Case Title: Hamilton v. Guardian Tax AL, LLC, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1200048

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:  May 28, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1200048
____________________
Shamblin Lane Hamilton
v.
Guardian Tax AL, LLC, and Carol Denise Hamilton
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-18-901685)
MENDHEIM, Justice.
Shamblin Lane Hamilton appeals from a Jefferson Circuit Court
judgment concluding that he had no interest in real property located on
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Brookmont Drive in  Birmingham ("the property") and ejecting him from
the property.  We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand the
cause.
I.  Facts
On May 4, 1992, Rodney J. Stanfa and Beverly M. Stanfa conveyed
the property to Shamblin and Carol Denise Hamilton by general warranty
deed.  The Hamiltons owned the property in fee simple subject to a
mortgage to Compass Bank recorded on November 8, 2003.
On August 31, 2004, Shamblin and Carol were divorced, and by
order of the court Shamblin was awarded sole ownership of the property.
The divorce judgment provided, in part:  "[T]he Agreement of the parties
filed in this cause, attached hereto, is hereby ratified and approved and
made a part of this decree the same as if fully set out herein and the
parties to this cause are ordered to comply herewith."  The "Agreement in
Contemplation of Divorce" attached to the divorce judgment provided,
relevant in part:
"3.  [Shamblin] shall become the sole owner of the house and
property located [on] Brookmont Drive, ... subject to the
mortgage thereon, which [Shamblin] assumes and shall make
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all future payments thereon.  [Shamblin] agrees to indemnify
and hold [Carol] harmless from paying said indebtedness.
"....
"19. Each party will execute and deliver to the other any
documents which may be reasonably required to implement
and accomplish the purpose and intent of this agreement, and
shall do any and all other things necessary to that end.  If
either party shall fail to comply with the provision of this
paragraph, this agreement shall constitute an actual grant,
assignment and conveyance of the property and rights in such
matter, and with such force and effect as shall be necessary to
effectuate the terms of this agreement.
"20.  Except as herein provided, both [Shamblin] and [Carol]
do hereby forever waive, release and quit claim to the other all
rights ... in and to, or against the property of the other party,
or his or her estate, whether now owned or hereinafter
acquired by such other party. ..."
On February 19, 2009, the divorce judgment was modified by an
agreement of the parties, and an order of the court adopting that
agreement declared that Shamblin had assumed sole responsibility of a
home-equity line of credit that Shamblin and Carol had jointly executed
with Compass Bank.  In his filings in the circuit court in this case,
Shamblin asserted that he was still making payments on the home-equity
line of credit as the litigation ensued.  Shamblin also alleged that he had
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paid off the mortgage on the property in 2010, that he had tried to get
Carol to give him a quitclaim deed verifying that he was the sole owner of
the property, but that she had "failed, refused or neglected" to do so.
The Hamiltons failed to pay the ad valorem real-property taxes on
the property, and on May 20, 2014, the State sold the property at auction
to Mercury Funding, LLC ("Mercury"), for $20,699.  The Jefferson Probate
Court issued a tax deed for the property to Mercury on January 2, 2018.
On January 5, 2018, Mercury conveyed its interest in the property
to Guardian Tax AL, LLC ("Guardian"), by quitclaim deed.  On April 24,
2018, Guardian filed a complaint for ejectment and to quiet title to the
property against the Hamiltons and Compass Bank.  In its complaint,
Guardian asserted that after the tax sale it "has paid the taxes on the
Property, purchased insurance for the Property, commenced/completed
preservation improvements on the Property, and/or incurred attorneys'
fees in relation to the Property."  Guardian indicated in the complaint that
Shamblin "may still wrongly claim an interest in the Property and/or be
in possession of the Property despite [Guardian's] attempts to gain
possession and quiet title."
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On March 11, 2019, Shamblin filed an answer and a counterclaim in
response to Guardian's complaint.  Specifically, Shamblin denied not
paying the ad valorem property taxes on the property, and he asserted
that he had "never received or been served any notice of delinquency for
ad valorem real property taxes" even though he had retained physical
ownership of the property from May 4, 1992, to the present.  In his
counterclaim, Shamblin asserted a claim for judicial redemption of the
property pursuant to § 40-10-83, Ala. Code 1975.1  On the same date, 
1At the time Shamblin filed his counterclaim in March 2019,
§ 40-10-83, Ala. Code 1975, provided: 
"When the action is against the person for whom the
taxes were assessed or the owner of the land at the time of the
sale, his or her heir, devisee, vendee or mortgagee, the court
shall, on motion of the defendant made at any time before the
trial of the action, ascertain (i) the amount paid by the
purchaser at the sale and of the taxes subsequently paid by the
purchaser, together with 12 percent per annum thereon,
subject to the limitations set forth in Section 40-10-122(a);
(ii) with respect to property located within an urban renewal
or urban redevelopment project area designated pursuant to
Chapters 2 or 3 of Title 24, all insurance premiums paid or
owed by the purchaser for casualty loss coverage on insurable
structures and the value of all permanent improvements made
by the purchaser determined in accordance with Section
40-10-122, together with 12 percent per annum thereon;
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March 11, 2019, Shamblin filed a "Motion for Judicial Redemption of
Property Sold for Taxes" in which he reiterated his arguments regarding
why he had a right to judicially redeem the property pursuant to
§ 40-10-83.
