Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Reinhardt

Citation: 391 Md. 209

Docket Number: 1ag/05

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-C-05-3297
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 1
September Term, 2005
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
RICHARD J. REINHARDT 
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
Harrell, Battaglia and Greene, JJ. dissent. 
Filed: February 10, 2006
1The version of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct applicable to this case
is the version of the Maryland Rules in effect prior to July 1, 2005.
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland filed a petition with this Court for
disciplinary action against Richard J. Reinhardt, alleging violations of the Maryland Rules
of Professional Conduct.1  The Commission charged respondent with violating Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct: (1) Rule 1.1 Competence, (2) Rule 1.2 Scope of
Representation, (3) Rule 1.3 Diligence, (4) Rule 1.4 Communication, (5) Rule 3.2 Expediting
Litigation, and (6) Rule 8.4 Misconduct.  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), we referred
the matter to Judge Ruth Jakubowski of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to make
findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law.  Judge Jakubowski held an evidentiary
hearing and concluded that respondent had violated Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), and 1.4(b).
Respondent admitted to violating Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4(a) and
3.2.  
I.
“The Petitioner has charged Respondent with violating the following
rules of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.  
Rule 1.1. Competence. 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
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thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation. 
Rule 1.2. Scope of Representation. 
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and,
when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.  In a criminal case,
the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and
whether the client will testify. 
(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by
appointment does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political,
economic, social or moral views or activities. 
(c) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client
consents after consultation. 
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith
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effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the
law. 
(e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted
by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the lawyer shall
consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer’s
conduct.
Rule 1.3. Diligence. 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client. 
Rule 1.4. Communication. 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of
a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation. 
Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation. 
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client. 
Rule 8.4. Misconduct. 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:. . . 
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(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation; 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;. . . 
“The parties entered into a Stipulation (Joint Exhibit 1) in which most
of the allegations of Petitioner's Complaint have been admitted.  
“All the Petitioner's charges against the Respondent arise out of the
Respondent's handling of a personal injury claim of his client, Ms. Bernice
Cohen, who was involved in an automobile accident on August 2, 1996.  The
evidence was undisputed that Ms. Cohen was injured in a multi-vehicle
automobile accident in M aryland on August 2, 1996.  At the time of the
accident, Ms. Cohen was a resident of New York and the accident occurred in
Maryland.  The evidence is also undisputed that within about two days of Ms.
Cohen's release from Johns Hopkins Hospital, sometime in August of 1996,
she engaged the Respondent to represent her in any claims resulting from the
automobile accident.  It is further undisputed that the Respondent assisted Ms.
Cohen in making a claim against her spouse's auto insurance carrier for
personal injury protection (PIP) benefits and actually obtained these benefits
for Ms. Cohen.  It is also undisputed that the Respondent obtained the
investigative report, conducted his own investigation and obtained medical
reports and bills from Ms. Cohen’s health care provider.  Respondent admits
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that he was unable to obtain a financial settlement from the party and/or parties
who caused the accident.  
“It is further undisputed that on or about July 30, 1999, the Respondent
filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on behalf of Ms.
Cohen where he named five Defendants including a corporate entity.  It is
further undisputed that on or about July 30, 1999, the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County did issue summons to the Defendants named in the action.
It is further undisputed and admitted by the Respondent that he failed to serve
said Defendants and failed to take any further action on Ms. Cohen’s claim.
The Respondent further admits that Ms. Cohen wrote to him on January 14,
2000, requesting a status on her case.  The Respondent admitted that he did not
respond to this letter and in fact lost the file.  According to the testimony, he
placed the file in a briefcase and later put that briefcase in a closet, obtained
a new briefcase, and did not realize that he had left the file in the old briefcase.
It is further admitted by the Respondent that on or about February 20, 2001,
Ms. Cohen wrote to the Respondent again requesting information about the
status of the case and the Respondent admits to not responding to her letter.
“The evidence further showed that on September 27, 2001, the Clerk
of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County issued a Notice of Contemplated
Dismissal pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-507.  The exhibits presented by the
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Petitioner indicated that the notification was sent by mail to the Respondent at
his Bosley Road address.  In testimony before this Court the Respondent
indicated that he does not recall ever receiving the 2-507 notice.  Although he
admits that he failed to take any action to prevent the dismissal of the Circuit
Court lawsuit, he does state that if he had received this notice he would have
immediately filed a Motion to Stay the Dismissal under Rule 2-507.
“Furthermore, in reviewing the Respondent's file that was admitted into
evidence in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, there is no evidence that the 2-507
notification is in the Respondent's file for Ms. Cohen. 
“It is further undisputed that on or about April of 2003, Ms. Cohen
asked a friend, who is an attorney, to contact the Respondent to gain additional
information about the status of her case.  On or about May 15, 2003, it is
admitted that Elizabeth O'Leary, a New York attorney, spoke with the
Respondent by phone and indicated that he was trying to determine the status
of her case and promised to contact Ms. Cohen in a few days.  Respondent
failed to contact Ms. Cohen following the May, 2003, telephone conversation.
It is also admitted that on or about July 8, 2003, Ms. O'Leary, counsel in New
York, sent Respondent a letter as a follow-up again requesting follow-up.
“Respondent testified that sometime around July or August of 2003, he
conducted an aggressive search for the file.  He also testified that although he
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had been searching for the file since January of 2002, that at this point in time
he underwent a more rigorous search and ultimately found the lost file in a
briefcase in the closet.  It is further undisputed that on August 27, 2003, the
Respondent sent Ms. Cohen a letter enclosing a copy of the lawsuit.
“Respondent admits that he never told Ms. Cohen that he had lost her
file and that he had taken no action on her case since 1999.  He did, however,
indicate in his letter that there was an issue about securing service on multiple
Defendants and advised her to forward any additional medical expenses for
further processing.  Respondent testified that at the time he sent this letter he
did not know that the case had been dismissed on or about September 27,
2001.  It is undisputed by the Respondent that following the letter of August
27, 2003, he did not take any action on Ms. Cohen’s case.  It is further
admitted that Ms. Cohen wrote another letter to the Respondent on or about
December 3, 2003, informing that she had neither received mail or telephone
communications and wanted a response within thirty days.  Respondent
admitted to not responding to Ms. Cohen’s letter of December 3, 2003.
“It is further admitted that on or about April 7, 2004, Ms. Cohen
contacted the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland concerning
Respondent's conduct.  Respondent admitted in his testimony that he lost the
file and continued to search for it over an eighteen month period to no avail
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until August of 2003.  He denies that he ever knew that the case was dismissed
and testified that he first learned of the dismissal when meeting with a
representative of the Attorney Grievance Commission.  He testified that he
was "overwhelmed" when he found out that the case was dismissed. 
“The Respondent admits to violating Rule 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a)
(Communication) and Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation).  The Respondent
denies that he violated Rule 1.1 and 1.2 as he argues that both of these Rules
are subsumed by his lack of diligence which he admits in Rule 1.3.  The
Respondent denies that he violated Rule 8.4 (Misconduct) as a result of the
Respondent's admitting to violating Rules 1.3, 1.4(a) and 3.2, this Court only
will address Rule 1.1, 1.2 and 8.4 in making its Finding of Fact and
Conclusion of Law. 
Rule 1.1.  Competence.
“In considering all the facts and circumstances elicited through
testimony and exhibits in this case, this Court finds that by clear and
convincing evidence that the Respondent in fact was in violation of Maryland
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1.  The Respondent admitted to losing a
client's file and failing to reconstruct it in a timely fashion, therefore, this
Court finds that this admission alone is sufficient by clear and convincing
evidence to find that the Respondent violated Maryland Rule of Professional
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Conduct 1.1 under the case of Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ober, 350
Md. 616 (1998). 
Rule 1.2.  Scope of Representation.
“The Respondent admitted to not taking any action on the case after
July 30, 1999, when the file was lost.  He further admits to not communicating
with Ms. Cohen as to the fact that the file was lost and that he was taking no
action on her behalf despite her numerous requests regarding status and
ultimate resolution of this case.  This Court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the Respondent therefore did violate Maryland Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.2(a). 
Rule 1.4(b).  Communication.
“The Respondent testified that he failed to explain at any time following
July 30, 1999, that he had lost the file and that no additional action had been
taken on her case.  This failure is, in this Court's opinion, by clear and
convincing evidence, a violation of Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct
1.4(b) since the Respondent did nothing to permit Ms. Cohen to make an
informed decision regarding her representation. 
Rule 8.4. Misconduct.
“It is Petitioner's position that the Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) and
(d).  It is the Petitioner's position that there is insufficient mitigation based on
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the Respondent's testimony or the report of Dr. Janofsky regarding a serious
or debilitating disorder.  Furthermore, it is Petitioner's position that his conduct
in failing to take any action on Ms. Cohen's case and failing to tell her that he
had lost the file and that the case was in fact dismissed rises to the level of
proof by clear and convincing evidence to support a finding of a violation of
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4.  This Court has considered the
credibility of the Respondent and has reviewed the exhibits presented by both
the Petitioner and Respondent and does not find sufficient evidence to support
a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent's conduct in
this case rose to the level of misconduct as stated in Rule 8.4.  This Court has
reviewed the cases that relate to intent and has considered the Respondent's
explanation as to why he failed to tell Ms. Cohen that he lost the file and had
taken no action on her case since July of 1999.  Based on all the factors,
including credibility of the witness as well as the mitigating factors as testified
to by the Respondent and discussed in a separate paragraph in this opinion, this
Court finds that the Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of proof by clear
and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) and (d). 
Mitigating Factors
“The Respondent has introduced into evidence a report dated July 21,
2005, of Dr. Jeffrey Janofsky.  Dr. Janofsky is a psychiatrist who evaluated the
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Respondent for purposes of rendering an opinion as to his mental state at this
time.  Dr. Janofsky opined that Mr. Reinhardt was not suffering from a
diagnosable mental disorder but did suffer from personality trait vulnerabilities
that may have interfered with his ability to adequately resolve the Cohen
matter.  Dr. Janofsky reaffirmed what Mr. Reinhardt stated to him and to both
counsel and in fact to this Court, that the reason he failed to deal with what he
had done in the Cohen matter was due to "embarrassment".  Dr. Janofsky
opined that he failed to face the consequences of misplacing the file which led
to additional errors in judgment on his part.  Dr. Janofsky further notes that his
difficulties are exacerbated by a lack of secretaries, associates, partners or
other support systems to help him deal with case management.  This Court
found Dr. Janofsky's report supportive of this Court's findings that mitigating
factors did exist to explain the Respondent's action in this case.  This Court
considered these mitigating factors in arriving at her findings as it relates to
Rule 8.4(c) and (d) along with the testimony of the Respondent. 
Conclusions of Law
“The Respondent has admitted to violating Maryland Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4(a) and 3.2. 
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“This Court finds that the Respondent violated Maryland Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.1 by losing the client’s file and failing to reconstruct
it in a timely fashion.
“This Court further finds that the Respondent violated Rule 1.2 by
failing to follow the client’s instruction to pursue this case and inform her of
the status of the case.
“This Court finds that the Respondent violated Rule 1.4(b) in failing to
inform the client of his actions or lack of actions, therefore, denying her the
opportunity to make an informed decision as to further representation of her
case. 
“This Court finds that the Respondent did not violate Rule 8.4(c) and
(d) in that he did not have sufficient intent rising to the level of dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation to a standard of clear and convincing
evidence.  This Court has considered the mitigating factors as well as the
credibility of the Respondent in arriving at this conclusion.”
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II.
Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to find violations of 8.4(c) and (d).
Respondent has not filed any exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions
of law.  
This Court has original and complete jurisdiction in attorney discipline matters.
Attorney Grievance v. James, 385 Md. 637, 654, 870 A.2d 229, 239 (2005).  Clear and
convincing evidence must support the findings of the hearing judge.  Attorney Grievance v.
Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 363, 872 A.2d 693, 706 (2005).  The hearing judge’s findings of
fact are prima facie correct, and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.  Attorney
Grievance v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 586, 876 A.2d 642, 654 (2005).  We review the
hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo.  Id.
Bar Counsel argues that the hearing judge’s findings as to Rule 8.4(c) are clearly
erroneous because, in considering whether respondent violated the rules, the hearing judge
impermissibly considered mitigation evidence offered by respondent.  Citing Attorney
Grievance v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 872 A.2d 693 (2005), Bar Counsel argues that facts
tending to show mitigation may be used to determine the severity of the sanction, but may
not be weighed in the balance of whether clear and convincing evidence was adduced to
prove a violation of the rules. 
