Case Title: State v. Snyder

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50672

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  September 23, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
MARSHALL LOVEJOY SNYDER,
Respondent on Review.
(No. D9801146T; CA A111712; SC S50672)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 8, 2004.
Daniel J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With
him on the opening and reply briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.  With them on
the supplemental reply brief was Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant
Attorney General.
Ernest Lannett, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review. With him on the briefs were Peter
A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of Public Defense Services,
and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender. 
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and
affirmed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
*Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Jon B. Lund, Judge. 187 Or App 648, 69 P3d 802 (2003).
BALMER, J.
This case presents two issues for review.  The first is
whether the state may petition this court for review of a
decision of the Court of Appeals when the state obtained the
disposition that it sought in that court, but challenges one of
the court's holdings.  The second issue, which arises only if the
state prevails on the first, is whether, during defendant's trial
for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), the trial
court erred in admitting results of a blood alcohol test into
evidence under ORS 813.320(2)(a) when the state failed to meet
the requirements of ORS 813.160(1)(a). (1)  The Court of
Appeals held that the trial court should not have admitted the
results of defendant's blood alcohol test under ORS
813.320(2)(a), (2) but affirmed defendant's DUII conviction on
the ground that the error was harmless.  State v. Snyder, 187 Or
App 648, 656-57, 69 P3d 802 (2003).  
For the reasons that we discuss below, we hold that the
state was aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals, that
ORS 2.520 (3) therefore authorizes the state to seek review of
that decision in this court, and that this dispute continues to
present a justiciable controversy.  We also hold that ORS
813.320(2)(a) creates an exception to the specifications for
blood alcohol tests otherwise required by ORS 813.160 (1999),
amended by Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 19, section 1. (4) 
Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part the decision
of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
FACTS
The material facts of the case are not in dispute, and
we take them from the Court of Appeals opinion and the record. 
Defendant was charged with DUII after being involved in a single-car accident.  The arresting officer, McLeod, found defendant
lying injured a short distance from his car.  Defendant was taken
to a hospital emergency room where his injuries were treated and
his blood was drawn for the purpose of performing a chemical
analysis.  Officer McLeod also was present at the emergency room,
and he observed defendant's behavior there.  
Before trial, defendant moved in limine to exclude the
results of the chemical analysis performed at the hospital on the
ground that the state had not provided the foundation for that
evidence that ORS 813.160 requires.  Specifically, defendant
argued that the state had not provided a witness to testify that
the person who had administered the test was qualified to
administer such a test or that the blood test had been
administered in accordance with Health Division methodology, both
of which are required by ORS 813.160. 
Defendant further argued that, because ORS 813.160 is
not a provision of the implied consent law, the blood test
evidence did not fall within the exception in ORS 813.320(2)(a)
that "provisions of the implied consent law shall not be
construed * * * to limit the introduction of otherwise competent,
relevant evidence" in a DUII prosecution.  Finally, defendant
asserted that, because the court had no way to ascertain whether
the person who had administered the chemical analysis and had
analyzed its results was qualified to do so or what the
hospital's printout of those results actually indicated about the
level of alcohol in defendant's blood, the results of his
chemical blood analysis were inadmissible due to a lack of
foundation.  
The state responded that ORS 813.160 is a provision of
the implied consent law and, therefore, under ORS 813.320(2)(a),
cannot be construed to limit the introduction of "otherwise
competent, relevant evidence" of the amount of alcohol in a
defendant's blood if the "evidence results from a test of [the
defendant's blood] while the defendant was hospitalized."
The trial court denied defendant's motion and, at
defendant's trial, allowed the state to introduce a certified
copy of the hospital records that had been authenticated by the
affidavit of the records custodian.  Officer McLeod then read the
hospital record into the trial court record and stated that the
chemical analysis results correlated to a .17 percent blood
alcohol content.  The state did not present evidence as to who
had tested defendant's blood sample or whether that person had
followed testing methods approved by the Health Division. 
Defendant testified in his own defense and, on direct
examination, stated "I -- obviously, I was drunk.  I'm not saying
that I was not drunk." (5)
A jury convicted defendant of DUII, ORS 813.010. 
Defendant appealed, asserting that the trial court had erred in
admitting the evidence of the chemical analysis of his blood
because the state had failed to lay the foundation for that
evidence that ORS 813.160(1)(a) requires. (6)  Before the Court
of Appeals, the state argued that its failure to show compliance
with ORS 813.160(1)(a) did not require the results of defendant's
chemical blood analysis to be excluded because those results
qualified for admissibility as "otherwise competent, relevant
evidence" under ORS 813.320(2)(a).  In the alternative, the state
argued that, if the trial court had erred by admitting those
results, that error was harmless in light of defendant's
admission that he had been intoxicated at the time of the
accident.  
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had
erred in admitting the results of defendant's chemical analysis
because the state did not show that the analysis was administered
in compliance with ORS 813.160.  Snyder, 187 Or App at 652-56. 
However, the court affirmed defendant's conviction based on its
conclusion that the error was harmless because defendant had
testified voluntarily at trial that he was drunk.  Id. at
657. (7)
ORS 2.520 AND JUSTICIABILITY
Defendant has raised a threshold issue that we must
consider before we may reach the statutory interpretation
question.  Defendant argues that we lack jurisdiction over this
case as both a statutory and constitutional matter.  He claims
that (1) the state is not an "aggrieved party" that may petition
for review under ORS 2.520; and (2) because this case no longer
presents a justiciable controversy, this court lacks the
constitutional authority to decide this case.
We consider the parties' statutory arguments first. 
State v. Hancock, 317 Or 5, 9, 854 P2d 926 (1993).  In Oregon,
the right to appeal is wholly statutory and is subject to any
limitations imposed by the statute conferring the right.  State
v. Adams, 315 Or 359, 364, 847 P2d 397 (1993) (citing Logsdon v.
State and Dell, 234 Or 66, 70, 380 P2d 111 (1963)); Ragnone v.
Portland School District No. 1J, 289 Or 339, 341 n 1, 613 P2d
1052 (1980).  ORS 2.520 confers jurisdiction on this court
following a decision by the Court of Appeals and provides that
"any party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals may
petition" this court for review.  The question before us, then,
is one of statutory interpretation:  Is the state in this case
"aggrieved" under the meaning of that term in the statute? 
Defendant contends that, because the state prevailed on
the merits in the Court of Appeals, it is not "aggrieved" under
ORS 2.520 and, for that reason, this court lacks jurisdiction
over this proceeding.  The state argues that this court's
decision in Palmer v. State of Oregon, 318 Or 352, 867 P2d 1368
(1994), dealt with an identical situation.  In that case, this
court held that the state was "aggrieved" under ORS 2.520 because
the Court of Appeals had ruled against the state on the threshold
issue whether the petitioner was permitted to assert the claim
that he did, even though the state prevailed on the merits:
"The state does not challenge the Court of Appeals'
disposition of the case, but rather challenges that
court's rationale for its disposition of petitioner's
second claim for relief.  ORS 2.520 provides that
'[a]ny party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of
Appeals may petition the Supreme Court for review.' 
(Emphasis supplied.)  In this case, the state is
'aggrieved' by the conclusion of law reached by the
Court of Appeals that is discussed in this opinion
because, if incorrect, the rationale of the lead
opinion in the Court of Appeals will force the state to
defend the merits of many future claims for post-conviction relief that it should not be required to
defend."
Palmer, 318 Or at 355 n 5 (emphasis in original).  Here, we
similarly conclude that the state was "aggrieved" and take the
opportunity to explain that result. 
When interpreting a statute, we must attempt to discern
the intent of the legislature, and, in doing so, we are guided by
the methodology of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or
606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  Pursuant to that methodology, we
first consider the text and context of the statute.  Id. at 610-11.  We also consider, at the first level of analysis, prior case
law from this court that interprets the same statutory wording. 
Robinson v. Nabisco, Inc., 331 Or 178, 184, 11 P3d 1286 (2000).
The text of ORS 2.520 requires that a party must be
"aggrieved" by a decision of the Court of Appeals to petition
this court for review.  As noted above, in Palmer this court
interpreted ORS 2.520 to permit a party to petition this court
for review of a Court of Appeals decision notwithstanding the
fact that the party had obtained the disposition that it had
sought from the Court of Appeals.  The party seeking review in
Palmer -- the state -- asserted that the "rationale" of the Court
of Appeals in that case would force it "to defend the merits of
many future claims for relief that it should not be required to
defend."  Palmer, 318 Or at 355 n 5.  This court agreed that, if
the "conclusion of law" that the Court of Appeals had reached was
incorrect, then the state indeed would have to defend on the
merits future claims that it should not be required to defend. 
Id.  Accordingly, it concluded that the state was "aggrieved" by
the Court of Appeals decision, as that term is used in ORS 2.520. 
Id. 
Here, the state argues that it is "aggrieved" by the
Court of Appeals decision in the same way that the state was
"aggrieved" by the Court of Appeals decision in Palmer:  If the
"conclusion of law" that the Court of Appeals reached is
incorrect, then the state will be required to take additional
steps to introduce certain evidence in DUII cases that it should
not be required to take.  We perceive no meaningful distinction
between Palmer and this case and therefore conclude that the
state is "aggrieved" by the Court of Appeals decision in this
case and is permitted by ORS 2.520 to seek review of that
decision in this court.
Defendant's second argument is that, even if the state
is "aggrieved" under ORS 2.520, no justiciable controversy exists
in this case because (1) the legal interests of the parties are
not adverse, and (2) this court's decision will not have any
practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy. 
According to defendant, any decision by this court will not
affect the "legal relationship between the parties," nor does
defendant have any interest in the outcome of the case. 
Defendant asserts that, because there is no longer a justiciable
controversy, this court lacks authority to consider the merits of
this case.
This court has held that the judicial power of the
state is limited to deciding existing controversies between
parties.  Yancy v. Shatzer, ___ Or ___, ___ P3d ___ (Sept. 16,
2004) (slip op at 25); Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or 174, 188-89,
895 P2d 765 (1995).  For a controversy to be justiciable, the
parties to the controversy must have adverse legal interests and
the court's decision in the matter must have some practical
effect on the rights of the parties.  Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or
402, 405, 848 P2d 1194 (1993).  We conclude that those two
requirements are satisfied here.
This court has noted previously that "[m]any
justiciable controversies go by default or without opposition"
and has determined that adversity exists even in cases in which
no respondent appears.  Teledyne Industries v. Paulus, 297 Or
665, 671, 687 P2d 1077 (1984).  Teledyne is one such example.  In
that case, the petitioners challenged a ballot measure
explanation prepared by a citizens' committee for use in a
voters' pamphlet and named the Secretary of State, but not the
citizens' committee, as respondent.  Id. at 667.  The relevant
statute did not require the Secretary of State to defend the
voters' pamphlet explanation, and the Secretary of State took no
position on the petitioners' proposed modification to that
explanation.  Id. at 667-69.  This court concluded that the fact
that the citizens' committee and the Secretary of State could
appear to contest the proposed modification was "sufficient to
provide the adversary character of the proceeding that makes the
issues justiciable."  Id. at 670.  See also Conkling v. Keisling,
316 Or 390, 400, 852 P2d 183 (1993) (Van Hoomissen, J., specially
concurring) (noting that no party appeared to defend citizens'
committee statement in challenge to ballot measure explanation). 
