Case Title: Briscoe v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 4/10

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2011-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Briscoe v. State of Maryland, No. 4, September Term 2010
FOURTH AMENDMENT – INVENTORY SEARCH – EVIDENCE OF
ESTABLISHED POLICY – When there is no evidence of an established police department
policy for conducting inventory searches, or, assuming a general policy exists, no evidence
of standardized criteria, a court cannot conclude that the search conducted was a valid
inventory search.  Likewise, the lack of evidence as to an established policy precludes
application of the inevitable discovery rule. 
FOURTH AMENDMENT – GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION – REASONABLE
RELIANCE ON BINDING PRECEDENT – The binding precedent in Maryland before
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), was that the full scope of the New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), rule applied to searches incident to arrest of a recent
occupant of a vehicle, which included searches of all containers, whether locked or
unlocked, within the passenger area of the vehicle.  The searching officer acted in objectively
reasonable reliance on that authority when he searched the locked glove compartment of the
vehicle in which defendant had been an occupant.  Therefore, the good- faith rule of Davis
v. United States, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011), applies, and evidence seized was not
entitled to be suppressed.  
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 107199019, 021
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 4
September Term, 2010
WILLIAM E. BRISCOE
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
*Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
               JJ.
Opinion by Barbera, J.
Bell, C.J., joins in judgment only.
Filed:   October 24, 2011
*Murphy, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while
an active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
Petitioner William E. Briscoe was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City and convicted of the crimes of possessing a regulated firearm after having
been convicted of a disqualifying crime; wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun in a
vehicle; possessing cocaine; and driving on a suspended license.  Those convictions were
based on evidence the police recovered while searching Petitioner’s vehicle at the time of
his arrest.  At that time, the police found cocaine in the center console of the passenger
compartment and a handgun in the locked glove compartment.  
Petitioner did not challenge the seizure of the cocaine, but he did seek suppression of
the handgun, claiming that it was the fruit of a search forbidden by the Fourth Amendment.
The suppression court denied the motion, finding that the evidence was lawfully obtained
either as a valid inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976),
and its progeny, or as a valid search incident to arrest under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454 (1981).
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioner challenged the Circuit Court’s
denial of his motion to suppress the handgun.  While the case was pending in that court, the
Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).  The State
conceded that, under Gant, the search violated the Fourth Amendment.  The State argued,
though, that Petitioner was not entitled to suppression of the handgun, by application of the
good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.  In the State’s view, the
police conducted the search “rely[ing] in good faith on controlling judicial precedent.”  The
Court of Special Appeals did not reach the Gant issue, holding instead that the handgun
1 Both counsel in the case at bar correctly anticipated the arguments that were
advanced by the parties in Davis, and both were well prepared to respond to this Court’s 
questions concerning how the Supreme Court’s potential decision on the issue might
apply to Petitioner.  In particular, counsel addressed whether binding appellate precedent
in Maryland at the time of the search at issue here would permit the search of the locked
glove compartment of Petitioner’s vehicle.  We therefore find it unnecessary to order
(and the parties have not requested) post-Davis reargument of the issue.
2
found within the locked glove compartment was recovered during a valid inventory search.
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted to answer the following
questions:
1.  Did the circuit court err in finding that a search of a vehicle was a valid
inventory search where the State failed to establish (a) that there was a
legitimate need to tow the vehicle, (b) that the officer made an inventory list
and gave a copy to the driver, (c) that the towing of the vehicle and the
opening of the locked glove compartment were permitted by established
standardized policies, or (d) that the opening of the locked glove box was
necessary to safeguard property against loss?
2.  In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. Gant, [556
U.S. 332] (2009), did the circuit court err in finding that a search of a vehicle,
which included a search of the locked glove compartment, was a valid search
incident to arrest where the State failed to establish that the arrestee was
unsecured and within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the search,
and where the police had the keys to the locked glove compartment?
At the time of briefing and oral argument in this case, the parties and the Court were aware
that the issue generated by the State’s good-faith argument was in material respect identical
to an issue then pending certiorari review in the Supreme Court.  The Court granted the writ
in Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010), and on June 16, 2011, issued its opinion in
the case.  564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419.1
The Davis Court held, much as the State has argued in the present case, “that searches
3
conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject
to the exclusionary rule.”  564 U.S. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24.  The holding of Davis
applies to the second question before us.  See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)
(holding that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no
exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”); State
v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35, 78, 18 A.3d 60, 86 (2011) (stating same).  Applying Davis to that
question, we must determine whether, incident to Petitioner’s arrest, the police searched the
locked glove compartment in objectively reasonable reliance on then-binding Maryland
appellate precedent, namely Belton.