Bar Counsel paints with too broad a brush.  Evidence presented to the hearing judge
may be relevant for different purposes.  Evidence may be relevant as to a rule violation as
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well as to the appropriate sanction.  For example, assuming that Bar Counsel alleged that an
attorney engaged in fraudulent conduct, evidence as to an attorney’s specific intent would
be relevant and properly considered in assessing whether Rule 8.4(c) was violated.  It would
also be relevant in the consideration of the appropriate sanction.
In concluding that respondent did not violate Rule 8.4(c) and (d) by clear and
convincing evidence, the hearing judge indicated that she considered respondent’s intent, his
explanation as to why he did not tell the client that he had lost the file and had taken no
action on her case since July 1999, and the credibility of the witnesses, as well as the
mitigating factors testified to by respondent and the psychiatric evidence presented by
respondent.  The hearing judge concluded that “[t]his court finds that [r]espondent did not
violate Rule 8.4(c) and (d) in that he did not have sufficient intent rising to the level of
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation to a standard of clear and convincing
evidence.”  Rule 8.4(c) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”   The hearing judge was
clearly erroneous because specific intent is not a necessary ingredient of dishonesty or
misrepresentation.
Respondent was dishonest and misrepresented the truth when he told his client that
he was working on the case when, in fact, he had lost the file and was not working on the
case at all.  In dealing with his client, respondent exhibited a lack of probity, integrity and
straightforwardness, and, therefore, his actions were dishonest in that sense.  See Attorney
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Grievance v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 25-26, 741 A.2d 1143, 1156 (1999).  Respondent
confuses intent with motive.  Although respondent may have acted in a certain manner
because he was “embarrassed,” he unquestionably told the client a lie.  Accordingly, we
sustain petitioner’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding as to Rule 8.4(c).
Respondent’s admission as to violation of Rules 1.3, 1.4(a), and 3.2, along with the
court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.2,
1.4(b), and this Court’s holding that respondent violated 8.4(c), establish a violation of Rule
8.4(d).  Behavior that may seriously impair public confidence in the entire profession,
without extenuating circumstances, may be conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.  See Attorney Grievance v. Childress, 360 Md. 373, 381, 758 A.2d 117, 121 (2000).
An attorney’s material misrepresentation to the client, his failure to act on the client’s case
for over three years and failure to expedite litigation, to the client’s detriment, is conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  Failure to represent a client in an adequate
manner and lying to a client constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(d).  See Attorney Grievance
v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1, 31, 762 A.2d 950, 966 (2000); Attorney Grievance v. Mooney,
359 Md. 56, 83, 753 A.2d 17, 31 (2000); Attorney Grievance v. Brugh, 353 Md. 475, 478-79,
727 A.2d 913, 914-15 (1999).
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III.
We now turn to the appropriate sanction.  The sanction for a violation of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct depends on the facts and circumstances of each case,
including a consideration of any mitigating factors.  Attorney Grievance v. Zuckerman, 386
Md. 341, 375, 872 A.2d 693, 713 (2005).  In determining the appropriate sanction to be
imposed, we are guided by our interest in protecting the public and its attendant confidence
in the legal profession.  Attorney Grievance v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 595, 876 A.2d  642,
660 (2005).  The purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the lawyer, but
to protect the public as well as to deter other lawyers from violating the Rules of Professional
Conduct.  Id. at 596, 876 A.2d at 660.  In order to protect the public, we impose a sanction
commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which the
violations were committed.  See Attorney Grievance v. Goodman, 381 Md. 480, 497, 850
A.2d 1157, 1167 (2004).
Bar Counsel maintains that disbarment is the appropriate sanction because respondent
has engaged in a “continuing course and pattern of dishonest and deceitful conduct” absent
any compelling, extenuating circumstances.  Respondent contends that a suspension of
between fifteen and thirty days would be appropriate. 
Respondent testified at the hearing that he did not inform his client about the missing
file when she asked about the status of her case “out of absolute embarrassment.”  He
testified that he looked frequently for her file, but that he then “would get sidetracked with
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other stuff.”  Respondent acknowledged that the lost file and his substantial inaction was
information “that the client needed to know so that she could make educated decisions about
her case.”  
