Case Title: Ex parte The Housing Authority of the City of Talladega

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0537, SC-2023-0908

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2024-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: May 24, 2024
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
_________________________
SC-2023-0537
_________________________
Ex parte Housing Authority of the City of Talladega
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS 
(In re: Harold Wallace 
v. 
The Housing Authority of the City of Talladega) 
(Talladega Circuit Court: CV-18-900509; 
Court of Civil Appeals: 2210486)
COOK, Justice.
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Harold Wallace fell while walking down the back-porch stairs to his 
apartment. In December 2018, he filed a complaint in the Talladega 
Circuit Court against his landlord, the Housing Authority of the City of 
Talladega ("the Housing Authority"). Wallace asserted claims of 
negligence and wantonness because the handrails for those stairs were 
missing when he fell. The Housing Authority moved for a summary 
judgment, arguing that the lack of handrails was an "open and obvious" 
danger and that Wallace had conceded in his deposition that the lack of 
handrails was known by him. The trial court agreed and granted the 
Housing Authority's motion for a summary judgment. Shortly afterward, 
Wallace appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. 
In a 3-2 decision, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial 
court's summary judgment in favor of the Housing Authority. See 
Wallace v. Housing Auth. of Talladega, [Ms. 2210486, Apr. 14, 2023] ____ 
So. 3d ____ (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). The Housing Authority then filed an 
application for a rehearing, which the Court of Civil Appeals overruled, 
without an opinion. 
The Housing Authority then petitioned this Court for certiorari 
review, arguing that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicts with 
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this Court's prior decision in Daniels v. Wiley, 314 So. 3d 1213 (Ala. 
2020). In Daniels, we affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant 
landlord after concluding that the landlord had no duty to the plaintiff 
tenant with respect to risks created by the muddy condition of a sidewalk 
within her apartment complex because the danger was "open and 
obvious." We granted certiorari review to determine whether the Court 
of Civil Appeals' decision in this case does in fact conflict with our 
decision in Daniels.
As explained below, after careful review, we conclude that the Court 
of Civil Appeals' decision does not conflict with Daniels, and we thus 
affirm. We issue this opinion primarily to clarify the scope and 
applicability of our decision in Daniels, including how the "open and 
obvious" doctrine applies in the landlord-tenant context. 
Facts and Procedural History
After suffering a stroke in 2015, Wallace applied in 2016 to the 
Housing Authority for a transfer to a handicap-accessible apartment in 
the Knoxville Homes apartment complex where his elderly mother lived. 
The Housing Authority approved Wallace's request and authorized his 
transfer, subject to the availability of an apartment.
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In December 2016, Wallace began preparing to move into his new 
apartment at Knoxville Homes. Wallace would later testify during a 
deposition that the Housing Authority had informed him that his 
Knoxville Homes apartment had been inspected and was ready for him 
to move in. 
According to Wallace, however, when he arrived to move into the 
apartment, he discovered that it was not ready. He stated that the 
apartment was dirty, that there were indications of roach and rat issues, 
that the floors needed additional work, that the cabinet under the sink 
had a hole that needed repair, and that the handrails around the back 
and front porches and the back-porch stairs had been removed and not 
replaced. Because he could not return to his former apartment, Wallace 
proceeded to move into his Knoxville Homes apartment despite those 
issues. 
When asked during his deposition what it was about the apartment 
that made him think that it was not ready, Wallace stated: 
"It didn't have no rail. They cut the rails and -- they cut 
the rails off. But I was told it [was] going to be fixed within a 
day or two. That's why I move in, because I thought they going 
to fix it and it's been three years."
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Although a Housing Authority employee told Wallace that the Housing 
Authority would fix everything within a week, Wallace stated that it did 
not do so.
Wallace also stated that from the day he moved into his Knoxville 
Homes apartment on December 16, 2016, until his fall on December 29, 
2016, he had three conversations with employees of the Housing 
Authority about installing the porch and stair railings. According to 
Wallace, the employees of the Housing Authority repeatedly told him 
that the railings would be reinstalled.
Wallace stated that, on the morning of December 29, 2016, he fell 
while descending the back-porch stairs. Although he was using his cane 
to help him keep his balance, Wallace stated that he nevertheless lost his 
balance and fell to the concrete sidewalk below. Wallace attributed his 
fall to the lack of a railing. According to Wallace, as a result of the fall, 
he injured his right shoulder, his knees, and perhaps his neck. 
On December 17, 2018, Wallace sued the Housing Authority. 
Wallace alleged that his injuries from the fall were the result of the 
negligence or wantonness of the Housing Authority or the person or legal 
entity who was responsible for the maintenance of his Knoxville Homes 
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apartment. 
On October 1, 2021, the Housing Authority filed a motion for a 
summary judgment. Relying on this Court's prior decision in Daniels, 
supra, the Housing Authority argued that it was entitled to a summary 
judgment because the absence of the back-porch-stair railing was an 
"open and obvious" danger of which Wallace was aware. As a result, the 
Housing Authority argued that it owed no duty to Wallace. In support of 
its motion, the Housing Authority included excerpts from Wallace's 
deposition testimony. 
Wallace opposed the Housing Authority's motion for a summary 
judgment. In support of his opposition, Wallace submitted his entire 
deposition testimony.
Following a hearing on the Housing Authority's motion, the trial 
court entered a summary judgment in its favor based on the authority in 
Daniels. As stated previously, Wallace then appealed the trial court's 
decision to the Court of Civil Appeals.
The Court of Civil Appeals, after reviewing the record, held that the 
trial court had erred in relying on Daniels in determining that the 
Housing Authority was entitled to a summary judgment. Thus, the Court 
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of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of 
the Housing Authority and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
This petition for a writ of certiorari followed. 
Standard of Review
"'"On certiorari review, this Court accords no 
presumption of correctness to the legal conclusions of the 
intermediate appellate court. Therefore, we must apply de 
novo the standard of review that was applicable in the Court 
of Civil Appeals."'"
