Case Title: UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA v COE

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Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-05T00:00:00Z

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Xo. 8 4 - 4 1 7 I N THE SUPIQEME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 5 UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , MARK COE, TAMERLY D. COE and JORDON COE, D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s . PEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and for the C o u n t y of M i s s o u l a , T h e H o n o r a b l e John S. H e n s o n , Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: F o r A p p e l l a n t : T e r r y Wallace argued, Missoula, M o n t a n a F o r R e s p o n d e n t : M o r a l e s & V o l i n k a t y ; J u l i o K. M o r a l e s argued, M i s s o u l a , M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d : May 2 , 1 9 8 5 D e c i d e d : A u g u s t 5 , 1 9 8 5 F i l e d : Rut; .' 1985 C l e r k Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Montana, County of Missoula, the Honorable John S. Henson presiding. This case involves an execution on a bank account to recover student loans under the National Direct Student Loan Program. The appellant, Mark D. Coe, a former Montana University student, took out a series of student loans under the National Direct Student Loan Program, amounting to $6,437.30. For these loans he was required to sign, through the University, a promissory note pursuant to the National Direct Student Loan Program of the United States. He defaulted on the loans and when later requested, made only one payment of $20. The University, respondent herein, brought suit and obtained a partial summary judgment in the sum of $6,437.30. Through one of several executions, the University levied against the joint savings account of Mark Coe at the First Bank-Western Montana, Missoula. The savings account was in the name of "Tammerly or Mark D. Coe" which at the time of execution had a balance of $3,179.23. Tammerly Coe requested the Bank not to release the funds, claiming that the funds did not belong to Mark Coe, but rather belonged to her and to Jordan Coe, brother to Tammerly and Mark. Pursuant to agreement of counsel, and a stipulation fi1 ed , plus to avoid the cost of an interpleader by the bank, the funds were deposited with the District Court. A second stipulation was filed to allow intervention by Tammerly Coe and Jordon Coe. Tammerly Coe and h e r b r o t h e r , Jordan contend t h a t they deposited t h e money i n t h e bank and t h a t t h e i r b r o t h e r , Mark, deposited no funds whatsoever. However, one o f t h e e x h i b i t s presented t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court was a copy o f t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d o f t h e account which l i s t e d t h e names o f Tammerly Coe o r Mark D . . Coe, along w i t h t h e i r a d d r e s s e s , which s t a t e d t h a t Mark was " t h e owner o f a j o i n t savings account w i t h h i s s i s t e r . " Jordan Coe d i d n o t sign t h i s account, nor does h i s name appear on t h e s i g n a t u r e card though he claims he owns $2,000 o f t h e funds i n t h e account. Jordan a l l e g e s he gave t h a t amount t o Tammerly f o r s a f e keeping on h i s b e h a l f . Tammerly claims t h e remainder of t h e funds, l e s s t h e $2,000 deposited by h e r b r o t h e r Jordan, belong t o h e r and t h a t Mark Coe, a s p r e v i o u s l y noted, never made a d e p o s i t . O n e b a s i c i s s u e and t h r e e sub-issues a r e presented f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . L i s t e d a s t h e b a s i c i s s u e is: (1) Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n d e c l a r i n g a l l t h e funds i n a j o i n t checking account a r e s u b j e c t t o execution on a judgment a g a i n s t one j o i n t t e n a n t . L i s t e d a s t h e t h r e e sub-issues a r e t h e following: ( 2 ) What p o r t i o n of a j o i n t checking account, i f any, i s s u b j e c t t o execution on a judgment a g a i n s t one who has signed a s i g n a t u r e