Case Title: Medlock v. Merrick

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-5

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Medlock v. Merrick1990 WY 14786 P.2d 881Case Number: 89-5Decided: 02/08/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
RICHARD AND CHRISANNE 
MEDLOCK, 

APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS),

v.

JOHN MERRICK, 

APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Harold Joffe, J. (Retired).

Robert T. Moxley 
and Jack Gage of Whitehead, Gage & Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellants.

Rodger McDaniel 
and Julie Nye Tiedeken of McDaniel and Tiedeken, Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants Richard 
Medlock and Chrisanne Medlock appeal the adverse jury verdict and subsequent 
denial of a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or alternatively 
for a new trial of their negligence action arising from a vehicle accident with 
appellee John Merrick.

[¶2.]     We affirm.

[¶3.]     The Medlocks state the 
issues as:

     I. Did the trial court 
commit an error of law or an abuse of discretion in refusing to set aside the 
jury verdict which found that the defendant John Merrick was not negligent in 
operating his vehicle when he struck the Plaintiffs' stopped vehicle while the 
Plaintiffs' vehicle was entirely in its own lane of traffic?

     II. Was there 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict?

     III. Did the trial 
court err in failing to give the Plaintiffs' tendered instruction relating to 
the Defendant's duty?

     IV. Was the jury's 
finding that the Defendant had not been negligent a conclusion, as a matter of 
law, that could not be reached by a reasonable man under the 
evidence?

[¶4.]     The respective parties 
offer extremely different versions of the circumstances leading to this lawsuit. 
Both agree that on July 26, 1987, Merrick's vehicle collided with the Medlocks' 
vehicle on a gravel road near Granite Reservoir in western Laramie County, 
Wyoming. The parties' contentions diverge at that point.

[¶5.]     Merrick's evidence 
reveals that he consumed two cans of beer while he was engaged in strenuous 
physical activity. Just before the accident occurred, Merrick was driving his 
vehicle in a westerly direction near the center of the road which was 
washboarded and had a hill dropping into a curve. He was traveling at a speed of 
approximately thirty miles per hour. Before approaching the hill, Merrick 
noticed the Medlocks' vehicle approaching from the other direction. When Merrick 
pulled his vehicle over to the right to allow the Medlocks' vehicle to pass, his 
vehicle came in contact with some gravel and became "unstable." Merrick then 
allowed his vehicle to enter the ditch on his right to avoid a collision with 
the Medlocks' vehicle. As Merrick attempted to slow his vehicle, something in 
the ditch forced his vehicle back out into the rear fender of the Medlocks' 
vehicle. The collision was slight and barely moved the Medlocks' vehicle. 
Merrick moved his vehicle before the accident scene was investigated. Both the 
Laramie County sheriff's deputy, who investigated the accident, and a state game 
warden, who came upon the scene of the accident, testified that, from observing 
and talking to Merrick, they did not detect any signs of 
intoxication.

[¶6.]     The Medlocks' evidence 
came primarily from the testimony of Richard Medlock and their accident 
reconstruction expert. They attempted to show that the impact moved their truck 
roughly three feet and that Merrick's vehicle bounced about thirty feet upon 
impact. Both Richard Medlock and Chrisanne Medlock testified that they smelled 
alcohol on Merrick's breath. Richard Medlock remarked that Merrick did not 
appear to be concerned about the accident. The accident reconstruction expert, 
on the basis of the Medlocks' account of the accident, testified he thought that 
Merrick's vehicle was traveling on the road at a speed of between forty and 
fifty miles per hour and that it struck the Medlocks' vehicle at a speed of 
between twelve and seventeen miles per hour.

[¶7.]     In October 1988, a 
six-member jury heard the case. The jury was given a three-question special 
verdict form on which to record its decisions in the case. Question number one 
stated:

1. Do you find that the 
defendant, John Merrick, was negligent?

Yes ____ No 
____

The jury checked 
"No" to this question, and the court polled the jury at the Medlocks' request.1 On October 27, 1988, the court 
entered a judgment in favor of Merrick.

[¶8.]     On October 31, 1988, 
the Medlocks moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or alternatively 
for a new trial on the basis of insufficient evidence. On November 4, 1988, the 
court heard arguments on the motion and denied it, finding that the jury verdict 
was sustained by sufficient evidence. This appeal followed.

[¶9.]     Merrick contends that 
the Medlocks' failure to move for a directed verdict precludes this Court from 
considering the propriety of the district court's denial of their motion for a 
new trial. We disagree. A motion for a new trial can be made independently of a 
motion for a directed verdict or of a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 9 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2539 
(1971). See also Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 P. 255 
(1925).

[¶10.]  A trial court has broad discretion when 
it is ruling upon a motion requesting a new trial; its decision on the motion 
will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. DeJulio v. Foster, 
715 P.2d 182 (Wyo. 1986). We have said:

     The right of trial by 
jury includes the right to have the jury pass upon questions of fact by 
determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight of conflicting evidence. 
The findings of fact, however, are subject to review by the trial judge who, 
like the jury, has had the benefit of observing the demeanor and deportment of 
the witnesses. If he concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict, he should grant a new trial * * *.

Long v. Forbes, 
58 Wyo. 533, 534, 136 P.2d 242, 158 A.L.R. 224 (1943) (citation omitted), quoted 
in Cody v. Atkins, 658 P.2d 59, 63 (Wyo. 1983). To determine whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, we apply the following 
standard:

[W]e assume the evidence 
in favor of the successful party to be true, leaving out of consideration 
entirely the evidence in conflict, and assigning every favorable inference to 
the evidence of the successful party that can be reasonably and fairly drawn 
from it. In addition, when reviewing a jury verdict, we leave to the jury the 
duty of ascertaining the facts, reconciling conflict therein and drawing its own 
inferences if more than one inference is permissible. Also, when the facts 
permit the drawing of more than one inference, then it is for the jury to choose 
which one will be utilized and, if supported by substantial evidence, the jury's 
choice will be held by us to be conclusive.        

Crown Cork & 
Seal Company, Inc. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (Wyo. 1982) 
(citations omitted), quoted in Seaton v. State of Wyoming Highway Commission, 
District No. 1, 784 P.2d 197, 207-208 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶11.]  Reviewing the evidence under this 
standard, we hold that substantial evidence exists to support the jury verdict. 
The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, and it is not 
required to accept a plaintiff's version of the facts. Kahler v. Martin, 570 P.2d 720 (Wyo. 1977). As long as sufficient evidence exists upon which the jury 
could base its findings, we will not disturb those findings even if we might 
have reached a different result. Jones v. Sheridan County School District # 2, 
731 P.2d 29 (Wyo. 1987); DeJulio, 715 P.2d 182. Much of the cross-examination of 
Richard Medlock impeached his credibility. For example, Richard Medlock admitted 
to giving erroneous information on his army physical form and to making a claim 
for a veteran's disability for injuries similar to those he claimed to have 
sustained in the accident which was the subject of this lawsuit. In addition, 
the Medlocks' expert made his conclusions on the basis of the Medlocks' version 
of the events. He also testified that the road was defective in its design. 
Beyond those observations, we will not speculate on the exact rationale, 
thoughts, or reasoning of the jury in reaching the conclusion that Merrick was 
not negligent. Howell v. Garcia, 747 P.2d 1140 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶12.]  Although the discretion in deciding 
whether to grant a new trial goes further than to mere sufficiency of the 
evidence, Cody, 658 P.2d 59, the Medlocks have pointed out nothing beyond a 
claim of insufficient evidence to show that the trial court abused its 
discretion. They do, however, attempt to argue for the first time on appeal that 
Merrick was negligent per se on the basis of an alleged statutory violation. The 
Medlocks designated only certain portions of the record, no part of which deals 
with the issue of negligence per se. The Medlocks have the burden to produce a 
record upon which this Court can decide the issues presented. Edwards v. 
Edwards, 732 P.2d 1068 (Wyo. 1987). We do not address issues raised for the 
first time on appeal. R.O. Corporation v. John H. Bell Iron Mountain Ranch 
Company, 781 P.2d 910 (Wyo. 1989). A party is bound by the theory of the case it 
advanced below. Thatcher & Sons, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Casper, N.A., 750 P.2d 1324 (Wyo. 1988). We will not consider this issue here.

[¶13.]  The Medlocks offered the following jury 
instruction, which the trial court refused to use:

     In the Course of these 
instructions, The Court will define various specific duties with which the 
parties are charged. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that a 
party has violated a duty, then that party is negligent. The effect of such 
negligence must be evaluated on the basis of all other instructions.

The court 
refused to utilize this instruction because its content was adequately covered 
by other instructions. For example:

INSTRUCTION NO. 
4

     When the word 
negligence is used in these instructions, it means the failure to use ordinary 
care. Ordinary care means the degree of care which might reasonably be expected 
of the ordinary careful person under the same or similar circumstances. The law 
does not say how such an ordinary careful person would act. That is for you to 
decide.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
6

     You are instructed 
that by a preponderance of evidence is meant not necessarily the greater number 
of witnesses or exhibits. It means the amount of evidence, taken on the whole, 
which leads the jury to find that the existence of the disputed fact is more 
probable than its nonexistence.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
8

     In this action, the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the 
following: 

     1. That the defendant 
was negligent;

     2. That the negligence 
of the defendant was a direct cause of the injury and damage to the plaintiff; 
and

     3. The nature and 
extent of the injuries claimed to have been so suffered, the elements of 
plaintiff's damage and the amount thereof.