The hearing judge apparently considered this testimony credible, because she 
accepted
respondent as credible in arriving at her conclusion that his conduct lacked “sufficient intent”
rising to the level of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Although we have found
the hearing judge erred in considering respondent’s motive in determining whether
respondent violated the rules, motive and lack of specific intent may be relevant when this
Court considers the appropriate sanction.  See id. at 497, 850 A.2d at 1167.  We note that the
hearing judge did not find that it was respondent’s conscious objective to engage in dishonest
conduct in violation of Rule 8.4(c) and (d).  The hearing judge is in the best position to judge
the credibility of the witnesses, and we accept her conclusion as to respondent’s state of
mind.  Although respondent did act dishonestly and did misrepresent to his client, there is no
evidence that he acted out of a fraudulent or selfish motive.
Respondent presents several factors in mitigation.  He has fully cooperated with Bar
Counsel.  He has engaged in negotiations with the client’s attorney regarding restitution,
expressed great remorse to the client, and informed the hearing judge that he continues to
work with the client’s new counsel to settle the matter.  Respondent presented psychiatric
evidence.  Dr. Janofsky opined that respondent suffered from personality trait vulnerabilities
that may have interfered with respondent’s ability to adequately resolve the problems that
2In respondent’s 1989 matter, alcohol was found to be a substantial cause of
respondent’s conduct.  See Attorney Grievance v. Nisbet, 316 Md. 464, 472, 560 A.2d 18,
22 (1989) (noting that “[w]hen alcoholism is, to a substantial extent, the cause of the
misconduct by an attorney, we view the misconduct in a somewhat different light”).
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occurred with regard to Ms. Cohen’s case.  Dr. Janofsky further observed that respondent’s
failure to face the consequences of his action led to additional errors in judgment.  
Bar Counsel maintains that the appropriate sanction is disbarment, arguing that Dr.
Janofsky’s report does not constitute “compelling extenuating circumstances” necessary to
justify a sanction less than disbarment for respondent’s acts of intentional dishonesty.  Bar
Counsel points out that this incident is not the first disciplinary matter for respondent, and
that respondent was suspended indefinitely in 1989, with the right to reapply after the
expiration of ninety days.2  As to the client’s injury flowing from respondent’s conduct, her
complaint against five defendants for $500,000 in damages, grounded in tort, was dismissed
for lack of prosecution, at least in part due to respondent’s inattentiveness and neglect. See
Md. Rule 2-507.  
At the outset, we note that lying to a client reflects most negatively on the legal
profession.  It goes without saying that a lawyer should not lie to the client about the status
of the client’s case.  See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Soak, 706
N.W.2d 385, 389 (Iowa 2005)(stating that “the practice of law simply cannot have people
engaged in it who lie to their clients”); Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Bolusky, 23 P.3d 268, 273
(Okla. 2001) (explaining that a lawyer should not lie to a client about the status of his or her
case under a rule identical to MRPC 8.4(c)).  We agree with the view expressed by the
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Supreme Court of New Jersey, stating that “[p]ublic confidence in the Bar is diminished
when an attorney misrepresents to his client that his case is proceeding smoothly when it is
not.  Clients should not continue to suffer the consequences of being told their case is under
control when it is not.”  In the Matter of Grabler, 552 A.2d 596, 600 (N.J. 1989).  
Every misrepresentation, however, does not call for disbarment.  Writing for this
Court, Judge Cathell discussed the reach of 
Attorney Grievance v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376,
773 A.2d 463 (2001), as follows:  
“We have not, however, always found disbarment to be the
appropriate sanction where there is misrepresentation involved,
especially where misappropriation of money was not involved.
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36,
785 A.2d 1260 (2001), we found an indefinite suspension to be
the appropriate penalty for an attorney who had made one
misrepresentation to one client but whose major transgression
was his lack of cooperation with the Attorney Grievance
Commission.  We did not apply Vanderlinde as a bright-line
rule, but applied the facts and circumstances of that case to
determine the appropriate sanction.  What Vanderlinde holds is
that ‘ordinarily’ disbarment will be the appropriate sanction
when dishonesty is involved; however, we must still examine
the facts, circumstances, and mitigation in each case.  In
Harrington, there was one instance of a degree of
misrepresentation.  There was, however, no pattern of a course
of deceitful conduct over an extensive period of time sufficient,
in our view to support a disbarment.  The gravaman of the
disciplinary proceeding was the attorney’s lack of diligence and
his lack of cooperation with bar counsel.  There, we determined
that the appropriate sanction was an indefinite suspension.”
Attorney Grievance v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646-47, 790 A.2d 621, 628-29 (2002).  See also
Attorney Grievance v. Jeter, 365 Md. 279, 293-94, 778 A.2d 390, 398 (2001) (concluding
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that “given the court’s findings that the respondent did not intend to defraud and that the
respondent was remorseful, the appropriate sanction is an indefinite suspension with a right
to reapply for admission to the Bar in six months); Iowa Supreme Court Attorney
Disciplinary Bd. v. Soak, 706 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 2005)(imposing suspension with no
possibility of reinstatement before two years for misrepresentation of status of client’s case);
Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Bolusky, 23 P.3d 268 (Okla. 2001)(attorney suspended for
misrepresenting status of client’s case); In the Matter of Templin, 502 A.2d 1 (N.J.1985)
(attorney who lied to his client advising him the case was pending after default judgment had
been entered for attorney's failure to answer interrogatories or respond to the court suspended
for one year); In the Matter of Loring, 374 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1977) (attorney who informed a
client that an appeal from the trial court's dismissal of an action filed out of time was
pending, when the appeal had been dismissed due also to late filing, suspended for six
months). 
Respondent’s conduct related to one client and one case.  Significantly, this is not a
case of misappropriation of funds or criminal conduct.  Considering all of the circumstances,
we conclude that the appropriate sanction is an indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS
AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THE COURT, INCLUDING
COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND
RULE 16-715, FOR WHICH SUM 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN
FAVOR 
OF 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION
AGAINST RICHARD J. REINHARDT.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 1
September Term, 2005
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
RICHARD J. REINHARDT
Bell, C.J.
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J.,
which Battaglia and Greene, JJ., Join.
Filed: February 10, 2006
I respectfully dissent as to the sanction only.  Rather than an indefinite suspension,
disbarment is more appropriate.
The majority is correct in sustaining the Commission’s exceptions.  Thus, Reinhardt,
for sanctioning purposes, stands adjudged as having violated the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 3.2, and 8.4(c) and (d) in the
course of his representation of Ms. Cohen.
Mitigation is analyzed traditionally by the Court in terms of the American Bar
Association’s (ABA) recommended standards.  For example, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 488-89, 671 A.2d 463, 483 (1996), we stated:
The mitigating factors listed in the ABA Standards
include: absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems;
timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify
consequences of misconduct; full and free disclosure to
disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation;
physical or mental disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary
proceedings; interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties
or sanctions; remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.
(Footnote omitted)
-2-
Id. ; see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 375, 872 A.2d 693,
713 (2005).  As such, “facts tending to show mitigation are used to determine the severity
of the sanction and not whether evidence adduced has established a violation of the rules by
clear and convincing evidence.”  Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 368, 872 A.2d at 709.
We intentionally set a high bar for respondents in cases where the flagship violation
is of MRPC 8.4(c) (“conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”), such
as the present one.  That high bar is described best in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001).
In cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud
stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not
accept, as “compelling extenuating circumstances,” anything
less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or
physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the
“root cause” of the misconduct and that also result in an
attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her conduct in
accordance with the law and the MRPC.
Vanderlinde explained why the bar was set at that height:
Unlike matters related to competency, diligence and the like,
intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most
important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make
intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse.
Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney’s
character.  Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for
intentional dishonest conduct.
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488.
The majority in the present case points out, appropriately so, that we are not inflexible
and unyielding in our application of Vanderlinde.  The majority seeks to illustrate this by
1Lane violated MRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) regarding
one complainant.  As to the other complainant, he violated MRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and
(b), 1.5(c), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d).
