Case Title: In re R.A.B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90345

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90345-Agenda 13-May 2001.
In re R.A.B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois,
Appellant, v. R.A.B., Appellee).
Opinion filed September 20, 2001.

	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In June 1998, the State filed a delinquency petition against
respondent, R.A.B., as a delinquent minor, alleging he committed
two counts of robbery. After a stipulated bench trial, the circuit
court of Du Page County adjudicated respondent a violent juvenile
offender and committed him to the Department of Corrections
until his twenty-first birthday. On appeal, respondent argued that
he did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-36(d) (West
1996) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-820 (West 1998)) and that, because
the stipulated bench trial was tantamount to an admission, he did
not knowingly waive his privilege against self-incrimination. The
appellate court agreed that the respondent did not knowingly
waive his right to a jury trial and reversed and remanded. 315 Ill.
App. 3d 620. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).



BACKGROUND
	On June 25, 1998, the State filed a delinquency petition
pursuant to section 5-3 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-3 (West
1996)) against the 16-year-old respondent, charging him with two
counts of robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 1996)). The petition
alleged that respondent committed robbery when he grabbed $90
from the hand of Nicole Lenz and took the money by use of force
and by threatening the imminent use of force. The State also filed
motions indicating its intent to prosecute respondent as a violent
juvenile offender (705 ILCS 405/5-36 (West 1996)) and under the
criminal laws as an adult (705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(a) (West 1996)).
Following a transfer hearing, the circuit court denied the State's
motion to prosecute respondent as an adult. Thereafter, respondent
filed two motions to suppress and a motion to dismiss the State's
petition seeking adjudication as a violent juvenile offender. In
November 1998, the circuit court denied the respondent's motion
to dismiss and set respondent's motions to suppress for hearing on
December 4, 1998.
	On that date, respondent withdrew the motions to suppress
and the following exchange occurred regarding the stipulated
bench trial:
			"MS. ZAHRIEH [respondent's attorney]: We would be
stipulating that if the State put on the witnesses, that the
court would find the petitions proven.
			MS. ORTON [Assistant State's Attorney]: Your Honor,
this is essentially a stipulated bench trial.
			THE COURT: Okay, what's the difference between a
stipulated bench trial and actual admission to the charge?
			MS. ORTON: My understanding, your Honor, is that
you, that in order to pursue an appeal regarding the court's
ruling on the minor's petition regarding the violent
juvenile offender petition by the People, in order to
pursue an appeal, that, in fact, minor need to only
stipulate or go through a stipulated bench trial, rather than
actually admit the petition.
			THE COURT: Is that the manner in which you wish to
proceed?
			MS. ZAHRIEH: Yes, sir."
The State then presented the facts for the stipulation and the
following exchange occurred:
			"THE COURT: [Respondent], at this time this is a
stipulated bench trial, in that this is the evidence if the
case were to proceed forward the State would produce. It
does appear to be sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to
sustain the two charges-three charges that have been
filed.
* * *
			THE COURT: You do, however, have the right to have
a formal hearing, where the witnesses were required to
appear in the courtroom, then subject them to cross-examination.
			And if you proceeded this way, however, the stipulated
bench trial, these are the rights you're giving up. The only
other trial there will be is what the state's attorney has just
elicited, do you understand this?
			MINOR RESPONDENT: Yes."
The circuit court explained the possible penalties involved in this
case and the respondent stated that he understood. After these
statements, the following exchange occurred:
			"THE COURT: Bearing everything in mind that I have
explained to you, also the possible consequences, is it
your agreement to proceed this way on a stipulated bench
trial, or, in fact, do you wish to have the witnesses
brought into court and proceed to trial?
			MINOR RESPONDENT: I'd like to admit, sir.
			THE COURT: All right, this is not really in the nature
of an admission. You're not admitting to the charges, but
what you're doing is not contesting the State's evidence.
			MINOR RESPONDENT: I don't want to go to trial.