INSTRUCTION NO. 
15

     Every person operating 
a motor vehicle upon a highway shall have the vehicle under reasonable control. 
A driver may be said to have his car under reasonable control when he is 
observing other use of the highway and has had the ability to guide and direct 
the course of the automobile, fix its speed and bring the car to a stop within a 
reasonable distance. Failure to have such control is evidence of 
negligence.

A party is not 
prejudiced when a refused instruction is covered by other instructions which 
have been given. DeJulio, 715 P.2d 182. The Medlocks did not object to any 
instructions which were given, and the trial court did not err in refusing to 
use the Medlocks' tendered instruction.

[¶14.]  The Medlocks' final contention is that 
the trial court should have found Merrick negligent as a matter of law. We 
disagree. The mere fact that a collision occurred does not in itself indicate 
negligence. Cody, 658 P.2d 59. Negligence is never presumed from an accident. 
DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986). The question of negligence is 
ordinarily one for the trier of fact. DeJulio, 715 P.2d 182; Miller v. 
Hedderman, 464 P.2d 544 (Wyo. 1970).

[¶15.]  The Medlocks have failed to demonstrate 
any grounds upon which the relief sought should be granted. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it denied the Medlocks' motion for a new 
trial.

[¶16.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶17.]  The plaintiff (appellant) was clearly 
free from fault when the defendant (appellee) drove off of the edge of this well 
graded, easily traveled county dirt road, came back onto the road and without 
admitted effort to stop, collided with plaintiff's stopped vehicle which 
occupied its proper lane on the edge of the roadway. Comparative negligence was 
not an issue and the collision resulted not from an act of God, but rather from 
the driving of the out-of-control defendant. This accident was man 
caused.

[¶18.]  After review of this extended record, I 
acquire no justification in trial evidence for the jury decision to deny the 
fault of the defendant driver. After concluding the verdict was completely 
unsupported on the issue of liability for the reasons expressed in my dissents 
in DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182 (Wyo. 1986) and Clarke v. Vandermeer, 740 P.2d 921 (Wyo. 1987) as principles recognized by this court in Chrysler Corp. v. 
Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978), I would remand for retrial.1 This conclusion is consistent with 
a philosophy that to defend adequately the jury system, it requires effective 
supervision when unjustified results occur. Freshwater v. Booth, 160 W. Va. 156, 
233 S.E.2d 312 (1977). See the extended defense of the jury system in Parklane 
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337, 99 S. Ct. 645, 654, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 
(1979), Rehnquist, J., dissenting. An excellent analysis and evaluation of the 
"civil-jury-trial right" which considers the "dynamics" and "justification for 
power allocation within that system" is provided by Stephens, Controlling the 
Civil Jury: Towards a Functional Model of Justification, 76 Ky.L.J. 81, 83 
(1987-88).

[¶19.]  Here, liability for fault should have 
existed regardless of the obvious decision of this jury to provide no recovery 
to this injured driver - stopped and properly parked. I would reverse the 
decision of the district court to deny a new trial because the cognitive filters 
applied by the jury did not provide justice. Wells v. McKenzie, 50 Wyo. 412, 62 P.2d 305 (1936); State Board of Law Examiners v. Phelan, 43 Wyo. 481, 5 P.2d 263 
(1931); Kester v. Wagner, 22 Wyo. 512, 145 P. 748 (1914); Sloan v. Kramer-Orloff 
Co., 371 Mich. 403, 124 N.W.2d 255 (1963); Jaeger v. Mitchell, 277 Mich. 464, 
269 N.W. 235 (1936). See Dubuc v. Ally, 448 N.W.2d 347 (Mich. 1989). See also 
Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. App. 1989) (challenged legal 
and factual sufficiency of the evidence which required appellate court reversal 
of a very large and multi-faceted jury verdict).

FOOTNOTES

1 Questions number two and 
three were phrased as follows:

2. 
If your answer to question number 1 was yes, do you find that John Merrick's 
negligence was a direct cause of the accident?

Yes 
____ No ____

3[.] If your answer to 
question number 2 is yes, what total amount of damages was sustained 
by:

Richard 
Medlock .......... $ ____ 

Chris[an]ne Medlock 
...... $ ____

Since the jury answered 
"No" to question number one, it did not answer, nor was it required to answer, 
questions number two and three.

 

FOOTNOTES for the 
Dissent

1 After a reasonable 
review of the record and careful examination of the exhibits, I do not question 
in any regard the comment made by the majority in assessing plaintiff's 
impeachment on the issues of extent of impact, damage, and actual injury. None 
of that impeachment changes the liability facts of clear fault except as to that 
jury where justice may be reached only through a curious cognitive filter. See 
Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 
273 (1987). That author suggests his testing in mock civil trials shows "[t]he 
most consistent and surprising result is that the students seem to ignore much 
of the evidence in the case when reaching their verdicts." Id. at 273. In 
analysis, he explains the processes in thinking which determine opinions and 
conclusions which are not necessarily related to the "real facts."