Case Title: Commonwealth v. Leiva

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12166 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JULIO BRIAN LEIVA. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     September 10, 2019. - June 9, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Robbery.  Armed Assault with Intent to Rob.  Fair 
Trial.  Rules of Professional Conduct.  Due Process of Law, 
Fair trial, Assistance of counsel.  Constitutional Law, 
Fair trial, Assistance of counsel, Confrontation of 
witnesses, Double jeopardy.  Witness, Expert.  Evidence, 
Expert opinion, Relevancy and materiality.  Practice, 
Criminal, Fair trial, Assistance of counsel, Confrontation 
of witnesses, Double jeopardy, Duplicative convictions, 
Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 11, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Daniel A. Ford, J. 
 
 
Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant. 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, K. Neil Austin, & Michael Hoven, for Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  A Hampden County jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder 
with attempted armed robbery as the predicate felony, in 
connection with the shooting death of William Serrano.  The 
victim was shot seven times at close range, as he sat smoking a 
cigarette with his girlfriend on the back porch of the 
girlfriend's sister's Springfield home.  Three men in dark 
hooded sweatshirts surrounded him, and one held a gun to his 
chest while the others searched his pockets.  Trapped in his 
chair, the victim appealed to the men to "chill" and "leave me 
alone."  Gun fire followed.  At trial, the Commonwealth called 
the victim's girlfriend, who identified her ex-boyfriend, the 
defendant, as the shooter. 
In this direct appeal from his convictions, the defendant 
contends that he is entitled to a new trial, principally due to 
his counsel's invocation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e), as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1416 (2015) (rule 3.3 [e]), which 
"forced" him to testify by way of a narrative, causing myriad 
violations of his State and Federal constitutional rights.1  The 
defendant also contends that (1) allowing the testimony of a 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the brief filed in support of the defendant 
by the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as 
amicus curiae. 
3 
 
 
 
substitute medical examiner, who did not perform the victim's 
autopsy, but who relied, in part, upon the original medical 
examiner's autopsy report in forming an expert opinion, violated 
his witness confrontation rights where the Commonwealth failed 
to show that the original medical examiner was legally 
unavailable; (2) failure to sever the defendant's trial from 
that of his codefendant resulted in prejudicial error because 
the trial judge admitted ammunition evidence found at the 
residence of his codefendant; and (3) his conviction of and 
sentencing for both felony-murder, with attempted armed robbery 
as the predicate felony, and armed assault with the intent to 
rob violated the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  The defendant also requests 
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
After a thorough review of the record, we discern no 
reversible error, and we decline to exercise our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce or set aside the verdict of 
murder in the first degree. 
Background.  1.  The evidence and proceedings at trial may 
be summarized as follows, reserving certain details for our 
analysis of the issues raised on appeal.  The victim's 
girlfriend had also previously dated the defendant "on and off" 
for about two years.  Although their dating relationship had 
ended about six months prior to the shooting, the girlfriend and 
4 
 
 
 
the defendant remained friendly.  The defendant visited 
Springfield several times per month, typically staying with 
friends on the third floor of an apartment building (friends' 
house).  During those visits, he and the girlfriend saw one 
another regularly. 
On the evening of the shooting, the victim accompanied the 
girlfriend to a family dinner that her sister was hosting at her 
residence.  When the couple arrived with the girlfriend's mother 
between 5:30 P.M. and 5:45 P.M., the victim situated himself in 
the living room to watch football, while the girlfriend joined 
family in the adjacent kitchen for dinner.  About twenty minutes 
later, they were just finishing the meal when the defendant 
arrived, uninvited, wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt with the 
"Sons of Anarchy" logo emblazoned on the back.  The girlfriend's 
sister offered him dinner. 
The defendant sat in the kitchen, eating and sending text 
messages on his cell phone for about one-half hour, and then 
left.  He returned to the gathering about fifteen minutes later, 
now wearing a dark puffy coat on top of the sweatshirt, visited 
for another ten to fifteen minutes, and then departed again.  
The defendant left through the back door of the house, onto a 
landing, where there was a small porch to his right and stairs 
on his left, which led down to the yard.  As the defendant 
stepped onto the landing, he passed by the victim, who was 
5 
 
 
 
sitting in a chair on the porch, smoking a cigarette with the 
girlfriend.  From her seat on the victim's lap, the girlfriend 
saw the defendant walk down the stairs, then around to the 
right, and behind the porch. 
A few minutes later, the defendant reemerged from behind 
the porch, followed closely by two other men in dark sweatshirts 
with raised hoods.  The girlfriend recognized one of these other 
men as Amadi Sosa, one of the defendant's friends (codefendant).  
As the defendant mounted the stairs to the porch, the defendant 
pointed the sawed-off barrel of a shotgun at the girlfriend, who 
was then attempting to block the top of the stairway.  As the 
three men pushed past her, the girlfriend opened the back door 
and shouted to her mother to call the police.  The three men 
surrounded the victim, and the defendant held the barrel of the 
gun toward the victim's chest.  The defendant instructed the 
other two men to "run his pockets," and they then bent over to 
reach into the victim's pockets. 
The victim, trapped in the chair, protested to no avail.  
Standing at close range, the defendant shot the victim seven 
times; the two other men looked on.  Screaming and bleeding, the 
victim managed to crawl inside, where police found him several 
minutes later, still alive and responsive.  The victim was 
rushed to the hospital, where he died in surgery. 
6 
 
 
 
Immediately after the shooting, the defendant returned to 
the friends' house, entered through the back, and then locked 
the front door to the building and hid in an apartment one floor 
below his usual accommodations.  Police came to the building and 
knocked on the door of the third-floor apartment; when no one 
answered, they waited for some period of time and then left.  At 
about 7:30 P.M., the defendant telephoned a female friend 
(driver) who had driven him from Framingham to Springfield and 
back several times in recent months.  He stated his desire "to 
hear her voice one last time," told her "shit went down," and 
then hung up.  The defendant's friend "Ketchup" telephoned the 
driver shortly thereafter, prompting the driver to depart for 
Springfield to pick up the defendant.  At 7:52 P.M., the 
defendant sent a text message to the driver, requesting pick-up 
at the codefendant's residence.  The driver responded:  "Babe, 
stay there."  Shortly thereafter, the defendant messaged the 
driver with a different address for rendezvous.  The driver knew 
this was the home of the defendant's friend "Ketchup," and had 
driven there for the defendant before. 
When the driver arrived at Ketchup's residence, it was 
after 11 P.M. and the defendant was in a rush to leave 
Springfield.  In the car, on the return trip to Framingham, the 
defendant appeared agitated, and the driver asked what had 
happened.  In response, the defendant used the driver's cell 
7 
 
 
 
phone to access the Internet and showed her a local news 
headline about a recent shooting in Springfield, on the street 
where the girlfriend's sister lived.  Back at the driver's 
Framingham residence, the defendant told her he "went to go rob 
somebody" but things went wrong.  The defendant evaded arrest 
until approximately one year after the shooting, when he was 
located in San Diego, California, and taken into custody.  
Police never recovered the murder weapon. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth proceeded against the defendant 
on all three theories of murder in the first degree:  deliberate 
premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder, 
with the predicate felony of armed robbery or attempted armed 
robbery.2  The prosecution's case primarily relied upon the 
eyewitness testimony of the girlfriend,3 who identified the 
defendant as the shooter .  During her trial testimony, the 
girlfriend also identified the codefendant and his brother as 
the two other men involved in the shooting,4 and revealed that 
                     
 
2 The defendant and the codefendant were tried jointly.  The 
codefendant's appeal from his conviction of murder in the first 
degree remains pending. 
 
 
3 Other witnesses for the Commonwealth included sixteen 
members of the Springfield police department, the girlfriend's 
sister and their mother, and the driver, who testified under the 
terms of a cooperation agreement with the Commonwealth. 
 
 
4 The girlfriend testified that she was "210 percent" 
certain that the third man involved in the shooting was the 
codefendant's brother, John.  She had identified all three of 
8 
 
 
 
she had seen the murder weapon at least once before the date of 
the shooting, at the codefendant's residence. 
 
The Commonwealth also introduced video and ballistics 
evidence.  The video footage, taken from surveillance cameras 
mounted in and around the friends' house, was probative as to 
certain details of the defendant's movements on the evening of 
the shooting.5  The ballistics evidence demonstrated that certain 
rounds of live .22 caliber ammunition police seized upon 
executing a warrant to search certain areas of the codefendant's 
residence both bore the same common manufacturer's markings as 
the seven shell casings recovered at the crime scene and were of 
                     
the men from photographic arrays presented to her by police.  A 
nolle prosequi was entered for the charges brought against the 
codefendant's brother when police brought charges against 
another individual instead.  The Commonwealth consented to sever 
the trial of this third alleged coventurer from the trial of the 
defendant and the codefendant. 
 
 
5 The Commonwealth properly authenticated and introduced the 
video footage as an exhibit in evidence through the testimony of 
several police witnesses.  The Commonwealth further elicited 
testimony about the positioning of cameras and recording 
logistics, and surveillance practices from an agent for the 
property management company then responsible for the friends' 
house.  The video recording provided the jury with evidence 
relevant to the timing, manner, and direction of the defendant's 
travels to and from the friends' house on the night in question.  
The movements reflected in the recording corroborated the 
girlfriend's testimony about the times the defendant was present 
at her sister's residence on the night of the shooting.  At the 
outset of trial, the court brought the jury on a view of the 
crime scene and its surrounding area, including stops at the 
friends' house and the residences of the girlfriend's sister, 
Ketchup, and the codefendant. 
9 
 
 
 
a caliber identical to that of four bullets recovered from the 
victim's body, and to that of the single bullet and seven shell 
casings recovered at the crime scene.  The Commonwealth's 
ballistics expert also testified as to his opinions, based upon 
personally performed prior testing of the seven shell casings 
and five bullets in evidence, that (i) all seven shell casings 
had been fired from the same unknown weapon capable of 
chambering and firing .22 caliber ammunition, and (ii) all five 
projectiles had been shot from the same unknown weapon capable 
of chambering and firing .22 caliber ammunition.  Without a gun 
for use in testing, however, it was not possible for the expert 
to provide an opinion whether the same weapon had both ejected 
the casings and shot the bullets. 
The theory of the defense relied on impeaching the 
girlfriend's credibility and criticizing the adequacy of the 
police investigation.  The defendant exercised his right to 
testify in his own defense, which he did in the form of a 
narrative.  He told the jury that he visited the residence of 
the girlfriend's sister early in the evening of November 10, 
2013, and ate dinner there, but left no later than about 6:15 
P.M. without returning.  Afterwards, the defendant went for a 
ride with friends to buy some marijuana and then returned to the 
friends' house, where he smoked with another friend in her 
second-floor apartment.  On cross-examination, the defendant 
10 
 
 
 
expressly denied that he shot the victim, and stated that he had 
not seen the codefendant during that mid-November trip to 
Springfield.  When confronted with the Commonwealth's video 
evidence, the defendant agreed that he was the individual 
appearing in some portions of the footage, where his distinctive 
"Sons of Anarchy" sweatshirt was visible, but denied that he was 
the individual appearing in other segments of the film, 
including one showing an individual in a dark puffy coat and 
possibly carrying something running toward the friends' house 
from the direction of the crime scene, within minutes of the 911 
dispatch, and another showing the same individual coming around 
to the back of the building and up the stairs to the second 
floor.  During cross-examination, defense counsel objected when 
the prosecutor asked the defendant why he had decided to testify 
at trial; the judge sustained the objection, and the defendant 
did not answer. 
In closing, defense counsel emphasized the presumption of 
innocence and the prosecution's high burden of proof:  he 
challenged the girlfriend's credibility, highlighting her 
absolute certainty that the codefendant's brother was the third 
man at the shooting, where police had conclusively ruled him 
out; called attention to the unexplained gaps and incorrect 
times reflected in the Commonwealth's video evidence; and 
condemned the "shoddy" nature of the police investigation, 
11 
 
 
 
conducted by officers whose testimony suggested narrow 
understandings of their respective assignments, as each had 
disclaimed responsibility for various investigative acts they 
described as "other officers' job."  At times during closing 
argument, defense counsel invoked portions of the defendant's 
testimony, including his treatment of the Commonwealth's video 
evidence, and the defendant's account of his interactions and 
conversations with the driver, but counsel did not reference the 
defendant's express denials that he shot the victim or saw the 
codefendant during his time in Springfield.  The jury acquitted 
the defendant of armed robbery, but found him guilty of murder 
in the first degree on all three theories, guilty of armed 
assault with the intent to rob, and guilty of unlawful 
possession of ammunition. 
2.  The defendant's allegations of infringements upon his 
constitutional rights by reason of his counsel's invocation of 
rule 3.3 (e) arose from the following events.  After the 
Commonwealth rested its case, the judge ordered a recess to 
allow defense counsel to confer with the defendant concerning 
whether the defendant would testify.  Once the judge returned to 
the bench, defense counsel requested to approach sidebar with 
the defendant present.  Upon confirming defense counsel did not 
seek an ex parte sidebar, the judge asked all attorneys to 
approach, but not the defendant. 
12 
 
 
 
At sidebar, the defendant's counsel reported that the 
defendant had decided to testify.  Defense counsel also revealed 
that, on the night before, he had had a lengthy telephone 
conversation with counsel for the Board of Bar Overseers 
concerning defense counsel's obligations under rule 3.3 (e) 
"involving supporting perjury."  After referring the judge to 
this court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535, 
cert. denied, 539 U.S. 907 (2003), defense counsel announced his 
intention to invoke rule 3.3 (e) upon the judge's permission for 
the defendant to join at sidebar, and to seek subsequent 
instruction from the judge as to how to proceed.  There was no 
objection. 
With the judge's permission, the defendant approached 
sidebar, whereupon defense counsel stated, "I'm invoking Rule 
3.3 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal [sic] Conduct," and 
then requested guidance from the judge.  Defense counsel added:  
"I do know if he takes the stand, I can ask him that one 
question . . . .  I have advised him as to what I'm supposed to 
advise him."  The judge then turned to the defendant and asked 
if this was true.  The defendant agreed that his counsel "told 
[him] what Rule 3.3 consists of" and responded "Yes" to the 
judge's follow-up inquiry whether he understood what counsel had 
told him. 
13 
 
 
 
The defendant returned to counsel table, and the attorneys 
remained at sidebar while the judge reviewed rule 3.3 (e) and 
the opinion in Mitchell.  As the judge alternated between 
reading certain portions of these authorities and commenting 
aloud, defense counsel stated the following relevant 
information:  prior to invoking rule 3.3, he had determined that 
withdrawing from representation would prejudice the defendant; 
he had been practicing law for thirty years, with about eighty-
five percent of his total engagements being in criminal defense 
matters; and his conduct at sidebar was limited to "invoking the 
rule," and "not making any representations of anything and I'm 
not allowed to."6  The judge instructed counsel "to follow the 
suggestions set forth in Mitchell and I will permit [the 
defendant] to give a narrative."  The judge also expressly 
prohibited all attorneys from making any reference to the rule 
or the form of the defendant's testimony, either during cross-
examination of the defendant or in closing argument.  Against 
counsel's advice, the defendant took the witness stand in 
exercise of his right to be heard in his own defense.  
                     
 
6 In the process of reviewing Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 
Mass. 535, cert. denied, 539 U.S. 907 (2003), the judge stated:  
"when the question of perjured testimony from a defendant 
arises, [rule 3.3 (e)] requires the lawyer before invoking the 
rule to act in good faith and firm basis in objective fact.  I 
gather you have done that?"  Defense counsel responded:  "I have 
followed my obligations under the rule and the caselaw." 
14 
 
 
 
Responding to defense counsel's single request to "tell the jury 
what you would like to talk to them about, please," the 
defendant testified in the form of a narrative. 
The judge clearly instructed the jury, on several 
occasions, that determinations of fact and witness credibility 
were solely and entirely for them to decide.7  In his charge to 
the jury, the judge explained that "[a]ttorneys have very grave 
responsibilities . . . to present evidence which is most helpful 
to their respective positions," and that objections or requests 
for sidebar conferences out of the jury's hearing were not to 
deprive the jury of relevant information, but rather to ensure 
they would only hear evidence that was relevant and "hear it in 
such a way that you are given a fair opportunity to evaluate its 
worth."  The judge did not instruct the jury regarding the 
presentation of the defendant's testimony in narrative form. 
Discussion.  1.  As-applied constitutional challenges to 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e).  Rule 3.3 (e) and related procedures 
this court approved in Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535, govern the 
                     
 
7 Prior to closing argument, the judge instructed the jury 
that "[t]he attorneys are not permitted to express their 
personal belief in the credibility or lack of credibility of any 
witness who testified in this case," and that witness 
credibility determinations were only for the jury to decide.  In 
his charge, the judge stated that if any juror believed that, at 
any point during the trial, he made any statement or ruling 
"suggesting how [he] felt the case was going or how the facts 
ought to be found, ignore it." 
15 
 
 
 
ethical and legal obligations of criminal defense counsel 
confronting anticipated client perjury.8  The primary duty of a 
                     
 
8 Rule 3.3 (e) states: 
 
"In a criminal case, defense counsel who knows that the 
defendant, the client, intends to testify falsely may not 
aid the client in constructing false testimony, and has a 
duty strongly to discourage the client from testifying 
falsely, advising that such a course is unlawful, will have 
substantial adverse consequences, and should not be 
followed. 
 
"(1) If a lawyer discovers this intention before accepting 
the representation of the client, the lawyer shall not 
accept the representation. 
 
"(2) If, in the course of representing a defendant prior to 
trial, the lawyer discovers this intention and is unable to 
persuade the client not to testify falsely, the lawyer 
shall seek to withdraw from the representation, requesting 
any required permission.  Disclosure of privileged or 
prejudicial information shall be made only to the extent 
necessary to effect the withdrawal.  If disclosure of 
privileged or prejudicial information is necessary, the 
lawyer shall make an application to withdraw ex parte to a 
judge other than the judge who will preside at the trial 
and shall seek to be heard in camera and have the record of 
the proceeding, except for an order granting leave to 
withdraw, impounded.  If the lawyer is unable to obtain the 
required permission to withdraw, the lawyer may not prevent 
the client from testifying. 
 
"(3) If a criminal trial has commenced and the lawyer 
discovers that the client intends to testify falsely at 
trial, the lawyer need not file a motion to withdraw from 
the case if the lawyer reasonably believes that seeking to 
withdraw will prejudice the client.  If, during the 
client's testimony or after the client has testified, the 
lawyer knows that the client has testified falsely, the 
lawyer shall call upon the client to rectify the false 
testimony and, if the client refuses or is unable to do so, 
the lawyer shall not reveal the false testimony to the 
tribunal.  In no event may the lawyer examine the client in 
such a manner as to elicit any testimony from the client 
16 
 
 
 
criminal defense attorney who "knows that the defendant, the 
client, intends to testify falsely," is "strongly to discourage" 
the client from executing that intent, "advising that such a 
course [of conduct] is unlawful, will have substantial adverse 
consequences, and should not be followed."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 
3.3 (e).  Where defense counsel encounters this dilemma after 
commencement of trial, and counsel's persuasive efforts fail, 
rule 3.3 (e) prohibits counsel from "examin[ing] the client in 
such a manner as to elicit any testimony from the client the 
lawyer knows to be false," and from "argu[ing] the probative 
value of the false testimony in closing argument or in any other 
proceedings, including appeals."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e) (3). 
In Mitchell, we considered a defendant's consolidated 
appeal from his conviction on two counts of murder in the first 
degree and the denial of his subsequent motion for a new trial.  
The defendant in Mitchell alleged ineffective assistance of 
counsel along with an assortment of other constitutional rights 
violations purportedly arising from (1) defense counsel's 
sidebar invocation of rule 3.3 (e) during trial, in the 
defendant's absence, and without sufficient grounds to "know" 
                     
the lawyer knows to be false, and the lawyer shall not 
argue the probative value of the false testimony in closing 
argument or in any other proceedings, including appeals." 
 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e), as appearing at 471 Mass. 1416 
(2015). 
17 
 
 
 
the defendant "intend[ed] to testify falsely;" (2) the 
consequential restriction of the defendant's testimony to 
narrative form; and (3) the notable absence of any reference to 
that testimony during defense counsel's closing summation.  We 
determined that the affidavit of counsel filed in connection 
with the defendant's new trial motion established counsel's 
"knowledge" of the defendant's intent to testify falsely prior 
to invoking rule 3.3 (e), where counsel had reached this 
conclusion "in good faith based on objective circumstances 
firmly rooted in fact," and that, while the defendant's absence 
from the sidebar conference was error, it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Mitchell, 438 Mass. at 546, 548.  We further 
held that (1) "[t]he narrative form of testimony was properly 
directed" and compliant with counsel's ethical obligations, id. 
at 549; (2) counsel's well-reasoned and persuasive closing 
argument did not "denude" his client of a defense by omitting 
reference to the defendant's testimony, id. at 550; and (3) no 
colloquy was required where the record supported the judge's 
determination that the defendant's waiver of counsel's 
assistance with respect to his own testimony was knowing and 
voluntary, id.9 
                     
 
9 To the extent that the court in Mitchell suggested that 
direction of narrative testimony requires a defendant's limited 
waiver of the right to counsel's assistance, we clarify that 
where a trial judge implementing rule 3.3 (e) exercises 
18 
 
 
 
On appeal from his convictions, the defendant here raises 
several as-applied constitutional challenges to rule 3.3 (e) and 
to certain procedures we approved in Mitchell.  The defendant 
argues that, following his decision to testify in his own 
defense, his trial proceeded in such a way that rule 3.3 (e) 
functioned to (1) compel defense counsel to both suspend his 
proper role as advocate and improperly usurp the jury's role as 
fact finder; (2) confine the form of the defendant's trial 
testimony to an uninterrupted narrative, without the benefit of 
counsel's direction; and (3) prevent counsel from deploying 
critical exculpatory portions of the defendant's testimony in 
closing argument.  Insofar as rule 3.3 (e) was thus applied to 
constrain counsel's advocacy and restrict the presentation of 
the defendant's trial testimony, based only on defense counsel's 
"knowledge" of the defendant's intent to testify falsely, the 
defendant specifically contends that the rule was implemented in 
violation of his State and Federal constitutional rights to an 
impartial jury, a fair trial, and the due process of law, as 
well as his privilege against self-incrimination, right to 
                     
discretion to direct that a defendant's testimony take narrative 
form (should the defendant persist in the decision to testify 
falsely), this does not leave the defendant "unrepresented" 
during that testimony.  Where the defendant decides to testify 
under these circumstances, that decision carries a rule-based 
relinquishment of the right to direct examination by counsel, 
which counsel is accordingly duty-bound to explain as part of 
the remonstration requirement. 
19 
 
 
 
testify in his own defense, and right to the assistance of 
counsel.  The defendant further alleges that the judge permitted 
his functional waiver of all these critical rights without 
adequate prior determination that the defendant's action was 
both knowing and voluntary.10 
Following discussion of the purposes that rule 3.3 (e) 
serves, we consider the defendant's contention that the manner 
in which defense counsel and the trial judge deployed 
rule 3.3 (e) and the Mitchell protocol here gave rise to errors 
of constitutional proportion.  Upon comprehensive review of the 
entire record in the defendant's case, we discern no error, 
constitutional or otherwise.  We conclude that defense counsel 
and the trial judge exercised appropriate discretion in 
selecting from among the range of procedures we authorized in 
Mitchell to meet the demands of rule 3.3 (e), without resultant 
violation of this defendant's Federal or State constitutional 
rights. 
                     
 
10 The defendant expressly does not challenge the 
sufficiency of defense counsel's factual basis for invoking rule 
3.3 (e) at trial or otherwise assert an ineffective assistance 
claim.  No motion for a new trial followed the verdicts, and the 
record on appeal does not contain an affidavit of trial counsel.  
Although nothing in this ruling precludes the defendant from 
filing a motion for a new trial challenging the basis of 
counsel's knowledge determination that the defendant intended to 
commit perjury, no appeal from an order ruling on such motion 
may lie unless first allowed by a single justice of this court.  
See G. L. c. 278, § 33E (to be allowed, postrescript appeal must 
"present[] a new and substantial question"). 
20 
 
 
 
We also take this opportunity to reexamine and reaffirm our 
conclusions in Mitchell, albeit with certain prospective 
emphases intended to clarify our rule 3.3 (e) doctrine, and 
confirm the availability of additional tools to defense counsel 
and trial judges to mitigate any derivative harshness that may 
otherwise inure to the defendant's detriment.  These include 
(1) the ability to conduct direct testimony as to portions of 
the defendant's intended testimony other than what counsel 
"knows" to be false, where, in counsel's exercise of 
professional judgment, this will mitigate potential for 
prejudice; (2) the ability to marshal portions of the 
defendant's testimony other than those parts counsel "knows" to 
be false in support of closing argument, where, in counsel's 
exercise of professional judgment, it will mitigate potential 
for prejudice; (3) providing that the judge should conduct a 
sidebar colloquy with defense counsel, in the defendant's 
presence, following counsel's invocation of rule 3.3 (e); and 
(4) providing, absent the defendant's expressed preference to 
the contrary, that the judge shall instruct the jury that they 
may not derive any inference from or otherwise consider the form 
of any witness's testimony. 
a.  Purpose of rule 3.3 (e).  The dimensions of the problem 
facing "defense counsel who knows that . . . [his or her] client 
. . . intends to testify falsely" at trial have not altered in 
21 
 
 
 
the seventeen years since we last assessed them, in Mitchell.  
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e).  Rule 3.3 (e) governs circumstances 
wherein a defense attorney's duties as a loyal advocate, "to 
present the client's case with persuasive force . . . while 
maintaining confidences of the client," collide with counsel's 
fundamental duty as an "officer" of the court, who "must not 
allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or 
fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false."11  Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 3.3 comment 2.  This intractable ethical dilemma 
strikes infrequently,12 but the potential impact of how we define 
                     
 
11 The solution this court reached in Commonwealth v. 
Moffett, 383 Mass. 201 (1981), sought to achieve a similar 
balance with respect to a defendant's right to counsel on appeal 
and counsel's ethical duty not to pursue frivolous legal 
arguments.  Where the defendant seeks to direct his or her 
appellate defense in a manner that would violate counsel's 
ethical obligations, the defendant may elect to proceed without 
counsel's assistance in certain limited respects, while still 
retaining the benefits of that right with respect to the 
remainder of the defense. 
 
 
12 These circumstances arise infrequently at trial.  A 
significant majority of criminal matters in this Commonwealth 
are resolved by entry of a guilty plea.  With respect to those 
criminal matters resolved by verdict following trial, the 
majority of defendants who exercise the right to trial also 
choose not to testify.  The majority of defense counsel 
representing defendants who decide to testify at trial are not 
faced with eve-of-trial or midtrial "knowledge" of the 
defendant's intent to testify falsely.  When defense counsel 
does encounter those circumstances, we expect that, a majority 
of the time, "a sharp private warning" from defense counsel, 
Mitchell, 438 Mass. at 546, as is required under rule 3.3 (e), 
will be effective in dissuading the defendant from carrying out 
planned perjury, negating any need for counsel's formal 
invocation of rule 3.3 (e) and allowing counsel to call and 
22 
 
 
 
a defense attorney's proper response implicates foundational 
constitutional safeguards, professional standards, and 
institutional objectives.  In other words, the integrity of our 
criminal justice system requires a sound established protocol. 
The objective of rule 3.3 (e) is to promote the honest 
administration of criminal justice.  In Mitchell, we recognized 
a "core principle of our judicial system that seeks to make a 
trial a search for truth."  Mitchell, 438 Mass. at 551.  See 
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) ("There is no 
gainsaying that arriving at truth is a fundamental goal of our 
legal system").  Of course, "[t]ruth is only one of the 
ingredients of justice.  Its whole is the satisfaction of those 
concerned" that a verdict is reached fairly.  Curtis, The Ethics 
of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 12 (1951).  Our construct of a 
fair trial embraces a defendant's individual right to answer to 
the State's charges, or, in the language of art. 12 of our 
Declaration of Rights, "to be fully heard in [one's] defense by 
[one]self or [one's] counsel, at [one's] election."  Among other 
things, this right to present a defense encompasses a 
defendant's right to counsel and right to testify at trial. 
                     
question the defendant in the usual manner, without ethical 
reservation.  See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 161-162 
(1986) (denying ineffective assistance claim arising from 
defense counsel's successful effort to convince his client not 
to testify falsely at trial). 
23 
 
 
 
The right to counsel is critical to secure a defendant's 
right to a fair trial.  "The very premise of our adversary 
system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both 
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that 
the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."  Herring v. 
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).  See United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) ("truth . . . is best 
discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question" 
[citation omitted]).  That foundational proposition tying 
partisan advocacy to just results demands an accused's access to 
defense counsel who projects "[t]he manifest appearance of a 
believer" in the defendant's chosen plea of "not guilty," 
Curtis, supra at 14, and delivers on the constitutional guaranty 
that a defendant "need not stand alone against the State at any 
stage of the prosecution . . . where counsel's absence might 
derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial," United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).  See Penson v. Ohio, 
488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) ("Absent representation . . . it is 
unlikely that a criminal defendant will be able adequately to 
test the government's case"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 685 (1984) (Sixth Amendment to United States 
Constitution "envisions counsel's playing a role that is 
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce 
just results").  "[E]ven when no theory of defense is available, 
24 
 
 
 
if the decision to stand trial has been made, counsel must hold 
the prosecution to its heavy burden of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt."  Cronic, supra at 656 n.19.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.1 
comment 3, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1414 (2015) (sanctioning 
defense counsel in "put[ting] the prosecution to its proof in 
all circumstances"). 
A defendant's right to testify is another of an accused's 
fundamental rights to ensure a fair trial.  Where a represented 
defendant elects to answer the State's charge in his own voice, 
and present the fact finder with "his own version of events in 
his own words," Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987), he is 
entitled to take the stand and provide sworn testimony as a 
witness in his own behalf -- with counsel's direction enabling 
that testimony to proceed "in an organized, complete and 
coherent way," Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 591 (1961).  
Even where counsel advises against it, the final decision 
whether a defendant takes the stand belongs to the defendant. 
Notably, this right to testify in one's own behalf, which 
we consider fundamental today, is of relatively recent vintage.  
At common law, defendants were disqualified from testifying at 
trial: 
"[T]he theory of the common law was to admit to the witness 
stand only those presumably honest, appreciating the 
sanctity of an oath, unaffected as a party by the result, 
and free from any of the temptations of interest.  The 
courts were afraid to trust the intelligence of jurors." 
25 
 
 
 
Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 336 (1892) (diagnosing 
"[f]ear or perjury" as "the reason for the rule").  That 
practice prevailed in this Commonwealth, until 1866.  See St. 
1866, c. 260; Commonwealth v. Stewart, 255 Mass. 9, 16 (1926).  
To assuage the fears of those opposing change, the 1866 law "in 
relation to evidence in criminal prosecutions" rendered 
defendants competent to testify, but expressly prohibited "any 
presumption against the defendant" owing to "neglect or refusal 
to testify."  See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 578 (citing fear of 
"erosion of the privilege against self-incrimination and the 
presumption of innocence" to explain "lag" in legislation). 
Experience under the new law soon gave rise to an 
understanding that permitting criminal defendants to testify at 
their sole election would be "equally serviceable for the 
protection of innocence" and "the detection of guilt."  Id. at 
581, quoting 1 Am. L. Rev. 396 (1867).  The advent of witness 
competency statutes thus suggests increased communal trust in 
both the power of cross-examination to elicit truth, see 5 
Wigmore, Evidence § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (hailing 
cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented 
for the discovery of truth"), and the jury's ability to deploy 
collective common sense and life experience to judge credibility 
accurately, Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 672 (1998).  
Subjecting the evidence to rigorous adversarial testing and 
26 
 
 
 
entrusting an impartial fact finder as the judge of credibility 
are critical components of a functioning adversary justice 
system. 
The right to trial by a fair and impartial jury is a pillar 
of our democratic liberty and "a vital restraint on the penal 
authority of government," as much so as any of the 
constitutional rights that ensure the individual criminal 
defendant a fair opportunity to state a defense.  Illinois v. 
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 348 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).  
Nothing provides ballast for these procedural pillars other than 
the people's confidence in their legitimacy as means to produce 
accurate and fair settlement of social disputes.  "The 
Constitution would protect none of us if it prevented the courts 
[and its officers] from acting to preserve the very processes 
that the Constitution itself prescribes."  Id. at 350.  Along 
those same lines, "the mere invocation of [a fundamental 
individual] right cannot automatically and invariably outweigh 
countervailing public interests."  Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 
400, 414 (1988). 
Attorneys, including those who represent criminal 
defendants on trial, are officers of the court.  In this 
Commonwealth, every attorney, as a statutory condition to 
licensure, swears an ancient oath to "do no falsehood, nor 
consent to the doing of any in court," and to "conduct [oneself] 
27 
 
 
 
in the office of an attorney within the courts according to the 
best of [one's] knowledge and discretion, and with all good 
fidelity as well to the courts as [one's] clients."13  G. L. 
c. 221, § 38.  A decision to elevate the standard of knowledge 
required to compel a defense attorney to disclose the 
defendant's intent to commit perjury, to inaccessible heights, 
would functionally tolerate the attorney's deliberate assistance 
of client perjury, compromising the integrity of jury verdicts 
and undermining public confidence in our system of justice. 
While our system scrupulously safeguards an accused's 
individual rights, the Constitution does not relieve a defendant 
from compliance with "rules of procedure and evidence designed 
to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of 
guilt and innocence."14  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 
                     
 
13 Although this oath was widely in use here by 1686, 
applicable law in what is now our Commonwealth continuously has 
required attorneys admitted to practice in the jurisdiction to 
swear the oath since 1701, with only minor linguistic variation.  
See Andrews, The Lawyer's Oath:  Both Ancient and Modern, 22 
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 3, 20 & n.77 (2009) (discussing history of 
oath). 
 
 
14 The United States Supreme Court also has expressly 
affirmed that "[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right 
to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise 
inadmissible under standard rules of evidence."  Taylor v. 
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988).  Moreover, "adherence to 
rules of procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts 
and arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to 
assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the 
opponent's case" are necessary for the adversary process to 
function effectively, and "[t]he State's interest in the orderly 
28 
 
 
 
302 (1973).  To this we add that a defendant's exercise of the 
right to counsel's assistance does not secure representation 
outside the purview of our rules of professional conduct.15  A 
defendant's right to testify (or present other evidence in his 
or her defense) is not a license to compel defense counsel to 
knowingly assist in eliciting false testimony or introducing 
other fabrications in evidence.  See United States v. Grayson, 
438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978) (describing attorney's ethical 
responsibility not to "assist his [or her] client in presenting 
what the attorney has reason to believe is false testimony" as 
"an important limitation on a defendant's right to the 
assistance of counsel"). 
It is well established that "[a] defendant's right to 
present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is 
subject to reasonable restrictions."  United States v. Scheffer, 
                     
conduct of a criminal trial is sufficient to justify the 
imposition and enforcement of firm, though not always 
inflexible, rules relating to the identification and 
presentation of evidence.  Id. at 411. 
 
 
15 Subsection (a) of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2, as appearing in 
471 Mass. 1313 (2015), states that "[a] lawyer shall seek the 
lawful objectives of his or her client through reasonably 
available means permitted by law and these Rules," and that 
"[i]n a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's 
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to 
. . . whether the client will testify."  Subsection (d) of that 
rule states that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to 
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is 
criminal or fraudulent." 
29 
 
 
 
523 U.S. 303, 308, 309 (1998) (upholding constitutionality of 
per se exclusion in Mil. R. Evid. 707 of any testimony or other 
evidence concerning polygraph test).  See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 
410 (holding preclusion of witness testimony appropriate 
sanction for discovery violation and not in violation of 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses in his 
defense); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1974) 
(noting "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to 
present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the 
adversarial system," in upholding exclusion of investigator's 
testimony where defense counsel refused to waive work product 
privilege respecting matters covered in testimony).  Where rules 
excluding evidence from criminal trials altogether "do not 
abridge an accused's right to present a defense so long as they 
are not 'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to the purposes they 
are designed to serve,'" Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308, quoting 
Rock, 483 U.S. at 56, surely rules restricting only the manner 
in which a party may present evidence, without restricting its 
content, must be governed by the same principle. 
Neither the right to testify nor the right to counsel 
extends its protection to perjury.  See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 
U.S. 157, 173 (1986) ("the right to counsel includes no right to 
have a lawyer who will cooperate with planned perjury"); Harris 
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) ("Every criminal defendant 
30 
 
 
 
is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do 
so.  But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right 
to commit perjury").  The instant case presents the more 
difficult and important questions (i) whether the procedures we 
have established under rule 3.3 (e) and the Mitchell protocol 
are logically related to the important purposes we intend them 
to serve; and (ii) insofar as they may limit the defendant's 
opportunity to testify truthfully with direction from counsel, 
"whether the interests served by [our] rule justify the 
[possible] limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional 
right[s]."  Rock, 483 U.S. at 56.  On reexamination, we are 
confident that rule 3.3 (e) and our procedures implementing it 
pass this test. 
b.  Role of narrative testimony.  The dilemma of ethical 
response by a criminal defense attorney representing a client 
intent upon testifying falsely at trial has fueled decades of 
intense debate.  The extensive discourse among academics and 
practitioners has generated more heat than light by returning to 
the same few suggested responses time and again.  Each of these 
suggested responses comes with its own frailties.16  We remain 
                     
 
16 Both refusing to call the client to testify, and 
directing the testimony to prevent any opportunity for the 
defendant to communicate what counsel "knows" would be perjured 
testimony, risk preventing or substantially curtailing the 
content of the defendant's testimony.  This is also true of 
specifically disclosing the intended perjury to the court, which 
31 
 
 
 
firm in our belief that the narrative approach permitted under 
rule 3.3 (e) is "the least worst" of these options.17  The rule 
elects to follow the open narrative method, supported by 
procedural safeguards initiated by counsel's limited disclosure 
of an ethical concern to the court.  The approach allows for the 
defendant to testify, albeit without counsel's direction or 
ability to use any "known" falsehood in closing argument.  Where 
the defendant includes the known perjury in narrative testimony, 
"the lawyer shall call upon the client to rectify the false 
testimony" but, "if the client refuses or is unable to do so, 
the lawyer shall not reveal the false testimony to the 
tribunal."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e) (3).  While not perfect, 
it is "the only method of effectuating both the right of the 
accused to testify and the duty of a defense lawyer not to 
assist in presenting known perjured testimony."  2 Restatement 
                     
carries yet a further drawback:  revealing client confidences 
made to the attorney.  Finally, conducting direct examination of 
the client in the normal course either requires or permits the 
attorney to pose a series of pointed questions deliberately 
guiding the defendant down the garden path of perjury. 
 
 
17 Separate statement of Andrew L. Kaufman, Report to the 
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Its Committee on Rules 
of Professional Conduct (May 1996) ("There is no easy resolution 
to the many conflicting policies that at stake in this 
situation, and it may well be that the task is to select the 
least worst, rather than the best, solution"). 
32 
 
 
 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 120 comment i, at 240 
(2000).18 
 
The narrative method preserves the defendant's ability to 
exercise the right to testify despite the "known" risk of 
perjury.19  Along with the intended falsehood known to the 
attorney, there may also be useful truth, and the opportunity to 
testify carries inherent value for the defendant who elects it.  
Inviting a narrative serves these ends without compromising 
                     
 
18 Rule 3.3 of the American Bar Association's (ABA's) Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, and the accompanying official 
comments, each as adopted in a majority of United States 
jurisdictions, suggest that the attorney confronting anticipated 
client perjury either refuse to call the defendant, when the 
lawyer knows the only testimony the client intends to give would 
be false; or, where there is testimony other than false 
testimony, examine the defendant only on those matters and not 
on the subject matter that would elicit the false testimony.  
See E.J. Bennett & H.W. Gunnarsson, Annotated Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 362-363 (9th ed. 2019) (official comments 6 
and 9).  Further, the ABA approach also requires defense counsel 
to pursue "reasonable remedial measures" when counsel "knows" 
the client has perjured him- or herself at trial, including 
disclosing the perjury to the judge.  See id. at 363-364 
(official comments 10 and 11).  With the possible exception of 
Maryland, it appears that no jurisdiction has adopted the 
suggestion that defense counsel not be required to make any 
disclosure, and proceed with direct examination and closing in 
the normal manner. 
 
 
19 "[P]erjury undermines the function and province of the 
law and threatens the integrity of judgments that are the basis 
of the legal system."  United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 
720-721 (2012).  Our system, however, hedges against the risk 
that judgment will be rendered on false premises by providing 
for rigorous cross-examination and reserving the task of 
distinguishing truth from falsity to the jury, as informed by 
their common sense and life experience. 
33 
 
 
 
public confidence in our adversary system, which could not 
withstand a regime allowing for officers of the court knowingly 
to participate in client perjury.  We conclude that any risk 
that the "narrative option" as permitted under rule 3.3 (e) and 
the Mitchell protocol poses to the defendant's constitutional 
rights is both logically related and proportional to the ends we 
intend it to serve, specifically upholding the integrity of our 
adversary system of justice. 
c.  Application of rule 3.3 (e) in the present case.  The 
procedures used to implement rule 3.3 (e) at the defendant's 
trial were proper.  Indeed, defense counsel's prudent advance 
consultation with bar counsel and his conscientious presentation 
of the issue at sidebar exemplified conduct befitting a member 
of our profession.  The trial judge carefully reviewed the text 
of the rule and our decision in Mitchell, and his rulings 
relative to the form of the defendant's testimony and counsel's 
performance did not constitute error.20  Counsel properly ensured 
the defendant's presence at sidebar during his invocation of 
rule 3.3 (e), and deliberately tailored his trial practice to 
choose procedures from among the array of possibilities approved 
                     
 
20 As the Commonwealth concedes, it was error for the 
prosecutor to ask the defendant why he had decided to testify.  
However, where defense counsel properly objected, the judge 
properly sustained the objection, and the jury were properly 
instructed not to speculate about or consider things not in 
evidence, the prosecutor's error is not reversible. 
34 
 
 
 
in Mitchell to suit the circumstances of the defendant's case.21  
Counsel did not "abandon" the defendant, but rather preserved 
the defendant's opportunity to share his version of events with 
the jury, in his own words.  Counsel appropriately asserted 
several proper objections throughout the prosecutor's cross-
examination of the defendant,22 and opted to reference certain of 
the defendant's testimony in support of his closing argument, 
                     
 
21 The defendant's brief on appeal claims that counsel's 
invocation of rule 3.3 (e) under the Mitchell protocol "requires 
a defendant to testify without the assistance of counsel by way 
of a narrative" (emphasis added).  This assertion is incorrect 
for at least two important reasons.  First, although the 
defendant's expressed election to exercise the right to testify 
(despite counsel's prior contrary advice and remonstration 
concerning the defendant's intent to testify falsely) is a 
prerequisite to counsel's sidebar invocation of rule 3.3 (e), 
that invocation by no means "requires" the defendant to stand by 
the earlier decision.  Until the moment a defendant takes the 
stand and swears or affirms to tell the truth, he or she still 
may change his or her mind.  Second, the invocation of 
rule 3.3 (e) is to be followed by a request for the judge to 
instruct counsel how to proceed.  Directing any testimony by the 
defendant to take open narrative form is "acceptable," Mitchell, 
438 Mass. at 552, but it is discretionary rather than mandatory.  
"The judge possesses considerable discretion to vary any of the 
procedures discussed [in Mitchell], if the interests of justice, 
or effective management of the trial so requires."  Id.  A 
mistrial may be in order if the defendant demonstrates that 
appointment of new counsel is required to prevent a miscarriage 
of justice.  Alternatively, the defendant may be permitted to 
represent himself, with the benefit of standby counsel. 
 
 
22 Counsel's effective pretrial advocacy secured the 
prosecutor's stipulation to waiving use of the defendant's prior 
convictions, removing what may otherwise have presented a 
significant impediment to the defendant's credibility. 
35 
 
 
 
suggesting that the Commonwealth had not adequately met its 
burden to prove that the defendant was the shooter. 
d.  Mitchell protocol.  i.  Prerequisite standard of 
attorney knowledge.  In Mitchell, 438 Mass. at 547, we held that 
before invoking rule 3.3 (e), counsel must have "a firm basis in 
objective fact for his [or her] good faith determination that 
the defendant intend[s] to commit perjury."  We reaffirm that 
standard today.  As we emphasized in Mitchell, this standard 
never was intended to set a low bar,23 id. at 552, and what a 
defense lawyer "knows" for purposes of rule 3.3 (e) denotes 
"actual knowledge," in accord with the definition of "knowledge" 
now set forth in Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.0 (g), 471 Mass. 1305 
(2015).24  Id. at 544. 
                     