That conclusion -- that the mere possibility that parties to a
proceeding could take opposing positions satisfies the adversity
requirement -- demonstrates the low threshold for determining the
existence of adverse legal interests.
Here, both parties not only appear, but they make
vigorous arguments to this court on behalf of their competing
interpretations of the statutes at issue and their differing
legal interests.  Their arguments to this court parallel the
differing views of the statute that they presented to the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.  Such continuing disagreement is
sufficient to satisfy the adversity requirement.  See Brumnett,
315 Or at 405 (so stating).
We also conclude that our decision in this case will
have a "practical effect" on the rights of the parties. 
Defendant correctly asserts that, because he no longer challenges
his DUII conviction, that conviction will not be affected by a
decision of this court.  However, our decision will have a
practical effect on the state, which is the party challenging the
decision of the Court of Appeals.  Here, no one disputes that the
Court of Appeals' decision had a practical effect on both parties
and that, in the absence of a decision by this court, the Court
of Appeals' construction and application of the DUII statutes
will be controlling on trial courts, the state, and future
defendants.  As discussed above, the state has been "aggrieved"
by the Court of Appeals decision because, if incorrect, that
decision improperly will hamper the state's ability to introduce
evidence against DUII defendants.  Cf. Palmer, 318 Or at 355 n 5
(Court of Appeals' incorrect rationale would force state to
defend merits of future claims that it should not be required to
defend).  Thus, as in Palmer, our decision in this case will have
a practical effect.  See also Hart v. Paulus, 296 Or 352, 357-58,
676 P2d 1384 (1984) ("possibility" that court decision "may
affect respondent's future action" meant case was justiciable
despite argument that decision would have no "practical
consequences"). 
At its most basic, defendant's argument is that,
because he lost in the Court of Appeals and did not seek review,
this dispute is moot.  That scenario, however, is very different
from other cases that this court has dismissed as moot, such as
Yancy, in which the petitioner's civil exclusion order had
expired, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 3-4), and Brumnett, in which
the petitioner had been released unconditionally from confinement
and the court could identify no collateral effect of any error in
not releasing him sooner.  315 Or at 406-07.  Here, in contrast,
a jury convicted defendant of DUII, he appealed that conviction,
and it was affirmed.  Defendant does not dispute that a criminal
conviction carries with it collateral consequences.  The fact
that defendant chose to end his effort to overturn his conviction
by declining to petition for review, while the state chose to
seek review, does not render the case moot.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that a
justiciable controversy exists.  We now turn to the statutory
issues that relate to the disputed blood alcohol analysis.
USE OF HOSPITAL BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST
On the merits, the state and defendant offer
conflicting views as to how the two statutes at issue, ORS
813.320(2)(a) and ORS 813.160, should be interpreted in relation
to one another.  
ORS 813.320 provides, in part:
"(1) The provisions of the implied consent law,
except ORS 813.300, shall not be construed by any court
to limit the introduction of otherwise competent,
relevant evidence in any civil action, suit or
proceedings or in any criminal action other than a
[DUII] violation * * *.
"(2) The provisions of the implied consent law
shall not be construed by any court to limit the
introduction of otherwise competent, relevant evidence
of the amount of alcohol in the blood of a defendant in
a prosecution for [DUII] if:
"(a) The evidence results from a test of blood
taken from the defendant while the defendant was
hospitalized or otherwise receiving medical care,
whether or not the defendant consented to the drawing
of blood or to the test; or
"(b) The evidence is obtained pursuant to a search
warrant."
ORS 813.160 provides, in part:
"(1) To be valid under ORS 813.300:
"(a) Chemical analyses of a person's blood shall
be performed by an individual shown to be qualified to
perform such analyses and shall be performed according
to methods approved by the Health Division.  For
purposes of this paragraph, the Health Division shall
approve methods of performing chemical analyses of a
person's blood that are satisfactory for determining
alcoholic content."
