Case Title: State v. Morrison

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2015-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 110,835 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID SCOTT MORRISON, WARD 5 COUNCILMAN, CITY OF PRAIRIE VILLAGE,  
JOHNSON COUNTY, KANSAS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
l. 
Judicial ouster of elected public officials is a drastic remedy and is available only 
on a showing of serious wrongdoing. 
 
2. 
Out of respect for the separation of powers and in the interest of appropriate 
judicial restraint in the face of political questions, only in exceptional circumstances 
should publicly elected officials be removed prior to the completion of their terms. 
 
3. 
A bad or corrupt purpose is not synonymous with illegal conduct or conduct that is 
not justified under the given circumstances. 
 
4. 
In order to find willful misconduct justifying judicial ouster from public office, a 
court must find both a bad or corrupt purpose and illegal action or inaction that was not 
justified under the given circumstances. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 50 Kan. App. 2d 1001, 335 P.3d 1204 (2014). 
Appeal from Johnson District Court; DAVID W. HAUBER, judge. Opinion filed October 2, 2015. Judgment 
of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reversed 
and remanded with directions. 
 
Rex A. Sharp, of Gunderson Sharp, LLP, of Prairie Village, argued the cause, and Barbara C. 
Frankland, of the same firm, J. Brett Milbourn, of Walters Bender Strohbehn, PC, of Kansas City, 
Missouri, and Thomas J. Bath, Jr., of Bath Edmonds, PA, of Overland Park, were with him on the briefs 
for appellant. 
 
Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Stephen M. Howe, district 
attorney, was on the briefs for appellee.  
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  The State of Kansas brought a quo warranto action pursuant to K.S.A. 
60-1205 to remove David Scott Morrison from his position on the Prairie Village City 
Council. After conducting a hearing, the district court concluded that the evidence was 
sufficient to show that Morrison willfully engaged in misconduct while in office and 
willfully neglected to perform a duty enjoined upon him by law. Consequently, the 
district court entered an order removing Morrison from office pursuant to K.S.A. 60-
1205(1) and (2). 
 
Morrison appealed, and the Court of Appeals concluded that the undisputed facts 
did not, as a matter of law, satisfy the criteria for judicial ouster established by caselaw 
applying K.S.A. 60-1205. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court and remanded 
the case with directions that judgment be entered in Morrison's favor, thus reinstating him 
to his public office. We granted review and conclude that, based on the applicable 
statutory language and caselaw, both the district court and the Court of Appeals 
3 
 
 
 
misapplied the standard required for ouster under K.S.A. 60-1205(1) and (2). As a result, 
we reverse both the district court and the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
FACTS 
 
The parties do not dispute the facts of this case. The Court of Appeals' recitation of 
the facts is quoted below. 
 
"Morrison was elected to the Prairie Village City Council in 2008 and re-elected 
in 2012. Kelley Malone was Morrison's long-time friend and a former coworker. In 2011, 
Malone began to have substance abuse problems. Eventually, Malone lost his job and 
became homeless. At this point, Malone called Morrison seeking help, as he believed he 
had nowhere else to turn. Morrison arranged for Malone to stay in a hotel for a week, 
bought him clothes, and set up a job interview for him. With employment, Malone's 
circumstances improved and he was able to purchase a home. 
"Unfortunately, the following year Malone relapsed. He again lost his home and 
feared for his life because he came to believe that a 'hit' had been taken out against him. 
On Saturday, October 27, 2012, Malone again sought Morrison's help. Morrison called 
his church seeking both advice and sanctuary for Malone. A pastor informed him that the 
church could not accommodate Malone and, further, that putting Malone in a hotel was 
ill-advised. Morrison then called a Prairie Village dispatcher, Dawn Johnson, to inquire 
into public resources available to assist the homeless. Johnson told Morrison that the 
usual practice was for a police officer to take the person to the City Union Mission in 
Kansas City, Missouri. Morrison arranged a spot for Malone at the City Union Mission, 
however, Malone refused to go as he did not believe it was a safe location. Morrison did 
not consider his own home a viable place for Malone to stay as Morrison lived with his 
elderly parents. Morrison's mother's immune system was so compromised that Morrison 
himself would check into a hotel when he contracted an illness or cold so as not to expose 
his mother to illness. Morrison feared a stranger in his home would endanger his mother's 
fragile health. 
4 
 
 
 
"At a loss, Morrison made the fateful decision to house Malone in city hall for a 
few days. The Prairie Village City Hall and police station are located in the same 
complex, separated by a long corridor. Access to city hall after normal business hours 
requires entering the police station, walking past the dispatch window, and passing 
through a locked door opened using a four digit security code. Each city councilman had 
a unique security code, though there were no policies or restrictions as to how those 
security codes could be used. The security code permitted access to the employee lounge, 
a weight room, and a locker room but not to any work spaces or other areas of city hall. 
"That Saturday evening, Morrison brought Malone to city hall around 6 p.m. 
Morrison walked to the dispatch window where Johnson was working and told her that he 
and Malone were there for a neighborhood meeting. Morrison also told Johnson not to be 
alarmed if she saw Malone on the surveillance cameras as he was with Morrison. Johnson 
was suspicious of Morrison's explanation and sent the following message to a Prairie 
Village police officer: 
 
'Ok, you know the homeless guy I told you David Morrison was calling 
about? Well he just took him over to city hall. Telling me "they" were 
having a meeting with the rest of the neighborhood . . . . Surely he 
wouldn't let that guy stay the night over there would he? I don't know of 
any meeting . . . not that that matters.' 
 
"At some point, Morrison and Malone left city hall to get dinner, returning at 
about 9 p.m. Pamela Huskey was working at the dispatch window when they returned 
and Morrison told her that he and Malone would be working in city hall that night. 
Twenty minutes later, Morrison left while Malone stayed to spend the night. Before 
leaving, Morrison gave Malone his security code after realizing that without it, Malone 
would not have restroom access. 
"The following morning, the janitor saw Malone in the city hall employee 
lounge. Just after noon, Morrison picked Malone up and the two attended a football game 
that evening. They returned to city hall just after midnight on Monday morning, October 
29, 2012. Morrison told the dispatcher on duty, Cory Parker, that he and Malone were 
going to do paperwork in city hall. Morrison left a few minutes later. Malone again spent 
5 
 
 
 
the night in city hall, leaving mid-morning on Monday and not returning for the rest of 
that day. He spent Monday night sleeping in the back of another friend's car. 
"That same day, Morrison called Police Chief Wes Jordan to discuss Malone's 
situation. Morrison described Malone's current drug addiction and told Chief Jordan that 
Malone had information about drug transactions and human trafficking operations. Chief 
Jordan instructed Morrison to have Malone contact him so he could meet with the Special 
Investigations Unit, a police unit primarily focusing on drug crimes. Neither Malone nor 
Morrison contacted Chief Jordan to arrange a meeting time. 
"The following evening, Tuesday, October 30, 2012, Malone again called 
Morrison and asked to stay the night at city hall. Morrison told Malone that he did not 
think it would be a good idea, however, Malone ignored Morrison's plea. Malone arrived 
at city hall just after midnight on Wednesday, October 31, 2012. Malone told Huskey, 
who was again working the dispatch window, that he and Morrison were going to be 
working again in city hall and that Morrison would be arriving soon. Malone then entered 
city hall. Morrison never arrived. 
"That morning, multiple city hall employees encountered Malone. Bettina 
Jamerson, the court administrator, encountered Malone at 7:30 a.m. as he was sitting in 
the employee break room. She reported Malone's presence to Officer Kyle Shipps. 
Officer Shipps confronted Malone and asked him why he was in the employee break 
room. Malone replied that he was there to meet with Morrison and Chief Jordan. Penny 
Mann, another employee, saw Malone in the break room around 8 that morning. She 
asked if she could help Malone, and he told her that he was waiting for Morrison to arrive 
with an attorney. Likewise, employee Sheila Hopkins saw Malone around 8:30 that 
morning when she entered the break room and saw Malone talking on a cell phone. 
Unsure of whether he was supposed to be there, Hopkins asked Malone if there was 
anything she could do for him. Malone responded by giving Hopkins 'a really dirty look.' 
Malone noisily gathered his things, left the break room, and went to the locker room. 
"When Chief Jordan arrived at work, Officer Shipps told him that Malone was 
waiting to meet with him. Chief Jordan found Malone in the locker room and escorted 
him back to the police station. Malone told Chief Jordan that he was dropped off by 
Morrison around 7 a.m. that morning. Chief Jordan attempted to call Morrison but was 
unable to reach him. Chief Jordan deactivated Morrison's security code and initiated an 
investigation to determine when Malone had actually been in city hall. 
6 
 
 
 
"Following the investigation, the Prairie Village City Council voted to oust 
Morrison from his position." State v. Morrison, 50 Kan. App. 2d 1001, 1002-05, 335 P.3d 
1204 (2014). 
 
On January 17, 2013, the State filed a quo warranto petition requesting that 
Morrison be removed from office pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1205. The State contended that 
Morrison's actions in giving his security code to Malone and allowing him to spend 
several nights in city hall violated sections of Prairie Village's City Code and, in addition, 
constituted the crimes of official misconduct, trespass, and theft. The State alleged that 
Morrison should be ousted from office based on him (1) willfully engaging in misconduct 
while in office; (2) willfully neglecting to perform any duty enjoined upon him by law; 
and (3) committing criminal acts involving moral turpitude. See K.S.A. 60-1205(1), (2), 
and (4).  
 
The case proceeded to trial, where an advisory jury concluded that Morrison did 
not commit any criminal acts involving moral turpitude. The jury did conclude, however, 
that Morrison, based on his acts of giving Malone his access code and allowing him to 
stay at city hall, intentionally or purposefully engaged in misconduct and neglected to 
perform a duty mandated by law. The district court adopted the findings of the advisory 
jury and concluded that Morrison's actions violated 1-212(e)(6)(b) and (g) of the Prairie 
Village City Code. Those two provisions precluded a council member from granting "in 
the discharge of his or her duties any improper favor, service, or thing of value" and from 
permitting the use of city property "for personal convenience . . . except when such 
services are available to the public generally." Code of the City of Prairie Village 1-
212(e)(6)(b) and (g). The district court reasoned: 
 
"Arguably, allowing Mr. Malone to stay in City Hall for four nights was an improper 
favor of value. . . . . The evidence is unrebutted from the city administrator, Quinn 
Bennion, that City Hall was not available for overnight residency to the public in general. 
7 
 
 
 
. . . Mr. Morrison, the evidence shows, used city property for his own convenience to 
meet his need to demonstrate to his friend that he was important enough to allow him 
access unavailable to the public in general. This was a personal benefit to Mr. Morrison."    
 
The court not only found that Morrison's actions violated the city code but that his 
testimony at trial explaining that he thought his actions were justified because of the lack 
of "restrictions or policy on how he could use his code, or even whether it could restrict 
any 'guests' he might bring into the city portion of the complex" was not believable. The 
court recounted the evidence presented at trial regarding when Morrison first brought 
Malone to city hall on the evening of Saturday, October 27, 2012: 
 
"[Morrison] picked up Mr. Malone and brought him to the dispatcher window where Ms. 
Johnson was still on duty. According to Ms. Johnson's testimony, Mr. Morrison made it 
sound as though he had a neighborhood meeting and that Mr. Malone would be there for 
that. This conversation is somewhat disputed. On direct, Mr. Morrison testified:  'And as 
I recall it, I think I said I was going to be meeting with Kelley and that I had to pick up 
some stuff for a homes association meeting . . . . Yeah, I had to pick up some material or 
some stuff for a homes association meeting, which I did while I was there.'  
 
"While Mr. Morrison attempted to recharacterize this conversation as a 
'miscommunication,' the Court finds that his testimony was not credible. It attempted to 
undermine Ms. Johnson's clear recollection that Mr. Morrison told her there was a 
neighborhood meeting and Mr. Malone was there in conjunction with the same. Ms. 
Johnson had her suspicions because this was the same individual Mr. Morrison had called 
about earlier. That Mr. Morrison had lied about the reason for Mr. Malone's presence and 
then sought to spin this same conversation in court, is particularly disturbing. Lies 
revealed themselves such as when the State challenged the homes association 'packet' that 
Mr. Morrison suggested he was there to pick up. When the State was poised to play a 
surveillance video from that first evening, after Mr. Morrison stated on direct that he had 
picked up the packet, Mr. Morrison acted as though his direct testimony had only 
indicated he intended to look for a packet. On cross examination, he testified that he did 
not pick up the packet because he 'remembered' he already had gotten the same earlier. 
8 
 
 
 
This was a significant line of testimony because the intent to lie and misrepresent is 
reflective of the fact that Mr. Morrison knew that what he was doing was wrong. 
 
. . . .  
 
". . . What is more serious is why Mr. Morrison felt compelled to misrepresent 
the reason for Mr. Malone's presence if he were secure in his belief, as he testified, that 
he could bring whoever he wanted into City Hall. This bit of bravado, however, is 
negated by the actual cover used to slip Mr. Malone into City Hall, which depended on a 
subordinate employee not questioning a city council member. In other words, Mr. 
Morrison depended, to a certain extent, on not being questioned. At trial, however, he 
was questioned, and he was willing to misrepresent to the Court the truth of what 
happened." (Emphasis added.)  
 
In addition to finding that Morrison had lied to the dispatcher about the reason for 
Malone's presence inside city hall outside of regular business hours, the court noted that 
Morrison had "neglected to mention any of the circumstances attendant on Mr. Malone's 
stay to either the city administrator or city attorney, who could have directed Mr. 
Morrison to the city's conflict of interests policy." 
 
Based on its findings that Morrison's actions violated two separate provisions of 
the city code, that his actions could not be explained by an honest but mistaken belief that 
they were legal or justified, and that Malone's presence inside city hall created 
unnecessary health and safety risks for city employees, the district court concluded that 
Morrison should be removed from office based on K.S.A. 60-1205(1) and (2). Morrison 
appealed the district court's order and filed a motion pursuant to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-
262(d) to stay the order, but the district court denied the motion. 
    
Before the Court of Appeals, Morrison did not contest any of the factual findings 
made by the district court but raised several purely legal arguments that could be distilled 
into one overarching contention:  the district court applied a "watered-down" legal 
standard for determining that ouster was justified under K.S.A. 60-1205(1) and (2). 
9 
 
 
 
Morrison contended that caselaw established that, in order for a public official's ouster to 
be justified under either K.S.A. 60-1205(1) or (2), the evidence must show that (1) the 
official's misconduct or neglect was so habitual or grave that it endangered the public 
welfare and (2) the official's conduct must have an evil motive of personal gain behind it. 
 
The Court of Appeals was persuaded by Morrison's argument, stating that its  
 
"review of prior judicial ousters of public officials in Kansas makes it clear that this 
remedy is available only in circumstances that show a corrupt purpose or an evil design 
by virtue of either (1) a persistent and habitual disregard for the law or for the official's 
public duty or (2) acts so egregious that they pose a grave threat either to public safety or 
to the public fisc." Morrison, 50 Kan. App. 2d at 1009.  
 
The Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence and concluded that it was not 
sufficient to satisfy the legal standard that it had gleaned from its review of prior cases: 
 
"David Morrison proved to be a clumsy benefactor. Worse, Morrison added 
casuistry to clumsiness when he fabricated a cover story to explain Malone's presence in 
city hall. But after considering the entire record and the underlying facts as determined by 
the district court, we are unable to find any indication that Morrison's actions arose out of 
an evil or corrupt motive; out of a habitual disregard for his public duty; out of a quest for 
selfish gain; or resulted in a serious threat to public safety. 
"As the district court acknowledged, Morrison was primarily—if not wholly—
motivated by his sincerely held view of his humanitarian duty to his fellow man. There is 
no evidence that this incident is anything other than an isolated and singular occurrence. 
Morrison gained no financial benefit and his actions did not threaten the public fisc. The 
district court expressly noted that Malone's presence at city hall did no actual harm. . . . . 
As such, we find that the district court erred in its application of K.S.A. 60-1205 to the 
facts of this case." Morrison, 50 Kan. App. 2d at 1010.  
 
10 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals accordingly reversed the district court's decision and 
remanded the case with directions that judgment be entered in Morrison's favor, 
reinstating him to his position on the city council. 50 Kan. App. 2d at 1011. Knowing that 
the State was likely to file a petition for review with this court, thus staying the issuance 
of the Court of Appeals' mandate, see Supreme Court Rule 8.03(j) (2014 Kan. Ct. Rule 
Annot. 77), Morrison filed a motion with the Court of Appeals pursuant to K.S.A. 2014 
Supp. 60-262(f), asking the court to stay the district court's ouster order. The Court of 
Appeals granted the motion, reasoning that Morrison would be irreparably harmed by 
being deprived of his elected office during the pendency of the State's appeal before this 
court.   
 
The State filed a petition for review, which this court granted. After oral 
arguments were heard by this court and nearly 7 months after the Court of Appeals' order 
staying Morrison's ouster and 4 months after the petition for review was granted, the 
State filed a motion requesting that we set aside the Court of Appeals' order staying 
Morrison's ouster. The State argued that, based on Rule 8.03(j), the stay was rendered 
ineffective once this court granted review of the Court of Appeals' decision. See Supreme 
Court Rule 8.03(j) (if petition for review is granted, Court of Appeals decision has no 
force or effect and mandate will not issue until disposition of appeal on review).     
 
WAS OUSTER APPROPRIATE? 
 
On review, the State argues that the legal standard the Court of Appeals applied to 
determine whether ouster was appropriate under the facts of this case is not supported by 
the language of K.S.A. 60-1205 or by cases applying earlier versions of the statute. The 
State contends that the district court applied the correct legal standard and, in turn, 
properly determined that Morrison's ouster was justified under the facts of this case. 
 
11 
 
 
 
K.S.A. 60-1201 states:  "Relief in the form of quo warranto shall be obtained 
under the same procedure as relief in other civil actions." K.S.A. 60-1202(2) states that 
quo warranto actions may be brought "[w]henever any public officer shall have done or 
suffered any act which by the provisions of law shall work a forfeiture of his or her 
office." 
 
This case meets the statutory prerequisite for quo warranto relief. In State, ex rel., 
v. Cahill, 222 Kan. 570, 576, 567 P.2d 1329 (1977), this court recognized that "ouster is a 
drastic action" and that  
 
"actions in the nature of quo warranto are now generally held to invoke the discretionary 
powers of the trial court and thus the grant or denial of relief rests within its sound 
discretion. [Citations omitted.] This is proper and just, since minor infractions should not 
make such drastic relief mandatory."  
 
See also Barnes v. Board of Cowley County Comm'rs, 293 Kan. 11, 17, 259 P.3d 725 
(2011) (quo warranto is an equitable remedy); State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of 
Representatives, 236 Kan. 45, 53, 687 P.2d 622 (1984) (quo warranto and mandamus 
relief are discretionary). Accordingly, ouster "should be invoked only where the evidence 
is clear and convincing, and the misdeeds [are] flagrant." Cahill, 222 Kan. at 576.  
 
The district court's decision reflects that court's awareness that it had the discretion 
to grant or deny the State's request for Morrison's removal. The district court stated:  
 
"In a quo warranto action, 'the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, take 
into consideration the position and motives of the relator, the interest or policy of 
granting the remedy, the public interest, convenience, or detriment, the prospect of strife, 
confusion, and litigation, and unreasonable delay or acquiescence of the complaining 
party.' The State, ex rel., v. Wyandotte County, 117 Kan. 151, 230 P. 531, 535 (1924)."   
12 
 
 
 
 
A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if the action (1) is arbitrary, 
fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of 
fact. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906, 935, 296 
P.3d 1106 (2013). As mentioned above, Morrison did not challenge any of the factual 
findings of the district court, nor did he challenge the court's conclusion that his actions 
violated the Code of the City of Prairie Village 1-212(e)(6)(b) and (g). His argument on 
appeal, which the Court of Appeals accepted, was that his actions, despite violating the 
city code, were not legally sufficient to justify ouster under K.S.A. 60-1205(1) or (2). 
Thus, the issue before this court is whether the district court's decision to remove 
Morrison from office constituted an abuse of discretion because the decision was based 
on an error of law or was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.  
 
In order to determine whether the court's decision was erroneous as a matter of 
law, we must look to the language of the ouster statute, K.S.A. 60-1205. Interpretation of 
a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. Jeanes v. 
Bank of America, 296 Kan. 870, 873, 295 P.3d 1045 (2013). The most fundamental rule 
of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be 
ascertained. Bergstrom v. Spears Manufacturing Co., 289 Kan. 605, 607, 214 P.3d 676 
(2009).   
 
