Case Title: LAURENCE and JUDI LAUGHTER; LANE AND LAURA FILLINIM; and O.D AND ROSANNE OWENS V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR SWEETWATER COUNTY, WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAURENCE and JUDI LAUGHTER; LANE AND LAURA FILLINIM; and O.D AND ROSANNE OWENS V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR SWEETWATER COUNTY, WYOMING2005 WY 54110 P.3d 875Case Number:  04-113Decided: 04/28/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                                                   

 
 
 
 
LAURENCE 
and JUDI LAUGHTER;

LANE and 
LAURA FILLINGIM; and

O.D. and 
ROSANNE OWENS,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
BOARD OF 
COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS

FOR 
SWEETWATER COUNTY, 
WYOMING,

a 
political subdivision of the State of Wyoming,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
            
Richard W. Walden of Budd-Falen Law Offices, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Harriet M. Hageman and Kara Brighton of Hageman & Brighton, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Jason Petri, Deputy Sweetwater County and Prosecuting 
Attorney, Green River, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN and VOIGT, JJ.. and KALOKATHIS and DONNELL, 
D.JJ.

 
 
 
 
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from an order denying summary judgment to the appellant landowners and granting 
summary judgment to the appellee county.  
The landowners sought declaratory judgment and other relief in regard to 
the adoption and implementation of the county's growth management plan.  We dismiss the appeal as to the monetary 
claims and affirm the declaratory judgment.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      The landowners 
present the following issues:

 
 
            
1.         
Whether the Sweetwater County Growth Area Management Plan and Agreement 
(the Plan) was properly adopted?

 
 
            
2.         
Whether the Plan is a joint land use plan subject to the provisions of 
the Wyoming Joint Powers Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-1-102 through 16-1-109 (Lexis 
1999) and, if so, whether it was adopted in compliance with said 
provisions?

 
 
            
3.         
Whether the Plan was properly incorporated into the Sweetwater County 
Zoning Resolution?

 
 
4.         
Whether the study areas set forth in the Plan were extended in compliance 
with applicable Wyoming statutes?

 
 
5.         
Whether the Plan and the conditional use permit standards set forth 
therein are unconstitutionally vague?

 
 
6.         
Whether the conditional use permit process in the Plan constitutes an 
illegal restraint on the use of land?

 
 
7.         
Whether the application of the Plan to the landowners violated the 
landowners' substantive due process rights?

 
 
8.         
Whether application of the Plan to the landowners temporarily took the 
landowners' property in violation of the Wyoming and United States 
Constitutions?

 
 
[¶3]      The appellee 
county presents the following issues:

 
 
1.         
Does the landowners' failure to designate an adequate record warrant 
dismissal of their appeal and the entry of sanctions, including payment of the 
county's attorney's fees and costs?

 
 
2.         
Did the landowners' claim for compensation fail to meet the requirements 
of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, thereby constituting an invalid governmental 
claim?

 
 
3.         
Does an invalid governmental claim deprive the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction?

 
 
4.         
Did the district court properly grant the county's motion for summary 
judgment?

 
 

 
 
[¶4]      The parties do 
not challenge the undisputed material facts set forth in the district court's 
decision letter.  The following 
summary of relevant facts is taken from that decision 
letter.

 
 
[¶5]      In 1993, the 
county appointed a task force to revise its existing land use plan.  The task force's product, identified 
herein as "the Plan," was styled as an agreement and required adoption not just 
by the appellee, but also by Rock Springs or 
Green River, or both cities.  After a public hearing in 1996, the Plan 
was adopted by the county, but by neither city.  The county then amended the Plan to 
delete the requirement that it be adopted by the cities and, after another 
public hearing, adopted the Plan as amended.

 
 
[¶6]      The amendments to 
the Plan also incorporated it into the county's zoning regulations by 
stating:  "The Growth Management 
Plan and Agreement shall be considered an integral part of the Sweetwater County 
Zoning and Subdivision Regulations."  
This incorporation was confirmed in 1997 by adoption of a resolution 
whose stated purpose was to ensure that the Plan was "properly enforced through 
the Zoning Resolution."

 
 
[¶7]      One of the 
primary purposes of the Plan was to manage growth within the county, especially 
in the "urbanizing" areas surrounding Rock 
Springs and Green River.  To that end, the Plan contained the 
following provisions:

 
 
Hillside 
Protection Study Period  The purpose of this three-year study period is to 
allow time for Sweetwater County and an appointed ad hoc committee to research 
and make recommendations on development criteria for lands with slopes of 10% or 
greater within the urbanizing area.

 
 
Urban 
Reserve Study Area  The urban reserve study area is an area which will allow 
established agriculture, grazing, livestock trailing and animal migration uses 
to continue in the area that has long-term potential for urban growth.  This area includes agriculturally 
designated lands shown on Exhibit "B".  
During a three-year study period beginning with the date of the adoption 
of this agreement, SweetwaterCounty will appoint an ad hoc committee to 
examine and make recommendations on the future use, acquisition and regulation 
of these lands.

 
 

5.9.5  Administration of Urban Reserve Study 
Area

 
 
The 
purpose of the urban reserve study area is to allow established commercial 
agriculture, grazing, livestock trailing and animal migration uses to continue 
on agriculturally-zoned areas within the urbanizing area that have long-term 
potential for urban growth, while Sweetwater County studies the most appropriate 
zoning and regulations for the area.  
These Urban Reserve Areas are zoned agriculture on Exhibit "B".  This area shall be under study for a 
three-year period of time with the option to extend the length of the study 
period if it becomes necessary.  The 
study period will begin upon the adoption of the 
agreement.

 
 
During 
this time frame existing commercial[,] agriculture, grazing, livestock trailing, 
animal migration and oil/gas/mineral extraction are all considered permitted 
uses within this area.  All other 
proposed uses, including residential accessory use, will require a Conditional 
Use Permit or a zone change depending on the nature of the application.  Each application will be review[ed] on a 
case-by-case basis.  The 
availability of public water will be a consideration/condition [for] each 
Conditional Use Permit and/or zone change.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
Concurrent 
with the adoption of this agreement, SweetwaterCounty by separate resolution shall amend 
the Sweetwater County Zoning Resolution to accommodate the Urban Reserve Study 
Area.

 
 

5.9.7  Administration of Hillside Protection Study Period

 
 
The 
purpose of this study period is to allow time for SweetwaterCounty to research and make recommendation 
on planning strategies which encourage environmentally sound development on 
hillsides with slopes of 10% or greater located within the urbanizing 
areas.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
In the 
Urbanizing Area during the study period, all establishment of uses, 
construction, development, grading and earthwork on lands with hillsides of 10% 
or greater will require a Conditional Use Permit and be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis.

 
 
If more 
study is needed, this agreement allows SweetwaterCounty the option to extend the time 
frame.

