Case Title: COX v. CITY OF CHEYENNE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-33

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
COX v. CITY OF CHEYENNE2003 WY 14679 P.3d 500Case Number: 03-33Decided: 11/18/2003
October 
Term, A.D. 2003

 
 

ELIZABETH 
J. COX; ANN F. KING;

DOUGLAS 
A. and SHERYL K. VANPELT;

THOMAS 
W. COX; WILLIAM S. COX;

ROBERT 
and GENEVA "PAT" WEAVER;

RONALD 
L. and BARBARA M. BROWSER;

CARRIE 
E. SMITH; GILBERT D. and

CHERYL 
G. CORDIER; and MARK and

RHONDA 
SUTHERLAND,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs) 
,

 

v.

                                                                                                

CITY 
OF CHEYENNE, a Wyoming Municipal

Corporation; 
HEARTLAND DEVELOPMENT

COMPANY; 
HEARTLAND HOME BUILDERS,

INC.; 
and JAMES O. WOODS, individually and

as 
President of HEARTLAND HOME

BUILDERS, 
INC.,

 

Appellees(Defendants) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable E. James Burke, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Gay 
Woodhouse of Gay Woodhouse Law Office; and Andrea L. Richard and Lori L. Brand 
of Rothgerber, Johnson & Lyons LLP, Cheyenne, WY.  Argument by Ms. Woodhouse and Ms. 
Richard.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

W. 
Perry Dray and Nicholas G.J. Healey of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, P.C., for 
City of Cheyenne; and Don W. Riske and James R. Salisbury of Riske & Arnold, 
P.C., Cheyenne, WY for Heartland Development Company, Heartland Homebuilders, 
Inc., and James O. Woods.  Argument 
by Mr. Dray.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Elizabeth 
J. Cox, Ann F. King, Douglas A. and Sheryl K. Vanpelt, Thomas W. Cox, William S. 
Cox, Robert and Geneva "Pat" Weaver, Ronald L. and Barbara M. Bowser, Carrie E. 
Smith, Gilbert D. and Cheryl G. Cordier, and Mark and Rhonda Sutherland 
(appellants) appeal the district court's order granting dismissal of their 
declaratory judgment action.  The 
district court determined that appellants lacked the standing to bring a 
declaratory judgment action challenging the annexation of property west of the 
existing Cheyenne city limits.  In 
making this determination, the district court concluded that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-1-409(a) (LexisNexis 2003) granted standing to challenge annexation to only 
two classes of individuals, city residents and the owners of the property being 
annexed, thereby impliedly precluding appellants, as adjoining landowners, from 
challenging the annexation.  The 
district court additionally found that even if appellants had standing, they 
failed to file their complaint within the ten-day limit provided by 
§ 15-1-409(c), and the action was therefore time barred.  We reverse.

 

 

 

[¶2]      Appellants 
present the following issues on appeal:

 

I.  Whether 
the district court erred by irrebuttably presuming that the city's annexation 
ordinance was valid and by disregarding the jurisdictional nature of 
[appellants'] challenge.

 

II.  Whether 
1.5 miles from the city limits is "contiguous with or adjacent to" the city for 
purposes of Wyo. Stat. § 15-1-402(a)(iv).

 

III.  Whether 
the city's ordinance No. 3447, purportedly annexing land to the city, is void 
ab initio as a violation of Wyoming statute.

 

IV.  Whether 
[appellants], as adjoining landowners, have standing to challenge ordinance No. 
3447.

 

V.  Whether 
the court erroneously stripped aggrieved parties' standing to pursue any claims 
by incorrectly applying Wyo. Stat. § 15-1-409.

 

VI.  Whether 
the court abused its discretion when it refused to allow [appellants] to amend 
their complaint to add allegations that the city deprived [appellants] of due 
process by failing to provide them the notice expressly required by 
statute.  

 

Appellee, 
City of Cheyenne (City) phrases the issues as follows:

 

I.  The 
lower court correctly dismissed Appellants' Complaint pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6) because Appellants did not have standing to challenge the annexation 
of the territory popularly known as the Village West subdivision to the city of 
Cheyenne as a matter of law.

 

II.  The 
lower court correctly dismissed Appellants' Complaint pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6) because Appellants did not file their challenge to the annexation of 
Village West within the ten (10) day time limit set out by Wyo. Stat. § 
15-1-409(c) but instead sued to invalidate the annexation almost ten (10) months 
after the annexation.

 

III.  The 
lower court acted within its discretion in denying Appellants' Motion to Amend 
Complaint.

 

Appellees 
Heartland Development Company, Heartland Home Builders, Inc., and James O. 
Woods, individually and as president of Heartland Home Builders, Inc. 
(collectively Heartland), state the issues as:

 

I.  Whether 
the district court correctly determined that [appellants] were not conferred 
standing to challenge the annexation of Village West to the City of Cheyenne by 
the applicable statute.

 

II.  Whether 
the trial court correctly determined that the challenge to the annexation of 
Village West by [appellants] was untimely and time barred.

 

III.  Whether 
the remaining issues raised by [appellants] are properly before this court.  

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On August 13, 
2001, the City enacted annexation ordinance No. 3447.  The ordinance became effective on August 
22, 2001, and annexed real property known as the Village West Subdivision 
(Village West) located west of Cheyenne on a portion of Section 4, T.13N, R.67W 
of the 6th P.M.  The annexed property is owned by the 
Heartland Development Company.  This 
property is 1.5 miles from the nearest city limit.  Village West has subsequently been 
rezoned to medium density residential and is slated for a sizeable housing 
development.  

 

[¶4]      The appellants 
own land adjoining, across the road from, or within ½ mile of the Village West 
subdivision.  None of the appellants 
own land within the annexed area, and none of the appellants are residents of 
the city of Cheyenne.  On June 11, 
2002, appellants brought a declaratory judgment action against the City and 
Heartland.  Appellants sought a 
declaration that Ordinance No. 3447 is void because it purports to annex land 
that is not contiguous with or adjacent to the city limits and therefore 
violates Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-402(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001).1  Appellants additionally sought a 
declaration that the annexation statutes are unconstitutional because the 
statutes deprive individuals of their right to property without due process of 
law.  

 

[¶5]      The City and 
Heartland filed motions to dismiss appellants' complaint pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to 
state a claim on which relief could be granted.  The City and Heartland claimed that 
appellants lacked standing to sue because they do not meet the standing 
requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-409(a).  The City and Heartland further argued 
that the plain language of § 15-1-409(c) requires that all proceedings to review 
the City's findings or conclusions must be brought within ten days of the 
effective date of the annexation ordinance.  

 

[¶6]      The district 
court granted the motions to dismiss finding that appellants lacked statutory 
standing to sue.  Additionally, the 
district court decided that, even if appellants had standing to sue, they had 
not brought their challenge within ten days as required by § 15-1-409(c) 
and were thus time barred.  After 
dismissal, on September 6, 2002, appellants moved to amend their complaint to 
also claim that the City had failed to give proper notice.  Appellants appealed on September 18, 
2002.  On February 10, 2003, the 
district court entered an order denying appellants' motion to amend their 
complaint.  

 

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      When reviewing a 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we focus on the allegations contained in 
the complaint and liberally construe them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.  Duncan v. Afton, 
Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 742 (Wyo. 1999).  
We will affirm an order of dismissal only when it is certain from the 
face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any facts which would 
entitle him to relief.  
Id.  Additionally, 
"[i]n a de novo review of the threshold question of jurisdiction, we examine 
the policies underlying both the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act and the 
doctrine of justiciability to determine if this is a proper case for judicial 
action.'"  Southwestern Pub. 
Serv. Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 978 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 1999) 
(quoting Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Wyo. 
1992)).  

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      The district 
court determined that appellants did not have standing to challenge the 
annexation.  Appellants' challenge 
to the annexation ordinance came by way of a declaratory judgment action, thus 
we will begin our analysis with a discussion of declaratory judgments.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103 (LexisNexis 
2003) states, 

 

            
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other 
writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or 
validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations.  

 

Appellants 
seek a determination of the validity of a municipal ordinance and thus fall 
within the general scope of the declaratory judgments act.  However, in order to bring a declaratory 
judgment action regarding a municipal ordinance, the challenger must also be an 
"interested" person.

 

[¶9]      The "requirement 
of an interest' captures the basic doctrine that there must be a justiciable 
controversy before relief will be granted."  Barber v. City of Douglas, 931 P.2d 948, 951 (Wyo. 1997).  
Generically, a justiciable controversy is defined as a controversy fit 
for judicial resolution.  Reiman 
Corp. v. City or Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1992).  Many doctrines are encompassed within 
the concept of justiciability including standing, ripeness, and mootness.  Id.  Of significance in this instance is 
standing.  The doctrine of standing 
focuses on whether a litigant is properly situated to assert an issue for 
judicial determination.  State ex 
rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo. 
1995).  A litigant has standing when 
he has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.  Id.  

 

[¶10]   The principles of standing, as well 
as ripeness, mootness, and the other justiciablity doctrines are captured in the 
elements necessary to establish a justiciable controversy under the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act.  These 
elements are:

 

1.  The parties have existing and genuine, as distinguished 
from theoretical, rights or interests.  

 

2.  The controversy must be one upon which the judgment of 
the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument 
evoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or academic 
conclusion. 
 

3.  It must be a controversy the judicial determination of 
which will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in 
equity upon the rights, status or other legal relationships of one or more of 
the real parties in interest, or, wanting these qualities to be of such great 
and overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of 
them.  
 

4.  The proceedings must be genuinely adversary in 
character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to 
engender a thorough research and analysis of the major issues.  
 

Reiman 
Corp., 
838 P.2d  at 1186 (quoting Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 
1974)).  Applying these criteria, we 
conclude that a justiciable controversy does exist in this case. 

 

[¶11]   Initially, we note that the 
declaratory judgments act "is founded upon the premise that society is disturbed 
not only when legal rights are violated, but also when they are placed in 
serious doubt or uncertainty."  
Reiman Corp., 838 P.2d  at 1185 (citing Edwin M. Borchard, The 
Declaratory JudgmentA Needed Procedural Reform (Part I), 28 Yale L.J. 1, 2 
(1918)).  Therefore, in order to 
accomplish its purpose, the declaratory judgments act is to be liberally 
construed and administered.  
Barber, 931 P.2d  at 951.  
In fact, the act itself states, "The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is 
remedial.  Its purpose is to settle 
and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to legal 
relations, and is to be liberally construed and administered."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-114 (LexisNexis 
2003).  

 

[¶12]   In effecting the broad purpose of 
the declaratory judgment action, we have recognized "an interest" in many 
contexts.  See, e.g., Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2003 WY 22, 63 P.3d 887 (Wyo. 2003) 
(potential injury); Jolley v. State Loan & Inv. Bd., 2002 WY 7, 38 P.3d 1073 (Wyo. 2002) (relaxed standing requirements for matters of public 
importance).  For example, we have 
found that residents of the city had standing to bring a declaratory judgment 
action challenging the issuance of a liquor license.  State ex rel. Bayou Liquors v. City 
of Casper, 906 P.2d  at 1050.  We 
noted that residents have a strong interest in seeing compliance with the 
law.  Id.  The residents in Bayou Liquors 
were "interested" because they sought to ensure that licenses were issued, 
renewed, or transferred in compliance with the law.  Id.  Such cases indicate our broad 
interpretation of the purpose of the declaratory judgments act and our 
recognition of existing and genuine interests in a variety of contexts.  

 

[¶13]   In the instant case, appellants 
have an existing and genuine interest.  
Appellants allege that they are the owners of land joining, across the 
road from, or within ½ mile of Village West.  The annexation of Village West thus 
brings appellants' land within one mile of the city limits and under the City's 
control for purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-411 (LexisNexis 2003).2   Additionally, the City of Cheyenne 
is a city of the first class under § 15-3-101 (LexisNexis 2003).   See Cheyenne, Wy., City Code, 
Historical Summary (2002).  Thus 
under § 15-3-202(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003) the City may exercise jurisdiction 
over matters within ½ mile of the corporate city limits should it choose to do 
so.

 

[¶14]   Likewise, although it was in the 
zoning context, we have found that adjoining landowners have standing to 
challenge a municipality's actions when those actions will double the density 
previously permitted on the adjoining land.  Hirschfield v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 944 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Wyo. 1997); Hoke v. Moyer, 865 P.2d 624, 628 (Wyo. 1993).  Village West 
is slated for the development of as many as 1,500 homes, which will 
significantly increase the density of the population on the land adjoining 
appellants' land.  We have said that 
such increases in the density of adjacent property raise a number of perceptible 
harms for a property owner, such as increased traffic and congestion.  Hirschfield, at 1143.  Additionally, accompanying the increase 
in density are health and safety concerns.  
Appellants, in the instant case, allege the same type of harm.  If these potential harms present 
standing to the challenger of a zoning decision, they present no less of an 
"interest" to the challenger of an annexation ordinance.  

 

[¶15]   Appellants are "interested" in 
another manner.  That is, the 
annexation of Village West facilitates the annexation of appellants' land.  Prior to the annexation ordinance, 
appellants were a distance from the city limits and were not adjoining the 
boundary of the City.  Whether 
appellants were "contiguous with or adjacent to" the annexing city prior to this 
annexation is a matter of some dispute.  
The meaning of these terms as used within the annexation statutes is at 
the heart of this suit and is also currently before this court in other 
litigation involving some of the same parties.  However, the resolution of this dispute 
is not essential to our present discussion, and we do not intend this discussion 
to indicate a determination either way.  
We do determine, however, that following this annexation, appellants' 
land is undeniably "contiguous with or adjacent to" the City because appellants 
now have an adjoining boundary with the City.  Hence, the instant annexation 
indisputably makes the future annexation of appellants' property possible.  See Adam v. City of Hastings, 668 N.W.2d 272 (Neb.App. 2003).   

 

[¶16]   The unquestionable possibility of 
future annexation due to a now adjoining boundary with the City presents 
appellants with an interest in challenging this annexation.  Some of appellants engage in rural 
activities including farming, ranching, and raising livestock which are not 
permitted by city zoning.  Although 
these uses would be "grandfathered in" should annexation take place, additional 
restrictions such as continual use to maintain the "grandfather" status create 
an interest in this annexation.  See 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-410 (LexisNexis 2003).  We, therefore, hold that the 
above-mentioned harms qualify under the broad purpose of the declaratory 
judgments act as an existing and genuine interest.

 

[¶17]   The other elements necessary to 
establish a justiciable controversy are present as well.  A judgment of the court will effectively 
resolve the controversy, as the annexation will be declared either valid or 
void.  Such a declaration will be a 
final judgment on the matter and not merely an academic discussion. Furthermore, 
the parties are clearly adversaries each of whom has already vigorously 
advocated his position and will undoubtedly continue to do so.  Based on the briefs and oral argument to 
this court, we are quite comfortable stating that each party has advanced his 
position with "sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis 
of the major issues."  Therefore, we 
find that appellants meet the justiciable controversy requirements of the 
declaratory judgments act.  

 

[¶18]   The City and Heartland have 
essentially argued that, even if appellants are "interested" for declaratory 
judgment purposes, our decision in Town of Marbleton v. Town of Big 
Piney, 719 P.2d 1389 (Wyo. 1986) precludes standing for challenging this 
annexation.  The City and Heartland 
argue that in Town of Marbleton we held that the only parties that have 
standing to challenge an annexation are those that meet the requirements of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-1-409(a).  We 
disagree with this broad interpretation of our holding in Town of 
Marbleton.  

 

[¶19]   In Town of Marbleton we 
began our discussion by noting that, in reaching its decision that Marbleton 
lacked the standing to challenge Big Piney's annexation, the district court 
explained:  "The matter is 
controlled by statute.  The statute 
sets out who may bring an action and impliedly says who cannot."  Id. at 1390.  We then declared that we agreed with the 
district court.  However, in 
immediately explaining our agreement with the district court we stated:  "Generally, municipalities can exercise 
only those powers which are expressly or impliedly conferred.'" Id. 
(quoting Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888, 895 (Wyo. 
1983)).  We then briefly discussed 
the powers of a municipality, noting that a municipality is not granted the 
right to challenge another municipality's annexation.  Later in our discussion, we cited to 
authority from other jurisdictions regarding a town's standing to 
contest an annexation.  Id. 
at 1391.  Our conclusion stated that 
we do not necessarily agree that municipal standing to contest 
annexations can only be express but that in that case Marbleton showed neither 
express nor implied standing.  
Id. at 1391.  
Additionally, we held that Marbleton did not show that its own municipal 
powers were sufficiently affected by Big Piney's annexation.  

 

[¶20]   A significant difference between 
Town of Marbleton and the instant case is the characteristics of the 
party bringing the declaratory judgment action.  A municipality has only the rights and 
powers granted by statute.  
Individuals are not similarly limited. Individuals have rights and powers 
independent of those created by statute.  
Our discussion in Town of Marbleton focused on, and was limited 
to, a municipality's standing to challenge annexation.  Beyond the limited nature of our 
discussion, our statement that "[w]e do not necessarily agree with these courts 
that municipal standing to contest annexations can only be express" discloses 
our willingness to consider other sources of standing to challenge an 
annexation.  We, therefore, conclude 
that Town of Marbleton did not decide the issue of whether individuals 
other than those listed in § 15-1-409(a) have standing to challenge 
annexation.   

 

[¶21]   We now address this statutory 
issue.  We do so by interpreting 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-409 (LexisNexis 2003), which 
states:

 

(a)  If any landowner in the territory proposed to be 
annexed or any owner of real property in the annexing city or town, or utility 
is aggrieved by the acts of the governing body, he may appeal to the district 
court for a review of the acts or findings thereof.
 

(b)  If the court determines that the action taken was 
capricious or arbitrary, or if it appears from the evidence that the landowner's 
right in his property is being unwarrantedly invaded or that the governing body 
abused its discretion, the court shall declare the annexing ordinance void.  If the court determines the action of 
the governing body was proper and valid, it shall sustain the 
ordinance.
 

(c)  All proceedings to review the findings and the 
decisions of the governing body shall be brought within ten (10) days of the 
effective date of the annexation ordinance, and if not brought within that time 
are forever barred.  
 

When 
interpreting statutes, our primary purpose is to determine the legislature's 
intent.  Parker Land & Cattle 
Co. v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Wyo. 
1993).

 

If 
the language is sufficiently clear, we do not resort to the rules of 
construction.  We apply our general 
rule that we look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of a statute when the 
language is unambiguous.  If the 
statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning and need 
not consult the numerous rules of statutory construction.

 

Ahlenius 
v. Board of Prof'l Geologists, 
2 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Wyo. 2000).  

 

[¶22]   We begin our interpretation by 
noting that the definition of landowner provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 15-1-401(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003) includes in some instances those whose 
land after the annexation would be within ½ mile of the city limits.3  Section 15-1-401(a)(ii) expressly states 
that the expanded definition of landowner applies for the purposes of §§ 
15-1-402, -404, and -405.  
Therefore, the expanded definition including those within ½ mile of the 
city limits after annexation does not apply to § 15-1-409.  Accordingly, appellants are not included 
in § 15-1-409(a) by virtue of the definition of landowner.  However, this exclusion does not 
necessarily mean that appellants are precluded from challenging the validity of 
the annexation ordinance.  The plain 
language of § 1-37-103 grants the right to pursue declaratory relief to those 
affected by a municipal ordinance and who are seeking to challenge its 
validity.  As discussed previously, 
appellants have standing under the declaratory relief act.  We therefore must determine whether the 
legislature intended § 15-1-409 to preclude such declaratory 
relief.

 

[¶23]   Section 15-1-409(a) provides a 
right of review to those who own property in the territory proposed to be 
annexed and the owners of real property within the city or town.   The plain language of subsection 
(a) grants this right of review for challenges to the governing body's acts and 
findings.  Subsection (a) contains 
no express language denying other classes of aggrieved persons the right to 
bring a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the annexing 
ordinance.  The declaratory 
judgments act was in effect at the time the annexation statute was passed, so we 
presume the legislature was aware of the act and could have excluded such causes 
of action had it so desired.  See 
Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶10, 50 P.3d 323, ¶10 (Wyo. 2002).     

 

[¶24]   Notably, the landowners granted a 
right of review by § 15-1-409 are those who are within the territory to be 
annexed.  These parties do not have 
to rely on the expanded definition of landowner provided by § 15-1-401 to be 
entitled to notice of the annexation.   These landowners are always 
entitled to specific notice under § 15-1-402(a)(vi).4  The landowners within the annexing 
territory wishing to challenge the governing body's acts and findings would 
therefore conceivably be aware of and at the public hearing required by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-1-405 (LexisNexis 2001) and situated to appeal the 
municipality's acts and findings.  

 

[¶25]   The notice requirements for the 
landowners of adjoining property, such as the appellants, are not similarly 
absolute.  The notice to these 
parties depends on whether the City has exercised authority pursuant to 
§ 15-3-202(b)(ii).  See Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-1-401.   
The parties in this action provide us with no authority to support the 
proposition that the City has exercised jurisdiction under § 
15-3-202(b)(ii).  Our review of the 
Cheyenne City Code revealed no such action either.  It is thus possible that adjoining 
landowners such as the appellants would not know of the annexation or the public 
hearing until well after the annexation had become effective.5  

 

[¶26]   Looking to subsection (b) we 
further see that the review afforded is for abuse of discretion or arbitrariness 
or capriciousness.  Such a review 
considers, in essence, the merits of the governing body's actions and findings, 
not the validity of the annexation ordinance.  The review afforded also allows for a 
determination of whether "the landowner's right in his property is being 
unwarrantedly invaded."  Appellants, 
not being "landowners" under this section, do not have standing to make such a 
claim.  Thus, the only avenue for 
the protection of their interests is a determination of the validity of the 
annexation ordinance through a declaratory judgment.  Considering the statute as a whole and 
the context of this right of review following notice and the public hearing, we 
can see that the legislature's purpose was to present the named parties with an 
express right of review to challenge the merits of the governing body's findings 
and decisions.     

 

[¶27]   We thus find that nothing in § 
15-1-409(a) evidences a legislative intent to preclude declaratory judgment 
actions challenging the validity of an annexation ordinance.  Certainly, the only parties entitled to 
challenge the merits of the governing body's findings and decisions are those 
listed within § 15-1-409(a).  
However, other classes of aggrieved individuals may challenge the 
validity of an annexation ordinance by way of the declaratory judgments 
act.    

 

[¶28]   We lastly consider whether 
appellants timely filed their action.  
The statute of limitations governing declaratory judgment actions is that 
"applicable to ordinary actions at law and suits in equity."  Anderson v. Wyoming Dev. Co., 60 
Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 337 (Wyo. 1944).  
The statute of limitation for declaratory judgments is found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-102 which provides that civil actions may be brought as 
prescribed by that chapter unless a different limitation is prescribed by 
statute in which case that limitation will govern.  The statute of limitations prescribed by 
this chapter is four years.  See 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (LexisNexis 2003).6

 

[¶29]   The issue is whether the annexation 
statutes prescribe a different limitation.  
The City and Heartland argue that § 15-1-409(c) provides such a differing 
limitation.  We do not agree.  Subsection (c) must be read with the 
preceding subsections.  It is the 
individuals challenging the findings and decisions of the governing body by way 
of subsection (a) that must bring an appeal within ten days.  The language of subsection (c), "All 
proceedings to review the findings and the decisions of the governing body" 
refers to the language of subsection (a), "he may appeal to the district court 
for a review of the acts or findings thereof."  The ten-day time limit is thus placed on 
the right of appeal noted in subsection (a).   

 

[¶30]   The effect of the ten-day provision 
is merely a condition to exercising the right of review mentioned in subsection 
(a).  Additionally, as noted above, 
the landowners granted a right of review under this section are those entitled 
to notice twenty days prior to the public hearing.   It is thus not unreasonable to 
expect them to exercise their right of review within an additional ten 
days.  Others, like appellants, are 
not guaranteed specific notice and are not granted standing by this specific 
statute.  Applying a ten-day time 
period to these parties therefore would be unreasonable.      

 

[¶31]   Furthermore, we think it is 
inconsistent to say that appellants are not afforded a right of review by 
§ 15-1-409(a), but then hold they are subject to the time limitation of 
§ 15-1-409(c).   
Subsection (c) contains no express language that it should apply to any 
other right of action and thus does not provide a statute of limitations to 
declaratory judgment actions challenging the validity of an annexation 
ordinance.  The declaratory judgment 
statutes are to be liberally construed to effect their broad purpose.  Applying a ten-day time limit to 
declaratory actions when there is no clear legislative intent to do so thwarts 
this broad purpose.  We therefore 
hold that aggrieved parties may thus challenge the validity of an annexation 
ordinance within the statute of limitations applicable to civil actions.   

 

[¶32]   We additionally mention that 
Heartland argues that the ten-day time limit must apply to other actions 
challenging annexation in order to give annexation matters some finality, 
otherwise the owner of the annexed land would not be safe in the development of 
his property.  Certainly the 
finality of an annexation is a valid and important concern.  However, we note that, in addition to 
the applicable statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches also applies to 
declaratory judgment actions.  See 
Anderson, 154 P.2d 318.  The 
defense of laches is a form of equitable estoppel based on a[n] unreasonable 
delay by a party in asserting a right.  
Laches does not depend on the passage of time alone; the plaintiff must 
be chargeable with lack of diligence in failing to proceed more promptly.  Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. 
Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 1284 (Wyo. 2000).  Laches will apply when the delay has 
worked injustice, prejudice, or disadvantage to the defendant.  Id.    

 

[¶33]   We have said:

 

The length of time during which the party neglects the assertion of 
his rights which must pass in order to show laches varies with the peculiar 
circumstances of each case, and is not, like the matter of limitations, subject 
to an arbitrary rule.  It is an 
equitable defense, controlled by equitable considerations, and the lapse of time 
must be so great, and the relations of the defendant to the rights such, that it 
would be inequitable to permit the plaintiff to now assert them.
 

Hammond v. 
Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 201 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 154 P.2d at 346).  Should an aggrieved party neglect the 
assertion of his rights for an amount of time that works injustice, prejudice, 
or disadvantage to the defendant, laches would apply to prevent a later 
action.  The facts of this case do 
not support a finding of laches because appellants filed their claim within ten 
months of the effective date of the ordinance at a time when Heartland had taken 
some initial steps to gain regulatory approval but had not taken any physical 
action on the property.  

 

[¶34]   Finally, we decline to consider the 
validity of this annexation ordinance.  
The district court dismissed this matter on the issue of standing and, 
therefore, never addressed the merits of this case.  We find it prudent to remand the matter 
to let the district court consider the merits of the case in the first 
instance.  Additionally, we note 
that because the case is no longer in a state of dismissal, the district court 
can consider whether or not to allow appellants to amend their complaint at this 
point.    

 

 

 

[¶35]   For the above stated reasons, we 
hold that appellants have standing to bring the declaratory judgment action 
challenging the annexation ordinance and, therefore, reverse and remand this 
matter to the district court.  

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-1-402 (a)(iv) provides:

 

(a)  Before 
any territory is eligible for annexation, the governing body of any city or town 
at a hearing as provided in W.S. 15-1-405 shall find that:

 

. . .

 

(iv)  The 
area sought to be annexed is contiguous with or adjacent to the annexing city or 
town, or the area meets the requirements of W.S. 
15-1-407[.]

 

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-1-411 states: 

 

All 
territory within one (1) mile of an incorporated city or town, as it now exists 
or may hereafter be established, is potentially an urban area.  No territory within a potential urban 
area may be incorporated as a city or town unless the governing body of the city 
or town causing the potential urbanized area to exist, by resolution, approves 
the proposed incorporation.  

3Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-1-401(a)(ii) provides:  

 

"Landowner" 
means the owner of real property in the territory proposed to be annexed who in 
the last calendar year was liable for a property tax thereon or was exempt by 
law from the payment of taxes on the property.  Anyone having a right to purchase land 
under a written contract is the owner of that land for annexation purposes.  For purposes of W.S. 15-1-402, 15-1-404 
and 15-1-405 "landowner" shall include persons owning property which, as a 
result of the proposed annexation would then be brought within one-half (1/2) 
mile of the corporate limits of a city which has exercised the authority granted 
under W.S. 15-3-202(b)(ii)[.]  

 

4Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-1-402(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2001) provides: 

 

The 
annexing city or town, not less than twenty (20) business days prior to the 
public hearing required by W.S. 15-1-405(a), has sent by certified mail to all 
landowners and affected public utilities within the territory a summary of the 
proposed annexation report as required under subsection (c) of this section and 
notice of the time, date and location of the public hearing required by W.S. 
15-1-405(a).

 

5Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-1-405(b) does require general notice of the hearing by way of 
newspaper.  However, it is not the 
specific notice provided to the landowners within the annexing 
territory.

 

6Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105 (a)(iv)(C) provides:

 

(a)  Civil 
actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within 
the following periods after the cause of action accrues:

 

. . .

 

(iv)  Within 
four (4) years, an action for:

 

. . .

 

(C)  An 
injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein 
enumerated[.]