K.S.A. 60-1205 states:   
 
"Every person holding any office of trust or profit, under and by virtue of any of 
the laws of the state of Kansas, either state, district, county, township or city office, 
except those subject to removal from office only by impeachment, who shall (1) willfully 
engage in misconduct while in office, (2) willfully neglect to perform any duty enjoined 
upon such person by law, (3) demonstrate mental impairment such that the person lacks 
the capacity to manage the office held, or (4) who shall commit any act constituting a 
13 
 
 
 
violation of any penal statute involving moral turpitude, shall forfeit such person's office 
and shall be ousted from such office in the manner hereinafter provided." (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
As is readily apparent from the statutory language, misconduct and neglect to 
perform duties required by law are grounds for ouster. In the context of an ouster action, 
official misconduct has been described as "'[a]n act done by a public officer in direct 
violation of a statute regulating his official duties is official misconduct within the terms 
of his bond.'" State, ex rel., v. Robinson, 193 Kan. 480, 488, 394 P.2d 48 (1964) (quoting 
Farmer v. Rutherford, 136 Kan. 298, 305, 15 P.2d 474 [1932]). In describing the type of 
neglect that can warrant removing a person from office, the court in The State v. 
Kennedy, 82 Kan. 373, Syl. ¶ 10, 108 P. 837 (1910), stated: "[T]he neglect contemplated 
must disclose either willfulness or indifference to duty so persistent or in affairs of such 
importance that the safety of the public interests is threatened." 
 
In addition to proving misconduct or neglect to perform a duty required by law, 
the language of K.S.A. 60-1205(1) and (2) indicates that there must be evidence showing 
the officeholder behaved "willfully." We recognize that two lines of cases appear to have 
evolved in the context of the standard by which "willful" conduct is evaluated. One 
standard requires a threshold that includes a bad or corrupt purpose, and one requires 
only establishing that the action or inaction was illegal and not justified under the 
circumstances. These two standards are not synonymous, and we clarify today that such 
"willful" conduct requires both. 
 
 Confusion about the proper standard has arisen because certain prior cases 
suggest that a bad or corrupt purpose must be shown. See, e.g., The State, ex rel., v. 
Corwine, 113 Kan. 192, 198, 213 P. 658 (1923) (word "willfully" in older statute requires 
showing that the officeholder's actions or inactions were based on actual or imputable bad 
14 
 
 
 
faith); The State, ex rel., v. Wilson, 108 Kan. 641, Syl. ¶ 7, 651, 196 P. 758 (1921) 
(construing older version of ouster statute, court concluded "willfully" implies wrongful 
motive, i.e., "a bad or a corrupt purpose, an evil intent without reasonable grounds to 
believe the action is lawful"); The State, ex rel., v. Foley, 107 Kan. 608, Syl. ¶ 2, 614, 193 
P. 361 (1920) (ouster statute not designed as pitfall for honest and sincere public officials 
who unintentionally err; paramount consideration is whether actions bear distinguishing 
characteristics of genuine good faith); Kennedy, 82 Kan. at 381 (under older statute, in 
order to oust county official for "corruptly or oppressively" performing duty required by 
law, plaintiff must show officer intentionally disregarded law for improper motives). 
 
Another line of cases has looked not at the public official's motive but at the legal 
justification for the conduct. See, e.g., State, ex rel., v. Duncan, 134 Kan. 85, 95, 4 P.2d 
443 (1931) (motive is difficult to determine; courts must look to words, acts, and 
consequences); The State, ex rel., v. Fishback, 102 Kan. 178, 171 P. 348 (1917) (honest 
misunderstanding of statutory duties did not prevent ouster of court clerk for willful 
neglect to perform legal duty despite lack of bad or corrupt purpose); The State v. Trinkle, 
70 Kan. 396, 402, 78 P. 854 (1904) (law presumes public official's acts were motivated 
by good faith). 
 
Confronted with this analytic dichotomy, the Court of Appeals in our case crafted 
a new legal standard for determining when ouster under K.S.A. 60-1205(1) and (2) is 
appropriate. It appears that the court blended two statements of law. The first one derives 
from Kennedy, discussing the type of willful neglect that will justify an officeholder's 
removal: 
 
"It is not every oversight or omission within the strict letter of the law which will 
entail forfeiture of office. The purpose of the statute is to prevent persons from 
continuing to hold office whose inattention to duty, either because of its habitualness or 
15 
 
 
 
its gravity, endangers the public welfare; and the neglect contemplated must disclose 
either willfulness or indifference to duty so persistent or in affairs of such importance 
that the safety of the public interests is threatened." (Emphasis added.) 82 Kan. 373, Syl. 
¶ 10.  
 
The second statement of law comes from Duncan, discussing the type of willful 
misconduct that may warrant removal from office: 
 
"[T]he writ of ouster cannot issue unless there has been a willful violation of official duty 
prompted by a bad or corrupt purpose, and without any reasonable grounds to believe 
that the action is lawful. Mere departure from the letter of the law will not warrant a 
judgment of ouster, unless it is prompted by an evil design. (State ex rel., v. Trinkle, 70 
Kan. 396, 78 P. 854; State, ex rel., v. Foley, 107 Kan. 608, 193 P. 361.) The county 
commissioners are vested with the general control and supervision of the affairs of the 
county. They are vested with discretionary powers, and must necessarily be guided by 
their judgment. An error in judgment does not come within the purview of the statute, but 
unlawful acts prompted by a corrupt purpose and bad faith warrant a judgment of 
ouster." (Emphasis added.) 134 Kan. at 94-95. 
 
Blending these two statements of law, the Court of Appeals crafted the following 
standards for determining whether ouster is justified under K.S.A. 60-1205(1) or (2): 
Ouster "is available only in circumstances that show a corrupt purpose or an evil design 
by virtue of either (1) a persistent and habitual disregard for the law or for the official's 
public duty or (2) acts so egregious that they pose a grave threat either to public safety or 
to the public fisc." Morrison, 50 Kan. App. 2d at 1009. The first standard appears to 
apply to willful neglect and the second standard appears to apply to willful misconduct.  
 
The problem with the first standard is that it is not consistent with the cases cited 
for assessing willful neglect. That standard applies to both single and repeated instances 
of neglect. See Kennedy, 82 Kan. 373, Syl. ¶ 10 (purpose of statute is to prevent persons 
16 
 
 
 
from continuing to hold office when inattention to duty endangers public welfare, either 
because of its habitualness or its gravity; "neglect" must disclose either willfulness or 
indifference to duty that is persistent or involves affairs of great importance to safety of 
public interests). A single instance of neglecting to perform an important duty can thus be 
the basis for removing a person from office. See State, ex rel., v. McKnaught, 152 Kan. 
689, 696-97, 107 P.2d 693 (1940) (police chief witnessed fellow law enforcement 
officers consuming liquor in violation of state's prohibition law; court concluded police 
chief's ouster was appropriate based on this single instance of failing to enforce the law).  
 
But the Court of Appeals' standard for judging willful neglect (i.e., a persistent and 
habitual disregard) requires a showing of repeated instances of neglect in order for ouster 
to be justified under K.S.A. 60-1205(2). Such a standard is at odds with our precedent. 
Furthermore, the language of K.S.A. 60-1205(2) indicates that a single instance of 
neglect can result in an officeholder's removal. K.S.A. 60-1205(2) (willful neglect to 
perform "any duty" results in forfeiture of office); see K.S.A. 60-1202(2) (quo warranto 
action appropriate whenever public officer performs or suffers "any act" that works 
forfeiture of office).  
 
The Court of Appeals' second standard for judging willful misconduct (i.e., acts so 
egregious that they pose a grave threat either to public safety or to the public fisc) is not 
supported by the language of K.S.A. 60-1205(1) (ouster appropriate when officeholder 
"willfully engage[s] in misconduct while in office") or the caselaw cited above, indicating 
that any illegal act done intentionally and without any reasonable basis for believing that 
it was legal or justified can warrant an officeholder's removal.    
 
The Court of Appeals set a standard that mandates a level of sustained 
malfeasance not required in our prior cases. It requires repetitive acts coupled with 
conduct of such a malevolent or dangerous nature as to constitute a threat of major 
17 
 
 
 
proportions. Such behavior is not the benchmark by which willful neglect or willful 
misconduct is proven. Consequently, the Court of Appeals sets too high of a standard for 
determining whether certain actions justify ouster under K.S.A. 60-1205(1) and (2). 
 
