Case Title: State v. Richard M. Fischer

Citation: 2010 WI 6

Docket Number: 2007AP001898-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 6 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1898-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Richard M. Fischer, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 152 
Reported at: 314 Wis. 2d 324, 761 N.W.2d 7 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 2, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 13, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Wolfgram   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Robin Shellow, Urszula Tempska, and The Shellow Group, 
Milwaukee, and James M. Shellow and Shellow & Shellow, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by James M. Shellow. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Thomas 
J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 6
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2007AP1898-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2005CM123) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent   
 
 
v. 
 
Richard M. Fischer   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner   
FILED 
 
FEB 2, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a court of 
appeals decision1 that affirmed a ruling by the Ozaukee County 
Circuit Court, the Honorable Tom R. Wolfgram presiding, that 
excluded an expert's report and opinion testimony based in part 
on the results of a preliminary breath test (PBT) the defendant 
took just prior to arrest.  Given the PBT result, the later 
blood test result, and typical absorption rates, the expert's 
opinion was that the defendant, Richard M. Fischer (Fischer), 
had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) below the legal limit at 
the time he was pulled over by police and that his BAC level 
                                                 
1 State v. Fischer, 2008 WI App 152, 314 Wis. 2d 324, 761 
N.W.2d 7. 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
2 
 
only later rose above the limit as his body continued to absorb 
the alcohol.   
¶2 
In its motion in limine, the State sought to exclude 
the evidence to the extent that it relied on Fischer's PBT 
results on two grounds:  first, that Wis. Stat. § 343.303, which 
prohibits admitting PBT results as evidence in drunk driving 
cases except for limited purposes that are inapplicable here,2 
means that PBT results cannot be used as the basis for an 
admissible expert opinion in such a case; and second, that PBT 
results are not sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for 
an expert opinion.  Fischer argued that the motion in limine 
should be denied for two reasons:  first, that Wis. Stat. § 
907.03, which permits an expert to testify as to an opinion 
regardless of the admissibility of the underlying data on which 
the opinion is based, is an exception to Wis. Stat. § 343.303; 
and second, that any reading of those statutes that would 
require the exclusion of the expert's opinion would violate his 
constitutional right to present a defense.  The circuit court 
and court of appeals ruled that the evidence must be excluded in 
general on the grounds advanced by the State:  that Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 343.303 states in relevant part:  "The result 
of the preliminary breath screening test shall not be admissible 
in any action or proceeding except to show probable cause for an 
arrest, if the arrest is challenged, or to prove that a chemical 
test was properly required or requested of a person under s.  
343.305(3)."   
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 
version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
3 
 
§ 343.303 prohibited the PBT results' use and that PBT results 
were insufficiently reliable to form the basis of an expert 
opinion that is admissible under Wis. Stat. §§ 907.02 and 
907.03.  Before this court, Fischer expanded his argument to 
urge the court to abandon the established Wisconsin "limited 
gatekeeper" approach, where reliability of evidence is a matter 
for the finder of fact, and instead adopt the federal standard 
articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,3 
where the trial judge has a significant role in determining 
reliability. 
¶3 
The questions before us are thus (1) whether Wis. 
Stat. § 343.303 creates an absolute bar on the admission of PBT 
results in operating while intoxicated (OWI) prosecutions, even 
when used as the basis for an expert's opinion offered under 
Wis. Stat. § 907.03; (2) if so, whether such an application of 
the statute violates a defendant's constitutional right to 
present a defense; and (3) whether we will accept counsel's 
invitation to revisit and reject the Wisconsin case law that 
establishes that "the reliability of the evidence is a weight 
and credibility issue for the fact finder."4  
¶4 
Though our analysis diverges in some respects from 
that of the circuit court and the court of appeals, we agree 
                                                 
3 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 
(1993) (holding that "under the [Federal Rules of Evidence] the 
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or 
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable") 
4 State v. Peters, 192 Wis. 2d 674, 690, 534 N.W.2d 867 (Ct. 
App. 1995). 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
4 
 
that the circuit court properly granted the State's motion in 
limine seeking to exclude the report and expert opinion 
testimony 
Fischer 
sought 
to 
introduce. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 343.303 expressly bars PBT results in OWI cases, and to allow 
Wis. Stat. § 907.03 to trump that prohibition would simply 
nullify that provision and would consequently present a variety 
of needless obstacles to the investigation, prosecution, and 
defense of drunk driving cases.  Giving effect to the two 
statutes together under these circumstances admittedly presents 
difficulties, but it is no solution to transform Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.303's inadmissibility into admissibility, reversing the 
legislature's clearly stated intention.  Principles of statutory 
construction and our duty to respect clear legislative policy 
decisions require us to read Wis. Stat. § 343.303 to create an 
exception to § 907.03 and forbid us to read § 907.03 as 
nullifying the prohibition in § 343.303.5 
                                                 
5 In this instance, we are not dealing with a legislative 
rule that "unduly burden[s] or substantially interfere[s] with" 
the exercise of the court's power, so we do not analyze the 
questions presented in terms of the shared power doctrine.  See 
Barland v. Eau Claire County, 216 Wis. 2d 560, 573, 575 
N.W.2d 691 (1998) ("In these areas of 'shared power,' one branch 
of government may exercise power conferred on another only to an 
extent that does not unduly burden or substantially interfere 
with the other branch's exercise of its power.") (quoting In re 
Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 775, 348 N.W.2d 559 
(1984)).  There are cases in which we do not defer to 
legislative choices that affect the judicial branch; for a case 
voiding a statute that impermissibly "abrogated or modified by 
legislative action" the right of a court to direct a verdict, 
see Thoe v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 
464, 195 N.W. 407 (1923) (quoting Kiley v. Chicago, Milwaukee & 
St. Paul Ry. Co., 138 Wis. 215, 226, 119 N.W. 309 (1909)). 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
5 
 
¶5 
Fischer argues that excluding the expert's opinion 
violates his right under the constitutions of the United States 
and Wisconsin to present a defense.  We disagree.  In United 
States v. Scheffer, the United States Supreme Court held that 
state rules that result in exclusion of defense evidence are 
constitutionally valid "so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or 
'disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.'"6  
This court articulated and applied the Scheffer analysis in 
State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶52, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 
N.W.2d 777.  To evaluate Fischer's constitutional claim, we 
apply 
the 
two-part 
test 
set 
forth 
in 
St. 
George, 
252 
Wis. 2d 499, ¶¶54-55.  We need not decide whether Fischer has 
satisfied the factors in the first step, i.e., that the 
testimony of the expert witness met the standards of Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02, that the opinion testimony in question is "clearly 
relevant to a material issue[,]" id., ¶54, that it is necessary 
to Fischer's defense, and that its probative value outweighs the 
prejudicial effect.  We assume for purposes of this analysis 
that Fischer has satisfied all four factors in the first part of 
the inquiry.  We then reach the second step, which involves 
weighing the defendant's right against the State's interest in 
excluding the evidence.  For reasons explained herein, we hold 
that in an OWI prosecution, even if a defendant establishes a 
constitutional right to present an expert opinion that is based 
                                                 
6 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) 
(quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
6 
 
in part on PBT results, the right to do so is outweighed by the 
State's 
compelling 
interest 
to 
exclude 
that 
evidence.  
Permitting the use of that evidence as the basis for an expert 
opinion 
would 
render 
meaningless 
the 
legislature's 
act 
forbidding such evidence in OWI prosecutions, an act that 
promotes efficient investigations of suspected drunk driving 
incidents and furthers the State's compelling interest in public 
safety on its roads.  The legislature's decision limiting the 
admissibility of PBT results helps law enforcement officers do 
their jobs with more cooperation from drivers than they would 
otherwise be likely to get——cooperation that is especially 
critical given that a PBT may be requested when an officer has a 
basis to justify an investigative stop but has not established 
probable cause to justify an arrest.7   
                                                 
7 In County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 310, 603 
N.W.2d 541 (1999), we addressed "the PBT's place in the process 
of an OWI investigation" in this way:  
First, an officer may make an investigative stop if 
the officer "reasonably suspects" that a person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime, Wis. Stat. 
[§] 968.24, or reasonably suspects that a person is 
violating the non-criminal traffic laws, State v. 
Griffin, 183 Wis. 2d 327, 333-34, 515 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  After stopping the car and contacting the 
driver, the officer's observations of the driver may 
cause the officer to suspect the driver of operating 
the vehicle while intoxicated.  If his observations of 
the driver are not sufficient to establish probable 
cause for arrest for an OWI violation, the officer may 
request the driver to perform various field sobriety 
tests.  The driver's performance on these tests may 
not produce enough evidence to establish probable 
cause for arrest.  The legislature has authorized the 
use 
of the PBT to assist an officer in such 
circumstances. 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
7 
 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm.  Though we benefit from the 
analyses of the court of appeals and the circuit court, we reach 
the result via a different analysis than that of those courts. 
The circuit court's grant of the motion in limine excluding the 
report and expert opinion was proper under Wisconsin statutes 
and it did not violate Fischer's constitutional right to present 
a defense.  The rule we adopt here is not a blanket rule against 
absorption curve opinion evidence but rather a rule prohibiting 
use of PBT results in the manner attempted here.8 
¶7 
Our analysis does not turn on an evaluation of the 
reliability of an expert opinion based on PBT results, which 
after all are routinely relied on to establish probable cause 
for arrest and have been held to be admissible for purposes 
other than those prohibited by statute.9  Because we conclude 
that the State's countervailing compelling interest and not the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Footnote omitted.) 
8 We recognize the concerns expressed by the United States 
Supreme Court about blanket exclusions in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 
U.S. 44, 56 (1987), and Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 
(1986) (discussing per se exclusions of evidence by state 
evidence rules). 
9 See, e.g., State v. Doerr, 229 Wis. 2d 616, 622, 599 
N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding PBT result admissible where 
defendant was charged with battery to police officer and 
resisting officer); State v. Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 959, 970 & n.5, 
512 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1994) (ruling that Wis. Stat. § 343.303 
did not bar admissibility of PBT result in trial for sexual 
assault, holding that the statutory bar on the evidentiary use 
of PBT results is limited to violations of Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63, 
940.09, and 940.25, and affirming exclusion of the result on 
other grounds). 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
8 
 
reliability of the expert testimony is dispositive of the 
analysis, there is no reason for us to revisit Wisconsin's well-
established role for the circuit court where expert testimony is 
proffered.  The law in Wisconsin continues to be that questions 
of the weight and reliability of relevant evidence are matters 
for the trier of fact.  As we stated in State v. Walstad, "This 
is the relevancy test of our rules and we adhere to it."10  We, 
therefore, decline to adopt a Daubert-like approach to expert 
testimony that would make the judge the gatekeeper. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶8 
The following facts are undisputed:  In January 2005, 
Fischer was pulled over when an officer observed lane deviation 
and suspected drunk driving.  The stop occurred at approximately 
1:40 a.m.  Fischer performed poorly on field sobriety tests.  
After those tests, at a time unspecified in the police report, a 
PBT was administered, and it measured a breath alcohol content 
of .11 percent.11  Fischer was arrested; a chemical blood test 
taken at 2:48 a.m. showed a BAC of .147 percent.  He was charged 
                                                 
10 State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 519, 351 N.W.2d 469 
(1984) ("In a state such as Wisconsin, where substantially 
unlimited cross-examination is permitted, the underlying theory 
or principle on which admissibility is based can be attacked by 
cross-examination or by other types of impeachment.  Whether a 
scientific witness whose testimony is relevant is believed is a 
question of credibility for the finder of fact, but it clearly 
is admissible."). 
11 "'Alcohol concentration' means the number of grams of 
alcohol in 100 milliliters of a person's blood or the number of 
grams of alcohol in 210 liters of a person's breath."  Wis. 
Stat. § 885.235(1)(a). 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
9 
 
with operating while intoxicated, second offense, and operating 
with a BAC of .08 or more, second offense, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and (b).  Fischer pled not guilty, and the 
case was set for trial.   
¶9 
He retained an expert who prepared a report using the 
data from the two tests, estimates as to the precise timing of 
the breath test after the stop, and absorption rate formulas to 
generate absorption curves, with the purpose of estimating the 
BAC prior to the time the PBT was taken, at the moment Fischer 
was stopped.  In his report, the expert said his calculations 
were based on a method similar to the one known as speculative 
retrograde extrapolation, which uses known data to estimate a 
person's BAC at an earlier point in time.  In the first report, 
dated February 13, 2006, the expert included the results of both 
tests and reached the following conclusion:   
I conclude that Mr. Fischer was in the absorptive 
phase when he was stopped and that his BAC was 
increasing with a high degree of scientific certainty. 
In 
addition 
my 
analyses, 
based 
on 
the 
chosen 
assumptions, 
indicate 
that 
the 
data 
are 
most 
consistent with, but do not establish, the hypothesis 
that Fischer was below the 0.08% threshold when 
stopped.    
¶10 In June 2006, the State filed a motion in limine to 
exclude the expert's report and testimony "to the extent the 
report and testimony rely on the PBT result," on the grounds 
that "(1) the PBT result is inadmissible at trial pursuant to 
statute and (2) there is no showing that the PBT result is 
reliable for any purpose other than probable cause."  After the 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
10 
 
State filed its motion in limine, Fischer submitted a second 
report, dated July 7, 2006, which his expert prepared on the 
basis that the PBT result could not be included in the data used 
for 
the 
analysis. 
 
The 
expert 
concluded, 
"[T]he 
single 
determination of blood alcohol made at 2:48 [a.m.] over an hour 
after [Fischer's] arrest is insufficient to establish that his 
blood alcohol content was above the 0.08% threshold when he was 
stopped at 1:40 [a.m.]."  
¶11 In a third submission by the expert, which was 
attached to Fischer's response to the State's motion in limine 
and submitted as Fischer's offer of proof12 after the court 
granted the motion, the expert, Dr. John Steele, contrasted the 
analysis possible using both the PBT and blood test results with 
the analysis possible without the use of the PBT result, and 
concluded:  
If one rejects the breath test data and relies only on 
the blood test, then the plausible range of BAC when 
Mr. Fischer was stopped ranges from near 0.0% to 
0.164%[,] a range which is both higher and lower than 
the critical 0.080% legal threshold. . . .  
If one includes the breath test result, . . . then at 
the time he was stopped Mr. Fischer most likely had a 
BAC of approximately 0.040% to 0.067%.   
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 901.03(1)(b) provides that "[e]rror may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which . . . excludes evidence 
unless . . . the substance of the evidence was made known to the 
judge by offer or was apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked."  See State v. Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d 65, 73, 
580 N.W.2d 181 (1998) ("Two purposes are served by an offer of 
proof:  first, provide the circuit court a more adequate basis 
for an evidentiary ruling and second, establish a meaningful 
record for appellate review."). 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
11 
 
¶12 The report that was the subject of the motion in 
limine included Fischer's PBT result in the text of the report. 
Though the report attached to Fischer's offer of proof stated 
that the PBT result "played no role in computing the curves," 
the report acknowledged that the PBT result played a significant 
role in the overall analysis by "allow[ing] the range of BAC [at 
the time of the stop] to be narrowed down." 
¶13 Following a motion hearing on the matter, the circuit 
court granted the State's motion in limine.  In so doing, the 
court observed that it was not aware of the legislative history 
of § 343.303, but that the legislature's intention was clear 
that "it was never contemplated that [a PBT] would be an 
evidentiary test."  The circuit court said its ruling was made 
"in light of the legislature's clear pronouncement about the 
admissibility here."  We note that had Fischer disclosed to Dr. 
Steele when and what alcoholic beverages he had been drinking, 
absorption curve opinion evidence from the expert based on that 
evidence would have been admissible.13   
                                                 
13 See, for example, State v. Vick, 104 Wis. 2d 678, 684-85, 
312 N.W.2d 489 (1981) (basing an absorption curve defense on 
breathalyzer test result and testimony from defendant as to the 
amount of alcohol he had consumed), and Wis JI——Criminal 234 
(2003), which states in part,  
Evidence has . . . been received as to how the body 
absorbs and eliminates alcohol.  You may consider the 
evidence 
regarding the analysis of the (breath) 
(blood) (urine) sample and the evidence of how the 
body absorbs and eliminates alcohol along with all the 
other evidence in the case . . . . 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
12 
 
¶14 The matter was tried to a jury.  The defense theory, 
as summarized in counsel's closing argument, was that the 
arresting officer was overeager to make an arrest and was 
therefore "not fair," and that Fischer was "going up on the 
absorption curve" when he was stopped and his BAC had not 
reached the .08 percent threshold.  The jury convicted Fischer 
on both charges. Fischer appealed the circuit court's ruling 
excluding the expert's evidence and the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's ruling.  The court of appeals noted 
that, in order to apply Wis. Stat. § 907.03 as Fischer contends 
it must be and permit an expert to base an opinion on and set 
before the jury inadmissible PBT results, the court "would have 
to conclude that any rule excluding evidence takes a back seat 
to a defendant's desire to admit such evidence, just because the 
State could rebut the evidence if it wished.  That cannot be the 
law."  State v. Fischer, 2008 WI App 152, ¶20, 314 Wis. 2d 324, 
761 N.W.2d 7.  In evaluating Fischer's constitutional claim, the 
court of appeals applied the St. George test and determined that 
Fischer had failed to satisfy the requirements of both parts of 
the test.  Applying the first part of the St. George test, the 
court of appeals said Fischer failed to show that the proffered 
evidence 
satisfied 
the 
standards 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 907.02 
(specifically, the court of appeals held that it would not 
assist the trier of fact) and that it had probative value.  Id., 
¶24.  Applying the second part of the St. George test, the court 
of appeals found Fischer had failed to show that his interest in 
presenting 
the 
evidence outweighed the State's compelling 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
13 
 
