Case Title: McElroy v. Pohopek

Citation: 375 Md. 574

Docket Number: 106/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pohopek
No. 106, September Term 2001
HEADNOTE:
LABOR 
AND 
EMPLOYMENT, 
COVERED 
EMPLOYEE, 
WORKERS’
COMPENSATION, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION  
A Maryland resident employed as a truck driver, by a trucking company based out of state,
who was required to keep and maintain the company owned tractor-trailer truck in Maryland
on weekends, but whose employment involved traveling, during the week, to various states
along the eastern seaboard, including sometimes Maryland, for regular pickups and
deliveries, is a “covered employee” pursuant to Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.) §
9 - 203 of the Labor and Employment Article.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 106
September Term, 2001
______________________________________________
MCELROY TRUCK LINES, INC.
v.
ALFONS JAMES POHOPEK
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
  
Filed:    June 17, 2003
1Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.) § 9-101 (f) defines “covered employee”
as “an individual listed in Subtitle 2 of this title for whom a person, a governmental unit,
or a quasi-public corporation is required by law to provide coverage under this title.”
The issue in this case is whether, pursuant to Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.)
§ 9-203 of the Labor and Employment Article, Alfons James Pohopek, the respondent, a
Maryland resident employed as a truck driver, by a trucking company based out of state,
who was required to keep and maintain the company owned tractor-trailer truck in Maryland
on weekends, but whose employment involved traveling, during the week, to various states
along the eastern seaboard, including sometimes Maryland, for regular pickups and
deliveries, is a “covered employee.” 1    Following a hearing, the Workers’ Compensation
Commission (the “Commission”) found that it had jurisdiction and, so, concluded that he
was.    A petition for judicial review was filed timely by the employer, McElroy Truck
Lines, Inc., the petitioner.  The Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County reversed the judgment
of the Commission, ruling, on summary judgment, that jurisdiction over the matter did not
lie in Maryland.    Dissatisfied with the reversal of the judgment of the Commission, the
respondent appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.   That court agreed with the
Commission and, thus, reversed the judgment of the circuit court.  Pohopek v. McElroy
Truck Lines, 140 Md. App. 235, 237, 780 A.2d 383, 384 (2001).    We shall affirm the
Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
The respondent sought employment with the petitioner by filing an application with
an agent of the petitioner in North Carolina.    After having been offered, and accepted,
employment with the petitioner, the respondent underwent a week’s training and orientation
2The applicable provision, as relevant, provided:
“3. In further consideration of McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. hiring the
employee whose duties include traveling regularly in the service of
McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. in Alabama and one or more other states, it is
agreed as follows:
“That any and all [workers’] compensation claims for on-the-
job-injuries that I, as an employee of McElroy Truck lines,
Inc. may have arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle
and/or any claims that may occur in the line and scope of my
employment with McElroy Truck Lines, Inc. shall be
exclusively governed by the [workers’] compensation laws of
the State of Alabama. ...”
2
in North Carolina, during the course of which he was presented with, and signed, a
Workers’ Compensation Agreement.    Under that agreement, all workers’ compensation
claims were to be “exclusively governed by the [workers’] compensation laws of the State
of Alabama,”2 where the petitioner’s principal place of business was located.    Thereafter,
the respondent was assigned a tractor-trailer leased by the petitioner, which he picked up in
Virginia, and, having only a Pennsylvania commercial driver’s license, at the petitioner’s
request, obtained a Maryland commercial driver's license.
The respondent obtained his delivery assignments by calling the petitioner’s
dispatchers.   Mostly he called dispatchers in North Carolina, but he also received
assignments from dispatchers in Alabama and Virginia.   The respondent’s deliveries were
to states primarily along the eastern seaboard, from as far north as New Hampshire to as far
3The Movement Listing for the respondent indicates that, in addition to the States
along the seaboard, the respondent made deliveries in Tennessee, Kentucky and Ohio.  
He made, according to the Listing, only three deliveries to Alabama.
3
south as Mississippi.3   The petitioner argued, and the Circuit Court determined, that it was
undisputed that, while he was employed by the petitioner, the respondent made 145
deliveries, of which  only 28, or 19 percent, were in Maryland and, of 45 refueling stops,
only 9 occurred in Maryland.   The Circuit Court concluded: “Given these facts, [the
petitioner] conducted around 80 percent of his employment activity outside the State of
Maryland.”
