role 
in establishing title to property:  “ ‘A patent to land, issued by the United States 
under authority of law, is the highest evidence of title, something upon which the 
holder can rely for peace and security in his possession.’ ”  (Brown v. Northern 
Hills Regional Railroad Authority (S.D. 2007) 732 N.W.2d 732, 739.)  Mindful of 
this circumstance, a number of courts express reluctance to interfere with the 
certainty and predictability of land titles conferred by a sovereign without any 
express reservation of rights.  (E.g., Leo Sheep, supra, 440 U.S. at pp. 687-688; 
                                              
2  
But several authorities have held, assumed, or recognized that conveyances 
by a sovereign may give rise to a sovereign’s implied grant of an easement over 
the land it retains, for the benefit of the property it conveys.  (E.g., Kellogg, supra, 
102 Cal.App.4th 796; Moores v. Walsh (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1046; accord, 
Kinscherff v. United States (10th Cir. 1978) 586 F.2d 159.) 
7 
Brown v. Northern Hills Regional Railroad Authority, supra, 732 N.W.2d at pp. 
739-740; Granite Beach Holdings v. State of Washington (Wn.Ct.App. 2000) 11 
P.3d 847, 854-855 (Granite Beach Holdings); State v. Black Bros., supra, 297 
S.W. at p. 218; United States v. Rindge, supra, 208 F. at p. 619 [dictum].) 
Second, the federal government owned most all of the land at one time.  
Observing that generations of federal patents have issued with no express 
reservation of rights, some courts warn that the common-ownership requirement 
would be meaningless unless stronger showings are required for implying an 
easement by necessity in cases tracing back to patents.  (E.g., State v. Black Bros., 
supra, 297 S.W. at p. 218; see also Granite Beach Holdings, supra, 11 P.3d at pp. 
854-855.) 
Finally, some courts recognize that strict necessity does not exist in the case 
of the sovereign as in the case of the private landowner, because the sovereign can 
exercise the power of eminent domain to obtain any and all reasonable rights-of-
way.  (E.g., Leo Sheep, supra, 440 U.S. at pp. 679-680; State v. Black Bros., 
supra, 297 S.W. at pp. 218-219; see also Moores v. Walsh, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 
1046, 1049-1050, fn. 1, 1051 [assuming an easement by necessity could be found 
if traced to common ownership by the federal government, any such easement was 
extinguished when state grantee could exercise its power of eminent domain].) 
The United States Supreme Court adverted to at least two of these 
considerations in Leo Sheep, supra, 440 U.S. 668.  In that case, the federal 
government had made a land grant to a private party without expressly reserving a 
right-of-way for public access to a reservoir located on landlocked federal 
property.  The government sought to establish an implied reservation in the land 
grant, but the high court rejected the claim:  “Where a private landowner conveys 
to another individual a portion of his lands in a certain area and retains the rest, it 
is presumed at common law that the grantor has reserved an easement to pass over 
8 
the granted property if such passage is necessary to reach the retained property.  
These rights-of-way are referred to as ‘easements by necessity.’  There are two 
problems with the Government’s reliance on that notion in this case.  First of all, 
whatever right of passage a private landowner might have, it is not at all clear that 
it would include the right to construct a road for public access to a recreational 
area.  More importantly, the easement is not actually a matter of necessity in this 
case because the Government has the power of eminent domain.”  (Leo Sheep, 
supra, 440 U.S. at pp. 679-680, fns. omitted.) 
The high court proceeded to explain that the “pertinent inquiry” was the 
intent of Congress when it granted the land in question pursuant to the Union 
Pacific Act of 1862.3  (Leo Sheep, supra, 440 U.S. at p. 681.)  After observing that 
the 1862 act specifically listed certain reservations to the grant but not one for 
access, the court declined to “find the tenuous relevance of the common-law 
doctrine of ways of necessity sufficient to overcome the inference prompted by the 
omission of any reference to the reserved right [of access] asserted by the 
Government.”  (Ibid.)  As the court explained, “[i]t is possible that Congress gave 
the problem of access little thought; but it is at least as likely that the thought 
which was given focused on negotiation, reciprocity considerations, and the power 
of eminent domain as the obvious devices for ameliorating disputes.”  (Ibid., fn. 
omitted.)  The high court held, both as a matter of common law doctrine and as a 
matter of construing congressional intent, that no reserved right-of-way existed:  
“[W]e are unwilling to imply rights-of-way, with the substantial impact that such 
                                              
3  
Because federal land patents are effected by means of enactments that 
constitute laws as well as contracts, the intent of Congress is a prominent 
consideration in their interpretation.  (See generally 3 Sutherland Statutes and 
Statutory Construction (6th ed. 2008 update) Public Land Grants, § 64:7, p. 357.) 
9 
implication would have on property rights granted over 100 years ago, in the 
absence of a stronger case for their implication than the Government makes here.”  
(Id. at p. 682.) 
The foregoing authorities and the considerations they raise are persuasive.  
Therefore, although we need not and do not presently impose a categorical bar to 
all easement-by-necessity claims tracing common ownership to the federal 
government, we hold that the special considerations above must inform the 
determination whether such an easement arises by implication.  This means that, 
consistent with existing California common law, an easement by necessity may 
arise by implication based on the inferred intent of the parties to the property 
conveyance, as determined from the terms of the relevant instrument and the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction.  (Daywalt v. Walker, supra, 217 
Cal.App.2d at p. 673; County of Los Angeles v. Bartlett, supra, 203 Cal.App.2d at 
p. 530.)  Strict necessity and common ownership remain required showings 
(Kellogg, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 803; Daywalt v. Walker, supra, 217 
Cal.App.2d at p. 672), but when a claimant traces common ownership back to the 
federal government and seeks to establish an implied reservation of an access 
right-of-way, the intent of Congress is paramount and the government’s power of 
eminent domain also bears significance.  (Leo Sheep, supra, 440 U.S. at pp. 679-
682.)  Given the unique historical and legal nature of land patents, extreme caution 
must be exercised in determining whether the circumstances surrounding a 
government land grant are sufficient to overcome the inference prompted by the 
omission of an express reference to a reserved right of access.  (See id. at pp. 681-
682.)  In such cases, the easement claimant bears the burden of producing 
evidence on the issues regarding the government’s intent to reserve an easement 
and the government’s lack of power to condemn. 
10 
In this matter, the federal government once simultaneously owned all the 
parcels composing the claimed dominant estate (the Murphy property) and all the 
parcels of the claimed servient estate (the Burch property).  By 1929, the 
government granted to private parties the last of the patents pertaining to the 
Burch property, and in 1932 it granted to John Bridges the patents pertaining to 
the Murphy property. 
The parties agree that, without an easement over the Access Road across 
the Burch property, the Murphy property has no vehicular access to or from any 
public road.  The parties dispute, however, which conveyance gave rise to the 
necessity for the easement, and whether there was common ownership of the 
claimed dominant and servient tenements at the time of the relevant conveyance.  
Murphy asserts the relevant conveyance occurred in 1929, when the federal 
government deeded the last of the parcels composing the Burch property while 
retaining ownership of the landlocked Murphy property.  She claims the 
conveyances in 1929 and earlier gave rise to an implied reservation of a right-of-
way of necessity over the conveyed Burch property for the benefit of the retained 
Murphy property.  Conversely, the Burches contend that common ownership 
cannot be established because the relevant conveyance occurred in 1932, when the 
federal government deeded the landlocked Murphy property to John Bridges but 
no longer owned the Burch property. 
We agree that an easement by necessity cannot arise by implication from 
the 1932 conveyance because common ownership was lacking.  But even 
assuming the relevant conveyance took place in 1929,4 when the federal 
                                              
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
4  
Although the government issued earlier patents for certain parcels of the 
Burch property, neither side offers arguments independent of the last 1929 patent.  
11 
government was the common owner of the Murphy property and the Burch 
property, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the trial court judgment in 
Murphy’s favor cannot stand. 
The record on appeal discloses that neither the patents themselves, nor the 
circumstances surrounding their issuance, support an easement by necessity.  The 
parties stipulated that “[t]he U.S. Government did not, when conveying out any 
parcel of the property along the Access Road between the Murphy property and 
Highway 162, expressly reserve an easement over the Access Road to Highway 
162 for the benefit of the Murphy property or other surrounding properties being 
retained by the U.S. Government.”  Murphy offered no legislative history 
demonstrating that Congress intended to imply a reservation of an easement under 
the federal statutes authorizing the subject patents.  (See Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 
75, 12 Stat. 392; Act of Mar. 3, 1855, ch. 207, 10 Stat. 701; Act of Apr. 24, 1820, 
ch. 51, 3 Stat. 566; accord, Granite Beach Holdings, supra, 11 P.3d at p. 854.)  
Indeed, any implication of a reservation for access appears negated by the 
circumstance that two of the statutes expressly provided for limited rights of 
reversion in the government, but omitted reservation of any other interest.  (Act of 
May 20, 1862, ch. 75, § 5, 12 Stat. 392 [purchaser’s change of residence or 
abandonment of land]; Act of Apr. 24, 1820, ch. 51, §§ 3, 4, 3 Stat. 566 
[purchaser’s failure in payment].)  Nor did Murphy show that the government 
lacked authority to condemn access if it deemed that doing so was necessary.  (See 
Granite Beach Holdings, supra, 11 P.3d at p. 854.) 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Accordingly, our analysis of the 1929 patent will be determinative with regard to 
both the Burch parcels at issue here. 
12 
In addressing these deficiencies, Murphy relies on Kellogg, supra, 102 
Cal.App.4th 796, in which the plaintiff owners of certain landlocked property 
traced common ownership back to the federal government and claimed an 
easement by necessity over the defendants’ neighboring properties.  Ruling in the 
plaintiffs’ favor, Kellogg broadly stated that “the federal government may be the 
common owner of the properties whose conveyance gives rise to the strict 
necessity that justifies an easement by necessity,” and that such a conclusion “is 
consistent with the public policy” to “promote the productive use of land.”  
(Kellogg at p. 799; see also Moores v. Walsh, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1049, fn. 
1.)  Murphy’s reliance on Kellogg is misplaced. 
Unlike the situation here, Kellogg, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 796, did not 
concern a claim of an implied reservation.  Rather, the plaintiffs in Kellogg sought 
to establish that when the federal government made a grant of landlocked 
property, the government also impliedly granted a right of access for that property 
over the land it retained.  (Kellogg at p. 811.)  Because exercise of the 
government’s power of eminent domain could have had no effect on access to the 
conveyed landlocked property, it is hardly surprising that Kellogg made no attempt 
to distinguish the authorities holding that such power negates the element of strict 
necessity when an implied reservation claim is at issue.  (E.g., Leo Sheep, supra, 
440 U.S. 668, Hash v. United States, supra, 403 F.3d 1308; State v. Black Bros., 
supra, 297 S.W. 213; cf. ante, fn. 2.)  As one treatise observes, where the 
government is identified as the common grantor, “an easement of necessity may 
be created against the government, but the government agency cannot establish an 
easement by necessity over land it has conveyed because its power of eminent 
domain removes the strict necessity required for the creation of an easement by 
necessity.”  (6 Miller & Starr, supra, § 15:27, p. 15-106, fns. omitted; see also id., 
§ 15:28, p. 15-109; cf. Moores v. Walsh, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1051; 
13 
Kinscherff v. United States, supra, 586 F.2d at pp. 159, 161 [plaintiffs who 
acquired landlocked land by federal patent entitled to a hearing to determine 
whether their patent included an implied easement to use an access road across 
federal land]; State of Utah v. Andrus (D.Utah 1979) 486 F.Supp. 995, 1002 & fn. 
11].) 
Moreover, Murphy’s expansive reading of Kellogg, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 
796, would, in the words of the Court of Appeal below, “effectively mean that any 
and all federal patent grants of adjoining California parcels of land, some 
landlocked and some not, and no matter in which order deeded to private parties, 
have always included (and hereafter always will) an easement of necessity from 
the landlocked property across the nonlandlocked properties to the nearest public 
road.”  (Fn. omitted.)  Neither the public policy generally favoring access to 
landlocked property, nor the easement decisions involving federal patents, call for 
such a far-reaching rule. 
Next, Murphy acknowledges Leo Sheep’s holding that the easement 
claimed there “is not actually a matter of necessity in [the] case because the 
Government has the power of eminent domain.”  (Leo Sheep, supra, 440 U.S. at 
pp. 679-680.)  She contends, however, this holding is unpersuasive here, because 
the easement she seeks does not implicate a public right-of-way.  Relying on Con. 
Channel Co. v. C. P. R. R. Co. (1876) 51 Cal. 269 and City of Oakland v. Oakland 
Raiders (1982) 32 Cal.3d 60, Murphy asserts the government may properly 
condemn an easement only if such action is necessary to provide public access to 
an area that is open to the public, such as the public reservoir and recreational area 
at issue in Leo Sheep.  We are not persuaded. 
Those decisions merely establish that a valid public purpose will not be 
found, and therefore the power of eminent domain cannot be exercised, where the 
proposed condemnation would benefit only a private company or individual.  
14 
(Con. Channel Co. v. C. P. R. R. Co., supra, 51 Cal. at pp. 271-273 [finding statute 
unconstitutional to the extent it authorized exercise of the right of eminent domain 
in behalf of a private mining company for its private use]; City of Oakland v. 
Oakland Raiders, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 72 [acquisition and operation of a football 
team franchise might be shown to serve a valid public purpose, and thus might 
support a city’s effort to condemn the franchise].) 
The issue here, however, is not whether the federal government could 
validly have condemned an easement over the Burch property for the benefit of a 
private owner or privately owned property.  Because the federal government still 
owned the Murphy property when it conveyed the Burch property, the relevant 
consideration is whether the government had the power to condemn an easement 
along the Access Road to provide access to its own land.  Murphy identifies no 
evidence or legal authority indicating the federal government lacked power to do 
so, and at least one California case, addressing the state power of eminent domain, 
suggests otherwise.  (Moores v. Walsh, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1051.) 
Finally, Murphy contends her claim is supported by several decisions 
holding that the ability to condemn an access easement does not preclude the 
creation of a common law easement by necessity.  (E.g., Blum v. Weston (1894) 
102 Cal. 362, 369; Taylor v. Warnaky (1880) 55 Cal. 350, 351; Roemer v Pappas, 
supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 206; Reese v. Borghi, supra, 216 Cal.App.2d at pp. 
329-330.)  Those decisions are of questionable relevance, however, because they 
addressed a limited and purely private statutory right of condemnation that has 
since been repealed.5  More importantly, extending their reasoning to this case 
                                              
5  
(Code of Civ. Proc., former § 1238, repealed by Stats. 1975, ch. 1275, § 1, 
p. 3409; Civ. Code, former § 1001, repealed by Stats. 1975, ch. 1240, § 1, p. 
3156.) 
15 
16 
would be at odds with the recognition that an easement is not a matter of necessity 
when the federal government has the power of eminent domain (Leo Sheep, supra, 
440 U.S. at pp. 681-682) and that strict necessity may be extinguished when a 
sovereign owner fails to exercise its power (Moores v. Walsh, supra, 38 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1051).  Such extension would also impede the public policy 
favoring the certainty and predictability of the countless patents that have issued 
over the last 180 years.  (See Leo Sheep, supra, 440 U.S. at pp. 687-688.) 
In sum, we conclude, based on the parties’ stipulated facts, that neither the 
patents in this case, nor the circumstances surrounding their issuance, support the 
implication that the federal government reserved a right of access over the Burch 
property in 1929 when it conveyed that property while retaining the landlocked 
Murphy property.  Accordingly, Murphy’s claim for an easement by necessity 
fails. 
DISPOSITION 
While easements by necessity are grounded in the public policy that 
property should not be rendered idle due to lack of access, the need for access, by 
itself, does not entitle a landlocked property owner to burden a neighbor’s land 
when the easement claim must be traced back to a federal patent.  For all the 
reasons above, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Murphy v. Burch 
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Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 156 Cal.App.4th 1434 
Rehearing Granted 
 
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Opinion No. S159489 
Date Filed: April 27, 2009 
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Court: Superior 
County: Mendocino 
Judge: Richard Henderson 
 
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Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Petersen Law Offices, Thomas E. Owen and Robert C. Petersen for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
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Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Carter, Vannucci & Momsen, Jared G. Carter and Brian C. Carter for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Thomas E. Owen 
Petersen Law Offices 
1102 S. Main Street, Suite 2 
Fort Bragg, CA  95437 
(707) 964-4044 
 
Brian C.. Carter 
Carter, Vannucci & Momsen 
444 North State Street 
Ukiah, CA  95482 
(707) 462-6694