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quoting dicta from Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646-47, 790 A.2d
621, 628-29 (2002).  See majority slip op. at 20.  Interestingly, a unanimous Court in Lane
nonetheless found disbarment to be the appropriate sanction where Lane made numerous
misrepresentations to two clients about work he never did.  We reached this result despite the
mitigating circumstances of Lane’s private practice inexperience at the time of the
misconduct, his remorse, his cooperation with Bar Counsel throughout the grievance process,
and his showing, by virtue of his successful practice as a public defender and later a
prosecutor following the misconduct, that he was no threat to the public.  Lane, 367 Md. at
644, 790 A.2d at 627.  It seemed that the Court was persuaded that disbarment, rather than
suspension, was appropriate because of the repetition and materiality of the
misrepresentations made by Lane while in private practice.  Lane, 367 Md. at 647, 790 A.2d
at 629.1
Not cited by the majority in the present case, but referred to in Lane, is Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 785 A.2d 1260 (2001).  In Harrington, the
Court majority chose indefinite suspension over disbarment where Harrington violated:
MRPC 1.3, 1.4 (a) and (b), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(d) in one matter; MRPC 1.3, 1.4(a) and
(b), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c) and (d) regarding a second complaint; and, MRPC 8.1(b) and 8.4(d)
in a third case.  The misconduct that led to Harrington being found in the one case to have
2Dr. Janofsky did not supply live testimony before the hearing judge.  Therefore,
demeanor-based credibility could not have been a factor in the hearing judge’s analysis.
3In Harrington, the respondent attorney paid the particular complainant in the 8.4(c)
violation case $35,000 in settlement of the loss she claimed as the result of his misconduct.
Reinhardt, as he stands before us, offers only good intentions in similar regard.
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violated  MRPC 8.4(c) was “leading his client to believe he had filed a lawsuit on her behalf,
when in fact he had not, and account[ing] for the delay because he was ‘waiting for a court
date.’” Harrington, 367 Md. at 48, 785 A.2d at 1267.
In settling on suspension in Harrington, the Court focused almost entirely on
Harrington’s multiple violations of MRPC 8.1, evinced by his “flagrant disregard of and
response to communications from Bar Counsel.”  Harrington, 367 Md. at 50-51, 785 A.2d
at 1268.  The singular MRPC 8.4(c) violation was barely mentioned by the majority in
Harrington in its brief analysis of the appropriate sanction.  The lone dissenter in Harrington,
Judge Raker, honed in on the 8.4(c) violation and urged disbarment on that basis. She stated
there that “[a]n attorney who is dishonest and deceitful should not be practicing law.”
Harrington, 367 Md. at 53, 785 A.2d at 1269-70.
Putting aside for a moment the weight to be accorded Dr. Janofsky’s 21 July 2005
written report2 in the mitigation analysis in the present case, it seems to me that the remaining
relevant mitigation factors are in a state of equilibrium.  The hearing judge found that
Reinhardt did not act with a selfish motive.  Also, Reinhardt cooperated with Bar Counsel.
He expressed remorse and worked with Ms. Cohen’s new attorney to try and settle her
restitution claim.3  On the other side of the scale is Reinhardt’s prior history with the
4In addition to noting his prior indefinite suspension, Dr. Janofsky’s report, under the
“Case Summary” heading, lists additional disciplinary contacts Reinhardt had with Petitioner.
It was reported that he had been reprimanded in 1987 for neglect of a personal injury case.
In August 2003, he received a warning from the Commission for lack of diligence in
handling an estate.
5The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)-2 is a frequently used
clinical test to assess an individual’s psychological personality profile. 
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Commission4 and the fact that his misconduct in this case resulted in his client not being able
to prosecute her tort claim where she sought $500,000 in damages.  No other of the ABA
factors are in play on this record. 
Turning then to Dr. Janofsky’s report, I find it to be of little service in the mitigation
analysis.  Dr. Janofsky’s letterhead indicates that he was a Board-certified psychiatrist and
neurologist.  The opening paragraph of his report, however, states that Reinhardt’s counsel
in the present case engaged the doctor only “to assess whether Mr. Reinhardt was suffering
from psychological factors that would impact negatively on his ability to practice law.”
(Emphasis in original).  Having administered an MMPI-2 test5 to Reinhardt, Dr. Janofsky
opined that, although noting a few frailties, Respondent’s  “MMPI-2 diagnostic profile is just
within normal range and was not diagnostically definitive.”  Continuing, Dr. Janofsky
reported that Reinhardt’s earlier alcohol abuse, occurring around the time of his ethical
infractions leading to his indefinite suspension in the late 1980's, had abated.  Respondent
had remained sober since about 1990.  Other than the alcohol abuse treatment, Reinhardt had
“no psychiatric contacts.”
