Case Title: P. v. Galland

Citation: 45 Cal. 4th 354 original opinion

Docket Number: S149890

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 12/29/08 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S149890 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G034189 
ANTHONY ANDREW GALLAND, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 01CF2350 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In this case, City of Buena Park police obtained a warrant to search 
defendant’s home, vehicle, and person for methamphetamine and evidence of 
methamphetamine sales.  After the warrant was executed, a portion of the search 
warrant affidavit was ordered sealed to protect the identity and safety of one or 
more confidential informants.  The magistrate ordered that this portion of the 
affidavit be secured in the Buena Park Police Department property room.  The 
sealed affidavit was subsequently brought to court to enable the Orange County 
Superior Court to rule on defendant’s motions under Penal Code section 1538.5 to 
quash and traverse the warrant and to suppress the evidence.  The motions were 
denied, and the original sealed portion of the affidavit was returned to police 
custody. 
When defendant appealed the ruling, the Court of Appeal discovered that 
the police department had purged its files of the original sealed portion of the 
affidavit.  The Court of Appeal declared that the magistrate’s order concerning the 
 
2 
custody of the affidavit was unsupported by any authority and held instead that the 
Penal Code required the magistrate “to retain the entire search warrant affidavit 
when the warrant is issued or at the time the return is filed.”  The Court of Appeal 
reasoned further that the remaining record was inadequate to permit meaningful 
appellate review and therefore reversed the denial of defendant’s motions to quash 
and traverse the warrant and to suppress the evidence seized under the warrant, 
even though the superior court had determined, as a matter of fact, that a substitute 
five-page document provided by the Orange County District Attorney’s Office 
was an unsigned version of the same warrant affidavit that had been provided to 
the magistrate.   
We agree the magistrate erred in directing that the original sealed portion of 
the affidavit be retained by the police department, but not for the reasons stated by 
the Court of Appeal.  A sealed affidavit in support of a search warrant may be 
retained by the requesting law enforcement agency only upon a showing (1) that 
disclosure of the information would impair further investigation of criminal 
conduct or endanger the safety of the confidential informant or the informant’s 
family; (2) that security procedures at the court clerk’s office governing a sealed 
search warrant affidavit are inadequate to protect the affidavit against disclosure to 
unauthorized persons; (3) that security procedures at the law enforcement agency 
or other entity are sufficient to protect the affidavit against disclosure to 
unauthorized persons; (4) that the law enforcement agency or other entity has 
procedures to ensure that the affidavit is retained for 10 years after final 
disposition of the noncapital case, permanently in a capital case, or until further 
order of the court (see Gov. Code, § 68152, subd. (j)(18)), so as to protect the 
defendant’s right to meaningful judicial review; and (5) that the magistrate has 
made a sufficient record of the documents that were reviewed, including the sealed 
materials, so as to permit identification of the original sealed affidavit in future 
 
3 
proceedings or to permit reconstruction of the affidavit, if necessary.  Because the 
People failed to make such a showing here, the magistrate erred in allowing the 
original sealed portion of the affidavit to be retained by the police department.   
We further find, however, that the Court of Appeal was mistaken in 
concluding that the magistrate’s error, and the subsequent loss of the original 
sealed search warrant affidavit, rendered it impossible to safeguard defendant’s 
right to meaningful appellate review.  Although the original affidavit has been lost, 
the superior court determined that the five-page unsigned document submitted by 
the district attorney’s office in its place was otherwise identical to the affidavit the 
superior court had reviewed prior to denying defendant’s motion to suppress, and 
that factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.  Moreover, subsequent to 
the Court of Appeal’s decision, the Orange County Superior Court discovered a 
copy of the original sealed search warrant affidavit in its files.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.           
BACKGROUND 
We take our facts largely from the prior Court of Appeal opinions arising 
from defendant’s criminal conviction.      
On August 9, 2001, Judge Daniel B. McNerney issued a search warrant for 
defendant Anthony Andrew Galland’s home, vehicle, and person.  The warrant 
was supported by Buena Park Police Detective David Hankins’s affidavit of 
probable cause that methamphetamine and items tending to establish sales of 
methamphetamine would be found there and was executed during the evening 
hours of August 9.  Defendant was arrested after methamphetamine was found on 
his person and in the trunk of his vehicle.  The police subsequently found 
methamphetamine and marijuana, evidence of drug sales activities, and guns in 
defendant’s mobile home.   
 
