Case Title: Naugher v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Naugher v. State1984 WY 83685 P.2d 37Case Number: 83-176Decided: 08/07/1984EMERSON NAUGHER, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
EMERSON NAUGHER, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, and Martin 
J. McClain, Asst. Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John Renneisen, and Mary B. 
Guthrie, Senior Asst. Attys. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN, and CARDINE, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The only question in 
this case is whether Naugher was entitled to have the jury instructed that it 
could consider his intoxication in determining whether he acted with the 
specific intent required for the commission of the crime charged. An appropriate 
instruction with respect to the effect of intoxication upon specific intent was 
offered by Naugher at his trial, but the district court refused to give it. We 
conclude that the district court properly refused to give the offered 
instruction, and we affirm the judgment and sentence.

[¶2.]     In his brief Naugher 
states the issue to be:

"Whether the trial 
[court] committed prejudicial error when it refused to instruct the jury that 
evidence showing Appellant acted while in a state of intoxication could be 
considered in determining whether Appellant acted with the specific intent 
necessary to convict him of aggravated robbery."

 

In its brief the 
State of Wyoming restates the issue in this 
way:

"Was it error for the 
trial court to refuse to offer an instruction that defendant's intoxication 
could affect his ability to form the specific intent necessary to commit 
aggravated robbery?"

[¶3.]     Early in July the 
victim in this case was "riding the rails" in search of employment. In the train 
yard at Laurel, Montana, the victim met Naugher and another 
individual named Drayton. The victim inquired of Drayton and Naugher where they 
were traveling, and upon learning that their destination was Florida the victim 
decided to travel with them. The victim then volunteered to obtain some liquor 
to take with them if one of the two would accompany him to a liquor store. 
Drayton went with him, and the victim purchased two bottles of beer, which he 
and Drayton consumed, two-fifths of white port wine and a pint of vodka. They 
took the wine and vodka with them back to the railroad 
yard.

[¶4.]     The victim, Drayton, 
Naugher, and an unidentified older man boarded an open freight car attached to a 
train headed for Cheyenne. The victim, Naugher and Drayton 
settled down in one end of the car while the other man went to the opposite end. 
As they were traveling, the victim, Naugher and Drayton began to drink the wine 
and vodka, passing the bottles around. The victim, who had been traveling all of 
the previous day and night, soon became intoxicated and went to sleep. His next 
clear recollection was awaking in a hospital bed in Sheridan, Wyoming. He was taken to the hospital after 
having been found wandering near the railroad tracks, and it was discovered that 
he was suffering from numerous injuries, including a broken nose, a dislocated 
shoulder and cuts and bruises, as well as a possible concussion. The victim did 
not have a clear recollection of what had occurred from the time he went to 
sleep in the railroad car until he found himself in the 
hospital.

[¶5.]     The record discloses 
that the victim was without some of his property following his encounter with 
Naugher and Drayton. Property which he was missing was found in the possession 
of Naugher. Treating physicians testified that serious bodily injury had been 
inflicted upon the victim in accordance with the definition found in § 
6-1-104(a)(x), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Rev.), which states:

"(x) `Serious bodily 
injury' means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which 
causes miscarriage, severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ."

[¶6.]     The State relied upon 
testimony from Drayton to establish the events of the robbery and infliction of 
injury upon the victim. This was possible because of a plea bargain entered into 
with Drayton pursuant to which he was permitted to plead guilty to simple 
robbery, and a recommendation for probation instead of incarceration was 
submitted to the district court. The fact of this arrangement was made known to 
the jury both during the opening statement of the prosecution and during 
Drayton's testimony. Drayton testified that the three men began drinking the 
wine and vodka soon after they boarded the train. He said that Naugher "was 
pushing [the victim] quite a bit of wine and liquor." The victim, according to 
Drayton, soon became intoxicated and passed out. Naugher then began emptying the 
victim's pockets, taking a pocket knife, a wallet containing twenty dollars and 
his identification. Drayton testified that when the victim began to awaken 
Drayton controlled him while Naugher struck him twice with a pipe. Naugher and 
Drayton then dragged the victim to the door of the moving freight train and 
forced him to jump, leaving his other possessions behind. After the victim was 
found near the railroad tracks in Sheridan the train was stopped in Gillette, and 
Naugher and Drayton were arrested. A personal search of Naugher disclosed the 
pocket knife, the wallet, and nail clippers belonging to the victim, were in 
Naugher's possession.

