Case Title: Illinois v. Castleberry

Citation: 2015 IL 116916

Docket Number: 116916

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2015-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 IL 116916 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
(Docket No. 116916) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. STEVEN 
CASTLEBERRY, Appellant. 
 
 
Opinion filed November 19, 2015. 
 
 
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, and 
Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the “void sentence rule,” which 
states that “[a] sentence which does not conform to a statutory requirement is void” 
(People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995)), should be abandoned. For the reasons 
that follow, we conclude that recent decisions from this court have undermined the 
rationale behind the rule to the point that the rule can no longer be considered valid. 
We therefore abolish the rule. 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
The defendant, Steven Castleberry, was convicted in the circuit court of Cook 
County of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 
5/12-14(a)(8) (West 2008)), based on separate acts of oral and vaginal contact with 
the victim. At sentencing, the State argued that defendant was subject to a 
mandatory 15-year sentencing enhancement on each of the two counts because the 
crimes had been committed by defendant while he was armed with a firearm (see 
720 ILCS 5/12-14(d)(1) (West 2008)). When added to the mandatory minimum 
term of 6 years’ imprisonment for each offense, this meant, according to the State, 
that defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum term of 21 years’ 
imprisonment on each count. 
¶ 4 
 
The circuit court disagreed with the State regarding the application of the 
15-year enhancement, concluding that the legislature had intended the 
enhancement to be applied only once under the circumstances presented. The 
circuit court sentenced defendant to a 9-year term of imprisonment on each count, 
adding the 15-year enhancement to only one of the counts. The two sentences were 
ordered to run consecutively, for a total term of 33 years’ imprisonment. 
¶ 5 
 
Defendant appealed and raised two arguments. First, defendant maintained that 
his conviction should be reversed because of errors that occurred during jury 
selection and, second, defendant contended that the 15-year enhancement was 
unconstitutional and, therefore, should not have been applied by the circuit court at 
all. The appellate court rejected both these arguments. 2013 IL App (1st) 
111791-U. The court affirmed defendant’s convictions and held that “the circuit 
court did not err in applying the 15-year add-on to one of defendant’s convictions.” 
Id. ¶ 36. 
¶ 6 
 
However, the appellate court then went on to state that its analysis did “not end 
there.” Id. ¶ 37. Responding to an argument raised by the State, the appellate court 
held that the 15-year enhancement was a mandatory statutory requirement that had 
to be added to the sentence for each of the two counts on which defendant had been 
convicted. Id. ¶ 38. The court further held that, because the sentence which lacked 
the enhancement “did not conform to the statutory requirements,” it was “void.” Id. 
The court remanded the matter to the circuit court for resentencing.  
¶ 7 
 
Defendant subsequently filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court which 
we allowed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). 
 
 
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¶ 8 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 9 
 
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the appellate court’s affirmance of his 
convictions. Instead, defendant’s sole contention is that the appellate court erred 
when it held that the sentence imposed without the statutory enhancement was 
void. Defendant maintains that the rule relied upon by the appellate court—that a 
sentence which does not conform to statutory requirements is void—is no longer 
valid in light of recent decisions from this court and, thus, could not provide a basis 
for the appellate court to reverse the circuit court’s sentencing order. 
¶ 10 
 
In addition, defendant contends that in the absence of the void sentence rule, the 
appellate court had no authority to consider the State’s request to increase his 
sentence. Instead, according to defendant, the State must seek a writ of mandamus 
from this court if it wishes to challenge the error committed by the circuit court: to 
date, the State has not done so. Accordingly, defendant argues that the judgment of 
the appellate court must be reversed. 
¶ 11 
 
To fully understand defendant’s argument regarding the void sentence rule 
some background information is required. This court has explained that “[w]hether 
a judgment is void or voidable presents a question of jurisdiction.” People v. Davis, 
156 Ill. 2d 149, 155 (1993). “Jurisdiction is a fundamental prerequisite to a valid 
prosecution and conviction. Where jurisdiction is lacking, any resulting judgment 
rendered is void and may be attacked either directly or indirectly at any time.” Id. A 
voidable judgment, in contrast, “is one entered erroneously by a court having 
jurisdiction and is not subject to collateral attack.” Id. at 155-56. 
¶ 12 
 
Jurisdiction is most commonly understood as consisting of two elements: 
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 
414 (2009). Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power “ ‘to hear and 
determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.’ ” 
Id. at 415 (quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 
Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002)). Personal jurisdiction refers to the court’s power “ ‘to bring 
a person into its adjudicative process.’ ” Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 870 
(8th ed. 2004)). 
¶ 13 
 
However, our cases have at times also held “that the power to render the 
particular judgment or sentence is as important an element of jurisdiction as is 
personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.” Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 156. 
Based on this idea, the rule has developed which holds that a circuit court which 
 
 
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violates a particular statutory requirement when imposing a sentence acts without 
“inherent authority” or “inherent power.” And, because the court has acted without 
power, it has acted without jurisdiction, thereby rendering the sentence void. Thus, 
the void sentence rule is stated: “A sentence which does not conform to a statutory 
requirement is void.” Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113. 
¶ 14 
 
Defendant argues, however, that other decisions from this court, in particular 
Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514 (2001), have concluded that the 
“inherent power” idea of jurisdiction is at odds with the grant of jurisdiction given 
to the circuit courts under our state constitution and, thus, is invalid. These 
decisions, defendant contends, have therefore undermined the rationale behind the 
void sentence rule to the point that it can no longer stand. 
¶ 15 
 
The most recent of our decisions addressing the scope of the circuit courts’ 
jurisdiction and the meaning of Steinbrecher is LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 
IL 116129. Because of its relevance, we quote this decision at length: 
 
“Steinbrecher noted that a 1964 constitutional amendment significantly 
altered the basis of circuit court jurisdiction, granting circuit courts ‘original 
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, and such powers of review of 
administrative action as may be provided by law.’ Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI 
(amended 1964), § 9. The current Illinois Constitution, adopted in 1970, 
retained this amendment and provides that ‘Circuit Courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters’ and that ‘Circuit Courts shall have such 
power to review administrative action as provided by law.’ Ill. Const. 1970, art. 
VI, § 9. Steinbrecher reasoned that, because circuit court jurisdiction is granted 
by the constitution, it cannot be the case that the failure to satisfy a certain 
statutory requirement or prerequisite can deprive the circuit court of its ‘power’ 
or jurisdiction to hear a cause of action. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 529-32. 
 
In so holding, Steinbrecher emphasized the difference between an 
administrative agency and a circuit court. An administrative agency, 
Steinbrecher observed, is a purely statutory creature and is powerless to act 
unless statutory authority exists. Id. at 530 (citing City of Chicago v. Fair 
Employment Practices Comm’n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1976)). A circuit court, on 
the other hand, ‘is a court of general jurisdiction, which need not look to the 
statute for its jurisdictional authority.’ Id. Thus, Steinbrecher concluded that the 
 
 
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‘ “inherent power” requirement applies to courts of limited jurisdiction and 
administrative agencies’ but not to circuit courts. Id. 
 
As Steinbrecher makes clear, following the 1964 constitutional amendment 
and the adoption of the 1970 Constitution, whether a judgment is void in a civil 
lawsuit that does not involve an administrative tribunal or administrative 
review depends solely on whether the circuit court which entered the 
challenged judgment possessed jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 
matter. ‘Inherent power’ as a separate or third type of jurisdiction applies only 
to courts of limited jurisdiction or in administrative matters. It has no place in 
civil actions in the circuit courts, since these courts are granted general 
jurisdictional authority by the constitution.  
 
Steinbrecher was reaffirmed in Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor 
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335-37 (2002). In Belleville Toyota, this 
court addressed the meaning of subject matter jurisdiction, specifically, 
whether the failure to comply with a statutory requirement or prerequisite can 
deprive a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 337-38. See, e.g., 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11 cmt. e (1982) (discussing the 
tendency in procedural law to treat various kinds of serious procedural errors as 
defects in subject matter jurisdiction). 
 
