Case Title: Ayers v. Petro

Citation: 417 So. 2d 912

Docket Number: 53181

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1982-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
417 So. 2d 912 (1982) Carol S. AYERS and Richard J. Ayers v. J. Michael PETRO. No. 53181. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 21, 1982. *913 George M. Quin, Gulfport, for appellants. Herbert W. Wilson, Gulfport, for appellee. Before SUGG, P.J., and ROY NOBLE LEE and DAN M. LEE, JJ. SUGG, Presiding Justice, for the Court: The principal question in this case is whether a deed to a husband and wife conveying the property to them, "as joint tenants, not as tenants in common, but with the right of survivorship in each upon the death of either," created a joint tenancy or a tenancy by entirety. This appeal is from a decision of the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County, Honorable Jason Floyd, Jr. presiding, granting appellee's petition to sell real property for a division of proceeds. We affirm. The facts are not in dispute. Steven K. Streetman and wife, Carol S. Streetman purchased the property from Hubert J. Pickle and wife, Faye Pickle on September 25, 1978. The deed conveyed the property to the Streetmans "As joint tenants, not as tenants in common, but with the right of survivorship in each upon the death of either... ." On the same date the Streetmans executed a deed of trust to the Pickles for the balance of the purchase price of the property in the amount of $4,500. Subsequently the Streetmans were divorced and Carol Streetman married Richard J. Ayers before June, 1980. On June 30, 1980, the property was sold by the trustee at a foreclosure sale to Richard J. Ayers and wife, Carol S. Ayers for $4,417.52, "As joint tenants, not as tenants in common, but with the rights of survivorship in each... ." On September 5, 1980, Steven K. Streetman conveyed the property to appellee, J. Michael Petro, by a quitclaim deed. The quitclaim deed purported to convey the entire title to Petro, but of course, operated only as a conveyance of Streetman's undivided one-half interest. Petro claims only Streetman's interest in the property. Appellants argue that the deed from Pickle to the Streetmans, (1) created an estate by entirety in the Streetmans who were then husband and wife, (2) Streetman could not destroy the tenancy by the entireties by conveying his interest to Petro, and (3) the purchase of the property by appellants at a trustee's sale did not inure to the benefit of Streetman. At the outset it is necessary to note the similarity and the difference between estates *914 in joint tenancy and estates by entirety. This is clearly stated in 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, section 33(b) as follows: An estate by entirety may exist only in a husband and wife and may not be terminated by the unilateral action of one of them because they take by the entireties and not by moieties. While the marriage exists, neither husband nor wife can sever this title so as to defeat or prejudice the right of survivorship in the other, and a conveyance executed by only one of them does not pass title. Cuevas v. Cuevas, 191 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1966); McDuff v. Beauchamp, 50 Miss. 531 (1874); Hemingway v. Scales, 42 Miss. 1 (1868)[1]. Conversely a joint tenancy may be destroyed by one of the joint tenants conveying his undivided interest. This was expressed in Richardson v. Miller, 48 Miss. 311 (1873) in the following language: Accord, Hemingway v. Scales, supra. Where a husband and wife own property as tenants by entirety, the property is held by them as joint tenants following a divorce. In Shepherd v. Shepherd,[2] 336 So. 2d 497 (Miss. 1976) we held that an estate by entirety would not become an estate in common following a divorce of the parties but the parties would hold the property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. The Streetmans' deed to the property recited that it was conveyed to them, "as joint tenants, not as tenants in common, but with the rights of survivorship in each upon death of either." Despite the unambiguous language creating a joint tenancy, appellants argue that the deed created an estate by entirety. Appellants' argument is based on the common law rule that the same deed, which would create an estate in joint tenancy in other persons, make a husband and wife tenants of the entirety. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 207 Miss. 480, 42 So. 2d 438 (1949); McDuff v. Beauchamp, 50 Miss. 531, (1874); Hemingway v. Scales, 42 Miss. 1 (1868); Sale v. Saunders, 24 Miss. 24 (1852). The common law rule stated in Wolfe, McDuff, Hemingway, and Sale was changed in 1880 by the amendment to Art. 18, Code 1857 and by the removal of disabilities of coverture of married women. The effect of the statutes was discussed in Conn v. Boutwell, 101 Miss. 353, 58 So. 105 (1911) where this Court held that a conveyance to a husband and wife created an estate in common rather than an estate by entirety. In Conn the Court stated: Conn holds that, after the legislature removed the disabilities of coverture in 1880, and amended Article 18 of the Revised Code of 1857 by including the clause "or to a husband and wife," a husband and wife are in the same position as other persons relative to conveyances or devises of lands. We therefore hold that section 89-1-7 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), the current version of section 1197 Revised Code of 1880, authorizes a husband and wife to hold land either as tenants in common, as joint tenants, or as tenants by entirety. The deed to the Streetmans specifically created a joint tenancy. Appellants also contend that the trial court erred in holding that the purchase of the property at the foreclosure sale by them inured to the benefit of Streetman, a cotenant of the appellant, Mrs. Ayers. This question was answered contrary to appellant's contention in Beaman v. Beaman, 90 Miss. 762, 44 So. 987 (1907) in the following language: We therefore hold that the purchase of the property by appellants at the foreclosure sale inured to the benefit of Streetman. After appellant purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, Streetman conveyed the property to J. Michael Petro by quitclaim deed. Under the rule announced in Richardson v. Miller, supra, and Hemingway v. Scales, supra, Streetman, as a joint tenant, could convey his undivided interest and thus destroy the joint tenancy that formerly existed between him and his ex-wife. The trial court required Petro, within 15 days, to pay into the registry of the court $2,208.76, which represented one-half of the amount paid by appellants when they purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. We therefore affirm and remand to the trial court for the entry of an order directing the sale of the property and a division *917 of the proceeds. After payment of the expenses of sale the proceeds shall be divided; one-half to appellants and one-half to appellee. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER, P.J., and BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, JJ., concur. HAWKINS, J., specially concurs. PRATHER, J., took no part. HAWKINS, Justice, specially concurring: I concur in the result reached in this case, on the issue raised on appeal. I am troubled by our holding in Shepherd v. Shepherd, 336 So. 2d 497 (Miss. 1976); in my view, we should have adopted the holding of the majority of the jurisdictions that husbands and wives who own property as tenants in the entirety or as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, by virtue of a decree of divorce, thereafter own the same property as tenants in common. I certainly believe the chancery court should have the power in a divorce action, where one of the parties prays specifically for such relief, to decree along with the divorce that property theretofore owned by the parties as tenants in the entirety or as joint tenants with right of survivorship should thereafter be owned as tenants in common. The chancery court in such a case is not simply dealing with one spouse's property, but with their joint property. I do not read Shepherd as depriving the chancery court of this power, however. [1] Of historical interest about cases appearing in 42 Miss.Reports is the following quotation from Lusby v. Railroad Co., 73 Miss. 360, 19 So. 239 (1895). Perhaps the case most cited for the false view is that of Railroad Co. v. Devaney, in the book entitled 42 Miss.Rep. [555]. The case has no binding authority upon us, nor does the doctrine of stare decisis have any application in the case referred to, nor in any other case found in the so-called 42 Miss. The opinions found in that volume are the utterances of a tribunal appointed by the military satrap who then ruled in a prostrate commonwealth, and have no other binding authority upon us than that each case therein must be regarded as res adjudicata. [2] Our holding in Shepherd is contrary to the weight of authority. 41 Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, par. 106, p. 106, 59 A.L.R. 718 and 52 A.L.R. 890. It is generally held that a decree of divorce severs an estate by the entireties and makes the divorced spouses tenants in common. Although not expressed in our opinion in Shepherd, the reason for our holding is that only the unity of person is destroyed by the divorce, leaving intact the unities of time, title, interest and possession. [3] Now Section 89-1-7 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972).