Case Title: BRIAN LEE DUKE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0298

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRIAN LEE DUKE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 74209 P.3d 563Case Number: S-07-0298, S-08-0132Decided: 06/03/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
BRIAN 
LEE DUKE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Brian 
Duke pled guilty to third-degree sexual assault pursuant to a plea 
agreement.  On appeal, he alleges 
several errors.  Principally, he 
contends that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because 
the State breached the plea agreement.  
According to Mr. Duke, the agreement was breached because the presentence 
investigation report (PSI) contained a recommendation for the imposition of a 
more severe sentence than that agreed to by the prosecutor in the plea 
agreement.  We find no error and 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Duke presents the following issues:

 
 

1.            
Did 
the State breach the plea agreement?

2.            
Was 
Mr. Duke's plea voluntary?

3.            
Did 
the prosecutor engage in misconduct?

4.            
Did 
the district court violate W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(A) or (C)?

5.            
Did 
the court violate Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-1301 through 7-13-1304 (LexisNexis 
2005) when it sentenced Mr. Duke?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Mr. 
Duke was charged with one count of third-degree sexual assault in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005).1  Prior to trial, a change of plea hearing 
was held and, in accordance with a plea agreement, Mr. Duke pled guilty to the 
charge.  The terms of the agreement 
were set forth in a letter from the prosecuting attorney to counsel for Mr. 
Duke.  The agreement was also 
recited in open court at the hearing.

 
 

[¶4]        
Before 
accepting the guilty plea, the district court advised Mr. Duke that the court 
was not bound by the plea agreement or required to impose the recommended 
sentence.  The court specifically 
advised Mr. Duke:

 
 
The 
Court:  You understand that this 
plea agreement is merely a recommendation of sentencing to the Court, the Court 
is not bound by that recommendation.  
You could receive a sentence that is more harsh than the terms of the 
plea agreement, and under the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
11(e)(1)(B), you will not be allowed to withdraw your plea of guilty if you 
receive a sentence that is more harsh.  
Do you understand all that?

The 
Defendant: Yes, sir.

The 
Court: You understand you will not be sentenced today, but instead the Court 
will order a presentence investigation and ASI [Addiction Severity Index] 
evaluation, and sentencing will only occur after receipt of those two 
documents.  Do you understand 
that?

The 
Defendant: Yes, sir.

 
 
Mr. 
Duke confirmed that he had not been threatened or forced to enter into the 
agreement and also confirmed that no other promise or agreement had been made in 
order to induce him to change his plea.  The district court placed Mr. Duke under 
oath and Mr. Duke provided testimony relating to the charge.  The court determined that Mr. Duke's 
testimony established a factual basis for the plea and accepted and entered the 
guilty plea.  The court then ordered 
a presentence investigation and an ASI evaluation.

 
 

[¶5]        
The 
PSI was submitted to the court on October 19, 2007.  The report indicated that it was prepared 
by a probation and parole agent with the Sweetwater County office of the Wyoming 
Department of Corrections, Division of Field Services.  The report 
noted that Mr. Duke pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, and accurately 
stated that the agreement provided for a recommended sentence of three to six 
years at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, with a referral to the Youthful 
Offender's Program (Boot Camp).  The 
report also contained a section entitled Evaluation & Recommendation that 
included the following passage:

 
 
The 
Defendant takes no accountability for his actions in the present offense, nor 
did he show any remorse for his actions for his prior convictions.  Regarding same, he told this agent this 
was the "second time [he] was set up for something like this."  Given that the Defendant has a 
significant history of sexually assaulting young girls, has had extensive 
counseling for same and still committed the instant offense, he clearly is a 
threat to the community.  It is 
recommended he be incarcerated for the maximum allotted time.  Should the Defendant be released [i]nto 
community supervision at any time, it is recommended that sex offender 
conditions be imposed.

 
 
The 
PSI concluded with this recommendation: "May it be respectfully recommended that 
the Defendant, BRIAN LEE DUKE, be denied the privilege of 
probation."

 
 

[¶6]        
At 
the sentencing hearing, defense counsel contended that the PSI contained several 
factual inaccuracies.  In order to 
preserve context, we present the entire exchange from the 
record:

 
 
The 
Court: [Defense Counsel], have you received both documents [the PSI and ASI 
report] in a timely manner?