As in Steinbrecher, Belleville Toyota began its analysis by noting the 1964 
constitutional amendment and its incorporation into the 1970 Constitution. 
Belleville Toyota concluded that these constitutional amendments ‘radically 
changed the legislature’s role in determining the jurisdiction of the circuit 
court.’ Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 337. And again, as in Steinbrecher, 
Belleville Toyota reasoned that a statutory requirement or prerequisite cannot 
be jurisdictional, since jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit courts by our state 
constitution. As Belleville Toyota noted, while it might have been appropriate 
prior to 1964 to state that the failure to conform to certain ‘statutory 
requirements prevented the court from acquiring subject matter jurisdiction,’ 
today that proposition ‘is confined to the area of administrative review—the 
only area in which the legislature still determines the extent of the 
circuit court’s jurisdiction.’ Id. at 338. 
 
Belleville Toyota thus held that ‘[w]ith the exception of the circuit court’s 
power to review administrative actions, which is conferred by statute, a circuit 
 
 
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court’s subject matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by our state 
constitution.’ Id. at 334. Subject matter jurisdiction ‘refers to the power of a 
court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding 
in question belongs’ (id.), and this jurisdiction extends to all ‘ “justiciable 
matters” ’ (id. (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9)). To invoke the circuit 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a party need only present a justiciable 
matter, i.e., ‘a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is 
definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.’ Id. at 335. 
 
In defining the meaning of subject matter jurisdiction, Belleville 
Toyota also rejected the idea of nonwaivable ‘conditions precedent’ to the 
exercise of circuit court jurisdiction. The court explained: 
 
‘Some case law, however, suggests that the legislature, in defining a 
justiciable matter, may impose “conditions precedent” to the court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction that cannot be waived. [Citations.] We necessarily 
reject this view because it is contrary to article VI [of the Illinois 
Constitution of 1970]. Characterizing the requirements of a statutory cause 
of action as nonwaivable conditions precedent to a court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction is merely another way of saying that the circuit court may only 
exercise that jurisdiction which the legislature allows. We reiterate, 
however, that the jurisdiction of the circuit court is conferred by the 
constitution, not the legislature. Only in the area of administrative review is 
the court’s power to adjudicate controlled by the legislature.’ Id. at 335-36. 
 
Accordingly, while the legislature can create new justiciable matters by 
enacting legislation that creates rights and duties, the failure to comply with a 
statutory requirement or prerequisite does not negate the circuit court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction or constitute a nonwaivable condition precedent to the 
circuit court’s jurisdiction. Id. See also, e.g., In re Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d 295, 
300-02 (2010); People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541, 
552-54 (2003). 
 
While its holding regarding the circuit courts’ jurisdiction rested on a 
constitutional basis, Belleville Toyota also stressed that it was consistent with 
the policy of preserving the finality of judgments. Under Illinois law, a party 
may challenge a judgment as being void at any time, either directly or 
 
 
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collaterally, and the challenge is not subject to forfeiture or other procedural 
restraints. See, e.g., Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 104 (an allegation of voidness 
substitutes and negates the need to allege a meritorious defense and due 
diligence under section 2-1401). Void judgments thus occupy a unique place in 
our legal system: to say that a judgment is void or, in other words, that it was 
entered without jurisdiction, is to say that the judgment may be challenged in 
perpetuity. For this reason, as Belleville Toyota observed, ‘[l]abeling the 
requirements contained in statutory causes of action ‘jurisdictional’ would 
permit an unwarranted and dangerous expansion of the situations where a final 
judgment may be set aside on a collateral attack.’ Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d 
at 341. Accordingly, only the most fundamental defects, i.e., a lack of personal 
jurisdiction or lack of subject matter jurisdiction as defined in Belleville Toyota 
warrant declaring a judgment void.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶¶ 30-38. 
¶ 16 
 
Defendant acknowledges that Steinbrecher expressly limited its holding to civil 
cases and determined that criminal proceedings raised “a separate set of concerns.” 
Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 532. Nevertheless, defendant maintains that the logic 
employed in decisions such as Steinbrecher, Belleville Toyota and LVNV cannot be 
limited solely to civil cases and that whether a circuit court complies with a 
statutory sentencing requirement in a criminal proceeding is irrelevant to the 
question of jurisdiction. 
¶ 17 
 
The State, in response, does not challenge defendant’s reasoning. The State 
fully embraces defendant’s contention that the void sentence rule can no longer be 
considered valid. We agree as well.  
¶ 18 
 
As both parties note, in granting jurisdiction over “all justiciable matters,” the 
Illinois Constitution does not distinguish between civil and criminal cases. Rather, 
the constitution explicitly excludes only one category of cases—a circuit court’s 
review of administrative actions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. Perpetuating the 
“inherent power” notion of jurisdiction cannot be reconciled with the constitution 
and is squarely at odds with the reasoning in Steinbrecher, Belleville Toyota and 
LVNV. Further, Steinbrecher did not identify the “separate set of concerns” that 
would justify continuing the “inherent power” idea of jurisdiction in the criminal 
context, further undermining the persuasiveness of retaining the void sentencing 
rule. See, e.g., Kristopher N. Classen & Jack O’Malley, Filling the Void: The Case 
for Repudiating and Replacing Illinois’ Void Sentence Rule, 42 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 
427, 453 (2011). 
 
 
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¶ 19 
  
The doctrine of stare decisis expresses the policy of courts to adhere to 
precedent and settled points of law “so that the law will not change erratically, but 
will develop in a principled, intelligible fashion.” People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 
145-46 (2007). The doctrine is not an inexorable command, however, and where 
good cause or compelling reasons justify departing from precedent we will do so. 
That standard is met here. Because “a circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction, 
which need not look to the statute for its jurisdictional authority” (Steinbrecher, 
197 Ill. 2d at 530), the void sentence rule is constitutionally unsound. Accordingly, 
the void sentencing rule is hereby abolished. 
¶ 20 
 
The State contends, however, that even if the void sentencing rule did not 
provide a basis for the appellate court’s decision, there was nothing improper about 
the appellate court increasing defendant’s sentence at the request of the State. We 
disagree. 
¶ 21 
 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a) sets forth with specificity those instances 
where the State may appeal in a criminal case. The rule does not permit the State to 
appeal a sentencing order. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a) (eff. July 1, 2006). See, e.g., People 
v. Davilla, 236 Ill. App. 3d 367, 389 (1992); People v. Hatfield, 257 Ill. App. 3d 
707, 711 (1994); People v. Williams, 131 Ill. App. 3d 597, 612 (1985). And, 
because the rule does not authorize the appeal of sentencing orders, it follows that 
the State could not have cross-appealed in the appellate court on this issue, “since a 
reviewing court acquires no greater jurisdiction on cross-appeal than it could on 
appeal.” People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194, 200 (1995). 
¶ 22 
 
The State argues, however, that it did not file either an appeal or a cross-appeal 
in the appellate court but “simply responded to a claim raised by defendant 
attacking his sentence as unauthorized” and the appellate court could, therefore, 
properly address its argument. This is incorrect. As the appellee in the appellate 
court, the State could, without filing a cross-appeal, raise any argument of record in 
support of the circuit court’s judgment. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 129 
(2003); United States v. American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924). 
However, an appellee who does not cross-appeal may not “attack the decree with a 
view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his 
adversary.” Id.  
¶ 23 
 
The State’s argument in the appellate court that the 15-year enhancement 
should be applied to defendant’s sentence was not brought to sustain the judgment 
 
 
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of the circuit court. It was, instead, a new and different issue brought with a view to 
“lessening the rights” of defendant. The State’s argument was a de facto 
cross-appeal challenging defendant’s sentence and, as such, was impermissible. 
See, e.g., People v. Newlin, 2014 IL App (5th) 120518, ¶ 31 (“What the State is 
essentially trying to do in the instant case is to piggyback an appeal on defendant’s 
appeal. We can find no authority for such practice ***.”); People v. Kent, 40 Ill. 
App. 3d 256, 265 (1976); see also Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 138-41. 
¶ 24 
 
The State also maintains that the appellate court had the authority, under Rule 
615(b)(1), to “reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from which the 
appeal is taken” (Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(1)), and, on this basis, could increase 
defendant’s sentence. But the authority granted under Rule 615(b) is limited to 
“reduc[ing] the punishment imposed by the trial court” (Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(4)), 
and the rule thus cannot be read as granting a plenary power to the appellate court to 
increase criminal sentences. Indeed, the void sentence rule rests on the assumption 
that Rule 615(b) does not permit a reviewing court to increase a criminal sentence; 
otherwise there would be no need for a reviewing court to resort to the notion of 
voidness. See Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113 (noting that our rules limit the State’s right to 
appeal and “prohibit the appellate court from increasing a defendant’s sentence on 
review”).  
¶ 25 
 
The State also points to People v. Scott, 69 Ill. 2d 85 (1977), as offering support 
for the appellate court’s decision to increase defendant’s sentence. Scott, however, 
holds only that where an unsentenced conviction is before a reviewing court as part 
of an appeal brought by a defendant, the court may remand the matter to the circuit 
court for sentencing on the conviction in order to “complete the circuit court’s order 
and render the judgment final.” Id. at 89. That situation is not present here and Scott 
does not stand for the broader notion that the appellate court may increase any 
criminal sentence at the request of the State. The appellate court, therefore, had no 
authority in this case to vacate the circuit court’s sentencing order in response to the 
State’s argument. 
¶ 26 
 
Although the appellate court may not, under our rules, address a request by the 
State to increase a criminal sentence which is illegally low, the State may, in 
appropriate circumstances, seek relief from this court via the writ of mandamus. In 
general, mandamus is an “ ‘extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of right, 
“the performance of official duties by a public officer where no exercise of 
discretion on his part is involved.” [Citation.]’ ” Cordrey v. Prisoner Review 
 
 
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Board, 2014 IL 117155, ¶ 18 (quoting Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 
(1999)). Only issues of law are considered in actions for mandamus; if factual 
questions are present, mandamus will not lie. Id. Further, mandamus is improper if 
it substitutes the court’s discretion or judgment for that of the official. Id. 
¶ 27 
 
The remedy of mandamus therefore permits the State to challenge criminal 
sentencing orders where it is alleged that the circuit court violated a mandatory 
sentencing requirement, but precludes the State from challenging ordinary, 
discretionary sentencing decisions. Further, the State is not barred from seeking 
mandamus relief even if the defendant’s case is pending on direct appeal. See 
People ex rel. Daley v. Strayhorn, 119 Ill. 2d 331, 336 (1988); see also People 
ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 191 (2009). In this case, the State has not 
moved for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus in this court. Nothing in this 
opinion should be read as preventing the State from filing such a request.  
¶ 28 
 
Finally, we note that the suggestion has been made that the issue of appealing 
criminal sentencing orders should be addressed by amending our rules. See, e.g., 
Classen & O’Malley, supra at 465-68. Typically, rule amendments begin in our 
Rules Committee under the procedures set forth in Rule 3 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 3 (eff. Mar. 
22, 2010)). These procedures are intended, among other things, “to provide an 
opportunity for comments and suggestions by the public, the bench, and the bar; 
[and] to aid the Supreme Court in discharging its rulemaking responsibilities.” Ill. 
S. Ct. R. 3(a)(1). We retain the prerogative, however, of departing from the 
procedures of the rule (Ill. S. Ct. R. 3(a)(2)), and there have been occasions when 
this court has amended a rule in the course of deciding a case on appeal. See, e.g., In 
re Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d 29, 46 (1988). 
¶ 29 
 
In this case, however, neither of the parties to the appeal have argued for a rule 
change. In the absence of briefing from the parties, or a full exploration of the 
issues associated with any amendment, we decline to amend our rules at this time. 
We reserve judgment on the matter should any amendment be proposed in the 
future. 
 
¶ 30 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 31 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed. The 
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
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¶ 32 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed. 
¶ 33 
 
Circuit court judgment affirmed.