The ultimate opinion expressed by Dr. Janofsky was, in pertinent part:
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It is my opinion that around his alleged mismanagement
of the Cohen matter, Mr. Reinhardt was not suffering from a
diagnosable mental disorder.  However, Mr. Reinhardt was
suffering from personality trait vulnerabilities that may have
interfered with his ability to adequately resolve the Cohen
matter.
Personality traits are enduring lifelong patterns of
perceiving, relating to and thinking about the environment and
oneself and are exhibited in a wide range of important social and
personal contexts.  In Mr. Reinhardt’s case, Mr. Reinhardt’s
tendency to misinterpret the motives of others and his
rationalization of his own behavior in his way of avoiding his
own feelings of hostility and affects his ability to deal with
difficult matters.  Additionally, his tendency to cover over and
to deny the intensity of his resentments could have also
exacerbated his problems in effectively dealing with his
misplacement of the Cohen file.
Mr. Reinhardt’s statements to both myself and to the Bar
Counsel investigator that “embarrassment” led to his behaviors
in the Cohen matter is a very accurate statement.  Failure to face
the consequences of misplacing the file led to further errors in
judgment on Mr. Reinhardt’s part.
Mr. Reinhardt’s difficulties were further exacerbated by
his lack of a secretary, associates, partners or any other support
systems to help him more appropriately deal with case
difficulties.  (Emphasis in original).
I glean from Dr. Janofsky’s report that, while Reinhardt may have had “issues” (as
that term is used in common parlance), he was not mentally ill at the time of the misconduct
in this case.  Merely having “issues,” however, is not sufficient since we decided Vanderlinde
to dilute the ordinary sanction of disbarment for intentional dishonesty, deceit, or
misrepresentation.  The persuasive force of evidence required to satisfy the Vanderlinde
threshold is 
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there . . . needs to be almost conclusive, and essentially
uncontroverted evidence that would support a . . . finding not
only that the attorney had a serious and debilitating mental
condition, but that the mental condition, in a sustained fashion,
affected the ability of the attorney in normal day to day
activities, such that the attorney was unable to accomplish the
least of those activities in a normal fashion.  Unless that
standard is met the impairment is not the ‘root cause’ of the
misconduct.
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418-19, 773 A.2d at 488.  Dr. Janofsky’s report does not supply a
sufficient basis for mitigation.  Accordingly, I give Dr. Janofsky’s report little weight in the
analysis of the appropriate sanction in this case.
Respondent engaged in intentional deceitful conduct, over an extended period of time,
on multiple occasions.  Embarrassment, however triggered, at having mislaid (or lost) Ms.
Cohen’s file is not an acceptable excuse for avoiding the client’s many inquiries about the
status of her case.  Knowing that he had done nothing to effectuate service of process, or
engaged in any other meaningful activity in furtherance of her case since filing suit on 30
July 1999, Reinhardt knew or should have known, given modern docket management
practices and technologies used by clerk’s offices statewide, that Md. Rule 2-507(c)
(dismissal after one year for lack of prosecution) likely would be effectuated, irrespective of
whether he actually received a copy of the formal Notice of Contemplated Dismissal from
the clerk, sent on 27 September 2001.  He made no effort at any time to reconstruct those
parts of his file that could be found easily from other sources, such as obtaining a copy of the
complaint from the court jacket, thus enabling him to carry on the representation in a timely
and diligent manner.  Given Reinhardt’s prior skirmishes with the disciplinary system over
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lack of diligence and other ethical obligations, I have no confidence in our ability to protect
the public in the future from Reinhardt repeating with other clients the problems spread
across this record or in demonstrating to other attorneys our lack of tolerance for this sort of
conduct if we do not order disbarment in this case.  The trust that must be at the center of the
lawyer-client relationship is undermined otherwise.  This Court has stated that intentional
dishonest conduct by an attorney is “almost beyond excuse” and that disbarment should
ordinarily be the sanction for such conduct.  Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488.
I would order disbarment of Respondent.
Judge Battaglia and Judge Greene join in the dissenting opinion.