Case Title: Oukrop v. Wyoming Bd. of Dental Examiners

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-145

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Oukrop v. Wyoming Bd. of Dental Examiners1989 WY 28767 P.2d 1390Case Number: 88-145Decided: 02/01/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming

RAY K. 
OUKROP, PETITIONER,

 
 
v.

 
 
WYOMING BOARD OF 
DENTAL EXAMINERS, RESPONDENT.

 
 
Appeal from 
the State Board of Dental Examiners.

 
 
John E. 
Stanfield of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, Laramie, and Douglas G. Madison of 
Dray, Madison & Thomson, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
petitioner.

 
 
Gay 
Woodhouse, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
respondent.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Petitioner Ray K. 
Oukrop (Oukrop) seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Wyoming Board 
of Dental Examiners (Board) to suspend his license to practice dentistry in 
Wyoming for 
one year followed by a period of probationary practice lasting five years. A 
petition for judicial review under W.S. 16-3-114 (October 1982 Repl.) and 
W.R.A.P. 12.09 was filed on February 12, 1988, and certification brought the 
case here.

 
 

[¶2.]     We affirm the Board's 
action.

 
 

[¶3.]     Oukrop was properly 
served with a complaint and Notice of Hearing by the Board on December 3, 1986. 
The complaint charged him with unprofessional conduct in grossly overprescribing 
the drug atropine. A detailed account of the specific events underlying this 
charge can be found in a related civil appeal recently published by this court. 
See Oukrop v. Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 233, 234-36 (Wyo. 1988). The president 
of the Board appointed a hearing officer who ruled on motions by Oukrop. Oukrop 
received a hearing on January 12-14, 1987. After the hearing, the Board 
determined that he had acted unprofessionally and disciplined him as described 
above.

 
 

[¶4.]     Oukrop presents an 
array of issues, most of which deal with his concern about the Board's 
conducting its hearing and review of his dental license while the civil action, 
referenced above, was on appeal to this court. He argues this was unfair because 
adverse findings by the Board might have prejudiced his rights in the civil 
action in the event this court had reversed that action for a new trial. Oukrop 
admits that these issues are moot since this court affirmed the civil action. 
Oukrop, 755 P.2d  at 239. We agree with him on that point and restate that this 
court does not issue advisory opinions on moot issues. SeeGoshenCountySchool 
District No. 1 v. Cochran, 764 P.2d 1037 (Wyo. 
1988).

 
 

[¶5.]     Oukrop's other issues 
amount to a challenge that the Board somehow denied him due process when the 
district court certified the case directly to this court. W.R.A.P. 12.09 
requires the district court to confine its review of a final agency decision to 
the record and the issues raised before the agency and to limit that review to 
matters specified in W.S. 16-3-114(c). The rule also gives the district court 
discretion to certify the case to this court if it determines the question at 
hand to be appropriate for that disposition. That is exactly what occurred here. 
Oukrop has not raised any issues concerning agency action that are cognizable 
under W.S. 16-3-114(c).

 
 

[¶6.]     The Board is 
affirmed.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., files 
a dissenting opinion.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶7.]     Unquestionably, this 
professional license supervision proceeding by the Wyoming Board of Dental 
Examiners was conjunctive to and precipitated by the malpractice case where the 
malpractice complainant won a large jury verdict. Mootness does not deny 
recognition that an administrative licensing agency should not become an adjunct 
for the litigating plaintiff.

 
 

[¶8.]     My specific concern and 
primary focus is that the procedural status of this administrative appeal was 
not appropriately analyzed where district court consideration of the broad array 
of issues included in the petition for review was denied by direct 
certification. To understand petitioner's supplication in this appeal, some 
procedural history requires comment. Intrinsically presented from oral argument 
and the contentious hostile atmosphere resulting from the administrative hearing 
is noticed anger by petitioner and his counsel against petitioner's malpractice 
carrier for failure to get the malpractice action settled. Similar aimed 
distaste is directed against the office of the attorney general for pursuing 
suspension while the malpractice issues remained litigatively 
unresolved.

 
 

[¶9.]     On January 19, 1988, 
the Wyoming Board of Dental Examiners, following an extended hearing process 
involving two separate hearing officers, entered an order to suspend petitioner 
for the incident which had been the subject of the malpractice action in Oukrop 
v. Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1988). A detailed petition for judicial 
review was filed challenging various procedural aspects of the licensing 
hearing. At that time, the Oukrop appeal was pending following entry of the 
district court judgment.

