Case Title: Zommer v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC13-717, SC13-1675

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2015-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-717 
____________ 
 
TODD ZOMMER,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC13-1675 
____________ 
 
TODD ZOMMER,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.  
Respondent. 
 
[January 15, 2015] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Todd Zommer appeals an order of the circuit court that denied his initial 
motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  He also petitions this Court 
 
 
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for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. 
Const.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of 
relief on all claims and deny Zommer’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
Todd Zommer was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree 
murder of Lois Corrine Robinson, a seventy-seven-year-old woman.  Zommer v. 
State, 31 So. 3d 733, 737 (Fla. 2010).1  In affirming Zommer’s conviction, this 
Court detailed the facts surrounding the murder: 
[O]n April 12, 2005, the body of Robinson was discovered in 
her Kissimmee home after an officer from the Osceola County 
Sheriff’s Office (OCSO) conducted a wellness check at the request of 
a neighbor.  Robinson’s vehicle was missing, and the level of 
decomposition indicated that she had been dead for several days.  The 
same day, Kissimmee police officers spotted Robinson’s vehicle and, 
having been advised that the vehicle was sought in reference to a 
homicide, attempted to initiate a traffic stop.  The driver of the vehicle 
accelerated with officers in pursuit until the vehicle crashed.  After a 
                                          
 
 
1.  Zommer was also charged with attempted first-degree murder, robbery, 
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, grand theft of a motor vehicle (three 
counts), grand theft (two counts), uttering a forgery, fleeing and eluding at high 
speed or with wanton disregard, resisting an officer without violence, possession of 
drug paraphernalia, and leaving the scene of an accident with property damage.  
Zommer, 31 So. 3d at 737.  Some of these crimes occurred during a separate 
incident in which Zommer struck Edgardo Fuentes with a vehicle.  Id. at 740.  
During trial, Fuentes testified that he was crossing a parking lot when he was 
struck from behind by a vehicle.  Id.  Fuentes hit the windshield and flipped over 
the car.  Id.  When he regained his composure, he saw two men, one of whom was 
Zommer, approach him.  Id.  The two men started kicking Fuentes, stole his wallet, 
and fled in the vehicle.  Id. at 741.  Prior to the commencement of trial, Zommer 
pled guilty to all counts except the murder charge.  Id. at 737.    
 
 
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brief foot chase of the occupant, Todd Zommer was arrested and taken 
into custody. 
In the days following the murder, Zommer admitted to 
numerous people that he killed Robinson.  The four admissions were 
to: (1) Joanne and James Vella, a mother and son with whom Zommer 
consumed drugs for a five-day period surrounding the time of the 
murder; (2) Matthew Druckenmiller, another acquaintance with whom 
Zommer consumed drugs; (3) a reporter for an Orlando television 
station; and (4) OCSO detectives.  A large portion of Zommer’s 
statement to OCSO was suppressed by the trial court because the 
detectives had failed to correct an inaccurate assumption by Zommer 
that if he invoked his right to counsel he would be required to wait 
eight months for counsel to be appointed. 
The details of the murder were thoroughly developed through 
Zommer’s statements, testimony from witnesses, and Zommer’s trial 
testimony.  From time to time, Zommer would live with a neighbor of 
Lois Corrine Robinson (the same neighbor who requested that OCSO 
conduct a wellness check for Robinson).  On Saturday, April 9, 2005, 
the neighbor told Zommer during a telephone conversation that 
Robinson had agreed to loan Zommer twenty dollars for gas.  Zommer 
walked to Robinson’s house to obtain the money and, when she 
opened the door, Zommer believed that Robinson recognized him as 
the individual who had stolen a boat from a neighbor’s yard.  Zommer 
accepted the twenty dollars from Robinson, left the premises, but then 
later returned.  During his interview with the television reporter, 
Zommer described the event: 
 
ZOMMER:  I killed the lady, Corrine, you know, 
because she wouldn’t mind her business, for one. . . .  In 
the life that I live, she should’ve minded her business.  
That’s what she shoulda did. 
. . . . 
 . . . I didn’t realize how old she was or—you know, 
that’s not a factor and, you know, the fact that she was a 
female didn’t matter.  It’s just the fact that she had saw 
me do something, and she should have minded her 
business and she didn’t.  You know, it’s just like 
anything else in the world. 
 
REPORTER:  What did she see you do? 
 
 
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ZOMMER:  She seen me robbing—stealing something. 
. . . . 
. . . [W]hen I went over there that day to meet her, I 
finally meet her, the recognition was there. 
. . . . 
REPORTER:  So is that why you killed her? 
 
ZOMMER:  Basically, yeah, to shut her up.  Tell her 
mind her business.  You know, when I was beating her, 
that’s what I was telling her, too.  “Now, you wanna talk, 
you wanna yell?  Yell now.  You wanna tell on 
somebody?  Tell now.” 
 
When Zommer returned to the Robinson home, she began 
showing Zommer items that she collected.  As Robinson was 
exhibiting her items, Zommer picked up a wooden instrument referred 
to as a ukelin and struck her over the head.  According to Zommer, 
“she bounced back a little bit.  And was like, ‘Oh, my God.  What was 
that?’  And I said, ‘It was your ceiling.’  And when she looked up, I 
hit her again.”  Zommer struck Robinson repeatedly with the ukelin 
until it shattered.  Zommer then hit Robinson with a hurricane lamp. 
He next obtained the cord from a computer mouse and placed it 
around Robinson’s neck as he attempted to strangle her.  During the 
attack, Robinson scratched and resisted.  The mouse cord ripped 
several times, and Zommer later told Matthew Druckenmiller that “it 
was hard to choke somebody when their fingers were in the way.”  
When the cord ripped, Zommer stopped the attack for a urination 
break.  After the bathroom break Zommer again attacked Robinson, 
stepping on her head in the process.  Then: 
 
I think I kicked her in the face.  I don’t think I punched 
her at all; I just think I kicked her.  And then she was 
kind of like flopping around.  I hate to say that, but she 
was—every time I kicked her, she’d moved to one spot 
and I’d kick her and I’d get in the other—I think I kicked 
her twice. 
 
Zommer then stopped the attack and walked into the kitchen for 
a cool drink from the refrigerator.  While in the kitchen, Zommer 
 
 
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noticed a block of knives on the counter.  Zommer fully described 
(during the television interview) the attack when he stated: 
 
I went in the kitchen, got a knife and came back 
and lifted her throat up, stood behind her. . . .  I straddled 
her, and lifted her head back and just sliced it, chu, chu, 
chu, chu.   
And then I dropped her head and she gurgled and I 
kicked her again.  And I sat and I watched her and I made 
sure she wasn’t breathing. 
 
Zommer admitted to one of the Vellas that he first attempted to 
cut Robinson’s throat with his left hand to make it appear that a left-
handed person had committed the murder.  When the left-hand 
attempt did not work, Zommer confirmed that he had to use his right 
hand.  He cut so deep into her throat that he could hear the knife 
hitting the bones.  Zommer informed the reporter that after the 
murder: 
 
I went home, took everything off, put it in a bag, 
ate, went back over there, got her car and drove her car 
down the street, walked back home, went back over there 
and made it look like a robbery.  And within that time 
frame, I threw the shoes and stuff away. 
 
When asked by the reporter if he was under the influence of 
drugs at the time of the murder, Zommer replied that he was “sober as 
f**k.” 
Subsequent to his arrest (and his confession to OCSO 
detectives) Zommer led the police to a dumpster where a plastic bag 
was recovered which contained bloody sneakers, socks, and a towel. 
A DNA analyst for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
(FDLE) testified that the blood on the sneakers and socks matched the 
known DNA profile of Robinson.  A swab from the inside of one of 
the socks revealed DNA that matched the known DNA profile of 
Zommer at all thirteen relevant locations on the DNA strand.  The 
analyst testified that the likelihood of randomly selecting a DNA 
profile of a Caucasian male who matched the DNA sample taken from 
the sock was one in 25 quadrillion.  Further, an FDLE footprint 
analyst testified that the sneakers recovered from the dumpster 
 
 
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exhibited design characteristics similar to a footprint impression that 
appeared on the back of the shirt that Robinson was wearing at the 
time of her death. 
An associate medical examiner concluded that the cause of 
death was a large incised wound to Robinson’s neck with massive 
hemorrhaging.  The examiner determined that there were at least two 
incised wounds to the neck.  One of the wounds was deep enough that 
it extended to Robinson’s backbone, and the examiner explained it 
would have required a significant amount of force to cut through the 
blood vessels and tissues of the neck to reach bone.  The wound was 
consistent with someone pulling the victim’s head back and making 
the incision with a sharp object, such as a blood-stained knife that was 
recovered from Robinson’s kitchen.  The examiner noted that there 
were defensive wounds on the victim’s hands.  Further, Robinson had 
contusions and abrasions on the front and back of her body as well as 
her head, and the examiner concluded that the number of injuries was 
consistent with someone struggling against an attacker for a period of 
several minutes.  The examiner opined that the head injuries were 
inflicted before the fatal neck wound because circulation to the head 
would have continued to develop the contusions found.  The examiner 
testified that all of Robinson’s injuries (other than the neck wound) 
could not have been caused by a single blow and a fall.  Moreover, 
these blows would not have rendered her immediately unconscious, 
but may have left her stunned and disoriented. 
Todd Zommer testified in his own defense.  Although he 
described the murder in great detail, his testimony during trial differed 
from his prior statements in three main respects.  First, Zommer 
testified at trial that he smoked crack cocaine before returning to 
Robinson’s house; therefore, he was high at the time of the murder. 
Second, Zommer asserted during trial that he did not kill Robinson 
because she had witnessed him stealing a boat.  Instead, he asserted 
that the only reason he returned to Robinson’s home was because he 
was high and wanted to talk to someone.  On cross-examination, he 
stated that he falsely admitted to stealing the boat to protect one of his 
friends.  He also claimed that he fabricated the boat-theft motive 
because the inmates at the jail wanted to “kick my ass” and he had to 
“come up with a reason that’s plausible for inmates to accept the fact 
that I killed a 77-old-woman [sic].”  When asked why he commenced 
and continued the attack on Robinson, Zommer professed that he did 
not know, and could not provide a reason for his actions.  Zommer 
 
 
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also testified that the night before the murder, he had unsuccessfully 
attempted to contact a childhood acquaintance because he felt that his 
life was coming unraveled and he was experiencing homicidal 
thoughts.  Third, Zommer contended during trial testimony that 
Robinson appeared to be unconscious after he struck her with the 
lamp, that she never fought him during the attack, and that she never 
used her hands in an attempt to block the mouse cord from strangling 
her. 
During cross-examination, Zommer was impeached with the 
following statements: 
 
I woke up that morning and I said, you know, 
what?  I’m just gonna—I’m going all out.  F**k it.  Can’t 
stand her.  I don’t even know her, dude.  The . . . hate, 
you know, it builds up. . . .  I’m sorry that she’s seventy-
seven years old.  It has nothing to do with it.  It’s not an 
age. . . .  It could have been a nineteen-year-old. . . .  I 
don’t think it would have mattered at that straight time.  
And the sad thing about it, it felt so good.  You know, 
what I’m saying? 
. . . . 
I knew right as soon as I saw [the ukelin], that’s 
what I was going to use. . . .  I said “Why don’t you get 
up and walk me around your house.”  What I really was 
doing is checking out who could see through what. . . .  I 
said, “Why don’t you show me your dolls, dah, dah, 
dah.”  And I’m walking around, the whole time I’ve 
already planned it in just the right spot. 
. . . . 
She started rolling around and grabbing my leg and 
s* *t.  And I’m like, “Get the f**k off me, you snitching 
bitch.”  And this has motivated me to keep doing it. 
. . . . 
I went berserk, dude.  But then I remember going 
in the kitchen looking for a knife. . . .  And I always told 
myself, it would be f**king so cool to f**king slice the 
bitch’s head off. . . . 
So I went in the f**king kitchen.  I got me this 
long ass f**king knife, and I stood over her like a 
f**king cowboy riding her like this, and I was f**king 
 
 
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yanking her, yanking her.  And not thinking of nothing 
but getting my s**t. . . .  It wasn’t the fact she’s a woman 
or older, anything like that.  It was the fact the bitch seen 
me doing something I got caught doing. 
 