(iii) with respect to any property which contains a residential
structure at the time of the sale regardless of its location, all
insurance premiums paid or owed by the purchaser for
casualty loss coverage on the residential structure and the
value of all preservation improvements made by the purchaser
determined in accordance with Section 40-10-122, together
with 12 percent per annum thereon, subject to the limitations
set forth in Section 40-10-122(a); and (iv) a reasonable
attorney's fee for the plaintiff's attorney for bringing the
action. The court shall also determine the right, if any, of the
defendant to recover any excess pursuant to Section 40-10-28
and shall apply a credit and direct the payment of the same as
set forth in subsection (b) of Section 40-10-78. Upon such
determination the court shall enter judgment for the amount
so ascertained in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant,
and the judgment shall be a lien on the land sued for. Upon
the payment into court of the amount of the judgment and
costs, the court shall enter judgment for the defendant for the
land, and all title and interest in the land shall by such
judgment be divested out of the owner of the tax deed."
§ 40-10-83 was amended effective January 1, 2020, primarily to change
the interest rate allowed under the statute from 12% to 8%.
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On March 20, 2019, Shamblin filed a "Motion to Show Cause"
regarding why he should be permitted to redeem the property.  In that
motion, Shamblin alleged, among other things:
"On March 11, 2019[, Guardian] requested a continuance of
the Status Conference scheduled for 11:00 am next day ... to
pursue settlement amongst the Parties.  [Guardian's] Attorney
was himself blind-sided by [Carol's] claim the next day that
the matter had been settled with [Guardian's] out-of-State
Attorneys in Georgia and that [Carol] had redeemed the
Property, without recourse to [Shamblin]."
Shamblin then argued that he, not Carol, had a right to redeem the
property because he was the owner of, and in possession of, the property.
On September 12, 2019, Guardian and Carol filed a "Joint
Stipulation of Dismissal" in which they requested dismissal of Guardian
from this action because a settlement agreement purportedly had been
reached between Guardian and Carol.  The joint stipulation explained:
"As a part of that agreement, Guardian assigned and
transferred all of its interest in this cause of action and in the
property that is the subject of this lawsuit to Carol D.
Hamilton.  Likewise, Carol D. Hamilton has agreed to accept
the liability for any claims raised in the suit, agreeing to
indemnify and defend Guardian against those claims.
Therefore, Guardian and Carol D. Hamilton stipulate to the
dismissal of Guardian and any claims against Guardian --
including the claims or counterclaims that were raised, or
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could have been raised -- with prejudice under Ala. R. Civ. P.
41(a).  This stipulation is not intended to end the action, but is
intended to dismiss Guardian as a party to the action."
Guardian and Carol did not submit along with their joint stipulation any
documentation regarding their settlement agreement or the quitclaim
deed transferring Guardian's interest in the property to Carol.
On September 23, 2019, Shamblin filed an objection to the joint
stipulation of dismissal that raised several arguments regarding why
Shamblin believed the dismissal of Guardian as a party was not
appropriate, including the fact that no evidence of the terms of the
settlement agreement or of the transfer of interest in the property had
been submitted to the circuit court.
On December 30, 2019, the circuit court entered an order concerning
Shamblin's motion for judicial redemption of the property.  The opening
paragraph of that order provided:
"This Cause came before this Court on November 13,
2019, for hearing on a Motion For Judicial Redemption For
Property Sold For Taxes filed by Defendant Shamblin Lane
Hamilton.  Appearing for [Guardian] was the Honorable Jeff
Chapman, and appearing for [Shamblin] was the Honorable
Enefaa Fenny.  All parties having had the opportunity to
present testimony and evidence, and the Court having
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considered the same, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED as follows:"
(Capitalization in original; emphasis added.)  In that order, the circuit
court declared that "[Shamblin] has been in actual physical possession of
the Property at all times relevant to this case and is still in undisturbed
possession at the filing of this Motion."  Based on that finding, the circuit
court concluded that, under § 40-10-83, Shamblin "is entitled to judicially
redeem the Property."  Accordingly, the circuit court ordered Guardian to
submit a statement of lawful charges within 14 days of the entry of the
order and for Shamblin to submit a response within 14 days thereafter
and to pay into the court charges that were undisputed. 
The following day, December 31, 2019, the circuit court entered an
order declaring that the joint stipulation of dismissal was moot.  The same
day, the circuit court also entered another order declaring that Shamblin's
motion to show cause why he should be permitted to redeem the property
also was moot.
