Case Title: Patricia Poffenbarger and Michael Poffenbarger v. Merit Energy Company and David Hertel

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1041707

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 05/11/2007  Poffenbarger
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1041707
____________________
Patricia Poffenbarger and Michael Poffenbarger
v.
Merit Energy Company and David Hertel
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court 
(CV-03-945)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Pursuant 
to 
Rule 
5, 
Ala. 
R. 
App. 
P., 
Patricia
Poffenbarger and Michael Poffenbarger, husband and wife,
appeal from a partial summary judgment entered by the Mobile
1041707
The record reflects that this 32-acre tract of land was,
1
itself, the subject of an oil and mineral rights lease between
the Poffenbargers and a third-party lessee.
2
Circuit Court in favor of Merit Energy Company ("Merit") and
David Hertel, Merit's operations manager.  We affirm.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
In 1955, oil was discovered beneath the surface of land
located in and around Citronelle, Alabama.  This discovery led
to the development of what is known as the "Citronelle oil
field."
In 1995 and 1999, Merit acquired substantial interests in
the Citronelle oil field.  On August 29, 2002, a leak was
discovered in a section of one of the oil pipelines acquired
by Merit.  That section of pipeline, although located on land
adjacent 
to 
a 
32-acre 
tract 
of 
land 
owned 
by 
the
Poffenbargers, ran along, and in close proximity to, the
boundary of that 32-acre tract.  Oil had escaped through a
hole in the pipeline and had entered the Poffenbargers' land.
This 32-acre tract is uninhabited woodlands and, except for
pipelines and other equipment associated with the production
of oil, is undeveloped.1
1041707
3
Merit contracted with M&M Industrial Services ("M&M") to
remove the spilled oil from the Poffenbargers' property.
After containing the oil, M&M replaced the leaking section of
pipeline.  M&M was on-site cleaning the oil spill from
August 29, 2002, through October 1, 2002.  Merit spent
approximately 
$42,000 
on 
the 
initial 
cleanup 
of 
the
Poffenbargers' property.
In November 2002, Merit's operations engineer, Laura
Nofziger, informed Mrs. Poffenbarger by letter that Merit had
completed its cleanup of the property.  Merit admits that
Nofziger's assertion to Mrs. Poffenbarger was incorrect and
that oil remains on the Poffenbargers' property.
On March 21, 2003, the Poffenbargers sued Merit and
Hertel, among others, asserting claims of trespass, nuisance,
wantonness, and negligence.  They sought "compensatory and
punitive damages in an amount deemed appropriate by the jury,
plus costs."  Merit and Hertel filed a joint answer in which
they denied the material allegations of the complaint and
asserted various affirmative defenses.  Later, Merit and
Hertel amended their answer by adding, in further response to
the Poffenbargers' punitive-damages claim, an affirmative
1041707
Merit and Hertel's motion also sought a partial summary
2
judgment on the question of whether the Poffenbargers were
entitled to recover damages for any mental anguish they may
have suffered.
In contrast, the defendants have proposed two plans for
3
the remediation of the Poffenbargers' property.  One would
cost between $10,000 and $15,000; the other would cost between
$40,000 and $56,000.
4
defense that stated, in part, that "[o]n August 9, 2004,
[Merit] entered into a consent agreement with the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and pursuant to that agreement
paid a fine of $78,672.00, which was in part a penalty for the
spill which is at issue in this case."
On February 11, 2005, Merit and Hertel filed a motion for
a partial summary judgment as to the proper measure of
compensatory damages for the contamination of real property.2
In their supporting brief, Merit and Hertel noted that the
Poffenbargers were seeking, as damages, the cost to remediate
their property and that, according to the Poffenbargers'
expert witness, the cost of that remediation was estimated to
be $2,608,740.   Merit and Hertel pointed out that an
3
appraisal of the Poffenbargers' 32-acre tract had been
obtained and that the appraisal indicated a $38,628 value
1041707
There was evidence that the oil spill affected only 5 of
4
the 32 acres in the tract at issue.  The change in value from
$38,628 to $32,628 was based upon the assumption that the 5
contaminated acres lost all their value, while the remainder
of the acreage lost no value, as a result of the spill.
5
before the contamination ($1,200 per acre) and a post-
contamination value of $32,628.4
Merit and Hertel argued that the proper measure of
damages for an injury to real property is not the cost to
remediate the property, but, instead, is the diminution in the
fair market value of the property resulting from the injury.