Ex parte S.L.M., 171 So. 3d 673, 677 (Ala. 2014) (quoting Ex parte Helms, 
873 So. 2d 1139, 1143 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Ex parte Toyota Motor 
Corp., 684 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 1996)).
"'The standard of review applicable to a summary 
judgment is the same as the standard for granting the motion 
....' McClendon v. Mountain Top Indoor Flea Market, Inc., 601 
So. 2d 957, 958 (Ala. 1992).
"'A summary judgment is proper when there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. The burden is on the 
moving party to make a prima facie showing that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that 
it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In 
determining whether the movant has carried that 
burden, the court is to view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party and to 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that 
party. To defeat a properly supported summary 
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judgment motion, the nonmoving party must 
present "substantial evidence" creating a genuine 
issue of material fact -- "evidence of such weight 
and quality that fair-minded persons in the 
exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably 
infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." 
Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12; West v. Founders Life 
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 
1989).'
"Capital Alliance Ins. Co. v. Thorough-Clean, Inc., 639 So. 2d 
1349, 1350 (Ala. 1994). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. 
Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So. 2d 337, 342 
(Ala. 2004)."
Pritchett v. ICN Med. All., Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 935 (Ala. 2006).
Discussion
In its petition, the Housing Authority alleges that the Court of Civil 
Appeals' decision conflicts with this Court's prior decision in Daniels, 
supra, which the Housing Authority cites for the proposition that it had 
no duty to warn of or make safe the condition of the back-porch steps 
because, it says, the danger posed by that condition was "open and 
obvious." According to the Housing Authority, the Court of Civil Appeals 
improperly ignored our holding in Daniels when it concluded that §§ 360 
and 361 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am. L. Inst. 1965) ("the 
Second Restatement") require landlords/lessors to protect tenants/lessees 
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from even "open and obvious" dangers in certain circumstances. 
Because we conclude that the Court of Civil Appeals applied the 
appropriate legal principles, we affirm. However, in light of the apparent 
confusion over the scope and applicability of Daniels, we issue this 
opinion to clarify the proper interpretation of that decision.
I. The Restatement Principles
Our Court has sometimes cited different provisions of the 
Restatements of Torts when discussing how the "open and obvious" 
doctrine applies to premises-liability claims, even in the landlord-tenant 
context. Thus, before turning to this Court's decision in Daniels, we 
believe it helpful to provide a background on the relevant provisions of 
the Restatement (First) of Torts (Am. L. Inst. 1934) ("the First 
Restatement") and the Second Restatement and to discuss the Alabama 
caselaw applying those provisions. 
A. A Landlord's Liability to Tenants Under the First 
Restatement
Section 356 of the First Restatement, which falls within a topic 
titled "Liability of Lessors of Land to Persons Thereon," see First 
Restatement Chapter 13, Topic 3 (emphasis added), states the general 
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rule governing a landlord's liability to tenants for dangerous conditions 
that exist when a lease begins. That rule provides that, "[e]xcept as stated 
in §§ 357 to 362, a lessor of land is not liable for bodily harm caused to 
his lessee or others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or a sub-
lessee by any dangerous condition whether natural or artificial which 
existed when the lessee took possession." First Restatement § 356 
(emphasis added).  
However, there are exceptions to this general rule governing a 
landlord's liability to a tenant. Specifically, §§ 360 and 361 of the First 
Restatement set forth two such exceptions for tenants injured on certain 
parts of the land over which the landlord retained control.  The exception 
in § 360 of the First Restatement states that
"[a] possessor of land, who leases a part thereof and 
retains in his own possession any other part which the lessee 
is entitled to use as appurtenant to the part leased to him, is 
subject to liability to his lessee and others lawfully upon the 
land with the consent of the lessee or a sub-lessee for bodily 
harm caused to them by a dangerous condition upon that part 
of the land retained in the lessor's control, if the lessor by the 
exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the 
condition and the unreasonable risk involved therein and 
could have made the condition safe."
(Emphasis added.)  
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Crucially, Comment a. to § 360 makes clear that the exception 
"applies to subject the lessor to liability irrespective of whether the lessee 
or those upon the land in his right know or do not know of the dangerous 
condition." (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the First Restatement recognizes 
that a landlord owes a duty to protect a tenant from even an "open and 
obvious" danger when that danger exists on a part of the premises (1) 
over which the landlord retained control and (2) that a tenant "is entitled 
to use as appurtenant to the part leased to him [(e.g., stairs or 
elevators1)]." First Restatement § 360.
Comment a. to § 360 further contemplates that a 
"lessee's knowledge may … put him in … contributory fault" 
and states that "unless the danger is so great that it is 
unreasonable for the licensee to encounter it in view of the 
purpose of his visit or if knowing of the dangerous condition 
he fails to exercise that caution which a reasonable man 
would under the circumstances, the lessor is liable to him 
notwithstanding his knowledge of the actual conditions." 
1Because "[t]he Housing Authority made no attempt to argue and 
show that no factual dispute existed as to the status of the back-porch 
stairs" before the trial court in this case, Wallace, ____ So. 3d at ____, 
that issue was not litigated, and the Court of Civil Appeals never actually 
determined whether the principles set forth in § 360 should apply to that 
portion of the property. We similarly do not address whether this Court 
has adopted the Comments to § 360 setting forth examples of parts of the 
land that a tenant "is entitled to use as appurtenant to the part leased to 
him."
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(Emphasis added.) In other words, under § 360, the "open and obvious" 
nature of a condition may be considered in determining whether a 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent and may bar recovery for a plaintiff 
who unreasonably encounters a known danger. The existence of an "open 
and obvious" danger does not, however, categorically relieve a landlord of 
his or her duty of care to tenants injured under the circumstances set 
forth in § 360.
Section 361 of the First Restatement provides another exception to 
the "open and obvious" doctrine and explains that
"[a] possessor of land, who leases a part thereof and 
retains in his own control any other part which is necessary 
to the safe use of the leased part, is subject to liability to his 
lessee and others lawfully upon the land with the consent of 
the lessee or a sub-lessee for bodily harm caused by a 
dangerous condition upon that part of the land retained in the 
lessor's control, if the lessor by the exercise of reasonable care
"(a) could have discovered the condition and the 
risk involved, and
"(b) could have made the condition safe."
(Emphasis added.)2 Comment a. to § 361 states that the foregoing rule 
2Comment b. to § 361  provides examples of parts of the land that 
are "necessary to the safe use of the leased part" and explains as follows: 
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"applies irrespective of whether the lessee or his licensees 
coming in his right upon that part of the land leased to him, 
know or could, by the exercise of reasonable care, discover the 
dangerous condition maintained by the lessor upon that part 
of the land maintained within his own control. As to the effect 
of the knowledge of the lessee and others entering upon the 
land with his consent, see § 360, Comment a."
(Emphasis added.) As with § 360, the "open and obvious" doctrine does 
not negate a landlord's duty of care to tenants under § 361. See Comment 
a. to § 361 ("As to the effect of the knowledge of the lessee and others 
entering upon the land with his consent, see § 360, Comment a."); 
Comment a. to § 360 ("[T]he lessor is liable to [a lessee] notwithstanding 
[the lessee's] knowledge of the actual conditions."). Similarly, the "open 
and obvious" nature of danger may properly be considered as part of the 
contributory-negligence analysis. Id.
Thus, under the traditional common-law principles of premises 
"The rule stated in this Section applies to the maintenance of 
walls, roofs, and foundations of an apartment house or office 
building. It applies also to any other part of the land, the 
careful maintenance of which is essential to the safe use of the 
rooms or offices or portion of land leased to the various 
lessees, such as the central heating, lighting, or water 
system."
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liability embodied in the First Restatement, the openness and 
obviousness of a danger does not nullify a landlord's duty to protect a 
tenant, in certain circumstances, from dangerous conditions on parts of 
the land over which the landlord retained control, subject to the defense 
of contributory fault for the tenant's failure to "exercise that caution 
which a reasonable man would under the circumstances." Comment a. to 
§ 360.
However, to the extent that a tenant could be argued in some 
circumstances and some locations to be only a "gratuitous licensee" or a 
"business visitor," the principle set forth in § 340 of the First Restatement 
may instead apply.3  Section 340 provides the general rule for "open and 
obvious" dangers and states that landowners do not owe "licensees, 
whether business visitors or gratuitous licensees," a duty of care 
regarding dangerous conditions if the licensees "know of the condition 
3As explained below, some Alabama caselaw has treated tenants, in 
certain circumstances or when in certain locations, as licensees or 
invitees.  See, e.g., Shelton v. Boston Fin., Inc., 638 So. 2d 824, 825 (Ala. 
1994) (plurality opinion) ("With respect to the common areas of an 
apartment complex, a tenant has the same legal rights as an invitee."). 
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and realize the risk involved therein."4
B. The Second Restatement's Position on "Open and 
Obvious" Dangers
The Second Restatement was published in 1965.  Sections 360 and 
361 of the Second Restatement are virtually identical to §§ 360 and 361 
4The First Restatement, published in 1934, embodies the 
traditional "no duty" rule of the "open and obvious" doctrine. See Ann K. 
Dittmeier, Premises Liability: The Disappearance of the Open and 
Obvious Doctrine, 64 Mo. L. Rev. 1021, 1025 (1999) (explaining that the 
First Restatement reflects the common-law "no duty" rule with respect to 
"open and obvious" dangers). Section 340 is entitled "General Liability of 
Possessors of Land to Licensees, Whether Business Visitors or 
Gratuitous Licensees," and states the rule as follows:
"A possessor of land is not subject to liability to his 
licensees, whether business visitors or gratuitous licensees, 
for bodily harm caused to them by any dangerous condition 
thereon, whether natural or artificial, if they know of the 
condition and realize the risk involved therein."
(Emphasis added.)  
In contrast to §§ 360 and 361, § 340 of the First Restatement does 
not include the additional requirement that the licensee be contributorily 
negligent for a landowner to avoid liability. However, Comment a. to 
§ 340 does acknowledge that some exceptions to the "no duty" rule in § 
340 for "open and obvious" dangers do exist. For instance, that comment 
states that the rule set forth in § 340 does not apply to "persons who enter 
land of another under a privilege which is independent of the consent of 
the possessor …, as where a patron of a public utility enters land in its 
possession seeking its services to which, as a member of the public, he is 
entitled (see § 347, Comment a)." Comment a. to § 340.
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of the First Restatement. Indeed, as the Court of Civil Appeals correctly 
noted in its opinion, "substantially the same principles are present in the 
comparable exceptions as to a landlord's duty discussed in the 
Restatement (First) of Torts §§ 357-62 (Am. L. Inst. 1934), including, in 
pertinent part, the exceptions described in §§ 360-61 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts." Wallace, ____ So. 3d at ____. 
However, by adopting § 343A, the Second Restatement did relax the 
general rule, embodied in § 340 of the First Restatement, that applies to 
"invitees" (or "business visitors") injured as a result of "open and obvious" 
dangers.5 Section 343A, which replaced § 340 of the First Restatement, 
provides, in pertinent part:
"(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical 
harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land 
whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the 
possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge 
or obviousness." 
5In contrast to the First Restatement, the Second Restatement 
distinguishes between the general duty owed to licensees and "invitees" 
(a category akin to "business visitors" under the First Restatement) in 
the case of "open and obvious" dangers. The Second Restatement defines 
an "invitee" as "either a public invitee or a business visitor." § 332. A 
"business visitor," in turn, is defined as "a person who is invited to enter 
or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with 
business dealings with the possessor of the land." Id. 
