Case Title: State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1995-Ohio-138

Docket Number: 19950391

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1995-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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The State ex rel. Liposchak v. Industrial Commission of Ohio.                    
[Cite as State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. Comm.                                 
(1995),           Ohio St.3d     .]                                              
Workers' compensation -- Application for permanent total                         
     disability compensation -- Claimant diagnosed with                          
     malignant mesothelioma twelve years after resigning in                      
     lieu of disciplinary action -- Industrial Commission errs                   
     in denying compensation when claimant suffers from a                        
     condition with an extremely long latency period.                            
     (No. 95-391 -- Submitted April 24, 1995 --                                  
Decided August 16, 1995.)                                                        
     In Mandamus.                                                                
     Relator-claimant, Robert E. Liposchak, began working for                    
respondent Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel in 1945.  In 1980,                          
claimant was caught bringing a handgun into the plant.  Faced                    
with disciplinary action, claimant quit.  Claimant's work                        
activities after that are unclear.  Claimant, at best, worked                    
sporadic odd jobs and allegedly cared for an invalid couple                      
until their death.                                                               
     In 1992, twelve years after he quit Wheeling-Pittsburgh                     
Steel, claimant was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma.  A                    
workers' compensation claim was allowed after it was determined                  
that the condition arose from claimant's employment.  A short                    
time later, claimant applied to respondent, Industrial                           
Commission of Ohio, for permanent total disability                               
compensation.  The application was denied after the commission                   
found that:                                                                      
     "[C]laimant voluntarily removed himself from the active                     
work force.  The claimant retired on 4-4-80 and has remained                     
unemployed to the present.  Although the claimant's                              
representative argued that caring for the elderly couple was                     
employment, there was no evidence presented supporting the                       
existence of an employment relationship between the parties.                     
     "Bequeathment of the home to the claimant in itself is                      
insufficient to establish an employer/employee relationship.                     
     "The commission finds that the claimant removed himself                     
from the active workforce on 4-4-80.  Therefore the claimant is                  
not permanently and totally disabled."                                           
     This cause is now before this court as an original action                   
in mandamus to compel the commission to award him permanent                      
total disability compensation.                                                   
                                                                                 
     Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy                    
and Marc J. Jaffy, for relator.                                                  
     Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Yolanda L.                       
Barnes, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.                              
                                                                                 
     Per Curiam.  Claimant's mesothelioma undeniably arose from                  
his employment at Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel.  Claimant's                         
mesothelioma undeniably prevents sustained remunerative                          
employment.  Medical impairment notwithstanding, permanent                       
total disability may nonetheless be foreclosed if it is found                    
that claimant voluntarily removed himself from the labor market                  
prior to his permanent total disability application.  State ex                   
rel. Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 69                    
Ohio St.3d 202, 631 N.E.2d 138.  Claimant initially challenges                   
Baker's applicability.  He alternatively argues that he never                    
voluntarily abandoned the work force.  For the reasons to                        
follow, we order the commission to vacate its permanent total                    
disability denial and to enter an order that declares claimant                   
to be permanently and totally disabled.                                          
     The existence of a causal relationship between an allowed                   
condition and an inability to work underlies all successful                      
requests for disability compensation.  Problems can arise when                   
another factor independently contributes to the inability to                     
return to relevant employment. We have characterized these                       
factors as either involuntary or voluntary, with the latter                      
precluding permanent total disability compensation when it                       
constitutes an abandonment of the entire job market.  Baker,                     
supra, at paragraph two of the syllabus.                                         
     In State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio                   
St.3d 42, 517 N.E.2d 533, we classified as "voluntary," a                        
departure from the work force that was precipitated by the                       
claimant's imprisonment.  We reasoned:                                           
     "While a prisoner's incarceration would not normally be                     
considered a 'voluntary' act, one may be presumed to tacitly                     
accept the consequences of his voluntary acts.  When a person                    
chooses to violate the law, he, by his own action, subjects                      
himself to the punishment which the state has prescribed for                     
that act."  Id. at 44, 517 N.E.2d at 535.                                        
     In State ex rel. Watts v. Schottenstein Stores Corp.                        
(1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 118, 121, 623 N.E.2d 1202, 1204, we noted                  
that "* * * firing can constitute a voluntary abandonment of                     
the former position of employment.  Although not generally                       
consented to, discharge, like incarceration, is often a                          
consequence of behavior that the claimant willingly undertook,                   
and may thus take on a voluntary character."                                     
     We recognize that claimant was not technically fired, but                   
resigned in lieu of such disciplinary action.  This distinction                  
is irrelevant.  We do find, however, two significant                             
distinctions between this case and both Watts and Ashcraft.                      
     First, claimant suffers from a condition with an extremely                  
long latency period.  As noted in State Indus. Ins. Syst. v.                     
Jesch (1985), 101 Nev. 690, 692, 709 P.2d 172, 174,                              
mesothelioma, at a minimum, has a latency period of twenty-five                  
to thirty years.  Latency periods of up to forty years are not                   
uncommon.  On at least two prior occasions we have recognized                    
the unique workers' compensation problems that can arise from                    
long-latency occupational diseases.  See Caruso v. Aluminum Co.                  
of Am. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 306, 15 OBR 436, 473 N.E.2d 818;                    
Jacobs v. Teledyne, Inc. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 168, 529 N.E.2d                   
1255.                                                                            
     Second, claimant did not have an allowed workers'                           
compensation claim for his occupational disease at the time he                   
left Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel.  Again, his mesothelioma did                     
not arise for another twelve years.  Viewing these factors                       
together, we decline to extend the reasoning that underlies                      
Watts and Ashcraft to these facts.  Unquestionably, claimant                     
committed an extremely serious offense by taking a gun to work,                  
irrespective of the plant's location in what he perceived to be                  
an unsafe area.  Nevertheless, we cannot find that in so doing,                  
the claimant tacitly surrendered a right that did not exist and                  
could not be foreseen.                                                           
     Accordingly, a writ of mandamus is granted.                                 
                                 Writ granted.                                   
     Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.                    
     Moyer, C.J., Wright and Cook, JJ., dissent.                                 
     Cook, J. dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  Here we                      
have a claimant who applied for permanent total disability                       
compensation ("PTD") twelve years after voluntarily retiring                     
(albeit in order to avoid being fired) and never having                          
reentered the job market.  According to the criteria set forth                   
in State ex rel. Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm.                   
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 631 N.E.2d 138, paragraph two of the                  
syllabus, this claimant should be ineligible for PTD.  The                       
majority opinion does not reach its contrary result by                           
determining that either of these criteria from Baker is unmet.                   
Rather, the latency period of mesothelioma is the factor                         
employed by the majority to find Liposchak eligible for PTD.                     
In effect, the opinion reasons that in order for the rule in                     
Baker to apply, the claimant needs to have known that he was                     
foregoing a PTD claim when retiring from the job and the job                     
market entirely.  The fallacy with this analysis is that PTD                     
compensation is intended to compensate for a claimant's                          
probable future wage loss due to the total impairment of the                     
claimant's earning capacity.  Id. at 212, 631 N.E.2d at 146.                     
While a worker may have a valid medical status for claiming                      
PTD, if that person has already voluntarily abandoned the job                    
market, the person has no future wage loss and therefore no                      
basis for receiving PTD.  This is the logical principle that                     
evolves from the common law, set forth in Baker at paragraph                     
two of the syllabus, State ex rel. Chrysler Corp. v. Indus.                      
Comm. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 193, 580 N.E.2d 1082, and State ex                   
rel. CPC Group, Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 53                     
Ohio St.3d 209, 559 N.E.2d 1330.                                                 
     Accordingly, I would deny the writ of mandamus.                             
     Moyer, C.J., and Wright, J., concur in the foregoing                        
dissenting opinion.