Case Title: State v. Murray

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC17-707, SC18-560, SC18-334

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-707 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
GERALD DELANE MURRAY, 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-334 
____________ 
 
GERALD DELANE MURRAY, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-560 
____________ 
 
GERALD DELANE MURRAY, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
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JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
December 20, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
The State appeals, and Gerald Delane Murray cross-appeals, the partial grant 
and partial denial of Murray’s initial postconviction motion filed under Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Murray also appeals the denial of his 
successive postconviction motion and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus.1  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s orders and 
deny habeas relief. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 2009, this Court affirmed Murray’s conviction for first-degree murder and 
sentence of death after four trials and three convictions for the murder of 59-year-
old Alice Vest in 1990.  Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d 1108, 1112 (Fla. 2009).  On 
direct appeal, this Court described the facts as follows: 
The evidence presented at the fourth trial revealed that on 
September 15, 1990, the victim, Alice Vest, arrived home around 
11:30 p.m. after having dinner with a friend.  When her friend called 
the next morning on September 16, however, Ms. Vest did not answer 
the phone.  Concerned, the friend called one of Ms. Vest’s neighbors 
and asked him to check on her.  The neighbor went to Ms. Vest’s 
home and observed that one of her window screens was out of the 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
 
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window and that her screen door was propped open.  Her phone lines 
had been cut.  After telling his wife to call 911, the neighbor and 
another man looked inside the home and discovered Ms. Vest’s body 
draped off of her bed with her head on the floor.   
According to the medical examiner’s testimony, the cause of 
death was strangulation with multiple stab wounds as a contributing 
factor.  Ms. Vest was also badly beaten with a metal bar, a candlestick 
holder, and a broken bottle that left bruising around her neck, breasts, 
and knees.  She also had a black eye, a broken jaw, multiple 
contusions, and at least twenty-four stab wounds over her face, neck, 
upper and lower back, abdomen and thigh.  Most of the stab wounds 
were knife wounds, but some were consistent with infliction by a pair 
of scissors found near her body.  Ms. Vest had been strangled with a 
web belt and two electrical cords.  She was also both vaginally and 
anally raped.   
According to James Fisher, earlier on September 15, 1990, 
Murray, Steve Taylor, and Fisher played pool together after which, at 
around 11:50 p.m., Fisher dropped Murray and Taylor off at a corner 
less than a mile from Murray’s home.  Fisher then went home and 
went to bed.  
Juanita White, who lived approximately two miles from the 
victim’s house, testified that, around 12:40 a.m., she saw Murray and 
Taylor in her barn and watched the men run away after she sent her 
dog to attack them.  Murray’s brother further testified that both Taylor 
and Murray left town the next day.   
Evidence recovered from the scene of the crime included six 
footprints, five from a Britannia shoe, which Taylor was known to 
wear, and one that was unidentified.  No fingerprints were recovered 
from the scene that could be tied to either Taylor or Murray.  Semen 
was found inside the victim but the results were inconclusive.  Semen 
was also discovered on a blouse and on a comforter and was found to 
be the same blood type as Taylor[2] but not Murray.  None of the 
blood spatters at the scene could be tied to either Taylor or Murray.  
                                          
 
 
2.  The death sentence and convictions of Taylor, Murray’s codefendant, 
were affirmed on direct appeal in Taylor v. State, 630 So. 2d 1038, 1040 (Fla. 
1993) (concluding that DNA evidence linked Taylor to the victim because “the 
analyst testified that semen found in the victim’s blouse matched Taylor’s DNA 
profile”). 
 
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But pubic hairs recovered from the victim’s body and from a 
nightgown were found to have the same microscopic characteristics as 
Murray’s pubic hair, but not Taylor’s.  Jewelry stolen from the 
victim’s home was linked to both Taylor[3] and Murray.   
Additional evidence presented at trial revealed that 
approximately six months after his indictment for the murder of Alice 
Vest, Murray escaped from prison.  One of his co-escapees, Anthony 
Smith, testified that, while out, Murray told him about his role in 
Vest’s murder.  According to Smith, Murray said that on the night of 
the murder Taylor came over to his house and wanted to go out.  
Murray initially refused, but Taylor was eventually able to change his 
mind after the two drank some beer.  Thereafter, Taylor convinced 
Murray to break into a house.  Together, the pair broke into what 
Murray thought was an unoccupied residence.  When Murray 
discovered the owner was home, he wanted to leave, but Taylor 
grabbed the female occupant, handed Murray a knife, and sexually 
assaulted her.  Afterwards, Murray had the victim perform oral sex on 
him.  Murray then wandered through the house looking for things to 
steal.  He returned to the bedroom five or ten minutes later and 
discovered that Taylor had stabbed the victim about fifteen or sixteen 
times but she was not dead.  Murray and Taylor then secured some 
sort of cord and, together, they choked the woman to death.  After 
they killed her, they took whatever was valuable and left.  
Approximately seven months after his escape, Murray was captured in 
Las Vegas, Nevada.   
The jury in Murray’s fourth trial reached a verdict of guilty as 
charged on all counts.  During the penalty phase, the State introduced 
evidence of Murray’s other violent felonies.  But, pursuant to 
Murray’s instructions, the defense did not introduce any mitigation 
evidence.  After the penalty phase closing arguments, the jury 
recommended a death sentence by a vote of eleven to one.   
Thereafter, the court held a Spencer hearing and Murray again 
declined to present any mitigation evidence.  The next day, the trial 
court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Murray to 
death, finding that the aggravators outweighed the mitigating 
                                          
 
 
3.  Evidence presented at Taylor’s trial was that a bag was discovered buried 
in Taylor’s backyard that “contained the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim’s 
home during the attack and burglary.”  Taylor, 630 So. 2d at 1040.   
 