4 
Eight days later, Hankins appeared before Judge James P. Marion with the 
original search warrant, warrant affidavit, return, and property report.  Hankins 
requested an order sealing the portion of the search warrant affidavit that 
contained the probable cause showing in order to protect the identity of a 
confidential informant, relying on the holding in People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
948 (Hobbs).  Hankins further requested that the sealed portion of the warrant be 
secured in the Buena Park Police Department property room.  Judge Marion 
signed the order.     
Hankins filed the sealed search warrant, return, and property report with the 
clerk of the superior court, but retained the sealed portion of the original warrant 
affidavit and transported this sealed document to the Buena Park Police 
Department for storage in its property room.  The partial search warrant affidavit 
filed with the court included Hankins’s training and experience but did not identify 
the basis for his belief that a search of defendant’s home, person, and property 
would reveal evidence of a crime.  The portion retained by Hankins contained the 
facts necessary to establish probable cause for the search.  Sometime later, for 
reasons not disclosed in the record, the court ordered the search warrant, partial 
affidavit, return, and property report in its possession to be unsealed and available 
to defendant’s attorney. 
In June 2002, defendant filed motions to quash and traverse the search 
warrant and to suppress evidence seized as a result of the search.  He challenged 
the validity of the warrant on numerous grounds, including the fact that Hankins 
had failed to file the complete original search warrant affidavit or a copy in the 
court file.  Defendant requested the trial court conduct an in camera review of the 
entire warrant affidavit to determine whether it contained probable cause and 
whether any of the sealed affidavit could be disclosed without jeopardizing the 
identity of the confidential informant.  The prosecution opposed the motion, 
 
5 
arguing that no legal authority required the issuing magistrate to retain the original 
warrant affidavit while the search warrant was executed and, in the alternative, 
that suppression of the evidence would not be a proper remedy assuming a 
violation of proper procedure.   
On August 2, 2002, Judge Robert R. Fitzgerald held an evidentiary hearing 
on defendant’s motions.  Defendant orally renewed his request for an in camera 
review of the sealed portion of the warrant affidavit.  Judge Fitzgerald did not rule 
on defendant’s request for in camera review, but proceeded to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on a knock-notice issue raised by the defense.  At the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Fitzgerald ruled as follows:  
“Discrepancy in the testimony is resolved in favor of law enforcement as opposed 
to a convicted criminal defendant in the same case.  [¶]  In that regard the motion 
in its entirety, unless there’s other argument shall be denied.  And that concludes 
our 1538.5.”  Defense counsel again requested an in camera review of the warrant 
affidavit or a continuance to file the appropriate discovery motion.  This request 
was denied.  Defendant pleaded guilty 17 days later to transporting 
methamphetamine and to possessing methamphetamine for sale and admitted 
arming enhancements as to both counts as well as five prior prison term 
allegations.  After he was sentenced to five years in prison, he filed an appeal from 
the court’s order denying his motions to quash and traverse the warrant and to 
suppress evidence and his request to file a discovery motion.   
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal held that Judge Fitzgerald’s 
denial of defendant’s request for an in camera review of the warrant affidavit 
violated the procedure set forth in Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th 948.  (People v. 
Galland (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 489, 492-494.)  The Court of Appeal noted that 
the sealed portion of the warrant affidavit, which Hankins had retained, was not a 
part of the appellate record.  From this omission, the Court of Appeal concluded 
 
6 
that Judge Fitzgerald had not reviewed the affidavit.  (Id. at p. 494.)  The Court of 
Appeal conditionally reversed the judgment to allow the trial court to conduct an 
in camera review of the search warrant affidavit and to prepare a proper record of 
those proceedings.  (Id. at p. 495.)   
Judge Fitzgerald conducted the in camera review on June 29, 2004.  By 
stipulation the parties agreed that Judge Marion had ordered a portion of the 
search warrant affidavit sealed and had directed Hankins, now an investigator for 
the district attorney’s office, to retain this document in the Buena Park Police 
Department property room.  They further agreed that Hankins would testify if 
called as a witness that he had transported the sealed portion of the original search 
warrant affidavit to the Buena Park Police Department property room for storage, 
that he had not altered or changed the original, and that he had brought the original 
sealed affidavit to court for the June 29 hearing.  The court accepted the parties’ 
stipulation and proceeded in chambers with Hankins.   
Judge Fitzgerald stated that based on his in camera review of the 
documents, a “conversation” with Hankins, and Hankins’s assurance that he had 
provided “the entirety of the package,” the reasons for sealing the warrant affidavit 
remained and the defense was not entitled to any further disclosure.  Judge 
Fitzgerald again denied defendant’s motion to quash and traverse the search 
warrant.  During the in camera hearing, Judge Fitzgerald ordered copies of the 
original documents to be sealed and placed in the court file and the original sealed 
documents to be returned “to the law enforcement agent.”     
On July 8, 2004, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial 
court’s denial of his motions to quash or traverse the warrant and to suppress 
evidence.  On February 28, 2005, the Court of Appeal received an affidavit from 
the clerk of the appellate division of the superior court.  The clerk averred that the 
sealed portion of the original search warrant affidavit, the part Hankins had 
 
7 
retained for storage at the Buena Park Police Department, was not in the court’s 
file.  The clerk further stated that a sergeant from the Buena Park Police 
Department had advised that the sealed portion of the original search warrant 
affidavit was “purged/destroyed.”  The Buena Park Police Department confirmed 
this information by letter dated March 2, 2005.   
On March 9, 2005, the Court of Appeal received a five-page facsimile from 
the Orange County District Attorney’s Office, which included what appeared to be 
an unsigned version of the entire warrant affidavit.  Because the document 
included information that might identify a confidential informant, the Court of 
Appeal ordered the five-page facsimile sealed.  A copy of the sealed facsimile was 
transmitted back to the superior court for it to determine whether this five-page 
facsimile was the same document the superior court had reviewed in camera on 
June 29, 2004.  If the superior court were to authenticate the five-page facsimile, 
the court was to augment the appellate record and prepare a supplemental clerk’s 
transcript.   
On April 12, 2005, Judge Fitzgerald reviewed the five-page facsimile 
pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s order and determined that it was in substance the 
same as the affidavit he had reviewed in camera on June 29, 2004.  He also 
discovered “another piece of paper that was in another sealed envelope.”  This 
newly discovered piece of paper, according to the Court of Appeal, contains 
evidence relevant to the probable cause determination and is likely to reveal the 
identity of a confidential informant if made public.  Without explaining the origin 
of this document, Judge Fitzgerald determined that the newly discovered 
document had been inadvertently omitted from the superior court file.  Judge 
Fitzgerald ordered the court’s file augmented with a supplemental clerk’s 
transcript, “including this courts find [sic] and the sealed affidavit.” 
 
8 
In a second published opinion, the Court of Appeal held that allowing the 
police to retain a portion of the original search warrant affidavit was contrary to 
state law, deprived defendant of an adequate appellate record, and violated his 
right to due process.  The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded 
the matter to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.   
Subsequent to that decision, Judge Kazuharu Makino calendared the matter 
for the purpose of informing the parties that the Orange County Superior Court 
Clerk’s Office had located a filed copy of the sealed materials that were 
considered by Judge Fitzgerald at the June 29, 2004, in camera hearing.  The 
materials, although temporarily lost, had been in the possession of the court “all 
that time.”  When the defense claimed that there was still “a debate about what 
those materials are, given the history,” Judge Makino declared that he was “not 
having any kind of hearing resolving anything.”     
DISCUSSION 
Evidence Code section 1041 codifies the common law privilege against 
disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant.  Evidence Code section 
1042, subdivision (b) states, in particular, that disclosure of an informant’s identity 
is not required to establish the legality of a search pursuant to a warrant.  A 
corollary rule provides “that ‘if disclosure of the contents of [the informant’s] 
statement would tend to disclose the identity of the informer, the communication 
itself should come within the privilege.’ ”  (Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 961-
962.)  “These codified privileges and decisional rules together comprise an 
exception to the statutory requirement that the contents of a search warrant, 
including any supporting affidavits setting forth the facts establishing probable 
cause for the search, become a public record once the warrant is executed.”  (Id. at 
p. 962; cf. Pen. Code, § 1534, subd. (a).)  Instead, a court may order any 
identifying details to be redacted or, as in this case, a court may adopt “the 
 
9 
procedure of sealing portions of a search warrant affidavit that relate facts or 
information which, if disclosed in the public portion of the affidavit, will reveal or 
tend to reveal a confidential informant’s identity.”  (Hobbs, supra, at p. 963.)   
When a defendant seeks to quash or traverse a warrant where a portion of 
the supporting affidavit has been sealed, the relevant materials are to be made 
available for in camera review by the trial court.  (Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 
963; see Evid. Code, § 915, subd. (b).)  The court should determine first whether 
there are sufficient grounds for maintaining the confidentiality of the informant’s 
identity.  If so, the court should then determine whether the sealing of the affidavit 
(or any portion thereof) “is necessary to avoid revealing the informant’s identity.”  
(Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 972.)  Once the affidavit is found to have been 
properly sealed, the court should proceed to determine “whether, under the 
‘totality of the circumstances’ presented in the search warrant affidavit and the 
oral testimony, if any, presented to the magistrate, there was ‘a fair probability’ 
that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the place searched 
pursuant to the warrant” (if the defendant has moved to quash the warrant) or 
“whether the defendant’s general allegations of material misrepresentations or 
omissions are supported by the public and sealed portions of the search warrant 
affidavit, including any testimony offered at the in camera hearing” (if the 
defendant has moved to traverse the warrant).  (Id. at pp. 974, 975.)  The 
prosecutor may be present at the in camera hearing; the defendant and defense 
counsel are to be excluded unless the prosecutor elects to waive any objection to 
their presence.  However, defense counsel should be afforded the opportunity to 
submit written questions, reasonable in length, which shall be asked by the trial 
judge of any witness called to testify at the proceeding.  (Id. at p. 973.) 
These procedures were “designed to strike a fair balance between the 
People’s privilege to refuse disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity and 
 
