Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Derek Vashon James

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC20-128

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2021-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC20-128 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
DEREK VASHON JAMES, 
Respondent. 
 
November 18, 2021 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that 
Respondent, Derek Vashon James, be found guilty of professional 
misconduct in violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar 
Rules), and that he be suspended from the practice of law for thirty 
days as a sanction for his misconduct.  The Florida Bar (Bar) filed a 
notice of intent to seek review of the referee’s report, challenging the 
referee’s recommendation that James be found not guilty of 
violating Bar Rule 4-8.4(d), as well as the referee’s recommended 
sanction.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For 
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the reasons discussed below, we approve the referee’s findings of 
fact and recommendations as to guilt, except for the 
recommendation that James be found not guilty of violating Bar 
Rule 4-8.4(d), which we disapprove, and find James guilty of 
violating the rule.  We also disapprove the referee’s recommended 
discipline, and instead, we suspend James from the practice of law 
for ninety-one days. 
BACKGROUND 
On January 28, 2020, the Bar filed a complaint against 
James, alleging that he engaged in misconduct by coaching a 
witness during a deposition in a contested worker’s compensation 
matter and making misrepresentations regarding his misconduct.  
The Bar’s complaint was referred to a referee, who held a hearing on 
both guilt and discipline and submitted a report with the following 
findings and recommendations. 
James represented the employer in a worker’s compensation 
case.  On July 31, 2018, Renee Gray, the adjuster who worked for 
the employer, was deposed via telephone.  Gray, James, and the 
claimant’s counsel, Toni Villaverde, attended the deposition via 
telephone, from different locations.  Because the deposition was not 
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conducted by video, the court reporter refused to swear Gray in as a 
witness, making her testimony unsworn.  While the deposition was 
in progress and Villaverde was questioning Gray, James sent text 
messages to Gray regarding her testimony.  The texts included 
coaching and specific directions on how to respond to Villaverde’s 
questions. 
The following messages were exchanged between Gray and 
James during Villaverde’s questioning of Gray: 
10:19 a.m. (James): You don’t 
 
10:20 a.m. (James): As to settlement checks expiration 
 
10:20 a.m. (James): You remember the deposition but not 
discussing checks 
 
10:20 a.m. (James): yes 
 
10:21 a.m. (James): Just review notes from 02/20/2018 
forward 
 
10:23 a.m. (James): Be careful just say 
 
10:23 a.m. (James): You may not see today 
 
10:25 a.m. (James): Take a break in 15 minutes? 
 
10:25 a.m. (Gray): Up to you. 
 
Villaverde could hear typing sounds and asked Gray and 
James if they were engaging in texting during the deposition.  
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James denied texting Gray and stated he was only receiving a text 
from his daughter.  Villaverde asked James to stop texting and put 
his phone away, and James agreed.  James misrepresented to 
Villaverde that he had concluded the text messaging when in fact 
he had not.  After a break, and after Villaverde resumed questioning 
Gray, James inadvertently sent the following text messages 
intended for Gray to Villaverde: 
11:53 a.m. (James): Just say it anyway 
 
11:53 a.m. (James): Just say 03/28 
 
11:54 a.m. (James): In addition to the 03/28/2018 email 
containing the signed release I show . . . 
 
11:55 a.m. (James): Don’t give an absolute answer 
 
11:55 a.m. (James): All I can see at this time but I cannot rule 
out existence 
 
11:55 a.m. (James): It’s a trap 
 
11:56 a.m. (James): Then say that is my best answer at this 
time. 
 
Once Villaverde noticed the texts, she stopped the deposition.  
She later filed a motion for production and in-camera inspection of 
all the texts sent during the deposition.  After the Judge of 
Compensation Claims granted the motion, James produced two 
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pages of text messages but never produced any texts involving his 
daughter, despite being ordered to do so by the judge, and despite 
his assurances to Villaverde during the deposition that the typing 
sounds she heard involved a text received from his daughter.  The 
judge found that the text messages were sent during the deposition, 
not during a break in the questioning, and that they were not 
protected by attorney-client privilege, contrary to James’s claims.  
The parties conducted a second deposition of the witness on 
February 19, 2019. 
During the disciplinary proceedings, James testified that he 
was unable to retrieve the texts from his daughter due to his own 
technological limitations.  He explained that worker’s compensation 
proceedings are informal, and he felt compelled to aid his witness 
during the deposition because Villaverde was constantly talking 
over Gray’s answers or interrupting with speaking objections, and 
he felt Gray was being mistreated.  The referee found that James’s 
texts to Gray while she was being questioned, telling her what to 
say, how to answer, to avoid providing certain information, to 
remember a deposition but not discuss certain checks, and to not 
give an absolute answer were dishonest. 
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Furthermore, the record shows that after the deposition 
ended, and in the days following the deposition, James tried to 
convince Villaverde that he sent the texts to Gray during the break, 
not during the questioning.  During a hearing on Villaverde’s 
motion for production and in-camera inspection, James failed to be 
transparent and forthright with the judge regarding his texts to 
Gray.  He made it appear that he only texted his wife and daughter 
during the deposition and that he sent the text messages to Gray 
during the break in the deposition. 
The referee recommends that James be found guilty of 
violating Bar Rules: 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor Misconduct) and 
4-3.4(a) (“A lawyer must not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s 
access to evidence or otherwise unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal 
a document . . . .”).  However, the referee recommends that James 
be found not guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not . . . 
engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .”) as well as others.  
The referee found the following aggravating factors were present:  
(1) dishonest or selfish motive; (2) refusal to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of the conduct; and (3) substantial experience in 
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the practice of law.  In mitigation, the referee found (1) absence of a 
prior disciplinary record; (2) full and free disclosure to the Bar or 
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; and (3) good character 
or reputation. 
The referee recommends that James be suspended from the 
practice of law for thirty days and that he be assessed the Bar’s 
costs.  The Bar seeks review of the referee’s recommendation that 
James be found not guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-8.4(d), as well as 
the recommended sanction. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The Referee’s Recommendation as to Guilt. 
To begin, the referee’s findings of fact are neither in dispute 
nor lacking in evidentiary support.  We therefore approve them 
without further comment.  The Bar challenges the referee’s 
recommendation of no guilt as to Bar Rule 4-8.4(d), contending that 
the referee’s own findings, as well as the record, support a contrary 
conclusion.  The Court must consider whether the referee’s 
recommendation that James be found not guilty of violating Bar 
Rule 4-8.4(d) is supported.  This Court has repeatedly stated that 
the referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable 
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rules to support the recommendations regarding guilt.  See Fla. Bar 
v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. Spear, 
887 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Fla. 2004).  The party challenging the 
referee’s finding of fact and recommendations as to guilt has the 
burden to demonstrate “that there is no evidence in the record to 
support those findings or that the record evidence clearly 
contradicts the conclusions.”  Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 
620 (Fla. 2007). 
Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) states, “A lawyer shall not . . . engage in 
conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to 
the administration of justice . . . .”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.4(d).  
This Court has determined that dishonesty in connection with the 
practice of law is prejudicial to the administration of justice.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Feinberg, 760 So. 2d 933, 938 (Fla. 2000).  Here, the 
referee specifically found that James’s response that he was just 
responding to his daughter when in fact texts were being sent to 
Gray was misleading and a matter contrary to honesty.  He also 
found that James misrepresented to Villaverde that he had 
concluded the text messaging when in fact he had not.  The referee 
further found that James’s texts to Gray while she was being 
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questioned, telling her what to say, how to answer, to avoid 
providing certain information, to remember a deposition but not 
discuss certain checks, and to not give an absolute answer were 
dishonest.  James’s dishonesty is clear from the record, and we find 
him guilty of violating Bar Rule 4-8.4(d). 
B. Discipline 
We now turn to the referee’s recommended discipline, a thirty-
day suspension.  In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, 
this Court’s scope of review is broader than that afforded to the 
referee’s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is this Court’s 
responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Picon, 205 So. 3d 759, 765 (Fla. 2016); Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 
So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  At the 
same time, this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in 
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions.  See Picon, 205 So. 3d at 765; Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 
So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999). 
The referee recommended a thirty-day suspension, finding 
that James’s conduct was not as egregious as in other cases 
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because he assisted Gray with dates that were already given.  We 
agree with the referee that a suspension is the appropriate sanction 
in this case.  See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 7.1(b) 
(“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in 
conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and 
causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal 
system.”).  James engaged in conduct aimed at defeating the 
opposing party’s lawful attempts to obtain evidence, undermining 
the adversarial process, and as a result, the trial court’s 
intervention was required.  He then made misrepresentations to 
cover up his misconduct.  However, we disagree with the referee’s 
conclusion that James’s conduct was not sufficiently egregious to 
warrant a more severe sanction. 
In Florida Bar v. Nicnick, 963 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2007), a lawyer 
with a prior ten-day suspension for misconduct concealed a child 
support settlement agreement from an opposing counsel before 
presenting it to opposing counsel’s client.  Nicnick continued to 
conceal the document from opposing counsel after it was returned 
to him, purportedly executed by opposing counsel’s client.  Id. at 
221.  Nicnick alleged that he felt compelled to investigate the 
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authenticity of the document before turning it over to opposing 
counsel and believed opposing counsel was aware of the settlement 
agreement.  Id. at 223.  We found that Nicnick’s failure to share the 
settlement agreement with opposing counsel was deceptive and 
suspended him for ninety-one days.  Id. at 225. 
Here, as in Nicnick, James was deceptive when he secretly sent 
the messages to Gray and then denied doing so when Villaverde 
questioned them about the texts.  He continued his deception after 
the deposition, claiming he sent the texts during a break in the 
deposition.  While James does not have a disciplinary history like 
Nicnick did, we find James’s behavior is even more egregious. 
James obstructed opposing counsel’s access to evidence when 
he secretly coached Gray while she was being questioned, telling 
her how to answer Villaverde’s questions and directing her to avoid 
providing certain information.  This conduct continued even after 
he assured Villaverde that he would stop texting during the 
deposition.  Thereafter, he repeatedly misrepresented to Villaverde 
that he did not send text messages to Gray during the deposition.  
Particularly egregious was his failure to be forthright with the Judge 
of Compensation Claims about sending the text messages to Gray 
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and about when he sent them.  We find that James’s behavior 
warrants a ninety-one-day suspension. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, we disapprove the referee’s recommended sanction 
and instead suspend James from the practice of law for ninety-one 
days.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of 
this opinion so that James can close out his practice and protect 
the interests of existing clients.  If James notifies this Court in 
writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty 
days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order 
making the suspension effective immediately.  James shall fully 
comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h).  James shall 
also fully comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-6.1, if 
applicable.  In addition, James shall accept no new business from 
the date this order is filed until he is reinstated.  James is further 
directed to comply with all other terms and conditions of the report. 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson 
Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from 
Derek Vashon James in the amount of $2,851.80, for which sum let 
execution issue. 
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It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, MUÑIZ, and 
COURIEL, JJ., concur. 
LAWSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, 
in which GROSSHANS, J., concurs. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER 
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
LAWSON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the referee’s own 
findings, as well as the record, support a determination that 
James’s conduct violated Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-8.4(d) 
(“A lawyer shall not: . . . engage in conduct in connection with the 
practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . 
.”), majority op. at 7-9, and concur in that part of the majority 
opinion.  However, in light of the referee’s mitigation findings and 
ability to personally assess both James’s demeanor as well as the 
credibility of his character evidence, I would follow the referee’s 
recommendation to the extent of imposing a nonrehabilitative 
suspension. 
We have previously stated that “the Court will generally not 
second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline, as long as it 
has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida 
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Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.”  Fla. Bar v. Picon, 205 
So. 3d 759, 765 (Fla. 2016) (citing Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d 
555, 558 (Fla. 1999)).  Although I recognize the very serious nature 
of James’s misconduct, I would not second-guess the referee’s 
recommendation to impose a nonrehabilitative suspension here.  
The referee found that James demonstrated cooperation by 
voluntarily producing text messages between himself and the 
witness beyond that which was required by the order of the Judge 
of Compensation Claims.  The referee further noted that James’s 
character witnesses, two attorneys with many years of experience 
practicing in the same field as James, testified to his well-
established reputation for being honest and fair within the worker’s 
compensation community.  This character testimony suggests that 
James’s misconduct here is an isolated incident. 
When reviewing James’s conduct, the referee considered case 
law where the Court imposed a ninety-one-day rehabilitative 
suspension and noted that the conduct in those cases was more 
egregious than James’s conduct.  One such case was Florida Bar v. 
Berthiaume, 78 So. 3d 503 (Fla. 2011).  There, this Court held that 
an attorney’s abuse of the subpoena power to conduct a personal 
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investigation demonstrated the utmost disrespect for the courts and 
warranted a ninety-one-day rehabilitative suspension.  Id. at 510-
11.  Another case cited by the referee was Florida Bar v. Nicnick, 
963 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2007), which I, unlike the majority, see 
majority op. at 11, agree supports the imposition of a 
nonrehabilitative suspension.  The attorney in Nicnick not only 
failed to disclose a settlement agreement to opposing counsel but 
also had a prior ten-day suspension.  963 So. 2d at 222. 
In contrast to the facts in Berthiaume and Nicnick that 
supported imposing a rehabilitative suspension, in James’s case, 
the referee found that James’s cooperation, full and free disclosure, 
lack of a prior record, and character testimony from two witnesses 
were mitigating factors sufficient to justify a nonrehabilitative 
sanction.  The referee’s recommendation was largely based on 
credibility determinations and an assessment of James’s demeanor 
that the referee was in the best position to make, and the referee’s 
recommendation is consistent with our precedent. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the 
opinion that imposes a ninety-one-day rehabilitative suspension. 
GROSSHANS, J., concurs. 
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Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Daniel James 
Quinn, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Orlando, Florida; and M. 
Hope Keating and Barry Richard of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Barry Rigby of Law Offices of Barry Rigby, P.A., Winter Park, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent