Case Title: Cervelli v. Graves

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5801

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cervelli v. Graves1983 WY 34661 P.2d 1032Case Number: 5801Case Number: 5801Decided: 04/06/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
LARRY B. CERVELLI, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

KENNETH H. GRAVES AND 
DeBERNARDI BROTHERS, INC., APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). No. 
5801

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Jack B. Speight 
(argued) and Blair J. Trautwein of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne, signed the brief 
on behalf of 
appellant.

David D. Uchner 
(argued) and Mark A. Bishop of Lathrop & Uchner, Cheyenne, signed the brief 
on behalf of appellees. 

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

RAPER, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case arose when 
Larry B. Cervelli (appellant) filed a personal injury suit for injuries he 
sustained when a pickup truck driven by him collided with a cement truck owned 
by DeBernardi Brothers, Inc. (appellee). The cement truck was driven by 
DeBernardi's employee, Kenneth H. Graves (appellee) while acting in the course 
of his employment. After trial, a jury found no negligence on the part of 
appellees. Appellant argues the jury was incorrectly instructed and, as a 
result, found as it did thereby prejudicing him. He raises the following issues 
on appeal:

"A. Did the court err in 
instructing the jury that it was not to consider a person's skills in 
determining whether that person is negligent?

"B. Did the court err in 
not instructing that defendant, Kenneth H. Graves, is held to a more specific 
standard of care since he was a professional truck driver and plaintiff, Larry 
B. Cervelli, was not?

"C. Did the court err in 
instructing the jury that there is no liability for injuries from dangers that 
are obvious and reasonably apparent in the context of this 
matter."

We will reverse 
and remand.

[¶2.]     Around 7:30 a.m., 
February 22, 1980, a collision occurred approximately nine miles west of 
Rock Springs, Wyoming in the westbound lane of Interstate 
Highway 80 involving a pickup driven by appellant and appellee's cement truck. 
At the time of the accident, the road was icy and very slick; witnesses 
described it as covered with "black ice." Just prior to the accident appellant 
had difficulty controlling his vehicle and began to "fishtail" on the ice. He 
eventually lost control of his vehicle and started to slide. Appellee Graves, 
who had been approaching appellant from behind at a speed of 35-40 m.p.h., 
attempted to pass appellant's swerving vehicle first on the left side, then the 
right. He too, thereafter, lost control of his cement truck and the two vehicles 
collided. It was from that accident that appellant brought suit to recover 
damages for the numerous injuries he suffered.

[¶3.]     By his own admission, 
appellee Graves at the time of the accident was 
an experienced, professional truck driver with over ten years of truck driving 
experience. He possessed a class "A" driver's license which entitled him to 
drive most types of vehicles including heavy trucks. He had attended the Wyoming 
Highway Patrol's defensive driver course and had kept up-to-date with various 
driving safety literature. He was the senior driver employed by appellee 
DeBernardi Brothers, Inc.

[¶4.]     The suit was tried to a 
jury on the issues of appellee's negligence as well as the degree, if any, of 
appellant's own negligence. After a four-day trial, the jury was instructed and 
received the case for their consideration. They found no negligence on the part 
of appellees. Judgment was entered on the jury verdict and appellant moved for a 
new trial claiming the jury was improperly instructed. The district court took 
no action on the motion; it was deemed denied in sixty days. Rule 59, W.R.C.P. 
This appeal followed.

[¶5.]     Appellant calls our 
attention to and alleges as error the district court's jury instructions 5 and 
10. Instruction 5 instructed the jury that:

"Negligence is the lack 
of ordinary care. It is the failure of a person to do something a reasonable, 
careful person would do, or the act of a person in doing something a reasonable, 
careful person would not do, under circumstances the same or similar to those 
shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonable, careful person 
would act under those circumstances, as that is for the Jury to 
decide.

"A reasonable, careful 
person, whose conduct is set up as a standard, is not the extraordinarily 
cautious person, nor the exceptionally skillful one, but rather a person of 
reasonable and ordinary prudence.