Id. at 737-40.  Zommer was convicted of murder and the jury recommended a 
sentence of death by a vote of ten to two.  Id. at 740.  As a basis for imposing the 
death sentence, the trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt the existence of four statutory aggravators: (1) Zommer had 
previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the 
person (the three convictions for crimes against Edgardo Fuentes, which the trial 
court treated as one prior violent felony) (significant weight); (2) the murder was 
committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest (great weight); (3) the murder 
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great weight);2 and (4) the 
murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) (great weight).  Id. at 743. 
The trial court found no statutory and ten nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances: (1) Zommer had a deprived childhood and a dysfunctional family 
(moderate weight); (2) Zommer has a history of drug abuse and dependence (little 
weight); (3) Zommer has exhibited good conduct while incarcerated (little weight); 
                                          
 
 
2.  The trial court noted that the “truly heinous, atrocious and cruel manner 
in which this murder was committed standing alone, even in the absence of the 
other aggravating circumstances, [was] sufficient to far outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances in this case.”  Zommer, 31 So. 3d at 744. 
 
 
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(4) Zommer can be productive in prison (little weight); (5) society will be 
protected by the imposition of a life sentence (little weight); (6) Zommer accepted 
responsibility for his actions during trial (little weight); (7) Zommer suffers from 
mental health disorders that do not rise to the level of a major mental illness (little 
weight); (8) Zommer was protective of his mother and his younger brother (little 
weight); (9) Zommer was in special education classes and experienced difficulty in 
school as a child, but eventually obtained a GED (little weight); and (10) Zommer 
attempted to contact Danny Newell3 on the night before the murder to tell him 
about having homicidal thoughts (moderate weight).  Id. at 743-44.   
On direct appeal, Zommer presented five claims.  Specifically, Zommer 
alleged that: (1) the trial court erred in finding the CCP aggravating circumstance; 
(2) the trial court erred in finding the HAC aggravating circumstance; (3) the trial 
court failed to properly interpret the statutory mitigating evidence offered and 
failed to correctly apply the law with regard to such mitigation; (4) the sentence of 
death was disproportionate; and (5) various provisions of Florida’s death penalty 
law were unconstitutional.  Id. at 744-54.  This Court denied relief on all claims 
                                          
 
 
3.  Danny Newell served as a child care worker while Zommer resided at a 
children’s center.  Zommer, 31 So. 3d at 741.  After Zommer left the center, he 
maintained contact with Newell.  Id.  Newell confirmed that on the day before the 
murder, Zommer left a distressed message and stated that he wanted to speak with 
Newell.  Id.  However, Zommer did not explain the nature of his problem.  Id. 
 
 
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and affirmed Zommer’s conviction and sentence.  Id. at 754.  The United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari review on October 4, 2010.  Zommer v. Florida, 
131 S. Ct. 192 (2010).       
Postconviction Proceedings 
On September 20, 2011, Zommer filed a motion for competency 
determination and a motion for postconviction relief.  The postconviction court 
appointed three experts to evaluate Zommer and determine whether he was 
competent to proceed during the postconviction proceedings.  After a hearing, the 
postconviction court concluded that Zommer was competent to proceed.   
In his postconviction motion, Zommer presented the following claims: (1) 
trial counsel performed ineffectively when they failed to: (a) move for a 
competency evaluation during trial; and (b) ask the trial court to instruct the jury 
that he was under the influence of psychotropic drugs during trial; (2) trial counsel 
performed ineffectively when they failed to adequately present evidence of his 
extensive drug use before and during the offense; (3) trial counsel performed 
ineffectively when they failed to rehabilitate Dr. Danziger on redirect examination; 
(4) cumulative error; (5) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2005), is facially vague 
and overbroad in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and trial counsel performed 
ineffectively to the extent they failed to present this issue; (6) Zommer’s Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment could be violated 
 
 
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because he may be incompetent at the time of execution; (7) Florida’s capital 
sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied pursuant to Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); and (8) 
Florida’s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied 
because it fails to prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death 
penalty.   
The postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing on claims 1, 2, and 
3, and reserved ruling on claims 4 through 8.  The evidentiary hearing was held on 
January 30, 2013.   
Zommer presented one witness, Dr. Michael Maher, a psychiatrist, who 
testified that Zommer’s mental health history supported a diagnosis of bipolar 
disorder and substance abuse disorder.  He further explained that both bipolar 
disorder and substance abuse disorder are characterized by the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as Axis I disorders, while personality 
disorders such as antisocial personality disorder are classified as Axis II disorders.  
Dr. Maher testified that to reach a valid Axis II diagnosis, the individual must 
exhibit identifiable, enduring personality qualities and characteristics during 
adulthood that are not caused by, or directly attributable to, an Axis I disorder.   In 
other words, according to Dr. Maher, there is no justification for an Axis II 
disorder diagnosis where the symptoms are better described by an Axis I disorder.   
 
