Case Title: People ex rel. Manning v. Nickerson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84457

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
People ex rel. Manning v. Nickerson (Ill. 
S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 84457-Agenda 26-May 1998.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex 
rel. BRENT MANNING, Director of Conservation, Appellant,
v. PATRICK NICKERSON, Appellee.
Opinion filed October 22, 1998.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the 
court:
When the State of Illinois sues a defendant in the circuit 
court, may the defendant assert a counterclaim in the circuit court against the 
state seeking damages for common law claims otherwise barred by sovereign 
immunity, or must the defendant file a separate action against the 
state in the Court of Claims? That is the critical issue for decision, an issue 
on which the appellate court has issued conflicting opinions. Compare the 
opinion below in this case (292 Ill. App. 3d 346 (defendant may raise issues in 
the circuit court by way of counterclaim otherwise barred by sovereign 
immunity)) with People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Cook 
Development Co., 274 Ill. App. 3d 175 (1995) (circuit court lacks 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a counterclaim raising claims barred by sovereign 
immunity), and People v. Patrick J. Gorman Consultants, Inc., 111 Ill. 
App. 3d 729 (1982) (same).
The Director of the Illinois Department of Conservation (the 
Director) filed a complaint against the defendant, Patrick Nickerson, in the 
circuit court of McDonough County. The Director alleged that the defendant, who 
owns property adjacent to Argyle State Park, constructed a building and cut down 
trees on park property. The state sought a permanent injunction to compel the 
defendant to remove the building and money damages for the defendant's use of 
the land. The defendant filed a counterclaim against the Director and sought a 
judicial determination of the boundary line between his property and the state 
park, ejectment of the state from his land, and money damages for the common law 
torts of trespass, emotional distress, and slander of title.
On the state's motion, the circuit court dismissed the 
defendant's counterclaim and held that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
defendant's counterclaim because the Court of Claims is vested with the 
exclusive jurisdiction over claims made against the state. The appellate court 
reversed and held that because the defendant's counterclaim required the 
resolution of the same issues and was based on the same facts as the state's 
complaint, the counterclaim was properly brought in the circuit court. We 
allowed leave to appeal.
The Illinois Constitution of 1970 abolished the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity "[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide by law." Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. XIII, §4. The State Lawsuit Immunity Act provides that "the 
State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court," except 
as provided in the Court of Claims Act. 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 1996). The Court of 
Claims Act creates the Court of Claims as the "exclusive" forum for resolving 
lawsuits against the state. 705 ILCS 505/8 (West 1996). Specifically, the Court 
of Claims has "exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine *** [a]ll claims 
against the State for damages in cases sounding in tort." 705 ILCS 505/8(d) 
(West 1996).
The purpose of sovereign immunity is to protect the state 
from interference with the performance of governmental functions and to preserve 
and to protect state funds. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. State of 
Illinois, 93 Ill. 2d 397, 401 (1982). Thus, an action brought nominally 
against a state employee in his or her individual capacity will be considered a 
claim against the state and barred by sovereign immunity if a judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff could operate to control the actions of the state or subject it 
to liability. Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (1992). In this case, 
the Director initiated a lawsuit against the defendant because he believed that 
the defendant encroached on state park property. The Department of Conservation 
is charged with managing state park property, and thus the Director was acting 
consistent with his public duty as a state official.
The defendant has brought-by way of counterclaim-various 
tort claims seeking damages in excess of $2 million against the Director. The 
claims relate to official duties of this state employee and any judgment would 
be recoverable against the state. Thus, these are essentially tort claims 
against the state and had they been filed in the form of a complaint, rather 
than a counterclaim, there is no question that the circuit court would lack 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims. 705 ILCS 505/8(d) (West 1996).
Does it matter then that the defendant has raised these tort 
claims by way of counterclaim in litigation initiated by the state in the 
circuit court? On one level, as the appellate court concluded, fairness seems to 
dictate that the defendant should be allowed to raise any counterclaim 
in the circuit court: the state started this fight in the circuit court and must 
live with the consequences. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, is not 
about fairness. The legislature has conferred immunity upon the state, and the 
legislature-only the legislature-can determine when and where claims against the 
state will be allowed. With regard to tort claims, the legislature's directive 
could not be more clear: tort claims against the state must be brought in the 
Court of Claims. See 705 ILCS 505/8(d) (West 1996).
The defendant has raised two additional claims in his 
counterclaim: he has sought a judicial determination of the boundary line 
between his property and the state park and ejectment. Does sovereign immunity 
require that these property claims also be brought in the Court of Claims? The 
central issue in the case is who owns the land in question, and that issue is 
before the circuit court by virtue of the state's complaint. The defendant's 
response is that he owns the land-not the state. Thus, the property claims 
raised by the defendant are defensive in nature and are asserted for the purpose 
of defeating the state's action, and not for the purpose of obtaining an 
affirmative judgment against the state. Because the circuit court has 
jurisdiction to decide the state's request for an injunction and money damages, 
and that necessarily involves a determination of the defendant's claimed 
ownership interest, sovereign immunity does not bar the circuit court from 
exercising jurisdiction over the defensive, property claims raised in the 
counterclaim.
Therefore, we reverse the appellate court's judgment with 
regard to the tort claims raised in the defendant's counterclaim: sovereign 
immunity bars the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction over those claims 
and requires that those claims be brought in the Court of Claims. We affirm the 
appellate court's judgment that the circuit court may exercise jurisdiction over 
the property claims raised in the defendant's counterclaim: those claims are 
defensive in nature and must necessarily be decided to adjudicate the State's 
request for injunctive relief and money damages. The judgment of the circuit 
court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the cause is remanded to that 
court for further proceedings.
Appellate court judgment
affirmed in part and reversed in 
part;
circuit court judgment affirmed in 
part
and reversed in part;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE MILLER took no part in the consideration or decision 
of this case.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part:
I agree with that portion of the court's judgment holding 
that the defendant must refile his tort counterclaims in the Court of Claims. I 
disagree, however, with the determination that the counterclaim seeking 
ejectment of the state from the land at issue may properly be asserted in the 
circuit court. I therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of today's 
opinion.
As the majority observes, actions against the State of 
Illinois may not be brought in any court except as permitted under the Court of 
Claims Act (Act). Sass v. Kramer, 72 Ill. 2d 485 (1978). Consistent 
with this principle, a counterclaim against the state that would otherwise fall 
under the bar of sovereign immunity may not be asserted in the circuit court, 
but must be filed as provided under the Act. See, e.g., 
Gorman, 111 Ill. App. 3d 729. This court has determined that disputes 
involving property of which the state is the record titleholder constitute 
"actions against the State" under the Act, and thus are within the exclusive 
province of the Court of Claims. Gordon v. Department of 
Transportation, 99 Ill. 2d 44 (1983); see also Sass, 72 Ill. 2d  at 
490-91. The Court of Claims also possesses sole jurisdiction over all claims 
against the state "founded upon any law of the State." 705 ILCS 505/8(a) (West 
1996).
The majority contends that, because the counterclaim at 
issue, like the State's complaint, sought an adjudication of the correct 
boundary line between the defendant's property and the state park, it was merely 
"defensive in nature" and was "asserted for the purpose of defeating the state's 
action" rather than for "obtaining an affirmative judgment against the state." 
Slip op. at 3. However, this ignores the fact that the counterclaim also 
explicitly demanded that "the [state] be ejected from [defendant's] property." 
As a basis for this demand, the defendant alleged that the state had illicitly 
"entered upon, placed new boundary signs upon, trespassed upon and *** exercised 
dominion and possession over" that portion of the land belonging to the 
defendant.
An action in ejectment is an affirmative, statutory claim 
which must be pleaded and proved. See 735 ILCS 5/6-101 et seq. 
(West 1994); Dagit v. Childerson, 391 Ill. 611 (1945); Bulatovic v. 
Dobritchanin, 252 Ill. App. 3d 122, 128 (1993). In the event the defendant 
in this case prevails on his claim as to the proper boundary line, the court 
will be required to enter an order ousting the state from its current possession 
of the land, thus entering an "affirmative judgment against the State." For this 
reason, as well as the fact that the counterclaim was "founded upon [a] law of 
the State" (705 ILCS 505/8(a) (West 1996)), the claim must be brought in the 
Court of Claims as required under the Act.