Case Title: Hill v. Inouye

Citation: 976 P.2d 390

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
976 P.2d 390 (1998) 90 Hawai`i 76 Frances L. HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kerry K. INOUYE, Defendant-Appellee. No. 21253. Supreme Court of Hawai`i. December 14, 1998. Reconsideration Granted in Part and Opinion Amended January 13, 1999. *391 Stephen T. Hioki, on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant. Keith S. Agena (Michael K. Tanigawa and Howard K. K. Luke with him on the brief) Honolulu, for defendant-appellee. MOON, C.J., KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ. Opinion of the Court by RAMIL, J. Plaintiff-Appellant Frances L. Hill appeals from the family court's order, dated December 8, 1997, dissolving the temporary restraining order (TRO) for protection from Defendant-Appellee Kerry K. Inouye and denying Hill's motion for a permanent protective order. Hill argues that the family court incorrectly applied Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 586-4 (Supp.1997), which requires a showing of recent acts of abuse. Hill, instead, argues that the family court should have applied HRS § 586-3 (Supp. 1997), which does not require a showing of recent acts of abuse. Inouye counters that the family court correctly interpreted and applied HRS § 586-4 and correctly required Hill to show recent acts of abuse. Because the family court incorrectly interpreted HRS § 586-3 (Supp. 1997), the applicable statute in this case, and because the family court required Hill to show recent acts of abuse, we vacate the family court's order and remand the matter for a new hearing in accordance with HRS § 586-3 (Supp. 1997) and in accordance with this opinion. Hill was a patrol officer with the Honolulu Police Department and Inouye was her supervisor when they started to date romantically in August 1995. Hill moved in with Inouye one month later. Within two weeks of living together, according to Hill, Inouye began to display violent behavior. Inouye's behavior continued, and Hill finally moved out of the apartment on January 27, 1997. *392 Although Hill moved out and Inouye began a new relationship, Hill and Inouye continued dating romantically. On November 4, 1997, Hill visited Inouye's new girlfriend to talk about Inouye. Inouye became angry and threatened Hill that, if she spoke with his girlfriend again, Hill would have to "face the consequences." Interpreting this as a threat, on November 20, 1997, Hill filed for and was granted a TRO for protection. An order to show cause (OSC) hearing was held on December 8, 1997.[1] At the OSC hearing, Hill asked the family court for an extended three-year protective order against her ex-boyfriend, Inouye. Inouye opposed the motion and asked for mutual restraining orders. The transcript of the OSC hearing provides the following exchange: (Emphases and brackets added.) The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo, under the right/wrong standard. See State v. Davia, 87 Hawai`i 249, 254, 953 P.2d 1347, 1352 (1998) (citing State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996)). "Under the right/wrong standard, we examine the facts and answer the question without being required to give any weight to the trial court's answer to it." State v. Timoteo, 87 Hawai`i 108, 113, 952 P.2d 865, 870 (1997) (quoting State v. Naeole, 80 Hawai`i 419, 422, 910 P.2d 732, 735 (1996) (citations omitted)). In the Interest of Jane Doe, Born May 22, 1976, 84 Hawai`i 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996) (brackets in original). Hill claims the family court erred because the family court (1) applied the wrong statute in denying Hill's petition for a protective order, and, therefore, (2) improperly required Hill to show "recent" acts of abuse to extend the order. Inouye disagrees and argues that (1) Hill waived her objection to the family court's application and interpretation of the specific statute by failing to raise the issue in the court below, and (2) the family court correctly applied and interpreted the statute requiring a finding of "recent" acts of abuse. Our primary discussion, therefore, is one of statutory construction. A preliminary question that needs answering is whether Hill "waived" her objection to the trial court's statutory interpretation by not raising the issue at the hearing. The general rule provides that "[i]ssues not properly raised on appeal will be deemed to be waived." Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 613, 837 P.2d 1247, 1268 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918, 113 S. Ct. 1277, 122 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1993). In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dacanay, 87 Hawai`i 136, 145 n. 14, 952 P.2d 893, 902 n. 14 (1998), the Intermediate Court of Appeals succinctly explained that appellate courts: Considering that additional facts are not required for this court to address the instant statutory interpretation issue, considering that our discussion below directly affects the family court's outcome in this case, and considering the importance of petitions for protection from domestic abuse, this court will consider the issue of statutory interpretation presented in the instant case. See State v. Bowe, 77 Hawai`i 51, 53, 881 P.2d 538, 540 (1994) (citation omitted). "The starting point in statutory construction is to determine the legislative intent *397 from the language of the statute itself." State v. Kaakimaka, 84 Hawai`i 280, 289, 933 P.2d 617, 626, reconsideration denied, 84 Hawai`i 496, 936 P.2d 191 (1997) (quoting State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 351-52, 845 P.2d 547, 551-52 (citations omitted), reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 849 P.2d 81 (1993)). Gray v. Administrative Dir. of the Court, 84 Hawai`i 138, 148, 931 P.2d 580, 590 (1997) (some brackets in original and some added) (emphases added). "[A] statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-in-formed people in two or more different senses." State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i 8, 19, 904 P.2d 893, 904 (1995) (citing 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 45.02 at 6 (5th ed.1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] rational, sensible and practicable interpretation of a statute is preferred to one which is unreasonable or impracticable[.]" State v. Jumila, 87 Hawai`i 1, 9, 950 P.2d 1201, 1209 (1998) (quoting Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai`i 217, 221-22, 941 P.2d 300, 304-305 (1997) (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted)). "The legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction[,] and illogicality." Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 19, 928 P.2d at 861 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Turning to the statutory provision in question, HRS § 586-3[3] provides in pertinent part: (Alteration in original.) (Emphasis added.) In comparison, HRS § 586-4 (Supp.1997) provides in pertinent part: (Emphases added.) HRS § 586-5.5 (Supp.1997) provides in pertinent part: (Emphases added.) The 1997 Hawai`i legislature amended HRS § 586-3 to remove the term "recent" from "recent past acts." The legislative history provides: Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1510, in 1997 Senate Journal, at 1557 (internal quotations in original) (alterations and emphases added). Based upon the plain language of HRS § 586-3 (Supp.1997) and the legislative history explaining its recent amendment, the family court improperly required Hill to show recent acts of abuse at the hearing. Although the family court has discretion to examine recent acts, the family court's order *399 and transcript of the OSC hearing reveal that the court did not consider the other evidence that Hill presented, including "past act or acts of abuse [that] may have occurred, or that the threats of abuse make it probable that acts of abuse may be imminent, or that extreme psychological abuse or malicious property damage is imminent." Based upon the evidence presented, the family court should have determined whether there was "adequate evidence to support the need for a protective order" without requiring a showing of "recent" acts. A showing of "recent" acts may be an indicator of imminent abuse or damage, but the family court must take into consideration all facts presented by the petitioner and the respondent to determine whether "a protective order is necessary to prevent domestic abuse or a recurrence of abuse[.]" We vacate the family court's order dissolving the TRO for protection and denying Hill's motion for a protective order. We remand the matter for a new hearing before the family court in accordance with HRS § 586-3 (Supp. 1997) and in accordance with this opinion. [1] HRS § 586-5 (Supp.1997) provides in pertinent part: Period of order; hearing. (a) A temporary restraining order granted pursuant to this chapter shall remain in effect at the discretion of the court, for a period not to exceed ninety days from the date the order is granted. (b) On the earliest date that the business of the court will permit, but no later than fifteen days from the date the temporary restraining order is granted, the court shall, after giving due notice to all parties, hold a hearing on the application requiring cause to be shown why the order should not continue. [2] The family court's order dissolving the TRO for protection, filed on December 8, 1997, stated that the TRO was dissolved and vacated because of "no findings of recent abuse or threat." Although the court looked to recent acts or threats of physical harm, injury, assault, or malicious damage to property, or extreme psychological abuse, there is no indication that the court looked to other evidence pursuant to HRS § 586-3. [3] The amendment to this statute became effective on June 30, 1997. Hill filed for a TRO on November 20, 1997. Therefore, the amendment applies to the instant appeal.