Case Title: ERHART v. EVANS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-284

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
ERHART v. EVANS2001 WY 7930 P.3d 542Case Number: 00-284Decided: 08/27/2001

 

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

PATRICK 
ADAM ERHART,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

JANE ANN 
EVANS,

formerly 
Jane Ann Erhart,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Donald J. Keenan of Keenan Law Office, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming  

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Sue Chatfield, Assistant Attorney General  

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 
            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      Patrick Adam 
Erhart (the father) appeals the order in which the district court found three 
prior district court orders were issued pursuant to contempt proceedings and did 
not modify his child support obligation and entered a judgment of child support 
arrearages against him.  We 
affirm.

 

 

 

[¶2]      The father frames 
the issues for review as follows:

 

A.  Did the court below err in finding that 
the support amount due from [the father] to [the mother] had not been modified 
to reduce [the father's] child support obligation from $300.00 per month to 
$250.00 per month?

 

B.  Did the court below err in calculating 
the amount of child support due?

 

The 
Department of Family Services (DFS), on behalf of Jane Ann Evans (the mother), 
rephrases the issues:

 

I.  Whether the district court's judgment 
and order dated August 31, 2000, affirming there was no modification of the 
original child support order, should be upheld.

 

II.  Whether the district court correctly 
calculated the amount of child support due.

 

 

 

[¶3]      We preface this 
factual review by noting that the underlying proceedings and resultant district 
court contempt orders are somewhat confounding.  This is due in part to the record being 
limited to a presentation of pleadings with no transcripts.  It is also due in part to the manner in 
which the district court orders were written.  

 

[¶4]      The father and 
the mother were divorced pursuant to a decree entered on June 10, 1977.  Two children were born as issue of the 
marriage, the first on March 15, 1973, and the second on April 28, 1976.  By the terms of the decree, the father 
was required to pay $150 per month per child in support for a $300 total monthly 
obligation.

 

[¶5]      Subsequent to the 
divorce, the father failed to consistently and fully pay his child support 
obligation, and the mother petitioned the court to initiate contempt proceedings 
against him.  The first of these 
resulted in a November 9, 1977, order which adjudged the father in contempt for 
failure to pay support in accrued arrearages of $1,640 and sentenced him to ten 
days in jail.  The order further 
provided the contempt and execution of sentence could be purged upon: (1) 
payment of $220 to the clerk of court by November 1, 1977; (2) payment of $220 
to the clerk of court each and every month thereafter with $20 to be applied to 
the $1,640 arrearage; and, (3) once the arrearage amount was satisfied, the sum 
of $300 per month to be paid to the clerk of court each month thereafter.  The order also specifically provided as 
follows:

 

            
This Court's previous Order ordering the [father] to pay to [the mother] 
the sum of $150.00 per month per child as and for support of the minor children 
of the marriage is not modified by this Order and this Order shall not be 
construed to find that [the father's] present ability to pay is $220.00 per 
month.  

 

[¶6]      On April 26, 
1983, the father was found in contempt for his failure to comply with the 
November 1977 order.  Additional 
child support arrearages were found in the amount of $1,320, and he was 
sentenced to thirty days in jail.  
Again the order provided the contempt could be purged and the sentence 
suspended upon:  (1) payment of $500 
to the clerk of court by May 1, 1983;1 (2) payment of $250 to the clerk of 
court each and every month thereafter with $20 to be applied to the initial 
$1,640 arrearage (November 9, 1977, order) and $30 to be applied to the new 
additional $1,320 arrearage; (3) payment of $250 per month to continue until 
such time as the $20 applications equaled the $1,640 arrearage, and at that time 
the entire $50 would be applied toward the $1,320 arrearage until satisfied; 
and, (3) once the arrearage amounts were satisfied, the sum of $300 per month to 
be paid consistent with the November 9, 1977, order.  The order further provided, in the event 
the payments were not made, the clerk of court would immediately issue a bench 
warrant for the father's arrest to serve his sentence.