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circumstances.  Specifically, the trial court found four aggravating 
factors: (1) Murray was previously convicted of three felonies 
involving violence (great weight); (2) he was engaged in a burglary 
and/or sexual battery at the time of the commission of the murder 
(immense weight); (3) the crime was committed for financial gain 
(some weight); and (4) the crime was especially heinous, atrocious 
and cruel (great weight).  The trial court rejected two statutory 
mitigating circumstances: (1) the crime was committed by another 
person, and Murray’s participation was relatively minor; and (2) 
Murray’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was 
substantially impaired.  However, the trial court found the following 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) the untimely death of 
Murray’s wife (very little weight); (2) Murray was incapable of 
forming relationships with people (very slight weight); (3) he had 
problems as a youth (little weight); (4) his lack of education and little 
contact with his father (slight weight); and (5) his mental evaluation 
after his arrest for aggravated assault (little weight).   
 
Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1112-14 (footnotes omitted).  
 
This Court affirmed Murray’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal.  Id. 
at 1126.4   When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, this Court identified 
evidence presented at trial consistent with Murray’s guilt as follows:   
                                          
 
 
4.  On direct appeal, Murray argued that:  
(A) the trial court erred by admitting hair evidence recovered from the 
victim’s body; (B) the trial court erred by admitting hair evidence 
recovered from the victim’s nightgown; (C) the trial court erred by 
admitting the testimony of a hair and fiber expert and limiting 
Murray’s cross-examination of him; (D) the trial court erred by 
denying Murray’s motion to dismiss his indictment; (E) the trial court 
erred by denying Murray’s right to interview grand jury witnesses; (F) 
the trial court erred in allowing the State to strike an African-
American juror without providing a legitimate race-neutral reason; 
(G) the trial court erred by denying Murray’s motion for mistrial due 
to juror misconduct; (H) the trial court erred in not giving the jury 
 
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(1) the testimony of a jailhouse informant (Smith) detailing Murray’s 
confession; (2) the evidence collected from the scene and the 
testimony of the medical examiner which, together, confirmed the 
details of the crime as Murray related them to Smith; (3) the testimony 
of several witnesses who placed Murray with Taylor in the vicinity of 
the crime near the time the crime was committed; (4) testimony 
describing the presence of two different shoe prints as well as multiple 
weapons, implying that more than one person committed this crime; 
(5) the implication of consciousness of guilt since Murray left town 
the next day and later escaped from incarceration; (6) evidence 
connecting Murray and Taylor to Ms. Vest’s stolen jewelry; (7) the 
incriminating statements Murray made to Detective O’Steen; and (8) 
the presence of pubic hair recovered from Ms. Vest’s body and 
nightgown which was found to have the same microscopic 
characteristics as Murray’s known pubic hair. 
 
Id. at 1125.  Murray petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, 
which was denied.  Murray v. Florida, 558 U.S. 949 (2009).   
 
Thereafter, Murray filed a motion for postconviction relief that was amended 
four times.  After holding two evidentiary hearings, the postconviction court 
granted a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst,5 but denied relief on all other 
claims.  Murray sought to amend his motion again, but was instead allowed to file 
                                          
 
further instruction regarding the meaning of “abiding conviction of 
guilt” when requested; (I) the trial court erred in allowing former trial 
testimony to be read to the jury; (J) the trial court erred in not 
dismissing his case because of double jeopardy; and (K) there was 
insufficient evidence to convict Murray of the offenses charged. 
Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1114.  
 
5.  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 
(Fla. 2016). 
 
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his additional claim in a successive motion for postconviction relief.   The 
postconviction court summarily denied relief on his successive claim. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The State appeals the grant of Hurst relief, and Murray cross-appeals the 
denial of his other initial postconviction claims, and the summary denial of his 
successive postconviction motion.  Murray also petitions this Court for a writ of 
habeas corpus.   
A.  INITIAL POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
1.  Hurst 
The State argues that the trial court erred by granting Murray a new penalty 
phase pursuant to Hurst.  However, because Murray’s jury recommended the death 
penalty by a vote of eleven to one, and because this Court has consistently and 
repeatedly granted capital defendants new penalty phases post-Hurst where there 
were nonunanimous jury recommendations in cases that became final after Ring,6 
we affirm the postconviction court’s grant of the new penalty phase.  See State v. 
Smith, 251 So. 3d 807, 810 n.3 (Fla. 2018) (citing 21 cases where this Court has 
granted new penalty phases for cases involving nonunanimous jury 
recommendations).   
                                          
 
 
6.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
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2.  Anthony Smith 
Murray argues that the postconviction court erred when it denied his newly 
discovered evidence claim based on evidence that the State’s witness, Anthony 
Smith, was coerced to testify against Murray and believed the State would reduce 
Smith’s sentence in exchange for testifying.  Murray bases this claim on statements 
Smith alleged in Smith’s own 3.850 motion and a letter Smith wrote to the 
prosecutor on January 26, 2006.  Murray asserts that it is probable that a jury on 
retrial hearing the impeachment evidence against Smith would discredit his 
testimony and acquit Murray.   
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must 
meet two requirements.  Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  First, the 
evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the 
time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not 
have known it though due diligence.  Id.  “Second, the newly discovered evidence 
must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”  Id.   
Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones test if it 
“weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt 
as to his culpability.”  Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 
1996)).  In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the 
postconviction court must “consider all newly discovered evidence which would 
 
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be admissible” and must “evaluate the ‘weight of both the newly discovered 
evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial.’ ”  Id. at 521 (quoting 
Jones, 591 So. 2d at 916).  This determination includes 
whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it 
constitutes impeachment evidence.  The trial court should also 
determine whether the evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the 
case.  The trial court should further consider the materiality and 
relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly 
discovered evidence. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  “When a claim of newly discovered evidence is based upon 
the recantation of testimony by a witness for the prosecution, the second prong of 
Jones II [709 So. 2d at 512] is met only where the defendant first establishes that 
the recanted testimony is truthful.”  Spann v. State, 91 So. 3d 812, 822 (Fla. 2012).    
 
This Court “review[s] the trial court’s findings on questions of fact, the 
credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence for competent, substantial 
evidence.”  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1100 (Fla. 2008).  However, we 
“review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo.”  Id.   
 
Although Smith’s 3.850 motion and letters would constitute a recantation of 
testimony if the allegations contained in them were taken as true, Murray’s claim 
of newly discovered evidence is not based upon the recantation of testimony, but 
on the impeachment value of Smith’s untruthful pleadings.  When confronted at 
Murray’s postconviction evidentiary hearing with his 3.850 motion and letter to the 
prosecutor, Smith admitted that those were not true but instead a ploy to attempt to 
 
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get a sentence reduction.  Smith repeatedly testified at Murray’s second evidentiary 
hearing that Smith was truthful in his testimony at Murray’s trial.  The 
postconviction court found that “Smith was credible when he made clear that his 
3.850 claims were false and that the State did not offer him a reduced sentence if 
he testified against” Murray in his testimony at Murray’s postconviction 
evidentiary hearing.  “[I]n determining whether the record supports the trial court’s 
finding that the recantation was not credible, we give great deference to the trial 
judge’s observations . . . .”  Spann, 91 So. 3d at 825.  The veracity of Smith’s 
evidentiary hearing testimony is further corroborated by the fact that Smith 
testified consistently through four trials about Murray’s admission to him after they 
escaped jail together.   
Additionally, Smith was impeached at Murray’s fourth trial in several 
respects.  First, Smith was impeached with evidence that the State agreed to waive 
the death penalty in Smith’s first-degree murder case in exchange for his testimony 
in Murray’s case.  Second, Smith was impeached with his eight prior felonies.  
Third, he was impeached with the inconsistencies in his deposition as to facts of 
his escape with Murray, and between the facts of Murray’s role in the murder and 
his written statement and testimony.  Fourth, Smith was impeached as to the bank 
robberies he completed after his escape from jail.  Fifth, he was impeached with 
 
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the specific facts of his murder conviction.  Finally, Smith was impeached with the 
fact that he had seen the television depiction of Murray’s case.     
Accordingly, it is not probable that the additional impeachment evidence 
would produce an acquittal on retrial.  Therefore, we affirm the postconviction 
court’s denial of this claim.     
3.  Expert Microscopist 
Murray argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present an 
expert microscopist in rebuttal to the State’s hair expert.  The postconviction court 
found that counsel was not deficient because he consulted with a hair and fiber 
expert and made a strategic decision not to call him as a defense expert.  We affirm 
the denial of relief.     
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland,7 this 
Court has explained that, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a 
defendant must satisfy two requirements: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
 
                                          
 
 
7.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 
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Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 
So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)). 
Regarding Strickland’s deficiency prong, there is a strong presumption that 
trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  
Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id.  The defendant bears the burden to 
“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 
U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  Regarding the prejudice prong, “Strickland requires 
defendants to show ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ [A] 
‘reasonable probability’ is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.’ ” Henry v. State, 948 So. 2d 609, 621 (Fla. 2006) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
Because both prongs of Strickland present mixed questions of law and fact, 
this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court’s 
factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but 
reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 
 
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So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).  Moreover, “when a defendant fails to make a 
showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a 
showing as to the other prong.”  Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688, 692 (Fla. 
2003) (quoting Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1182 (Fla. 2001)). 
Here, Murray did not demonstrate deficiency.  At both postconviction 
evidentiary hearings, Murray’s counsel testified that he did not call a hair and fiber 
expert to testify because the hair at issue had been consumed by DNA testing.  
Thus, counsel made the strategic decision to use information gained from 
discussion with the expert to call into question the testing methods utilized by 
Joseph DiZinno, the State’s expert.     
 
Additionally, Murray did not prove prejudice.  Trial counsel effectively 
utilized the information he gained from talking to an independent expert to 
challenge DiZinno’s testing and to elicit through cross-examination that there was 
no proficiency testing, no written protocols, and no database of hair characteristic 
when the hair analysis was conducted.  Therefore, Murray has not shown a 
reasonable probability that the sentence imposed would have been different had 
defense counsel presented its own expert witness.  In other words, our confidence 
is not undermined.   
 
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief.   
4.  Newly Discovered Evidence Regarding DiZinno’s Testimony 
 
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Next, Murray argues that the postconviction court erred in denying his 
newly discovered evidence claim regarding Joseph DiZinno’s trial testimony.  
Specifically, Murray claims that newly discovered evidence — a 2013 review by 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) of DiZinno’s lab work and testimony in Murray’s 
trial — establishes that DiZinno’s trial testimony regarding the hair evidence is 
false and misleading.  However, we affirm the denial of this claim. 
A defendant must satisfy a two-prong test in order to obtain relief on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence:   
First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the 
party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the 
defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of 
diligence.  Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such 
nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. 
 
Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 990 (Fla. 2009).  “Newly discovered evidence 
satisfies the second prong of this test if it ‘weakens the case against [the defendant] 
so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability.’ ”  Henry v. State, 125 
So. 3d 745, 750 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1023-24 (Fla. 
2009)).  
Murray has met the first prong of the newly discovered evidence test 
because the 2013 DOJ review could not have been previously discovered by 
Murray or trial counsel by due diligence because it did not exist at the time of trial.   
 
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However, in Duckett v. State, 231 So. 3d 393, 396-401 (Fla. 2017), this 
Court rejected claims of newly discovered evidence, Brady,8 and Giglio9 violations 
related to a 2014 Department of Justice review of FBI hair and fiber analyst 
Michael Malone.  Duckett involved a nearly identical report with similar 
conclusions about the report and testimony of hair and fiber expert Malone.  In 
Duckett, this Court determined that Duckett failed to establish that the 2014 DOJ 
review of the hair and fiber analyst’s work and testimony in the defendant’s trial 
was of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial, as 
required to be granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  Id. at 400.  
This Court reasoned that although the review indicated that the analyst’s lab 
reports and testimony contained some erroneous statements that exceeded the 
limits of science, the testimony also accurately represented the reliability of hair 
analysis, that the testimony was challenged extensively, that the field of forensic 
hair science was not discredited, and that the hair evidence was not the only 
evidence to tie Duckett to the murder.  Id. at 399-400.  
 
Similar to Duckett, Murray has failed to meet the second prong of the newly 
discovered evidence test because Murray has failed to demonstrate that the alleged 
                                          
 
 
8.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
9.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
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newly discovered evidence, the 2013 DOJ review, would probably produce an 
acquittal on retrial.  First, Murray has not established that DiZinno’s trial 
testimony, when considered in its full context, was false.  Although the 2013 DOJ 
review concluded that DiZinno’s lab reports or trial testimony contained some 
erroneous and invalid statements that exceeded the limits of science, the full 
context of DiZinno’s trial testimony indicates that DiZinno used limiting language 
intended to limit his conclusions.  This is supported by the testimony of Richard 
McNally, the section chief of the science and technology branch in the General 
Counsel’s office at the FBI, who testified at Murray’s postconviction evidentiary 
hearing that the review did not take into account the limiting language of DiZinno 
in context, but looked only at the individual statements.  Second, DiZinno’s 
testimony was challenged at trial.  Murray’s counsel extensively challenged 
DiZinno’s credibility during cross-examination and even objected prior to his 
testimony as to the lack of procedures and protocols.  Third, even according to 
Jason Beckert, who testified for Murray on the subject of microscopy at the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing, the field of forensic hair analysis has not been 
discredited and the FBI has not discontinued the use of such analysis.  Beckert 
further testified at the postconviction hearing that the errors attributed to DiZinno 
were not errors at all.  As explained in the letter from the FBI itself, the science 
underling microscopic hair comparison was not the subject of the 2013 DOJ 
 
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review.  Given this context, the newly discovered evidence does not give rise to a 
reasonable doubt as to Murray’s culpability.  
 
