Case Title: State v. Sanders

Citation: 347 N.C. 587

Docket Number: 88A85-3

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 88A85-3
FILED: 6 MARCH 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
STANLEY SANDERS
On defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari to
review an order entered on 16 October 1995 by Lamm, J., in
Superior Court, Transylvania County, declaring a mistrial, and an
order entered on 8 March 1996 by Warren, J., in Superior Court,
Transylvania County, denying defendant’s plea in bar and motion
for imposition of a life sentence.  Heard in the Supreme Court
16 October 1997.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Ellen B.
Scouten, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the
State.
James R. Glover for defendant-appellant.
ORR, Justice.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, first-
degree rape, felonious breaking and entering, and felonious
larceny on 1 July 1982.  Based on the jury’s recommendation,
defendant was sentenced to death for the first-degree murder
conviction and appealed to this Court.  In a per curiam opinion,
this Court vacated the judgments and remanded for a new trial
because of “the entirely inaccurate and inadequate transcription
of the trial proceedings.”  State v. Sanders, 312 N.C. 318, 319,
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321 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1984) (per curiam) (Sanders I).  Following
the new trial and capital sentencing proceeding, defendant was
again sentenced to death.
On 7 April 1987, this Court entered an order remanding
to the trial court “for the sole purpose of hearing defendant’s
motion to suppress the evidence taken from his residence.”  State
v. Sanders, 319 N.C. 399, 400, 354 S.E.2d 724, 725 (1987).  After
further briefing and argument by the parties, this Court found no
error in the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress or in the
guilt phase of defendant’s trial.  However, because of McKoy
error, the case was remanded for a new capital sentencing
proceeding.  State v. Sanders, 327 N.C. 319, 395 S.E.2d 412
(1990) (Sanders II), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1051, 112 L. Ed. 2d
782 (1991).
On 9 October 1991, based upon defendant’s motion for a
change of venue, the trial court entered an order transferring
venue from Transylvania County to McDowell County.  Defendant’s
third capital sentencing proceeding was held at the 11 September
1995 Criminal Session of Superior Court, McDowell County.  On the
second day of deliberations, the State moved for a mistrial, and
Judge Charles C. Lamm, Jr., orally granted the motion.  Judge
Lamm subsequently entered a written order on 6 October 1995,
declaring a mistrial based on juror misconduct.  This order was
filed on 16 October 1995.  On 16 February 1996, defense counsel
filed a “Plea in Bar and Motion for Entry of Life Sentence or
Motion for Continuance of Trial Date.”  Judge Raymond A. Warren
denied defendant’s “plea in bar for the entry of an order
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cancelling the penalty phase trial and imposing a life sentence”
and allowed defendant’s motion for a continuance.  Defendant then
filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court and
requested that we review the orders entered by Judge Lamm and
Judge Warren.  This Court allowed defendant’s petition on
10 October 1996.
A detailed review of the evidence introduced during the
guilt phase of defendant’s trial is set forth in the prior
opinion of this Court, finding no error in that phase of the
trial.  Sanders II, 327 N.C. 319, 395 S.E.2d 412.  Further
discussion of the evidence introduced during that trial is
unnecessary here.
In the present case, defendant contends that the trial
court erred by granting the State’s motion for a mistrial over
defendant’s objection, thereby violating his constitutional right
to be free from double jeopardy.  Defendant argues that
(1) nothing occurred during jury deliberations which constitutes
“manifest necessity” for granting a mistrial, (2) the trial court
failed to adequately identify the alleged juror misconduct in its
findings of fact, and (3) the trial court erred by failing to
explore alternative remedies which could have permitted the
sentencing proceeding to continue to final conclusion.  We
disagree with defendant’s contentions and affirm the orders of
the trial court.
