Case Title: Hill v. Mayall

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-65

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hill v. Mayall1994 WY 144886 P.2d 1188Case Number: 94-65Decided: 12/14/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
William R. HILL and 
Melanie F. Hill,

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Justin K. 
MAYALL,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from The District 
Court, Fremont County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

 

F.M. Andrews, 
Jr. of Andrews and Anderson, P.C., Riverton, for 
appellants.

Thomas M. Hogan, 
Casper, for appellee.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellants appeal 
the grant of a motion for summary judgment in an action to enforce two 
promissory notes. The first of the two notes was collateralized by a mortgage 
signed by both appellants. Appellants maintain that appellee's action on both 
notes is time barred and that there is a material issue of fact as to whether 
the first note was secured by a mortgage.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellants and 
appellee state the following issues:

1. Did the court err in 
denying defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the bar of the 
new statute of limitations, § 34.1-3-118, W.S. 1977?

2. Did the court err in 
granting an order of sale and for deficiency judgment against the defendant 
Melanie Hill on the mortgage in the absence of an established 
debt?

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      Appellant, 
William R. Hill, defaulted on two promissory notes. On October 17, 1984, Mr. 
Hill executed and delivered the two notes to the American National Bank of 
Riverton, Wyoming (Bank). Note No. 1 was for the sum of $12,354.95 and Note No. 
2 was for the sum of $68,742.70. Both notes were due and payable on April 17, 
1985 and Mr. Hill failed to pay either note. Note No. 1 was secured by a 
mortgage signed by both Mr. Hill and his wife, Melanie F. 
Hill.

[¶5]      The Bank was 
declared insolvent on June 11, 1985 and the Federal Depository Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) was named as the receiver of the Bank. The FDIC assigned the 
notes and the mortgage to appellee, Justin K. Mayall (Mayall), on June 7, 1991. 
On March 23, 1992, Mayall filed suit demanding judgment on the notes plus 
interest accrued, requesting authorization to foreclose on the mortgage, and 
seeking a deficiency judgment against Mr. Hill on both notes and against Mrs. 
Hill on Note No. 1 which was secured by the mortgage.

[¶6]      The Hills filed a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings on November 9, 1992, arguing that Mayall's 
claim was time barred. Mayall filed a motion for summary judgment on February 
18, 1993. On September 14, 1993, the district court granted Mayall's motion for 
summary judgment and denied the Hills' motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.

III. 
DISCUSSION

RETROACTIVE 
APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

[¶7]      We first resolve 
the question of whether Mayall's claim is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. We step into the shoes of the district court when we review the 
grant of a motion for summary judgment. Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 437 
(Wyo. 1985). The same material is reviewed and the same standards are applied. 
Id. The burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists is on the party moving for summary judgment. Bancroft v. Jagusch, 
611 P.2d 819, 820 (Wyo. 1980). We review the material in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Id.

[¶8]      Summary judgment 
is proper when questions of law are raised and there are no material facts at 
issue. Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of Town of Buffalo, 348 P.2d 76, 
81 (Wyo. 1959). The ultimate question upon review is whether the district court 
properly applied the law in light of the undisputed facts. Id. at 82. 
Here, the district court applied the proper rule of law and there were no 
material facts in dispute. Summary judgment granted in favor of Mayall was, 
therefore, proper.

[¶9]      Prior to July 1, 
1991, Mayall's claim on the notes was controlled by a ten year statute of 
limitations. See Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-104 (1988). On July 1, 1991, Wyo. Stat. 
§ 34.1-3-118 (1991) went into effect, shortening the statute of limitations 
governing actions to enforce commercial notes to six years. The notes became due 
and payable on April 17, 1985.

[¶10]   The Hills contend that Mayall had 
until July 1, 1991 to file his action or the six year statute of limitations 
would bar his claim. Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-3-118 was approved on February 27, 1991 
and became law on July 1, 1991. Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 160, § 5 (1991). The Hills 
argue that as of February 27, 1991, Mayall was on notice that he had to file an 
action to enforce the notes by July 1, 1991 or the six year statute of 
limitations would retroactively bar his claim. We 
disagree.

[¶11]   Predictability is an important 
component of our common law system. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Path of The Law, 10 Harv.L.Rev. 457 (1897); and H.L.A. Hart, The Concept 
of Law 143-44 (1961). Retroactive application of the law destroys 
predictability. A statute of limitations will not be given retroactive effect 
unless the legislature articulates express provisions for retroactive 
application. National Tailoring Co. v. Scott, 65 Wyo. 64, 196 P.2d 387, 
397 (1948) (quoting 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions, § 4 at 913). 
Further, even if the legislature provides for retroactive application of the 
law, a person must be given a reasonable time in which to enforce any remedy he 
or she has available. National Tailoring Co., 196 P.2d  at 401 (quoting 
People v. Cohen, 245 N.Y. 419, 157 N.E. 515, 516 
(1927)).

[¶12]   Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-3-118 contains no 
express provision for retroactive application. It cannot, therefore, 
retroactively bar Mayall's claim. We hold that Wyo. Stat. § 34.13-118 cannot be 
retroactively applied to bar claims on commercial notes that were executed and 
delivered under the prior ten year statute of limitations.

[¶13]   Assuming, arguendo, there 
were express provisions for retroactive application of the new statute, four 
months and three days is, as a matter of law, an unreasonable time in which to 
expect all holders of commercial notes to file claims. See Adams & Freese 
Co. v. Kenoyer, 17 N.D. 302, 116 N.W. 98, 100 (1908) (holding three months 
and twenty-one days in which to bring a claim unreasonable as a matter of law). 
When legislation impairs a remedy, such as the right to enforce a note by 
foreclosing on a mortgage, it is essential that the holder of the remedy be 
given a reasonable time in which to enforce that remedy. National Tailoring 
Co., 196 P.2d  at 400-01 (quoting Cohen, 157 N.E. at 
516).

[¶14]   A contract is governed by the laws 
in effect at the time the agreement is executed. See Memphis & L R R Co. 
v. Berry, 112 U.S. 609, 623, 5 S. Ct. 299, 305, 28 L. Ed. 831, 842 (1884); 
Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 597, 6 Otto 595, 24 L. Ed. 793, 794 
(1877); and Stephan & Sons, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 629 P.2d 71, 78 (Alaska 1981). People rely on the stability of the law when ordering 
their affairs. At the time Mr. Hill executed and delivered the notes, a ten year 
statute of limitations was in effect. Mayall was entitled to rely on that ten 
year statute of limitations.

[¶15]   We hold that Mayall's claim was 
governed by the ten year statute of limitations in effect at the time the notes 
were executed and delivered and that the new six year statute of limitations 
cannot retroactively bar his claim.

SALE ORDER 
AND DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT

[¶16]   We next consider whether the Hills' 
denial of an established debt brought a material fact into issue and thereby 
rendered the order for sale of the mortgaged property and the deficiency 
judgment against Mrs. Hill improper. The Hills challenge the order requiring the 
sale of the mortgaged property and the order for a deficiency judgment entered 
against Mrs. Hill. They argue that there is a material question of fact as to 
whether the mortgage was collateral for Note No. 1. This challenge lacks 
merit.

[¶17]   Note No. 1 is a single page 
document with a typed notation on the note: "Secured by Real Estate Mortgage 
dated April 28, 1980." Mr. Hill executed Note No. 1 on October 17, 1984. The 
mortgage securing Note No. 1 is dated April 28, 1980 and is signed by William 
Hill and Melanie Hill. The mortgage was executed on April 28, 1980 to initially 
secure payment of a $35,000.00 promissory note. The $35,000.00 note was paid as 
of February 6, 1984.

[¶18]   Mayall contends that the mortgage 
secures Note No. 1 which was executed on October 17, 1984. The Hills deny that 
the mortgage secures Note No. 1. The Hills assert that their denial raises a 
material issue of fact and, therefore, summary judgment was 
improper.

[¶19]   The parties admit, however, that 
the mortgage is in default. The district court found that there were no material 
facts at issue. To reach this decision, the district court must have concluded 
that the mortgage was intended to secure Note No. 1. We 
agree.

[¶20]   We hold that the mortgage dated 
April 28, 1980 is the same mortgage referred to in Note No. 1. If there was 
another mortgage dated April 28, 1980 which was intended to secure Note No. 1, 
the Hills were obligated to present evidence of that mortgage. They cannot place 
the fact in issue by simply denying the logical connection between the note 
"Secured by Real Estate Mortgage dated April 28, 1980" and the mortgage executed 
on that same date.

[¶21]   We have repeatedly held that the 
purpose of summary judgment would be defeated if a party could force an issue to 
trial by merely asserting that a material fact is in dispute. Duffy, 708 P.2d  at 436; Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867, 871 (Wyo. 1975); Maxted 
v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832, 834-35 (Wyo. 1974). The 
Hills' denial lacks merit and their semantic gymnastics cannot create a disputed 
issue of fact where none exists.

[¶22]   The district court expressly found 
that there were no material facts at issue. The Hills admitted executing and 
delivering the notes and the mortgage. They also admitted that the notes and the 
mortgage were in default and that Mayall was the holder of the notes and the 
mortgage. Further, Mrs. Hill signed the mortgage. No other facts were necessary 
to justify the sale order or the deficiency judgment against Mrs. 
Hill.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶23]   We hold that the district court 
applied the proper rule of law in determining that there were no material facts 
at issue. Summary judgment was, therefore, proper. Wyo. Stat. § 34.1-3-118 did 
not retroactively bar Mayall's claim and Note No. 1 was secured by the mortgage. 
An underlying debt was, therefore, established. The order to sell the mortgaged 
property was proper, as was the deficiency judgment against Mrs. 
Hill.

[¶24]   Affirmed.