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(Emphasis added.) See also Michalski v. Home Depot, Inc., 225 F.3d 113, 
118-19 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that, in response to widespread backlash to 
the "availability of the open and obvious doctrine as a complete and total 
defense to premises liability," the Second Restatement "adopted a 
different view, relating the liability of landowners for harm caused by 
obvious dangers to the foreseeability of that harm"). Thus, under § 343A, 
a landowner owes no general duty to protect invitees from "open and 
obvious" dangers "unless the possessor [or landowner] should anticipate 
the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." (Emphasis added.)
C. Alabama Caselaw
In its opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals emphasized that, although 
our caselaw rejects § 343A of the Second Restatement's "more liberal 
approach" as to a landowner's general duty regarding "open and obvious" 
dangers, Wallace, ____ So. 3d at ____, the specific rules relating to 
landlords set forth in §§ 360 and 361 of both the First Restatement and 
the Second Restatement continue to reflect a "proper statement of 
Alabama law."  Id. As discussed below, we agree with the Court of Civil 
Appeals' characterization of our controlling precedent.
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1. Alabama Courts Apply the General, Traditional Rule 
of the "Open and Obvious" Doctrine -- Rejecting 
§ 343A's Applicability to Invitees
This Court has repeatedly affirmed that, "'as a general rule, an 
invitor will not be liable for injuries to an invitee resulting from a danger 
which was known to the invitee or should have been observed by the 
invitee in the exercise of reasonable care.'" Edwards v. Hammond, 510 
So. 2d 234, 236 (Ala. 1987) (quoting Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So. 2d 985, 
989 (Ala. 1980) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis omitted); see also Lamson 
& Sessions Bolt Co. v. McCarty, 234 Ala. 60, 63, 173 So. 388, 391 (1937); 
Sloss Iron & Steel Co. v. Tilson, 141 Ala. 152, 161, 37 So. 427, 429 (1904). 
Thus, we have adopted the general rule set forth in § 340 of the First 
Restatement, which provides that the openness and obviousness of a 
dangerous condition relieves landowners of a duty of care to "gratuitous 
licensees" and "business visitors" (or "invitees") whose privilege to enter 
the land depends on the landowner's consent. 
We acknowledge that this Court appeared to briefly deviate from 
this traditional formulation of the "open and obvious" doctrine when, in 
1989, we began relying on § 343A of the Second Restatement in several 
decisions concerning premises liability. See, e.g., Terry v. Life Ins. Co. of 
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Georgia, 551 So. 2d 385, 386 (Ala. 1989), Campbell v. Valley Garden 
Apartments, 600 So. 2d 240 (Ala. 1992), and Sisk v. Heil Co., 639 So. 2d 
1363, 1365 (Ala. 1994). 
However, we clearly returned to our former position when, in Ex 
parte Gold Kist, Inc., 686 So. 2d 260, 261 (Ala. 1996), and Sessions v. 
Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d 649 (Ala. 2002), we expressly rejected the 
principle set forth in § 343A. In Gold Kist, 
"[the plaintiff], an employee of the United States 
Department of Agriculture ('USDA'), was injured while 
working at her job when she slipped in water, grease, and 
other substances that had accumulated on the floor of [the 
defendant]'s poultry processing plant. The USDA had an 
office and a break room at [the defendant's] plant to facilitate 
the inspection of poultry. [The plaintiff] had been working at 
the plant for nine months before the accident. In the accident 
she injured her back; she sued, alleging that the accident was 
caused by an unsafe or hazardous condition created by [the 
defendant]."
686 So. 2d at 261. The trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff 
"could not recover if the condition that caused the accident was open and 
obvious," and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Id. On 
appeal to this Court, the plaintiff, relying on § 343A of the Second 
Restatement, argued "that the trial court should have further explained 
that a possessor of land is not liable for harm caused by open and obvious 
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danger 'unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such 
knowledge or obviousness.'" Id. This Court, however, was unpersuaded 
by the plaintiff's argument and concluded that § 343A was not "a correct 
statement of the law relating to the liability of a possessor of land." Id. 
The relevant holding in Sessions similarly concerned whether a 
possessor of land had a general duty to protect invitees from "open and 
obvious" dangers. In Sessions, the plaintiff, a plumbing subcontractor, 
sued the defendant, a general contractor, after the plaintiff "fell through 
an opening for a stairwell in the second floor of the building the parties 
were constructing." 842 So. 2d at 651. On appeal, this Court noted that 
there was "undisputed evidence that the hazard of the unguarded 
stairwell was open and obvious," id., and -- relying on Gold Kist -- 
concluded that the openness and obviousness of the hazard "negate[d] 
any general duty in the defendant general contractor to barricade the 
stairwell or to warn the subcontractor plaintiff of the hazard." Id. at 654 
(emphasis added).
Thus, despite the confusion created by some of our prior caselaw's 
reliance on § 343A of the Second Restatement, this Court -- when 
applicable -- continues to apply the traditional, and general, rule of 
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liability with regard to "gratuitous licensees" and "business visitors" (or 
"invitees") set forth in § 340 of the First Restatement.
2. Alabama Courts Recognize a Landlord's Common-
Law Duty to Tenants With Regard to "Open and 
Obvious" Conditions in Certain Circumstances
Importantly, cases dealing with the general liability of landowners 
to licensees or invitees do not ordinarily govern a landlord's specific 
liability to tenants injured on certain parts of the land over which the 
landlord retained control. As the Court of Civil Appeals' decision 
explains, in contrast to § 343A -- which has "no foundation in Alabama 
law" -- this Court has consistently embraced the specific rules set forth 
in §§ 360 and 361 of the First Restatement and the Second Restatement 
as "the long-standing law in Alabama." Wallace, ____ So. 3d at ____.  
For example, in 1936, we observed, in Prudential Insurance Co. of 
America v. Zeidler, 233 Ala. 328, 171 So. 634 (1936),
"that the general authorities -- state and federal -- in this 
jurisdiction are to the effect that, 'to the rule that a tenant 
takes the leased premises subject to defects not amounting to 
a trap, there is an exception to the effect that the owner of a 
building who leases it to different tenants, and expressly or 
impliedly reserves portions thereof, such as halls, stairways, 
porches, walks, etc., for the use in common of different 
tenants, is liable for any personal injury to a tenant, or a 
person in privity with a tenant, due to defects in the portion 
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of the leased premises of which the landlord so retains control, 
provided the defect is ascribable to the negligence of the 
landlord, and the tenant or person injured is not guilty of 
contributory negligence.'" 
233 Ala. at 333, 171 So. at 638 (citing Annotation, Liability of Landlord 
for Personal Injuries Due to Defective Halls, Stairways, And the Like, 
For Use of Different Tenants, 25 A.L.R. 1273 (1923) (discussing Roman 
v. King, 289 Mo. 641, 233 S.W. 161 (1921)), and Mudd v. Gray, 200 Ala. 
92, 75 So. 468 (1917)) (emphasis omitted; emphasis added).6 This view is 
entirely consistent with the principles reflected in § 360 of the First 
6Both Roman and Mudd are consistent with § 360. For instance, in 
Roman, the Missouri Supreme Court embraced the proposition that the
"'[m]ere continued use of a common passageway, after 
knowledge of its dangerous condition, is not of itself conclusive 
evidence of a lack of due care on the part of the tenant, since 
such knowledge does not require the tenant to desist from 
using same in a careful manner, nor render the careful use of 
same contributory negligence.'" 
289 Mo. 641, 233 S.W. at 165 (quoting Home Realty Co. v. Carius, 189 
Ky. 228, 224 S.W. 751, 752 (1920)).
In Mudd, this Court stated that "[a] reading of the authorities 
would clearly disclose that the obligation of the landlord … as to keeping 
in repair the stairway used in common by the different tenants and 
controlled by the landlord, extended not only to the tenant, but to his 
invitees, whether expressly or by implication." 200 Ala. at 94, 75 So. at 
470.
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Restatement and the Second Restatement. 
More recently, in Hancock v. Alabama Home Mortgage Co., 372 So. 
2d 858, 858 (Ala. 1979) ("Hancock I"), we recognized that the rule set 
forth in § 360 of the Second Restatement "has long been the rule in this 
State." Applying the principles in § 360, we reversed the trial court's 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant landlord and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. Id. In a subsequent appeal, we explained 
that the rule concerning a landlord's liability with respect to certain areas 
over which the landlord retained control, as described in Zeidler, is 
"imposed so that 'tenants and their invitees may have egress and ingress 
without unnecessary danger in the due exercise of the privilege or 
necessity of going to and from such apartment house or office building.'" 
Hancock v. Alabama Home Mortg. Co., 393 So. 2d 969, 970 (Ala. 1981) 
("Hancock II") (quoting Preston v. LaSalle Apartments, 241 Ala. 540, 543, 
3 So. 2d 411, 413 (1941)). 
Likewise, our Court has expressly affirmed the rule set forth in 
§ 361.  See Chambers v. Buettner, 295 Ala. 8, 12, 321 So. 2d 650, 653 
(1975).
Again, in Coggin v. Starke Bros. Realty Co., 391 So. 2d 111, 113 
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(Ala. 1980), a plurality of this Court affirmed the rules set forth in §§ 360 
and 361.  In that case, the plaintiff tenant slipped and fell down the back 
steps to her apartment that "were a portion of the common area of the 
rental property used by [the plaintiff tenant] and the other tenants." Id. 
at 112. The plaintiff tenant admitted that she had noticed "that the back 
steps leading up to her dwelling were 'steep and narrow' and lacked a 
handrail" before her fall. Id.  The trial court entered a summary judgment 
in favor of the defendant landlord. This Court reversed and concluded 
that the "evidence, including evidence bearing on the defense of 'open and 
obvious danger,' viewed in light of the applicable substantive law, 
presents genuine issues of material fact which [the plaintiff tenant] is 
entitled to have submitted, pursuant to appropriate instructions, for a 
jury's determination." Id. at 113.7  As the Court of Civil Appeals' decision 
7And there are other Alabama cases applying the principles from 
§§ 360 and 361.  For instance, in Berness v. Regency Square Assocs., Ltd., 
514 So. 2d 1346, 1348 (Ala. 1987), we similarly reversed a trial court's 
summary judgment in favor of a defendant landlord after explaining that, 
in contrast to our decisions applying the general "open and obvious" rule, 
the plaintiff tenant's knowledge of the dangerous condition in that case 
raised a factual question regarding whether she was contributorily 
negligent rather than a legal question involving the defendant landlord's 
"threshold duty to warn" of the danger posed by the dangerous condition. 
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correctly notes, the present case "factually resembles Coggin regarding 
the type of danger at issue -- a missing stair handrail leading to the 
leased premises …."  Wallace, ____ So. 3d at ____.
Thus, when applicable, this Court has repeatedly, and expressly, 
affirmed the substantive propositions in §§ 360 and 361 of the First 
Restatement and the Second Restatement. 
II. This Court's Decision in Daniels
With the above background in mind, we now turn to this Court's 
decision in Daniels, supra. In Daniels, the plaintiff, a resident of an 
apartment complex owned and managed by the defendants, was "walking 
on the sidewalk from her apartment to the mail kiosk for her building to 
retrieve her mail." 314 So. 3d at 1215. According to the plaintiff, because 
of rain earlier that day, mud had accumulated on the sidewalk. Id. The 
In Nayman v. Tracey, 599 So. 2d 604, 605 (Ala. 1992), we again 
emphasized that the parties in that case were "related as landlord and 
tenant and that [the plaintiff tenant] contend[ed] that the area where he 
was injured was a 'common' area over which [the defendant landlord] 
retained control." Accordingly, we reversed a trial court's summary 
judgment in favor of defendant landlord after concluding that §§ 360 and 
361, as well as our prior caselaw, recognize a landlord's duty to maintain 
the common areas of an apartment complex in a reasonably safe 
condition in certain circumstances. Id. at 606-07.
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plaintiff alleged that, when she stepped off the sidewalk curb, she slipped 
and fell -- breaking both of her knees. Id. The plaintiff sued, alleging that 
the defendants "had breached duties 'to ensure that the premises of the 
apartment complex were reasonably safe for tenants' and 'to not create 
and/or allow dangerous conditions on the premises of the apartment 
complex.'" Id. 
The defendants moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among 
other things, that "they were not liable for [the plaintiff's] injuries 
because, they argued, the alleged danger created by mud was open and 
obvious." Id. In support of their summary-judgment motion, the 
defendants attached the affidavit of the apartment complex's community 
manager. Id. at 1216. In that affidavit, the community manager testified 
"that a diligent search had been conducted of the records of 
the apartment complex and that no record was located 
concerning complaints about mud accumulating on the 
sidewalk near the area where [the plaintiff] fell or other 
complaints regarding the general condition of the sidewalk 
before [the plaintiff's] fall …. According to [the community 
manager], neither [the plaintiff] nor any other tenant had 
reported a problem with the condition of the sidewalk to her. 
[The community manager] explained that, in addition to 
walking on the sidewalk to retrieve the mail, [the plaintiff] 
could walk on the street, walk through a breezeway, or drive 
her car to the mail kiosk and park in front of it in one of the 
spaces provided for that purpose."
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Id. (emphasis added). The defendants additionally submitted "deposition 
testimony from [the plaintiff] regarding her knowledge of the condition 
of the sidewalk, her navigation of the sidewalk, and the circumstances 
surrounding her accident." Id. 
In response, the plaintiff acknowledged that she was aware of "the 
danger created by the accumulated mud on the sidewalk and curb." Id. 
at 1217. However, she argued that this knowledge did not foreclose her 
negligence and wantonness claims because the defendants "should have 
anticipated her being injured by the danger because, she said, they did 
not provide her with a 'reasonable and safe alternative' means for 
retrieving mail on a rainy day." Id.  Further, she argued that the 
defendants were "liable for her injuries because, she said, they knew or 
should have known about the danger created by the mud on the sidewalk, 
which, she said, was 'plainly visible.'" Id. In support of this proposition, 
the plaintiff cited Campbell, supra, which in turn quoted § 343A of the 
Second Restatement and held that a plaintiff's knowledge of the slippery 
condition of a sidewalk did not bar her negligence claim. Daniels, 314 So. 
3d at 1217; Campbell, 600 So. 2d at 241-42. 
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The defendants replied, arguing that "Campbell had been overruled 
by Ex parte Gold Kist, Inc., 686 So. 2d 260, 261 (Ala. 1996) (declining to 
adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965), which was quoted in 
Campbell ….), and that, consequently, [the plaintiff's] reliance on 
Campbell [was] misplaced." Daniels, 314 So. 3d at 1218 (footnote 
omitted). 
The trial court agreed with the defendants and entered a summary 
judgment in their favor. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's 
judgment. In our decision, we noted that, in Gold Kist and Sessions, this 
Court had "'decline[d] to adopt § 343A as a correct statement of the law 
relating to the liability of a possessor of land.'" Id. at 1222 (quoting Gold 
Kist, 686 So. 2d at 261). We further stated that, "[t]o the extent that … 
Campbell, supra[,] … and other cases citing, quoting, and/or applying the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A may hold otherwise, they are 
overruled." Id. at 1225. 
As to the facts in Daniels, we noted (1) that it was undisputed that 
the condition of the muddy sidewalk and curb created an "open and 
obvious" danger and (2) that the plaintiff admitted "that she appreciated 
the danger created by the mud when she testified that she typically 
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avoided the danger by hopping over the mud." Id. (emphasis added). 
Therefore, we determined that the defendants did not owe the plaintiff 
"any general duty to mark the sidewalk and curb where the mud had 
accumulated or to warn [the plaintiff] of the danger …." Id. (emphasis 
added). We also held that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the 
defendants had "breached a special duty, as distinguished from the 
general duty … already discussed." Id. Specifically, we held that, because 
the plaintiff had failed to cite any relevant legal authority for her claim 
that a "landlord's safety manual imposes a special duty of care on the 
landlord to protect tenants from open and obvious dangers," she had 
"waived any challenge to the summary judgment in this regard." Id. at 
1226. We further stated that, "[t]o the extent that [the plaintiff] may 
argue that [the defendants] breached a special duty by failing to provide 
a safe, alternative route for [the plaintiff] to retrieve the mail," that 
"alleged special duty rests upon the principal of law this Court rejected 
in Gold Kist and, thus, is unavailing." Id. 
III. Daniels Did Not Reject the Principles Set Forth in §§ 360 and 
361 of the First Restatement and the Second Restatement
As noted, the Housing Authority argues that any duty imposed by 
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§§ 360 and 361 was abrogated by our decision in Daniels. After careful 
consideration, we see no reason to conclude that this Court's decision in 
Daniels upended our entire body of caselaw concerning the separate and 
distinct duties described in §§ 360 and 361 of the First Restatement and 
the Second Restatement. 