"Negligence is actionable 
only when it appears that it was a direct cause of any injury and damages 
complained of. A direct cause is a cause which directly brings about the injury 
either immediately or through happenings which follow one after 
another.

"There may be more than 
one direct cause in that an accident may result from one or more separate and 
distinct acts by different persons."

Instruction 10 
instructed the jury that:

"Cervelli [appellant] and 
Graves [appellee] had a duty to use ordinary care for their own safety and 
protection, and to that end to observe the dangers, if any, which were open and 
obvious to them, or as well known to one as to the other, if they were using 
reasonable care and caution for their own safety and protection, and to guard 
against injury to themselves so far as by such reasonable care they could 
protect themselves. They had a duty to use for their own safety all such care 
and caution as an ordinarily prudent person ordinarily uses under like 
circumstances.

"Ordinary care demands 
that such vigilance be increased where special circumstances exist. The degree 
of diligence required of the parties in order to measure up to the standard of 
ordinary care which the law requires, varies with the circumstances and the 
conditions which might normally be brought about by the weather, and the 
opportunity to observe things. There is no liability for injuries from dangers 
that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well known to the person injured as 
they are to any other parties."

[¶6.]     In chambers, 
appellant's counsel made timely and specific objections to both instructions 5 
and 10 and proposed instructions consistent with his objection to instruction 
5.1 Appellant's counsel stated 
distinctly that he objected to the second paragraph of instruction 5 because he 
argued appellee Graves was a professional truck 
driver and should be "held to a higher duty of care." In the alternative, 
counsel argued if appellee Graves is not held 
to a higher standard by virtue of his occupation, the jury is at least allowed 
to take cognizance of any knowledge and skill he possesses; therefore, the 
instruction's second paragraph should be deleted. Instruction 10, in its 
entirety, was objected to as incorrectly applying the doctrine of known and 
obvious danger, as it pertains to slip and fall cases, to this highway collision 
case; appellant argued that it had no application to the case at bar.2 Because appellant's objections were 
timely and specific, the trial judge was sufficiently aware of the nature and 
grounds of the objection to afford him the opportunity, upon second thought, to 
change them if he so chose. For that reason, the objections were sufficient to 
preserve the issue and permit our review of the questioned instructions. Rule 
51, W.R.C.P.; Danculovich v. Brown, 
Wyo., 593 P.2d 187 (1979); Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. Cook, 
Wyo., 526 P.2d 986 (1974).

[¶7.]     In reviewing alleged 
errors in jury instructions, a finding of error is not alone sufficient to 
reverse; prejudicial error must be found. Walton v. Texasgulf, Inc., Wyo., 634 P.2d 908 
(1981). Prejudicial error is never presumed; it must be established by the 
parties. Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. 
Cook, supra. If it is established that an instruction or instructions had a 
tendency to confuse or mislead the jury with respect to the applicable 
principles of law, reversal is proper. 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil § 2558, p. 668 (1971); see also, Marken v. Empire Drilling Company, 75 
Wyo. 121, 293 P.2d 406 (1956). We shall proceed with the foregoing in 
mind.

I

[¶8.]     We begin our discussion 
of the issues by reviewing instruction 5 given by the trial court. Appellant 
argues that the second paragraph of that instruction is an incorrect statement 
of the law. We agree.

[¶9.]     The complained of 
portion of that instruction states:

"A reasonable, careful 
person, whose conduct is set up as a standard, is not the extraordinarily 
cautious person, nor the exceptionally skillful one, but rather a person of 
reasonable and ordinary prudence."

That language is 
an apparent attempt to enlarge upon the reasonable man standard. In that attempt 
to explain the reasonable man concept, however, the instruction goes too far. It 
contradicts the correct statement of the law contained in the first paragraph of 
the instruction. Simply put, the first paragraph of the instruction correctly 
states that negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care where ordinary 
care is that degree of care which a reasonable person is expected to exercise 
under the same or similar circumstances. Vassos v. Roussalis, Wyo., 625 P.2d 768 (1981); Nehring v. Russell, Wyo., 582 P.2d 67 (1978); Fegler v. Brodie, Wyo., 
574 P.2d 751 (1978). The trial court's instruction first allows the jury to 
consider the parties' acts as compared to how the reasonable person would act in 
similar circumstances and then limits the circumstances the jury can consider by 
taking out of their purview the circumstances of exceptional skill or knowledge 
which are a part of the totality of 
circumstances.

[¶10.]  Our view that negligence should be 
determined in view of the circumstances is in accord with the general view. The 
Restatement, Torts 2d § 283 (1965) defines the standard of conduct in negligence 
actions in terms of the reasonable man under like circumstances. Professor 
Prosser, discussing the reasonable man, likewise said that "negligence is a 
failure to do what the reasonable man would do `under the same or similar 
circumstances.'" He contended a jury must be instructed to take the 
circumstances into account. Prosser, Law of Torts § 32, p. 151 (4th ed. 1971). 
Prosser also went on to note that under the latitude of the phrase "under the 
same or similar circumstances," courts have made allowance not only for external 
facts but for many of the characteristics of the actor 
himself.

[¶11.]  It has been said that "[c]ircumstances 
are the index to the reasonable man's conduct. His degree of diligence varies 
not only with standard of ordinary care, but also with his ability to avoid 
injuries to others, as well as the consequences of his conduct." (Footnote 
omitted.) 1 Dooley, Modern Tort Law § 3.08, p. 27 (1982 Rev.). It was aptly put 
many years ago when it was said:

"`It seems plain also 
that the degree of vigilance which the law will exact as implied by the 
requirement of ordinary care, must vary with the probable consequences of 
negligence and also with the command of means to avoid injuring others possessed 
by the person on whom the obligation is imposed. * * * Under some circumstances 
a very high degree of vigilance is demanded by the requirement of ordinary care. 
Where the consequence of negligence will probably be serious injury to others, 
and where the means of avoiding the infliction of injury upon others are 
completely within the party's power, ordinary care requires almost the utmost 
degree of human vigilance and foresight.'" (Footnote omitted.) Id., quoting from Kelsey 
v. Barney, 12 N.Y. 425 (1855).

[¶12.]  At a minimum, as Justice Holmes once 
said, the reasonable man is required to know what every person in the community 
knows. Holmes, Common Law p. 57 (1881). In a similar vein, Professor Prosser 
notes there is, at least, a minimum standard of knowledge attributable to the 
reasonable man based upon what is common to the community. Prosser, supra at pp. 
159-160. Prosser went on to say, however, that although the reasonable man 
standard provides a minimum standard below which an individual's conduct will 
not be permitted to fall, the existence of knowledge, skill, or even 
intelligence superior to that of an ordinary man will demand conduct consistent 
therewith. Id. at 161. Along that same line, Restatement, Torts 2d § 289 (1965) 
provides:

"The actor is required to 
recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing an invasion of another's 
interest if a reasonable man would do so while exercising

"(a) such attention, 
perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of other pertinent matters, 
intelligence, and judgment as a reasonable man would have; 
and

"(b) such superior 
attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment as the 
actor himself has."

Section 289 
comment m expands further on the effect of superior qualities of an individual 
when it states:

"m. Superior qualities of actor. The 
standard of the reasonable man requires only a minimum of attention, perception, 
memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment in order to recognize the 
existence of the risk. If the actor has in fact more than the minimum of these 
qualities, he is required to exercise the superior qualities that he has in a 
manner reasonable under the circumstances. The standard becomes, in other words, 
that of a reasonable man with such superior attributes."

[¶13.]  The instruction given by the trial court 
could easily have been construed by the jury to preclude their consideration of 
exceptional skill or knowledge on the part of either party which the evidence 
may have shown. In determining negligence the jury must be allowed to consider 
all of the circumstances surrounding an occurrence, including the 
characteristics of the actors in reaching their decision. Where, as here, there 
was evidence from which the jury could have concluded appellee Graves was more 
skillful than others as a result of his experience as a driver, they should be 
allowed to consider that as one of the circumstances in reaching their decision. 
The second paragraph of instruction 5, as appellant points out, could easily 
have misled the jury into disregarding what they may have found from the 
evidence regarding appellee's skill and as such prejudiced appellant. The 
objectionable language of the instruction is surplus language which, rather than 
clarifying the fictional concept of the reasonable person, actually unduly 
limited it. Therefore, because instruction 5 was both an incorrect statement of 
the law and more importantly very probably misleading, we hold that the trial 
court committed reversible error in using it to instruct the 
jury.

II

[¶14.]  Although we hold that the trial court 
erred when it in effect instructed the jury to disregard exceptional 
characteristics of either of the parties in determining negligence, we cannot 
extend that holding to rule favorably on appellant's second issue. Appellant 
would have us hold that the trial court erred in failing to instruct that, as a 
matter of law, appellee Graves was held to a higher standard of care because he 
was a professional truck driver. It is one thing to say that, if so found, a 
jury can take account of an individual's exceptional knowledge or skill in 
determining negligence; it is quite another to say that as a matter of law, 
because he is a truck driver, an individual is held to a higher standard of care 
than other drivers. Appellant would, in his own words, have us treat this as a 
professional truck driver's driver malpractice case. That we will not 
do.

[¶15.]  Appellant relies on the fact that the 
State has created various classes of driver's licenses and that appellee Graves 
possessed a class "A" license as his basis for claiming that, as a matter of 
law, truck drivers, as a group, are held by statute to a higher standard of 
care. Section 31-7-109, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, is the statute upon which he 
relies. It provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Every driver's 
license issued by the department shall be classified to indicate the type or 
general class of vehicles the licensee may drive.

"(b) License 
classification shall be prescribed by the department and shall take into account 
the operational characteristics of the vehicles involved, their design and 
factors the division reasonably believes are important to safe traffic. These 
qualifications may include any test or affidavit of proficiency authorized to be 
given to the original applicants by W.S. 31-7-114.

"(c) Licensing 
classification plan:

"(i) Class `C' consists 
of any single vehicle or combination of vehicles except motorcycles and buses 
not in excess of sixteen thousand (16,000) pounds unladen vehicle or total 
combined weight;

"(ii) Class `B' consists 
of any single vehicle, except motorcycles, weighing over sixteen thousand 
(16,000) pounds unladen vehicle weight and all vehicles under class 
`C';

"(iii) Class `A' consists 
of any vehicle or combination of vehicles, except motorcycles, including all 
vehicles under classes `B' and `C'."

[¶16.]  That statute does not create a higher 
standard of care for possessors of each successively higher class of license. 
It, in § 31-7-109(b), explains that the classification scheme was created to 
take cognizance of varying operational characteristics and design factors when 
licensing drivers to drive different classes of vehicles. It deals with what 
type of vehicles the holder of any class license may drive, rather than the 
standard of care the holder of each must exercise. Section 31-5-104, W.S. 1977, 
sets the statutory standard that drivers must obey the traffic laws of this 
state. Nowhere in our statutes can we find a provision requiring that any one 
class of drivers must exercise a higher standard of care than others - all 
drivers are to exercise due care under the circumstances in the operation of 
their vehicles. Miller v. Hedderman, 
Wyo., 464 P.2d 544 (1970). This court has held that drivers in this state have a 
two-fold duty to comply with the applicable traffic laws and regulations and to 
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. McVicker v. Kuronen, 71 Wyo. 222, 256 P.2d 111 (1953).

[¶17.]  Appellant cites Dillenbeck v. City of Los Angeles, 69 Cal. 2d 472, 72 Cal. Rptr. 321, 446 P.2d 129 (1968) for the proposition that truck 
drivers as a group should be held to a higher standard of care than other 
drivers. Dillenbeck dealt with an automobile collision in which a policeman, 
responding to an emergency, drove through a red light and collided with another 
vehicle. The other driver died as a result of the injuries he sustained in the 
mishap. The issue that case decided was evidentiary rather than one dealing with 
jury instructions. The court ruled that evidence of police safety bulletins and 
the information contained therein concerning proper police procedures for 
responding to an emergency should have been admitted at trial. The bulletins 
were admissible to show procedures that may or may not have been followed by the 
defendant, as well as to show the standard of care required of police officers 
based on their knowledge. In dicta the court indicated that an instruction on a 
higher standard of care required of drivers of emergency vehicles may have been 
appropriate. It is that dicta to which appellant refers 
us.

[¶18.]  Dillenbeck is distinguishable from 
the instant case on its facts. There the court dealt with the case of an 
emergency driver who, in the performance of his duties, was acting outside the 
normal traffic laws. Here we are faced with drivers operating under the normal 
rules of the road with no provision for them to do otherwise.3 Because of the factual difference, 
we find Dillenbeck, together with its dicta, inapplicable to the case before 
us.

[¶19.]  Appellant cites no other authority to 
support an instruction that truck drivers as a class are held to a higher 
standard of care. Our own research has likewise failed to turn up authority to 
support such an instruction. Quite to the contrary, the general state of the law 
supports the opposite conclusion that all drivers, regardless of class, are held 
to the same standard of care - due care under the circumstances.4 Without so stating to the jury by 
way of an instruction, jury consideration of an individual truck driver's 
exceptional skill is one of the circumstances contemplated by instruction 5, 
corrected by the deletion of the second paragraph.

[¶20.]  In view of the lack of statutory or 
common-law authority which would support the giving of appellant's proffered 
instruction 24, we hold that the trial court quite rightly rejected 
it.

III

[¶21.]  We reach appellant's final issue in which 
he argues that the trial court erred in giving instruction 10. He particularly 
objects to the final sentence of that instruction which states the essence of 
the entire instruction. That sentence states: "There is no liability for 
injuries from dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well known to 
the person injured as they are to any other parties." That is an erroneous 
statement of the law of negligence as it applies to the case at 
bar.

[¶22.]  The instruction is basically the type of 
instruction given in a slip and fall case dealing with the known and obvious 
danger of natural accumulation of ice and snow. We have, on numerous occasions, 
upheld the known and obvious danger rule in appropriate slip and fall cases. Norman v. City of Gillette, Wyo., 658 P.2d 697 (1983); Sherman v. Platte 
County, Wyo., 642 P.2d 787 (1982); Johnson v. Hawkins, Wyo., 622 P.2d 941 
(1981); Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 
550 P.2d 494 (1976). Those cases all dealt with suits brought by the injured 
party against the owner of the premises where the fall occurred. The thrust of 
our known and obvious danger rule decisions has been that the danger presented 
by accumulations of snow and ice does not generally create liability for a 
possessor of property because of their natural character. We have never, 
however, applied that rule to an automobile collision case where the parties 
involved were not in control of the premises where the accident 
occurred.

[¶23.]  Here, the trial court incorrectly applied 
the known and obvious danger rule to a negligence action between two drivers on 
an icy highway. The rule does not apply in such a case. To apply such a rule to 
the case at bar abrogates Wyoming's comparative negligence statute5 upon which the jury was also 
instructed by the trial court. 

[¶24.]  Where we have carved out a rule as a 
matter of public policy to protect possessors of land from liability for the 
natural accumulation of ice and snow, such a rule is unnecessary between two 
parties like those here where we have adopted comparative negligence. As we 
noted in Sherman v. Platte County, 
supra at 789-790, the adoption of the comparative negligence rule did not 
abrogate the obvious danger rule because, under that rule, there is no 
negligence on the defendant's part; the adoption of comparative negligence 
created no new duties of care. In this case, both appellant and appellees owed a 
duty to exercise due care under the circumstances and both have alleged the 
other violated that duty. Comparative negligence is particularly applicable in 
this case. Instruction 10 in effect resurrects contributory negligence as a bar 
to appellant's recovery. Our comparative negligence statute, see fn. 5, clearly 
forbids any such bar to appellant's recovery. See, Board of County Com'rs of County of Campbell 
v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174 (1981), reh. denied Wyo., 627 P.2d 163 
(1981).

[¶25.]  Instruction 10, viewed in any light, 
precludes recovery for appellant in view of the uncontroverted fact that the 
accident occurred on ice and such condition was known to both parties. It allows 
the trial court to decide the case for the jury, whereas the jury is properly 
the fact finder. Instruction 10 applies an inapplicable rule of law. Because it 
effectively precluded appellant's recovery by taking away a jury question, it 
was prejudicial. There can be negligent driving on icy roads by one or the other 
or both parties in varying percentages. What a jury may decide upon hearing this 
case and after being properly instructed we are unable to say. What we must say, 
though, is that appellant should have the benefit of having his case decided by 
a properly instructed jury rather than by the trial court through an incorrect 
jury instruction.

[¶26.]  Reversed and remanded for a new 
trial.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellant requested that 
the following two instructions be given in place of what the court ultimately 
gave in instruction 5. Appellant's proposed instruction 5 omitted the second 
paragraph of the instruction which he objected to and 
provided:

"Negligence is the lack 
of ordinary care. It is the failure of a person to do something a reasonable, 
careful person would do, or the act of a person in doing something a reasonable, 
careful person would not do, under all the circumstances the same or similar to 
those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonable, careful 
person would act under those circumstances, as that is for the Jury to 
decide.

"Negligence is actionable 
only when it appears that it was a direct cause of any injury and damages 
complained of. A direct cause is a cause which directly brings about the injury 
either immediately or through happenings which follow one after 
another.

"There may be more than 
one direct cause in that an accident may result from one or more separate and 
distinct acts by different persons."

Appellant's 
proposed instruction 24 dealing with appellee Graves' duty of care provided:

"The evidence in this 
case shows that Defendant Kenneth Graves was employed by Defendant, DeBarnardi 
[DeBernardi] Brothers, Inc., as a professional truck driver. As such, Defendant 
Kenneth Graves was under a duty to exercise the skill, diligence and knowledge 
and must apply the means and methods which would be reasonably exercised and 
applied by members of his occupation in good standing and in the same line of 
practice."

2 Because of the nature of 
appellant's objection to instruction 10, no substitute instruction was proposed 
nor was one necessary.

3 We note that § 31-5-107, 
W.S. 1977, deals specifically with exemptions from the general traffic rules 
afforded drivers of emergency vehicles and the standards of care they are 
charged with.

4 Capital Raceway Promotions, Inc. v. 
Smith, 22 Md. App. 224, 322 A.2d 238 (1974) (neither the inexperience of a 
novice nor the professional experience of a truck driver affects the standard of 
care required of a driver); Duckworth v. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 469 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1972); and New Deal Cab Company v. Meyer, Fla., 139 So. 2d 189 (1962) (although a common carrier owes the highest degree of care to 
its passengers, as to other drivers, its duty is to exercise ordinary care under 
the circumstances); Lemons v. Maryland 
Chicken Processors, Inc., 223 Md. 362, 164 A.2d 703 (1960) (truck drivers 
are held to the same standard of care as all other 
drivers).

5 Section 1-1-109, W.S. 
1977, entitled "Comparative negligence" provides:

"(a) Contributory 
negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal 
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury 
to person or property, if the contributory negligence was not as great as the 
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the 
person recovering.

"(b) The court may, and 
when requested by any party shall:

"(i) If a jury trial, 
direct the jury to find separate special verdicts;

"(ii) If a trial before 
the court without jury, make special findings of fact, determining the amount of 
damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party. The court 
shall then reduce the amount of such damages in proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributed to the person recovering;

"(iii) Inform the jury of 
the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
negligence."