Case Title: In Re: Jason W.

Citation: 378 Md. 596

Docket Number: 23/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Re: In Re: Jason W.
    No. 23, September Term, 2003
HEADNOTE:
Md. Code, § 26-101(a) of Education Article, which makes it an
offense to “willfully disturb or otherwise willfully prevent the
orderly conduct of the activities, administration, or classes of
[a school]” requires an actual disturbance that significantly
interferes with the school operation; conduct that causes no more
than minimal disruption or diversion not covered.
In the Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No. CCJ-16360
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 23
September Term, 2003
______________________________________
IN RE: JASON W.
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
      Raker, Harrell and Battaglia, JJ., Concur
______________________________________
Filed:     December 5, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he also participated in the decision and
adoption of this opinion.
We are called upon to examine the reach of Maryland Code, § 26-101(a) of the
Education Article, which makes it a misdemeanor, subject to a $2,500 fine and six months
in jail, for a person to “willfully disturb or otherwise willfully prevent the orderly conduct
of the activities, administration, or classes of any institution of elementary, secondary, or
higher education.”  We shall conclude that the statute does not cover the conduct that
occurred here.
BACKGROUND
 Around 9:15 on the morning of December 13, 2001, a teacher at the Clear Spring
Middle School in Washington County observed one of his students, Jason W., just outside
the classroom scribbling something on a wall that bordered a stairway or ramp.  As he
walked over to investigate, he observed that Jason had written on the wall, in pencil, the
words “There is a bomb,” and that, as he approached, Jason began erasing the word
“bomb” with his hand.  The teacher inquired what Jason was doing but did not get a
coherent answer, whereupon he escorted Jason to the principal’s office.  
The principal took a photograph of the writing, which was never placed in
evidence, and called the police and Jason’s mother. About an hour later, a deputy sheriff
appeared at the school and, after giving Jason his Miranda warnings and in the presence
of Jason’s mother and the teacher, questioned him.  Jason admitted having written “There
is a bomb” on the wall and, when asked for an explanation, said that “he didn’t know
what he was doing.”  The sheriff went to look at the wall and saw only the words “There
1 Until October 1, 2002, the basic criminal code in Maryland was found in Article 27
of the 1957 Code.  With the enactment of the new Criminal Law Article in 2002, as part of
the on-going code revision process, Article 27 has been repealed, and its provisions are now
found, in code-revised form, in the Criminal Law Article.  The events here occurred while
Article 27 was still in effect.
-2-
is a.”  Underneath those words were smeared pencil marks that were illegible.  The
principal obviously did not treat the message as an actual bomb threat, for he took no
action to clear the school building, to alert the fire marshal or any bomb detection or
disposal agency, or to otherwise disrupt the normal operation of the school.
Upon this evidence, Jason was charged with juvenile delinquency based on his
alleged violation of two criminal statutes: then-Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 9, making it a
felony to threaten to explode a destructive device, and Education Article, § 26-101(a)
which, as noted, makes it unlawful for a person wilfully to disturb or otherwise prevent
the orderly conduct of the activities, administration, or classes of any institution of
elementary, secondary, or higher education.1  At the commencement of the adjudicatory
hearing, the State, without objection, amended the petition to delete the charge under Art.
27, § 9, and replace it with an allegation that Jason had violated then-Art. 27, § 151A,
making it a felony for any person to circulate or transmit to another, with intent that it be
acted on, a statement or rumor about the location or possible detonation of a destructive
device, knowing the statement to be false.
On the evidence submitted, the court found no violation of § 151A, perhaps
because the teacher intervened before Jason could finish writing his message.  Jason
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never indicated the location or possible detonation of a destructive device; he never stated
where any bomb was located, whether in the school or somewhere else.  The court treated
§ 26-101(a) as having been violated simply by Jason’s writing on the wall, without regard
to the content of his message.  After consulting dictionary definitions of “disturb” and
“orderly,” the court concluded that (1) Jason’s conduct was wilful in that it was
intentional, and (2) “[w]riting on a wall, which is not authorized, would be a violation of
this section because the administration would have to take care of the investigation,
cleaning.  It’s out of the regular ordinary course of the school.”
Although at the subsequent disposition hearing the State regarded the incident as a
“minor” one, it was concerned about earlier incidents involving Jason, as brought out in a
social service report and testimony by the principal.  The court found Jason delinquent,
retained him in the custody of his parents, but placed him on probation subject to good
behavior and a number of more detailed conditions intended to assure good behavior. 