For the sake of clarity, we explain briefly the
statutory scheme for DUII prosecutions -- in particular, the
relationship between ORS 813.300, 813.160, and 813.320 -- before
addressing the parties' arguments.  ORS 813.300(2) sets out the
percentage of alcohol in a person's blood that constitutes "being
under the influence of intoxicating liquor."  ORS 813.300(2)
(stating that .08 percent constitutes "being under the influence
of intoxicating liquor").  ORS 813.160 provides how a chemical
analysis of a person's blood must be performed for that analysis
"[t]o be valid under ORS 813.300[.]" 
The issue here is whether ORS 813.320 provides an
exception to the specific requirements set out in ORS 813.160. 
ORS 813.320 has a complicated history.  In 1973, the legislature
created the statutory predecessor to ORS 813.320, former ORS
483.648 (1973).  That statute provided, in part:
"The provisions of the implied consent law, ORS
483.634 to 483.646 [* * *] shall not be construed by
any court to limit the introduction of otherwise
competent, relevant evidence in any civil action, suit
or proceedings or to any criminal action other than a
[DUII violation] or [driver license suspension for
refusing a breath test]."
(Emphasis added.)  Former ORS 483.648 (1973) expressly included
the statutory predecessor to ORS 813.160 as a "provision[] of the
implied consent law."  See former ORS 483.644 (1973), renumbered
as ORS 487.815 (1983), renumbered again as ORS 813.160 (1985).
In cases decided before 1999, this court had
interpreted that set of statutes -- i.e., the earlier versions of
ORS 813.300, 813.160, and 813.320 -- to mean that evidence of a
defendant's blood alcohol content that did not satisfy the
provisions of the implied consent law must be suppressed in DUII
prosecutions, even though that same evidence could be admissible
with respect to other kinds of criminal charges against the same
defendant.  See, e.g., State v. Moylett, 313 Or 540, 547-48, 556,
836 P2d 1329 (1992) (allowing evidence of chemical blood analysis
in regard to assault and criminal mischief charges but
suppressing same evidence in regard to DUII charge because
evidence had not been obtained pursuant to ORS 813.140); see also State v. Heintz, 286 Or 239, 254, 594 P2d 385 (1979) (to similar
effect under predecessor statute).
In 1999, the legislature amended ORS 813.320 by adding
subsection (2)(a).  The issue before us is whether that
subsection now permits the state to introduce evidence in a DUII
prosecution that does not satisfy the specific requirements of
ORS 813.160 that the test and the person administering it comply
with Health Division rules and qualifications.
The state argues that, for purposes of ORS
813.320(2)(a), ORS 813.160 is a "provision[] of the implied
consent law" and thus cannot be construed "to limit the
introduction of otherwise competent, relevant evidence of the
amount of alcohol in the blood of [the] defendant[.]"  Based on
its contention that the chemical analysis of defendant's blood in
this case was "otherwise competent, relevant evidence," the state
argues that the trial court properly admitted that evidence, even
though the state did not prove that that analysis complied with
the specifications set out in ORS 813.160. 
In response, defendant maintains that the evidence
proffered by the state was not "otherwise competent" under ORS
813.320(2)(a) because it did not satisfy the specific
requirements of ORS 813.160.  For that reason, defendant argues,
the trial court erred in admitting the evidence. (8) 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by
admitting that evidence because, in the Court of Appeals' view,
the phrase "otherwise competent" in ORS 813.320(2)(a) required
the state to demonstrate compliance with the specifications in
ORS 813.160(1)(a).  Snyder, 187 Or App at 654.  The state had
asserted that the evidence of the amount of alcohol in
defendant's blood was rendered "otherwise competent" by the
state's introduction of the certified hospital record, in
conjunction with testimony that the blood had been taken from
defendant while he was hospitalized, and that the latter
testimony demonstrated that the evidence complied with ORS
813.320(2)(a).  In rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeals
stated that, "[i]f mere satisfaction of other conditions
specified in subsection (2)(a) could themselves render chemical
blood analysis evidence 'otherwise competent,' the latter
requirement would be superfluous."  187 Or App at 655. 
The state asserts that the Court of Appeals' statutory
interpretation conflicts with the text and context of ORS
813.320(2)(a).  The state argues that, by referring to "otherwise
competent" evidence -- as opposed simply to competent evidence --
the legislature intended not to exclude chemical blood analysis
results as "incompetent" solely for failure to comply with ORS
813.160 or other provisions of the implied consent law.  In the
state's view, if defendant was hospitalized or otherwise
receiving medical care when the blood was taken and the state
could prove that the evidence was otherwise competent, ORS
813.320(2)(a) allowed that evidence to be admitted, even if the
specific requirements of ORS 813.160(1)(a) had not been met. 
Moreover, the state contends that the Court of Appeals'
interpretation amounts to a determination that, if the state
cannot show compliance with ORS 813.160, then chemical blood
analysis results are never admissible, regardless of whether the
defendant was hospitalized or otherwise receiving medical care at
the time that the sample was taken or tested.  Because such an
interpretation would render ORS 813.320(2)(a) "meaningless," the
state argues that "otherwise competent" must mean that the
evidence be "competent" in a manner unrelated to the implied
consent law -- for example, by satisfying chain of custody
requirements or meeting foundational requirements established by
case law.
Defendant adopts the reasoning of the Court of Appeals
that, in the context of evidence resulting from a chemical blood
analysis, only evidence that satisfies ORS 813.160(1)(a) is
"otherwise competent" evidence under ORS 813.320(2)(a).  On
appeal, defendant's only challenge to the evidence offered by the
state was that the state failed to comply with ORS 813.160(1)(a). 
ORS 813.320(2) provides that, if evidence offered to
show a DUII defendant's blood alcohol content is "otherwise
competent," a court shall not construe other provisions of the
implied consent law to limit its introduction, provided that the
circumstances in subsection (2)(a) are satisfied. (9)  As we
explained above, we accept that ORS 813.160 is considered part of
the implied consent law for purposes of ORS 813.320(2)(a).  See
___ Or at ___, slip op at 17 n 8.  
The determinative word in ORS 813.320(2) is
"otherwise," and, as both parties recognize, it is a word of
common usage that has a plain and natural meaning.  See Smoldt v.
Henckels & McCoy, Inc., 334 Or 507, 511, 53 P3d 443 (2002)
("otherwise" is word of common usage that has plain and natural
meaning).  "Otherwise" is a comparative word; that is, to
construe properly the meaning of the word that "otherwise" is
modifying, we must examine the concept or word to which that
modified word is being compared.  See, e.g., Webster's Third New
Int'l Dictionary 1598 (unabridged ed 1993) (defining "otherwise,"
inter alia, as "in a different way or manner," "in different
circumstances : under other conditions," and "in other
respects").  See also Smoldt, 334 Or at 511 (similarly defining
word "otherwise" as used in statute).  
Here, ORS 813.320(2) states that it is the "provisions
of the implied consent law" that "shall not be construed to limit
the introduction of otherwise competent, relevant evidence of the
amount of alcohol in the blood of a defendant in a [DUII]
prosecution[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  It is apparent from the
inclusion of the word "otherwise" in that provision that the
legislature intended that the evidence in question be competent
"in a different way or manner" than as provided by the implied
consent law, as long as the circumstances in subsection (2)(a) or
(2)(b) are satisfied.
To read the statute in the manner that defendant
advocates -- that, despite the presence of the term "otherwise,"
ORS 813.320 nonetheless requires the state to satisfy a provision
of the implied consent law, ORS 813.160(1)(a), for the evidence
it offers to be "competent" -- would impermissibly omit or fail
to give meaning to a term that the legislature has included in
the statute.  See ORS 174.010 (in interpreting statutes, courts
may not omit words that legislature has inserted).  Such an
interpretation also would conflict with the mandate that we
should attempt to give effect to all provisions or particulars of
the statute when construing it.  See id.; Moustachetti v. State
of Oregon, 319 Or 319, 326, 877 P2d 66 (1994) (citing statute).