 

[¶7]      Pursuant to a 
Warrant of Attachment issued on November 9, 1983, the father was arrested for 
failure to make the payments specified in the April 1983 contempt order.  The mother and the father entered into 
and filed a stipulation on December 22, 1983, which provided in part that, after 
the additional $225 arrearage was satisfied in full, "[the father] agrees to pay 
and [the mother] agrees to accept $250.00 per month in accordance with the court 
order dated April 25, 1983."  The 
court entered an order on December 23, 1983, approving the stipulation and 
ordering compliance with the stipulated payment terms.  Those terms provided the father would 
pay $275 per month commencing December 1, 1983, and each month thereafter until 
the new arrearage of $225 was satisfied.  
Upon such satisfaction, the payments would reduce to $250 per month and 
be applied in accordance with the court's April 1983 order.  The order also provided, in the event 
the father failed to make payment, the clerk of court would immediately issue a 
bench warrant for his arrest and confinement pending further 
proceedings.

 

[¶8]      The mother again 
asked the court to initiate contempt proceedings against the father in August of 
1987 alleging that, although the arrearages ordered to be paid in the previous 
three court orders had been satisfied, the father was $12,950 in arrears on his 
total $300 per month child support obligation established in the original 1977 
divorce decree.2  A hearing was apparently scheduled for 
September 24, 1987, but was postponed upon the district court's request for 
briefing on the issue of retroactive modification of support orders.  The mother filed a memorandum on the 
issue in January of 1988, and the father filed a reply in May of 1988, but the 
record does not reflect a court order resulting from this contempt 
proceeding. 

 

[¶9]      DFS filed a 
Notice of Assignment of rights to child and spousal support in June of 1996 and 
a Petition for Order to Show Cause in May of 1998 alleging the father had 
accrued arrearages of $12,860.  The 
record reflects in August 2000 DFS filed a Corrected and Amended 
Memorandum Brief on the issues of whether there was a modification of the 
original divorce decree, the age of emancipation of the children, and the 
arrearage balance due.  The text of 
this document indicates DFS filed a Memorandum Brief on May 12, 1999, and made 
argument to the district court on August 30, 1999; however, no pleading or 
transcript is contained in the record as certified on appeal.  The corrected brief asserts the father 
owed a balance of $20,790.30 in child support.3

 

[¶10]   On August 31, 2000, the district 
court issued a Judgment and Order by which it held the three prior contempt 
orders did not constitute proper modifications of the $150 per month per child 
support obligation established in the original 1977 divorce decree and the 
father owed $20,790.30 in arrearages giving credit for $1,950 paid pursuant to a 
juvenile case.  The district court 
entered judgment against the father in the sum of $20,790.30, and the father 
appealed to this court. 

 

 

[¶11]   The standard of review enunciated 
in other child custody and domestic relations contempt cases is applicable to 
this matter.  Crites v. 
Alston, 837 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Wyo. 1992).

 

In  Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 313 
(Wyo. 1989), we said that "[w]e will not disturb the decision of the trial court 
. . . in the absence of some serious procedural error, a violation of 
a principle of law, or a clear and grave abuse of discretion."  See also Deen v. Deen, 774 P.2d 621 (Wyo. 1989) and Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346 (Wyo. 1986). 

 

Id.; 
see also Rogers v. Rogers, 973 P.2d 1118, 1121 (Wyo. 1999).  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Belless v. Belless, 2001 WY 41, 
¶6, 21 P.3d 749, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001); see also Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo. 1998).  We must determine 
whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any 
facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  Belless, 
¶6.

 

 

[¶12]   The father contends that, through 
the course of the multiple contempt proceedings and court orders, and in 
particular the December 1983 stipulation and related court order, the original 
divorce decree support obligation of $150 per month per child ($300 total) was 
modified and reduced to $250 per month.  
The district court found:  
"All of these orders related to contempt proceedings.  In 1987, the arrears and contempt issues 
arose again but were never decided.  
None of the orders constituted a proper modification." 

 

[¶13]   The issue has been made confusing 
by the manner in which the three district court contempt orders were 
framed.  The November 1977 order 
found the father in contempt and in arrears and then set out a lower 
child support payment with a designated portion to be applied to accrued 
arrearages.  Once the arrearages 
were satisfied, the order mandated a return to the $300 per month payment.  The order explicitly stated it did not 
constitute a modification or a determination that the father's present ability 
to pay was the lower support amount.  
However, it failed to clarify whether arrearages would continue to accrue 
for the difference between the original support amount and the lowered 
amount.  The April 1983 order was 
drafted in much the same way, but instead of the "no modification" language it 
provided "thereafter, [the father] shall pay . . . $300.00 per month 
consistent with the November 9, 1977 order."  (Emphasis added.)  The December 1983 order again used 
similar lowered payment language, provided no reference to modification, and 
stated, "Upon the new arrearage of $225.00 being satisfied, the monthly 
support payment shall reduce to $250.00 per month and [be] applied  in accordance with the court's April 25, 
1983 order."  (Emphasis 
added.)  So, in a peculiar and 
confusing manner, the third order related back to the second order, and the 
second order related back to the first. And none explained whether arrearages 
would continue to accrue for the difference between the original support amount 
and the lowered amount set out in each individual order.  However, the first contempt order in the 
chain explicitly rejected modification of the divorce decree order for support. 

 

[¶14]   In Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336, 348-49 (Wyo. 1989) (citations omitted and emphasis added), we 
considered the requirements for modification:

 

While 
the general rule is that a court has continuing jurisdiction to modify the 
custody and support aspects of its own decree, such jurisdiction is bestowed 
upon the court only through proper petition by one of the parents in the 
underlying action pursuant to W.S. 20-2-113(a).  W.S. 20-2-113(a) provides in relevant 
part:

 

In granting a divorce or annulment 
of a marriage, the court may make such disposition of the children as appears 
most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the 
children. . . . On the petition of either of the 
parents, the court may revise the decree concerning the care, custody, 
visitation and maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the parents 
and the benefit of the children require[].  
[Emphasis added.]

 

            
The effect of the foregoing statute, as it applies to the instant case, 
is that it authorizes the court, "[o]n the petition of either of the parents," 
to revise and alter its decree.  
The clear language of this section instructs that the court may 
not, of its own initiative, modify its own order with respect to, among other 
things, a child support obligation absent a proper petition by one of the 
parents requesting such modification.  

 

Thus, a 
petition of one of the parents seeking modification of an existing order is a 
statutory prerequisite to the court's power to act.

 

[¶15]   Neither party contends that a 
petition for modification was ever filed.  
The certified record provided is an incomplete compilation of the 
pleadings from the various contempt actions without transcripts of any of the 
court proceedings.  It contains no 
petitions requesting modification by either party.  "Under our statute the obligation of 
support is a continuing one; it is also one which is at all times subject to 
change upon proper request to the court for modification or clarification 
contingent upon a change in circumstances of the parties."  Redman v. Redman, 521 P.2d 584, 
587 (Wyo. 1974) (footnote omitted and emphasis added).  The party who seeks to have a child 
support order modified has the burden of showing that a substantial or material 
change in circumstances has occurred since the initial decree was 
entered.  Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Wyo. 1998).  The 
contempt orders do not reflect any such petitions nor do they make necessary 
findings as to a change in circumstances warranting modification.  These legal prerequisites for 
modification cannot be extinguished by parental stipulation to reduced 
payments.  The law precludes parties 
from bargaining away the funds intended for the exclusive benefit of their 
children.  Hammond v. 
Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 202 (Wyo. 2000); Hurlbut v. Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 842 (Wyo. 1998) (a child support obligation does not belong to the 
custodial parent, and that parent does not have the authority to bargain it 
away).  

 

[¶16]   W.R.C.P. 15(b), which allows 
amendments to pleadings to conform to the evidence, is appropriate in some 
circumstances when the parties have expressly or impliedly consented to 
consideration of a modification by the court even though a petition to modify 
has never been filed.  Strahan v. 
Strahan, 400 P.2d 542, 544 (Wyo. 1965).  This court allowed such an amendment in 
Strahan, which was initiated as a contempt proceeding but, through 
presentation of significant evidence of changed circumstances, evolved into a 
modification hearing.  In that case, 
the district court specifically advised the parties of its intent to consider 
the issue of modification on the basis of the evidence received.  After this specific notice, the parties 
did not object, and their consent could be inferred.  However, the circumstances of the 
instant case do not warrant a similar application of W.R.C.P. 15(b).  The record, devoid of transcripts or 
other evidence, does not support the conclusion that the parties consented to 
the consideration of the modification issue by the district court.  Connors, 769 P.2d  at 349.  Nor does the record provide any 
indication the district court intended to treat the contempt proceedings as 
modification proceedings.  Further, 
none of the orders set out the essential findings as to changed 
circumstances.  Therefore, without a 
petition for modification, evidence of consent to modification, and appropriate 
findings of changed circumstances, the contempt orders cannot be converted by 
application of W.R.C.P. 15(b) to orders modifying  the original support order. 

