Case Title: Lane v. Sumner County

Citation: 298 S.W.2d 708

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1957-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
298 S.W.2d 708 (1957) Ed LANE v. SUMNER COUNTY et al. Supreme Court of Tennessee. February 8, 1957. W. T. Goodall, Jr., Gallatin, for appellants. Harsh & Kelly, Gallatin, for appellee. BURNETT, Justice. This suit, insofar as it is presented to this Court, was brought to strike two paragraphs from a decree of the Circuit Court of Sumner County entered therein in September 1950. The basic reason for striking these portions of the decree is that they are void as contrary to public policy and therefore should be stricken. The portions of the decree sought to be stricken and elided are: The bill was demurred to on various grounds. After certain amendments the Chancellor heard the matter on bill and demurrer and rendered a very comprehensive and well reasoned memorandum opinion, which is part of the record, sustaining the position of complainant and ordering the above quoted portions of the decree stricken from that decree because they were void and against public policy. We will hereinafter at various times quote parts of this opinion of the Chancellor and in doing so adopt the portions as quoted as the opinion of this Court. This argument is based upon the well founded maxim Volenti Non Fit Injuria (he who consents to what is done cannot complain of it) and to the general proposition so well set forth by Mr. Gibson in his Suits in Chancery, 4th Edition, Secs. 72 and 577, that generally speaking consent decrees can only be attacked for fraud. They are final if the decree "violates no law or public policy". It is said at page 95 of Gibson, supra, Sec. 72, that: A maxim of equal standing to that above quoted is Ex Pacto Illigito Non Oritur Actio (no suit can be brought to enforce a contract in violation of law). This exception as noted above in the attack on consent decrees is thus set forth. The suit now before us is such a suit. The portion of the decree attacked is said to be void as contrary to public policy. What is against public policy and a definition covering it in a given case is a broad question and one that may apply to one State and not to another. In considering what is against public policy it is the duty and province of the court, in determining this question, to consider analogous cases involving the same general principle. Long ago, in considering this question, this Court in Osborne v. Allen, 143 Tenn. 343, 352, 226 S.W. 221, 224, adopted with approval a statement from Mr. Pomeroy (Section 935) as follows: The problem naturally in the instant case is one of application. In considering the problem, too, it makes no difference whether or not the contract can "be purged of its illegality by the fact that the act of the officials was not harmful, nor by the fact that it was done in good faith". Osborne v. Allen, supra. And as the Chancellor says: And this: And further: After very carefully reading this record and the authorities cited by respective counsel we feel that for the reasons expressed herein, largely those of the Chancellor, that the decree below must be sustained with costs.