 
23 "Conjecture or speculation that the defendant intends to 
testify falsely are not enough.  Inconsistencies in the evidence 
or in the defendant's version of events are also not enough to 
trigger the rule, even though the inconsistencies, considered in 
light of the Commonwealth's proof, raise concerns in counsel's 
mind that the defendant is equivocating and is not an honest 
person.  Similarly, the existence of strong physical and 
forensic evidence implicating the defendant would not be 
sufficient.  Counsel can rely on facts made known to him [or 
her] and is under no duty to conduct an independent 
investigation."  Mitchell, 438 Mass. at 552.  See Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 3.3 comment 11B (adopting Mitchell's explanation of 
standard). 
 
 
24 In Mitchell, 438 Mass. at 544, we tacitly adopted the 
uncontroverted rationale of the Superior Court judge "that the 
rule does not define the term 'knows,' but the terminology 
section of the [ABA] Model Rules of Professional Conduct, on 
which rule 3.3 is based, states that the term 'knows' 'denotes 
36 
 
 
 
By way of clarification, the necessary knowledge is 
"actual" not in terms of the level of certainty with which it is 
held, but rather in the sense that it "does not include unknown 
information, even if a reasonable lawyer would have discovered 
[such information] through inquiry."  Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 120 comment c.  In other words, a lawyer 
"knows" a client's intent based upon the "information [the 
attorney] possesses" already, without ignoring the obvious, but 
equally without further investigation.  Mitchell, 438 Mass. at 
546-547 ("The lawyer may act on the information he or she 
possesses, and we decline to impose an independent duty on the 
part of counsel to investigate because such a duty would be 
'incompatible with the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client 
relationship'" [citation omitted]). 
"Knowledge," as used in rule 3.3 (e), must be derived from 
"objective circumstances firmly rooted in fact," Mitchell, 438 
Mass. at 546, as opposed to mere belief.  Defense counsel who 
find themselves struggling to decide whether they have a "firm 
basis in objective fact" very likely do not.  In making this 
decision, "a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of 
testimony or other evidence in favor of the client . . . [but] 
cannot ignore an obvious falsehood."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 
                     
actual knowledge of the fact in question.  A person's knowledge 
may be inferred from circumstances.'" 
37 
 
 
 
comment 8.  It is only appropriate that the standard should be 
high.  See Nix, 475 U.S. at 189 (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
("Except in the rarest of cases, attorneys who adopt 'the role 
of the judge or jury to determine the facts,' pose a danger of 
depriving their clients of the zealous and loyal advocacy 
required by the Sixth Amendment" [citations omitted]). 
We decline to adopt the more rigid standard of "knowledge 
beyond a reasonable doubt," which we continue to believe 
"essentially would eviscerate rule 3.3 (e)" by setting a 
standard "virtually impossible to satisfy," Mitchell, 438 Mass. 
at 546, namely, "an abiding conviction, to . . . the highest 
degree of certainty possible in matters relating to human 
affairs."  Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 477 (2015) 
(imposing revised mandatory jury instruction defining "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard).  See, e.g., Doe v. Federal 
Grievance Comm'n, 847 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1988) (interpreting 
"actual knowledge" standard to mean not that attorney must "wait 
until he has proof beyond a moral certainty," but rather that 
"he must clearly know, rather than suspect"). 
The concurrence would require defense counsel to initiate 
our rule 3.3 (e) protocol only when counsel knows "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that the defendant intends to testify falsely.  
Noting that juries apply the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard every day, the concurrence then asks, "[W]hy cannot 
38 
 
 
 
defense counsel do the same?"  Post at    .  The question is an 
important one, to which the court in Mitchell provided an 
answer:  defining defense counsel's duty of candor to the 
tribunal to require action only if counsel knows "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that counsel's own client intends to lie under 
oath "essentially would eviscerate" rule 3.3 (e), leaving a 
hollow pretense.  Mitchell, 438 Mass. at 546.  The jury's role 
as impartial judges of the facts, who decide the case without 
fear or favor,25 is a far cry from the role of defense counsel, 
who alone contests the State's ability to carry its weighty 
burden of proof, the defendant's sole shield against the 
                     
 
25 A juror, in good faith, may see reasonable doubt where 
his or her fellow juror is convinced that no reasonable doubt 
exists.  Indeed, when we charge a jury after they have declared 
themselves deadlocked, we instruct: 
 
"In conferring together, you ought to give proper respect 
to each other's opinions, and listen with an open mind to 
each other's arguments.  Where there is disagreement, those 
jurors who are for acquittal should consider whether a 
doubt in their own minds is a reasonable one, if it makes 
no impression on the minds of other jurors who are equally 
honest, equally intelligent, and who have heard the same 
evidence, with the same attention, with an equal desire to 
arrive at the truth, and who have taken the same oath as 
jurors.  On the other hand, those jurors who are for 
conviction ought seriously to ask themselves whether they 
may not reasonably doubt the correctness of their judgment, 
if it is not shared by other members of the jury.  They 
should ask themselves whether they should distrust the 
weight or adequacy of the evidence if it has failed to 
convince the minds of their fellow jurors." 
 
Instruction 2.460 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for 
Use in the District Court (2020) ("When Jurors Cannot Agree"). 
39 
 
 
 
potential "conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or 
his liberty."  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938). 
No criminal defense attorney wants to disclose impending 
client perjury to the court.  Defense counsel is the accused's 
partisan armor:  a professional advocate charged with a duty to 
zealously represent the client.  During trial, a criminal 
defense attorney is saddled with enormous responsibility and 
under enormous stress.  With neither the support of eleven 
fellow jurors, nor the opportunity to deliberate 
collaboratively, and at length, about the conflicting testimony, 
a defense attorney facing midtrial anticipation of client 
perjury is "on the spot" -- alone.  To protect the attorney-
client relationship and minimize the risk of impinging upon a 
defendant's constitutional rights, the knowledge threshold 
embedded in rule 3.3 (e) must be high, but to protect the 
integrity of the trial, that standard must be viable.  The 
standard this court reaffirms today is both.  To instead require 
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt would erect an impenetrable 
fortress to which even the most conscientious attorney safely 
may repair, rather than invoke rule 3.3 (e) and its accompanying 
potential to prejudice the client.  And why not do so, if the 
rules of our profession permit?  In the context of expected 
client perjury, imposing a standard of knowledge beyond a 
40 
 
 
 
reasonable doubt would, in practice, constitute no standard at 
all. 
ii.  Mitigating potential prejudice.  Today, although we 
reaffirm our holding that the knowledge standard we established 
in Mitchell is in keeping with a defendant's constitutional 
rights, we remain concerned that when counsel invokes rule 
3.3 (e), the judge and defense counsel deploy the narrative 
approach in such a way as to limit its necessary effect ensuring 
that counsel is neither compelled nor permitted to elicit known 
perjury, to protect the integrity of the verdict.26  In service 
of that end, we emphasize the range of available options that 
counsel and the judge may deploy in the sound exercise of their 
discretion, and in taking into account the circumstances of a 
particular case, to mitigate any unfair prejudice to the 
defendant.  See, e.g., Allen, 397 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (upholding constitutionality of removing 
contumacious defendant from court room after warning, and 
observing:  "it is not weakness to mitigate the disadvantages of 
his expulsion as far as . . . possible in the circumstances" by 
making efforts to keep him apprised of trial progress and 
providing means for communicating with attorney). 
                     
 
26 We ask this court's standing advisory committee on the 
rules of professional conduct to amend the official comments to 
rule 3.3 to conform to our decision in Mitchell as reaffirmed in 
this opinion. 
41 
 
 
 
To the extent that counsel believes that such prejudice may 
be limited by presenting only what counsel "knows" to be the 
perjured portion of the direct testimony by way of a narrative, 
or by utilizing the "nonperjurious" parts of the defendant's 
intended testimony in argument, the discretion to deploy those 
options is available to counsel in conformity with attorney 
obligations of candor under rule 3.3 (e).  Counsel should remain 
standing during the defendant's open narrative testimony, may 
object during cross-examination as appropriate and to the extent 
that such objection would not promote a known falsehood, and may 
conduct redirect examination as appropriate and to the extent 
that it does not elicit testimony the attorney knows to be 
false. 
Further, unless the defendant requests its omission, the 
judge should provide a general jury instruction stating that the 
judge has the discretion to control the mode, order, and manner 
of the presentation of witness testimony throughout the trial, 
and that the jury may not derive any inference from the form of 
a witness's testimony or consider it in their deliberations.27  
                     
 
27 We do not agree that it is a foregone conclusion that the 
narrative approach telegraphs a message to the jury that defense 
counsel does not believe the defendant.  "Because the defendant 
in a criminal trial is not situated the same as other witnesses, 
it would not be illogical for a jury to assume that special 
rules apply to [a defendant's] testimony, including a right to 
testify in a narrative fashion."  People v. Johnson, 62 Cal. 
App. 4th 608, 629, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 914 (1998). 
42 
 
 
 