card? ( 3 ) Was i n t e n t o f t h e co-tenants o f a j o i n t checking account a f a c t o r i n determining a c r e d i t o r ' s r i g h t t o execute a judgment a g a i n s t one co-tenant? ( 4 ) What, i f any, i n t e r e s t s o f co-tenants i n a j o i n t checking account a r e s u b j e c t t o p r o t e c t i o n ? A s noted i n t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s b r i e f t h i s c a s e i s one o f f i r s t impression addressing t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether a j o i n t bank account i s s u b j e c t t o execution on a judgment a g a i n s t only one j o i n t d e p o s i t o r , and i f s o , t o what e x t e n t . The D i s t r i c t Court a f t e r having examined s t a t u t o r y c a s e law i n Montana and elsewhere, a s w e l l a s t h e e q u i t a b l e arguments r a i s e d , concluded t h a t under t h e p r e s e n t f a c t t h e e n t i r e account was s u b j e c t t o execution. The a p p e l l a n t s argue t h a t t h e District Court e r r e d f o r two reasons. The f i r s t reason was t h a t t h e s o l e i s s u e t h a t t h e c o u r t was t o d e c i d e , a s set f o r t h i n t h e s t i p u l a t i o n , was who owned t h e money i n t h e account. Based upon t h a t determination, t h e c o u r t was t o d e c i d e what amount was s u b j e c t t o execution. Appellants a l l e g e t h e a f f i d a v i t was n o t supposed t o a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e o f i n t e n t , a s counsel had s t i p u l a t e d . They f u r t h e r a l l e g e t h a t t h e only i s s u e , t h e only burden t h a t t h e s e d e p o s i t o r s had, was t o show who owned t h e money i n t h e account. Tarnrnerly and Jordan submitted an a f f i d a v i t t h a t set f o r t h whose money was i n t h e account, which t h e U n i v e r s i t y f a i l e d t o r e f u t e . The second reason was t h a t a p p e l l a n t s were never given an o p p o r t u n i t y t o argue t h e i s s u e o f i n t e n t . The c o u r t looked t o t h e argument o u t s i d e t h e s t i p u l a t i o n o f c o u n s e l , which a p p e l l a n t s contend c o n s t i t u t e d e r r o r . They c l a i m , under t h e circumstances o f t h i s c a s e , t h e i s s u e of t h e judgment c r e d i t o r ' s r i g h t s t o funds i n t h e j o i n t account never hinged on t h e i s s u e o f i n t e n t . W e f i n d t h a t t h e f i r s t two i s s u e s a r e t h e c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e s i n t h i s case. These two i s s u e s can be p r o p e r l y r e s t a t e d whether t h i s i s a j o i n t tenancy account w i t h r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p , o r whether it is a tenancy i n common. Both t h e a p p e l l a n t s and t h e respondent r e l y on previous c a s e law i n Montana t h a t a d d r e s s e s i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g j o i n t bank accounts regarding r i g h t s o f i n h e r i t a n c e and i n h e r i t a n c e taxes. Malek v. Patten (Mont. 1984), 678 P.2d 201, 41 St.Rep. 305; Anderson v. Baker (Mont. 1982), 641 P.2d 1035, 39 St-Rep. 273; In the Matter of Sinclair (Mont. 1982), 640 P.2d 918, 39 St.Rep. 331; Casagranda v. Donahue (1978), 178 Mont. 479, 585 P.2d 1286; Patterson v. Halterman (1973), 161 Mont. 278, 505 P.2d 905; State Board of Equalization v. Cole (1948), 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989; In Re Sullivan's Estate (1941), 112 Mont. 519, 118 P.2d 383. Appellants direct our attention to cases outside this jurisdiction, claiming this particular set of circumstances has not previously been answered by Montana case law. Purma v. Stark (Kan. 1978), 585 P.2d 991; Walnut Valley State Bank v. Stova11 (Kan. 1978), 574 P.2d 1382; Yakima Adjustment Services v. Durand (Wash.App. 1981), 622 P.2d 408. Appellants argue these out of state jurisdictional cases state the majority rule. We find that the Montana rule set forth in our case law as to joint tenancy and tenancy in common, represents a more reliable manner of determining questions concerning the ownership of joint accounts. As Justice Sheehy very ably noted in