Case Title: P.L. v. A.H.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 23S-AD-00158

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2023-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 23S-AD-00158  
In the Matter of the Adoption of S.L.; 
P.L., 
Appellant (Respondent below) 
–v– 
M.H. and A.H., 
Appellees (Petitioners below). 
Argued: April 27, 2023 | Decided: June 20, 2023 
Corrected 
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court 
No. 29D01-2006-AD-964 
The Honorable Michael A. Casati, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
No. 22A-AD-80 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Slaughter, Goff, and Molter concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jun 20 2023, 2:18 pm
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Massa, Justice 
 Adoptive Parents challenge a Court of Appeals’ decision requiring 
them to provide notice to biological Father of the temporary custody of 
Child, rendering the trial court’s order void for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. While the panel below erred in requiring notice in a 
temporary custody matter, we resolve this case on the narrower ground of 
no appellate jurisdiction.  
Facts and Procedural History 
P.L. (“Father”) is the biological father of S.L. (“Child”).  Child was 
removed twelve days after birth and placed with M.H. and A.H. 
(“Adoptive Parents”) for fourteen months. In May 2015, Grandparents 
petitioned for guardianship, which the trial court granted the next day.  
Child resided with Grandparents and spent weekends, holidays, and 
vacations with Adoptive Parents. By May 2019, Child was placed full time 
with Adoptive Parents.  
In June 2020, Adoptive Parents petitioned to adopt Child, and 
separately moved for temporary custody, and to consolidate the adoption 
and temporary custody cases with the Hamilton Superior Court under 
Trial Rule 42(D). Father was not served the petition or motions. And while 
Father was entitled to notice of the adoption petition, Ind. Code §§ 31-19-
2.5-3, 31-19-9-1, the law requires no such notice of temporary custody 
actions, I.C. § 31-19-2-13. 
The Hamilton Superior Court thus conducted a hearing on the motion 
for temporary custody with only Adoptive Parents and Grandparents 
present. On July 8, 2020, the court granted Adoptive Parents temporary 
custody, determining it was in Child’s best interest to be placed with 
Adoptive Parents while the adoption petition was pending. More than a 
year later, Father filed a Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion to set aside the trial 
court’s order of custody, arguing the order was void ab initio for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, based on a lack of notice to which he was not legally 
entitled.  
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The trial court denied Father’s motion, finding the temporary custody 
order was not void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction, and explained 
that Indiana Code section 31-19-2-13 authorizes an ex parte proceeding in 
temporary custody matters. Father appealed. In a unanimous, 
unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the trial 
court erred in denying Father’s Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion to set aside the 
temporary custody order. P.L. v. M.H. and A.H., 194 N.E.3d 654, 2022 WL 
3724896, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2022). The panel reasoned that 
because Adoptive Parents failed to serve Father with notice of their 
adoption petition, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Father, 
rendering the temporary custody order void. Id. at *2–3.  
Adoptive Parents sought transfer, which we now grant. See Ind. 
Appellate Rule 58(A).  
Standard of Review 
 
An appellate court must have jurisdiction to review a trial court’s 
order, and a court has a duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction 
before proceeding to the merits of the case. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Scroghan, 801 
N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Appellate jurisdiction cannot be 
conferred by the parties or the trial court if the order is “not appealable 
either as a final judgment or under Trial Rule 54(B).” Georgos v. Jackson, 
790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003). “Whether an order is a final judgment 
governs the appellate courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.” Front Row 
Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 757 (Ind. 2014) (citing Georgos, 790 
N.E.2d at 451). Appellate jurisdiction can be raised at any time and “the 
appellate court may consider the issue sua sponte.” Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 
451 (citing Albright v. Pyle, 637 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). 
“Jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo.” Young v. Estate of 
Sweeney, 808 N.E.2d 1217, 1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
Discussion and Decision 
This Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is identified by the Indiana 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which were adopted by this Court. See IND. 
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CONST. art. VII, § 4 (stating the Supreme Court “shall exercise appellate 
jurisdiction under such terms and conditions as specified by rules[.]”). 
Appellate jurisdiction is limited to final judgments, interlocutory orders, 
and appeals from agency decisions.1 Ind. Appellate Rule 5. This Court’s 
authority to exercise jurisdiction “is generally limited to appeals from final 
judgments.” Ramsey v. Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ind. 2012) (quoting 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fields, 842 N.E.2d 804, 806 (Ind. 2006)). 
The trial court’s denial of the motion to set aside is 
not a final appealable order.  
Indiana Appellate Rule 2(H) defines a final judgment as a judgment 
that “disposes of all claims as to all parties[,]” App. R. 2(H)(1), or “the trial 
court in writing expressly determines under Trial Rule 54(B) . . . there is 
no just reason for delay and in writing expressly directs the entry of 
judgment . . . .”App. R. 2(H)(2)2; Ramsey, 959 N.E.2d at 251–52. 
Specifically, a final judgment under Appellate Rule 2(H)(1) disposes 
“all issues as to all parties, thereby ending the particular case[,]” and 
“leaves nothing for future determination.” Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 451 
(internal citation omitted). Once a final judgment is issued by the trial 
court, it does not require a future decision by that same court. Thompson v. 
Thompson, 259 Ind. 266, 269, 286 N.E.2d 657, 659 (1972) (citing Seaney v. 
Ayres, 238 Ind. 493, 151 N.E.2d 295 (1958)). This is because “[t]he purpose 
of the final judgment rule is to prevent delay in the trial of lawsuits which 
would result from limitless intermediate appeals.” Thompson, 259 Ind. at 
 
1 Indiana Appellate Rule 14 instructs that an interlocutory appeal may proceed as: an 
interlocutory appeal of right, as a certified discretionary interlocutory appeal, or as an 
interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of a class action certification. App. R. 14(A)–(C). 
Indiana courts have appellate “jurisdiction to entertain actions . . . and to review final orders, 
rulings, decisions, and certified questions of an Administrative Agency.” App. R. 5(C)(1). We 
limit our discussion to the narrow question of whether this was a final appealable judgment 
because this case does not present an interlocutory or agency order.   
2 Indiana Appellate Rule 2(H) contains three additional categories of final judgments: final 
judgments under Trial Rule 60(C), a ruling on a mandatory or permissive motion to correct 
error, and an order “otherwise deemed final by law.” App. R. 2(H)(3)–(5). However, these 
categories are not relevant to this case because they are not implicated here.   
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269, 286 N.E.2d at 659 (citing Lake Cnty. Trust Co. v. Ind. Port Comm’n, 248 
Ind. 362, 229 N.E.2d 457 (1967); Mak-Saw-Ba Club v. Coffin, 169 Ind. 204, 82 
N.E. 461 (1907)). Final judgments end the case at the trial level. See Georgos, 
790 N.E.2d at 451 (explaining the trial court’s grant of a motion “was not a 
final judgment because it did not end the case.”). 
The trial court consolidated the two cases pending before it under Trial 
Rule 42(D), thereby creating one case. But this one case had two separate 
matters pending before it: one was a motion for temporary custody and 
the other was a petition for adoption. On July 8, 2020, the Hamilton 
Superior Court issued one order addressing Father’s preliminary motion 
to set aside temporary custody, finding it in Child’s best interest to grant 
temporary custody pending the adoption under Indiana Code section 31-
19-2-13. Because the petition for adoption was still pending at the time the 
trial court issued this preliminary order—thus not disposing of all the 
claims—the trial court’s July 8 order was not a final judgment. Georgos, 
790 N.E.2d at 451–52; App. R. 2(H)(1) (“A judgment is a final judgment if . 
. . it disposes of all claims as to all parties[.]”).  
The trial court’s order is also not a final judgment under Appellate Rule 
2(H)(2) because it lacks a key phrase. An order “as to less than all of the 
issues, claims, or parties in an action may become final only by meeting 
the requirements of T.R. 54(B).” Martin v. Amoco Oil Co., 696 N.E.2d 383, 
385 (Ind. 1998). Trial Rule 54(B) requires a court’s order to “expressly 
determine[] that there is no just reason for delay, and in writing expressly 
direct[] entry of judgment.” T.R. 54(B); Fields, 842 N.E.2d at 806. These 
express directives are required “to provide a bright line so there is no 
mistaking whether an interim order is or is not appealable[,]” Georgos, 790 
N.E.2d at 452, and safeguard “judicial economy by protecting against the 
appeal of orders that are not yet final[,]” Front Row Motors, LLC, 5 N.E.3d 
at 757 (quoting Paulson v. Centier Bank, 704 N.E.2d 482, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1998), trans. denied). Yet the trial court’s order did not use the key phrase 
and state that there was “no just reason for delay” or direct entry of 
judgment. App. R. 2(H)(2). Instead, the Hamilton Superior Court entered 
an interim order, which lacked the key phrasing or an express directive 
for entry of judgment and granted temporary custody to Adoptive Parents 
until further action by the court. Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 452. 
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Conclusion 
Hamilton Superior Court granted only temporary custody while the 
adoption petition was still pending. Its order was not a final judgment 
under Appellate Rule 2(H) because it neither disposed of all claims for all 
parties, Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 451, nor stated, “there was no just reason 
for delay,” T.R. 54(B). The appeal is dismissed. 
Rush, C.J., and Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Paul R. Sadler 
Emswiller, Williams, Noland & Clarke, LLC 
Indianapolis, IN 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Bryan H. Babb 
Steven D. Groth 
Seema R. Shah 
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP 
Indianapolis, IN 
Timothy R. Stoesz 
Stoesz & Stoesz 
Westfield, IN