Case Title: Johnson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20S-CR-61

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 20S-CR-61 
Brandon L. Johnson, 
Appellant-Defendant, 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee-Plaintiff. 
Argued: May 14, 2020 | Decided: May 22, 2020 
Appeal from the Orange Circuit Court, No. 59C01-1602-F4-160 
The Honorable Steven L. Owen, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
No. 19A-CR-334 
Per Curiam Opinion 
Chief Justice Rush and Justice David, Justice Massa, and Justice Goff concur. 
Justice Slaughter dissents without separate opinion. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
May 22 2020, 10:53 am
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-61 | May 22, 2020 
Page 2 of 4 
Per curiam. 
In Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. 2008), and Collins v. State, 817 
N.E.2d 230 (Ind. 2004), we held that a defendant who pleads guilty may 
waive the right to appellate review of his or her sentence only if this 
waiver is knowing and voluntary. Today we reaffirm the critical role of 
the trial court in safeguarding the validity of such waivers. Accordingly, 
we reverse the trial court and remand to allow Brandon L. Johnson to 
pursue a belated direct appeal of his 12-year sentence. 
In April 2017, Johnson agreed to plead guilty to Level 4 felony dealing 
in methamphetamine in exchange for the dismissal of other charges. 
Under the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court retained full 
discretion as to the sentence to be imposed. Among the terms included in 
the written plea agreement was: “DEFENDANT WAIVES RIGHT TO 
APPEAL AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF.” Appellant’s App. (“App.”) 
Vol. 2, p. 108. After a short colloquy in which the trial judge asked 
Johnson whether he understood that he was giving up his appellate rights 
by pleading guilty, the court accepted the plea.  
On May 1, 2017, Johnson was sentenced to the maximum term of 12 
years incarceration. Like the plea agreement, the written sentencing order 
provided “DEFENDANT WAIVES RIGHT TO APPEAL AND POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF.” App. Vol. 2, p. 167. After imposing the sentence, 
the trial judge explained that he would not appoint appellate counsel for 
Johnson because he interpreted the plea agreement’s waiver of the “right 
to appeal” to include waiver of the right to appeal the sentencing decision. 
App. Vol. 3, p. 82. Johnson did not timely file a notice of appeal. 
After the denial of his request to enter the purposeful incarceration 
program—which allows trial courts to modify the sentence of an offender 
upon completion of the program—Johnson requested appellate counsel 
and filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Shortly thereafter, on 
October 3, 2018, Johnson sought permission to file a belated notice of 
appeal, arguing that he was only recently made aware of his right to 
appeal his sentence. At the hearing on this motion, Johnson’s trial counsel 
indicated that he was also unaware that a defendant could appeal a 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-61 | May 22, 2020 
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sentence following an open plea and therefore did not discuss with 
Johnson the waiver of his appellate rights. 
The trial court denied Johnson’s request to file a belated notice of 
appeal. This decision was affirmed on appeal. Johnson v. State, 140 N.E.3d 
854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), vacated. The Court of Appeals “f[ou]nd it 
concerning” that the plea agreement purported to waive Johnson’s right to 
seek post-conviction relief, a “patently void and unenforceable term” that 
“our courts have held [invalid] for almost thirty years.” Id. at 861, fn. 6. It 
also “strongly recommend[ed]” that the county prosecutor’s office 
“update its outdated plea agreement form so that it more clearly explains 
the effect of the waiver of the right to appeal… .” Id. at 863, fn. 9. But 
ultimately, the opinion held, the fact that Johnson accepted the plea 
agreement was sufficient for the trial court to find a valid waiver of his 
right to appeal, although “in other cases in which our courts have upheld 
a waiver-of-appeal provision in a plea agreement, the provision was more 
explicit about the waiver of the right to appeal the sentence.” Id. at 862. 
We share the Court of Appeals’ concern about the vagueness of the 
waiver provision at issue here. In Collins, we held that a defendant who 
pleads guilty remains entitled to appeal the merits of a trial court’s 
sentencing decision. 817 N.E.2d at 231. Four years later, in Creech, we 
cautioned that defendants may waive this right of appeal only if this 
waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily, and found valid waiver where 
Creech’s plea agreement specifically waived his “right to appeal [his] 
sentence[.]” 887 N.E.2d at 74-75. 
Under these circumstances, we find the general waiver of Johnson’s 
“right to appeal,” particularly when contained in the same sentence as an 
unenforceable waiver of post-conviction relief, insufficiently explicit to 
establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of Johnson’s right to appeal his 
sentence. We therefore remand to the trial court with instructions to grant 
Johnson’s motion for permission to file a belated notice of appeal. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur.  
Slaughter, J., dissents, and would expressly adopt the court of 
appeals’ opinion.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-61 | May 22, 2020 
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A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Amy E. Karozos 
State Public Defender 
Vickie R. Yaser 
Deputy Public Defender 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Andrew A. Kobe 
Deputy Attorney General 
Ian A. McLean 
Deputy Attorney General 
Matthew B. MacKenzie 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana