Case Title: Beau Christian Lefferdink v. State of Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0201

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
BEAU CHRISTIAN LEFFERDINK v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 75Case Number: No. S-10-0201Decided: 05/04/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

BEAU 
CHRISTIAN LEFFERDINK,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

David 
McCarthy, Laramie, WY.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. 
Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Beau Lefferdink 
challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress after he was 
charged with two counts of sexual exploitation of children.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Lefferdink raises 
three issues before this Court:

 
 

1.    
Should 
the misstatement of fact in the affidavit for a search warrant be stricken as 
knowingly and intentionally made or in reckless disregard for the 
truth?

2.    
Was 
[Lefferdink]'s right to confrontation and due process violated for a failure to 
disclose exculpatory evidence?

3.    
If 
stricken, does probable cause for the search of a computer IP address or 
residence exist within the four corners of the affidavit?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In the spring of 
2009, Albany County Sheriff's Deputy Chris Konija was involved in an undercover 
operation to monitor LimeWire1 in an attempt to identify Albany 
County internet users who were downloading and sharing child 
pornography.

 
 
[¶4]      Lefferdink's 
computer IP address showed that it was downloading child pornography, and Deputy 
Konija began to monitor that address.  A search warrant was obtained for Bresnan 
Communications to identify the user of the IP address.  Lefferdink was identified as the owner 
of the computer that downloaded the illegal material and, consequently, a search 
warrant was obtained for Lefferdink's address.  Lefferdink's desktop computer and laptop 
computer were both seized.  Thereafter, Lefferdink was charged with 
two counts of sexual exploitation of children in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 6-4-303(b)(iv) and 6-4-303(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 
2009).

 
 
[¶5]      On January 12, 
2010, Lefferdink filed a motion to suppress evidence, based upon the contention 
that Deputy Konija knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for 
the truth, lied in his affidavits.  
Also on January 12, Lefferdink filed a motion requesting that the court 
issue a subpoena duces tecum to the Division of Criminal Investigation requiring 
the production of all notes, documents, and reports created during its forensic 
investigation of Lefferdink's computers.  
The district court granted the motion requesting the subpoena duces 
tecum.  However, a motion to quash 
was filed, because the subpoena directed the information to be produced to 
Lefferdink, and not the court, in violation of W.R.Cr.P. 17(d) and Wolfe v. State, 998 P.2d 385, 387 (Wyo. 
2000).  The court granted the motion 
to quash because the subpoena was not in compliance, but encouraged the issuance 
of another subpoena in compliance with the law.  However, another subpoena was never 
issued.

 
 
[¶6]      On February 10, 
2010, both parties stipulated that the deputy did misstate the time and date in 
both affidavits of when he first saw Lefferdink's IP address.  The court still denied the motion to 
suppress, however, and found that the misstated time and date was at most a 
simple mistake.  The court ruled 
that even if the time and date were omitted from the affidavits, they still 
contained enough information to support the search 
warrants.

 
 
[¶7]      Lefferdink 
entered a conditional plea with the understanding of both parties that his 
intent was to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.  He was sentenced on both counts and 
ordered to serve concurrent sentences of not less than three years nor more than 
seven years on each.  The sentence 
was suspended, and he was placed on six years supervised probation for each 
count and received credit for time served. This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      In his first and 
third interrelated arguments on appeal, Lefferdink contends that the district 
court erred when it determined that the deputy's misstatement as to what date 
and what time he viewed the sharing of the pornographic material was at most 
negligent or a simple mistake. Furthermore, Lefferdink argues that the court was 
wrong when it determined that even if the misstatements were stricken, the 
affidavits provided sufficient probable cause to issue the search 
warrants.

 
 

In 
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not 
interfere with the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's determination because the trial court has an opportunity at the 
evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the 
evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions. The 
constitutionality of a particular search is a question of law that we review 
de novo.

 
 

Sam 
v. State, 2008 
WY 25, ¶ 9, 177 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Wyo. 2008) (citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶9]      Both parties in 
this case stipulated that the affidavits contained the wrong date and time of 
Deputy Konija's viewing of the information.

 
 
Both 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution require a search warrant to be 
supported by sworn statement. The difference in the language of the two 
constitutions has been noted by this court:

 
 
The 
provision of the Wyoming Constitution covering search and seizure, being Article 
1, § 4, is different than that of the United States Constitution and makes it 
mandatory that the search warrant be issued upon an affidavit. This difference 
has heretofore been the subject of comment in State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 
185, 194 P. 342, 345, 13 A.L.R. 1284, where it was said: 

 
 
"Our 
Constitution is some stronger, in that it uses affidavit' instead of oath or 
affirmation'; the word affidavit' requiring the matter to be in written 
form."

 
 

Smith 
v. State, 
557 P.2d 130, 132 (Wyo. 1976).  Both 
constitutional provisions require a hearing when a defendant offers proof that 
false statements were included in the affidavit knowingly and intentionally or 
with reckless disregard for the truth. Defendant must show these statements were 
necessary to a finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 672 (1978):  Hyde v. 
State, 769 P.2d 376, 379 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 
A 
suppression hearing on these grounds requires the defendant to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the affiant gave deliberately false 
statements or recklessly disregarded the truth.  If the defendant meets this burden, then 
the affidavit's false material is set to one side.  If the remaining content is still 
sufficient to establish probable cause, then it is proper to deny the motion to 
suppress.  If the remaining content 
is insufficient, then the search warrant is invalid and the exclusionary rule 
prohibits the admission of the evidence just as if probable cause was lacking on 
the face of the affidavit.  Hyde, 769 P.2d  at 
378-79.

 
 

Davis 
v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 92-93 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 
[¶10]   During the motion hearing, Deputy 
Konija testified that in drafting the first affidavit for a Bresnan search 
warrant, he included references to multiple computer files containing child 
pornography and the dates and times during which he observed them being viewed 
or shared through Lefferdink's IP address (which Bresnan identified as 
Lefferdink's after the search warrant was served on Bresnan).  The affidavits support the deputy's 
testimony.   In fact, 
Lefferdink's computers together contained over 700 images of child 
pornography.  Before presenting the 
Bresnan affidavit to the circuit court, a deputy county attorney suggested to 
the officer that he include "the worst of the worst" video files in the 
affidavit in order to simplify the search.  
In doing so, remaining dates and times of observations were deleted.  Deputy Konija testified that he 
inadvertently misstated the date and time in his affidavit due to the "cutting 
and pasting" error.  The deputy, in 
fact, observed the pertinent information on July 1, 2009, and stated on direct 
examination that misstating the error was not intentional.2

 
 
[¶11]   Regarding the deputy's 
misstatements, the court stated:

 
 
            
In sum, the Court finds that Deputy Konija failed to ensure that the 
identified video file  matched up with the identified time (July 13, 2009, at 
12:00 p.m.) in his affidavit after he omitted the references to the other video 
files and dates/times.  This failure 
was, at most, due to Deputy Konija's negligence or a simple mistake.  It was not, however, deliberately false 
or with reckless disregard for the truth.  
Negligence or innocent mistake[s] are insufficient grounds to find the 
misstatement should be set aside.'"  Davis [v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 94 (Wyo. 1993)], 
(citing Franks [v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 
(1978)].

 
 
[¶12]   We agree with the district 
court.  Although the date and time 
was wrong as it was listed in the affidavits, the misinformation was simply a 
mistake made by the deputy and was not deliberate.  Given that 
the trial court had an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we will not interfere with its decision 
to deny Lefferdink's motion to suppress.

 
 
[¶13]   Remaining on the subject of the 
affidavits, Lefferdink argues that even with the wrong date and times included 
in the affidavits, probable cause does not exist for the search of an IP address 
or residence, and thus all evidence must be suppressed. 

 
 
            
On this issue we have said:

 
 

   In 
reviewing an affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant, 
this Court is mindful of the fact that there is a strong preference under the 
law for law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant instead of engaging in a 
warrantless search. Thus, an affidavit comes to this Court with a presumption of 
validity. In order to promote the warrant process, and remembering that 
affidavits are not normally executed by legal technicians, this Court resolves 
doubtful or marginal cases in this area in favor of sustaining the warrant. 
Ultimately, our duty on review simply is to ensure that the warrant-issuing 
judicial officer had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause 
existed.

 
 

Schirber 
v. State, 
2006 WY 121 ¶ 5, 142 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Wyo. 2006) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
 
The existence of probable cause justifying the 
issuance of a search warrant involves a twofold finding. First, the factual 
situation described in the affidavit must be sufficient to cause a 
reasonably cautious person to believe that a crime was being committed or that 
one had been committed. Second, there must be an adequate showing that the 
fruits of the crime or the evidence thereof are in the structure or area sought 
to be searched.

 
 

Mueller 
v. State, 
2009 WY 27, ¶¶ 8-9, 202 P.3d 404, 406 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶14]   We previously summarized the 
standard for a warrant-issuing judicial officer's probable cause determination: 

 
 

The 
judicial officer who is presented with an application for a search warrant 
supported by an affidavit applies a "totality of circumstances" analysis in 
making an independent judgment whether probable cause exists for the issuance of 
the warrant.  In making that 
independent judgment, the judicial officer is limited to the four corners of the 
supporting affidavit.  The "totality 
of circumstances" analysis requires the judicial officer simply "to make a 
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth 
in the affidavit before him, including the veracity' and basis of knowledge' 
of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place."

 
 

Mueller, 
¶ 9, 202 P.3d  at 406-07 
(citations omitted).  "[T]he 
judicial officer does not measure the affidavit by a reasonable doubt' standard 
or a preponderance of evidence' standard; instead, the measure is that the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit must amount to more than a mere 
suspicion, yet need not rise to the level of prima facie evidence of 
guilt."  Id.  
Also,

 
 
There 
is a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting a search warrant. * * * Furthermore, the 
affidavit is to be tested by much less vigorous standards than those governing 
the admissibility of evidence at trial. * * * The issuing judge's determination 
should be paid great deference upon appeal. * * * Because of the preference for 
warrants, and the desire to encourage law enforcement personnel to seek 
warrants, any doubt should be resolved by sustaining the 
search.

 
 

Page 
v. State, 2003 
WY 23, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d 904, 909 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Hixson v. State, 2001 WY 99, ¶ 6, 
33 P.3d, 154, 156-57 (Wyo. 2001)).

 
 
[¶15]   With the above principles in mind, 
we do not find there to be any deficiencies in the affidavits.  Lefferdink argues that, without the 
inclusion of a date and time in the affidavits, there is no nexus between his IP 
address and Bresnan, or between his IP address and the computers located at the 
residence using the IP address.  
Yet, even if all references to date and time were stricken from both 
affidavits in this case, we agree with the State that the remaining content was 
sufficient to cause a reasonably cautious person to believe that the crime of 
sexual exploitation of children had been or was being committed by the user of 
the IP address listed in the affidavits.  
The affidavits sufficiently indicated that the IP user's identifying 
information was available from Bresnan, and that evidence of a crime could be 
found on the computers located in that user's residence.

 
 
[¶16]   When the search warrants were 
issued here, the issuing judge knew that a person was accessing the internet 
using a specific IP address; that the same IP address was being used within 
Albany County; that the user of the IP address possessed and was sharing 
computer files that were known to depict illegal child pornography; that at 
least one of the files had been viewed by the deputy; that the computer 
connected to that specific IP address was home to at least five images of child 
pornography; and that the deputy discovered a computer sharing child pornography 
over the internet and exactly how he linked the computer to Lefferdink's 
residence.  Under an objective test, 
that is adequate information to justify the assertions made by the affiant and 
relied upon by the judge in issuing the warrant.  When taking into consideration the 
totality of the facts contained in both affidavits, we conclude that the 
district court did not err when determining the affidavits established a 
substantial basis for concluding that the searches would produce evidence of a 
crime.

 
 
[¶17]   Finally, Lefferdink contends on 
appeal that the State failed to disclose material and favorable evidence 
pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), which he requested via subpoena duces tecum in preparation for his 
suppression hearing.  As was 
conceded by Lefferdink, however, this issue was not preserved by his conditional 
plea, which preserved only the right to challenge the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law contained in the district court's April 6, 2010 Decision 
Letter.  Furthermore, as the State points out, 
this issue was not raised during the suppression hearing, and thus, the district 
court never discussed, let alone determined either way, if a pretrial Brady violation occurred.  Thus, we are prevented by Lefferdink's 
own plea agreement from considering this issue on appeal.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶18]   The order of the district court 
denying Lefferdink's motion to suppress is affirmed.  Because Lefferdink did not establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the deputy's misstatement was deliberately 
false or made with reckless disregard for the truth, and because the affidavits, 
even without the proper date and time, provided probable cause to issue the 
search warrants, we affirm the district court.  Furthermore, because Lefferdink's 
conditional plea did not preserve any Brady issue, we decline to consider that 
issue on appeal.  The Judgment and 
Sentence of the district court is affirmed.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1LimeWire is a computer program generally available to the public that 
allows users to connect to a peer-to-peer network in order to share files 
without going through any central server or hub.

 
 

2The IP activity report was also admitted into evidence and showed the 
information being shared by Lefferdink on July 1, 2009.  The report showed the IP address 
belonging to Lefferdink also shared another child pornography video file on July 
13, 2009, at noon.