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim.   
5.  Identification of Pieces of the Victim’s Jewelry 
Murray also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object 
to hearsay testimony related to an officer’s testimony identifying the jewelry as the 
victim’s.  We conclude that the postconviction court did not err in denying this 
claim.   
First, Murray failed to demonstrate deficiency.  Trial counsel testified at the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing that he did not object to Detective O’Steen’s 
comment about the jewelry because he recalled that O’Steen had visibly seen a 
photograph of the victim wearing that particular jewelry item prior to discovering 
the jewelry and had made that conclusion on his own.  Additionally, trial counsel 
testified that the issue of the jewelry being the victim’s was well-settled and 
strategically not an issue worth fighting.  This was a strategic decision.  See  
Patrick v. State, 246 So. 3d 253, 262 (Fla. 2018) (“A decision that lodging a 
particular challenge to the validity of evidence would be a waste of resources in 
light of counsel’s knowledge of corroborating facts can be a reasonable strategic 
decision.”).   
 
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  Second, Murray failed to demonstrate prejudice.  At the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that Murray’s theory of the case was that 
Taylor was the sole perpetrator of the crime, a trial strategy established by the 
record.  Counsel further testified that the jewelry discovered in Taylor’s backyard 
supports this theory and that it was strategically not worth trying to fight about it 
because it was a well-settled issue that the jewelry was identified as being the 
victim’s.  Thus, Murray has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of a 
different outcome had counsel objected.  In other words, our confidence is not 
undermined.   
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief.   
6.  Shoeprint Expert 
Additionally, Murray claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
retain an expert on shoeprint analysis to rebut the testimony of the State’s expert, 
John Wilson.  Murray alleges that a defense expert could testify that the shoeprints 
found in the victim’s home were from one individual.  We affirm the denial of this 
claim.   
This Court has explained that it is not necessary for defense counsel to retain 
a defense expert “where defense counsel cross-examined the State’s experts to 
establish the facts necessary for the defense.”  Belcher v. State, 961 So. 2d 239, 
250 (Fla. 2007).  Even if “arguably trial counsel’s strategy may have ultimately 
 
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been unsuccessful, [the defendant] cannot now properly challenge an informed, 
strategic decision of counsel in the hindsight of postconviction.”  Dufour v. State, 
905 So. 2d 42, 62 (Fla. 2005).  “The defendant bears the burden to ‘overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be 
considered sound trial strategy.” ’ ”  McCoy v. State, 113 So. 3d 701, 707 (Fla. 
2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
In this case, Murray failed to demonstrate deficiency.  Trial counsel testified 
at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that he spoke with Wilson prior to trial, 
and Wilson told counsel there was only one set of footprints.  Thus, counsel’s 
strategic decision to not call a shoeprint expert was reasonable given the 
information he had been provided by the State’s expert that there was only one set 
of footprints.  Ultimately at trial, Wilson’s testimony implied that one print may 
have come from a different shoe.  Because this testimony was different from  
Wilson’s prior reports, counsel thoroughly cross-examined Wilson about the 
discrepancy dealing with the shoe impressions, specifically asking Wilson to read 
from his report anywhere it mentions the possibility of any shoes other than 
Britannia shoes.  Further, trial counsel moved to strike Wilson’s testimony, and 
that was denied.  Counsel further addressed the discrepancy in Wilson’s testimony 
in closing argument.  Because trial counsel’s cross-examination brought out all the 
 
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material points Murray claims an expert could have presented, Murray did not 
demonstrate deficiency.   
 
Second, Murray failed to demonstrate prejudice.  Wilson explained at trial 
that he could not say for sure that the unidentified print came from a different shoe.  
Further, Wilson testified that there was no way he could testify as to how many 
people were inside the victim’s house at the time of the victim’s murder.  Murray’s 
argument to this Court that “no expert has ever testified that there was more than 
one type of shoeprint found at the scene” supports the conclusion that there was no 
prejudice, particularly given trial counsel’s effective cross-examination.  Thus, 
Murray has failed to establish a reasonable probability of a different result if trial 
counsel had retained a shoeprint expert.  In other words, our confidence in the 
outcome is not undermined.   
 
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of this claim. 
7.  Other Claims 
Murray further contends that the postconviction court erred in denying 
several of his initial postconviction claims without an evidentiary hearing.  
Specifically, Murray claims that the postconviction court erred in summarily 
denying the following eight10 unrelated issues:  (1) trial counsel was ineffective in 
                                          
 
 
10.  In addition to these eight issues, Murray mentioned in a footnote in his 
brief that he wishes to appeal all claims in his initial postconviction motion that did 
not receive an evidentiary hearing; however, Murray failed to present argument to 
 
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failing to request a Richardson11 hearing and to move for a mistrial regarding John 
Wilson’s trial testimony that reconciled the discrepancy in the chain of custody of 
the hair from the victim’s nightgown, for failing to discover that Wilson put the 
lotion bottle in the plastic bag, and for inadequately preparing for trial with respect 
to the tampering claim;12 (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach 
Anthony Smith, who testified as to Murray’s role in the victim’s murder; (3)  the 
State’s failure to disclose the DOJ’s investigation into DiZinno violated Brady; (4) 
the State’s failure to disclose that DiZinno’s initials on the hair evidence were 
written by someone else violated Brady, and trial counsel was ineffective in failing 
to object to this Brady violation or request a Richardson hearing; (5) the 
presentation of DiZinno’s testimony violated Giglio; (6) trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request a Richardson hearing because DiZinno did not 
                                          
 
this Court and, therefore, waived the unbriefed claims.  See Braddy v. State, 219 
So. 3d 803, 825 (Fla. 2017).   
 
11.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).   
 
12.  To the extent Murray is attempting to relitigate the admission of the hair 
evidence that either was or could have been raised on direct appeal, it is 
procedurally barred.  See Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 932, 936 n.3 (Fla. 2002).  
Additionally, we agree with the postconviction court that the addition to Wilson’s 
testimony did not materially alter or change a previous statement, did not rise to 
the level of a discovery violation, and would not have supported a Richardson 
hearing.  And trial counsel raised multiple challenges to the chain of custody in an 
effort to prevent the State from admitting the hair evidence due to tampering and at 
trial identified the suspicious nature of Wilson’s testimony and challenged his 
credibility.  Therefore, Murray could not prove deficiency under Strickland.  
 
- 22 - 
personally receive, mount, or initial the items into evidence; (7) trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the State’s use of peremptory challenges to 
exclude jurors; and (8) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly preserve 
two instances of juror misconduct.  However, because these claims were facially 
insufficient, procedurally barred, or without merit, we affirm the trial court’s 
summary denial.  See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.851, 3.852, & 
3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 491 n.2 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that an evidentiary hearing 
must be held on an initial 3.851 motion whenever the movant makes a facially 
sufficient claim that requires a factual determination); Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 
So. 2d 1009, 1023 (Fla. 1999) (“Trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to raise meritless claims or claims that had no reasonable probability of 
affecting the outcome of the proceeding.”).   
Additionally, “because all issues which were not barred were meritless, we 
can find no cumulative error.”  Johnson v. Singletary, 695 So. 2d 263, 267 (Fla. 
1996).   
B.  SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
In the appeal of the denial of his successive postconviction motion, Murray 
contends that newly discovered evidence demonstrates that Murray is innocent, 
entitling him to an evidentiary hearing and a new trial.  This alleged newly 
discovered evidence is from James Dixon, a person of interest during the original 
 
- 23 - 
homicide investigation in this case, who claims that Walter Holton committed the 
murder, not Murray or Taylor.  The affidavit of James Dixon, taken on September 
15, 2017, states the following: 
I, James Dixon worked for Walter Holton in the early 90s doing odd 
jobs.  Holton sold large amounts of cocaine with a Cuban Friend from 
Miami, who drove a Porsche.  Both men were dangerous if you 
crossed them and were known to put contract hits out on people who 
crossed them.  I was questioned by Police about a sailboat necklace 
that was possibly connected to a homicide.  I got the sailboat necklace 
from Angela Smith, who was the girlfriend of Walter Holton at the 
time.  She told me that she got it from his Cuban friend, who told her 
to “never get rid of it.”  I did not tell the police where I got the 
necklace from, because I was afraid of Walter Holton and his Cuban 
friend.  My DNA was collected by the police and I was cleared of any 
involvement with the homicide case.   
 
We have affirmed the summary denial of a newly discovered evidence claim 
filed in Taylor’s case based on James Dixon’s affidavit.  See Taylor v. State, No. 
SC18-520 (Fla. Dec. 20, 2018).  We do so as well here. 
As this Court has explained: 
A successive rule 3.851 motion may be denied without an evidentiary 
hearing if the records of the case conclusively show that the movant is 
entitled to no relief.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).  This Court 
reviews the circuit court’s decision to summarily deny a successive 
rule 3.851 motion de novo, accepting the movant’s factual allegations 
as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record, and affirming 
the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled 
to no relief. 
 
Kormondy v. State, 154 So. 3d 341, 351 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Walton v. State, 3 So. 
3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2009)).  This “Court will uphold the summary denial of a 
 
- 24 - 
newly-discovered-evidence claim if the motion is legally insufficient or its 
allegations are conclusively refuted by the record.”  Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 
198 (Fla. 2009).   
Here, the factual allegations of the newly discovered evidence claim based 
on James Dixon’s affidavit are directly and conclusively refuted by the following 
portions of the record:  (1) testimony from Joseph DiZinno, the expert at the FBI, 
matching the pubic hair recovered from Ms. Vest’s body and nightgown with the 
microscopic characteristics as Murray’s pubic hair;13 (2) the testimony of Smith 
detailing Murray’s confession; (3) evidence connecting Murray and Taylor to Ms. 
Vest’s jewelry; and (4) incriminating statements Murray made to Detective 
O’Steen.  The bag of jewelry, including a sailboat piece that the detective 
discussed at both Murray and Taylor’s trials, was found buried in a bag at Taylor’s 
former place of residence.  See Taylor, 630 So. 2d at 1039-40 (“In January, 1991, 
while Taylor’s former roommate was removing a fence behind the duplex, he 
discovered a small plastic bag buried in the ground near the fence.  The bag 
contained the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim’s home during the attack and 
burglary.”).  At Murray’s trial, Murray’s brother and a friend testified that in 
                                          
 
 
13.  During postconviction proceedings, STR testing on DNA extract of the 
hair was conducted by FDLE and then by a defense expert.  FDLE found Murray 
to be a match for “Q20, Hair #5,” and the defense expert was unable to exclude 
Murray. 
 