			THE COURT: You actually do not want a trial beyond
what has occurred this morning, is that right?
			MINOR RESPONDENT: Yes.
			THE COURT: All right. You're making that decision
of your own free will?
			MINOR RESPONDENT: Yes.
			THE COURT: Okay, on that basis then I'm going to
concur and proceed this morning as a stipulated bench
trial. And will then indicate that my findings are the
evidence submitted by the state's attorney is sufficient
beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain *** the charge of
robbery as alleged in case number 98 JD 701. The minor
accordingly is found delinquent ***."
	At the December 16, 1998 dispositional hearing, the circuit
court committed the respondent to the Department of Corrections
until his twenty-first birthday. Respondent filed a motion to
reconsider his adjudication as a violent juvenile offender, which
the circuit court denied.
	The appellate court reversed, holding that respondent did not
expressly and understandingly waive his right to a jury trial. 315
Ill. App. 3d at 624. In remanding for a new trial, the appellate
court stated that there was no written jury waiver in the record and
the transcripts of the proceedings were devoid of any mention of
respondent's right to a trial by jury. 315 Ill. App. 3d at 624.



ANALYSIS
	The issue in this case involves whether respondent knowingly
waived his right to a jury trial under the Act. Since the facts are
not questioned, the issue is a question of law. Accordingly, our
review is de novo. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 (1998). We
note that respondent raised this issue for the first time in the
appellate court. Ordinarily, errors not objected to during trial or
raised in the post-trial motion are considered waived. Under
Supreme Court Rule 615(a), we will review plain errors affecting
substantial rights, even if those errors were not objected to during
trial or presented in a post-trial motion. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).
We will invoke the plain error rule in two limited circumstances:
"(1) where the evidence is closely balanced; or (2) when the errors
are of such magnitude that defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the
integrity of the judicial process." People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487,
502-03 (2000). As this case deals with the knowing waiver of the
fundamental right to a jury trial, we will consider this issue under
the plain error doctrine. People v. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d 327, 333
(1985); People v. Taylor, 291 Ill. App. 3d 18, 20-21 (1997).
	Section 5-36(d) of the Act provides that when the State seeks
to adjudicate a minor a violent juvenile offender under the Act, a
"[t]rial on the petition shall be by jury unless the minor demands,
in open court and with advice of counsel, a trial by the court
without a jury." 705 ILCS 405/5-36(d) (West 1996). We note that,
in a similar fashion, defendants in criminal cases are generally
entitled to a trial by jury unless "understandingly waived by
defendant in open court." 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 1998). Also,
in criminal cases, jury waivers are required to be in writing. 725
ILCS 5/115-1 (West 1998). The Juvenile Court Act, however,
does not have a similar provision requiring a written waiver. This
court has recently noted that "virtually all of the constitutional
requirements of a criminal trial have been introduced into juvenile
delinquency proceedings *** includ[ing] the right to adequate
notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right to remain silent,
and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses." In re A.G.,
195 Ill. 2d 313, 318 (2001). The right to a trial by jury, however,
is not an absolute right in juvenile proceedings (McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647, 91 S. Ct. 1976
(1971); People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d 67 (1980)), but
rather is only available in a limited number of situations under the
Act (see In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2000) (the Act grants a jury
trial to habitual and violent juvenile offenders, but it does not grant
such a right to juveniles charged with first degree murder); 705
ILCS 405/5-35(d), 5-36(d) (West 1996)).
	To be a valid jury waiver, it must be knowingly and
understandingly made. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d  at 334. A determination
of whether a jury waiver is valid cannot rest on any precise
formula but depends on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case. People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327, 332 (1984). A jury
waiver may be valid if it is made by defense counsel in the
defendant's presence and the defendant does not object. People v.
Watson, 246 Ill. App. 3d 548, 549 (1993). No specific admonition
or advice is required before an effective jury waiver may be made.
