Case Title: Spitz v. Municipal Court of City of Phoenix

Citation: 127 Ariz. 405, 621 P.2d 911

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1980-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
127 Ariz. 405 (1980) 621 P.2d 911 Harry B. SPITZ, Petitioner, v. The MUNICIPAL COURT OF the CITY OF PHOENIX, Arizona, and The Honorable Lyle Allen, Judge thereof; The Honorable Keith Haien, Judge thereof; and The City of Phoenix Prosecutor's Office, Respondents. No. 15096. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. December 16, 1980. *406 Harris & Peacock by Donald W. Harris, Eldridge & Brown by Steve J. Brown, Steven R. Chanen, Phoenix, for petitioner. Andy Baumert, Phoenix City Atty. by Lauraine Rees Crawford, Asst. City Prosecutor, Phoenix, for respondents. CAMERON, Justice. We granted this petition for special action because it is a matter of state-wide importance and because there was not equal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appeal. Rule 1, Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, 17A A.R.S. We must answer the following questions: The facts necessary for a resolution of this matter are not in dispute. On 26 May 1978, petitioner Harry B. Spitz was the owner of Empire Discount Liquors. On that date, one Cindy Fitchner entered the premises, produced an Arizona driver's license which indicated she was nineteen years old, and purchased alcoholic beverages from the petitioner. She was, in fact, under the age of nineteen years. Her affidavit reads as follows: Cindy Fitchner was granted immunity in return for her co-operation and testimony in the prosecution of the petitioner Spitz for violation of A.R.S. § 4-244(9), selling liquor to a minor. Spitz contends that he relied upon the identification presented by Cindy Fitchner and believed her to have been of legal age (19) for purchase of alcoholic beverages. Thus Cindy Fitchner, the person who knowingly and intentionally encouraged Spitz to sell liquor to her, was granted immunity while Spitz, who innocently sold liquor without knowledge that the purchaser was under age, was charged with the crime of selling liquor to a person under 19 years of age. Spitz was originally granted the right to a jury trial by one city magistrate, but *407 when the matter was assigned to a second city magistrate, a jury trial was denied. Spitz' motion to be allowed to show ignorance or lack of knowledge as to Cindy Fitchner's true age was denied. He was found guilty by the court sitting without a jury and placed on two years probation. The matter was appealed to the Superior Court which affirmed the judgment, and an appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. From these rulings, petitioner brought this petition for special action, and we accepted jurisdiction. IS IGNORANCE OR LACK OF GUILTY KNOWLEDGE A DEFENSE TO THE CRIME OF SELLING LIQUOR TO A MINOR? The affidavit of Cindy Fitchner makes it clear that she was the moving party in the commission of the offense. The pleading indicates Harry Spitz was ignorant and without knowledge as to her age as a result of the altered driver's license presented to him by Cindy Fitchner. Our statute reads: This statute, standing alone, does not appear to require knowledge that the purchaser is under nineteen years of age. Under this statute, if the person is under nineteen years of age, a seller could be guilty regardless of the belief of the seller that the purchaser is of legal age. This guilt, without intent, is allowed in certain cases, frequently involving the protection of children. Holding that A.R.S. § 4-244 defines a crime without intent would not be inconsistent with the majority view in the United States that ignorance or mistake as to the age of a minor is not a defense in a criminal prosecution for sale of liquor to a minor. See Annotation, 12 A.L.R.3d 991 and People v. Davin, 1 App.Div.2d 811, 148 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956). The requirement of wrongful intent or mens rea in criminal cases, however, is the rule rather than the exception, State v. Cutshaw, supra, and we will resolve any doubt in favor of a requirement of criminal intent unless there is manifested a clear legislative intent that the crime does not require such guilty knowledge. In the instant case, we believe that A.R.S. § 4-244 must be read with another section of the same article: A.R.S. § 4-241 provides that if the seller has "reason to question" the age of the purchaser, certain procedures must be followed, and if he does not follow these procedures, he is then deemed to have "constructive knowledge" of the age of the buyer. We believe that the legislature, by A.R.S. § 4-241, meant that a person charged with selling liquor to a minor could show ignorance and lack of knowledge if he complied with the provisions of the statute. In other words, if the seller does not follow these procedures, ignorance or lack of knowledge is not a defense, but if he does follow the statute and checks the identification card, driver's license, or armed forces identification card, ignorance or lack of knowledge is a defense. By enacting A.R.S. § 4-241(A) and (B), we believe that the legislature intended that guilty knowledge or ignorance could be a defense to those sellers who complied with those provisions and in good faith sold liquor to those who were in fact minors. It was error for the trial court to deny Spitz the right to show ignorance or lack of knowledge as a defense. JURY TRIAL The question of whether or not the defendant is entitled to a jury trial depends upon whether this is a serious offense or a petty offense. A.R.S. § 4-246, prior to its amendment, provided: Thus the crime that defendant is charged with is a misdemeanor, punishable by up to six months in the county jail and a fine of not more than $300. The United States Supreme Court has stated that a person is entitled to a jury trial if the crime is punishable by sentence in excess of six months, Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S. Ct. 1886, 26 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968); and it is immaterial what the actual sentence was that was imposed. If the punishment could have been in excess of six months, a jury is required. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra. Our courts have held that crimes involving moral turpitude also require a jury trial. See Goldman v. Kautz, 111 Ariz. 431, 531 P.2d 1138 (1975); Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 479 (1966); City Court of City of Tucson v. Lee, 16 Ariz. App. 449, 494 P.2d 54 (1972). In the instant case, the permissible punishment was not in excess of six months, the permissible fine was not excessive, and the crime does not involve moral turpitude. State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 127 Ariz. 152, 618 P.2d 1078 (1980). The fact that there might be an additional sanction, such as suspension of the liquor license by the Superintendent of the Department of Liquor Licenses and Control, A.R.S. § 4-210, does not mandate a jury trial. Blue Jeans Corporation v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E.2d 867 (1969). We do not find that defendant was entitled to a jury trial. WAS THE SENTENCE EXCESSIVE? Defendant also contends that the sentence was excessive in that he received more probation, two years, than the time to which he could be actually sentenced. The crime with which defendant was charged occurred on 26 May 1978, and the law in *409 effect at that time read in pertinent part as follows: Even though defendant could be sentenced to no more than six months, we find no error in the two years probation. State v. Harris, 122 Ariz. 593, 596 P.2d 731 (App. 1979). The conviction is set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Judge of the Municipal Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., HOLOHAN, V.C.J., and HAYS and GORDON, JJ., concur.