Case Title: N. Laramie Range Found. v. Converse County Bd. of County Comm'rs

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0060

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
NORTHERN LARAMIE RANGE FOUNDATION, a Wyoming non-profit corporation, NORTHERN LARAMIE RANGE ALLIANCE, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company, and WHITE CREEK RANCH, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company v. CONVERSE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, and WASATCH WIND INTERMOUNTAIN, LLC d/b/a Pioneer Windpark I, LLC, and Pioneer Windpark II, LLC; NORTHERN LARAMIE RANGE FOUNDATION, a Wyoming non-profit corporation, and NORTHERN LARAMIE RANGE ALLIANCE, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, INDUSTRIAL SITING DIVISION, and WASATCH WIND INTERMOUNTAIN, LLC d/b/a Pioneer Windpark I, LLC, and Pioneer Windpark II, LLC.2012 WY 158Case Number: S-12-0060; S-12-0061Decided: 12/14/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
 
NORTHERN 
LARAMIE RANGE FOUNDATION, a Wyoming non-profit corporation, NORTHERN LARAMIE 
RANGE ALLIANCE, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company, and WHITE CREEK RANCH, 
LLC, a Wyoming limited liability 
company,Appellants(Petitioners),v.CONVERSE COUNTY 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, and WASATCH WIND INTERMOUNTAIN, LLC d/b/a 
Pioneer Windpark I, LLC, and Pioneer Windpark II, 
LLC,Appellees(Respondents).NORTHERN LARAMIE RANGE 
FOUNDATION, a Wyoming non-profit corporation, and NORTHERN LARAMIE RANGE 
ALLIANCE, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company, 
Appellants(Petitioners),v.WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, INDUSTRIAL SITING DIVISION, and WASATCH WIND 
INTERMOUNTAIN, LLC d/b/a Pioneer Windpark I, LLC, and 
Pioneer Windpark II, 
LLC,Appellees(Respondents).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Converse County
The Honorable Keith 
G. Kautz, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellants:
Peter 
C. Nicolaysen and Pamela M. Brondos 
of Nicolaysen & Associates, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Nicolaysen.
 
Representing Appellee 
Converse County Board of County Commissioners:
            
No Appearance.
 
Representing Appellee 
Wasatch Wind Intermountain, LLC:
Brent R. Kunz and 
Lucas Buckley of Hathaway & Kunz, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming; John A. Masterson 
and Alaina M. Stedillie of Rothgerber 
Johnson & Lyons LLP, Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Masterson.
 
Representing Appellee 
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, Industrial Division :
            
Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Jay A. Jerde, 
Deputy Attorney General; Luke J. Esch, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Mr. Esch.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN*, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
*Justice Golden retired effective 
September 30, 2012.
 
KITE, Chief 
Justice.            

 
[¶1]      
This appeal involves two permitting actions for a wind energy project in 
the mountains of Converse County.  In Case No. S-12-0060, the 
Northern Laramie Range Alliance, LLC (NLRA), Northern Laramie Range 
Foundation (NLRF) and White Creek Ranch, LLC (“the objectors”) challenge 
the district court’s affirmance of the Converse County Board of 
County Commissioners’ (Board) decision to grant Wasatch Wind 
Intermountain, LLC’s (Wasatch) application for a Wind Energy 
Conversion System Permit (WECS permit).  They also 
challenge the district court’s rulings that NLRA 
and NLRF did not have standing to appeal the Board’s 
decision.  We conclude NLRA has standing, 
but NLRF does not.  We further rule the Board 
properly granted Wasatch’s application for a WECS 
permit.  Consequently, in Case No. S-12-0060, we affirm in 
part and reverse in part.   
 
[¶2]      
In the second case, Case No. S-12-0061, NLRA 
and NLRF (“the objectors”) challenge the district 
court’s affirmance of the Wyoming Department of Environmental 
Quality, Industrial Siting Council’s (ISC) decision to grant 
a state industrial siting permit for construction of the 
project.  We conclude the agency acted within its authority, 
and there is sufficient evidence to justify its decision.  
Consequently, we affirm the district court’s decision in Case No. 
S-12-0061.1  

 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]      
The issues in the Converse County case, Case No. S-12-0060, may be 
summarized as follows:
 
1.    
What is the 
appropriate standard of review of the Board’s action?
 
2.    
Do 
NLRF, NLRA and/or White Creek Ranch have standing to 
appeal?  
 
3.    
Did the 
Board act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, abuse its discretion or 
otherwise act in a manner not in accordance with law when it 
ruled Wasatch’s application was complete and granted it 
a WECS permit?
 
a.    
Was the 
traffic study adequate?
b.    
Was there 
sufficient evidence of financial assurances?
 
4.    
Were proper 
notifications given to nearby landowners?
 
5.    
Were the 
objectors denied due process of law?
 
[¶4]      
The issues raised in Case No. S-12-0061 are:
 
1.    
Was it 
lawful for the ISC to issue the industrial siting permit 
subject to Special Condition #19 which required Wasatch to provide further 
evidence of its financial resources prior to construction of the 
project?
 
2.    
Did 
the ISC properly conclude that, with the inclusion of Special 
Condition #19, Wasatch had met the financial assurance requirement and was 
entitled to a permit?
 
3.    
Were 
the ISC’s findings that the project will not pose a threat of 
serious injury to the environment or to the social and economic condition or 
inhabitants in the affected area supported by substantial evidence?
 
FACTS
 
[¶5]      
These consolidated cases involve two different permits issued to Wasatch 
allowing it to construct and operate a two-phase wind energy project in the 
Northern Laramie mountain range near Glenrock in Converse County, 
Wyoming.  The project, called Pioneer Wind Park I and II, 
includes sixty-two wind turbines, together with support structures and 
transmission lines, and is to be constructed entirely on private land leased by 
Wasatch.    
 
[¶6]      
In Case No. S-12-0060, NLRA, NLRF and White Creek 
Ranch challenge the Board’s decision granting Wasatch a WECS 
permit.  The Board held a public hearing 
on Wasatch’s application on April 11, 2011, considered written 
comments and made its decision at a second public hearing on May 3, 
2011.  The objectors petitioned the district court for review 
of the Board’s decision.  The district court ruled that 
neither NLRA nor NLRF had standing to appeal, but found 
that White Creek Ranch did, and, after considering the merits, the district 
court affirmed the Board’s decision.     

 
[¶7]      
In Case No. S-12-0061, NLRA and NLRF challenge 
the ISC’s order granting Wasatch a state 
industrial siting permit for construction and operation of the wind 
energy project.  Wasatch filed its application for a permit 
with the ISD on February 2, 2011.2  The application process was very 
complex and included information about numerous areas of potential concern, 
including environment, wildlife, impacts on communities and labor resources, tax 
projections, financial resources, and others.  
The ISD reviewed the application and identified some 
deficiencies, to which Wasatch responded.  The ISD 
thereafter determined that Wasatch’s application was complete, and 
the ISC considered it at a contested case hearing held over several 
days in May and June 2011.  In addition to taking sworn 
testimony, the ISC also received and considered limited appearance 
statements from audience members.  The ISC 
granted Wasatch’s application and permitted the project; however, it 
included numerous conditions, some of which had to be fulfilled prior to the 
commencement of construction.  NLRA 
and NLRF filed a petition for review of the ISC decision 
with the district court and that court affirmed.    

 
[¶8]      
Both district court decisions were appealed to this Court and we 
consolidated them for review and decision.  Additional facts 
will be described in our analysis of the issues.  
    
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶9]      
The two cases on appeal come to us from different types of administrative 
proceedings and that difference affects the standard of review we 
apply.  For both cases, our review is governed by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2011):
 
 
(c) To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:
 
            
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed; and
 
            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:
 
         
   (A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;
 
         
   (B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege or immunity;
 
         
   (C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;
 
         
   (D) Without observance of procedure required by 
law; or
 
         
   (E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a 
case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.
 
[¶10]   
The Converse County permit case, No. S-12-0060, proceeded as a public 
hearing in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-501 through § 18-5-513 
(LexisNexis 2010) (statutes pertaining to county permitting of wind 
facilities) and the Converse County Wind Energy Siting 
Regulations.  In accordance with § 18-5-506 and the county 
regulations, the proceeding was not a formal trial-type or contested case 
hearing, but an informal hearing where public comment was solicited.  
The witnesses were not sworn, comment times were limited and there was no 
typical cross examination or other indicia of a true adversarial 
process.  After the hearing, the Board issued findings and a 
decision granting the WECS permit.  See § 
18-5-507.  Because of the informal nature of the hearing, the 
district court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review rather 
than the substantial evidence standard applicable to factual findings made after 
formal contested case hearings under Dale v. 
S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 
84, 188 P.3d 554 (Wyo. 2008).  
 
 
[¶11]   
The objectors claim the district court erred by using the arbitrary and 
capricious standard instead of the substantial evidence standard.  
In Dale, we provided a comprehensive review and reiteration of the 
standards of review for administrative decisions, specifically explaining the 
differences between the substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious 
standards.  Our task in applying the substantial evidence test 
is to
 
examine 
the entire record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support 
an agency’s findings. If the agency’s decision is supported by substantial 
evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency and 
must uphold the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 
which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency’s conclusions. 

 
Id., 
¶ 11, 
188 P.3d  at 558 (citations omitted).  Further, 
when conducting a substantial evidence review of the record,
 
the 
deference that normally is accorded the findings of fact by a trial court is 
extended to the administrative agency, and we do not adjust the decision of the 
agency unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
on record. This is so because, in such an instance, the administrative body is 
the trier of fact and has the duty to weigh the evidence and 
determine the credibility of witnesses.
 
Id., 
¶ 11, 
188 P.3d  at 558-59.    
 
[¶12]   
The arbitrary and capricious standard also requires the reviewing court 
to consider the entire agency record to determine whether it reasonably could 
have made its findings and order based upon all the evidence before 
it.  Id., ¶ 12, 188 P.3d  at 559, citing 
Newman 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2002 WY 
91, ¶ 19, 49 P.3d 163, 170 (Wyo. 2002).  
However, “the arbitrary and capricious standard is more lenient and 
deferential to the agency than the substantial evidence standard because 'it 
requires only that there be a rational basis for the agency’s decision.’” 
Id.
 
[¶13]   
Our primary focus in Dale was on determining the appropriate 
standard for reviewing an agency’s factual findings after a contested case 
hearing.  We ruled that, because of the confusion that had 
inured from using both the substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious 
standards for reviewing evidentiary issues in contested case hearings, we would 
thereafter confine our review of the evidence to the substantial evidence 
standard.  Dale, ¶¶ 16-22, 188 P.3d  at 
559-61.  Nevertheless, we also addressed the proper use of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review and discussed its history under the 
Federal Administrative Procedure Act:
 
The 
judicial review provision of the federal Administrative Procedures Act, 
5 U.S.C. § 706, is similar to § 
16–3–114(c). 
Historically under the federal act, the arbitrary and capricious standard was 
used to review informal adjudications. 33 Fed. 
Prac. & Proc., Judicial Review § 8334. Friends 
of the Bow v. Thompson, 
124 F.3d 1210, 1214–17 (10th Cir.1997), 
demonstrates the traditional use of the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review in adjudicative contexts. In that case, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in 5 U.S.C. § 706 to 
review an agency’s decision after an informal proceeding involving a timber 
sale. See also, Citizens 
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971). On the other hand, the substantial evidence standard has 
traditionally been applied to review evidentiary findings after formal, 
trial-type agency proceedings. 33 Fed. 
Prac. & Proc., Judicial Review §§ 8333.
 
Id., 
¶ 20, 
188 P.3d  at 560-61 (footnote omitted).  

 
[¶14]   
As referenced in Dale, the Federal Practice and Procedure treatise 
explains the rationale behind applying separate standards of review to agency 
actions arising from different types of agency proceedings.  
The treatise refers to substantial evidence review as “reasonableness 
review” and explains that “[r]easonableness review is appropriate any 
time an administrative program requires a high probability of correctness but 
cannot tolerate judicial duplication of administrative decision making. 
Traditionally, this combination exists when the decision was made through a 
formal, trial-like proceeding.”  33 Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Judicial Review § 8333 
(2006).  The arbitrary and capricious standard of review 
applies to those “administrative schemes in which the courts are to have a 
lesser role,” like when reviewing a decision after an informal agency 
hearing.  Id., § 8334.  
 