First, the plaintiff in Daniels based her argument on § 343A of the 
Second Restatement. In concluding that the defendants in Daniels owed 
no general duty to the plaintiff with respect to the danger posed by the 
muddy sidewalk, this Court expressly relied on (1) Gold Kist's holding 
that we have not adopted "'§ 343A as a correct statement of the law 
relating to the liability of a possessor of land,'" Daniels, 314 So. 3d at 
1222 (quoting Gold Kist, 686 So. 2d at 261), and (2) this Court's 
subsequent recognition in Sessions that the general rule set forth in 
§ 343A of the Second Restatement "is not the law in Alabama." Id. at 
1224-25. Importantly, the holdings in Gold Kist and Sessions concern 
only whether a possessor of land owes his or her invitee a general duty to 
protect the invitee against known or obvious conditions on the land if "the 
possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
obviousness." §343A. In neither case did we mention -- much less reject 
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-- the specific rules of liability embodied in §§ 360 and 361 of the First 
Restatement and the Second Restatement that govern a landlord's duty 
of care to tenants in certain circumstances. 
Further, our opinion in Daniels expressly noted that the plaintiff in 
that case had testified that "she typically avoided the danger by hopping 
over the mud," 314 So. 3d at 1225, and that there was evidence indicating 
that, "in addition to walking on the sidewalk to retrieve the mail, [the 
plaintiff] could walk on the street, walk through a breezeway, or drive 
her car to the mail kiosk and park in front of it in one of the spaces 
provided for that purpose." 314 So. 3d at 1216.8
8As discussed above, in Hancock II, this Court explained that the 
specific rule concerning a landlord's liability with respect to certain areas 
over which the landlord retained control is "imposed so that 'tenants and 
their invitees may have egress and ingress without unnecessary danger 
in the due exercise of the privilege or necessity of going to and from such 
apartment house or office building.'" 393 So. 2d at 970 (quoting Preston, 
241 Ala. at 543, 3 So. 2d at 413) (emphasis added). As noted above, in 
Daniels, there was evidence indicating that other means of "egress and 
ingress" were available to the plaintiff. Thus, the result in Daniels is 
consistent with the underlying purpose of the rules set forth in §§ 360 
and 361.  
As illustrated by Daniels, if the specific conditions set forth in §§ 
360 and 361 do not apply, a tenant may be treated as an invitee in areas 
outside of the actual leased premises.  Daniels, 314 So. 3d at 1222 n.4 
("'With respect to the common areas of an apartment complex, a tenant 
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Our decision in Daniels also did not -- expressly or implicitly -- 
overrule this Court's decisions in Hancock I, Chambers, or Coggin, supra, 
which recognized that the rules set forth in §§ 360 and 361 are well 
established under Alabama law. As the Court of Civil Appeals further 
explained in its opinion:
"The plaintiff in Daniels does not appear to have adequately 
argued that any other exception or special duty applied to her 
claim, which involved merely a muddy sidewalk leading to the 
mail kiosk. Daniels did not expressly discuss Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 360-61 or criticize the above-noted 
precedents discussing those sections as correct statements of 
Alabama law regarding exceptions to the general rule 
governing a landlord's duty as to an open and obvious danger. 
… [T]he supreme court gave no indication that [Coggin or 
Hancock I] had incorrectly stated the law or had been 
overruled as part of the court's addressing the general rule as 
to a landlord's duty."
Wallace, ____ So. 3d at ____. 
For these reasons, we agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that 
this Court, in Daniels, did not intend to overrule long-standing Alabama 
law recognizing the specific rules of liability set forth in §§ 360 and 361. 
has the same rights as an invitee.'") (quoting Shelton, 638 So. 2d at 825); 
id. at 1225 ("Applying Sessions [(an invitee case)] to the facts of this case 
…."). 
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Thus, although our holding in Daniels is sound, we caution that it should 
not be interpreted as rejecting a landlord's duties under the 
circumstances described in §§ 360 and 361 of the First Restatement and 
the Second Restatement. Moreover, because the Housing Authority failed 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the principles set 
forth in §§ 360 and 361 apply to the circumstances in this case, we 
conclude that the Court of Civil Appeals properly held that the Housing 
Authority was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is no conflict 
between the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in the present case and our 
prior decision in Daniels. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Civil Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur. 
Bryan and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result. 
Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Wise, J., joins.
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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).
I agree with Judge Hanson's dissenting opinion, joined by Judge 
Fridy, which concludes that the Court of Civil Appeals' ruling in this case 
conflicts with this Court's recent decision in Daniels v. Wiley, 314 So. 3d 
1213 (Ala. 2020).  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from this Court's 
decision to affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
In Campbell v. Valley Garden Apartments, 600 So. 2d 240 (Ala. 
1992), which was overruled by Daniels, supra, this Court reversed a 
summary judgment that had been entered in favor of a landlord in a 
premises-liability action brought by one of the landlord's tenants after 
she slipped and fell on a slippery steel plate that spanned a drainage 
ditch on her way to the garbage dumpster that served her apartment.  
The trial court in Campbell had entered the summary judgment in favor 
of the landlord based on the fact that the tenant had knowledge of the 
slippery condition of the steel plate and, apparently, the implicit finding 
that she was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in choosing to 
walk over it.  On appeal, this Court noted that "[a] landlord has a duty to 
maintain common areas in a reasonably safe condition in order to avoid 
liability for injury to a tenant or a guest."  600 So. 2d at 241.  In support, 
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the Court in Campbell cited Hancock v. Alabama Home Mortgage Co., 
393 So. 2d 969 (Ala. 1981), which acknowledged an exception to the 
general rule that tenants take leased premises subject to existing defects:
"'[T]he owner of a building who leases it to different tenants, 
and expressly or impliedly reserves portions thereof, such as 
halls, stairways, porches, walks, etc., for the use in common 
of different tenants, is liable for any personal injury to a 
tenant, or a person in privity with a tenant, due to defects in 
the portion of the leased premises of which the landlord so 
retains control, provided the defect is ascribable to the 
negligence of the landlord, and the tenant or person injured is 
not guilty of contributory negligence.'"