interest in excluding the evidence.  Id., ¶17.  The rationale 
for the court of appeals' analysis in both steps centered on its 
view that PBT results were insufficiently reliable to serve as 
the basis for an expert opinion.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 This case involves the interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 
343.303, 907.02, and 907.03. Statutory interpretation presents a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo. Rechsteiner v. 
Hazelden, 2008 WI 97, ¶26, 313 Wis. 2d 542, 753 N.W.2d 496.  It 
also involves review of a court's ruling on the admissibility of 
expert opinion.   
The admissibility of expert opinion testimony 
lies in the discretion of the circuit court.  A 
circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if 
it makes an error of law or neglects to base its 
decision upon facts in the record. . . . The question 
then is whether the circuit court applied the correct 
legal principles to the facts of record. This court 
decides any questions of law which may arise during 
its review of an exercise of discretion independently 
of the circuit court and court of appeals.   
St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶37 (footnotes omitted).  
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶16 We agree with the court of appeals that the statutes 
at issue here are best read to exclude expert testimony based on 
PBT results.  We also agree that the State's compelling interest 
in excluding PBT results outweighs Fischer's right to present 
this evidence.  As we explain herein, however, our analysis does 
not turn on the premise that PBT results are insufficiently 
reliable to serve as the basis of admissible expert testimony. 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
14 
 
It turns instead on the second part of the St. George test and 
on 
the 
State's 
compelling 
interest 
in 
investigating 
and 
successfully prosecuting those who violate drunk driving laws. 
¶17 A preliminary matter to clarify is whether there is 
any meaningful difference between Fischer's presenting the 
expert's report that included the actual PBT result and 
presenting the expert's opinion testimony based on analysis of 
data including the PBT result, presumably without explicitly 
disclosing, at least initially, the PBT result to the jury.  The 
motion in limine asked the circuit court to exclude both the 
written report and the opinion testimony.  In his briefing to 
this court, Fischer focused on the admission of the expert 
opinion testimony and asserted that he "never intended to submit 
Dr. Steele's report to the jury," and that "[t]he admission of 
Dr. Steele's opinions would not have presented PBT results for 
the jury's consideration."  In other words, we understand 
Fischer to be arguing, if the expert testified only to his 
opinion, there would arguably be no technical violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 343.303.  
¶18 In practical terms, however, in this case there is no 
meaningful difference.  The PBT results, whether initially fully 
disclosed to the jury or not, would inevitably be disclosed to 
the jury the moment that the expert testified as to the 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
15 
 
methodology and data that underlie the opinion.14  Fischer's 
brief explains that "[t]he jury would have heard in general Dr. 
Steele's methodology and the conclusions he reached."  The 
methodology, of course, involved using the PBT result and the 
blood test result to indicate whether any absorption curves were 
consistent with both data points.  Given that the expert 
represented in the report dated July 7, 2009, "[W]e can know 
virtually nothing about the BAC when [Fischer] was stopped" if 
the blood test is the only available evidence, it stands to 
reason that even a limited explanation of the methodology 
Fischer wanted to have put before the jury would have to include 
the 
first 
data 
point: 
 
the 
PBT 
result. 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances, admitting an expert opinion that relies on PBT 
results means admitting the PBT results in one form or another, 
and that cannot be done without violating Wis. Stat. § 343.303.  
We also again note that the offer of proof included Fischer's 
PBT result and acknowledged the role it played in the expert's 
analysis. 
¶19 Fischer argues that even if Wis. Stat. § 343.303 bars 
the use of PBT results, Wis. Stat. §§ 907.02 and 907.03, read 
together, create an exception to the prohibition in Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
14Permitting references to a prior PBT without giving the 
actual measurement is also unworkable.  A defendant might well 
even benefit additionally from such coy use of the results.  If 
jurors infer (or are told) that a test was administered but 
receive no results, they might infer a lower PBT than actually 
existed on the assumption that the State would not fail to 
disclose any result favorable to the prosecution. 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
16 
 
§ 343.303 and explicitly permit use as the basis of an expert's 
opinion.15  Those statutes permit an expert to testify to an 
opinion based on facts that are otherwise inadmissible if they 
are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.03. 
¶20 The thorny question of what to do with inadmissible 
evidence that experts rely upon as a basis for an opinion is one 
that has proved difficult to answer with a fair and workable 
rule.    
¶21 Law professor Daniel Blinka concisely summarizes the 
practical difficulty of explaining the bases for expert opinions 
when they include inadmissible evidence, and the unsatisfactory 
options for resolving the question:  
Problems arise, however, when experts are called 
upon to explain how they reached a conclusion. What 
should be done with the experts' inadmissible bases? 
Does the experts' reliance validate the otherwise 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 907.02 and 907.03 provide: 
907.02 Testimony by experts. If scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
907.03 Bases of opinion testimony by experts.  The 
facts or data in the particular case upon which an 
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before 
the hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need 
not be admissible in evidence. 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
17 
 
inadmissible information, thereby transforming it into 
admissible evidence?  Conversely, should the court bar 
any mention of the tainted bases while permitting only 
the expert's testimony about the opinion?  Or should 
the 
judge 
instruct 
the 
jury 
to 
consider 
the 
inadmissible bases for whatever bearing they have on 
the cogency of the expert's opinion testimony, but not 
for any other purpose?  If the judge elects the latter 
course, what exactly does such an instruction mean?  
And if such limiting instructions are meaningless, is 
Rule 703 [a federal evidence rule parallel to Wis. 
Stat. § 907.03] a device that allows a party to simply 
parade inadmissible evidence before the jury in direct 
contravention of the exclusionary rules?16 
¶22 Recent changes in federal evidence rules attempted to 
resolve the matter in federal courts by allowing disclosure of 
otherwise inadmissible facts or data to the jury after a judge 
has 
balanced 
the 
evidence's 
probative 
value 
against 
any 
prejudicial effect.  Fed. R. Evid. 703 advisory committee's 
note, 2000 amendment.  Blinka observes that this approach "is 
problematic on both policy and practice grounds" and illustrates 
what he calls the sometimes "nonsensical" results: 
In theory, the "otherwise" inadmissible basis is put 
before the jury for the limited purpose of explaining 
the expert's opinion and reasoning.  But this creates 
some horrendous difficulties.  In the hearsay context, 
although the expert may have relied upon the hearsay 
statement for the truth of the matter asserted, the 
jury is instructed that it cannot use the statement 
for the very same purpose.17  
                                                 