People v. Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d 462, 469 (1997). The failure to file a
written jury waiver does not require reversal so long as the waiver
was understandingly made in open court. People v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283, 284-85 (1999).
	In Scott, this court addressed whether a written waiver alone
validly waives a defendant's right to a jury trial. The defendant
executed a written jury waiver in his attorney's office, which was
later filed outside of the defendant's presence. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d  at
284. On the day of trial and in the defendant's presence, the
following exchange occurred:
			" 'MR. WILLIAMS [defendant's counsel]: And we
would proceed to the bench trial today.
			THE COURT: Okay, Defendant files motion to
dismiss. States Attorney given two weeks to file
responsive pleading. Okay, we'll proceed to bench trial,
then?
* * *
			THE COURT: Okay, appreciate that., [sic] okay. We
will then proceed with the bench trial. Mr. Vaughan, you
may proceed.' " Scott, 186 Ill. 2d  at 284.
This court noted that it had "never found a valid jury waiver where
the defendant was not present in open court when a jury waiver,
written or otherwise, was at least discussed." Scott, 186 Ill. 2d  at
285. The State argued that references to a bench trial constituted
an acknowledgment of a waiver in open court, but this court
pointed out that the "defendant was never present in open court
when a jury waiver was discussed." Scott, 186 Ill. 2d  at 285.
Additionally, the written jury waiver executed by the defendant
stated he had " 'until the last Thursday of December, 1994 to
revoke this waiver of jury trial.' " Scott, 186 Ill. 2d  at 285. The
court found that the language implied that the jury waiver was
irrevocable after that date. Thus, the defendant's silence may have
been due to his belief that he could no longer revoke his jury
waiver. The court could not presume that the defendant's silence
constituted a valid waiver and held that the defendant did not
validly waive his right to a jury trial in open court. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d  at 285-86.
	In People v. Williamson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 54 (1999), the
appellate court considered whether the defendant validly waived
his right to a jury trial. At a status hearing, the following exchange
occurred:
			" 'THE COURT: All right. You want to demand at this
time?
			MR. BODE [codefendant Warship's attorney]: We're
demanding trial.
			THE COURT: All right, on Williamson.
			MR. BODE: Would like a trial date.
			MR. MANN [defendant's attorney]: I'll fill out the
form in a minute, on my client as well, we'll demand but
without waiving, to file the motions.
			THE COURT: Are you indicating juries at this time or
benches?
* * *
			MR. MANN: We'll take a bench Judge.' " Williamson,
311 Ill. App. 3d at 55.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court stated:
" 'Defendants are demanding trial, March 29th. Each one will be
a bench.' " Williamson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 55. Subsequent
hearings included references by the assistant State's Attorney or
trial judge that the case was set for a bench trial. The record did
not contain a signed jury waiver. The State argued that the
defendant understandingly waived his right to a jury trial because
the defendant was present during discussions about a bench trial
and he did not object when his attorney indicated that he would
proceed by way of a bench trial. Williamson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at
57. The appellate court, finding Scott to be instructive, stated that
"nothing was said at any of these pretrial hearings that would have
indicated to defendant that he had a right to a jury trial or that his
right to a jury trial was being waived. Likewise, on the day of trial,
there was no discussion of defendant's right to trial by jury or
waiver of that right." Williamson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 59. The
appellate court concluded that the references to a bench trial were
insufficient to constitute a valid jury waiver in open court.
Williamson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 59.
	In People v. Watson, 246 Ill. App. 3d 548 (1993), the
defendant was not present at a pretrial hearing but was represented
by counsel. His attorney stated that " '[w]hat I'd like to do is set
[case number] 565 for bench trial and we need to make the note to
do the jury waiver of Mr. Watson the date that we set.' " Watson,
246 Ill. App. 3d at 548. The circuit court continued the hearing and
noted that the defendant's jury waiver must be received before the
trial started. At various rescheduling hearings, the defendant was
present when references were made that he would be proceeding
by way of a bench trial. Watson, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 549. The State
argued that references to a bench trial made in the defendant's
presence constituted a valid waiver. The appellate court disagreed,
finding that "[v]ague references to a bench trial at the rescheduling
conferences were not sufficient to constitute a valid jury waiver,
especially in light of the fact that the record is devoid of evidence
suggesting that the defendant was ever apprised of his right to a
jury trial." Watson, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 549.