this Court's opinion in Casaqranda v. Donahue, supra, that rule was set forth and reiterated in Ludwig v. Montana Bank & Trust Co. (1939) , 109 Mont. 477, 98 P.2d 377, wherein this Court quoted with approval from Hill v. Badeljy (Ca.App. 1930), 290 P. 637 at 640: "The question involved in cases of this character is the intention of the parties . . . and when such intention is evidenced by a written agreement, as was done in the case at bar, this question of intention ceases to be an issue, and the Courts are bound by the written agreement . . . Furthermore . . . parol evidence is not admissible to change the terms of the legal effect of such a written instrument where it is in no r e s p e c t u n c e r t a i n o r ambiguous.'' 9 8 P.2d a t 389. I n our most r e c e n t c a s e , Malek v. P a t t e n , supra, t h i s Court again r e a s s e r t e d t h a t it " p r e f e r r e d " t h e Montana r u l e even though t h e d o n e e / j o i n t owner never signed t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d . I n Montana's c a s e s involving t h i r d p a r t i e s , one j o i n t owner i s t r u l y an owner w i t h an unquestionable r i g h t t o withdraw t h e e n t i r e funds. I t i s only where one j o i n t t e n a n t seeks t o t a k e advantage o f t h e o t h e r without t h i r d p a r t y r i g h t s being a f f e c t e d , t h a t t h i s Court h a s allowed evidence beyond t h e j o i n t account s i g n a t u r e card and its l e g a l consequences. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e such t h i r d p a r t y r i g h t s a r e t h e primary c o n s i d e r a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e no e x t r i n s i c evidence was admissible. Mark Coe, Tammerly Coe and Jordan Coe a l l admit i n t h e i r a f f i d a v i t t h a t Mark was an owner of t h e j o i n t account. The second i s s u e c o n s i d e r s whether t h e j o i n t account is d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a t r a d i t i o n a l common law f r a c t i o n a l s h a r e , and a c r e d i t o r o f one d e p o s i t o r can execute on t h e whole account. The s t a t u t e s t h a t c o n t r o l i n t h i s m a t t e r cover t h e p r o p e r t y and ownership t h e r e o f and ownership of j o i n t bank accoun.ts i n Montana. That s e c t i o n , 70-1-101, MCA, p r o v i d e s a s follows: "Property defined--ownership. The ownership o f a t h i n g i s t h e r i g h t o f one o r more persons t o possess and use it t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r s . I n t h i s code, t h e t h i n g o f which t h e r e may be ownership i s c a l l e d property." S e c t i o n 32-1-442, MCA, concerning ownership o f j o i n t bank accounts i n Montana, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "When a d e p o s i t h a s been made o r s h a l l h e r e a f t e r be made i n any bank t r a n s a c t i n g business i n t h i s s t a t e i n t h e names of two o r more persons, payable t o e i t h e r o r payable t o e i t h e r o r t h e s u r v i v o r , o r any s u r v i v o r , such d e p o s i t , o r any p a r t t h e r e o f , o r any i n t e r e s t o r dividend thereon, may be paid t o any o f s a i d persons whether t h e o t h e r o r o t h e r s be l i v i n g o r n o t . . . " S e c t i o n 70-1-306, MCA, provides: "Ownership by s e v e r a l persons--types. The ownership o f p r o p e r t y by s e v e r a l persons i s e i t h e r o f : " (1) j o i n t i n t e r e s t s ; " ( 2 ) p a r t n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t s ; " ( 3 ) i n t e r e s t s i n common." A s p r e v i o u s l y noted i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e s i n t h i s case, numbers 1 and 2 , t h e q u e s t i o n i s whether t h i s i s a j o i n t account under our s t a t u t o r y and c a s e law, o r a tenancy i n common w i t h no s u r v i v o r . This Court i n I v i n s v. Hardy (1947), 120 Mont. 35, 179 P.2d 745, h e l d t h a t a tenancy i n common i s c r e a t e d whenever t h e instrument b r i n g i n g an e s t a t e o f two o r more persons i n t o e x i s t e n c e does n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e