Case Title: Anderson v. WBNS-TV, Inc.

Citation: 2019-Ohio-5196

Docket Number: 2018-0792

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Anderson v. WBNS-TV, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-5196.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-5196 
ANDERSON ET AL., APPELLEES, v. WBNS-TV, INC., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Anderson v. WBNS-TV, Inc., Slip Opinion No.  
2019-Ohio-5196.] 
Defamation—Court of appeals applied incorrect standard in determining whether 
fault element of defamation claim had been met—Court of appeals’ 
judgment vacated and cause remanded. 
(No. 2018-0792—Submitted April 24, 2019—Decided December 18, 2019.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 17AP-660, 2018-Ohio-761. 
__________________ 
DONNELLY, J. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 1} The Columbus Police Department sent an information sheet to 
appellant, WBNS-TV, Inc. (“WBNS”), among other media outlets, on January 20, 
 
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2016.  The information sheet described the robbery of a hoverboard from an eight-
year-old child that took place in the parking lot of a waterpark on November 26, 
2015, and stated that “suspects * * * put a gun to the eight-year-old’s head and 
demanded the hoverboard.”  The information sheet also asked for help identifying 
the people in an accompanying photograph “who may have been involved” in the 
robbery.  That photograph depicted siblings Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron Anderson, 
and it had been taken by a surveillance camera as they entered the waterpark. 
{¶ 2} WBNS used the information sheet to prepare a segment that aired 
during the 5:00 a.m. broadcast on January 21, 2016.  During the segment, WBNS 
employees showed the picture of Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron, while stating: a “girl 
was riding her hoverboard when robbers went up to her, put a gun to her head and 
took it.  Columbus Police say suspects—seen here—took off in a PT cruiser.”  
During the 6:00 a.m. broadcast that same day, while showing the same picture, 
WBNS employees stated, “Columbus Police hope you recognize these two men 
who robbed an 8-year-old girl at gunpoint!”  On the WBNS website, 
www.10tv.com, the picture of Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron was published with the 
accompanying text, “The suspects put a gun to the 8-year-old girl’s head * * *.” 
{¶ 3} When Nanita Williams (the mother of Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron) 
saw the early morning broadcast on January 21, 2016, she began screaming and 
crying, which woke her family.  Williams and her children went to the police 
station, and after approximately four hours of questioning, the police determined 
that Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron had not been involved in the crime.  Shortly 
thereafter, the Columbus Police Department released a statement that the people in 
the photograph had spoken to detectives, and after further investigation, the police 
had determined that they had not been involved in the robbery.  Upon receiving this 
statement, WBNS employees removed the picture from its website.  WBNS 
employees did not subsequently refer to the picture of Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron. 
 
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{¶ 4} Appellees, Aaron, Aaronana, Willie Anderson, and Williams, 
(collectively, “the Andersons”),1 filed a complaint against WBNS asserting, among 
other claims, a claim for defamation.  WBNS moved for and was granted summary 
judgment on all counts. The trial court held that the Andersons could not prove an 
essential element, fault, of their defamation claim, see Jackson v. Columbus, 117 
Ohio St.3d 328, 2008-Ohio-1041, 883 N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 9 (setting forth the elements 
of a defamation claim). 
{¶ 5} The Andersons appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred in 
granting WBNS summary judgment on the defamation claim.  The court of appeals 
reversed the trial court’s judgment on that claim, stating, “There is no question that 
WBNS defamed some of the Andersons.”  2018-Ohio-761, ¶ 8.  The court framed 
the issue before it as whether “broadcasting an accusation that the Andersons were 
robbers without investigation by WBNS and based on a set of police documents 
which claimed only that some of the Andersons were suspects is sufficient proof of 
a violation of a duty of care to allow the lawsuit to survive a motion for summary 
judgment.”  Id. at ¶ 11.  The court concluded that the lawsuit should survive 
summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact existed, and it 
remanded the cause to the trial court.  Id. at ¶ 11, 16.  See Civ.R. 56(C) (setting 
forth the summary-judgment standard). 
{¶ 6} We accepted WBNS’s discretionary appeal.  153 Ohio St.3d 1461, 
2018-Ohio-3258, 104 N.E.3d 791. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 7} Attempting to attain the proper balance between protecting the 
freedom of speech guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions and 
                                                          
 
1. Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron Anderson are the three people allegedly defamed by WBNS.  
Appellees in this case are Aaron, Aaronana, and Willie Anderson (the father of Aaron, Aaronana, 
and Arron Anderson), individually and as guardian of Arron, and Nanita Williams (the mother of 
Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron Anderson), individually and as guardian of Arron). 
 
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protecting citizens from injury to their reputations is fraught with difficulty.  This 
court and the Supreme Court of the United States have grappled with the issue for 
years.  See, e.g., Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 
512 N.E.2d 979 (1987) (plurality opinion); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). 
{¶ 8} In Ohio, in a case involving a private person who was allegedly 
defamed in a statement about a matter of public concern, the plaintiff “has the 
burden of proving both that the statement was false and [that] the defendant was at 
least negligent in publishing it.”  Dale v. Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Assn., 57 Ohio 
St.3d 112, 114, 567 N.E.2d 253 (1991), citing Lansdowne.  Moreover, the 
negligence must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.  Lansdowne at 180 
(Lansdowne was not a majority opinion; a year after it was decided, a majority of 
the court acknowledged that the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard set forth 
in Lansdowne was the appropriate standard of proof, Oney v. Allen, 39 Ohio St.3d 
103, 106, 529 N.E.2d 471 (1988), fn. 2). 
{¶ 9} A defamation claim against a news organization requires proof that 
(1) the organization made a false statement, (2) the statement was defamatory, (3) 
the organization published the statement, (4) the plaintiff was harmed as a 
proximate result of the publication, and (5) the organization acted with the requisite 
degree of fault in publishing the statement.  Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, Inc., 133 
Ohio St.3d 366, 2012-Ohio-4193, 978 N.E.2d 832, ¶ 77.  For purposes of its motion 
for summary judgment, WBNS assumed that the Andersons could satisfy all the 
elements of a defamation claim with the exception of the fault element.  That is, 
WBNS argued in its motion for summary judgment only that the Andersons could 
not prove that WBNS acted with the requisite degree of fault in publishing the 
statements. 
{¶ 10} It follows that in its opinion granting summary judgment to WBNS, 
the trial court focused its analysis on the fault element.  In considering WBNS’s 
 
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5
argument that the Andersons could not prove that WBNS impermissibly altered the 
information that the police had supplied, the trial court summarized the facts and 
said that “[w]ithin this complete context, the Court cannot conclude that a 
reasonable reader or viewer would interpret the stories as defamatory.”  But shortly 
before that statement, the trial court said that its “analysis [was] limited to the fault 
prong in this case.”  The trial court’s statement regarding WBNS’s allegedly 
defamatory statements was, at best, dictum, which is not binding on this or any 
other court, see State ex rel. Gordon v. Barthalow, 150 Ohio St. 499, 505-506, 83 
N.E.2d 393 (1948). 
{¶ 11} On appeal, both parties focused their arguments on the trial court’s 
fault-element determination.  Before the court of appeals purported to apply the 
fault standard that this court announced in Lansdowne, 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 512 
N.E.2d 979, it said:  
 
There is no question that WBNS defamed some of the Andersons.  
It accused members of the family of being armed robbers.  * * * 
[M]erely publishing a false, defamatory statement is sufficient to 
establish a traditional defamation claim.  Common law malice is 
established by the mere publication of false, defamatory material.  
The fact that WBNS failed to distribute a retraction supports the 
common law presumption of malice applicable in such situations. 
 
2018-Ohio-761, ¶ 8.  Because WBNS focused its summary-judgment argument on 
the fault element, the trial court confined its decision to that element, and the parties 
confined their arguments on appeal to the fault element.  The defamatory-statement 
element of the defamation claim (i.e., whether the publications were defamatory) 
was not before the court of appeals, and that court’s expression regarding WBNS’s 
alleged defamation of Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron Anderson was not essential to 
 
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its fault-element determination.  The court’s statement regarding WBNS’s 
allegedly defamatory publications was dictum and, therefore, is not the law of the 
case. 
{¶ 12} This appeal stems from WBNS’s motion for summary judgment 
based on only the fault element of the Andersons’ defamation claim and the court 
of appeals’ review of that decision.  The question before the court of appeals was 
whether the trial court erred in holding that the Andersons could not prove the fault 
element of their defamation claim.  The issue whether the publications were 
defamatory was not before the court. 
{¶ 13} Although the court of appeals correctly stated the appropriate 
standard as set forth in Lansdowne, it ultimately applied a different standard.  
Actually, the court erred in two ways.  It stated that “merely publishing a false, 
defamatory statement is sufficient to establish a traditional defamation claim,” 
2018-Ohio-761 at ¶ 8.  This statement is plainly contrary to Lansdowne, which 
requires a showing of negligence.  The court of appeals also erroneously stated that 
“a media outlet has a stronger duty to research the facts in such cases than it did 
when the Lansdowne case was decided.”  2018-Ohio-761 at ¶ 11.  The court did not 
cite any authority for this new standard or explain what constitutes compliance with 
the “stronger duty.” 
{¶ 14} We agree with WBNS that the standard set forth in Lansdowne, 32 
Ohio St.3d 176, 512 N.E.2d 979, is the appropriate standard to apply in this case.  
We also agree that Lansdowne requires the Andersons to present clear and 
convincing evidence that WBNS acted negligently in publishing defamatory 
statements about Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron.  And we agree that although the 
court of appeals correctly set forth the Lansdowne standard, it did not apply it.  
Thus, we vacate the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the cause to the court 
of appeals for it to again consider whether the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment to WBNS on the Andersons’ defamation claim.  On remand, the court of 
 
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7
appeals is instructed to apply the standard set forth in Lansdowne.  We express no 
opinion on the merits of this case; we remand the cause solely to allow the court of 
appeals to apply the appropriate standard. 
{¶ 15} Because we adopt WBNS’s first proposition of law and remand the 
cause to the court of appeals, we decline to address its other propositions of law. 
Judgment vacated 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 16} I did not vote to accept this case, 153 Ohio St.3d 1461, 2018-Ohio-
3258, 104 N.E.3d 791, because I did not believe that it presented a significant 
constitutional question or an issue of public or great general interest, see Ohio 
Constitution, Article IV, Section 2(B)(2)(a)(ii) and (e); S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.02(A).  In 
my view, the case simply involved the application of settled standards and thus 
called for (at most) error correction.  Now that I have had the opportunity to review 
the record with the benefit of full briefing, that conclusion seems all the more clear. 
{¶ 17} But as the case is now before us, I concur in the majority’s decision 
to vacate the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals on the fault element 
of the Andersons’ defamation claim against WBNS-TV (“WBNS”), and to remand 
the case to ensure that the court applies the standard announced in Lansdowne v. 
Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 512 N.E.2d 979 (1987).  The 
court of appeals may well have intended to apply that standard the first time around, 
but unfortunately, its gratuitous commentary obscures its analysis.  Vacating the 
judgment and remanding the case will ensure that the appropriate standard is 
 
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applied in this case and prevent the now-vacated decision from causing confusion 
for future litigants. 
{¶ 18} I would go further than the majority, however, and also resolve 
WBNS’s fifth proposition of law by expressly vacating the Tenth District’s 
apparent holding that WBNS’s publications were defamatory, 2018-Ohio-761, ¶ 8.  
Doing so would address the dissenting justice’s concern that the court of appeals’ 
statement on that point might be treated as the law of the case.  And it is appropriate 
to vacate that portion of the Tenth District’s decision because the issue whether the 
publications were defamatory was not before the court on appeal. 
{¶ 19} WBNS moved for summary judgment based solely on the fault 
element of the Andersons’ defamation claim,2 and consequently, the Andersons 
were never put to their burden of proof on the question whether the publications 
were defamatory.  Thus, the only question before the trial court in the summary-
judgment phase was whether WBNS acted negligently.  While the trial court’s 
analysis is somewhat muddled, I am reluctant to read it as having decided the 
defamatory element outright, particularly when the court explicitly expressed that 
its decision was confined to the fault element.  Franklin C.P. No. 16CV-9809 (Aug. 
21, 2017) (noting that “WBNS focuse[d] its argument solely on the fault prong” 
and concluding that the “plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of establishing a 
genuine issue of material fact as to WBNS’ negligence”). 
{¶ 20} WBNS makes this very point in its brief to this court.  It complains 
that even though its motion for summary judgment had “assumed arguendo that 
other elements of a defamation claim were met and focused solely on the element 
of fault,” the Tenth District “proceeded to adjudicate other elements” of the 
                                                          
 
2. Indeed, in its reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, WBNS expressly 
disclaimed any basis for the court to decide whether the publications were defamatory: WBNS 
reiterated that its motion was “based solely on the fourth element of a defamation claim” and thus 
asserted that an argument made by the Andersons seemingly addressing the defamatory element had 
“no bearing on the Motion.”  
 
January Term, 2019 
 
9
defamation claim.  On this procedural posture, I agree that it was improper for the 
Tenth District to comment that “[t]here is no question that WBNS defamed some 
of the Andersons,” 2018-Ohio-761 at ¶ 8.  Likewise, I do not think it is appropriate 
for us to decide that question in the first instance. 
{¶ 21} I would therefore also vacate the finding of the Tenth District Court 
of Appeals as it relates to the defamatory element.  I otherwise concur with the 
majority’s decision vacating the Tenth District’s judgment on the question of fault 
and remanding the case for the court to apply the standard enunciated in 
Lansdowne, 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 512 N.E.2d 979, in its review of that issue. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 22} In this case, we have a holding by the trial court that as a matter of 
law the publications are not defamatory, an appellate-court decision overruling that 
holding, and a proposition of law calling on this court to address that determination.  
But the majority avoids issuing a dispositive decision by focusing on a nonissue—
the appellate court’s supposed tinkering with the standard of fault in defamation 
cases.  However, the Tenth District Court of Appeals did nothing to alter 
defamation law in this state—the “stronger duty” language in the appellate court’s 
decision, 2018-Ohio-761, ¶ 11, is an expression of opinion separate and apart from 
the legal analysis in the appellate decision and is therefore obiter dictum.  The 
majority sends this case back to the appellate court for it to apply the fault standard 
for private-figure defamation established in Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal 
Publishing Co., 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 512 N.E.2d 979 (1987) (plurality opinion).3  
Lansdowne provides the standard for proving fault in a case involving a private-
figure plaintiff and a news-media defendant: “the plaintiff must prove by clear and 
                                                          
 
3. Although Lansdowne is a plurality opinion, the standard set forth in the case was acknowledged 
as the correct standard by a majority of the court in Dale v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn., 57 Ohio 
St.3d 112, 114, 567 N.E.2d 253 (1991). 
 
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convincing evidence that the defendant failed to act reasonably in attempting to 
discover the truth or falsity or defamatory character of the publication.”  Id. at 180.  
But the appellate court has already applied that standard; it held that there is a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether appellant, WBNS-TV, Inc. (“WBNS”), violated 
its duty of care in publishing what the appellate court held was defamatory material.  
2018-Ohio-761 at ¶ 8, 11. 
{¶ 23} By remanding this case to the appellate court for a second 
application of Lansdowne, the majority ignores the threshold question whether the 
material is defamatory.  The trial court granted summary judgment to WBNS on 
the defamation claim because it held that the Andersons had failed to sustain their 
burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to WBNS’s negligence—
the trial court determined that the publications at issue lacked a defamatory 
character.  The court of appeals, on the other hand, declared the publications 
defamatory before moving on to apply the Lansdowne test.  This leaves as the law 
of the case the appellate court’s determination that the publications at issue are 
defamatory.  See Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984) (“the 
decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal 
questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and 
reviewing levels”). 
{¶ 24} But the majority—in its concentrated effort not to resolve this case—
simply wishes away the law-of-the-case problem by declaring without analysis that 
any holdings regarding the defamatory character of the publications by the lower 
courts are dicta.  The majority thereby treats what is substantive as dictum and what 
is dictum as substantive.  It illogically holds that anything that touches on the 
defamatory nature of the publications in this case is dictum while simultaneously 
elevating that which is truly dictum—the appellate court’s after-the-holding 
pontification about the role of media in a digital society—to the level of something 
substantive.  It does all of this only to arrive at its hollow holding remanding the 
 