16 Daniel D. Blinka, "Practical Inconvenience" or Conceptual 
Confusion:  The Common-Law Genesis of Federal Rule of Evidence 
703, 20 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 467, 469 (1997).  
17 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice:  Wisconsin 
Evidence § 702.604, at 621-22 (3d ed. 2008). 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
18 
 
¶23 We therefore approach this case with an understanding 
of the larger context and an awareness that courts have tried 
various approaches to expert opinion evidence, in an effort to 
create fair and workable solutions that appropriately filter the 
evidence presented to juries.   
¶24 Our 
analysis 
is 
premised 
on 
long-established 
principles of statutory construction.  "It is, of course, a 
solemn obligation of the judiciary to faithfully give effect to 
the laws enacted by the legislature, and to do so requires a 
determination of statutory meaning. . . . Therefore, the purpose 
of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute 
means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended 
effect."18  When statutes conflict, we must attempt to reconcile 
them if possible.19  When confronted with an apparent conflict 
between statutes, we construe sections on the same subject 
matter to harmonize the provisions and to give each full force 
and effect.20  We will not construe statutes so as to work 
unreasonable results.21  
                                                 
18 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
19 Bingenheimer v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 129 
Wis. 2d 100, 107-08, 383 N.W.2d 898 (1986). 
20 Glinski v. Sheldon, 88 Wis. 2d 509, 519, 276 N.W.2d 815 
(1979). 
21 Cross v. Hebl, 46 Wis. 2d 356, 361, 174 N.W.2d 737 
(1970). 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
19 
 
¶25 Fortunately, in this case, the legislature's policy 
decision regarding the absolute inadmissibility of the PBT 
results under these circumstances simply could not be clearer.  
Reading the statutes together to create an exception to Wis. 
Stat. § 907.03 by excluding expert evidence to the extent that 
it is based on prohibited PBT results comports with our 
obligation to give effect to the legislature's intent.  The 
alternative would likely nullify Wis. Stat. § 343.303 whenever a 
party attached the opinion or report of an expert to the PBT 
result it wished to get before the jury. 
¶26 We approach this question carefully, cognizant of the 
effect this decision has on the law enforcement officers, 
prosecutors, and defense counsel who investigate and try these 
cases daily.  The practical implications of a contrary reading 
would be significant.  Among them would be the fact that, 
assuming that the rule would apply equally to the State, PBT 
results could routinely be used against defendants in spite of a 
statute to the contrary.22  Further, reversing the legislature's 
assurance to drivers that PBT results will not be used in a 
prosecution for OWI could well mean that fewer suspected drunk 
                                                 
22 If the presentation of otherwise inadmissible PBT result 
evidence via an expert were permitted, there would be no reason 
to limit its use to the defense.  Unlike other evidence that is 
unavailable to the prosecution (the involuntary testimony of the 
defendant, for example), PBT results are evidence that is 
originally in the State's possession that must be turned over to 
the defense.  Rules of fair play certainly do not go so far as 
to require the State to gather and turn over evidence that is 
usable only by the defense.   
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
20 
 
drivers would be willing to submit to a PBT in the first place, 
with 
the 
result 
that 
police 
could 
find 
themselves 
more 
frequently in situations where they had reasonable suspicion 
sufficient to justify an investigative stop, but perhaps 
insufficient evidence to establish probable cause for an arrest.  
Under circumstances like this, an officer could be faced with 
the constitutional necessity of releasing a driver he or she 
reasonably believed to be intoxicated. 
¶27 Fischer contends that if the statutes are construed to 
exclude evidence based on the PBT results, as we do herein, they 
violate his constitutional right to present a defense.23  Where a 
defendant challenges the exclusion of expert testimony evidence 
on the grounds that it violates his or her right to present a 
defense, the court evaluates the claim using the test set forth 
in St. George pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Scheffer: 
For the defendant to establish a constitutional 
right to the admissibility of the proffered expert 
                                                 
23 See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 ("Whether rooted directly in 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the 
Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a 
meaningful 
opportunity 
to 
present 
a 
complete 
defense.") 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984) ("The Constitution 
guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it 
defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the 
several provisions of the Sixth Amendment[.]").  In State v. 
Pullizano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 645, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990), this 
court 
identified the confrontation and compulsory process 
clauses of Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution as 
a parallel source of such a right.  
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
21 
 
witness testimony in the present case, the defendant 
must satisfy a two-part inquiry . . . . This two-part 
inquiry enables a circuit court to determine the 
accused's interest in admitting the evidence and to 
determine whether the evidence is clearly central to 
the defense and the exclusion of the evidence is 
arbitrary and disproportionate to the purpose of the 
rule of exclusion, so that exclusion "undermine[s] 
fundamental elements of the defendant's defense."  
St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶53 (quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 
315). 
¶28 The court then listed the factors for each step of the 
inquiry: 
In the first part of the inquiry, the defendant 
must satisfy each of the following four factors 
through an offer of proof. The defendant must show: 
1) The testimony of the expert witness met the 
standards of Wis. Stat. § 907.02 governing the 
admission of expert testimony. 
2) The expert witness's testimony was clearly relevant 
to a material issue in this case. 
3) The expert witness's testimony was necessary to the 
defendant's case.  
4) The probative value of the testimony of the 
defendant's expert witness outweighed its prejudicial 
effect. 
After the defendant successfully satisfies these 
four factors to establish a constitutional right to 
present the expert testimony, a court undertakes the 
second part of the inquiry by determining whether the 
defendant's right to present the proffered evidence is 
nonetheless 
outweighed 
by 
the 
State's 
compelling 
interest to exclude the evidence. 
St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶¶54-55 (footnotes omitted). 
¶29 We assume without deciding that the defendant in the 
present case has satisfied the four factors of the first part of 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
22 
 
the inquiry, since we view the second part of the inquiry as 
determinative of the outcome in this case.24  Assuming Fischer 
has established a right to present the expert evidence in 
question, we nevertheless conclude for reasons given herein that 
his right to do so is outweighed by the State's compelling 
interest in excluding the evidence.  Accordingly, exclusion of 
the evidence did not result in a violation of his constitutional 
right to present a defense. 
¶30 In its brief to this court, the State argues that 
unique 
constitutional 
challenges 
are 
presented 
in 
OWI 
investigations and that significant law enforcement purposes are 
served 
by 
prohibiting 
the 
use 
of 
PBT 
results 
in 
OWI 
prosecutions: 
The critical fact is that the preliminary breath test 
is a preliminary screening tool used during the 
investigation of a person suspected of drunk driving 
before there is probable cause to make an arrest.  A 
preliminary breath test may be requested when the 
police have more evidence than reasonable suspicion 
necessary to justify an investigative stop, but less 
than probable cause necessary to justify an arrest. 
¶31 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 343.303 begins 
with Wisconsin Act 193, § 7, ch. 193, Laws of 1977, the original 
                                                 
24 For examples of cases where this court has assumed 
without deciding that a preliminary step in the analysis has 
been satisfied, see Washburn County v. Smith, 2008 WI 23, ¶86, 
308 
Wis. 2d 65, 
746 
N.W.2d 243 
("Even 
assuming 
that 
the 
defendant has satisfied the first two prongs of the Quelle 
inquiry, he has not satisfied the third prong."), and Nichols v. 
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 20, ¶19, 308 Wis. 2d 17, 746 
N.W.2d 220 (for purposes of public policy analysis, assuming 
without deciding that plaintiffs established all four elements 
of a common-law negligence claim). 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
23 
 
legislation creating what later became Wis. Stat. § 343.303, and 
it contains evidence that is consistent with this rationale.  An 
analysis prepared by the Legislative Reference Bureau of the 
proposed bill (A.B. 1) states the following:   
Law enforcement officers are authorized to request 
persons suspected of driving under the influence of an 
intoxicant to submit to a preliminary breath test.  
The test results would not be admissible in any court 
action or proceeding where it is material to prove 
that the person was driving under the influence of an 
intoxicant, but would give the officer a basis to 
decide 
if 
further 
chemical 
analysis 
would 
be 
necessary.25 
While that is a statement of fact, not a statement that that was 
the reason it was adopted, it is worth noting that we located no 
statement about the reliability or unreliability of the PBT in 
the legislative history. 
¶32 In the evidentiary gap between reasonable suspicion 
and probable cause for arrest, a voluntarily taken PBT can 
furnish the necessary evidence to remove an impaired driver from 
the 
road.26 
 
Recognizing 
this, 
the 
State 
suggests, 
the 
legislature 
reasonably 
may 
have 
sought 
to 
eliminate 
any 
                                                 
25 Drafting File for 1977 Wis. Act 193, Analysis by the 
Legislative Reference Bureau of 1977 A.B. 1, Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. (emphasis added). 
26 This approach reflects the analysis we undertook of Wis. 
Stat. § 343.303 in Renz to determine the quantum of proof 
necessary for an officer to request that a driver take a PBT:  
"[W]e conclude that the context, history and purpose of the 
statute all suggest that 'probable cause to believe' refers to a 
quantum of proof greater than the reasonable suspicion necessary 
to justify an investigative stop, . . . but less than the level 
of proof required to establish probable cause for arrest."  231 
Wis. 2d at 316.   
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
24 
 
disincentive a driver might have to consent to take the PBT by 
assuring drivers that the results would not be used at trial.  
The State argues that promoting the gathering of evidence 
necessary to arrest those who are actually intoxicated obviously 
furthers the State's compelling interest in arresting and 
prosecuting drunk drivers, and we agree.  It is beyond dispute 
that the State has a compelling interest in combating the threat 
to public safety created by drunk driving, as our cases and 
other courts have repeatedly recognized.27  On this basis, we 
therefore conclude that Fischer's right to present evidence, 
assuming for the purposes of this argument that he has 
established that right by satisfying the factors of the first 
part of the St. George test, is nonetheless outweighed by the 
State's compelling interest in excluding the expert evidence 
based on PBT results. 
¶33 Finally, we turn to Fischer's invitation to revisit 
the law regarding the admissibility of expert testimony and to 
adopt a Daubert-like approach with the judge as the gatekeeper.  
As we noted initially, our analysis does not turn on an 
evaluation of the reliability of an expert opinion based on PBT 
                                                 
27 "No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the 
drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating 
it.  Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on 
the Nation's roads are legion."  Mich. Dep't of State Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990).  "Obviously, enforcing drunk 
driving laws is a significant state interest.  No supporting 
authority is necessary to identify the significant toll that 
drunken drivers have exacted on the American public in loss of 
life, limb, and property."  State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 
545, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993). 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
25 
 
results.  This therefore is not an appropriate case on which to 
base such an abrupt departure from established case law, 
especially on the strength of undeveloped arguments.  As stated 
earlier, our analysis diverges from that of the circuit court 
and the court of appeals.   
¶34 We have taken a different approach than the one taken 
by both the circuit court and the court of appeals in their 
decisions to exclude the evidence.  The question of whether PBT 
results are adequately reliable figured in the analysis of each 
of those courts in several respects, and the question of 
reliability was also raised by the State as a reason to exclude 
expert evidence based on PBT results.28  The accuracy of this 
type of test may be subject to dispute, but Wisconsin courts 
have nevertheless upheld its admission for purposes other than 
those prohibited by Wis. Stat. § 343.303.29  There is no basis 
for speculating that the reason the legislature prohibited the 
evidentiary use of a test that is used hundreds of times every 
day in Wisconsin is that it is "of dubious reliability even 
under the best testing conditions," as the State argued in its 
brief.  In fact, a review of the legislative history of Wis. 
                                                 
28 For example, the State in its brief to this court argues, 
"Fischer's expert wanted to use breath test results [that] would 
have been of dubious reliability even under the best testing 
conditions that were obtained from a breath testing device that 
may have been unable to produce results [that] were reliable at 
all."  
29 See, e.g., supra note 9 (citing Doerr, 229 Wis. 2d at 
622, and Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d at 970). 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
26 
 
Stat. § 343.30330 gives no indication whatsoever that the 
prohibition on the use of PBT results is rooted in concerns 
about reliability of the test.  If the PBT's reliability were of 
such concern, it would be a small thing for any competent 
defense attorney to attack the reliability of PBT results and 
thereby limit the value to the prosecution of such evidence.  
Saying that PBT results are not admissible is not the same thing 
as saying they are not reliable.  Wisconsin's tradition of 
leaving the weight and credibility of the evidence to the trier 
of fact, which continues to be the law, cannot be squared with 
an analysis that excludes evidence on the basis of its lack of 
reliability.   
                                                 
30 In Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 312, we set forth the statute's 
legislative history:  
The 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
first 
authorized 
a 
preliminary breath test in 1977 as part of Assembly 
Bill 1 of the November 1977 Special Session.  1977 
A.B. 1; § 7, ch. 193, Laws of 1977.  That original PBT 
statute provided "[i]f a law enforcement officer has 
probable cause to believe that a person has violated 
s. 346.63(1) . . . , the officer may request the 
person, prior to arrest and issuance of a citation, to 
take a preliminary breath test . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(2)(a)(1977-78)(repealed 1981). 
. . . . .   
In 1981, as part of the budget bill, the 
legislature enacted amendments to the OWI laws that, 
among other changes, removed the PBT from Wis. Stat. § 
343.305 and created Wis. Stat. § 343.303. §§ 1568b and 
d, ch. 20, Laws of 1981. 
(Brackets and first two ellipses in original.) 
No. 
2007AP1898-CR   
 
27 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶35 Accordingly, we affirm. Though we benefit from the 
analyses of the court of appeals and the circuit court, we reach 
the result via a different analysis than that of those courts. 
The circuit court's grant of the motion in limine excluding the 
report and expert opinion was proper under Wisconsin statutes 
and it did not violate Fischer's constitutional right to present 
a defense.  The rule we adopt here is not a blanket rule against 
absorption curve opinion evidence but rather a rule prohibiting 
use of PBT results in the manner attempted here.  
¶36 Our analysis does not turn on an evaluation of the 
reliability of an expert opinion based on PBT results, which 
after all are routinely relied on to establish probable cause 
for arrest and have been held to be admissible for purposes 
other than those prohibited by statute.   Because we conclude 
that the State's countervailing compelling interest and not the 
reliability of the expert testimony is dispositive of the 
analysis, there is no reason for us to revisit Wisconsin's well-
established role for the circuit court where expert testimony is 
proffered.  The law in Wisconsin continues to be that questions 
of the weight and reliability of relevant evidence are matters 
for the trier of fact.  As we stated in State v. Walstad, "This 
is the relevancy test of our rules and we adhere to it."  119 
Wis. 2d at 519.  We, therefore, decline to adopt a Daubert-like 
approach to expert testimony and make the judge the gatekeeper. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2007AP1898-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶37 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion's conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 343.303 
"expressly bars" preliminary breath test (PBT) results in trials 
in which the charge is operating under the influence of an 
intoxicant in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (OWI) or 
operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration in violation 
of § 346.63(1)(b) (PAC).  See majority op., ¶4.  As the majority 
opinion aptly states, "[T]he legislature's policy decision 
regarding the absolute inadmissibility of the PBT results under 
these circumstances simply could not be clearer."  Majority op., 
¶25.  However, I write separately and concur because unlike the 
majority opinion, which concludes that the reliability of the 
PBT results is not dispositive, see majority op., ¶7, I conclude 
that as a matter of law PBT results are neither reliable nor 
admissible for the purpose of confirming or dispelling a 
defendant's specific alcohol concentration in an OWI or PAC 
trial.  In such a trial, an expert cannot reasonably rely on PBT 
results for that purpose, and thus, PBT results are not 
admissible to prove or disprove a specific level of alcohol 
concentration.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.303 ("The result of the 
preliminary breath screening test shall not be admissible in any 
action or proceeding except to show probable cause for an 
arrest, if the arrest is challenged, or to prove that a chemical 
test was properly required or requested of a person under 
s. 343.305(3).").  Finding an expert who wishes to rely on the 
PBT 
results to form an opinion does not transform the 
No.  2007AP1898-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
inadmissible and unreliable evidence into admissible evidence in 
an OWI or PAC trial, and such testimony would only confuse 
rather than assist the jury and would completely undermine the 
presumption afforded to proper chemical testing. 
¶38 While there are other scenarios in which PBT results 
may be admissible, the circumstances of those cases do not 
involve PBT results being utilized to prove specific alcohol 
concentration as an element of the crime.  See State v. Doerr, 
229 
Wis. 2d 616, 
622-25, 
599 
N.W.2d 897 
(Ct. 
App. 
1999) 
(agreeing 
with 
the 
circuit 
court 
that 
PBT 
results 
were 
admissible at trial to assist the jury in evaluating the 
defendant's charges of battery to a law enforcement officer in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.20(2) and resisting an officer in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41); State v. Beaver, 181 
Wis. 2d 959, 969-71, 512 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1994) (concluding 
that PBT results may be admissible at trial as evidence of the 
defendant's comprehension of his Miranda rights or his ability 
to intelligently waive them).  In contrast, in OWI and PAC 
cases, proving a specific alcohol concentration is often a hotly 
contested issue; a specific alcohol concentration is an element 
of the crime (PAC)1 and serves as statutorily relevant or prima 
                                                 
1 In order to find a defendant guilty of operating with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(b), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle and (2) had a 
prohibited alcohol concentration at the time he operated the 
motor vehicle.  Wis JI——Criminal 2660.  "Prohibited alcohol 
concentration" is defined as "an alcohol concentration of 0.08 
or more" if the defendant "has 2 or fewer prior convictions, 
suspensions, or revocations, as counted under s. 343.307(1)."  
Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m)(a). 
No.  2007AP1898-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
facie evidence of an element of the crime (OWI).2  In these 
cases, PBT results are not deemed reliable for purposes of 
confirming 
or 
dispelling 
a 
defendant's 
specific 
alcohol 
concentration and thus are not admissible at trial to prove or 
disprove the defendant's alcohol concentration, even though PBT 
results are admissible at the probable cause hearing.  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.303; State v. Faust, 2004 WI 99, ¶26, 274 
Wis. 2d 183, 
682 
N.W.2d 371. 
 
PBT 
results 
are 
utilized 
preliminarily for the purpose of determining whether a suspected 
drunk driver should be arrested and required to submit to 
further chemical testing.  See County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 
Wis. 2d 293, 313, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999) ("[T]he language that 
the legislature chose to describe the test confirms that it 
intended the PBT to function as a screening tool to be used 
prior 
to 
arrest. . . . [W]hen 
it 
described 
the 
test 
as 
'preliminary,' 
the 
legislature 
clearly 
indicated 
that 
it 
intended the test to be a preparation for something else.  It 
seems obvious that something else——the main matter——is the 
arrest itself.").  Unlike the PBT, such chemical testing is 
subject to certain safeguards to ensure reliability.   
                                                 
2 In order to find a defendant guilty of operating while 
under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle and (2) was 
under the influence of an intoxicant at the time he operated the 
motor 
vehicle. 
 
Wis 
JI——Criminal 
2663. 
 
"[A]n 
alcohol 
concentration of more than 0.04 but less than 0.08 is relevant 
evidence 
on 
the 
issue 
of 
intoxication," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 885.235(1g)(b), and "an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more 
is prima facie evidence" that the defendant was under the 
influence of an intoxicant, Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1g)(c). 
No.  2007AP1898-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
¶39 Essentially, Fischer's argument is that the statutory 
prohibition of PBT evidence is unconstitutional.  Since the 
plain language of the statute precludes admissibility in the 
case at issue, Fischer would have the burden to prove the 
statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Simply 
stated, Fischer has not met that burden.   
¶40 What is good for the goose is good for the gander.  
Just as the defense should not be allowed to admit PBT results 
in an underlying OWI or PAC trial, the State should not be able 
to rely on those test results either.  Merely because an expert 
may opine that he or she relied upon PBT results in order to 
form an opinion does not render the underlying test results 
admissible.  As we have seen in other scenarios, an expert's 
opinion does not transform inadmissible evidence into admissible 
evidence.  For example, if an expert were to review polygraph 
test results or voice stress analysis test results to form a 
basis for an opinion, would the court allow those underlying 
test results to come in at trial when they are otherwise 
precluded?  See Wis. Stat. § 905.065; State v. Davis, 2008 WI 
71, ¶20, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332; State v. Shomberg, 
2006 WI 9, ¶39, 288 Wis. 2d 1, 709 N.W.2d 370 (citing State v. 
Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 278-79, 307 N.W.2d 628 (1981)). In other 
words, otherwise inadmissible evidence is not automatically 
admissible simply because a party can find an expert who says 
that he or she relied upon that evidence in forming an opinion.  
In addition, to allow an expert to so opine without introducing 
the underlying data would tie the opposing party's hands with 
No.  2007AP1898-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
respect to cross-examination.  The judge, as gatekeeper, has the 
capacity to determine whether certain evidence is admissible and 
whether certain expert testimony assists the jury in its 
determination, and PBT results have not been admissible in OWI 
or PAC trials.  Here, admitting PBT results can serve only to 
confuse the jury and undermine the presumption of accuracy 
afforded to chemical tests like the Intoxilyzer.  See State v. 
Busch, 217 Wis. 2d 429, 443, 576 N.W.2d 904 (1998) (explaining 
that approved quantitative breath alcohol test instruments, like 
the Intoxilyzer, are recognized methods of testing authorized by 
statute and are thus entitled to a prima facie presumption of 
accuracy); Wis. Admin. Code § TRANS 311.04 (May 1997); Wis JI——
Criminal 230, 232 (When an approved testing device is involved, 
the jury is instructed that "[t]he law recognizes that the 
testing device used in this case uses a scientifically sound 
method of measuring the alcohol concentration of an individual.  
The State is not required to prove the underlying scientific 
reliability of the method used by the testing device.  However, 
the State is required to establish that the testing device was 
in proper working order and that it was correctly operated by a 
qualified person."). 
¶41 To admit PBT results in an OWI or PAC trial would 
unravel the presumption that currently exists with respect to 
the accuracy of the PBT and create a whole new burden of proof 
for the State.  "The PBT device has not been approved by the 
[Department of Transportation (DOT)] and does not receive a 
prima facie presumption of accuracy to establish a defendant's 
No.  2007AP1898-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
blood alcohol level."  Doerr, 229 Wis. 2d  at 624-25 (explaining 
that 
because 
of 
the 
DOT's 
evaluation 
and 
approval, 
the 
legislature has determined that some breath test instruments are 
entitled to a prima facie presumption of accuracy; the PBT, 
however, is not included in the DOT's list of approved 
instruments and consequently has a limited evidentiary use in 
motor vehicle proceedings).  Admitting PBT results at trial 
would erode the presumption and lead the jury to confusion 
rather than clarification when it comes to chemical test 
results.  The legislature recognized that danger when it 
determined that in this type of trial, PBT results are not 
admissible to prove a specific level of alcohol concentration. 
¶42 As a result, I conclude that the legislature has 
spoken, and PBT results are not admissible in an OWI or PAC 
trial for the purpose of confirming or dispelling a specific 
alcohol concentration.  Even if an expert were to rely upon PBT 
results to form the basis of an opinion, the test results are 
still unreliable and inadmissible for the purpose offered in the 
case at issue.  I agree with the majority, however, that this 
prohibition does not preclude the defense from offering an 
absorption curve defense.  See majority op., ¶6.  Still, just as 
I would not allow the State to introduce this PBT evidence at 
trial, the defense is precluded from offering an absorption 
curve defense based upon PBT results.  Accordingly, I would 
conclude as a matter of law that an expert cannot reasonably 
rely upon PBT results to form an opinion in an OWI or PAC trial. 
¶43 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
No.  2007AP1898-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
¶44 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2007AP1898-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1