The respondent was off on weekends.   When he was off, as a part of his employment
agreement, the company supplied tractor-trailer was kept  in Maryland near the respondent’s
home in St. Mary’s County.   In addition to looking after the tractor-trailer and its contents -
it usually was loaded on Fridays for Monday morning delivery - , the respondent was
responsible for its regular maintenance and appearance.     The Court of Special Appeals
also observed: “In the early morning hours each Monday, Pohopek would conduct a pre-trip
checklist of the truck, which consisted of testing the engine, brakes, lights, and other routine
mechanical components.  Pohopek then, in accordance with federal requirements, updated
his log book.”  Pohopek, at 237, 780 A.2d at 384. 
After having worked for the petitioner for approximately six months, the respondent
was involved in an accident while driving the petitioner’s tractor-trailer through South
4
Carolina.   He filed in Maryland a workers’ compensation claim for the injuries he
sustained.  The petitioner defended on the basis that the Commission had no jurisdiction
over the case, that the respondent was not a “covered employee.”    As indicated, although
the Circuit Court was persuaded, both the Commission and the Court of Special Appeals
rejected that defense.
Whether the respondent is a “covered employer” must be determined by reference
to § 9-202 and § 9-203.   The former addresses the relationship between the employee and
the employer, while the latter, the place of the injury.   Section 9-202 makes clear that to be
a “covered employee,” an individual must be “in the service of an employer under an
express or implied contract of apprenticeship or hire.”   On the other hand, § 9-203 provides:
“(a) In general. -- Except as otherwise expressly provided, an individual is a
covered employee while working for the employer of the individual:
“(1) in this State;
“(2) outside of this State on a casual, incidental, or occasional
basis if the employer regularly employs the individual within
this State; or
“(3) wholly outside the United States under a contract of
employment made in this State for the work to be done wholly
outside of the United States.
“(b) Incidental service in State. -- (1) An individual is not a covered employee
while working in this State for an employer only intermittently or temporarily
if:
“(i) the individual and employer make a contract
of hire in another state;
5
“(ii) neither the individual nor the employer is a
resident of this State;
“(iii)  the  employer  has  provided workers'
compensation insurance coverage under a
workers'  compensation or similar law of another
state to cover the individual while working in
this State;
“(iv) 
the 
other 
state 
recognizes 
the
extraterritorial provisions of this title; and
“(v)   the  other  state  similarly exempts covered
employees and their employers from its law.
“(2)  If an individual is exempted from  coverage  under  this
subsection  and injured in this State while working for the
employer of the individual, the sole remedy of the individual is
the workers' compensation or similar  law  of  the  state  on
which  the exemption is based.
“(3) A certificate from an authorized officer   of   the   workers'
 compensation commission or similar unit of another state
certifying that the employer is insured in that state and had
provided extraterritorial insurance coverage for the employees
of the employer while working within this State is prima facie
evidence that the employer carries 
that compensation insurance.
“(c) Outside State. -- Except as otherwise expressly provided,  an  individual
who  is employed wholly outside of this State is not a covered employee.”
Thus, to be a “covered employee” and therefore eligible to bring, and maintain, a worker’s
compensation claim in this State, a worker must be an employee, § 9-202 (a), and, as the
Court of Special Appeals recognized, “the site of one’s employment is the critical element
for” making that determination.  Pohopek at 240, 780 A.2d at 385.  In this case, we are
concerned only with § 9-203 (a): the petitioner does not contend that the respondent was
employed wholly outside of Maryland, rendering § 9-203 (c) inapplicable, and although the
6
petitioner maintains that the respondent was not regularly employed in Maryland, so that,
in that sense, he was employed in Maryland only intermittently, it does not suggest that the
prerequisites that make § 9-203 (b) applicable are present in this case.    
The gist of the petitioner’s argument is that the respondent simply was not regularly
employed in the State of Maryland.   It asserts, noting that Dixon v. Able Equip. Co., 107
Md. App. 541, 549,  668 A.2d 1009, 1012 (1995), indicated that ‘“regular’ implies a
uniform course of conduct” and relying on what the Movement Listing for the respondent
shows,  that about 80 percent of the respondent’s trips were to places other than Maryland,
that the respondent’s employment in Maryland lacked the required uniformity of conduct.
The petitioner argues, alternatively, that, even if the respondent were regularly employed
in this State, his employment outside the State cannot be characterized, logically or
appropriately, as “casual, incidental or occasional.”
Relying on the same case and the same definition, the Court of Special Appeals
concluded otherwise with respect to the regularity of the respondent’s employment in
Maryland.    Noting the Dixon court’s acknowledgment that there is “no particular formula
for establishing ‘regular’ employment” and evaluating the case on its facts, 140 Md. App.
at  241, 780 A. 2d at 386, the intermediate appellate court reasoned: 
“Here, the consistency of Pohopek's schedule and the employment
responsibilities he carried out within the State persuade us to find regularity
in Pohopek's Maryland employment.  Pohopek was not commuting to work
in another state on a daily or regular basis, but, instead, he was based out of
Maryland and traveled regularly, albeit extensively, as part of his routine
employment.”
4The Court of Special Appeals, in the case sub judice stated, “if an employee
works outside the State but does not work wholly outside the State, then the employee's
work outside the State is said to be casual.”  Pohopek at 242, 780 A.2d at 387.  For that
proposition, it relied upon its earlier cases of Dixon v. Able Equip. Co., 107 Md. App.
541, 546,  668 A.2d 1009,1011 (1995) and Willson & Sons v. Garrett, 76 Md. App. 120,
126 -27, 543 A.2d 875, 878 (1988).  Before the court in Garrett was the predecessor of §
9-203 (a), Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Replacement Volume) art. 101, § 21 (c) (4), which
provided:
“(c) Exemptions. – The following employees are exempt from the coverage
of this act:
*    *    *    *
“(4) Casual employees or any employees who are employed
wholly without the State, except that for all purposes of this
article, casual, occasional or incidental employments outside
of this State by the Maryland employer of an employee or
employees regularly employed by said employer within this
State shall be construed to be employment within this
State....”
The Garrett court affirmed the award of workers’ compensation to an employee who was
hired in Maryland, by a Maryland corporation doing business in Maryland, Virginia and
the District of Columbia, and worked during the entire period before being injured in
Virginia, 76 Md. App. at 122, 543 A. 2d at 876, but who testified that he was promised
work in Maryland in the future.  Id. at 124 - 25, 543 A. 2d at 877.  It explained its
decision as follows:  
  
“That [Garrett], a Maryland resident, was hired at the main office of a
Maryland company engaged in business in Maryland, Virginia and the
District of Columbia; that [Garrett] was hired as a full-time employee; that
he was told that the Virginia job would last approximately 12 to 13 weeks,
after which he would be assigned to a worksite in Maryland; and that
[Garrett] received tools from Willson when he was hired, are all facts from
(continued...)
7
Id.    Turning to the respondent’s employment outside the State, the court conceded that it
was, like his employment in State, regular.   Id.   Nevertheless, it held:
“[O]ur finding that Pohopek regularly works outside the State is inherently a
finding that Pohopek does not work wholly outside the State, and, therefore,
under Dixon and Garrett,[4] Pohopek's work outside the State must be
4 (...continued) 
which it could have been concluded that [Garrett] was not ‘employed to do work entirely
or wholly outside of the State’and, therefore, that his work in Virginia was ‘incidental
employment outside of the State.’”
Id. at 127, 543 A.2d at 878.
5Maryland Code  (1939, 1947 Cum.Supp.) Art. 101, §  67(3), as pertinent to this
issue, provided:
“But for all purposes of this Article, casual, occasional or incidental
employments outside of this State by the Maryland employer of an
employee or employees regularly employed by said employer within this
State shall be construed to be employment within this State; provided,
however, if an employee or the dependents of an employee shall receive
compensation or damages under the laws of any other State, nothing herein
contained shall be construed so as to permit a total compensation for the
same injury greater than is provided for in this Article.”
8
interpreted as casual.  Dixon and Garrett essentially instruct us that the
finding of regular employment outside of the State is inconsequential, until
there is a finding of casual employment within the State, which triggers
Section 9-203(b). Until there is a finding of casual  employment within the
State, the only determinative status of work outside of the State is either
‘whole’ or ‘casual.’ Under our interpretation,  Pohopek is covered under
subsection (a)(2), because his work outside of the State is said to be casual
(because it is not whole), while his work within the State is said to be regular,
because of the uniformity of his schedule and employment responsibilities in
Maryland.”    
Id. at 242 - 43, 780 A. 2d at 387.
This Court has not addressed the precise question this case presents.   We have,
however, interpreted a predecessor of § 9-203 (a),  Maryland Code  (1939, 1947 Cum.
Supp.) Art. 101, §  67(3),5 see  Gatton v. Sline Co., 199 Md. 578, 87 A.2d 524 (1952), and
considered the meaning of “casual employees” in the context of statutory provisions
excluding such employees from the coverage of the workers’ compensation laws.   See, e.g.
9
Wood v. Abell, 268 Md. 214, 221, 300 A.2d 665 (1973); Lupton v. McDonald, 241 Md.
446, 217 A.2d 262 (1966); Clayburn v. Soueid, Inc. 239 Md. 331, 211 A.2d 728 (1965);
East v. Skelly, 207 Md. 537, 114 A.2d 822 (1955);  Moore v. Clarke, 171 Md. 39, 187 A.
887 (1936);  Marvil v. Elliott, 164 Md. 659, 165 A. 822 (1933);  Hygeia Ice & Coal Co. v.
Schaeffer, 152 Md. 231, 238, 136 A. 548 (1927); State Accident Fund v. Jacobs, 134 Md.
133, 106 A. 255 (1919).
In Gatton, the employer was a Maryland company, with offices in Baltimore City,
that worked jobs in other states, including, West Virginia.  Gatton, who was accidentally
killed while working for the company in West Virginia, was turned down when he applied
for a job at the company’s Baltimore office, there being no union openings.  As directed, he
went to the company’s job site in West Virginia.   After being instructed that he had to
before he could do work on the West Virginia job, he joined the union in West Virginia, was
hired and worked on the West Virginia job.  Although his  paychecks were drawn in
Baltimore City and sent to him at the job site, he was paid according to the West Virginia
union wage scale.  The evidence was that Gatton was not provided transportation to West
Virginia and that the decision to hire him was made by the job foreman in West Virginia.
199 Md. 578 at 580-81, 87 A.2d at 524 - 25.   
The Court summarily disposed of the question whether Gatton was a casual
employee, concluding that “his employment outside the State was not a casual, occasional
or incidental employment by a Maryland employer of a workman regularly employed within
6It is well settled in Maryland that where the essential terms and manner of
(continued...)
10
this State, so that the sole question is whether he was an employee who was "employed
wholly without the State.” Id. at 581, 87 A. 2d at 525.    It  held that Gatton was hired to
work entirely and wholly outside the State of Maryland and, thus, his wife could not claim
benefits under the Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act.  Id. at 584 - 85, 87 A. 2d at 526 -
27.     The Court made clear, however, that the place of employment - where the employee
was hired - is not dispositive:
“However, we do not think the question of where he was actually engaged to
do work affects his widow's rights under our statute.  The Legislature has seen
fit to exempt from the operation of our act those who are ‘employed wholly
without the State.’  That cannot mean those who enter into their contract of
employment outside of the State, because otherwise the word ‘wholly’ would
have no meaning whatever.  It must mean those who are employed to do work
entirely or wholly outside of the State, and this is emphasized by the
exception which permits casual, occasional or incidental employment outside
of the State.  The deceased in this case did not have a casual, occasional or
incidental employment outside of the State.  His employment was to work
entirely outside of the State, and that is all the work he ever did for this
employer.  The Legislature could have caused the statute to embrace all
employments of residents of this State by employers located in this State, but
it did not do so, and we cannot change the plain wording of the Act.   
Id.  199 Md. at 583-84, 87 A.2d 526.