For reasons we shall explain more fully, we hold that the search of the glove
compartment was not a valid inventory search.  We further hold that, under Davis, the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to what, at the time, was a lawful search of
the glove compartment, under Belton.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals, albeit on a ground not relied upon by that court.
I.
A. The Suppression Motion Hearing
Baltimore City Police Officer Lavgh Bormanshinov was the sole witness at the
hearing on Petitioner’s motion to suppress the handgun.  Officer Bormanshinov testified  as
follows about the sequence of events before and during the search of Petitioner’s vehicle:
2 The record does not disclose what Officer Bormanshinov meant by the term
“positive.”
4
On June 26, 2007, at 12:50 a.m., Officer Bormanshinov observed a minivan traveling
near the 1200 block of Presstman Street in Baltimore.  Its taillights were not illuminated.
Officer Bormanshinov activated his lights and trained his spotlight on the minivan,
indicating to the driver that he pull over.  The driver, Petitioner, immediately stopped the
minivan.
Officer Bormanshinov approached the vehicle and asked Petitioner for his driver’s
license and the vehicle’s registration.  Petitioner could not produce his driver’s license, but
he did provide the officer with the registration.  The registration showed that the minivan
was owned by Ms. Luella Lane.  
Officer Bormanshinov returned to his vehicle and, using the information Petitioner
supplied him, discovered that Petitioner’s license was suspended and there was an open
arrest warrant for him.  Officer Bormanshinov returned to the minivan and asked Petitioner
for the keys, which Petitioner gave him.  Officer Bormanshinov then went back to his
vehicle and, upon further investigation, learned that the warrant was “positive.”2  Officer
Bormanshinov removed Petitioner and his passenger, Jeremy Ringgold, from the minivan.
Officer Bormanshinov arrested Petitioner, searched him, and sat him on the curb.
At some point during the preceding events, Officer Bormanshinov’s Sergeant, whose
name is not reflected in the record, arrived on the scene.  The Sergeant stood next to the
passenger door to monitor the then-still-seated front seat passenger, Ringgold, while Officer
5
Bormanshinov further investigated the warrant for Petitioner.  When Officer Bormanshinov
returned, he asked Ringgold for identification for the purpose of running a “warrant check.”
Ringgold was unable to comply.  Consequently, Officer Bormanshinov and his Sergeant
removed Ringgold from the minivan, as well.  Officer Bormanshinov searched Ringgold
(evidently finding nothing of relevance to the present case) and sat him on the curb next to
Petitioner.
Officer Bormanshinov testified that,“[s]ince [Petitioner] was arrested,” he “did an
inventory search of the vehicle.”  Using the keys Petitioner gave to him, Officer
Bormanshinov unlocked the glove compartment and found a handgun inside.  He also found
several vials of suspected cocaine, one in the coin slot to the left of the steering wheel and
two more in a Colt 45 can that was in the vehicle’s center console.
The State did not ask further questions of Officer Bormanshinov concerning the
purported “inventory search.”  Neither did the State introduce any evidence of a Baltimore
City Police Department policy or procedure regarding inventory searches.  
At some point, Officer Bormanshinov decided to have the minivan towed to the “City
yard.”  Officer Bormanshinov tried without success to have Ms. Lane, the owner of the
vehicle, contacted to let her know that her car would be towed to the impound lot. 
During cross-examination, Officer Bormanshinov testified that Petitioner was calm,
polite, cooperative, and sober during the traffic stop, arrest, and search of the minivan.
Defense counsel then asked Officer Bormanshinov when the decision was made to tow the
6
minivan, and he responded simply, “My plan was to tow the vehicle.  But I had to do a
search of the vehicle before -- that’s our procedure -- before it gets towed.”  Defense counsel
propounded further questions on this point, resulting in the following exchange:  
Defense Counsel:  Are you familiar with the general order that requires you
to follow all of the procedures for towing a car or impounding a car?
Officer Bormanshinov:  I believe once the driver’s suspended and he or she
is not the registered owner, then the car, car can be towed.
Defense Counsel:  But do you have any policies or procedures that direct you
what you’re supposed to do in that situation?
Officer Bormanshinov:  I have not come across that.
Defense Counsel:  You’re not familiar with any general orders describing
what you should be doing in that situation?