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

 
 
The 
Court: Are there any additions, deletions, or corrections to those 
documents?

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.  
Beginning on page 4 of the presentence investigation, Roman numeral III, 
prior offense history, there's a juvenile court history dated 12/15/02.  My client would like to make a note that 
he was never charged for this burglary.  
He did go to the juvenile diversion program on January 1, 2003.  That's listed in the disposition and 
date paragraph, however not for the burglary.

 
 
The 
Court: The Court will delete that offense and not consider it in 
sentencing.  Anything 
else?

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.  On page 
5, on the cruelty to animal charge misdemeanor, my client would like to make a 
note that he wasn't charged with this.  
On the disposition, it does say dismissed.

 
 
The 
Court: The Court will delete that reference and not consider it in 
sentencing.  Anything 
else?

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: On the offense of attempted rape, my client would like to make a note 
it was reduced to battery with intent to commit a serious felony, which was a 
misdemeanor offense.

 
 
The 
Court: The attempted rape charge will be considered as a 
misdemeanor.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: On page 6, under the adult court history title, the last offense 
listed there, my client is unaware of what the endangering the welfare of a 
minorwhat that citation is about.

 
 
The 
Court: That offense will be deleted and will not be considered by the 
Court.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: On Page 8, under marital status, it is listed a current spouse or 
significant other.  The young lady 
listed there as his girlfriend, she is not his girlfriend 
anymore.

 
 
The 
Court: That change is noted.

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: On page 9, under the employment section, the unemployment date since, 
it says February 3, 2007.  However, 
he still had his job available to him until March.

 
 
The 
Court: Anything else?

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: Pardon?

 
 
The 
Court: Anything else?

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: Under the evaluation recommendation, page 12this is Roman numeral 
VII.  The parts where the agent is 
making [her] recommendation, [she's] using the burglary and attempted rape and 
cruelty to animals, which were the additions and deletions which we have 
discussed just now.  And that is 
all, Your Honor.

 
 
The 
court then heard argument from Mr. Duke and the State.  The State recommended the agreed-upon 
sentence as follows:

 
 
Your 
Honor, the State would ask that you sentence the defendant per the plea 
agreement.  Penitentiary time isis 
important in this case.  It's 
appropriate in this case.  We're 
talking about a 12-year-old girl who he had sex with.  If this had been charged under the new 
statutes that were passed underas of July 1, he would be looking at 
substantially more time due to that age difference.

 
 
Also, 
the Court can consider, you know, the underlying facts of that prior 
offense.  You know, there's prior 
sexual misconduct by this defendant.  
And that's why I think penitentiary timethe State's pursuing 
penitentiary time in this case.

 
 
It's 
not part of the plea agreement and it's not part of our sentencing worksheet, 
but something I think would be important for the Court to consider and benefit 
the defendant is some type of psychosexual evaluation and treatment.  Maybe that's something he can begin at 
the penitentiary.

 
 
I 
do have faith in the boot camp program.  
They do an excellent job up there.  
He's of such a young age thathe won't even turn 18 until, I think, later 
this monthor, actually, until January.  
I think given a shot, due to his age, at the boot camp would be 
important, because that would be followed by a period of supervision.  However, based upon his previous 
history, this being an additional sexual offense, I'd ask the Court to accept 
the plea agreement.

 
 
Defense 
counsel also urged the court to sentence Mr. Duke in accordance with the plea 
agreement.

 
 

[¶7]        
The 
district court did not accept the recommendation and, instead, sentenced 
Mr. Duke to ten to fifteen years of imprisonment.  Mr. Duke appealed.  His appeal was docketed as case number 
S-07-0298.  While his appeal was 
pending, Mr. Duke filed a motion in the district court to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  He claimed that the plea 
agreement bound not just the prosecutor's office, but also the Department of 
Corrections, and more specifically, the probation agent who prepared the 
PSI.  Consequently, he contended 
that the sentencing recommendation in the PSI violated the agreement. We stayed 
briefing in Mr. Duke's direct appeal pending resolution of this 
motion.