On January 9, 2020, Guardian filed a motion seeking a 14-day
extension for complying with the circuit court's December 30, 2019, order
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"in order to be able to present a statement of charges to the court."  On
January 10, 2020, the circuit court granted Guardian's request for a
14-day extension, meaning that it had until January 27, 2020, to file its
statement of lawful charges.  However, on February 11, 2020, Carol, with
Guardian's consent, filed a "Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate and
Renewed Motion to Substitute and Dismiss" in which she requested that
the circuit court vacate its orders of December 30 and December 31, 2019,
on the basis that those orders failed to account for the fact that Guardian
had transferred its interest in the property by quitclaim deed to Carol as
part of their settlement.  Accordingly, Carol requested that she be
realigned as the plaintiff and then be given ample time to submit a
statement of lawful charges.  Carol also requested that Guardian be
dismissed with prejudice from the action.
On February 11, 2020, Shamblin filed an objection to Carol's motion,
arguing, among other things, that her motion was untimely under
Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P.  The following day, Shamblin filed a motion to
show cause why Guardian and Carol should not be held in contempt
because they had failed to comply with the circuit court's discovery orders
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and its December 30, 2019, order requiring the submission of a statement
of lawful charges on the property. On February 12, 2020, Shamblin filed
a "Motion for an Order to Deposit Undisputed Charges with the Clerk of
Court" in which he asserted that on July 30, 2018, Guardian had sent a
statement of lawful charges to Shamblin that requested the sum of
$45,457.56.2  Shamblin stated that he did "not dispute the sum of
$32,216.97 which includes the excess bid amount of $18,000.00." 
Shamblin therefore requested an order from the circuit court requiring
him to pay $32,216.97 to the circuit clerk, setting a date for Guardian to
prove any disputed amount of lawful charges, and stating that Shamblin
was entitled to a refund of the excess bid amount from "the Jefferson
County Tax Collector."
On February 28, 2020, Guardian and Carol filed a joint response to
Shamblin's contempt motion in which they contended that the circuit
court's failure to address the settlement between Guardian and Carol had
2Shamblin attached to his motion a copy of the document containing
the $45,457.56 figure.  The document is dated July 30, 2018, but it is
labeled "Settlement Worksheet."
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caused their delay in responding to court orders.  They reiterated that, in
their view, "[a]s part of that settlement, ... [Carol] would be substituted as
Plaintiff and in Guardian’s place."  They also contended that, "because
Guardian no longer has an interest in the property, ... the sole party from
which [Shamblin] could redeem the property is [Carol]."  Finally, they
insisted that Carol's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the December 30,
2019, order was still pending, so, they insisted, issuing contempt sanctions
would be premature. 
On March 3, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on outstanding
motions in the action.3  On June 26, 2020, the circuit court entered a
judgment quieting title to the property in favor of Carol and ordering
Shamblin to be ejected from the property.  The circuit court's judgment
provided:
3Guardian's counsel requested, and subsequently received,
permission from the circuit court to appear by telephone at the March 3,
2020, hearing because, Guardian asserted, "[Carol], and not Guardian, is
the real party in interest, [so] any arguments to be made on the motions
pending before the Court on March 3, 2020, would be made by [Carol's]
counsel."
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"This cause was submitted upon the pleadings, the
written and oral motions made in open court, and oral
arguments of the parties. Upon consideration thereof, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court as
follows:
"1.  The Complaint was filed on the 4th day of April 2018 in
this cause against Defendants Shamblin Hamilton and Carol
Hamilton, seeking to quiet title and eject the Defendants living
in the property.
2.  [Guardian] had acquired the property from the purchaser
at a tax sale held on May 20, 2014.
"3.  The parties, having Answered, appeared in open court for
a status conference on the 12th day of March, 2019 to discuss
all pending items before the court.
"4.  At said hearing, Defendant Carol Hamilton advised the
court that she had reached a settlement agreement with
[Guardian] to redeem and purchase the property at issue by
paying to [Guardian] a sum satisfactory to [Guardian] to
acquire all [Guardian's] rights in the property.
"5.  All parties consented to discuss and argued all relevant
items in open court, and the Court took argument on the
issues.
"6.  The Court hereby finds as follows:
"a.  The Court takes judicial notice that the [Hamiltons]
were previously married and possessed joint ownership of the
property in question, with both parties listed on the deed with
rights of survivorship at the time of the tax sale, and both
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remained on the warranty deed at the time this cause was
commenced.
"b.  The Court takes judicial notice that the [Hamiltons]
were divorced and that the property was awarded to
Defendant Shamblin Hamilton, with a second mortgage/line of
credit in both parties' names remaining, secured by the
property at issue here.
"c.  The Court takes judicial notice that the deed of said
property was never altered in any way following said divorce
and per Ala. Code 1975, § 40-10-8.  The books and records of
the probate office are prima facie evidence in this cause.  As
such, this Court finds Defendant Carol Hamilton, though no
longer an owner as joint tenant with rights of survivorship
with Defendant Shamblin Hamilton, did have a redeemable
interest in the property as defined by Ala. Code 1975,
§ 40-10-120.[4]
4Section 40-10-120(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in part:
"(a)  Real estate which hereafter may be sold for taxes
and purchased by the state may be redeemed at any time
before the title passes out of the state or, if purchased by any
other purchaser, may be redeemed at any time within three
years from the date of the sale by the owner, his or her heirs,
or personal representatives, or by any mortgagee or purchaser
of such lands, or any part thereof, or by any person having an
interest therein, or in any part thereof, legal or equitable, in
severalty or as tenant in common, including a judgment
creditor or other creditor having a lien thereon, or on any part
thereof; and an infant or insane person entitled to redeem at
any time before the expiration of three years from the sale may
redeem at any time within one year after the removal of the
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"d.  In open court, [Guardian] represented that
[Guardian] and Defendant Carol Hamilton entered into a
Settlement Agreement whereby [Guardian] had transferred all
[its] rights, interests, and title to Defendant Carol Hamilton
and [Guardian] further stated they were in agreement to treat
the agreement as a judicial redemption and/or to stipulate to
the substitution and realignment of parties if this Court did
not view this agreement as dispositive.
"e.  This Court, having found that Defendant Carol
Hamilton held a redeemable interest in the property; that
Defendant Shamblin Hamilton has failed to redeem the
property; and that [Guardian] and Defendant Carol Hamilton
having entered into an agreement, finds that Defendant Carol
Hamilton has judicially redeemed the property at issue in this
cause ... and is entitled to judgment in her favor.
"f.  This Court recognizes Defendant Carol Hamilton,
having acquired all [Guardian's] rights in the property and
having been assigned [Guardian's] interest in this cause, and
hereby enters judgment in favor of Defendant Carol Hamilton
and against Defendant Shamblin Hamilton to quiet title and
ejects Defendant Shamblin Hamilton from the premises.
"g.  It is further ORDERED that any interest Defendant
Shamblin Hamilton has in said premises, including his
possessory interest, was terminated by the Settlement
Agreement of the other parties and any interest he may have
claimed is hereby extinguished, and Defendant Shamblin
Hamilton is divested of same.
disability; and such redemption may be of any part of the lands
so sold, which includes the whole of the interest of the
redemptioner.  ..."
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"h.  It is further ORDERED that Defendant Shamblin
Hamilton has thirty (30) days from the date of this Order
(July 26, 2020) to vacate the property.  If Defendant Shamblin
Hamilton fails to vacate said property within the time
specified in this Order, the Sheriff is directed to remove
Defendant Shamblin Hamilton by any lawful means."
(Capitalization in original.)  On July 18, 2020, Shamblin filed a
postjudgment motion asking the circuit court to alter, amend, or vacate its
June 26, 2020, judgment.  On July 20, 2020, Shamblin filed a motion to
stay enforcement of the June 26, 2020, judgment pending a ruling on his
postjudgment motion.  On July 31, 2020, Carol filed responses to those
motions.  The circuit court never ruled on Shamblin's postjudgment
motion; accordingly, it was denied by operation of law pursuant to
Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., on October 16, 2020.5  Shamblin filed his appeal
on October 23, 2020.  
II.   Standard of Review
The parties disagree as to the proper standard of review for this
appeal.  Shamblin contends for a de novo standard because, he asserts,
5The circuit court also never ruled on Shamblin's motion to stay
enforcement of the June 26, 2020, judgment.
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the issue to be determined is a question of law -- who has a right to
redeem the property under § 40-10-83:  Shamblin or Carol?  See, e.g.,
Ex parte Jarrett, 89 So. 3d 730, 732 (Ala. 2011) (observing that, " '[w]here
the facts are not in dispute and we are presented with pure questions of
law, this Court's standard of review is de novo' " (quoting State v.
American Tobacco Co., 772 So. 2d 417, 419 (Ala. 2000))).  In contrast,
Carol and Guardian contend that the ore tenus standard applies because
"[t]he case was submitted with ore tenus evidence and testimony."  Carol
and Guardian's brief, p. 11.  See, e.g., Yeager v. Lucy, 998 So. 2d 460, 462
(Ala. 2008) (" ' "When a judge in a nonjury case hears oral testimony, a
judgment based on findings of fact based on that testimony will be
presumed correct and will not be disturbed on appeal except for a plain
and palpable error." ' " (quoting Smith v. Muchia, 854 So. 2d 85, 92
(Ala.2003), quoting in turn Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So. 2d 377, 379
(Ala. 1996))).  
The Court is frankly mystified by Carol and Guardian's asserted
position.  In its June 26, 2020, judgment, the circuit court began by
stating:  "This cause was submitted upon the pleadings, the written and
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oral motions made in open court, and oral arguments of the parties.  Upon
consideration thereof, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by
the Court as follows:"  (Capitalization in original; emphasis added.)  The
remainder of that judgment indicated that all the facts relied upon by the
circuit court in reaching its decision were based on two sources: 
(1) "judicial notice" from previous legal proceedings and (2) statements
made by counsel for the parties at hearings in this case.  A motion by
Guardian seeking to appear by telephone at the March 3, 2020, hearing
that preceded the entry of the June 26, 2020, judgment observed that "any
arguments to be made on the motions pending before the Court on
March 3, 2020, would be made by [Carol's] counsel."  (Emphasis added.) 
Nothing in the record even hints that testimony of any kind was received
during the March 3, 2020, hearing.  The only affidavit of any kind
submitted in this case was from Shamblin's counsel in support of the
contempt motion seeking sanctions based on the alleged failure of
Guardian and Carol to comply with the circuit court's discovery orders. 
No other "testimony" of any kind is included in the record.  Carol and
Guardian's brief on appeal is bereft of any quotation of, citation to, or
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allusion to testimony presented in the circuit court.  Their sole support for
their contention is introductory language in the December 30, 2019, order
that stated:  "All parties having had the opportunity to present testimony
and evidence, and the Court having considered the same, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:"  (Capitalization in
original; emphasis added.)  However, on its face that statement merely
indicates that the parties could have presented testimony, not that any
party did, in fact, do so.  Indeed, nothing in the remainder of the
December 30, 2019, order cited testimony as a basis for the circuit court's
rulings in that order.  Moreover, the December 30, 2019, order was in
Shamblin's favor, and, according to Carol and Guardian, it was not the
final judgment by the circuit court in this case, so its passing reference to
"testimony" is irrelevant to the standard for reviewing the June 26, 2020,
judgment.  In sum, there is no indication in the record that the circuit
court heard ore tenus evidence in this case.  The June 26, 2020, judgment
appears to have been based on exactly what the circuit court stated it was: 
the pleadings, motions, and arguments of the parties.  Accordingly, the
appropriate standard of review is the de novo standard.  
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III.  Analysis
We begin by addressing Shamblin's argument that the circuit court's
December 30, 2019, order was a final, appealable order, that Carol's
February 11, 2020, motion was an untimely postjudgment motion under
Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., because it was filed 43 days after the entry of
the December 30, 2019, order, and that therefore the circuit court erred
in altering and/or vacating its December 30, 2019, order with its June 26,
2020, judgment.  Shamblin notes that Rule 54(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., states
that a " '[j]udgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order
from which an appeal lies."  Shamblin then asserts that "[t]he order of the
trial court dated December 30, 2019, is a 'decree and any order from which
an appeal lies.' "  Shamblin's brief, p. 41.  
However, Shamblin does not explain why the December 30, 2019,
order was an appealable order.  
"An appeal ordinarily lies only from a final judgment.
Ala. Code 1975, § 12-22-2; Bean v. Craig, 557 So. 2d 1249, 1253
(Ala. 1990).  A judgment is generally not final unless all
claims, or the rights or liabilities of all parties, have been
decided.  Ex parte Harris, 506 So. 2d 1003, 1004 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1987).  The only exception to this rule of finality is when
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the trial court directs the entry of a final judgment pursuant
to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Bean, 557 So. 2d at 1253."
Faulk v. Rhodes, 43 So. 3d 624, 625 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).
The December 30, 2019, order clearly was not a final judgment
because, although the circuit court determined that Shamblin had a right
to redeem the property, the amount required to redeem the property had
not been determined.  The December 30, 2019, order expressly directed
Guardian to submit a statement of lawful charges and directed Shamblin
to then submit a statement of undisputed charges and to pay the
undisputed amount into the circuit court.  Thus, the December 30, 2019,
order did not dispose of all the rights and liabilities of the parties.6  It is
also clear that the circuit court did not direct the entry of a final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b) in the December 30, 2019, order.  Accordingly, the
December 30, 2019, order was not appealable. Because that order was
6Our courts have ruled in redemption cases involving § 40-10-83 that
an order that determines the right of redemption and the amount required
for redemption may be final before the redemptioner has paid the
redemption amount. See, e.g., Moorer v. Chastang, 247 Ala. 676, 680, 26
So. 2d 75, 78-79 (1946); Prescott v. Milne, 308 So. 3d 906, 911 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2019).  That is not the situation here, and no contention has been
made that this case is similar to those cases.
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interlocutory, Carol's February 11, 2020, motion seeking a modification of
that order was not untimely, and the circuit court was permitted to alter
the December 30, 2019, order by entering the June 26, 2020, judgment. 
See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pabon, 903 So. 2d 759, 765 (Ala.
2004) (stating that an "order remain[s] subject to revision at any time
before the trial court enter[s] its final judgment"). 
Shamblin's primary argument in this appeal is that he was entitled
to redeem the property under § 40-10-83 and that the circuit court erred
in concluding instead that Carol had a right to redeem that she exercised
through executing a settlement agreement with Guardian.  To evaluate
Shamblin's contention, we review the principles involved in tax-sale
redemptions.