Officer Bormanshinov:  No, ma’am.
* * *
Defense Counsel:  You’re not familiar with the towing procedures that require
you to do a complete and total inventory of everything that’s in the car?
Officer Bormanshinov:  I’m familiar with that, ma’am.
Defense Counsel:  You are?
Officer Bormanshinov: With the inventory, yes.
Defense Counsel:  So then you completed your vehicle report; isn’t that
correct?
Officer Bormanshinov:  Yes.
Defense Counsel:  And your vehicle report notes everything that was
inventoried in the car?
Officer Bormanshinov:  I believe there was nothing of value to be inventoried
7
in the vehicle.
Defense Counsel:  But don’t your own general orders require you to write
down everything that belongs to the owner in order to protect them and protect
the property?
Officer Bormanshinov:  I, I’m not sure of that, ma’am.
Defense Counsel:  Can you tell us what was in the car?
Officer Bormanshinov:  Yes, an empty oxygen tank.
At the conclusion of Officer Bormanshinov’s testimony, defense counsel sought
suppression of the handgun on the ground that the search of the locked glove compartment
was not a valid inventory search.  Defense counsel argued that “the officer was [un]able to
articulate what the procedure was.  He was unable to produce any of the orders.  He was
unable to repeat any training that he’s had in this case.”  For those reasons, defense counsel
maintained that the search was not a “legitimate” inventory search, but instead was “an
excuse [for] further investigation.”  
The State disagreed.  In the State’s view, Officer Bormanshinov conducted a valid
inventory search of the vehicle, including the glove compartment.  The State further argued
that, even if the search was not valid as an inventory search, the search of the glove
compartment was authorized as a part of a search incident to arrest under the then-prevailing
Supreme Court authority of Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, n. 4.
The motions court denied the motion to suppress.  The court explained:
I think it was a valid inventory search and I think, although the officer didn’t
have the administrative order at hand to cite, he was certainly familiar with it
3 In Hamel, the Court of Special Appeals held that a locked glove compartment falls
within the scope of a lawful search under Belton.  179 Md. App. 1, 18, 943 A.2d 686, 696
(2008).  
8
and it was a routine that he was familiar with and followed the steps . . . .
Also, in light of [Hamel v. State, 179 Md. App. 1, 943 A.2d 686 (2008),][3]
 . . . given to me by the State which bears a recent date, which indicates that
the Court of Appeals hasn’t had its say on that yet . . . . But certainly, this
search would fall within the ambit of what was found to be under the
Constitution in a search incident to arrest.  I mean, they just clearly held that
a locked glove compartment is within the ambit under the latest Supreme
Court decision.  So, under either theory, it was a valid search.
B. The Trial and Appeal
Petitioner was subsequently convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to
imprisonment for five years, without the possibility of parole.  On appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress
because the search was neither a valid inventory search nor a valid search incident to arrest,
under Belton.  In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
judgments of conviction, holding “that the inventory search of the minivan in this case was
reasonable.”  The court therefore did not address whether the search of the glove
compartment was a valid search incident to Petitioner’s arrest.
II.
Searches done without a warrant are “presumed to be unreasonable.”  Henderson v.
State, 416 Md. 125, 148, 5 A.3d 1072, 1085 (2010) (stating that a search unaccompanied by
a warrant “is presumptively unreasonable”).  There are, however, recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement, two of which are relevant to the present case.  The first is known
9
as the “inventory search,” which generally authorizes the search of a vehicle in lawful police
custody for the purpose of cataloging property located therein.  See Opperman, 428 U.S. at
376; Duncan v. State, 281 Md. 247, 259, 378 A.2d 1108, 1116 (1977).  The second is the
“search incident to a lawful arrest.”  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (holding that a search incident to arrest
permits the law enforcement officer to search the person of the arrestee and the area around
the arrestee where the arrestee might reach to grab a weapon or evidence); Belton, 453 U.S.
at 460 (applying Chimel’s holding to the search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent
occupant).  As with any warrantless search, the State bears the burden to overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness.  Paulino v. State, 399 Md. 341, 348, 924 A.2d 308, 313
(2007).