 
 
Concurrent 
with the adoption of this agreement, SweetwaterCounty by separate resolution shall amend 
the Sweetwater County Zoning Resolution to accommodate the Hillside Study 
Period.

 
 
[¶8]      In 1998, the 
appellant landowners purchased lands within the Urban Reserve Study Area, part 
of which lands also were within the Hillside Protection Study Area.  Consequently, conditional use permits 
were required for the landowners' proposed new use, described as "hobby 
ranching."  In addition, the county 
notified the landowners that their lands lay within an existing subdivision and 
that they would need to obtain a conditional use permit to establish a different 
use of the property.  What followed 
was a protracted administrative struggle between the parties over the 
conditional use permit application process.  Eventually, after a contested case 
hearing before an independent hearing examiner, the county issued conditional 
use permits to the landowners.  Over 
a year later, the landowners presented to the county a claim under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-101, et seq. 
(LexisNexis 2003), and subsequently filed this litigation.  The district court entered summary 
judgment in favor of the county on April 14, 2004.

 
 

 
 

[¶9]      We see no need 
once again to reiterate our well-known standard for the review of summary 
judgments.  See Ahrenholtz v. 
Laramie Economic Development Corp., 2003 WY 149, ¶ 16, 79 P.3d 511, 515, 
amended on reh'g, 2003 WY 149A, 82 P.3d 714 (Wyo. 2003) and McLean v. Hyland Enterprises, 
Inc., 2001 WY 111, ¶ 14, 34 P.3d 1262, 1266-67 (Wyo. 2001).  That same standard applies in 
declaratory judgment actions.  
Pullar v. Huelle, 2003 WY 90, ¶ 6, 73 P.3d 1038, 1039-40 (Wyo. 
2003); 
Goglio v. Star Valley Ranch Ass'n , 2002 WY 94, ¶ 12, 48 P.3d 1072, 1076 
(Wyo. 2002).

 
 

 
 

Motion 
to Dismiss

 
 
[¶10]   The county filed a motion to 
dismiss this appeal because the landowners did not, contemporaneously with the 
filing of their appellate brief, serve and file a designation of the record, as 
is required by W.R.A.P. 3.05(b).  In 
response to the motion to dismiss, the landowners immediately filed their 
designation of the record.  In an 
exercise of our discretion under W.R.A.P. 1.03, we denied the motion to dismiss, 
but we sanctioned the landowners' attorney for the late filing.  We decline now to revisit that 
decision.

 
 
Governmental 
Claim

 
 
[¶11]   The claim presented by the 
landowners to the county sought compensation for loss of use of the property, 
devaluation of the property as a result of restrictions placed upon its use, and 
damages incurred in obtaining allegedly unnecessary and illegal permits.  These allegations were characterized in 
the claim as resulting in inverse condemnation, an unconstitutional taking, and 
deprivation of due process of law.  
In the prayer for relief in their complaint, the landowners sought 
compensation for these three causes of action, and for "arbitrary and capricious 
conduct in adopting and implementing" the Plan.

 
 
[¶12]   The county contended in the 
district court that the landowners' causes of action were time-barred because 
their claim for compensation had not been presented within the two-year 
limitation period of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a).1  In its decision letter, the district 
court ruled that inverse condemnation actions are governed by the WGCA, and 
further ruled that, inasmuch as the landowners' takings and due process claims 
were analogous to their inverse condemnation claim, "to the extent one cause of 
action may be time-barred, this Court believes the others would [be] as 
well."  The district court went on 
to rule, however, "this Court need not determine whether [the landowners'] 
claims are time-barred, because this Court determines that there has been no 
temporary taking (or inverse condemnation) herein."

 
 
[¶13]   The landowners' appellate brief 
contains a concession that inverse condemnation actions are governed by the WGCA 
and that their inverse condemnation cause of action is, therefore, 
time-barred.2  Were that the end of it, it might appear 
that we need not consider whether the WGCA applies to the other causes of action 
because the district court made no actual ruling in that regard.  However, the county has raised the issue 
again before this Court, with emphasis upon the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction, or rather, the lack thereof.

 
 

[¶14]   This Court has now stated several 
times that governmental claims must meet the dictates of both the WGCA and Wyo. 
Const. art. 16, § 7.3  Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, ¶ 
10, 101 P.3d 465, 468 (Wyo. 2004); 
Yoak v. Ide, 2004 WY 32, ¶ 6, 86 P.3d 872, 874 (Wyo. 2004); 
Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 11, 86 P.3d 863, 867 (Wyo. 2004) 
(Beaulieu II); 
Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 15, 20 P.3d 521, 527 (Wyo. 2001) 
(Beaulieu I).  Specifically, such claims must be signed 
by the claimant and certified to under penalty of perjury, and they must be 
presented to the governmental entity within two years of the date of the alleged 
act, error or omission.  Unless 
those requirements have been met, and unless such compliance is stated in the 
complaint, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.  Bell, 2004 WY 153, ¶ 36, 101 P.3d  
at 476; 
Lankford v. City of Laramie, 2004 WY 143, ¶ 22, 100 P.3d 1238, 1244 (Wyo. 
2004); 
Beaulieu II, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 11, 86 P.3d  at 867; 
Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 14, 20 P.3d  at 527.

 
 
[¶15]   That is not the end of the matter, 
however.  By its own terms, the WGCA 
applies only to claims and actions brought "under this act . . .."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a).  Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming 
Constitution, on the other hand, applies to all claims against the 
state and its political subdivisions.  
That would include the landowners' due process and takings claims, 
whether or not those claims were analogous to the inverse condemnation claim.4  Consequently, even if the presentment 
limitation period of the WGCA did not apply to the due process and takings 
claims, those claims were constitutionally deficient because they were not 
signed by the landowners and they were not certified to under penalty of 
perjury.5

 
 

[¶16]   Our jurisprudence dictates that 
neither the district court nor this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a 
governmental claim that has failed to meet the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 
16, § 7.  Lankford, 2004 WY 
143, ¶ 23, 100 P.3d  at 1244; 
Beaulieu II, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 15, 86 P.3d at 868-69; 
Platte Development Co. v. State, Environmental Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972, 974 (Wyo. 1998); 
Sheridan Retirement Partners v. City of Sheridan, 950 P.2d 554, 556-57 
(Wyo. 1997).  The monetary claims should have been 
dismissed on that ground and we will dismiss this appeal to that 
extent.

 
 
Declaratory 
Judgment

 
 
[¶17]   In addition to the 
compensatory claims, the landowners' complaint also seeks redress in the form of 
a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Plan is invalid.6  The landowners' contentions are 
summarized in their appellate brief as follows:

 
 
            
The [Plan] was improperly adopted by the County.  The joint land use plan was not adopted 
in accordance with its own terms, and the County's attempt to amend and 
"readopt" the document violated both the plain language of the [Plan] and 
applicable provisions of the Wyoming Zoning Act, W.S. §§ 18-5-201 through 
18-5-208.  The [Plan], which is a 
joint land use plan created under the authority found in W.S. § 9-8-302, was 
also developed in violation of the WJPA and was not properly incorporated into 
the [county's zoning resolutions].  
Extension of the [Plan's] four "study areas" was also done in violation 
of applicable zoning provisions.

 
 
            
In addition to the procedural maladies, the [Plan], or more specifically, 
its implementing [conditional use permit] regulations, is facially invalid.  The [Plan] imposes a [conditional use 
permit] requirement for any "new" use in any of the four "study areas."  The [conditional use permit] 
regulations, however, do not set forth any standards or guidelines to assist 
County officials in determining whether to approve or deny a [conditional use 
permit] application.  The regulation 
gives unbridled discretion to County officials.  Such discretion renders the [conditional 
use permit] regulations unconstitutionally vague and in violation of substantive 
due process.

 
 
            
The [Plan], th[r]ough its implementing [conditional use permit] 
regulations, is also an improper restraint on land use within SweetwaterCounty.  At the time [the landowners] were 
seeking their [conditional use permits], the four "study areas" encompassed most 
of the unincorporated areas of the County, and almost all of the growth 
management area.  By requiring a 
[conditional use permit], or a "special use" permit for any "new" land use 
within the "study areas," the County was effectively controlling land use in an 
ad hoc and arbitrary manner.  Such 
land use control is the antithesis of proper zoning.  It allows for arbitrary and 
discriminatory interference with the basic rights of private 
property.

 
 

 
 
[¶18]   The landowners' first argument is 
that, because the Plan as originally drawn required adoption by at least one of 
the cities in addition to the county, the failure of either city to adopt the 
Plan resulted in the county not being able to adopt it on its own.  Therefore, both the initial adoption and 
the later amendment were invalid.  
The county's response to this argument, which the district court 
accepted, was that the county had properly adopted the Plan as amended, and that 
municipal concurrence was then no longer necessary.  We agree.  The status of the Plan in its earlier 
version is not relevant, given that it was adopted as amended before the 
landowners purchased their property.   
We also agree with the district court's conclusion that nothing in the 
record reveals the county used improper procedures in adopting the amended 
version.  Although the Plan was 
styled as a "plan and agreement," the landowners have shown no reason it could 
not suffice as the county's land use plan, even if it did not become an 
agreement with the cities.

 
 
Notice 
and Procedural Due Process

 
 

[¶19]   There is some question in the 
materials before this Court as to the exact nature of the landowners' second 
argument, which involves notice and procedural due process in regard to the 
county's adoption of the Plan.  The 
complaint did not allege inadequate notice or a procedural due process 
claim.  Such an argument was made to 
the district court, however, and in its decision letter, the district court 
separately dealt with the issue.  
Appropriately, the district court noted the existence of both statutory 
notice and constitutional due process requirements.  See Pfeil v. Amax Coal West, Inc., 
908 P.2d 956, 960-61 (Wyo. 1995).  Without further analysis, the district 
court stated that the two-year period in which to contest statutory notice 
provisions found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-103(c) (LexisNexis 2001) did not 
apply to allegations of constitutional due process violations.7  The district court then went on to apply 
the following standard, taken from Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950):  "Proper notice entails notice that is 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.'"  The district 
court also cited Amoco Production Co. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 
882 P.2d 866, 872 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Robbins v. South Cheyenne Water 
and Sewer Dist., 792 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Wyo. 1990)), 
wherein this Court held that "procedural due process is satisfied if a person 
is afforded adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.'"8  Applying these standards, the district 
court found against the landowners.

 
 

[¶20]   In their appellate brief, the 
landowners have limited their notice argument to allege that the public notice 
issued by the county prior to adoption of the Plan as amended did not satisfy 
the notice and public hearing requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-202(c) 
(LexisNexis 2003).9  Specifically, quoting Hallmark 
Builders and Realty v. City of Gunnison, 650 P.2d 556, 559 (Colo. 
1982), the 
landowners contend that "a notice should set forth the information reasonably 
necessary to provide adequate warning to all persons whose rights may be 
affected by the proposed action," and that "the notice must . . . apprise the 
public of the subject matter of the hearing and the nature of the proposed 
zoning change."  See also Hoke v. 
Moyer, 865 P.2d 624, 630-31 (Wyo. 1993) (notice and public hearing required 
before a board of county commissioners may adopt the recommendations of a zoning 
commission) and Schoeller v. Board of County Com'rs of Park County, 568 P.2d 869, 872 (Wyo. 1977) (notice and public hearing required 
before zoning resolution may be adopted).  
Inasmuch as the landowners have limited their argument to the statutory 
notice requirement, we will address only that issue.

 
 
[¶21]   The public notice published prior 
to adoption of the amended Plan reads as follows:

 
 
On 
November 20, 1996, at 10:00 a.m., . . . the Sweetwater County Planning and 
Zoning Commission will hold a public hearing regarding the following:  Proposed changes to Sections 3, 4, and 5 
of the Sweetwater County Growth Management Plan and Agreement; adoption of the 
Sweetwater County Growth Management Plan and Agreement by the Cities of Green 
River and Rock Springs; revision of City Codes and Ordinances adopted by 
Sweetwater County on April 23, 1996 . . . and, amendment of the Sweetwater 
County Zoning and Subdivision Regulations to include revised City Codes and 
Ordinances.  These proposed changes 
are necessary to finalize the Growth Management Plan and Agreement with the 
Cities of Green River and Rock 
Springs.  The 
Sweetwater County Board of Commissioners will hold a public hearing on the 
recommendations of the Sweetwater County Planning and Zoning Commission 
concerning these issues at their regular meeting scheduled for December 4, 1996, 
at 2:00 p.m.  If you have any 
questions regarding these proposed changes or ordinances for adoption, they are 
on display at the following places: . . ..

 
 

[¶22]   Under any applicable standard, we 
simply see no deficiency in this public notice.  No one reading it could mistake the fact 
that the county would be considering proposed changes to, and adoption or 
re-adoption of, the county's growth management plan.  Furthermore, the specific reference to 
Sections 3, 4, and 5 directed the reader's attention to the very provisions at 
issue in this case.  The landowners 
were in no way prejudiced by this published notice.  Pfeil, 908 P.2d at 
960 (prejudice required before agency action 
reversed).

 
 

Wyoming Joint 
Powers Act

 
 
[¶23]   The landowners' position that the 
county's adoption of the Plan violated the Wyoming Joint Powers Act (WJPA) is 
straightforward.  They contend that 
the Plan is a "local land use plan" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-8-102(a)(ix) 
(LexisNexis 2003).10  Local governments cooperating in the 
development of a local land use plan must do so in accordance with the WJPA.11  Any cooperative agreement not complying 
with the WJPA is invalid.12  Because the Plan was designated as a 
cooperative agreement among the county and the cities of Rock Springs and Green 
River, and because the Plan does not meet WJPA requirements, the 
landowners conclude that it is invalid.