"Under Alabama law, after a parcel of property has been
sold because of its owner's failure to pay ad valorem taxes
assessed against that property (see § 40-10-1 et seq., Ala. Code
1975), the owner has two methods of redeeming the property
from that sale:  'statutory redemption' (also known as
'administrative redemption'), which requires the payment of
specified sums of money to the probate judge of the county in
which the parcel is located (see § 40-10-120 et seq., Ala. Code
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1975), and 'judicial redemption' under §§ 40-10-82[7] and
40-10-83, Ala. Code 1975, which involves the filing of an
original civil action against a tax-sale purchaser (or the filing
of a counterclaim in an ejectment action brought by that
purchaser) and the payment of specified sums into the court in
which that action or counterclaim is pending.  See generally
William R. Justice, 'Redemption of Real Property Following
Tax Sales in Alabama,' 11 Cumb. L. Rev. 331 (1980-81)."
First Props., L.L.C. v. Bennett, 959 So. 2d 653, 654 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006). 
"The right to statutorily redeem property sold for taxes expires three
years after the date of the sale ...."  Henderson v. Seamon, 261 So. 3d
1203, 1206 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).  See also Daugherty v. Rester, 645 So.
2d 1361, 1364 (Ala. 1994) ("We follow O'Connor v. Rabren, 373 So. 2d 302
(Ala. 1979), and hold that the phrase 'three years from the date of the sale'
in § 40-10-120, [Ala. Code 1975,] means three years from the date of the
sale at the courthouse and the issuance of the certificate of purchase."). 
7Section 40-10-82, Ala. Code 1975, establishes "a 'short statute of
limitations' for tax-deed cases, pursuant to which, 'to bar redemption
under § 40-10-83, the tax purchaser must prove continuous adverse
possession for three years after he is entitled to demand a tax deed.' "  US
Bank Tr., N.A. v. Trimble, 296 So. 3d 867, 869 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019)
(quoting Gulf Land Co. v. Buzzelli, 501 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Ala. 1987)). 
Section 40-10-82 is not implicated in this case.
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"We have stated many times that the purpose of § 40-10-83 is
to preserve the right of redemption without a time limit, if the
owner of the land seeking to redeem has retained possession.
This possession may be constructive or scrambling, and, where
there is no real occupancy of the land, constructive possession
follows the title of the original owner and can only be cut off by
the adverse possession of the tax purchaser."
Gulf Land Co. v. Buzzelli, 501 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Ala. 1987).
"The rights and remedies of the parties following a valid
tax sale may be summed up as follows.  After confirmation of
the sale, the purchaser, or the state if the land is bid in for the
state, is entitled to a certificate of purchase. Code 1975,
§§ 40-10-19, -20.  The purchaser (other than the state) is then
immediately entitled to possession, and 'if possession is not
surrendered within six months after demand therefor,' the
purchaser (other than the state) may bring an action in
ejectment or other action for possession.  Code 1975,
§ 40-10-74.  After the expiration of three years from the date
of sale, a purchaser other than the state is entitled to a deed
[Code 1975, § 40-10-29], and land bid in for the state may be
sold and the purchaser given a deed.  Code 1975, §§ 40-10-132,
-135.
"The original owner, or his successor in interest, may
redeem the land within three years from the date of sale to a
purchaser other than the state, or any time before title passes
out of the state if the land was sold to the state.  Code 1975,
§ 40-10-120.  Once that initial redemption period expires, only
those original owners or their successors who have possession
may redeem, without limit of time. Code 1975, § 40-10-83;
Tensaw Land & Timber Co. v. Rivers, [244 Ala. 657, 15 So. 2d
411 (1943)]. "
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O'Connor v. Rabren, 373 So. 2d 302, 307 (Ala. 1979) (footnote omitted;
emphasis added).
"In 1946, in Moorer v. Chastang, 247 Ala. 676, 26 So. 2d
75 (1946), the Court laid out the following requirements
necessary to obtain redemption under what is now § 40-10-83:
First, there must be possession of the land by the complainant
within the meaning of the statute.  Moorer, 247 Ala. at 679, 26
So. 2d at 78.  Second, the complainant must belong to the class
permitted under the statute to redeem.  Moorer, 247 Ala. at
680, 26 So. 2d at 78.  Third, there must be a claim by the
opposing party under a tax sale.  Id.  Fourth, there must not
be a suit pending to enforce or test the opposing party's claim.
Id."
State Dep't of Revenue v. Price-Williams, 594 So. 2d 48, 52 (Ala. 1992).
Shamblin bases his right to redeem under § 40-10-83 on his
assertion that he has been the owner in possession of the property since
May 4, 1992.  Carol and Guardian argue that they 
"certainly contested this issue [that Shamblin was the owner
in possession] before the trial court in hearings and testimony,
but [Shamblin] did not order a transcript or include a Rule 10[,
Ala. R. App. P.,] statement.[8]  [Shamblin] may therefore
8Carol and Guardian refer to Rule 10(d), Ala. R. App. P., which gives
the appellant a right to "prepare a statement of the proceedings in lieu of
the usual transcript," Adams v. Adams, 335 So. 2d 174, 177 (Ala. Civ. App.
1976), "[i]f no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial
was made, or if a transcript is unavailable."  Rule 10(d), Ala. R. App. P.
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disagree with the limited factual findings the trial court made
following the hearings, but [he has] failed to make a showing
here that the [June 26, 2020,] order is wholly unsupported by
any credible evidence or is plainly erroneous and manifestly
unjust.  Indeed, the record confirms that [Carol] is the owner
of the property by virtue of the quitclaim deed from Guardian."
Carol and Guardian's brief, p. 14.
We find Carol and Guardian's argument wholly unpersuasive.  To
begin with, their argument relies upon their assertion that testimony was
presented in the circuit court, but we have already concluded in Part II of
this opinion that the record categorically refutes that assertion.
Furthermore, no filing from Carol and Guardian in the circuit court
objected to or even suggested that Shamblin's assertion in his
counterclaim that he was the owner in possession of the property was
false.  Indeed, the very fact that Guardian sought to eject Shamblin from
the property belies any notion that Carol and Guardian "contested" that
Shamblin was in physical possession of the property.  Submissions in the
record show (1) that Shamblin was awarded sole ownership of the
property by a divorce judgment entered on August 31, 2004, and that he
was solely responsible for the mortgage on the property from that time
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forward; (2) that Shamblin assumed sole responsibility for repaying a
home-equity line of credit connected with the property under a modified
divorce judgment entered on February 19, 2009; and (3) that Shamblin
paid off the mortgage on the property in 2010.  Those facts presumably
explain why the circuit court in its December 30, 2019, order concluded
that "[Shamblin] has been in actual physical possession of the Property at
all times relevant to this case and is still in undisturbed possession at the
filing of this Motion."  That finding was never contradicted in the circuit
court's June 26, 2020, judgment.  Finally, Carol and Guardian's contention
that the record shows that Carol "is the owner of the property by virtue
of the quitclaim deed from Guardian" does not conflict with Shamblin's
contention that he is the owner in possession of the property; it merely
indicates that Carol is the title holder to the property, not that she is in
physical possession of the property.
Based on the foregoing, we agree with Shamblin that he is the owner
in possession of the property and that he appears to meet the
requirements necessary to obtain redemption under § 40-10-83.  What
remains for evaluation is the circuit court's conclusion in its June 26,
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2020, judgment that Carol exercised a right of redemption by executing
a settlement agreement with Guardian and that, in doing so, she
extinguished any right of redemption or possession of the property
previously held by Shamblin.  The circuit court reasoned and concluded
as follows in its June 26, 2020, judgment:  (1) because "the deed of [the]
property was never altered in any way following [Shamblin and Carol's]
divorce," Carol "did have a redeemable interest in the property as defined
by Ala. Code 1975, § 40-10-120"; (2) Guardian and Carol represented to
the circuit court that they had "entered into a Settlement Agreement
whereby [Guardian] had transferred all [its] rights, interests, and title to
Defendant Carol Hamilton and [Guardian] further stated they were in
agreement to treat the agreement as a judicial redemption"; (3) "Shamblin
Hamilton has failed to redeem the property"; (4) Carol had "judicially
redeemed the property at issue in this cause"; and (5) "any interest
Defendant Shamblin Hamilton has in said premises, including his
possessory interest, was terminated by the Settlement Agreement of the
other parties and any interest he may have claimed is hereby
extinguished."  
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Multiple problems exist with the circuit court's reasoning and
conclusions.  First and foremost, assuming that the circuit court was
correct that Carol initially possessed a right to redeem the property under
§ 40-10-120 because her name remained on the deed to the property after
Shamblin and Carol's divorce, that right of redemption was extinguished
three years after the tax sale that occurred on May 20, 2014.  See, e.g.,
Daugherty, 645 So. 2d at 1364; Henderson, 261 So. 3d at 1206.  The owner
in possession was the only party that retained a right of redemption after
Mercury was awarded the tax deed to the property on January 2, 2018,
(and passed it to Guardian three days later).  See, e.g., Buzzelli, 501
So. 2d at 1213; O'Connor, 373 So. 2d at 307.  As we have explained, the
owner in possession was Shamblin, not Carol, and the circuit court never
found otherwise.  Therefore, Carol did not possess a right of redemption
at the time Guardian commenced this action or any time thereafter. 
Second, Carol and Guardian never submitted the terms of their settlement
agreement into evidence, and there is no transcript of the hearings in
which counsel for Carol and Guardian described the terms of the
settlement agreement to the circuit court.  Thus, although it is true that
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"attorneys are officers of the court and their statements require no oath,"
Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So. 2d 146, 150 (Ala. 2002), there is no evidence
of the amount Carol gave to Guardian to "acquire[] all [Guardian's] rights
in the property" as the circuit court put it.  For that matter, there is no
record evidence demonstrating that Carol actually possesses the tax deed
from Guardian.  Third, even assuming that Carol paid Guardian to
acquire its rights in the property and that Carol does possess the tax deed
to the property, a settlement agreement between Carol and Guardian
could not extinguish the right of redemption held by Shamblin under
§ 40-10-83 because his right is based on his status as the owner in
possession, a status that could not be affected by the settlement
agreement between the other parties in this action.  Fourth, because Carol
did not possess a right of redemption at the time she executed the
settlement agreement with Guardian, and because Shamblin possessed a
right of redemption under § 40-10-83, at most the settlement agreement
simply empowered Carol to step into Guardian's shoes as the plaintiff in
this action seeking ejectment and to quiet title -- which is the relief that
Carol and Guardian requested in their September 12, 2019, joint
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stipulation of dismissal9 and what Guardian argued for in its January 9,
2020, motion for an extension to comply with the December 30, 2019,
order to submit a statement of lawful charges. Finally, the circuit court's
finding that Shamblin had failed to redeem the property ignored the fact
that Guardian never submitted a statement of lawful charges following
the entry of the circuit court's December 30, 2019, order, so Shamblin did
not know the amount required for exercising his right to redeem the
property.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit court erred in
determining that Carol redeemed the property through her settlement
agreement with Guardian and extinguished Shamblin's right to redeem
the property.  For all that appears in the record, Shamblin possesses a
right to redeem the property under § 40-10-83 by virtue of his being an
9Indeed, Carol and Guardian emphasized that "[t]his stipulation is
not intended to end the action, but is intended to dismiss Guardian as a
party to the action."  Despite this, the circuit court in its June 26, 2020,
judgment treated the settlement agreement as an act that disposed of all
issues in this case.  
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owner in possession of the property.  Therefore, the circuit court's
judgment is due to be reversed.  
IV.  Conclusion
We reverse the circuit court's June 26, 2020, judgment, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, and Stewart,
JJ., concur.
Mitchell, J., concurs specially.
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the majority opinion.  As it correctly notes, the
undisputed evidence indicates that Shamblin Lane Hamilton is the owner
in possession of the property at issue.  Accordingly, he has the right to
redeem that property under § 40-10-83, Ala. Code 1975.  
As support for the principle that § 40-10-83 permits an owner in
possession of property to redeem that property at any time, the majority
opinion cites State Department of Revenue v. Price-Williams, 594 So. 2d
48, 52 (Ala. 1992), and O'Connor v. Rabren, 373 So. 2d 302, 307 (Ala.
1979).  Portions of these cases suggest that an owner can redeem under
§ 40-10-83 only if he or she is in possession of the disputed property.  But
cases decided after Price-Williams and O'Connor make clear that
possession is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial redemption under
§ 40-10-83.  See, e.g., McGuire v. Rogers, 794 So. 2d 1131, 1136 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2000) (explaining that the "application of § 40-10-83 employed in
O'Connor has been displaced by the more recent Gulf Land [Co. v.
Buzzelli, 501 So. 2d 1211 (Ala. 1987),] and its progeny" and rejecting a
claim that a property owner could not redeem under § 40-10-83 because
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she was not in possession of the property).  See also Southside Cmty. Dev.
Corp. v. White, 10 So. 3d 990, 992 (Ala. 2008) (recognizing that, under
Gulf Land, a lack of possession does not categorically bar an owner's
action seeking judicial redemption under § 40-10-83).  
I previously discussed my view of § 40-10-83 in Austill v. Prescott,
293 So. 3d 333, 362 (Ala. 2019) (Mitchell, J., concurring in the result), in
which I explained that an owner of property whose possession had been
cut off by a tax purchaser's adverse possession nevertheless had a right to
judicially redeem the property:
"[I]n my view, a tax purchaser may cut off the possession of a
property owner by adversely possessing the property for three
years.  But cutting off possession does not, by itself, extinguish
the owner's judicial-redemption right.  Instead, once the
owner's possession is cut off, the owner has three years from
the date the tax purchaser became entitled to demand a tax
deed to judicially redeem the property.  If the right of judicial
redemption is not exercised within those three years, then the
right is extinguished.  Of course, if the owner remains in
possession of the property (i.e., the tax purchaser never cuts off
the owner's possession), then the owner may redeem at any
time."
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(Emphasis added.)  Thus, an owner may be able to judicially redeem
property under § 40-10-83 even if he or she does not retain possession of
the property.
Of course, the appeal now before us does not involve a claim of
adverse possession; Shamblin's possession of the property has not
seriously been disputed.  Because I understand the majority opinion to be
citing Price-Williams and O'Connor for the proposition that an owner in
possession of property always has a right to redeem that property under
§ 40-10-83 -- and not for the proposition that only an owner in possession
of property has a right to redeem under § 40-10-83 -- I join that opinion.
35