[¶15]   
Two federal cases, Friends of the Bow v. Thompson, 
124 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 
1997), and Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1971), abrogated on other grounds, Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, 97 S. Ct. 980, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1977), demonstrate the applicability of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard to informal agency decision making.   
In Friends of the Bow, 124 F.3d  at 1214-17, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to review 
a U.S. Forest Service decision allowing a timber sale on national forest 
lands.  That decision was made after an informal proceeding 
involving agency analysis of a list of alternative actions.   
Similarly, Volpe involved an informal adjudication by the 
Secretary of Transportation allowing federal funding for construction of a 
highway through Overton Park in Memphis, Tennessee.  The only 
hearing required by the applicable statutes was conducted by local officials to 
inform the public about the proposed project and elicit community opinion on the 
design and route.  The United States Supreme Court ruled that 
the absence of a formal adjudicatory hearing dictated that substantial evidence 
review was not required and the arbitrary and capricious standard of review was 
appropriate.  Volpe, 401 U.S.  at 414-15, 91 S. Ct.  at 
822.   
 
[¶16]   
The objectors direct us to Gilbert v. Bd. of 
County Comm’rs of Park County, 2010 WY 68, 232 P.3d 17 (Wyo. 2010), as support for their contention that the substantial evidence 
standard should apply to the Board’s findings in this case even though the 
hearing was not conducted as a contested case.  In Gilbert, 
Park County adopted revised zoning regulations which provided that earlier 
land use regulations, including allowing light industrial/manufacturing in 
certain areas, would expire at a certain time unless particular conditions were 
met.  Gilbert requested a variance to maintain the option of 
light industrial/manufacturing use on his property.  The 
planning coordinator determined that Gilbert’s designation was subject to 
expiration, apparently rejecting the variance request.  The 
matter proceeded to the Park County Planning and Zoning Commission which held a 
public hearing and recommended to the board of county commissioners that the 
variance request be denied.  Id., ¶¶ 4-6, 
232 P.3d  at 19-20.
 
[¶17]   
The board also held public hearings on the matter, which were documented 
by tape recordings and board minutes.  At the hearings, the 
board heard the recommendations of the commission, Gilbert’s comments, and took 
oral and written statements from neighbors and a former owner of the 
property.  The board denied the variance request in a written 
resolution which included findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
On appeal, the district court ordered a partial remand to “provide a 
record of the [b]oard’s deliberation in denying the variance request.” 
The board then issued a second resolution again denying Gilbert’s 
application.  Id., ¶¶ 6-8, 232 P.3d  at 
19-20.  On appeal to this Court, Gilbert argued that the case 
had morphed into a contested case hearing and he was, therefore, entitled to all 
of the procedural protections required in such a hearing.  
Id., ¶ 13, 232 P.3d  at 25.  We 
determined the hearing was not a “de facto” contested case hearing because the 
proceeding was not conducted as such and the applicant did not have a vested 
property right in the variance.  Id., ¶ 14, 
232 P.3d  at 25.
 
[¶18]   
In support of their argument in this case, the objectors rely upon our 
application of the substantial evidence standard in Gilbert to review the 
board’s factual determinations as to whether Gilbert had met the variance 
standards.  Without discussing in detail the appropriate 
standard of review, we applied both the substantial evidence and arbitrary and 
capricious standards to the same factual findings.  Id., 
¶¶ 21-22, 232 P.3d  at 30-31.  The 
determination of which standard of review applied was not directly at issue in 
Gilbert, and the application of both standards of review simply showed 
that under either the agency’s decision was appropriate.  
Consequently, Gilbert does not mandate that we apply the 
substantial evidence standard of review to decisions made after informal 
non-contested case agency proceedings.  Given the issue is 
directly presented in this case and Dale, federal precedent and learned 
treatises all indicate the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies 
to administrative proceedings which were not conducted as trial-type 
adjudications or contested cases, we agree with the district court that the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review is appropriate to review Converse 
County’s permit decision.  
 
[¶19]   
The ISC appeal, Case No. S-12-0061, involved a conventional 
contested case proceeding.  As such, we apply the substantial 
evidence standard of review to the agency’s evidentiary 
determinations.   
 
When 
the burdened party prevailed before the agency, we will determine if substantial 
evidence exists to support the finding for that party by considering whether 
there is relevant evidence in the entire record which a reasonable mind might 
accept in support of the agency’s conclusions. If the hearing examiner 
determines that the burdened party failed to meet his burden of proof, we will 
decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision to 
reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by considering whether that 
conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record 
as a whole.  If, in the course of its decision making process, 
the agency disregards certain evidence and explains its reasons for doing so 
based upon determinations of credibility or other factors contained in the 
record, its decision will be sustainable under the substantial evidence test. 
Importantly, our review of any particular decision turns not on whether we agree 
with the outcome, but on whether the agency could reasonably conclude as it did, 
based on all the evidence before it.
 
Dale, 
¶ 22, 
188 P.3d  at 561 (citations omitted).
 
[¶20]   
Even in contested case proceedings, the arbitrary and capricious standard 
remains available as a “'safety net’ to catch agency action which prejudices a 
party’s substantial rights or which may be contrary to the 
other W.A.P.A. review standards yet is not easily categorized or fit 
to any one particular standard.” Dale, ¶ 23, 188 P.3d  at 561, 
quoting Newman, ¶ 23, 
49 P.3d  at 172.  
In all cases, we review an agency’s conclusions of law de 
novo, and will affirm only if the agency’s conclusions are in 
accordance with the law. Moss v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & 
Comp. Div., 2010 WY 66, ¶ 11, 232 P.3d 1, 4 (Wyo. 2010); 
Dale, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 561-62.
 
DISCUSSION
 
A.   
Converse County Permit (Case No. 
S-12-0060)
 
1.    
Standing
 
[¶21]   
The district court determined that neither NLRA 
nor NLRF had standing to pursue an appeal from the Board’s decision 
granting a WECS permit to Wasatch.  It decided, 
however, that White Creek Ranch did have standing and proceeded to determine the 
merits of the appeal.  NLRA and NLRF 
contest the district court’s determination that they do not have standing; 
Wasatch contests the district court’s ruling that White Creek does have 
standing.
 
[¶22]   
“The existence of standing is a legal issue that we review de 
novo.” Halliburton Energy Services v. Gunter, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 10, 
167 P.3d 645, 649 (Wyo. 2007).  See 
also, Northfork Citizens for Resp. Dev. v. Park County 
Bd. of County Comm’rs, 2008 WY 88, ¶ 6, 189 P.3d 260, 262 
(Wyo. 2008).  Standing is a jurisprudential rule that 
implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction; thus, it can be raised at any 
time.   Hicks v. Dowd, 2007 WY 74, ¶ 18, 
157 P.3d 914, 918 (Wyo. 2007), citing Granite 
Springs Retreat Ass’n, Inc. v. Manning, 2006 WY 
60, ¶ 5, 133 P.3d 1005, 1009-10 (Wyo. 2006); 
Mutual 
of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Blury–Losolla, 
952 P.2d 1117, 1119-20 (Wyo. 1998).
 
[¶23]   
In general, the doctrine of standing centers on whether a party “is 
properly situated to assert an issue for judicial determination.”  
Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, ¶ 9, 79 P.3d 500, 505 (Wyo. 2003).  A party has standing when it has a 
personal stake in the outcome of a case.  Id.  
Given this is an agency action, we start with the applicable statutes 
and rules to define who has an interest in the matter.  The 
Converse County regulations were adopted pursuant to § 18-5-501 et 
seq.  Section 18-5-508 states that “[a]ny party 
aggrieved by the final decision of the board of county commissioners may have 
the decision reviewed by the district court pursuant to Rule 12 of the Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure.”  W.R.A.P. 12.01 
provides judicial review to “any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact” 
by agency action.  Similarly, § 16-3-114(a) provides that “any 
person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency 
in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction . . . is entitled to 
judicial review . . . .”    
 
[¶24]   
A litigant is “aggrieved or adversely affected in fact” by an agency 
action if he has a “legally recognizable interest in that which will be affected 
by the action.”  Roe v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 
Campbell County, 997 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Wyo. 2000) (citation 
omitted).  In order to establish standing for judicial review 
of an agency action, a litigant must show injury or potential injury by 
“'alleg[ing] a perceptible, rather than speculative, harm 
resulting from agency action.’”  Hoke v. 
Moyer, 865 P.2d 624, 628 (Wyo. 1993), quoting Foster’s 
Inc. v. City of Laramie, 
718 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 1986).  
“'The interest which will sustain a right to appeal must generally be 
substantial, immediate, and pecuniary. A future, contingent, or merely 
speculative interest is ordinarily not sufficient.’” L Slash 
X Cattle Co., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 
623 P.2d 764, 769 (Wyo. 1981), 
quoting 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 
180.  Specifically in the context of zoning or land use 
planning, 
 
[a]n 
aggrieved or adversely affected person having standing to sue is a person who 
has a legally recognizable interest that is or will be affected by the action of 
the zoning authority in question. An individual having standing must have a 
definite interest exceeding the general interest in community good shared in 
common with all citizens.
 
E.C. Yokley, 
4 Zoning Law and Practice § 24-3 at 194 (4th ed. 1979) (footnote 
omitted). 
 
 Hoke, 
865 P.2d  
at 628.  
 
[¶25]   
We have decided a number of cases involving questions of standing in 
zoning and/or land use actions.  In Hoke, 
865 P.2d  at 628, we determined that Mr. Moyer had standing to 
contest the Teton County Board of County Commissioners’ decision allowing a 
higher density zoning category for a subdivision adjacent to his 
property.  We said that doubling the density on the adjacent 
property raised “a number of perceptible harms for a property owner which are 
different than the harm to the general public, such as increased traffic and 
congestion.”  Id.  See also 
Hirschfield v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of County of Teton, 
994 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Wyo. 1997) (holding landowners had standing 
to challenge an agency decision which would have the effect of doubling the 
housing density previously allowed on adjoining land).  In 
Northfork, the litigants, who lived on property adjacent to 
a proposed subdivision, established standing by showing potential harm that 
exceeded the general public’s interest.  They asserted the 
proposed land use change would increase the housing density on the adjacent land 
and violated other county land use regulations, including open space 
requirements, which could interfere with their scenic views and have adverse 
impacts on their ability to observe and enjoy the wildlife on their own 
properties.  Northfork, ¶¶ 13-14, 
189 P.3d  at 263-65.   In Cox, ¶ 14, 
79 P.3d  at 506, we determined adjoining landowners had standing to 
challenge a municipality’s annexation decision that would increase housing 
density, leading to increased traffic and congestion and health and safety 
concerns.  
 
[¶26]   
On the other hand, we determined the potential litigants in Roe, 
997 P.2d  at 1023, failed to establish standing to contest 
the county commission’s authorization of an application to re-subdivide a 
subdivision.  Although they alleged the commission had 
deviated from the proper administrative process and discussed general concerns 
about water rights and termination of water and sewer services, they did not 
spell out how the agency decision specifically threatened 
them.   
 
[¶27]   
Turning to the appellants in this case, we start with White Creek Ranch 
because some of the principles applicable to its standing will also apply to our 
later analysis.  White Creek Ranch asserts that it owns land 
bordering the Wasatch project and the project threatens its scenic views and 
wildlife habitat and migration.  These assertions fall 
squarely within our ruling in Northfork; consequently, we 
conclude White Creek Ranch has standing as it was aggrieved or adversely 
affected in fact by the agency action.3     

 
[¶28]   
We turn, then, to the two associations that also seek to challenge the 
Converse County decision, NLRA and NLRF.  Because “person” is defined as “any 
individual, partnership, corporation, association, municipality, governmental 
subdivision or public or private organization of any character other than an 
agency,” see W.R.A.P. 12.02 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-101(b)(vii) (LexisNexis 2011), an association can appeal under the 
administrative procedures act provided it is “aggrieved or adversely affected in fact” by the agency 
action.  Section 16-3-114(a).  

 
[¶29]   
An association can establish standing on its own or through the 
associational rights of its members.  Int’l Assoc. of 
Firefighters, Local No. 279 v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Fire Dept. of 
City of Cheyenne, 702 P.2d 1294, 1298 (Wyo. 1985), J. Thomas, 
specially concurring; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2211, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975).  
Warth, 422 U.S.  at 511, 95 S. Ct.  at 2211-12 
(citations omitted), provides a template for establishing an association’s 
standing:
 
[A]n association may 
have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and 
to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may 
enjoy.  Moreover, in attempting to secure relief from injury 
to itself the association may assert the rights of its members, at least so long 
as the challenged infractions adversely affect its members’ associational 
rights.   
 
            
Even in absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing 
solely as the representative of its members.  . . . [However,] 
[t]he association must allege that its members, or any one of them, are 
suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of 
the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members 
themselves brought suit.
 
[¶30]   
The record indicates NLRA is a limited liability company with 
approximately 900 members.  It claims standing through injury 
to its members, particularly Sally Sarvey and White Creek Ranch, and 
through injury to itself.  We have already established that 
White Creek Ranch has standing.  The record includes 
information and assertions that Kenneth Lay, the owner of the ranch, is a member 
of NLRA; consequently, the ranch’s individual standing also confers 
standing on NLRA through its associational ties.  
See Northfork, ¶¶ 8, 17, 189 P.3d  
at 262, 265 (holding an organization had standing because some of its individual 
members did).   
 
