Case Title: State of Florida v. John H. Carter

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC95-605

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC95605
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN H. CARTER,
Respondent.
[December 5, 2002]
QUINCE, J.
We have for review Carter v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1063 (Fla. 1st DCA
April 30, 1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with Schwartz v. State, 719
So. 2d 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), and Strunk v. State, 728 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1999).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  Because the
district court in Carter applied a per se rule to the question of whether the failure to
file a single monthly report constitutes a substantial violation of probation, we
quash and remand for reconsideration not inconsistent with this opinion.  Although
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the First District's decision may ultimately be correct, we reject any per se rule that
the failure to file a single report may never justify probation revocation.
After pleading nolo contendere to aggravated battery, trespass, and
misdemeanor stalking, John H. Carter (Carter) was sentenced in 1997 to nine
months in jail followed by two years of probation.  Thereafter, the State filed an
affidavit for violation of probation charging Carter with five violations, including
failure to file a report for the month of February 1998.  He was found not guilty of
all violations except the failure to file the report; Carter admitted that violation.  The
trial court revoked Carter’s probation and sentenced him to 54.9 months in state
prison.
On appeal the First District Court of Appeal, relying on its earlier precedent,
held that failure to file a single monthly report does not by itself constitute a
substantial violation of probation.  See Moore v. State, 632 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1994);  accord Sanders v. State, 675 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).  The
First District acknowledged that its decision was in conflict with the decision by the
Fourth District in Schwartz v. State, 719 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).  This
petition for discretionary review followed. 
The State argues that the failure to file a single monthly report by itself may
be a proper basis for revocation as was held in Schwartz and Strunk.  We hold that
1   Recently, in State v. Meeks, 789 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 2001), we held, under the
youthful offender sentencing scheme, that only a new criminal offense constitutes a
substantive violation of probation or community control.  Under section 958.14,
Florida Statutes (1995), the trial court must determine whether the offender has
committed a technical or substantive violation.  However, under the general sentencing
scheme pertaining to this defendant, the question for the trial court is whether there has
been a willful and substantial violation of the terms and conditions of probation.
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failure to file a single monthly report may, in certain circumstances, justify
probation revocation if such failure is willful and substantial and supported by the
greater weight of the evidence.  See Hightower v. State, 529 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1988).1  
In the instant case, the district court improperly applied a per se rule when it
relied on Moore and Sanders in reaching its conclusion that the failure to file a
single monthly report as a matter of law is not a substantial violation, and thus not
sufficient to justify a probation revocation.  Such a holding means that under no
circumstances could a failure to file a single report justify a revocation of probation. 
Such a per se rule strips the trial court of its obligation to assess any alleged
violations in the context of a defendant’s case.  Trial courts must consider each
violation on a case-by-case basis for a determination of whether, under the facts
and circumstances, a particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported
by the greater weight of the evidence.  In other words, the trial court must review
the evidence to determine whether the defendant has made reasonable efforts to
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comply with the terms and conditions of his or her probation.  See Thorpe v. State,
642 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Stevens v. State, 599 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1992).  
We agree with Judge Letts’ statements in his specially concurring opinion in
Davis v. State, 474 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (Letts, J., specially
concurring), that probation reports are not merely technical niceties and the failure
to report is a serious violation of the privilege of probation.  The probation system
operates under a tremendous workload.  In order to maintain its effectiveness, all
participants, including the defendants, must comply with the requirements imposed
upon them.  Failure to enforce the reporting requirements undermines the system
and the practical consequence is no control, no supervision, and no probation.  
However, the application of these principles does not mean failure to comply
in every instance is, a fortiori, a willful and substantial violation justifying
revocation.  Indeed, the initial decision to place someone on probation is a serious
matter and is made by the trial court only after careful consideration.  Likewise, the
decision to revoke that probation should be made with no less care, and only when
the probation violation is both willful and substantial so as to indicate that probation
will not work for that defendant.  There may be circumstances where  revocation is
patently unfair.  For example, in Hightower v. State, 529 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA
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1988), the record was not clear as to whether the defendant was informed that he
had the duty to file a report, and in Jordan v. State, 412 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2d DCA
1982), the defendant filed three reports late because he was in the hospital. 
However, there are also circumstances where failure to file a single report may be a
willful and substantial violation which would justify revocation.  In Schwartz, the
defendant argued that he did not file his monthly probation report because he was
in an accident.  The evidence showed that the defendant went to work after the
accident, during the time he claimed to be incapacitated.  The defendant’s failure to
comply with the terms of probation was a blatant disregard of his probation
obligations and the revocation was found to be justified.
These cases demonstrate why it makes sense to allow the trial court the
discretion to weigh each situation without the mandates of a bright line rule
requiring revocation or preventing it.  The trial court is in a better position to
identify the probation violator’s motive, intent, and attitude and assess whether the
violation is both willful and substantial.  
Carter filed his report late on purpose (which may constitute willful
behavior), but he states that he did so because he wished to appear before the court
to discuss his ability to make restitution.  When he attempted to get help from the
public defender’s office, he said they gave him the runaround.  A friend told him to
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stop reporting, that he would then be in violation and would have to appear before
the court, at which time he could address the issue of restitution.  Although the
probation officer may not have realized the consequences of her discussion with
the defendant, she apparently tacitly endorsed this method.  The probation officer
testified that she told Carter that in order for a probationer to get back before the
court, he or she would need either to get a public defender or violate probation. 
Since Carter felt he got the runaround from the public defender’s office, he then
intentionally violated his probation by failing to file his report.  Whether these
actions rise to the level necessary to justify revocation is within the province of the
trial court to determine.  The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether
there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether
such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence.  See
Van Wagner v. State, 677 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Harris v. State, 610 So.
2d 36 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).  The trial court in this case weighed the evidence and
determined that Carter’s conduct warranted revocation.
On appeal from the trial court’s decision on the issue, the standard of review
is abuse of discretion.  See Bell v. State, 643 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994);
Steiner v. State, 604 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).  That is, the appellate court
must determine whether or not the trial court acted in an arbitrary, fanciful or
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unreasonable manner in determining that Carter's violation was both willful and
substantial.  See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).  In this case,
the First District's opinion states only that a single failure to file could not trigger
revocation.  Because we reject any per se rule that the failure to file a single report
can never, alone, be a substantial violation so as to preclude revocation, we quash
the First District's decision and remand this case for reconsideration consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, WELLS, and LEWIS, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.  In my opinion, a failure to file a single monthly
probation report, by itself, cannot serve as the basis for the revocation of
probation.  Therefore, I would affirm the First District's decision in Carter v. State,
24 Fla. L. Weekly D1063 (Fla. 1st DCA Apr. 30, 1999).  
Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1997), provides for the revocation of
probation and states:
Whenever within the period of probation or community control
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there are reasonable grounds to believe that a probationer or offender
in community control has violated his or her probation or community
control in a material respect, any law enforcement officer who is aware
of the probationary or community control status of the probationer or
offender in community control or any parole or probation supervisor
may arrest or request any county or municipal law enforcement officer
to arrest such probationer or offender without warrant wherever found
and forthwith return him or her to the court granting such probation or
community control. . . . The court, upon the probationer or offender
being brought before it, shall advise him or her of such charge of
violation and, if such charge is admitted to be true, may forthwith
revoke, modify, or continue the probation or community control or
place the probationer into a community control program.   
(Emphasis supplied.)  
The Florida Legislature has chosen not to define which violations are
"material."  Accordingly, under the well established principles of statutory
construction, this Court must give the term "material" its plain and ordinary
meaning.  See Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992)  This plain and
ordinary meaning may be determined by reference to a dictionary definition.  See
id.  "Material" is defined as "significant" or "essential," Black's Law Dictionary 991
(7th ed. 1999), or as "having real importance or great consequence."  Merriam
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 717 (10th ed. 1996).  Although the failure to submit
one monthly report is certainly a violation of probation, I cannot agree with the
majority that this single failure, by itself, could ever be significant or essential. 
Therefore, in the absence of legislative action to clarify which probation violations
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are "material," I would follow those district courts that have held that this type of
isolated technical probation violation does not rise to the level of a revocable
violation.  See e.g., Butler v. State, 775 So. 2d 320, 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000);
Sanders v. State, 675 So. 2d 665, 665-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (citing Glenn v.
State, 558 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)); Moore v. State, 632 So. 2d 199, 199
(Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Moreover, today's majority decision gives little guidance to the trial courts as
to when the failure to file a single report, standing alone, would be considered a
material violation of probation warranting revocation.  Further, the appellate
standard of review of abuse of discretion provides little to no guidance to the
appellate courts as to where the line of demarcation should be.  This lack of
guidance raises the real possibility that whether probation is revoked for failure to
file a single report will not depend on an objective standard but on the philosophy
of the individual judge.  Given that the consequence of the decision in many cases
will be a considerable period of incarceration, applying a per se rule that the failure
to file a single monthly probation report without more cannot serve as the basis for
the revocation of probation is the better course in this limited circumstance.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
First District - Case No. 1D98-2881
(Escambia County)
Richard E. Doran, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief,
Criminal Appeals, and Karla D. Ellis, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Petitioner
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent