Case Title: BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON CO. v. BASSETT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON CO. v. BASSETT2000 WY 1558 P.3d 1079Case Number: 98-342, 98-343Decided: 07/25/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, by and on behalf of the TETON COUNTY SHERIFF'S 
DEPARTMENT, Appellants (Defendants),v.RAYCE B. BASSETT and PATRICIA 
BASSETT; and MICHAEL COZIAH and, SONIA COZIAH, Appellees (Plaintiffs).

 STATE OF WYOMING, by and on behalf of the 
WYOMING HIGHWAY PATROL, Appellant (Defendant),v. RAYCE B. BASSETT and 
PATRICIA BASSETT; and MICHAEL COZIAH and, SONIA COZIAH, Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

Appeals from the District 
Court of Teton County, the Honorable D. Terry Rogers, 
Judge.

Representing 
Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, by and on behalf of the Teton 
County Sheriff's Department: Paul K. Knight of 
Mullikin, Larson & Swift LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.Representing State, by 
and on behalf of the Wyoming Highway Patrol: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Dennis M. Coll, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Francisco L. Romero, Assistant Attorney General, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.Representing Appellees: David G. Lewis, Jackson, 
Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* and GOLDEN, JJ., and GRANT, 
D.J.

* Retired June 2, 
2000.

GRANT, District 
Judge.

[¶1] These 
appeals are from the judgment on a jury verdict against officers of the Wyoming 
Highway Patrol and the Teton County Sheriff's Department after trial of 
appellees' claim that the officers were at fault in the establishment and 
operation of a roadblock to stop a fleeing suspect on U.S. Highway 89 north of 
Jackson, on March 15, 1995. Appellees were driving toward Jackson when they 
encountered the roadblock and, at the direction of the officers, passed through 
it just ahead of the high-speed flight of the suspect, Steve Ortega (Ortega), 
whose car crashed into appellees' vehicle just after it cleared the roadblock. 
Police had pursued Ortega, who was wanted in two jurisdictions and considered 
armed and dangerous, from Dubois where they first saw him.

[¶2] These 
appeals present three issues: (1) whether the jury should have been instructed 
that police officers can be held liable to innocent bystanders who are injured 
when struck by the fleeing suspect, only if police conduct was extreme and 
outrageous; (2) whether the fleeing suspect who collided with appellees' car 
should have been included on the verdict form as an actor whose conduct would be 
compared by the jury in allocating fault pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-1-109 
(Lexis 1999), Wyoming's comparative fault statute; and (3) whether one of the 
officers was entitled to qualified immunity from suit. 

[¶3] The 
district court held the police to the standard of the ordinarily prudent police 
officer in similar circumstances, refused to include Ortega among those whose 
fault was compared, and rejected the claim of qualified immunity. We will 
reverse and remand for trial with Ortega included on the verdict form as an 
actor whose conduct must be compared with that of the appellants in allocating 
fault, and with an appropriate instruction on proximate 
cause.

[¶4] The Wyoming 
Highway Patrol pursued Ortega from Dubois at high speeds. Ortega repeatedly 
swerved from his own lane toward oncoming traffic, and otherwise presented a 
menace to the traveling public in an apparent attempt to cause a crash which 
would divert the pursuing officers or involve them in a crash. These efforts 
failed, but the officers were unable to stop Ortega making the roadblock 
necessary.

[¶5] The Wyoming 
Highway Patrol requested that the roadblock be established at Moran Junction, 
but the Sheriff's deputies, who had been requested to assist, decided to 
establish the roadblock farther south, beyond the intersection of U.S. Highway 
89 and Antelope Flats Road. At that location, they placed improvised road spikes 
in the hope that Ortega would turn off of the highway onto the road and be 
stopped when the spikes disabled his vehicle. Ortega did not turn off of the 
highway, and continued on until he was stopped by the crash just on the Jackson 
side of the roadblock.

[¶6] As these 
events were unfolding, appellees, Michael Coziah (Coziah) and Rayce Bassett 
(Bassett), were enroute home from fishing at Coulter Bay. As they approached 
Moran Junction, where they would turn south toward Jackson, they passed several 
officers who were at the right of the road. These were Sergeant Wilson of the 
Wyoming Highway

[¶7] Patrol and 
park police whom he was briefing. None of these officers made any effort to warn 
appellees of the hazardous situation developing on U.S. Highway 89 onto which 
appellees' vehicle turned.

[¶8] As 
appellees approached the roadblock, surprised officers began frantically 
gesturing for them to go through as a deputy sheriff moved his car for their 
passage. Ortega, approaching at 100 miles per hour or more, went through the 
same opening, smashing into Coziah's car which was going approximately thirty 
miles per hour. Coziah and Bassett were injured, and Ortega was 
arrested.

[¶9] Appellees 
sued the Wyoming Highway Patrol and Sheriff's officers alleging that they were 
negligent in pursuing Ortega, failing to warn appellees of the danger, and in 
operating the roadblock. At the close of the evidence, appellants sought 
instruction to the jury that the officers could be liable only if their conduct 
was extreme and outrageous, citing DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986). 
They also objected to the absence of Ortega from the verdict form as a non-party 
actor whose fault must be compared with that of appellants. The State moved for 
judgment for Sergeant Wilson on the basis of qualified 
immunity.

[¶10] In rulings 
which are the basis of these appeals, the district court refused appellants' 
motion for judgment as to all but two of the named officers, ruled that DeWald 
did not apply in the circumstances shown by the evidence, rejected the claim of 
qualified immunity, and refused to include Ortega as an "actor" on the grounds 
that his conduct was willful and wanton, citing Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979). The verdict form included as those whose fault should be 
compared Coziah, who was driving appellees' car, the Wyoming Highway Patrol, the 
Sheriff's officers, and as a non-party, the National Park Service. The jury 
allocated 0% fault to Coziah, 40% fault to the Wyoming Highway Patrol, 20% fault 
to the Sheriff's officers, and 40% fault to the National Park 
Service.

[¶11] Alleged 
errors in instructions and form of verdict are reviewed to determine if the 
instructions present an accurate statement of the governing law. Betts v. 
Crawford, 965 P.2d 680, 686 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 832 (Wyo. 1994)). We review denial of the motion for 
judgment as a matter of law taking as true all of the non-moving party's 
evidence with its reasonable inferences, affording no deference to the district 
court's determination, to inquire whether a reasonable jury could reach but one 
verdict. Anderson v. Duncan, 968 P.2d 440, 442 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶12] Since it 
is dispositive, we turn first to the question of whether Ortega, whose conduct 
was willful and wanton or intentional, should have been included among the 
actors whose fault would be determined and compared with that of the other 
actors by the jury in apportioning fault among the actors as required by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann § 1-1-109. Appellees contend, and the district court held, that 
Ortega's willful and wanton or intentional conduct could not be compared with 
the conduct of appellants, citing Danculovich for the proposition that the 
conduct of a willfully and wantonly negligent, or by necessary implication, 
intentional tortfeasor ("willful actor") cannot be compared under Wyo. Stat. Ann 
§ 1-1-109 with that of a merely negligent ("negligent") actor because the two 
varieties of conduct, willful and negligent, differ not merely in degree but in 
kind and therefore cannot be compared. We disagree for several 
reasons.

[¶13] Unlike the 
version before the 1994 amendment to Wyo. Stat. Ann 1-1-109, which used 
"negligence," its present iteration introduces the more inclusive term "fault" 
and defines it as including conduct that is "in any measure negligent" 
eliminating degrees or varieties of negligence consistent with one of the 
purposes of the statute, that is to ameliorate the harshness of the doctrine of 
contributory negligence. The comparative negligence statute remedied the 
injustice of the doctrine of contributory negligence by stating that a 
plaintiff's negligence prevents recovery only in proportion as it causes 
plaintiff's damages.

[¶14] The use of 
the word "includes" is significant because "includes" generally signifies an 
intent to enlarge a statute's application, rather than limit it, and it implies 
the conclusion that there are other items includable, though not specifically 
enumerated. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 
100, 62 S. Ct. 1, 4, 86 L. Ed. 65 (1941); Paramount Gen. Hosp. Co. v. National 
Medical Enterprises, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 496, 117 Cal. Rptr. 42, 47 (1974); 
Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Tollefson, 961 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Colo.App. 1998); 
Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 58 Haw. 25, 564 P.2d 135, 141 (1977); Janssen v. Janssen, 
331 N.W.2d 752, 755-56 (Minn. 1983); Zorba Contractors, Inc. v. Housing 
Authority of City of Newark, 282 N.J. Super. 430, 660 A.2d 550, 551 (1995); 
Matter of Estate of Corwin, 106 N.M. 316, 742 P.2d 528, 529 (1987); North 
Carolina Turnpike Authority v. Pine Island, Inc., 265 N.C. 109, 143 S.E.2d 319, 
327 (1965); Lucke v. Lucke, 300 N.W.2d 231, 234 (N.D. 1980); Bradshaw v. Joseph, 
164 Vt. 154, 666 A.2d 1175, 1176 (1995).

