Case Title: City of Seattle v. Buerkman

Citation: 408 P.2d 258, 67 Wash. 2d 537

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1965-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
67 Wn.2d 537 (1965) 408 P.2d 258 THE CITY OF SEATTLE, Appellant, v. LEROY C. BUERKMAN, Respondent.[*] No. 37830. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. December 2, 1965. A.L. Newbould, John P. Harris, and William L. Parker, for appellant. John F. Dore, for respondent. KELLY, J.[] On January 23, 1964, Leroy C. Buerkman was convicted in the Municipal Court of Seattle, King County, for allegedly operating a motor vehicle while under *538 the influence of or affected by the use of intoxicating liquor, and of negligent driving, in violation of the stated ordinances of the City of Seattle. He received sentences totaling $300 in fines and 90 days in jail. Defendant's case had been called for trial about 2:30 p.m. on January 23, 1964, in traffic court. At that time, his previously retained counsel was not present, being in trial in the King County Superior Court. The municipal judge was so advised, but refused a continuance until defendant's counsel could be free, but did pass the case to the end of his own calendar. The court was again advised by defendant that his counsel was still tied up in superior court; nevertheless, the court required defendant to stand trial without counsel, with the result indicated. When the court pronounced his judgment and sentence, the defendant, not versed in the requirements of law and procedure (he is a longshoreman by occupation), announced orally in open court that he "appealed." The traffic judge noted the "appeal" on his docket, fixed an appeal bond of $750, which defendant furnished, and also had the defendant sign an acknowledgment of a trial date in the superior court, which date was fixed by the traffic court judge, pursuant to the practice of the superior court. The municipal court's transcript was filed in superior court the following day. Promptly and within the 10 days allowed by statute, defendant's counsel, having in the meantime been relieved from his superior court duties, filed motions in the municipal court for a new trial and arrest of judgment. These apparently were never disposed of. When the matter came on for hearing in superior court, the city objected to the judge's hearing the appeal de novo and moved for a dismissal because the notice of appeal was not in writing as required by law. Defendant asked for a dismissal because of the alleged violation of his constitutional rights or for a remand for trial with counsel present. The superior court judge, after granting the parties a full hearing on what happened in municipal court, not on the merits of the charges, however, and after receiving briefs, *539 took the matter under advisement and thereafter signed an order containing the following provisions: IT IS ORDERED, AJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: .... .... DONE IN OPEN COURT this 21 day of July, 1964. The city appealed from the court's ruling and particularly from the quoted paragraph thereof. [1] The defendant's appeal from the municipal court to the superior court was ineffective, however, as an "appeal." Notice of appeal must be given in writing. State v. Ladiges, 63 Wn.2d 230, 386 P.2d 416 (1963). This was not done. The superior court, therefore, was without jurisdiction to consider the so-called appeal and grant a trial de novo, which is the procedure that follows an "appeal," properly perfected. State v. Miller, 59 Wn.2d 27, 365 P.2d 612 (1961); State v. Buckman, 51 Wn.2d 827, 322 P.2d 881 (1958), and cases cited therein. The law governing procedure in cases of this type is Rule 6.01, et seq., J Crim. R, RCW vol. 0, pertinent parts of which we quote: Rule 6.01: Rule 6.03: [2] The above-stated rules which became effective July 1, 1963, are referred to in State v. Ladiges, supra, but were held not to apply retroactively in that case. Ladiges clearly outlined the procedural steps to be followed in invoking the jurisdiction of the superior court, as well as the duties of the court from which the appeal is being taken. The language in the rules, like the language in the statutes from which they were derived, is mandatory. Bellingham v. Hite, 37 Wn.2d 652, 225 P.2d 895 (1950); Seattle v. Reed, 6 Wn.2d 186, 107 P.2d 239 (1940). See, also, RCW 35.20.030, which provides in part: RCW 35.22.530 provides in part: [3, 4] The superior court has jurisdiction over an appeal, properly perfected, in which case the trial therein *541 is de novo, and on the merits, without reference to any irregularities which may have occurred in the lower court. State v. Miller, supra; State v. Buckman, supra. The superior court, likewise, has the power to review any errors or irregularities which may have occurred, and particularly so when the defendant's substantial rights were violated by forcing him to trial without the benefit of his counsel, through no fault of the defendant. We can conceive of no error more pregnant with prejudice or violative of a defendant's rights than what admittedly occurred in traffic court. We are not unmindful of the heavy docket that confronts the municipal judge daily, and his efforts to expedite its disposition. However, basic rights of those accused of crime cannot be sacrificed or disregarded in the interests of expediency, no matter how commendable the objective. The prejudicial error committed in municipal court can be remedied only by a review thereof by superior court, and not by appeal. We consider the superior court judge's full and careful consideration of the questions raised by the motions as a ruling upon a review, and not on appeal. To hold otherwise would be to sanction a possible miscarriage of justice. The order of the trial court is affirmed in all respects except the last sentence thereof: "If said trial is not conducted within ten days of the signing of this order, the charges against the defendant will be dismissed." which is deleted. Affirmed as modified. ROSELLINI, C.J., HILL, WEAVER, and HAMILTON, JJ., concur. March 18, 1966. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 408 P.2d 258. [] Judge Kelly is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.