The Court of Special Appeals, in Willson & Sons v. Garrett, 76 Md. App. 120, 543
A.2d 875 (1988), relied on this passage to reject the argument that an employee who worked
only out of State for a Maryland employer, but was promised an in-state job site at the
earliest opportunity, was not entitled, as a matter of law, to workers’ compensation benefits.6
6(...continued)
 employment are undisputed, the issue as to the relation between the parties and the nature
of the employment is one of law for the Court.   Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould,
273 Md. 486, 519, 331 A.2d 55, 75 (1975); Clayburn v. Soueid, 239 Md. 331, 337, 211
A. 2d 728, 731 (1965); Charles Freeland & Sons v. Couplin, 211 Md. 160, 168, 126 A.2d
606, 611 (1956).   This applies to the question of whether the employment is casual, see,
e. g. Wood v. Abel, 268 Md. 214, 226, 300 A. 2d 665, 671 (1973); East v. Skelly, 207
Md. 537, 538, 114 A. 2d 822 (1955), or not.  Clayburn at 340, 211 A. 2d at 732.   See
State Accident Fund v. Jacobs, 134 Md. 133, 106 A. 255 (1919).
7Gatton v. Sline Company, Inc., 199 Md. 578, 87 A.2d 524 (1952) actually
interpreted the predecessor to § 21 (c) (4), § 67 (3); however, as the intermediate
appellate court recognized in Garrett,  the pertinent part of that section was virtually
identical to  §  21(c)(4).  Garrett, 76 Md. App. at 125 n. 3, 543 A. 2d at 877 n. 3.
11
Id. at 126 - 27, 543 A. 2d at 878.    It explained:
“As Gatton demonstrates, the Court of Appeals has given § 21(c)(4)7 a
broader interpretation than that urged by appellants.  This is shown by the fact
that it emphasized that the relevant inquiry is whether the employee is
‘employed to do work entirely or wholly outside of the State’ and by its
reference to the exceptions for casual, occasional or incidental employment
outside of the State.  Thus, although we agree with appellants that, where an
employee is ‘actually engaged’ is not dispositive, we disagree that the only
relevant factor to be considered is where the employee actually worked.  We
think it necessarily follows from the Court's interpretation of the statute that
the question whether an employee was employed to work wholly outside of
the State of Maryland is to be determined from the facts and circumstances
of each case.”
Id.
Although, as indicated, this Court has considered the term, “casual employee” in a
number of cases, it has, as have courts generally, “refrained from giving a definition ...
which must govern in all cases.”  Hygeia Ice & Coal Co., 152 Md. at 238, 136 A. at 551.
See  Wood v. Abell, 268 Md. at 221, 300 A.2d at 669.    Instead, we have consistently held
12
that the decision in any case was to be determined by “its peculiar facts and circumstances.”
Id.  (quoting Hygeia at 238, 136 A. at 551).  What has resulted has been the development
of “an elastic test for determining whether an employee is ‘casual’ or ‘regular,’” with the
factors to be considered being the nature of the employer’s work, the scope and purpose of
the hiring and the duration of the employment, Wood at 223, 300 A. 2d at 670, “whether it
is occasional, incidental, accidental, or a usual concomitant of the employer’s business.”
Moore at 53, 187 A. at 894.  See  Clayburn at 337, 211 A.2d at 731.  
This Court has held, where the essential terms and manner of employment is
undisputed, see Clayburn at 337, 211 A. 2d at 731, that the worker has been hired to perform
a single service on a single or particular occasion, that the employment was casual.  Lupton
at 450-51, 217 A.2d at 264.   See Wood at 223, 300 A. 2d at 670;  East at 540, 114 A.2d at
823;  Moore 171 Md. at 53, 187 A. at 893 - 94; Marvil v. Elliott, 164 Md. 659, 165 A. 822
(1933).
In Wood v. Abell, the worker was hired to help prepare the local fairgrounds for an
upcoming event.   Aside from the fact that he was to do various odd jobs as required by the
county fair association and would be paid by the hour, there was “[n]o definite
understanding ... concerning the duration of their employment, but it was generally expected
that [his] services would be needed for approximately one or two weeks.   Clearly, no
decision was reached that [he] would be employed in the future or that the job[] would be
continuous.” 268 Md. at 217, 300 A. 2d at 667.    We noted also, quoting the testimony of
13
the general manager of the county fair association, that the worker was hired to do odd jobs,
on an indefinite basis, “like on call.”  Id. at 224, 300 A.2d at 670.     
Lupton v. McDonald involved an injury to a worker who had been hired to “help
finish the job” that the employer’s previous employee had abandoned.  241 Md. at 449, 217
A. 2d at 264.    The evidence was undisputed that the duration of the job was short, no more
than one day, and that there was no prior relationship between the employer and the worker.
 Concluding that the worker was a casual employee, the Court noted that “[t]he nature of the
work was temporary, the duration of the employment was only for a day, and it was
occasional and incidental.”  Id. at 450, 217 A. 2d at 264.   The Court  rejected the argument
that the scope and purpose of the hiring must be considered, along with duration and
regularity of service, in determining whether the employment was casual, explaining:
“But the scope and purpose of Lupton’s hiring by Milburn was only to
complete the work which Lupton’s predecessor had left unfinished; the hiring
was confined to completing a specific job on a particular piece of land which
might ‘possibly’ take a day.   Lupton also refers to the definition of casual
employment given in 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, § 51.00 (1965),
that ‘Employment is casual when it is irregular, unpredictable, sporadic and
brief in nature.’  Here, the employment was not only irregular but for a single
occasion; Milburn had never employed Lupton before and had no plans to
engage him for the future.   It was unpredictable and sporadic, in that Lupton
was only hired because Marx, who had originally been engaged by Milburn
to do the work, had left the job.   The hiring was clearly brief in nature.”
Id. at 451, 217 A. 2d at 265.
 East v. Skelly and  Moore v. Clarke both involved jockeys and, in both, the Court
concluded, as a matter of law, that the jockeys were casual employees.   In Moore v. Clarke,
14
the jockey, who was regularly employed by a trainer to ride that trainer’s horses, was hired
solely to ride a horse in a race, by the horse’s owner, with  whom he had no on-going
relationship.      Explaining our decision, we said:
“In this case the employment extended over a period of but a few minutes at
most, and while it was a part of a business in which the employer was
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relations between the employer and the employee ceased.   It was incidental and fortuitous
in the sense that, while the employer must have employed some one to ride her horse, she
was under no obligation to employ Hanford, and that while his business was riding horses
in races, he was, until she employed him for that service, under no obligation to ride her
horse in that race, or indeed to ride in it at all.   The distinction between a casual
employment and a regular employment is illustrated by his relation to Burch, by whom he
was employed at a fixed monthly compensation to ride Burch’s horses, when requested by
Burch, in any race in which they were entered, and his relation to Mrs. Clarke, by whom he
was employed for a single race.”
171 Md. at 54, 187 A. at 894.
The jockey in East v. Skelly was a free lance jockey, who had ridden horses for the
same owner some ten or twelve times during a six or seven month period, or about two
percent of the races he had ridden during that time frame.  207 Md. at 539, 114 A.2d at 823.
We noted “a complete analogy” between that case and Moore v. Clarke, which we
explained, as follows:
“The jockey in the earlier case was a contract rider for a well known trainer
of a public stable.   As is usually the case, he was free to ride in any race in
which his employer did not have a horse entered.   In the race in which he was
killed, he was doing that, and riding for a trainer for whom he had ridden a
number of times during the meet and for whom, but for the accident, he would
have presumably ridden in the future.   The methods of employment, the
methods of payment and all significant facts are the same in the two cases.”
Id. at 541, 114 A. 2d at 823 - 24.   Accordingly, we reached the same result, holding that the
15
jockey was a “casual employee.” 
In Marvil v. Elliot, a carpenter, hired to remove shingles from the eaves of a building,
was injured when he fell from a ladder.   Addressing the question presented, whether the
injured worker was entitled to an award of workers’ compensation as an employee, the
Court opined:
“In the present case, the appellee was allowed by a property owner for whom
he was working to be engaged temporarily by a contractor in charge of other
work on the same premises.   Upon the completion of the task to which the
appellee was thus assigned, and which would probably have required not
more than two or three hours for its performance, he was to resume his work
for the first employer.   The brief service he was undertaking to render for the
contractor had no relation to any engagement between them in the past or
future.   It was limited to a particular occasion beginning and ending within
a short portion of a single day.   In view of its restricted scope and purpose,
it must be regarded as casual within the meaning of the Maryland statute.”
164 Md. at 665, 165 A. at 824.
These cases are to be contrasted with those in which the Court concluded that the
employment was “regular,” not “casual.”   Clayburn v. Soueid, Inc., 239 Md. at 337, 211 A.