 
 
[¶24]   This argument, too, must fail, for 
the simple reason that the county and the cities did not enter into a 
cooperative agreement subject to the WJPA.  
No matter how it may have been styled, the Plan adopted and readopted by 
the county in 1996 was a unilateral land use plan.  The fact that the county made a failed 
attempt to enter into a common plan with the cities did not destroy its ability 
to adopt the Plan on its own.  
Further, the fact that the City of Green River subsequently adopted the Plan and 
began to enforce its provisions within its municipal boundaries did not 
automatically convert the Plan into a joint powers agreement under the 
WJPA.

 
 

Sweetwater 
CountyZoning 
Resolution

 
 

[¶25]   In Ford v. Board of County 
Com'rs of Converse County, 924 P.2d 91, 94-95 (Wyo. 1996), this 
Court held that a county's comprehensive land use plan is merely a policy 
statement, while its zoning resolution has the force and effect of law.  In response, the county took steps to 
ensure that the Plan was enforceable through its zoning resolution.  Ford was published in September 
1996.  On December 4, 1996, the 
county amended the Plan to read, "[t]he Growth Management Plan and Agreement 
shall be considered an integral part of the Sweetwater County Zoning and 
Subdivision Regulations."  The 
district court relied upon this amendment in concluding that the Plan could be 
implemented and enforced through the zoning resolution.  Beyond that effort, however, the county 
took additional measures.  On 
January 8, 1997, the county amended Section 3.b.(6) of its zoning resolution to 
read:

 
 
Within 
the urbanizing and city growth areas within the Growth Management Boundary as 
described by the Sweetwater County Growth Management Plan and Agreement and 
shown on Exhibit "A" of the Sweetwater County Growth [Management] Plan and 
Agreement, the commencement or establishment of any uses, development, or 
construction including the development of roadways that are established after 
the effective date of said agreement, shall meet the development and permitting 
standards and policies of the Growth Management Plan and Agreement and the 
Zoning Resolution of Sweetwater County.  
Where the policies and standards of said Growth Management Plan and 
Agreement are different than those standards of the Zoning Resolution or other 
official regulations of SweetwaterCounty, the more restrictive standards, 
regulations, or policies shall apply.

 
 
[¶26]   While perhaps inartfully drawn, the 
purpose of the amendmentthat being to make the conditional use permit process 
of the Plan part of the zoning resolutionis sufficiently clear so as to 
accomplish that end.  That intent 
was made patently clear by the language of the accompanying statement of 
purpose:

 
 
PURPOSE 
OF AMENDMENT:

 
 
To 
support the integration of the Growth Management Plan and Agreement into the 
Sweetwater County Zoning Resolution.

 
 
This 
amendment helps ensure that the Growth Management Plan is properly enforced 
through the Zoning Resolution.  A 
recent Wyoming Supreme Court decision has held that rules and regulations stated 
in a plan can only be enforced through county zoning and subdivision 
regulations.

 
 
[¶27]   The landowners challenge the 
effectiveness of these amendments first by suggesting that they are no more than 
an attempt to zone through a land use plan.  Second, they contend that the amendments 
have never taken effect because, by their own wording, they only apply to uses 
established "after the effective date of said agreement . . .."  Because the landowners believe that the 
Plan was not properly adopted, they further believe that it has never become 
effective and has no "effective date" for purposes of these 
amendments.

 
 
[¶28]   We reject all of these 
contentions.  We have already 
determined that the Plan became effective as a county land use plan when it was 
first adopted by the county.  
Further, we find the county met the dictates of Ford by engrafting 
the Plan's enforcement toolthe conditional use permit processinto the county's 
zoning resolution.

 
 
Extension 
of the Study Areas

 
 
[¶29]   As adopted in 1996, Section 5 of 
the Plan provided for four "study areas":  
the Design Criteria Study Area (development standards for highway 
rights-of-way), the Urban Reserve Study Area (agriculturally zoned areas within 
urbanizing areas), the Special Study Area (scenic, environmental, and 
recreational resources), and the Hillside Protection Study Period (development 
on slopes of 10% or greater).  The 
"study period" for each area was to be three years, with the option for 
extension if necessary.  In 
addition, Section 11 of the Plan created a three-year "work program" whereby ad 
hoc committees would be appointed to study certain enumerated developmental 
issues, specifically including issues related to the four study 
areas.

 
 
[¶30]   The Plan was adopted on April 23, 
1996, meaning the study area and work program provisions would expire on April 
23, 1999, unless extended.  The 
county's planning and zoning commission began the process for approval of such 
extension by publication of a hearing notice on February 13, 1999.13  In pertinent part, that notice indicated 
that an issue to be heard at the commission's March 17, 1999, meeting was the 
"[p]roposed extension of the study period under Section 11.0 Work Program" of 
the Plan.  The notice also indicated 
that the board of county commissioners would consider the same matters during 
its meeting on April 7, 1999.

 
 
[¶31]   The minutes of the March 17, 1999, 
commission meeting indicate that the public meeting occurred, that public 
comment was accepted, and that, after discussion, the commission unanimously 
recommended to the board that the work program be 
extended.

 
 
[¶32]   On March 25, 1999, the county had 
published another public notice, this time announcing a "joint workshop" between 
the commission and the board on April 9, 1999, for the purpose of discussing 
general issues related to planning and zoning.  The agenda available at the meeting 
listed the work program as one of four items for discussion.  The minutes from the meeting reveal a 
lengthy and somewhat heated discussion of the work program, including citizen 
comments.  In addition, the board 
considered the work program and took public comment in regard thereto at its 
regular meeting on April 7, 1999, and a continuation of that meeting on April 
20, 1999.  In the end, the board 
voted to extend the work program and study areas for an additional three 
years.

 
 
[¶33]   The landowners contend that, 
despite all of the foregoing, notice of the possible extension of the work 
program was insufficient to advise the public that the study areas might also be 
extended.  The district court 
rejected this contention, for two reasons.  
First, the district court reviewed the Plan and found the work program 
and the study areas to be "inextricably intertwined," meaning that notice of the 
former was notice of the latter.  
Second, the district court pointed out that some of the landowners had 
actually attended the April meetings for the specific purpose of opposing 
extension of the study areas.  Thus, 
no prejudice could be shown to have resulted from the 
notices.

 
 
[¶34]   We agree with the district court's 
analysis.  The fact that the work 
program and the study areas were "linked" is revealed in one of the findings of 
the resolution passed by the board extending them both:  "WHEREAS, a work program was established 
under Section 11.0 of the County's Growth Management Plan to address certain 
identified issues including not only the development of policies and standards 
for the study areas but the revision of the plan itself and the amendment of 
zoning and subdivision regulations[.]"  
This clause is an accurate recitation of the Plan's work program 
provisions, wherein the "topics under study" specifically include the study 
areas.

 
 

[¶35]   The notice provisions of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 18-5-202 both require only "[n]otice of the time and place of 
hearing."  As we have previously 
held, however, "compliance with statutory requirements of notice and hearing 
does not always satisfy constitutional requirements of due process."  Pfeil, 908 P.2d  at 
961.  The constitutional test of procedural 
due process is "reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 
. . .."  Id.

 
 

[¶36]   The reasonableness of notice is 
determined by the circumstances, including the nature of the proceeding and the 
character of the rights to be affected.  
16B Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law § 934 (1998).  Under the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act (WAPA), for instance, different notice requirements are provided 
for general rulemaking activity and contested case hearings.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-103(a)(i); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(b) (LexisNexis 
2003).  Certainly, in the context of 
the present casea public hearing set for the purpose of reviewing planning and 
zoning resolutionsa published notice that identified the particular issues to 
be discussed, even in general terms, was sufficient.  Notice to the public that the work 
program would be addressed was sufficient notice to the public that the 
individual aspects of the work program, including the study areas, were at 
issue.

 
 
Conditional 
Use Permit Standards

 
 

[¶37]   The landowners argue that the 
county's conditional use permit process is unconstitutionally vague and 
violative of substantive due process because it contains inadequate standards 
for the guidance of permitting officials.  
Citing Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 
467 U.S. 947, 964 n.12, 104 S. Ct. 2839, 81 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1984), they 
contend that a zoning ordinance is invalid if it leaves too much to the 
discretion of local officials.  
Rather, the landowners suggest that "standards must be precise and 
objective."  See Lady J. 
Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1362 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1053 (2000).  In particular, the landowners decry what 
they describe as the county's "unbridled discretion" first, to either approve or 
deny a conditional use permit, and second, to impose any special condition or 
requirement the county deems "necessary."

 
 

[¶38]   The district court granted summary 
judgment to the county on this issue, and we will affirm that decision.  While it is true that the discretion of 
permitting officials may not  be 
"unbridled," it is also true that they must be allowed to act with a certain 
amount of discretion, exercised reasonably, as opposed to arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  Prudential Trust 
Co. v. City of Laramie, 492 P.2d 971, 974 
(Wyo. 
1972).  In that regard, the county's zoning 
resolution contains the following guidance in limiting the conditions that may 
be placed on a conditional use permit:

 
 
Pursuant 
to the regulations hereinafter set forth, certain uses may be permitted by 
Conditional Use Permit within the stated Zone Districts and may be subject to 
special conditions or requirements deemed necessary by the County.  To insure that the Conditionally 
Permitted Use does not unreasonably impose adverse impacts on the health, 
safety, and general welfare of the County or on adjacent or nearby properties or 
residents, the County may impose certain special conditions including but not 
limited to the following:

 
 
            
- Duration of use

            
- Extension of the C.U.P.

            
- Hours of operation

            
- Site and/or building improvements

            
- Parking requirements

                                    
- Sewer and water requirements

 
 
In 
addition, the pre-printed application form, itself, contains a list of potential 
requirements:  site plan, boundary 
survey, hazardous materials inventory, topographic map, grading and drainage 
plan, soil engineering tests, plans and elevations of proposed structures, 
structural blue prints, engineer-approved foundation designs, engineer-approved 
public right-of-way and road construction plans, range management plan, nutrient 
management plan, hillside management plan, proof of access onto a county road, 
proof of ownership, proof of connection to public sewer and/or water system, and 
"other."

 
 
[¶39]   From these materials, we know that 
the guiding purpose of the conditional use permit process is the "health, 
safety, and general welfare" of the county.  And from the statutory construction 
maxim, ejusdem generis, we also know that "other" requirements must be of 
the same nature as those printed on the application form.14  Consequently, the county is limited to 
the imposition of permit conditions that are designed to promote the health, 
safety, and welfare of its inhabitants, and that are similar in nature to those 
listed above.  These are sufficient 
guidelines to prevent the county from acting arbitrarily or capriciously in the 
administration of the conditional use permit system.

 
 
Illegal 
Restraint on Land Use

 
 
[¶40]   The plethora of stated causes of 
action in the landowners' complaint caused the district court some analytical 
confusion.  The district court 
interpreted the illegal restraint issue as a question of substantive due 
process.  In their appellate brief, 
however, the landowners have presented illegal restraint and substantive due 
process as separate issues.  We will 
do likewise.

 
 

[¶41]   The gist of the landowners' illegal 
restraint argument is that the county's extensive conditional use permit system 
is the antithesis of zoning.  In 
other words, instead of a conditional use permit system designed to consider 
land uses not specifically allowed in a particular zoning district, the county 
uses the special permit process to control all land uses, whether or not 
consistent with underlying zoning.  
We will not further address this issue, because the landowners have not 
analyzed the particulars of the county's planning and zoning resolutions within 
the context of this state's statutory planning and zoning construct.  The landowners cite only one case, 
Rockhill v. Chesterfield Tp., Burlington County, 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473, 477-80 (1957), 
wherein the Supreme Court of New Jersey struck down a special use permit system 
where there was no underlying zoning district scheme, in violation of that 
state's constitutional and statutory zoning principles.15  This is not sufficient analysis from 
which we can conclude that the county's dissimilar conditional use permit 
structure violates Wyoming's statutes or constitution.  There is simply no showing in this case 
that a temporary work program containing special study areas designed to deal 
with urbanization, superimposed on an existing zoning scheme, is an illegal 
restraint on land use.

 
 
Substantive 
Due Process

 
 

[¶42]   Our federal constitution, in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and our state constitution, in article 1, § 6, 
proclaim that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law."  The 
constitutional principle of "due process" has both a procedural aspect and a 
substantive aspect.  Moreno v. State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 
775 P.2d 497, 500 (Wyo. 1989).  We have already considered herein the 
notice and opportunity to be heard requirements of procedural due process.  In a previous discussion of the exercise 
of the police power by local governments, we said the 
following:

 
 
"In 
general, Wyoming has, in zoning cases, interpreted its 
due process provision in a manner parallel to the federal provisions.  See e.g. Board of County 
Commissioners of Teton County v. Teton County Youth Services, Inc., Wyo., 
652 P.2d 400, 414 (1982).

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
The constitutional standard of substantive due process, under both 
United States and Wyoming interpretations, 
demands that a police power regulation must promote a legitimate public 
objective with reasonable means.  
The substantive due process standard of reasonableness is applicable 
during the initial legislative process and theoretically confines the 
legislators.  The judiciary may, in 
the context of an actual case, be called on to measure the legislative 
performance against the constitutional standard.  When the legislative enactment lies in 
the economic and social welfare area, and when there are no suspect criteria or 
fundamental interests involved, the court will, in testing the enactment, 
inquire only as to whether the regulation is of debatable reasonableness.  In other words, if the court perceives 
that the legislature had some arguable basis for choosing the end and the means, 
it will sustain the regulation at least as to compliance with substantive due 
process.  Only when a regulation 
amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of regulatees' property will it be deemed to 
violate the dictates of substantive due process.  As we said in Washakie 
CountySchool 
District No. One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310, 333 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 
28:

 
 
            
When an ordinary [nonfundamental constitutional] interest is involved, 
then a court merely examines to determine whether there is a rational 
relationship between a classification * * * and a legitimate state 
objective.'

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
The legitimate objectives of the police power are loosely characterized 
as being public in nature and the potential range is very broad.  See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed 27 (1954).  . . 
.

 
 
            
As to the means chosen by the Cheyenne council to achieve these objectives, 
we reiterate that, in the economic and social welfare area and when the 
ordinance is examined in a general, facial manner, the courts will usually go no 
further than to ascertain the debatable reasonableness of the legislative 
choices.  See Snake River Venture 
v. Board of County Commissioners, Teton County, Wyo., 616 P.2d 744, 753 
(1980).  The United States Supreme 
Court, in dealing with general, facial challenges to local exercises of police 
power, has sustained the substantive due process reasonableness of a number of 
facets of local zoning.  . . 
.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
Substantive due process, with its emphasis on legitimate objectives and 
rational means, can be explored and applied in a general sense when the 
reasonableness of the entire ordinance or statute is in question.  See e.g. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. 
Ambler Realty Co., [272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926)].  It can also be examined in a specific 
sense, when the court evaluates the reasonableness of a law as applied to an 
individual.  See Nectow v. City 
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S. Ct. 447, 72 L. Ed. 842 (1928)."

 
 

Board of 
County Com'rs of Teton County v. Crow, 2003 WY 
40, ¶ 19, 65 P.3d 720, 727-28 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. 
Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 726-28 (Wyo. 1985)).  See also Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Wyo. 1995) (substantive due process protects against 
arbitrary governmental action); White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Wyo. 
1989) (substantive due process met if the 
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state objective); Moreno, 
775 P.2d at 500 ("the exercise of the state police power 
must promote a legitimate public objective with reasonable means"); Bulova 
Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409, 417 (Wyo. 
1962) ("the purposes for which the police power 
is invoked must have relation to the public weal, must be within the scope and 
in furtherance of that power, and the means adopted must be reasonable and 
appropriate for the accomplishment of and have a substantial connection with the 
end in view") and Pirie v. Kamps, 68 Wyo. 83, 229 P.2d 927, 929 
(1951) (laws enacted for the general welfare 
must be reasonable and not arbitrary).  
The party alleging an infringement of his constitutional rights bears the 
burden of showing the existence of the right, and that it has been infringed 
upon in an impermissible way.  
Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 289 
(Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
[¶43]   The landowners contend that the 
county's conditional use permit system is facially unconstitutional because it 
is vague, and it is unconstitutional as applied to them because it was applied 
arbitrarily.  As to the first 
contention, the landowners argue, as set forth above, that the permit system 
contains no standards or guidance for county enforcement officials.  Having already dealt with that 
contention, we will not do so again.  
Suffice it to say that we do not find unbridled discretion in the Plan or 
in the enforcing zoning resolution; rather, we find sufficient guidance within 
both for enforcement officials and for those subject to 
regulation.

 
 
[¶44]   The landowners' as-applied 
challenge to the conditional use permit system is based upon several factual 
allegations:  (1) the county 
unreasonably required the landowners to attend a pre-application meeting, to 
vacate an old subdivision plat, to dedicate a public road, to prepare a 
certified range management plan, and to reach an agreement with surrounding 
landowners; (2) the county unreasonably delayed the permitting process; and (3) 
the county's actions were motivated by bias, bad faith, or other improper 
motives, including community resistance.

 
 
[¶45]   In their appellate brief, the 
landowners detail their grievances.  
They contend that the county acted arbitrarily in requiring them to 
attend a pre-application meeting.  
They find arbitrariness in this requirement because such is not contained 
in the conditional use permit regulations, but is required on a case-by-case 
basis as a policy of the county's planning office.  Second, the appellants contend that 
there is no statute directing them to vacate the subdivision plan, so the 
county's demand that they do so was arbitrary.  Next, the landowners describe as "the 
most egregious example of the vague nature of" the conditional use permit 
regulations as being the requirement that they obtain environmental 
studies.  More precisely, they 
complain that it was uncertain whether the requirement for such studies was 
truly mandatory, or was merely a recommendation.16

 
 

[¶46]   The district court applied the 
review standard set forth above and concluded that the permit system did not 
violate the landowners' right to substantive due process.  First, the district court noted that 
land-use regulations, including zoning laws, that reasonably promote the health, 
safety, and general welfare of the populace, even when adversely affecting real 
property interests, have been viewed as permissible governmental action.  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125, 
98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978).  Finding that both the Plan and the 
county's zoning resolution were implemented for the public health and welfare, 
the district court concluded that the means chosen to achieve those objectives 
were reasonable.

 
 
 
 
[¶47]   Having reviewed the entire record, 
we conclude that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment to 
the county on the landowners' substantive due process issues.  Aside from diatribe, the landowners have 
provided little to show either that the county's reasons for exercising the 
police power, or its chosen methods in doing so, were improper.  In the urbanizing area, the county had 
implemented a conditional use permit system to manage growth while it studied 
its existing zoning districts.  The 
landowners purchased agriculturally zoned lands, subject to an existing 
subdivision plat, that they intended to convert to "hobby ranching."  These facts alone subjected the 
landowners to the county's reasonable change-in-use policies.  In addition, the lands were affected by 
at least two of the study areas found in the PlanHillside Protection and Urban 
Reservethat justified additional regulatory processes.  And beyond that, public hearings 
revealed opposition from a neighboring subdivision, consideration of which is, 
of course, the reason for public hearings.

 
 
[¶48]   The lack of substance in the 
landowners' substantive due process argument on appeal is, perhaps, best 
exemplified by their presentation in regard to the subdivision plat issue.  In their appellate brief, the appellants 
make the following complaints:

 
 
            
The [conditional use permit] condition requiring [the landowners], as 
opposed to the County, to vacate the subdivision is another example of the 
problems associated with the vague [conditional use permit] standards.  Despite the fact that [the landowners] 
were never involved in recording the subdivision plat, and that there is no 
statutory directive requiring [the landowners] to vacate the plat, the County 
placed this responsibility on [the landowners].  . . .  Requiring [the landowners] to vacate a 
subdivision without the associated statutory authority is just the sort of 
unbridled discretion that violates the substantive Due Process standards and 
that renders the [conditional use permit] regulations 
invalid.

 
 
                                    
. . .

