Case Title: Dunnegan v. Laramie County Com'rs

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dunnegan v. Laramie County Com'rs1993 WY 74852 P.2d 1138Case Number: 91-169, 92-88Decided: 05/20/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Gerald L. DUNNEGAN, d/b/a 
J & G Wholesale and Leo Holmes,

 Petitioners,

v.

LARAMIE COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS and Laramie County Sheriff,

 Respondents,

and

Leo HOLMES, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v. 

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

LARAMIE COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS; Laramie County Sheriff; and State of Wyoming, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

 Gerald L. DUNNEGAN, d/b/a J & G 
WHOLESALE and Leo Holmes, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court of Laramie County, Harold Joffe, J.

Roger McDaniel, 
Cheyenne, argued by Mr. McDaniel, for Gerald L. Dunnegan, d/b/a J & G 
Wholesale and Leo Holmes.

Roberta A. 
Coates, Cheyenne, argued by Ms. Coates, for Laramie County Com'rs and Laramie 
County Sheriff.

Michael L. 
Hubbard, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lawrence A. Bobbitt, III, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., for state of Wyo.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Leo 
Holmes was convicted of selling fireworks in violation of a county resolution 
regulating fireworks and assessed a $750 fine. An appeal was taken from the 
conviction, and a suit was filed seeking a declaratory judgment that the county 
resolution was unenforceable. The cases were consolidated. After argument in 
this court and remand, the trial court entered an order affirming appellant's 
conviction but vacating the $750 fine and affirming the county's authority to 
regulate fireworks. Laramie County appeals that part of the order vacating the 
fine.

[¶2]      These 
consolidated appeals present the essential question of the validity of a Laramie 
County Commissioners' resolution regulating the use, sale and possession of 
fireworks in Laramie County. In determining the validity of the resolution, we 
revisit the question of a county's authority to regulate in this 
area.

[¶3]      We reverse 
appellant Leo Holmes' county court conviction, and reverse in part and affirm in 
part the district court's April 30, 1992 judgment and 
order.

[¶4]      Appellant Leo 
Holmes and appellee J & G Wholesale present the following issues for 
review:

A. The language used in 
the Laramie County Resolution when read in conjunction with the provisions of 
the Wyoming fireworks act (W.S. §§ 35-10-201 through 207), (the "Fireworks Act") 
specifically W.S. §§ 35-10-201(a), 35-10-204(a)(iii) and 35-10-204(a)(iv) is 
ambiguous, inconsistent and unconstitutionally vague and violates the due 
process provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, Article 1, §§ 3 and 6, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

B. Did the District 
Court, in responding to this Court's Order Remanding Case for Consideration of 
Additional Certification filed March 20, 1992, exceed its subject matter 
jurisdiction to the extent that it went beyond the authority contained in the 
request on remand that it certify, or decline to certify, the threshold question 
set forth in the Supreme Court's Order of March 20, 1992? Alternatively, if the 
District Court acted within its jurisdiction, did the District Court correctly 
conclude that the County does not have authority to impose criminal 
sanctions?

[¶5]      The appellant 
Laramie County presents only one issue for review:

Does the grant of a 
police power for the protection of the health and welfare of the citizens of a 
county of the State of Wyoming necessarily include the right to carry such power 
into effect, and does it empower the county to use proper means to enforce its 
Resolution, subject to judicial review as to the reasonableness of such 
means?

[¶6]      On April 3, 1991, 
following a bench trial in county court, Leo Holmes was found guilty of 
violating the Laramie County fireworks resolution. Holmes timely appealed to the 
district court and, along with J & G Wholesale, filed a Complaint for 
Injunctive Relief in the district court seeking to enjoin the county from 
enforcing the county resolution in a manner contrary to its plain and ordinary 
meaning. For purposes of appeal to this court, the district court consolidated 
Holmes' appeal from his conviction with the following certified question from 
the civil action for an injunction:

Do the provisions of W.S. 
§ 35-10-201(a), and the provisions of W.S. § 35-10-204(a)(iv) when read and 
interpreted in conjunction with the Laramie County Resolution violate the due 
process provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1, Sections 3 and 6, and 
the United States Constitution, under the 14th Amendment, such that the 
resolution in its entirety is void for vagueness and the conviction must be set 
aside?

[¶7]      We heard oral 
argument on the certified question on December 10, 1991, and on March 20, 1992, 
we issued an Order Remanding Case for Consideration of Additional Certification. 
In that order, we asked the district court to consider the certification of a 
constitutional question to this court regarding the county's authority to 
exercise the police power of the State of Wyoming by resolution regulating the 
sale of fireworks in the county.

[¶8]      The district 
court denied additional certification and issued an order affirming the county's 
authority to regulate fireworks but denying its authority to impose criminal 
sanctions for violation of the county resolution. Laramie County appeals from 
the portion of the district court's judgment denying the county's authority to 
impose criminal sanctions. No cross appeal was filed challenging the district 
court's determination that a county may, under W.S. 35-10-201 through -207, 
regulate the use, sale and possession of fireworks. However, because the 
question of a county's authority to regulate the use, sale and possession of 
fireworks so closely relates to the county's authority to impose criminal 
sanctions, we take this opportunity to reexamine our prior decisions in 
Haddenham v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 679 P.2d 429 (Wyo. 1984) (Haddenham II) and 
Gueke v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 728 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶9]      In Haddenham II 
and Gueke, we held that counties possess the authority to regulate the use, sale 
and possession of fireworks. The doctrine of stare decisis requires adherence to 
established precedence. Burns v. Burns, 67 Wyo. 314, 224 P.2d 178, 183 (1950); 
Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 803-04 (Wyo. 1979). However, as a principle 
of policy, not an inexorable command, stare decisis does not create a mechanical 
formula for adherence to prior decisions and should not be rigid in its 
application. Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Wyo. 1992); Burns, 224 P.2d  at 
183. The principle reasons for disregarding the rule of stare decisis and 
departing from precedent are to prevent the perpetuation of error and "to 
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law." Cook, 841 P.2d  at 1353; see also 
Worthington, 598 P.2d  at 804.

[¶10]   This appeal presents an occasion 
when departure from precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious 
principles of law. To the extent they hold that W.S. 35-10-205 authorizes county 
governments to regulate the sale of fireworks not otherwise regulated by state 
law, Haddenham II and Gueke misstate the law. Continued adherence to this 
misanalysis of the law cannot be justified by a commitment to precedent and the 
doctrine of stare decisis.

[¶11]   Wyoming Statute 35-10-205 
states:

This act [§§ 35-10-201 
through 35-10-207] shall not be construed to prohibit the imposition by 
municipal ordinance of further regulations or prohibitions upon the sale, 
use and possession of fireworks within the corporate limits of any city or town, 
but no such city or town shall permit or authorize the sale, use, or 
possession of any fireworks in violation of this act. [emphasis added, brackets 
in original]

Our general 
rules of statutory construction are well settled. If the language of a statute 
is clear and unambiguous, we must abide by the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words used. Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo. 1988). Wyoming Statute 35-10-205 clearly authorizes cities 
or towns to adopt more stringent bans upon the use, sale and possession of 
fireworks, but it contains no similar grant of authority to counties. Our 
decisions in Haddenham II and Gueke ignore the distinction between counties and 
municipalities, both in the state statutes governing fireworks regulation and in 
well established definitions of the terms. The term "municipality" can never 
include a county government and they "should not be compared any more than 
apples and oranges, as it is fruitless." Gueke, 728 P.2d  at 172 (Macy, J., 
dissenting).

[¶12]   A municipality has been defined as 
a "city, borough, town, township or village [and] [a]lso [as] the body of 
officers taken collectively, belonging to a city, who are appointed to manage 
its affairs and defend its interests." Black's Law Dictionary 918 (5th ed. 
1979). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that "[i]n common parlance, and 
even in legislative and judicial language, the word `municipality' is applied to 
towns as well as to cities and incorporated villages." Miller v. Town of Jacobs, 
70 Wis. 122, 35 N.W. 324, 325 (1887); see also 27A Words & Phrases 527 et 
seq. (1961) and (Cum.Supp. 1991).

[¶13]   This Court outlined clearly the 
difference between a city and a county when we stated:

The line of distinction 
between corporations of a public character, such as counties, townships, and 
school districts, and municipal corporations proper, such as cities and towns, 
is clearly marked. The former class of corporations are subdivisions of the 
state for governmental and other public purposes, while the latter class is 
called into existence by the will of the people, within the limits expressed by 
petition, by vote, or by the representatives of the people in the 
legislature.

Board of Comm'rs 
v. Searight Cattle Co., 31 P. 268, 277 (Wyo. 1892).

[¶14]   Wyoming cities and counties differ 
in the functions they perform, the authority they possess, and in the way they 
are created. In his treatise on Wyoming local government, Professor Rudolph 
explains:

Counties, by reason of 
their state mandated responsibilities, serve as administrative arms of the state 
and must, therefore, collectively cover the entire area of the state. * * * The 
constitution provides that no new county shall be formed unless it includes 
property with an assessed valuation of at least two million dollars, nor shall a 
new county be organized unless it has a population of not less than 1500 
inhabitants.

E. George 
Rudolph, Wyoming Local Government Law 1-2 (1985). In contrast, cities are 
described as follows:

Courts state frequently, 
and almost ritualistically, that municipal corporations are creatures of the 
legislature and subject to its complete dominion and control. The proposition, 
of course, is equally applicable to counties and school districts, but it has 
its principal impact with respect to cities because there it is not so obvious. 
Cities and towns come into being through local initiative, perform a broader 
range of functions, and have correspondingly greater discretionary 
authority.

E. George 
Rudolph, Wyoming Local Government Law at 67-68.

[¶15]   Other authorities agree that 
counties and cities are distinct, and the word "municipality" refers to 
cities.

Municipal corporations, 
using the term in its strict sense, include, unless otherwise provided by the 
constitution or a statute, as a general rule, only incorporated cities, villages 
and towns. Counties, it is generally held, are not included * * 
*.

1 Eugene 
McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations, § 2.23 (3d ed. 1987) (citations 
omitted).

[¶16]   Further evidence of the 
legislature's intent to permit only municipalities to impose more strict 
regulation of fireworks can be found in the legislature's use of the terms 
"municipal ordinance," "city or town" in W.S. 35-10-205 rather than the term 
"governing body." Wyoming Statute 35-10-201(b) defines governing body as 
follows:

"Governing body" means 
the board of county commissioners as to the area within a county but outside the 
corporate limits of any city or town; or means the city council or other 
governing body of a city or town as to the area within the corporate limits of 
such city or town.

When the 
legislature has intended that enactments apply to both counties and cities, it 
used the specific phrase "governing body." See e.g., W.S. 35-10-203(a) 
(1988).

[¶17]   Wyoming Statute 35-10-205, in 
granting authority to enact more stringent regulations, does not use the term 
"governing body," but rather uses the terms "city or town" and "municipal 
ordinance." Our decisions in Haddenham II and Gueke ignored this distinction and 
erroneously read into the terms "city or town" a grant of authority for counties 
to also enact more stringent regulations. We hold that W.S. 35-10-205 does not 
grant counties the authority to enact more stringent regulations of the use, 
sale and possession of fireworks, and we overrule our decisions in Haddenham II 
and Gueke to the extent those decisions hold to the 
contrary.

[¶18]   Additionally, we find that W.S. 
35-10-203(a), 18-3-509, 35-9-401 through -402, and 35-9-301 through -304 provide 
no grants of authority, express or implied, allowing counties to regulate 
fireworks. As noted earlier, we accord to the language of these provisions its 
plain and ordinary meaning.

[¶19]   Wyoming Statute 35-10-203(a) reads 
in part:

Any governing body shall 
have the power to grant permits, within the area under its jurisdiction, for 
supervised public displays of fireworks by individuals, municipalities, 
amusement parks and other organizations and groups, and to adopt reasonable 
rules and regulations for the granting of such permits.

The language of 
this section is clear. It authorizes any governing body, i.e., cities, towns and 
county government to issue permits for public displays of fireworks and to adopt 
rules and regulations for the granting of those permits. This grant of authority 
is very specific, and the section's plain and ordinary language cannot be read 
to provide a generalized grant of authority to regulate, in addition to the 
granting of permits for public displays, the use, sale and possession of 
fireworks.

[¶20]   Wyoming Statute 18-3-509 authorizes 
boards of county commissioners to provide fire protection for persons and 
property within county boundaries, and enumerates specifically what a county may 
do in providing that protection. It makes no reference to fireworks or the 
regulation of fireworks, and no such grant of authority can be implied from the 
language used.

[¶21]   Wyoming Statutes 35-9-301 through 
-304 provide for the closure of areas of extreme fire danger. This authority to 
close or limit an area's use by the public is vested in the state board of land 
commissioners. W.S. 35-9-301. These provisions grant no regulatory authority to 
counties or county boards of commissioners.

[¶22]   Wyoming Statutes 35-9-401 through 
-402 provide for the appointment of a county fire warden and outline the county 
fire warden's duties. These provisions do not grant counties any type of broad 
authority to regulate the use, sale and possession of 
fireworks.

[¶23]   A county is a political subdivision 
of the state, created to aid in the administration of government. State v. Bd. 
of County Comm'rs, 642 P.2d 456, 457 (Wyo. 1982). The county enforces state 
statutes and laws. It does not enact laws. A municipality may, on the other 
hand, enact ordinances with criminal penalties which it enforces through its 
police departments and municipal courts. As an arm of the state, the county has 
only those powers expressly granted by the constitution or statutory law or 
reasonably implied from powers granted. Id.; Hyde v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 47 Wyo. 
101, 31 P.2d 75, 77 (1934). Thus, counties enforce state statutes regulating 
fireworks but may not enact laws providing criminal penalties for such 
regulation. 

[¶24]   The 1993 legislature seemingly 
recognized that W.S. 35-10-205 granted no authority to counties to regulate 
fireworks when, during the 1993 legislative session, it amended W.S. 35-10-205 
to now provide:

     This act shall not be 
construed to prohibit the imposition by municipal ordinances or county 
resolution of further regulations or prohibitions upon the sale, use and 
possession of fireworks within the corporate limits of any city or town, nor 
shall this act be construed to prohibit the imposition by any county of further 
regulations or prohibitions upon the sale, use and possession of fireworks 
within the borders of the county and outside the corporate limits of any city or 
town, but no such city, town or county shall permit or authorize the 
sale, use or possession of any fireworks in violation of this act. [emphasis 
added]

[¶25]   We decline comment upon the effect 
of the amendment except to note that it provides further evidence that W.S. 
35-10-205, in effect when the Laramie County fireworks resolution was drafted, 
did not authorize counties to regulate the use, sale or possession of fireworks. 
Therefore, we must declare the Laramie County fireworks resolution 
invalid.

[¶26]   We reverse the conviction of Leo 
Holmes under the county resolution and reverse the district court's judgment to 
the extent it upheld the authority of the county to regulate the use, sale or 
possession of fireworks.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶27]   I must dissent from the disposition 
of this case made in the majority opinion. The majority has gone too far afield 
in endeavoring to overrule Haddenham v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Carbon County, 
679 P.2d 429 (Wyo. 1984), and Gueke v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Teton County, 
728 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1986). The majority opinion departs so far from the issues 
presented in this controversy as to create an advisory opinion. Our 
jurisprudential rule is that we do not furnish advisory opinions. E.g., Wyoming 
Health Services, Inc. v. Deatherage, 773 P.2d 156 (Wyo. 1989); State Bd. of 
Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 745 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1987); Brad Ragan Tire 
Co. v. Gearhart Indus., 744 P.2d 1125 (Wyo. 1987); Graham v. Wyoming Peace 
Officer Standards and Training Comm'n., 737 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 1987); Kurpjuweit v. 
Northwestern Dev. Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1985); Reno Livestock Corp. v. 
Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), 638 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1981); Knudson v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1976); Wallace v. Casper Adjustment Serv., 500 P.2d 72 (Wyo. 1972). 
Cf. Tobin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1975); Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726 
(Wyo. 1975); West v. Willey, 453 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1969).

[¶28]   The appeal by Holmes and J & G 
Wholesale to this court presented issues relating only to unconstitutional 
vagueness in violation of the due process provisions of the Wyoming Constitution 
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The 
district court specifically refused to certify to this court the question of the 
authority of the county commissioners to regulate fireworks. The appeal of 
Laramie County assumes the existence of authority, and it merely attacks the 
ruling of the district court that Laramie County had no authority to impose 
sanctions for violation of its regulation. Using these issues as a premise for 
overruling prior case law is peculiarly ill-advised. It may be that, in a proper 
case, it would be appropriate to reconsider the question of authority of the 
counties to regulate fireworks, but this is not such a 
case.

[¶29]   I also think the Legislature should 
reconsider the amendment to Wyo. Stat. § 35-10-205 adopted in Ch. 141, 1993 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws. If the majority correctly has overruled Haddenham and Gueke, I 
cannot discern any authorization to the counties to regulate in the amended 
statute. A statement that the statute does not prohibit the imposition of 
further regulation or prohibition by county resolution is not an appropriate way 
to grant authority to the counties to exercise the police power. Such authority 
should be extended affirmatively and doing so by virtue of a negative pregnant 
does not suffice.