Case Title: Juvenile v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12455

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12455 
 
A JUVENILE  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
August 13, 2018. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Delinquent Child.  Bail. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, a juvenile, has been charged in a 
delinquency complaint with being an accessory to murder after 
the fact, in violation of G. L. c. 274, § 4, and with assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 15A.  At the juvenile's arraignment, a Juvenile 
Court judge set bail at $50,000.  A Superior Court judge 
subsequently denied the juvenile's petition for bail review, and 
the juvenile then filed a petition with a single justice of this 
court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The single justice denied 
the petition, and the juvenile appeals.  We affirm.1 
 
 
Background.  The juvenile has been in the permanent custody 
of the Department of Children and Families (department) since 
2013.  In October, 2016, he was charged in a delinquency 
complaint with vandalizing property, in violation of G. L. 
c. 266, § 126A, and assault and battery, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 13A.  After his arraignment on those charges, he was 
released to the custody of the department.  He subsequently 
failed to appear for a compliance and election hearing scheduled 
for January, 2017, and a default warrant issued.  The juvenile 
remained in default until October, 2017, when he was arrested in 
connection with the events that led to the current charges. 
 
                                                 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services, Youth Advocacy Division and 
Children and Family Law Division. 
2 
 
 
In setting the juvenile's bail at $50,000, the Juvenile 
Court judge marked on the bail form that the reasons for doing 
so were the nature and circumstances of the offenses charged; 
the potential penalty the juvenile faces; and the juvenile's 
family ties, record of flight to avoid prosecution, failure to 
appear at a court proceeding, and status of being on bail 
pending adjudication of a prior charge.  The judge also included 
handwritten notes in the section for "Findings of fact for bail 
amount higher than what juvenile/defendant may afford," which 
appear to state that "[t]he Juvenile may be indicted. -- Victim 
murdered -- child in DCF and DYS custody -- been in warrant 
status since Jan. 18, 2017 -- Co-Defendant, stabbing -- fled 
with him + returned 4 murder weapon." 
 
 
The juvenile petitioned for a review of the bail 
determination in the Superior Court.  A judge in that court 
denied the petition in a handwritten marginal note stating that 
"[t]he court has considered the defendant's lack of financial 
resources.  However, given the fact that he is in the custody of 
DCF and has been a runaway for months, there is no reasonable 
alternative to assure the defendant's appearing in court other 
than setting a bail he cannot post.  [Brangan v.  Commonwealth], 
477 Mass. 691 (2017)." 
 
 
Discussion.  The juvenile argues, among other things, that 
a judge making a bail determination for a juvenile in the 
department's custody must take into account the fact that the 
department does not post bail for such juveniles, and therefore 
bail in any amount will be more than the juvenile can pay and 
will result in pretrial detention.2  In his view, both judges who 
addressed the bail issue here -- the Juvenile Court judge in 
setting bail, and the Superior Court judge in denying the 
petition for bail review -- failed to do this and, as a result, 
violated his due process rights.  In the particular 
circumstances presented here, and in particular on the record 
before us, we disagree. 
 
 
In our recent decision in Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 
Mass. 691 (2017), we addressed the extent to which a judge 
                                                 
2 The juvenile states that the Department of Children and 
Families (department) does not post bail for juveniles in its 
custody.  Although the juvenile has not provided any definitive 
support for this assertion, he has provided certain information 
that suggests this to be true (and the Commonwealth does not 
specifically disagree).  At least for purposes of this appeal, 
we accept this to be true. 
3 
 
 
"must consider a criminal defendant's financial resources 
in setting bail, whether such a defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to an affordable bail, and the 
due process requirements that apply if the judge settles on 
a bail amount that is more than the defendant can pay, 
resulting in pretrial detention." 
 
Id. at 693.  We concluded that although a judge must consider a 
defendant's ability to pay, the judge "is not required to set 
bail in an amount the defendant can afford if other relevant 
considerations weigh more heavily than the defendant's ability 
to provide the necessary security for his appearance at trial."  
Id.  In short, a judge may, in certain circumstances, set a bail 
that a defendant will be unable to post. 
 
 
If the judge does so, "the judge must provide findings of 
fact and a statement of reasons for the bail decision, either in 
writing or orally on the record," that explain not only "how the 
bail amount was calculated" but also why, "notwithstanding the 
fact that the bail amount will likely result in the defendant's 
detention, the defendant's risk of flight is so great that no 
alternative, less restrictive financial or nonfinancial 
conditions will suffice to assure his or her presence at future 
court proceedings."  Id. at 707. 
 