[¶31]   NLRA 
also claims standing through another member, Sally Sarvey.  
One of the bases advanced by NLRA in support of 
Ms. Sarvey’s (and accordingly its own) standing is her concern about 
the visual and scenic disturbance of the area as a result of the Wasatch 
project.  This concern was raised in an email sent to the 
county commissioners which stated in part:
 
We [Michael and Sally 
Sarvey] understand that the gravel operation on the face of the same 
mountains has ceased and that reclamation has begun.  Many are 
skeptical that it will be effective but we remain hopeful that it is 
possible.  Everyone views that gravel operation as an ugly 
scar on an otherwise peaceful scene.  Now, as proposed, Phase 
I of the Wasatch wind farm will stand on the ridge just above the gravel quarry 
and further add to the Glenrock area disaster with its 30 enormous towers and 
blinking lights.  
 
In making your 
decision on whether to permit this farm we beseech you to stand back and put it 
into the perspective of the future.  How will it be viewed by 
Glenrock residents and all those that pass by?  What will you 
and others think as you are repeatedly reminded of your part in it?  
What will future generations, including your own descendents, 
wonder?
 
[¶32]   
Even putting aside the irrelevant reference to the gravel quarry which 
apparently has nothing to do with the wind energy project, it is clear from this 
excerpt that Ms. Sarvey does not make the requisite connection 
between an individual harm to herself or her property and the 
project.  There is no indication that the wind farm will 
threaten her with any harm beyond that the general public would 
incur.  These general assertions do not aid her 
or NLRA in establishing standing.  
 
[¶33]   
Nevertheless, Ms. Sarvey also stated at the public hearing 
that she owned property “near” land Wasatch leased for its project and she had 
concerns about the increased traffic from the project.  We 
note her assertion that her property is “near” the project does not precisely 
fall within our precedent finding standing when the litigants asserted their 
property “adjoined” or was “adjacent” to the area of proposed 
action.  See, e.g., Northfork, 
Hoke, supra.  However, Ms. Sarvey 
testified about the traffic study and stated that she was concerned about the 
project construction vehicles causing traffic and safety issues.  
As we noted in Cox, Northfork, Hoke, and 
Hirschfield, concerns about traffic, congestion and safety in the area of 
one’s property are perceptible harms for a property owner that distinguish him 
or her from the general public.  Under these circumstances, we 
conclude Ms. Sarvey had standing and, her membership 
in NLRA confers standing on the organization as 
well.   
 
[¶34]   
Finally, we consider NLRF, a nonprofit corporation which 
apparently has tax exempt (§501(c)(3)) status under the Internal Revenue 
Code.  It has no members and cannot, therefore, establish 
standing through its members.  It must establish that, as an 
organization, it will potentially be injured by the project.  
In Warth, 422 U.S.  at 511, 95 S. Ct.  at 2211, the 
United States Supreme Court explained that “an association may have standing in 
its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate 
whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.”  

 
[¶35]   NLRF 
does not claim that it owns property adjacent to the project, but argues, 
instead, that the project will thwart its purposes.  The 
foundation’s articles of incorporation recite that it was organized “exclusively 
for charitable, educational, and scientific purposes.”  In its 
pleadings, it makes various representations such as, its “purpose is to sponsor, 
engage in and promote activities on public and private lands in the Northern 
Laramie Range, including those areas adjacent to Applicant’s project 
boundaries.  The programming, mission and purpose 
of NLRF would be adversely affected by the destruction of the scenic 
views and natural beauty, and the degradation of the environment, natural 
habitat, wildlife and biological resources.”  These 
allegations are extremely general and do not show a causal relationship between 
these perceived threats and the project.  There is no 
description of the foundation’s planned programs, where specifically they will 
be located, or how the programs would actually be harmed by the wind 
project.  In establishing a true interest sufficient to 
warrant a finding of standing, the “'pleadings must be something more than an 
ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.’”  
Warth, 422 U.S.  at 509, 95 S. Ct.  at 2211, quoting 
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2416, 37 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1973).  There is nothing 
in NLRF’s claims which separates its asserted injury from that of 
the general public who enjoys the Northern Laramie Range.  As 
such, NLRF has failed to establish an injury or potential injury 
sufficient to warrant judicial intervention on its behalf.  
Nevertheless, because White Creek Ranch and NLRA have 
standing, we will consider the merits of this appeal.
 
2.    
Application 
Requirements
 
[¶36]   
The objectors argue that Wasatch did not meet some of the requirements 
for an application for a WECS permit.   Those 
requirements are found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-503, which states in relevant 
part:
 
(a) To 
obtain the permit required by W.S. 18-5-502, the 
owner or developer of a wind energy facility shall submit an application to the 
board of county commissioners. The application shall:
 
            
(i) Certify that reasonable efforts have been undertaken to 
provide notice in writing to all owners of land within one (1) mile of the 
proposed wind energy facility and to all cities and towns located within twenty 
(20) miles of the wind energy facility. Notice shall include a general 
description of the project including its location, projected number of turbines 
and the likely routes of ingress and egress.
            
. . . .
            
(iv) Certify that the proposed wind energy facility will comply with all 
applicable zoning and county land use regulations, which regulations shall be no 
less stringent than the standards required by this article.
 
            
. . . .
 
            
(vii) Provide evidence sufficient for the board of county commissioners 
to determine if the proposed wind energy facility has adequate legal access. The 
application also shall describe how private roadways within the facility will be 
marked as private roadways and shall acknowledge that no county is required to 
repair, maintain or accept any dedication of the private roadways to the public 
use. The application also shall include a traffic study of any public roadways 
leading to and away from the proposed facility and the board of county 
commissioners may require the applicant to enter into a reasonable road use 
agreement for the use of county roads prior to construction of the 
facility.
 
            
. . . .
 
(b) A 
wind energy facility subject to this article shall meet the requirements adopted 
pursuant to W.S. 35-12-105(d) and (e) 
regardless of whether the facility is referred to the 
industrial siting council pursuant to W.S. 18-5-509 or is 
otherwise subject to the industrial siting act.
 
[¶37]   
Interpretation of statutes and their implementing administrative 
regulations involves a question of law, which we review de 
novo.  J & 
T Properties, LLC v. Gallagher, 2011 WY 
112, ¶ 8, 256 P.3d 522, 524 (Wyo. 2011) 
(statutes); Bailey v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 
2010 WY 152, ¶ 9, 243 P.3d 953, 956 (Wyo. 2010) (administrative 
regulations).  However, it is also “settled that 
we defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own rules and 
regulations unless that interpretation is clearly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the plain language of the rules.”  
Office of State Lands and Investments v. Mule Shoe Ranch, Inc., 
2011 WY 68, ¶ 11, 252 P.3d 951, 954 (Wyo. 2011), citing 
Powder 
River Basin Resource Council v. Wyo. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2010 WY 
25, ¶ 6, 226 P.3d 809, 813 (Wyo. 2010).  
To interpret statutory language:
 
[T]he 
paramount consideration is to determine the legislature’s intent, which must be 
ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute. We look 
first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute 
is ambiguous. A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that 
reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and 
predictability. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or 
uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. If we determine that a statute 
is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.
 
Dorr v. 
Smith, Keller & Associates, 2010 WY 
120, ¶ 11, 238 P.3d 549, 552 (Wyo. 2010) 
(citation omitted). 
 
Mule 
Shoe, ¶ 13, 
252 P.2d  at 954-55.  All statutory provisions 
pertaining to the same subject are considered in pari 
materia. Sorensen 
v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 2010 WY 
101, ¶ 13, 234 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Wyo. 2010).  
The determination of whether a statute is ambiguous or clear is a matter 
of law to be determined by the court.  Id.
 
a.    
Traffic 
Study
 
[¶38]   
Section 18-5-503(a)(vii) requires  the WECS 
application to “include a traffic study of any public roadways leading to and 
away from the proposed facility . . . .”  Converse County, 
Wyoming Wind Energy Siting Regulations, Resolution No. 10-10(4)(h) 
(hereinafter Resolution 10-10) mirrors the 
statute.   Wasatch’s application contained a 
civil engineering firm’s traffic study covering numerous roads, including Mormon 
Canyon Road and Box Elder Road.  The objectors contend the 
applicant did not comply with the traffic study requirement because it did not 
include a study of a particular section of Box Elder Road and the traffic study 
was otherwise deficient.  
 
[¶39]   Wasatch’s 
study indicates that traffic will be filtered to the project from I-25 and, 
after leaving the interstate, “the primary route will utilize Mormon Canyon 
Road, which extends south from Birch Street in Glenrock to the project 
site.  A secondary route utilizing Sunflower Trail, Cold 
Springs Road, Windy Ridge Road and Box Elder Road may also be utilized, but only 
under special circumstances.  All traffic, including 
transport, construction, and commuter vehicles will be directed to utilize the 
Mormon Canyon Road route except in the case of an emergency or if otherwise 
directed.”    
 
[¶40]   
The maps included in the record show that the Mormon Canyon and Box Elder 
Roads head south from I-25.  Box Elder Road intersects with 
the Mormon Canyon Road in the project area; it then turns away from the project 
and heads further south away from I-25.  Wasatch’s 
traffic study did include Box Elder Road to the intersection with the Mormon 
Canyon Road but did not include the section that heads south from the project 
and away from I-25.  The objectors claim, therefore, that 
because the section was not studied, the traffic study was insufficient to meet 
the requirements of the statute and regulation which require a study of 
“any public roadways leading to and away from the proposed 
facility.”  Section 18-5-503(a)(vii); Resolution 10-10(4)(h) 
(emphasis added).  
 
[¶41]   
The objectors’ argument ignores a key part of the clear and unambiguous 
statutory language—the traffic study requirement is for any roads leading “to 
and away from the proposed facility.” The focus of the statutory language is 
access (ingress and egress) to and from the project facility.  
The legislature obviously intended that the applicant provide information 
on any route which could potentially be used to access the facility.  
The objectors’ argument that a study is required of any road which 
somehow connects to a road leading to or from the facility reads words into the 
statute.  “[T]he omission of words from a 
statute is considered to be an intentional act by the legislature 
and we will not read words into a statute 
when the legislature has chosen not to include them.”  
Morris v. CMS Oil and Gas Co., 2010 WY 37, ¶ 28, 
227 P.3d 325, 333 (Wyo. 2010).  It would also 
impose an impossible burden since most roads intersect with others.  
We do not interpret statutes in a way that would create an absurd 
result.  Mule Shoe, ¶ 19, 252 P.3d  at 
956.
 
[¶42]   
The section of Box Elder Road which Wasatch did not study leads south 
from the intersection with Mormon Canyon Road, away from I-25 which is 
identified as the key interstate thoroughfare for all traffic to and from the 
project.  The objectors point to no evidence in the record 
that the unstudied section of Box Elder Road would have any use for, or 
connection with, the project.  As such, even though that 
section leads away from the project area, it does not go anywhere that would be 
of any benefit to the applicant or the project.  We conclude 
the clear language of the statute requires the study of any road with some 
relationship to the project and traffic resulting from the project.  
The legislature did not intend to impose an overly onerous burden on the 
applicant to study roads having no actual use in traveling to or from the 
project.  The Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by 
failing to require Wasatch to study the irrelevant section of Box Elder Road. 

 
[¶43]   
The objectors also claim the traffic study had many other 
deficiencies.  Wasatch’s traffic study was 
prepared by a civil engineering firm and contained extensive information, 
including current road conditions and traffic and intersection volumes and the 
projected traffic generation from the project.  The objectors 
submitted a review of Wasatch’s traffic study prepared by another 
engineering firm, identifying deficiencies in the study.  
After the hearing, Wasatch provided more information on Box Elder Road 
and stated that the deficiencies identified in the objectors’ review of the 
traffic study “are beyond the scope of the traffic study as required by the 
regulations.   These issues will be fully addressed by 
the Road Use Agreement required between [the Applicant] and Converse 
County.”    
 
[¶44]   
In its decision, the Board found: 
 
A 
traffic study conducted by Civil Engineering Profession[al]s, Inc. was submitted 
with the application at Section H.  
 
            
[Counsel for objectors] submitted critiques of the road study and its 
amendment submitted by Applicant.  . . . After careful review 
of the traffic study and the critiques, the Commissioners believe the traffic 
study and amendment submitted by Applicant is adequate and meets the 
requirements of the Resolution.  The Commissioners expect 
finalization of the Road Service Agreement prior to the ISC Hearing 
. . . and modification between Applicant and the County as the project 
progresses.   
 