In reviewing the ruling of the suppression court, we must rely solely upon the record
developed at the suppression hearing.  See, e.g., Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 148, 12 A.3d
1238, 1245 (2011).  We view the evidence and inferences that may be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the party who prevails on the motion, id., 12 A.3d at 1245, here,
the State.  We give deference to the first-level factual findings made by the suppression
court, and we accept those findings unless shown to be clearly erroneous.  See, e.g., Elliot
v. State, 417 Md. 413, 427, 10 A.3d 761, 769 (2010).  We, however, make an independent
appraisal of the constitutionality of a search, “applying the law to the facts found in each
particular case.”  Id. at 428, 10 A.3d at 769 (quoting Belote v. State, 411 Md. 104, 120, 981
10
A.2d 1247, 1256 (2009)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
A. Inventory Search
1.
We first address the State’s contention that the search of the locked glove
compartment was undertaken in the course of a lawful inventory search, under Opperman,
Duncan, and related jurisprudence.  Pursuant to this well-defined exception to the warrant
requirement, a search of a vehicle for the purpose of itemizing the property therein is
constitutional, so long as the vehicle is in lawful police custody at the time of the search and
the search is carried out pursuant to “standardized criteria or [an] established routine”
established by the law enforcement agency.  Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (citation
omitted).
The purposes of an inventory search are three:  to protect the police from danger, to
protect the owner’s property, and to protect the police against claims and disputes over lost
or stolen property.  Duncan v. State, 281 Md. 247, 257, 378 A.2d 1108, 1115 (1977) (citing
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369).  As with all exceptions to the warrant requirement, use of the
inventory search must be limited to those circumstances that are tied to the precise
justifications for it, which do not include criminal investigation.  See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4
(“[A]n inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence.”).  Therefore, the State must ensure that the record of the
suppression hearing reflects both that the vehicle was in lawful police custody at the time of
11
the search and that the search was conducted in accordance with a sufficiently standardized
departmental policy or routine.   See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-5; Duncan, 281 Md. at 259, 378
A.2d at 1116.
Petitioner advances several arguments in support of the contention that the State failed
to establish that the search of the vehicle falls within the limited purview of an “inventory
search.”  He argues:  (1) the State failed to establish at the suppression hearing that, at the
time of the search, the vehicle was in lawful police custody; (2) Officer Bormanshinov’s
listing of only the contraband (cocaine and handgun) on the purported inventory list
undermines the State’s assertion that Officer Bormanshinov was conducting a valid
inventory search; and (3) the record contains no evidence of a departmental policy that
permitted, authorized, or otherwise regulated the search of closed or locked containers,
rendering the motion court’s ruling fatally flawed under Wells.  
Officer Bormanshinov testified that, once he determined that the vehicle was not
owned by Petitioner, he attempted to contact the owner, Ms. Luella Lane, to advise her that
her car would be towed to the impound lot.  When asked by defense counsel why it was
necessary to tow the vehicle, Officer Bormanshinov replied that he “believ[ed that] once the
driver’s suspended and he or she is not the registered owner, then the car . . . can be towed.”
However, he had “not come across,” and was not familiar with, any procedures or orders
governing the appropriate action in that situation.  Moreover, Officer Bormanshinov could
only testify that “I had to do a search of the vehicle before -- that’s our procedure -- before
4 The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida discloses that the car Wells was driving
at the time of the stop had been loaned to him, and that he gave the police permission to open
the locked trunk, but not permission to open anything that might be found therein.  State v.
Wells, 539 So. 2d 464, 466 (1989).
12
it gets towed.” 
We shall assume, without deciding, that Officer Bormanshinov’s references to a
“procedure” (without any mention of a specific rule or regulation) sufficed to establish the
existence of a sufficiently routinized, general departmental inventory search policy.  Even
so, Officer Bormanshinov’s testimony gives no indication that the supposed policy provides
standardized criteria governing the search of closed or locked containers and, if so, that the
search of the locked glove compartment was done according to that policy.
The State correctly notes that, in the context of inventory searches, “nothing . . .
prohibits the exercise of police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according
to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of
criminal activity.”  Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987) (emphasis added).  Such
discretion, however, must be exercised pursuant to standardized criteria, which, with respect
to the search of closed and/or locked containers, are not present in the record before us.
The Supreme Court addressed this precise point in Wells.  The defendant in that case
was stopped for speeding and subsequently arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol.  495 U.S. at 2.  In an inventory search that followed, a locked suitcase was found
within the locked trunk.4  Id.  The suitcase was forced open, revealing a garbage bag
containing marijuana.  Id.  The defendant asserted that the search of the locked suitcase
5 Unlike in the case before us, the record in Wells contained the Florida Highway
Patrol’s written inventory policy.  See Wells, 539 So. 2d at 469.  And yet, because that policy
in Wells  made “no mention of opening closed containers,” both the Florida Supreme Court
(continued...)
13
exceeded the scope of a valid inventory search.  Id. at 2-3.  
The Court agreed with Wells that the search of the locked suitcase could not be
upheld as an inventory search, because “the record contained no evidence of any Highway
Patrol policy on the opening of closed containers found during inventory searches.”  Id. at
3.  Nor did the Court assume that there was one, in the absence of any indication in the
record of a departmental policy on the subject; rather, the Court analyzed the case as if there
were no such policy, stating that the department “had no policy whatever with respect to the
opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search.”  Id. at 4-5.
Consequently, the Court held that the search “was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment” and therefore the evidence found incident to the search was correctly
suppressed.  Id. at 5.  
The case at bar suffers from the same lack of evidence in the record of a Baltimore
City Police Department policy concerning the opening of locked containers during an
inventory search.  In the absence of evidence that such a policy existed, it is impossible to
distinguish a valid inventory search from a general investigatory search.  As in Wells, we are
constrained to conclude in the present case that the search of the locked glove compartment
was not “sufficiently regulated to satisfy the Fourth Amendment,” Wells, 495 U.S. at 5, to
qualify as an inventory search.5 
(...continued)
and the United States Supreme Court held that the search was not a valid inventory search.
Id. 
14
2. 
The State, perhaps predicting that we would reach this conclusion, argues that, even
if “Officer Bormanshinov’s on-scene search was not a proper inventory, the evidence was
nevertheless admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.”  We disagree.
“The exception [to the warrant requirement] for exigent circumstances is a narrow
one.”  Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 402, 813 A.2d 231, 241 (2002).  Under the inevitable
discovery doctrine, “[e]vidence obtained as a result of an illegal search is admissible where,
absent the illegal conduct, the evidence inevitably would have been discovered through legal
means.”  Id. at 415, 813 A.2d at 248.  According to the State, that doctrine is applicable here,
because “[t]here can be no question that the police had authority to, and ultimately did, tow
and impound [Petitioner’s] minivan.  Thus, the search of the vehicle undoubtedly would
have occurred regardless of Officer Bormanshinov’s on-scene investigatory search.”
The problem with the State’s argument is that the record before us is devoid of
evidence demonstrating that the vehicle’s locked glove compartment would have been
inventoried according to departmental policy, once it was towed to the impound lot.  Without
such evidence in the record, we are unable to conclude that the handgun would have been
discovered inevitably, in a later inventory search of the locked glove compartment.  See
United States v. Mendez, 315 F.3d 132, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that for the
15
inevitable discovery doctrine to apply to inventory searches, the government must prove:
“(1) that the police had legitimate custody of the vehicle . . . so that an inventory search
would have been justified; (2) that when the police in the police agency in question
conducted the inventory searches, they did so pursuant to ‘established’ or ‘standardized’
procedures; and (3) that those inventory procedures would have ‘inevitably’ led to the
‘discovery’ of the challenged evidence” (citations omitted)).
In sum, the search of the locked glove compartment cannot be upheld either as a
proper inventory search or as evidence that would have been “inevitably discovered” in a
subsequent inventory search.  
B. 
1. Search Incident to Arrest
At the time of the search at issue in this case, Belton was the rule that guided the
search of a vehicle, as a search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant. The Supreme
Court held in Belton that, “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile.”  453 U.S. at 460 (footnote omitted).  The Court
considered that rule to be an application, in the vehicle context, of its analysis in Chimel.
Id.  Chimel “established that a search incident to arrest may not stray beyond the area within
the immediate control of the arrestee . . . .”  Id.  The Belton Court reasoned “that articles
inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in
fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach in
16
order to grab a weapon or eviden[ce].’”  Id. (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).  Under
Belton, “the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the
passenger compartment.”  Id.  “Containers,” as defined in Belton, includes the glove
compartment.  Id. at 460 n.4.
The Supreme Court subsequently acknowledged in Gant that Belton was “widely
understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there
[was] no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.”
556 U.S. at     , 129 S. Ct. at 1718.  Maryland courts were no different in this regard.  See,
e.g., Gee v. State, 291 Md. 663, 668, 435 A.2d 1387, 1390 (1981) (holding that the search
of the defendant’s closed wallet found on the car seat of the defendant’s vehicle incident to
his arrest was authorized under the “bright-line” rule of Belton and that Belton was
dispositive because the search was of a passenger compartment contemporaneous to a lawful
arrest); McCain v. State, 194 Md. App. 252, 284, 276, 4 A.3d 53, 66 (2010) (explaining that
Maryland adopted the “broad reading of Belton”); Purnell v. State, 171 Md. App. 582, 602,
911 A.2d 867, 879 (2006) (applying the Belton rule to searches of property belonging to
third-parties located within the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to the arrest of
a vehicle occupant).
Subsequent to the search of the vehicle incident to Petitioner’s arrest, the Supreme
Court decided Gant.  In Gant, the Supreme Court rejected the prevailing interpretation of
Belton, explaining: “We now know that articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely
6 The phrase “objectively reasonable reliance” means in the context of the present
case that Officer Bormanshinov, at the time of the search of the passenger area of the car,
could conduct the search under the authority of Belton, so long as the so-called
(continued...)
17
within the area into which an arrestee might reach, and blind adherence to Belton’s faulty
assumption would authorize myriad unconstitutional searches.”  556 U.S. at     , 129 S. Ct.
at 1723 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court adopted the following
rule in Gant:  “Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search
or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest.”  556
U.S. at     , 129 S. Ct. at 1723.  
2. Application of the Good-Faith Exception?
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gant has generated the second question Petitioner
presents, which is whether Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the rule established in that
case, thereby requiring suppression of the handgun that was seized during the search of the
minivan.  The State has conceded that the search of the minivan was unlawful, under Gant.
We shall accept that concession and assume, for discussion purposes only, that the State was
correct to concede that issue.  The State argues that, although the search was not proper
under Gant, Petitioner is not entitled to suppression of the handgun, by operation of the
“good-faith” principles announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).  This
is so, the State argues, because Officer Bormanshinov acted in objectively reasonable
reliance on appellate precedent then-binding in Maryland, namely, Belton.6  The State asserts
(...continued)
objectively reasonable officer (but not necessarily Officer Bormanshinov), knowing what
Officer Bormanshinov knew at the time, could conduct a Belton search.  It is well settled
that,
Fourth Amendment reasonableness is predominantly an objective inquiry. 
We ask whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the
challenged] action.  If so, that action was reasonable whatever the
subjective intent motivating the relevant officials.  This approach
recognizes that the Fourth Amendment regulates conduct rather than
thoughts; and it promotes evenhanded, uniform enforcement of the law.
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).  The principle of “objectively reasonable reliance” was
applied in Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004).  In that case, the Court held that an
arrest was lawful where the officers were possessed of facts that gave rise to probable
cause to arrest the person (Alford), even though they relied, wrongly, on an altogether
different legal basis in making the arrest.  The Court explained: 
As we have repeatedly explained, the fact that the officer does not have the
state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal
justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as
long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.  The
Fourth Amendment’s concern with “reasonableness” allows certain actions
to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever that subjective intent.  
Id. at 153 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
18
the very argument that since has carried the day in Davis.
The search at issue in Davis had its genesis in a routine traffic stop that resulted in the
arrests of the driver, for driving while intoxicated, and the passenger, Willie Davis, for
giving a false name to police.  556 U.S. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2425.  The police handcuffed the
driver and Davis and placed them in the back of separate patrol cars.  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at
2425.  The police then searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle and found a
revolver inside Davis’s jacket pocket, which had been left there.  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at
2425.  
19
Davis sought suppression of the revolver.  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2426.  Before the
federal district judge, Davis acknowledged that the “search fully complied with existing
Eleventh Circuit precedent,” though he still sought to preserve the issue for appeal.  Id. at
    , 131 S. Ct. 2426 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The district court denied that
motion.  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2426.  Davis was convicted and, while his appeal was
pending before the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Gant.  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct.
at 2426.  Davis argued that, under Gant, the search of the vehicle was unconstitutional, and
therefore he was entitled to suppression of the revolver found during that search.  United
States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010).  
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the search was
unconstitutional but refused to exclude the evidence, holding instead that the good-faith
exception was applicable.  Id.  The court explained that, “like most other courts, [it] had read
Belton to mean that police could search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest
regardless of the occupant’s actual control over the passenger compartment.”  Id. at 1263.
The court emphasized that,
[a]lthough an officer’s mistake of law cannot provide objectively reasonable
grounds for a search, the mistake of law here was not attributable to the police.
On the contrary, the governing law in this circuit unambiguously allowed [the
officer] to search the car.  Relying on a court of appeals’ well-settled and
unequivocal precedent is analogous to relying on a statute, or a facially
sufficient warrant—not to personally misinterpreting the law.
Id. at 1267-68 (internal citations omitted).  The court held that, because the police officer
“reasonably relied on clear and well-settled precedent[,]” the good-faith exception to the
20
exclusionary rule applied.  Id. at 1266.
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, 556 U.S. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2426,
and affirmed, id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2434.  The Davis Court began by noting that the parties
agreed that the search in question, when conducted, was authorized by binding Eleventh
Circuit precedent, and the parties agreed that the search did not comport with the
requirements of Gant.  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2428.  The parties disagreed, however, about
whether Gant was to be applied retroactively, id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2430, and, if so,
whether the good-faith exception would preclude application of the exclusionary rule, id. at
   , 131 S. Ct. at 2431.
The Supreme Court had no difficulty deciding that Gant was to be retroactively
applied.  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2431.  The Court then turned to the more difficult question:
whether the exclusionary rule must also be applied.  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2431.  The Court
framed the questions as “whether to apply this sanction when the police conduct a search in
compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled.”  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2423.
The Court held: “Because suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these
circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public
safety, we hold that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding
appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.”  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24.
The Davis Court noted that “[e]xclusion is ‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor
is it designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search.”  Id. at     , 131
21
S. Ct. at 2426 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)).  Instead, “[t]he rule’s
sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”  Davis, 564 U.S.     , 131
S. Ct. at 2426.  It was for that reason, the Court explained, that the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule was developed in Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (declining to apply the
exclusionary rule where police officers conducted a search in “objectively reasonable
reliance” on a warrant later determined invalid), and subsequently applied in Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987) (applying the good-faith exception to a police officer’s search
that was conducted in accordance with a statute later deemed unconstitutional), Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (applying the good-faith exception to searches incident to
arrests based on arrest warrant information contained within a database maintained by
judicial employees later determined to be erroneous), and Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135 (2009) (applying the good-faith exception to searches conducted following execution
of outstanding arrests warrants later determined to be erroneous due to police record-keeping
error).  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28.  The Davis Court noted that the common theme
throughout those cases was a lack of police officer culpability.  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2427-
28.
The Davis Court concluded that application of the exclusionary rule was unwarranted
in the case before the Court, given the same absence of police culpability; that is, the police,
when conducting the search under Belton, did not “deliberately, recklessly, or with gross
negligence[]” violate Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. at     , 131 S. Ct. at 2428.  The
22
Court pointed out that Davis had arisen out of the Eleventh Circuit, which had interpreted
Belton “to establish a bright-line rule authorizing the search of a vehicle’s passenger
compartment incident to a recent occupant’s arrest.”  131 S. Ct. at 2428.
The principle that emerges from Davis is that operation of the exclusionary rule is
suspended only when the evidence seized was the result of a search that, when conducted,
was a “police practice” specifically authorized by the jurisdiction’s precedent in which the
officer operates.  To decide whether the particular search at issue in the present case—the
search of the locked glove compartment—comes within the Davis rule, we must examine
what Maryland law dictated at the time of that search.
The search of Petitioner’s vehicle was conducted on June 26, 2007.  At that time, the
search of the minivan incident to Petitioner’s arrest was governed by the then-prevailing
Belton bright-line rule.  See Gee, 291 Md. at 668, 435 A.2d at 1389-90; McCain, 194 Md.
App. at 276, 4 A.3d at 66.  Under Belton, a glove compartment is included in the Belton
perimeter.  See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 n. 4.  At the time of the search at issue, no reported
decision of this Court or the Court of Special Appeals had addressed specifically whether
a police officer conducting a Belton search could open a locked glove compartment.
Petitioner takes the position that, because, at the time of the search at issue, no
reported decision in Maryland expressly authorized police to open a locked glove
compartment as part of a Belton search, there did not exist at that time “binding appellate”
Maryland authority upon which Officer Bormanshinov could have “reasonably relied” in
7 We have mentioned that the suppression court relied on Hamel in ruling that the
search of the glove compartment was a lawful search under Belton.  
23
searching the glove compartment.  The State acknowledges that there was no then-existing
reported Maryland decision specifically authorizing the search of a locked glove
compartment.  The State points out, though, that, “just prior to the suppression hearing in this
case, the Court of Special Appeals [in Hamel, 179 Md. App. at 18, 943 A.2d at 696] made
it clear that Belton permitted the search of a locked gloved compartment.”7  Petitioner replies
that Hamel is of no benefit to the State, because it was filed two months after the search in
question and thus could not serve as precedent upon which Officer Bormanshinov could
objectively and in good faith rely.  We are in general accord with the State that the Davis
good-faith exception applies to the search at issue, although we take a slightly different tack
in reaching that conclusion.
We understand the Davis Court’s reference to binding appellate precedent to mean
that the caselaw of the jurisdiction must have been clear about whether that jurisdiction had
adopted the bright-line rule of Belton.  Petitioner and the State do not disagree that, until
Gant was decided, Belton was a part of Maryland law.  And, under Belton, the police are
entitled to search the entire passenger compartment of a vehicle, including the glove
compartment.  To repeat, the Belton Court made clear that, in a search for both weapons and
destructible evidence incident to a valid arrest of a vehicle’s occupant, police may search
“inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment” of the vehicle, and
may “examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment[.]”
24
453 U.S. at 460.  The Belton Court defined “container” for this purpose as “denot[ing] any
object capable of holding another object.  It thus includes closed or open glove
compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger
compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.”  Id. at 460-61 n.4.  We
believe it to be clear, under Belton itself, that a locked glove compartment is within the scope
of the rule announced in that case, notwithstanding that the Court made no effort to include
that detail or, for that matter, any other fact-specific details concerning the scope of the
search.  Indeed, the Belton Court expressly eschewed a fact-specific rule in favor of a bright-
line rule that could be easily applied by officers in the field.  See id. at 458 (“[A] single,
familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Petitioner is correct that, before the Court of Special Appeals’s decision in Hamel, no
reported Maryland appellate decision expressly held that the police, in conducting a Belton
search, may open a locked glove compartment.  Given the bright-line nature of the Belton
rule, however, it would be unfaithful to its very design and purpose to have its application
and, in turn the application of the Davis good-faith exception, depend on whether a
container, undeniably within the so-called Belton perimeter, is locked or unlocked.  In other
words, the Court of Special Appeals, in deciding Hamel as it did, merely applied the Belton
rule to the specific facts of the case.  Hamel did not create new “binding appellate precedent”
8 Well before Hamel, the Court of Special Appeals encountered a case in which police
officers had searched the locked console of an automobile as part of a Belton search and
seized certain items inside.  State v. Fernon, 133 Md. App. 41, 45, 754 A.2d 463, 465
(2000).  Evidently it had not occurred to the respondent to argue that the search exceeded
the scope of Belton because the items had been seized from the locked console.  Id., 754
A.2d at 465.  The Court of Special Appeals upheld the search without commenting on the
fact that the console had been locked.  Id. at 64, 754 A.2d at 475-76.  Other courts seemingly
have been untroubled by Belton searches of locked containers.  See, e. g., United States v.
Palmer, 360 F.3d 1243, 1246-67 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that delay in unlocking and
searching glove box to allow defendant to be removed to patrol car did not extinguish
justification for protective search of locked glove box); United States v. Valiant, 873 F.2d
205, 206 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding search under Belton of locked briefcase within vehicle
after placing defendant under arrest); State v. Hanna, 839 P.2d 450, 452 (Ariz. 1992)
(upholding search under Belton of locked glove compartment and listing cases upholding
“warrantless searches incident to arrest where the possibility of an arrestee’s grabbing a
weapon or evidence were equally as remote”); State v. Farr, 587 A.2d 1047, 1050 (Conn.
1991) (upholding search of locked glove compartment where defendant was removed from
vehicle and placed in patrol car because area was within searchable zone under Belton);
Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383, 388 n.11 (D.C. 1983) (noting that, although Belton did
not apply because defendant had locked the vehicle and walked away before arrest and
search, “[i]f the car could validly be searched under Belton, then the search could lawfully
include the glove compartment, locked or unlocked”).  
25
in Maryland; rather, that case merely applied what was at the time, and had been since 1981,
Maryland law.8
We therefore hold that, before Gant, binding appellate precedent in Maryland, namely
Belton, dictated that searches incident to arrest of recent occupants of vehicles included
searches of all containers, whether locked or unlocked, within the passenger areas of the
vehicles.  Officer Bormanshinov acted in objectively reasonable reliance on that authority
when he searched the locked glove compartment.  It follows then, that the good-faith rule
of Davis applies, and the suppression court correctly denied the motion to suppress the
handgun found there.
26
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which had
affirmed the judgments of conviction.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED;
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
Bell, C.J., joins in judgment only.