393 So. 2d at 970 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Zeidler, 233 
Ala. 328, 333, 171 So. 634, 638 (1937)).  The Court in Campbell also 
pointed to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (Am. L. Inst. 1965), 
which provides that the possessor of land is generally not liable for harm 
caused to invitees if the danger that caused the harm was "known or 
obvious" to the injured invitee "unless the possessor should anticipate the 
harm despite such knowledge or obviousness."  Based on Hancock and 
the Restatement, the Court in Campbell concluded that the landlord in 
that case had a duty to remedy the dangerous condition caused by the 
slippery steel plate even though that danger was known by the tenant.  
The Court noted that there was evidence suggesting that the tenant had 
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no reasonable alternative to walking over the plate to reach the garbage 
dumpster.  Thus, according to the Court, questions of her contributory 
negligence or assumption of the risk were for a jury to decide and were 
not an appropriate basis for a summary judgment.  600 So. 2d at 242.  
Campbell arguably would support the position of the plaintiff in the 
present case, who fell while descending stairs with no safety rail leading 
from his apartment.  See also Coggin v. Starke Bros. Realty Co., 391 So. 
2d 111 (Ala. 1980) (plurality opinion) (cited by the Court of Civil Appeals 
in the present case and reversing a summary judgment that had been 
entered in favor of a landlord in an action with facts similar to those in 
this case).  But Campbell has since been overruled, and its reasoning has 
been reasoning rejected by this Court.
In Daniels, supra, a tenant, Daniels, sued her landlord after she 
slipped in mud that had accumulated on the sidewalk leading from her 
apartment to the mail kiosk for her apartment building.  The presence of 
the mud was open and obvious, and Daniels admitted to knowledge of it.  
The trial court in Daniels entered a summary judgment in favor of the 
landlord.  On appeal, Daniels pointed to Campbell, supra, in support of 
an argument that her landlord could not escape liability based solely on 
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the open and obvious nature of the danger and her awareness of that 
danger because, she asserted, the landlord should have anticipated that 
tenants would walk through the accumulated mud in order to retrieve 
their mail.  However, 
"contrary to Daniels's contention, this Court in Sessions [v. 
Nonnenmann, 842 So. 2d 649 (Ala. 2002),] explicitly 
recognized that the law relied upon by Daniels holding that a 
landlord has a duty to eliminate open and obvious dangers or 
to warn an invitee of such dangers if the invitor 'should 
anticipate the harm' -- is not the law in Alabama."
314 So. 3d at 1224-25.  The Court in Daniels expressly overruled 
Campbell and other landlord-liability cases to the extent that they held 
otherwise.  And, because the accumulation of mud that caused Daniels's 
injuries was open and obvious (indeed, the danger was known and 
appreciated by Daniels), the landlord "did not owe Daniels any general 
duty to mark the sidewalk and curb where the mud had accumulated or 
to warn Daniels of the danger."  Id. at 1225.  The Court also rejected 
Daniels's position to the extent that she claimed that her landlord had 
"breached a special duty by failing to provide a safe, alternative route for 
Daniels to retrieve her mail" because such an argument was based on the 
already rejected concept that a landlord has a duty to remedy open and 
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obvious dangers if the landlord has reason to anticipate that a tenant will 
be injured notwithstanding the open and obvious nature of the danger.  
Id. at 1226.
Although the Court in Daniels expressly discussed (and rejected) § 
343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, I cannot, as the main opinion 
does, read the opinion in Daniels as affecting only the relevance of that 
particular Restatement provision and not precedent applying §§ 360 and 
361 of the Restatement (First) of Torts (Am. L. Inst. 1934) and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  The Court in Daniels clearly stated that 
landlords do not have a duty to remedy dangerous conditions that are 
open and obvious and rejected Daniels's argument that the lack of a safer 
alternative route to the apartment building's mailboxes served to impose 
a special duty on the landlord to remedy the danger resulting from the 
accumulation of mud.  I do not see any meaningful distinction between 
Daniels and the present case.
Moreover, it appears to me that Campbell, supra, which was 
undisputedly expressly overruled in Daniels, relied on precedent 
applying the concepts embodied in §§ 360 and 361 of the First 
Restatement and the Second Restatement, upon which the main opinion 
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in the present case relies.  Specifically, Campbell cited Hancock v. 
Alabama Home Mortgage Co., 393 So. 2d 969 (Ala. 1981) ("Hancock II"), 
for the proposition that landlords have a duty to maintain common areas 
in a safe condition.  Campbell, 600 So. 2d at 241.  The Court in Hancock 
II referenced an earlier opinion involving the same parties in that case, 
Hancock v. Alabama Home Mortgage Co., 372 So. 2d 858 (Ala. 1979) 
("Hancock I"), which, as the main opinion points out, stated that the rule 
set out in § 360 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts "has long been the 
rule in this State."  372 So. 2d at 858.  Thus, it seems to me that, in 
overruling Campbell, the Court in Daniels rejected the basis of imposing 
a duty on landlords to remedy open and obvious dangers that the 
majority opinion in this case embraces.  
In sum, I cannot construe Daniels's conclusion that landlords do not 
have a duty to remedy open and obvious dangers as leaving unaffected 
prior opinions that can be read to suggest the opposite conclusion, albeit 
with references to portions of the Restatement not expressly discussed in 
Daniels.  This includes Coggin, supra, upon which the Court of Civil 
Appeals relied in reversing the trial court's judgment in the present case 
and which cited Hancock I and §§ 360 and 361 of the Restatement in 
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reversing a summary judgment in favor of a landlord that had been sued 
by a tenant who fell from a staircase lacking a handrail.  Because I 
believe that Daniels overruled prior decisions suggesting that landlords 
have a duty to remedy open and obvious dangers, I respectfully dissent.  
I do not mean to suggest that landlords might not be required under other 
laws and regulations to repair their properties to remedy defects posing 
a danger to tenants. But those other rules, under Alabama law and based 
on Daniels, cannot make a landlord an insurer of a tenant's actions on 
the property.
Wise, J., concurs.