Case Title: P. v. Knoller

Citation: 

Docket Number: S134543

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 5/31/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S134543 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/2 A099250,  
 
 
) 
A099366, A099499, A109260 
MARJORIE KNOLLER, 
) 
 
 
) 
San Francisco County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 18181301 
___________________________________ ) 
 
On January 26, 2001, two dogs owned by defendant Marjorie Knoller and 
her husband, codefendant Robert Noel, attacked and killed Diane Whipple in the 
hallway of an apartment building in San Francisco.  Defendant Knoller was 
charged with second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 189)1 and involuntary 
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (b)); codefendant Noel, who was not present at the 
time of the attack on Whipple, was charged with involuntary manslaughter but not 
murder.  Both were also charged with owning a mischievous animal that caused 
the death of a human being, in violation of section 399. 
After a change of venue to Los Angeles County, a jury convicted 
defendants on all counts.  Both moved for a new trial.  (See § 1181, subd. 6 [a trial 
court may grant a new trial when “the verdict or finding is contrary to law or 
evidence”].)  The trial court denied Noel’s motion.  It granted Knoller’s motion in 
                                              
1  
All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 
2 
part, giving her a new trial on the second degree murder charge, but denying her 
motion for a new trial on the other two crimes of which she was convicted 
(involuntary manslaughter and possession of a mischievous animal that causes 
death). 
With respect to Knoller, whose conviction of second degree murder was 
based on a theory of implied malice, the trial court took the position that, to be 
guilty of that crime, Knoller must have known that her conduct involved a high 
probability of resulting in the death of another.  Finding such awareness lacking, 
the trial court granted Knoller’s motion for a new trial on the second degree 
murder conviction. 
The trial court sentenced both defendants to four years’ imprisonment, the 
maximum term for involuntary manslaughter (§ 193, subd. (b)), staying the 
sentences for the section 399 violations.  Defendants appealed from their 
convictions, and the People appealed from the order granting Knoller a new trial 
on the murder count.  The Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals. 
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting Knoller a new 
trial on the second degree murder charge.  It remanded the case to the trial court 
for reconsideration of the new trial motion in light of the Court of Appeal’s 
holding that implied malice can be based simply on a defendant’s conscious 
disregard of the risk of serious bodily injury to another.  In all other respects, the 
Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions of both defendants. 
Both defendants petitioned this court for review.  We granted only 
Knoller’s petition, limiting review to two questions:  “(1) Whether the mental state 
required for implied malice includes only conscious disregard for human life or 
can it be satisfied by an awareness that the act is likely to result in great bodily 
3 
injury,”2 and “(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting 
Knoller’s motion for new trial under Penal Code section 1181[, subdivision 6].” 
With respect to the first issue, we reaffirm the test of implied malice we set 
out in People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574 and, as mentioned on page 16, post, 
reiterated in many later cases:  Malice is implied when the killing is proximately 
caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, 
which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct 
endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ”  
(People v. Phillips, supra, at p. 587.)  In short, implied malice requires a 
defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another—
no more, and no less. 
Measured against that test, it becomes apparent that the Court of Appeal set 
the bar too low, permitting a conviction of second degree murder, based on a 
theory of implied malice, if the defendant knew his or her conduct risked causing 
death or serious bodily injury.  But the trial court set the bar too high, ruling that 
implied malice requires a defendant’s awareness that his or her conduct had a high 
probability of resulting in death, and that granting defendant Knoller a new trial 
was justified because the prosecution did not charge codefendant Noel with 
murder.  Because the trial court used an incorrect test of implied malice, and based 
its decision in part on an impermissible consideration, we conclude that it abused 
its discretion in granting Knoller a new trial on the second degree murder count.  It 
is uncertain whether the court would have granted the new trial had it used correct 
                                              
2  
Our order limiting the issues referred to “great bodily injury,” but the Court 
of Appeal decision referred to “serious bodily injury.”  The two terms are 
“ ‘essentially equivalent’ ” (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831), and 
although there are some differences in the statutory definitions (compare § 243, 
subd. (f)(4) [defining “serious bodily injury”] with § 12022.7, subd. (f) [defining 
“great bodily injury”]), those differences are immaterial here. 
4 
legal standards.  We therefore remand the matter to the Court of Appeal, and direct 
it to return the case to the trial court with directions to reconsider defendant 
Knoller’s new trial motion in light of the views set out in this opinion.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
In 1998, Pelican Bay State Prison inmates Paul Schneider and Dale 
Bretches, both members of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang, sought to engage 
in a business of buying, raising, and breeding Presa Canario dogs.  This breed of 
dog tends to be very large, weighing over 100 pounds, and reaching over five feet 
tall when standing on its hind legs.  A document found in defendants’ apartment 
describes the Presa Canario as “a gripping dog . . . [¶] . . . always used and bred 
for combat and guard . . . [and] used extensively for fighting . . . .” 
Prisoners Schneider and Bretches relied on outside contacts, including 
Brenda Storey and Janet Coumbs, to carry out their Presa Canario business.  
Schneider told Coumbs that she should raise the dogs. 
As of May 1990, Coumbs possessed four such dogs, named Bane, Isis, Hera, 
and Fury.  Hera and Fury broke out of their fenced yard and attacked Coumbs’s 
sheep.  Hera killed at least one of the sheep and also a cat belonging to Coumbs’s 
daughter.  Coumbs acknowledged that Bane ate his doghouse and may have joined 
Fury in killing a sheep. 
Defendants Knoller and Noel, who were attorneys representing a prison 
guard at Pelican Bay State Prison, met inmate Schneider at the prison sometime in 
1999.  In October 1999, defendants filed a lawsuit on behalf of Brenda Storey 
against Coumbs over the ownership and custody of the four dogs.  Coumbs 
decided not to contest the lawsuit and to turn the dogs over to defendants.  
Coumbs warned Knoller that the dogs had killed Coumbs’s sheep, but Knoller did 
not seem to care. 
5 
Defendant Knoller thereafter contacted Dr. Donald Martin, a veterinarian 
for 49 years, and on March 26, 2000, he examined and vaccinated the dogs.  With 
his bill to Knoller, Dr. Martin included a letter, which said in part:  “I would be 
professionally amiss [sic] if I did not mention the following, so that you can be 
prepared.  These dogs are huge, approximately weighing in the neighborhood of 
100 pounds each.  They have had no training or discipline of any sort.  They were 
a problem to even get to, let alone to vaccinate.  You mentioned having a 
professional hauler gather them up and taking them. . . .  Usually this would be 
done in crates, but I doubt one could get them into anything short of a livestock 
trailer, and if let loose they would have a battle.  [¶]  To add to this, these animals 
would be a liability in any household, reminding me of the recent attack in 
Tehama County to a boy by large dogs.  He lost his arm and disfigured his face.  
The historic romance of the warrior dog, the personal guard dog, the gaming dog, 
etc. may sound good but hardly fits into life today.”  Knoller thanked Dr. Martin 
for the information and said she would pass it on to her client. 
On April 1, 2000, both defendants and a professional dog handler took 
custody of the dogs from Coumbs.  Bane then weighed 150 pounds and Hera 130 
pounds.  Coumbs told both defendants that she was worried about the dogs, that 
Hera and Fury should be shot, and that she was also concerned about Bane and 
Isis. 
Hera remained for a short time at a kennel in San Mateo County while Bane 
was sent to a facility in Los Angeles County.  Both defendants soon became 
concerned for the health of the two dogs.  On April 30, 2000, defendants brought 
Hera to their sixth-floor apartment at 2398 Pacific Avenue in San Francisco.  Bane 
arrived in September 2000.  Codefendant Noel purchased dog licenses, registering 
himself and Knoller as the dogs’ owners. 
6 
A later search of defendants’ apartment showed that they frequently 
exchanged letters with Pelican Bay inmates Schneider and Bretches.  Over 100 
letters were sent and received between March and December 2000, apparently 
under the guise of attorney-client correspondence.3  In the letters, defendants 
discussed a commercial breeding operation, considering various names such as 
GuerraHund Kennels, Wardog, and finally settling on Dog-O-War.  Prisoners 
Schneider and Bretches’ notes on a Web site for the business described Bane as 
“Wardog,” and “Bringer of Death: Ruin: Destruction.” 
Between the time defendants Noel and Knoller brought the dogs to their 
sixth-floor apartment in San Francisco and the date of the fatal mauling of Diane 
Whipple on January 26, 2001, there were about 30 incidents of the two dogs being 
out of control or threatening humans and other dogs.  Neighbors mentioned seeing 
the two dogs unattended on the sixth floor and running down the hall.  
Codefendant Noel’s letters to prisoner Schneider confirmed this, mentioning one 
incident when defendant Knoller had to let go of the two dogs as they broke from 
her grasp and ran to the end of the hall.  Noel described how the dogs even pushed 
past him and “took off side by side down the hall toward the elevator in a 
celebratory stampede!! 240 lbs. of Presa wall to wall moving at top speed!!!”  In a 
letter to inmate Schneider, defendant Knoller admitted not having the upper body 
strength to handle Bane and having trouble controlling Hera. 
When neighbors complained to defendants Noel and Knoller about the two 
dogs, defendants responded callously, if at all.  In one incident, neighbors Stephen 
                                              
3  
The trial court ruled that letters written by or addressed to codefendant Noel 
were admissible against defendant Knoller, and vice versa, on a theory that raising 
the Presa Canario dogs was a joint enterprise.  The Court of Appeal rejected 
defendants’ challenge to this ruling.  Both defendants raised the issue in their 
respective petitions for review.  We denied Noel’s petition, and in granting 
Knoller’s petition we limited review to other issues. 
7 
and Aimee West were walking their dog in a nearby park when Hera attacked their 
dog and “latched on” to the dog’s snout.  Noel was unable to separate the dogs, but 
Aimee threw her keys at Hera, startling Hera and causing Hera to release her grip 
on the Wests’ dog.  On another day, Stephen West was walking his dog when he 
encountered Noel with Bane.  Bane lunged toward West’s dog, but Noel managed 
to pull Bane back.  When Stephen West next saw Noel, West suggested that Noel 
muzzle the dogs and talk to dog trainer Mario Montepeque about training them; 
Noel replied there was no need to do so.  Defendants Knoller and Noel later 
encountered Montepeque, who advised defendants to have their dogs trained and 
to use a choke collar.  Defendants disregarded this advice.  On still another 
occasion, when dog walker Lynn Gaines was walking a dog, Gaines told Noel that 
he should put a muzzle on Bane; Noel called her a “bitch” and said the dog Gaines 
was walking was the problem. 
There were also instances when defendants’ two dogs attacked or threatened 
people.  David Moser, a fellow resident in the apartment building, slipped by 
defendants Knoller and Noel in the hallway only to have their dog Hera bite him 
on the “rear end.”  When he exclaimed, “Your dog just bit me,” Noel replied, 
“Um, interesting.”  Neither defendant apologized to Moser or reprimanded the 
dog.  Another resident, Jill Cowen Davis, was eight months pregnant when one of 
the dogs, in the presence of both Knoller and Noel, suddenly growled and lunged 
toward her stomach with its mouth open and teeth bared.  Noel jerked the dog by 
the leash, but he did not apologize to Davis.  Postal carrier John Watanabe testified 
that both dogs, unleashed, had charged him.  He said the dogs were in a “snarling 
frenzy” and he was “terrified for [his] life.”  When he stepped behind his mail cart, 
the dogs went back to Knoller and Noel.  On still another occasion, the two dogs 
lunged at a six-year-old boy walking to school; they were stopped less than a foot 
from him.  
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One time, codefendant Noel himself suffered a severe injury to his finger 
when Bane bit him during a fight with another dog.  The wound required surgery, 
and Noel had to wear a splint on his arm and have two steel pins placed in his 
hand for eight to 10 weeks. 
Mauling victim Diane Whipple and her partner Sharon Smith lived in a sixth-
floor apartment across a lobby from defendants.  Smith encountered defendants’ 
two dogs as often as once a week.  In early December 2000, Whipple called Smith 
at work to say, with some panic in her voice, that one of the dogs had bitten her.  
Whipple had come upon codefendant Noel in the lobby with one of the dogs, 
which lunged at her and bit her in the hand.  Whipple did not seek medical 
treatment for three deep, red indentations on one hand.  Whipple made every effort 
to avoid defendants’ dogs, checking the hallway before she went out and 
becoming anxious while waiting for the elevator for fear the dogs would be inside.  
She and Smith did not complain to apartment management because they wanted 
nothing to do with defendants Knoller and Noel. 
On January 26, 2001, Whipple telephoned Smith to say she was going home 
early.  At 4:00 p.m., Esther Birkmaier, a neighbor who lived across the hall from 
Whipple, heard dogs barking and a woman’s “panic-stricken” voice calling, “Help 
me, help me.”  Looking through the peephole in her front door, Birkmaier saw 
Whipple lying facedown on the floor just over the threshold of her apartment with 
what appeared to be a dog on top of her.  Birkmaier saw no one else in the 
hallway.  Afraid to open the door, Birkmaier called 911, the emergency telephone 
number, and at the same time heard a voice yelling, “No, no, no” and “Get off.”  
When Birkmaier again approached her door, she could hear barking and growling 
directly outside and a banging against a door.  She heard a voice yell, “Get off, get 
off, no, no, stop, stop.”  She chained her door and again looked through the 
9 
peephole.  Whipple’s body was gone and groceries were strewn about the hallway.  
Birkmaier called 911 a second time. 
At 4:12 p.m., San Francisco Police Officers Sidney Laws and Leslie Forrestal 
arrived in response to Birkmaier’s telephone calls.  They saw Whipple’s body in 
the hallway; her clothing had been completely ripped off, her entire body was 
covered with wounds, and she was bleeding profusely.  Defendant Knoller and the 
two dogs were not in sight. 
The officers called for an ambulance.  Shortly thereafter, defendant Knoller 
emerged from her apartment.  She did not ask about Whipple’s condition but 
merely told the officers she was looking for her keys, which she found just inside 
the door to Whipple’s apartment. 
An emergency medical technician administered first aid to Whipple, who had 
a large, profusely bleeding wound to her neck.  The wound was too large to halt 
the bleeding, and Whipple’s pulse and breathing stopped as paramedics arrived.  
She was revived but died shortly after reaching the hospital.  
An autopsy revealed over 77 discrete injuries covering Whipple’s body 
“from head to toe.”  The most significant were lacerations damaging her jugular 
vein and her carotid artery and crushing her larynx, injuries typically inflicted by 
predatory animals to kill their prey.  The medical examiner stated that although 
earlier medical attention would have increased Whipple’s chances of survival, she 
might ultimately have died anyway because she had lost one-third or more of her 
blood at the scene.  Plaster molds of the two dogs’ teeth showed that the bite 
injuries to Whipple’s neck were consistent with Bane’s teeth.  