[¶45]   
Neither the statute nor the regulation define “traffic study” or set out 
any parameters for the study.  Although the objectors’ 
critique found Wasatch’s traffic study lacking, the Board was 
presented with an extensive analysis from Wasatch and accepted it.  
The Board also referenced a road use agreement which was in the process 
of being finalized.  The statute and regulation specifically 
allow the board of county commissioners to require the applicant to enter into a 
reasonable road use agreement for the use of county roads prior to construction 
of the facility.4   
 
[¶46]   
The arbitrary and capricious standard of review requires this Court to 
give deference to the agency decision and to affirm if the agency reasonably 
could have made its findings and order based upon all the evidence before 
it.   In fact, we have described “arbitrary” as “willful 
and unreasoning action, without consideration and regard for the facts and 
circumstances presented, and without adequate determining 
principle.”  Henderson v. City of Laramie (In re West 
Laramie), 457 P.2d 498, 502 (Wyo. 1969).  
While there is evidence in the record from which two different opinions 
could be derived, “'action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised 
honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an 
erroneous conclusion has been reached.’”  Id., quoting 
Miller v. City of Tacoma, 378 P.2d 464, 474 (Wash. 
1963).  Although the objectors claim their critique 
demonstrated deficiencies in Wasatch’s traffic study, they do not 
analyze the alleged deficiencies on appeal.  This is not 
sufficient to show the Board’s decision was unreasonable or willful.  
The Board considered the evidence before it and the protection afforded 
by the road use agreement and determined Wasatch had met the statutory and 
regulatory requirements.  In doing so, the Board did not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  

b.    
   Financial 
Assurance
 
[¶47]   
Section 18-5-503(b) and Resolution 10-10(4)(m) include the financial 
assurance provision applicable to WECS permit applications and 
require a wind energy facility to meet the requirements adopted pursuant to § 
35-12-105(d) and (e) (LexisNexis 2009).  Sections 35-12-105(d) 
and (e) state in relevant part:
 
(d) 
 [T]he council shall promulgate rules and regulations 
prescribing decommissioning and site reclamation standards for facilities 
permitted under W.S. 35-12-102(a)(vii)(E) and 
(F).   Such standards shall preempt county rules or 
regulations concerning decommissioning and reclamation and shall be designed to 
assure the proper decommissioning and interim and final site reclamation of 
commercial facilities generating electricity from wind and wind energy 
facilities during construction and operation of the facility, at the end of 
their useful life, upon revocation of a permit authorizing their operation or 
upon the happening of any event which causes operations to cease. 
 
(e) 
 [T]he council shall promulgate rules and regulations 
prescribing financial assurance requirements for facilities permitted by it 
pursuant to W.S. 35-12-102(a)(vii)(E) and 
(F). . . . These rules and regulations shall preempt county rules and 
regulations concerning financial assurances and shall be designed to provide 
adequate assurance that the permitted facilities will be properly reclaimed and 
decommissioned at the end of their useful life, upon revocation of a permit 
authorizing their operation or upon the happening of any event which causes 
operations to cease. The elements to consider when establishing adequate levels 
of financial assurance shall include credit worthiness, financial strength, 
credit history, credit rating and any other factors that reasonably bear upon 
the decision to accept a financial assurance. The financial assurance may be in 
any form acceptable to the council and may include a corporate guarantee, letter 
of credit, bond, deposit account or insurance policy.
 
[¶48]   
Subsection (e) contains the financial assurance requirement at issue 
here.  Application of this provision in this case is somewhat 
difficult, because although it was adopted during the 2010 Wyoming legislative 
session effective July 1, 2010, the ISC did not finally promulgate 
the rules mandated by the statute until after Converse County had 
granted Wasatch’s permit.  See Wyoming 
Department of Environmental Quality, Rules and Regulations of the 
Industrial Siting Council (hereinafter ISC Rules), Chap. 
1, § 9(p), effective May 31, 2011.  The parties make much of 
this procedural timeline—the objectors argue Wasatch was required to comply with 
the proposed rules, while Wasatch states that it was not.  In 
fact, however, the objectors’ specific complaints about Wasatch’s 
financial assurance evidence do not address the rules.  
Consequently, this issue can be resolved without considering the lack of 
final promulgated rules at the time of the board decision.
 
[¶49]   
Responding to Resolution 10-10(4)(m), Wasatch stated in 
its WECS application:
 
To 
finance the construction, operation, decommissioning and reclamation of the 
Projects, Pioneer Wind Park . . . will join with a financial partner that not 
only understands the nuances of wind farm financing, but also has extensive 
experience operating wind energy facilities and other energy assets.  
This financial partner will have the financial capability and be able to 
provide the financial assurances required under the 
Industrial Siting Act.   
 
Wasatch 
included a reclamation and decommissioning plan with its application and Sanjay 
Bhasin, a representative of its financial partner, Edison Mission Energy, 
spoke at the public hearing.  The Board found the financial 
assurance acceptable based upon the applicant’s statement that it would join 
with the financial partner, the Edison representative’s statement, 
and Wasatch’s testimony about the proposed ISC 
requirement “that Applicant must post a sufficient bond to insure project 
decommissioning and reclamation.”  The Board 
added:  “Additionally, the ISC staff has approved 
the financial assurances provided by Applicant.”    

 
[¶50]   
The objectors assert Wasatch’s financial assurance evidence 
was insufficient because it was relying on a financial partner instead of its 
own financial resources.  We will discuss aspects of the 
financial assurance requirements in more detail in Case No. S-12-0061; however, 
at this juncture we note there is nothing in § 35-12-105(e) which requires the 
applicant to provide such assurances based upon its own financial resources and 
without relying on partners or investors.  Reading subsections 
(d) and (e) together, it is clear the legislature’s intent was to assure that 
projects will be properly reclaimed and decommissioned.  The 
legislature made no statement about who had to provide the financial assurance 
that such reclamation and decommissioning would take place.  
Thus, there was nothing arbitrary or capricious about the Board relying 
upon Wasatch’s evidence regarding its financial partner to meet the 
assurance requirement.  
 
[¶51]   
The objectors also challenge the sufficiency of Edison’s financial 
assurances.  Section § 35-12-105(e) provides: “The elements to 
consider when establishing adequate levels of financial assurance shall include 
credit worthiness, financial strength, credit history, credit rating and any 
other factors that reasonably bear upon the decision to accept a financial 
assurance.”  Mr. Bhasin, the Managing Director for the 
Wind Energy Development Group for Edison Mission Energy, appeared at the public 
hearing.  He described his company’s financial resources and 
wind energy assets in several states.  Mr. Bhasin 
stated that his company was one of the top “five or six U.S. companies in the 
wind energy sector.”  He indicated, although Edison had not 
irrevocably committed to acquire the Wasatch project, that was its intent once 
the project was permitted.   He also stated that 
considerable planning efforts had already been made.  Under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, this evidence provided a 
rational basis for the Board to accept Wasatch’s financial 
assurance.  
 
[¶52]   
Moreover, the evidence also included Wasatch’s reclamation 
and decommission plan, which is part of the scope of the financial assurance 
requirement.  The plan included lease conditions Wasatch had 
negotiated with the private land lessors mandating the lessee to 
meet reclamation requirements and “establishing individual removal 
bonds.”  Wasatch also committed to provide guaranteed funds to 
cover the costs of decommissioning as required by the ISC.5  
 
[¶53]   
The objectors also fault the Board for stating that the “ISC 
staff” had approved the financial assurances provided by Wasatch as a basis for 
approving the permit.  Wasatch admits this statement was in 
error as the ISC had not yet made its decision and, as will be 
discussed in more detail, infra, the ISC ended up imposing a 
condition requiring further financial assurances prior to 
construction.  That aspect of the Board’s decision was simply 
an alternative or additional basis to support its ruling.  The 
other evidence relied upon by the Board in making its decision was sufficient to 
justify its decision. A rational basis clearly existed to support the Board’s 
decision that Wasatch met the financial assurance requirements for issuance of 
the WECS permit.     
 
3.    
Notification
 
[¶54]   
The objectors claim Wasatch failed to properly notify and identify as 
nonparticipating landowners nearby property owners, Chester and 
Jennifer Hornung and White Creek Ranch, and failed to identify them 
as adjoining property owners in the project plan as required by the county 
regulations.  Resolution 10-10(4)(a) requires the applicant to 
include in its application:
 
a.    
Certification that 
demonstrates reasonable efforts have been undertaken by the applicant to provide 
notice, in writing, to all owners of land within one (1) mile of the 
proposed WECS Project, and to all cities and towns located within 
twenty (20) miles of the WECS Project.  Notice 
shall include a general description of the project including its location, 
anticipated dates for commencement of construction and operations, projected 
number of turbines and the likely routes of ingress and egress.  

 
Additionally 
the following shall be submitted:  
 
. . . . 

 
ii.   
The name(s), address(es), and phone number(s) of all 
non-participating adjacent property owner(s) within one (1) mile of 
the WECS project site[.]
 
[¶55]   
Resolution 10-10(4)(i) requires the applicant to provide a project 
plan with certain information, including “[a] site plan for the installation of 
a WECS Project showing the planned location of each WECS 
tower, primary structure(s), property lines (including identification of 
adjoining properties), setback lines, public and private access roads and 
turnout locations, substation(s), electrical cabling from the WECS 
tower to the substations, ancillary equipment, transmission lines, and layout of 
all significant structures within the geographical boundaries of any applicable 
setback.”  (emphasis added).   
Subsection (i) also acknowledges that the project plan may change 
and simply requires that after the permit is granted, the “project plan be 
revised to show the final location of all facilities.”  
Resolution 10-10(4)(i).     

 
[¶56]   
The Board made the following finding regarding the certification 
requirement:
 
            
In its application, Applicant provides a certification in Appendix 
1.  In Section A, Applicant provides a list of all owners of 
land located within one mile of the WECS Project, and all cities 
located within 20 miles, and proof thereof that they were notified.  

 
            
At the public hearing, and by supplementary letter (Ex. 14) 
Jennifer Hornung stated that she should have been 
notified  because she lives within one mile of the [land] 
leased . . .  by Applicant.  At the public 
hearing, Applicant replied that Mrs. Hornung is well outside of the 
project boundaries.  Nor is the lease land that she is 
referring to within the project boundary.  Applicant also 
testified that a representative of the project had talked with 
Mrs. Hornung and her husband about the details of the project and 
offer[ed] more information if she would contact them.  
(Exh. 18)  In Mrs. Hornung’s letter 
submitted after the hearing to the Commissioners, she stated she was within a 
mile of the leased land and that should put her within the boundary of the 
project.  She rejected the assertion that anyone had 
substantively talked with her when she went to an open house for the wind 
project in the fall.
 
            
The Commissioners asked Holly Richardson, the County Interim Special 
Projects Officer, and one familiar with GIS locations, to verify the distance 
from Mrs. Hornung’s residence and the distance to the project 
boundary listed in the application.  She related to the 
Commissioners at the meeting this day that the distance is approximately 2.5 
miles from Mrs. Hornung’s residence to the project boundary, and 
approximately 1.75 miles from the White Creek Ranch.
 
            
A review of the maps and testimony by Wasatch at the public hearing 
indicated that Mrs. Hornung’s residence was over two miles from the 
perimeter of the project, though within one mile of the Stratton property which 
is leased by Applicant, but not included in the project.  

 
            
Some confusion seems to exist between the project boundary and the larger 
area whereby Applicant has also leased property.  (See Ex. 
30).  However, based upon all evidence heard and received, the 
Commissioners believe that Applicant has provided the necessary certification 
and accompanying information to believe that the necessary property owners, 
cities and subdivisions were notified as required under the 
Resolution.
 
The 
Board also found Wasatch’s project plan to be sufficient, while 
noting that the resolution allows changes to be made in the project plan as long 
as it is revised to show the final location of all facilities.  
  
 
[¶57]   
As the Board’s decision indicates, there was confusion over where the one 
mile perimeter for notification purposes should be measured from or, in other 
words, the location of the “project.”  Wasatch measured the 
notification distance from the closest turbine and the objectors claim this was 
improper because a WECS project site is not a turbine, but “a 
facility with a variety of required components—a system of multiple turbines, 
power collecting, storing and transmitting systems, operations and maintenance 
buildings, stations, roads, infrastructure, etc.”  Even if we 
were to accept that argument, the objectors point to no evidence that 
the Hornung residence is within a mile of any of those 
components.  The objectors’ evidence showed the residence was 
within one mile of land leased by Wasatch but not within one mile of any of the 
project components.  As such, the objectors’ argument is not 
even internally consistent.  Moreover, it is clear from 
reviewing the record that the Board correctly considered the conflicting 
evidence regarding the distances and rationally concluded 
the Hornungs were not within one mile of the project. 
 
[¶58]   
The objectors also contend White Creek Ranch should have received 
notification and been identified as a non-participating landowner because it 
owns property in a section which was listed in the application as part of the 
legal description of Wasatch’s project and was adjacent to the 
“study area boundary.”  The project legal description section 
of the application lists the “leased private lands in and around the project 
area and transmission line corridor.”  It does not purport to 
include only the actual area of the project.  The study area 
boundaries do not have relevance to the regulation which requires notification 
to landowners within one mile of the proposed WECS 
project.  The objectors simply do not make the requisite 
showing that the White Creek property was within one mile of the actual 
project.   
 
[¶59]   
For the same reasons that we conclude the notification was sufficient, we 
also conclude the project plan was adequate even though it did not identify 
White Creek Ranch or the Hornungs as adjoining property 
owners.  Resolution 10-10(4)(i) requires a project plan 
to include a site plan for the installation of the WECS project 
including planned location of the project components.  One of 
the requirements is a showing of property lines, including identification of 
adjoining properties.  As the evidence described above makes 
clear, the Hornung and White Creek properties do not “adjoin” the 
project site.        
 
[¶60]   
In addition, in previous cases we have addressed contentions that an 
applicant failed to comply with statutory notice requirements and stated that 
“an error must be prejudicial and affect the substantial rights of the appellant 
to warrant reversal.”  Pfeil v. Amax 
Coal West, Inc., 908 P.2d 956, 960 (Wyo. 1995), citing Grams 
v. Environmental Quality Council, 730 P.2d 784, 787 (Wyo. 
1986).  In Pfeil, we determined that, 
although Amax failed to mail notice of a proposed mine permit revision to an 
opponent’s current address, she was not deprived of notice because she “had 
actual notice, timely filed an objection, and did not make a request for a 
continuance.”  Id.  
The Hornungs and White Creek Ranch learned of the 
application, appeared at the public hearing, and submitted additional 
information to the Board.  Given they had actual notice of the 
proceeding and participated in it, they have failed to demonstrate prejudice 
even if they did not receive any required legal notice.  
Id. 6 
 
4.    
Procedural Due Process 

 
[¶61]   
The objectors claim the Board violated their right to procedural due 
process by accepting and relying on information Wasatch submitted after the 
public hearing without giving them reasonable notice and meaningful opportunity 
to be heard.  In particular, they take issue with their 
inability to respond to Wasatch’s assertion that the ISC 
staff had accepted their financial assurances and a post-hearing letter provided 
by Wasatch.  They also assert their due process rights were 
violated when the Board directed that a county employee provide information 
about the distances from the project to the Hornung and White Creek 
Ranch properties.     
 
[¶62]   
Wyo. Const. Art. 1, § 6 states:  “No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”  
Procedural due process principles apply in the administrative context and 
“require reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before 
governmental action may substantially affect a significant property 
interest.”  Pfeil, 908 P.2d  
at 961.  However, as the United States Supreme Court stated in 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972):  “Once it is determined that 
due process applies, the question remains what process is due. . . . 
[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as 
the particular situation demands.” 
 
[¶63]   
Section 18-5-506 mandates the procedure to be applied in WECS 
permit cases and required the Board to “hold a public hearing to consider public 
comment” and accept written comment for not less than forty-five days after 
determining that the application is complete.  There is no 
allegation that the Board failed to follow the statutory procedure.  
Although the objectors claim they should have had an opportunity to 
respond to submissions Wasatch made after the hearing, the statute did not 
require that.
 
[¶64]   
With regard to the objectors’ specific claims, we have already addressed 
the Board’s acceptance of Wasatch’s assertion that 
the ISC staff had accepted their financial assurance.  
As we stated above, that assertion was incorrect but ultimately 
unnecessary to the Board’s decision; consequently, the objectors’ inability to 
respond to it is irrelevant.  Wasatch’s 
post-hearing letter addressing the public comments at the hearing fell within 
the written comment period allowed by the statute, and the Board did not violate 
due process by allowing or considering those additional comments.  
Besides, the objectors also presented additional information after the 
hearing which is part of the evidentiary record.   

 
[¶65]   
Finally, the objectors claim their due process rights were violated when 
the Board directed a county employee to measure the distance from the project to 
the Hornung and White Creek Ranch properties and considered the 
information at the May 3, 2011, hearing where it granted the permit.  
They point to no legal authority prohibiting the Board from doing 
so.  Moreover, the results reported by the county employee 
were consistent with information Wasatch had already presented to the 
Board.  As we explained in detail earlier, the parties 
disagreed over where the one mile notification radius should be measured 
from–the project site or the leased land.  The measurements 
provided by the county employee did not change that underlying 
dispute.  The objectors have simply made no showing that their 
right to due process was violated or that they were prejudiced by the procedures 
employed by the Board.  See, e.g., Greene v. Wyo. 
Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 2009 WY 42, ¶ 39, 204 P.3d 285, 
296 (Wyo. 2009).  
            
  
 
B.   ISC 
Permit (Case No. S-12-0061)
 
[¶66]   
The ISC issued a permit to Wasatch for Pioneer Wind Park I 
and II under the Industrial Development Information and Siting Act, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-12-101through § 35-12-119 (LexisNexis 2010) 
(Industrial Siting Act).  NLRA and 
NLRF7 (hereinafter referred to as “the 
objectors”) challenge the ISC determination that Wasatch met certain 
requirements for a permit.  Section 35-12-109 (LexisNexis 
2010)8 set out extensive permit application requirements and 
stated in relevant part:
 
(a) An 
application for a permit shall be filed with the division, in a form as 
prescribed by council rules and regulations, and shall contain the following 
information:
 
            
(i) The name and address of the applicant, and, if the applicant 
is a partnership, association or corporation, the names and addresses of the 
managers designated by the applicant responsible for permitting, construction or 
operation of the facility;
 
            
(ii) The applicant shall state that to its best knowledge and belief the 
application is complete when filed and includes all the information required 
by W.S. 35-12-109 and the rules and regulations, except for any 
requirements specifically waived by the council pursuant to W.S. 35-12-107;
 
            
(iii) A description of the nature and location of the 
facility;
 
            
(iv) Estimated time of commencement of construction and construction 
time;
 
            
(v) Estimated number and job classifications, by calendar quarter, of 
employees of the applicant, or contractor or subcontractor of the applicant, 
during the construction phase and during the operating life of the facility. . .
 
            
(vi) Future additions and modifications to the facility which the 
applicant may wish to be approved in the permit;
 
            
(vii) A statement of why the proposed location was selected;
 
            
(viii) A copy of any studies which may have been made of the 
environmental impact of the facility;
 
            
(ix) Inventory of estimated discharges including physical, chemical, 
biological and radiological characteristics;
 
            
(x) Inventory of estimated emissions and proposed methods of 
control;
 
            
(xi) Inventory of estimated solid wastes and proposed disposal 
program;
 
            
(xii) The procedures proposed to avoid constituting a public nuisance, 
endangering the public health and safety, human or animal life, property, 
wildlife or plant life, or recreational facilities which may be adversely 
affected by the estimated emissions or discharges;
 
            
(xiii) An evaluation of potential impacts together with any plans and 
proposals for alleviating social and economic impacts upon local governments or 
special districts and alleviating environmental impacts which may result from 
the proposed facility. The evaluations, plans and proposals shall cover the 
following:
 
                        
(A) Scenic resources;
 
                        
(B) Recreational resources;
 
                        
(C) Archaeological and historical resources;
 
                        
(D) Land use patterns;
 
                        
(E) Economic base;
 
                        
(F) Housing;
 
                        
(G) Transportation;
 
                        
(H) Sewer and water facilities;
 
                        
(J) Solid waste facilities;
 
                        
(K) Police and fire facilities;
 
                        
(M) Educational facilities;
 
                        
(N) Health and hospital facilities;
 
                        
(O) Water supply;
 
                        
(P) Other relevant areas[;]
 
                        
(Q) Agriculture;
 
                        
(R) Terrestrial and aquatic wildlife;
 
                        
(S) Threatened, endangered and rare species and other species of concern 
identified in the state wildlife action plan as prepared by the Wyoming game and 
fish department.
 
            
(xiv) Estimated construction cost of the facility;
 
            
(xv) What other local, state or federal permits and approvals are 
required;
 
            
(xvi) Compatibility of the facility with state or local land use plans, 
if any;
 
            
(xvii) Any other information the applicant considers relevant or required 
by council rule or regulation;
 
            
(xviii) A description of the methods and strategies the applicant will 
use to maximize employment and utilization of the existing local or in-state 
contractors and labor force during the construction and operation of the 
facility;
 
            
(xix) Certification that the governing bodies of all local governments 
which will be primarily affected by the proposed facility were provided 
notification, a description of the proposed project and an opportunity to ask 
the applicant questions at least thirty (30) days prior to submission of the 
application;
 
            
(xx) For facilities permitted pursuant to W.S. 35-12-102(a)(vii)(E) or 
(F), a site reclamation and decommissioning plan, which shall be updated every 
five (5) years, and a description of a financial assurance plan which will 
assure that all facilities will be properly reclaimed and decommissioned. All 
such plans, unless otherwise exempt, shall demonstrate compliance with any rules 
or regulations adopted by the council pursuant to W.S. 35-12-105(d) and 
(e);
 
            
(xxi) Information demonstrating the applicant's financial capability to 
construct, maintain, operate, decommission and reclaim the facility.9
 
(footnote 
added).
 
[¶67]   
Section 35-12-113 stated the standards that must be satisfied for 
the ISC to grant a permit and provided in pertinent part:
 
(a) 
Within forty-five (45) days from the date of completion of the hearing the 
council shall make complete findings, issue an opinion and render a decision 
upon the record, either granting or denying the application as filed, or 
granting it upon terms, conditions or modifications of the construction, 
operation or maintenance of the facility as the council deems appropriate. The 
council shall not consider the imposition of conditions which address impacts 
within the area of jurisdiction of any other regulatory agency in this state as 
described in the information provided in W.S. 35-12-110(b), 
unless the other regulatory agency requests that conditions be imposed. The 
council may consider direct or cumulative impacts not within the area of 
jurisdiction of another regulatory agency in this state. The council shall grant 
a permit either as proposed or as modified by the council if it finds and 
determines that:
 
            
(i) The proposed facility complies with all applicable 
law;
 
            
(ii) The facility will not pose a threat of serious injury to the 
environment nor to the social and economic condition or inhabitants or expected 
inhabitants in the affected area;
 
            
(iii) The facility will not substantially impair the health, safety or 
welfare of the inhabitants; and
 
            
(iv) The applicant has financial resources to construct, maintain, 
operate, decommission and reclaim the facility.10
 
(b) No 
permit shall be granted if the application is incomplete.
 
(c) If 
the council determines that the location of all or part of the proposed facility 
should be modified, it may condition its permit upon that modification, provided 
that the local governments, and persons residing therein, affected by the 
modification, have been given reasonable notice of the modification.
 
(d) The 
council shall issue with its decision, an opinion stating in detail its reasons 
for the decision. If the council decides to grant a permit for the facility, it 
shall issue the permit embodying the terms and conditions in detail, including 
the time specified to commence construction, which time shall be determined by 
the council's decision as to the reasonable capability of the local government, 
most substantially affected by the proposed facility, to implement the necessary 
procedures to alleviate the impact. A copy of the decision shall be served upon 
each party.
 
. . . 
.
 
(h) For 
applicants subject to W.S. 35-12-105(e), a 
permit may be issued conditioned upon the applicant furnishing a bond or other 
financial assurance acceptable to the division in an amount determined by the 
director to cover the cost of decommissioning and reclaiming the 
facility.
 
(footnote 
added).    
 
1.    
Financial 
Assurance
 
[¶68]   
Sections § 35-12-109(a)(xx) and (xxi) and § 35-12-113(a)(iv) and (h) 
(quoted above) and § 35-12-105(e) (quoted in Paragraph 47, supra) 
addressed the financial assurance requirement for industrial siting 
permits.  After the contested case hearing, 
the ISC issued the following conclusions 
concerning Wasatch’s financial assurance evidence:
 
            
[T]his Council notes that Wasatch Wind did not attempt to establish its 
own financial resources to demonstrate it[s] ability to construct, maintain, 
operate, decommission and reclaim the facility.  Rather, the 
Applicant relied upon Edison Mission Wind’s financial capability to satisfy the 
financial assurance requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-12-113(a)(iv).  This Council is aware that Edison Mission 
Wind is not contractually bound to exercise its option to purchase the 
Projects.  The Council is further aware that these types of 
financing arrangements are standard in the industry.  
Nevertheless, considering the testimony of [Sanjay] Bhasin 
[representative of Edison Mission Wind], this Council finds that further 
assurance of financial capability must be provided before construction can begin 
so that the Council is assured that Wasatch Wind has actually obtained 
sufficient assurances of financial resources.  Therefore, the 
Council finds it necessary to impose Special Permit Condition #19 which requires 
sufficient financial assurances prior to construction.  

 
With 
that conclusion, the ISC granted Wasatch’s application 
for a permit, stating “with the imposition of the following conditions, . . . 
[t]he Applicant has the financial resources to construct, maintain, operate, 
decommission and reclaim the facility.”  Special Condition #19 
states:
 
Prior 
to the start of construction, Permittee shall provide evidence 
acceptable to the Council, upon recommendation of the 
Industrial Siting Division, that the Permittee has 
obtained sufficient financial resources to construct, maintain, operate, 
decommission and reclaim the facility.  If sufficient 
financial resources are not obtained within two years, the Permit shall 
expire.  
 
[¶69]   
The objectors claim first that the ISC erred by allowing 
Wasatch to provide the financial assurance through another party, Edison Wind 
Energy (Edison).  They insist the applicant must provide proof 
that it, alone, had the financial means to construct, maintain, operate, 
decommission and reclaim the facility.  The objectors made a 
similar argument in Case No. S-12-0060; however, resolution of the issue in this 
case requires more detailed analysis of the relevant provisions of the 
Industrial Siting Act.  Section 35-12-109(a)(xxi) 
required the application to include “[i]nformation demonstrating 
the applicant’s financial capability to construct, maintain, operate, 
decommission and reclaim the facility.”  In order to grant the 
application, the ISC was required to determine “[t]he applicant has 
financial resources to construct, maintain, operate, decommission and reclaim 
the facility.”  Section 35-12-113(a)(iv).   

 
[¶70]   
In accordance with our statutory construction principles, we start with 
the plain language of the statutes.  Section 35-12-113(a)(iv) 
does not state that the applicant cannot rely on other investors or partners to 
establish its financial capability and, in fact, refers to “financial 
resources.”  The plain meaning of “resource” is “a source of 
supply, support, or aid.”  Merriam Webster Dictionary 
426 (2005).  
Investors and partners are, obviously, sources of supply, support or 
aid.  If we were to interpret the statute as the objectors 
suggest, the applicant would have to show cash or other assets immediately 
available which seems untenable considering the scope and expense associated 
with wind energy development.  We see no distinction between 
allowing an applicant to demonstrate it has an investor and allowing it to show 
that it can obtain credit to conduct the requisite activities.  
Those are “financial resources” which can be used to construct, maintain, 
operate, decommission and reclaim a facility.  As we said 
earlier, the legislature’s intent with regard to the financial assurance 
requirement is to ensure that the project will be properly reclaimed and 
decommissioned.  Investors or partners can be resources to 
enable an applicant to comply with that legislative intent.  

 
[¶71]   
Additionally, the legislature directed the ISC to promulgate 
rules
 
designed 
to provide adequate assurance that the permitted facilities will be properly 
reclaimed and decommissioned at the end of their useful life, upon revocation of 
a permit authorizing their operation or upon the happening of any event which 
causes operations to cease. The elements to consider when establishing adequate 
levels of financial assurance shall include credit worthiness, financial 
strength, credit history, credit rating and any other factors that reasonably 
bear upon the decision to accept a financial assurance. The financial assurance 
may be in any form acceptable to the council and may include a corporate 
guarantee, letter of credit, bond, deposit account or insurance 
policy.
 
Section 
35-12-105(e).  This statute clearly indicates that adequate 
levels of financial assurance may include outside resources. 
 Although the financial assurance rules were not finally 
promulgated when the application was filed in this case,11 reading all of these statutes 
in pari materia in accordance with our standard 
of review convinces us applicants were allowed to provide financial assurances 
from outside sources.  The ISC did not err by 
allowing Wasatch to present its financial resources information through 
Edison.  
 
[¶72]   
The objectors next argue that even considering the Edison information, 
there was insufficient evidence to meet the financial assurances requirement, 
particularly adequate levels of credit worthiness, financial strength, credit 
history, and credit rating as required by § 35-12-105(e).  
Mr. Bhasin testified that Edison is a large company which 
produces power from different sources, including coal, natural gas and 
wind.  It is one of the larger wind energy producers in the 
country and, in recent years, had financed $879 million in wind energy 
projects.   
 
[¶73]   
Mr. Bhasin testified that Edison had entered into an option 
to purchase the project from Wasatch, and, although it intended to do so, it 
would not exercise that option until a permit had been issued.  
He testified, however, that Edison was not bound by its agreement with 
Wasatch.  The evidence also established that Edison was 
experiencing financial difficulties as a result of lower power prices and the 
need to retrofit some of its coal-fired power plants to meet environmental 
standards.  On cross examination, Mr. Bhasin 
admitted that Edison’s credit rating was a B- due to the coal part of the 
business and the company’s stock was considered to be “speculative” or “junk” by 
certain rating agencies.    
 
[¶74]   
Christine Mikell, Wasatch’s Development Director, 
testified that Wasatch’s goal was to develop the project, obtain the 
permit and find an investor or buyer.  She stated the process 
is standard in the wind development industry and, in fact, Wasatch and Edison 
had already developed a wind project in Utah using the same type of 
process.  Ms. Mikell testified that Wasatch had 
obtained a twenty-year power purchase agreement with Rocky Mountain Power to 
sell the power generated by the Pioneer Wind Park project.  In 
addition, she stated that Wasatch had already spent approximately $12 million 
developing the project, which included obtaining leases, the required surveys 
and analyses, a security deposit to Rocky Mountain Power for the power purchase 
agreement, and security deposits for the wind turbines.  
Edison and Wasatch also committed to post a surety bond prior to 
construction for decommissioning and reclamation of the project 
site.    
 
[¶75]   
The record, therefore, contained conflicting evidence as to whether 
Edison had sufficient financial resources and 
 the ISC had concerns about the fact that Edison 
was not “contractually bound to exercise its option to purchase the 
Projects.”  Consequently, it included Special Condition #19 in 
the permit and ruled that, with the condition, Wasatch was entitled to a permit 
under § 35-12-113.  Given the ISC did not find 
that the financial assurance evidence was sufficient at the time of the hearing, 
the dispositive question here is not whether there was substantial evidence to 
support a finding that Wasatch had sufficient resources, but rather whether 
the ISC had the authority to grant the permit subject to the 
condition that the permittee provide further assurances prior to 
construction.  
 
[¶76]   
Section 35-12-113(a) refers repeatedly to the ISC’s authority 
to condition permits, allowing it to grant a permit “upon terms, conditions or 
modifications of the construction, operation or maintenance of the facility as 
the council deems appropriate” and “as proposed or as modified by the 
council.”  The authority for imposing conditions is broad even 
allowing the ISC to impose a condition requiring the location of 
“all or part of the proposed facility [to] be modified.”  
Section 35-12-113(c).  Other provisions of the 
Industrial Siting Act also refer to permit conditions.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-12-106(a) (industrial facilities must be 
constructed in conformity with a permit and any terms and conditions of the 
permit); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-12-110(c) (other state agencies can recommend 
conditions to include in a permit).  Despite the numerous 
references to conditioning permits, the objectors claim the ISC was 
required to find that the financial assurances were in place prior to issuing 
the permit.12  If their argument 
were correct, the statutory language allowing the ISC to condition 
permits would be meaningless.  A basic tenant of statutory 
construction is that we do not interpret statutes in such a way to render any 
portion meaningless.  Stutzman v. Office 
of Wyo. State Engineer, 2006 WY 30, ¶ 16, 130 P.3d 470, 475 
(Wyo. 2006); K.P. v. State, 2004 WY 
165, ¶ 22, 102 P.3d 217, 224 (Wyo. 2004). 

 
[¶77]   
We have previously described the general purpose of the 
Industrial Siting Act as “to protect Wyoming’s environment and the 
social and economic fabric of its communities from the mischiefs 
resulting from massive, unregulated industrial development.”  
City of Evanston v. Griffith, 715 P.2d 1381, 1384 
(Wyo. 1986).  See also Industrial Siting 
Council v. Chicago and North Western Transportation Co., 
660 P.2d 776, 784 (Wyo. 1983).  In order to 
meet that purpose, the Act specifically allows the ISC to condition 
permits on a developer’s agreement to employ measures to mitigate the impacts of 
the project.  Id.  See 
also 
J. Van Baalen, Industrial siting Legislation: 
The Wyoming Industrial Development Information and Siting Act – 
Advance or Retreat? 11 Land & Water L. Rev. 27, 32-33 
(1976).  This is confirmed by ISC Rules, Chap. 1, 
§ 9 (1997):13  “The Council shall either 
grant or deny the application as filed, or grant it upon terms, conditions or 
modifications of the construction, operation or maintenance of the industrial 
facility as the Council deems appropriate.”  See 
generally Mule Shoe, ¶ 11, 252 P.3d  at 954 (discussing 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its rules).  The 
clear language of the statutes and regulations, therefore, allows 
the ISC to condition permits in order to protect Wyoming’s 
environment and the social and economic fabric of the communities.  

 
[¶78]   
In Laramie River Cons. Council v. Industrial Siting 
Council, 588 P.2d 1241 (Wyo. 1978), we addressed 
the ISC’s authority to condition permits, albeit under different 
statutory language.  The statute existing at the time gave 
the ISC options of issuing a permit with no conditions; issuing a 
permit conditioned upon the commencement of construction within a reasonable 
time; issuing a permit “conditioned upon specified changes in the application; 
or [] [r]ejecting the application pending further study” if the applicant was 
not able to demonstrate that the requirements for issuance of a permit had been 
met.  Id. at 1245-46.  The Laramie 
River Conservation Council claimed the ISC violated the statute by 
granting a permit for an electric plant with conditions which required further 
study and mitigation of social, economic, health, safety and welfare concerns, 
rather than denying the permit and requiring further study.   
Id. at 1250-56.  
 
[¶79]   
This Court rejected Laramie River Conservation Council’s argument that 
the ISC had to deny the application and require further study, 
stating Laramie River’s interpretation was contrary to the agency’s 
interpretation of its charge, the clear statute did not state that such denial 
was required, and Laramie River’s interpretation would deprive 
the ISC of its statutory discretion to grant permits with 
conditions. Id. at 1250.  We further held that the 
conditions did not act as an inappropriate substitute for the requirement of 
showing no serious injury to the listed interests.  Instead, 
“[t]hese conditions constitute an effort by the [ISC] to encompass 
remedies for contingencies within the application. . . which, if the conditions 
developed, could be relied upon by the [ISC] in the exercise of its 
authority and responsibility to monitor the operations.”  
Id. at 1251. This Court concluded, therefore, 
the ISC’s decision complied with the law and stated that granting 
the permit with conditions was “an appropriate way to resolve certain areas in 
which absent such a commitment the [ISC] might be concerned as to the 
potential for injury to the inhabitants . . .”  Id. at 
1255.   While the Laramie River decision did not 
address the financial assurance requirement, it can be interpreted as allowing 
permits to include conditions pertaining to the requirements for granting a 
permit under § 35-12-113(a).  We conclude, therefore, that the 
clear statutory language and our precedent allowed the ISC to issue 
the permit subject to the financial assurance condition.14  
 
[¶80]   
Special Condition #19 in Wasatch’s permit requires 
the permittee to provide, prior to the commencement of construction, 
evidence acceptable to the ISC showing that it has obtained 
sufficient financial resources to construct, maintain, operate, decommission and 
reclaim the facility.  Although the objectors claim the 
condition is not sufficiently definite, it clearly meets the mandate of § 
35-12-113(d) which simply requires issuance of “the permit embodying the terms 
and conditions in detail.”  By directing 
the permittee to provide adequate information and obtain 
further ISC approval prior to construction, Special Condition #19 
protects the state from the injury that could result if a permittee 
started construction and was financially unable to finish the 
project.  It also limits the amount of time 
the permittee has to comply by stating that if “sufficient financial 
resources are not obtained within two years, the Permit shall 
expire.”  By including the two year deadline, 
the ISC ensured the project would not be delayed 
indefinitely.  In addition, the permittee will be 
obligated under Condition #15 to furnish, prior to the start of construction, a 
surety bond or similar security of over $18 million dollars for decommissioning 
and reclamation of the project, thereby providing additional financial 
assurance.      
 
[¶81]   
Finally, the objectors suggest that due process is somehow thwarted by 
the ISC’s imposition of a condition and later determination outside 
of the contested case hearing process as to whether that condition has been 
met.  This argument is misplaced.  
The ISC is governed by the Wyoming Public Meetings Act which 
requires it to conduct all business in “public meetings, open to the public at 
all times.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(a) (LexisNexis 
2011).  Thus, the ISC’s ultimate determination as 
to the sufficiency of the permittee’s financial information will be 
made in public.  ISC Rules Chap. 2, § 4 allows 
persons to petition the ISC for a hearing on any “action, decision, 
order or permit.”  Sufficient process is, therefore, available 
to the objectors to contest a future ISC finding regarding 
the permittee’s financial assurances.  
 
2.    
Threat of Serious 
Injury
 
[¶82]   
Section 35-12-113(a)(ii) states: “the council shall grant a permit either 
as proposed or modified by the council if it finds and determines that . . . 
[t]he facility will not pose a threat of serious injury to the environment nor 
to the social and economic condition or inhabitants or expected inhabitants in 
the affected area.”  The objectors claim the ISC 
erred by determining that Wasatch had met this permit requirement.  

 
a.    
Affected 
Area
 
[¶83]   
The objectors assert that Wasatch did not properly study the “affected 
area” to determine the threat of serious injury.  The precise 
term “affected area” is not defined by statute; however, the ISC 
Rules provide insight into the meaning of “affected area” in the context of the 
risk of serious injury.  
 
[¶84]   ISC 
Rules Chap. 1, § 2 (1997) stated in relevant part:
 
 (b) 
“Area or local government primarily affected by the proposed industrial 
facility” means:
 
            
(i) Any defined geographical area or unit of local government or 
special district in which the construction or operation of the industrial 
facility may significantly affect the environment, population, level of economic 
well-being, level of social services, or may threaten the health, safety or 
welfare of present or expected inhabitants. 
 
(c) “Areas of site 
influence” means the areas which may be affected environmentally, socially, or 
economically, in any significant degree, by the location of the industrial 
facility at the proposed site. A separate “area of influence” may be considered 
for each resource identified in Section 7(i) of these rules.15
 
(footnote 
added).  
 
[¶85]   
Chapter 1, § 7 (1997) of the rules set forth the pertinent requirements 
for the application: 
 
Section 7. 
Application information to be submitted. In accordance 
with W.S. 35-12-109, the application shall contain the information 
required by the act with respect to both the construction period and online life 
of the proposed industrial facility and the following information the council 
determines necessary: . . . 
 
            
(b) A description of the specific, geographic location of the proposed 
industrial facility. The description shall include the following:
 
                        
(i) Preliminary site plans at an appropriate scale indicating the 
anticipated location for all major structures, roads, parking areas, on-site 
temporary housing, staging areas, construction material sources, material 
storage piles and other dependent components;
 
                        
(ii) The area of land required by the industrial facility and a land 
ownership map covering all the components of the proposed industrial 
facility.
. . . .
 
            
(g) The applicant shall identify what it deems to be the area of site 
influence and the local governments primarily affected by the proposed 
industrial facility as defined in sections 2(b) and (c), respectively, of these 
regulations. The immediately adjoining area(s) and local governments shall also 
be identified with a statement of the reasons for their exclusion from the list 
of area(s) or local governments primarily affected by the proposed industrial 
facility.
 
. . . .
 
(i)  
An evaluation of the social and economic conditions in the area of site 
influence. The social and economic conditions shall be inventoried and evaluated 
as they currently exist, projected as they would exist in the future without the 
proposed industrial facility and as they will exist with the facility. Prior to 
submitting its application, each applicant shall confer with the administrator 
to define the needed projections, the projection period and issues for 
socioeconomic evaluation. The evaluation may include, but is not limited 
to:
 
(i)            
Land use 
designation of the site location, including whether or not the use of the land 
by the industrial facility is consistent with state, intrastate, regional, 
county and local land use plans, if any. The analysis shall include the area of 
land required and ultimate use of land by the industrial facility and 
reclamation plans for all lands affected by the industrial facility or its 
dependent components;
 
(ii)          
A study of 
the area economy including a description of methodology used.
 
. . . .
 
(j) An evaluation of 
the environmental impacts. The items shall be noted and evaluated as they would 
exist if the proposed industrial facility were built. Each evaluation should be 
followed by a brief explanation of each impact and the permit issued that 
regulates the impact. If the impact is not regulated by a state regulatory 
agency or federal land management agency, the application must including plans 
and proposals for alleviating adverse impacts. Cumulative impacts of the 
proposed industrial facility and other projects in the area of site influence 
should be addressed separately.
 
(k) The applicant 
shall describe the procedures proposed to avoid constituting a public nuisance, 
endangering the public health and safety, human or animal life, property, 
wildlife or plant life, or recreational facilities which may be adversely 
affected by the proposed facility, including:
 
            
(i) Impact controls and mitigating measures proposed by the 
applicant to alleviate adverse environmental, social and economic impacts 
associated with construction and operation of the proposed industrial 
facility;
 
            
(ii) Monitoring programs to assess effects of the proposed industrial 
facility and the overall effectiveness of impact controls and mitigating 
actions.
 
ISC Rules, 
Chap. 1, § 9 (1997)16 governed the ISC’s decision and stated in 
relevant part:
 
(b) Threat of serious 
injury. In order to find that the industrial facility does not pose a threat of 
serious injury, the Council must find that the granting of a permit will not 
result in a significant detriment to, or significant impairment of, the 
environment or the social and economic condition of present or expected 
inhabitants.
 
            
(i) “Environment” shall mean the physical conditions existing 
within the affected area, including, but not limited to, land, air, water, 
minerals, flora, wildlife, noise, and objects of historic, aesthetic, or 
recreational impacts over which the Council has jurisdiction. 
 
            
. . . .
 
            
(iii) In determining whether the proposed industrial facility poses a 
threat of serious injury to the economic condition of the present or expected 
inhabitants, any net deterioration of a material nature in the condition of 
either present or expected inhabitants will be weighed negatively. “Economic 
conditions” may include, but is not limited to, the following 
factors:
            
(A) Upgrading of jobs and increased income;
 
            
(B) Family and per capita income;
 
            
(C) Unemployment and underemployment rates within the area of site 
influence;
 
            
(D) Purchasing power of earnings within the area of site 
influence;
 
            
(E) Short-term and long-term fluctuations in resource consumption and 
resource availability;
 
            
(F) Employment dislocation and skill obsolescence;
 
            
(G) Employment opportunities;
 
            
(H) Diversity of economy and stability of various segments of the 
economy[.]
 
[¶86]   
The ISC noted that the ISD “determined the area 
primarily affected is a polygon that includes the Project site, the 
municipalities of Douglas, Rolling Hills, Glenrock, Evansville, Bar Nunn, Mills 
and Casper and inclusive areas of Converse and Natrona 
County.”   The objectors seem to argue that this entire 
area should have been considered the “affected area” in determining whether the 
project posed a threat of serious injury to any of the interests addressed in § 
35-12-113(a)(ii), i.e., the environment and social and economic 
condition.  In other words, they argue that the area which 
must be studied for all interests is static and should have included the entire 
polygon identified as the area primarily affected by the ISD 
staff.  This interpretation ignores many other portions of the 
rules.  
 
[¶87]   
Chap. 1, § 2(b) defined area “primarily affected” as “any defined 
geographical area” “in which the construction or operation of the industrial 
facility may significantly affect the environment, population, level of economic 
well-being, level of social services, or may threaten the health, safety or 
welfare of present or expected inhabitants.”  This definition 
specifically listed the different interests that may be affected by a project, 
such as environment, population, economic well-being, etc., and indicated that 
they may have differing “affected areas.”  The provision also 
used the term “significant” demonstrating that each interest should be evaluated 
separately to determine if the project’s effect on that interest is 
“significant” or not.  
 
[¶88]   
Similarly, subsection (c) of Chap. 1, § 2, indicated that there may be 
separate “areas of site influence” for the various interests and, again, 
required a degree of significance to qualify.  Notably, that 
section also specifically stated that a separate “area of influence” may be 
considered for each interest or “resource” identified in Section 7(i), 
which included the social and economic conditions.  The fact 
that the definition of area of site influence differentiated between the various 
interests and required a significant degree of impact confirms that the 
pertinent area may change based upon the type of interest affected.  
There are material differences between environmental, social and economic 
interests. The environmental impacts will necessarily occur closer to the actual 
facility; while, the social and economic impacts may stretch further to 
populated areas.  The rules recognized the need to examine the 
interests individually to determine the proper scope of site 
influence.
 
[¶89]   
Section 7(i) required evaluation of the social and economic 
impacts of the project and directed the applicant to “confer with the 
administrator to define the needed projections, the projection period and issues 
for socioeconomic evaluation.”  This provision clearly allowed 
the scope of the social and economic evaluations to be honed to reflect the 
areas that are actually impacted.  Similarly, §7(j) provided 
flexibility in determining the scope of the environmental evaluation and 
referred to interaction with other agencies to determine such 
impacts.   Likewise, Chapter 1, § 9, which pertained to 
the ISC’s decision referred to significant or substantial impairment 
or detriment to different interests, confirming that impact should be evaluated 
in the area appropriate for that interest.  
 
[¶90]   
The clear language of the statutory and regulatory provisions did not 
require an evaluation of all resources over the entire polygon-shaped area 
identified as primarily affected by ISD.  It was 
appropriate for the ISC to allow evaluations of different affected 
areas for individual interests.
 
b.    
Environment
 
[¶91]   
The objectors argue the record does not contain substantial evidence to 
support the ISC’s determination that the project would not pose a 
threat of serious injury to the environment.  They claim 
Wasatch should have extended its study area for various types of wildlife, 
largely because Wasatch revised its application shortly before the hearing to 
move some of the turbines closer to the eastern boundary of its environmental 
study area.  The record shows that Wasatch consulted 
extensively with the Wyoming Game and Fish Department regarding the survey 
protocols, conducted  the surveys and presented them to 
the ISC as part of the permit process.  Wasatch 
also consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and, because of that 
agency’s concerns about raptors, it added additional 
surveys.    
 
[¶92]   
Richard Spencer Martin, the Senior Project Development Manager and 
in-house environmental expert for Wasatch, testified at the hearing regarding 
the wildlife surveys  conducted by SWCA 
Environmental Consultants.  The study area is identified on 
various maps in the record and included the area of actual development, together 
with additional areas depending on the species being studied.  
For example, golden eagles and raptors were studied in the project area 
and, on recommendation from the wildlife agencies, they were also studied 
outside of the project area—golden eagles by four miles and other raptors by two 
miles.  As a result of the surveys, Wasatch revised the site 
plan to avoid a high raptor concentration area.  The Game and 
Fish Department reviewed the revised site plan which showed the relocation of 
some of the turbines and indicated it did not change that agency’s 
recommendations.  Game and Fish Department representative 
Mary Flanderka also testified at the hearing and confirmed that the 
movement of the turbines did not mandate adding to the study 
area.    
 
[¶93]   
The objectors called Hamilton Smith, an ecologist with the environmental 
consulting firm, Biota Research Consulting, to testify at the 
hearing.  He stated that he had reviewed Wasatch’s 
application and other relevant documents.  He was concerned 
with the methodology employed by SWCA to monitor wildlife movement 
and habits.  For example, he indicated the raptor monitoring 
points should have been closer together, the study area should have been larger, 
and the surveys should have been conducted more evenly throughout the 
seasons.   
 
[¶94]   
The ISC was the trier of fact and, as such, had 
the responsibility to resolve issues of witness credibility and weigh the 
evidence.  See, e.g., Dorr v. Wyo. Bd. of Certified 
Public Accountants, 2006 WY 144, ¶ 33, 146 P.3d 943, 957 (Wyo. 
2006).  It sifted through the evidence and, specifically 
referencing the testimony of Martin and the Game and Fish representatives as 
support for its decision, stated that Wasatch had shown that the proposed 
project would not “pose a threat of serious injury to the environment . . . 
.”  With regard to the impact on the biological and wildlife 
resources in the area, the ISC rejected Mr. Smith’s testimony in 
favor of Ms. Flanderka’s.  As part of its determination 
that Wasatch’s project would not pose a threat of serious injury to 
the environment, the agency necessarily concluded the study area was 
adequate.17  Although the evidence 
was conflicting, the record clearly contained relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in 
support of the agency’s conclusion.  Dale, ¶ 11, 
188 P.3d  at 558-59.
 
c.    
Social and Economic 
Condition
 
[¶95]   
The ISC determined that Wasatch’s project “will not pose a threat of serious injury . . . to the 
social and economic condition or inhabitants in the affected area.”  
§ 35-12-113(a)(ii).  The objectors claim this finding 
is not supported by substantial evidence.  In particular, they 
assert the record demonstrates the project poses a threat of serious injury to 
property values and the historic use and preservation of properties adjacent to 
the project.   
 
[¶96]   
The ISD determined the appropriate study area for the 
socioeconomic analysis was Converse and Natrona counties, with inclusive 
municipalities.  Wasatch engaged Blankenship Consulting, LLC 
to conduct a socioeconomic assessment of its project which was included in the 
application, and George Blankenship, the principal of the firm, testified at the 
contested case hearing.  Mr. Blankenship studied the existing 
conditions and potential effects of the project on various socioeconomic 
conditions such as work force, land use, tax revenues, and public facilities and 
services.  He concluded the benefits of the project were 
significant, while the potential negative impacts were minimal and the project 
would not pose a threat of serious social or economic injury to the current or 
expected inhabitants of the area.  He did not, however, 
conduct an analysis of the impact of the project on individual property values 
in the area of the project.    
 
[¶97]   
The objectors called some area landowners, including Ms. Hornung, 
Grady Gaubert and Bret Frye, who testified that the project would 
adversely impact the view shed and, consequently, property values.  
Mr. Lay, owner of the White Creek Ranch, also testified on behalf of the 
objectors and stated that he believes the project will cause serious injury to 
his property, especially in light of the fact that it is listed on the National 
Register of Historical Places.  He further indicated the 
project would change the character of the area from recreational to 
industrial.    
 
[¶98]   
A real estate appraiser from Wisconsin, Kurt Kielisch, also 
testified for the objectors.  He did not appraise the affected 
properties, but he did prepare a property value impact report which was 
submitted as an exhibit at the hearing.   In preparing 
his report, he conducted a literature study about the perceptions of wind energy 
projects, including their effect on property values in different parts of the 
country and the world; reviewed the project; and surveyed eleven Wyoming 
individuals, including four realtors, four appraisers and three landowners with 
property near the projects.  He concluded that if the project 
were allowed, the highest and best use of the surrounding property would be 
changed from recreational to agricultural, resulting in a devaluation of 40% to 
71%.    
 
[¶99]   
During the rebuttal portion of its case, Wasatch called Neal 
Hilston, a Wyoming appraiser and real estate broker and one of the 
persons interviewed by Mr. Kielisch.  
Mr. Hilston stated that Mr. Kielisch’s report 
misrepresented some of the comments he made during the interview.  
He criticized the Kielisch report because it did not include 
analysis of wind projects in Wyoming or neighboring states, but relied, instead, 
on information from Europe and the eastern part of the United 
States.  Mr. Hilston also stated that he had 
actually appraised six or seven ranches that were located next to properties 
with wind farms and he did not see any effect from the wind farms on the values 
of the adjoining properties, although he admitted there was not much information 
available.    
 
[¶100] 
  The ISC determined the projects would not 
pose a threat of serious injury to the social and economic condition or 
inhabitants of the affected area.  It accepted 
Mr. Hilston’s testimony over Mr. Kielisch’s “regarding 
the effect of the wind farm on property values” because Mr. Hilston 
“was familiar with the unique characteristics of the residents of Wyoming and 
area surrounding the Projects.  Mr. Kielisch’s 
report was based upon information from areas distant to Wyoming.”  
The ISC properly weighed the conflicting evidence and 
determined that the evidence pertaining to property values did not establish a 
threat of serious injury to the economic condition of the area.  
There is substantial evidence in the record to support its 
determination.     
 
[¶101] 
The ISC 
also correctly kept in mind that the Industrial Siting Act is 
primarily “concerned with the question of acceptability of various impacts” 
and  does not require the virtual elimination of all 
impacts.  Laramie River, 588 P.2d  at 
1249.  That approach is made clear in the statutory provision 
requiring denial of a permit only if it will pose a threat of serious 
injury to the social and economic condition or inhabitants.  
Section 35-12-113(a)(ii) (emphasis added).  Likewise, the statutes and regulations did not include the 
effect on individual property values as one of the factors requiring economic 
analysis.  We recognized the community based focus of 
the Industrial Siting Act when we stated in Laramie River, 
588 P.2d at 1253:  “[The] 
Industrial Siting Council is to be concerned with the collective not 
individual welfare of the present and expected inhabitants.”  
While certain inhabitants may suffer a detriment because of the location 
of the project, the ISC decision “must be based upon a balancing of 
the interests of all the inhabitants of the area, not simply upon the interests 
of one segment of the inhabitants.”  Id. at 
1254.  
 
[¶102]  
Although individual property value concerns are not part of the required 
analysis, ISC Rules, Chap. 1, § 9(b)(iii) stated the ISC 
was not 
limited to the listed factors, meaning there was no legal impediment to 
consideration of such evidence in the particular way it was done in this case, 
i.e., considering it but not placing individual interests over the collective 
interest.  In fact, 
the ISC addressed the Hornungs’ view shed objections by 
attaching Special Condition #20 to Wasatch’s permit, requiring it to 
negotiate in good faith with the Hornungs to find a means to 
mitigate the visual and potential audio impacts of the project on them, such as 
using vegetative screening.  The ISC’s decision 
that the project would not pose a threat of serious injury to the social and 
economic condition or inhabitants in the affected area under § 35-12-113(a)(ii) 
was informed and is supported by relevant evidence a reasonable mind might 
accept in support of the agency’s conclusion.  
 
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶103] 
  In the Converse County case, Case No. S-12-0060, we 
agree with the district court that White Creek Ranch, as an adjacent landowner, 
has standing to appeal the Board’s decision because it asserted the project 
threatened its scenic views and wildlife habitat and migration, interests which 
are sufficient under Northfork.  We 
disagree with the district court regarding NLRA 
and conclude that it has standing through its members to appeal.  
NLRF, however, does not have standing; its claims are simply too 
general and speculative to separate its asserted injury from that of the 
general public.  We also hold that 
the arbitrary and capricious standard is appropriate for our review of the 
Board’s decision, given the administrative process was an informal public 
hearing.  On the merits, we conclude the Board did not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously by determining Wasatch had presented sufficient 
traffic study and financial assurance information.  In 
addition, the proper notifications were provided and the objectors were not 
denied due process of law.  We, therefore, affirm in part and 
reverse in part the district court’s decision in Case No. S-12-0060.  

 
[¶104]  
In the ISC case, Case No. S-12-0061, we conclude 
the ISC was not required to rely solely on Wasatch’s 
individual financial resources, but could consider the financial evidence 
relative to its proposed investor, Edison.  
The ISC also properly conditioned Wasatch’s 
permit by requiring additional financial assurance prior to commencement of 
construction.  The agency did not err in allowing Wasatch to 
evaluate different “affected areas” for the various interests identified in the 
statutes.  Finally, the record contains substantial evidence 
to support the ISC’s conclusion that Wasatch’s 
proposed facility will not pose a threat of serious injury to the environment or 
to the social and economic condition or inhabitants in the affected 
area.  We, therefore, affirm the district court’s decision in 
Case No. S-12-0061.  
 
 
FOOTNOTES
1In Case No. S-12-0060, the Converse County Board of 
County Commissioners is listed as an appellee, but it did not file a 
brief or otherwise appear.  In Case No. S-12-0061, Wasatch and 
the Industrial Siting Division (ISD) both appeared and filed 
briefs as appellees.  
2The ISD is a division of the Department of 
Environmental Quality and provides staff, oversight, technical advice, etc. for 
industrial siting.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-12-103, 
35-12-105, 35-12-110 (LexisNexis 2009).  The ISC 
is an appointed council which acts as the decision-making body for industrial 
siting.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
35-12-104 through106 (LexisNexis 2009). 
3White Creek Ranch also asserts standing on the basis 
that its buildings are on the National Historic Register of Places.  
It claims the project threatens its ability to “maintain” those 
buildings.  We fail to see the connection between the building 
designation and possible injury from the project.  It is not, 
however, important because we have already determined that White Creek Ranch has 
standing to protect its other interests.  
4The objectors claim that, in order to rely on it, the 
road use agreement had to be finalized before the application could be 
granted.  The clear language of § 18-5-503(a) and Resolution 
10-10 allows the county to require a road use agreement prior to construction, 
not prior to the permit being granted.  
5The objectors 
maintain the evidence was flawed because Mr. Bhasin stated 
the permittee would not need to post a bond prior to 
construction.  His statement seems to be a simple 
misunderstanding.  In fact, as Wasatch maintained, 
the ISC conditioned the permit by requiring 
the permittee to provide a bond or similar security of over 
$18,000,000 for decommissioning and reclamation before the start of 
construction.       
6The objectors 
also assert the mineral interest owner certification in Wasatch’s 
application was not accurate.  This assertion is made entirely 
without reference to any particular mineral interest owner who did not receive 
notice and there is absolutely no showing of prejudice to anyone.  
As such, we summarily reject it under 
Pfeil.
7Wasatch and 
the ISD do not contest the objectors’ standing in Case No. 
S-12-0061.  The Industrial Siting Act, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-12-111 (LexisNexis 2010) specifically allowed “any nonprofit organization with a Wyoming chapter, 
concerned in whole or in part to promote conservation or natural beauty, to 
protect the environment, personal health or other biological values, to preserve 
historical sites, to promote consumer interests, to represent commercial and 
industrial groups, or to promote the orderly development of the areas in which 
the facility is to be located” to be a party to the ISC permit 
process.  The provision was amended in 2011 to include 
agricultural groups.  Laws 2011, 
ch. 146, § 1, eff. July 1, 2011.   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-12-114 allows 
“[a]ny party as defined in W.S. 35-12-111 aggrieved by the final 
decision of the council on an application for a permit [to] obtain judicial 
review.”   See also, Laramie River Conservation 
Council v. Industrial Siting Council, 588 P.2d 1241, 
1246 (Wyo. 1978).
8The 2010 version of the relevant statutes applies in 
this case because the application was submitted and the hearing was held prior 
to the effective date of changes to some of the provisions in 2011 and 
2012.
9Section 35-12-109 
has since been amended by the legislature.  In particular, 
subsection (a)(xxi) was amended in 2012 to state: “Information demonstrating the applicant’s financial 
capability to decommission and reclaim the facility. For facilities meeting the 
definition of W.S. 35-12-102(a)(vii)(E) the 
information shall also demonstrate the applicant's financial capability to 
construct, maintain and operate the facility[.]” 2012 Wyo. Laws, Chap. 50, § 1, 
effective July 1, 2012.
10Section 35-12-113(a)(iv) 
was changed in 2012 to state:  “(iv) The applicant has financial resources to decommission 
and reclaim the facility. For facilities meeting the definition 
of W.S. 35-12-102(a)(vii)(E) the 
council shall also be required to find the applicant has financial resources to 
construct, maintain and operate the facility.”
11The ISC rules regarding financial assurances 
were adopted on May 31, 2011.  ISC Rules, Chap. 1, 
§§ 9(p), 10(d).
12Interestingly, the objectors do not seem to challenge 
the ISC’s authority to condition permits regarding the other 
requirements of § 35-12-113(a), including the environment, economic and social 
conditions, and health, safety and welfare.  

13Chap. 1 of 
the rules was revised, effective May 31, 2011, several months after Wasatch 
filed its application in February 2011.  
Compare ISC Rules, Chap. 1 (1997) and ISC Rules, 
Chap. 1 (2011).  This provision is currently found in Chap. 1, 
§ 12 (2011).     
14This holding 
also resolves the objectors’ argument that the ISC’s decision was 
arbitrary and capricious because it granted the permit in violation of § 
35-12-113(b) which states that “[n]o permit shall be 
granted if the application is incomplete.”  The objectors’ 
specific argument is that, because Wasatch did not provide the requisite 
financial assurances, the application was incomplete and had to be 
denied.  The record demonstrates that the ISD 
reviewed the application, issued a notice of deficiency asking for more 
financial information, and, after receiving Wasatch’s response, 
determined the application was complete.  The objectors equate 
a “complete” application with an application that should be granted.  
Clearly, the requirement of a complete application pertains to the 
applicant’s responsibility to provide all information requested by the 
application process; the ultimate decision as to whether the application meets 
the statutory requirements for granting a permit is, however, left to the 
ISC.  Otherwise, there would be no need for the 
two-step process.  Compare, § 35-12-109 and § 
35-12-113.  The ISC did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously by determining the application was complete, but imposing the 
financial assurances condition as part of the permit approval 
process.  
15The revised rules include the following definition 
which was not in effect at the time Wasatch filed its application:  
“(af) 'Study Area’ is the geographic and political boundary, as 
designated by the administrator for the required governmental, social, and 
economic studies required for applications.”  ISC 
Rules, Chap. 1, § 2(af) (2011).
16This provision is currently located at ISC 
Rules, Chap. 1, § 12(c) (2011).  
17To further protect the environment, 
the Wasatch’s permit includes Special Condition 
#16:
 
Before the start of 
construction of each segment of construction – Pioneer Wind Park I and Pioneer 
Wind Park II – Permittee shall provide the second year survey of 
wildlife to ISD.  The Director may authorize the start 
of construction of the segment on a favorable recommendation by the Wyoming Game 
and Fish Department.  . . .
 
In addition, Condition # 
5 allows the ISC to review any adverse social, economic, or 
environmental impacts from the project which were unforeseen when the permit was 
granted and require additional mitigation measures to address the 
impacts.  The record includes evidence about the formation of 
a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) which will include the wildlife 
agencies, DEQ, landowners and the permittee.  
The TAC will evaluate the post-construction monitoring data 
on an annual basis to determine if there are adverse wildlife impacts and 
develop appropriate mitigation measures if 
needed.