Case Title: South Easton v. Easton

Citation: 387 Md. 468

Docket Number: 120/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
South Easton Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Town of Easton, No. 120, Sept. Term 2004.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - HOME RULE -
EXPLICIT POWER TO CONVEY PROPERTY 
A declaration by an incorporated municipality that the conveyance of a road bed of a closed
public right-of-way to a private entity for a public use is affirmed where the conveyance
conformed with Article 23A, § 2 (b) (24) of the Maryland Code.  Article 23A, § 2 (b) (24)
requires that the legislative body determine that the street bed in question was no longer
needed for public use or public purpose before passing an ordinance conveying the street bed.
The Easton Town Council exercised properly its authority when it closed Adkins Avenue
pursuant to its town charter.  Conveyance of the now-closed road bed to a private, non-profit
corporation to expand the emergency room facility of the Town’s only hospital occurred after
the Town Council effectively determined that the road bed was no longer needed for any
other public use or purpose. 
RECUSAL - PERMISSIVE - STANDARD REQUIRING OTHER JUDGE TO HEAR
MOTION
Initial recusal request by counsel was refused properly because no evidence of partiality was
proffered.  Refusal of the motion was not an abuse of discretion because there was no
evidence that the sitting judge would be partial towards an opposing party that operated a
hospital that may give medical treatment to the judge or his family.  In a post-trial motion for
recusal resulting that it be heard by another judge, the moving counsel demonstrated only
adverse outcomes before the sitting judge and not personal bias, as required under Surratt
v.  Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439, 578 A.2d 745 (1990).  As a result, the sitting judge
denied properly the motion to recuse because sufficient personal bias was not alleged.
Circuit Court for Talb ot County
Case # 20-C-04-005010 AA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 120
September Term, 2004
SOUTH EASTON NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.
v.
TOWN OF EASTON, MARYLAND, et al.
Bell, C.J.
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:     June 3, 2005
This case began with a request by Shore Health Systems, Incorporated (“SHS”),
operator of the Easton Memorial Hospital in Easton, Maryland (the “Hospital”), to expand
the Hospital’s emergency room facilities.  A prerequisite for construction of the planned
expansion was the closure and conveyance to SHS of the roadbed of Adkins Avenue, a
public street of the Town of Easton (“Town”), an incorporated municipality.  The closure and
conveyance would allow the new facility to be built across the existing public right-of-way.
A hearing was held by the Town Council to consider concurrently the proposed
closure of Adkins Avenue and a zoning amendment for the proposed Hospital expansion.
SHS claimed that the existing Hospital was designed for less than one-half of the current
patient flow.  Construction over the street bed was asserted as the only viable expansion
alternative for the increased need for emergency room services.  The South Easton
Neighborhood Association, Inc. (“SENA”) opposed the closing of Adkins Avenue, offering
two main arguments: (a) it would leave local neighborhood residents without a safe
alternative to access downtown Easton; and (b) the existing use of Adkins Avenue by the
public foreclosed the Town’s ability to close the street and convey the street bed to SHS.  On
5 January 2004, the Town Council enacted Ordinance No. 466, closing Adkins Avenue and
authorizing the conveyance to SHS of the lion’s share of the street bed.  
SENA filed in the Circuit Court for Talbot County a two count petition against the
Town, generally seeking to enjoin the closure and transfer.  The first count sought a
declaration, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, §§ 3-401, et. seq. of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, that Ordinance No. 466 exceeded the
1  SHS and the Town filed their joint petition for writ of certiorari to bypass the Court
of Special Appeals even though they succeeded in the Circuit Court.  The reason given for
their initiative was the substantial public interest in constructing promptly the new emergency
room facility.  SENA, which filed a cross-petition, also desired that we assume jurisdiction
over the appeal.  
2
statutory authority granted to the Town Council under Article 23A, § 2(b) (24) of the
Maryland Code.  The second count sought judicial review of the Town Council’s action as
if it were reviewable as the final action of an administrative agency or body. 
At a motions hearing on 30 July 2004, the Circuit Court orally granted summary
judgment to the Town and SHS (the latter having intervened as a party defendant), indicating
its intention to declare Ordinance No. 466 to be a valid exercise of the authority granted to
the Town by Article 23A, § 2(b)(24).  In the judgment entered on 3 August 2004, the Circuit
Court declared Ordinance No. 466 lawful and, with respect to SENA’s petition for judicial
review, affirmed the Town Council’s decision to close and convey Adkins Avenue.  SENA’s
post-judgment motions were denied.
SENA appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted a writ of certiorari, on
the petition of SHS and the Town (collectively described here as Appellees)1 before the
intermediate appellate court could consider the appeal (see § 12-201 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article, Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.) and Maryland Rule 8-302)
to decide the following questions, which we re-order to facilitate our analysis:
I.  Whether the Town, in authorizing the closing and conveyance
to private parties of an actively used public road, violated its
fiduciary responsibilities under Maryland law with respect to
2 In our Order, dated 17 December 2004, acting on the pending petitions for certiorari,
we denied SENA’s cross-petition without prejudice to raise any issues it may have raised
properly before the Court of Special Appeals.  The first question posed here was raised by
SENA in its brief.
3 We raise on our initiative the question of the jurisdiction in the appellate courts and
the Circuit Court to consider the petition for judicial review aspect of this case.  SENA
(continued...)
3
that public road and failed to meet its burden of proof as a
fiduciary for the challenged closing of an actively-used public
street.[2]
II. Whether the requirement in Section 2(b)(24) of Article 23A
that municipal property may be conveyed when the legislative
body determines that “it is no longer needed for any public use”
prohibits a municipality from conveying public property to a
private person or entity if a limited minority of public uses the
public property for convenience.
III. Whether the Town properly determined that closing Adkins
Avenue to enable SHS to construct a new emergency care
facility promotes a public benefit.
IV. Whether SENA submitted sufficient evidence of judicial
bias to require Judge Horne to recuse himself from deciding this
case.
For reasons to be explained, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.
I.
Further judicial review of the Circuit Court’s order upholding the Town Council’s
decision to close Adkins Avenue cannot be maintained as an action for judicial review of an
administrative agency’s decision.  Our review here shall be directed to the Circuit Court’s
declaratory judgment, an appealable final order.3
3(...continued)
appeals the declaratory relief granted and further seeks judicial review of the affirmance of
the Town Council’s decision to pass Ordinance No. 466.  We clearly have jurisdiction over
the appeal as to the declaration, a final judgment.  Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.) § 12-
301 of the Cts. and Judicial Proceedings Article.  
In its petition (Count 2) in the Circuit Court, SENA pled for judicial review, pursuant to
Maryland Rule 7-202, “as to the lawfulness” of the enactment of Amended Ordinance No.