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case to the appellate court for its reapplication of the Lansdowne standard.  In so 
doing, the majority is able to wash its hands of a messy case, achieving nothing 
other than causing further delay in resolving the matter and additional expense for 
the litigants. 
{¶ 25} What this court should do first is determine whether the appellate 
court’s determination that the publications are defamatory is correct.  And only if 
this court determines that that determination is correct should this court go on to 
determine whether the appellate court’s application of the fault standard established 
in Lansdowne to the facts of this case is correct.  If there is no defamatory content 
in the publications, there is no reason to employ the Lansdowne test. 
{¶ 26} Applying the standard established in Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, 
Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 366, 2012-Ohio-4193, 978 N.E.2d 832, ¶ 79, for determining 
whether a statement is defamatory—in other words, reviewing the totality of the 
circumstances and evaluating the allegedly defamatory statements in the context of 
the entire publication in which they appeared to determine whether a reasonable 
person would interpret them to be defamatory—I would hold that the statements at 
issue are not defamatory.  That is, construing the publications from the perspective 
of a person viewing a “crime-stoppers” report stating that the Columbus Police 
Department (“CPD”) was seeking information from the community to solve an 
armed-robbery case, a reasonable viewer would not interpret the publications as 
defamatory.  Therefore, I would reverse the appellate court’s judgment and reinstate 
the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to WBNS.  Because the majority 
does otherwise, I dissent. 
We Should Decide this Case on the Merits 
{¶ 27} Because there is a potentially dispositive issue that lies before us—
whether the publications are defamatory—we should decide that issue.  The trial 
court’s and appellate court’s determinations on that issue were not dicta; instead, 
they were essential to their holdings in each instance.  Further, despite the 
 
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majority’s contention, there is no reason to remand this case to the appellate court—
it has already applied the standard the majority believes it should apply.  As set 
forth below, the statements the majority identifies as problematic in the court of 
appeals’ decision regarding the fault standard are obiter dicta, as they address an 
issue not in play in the appeal.  Moreover, the appellate court clarified in its 
rejection of an application for an en banc hearing that it was establishing no new 
standard in its decision.  Finally, a remand to the appellate court will result in a 
waste of judicial resources and unnecessary expenses to the parties. 
The trial court’s determination that the publications 
were not defamatory is not dictum 
{¶ 28} The trial court’s holding that the publications in this case were not 
defamatory is the central determination around which this case revolves.  That 
holding was not dictum—“[a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial 
opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case * * *,” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1240 (10th Ed.2014).  The trial court’s holding was dispositive, and the 
appellate court’s judgment overruling the trial court on that issue should be the 
focus of this court’s review. 
{¶ 29} The majority’s declaration that the holdings of the trial court and 
appellate court are dicta ignores what happened in this case.  Members of the 
Anderson family4 allege that WBNS defamed them in broadcast and Internet 
reports regarding the robbery of a hoverboard from a young girl; WBNS based its 
reports on information provided by the CPD in an e-mail containing a Media 
Information Sheet and accompanying photographs, and WBNS’s reports included 
a CPD-provided picture of three Anderson family members near the scene of the 
                                                          
 
4. Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron Anderson are the three people allegedly defamed by WBNS.  
Appellees in this case are Aaron, Aaronana, and Willie Anderson (the father of Aaron, Aaronana, 
and Arron Anderson), individually and as guardian of Arron, and Nanita Williams (the mother of 
Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron Anderson), individually and as guardian of Arron (collectively, “the 
Andersons”). 
 
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13 
crime.  A central issue before the trial court was whether WBNS negligently altered 
the information provided by the CPD and thereby defamed the three Andersons.  
Examining the publications and recognizing that under Am. Chem. Soc., 133 Ohio 
St.3d 366, 2012-Ohio-4193, 978 N.E.2d 832,  the words at issue in the publications 
could not be read in isolation, the trial court viewed the alterations in context to 
determine whether the material published by WBNS was defamatory.  Thereafter, 
the most essential holding of the trial court was that the alteration of the word 
“suspects” in the CPD-provided media information to “robbers” in WBNS’s reports 
did not make the publications defamatory and therefore the Andersons failed to 
meet their burden of demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact existed on 
the issue of fault. 
{¶ 30} The trial court’s determination that the publications at issue here 
were not defamatory was not an off-the-cuff musing  or some gratuitous expression 
made without any legal analysis or consideration of the consequences.  The 
determination was not superfluous to the determination of the motion for summary 
judgment; instead, it was the basis for the trial court’s granting the motion for 
summary judgment after carefully and systematically applying the appropriate 
caselaw. 
{¶ 31} In its motion for summary judgment, WBNS argued that to 
successfully prosecute a defamation claim against a broadcast-media defendant, a 
plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a false statement was made about the 
plaintiff, (2) the statement was defamatory, (3) the statement was broadcast by 
television or radio or written and published, and (4) in broadcasting or publishing 
the statement, “the defendant acted with the necessary degree of fault.”  (Emphasis 
deleted.)  See also Am. Chem at ¶ 77 (listing these same four elements and a fifth 
element—injury to plaintiff—as those necessary to prove a defamation claim). 
{¶ 32} For the purposes of its motion for summary judgment, WBNS 
concentrated on the fourth element of a claim for defamation, fault.  WBNS pointed 
 
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to Lansdowne as providing the standard for proving fault in a case involving a 
private-figure plaintiff and a news-media defendant: “the plaintiff must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant failed to act reasonably in 
attempting to discover the truth or falsity or defamatory character of the 
publication,” id., 32 Ohio St.3d at 180, 512 N.E.2d 979.  Focusing on only the fault 
element of the defamation test, WBNS argued that the Andersons could not 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that WBNS had acted with the necessary 
degree of fault. 
{¶ 33} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of WBNS.  In 
addressing the defamation claim, the court, too, focused on the fault element of the 
defamation test, analyzing two theories of negligence advanced by the 
Andersons—(1) WBNS failed to investigate the information from the CPD and (2) 
WBNS altered the information from the CPD.  In support of those theories, the 
Andersons presented little evidence.  “A motion for summary judgment forces the 
nonmoving party to produce evidence on any issue for which that party bears the 
burden of production at trial.”  Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas, 59 Ohio St.3d 
108, 570 N.E.2d 1095 (1991), paragraph three of the syllabus.  The Andersons 
submitted (1) WBNS’s Facebook post about the robbery with accompanying 
commentary from the public, (2) a few interrogatory answers from WBNS 
establishing that it had no set procedure for verifying information provided by the 
CPD and that WBNS was unable to determine which staff member had written the 
Facebook story, and (3) affidavits from Aaron and Willie Anderson describing what 
had happened from their perspective and the injuries they and their family members 
had suffered. 
{¶ 34} The Andersons’ first theory of negligence was that WBNS was 
negligent in failing to investigate the information provided by the CPD.  Quoting 
Horvath v. Telegraph, 11th Dist. Lake No. CA-8-175, 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS 
 
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15 
15776, *27 (Mar. 8, 1982), the trial court rejected that theory, concluding that 
WBNS had reasonably relied on the CPD reports:  
 
[I]mposing a duty of investigation on WBNS when it reasonably 
relied on information from law enforcement officials “would * * * 
depriv[e] the general public of news to which they are entitled and 
to place intolerable burdens and costs upon a publisher.”  * * *  
Because plaintiffs have not demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence that WBNS acted negligently, summary judgment in 
WBNS’ favor is proper on [the Andersons’] defamation count. 
 
(First ellipsis and second set of brackets sic.) 
{¶ 35} The Andersons’ second theory of negligence was that WBNS was 
negligent in altering the characterization of Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron from 
“suspects” in the Media Information Sheet  to “robbers” in WBNS’s stories.  In 
analyzing this theory, the trial court focused on two issues: whether a case cited by 
the Andersons supported their claim and whether the alteration caused the 
publications to be defamatory.  The Andersons offered no evidence on the issue of 
negligent alteration—no expert opinion that WBNS had acted unreasonably by 
industry standards; the only evidence the court had before it was the publications 
themselves and the CPD-provided materials. 
{¶ 36} In support of their argument, the Andersons cited Young v. Morning 
Journal, 76 Ohio St.3d 627, 669 N.E.2d 1136 (1996).  But the trial court held that 
Young was inapposite because it is premised on the fair-reporting privilege and that 
privilege was not at issue in the case. 
{¶ 37} The trial court then—pursuant to Lansdowne’s instruction to 
determine whether the publisher of the material reasonably attempted to discover 
the defamatory character of the publication—specifically addressed whether the 
 
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publications were defamatory.  Noting that courts do not look at allegedly 
defamatory statements in a vacuum, the trial court held as a matter of law that the 
material published by WBNS was not defamatory.  In reaching that determination, 
the trial court correctly identified the standard set forth in Am. Chem. Soc., 133 
Ohio St.3d 366, 2012-Ohio-4193, 978 N.E.2d 832, at ¶ 79, and quoted the following 
language from that case: 
 
“In determining whether a statement is defamatory as a 
matter of law, a court must review * * * the totality of the 
circumstances” and by “read[ing] the statement[] * * * in the context 
of the entire [publication] to determine whether a [reasonable] 
reader would interpret [it] as defamatory.”  Mann v. Cincinnati 
Enquirer, 1st Dist. No. C-090747, 2010-Ohio-3963, ¶ 12. 
 
(Ellipses and brackets sic.)  Id. 
{¶ 38} The trial court then applied that standard and made a specific legal 
determination.  In accord with Am. Chem Soc., the court turned to the publications 
themselves, the only evidence it had before it  regarding the claim for negligence 
in altering the CPD information: 
 
It is true that the broadcast contained the word “robbers” and the 
internet story had “robbers” in the headline.  However, the morning 
show used both the Parking Lot and Hall Photographs. It also 
characterized plaintiffs as suspects while showing the Hall 
Photograph.  And, the posting also used “suspects” throughout the 
body of the story.  Within this complete context, the Court cannot 
conclude that a reasonable reader or viewer would interpret the 
stories as defamatory. 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
17 
 
{¶ 39} The trial court therefore concluded that WBNS was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the theory of negligence premised on WBNS’s 
alteration of “suspects” in the CPD-provided information to “robbers” in WBNS’s 
reports because the alterations did not make the publications defamatory when the 
alterations were viewed in the context of the whole publication in accord with Am. 
Chem. Soc.  The trial court held: 
 
In sum, plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of 
establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to WBNS’ 
negligence.  The Court thus concludes that: (1) there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact; (2) WBNS is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one 
conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the plaintiffs. 
 
{¶ 40} The Lansdowne standard requires the plaintiff to “prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant failed to act reasonably in attempting to 
discover the truth or falsity or defamatory character of the publication.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id., 32 Ohio St.3d at 180, 512 N.E.2d 979.  The trial court based its decision 
on its conclusion that the Andersons had failed to sustain their burden to 
demonstrate that the published material was defamatory.  And if a plaintiff cannot 
prove defamatory content, his or her claim for defamation fails.  The trial court’s 
holding on the defamatory nature of the publications was therefore not dictum—
“[a] judicial comment * * * that is unnecessary to the decision in the case * * *,” 
Black’s at 1240.  To the contrary, it was the very basis of the court’s decision on 
the defamation claim and the opposite of dictum. 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
The appellate court’s determination that the publications 
were defamatory is not dictum 
{¶ 41} The appellate court realized the import of the trial court’s 
determination that the publications were not defamatory, and it reversed that ruling 
and held that the publications were defamatory before moving on to the next 
inquiry—whether WBNS had acted negligently.  It simply held, “There is no 
question that WBNS defamed some of the Andersons,” and then moved on.  2018-
Ohio-761 at ¶ 8.  The appellate court’s determination that the publications are 
defamatory was crucial to its holding and thus was not dictum.  Without that 
determination, the appellate court’s application of Lansdowne would have been a 
meaningless exercise. 
{¶ 42} The Andersons appealed the trial court’s judgment, asserting one 
assignment of error: the trial court improperly granted WBNS summary judgment 
on the defamation claim because the Andersons had provided clear and convincing 
evidence of WBNS’s negligence.  The Andersons supported that assignment of 
error with two arguments acknowledging that the CPD was a reliable source and 
asserting that it was WBNS’s “significant alteration” or “significant changes” of 
the information received from the CPD that constituted clear and convincing 
evidence of negligence. 
{¶ 43} At first blush—just reading the single assignment of error—one 
might conclude that the Andersons abandoned an appeal of the trial court’s 
determination that WBNS was entitled to summary judgment because the alteration 
of “suspects” to “robbers” when read in the context of the whole publication could 
not be interpreted as defamatory by a reasonable reader or viewer; however, such a 
conclusion would be inconsistent with our precedent. 
{¶ 44} Although the general rule is that “this court will not consider 
arguments that were not raised in the courts below,” Belvedere Condominium Unit 
Owners’ Assn. v. R.E. Roark Cos., Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 279, 617 N.E.2d 1075 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
19 
(1993), modified in part on other grounds, Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 119 Ohio 
St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio-4827, 895 N.E.2d 538, syllabus, this court has stated, “When 
an issue of law that was not argued below is implicit in another issue that was 
argued and is presented by an appeal, we may consider and resolve that implicit 
issue,” id. 
{¶ 45} The Andersons alleged in their appellate-court brief that “[t]his case 
involves an undisputed defamatory statement, about private individuals, that was 
negligently altered prior to publication.”  Implicit in the Andersons’ argument is 
that it was WBNS’s alteration of the CPD-provided information that made it 
defamatory.  The Andersons further alleged, “This alteration is the difference 
between the police knowing Appellants committed a robbery but not knowing their 
identity, versus the police suspecting Appellants involvement in a robbery.  The 
former leaves little room for the potential innocence of Appellants.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)  The issue whether the alteration was defamatory was squarely before the 
court, and only if the alteration made the character of the publication defamatory 
could the negligence issue be addressed.  Therefore, the Andersons’ only chance 
for relief would require a determination that the alteration made the reported 
information defamatory. 
{¶ 46} The appellate court provided that chance; its first step in reversing 
the trial court was to declare the publications defamatory:  
 
There is no question that WBNS defamed some of the 
Andersons.  It accused members of the family of being armed 
robbers.  * * * [T]his is not a case involving public figures, so 
merely publishing a false, defamatory statement is sufficient to 
establish a traditional defamation claim. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
2018-Ohio-761 at ¶ 8.  However, unlike the trial court, which applied Am. Chem. 
Soc., 133 Ohio St.3d 366, 2012-Ohio-4193, 978 N.E.2d 832, in reaching the 
determination that the publications were not defamatory, the appellate court did not 
consider whether a reasonable reader or viewer construing each publication as a 
whole would interpret it as defamatory.  Nonetheless, its determination, too, was 
critical to its holding.  Thereafter, the appellate court applied the fault standard in 
Lansdowne, 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 512 N.E.2d 979.  In doing so, the appellate court 
revived the Andersons’ claims for defamation. 
{¶ 47} And because the majority here remands the case to the appellate 
court to apply the fault standard established in Lansdowne without addressing 
WBNS’s fifth proposition of law—the proposition concerning the defamatory 
nature of the publications—it leaves undisturbed the appellate court’s 
determination that the publications are defamatory.  That portion of the appellate 
decision becomes the law of the case.  Pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, 
 
a trial court is without authority to extend or vary the mandate issued 
by a superior court, [Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d] at 4, 462 N.E.2d 410, 
and “where at a rehearing following remand a trial court is 
confronted with substantially the same facts and issues as were 
involved in the prior appeal, the court is bound to adhere to the 
appellate court’s determination of the applicable law,” id. at 3. 
 
Giancola v. Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d 594, 2018-Ohio-1694, 109 N.E.3d 1194, ¶ 16.  
This court has not reversed the appellate court’s holding that WBNS’s publications 
are defamatory, and that holding, pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, should 
be binding on the court of appeals and the trial court upon remand. 
{¶ 48} But the majority concocts from thin air a way around that holding’s 
being the law of the case: it proclaims that the trial court’s and the appellate court’s 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
21 
holdings regarding the defamatory nature of the publications are dicta.  This 
conclusion is based upon no authority; it is merely what the majority desires to be 
true.  Such a holding should come by way of precedent and reason, not judicial 
diktat.  But there is no precedent that says that a court’s holding on an essential 
element of a claim is dictum, and there is no reasonable way to argue that it can be. 
The “stronger duty” language in the appellate opinion is obiter dictum 
{¶ 49} But the majority’s misguided analysis of this case gets worse.  When 
it comes to the application of the Lansdowne test, the majority attacks a straw 
man—the lower court establishes no new standard and announces no new test for 
determining fault in private-figure defamation cases involving media defendants.  
However, the majority determines that the “stronger duty” language in the appellate 
opinion does establish a new fault standard in private-figure defamation cases, and 
it remands the case for further proceedings consistent with Lansdowne.  
{¶ 50} Pursuant to Lansdowne, “the plaintiff must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant failed to act reasonably in attempting to 
discover the truth or falsity or defamatory character of the publication.”  Id., 32 
Ohio St.3d at 180, 512 N.E.2d 979.  The appellate court set forth the Lansdowne 
standard as follows: “The Supreme Court of Ohio has provided some protection 
from liability for media outlets by requiring that persons defamed by the media 
show some fault on the part of the media and make that showing by clear and 
convincing evidence.”  2018-Ohio-761 at ¶ 9.  The court then distilled the case to 
the following issue, consistent with Lansdowne: 
 
For purposes of the lawsuit filed by the Andersons, the question 
becomes whether or not broadcasting an accusation that the 
Andersons were robbers without investigation by WBNS and based 
on a set of police documents which claimed only that some of the 
Andersons were suspects is sufficient proof of a violation of a duty 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
of care to allow the lawsuit to survive a motion for summary 
judgment. 
 