10 
the defendant’s limited discovery rights in connection with any challenge to the 
search warrant’s validity.”  (Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 964.)  As we have noted, 
“ ‘there is a fundamental difference between a trial to adjudicate guilt or innocence 
and a pretrial hearing to suppress evidence.  The due process requirements for a 
hearing may be less elaborate and demanding than those at the trial proper.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 968.)  Thus, “ ‘[a] defendant’s interest in availing himself of the exclusionary 
rule may, in exceptional circumstances, be subordinated to safety precautions 
necessary to encourage citizens to participate in law enforcement.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The 
“strong and legitimate interest in protecting the informant’s identity” (People v. 
Luttenberger (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1, 19) derives from the need to protect the safety of 
the informant and the informant’s family, the need to preserve the informant’s 
usefulness in current and future investigations, and the need to assure others who 
are contemplating cooperation with law enforcement of their safety as well.  
(McCray v. Illinois (1967) 386 U.S. 300, 308-309.)     
In this case, the magistrate ordered the search warrant affidavit to be sealed, 
and the superior court reviewed the sealed affidavit in camera, ordered that it 
remain sealed, and denied defendant’s motions to quash and traverse the warrant.  
Our review, however, does not encompass any of those rulings.  The parties have 
asked us instead to decide where the original sealed warrant affidavit should be 
stored once the search warrant has been executed and what should happen to 
defendant’s challenges to the warrant on appeal when the original sealed affidavit 
has been lost.  Neither of these questions is answered in Hobbs, but Hobbs does 
inform our analysis of the important competing interests at stake.     
A 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the statutory scheme governing the 
issuance of a warrant (Pen. Code, §§ 1523-1541) “ ‘read as a whole’ requires the 
magistrate to retain the entire search warrant affidavit when the warrant is issued 
 
11 
or at the time the return is filed.”  This was so, the Court of Appeal continued, 
because an “affidavit” as used in sections 1523 et seq. includes “the entire 
affidavit,” regardless of whether part of it has been sealed, and is thus “a court 
record subject to the pertinent Government Code sections,” including Government 
Code section 69846, which provides:  “The clerk of the superior court shall safely 
keep or dispose of according to law all papers and records filed or deposited in any 
action or proceeding before the court.”   
Thus, as to papers or records filed or deposited in any action, the superior 
court may either “safely keep” them or “dispose of [them] according to law.”  
(Gov. Code, § 69846.)  Defendant argues that “[i]n this context, the term ‘dispose’ 
clearly refers to destruction” and that “[o]ne does not ‘dispose’ of documents by 
giving them to the police for safekeeping.”  Certainly the destruction of court 
records, which is governed by Government Code sections 68152 and 68153, is 
included within the meaning of “dispose” in Government Code section 69846.  
Section 68152 sets forth the retention periods for various categories of court 
records, including search warrants, which may not be destroyed until at least 10 
years after the final disposition in a noncapital case.  (Gov. Code, § 68152, subd. 
(j)(18).)  After that period, section 68153 provides that such records “may be 
destroyed.  Destruction shall be by shredding, burial, burning, erasure, 
obliteration, recycling, or other method approved by the court, except confidential 
and sealed records, which shall not be buried or recycled unless the text of the 
records is first obliterated.”   
However, a review of the Penal Code reveals that the destruction of court 
records under Government Code sections 68152 and 68153 is not the only way the 
clerk of court may “dispose” of papers and records filed or deposited in any action 
or proceeding “according to law.”  (Gov. Code, § 69846.)  Penal Code section 
1417.5 provides that 60 days after the final determination of a criminal action or 
 
12 
proceeding, the clerk of court shall “dispose” of exhibits introduced or filed in the 
proceeding by releasing them to the person who was in lawful possession of the 
exhibits or to the person establishing title to or a right to possession of the exhibits.  
(Pen. Code, § 1417.5, subd. (b)(1), (2).)  If that person fails to apply for return of 
the exhibit, the clerk of court is instructed to dispose of the item by transferring it 
to the appropriate county agency for sale (id., § 1417, subd. (c)(2)) or, if the item 
is money or currency, by transferring it to the county treasurer with instructions to 
publish a public notice.  (Id., § 1420.)  Even before the action has been finally 
determined, the court may order an exhibit released to the appropriate party “upon 
stipulation of the parties or upon notice and motion” under specified conditions 
(id., § 1417.2) or where the exhibit “poses a security, storage, or safety problem.”  
(Id., § 1417.3.)  And, in a situation analogous to the current one, an application for 
and an order approving the interception of any wire or electronic communication 
“shall be sealed by the judge” and “[c]ustody of the applications and orders shall 
be where the judge orders.”  (Id., § 629.66; see also id., § 629.64 [custody of 
recordings of any intercepted wire or electronic communication “shall be where 
the judge orders”].)   
As demonstrated by these examples, the statutory scheme contemplates that 
certain court records may, even prior to the final determination of the action, be 
retained in the custody of someone other than the clerk of court.  Although the 
Penal Code does not explicitly identify the custodian for a sealed search warrant 
affidavit,1 we note that the term “according to law” is not limited to statutory law 
                                              
1  
The California Rules of Court do not provide an explicit answer, either.  
Although sealed records “must be securely filed and kept separate from the public 
file in the case” under rule 2.551(f) of the California Rules of Court, this rule does 
not apply to “records that are required to be kept confidential by law” (Cal. Rules 
of Court, rule 2.550(a)(2)), such as “search warrant affidavits sealed under People 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
13 
but encompasses decisional law as well.  (Cf. Estate of Ford (2004) 32 Cal.4th 
160, 173 [“Evidence Code section 115 provides that the burden of proof in civil 
cases is a preponderance of the evidence ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.’  
The law providing for a higher standard of proof may include decisional law”].)  
For example, we have recognized that confidential law enforcement personnel 
files that are reviewed in camera by the court under Pitchess v. Superior Court 
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 may be retained by the custodian of those records instead of 
by the court, provided that the court makes an adequate record of what was 
reviewed.  (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228-1230; see also Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 2.551(g); cf. In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 223 [trial 
court need not retain documents reviewed by the court that “contain matters 
unrelated to the defendant’s case whose disclosure would interfere with effective 
law enforcement”].)  Similarly, to determine whether the law permits a sealed 
search warrant affidavit to be retained in the custody of an entity other than the 
court, we must balance the public’s interest in preventing disclosure of the 
confidential informant’s identity against the defendant’s interest in maintaining the 
integrity of the record and in preserving that record for further judicial review.  
(Cf. Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 971-972.)   
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948.”  (Advisory Com. com. to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
2.550.)  Rule 2.585(b) provides that records examined by the court in a 
confidential in camera proceeding must be filed “under seal” but does not specify 
where those records must be kept.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(g); cf. 
Tenn. R. Crim. Proc., rule 41(d) [“The magistrate shall prepare an original and two 
exact copies of each search warrant.  The magistrate shall keep one copy as a part 
of his or her official records”].)   
 
14 
Defendant, like the Court of Appeal, contends that a search warrant 
affidavit must be filed with the clerk of the superior court at the earliest 
opportunity and must remain there until such time as the document is eligible to be 
destroyed.  (See Gov. Code, § 68152, subd. (j)(18).)  The People, on the other 
hand, argue that law enforcement should be permitted to seek an order allowing 
the original sealed search warrant affidavit to be retained at a location other than 
the court, as long as the court describes the materials reviewed with sufficient 
particularity to permit authentication of those materials in future proceedings.   
We find that neither position strikes the appropriate balance of these 
important competing interests.  Defendant’s approach gives too little weight to the 
“strong and legitimate interest” (People v Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 19) 
in securing the safety of the confidential informant and the likelihood that 
informants will be reluctant to cooperate with law enforcement if the 
confidentiality of their identities cannot be maintained.  The People’s approach 
fails to consider the possibility that the court, in certain circumstances, may be a 
more secure location than a law enforcement agency for maintaining the integrity 
of the record and preserving it for further judicial review.  As the Court of Appeal 
noted, a law enforcement agency (or its officers) should not be allowed to retain 
court documents “simply because the agency prefers to maintain custody of 
documents relating to the identity of a confidential informant.”  In the absence of a 
particularized showing, we must presume that the court clerk’s office can 
safeguard the sealed documents in its possession.  (People v. Martinez (1999) 22 
Cal.4th 106, 125 [citing Evidence Code section 664]; People v. Smith (1965) 234 
Cal.App.2d 404, 407.)  By the same token, though, law enforcement should not be 
put to the choice of either risking the safety of a confidential informant or 
refraining from the prosecution of the crimes uncovered by the informant where 
 
