Case Title: Summit v. Continental

Citation: 

Docket Number: S097344

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 3/7/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
SUMMIT FINANCIAL HOLDINGS, LTD.,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S097344
v.
)
)
Ct.App. 4/1 D036868
CONTINENTAL LAWYERS 
)
TITLE COMPANY,
)
)
Orange County
Defendant and Appellant.
)
Super. Ct. No. 767157
                                                                                      )
The question presented by this case is whether an escrow holder owes a
duty of care to a nonparty to the escrow based on an assignment to that nonparty
by another nonparty to the escrow.  We answer this question in the negative.
The complicated factual background of this case will be presented more
fully below, but in brief, the question presented arises under the following
circumstances:  Dr. John Furnish, the maker of a promissory note secured by a
deed of trust on real property in Corona Del Mar, refinanced his secured
obligations by obtaining a new loan from a new lender, a portion of the proceeds
of which was to pay the earlier note in full.  Defendant Continental Lawyers Title
Company (CLTC) provided escrow services for the refinance transaction and was
instructed by the parties to the escrow to pay the note by issuing a check to Talbert
Financial (Talbert).  CLTC followed that instruction on closing of the refinance
2
transaction.  In this lawsuit, plaintiff Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. (Summit)
sued CLTC for negligence.  Summit contended that in the refinance transaction
CLTC should have paid the note by issuing a check to Summit rather than Talbert
because CLTC knew Talbert had assigned its rights in the note and deed of trust to
Summit.  Neither the assignor, Talbert, nor the assignee, Summit, were parties to
the escrow.  Nevertheless, the trial court, relying on Kirby v. Palos Verdes Escrow
Co. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 57 (Kirby), concluded that CLTC owed a duty of care
to Summit, and that CLTC breached that duty because CLTC, with knowledge of
the assignment from Talbert to Summit, paid Talbert rather than Summit.  The
trial court awarded judgment to Summit against CLTC for negligence, but the
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that CLTC owed no duty of care to Summit.
We agree with the Court of Appeal and affirm its judgment.
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND*
A.
The Loan
In August 1994 Furnish borrowed $425,000 from Talbert, and signed the
note payable to Talbert.  The note was secured by the deed of trust on the property.
Both the note and the payment book given to Furnish required him to pay the
monthly installments on the note to Talbert at Talbert’s Orange, California,
address.1
                                                
*
We adopt the Court of Appeal’s statement of the factual and procedural
background as part I of our opinion.  No party petitioned for rehearing to suggest
that the Court of Appeal omitted or misstated any material fact.  (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 29(b)(2).)  Brackets enclosing material (other than parallel citations)
denote insertions or additions by this court.
1 
Under the terms of the note, the first six monthly installments were
impounded.  Furnish paid three other monthly installments to Talbert in June, July
(footnote continued on next page)
3
At the same time the deed of trust was recorded, a document entitled
“Assignment of Deed of Trust” was recorded that assigned the beneficial interest
under the note and deed of trust from Talbert to Summit.  However, neither
Talbert nor Summit gave Furnish notice of the assignment, as[, according to
Furnish, was] required by Civil Code section 2937.2
B.
The Refinance
In September 1995 Furnish obtained a new loan from Dundrel Securities
(Dundrel) that was used in part to pay the note.  Furnish and Dundrel employed
Beverly Hills Escrow (BHE) to handle the refinancing transaction, and CLTC
acted as an escrow holder in connection with issuing the title insurance for the new
deed of trust securing the new note payable to Dundrel.  [Neither Talbert nor
Summit was a party to the BHE escrow or the CLTC escrow.]
CLTC prepared a preliminary title report noting (at item 6) that the property
was encumbered by a deed of trust securing the Talbert note, and that an
assignment of the note and deed of trust from Talbert to Summit had been
recorded.  BHE thereafter obtained a note payoff demand from Talbert specifying
the outstanding balance to be paid to Talbert to fully pay the note.  On
September 8, 1995, BHE forwarded Talbert’s payoff demand to CLTC and
identified it as the “Demand for item 6 on the Preliminary Title Report.”
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
and August 1995.  Other than the impounded amounts and these three payments,
Furnish made no payments on the note.
2
All statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
4
On close of the refinancing transaction, CLTC paid Talbert from funds
deposited with CLTC by Dundrel in accordance with the payoff demand and
BHE’s instructions.  Summit did not receive these funds from Talbert.
C.
The Legal Proceedings
In February 1997 Furnish filed for protection under chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.), and in April 1997 the bankruptcy
court entered an order for sale of the property free and clear of all liens.  The order
directed that the proceeds of the sale be used to pay the amounts owed the first
trust deed holder, Dundrel, and amounts owed to another secured creditor, and that
any purported liens on the property held by other parties, including Summit, would
attach to the remaining proceeds of the sale.
In July 1997 Furnish moved in the bankruptcy court for an order
disallowing Summit’s lien claim on the remaining proceeds from the sale of the
property.  Furnish argued the amount he paid Talbert in 1995 in the refinance
transaction fully extinguished Furnish’s obligations under the note.  He established
that he never received notice of the assignment of the deed of trust[, and he
contended that notice was] required by section 2937, subdivision (d), and [that]
under section 2937, subdivision (f), a debtor’s payment to the prior note holder
before receiving notice of the assignment pro tanto extinguishes the underlying
obligation.  The payment to Talbert therefore[, Furnish argued,] fully extinguished
the note.  Summit opposed the motion, arguing that (1) the recorded assignment of
the note and deed of trust was adequate to provide constructive notice of the
transfer from Talbert to Summit, and (2) in any event Furnish received a notice
that complied with section 2937, subdivision (d).  The bankruptcy court concluded
Furnish was not given the notice required by section 2937, subdivision (d) and the
5
payment to Talbert extinguished the note under section 2937, subdivision (f).  It
therefore disallowed Summit’s lien claim on the remaining proceeds for the sale of
the property.[3]
In this proceeding, Summit sought recovery from CLTC of the note
payment CLTC made to Talbert, contending that CLTC was negligent by making
the note payment to Talbert rather than to Summit.  The trial court concluded
Kirby was controlling and that CLTC owed a duty of care to Summit.  The trial
court further found that CLTC was negligent [and] breached its duty of care to
Summit, and [that] CLTC’s negligence was a proximate cause of Summit’s injury.
Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment for damages in favor of Summit
against CLTC.[4]
[The Court of Appeal reversed on the ground that Summit, being a stranger
to the escrow, was not owed a duty of care by CLTC.]
                                                
3 
[Both the bankruptcy court and the Court of Appeal assumed that section
2937 requires that a borrower be given notice of the assignment of the debt.
However, by its terms the section requires only that a borrower be given notice of
transfer of servicing of a debt on one to four residential units.  Commentary on the
Court of Appeal’s opinion raises the question whether section 2937 does apply to
assignment, as well as transfer of servicing, of a debt.  (See Bernhardt & Whitman,
Escrow (Cont.Ed.Bar 2001) 24 Real Prop. L.Rptr. 160.)  That is a question we
need not and do not reach here.  In this case, the borrower, Furnish, was found free
of liability by the bankruptcy court and the parties no longer dispute that issue.]
[4]
The trial court reduced the damage award sought by Summit because it
concluded Summit was contributorily negligent.
6
II.  DISCUSSION
“An escrow involves the deposit of documents and/or money with a third
party to be delivered on the occurrence of some condition.”  (3 Miller & Starr, Cal.
Real Estate (3d ed. 1989) § 6:1, pp. 2-3 (rev. 9/00); see Fin. Code, § 17003, subd.
(a).)  An escrow holder is an agent and fiduciary of the parties to the escrow.
(Amen v. Merced County Title Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 528, 534 (Amen); Rianda v.
San Benito Title Guar. Co. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 170, 173.)  The agency created by the
escrow is limited—limited to the obligation of the escrow holder to carry out the
instructions of each of the parties to the escrow.  (Vournas v. Fidelity Nat. Tit. Ins.
Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 668, 674 (Vournas); Schaefer v. Manufacturers Bank
(1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 70, 77 (Schaefer); Blackburn v. McCoy (1934) 1
Cal.App.2d 648, 655.)  If the escrow holder fails to carry out an instruction it has
contracted to perform, the injured party has a cause of action for breach of
contract.  (Amen, at p. 532.)
In delimiting the scope of an escrow holder’s fiduciary duties, then, we start
from the principle that “[a]n escrow holder must comply strictly with the
instructions of the parties.  [Citations.]”  (Amen, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 531.)  On
the other hand, an escrow holder “has no general duty to police the affairs of its
depositors”; rather, an escrow holder’s obligations are “limited to faithful
compliance with [the depositors’] instructions.”  (Claussen v. First American Title
Guaranty Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 429, 435-436; see, e.g., Vournas, supra, 73
Cal.App.4th at p. 674; Romo v. Stewart Title of California (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th
1609, 1618, fn. 9; Schaefer, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d at pp. 77-78; Axley v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co. (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d 1, 9.)  Absent clear evidence of
fraud, an escrow holder’s obligations are limited to compliance with the parties’
7
instructions.  (Lee v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1968 ) 264 Cal.App.2d 160, 162; 3
Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, § 6:26, p. 68.)  Here, even though the
escrow holder, CLTC, was aware of the assignment from Talbert to Summit, there
is no evidence CLTC was aware of any collusion or fraud in the fund
disbursement that would have adversely affected any party to the escrow.
However, because CLTC knew Talbert had assigned its rights in the note
and deed of trust to Summit, Summit contends CLTC breached both a fiduciary
duty and a tort duty to Summit by paying Talbert.  We conclude neither contention
has merit.
A.  The Asserted Fiduciary Duty:  Kirby
In contending that the escrow holder here, CLTC, owed a duty of care to
Summit, even though neither Talbert nor Summit were parties to the escrow,
Summit relies upon Kirby, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d 57.  In Kirby, the Pierces
opened an escrow with Palos Verdes Escrow Company, Inc. (Palos Verdes) for the
purchase of certain real property.  While awaiting permanent financing from the
Small Business Administration (SBA), the Pierces took out a short-term loan from
Universal Financial (Universal), which loan was secured by a second deed of trust
on the property.  Universal then assigned the note and the deed of trust to the
Kirbys, and the assignment was recorded.  After funds from the SBA were
deposited into escrow, Universal made a demand on Palos Verdes for payment of
the Pierces’ note, and the Pierces orally authorized payment.  Because one of its
officers had reviewed the title insurance policy on the property before forwarding
it to the Pierces, Palos Verdes had constructive notice of Universal’s assignment to
the Kirbys.  Nevertheless, Palos Verdes made the payment to Universal.  When the
Kirbys demanded payment from Universal and Universal failed to pay them, the
8
Kirbys filed suit against Palos Verdes on the theory it performed its escrow duties
negligently by paying Universal rather than the Kirbys.  The Kirbys prevailed in
the trial court, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.  (Kirby, at pp. 60-61.)
Kirby began its analysis by reviewing the familiar principles recited above.
(Kirby, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at pp. 64-65.)  However, after acknowledging that
the agency created by an escrow is limited to the obligation to carry out the
instructions of the parties to the escrow, and that an escrow holder is liable to the
parties insofar as it fails to carry out the instructions it has contracted to perform,
Kirby held that Palos Verdes was liable to the Kirbys, who were strangers to the
escrow, precisely because it did carry out the instructions of a party—the Pierces.
The rationale Kirby gave for this anomalous conclusion was that “[r]eceipt of
notice of the assignment was equivalent to the receipt of new escrow instructions
regarding the party to be paid.  (Builders’ Control Service of No. Cal., Inc. v.
North American Title Guar. Co. (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 68, 74 . . . .)  Such ‘new’
instructions conflicted with the Pierces’ verbal instructions to pay Universal.  This
conflict should have alerted defendant to a potential problem in paying Universal
rather than the Kirbys, and vice versa.  As the escrow holder faced with conflicting
instructions, Palos Verdes had the duty to delay payment of escrow funds until
such time as the proper payee was identified.  [Citation.]”  (Kirby, at pp. 65-66.)
As the Court of Appeal in the present case observed, Kirby appears to be
the only California case that holds an escrow holder can be liable to strangers to
the escrow for injuries allegedly caused by the escrow holder following its
principals’ instructions.  We agree with the Court of Appeal that Kirby’s analysis
for its novel legal conclusion is not convincing.  “Kirby’s holding rested on its
reading of Builders’ Control Service that (1) knowledge of an escrow holder that a
9
nonparty distributee of funds from the escrow has made an assignment of the right
to receive those funds is deemed an amendment to the escrow instructions by the
parties to the escrow, and (2) an escrow holder who follows the parties’
instructions rather than the ‘deemed amended’ instructions is exposed to liability
even though its principals suffer no injury from the fact the escrow holder
followed its principals’ instructions.  [¶]  Kirby’s holding is flawed because
Builders’ Control Service does not stand for either legal proposition.”
In Builders’ Control Service, a lender agreed to fund an owner-builder’s
construction of homes, and to ensure that the loan funds would actually be used to
pay the construction costs, the lender deposited the funds with the plaintiff fund
control agent.  The parties to the loan also agreed that the owner-builder would
assign the proceeds from the sale of the newly constructed homes to the fund
control agent as an additional source of funds to pay the construction costs.  The
defendant title company acted as an escrow holder for the proceeds of the home
sales, and, because it had received a copy of the assignment and had recorded it,
the title company knew that the owner-builder had assigned the proceeds of the
sales to the fund control agent.  Nevertheless, the title company assertedly made
deductions from the sales proceeds in violation of the terms of the assignment.
(Builders’ Control Service of No. Cal., Inc. v. North American Title Guar. Co,
supra, 205 Cal.App.2d at pp. 70-72 (Builders’ Control Service).)  In Builders’
Control Service, then, the question was whether the defendant title company,
acting in its capacity as an escrow holder and knowing that its principal had
assigned the sales proceeds held by it, was liable to the plaintiff fund control agent
for violating the terms of the assignment.
10
As the Court of Appeal in the present case correctly observed:  “Although
the Builders’ Control Service court concluded the escrow holder was obligated to
disburse the funds to the owner-builder’s assignee, the principles it applied have
no application to whether an escrow holder owes duties to a nonparty based on an
assignment made by [one] stranger to the escrow to [another] stranger to the
escrow.  The Builders’ Control Service court first noted that when a home sale
escrow closed, the escrow holder held the sales proceeds as agent for the owner-
builder principal.  The Builders’ Control Service court then cited section 2344 for
the rule that, when a principal has assigned funds to a third party, an agent for that
principal who comes into possession of those funds must surrender them to the
third party.  (205 Cal.App.2d at p. 73.)  Thus, Builders’ Control Service stands for
the proposition only that an agent’s obligation to disburse proceeds held by the
agent for its principal is coextensive with the principal’s obligation to disburse
those proceeds to the assignee.  [Fn. omitted.]”
We agree with the Court of Appeal here that “Kirby misread Builders’
Control Service.  Builders’ Control Service holds only that an agent’s knowledge
of an assignment by its principal obligates the agent to honor the principal’s
assignment [fn. omitted]; Kirby transformed that obligation, which is founded in
the law of agency, into a duty owed to honor contracts made by creditors of the
principal even though the escrow holder had no agency relationship with the
creditor.”  The Builders’ Control Service court did say that “receipt of notice [of
an assignment] is tantamount to new instructions.”  (Builders’ Control Service,
supra, 205 Cal.App.2d at p. 74.)  However, under the facts of that case, the
statement meant no more than that a party to an escrow may issue new instructions
to the escrow holder in the form of an assignment.  As the Court of Appeal here
11
observed:  “Kirby’s citation to Builders’ Control Service as holding that receipt of
notice of the assignment was equivalent to the receipt of new escrow instructions
regarding the party to be paid demonstrates Kirby’s misreading of Builders’
Control Service.  In the context of Builders’ Control Service, the agent’s receipt of
notice of the assignment could be deemed the equivalent of a new instruction
regarding the party to be paid because the assignment was made by the owner-
builder, a party to the escrow entitled to give instructions to the escrow holder.
