Case Title: State v. Green

Citation: 173 Vt. 540, 790 A.2d 426

Docket Number: 2001-035

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Green (2001-035); 173 Vt. 540; 790 A.2d 426

[Filed 21-Dec-2001]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-035

                             DECEMBER TERM, 2001

State of Vermont 	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont,
                                       }	Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit
Kenneth Green	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 114-8-99Wmcs

                                                Trial Judge: David T. Suntag

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The State appeals from the district court's judgment in favor of
  defendant in this civil license  suspension proceeding.  The State
  challenges the trial court's ruling that, in cases involving  defendants
  who submitted to a test after being stopped for driving while intoxicated
  (DWI), the State  must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
  defendant was operating a vehicle, rather  than showing merely that the
  arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant  was
  operating the vehicle.  We affirm.

       On the evening of August 13, 1999, a police officer for the Town of
  Wilmington observed an  oncoming vehicle pass by him at a high rate of
  speed.  The officer turned his patrol car around and  pursued the vehicle
  to a nearby residence, where he observed defendant walking around the car.  
  Defendant denied that he had been driving the car, but he was eventually
  arrested and processed for  DWI.  At the police station, he agreed to take
  a breath test, which revealed an alcohol concentration  of .139.  In
  response to the DWI criminal charge filed against him, defendant submitted
  affidavits  stating that he was not the driver on the night in question. 
  Based on these affidavits and the fact that  the arresting officer had been
  unable to actually see who was operating the vehicle, the district court 
  found that the State had not proven that defendant was the operator that
  night; accordingly, the  criminal charge was dismissed.

       At the continued final suspension hearing, the court found once again
  that the State had failed  to prove operation, even by a
  preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.  The court rejected the State's 
  argument that the relevant statute required the State to prove only that
  the arresting officer  reasonably believed that defendant was operating the
  vehicle at the time alleged.  On appeal, the  State reiterates its argument
  that it needed to prove only that the officer had reasonable grounds to 
  believe that defendant was operating the vehicle at the time in question.

 

  Under 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h), the issues at a final civil suspension hearing
  are limited to:

         (1) whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable
    grounds to  believe that the person was operating, attempting to
    operate or in actual  physical control of a vehicle in violation
    of section 1201 of this title;

         (2) whether at the time of the request for the evidentiary
    test the  officer informed the person of the person's rights and
    the consequences of  taking and refusing the test substantially as
    set out in subsection 1202(d) of  this title;

         (3) whether the person refused to permit the test;

         (4) whether the test was taken and the test results indicated
    that the  person's alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more at the
    time of operating,  attempting to operate or being in actual
    physical control of a vehicle in  violation of section 1201 of
    this title, whether the testing methods used  were valid and
    reliable and whether the test results were accurate and 
    accurately evaluated. . . .

         (5) whether the requirements of section 1202 of this title
    were  complied with.

  (Emphasis added.)  The district court is required to suspend a person's
  license upon finding either  that (1) the law enforcement officer had
  reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating a  vehicle while
  intoxicated, but the person refused to submit to a test, or (2) the officer
  had reasonable  grounds to believe the person was operating a vehicle while
  intoxicated, the person submitted to a  test, and the test result indicated
  that the person's alcohol concentration exceeded the statutory limit  "at
  the time the person was operating" the vehicle.  23 V.S.A. § 1205(i).

       This Court has already held under a similarly worded predecessor
  statute that, in cases where  the defendant refused to submit to a test,
  the trial court is not required to find that the defendant was  operating
  the vehicle, but rather only that "the officer had reasonable grounds to
  believe there was  operation or control."  Shaw v. Vermont District Court,
  152 Vt. 1, 4, 563 A.2d 636, 638 (1989).  In  the State's view, there is no
  separate statutory element of operation contained in § 1205(h), and thus 
  the holding in Shaw should apply equally to cases in which the defendant
  submitted to a test.

       We find the State's argument unpersuasive.  The only plausible
  interpretation of § 1205(h)(1)  is that the officer must have a reasonable
  basis for requesting that a motorist take a test.  If the person  refuses
  to take the test, it is the refusal itself, not operation while
  intoxicated, that is the basis for any  license suspension.  Because
  license suspension may follow from a refusal to take a test, the 
  Legislature has elected to protect motorists from capricious or
  unreasonable demands that they  submit to a test by requiring "that it be
  adjudicatively determined whether or not the belief of the

 

  officer, from which the request for a test is generated, is a reasonable
  one."  State v. District Court,  129 Vt. 212, 214,