2018-Ohio-761 at ¶ 11.  In the next sentence, the court provided its holding: “We 
find that the lawsuit at least presents a genuine issue of material fact which allows 
the lawsuit to proceed past the motion for summary judgment filed by WBNS.”  Id.   
{¶ 51} It is after this pronouncement that the “stronger duty” language 
appears in the opinion, along with other nonessential extras that seem to question 
WBNS’s professionalism rather than its liability.  The court of appeals opined that  
 
putting such false claims on a website means that the falsely accused 
have the accusation available to anyone who chooses to do a search 
of the internet forever.  WBNS has not printed a story correcting its 
false accusations or put notice on the internet that it falsely accused 
the family.  Frankly, a media outlet has a stronger duty to research 
the facts in such cases than it did when the Lansdowne case was 
decided.  False stories on the internet do not simply disappear 
because the truth is later discovered. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. 
{¶ 52} This passage in the opinion appears well after the appellate court’s 
determination that “[t]here is no question that WBNS defamed some of the 
Andersons.”  Id. at ¶ 8.  And it appears after the appellate court’s recognition of the 
limited question before it: “The assignment of error filed on behalf of the Andersons 
refers to negligence on behalf of WBNS as now required by the Supreme Court of 
Ohio.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 53} “Obiter dictum” is defined as “ ‘an incidental and collateral opinion 
uttered by a judge, and therefore (as not material to his decision or judgment) not 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
23 
binding.  * * *  Hence, any incidental remark, reflection, comment, or the like.’ ”  
State ex rel. Gordon v. Barthalow, 150 Ohio St. 499, 505-506, 83 N.E.2d 393 
(1948), quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d Ed.).  The appellate 
court signaled that its commentary was merely an aside when it used the word 
“frankly” to introduce what it was about to say about a “stronger duty.”  2018-Ohio-
761 at ¶ 11.  What followed was mere gavel-rattling.  The appellate court’s 
editorializing and commentary, while eye-catching, does not carry with it any 
weight of authority overruling our precedent in Lansdowne or creating a new duty 
or fault standard in private-figure defamation cases.  See Interstate Sash & Door 
Co. v. Cleveland, 148 Ohio St. 325, 74 N.E.2d 239 (1947) (obiter dictum has no 
weight of authority).  The court of appeals set forth the issue before it, quickly 
established its holding, and then began pontificating.  The majority has now 
attached jurisprudential significance to bloviation. 
What the “stronger duty” language in the appellate opinion 
addresses is not at issue 
{¶ 54} Moreover, the “stronger duty” phrase relates to the word “research”: 
“Frankly, a media outlet has a stronger duty to research the facts in such cases  
* * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  2018-Ohio-761 at ¶ 11.  However, the Andersons did 
not appeal from the trial court’s determination that WBNS could rely on the 
information from the CPD as information from a trusted source and that WBNS 
had no duty to investigate the information.  There was only one assignment of error 
before the appellate court—“ ‘The trial court erred in granting [WBNS’s] motion 
for Summary Judgment on [the Andersons’] defamation claim where [the 
Andersons’] provided clear and convincing evidence of [WBNS’s] negligence.’ ” 
See 2018-Ohio-761 at ¶ 1, quoting the Andersons’ brief. 
{¶ 55} The Andersons supported that assignment of error with two 
arguments.  Each of the arguments acknowledges that the CPD was a reliable 
source and asserts that it was WBNS’s “significant alteration” or “significant 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
changes” of the information received from the CPD that constitute clear and 
convincing evidence of negligence.  The headings of these arguments read: 
 
In [the Andersons’] private defamation claim, [WBNS’s] 
significant alteration of reliable source information is clear and 
convincing evidence of negligence. 
Authority advanced by [WBNS] fails to address liability for 
significant changes in reliable source information prior to 
publication. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 56} Therefore, the court of appeals stated that the issue before it was 
“[w]hether [WBNS’s] alteration in referring to [the Andersons] as ‘robbers,’ when 
the [CPD had] supplied information referring to ‘suspects,’ is clear and convincing 
evidence sufficient to raise a jury question as to the fault element of [the 
Andersons’] claim for defamation.” 2018-Ohio-761 at ¶ 2.  Accordingly, the 
appellate court’s words regarding WBNS’s duty to investigate were not material to 
the judgment and were therefore dicta. 
The court of appeals left no doubt in its subsequent opinion 
that it had not modified Lansdowne 
{¶ 57} Moreover, in addressing WBNS’s application for rehearing en banc, 
the appellate court specifically stated that it had created no new law in its decision 
and that it had relied on Lansdowne, 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 512 N.E.2d 979, only.  
WBNS’s application for rehearing alleged that the appellate court had failed to 
apply the private-figure fault standard announced in Lansdowne.  The appellate 
court denied the application for rehearing en banc, holding that it had not failed to 
follow Lansdowne (“We do not view our decision in this case as in any way failing 
to follow the Lansdowne case,” 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-660 (Apr. 24, 2018), 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
25 
¶ 3) and that its decision was not in conflict with its prior decisions that had applied 
Lansdowne.  The court of appeals made clear in its denial of the rehearing motion 
what was apparent from the face of its original decision: it was not making the 
Tenth Appellate District an outlier in the state and in the nation regarding 
defamation law.  Rather, it had been editorializing, and there could be no danger 
that the trial court would apply the wrong fault standard upon remand. 
Remand to the appellate court is unnecessary 
{¶ 58} Even the Andersons, in their brief filed in this court, characterize the 
“stronger duty” language as evidence of the “judge[’s] outrage[] at the 
egregiousness” of WBNS’s violation of the negligence standard and as an 
admonition to media outlets regarding “their responsibility in light of the internet,” 
and assert that the offending passage is merely dicta. 
{¶ 59} The Andersons also assert that they have “never argued” for a 
heightened standard of fault for Internet publications or for the abrogation of 
Lansdowne.  (Emphasis sic.)  Moreover, the Andersons agree that the standard of 
fault in a private-figure defamation claim is controlled by Lansdowne.  Therefore, 
the superfluous commentary from the appellate court in its opinion should not stop 
this court from resolving the discretionary appeal we accepted. 
{¶ 60} Civ.R. 56 authorizes courts to grant summary judgment.  The rule 
was created to promote “judicial economy through elimination of needless trials in 
circumstances where there are no genuine issues of material fact.”  State ex rel. 
Celebrezze v. Tele-Communications, Inc., 62 Ohio Misc.2d 446, 448, 601 N.E.2d 
260 (Ct. of Cl.1991).  Rather than decide whether summary judgment is appropriate 
and possibly resolve this case, the majority instead remands this case for a 
superfluous additional level of appeal, to the detriment of judicial economy. 
{¶ 61} Affording the appellate court’s dicta its proper authoritative value, 
none, I would reject WBNS’s second proposition of law—alleging that the 
appellate court created a new “stronger duty” fault standard—and turn to a review 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
of the appellate court’s determination that the publications at issue here are 
defamatory. 
Facts 
{¶ 62} These facts are not in dispute.  On January 20, 2016, at 11:02 p.m., 
Luella Miller of the CPD sent a Media Release e-mail containing a Media 
Information Sheet and two pictures to a host of individuals and media outlets.  The 
information contained in the Media Release e-mail and its attachments had been 
submitted by a detective of the robbery unit and had been approved for release by 
a sergeant prior to its dissemination. 
{¶ 63} The subject line of the Media Release e-mail reads: “FW: Media 
Release – Robbery – Fort Rapids-4565 Hilton Corporation Drive.”  The attachment 
line of the Media Release e-mail reads: “09 Leaving Waterpark.png; 08 Two Guy 
[sic] Rob Kid in front of Parents.png; Media Release – Robbery * * *.”  The 
attached Media Information Sheet is dated January 10, 2016, and lists the offense 
or incident type as “Robbery.”  The Media Information Sheet also describes the 
incident and asks for help in identifying the people in the photographs: 
 