However, Kirby transmuted that agency concept into a holding that transactions by
strangers to an escrow can supersede and amend the instructions given by the
parties to the escrow.  Nothing in Builders’ Control Service supports that
remarkable conclusion.”5
For the reasons stated, Kirby v. Palos Verdes Escrow Co., supra, 183
Cal.App.3d 57, is disapproved insofar as it is inconsistent with the views
expressed herein.
B.  The Asserted Tort Duty:  Section 1714, Subdivision (a)
In the alternative, relying upon section 1714, subdivision (a),6 Summit
argues the judgment against CLTC was proper because all persons are liable for
                                                
5 
Builders’ Control Service relies on two cases—Baumgarten v. California
Pac. T. & T. Co. (1932) 127 Cal.App. 649 and Roberts v. Carter & Potruch (1956)
140 Cal.App.2d 370—for the proposition that once funds in escrow have been
assigned, and the escrow holder notified of the assignment, the escrow holder must
observe the assignment.  (Builders’ Control Service, supra, 205 Cal.App.2d at pp.
73-74.)  Like Builders’ Control Service, both Baumgarten and Roberts involve
assignments by parties to escrows.  (Baumgarten, at pp. 653-656; Roberts, at pp.
371-372.)
6 
Section 1714, subdivision (a) provides:  “Everyone is responsible, not only
for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his
want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except
(footnote continued on next page)
12
injuries caused by their negligent conduct.  However, the threshold question in an
action for negligence is whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to use care
(6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 732, p. 60), and the
“[r]ecognition of a duty to manage business affairs so as to prevent purely
economic loss to third parties in their financial transactions is the exception, not
the rule, in negligence law” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998)
19 Cal.4th 26, 58).
In Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650, we stated:  “The
determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third
person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various
factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s
conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.  [Citations.]”
Applying the six-factor Biakanja test to the facts of this case, the Court of
Appeal concluded there was no reason to depart from “the general rule that an
escrow holder incurs no liability for failing to do something not required by the
terms of the escrow or for a loss caused by following the escrow instructions.
(Axley v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., supra, 88 Cal.App.3d at p. 9).”  We find the
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury
upon himself.  The extent of liability in such cases is defined by the Title on
Compensatory Relief.”
13
analysis of the Court of Appeal persuasive.  “First, the transaction CLTC
undertook was not intended to affect or benefit Summit.  CLTC was engaged by
Dundrel and Furnish to assist them in closing a loan transaction between Dundrel
and Furnish, and any impact that transaction may have had on Summit was
collateral to the primary purpose of the escrow.  Second, although the certainty of
injury element is satisfied because the evidence supports the conclusion Summit
did not receive the funds paid to Talbert, the foreseeability of harm element does
not support a duty because there is no suggestion CLTC could have foreseen that
Talbert would default on its obligation to disburse the funds to Summit as Talbert
had agreed to do under the assignment.[7]”  With regard to the moral blame factor,
compliance by CLTC with its fiduciary duty to follow the instructions of the
parties to the escrow was not blameworthy and is, instead, a policy consideration
that militates against concluding the company had a tort duty in this case.  Finally,
there is not a sufficiently close connection between the payment of Talbert and the
injury suffered by Summit to warrant imposition of a duty of care.  Although the
payment to Talbert was found by the bankruptcy court to have extinguished
Furnish’s obligation under the note, Summit’s injury was caused by Talbert’s
breach of its contractual obligation to Summit.
                                                
7
“In arguing for imposition of a duty, Summit emphasizes that CLTC knew
Summit was the assignee of the note and deed of trust and knew or should have
foreseen that payment to Talbert would injure Summit.  However, foreseeability of
financial injury to third persons is not alone sufficient to impose liability for
negligent conduct.  (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., supra, 19
Cal.4th 26, 57-58.)”
14
CONCLUSION
We decline to adopt a rule that would, by subjecting an escrow holder to
conflicting obligations, undermine a valuable business procedure, and we
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
BROWN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
1
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.
I join the majority in concluding that defendant Continental Lawyers Title
Company (CLTC) owed no duty, as a fiduciary or under the law of negligence, to
make the loan payoff to plaintiff Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. (Summit),
rather than to the original lender, Talbert Financial (Talbert).  I have signed the
majority opinion because I understand its holding as limited to this and similar fact
situations and, in particular, as not deciding whether an escrow holder might
breach its fiduciary duty to a party to the escrow by paying off, pursuant to
instructions, an original lender who had assigned and transferred the note and deed
of trust to another.
Under Civil Code section 2935, paying the outstanding amount of a loan
secured by a deed of trust to the original lender does not extinguish the debt if an
assignment of the loan has been recorded and the original lender no longer holds
the promissory note.  (Rodgers v. Peckham (1898) 120 Cal. 238, 242.)  As the
majority observes, the Legislature may, in Civil Code section 2937, have intended
to change this rule as to small residential properties and require personal notice to
the borrower, though that statute speaks only of transfers of servicing of
indebtedness, not of assignments.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5, fn. 3; see Bernhardt &
Whitman, Escrow (Cont.Ed.Bar 2001) 24 Real Prop. L.Rptr. 160.)  To the extent
2
the rule of Civil Code section 2935 stands unmodified, however, a borrower could
remain indebted to an assignee holding the note even after paying off the original
lender in full, and thus be liable for double payment or face foreclosure on the
security.  Where the misdirected payment is made by and through an escrow
agent, in the face of recorded notice of the assignment, the escrow agent might
well be held to have breached its duty to the borrower.  That such a misdirected
payoff were made pursuant to the escrow instructions—typically drafted by the
escrow agent itself or by the new lender, rather than by the borrower—would not
necessarily excuse or negate the breach.
In short, a borrower subjected to double payment of a loan because the
escrow agent paid the wrong party might be able to recover from the escrow agent
in the amount of the payment or other damages, even if the escrow agent was only
following its instructions.  In the present case, however, we need not face this
question, as here a federal bankruptcy court and the appellate court below held the
payment to Talbert extinguished the borrower’s debt, and the parties no longer
dispute that point.
Also properly left unaddressed in the majority opinion is Summit’s
perfunctory claim that CLTC is liable for violating Civil Code section 2941, which
governs the reconveyance of a deed of trust when the obligation it secures has
been satisfied.  Summit neither explains in what respect CLTC violated Civil Code
section 2941 nor cites record evidence showing a violation.  But Civil Code
section 2941 does provide for a title company’s liability under some circumstances
(see id., subd. (b)(6)), and the majority opinion, as I read it, does not preclude such
liability in a proper case.
3
I concur in the majority opinion, which correctly resolves the narrow
question presented by the parties to this case.
WERDEGAR, J.
I CONCUR:
MORENO, J.
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. v. Continental Lawyers Title Company
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 87 Cal.App.4th 1379
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S097344
Date Filed: March 7, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Orange
Judge: Raymond J. Ikola
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Wolf, Rifkin & Shapiro and Marc E. Rohatiner for Defendant and Appellant.
Billet, Kaplan & Dawley and Terry S. Kaplan for California Land Title Association as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Stephan, Oringher, Richman & Theodora, Harry W. R. Chamberlain II, Robert M. Dato; Robie & Matthai,
Edith M. Matthai and Pamela E. Dunn for American Insurance Association and Association of Southern
California Defense Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of  Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Doumani & Grandon, Grandon & Associates, Robert M. Grandon; Callahan & Blaine and Jim P. Mahacek
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Marc E. Rohatiner
Wolf, Rifkin & Shapiro
11400 West Olympic Boulevard, Ninth Floor
Los Angeles, CA  90064-1565
(310) 478-4100
Terry S. Kaplan
Billet, Kaplan & Dawley
1888 Century Park East, Suite 1700
Los Angeles, CA  90064-1565
(310) 478-4100
Harry W. R. Chamberlain II
Stephan, Oringher, Richman & Theodora
2029 Century Park East, 6th Floor
Los Angeles, CA  90067
(310) 557-2009
Robert M. Grandon
Grandon & Associates
242 S. Orange Avenue, Suite 202
Brea, CA  92821
(714) 257-9503
3