Case Title: Hambuechen v. 221 Market North, Inc.

Citation: 2015-Ohio-756

Docket Number: 2013-1603

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Hambuechen v. 221 Mkt. N., Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-756.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-756 
HAMBUECHEN, APPELLEE, v. 221 MARKET NORTH, INC., D.B.A. NAPOLI’S 
ITALIAN EATERY, APPELLEE; OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Hambuechen v. 221 Mkt. N., Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-756.] 
Civil Rights Commission—R.C. 4112.06—Judicial review of an order of the Civil 
Rights Commission—The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings 
initiated pursuant to R.C. 4112.06; therefore, the petition for review of an 
order of the Civil Rights Commission must be served by a clerk of courts 
on all parties who appeared before the commission and on the commission 
itself within one year of the date that the petition was filed, as required by 
Civ.R. 3(A). 
(No. 2013-1603—Submitted July 8, 2014—Decided March 5, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, 
No. 2013CA00044, 2013-Ohio-3717. 
_______________________ 
 
 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings initiated pursuant to R.C. 
4112.06; therefore, the petition for review of an order of the Civil Rights 
Commission must be served by a clerk of courts on all parties who 
appeared before the commission and on the commission itself within one 
year of the date that the petition was filed, as required by Civ.R. 3(A). 
_______________________ 
O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} This case presents a single question.  In an R.C. 4112.06 action 
seeking judicial review of an order of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, what is 
the deadline to perfect service of a copy of the petition upon all the parties?  There 
is no reason to depart from the well-accepted principle that the Rules of Civil 
Procedure are applicable to actions brought pursuant to R.C. 4112.06.  Appellant, 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission, argues that if the party seeking judicial review of 
the order does not ensure that service by the clerk’s office of the petition for 
review is initiated within 30 days, the commission may proceed to enforce its 
decision.  It is undisputed by the parties that the petition for judicial review must 
be filed in the common pleas court within 30 days of the service of the 
commission’s order.  But as the Fifth District Court of Appeals correctly held, 
because R.C. 4112.06 does not set forth a specific deadline for serving the petition 
for judicial review on the other parties, and the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to 
actions commenced in common pleas courts pursuant to that section, there is no 
good reason not to apply Civ.R. 3(A) and 4.  We agree. 
{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 3(A), service of the petition must be obtained 
within one year of the date that an action is filed.  While it would have been 
simpler for the legislature to include a service deadline in R.C. 4112.06, the 
reality is that they did not.  Therefore, since the statute is silent on the question of 
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service, reliance on the Rules of Civil Procedure is clearly preferable to arbitrarily 
choosing a deadline. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} The facts of this case are not in dispute.  In March 2007, appellee 
Ana Hambuechen filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission 
contending that her employment by appellee, 221 Market North, Inc., d.b.a. 
Napoli’s Italian Eatery, in Canton, Ohio, had been terminated because she became 
pregnant.  The commission investigated the complaint and found that probable 
cause existed that an unlawful employment practice had occurred in violation of 
R.C. 4112.02(A).  The matter proceeded to a trial before an administrative law 
judge.  That judge recommended that the commission find that the employer had 
violated the law by firing Hambuechen.  The commission adopted the 
administrative law judge’s recommendation, and on November 15, 2012, issued 
an order finding that the employer had participated in a discriminatory practice in 
violation of R.C. Chapter 4112 and requiring the employer to offer Hambuechen 
reinstatement and back pay. 
{¶ 4} On November 26, 2012, the employer filed a petition for judicial 
review in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 4112.06.  On 
the petition, the employer’s attorney certified that he had mailed copies of the 
petition to the commission and to attorneys for the commission and Hambuechen, 
but he did not file a praecipe for service on the parties with the clerk of the 
common pleas court.  On December 28, 2012, the commission moved to dismiss 
the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the employer had 
failed to properly initiate service by the clerk within 30 days of the date the 
commission’s order was mailed. On December 31, 2012, 35 days after the petition 
for review of the commission’s order was filed, the employer filed a praecipe for 
service with the clerk of courts.  The employer filed a response to the 
commission’s motion to dismiss claiming that according to Civ.R. 3(A), service 
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must be obtained within one year.  The common pleas court granted the 
commission’s motion to dismiss after concluding that the petition for review was 
not timely served on the parties. 
{¶ 5} The employer appealed the common pleas court’s decision to the 
Fifth District Court of Appeals on March 5, 2013.  The Fifth District reversed the 
decision of the common pleas court, holding that under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the employer had one year to perfect service through the clerk of the 
common pleas court.  5th Dist. Stark No. 2013CA00044, 2013-Ohio-3717.  The 
matter was remanded to the court to reinstate the appeal.  The commission has 
now appealed the Fifth District’s judgment. 
Analysis 
{¶ 6} The sole question in this appeal is whether a party has one year to 
obtain service of a petition to review an order of the Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission.  We agree with the Fifth District that the one-year deadline is 
correct.  R.C. 4112.06 provides:  
 
(A) Any complainant, or respondent claiming to be 
aggrieved by a final order of the commission, including a refusal to 
issue a complaint, may obtain judicial review thereof, and the 
commission may obtain an order of court for the enforcement of its 
final orders, in a proceeding as provided in this section.  Such 
proceeding shall be brought in the common pleas court of the state 
within any county wherein the unlawful discriminatory practice 
which is the subject of the commission’s order was committed or 
wherein any respondent required in the order to cease and desist 
from an unlawful discriminatory practice or to take affirmative 
action resides or transacts business. 
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(B) Such proceedings shall be initiated by the filing of a 
petition in court as provided in division (A) of this section and the 
service of a copy of the said petition upon the commission and 
upon all parties who appeared before the commission.  * * * 
* * * 
(H) If no proceeding to obtain judicial review is instituted 
by a complainant, or respondent within thirty days from the service 
of order of the commission  pursuant 
to 
this 
section, 
the 
commission may obtain a decree of the court for the enforcement 
of such order upon showing that respondent is subject to the 
commission's jurisdiction and resides or transacts business within 
the county in which the petition for enforcement is brought. 
 
{¶ 7} Like most statutes addressing an appeal from an order of a state 
agency, this statute does not set forth a deadline for initiating service.  Civ.R. 1(A) 
states, “These rules prescribe the procedure to be followed in all courts of this 
state in the exercise of civil jurisdiction at law or in equity * * *.”  The Staff 
Notes to the July 1, 1971 amendment to Civ.R. 1(C) provide: “[T]he Civil Rules 
will be applicable to special statutory proceedings adversary in nature unless there 
is a good and sufficient reason not to apply the rules.”  Hence, the Rules of Civil 
Procedure should be applied here because there is no good or sufficient reason not 
to apply those rules.  The General Assembly chose not to specify a time limit 
other than the one prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure and this court will 
not legislate from the bench. 
{¶ 8} The Eighth District Court of Appeals has decided a case which, 
while not exactly on point, supports the general proposition that Civ.R 3(A) and 4 
apply to parties in a proceeding under R.C. 4112.06.  In Cleveland v. Ohio Civ. 
Rights Comm., 43 Ohio App.3d 153, 540 N.E.2d 278 (8th Dist.1988), the city of 
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Cleveland filed a petition for review of the commission’s determination that 
Cleveland had discriminated against an employee based on a physical handicap.  
The city mailed a copy of the petition to each party by regular mail but did not 
attempt to obtain service through the clerk of courts.  The court of common pleas 
dismissed the petition because Cleveland had failed to obtain service of the 
petition within one year as required by Civ.R. 3(A) and 4(A).  The Eighth District 
reversed, stating: 
 
The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to an action 
commenced in common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 4112.06.  
Abbyshire Constr. Co. v. Civil Rights Comm. (1974), 39 Ohio 
App.2d 125, 68 O.O.2d 319, 316 N.E.2d 893. R.C. 4112.06 is 
silent as to whether the petition initiating the appeal must be served 
through the clerk of courts.  However, a de novo hearing of a Civil 
Rights Commission decision on the merits is clearly adversarial in 
nature.  Therefore, Civ.R. 3(A) and Civ.R. 4(A) and (B) apply 
absent a good and sufficient reason not to apply those rules.  We 
cannot find such good and sufficient reason. 
 
Id. at 156. 
{¶ 9} The same court reached a similar result years later in Donn, Inc. v. 
Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 68 Ohio App.3d 561, 589 N.E.2d 110 (8th Dist.1991).  
In that case, the court specifically held that “R.C. 4112.06(B) requires that a 
notice of judicial review proceedings be served upon ‘all parties who appeared 
before the commission.’ Civ.R. 3 and 4 further provide that a civil action is 
commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court and service upon the 
defendant through the clerk of courts within one year of filing.” Id. at 565. 
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{¶ 10} The office of the clerk of courts exists for a reason.  The use of a 
central office brings stability to the system.  The judicial system and the public 
thus have a concrete method of knowing when a document has been filed, who 
has been served with that document, and how that document was served.  As this 
court recently reasoned in Clermont Cty. Transp. Improvement Dist. v. Gator 
Milford, L.L.C., ___ Ohio St.3d ____, 2015-Ohio-241, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 2, 
“actual knowledge” is never a substitute for service by the clerk of courts.  
Accordingly, the employer was required to perfect service through the clerk of 
courts within one year of the filing of the petition for judicial review of this 
administrative decision.  The employer did so in this case.  Once the notice of 
appeal was timely filed in the court of common pleas, the action should not have 
been dismissed by the common pleas court for failure of service.  The employer, 
like all litigants, had one year to perfect service. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 11} Based upon the foregoing analysis, we agree with the conclusion 
reached by the court of appeals.  The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to 
proceedings initiated pursuant to R.C. 4112.06; therefore, the petition for review 
of an order of the Civil Rights Commission must be served by a clerk of courts on 
all parties who appeared before the commission and on the commission itself 
within one year of the date that the petition was filed, as required by Civ.R. 3(A).  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Fifth District, and we remand the 
cause to the Stark County Common Pleas Court for further proceedings according 
to law and consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., concur separately. 
_________________ 
 
 
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FRENCH, J., concurring. 
{¶ 12} Like the majority, I would affirm the judgment of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the court of common pleas for further 
proceedings on the petition for judicial review filed by appellee, 221 Market 
North, Inc., d.b.a. Napoli’s Italian Eatery (“Napoli’s”).  But because I reach that 
result based upon the plain language of R.C. 4112.06, and not upon application of 
the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, I concur separately. 
{¶ 13} Napoli’s filed a timely petition for judicial review of a final order 
of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and certified that it had mailed copies of the 
petition to the commission and to attorneys for the commission and Ana 
Hambuechen by regular mail.  Thirty-five days after filing its petition, and after 
the commission moved for dismissal, Napoli’s filed a praecipe for service by the 
clerk of court.  The common pleas court dismissed the petition based on its 
conclusion that the commission and the parties who appeared before the 
commission were not timely served, as required by R.C. 4112.06(B).  The Fifth 
District reversed, holding that Civ.R. 3(A) affords Napoli’s one year after filing 
its petition to perfect service through the clerk of court.  2013-Ohio-3717.  The 
majority agrees with the Fifth District that Civ.R. 3(A) applies, that service by the 
clerk is required under R.C. 4112.06, and that a petitioner has one year after filing 
a petition to accomplish service. 
{¶ 14} When a right to appeal is conferred by statute, the appeal can be 
perfected only in the mode prescribed by statute.  Ramsdell v. Ohio Civ. Rights 
Comm., 56 Ohio St.3d 24, 27, 563 N.E.2d 285 (1990).  R.C. 4112.06 confers a 
right to appeal and obtain judicial review of a final order of the commission.  
Proceedings under R.C. 4112.06 “shall be initiated by the filing of a petition in 
[the common pleas] court * * * and the service of a copy of the said petition upon 
the commission and upon all parties who appeared before the commission.”  R.C. 
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4112.06(B).  The court obtains jurisdiction upon the filing and service of the 
petition and the commission’s subsequent filing of the record.  Id. 
{¶ 15} R.C. 4112.06 does not explicitly state when a petitioner must file a 
petition or when and how service of the petition must be made.  This court, 
however, has held that a petition for judicial review under R.C. 4112.06 must be 
filed within 30 days of service of the commission’s order.  Ramsdell at 25.  We 
reached that conclusion based on R.C. 4112.06(H)’s authorization for the 
commission to obtain a decree for enforcement of its order if no proceeding for 
judicial review is commenced within 30 days from service of the commission’s 
order.  “[S]uch an interpretation necessarily follows from the practical operation 
of the statute.”  Ramsdell at 25. 
{¶ 16} The questions now before this court are when and how service of a 
petition under R.C. 4112.06 must be made.  The majority broadly applies Civ.R. 
3(A) and 4 to hold that a copy of an R.C. 4112.06(A) petition must be served by 
the clerk of the common pleas court within one year after the petition is filed. 
{¶ 17} The Rules of Civil Procedure, “to the extent that they would by 
their nature be clearly inapplicable, shall not apply to procedure (1) upon appeal 
to review any judgment, order or ruling [and] (7) in * * * special statutory 
proceedings.”  Civ.R. 1(C).  See also Ramsdell at 27 (considering whether Civ.R. 
6(E)’s three-day mail rule applied to the time for filing a petition under R.C. 
4112.06). 
{¶ 18} The parties’ arguments focus primarily on whether Civ.R. 3(A)’s 
one-year service period for purposes of commencing a civil action applies to 
proceedings under R.C. 4112.06, but this case also raises the question whether 
service of an R.C. 4112.06 petition must be made by the clerk of court.  Despite 
the commission’s argument that that issue is not before this court because 
Napoli’s did not contest it below, the requirements for obtaining judicial review 
under R.C. 4112.06 are jurisdictional and may not be waived.  Ramsdell at 27-28; 
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VeriFone, Inc. v. Limbach, 69 Ohio St.3d 699, 635 N.E.2d 377 (1994) (statutory 
filing requirements are jurisdictional and cannot be waived). 
{¶ 19} By its own terms, Civ.R. 3(A) is inapplicable to proceedings under 
R.C. 4112.06.  The rule addresses commencement of a “civil action” and states 
that commencement occurs “by filing a complaint * * * if service is obtained 
within one year from such filing upon a named defendant.”  Civ.R. 3(A).  But 
R.C. 4112.06 does not refer to its review process as a “civil action,” nor does the 
prescribed procedure for obtaining review involve the filing of a complaint.  
Consequently, Civ.R. 3(A) does not apply to a petition for judicial review under 
R.C. 4112.06. 
{¶ 20} Civ.R. 4(A), which requires the clerk of court, upon the filing of a 
complaint, to “forthwith issue a summons for service upon each defendant listed 
in the caption,” is similarly inapplicable.  The clerk’s duty under Civ.R. 4(A) 
arises only upon the filing of a complaint, which is not part of the statutory 
procedure under R.C. 4112.06.  Further,  R.C. 4112.06 does not state that a clerk 
of court must serve copies of the petition, nor does it refer to the issuance of a 
summons or praecipe for service; it simply states that proceedings “shall be 
initiated by the filing of a petition in court * * * and the service of a copy of the 
said petition.”  R.C. 4112.06(B).  The statute does not indicate that different 
entities must complete the acts of filing and serving.  Indeed, reading the statute to 
require that the petitioner file the petition, but that the clerk serve the petition, 
requires the reader to imply a change in the unidentified subject of the sentence.  
Reading R.C. 4112.06 according to its plain meaning, and accepting that the 
General Assembly did not intend different subjects in its single-sentence 
requirements of filing and service, I conclude that R.C. 4112.06 does not require 
service by the clerk of courts and that the mail service by Napoli’s attorney 
perfected the initiation of proceedings for judicial review. 
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{¶ 21} For these reasons, I concur, albeit on different grounds, in the 
majority’s judgment affirming the Fifth District’s reversal. 
O’DONNELL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, 
Stephen Carney and Jeffrey Jarosch, Deputy Solicitors, and Wayne Williams, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. 
Stanley Rubin, for appellee 221 Market North, Inc., d.b.a. Napoli’s Italian 
Eatery. 
_________________