 
 
            
Additionally, the substantive and procedural road blocks erected by the 
Commission and the Board constitute an unreasonable delay in the permitting 
process.  The first delay occurred 
in the fall of 1998 when the County required [the landowners] to vacate the 
platted subdivision.  There is 
nothing in any Wyoming statute which would require the 
landowner not responsible for the subdivision, as opposed to the County, to 
vacate the subdivision.  The County 
arbitrarily made the vacation the responsibility of [the landowners] rather than 
the County, and delayed processing the [conditional use permit] applications 
until the plat was vacated.

 
 
[¶49]   These complaints are unaccompanied 
by citation to pertinent authority, or even by explanation as to why such a 
requirement is arbitrary and unreasonable.  
The district court made the following findings, unchallenged in this 
appeal, in regard to the subdivision plat issue:

 
 
            
In October 1998, the County notified [the landowners] that a significant 
portion of the property lay within the existing Overland Village Subdivision and 
that [the landowners] needed to obtain a [conditional use permit] to establish 
any new uses on the property.  On 
October 18, 1998, the County sent [the landowners] correspondence that described 
the required process to pursue issuance of a [conditional use permit] from the 
Board.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
During this entire period of time, the County required resolution of the 
Overland Village Subdivision issues and related access issues.  Essentially, the access issues included 
the "Gaensslen Ranch 
Road" and related "spur" that provides access to the 
Gaensslen Ranch Subdivision and to [the landowners'] property.  [The landowners] maintained that the 
Gaensslen Ranch 
Road was not a public roadway.  The County maintained that, before the 
Overland Village Subdivision could be vacated, it was necessary for [the 
landowners] either to dedicate the Gaensslen Ranch Road to the County or to 
comply with their obligations to construct the "Firehole Basin 
Drive," which was the road that had been dedicated to 
the County as part of the Overland Village Subdivision plats.  [The landowners] challenged the public 
nature of the Gaensslen Ranch Road, and the County asserted that, in the 
alternative, [the landowners] would be required to construct the Firehole Basin 
Drive in order to prevent any violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34-12-108.

 
 
(Footnotes 
omitted.)

 
 

[¶50]   It almost goes without saying that 
the county had a legitimate interest both in requiring amendment of the 
subdivision plat in the face of a proposed contrary use, and in maintaining 
public access to the surrounding properties.  Furthermore, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
34-12-106 through 34-12-111 (LexisNexis 2003) clearly reveal the landowners' 
role in the vacation of a subdivision plat.  Indeed, the landowners have presented no 
authority for the proposition that it would be the county's duty or right to 
vacate the subdivision plat.  And 
finally, vacation of the plat necessarily was complicated by the effect of 
vacation upon dedicated public streets and roads.  See Ahearn v. Town of Wheatland, 
2002 WY 12, ¶¶ 22-23, 39 P.3d 409, 418-19 (Wyo. 2002); 
Town of Moorcroft v. Lang, 779 P.2d 1180, 1184 (Wyo. 1989) and Gay Johnson's Wyo. Automotive 
Service Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 367 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo. 1961).  It could be said that, not only was the 
county's requirement that the subdivision plat and public access issues be 
resolved not arbitrary, but a failure to require resolution of those issues 
would have been unreasonable under the circumstances.

 
 

[¶51]   The landowners' contention that the 
county acted in bad faith or from improper motive is similarly deficient.  First, the landowners contend that the 
county paid inordinate attention to the concerns of property owners in a 
neighboring "upscale residential subdivision . . .."  They cite Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. 
Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 124-25 (3rd Cir. 2000), for 
the proposition that delay in the permitting process due to community resistance 
raises the question of bad faith or improper motive, and they cite Fritts v. 
City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Ky. 1961), as 
holding that the purpose of zoning is not to protect the value of the property 
of particular individuals.  Further, 
the landowners suggest that the county's actions in regard to their conditional 
use permit applications was likely unduly influenced by the fact that, among the 
neighboring subdivision owners who objected to and presented evidence against 
the permits, were a prominent local attorney and a member of the county's 
planning and zoning commission.

 
 

[¶52]   We are convinced, for several 
reasons, that summary judgment in favor of the county was appropriate despite 
these bad faith allegations.  The 
general purpose of zoning is to "conserve and promote the public health, safety 
and welfare of the citizens of the county."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-105(a) 
(LexisNexis 2003); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-306(a)(vii) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  Surely, the best 
evidence of the effect of particular action upon the citizenry is input from 
those citizens affected thereby.  
Furthermore, protection of property values and preservation of 
neighborhood "character" are proper factors for consideration in zoning 
decisions.  83 Am.Jur.2d, Zoning 
and Planning §§ 60-61 (2003).  Even the cases cited by the landowners 
recognize these principles.  In 
Woodwind Estates, Ltd., 205 F.3d  at 123-25, the 
municipality's denial of a permit was reversed because it was based on a factor 
irrelevant to the purposes of zoning, that being the socioeconomic status of 
prospective tenants in a low-income housing project, not simply because the 
municipality had considered community resistance to the project.  Similarly, in Fritts, 348 S.W.2d  
at 714, while 
stating that it is not the purpose of zoning to protect property values, the 
court added that "the effect of a zoning change on the value of neighboring 
property is . . . one factor to be considered[.]"  And beyond all that, the "improper 
motive" standard of Woodwind Estates, Ltd. has been abrogated, and has 
been supplanted with a standard whereby the substantive component of the due 
process clause is violated by governmental action only where such action is so 
arbitrary as to shock the conscience.  
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 399-402 
(3rd Cir. 2003).

 
 

[¶53]   Finally, the landowners provide 
only innuendo in regard to the participation of a local attorney and a planning 
commission member in the opposition to their conditional use permit 
applications.  The district court 
found, and the landowners have not suggested otherwise, that the commission 
member recused herself from the commission proceedings and did not vote on the 
issue.  See 83 Am.Jur.2d, 
Zoning and Planning, supra, § 734 (recusal is proper remedy for potential 
conflict of interest).  Likewise, 
the landowners recite no facts showing improper participation by the 
attorney.  In the absence of such 
showing, we will presume neither bad faith nor prejudice, and we have been 
directed to no evidence showing county conduct that "shocks the 
conscience."

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶54]   The landowners' monetary claims 
should have been dismissed for failure to comply either with the requirements of 
the WGCA or Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7.  
In affirming the summary judgment granted to the county in the 
declaratory judgment sphere, we have found (1) that the Plan was properly 
adopted by the county as its individual land-use plan and not as a joint land 
use-plan with Rock Springs or Green River; (2) that the Plan did not need to 
meet the requirements of the WJPA; (3) that the landowners' right to procedural 
due process was not violated in the adoption process; (4) that the Plan was 
properly enforced through the county's zoning resolution; (5) that the time 
period for the study areas contained in the Plan was properly extended; (6) that 
the Plan's conditional use permit standards are not unconstitutionally vague; 
(7) that the Plan and its conditional use permit system does not constitute an 
illegal restraint on land use; and (8) that the landowners' right to substantive 
due process was not violated by application of the conditional use permit 
system.

 
 
[¶55]   The appeal of the monetary claims 
is dismissed.  Summary judgment in 
favor of the county is affirmed as to the declaratory judgment 
issues.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 

  1"No action shall be brought under 
this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which the action is 
based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in writing within two 
(2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a).  The Plan was enforced against the 
landowners beginning in October 1998.  
They did not present their claim to the county until October 
2002.

  2See Lankford v. City of Laramie, 
2004 WY 143, ¶ 18, 100 P.3d 1238, 1243 (Wyo. 2004) and Waid v. State ex rel. Dept. of 
Transp., 996 P.2d 18, 24-25 (Wyo. 2000).

3

No money 
shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law and on 
warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, claims, accounts or demands 
against the state, or any county or political subdivision, shall be audited, 
allowed or paid until a full itemized statement in writing, certified to under 
penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers whose duty it 
may be to audit the same.

 
 

Wyo. Const. 
art. 16, § 7.

  4For the proposition that even 
constitutional claims may be reasonably restricted and regulated where there is 
a legitimate state interest, see Lankford, 2004 WY 143, ¶¶ 18-21, 100 
P.3d at 1243-44; 
Wyoming State Highway Dept. v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Wyo. 
1978); 
Michel v. State of Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 97, 76 S. Ct. 158, 100 L. Ed. 83 
(1955); 
American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 66, 31 S. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82 (1911); Johnny 
H. Killian and George A. Costello, The Constitution of the United States of 
America, Analysis and Interpretation, 1695 (1996); 16A 
C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §§ 449, 451-52 (1984 & Cum. Supp. 
2004); and 
16B Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 583-88 (1998).

  5Use of the plural "claims" is 
somewhat misleading.  The landowners 
presented a single "governmental claim" that became the basis for multiple 
causes of action.

6

Any 
person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings 
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are 
affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, 
contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or validity arising 
under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or 
other legal relations.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-37-103 (LexisNexis 2003).

  7"No rule is valid unless submitted, 
filed and adopted in substantial compliance with this section.  A proceeding to contest any rule on the 
ground of noncompliance with the procedural requirements of this 
section must be commenced with two (2) years from the effective date of 
the rule."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-103(c) (emphasis added).  This 
provision is part of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.  Clearly, the landowners' complaint was 
brought well beyond the two-year period.  
Because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-202 (LexisNexis 2003) contains its own 
notice and hearing requirements, however, there is some question, unanswered by 
the parties, whether the landowners' attack is upon the procedural requirements 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-103(c).  
Without adequate guidance of the parties in that regard, and because the 
district court's decision was not based on that point, we will address the 
merits of the notice issue.

  8The parties have not directed this 
Court's attention to any distinction between the notice and due process 
requirements of a judicial proceeding or contested case hearing, on the one 
hand, which were the situations in Mullane and Amoco Production Co., 
respectively, and administrative rule-making, on the other hand, which is 
the situation presently before this Court.  
We will not venture there on our own.

9

The 
planning and zoning commission shall prepare recommendations to effectuate the 
planning and zoning purposes and certify its recommendations to the board of 
county commissioners.  Before 
adopting the recommendations the board shall hold at least one (1) public 
hearing.  Notice of the time and 
place of hearing shall be given by one (1) publication in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county at least fourteen (14) days before the date of the 
hearing.  After public hearing has 
been held, the board shall vote upon the adoption of the planning or zoning 
recommendation.  No planning or 
zoning recommendation shall be adopted unless a majority of the board votes in 
favor thereof.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 18-5-202(c).

10

"Local 
land use plan" means any written statement of land use policies, goals and 
objectives adopted by local governments.  
Such plans shall relate to an explanation of the methods for 
implementation, however, these plans shall not require any provisions for 
zoning.  Any local land use plan may 
contain maps, graphs, charts, illustrations or any other form of written or 
visual communication[.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 9-8-102(a)(ix).

  11"For the purpose of development of 
local land use plans, the local government within each city, town and county may 
cooperate in the development of land use plans not inconsistent with established 
goals, policies and guidelines in accordance with the powers granted by the 
Wyoming Joint Powers Act [§§ 16-1-102 through 16-1-110]."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-8-302(b) (LexisNexis 
2003).

12

Any two 
(2) or more agencies may enter into agreements with each other for joint or 
cooperative action pursuant to this act.  
No agreement hereunder nor amendment thereto is effective 
until:

 
 
(i)  The governing body of each participating 
agency has approved the agreement or amendment;

 
 
(ii)  The agreement or amendment is submitted 
to and approved by the Wyoming attorney general who shall determine whether the 
agreement or amendment is compatible with the laws and constitution of Wyoming; 
and

 
 
(iii)  The agreement or amendment is filed with 
the keeper of records of each participating agency.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-1-105(a).

  13In addition to the statutory notice 
requirement before a board of county commissioners adopts a land use plan, as 
cited in footnote 9 hereinabove, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-202(b) contains a 
similar requirement for public notice before a planning and zoning commission 
certifies its recommendations to the board:

 
 
The 
planning and zoning commission may prepare and amend a comprehensive plan 
including zoning for promoting the public health, safety, morals and general 
welfare of the unincorporated areas of the county, and certify the plan to the 
board of county commissioners.  
Before certifying its plan or amendments thereto to the board the 
commission shall hold at least one (1) public hearing.  Notice of the time and place of hearing 
shall be given by one (1) publication in a newspaper of general circulation in 
the county at least thirty (30) days before the date of the 
hearing.

  14The rules of statutory construction 
apply to the construction of administrative rules and regulations.  Powder River Coal Co. v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 423, 426 (Wyo. 
2002).  "Ejusdem generis" is a "canon of 
construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the 
general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same 
type as those listed."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 556 (8th ed. 2004).  See Norman J. Singer, 2A 
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:17 (6th ed. 2000) (also "called Lord Tenterden's Rule, [it] 
is of ancient vintage, going back to Archbishop of Canterbury's Case, 2 Co Rep 
46a, 76 Eng Repr 519 (1596)").  This 
Court has applied the doctrine many times.  
See Powder River Coal Co., 2002 WY 5, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d at 
429-30 and the cases cited 
therein.

  15The New Jersey court described the offending 
program as "spot zoning."  
Rockhill, 128 A.2d  at 478.  Technically, "spot zoning" occurs when 
"a particular piece of land [is zoned] without regard for the zoning of the 
larger area surrounding the land."  
Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at 1650.  "Spot zoning" does not really describe 
what was happening in New Jersey nor does it 
describe the SweetwaterCounty plan.

16While 
the landowners do not specifically identify the environmental studies to which 
they object, they do direct this Court's attention to a letter from the county's 
land use director, in which he discusses a certified nutrient management plan, a 
certified range management plan, an air quality study, a drainage report, a site 
plan, a transportation plan, and a water use plan.  We note that these are included as 
requirements on the conditional use permit application.