Case Title: Adams v. Leatherbury

Citation: 388 So. 2d 510

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1980-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
388 So. 2d 510 (1980)
W. P. ADAMS
v.
E. Robert LEATHERBURY, as Chairman of the State Pilotage Commission; Joe Ollinger, Jr., and J. E. Rehm, as members of the State Pilotage Commission.
79-227.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 12, 1980.
*511 Mylan R. Engel and Edgar P. Walsh of Engel & Smith, Mobile, for appellant.
Kirk C. Shaw of Armbrecht, Jackson, Demouy, Crowe, Holmes & Reeves, Mobile, for appellees.
MADDOX, Justice.
This appeal involves a claim of age discrimination by a Mobile bar pilot, who was requested by the State Pilotage Commission to surrender his bar pilot's license on his sixty-eighth birthday, as required by Code 1975, § 33-4-53.
The bar pilot filed this action against the members of the State Pilotage Commission, and asked the Court to declare the state's compulsory retirement of bar pilots law unconstitutional, because it conflicted with the provisions of the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (FADEA). 29 U.S. C.A. § 623 and § 631.
The sole issue presented is whether Alabama's compulsory retirement law is preempted by the FADEA. We hold that it is not, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Code 1975, § 33-4-53 states:
Sections 623 and 631 of title 29 U.S.C.A. state in pertinent part:
§ 623. Prohibition of age discrimination
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer
§ 631. Age limits
Individuals at least 40 but less than 70 years of age
In order for us to decide whether the FADEA applies, we must first determine whether the party alleged to have engaged in discrimination is an "employer" within the meaning of the federal statute. Section 630 of title 29 U.S.C.A. defines "employer" as follows:
Did the State Pilotage Commission have twenty employees? There was conflicting testimony on this issue; the bar pilot contended that it did. The Pilotage Commission contended it had no employees, and in support of its position, cites Mobile Bar Pilots Ass'n v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1938), wherein it was stated:
We hold that the State Pilotage Commission does not employ the pilots; therefore, it is not an "employer" under that provision of the FADEA, because it has less than the prescribed number of employees, but, 29 U.S.C.A. § 630, also defines "employer" as a state agency. Is the State Pilotage Commission a state agency? We hold that it is. It is created by statute, Code 1975, § 33-4-1, and its members are appointed by the governor, Code 1975, § 33-4-3; therefore, it is clear that the State Pilotage Commission is an "employer" within the meaning of the FADEA.
The FADEA obviously conflicts with the state's compulsory retirement law, because the state law requires compulsory retirement of bar pilots at age 68; the FADEA sets the mandatory retirement at age 70; therefore, the dispositive question is whether the federal law preempts state law. We now address that dispositive issue.
The United States Supreme Court in Ray of Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 98 S. Ct. 988, 994, 55 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1977), stated:
The United States Supreme Court has also stated:
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443, 80 S. Ct. 813, 815, 4 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1960). Further, the United States Supreme Court has said:
New York Department of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413, 93 S. Ct. 2507, 2513, 37 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1972). And in a more recent opinion that Court has stated:
DeCana v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356, 96 S. Ct. 933, 937, 47 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1976).
The Federal District Court for Alaska in Simpson v. Alaska Commission for Human Rights, 423 F. Supp. 552 (D.C.Alaska 1976), stated:
Applying the foregoing principles of preemption, we find no express intent by Congress to supersede and preempt this area of state regulation of bar pilots. The Pilotage Commission points out that in Senate Report No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 reprinted in (1978), 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 504, 508, it was stated, that "[a]s this language makes clear, the ADEA does not preempt State laws"; but that statement is not concerned with the entire Act, only with § 14(a), now 29 U.S.C.A. § 633(a), which deals with the federal-state interaction in enforcement of age discrimination laws.
As stated in Dorgan v. State, 29 Ala.App. 362, 196 So. 160 (1940):
29 Ala.App. at 364, 196 So.  at 162. In an early case, the United States Supreme Court in Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851), citing 1 Stat. at Large 53, stated:
We hold that the regulation of bar pilots is a matter to be decided by the states, absent congressional intent to preempt that state regulation. For example, in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 98 S. Ct. 988, 55 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1977), the Supreme Court of the United States decided that federal law had preempted the regulation of pilots of enrolled vessels.[1] The Court opined:
While a state regulation of bar pilots of "enrolled" vessels which conflicted with a federal regulation would be preempted, we do not believe that Congress, by virtue of the FADEA has preempted the field even as to pilots working on "enrolled" vessels. Assuming, however, that the FADEA did preempt the field as to bar pilots, regardless of the type vessels on which they were working, that does not end the inquiry.
The FADEA provides for "bona fide occupational qualifications", 29 U.S. C.A. § 623(f)(1). "Bona fide occupational qualifications" are defined in 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(d), as:
After defining "bona fide occupational qualifications", § 860.102(d) continues by giving an example:
Thus, airline pilots may be required to retire at age 60 by their "employers." There is a close analogy between bar pilots and airline pilots, although we realize that the two are not the same. We cannot ignore the fact that the State's interest in promoting the public safety in its harbors and on its waterways is sufficiently broad to permit the State to require the retirement of bar pilots at age 68; in short, the state law which sets a mandatory retirement age for bar pilots would be a "bona fide occupational qualification," and the FADEA, even if preemptive, would not apply, because of the "bona fide occupational qualification" exemption,[2] but in this case, we give force to the legislative determination that bar pilots should retire at age 68 and hold that this legislative determination meets the requirements of the act which place the burden on the employer to show a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons within the class (in this case, persons over 68 years of age) would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of a bar pilot.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and JONES, SHORES, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
[1]  Enrolled vessels are those "engaged in domestic or coastwide trade or used for fishing," whereas registered vessels are those engaged in trade with foreign countries. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 272-273, 97 S. Ct. 1740, 1745, 52 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1977).
[2]  We recognize "... that the burden is on the employer to show (1) that the bfoq which it invokes is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business ..., and (2) that the employer has reasonable cause, i. e., a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons within the class ... would be able to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved, or that it is impossible or impractical to deal with persons over the age limit on an individualized basis." Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).