In the present case, the jury began sentencing
deliberations on 4 October 1995 at 10:45 a.m.  That same day at
4:00 p.m., the jury sent the trial court a written question which
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stated, “How do we as a jury, when one or more of us have
questions regarding facts of the case (feel we have not been
given enough information)[,] deal with finding the facts or
coming to an undecisive [sic] conclusion[?]”  After conferring
with counsel, Judge Lamm brought the jury out and questioned the
foreman as follows:
THE COURT:  Sir, without telling me --
if the jury has answered one or more issues
already, without telling me what the answer
to that issue is; if you could tell me, is
this question relating to a specific issue or
issues?
FOREMAN:  It’s on the Issue Three.
THE COURT:  On Issue Three?
FOREMAN:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  Okay, sir.  Do you wish to
be instructed again on Issue Three and Issue
Four?
FOREMAN:  Yes, sir.
Before instructing on Issues Three and Four, the trial
court first reminded the jury that “the state must prove three
things beyond a reasonable doubt” before the jury can recommend a
sentence of death.  The trial court also defined “reasonable
doubt” for the jury and gave the pattern jury instructions as to
the three things the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt.  It then gave the pattern jury instructions
pertaining to Issue Three, which provides, “Do you unanimously
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstance
or circumstances found is, or are, insufficient to outweigh the
aggravating circumstance or circumstances found?” and Issue Four,
-5-
which provides, “Do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances you
found is, or are, sufficiently substantial to call for the
imposition of the death penalty when considered with the
mitigating circumstance or circumstances found by one or more of
you?”  After receiving these instructions, the jury resumed
deliberations at 4:20 p.m.
At 5:05 p.m., Judge Lamm excused the jurors for the day
and stated that they would begin deliberations again the next
morning at 9:30.  Prior to sealing the jury’s Issues and
Recommendation as to Punishment form and notepad, Judge Lamm
noted that there was a folded piece of paper on top.  Several
jurors indicated to Judge Lamm that the paper contained another
question for him but that they were not through framing the
question.  Accordingly, Judge Lamm agreed to address the question
in the morning once the jurors were ready.
The next morning, prior to returning to deliberate,
Judge Lamm asked the foreman to tell him how long the jury had
been deliberating on the issue that it was currently deciding. 
The foreman told Judge Lamm that the jury had been deliberating
on the issue since sometime after the lunchtime meal, that three
votes had been taken, and that the split for the last vote was “a
little bit different.”  The foreman then indicated that the jury
would continue deliberations, and the jury in fact resumed
deliberations at 9:49 a.m.
At approximately 10:15 a.m., Judge Lamm was handed
another piece of paper by the jury.  This note stated, “We have a
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vote of 11-1.  Hung jury on the final issue.”  Judge Lamm then
called the jury into the courtroom and asked the foreman to tell
him whether the jury was referring to Issue Four when it
referenced the “final issue.”  The foreman informed Judge Lamm
that the jurors had begun deliberations on Issue Four that
morning.  Judge Lamm requested that the jury deliberate further
on that issue to see if it could reach a unanimous decision. 
Jury deliberations resumed at 10:25 a.m.
At 10:55 a.m., Judge Lamm was handed another note by
the jury, which included the following statements:
We can not come to a unanimously [sic]
decision on Issue Four.
We had a[n] error at one point and went ahead
and signed it but we reread recommendation as
to punishment.
We need to know if life means life in prison.
We [have] one juror who . . . investigat[ed]
on her own and talked to a judge and police
officers.
After a brief recess, Judge Lamm met with counsel for both
parties, in defendant’s presence.  Both counsel were informed of
the contents of the note set out above.  Judge Lamm also informed
counsel that the note which was received at approximately 10:15
a.m. stated, “We have a vote of eleven to one,” and that under
that it read, “Hung jury on the final issue.”  Finally, he also
stated that the folded-up piece of paper which had been sealed
the previous night made some reference to the eleven to one vote
on Issue Three.
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Defense counsel then requested that the trial court
rule that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict and
enter a sentence of life imprisonment as required by statute. 
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b) (1997).  The trial court denied this
request.  Defense counsel also requested that the trial court
bring the jurors out and conduct a limited inquiry on “whether or
not they believe that further deliberation, without any further
instruction, would lead or might lead to a unanimous verdict” and
if the answer to that was “no,” that the trial court declare that
the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.  The trial
court also denied this request.  It should be noted that defense
counsel did not object to the trial court’s rulings on these
requests and has not brought them forward on appeal.
Defense counsel’s final request was that the trial
court reinstruct the jury on the meaning of life imprisonment. 
Subsequently, the trial court asked what the State’s position was
with respect to this request.  The prosecutor stated that he
believed the jury should be instructed on the definition of life
imprisonment, but also noted:
[W]e simply cannot ignore the last part of
that note which facially shows juror
misconduct.  I don’t see how this court can
do anything other than, at this point, make
an inquiry into that.  I don’t really know
what the procedure is but it has to be done
. . . .  I think we would have to identify
the potentially offending juror and give that
person a chance here on the record to admit
or deny it.  I think the court has to make an
inquiry and make a determination; has there
been juror misconduct before anything else
happens.
-8-
The foreman was then brought into the courtroom and
questioned concerning the jury’s note stating that a juror had
spoken with a judge and police officers.  The foreman stated that
juror number six told the jury that she had been informed by a
judge and police officers that life imprisonment meant that the
defendant had to serve twenty years in prison.  Judge Lamm
thanked the foreman for his help and asked him not to repeat the
conversation to the rest of the jurors.  Defense counsel pointed
out that defendant “is facing forty years before he is even
eligible for parole so what the juror was told is not true.” 
Defense counsel then requested that the jurors be informed that
what they may have heard from an outside source is “neither the
law nor the evidence they heard in this courtroom, and they are
bound by the law as given by the judge.”  Additionally, defense
counsel requested that the jury be instructed that “life means
life.”
After some discussion between the trial court and
defense counsel, defense counsel stated, “we do not want the
court to declare a mistrial at this point.”  Defense counsel
argued that “defendant has a right to have this jury continue to
deliberate.”  The prosecutor agreed with defense counsel and
suggested that the trial court make a further inquiry into the
statements made by juror number six.
The trial court then brought juror number six, Renita
Lytle, into the courtroom.  In response to questioning by the
trial court, Lytle stated that she had lied to the jury about
talking with anyone concerning the situation.  She admitted that
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she spoke with her nephew, who is a police officer, but said she
never asked him about the case.  She further stated the
following:
And then I told a lie about the judge
because -- I mean they was giving -- they was
making me think that I was dumb and that I
didn’t have a right to my opinion . . . .  I
mean yesterday they were like, “You need to
get out of here!”  I mean, “You don’t need to
be in here!  You need to go tell the judge
that I don’t belong in here and get one of
them alternates to come in and take your
place.”  I mean it was really pressuring me
into doing things that I really didn’t
believe in, and I was feeling hurt and I was
feeling sad because they didn’t like me for
the reason, for my suggestion, and I just
didn’t -- and I couldn’t take the pressure
and so I figured if I just tell them that,
you know, tell them this, then they will just
back off and leave me alone and then I’d be
out of the case because I could not take the
pressure.
Lytle further stated that her understanding of life imprisonment
was that “you go to jail and you remain for life.”  However, she
indicated that the other jurors had told her that if defendant
received life imprisonment, he would “get out in a couple
months.”  She also stated that the other jurors said that they
hoped that she or “anybody in [her] family will be his next
victim.”
At this point, defense counsel requested the trial
court to instruct that life means exactly what the court had
previously instructed and to give the deadlocked jury
instructions pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1235.  The prosecutor
expressed concern that the rest of the jury had been informed by
a juror that “she did something wrong that all of them had been
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told not to do” and stated he did not believe the jury should
continue deliberations.
Once the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial
court informed the jurors that he was aware there had been some
discussion of the meaning of a life sentence.  Judge Lamm also
noted that some of the discussions may have been based on
“inaccurate information” or “inaccurate occurrences.”  Judge Lamm
then instructed the jurors to eliminate the question of parole
eligibility from their minds, that life imprisonment means
“imprisonment in the state’s prison for life,” and further
instructed them to reason the matter over without surrendering
their conscientious convictions.
At 12:25 p.m., jury deliberations resumed.  Twenty
minutes later, the trial court received a note from juror number
three, which the trial court characterized as “one juror making
accusations against another juror.”  The note to the trial court
stated as follows:
1.  Is a statement from Juror #6 that because
we were not at the last trials for murder and
did not know all the facts that she could not
vote for the death sentence and didn’t know
how the rest of us could -- Is that reason
acceptable to the court?
2.  Juror 6 made several statements that
basically said she did not believe in the
death penalty; however, when pressed on the
issue said she did believe in it.
I’m sorry if I’m making trouble for the
court, I simply felt I needed to ask these
questions.  If you don’t wish to answer, that
is, of course, fine with me.
Thank you,
Juror #3
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At this point, defense counsel made the following
statement:
Your honor, at this time the defense
makes a motion that the court call the jury
out into the courtroom and the court inquire
of the foreman of the jury if the jury is
still deadlocked.  If the foreman answers in
the affirmative, we believe it is time to
take this matter from the jury.  They have
been deliberating for a period of more than
seven hours; they have degenerated into
something that is much less than jury
deliberations and I think that this is what
the statute contemplates when they give the
Superior Court Judge the power to take the
matter away from the jury.  It’s time, it’s
past time.
The prosecutor then renewed his motion for a mistrial. 
Subsequently, the trial court declared a mistrial based on juror
misconduct.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1062 provides, in pertinent part:
Upon motion of the State, the judge may
declare a mistrial if there occurs during the
trial, either inside or outside the
courtroom, misconduct resulting in
substantial and irreparable prejudice to the
State’s case and the misconduct was by a
juror or the defendant, his lawyer, or
someone acting at the behest of the defendant
or his lawyer.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1062 (1997).  “Whether to grant a motion for
mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and
its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is so
clearly erroneous as to amount to a manifest abuse of
discretion.”  State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 383, 462 S.E.2d
25, 35 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 L. Ed. 2d 482
(1996).  “[H]owever, a trial court in a capital case has no
authority to discharge the jury without the defendant’s consent
-12-
and hold the defendant for a second trial, absent a showing of
‘manifest necessity.’”  State v. Lachat, 317 N.C. 73, 82-83, 343
S.E.2d 872, 877 (1986).
A manifest necessity exists only when some event occurs
at trial creating a situation where the defendant’s right to have
the trial continue to termination in a judgment is outweighed by
“the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just
judgments.”  Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 93 L. Ed. 974,
978 (1949).  This Court has recognized two kinds of necessity to
justify a mistrial without defendant’s consent -- “physical
necessity” and the “necessity of doing justice.”  State v.
Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 505, 124 S.E.2d 838, 847 (1962).  The
necessity of doing justice has been defined as “aris[ing] from
the duty of the court to ‘guard the administration of justice
from fraudulent practices; as in the case of tampering with the
jury, or keeping back the witnesses on the part of the
prosecution.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Wiseman, 68 N.C. 203, 206
(1873)).  It is limited to “the occurrence of some incident of a
nature that would render impossible a fair and impartial trial
under the law.”  Id.
In discussing the determination of a “manifest
necessity,” this Court has quoted the United States Supreme Court
and stated:
“We think, that in all cases of this
nature, the law has invested Courts of
Justice with the authority to discharge a
jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in
their opinion, taking all the circumstances
into consideration, there is a manifest
necessity for the act, or the ends of public
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justice would otherwise be defeated.  They
are to exercise a sound discretion on the
subject; and it is impossible to define all
the circumstances, which would render it
proper to interfere.  To be sure, the power
ought to be used with the greatest caution,
under urgent circumstances, and for very
plain and obvious causes; and, in capital
cases especially, Courts should be extremely
careful how they interfere with any of the
chances of life, in favour of the prisoner. 
But, after all, they have the right to order
the discharge; and the security which the
public have for the faithful, sound, and
conscientious exercise of this discretion,
rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the
responsibility of the Judges, under their
oaths of office.”
State v. Shuler, 293 N.C. 34, 43, 235 S.E.2d 226, 232 (1977)
(quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580, 6 L. Ed. 165,
165 (1824)) (alteration in original).
In the present case, the trial court made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to its
decision to grant a mistrial:
Due to the previous occurrences that
occurred on the record, the court making no
finding or taking everything that has
occurred as being true except making no
finding as to the truth or falsity of the
responses to the court’s inquiry of the
foreperson, Mr. Woody, with regard to what
Juror Number 6, Mrs. Lytle, said that she
did, or what she said;
And without taking as true or false,
making no finding of fact with regard to the
truth or falsity of Mrs. Lytle’s explanation
of what occurred in that regard; in regard to
the telephone call to her nephew or whether
she talked to any other police officers or to
any judges;
But taking everything else as being true
and finding that further things that
Mrs. Lytle said as to the treatment that she
received in the jury room for at least a
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portion of the day yesterday and the
emotional state that it put her in when she
went home yesterday after being dismissed for
the day;
And considering these statements of
Juror Number 3, . . . and noting that the
characterization of the statement are [sic]
allegations as to what one juror is saying or
doing and the motive behind what one juror is
saying or doing and the position that the
juror is taking;
From all of those things, the court
concludes as a matter of law; [t]hat at least
one and more than likely a number of the
jurors are not following the instructions of
the court as to their conduct and duties as
jurors during deliberations; are not
following the law as instructed by the court.
The court concludes that this
constitutes juror misconduct and for that
reason, the court declares a mistrial in this
case.
Juror misconduct encompasses a wide range of improper
activities.  Thus, it is appropriate for the trial court to be
given broad discretion in determining whether juror misconduct
has occurred.  In State v. Shedd, 274 N.C. 95, 161 S.E.2d 477
(1968), this Court elaborated on the justification for the trial
court’s broad discretion and stated:
The trial judge is clothed with power of
discretion as to whether he should order a
mistrial or set aside a verdict by reason of
alleged misconduct of a juror or jurors
“because of his learning and integrity, and
of the superior knowledge which his presence
at and participation in the trial gives him
over any other forum.  However great and
responsible this power, the law intends that
the Judge will exercise it to further the
ends of justice, and though, doubtless it is
occasionally abused, it would be difficult to
fix upon a safer tribunal for the exercise of
this discretionary power, which must be
lodged somewhere.”
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Id. at 104, 161 S.E.2d at 483 (quoting Moore v. Edmiston, 70 N.C.
471, 481 (1874)).
Here, a thorough review of the record supports the
trial court’s decision to grant a mistrial based on juror
misconduct.  On three separate occasions on 5 October 1995, Judge
Lamm sent the jurors out to deliberate and instructed them to
resume deliberations.  Twice after being sent out to deliberate,
the jurors sent back a statement which revealed that they were
not deliberating as Judge Lamm had instructed, but were
discussing outside matters such as parole eligibility, a juror’s
outside investigation, evidence at the previous trial, and
whether one juror believed in the death penalty.  None of these
matters had any bearing on their consideration of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, which Judge Lamm had instructed and
reinstructed the jurors to consider in connection with Issues
Three and Four.
In fact, immediately after Judge Lamm reiterated his
instructions that the jury was to consider the law as instructed
by the court and the evidence heard in court “and nothing else,” 
the jurors sent back a note which revealed they were considering
irrelevant matters, contrary to the instructions Judge Lamm had
just given.  This note, which was written by juror number three,
showed that at least one juror was discussing the fact that he or
she had not heard the evidence in defendant’s previous trial. 
The note also referenced a discussion of whether one juror
believed in the death penalty.  Thus, there is ample evidence
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that the jurors were disregarding the trial court’s instructions
concerning their duties and the law.
Additionally, Judge Lamm noted in his order the
treatment which juror Lytle received in the jury room and “the
emotional state that it put her in when she went home.”   While
we recognize that jury deliberations require a certain degree of
debate and the expression of personal beliefs, the trial court’s
findings of fact indicate that it believed that the conduct
directed at juror Lytle exceeded the allowable limits.  It is one
thing to permit heated debate inside the jury room, but another
to allow personal attacks and threats directed at a juror.  Here,
juror Lytle indicated that several jurors expressed their belief
that she was not capable of continuing deliberations and that she
should request the judge to replace her with an alternate. 
Further, according to juror Lytle, several jurors stated that
they hoped she or “anybody in [her] family will be [defendant’s]
next victim.”  This conduct is further evidence that the jurors
were ignoring Judge Lamm’s instructions and continuing to discuss
extraneous matters.  Even defense counsel recognized this as
juror misconduct by stating, “Well, there has been juror
misconduct, Your Honor!  There have been eleven people back there
telling a juror she doesn’t belong in that jury and she needed to
get out.”  Once this conduct was brought to the attention of the
trial court, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s discretionary decision to declare a mistrial.
Although the trial court failed to make any findings of
fact with respect to the truth of the allegations concerning
-17-
juror Lytle’s conduct, the record reveals that juror number six
told the other jurors that she had spoken with police officers
and a judge concerning the definition of life imprisonment. 
Juror number six admitted on the record that she knew that
discussing the case with outside parties was forbidden and that
she deliberately told the other jurors that she committed this
misconduct.  Although she stated, on the record, that she had not
actually conducted an outside investigation, the trial court
could not inform the other jurors that she had lied to them
without diminishing her credibility with them.  A
misrepresentation of this nature by one juror to the other jurors
also raises a question of juror misconduct.
Furthermore, the danger of potential prejudice to
defendant existed in two different respects.  First, assuming
that the vote on Issue Four was eleven to one in favor of the
death penalty, had the hold-out juror capitulated under the 
pressure, defendant would have received a death sentence. 
Second, if the eleven jurors voting for the death penalty had, in
fact, been told that life meant twenty years in prison, it could
have influenced their votes on the death penalty.
As this Court has previously stated, “[t]he
determination of the existence and effect of jury misconduct is
primarily for the trial court whose decision will be given great
weight on appeal.”  State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 83, 405 S.E.2d
145, 158 (1991).  A thorough review of the record reveals that,
in the present case, the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in ordering a mistrial.  Although each instance of
-18-
misconduct may not be, by itself, enough to warrant a mistrial,
the cumulative effect of the misconduct rises to the level of
“manifest necessity” for the declaration of a mistrial.
Because we have concluded that the trial court in the
present case properly declared a mistrial for a manifest
necessity, defendant’s right to be free of double jeopardy will
not be violated by a further sentencing proceeding.  “It has long
been a fundamental principle of the common law of North Carolina
that no person can be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for
the same offense.”  Lachat, 317 N.C. at 82, 343 S.E.2d at 876. 
However, this principle is not violated where a defendant’s trial
ends with a mistrial declared for a manifest necessity or to
serve the ends of public justice.  Id.  When a mistrial has been
declared properly, “in legal contemplation there has been no
trial.”  State v. Tyson, 138 N.C. 627, 629, 50 S.E. 456, 456
(1905).   This principle applies equally to sentencing
proceedings.  Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
Next, we will address defendant’s contention that the
trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to make
“findings of fact sufficient to identify the alleged misconduct
of one or more jurors” which was the basis for the mistrial. 
Defendant argues that Judge Lamm’s order “[m]akes it clear that
the mistrial was based on something that occurred in the jury
deliberation room, not on any impropriety occurring outside the
deliberations themselves.”  He further argues that the absence of
explicit findings of fact makes it impossible for this Court to
review this matter and to determine whether there was a factual
-19-
basis for the trial court’s conclusions that a juror or jurors
had failed to abide by instructions.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1064 provides that “[b]efore granting a
mistrial, the judge must make finding [sic] of facts with respect
to the grounds for the mistrial and insert the findings in the
record of the case.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1064 (1983).  The official
commentary to the statute adds:
This provision will be important when
the rule against prior jeopardy prohibits
retrial unless the mistrial is upon certain
recognized grounds or unless the defendant
requests or acquiesces in the mistrial.  If
the defendant requests or acquiesces in the
mistrial, that finding alone should suffice.
In the present case, the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, as set out above, sufficiently comply with
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1064.  While the trial court did not set out each
instance of juror misconduct, the order provided a sufficient
factual basis for appellate review.  As this Court noted in State
v. Felton, 330 N.C. 619, 412 S.E.2d 344 (1992):
Even if the trial court’s prefatory
description of the motivating factors leading
to its order of mistrial did not amount to a
“finding of fact” as mandated by N.C.G.S. §
15A-1064, any such error is clearly harmless
as the record here reveals ample factual
support for the mistrial order.
Id. at 630, 412 S.E.2d at 351.
In fact, in State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 356 S.E.2d
319 (1987), the trial court failed to make any contemporaneous
findings in support of its mistrial declaration.  However, this
Court noted that the basis for the mistrial was “certainly
apparent in the record.”  Id. at 570, 356 S.E.2d at 324. 
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Similarly, here, the findings of fact, along with an examination
of the record, provide ample support for the trial court’s
finding of “manifest necessity” warranting a mistrial.
Finally, we address defendant’s contention that the
trial court erred in granting the mistrial without first
exploring alternative remedies which could have allowed the
sentencing proceeding to continue.  Defendant argues that “[m]any
options to mistrial were available and should have been given
consideration before aborting the trial by granting the State’s
motion.”
This Court has recognized that the grant of a
“[m]istrial is a drastic remedy, warranted only for such serious
improprieties as would make it impossible to attain a fair and
impartial verdict.”  State v. Stocks, 319 N.C. 437, 441, 355
S.E.2d 492, 494 (1987).  In the present case, the trial court
properly explored other options prior to declaring a mistrial. 
For example, regarding the incident with juror number six, the
trial court did not immediately declare a mistrial.  Instead, the
trial court addressed the questions which had arisen regarding
life imprisonment.  The trial court instructed the jury that life
imprisonment means “imprisonment in the state’s prison for life.” 
It further admonished the jurors to eliminate from their minds
the question of parole eligibility and to put aside any
“inaccurate information.”
Thus, the trial court gave the jury an opportunity to
resume proper deliberations and continue the sentencing
proceeding to conclusion.  However, after the jury deliberated
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for only twenty additional minutes, it became apparent to the
trial court that the jury had disregarded its instructions and
was once again discussing extraneous matters and failing to focus
on the issues at hand.  At that point, the trial court, in its
discretion, determined that a mistrial was the appropriate
remedy.  After previously exploring a less drastic remedy, by
giving the jury additional curative instructions, the trial court
determined that a mistrial was “manifestly necessary.”  We agree
with the trial court’s decision and do not believe that the trial
court erred in resorting to this drastic remedy.  Accordingly,
this assignment of error is overruled.
AFFIRMED.
========================
Justice FRYE dissenting.
I am troubled by the difficulties the State has
encountered in seeking to secure the death penalty for this
defendant for this terrible crime.  The General Assembly has
provided that when a jury cannot, within a reasonable time,
unanimously agree to a sentencing recommendation, the judge shall
impose a sentence of life imprisonment.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b)
(1997).  It seems abundantly clear that, at the time the court
declared a mistrial, the jury could not unanimously agree to a
sentencing recommendation.  The appropriate action was for the
judge to either impose a sentence of life imprisonment or
encourage the jurors to continue deliberating to see if they
could unanimously agree to a sentencing recommendation.  “[A]
trial court in a capital case has no authority to discharge the
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jury without the defendant’s consent and hold the defendant for a
second trial, absent a showing of ‘manifest necessity’ for a
mistrial.”  State v Lachat, 317 N.C. 73, 82-83, 343 S.E.2d 872,
877 (1986).  In this capital sentencing proceeding, defendant
objected to a mistrial.  No manifest necessity justified
discharging this third capital sentencing jury and convening yet
another jury to recommend life or death.  Because the jury was
unable to reach a unanimous agreement as to the sentencing
recommendation, our statute requires the imposition of a sentence
of life imprisonment.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b).
Justice WEBB joins in this dissenting opinion.