Case Title: Michael v. Hertzler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-08-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michael v. Hertzler1995 WY 123900 P.2d 1144Case Number: 94-123Decided: 08/04/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Susan 
Kay MICHAEL and Chris Michael,

 Appellants (Plaintiffs), 

and

 Wyoming Attorney 
General,

 Appellant,

v.

Dean 
B. HERTZLER,

 Appellee (Defendant).

Donald 
J. Sullivan, Cheyenne, for appellants Michael.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen.; Richard Dixon, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
appellant Wyoming Atty. Gen.

James 
A. Eddington of Jones, Eddington & Weaver, Torrington, for 
appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The only issue in 
this case is the constitutionality of WYO. STAT. § 20-7-101 (1994), which 
provides for an original action by a grandparent to establish reasonable 
visitation rights to a minor grandchild. Susan Kay Michael and Chris Michael 
(the Michaels) instituted such an action against Dean B. Hertzler (Hertzler) who 
was the custodian of the grandchildren. They sought to establish the right of 
visitation with grandchildren who had been adopted by Hertzler and the Michaels' 
daughter. Hertzler attacked the constitutionality of the statute, and the trial 
court ruled the statute "is unconstitutional under the due process requirements 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 6 of the Wyoming Constitution." We hold parental rights are 
regarded as fundamental rights in Wyoming; the constitutionality of the statute 
is to be tested under the strict scrutiny standard; the State of Wyoming (State) 
does have a compelling interest which justifies the statute; and the statute is 
constitutional. We reverse and remand this case for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion.

[¶2]  The Michaels, in their Brief of 
Appellants, set forth the following issue:

The 
sole issue on appeal is whether W.S. 20-7-101(a) violates the due process 
requirements of the United States Constitution and the Wyoming State 
Constitution.

In 
its Brief of the State of Wyoming as Appellant, the State articulates these 
issues:

I. 
Does W.S. 1-20-107 [sic] work to create substantive rights in grandparents which 
then impinge upon the rights of parents to raise their children?

II. 
Who will serve to protect the rights of children when unfettered exercise of 
parental rights impinge upon the best interest of children?

III. 
Does collapse of the nuclear family through death or judicial intervention 
constitute harm to the child sufficient to warrant invocation of the state's 
parens patriae powers of protection?

In 
the Brief of Appellee, filed by Hertzler, the stated issue is:

I. 
Does W.S. § 20-7-101 violate the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution and the State of Wyoming Constitution?

[¶3]      The Michaels have 
a daughter, Pam, who is the natural daughter of Mrs. Michael and the 
stepdaughter of Mr. Michael. During their marriage, Pam and Hertzler adopted a 
boy, born February 22, 1986, and a girl, born June 24, 1990. At the time of the 
respective adoptions, each child was approximately six months old. In 1991, Pam 
was divorced from Hertzler and had primary custody of the children. During that 
situation, the Michaels enjoyed ample visitation with the grandchildren. 
Subsequently, Hertzler was made the primary custodian of the children by mutual 
agreement with Pam. After the change of custody and following Hertzler's 
remarriage, the relationship between the Michaels and Hertzler deteriorated to 
the point Hertzler refused to allow the two children to visit the 
grandparents.

[¶4]      The Michaels then 
filed an action seeking to have their rights declared under WYO. STAT. § 
20-7-101, which provides:

(a) 
A grandparent may bring an original action against any person having custody of 
the grandparent's minor grandchild to establish reasonable visitation rights to 
the child if:

(i) 
The grandparent's child who is the parent of the minor grandchild has died or 
has divorced the minor grandchild's other parent and the person having custody 
of the minor grandchild has refused reasonable visitation rights to the 
grandparent; or

(ii) 
An unmarried minor grandchild has resided with the grandparent for a period in 
excess of six (6) consecutive months before being returned to the custody of the 
minor grandchild's parents and the parents have refused reasonable visitation 
rights to the grandparent.

(b) 
In any action or proceeding under subsection (a) of this section, the court may 
grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent of a child if the court 
finds, after a hearing, that visitation would be in the best interest of the 
child and that the rights of the child's parents are not substantially 
impaired.

(c) 
No action to establish visitation rights may be brought by a grandparent under 
subsection (a) of this section if the minor grandchild has been adopted and 
neither adopting parent is a natural parent of the child.

(d) 
In any action or proceeding in which visitation rights have been granted to a 
grandparent under this section, the court may for good cause upon petition of 
the person having custody or who is the guardian of the child, revoke or amend 
the visitation rights granted to the grandparent.

Hertzler 
asserted the unconstitutionality of this statute in defending the 
action.

[¶5]      After a hearing, 
the trial court ruled that WYO. STAT. § 20-7-101(c) provided grandparents of 
adopted grandchildren, like the Michaels, standing to petition the court for 
grandparental visitation rights. The trial court ruled, however, that "W.S. § 
20-7-101(a) is unconstitutional under the due process requirements of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because, without a 
preliminary finding of harm to the children, or unfitness of the parent, the 
State does not have a compelling interest in ordering visitation." This ruling 
in the Order on Declaratory Judgment was supported by a twelve-page opinion 
letter in which the trial court reasoned primarily by analogy. The Michaels and 
the State have appealed from that order and decision.

[¶6]      As a threshold 
question, we address the contention of the Michaels that WYO. STAT. § 20-7-101 
enjoys a presumption of constitutionality which requires Hertzler to assume the 
burden of demonstrating it is unconstitutional. Recently, we addressed the 
burden of proof in cases involving constitutional challenges. We said that, 
normally:

[O]ne 
who alleges unconstitutionality bears a heavy burden and must clearly and 
exactly show the unconstitutionality beyond any reasonable doubt. However, that 
rule does not apply where a citizen's fundamental constitutional right, such as 
free speech, is involved. The strong presumptions in favor of constitutionality 
are inverted, the burden then is on the governmental entity to justify the 
validity of the ordinance, and this Court has a duty to declare legislative 
enactments invalid if they transgress that constitutional provision. The rule we 
apply under the circumstances of this case is:

Where 
rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizen are involved, the usual strong 
presumption in favor of constitutionality does not apply, and this rule is 
applicable to First Amendment rights. This is true in situations involving the 
right of freedom of expression or thought, or of speech, or association, or of 
the press, or of religion. Under some authority, the usual presumption in favor 
of constitutionality is merely weaker where the statute arguably inhibits 
fundamental rights.

Miller 
v. City of Laramie, 880 P.2d 594, 597 (Wyo. 1994) (citations 
omitted).

The 
concept articulated in Miller places the burden of proof on the State and the 
Michaels as the parties asserting the constitutionality of the 
statute.

[¶7]      We next turn to 
the standard under which the constitutionality of the statute is to be analyzed. 
If a statute reaches ordinary interests in economic and social welfare, the 
determination to be made is whether the statute is rationally related to a 
legitimate state object. If, on the other hand, the statute reaches a 
fundamental interest, the court is to employ the test of strict scrutiny in 
making its determination as to whether the enactment is essential to achieve a 
compelling state interest. White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶8]      The common law 
rule was that grandparents had no right to visitation of their grandchildren if 
it was forbidden by the parents. Matter of Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968 (Wyo. 
1990). The rule of common law deferred to the right of the parents to make 
decisions regarding their children's associations, and it recognized government 
is not equipped nor intended to dictate social interaction among families. In 
1977, our legislature adopted WYO. STAT. § 20-2-113(c), which permitted a 
petition by a grandparent for visitation in a divorce or separation proceeding 
upon a showing that the visitation would be in the best interest of the child. 
Our construction of that statute has resulted in a rule that the present and 
future welfare of the children is of paramount consideration. Nation v. Nation, 
715 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1986). It is also clear that WYO. STAT. § 20-2-113(c) does 
not afford a right of visitation, but simply confers standing to seek a hearing. 
Matter of Adoption of RDS. This appears to be consistent with other 
grandparental visitation statutes that are said not to presume to create 
substantive rights. Doris Jonas Freed and Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the 
Fifty States: An Overview, 24 Fam. L.Q. 309, 372-73, 388-89 (1991).

[¶9]      In 1991, the 
legislature created a proceeding separate from a divorce or separation 
proceeding in which grandparents could seek rights of visitation. The 
predecessor of WYO. STAT. § 20-7-101 was adopted, causing Wyoming to become one 
of fifty states adopting such a statute. See Appendix A attached to this 
opinion. We note the statute in Wyoming specifically provides that "the court 
may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent of a child if the 
court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would be in the best interest of 
the child and that the rights of the child's parents are not substantially 
impaired." WYO. STAT. § 20-7-101(b).

[¶10]   Hertzler contends he has a 
constitutionally recognized fundamental right to raise his children as he 
chooses, and no compelling state interest can be identified to justify this 
statute when the test of strict scrutiny is applied. The Michaels argue this 
statute is constitutional under either a rational relationship test or the 
strict scrutiny test because it is a permissible expression of the legitimate 
interest of the State in the well-being of children. The argument of the State 
seeks to justify the statute on the premise of the best interests of a child. In 
this regard, the State posits its interest under the doctrine of parens patriae 
and argues it appropriately can initiate a statute to provide for visitation 
limited to the situation in which the family unit has been disrupted by death or 
separation of the parents and is sufficiently narrowly drawn.

[¶11]   We hold the strict scrutiny test 
must be applied in this instance. The right to associate with one's family is a 
fundamental constitutional right. DS v. Dep't of Pub. Assistance and Social 
Services, 607 P.2d 911, 918 (1980). In State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165, 173 
(Wyo. 1981), we said:

"Strict 
scrutiny" is the standard applied when it becomes necessary to balance a 
fundamental right against a compelling state interest. It requires the 
establishment of the compelling state interest and the showing that the method 
of achieving such is the least intrusive of those methods by which such can be 
accomplished. See DS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 
supra; State ex rel. McDonald v. Whatcom County District Court, 19 Wn. App. 429, 
575 P.2d 1094 (1978), aff'd 92 Wn.2d 35, 593 P.2d 546 (1979); Meloon v. 
Helgemoe, 436 F. Supp. 528 (D.C.N.H. 1977), aff'd 564 F.2d 602 [1st Cir.], cert. 
denied 436 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 2858, 56 L. Ed. 2d 793; Duranceau v. City of Tacoma, 
27 Wn. App. 777, 620 P.2d 533 (1980); Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 348 N.E.2d 537 (1976); Constructors Association of 
Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936 (D.C.Pa. 1977), aff'd. 573 F.2d 811 [3d Cir.] (1978).

Our 
rule is consistent with the proposition that a parent enjoys a fundamental right 
to raise his children. The Supreme Court of the United States articulates the 
proposition that, "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture 
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom 
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply or hinder." 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S. Ct. 438, 442, 88 L. Ed. 645, 
reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 804, 64 S. Ct. 784, 88 L. Ed. 1090 (1944).

[¶12]   Precedent teaches that the 
fundamental right asserted by Hertzler has been categorized as a liberty 
interest protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States, and extended to the states by the phrase in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law * * *." E.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972); Prince; Pierce v. Soc'y of the 
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925). The same rule is found in WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 6, which 
provides, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law." A statute that infringes upon the constitutional right to 
due process will be stricken. Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 
1965).

[¶13]   The crux of Hertzler's position 
with respect to WYO. STAT. § 20-7-101 is that it infringes upon his fundamental 
right to liberty in the rearing of his children without undue governmental 
interference. The claim of due process involves a requirement that the party 
claiming the constitutional protection demonstrate a protected interest in life, 
liberty or property, and the interest has been infringed in an impermissible 
way. Ward v. Bd. of Trustees of Goshen County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 865 P.2d 618 
(Wyo. 1993). The substantive due process right will protect against arbitrary 
governmental action, even though the decision to act is made through procedures 
that are in themselves constitutionally adequate. Miller v. Campbell County, 
Wyoming, 722 F. Supp. 687 (D.Wyo. 1989), aff'd. 945 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1096, 112 S. Ct. 1174, 117 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1992).

[¶14]   In fleshing out the concept of a 
liberty interest, the Supreme Court of the United States has said a liberty 
interest "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of 
any individual to * * * establish a home and bring up children." Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923). In a local 
context, the United States district court has ruled that liberty under the due 
process clause is broader than freedom from bodily restraint. Moore v. Wyoming 
Medical Center, 825 F. Supp. 1531 (D.Wyo. 1993). This right of privacy is 
inherent in the concept of ordered liberty according to one author. Michael J. 
Minerva, Jr., Grandparent Visitation: The Parental Privacy Right to Raise Their 
"Bundle of Joy," 18 FLA.ST.U.L.REV. 533, 540-41 (1991). The right supports 
parents in making decisions regarding the care and company of their children 
with minimal government intervention, and we hold that Hertzler has presented a 
protected liberty interest in the context of his right of privacy.

[¶15]   This reasoning invokes the concept 
of strict scrutiny, which demands identification of a compelling state interest. 
The compelling state interest then must be balanced against the fundamental 
right, and the method of protecting that compelling state interest must be the 
least intrusive by which that interest can be accomplished. State in the 
Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165.

[¶16]   While the interest of the parent is 
a fundamental liberty interest, it is not without its limitations. For example, 
in applying the concept of due process under the federal constitution, the 
Supreme Court has weighed the right of parents against the right of a minor to 
seek an abortion. It held the pregnant minor was entitled to a proceeding to 
demonstrate either that she was mature and well enough informed to make a 
decision about abortion in consultation with her physician, independently of her 
parents' wishes or, if she was not capable of the independent decision, she 
could show the abortion would be in her best interest. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 61 L. Ed. 2d 797, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887, 100 S. Ct. 185, 62 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1979). Similarly, a child was hold to be entitled to a 
hearing prior to being admitted to a mental institution despite the 
determination of the parents that the child should be admitted. Parham v. J.R., 
442 U.S. 584, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1979). Prince upheld a statute 
protecting children against the crippling effects of child employment, 
especially in public places, and the possible harm arising from other activities 
subject to all the diverse influences of the street.

[¶17]   In considering the interest of the 
State, we find support in persuasive authority from other jurisdictions. In 
Lehrer v. Davis, 214 Conn. 232, 571 A.2d 691 (1990), the court was presented 
with a reserved question of law concerning the constitutionality of that state's 
visitation statute under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the visitation statute 
because of an insufficient factual record. It said, however, "[p]sychiatrists 
and psychologists * * * unanimously counsel that children should maintain and 
retain meaningful relationships and that to deny them continuing contacts is a 
deprivation * * *. Stability, continuity and opportunity, of and for meaningful 
associations are said to build a healthy psyche." Lehrer, 571 A.2d  at 
695.

[¶18]   In Florida, a court of appeals, 
concluded the statute was facially valid because the state had a compelling 
interest in the welfare of children. Sketo v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 381 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1990). The court did not specify the level of scrutiny, although a 
compelling interest suggests strict scrutiny, nor did it weigh the interest of 
the parties or the children. It did hold that the visitation awarded was 
excessive and reversed that decision as an abuse of discretion.

[¶19]   Indiana has ruled the interest of 
the state is found in protecting the best interest of the child. It held that 
the General Assembly had employed a means reasonably related to a legitimate end 
of state government, and an amendment to the grandparent visitation statute did 
not infringe upon the constitutional right of parents to raise their families as 
they see fit. Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1989).

[¶20]   In Kentucky, the supreme court 
considered the constitutionality of that state's grandparent visitation statute 
and balanced the parents' liberty interest, under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
rear children without undue government interference, against the interests of 
the state to endeavor to strengthen familial bonds. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 
(Ky. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 378, 121 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1992). 
The Kentucky court invoked the rational relation test of lesser scrutiny in 
finding its statute to be constitutional and said:

If 
a grandparent is physically, mentally and morally fit, then a grandchild will 
ordinarily benefit from contact with the grandparent. That grandparents and 
grandchildren normally have a special bond cannot be denied. Each benefits from 
contact with the other. The child can learn respect, a sense of responsibility 
and love. The grandparent can be invigorated by exposure to youth, can gain an 
insight into our changing society, and can avoid the loneliness which is so 
often a part of an aging parent's life. These considerations by the state do not 
go too far in intruding into the fundamental rights of the parents. Thus, we 
find that KRS 405.-021 [Kentucky's grandparent visitation statute] is 
constitutional.

King, 
828 S.W.2d  at 632.

[¶21]  The New York Court of Appeals said, in a 
similar vein:

The 
amended statute, as several courts have recognized, rests on the humanitarian 
concern that "`[v]isits with a grandparent are often a precious part of a 
child's experience and there are benefits which devolve upon the grandchild * * 
* which he cannot derive from any other relationship.'" (Matter of Ehrlich v. 
Ressner, 55 A.D.2d 953, 391 N.Y.S.2d 152, quoting Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 
437, 332 A.2d 199, 204; see, Matter of Vacula v. Blume, 53 A.D.2d 633, 384 
N.Y.S.2d 208).

Emanuel 
S. v. Joseph E., 78 N.Y.2d 178, 573 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38, 577 N.E.2d 27, 29 
(1991).

[¶22]   Following the lead of the courts of 
our sister jurisdictions, we perceive a compelling state interest in the State 
of Wyoming which justifies the grandparent visitation statute, perhaps more so. 
The statute specifically adopts the best interest of the child as a standard 
which we perceive as representing a compelling state interest in the state's 
role as parens patriae. In State in Interest of C, we held that protecting the 
health, safety, and welfare for the best interest of the child is a compelling 
state interest.

[¶23]   We then reach the question of 
weighing the compelling interest of the State in protecting the best interest of 
the child against Hertzler's fundamental liberty right. We previously have noted 
Hertzler's right is not unfettered. A state derives power to adopt regulations 
for the well-being of its citizens from its police power. The police power is 
the inherent plenary power possessed by the state not only to prevent its 
citizens from harming one another, but to promote all aspects of public welfare. 
See Development in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV.L.REV. 
1156, 1198-99 (1980).

[¶24]   Society clearly condones intrusions 
upon parental rights which are justified in the face of abuse or neglect. The 
best interest of the child is the standard applied in connection with WYO. STAT. 
§§ 14-3-201 to -215 (1994), which permits the state to intervene to protect 
children from abuse or neglect jeopardizing their health or welfare and to seek 
stabilization of the home environment. Protective custody on a temporary basis 
is provided for abused or neglected children by WYO. STAT. § 14-3-208. Illicit 
sexual relations with children and immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with 
children are prohibited under WYO. STAT. §§ 14-3-104 and -105 (1994). In the 
statutes relating to juvenile court, the recognition of an authority in the 
state superior to that of the parents is present. WYO. STAT. §§ 14-6-201 to -243 
(1994). In appropriate situations, the state has the power to intervene and 
terminate parental rights. WYO. STAT. §§ 14-2-308 to -319 (1994).

[¶25]   In this capacity as parens patriae, 
the state can supervise the welfare of children and promote their best interest 
in a way which affects the rights of parents. The safety of children is 
protected by requiring parents to restrain them in automobile car seats under 
WYO. STAT. § 31-5-1303 (1994). They are required to send their children of 
school age to be educated by WYO. STAT. § 21-4-102 (1992). These simply are 
examples of the manifestation of the state interest in protecting 
children.

[¶26]   In this court, the right of the 
state to intervene in the best interest of the child under certain circumstances 
has been recognized. We held a paternal grandmother could be granted temporary 
custody of a grandchild, in the best interest of the child, upon a petition 
based on the custodial father's neglect of the child. In the Interest of MKM, 
792 P.2d 1369 (Wyo. 1990). We have held the Department of Family Services could 
continue to have temporary legal custody of the child following the showing of 
physical abuse and neglect by the custodial father. In the Interest of MFB, 860 P.2d 1140 (Wyo. 1993). Similar results occur in Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624 (Wyo. 1989); Matter of Parental Rights of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984); 
and Matter of SKJ, 673 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶27]   We do not find much discussion in 
the authorities in this area in the rights of grandchildren and grandparents to 
associate. The Supreme Court of the United States clearly has recognized that 
children are "persons" within the meaning of the Bill of Rights. There the Court 
said:

Students 
in school as well as out of school are "persons" under our Constitution. They 
are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they 
themselves must respect their obligations to the State.

Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S. Ct. 733, 739, 
21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969).

[¶28]   In our cases, the right to 
associate with one's family is identified as a fundamental liberty under WYO. 
CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 6, 7, and 36. Matter of Parental Rights of GP, 679 P.2d 976; DS, 607 P.2d 911. We perceive this interest to be an equivalent fundamental 
right to that asserted by Hertzler. It is available to children and 
grandparents, as well as parents, and the state has an equal duty to protect the 
fundamental rights of the grandparents and the children.

[¶29]   In Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 
1091 (Wyo. 1993), while the issue of constitutionality was not advanced, we 
said:

Scholarly 
study and research has confirmed this position articulated by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court [in Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199, 204-05 (1975) 
grandparents and grandchildren are linked by heredity, special relationships 
arise, visits with a grandparent are often a precious part of a child's 
experience producing benefits no other relationship can give] and has 
demonstrated that children who miss out on the bonding process with grandparents 
are deprived of a valuable experience. One author has set forth the significant 
factors in this way.

Social 
scientists have identified at least four "symbolic" roles that help explain the 
ways in which grandparents influence their families. The "being there" role 
requires nothing more than a grandparent's presence and may help younger 
generation members in two ways. First, this presence "mitigates against the 
obtrusive events of the outside world and disruptive events of role transitions 
* * * [and] serves to maintain the identity of the family." In times of 
transition, such as after the birth of a sibling or during divorce, a 
grandparent's presence may exert a calming influence on grandchildren. Second, 
just by being there, grandparents provide an important stabilizing influence 
particularly important for children born of early teenage mothers.

The 
second symbolic role played by grandparents is that of "family watch-dog." In 
this role, the grandparent is alert for signs of abuse or neglect that might 
indicate that the family will need active care and protection. Third, an 
"arbitrating" role may be assumed when grandparents actively negotiate between 
parents and children concerning values and behaviors that may be more central, 
in the long run, to family continuity and individual enhancement than those that 
the parents' authority status allow to be expressed. Such negotiation may also 
occur when grandparents downplay volatile or disruptive differences between 
parents and children. The fourth important symbolic role for grandparents is as 
"interpreters" of the family's history. Grandparents may help grandchildren 
build connections between the family's past, present, and future, which help 
children form a firmer sense of identity.

Patricia 
S. Fernandez, Grandparent Access: A Model Statute, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 
109, 109-110 (1988) (footnotes omitted) (citing V. BENGSTON, DIVERSITY AND 
SYMBOLS IN GRANDPARENTAL ROLES, IN GRANDPARENTHOOD 21-24 (V. Bengston & J. 
Robertson eds. 1985)).

We 
conclude that, in addition to the compelling state interest attaching to the 
best interest of the children, the compelling state interest exists in 
maintaining the right of association of grandparents and 
grandchildren.

[¶30]   The relative interests of the 
parties, parents, grandparents, and children must be balanced and procedural 
protections or safeguards must be present as the situation demands. Lentsch v. 
Marshall, 741 F.2d 301 (10th Cir. 1984). We are satisfied WYO. STAT. § 20-7-101 
contains the appropriate safeguards. While the grandparent may bring the action 
to seek visitation, it cannot be granted until a hearing is conducted to 
determine if the visitation is in the best interest of the child and the rights 
of the child's parents are not substantially impaired. The record is silent in 
this regard, but we can think of no situation in which it might be more 
appropriate for the trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem to advance the 
interests of the children. See WYO.R.CIV.P. 17(c). Furthermore, the statute 
provides for an additional procedural safeguard in subsection (d) in the form of 
continuing jurisdiction in the court.

[¶31]   We are satisfied this statute is 
sufficiently narrowly drawn. Only a grandparent is afforded the opportunity to 
file for visitation. The circumstances are limited to an instance in which the 
grandparent's child, who is the parent, has died or has divorced the other 
parent, and the person having custody has refused reasonable visitation; or an 
instance in which an unmarried minor grandchild has resided with the grandparent 
for more than six months before being returned to the custody of the 
grandchild's parents, and those parents have refused reasonable visitation 
rights. We understand weighing of the fundamental interests of the parents, 
grandparents, and children is not an easy task. It will be a difficult decision 
in many instances, but the standard incorporated in the statute, the best 
interest of the child, is well recognized, and the court clearly can control 
those rights so the rights of the parents will not be substantially 
impaired.

[¶32]   We affirm the ruling of the trial 
court that the Michaels, as parents of a parent who has adopted children, have 
standing to petition for grandparent visitation under WYO. STAT. § 20-7-101(c). 
We hold the statute is constitutional, and we reverse the trial court's ruling 
that the grandparent visitation is unconstitutional. The case is reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

APPENDIX 
A

Alabama 
Code § 30-3-4 (Michie 1989)

Alaska 
Statutes § 25.24.150 (Michie 1991)

Arizona 
Revised Statutes Annotated § 25-337.01 (West 1993 Supp.) 

Arkansas 
Code Annotated § 9-13-103 (Michie 1993)

California 
Family Code §§ 3102-3104 (West 1994)

Colorado 
Revised Statutes Annotated §§ 19-1-117 - 19-1-117.7 (Bradford 1994 
Supp.)