Jason appealed, contending that, absent evidence of any actual disturbance or disruption
of school activities, the statute had not been violated.  In a split, unreported decision, the
Court of Special Appeals agreed and reversed the judgment.  The panel majority noted
that no evidence had been presented that classes were halted or that other students were
even aware of the event, and that, although school personnel had to discipline Jason and
the police were called, “the situation did not constitute the type of disturbance or
disruption of the orderly conduct of school activities, administration, or classes
2 The 1865 law was enacted in conformance with the mandate inserted in the 1864
Constitution that the General Assembly, at its next session, provide for a uniform system of
free public schools.  See Md. Const. of 1864, art. VIII, § 4.
-4-
contemplated by the statute.”
DISCUSSION
Section 26-101(a) has its roots in the first Statewide public education law enacted
in Maryland, 1865 Md. Laws, ch. 160, and its history helps to illuminate its purpose and
scope.2  Ch. IV, § 6 of the 1865 law provided that any person who “shall willfully disturb,
interrupt or disquiet any district school in session, or any persons assembled with the
permission of the District [School] Commissioner in any district school house for the
purpose of giving or receiving instruction in any branch of education or learning” shall
forfeit $20 for the benefit of the school district, and, if payment was not immediately
made, the person could be committed to jail until the payment was made, but not for more
than 30 days. 
For 100 years, that provision, as amended and re-codified from time to time,
remained solely in the public education law, as an aspect of school administration.  In
1966, a partially overlapping provision was placed in the criminal code as well, when the
Legislature made it a misdemeanor, punishable by six months in jail and a $1,000 fine,
for a person to refuse to leave any public building or grounds of a public agency during
regular business hours, upon request to do so by an authorized employee, if the
-5-
surrounding circumstances were such as to indicate that the person had no apparent
lawful business there or was acting in a manner “disruptive of and disturbing to the
conduct of normal business” by the agency.  See 1966 Md. Laws, ch. 552, enacting §
577A to Art. 27 of the Maryland Code.  Three years later, the Legislature added another,
more focused trespass provision to Art. 27, authorizing the highest official or governing
body of the various State colleges and public schools to deny access to the school
buildings or grounds to persons who had no lawful business there or who were acting in a
manner “disruptive or disturbing to the normal educational functions of the institution”
and making it a misdemeanor to trespass on the grounds, to refuse to leave upon request,
or wilfully to damage or deface the property of the institution.  See 1969 Md. Laws, ch.
627, enacting new § 577B to Art. 27.  In the same session, as part of a comprehensive
revision of the public education law, the education provision, then codified as § 96 of Art.
77, was rewritten to tie into § 577A of Art. 27.  See 1969 Md. Laws, ch. 405.  With the
1969 amendment made by ch. 405, §96 made it unlawful for any person, organization, or
group “to disturb any public school in session, or to interfere in any manner with the
normal operation of a public school,” for the violation of which the remedies provided in
§ 577A of Art. 27 plus injunctive relief were available.  
In 1970, through the enactment of a new section 123A to Art. 27, the criminal
provisions were strengthened, largely as the result of the recent outbreak of riots and
organized disturbances on college campuses and in some of the secondary public schools. 
3 The disturbances at the Prince George’s County schools were extensively reported
in the Washington Post.  A January 13, 1970 article noted that 22 students had been arrested
at one of the schools after fighting broke out.  One student set off some tear gas.  See
Douglas Watson, “21 Students Held in DuVal Clash,” Washington Post, January 13, 1970,
at C1.  On February 11, 1970, the Post  noted that, earlier in the Fall, 60 students had been
arrested at another Prince George’s County high school after racial disturbances.  See
Lawrence Meyer, “Board Acts to Calm Schools,” Washington Post, February 11, 1970, at
C5.  On February 12, 1970, the Annapolis Evening Capital reported that roving gangs of
Annapolis Senior High School students had smashed windows at the school, “roughed up”
an assistant principal, and ripped down posters just before classes were to begin.  More than
half the students left the school after the disorders erupted, but the police had to be called to
clear the hallways.  See Evening Capital, February 12, 1970, at 1.  The disturbances at the
Annapolis school caught the attention of State legislators. See Hal Burdett, “County
legislators, lawmen huddle on school disorders,” Annapolis Evening Capital, February 14,
1970, at 1, 2.  See also Michael Parks, “Pupil-Jailing Bill is Sent to Governor,” Baltimore
Sun, April 1, 1970 at C 24, noting that the law was prompted by “repeated disturbances” at
two high schools in Prince George’s County, one involving a “reign of terror” and the other
racial bullying and harassment of students that led to “near riots,”and that it gained support
when students at several high schools in Baltimore “demonstrated in February, at times
boycotting classes and marching on the city school administration building.”    When the bill
was passed, the Annapolis Evening Capital reported that it had been “prompted by disorder
-6-
The broadening and focused application of trespass, disorderly conduct, or school
disturbance laws was then a national phenomenon.  See Sheldon R. Shapiro, Participation
of Student in Demonstration on or near Campus as Warranting Imposition of Criminal
Liability for Breach of Peace, Disorderly Conduct, Trespass, Unlawful Assembly, or
Similar Offense, 32 ALR 3d 551 (1970).  The Maryland Legislature had not yet begun to
preserve committee files or to require written committee reports, so there is no official
legislative history of the 1970 Maryland law, but contemporary press reports reveal that
the bill was a response to a wave of rioting, violent racial confrontations, and vandalism
at high schools in Prince George’s County and Annapolis.3    
in the schools.”  See “School disorder bills approved,” Annapolis Evening Capital, April 1,
1970 at 3.
4 The Revisor’s Note initially appended to § 26-101 and found in the 1978 edition of
the Education Article, pointed out that, although former § 96 of Art. 77 applied only to the
disruption of public schools, the parallel provision in § 123A of Art. 27 applied to all
schools, that § 26-101 adopted the broader scope of § 123A, and that it conceivably applied
to private schools as well.
-7-
Without any reference to either § 577A or § 577B of Art. 27 or § 96 of Art. 77, the
1970 Act made it a misdemeanor for any person (1) wilfully to disturb or otherwise
prevent the orderly conduct of the activities, administration, or classes of any school,
college or university in Maryland or (2) to molest or threaten with bodily harm any
student, employee, administrator, agent, or other person lawfully in a building or on the
grounds or vicinity of any school, college, or university.  With the enactment of that law,
there thus existed somewhat parallel provisions in both the criminal and public education
laws prohibiting, and making criminal, conduct that disrupted the public schools and
colleges.  
In the course of code-revising the education laws in 1977, the Legislature
combined § 123A of Art. 27 with § 96 of Art. 77 into the new § 26-101 of the Education
Article and, for consistency, moved § 577B of Art. 27 to the new Article as § 26-102. 
Section 26-101(a) is the provision at issue here, making it a criminal offense for any
person wilfully to disturb or otherwise prevent the orderly conduct of the activities,
administration, or classes of any institution of elementary, secondary, or higher
education.4  Section 26-101(b) picks up the provisions of former § 123A(b) that
-8-
prohibited a person from molesting or threatening students, employees, and others
lawfully on the school grounds. The school disruption provisions, though carrying
criminal penalties, were thus removed from the criminal code and placed back in the
public education laws, where they began.
When the 1970 Act was pending before the Legislature, some concern was
expressed about its breadth.  Debate in the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Delegates was extensive, and the fear was raised that, if read literally, the Act “could be
applied to a kindergarten pupil throwing a temper tantrum.”  See Baltimore Sun, April 1,
1970 at C24, supra.  Clearly, however, that was not its intent; nor was that the legislative
intent when those provisions were melded into § 26-101(a).  The focus in 1970, which
remained unchanged in 1977, was on riots and organized demonstrations and disturbances
that actually impeded the schools from carrying out their administrative and educational
functions.  When the bill was presented to the Governor for signature, its sponsor noted
that it would give police “a handy weapon . . . with which to end these disturbances,
disorders and riots.”  Michael Parks, “Mandel To Sign Bill Making Campus Disruption A
Crime,” Baltimore Sun, May 21, 1970, C 8.
In this light, the view of the juvenile court that merely writing on the wall, without
regard to the content of the writing, constitutes a violation of § 26-101(a) “because the
administration would have to take care of the investigation [and] cleaning” is clearly
untenable.  Depending on the extent to which an unauthorized writing actually damages
-9-
or defaces public school property, that conduct may or may not fall within the ambit of §
26-102(e)(3) – part of former Art. 27, § 577B  – which makes it unlawful for a person
wilfully to damage or deface any public school building, but Jason was not charged with
that offense.  The juvenile court’s reading of § 26-101(a) would make criminal any
unauthorized conduct that requires even a minimal response by a school official, and that
would, indeed, raise the specter of a young child being haled into juvenile court and
found delinquent for throwing a temper tantrum in school.  As we have so often said,
statutes must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical, incompatible
with common sense, or that would reach an absurd result that could not possibly have
been intended by the Legislature.  See Whiting-Turner v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 302,
783 A.2d 667, 671 (2001); Facon v. State, 375 Md. 435, 446, 825 A.2d 1096, 1102
(2003).
A typical public school deals on a daily basis with hundreds – perhaps thousands –
of pupils in varying age ranges and with a variety of needs, problems, and abilities, scores
of teachers, also with varying needs, problems, and abilities, and a host of other
employees, visitors, and occasional trespassers.  The “orderly conduct of the activities,
administration, or classes” takes into account and includes within it conduct or
circumstances that may momentarily divert attention from the planned classroom activity
and that may require some intervention by a school official.  Disruptions of one kind or
another no doubt occur every day in the schools, most of which, we assume, are routinely
5 Section 7-306(b) of the Education Article requires the State Board of Education to
establish guidelines for a code of discipline with standards of conduct and consequences for
violations.  Subsection (c) requires the local boards of education to adopt regulations that
provide for educational and behavioral interventions, counseling, and student and parent
conferencing, as well as “alternative programs, which may include in-school suspension,
suspension, expulsion, or other disciplinary measures that are deemed appropriate.”  See also
COMAR 13A.08.01.11.  The Legislature has thus anticipated that disruptive behavior on the
part of a student may result in a variety of sequentially serious discipline within the school
setting.  In conformance with the legislative mandate, the State Board of Education did
promulgate guidelines for the local school systems.  See MARYLAND GUIDELINES FOR A
STATE CODE OF DISCIPLINE, State Department of Education (Jan. 1997).  The guidelines
created two classes of violations, all of which were regarded, in some way, as being
disruptive in nature.  Classification I includes “a wide range of behaviors which disrupt the
learning environment,” ranging from tardiness, disrespect (defined as “inappropriate
comments or physical gestures to teachers or staff members or others”), dress code
violations, classroom disruption (“behavior which interferes with the learning of others in
a classroom or other learning environment”), and insubordination (“refusing to follow
directions of teachers, staff, or administration”), to fighting, indecent exposure, vandalism,
destruction of school property, and sexual activity.  Id., at 8, 19.  The interventions
recommended for those violations include student and parent conferences, mediation,
counseling, community service, loss of various privileges, detention, restitution, in-school
suspension, and suspension.  Id., at 9.  Classification II offenses are more serious.  They
include such things as possession of weapons, physical attacks, theft, stalking, and possession
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dealt with in the school setting by principals, assistant principals, pupil personnel
workers, guidance counselors, school psychologists, and others, as part of their jobs and
as an aspect of school administration.  Although, undoubtedly, some conduct is serious or
disruptive enough to warrant not only school discipline but criminal, juvenile, or mental
health intervention as well, (see, for example, In re Nahif, 123 Md. App. 193, 717 A.2d
393 (1998)), there is a level of disturbance that is simply part of the school activity, that is
intended to be dealt with in the context of school administration, and that is necessarily
outside the ambit of § 26-101(a).5  
The words “disturb or otherwise willfully
of contraband, and the sanctions include extended suspension and expulsion. Id., at 9-10.
Some of the conduct, even in Classification I, is, itself, criminal, and may be punished in
delinquency proceedings.  Most of the conduct in Classification I is not itself criminal,
however, and could hardly have been intended to be made criminal simply by characterizing
it as disruptive to the learning environment.  
-11-
prevent,” as used in § 26-101(a), cannot be read too broadly or too literally.  A child who
speaks disrespectfully or out of turn, who refuses to sit down or pay attention when told to
do so, who gets into an argument with another student, who throws a rolled-up napkin
across the room, who comes to class late, or even one who violates the local dress code in
some way, may well disturb the class and, if sent to the principal, may divert the teacher
or the principal from other duties for a time, but surely that conduct cannot be regarded as
criminal because it is temporarily disruptive.  We reject the State’s argument that there
need not be any “actual disturbance.”  The only sensible reading of the statute is that there
must not only be an “actual disturbance,” but that the disturbance must be more than a
minimal, routine one.  It must be one that significantly interferes with the orderly
activities, administration, or classes at the school.  
There was no such disturbance here.  The principal did not take the writing as an
actual threat, and, fortunately, he was accurate in his assessment.  Had a credible bomb
threat been made and action appropriate to that threat been taken, the situation would be
quite different.  On these facts, the Court of Special Appeals was correct in reversing the
finding of delinquency.
-12-
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH
COSTS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 23
September Term, 2003
IN RE: JASON W.
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Concurring Opinion by Harrell, J.,
in which Raker and Battaglia, JJ. join
Filed:   December 5, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court;  after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he also participated in the decision and
adoption of this opinion.
1 The “Fourth Estate” is the press, or journalists in general.  The term is commonly
attributed to the historian Thomas Carlyle:
[Edmund] Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the
Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than
they all....  Printing...is equivalent to Democracy....  Whoever can speak,
speaking now to the whole nation, becomes a power, a branch of government,
with inalienable weight in law-making, in all acts of authority.  
Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-worship, And The Heroic In History (Lecture V, 1840),
available at http://gutenberg.net/ (Project Gutenberg).
I concur in the Court’s opinion and judgment.  I write separately to comment on the
appropriateness of  relying on newspaper articles as sources for divining legislative intent.
(See slip op. at 6 n.3, and 8).  Generally, it is unwise for courts to rely on the fruit of the
Fourth Estate1 in such endeavors.  As apparent justification for recourse to such in the present
case, Judge Wilner notes that, at the time of the enactment of the 1970 law, “[t]he Maryland
legislature had not yet begun [regularly] to preserve committee files or to require written
committee reports, so there is no official legislative history” of the 1970 version of the statute
at issue here.  For that reason, the present situation may well be one of the rare occasions
-2-
when it is appropriate for a court to consider, to some degree, relatively contemporaneous
relevant newspaper articles in ascertaining the legislative intent of an enactment of
comparable vintage.  Nonetheless, even when appropriate to do so, the use of newspaper
accounts should be approached with caution and selectivity. 
I subscribe generally to what Judge Cole stated in 1983 in his dissent in Hornbeck v.
Somerset County Bd. of Ed., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983), where, in response to the
majority’s reliance on newspaper accounts of the Maryland Constitutional Convention of
1867 in interpreting a provision of the Maryland Constitution (Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 626-28,
458 A.2d at 773-74), he wrote: “Newspaper articles [   ] are hardly the most reliable sources
for extrapolating legislative intent; they certainly are not adequate substitutes for cogent
analysis of the purpose of a provision as discerned from its historical context and basic
goals.”  Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 661, 458 A.2d at 792 (emphasis in original).  Judge Cole and
I are not alone in our skepticism.
Jack Schwartz and Amanda Conn, in their article The Court of Appeals at the Cocktail
Party: The Use and Misuse of Legislative History, 54 Md. L.Rev. 432, 437 (1995), warned
generally that:
The Court of Appeals has gone awry by failing to make clear
that not all legislative history has equal value in the court’s
exercise of assigning probabilities to various statutory readings.
Too often the court has not differentiated the reliable from the
unreliable, evidence that genuinely might reflect the legislative
purpose underlying the enacted bill from evidence that reflects
little more than someone’s effort to gain leverage in the process.
By indiscriminately assigning essentially the same weight to
-3-
each form of legislative history, the court makes an error of the
same type as affording legislative history too much or too little
weight altogether.
Id. at 437.  They concluded that, in order “to be the faithful investigator of legislative
purpose that it claims to be, the [C]ourt should discard its fascination with potentially
misleading scraps in the legislative history and focus instead on the clues that matter.”  Id.
at 465.
A major treatise writer on the subject of statutory construction cautions against the use
of unofficial sources in aid of ascertaining legislative intent.  “Statements from nonofficial
sources having no special connection with the preparation and proposal of a bill are not
generally considered for interpretation purposes.”  Sutherland Stat. Const. § 48.11 (5 th Ed.).
Sutherland points out that “interpretations of legislation made by those lacking statutory
authority to do so are given less weight.”  Id. § 49.06.  Nonetheless, he concedes that “the
meaning attached by people affected by an act may have an important bearing on how it is
construed.”  Id.
A number of courts have disparaged reliance on newspaper articles in similar contexts.
In Hulcher v. Commonwealth, 575 S.E.2d 579, 583, n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2003), the Virginia
Court of Appeals declined “appellant’s invitation to consider newspaper and journal articles
written contemporaneously with the passage of the [ ] statute as an appropriate source of
‘legislative history’.”  The Kansas Court of Appeals, in 
Mitchell v. Rayl, 665 P.2d 1117, 1119
(Kan. Ct. App. 1983), expressed its unwillingness “to accept a newspaper article as
-4-
conclusive proof of legislative intent.”  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin opined “we do not
find persuasive the after-the-fact media reports upon which the dissent relies.... Just as ex
post facto explanations from legislators cannot be relied upon to determine legislative intent,
ex post facto newspaper articles cannot provide guidance as to legislative intent.”  R.U.R.A.L.
v. Public Service Comm’n of Wisconsin, 619 N.W.2d 888, 904, n.20 (Wis. 2000).  The
Supreme Court of Vermont expressed a similar view, stating that “comments made by an
attorney for the Department of Public Service to a newspaper reporter after the legislation
passed are in no way relevant to the question of legislative intent.”  In re Pet. of Quechee
Serv. Co., Inc., 690 A.2d 354, 366, n.7 (Vt. 1996).  The Supreme Court of California stated
that “articles in newspapers or other unofficial publications cannot be considered as
statements of legislative intent.”  Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 185 P.2d 805, 813
(Cal. 1947).  The Minnesota Tax Court recently held that newspaper articles are not evidence
of legislative intent because “none of the individuals were involved in the drafting or passage
of the legislation, their statements were not made contemporaneously with the passage of the
act, and the statements do not indicate that the individuals had any responsibility for the law’s
enactment.”  ILHC of Eagan, LLC v. County of Dakota, 2003 Minn. Tax LEXIS 22 at *11-
12, 2003 WL 21108385 at *4 (Minn. Tax 2003).
Courts that have employed news accounts in their search for legislative intent are
mindful of the inherent pitfalls and parse narrowly the appropriateness of the circumstances
in which they consider the articles.  Certain federal courts have accepted newspaper articles
-5-
as evidence bearing on legislative intent only when the relevant legislative body or bodies
did not maintain records of official legislative history.  See May v. Cooperman, 572 F.Supp
1561, 1564 (D.N.J. 1983), but see dissent in May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 264 (3d Cir.
1985) (commenting on the use of newspaper articles, Judge Becker observed that “the
opinions and perceptions of the community are shaped by many factors....  Such perceptions
are thus unreliable indicators of what the legislative purpose of the statute in fact was”);
Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F.Supp. 1138, 1149 (N.D. Miss. 1980).  Another federal court
admitted newspaper articles not for the truth of the information contained in them, but solely
for the purpose of showing that they were published.  U.S. v. Halifax County Bd. of Ed.,, 314
F.Supp. 65, 75 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
A number of State courts have treated newspaper articles similarly.  In Fox v. Bd. of
Ed. of the Township of West Milford, 226 A.2d 471 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967), the
court stated that “the legislative language is undoubtedly ambiguous, and requires resort to
legislative history, contemporaneous construction and administrative interpretation to shed
light on the true meaning and intent of the statute.”  226 A.2d at 480 (citing favorably to a
newspaper article issued contemporaneous to the statute in question).  The Supreme Court
of Arizona, after determining that the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation was
inapplicable, opined that “to find legislative intent, we consider the context of the statute, the
language used, the subject matter, the historical background, the effects and consequences,
and the spirit and purpose of the law.”  Arizona Newspapers Ass’n v. Superior Court, 694
-6-
P.2d 1174, 1176 (Ariz. 1985) (relying on newspaper accounts to show information was
published).
Where, as in the present case, there was no formal documentation of the legislative
history maintained by the Maryland General Assembly or Governor at the time, I can accept
the Court’s careful and thoughtful recourse to relatively contemporaneous newspaper
accounts of relevance to the legislation when it was under consideration and when it was
enacted.  Moreover, Judge Wilner’s use of the articles he refers to serves only as context in
the Court’s analysis.  Understanding the public crisis that animated the legislative initiative
in 1970 (see slip op. at 6 n.3) appears to be legitimate background information.  The Court’s
analysis does not depend solely on these accounts in assigning to the statute the meaning it
does.  The bulk of the Court’s analysis, apart from the newspaper accounts, represents the
type of “cogent analysis of the purpose of a provision as discerned from its historical context
and basic goals,” as envisioned by Judge Cole in his Hornbeck dissent.
Judge Raker and Judge Battaglia join in this concurring opinion.