Case Title: State v. Slapnicher

Citation: 149 N.W.2d 390

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1967-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
149 N.W.2d 390 (1967) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Lawrence Joseph SLAPNICHER, Appellant. No. 39633. Supreme Court of Minnesota. March 23, 1967. *391 Arvid Nasi, Jr., Hibbing, for appellant. Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, John C. Arko, County Atty., David Naughtin, Asst. County Atty., Hibbing, for respondent. OTIS, Justice. This is an appeal from a paternity adjudication. The only issue is whether the court erred in refusing to receive testimony given by a witness at a previous trial, which the defendant claims was exculpatory notwithstanding the fact it was subsequently repudiated. The attending physician testified that the date of conception was within 2 or 3 days of April 29, 1963. One Kenneth Ostroot was called as a witness with the understanding he could be cross-examined by both parties and neither of them would be bound by his testimony. In the course of his examination by the state, Ostroot testified as follows: On cross-examination by defendant's counsel, Ostroot stated: On the afternoon of the day that Ostroot gave this testimony, he was asked by the court in chambers whether he wished to clarify any discrepancy in his testimony, to which he made the following answer: The discussion terminated with the following colloquy: Thereupon the trial court granted a mistrial.[1] At the second trial, the defendant called Ostroot, who again stated that the last time *393 he dated the mother was in January 1963. He then testified as follows: An objection to the last question was sustained as an attempt to impeach defendant's own witness without any claim of surprise. Thereupon defendant renewed a previous request to treat Ostroot as a hostile witness and to cross-examine him on his prior testimony, which defendant argued was inconsistent. Defendant asserts that having been given under oath and subject to cross-examination the testimony was admissible. The motion was denied. The jury found defendant guilty as charged, and defendant appeals from an order denying a new trial. We are here asked to apply a rule, advocated by a number of distinguished scholars and commentators and adopted by the Second Circuit United States Court of Appeals, that in the absence of surprise, and without being limited to impeachment, a litigant has a right to introduce as substantive evidence inconsistent testimony given by a witness at a prior trial.[2] The principal objections to such a rule do not obtain, it is argued, if the witness was present at the first trial, was under oath, subject to cross-examination, and is now available to be sworn and cross-examined by the adverse party at the second trial. Although the rule for which defendant contends may well merit our further consideration in an appropriate case notwithstanding our prior adherence to an orthodox position,[3] we are persuaded that this is not the proper vehicle for adopting the more liberal approach which is proposed. A careful examination of Ostroot's testimony discloses that he did not at any time affirmatively admit he had relations with the mother within a period of 3 months prior to conception. On the contrary, he qualified all of his initial testimony by consistently stating that he did not know when he had been out with her. At most, he said it might have been in April or May; that he wasn't sure; that it had been a long time; and that he couldn't quite recall. This, in our opinion, is too insubstantial a premise from which to conclude that Ostroot, and not defendant, was the father. Had Ostroot made an unqualified admission and later repudiated it, we would be obliged to decide whether it was admissible as substantive evidence. However, a fair reading of the testimony first given by Ostroot makes it clear that he had no recollection of the crucial dates. Where evidence is this vague and inconclusive, we hold that its exclusion was not prejudicial and does not require the granting of a new trial. Affirmed. [1] We believe the better procedure would have been to complete the trial and let the jury decide which version of Ostroot's testimony was the more accurate. [2] United States v. De Sisto (2 Cir.) 329 F.2d 929, 933; Di Carlo v. United States (2 Cir.) 6 F.2d 364, 368, certiorari denied, 268 U.S. 706, 45 S. Ct. 640, 69 L. Ed. 1168; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3 ed.) § 1018; McCormick, Evidence, § 39; McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 Tex.L.Rev. 573; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 177, 192; Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 Cornell L.Q., 239, 249; A.L.I., Model Code of Evidence, Rule 503(b); 9A U.L.A., Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(1); Annotation, 133 A.L.R. 1454, 1462. [3] Kvanli v. Village of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 486, 139 N.W.2d 275, 279; State v. Mlynczak, 268 Minn. 417, 419, 130 N.W.2d 53, 54; State v. Dahlgren, 259 Minn. 307, 309, 107 N.W.2d 299, 301; State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 361, 285 N.W. 898, 900. See, also, United States v. Rainwater (8 Cir.) 283 F.2d 386.