	In the present case, neither the right to a jury trial nor a jury
waiver was discussed in the respondent's presence in open court.
As demonstrated by the previous cases, vague references to a
stipulated bench trial by respondent's attorney, the prosecutor, and
the circuit court were insufficient to constitute a valid jury waiver.
Although the circuit court instructed the respondent that he had a
right to a formal hearing to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
the record is devoid of any mention of the respondent's right to a
trial by jury as prescribed under the Juvenile Court Act.
	The State argues that this court's decision in Frey compels the
conclusion that there was a valid waiver. In Frey, the circuit court
entered an order, approved by defense counsel, stating that " 'the
defendant's attorney indicates the defendant will waive a jury trial
in this case.' " Frey, 103 Ill. 2d  at 329. This court, recognizing that
an accused typically speaks and acts through his attorney, noted
that "we have given effect to jury waivers made by defense
counsel in defendant's presence where defendant gave no
indication of any objection to the court hearing the case." Frey,
103 Ill. 2d  at 332. We found a valid jury waiver. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 
at 333.
	The present case is distinguishable from Frey. This court in
Frey noted that it was apparent from the record that the defendant
was aware of his right to a jury trial and was present prior to trial
when the jury waiver was discussed. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d  at 333. Here,
there was no indication in the record that respondent was aware of
his right to a jury trial in his juvenile proceeding. Further, there
was no discussion of a jury waiver nor was one ever entered into
before the circuit court.
	Other cases relied on by the State that have found a valid
waiver are likewise distinguishable because either the defense
counsel or the circuit court mentioned the defendant's right to a
jury trial or discussed the jury waiver in the defendant's presence
in open court. See People v. Lombardi, 305 Ill. App. 3d 33, 40-41
(1999) (before the end of the trial, the court admonished the
defendant as to her right to a jury trial and the defendant
understandingly waived that right); People v. Tucker, 183 Ill. App.
3d 333, 334-35 (1989) (the circuit judge asked defense counsel in
the defendant's presence whether he wanted a jury trial and
counsel declined, stating his request for a bench trial); People v.
Murrell, 60 Ill. 2d 287, 290 (1975) (the record showed the jury
waiver was made by counsel in open court in the defendant's
presence).
	Respondent in this case had a right to a trial by jury on the
petition to adjudicate him a violent juvenile offender under the
Act. It is clear from the record that respondent was not informed
in open court of his right to a jury trial and there is nothing in the
record to indicate he validly waived that right. Although
respondent had previous experience in the juvenile justice system,
we cannot presume from this fact that he had knowledge of his
right to a jury trial. In re J.W., 164 Ill. App. 3d 826, 829 (1987).
Further, respondent points out that in his previous delinquency
proceedings, he had not been eligible for a jury trial. As in Scott,
we cannot presume respondent's silence constituted a valid
waiver. Therefore, we find that the record fails to support that
respondent knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury
trial. Because of our resolution of the jury waiver issue, we need
not address respondent's second argument on appeal.
	Since the cause will be remanded for further proceedings, we
have reviewed the record and find that the evidence presented
before the circuit court was sufficient to adjudicate respondent
delinquent in that he committed the offense of robbery beyond a
reasonable doubt. Thus, there will be no double jeopardy violation
in the event of a new trial. In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d 594, 604
(1998). Our conclusion does not in any way imply a determination
of respondent's guilt or innocence that would be binding on retrial.
Taylor, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 21.



CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court's
judgment reversing the judgment of the circuit court and
remanding the cause for a new trial.
Affirmed.