Mass. G. Evid. § 611(a) (2020).  The effect of any or all of 
these tactical choices depends upon the circumstances in a 
particular case.  The decision regarding the jury instruction is 
a strategic one to be made by counsel, in consultation with the 
client.  The matter should be addressed with the judge at the 
charge conference. 
Counsel is put in a most difficult position during trial or 
on the eve of trial when presented with information providing a 
good faith basis in objective fact revealing the defendant's 
intent to commit perjury.  The first and foremost ethical 
obligation of counsel, in service both to the court and to the 
client, is to advise strongly against it and exercise a genuine 
best effort to persuade the client to testify truthfully or 
otherwise reconsider the decision to testify at all.  Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 3.3 (e) & comment 11C.28  Counsel should also explain to 
                     
 
28 This includes a full explanation to ensure the defendant 
understands the implications of perjured testimony on counsel's 
ethical duties under the rules of professional conduct, and the 
potential for certain associated consequences, specifically, the 
obligation of counsel to invoke rule 3.3 (e) at sidebar, 
effectively disclosing the attorney's knowledge of the intended 
perjury to the court and the prosecution; the court's possible 
direction of narrative testimony, meaning that counsel could 
neither conduct a full direct examination to assist and guide 
the defendant's testimony, to the extent it would elicit known 
perjury, nor argue the known perjured testimony in closing; and 
the possibility that the jury could draw a negative inference in 
the event that jurors notice the different form of the 
defendant's testimony and the absences in defense counsel's 
closing argument. 
43 
 
 
 
the defendant that perjury does not fall within the parameters 
of a defendant's rights to testify or to counsel's assistance.  
Finally, counsel should once again confirm the defendant's 
understanding that by exercising his right to testify (without 
first consenting to do so truthfully), he would lose both his 
right to have counsel elicit his testimony through directed 
questioning and the otherwise available opportunity for defense 
counsel to have all of the defendant's testimony available for 
use in presenting a closing argument to the jury due to rule 
3.3 (e)'s constraints on counsel's conduct. 
Where defense counsel invokes rule 3.3 (e) at sidebar 
during trial, the judge, before ruling that the defendant may 
only testify in narrative form, should conduct a colloquy with 
defense counsel, in the presence of the defendant, to ensure 
that defense counsel has fully explained the implications of the 
defendant's choice to exercise the right to testify in light of 
counsel's invocation of rule 3.3 (e).29 
                     
 
29 The judge should pose the following questions to defense 
counsel: 
 
(1) Have you explained to the defendant your ethical 
obligation not to assist in the presentation of testimony 
or other evidence you know to be false? 
 
(2) Have you explained to the defendant that if he chooses 
to testify, you will not assist in examining him with 
respect to any of his testimony you know to be false? 
 
44 
 
 
 
2.  Testimony of substitute medical examiner.  By the time 
of trial, the medical examiner who had performed and prepared a 
written report of the victim's autopsy (original examiner) no 
longer worked for the Commonwealth and lived in North Carolina.  
Over the defendant's objections, the judge allowed a different 
medical examiner, who was not present for the victim's autopsy 
(substitute examiner), to provide an expert opinion on cause of 
death.  On direct examination, the substitute examiner testified 
to the types, locations, and directionality of the wounds on the 
victim's body, based upon his independent review of the autopsy 
photographs.30  The autopsy photographs showed eleven wounds from 
where bullets entered or exited from the victim's body, 
                     
(3) Have you explained to the defendant that if he chooses 
to testify, you may not argue to the jury any of his 
testimony that you know to be false? 
 
(4) Have you explained to the defendant the default jury 
instruction that will be included in my charge in an 
attempt to mitigate any resulting prejudice, and that he 
has the option to have that instruction omitted? 
 
 
After counsel's affirmative answer to each question, the 
judge should turn to the defendant for confirmation that counsel 
did in fact make such explanation, and that the defendant 
understood it. 
 
 
30 These photographs previously had been authenticated and 
admitted attendant to the earlier testimony of the photographer, 
who took them to document the autopsy in his then-assigned 
official capacity with the Springfield police department's 
photographic division.  The judge admitted these photographs 
subject to the defense attorney's pending motion to strike most 
of them as unduly prejudicial, which the judge later allowed.  
Only four of them went to the jury. 
45 
 
 
 
supporting the substitute examiner's conclusion that the victim 
was shot at least seven times.  Finally, results of a toxicology 
report from the autopsy ruled out alternative causes of death.  
Over defense counsel's objection, the substitute examiner then 
opined, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that 
"multiple gunshot wounds [to] the torso" caused the victim's 
death. 
On appeal, the defendant challenges the substitute 
examiner's testimony under the Sixth Amendment and art. 12.  
Specifically, the defendant asserts violations of his witness 
confrontation rights arising from the judge's (1) failure to 
require proof that the original examiner was legally unavailable 
to testify before permitting the substitute examiner's 
testimony, and (2) evidentiary admission of the substitute 
examiner's expert opinion, informed by his review of the 
original examiner's autopsy report.  Both of the defendant's 
arguments are unavailing, since we conclude that the substitute 
examiner did not testify to any statements from the original 
examiner's autopsy report that qualify as testimonial hearsay 
(with one potential, immaterial exception).  Even if there were 
any testimonial hearsay included in the substitute expert's 
testimony, it would satisfy the "harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard applicable to preserved constitutional errors. 
46 
 
 
 
A judge's decision to allow a substitute examiner to 
testify at trial need not require a prior showing that the 
author of a victim's autopsy report is legally "unavailable" to 
testify in order to protect a defendant's witness confrontation 
rights.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 705, 719 
(2016); Commonwealth v. Reavis, 465 Mass. 875, 881 (2013).  We 
decline the defendant's invitation to reconsider established 
precedent:  allowing the Commonwealth to call the substitute 
examiner as a witness was not error.31 
Nor did the judge run afoul of the defendant's witness 
confrontation rights upon the admission of the substitute 
examiner's expert opinion as to cause of death.  A medical 
examiner who did not personally attend or supervise a victim's 
autopsy may nonetheless form a proper independent opinion on the 
victim's cause of death by reviewing another medical examiner's 
autopsy report and autopsy photographs.  See Commonwealth v. 
Seino, 479 Mass. 463, 466-467 (2018), citing Reavis, 465 Mass. 
at 883.  Although he need not have specified the opinion's 
basis, see Mass. G. Evid. § 705 (2020), the substitute examiner 
testified to personal review not only of the autopsy report, but 
                     
 
31 The analysis applicable when a judge decides whether to 
allow an expert witness to testify does not differ where the 
expert is a substitute medical examiner.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994) (detailing "gatekeeper" factors 
relevant to decision); Mass. G. Evid. § 702 (2020). 
47 
 
 
 
also of the autopsy photographs, certain apparel the victim was 
wearing when he was shot,32 and certain of the victim's medical 
records.  These were permissible foundations for his independent 
opinion on cause of death, see Commonwealth v. Markvart, 437 
Mass. 331, 337 (2002), and the defendant had a meaningful 
opportunity to cross-examine the substitute expert about them. 
Finally, with the possible exception of the toxicology 
report, none of the substitute medical examiner's direct 
testimony violated the confrontation clause because he did not 
implicate or rely upon statements made with a primary purpose of 
"creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony."33  
Commonwealth v. Wadsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 464 (2019), quoting 
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011).  Even if any of 
the substitute examiner's testimony were in violation of the 
confrontation clause, the error would have been harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt where it was merely cumulative of other 
                     
 
32 The substitute medical examiner testified that the 
locations of holes in clothing he examined matched up with the 
locations of the wounds on the victim's body.  The victim's 
boots and photographs of the boots and other apparel were 
admitted in evidence. 
 
 
33  Whether a "toxicology report [of the victim] . . . 
constitutes testimonial hearsay" implicating the confrontation 
clause remains an open question.  Commonwealth v. Montrond, 477 
Mass. 127, 140 (2017) (Lowy, J., concurring), citing Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009).  Here, the 
results of the toxicology test demonstrated nothing unusual 
apart from a metabolite of marijuana (a byproduct of the body 
breaking down the drug, once ingested). 
48 
 
 
 
witness testimony proving that the victim died from multiple 
gunshot wounds, including from the trauma surgeon who operated 
on the victim at the time of his death; the testimony provided 
no detail as to the killer's identity or directly implicated the 
defendant in any way, and our review of the entire record 
supports the conclusion that it could not have affected the 
jury's verdicts.  See Commonwealth v. Montrond, 477 Mass. 127, 
138 (2017); Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 701 (2010). 
 
3.  Ammunition seized from the codefendant's residence.  
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to exclude all evidence 
relating to firearms and ammunition seized from the basement of 
the codefendant's residence.34  After hearing,35 the judge allowed 
                     
 
34 None of the firearms found at the codefendant's residence 
was consistent with the girlfriend's description of the murder 
weapon, which police never located. 
 
 
35 At the hearing, defendant's counsel argued that the 
challenged evidence would cause unfair prejudice against the 
defendant at a joint trial, because, unlike the codefendant, the 
defendant did not live at the codefendant's residence.  Although 
defense counsel had also moved in limine for relief from 
prejudicial joinder under Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (d), 378 Mass. 859 
(1979), the grounds for that request concerned prior bad acts 
evidence unrelated to the evidence police seized from the 
codefendant's residence.  To the extent the defendant now argues 
that undue prejudice arising from the ammunition evidence 
approached that level of compelling prejudice requiring 
severance, we disagree.  That type of prejudice arises only in a 
case of "mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable" defenses, 
Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 659 (1982), as where each 
codefendant advances the other's guilt as a sole defense, see 
Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 543 (2011), citing 
Moran, supra at 657-659.  Although a trial judge retains 
discretion to order severance where it appears that joint trial 
49 
 
 
 
the motion in part, restricting the Commonwealth's admissible 
evidence solely to certain live rounds of ammunition (admissible 
ammunition) bearing the same manufacturer's markings as the 
cartridge casings recovered from the crime scene and the caliber 
of each of four projectiles removed from the victim's body and 
the single projectile and cartridge casings recovered at the 
crime scene.  The judge later allowed the admissible ammunition 
to be marked as an exhibit at trial, over renewed objection. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge abused his 
discretion by failing to exclude the admissible ammunition from 
evidence at trial, because (i) forensic science could not 
conclusively verify that the ammunition used to shoot the victim 
came from the same stockpile of admissible ammunition later 
seized from the codefendant's basement, and (ii) its unfairly 
prejudicial effect outweighed any possible probative evidentiary 
value.  We disagree.  The judge properly characterized the 
admissible ammunition as relevant evidence, and any resultant 
prejudice did not rise to a level warranting its exclusion. 
From among the numerous firearms and liberal assortment of 
ammunition seized from the codefendant's residence, the judge 
found only the admissible ammunition relevant, and excluded the 
                     
is "not in the best interests of justice," Mass. R. Crim. P. 
9 (d) (1), the record is devoid of any basis for such a finding 
here, where the defendant and codefendant advanced entirely 
consistent trial defenses. 
50 
 
 
 
rest as irrelevant.  That ruling did not require the support of 
conclusive forensic science.  To qualify as "relevant," a piece 
of proffered evidence need not be sufficient to prove the entire 
case (or even an issue within the case).36  See Commonwealth v. 
Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 467 (1905) ("evidence having a tendency 
to prove a proposition is not inadmissible because it does not 
wholly prove the proposition"). 
 
The admissible ammunition, seized from the codefendant's 
basement, carried substantial probative value as to the 
defendant's participation in the shooting.  Not only did its 
caliber match that of the bullets recovered from the victim's 
body and the bullet recovered from the crime scene, but its 
casings also bore the same manufacturer's markings as those 
recovered outside the residence where the defendant admitted he 
had eaten dinner on the evening of the shooting, and where the 
girlfriend testified that she recognized both the defendant and 
the codefendant as the individuals perpetrating the shooting, 
and the murder weapon as a sawed-off shotgun she had seen once 
before at the codefendant's residence.  On cross-examination, 
the defendant also admitted to sending a text message directing 
the driver to pick him up at the codefendant's residence on the 
                     
 
36 The sufficiency of evidence (required to satisfy a burden 
of production) is not the same as the admissibility of evidence.  
"A brick is not a wall."  1 McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 1114 
(R.P. Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020). 
51 
 
 
 
night of the shooting.  When the admissible ammunition is taken 
into account, the defendant's participation in the shooting is 
more probable than it otherwise would be without considering the 
admissible ammunition, because it connected him both to the 
codefendant, who the girlfriend also identified as a participant 
in the shooting at the crime scene, and to the codefendant's 
residence, where the girlfriend previously had seen the murder 
weapon and where the defendant asked to be picked up on the 
night of the shooting.  Mass. G. Evid. § 401 (2020).  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Rosa, 468 Mass. 231, 237-238 (2014) (ammunition 
recovered from coventurer's bedroom not admitted in error where 
offered to prove defendant's participation in crime by linking 
him to coventurer, also identified at scene of crime).  The jury 
are unlikely to have drawn any additional, impermissible 
inferences. 
 
4.  Double jeopardy.  The defendant contends that his 
conviction of armed assault with the intent to rob is 
duplicative of his conviction of felony-murder with attempted 
armed robbery as the predicate felony.  A conviction of a 
predicate felony may stand, however, where the jury find 
sufficient additional grounds for their verdict of murder in the 
first degree other than felony-murder.  See Commonwealth v. 
Pennellatore, 392 Mass. 382, 390 (1984).  Although a jury's 
finding of either (i) deliberate premeditation or (ii) extreme 
52 
 
 
 
atrocity or cruelty ensures the guilty verdict on a predicate 
felony is not duplicative, the jury here found both. 
 
For the reasons stated, the defendant's convictions are 
affirmed.  The record reveals no basis to support relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Lenk and Budd, JJ., 
join).  I agree with the court's revision of the protocol that 
defense counsel should apply under Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e), as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1416 (2015), when he or she "knows" that 
his or her client intends to testify falsely.  Ante at    .  I 
write separately, however, because I disagree with the court 
that a defense attorney should be required in a criminal case to 
reveal to the judge that the client will testify falsely, and 
trigger all the consequences arising from that revelation, when 
the attorney has "a firm basis in objective fact for his [or 
her] good faith determination that the defendant intend[s] to 
commit perjury" (second alteration original).  Id. at    , 
quoting Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535, 547, cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 907 (2003).  I would not require an attorney to 
make this disclosure unless the attorney knows beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the client intends to commit perjury. 
 
As the court recognizes, ante at note 16, it is a 
devastating blow to a criminal defendant when the attorney who 
is retained or appointed to represent the defendant discloses to 
the judge presiding at the trial that his or her client intends 
to testify falsely; it effectively tells the judge not only that 
the attorney knows that the client is guilty of the crimes 
charged but that the attorney knows the client also intends to 
lie about it and commit the crime of perjury.  It deprives the 
2 
 
 
defendant of the attorney's assistance in preparing to testify 
regarding the subject matter the attorney believes to be false, 
deprives the defendant of questioning by the attorney on direct 
examination designed to elicit that testimony, and deprives the 
defendant of the opportunity for defense counsel to present that 
testimony in closing argument. 
 
I do not believe that an attorney should be required to do 
the functional equivalent of throwing his or her client under 
the bus unless the attorney knows that the client's testimony 
will be false beyond a reasonable doubt.  Why should the legal 
standard requiring a defense attorney to "turn in" his or her 
client as a perjured witness be less than the legal standard a 
jury will use in determining the client's guilt?1 
 
I am perplexed by the court's declaration that the standard 
of knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt "'essentially would 
eviscerate rule 3.3 (e)' by setting a standard 'virtually 
impossible to satisfy.'"  Ante at    , quoting Mitchell, 438 
Mass. at 546.  Juries apply that standard every day to find 
                     
 
1 The court seeks to distinguish the role of the jury from 
the role of the defense attorney, describing defense counsel as 
"the defendant's sole shield against the potential 'conviction 
and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.'"  Ante 
at    , quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).  
But it is precisely because of defense counsel's role as the 
defendant's "sole shield" that the standard for disclosing a 
client's anticipated perjury should be as high as the jury's 
standard for finding guilt. 
3 
 
 
defendants guilty; the reasonable doubt standard is high, but it 
is certainly not impossible to satisfy.  And presumably any 
defense counsel adequately prepared for trial who decides to 
make this disclosure knows what evidence will be presented at 
trial, and is likely to have even more information than the jury 
because he or she will have the benefit of privileged 
communications with the client and the defense investigator's 
findings.  If a jury can find proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
based on the evidence at trial, why cannot defense counsel do 
the same? 
 
Moreover, knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt is a standard 
of certainty that any criminal defense counsel should 
understand.  The same cannot be said for the court's standard of 
"a firm basis in objective fact."  Ante at    .  In fact, the 
court struggles to define that standard and, when one looks 
closely at the court's explanation of the standard, it 
approximates the knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt standard.  
The court recognizes that "[i]t is only appropriate that the 
standard should be high."  Id. at    .  "Inconsistencies in the 
evidence or in the defendant's version of events are . . . not 
enough to trigger the rule," and even "the existence of strong 
physical and forensic evidence implicating the defendant would 
not be sufficient."  Id. at note 23.  The court adds: 
4 
 
 
"Defense counsel who find themselves struggling to decide 
whether they have a 'firm basis in objective fact' very 
likely do not.  In making this decision, 'a lawyer should 
resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other 
evidence in favor of the client . . . [but] cannot ignore 
an obvious falsehood." 
 
Id. at    , quoting Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 comment 8.  If, under 
the "firm basis in objective fact" standard, an attorney is 
required to resolve any doubt as to whether the client intends 
to testify falsely in favor of the client, this certainly seems 
to require an attorney to have no reasonable doubt before he or 
she tells a judge that the client intends to commit perjury. 
 
The court appears to contend, in essence, that if we 
established a reasonable doubt standard, no attorney would 
disclose a client's perjury but would instead shirk his or her 
duty under rule 3.3 (e) by conjuring a reasonable doubt in order 
to avoid the consequences to the client of disclosure.  See ante 
at    .  This assumption, that defense attorneys will not abide 
by their ethical obligations to the court when hard decisions 
have to be made, is unfair to the defense bar.  It is also a 
poor reason to reject a reasonable doubt standard, especially 
where the standard as articulated by the court is effectively a 
reasonable doubt standard by another name.