 
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Dr. Maher testified that, for a significant period of time, Zommer was 
married and involved in a responsible family relationship and did not demonstrate 
any antisocial personality characteristics.  He believed that the patterns of rule 
breaking and violence displayed by Zommer could be attributed exclusively to the 
manic episodes that arose as part of Zommer’s bipolar disorder.  Thus, Dr. Maher 
testified that while he agreed with the penalty phase testimony of psychiatrist Dr. 
Jeffrey Danziger, who concluded that Zommer suffered from bipolar and substance 
abuse disorders, he disagreed with Dr. Danziger’s diagnosis of antisocial 
personality disorder.  Dr. Maher additionally concluded that Zommer’s outbursts 
during trial were characteristic of a person who is in a manic state of bipolar 
disorder that was not fully suppressed by medication.   
The State presented four witnesses.  Patricia Cashman and Kelly Sims, the 
attorneys who represented Zommer during trial, testified in detail regarding their 
relationship with Zommer, how they addressed his mental illness and behavioral 
outbursts during trial, the extent of their mitigation investigation, and their strategy 
during trial—particularly during the penalty phase.  Cashman and Sims further 
explained why they decided not to: (1) request a jury instruction regarding 
Zommer’s use of psychotropic medications; or (2) attempt to impeach on redirect 
examination the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder by Dr. Danziger.  
 
 
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Toni Maloney, a private investigator, testified that she helped Cashman and 
Sims collect the records requested by the mental health experts.  She spoke with 
Zommer several times and was aware that he had consumed drugs before the 
murder and confessed his involvement in the murder on multiple occasions.   
Finally, the State presented Dr. Danziger, who reaffirmed his conclusion that 
Zommer suffered from bipolar disorder, substance abuse disorder, and antisocial 
personality disorder.  He testified that Axis I and Axis II diagnoses are not 
mutually exclusive, and, therefore, individuals may be concurrently diagnosed with 
both bipolar disorder and antisocial personality disorder.  Dr. Danziger further 
added that Zommer had long-standing problems, dating back to childhood, which 
demonstrated that Zommer met all the major criteria for antisocial personality 
disorder.   
For example, before the age of twelve, records indicate that Zommer 
engaged in antisocial and destructive behaviors such as setting fires, running away, 
and threatening his family members.  Dr. Danziger explained that these behaviors 
manifested before the age of fifteen, and the doctors who treated him at that time 
diagnosed Zommer with conduct disorder.  According to Dr. Danziger, Zommer 
exhibited a pattern of destructive, goal-driven behavior, which is generally 
inconsistent with the behavior displayed by individuals who behave unlawfully 
during the manic episodes of bipolar disorder.  He further explained that it is not 
 
 
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uncommon for individuals with antisocial personality disorder to have sustained 
periods in their lives during which they are productive and responsible members of 
society.  That period of law-abiding conduct, however, does not preclude a finding 
of antisocial personality disorder.  Accordingly, Dr. Danziger concluded that 
Zommer suffered from antisocial personality disorder because he could not 
conclude that the aggressive and illegal behavior exhibited by Zommer was 
exclusively attributable to, or better explained by, bipolar disorder.   
On March 28, 2013, the postconviction court issued an order denying all 
claims.  This appeal follows.  
ANALYSIS 
 
Strickland Standard of Review 
Zommer’s first two claims challenge the postconviction court’s 
determination that counsel did not perform ineffectively during the guilt phase of 
his trial.  This Court recently described what a defendant must establish to succeed 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel:   
[T]he test when assessing the actions of trial counsel is not how, in 
hindsight, present counsel would have proceeded.  See Cherry v. 
State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1995).  On the contrary, a claim for 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel must satisfy two criteria.  First, 
counsel’s performance must be shown to be deficient.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  Deficient performance in this 
context means that counsel’s performance fell below the standard 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Id.  When examining counsel’s 
performance, an objective standard of reasonableness applies, id. at 
688, and great deference is given to counsel’s performance.  Id. at 
 
 
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689.  The defendant bears the burden to “overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 
considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 
350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  This Court has made clear that “[s]trategic 
decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”  See 
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  There is a 
strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not 
ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. 
Second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the 
defendant, ultimately depriving the defendant of a fair trial with a 
reliable result.  [Id. at] 689.  A defendant must do more than speculate 
that an error affected the outcome.  Id. at 693.  Prejudice is met only if 
there is a reasonable probability that “but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  Both deficient performance 
and prejudice must be shown.  Id.   
 
Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 671-72 (Fla. 2010).   
Ineffective assistance claims are evaluated under a mixed standard of review 
because the performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland present mixed 
questions of law and fact.  Id. at 672.  Postconviction courts hold a superior 
vantage point with respect to questions of fact, evidentiary weight, and 
observations of the demeanor and credibility of witnesses.  See Cox v. State, 966 
So. 2d 337, 357-58 (Fla. 2007).  As a result, this Court defers to the postconviction 
court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.  See Bradley, 33 So. 3d at 672.  However, this Court reviews the 
postconviction court’s legal conclusions de novo.  Id.  Finally, because Strickland 
requires that a defendant establish both deficiency and prejudice, an appellate court 
 
 
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evaluating a claim of ineffectiveness is not required to issue a specific ruling on 
one component of the test when it is evident that the other component is not 
satisfied.  See Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 996 (Fla. 2006). 
Psychotropic Drug Instruction 
 
In his first claim, Zommer contends trial counsel performed deficiently when 
they failed to request that the court instruct the jury that Zommer’s presence during 
trial was aided by the use of psychotropic drugs.   
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.215(c) provides that:  
 (c) Psychotropic Medication. A defendant who, because of 
psychotropic medication, is able to understand the proceedings and to 
assist in the defense shall not automatically be deemed incompetent to 
proceed simply because the defendant’s satisfactory mental condition 
is dependent on such medication, nor shall the defendant be prohibited 
from proceeding solely because the defendant is being administered 
medication under medical supervision for a mental or emotional 
condition. 
. . . . 
(2) If the defendant proceeds to trial with the aid of medication 
for a mental or emotional condition, on the motion of defense counsel, 
the jury shall, at the beginning of the trial and in the charge to the 
jury, be given explanatory instructions regarding such medication. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  While Zommer does not contend that his competency during 
trial was dependent on medication, he claims that the medication prevented the 
jury from observing his true demeanor.  Specifically, Zommer contends that two 
mental health experts testified he was suffering from symptoms of mental illness—
such as episodes of mania and depression—which the jury did not observe because 
 
 
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those symptoms were masked by medication.  He claims that counsel should have 
requested the jury be instructed that medication suppressed his ability to manifest 
these symptoms.  As a result, the jury may have discounted the credibility of the 
mental health experts.   
During the evidentiary hearing, both Cashman and Sims testified that they 
discussed with the mental health experts and Zommer whether they should request 
the explanatory jury instruction.  Based upon prior experiences, Cashman testified 
that the defense ultimately decided not to request the instruction:    
We were concerned how the jury would take that and that they 
would hold it against him, be scared of him, think he was crazy.  I 
mean, [Zommer] . . . was a little bit on edge, as it was, while 
medicated.  And if the jury saw that, they could be fearful that, if he’s 
that way on meds, what if he gets off ‘em?  You know, what if this 
happens again?  And, you know, as a defense attorney you worry 
about jurors who are scared of the mentally ill, because there’s no 
cure for it, all you can do is control it. 
 
Cashman further testified the defense was concerned that an instruction, or the 
presentation of expert testimony regarding the medication of Zommer during trial, 
could have led to the disclosure of information about Zommer that would not have 
been well received by the jury.  Similarly, Sims testified that the defense made a 
strategic decision not to request the explanatory instruction because 
[Zommer] barely looked under control, and if we were to tell 
somebody that he’s under control based on psychotropic medications, 
there might be great worry in the jury if [Zommer] would ever get out 
or [Zommer] would ever . . . get into a more free setting within the 
jails, you know, that would come with a life sentence . . . . 
 
 
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Sims explained that during the guilt phase, Zommer always appeared to be 
“straining at the leash, even with the best medication,” and the defense did not 
want the jury to conclude that they “had some wild animal” that needed 
psychotropic medications to stand trial.  He noted that even with medication, 
Zommer “seemed dangerous” and had multiple outbursts where the jury heard his 
comments and saw his reactions to witness testimony.4  
The facts established during the evidentiary hearing demonstrate that both of 
Zommer’s trial attorneys thoroughly considered whether to request a jury 
instruction to explain that Zommer’s presence during trial was aided by 
psychotropic medications.  However, after consulting with multiple mental health 
experts, and relying on their previous experiences under similar circumstances, 
counsel determined not to request such an instruction because they were concerned 
                                          
 
 
4.  Zommer additionally claims that counsel performed deficiently because 
counsel knew that the facts presented during trial demonstrated that Zommer 
would likely be convicted of murder, yet they attempted to justify their decision 
not to request the instructions on the basis that the jury might fear that Mr. 
Zommer would someday be released from prison.  Cashman and Sims testified that 
they wanted to avoid any discussion which highlighted or explained that Zommer’s 
erratic and eccentric behavior during trial was actually a suppressed version of the 
“true Zommer.”  The defense was concerned that the instruction would allow the 
jury to focus on, and potentially fear, Zommer’s mental instability.  Counsel were 
additionally concerned that the jury might fear how Zommer would react in a less 
restrictive prison environment.  We conclude that this decision was made after 
careful contemplation and reflects a reasonable and strategic trial strategy.        
 
 
- 19 - 
the instruction might negatively impact the jury’s view of Zommer.  This decision 
was reasonable and strategic, and clearly falls within the wide range of acceptable 
professional conduct. 
Moreover, counsels’ purported failure to alert the jury that Zommer’s “true 
demeanor” was suppressed by psychotropic medication is refuted by the record.  
The jury had more than ample time to observe his demeanor over the course of the 
nine-day trial.  When Zommer testified, the jury heard him confess in intricate 
detail to the murder and explain his thought process during the murder as to why 
he attacked the victim.  See Zommer, 31 So. 3d at 739-40.  It is reasonable to 
conclude that after hearing Zommer’s disturbing testimony and witnessing his 
erratic behavior during trial, an instruction informing the jury that Zommer’s 
behavior was aided by psychotropic medication would not have benefitted the 
defense.  Rather, the instruction likely would have had a significant negative 
impact on the jury’s perception of Zommer’s mental stability.     
Moreover, even if counsel had requested the instruction, it is unlikely that 
the trial court would have provided it.  This Court has previously held that the 
plain language of rule 3.215(c)(2) requires an instruction on psychotropic 
medication only when the defendant’s ability to proceed to trial is dependent on the 
use of such medication.  See Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 158 (Fla. 1998).  
Here, trial counsel testified during the evidentiary hearing that nothing in their 
 
 
- 20 - 
interactions with Zommer suggested that he did not have the ability to proceed to 
trial without drugs.  Further, Zommer was evaluated by three mental health 
professionals who never questioned Zommer’s ability to proceed to trial.  As a 
result, Cashman testified that the defense did not have a good faith basis to believe 
that Zommer was incompetent to stand trial and, therefore, did not seek a 
competency evaluation.  Zommer’s competency was not in question and his ability 
to proceed to trial was not dependent on the use of psychotropic medications.  The 
assertion now that psychotropic medication diminished his ability to manifest 
symptoms of mental illness does not satisfy the requirements of the rule or 
establish a legal basis for entitlement to the instruction.  Thus, counsel were not 
deficient for failing to request a jury instruction that was not applicable given the 
plain language of the rule.   
These facts further demonstrate why Zommer’s reliance on Rosales v. State, 
547 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), is misplaced.  In Rosales, the district 
court addressed whether the trial court erred when it denied the defendant’s motion 
to instruct the jury that he took psychotropic medication at the time of trial, and not 
whether counsel performed ineffectively when they failed to request the 
instruction.  Id.  Additionally, the defendant in Rosales spent seventeen years in 
and out of mental health facilities, and three of the hospitalizations occurred within 
one year of the crime with which the defendant was charged.  Id.  On at least two 
 
 
- 21 - 
occasions, the defendant in Rosales was adjudicated mentally ill and was 
involuntarily committed.  Id.  In addition, several doctors testified that the 
defendant: (1) suffered from paranoid schizophrenia; (2) did not know right from 
wrong at the time of the murder; and (3) was insane at the time of the murder.  Id.  
Most importantly, a psychiatrist specifically testified that the defendant was 
competent to stand trial solely because of the psychotropic medication.  Id.  Here, 
while Zommer suffers from bipolar disorder, he does not contend, nor is there any 
evidence to support that his mental illness has impacted his competency, or that his 
ability to stand trial was dependent on his use of psychotropic medication.  Thus, 
the facts and procedural posture here are materially distinguishable from Rosales. 
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that trial counsel performed 
deficiently by failing to request a jury instruction regarding Zommer’s use of 
psychotropic medication, which we do not, Zommer has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice during either the guilt or penalty phase.  During the guilt phase, Zommer 
consistently admitted that he murdered the victim, and previously described in 
great detail how he selected his weapons, evaluated the layout of the victim’s 
home, and then used multiple means to effectuate her death.  Zommer, 31 So. 3d at 
744.  This evidence conclusively establishes Zommer’s guilt and demonstrates that 
counsels’ failure to request the jury instruction during the guilt phase of trial does 
not undermine confidence in his conviction.  
 
 
- 22 - 
With regard to the penalty phase, the jury recommended a sentence of death 
by a vote of ten to two.  Id. at 750.  The trial court found four statutory aggravating 
circumstances, three of which—CCP, HAC, and prior violent felony—are among 
the weightiest aggravating circumstances in Florida’s statutory sentencing scheme.  
See id. at 751; see also Morton v. State, 995 So. 2d 233, 243 (Fla. 2008); Sireci v. 
Moore, 825 So. 2d 882, 887 (Fla. 2002).  Although the trial court found ten 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, it afforded only two “moderate” weight.  
Zommer, 31 So. 3d at 744.  The trial court specifically found that Zommer suffered 
from mental health disorders, but determined that the disorders did not rise to the 
level of a major mental illness, and afforded this mitigation “little” weight.  Id.  
Based on the significant aggravation and the relatively minor mitigation (which 
included a finding regarding Zommer’s mental illness), Zommer has failed to 
demonstrate that counsels’ failure to request the explanatory jury instruction would 
have created a reasonable probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome of his penalty phase trial.  Based on the foregoing, we deny this claim. 
Failure to “Rehabilitate” 
 
During the penalty phase, the defense presented multiple mental health 
experts.  One expert, Dr. Danziger, testified on direct examination that Zommer 
suffered from bipolar disorder and substance abuse disorder.  During cross-
examination, the prosecution elicited from Dr. Danziger his opinion that Zommer 
 
 
- 23 - 
also suffered from antisocial personality disorder.  Defense counsel did not address 
the issue on redirect examination.  Zommer now contends that his trial counsel 
performed deficiently when they failed to “rehabilitate” Dr. Danziger after he 
testified that Zommer suffered from antisocial personality disorder.  Essentially, 
Zommer alleges that counsel performed deficiently when they did not impeach Dr. 
Danziger with evidence that antisocial personality disorder was an inappropriate 
diagnosis.  Notably, despite Zommer’s contention that counsel performed 
deficiently when they failed to impeach Dr. Danziger’s purportedly incorrect 
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, Zommer does not contend that counsel 
performed deficiently when they presented Dr. Danziger as a witness.5   
To support this claim, Zommer notes that during the penalty phase, the 
defense presented Dr. Jethro Toomer, a clinical psychologist, who testified that 
Zommer did not suffer from antisocial personality disorder.  However, during 
                                          
 
 
5.  Zommer does, however, allege that Dr. Danziger incorrectly diagnosed 
him with antisocial personality disorder.  To support this claim, Zommer presented 
Dr. Maher, who testified during the evidentiary hearing that he disagreed with Dr. 
Danziger’s diagnosis.  This disagreement, however, does not constitute a basis for 
postconviction relief.  Simply because Zommer has now secured an expert who 
disagrees with Dr. Danziger’s diagnosis does not render counsels’ initial decision 
to present Dr. Danziger unreasonable.  This claim is, therefore, without merit.  See 
Floyd v. State, 18 So. 3d 432, 454 (Fla. 2009) (“Trial counsel’s investigation into 
mental-health mitigation ‘is not rendered incompetent merely because the 
defendant has now secured the testimony of a more favorable mental health 
expert.’ ” (quoting Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 986 (Fla. 2000))).   
 
 
- 24 - 
cross-examination, the prosecution significantly impeached Dr. Toomer regarding 
this conclusion.  On redirect examination, defense counsel rehabilitated Dr. 
Toomer by asking him questions regarding Zommer’s relationships with his ex-
wife and son.  These questions provided Dr. Toomer with the opportunity to 
explain that individuals who suffer from antisocial personality disorder do not 
experience episodes of relative stability and appropriate functioning, or times 
where they care about the welfare of others.  Rather, he explained that individuals 
with antisocial personality disorder “have a continuing history where they are 
exploiting other people.  There are no breaks.”  Defense counsel also rehabilitated 
Dr. Toomer by asking him to highlight additional qualities which Zommer 
possessed that were inconsistent with a diagnosis for antisocial personality 
disorder.   
During the evidentiary hearing, Sims testified that he and Cashman were 
aware that Dr. Danziger had diagnosed Zommer with antisocial personality 
disorder, but made a strategic decision to present Dr. Danziger as a witness 
because they believed that the positive attributes of his testimony outweighed the 
negative.  Specifically, Sims noted that Dr. Danziger was the only psychiatrist—
out of the five doctors that evaluated Zommer—who concluded that Zommer 
suffered from bipolar disorder.  Further, Sims testified that the defense presented 
Dr. Danziger because he: (1) had a strong presence in front of the jury; (2) had a 
 
 
- 25 - 
strong educational and “hands-on” background; (3) frequently testified for the 
State; and (4) presented a “perfect storm” theory that Cashman and Sims believed 
meaningfully connected the mitigating circumstances and explained why Zommer 
may have committed the murder.6  Sims testified that the defense did not elicit on 
direct examination Dr. Danziger’s diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder 
because it was unfavorable testimony and was contrary to that of Dr. Toomer.  
When asked why he did not impeach Dr. Danziger after Dr. Danziger testified on 
cross-examination that Zommer met the criteria for a diagnosis of antisocial 
personality disorder, Sims responded:  
                                          
 
 
6.  During the penalty phase, Dr. Danziger was asked “how does Todd 
Zommer end up in that orange jumpsuit . . . ?”  Dr. Danziger responded: 
Everything bad that could have happened did.  You have 
someone who has a loaded family history for substance abuse.  You 
have someone who may have suffered some oxygen deprivation at 
birth.  He grew up in a family where he witnessed domestic violence.  
He was physically abused, according to the records.  There’s reports 
that he may have been sexually abused by other youths at one of the 
facilities that he was at.  And he grew up in a home . . . with no love, 
emotional warmth, someone who was emotionally neglected.  All of 
this was very fertile ground for the development of mental illness and 
substance abuse.   
We saw early in his life . . . stirrings of a mental disorder. . . .  
He had features of hyperactivity, impulsivity, aggression, uncontrolled 
conduct problems, all of these things together as he grew up and grew 
older.  As he got into his adulthood, the mental illness showed itself in 
full form.  Unfortunately, like many individuals with bipolar disorder, 
he resorted to drugs. . . .  The combination of crystal meth, cocaine, 
bipolar disorder, all of these things together, combined with 
everything in his early life: a perfect, terrible storm.  
 
 
- 26 - 
While with Dr. Toomer I was able to go back and talk to him about 
[the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder], and he was 
able to explain—‘cause he didn’t have that diagnosis, he was able to 
explain why this [diagnosis] didn’t work.  To do the same thing with 
Dr. Danziger would just have him explain why that diagnosis was 
correct to me.  He wasn’t [going to] come off that diagnosis; some 
worse factual issues had a chance of coming out.  And the bottom line 
was, I didn’t want get in front of the jury and say, this is a great 
expert, he’s perfect, he’s told you exactly how this crime occurred and 
why [Zommer] should not get the ultimate penalty with regards to A, 
B and C, but as far as D goes, oh, don’t listen to that, because . . . he 
doesn’t know anything about [it].  That’s not a consistent approach to 
a witness and I wasn’t going to fight with my own witness over that. 
 
Sims further explained:    
 
I thought [Dr. Danziger’s] opinion was valid, even though there are 
some . . . gaps . . . in whether or not [Zommer met all of the diagnostic 
criteria], based on his two and a half years self-reported doing fine 
and actually loving his wife and his children.  And I thought that Dr. 
Danziger, when we talked to him about whether [Zommer] suffered 
from that mental illness, he made real good sense that he did.  So I 
don’t—I didn’t want the doctor explaining that to the jury. 
 
This testimony reflects that although the defense was aware Dr. Danziger 
had diagnosed Zommer with antisocial personality disorder, they believed the 
remaining portions of his testimony substantially benefitted their mitigation 
strategy and outweighed the negative impact associated with a diagnosis of 
antisocial personality disorder—particularly because he was the only psychiatrist 
that diagnosed Zommer with bipolar disorder.7  Counsel believed that Dr. 
                                          
 
 
7.  Dr. Daniel Tressler, a psychologist presented by the State, concluded that 
Zommer did not suffer from bipolar disorder because he believed that Zommer 
 
 
- 27 - 
Danziger’s strong credentials and prior experience as an expert who testified for 
both the defense and the State further bolstered the credibility of his testimony.  
Counsel also extensively discussed with Dr. Danziger why he believed Zommer 
was mired in a “perfect, terrible storm” of mental instability immediately before he 
murdered the victim.   
When the prosecution elicited Dr. Danziger’s diagnosis of antisocial 
personality disorder on cross-examination, counsel made a strategic decision not to 
dispute or impeach on redirect examination the testimony of their most important 
expert.  Counsel believed that the antisocial personality disorder diagnosis was 
supported by the evidence, and did not question Dr. Danziger further regarding his 
diagnosis because they did not want to risk opening the door to the admission of 
even more unfavorable evidence that would have actually undercut the mitigation 
value of the testimony already presented.  See Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 437 
(Fla. 2004) (“An ineffective assistance claim does not arise from the failure to 
present mitigation evidence where that evidence presents a double-edged sword.”).  
Thus, we conclude that counsel did not perform deficiently when they failed to 
impeach their most important expert regarding his diagnosis of antisocial 
personality disorder, a diagnosis that counsel believed was reasonably supported 
                                          
 
exhibited no signs of the disorder after drugs were removed from his 
system.  Zommer, 31 So. 3d at 749.   
 
 
- 28 - 
by the evidence.  See Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 554 (Fla. 2010) 
(holding that “[r]easonable decisions regarding trial strategy, made after 
deliberation by a claimant’s trial attorneys in which available alternatives have 
been considered and rejected, do not constitute deficient performance under 
Strickland.”).  
 
Zommer also cannot demonstrate prejudice for several reasons.  First, he has 
presented no evidence to demonstrate that the failure to impeach Dr. Danziger’s 
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder undermines confidence in his death 
sentence.  To the contrary, had trial counsel attempted to impeach Dr. Danziger by 
asserting that Zommer had previously exhibited behavior inconsistent with a 
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, Dr. Danziger likely would have 
testified, as he did during the evidentiary hearing, that it was not uncommon for 
antisocial individuals to sustain periods of relative stability, and would have 
concluded that Zommer suffered from antisocial personality disorder despite these 
periods of stability.  This testimony would have not only supported Dr. Danziger’s 
unfavorable diagnosis, but would have undercut both the remaining portions of Dr. 
Danziger’s testimony regarding the “perfect storm” theory and Dr. Toomer’s 
testimony that the periods of stability in Zommer’s life indicated he did not suffer 
 
 
- 29 - 
from antisocial personality disorder.8  Thus, had counsel attempted to impeach Dr. 
Danziger, they would have unsuccessfully challenged the clinical diagnosis of one 
of their best and strongest experts and undercut the arguably less credible 
testimony of another.  Zommer has in no way demonstrated that this 
counterintuitive strategy undermines confidence in his death sentence.   
Furthermore, based on the established aggravation and the relative lack of 
mitigation, we conclude that Zommer has failed to demonstrate prejudice by any 
purported failure of counsel and affirm the denial of this claim.   
HABEAS CLAIMS 
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Zommer asserts that: (1) Florida’s 
capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as applied; (2) Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it is applied in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner, and trial and appellate counsel did not adequately raise this 
issue; (3) cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial; and (4) he may be 
incompetent at the time of his execution.  The majority of these claims are not 
cognizable in a petition for habeas relief, and Zommer’s properly raised claim of 
                                          
 
 
8.  Dr. Toomer was the only doctor who concluded that Zommer suffers 
from borderline personality disorder (as opposed to antisocial personality 
disorder), despite concluding that Zommer: (1) possesses all seven criteria of 
antisocial personality disorder, and (2) was diagnosed with conduct disorder as a 
child (a prerequisite to a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder).  Zommer, 31 
So. 3d at 748-49.   
 
 
- 30 - 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is without merit.  Zommer’s claims are 
substantially similar to those presented and rejected in Smith v. State, 126 So. 3d 
1038, 1053 (Fla. 2013).  We reject these claims for similar reasons.   
First, we have previously denied claims by Zommer on direct appeal that 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as applied.  See Zommer, 
31 So. 3d at 752-53.  He is, therefore, procedurally barred from relitigating this 
claim a second time in a habeas petition.  See Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 
976-77 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting a Ring/Apprendi claim in Blackwood’s habeas 
petition as procedurally barred because it was raised and rejected on direct appeal); 
see also Smith, 126 So. 3d at 1053 (“Habeas corpus should not be used as a vehicle 
for presenting issues which should have been raised at trial and on appeal or in 
postconviction proceedings.” (quoting Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 874 (Fla. 
2003))).  Second, this claim is not properly presented in this habeas petition 
because Zommer presented basically an identical claim in his initial postconviction 
motion, which was rejected by the postconviction court.  Smithers v. State, 18 So. 
3d 460, 472 (Fla. 2009) (“[E]ach claim is procedurally barred because Smithers 
raised an identical claim in his motion for postconviction relief.”).   Accordingly, 
we deny this claim.   
Zommer is also not entitled to relief on his claims that Florida’s capital 
sentencing scheme is unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious, and counsel 
 
 
- 31 - 
performed ineffectively when they failed to raise this issue on appeal.  Zommer’s 
challenges to Florida’s death penalty scheme are procedurally barred because they 
were raised in his initial postconviction motion and rejected by the postconviction 
court.  See id. 
Further, Zommer’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are without 
merit.  This Court has consistently rejected the argument that Florida’s death 
penalty scheme fails to prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death 
sentences and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  See, e.g., Lugo v. State, 
845 So. 2d 74, 119 (Fla. 2003).  Thus, because Zommer’s challenges are meritless, 
appellate counsel did not perform ineffectively by failing to present this claim on 
direct appeal, and Zommer is not entitled to relief.  See Smith, 126 So. 3d at 1054. 
Zommer’s cumulative error claim is also procedurally barred because the 
claim was presented in his initial postconviction motion and rejected by the 
postconviction court.  See id. at 1053.  The claim is barred for the additional reason 
that it attempts to relitigate claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  See 
Nelson v. State, 43 So. 3d 20, 34 (Fla. 2010) (“Nelson’s claim that trial counsel 
was ineffective is denied because ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not 
cognizable in habeas corpus.”).  Further, even if the claim were not procedurally 
barred, each of Zommer’s individual claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel independently lack merit, and therefore there are no errors, let alone 
 
 
- 32 - 
cumulative error, to consider.  Zommer is not entitled to relief on this claim.  See 
Patrick v. State, 104 So. 3d 1046, 1069 (Fla. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 85 
(2013).  
Finally, we deny Zommer’s competency at execution claim because it is not 
yet ripe for review.  See Nelson, 43 So. 3d at 34 (“We also deny Nelson’s 
competency claims because they are not ripe for review and were raised solely for 
preservation purposes.” (citing State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 n.19 (Fla. 
2003))). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of 
Zommer’s motion for postconviction relief and deny his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Osceola County,  
Jon Berkley Morgan, Judge - Case No. 492005CF001200CRXXXX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
 
 
 
- 33 - 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Richard 
Edward Kiley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, and 
Ali Andrew Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle 
Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Katherine Maria 
Diamandis, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent