Case Title: Frank Lane Foster v. John B. Traul, M.D. Medical malpractice and lack of informed consent

Citation: 

Docket Number: 33537

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2007-12-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 33537 
 
FRANK LANE FOSTER and EDITH 
FOSTER, husband and wife,  
                                                       
          Plaintiffs-Appellants,                       
                                                       
v.                                                     
                                                       
JOHN B. TRAUL, M.D., and ANESTHESIA 
ASSOCIATES OF POCATELLO, P.A.,             
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          Defendants-Respondents,                      
                                                       
and                                                    
                                                       
JOHN TATHAM, CRNA, and POCATELLO 
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,        
 
          Defendants.                                                   
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Idaho Falls, October 2007 Term 
 
2007 Opinion No. 135 
 
Filed:  December 24, 2007 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, for Bannock County.  Hon. N. Randy Smith, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s order is vacated and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings. 
 
Lowell N.  Hawkes, Chartered, Pocatello, for appellants.  Lowell N. 
Hawkes and Ryan Lewis argued. 
 
Quane Smith, LLP, Boise, for respondents Anesthesia Associates of 
Pocatello, P.A. and John B. Traul, M.D.  Matthew F. McColl argued.   
 
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, Pocatello, for respondent 
John B. Traul, M.D. 
 
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice 
 
Lane Foster sued Dr. John Traul, Anesthesia Associates (AA) and others, alleging 
medical malpractice and lack of informed consent.  In 2005, this Court affirmed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Foster’s negligence claim, 
1 
but vacated the judgment as to Foster’s informed consent claim.  Shortly thereafter, 
Defendants again moved for summary judgment.  Foster submitted the Third Affidavit of 
Dr. Patton in opposition to the motion, which relied in part on two previously stricken 
affidavits.  The district court first struck the portions of the Third Affidavit as to 
causation and injury, which referred to the prior affidavits.  Next, the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Traul and AA because Foster failed to meet his 
burden with regard to the causation element of his informed consent claim.  Foster 
appeals to this Court, arguing the district court erred in striking the affidavit, granting 
summary judgment to Traul and AA, and denying his motion to disqualify Defendants’ 
attorneys.  We vacate and remand to the district court for further proceedings. 
I. 
 
Dr. Peter Schossberger performed back surgery on Lane Foster at Pocatello 
Regional Medical Center on December 15, 1998.  Dr. John Traul, who is affiliated with 
AA, provided anesthesia services during the operation.  Following the back surgery, 
Foster reported vision loss in his right eye and reduced vision in his left eye.  Mrs. Foster 
immediately noticed that Foster’s head and face were severely swollen.  A doctor at the 
Moran Eye Center subsequently diagnosed Foster with bilateral posterior ischemic optic 
neuropathy (PION).   
 
This Court issued an opinion in this case on July 21, 2005 affirming the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment on Foster’s medical negligence claim.  See Foster v. 
Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 120 P.3d 278 (2005).  The district court struck Dr. Patton’s first 
two affidavits because they improperly relied on the inadmissible prelitigation screening 
panel report.  Without these affidavits, Foster presented no expert testimony alleging 
breach of the standard of care.  Therefore, this Court affirmed the district court’s 
summary judgment on the negligence claim.  However, this Court noted that the issue of 
informed consent is entirely separate from that of negligence:  “A physician may be held 
liable under the doctrine of informed consent even if there was no negligence in the 
actual treatment of the patient.”  Foster, 141 Idaho at 894, 120 P.3d at 282 (citing 
Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 251, 805 P.2d 452, 457 (1991)).  Since Defendants 
had not challenged Foster’s informed consent claim, Foster was under no burden to 
present evidence regarding informed consent.  Thus, this Court vacated the district 
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court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Traul and AA on the informed consent 
claim. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Traul and AA filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment.  
In support of their motion, Traul and AA filed the Affidavit of Nancy Newman, the 
“preeminent authority” on perioperative vision loss stemming from spine surgery and a 
board-certified and practicing neurologist.  In addition, Traul filed a second affidavit in 
support of the motion.   
 
After three separate continuances, Foster filed his brief in opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, along with the Third Affidavit of John Patton, M.D.1  
The first paragraph of Dr. Patton’s affidavit states: 
I make this Affidavit on the basis of my personal and professional medical 
training, knowledge and experience, including review of depositions, 
medical record, and materials in this case (as referred to in my prior 
Affidavits) 
and 
the 
post-appeal 
affidavits 
of 
Defendant 
Traul 
(September 19, 2005) and Nancy Newman (September 20, 2005).   
 
In addition he affies: “This Third Affidavit is made in supplement to the substance of my 
previous Affidavits of January 31, 2003 and March 30, 2003 which I incorporate herein 
by reference.”  Patton continues to detail his opinion that the anesthesia-related care of 
Foster was negligent and substandard, and “needlessly resulted” in Foster’s blindness 
while under the care of Traul and personnel of AA. 
 
Traul and AA moved to strike Dr. Patton’s third affidavit, asserting several 
grounds, including Dr. Patton’s incompetence to testify on issues of causation, Dr. 
Patton’s refusal to present himself for a noticed deposition, and Dr. Patton’s continued 
reliance upon the prelitigation screening panel’s report.  The district court granted the 
motion to strike finding that Dr. Patton was not qualified to testify on matters of 
ophthalmologic causation and that Dr. Patton’s opinion testimony continued to be tainted 
                                                 
1 Foster also filed the Affidavit of Dr. Elizabeth Frost eight months after the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which explained in detail why anesthesiologists were qualified to render opinions with respect to 
blindness during surgery.  Traul and AA objected on the basis that the affidavit was untimely.  Foster 
pointed to the district court’s request during a previous hearing that the parties submit “whatever they 
want.”  According to the transcript, the judge requested additional legal authority to assist his decision.  
Striking the affidavit as untimely, the district court noted: “Now, (1) after the Court had said that it didn’t 
want any further briefing on the Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) after three extensions of time to 
respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment (each time over the objection of Defendants), the Plaintiffs 
want to continue to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment.”  The district court properly exercised 
discretion to strike this affidavit.  
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by his reliance on the panel report.  The district court subsequently granted the Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment, finding Foster no longer had qualified testimony to 
support the claim that Foster’s injuries were a result of submitting to the anesthesia on 
December 15, 1998.  Foster timely appealed to this Court. 
II. 
 
In this case, we address whether the district court abused its discretion by striking 
the Third Affidavit of Dr. Patton, finding him incompetent to testify as to matters of 
ophthalmologic causation; whether the district court erred when it granted summary 
judgment, holding that Foster failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the 
causation element of his informed consent claim; and whether the district court erred in 
denying Foster’s motion to disqualify defense counsel because its newly hired associate 
was a former law clerk who worked on the prior summary judgment decision in this case. 
A. 
 
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies 
the same standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion.  Carnell v. 
Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 326, 48 P.3d 651, 655 (2002).  Summary judgment is 
proper “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).  All disputed 
facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving 
party.  Id., 137 Idaho at 327, 48 P.3d at 656 (citing Jacobson v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 136 Idaho 171, 173, 30 P.3d 949, 951 (2001)).  Summary judgment is appropriate 
where the nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.  Id. (citing 
Jensen v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 136 Idaho 460, 463, 35 P.3d 776, 779 (2001)). 
 
The question of admissibility of affidavits under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(e) is a threshold question to be analyzed before applying the liberal construction and 
reasonable inference rules required when reviewing motions for summary judgment to 
determine whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.  
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994).  The Court must 
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look at the affidavit and determine whether it alleges facts, which if taken as true, would 
render the testimony admissible.  Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 
160, 163, 45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002).   
When reviewing the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse 
of discretion standard.  An abuse of discretion review requires a three-part inquiry: (1) 
whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 
court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason.  McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, LLC, 144 
Idaho 219, ___, 159 P.3d 856, 858-59 (2007) (citing Schwan’s Sales Enter., Inc. v. Idaho 
Transp. Dept., 142 Idaho 826, 831, 136 P.3d 297, 302 (2006)).  A district court has broad 
discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified as an expert, and admissibility of 
expert testimony will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.  Weeks v. E. 
Idaho Health Serv., 143 Idaho 834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007) (citing Warren v. 
Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 605, 83 P.3d 773, 779 (2003)). 
B. 
To establish a claim of informed consent, the plaintiff must prove three elements: 
nondisclosure, causation, and injury.  Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 257, 805 P.2d 
452, 463 (1991).  The district court did not strike Dr. Patton’s testimony concerning 
nondisclosure, but did strike the portions of the affidavit relating to causation and injury, 
stating there was “no foundation for Dr. Patton’s opinions that Mr. Foster had been 
injured as a result of submitting to the medical procedure performed by Dr. Traul.”  The 
court held that Dr. Patton did not have qualifications to render a medical opinion as to 
matters of ophthalmology.  Further, based on Paragraph 1 of the affidavit, where he refers 
to his prior affidavits, the court struck the portions of Dr. Patton’s Third Affidavit that 
dealt with causation and injury to the extent the prelitigation screening panel’s report 
deals with the issues of causation and injury.  
 
Foster argues that the question of causation is really a jury question – whether a 
reasonable person would have chosen no treatment or a different course of treatment had 
he been adequately informed.  In addition, Foster asserts Dr. Patton is indeed qualified to 
render a medical opinion as to matters of ophthalmology because he was familiar with 
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post-surgical blindness as related to anesthesia.  According to Foster, the district court 
abused its discretion and “picked between affidavits” by “buying” the challenged 
conclusion of Dr. Newman that Foster’s blindness could not have been prevented. 
 
Respondents argue that the district court properly acted as a “gatekeeper” under 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 to determine Dr. Patton was incompetent to testify on issues 
of medical causation relating to ophthalmology.  Therefore, they argue the district judge 
properly exercised his discretion in striking the Third Affidavit of Dr. Patton.  
 
The test to determine whether a witness is qualified as an expert is “not rigid” and 
can be found in Idaho Rule of Evidence 702.  Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837, 153 P.3d at 1183 
(citing West v. Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 138-39, 968 P.2d 228, 233-34 (1998)).  Idaho Rule 
of Evidence 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.   
 
A qualified expert is one who possesses “knowledge skill, experience, training, or 
education.”  Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837, 153 P.3d at 1183. Formal training is not necessary, 
but practical experience or special knowledge must be shown to bring a witness within 
the category of an expert.  Id. (citing Warren, 139 Idaho at 605, 83 P.3d at 779).  The 
proponent of the testimony must lay foundational evidence showing that the individual is 
qualified as an expert on the topic of his or her testimony.  Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837, 153 
P.3d at 1183 (citing State v. Burrow, 142 Idaho 328, 330, 127 P.3d 231, 233 (Ct. App. 
2005)). 
Dr. Patton is a board-certified anesthesiologist.  His Third Affidavit details the 
basis of his familiarity with the anatomy of blood supply to the eyes as relates to 
anesthesia care and potential for injury to the eyes.  Dr. Patton testifies it is his 
professional medical opinion based on reasonable medical probability that the anesthesia-
related care of Foster, including lack of proper informed consent, was negligent and 
substandard and “needlessly resulted” in Foster’s blindness while under the care of Traul 
and AA.  In Weeks, the district court held that the expert was not qualified to testify as an 
expert witness on the issue of causation.  This Court reversed and held that the expert 
witness’ education, specialized knowledge, and thirty years’ experience established that 
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he met the test outlined in Idaho Rule 702.  Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837, 153 P.3d at 1183.  
Similarly, Dr. Patton meets the test outlined in the rule based on his education, 
specialized knowledge, and experience as an anesthesiologist.  Thus, the district court 
erred in finding Dr. Patton incompetent to testify regarding Mr. Foster’s blindness as 
related to the anesthesia care during his surgery.  
In addition, the district court held that Dr. Patton, an anesthesiologist, was not 
competent to testify as to ophthalmologic issues.  However, this Court has specifically 
held there is no requirement that an expert witness must be board-certified in the same 
specialty as the physician against whom medical malpractice is alleged to establish a case 
of medical malpractice.  Pearson v. Parsons, 114 Idaho 334, 337, 757 P.2d 197, 200 
(1988). “[T]o fulfill the requirement of presenting expert testimony in a medical 
malpractice case against a board-certified specialist, plaintiff may offer the testimony of a 
physician who is not board-certified in the same specialty as the defendant, so long as the 
testimony complies with the requirements of I.C. §§ 6-1202 and 6-1303.”  Id.  In this 
case, Dr. Patton was an anesthesiologist.  Dr. Traul was also an anesthesiologist.  
Nevertheless, the district court seems to require an ophthalmologist from the plaintiff in 
order to establish causation.  Dr. Patton’s specialty is not determinative.  One would not 
expect an ophthalmologist to be present when the anesthesiologist discusses with his 
patient the potential risks that anesthesia care might pose to his eyesight during a surgery.  
One would hope that, if there were risks which anesthesia care could pose during a 
surgery, the anesthesiologist would have the knowledge and capability of so informing 
the patient.  After all, the anesthesiologist is in the best position to inform and protect the 
patient and certainly should know of the type of risks that may exist. 
The only question is whether Dr. Patton is qualified under Rule 702.  As 
discussed above, Dr. Patton is qualified under Rule 702 based on his experience as an 
anesthesiologist.  Thus, the district court erred in striking the portions of Dr. Patton’s 
affidavit relating to causation and injury.2 The district court did not act within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the proper legal standards when it found 
                                                 
2 Foster does not appeal the district court’s holding that the portions of the affidavit referring to his 
previously stricken affidavits should be stricken.  Thus, those references remain stricken.  Notwithstanding 
those references, found in the first and final paragraphs of the Third Affidavit, the affidavit meets the 
standards of Rule 702. 
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“no foundation for Dr. Patton’s opinions that Mr. Foster had been injured as a result of 
submitting to the medical procedure performed by Dr. Traul.”   
C. 
As noted above, in order to establish a claim based on the doctrine of informed 
consent, a patient must prove three basic elements: nondisclosure, causation, and injury.  
Sherwood, 119 Idaho at 257, 805 P.2d at 463.  The district court declined to grant 
summary judgment as to the nondisclosure element of informed consent, finding the 
remaining unstricken portions of Dr. Patton’s Third Affidavit sufficient to survive 
summary judgment on this issue.  Similarly, the court declined to grant summary 
judgment to Defendants with regard to the injury element, because there was evidence 
Foster had injuries to his eyes after the surgery.  Thus, the only basis upon which the 
district court granted summary judgment was as to the causation element of informed 
consent.  This resulted from the court’s striking of Dr. Patton’s causation testimony.   
The district court applied Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 136 Idaho 800, 805, 41 P.3d 
228, 233 (2001), to hold there are two “sub-elements” to causation. First, the plaintiff 
must show whether one would have consented to the procedure if there had been 
sufficient disclosure.  As to this element, the district court declined to grant summary 
judgment.  Second, the court said Foster must show that “the breach of the nondisclosure 
element of informed consent was the proximate cause of Mr. Foster’s injuries.”  Since the 
district court found Dr. Patton incompetent to testify as to this element of causation, 
Foster presented no evidence as to causation.  On the other hand, the court points to Dr. 
Newman’s testimony that the exact cause of PION is unknown.  Since Foster failed to 
present expert testimony as to this “sub-element” of causation, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Traul and AA. 
Foster argues the district court improperly equated causation in an informed 
consent claim with medical negligence.  According to Foster, he satisfied the causation 
element by demonstrating he would not have consented to the procedure if he had been 
informed of the material risks involved.   Foster claims causation in an informed consent 
case is a fact question that focuses upon the process of giving consent—it is a jury 
question that considers the reasonable person standard and not expert medical testimony.  
Thus, Foster argues he did not need an expert to testify as to causation to survive a 
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motion for summary judgment.  Foster continues to argue that even if the district court 
did not err as to the “sub-element” of causation, questions of fact still preclude summary 
judgment because Mr. Foster would not have ended up blind had he not submitted to the 
surgery.   
Respondents argue the district court properly granted their motion for summary 
judgment below.  Specifically, Dr. Traul and AA argue that Foster was obligated to prove 
that he was injured by the anesthesia care, for which Dr. Traul and AA were responsible.  
Since the Plaintiff failed to present evidence on this matter, Defendants contend that 
summary judgment was proper. 
 
Informed consent is separate from negligence. Foster, 141 Idaho at 894, 120 P.3d 
at 252 (citing Sherwood, 119 Idaho at 251, 805 P.2d at 457).  A physician may be held 
liable on an informed consent theory even though the physician is free from personal 
negligence.  Sherwood, 119 Idaho at 251, 805 P.2d at 457. The doctrine of informed 
consent is the general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose to his patient 
those risks of injury which might result from a proposed course of treatment.  Id.   
The district court erred when it held that Foster must show two types of causation 
under this element.  The court’s conclusion may have been based on an erroneous reading 
of Anderson v. Hollingsworth.  There, the Court said, citing Sherwood, that: 
 
To prove causation the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a prudent person in the patient’s position would not have 
consented to the proposed procedure had full and adequate disclosure of 
the significant risks been made at the time consent was originally given 
. . . 
 
 
Thus, in order to prove causation [the patient] must show by a 
preponderance of evidence that ‘a reasonable person would have chosen 
no treatment or a different course of treatment had he or she been 
adequately informed by the physician.’” 
 
136 Idaho at 805, 41 P.3d at 233.  This is a correct recitation of the causation element of 
an informed consent case and it is only one type of causation.   The district court 
correctly held that Foster presented sufficient facts to withstand summary judgment on 
this element.  The confusion may have resulted from the next sentence in Anderson – 
“Anderson must also prove she has been injured as a result of submitting to the medical 
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procedure.”  Id.  Injury here is not a part of causation but, rather, the third element of an 
informed consent claim. 
 To show injury, the plaintiff must prove his injuries were a direct and proximate 
cause of the defendant’s failure to disclose risks and alternatives to the patient.  The 
injury must be as a result of the undisclosed material risk, rather than some unrelated risk, 
such as falling off of the operating table or faulty work on the part of medical personnel 
not involved in anesthesia care.  The district court below denied summary judgment as to 
nondisclosure and injury, which has not been appealed here.  However, in order to 
establish the injury element the patient must show that the injury arose out of a material 
risk of the surgery that should have been disclosed to him.  It is irrelevant whether 
Traul’s and AA’s actions caused the injury.  The question is whether Traul’s and AA’s 
failure to fully disclose risks and alternative treatments caused Foster to sustain an injury 
that is related to a material risk that the physician failed to disclose.  
There is a material question of fact whether Foster was injured as a result of the 
surgery.  Dr. Newman, Defendants’ expert, testified that PION is a rare perioperative 
complication that occurs 1 in 60,000 to 1 in 125,000 of all anesthetics.  It occurs more 
frequently in prolonged complicated spinal procedures in the prone position, estimated to 
be 1 in 1,000.  Dr. Newman’s affidavit stated that the exact cause of PION is unknown, 
but possible causes include surgery factors, perioperative factors and certain patient 
factors, such as unrecognized hypertension.  In Mr. Foster’s case specifically, possible 
factors at play include the length of surgery in the prone position, Foster’s vascular risk 
factors of hypertension, disease and stroke, and an anatomic predisposition that could not 
have been recognized preoperatively.  Finally, Dr. Newman claims the PION here was an 
“entirely unpredictable event that could not have been prevented” by the doctors here.  
In response, Dr. Patton addresses the issue of injury in his affidavit.  First, Dr. 
Patton asserts Dr. Newman’s statement that this was an “entirely unpredictable” event 
does not mean that Mr. Foster’s blindness would have occurred despite the conditions 
that took place during his surgery.  Patton notes that Dr. Traul cannot state there was any 
pre-anesthesia informed consent conversation, and the record does not indicate Dr. Traul 
exercised proper oversight of Foster.  Patton also claims the possibility that blood supply 
to the posterior part of the nerve from small vessels may be easily compressed by fluid 
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buildup in that area “is fundamental anatomy taught to anesthesiologists.”  “Maintaining 
fluid balance and blood pressure is the essence of the role of anesthesia in any surgery.”  
Dr. Patton testifies it is undisputed in this case that the blindness of Foster resulted from 
“ischemia” or a loss of blood supply to the eyes.  Finally, he states that “Mr. Foster’s 
December 15, 1998 blindness [was] indeed preventable by proper anesthesia care.”   
Viewing all evidence in a light most favorable to Foster, the nonmoving party, 
there is a genuine issue of material fact on the injury element of his informed consent 
claim.  In this case, all experts agree that a certain percentage of patients would sustain a 
vision injury from the procedure.  Although we may not know precisely how the injury 
occurred, or what percentage would suffer such injury, the evidence presented 
demonstrates the injury was a risk of the procedure, and that Foster sustained the injury.  
This evidence is sufficient to preclude summary judgment as to injury.  The statements 
contained in the affidavits, taken as true, together with all legitimate inferences that flow 
therefrom, were sufficient to establish the existence of genuine issues of material fact.  
The district court erred when it granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 
D. 
Following Dr. Traul’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Foster filed a 
Motion to Disqualify Dr. Traul and AA’s counsel.  Prior to joining Quane Smith, Ms. 
Carole Wesenberg served a judicial law clerkship with District Judge Smith.  During this 
time, Ms. Wesenberg assisted the district court in the preparation, research, and writing 
of the court’s prior decision granting summary judgment to the Defendants in this matter.  
Ms. Wesenberg subsequently joined Quane Smith’s Idaho Falls office.  According to Dr. 
Traul’s lawyers, the only Quane Smith lawyers who have handled this case are Matthew 
McColl and Richard Stubbs of Boise.  Ms. Wesenberg’s supervisor in Idaho Falls has not 
allowed her to be involved in any matters in which she was involved as a law clerk, and 
Ms. Wesenberg has not and will not receive any portion of the fees from such lawsuit, 
nor has she had access to any files in the Quane Smith Boise office regarding this lawsuit. 
The decision to grant or deny a motion to disqualify counsel is within the 
discretion of the trial court.  Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110, 114 
(Ct. App. 1991).  Thus, the abuse of discretion standard, described above, applies. 
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Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.12(a) provides that a lawyer shall not 
represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally 
and substantially as a law clerk, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed 
consent, confirmed in writing.  According to subsection (c), if a lawyer is disqualified 
under (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly 
undertake or continue representation in the matter unless: (1) the disqualified lawyer is 
timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee 
therefrom; and (2) written notice is promptly given to the parties and any appropriate 
tribunal to enable them to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.  Idaho R. 
Prof. Conduct 1.12(c) (2005).  “Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any 
participation in the matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that 
are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated 
lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law.  Idaho R. Prof. 
Conduct 1.0(k) (2005). 
The Preamble to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “the Rules 
are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating 
conduct through disciplinary agencies.”  Idaho R. Prof. Conduct Preamble.  The 
Preamble cautions that “the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked 
by opposing parties as procedural weapons.”  Id.  In Weaver, the Court of Appeals began 
with similar principles: 
The moving party has the burden of establishing grounds for 
disqualification.  The goal of the court should be to shape a remedy which 
will assure fairness to the parties and the integrity of the judicial process.  
Whenever possible, courts should endeavor to reach a solution that is least 
burdensome to the client.   
 
Weaver, 120 Idaho at 697, 819 P.2d at 115 (internal citations omitted).  When the motion 
to disqualify comes from an opposing party, the motion should be viewed with caution.  
Id.  The Court of Appeals applied a four-part test to determine whether an appearance of 
impropriety alone will give a party standing to interfere with an adverse party’s choice of 
counsel: 
(1) 
Whether the motion is being made for the purposes of harassing 
the defendant, 
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(2) 
Whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged in some 
way if the motion is not granted, 
(3) 
Whether there are any alternative solutions, or is the proposed 
solution the least damaging possible under the circumstances, and 
(4) 
Whether the possibility of public suspicion will outweigh any 
benefits that might accrue to continued representation. 
 
Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698, 819 P.2d 116.3 
In the present case, the district court applied the four-part test established by the 
court of appeals in Weaver.  Since motions to disqualify are generally disfavored and the 
Weaver factors suggested disqualification was not required, the court declined to 
disqualify Quane Smith, even though counsel did not strictly comply with Rule 1.12.   
The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying these factors to this case.  
Although an attorney might have a mandatory duty to disclose a potential conflict, the 
Court does not have a mandatory duty to disqualify.  Although Quane Smith failed to 
provide notice to the tribunal immediately upon the hiring of Ms. Wesenberg, Ms. 
Wesenberg was in fact properly screened from participation in the case.  Further, Foster 
will not be damaged if the motion is not granted -- there is very little benefit to be had at 
this point in the case by disqualifying defense attorneys.  Finally, it is worth note that 
Foster did not promptly file the Motion to Disqualify upon learning of Ms. Wesenberg’s 
employ. 
 
The district court awarded $2,271.40 in costs to the Defendants below, based on 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(A)4, because Traul and AA prevailed on their 
motion for summary judgment.  Since we vacate the summary judgment, the award of 
costs is similarly vacated. 
                                                 
3 In Weaver, the Court of Appeals addressed a motion to disqualify under Rules 1.7(b) (dealing with 
situations where an attorney’s representation of one client may be materially limited by representation of 
another client) and 1.10(a) (imputation of conflicts of interest).  120 Idaho at 697, 819 P.2d at 114. 
4 Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)(A) provides: “Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.” 
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III. 
 
We vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand the case to 
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Foster is awarded 
his costs on appeal.    
 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, HORTON and Justice Pro 
Tem BUSH CONCUR. 
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