The victims were walking in the parking lot of Fort Rapids 
waterpark watching their eight year old daughter ride her 
“hoverboard.”  The suspects approached on foot, put a gun to the 
eight-year-old’s head and demanded the hoverboard.  The suspects 
then ran to a white PT cruiser and fled out of the parking lot. 
Anyone that can help identify the persons in the attached 
photographs who may have been involved are asked to contact the 
Columbus Police Robbery Unit at 614-645-4665.  If they wish to 
remain anonymous [they] can contact Central Ohio Crime Stoppers 
at 614-645-TIPS (8477). 
 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
27 
{¶ 64} One of the pictures disseminated with the Media Release e-mail is 
grainy and depicts the parking lot of the Fort Rapids indoor waterpark at the time 
of the robbery (“parking-lot photograph”).  In that photograph, there are several 
people standing under a light, but the image is not clear, and the people are not 
identifiable.  The parking-lot photograph is dated and time-stamped November 26, 
2015, 9:47:19 p.m. 
{¶ 65} The second picture, which is a still shot taken from a surveillance 
video, is an interior view of the Fort Rapids indoor waterpark and it shows three 
people, two males and one female, walking in a hallway (“interior photograph”).  
This interior photograph is clear enough that the people are identifiable.  The three 
people in the interior photograph are Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron Anderson.  The 
picture is dated and time-stamped November 26, 2015, 9:25:44 p.m. 
{¶ 66} Michael Gravely, the assignment manager in the news department 
of WBNS, testified by affidavit that the CPD did not provide any names for the 
people in the interior photograph and no one on staff at WBNS had information 
about their identity.  The WBNS news staff reviewed the Media Release e-mail and 
the attachments and rewrote the information as a news story for WBNS’s regular 
“CrimeTracker 10” news feature to air the next morning.  The stories aired during 
the 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. broadcasts on January 21, 2016.  A written story was 
also posted on WBNS’s webpage and Facebook page (“Web reports”). 
{¶ 67} The record does not contain recordings of the broadcasts but does 
contain copies of the scripts for the broadcasts.  The script for the 5:00 a.m. 
broadcast reads:  
 
New this morning 
* * * 
An 8-year-old girl robbed at gunpoint—for a popular toy. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
The robbery happened in the parking lot of Fort Rapids 
indoor waterpark back in November. 
You can see the scene in these just-released surveillance 
images. 
The girl was riding her hoverboard when robbers went up to 
her, put a gun to her head and took it.  Columbus Police say 
suspects—seen here—took off in a PT cruiser. 
 
The picture displayed when the newscaster said “seen here” was the interior 
photograph. 
{¶ 68} The script for the later broadcast reads:  
 
IN CRIMETRACKER 10, 
* * * [Notes: show suspect pic] 
Columbus Police hope you recognize these two men who 
robbed an 8-year-old girl at gunpoint! 
It happened in the parking lot of Fort Rapids indoor 
waterpark in Columbus.  [Notes: show parking lot photo]   
Robbery detectives just released surveillance images from 
the November crime. 
The girl was riding her hoverboard in the parking lot with 
her family when they say two men pointed a gun at her head, taking 
it.  . 
[Notes: show suspect pic]   
Columbus Police say suspects—seen here—took off in a PT 
cruiser. 
 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
29 
(Capitalization and brackets sic.)  Again, the picture displayed at the beginning of 
the broadcast and during the “seen here” portion was the interior photograph. 
{¶ 69} The written publication was posted on WBNS’s webpage and 
Facebook page with the headline, “Robbers Put Gun To Child’s Head And Steal 
Hoverboard.”  (Boldface deleted.)  The body of the story stated: 
 
Columbus police are searching for two men who robbed a 
child at gunpoint in east Columbus. 
It happened Sunday, November 26, 2015 outside Fort Rapids 
Water Park around 10 PM. 
Police say the victim was riding her hoverboard while in the 
parking lot with her family when they were approached by two men.  
The suspects put a gun to the 8-year-old-girl’s head and demand[ed] 
the toy. 
When she handed it over, the two men ran to a white PT 
Cruiser and took off. 
Investigators say there was a woman with the two male 
suspects.  They are not sure how she is connected to the robbery. 
No one was injured during the robbery. 
If you have any information about this incident, call 
Columbus Police at 614-645-4665 or make an anonymous tip to 
Central Ohio Crime Stoppers at 614-645-TIPS (8477). 
 
{¶ 70} When the online publication was originally posted, the interior 
photograph was displayed with it. 
{¶ 71} On January 21, 2016, at 5:15 a.m., Willie Anderson received a call 
at work from his wife, Nanita Williams, about the newscast.  Mr. Anderson left 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
work and took his wife and children (Aaron, Aaronana, and Arron) to the police 
station. 
{¶ 72} As a result of the CPD’s follow-up investigation, including 
interviewing the Anderson family, Carmel Wilson of the CPD sent an e-mail with 
the subject line “Important Update.”  Attached to the e-mail was an Updated Media 
Information Sheet on the robbery.  It contained the same information concerning 
the robbery itself, but included the following: 
 
Follow-Up and Update: Following the news coverage, the 
individuals in the video immediately came into Columbus Police 
Headquarters.  The individuals in the video spoke to detectives, and, after 
further investigation, were found to not be the suspects in the robbery.  
Please discontinue the use of this video for any further reporting of this 
crime. 
 
{¶ 73} WBNS received the investigation update on January 21, 2016, at 
approximately 12:25 p.m.  Gravely immediately removed the interior photograph 
from the Web reports and replaced it with the grainy parking-lot photograph.  After 
the original broadcasts, WBNS did not make any further on-air broadcasts about 
the waterpark robbery.  On August 5, 2016, counsel for the Andersons sent WBNS 
a letter asking for a correction/retraction of the photograph. 
Procedural History 
{¶ 74} In October 2016, the Andersons filed in the Franklin County Court 
of Common Pleas a complaint against WBNS alleging invasion of privacy/false 
light, defamation of character, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation 
of R.C. 2739.14 (which requires newspaper companies that have published false 
statements to publish corrections when requested by the people affected by the 
statement), and loss of consortium.  WBNS’s motion for summary judgment was 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
31 
granted as to all five claims.  The Andersons appealed only the judgment on their 
defamation claim, and the court of appeals reversed. 
{¶ 75} This court accepted jurisdiction over all six of WBNS’s propositions 
of law, including one asserting that the publications were not defamatory.  As stated 
above, I would reject WBNS’s second proposition of law; WBNS’s remaining 
propositions of law are as follows: 
 
1. First Amendment protections and jurisprudence extend to 
speech published on the Internet, and, specifically, this Court’s 
decision in Lansdowne * * *, which set the fault standard in private-
figure defamation cases, applies equally to statements published on 
the Internet. 
3. The law does not require the news media to conduct their 
own investigation or withhold publishing the news until they are 
able to contact the persons implicated or otherwise inquire into and 
corroborate official information supplied by law enforcement. 
4. Persons are not liable under the law of defamation for 
statements that they do not publish or authorize another to publish. 
5. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, a court 
must review the totality of the circumstances and by reading the 
statement in the context of the entire publication to determine 
whether a reasonable reader would interpret it as defamatory. 
6.  The essential elements of a defamation claim do not turn 
on the relative financial condition of the plaintiff and defendant. 
 
{¶ 76} Because this case can and should be resolved by addressing WBNS’s 
fifth proposition of law, which requires a straightforward application of Am. Chem. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
Soc., 133 Ohio St.3d 366, 2012-Ohio-4193, 978 N.E.2d 832, to the publications at 
issue here, I would decline to address the remaining propositions of law. 
Law and Analysis 
Standard of review 
{¶ 77} When reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the 
court applies a de novo standard of review.  Esber Beverage Co. v. Labatt USA 
Operating Co., L.L.C., 138 Ohio St.3d 71, 2013-Ohio-4544, 3 N.E.3d 1173, ¶ 9.  
Summary judgment is appropriate when 
 
“(1) [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; 
(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 
(3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to 
but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in 
favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment 
is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.” 
 