 
 

[¶8]        
The 
district court found no breach of the plea agreement and denied Mr. Duke's 
motion to withdraw his plea.  Mr. 
Duke appealed from the order, and that appeal was docketed in this Court as case 
number S-08-0132.  Mr. Duke moved 
for consolidation of the two cases.  
We granted that motion.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Violation 
of Plea Agreement

 
 

[¶9]        
Whether 
a breach of a plea agreement has occurred is a question of law that we review de novo.  Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, ¶ 13, 
151 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

[¶10]     
Mr. 
Duke contends that the language of the plea agreement bound the probation agent 
who prepared the PSI because the probation agent was acting as an agent of the 
State when preparing the PSI.  He 
also suggests that the prosecutor improperly influenced the probation agent, 
resulting in the agent recommending a more severe sentence.  The State contends that the prosecutor 
did not violate the terms of the plea agreement and that the probation agent 
served as an agent of the sentencing court, not the State.

 
 

[¶11]     
The 
district court, in its decision letter, resolved these questions in favor of the 
State:

 
 
The 
Deputy Carbon County and Prosecuting Attorney twice requested at Defendant's 
Sentencing Hearing that the sentencing court accept the plea agreement. . . 
.  Therefore, the attorney for the 
state properly recommended a particular sentence pursuant to the plea agreement 
and in accordance with her duties under W.R.Cr.P. 
11(e)(1)(B).

. 
. .

[T]he 
Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole acts on behalf of an independent 
judiciary when it compiles a PSI for the court.  The Wyoming Department of Probation and 
Parole is not an agent of the prosecutor but rather serves the sentencing 
court.  Because the Wyoming 
Department of Probation and Parole is not an agent of the prosecutor, it cannot 
be bound by a plea agreement between Defendant and the prosecutor.  Thus, a harsher recommendation from the 
Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole than that agreed to by the prosecutor 
is not a breach of the plea agreement.

 
 
We 
agree with the district court.

 
 

[¶12]     
We 
first examine whether the prosecutor complied with the terms of the plea 
agreement.  We have stated the 
following regarding plea agreements:

 
 
A 
plea agreement is a contract between the defendant and the State to which the 
general principles of contract law are applied. "When determining whether a 
breach of the plea agreement has occurred we: (1) examine the nature of the 
promise; and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the defendant's reasonable 
understanding of the promise at the time the plea was entered.'"  Ford v. State, 2003 WY 65, ¶ 11, 69 P.3d 407, 410 (Wyo. 2003). The prosecutor "must explicitly stand by" the terms of any 
agreement; and if the State is unable to carry out the terms, the correct remedy 
is withdrawal of the plea.  Ford, ¶ 18, 69 P.3d  at 412. The State 
may not obtain the benefit of the agreement and at the same time avoid its 
obligations without violating either the principles of fairness or the 
principles of contract law.  Id.

 
 

Frederick, 
¶ 13, 151 P.3d  at 1141.

 
 

[¶13]     
The 
terms of the plea agreement were detailed in a letter from the prosecutor to 
defense counsel.  The letter 
stated:

 
 
If 
your client were to enter a plea of Guilty on the charge of Third Degree Sexual 
Assault, the State would recommend the following to the Court pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. Rule 11(e)(1)(B):

 
 
We 
would ask that your client be sentenced to a term of incarceration of not less 
than Three (3) years, nor more than Six (6) years at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  He would be given 
credit off of both his minimum and maximum term for any time which he has spent 
in jail on this charge.  In addition 
the State would recommend your client for the Boot Camp program, and upon 
successful completion of the program, the State would concur with a Motion for 
Sentence Reduction as recommended by his Boot Camp Program 
advisors.

 
 
The 
letter was read aloud by the judge at the change of plea hearing.  Mr. Duke, his attorney, and the 
prosecutor confirmed that the letter accurately reflected the terms of the 
agreement.  The letter reflects, and 
it is undisputed, that the plea agreement was entered into pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
11(e)(1)(B), which states:

 
 
(1)       In General. 
The attorney for the state and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant 
when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an 
agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a 
charged offense or to a lesser related offense, the attorney for the state will do any of 
the following:

. 
. .

(B)       Make a recommendation, or agree not to 
oppose the defendant's request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such 
recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the 
court;

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶14]     
In 
order to determine whether the plea agreement was breached, our first step is to 
identify the promises made by the State in the agreement.  Fortunately, the agreement is in writing 
and there is no dispute regarding its terms.  In the first paragraph of the agreement, 
the prosecutor stated that, in return for a guilty plea, "the State would 
recommend the following to the Court pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. Rule 
11(e)(1)(B)."  Mr. Duke 
contends that this language binds "the State," which includes not just the 
prosecutor, but also the probation agent who prepared the PSI.  The district court rejected this 
argument, and so do we.

 
 

[¶15]     
The 
agreement does not mention the PSI or indicate any intention to limit the 
contents of the report.  Before 
entering his guilty plea, Mr. Duke was advised that the district court would 
order and review a PSI prior to deciding upon an appropriate sentence.  "[T]he trial court is given broad 
discretion to consider a wide variety of factors about the defendant and his 
crimes."  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 
(Wyo. 1993).  We have previously 
recognized that a sentencing recommendation contained in a PSI is one of the 
factors that a court may properly consider in determining the appropriate 
sentence to impose.  Id.  The plea agreement between Mr. Duke and 
the State specifies that the recommendation from the prosecutor would be made 
"to the Court pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. Rule 11(e)(1)(B)."  That rule clearly and unambiguously 
states that the agreed-upon recommendation will be made by "[t]he attorney for 
the state."  It is undisputed that 
the prosecutor made the required recommendation at the sentencing hearing.  Accordingly, we find that the record 
clearly shows that the prosecutor adhered to the terms of the plea 
agreement.

 
 

[¶16]     
We 
next address Mr. Duke's contention that the probation officer was acting as an 
agent of the State.  We have not 
addressed the question of whether a probation agent who prepares a PSI is an 
agent of the sentencing court or of the State, but courts in other jurisdictions 
have.  Those confronted with facts 
similar to those in Mr. Duke's case have determined that the probation agent, 
when preparing a PSI, is acting as an agent of the sentencing court.  For example, the Washington Supreme 
Court determined that "a CCO [Community Corrections Officer] acts on behalf of 
the court when it provides information through a presentence report."  State v. Sanchez, 46 P.3d 774, 781 
(Wash. 2002).  It concluded that the 
CCO who prepares the PSI is not bound by the plea agreement: "the CCO has an 
independent duty of investigation and recommendation in these cases.  The CCO is not part of the prosecution 
team.  The CCO was not involved in 
the preparation of, nor the promises made in, the plea agreement."  Id.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court has arrived 
at the same conclusion:

 
 
[T]he 
preparer of a presentence report is to be a neutral and independent participant 
in the sentencing process.  It 
necessarily follows that a parole or probation officer acts on behalf of an 
independent judiciary, not as an agent of the state, in preparing a presentence 
report.  Like the sentencing court, 
the preparer of a presentence report is neither a party to nor bound by a plea 
agreement between the defendant and the state and, therefore, cannot breach the 
terms of that agreement in preparing the report.

. 
. .

We 
conclude that, in preparing the presentence report, the probation officer was 
acting on behalf of an independent judiciary and not as an agent of the 
state.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the probation officer was neither a party to nor bound by the plea agreement 
between the defendant and the state and could not breach the terms of that 
agreement by including a recitation of the dismissed counts in the presentence 
report.

 
 

State 
v. McQuay, 
452 N.W.2d 377, 383-84 (Wis. 1990).  
In Montana, a probation officer's sentencing "recommendation [is] part of 
the statutorily authorized pre-sentence investigation, not a breach of the 
prosecutor's agreement."  State v. Milinovich, 812 P.2d 338, 340 
(Mont. 1991), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Deserly, 188 P.3d 1057 (Mont. 2008).  The court 
reaffirmed this conclusion in State v. 
Yother, 831 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Mont. 1992) (a "probation officer's 
recommendation . . . is not equivalent to a recommendation by the 
prosecutor").

 
 

[¶17]     
 To the extent that our case law touches 
this issue, we have not found a violation of a plea agreement when the PSI 
contains a more severe sentencing recommendation.  In Mehring, the defendant was charged with 
eight counts of second-degree sexual assault and two counts of third-degree 
sexual assault.  860 P.2d  at 
1105.  He entered into a plea 
agreement with the State providing that he would plead guilty to two counts of 
second-degree sexual assault, and the State would move to dismiss the remaining 
counts.  Id.  The State also agreed to recommend a 
sentence of 10-25 years imprisonment on each count, to be served 
concurrently.  Id. at 1109.  The PSI, however, contained a 
recommendation for a more severe sentence.  
Id. at 1115.  In the PSI, the Probation/Parole Agent 
recommended that Mr. Mehring be sentenced to a minimum of 20 years 
imprisonment.  Id.  On appeal, Mr. Mehring challenged the 
propriety of the district court's consideration of the sentencing recommendation 
portion of the PSI.  Id.  He claimed that, because W.R.Cr.P. 32 
did not require that a sentence recommendation be included in the PSI, it was 
improper for a sentencing court to consider the recommendation.  Id.  We upheld the sentence and found no 
abuse of discretion in the inclusion of the recommendation in the PSI.  Id. at 1115.

 
 

[¶18]     
Mr. 
Duke relies upon a number of decisions that are factually distinguishable from 
his case.  These decisions roughly 
fall into two categories.  The first 
includes cases where police or other law enforcement officials made 
recommendations for sentences more severe than those recommended by the 
prosecutor pursuant to the plea agreement.  
For example, in State v. 
Matson, the recommendation for a longer sentence came in a letter, written 
on police department letterhead, from a police detective who had been involved 
in the investigation of the case.  
674 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Wis. App. 2003).  
The Wisconsin court held that the detective's letter breached the 
agreement.  It 
stated:

 
 
Because 
an investigative officer is the investigating arm of the prosecutor's office, 
principles of fairness and agency require us to bind the investigating officer 
to the prosecutor's bargain. . . .  
Investigating officers are so integral to the prosecutorial effort that 
to permit one to undercut a plea agreement would, in effect, permit the State to 
breach its promise.

 
 

Id. 
at 57-58.  To similar effect are United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 
(4th Cir. 1986), and Lee v. 
State, 501 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1987).  
Cf. Allen v. Hadden, 57 F.3d 1529 (10th Cir. 1995) (harmless error where 
charge dismissed pursuant to plea agreement was mentioned in PSI in later case, 
but did not affect sentence).  In 
Mr. Duke's case, the probation officer who prepared the PSI was neither an 
employee nor part of the "investigative arm" of the prosecutor's 
office.

 
 

[¶19]     
In 
the remaining distinguishable cases cited by Mr. Duke, the prosecutor undermined 
the State's sentencing recommendation.  
For example, in State v. 
Sledge, the prosecutor recommended the agreed-upon sentence, but then 
undermined the recommendation by presenting witness testimony of the probation 
officer who detailed a number of aggravating factors, and recommended a much 
longer sentence.  947 P.2d 1199, 
1200 (Wash. 1997).  The Washington 
Supreme Court found that this constituted a breach of the plea agreement 
because, while "[t]he recommendation need not be made enthusiastically,'" the 
prosecutor may not actively undermine it.  
Id. at 1205.  Similarly, in State v. Chetwood, the prosecutor made 
the agreed-upon sentencing recommendation, but improperly undermined it by 
presenting the testimony of an officer who recommended a more severe 
sentence.  170 P.3d 436, 438 (Kan. 
App. 2007).

 
 

[¶20]     
Mr. 
Duke suggests several times in his brief that the prosecutor in this case 
undermined the plea agreement by exercising influence over the probation agent 
who wrote the PSI.  For example, he 
states: "it is clear that the [PSI] writer was more of a surrogate [of the 
prosecutor] than an independent voice."  We find no support for Mr. Duke's 
allegations.  The record does not 
show any communication between the prosecutor and the probation agent regarding 
the sentence recommendation, nor is there any evidence that the prosecutor 
attempted to influence the recommendation in any way.

 
 

[¶21]     
In 
summary, we find no indication that the prosecutor breached the terms of the 
plea agreement.  The record shows 
that the attorney for the State followed the explicit terms of the agreement, in 
conjunction with W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B), and made the required 
recommendation.  We find that the 
probation agent preparing a PSI report acts as an agent of the sentencing court, 
not of the prosecution, and is not bound by the plea agreement.2  There is no evidence in the record to 
suggest that the prosecutor improperly influenced the probation agent or 
otherwise undermined the State's sentencing recommendation.3

 
 
Standard 
of Review for Remaining Issues

 
 

[¶22]     
Mr. 
Duke did not object in the district court to the remaining alleged errors.  We will review for plain error.  In order to show plain error, Mr. Duke 
must demonstrate that: "1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as 
error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 
3) the party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially 
prejudiced him.'"  Evenson v. State, 2008 WY 24, ¶ 7, 177 P.3d 819, 823 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Talley 
v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007)).  We note that the record clearly shows 
all incidents alleged as error.

 
 
Voluntariness 
of Guilty Plea

 
 

[¶23]     
Mr. 
Duke contends that his guilty plea was not voluntary because he was not informed 
by the court of an affirmative defense available to him.  Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the 
district court must advise the defendant of "[t]he nature of the charge to which 
the plea is offered."  W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b)(1).  To be informed of "the 
nature of the charge" means that the defendant must be aware of "what acts were 
necessary to establish guilt."  Sanchez v. State, 592 P.2d 1130, 1135 
(Wyo. 1979).  In this case, the 
court was required to advise Mr. Duke of the elements of third-degree sexual 
assault, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(i).  
Those elements are the actus 
reus of sexual intrusion and the attendant circumstances that the actor is 
at least four years older than the victim, who is less than 16 years 
old.

 
 

[¶24]     
Mr. 
Duke correctly notes that, for a person charged with violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-304(a)(i), "it is an affirmative defense that the actor reasonably believed 
that the victim was sixteen (16) years of age or older."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-308(a).  He asserts that, although he was 
properly advised of the crime he was charged with, the district court should 
have advised him of this affirmative defense.  In order to prevail based on plain 
error, Mr. Duke must demonstrate the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law.  Mr. Duke cites no authority 
requiring a trial court to inform a criminal defendant of potential defenses to 
the charged crimes.  Similarly, he 
points to no authority requiring that a defendant be permitted to withdraw a 
guilty plea if the court fails to advise the defendant of available affirmative 
defenses.  We have not previously 
addressed this issue.  Decisions 
from other jurisdictions suggest that Mr. Duke's position is incorrect as a 
matter of law.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. Scully, 746 F.2d 951, 956 
(2d Cir. 1984) ("[D]ue process does not require that a defendant be advised of 
every basis on which he might escape or receive a lesser punishment for an 
offense that he has committed."); State 
v. Reynolds, 533 N.E.2d 342, 343-44 (Ohio 1988) (trial court not required to 
advise defendant represented by counsel of statutory affirmative defenses).  Mr. Duke has failed to establish the 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

 
 
Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 

[¶25]     
At 
the sentencing hearing, Mr. Duke alleged several inaccuracies in the PSI.  Of relevance to this discussion, the 
report listed an Idaho offense dated June 10, 2003 as "Attempted Rape."  The description states the following: 
"According to the charging document filed in this matter, the Defendant 
attempted an act of sexual intercourse with [JM], who resisted, but whose 
resistance was overcome by force and violence.  This agent received no further details 
of this offense."  This entry was 
discussed at the sentencing hearing:

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: On the offense of attempted rape, my client would like to make a note 
it was reduced to battery with intent to commit a serious felony, which was a 
misdemeanor offense.

 
 
The 
Court: The attempted rape charge will be considered as a 
misdemeanor.

 
 

[¶26]     
Later, 
during the State's sentencing argument, the prosecutor made reference to Mr. 
Duke's criminal history and referred to the crime under consideration as "an 
additional sexual offense."  Mr. 
Duke contends that the prosecution's reference to the prior offense was improper 
because it referred to "unproven or unsubstantiated 
allegations."

 
 

[¶27]     
At 
no time did Mr. Duke contest the underlying facts of the offense, nor did he 
contend that it was not in fact originally charged as attempted rape.  He only requested that the court note 
that the offense had been reduced to a misdemeanor.  The prosecutor did not make any 
reference to the level of this offense during her sentencing argument.  She explicitly limited argument to "the 
underlying facts of that prior offense."  
Additionally, the PSI contains two other incidents of alleged, but 
uncharged, sexual misconduct.  In 
each case, Mr. Duke was alleged to have brought a woman to his bedroom, locked 
the door, and attempted to assault her.  
In both cases, the women escaped.  Mr. Duke did not contend at the 
sentencing hearing that the Probation/Parole Agent inaccurately related these 
incidents.  Mr. Duke has failed to 
demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated.

 
 
Alleged 
Violations of W.R.Cr.P. 32

 
 

[¶28]     
W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a)(3)(A) requires that "[a]t least 10 days before imposing sentence, unless 
this minimum period is waived by the defendant, the court shall provide the 
defendant and the defendant's counsel with a copy of the [PSI]."  Mr. Duke asserts that the rule was 
violated because he received the PSI on the day he was sentenced and did not 
waive the 10-day requirement.  As 
illustrated by the following exchange, Mr. Duke waived the 10-day notice 
requirement:

 
 
The 
Court:  Have you received a copy of 
the presentence investigation report and ASI [Addiction Severity Index] 
evaluation?

 
 
The 
Defendant:  I received it here at 
the courthouse, Your Honor.

 
 
The 
Court:  You just now received it 
this morning?

 
 
The 
Defendant:  Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
The 
Court:  So you've not had the 
opportunity to review it, to

 
 
The 
Defendant:  I 
have.

 
 
The 
Court:  discuss it with your 
attorney?

 
 
The 
Defendant:  I have.  We discussed it just on the bench right 
there.

 
 
The 
Court:  Have you had all the time 
that you need?

 
 
The 
Defendant:  Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 

[¶29]     
In 
addition, the record clearly shows that the PSI was filed on October 22, 2007, 
well in advance of the November 5, 2007 sentencing hearing.  The district court also separately asked 
Mr. Duke's counsel whether she received the PSI "in a timely manner," and 
counsel responded affirmatively.

 
 

[¶30]     
Mr. 
Duke contends on appeal that he has significant literacy limitations that 
prevented him from reading and understanding the PSI in the time provided.  He contends that this is demonstrated by 
the poor quality of the written statement provided to the Probation/Parole Agent 
and included in the PSI.  We find 
that this allegation is not supported by the record.  While Mr. Duke's written statement does 
contain some grammar and spelling errors, it is clearly comprehensible and 
provides no evidence that Mr. Duke was unable to understand the PSI.  We find no violation of W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a)(3)(A) given this record.

 
 

[¶31]     
Mr. 
Duke also contends that the district court violated W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C).  That provision provides, in relevant 
part:

 
 
If 
the comments of the defendant and the defendant's counsel or testimony or other 
information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence 
investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court 
shall, as to each matter controverted, make:

 
 
(i)         
A finding as to the allegation; or

(ii)        A 
determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted 
will not be taken into account in sentencing.  A written record of such findings and 
determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence 
investigation report thereafter made available to penal 
institutions.

 
 
During 
the sentencing hearing, after defense counsel made several suggested corrections 
that the court accepted, the following exchange occurred:

 
 
The 
Court:  Anything 
else?

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  Under the evaluation 
recommendation, page 12this is Roman numeral VII.  The parts where the agent is making 
[her] recommendation, [she's] using the burglary and attempted rape and cruelty 
to animals, which were the additions and deletions which we have discussed just 
now.  And that is all, Your 
Honor.

 
 

[¶32]     
Mr. 
Duke contends that defense counsel's comment was an allegation of a factual 
inaccuracy in the contents of the PSI, and that the court was obligated by 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C) either to make a finding regarding the disputed provision 
or to find that the provision would not be considered in sentencing.  We disagree.  When viewed in context, it is apparent 
that counsel was simply pointing out that the court should consider the 
Probation/Parole Agent's sentencing recommendation in light of the factual 
corrections accepted by the court.  
Defense counsel was not making an allegation of factual inaccuracy, and 
no response or action from the district court was required.  We discern no violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law.

 
 
Addicted 
Offender Accountability Act

 
 

[¶33]     
Mr. 
Duke contends that the district court erred by imposing a sentence of 
imprisonment.  For support, he 
relies upon a provision of the Addicted Offender Accountability Act, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-1303.  That provision 
states, in full:

 
 
(a)       Except as 
provided in subsection (c) of this section, notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, qualified offenders may be placed on probation under W.S. 7-13-301, 
receive a suspended sentence under W.S. 7-13-302(a) or placed on probation under 
W.S. 35-7-1037. The sentence or probation order shall set forth the terms of a 
treatment program based upon the substance abuse assessment and any other terms 
and conditions as the court may deem appropriate under the circumstances, and 
require the offender to satisfactorily complete the treatment program. The court 
shall include in the sentence or probation order any provisions necessary to 
reasonably protect the health of the offender.

(b)       The 
treatment provider shall be required to report to the court, the prosecuting 
attorney, probation officer and counsel representing the offender not less than 
once per month on the offender's progress in meeting the requirements of the 
sentence and the program.

(c)        A 
qualified offender or person sentenced under this act may be incarcerated if the 
court concludes on the basis of the evidence that:

(i)         
No adequate treatment alternative exists;

(ii)        Under 
the facts of the case, the interests of justice require a period of 
incarceration; provided however, under the circumstances, a portion of the 
sentence may be suspended under the conditions set forth in subsection (a) of 
this section;

(iii)       The 
offender refuses to agree to participate in the court ordered treatment program 
or fails to satisfactorily complete the court ordered treatment program; 
or

(iv)       The 
offender commits a felony, sells or otherwise delivers controlled substances 
while in a program pursuant to this section, or engages in other behavior that 
poses an unreasonable risk to public safety while in the program. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the absence of the commission of 
these acts, those programs and sanctions set forth in W.S. 7-13-1102 and 
7-13-1107(b) may be used at the discretion of the probation officer or court to 
address other violations of the sentencing or probation 
order.

(d)       In the 
event probation is revoked, the court may impose one (1) or more of the 
sanctions set forth in W.S. 7-13-1102 or 7-13-1107(b) unless the court, in its 
sole discretion, finds that another disposition, including imprisonment, is 
necessary under the facts of the case.

 
 
Mr. 
Duke interprets the statute to require that sentencing courts, absent one of the 
conditions appearing in subsection (c), sentence qualified offenders to 
probation.4  We disagree.

 
 

[¶34]     
The 
plain text of the statute does not limit the discretion of the trial courts to 
make sentencing decisions.  
Subsection (a) specifically states that "qualified offenders may be placed on probation."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1303(a) (emphasis 
added).  As a general matter, the 
word "may" when used in a statute, is permissive.  Mayor v. Board of Land Comm'rs, 192 P.2d 403, 411 (Wyo. 1948).  Nothing in 
the statutory text suggests that the legislature intended any other 
interpretation.

 
 

[¶35]     
The 
only decision cited by Mr. Duke to support his position is People v. Murillo, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002).  In Murillo, the California Court of Appeals 
determined that it was error for the trial court to sentence the qualifying 
offender to incarceration rather than one of the alternatives specified by the 
statute.  126 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 
363.  Murillo, however, involved a California 
statute that differs markedly from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1303.  The California law states that "any 
person convicted of a nonviolent drug possession offense shall receive probation."  Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1(a) (West 2008) 
(emphasis added).  See Murillo, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d  at 
360.  Given the different statutory 
language upon which Murillo is 
premised, its conclusion is not relevant to our interpretation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-1303.  In light of the 
clear discretionary language in Wyoming's statute, we find no indication that 
the court violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law when it ordered a 
sentence of imprisonment.

 
 

[¶36]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a) (LexisNexis 2005) stated, in relevant 
part:

(a)           
An 
actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if, under circumstances not 
constituting sexual assault in the first or second degree:

(i)     
The 
actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim and inflicts sexual 
intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years; . . . 
.

In 
2007, the legislature significantly revised the sexual assault statutes.  2007 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 159.  As part of that revision, subsection 
(a)(i) was removed from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304.  Section 6-2-314, entitled "Sexual abuse 
of a minor in the first degree; penalties" was added.  That section includes the following 
provision:

(a)           
An 
actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree 
if:

(i)     
Being 
sixteen (16) years of age or older, the actor inflicts sexual intrusion on a 
victim who is less than thirteen (13) years of age; . . . 
.

2This 
conclusion is consistent with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-407(a)(ii), which requires 
probation and parole agents to "[i]nvestigate all cases referred by any court . 
. . and report to the court . . . in writing."

3As 
additional support for his contention that he should have been allowed to 
withdraw his guilty plea, Mr. Duke asserts that his plea was not voluntary 
because it was falsely induced.  
Specifically, Mr. Duke alleges that the prosecutor "represented to [him] 
that upon his entry of a guilty plea he would be sentenced with a single agreed 
recommendation," and he "accepted the offer with that understanding."  According to Mr. Duke, "[i]f the promise 
he relied upon was not what it appeared to be, it was false inducement," 
regardless of the intention of the prosecutor.  Mr. Duke did not raise this issue in the 
district court, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest Mr. Duke 
believed that the plea agreement bound the probation agent who prepared the 
PSI.  Absent evidentiary support, we 
will not further consider this assertion.

4The 
district court found that Mr. Duke was a qualified offender.  The State does not contest this 
finding.