Case Title: Evans v. Evans

Citation: 

Docket Number: 141277

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, Powell, and 
Kelsey, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 
 
WILLIAM D. EVANS, IN HIS CAPACITY 
AS TRUSTEE OF THE WANDA S. EVANS TRUST 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 141277 
SENIOR JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
June 4, 2015 
WAYNE L. EVANS, INDIVIDUALLY AND 
AS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF 
DOUGLAS E. EVANS, DECEASED, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TAZEWELL COUNTY 
Keary R. Williams, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider as an issue of first 
impression in Virginia whether one spouse with an ownership as 
a tenant by the entirety in real property may, by his or her 
sole act, convey that ownership to the other spouse to create 
a fee simple estate in the grantee spouse. 
BACKGROUND 
On November 26, 1973, Douglas E. Evans and Wanda S. 
Evans, husband and wife, obtained title to a parcel of real 
property known as 605 Fairway Drive in the Town of Bluefield 
in Tazewell County (the "Fairway Drive property") as tenants 
by the entirety with right of survivorship by way of a deed 
from Ply Developing Corporation.  On December 27, 1976, 
Douglas executed a general warranty deed (the "1976 deed") 
that purported to convey to Wanda "all of his interest" in the 
Fairway Drive property in exchange for both "love and 
affection" and "ten dollars, cash-in-hand paid."  The 1976 
 
2 
deed identified Douglas as the sole grantor, naming Wanda only 
as the grantee. 
For reasons not explained in the record, the 1976 deed 
was not recorded in the land records of Tazewell County in 
Deed Book 456, page 322 until April 11, 1979.  Nor does the 
record provide direct evidence that prior to it being 
recorded, Wanda accepted physical delivery of the 1976 deed or 
that it was she who caused the deed to be recorded. 
Douglas and Wanda had three sons, William D. Evans, Lloyd 
David Evans and Wayne Lewis Evans.  Wayne has two children, 
Lisa Marie Evans and Jason Lloyd Evans.  On February 2, 1993, 
Wanda executed a trust agreement creating a revocable inter 
vivos trust designated as the Wanda S. Evans Trust (the 
"trust"). 
Under the pertinent terms of the trust, upon Wanda's 
death the assets were to be distributed as follows: 
• $25,000 each individually to her grandchildren Lisa 
and Jason, to be held in separate trusts by William 
until each grandchild reached the age of 30; 
• A life estate to Douglas in the Fairway Drive 
property including household goods, if he survived 
Wanda at her death; 
• The remainder of the trust assets, including the 
Fairway Drive property and the household goods, to 
William. 
In the trust Wanda expressly made no provision for Wayne and 
Lloyd to receive any assets of the trust.  The trust further 
 
3 
provided that William was to serve as an alternate successor 
trustee.  At all times relevant to the litigation in this 
appeal, William served in that capacity after Wanda's death 
and the death of the first named successor trustee. 
Contemporaneous with the creation of the trust, Wanda 
executed a deed which purported to convey by general warranty 
"all of her interest in" the Fairway Drive property to herself 
as trustee of the trust (the "1993 deed").  The 1993 deed 
identifies the property as "being the same interest in real 
estate conveyed to [Wanda] by deed dated February 2, 1993 
[sic], from Douglas E. Evans, which deed is of record in . . . 
Deed Book 456, page 322."1 
Wanda died testate on April 18, 1994.  At the time of her 
death, she and Douglas were residing in the Fairway Drive 
property.  Under the terms of her will, which was executed the 
same day as the 1993 deed and the trust, any property 
remaining in her estate was to pour over into the trust.  
Consistent with the provisions of the trust, her will also 
purports to bequeath the Fairway Drive property to William 
subject to a life estate in Douglas. 
                     
1 Although the 1993 deed misstates the record date of the 
1976 deed, it correctly identifies that deed by its location 
in the land records.  Because the 1993 deed was not challenged 
on this discrepancy, we will treat it as a scrivener's error. 
 
4 
Following Wanda's death, title to the Fairway Drive 
property became a subject of dispute principally between Wayne 
and William.  On April 17, 1995, Wayne, as next friend of Lisa 
and Jason, filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit 
Court of Tazewell County against Douglas, William and the 
executor of Wanda's estate.  Therein, Wayne asserted that the 
trust failed on numerous grounds.  As pertinent to this 
appeal, Wayne asserted that the 1993 deed was ineffective to 
transfer any interest in the Fairway Drive property to the 
trust because "neither spouse can sever an estate by the 
entireties or convey or dispose of any part of it . . . by his 
or her sole act."  Implicit in this assertion was the further 
assertion that the 1976 deed was ineffective to convey 
Douglas' interest in the Fairway Drive property to Wanda by 
his sole act.  Thus, Wayne contended that Wanda "had no 
separate estate or interest in" the Fairway Drive property 
which she could convey by deed to the trust or devise in her 
will. 
On November 13, 1995, the circuit court ruled that "no 
actual controversy" existed between the parties and dismissed 
the complaint without prejudice.  Thereafter, on November 30, 
1995, Wayne, both as next friend of his children and 
individually, William, Douglas, and Wanda's executor entered 
into a mutual release and settlement agreement.  As relevant 
 
5 
to this appeal, the parties to the settlement agreed that 
Douglas would be permitted to remain in the Fairway Drive 
property until his death and further was to receive a payment 
of $81,869.63 from Wanda's estate in "full satisfaction of his 
claims against the estate, whether under the Trust, the Will, 
his elective share or otherwise."  Douglas expressly "waive[d] 
any right he may have to [the Fairway Drive property] except 
for his life interest."  Douglas continued to live in the 
Fairway Drive property until his death on March 12, 2012. 
On November 19, 2012, William, in his capacity as trustee 
of the trust, filed a declaratory judgment action against 
Wayne, both individually and as personal representative of 
Douglas' estate, Lloyd, Lisa and Jason in the circuit court 
seeking to quiet title in the Fairway Drive property.  An 
amended complaint was filed on February 22, 2013.  As alleged 
therein, Wayne and Lloyd asserted a claim of ownership in the 
Fairway Drive property through Douglas' estate, contending 
that title to the property had remained in Douglas and Wanda 
as tenants by the entirety at the time of Wanda's death and, 
thus, that it became Douglas' property in fee simple as the 
survivor. 
Wayne and the other defendants (collectively, "Wayne") 
filed an answer in which they acknowledged the claim that the 
Fairway Drive property had remained as an estate by the 
 
6 
entirety in Douglas and Wanda.  This was so, they contended, 
because the 1976 deed was ineffective to divest Douglas of his 
interest since it was not executed both by Douglas and Wanda 
as grantors. 
William and Wayne filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the respective positions of which parallel the 
arguments made in this appeal.  In summary, William maintained 
that the 1976 deed was effective because Douglas and Wanda 
"joined" in the deed as grantor and grantee.  He further 
maintained that even if the 1976 deed was technically 
deficient, the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed should 
prevent Douglas' estate from seeking an interest in the 
property.  Finally he contended that the settlement agreement 
barred Douglas' estate from asserting that Douglas had any 
interest other than a life estate in the Fairway Drive 
property. 
In response, Wayne maintained that the 1976 deed was 
ineffective because tenants by the entirety must join as 
grantors to convey any interest in the property, even if the 
conveyance is to one of them individually.  He further 
maintained estoppel by deed was inapplicable where the deed 
relied upon was void, and not merely technically deficient.  
Finally, Wayne denied that the settlement agreement was 
applicable to the Fairway Drive property because neither the 
 
7 
trust nor Wanda's estate ever had ownership of the property 
and, thus, the trust could not assert a claim of ownership 
based on Douglas' waiver of any interest he might have had in 
the property. 
Following argument on the cross-motions, the circuit 
court issued an opinion letter dated October 10, 2013 in which 
it concluded that the 1976 deed failed to show the requisite 
intent to "jointly transfer[]" the Fairway Drive property to 
Wanda in fee simple and thus, because that deed was 
ineffective, the 1993 deed was likewise ineffective to 
transfer any interest to the trust.  The circuit court 
concluded that William could not rely upon the equitable 
doctrine of estoppel by deed "due to the invalidity of the 
1976 conveyance."  The court entered an order dated December 
17, 2013 sustaining Wayne's motion for summary judgment, but 
retaining jurisdiction over the case to consider a motion for 
reconsideration which had been filed by William on December 5, 
2013. 
In the motion for reconsideration, William, among other 
things, asked the circuit court to make an express ruling as 
to the effect of the November 30, 1995 settlement agreement.  
William asserted that the settlement agreement constituted a 
waiver of any claim that Douglas, and by extension his estate, 
 