While the Court of Appeals set a standard that was too high, the district court, on 
the other hand, failed to consider whether the proven violations under the Code of the 
City of Prairie Village were prompted by a bad or corrupt purpose. The district court 
found Morrison violated Sections 1-212(e)(6)(b) and 1-212(g) of the Prairie Village City 
Code by intentionally giving Malone his access code and allowing him to stay at city hall 
for several nights. Consequently, Morrison's conduct in secreting Malone into city hall 
under false pretenses showed that Morrison did not act with a good faith belief that his 
actions were legal or justified under the circumstances. 
 
We are mindful that, under our Constitution, the people elect their state office 
holders and representatives and city and county commissioners in order to have such 
officials serve out their terms for which they were elected. As the Court of Appeals aptly 
noted:  "Our courts' long history of considering judicial ouster a drastic remedy, available 
only on a showing of serious wrongdoing, is deeply rooted in judicial respect for the 
separation of powers and judicial restraint in the face of political questions." Morrison, 
50 Kan. App. 2d at 1011. 
 
It is only in exceptional circumstances that publicly elected officials should be 
removed prior to the completion of their terms. A careful review of our cases shows that, 
while they are at times inconsistent, they generally recognize an exceptional circumstance 
by requiring a bad or corrupt purpose when applying the question of willful neglect and 
willful misconduct under K.S.A. 60-1205(1) and (2). 
 
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Here, while the district court found that Morrison's conduct showed that he did not 
act with a good faith belief that his actions were legal or justified under the 
circumstances, more is required under our standard. A finding of a bad or corrupt purpose 
is also necessary to satisfy ouster under K.S.A. 60-1205(1) and (2). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We therefore find that the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
determine whether Morrison's conduct was the product of a bad or corrupt purpose. See 
State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 755, 234 P.3d 1 (2010) (district court by definition 
abuses its discretion when making an error of law; abuse of discretion standard includes 
review to ensure that discretion not guided by erroneous legal conclusions). The decision 
of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The district court's decision ordering Morrison's 
removal from the Prairie Village City Council is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
application of the standard consistent with this decision. Based on this outcome, the 
State's belated motion to set aside the Court of Appeals' stay of the district court's ouster 
order is rendered moot.  
 
STEGALL, J., not participating. 
EVELYN Z. WILSON, District Judge, assigned.1 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: District Judge Wilson was appointed to hear case No. 110,835 
vice Justice Stegall under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) of 
the Kansas Constitution. 
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* * * 
 
JOHNSON, J., dissenting in part:  I cannot agree with the majority's holding that the 
district court failed to determine that Morrison's conduct was the product of a bad or 
corrupt purpose. Accordingly, I would simply reverse the Court of Appeals, including its 
unauthorized order to stay the district court's ouster order, and I would affirm the district 
court's Judgment of Ouster. 
 
First, the verdict form presented to the advisory jury asked the questions of 
whether it was highly probable that Morrison, "while in office, intentionally or 
purposefully engaged in misconduct in order to do wrong or cause injury to another," and 
"while in office, intentionally or purposefully neglected to perform any duty mandated by 
law in order to do wrong or cause injury to another." The jury answered those questions 
affirmatively. If a person acts or refuses to act "in order to do wrong or cause injury to 
another," that person's conduct must be deemed the product of a bad or corrupt purpose. 
In other words, a determination that Morrison's conduct was for the purpose of doing 
wrong or causing injury to another is the equivalent of finding that his conduct was for a 
bad or corrupt purpose. 
 
Likewise, the district court specifically found that the evidence showed that 
Morrison "used city property for his own convenience," which was "a personal benefit to 
[Morrison]." The district court also made determinations about Morrison's lack of 
credibility in his excuses, which bolsters those findings. In my view, a public official who 
knowingly appropriates the public's property for the official's own personal benefit has 
acted for a corrupt purpose. Granted, as Morrison argued before us, there are instances of 
misappropriation of public property that are so de minimis that they should not support an 
ouster, e.g., making a single personal photocopy on the city's machine. But that is where 
the district court's exercise of discretion comes into play; it does not negate the bad or 
20 
 
 
 
corrupt purpose of the action. Here, Morrison's actions went way past de minimis, and the 
district court's findings were sufficient to support its judgment. I would affirm.  
 
BILES, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.