Connecticut 
General Statutes Annotated § 46b-59 (State 1986)

Delaware 
Code Annotated, Title 13, §§ 721-728 (Michie 1993)

Florida 
Statutes Annotated § 752.001-752.01 (West 1994 Supp.)

Code 
of Georgia Annotated § 74-112 (19-7-3) (Harrison 1994 Supp.)

Hawaii 
Revised Statutes Annotated § 571-46(7) (Harrison 1992 Supp.)

Idaho 
Code § 32-719 (Michie 1994 Supp.)

Illinois 
Annotated Statutes, Ch. 750, ¶ 5/607(b), Ch. 755 ¶ 5/11-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 
1992)

Indiana 
Code Annotated §§ 31-1-11.7-2 to 31-7-11.7-8 (Michie 1994 Supp.)

Iowa 
Code Annotated § 598.35 (West 1994 Supp.)

Kansas 
Statutes Annotated § 38-129 (State 1994)

Kentucky 
Revised Statutes Annotated § 405.021 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984)

Louisiana 
Revised Statutes Annotated § 9:344 (West 1994)

Maine 
Revised Statutes Annotated, Title 19, § 1003 (West 1993 Supp.)

Maryland 
Family Law Code Annotated § 9-102 (Michie 1993 Supp.)

Massachusetts 
Annotated Laws, Ch. 119 § 39D (Law.Coop.Supp. 1994)

Michigan 
Statutes Annotated § 25.312(7b) (Callaghan 1994 Supp.)

Minnesota 
Statutes Annotated § 257.022 (West 1994 Supp.)

Mississippi 
Code 1972 Annotated §§ 93-16-1 to 93-16-7 (Law.Coop. 1993 Supp.)

Annotated 
Missouri Statutes § 452.402 (Vernon Supp. 1993)

Montana 
Code Annotated §§ 40-4-217, 40-9-101 to 40-9-102 (State 1993)

Nebraska 
Revised Statutes §§ 43-1801 to 43-1803 (State 1988)

Nevada 
Revised Statutes Annotated §§ 125 A. 330 to 125 A. 340, 432.B560(1)(c) (Michie 
1993)

New 
Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated § 458:17-d (Butterworth 1993 
Supp.)

New 
Jersey Statutes Annotated § 9:2-7.1 (West 1994 Supp.)

New 
Mexico Statutes Annotated §§ 40-9-1 to 40-9-4 (Michie 1994 Replacement 
Pamphlet)

New 
York Domestic Relations Law §§ 72, 240 (West {McKinney} 1994 Supp.)

North 
Carolina General Statutes §§ 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, 50-13.5j (Michie 
1989)

North 
Dakota Century Code § 14-09-05.1 (Michie 1993 Supp.)

Ohio 
Revised Code Annotated §§ 3109.051, 3109.11, 3109.12 (Banks-Baldwin 
1992)

Oklahoma 
Statutes Annotated, Title 10, §§ 5, 60.16 (West 1994 Supp.)

Oregon 
Revised Statutes §§ 109.121, 109.123 (State 1993)

23 
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated §§ 5311-5314 (West-Bisel 
1991)

Rhode 
Island General Laws §§ 15-5-24.1 - 15.5-24.3 (Michie 1993)

South 
Carolina Code Annotated § 20-7-420(33) (Law.Coop. 1985)

South 
Dakota Codified Laws Annotated §§ 25-4-52, 25-4-54 (Michie 1992)

Tennessee 
Code Annotated § 36-6-301 (Michie 1991)

Texas 
Family Code Annotated §§ 14.03(e) - 14.03(f) (West 1994 Supp.)

Utah 
Code Annotated § 30-5-1, 30-5-2 (Michie 1993 Supp.)

Vermont 
Statutes Annotated, Tit. 15, §§ 1011-1016 (Equity 1989)

Virginia 
Code Annotated §§ 20-1024.1 - 20-124.4 (Michie 1994 Supp.)

Washington 
Revised Code Annotated § 26.09.240 (West 1994 Supp.) 

West 
Virginia Code §§ 48-2B-1 to 48-2B-9 (Michie 1994 Supp.)

Wisconsin 
Statutes Annotated §§ 767.245, 880.155 (West 1993, 1991)

Wyoming 
Statutes §§ 20-2-113(c) and 20-7-101 (Michie 1994 Supp.)