Case Title: In re Disqualification of Hedric

Citation: 2009-Ohio-7208

Docket Number: 09AP061

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Hedric, 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208.] 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF HEDRIC. 
THE STATE OF OHIO v. PHILLIPS. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Hedric,  
127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208.] 
Judges — Affidavit of disqualification — Disqualification denied. 
(No. 09-AP-061 — Decided July 6, 2009.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Butler County Court of Common Pleas 
Case No. CR2008-01-0006. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Scott N. Blauvelt, counsel for defendant, Michael Dale Phillips, 
has filed an affidavit with the clerk of this court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking the 
disqualification of Judge Craig D. Hedric from acting on any further proceedings 
in case No. CR2008-01-0006, a criminal matter in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Butler County. 
{¶ 2} According to Blauvelt, the defendant was charged with operating a 
motor vehicle under the influence, a felony of the third degree.  The indictment 
also alleged that defendant has at least one other felony OMVI conviction and 
included a specification that defendant has five or more prior OMVI convictions 
within the past 20 years.  Blauvelt further states that while serving as an assistant 
prosecuting attorney for Butler County, Judge Hedric prosecuted one of 
defendant’s prior OMVI convictions.  Blauvelt thus maintains that the Code of 
Judicial Conduct bars Judge Hedric from presiding over defendant’s trial because 
the judge previously served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy and also 
possesses personal knowledge of disputed facts. 
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{¶ 3} Judge Hedric has responded in writing to the concerns raised in the 
affidavit.  He admits that he successfully prosecuted the defendant for OMVI in 
2001.  The judge, however, expressly denies Blauvelt’s claim that he possesses 
relevant evidence regarding defendant’s prior conviction.  Rather, he states that he 
has no recollection of the defendant or the facts of his 2001 OMVI case. 
{¶ 4} For the following reasons, I find no basis for ordering the 
disqualification of Judge Hedric.  First, “[a] party may be said to have waived the 
right to obtain a judge’s disqualification when the alleged basis therefor has been 
known to the party for some time, but the objection is raised in an untimely 
fashion, well after the judge has participated in the proceedings.”  In re 
Disqualification of Pepple (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 606, 607, 546 N.E.2d 1298.  The 
defendant first appeared before Judge Hedric in January or February 2008, when 
he pleaded no contest to the charges in the indictment.  But the matter of Judge 
Hedric’s involvement in the 2001 OMVI case was not raised at that time.  Instead, 
the matter was not raised until after the court of appeals vacated defendant’s plea 
in March 2009 and remanded the case to Judge Hedric for further proceedings.  
See State v. Phillips, 12th Dist. No. CA2008-05-126, 2009-Ohio-1448. 
{¶ 5} Second, Blauvelt argues that sections (a) and (b) of Rule 
2.11(A)(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide separate grounds for 
disqualifying Judge Hedric in this matter.  Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(7)(a) provides 
that a judge shall disqualify himself or herself if the “judge served as a lawyer in 
the matter in controversy.”  Section (b) provides that a judge shall disqualify 
himself or herself if the “judge served in governmental employment, and in such 
capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer * * * concerning the 
particular matter.”  Blauvelt contends that – as applied to the underlying action – 
the term “matter” in these rules involves a broader application than just the instant 
conduct of driving under the influence because the defendant’s prior convictions 
are essential elements of the current offense and specification. 
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 6} Initially, it is noted that sections (a) and (b) of Jud.Cond.R. 
2.11(A)(7) distinguish between lawyers and government lawyers.  Because the 
allegations here involve Judge Hedric’s prior employment as an assistant county 
prosecutor, only section (b) applies to this matter.  Moreover, the plain language 
of section (b) would require Judge Hedric’s disqualification only if he had acted 
as a government lawyer in the “particular” matter before him.  Because Judge 
Hedric was not involved as a prosecuting attorney in the underlying action, this 
rule does not compel his disqualification.  There is no ambiguity in the language 
of the rule and thus no room to construe this section broadly, as Blauvelt requests. 
{¶ 7} Third, Blauvelt contends that the judge has personal knowledge of 
disputed facts and is arguably a material witness in the underlying case.  See 
Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(1) and (A)(2)(d).  Blauvelt notes that the state must prove all 
necessary elements of the OMVI offense, including defendant’s identity as the 
individual convicted in the 2001 OMVI case.  According to Blauvelt, Judge 
Hedric has personal knowledge of a disputed fact – defendant’s identity – that is 
relevant to defendant’s current case. 
{¶ 8} For his part, Judge Hedric disputes that he has knowledge of any 
disputed facts.  The judge avers that defendant appeared before him last year 
when he pleaded no contest, yet he did not remember the defendant or his prior 
OMVI case.  Moreover, the judge disputes that defendant’s identity – as it relates 
to the prior conviction – is at issue in the current OMVI case.  According to Judge 
Hedric, all that is required to prove the prior conviction is a certified copy of the 
judgment entry in defendant’s 2001 OMVI case. 
{¶ 9} “I have declined to establish a rule ‘requiring disqualification of a 
judge based solely on suppositions that the judge may be called as a witness or 
allegations that the judge possesses evidence material to the case.’ ”  In re 
Disqualification of Stuard, 113 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2006-Ohio-7233, 863 N.E.2d 
636, ¶ 6, quoting In re Disqualification of Gorman (1993), 74 Ohio St.3d 1251, 
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657 N.E.2d 1354.  Moreover, when the evidence concerning the transaction at 
issue may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, the trial judge is 
not such a material witness as to require the judge’s disqualification.  In re 
Disqualification of Stuard, ¶ 6 (citing cases). 
{¶ 10} If Judge Hedric concludes that he is likely to be a material witness 
in the proceeding, he can and should disqualify himself, as Jud.Cond.R. 
2.11(A)(2)(d) directs.  See id. at ¶ 7 (construing former Canon 3(E)(1)(d)(v) of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct).  On the record before me, however, I cannot determine 
whether the judge possesses evidence that is material to defendant’s case, let 
alone whether such evidence is obtainable from other witnesses or documents. 
{¶ 11} As I have stated, “[a] judge is presumed to follow the law and not 
to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to 
overcome these presumptions.”  In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 
1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.  Those presumptions have not been 
overcome in this case. 
{¶ 12} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 
denied.  The case may proceed before Judge Hedric. 
______________________