Case Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, Inc.

Citation: 2004-Ohio-6506

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, Inc., 104 Ohio St.3d 168, 2004-Ohio-
6506.] 
 
 
CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. COMPMANAGEMENT, INC., ET AL. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, Inc., 104 Ohio St.3d 168, 
2004-Ohio-6506.] 
Unauthorized practice of law before Industrial Commission and Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation—Limits of permissible representation by 
nonlawyers. 
(No. 2004-0817 — Submitted August 17, 2004 — Decided December 15, 2004.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on the Unauthorized 
Practice of Law, No. UPL 02-04. 
_______________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Nonlawyers who appear and practice in a representative capacity before the 
Industrial Commission and the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation in 
conformity to Industrial Commission Resolution No. R04-1-01 are not 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 
_______________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶1} 
On April 15, 2002, relator, Cleveland Bar Association (“CBA”), 
filed a complaint with the Board of Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice 
of Law pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VII(5).  The complaint alleged that respondents 
CompManagement, Inc. (“CMI”), Jonathan R. Wagner, Robert J. Bossart, and 
Bobbijo Christensen engaged in the unauthorized practice of law as follows: 
{¶2} 
(1) “[B]y appearing in person at formal, oral, adjudicatory 
hearings, scheduled and held by the Industrial Commission of Ohio, upon various 
disputed workers’ compensation matters, in behalf of so-called ‘clients’ of 
January Term, 2004 
2 
respondent CompManagement, Inc., and, in the course of such appearances, 
performing such acts as examining and/or cross-examining witnesses; interpreting 
statutory provisions, case law, and administrative rulings; and making and/or 
giving legal interpretations with respect to the nature, weight, significance, and 
credibility of the evidence presented at such hearings and/or theretofore already of 
record in the Industrial Commission of Ohio’s claim file upon the claim then in 
issue”; and 
{¶3} 
(2) By preparing, signing, and filing “various documents of a legal 
nature, such as notices of appeal, motions, objections to orders of the 
Administrator 
of 
Workers’ 
Compensation, 
applications 
for 
handicap 
reimbursement, applications for the settlement of individual workers’ 
compensation claims, and requests for continuances, in behalf of respondent 
CompManagement, Inc.’s so-called ‘clients.’ ”1 
{¶4} 
After extensive discovery by the parties, the board held a formal 
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VII(7)(A) and (14), which was 
conducted on May 21 and 22, 2003, and adjourned to and completed on August 
22, 2003.  The board filed its final report on May 18, 2004, recommending that 
this court issue an order finding that respondents CMI and Bobbijo Christensen 
have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, prohibiting them from engaging 
in the unauthorized practice of law in the future, and providing for reimbursement 
of costs and expenses incurred by the board and relator. 
{¶5} 
In making its recommendation, the board concluded that the 
following conduct in which CMI and/or Christensen engaged amounts to the 
unauthorized practice of law:  (1) “preparation, signing and filing of documents in 
                                                 
1. In its complaint, CBA also alleged that attorney Tim Toth had assisted the respondents in 
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.  Although attorney Toth was initially named as a 
respondent in these proceedings, the board has dismissed the claims against him for lack of 
jurisdiction, and no objections have been filed to this aspect of the board’s report. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
handling claims before the Industrial Commission on behalf of employers,” (2) 
“negotiation and involvement with settling claims,” (3) “direct and indirect 
examination [including cross-examination] of witnesses during hearings,” (4) 
“presentation of employer concerns, arguments, summations of evidence, 
conclusions regarding the import of factual information and/or closing statements 
on behalf of employers during hearings,” (5) “recommendation and advice to 
employers as to taking appeals and other legal action,” and (6) “evaluation, advice 
or recommendation concerning whether an employer should retain an attorney to 
handle a claim before the Industrial Commission.” 
{¶6} 
The board also found that CMI engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law generally by its “representation of employers’ interests in handling 
claims before the Industrial Commission,” and that it furnished information to its 
hearing representatives with regard to “[p]ertinent court decisions and changes in 
the workers’ compensation law * * *, sometimes using a law firm to summarize 
the legal developments for [its] employees.” 
{¶7} 
Despite the breadth of its evidentiary review, the board’s legal 
analysis was admittedly less than comprehensive.  The board found itself 
unequipped “to evaluate * * * public interest factors or exercise discretion in 
applying Rule VII,” since it serves only “as an advisory body under the Supreme 
Court and * * * merely offers recommendations.”  Accordingly, the board 
declined to consider that the public interest might warrant restraint in the use of 
the court’s power to suppress lay representation in the workers’ compensation 
field.  Instead, the board took the approach that respondents are not authorized to 
engage in any conduct that corresponds to an activity that has been listed in some 
generalized definition of the practice of law under “the applicable precedents,” 
while leaving it to this court to “factor[] in public interest considerations and a 
January Term, 2004 
4 
measure of flexibility” in determining whether “lay representation [would] pose a 
hazard to the public in this limited setting.” 
{¶8} 
After the filing of the final report of the board, we issued an order 
to respondents to show cause why the report should not be confirmed and an 
appropriate order granted.  Gov.Bar R. VII(19)(A).  Both respondents and relator 
have filed objections to the report. 
{¶9} 
The cause is now before the court for the determination specified 
in Gov.Bar R. VII(19)(D). 
{¶10} The immediate issue in this unauthorized-practice-of-law case 
centers on the activities of a single, although perhaps Ohio’s largest, actuarial 
service company and its employees in connection with their representation of 
employers in matters of workers’ compensation.  The potential impact of its 
resolution, however, extends far beyond this proceeding, for it implicates the 
Industrial Commission’s longstanding policy of permitting nonlawyers, 
specifically actuarial firms and unions, to appear and practice before the 
commission and the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation in a representative 
capacity on behalf of employers and injured workers and to perform a variety of 
functions as regards the administration and adjudication of workers’ 
compensation claims. 
{¶11} The workers’ compensation system in Ohio began with “the 
unanimous adoption of Proposal Number 24, or Section 35, Article II [of the Ohio 
Constitution], at the Constitutional Convention of 1912 and the enactment of 
Ohio’s first compulsory workers’ compensation law, 103 Ohio Laws 72, on 
February 26, 1913.”  Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 115, 
118, 748 N.E.2d 1111.  The system was conceived and has long since functioned 
as an alternative loss-distribution mechanism to that of the common law of torts, 
which had proved wholly unsound and “incapable of dealing with the often 
January Term, 2004 
5 
devastating social and economic consequences of industrial accidents.”  Id. at 119, 
748 N.E.2d 1111. 
{¶12} The joint committee that sponsored the 1924 constitutional 
amendment that put Section 35, Article II in its present form intended for the 
system to operate “ ‘without necessity for recourse to law suits or employment of 
attorneys or payment of court costs.’ ”  Mabley & Carew Co. v. Lee (1934), 129 
Ohio St. 69, 74-75, 1 O.O. 366, 193 N.E. 745.  Thus, “[o]ne of the main objects 
sought to be accomplished by [the] enactment [of the Workers’ Compensation 
Act] was to provide a speedy, simple, and inexpensive method to compensate” 
workers for work-related injuries “and to do away with the vexatious and 
protracted litigation which had proved so costly, exhaustive, and unsatisfactory, 
oftimes resulting in great injustice.”  Goodman v. Beall (1936), 130 Ohio St. 427, 
429, 5 O.O. 52, 200 N.E. 470. 
{¶13} Accordingly, lay representation has been a feature of Ohio’s 
workers’ compensation system since its inception.  Id. at 430, 5 O.O. 52, 200 N.E. 
470.  While the adjective complexities of today’s workers’ compensation statutes 
“bear[] little resemblance to the rather simple plan first prescribed,” McMillen v. 
McCahan (C.P.1960), 83 Ohio Law Abs. 1, 14 O.O.2d 221, 167 N.E.2d 541, 549, 
the sophistication and presence of nonlawyer representatives in the system have 
steadily increased.  Thus, in 1963, it was estimated that 20,000 claims were set for 
an initial-level hearing before the Industrial Commission each year, that a 
representative appears on behalf of at least one of the parties in 60-65 percent of 
the hearings, and that “nonlawyers represent claimants in 60 per cent of the cases 
and employers in more than 50 per cent of the cases” in which a hearing 
representative is involved.  In re Unauthorized Practice of Law in Cuyahoga Cty. 
(1963), 175 Ohio St. 149, 156-157, 23 O.O.2d 445, 192 N.E.2d 54 (Gibson, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
January Term, 2004 
6 
{¶14} By 1970, actuarial firms in particular had become the primary 
means by which many Ohio employers discharge their obligations under the 
Workers’ Compensation Act.  Consequently, on December 31, 1970, the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association 
(“OSBA”) and 13 actuarial service companies adopted a set of “Standards of 
Practice Governing Actuarial Services,” which is often tersely referred to as the 
“1970 agreement.”  See XLIV Ohio Bar 161 (Feb. 8, 1971).  Cf. State ex rel. 
Nicodemus v. Indus. Comm. (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 58, 62-63, 5 OBR 115, 448 
N.E.2d 1360 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
{¶15} The 1970 agreement enumerates various functions that actuarial 
firms may and may not properly perform and recommends “to others concerned” 
that they follow these “principles as standards of proper conduct for actuarial 
service companies.”  XLIV Ohio Bar at 162.  In so doing, the agreement purports 
to strike an appropriate balance between “the public interest [in] the prompt, fair 
and efficient administration of the Workmen’s Compensation Laws” and the 
“recognition that no person may practice law in Ohio, who has not been admitted 
to the Bar by the Supreme Court of Ohio.”  Id. at 162, 163. 
{¶16} By its own terms, the 1970 agreement is not directly enforceable 
against anyone.  Id. at 164.  (Determinations of joint actuarial service commission 
created under agreement “shall not be binding upon any signatory to these 
standards.”)  Its list of permissible and prohibited actuarial functions, however, 
has since been the cornerstone of the Industrial Commission’s policy on 
nonlawyer appearance and practice before the agency.  As explained in a recent 
“Statement of All Members of the Industrial Commission,” dated May 21, 2004, 
“For more than 30 years, this and past Industrial Commissions have followed the 
1970 Agreement * * *.  Relevant portions of the agreement were set forth initially 
January Term, 2004 
7 
in Hearing Officer Manual at T.6.  This policy statement has been in place since 
January 1, 1989 and was republished in 2001 as Hearing Officer Manual R4.” 
{¶17} In their May 21, 2004 statement, the commissioners also revealed 
that “[i]n the past two days, approximately 70% of Industrial Commission 
hearings have been continued due to concerns raised following [the board’s] 
recommendations [in this case]” and that “injured workers and their employers 
have experienced hardships due to the continuation of hearings.”  Accordingly, 
the Industrial Commission rescinded Hearing Officer Manual Memo R4 on June 
2, 2004, and replaced it with Resolution No. R04-1-01.  Some of the stated 
purposes of the resolution are to update the standards set forth in the 1970 
agreement in order to reflect “changes in the workers’ compensation system that 
have developed over the last 33 years,” to resolve questions concerning “those 
specific guidelines that are in the 1970 agreement * * * but are not expressly set 
forth in Memo R4,” and “to issue interim standards for third party administrators 
[i.e., actuarial firms], union representatives, or employees of employers who 
appear before the Bureau and Commission until permanent guidelines are issued 
by the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of Cleveland Bar Association v. 
CompManagement, Case No. 04-0817.” 
{¶18} Industrial Commission Resolution No. R04-1-01 provides: 
{¶19} “(A) The following activities shall be permitted before the 
Industrial Commission or the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, to the extent 
performed by third-party administrators, by union representatives until permanent 
guidelines are provided by the Ohio Supreme Court, or employees of an employer: 
{¶20} “1. Investigation, or assistance to injured workers and employers in 
investigating, the facts with respect to any claim, including discussing the facts 
and their relationship to the claim with employers, witnesses, and others, 
January Term, 2004 
8 
preparing and securing statements, and preparing and obtaining reports regarding 
the facts; 
{¶21} “2. Assistance to injured workers and employers in the 
administration of a claim and the filing of claims and appeals, without making any 
legal determination respecting such claims or appeals, before the administrator of 
the Bureau of Workers' Compensation and/or the Industrial Commission of Ohio; 
{¶22} “3. Attendance at any hearing before the Industrial Commission for 
the purposes of recording and reporting any action taken at such hearing, reporting 
the factual results of any claim investigation, apprising the hearing officer or 
officers of documents or parts thereof that are in the file or that are missing from 
the file, including medical reports, filing documents, requesting a postponement 
or continuance of the hearing, and discussing matters within the independent 
knowledge of the representative, subject to all the limitations as set forth below; 
{¶23} “4. Completion and submission of any and all records and reports 
with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation or the Industrial Commission of Ohio 
regarding injured workers and employers, including, but not limited to, any and all 
forms promulgated and adopted by the Industrial Commission and the Bureau of 
Workers' Compensation, either written, verbal or electronically produced; 
{¶24} “5. Completion and submission of records and reports dealing with 
job classifications pertinent to premium rates and other Bureau of Workers' 
Compensation premium programs; 
{¶25} “6. Completion and submission of any and all reports or forms 
concerning, but not limited to, premiums, payroll rate adjustment protests, 
settlements, and handicap reimbursement requests before the Bureau of Workers' 
Compensation or the Industrial Commission; 
{¶26} “7. Filing protests within the Bureau of Workers' Compensation to 
the Adjudicating Committee, the Self-Insured Review Panel, the Self-Insuring 
January Term, 2004 
9 
Employers Evaluation Board, or the Administrator, or his designee, as permitted 
by statute, and representation before any of these bodies, subject to the limitations 
set forth below; 
{¶27} “8. Preparation of reports to employers dealing with the status of 
risks, status of reserves and actuarial analysis thereof; 
{¶28} “9. Advise employers or injured workers to seek legal 
representation. 
{¶29} “(B) In recognition that no person may practice law in Ohio who 
has not been admitted to the Bar by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and further 
recognizing that the practice of law is defined by the Ohio Supreme Court, non-
lawyers may not properly perform the following functions before the Industrial 
Commission or the Bureau of Workers' Compensation:  
{¶30} “1. Examine or cross-examine the claimant or any witness, directly 
or indirectly; 
{¶31} “2. Cite, file or interpret statutory or administrative provisions, 
administrative rulings or case law; 
{¶32} “3. Make and give legal interpretations with respect to testimony, 
affidavits, medical evidence in the form of reports or testimony, or file any brief, 
memorandum, reconsideration or other pleading beyond the forms actually 
provided by the Commission or the Bureau; 
{¶33} “4. Comment upon or give opinions with respect to the evidence, 
credibility of witnesses, the nature and weight of the evidence, or the legal 
significance of the contents of the claims file; 
{¶34} “5. Provide legal advice to injured workers and employers; 
{¶35} “6. Give or render legal opinions, or cite case law or statutes to 
injured workers and employers before, at or after the time when claims are 
January Term, 2004 
10 
initially certified or denied certification as valid claims by the employer upon the 
presentation of claim applications by employees; 
{¶36} “7. Provide stand-alone representation at hearing by charging a fee 
specifically associated with such hearing representation without providing other 
services.” 
{¶37} Nonlawyer representatives are today more than ever an integral 
part of Ohio’s workers’ compensation system.  As of June 2002, there were 
2,224,466 open workers’ compensation claims in Ohio.  Between 1997 and 2002, 
the Industrial Commission held an average of 179,786 hearings each year.  During 
2002, a total of 236,344 new claims were filed, and 189,869 claims were heard.  
According to the bureau, “[a]s of March 30, 2003, there were 12,546 active claims 
with a representative having a code of ‘LREP UNION IW’ which is usually used 
for a union representative.”  According to CMI’s expert, Daniel Ingberman, “[o]f 
the 263,638 workers’ compensation insurance policies in Ohio in 2002, 99,224 
(37.6%) use the services of an Actuarial Firm for their workers’ compensation 
claims.”  Employers using the services of CMI in claims with injury dates 
between January 1998 and December 2001 sought attorney representation at 
hearings only “1.5% of the time.”  The state of Ohio estimates that nonlawyers 
represent at least one party in approximately 95 percent of the hearings held each 
year and that “in almost half of all Industrial Commission hearings (47 percent or 
89,300 total hearings) [held each year], the employer’s only representative is an 
actuary.”  And considering that within two days after the board’s report in this 
case the Industrial Commission was compelled to continue “approximately 70%” 
of its hearings due to concerns over nonlawyer representation, it is clear that 
actuarial firms and unions have come to play a critical role in the workers’  
compensation system. 
January Term, 2004 
11 
{¶38} It is no secret that a full confirmation of the board’s report in this 
case would substantially alter the administrative landscape.  As the 90 parties and 
amici interested in this proceeding are well aware, that eventuality would 
immediately vitiate Industrial Commission procedures that have been in place for 
more than 30 years, ban virtually all nonlawyer involvement in the hearing 
process, significantly, if not drastically, curtail the business of actuarial firms, and, 
to a lesser extent, impair the ability of unions to represent their members, and 
increase the premium costs and attorney fees for workers’ compensation claims in 
Ohio.  From a practical standpoint, the issuance of an order as recommended by 
the board would purge the workers’ compensation system of nonlawyer 
representatives, for the board has suggested that we enjoin laypersons from 
engaging in conduct that ranges from the most mundane processing functions, 
such as preparing administrative documents, to the overall handling of workers’ 
compensation claims. 
{¶39} This court has exclusive power to regulate, control, and define the 
practice of law in Ohio and, therefore, the ultimate “authority to determine the 
qualifications of persons engaged in the practice of law before the Industrial 
Commission.”  In re Unauthorized Practice of Law in Cuyahoga Cty., supra, 175 
Ohio St. at 151, 23 O.O.2d 445, 192 N.E.2d 54.  See, also, Shimko v. Lobe, 103 
Ohio St.3d 59, 2004-Ohio-4202, 813 N.E.2d 669, ¶ 15.  However, while this court 
unquestionably has the power to prohibit lay representation before an 
administrative agency, it is not always necessary or desirable for the court to 
exercise that power to its full extent.  The power to regulate includes the authority 
to grant as well as the authority to deny, and in certain limited settings, the public 
interest is better served by authorizing laypersons to engage in conduct that might 
be viewed as the practice of law. 
January Term, 2004 
12 
{¶40} Because the “public interest factors” that the board declined to 
consider are so prevalent in this case, a more sophisticated approach to resolving 
the present inquiry is required than simply ascertaining whether respondents’ 
conduct falls within some abstract or generalized definition of the practice of law.  
Of course, Gov.Bar R. VII is built on the premise that limiting the practice of law 
to licensed attorneys is generally necessary to protect the public against 
incompetence, divided loyalties, and other attendant evils that are often associated 
with unskilled representation.  But not all representation requires the level of 
training and experience that only attorneys can provide, and in certain situations, 
the protective interest is outweighed by other important considerations. 
{¶41} Thus, in a keenly insightful analysis, former Justice Gibson 
provided the following essential framework for resolving the present inquiry: 
{¶42} “[W]hat part, if any, of the activities required of one acting in a 
representative capacity before the Industrial Commission or the Bureau of 
Workmen's Compensation or both constitute[s] the practice of law for which only 
attorneys at law are qualified?  The answer to this question involves the resolution 
of many conflicting interests and considerations. 
{¶43} “In an attempt to find a mold in which to fit this issue, many cases 
concerning the unauthorized practice of law by those not licensed as attorneys at 
law were examined.  Such cases, including those relating specifically to 
workmen's compensation, are filled frequently with broad and sometimes all-
encompassing statements, which might be termed political in nature, as to what 
constitutes the practice of law, but in the end the courts find that not all is black or 
white, and laymen usually are permitted to continue performing some acts alleged 
to constitute the unauthorized practice of law.  Clearly, the answer to the critical 
question in this case is not to be found in any generalized definition of what 
constitutes the practice of law. 
January Term, 2004 
13 
{¶44} “There can be no doubt that here it is necessary to balance (1) the 
public interest in the greater protection generally afforded the public in matters 
relating to the law by persons who have pursued required courses of legal training, 
passed examinations showing their qualifications in legal matters and who are 
subject to ethical standards enforced by this court against (2) the public interest, as 
expressed in constitutional and statutory provisions, in affording workers 
compensation for injuries or death arising out of and in the course of employment 
without necessity of litigation, attorneys, and their attendant costs.  (Attention is 
invited to Goodman v. Beall et al., Industrial Commission [1936], 130 Ohio St. 
427 [5 O.O. 52, 200 N.E.470], where Zimmerman, J., for this court, discussed the 
objectives of both Section 35, Article II, Ohio Constitution, and the Workmen's 
Compensation Act.)  These conflicting interests are represented by the committee, 
which emphasizes the necessity of protecting the public against the hazards of 
advice and representation of persons unqualified in the law with respect to rights 
and obligations under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended and as 
construed by numerous court rulings and by the respondents, who emphasize the 
informality of workmen's compensation proceedings and the desire of the 
founders of the Ohio workmen's compensation system to enable workers to obtain 
relief without paying attorney fees or court costs and without vexing litigation.”  
In re Unauthorized Practice of Law in Cuyahoga Cty., supra, 175 Ohio St. at 154-
155, 23 O.O.2d 445, 192 N.E.2d 54 (Gibson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
{¶45} Confronting a similar issue in Henize v. Giles (1986), 22 Ohio 
St.3d 213, 22 OBR 364, 490 N.E.2d 585, the court decided to authorize lay 
representation at unemployment compensation hearings even though that activity 
could be viewed as the practice of law.  At issue in Henize was an agency rule that 
authorized nonlawyers to represent claimants and employers at administrative 
January Term, 2004 
14 
hearings before the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services and the Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review.  As explained by the court: 
{¶46} “This rule reflects the board's longstanding policy of permitting 
non-lawyers to assist parties in the presentation of their claims. The proceedings 
are designed and function as alternatives to judicial dispute resolution so that the 
services of a lawyer are not a requisite to receiving a fair hearing and just 
decision. 
{¶47} “In this regard, claimants are traditionally accompanied by * * * 
union representatives * * *.  Over the years, an increasing number of employers 
have utilized [actuarial] service companies to provide management support of 
various payroll, tax and employee benefit operations. * * * As an incidental 
portion of such service, agents are provided to attend board hearings as 
representatives of the employer.”  Id., 22 Ohio St.3d at 216-217, 22 OBR 364, 490 
N.E.2d 585. 
{¶48} The court recognized that along with its broad regulatory power 
over the practice of law comes “the concomitant responsibility to protect the 
public by preventing the unauthorized practice of law, while at the same time not 
exercising this authority so rigidly that the public good suffers.”  Id. at 217, 22 
OBR 364, 490 N.E.2d 585.  The court explained that it is “the responsibility of the 
judiciary not to take a one-dimensional approach in the area of regulating the 
unauthorized practice of law,” but instead to exercise its power “ ‘in a common-
sense way in order to protect primarily the interest of the public and not to hamper 
and burden such interest with impractical technical restraints.’ ”  Id. at 218, 22 
OBR 364, 490 N.E.2d 585, quoting Cowern v. Nelson (1940), 207 Minn. 642, 
647, 290 N.W. 795. 
January Term, 2004 
15 
{¶49} Thus, after noting that “other states have allowed lay representation 
at unemployment hearings even though it could arguably be viewed as the practice 
of law,” the court further explained: 
{¶50} “The following quote from State v. Dinger (1961), 14 Wis. 2d 193, 
109 N.W.2d 685 (which allowed brokers to engage in certain legal practices), is 
representative of the reasoning of some of our sister states which have allowed lay 
practice in certain instances and is instructive to the case sub judice: 
{¶51} "‘Further, although we have the power to declare void Rule, sec. 
R.E.B. 5.04, insofar as it affects the practice of law, we do not use the power in 
this instance, because we, ourselves, consider the rule a salutary one which in its 
essentials continues a practice of laymen which we have long tacitly permitted and 
which has worked reasonably well. The Rule has not enlarged the practice of the 
law by laymen which we have hitherto permitted. When we consider that such 
practices should be discontinued it will be time for us to use our power. It is not 
required now.’  Id. at 206, 109 N.W.2d at 692. 
{¶52} “The finding is inescapable that because of the character of the 
proceedings in light of the interest at stake, lay representation does not pose a 
hazard to the public in this limited setting. Our conclusion is further bolstered by 
the clear recognition that lay representation has been the practice since the 
inception of Ohio's unemployment compensation program in 1936. 
{¶53} “* * * We believe board hearings should not be turned into 
adversarial proceedings since they are legislatively designed to function as an 
informal mechanism through which the referee, in a participatory capacity, 
ascertains the facts involved.  In light of the serious detriment to claimants and 
employers which would result if the current system was unnecessarily disturbed, 
we deem this to be an appropriate and limited setting in which to authorize lay 
January Term, 2004 
16 
representation by granting due deference to the statute and agency rule.”  
(Emphasis sic; footnote omitted.)  Id. at 218-220, 22 OBR 364, 490 N.E.2d 585. 
{¶54} Nevertheless, lay representatives were not given carte blanche in 
Henize to appear and practice before the unemployment compensation agencies.  
Accordingly, the court in Henize was careful to point out: “Our decision today 
does not reach nor permit the rendering of legal advice regarding unemployment 
compensation laws or board orders.  Rather, our narrow holding merely permits 
lay representation of parties to assist in the preparation and presentation of their 
cause in order to facilitate the hearing process.”  Id., 22 Ohio St.3d at 219, 22 
OBR 364, 490 N.E.2d 585.  Specifically, the court permitted agents of actuarial 
firms to attend board hearings as employer representatives in order “to assure that 
the board has the appropriate personnel records, staff, and other documents 
present at the hearing and to assist in the fact-finding process during the referee’s 
claim review.”  Id. at 217, 22 OBR 364, 490 N.E.2d 585. 
{¶55} In the workers’ compensation setting, the court has decided four 
cases involving lay practices before the Industrial Commission in which it held 
that certain specific legal activities are properly performed only by attorneys at 
law.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Estep (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 172, 657 N.E.2d 499 
(contingent-fee representation of workers’ compensation claimant); In re 
Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra (same); State ex rel. Nicodemus, supra 
(advising clients of the legal ramifications of commission orders); Goodman, 
supra (preparation of court record under pre-1955 rehearing proceedings in 
accordance with former G.C. 1465-90, 111 Ohio Laws 227).  Because the 
activities at issue in these cases were so clearly beyond any acceptable bounds of 
lay representation, the court was able in certain instances to simply make a general 
statement about the legal nature of appearances and practice before the Industrial 
Commission and conclude therefrom that the lay conduct at issue was 
January Term, 2004 
17 
unauthorized.  This approach, however, has tended to create substantial confusion 
over the legal nature of other lay practices before the commission and the extent 
to which the practice-of-law label determines the layperson’s authority to engage 
in representative conduct. 
{¶56} Indeed, this court added to the confusion by actually misreading its 
own cases in Henize.  Thus, despite the obvious fact that the unemployment and 
workers’ compensation settings are virtually equivalent in every way that matters 
for purposes of the present discussion, the court in Henize felt compelled to draw 
a tenuous distinction between the two fields because it mistakenly concluded that 
our past decisions in the workers’ compensation area “have held that 
representatives of parties must be licensed attorneys.”  Id., 22 Ohio St.3d at 219, 
22 OBR 364, 490 N.E.2d 585, fn. 10.  To the same effect, CBA has cited those 
decisions to support its contention that nonlawyers are precluded from performing 
the various representative functions mentioned in the board’s report that are 
allowed under Resolution No. R04-1-01.  But the plain truth is that this court has 
never held that only lawyers may practice in a representative capacity before the 
Industrial Commission.  Nor has the court ever concluded that nonlawyers are 
unauthorized to provide the kind of representative services in the workers’ 
compensation setting that the court in Henize authorized them to provide in the 
unemployment context.  Accordingly, we find that now is the appropriate time to 
clarify the import of our prior decisions in this area. 
{¶57} In In re Unauthorized Practice of Law, the court upheld an 
injunction prohibiting certain individuals and a partnership from representing 
workers’ compensation claimants.  In so doing, the court held: 
{¶58} “No person, other than an attorney in good standing, may hold 
himself out as being qualified to render service to those who may have claims for 
compensation arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Laws of Ohio or as 
January Term, 2004 
18 
being able to render services in the preparation and presentation of such claims 
nor may such person render such advice or services if a fee for such advice or 
services is to be received from or charged against the one having such a claim.”  
Id., 175 Ohio St. 149, 23 O.O.2d 445, 192 N.E.2d 54, paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
{¶59} The awkward syntax of this syllabus makes it facially unclear 
whether the court was prohibiting lay representatives from providing preparation 
and presentation services in general or merely for a fee.  Thus, CBA argues that 
under this holding, laypersons are generally precluded from “[a]ppearing at 
adjudicative hearings as advocates before the Industrial Commission.”  We find it 
eminently clear, however, that the court did not intend its holding to apply beyond 
the particular type of conduct at issue. 
{¶60} In reaching its holding, the court specifically recognized that there 
is “a substantial danger that reasons given by this court for its decision in this case 
may be interpreted as prejudging controversies which may later arise in 
determining whether other kinds of conduct not in or related to court cases 
amount to the practice of law.  Thus, the briefs filed in this case on behalf of amici 
curiae emphasize how important it is that this court should avoid broad 
generalizations in giving its reasons for holding that what the respondents did in 
the instant case amounted to the practice of law.”  Id., 175 Ohio St. at 152, 23 
O.O.2d 445, 192 N.E.2d 54. 
{¶61} An expansive interpretation of the holding in In re Unauthorized 
Practice of Law would, therefore, be patently illogical, for it necessarily assumes 
that the court made the very kind of broad generalization that it expressly sought 
to avoid.  In any event, the court specifically explained that its primary concern 
was in “[p]rotecting members of the public from being induced to pay for such 
advice and services of nonlawyers” and that “the judgment of the trial court 
January Term, 2004 
19 
enjoins respondents from doing those acts instead of, as it probably should have, 
merely enjoining them from doing them for a fee.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 152-
153, 23 O.O.2d 445, 192 N.E.2d 54, citing Goodman, supra. 
{¶62} In Estep, supra, the court prohibited the respondent in that case 
from engaging in essentially the same conduct that was enjoined in In re 
Unauthorized Practice of Law, and its primary focus was also on prohibiting 
nonlawyers from charging or receiving a fee for rendering advice or services to 
workers’ compensation claimants.  Nevertheless, CBA cites Estep for the 
proposition that “[p]reparing, signing, and filing of legal papers—such as 
objections to orders, notices of appeal, motions, protests and applications—with 
the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and the Industrial Commission in behalf of 
others constitutes the practice of law.” 
{¶63} In a general sense, CBA is correct, for the court in Estep found that 
“appearances and practice before the Industrial Commission constitute the 
practice of law.”  Id., 74 Ohio St.3d at 173, 657 N.E.2d 499.  In so doing, the 
court cited State ex rel. Nicodemus, supra, 5 Ohio St.3d at 60, 5 OBR 115, 448 
N.E.2d 1360, which held as follows: 
{¶64} “Appearances and practice before the Industrial Commission 
constitute the practice of law.  Goodman * * *; In re Unauthorized Practice of 
Law [supra].  Gates, McDonald [an actuarial firm] is not authorized to practice 
law, and, thus, is not authorized to advise its clients of the legal ramifications of 
commission orders.  For this reason, we find that the ‘import’ of the order was 
beyond the scope of Gates, McDonald’s authority, and that the notice received by 
it cannot be imputed to the employer.” 
{¶65} But aside from the specific conduct at issue in these cases, the 
court has held that laypersons are not prohibited from appearing and practicing 
before the commission in a representative capacity.  All three of these cases—
January Term, 2004 
20 
Estep, State ex rel. Nicodemus, and In re Unauthorized Practice of Law—
ultimately come to rest on the court’s decision in Goodman.  Yet Goodman never 
held that appearances and practice before the Industrial Commission generally 
constitute the practice of law for which only attorneys are qualified.  Goodman 
held only that “the preparation of a rehearing record should be in complete charge 
of an attorney at law” because “[s]uch record constitutes the entire evidence upon 
which the merits or demerits of a claim can be determined by a court and jury.”  
Id., 130 Ohio St. at 433, 5 O.O. 52, 200 N.E. 470. 
{¶66} Other than the preparation of a court record, however, the court in 
Goodman specifically held that lay representatives are generally authorized to 
appear and practice before the Industrial Commission.  Thus, the court explained: 
{¶67} “In the vast majority of instances no special skill is required in the 
preparation and presentation of claims. Ordinarily they consist of statements and 
affidavits submitted by the employer, the employee, or the latter's dependents, and 
by others having knowledge of the facts, accompanied by the reports of attending 
physicians or surgeons, on forms prepared and furnished by the commission. 
Frequently the commission has its own representative conduct an independent 
investigation of the particular claim for the purpose of ascertaining the true 
situation, and sometimes there are informal oral hearings before a referee. Validity 
of the claim having been established, compensation is paid on the basis prescribed 
by the statutes, and the incident is closed. 
{¶68} “Since the inception of the Workmen's Compensation Act it has 
been common practice for laymen to assist an injured or diseased workman or his 
dependents in the submission of a claim. Often this is done as an accommodation 
by representatives of the employer or by representatives of an organization to 
which a claimant may belong, and such usually simple services are for the most 
part performed in an expeditious and satisfactory manner. In our judgment this is 
January Term, 2004 
21 
not the practice of law * * *.”  Id., 130 Ohio St. at 430-431, 5 O.O. 52, 200 N.E. 
470. 
{¶69} It now becomes readily apparent that these four cases do not 
prohibit lay representation before the Industrial Commission, but instead mark the 
outer boundaries of permissible lay conduct.  It is also clear that the thicket 
created by our ambivalent use of the term “practice of law” can be avoided by 
simply recognizing that in certain cases there are multiple interests to consider in 
determining whether a particular legal activity is acceptably performed by 
nonlawyers.  In this way, we can freely assume that all representative conduct at 
the administrative level falls within the broad definition of the practice of law, yet 
still authorize lay representatives to perform certain functions in the 
administrative setting when the public interest so demands. 
{¶70} Because of the undeniable similarities in the unemployment 
compensation and workers’ compensation settings, and considering that 
mandating the use of attorneys at the administrative level would frustrate the goals 
and designs of the workers’ compensation system, we hold that nonlawyers who 
appear and practice in a representative capacity before the Industrial Commission 
and the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation in conformity to Industrial 
Commission Resolution No. R04-1-01 are not engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law.2 
{¶71} Accordingly, the board’s recommendation is hereby rejected, and 
the cause is remanded to the board with instructions to consider any allegations by 
relator that the respondents failed to act in accordance with standards now set 
forth in Resolution No. R04-1-01. 
Judgment accordingly. 
                                                 
2.  In light of this holding, we find relator’s objections to the board’s findings that respondents 
Wagner and Bossart did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law to be moot. 
January Term, 2004 
22 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents with opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶72} The Board of Commissioners on the Unauthorized Practice of Law  
concluded that CompManagement’s “representation of employers’ interests in 
handling claims before the Industrial Commission on behalf of employers 
amounts to the unauthorized practice of law.”  The board concluded that 
CompManagement’s “negotiation and involvement with settling claims before the 
Industrial Commission on behalf of employers amounts to the unauthorized 
practice of law.”  The board concluded that CompManagement’s “direct and 
indirect examination of witnesses during hearings before the Industrial 
Commission amounts to the unauthorized practice of law.”  The board concluded 
that CompManagement’s “presentation of employer concerns, arguments, 
summations of evidence, conclusions regarding the import of factual information 
and/or closing statements on behalf of employers during hearings before the 
Industrial Commission amounts to the unauthorized practice of law.”  The board 
concluded that CompManagement’s “recommendation and advice to employers as 
to taking appeals or other legal action in handling claims before the Industrial 
Commission on behalf of employers amounts to the authorized practice of law.”  
Finally, the board concluded that CompManagement’s “evaluation, advice or 
recommendation concerning whether an employer should retain an attorney to 
handle a claim before the Industrial Commission amounts to the unauthorized 
practice of law.”  Based on the facts presented, I agree with each of these 
conclusions. 
January Term, 2004 
23 
{¶73} I believe that the practice of law is the practice of law and that 
nonlawyers should not be authorized to engage in it.  I believe this 
notwithstanding 
tradition 
and 
putative 
cost-savings. 
 
Finding 
that 
CompManagement and similar entities engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law and prohibiting them from so engaging in the future would not lead to 
calamitous results.  CompManagement could still play a meaningful role in a host 
of administrative activities.  The market is overflowing with young, enterprising 
attorneys willing to perform this work.  The surfeit of attorneys would help keep 
costs about where they are now.  In any event, I do not find cost-savings to be a 
relevant issue.  CompManagement engaged in the unauthorized practice of law 
and ought to be punished accordingly.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Willacy, LoPresti & Marcovy and Aubrey B. Willacy; Michael P. Harvey 
Co., L.P.A., and Michael P. Harvey, for relator. 
 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., Robert M. Kincaid Jr., Elizabeth A. McNellie 
and Rodger L. Eckelberry, for respondents CompManagement, Inc., Robert J. 
Bossart, and Jonathan Wagner. 
 
Hanna, Campbell & Powell, L.L.P., Douglas N. Godshall, Timothy C. 
Campbell and John R. Chlysta, for respondent Bobbijo Christensen. 
 
Eugene P. Whetzel, in support of relator, for amicus curiae Ohio State Bar 
Association. 
 
Downs, Hurst & Fishel, Marc A. Fishel and David A. Riepenhoff, in 
support of respondents, for amici curiae County Commissioners Association of 
Ohio, Ohio School Boards Association, and Ohio Public Employer Labor 
Relations Association. 
 
Michael H. Cochran, in support of respondents, for amicus curiae Ohio 
Townships Association. 
January Term, 2004 
24 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Jonathan R. Vaughn, in 
support of respondents, for amicus curiae Ohio Library Council. 
 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office and Philip J. Fulton, in support of respondents, 
for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., Steven M. Loewengart and Greta M. 
Kearns, in support of respondents, for amicus curiae Council of Smaller 
Enterprises. 
 
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn and Kevin R. McDermott, in support of 
respondents, for amicus curiae the Service Association of Ohio, Inc. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Robert A. Minor and Robin 
Obetz, in support of respondents, for amicus curiae the Ohio Council of Retail 
Merchants. 
 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin and Michael J. Hickey, in 
support of respondents, for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Thomas R. Sant, in support of respondents, 
for amici curiae Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent 
Business, Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, and Ohio Manufacturers’ Association. 
 
Zeiger, Tigges, Little & Lindsmith, L.L.P., John W. Zeiger, Steven W. 
Tigges and Stuart G. Parsell, in support of respondents, for amici curiae Greater 
Akron Chamber of Commerce, Canton Regional Chamber of Commerce, Greater 
Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce, city of Cincinnati, Greater Columbus 
Chamber of Commerce, Dayton Area Chamber of Commerce, Lake County 
Chambers of Commerce, Springfield & Clark County Chamber of Commerce; 
Ohio Grocers Association, American Electric Power Service Corporation, the 
Ohio College Association, Inc., Ohio Newspaper Association, Ohio Association 
of Broadcasters, Ohio Automobile Dealers Association, Ohio Home Builders 
Association, Columbus Medical Association, Ohio Health Care Association, Ohio 
January Term, 2004 
25 
Dental Association, Ohio Restaurant Association, Ohio Wholesale Marketers 
Association, North Eastern Storeowners, Inc., Dayton Tooling and Manufacturing 
Association, Inc., American Council of Engineering Companies of Ohio, Ohio-
Michigan Equipment Dealers Association, Ohio Association of McDonald’s 
Operators, Ohio Ready Mixed Concrete Association, Ohio Lawn Care 
Association, Ohio Turfgrass Foundation, Ohio Pest Control Association, Ohio 
Association of Health Underwriters, the East Central Ohio Food Dealers 
Association, Community Bankers Association of Ohio, Alvan Motor Freight, Inc., 
American Rental Association of Ohio, Automotive Service Association of Ohio, 
Inc., Ohio Savings Bank, Ohio Forestry Association, Inc., Professional Insurance 
Agents Association of Ohio, Inc., Associated General Contractors of Ohio, 
Bowling Centers Association of Ohio, the Employers’ Association, R. T. Lambert 
& Associates for Ohio Auto & Truck Recyclers, Ohio Council of Retail 
Merchants, the Wholesale Beer & Wine Association of Ohio, Allied Construction 
Industries, National Retail Hardware Association, Ohio Automatic Merchandising 
Association, Ohio Optometric Association, the E. W. Scripps Company, Ohio 
Association of Convenience Stores, Ohio Bakers Association, Great Lakes 
Petroleum Retailers & Allied Trade Association, Ohio Trucking Association, 
Ohio Veterinary Medical Association, Shepherd of the Valley Lutheran 
Retirement Services, Inc., Ohio Pork Producers Council, Ohio Association of 
Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors, Inc., Subcontractors Association of 
Northeast Ohio, North American Employers’ Council, Inc., Builders Exchange of 
East Central Ohio, the Ohio Nursery & Landscape Association, National 
Employers Network Alliance, Ohio Land Title Association, Ohio Florists’ 
Association, Associated Builders & Contractors, Ohio Valley Chapter, National 
Electrical Contractors Association, Greater Cleveland Chapter, Air Conditioning 
January Term, 2004 
26 
Contractors of America, Ohio Chapter, and Ohio Tire Dealers and Retreaders 
Association. 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Assoc. Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, in 
support of respondents, for amicus curiae Ohio AFL-CIO. 
 
Wiles, Boyle, Burkholder & Bringardner Co., L.P.A., Michael L. Close 
and Dale D. Cook, in support of respondents, for amicus curiae American 
International Companies. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Christopher D. Stock, Deputy Attorney 
General, for amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
 
William E. Kovacic, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, James C. Cooper, and 
Brenda W. Doubrava, for amicus curiae Federal Trade Commission. 
_______________________