 
 

[¶10.]  As dated and served April 26, 1988, the 
office of the attorney general petitioned the district court to certify the 
appeal directly to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09 on the stated 
basis:

 
 
     2. This matter is 
appropriate for Supreme Court review. The case involves significant legal 
questions which have not been addressed by the highest court of this State, and 
the matter is very likely to be applealed [sic] to the Supreme Court upon 
decision adverse to either party.

 
 
     3. In the interests of 
judicial economy and expeditious resolution of the legal issues involved, this 
case is appropriate for certification to the Supreme 
Court.

 
 

[¶11.]  At that time, the record of the 
administrative hearing proceeding had not yet been filed and apparently was 
first filed on May 6, 1988 in accord with certification of the presiding 
administrative hearing officer. The Wyoming Board of Dental Examiner's petition 
for certification to the Wyoming Supreme Court was not filed, for undisclosed 
reasons, until June 7, 1988. However, on May 3, 1988, petitioner filed and 
served an opposition to the petition for certification. That document included a 
denial of the attorney general's statement in certification request and other 
comments evidencing a considerable level of extraneous 
anger.

 
 

[¶12.]  Without any participative hearing, the 
district court, on June 7, 1988, entered the certification order containing a 
date of May 1, 1988. Upon docketing in this court, the motion activity remained 
as busy as had been the case in proceedings before the administrative agency. 
Petitioner filed a motion to remand to which objection was taken by the Wyoming 
Board of Dental Examiners. This court denied, although the petitioner obviously 
wanted a district court hearing. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to 
supplement the record, which was granted, followed by a notice of additional 
authorities. The Wyoming Board of Dental Examiners moved to strike the notice of 
authorities, which motion was denied.

 
 

[¶13.]  It is my persuasion, and the basis for 
this dissent, that before direct certification is granted by the district court, 
the litigants, if one opposes, should be granted a hearing for argument and 
analysis of the appropriateness of that expediting process. In my opinion, that 
is the spirit as well as the due process function of the certification 
rule.

 
 
     The review shall be 
conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record as 
supplemented pursuant to Rule 12.08, W.R.A.P., and to the issues raised before 
the agency. The court's review shall be limited to a determination of the 
matters specified in § 16-3-114(c).

 
 
     If after such review, 
the district court concludes the matter to be appropriate for determination by 
the Supreme Court, the district court may certify the case to the Supreme Court. 
Upon notification of such certification, the petitioner shall pay the required 
docketing fee.

 
 
     The district court may 
receive written briefs and hear oral argument in its discretion. The briefing 
schedule shall be fixed by the district court. The district court may, in its 
discretion, remand the case to the agency for proceedings in accordance with the 
direction of the court. If the matter is not certified to the Supreme Court, the 
district court shall enter judgment, affirming, modifying, or reversing the 
order of the agency.

 
 
W.R.A.P. 
12.09.

 
 

[¶14.]  There is a difference between requested 
certification as distinguished from either stipulated certification or even an 
unprompted certification. Certification and subsequent remand is not the best 
answer. At the same time, any litigant who had been through an arduous and, as 
sometimes occurs, like this case, acrimonious administrative proceeding, should 
be provided the record settling and issue clarification opportunity which is far 
better addressed by the district court as the Wyoming judicial agency of general 
responsibility.1 I find an 
abuse of discretion in the certification of the petition for review to this 
court without at least affording the litigants an obligation and responsibility 
to address the district court in an actual hearing. Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 
1986).

 
 

[¶15.]  The least persuasive argument presented 
is that whatever the district court does one way or another, one or the other 
party will appeal. Maybe so, maybe not. Perhaps attorney's fees will be charged 
and perhaps further the resulting appeal can be more clearly defined with 
enunciation of issues beyond sufficiency of the evidence. I would remand for 
district court hearing and consequent initial consideration of any complaint 
about procedural aspects of the administrative hearing as well as the scope of 
the adjudicatory conclusion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Although 
not precisely similar, any record organizational analysis and factual resolution 
such as was required in Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. McKnight, 764 P.2d 1039 (Wyo. 1988) cannot properly, in efficiency, be added to this court's 
responsibility. Time constraints and opinion preparation schedules deter this 
adjudicatory incursion.