Animal control officer Andrea Runge asked defendant Knoller to sign over 
custody of the dogs for euthanasia.  Knoller, whom Runge described as “oddly 
calm,” agreed to sign over Bane, but she refused to sign over Hera for euthanasia 
and she refused to help the animal control officers with the animals, saying she 
10 
was “unable to handle the dogs.”  When tranquilizer darts malfunctioned and 
failed to quiet Bane, “come-along” poles were used by animal control officers 
backed up by officers with guns drawn.  Hera too was controlled by officers with 
“come-along” poles. 
On February 8, 2001, both defendants appeared on the television show Good 
Morning America and basically blamed mauling victim Whipple for her own 
death.  Defendant Knoller claimed that Whipple had already opened her apartment 
door when something about her interested Bane.  He broke away, pulled Knoller 
across the lobby, and jumped up on Whipple, putting his paws on either side of 
her.  Knoller said she pushed Whipple into Whipple’s apartment, fell on top of 
Whipple, and then tried to shield Whipple with her own body.  But Whipple’s 
struggles must have been misinterpreted by the dog, and when Whipple struck 
Knoller with her fist, the dog began to bite Whipple.  Knoller claimed that 
Whipple had ample opportunity to just slam the door of her apartment or stay still 
on the floor. 
Codefendant Noel did not testify, but he presented evidence of positive 
encounters between the two dogs and veterinarians, friends, and neighbors.  
Defendant Knoller did testify in her own defense.  She referred to herself, her 
husband, and Pelican Bay prisoner Schneider as the “triad,” and she spoke of 
Schneider as her “son.”  The two dogs had become a focal point in the 
relationship.  She denied reading literature in the apartment referring to the vicious 
nature of the dogs.  She thought the dogs had no personality problems requiring a 
professional trainer.  She denied receiving or otherwise discounted any warnings 
about the two dogs’ behavior and she maintained that virtually all the witnesses 
testifying to incidents with the dogs were lying.  She said she never walked both 
dogs together.  Ordinarily, she would walk Hera and codefendant Noel would 
walk Bane, because she had insufficient body strength to control Bane.  But after 
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Noel was injured while breaking up a fight between Bane and another dog, 
Knoller would sometimes walk Bane, always on a leash.  She said she had just 
returned from walking Bane on the roof of the apartment building, and had opened 
the door to her apartment while holding Bane’s leash, when Bane dragged her 
back across the lobby toward Whipple, who had just opened the door to her own 
apartment.  The other dog, Hera, left defendants’ apartment and joined Bane, who 
attacked Whipple.  Knoller said she threw herself on Whipple to save her.  She 
denied that Hera participated in the attack.  She acknowledged not calling 911 to 
get help for Whipple. 
Asked whether she denied responsibility for the attack on Whipple, Knoller 
gave this reply:  “I said in an interview that I wasn’t responsible but it wasn’t for 
the—it wasn’t in regard to what Bane had done, it was in regard to knowing 
whether he would do that or not.  And I had no idea that he would ever do 
anything like that to anybody.  How can you anticipate something like that?  It’s a 
totally bizarre event.  I mean how could you anticipate that a dog that you know 
that is gentle and loving and affectionate would do something so horrible and 
brutal and disgusting and gruesome to anybody?  How could you imagine that 
happening?” 
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented evidence that the minor character of 
defendant Knoller’s injuries—principally bruising to the hands—indicated that she 
had not been as involved in trying to protect mauling victim Whipple as she had 
claimed.  Dr. Randall Lockwood, the prosecution’s expert on dog behavior, 
testified that good behavior by a dog on some occasions does not preclude 
aggressive and violent behavior on other occasions, and he mentioned the 
importance of training dogs such as Bane and Hera not to fight. 
The jury found Knoller guilty of second degree murder; it also found both 
Knoller and Noel guilty of involuntary manslaughter and owning a mischievous 
12 
animal that caused the death of a human being.  Both defendants moved for a new 
trial.  The trial court denied Noel’s motion.  We quote below the pertinent 
statements by the trial court in granting Knoller’s motion for a new trial on the 
second degree murder count. 
The trial court observed:  “The law requires that there be a subjective 
understanding on the part of the person that on the day in question—and I do not 
read that as being January 26th, 2001 because by this time, with all of the 
information that had come out dealing with the dogs, the defendants were fully on 
notice that they had a couple of wild, uncontrollable and dangerous dogs that were 
likely going to do something bad.  [¶]  Is the ‘something bad’ death?  That is the 
ultimate question in the case.  There is no question but that the something bad was 
going to be that somebody was going to be badly hurt.  I defy either defendant to 
stand up and tell me they had no idea that those dogs were going to hurt somebody 
one day.  But can they stand up and say that they knew subjectively—not 
objectively and that’s an important distinction—that these dogs were going to 
stand up and kill somebody?”  (Italics added.) 
The trial court continued:  “I am guided by a variety of principles.  One of 
them is that public emotion, public outcry, feeling, passion, sympathy do not play 
a role in the application of the law.  The other is that I am required to review all of 
the evidence and determine independently rather than as a jury what the evidence 
showed.  I have laid out most of the evidence as it harms the defendants in this 
case.  Their conduct from the time that they got the dogs to the time—to the weeks 
after Diane Whipple’s death was despicable.” 
“There was one time on the stand, Ms. Knoller, when I truly believed what 
you said.  You broke down in the middle of a totally scripted answer and you 
actually, instead of crying, you actually got mad and you said you had no idea that 
this dog could do what he did and pounded the table.  I believed you.  That was the 
13 
only time, but I did believe you.”  The court then described the definition of 
second degree murder as requiring that one “subjectively knows, based on 
everything, that the conduct that he or she is about to engage in has a high 
probability of death to another human being.”  (Italics added.) 
The trial court went on:  “What we have in this case as it relates to 
Ms. Knoller is the decision to take the dog outside, into the hallway, up to the roof, 
go to the bathroom, bring it back down and put it in the apartment.  There was no 
question but that taking the dog out into the hallway by that very act exposed other 
people in the apartment, whether they are residents there or guests, invitees to 
what might happen with the dog.  When you take everything as a totality, the 
question is whether or not as a subjective matter and as a matter of law Ms. 
Knoller knew that there was a high probability that day, or on the day before on 
the day after,—I reject totally the argument of the defendants that she had to know 
when she walked out the door—she was going to kill somebody that morning.  The 
Court finds that the evidence does not support it.”  (Italics added.) 
The trial court concluded it had “no choice, . . . taking the Legislature’s 
scheme, the evidence that was received, as despicable as it is, but to determine not 
that [defendant Knoller] is acquitted of second degree murder but to find that on 
the state of the evidence, I cannot say as a matter of law that she subjectively knew 
on January 26th that her conduct was such that a human being was likely to die.”  
(Italics added.)  
The trial court mentioned another consideration:  “The Court also notes a 
great troubling feature of this case that Mr. Noel was never charged [with murder] 
as Ms. Knoller was.  In the Court’s view, given the evidence, Mr. Noel is more 
culpable than she.  Mr. Noel personally knew that she could not control those 
dogs.  He could not control those dogs.  Mr. Noel was substantially haughtier than 
she was.  In brushing off all of the incidents that happened out in the street, 
14 
Mr. Noel knew as a theological certainty that that dog, which had recently been 
operated on, was taking medication that had given it diarrhea, was going to go out 
into the hallway or out into the street possibly, at the hands of Ms. Knoller.  He . . . 
left her there to do that.  [¶]  . . .  And yet Mr. Noel was not charged [with murder].  
Equality of sentencing and the equal administration of justice is an important 
feature in any criminal court.  That played a role as well.”  The trial court then 
granted defendant Knoller’s motion for a new trial on the second degree murder 
count. 
As noted earlier, both defendants as well as the prosecution appealed.  The 
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting Knoller’s motion for a 
new trial on the second degree murder count.  It disagreed with the trial court that 
a second degree murder conviction, based on a theory of implied malice, required 
that Knoller recognized “her conduct was such that a human being was likely to 
die.”  The Court of Appeal held that a second degree murder conviction can be 
based simply on a defendant’s “subjective appreciation and conscious disregard of 
a likely risk of . . . serious bodily injury.”  In all other respects, the Court of 
Appeal affirmed both defendants’ convictions.  
II.  THE ELEMENTS OF IMPLIED MALICE  
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice 
aforethought.  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  Malice may be express or implied.  (§ 188.)  At 
issue here is the definition of “implied malice.” 
Defendant Knoller was convicted of second degree murder as a result of the 
killing of Diane Whipple by defendant’s dog, Bane.  Second degree murder is the 
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but without the 
additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that 
would support a conviction of first degree murder.  (See §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.)  
15 
Section 188 provides:  “[M]alice may be either express or implied.  It is express 
when there is manifested a deliberate intention to take away the life of a fellow 
creature.  It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the 
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” 
The statutory definition of implied malice, a killing by one with an 
“abandoned and malignant heart” (§ 188), is far from clear in its meaning.  Indeed, 
an instruction in the statutory language could be misleading, for it “could lead the 
jury to equate the malignant heart with an evil disposition or a despicable 
character” (People v. Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 587) instead of focusing on a 
defendant’s awareness of the risk created by his or her behavior.  “Two lines of 
decisions developed, reflecting judicial attempts ‘to translate this amorphous 
anatomical characterization of implied malice into a tangible standard a jury can 
apply.’ ”  (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 103, quoting People v. 
Protopappas (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 152, 162-163.)  Under both lines of 
decisions, implied malice requires a defendant’s awareness of the risk of death to 
another. 
The earlier of these two lines of decisions, as this court observed in People 
v. Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at page 103-104, originated in Justice Traynor’s 
concurring opinion in People v. Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d 470, 480, which stated 
that malice is implied when “the defendant for a base, antisocial motive and with 
wanton disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree of 
probability that it will result in death.”  (We here refer to this as the Thomas test.)  
The later line dates from this court’s 1966 decision in People v. Phillips, supra, 64 
Cal.2d at page 587:  Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by 
“ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was 
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life 
of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ”  (The Phillips test.) 
16 
In People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300, we held that these two 
definitions of implied malice in essence articulated the same standard.  Concerned, 
however, that juries might have difficulty understanding the Thomas test’s concept 
of “wanton disregard for human life,” we later emphasized that the “better practice 
in the future is to charge juries solely in the straightforward language of the 
‘conscious disregard for human life’ definition of implied malice,” the definition 
articulated in the Phillips test.  (People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1221.)  
The standard jury instructions thereafter did so.  (See CALJIC No. 8.11; 
CALCRIM No. 520.)  Since 1989, our decisions have articulated the standard we 
set out in Dellinger and in CALJIC No. 8.11.  (See, e.g., People v. Randle (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 987, 994; People v. Taylor (2004) 32 Cal.4th 863, 867-868; People v. 
Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107; People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 308; 
People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 450; People v. Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 
Cal.4th at pp. 104, 111.)  The trial court here instructed the jury in the language of 
CALJIC No. 8.11. 
III.  THE COURT OF APPEAL’S TEST FOR IMPLIED MALICE  
As discussed in the preceding part, the great majority of this court’s 
decisions establish that a killer acts with implied malice only when acting with an 
awareness of endangering human life.  This principle has been well settled for 
many years, and it is embodied in the standard jury instruction given in murder 
cases, including this one.  The Court of Appeal here, however, held that a second 
degree murder conviction, based on a theory of implied malice, can be based 
simply on a defendant’s awareness of the risk of causing serious bodily injury to 
another. 
In support of that view, the Court of Appeal pointed to three decisions of 
this court:  People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310 (Conley), People v. Poddar 
17 
(1974) 10 Cal.3d 750 (Poddar), and People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529 
(Coddington).  We discuss each case below. 
In Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, the defendant, after consuming copious 
quantities of alcohol, went to the home of his former lover and her husband, where 
he shot and killed both of them.  He was convicted of two counts of first degree 
murder.  The issue on appeal was whether the trial court should have instructed the 
jury on diminished mental capacity caused by intoxication.  This court held that it 
should have so instructed because “[a]n awareness of the obligation to act within 
the general body of laws regulating society . . . is included in the statutory 
definition of malice in terms of the abandoned and malignant heart.”  (Id. at 
p. 322.)  In explaining that holding, Conley stated that a person who carefully 
weighs the course of action he is about to take and chooses to kill his victim, after 
considering the reasons for and against it, “is normally capable also of 
comprehending the duty society places on all persons to act within the law.”  
(Ibid.)  Conley continued:  “If, despite such awareness, he does an act that is likely 
to cause serious injury or death to another, he exhibits that wanton disregard for 
human life or antisocial motivation that constitutes malice aforethought.”  (Ibid., 
italics added.)4  It is this sentence from Conley on which the Court of Appeal 
relied.  But that language from Conley described the defendant’s act (the objective 
component of implied malice), not the defendant’s mental state (the subjective 
component of implied malice); it is therefore irrelevant to the issue here, which 
                                              
4  
In People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 679, we quoted that passage 
from Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310 at page 322, in summarizing the doctrine of 
diminished capacity; we then explained how imperfect self-defense—the issue in 
Flannel—differed from diminished capacity.  Not at issue in Flannel was the 
distinction between a defendant’s awareness of the risk of serious bodily injury 
and awareness of the risk of death. 
18 
concerns the subjective component—whether the defendant must be aware of the 
risk of death or only a risk of serious bodily injury. 
Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, did not discuss whether implied malice could 
be based merely on a defendant’s awareness of the risk of serious bodily injury to 
another but not the risk of death resulting from the defendant’s actions.  That 
issue, presented here, did not arise in Conley, because there the defendant, who 
said he was going to kill the victims and did so, could not claim he was aware only 
of the risk of causing serious bodily injury. 
In cases decided shortly before and after Conley, we reiterated the 
established definition of implied malice as requiring an awareness of the risk that 
the defendant’s conduct will result in the death of another.  One year before 
Conley was filed, we stated in People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 780, 782, 
that implied malice required a “conscious disregard for life.”  Conley did not at all 
suggest that it intended to depart from the view expressed in Washington.  And 
two months after Conley, this court in People v. Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at page 
582, endorsed its earlier statement in Washington that implied malice requires a 
“conscious disregard for life.”  (Italics added.) 
We now turn to Poddar, supra, 10 Cal.3d 750, the second of the three 
decisions that the Court of Appeal cited.  In that case, the defendant went to the 
home of a woman he had dated casually, shot her with a pellet gun, and then killed 
her with a knife.  He was convicted of second degree murder.  This court held that 
the trial court’s jury instruction on second degree murder was defective because it 
did not explain the concept of diminished capacity as set out in Conley, supra, 64 
Cal.2d 310.  (Poddar, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 757-759.)  In its discussion of 
diminished capacity, Poddar stated that to prove implied malice, “it must be 
shown that the accused was both aware of his duty to act within the law and acted 
in a manner likely to cause death or serious bodily injury despite such awareness.”  
19 
(Id. at p. 758, italics added.)  As in Conley, Poddar referred to serious bodily 
injury in describing the defendant’s act, the objective component of implied 
malice.  Poddar did not say that the defendant’s mental state, the subjective 
component of implied malice, at issue here, could be satisfied by proof that the 
defendant acted with an awareness that his conduct could cause serious bodily 
injury.  Indeed, the defendant in Poddar never claimed that he was unaware that 
his acts could cause death. 
Even if the above discussed language from Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at 
page 322, and from Poddar, supra, 10 Cal.3d at page 758, could be viewed as 
implying that a second degree murder conviction, on a theory of implied malice, 
could be based simply on a defendant’s awareness of the risk of causing serious 
bodily injury, rather than death, that language would lack authoritative force.  “ ‘It 
is axiomatic that language in a judicial opinion is to be understood in accordance 
with the facts and issues before the court.  An opinion is not authority for 
propositions not considered.’ ”  (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 
680, quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1999) 19 
Cal.4th 1182, 1195.)  “An appellate decision is not authority for everything said in 
the court’s opinion but only ‘for the points actually involved and actually 
decided.’ ”  (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620.)  Because the facts 
and issues in Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, and in Poddar, supra, 10 Cal.3d 750, 
did not encompass the question whether implied malice could be based on a 
defendant’s awareness of the risk of serious bodily injury alone, the language the 
Court of Appeal cited from Conley and Poddar lacks authoritative force. 
This brings us to Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th 529, the last in the trio of 
decisions relied on by the Court of Appeal.  In that case, the defendant lured 
teenage girls to his mobilehome by telling them they would star in an antidrug 
video, and then raped them and committed other sexual offenses.  He killed two 
20 
older women who had accompanied the girls as chaperones.  The defendant was 
convicted of two counts of first degree murder with special circumstances, as well 
as various other offenses, and he was sentenced to death. 
Among the many issues the defendant in Coddington raised on appeal was 
a claim that the trial court had erred in not instructing the jury on second degree 
murder based on implied malice.  Responding to that claim, the Attorney General 
argued in Coddington that such an instruction was not needed because there was 
no evidence that the defendant’s offense was less than first degree murder, and 
that the defendant’s conduct proved that he “acted with actual or presumptive 
knowledge that serious bodily injury was likely to occur.”  (Coddington, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at p. 592, italics added.)  This court rejected the Attorney General’s 
argument, explaining that such a mental state (actual or presumptive knowledge 
that serious bodily injury is likely to occur) “permits an inference of implied 
malice . . . and does not support a conclusion that no instruction on second degree 
murder on a theory of implied malice was necessary.”  (Ibid.) 
Notwithstanding Coddington’s offhand comment that knowledge of the risk 
of serious bodily injury permits an inference of implied malice, Coddington 
reiterated the established rule that a trial court must instruct on second degree 
murder based on implied malice whenever there is evidence “from which the jury 
could have inferred that appellant acted without intent to kill even though his 
conduct posed a high risk of death.”  (Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 593, 
italics added.)  Thus, Coddington’s offhand comment cannot be viewed as 
implicitly overruling the decisions of this court discussed earlier (see ante, at 
p. 16) declaring that implied malice requires an awareness of the risk of death. 
In sum, the three decisions on which the Court of Appeal relied lack 
persuasive force.  Neither Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 310, nor Poddar, supra, 10 
Cal.3d 750, addressed the issue presented here:  whether implied malice can be 
21 
based on a defendant’s awareness of the risk of great bodily injury but not death 
resulting from the defendant’s actions.  With respect to the comment in 
Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at page 592, suggesting that knowledge of the 
likelihood of serious bodily injury permits an inference of implied malice, it is 
inconsistent not only with the holding in that case but also with the views 
expressed in other decisions of this court.  (See ante, at p. 16.)  We conclude that a 
conviction for second degree murder, based on a theory of implied malice, 
requires proof that a defendant acted with conscious disregard of the danger to 
human life.  In holding that a defendant’s conscious disregard of the risk of serious 
bodily injury suffices to sustain such a conviction, the Court of Appeal erred. 
IV.  THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF A NEW TRIAL ON THE SECOND DEGREE 
MURDER CHARGE 
We now turn to the second issue raised by the petition for review –whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant Knoller a new trial on the 
second degree murder charge.  Such an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court 
based its decision on impermissible factors (see People v. Carmody (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 367, 378) or on an incorrect legal standard (see Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. 
(2001) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435-436; In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 496).  
In granting Knoller a new trial, the trial court properly viewed implied 
malice as requiring a defendant’s awareness of the danger that his or her conduct 
will result in another’s death and not merely in serious bodily injury.  (See ante, at 
pp. 12-13.)  But the court’s ruling was legally flawed in other respects.  As we 
explain below, the trial court based its ruling on an inaccurate definition of implied 
malice, and it inappropriately relied on the prosecutor’s failure to charge 
codefendant Noel with murder. 
22 
As discussed earlier in part II, this court before its decision in People 
v. Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1212, had defined implied malice in two similar but 
somewhat different ways.  Under the Thomas test, malice is implied when “the 
defendant for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life, 
does an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will result in death.”  
(People v. Thomas, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 480 (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.); see also 
People v. Poddar, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 756-757.)  Under the Phillips test 
(People v. Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 587), malice is implied when the killing 
is proximately caused by “an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous 
to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his 
conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for 
life.”  In People v. Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1212, we observed that although 
these two tests “articulated one and the same standard” (id. at p. 1219), the 
Thomas test contained “obscure phraseology” and had “become a superfluous 
charge,” so that the “better practice in the future” would be for trial courts to 
instruct juries in the “straightforward language” of the Phillips test (id. at 
p. 1221).5 
Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury in accordance with the 
Phillips test.  But when the court evaluated defendant Knoller’s new trial motion, 
it relied on language from the Thomas test, and as explained below, its description 
of that test was inaccurate.  The court stated that a killer acts with implied malice 
when the killer “subjectively knows, based on everything, that the conduct that he 
or she is about to engage in has a high probability of death to another human 
being” and thus the issue in this case was “whether or not as a subjective matter 
                                              
5  
For trial courts too, the better practice in the future would be to use the 
Phillips test, rather than the Thomas test, in ruling on motions for a new trial as 
well as other matters in which the definition of implied malice is in issue. 
23 
and as a matter of law Ms. Knoller knew that there was a high probability” that her 
conduct would result in someone’s death.  (Italics added.)  But “high probability 
of death” is the objective, not the subjective, component of the Thomas test, which 
asks whether the defendant’s act or conduct “involves a high probability that it 
will result in death.”  (People v. Thomas, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 480 (conc. opn. of 
Traynor, J.).)  The subjective component of the Thomas test is whether the 
defendant acted with “a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for 
human life.”  (Ibid.)  Nor does the Phillips test require a defendant’s awareness 
that his or her conduct has a high probability of causing death.  Rather, it requires 
only that a defendant acted with a “conscious disregard for human life” (People v. 
Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1221; People v. Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at 
p. 587).   
As just shown, in treating the objective component of the Thomas test as 
the subjective component of that test, the trial court applied an erroneous 
definition of implied malice in granting defendant Knoller a new trial on the 
second degree murder charge. 
In ruling on Knoller’s motion for a new trial, the trial court also commented 
that, in its view, codefendant Noel was more culpable than defendant Knoller, and 
that the district attorney’s failure to charge Noel with murder was a “troubling 
feature of this case” that “played a role as well” in the court’s decision to grant 
Knoller a new trial on the second degree murder charge.  Dissimilar charging of 
codefendants, however, is not among the grounds for a new trial in section 1181.  
Although section 1181 states that a defendant’s new trial motion may be granted 
only on the grounds stated in that section, several courts have held that new trials 
may nonetheless be granted on grounds not enumerated in the statute when 
necessary to protect a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Oliver (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 747, 751 [judicial misconduct]; People 
24 
v. Davis (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 106, 109 [unexpected absence of witness].)  No 
published decision, however, has ever approved granting a new trial based on 
differential treatment of defendants.  (See generally People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 744, 810-813 [disposition of codefendant’s case is irrelevant to jury’s 
determination at penalty phase of capital case].) 
We specifically do not address whether a new trial could be granted on such 
a ground, an issue that would involve significant separation of powers 
considerations.  Even assuming a new trial could be granted on such a ground, it is 
not justified here.  Defendant Knoller and codefendant Noel were not similarly 
situated with regard to their dog Bane’s fatal mauling of Whipple in the hallway of 
the apartment building where they all lived.  The immediate cause of Whipple’s 
death was Knoller’s own conscious decision to take the dog Bane unmuzzled 
through the apartment building, where they were likely to encounter other people, 
knowing that Bane was aggressive and highly dangerous and that she could not 
control him.  Bringing a more serious charge against the person immediately 
responsible for the victim’s death was a permissible exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, not grounds for a new trial. 
V.  CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION 
In sum, the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant Knoller a 
new trial on the second degree murder charge.  That court erroneously concluded 
both that Knoller could not be guilty of murder, based on a theory of implied 
malice, unless she appreciated that her conduct created a high probability of 
someone’s death, and that a new trial was justified because the prosecution did not 
charge codefendant Noel with murder.  It is uncertain whether the trial court 
would have reached the same result using correct legal standards.  Moreover, the 
Court of Appeal, in reversing the trial court’s order, also erred, mistakenly 
reasoning that implied malice required only a showing that the defendant 
25 
appreciated the risk of serious bodily injury.  Under these circumstances, we 
conclude that the matter should be returned to the trial court to reconsider its new 
trial order in light of the views set out in this opinion. 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to 
that court, with directions to return the case to the trial court for reconsideration of 
defendant Knoller’s new trial motion in accord with the views expressed in this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Knoller 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 128 Cal.App.4th 1391 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S134543 
Date Filed: May 31, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: James L. Warren 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Dennis Patrick Riordan, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Riordan & Horgan, Donald M. Horgan 
and Dylan Schaffer for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share and Amy Haddix, Deputy Attorneys 
General for for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Dennis Patrick Riordan 
Riordan & Horgan 
523 Octavia Street 
San Francisco, CA  94102 
(415) 431-3472 
 
Amy Haddix 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5893