Case Title: State v. Terrell A. Coleman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP000917-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-0917-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :               
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Terrell A. Coleman, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 20, 1996 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  The State of Wisconsin seeks review 
of a published decision of the court of appeals,
1 which reversed 
a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Judge 
Jeffrey A. Kremers, convicting Terrell A. Coleman of one count of 
felon in possession of a firearm, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(2) (1989-90).
2  Two issues are before this court.  
First, under what circumstances does a defense of privilege exist 
to a charge of felon in possession of a firearm?  Second, did the 
circuit court commit error by denying Coleman’s request to 
instruct the jury on privilege, and, if so, is the error 
harmless?  We hold that a narrow defense of privilege, which 
                                                          
 
1  State v. Coleman, 199 Wis. 2d 174, 544 N.W.2d 912 (1996). 
2  All future references are to the 1989-90 statutes unless 
otherwise indicated. 
95-0917-CR 
2 
originates from United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 
1982), and State v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129 (6th Cir. 1993), exists 
to a charge of felon in possession of a firearm.  We further hold 
that the circuit court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on 
privilege, and that this error is not harmless.  We therefore 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
I. 
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.  On October 21, 
1992, between 8:30 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., Terrell A. Coleman arrived 
at the residence of Tanisha Evans and Camille Mason to pick up 
his niece and nephew.
3  While Coleman was waiting in the living 
room for the children, he heard what he thought was kicking at 
the door.  Coleman testified:  "I thought it was somebody to come 
up in there and try and rob it again." (R. 25 at 3.)   
Both Coleman and Evans testified that four men had robbed 
the residence approximately one month earlier.  One of the men 
had put a gun to Evans' head, in the presence of her children.  
Coleman, who was in Mason's bedroom at the time, jumped out of 
the window, ran to the corner, and called the police.
4  Evans 
also testified that her brother purchased a rifle for her because 
of this incident.  Evans kept the rifle in a closet in Mason's 
bedroom, because Evans' bedroom did not have a closet. 
                                                          
 
3  Camille Mason is Coleman's girlfriend.  Tanisha Evans is 
the mother of Coleman's niece and nephew. 
4  Both Evans and Coleman testified in a subsequent criminal 
trial involving this robbery. 
95-0917-CR 
3 
Coleman testified that he therefore was scared when he heard 
the noise at the door because he thought "[s]omebody was going to 
rob the house again."  (R. 25 at 6.)  He further testified that 
he panicked, ran into Mason's bedroom, grabbed the rifle, went 
into the living room, and pointed the rifle at the door "to 
defend [him]self."  (R. 25 at 7.)    Much to Coleman's surprise, 
when the door opened, uniformed members of the Milwaukee County 
Sheriff's Tactical Squad entered the residence.   
The officers were executing a "no knock" search warrant at 
the residence.  They used a "hooligan," which is a bar-type tool, 
to pry open the screen door.  They also breached the inner door 
by hitting it two to three times with a large "ram" to push it 
in, which took about five to six seconds.  One officer testified 
that this process would make a noise that definitely would be 
heard.  In addition, since the officers were executing a "no 
knock" search warrant, they did not announce "policesearch 
warrant" until they had broken down the doors. 
One officer testified that after they breached the doors and 
saw Coleman pointing the rifle at them, everyone experienced an 
extremely intense moment.  Another officer testified that Coleman 
looked frightened.  Within a matter of seconds, Coleman lowered 
the rifle, ran into Mason's room, threw the rifle onto the bed, 
and turned around to face the officers with his hands raised in 
what one officer viewed as an effort to surrender.  Coleman 
testified that he ran into the room because he was afraid the 
officers were going to shoot him.   
95-0917-CR 
4 
On October 22, 1992, the State filed a criminal complaint, 
charging Coleman with one count of felon in possession of a 
firearm, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2).
5  A preliminary 
hearing was held on November 2, 1992.  The circuit court 
concluded that probable cause existed and therefore held Coleman 
for trial.  On the same day, the State filed an information 
against Coleman, again charging him with one count of felon in 
possession of a firearm.  Coleman pled not guilty. 
Following several continuances, a jury trial was held on May 
31 and June 1, 1994.  The parties stipulated that Coleman was a 
convicted felon within the meaning of § 941.29(2).  Coleman also 
conceded at trial that he had actual possession of the rifle when 
the officers entered Evans' residence.  Thus, the main issue at 
trial was whether Coleman's possession of the rifle was 
privileged. 
Accordingly, in his opening statement, Coleman's attorney 
said, "[I]n this particular case it will be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [holding the rifle] was a reasonable action 
that was privileged[Coleman] was privileged to take under the 
law."  (R. 24 at 74.)  Coleman also presented evidence, through 
his own testimony and that of Evans, in support of his claim that 
his possession of the gun was privileged.  In addition, Coleman 
asked the court to give the following pattern jury instructions:  
Wis JICriminal 790 (coercion); Wis JICriminal 800 (privilege: 
                                                          
 
5  Section 941.29(2) provides in pertinent part: "Any person 
specified in sub. (1) who, subsequent to the conviction for the 
felony or other crime, as specified in sub. (1), . . . possesses 
a firearm is guilty of a Class E felony."   
95-0917-CR 
5 
self-defense); Wis JICriminal 810 (privilege: self-defense: 
retreat); Wis JICriminal 825 (privilege: defense of others); 
Wis JICriminal 860 (privilege: defense of another's property).  
The State conceded that a defense of privilege exists to a charge 
of felon in possession of a firearm, but argued that Coleman was 
not entitled to such an instruction because he had not produced 
sufficient evidence in support of the defense of privilege.  
The circuit court denied Coleman's request to instruct the 
jury on privilege, because he determined that Coleman had not 
produced sufficient evidence that the defense of privilege 
applied.
6  Similarly, the circuit court informed Coleman's 
                                                          
 
6 Specifically, the circuit court judge concluded: 
 
And I will acknowledge, I'm troubled by the situation 
in the case and the facts, but in the final analysis, 
it seems to me that there has to be more than just a 
defendant hearing somebody kicking at the door to 
justify these defenses. 
 
It seems to me that there has to be some basis for the 
defendant to believe that there was a threat to some 
threshold level on the record that has to be shown 
before it becomes even a jury question on those issues 
and I don't think on this record there is such a basis. 
. . . . 
 
I would also note that what he did in the robbery case 
when he heard the robbery was to jump out the window 
and go call the police.  Seems like that would have 
been a, he could have done that just as easily and I 
don't want to be put in the position where someone 
says, well the judge is acting as a juror now and 
deciding what would have been reasonable.  That is not 
my point. 
 
My point is that I think there has to be some level of 
reserved or anticipated danger shown on the record 
before he is justified in using one of the defenses and 
I don't think that is here in this record. 
(R. 25 at 39-40.) 
95-0917-CR 
6 
attorney that he could not discuss self-defense in closing 
arguments.  Immediately thereafter, Coleman’s attorney moved for 
a mistrial.  The circuit court denied the motion.  Subsequently, 
the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the circuit court 
entered a judgment of conviction.  Coleman then appealed. 
The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court had 
committed error by refusing to instruct the jury on privilege.  
The court further held that such error is not harmless, and thus 
ordered a new trial.
7   
II. 
We initially consider the issue of the applicability of a 
defense of privilege.  The parties agree that a defense of 
privilege exists to a charge of felon in possession of a firearm 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2).  We likewise agree with this 
conclusion.  Although § 941.29(2) is a strict liability offense, 
State v. Phillips, 172 Wis. 2d 391, 395, 493 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 
1992), review denied, 497 N.W.2d 132 (1993), this court has 
determined that a strict liability offense is subject to a 
defense of privilege.  State v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 44, 53-57, 318 
N.W.2d 370 (1982).
8  In addition, the applicable statute defining 
                                                          
 
7  However, the court of appeals did not determine the 
circumstances under which a privilege exists to a charge of felon 
in possession of a firearm.  Instead, the court only addressed 
the issue of whether Coleman had introduced sufficient evidence 
to entitle him to a self-defense instruction.   
8 
 
Although 
State 
v. 
Brown 
involved 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.57(4)(h), Brown is nonetheless applicable precedent in this 
case. In particular, the court held:   
95-0917-CR 
7 
privilege provides: "The fact that the actor's conduct is 
privileged, although otherwise criminal, is a defense to a 
prosecution for any crime based on that conduct."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.45 (emphasis added).  There is no indication that the 
legislature intended to supersede § 939.45 when it enacted 
§ 941.29(2), by entirely denying a felon in possession of a 
firearm the defense of privilege.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
a defense of privilege applies to § 941.29(2).        
The parties, however, disagree about the scope of this 
privilege.  Coleman argues that the statutory defenses of 
coercion, self-defense, defense of others, and defense of 
property are applicable.
9  The State, on the other hand, contends 
that these statutory defenses are inapplicable because they do 
not address the purpose underlying the offense of felon in 
possession of a firearm, or the strict liability aspect of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
We conclude that recognizing a defense of legal 
justification does not necessarily conflict with the 
concept that violation of a traffic law is a strict 
liability offense.  The basic concept of strict 
liability is that culpability is not an element of the 
offense and that the state is relieved of the 
burdensome task of proving the offender's culpable 
state of mind.  When the defendant in the case at bar 
claims legal justification, he is not seeking to 
disprove a statutorily required state of mind.  Instead 
he is claiming that even though he knowingly violated 
the law, his violation was privileged under the 
circumstances. 
State v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 44, 53, 318 N.W.2d 370 (1982).  
Likewise, we conclude that even though violation of § 941.29(2) 
is a strict liability offense, it is not inconsistent to 
recognize the defense of privilege to it. 
9  These defenses are set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 939.45 - 
939.49. 
95-0917-CR 
8 
offense.  Accordingly, the State asks this court to recognize a 
narrow defense of privilege under § 939.45(6), as defined 
primarily in United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 
1982).   
We therefore must determine under what circumstances a 
privilege exists to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2).  Although this is an 
issue of first impression in Wisconsin, courts in several other 
jurisdictions have considered whether a defense of privilege 
exists to a statute that prohibits a felon from possessing a 
firearm.  These courts have overwhelmingly determined that a 
defense of privilege exists.
10  However, these courts have 
disagreed on the specific privilege that appliescoercion, 
                                                          
 
10  A non-exhaustive survey of case law from other 
jurisdictions indicates that the following jurisdictions have 
recognized a defense of privilege to a charge of felon in 
possession of a firearm:  United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770 
(9th 
Cir. 
1996); 
United 
States 
v. 
Perez, 
86  
F.3d 735 (1996); United States v. Martin, 62 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 1556 (1996); United 
States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. 
__, 115 S. Ct. 2287 (1995); United States v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129 
(6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 
1991); United States v. Vigil, 743 F.2d 751 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1090 (1984); United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 
1159 (5th Cir. 1982); Marrero v. State, 516 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Blache, 480 So. 2d 304 (La. 1985); 
State v. Castrillo, 819 P.2d 1324 (N.M. 1991); Conaty v. Solem, 
422 N.W.2d 102 (S.D. 1988); see also People v. King, 582 P.2d 
1000 (Cal. 1978) (en banc) (self-defense available to charge of 
felon in possession of a concealable firearm); State v. Crawford, 
521 A.2d 1193 (Md. 1987) (defense of necessity exists to charge 
of carrying a concealed weapon); State v. Hardy, 397 N.E.2d 773 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (self-defense available where defendant 
charged with having a weapon while under a disability).  But see 
Johnson v. State, 650 S.W.2d 414 (Tx. Crim. App. 1983) (necessity 
defense not available to defendant charged with unlawfully 
carrying a handgun on licensed premises).    
95-0917-CR 
9 
necessity, duress, self-defense, or "justification" in general.
11  
Yet, regardless of the title, the vast majority of courts have 
defined the privilege narrowly, by either requiring the defendant 
to satisfy a multiple-part test, or prove certain elements in 
addition to the common law elements of the applicable privilege.
12        
The State makes a compelling argument that, because of the 
underlying purpose of Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2), this court should 
also narrowly define any applicable privilege.  This court has 
recognized that the legislative purpose behind § 941.29(2) is the 
protection of public safety.  State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 
706-08, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994).  Specifically, § 941.29(2) is 
aimed at keeping firearms away from felons, because the 
legislature has determined that felons are more likely to misuse 
firearms.  Id.   
We thus conclude that a narrow defense of privilege under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.45(6) exists to a charge of felon in possession 
of a firearm.  In order to be entitled to the defense, the 
                                                          
 
11  See, e.g., United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1161 n.3 
(5th Cir. 1982) (using common elements of duress and necessity 
and calling it "justification defense")  State v. Crawford, 521 
A.2d 1193, 1200-01 (Md. 1987) (necessity); State v. Castrillo, 
819 P.2d 1324, 1328 (N.M. 1991) (duress); Conaty v. Solem, 422 
N.W.2d 102, 104 (S.D. 1988) (self-defense). 
12  See, e.g., United States v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1134-35 
(6th Cir. 1993) (five-part test); United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 
1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 1982) (four-part test); Marrero v. State, 
516 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (five-part 
test); State v. Blanche, 480 So. 2d 304, 308 (La. 1985) 
(requiring defendant to prove he or she took possession of weapon 
for a period no longer than necessary); State v. Castrillo, 819 
P.2d 1324, 1330-31 (N.M. 1991) (requiring defendant to prove he 
or she possessed a firearm for a period of time no longer than 
justified, and to pursue other actions, if reasonably possible, 
before committing the crime).  
95-0917-CR 
10 
defendant must prove: (1) the defendant was under an unlawful, 
present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to 
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily 
injury, or the defendant reasonably believes he or she is under 
such a threat;
13 (2) the defendant did not recklessly or 
negligently place himself or herself in a situation in which it 
was probable that he or she would be forced to possess a firearm; 
(3) the defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to 
possessing a firearm, or reasonably believed that he or she had 
no such alternative; in other words, the defendant did not have a 
chance to refuse to possess the firearm and also to avoid the 
threatened harm, or reasonably believed that he or she did not 
have such a chance; (4) a direct causal relationship may be 
reasonably anticipated between possessing the firearm and the 
avoidance of the threatened harm; (5) the defendant did not 
possess the firearm for any longer than reasonably necessary.  
See Gant, 691 F.2d at 1162-63, 1163 n.9; United States v. 
Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472-73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 
                                                          
 
13  Note that under the Gant test, the first-prong does not 
provide that a defendant's conduct may be privileged where the 
defendant reasonably believes he or she is under an unlawful, 
present, imminent, and impending threat.  United States v. Gant, 
691 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir. 1982)   However, several state 
courts have determined that a privilege exists under such 
circumstances.  People v. King, 582 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Cal. 1978); 
Marrero v. State, 516 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1987); State v. Blache, 480 So. 2d 304, 308 (La. 1985); State v. 
Crawford, 521 A.2d 1193, 1200 (Md. 1987).  We are persuaded by 
the decisions of these courts, and therefore have incorporated 
this into the five-part test that we are adopting.  
95-0917-CR 
11 
U.S. 872 (1990); Newcomb, 6 F.3d at 1134-35.
14  We emphasize that 
a defendant will be able to establish these elements "only on the 
rarest of occasions," because of the difficulty in proving that 
he or she did not have a reasonable legal alternative to 
violating the law, and that he or she possessed the firearm for a 
period of time no longer than reasonably necessary.
15  See Perez, 
86 F.3d at 737; Perrin, 45 F.3d at 874 (citing Singleton, 902 
F.2d at 472). 
III. 
We next turn to the issue of whether the circuit court erred 
in not giving Coleman's requested instructions, and, if so, 
whether such error is harmless.  A circuit court has broad 
discretion in deciding whether to give a requested jury 
instruction.  E.g., State v. Vick, 104 Wis. 2d 678, 690, 312 
N.W.2d 489 (1981).  However, a circuit court must exercise its 
discretion in order "to fully and fairly inform the jury of the 
rules of law applicable to the case and to assist the jury in 
                                                          
 
14  In United States v. Gant, the court set forth a four-part 
test, and also indicated in a footnote that a defendant's 
"continued possession beyond the time that the emergency exists 
will defeat the defenses."  691 F.2d 1159, 1163 n.9 (5th Cir. 
1982).  The court in United States v. Singleton adopted the Gant 
four-part test, and likewise indicated that "[c]orollary to the 
requirement that the defendant have no alternative to possession 
of the firearm is the requirement that the defendant get rid of 
the firearm as soon as a safe opportunity arises."  902 F.2d 471, 
473 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 872 (1990).  In United 
States v. Newcomb, the court combined the Gant four-part test 
with the additional requirement set forth by the courts in Gant 
and Singleton, resulting in a five-part test.  6 F.3d 1129, 1134-
35 (6th Cir. 1993).   
15  For example, such a rare occasion would occur where a 
felon is attacked and wrestles a weapon away from his attacker.  
E.g., State v. Castrillo, 819 P.2d 1324, 1329 (N.M. 1991). 
95-0917-CR 
12 
making a reasonable analysis of the evidence."  Id. (quoting 
State v. Dix, 86 Wis. 2d 474, 273 N.W.2d 250 (1979)).  In 
addition, a criminal defendant is entitled to a jury instruction 
on a theory of defense if: (1) the defense relates to a legal 
theory of a defense, as opposed to an interpretation of evidence, 
State v. Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d 177, 191-92, 170 N.W.2d 755 (1969); 
(2) the request is timely made, Turner v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 45, 
51-52, 218 N.W.2d 502 (1974); (3) the defense is not adequately 
covered by other instructions, Johnson v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 344, 
367-68, 249 N.W.2d 593 (1976); Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d at 192; and 
(4) the defense is supported by sufficient evidence, Johnson v. 
State, 85 Wis. 22, 28-29, 270 N.W.2d 153 (1978); Turner, 64 Wis. 
2d at 51-52.   
In the present case, the parties only dispute whether 
Coleman presented sufficient evidence in support of the defense 
of 
privilege.
16 
Evidence 
is 
sufficient 
if 
"a 
reasonable 
construction of the evidence will support the defendant's theory 
'viewed in the most favorable light it will reasonably admit from 
the standpoint of the accused.'"  State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 
122, 153, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977) (quoting Ross v. State, 61 Wis. 
2d 160, 172-73, 211 N.W.2d 827 (1973)).  In making this 
determination: 
                                                          
 
16  Coleman clearly met the additional three requirements 
First, the defense of privilege is a legal theory of defense.  
Wis JICriminal 700 (Law Note:  Theory of Defense Instructions).  
Second, Coleman requested the instructions on May 31, 1994, one 
day before the instructions conference, which was timely.  Third, 
no other instructions adequately covered Coleman's theory of the 
defense, because the circuit court judge refused to give any 
instructions on privilege.     
95-0917-CR 
13 
 
[N]either the trial court nor this court may, under the 
law, look to the "totality" of the evidence . . . in 
determining whether the instruction was warranted.  To 
do 
so 
would 
require 
the 
court 
to 
weigh 
the 
evidenceaccepting one version of facts, rejecting 
anotherand 
thus 
invade 
the 
province 
of 
the        
jury . . . . 
Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d at 153; accord State v. Jones, 147 Wis. 2d 
806, 816, 434 N.W.2d 380 (1989).  Thus, neither the trial court 
nor the reviewing court may weigh the evidence, but instead may 
only ask whether a reasonable construction of the evidence, 
viewed favorably to the defendant, supports the alleged defense.  
Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d at 154; Jones, 147 Wis. 2d at 816.  "If this 
question is answered affirmatively, then it is for the jury, not 
the trial court or this court, to determine whether to believe 
defendant's version of the events." Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d at 154; 
Jones, 147 Wis. 2d at 816.  
Furthermore, although we have repeatedly indicated that the 
defendant bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence, we 
have also determined that the source of such evidence may be 
facts produced by the defense or by the state. State v. Felton, 
110 Wis. 2d 485, 508, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983).  Thus, the evidence 
may be facts affirmatively presented by the state, facts elicited 
from the state's witnesses through cross-examination, or evidence 
affirmatively presented by the defense.  Id.; Wis JICriminal 
700 (Law Note:  Theory of Defense Instruction). 
In the present case, we conclude that Coleman presented 
sufficient evidence in support of the defense of privilege.  The 
evidence 
was 
sufficient 
because 
the 
jury, 
in 
reasonably 
construing the evidence, could have determined that Coleman had 
95-0917-CR 
14 
satisfied the five-part test.  First, a reasonable jury could 
find that Coleman reasonably believed he was under an unlawful, 
present, imminent, and impending threat of being robbed, based on 
his testimony that he thought someone was kicking the door, and 
based on Coleman and Evans' testimony regarding the prior 
robbery.  Second, a reasonable jury could find that Coleman did 
not recklessly or negligently place himself in a situation in 
which it was probable he would be forced to choose criminal 
conduct, since he testified that he was at the residence to pick 
up his niece and nephew.  Third, a jury could find that Coleman 
reasonably believed that he had no reasonable, legal alternative 
to violating the law, because a jury could find that he made a 
split-second decision to grab the rifle when he heard the noise.  
Fourth, a reasonable jury could find that there was a direct 
causal relationship between Coleman possessing the weapon and the 
robbery which he testified that he thought was occurring.  Fifth, 
a reasonable jury could find that Coleman did not possess the gun 
any longer than absolutely necessary, since he testified that he 
grabbed the rifle when he heard the noise, and evidence 
established that he dropped it a few seconds after the officers 
breached the doors.   
Therefore, because Coleman presented sufficient evidence in 
support of the defense of privilege, the court committed error by 
refusing to give a theory of defense instruction.  See Wis 
JICriminal 700; Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d at 191-92.  We note, 
however, that the instructions requested by Colemancoercion, 
self-defense, defense of others, and defense of propertyare 
95-0917-CR 
15 
substantively different than the five-part test we have adopted 
here today.  Nonetheless, the circuit court committed error by 
refusing to give any instruction on Coleman's theory of the 
defense.   
Since we have determined that the circuit court committed 
error, we must therefore consider whether such error is harmless.  
An error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that 
the error contributed to the conviction.  E.g., State v. Dyess, 
124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).  If a reasonable 
possibility exists that the error contributed to the conviction, 
the reviewing court must reverse the conviction and order a new 
trial.  Id.  We have indicated:  "It can be prejudicial error for 
a trial judge to fail to instruct on a special defense if the 
evidence raises that issue." Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d at 192.  
We conclude that a reasonable possibility exists that the 
error contributed to the conviction.  If the jury had been 
properly instructed as to Coleman's theory of the defense, the 
jury reasonably could have found that Coleman's brief possession 
of the firearm was privileged under the circumstances, and 
therefore they may not have returned a guilty verdict.  Thus, the 
error committed by the circuit court is not harmless.
17 
In summary, we hold that a narrow defense of privilege 
exists to a charge of felon in possession of a firearm.  In order 
to be entitled to the defense, a defendant must satisfy the five-
                                                          
 
17  Coleman also raises a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Since we have reversed the conviction on the jury 
instruction issue, we need not reach this claim. 
95-0917-CR 
16 
part test that we have adopted.  In the present case, Coleman 
presented sufficient evidence that the defense of privilege is 
applicable, because a reasonable construction of the evidence 
supports Coleman’s theory of defense. Therefore, the circuit 
court erred by not instructing the jury on privilege.  Moreover, 
such error is not harmless, because there is a reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to Coleman's conviction.  
Accordingly, the conviction must be reversed, and a new trial 
ordered.  
 
By 
the 
Court.The 
decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
is 
affirmed. 
95-0917-CR 
17 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
Case No.:  
95-0917-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case:  
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
Terrell A. Coleman, 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  199 Wis. 2d 174, 544 N.W.2d 912 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed:  
 
December 20, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
 
October 30, 1996 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
 
JEFFREY A. KREMERS 
 
 
 
JUSTICES:  
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Sharon Ruhly, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
95-0917-CR 
18 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Thomas E. Harris, Waukesha.