Defendant argues that the words "otherwise competent"
do have meaning under his proposed interpretation because other
provisions of the implied consent law, such as ORS 813.100(1) and
ORS 813.140, no longer can be used to exclude chemical blood
analysis evidence taken under the circumstances of ORS
813.320(2)(a). (10)  Assuming without deciding that defendant's
assertion is correct, defendant offers no persuasive explanation
why ORS 813.160 should be construed differently than the other
implied consent law provisions that defendant claims are affected
by subsection (2)(a), except his contention that that statute is
"a foundational requirement."  Further undermining defendant's
argument is the fact that the legislature could have, but did
not, create an exception for ORS 813.160 from the "shall not be
construed * * * to limit" directive.  Cf. ORS 813.320(1)
(creating express exception for ORS 813.300). 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the
text and context of ORS 813.320(2) demonstrate that, in enacting
that statute, the legislature intended to remove ORS 813.160 as a
barrier to introducing evidence of a blood alcohol test taken
while a defendant was hospitalized or receiving medical care,
provided that the evidence meets competency requirements that are
based on a source of law outside of the implied consent law. 
We wish to emphasize what we do not decide in this
case.  The parties have raised no issue, and we have no occasion
to determine, what "other" competency requirements might apply
respecting evidence of the kind offered in this case.  Defendant
did not challenge in the Court of Appeals the competency of the
evidence that the state offered on any grounds other than its
noncompliance with ORS 813.160(1)(a).  We can say that we reject
the state's suggestion that ORS 813.320(2)(a) in some way relaxes
the ordinary foundational requirements that the case law
establishes for the admission of blood alcohol test results.  But
our holding is limited to the conclusion that, when the
prerequisites of ORS 813.320(2)(a) are met, the state need not
also demonstrate that the blood test results meet the
requirements of ORS 813.160(1)(a).
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding
that, for purposes of ORS 813.320(2)(a), the state must
demonstrate compliance with ORS 813.160(1)(a) for evidence to be
"otherwise competent" to prove a defendant's blood alcohol
content and that, because the state did not comply here, the
trial court erred in admitting the chemical blood analysis
evidence.  However, because the Court of Appeals correctly
affirmed the trial court on different grounds, we affirm that
disposition.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part and affirmed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.
1. The Court of Appeals stated that the 1999 versions of
the statutes apply to this case.  State v. Snyder, 187 Or App
648, 651 n 3, 69 P3d 802 (2003).  However, the incident for which
defendant was charged occurred in 1998; consequently, the 1997
statutes -- rather than the 1999 amendment to ORS 813.320, which
added subsection (2)(a) at issue here -- properly apply.  At
defendant's trial, which took place in 2000, the state argued
that the 1999 amendments applied and defendant did not object. 
Nor did defendant raise an objection on that ground before the
Court of Appeals or this court.  Because the parties have not
raised that issue, we take the case as presented and continue to
consider the application of the 1999 statutes to defendant.
2. ORS 813.320(2) provides:
"The provisions of the implied consent law shall
not be construed by any court to limit the introduction
of otherwise competent, relevant evidence of the amount
of alcohol in the blood of a defendant in a prosecution
for driving while under the influence of intoxicants
if:
"(a) The evidence results from a test of blood
taken from the defendant while the defendant was
hospitalized or otherwise receiving medical care,
whether or not the defendant consented to the
drawing of blood or to the test[.]"
3. ORS 2.520 provides:
"Any party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of
Appeals may petition the Supreme Court for review
within 35 days after the date of the decision, in such
manner as provided by rules of the Supreme Court."
4. Throughout this opinion, we refer to the 1999 version
of ORS 813.160, which provides, in part:
"(1) To be valid under ORS 813.300 [which provides
that not less than .08 percent blood alcohol
constitutes being under the influence of intoxicating
liquor]:
"(a) Chemical analyses of a person's blood shall
be performed by an individual shown to be qualified to
perform such analyses and shall be performed according
to methods approved by the Health Division.  For
purposes of this paragraph, the Health Division shall
approve methods of performing chemical analyses of a
person's blood that are satisfactory for determining
alcoholic content."
In 2003, the legislature amended that statute by
specifying the licensing and accreditation requirements for a
laboratory where a chemical analysis is performed for that
analysis to be valid under ORS 813.300, but those amendments do
not affect the decision here.  See Or Laws 2003, ch 19, § 1.  All
subsequent references to ORS 813.160 are to the 1999 version.
5. Defendant's theory at trial was that he was not the
driver of the car.
6. As noted above, in his argument to the trial court,
defendant questioned whether "anybody in the court can tell
whether or not somebody competent took the test and analyzed the
test results[,]" suggesting that defendant challenged the
competence of the blood test results generally, as well as
arguing that the state had failed to meet the requirements of ORS
813.160.  On appeal, however, defendant's only argument was that
the trial court admitted the "evidence of defendant's blood draw
without requiring the state to lay the foundation required by ORS
813.160(1)."  That was the issue that the Court of Appeals
decided.  Snyder, 187 Or App at 655-56 ("For purposes of ORS
813.320(2), the state must demonstrate compliance with ORS
813.160(1)(a) in order for evidence of a chemical analysis to be
'otherwise competent' to prove a defendant's blood alcohol
content.").  That also was the issue on which the state sought
review in this court.  Accordingly, the separate question whether
the blood test evidence here was inadmissible because it was not
"competent" for some reason other than lack of compliance with
ORS 813.160(1)(a) is not properly before the court.
7. Before the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
defendant also argued that he had been denied his statutory right
to a speedy trial.  The Court of Appeals rejected that argument
without discussion.  187 Or App at 657.  We do not address that
issue, because defendant has not raised it before this court. 
8. Before this court, defendant also argues that ORS
813.160 is not a "provision[] of the implied consent law," and
therefore does not come within the exception to the implied
consent law requirements created by ORS 813.320(2)(a).  The Court
of Appeals did not address that issue because, after assuming
without deciding that ORS 813.160 is a provision of the implied
consent law, the court concluded that the state's evidence was
not "otherwise competent" because it did not meet the
requirements of ORS 813.160.  187 Or App at 652-53.  Moreover,
the Court of Appeals noted that there was no need to address the
issue, because neither party had raised it before that court. 
187 Or App at 652 n 5.  Because defendant lost below and failed
to argue to the Court of Appeals that ORS 813.160 is not a
provision of the implied consent law, we conclude that that
argument is not preserved and decline to consider it.  See State
v. King, 307 Or 332, 338, 768 P2d 391 (1989) (refusing to
consider argument made in trial court, but not made in Court of
Appeals); ORAP 9.20(2) (if Supreme Court allows review and does
not limit questions on review, questions before Supreme Court
include all questions properly before the Court of Appeals that
petitioner or respondent claims were erroneously decided by that
court).
9. Defendant does not dispute that the test of blood at
issue here was taken from him while he was receiving medical care
at a hospital.
10. ORS 813.100(1) permits a chemical blood test to be
performed if the person is receiving medical care in a health
care facility immediately after a motor vehicle accident and has
been arrested for DUII, informed of his or her rights and the
consequences of agreeing to a test, and consents to the test. 
ORS 813.140 provides that ORS 813.100 does not preclude the
administration of a chemical blood test if the person expressly
consents or if the police officer has probable cause to believe
that evidence that the person committed DUII will be found from
the test and the person is incapable of consenting.