t h a t t h e e s t a t e c r e a t e d i s o t h e r than a "tenancy i n common." The f a c t s s i t u a t i o n concerning t h e s i g n i n g o f t h e s i g n a t u r e card i n Casagranda v. Donahue, supra, and t h e f a c t s s i t u a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e a r e d i f f e r e n t . The c a r d signed i n t h e j o i n t account i n Casagranda s p e c i f i c a l l y s a i d : "The undersigned hereby open a n account i n your bank a s j o i n t t e n a n t s and n o t a s t e n a n t s i n common, and, upon t h e d e a t h o f e i t h e r o r any o f u s , a l l monies t h e n i n t h i s account s h a l l be p a i d t o t h e s u r v i v o r o r s u r v i v o r s a s h i s , her, o r t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l property. A l l monies h e r e a f t e r deposited i n t h i s account s h a l l likewise be j o i n t t e n a n t s and n o t t e n a n t s i n common. You a r e hereby d i r e c t e d t o honor checks o r o r d e r s on t h i s account signed by e i t h e r o r any o f u s , o r s u r v i v o r s o f e i t h e r o r any o f us." Under t h a t f a c t s s i t u a t i o n i n Casagranda, w e held t h a t t h e savings account became t h e i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t y o f respondent upon t h e d e c e d e n t ' s death. Right o f s u r v i v o r s h i p , which i s an e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f any j o i n t tenancy, cannot be d e f e a t e d by t h e e x e c u t r i x o f d e f e n d a n t ' s e s t a t e , and any a t t e m p t t o s a t i s f y t h e g e n e r a l d e v i s e s i n a w i l l . I n t h e c a s e a t b a r t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d signed by Tammerly D. Coe o r Mark D. Coe noted: "The s i g n a t u r e of each person authorized t o s i g n on t h i s account appears on t h e r e v e r s e s i d e o f t h i s card and s i g n i f i e s agreement t h a t t h e account i s s u b j e c t t o a l l a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s o f t h i s bank now e x i s t i n g o r h e r e a f t e r adopted. I acknowledge r e c e i p t of a copy o f t h e Bank's Rules and Regulations Governing Bank Accounts." The r e v e r s e s i d e o f t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d had t h e following notated a t t h e bottom: "The undersigned d e p o s i t o r , whose bank account i s described on t h e r e v e r s e s i d e , hereby a p p o i n t s t h e p e r s o n ( s ) whose specimen s i g n a t u r e (s) appears above, agent (s) o f t h e undersigned with r e s p e c t t o s a i d bank account with t h e a u t h o r i t y s p e c i f i e d i n t h e Bank's posted General Rules and Regulations Governing Bank Accounts. l1 W e f i n d t h a t t h e major d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a j o i n t tenancy a s opposed t o a tenancy i n common i s a r i g h t o f t h e s u r v i v o r o f each o f t h e co-tenants. W e hold, under t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , t h a t t h i s i s a tenancy i n common and t h a t t h e c r e d i t o r , U n i v e r s i t y of Montana, i s e n t i t l e d t o one-half, n o t t h e t o t a l amount l e v i e d a g a i n s t t h e account c u r r e n t l y being held by t h e Clerk o f t h e Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . Ha.ving decided t h e f i r s t two i s s u e s which a r e c o n t r o l l i n g , it is unnecessary t o c o n s i d e r t h e remaining i s s u e s presented by t h e respondent, t h a t being whether a p p e l l a n t s had f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h an i n t e n t n o t t o make Mark Coe an owner and whether equitable considerations favor the appellants. The judgment of the District Court is modified and remanded with direction to comply with the provisions of this opinion. Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., dissenting: I respectfully dissent from what I find to be a bewil- dering rationale in the majority opinion. In stating the facts, the majority notes: "Through one of several executions, the University levied against the joint savings account of Mark Coe at the First Bank-Western Montana, Missoula." With little explanation, the majority concludes its opinion by finding that the account is not a joint account, but rather a tenancy in common. Apparently, the majority's conclusion rests upon the fact that the signature card did not contain a clear designation of ownership, nor was there a reference to survivorship; therefore, the Court deems the funds in the account to be held by the account designees as tenants in common rather than joint tenants. This is a case of first impression in Montana. In Casagranda v. Donahue (1978), 178 Mont. 479, 585 P.2d 1286, relying on State Board of Equalization v . Cole (1948), 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989, this Court held that where depositors sign a signature card containing an agreement that the depos- it is payable to one of the co-depositors or the survivor, the question of donative intent is settled and the funds in the account are a joint tenancy. However, in both Casagranda and Cole, one of the people whose names appeared on the signature card had died. This Court made an exception to that rule in Anderson v. Baker (1981), 196 Mont. 494, 641 P.2d 1035. In Anderson, the donor/depositor attempted in her lifetime to divest the alleged joint tenant of any interest in the account. This Court held that the donor/depositor had exclusive ownership of the funds in the joint account and that the signature card was not conclusive under Montana law. The distinguishing feature from Casaqranda and Cole was that t h e donor/depositor was a l i v e and d o n a t i v e i n t e n t was a s s e r t a i n a b l e . I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e r e i s no agreement f o r t h e s e funds t o be owned i n any c e r t a i n manner. Therefore, t h e q u e s t i o n o f ownership must remain open. The unrefuted f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e show t h a t t h e funds i n t h e account were owned by Tammerly Coe and Jordan Coe. Mark Coe, under f a c t s which a r e n o t c o n t e s t e d , had no ownership i n t h e funds. it should be noted t h a t a bank account i t s e l f can be held i n a d i f f e r e n t ownership than t h e funds deposited i n t h e account. Two lawyers may have a j o i n t account a s p a r t n e r s and d e p o s i t a c l i e n t ' s money i n t h e account. Those monies do n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y become t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e named account owners. It i s t r u e t h a t , a s between t h e bank and t h e deposi- t o r s , t h e bank i s without l i a b i l i t y when it r e l e a s e s funds t o t h o s e named an t h e account. However, i f t h e funds i n t h e account belong t o a n o t h e r , t h e account owners must hold t h e money i n t r u s t f o r t h e r i g h t f u l ownpr. I n O'Hair v. O'Hair (Ariz. 1973), 508 P.2d 66, t h e Arizona c o u r t d e a l t w i t h a s i m i l a r q u e s t i o n . Under t h e f a c t s of t h a t c a s e , t h e c o u r t was involved i n determining ownership of $150,000 deposited by husband i n husband and w i f e ' s j o i n t bank account. The c o u r t s t a t e d : "While a s between t h e bank and t h e depos- i t o r t h e c o n t r a c t o f d e p o s i t i s conclu- s i v e , t h e m e r e form of t h e bank account i s n o t regarded a s s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b - l i s h t h e i n t e n t o f t h e d e p o s i t o r t o g i v e a n o t h e r a j o i n t i n t e r e s t i n o r ownership of t h e d e p o s i t . Bolton v. Bolton, 306 111. 473, 138 N.E. 158 (1923) ; B a l l v. Forbes, 314 Mass. 200, 49 N.E.2d 898 (1943); Hodgins v. Zabel, 7 Misc.2d 484, 166 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup.Ct. 1.957); Indus- t r i a l T r u s t Co. v. Taylor, 69 R . I . 62, 30 A.2d 853 (1943) . A s t h e c o u r t s a i d i n Cashman v. Mason, 72 F.Supp. 487, 492 (D.Minn. 1947) : "'Joint accounts are a common method of handling funds in a bank as between husband and wife and others for mutual convenience and economy, but without necessarily intending to bestow any present interest in the fund on the one who is joined for the convenience of the owner of the moneys deposited.' " ' [TI he intention of the depositor is controlling.' McNabb v. Fisher, supra, 38 Ariz. at 295, 299 P. at 681." 