15 
security procedures for sealed documents at the clerk’s office are demonstrably 
inadequate.     
In our view, a sealed search warrant affidavit, like search warrant affidavits 
generally, should ordinarily be part of the court record that is maintained at the 
court.  Such a rule minimizes the potential for tampering with the record and 
eliminates the need for time-consuming and cumbersome record-authentication 
procedures.  (E.g., People v. Martinez (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 233, 239.)  
However, a sealed search warrant affidavit may be retained by the law 
enforcement agency upon a showing (1) that disclosure of the information would 
impair further investigation of criminal conduct or endanger the safety of the 
confidential informant; (2) that security procedures at the court clerk’s office 
governing a sealed search warrant affidavit are inadequate to protect the affidavit 
against disclosure to unauthorized persons; (3) that security procedures at the law 
enforcement agency or other entity are sufficient to protect the affidavit against 
disclosure to unauthorized persons; (4) that the law enforcement agency or other 
entity has procedures to ensure that the affidavit is retained for 10 years after final 
disposition of the noncapital case, permanently in a capital case, or until further 
order of the court (see Gov. Code, § 68152, subd. (j)(18)), so as to protect the 
defendant’s right to meaningful judicial review; and (5) that the magistrate has 
made a sufficient record of the documents that were reviewed, including the sealed 
materials, so as to permit identification of the original sealed affidavit in future 
proceedings or to permit reconstruction of the affidavit, if necessary.  Defendant is 
correct that “there is nothing inconsistent with the preservation of confidentiality 
and the retention of confidential information in sealed court files”—but that is so 
only in the absence of a showing that court procedures concerning sealed 
affidavits are inadequate to protect the affidavit against disclosure to unauthorized 
persons.  Where the record shows that court procedures are inadequate to protect 
 
16 
the informant’s identity—and that the law enforcement agency can protect the 
informant’s identity and the integrity of the sealed affidavit—there is nothing in 
the Penal Code or in the Constitution to bar the law enforcement agency from 
retaining custody of the original sealed affidavit.  
The circumstances in this case do not leave one with great confidence in 
either the clerk’s office or in the police department.  Although the superior court 
made a copy of the sealed search warrant affidavit following the June 29, 2004, 
hearing on defendant’s motions challenging the warrant, the clerk’s office was 
unaware of its whereabouts for a significant period of time, and the record does 
not reflect what security procedures (if any) governed the sealed affidavit during 
that period.  The police department did maintain the original affidavit in a secure 
location, yet failed to ensure that the affidavit was retained for the requisite period 
or to prevent its destruction.  There is, of course, the possibility of error or 
negligence in every human endeavor.  Nonetheless, it may prove fruitful for all 
involved parties to consider how confidential and sensitive documents under seal 
might best be maintained with sufficient security and retained for the requisite 
length of time.  In particular, courts should endeavor to promptly address and 
resolve security concerns identified by the People so that those confidential 
records may be maintained securely at the court.  This problem may merit 
consideration as a statewide policy matter, and we suggest to the Judicial Council 
that it establish a task force for that purpose.   
Regardless of what eventually occurred, however, the magistrate here erred 
in permitting the police department to retain custody of the original sealed search 
warrant affidavit without a showing that the clerk’s office was unable to maintain 
the sealed affidavit with adequate security and that the police department had 
adequate procedures to maintain the sealed affidavit in a secure location and to 
retain the affidavit for the requisite period of time, and without describing the 
 
17 
affidavit it reviewed with sufficient specificity so that a reviewing court in a future 
proceeding could have confidence it was examining the same document.   
We do not purport to exhaust the methods by which a magistrate may 
create a record of a sealed search warrant affidavit that is not retained by the court, 
but it may prove helpful for the magistrate to consider describing the sealed 
document’s general physical characteristics (i.e., the number of pages or 
paragraphs), marking each page of the affidavit with the magistrate’s initials, 
directing the People to file a redacted version of the sealed affidavit, or other 
methods to facilitate identification or reconstruction of the sealed document in 
future proceedings.  (Cf. People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229.)  
B 
Defendant, like the Court of Appeal, contends that the error that led to the 
destruction of the original sealed search warrant affidavit rendered meaningful 
appellate review of the warrant impossible and that the due process violation 
requires suppression of the evidence seized under the warrant.  We disagree.  The 
record reconstructed by the superior court is sufficient to permit meaningful 
appellate review of the warrant. 
“ ‘A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to an appellate record adequate 
to permit “meaningful appellate review.” ’ ”  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
686, 756.)  In this case, defendant seeks review of the validity of the search 
warrant, which was supported by an affidavit that is now missing.  The absence of 
an affidavit to support an executed search warrant, however, does not invalidate 
the warrant when “other evidence may be presented to establish the fact that an 
affidavit was presented, as well as its contents.”  (U.S. v. Lambert (11th Cir. 1989) 
887 F.2d 1568, 1571-1572; accord, U.S. v. Gibbs (5th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 352, 
356 [quoting Lambert]; U.S. v. Towne (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2d 537, 543 [same]; 
U.S. v. Campbell (E.D.Mich. 2007) 525 F.Supp.2d 891, 907 [same]; see generally 
 
18 
State v. Raflik (Wis. 2001) 636 N.W.2d 690, 697 [“most federal courts have not 
seen fit to suppress evidence because of a failure to record some or all of the 
warrant application”].)  “ ‘The rule that emerges is that reversal is indicated only 
where critical evidence or a substantial part of a [record] is irretrievably lost or 
destroyed, and there is no alternative way to provide an adequate record so that the 
appellate court may pass upon the question sought to be raised.’ ”  (People v. 
Curry (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 349, 354; see also People v. Holloway (1990) 50 
Cal.3d 1098, 1116, disapproved on other grounds, People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.)     
The superior court here determined that the record was adequate.  We 
review the superior court’s findings regarding the reconstruction of the original 
search warrant affidavit, which are essentially factual, under a deferential 
substantial evidence standard.  We then independently determine whether the 
record, as reconstructed and settled by the trial court, is adequate to allow the 
appeal to proceed meaningfully.  (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 662; 
People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1011 [“This court has repeatedly recognized 
that settlement of the record is primarily a question of fact to be resolved by the 
trial court”].)  
On April 12, 2005, the superior court found that the five-page unsigned 
document the Court of Appeal had obtained from the Orange County District 
Attorney’s Office was the same in content as the search warrant affidavit it had 
reviewed on June 29, 2004.  The superior court’s own recollection constitutes 
substantial evidence that the content of the two documents was the same.  (People 
v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1231; accord, State v. Raflik, supra, 636 N.W.2d 
at pp. 699, 701.)   
Defendant does not challenge the superior court’s finding that the five-page 
document it reviewed on April 12, 2005, was the same as the affidavit it had 
 
19 
reviewed on June 29, 2004, when it denied his motion to suppress.  He argues 
instead that the record is inadequate because the critical issue is what document 
the magistrate reviewed before issuing the search warrant, and the magistrate has 
no recollection of reviewing or signing this search warrant and would be unable to 
say whether the affidavit the superior court reviewed on April 12, 2005, is the 
same in substance as the one he reviewed on August 9, 2001.   
Detective Hankins, however, did have such a recollection.  According to 
the parties’ stipulation, Hankins would have testified that the sealed affidavit the 
superior court reviewed on June 29, 2004, was “the exact sealed portion of the 
affidavit from the time in 2001,” that the affidavit had been stored at the Buena 
Park Police Department in the interim, and that “[i]t has not been altered or 
changed in any way.”  Hankins’s testimony, which was credited by the superior 
court, provides substantial evidence that the sealed affidavit was the same affidavit 
presented to the magistrate in support of the warrant.  (See People v. Hawthorne 
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 64 [“Because defense counsel were not present during 
relevant events, their failure to contribute to the settled statement is both 
understandable and without significance to its reliability”]; accord, U.S. v. Gibbs, 
supra, 421 F.3d at p. 359 [relying on the testimony of a sheriff’s deputy that at 
least one drug buy was included in the search warrant affidavit, now missing, that 
was submitted to the issuing judge]; U.S. v. Towne, supra, 997 F.2d at p. 539 
[relying on police officer’s testimony that an attachment to a pleading was 
identical to the search warrant’s missing attachment]; Nutt v. State 
(Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1973) 299 A.2d 468, 470 [relying on officer’s testimony that 
copy of search warrant affidavit was identical to the missing original].)  Indeed, 
“there is no reason to think that extrinsic evidence cannot be considered to 
establish the circumstances under which a warrant was issued and the nature of the 
documents relied upon in authorizing a search, insofar as such matters are deemed 
 
20 
relevant to the constitutional inquiry.”  (U.S. v. Towne, supra, 997 F.2d at p. 542; 
accord, People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 391-393 [relying on extrinsic 
evidence to establish the contents of an affidavit where the original affidavit in 
support of the arrest warrant had been destroyed by the clerk’s office]; cf. U.S. v. 
Pratt (11th Cir. 2006) 438 F.3d 1264, 1266 [“We hold that the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit the use of other evidence to establish the existence and the 
contents of a lost search warrant”].)        
In concluding that the record was insufficient to enable meaningful 
appellate review, the Court of Appeal did not directly confront the basis for the 
superior court’s finding that the sealed affidavit it reviewed on June 29, 2004, was 
the same affidavit the magistrate had reviewed prior to issuing the warrant, nor did 
it challenge the basis for the superior court’s finding that the five-page document 
was the same in content as the sealed affidavit the superior court had reviewed on 
June 29, 2004.  Indeed, the Court of Appeal did not even identify what standard of 
review it was applying before arriving at its conclusion that “there is good cause to 
doubt the authenticity of the confidential attachment in the appellate record.”  The 
Court of Appeal focused instead on its finding that “at every procedural juncture 
the trial court’s handling of the warrant affidavit invited error and confusion,” 
from the moment Hankins was allowed to retain “the crucial part of the warrant 
affidavit,” to the superior court’s failure initially to review the affidavit in camera 
prior to ruling on defendant’s motions, and finally to the superior court’s 
“subsequent and belated review, which yielded an entirely new page to add to [the 
sealed materials].”  Although the decision to allow the police to retain custody of 
the original sealed search warrant affidavit was error (as we have discussed 
above), and although the superior court’s failure to review the sealed warrant 
affidavit at the initial hearing on defendant’s motions challenging the warrant was 
error as well (see People v. Galland, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 492-494) and 
 
