Case Title: In re Chittenden Solid Waste District

Citation: 163 Vt 185, 657 A.2d 197

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN_RE_CHITTENDEN_SOLID_WASTE_DIST.94-223; 163 Vt 185; 657 A.2d 197

[Filed 20-Jan-1995]


NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont
Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any
errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to
press. 


                                 No. 94-223


In re Chittenden Solid Waste                      Supreme Court
District
                                                  On Appeal from
                                                   Chittenden Superior Court

                                                  November Term, 1994


Merideth Wright, J.

Michael L. Burak, Brian J. Sullivan and Robert I. Goetz of Burak & Anderson
and Joseph E. Frank of Paul, Frank & Collins, Inc., Burlington, for
plaintiff-appellant 

Dennis R. Pearson, Charles T. Shea and Robert F. O'Neill of Gravel and Shea,
for defendant-appellee 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     ALLEN, C.J.   Chittenden Solid Waste District (CSWD) appeals from a
decision of the Chittenden Superior Court dismissing a petition for
condemnation of land owned by the appellee, Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Company
(HS&G).  We reverse. 

     CSWD is a union municipal district organized in 1987 under 24 V.S.A.
 4861-4868. It sought to condemn property in Williston owned by HS&G and
used to supply sand for its sand blending and supply business in Hinesburg. 
CSWD filed its superior court petition pursuant to 24 V.S.A. chapter 61,
subchapter 13 in August 1992, detailing facts supporting necessity for a
landfill site and reviewing numerous factors underlying its decision to seek
condemnation of HS&G's property.  The petition recited that: 

       On June 30, 1992, CSWD held a public hearing pursuant to 24
       V.S.A.  2299c(b), for the purpose of receiving suggestions and
       recommendations from the public regarding the acquisition of the
       Subject Property and the Related Interests by eminent domain.
       CSWD's Board of Commissioners considered these suggestions
       and recommendations at a special meeting held pursuant to 24
       V.S.A.  2299c(a).  At this meeting, CSWD's Board of

 

       Commissioners adopted a resolution setting forth the necessity for
       the taking and the compensation to be paid.

HS&G filed an objection to the petition, and after extensive discovery, CSWD
moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that it had complied with all of
the eminent domain prerequisites. The court did not rule on the motion but
instead conducted a nine-day evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
CSWD Board had considered the statutory factors, particularly the "least
inconvenience and expense" to the landowner, within the meaning of 24 V.S.A.
 2299b(1), which sets forth the elements of necessity.  The court did not
address the merits of CSWD's necessity case. 

     At the completion of these hearings, the court concluded that CSWD's
resolution "did not address the valuation criterion of  2299b(2) of
business losses to the landowner," did not determine whether and to what
extent HS&G's business yield would be proximately lessened by the
condemnation, and "failed to set forth the compensation to be paid in the
resolution adopted on June 30, 1992, as required in  2299c(a) when read
together with  2299b(2) and 2299f." The court dismissed CSWD's petition,
and the present appeal followed. 

     The central issue on appeal is whether the court was authorized to
consider substantive compliance by the CSWD Board with pre-condemnation
requirements under the Landfill Condemnation Statute, 24 V.S.A. 
2299c-2299d.  Except for determining that a condemnor has in fact met the
procedural requirements for filing a condemnation petition (such as whether
the meeting was conducted in accordance with the public notice and other
requirements of  2299c(b)), the court lacked authority to dismiss the
petition based on whether the petitioner had adequately considered the
statutory factors in seeking condemnation or in setting forth the
compensation to be paid, within the meaning of  2299c(a).  Hence, the scope
of the court's proceeding was beyond its statutory authority, and its
resultant order was invalid. 

     A Vermont solid waste district begins the condemnation process by
holding a public hearing to consider both necessity and compensation.  24
V.S.A.  2299c(b).  Section 2299c(b) 

 

is clear on its face that the purpose of the hearing is limited and does not
reach the merits of necessity or damages, which the superior court determines
at a full evidentiary hearing. 24 V.S.A.  2299d-k.  The  2299c(b)
hearing is conducted by the solid waste district's board of commissioners,
which has no judicial or quasi-judicial functions but acts in an executive
capacity, to "hear and consider all objections, suggestions for changes and
recommendations made by any person interested."  Id.  2299c(b). 

     In State Highway Bd. v. Coburn, 125 Vt. 513,