Merit and Hertel asserted that, although a property owner may
recover the cost of remediation if the injury to the property
is "temporary" rather than permanent, the repair costs
recovered cannot exceed the diminution in the fair market
value of the property caused by the injury.  They argued that,
because the cost of remediating the Poffenbargers' property
exceeded the diminution in its value, the proper measure of
damages for the injury to the Poffenbargers' property was the
diminution in the value of the property.
In response, the Poffenbargers argued that the leak of
oil onto their property caused what Alabama cases refer to as
a "temporary" injury and that, accordingly, they were entitled
1041707
The trial court also entered a summary judgment in favor
5
of Merit and Hertel on their assertion that the Poffenbargers
are not entitled to mental-anguish damages.  The present
appeal does not involve that portion of the trial court's
judgment.
6
under Alabama law to recover the cost of restoring the real
property to its predamaged condition.  They also argued that
the rule of law limiting damages for injuries to real property
caused by pollution to the diminution in value of the property
was antiquated, given the "emerging area of environmental law
and pollution control," as well as the implementation of
statutes and regulations seeking to limit pollution.
On August 1, 2005, the trial court granted Merit and
Hertel's motion and entered a partial summary judgment in
their favor.  In its order, the trial court found "that there
[was] no genuine issue of material fact as to [the
Poffenbargers'] claim[] for remediation costs which exceed
diminution in fair market value of the land ... and that
[Merit and Hertel] are entitled to a summary judgment in their
favor on [this] claim[] as a matter of law."   The trial court
5
held
"that the proper measure of compensatory damages in
this action, which is based on alleged damages to
[the 
Poffenbargers'] 
real 
property, 
is 
the
difference between the fair market value of the
1041707
The trial court's decision to eliminate the language
6
making its order final under Rule 54(b) was appropriate.  As
this Court 
recently 
stated, "'[F]or a 
Rule 54(b) certification
of finality to be effective, it must fully adjudicate at least
one claim or fully dispose of the claims as they relate to at
least one party.'"  Scrushy v. Tucker, [Ms. 1050564, April 12,
2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006) (quoting Haynes v. Alfa
Fin. Corp., 730 So. 2d 178, 181 (Ala. 1999)) (emphasis added).
7
property before and after the alleged damage, not to
exceed the fair market value of the property before
the alleged damage."
The trial court certified its judgment as final pursuant to
Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  It also certified that an
immediate appeal from the judgment would materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation because it involved
a controlling question of law as to which there was a
substantial ground for a difference of opinion.  According to
the trial court, the controlling question of law was: "[W]hat
is the appropriate measure of compensatory damages for
contamination to land where the remediation or clean-up costs
exceed the fair market value of the land before it was
contaminated?"  Thereafter, the trial court amended its order
nunc pro tunc, eliminating the language making the order final
under Rule 54(b).6
Pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., the Poffenbargers
petitioned this Court for permission to appeal from the trial
1041707
8
court's partial summary judgment.  This Court granted the
Poffenbargers' petition.
II.  Standard of Review
A summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 56, Ala. R.
Civ. P.  We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for a
summary judgment de novo.  Bruce v. Cole, 854 So. 2d 47, 54
(Ala. 2003).  In the present case, our review is de novo for
the additional reason that the material facts are undisputed
and the only issue presented involves a pure question of law.
See Christian v. Murray, 915 So. 2d 23, 25 (Ala. 2005).
III.  Analysis
This appeal presents, for the first time, a fact
situation that directly raises the following question:  Under
Alabama law, what is the general rule for the measurement of
direct, compensatory damages for an injury to real property
when the cost to remediate the property exceeds the diminution
in the value of the property caused by the injury?  The
Poffenbargers assert that the proper measure of damages is the
full cost to remediate the property; Merit and Hertel assert
1041707
9
that the proper measure of damages generally is the diminution
in the value of the property.  We agree with Merit and Hertel,
and we therefore conclude that the trial court's judgment is
due to be affirmed.
Although this is the first time this Court has been
confronted with a case in which the cost to remediate injured
real property exceeds the diminution in its value caused by
the injury, this Court, on numerous occasions, has addressed
the issue of the proper measure of damages for injury to real
property.  Those cases, as well as the authorities on which
they rely, inform our conclusion in the present case.
At issue in Brinkmeyer v. Bethea, 139 Ala. 376, 35 So.
996 (1904), was a trespass to real property that involved the
removal from the real property of clay, dirt, and topsoil.
This Court described the common-law measure of damages for
injuries to real property as follows:
"'In actions for injury to real property, when
the injury is done to the realty itself, the measure
of damages is the difference in the value of the
land before and after the trespass, or in some cases
the amount necessary to restore the property to the
condition in which it was before the trespass was
committed.' - [5] Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 36; 3 Sedg.
on Damages (8th Ed.) § 932."
1041707
10
139 Ala. at 378, 35 So. at 997 (emphasis added).  The quoted
passage from The American and English Encyclopedia of Law is
followed in that Encyclopedia by a footnote explaining as
follows:  "Where the cost of putting the premises in the same
condition in which they were before the trespass exceeds the
increased value thereby added to the land, the depreciation in
value of the land will usually be held to be the measure of
damages."  5 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 36 n.1
(John Houston Merrill ed., 1888).  Section 932 of Sedgwick on
Damages, the other source upon which this Court relied in
Brinkmeyer, similarly states:
"The general principle upon which compensation
for injuries to real property is given, is that the
plaintiff should be reimbursed to the extent of the
injury to the property.  The injury caused by the
defendant may be of a permanent nature; in such a
case the measure of damages is the diminution of the
market value of the property.  If the injury caused
a total or partial loss of the land for a limited
time, the diminution in rental value is the measure.
One of these two measures is always applicable.  If
the injury is easily reparable, the cost of
repairing may be recovered.  But it must be shown
that the repairs were reasonable; and if the cost of
repairing the injury is greater than the diminution
in market value of the land, the latter is always
the true measure of damages.  Strictly speaking,
therefore, the cost of repairs is not the measure of
damages, but only evidence of the amount of
damages."
1041707
11
3 Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Measure of Damages
§ 932 (8th ed. 1891) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
In Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Mitchell, 161 Ala.
278, 49 So. 851 (1909), this Court again addressed the proper
measure of damages for an injury to real property.  This Court
described the facts before it in that case as follows:
"This was an action for damages for the overflow
of appellee's land, caused by the defendant's
obstruction of the natural flow of waters in a creek
or branch. ...
"....
"Plaintiff had a number of tenant houses upon
his land and it appeared in evidence that the
overflow of water invaded some of the houses,
leaving in those invaded, and under all of them, and
on the land, slime, mud, and debris, causing the
floors to swell, and piers to settle, and the sills
to rot.  The plaintiff testified that he had cleaned
up the land and houses, and partially repaired the
injuries done to the foundations and floors of the
houses. 
 
This 
had 
been 
accomplished 
at 
an
expenditure of $300, and had so far restored the
premises to their original condition that the rent
received from each of the houses had been diminished
by 50 cents a month only.  There had been no loss of
soil, nor had any part of the premises been
seriously or permanently overlaid by soil deposited
upon them."
161 Ala. at 280-83, 49 So. at 852-53.  Discussing the
appropriate measure of damages, we stated:
1041707
12
"On these facts, without more, the plaintiff was not
entitled to compensation as for the lasting
detriment of his land–-as for detriment not to be
averted or removed by reasonable effort and
expenditure. 
 
4 
Suth. 
Dam. 
§§ 
1017, 
1018;
Abercrombie v. Windham, 127 Ala. 179, 28 South. 387
[(1900)].  So far as these injuries are concerned,
the true measure of plaintiff's damages was the
reasonable expense of restoring the premises and the
loss of income pending their restoration with
reasonable effort, expenditure, and expedition.  The
plaintiff was in duty bound to make reasonable
effort to prevent the accumulation of damages."
161 Ala. at 283, 49 So. at 853.
In reaching its decision in Sloss-Sheffield, this Court
relied, among other things, on 4 J.G. Sutherland, A Treatise
on the Law of Damages §§ 1017-18 (3d ed. 1904).  Sections 1017
and 1018 of that treatise state, in part, as follows:
"§ 1017. ...  Wherever, by one act, a permanent
injury is done the damages are assessed once for
all, even though separate parcels of land are
affected, and any depreciation in the value of the
property will be an element of damages according to
the extent and duration of the plaintiff's estate.
...
"....
"§ 1018. ...  If the wrong consists in the
destruction or removal of some addition, fixture or
part of the premises the loss may be estimated upon
the diminution of their value if any results, or
upon the value of the part severed considered either
as a part of the premises or detached ....  When
occasion requires it the rule is generally announced
to be that when the reasonable cost of repairing the
1041707
References to "temporary" and "permanent" injury to land
7
in many of the cases referenced in this opinion may relate not
just to whether the injury naturally will abate, i.e., correct
itself, within some period of time, but whether the injury is
reparable by human intervention.  In Sloss-Sheffield Steel &
Iron Co., this Court stated:
"Where permanent (that is, irreparable) injury
is done to the freehold, it would seem that the only
proper measure of damages is the difference between
the value of the premises with and without such
13
injury by restoring the premises is less than the
damage done such cost measures the damages; but if
the cost of restoration is more than the diminished
value the latter generally determines the amount of
the recovery."
4 Sutherland on Damages §§ 1017-18 (emphasis added; footnotes
omitted).
In Fuller v. Fair, 202 Ala. 430, 80 So. 814 (1919), this
Court stated the general measure of damages for injury to real
property as follows:
"(1) If the land is taken, or its value totally
destroyed, the owner is entitled to recover the
market value thereof at the time of the taking or
destruction, with legal interest thereon to the time
of the trial.  (2) If the land is permanently
injured, but not totally destroyed, the owner will
be entitled to recover the difference between the
market value of the land at the time immediately
preceding the injury and the market value of the
land in its immediate condition after the injury,
with legal interest thereon to the time of the
trial.  (3) If the land is temporarily, but not
permanently,
 injured, the owner is entitled to
[7]
1041707
injury at the time thereof. ...
"But where the injury is not permanent, and the
premises 
may 
be 
restored 
to 
their 
original
condition, a different rule prevails in this state."
181 Ala. at 581, 61 So. at 936 (emphasis added).  In Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gadsden Sand & Gravel Co., 248 Ala. 273,
279, 27 So. 2d 578, 584 (1946), this Court referenced injuries
to land that are "not permanent, but reparable."  One writer,
taking note of Alabama decisions indicating that, "[i]f the
cost of restoration plus loss of use exceeds the diminution in
value of the land, ... the distinction [between permanent and
temporary injuries] becomes moot because damages will be
limited to the diminution in value," expressly suggests that
"whether an injury is temporary or permanent for the purpose
of measuring damages may be a matter of economics,
determinable by comparing the cost of restoration to the
diminution in value."  William W. Watts, Common Law Remedies
in Alabama for Contamination of Land, 29 Cumb. L. Rev. 37, 47
(1999).
14
recover the amount necessary to repair the injury or
to put the land in the condition it was at the time
immediately 
preceding 
the 
injury, 
with 
legal
interest thereon to the time of the trial."
202 Ala. at 432, 80 So. at 816.
The legal authorities on which the Fuller Court relied
with regard to the measure of damages included § 7229 of
Commentaries on the Law of Negligence, which viewed the cost
of repair as a limitation on recoverable damages:
"Where the injury to real estate is permanent,
the damages may be assessed on the basis of a
permanent depreciation of the value of the property.
... Where the injury is temporary and may be abated,
1041707
15
the recovery is limited to the amount necessary to
put the land in as good a condition as it was before
the injury, and, in addition, compensation for any
loss of use during the time it was rendered unfit
for occupancy."
6 Seymour D. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Negligence
§ 7229 (1905) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
In Pan American Petroleum Co. v. Byars, 228 Ala. 372, 153
So. 615 (1934), a landowner sued based on the contamination of
water wells that resulted from the leakage of gasoline from
tanks and pumping equipment maintained by the defendant.  This
Court stated:
"In actions like the one now before the court
the measure of damages, as a general rule, in the
event the injury to the land is permanent, is the
difference between the market value of the land
before the injury, and its market value after the
injury.
"If the injury is not permanent, but temporary,
the measure of damages ordinarily is the difference
between the rental value of the land before the
injury and the rental value after the injury.  But,
in addition to a recovery for the loss in market
value of the property or its rental value, the
plaintiff may, in such cases, recover any special or
incidental damages which he may have suffered
thereby, and which proximately resulted from the
wrong, 
whether 
the 
injury 
was 
permanent 
or
temporary."
228 Ala. at 376, 153 So. at 619.
1041707
16
We addressed the proper measure of damages for injury to
real property more recently in Borland v. Sanders Lead Co.,
369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979).  In Borland, the plaintiffs owned
property on which they farmed and raised cattle.  A lead plant
was located on adjacent property.  On two occasions, the
filtering process at the lead plant failed, allegedly causing
an 
accumulation of lead 
particulates 
and sulfoxide deposits on
the plaintiffs' property.  Following a trial at which evidence
was presented ore tenus, the trial court entered a judgment in
favor of the defendant on the basis that the defendant's
compliance with the Alabama Air Pollution Control Act, Ala.
Code 1975, § 22-28-1 et seq., shielded the defendant from
liability, and that the plaintiffs had not been damaged
because the value of their property had been increased by the
presence of the lead plant.
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's
judgment.  369 So. 2d at 525.  First, this Court held that
compliance with the Alabama Air Pollution Act, by its plain
language, did not 
shield 
the 
defendant company 
from liability.
369 So. 2d at 526.  Separately, as to the issue of damages, we
stated:
1041707
17
"On remand, the issue of the proper measure of
damages will undoubtedly arise.  In its final
decree, the trial Court held that the Plaintiffs'
property had increased in value as commercial
property due to its proximity to the Defendant's
lead plant; therefore, Plaintiffs were not allowed
to recover of the Defendant.  As noted earlier, such
a rule would allow industries, as here, to have
absolute control over the use of another's property.
This clearly is not the rule for measuring damages
in trespass cases.  Moreover, it overlooks the fact
that the appreciation factor is totally unrelated to
the wrongful acts complained of.
"It is often stated that the measure of damages
in trespass cases is the difference between the
value of the land before and after the trespass. ...
"We note, however, that this may not be a case
where the damages are to be based on the difference
in value before and after the trespass.  This rule
is subservient to the underlying proposition for
measuring damages in trespass cases: The Plaintiff
is ordinarily entitled to an amount which will
compensate him for actual damages sustained.  Thomas
v. Bank of Hurtsboro, 243 Ala. 658, 11 So. 2d 370
(1942).  In 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trespass § 51, it is
stated:
"'No hard and fast principles can be
laid down for the measurement of damages in
this class of cases. Generally, the rules
to be applied depend upon whether or not
the injury is permanent or temporary in
character.  As is the rule generally, in
the case of permanent injury, the recovery
must include all damages, both past and
future.  The proper measure of damages is
the difference between the value of the
realty before the injury and its value
after the injury, except where there is a
1041707
18
total destruction, when the owner is
entitled to recover the entire value.
"'As 
to 
temporary 
injuries, 
the
authorities are not in agreement as to the
proper 
rule 
generally 
for 
their
computation.  Some courts have applied the
rule in actions of trespass that the cost
of restoring the property to its former
condition is the proper measure of damages
for a temporary injury thereto when this is
less than the diminution of the market
value of the whole property by reason of
the 
injury, 
but 
where 
the 
cost 
of
restoration is more than the diminution in
the market value, the latter is generally
the true measure of damages.  In general,
the measure of damages for wrongfully
depriving the plaintiff of the use of his
property is the rental value or the
reasonable value of the use of the property
during the time he is deprived thereof.
Thus for a wrongful ouster of the plaintiff
from a portion of his farm, damages may be
awarded equal to the difference in the
rental value of the farm with and without
such 
portion.' 
(Emphasis 
[added 
in
Borland].)
"....
"In conclusion, in determining the amount of
damages recoverable by a plaintiff whose property
has been trespassed upon, the law is flexible and
the rule simple: What will compensate the plaintiff
for the injury he has received?  In a case such as
the present one, it must first be determined whether
the alleged intrusion is of a permanent nature or of
a continuing nature.  If the injury is permanent,
damages must be recovered for all time –- past,
present and future.  The measure of damages means
the difference in the fair market value of the
1041707
The Borland Court spoke of whether "the alleged
8
intrusion" is of a "permanent" nature or a "continuing"
nature.  It also made reference to whether the "injury" is
permanent or continuing.  We note that, regardless of whether
the trespass itself is permanent (i.e., whether some object or
substance placed upon the land by the trespasser will remain
on the land permanently), the injury to the land may be either
"permanent" or "temporary."  If the injury is permanent, the
rule of damages described in the penultimate paragraph of the
above-quoted passage is applicable; if the injury is
temporary, the rule of damages described in the last-quoted
paragraph would be applicable.
19
property before and after the trespass, based on the
plaintiff's use of the property or adaptability of
the property to a particular use prior to the
trespass.
"If the nature of the injury is continuous
(i.e., during the tenure of the trespass), the
plaintiff can recover for the use of his property or
its fair rental value.  (Also, plaintiff may be able
to recover the cost of restoration if this, plus
rental value, is less than the diminution in value.)
Any damages for future loss must be recovered in a
later action if and when a subsequent trespass
occurs."
369 So. 2d at 530-31 (emphasis added unless otherwise
indicated).8
Intermediate appellate court decisions from this State
also have addressed the measure of damages for injury to real
property.  In Jackson v. Bohlin, 16 Ala. App. 105, 75 So. 697
(1917), the plaintiff sought damages for trespass to his
1041707
20
property.  The Court of Appeals stated the measure of damages
for injury to real property as follows:
"'In actions for injury to real property, when
the injury is done to realty itself, the measure of
damages is the difference in the value of the land
before and after the trespass, or in some cases the
amount necessary to restore the property to the
condition in which it was before the trespass was
committed.'
"Where the injury is such as may be remedied by
restoring the property to its condition when the
trespass was committed, and the cost of restoring
the property is less than the depreciation in the
value of the land, and the wrong is not attended
with such circumstances of aggravation as to
authorize the imposition of exemplary damages, and
consequential damages are not recoverable in the
action under the principles hereinafter stated, the
cost of restoring the property is the measure of
damages."
16 Ala. App. at 108, 75 So. at 700 (emphasis added; citations
omitted).
In City of Birmingham v. Kircus, 19 Ala. App. 614, 99 So.
780 (1924), the defendant appealed a judgment in the
plaintiff's favor in an action by the plaintiff to recover for
damage allegedly caused by the defendant's construction and
maintenance of sewers and drains.  In addressing the measure
of damages for injuries to real property, the Court of Appeals
stated:
1041707
21
"When the damage caused by the erection of a dam
or sewer diverting or concentrating the water from
its natural flow is recurring, the right of action
for each recurring injury is in the owner of the
land at the time the injury results.  Where the
injury is permanent, by a casual or recurrent
overflow of water on land, the measure of damages is
the difference between the market value of the land
with and without the injury at the time thereof.
But in cases of temporary or occasional injuries,
and where the damage may be repaired at less costs
than the diminution in value, the measure of damages
is the costs of restoring the land to its former
condition."
19 Ala. App. at 618, 99 So. at 784 (emphasis added; citations
omitted).
In addition to the foregoing, several legal treatises
indicate that the measure of damages for abatable injuries to
real property generally is limited by the diminution in the
value of the property caused by the complained-of injury.  In
25 C.J.S. Damages § 135 (2002), we find the following
statement:
"Where the injury to real property is merely
temporary, or where the property can be restored to
its original condition, the measure of damages may
be, or should include, the cost of repairs or
restoration, as where the injury is susceptible of
remedy at a moderate or reasonable expense and the
cost of restoration may be shown with reasonable
certainty, or where the cost of restoration is less
than the diminution in the value of the property.
...
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22
"The cost of restoration, however, cannot be
adopted as the measure of damages where the cost of
restoring the property would exceed the value
thereof 
in 
its 
original 
condition, 
or 
the
depreciation in the value thereof, or the actual
damage sustained by plaintiff, or where restoration
is impracticable." 
(Footnotes omitted.)  Similarly, 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 265
(2003) states:
"Most courts agree that when the injuries to
real estate are found to be temporary or reparable,
the diminished market value of the property will not
be used as the measure of recovery.  For the
purposes of measuring damages for injury to real
property, a diminution in value may be determined by
the cost of repairing the damage, provided that that
cost does not exceed the former value of the
property and provided also that the repairs do not
enhance the value of the property over what it was
before it was damaged.
"....
"Along with decisions stating that restoration
cost should be awarded only if it is less than the
difference in the value of the property before and
after the injury, some authorities hold that the
measure of damages is either the diminution in the
rental value unless the land can be restored to its
former condition for a lesser sum, or it is the
[diminution in] rental value plus the cost of
restoration where this is less than the depreciation
in the value of the premises."
(Footnotes omitted.)
We hold that the appropriate measure of direct,
compensatory damages to real property generally is the
1041707
In deciding the issue presented in this case -- the
9
measure of direct, compensatory damages generally recoverable
for injury to real property -- we are not presented with, and
we do not intend to address, the question whether this rule
admits of any exceptions.  See generally, e.g., Christopher E.
Brown, Comment, Dump It Here, I Need the Money: Restoration
Damages for Temporary Injury to Real Property Held for
Personal Use, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 699 (1996) (citing
authorities supportive of the proposition that compensatory
damages may be awarded for loss of value personal to a
landowner where the diminution in market value would not fully
compensate the landowner for his or her loss, and that such
recovery would not be inconsistent with the principles
prohibiting 
awards 
that 
constitute 
economic 
waste 
or 
windfalls
to the recipient).  See also Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 929 cmt. b (1979) (noting that, if the cost of replacing the
land in its original condition is disproportionate to the
diminution in the value of the land caused by the trespass,
damages are measured only by the difference between the value
of the land before and after the harm, "unless there is a
reason personal to the owner for restoring the original
condition").  The Poffenbargers do not advance any such
exception.  Nor do they argue that the diminution in the fair
market value of the land as the appropriate measure of damages
23
diminution in the value of that property, even when the cost
to remediate the property exceeds the diminution in the value
thereof.  That is the measure of damages to be applied in the
present case.  In so holding, we need not determine whether
the 
injury 
to 
the 
Poffenbargers' 
property 
is 
more
appropriately 
termed 
"permanent" 
or 
"temporary"; 
regardless 
of
which term is applied, the measure of damages would be the
same because the cost to remediate the property exceeds the
diminution in the value thereof.9
1041707
should yield to the cost of remediation as the appropriate
measure in cases where the latter is not disproportionate to
the former.
24
The Poffenbargers argue that "[l]and ... is unique, non-
fungible, and irreplaceable," Poffenbargers' brief at 43
(citing Downing v. Williams, 238 Ala. 551, 554, 191 So. 221,
222-23 (1939) (noting that "'a specific tract [of land] is
unique and impossible of duplication by the use of any amount
of money'")), and, accordingly, that the "transient 'fair
market value' of land" should not be all that stands between
the land and its destruction.  The Poffenbargers also argue
that "compensatory damages should make the innocent victim
whole, while polluters should have a disincentive to pollute,"
Poffenbargers' brief at 49, and that the rule of law affirmed
here today will provide no incentive to potential polluters to
act responsibly in maintaining and 
repairing 
their 
systems and
equipment because it could be cheaper to take the risk that,
if sued, they might have to pay a landowner no more than the
market value of affected land.
We are not unsympathetic to the concerns reflected in the
Poffenbargers' arguments.  Compensatory damages should indeed
be adequate to make the victim whole.  As this Court noted in
1041707
As already noted (see note 9, supra), we do not have
10
before us the question whether this general rule admits of any
25
Borland, the "underlying proposition for measuring damages in
trespass cases [is that] [t]he [p]laintiff is ordinarily
entitled to an amount which will compensate him for actual
damages sustained."  369 So. 2d at 530.  Awarding money
damages in an amount many times over the actual value of the
land at issue, however, may not serve the end of making the
victim whole as much as it raises the specter of a windfall to
a victim who, in many cases, will have little or no incentive
to spend those moneys to repair land that, even upon full
remediation, will be worth only a small fraction of the money
so expended.  The rule we apply today, by definition, serves
to make victims of pollution whole, at least in an objective
or pecuniary sense, without allowing for economic waste.
What the rule we apply today admittedly does not do,
however, is address intangible or subjective loss that may
accompany the contamination or other injury to a specific
tract of land.  In some cases, this rule also admittedly will
not provide a disincentive to polluting another's land.  In
these respects, we note that the Rule 5 question before us is
limited to the general,
 common-law measure of direct,
10
1041707
exceptions.  Moreover, we do not have before us the separate
question of punitive damages, or for that matter any question
regarding consequential or incidental damages.
"Trespass is both a legal action and an equitable action
11
...."  Storey v. Patterson, 437 So. 2d 491, 493-95 (Ala. 1983)
(recognizing that, in those cases where an injury to real
property is such that pecuniary compensation is inadequate,
"'a court of equity will interfere and award an injunction to
prevent such injuries'" (quoting Smith v. Morris, 181 Ala.
279, 281, 61 So. 276, 281 (1913), citing Hooper v. Dora Coal
Mining Co., 95 Ala. 235, 10 So. 652 (1892))).  In an
appropriate case, the equitable remedy of an injunction can be
an appropriate form of relief by which a thing or a substance
tortiously placed on another's land can be removed or by which
an injury to property otherwise is corrected and the property
restored to its pre-trespass condition.  See West Town Plaza
Assocs. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 So. 2d 1290, 1295-98
(Ala. 1993); Alabama Power Co. v. Drummond, 559 So. 2d 158,
162-63 (Ala. 1990) (Houston, J., dissenting).  The question
presented in this appeal, however, does not require us to
address the availability of injunctive relief.
See generally, e.g., the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
12
§§ 1251-1386 (2001); the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.
§ 2702(a) (1994); the Federal Resource Conservation and
26
compensatory damages.  We do not have before us the separate
questions of consequential and punitive damages.  Nor do we
have 
before 
us 
the 
question 
whether 
and 
under 
what
circumstances the separate remedy of injunctive relief may be
available to require a trespasser to remove objects or
substances tortiously placed on the affected land.
  We also
11
note that a variety of environmental laws have been adopted by
our national and state legislatures.12
1041707
Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k)
(1994);  the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2003);
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994); 40 C.F.R. parts 1-1700 (2006); Ala. Code 1975, §§ 22-
22-1 to 22-40A-24; Ala. Admin. Code (Alabama Department of
Environmental Management), Chapter 335.
27
The Poffenbargers also argue that measuring their
compensatory damages by the diminution in value of their real
property will, in effect, facilitate a taking of their
property without their consent in violation of § 23 of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901.  Among other things, § 23
prohibits the "taking of private property for private use
without the owner's consent."  Section 23, however, is a
limitation on governmental action, not private action, and
therefore is inapplicable to the present case.  See id.; Gober
v. Stubbs, 682 So. 2d 430, 433 (Ala. 1996) (The power of
eminent domain "is a power inherent in every sovereign state.
Section 23 merely places certain limits on the exercise of the
power of eminent domain.").
It is true, as the Poffenbargers point out, that this
Court held in Borland that allowing a defendant to escape
payment for injuries it caused to land simply because of
market factors unrelated to the defendant's tortious conduct
1041707
28
"would permit private condemnation, which, unquestionably, is
impermissible."  The holding in Borland is inapposite to the
present case, however.  The issue in Borland was whether a
plaintiff would be prevented from recovering for injury to his
real property caused by the tortious actions of an adjacent
landowner because additional, nontortious actions of the
defendant increased the overall value of the plaintiff's real
property.  This Court answered that question in the negative,
in effect holding that in order to determine the diminution in
value of real property, one must isolate the inquiry to the
effect upon the value of the property caused by the tortious
conduct.  The rule that we apply today is not inconsistent
with Borland, does not allow a defendant to escape
responsibility for injuring a plaintiff's property, and does
not permit "private condemnation."
Finally, 
the 
Poffenbargers 
argue 
that 
limiting
compensatory damages in the present case to the diminution in
fair market value of their real property would contravene the
guaranty in § 13 of the Alabama Constitution that every person
has a remedy "for any injury done him, in his lands, goods,
person or reputation."  We disagree.  Our holding in this case
1041707
29
allows the Poffenbargers to seek a remedy in the form of
damages measured by their objective, pecuniary loss.
IV.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we find that the proper measure
of direct, compensatory damages for any injury to the
Poffenbargers' real property is the diminution in the fair
market value of that real property as a result of the alleged
injury.  We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Stuart, Smith, and Parker,
JJ., concur.
Woodall and Bolin, JJ., dissent.
1041707
30
WOODALL, Justice (dissenting).
In my opinion, this Court, in granting the Poffenbargers
permission to appeal, has ignored the plain requirement of
Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., that the order appealed from involve
"a controlling question of law."  Consequently, I repeat what
I have previously said under similar circumstances:
"Under Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., an appeal by
permission may be allowed where an 'interlocutory
order involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion.'  (Emphasis added.)  Here, although the
interlocutory order involves a question of law, it
certainly does not involve a 'controlling' question
of law.  Therefore, I must respectfully dissent,
because 
I 
would 
dismiss 
the 
appeal 
without
prejudice."
City of Prattville v. Corley, 892 So. 2d 845, 852 (Ala.
2003)(Woodall, J., dissenting).
In urging this Court to grant the Poffenbargers
permission to appeal, Merit stated:
"Defendants 
agree 
that 
an 
immediate 
appeal 
would
materially 
advance 
the 
termination 
of 
this
litigation 
and 
avoid 
future 
litigation. 
[The
Poffenbargers] are likely to be more amenable to
settlement if this Court affirms the trial court's
order.  Additionally, an affirmance would prevent
litigation by other owners of oil field property
having 
unreasonable 
expectations 
of 
receiving
windfall awards with no requirement that the money
be spent on remediation."
1041707
31
As I stated in Corley, "[w]hile [an] interest in settlement is
understandable, and while pretrial settlements are to be
encouraged, those factors do not make the issue presented
'controlling' for purposes of Rule 5."  892 So. 2d at 852
(Woodall, J., dissenting).
Bolin, J., concurs.