2d at 731 ; State Accident Fund v. Jacobs, 134 Md. 133, 106 A. 255 (1919).    In Clayburn
v. Soueid, Inc. we explained why the  worker in that case was not a “casual employee” and,
thus, a “regular” one:  
“The work which Clayburn performed for Soueid was essential to Soueid*s
business of building houses. Soueid sub-let the work of building the houses,
but engaged laborers, of whom Clayburn was one, in the cleaning of the
houses after they were built, laying drain, leveling the ground, moving
material from one location to another, and  general laborer*s work. This work
was necessary in connection with each of the houses Soueid was building.
Clayburn was taken by Soueid from one location to another and always
16
worked under Soueid*s personal direction. The work was not seasonal, except
in the sense that, being largely performed out of doors, the weather had to be
favorable. The work did not have to be performed continuously, but it was
necessary at certain stages of each building operation, and Soueid built houses
steadily. Clayburn testified, without contradiction, that after Soueid first
engaged him from the labor pool, Soueid told him he would give him a steady
job, and Clayburn said that this was what he was looking for. After a few
days,  Soueid raised Clayburn*s pay, and called for him, not at the place where
the other men, in a labor pool, awaited day*s employment, but at another
location previously agreed upon between the two men. During the entire
period, Clayburn worked for no one except Soueid, except for a day or two
between April 3 and 8, when Soueid had said he would be out of town. The
evidence is clear that Clayburn*s employment by Soueid was steady and
pursuant to a continuing and individually arranged agreement.
Id. at 340, 211 A. 2d at 732 - 33.
The Court relied on Jacobs, in which the worker, a farmer and a teamster, was hired
early in the canning season “to work for [the employer] at such times as I might need him,
and he promised to help me out at all such times as I might call upon him.”  134 Md. at 134,
106 A. at 255.   Receiving during the season, “the same wages paid all the time,” the worker
had been called on repeatedly for hauling, which he did.   Id.  We concluded that the worker
was not a “casual employee.”  Noting that the determination of the nature of an employment
relation must be made “with principal reference to the scope and purpose of the hiring rather
than with sole regard to the duration and regularity of the service,” id. at 135, 106 A. at 255,
we observed:
“One who enters into a contract of employment for an entire season is not a
casual employee merely because he may be required to work for only a short
and irregular periods.   When there is a continuing engagement to serve the
employer in his business at such times as the particular and essential service
may be needed, the employment is not ‘casual’ according to any of the
17
judicial definitions of that term.   In this case the service required and
rendered was occasional, but it was in pursuance of an engagement covering
the whole of the working season at the employer’s plant.”
Id. at 135, 106 A. at 255 - 56.   We held that the worker was injured, and his death therefore
resulted from, engaging in work that was a necessary part of the employer’s business, work
that was done “under an employment which was not limited to the hauling then in progress,
but applied to every recurring occasion for such assistance during the whole of one of the
annual productive periods of the employer’s enterprise.”  Id. at 136, 106 A. at 256.
We may glean from the foregoing that where the facts and the circumstances of a
given case reveal that the undertaking by the worker, on behalf of the employer, is not
pursuant to an agreement providing for a continuous employment relationship, is of short
duration and/or is temporary or sporadic, the employment , and therefore the employee, is
“casual.”  On the other hand, where the facts and circumstances reveal an agreement or
arrangement, continuous in nature, calling for the worker to work for the employer, as and
when the particular and essential requirements of the business demand, the employment, and
therefore the employee, is not “casual.”   And this is true whatever the duration or nature of
any one or more of the component undertakings.
It is undisputed that there is an employment relationship between the petitioner and
the respondent; the respondent regularly makes deliveries all along the east coast, driving
the petitioner’s tractor-trailer.   Apropos the issue with which we are presented, whether the
regular employment is in Maryland, the arrangement contemplates a regular presence in
18
Maryland.   The respondent begins, and ends, his work week in Maryland and the
petitioner’s tractor-trailer is kept in Maryland.    In regard to the latter responsibility, the
respondent is charged with its safekeeping and the safekeeping of any cargo that it might
contain.   Moreover, the respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the tractor-trailer.
We believe these facts and circumstances suffice to establish that the respondent’s
employment in Maryland, rather than being “casual,” was “regular.”   This is consistent with
the holding of the Court of Special Appeals, which, as we have seen, relying on the
definition of “regular” enunciated in Dixon, i.e. “a uniform course of conduct,” was
persuaded by the consistency of the respondent’s schedule and job responsibilities.  Pohopek
at 240 - 41, 780 A.2d at 386, (quoting Dixon v. Able Equip. Co. 107 Md. Ap. at 549, 668
A.2d at 1012). 
The Court of Special Appeals determined, however, that the respondent was also
regularly employed outside the State of Maryland, but that finding, in and of itself, was
necessarily one that the respondent’s employment outside the State was only “casual” -
reasoning that only employment wholly outside the State would preclude a compensation
award to an employee regularly employed in State.   Pohopek, 140 Md. App. at  241, 780
A. 2d at 386.    To be sure, the respondent spends a considerable amount of his time working
for the petitioner outside the State of Maryland, about 80 percent, judging from the
petitioner’s Movement Listing for the respondent.   That - considering all of the employment
activity outside the State as a whole -  does seem to qualify as regular employment. 
19
Tractor-trailer drivers, however, “constitute a unique class of employees whose activity, by
its very nature, is transient.  The fact that a truck driver may spend a significant amount of
time in one State does not detract from the essentially transitory nature of the activity in
which he engages.”  Cowger v. The Industrial Commission, 313 Ill. App. 3d 364, 374, 728
N.E.2d 789, 796 (2000), quoting Patton v. Industrial Comm'n, 147 Ill. App. 3d 738, 745,
498 N.E.2d 539, 544 (1986).   See also   9 A. Larson & L. Larson Workers' Compensation
Law §  143.04 [2] [c] (2003), in which it is said:
“In some kinds of employment, like trucking, flying, selling, or construction
work, the employee may be constantly coming and going without spending
any longer sustained periods in the local state than anywhere else; but a status
rooted in the local state by the original creation of the employment relation
there, is not lost merely on the strength of the relative amount of time spent
in the local state as against foreign states. An employee loses this status only
when his or her regular employment becomes  centralized and fixed so clearly
in another state that any return to the original state would itself be only casual,
incidental and temporary by comparison. This transference will never happen
as long as the employee’s presence in any state, even including the original
state, is by the nature of the employment brief and transitory.”
Thus, while, when viewed together, the amount of employment activity outside the State
dwarfs the amount in State, when each location to which the respondent travels making
deliveries and pick-ups is considered separately, the respondent’s presence in none of them
is substantially greater than in Maryland.   Indeed, the respondent’s presence in Alabama,
the place to which the agreement refers and which the petitioner suggests is the proper situs
for the compensation action, is considerably less. 
20
Professor Larson, Cowger and Patton all addressed the situation in which the place
where the employment was contracted is determinative of the situs of the employment
relation for purposes of jurisdiction to award workers’ compensation.    In this case, the
place at which the employment relation was formalized was North Carolina, rather than
Alabama.   Under their rationale, the situs of the employment relation would be North
Carolina and, therefore, the jurisdiction to resolve workers’ compensation issues arising out
of that relationship.  That situs would remain unless and until the employee’s regular
employment becomes fixed clearly in another State; it is not sufficient that the relative
amount of time spent in the local State is less, even considerably so, than that spent in the
foreign states.
 In Maryland, the place where the employment was contracted is not the dispositive
factor.  Gatton, 199 Md. at 583-84, 87 A. 2d at 526.  That factor is whether the employment
in Maryland is regular when compared to the employment outside Maryland.  That
comparison, when the employment itself is transitory, is between the State where the
employment has been found to be regular and each of the other locations to which the
employment has a relationship.   Thus, it is not the whole of the employment outside the
State that is considered, it is only that in some other State that surpasses the “casual.”     As
Professor Larson points out, “a status rooted in the local state... is not lost merely on the
strength of the relative amount of time spent in the local state as against foreign states.   An
employee loses this status only when his or her regular employment becomes centralized and
21
fixed so clearly in another state that any return to the original state would itself be only
casual, incidental and temporary by comparison.”  9 A. Larson & L. Larson, Workers’
Compensation Law § 143.04 [2] [c] (2003). 
We hold that the respondent was regularly employed in Maryland and that his
employment activity in none of the other states in which he makes deliveries and pick-ups
is, by comparison, other than “casual, occasional or incidental.”   Accordingly, the judgment
of the Court of Special Appeals is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.