M.H. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 134 Ohio St.3d 65, 2012-Ohio-5336, 979 N.E.2d 1261,  
¶ 12, quoting Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 
(1977), citing Civ.R. 56(C). 
Elements of a defamation claim 
{¶ 78} To establish defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate  
 
“(1) that a false statement of fact was made, (2) that the statement 
was defamatory, (3) that the statement was published, (4) that the 
plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result of the publication, and 
(5) that the defendant acted with the requisite degree of fault in 
publishing the statement.” 
 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
33 
Am. Chem. Soc. At ¶ 77, quoting Pollock v. Rashid, 117 Ohio App.3d 361, 368, 
690 N.E.2d 903 (1996). 
{¶ 79} Defamation includes both libel and slander.  Lawson v. AK Steel 
Corp., 121 Ohio App.3d 251, 256, 699 N.E.2d 951 (1997).  Defamation by a 
television broadcast is libel, whether or not it is read from a manuscript.  3 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 568A (1977); see Perez v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 215, 520 N.E.2d 198 (1988). 
{¶ 80} A publication is defamatory if it “reflect[s] injuriously on a person’s 
reputation, or expos[es] a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or 
disgrace, or affect[s] a person adversely in his or her trade, business or profession.”  
A&B—Abell Elevator Co., Inc. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 7, 651 N.E. 2d 1283 (1995).  In regard to whether a 
publication is defamatory, “it is for the court to decide as a matter of law whether 
certain statements alleged to be defamatory are actionable or not.”  Yeager v. Local 
Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 6 Ohio St.3d 
369, 372, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983).  In making that determination, a court must 
review the totality of the circumstances and view the statement in the context of the 
entire publication in order to determine whether a reasonable person would interpret 
the statement as defamatory.  Am. Chem. Soc. at ¶ 79. 
{¶ 81} The appellate court, in determining that the publications are 
defamatory, focused on WBNS’s use of the term “robbers” instead of “suspects” 
without applying the totality-of-the-circumstances standard set forth in Am. Chem. 
Soc.  As the Andersons succinctly stated in their brief before this court, “The only 
issue becomes whether, considering the entire context of the publication, ‘a 
[reasonable] reader would interpret [the publication] as defamatory.’ Am. Chem. 
Soc., 133 Ohio St.3d 366, 2012-Ohio-4193, 978 N.E.2d 832, at ¶ 79.”  (Brackets 
sic.)  In holding that the publications are defamatory, the appellate court focused 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
on WBNS’s use of the term “robbers” instead of “suspects.”  I limit my review to 
that determination. 
No genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether 
the publications are defamatory 
{¶ 82} In a libel action, the publication “ ‘claimed to be defamatory must 
be read and construed in the sense which the readers to whom it is addressed would 
ordinarily understand it.’ ”  Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290, 293, 
39 S.Ct. 448, 63 L.Ed. 987 (1919), quoting Commercial Publishing Co. v. Smith, 
149 F. 704, 706 (6th Cir.1907).  A reviewing court should consider 
 
not only the plain text of the publication, but also the composition 
of the story; its syntax and context; its timing; the prominence the 
[publication was] accorded * * *; the neutral, positive or negative 
thrust of the [publication]; material factual omissions or distortions; 
the image of the subject that the publication seeks to project and all 
other facts that may reflect upon the publisher’s intent and purpose 
to publicly disseminate the information * * *.  [Moreover, a court 
should be] always mindful of the caveat that the words of the 
publication should not be considered in isolation, but rather within 
the context of the entire [publication] and the thoughts that the 
[publication] through its structural implications and connotations is 
calculated to convey to the [viewer] to whom it is addressed. 
 
Connaughton v. Harte Hanks Communications, Inc., 842 F.2d 825, 840 (6th 
Cir.1988), aff’d 491 U.S. 657, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989).  This court 
has similarly determined that a court must review the totality of the circumstances 
and view the statement in the context of the entire publication in order to determine 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
35 
whether a reasonable person would interpret the statement as defamatory.  Am. 
Chem. Soc. at ¶ 79. 
{¶ 83} The publications at issue in this case were presented to viewers as 
crime-stoppers reports—reports produced when the police enlist the media to 
publicize the details of a crime in the hope that the viewing public can provide 
information that will help solve the crime.5  Therefore, the alleged defamatory 
publications must be viewed and construed from the perspective of a viewer 
watching or reading a crime-stoppers report. 
{¶ 84} A viewer watching or reading the crime-stoppers reports at issue 
here would understand that the information being viewed was about an ongoing 
police investigation into an unsolved crime and that the CPD was turning to the 
community to obtain tips or information about the robbery and the identity of 
unknown robbery suspects.  The reports themselves make clear that they result from 
uncertainty. 
{¶ 85} Viewers would not mistake these crime-stoppers reports for news 
reports about an arrest or conviction of a robber and would understand that persons 
of interest or suspects were being sought for questioning in the robbery.  Moreover, 
viewers would understand that the dissemination of the publications was a public 
service for the protection of the community as a whole. 
{¶ 86} With this understanding, I turn to the 5:00 a.m. news broadcast:  
 
New this morning 
* * * 
An 8-year-old girl robbed at gunpoint—for a popular toy. 
                                                          
 
5. Central Ohio Crime Stoppers is an entity that offers rewards for anonymous tips.  I use the term 
“crime-stoppers reports” generically to refer to publications that result from the police soliciting 
media outlets to release the facts of crimes to the public and to ask for the public’s help in solving 
the crimes. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
The robbery happened in the parking lot of Fort Rapids 
indoor waterpark back in November. 
You can see the scene in these just-released surveillance 
images. 
The girl was riding her hoverboard when robbers went up to 
her, put a gun to her head and took it.  Columbus Police say 
suspects—seen here—took off in a PT cruiser. 
 
When the entire broadcast is construed from the perspective of a reasonable viewer 
watching a crime-stoppers report, the broadcast is not defamatory. 
{¶ 87} The publication is an accurate reflection of the information that 
WBNS received from the CPD: an eight-year-old girl was robbed at gunpoint for a 
hoverboard; during the commission of the robbery, the robbers placed a gun against 
the child’s head; when the robbery was complete, the robbers left in a PT Cruiser. 
{¶ 88} Viewing the entire publication—its plain text, its composition, its 
neutral thrust, its factual accuracy, its intent and purposes, and its implications and 
connotations—reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that 
conclusion is that the publication is not defamatory. 
{¶ 89} The 6:00 a.m. news broadcast also included the crime-stoppers 
report: 
 
IN CRIMETRACKER 10, 
* * * [Notes: show suspect pic] 
Columbus Police hope you recognize these two men who 
robbed an 8-year-old girl at gunpoint! 
It happened in the parking lot of Fort Rapids indoor 
waterpark in Columbus.  [Notes: show parking lot photo] 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
37 
Robbery detectives just released surveillance images from 
the November crime. 
The girl was riding her hoverboard in the parking lot with 
her family when they say two men pointed a gun at her head, taking 
it. 
[Notes: show suspect pic] 
Columbus Police say suspects—seen here—took off in a PT 
cruiser. 
 
(Capitalization and brackets sic.)  Construing this publication from the perspective 
of a viewer watching a crime-stoppers report, it is clear that the CPD was seeking 
information from the community about the robbery or the suspects. 
{¶ 90} Like the first publication, this publication would not be mistaken as 
a publication about an arrest or conviction of a robber.  A viewer would understand 
that the information being viewed was about an ongoing police investigation into 
an unsolved crime.  Given the context of the publication, a reasonable viewer would 
not view the report as defamatory. 
{¶ 91} The Andersons argue that this publication declares that the two 
unknown men depicted in the interior photograph are the robbers, thereby making 
the publication defamatory.  However, this argument is sustainable only if portions 
of the publications are considered in isolation. 
{¶ 92} Both parties agree, citing Am. Chem. Soc., 133 Ohio St.3d 366, 2012-
Ohio-4193, 978 N.E.2d 832, at ¶ 79, that we must consider the entire context of the 
publication in determining whether a reasonable viewer would interpret the 
publication as defamatory.  The Andersons’ argument that WBNS’s publication 
was defamatory because it referred to the men in the interior photograph (Aaron 
and Arron) as “robbers” rather than “suspects” is based on textual isolation.  
“[C]ourts do not look at an allegedly defamatory statement in a vacuum.”  Sabino 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
v. WOIO, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-491, 56 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.).  Unlike in Sullins 
v. Raycom Media, Inc., 2013-Ohio-3530, 996 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), a case 
in which it was reported in a television program that Sullins was one of 
“Cleveland’s 25 Most Wanted Fugitives” when he was not a wanted fugitive, here, 
both words, “robbers” and “suspects,” appear in the publication.  The report begins, 
“Columbus Police hope you recognize,” which is the purpose of a crime-stoppers 
report: garnering tips and information about suspects in a crime.  The script in the 
short broadcast accurately reports that two men robbed a girl at gunpoint; it also 
characterizes the two pictured men as “suspects”; and the publication ends with the 
statement “suspects—seen here—” and the interior photograph. 
{¶ 93} The overriding conclusion to be drawn from the story is that the two 
men were suspects.  Viewing the entire publication—its plain text, its composition, 
its neutral thrust, its factual accuracy, its intent and purposes, and its implications 
and connotations—reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that 
conclusion is that the publication is not defamatory. 
{¶ 94} The last CrimeTracker 10 report complained of was posted on 
WBNS’s webpage and Facebook page.  The headline read, “Robbers Put Gun To 
Child’s Head And Steal Hoverboard.”  (Boldface deleted.)  The body of the article 
read: 
 
Columbus police are searching for two men who robbed a 
child at gunpoint in east Columbus. 
It happened Sunday, November 26, 2015 outside Fort Rapids 
Water Park around 10 PM. 
Police say the victim was riding her hoverboard while in the 
parking lot with her family when they were approached by two men.  
The suspects put a gun to the 8-year-old-girl’s head and demand[ed] 
the toy. 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
39 
When she handed it over, the two men ran to a white PT 
Cruiser and took off. 
Investigators say there was a woman with the two male 
suspects.  They are not sure how she is connected to the robbery. 
No one was injured during the robbery. 
If you have any information about this incident, call 
Columbus Police at 614-645-4665 or make an anonymous tip to 
Central Ohio Crime Stoppers at 614-645-TIPS (8477). 
 
A reasonable person reading the entire report and construing the report from the 
perspective of a crime-stoppers reader would not interpret the publication to be 
defamatory. 
{¶ 95} The Web reports are accurate: the CPD was searching for two men 
who had robbed a child at gunpoint in the parking lot of the Fort Rapids indoor 
waterpark; the crime did happen on November 26, 2015, at approximately 10:00 
p.m.; the girl was riding her hoverboard when she was robbed; and her parents were 
with her at the time of the robbery.  After the commission of the robbery, the two 
men were seen fleeing the scene in a white PT Cruiser. 
{¶ 96} Despite the fact that the online report accurately reflected the 
information WBNS received from the CPD, the Andersons nevertheless argue that 
the entire content cannot negate the defamatory content of the headline, “Robbers 
Put Gun To Child’s Head And Steal Hoverboard.”  (Boldface sic.)  The only 
question is, does the inclusion of the interior photograph with the headline convert 
the publication to a defamatory publication?  It does not. 
{¶ 97} A headline of an article cannot be read in isolation, it must be read 
in the context of the article following it.  See Crall v. Gannett Satellite Information 
Network, Inc., S.D. Ohio No. C-2-92-233, 1992 WL 400713, *3 (Nov. 6, 1992) 
(When considering whether a statement is defamatory, the court must not look 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40 
solely to the allegedly defamatory statements but must also consider the statements 
in the context of the entire article; therefore, the headline at issue must be construed 
along with the ensuing article). 
{¶ 98} The publication ends with a plea for help: “If you have any 
information about this incident, call Columbus Police * * * or make an anonymous 
tip to Central Ohio Crime Stoppers * * *.” 
{¶ 99} A reasonable person reading the Web reports in their entirety and 
considering their context—crime-stoppers reports—would not interpret the 
publications to be defamatory.  The overriding conclusion to be drawn from the 
story is that the two men were suspects.  Viewing the entire publication—its plain 
text, its composition, its neutral thrust, its factual accuracy, its intent and purposes, 
and its implications and connotations—reasonable minds can come to but one 
conclusion and that conclusion is that the publication is not defamatory. 
{¶ 100} Therefore, I would conclude that WBNS’s publications at issue in 
this case were not defamatory as a matter of law.  Consequently, it is unnecessary 
to consider the fault standard established in Lansdowne, 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 512 
N.E.2d 979. 
The Bigger Picture 
{¶ 101} In the end, the CrimeTracker 10 reports yielded exactly what they 
were expected to—community tips to obtain information about the identity of the 
two unknown males in the only clear photograph the CPD had in order for the CPD 
to find them, interview them, and determine whether they were connected to the 
armed robbery of an eight-year-old child.  That happened, and the Andersons were 
cleared of any wrongdoing. 
{¶ 102} The state of Ohio, as an amicus curiae in support of WBNS, argues 
that media outlets provide an invaluable service to the general public and law 
enforcement by publicizing requests for tips.  I agree. 
 
January Term, 2019 
 
41 
{¶ 103} Crime-stoppers news features have been an invaluable tool of law 
enforcement since 1976.  Briseno, APD detective started Crime Stoppers program 
40 
years 
ago 
in 
Albuquerque 
(Oct. 
16, 
2016), 
https://www.abqjournal.com/867864/on-a.html (accessed July 15, 2019).  In July 
1976, hoping to get a lead in the investigation of the homicide of Michael Carmen, 
a young college student, Detective Greg MacAleese turned to the eyes and ears of 
the citizens of Albuquerque, New Mexico, to ask for help in solving the murder.  
Id.  Since that time, according to the article, crime-stoppers programs have aided in 
the arrest of more than one million criminals and the recovery of more than $2 
billion in stolen property.  Id. 
{¶ 104} And while some of the comments posted by the public to WBNS’s 
webpage were horrendous, offensive, hurtful, and deplorable, those comments are 
not a result of the CrimeTracker 10 publication.  Those comments are a sad 
commentary on the lack of civility in the electronic world: some people enjoy the 
ability to anonymously post ugly comments and pass judgment as to the guilt or 
innocence of the people depicted in a photograph in a crime-stoppers report asking 
for help identifying them.   
Conclusion 
{¶ 105} We should address the threshold issue whether the publications are 
defamatory; the determinations of the trial court and appellate court on that issue 
were essential to their holdings and thus were not dicta.  Moreover, I disagree with 
the majority’s determination that the court of appeals’ “stronger duty” language is 
meaningful; it is not a holding and is nothing more than dicta. 
{¶ 106} Regarding the defamatory nature of the publications, I conclude, 
after reviewing each publication as a whole and construing each publication from 
the perspective of a viewer watching or reading a crime-stoppers report seeking 
information about unknown suspects who may be connected to a robbery, that a 
reasonable viewer or reader would not interpret the “CrimeTracker 10” publications 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
42 
as defamatory.  Therefore, I would reverse the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ 
judgment and reinstate the trial court’s judgment in favor of WBNS. 
{¶ 107} Instead, this court remands this matter to an appellate-court panel 
that no longer exists (two-thirds of the judges on the original panel are no longer 
on the bench) to resolve an issue that does not exist.  Perhaps that court will remand 
the cause to the trial court, and since the trial judge who granted summary judgment 
is no longer a common pleas court judge, a new trial judge will begin considering 
the case. 
{¶ 108} It has been two years since the Andersons filed their first appellate 
brief.  How many more months or years have been added to the litigation process 
today?  Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution does more than guarantee a 
citizen’s right to seek a remedy by due course of law “for an injury done him in his 
* * * reputation,” it also provides that justice shall be “administered without denial 
or delay.”  This court falls far short of that mandate today. 
_________________ 
 
Calig Law Firm, L.L.C. and Sonia T. Walker; Jones Law Group, L.L.C., 
Eric A. Jones, and Nicholas Kolitsos, for appellees. 
 
Zeiger, Tigges & Little, L.L.P., Marion H. Little Jr., and Kris Banvard, for 
appellant. 
 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, State Solicitor, and 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
the state of Ohio. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., John J. Kulewicz, Thomas E. 
Szykowny, Daniel E. Shuey, and Arryn K. Miner, urging reversal for amici curiae 
The Ohio Association of Broadcasters, Ohio News Media Association, American 
Society of News Editors, Associated Press Media Editors, Radio Television Digital 
News Association, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and Society for 
Professional Journalists. 
January Term, 2019

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