Case Title: Motor Vehicle Administration v. Pollard

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18/19

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Motor Vehicle Administration v. John W. Pollard, No. 18, September Term 2019.  Opinion 
by Hotten, J.  
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS – REASONABLE 
GROUNDS – The Court of Appeals held that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred 
when she did not determine whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds 
to believe that a detained individual was driving or attempting to drive a vehicle pursuant 
to Transportation Article § 16-205.1.  Without deciding this, the ALJ could not conclude 
whether Respondent violated Transportation Article § 16-205.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Caroline County 
Case No. C-05-CV-18-000156   
Argued: October 2, 2019 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 18 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
__________________________________ 
 
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION 
v. 
JOHN W. POLLARD 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Booth, 
Greene, Clayton, Jr. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: December 23, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
2019-12-23 
10:30-05:00
The Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”), seeks review of an adverse decision 
by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  The MVA alleges that the ALJ failed to consider 
whether the detaining officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the individual, John 
W. Pollard (“Pollard”), was driving or attempting to drive his vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol.  The ALJ found that Pollard did not drive under the influence of 
alcohol in violation of Md. Code § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article (“Transp.”) but 
instead used his vehicle as a “shelter.”  The Circuit Court for Caroline County affirmed the 
ALJ’s decision.  We granted certiorari to answer the following question: 
Was the administrative law judge in error to believe that a drunk driving 
suspect who refused a test for alcohol concentration could avoid a license 
suspension by asserting the defense he was “sheltering” in a vehicle without 
regard to the detaining officer’s reasonable grounds to believe that the 
motorist had been driving his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol? 
 
For reasons discussed below, we answer that question in the affirmative and reverse the 
judgment of the Circuit Court for Caroline County. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Factual Background 
 
On October 1, 2017 at 12:07 a.m., Trooper John Tucker (“Trooper Tucker”) found 
Pollard in his vehicle after responding to a trespassing call.  Pollard parked his vehicle on 
or near the driveway of his ex-girlfriend’s house, situated in a rural area off a dirt road.  
The keys were in the ignition, but the vehicle was parked and not running.  Pollard’s driver 
seat was reclined, and Pollard informed Trooper Tucker that he had been asleep for about 
thirty to forty-five minutes. 
 
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Trooper Tucker woke Pollard, observed that his eyes were bloodshot, and detected 
that his speech was slurred.  Trooper Tucker also noticed a strong odor of alcohol 
emanating from Pollard’s breath.  Trooper Tucker initially requested Pollard leave the 
premises, but when he refused, Trooper Tucker asked Pollard to perform standardized field 
sobriety tests and take a preliminary breath test.  Pollard refused.  Thereafter, Trooper 
Tucker read Pollard the “Advice of Rights” or DR-15 form, which, among other things, 
advises the detained individual of the possible sanctions for refusing to take an alcohol 
concentration test under Transp. § 16-205.1 and the individual’s hearing rights and right to 
participate in the Ignition Interlock System Program.  Pollard then requested that Trooper 
Tucker contact his attorney, which Trooper Tucker did.  Pollard’s attorney did not answer, 
and Trooper Tucker did not leave a message.  Pollard again refused to submit to a 
breathalyzer test.  Trooper Tucker detained Pollard, confiscated his license, and issued an 
Order of Suspension for refusing to take the breathalyzer test in violation of Transp. § 16-
205.1. 
Procedural Background 
 
On October 6, 2017, Pollard requested an administrative hearing pursuant to Transp. 
§ 16-205.1, and requested that the ALJ subpoena Trooper Tucker to testify about whether 
Pollard was in actual physical control of his vehicle, whether he had an opportunity to 
consult his attorney, and whether his vehicle was on private property.  The ALJ granted 
this request and moved the hearing to July 25, 2018, in Easton, Maryland where Trooper 
Tucker was assigned.  The subpoena was issued on June 13, 2018, but Trooper Tucker did 
not appear at the hearing on July 25, 2018, or submit documentation justifying his absence.  
 
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At the hearing, the ALJ proceeded without Trooper Tucker and rendered a decision without 
Trooper Tucker’s live testimony.1  At the hearing, Pollard argued that Transp. § 16-205.1 
was not applicable to him because he was not in actual physical control of his vehicle and 
was using it as shelter.  Put another way, Pollard argued he did not violate Transp. § 16-
205.1 because he did not operate the vehicle.  The ALJ agreed with Pollard’s argument and 
relied on Atkinson v. State, 331 Md. 199, 627 A.2d 1019 (1993), where this Court explained 
that an individual is not in “actual physical control” of the individual’s vehicle if the 
individual is sheltering in the vehicle.  The ALJ, however, neglected to address whether 
Trooper Tucker had reasonable grounds to believe that Pollard was driving or attempting 
to drive his vehicle as required by Transp. § 16-205.1. 
The MVA timely appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Circuit Court for Caroline 
County.  The MVA argued that the ALJ improperly relied on Atkinson because that case 
involved an inapplicable criminal statute.  The MVA also argued that Motor Vehicle 
Administration v. Krafft, 452 Md. 589, 158 A.3d 539 (2017) applied.  In Krafft, this Court 
held that the MVA only needs to prove that the detaining officer had reasonable grounds 
to believe that the detained individual was driving or attempting to drive under the 
influence in a case arising under Transp. § 16-205.1, not that the individual was actually 
driving or attempting to drive.  The circuit court ultimately upheld the ALJ’s judgment 
without expressly justifying its decision. 
                                              
1 The Circuit Court for Caroline County subsequently found that Trooper Tucker 
had notice of the hearing and simply did not appear.  The circuit court held that the ALJ 
correctly proceeded without Trooper Tucker. 
 
4 
 
The MVA timely appealed, and we granted certiorari. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When we review the decision of an administrative agency, we “review the agency’s 
decision directly, not the decision of the circuit court.”  Comptroller of Treasury v. Science 
Applications Int’l. Corp., 405 Md. 185, 192, 950 A.2d 766, 770 (2008).  We defer to an 
agency’s interpretations and decisions.  See Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning 
Comm’n v. Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. 73, 83, 985 A.2d 1160, 1166 
(2009).  However, we review the whole record to determine whether the ALJ’s decision 
was supported by substantial evidence and correct conclusions of law.  Id. at 84, 985 A.2d 
at 1165.  Substantial evidence is evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate[.]”  Id. at 84, 985 A.2d at 1166 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
We review an agency’s decision that is premised upon the “application and analysis 
of caselaw” without deference to the agency’s legal conclusions.  Frey v. Comptroller of 
Treasury, 422 Md. 111, 138, 29 A.3d 475, 490 (2011) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).  If we determine the agency’s decision was based on an error of law, we shall 
remand the case to the agency to remedy the error.  Bereano v. State Ethics Comm’n, 403 
Md. 716, 756, 944 A.2d 538, 561 (2008). 
“Therefore, ordinarily the court reviewing a final decision of an administrative 
agency shall determine (1) the legality of the decision and (2) whether there was substantial 
evidence from the record as a whole to support the decision.”  Gigeous v. Eastern 
Correctional Institution, 363 Md. 481, 496, 769 A.2d 912, 922 (2001) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 
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DISCUSSION 
A. Test refusal cases are limited to the issues enumerated in Transp. § 16-205.1 as 
we held in Krafft. 
 
At issue is whether Trooper Tucker had reasonable grounds to believe that Pollard 
was driving or attempting to drive his vehicle while under the influence.  Section 16-205.1 
of the Transportation Article “authorizes a law enforcement officer who believes that an 
individual has been driving (or attempting to drive) while under the influence of alcohol to 
ask the individual to take a breath test for blood alcohol concentration.  If the individual 
refuses, the individual’s driving privileges in Maryland are automatically suspended[.]”  
Krafft, 452 Md. at 591, 158 A.3d at 540.  One whose driving privileges are suspended may 
challenge the suspension in front of an ALJ; however, the individual may only contest the 
issues enumerated in the statute.  Id.  Under Transp. § 16-205.1, the MVA must prove that 
the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the detained individual 
had been driving or attempting to drive rather than prove that the individual was actually 
driving or attempting to drive.  See id. at 592, 158 A.3d at 540-41 (holding that “in a test 
refusal case, there is no requirement that the [MVA] prove that the individual was actually 
driving (or attempting to drive) while under the influence of alcohol.  Rather the relevant 
question is whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the individual was 
doing so.” (emphasis in original)). 
 
Title 11 of the Maryland Transportation Article defines “driving” as “to drive, 
operate, move, or be in actual physical control of a vehicle, including the exercise of control 
over or the steering of a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.”  Transp. § 11-114.  
 
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Therefore, to sanction the individual under Transp. § 16-205.1, the MVA must show that 
the detaining officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the detained individual had 
been driving, operating, moving, or was in actual physical control of a vehicle, or was 
attempting to do one of these actions, while under the influence of alcohol. 
 
Here, the MVA argues that the ALJ misapplied Atkinson and improperly required 
the MVA to prove that Pollard was in “actual physical control” of his vehicle, rather than 
that Trooper Tucker had reasonable grounds to believe Pollard was driving or attempting 
to drive while under the influence.  We agree. 
 
Atkinson was a criminal case involving a defendant’s assertion that he was not 
driving or attempting to drive under the influence of alcohol but was merely “sheltering” 
on the side of the road.  We outlined various factors to be applied when determining 
whether a defendant is in “actual physical control” of a vehicle for purposes of the criminal 
statute governing offenses related to driving while intoxicated or under the influence 
(“DUI”).  Atkinson, 331 Md. at 216, 627 A.2d at 1025.  For purposes of the criminal statute, 
the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was driving or 
attempting to drive a vehicle while intoxicated.  Transp. § 21-902.  In Atkinson, the issue 
was whether the individual was “driving or attempting to drive” when he was sitting 
intoxicated and asleep in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, parked on the side of the road with 
his keys in the ignition, but his engine off.  We examined the definition of “drive,” under 
Transp. § 11-114, and we held that what constitutes “actual physical control” will 
inevitably depend upon the facts of the individual case.  We enumerated several factors 
that a court may consider in determining whether an individual is in “actual physical 
 
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control” for purposes of the DUI statute.  After considering the applicable factors, we 
determined that reasonable doubt existed whether the individual was not in “actual physical 
control” for purposes of the criminal statute, Transp. § 21-902.  Id. at 212-13, 627 A.2d at 
1025-26. 
We hold that the Atkinson factors do not apply to a test refusal case because the 
MVA is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is driving or 
attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol.  We determine that the ALJ 
misapplied Atkinson and should not have considered the Atkinson factors in her decision.  
In other words, the ALJ should have determined whether Trooper Tucker had reasonable 
grounds to believe that Pollard was driving or attempting to drive while under the influence 
of alcohol. 
B. The ALJ must determine whether the detaining officer had reasonable grounds 
to believe that the detained individual was driving or attempting to drive a vehicle 
pursuant to Transp. § 16-205.1. 
 
The MVA must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the “investigating 
officer had reasonable grounds to believe” that the detained individual was driving or 
attempting to drive.  Krafft, 452 Md. at 608, 158 A.3d at 550 (emphasis in original).  
“Reasonable grounds” under Transp. § 16-205.1 means “reasonable articulable suspicion,” 
which is less than “preponderance of the evidence or probable cause.”  MVA v. Shepard, 
399 Md. 241, 254, 259, 923 A.2d 100, 107, 110 (2007).  “Reasonable suspicion is a 
common sense, nontechnical conception that considers factual and practical aspects of 
daily life and how reasonable and prudent people act.”  Motor Vehicle Administration v. 
Shea, 415 Md. 1, 19, 997 A.2d 768, 778 (2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
 
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We consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detaining officer 
had “reasonable suspicion,” and we give deference to the detaining officer’s experience 
and training and his or her ability to infer from his or her observations.  Id. 
In Motor Vehicle Administration v. Carpenter, 424 Md. 401, 36 A.3d 439 (2012), 
we held that the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Carpenter 
drove his truck while under the influence even though the officer did not see Carpenter 
driving, or attempting to drive, his vehicle.  424 Md. at 417, 36 A.3d at 448.  Carpenter 
argued that a detaining officer cannot infer that an individual was driving or attempting to 
drive.  Id. at 415, 36 A.3d at 447-48.  In other words, an officer cannot base his or her 
“reasonable grounds to believe” on an inference.  We disagreed and held that a detaining 
officer may reasonably infer that a detained individual was driving a vehicle while under 
the influence even if the officer did not actually see the detained individual driving the 
vehicle.  Id. at 416, 36 A.3d at 448.  “To be reasonable, an inference must be the application 
of ‘common sense, powers of logic, and accumulated experiences in life to arrive at 
conclusions from demonstrated sets of facts.’”  Id. at 416, 36 A.3d at 448.  In Carpenter, 
the officer’s inferences were reasonable because the officer responded to the scene of a car 
accident involving the individual’s truck.  Id. at 417, 36 A.3d at 448.  Carpenter admitted 
that he had been traveling from Delaware to Maryland after having two beers.  Id.  The 
facts clearly indicated that officer’s inferences were reasonable and that she had reasonable 
grounds to believe Carpenter was driving his truck.  Id. 
  Like in Carpenter, Trooper Tucker did not see Pollard driving, or attempting to 
drive, his vehicle; thus, Trooper Tucker needed to rely on his inferences.  Trooper Tucker’s 
 
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statements reflect that Trooper Tucker had reasonable grounds to believe Pollard was 
driving or attempting to drive under the influence of alcohol.  Trooper Tucker found Pollard 
in the driver’s seat of his parked vehicle with the keys in the ignition.  Pollard was 
trespassing on his ex-girlfriend’s property and refused to leave.  Pollard had extremely 
bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor emanating from his breath and person.  
Pollard refused to participate in any field sobriety tests, including a preliminary breath test.  
Based on these circumstances, Trooper Tucker could reasonably infer that Pollard was 
driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol even without observing 
Pollard operate his vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, we conclude that Trooper Tucker had reasonable grounds to believe that 
Pollard was driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol and the ALJ 
erred when she failed to consider Trooper Tucker’s reasonable grounds. 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 
COURT FOR CAROLINE COUNTY 
IS REVERSED.  COSTS TO BE PAID 
BY JOHN W. POLLARD.