Case Title: Hughes v. Lippincott

Citation: 245 P.2d 390, 56 N.M. 473

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1952-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
245 P.2d 390 (1952) 56 N.M. 473 HUGHES et al. v. LIPPINCOTT. No. 5437. Supreme Court of New Mexico. June 11, 1952. Rehearing Denied July 2, 1952. Henry J. Hughes, Santa Fe, for appellants. Seth & Montgomery, Wm. R. Federici, Santa Fe, for appellee. McGHEE, Justice. The controlling issue presented by this appeal is whether the defendant, Camilla Hare Lippincott, is to be sustained in her contention the conveyance from which she derives title describes her property as bounded by a way, thus vesting in her an easement of passage over a private way. The plaintiffs and the defendant derive their respective titles to adjoining property from common grantors, Kenneth M. Chapman and wife. The deed in question was given October 1, 1941, to defendant's predecessor in title, Joseph T. Curtiss, and conveyed a tract of land fronting on a public street in the city of Santa Fe, New Mexico, the grantors retaining ownership of the portion directly behind the tract sold, not on a public street, together with a narrow strip approximately 20 feet wide, know as Plaza Balentin, to be used as a way to the public street, which private way extended past both properties. The property conveyed by the October 1, 1941, deed was described therein as follows: The plaintiffs, subsequent grantees from the Chapmans, sought to quiet title to the private way, Plaza Balentin, against the defendant's claim of easement therein. The trial court found substantially for the defendant and its pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law were as follows: The court then concluded as matters of law: The plaintiffs now contend (1) there can be easement by implication in New Mexico unless the same is "by necessity"; (2) that any right in the private way was excluded under the terms of the conveyance; that the sentence of the description in the deed to defendant's predecessor in title reading: "Bounded North by property of Mrs. K.M. Chapman; East by Plaza Balentin; South by Acequia Madre and West by Jack Davis and J.A. Lowe." is inoperative to vest any right in the way because the first portion of the description by courses and distances excludes the way; that the reference to the way is descriptive merely and for purposes of location; and (3) that the original grantee, Curtiss, abandoned his claim to an easement and the defendant Lippincott cannot revive and assert the same. As to the first contention, plaintiffs are mistaken in their assertion there can be no easement by implication in New Mexico unless the same is "by necessity." They rely principally on the case of Michelet *393 v. Cole, 20 N.M. 357, 149 P. 310, 311. That case involved an easement claimed to pass as an appurtenant to the property conveyed under a clause in the deed following the description, reading: "together with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging." Our court declared the grantee held no easement in the way contended for, on that basis, stating: We did not have there before us the contention here made that an easement arises by implication from a deed describing the property conveyed as bounded by a way. As stated in 17 Am.Jur., Easements, Sec. 34, p. 948, and approved by this court in Venegas v. Luby, 49 N.M. 381, 164 P.2d 584, various elements are essential to create an easement by implication upon the severance of the unity of ownership in an estate. And it is true that among these elements is the requirement that the easement be reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant portion of the property. However, easements may be raised by ways other than by passing as an appurtenant upon the severance of unity of ownership. As stated in a recent Ohio case, Trattar v. Rausch, 154 Ohio St. 286, 95 N.E.2d 685, 689: Different considerations are involved in the determination of easements arising in these differing ways. With the nature of the easement here contended for, necessity or the lack of it has no bearing. 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 40, Page 704 et seq.; Anno: 122 Am.St.Rep. 216; New England Structural Co. v. Everett Distilling Co., 189 Mass. 145, 75 N.E. 85; Hill v. Taylor, 296 Mass. 107, 4 N.E.2d 1008; McPherson v. Monegan, 120 Mont. 454, 187 P.2d 542; Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 N.E.2d 8. Plaintiffs quote from Burling v. Leiter, 272 Mich. 448, 262 N.W. 388, 100 A.L.R. 1312, to support their claim easements are to be implied only in cases of necessity to prevent the fettering of estates; however, this case likewise involved an easement claimed to arise from an existing use at the time of severance, and the statements therein contained, as well as those in Michelet v. Cole, supra, have no application to the present determination. We now come to those matters raised under the second general contention of plaintiffs that any easement in the private way known as Plaza Balentin was excluded from the terms of the conveyance. It is the general rule and the rule followed in this state that where the description of property conveyed calls for a road or way as a boundary and the grantor owns the fee in said way, an easement in the way passes to the grantee and his heirs and assigns by implication of law. In Nickson v. Garry, 51 N.M. 100, 179 P.2d 524, 526, the authorities are collected and analyzed after this general assertion by our court: In the Nickson case a controversy arose over the ownership of a narrow strip of land being the south 15 feet of a lot in Roswell, New Mexico. The grantor conveyed away the north 35 feet of the lot in a deed containing the following language: *394 "* * * and it is hereby understood and agreed that the remaining 15 feet of said lot shall be perpetually reserved for an alley." The heirs of the grantor contended for ownership of the strip in question, and we held, among other things, that the heirs of the grantor were estopped from claiming that the alley, though not in fact in existence prior to the execution of the deed, was created by the deed itself. We also quoted therein the following language from Hennessey v. Old Colony & N.R. Co., 101 Mass. 540, 100 Am.Dec. 127: See also, 17 Am.Jur., Easements, Sec. 46, p. 957; 14 Am.Jur., Covenants, Sec. 17, p. 494; 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 40, page 704; 122 Am.St.Rep. 216 and Vol. 2 Thompson, Real Property, Sec. 470 et seq. Plaintiffs assert the deed in question does not "bound the property by a way," but merely mentions the way for purposes of description or location without any intention of making it the actual boundary of the land. It is generally stated in the authorities cited last above that no easement is acquired by the grantee in such cases. We are referred by the plaintiffs to three cases in support of his contention: Lankin v. Terwilliger, 22 Or. 97, 102, 29 P. 268; Brizzalaro v. Senour, 82 Ky. 353; and Talbert v. Mason, 136 Iowa 373, 113 N.W. 918, 14 L.R.A.,N.S., 878. In the case of Brizzalaro v. Senour, the original owner executed a conveyance to a lot of ground defined by metes and bounds and designating one of the lines in the following manner: "Thence northwardly with the east line of said bridge company sixty-five feet to a ten-foot alley (which extends from the east line of the said bridge property to Greenup street, running parallel with said Second street), thence eastwardly, * * *". The weight of the testimony was no such alley had been laid out in fact or on any map or survey by the grantor. The court recognized the grantor and his privies would be bound by estoppel but ruled a subsequent purchaser from the grantor would not be estopped on the basis that a mere recital in the deed, although capable of working an estoppel against the grantor, can neither vest or divest title. In Talbert v. Mason, supra, the exception to the general rule is recognized but the facts of that case did not place the conveyance within the exception. Only in the case of Lankin v. Terwilliger, supra [22 Or. 102, 29 P. 269] is the exception actually applied. The description there involved read, in part, as follows: The gist of the court's decision is contained in the following statement: In our opinion the present description does not fall within the rule stated in Lankin v. Terwilliger, supra. And furthermore, that portion of the description defining the property conveyed by courses and distances is, alone, sufficient on which to base the implication of an easement in the grantee in the private way known as Plaza Balentin. For convenience we again set out the pertinent part of that portion of the description: In American Steel Foundries v. Sibley Soap Co., 3 Cir., 270 F. 70, 71, the common grantor first conveyed to the soap company a lot of ground: This deed was duly recorded and thereafter the grantor conveyed to the predecessor in title of the steel foundry all his interest and title to a 20-foot strip which abutted the western line of the soap company's lot. In an action by the soap company to restrain the steel foundry from erecting buildings on this 20-foot strip, the soap company prevailed, the court stating: The similarity between the description involved in the American Steel Foundries case and the present one is apparent. The most recent case discovered in point is that of Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 89 N.E.2d 8, 9, decided December, 1949. There an easement over a way between properties abutting on the way was in dispute. At one time the entire property was held by a common grantor. In 1922 the plaintiff's lot was conveyed to one, Durkiwicz, by a deed referring to the property *396 as "land in Waltham situated on the easterly side of Wall Street, a private way." The pertinent part of the description in that deed is quoted in the opinion as: Subsequently Durkiwicz conveyed to the plaintiff employing the same description. Many years later the common grantor conveyed the remaining property held by him to the defendant's predecessors and the defendants later proposed to erect a garage on the property. It appeared that Wall Street had never been opened between the two properties, and the proposed garage would have interfered with plaintiff's right of way over what would have been a continuation of Wall Street. The ruling of the trial court that no easement was created in this portion of the property was reversed. The court stated, significantly, as follows: See also Malone v. Jones, 211 Ala. 461, 100 So. 831; and McPherson v. Monegan, 120 Mont. 454, 187 P.2d 542. In our opinion the deed in the present case clearly described the defendant's property as bounded on the east by the private way, Plaza Balentin, in employing these terms: "* * * thence S. 32° 02' E. 16.7 feet to an iron pipe on the West side of Plaza Balentin; thence S. 08° 38' W. along the West side of Plaza Balentin 107.75 feet to the Southeast corner, * * *". Because the precise description by courses and distances expresses the intention of the grantors to bound the premises by the way, there is no conflict between it and the general description by metes and bounds appearing immediately after the description by courses and distances, in these words: "Bounded North by property of Mrs. K.M. Chapman; East by Plaza Balentin; South by Acequia Madre and West by Jack Davis and J.A. Lowe." (Emphasis supplied.) It is, therefore, our view, and we so hold, when the two nonconflicting modes of description are read together the deed comes without question under the general rule as stated above and an easement of passage over the way vested in the defendant; and none other than an innocent purchaser for value without notice of the existing easement could divest the defendant's rights in the way. In the record before us plaintiffs have not brought themselves within that category. The trial court found the deed from the common grantors, Kenneth M. Chapman and Kate M. Chapman, was dated October 1st, 1941, and duly recorded in the office of the County Clerk of Santa Fe County. The deed bears the certification of the County Clerk that it was recorded October 24, 1941. The deed from the Chapmans to the plaintiffs *397 was not executed until December 11, 1945. Nor are any other circumstances presented to defeat the easement of the defendant in the private way. Plaintiffs contend lastly that the defendant or her predecessor has abandoned any right existing in the way, but it is our view the weight of the testimony supports the finding of the trial court otherwise. All other contentions by plaintiffs have either been abandoned or are deemed without merit. The judgment will be affirmed. It is so ordered. LUJAN, C.J., and SADLER, COMPTON, and COORS, JJ., concur.