 
In this case, when the Juvenile Court judge set bail at 
$50,000, the judge was, for all intents and purposes, issuing an 
order of detention, because the juvenile had no financial 
resources to post that amount of bail or, in fact, any amount of 
bail.  There is no question, following our decision in Brangan, 
that where a bail determination is likely to lead to pretrial 
detention, a judge making that determination must consider 
alternative nonfinancial conditions and must make findings in 
connection with the decision.  Those findings should demonstrate 
that a judge has engaged in fair and meaningful consideration of 
reasonable alternatives relevant to the circumstances of the 
case such that a reviewing court can be satisfied that the 
requirements detailed in Brangan have been met.  As we indicated 
in Brangan, the findings can be written or oral so long as there 
is adequate indication, on the record, that due consideration 
has been given to nonfinancial alternatives.3  This holds true 
                                                 
3 We reiterate here a point that we made in Brangan v. 
Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 707 n.19 (2017), regarding the use 
of the form captioned "Reasons for Ordering Bail, G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58."  The Juvenile Court form -- which lists several generic 
4 
 
regardless of whether the bail determination pertains to a 
juvenile or adult defendant. 
 
 
There also is no question that when a juvenile (or a 
defendant) petitions this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
seeking review of a bail determination (or for any other 
reason), it is the petitioner's burden to create a record 
substantiating his claim of error.  See, e.g., Gorod v. 
Tabachnick, 428 Mass. 1001, 1001, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 
(1998), and cases cited (petitioner's burden to create record 
showing substantial claim of violation of substantive right).  
In this case, such a record might have included details 
regarding the bail hearing in the Juvenile Court (in the form of 
a transcript, an affidavit from counsel, or some other reliable 
source) that would show, as the juvenile claims, that reasonable 
nonfinancial conditions were not discussed or considered by the 
judges below.  We do not have that.  All we have in the record 
before us (and all that was before the single justice) are the 
bail form completed by the Juvenile Court judge and the Superior 
Court judge's handwritten notation in the margin of the petition 
for bail review. 
 
 
Although the details that the judges set forth as to what 
informed their respective decisions are scant, those details are 
enough, in the circumstances, to demonstrate that there was no 
abuse of discretion in setting the juvenile's bail.  As is noted 
in the decisions, the juvenile was in default at the time of his 
arrest on the current charges; he had essentially fled from the 
department's custody and was a "runaway" at the time of his 
arrest; and, importantly, the Superior Court judge noted that 
there was no reasonable alternative to bail.  The judges, in 
other words, recognized the very issues with which the juvenile 
is (and we are) concerned.  We are satisfied that no due process 
violation has occurred in this instance. 
 
 
The juvenile also raises two additional issues regarding 
setting bail for a juvenile in the department's custody:  first, 
                                                                                                                                                             
categories of reasons for the bail that a judge may check off -- 
may be useful in making the required findings, but "we caution 
that further elaboration of the findings may be prudent where 
the bail is likely to result in long-term detention," as would 
generally be the case with juveniles in the custody of the 
department.  Id.  We also take this opportunity to suggest that 
the Juvenile Court consider revising the form to better reflect 
the need for the consideration of alternative nonfinancial 
conditions. 
5 
 
that doing so violates a juvenile's equal protection rights; and 
second, that doing so involves both executive and judicial 
branches of government and thus violates the separation of 
powers principles set forth in art. 30 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  As to the latter issue, the juvenile did 
not raise it before the single justice, and we therefore need 
not consider it.  See Carvalho v. Commonwealth, 460 Mass. 1014, 
1014 (2011), and cases cited. 
 
 
As to the former issue, regarding equal protection, we find 
no merit to the juvenile's assertions.  The juvenile argues that 
because the department does not post bail for juveniles in its 
custody (see note 2, supra), a juvenile so situated is being 
treated differently from a juvenile in the custody of a parent, 
who, the argument goes, may have the ability to post bail for 
the juvenile.  The argument misses the mark.  The basis of a 
juvenile's inability to post bail makes no difference.  A 
juvenile in the department's custody is no differently situated, 
for purposes of posting bail, from a juvenile whose parents 
cannot afford bail or, for that matter, an indigent adult 
defendant.  The juvenile is not, in short, as he suggests, being 
penalized for not having a family. 
 
 
Conclusion.  Where the bail determination was appropriately 
made and no violation of the juvenile's rights has been shown to 
have occurred, the single justice did not, on the basis of the 
record before him, err or abuse his discretion in denying the 
juvenile's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, seeking review of that 
determination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Melissa Allen Celli (Julianne Feliz-Kidd also present) for 
the juvenile. 
 
Stephen C. Nadeau, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Afton M. Templin, for Youth Advocacy Foundation of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief.