Case Title: State v. Compton

Citation: 

Docket Number: S45905

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  February 7, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
	v.
JESSE CALEB COMPTON,
	Appellant.
(CC 109705859A; SC S45905)

	En Banc
	On automatic and direct review of the judgment of
convictions and sentence of death imposed by the Circuit Court of
Lane County.
	Lyle Velure, Judge.
	Argued and submitted November 5, 2001.
	Mary M. Reese, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for appellant.  With her on the briefs was David Groom,
State Public Defender.
	Jennifer Scott Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for respondent.  With her on the briefs were
Hardy Meyers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General, and Kathleen Cegla, Stacey RJ Guise, and Robert B.
Rocklin, Assistant Attorneys General.
	LEESON, J.
	The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.
	LEESON, J.
	This is an automatic and direct review of a judgment of
conviction and sentence of death.  ORS 138.012(1); ORAP 12.10(1). 
Defendant seeks reversal of his convictions for aggravated
murder, murder by abuse, two counts of sexual penetration in the
first degree, and one count of abuse of a corpse in the second
degree.  In the alternative, defendant asks this court to vacate
his sentence of death and to remand the case for resentencing. 
We affirm the judgment of conviction and the sentence of death.
I.  FACTS

	Because the jury found defendant guilty, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state.  State v.
Hayward, 327 Or 397, 399, 963 P2d 667 (1998).  
	Early in 1997, Stella Kiser and her daughter, Tesslynn
O'Cull, began living with defendant in defendant's apartment. 
The child was approximately two-and-one-half years old when Kiser
moved in with defendant.  Defendant frequently hosted "drug
parties" at his apartment, some of which lasted for several days. 
Defendant frequently prepared methamphetamine for smoking by
melting it with a small propane torch.  On at least one occasion,
defendant held the lighted torch close to his hand to show his
friends that he could withstand a great deal of pain.  
	Soon after Kiser and Tesslynn moved in with defendant,
defendant began abusing Tesslynn.  Defendant hit her on her
buttocks and back with a wooden spoon, a spatula, and a belt. 
Visitors to the apartment observed defendant slap her in the
face, drag her by her hair, force her to stand in the corner for
long periods of time, and make her take long, cold baths or
showers.  Defendant frequently was angry at Tesslynn, and he
called her disparaging names. Visitors also observed that
defendant and Kiser usually kept Tesslynn in the bedroom during
the drug parties, and they could hear the child cry for hours
after defendant had been in the bedroom with her.  Defendant
would not permit others to go into the bedroom to help her. 
Eventually, defendant and Kiser kept Tesslynn in the bedroom most
of the time.  When a neighbor complained about the way that
defendant treated Tesslynn, defendant told him that he would kill
the neighbor and the neighbor's girlfriend if they called the
police.
	Approximately two months before Tesslynn's death,
defendant broke four vertebrae in her back.  Sometime thereafter,
he forcefully penetrated her vagina with an object and inflicted
large, gaping burns on the child's back, buttocks, and genitals
using an open flame.  Some of those burns became infected, and
defendant poured rubbing alcohol into them.  He also inflicted
smaller round burns on the child's legs.  During the two-week
period before Tesslynn died, defendant immobilized her 10 to 15
times by placing her hands and feet over her head and tying them
together with ropes, cords, or strips of cloth.  He left her tied
up for eight to ten hours at a time.  Within 24-hours preceding
the child's death, defendant struck her in the head several
times, causing bruising to her brain, and either punched her in
the abdomen or stomped on her with his foot, causing severe
internal injuries.  He also scraped and bruised her abdomen with
a fork.
	Defendant found Tesslynn dead in the bedroom of the
apartment between midnight and 2:00 a.m. on June 14, 1997. 
Defendant cut Tesslynn loose from her restraints and tried to
revive her by giving her CPR.  He also struck her in the left
side of the chest a few times with his fist, then applied a
frayed, live electrical cord to her chest, and splashed her with
cold water.  He was unable to revive her. 
	Defendant and Kiser agreed to leave the body in the
bedroom while they thought about what to do.  Tesslynn's injuries
were so extensive that defendant and Kiser feared that they would
go to jail if anyone saw the body.  Eventually, they decided to
bury the body, which they did with the help of defendant's
sister.  In the days after they buried Tesslynn, defendant and
Kiser were happy, playful, and affectionate with one another.
They told friends that Tesslynn was with a babysitter or at
Kiser's aunt's house and that they were planning to move out of
town.  They also told friends that they wanted to have a baby
boy.  
	On the evening of June 16, 1997, defendant's sister
told the Springfield Police Department that she had helped
defendant and Kiser bury Tesslynn's body in the Sweet Home area
two days earlier.  Early on the morning of June 17, Springfield
police officers found the child's body buried in a shallow grave
near a logging road in the area that defendant's sister had
described.  They unearthed the body and arranged for an autopsy. 
In the grave, they also found, among other things, a piece of
cloth that appeared to be torn from a curtain, a strip of gray
cloth, a blue braided belt, and a woman's ring with a pink stone
in it.
	That afternoon, police officers went to defendant's
apartment.  They advised defendant of his Miranda rights and
obtained his permission to enter the apartment and to look
around.  Most of the apartment was dirty and smelled bad.  There
were many holes in the walls, which defendant had made by
punching the walls when he was angry or by throwing knives.
	In subsequent searches of the apartment, the police
found drug paraphernalia, drug residue, and a propane torch. 
They also found a lamp with a cut cord, a pair of pliers with
burn residue on it, rubbing alcohol bottles, and white cloths
with knots in them.  In a search of a dumpster near defendant's
apartment, the police found two trash bags from defendant's
apartment that contained a Mother's Day card for Kiser, child's
clothing, an electrical cord that had been cut and had a frayed
end, a blue cloth, a white cloth, and a shoestring with knots in
them, and a rope.  The cloth and shoestring had hair mixed in
with the knots.  Some of the cloth that the police found was
similar to cloth that had been found in the child's grave.
	The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy
concluded that Tesslynn had died of shock, and he listed the
cause of death as "battered child syndrome." (1) Defendant was
indicted on six counts of aggravated murder, murder by abuse,
first-degree sexual penetration, and second-degree abuse of a
corpse.  As noted, the jury convicted him of all counts, and he
was sentenced to death.  On review, defendant raises 35
assignments of error.  We analyze defendant's arguments in the
context of pretrial issues, guilt-phase issues, and penalty-phase
issues. 
II.  PRETRIAL PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

A.  Denial of Demurrer to Count 1
	Count 1 of the indictment charged defendant with
aggravated murder as follows:
		"The defendant, * * * on or about the 14th day of
June, 1997, in the county aforesaid, in the course of
or as a result of intentional maiming or torture of
Tesslynn O'Cull, age three (3) years, did unlawfully
and recklessly, under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life, cause the
death of Tesslynn O'Cull, another human being; and
defendant * * * previously engaged in a pattern or
practice of assault or torture of Tesslynn O'Cull or
another child under 14 years of age; contrary to
statute and against the peace and dignity of the State
of Oregon[.]" 
Before trial, defendant filed a demurrer to that charge,
contending that ORS 163.095(1)(e) is vague under both the Oregon
Constitution and various provisions of the federal constitution. 
The trial court denied the demurrer.
	On review, defendant contends that ORS 163.095(1)(e),
either alone or in conjunction with ORS 163.115(1)(c), "is vague
as to the mental state required with regard to the result of
death when a homicide occurs as a result of maiming or
torture[.]"  Therefore, he argues, the statute violates Article
I, sections 20 (equal privileges and immunities) and 21 
(prohibiting ex post facto laws), of the Oregon Constitution, and
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.  The state responds that defendant's claims were
not properly raised by demurrer because they did not in fact
raise a vagueness challenge.  Instead, those claims raised
questions of statutory construction, which is not a matter that
can be raised by demurrer.
	We analyze defendant's challenge as he has framed it,
namely, as a vagueness challenge.  The state concedes that a
vagueness challenge is a valid basis for a demurrer.  See State
v. McKenzie, 307 Or 554, 560, 771 P2d 264 (1989) (holding
vagueness challenge proper basis for demurrer to indictment).  On
the merits, the state contends that the statutes defining
aggravated murder by abuse are not vague because they clearly
provide that the mental state with regard to causing death by
abuse is recklessness.
	This court has held that Article I, sections 20 and 21,
of the Oregon Constitution, require the terms of a criminal
statute to be explicit enough "to inform those who are subject to
it of what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties."  State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 160, 838 P2d 558 
(1992) (quoting State v. Graves, 299 Or 189, 195, 700 P2d 244
(1985)).  In addition, a criminal statute "must not be so vague
as to allow a judge or jury unbridled discretion to decide what
conduct to punish."  Id. at 161.  To prevail on a facial
vagueness challenge, a defendant must show that the statutes
creating the crime of aggravated murder by abuse are vague in all
their possible applications.  State v. Chakerian, 325 Or 370,
381-82, 938 P2d 756 (1997).
	ORS 163.115 defines murder by abuse, in part, as murder
that occurs when a person "recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life"
causes the death of a child under the age of 14 years.  ORS
163.115(c).  The mental state for causing death by abuse is
recklessness. 
	ORS 163.095 provides that murder by abuse is aggravated
murder if the homicide "occurred in the course of or as a result
of intentional maiming or torture of the victim."  ORS 
163.095(1)(e).  To prove intentional torture, the state must
prove that the person intended to inflict intense physical pain
on an unwilling victim.  State v. Cornell/Pinnell, 304 Or 27, 31-32, 741 P2d 501 (1987); see also State v. Langley, 314 Or 247,
268, 839 P2d 692 (1992) ("The focus of a torture inquiry is not
on the defendant's intent to cause the victim's death, but on the
defendant's separate intent to cause intense physical pain.").
	Read together, ORS 163.115(1)(c) and ORS 163.095(1)(e)
make clear that a person commits murder by abuse if the person
recklessly causes the death of a child under 14 years of age
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life.  For murder by abuse to be aggravated murder, the
state also must prove that the homicide occurred in the course of
or as a result of intentional maiming or torture of the victim. 
ORS 163.095(1)(e).  The requirement that the state prove the
intentional maiming or torture of the victim to prove aggravated
murder does not alter the mental state for causing the victim's
death, which is "recklessness."  The statutes defining the crime
of aggravated murder by abuse are not vague regarding the mental
state for causing the victim's death.  Accordingly, those
statutes do not violate Article I, sections 20 and 21, of the
Oregon Constitution.
	Defendant also argues that the statutes violate the
federal constitution for the same reasons that he advanced under
the Oregon Constitution.  Defendant is correct that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
enforcing vague criminal laws.  Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 US
451, 458, 59 S Ct 618, 83 L Ed 888 (1939).  However, a statute
defining a criminal offense that gives a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is
prohibited withstands a vagueness challenge.  Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 US 489, 498, 102
S Ct 1186, 71 L Ed 2d 362 (1982).  For the reasons discussed
above, the statutes defining aggravated murder by abuse meet that
standard. (2)  The trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's
vagueness challenge to Count 1 of the indictment. (3)
B.  Denial of Motion to Prohibit Death Penalty  
	ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995) (4) provides, in part:
		"In the [sentencing] proceeding, evidence may be
presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to sentence including, but not limited to,
victim impact evidence * * * and any aggravating or
mitigating evidence relevant to [the fourth question
under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D), namely, whether the
defendant should receive a death sentence]."
Before trial, defendant filed a "Motion to Prohibit Death
Penalty," arguing that ORS 163.150(1) (1995) fails to provide the
jury with "guided discretion" for making the decision whether a
defendant should receive a death sentence.  The trial court
denied the motion.
	On review, defendant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to prevent the death penalty because
ORS 163.150(1) (1995), and its related jury instruction, (5)
 violate
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.  That is so, defendant contends, because neither
the statute nor the instruction informs the jury that it is
entitled to consider aggravating factors only insofar as they
relate to defendant's character or to the circumstances of his
crime in deciding whether to impose a death sentence.  The state
responds that, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
complete jury discretion is permissible regarding whether a
particular defendant should receive a death sentence. 
	The United States Supreme Court has explained that
there are two aspects of the capital sentencing process:  the
eligibility phase and the selection phase.  Buchanan v. Angelone,
522 US 269, 275, 118 S Ct 757, 139 L Ed 2d 702 (1998).  In the
eligibility phase, "the jury narrows the class of defendants
eligible for the death penalty" by finding a defendant guilty of
aggravated murder.  Id.  In the selection phase, "the jury
determines whether to impose a death sentence on an eligible
defendant."  Id.  The Supreme Court has emphasized the need for
channeling and limiting the jury's discretion in the eligibility
phase, to ensure that the death penalty is not imposed
arbitrarily or capriciously.  Id. at 275-76.  In the selection
phase, by contrast, what is important is that there be "an
individualized determination on the basis of the character of the
individual and the circumstances of the crime."  Tuilaepa v.
California, 512 US 967, 972, 129 L Ed 2d 750, 114 S Ct 2630
(1994) (emphasis in original) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 US
862, 879, 103 S Ct 2733, 77 L Ed 2d 235 (1983).  In the selection
phase, the Court has stated that "our decisions suggest that
complete jury discretion is constitutionally permissible." 
Buchanan, 522 US at 276.   
	Similarly, in California v. Ramos, 463 US 992, 1008,
103 S Ct 3446, 77 L Ed 2d 1171 (1983), the Court held that, once
a defendant has been found eligible for the death penalty, "the
jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine
whether death is the appropriate punishment."  Zant provides an
example of the Court's deference to states regarding the
selection phase.  In that case, the Court found no constitutional
infirmity when a Georgia court instructed the jury in the
selection phase to consider "all facts and circumstances
presented in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of
punishment as well as such arguments as have been presented for
the State and for the Defense."  Zant, 462 US at 878-80, 889 n 
25.
	Applying those standards, we cannot say that ORS
163.150(1) and its related jury instruction violate the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  The
federal constitution does not require the court to instruct the
jury in the penalty phase that it is entitled to consider only
aggravating factors that relate to the defendant's character or
to the circumstances of the defendant's crime in deciding whether
to impose a death sentence.  The trial court did not err in
denying defendant's motion to prohibit the death penalty. 
C.  Failure to Excuse Juror for Cause
	In responding to questions on a jury questionnaire and
during initial questions during voir dire, one prospective juror,
Burk, stated that she believed that criminal defendants should be
required to prove their innocence, that the death penalty is
appropriate for a brutal murder, and that she would follow her
own beliefs if she were confronted with a jury instruction that
was contrary to her beliefs.  Based on those statements,
defendant moved to excuse Burk from the jury.  The prosecutor
then explained to Burk that the state was required to prove
defendant guilty of all the charges.  Burk agreed with the
prosecutor that, if criminal charges were filed against her, the
state would be required to prove the charges and that she would
not have to disprove them.  The following colloquy then occurred:
		"Q.  [Prosecutor]:  And would you accept that same
circumstance for this defendant?
		"A.  I see what he is saying now.  Yeah, I
understand now.
		"Q.  If you were to sit on this jury and the State
put on its case and defendant didn't put on any
evidence at all, would you be able to say to all of us
now that you wouldn't hold that against him because
it's not his obligation to prove anything?
		[Prosecutor repeats question at Burk's request.]
		"A.  No, I wouldn't hold it against him.
		"Q.  The State is required to prove to your
satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did it.
		"A.  Yes.
		"Q.  We don't want to convict people [who] aren't
guilty.
		"A.  Right." 
Based on Burk's answers to those questions, the prosecutor
opposed defendant's motion to excuse Burk from the jury, and the
trial court denied the motion.  Burk was not excused. 
	Defendant contends that Burk's answers to the jury
questionnaire and initial questions during voir dire demonstrate that she was biased.  He argues that the trial court's denial of
his motion to excuse Burk violated his right to an impartial jury
under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution. (6) 
The state responds that, viewed in their entirety, Burk's
statements demonstrated that she would be a fair and impartial
juror.
	Actual bias is a basis for challenging prospective
jurors.  See ORCP 57 D(1)(g) (incorporated by reference and made
applicable to criminal trials in ORS 136.210(1)).  In deciding
whether a juror should be excused, "the test is whether the
prospective juror's ideas or opinions would impair substantially
his or her performance of the duties of a juror to decide the
case fairly and impartially on the evidence presented in court." 
State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 74, 969 P2d 1013 (1998); see also
Patton v. Yount, 467 US 1025, 1036, 81 L Ed 2d 847, 104 S Ct 2885
(1984) (to same effect).  Whether a prospective juror actually is
biased is a factual question "to be determined by the trial court
in the exercise of its discretion."  State v. Montez, 309 Or 564,
574-75, 789 P2d 1352 (1990).  Because the trial court has the
advantage of observing a challenged prospective juror's demeanor,
apparent intelligence, and candor, that court's judgment as to
the prospective juror's ultimate qualifications is entitled to
great weight.  Id. at 575.  This court will not disturb a trial
court's ruling on the matter absent a manifest abuse of
discretion.  State v. Nefstad, 309 Or 523, 528, 789 P2d 1326
(1990).  We give greatest deference to the trial court when a
juror's answers are contradictory or unclear.  See Barone, 328 Or
at 78 (so stating).
	The record reveals that, once she understood the role
of a juror and the responsibility of the state to prove defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, Burk expressed her willingness
to perform the tasks of a juror in the manner required by law. 
The trial court, having had the opportunity to observe Burk's
demeanor, candor, and apparent intelligence, concluded that she
would be a fair and impartial juror.  Defendant has not
demonstrated that the trial court manifestly abused its
discretion in denying defendant's motion to excuse Burk. 
D.  Exclusion of Nonregistered Voters and Felons From Jury 
	Before jury selection, the trial court asked the
potential jurors if any of them were not registered to vote or if
any had been convicted of a felony in the last 15 years.  Based
on their responses, and over defendant's objection, the court
excused at least four potential jurors because they were not
registered to vote.  The trial court relied on Oregon Laws 1997,
chapter 313, section 9b (E) and (F) (hereafter referred to as SB
(Senate Bill) 936), (7) 
in excluding the jurors.  
Defendant makes several global arguments challenging
the constitutionality of SB 936.  Defendant acknowledges that the
same global challenges were before this court in State v. Fugate,
332 Or 195, 26 P3d 802 (2001), which had not been decided when
defendant filed his brief in this case.  In Fugate, the court
rejected those challenges.  
	With respect to specific provisions of SB 936,
defendant contends that excluding nonregistered voters and felons
from jury service deprived him of his right to trial by a jury
that reflected a fair cross-section of the community under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (8) and what he
views as the same right under Article I, section 11, of the
Oregon Constitution. (9)  In defendant's view, nonregistered voters
and felons are more likely to have a "watchdog" attitude toward
an overzealous government than are registered voters and those
who have not been convicted of a felony, and, therefore, those
groups cannot be excluded from jury service without violating the
constitutional requirement that a jury pool represent a fair
cross-section of the community.
	Normally, this court addresses issues of state
constitutional law before resolving issues of federal
constitutional law.  See State v. Cookman, 324 Or 19, 25, 920 P2d
1086 (1996) (explaining paradigm of analyzing state
constitutional claims before federal constitutional claims).  In
this case, however, defendant has not suggested any different
analysis under the Oregon Constitution than under the federal
constitution.  Accordingly, for purpose of this case, we assume,
without deciding, that the state and federal guarantees are the
same.  See State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 363, 836 P2d 1308 (1992) 
(presuming same analysis of venue issue under Article I, section
11, and Sixth Amendment, because defendant did not suggest
different analysis under state and federal constitutions). (10)  
	Defendant argues that exclusion of nonregistered voters
and felons from the jury pool violates his Sixth Amendment right
to have his jury drawn from a "fair cross-section of the
community."  We begin by noting that, under the Sixth Amendment,
a person who has been charged with a serious offense has a
fundamental right to a trial by jury.  Duncan v. Louisana, 391 US
145, 158, 88 S Ct 1444, 20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968).  That right
encompasses trial by a jury that is drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 US 522, 530,
95 S Ct 692, 42 L Ed 2d 690 (1975).  The United States Supreme
Court has held that one aspect of the fair cross-section
requirement is that any group that the law excludes from jury
service not be a "distinctive group" within the community.  Duren
v. Missouri, 439 US 357, 364, 99 S Ct 664, 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979). 
However, the fair cross-section requirement does not mean that
the jury must "mirror" the community from which it is selected. 
Id. at 364 n 20.
	Defendant relies on the three-pronged test adopted in
United States v. Guzman, 337 F Supp, 140, 143-44 (SDNY), aff'd on
other grounds, 468 F2d 1245 (2nd Cir 1972), for his argument that
nonregistered voters and felons are "cognizable groups" that   
SB 936 cannot exclude from jury service without violating the
Sixth Amendment. (11)  The state responds that, even assuming that
the Guzman test is a correct statement of federal law, it does
not aid defendant here, because nonregistered voters and felons
do not satisfy the first prong of that test.
	We find no cases, and defendant identifies none, in
which a federal circuit court has adopted the Guzman test.  
Rather, federal circuit courts have held that a group is
distinctive under Duren if:
	"(1) the group is defined and limited by some factor,
(2) a common thread or basic similarity in attitude,
ideas, or experience runs through the group, and (3)
there is a community of interests among members of the
group such that the groups interest cannot be
adequately represented if the group is excluded from
the jury selection process." 
See United States v. Fletcher, 965 F2d 781, 782 (9th Cir 1992) 
(adopting test from Eleventh Circuit).  Federal courts
consistently have held that nonregistered voters do not comprise
a distinctive group.  See Murrah v. Arkansas, 532 F2d 105 (8th
Cir 1976) (so holding and identifying other courts in accord).  
Although convicted felons are defined by a common factor, namely,
that they have been found guilty of violating the law, their
reasons and ways of doing so are many and varied.  A person who
has committed a felony offense by violating environmental or tax
laws, for example, does not necessarily have the same "attitude,
ideas, or experience" as a person who has committed robbery or
rape.  Thus, although felons as a group arguably might satisfy
the first prong of the Fletcher test, they do not satisfy the
other two prongs.  We have little difficulty concluding that
felons, like nonregistered voters, are not a distinctive group
for purposes of the fair cross-section requirement under the
Sixth Amendment.  See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 71 F3d 1269
(7th Cir 1995) (holding persons charged with felonies not
distinctive group).  We therefore conclude that defendant's fair
cross-section argument fails under the federal constitution.  As
explained above, because defendant has not suggested a different
analysis under Article I, section 11, his fair cross-section
argument also fails under the Oregon Constitution.  The trial
court did not err in asking potential jurors if they were not
registered voters or had been convicted of a felony in the last
15 years, and in excusing those who responded affirmatively.
	We do not address defendant's other challenges to    
SB 936, section 9(b), because he did not raise them below.  See 
State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 243 n 23, 986 P2d 5 (1999) 
(declining to address argument made for first time on appeal). 
We have reviewed those unpreserved challenges and conclude that
none reflects error apparent on the face of the record, because
none raises an error of law that is obvious.  See State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 435-36, 7 P3d 522 (2000) (applying
doctrine).  We have reviewed defendant's remaining assignments of
error regarding pretrial issues and reject them without further
discussion.
III.  GUILT-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

	Defendant asserts that the trial court committed 17
reversible errors during the guilt phase of defendant's trial. 
Defendant concedes that 10 of those alleged errors are not
preserved.  We have reviewed each unpreserved claim of error and
conclude that none reflects error apparent on the face of the
record, because none raises an error of law that is obvious.  See
Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or at 435-36 (applying doctrine). (12)  
	We also have reviewed defendant's remaining assignments
of error and reject them without further discussion.
IV.  PENALTY-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

	Defendant raises several assignments of error regarding
the penalty phase.
A.  Denial of Motion for Mistrial
	At sentencing, the state contended that defendant
should receive a death sentence.  To impose that sentence, the
jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things,
that defendant's conduct that caused Tesslynn's death was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
her death would result.  See ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A) (1995) 
(describing sentencing factor).  In his closing argument, defense
counsel contended that, even assuming that defendant deliberately
had engaged in the conduct that killed Tesslynn, he had not done
so with a reasonable expectation that her death would follow.
Rather, counsel argued, shock had caused the child's death, which
is a phenomenon that a lay person would not know about and which
sometimes "sneaks up" even on doctors.
	In response to defendant's argument, the prosecutor
argued as follows:
		"Deliberately means a state of mind that examines
and considers the contemplated act * * * [and] whether
that act should or shouldn't be done.  Deliberation is
present if the thinking is done in a cool mental state
under such circumstances and for such period of time as
to permit a careful weighing of the proposed decision.
		"I want you to - unfortunately, I am going to draw
you back a little bit to what was going on in that home
the last few days of Tesslynn's life.
		"What we know pretty clearly is there was a
violent blow at least to her back and perhaps a violent
blow to her abdomen that caused internal bleeding.  We
know she was sexually abused as she was vaginally
penetrated within the last couple days of her life.
		"We know the night she died she was tied up with
her legs up over her head.  We know she had vomited. 
By all accounts the abdominal bleed was apparently
causing her some distress and we know, I think
logically, that the defendant was well aware that the
child was in some severe distress, and that alone might
be enough for deliberation but I want you to think
about the condition that this little girl was in when
those terrible injuries in and of themselves were
inflicted on her.
		"You can look at the pictures and see that the
labia is essentially burned off, and whether or not it
is burned off by boiling water poured over her anal
area when she was tied up, or whether or not it's
burned off by * * * a propane torch doesn't really
matter.
		"When [defendant] is sexually abusing her he is
looking at the full sight, sound[,] smell, package of
that child.  She must have begged for mercy.  She must
have expressed the terrible pain she felt, and he went
on anyway.
		"I guess she was probably crying when he stomped
on her back, and think about what he was stomping on, a
little girl, 31 pounds, damaged almost beyond repair,
beaten repeatedly, fed occasionally, tied up, sexually
abused, burned with cigarettes, for weeks even months.
		"Did he deliberately do those acts?  What other
word would you put with it?  He extremely deliberately
did those acts.  He knew exactly what he was doing. 
Was it reasonable for him to expect her to die?  Could
she survive another week in this household?  Would she
have lived another week?  Ask yourself that.  Probably
not.  Would she have lived another month?  No.  Was he
going to kill her one day or another?
		"Think about what she must have felt in the
bedroom, internally bleeding, tied up while her mother
and [defendant] partied in the other room.  What a
terrible, torturous, brutal way to die.  It would be
terrible for all of us for adults, but for a little
girl just turned three years old the week before, it
must have been much more terrifying, much more hard to
understand.
		"Were the acts deliberate?  Absolutely." 
(Emphasis added.)  During that part of prosecutor's closing
argument, one juror began to cry.  Defendant moved for a mistrial
on the ground that the prosecutor intentionally was "inflaming
the jury in the manner and directness of his argument, using
voice and everything else he can to inflame them improperly     
* * *."  The trial court denied the motion and, with defendant's
agreement, selected an alternate juror to replace the juror who
had begun to cry.  
	Before this court, defendant contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial.
He also argues that the parts of the prosecutor's statements
emphasized above violated his right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment and deprived the sentencing proceeding of
the reliability that the Eighth Amendment requires.  The state
responds that defendant's objection did not preserve the
constitutional arguments that he raises here.  On the merits, the
state responds that the prosecutor's statements were relevant to
issues at sentencing and that the emotional overtones of the
argument did not make it improper.  Therefore, the state
contends, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion for a mistrial, and no constitutional
violation occurred.
	We conclude that defendant's objection was sufficient
to put the trial court on notice that, in defendant's view, the
prosecutor's statements denied defendant his right to a fair
sentencing proceeding, whether that right is grounded in the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution or derives from some other source.  We turn to the
merits.
	Defendant argues that the prosecutor "veered off topic
and exhorted the jury to feel what [Tesslynn] must have felt in
her last moments."  That, he contends, was improper, because, in
doing so, the prosecutor "asked the jury to engage in speculation
and to rely on facts not in evidence," and because "the
argument's purpose could only have been to evoke an emotional
response from the jury."  The state contends that the prosecutor
did not ask the jury to engage in speculation about Tesslynn's
uncommunicated thoughts and feelings.  Rather, he "sought to
convey what one can infer that [Tesslynn] did communicate to
defendant." (Emphasis in original.)  Therefore, the prosecutor's
statements helped to establish that defendant was aware of the
pain that Tesslynn had suffered from the injuries that he had
caused and that he nonetheless chose to inflict even more severe
injuries that ultimately caused her death.
	This court consistently has held that a motion for a
mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 
State v. Jones, 242 Or 427, 433, 410 P2d 219 (1966).  Even if we
find the prosecutor's remarks to be "improper, tasteless, or
inappropriate," we will not find an abuse of discretion unless
the effect of the remarks is to deny a defendant a fair trial. 
State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 24, 791 P2d 836 (1990).
	In our view, the allegedly objectionable remarks in
this case did not violate that standard.  The prosecutor's
argument called for the jury to make inferences about how
Tesslynn must have responded to the injuries that defendant had
inflicted on her.  Those inferences reasonably were related to
the nature and extent of Tesslynn's injuries.
	Moreover, the prosecutor's argument that Tesslynn must
have communicated her suffering and that defendant must have been
aware of it responded to defendant's contention that he had not
acted deliberately and with a reasonable expectation that death
would result.  Defendant's willingness to inflict additional
injuries the night of Tesslynn's death, even though he knew that
she already was in pain from internal injuries, extensive burns,
and from being tied up, helped to establish that he acted
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that her death
would result.
	Although we question the propriety of the prosecutor's
comments regarding Tesslynn's feelings and inability to
understand what was happening to her, we cannot conclude that
those comments, alone, were egregious enough to make the
sentencing proceeding unfair.  See Smith, 310 Or at 27 
(concluding that prosecutors's comments, during closing argument
of capital sentencing proceeding, regarding victim's last
thoughts and feelings were "more gratuitous than inflammatory"). 
Consistent with this court's decision in Smith, we decline
defendant's invitation to create a rule that requires a new
sentencing proceeding whenever a prosecutor makes a comment that
arguably asks jurors to imagine what a victim thought or felt.
	We turn to defendant's claim that the prosecutor's
closing argument in the penalty phase violated his right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Federal courts have held
that a prosecutor's statements in asking for a particular penalty
must be confined to issues relevant to factors that the jury may
consider at the sentencing proceeding.  See, e.g., Coleman v.
Brown, 802 F2d 1227, 1239 (10th Cir 1986) (so stating).  Courts
have acknowledged that some emotion is inevitable in capital
sentencing, see, e.g., Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F2d 1383, 1404-05
(11th Cir 1985), and that "appeals to emotion ordinarily do not
alone render an argument improper," Coleman at 1239 (emphasis in
original).  However, even if a prosecutor's comments are
improper, there is no violation of due process unless those
comments result in a sentencing proceeding that is "fundamentally
unfair."  See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 US 637, 645, 94 S Ct
1868, 40 L Ed 2d 431 (1974) (establishing, in habeas proceeding,
"fundamental fairness" standard for prosecutorial misconduct at
guilt phase).
	As we have explained above, the prosecutor's arguments
in this case related to an element that was essential to the
jury's deliberation in the penalty phase, namely, whether
defendant had engaged in conduct deliberately and with a
reasonable expectation that Tesslynn's death would result.  A
certain degree of emotion was inevitable at defendant's
sentencing hearing, given the nature and extent of Tesslynn's
injuries.  Even assuming that some of the allegedly objectionable
comments were improper, we do not think that those comments
resulted in a fundamentally unfair sentencing proceeding.
	We reject defendant's Eighth Amendment claim for the
same reasons.  The statements to which defendant objects did not
result in a sentence that was imposed arbitrarily and
capriciously.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US 153, 189, 96 S Ct
2909, 2932, 49 L Ed 2d 859 (1976) (under Eighth Amendment,
sentencing discretion must be "suitably directed and limited so
as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action").
B.  Imposition of Death Sentence
	Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it
imposed a sentence of death for defendant's conviction for
aggravated murder as pleaded in Count 1 of the indictment.  The
first question under ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1995) is "[w]hether the
conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that death of the deceased or another would result."  Defendant
maintains that that question is an element of the crime of 
aggravated murder that had to be pleaded in the indictment. 
Because the element of deliberateness was not pleaded, defendant
argues, the trial court lacked authority to submit defendant's
case to the jury for a finding on that issue and therefore lacked
authority to impose a death sentence.  
	Defendant admits that he did not object in the trial
court to his sentence on the grounds asserted here.  However,
defendant argues that the state's failure to plead
"deliberateness" in the indictment deprived the trial court of
subject matter jurisdiction and that lack of subject matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.  See
Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 383, 823 P2d 956
(1991) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time, including on appeal).  Defendant also argues that this
court should review the matter as "error apparent on the face of
the record."
	Defendant concedes that the identical issue was before
this court in State v. Terry, 333 Or 163, 37 P3d 157 (2001).  In
that case, this court rejected the defendant's jurisdictional
argument and his argument that the alleged error was "error
apparent on the face of the record."  We reject defendant's claim
in this case for the same reasons.  We have reviewed each of
defendant's other assignments of error regarding the penalty
phase and reject them without further discussion.
V.  CONCLUSION

	Having reviewed each assignment of error and each
argument under each assignment, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in entering judgment on defendant's convictions for
aggravated murder, murder by abuse, two counts of sexual
penetration in the first degree, and one count of abuse of a
corpse in the second degree, or in imposing a sentence of death.
	The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.



1. 	At trial, defendant's medical expert witness described
battered child syndrome as a conglomeration of different events
indicating that a child repetitively had been neglected or
injured.  Defendant's expert agreed with the medical examiner
that Tesslynn was a victim of battered child syndrome.

2. 	We do not address defendant's argument under the Eighth
Amendment, because he did not raise it below.  See State v.
Barone, 329 Or 210, 243 n 23, 986 P2d 5 (1999) (declining to
address argument made for first time on review).  We also
conclude that the argument does not reflect error apparent on the
face of the record, because it does not raise an error of law
that is obvious.  See State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 435-36, 7 P3d 522 (2000) (applying doctrine).  

3. 	We note that the United States Supreme Court has upheld
the imposition of the death penalty without proof that the
defendant possessed the intent to kill.  In Tison v. Arizona, 481
US 137, 158, 107 S Ct 1676, 95 L Ed 2d 127 (1987), the Court held
that, if a criminal defendant was a major participant in a felony
and showed reckless indifference to human life, then the
defendant could be sentenced to death even if the defendant did
not intend to kill the victim.  The Court reasoned that
	"some intentional murderers may be among the most
dangerous and inhumane of all - [including] the person
who tortures another not caring whether the victim
lives or dies * * *.  This reckless indifference to the
value of human life may be every bit as shocking to the
moral sense as an 'intent to kill.'"
Id. at 157.

4. 	The legislature amended ORS 163.150(1)(a) in 1997. Or
Laws 1997, ch 784, § 1.

5. 	ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1995) provides that, regarding
the fourth question,
	"the court shall instruct the jury to answer the
question 'no' if one or more of the jurors find there
is any aspect of the defendant's character or
background, or any circumstances of the offense, that
one or more of the jurors believe would justify a
sentence less than death." 
(Emphasis added.)  Pursuant to that statute, the trial court gave
the following jury instruction concerning the fourth question:
		"The burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
does not apply to this question.  As to this question
neither side bears any burden of proof.  This question
calls for a discretionary determination by each of you.
If 12 jurors do not agree that the answer to this
question is 'yes' then you must answer this question
'no.' 
		"Even though you have answered 'yes' to the first
three questions, you are not required to answer 'yes'
to this question.  The purpose of this question is to
allow each of you to take into account any mitigating
circumstances that weighs against the sentence of
death.  Any one of you has the power and discretion to
choose life imprisonment as the appropriate sentence. 
You must answer this question 'no' if one or more of
the jurors find there is any aspect of the defendant's
character, background, or any circumstances of the
offense that one or more of the jurors believed would
justify a sentence less than death."  
6. 	Defendant does not argue that, in this context, the
Oregon constitutional guarantee differs from that of the United
States Constitution.  See State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 71 n 2, 969
P2d 1013 (1998) (analyzing state and federal constitutional
claims together in context of motion to exclude jurors for cause
in absence of argument to contrary).

7. 	SB 936 (1997) was a legislative paraphrase of selected
provisions of an amendment to the Oregon Constitution that was
known as Ballot Measure 40 (1996) and modified several parts of
the Oregon Constitution relating to the criminal law.  Measure 40
became Article I, section 42, of the Oregon Constitution, on
December 5, 1996.  Or Laws 1997, v 1, at ix-x.  In Armatta v.
Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 254-55, 959 P2d 49 (1998), this court
declared Measure 40 unconstitutional.  In 1997, the legislature
passed SB 936, which became effective June 12, 1997.  Section 9b
of SB 936 expired on July 1, 1999.  Or Laws 1997, ch 313, § 9a(2).   
		Section 9b(3) provided, in part, that 
		"[a]ny person is eligible to act as a juror in a
criminal trial, beginning on or after December 5, 1996,
unless the person:
		"* * * * *
		"(E) Has been convicted of a felony or served a
felony sentence within the prior 15 years; or
		"(F) Is not registered to vote."  
8. 	The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part: 
		"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury * * *."  


9. 	Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
provides, in part:
		"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to public trial by an impartial jury   
* * *."


10. 	We note that, in State v. Amini, 331 Or 384, 389, 15
P3d 541 (2000), this court held that Article I, section 11, does
not incorporate a broad fairness standard for reviewing a jury
instruction.  Rather, the guarantee is trial by a jury that is
not prejudiced or biased.  Id. at 391.  

11. 	Under the Guzman test,
		"[a] cognizable group is not one whose membership
shifts from day to day or whose members can be
arbitrarily classified.  Secondly, the group must have
cohesion.  There must be a common thread which runs
through the group, a basic similarity in attitudes or
ideas or experience which is present in the group and
which cannot be adequately represented if the group is
excluded from the jury selection process.  Finally,
there must be a possibility that exclusion of the group
will result in partiality or bias on the part of juries
hearing cases in which group members are involved. 
That is, the group must have a community of interests
which cannot be adequately protected by the rest of the
populace." 
Guzman, 337 F Supp at 143-44. 

12. 	We note that defendant's 20th and 23rd assignments of
error are based on a premise that we have rejected earlier in
this opinion.  Defendant contends that, because ORS 163.115(1)(c)
and ORS 163.095(1)(e) are vague regarding the mental state
required for the death that results from a pattern or practice of
abuse or torture, the trial court erred in instructing the jury
that the state had to prove, among other things, that defendant
"recklessly caused the death of Tesslynn O'Cull under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life."  Defendant did not object to that instruction. 
Because, as we have held, the statutes are not vague regarding
the mental state required for causing the victim's death,
defendant's argument does not raise an error of law that is
obvious.  Therefore, there is no error apparent on the face of
the record.  See Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or at 435-36 (applying
doctrine).