Case Title: People v. Tirado

Citation: 

Docket Number: S257658

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
__________________________ 
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JOSE GUADALUPE TIRADO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S257658 
 
Fifth Appellate District 
F076836 
 
Kern County Superior Court 
BF163811A 
 
 
January 20, 2022 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Kruger, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Perluss* concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
S257658 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Penal Code section 12022.53 establishes a tiered system of 
sentencing enhancements for specified felonies involving 
firearms.1 
 
Section 
12022.53, 
subdivision 
(h) 
(section 
12022.53(h)) authorizes courts to strike certain enhancements 
in the interests of justice under the authority of section 1385.  
Here we consider the scope of that authority when the 
prosecution has alleged, and the jury has found true, the facts 
supporting an enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision 
(d) (section 12022.53(d)).  The question is what the court may do 
if it decides to strike that enhancement.  May the court impose 
a lesser uncharged enhancement under either section 12022.53, 
subdivision (b) (section 12022.53(b)) or section 12022.53, 
subdivision (c) (section 12022.53(c))?  Or is the court limited to 
imposing the section 12022.53(d) enhancement or striking it?  
We conclude the statutory framework permits a court to strike 
the section 12022.53(d) enhancement found true by the jury and 
to impose a lesser uncharged statutory enhancement instead. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Brian Phillips was in a Bakersfield convenience store 
when defendant Jose Guadalupe Tirado and Anthony Aldaco 
walked in.  As Aldaco tried to steal a case of beer, Phillips 
 
1  
Further unspecified section references are to the Penal 
Code. 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
intervened and the two men wrestled on the floor.  During the 
struggle, defendant walked behind Phillips and shot him in the 
back with a semiautomatic pistol.  Defendant and Aldaco ran 
out with the beer, but defendant was arrested later the same 
morning.  Although Phillips survived the shooting, a bullet 
fractured his hip.  He required surgery and had to use a walker 
for a month thereafter.  He continued to suffer from pain and 
neuropathy in his foot.   
The Kern County District Attorney’s Office charged 
defendant with attempted murder, second degree robbery, 
participation in a criminal street gang, carrying a loaded 
firearm while a participant in a criminal street gang, assault 
with a semiautomatic firearm, and misdemeanor driving under 
the influence of alcohol.2  Enhancements were added to the 
attempted murder and robbery counts, alleging defendant 
personally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury.  
(§ 12022.53(d).)3  The counts for gang participation and carrying 
a loaded gun were dismissed before trial.  A jury convicted 
defendant 
of 
second 
degree 
robbery, 
assault 
with 
a 
semiautomatic firearm, and driving under the influence.  It also 
found true the firearm use enhancements on the robbery and 
assault counts (§§ 12022.53(d), 12022.5, subd. (a)), as well as the 
 
2  
 (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 211, 212.5, subd. (c), 186.22, subd. 
(a), 25850, subd. (c)(3), 245, subd. (b); Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. 
(a).)   
3  
The information also alleged:  (1) gang participation 
enhancements under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), as to the 
counts for attempted murder, robbery, and assault; (2) a firearm 
use enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), as to 
the assault count; and (3) a bodily injury enhancement under 
section 12022.7, subdivision (a), as to the assault count.   
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
bodily injury enhancement on the assault count (§ 12022.7, 
subd. (a)).4   
Before sentencing, defendant moved under section 
12022.53(h) to strike the firearm use enhancement under 
section 12022.53(d).  He argued the interests of justice would not 
be served by imposing the 25 years-to-life sentence required by 
section 12022.53(d).5  He urged that, even if the court struck the 
section 12022.53(d) enhancement, it could still impose a 
sentence of ten years or longer based on the remaining charges 
and enhancements.  The court denied defendant’s motion.6     
It sentenced defendant to the midterm of three years for 
robbery with a 25-years-to-life enhancement under section 
12022.53(d).  It imposed concurrent sentences of six years for 
the assault with a four-year enhancement for personal firearm 
 
4  
The jury did not reach a verdict on the attempted murder 
count or on the gang enhancements under section 186.22, 
subdivision (b)(1).  The trial court declared a mistrial as to those 
allegations.   
5  
In support of the motion, defendant noted that he was 22 
years old with a limited criminal history.  He also cited his 
employment record, along with the testimony of character 
witnesses, the spontaneous nature of the shooting, and the fact 
that he was under the influence of alcohol when he shot the 
victim in the back. 
6  
The court acknowledged the factors cited by the defense 
and that the case was challenging because of the severity of the 
penalty.  However, it noted that defendant had a previous 
conviction for carrying a concealed weapon; brought a firearm 
with him on a “beer run,” indicating a readiness to use it; and 
escalated the force he used from joining the scuffle to shooting 
the victim at pointblank range.  In the court’s view, the totality 
of the circumstances did not call for a deviation from the 
statutorily mandated penalty for this “very serious offense.”   
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
use and a three-year enhancement for great bodily injury,7 as 
well as 90 days for driving under the influence.  
Defendant appealed, asserting the trial court abused its 
discretion because it was unaware of its full set of options under 
section 12022.53(h).  According to defendant, the court believed 
it had only two choices:  (1) impose the section 12022.53(d) 
enhancement; or (2) strike it.  He urged the court had a third 
choice:  to strike the section 12022.53(d) enhancement and 
impose a lesser enhancement under either section 12022.53(b) 
or (c).8   
The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that, under the 
circumstances, the trial court’s power under section 12022.53(h) 
was binary.  It could strike the section 12022.53(d) enhancement 
found true by the jury or it could impose it.  It could not strike 
the enhancement and substitute a different unalleged 
enhancement.  In the Court of Appeal’s view, the trial court 
correctly understood the scope of its power and did not abuse its 
discretion.  The Court of Appeal noted that its decision conflicted 
with People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 217 (Morrison).  
We granted review to resolve the conflict.   
 
7  
(§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a).) 
8  
Before the Court of Appeal, the People argued defendant 
had forfeited this argument by failing to specifically request the 
trial court strike or reduce the enhancement imposed upon 
defendant.  (People v. Tirado (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 637, 641, fn. 
5 (Tirado).)  The Court of Appeal did not address the forfeiture 
argument, instead rejecting defendant’s claim of error on the 
merits.  (Ibid.)   
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
II.  DISCUSSION 
When being sentenced, a defendant is entitled to decisions 
made by a court exercising informed discretion.  (People v. 
Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.)  A court acting while 
unaware of the scope of its discretion is understood to have 
abused it.  (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378.)  
Whether the trial court here abused its discretion depends on 
the scope of that discretion under section 12022.53.  We review 
this question of statutory interpretation de novo.   
Section 12022.53 was first enacted in 1997 as part of the 
state’s “Use a Gun and You’re Done” law.  (Stats. 1997, ch. 503, 
§ 1 et seq.)  The statute sets out “sentence enhancements for 
personal use or discharge of a firearm in the commission” of 
specified felonies.9  (People v. Palacios (2007) 41 Cal.4th 720, 725 
(Palacios).)  Section 12022.53, subdivision (a) lists the felonies 
to which the section applies.  Section 12022.53(b) mandates the 
imposition of a 10-year enhancement for personal use of a 
firearm in the commission of one of those felonies; section 
12022.53(c) mandates the imposition of a 20-year enhancement 
for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm; and section 
12022.53(d) provides for a 25 years-to-life enhancement for 
personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great 
bodily injury or death to a person other than an accomplice.10  
The legislative intent behind section 12022.53 is to impose 
 
9  
An enhancement is “an additional term of imprisonment 
added to the base term” prescribed by statute for a given offense.  
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(3).)   
10  
In addition to the felonies specified in section 12022.53, 
subdivision (a), section 12022.53(d) applies to the felonies 
specified in section 246 and in subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 
26100.  (§ 12022.53(d).)   
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
“ ‘substantially longer prison sentences . . . on felons who use 
firearms in the commission of their crimes.’ ”  (People v. Garcia 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1172, quoting Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 1, 
p. 3135.)   
Subdivisions (f) and (j) of section 12022.53 provide further 
guidance to a trial court when sentencing under the statute.  
The court’s power to impose a section 12022.53 enhancement is 
limited:  “For the penalties in this section to apply, the existence 
of any fact required under subdivision (b), (c), or (d) shall be 
alleged in the accusatory pleading and either admitted by the 
defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.”  
(§ 12022.53, subd. (j) (section 12022.53(j)).)  If a section 12022.53 
enhancement is admitted or found true, the court must “impose 
punishment for that enhancement pursuant to this section 
rather than imposing punishment authorized under any other 
provision of law, unless another enhancement provides for a 
greater 
penalty 
or 
a 
longer 
term 
of 
imprisonment.”  
(§ 12022.53(j).)  The court may impose “[o]nly one additional 
term of imprisonment under this section . . . per person for each 
crime.”  (§ 12022.53, subd. (f) (section 12022.53(f).)  If “more than 
one enhancement per person is found true under this section,” 
the court must impose the “enhancement that provides the 
longest term of imprisonment.”  (Ibid.)   
Before January 1, 2018, section 12022.53 prohibited 
courts from striking its enhancements.  Former subdivision (h) 
of section 12022.53 provided:  “Notwithstanding Section 1385 or 
any other provision of law, the court shall not strike an 
allegation under this section or a finding bringing a person 
within the provisions of this section.”  (Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 3, 
p. 3137.)  Thus, if a section 12022.53 enhancement was alleged 
and found true, its imposition was mandatory.  (Palacios, supra, 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
41 Cal.4th at p. 726; see also People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 
1048, 1056.)  In 2017, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 
620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 620), amending section 
12022.53(h) to remove this prohibition.  (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, 
§ 2.)  Section 12022.53(h) now provides that a “court may, in the 
interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and at the time of 
sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise 
required to be imposed by this section.”  
Section 1385 provides that a court may, “in furtherance of 
justice, order an action to be dismissed.”  (Id., subd. (a).)  Though 
section 1385 literally authorizes the dismissal of “an action,” it 
has been construed to permit the dismissal of parts of an action 
(People v. Burke (1956) 47 Cal.2d 45, 51), including a weapon or 
firearm use enhancement (see People v. Price (1984) 151 
Cal.App.3d 803, 818−819; People v. Dorsey (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 
15, 17–18).  Further, the statute’s application is broad:  “Section 
1385 permits dismissals in the interest of justice in any 
situation where the Legislature has not clearly evidenced a 
contrary intent.”  (People v. Williams (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470, 482.)   
There is no dispute that section 12022.53(h), as amended, 
authorizes a court to strike a section 12022.53(d) enhancement 
entirely and impose no additional punishment under section 
12022.53.  The question is whether the court can strike the 
section 12022.53(d) enhancement and, in its place, impose a 
lesser enhancement under section 12022.53(b) or section 
12022.53(c), even if the lesser enhancements were not 
specifically charged in the information or found true by the jury.   
As noted, the Courts of Appeal have split on this question.  
Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 217 held that a trial court 
confronting these circumstances can strike the section 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
12022.53(d) enhancement and impose one of the lesser 
enhancements.  The court pointed to case law recognizing that 
a court “may impose a ‘lesser included’ enhancement that was 
not charged in the information when a greater enhancement 
found true by the trier of fact is either legally inapplicable or 
unsupported by sufficient evidence.”  (Morrison, at p. 222, citing 
People v. Strickland (1974) 11 Cal.3d 946 (Strickland), People v. 
Fialho (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1389 (Fialho), People v. Dixon 
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 985 (Dixon), People v. Lucas (1997) 55 
Cal.App.4th 721 (Lucas), People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 
616 (Allen).)  Extending the principle of those authorities, the 
Morrison court “[saw] no reason” why a court could not strike an 
adjudicated section 12022.53(d) enhancement and impose an 
unadjudicated enhancement under section 12022.53(b) or (c).  
(Morrison, at p. 222.)   
The Court of Appeal below disagreed with Morrison.  It 
reasoned that the plain language of section 12022.53(h) did not 
authorize a court “to substitute one enhancement for another.”  
(Tirado, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 643.)  Rather, section 
12022.53(h) authorizes a “binary” choice:  either strike the 
enhancement or impose it.  (Tirado, at p. 643; see also, ibid. 
[“nothing in [the statute] conveys the power to change, modify, 
or substitute a charge or enhancement”].)  The court opined that, 
if the prosecution had alleged all three enhancements — i.e., the 
enhancements under section 12022.53(b), (c) and (d) — and the 
jury had found all three to be true, then the court “would have 
had the discretion to strike the [section 12022.53(d)] 
enhancement and . . . either impose one of the other two 
enhancements or strike them as well.”  (Tirado, at p. 644; see 
also People v. Wang (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1090−1091.)  
However, “because the People exercised their charging 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
discretion to allege only one enhancement, the trial court was 
limited to either imposing or striking that enhancement.”  
(Tirado, at p. 644.)  The court distinguished the case law relied 
upon by the Morrison court, reasoning that “the enhancement 
at issue here was neither unsupported by the law nor 
unsupported by the evidence.”  (Ibid.)   
Morrison correctly described the scope of a trial court’s 
sentencing discretion under section 12022.53.  Although the 
prosecution did not specifically allege enhancements under 
section 12022.53(b) or (c), the trial court could impose those 
enhancements even when the section 12022.53(d) enhancement 
was not legally or factually inapplicable.  Neither case law nor 
the language of section 12022.53 compels a contrary conclusion.   
At the outset, it is worth noting that a court is not 
categorically prohibited from imposing a lesser included, 
uncharged enhancement so long as the prosecution has charged 
the greater enhancement and the facts supporting imposition of 
the lesser enhancement have been alleged and found true.  The 
case law cited by Morrison and the Court of Appeal below makes 
this clear.  For example, Strickland, supra, 11 Cal.3d 946 held 
that an uncharged enhancement may be imposed when a 
charged and adjudicated enhancement is inapplicable to the 
offense for which the defendant is ultimately convicted.  
(Strickland, at p. 961.)  There, the defendant was charged with 
murder but convicted of voluntary manslaughter.  At 
sentencing, the trial court imposed a firearm use enhancement 
under section 12022.5.  This court held the imposition of that 
enhancement was erroneous because section 12022.5 did not 
apply to voluntary manslaughter.  (Strickland, at pp. 959−960.)  
However, we held the defendant was subject to a separate 
firearm use enhancement under section 12022.  (Strickland, at 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
p. 961.)  We reasoned that section 12022 “ ‘would be applicable 
in any case in which [section] 12022.5 applies’ ”; that section 
12022.5 “ ‘is a limited application of section 12022 with a heavier 
penalty’ ”; and that, because the jury found that the defendant 
came within the provisions of section 12022.5, it had manifestly 
found all the facts necessary for application of section 12022.  
(Strickland, at p. 961.)   
Fialho, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th 1389 reached a similar 
conclusion.  There, the defendant was charged with murder and 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter.  The jury also found true 
an enhancement under section 12022.53(d).  The trial court 
imposed a different firearm use enhancement under 12022.5, 
subdivision (a), because section 12022.53 does not apply to 
voluntary manslaughter.  (Fialho, at pp. 1391−1392.)  On 
appeal, the defendant urged that the section 12022.5, 
subdivision (a) enhancement should be stricken because it had 
not been alleged in the information or found true by the jury.  
(Fialho, at p. 1392.)  Relying on Strickland, the Court of Appeal 
rejected the argument, concluding that “when an enhancement 
is alleged in the information, the defendant is put on notice ‘that 
his [or her] conduct [could] also be in violation of’ an uncharged 
enhancement that ‘would be applicable in any case’ in which the 
charged enhancement applies, and imposition of the uncharged 
enhancement is permitted.”  (Fialho, at p. 1397.)  Because the 
defendant had conceded there was sufficient evidence to support 
the 
imposition 
of 
a 
section 
12022.5, 
subdivision 
(a) 
enhancement, had it been alleged, the Court of Appeal 
concluded the enhancement was properly imposed.  (Fialho, at 
pp. 1395, 1398.)  It would elevate form over substance, the court 
reasoned, to require “a specific lesser included enhancement 
code section [to] be pleaded before [the] lesser included 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
enhancement can be imposed.”  (Id. at p. 1398.)  The authority 
of a trial court to impose an uncharged enhancement, in 
appropriate circumstances, has also been upheld against similar 
challenges by defendants when the evidence was insufficient to 
support the adjudicated enhancement.  (See Dixon, supra, 153 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1001−1002; Lucas, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 743; see also Allen, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 627.)   
The question of a court’s authority to impose an uncharged 
enhancement often arises in the context of a due process 
challenge.  (See Dixon, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
1001−1002; Lucas, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 743.)  “A 
defendant has the ‘right to fair notice of the specific sentence 
enhancement allegations that will be invoked to increase 
punishment for his crimes.’ ”  (People v. Anderson (2020) 9 
Cal.5th 946, 953, quoting People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
735, 747.)  But unless the Legislature requires otherwise, the 
“accusatory pleading need not specify by number the statute 
under which the accused is being charged.”  (People v. Thomas 
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 818, 826.)  Where a lesser offense is 
encompassed within a greater one, the factual allegations made 
in charging the greater offense are sufficient to give notice of the 
lesser.  By charging the greater offense, the prosecution 
demonstrates an “intent to prove all the elements of any lesser 
necessarily included offense.  Hence, the stated charge notifies 
the defendant, for due process purposes, that he must also be 
prepared to defend against any lesser offense necessarily 
included therein, even if the lesser offense is not expressly set 
forth in the indictment or information.”  (People v. Birks (1998) 
19 Cal.4th 108, 118 (Birks).)  Thus, when a greater offense or an 
enhancement is dismissed after having been found true, the 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
lesser offense has nevertheless been charged and found true and 
may therefore be properly applied to the defendant. 
The Court of Appeal below distinguished the cases 
Morrison relied on, reasoning that here the enhancement “was 
neither unsupported by the law nor unsupported by the 
evidence.”  (Tirado, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 644.)  Based on 
that distinction, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court 
could not impose an enhancement under section 12022.53(b) or 
(c) because the prosecution had not specifically alleged the lesser 
enhancements.  (Tirado, at p. 644.)  That is, the Court of Appeal 
regarded the above-mentioned cases as prescribing the only 
circumstances in which a trial court can impose an uncharged 
enhancement.  But nothing in Strickland or the other cases 
mentioned suggests that a trial court’s power to impose an 
uncharged enhancement is conditioned on the charged and 
adjudicated enhancement being inapplicable.  Under those 
cases, imposition of an uncharged enhancement is permitted so 
long as the facts supporting its imposition are alleged and found 
true.11  (Fiahlo, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1397; see also 
Strickland, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 961.)   
Thus far, we have concluded that courts are not 
categorically 
prohibited 
from 
imposing 
uncharged 
enhancements and that the power to do so is not conditioned on 
the charged and adjudicated enhancement being legally or 
 
11  
The People argue that the “statutory source for a court’s 
authority to substitute and impose a lesser uncharged 
enhancement is found” in section 1181, subdivision 6, “which 
expressly permits such an action only ‘[w]hen the verdict or 
finding is contrary to law or evidence,’ ” and section 1260, “which 
expressly allows a court to modify a judgment.”  However, 
neither Strickland nor Fialho relied on or cited either provision.   
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
factually inapplicable.  The next question is whether section 
12022.53 bars a trial court from imposing an enhancement 
under section 12022.53(b) or (c) when those enhancements are 
not specifically listed in the accusatory pleading, but the facts 
giving rise to the enhancement are alleged and found true.  The 
Legislature could draft a statute that restricts a court’s 
discretion in this manner.  (People v. Superior Court (Romero) 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 516 (Romero).)  Read as a whole, however, 
the current language of section 12022.53 does not contain such 
a limitation.   
The Court of Appeal reasoned that “[n]othing in the plain 
language of [section 12022.53(h)] authorizes a trial court to 
substitute one enhancement for another.”  (Tirado, supra, 38 
Cal.App.5th at p. 643.)  It can dismiss an enhancement or 
impose it, but cannot “change, modify, or substitute” an 
enhancement.  (Ibid.)  The People make a similar argument.  
According to the People, section 12022.53(h) does not allow a 
court to modify an enhancement by effectively deleting an 
element of an enhancement that has been found true. 
These arguments are correct as far as they go.  Section 
12022.53(h) does not authorize the imposition of any of section 
12022.53’s enhancements; it only authorizes a trial court to 
“strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be 
imposed by this section.”  (§ 12022.53(h).)  Section 12022.53(j) is 
the subdivision that authorizes the imposition of enhancements 
under section 12022.53.  It provides that for the penalties in 
section 12022.53 to apply, the existence of any fact required by 
section 12022.53(b), (c), or (d) must be alleged in the accusatory 
pleading and admitted or found true.  Therefore, the question is 
not whether section 12022.53(h) authorizes the court to change, 
modify, or substitute an enhancement.  Rather, it is whether 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
section 12022.53(j) authorizes the court to impose an 
enhancement under section 12022.53(b) or (c) after striking a 
section 12022.53(d) enhancement.  To answer that question, we 
must determine whether the existence of facts required by 
section 12022.53(b) and (c) were alleged and found true.   
Those requirements were met here.  In connection with 
the robbery count, the information alleged that defendant “did 
personally and intentionally discharge a firearm which 
proximately caused great bodily injury or death to another 
person, not an accomplice . . . within the meaning of Penal Code 
section 12022.53(d).”  This charging language referred to facts 
necessary to prove allegations under section 12022.53(b) and (c) 
as well.  Firing a gun as alleged would meet the use requirement 
of section 12022.53(b) and the discharge element of section 
12022.53(c).  Likewise, the jury’s findings established that these 
same facts were proven true.   
To summarize:  When an accusatory pleading alleges and 
the jury finds true the facts supporting a section 12022.53(d) 
enhancement, and the court determines that the section 
12022.53(d) enhancement should be struck or dismissed under 
section 12022.53(h), the court may, under section 12022.53(j), 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
impose an enhancement under section 12022.53(b) or (c).12  The 
plain statutory language supports this conclusion.13   
 
12  
It should be noted, however, that this general rule only 
applies when a true finding under section 12022.53(d) 
necessarily includes a true finding under section 12022.53(b) or 
(c).  That would not be the case if a section 12022.53(d) 
enhancement were added to a charge under section 246 
[shooting at an inhabited dwelling house] or under subdivisions 
(c) or (d) of section 26100 [shooting from a motor vehicle].  Those 
offenses are not “specified in subdivision (a),” as required for 
imposition of an enhancement under section 12022.53(b) or (c).  
(§ 12022.53(b), (c).) 
13  
At oral argument, the People placed great weight on the 
1927 case of People v. Superior Court (Prudencio) (1927) 202 Cal. 
165.  Their reliance is misplaced.  In Prudencio, the defendant 
was charged with first degree murder.  The jury found the 
defendant guilty of that offense and fixed the punishment at 
death.  (Prudencio, at p. 167.)  The defendant moved for a new 
trial.  The trial court denied the motion but found the evidence 
was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict and, instead, found 
the defendant guilty of second degree murder.  (Id. at pp. 
168−169.)  This court held the trial court’s action was 
unauthorized because section 190 gave the jury sole discretion 
to determine the degree of and punishment for murder.  
(Prudencio, at p. 170.)  Thus, the trial court’s options were to 
grant a new trial or to “pronounce judgment upon the verdict as 
rendered.”  (Prudencio, at pp. 169−170.)  Unlike Prudencio, this 
is not a murder case, and section 12022.53 does not limit a trial 
court to imposing the enhancement found true by the jury.  
Amended section 12022.53(h) allows a court to strike a jury’s 
true finding under section 12022.53(d), and section 12022.53(j) 
allows a court to impose a lesser enhancement so long as the 
facts required by the relevant subdivision were alleged and 
found true.  There are other points of distinction as well.  When 
Prudencio was tried, the court had no power to alter a jury 
verdict under section 1181.  Its sole authority under that 
provision was to grant a new trial.  Section 1181 was only 
 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
This understanding is also consistent with the legislative 
history of Senate Bill 620.  As mentioned, the Legislature’s goal 
in enacting section 12022.53 was to protect Californians and 
deter violent crime by imposing “substantially longer prison 
sentences . . . on felons who use firearms in the commission of 
their crimes.”  (Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 1, p. 3135.)  The 
Legislature created an escalating set of enhancements, based on 
the defendant’s conduct and the harm caused.  (§ 12022.53(b), 
(c), (d).)  It ensured that the harshest applicable punishment 
would be imposed in each case.  (§ 12022.53(f), (j).)  Former 
subdivision (h) of section 12022.53 reinforced those objectives by 
prohibiting courts from striking allegations or findings bringing 
a person within the statute’s coverage.  (Stats. 1997, ch. 503, § 3, 
p. 3137.)  However, as Senate Bill 620’s legislative history 
shows, the enhancement scheme “caus[ed] several problems.”  
(Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 28, 2017, p. 3.)  An analysis 
prepared for the Senate Committee on Public Safety before the 
bill’s passage noted that the sentencing enhancements had 
“[g]reatly increase[d] the population of incarcerated persons.”  
(Ibid.)  The percentage of the state’s budget devoted to 
corrections rose from 4 percent of General Fund expenses in the 
early 1980s to 9 percent in 2014.  (Ibid.)  The analysis stated 
that Senate Bill 620 would provide courts with discretion to 
strike a firearm enhancement, thereby providing relief “to a 
 
subsequently amended to permit modification under some 
circumstances.  (See People v. Tubby (1949) 34 Cal.2d 72, 76.)  
Finally, our resolution here turns on the application of section 
12022.53, a provision added to the Penal Code 70 years after 
Prudencio was decided.  For all these reasons, the People’s 
repeated reliance on Prudencio is unavailing.    
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
deserving defendant, while a defendant who merited additional 
punishment” would still receive it.  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Mar. 28, 2017, p. 7.)  The argument in support echoed this 
description, stating the bill would allow judges “to impose 
sentences that fit the severity of the offense.”  (Id. at p. 8.)  This 
history reflects a legislative intent to retain the core 
characteristics of the sentencing scheme.  More severe terms of 
imprisonment with the harshest applicable sentence remained 
the default punishment.  However, courts were granted the 
flexibility 
to 
impose 
lighter 
sentences 
in 
appropriate 
circumstances. 
The People argue it would violate separation of powers 
principles to allow a court to impose a section 12022.53(b) or (c) 
penalty when only a section 12022.53(d) enhancement is 
charged and found true.  If the People’s position is correct, a 
court could not impose an uncharged lesser enhancement even 
when the adjudicated enhancement is 
inapplicable or 
unsupportable.  Yet, that authority has been repeatedly 
endorsed.  (See Strickland, supra, 11 Cal.3d 946; Fialho, supra, 
229 Cal.App.4th 1389.)  To be sure, it is the prosecution that 
determines what charges should be brought and against whom.  
(Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 134−135.)  That authority 
includes the power to charge specific enhancements and seek 
the maximum available term (People v. Bizieff (1990) 226 
Cal.App.3d 130, 138) free from judicial supervision or 
interference.  However, once those decisions have been made 
and the proceedings have begun, “the process which leads to 
acquittal or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.”  
(People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 94.)  The prosecution 
cannot control the court’s authority to select from the 
PEOPLE v. TIRADO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
legislatively authorized sentencing options.  (See Romero, supra, 
13 Cal.4th at p. 516.)  Here, the Legislature has permitted courts 
to impose the penalties under section 12022.53(b), (c), or (d) so 
long as the existence of facts required by the relevant 
subdivision has been alleged and found true.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed.  The matter 
is remanded for the Court of Appeal to address the People’s 
unresolved forfeiture argument (see ante, p. 4, fn. 8) and for any 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.    
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
PERLUSS, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Tirado 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 38 Cal.App.5th 637 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S257658 
Date Filed:  January 20, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Kern 
Judge:  John D. Oglesby 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Theresa Schriever, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and 
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler 
and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans, F. Matt Chen, 
Catherine Chatman and Dina Petrushenko, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Theresa Schriever 
Central California Appellate Program 
2150 River Plaza Drive, #300 
Sacramento, CA 95833 
(916) 441-3792 
 
Dina Petrushenko 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 
(916) 210-6048