21 
the police department’s subsequent destruction of the sealed warrant affidavit was 
surely regrettable, the question on appeal is whether the reconstructed record is 
nonetheless sufficient to permit appellate review of the warrant.  The superior 
court found that the reconstructed record—i.e., the unsigned five-page 
document—was identical in substance to the lost affidavit, and that finding is 
supported by substantial evidence.  (People v. Barnard (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 
400, 409.)2     
We share the Court of Appeal’s concern over the superior court’s discovery 
at the April 12, 2005, hearing of “ ‘another piece of paper that was in another 
sealed envelope,’ ” that has relevance to the determination of probable cause, and 
that “had been inadvertently omitted from the superior court file” but whose origin 
was unknown, but the failure to identify this additional document appears to be 
directly attributable to the very limited remand ordered by the Court of Appeal 
itself.  When the Court of Appeal realized that the sealed warrant affidavit was 
missing from the record, the proper procedure would have been to remand the case 
to the superior court with directions to hold a hearing to reconstruct or settle the 
record as to the missing search warrant affidavit and augment the record 
accordingly.  (See People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1231; People v. 
                                              
2  
The Court of Appeal also intimated that the passage of time had rendered 
the reconstruction of the record “too far attenuated from the magistrate’s 
determination of probable cause to serve as a legitimate basis for any decision on 
the warrant’s validity.”  But, as we have previously held, “[t]ime alone . . . is not 
the dispositive consideration in evaluating whether a reconstructed record affords 
meaningful appellate review.  The nature of the issue, the amount of the record 
reconstructed, and the means available to assist the process are all important in 
determining the reliability of any substitute for a contemporaneous verbatim 
account.”  (People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 64.)  The current record 
does not compel a finding that the passage of time has rendered reconstruction of 
the affidavit or other record-settlement procedures impossible.        
 
22 
Martinez, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 239; see also People v. Osband, supra, 13 
Cal.4th at p. 661.)  The Court of Appeal did order a remand, but only for a very 
narrow purpose:  “to review the [five-page document] to determine if it is the same 
affidavit reviewed by the court on June 29, 2004.  If the superior court determines 
the sealed document is the same affidavit it reviewed on June 29, 2004, the 
superior court is ordered to augment the record and prepare a supplemental Clerk’s 
Transcript to include the sealed affidavit.”  Thus, the reason the superior court did 
not identify the significance or provenance of the additional piece of paper in a 
separate sealed envelope is that the Court of Appeal never instructed the superior 
court to do so.  
We are concerned as well that the Court of Appeal provided no notice to 
the parties of its remand to the superior court or of its receipt of the augmented 
record, nor did it otherwise afford the parties an opportunity to participate in the 
record settlement process.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.155(d), 8.340(c).)  
However, we need not decide the precise effect of the failure to provide notice to 
the parties of the record-settlement process or the precise effect of the discovery of 
the unidentified additional piece of paper described above for it appears that, 
subsequent to the issuance of the Court of Appeal’s opinion, the superior court 
was able to locate the filed copy of the sealed search warrant affidavit in the 
clerk’s office.  It therefore seems most prudent to remand the matter to enable the 
superior court to conduct a full hearing to reconstruct or settle the record as to the 
missing original sealed search warrant affidavit.  At that hearing, the superior 
court may consider all relevant matters, including the filed copy of the sealed 
affidavit as well as the five-page document and the additional piece of paper the 
superior court viewed at the prior hearing, and, if necessary, inquire into the 
circumstances under which the original affidavit was purged.  The present 
 
23 
circumstances, however, do not justify a finding that defendant’s right to 
meaningful appellate review has been irrevocably compromised.    
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter is 
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J.  
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Galland 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 146 Cal.App.4th 277 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S149890 
Date Filed: December 29, 2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Robert R. Fitzgerald* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Jackie Menaster, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, 
Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holley A. Hoffman, 
Maxine P. Cutler, Stephen T. Oetting, Gil Gonzalez and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
*Retired judge of the Orange Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 
of the California Constitution.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jackie Menaster 
2658 Griffith Park Boulevard, #503 
Los Angeles, CA  90039-2520 
(323) 644-0952 
 
Lynne G. McGinnis 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2205