 

[¶17]   Public policy also supports the 
conclusion that no modification occurred in this case.  By implication, the father is requesting 
retrospective modification of his child support obligation.  Despite many years of inconsistent 
payments leading to multiple contempt proceedings and arrearage judgments as 
well as incarceration, he now asks this court to find that his support 
obligation was modified by the December 1983 order.  As we noted in Parry v. Parry, 
766 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Wyo. 1989), allowing retrospective modifications may 
encourage default.  A party could 
decide to stop making payments and allow arrearages to accrue with the hope the 
court will cancel or reduce the accrued payments owed and/or the continuing 
child support obligation.  We 
decline to establish such a precedent and affirm the district court's 
determination that the child support obligation established in the 1977 divorce 
decree was not modified by the three subsequent court orders issued in contempt 
proceedings.

 

[¶18]   The father also argues that the 
district court's determination of arrearages was incorrect and not supported by 
any evidence.  In this regard, his 
failure to ensure a sufficient record for review by this court is 
conclusive.

 

In order 
to find an abuse of discretion, we must review all the evidence heard by the 
district court.  Father, as 
appellant here, bears the burden of providing this court a complete record on 
which to base a decision.  The 
hearing in this case was unreported.  
Father failed to present a settlement of the record as provided in 
W.R.A.P. 3.03.  In the absence of a 
complete record, we must "accept the trial court's findings as being the only 
basis for deciding the issues which pertain to the evidence.  In the absence of anything to refute 
them, we will sustain the trial court's findings, and we assume that the 
evidence presented was sufficient to support those findings.'"  Weiss v. Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 
498 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget Exploration, 
Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 771-72 (Wyo. 1995)).

 

Thomas 
v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 721 (Wyo. 1999) (some citations omitted); see also Ahearn v. 
Ahearn, 993 P.2d 942, 949 (Wyo. 1999); Jordan v. Brackin, 992 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Wyo. 1999); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 756 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Wyo. 
1988).  As noted above, the 
certified record is a partial collection of the pleadings filed during the 
course of this extended proceeding.  
Although several hearings were held, including one during the most 
recent contempt proceeding, no hearing transcripts were provided in the 
record.  Likewise no W.R.A.P. 3.03 
statement was provided for this court to consider.  The father, as the appellant, bears the 
burden to bring a sufficient record to this court upon which a decision can be 
based.  Wood v. Wood, 865 P.2d 616, 617 (Wyo. 1993).  On the 
basis of this record, we can discern no serious procedural error or violation of 
a principle of law.  Crites, 
837 P.2d  at 1066.  Nor can we 
identify any "clear and grave abuse of discretion" in such a vacuum.  Id.  Similar to the circumstances of 
Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, we are compelled to conclude the evidence presented 
was sufficient to support the district court's findings, and we affirm the 
judgment entered against the father in the sum of  $20,790.30.

FOOTNOTES

1Distribution of this payment was 
specified to address (1) the mother's attorney fees in the amount of $237.65; 
(2) $200 child support for the month of May 1983; (3) $20 for past arrearages 
stated in the November 9, 1977, order; and (4) $42.35 for the $1,320 
arrearages.

 2The mother filed a Request for Order to 
Show Cause and Citation for Contempt on August 11, 1987.  She alleged therein that the father was 
in arrears $100 per month from July 1977 through January 1986 and $50 from 
February 1986 through July 1987 for a total arrearage of $12,950.  

 3DFS alleged the father owed $58,790 
(there was an apparent typographical error in the document on this figure) total 
combined child support obligation for the two children from the date of the 
decree, had paid $36,049.70 with a resulting balance due of $22,740.30, and was 
entitled to $1,950 credit for support payments made pursuant to a juvenile 
docket, for a total support arrearage due of $20,790.30.