508 P.2d at 68. Unfortunately, the precedent of this case is incredibly far-reaching and will effectuate absurd results. Despite actual evidence of ownership including the intent of deposi- tors, funds in a bank account are joint tenancy funds if the account provides for survivorship and tenancy in common funds if the account is silent as to survivorship. Under the authority of this case, the ownership of all funds will be automatically transferred to reflect the ownership designated on the account itself. Although the majority opinion is not clear as to what disposition occurred in the District Court, the fact is that the District Court allowed execution upon all of the funds in the joint bank account. I would reverse and remand with directions to dismiss. Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber dissents as follows: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. While this dissent adds no authority, I trust it will help to raise questions not yet answered by the majority opinion and Justice Morrison's dissent. For clarity in the discussion, following is Exhibit 6, the signature card for this account: r! CIV /LfS A4 Stata ~ ~ & ? & ? ? h h o n e No 7aJ - =.\- Soclai Secur~ty or 5- 3 1 . ( . . 3 P ~ J ~ C C U D ~ I I O ~ Taxpayer Ident. No 7 LJ or Employer First Bank (N.A.) -Western Monlana Mlssoula Ylt.oula, Uontaru 69807 Membar F l n t Bank Syncem S a v l n ~ l 0 SpeClll Sevlngs 0 Check~ng Specla1 Checklng Con~merclal 0 T ~ m e Certlficetaa., 0 Psnnerrnip u Unlform Gilt to M~nora 0 Indtvldual 0 Soc~ety or Organizat~on 63 J o ~ n l 0 Truatee CJ Mulllple Trustee I. Onicer'r Inltlrlr - 2.2-10s S l p n e t u r a r raqulred on all checks or wllhdrewala I I POWER Of ATTORNEY In a number of the decisions of this Court discussing bank accounts, the account cards indicated an express intention to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The foregoing only indicates an intent to establish a "Joint" account. Ttle undersloned deposllor. whose bank aCCOUnl Is de¶crlbad on reverse slda, hereby apuolnts (ha peraon(aJ rhoae rpeclmen aignatureIaJ apPaars above, aganl(rJ of lha undarrlgned wllh raapect to r a l d , bank rccounl w ~ l h Iha euthorlly @pecll~ad In tna Bank'@ Postad Ganrrrl Rular and Ragulallona Qovarnlnp 8ank AccounU. cy S e c t i o n 32-1-442, MCA, i n substance provides t h a t when a d e p o s i t i s made payable t o e i t h e r o f two p e r s o n s , such d e p o s i t may be paid t o e i t h e r o f such persons, whether 1-iving o r n o t . A s a r e s u l t , from t h e Bank's s t a n d p o i n t , t h i s account is t r e a t e d a s a j o i n t tenancy with r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p . I n c o n t r a s t , S 70-1-307, MCA, i n substance provides t h a t a j o i n t tenancy i s one owned by s e v e r a l persons i n equal. s h a r e s by a t i t l e c r e a t e d by a s i n g l e t r a n s f e r when e x p r e s s l y d e c l a r e d i n t h e t r a n s f e r t o be a j o i n t tenancy. The s i g n a t u r e card does n o t c o n t a i n a d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t t o c r e a t e a j o i n t tenancy. I n a s i m i l a r manner, § 70-1-314 i n substance provides t h a t every i n t e r e s t c r e a t e d i n f a v o r o f s e v e r a l persons i s an i n t e r e s t i n common u n l e s s d e c l a r e d i n i t s c r e a t i o n t o be a j o i n t i n t e r e s t a s provided i n § 70-1-307, MCA. These code s e c t i o n s suggest t h a t t h e account i n q u e s t i o n should be c l a s s e d a s a tenancy i n common. However, i n Marshall v. Minlschmidt (1966) , 148 Mont. 263, 419 P.2d 486, t h i s Court concluded t h a t a brand with an "or" d e s i g n a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d a j o i n t tenancy. Following i s t h e form o f ownership and conclusion o f t h e Court: "The ownership o f t h e brand a s o f December 7 , 1954, was i n t h e name o f 'Wm. L. o r E t t a M. Minlschmidt o r Vern F i e l d . . . Then, on J u l y 10, 1958, d u r i n g t h e d e c e a s e d ' s l a s t i l l n e s s , t h e brand was t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e names o f 'Wm. L. o r E t t a M. Minlschmidt . . .' "The recorded brand s i g n i f i e s a j o i n t i n t e r e s t i n t h e brand, t h e s e v e r a l persons having equal s h a r e s . S e c t i o n 67-308, R.C.M. 1947. [Now S 70-1-307, MCA. ] I' Marshall was subsequently followed by t h i s Court i n F i r s t Westside Nat' 1 Bank v. L l e r a , Tynes & F i s h e r (1978) , 176 Mont. 481, 580 P.2d 100. There t h e Court concluded t h a t following Marshall, i n Montana an ownership document showing t i t l e i n two o r more persons "and/orV h a s t h e e f f e c t of c r e a t i n g a j o i n t tenancy e s t a t e w i t h r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p . This a p p l i e d t o personal p r o p e r t y , n o t r e a l e s t a t e . The Court then considered t h e n a t u r e of t h e i n t e r e s t of a j o i n t t e n a n t i n j o i n t tenancy property and r e f e r r e d t o what i s now S 70-1-307, MCA, t o conclude t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f t h e s t a t u t e i s t o i n c l u d e a l l of t h e i n c i d e n t s o f a j o i n t tenancy e s t a t e a t common law. The Court then s t a t e d : "Thus, a c c e p t i n g t h e ' a n d / o r 1 t i t l e a s having c r e a t e d a j o i n t tenancy i n t h i s c a s e , t h e l e g a l r e s u l t i s t h a t Allen R. L l e r a owned an e q u a l s h a r e i n t h e automobile, and t h e r i g h t of s u r v i v o r s h i p w i t h h i s mother." The foregoing c a s e s have n o t been overruled. Based on t h e foregoing a u t h o r i t y , I conclude t h a t w e must c l a s s t h e p r e s e n t bank account a s a j o i n t tenancy bank account, w i t h each o f t h e two account h o l d e r s having a l l o f t h e r i g h t s of j o i n t t e n a n t s with. r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p . Our next c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s t h e e f f e c t o f t h e levy o f execution upon t h e i n t e r e s t o f Mark D. Coe i n t h e j o i n t account. A s pointed o u t , § 32-1-442, MCA, c l e a r l y g i v e s t o Mark D . Coe t h e r i g h t t o withdraw a l l o f t h e funds from t i m e t o t i m e i n t h e account, and o b l i g a t e s t h e Bank t o pay any amounts drawn from t h e account by him. That code s e c t i o n was construed i n Ludwig v. Montana Bank & T r u s t Co. (1939), 109 Mont. 477, 98 P.2d 379, where t h e Court was faced w i t h t h e withdrawal of a l l o f t h e funds from an account by one j o i n t p a r t y without t h e consent o f t h e o t h e r . The Court c i t e d w i t h approval H i l l v. Badeljy, 117 Cal.App. 598, 290 P. 637, 6 4 0 s t a t i n g : " 'The q u e s t i o n involved i n c a s e s o f t h i s c h a r a c t e r is t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s making t h e d e p o s i t , and where such i n t e n t i o n i s evidenced by a w r i t t e n agreement, a s was done i n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h i s q u e s t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n c e a s e s t o be an i s s u e , and t h e c o u r t s a r e bound by t h e w r i t t e n agreement . . . Furthermore, i n any a c t i o n between t h e d e p o s i t o r s o r t h e bank d u r i n g t h e l i f e t i m e of b o t h d e p o s i t o r s , i n t h e absence o f fraud o r mistake, par01 evidence is n o t admissible t o change t h e terms of t h e l e g a l e f f e c t o f such a w r i t t e n instrument where it i s i n no r e s p e c t u n c e r t a i n o r ambiguous.'" There i s no evidence i n t h e r e c o r d t o i n d i c a t e any c o n t r a r y i n t e n t on t h e p a r t o f t h e p a r t i e s . I would conclude t h a t t h e execution c r e d i t o r can p r o p e r l y a t t a c h a l l of t h e funds i n t h e bank account i n t h e same manner t h a t Mark Coe could have withdrawn a l l o f t h e funds from t h e same account. The undersigned J u s t i c e William E. Hunt, S r . j o i n s i n t h e foregoing d i s s e n t . / - - - - J u s t i c e