[¶7.]     Soon after the victim 
was discovered and taken to the hospital Naugher and Drayton were charged with 
the crime of aggravated robbery as defined in § 6-2-401(c)(i), W.S. 1977 (June 
1983 Rev.). In the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, § 6-2-401 defines the crime of 
robbery as follows:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of robbery if in the course of committing a crime defined by W.S. 6-3-402 
he:

"(i) Inflicts bodily 
injury upon another; or

"(ii) Threatens another 
with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily 
injury.

* * * * * 
*

"(c) Aggravated robbery 
is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years nor more 
than twenty-five (25) years if in the course of committing the crime of robbery 
the person:

"(i) Intentionally 
inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury; * * 
*"

Section 
6-3-402(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Rev.), provides as 
follows:

"(a) A person who steals, 
takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to 
deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of 
larceny."

[¶8.]     The charge against 
Drayton was resolved by his plea of guilty in accordance with the plea bargain. 
Naugher was convicted after a trial to a jury. He then was sentenced to a term 
of not less than five and not more than fifteen years in the penitentiary. This 
appeal is taken from that judgment and sentence.

[¶9.]     After the close of the 
evidence Naugher offered his requested Instruction A, which 
provided:

"Voluntary intoxication 
is no excuse for the commission of a crime. However, pertinent portions of the 
Wyoming Statutes provide that `Where a crime rests in intention, the inebriated 
condition of the defendant at the time of committing the offense may be proved 
to the jury, as bearing upon the question of intention.' Thus, evidence that a 
defendant acted or failed to act while in a state of intoxication is to be 
considered in determining whether or not the defendant acted, or failed to act, 
with specific intent as charged."1

The district 
court refused the requested instruction, and in accordance with the requirement 
of Rule 31, W.R.Cr.P.,2 Naugher's counsel stated his 
objection to the refusal in this way:

"We object to the failure 
to give Instruction A because we believe that the evidence shows satisfactorily 
that all of the parties were drinking heavily including the defendant and that 
the drinking may have been a factor in the crime."

[¶10.]  The record does not disclose any claim of 
intoxication by Naugher prior to the offering of the proposed instruction. The 
only evidence came from Drayton and the victim. The victim 
said:

"Yeah. We were drinking 
and I had been traveling, you know, all night and all day and was pretty tired, 
and I hadn't drank for quite a while. The booze was pretty heavy because after 
the train got under way, one of the fellows, this fellow right here [Naugher], 
he laid down his blanket and everything, and so I laid mine out next to his, you 
know, and I laid down and we drank and talked and the other fellow was sitting 
against the wall and passing the bottle back and forth, and I laid down on my 
back there and I went to sleep, * * *."

Drayton 
testified as follows:

"Q And you and Mr. 
Naugher and [the victim] are drinking? 

"A Yes, 
sir.

* * * * * 
*

"Q So you had the drinks 
before the incident happened; is that correct?

"A We was all drinking 
before the incident happened, sir, me and [the victim] and Mr. Naugher was 
drinking on the train while we was riding."

[¶11.]  In his argument to this court Naugher 
places primary reliance upon Goodman v. 
State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 400 (1977). In that case this 
court reversed a conviction of murder in the first degree because we held that 
the defendant was entitled to an instruction on intoxication. Goodman's theory 
of the case was that because of voluntary intoxication he was incapable at the 
time of the crime of forming the requisite specific intent for first-degree 
murder at the time of the crime. We do not recede from our holding in Goodman v. State, supra, that a 
defendant in a criminal case has the right to an affirmative instruction on his 
theory of the case when there is competent and substantial evidence to sustain 
that theory and his offered instruction is sufficient to apprise the trial court 
of his theory. The failure to affirmatively instruct the jury with respect to 
the defendant's theory of the case in such circumstances violates due process 
and is prejudicial error. Garcia v. 
State, Wyo., 667 P.2d 1148 (1983); Grable v. State, Wyo., 649 P.2d 663 (1982); Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 (1981); Goodman v. State, supra; Blakely v. State, Wyo., 474 P.2d 127 (1970); and State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 41, 178 P.2d 119 
(1947).

[¶12.]  Naugher's application of these rules to 
the facts of his case, however, is misplaced. During the trial, except for the 
offered instruction, Naugher apparently did not rely upon voluntary intoxication 
as a theory in his defense. It was his position that there was not sufficient 
credible evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed 
the crime of aggravated robbery. He did not assert that he became so intoxicated 
that he was incapable of forming the requisite specific intent to commit the 
crime except by the proffered instruction. Instead Naugher insisted that the 
victim became so intoxicated that he could not remember what occurred and could 
not even say whether he had been robbed or who might have done it. Naugher also 
insisted that Drayton's testimony was not credible and he sought to suggest that 
if any crime was committed Drayton was the guilty party. Given the circumstances 
of this case, the statement of the Supreme Court of Kansas is an appropriate 
summation:

"While it is true the 
defendant is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the jury under 
appropriate instructions, intoxication was never presented by the appellant as a 
theory in this case, and he cannot do so for the first time on appeal. * * *" State v. Garcia, 233 Kan. 589, 664 P.2d 1343, 1358 (1983).

[¶13.]  Before a defendant is entitled to an 
instruction on voluntary intoxication with respect to the element of specific 
intent in a crime involving such an element, there must be competent evidence in 
the record to support the giving of the instruction. Goodman v. State, supra. When, as here, 
the record reveals no evidence of the defendant's intoxication, no instruction 
is appropriate. Goodman v. State, 
supra; Miller v. State, Wyo., 560 P.2d 739 
(1977). The only evidence in this record that approaches intoxication is the 
testimony of the victim and Drayton that Naugher was drinking on the train. 
There is no evidence of how much Naugher drank, what period of time was 
involved, or what effect, if any, the drinking had on him. The lack of this 
information serves to distinguish this case from Goodman v. State, supra, and like many 
other jurisdictions, some with statutes similar to § 6-1-202(a), W.S. 1977 (June 
1983 Rev.), we hold that a mere showing that a defendant may have been drinking 
prior to the commission of a crime is not sufficient to establish intoxication 
nor to require the giving of an instruction even if one is requested. State v. Roqueni, 94 Ariz. 72, 381 P.2d 757 (1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 948, 84 S. Ct. 359, 11 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1963); People v. Turville, 51 Cal. 2d 620, 335 P.2d 678, cert. denied 360 U.S. 939, 79 S. Ct. 1465, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1551 (1959); People v. Montez, 197 Colo. 126, 589 P.2d 1368 (1979); Wright v. State, 
Del., 374 A.2d 824 (1977); Nicholson v. 
United States, D.C.App., 368 A.2d 561 (1977); Jacobs v. State, Fla., 396 So. 2d 1113 
(1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 933, 102 S. Ct. 403, 70 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1981); Wolfe v. State, 270 Ind. 81, 383 N.E.2d 317 (1978); State v. Haines, Iowa, 
259 N.W.2d 806 (1977); State v. 
Smith, Me., 277 A.2d 481 (1971); State v. Hill, Minn., 256 N.W.2d 279 
(1977); State v. Prim, 201 Neb. 279, 
267 N.W.2d 193 (1978); and Hatcher v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 811, 241 S.E.2d 756 (1978).

[¶14.]  The evidence in this case was 
insufficient to justify the giving of an instruction such as that requested by 
Naugher advising the jury of the effect of intoxication upon the element of 
specific intent. There was no error in the refusal of the district court to 
instruct the jury on the factor of intoxication because intoxication was not 
supported by any substantial evidence nor was it an affirmative theory in 
Naugher's trial presentation of the case.

[¶15.]  The judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.

1 Section 6-1-202(a), W.S. 
1977 (June 1983 Rev.), provides:

"Self-induced 
intoxication of the defendant is not a defense to a criminal charge except to 
the extent that in any prosecution evidence of self-induced intoxication of the 
defendant may be offered when it is relevant to negate the existence of a 
specific intent which is an element of the crime."

2 Rule 31, W.R.Cr.P., 
provides that the manner of making objections to the giving of jury instructions 
is controlled by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 51, W.R.C.P., 
provides in part that:

"* * * No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. * * 
*"