466.  It also sought injunctive and other relief without specifying as to whether that relief was
sought as consideration of the declaratory action or judicial review.  SENA made no attempt
to identify the source of its implied legal right to judicial review of the Town Council’s
action in the Circuit Court.  Although Chapter 200 of Title 7 of the Maryland Rules provides
the process for how judicial review of administrative agency decisions is to proceed, it does
not grant the right to a party to seek review of an administrative decision.  County Council
for Prince George’s County v. Carl M. Freeman Assocs., Inc., 281 Md. 70, 74, 376 A.2d
860, 862 (1977) (the “B” Rules (the predecessors to Chapter 200 of Title 7 of the Maryland
Rules) do not create a statutory right of appeal).  
There appears to be no statutory authority for the Circuit Court to consider a petition for
judicial review of the Town Council’s decision to close Adkins Avenue.  If there were an
authorizing provision, it likely would be deemed a special remedy allowed by statute or
ordinance and thus preclude the declaratory relief sought by SENA.  § 3-409 (b) of the Cts.
and Judicial Proceedings Article; see Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md. 462,
478, 860 A.2d 871, 880 (2004); Utilities, Inc. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 362 Md.
37, 45, 763 A.2d 129, 133 (2000) (holding § 3-409 (b) of the Declaratory Judgment Act
applies to special statutory remedies beginning with either administrative or judicial
proceedings);  Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n v. Washington Nat’l
Arena, 282 Md., 588, 596, 386 A.2d 1216, 1223 (1978) (observing that § 3-409 (b) of the
Declaratory Judgments Act would deprive a trial court of the “power to render a declaratory
decree only in those cases where the Legislature intended to prohibit the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction by the courts”).  Our research did not uncover a legislative
authorization for judicial review of the Town’s actions in the Circuit Court in either the
Maryland Code or the Town of Easton Charter or Ordinances.
Even absent such statutory authority, we have authorized, in limited, Constitutional
circumstances, the judiciary to exercise its inherent authority to review quasi-judicial
decisions by administrative agencies.  Bd. of Educ. v. Sec’y of Pers., 317 Md. 34, 44, 562
A.2d 700, 705 (1989); Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274
(continued...)
4
3(...continued)
Md. 211, 223, 334 A.2d 514, 523 (1975).  The courts retain “inherent power to review
actions of administrative boards shown to be arbitrary, illegal or capricious, and to impair
personal or property rights. . .,” Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945),
when an administrative agency acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.  
In contrast, “the courts are likewise without authority to interfere with any exercise of the
legislative prerogative within constitutional limits, or with the lawful exercise of
administrative authority or discretion.”  Id.  Maryland courts, however, may entertain cases
when the sole issue raised may be characterized fairly as seeking a common law writ of
mandamus as relief.  Bucktail, LLC v. County Council, 352 Md. 530, 541-42, 723 A.2d 440,
445 (1999) (allowing appeal of Circuit Court’s judicial review of county council’s decision
to deny a zoning amendment ordinance as substantially seeking a common law writ of
mandamus where Bucktail’s application for a zoning amendment met all mandatory submittal
requirements and was recommended for approval by the Talbot County Planning
Commission).  Any vestige of discretion exercised by the administrative agency, however,
will prevent the characterization of such an appeal as one seeking a writ of mandamus.  See
Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 504, 331 A.2d 55, 66 (1975).  A
common law writ of mandamus is one where the relief sought involves the traditional
enforcement of a ministerial act (a legal duty) by recalcitrant public officials.  Gisriel v.
Ocean City Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 345 Md. 477, 497-500, 693 A.2d 757, 767-68
(1997) (petition for judicial review was characterized properly as one seeking a common law
writ of mandamus where the plaintiff sought to compel the Board of Elections to perform its
duty in executing the terms of the Ocean City Charter regarding qualified and registered
voters); Murrell v. Mayor of Balt., 376 Md. 170, 196, 829 A.2d 548, 564 (2003) (where the
original complaint was in substance more like a common law mandamus action than a
petition for judicial review); but see id. at 199-200, 829 A.2d at 565-66 (observing that
original petition for judicial review was not considered by petitioner as a writ of mandamus
until appealed) (Wilner, J., dissenting).  
We are unable to characterize the petition for judicial review aspect of the present action as
one seeking review of an administrative agency acting in its quasi-judicial capacity or in
pursuit of a common law writ of mandamus.  In its challenge to the Town Council’s decision
to enact Ordinance No. 466, SENA seeks, at a minimum, review of the legislative action of
the Town Council to close a street bed under both a town charter provision and a Maryland
statute granting the Town the discretion to enact an ordinance accomplishing that act.  Thus,
the petition for judicial review in this case may not be characterized fairly as a common law
action of mandamus.
(continued...)
5
3(...continued)
Even if the Circuit Court possessed jurisdiction to exercise appellate review of the Town
Council’s decision in this regard, our appellate jurisdiction is lacking over the judgment of
the Circuit Court’s affirmance of the Town Council’s decision.  There is no legislatively-
granted right to appeal or seek judicial review, in the Town Charter or Ordinances,
authorizing further judicial review of the Circuit Court’s judgment entered in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction.  Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 12-302 (a) of the Cts. and
Judicial Proceedings Article.  Because this case may not be characterized as a common law
writ of mandamus action, there is no appellate jurisdiction for review by this Court akin to
Bucktail, Gisriel, and Murrell, supra. 
4 The C-M Zone is a floating zone (much like a planned-unit development, or PUD)
providing for the planned and orderly development of medical facilities in Easton.  See
Mayor of Rockville v. Rylyns Enters., Inc., 372 Md. 514, 533-35 n. 9, 539 n.15, 814 A.2d
469, 480-81 n. 9, 484 n.15 (2002), for a comparison of floating versus Euclidean zoning.
6
II.
 
The Hospital lies within a Commercial-Medical Zoning District (“C-M Zone”)4,
established in 1993 and last amended by Town ordinance in 1998.  The Hospital’s main
campus bears the address 219 South Washington Street.  The campus is bordered on the
north and south by Biery Street and West Earle Avenue, respectively, and on the west by
Adkins Avenue.  Adkins Avenue is approximately nine hundred feet long and runs in a
north/south direction, connecting Biery Street to Earle Avenue.  Adkins Avenue is forty feet
wide at its northern terminus with Biery Street and fifty feet wide at its southern terminus
with Earle Avenue.
The Hospital is wholly-owned by SHS, a Maryland non-profit, non-stock charitable
corporation providing emergency, diagnostic, and clinical medical care on the Eastern Shore
of Maryland, principally through two hospitals – the Hospital and Dorchester General
7
Hospital in Cambridge, Maryland, as well as other facilities.  Other than the two hospitals
operated by SHS, there are no other hospitals in Talbot, Dorchester, Queen Anne’s or
Caroline Counties.
The Hospital Emergency Room (the “Emergency Room”) was designed in 1983 to
accommodate approximately 13,000 visits annually.  At the time of the Town Council
meeting in October 2003, the Emergency Room was receiving approximately 41,000 visits
per year.  Estimates supplied by SHS indicated that approximately 50,000 patients would
present at the Emergency Room by the year 2015, based on population growth and
demographic progression.  
On 20 October 2003 the Town Council held a joint public hearing to consider, among
other things, the proposed amendment to the C-M Zone to accommodate the Hospital
expansion.  In its request, SHS represented to the Town that a prerequisite to the construction
of the expanded Emergency room was the closure and conveyance of Adkins Avenue to
SHS.  SHS proposed expanding the Hospital facility across the street bed and onto lots SHS
controlled on the opposite side of Adkins Avenue.  Title to the street bed was to be
transferred to SHS.  The record contains a letter from the Chairman of the Town’s Planning
and Zoning Commission and a Town staff report, both of which recommended approval of
the closure of Adkins Avenue and propose no other or a future public use or purpose for the
street bed.  SHS submitted a traffic study showing that only 5-6 cars per hour drove the
8
length of Adkins Avenue during peak travel periods.  (Figure 1 depicts a not-to-scale
drawing of the proposed Emergency Room expansion across the bed of Adkins Avenue). 
 
Figure 1
5 The residents supporting SENA at the Town Council hearing, and as named parties
in this case, are either residents or property owners on the several streets surrounding the
Hospital.  None of these properties abut Adkins Avenue.  The Hospital and a synagogue are
the sole owners of the property abutting Adkins Avenue.
6 Article 23A, § 2(b) states:
(b) Express Powers. – In addition to, but not in substitution of,
the powers which have been, or may hereafter be, granted to it,
such legislative body also shall have the following express
ordinance-making powers:
*
*
*
*
(24) To acquire by conveyance, purchase or condemnation real
or leasehold property needed for any public purpose; to erect
buildings thereon for the benefit of the municipality; and to sell
at public or private sale after twenty days’ public notice and to
convey to the purchaser or purchasers thereof any real or
leasehold property belonging to the municipality when such
legislative body determines that the same is no longer needed for
any public use. 
(continued...)
9
     
SENA purported to be acting at the Town Council hearing on behalf of area residents
in its opposition to SHS’s requests.5  Wye Avenue, which runs parallel to Adkins Avenue,
was alleged to be an impractical alternative for public ingress and egress because of street
congestion, pedestrian use, and a lack of off-street parking.  After submitting petitions
supporting that Adkins Avenue be retained as a much-desired public right of way by the local
residents, SENA argued that the Town lacked the legal authority to close Adkins Avenue
because the on-going public use of Adkins Avenue, to any degree, foreclosed the Town’s
discretion to close the street under Article 23A, § 2(b)(24) of the Maryland Code.6 
6(...continued)
To take by gift, grant, bequest, or devise and to hold real and
personal property absolutely or in trust for parks or gardens, or
for the erection of statutes, monuments, buildings, or structures,
or for any public use, upon such terms and conditions as may be
prescribed by the grantor or donor, and accepted by the
municipality; to provide for the proper administration of the
same; and to convey the same when such legislative body
determines that it is no longer needed for public purposes,
subject to the terms and conditions of the original grant.
Md. Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.).  
All Maryland Code citations contained herein, unless otherwise specified, will be to Article
23A, 2001 Replacement Volume, in effect at the time of the motions hearing in the Circuit
Court. A portion of § 2 (b), not relevant to this appeal, was amended, effective 1 October
2004.  2004 Md. Laws Chap. 282. 
7A small portion of the street bed was to be transferred to the Temple B’nai Israel
Congregation (the “Temple”), which fronts on the northwest corner of the intersection of
Adkins Avenue and Earle Avenue.  The Temple is not a participant in this appeal.  
10
On 3 November 2004, the Town Council approved the closure of Adkins Avenue.  On
5 January 2004, the Town Council enacted Amended Ordinance No. 466 and conveyed the
relevant portion of the street bed to SHS.  The Amended Ordinance authorized: 
(1) closing Adkins Avenue and conveying a portion of the bed
of that street to SHS as requested by it will serve a public
purpose and benefit, namely, facilitating the provision of
emergency and outpatient care services to the residents of the
Town, Talbot County and surrounding counties; and (2) closing
the remaining portion of the bed of Adkins Avenue to the
Temple [7] is appropriate since no public purpose is served by
maintaining that portion of Adkins Avenue as a public street.
The Ordinance also incorporated by exhibit a new boundary line revision plat (“McCrone
Plat”) submitted by SHS.  The McCrone Plat showed that SHS and the Temple, the sole
8 Town Charter Article II § 17-A (3) states that the Town may, “(3) Grade, straighten,
widen, alter, improve, or close up any existing town public street or way or part thereof.”
11
property owners abutting Adkins Avenue, would receive the streetbed, which was captioned
on the McCrone Plat as “to be abandoned.”  
Ordinance No. 466 incorporated a statement of the Town Council’s Findings of Fact.
These findings included: 1) Adkins Avenue is used as a convenience by area residents in lieu
of Wye Avenue; 2) SHS would maintain a means of access of transit between Earle Avenue
and Biery Street in the event that an emergency would close access to Wye Avenue and
South Washington Street; 3) Town Charter Article II § 17-A (3)8 authorized the Town
Council to close public streets; 4) closing a portion of Adkins Avenue was in the best interest
of the public in providing improved emergency medical services to the Town; 5) the Hospital
would use approximately 250 feet of the 900 foot street bed for the addition to the Hospital
and the proposed Emergency Room; 6) there is no particular benefit in publicly maintaining
the portion of Adkins Avenue remaining after the Hospital’s construction of the expanded
Emergency Room; and, 7) the Town Council was authorized to convey the remaining street
bed pursuant to Md. Code Article 23A, § 2(b)(24).  (Figure 2 depicts the Hospital in relation
to the streets of the Town.  Pennsfield Lane, depicted here parallel to Wye Avenue and
Adkins Avenue, is an alley).
12
Figure 2
9 The Easton Planning and Zoning Commission convened twice to consider the
proposed zoning amendment and street closure.  After both meetings, the Chairman stated
in a letter that the Commission “supported the vacation of Adkins Avenue”.  The Town
Engineer also reviewed the proposed renovations to the Hospital and, while not specifically
addressing the closing of Adkins Avenue, did not identify an alternate public use or purpose
necessitating retention of the to-be-closed street bed. 
13
Amended Ordinance No. 465 also was enacted 5 January 2004.  This ordinance
amended the C-M District Zone to reflect the Emergency Room expansion and incorporated
by reference the Emergency Services Pavilion and Outpatient Center C-M District
Application & Amendment Sketch Plan detailing the construction of the Emergency Room
over the to-be-closed street bed of Adkins Avenue.  Ordinance No. 465 also incorporated the
closure of Adkins Avenue, stating that the “Town Council will take the necessary legislative
action” to close and transfer Adkins Avenue to SHS and the Temple.9
On 4 February 2004 SENA filed in the Circuit Court for Talbot County its two count
complaint against the Town.  SENA reiterated in its complaint that the Town lacked legal
authority to close Adkins Avenue while the street still was being used by the public.  It
alleged that the Town held Adkins Avenue in trust for the public use.  Lastly, it alleged, in
its judicial review request, that the Town acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting
Ordinance No. 466.  Four months after filing the suit, SENA moved for assignment of a
judge to hear the case who was not dependant on SHS for health care, claiming that the sole
sitting judge in the Circuit Court should recuse himself if he or any member of his immediate
family relied upon SHS for necessary health care.
14
After SHS intervened as a party defendant, SHS and the Town moved separately for
summary judgment on both counts.  In both motions, the parties claimed that the Town was
authorized under the Town Charter to close the street.  They further asserted that the Town
reached the necessary legal conclusion comporting with § 2 (b) (24), that continued use of
Adkins Avenue as a public thoroughfare was no longer needed and the construction of an
expanded emergency room was a public use and public benefit.  In addition, the Town
opposed the motion for recusal of the judge, pointing out that the reasoning of SENA’s
motion effectively would extend to each sitting judge in each Circuit Court in the M id-Shore
Area.
The Honorable William S. Horne held a hearing in the Circuit Court on 30 July 2004
to consider the motion for his recusal and the motions for summary judgment.  Regarding
the recusal motion, counsel for SENA alleged that Judge Horne and his wife relied
extensively on the Hospital for medical treatment.  Because of this reliance, counsel believed
that Judge Horne could not decide this litigation fairly and impartially.  Judge Horne denied
SENA’s motion, stating that whether a judge depended on SHS for medical care for
himself/herself or his/her family was irrelevant to his or her ability to decide fairly the
matters raised in SENA’s complaint and the motions for summary judgment.
The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town and SHS and
declared Ordinance No. 466 lawful.  In its oral opinion, the Circuit Court stated that, even
though the conveyance of the largest portion of the street bed of Adkins Avenue was to a
15
private entity, the land transfer to build the expanded emergency room was for a public use
and benefitted the public.  Although Adkins Avenue was being used as a public street to
some extent, the Town Council properly determined, pursuant to § 2 (b) (24), that it no
longer was needed as a public street.  The court also noted that the Town Council recognized
that parallel, remaining streets could be used to arrive at the same locations that Adkins
Avenue served.  The Circuit Court concluded further that the planned public use of the street
bed of Adkins Avenue for an expanded emergency room was superior to that of the
convenience of the nearby residents in having Adkins Avenue continue as a public
thoroughfare.
  
SENA filed a motion for a new trial, citing Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320
Md. 439, 578 A.2d 745 (1990).  SENA’s counsel alleged that Judge Horne had demonstrated
a “rather remarkable and offensive pattern of judicial misconduct” towards the attorneys and
clients of their firm and enclosed sealed affidavits allegedly supporting that position.
Because of this alleged longstanding pattern of personal animus, counsel believed that their
motion, as a matter of law, must be heard and ruled upon by another judge.  Judge Horne
denied the motion, without a hearing, on 2 September 2004.
III.
SENA asserts that the Town, as the entity holding public roads in trust for the public
as a matter of law, violated an implied fiduciary relationship to the general public.  As
support for the existence of this fiduciary relationship, SENA contends that we have held that
10 This is so unless an express fiduciary relationship is found to exist.  See Ward v.
Mayor of Balt., 267 Md. 576, 298 A.2d 382 (1973) (holding that Baltimore City did not
violate explicit trust agreement to invest proceeds from the sale of a testamentary transfer of
real property for a public park when it later resold a portion of that public park if it invested
the proceeds from that sale into improvements to the remaining park).  SENA attempted
before this Court, in a motion to correct the record, to introduce additional evidence not
presented to the Town Council or the Circuit Court.  This new evidence purportedly would
indicate that Adkins Avenue was conveyed to the Town pursuant to a deed that contained
conditions upon the conveyance.  On 3 February 2005, we denied this motion.
16
“‘land held by a municipality in its governmental capacity . . . and therefore held in trust for
the public cannot be disposed of without special statutory authority. .  . .’”  McRobie v.
Mayor of Westernport, 260 Md. 464, 467, 272 A.2d 655, 657 (1971) (quoting Mayor of Balt.
v. Chesapeake Marine Ry. Co., 233 Md. 559, 572, 197 A.2d 821, 827 (1964)).  SENA
equates a municipal corporation’s (and its officials’) duty to hold property in trust for the
public to that of the fiduciary duty a trustee would have towards a beneficiary.  When a
beneficiary or dependent party produces evidence that a trustee has violated its fiduciary
duty, the trustee shoulders the burden of adducing proof to the contrary.  Lopez v. Lopez, 250
Md. 491, 501, 243 A.2d 588, 594 (1968).  As SENA sees it, the Town had the burden to
rebut the alleged breach of its implied fiduciary duty to the public in its conveyance of
Adkins Avenue to SHS.  SENA’s novel argument is incorrect.
As Appellees point out, the public trust discussed in McRobie has never been viewed
as more than an advisory admonition to public officials.10  In Kerpelman v. Bd. of Pub.
Works, 261 Md. 436, 276 A.2d 56 (1971), Kerpelman’s standing to sue was based on her
status as a member of the Maryland public.  She claimed that the public trust was violated
11 Article 6 stated in relevant part, that “all persons invested with the Legislative or
Executive powers of Government are the Trustees of the Public, and, as such, accountable
for their conduct . . . .”
17
by the Maryland Board of Public Works when it transferred wetlands in Worcester County
to a private entity for a “completely and totally inadequate money consideration.”  Id. at 440,
276 A.2d at 58.  She alleged that persons invested with legislative powers of government
were trustees and accountable to her as a beneficiary of the public trust flowing from Article
6 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.11  We rejected the notion that Article 6 created a
beneficiary - trustee relationship.  We explained rather that the language of Article 6 was
merely advisory.  Id. at 444-45, 276 A.2d at 61.  
An incorporated municipality, like Easton, invested with legislative powers under §
2 (b) (24), holds property in trust for the public in a general sense, but not in a way creating
a special relationship relative to the public at large.  This “public trust” does not create a
fiduciary relationship.  1 George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, § 38, p. 422
(1984) (“Public office is a “trust” in the sense that confidence is imposed that the welfare of
the public will be enhanced, but there is no trust [here].”).
IV.
The exercise of the governmental power at issue in this case is solely that to convey
a former public street bed.  Our standard of review of the declaratory judgment entered as
the result of the grant of a motion for summary judgment is whether that declaration was
correct as a matter of law.  Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 476, 860
12 Appellees did not raise in their petition for writ of certiorari whether SENA or its
individual members, in order to maintain the complaint for declaratory judgment, possessed
a special interest sufficiently greater than that of the general public.  Although the Town
raised the standing issue in its motion for summary judgment in the Circuit Court, the point
was not addressed further at the motions hearing or in the final judgment.  While we limit our
review here to issues raised properly by our grant of the writ of certiorari, it is problematic
whether SENA ultimately could triumph, as a matter of law, where none of its individual
members own property abutting Adkins Avenue.  We note that authority in this State does
not support SENA’s claim that it has suffered sufficient particular injury greater than the
general public.  German Evangelical Lutheran St. Lucas Congregation v. Mayor of Balt., 123
Md. 142, 151-54, 90 A. 983 (1914) (explaining the widely held presumption that property
owners that have portions of public right-of-ways closed that either merely leave
inconvenient access to their property or the section closed does not abut their property suffer
no greater than the public as a whole and are denied compensation for the closing); Van
Witsen v. Gutman, 79 Md. 405, 409-12, 29 A. 608, 609-10 (1894) (holding that statute
permitted abutting landowners to have standing to challenge Baltimore City Ordinance
closing one section of an alley for a private use); see Riggs v. Winterode, 100 Md. 439, 452,
59 A. 762, 767 (1905) (observing that property owners without a greater interest in a publicly
used road have been precluded from seeking an injunction to halt the closure of a public
(continued...)
18
A.2d 871, 879 (2004).  For a declaration regarding a town council’s decision to convey
property used for government purposes (a legislative determination) to be correct as a matter
of law, the analysis focuses on whether the decision was made within “the legal boundaries”
of the Town’s statutory authority.  See Dep’t. of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand &
Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 224, 334 A.2d 514, 523 (1975).
A.
As an incorporated municipality, the Town is granted the express power to convey real
property pursuant to Article 23A, § 2 (b) (24) of the Maryland Code.  After examining the
statutory language of § 2 (b) (24) and the issues presented by SENA, we agree with the
Circuit Court and shall affirm the declaration regarding Amended Ordinance No. 466.12
12(...continued)
street in other jurisdictions).  Likewise, other states “almost universally” hold that when a
street is closed in another block from the complaining property owner, the complaining
property owner has not suffered sufficient special damages greater than that suffered by the
general public.  This is true even when it can be shown that the diversion of travel
depreciates the value of property or the new route is less convenient.  See 11 Eugene
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 30.194, p. 136-37 (3rd ed. 2000).  Without special
damages or injury, or property abutting the soon-to-be-closed street, residents have been
denied generally standing to sue for injunctive relief.  Id. at § 30.200, p. 153; but id. at §
30.200, p. 153 (decisions granting residents that do not own property abutting on the soon-to-
be closed street “should be regarded as unusual”); see Inlet Assocs. v. Assateague House
Condo. Assoc., 313 Md. 413, 440-43, 545 A.2d 1296, 1310-11 (1988) (holding Circuit
Court’s ruling not clearly erroneous that plaintiffs had standing for declaratory action seeking
invalidation of ultra vires resolution conveying portion of public street and riparian rights
to private entity for development where, among other things, plaintiffs held property near and
adjoining the property for development).
13 Originally approved on 25 April 1947, Md. Laws Chap. 731, § 2 (b) (24) remains
unaltered from its original language despite two subsequent re-enactments.  1983 Md. Laws
(continued...)
19
Before deciding ultimately the legality of Amended Ordinance No. 466, it is necessary
to explain two separate (originally), but now intertwined, legal concepts at issue in this case.
The first is the authority of a municipal corporation to convey governmental real property.
At common law, municipalities had no inherent power to convey property used for
governmental purposes, absent legislative approval from the General Assembly.  McRobie,
260 Md. at 467-68, 272 A.2d at 657.  Article 23A § 2 (b) (24) supplies that legislative grant.
Article XI-E, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution granted Home Rule to municipal
corporations, enabling those corporations to enact local laws or ordinances relating to their
respective governmental affairs.  Section 2 (b) of Article 23A enumerates a non-exclusive
list of “express ordinance-making” powers available to municipal corporations.13  Ordinances
13(...continued)
Chap. 398; 1995 Md. Laws Chap. 519.  Section 2 of Article 23A was originally applied to
Talbot County (and other counties).  In 1973 an exemption which included Allegany, Anne
Arundel, Baltimore, Calvert, Caroline, Cecil, Charles, Dorchester, Frederick, Kent, Prince
George’s, St. Mary’s, Somerset, Washington, Wicomico, and Worcester Counties from § 2,
was repealed.  1973 M d. Laws Chap. 451. 
20
passed pursuant to this broad-sweeping Home Rule power, however, are not permitted to be
contrary to existing public general laws.  Art. 23A, § 2 (a); Inlet Assocs. v. Assateague House
Condo. Assoc., 313 Md. 413, 425, 545 A.2d 1296, 1302 (1988).
The second issue is the authority of a municipal corporation to close permanently a
public street.  Home Rule empowers municipal corporations with the authority to close
streets.  Md. Const. Art. XI-E, § 3; Art. 23A, § 1.  The authority to close public streets is
limited to circumstances where the closure, and subsequent transfer, of the public street does
not benefit solely a private interest because the streets of a municipal corporation are held
in trust for the benefit of the general public, “the closing of a street, and the conveyance of
the [municipality’s] interest in the street solely for the private benefit of another, is not within
the legislative body’s power. . . .”  Inlet Assocs., 313 Md. at 431, 545 A.2d at 1305.
Otherwise, the State possesses plenary power to close streets and may delegate that authority.
Mayor of Balt. v. Brengle, 116 Md. 342, 81 A. 677 (1911) (holding that the closing of a
public street in accordance with a legislatively sanctioned annexation plan to be valid); see
11 Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 30.185, p. 99-102 (3rd ed. 2000).
We first addressed an appellate challenge to § 2 (b) (24), some forty years after its
enactment, in the factual context of the closure of a public street and the conveyance of the
14 Our review of street closure decisions before 1988 were resolved on other grounds.
The bulk of the cases were resolved before § 2 (b) (24) was enacted or involved public
entities to which § 2 (b) (24) of Article 23A did not apply.  E.g., Perellis v. Mayor of Balt.,
190 Md. 86, 57 A.2d 341 (1948); Krebs v. Uhl, 160 Md. 584, 154 A. 131 (1931); Johnson
v. Mayor of Oakland, 148 Md. 432, 129 A. 648 (1925); German Evangelical Lutheran St.
Lucas Congregation v. Mayor of Balt., 123 Md. 142, 90 A. 983 (1914); Mayor of Balt. v.
Brengle, 116 Md. 342, 81 A. 677 (1911); Jenkins v. Riggs, 100 Md. 427, 59 A. 758 (1905);
Van Witsen v. Gutman, 79 Md. 405, 29 A. 608 (1894).  One case, McKaig v. Mayor of
Cumberland, 208 Md. 95, 116 A.2d 384 (1955), was resolved subsequent to the enactment
of Chapter 731 in 1947, concurrent with ratification of the Home Rule provisions of the
Maryland Constitution, but before the repeal of the exemption to the provisions of § 2 of
Article 23A granted in 1973 to municipal corporations within Allegany County. 
21
street bed.  Inlet Assocs. v. Assateague House Condominium Assoc., 313 Md. 413, 545 A.2d
1296 (1988).14  Then-Chief Judge Murphy, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the
express delegation of legislative authority by the General Assembly to municipal
corporations required an “intention that the city council act upon municipal affairs through
ordinances when performing its legislative function.”  Id. at 430, 545 A.2d at 1304.  Before
considering the substance of § 2 (b) (24), we held that the controlling provisions of § 2 (b)
required the Town of Ocean City, a municipal corporation, to make an affirmative
determination via an ordinance before conveying a portion of a public street to Inlet
Associates.  Inlet Assocs., 313 Md. at 431, 545 A.2d at 1305.  Because the municipal
corporation conveyed the street bed via a resolution, rather than an ordinance, we held
ineffective the Town of Ocean City’s attempted conveyance of the street bed.  We further
expressed that the relevant controlling Ocean City Town Charter provisions, which did not
require an express determination of whether the street bed was needed for any public use,
15 There was no evidence presented to the Town Council or Circuit Court by SENA
purporting to describe the means by which the Town acquired Adkins Avenue.  But see notes
10 and 17, supra, considering SENA’s denied motion to admit additional evidence.
22
were controlled by Article 23A, § 2 (b) (24), namely that “a determination that there is no
longer any public need for the street is requisite . . . .”  Inlet Assocs., 313 Md. at 431, 545
A.2d at 1305.
B.
The gravamen of SENA’s appeal is that Amended Ordinance No. 466 exceeded the
statutory authority granted by § 2 (b) (24).  The contest here is limited to the determination
of why the property was conveyed, although the exact means of the conveyance also is
contested by SENA.  Section 2 (b) (24) of Art. 23A contemplates conveyance by a
municipality of public property in two scenarios.  The first occurs when the property was
acquired initially by the municipal corporation through “conveyance, purchase or
condemnation.”  The second is when a municipal corporation receives property by “gift,
grant, bequest, or devise” and later conveys all or a portion of property so acquired.
The manner in which the municipality acquired the subject property in the first
instance is unclear on this record.15  This creates a hurdle to a determination under which
scenario of § 2 (b) (24) the operative facts should be analyzed.  Of course, this omission may
not be important if the tests that must be met under either scenario are functionally identical
or, if different, the result would be the same on the particular facts of  the present case.  In
the first scenario, the municipality may convey the property when the “legislative body
23
determines that [it] is no longer needed for any public use.” Art. 23A, § 2 (b) (24) (emphasis
added).  In the second, the municipality may convey the property when it determines “it is
no longer needed for public purposes. . . .”  Id. (emphasis added).  In this case, Ordinance
No. 466 conveyed the street bed to SHS, for the purpose of the expanded Emergency Room,
and to the Temple, neither of which depended on Adkins Avenue for its sole main access.
Although there may be a conceptual difference between public use and public
purposes as contemplated by the statute, property held for certain government purposes also
may be a public use and a public purpose at the same time.  Adkins Avenue, for example, is
both.  In Inlet Associates, we explained conclusively that “the streets of a municipality are
held in trust for the benefit, use, and convenience of the general public.  313 Md. at 431, 545
A.2d at 1305 (emphasis added) (citing Sinclair v. Weber, 204 Md. 324, 104 A.2d 561 (1954);
Townsend, Grace & Co. v. Epstein, 93 Md. 537, 49 A. 629 (1901)). 
Our holding in Inlet Associates notwithstanding, were we to parse the analytical
paradigm into separate parts, the result would be the same.  Public use is a somewhat
undefined legal tenet– there is “[n]o satisfactory single clear-cut rule . . . which can decide
all cases . . . .”  Green v. High Ridge Assoc., 346 Md. 65, 73, 695 A.2d 125, 128 (1997)
(citation omitted).  Ultimately, it is for the Judiciary to determine whether a particular use is
public, although a reviewing court will “give weight” to legislative bodies in their own
determinations of what constitutes a public use.  Id., 695 A.2d at 128-29; Prince George’s
County v. Beard, 266 Md. 83, 95-96, 291 A.2d 636, 642 (1972) (explaining that a legislative
16 We consider separately the issue of the eventual use of the street bed once it is
conveyed to SHS.  See V., infra.  In respect to the issue of closing a street, the Town’s
determination as to need for future public use and public purpose under § 2 (b) (24) must be
(continued...)
24
body cannot merely declare a public use without a judicial determination).  For example,
actual public use or an entitlement by the public to use the property is often sufficient to
prove that a public use exists in condemnation cases.  Green, 346 Md. at 74, 695 A.2d at 129.
By comparison, a public purpose is a more broadly-defined term; a public purpose is a
government-directed action for the benefit of the public as a whole.  Black’s Law Dictionary,
1267 (8th ed. 2004).  Examples of valid public purposes range from legal benefits to
domestic partners of county employees, Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 513, 801
A.2d 148, 157 (2002), to ensuring the habitability of housing, Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507,
531, 750 A.2d 10, 23 (2000).
Here, we examine the determination by the Town Council in regard to Adkins Avenue
as it existed at the time Ordinance No. 466 was enacted.  Adkins Avenue, as a public street,
was both a public use and used for a public purpose.  The Findings of Fact by the Town
Council reflect sufficiently this premise.  In its Findings of Fact, the Town Council
determined that the public use of Adkins Avenue was as an access to the existing Hospital
and as a convenient route for nearby residents traveling downtown.  With the zoning
amendment approved, including the proposed Emergency Room expansion across the street
bed, there no longer could be public use of Adkins Avenue as either an access or a through-
street.16  Likewise, Adkins Avenue served a public purpose of providing access for the public
16(...continued)
made with the current public use and purpose in mind, not the proposed use.
17 SENA also proposes that the conveyance of Adkins Avenue is a common law
abandonment, which would be permitted only if the road has not been used by the public or
accepted for maintenance by the Town.  See Welker v. Strosnider, 22 Md. App. 401, 323
A.2d 626 (1974).  This theory relies on the language in the McCrone Plat describing the
transfer of the street bed of Adkins Avenue as an “abandonment.”  The “abandonment
language” in the McCrone Plat cannot be read to be superior to the express language of
Ordinance No. 466, which states that Adkins Avenue is to be closed and the street bed
conveyed to SHS.
SENA also alleges that the Town is restricted from conveying Adkins Avenue by the “terms
and conditions” of the original grant, Art. 23A, § 2 (b) (24), relying on the proposed
additional evidence proffered in its rejected motion to correct the record.  It also suggests that
there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Town holds Adkins Avenue in
fee simple or merely as a public right of way.  There is no evidence before us regarding any
terms or conditions regarding the Town’s use of Adkins Avenue; thus, SENA’s proposition
that Adkins Avenue was intended only as a public street must, and does, fail.  If the Town
were to hold only a right-of-way, closing the road would revert title to the street bed to the
abutting property owners, SHS and the Temple. Md. Code (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.) § 2-114
of the Real Property Article..  See Md. Code (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.) § 2-114 of the Real
Property Article; Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm’n v. McCaw, 246
(continued...)
25
to the Hospital’s existing emergency medical facility.  SENA offers little argument, or
evidence, that the Town Council did not consider the public use or purpose of Adkins
Avenue, nor that the Town Council did not determine that Adkins Avenue was no longer
needed for the existing public use or purpose.  Furthermore, SENA offers little to rebut the
Town Council’s decision that the retention of Adkins Avenue was not needed for any other
public use.
Instead, SENA contends that Amended Ordinance No. 466 violates the Town’s
statutory authority because Adkins Avenue was an actively used public street.17  It believes
(...continued)
Md. 662, 675-76, 229 A.2d 584, 591 (1967) (citations omitted). 
26
that the authority to convey or sell public property under § 2 (b) (24) may be exercised only
after a finding of non-use.  In other words, any contemporaneous or actual public use would
preclude the Town from conveying the street bed. 
SENA relies on Cristofani v. Board of Education of Prince George’s County, 98 Md.
App. 90, 632 A.2d 447 (1993), to support its interpretation of Article 23A, § 2 (b) (24)
requiring that any need associated with contemporaneous use would foreclose the Town from
conveying the street bed.  In that case, Judge Cathell, writing then for the Court of Special
Appeals, explained that an incorporated municipality could not abandon land held in fee
simple to a neighboring property owner.  He further explained, by means of an example, that
mere non-use, which may constitute abandonment, was insufficient to  transfer property held
for a governmental purpose, without a legislative determination pursuant to Article 23A, §
2 (b) (24).  Cristofani did not require the absence of use or need, but merely illustrated that
if non-use existed alone, it would be an insufficient justification to convey the property.  Id.
at 96-97, 632 A.2d at 450.
In relying on the dicta in Cristofani, SENA ignores two principles of statutory
construction.  First, SENA’s interpretation replaces “needed” with the term “used” in the
statute, rendering “needed” nugatory and precluding any statutory effect being given to the
ordinary meaning of the word.  Bd. of Educ. v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63, 453 A.2d 1185, 1189
(1982).  Second, to adopt SENA’s interpretation of Article 23, § 2 (b) (24) would produce
27
absurd results.  Coerper v. Comptroller of Treasury, 265 Md. 3, 6, 288 A.2d 187, 188 (1972).
Recognizing an absolute no-use standard would permit one person to walk the length of
Adkins Avenue, or any other public right of way, and thereby foreclose any conveyance of
the roadbed, regardless of the Town Council’s legislative determinations.
SENA also argues that Ordinance No. 466 fails to mimic the exact language of § 2 (b)
(24) and therefore a determination that Adkins Avenue is “no longer needed” may not be
deduced from this record without the Town Council reciting the so-called “magic words.”
We have held that mere incantation of the “magic words” of a legal test, as an adherence to
form over substance, may not cause the Genie to appear and is neither required nor desired
if actual consideration of the necessary legal considerations are apparent in the record.
Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 559, 865 A.2d 563, 576 (2005); Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md.
284, 305, 808 A.2d 1262, 1276 (2002).  Here, the Town Council decided to close Adkins
Avenue and transfer the street bed to SHS and the Temple only after its Planning & Zoning
Commission, Town Engineer, Town Planner, and a staff report approved the closure without
so much as a suggestion for any other future public use.  If the closed street bed was needed
for any other public use or purpose, the various town agencies and officials who pondered
the fully revealed plans surely would have stated so.  Although the Town Council did state
that the portion of the street bed unconsumed by the Emergency Room expansion was no
longer needed, there is sufficient substance in this record to support the Circuit Court’s
18 The general weight of other authorities indicate a less demanding judicial standard
when reviewing the closure and the conveyance of a public street by a municipality.  Many
states will not question the closure of a public street in the absence of arbitrary action, fraud,
or collusion.  McQuillin, supra, at §30.187 at 122-23 (citing twenty-one jurisdictions).  Other
authorities support the contention that the motive of the municipality to close is not
reviewable.  The proposed purpose of the closure is reviewable to determine whether this
purpose is either ultra vires or for solely a private purpose.  Id. at § 30.186 at 114-15, n. 1,
(continued...)
28
declaration that Ordinance No. 466 was legally correct and that the entire street bed was no
longer needed.
In the alternative, SENA argues that the statutory language forbids a balancing test
between competing public uses and benefits.  Both the Town Council’s Amended Ordinance
No. 466 and the Circuit Court’s oral opinion suggested, to some degree, assignment of a
greater public purpose in closing Adkins Avenue and building an expanded Emergency
Room than in maintaining Adkins Avenue “as is.”  Because Adkins Avenue is a street bed
used by the public, SENA argues, any comparison to a subsequent public use is not a proper
consideration when exercising the Town’s authority to convey the public property.  
Even if § 2 (b) (24) disallowed expressly a balancing test, it allows a legislative body
to convey property when that body determines the property is no longer needed.  Town
Charter Article II § 17-A (3) grants the Town Council the authority to close Adkins Avenue
and, presuming for purposes of this case, the Town retains title to the street bed.  Article
23A, § 2 (b) (24) controls only the authority to convey that property.  Once closed, Adkins
Avenue was no longer needed for use as a public right of way and no longer needed for any
public purpose.18  
18(...continued)
2 (citing sixteen jurisdictions, including Perellis v. Mayor of Balt., 190 Md. 86, 57 A.2d 341
(1948)).  Only two jurisdictions support the concept of a “no use” standard.  Id. at §
30.186.10 at 121-22, n. 26, 27 (California and New Jersey).  
29
V.
SENA argues that any transfer to SHS, a private entity, is for a private purpose,
regardless of the eventual use to which the former street bed is put.  SENA is correct that
SHS is a private entity.  See Baltimore County Hosp., Inc. v. Maryland Hosp. Serv., Inc., 234
Md. 427, 429-30, 200 A.2d 39, 42 (1964) (citing Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d
298 (1946)).  Adkins Avenue, SENA alleges, cannot be closed and conveyed to such a
private entity.  
Ultimately, the characterization of the transfer with which we should be concerned
is determined by its use, and not by the private status of the property owner.  Perellis v.
Mayor of Balt., 190 Md. 86, 92-95, 57 A.2d 341, 344-45 (1948).  In Perellis, we considered
the closing of a public street and held that it was “solely for the private advantage” of one
private property owner.  Id. at 95, 57 A.2d at 345.  The eventual use of the closed street was
to permit the private property owner to construct a building connecting two detached
commercial properties.  At the same time, other property owners abutting onto the public
street would lose access to their properties by the closing of the public street.  Ultimately, we
stated that Maryland courts must determine “from the facts of each case presented whether
the primary purpose or effect is public or private.”  Id. at 95, 57 A.2d at 346.  Even though
the property owner was to pay the cost of the changes to the street and offer the City use of
19 The Riggs cases involved two separate appeals regarding the same road closure.
Both appeals were decided on the same day.
30
an adjacent vacant lot for a new right of way, the eventual private use “vitiated the entire
transaction.”  Id. 
In contrast, in Jenkins v. Riggs, 100 Md. 427, 59 A. 758 (1905) and Riggs v.
Winterode, 100 Md. 439, 59 A. 762 (1905),19 we examined a street closure in which
Baltimore County closed a publicly used road (pursuant to then § 12 of Article 25 of the
Code of Public General Laws) that bisected Riggs Farm.  In that case, the existing road had
been in public use for “more than a century” as a connecting road and was in need of repair.
Jenkins, 100 Md. at 429, 59 A. at 759.  Somewhat like the condition of the record before the
Court in the present case, there was no evidence that Baltimore County had acquired title to
the road bed.  Id.  According to an agreement with Baltimore County, Riggs graded two new
roads on his property, both of which avoided the center of his farming operations, and
conveyed title to these roads to Baltimore County, which, with public funds, paved with
asphalt one of the roads.  Id. at 433-34, 59 A. at 760.  In upholding the closing of the existing
public street, we upheld the County’s decision to close the old road, to which it had
questionable title, for the convenience of the public.  Winterode, 100 Md. at 449, 59 A. at
766.
In a case where the party at issue was a hospital, we held that the authorization of the
issuance of public bonds where some of the proceeds from that sale would be provided to a
private hospital would be for a public purpose.  Finan v. Mayor of Cumberland, 154 Md.
20 Because the Hospital operates an emergency room, SHS stated (in a statement of
grounds and authorities in support of its motion for summary judgment before the Circuit
Court) that 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd (Lexis 2001) prevented it from “dumping” patients deemed
unable to pay for medical care and required it to evaluate and stabilize all individuals that
enter the Hospital with an emergency medical condition.  Hardy v. New York City Health and
Hosps. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 792 (2nd Cir. 1999); Bryan v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ.
of Virginia, 95 F.3d 349,  351 (4th Cir. 1996).  This assertion (which SENA did not contest)
also contributes to the public use and public benefit of the Emergency Room.
31
563, 141 A. 269 (1928).  In that case, the Town of Cumberland issued bonds with 20% of
the proceeds to be directed to an existing private entity, the Allegany Hospital of Sisters of
Charity, for improvements and additions to the existing hospital.  Id. at 564, 141 A. at 270.
We ultimately concluded that the use of public funds by a private entity was acceptable when
the eventual use of those funds, the erection and maintenance of a hospital for the benefit of
the public, was a sufficiently public use.  Id. at 565-67, 141 A. at 270-71.
The record before the Town Council and the Circuit Court in the present case provides
ample illustration of the public purpose of the Hospital.  The proposed expansion of the
Emergency Room is also factually more similar to Finan and Riggs than Perellis.  The
necessity of the Emergency Room constitutes a public purpose that promotes clearly the
public welfare.20  Amended Ordinance No. 466 states that the new facility to be constructed
across the street bed would serve an undeniably “public purpose and benefit, namely,
facilitating the provision of emergency and outpatient care services to the residents of the
Town . . . .”  The Circuit Court’s declaration is legally correct.
32
VI.
As its last stand in this litigation, SENA alleges that Judge Horne abused his
discretion in refusing to recuse himself. 
In regard to such a pretrial motion, we have held that the party moving for recusal
bears a “heavy burden to overcome the presumption of impartiality.”  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 297, 818 A.2d 219, 232 (2003) (quoting Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Shaw, 363 Md. 1, 11, 766 A.2d 1028, 1033 (2001).  Judges “occupy a
distinguished and decisive position . . . [requiring them] to maintain high standards of
conduct.”  Jefferson-El v. State, 330 Md. 99, 106, 622 A.2d 737, 741 (1993) (citations
omitted). Unless grounds for mandatory recusal are met, a judge’s decision not to recuse
himself or herself will be overturned only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.  Surratt
v.  Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439, 465, 578 A.2d 745, 757-58 (1990).  An abuse of
discretion standard is objective– “whether a reasonable member of the public knowing all
the circumstances would be led to the conclusion that the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.”  In re Turney, 311 Md. 246, 253, 533 A.2d 916, 920 (1987).
Recognized grounds implicating possible partiality include a significant financial interest in
a party or outcome, a pre-judicial relationship as an attorney with a party or counsel for a
party, or a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.  Md. Rule 16-813, Canon 3C.
21 Article IV, § 7 of the Maryland Constitution states:
No judge shall sit in any case wherein he may be interested, or
where either of the parties may be connected with him, by
affinity or consanguinity, within such degrees as now are not, or
may hereafter be prescribed by Law, or where he shall have
been of counsel in the case.
33
In this case, SENA did not allege any grounds consistent with the requirements for
mandatory recusal.21  The essence of the initial motion was that Judge Horne might be partial
to SHS for fear that a ruling adverse to SHS’s interests might result in the deprivation of
adequate medical care to Judge Horne or his wife, who was seriously ill.  SENA could not
overcome the presumption of judicial impartiality, however, because it never mustered any
evidence of an instance of partiality by Judge Horne toward SHS.  Judge Horne recognized
this and weighed sufficiently SENA’s contention, stating:
I share your opinion and if I had a scintilla of a concern that my
decision in this case would be slanted in any direction by a fear
of retaliation on the part of anyone or the hope or expectation of
reward from anyone I would not hesitate to remove myself. . . I
feel that there is a presumption that judges are honorable people
who understand the oath that they took to decide cases fairly and
impartially.
SENA’s second contention, that Judge Horne’s conduct rose to the level of that in
Surratt, blurs the line between personal and judicial conduct.  In Surratt, we permitted
counsel to move for recusal and have the motion heard by a different judge when personal
misconduct between the sitting judge and counsel was alleged sufficiently.  320 Md. at 466,
578 A.2d at 758.  The asserted basis for recusal was alleged long-standing sexual harassment
34
by the male judge of the female counsel that was attested to by counsel on the record.  While
we made no conclusions about the accuracy of the allegations, we concluded that the alleged
sexual harassment raised serious issues regarding the judge’s personal conduct.  Id. at 469,
578 A.2d at 760.  We have defined personal conduct as “derived from an extra-judicial
source . . . ,”  Jefferson-El, 330 Md. at 107, 622 A.2d at 741, and held that the Surratt
procedure is not available when “charges against the trial judge do not involve any personal
misconduct.”  Surratt, 320 Md. at 767, 578 A.2d at 759 (citing State v. Calhoun, 306 Md.
692, 746, 511 A.2d 461, 488 (1986)) .
On the record in the present case, Judge Horne asked SENA’s counsel for specific
examples of his impermissible judicial conduct.  Each example listed by SENA’s counsel
involved examples of adverse rulings or decisions made by Judge Horne in a judicial setting.
None rose nearly to the level of the alleged sexual harassment in Surratt. 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
TALBOT COUNTY AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO
BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.