8 
had on the Fairway Drive property, thus effectively validating 
the 1976 deed. 
In a hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the 
circuit court acknowledged that it had not expressly addressed 
the effect of the settlement agreement, but that "it was 
implicitly addressed."  Accordingly, the court ruled that its 
judgment did not violate the terms of the agreement.  By a 
final order dated May 27, 2014, the court denied the motion 
for reconsideration and entered final judgment for Wayne.  We 
awarded William this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
William assigns error to the circuit court's rulings that 
the 1976 deed was ineffective and, therefore, failed to 
terminate Douglas' and Wanda's tenancy by the entirety in the 
Fairway Drive property.  He further assigns error to the 
court's correlative rulings that neither estoppel by deed nor 
the terms of the settlement agreement barred Douglas' estate 
from asserting ownership of the Fairway Drive property. 
We review questions regarding the validity and effect of 
deeds and other written legal documents de novo.  See Ott v. 
L&J Holdings, LLC, 275 Va. 182, 187, 654 S.E.2d 902, 904 
(2008).  Because the dispositive issue in this case, as 
recognized by the circuit court and the parties, is whether 
the 1976 deed effectively terminated Douglas' tenancy by the 
 
9 
entirety ownership in the Fairway Drive property, leaving 
Wanda as the sole owner in fee simple, we begin our analysis 
with a review of our prior decisions regarding ownership of 
real property as tenants by the entirety. 
Virginia is one of about two-dozen states that continue 
to recognize tenancies by the entirety.  See Bunker v. Peyton, 
312 F.3d 145, 151 (4th Cir. 2002).  Tenancy by the entirety is 
a legal fiction "'based upon the same four unities that 
support joint tenancies [plus] a fifth unity . . . of 
marriage.'"  Rogers v. Rogers, 257 Va. 323, 326, 512 S.E.2d 
821, 822 (1999)(quoting Jones v. Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 181, 
314 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1984)); see also Pitts v. United States, 
242 Va. 254, 258-59, 408 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1991). 
It is well established that specific consequences flow 
from the addition of this fifth unity.  First, during the 
marriage, neither spouse may make an absolute disposition of 
property held as tenants by the entirety "by his or her sole 
act."  Hausman v. Hausman, 233 Va. 1, 3, 353 S.E.2d 710, 711 
(1987).  Second, consistent with this restriction on 
alienability, no creditor of only one spouse can attach 
property held by both spouses as tenants by the entirety.  
Pitts, 242 Va. at 258-59, 408 S.E.2d at 903.  Finally, so long 
as the property remains held by them as tenants by the 
entirety, upon the death of one spouse, ownership of the 
 
10 
property will pass to the other in fee simple outside the 
estate of the deceased spouse.  Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 
735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951). 
While these principles have been applied in many cases 
extending to the earliest decisions of this Court, see, e.g., 
Thornton v. Thornton, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 179 (1825), a careful 
review of these cases reveals that, unlike the current case, 
they primarily involved either a security interest of or a 
conveyance to a third party.  See, e.g., Hausman, 233 Va. at 
3, 353 S.E.2d at 711 (1987)(refusing to prioritize lien on 
marital property granted by only one spouse); Waskey v. 
Thomas, 218 Va. 109, 113, 235 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1977)(granting 
rescission where grantee obtained deed signed by only one 
spouse).  Thus, the question whether a deed executed by one 
spouse purporting to convey his or her ownership in a property 
held by the entirety to the other spouse is one of first 
impression in Virginia. 
Wayne contends that the circuit court correctly ruled 
that any conveyance of ownership in property held by the 
entirety must be joined by both spouses as grantors.  In 
support of this contention, he relies heavily on our decision 
in Vasilion. 
In Vasilion, we considered whether a judgment creditor of 
the husband was entitled to rescission of a deed in which the 
 
11 
husband and wife jointly conveyed a property held by them as 
tenants by the entirety to the wife solely on the ground that 
the purpose of the deed was to put the property beyond the 
reach of the creditor.  192 Va. at 738, 66 S.E.2d at 601.  
Concluding that the trial court did not err in refusing to 
rescind the deed, we based our decision on the fact that the 
property could not have been attached by the creditor prior to 
the conveyance, because the debt was not a "joint debt[] of 
both spouses."  Id. at 740, 66 S.E.2d at 602.  In so doing, we 
noted that "husband and wife unquestionably can join in a deed 
conveying the entirety to a third party, and in 
Virginia[, Code § 55-9] permits a husband and wife to join in 
a deed conveying land to himself or herself."  Id.  
Emphasizing the latter part of this statement, Wayne contends 
that property held by spouses as tenants by the entirety may 
only be conveyed to one of them when both join in the deed as 
grantors.  We disagree. 
First, we note that in Vasilion the validity of the deed 
to the wife would not have altered our holding that the 
judgment creditor could not have attached the property prior 
to the conveyance.  Thus, while we held that the deed to the 
wife was effective because both spouses joined as grantors in 
the deed, this does not resolve the question whether both 
 
12 
spouses must join as grantors in a deed purporting to convey 
property held as tenants by the entirety solely to one spouse. 
This case presents the first opportunity for the Court to 
resolve the issue whether under any circumstance one spouse 
(the "grantor-spouse") may effectively convey all of his or 
her ownership in property held in a tenancy by the entirety to 
the other spouse (the "grantee-spouse") who does not join in 
the deed as grantor.  While the best practice would still be 
for both spouses to join as grantors in a deed to one of them 
separately, for the reasons that follow we hold that where 
there is sufficient evidence of the intent of the grantor-
spouse to make such a conveyance and, likewise, of voluntary 
acceptance of the conveyance by the grantee-spouse, the 
requirement of mutual consent in the conveyance is met. 
In discussing the requisites for a valid deed, voluntary 
acceptance by the grantee is often discounted as a formality 
that is subsumed within the prerequisite delivery of the deed 
to the grantee.  As we observed long ago in Skipwith v. 
Cunningham, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 271, 282 (1837), "the assent of 
the grantee is implied in all conveyances; first, because of 
the supposed benefit; secondly, because it is incongruous and 
absurd that when a conveyance is completely executed on the 
grantor's part, the estate should continue in him; thirdly, to 
prevent the uncertainty of the freehold."  Nonetheless, the 
 
13 
role of the grantee to a conveyance is not a passive one.  
"Delivery indeed to the grantee himself implies acceptance by 
him; but as such delivery is not always to him in person, the 
necessity of immediate acceptance is not implied in the 
necessity of a delivery."  Id. at 281. 
"That act [of delivery of the deed] indeed cannot compel 
the grantee to take against his will, but it is, as to the 
grantor, a complete and consummate act before that will is 
declared, although it may be avoided by the dissent of the 
grantee.  No [person] indeed can be forced to take an estate 
against his will; but the law on the other hand presumes that 
every estate, given by will or otherwise, is beneficial to the 
party to whom it is given, until he renounces it."  Id. at 
281.  The rule laid down in Skipwith nearly two centuries ago 
remains the law of the Commonwealth today.  See, e.g., Langman 
v. Alumni Ass'n of the Univ. of Va., 247 Va. 491, 500, 442 
S.E.2d 669, 675 (1994)("Acceptance on the part of the grantee 
is implied, because the conveyance is presumed to be 
beneficial, unless the grantee refuses to accept the deed by 
some act of renunciation, dissent, disagreement, or 
disclaimer."). 
This is not to say that in the case of tenants by the 
entirety that implied acceptance by the fact of a purported 
delivery will be sufficient to prove the validity of the deed, 
 
14 
for the consent of the grantee-spouse must be affirmative in 
order to satisfy the requirement of mutual consent.  The 
grantee-spouse's acceptance must be affirmative in order to 
avoid any mischief that might result in the rare case where 
conversion of an entirety ownership to a fee simple ownership 
would not be beneficial to the grantee-spouse.2  Accordingly, 
we turn to consider whether the record in this case 
establishes that Wanda affirmatively accepted the conveyance 
from Douglas under the 1976 deed and, thus, gave her consent 
to the dissolution of the tenancy by the entirety. 
Douglas’ unilateral execution of the 1976 deed plainly is 
sufficient to establish his intent to divest himself of his 
tenancy by the entirety ownership in the Fairway Drive 
property in favor of a fee simple ownership in Wanda.  
However, there is no evidence as to how, when or to whom the 
deed was delivered, nor can it be established from the record 
who caused the deed to be recorded in 1979.  As of 1979, at 
                     
2 For example, where the spouses are estranged, one spouse 
might attempt to be divested of an interest in property that 
was environmentally contaminated or otherwise undesirable by 
surreptitiously recording a deed purporting to convey a fee 
simple interest to a grantee-spouse.  Such a deed would be 
ineffective, however, because there would be no evidence of 
mutual consent.  Indeed, in such a case, even actual delivery 
of the deed to and acceptance by the grantee-spouse in person 
might not be sufficient if the evidence showed that the 
acceptance was made without knowledge of the undesirable 
nature of the property or other fraudulent purpose by the 
grantor-spouse. 
 
15 
best there was only an implied delivery to and acceptance of 
the deed by Wanda. 
Nevertheless, Wanda's execution in 1993 of a deed, trust 
and will, which each addressed her ownership of the Fairway 
Drive property as her separate property, is clear evidence of 
her affirmative intent to accept the 1976 deed and thereby her 
consent to the dissolution of the tenancy by the entirety to 
create her fee simple ownership of the property.  The specific 
reference in the 1993 deed to the conveyance to her by the 
1976 deed removes any doubt that Wanda could have believed she 
still was seized only of a tenancy by the entirety ownership 
in the property.  Based on the record in this particular case, 
there is sufficient evidence to establish the mutual consent 
of Douglas and Wanda to the conversion of their tenancy by the 
entirety ownership of the Fairway Drive property to the fee 
simple ownership in Wanda.  Thus, the circuit court erred in 
finding that the 1976 deed was not valid to accomplish its 
object.3  It then follows that the 1993 deed would likewise 
have been valid to transfer Wanda's fee simple interest to the 
trust. 
                     
3 Our resolution of this issue in William's favor moots 
his further assignments of error challenging the circuit 
court's failure to apply the doctrine of estoppel by deed or 
to interpret the settlement agreement as waiving any claim by 
the estate to the Fairway Drive property.  Accordingly, we 
express no opinion on those issues. 
 
16 
                    CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court erred 
in finding that the 1976 deed was ineffective and void.  We 
will reverse the judgment of the court in favor of Wayne and 
enter final judgment for William confirming that the Fairway 
Drive property is the property of the trust, as is already 
reflected in the land records of Tazewell County. 
Reversed and final judgment.   
 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE 
MIMS join, concurring. 
 
 
Although I agree with the outcome of this case, I cannot 
agree with the majority’s rationale.  According to the 
majority, evidence of mutual consent is all that is necessary 
for one spouse to convey his interest in a tenancy by the 
entirety to the other spouse.  I disagree with the majority 
because, in my opinion, it ignores the fundamental nature of 
tenancies by the entirety, creates an incorrect standard for 
reviewing such conveyances, and unnecessarily creates an 
exception to longstanding principles of law that could 
potentially, as demonstrated by the facts at bar, create 
uncertainty as to ownership. 
 
This Court has long recognized that “[n]either spouse can 
by separate act make an absolute disposition of property they 
 
17 
hold as tenants by the entirety.”  Rogers v. Rogers, 257 Va. 
323, 326, 512 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1999) (quoting Jones v. 
Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 181, 314 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1984)).  This is 
because tenancies by the entirety are based on the legal 
fiction that husband and wife are one entity.  Id.  As husband 
and wife are one, “neither [spouse] has an interest [in the 
property] which can be conveyed.”  Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 
Va. 735, 742, 66 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1951).  Indeed, it is the 
very fact that neither spouse has an individual interest in 
the property that protects the tenancy by the entirety from 
judgments against only one spouse.  Id. at 742-43, 66 S.E.2d 
at 603-04. 
Notably, in the 1976 deed, Douglas purported to convey 
“all of his interest” in the Fairway Drive property.  If 
Douglas, as an individual, held any interest in the Fairway 
Drive property which he could unilaterally convey, that 
interest would be reachable by any of Douglas’ creditors.  
Clearly, that is not the case because, as previously noted, 
Douglas’ interest in the Fairway Drive property amounts to no 
interest at all.  Thus, it is clear that Wanda and Douglas, 
jointly as husband and wife, held all of the interest in the 
Fairway Drive property. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Douglas had no individual 
interest in the Fairway Drive property, “it is settled beyond 
 
18 
debate that . . . tenants by the entirety [have] no power to 
alienate permanently their interest, unless they act[] 
together.”  Jones, 227 Va. at 182, 314 S.E.2d at 65 (emphasis 
added).  See also Vasilion, 192 Va. at 740, 66 S.E.2d at 602 
(“When an estate by the entireties is once set up, neither 
spouse can sever it by his or her sole act.”).  Given that 
Douglas and Wanda’s actions in the present case occurred over 
16 years apart, it can hardly be said that they acted 
together.  Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that 
Wanda was even aware of Douglas’ unilateral actions until she 
executed the 1993 deed. 
 
Further, the majority fails to explain the state of the 
property between the time it is conveyed by one spouse and the 
time such conveyance is accepted by the other.  I recognize 
that this may be of little consequence in a case where the 
conveyance and acceptance occur simultaneously, but a coherent 
doctrine must also account for cases like the present, where 
the gap between unilateral conveyance and affirmative 
acceptance is measured in years.  When does the tenancy by the 
entirety actually terminate: on the date of the initial 
conveyance, on the date the deed is recorded, or on the date 
it is affirmatively accepted?  I recognize that such questions 
may have little bearing on the present case, but they will 
likely have significant ramifications in other areas of the 
 
19 
law (e.g., tax, bankruptcy, etc.).  Furthermore, although the 
majority addresses the need for an affirmative acceptance to 
avoid the potential mischief a surreptitious conveyance could 
cause, it fails to address the reverse situation, where the 
grantee-spouse withholds affirmative acceptance to the 
detriment of the grantor-spouse. 
I also take issue with the majority’s reliance on Wanda’s 
acceptance of Douglas’ unilateral conveyance to demonstrate 
the parties “mutual consent.”  Mutual consent, without more, 
has never been recognized as a valid means for terminating a 
tenancy by the entirety.  Indeed, the phrase “mutual consent” 
has never once been mentioned in our entire jurisprudence on 
tenancies by the entirety. 
It has been established law in this Commonwealth since 
1825 that terminating a tenancy by the entirety requires “a 
joint conveyance of the property.”  Vasilion, 192 Va. at 740, 
66 S.E.2d at 602 (citing 2 Raleigh C. Minor, The Law of Real 
Property, § 854 (1908)).  See also Thornton v. Thornton, 24 
Va. (3 Rand.) 179, 183 (1825).  This is true regardless of 
whether the property is being conveyed to one spouse or to a 
third party.  While such an approach may appear to put form 
over substance, in reality, it avoids all of the pitfalls 
discussed above.  Both parties, along with any affected third 
parties, will immediately know the state of the property 
 
20 
ownership; there can be no gamesmanship in the form of 
surreptitious conveyances or withheld acceptances; and the 
“mutual consent” of both spouses is readily apparent in the 
joint conveyance. 
Rather than relying on a strained interpretation of the 
alleged 1976 conveyance from Douglas to Wanda, I would reverse 
the judgment of the trial court based on the terms of the 
November 30, 1995 settlement agreement (the “Settlement 
Agreement”).  At the time Douglas entered into the Settlement 
Agreement, Wanda had already passed away.  Therefore, Douglas 
was the sole owner of the property because the tenancy by the 
entirety had terminated with Wanda’s death.  At that point, he 
was free to alienate his interest in the property, which he 
did in the Settlement Agreement, with the exception of a life 
interest.  In exchange, he received $81,869.63 in 
consideration.  As Douglas only retained a life estate, he had 
no interest to pass on to his heirs.  Accordingly, I concur 
with the majority that a judgment confirming that the Fairway 
Drive property is the property of the trust should have been 
entered for William.