[¶15] Appellees 
insist this is not so because the words "reckless," "wanton," "culpable" or 
"intentional" were stricken from the definition of "fault" in Senate File No. 
351 evincing clear intent that they 
were not included in the definition of "fault" as conduct "in any measure 
negligent." This argument reads more into the deletion than we think justified. 
It leaves unexplained the legislature's expansion of "negligence" to "fault" 
which includes conduct "in any measure negligent." It may be as reasonable to 
attribute the deletions to a belief that the deleted words are subsumed in the 
phrase "in any measure negligent" as it would be to attribute them to other 
motives.

[¶16] As the 
language of the statute clearly is broad enough to encompass willful and wanton 
conduct, we must determine whether the legislature intended such inclusion. We 
begin with the proposition that when the legislature amends a statute, some 
change in the existing state of the law was intended and that the court should 
endeavor to make such amendment effective. Brown v. State, 590 P.2d 1312, 1314 
(Wyo. 1979); DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 483 (Wyo. 1977). Obviously, the 
amendment to the statute changed the law to compare strict and products 
liability with negligent conduct, but the changes go beyond that. Defining 
"fault" as broader than the conduct explicitly stated evidences an intention to 
compare all species of culpable conduct. We have a duty to effectuate this 
intent, and therefore, hold that willful conduct must be compared with 
negligence under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-1-109.

[¶17] 
Application of Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-1-109 in this case to include Ortega as an 
actor2 is also consistent with the other 
purpose of the statute, the elimination of joint and several liability. 
Subsection (e) provides that "[e]ach defendant is liable only to the extent of 
that defendant's proportion of the total fault * * *." To leave an actor such as 
Ortega out of the apportionment calculation exposes the remaining appellants to 
the possibility that they will be held to answer for his misconduct. Such a 
result does act as an incentive to those with a duty to protect against 
intentional harm, and "[a] number of courts therefore have concluded that 
persons who negligently fail to protect against the specific risk of an 
intentional tort should bear the risk that the intentional tortfeasor is 
insolvent." Restatement (Third) of Torts § 24 cmt. b at 164 (Proposed Final 
Draft (Revised) 3/22/99). The statutory elimination of joint and several 
liability, however, forecloses our consideration of the merits of such a policy. 
The legislature has clearly opted to relieve joint tortfeasors of liability 
beyond that for which they bear proportional fault rather than shift the burden 
of insolvency of one joint tortfeasor to the others for the protection of 
potential plaintiffs.

[¶18] Contrary 
to appellees' argument, our application of Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-1-109 is not 
precluded by Danculovich. Brown, while driving under the influence of alcohol 
and exceeding the speed limit, failed to negotiate a curve causing a rollover 
crash in which Danculovich was killed. Danculovich, 593 P.2d  at 190. The trial 
court ruled that the record would not support a finding by the jury of willful 
and wanton misconduct for punitive damages and removed the issue from the jury's 
consideration. Id. at 192. On appeal, we held that there was sufficient evidence 
for the jury to have found willful and wanton misconduct for punitive damages 
and so reversed and remanded. Id. at 194.

[¶19] In dicta, 
we added that Danculovich's ordinary negligence, if any, could not be compared 
with Brown's willful and wanton conduct-if such the jury found-because, we said, 
the trial court may have ruled as it did out of fear that the jury would be 
confused by comparing negligence, gross negligence (as then required by the 
so-called "guest statute," since invalidated, Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 
(Wyo. 1978)), and willful and wanton conduct. Danculovich, 593 P.2d  at 194-96. 
Justices Rose and McClintock, specially concurred, warning that the issue on 
which our dicta pronounced was not raised below or addressed by the trial court, 
was not raised or briefed by the parties in this court, was not warranted by the 
record, and the dictum was unnecessary and unwise. Danculovich, 593 P.2d  at 
196-99. Whether or not our decision today vindicates the views of Justices Rose 
and McClintock, there are substantial elements distinguishing Danculovich from 
the case we now consider. At the time the case was decided, Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
1-1-109 used only the phrase "negligence" not "fault" which includes conduct "in 
any measure negligent." The "guest statute," which required a plaintiff to prove 
"gross negligence" was in effect; subsection (e) limiting a defendant's 
liability to his apportionment of negligence was not present; and importantly, 
the comparison was of the conduct of only the plaintiff and the defendant 
driver-not the conduct of another "actor."

[¶20] Appellants 
reiterate their contention that DeWald justifies their insistence at the 
instruction conference that an instruction should have been given to the jury 
that the actions of the police officers could result in liability only if the 
jury found "extreme or outrageous conduct" on the part of the officers. 
Appellants insist here that DeWald established a duty or standard of care for 
police officers different from that to which others are held; that is, not a 
duty to act as ordinarily prudent police officers would act in like 
circumstances to avoid undue risk of harm to citizens, but only to avoid undue 
risk of harm by conduct that is extreme and outrageous. Appellants misapprehend 
the significance of DeWald, because DeWald advanced no such separate or 
different duty or standard of care. In that case, we held that the facts 
precluded a finding of causation of the plaintiff's damages by the officer's 
conduct.

[¶21] DeWald was 
killed when, as he waited for a traffic light to change at an intersection near 
downtown Laramie, Maddox crashed into DeWald's car with his vehicle. Highway 
Patrol officers had endeavored to stop Maddox just outside of Laramie for 
driving while intoxicated. Maddox did not stop when signaled to do so by the 
patrolmen, and they pursued him, but dropped back when the speed of the chase 
reached fifty-five miles per hour. DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 645. In the wrongful 
death claim against the State of Wyoming, the district court granted the State's 
motion for summary judgment on the basis of common law qualified immunity, which 
we recognized in Kimbley v. City of Green River, 663 P.2d 871, 883 (Wyo. 1983). 
DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 646. This Court held that the implied immunity defense did 
not apply to operational functions of the patrolmen, which do not qualify as the 
basic, discretionary, policy-making type of functions that the defense of 
qualified immunity protects. DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 649.

[¶22] We 
affirmed the summary judgment, but not because we applied a standard of care 
other than the one set forth in Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 114 
(Wyo. 1992). Instead, we said:

[¶23] The 
liability of a police officer for pursuing a law violator who becomes involved 
in an accident causing damage to a third person has not before been considered 
by this court. A review of the decided cases exhibits a considerable reluctance 
to find the officers liable where they are not involved in the 
accident.

[¶24] The policy 
reasons stated are that the officer has a duty to apprehend, arrest and remove 
from the highways drunk drivers; that if, in the performance of his job as a 
patrolman, he must choose whether to pursue or allow a lawbreaker to escape, he 
should not be liable for either choice in the absence of gross or wanton conduct 
almost amounting to bad faith; that he should be responsible only for the 
careful operation of his own car; and that he should not be liable for the 
unpredictable actions of the driver being pursued for that would make him an 
insurer of the wrongful acts of a lawbreaker. All of the above seem to 
essentially say that, except in extreme or outrageous circumstances, an 
officer's pursuit of a vehicle which is involved in an accident not involving 
the officer's vehicle is not the proximate cause of that 
accident.

[¶25] We agree 
with these courts and hold that when a police officer pursues a fleeing violator 
and the violator injures a third party as a result of the chase, the officer's 
pursuit is not the proximate cause of those injuries unless the circumstances 
indicate extreme or outrageous conduct by the officer. To put it another way, 
the possibility that the violator will injure a third party is too remote to 
create liability until the conduct of the officer becomes 
extreme.

DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 
649-50.

[¶26] The nature 
of the duty applied in DeWald is the same as the duty articulated in Keehn, 834 P.2d  at 114, in which DeWald is cited. The causation feature of DeWald was 
emphasized in a later case:

"Proximate cause means 
that the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the 
act of negligence. The law does not charge a person with all the consequences of 
a wrongful act, but ignores remote causes and looks only to the proximate 
cause." DeWald v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 643, 651 (1986) (citation 
omitted).

Harmon v. Town 
of Afton, 745 P.2d 889, 891 (Wyo. 1987). 

[¶27] Even so, 
the appellants were entitled to have the district court give the offered 
instruction. We have identified the elements of a cause of action or claim for 
negligence as:

[¶28] [T]he 
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; the defendant breached that duty; the 
defendant's breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries; and the 
plaintiff was injured. Anderson v. Duncan, 968 P.2d 440, 442 (Wyo. 1998) (citing 
Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 51 (Wyo. 1997); Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 
1043 (Wyo. 1995)). To prevail, the plaintiff must prove all four elements of the 
negligence claim. Bird v. Rozier, 948 P.2d 888, 892 (Wyo. 
1997).

[¶29] Kirby v. 
NMC/Continue Care, 993 P.2d 951, 954 (Wyo. 1999). In Keehn, 834 P.2d  at 115, we 
said:

The elements that a 
plaintiff must establish to maintain a negligence action in a court of law are: 
(1) that the defendant owed to the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified 
standard of care; (2) that the defendant breached the duty of care; (3) that the 
defendant's breach of the duty of care proximately caused injury to the 
plaintiff; and (4) that the injury sustained by the plaintiff is compensable by 
money damages. See, MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990); 
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30 (5th ed. 
1984). Elements (1) and (2), duty and breach of duty, address whether the 
conduct of the alleged tortfeasor was in fact negligent. Element (3), proximate 
cause, is considered only after negligence is first established to determine 
whether the tortfeasor should be legally responsible for his negligence. 
Finally, element (4), injury/damages, is considered to determine the extent of 
the tortfeasor's liability to the plaintiff if the foregoing issues are resolved 
affirmatively.

[¶30] It is 
clear, upon careful analysis, that Keehn is concerned with the duty elements of 
the claim while the aspect of DeWald that the appellants rely upon as stating 
the duty really addresses the element of causation. Kirkwood v. Kelly, 794 P.2d 891, 894 (Wyo. 1990). That distinction was established many years ago in York v. 
North Central Gas Co., 69 Wyo. 98, 115, 237 P.2d 845, 850 (1951) (emphasis in 
original):

[¶31] The 
elements of a cause of action for negligence are set out in Restatement of 
Torts, § 281, and Prosser on Torts, p. 177. In this case, we refer to only two 
of these elements which we distinguish by calling one the negligence question, 
the other the causation question. See Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 170, 126 N.E. 814, 816. To establish actionable negligence plaintiffs had the burden of 
proving not only that the break in the line was due to defendant's lack of care 
(the negligence question), but also that the escaping gas was the gas that 
exploded in the building (the causation question).

[¶32] Both 
DeWald and Keehn must be accounted for in the instructions to the jury in a case 
like this. It is essential that the concepts of DeWald and Keehn remain distinct 
rather than merged. One deals with proximate cause; the other deals with duty. 
Both are elements of the cause of action for negligence, and, under 
circumstances such as these, those elements must be correctly explained to the 
jury. The product of our analysis is that the district court should have 
instructed the jury to follow the causation standard announced in DeWald in 
determining the liability of the police officers and their respective employers 
in this instance.

[¶33] The 
activities of the law enforcement officers in this case, although different in 
detail, cannot be distinguished from "an officer's pursuit of a vehicle which is 
involved in an accident not involving the officer's vehicle." DeWald, 719 P.2d  
at 649. The officers here were engaged in an effort to stop a violator of the 
law. If one of them had been in front of Ortega, instead of following him, as 
was the case in DeWald, surely the rule of causation announced in DeWald would 
be applicable. If the lead officer were far enough ahead of the fleeing violator 
to endeavor to structure a roadblock to stop that person, logic demands that the 
same standard be applied. It was reversible error to fail to instruct on the 
causation rule announced in DeWald. 

[¶34] A closely 
related issue is raised by the State's contention that Sergeant Wilson should 
have been granted judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified 
immunity. We do not agree because our prior cases, including DeWald, are to the 
contrary. The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann §§ 1-39-101 
through 1-39-121 (Lexis 1999), retains sovereign immunity except as specifically 
provided by statute. Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Wyo. 1985). The 
relevant statutory exception here is Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1- 39-112, which 
provides:

[¶35] A 
governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of 
peace officers while acting within the scope of their 
duties.

[¶36] Despite 
this exception, we have stated that

"a qualified immunity is 
available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being 
dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and 
all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on 
which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds 
for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled 
with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive 
officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct. * * 
*"

[¶37] Blake v. 
Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1109 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208 (1983) 
(quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974), 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978)).

[¶38] 
Determination of a peace officer's entitlement to qualified immunity under state 
law is governed by consideration of four factors: (1) the officer was acting 
within the scope of his or her duties; (2) the officer was acting in good faith; 
(3) the officer's acts were reasonable under the circumstances; and (4) the 
officer's acts were discretionary duties and not merely operational or 
ministerial duties. Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1344 (Wyo. 1997); Darrar 
v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 575-76 (Wyo. 1996). The parties do not dispute that 
Sergeant Wilson was acting within the scope of his duties and in good faith, but 
they cannot agree on the reasonableness of Sergeant Wilson's actions, or 
inaction, and whether that action or inaction was discretionary. We find no 
discretionary activity here, and therefore, need not consider the reasonableness 
of Sergeant Wilson's conduct.

[¶39] Qualified 
immunity is available only for discretionary functions, DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 649, 
and it is the character of an official's act, rather than the character of his 
office, which determines whether any particular act is discretionary. Oyler v. 
State, 618 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Wyo. 1980). The term "discretionary" in the context 
of a qualified immunity question is a misnomer. It has long been understood to 
be limited to executive policy functions. Id. Other jurisdictions, dealing with 
equivalent doctrines, have determined that discretionary duties are strictly 
limited to acts within the special competence of the executive branch. The 
Washington Supreme Court has said that "[s]ince the concept of discretionary 
governmental immunity is a court-created exception to the general rule of 
governmental tort liability, its applicability is necessarily limited only to 
those high level discretionary acts exercised at a truly executive level." 
Bender v. City of Seattle, 99 Wn.2d 582, 664 P.2d 492, 497 (1983). Colorado 
courts have established a similarly narrow definition of discretionary acts. "In 
this limited sense, discretionary acts are those which are of a judgmental, 
planning, or policy nature." Cooper v. Hollis, 42 Colo. App. 505, 600 P.2d 109, 
111 (1979).

[¶40] Viewed in 
light of these limitations, none of the decisions made by Sergeant Wilson were 
of an executive, policy nature. Sergeant Wilson participated in deciding where 
to establish the roadblock, and neglected to warn Bassett and Coziah that a 
dangerous high- speed pursuit was approaching. While these decisions involve the 
exercise of discretion, they do not involve planning or policy formation, and 
thus, are operational decisions. As was aptly noted by the Washington Supreme 
Court: "`If this type of [operational] conduct were immune from liability, the 
exception would surely engulf the rule, if not totally destroy it.§" DeWald, 719 P.2d  at 648 (quoting Mason v. Britton, 85 Wn.2d 321, 534 P.2d 1360, 1365 
(1975)). Thus, the district court's denial of the State's motion for judgment as 
a matter of law was proper.

[¶41] The 
exclusion of Ortega from the verdict form frustrates the legislature's expressed 
intent, and the defendants were entitled to have the causation rule of DeWald 
given as an instruction to the jury. We reverse and remand for a new 
trial.

FOOTNOTES

1 Senate File 
No. 35 was the bill introduced in the 1994 session of the Wyoming State 
Legislature that ultimately was adopted as Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 98, § 1 (1994) to 
amend Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-1-109.

2 We note 
that other jurisdictions that have considered whether willful and wanton 
misconduct can be compared to mere negligence have reached different 
conclusions. See Annotation, Application of Comparative Negligence in Action 
Based on Gross Negligence, Recklessness, or the Like, 10 A.L.R.4th 946, 948-52 
(1981); Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Applicability of Comparative Negligence 
Principles to Intentional Torts, 18 A.L.R.5th 525, 533-40 (1994); Burke v. 12 
Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429, 170 Ill.Dec. 633, 593 N.E.2d 522, 528-32 (1992); and Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96, 752 P.2d 140, 
143 (1988). As our legislature has plainly directed such comparisons, we need 
not consider the various arguments on either side of the 
issue.