- 25 - 
February 1991 they saw Taylor go into the backyard of the duplex he lived in 
previously and return with dirty hands from digging.  Additionally, Taylor’s semen 
DNA that was found on the victim’s blouse contradicts Dixon’s theory that Taylor 
was not involved in the murder.  Taylor, 630 So. 2d at 1040.   
Accordingly, we affirm the summary denial of Murray’s successive 
postconviction motion. 
C.  HABEAS PETITION 
1.  Burglary Jury Instruction 
In his petition for habeas relief, Murray alleges that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to allege fundamental error based on the unobjected to 
“remaining in” language contained in the jury instruction for burglary.  However, 
we deny relief.    
The standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel mirrors the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  
Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 2002).  In order to grant habeas relief on 
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this Court must determine 
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result.  
 
 
- 26 - 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986) (citing Johnson v. 
Wainwright, 463 So. 2d 207, 209 (Fla. 1985)).   
 
Additionally, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to 
raise meritless issues or issues that were not properly raised in the trial court and 
are not fundamental error.  Valle, 837 So. 2d at 908.  “In fact, appellate counsel is 
not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise a claim that might have had some 
possibility of success; effective appellate counsel need not raise every conceivable 
nonfrivolous issue.”  Id. (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983); 
Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541, 549 (Fla. 1990)).  Jury instructions “are 
subject to the contemporaneous objection rule, and, absent an objection at trial, can 
be raised on appeal only if fundamental error occurred.”  State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 
643, 644 (Fla. 1991). 
Murray did not meet his burden of proving that appellate counsel was 
ineffective for not litigating this claim of instructional error on direct appeal 
because Murray did not demonstrate that the unobjected to “remaining in” 
language included in the burglary instruction was error that rises to the level of 
fundamental error.   
This case is factually distinguishable from Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383 
(Fla. 2002).  In Floyd, this Court reversed a burglary conviction where the jury 
instruction included the “remained in” language.  Id. at 402.  The evidence in 
 
- 27 - 
Floyd supported that the victim and the defendant knew each other, had an 
extended discussion on the victim’s porch and in the house prior to the shooting.  
Id.  This Court reasoned that the facts did not support a “surreptitious remaining” 
because it could be argued that the defendant’s intent to commit a crime formed 
after he entered the victim’s house.  Id. at 402.  Therefore, when the facts cannot 
support a “surreptitious remaining” after a consensual entry, inclusion of the 
“remaining in” language from the standard jury instruction constitutes fundamental 
error.  Id.   
In the present case, the record supports that Murray broke into the victim’s 
house in order to gain entry, and not after a consensual entry.  Specifically, this 
Court summarized that “one of her window screens was out of the window and that 
her screen door was propped open.  Her phone lines had been cut.”  Murray, 3 So. 
3d at 1113.  There is no plausible analysis under which the jury could have 
concluded that the defendant entered the victim’s house without criminal intent and 
only formed criminal intent while “remaining in” the victim’s house.  As applied to 
the facts of Murray’s case, the inclusion of the “remaining in” language in the 
burglary instruction was mere surplusage and not fundamental error.  Thus, 
because including the “remaining in” language in the jury instruction was not 
fundamental error, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for not raising 
 
- 28 - 
an unpreserved claim on appeal.  See Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1281 
(Fla. 2005).   
Accordingly, we deny this claim. 
2.  Juror Vaccaro 
Murray next argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
on direct appeal a claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
cause challenge of juror Vaccaro.  However, we disagree.     
“The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay 
aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence 
presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court.”  Lusk v. State, 
446 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1984).  “A trial court has great discretion when 
deciding whether to grant or deny a challenge for cause based on juror 
competency.”  Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 939 (Fla. 2003).  “This is because 
trial courts have a unique vantage point in their observation of jurors’ voir dire 
responses.”  Id.  As a result, “this Court gives deference to a trial court’s 
determination of a prospective juror’s qualifications and will not overturn that 
determination absent manifest error.”  Id.   
 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Although Mr. Vaccaro 
initially indicated that it may be true that he would be more likely to believe a 
police officer due to his familial relationships, upon further questioning he 
 
- 29 - 
affirmed that he could follow the judge’s instruction to evaluate witness testimony 
individually and not give more weight to a witness’s testimony because the witness 
is a police officer.  The trial judge noted that in observing Mr. Vaccaro, he seemed 
very sincere and honest in his assertion.  Appellate counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to raise this meritless issues.  See Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1271 
(Fla. 2016).   
 
Accordingly, we deny relief. 
3.  Representing Murray at Trial and on Direct Appeal 
Murray next claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for serving as both 
trial counsel and counsel on direct appeal, violating Murray’s rights to conflict-free 
counsel, due process, and equal protection.  However, no relief is warranted.   
 
“An actual conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel’s performance 
violates the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”  McWatters v. 
State, 36 So. 3d 613, 635 (Fla. 2010).  “To prove a claim that an actual conflict of 
interest existed between a defendant and his counsel, the defendant must show that 
his counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that the conflict adversely 
affected counsel’s performance.”  Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 661 (Fla. 
2000) (quoting Quince v. State, 732 So. 2d 1059, 1063 (Fla. 1999)).  “A possible, 
speculative or merely hypothetical conflict is ‘insufficient to impugn a criminal 
 
- 30 - 
conviction.’ ”  Hunter v. State, 817 So. 2d 786, 792 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)). 
However, because ineffective assistance of counsel claims for failing to 
preserve issues at trial are properly raised in postconviction, there arises no 
potential for conflict when counsel is the same for trial and direct appeal.  
Additionally, “[a]ppellate counsel’s failure to raise an issue which was not 
preserved for appellate review and which does not present a fundamental error 
does not amount to a serious deficiency in performance.”  Bertolotti v. Dugger, 
514 So. 2d 1095, 1097 (Fla. 1987).  As a result, Murray cannot demonstrate the 
deficiency prong of Strickland regarding counsel’s decision to represent Murray 
during trial and on direct appeal. 
Accordingly, we deny this habeas claim. 
4.  John Wilson 
 
Murray contends that appellate counsel was ineffective on direct appeal for 
failing to argue fundamental error and ineffective assistance of counsel on the face 
of the record regarding John Wilson’s testimony reconciling the chain of custody 
of the hair on the victim’s nightgown in relation to the lotion bottle.  However, this 
habeas claim is procedurally barred. 
To the extent Murray is utilizing this claim as an attempt to relitigate the 
admission of the hair evidence that was raised and rejected on direct appeal, it is 
 
- 31 - 
procedurally barred.  See Murray, 3 So. 3d at 1115-16.  Moreover, this claim is 
very similar to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in Murray’s 
initial postconviction motion that was summarily denied by the postconviction 
court.  Although claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are 
appropriately presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, Valle, 837 So. 2d at 
907, claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may not be used to 
camouflage issues that should have been presented on direct appeal or in a 
postconviction motion.  Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000). 
Accordingly, we deny this habeas claim.  
5.  DiZinno’s Initials 
Murray also claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to more 
directly challenge Dizinno’s testimony when he gave new testimony during the 
fourth trial that a lab assistant named Angie Moore probably placed his initials on 
the hair evidence slides at the lab based on a review of his notes.  DiZinno had 
previously testified that he thought another technician had placed his initials on the 
slides, but he also testified previously that he was not certain about that.  Because 
appellate counsel raised claims related to DiZinno’s testimony and the chain of 
custody regarding this evidence, we conclude that he was not ineffective for failing 
to raise such claims. 
 
- 32 - 
A habeas petition should not be used as a vehicle for relitigating claims that 
were raised and rejected by this Court in prior proceedings.  See Thompson v. 
State, 759 So. 2d 650, 657 n.6 (Fla. 2000).  This Court has explained that when 
looking at claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise 
additional arguments in support of a claim on direct appeal, “petitioner’s 
contention that [the point] was inadequately argued merely expresses 
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the argument in that it did not achieve a 
favorable result for petitioner.”  Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 645 (quoting Routly v. 
Wainwright, 502 So. 2d 901, 903 (Fla. 1987)). 
On appeal, appellate counsel raised multiple claims of evidence tampering, 
and the trial court’s failure to exclude some evidence.  See Murray, 3 So. 3d at 
1115-16.   This included a claim that the trial court erred by admitting the hair 
evidence despite indications of probable tampering.  See id.  Counsel specifically 
pointed to DiZinno’s testimony and changing the name of the technician who 
worked for him that placed his initials on the slides.  Initial Brief For Appellant at 
23-26, 27-31, 47-49, Murray, 3 So. 3d 1108.  Therefore, because he in fact did so, 
appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to challenge the chain of 
custody through the change in DiZinno’s testimony regarding who placed his 
initials on the slides.   
6.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
- 33 - 
 
Finally, Murray alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on inconsistencies in testimony of 
various witnesses on direct appeal.  However, we deny relief. 
 
 
Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a 
meritless issue.  See Valle, 837 So. 2d at 908.  Murray has not cited one case 
involving prosecutorial misconduct based upon inconsistent testimony of witnesses 
on retrial.  Cf. Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1, 8-9 (Fla. 1999) (“Prosecutors Cox and 
Goudie attempted to tilt the playing field and obtain a conviction and death 
sentence in a number of improper ways:  by invoking the immense power, prestige, 
and resources of the State (i.e., ‘What interest do we [prosecutors] as 
representatives of the citizens of this county have in convicting somebody other 
than the person—.’); by demeaning and ridiculing the defendant (i.e., ‘if that guy 
were Pinocchio, his nose would be so big none of us would be able to fit in this 
courtroom’); by characterizing the defendant as the archetypical liar and then 
equating truth with justice and justice with a conviction (i.e., ‘[t]ruth equals justice’ 
and ‘justice is that you convict him’); by appealing to the jurors’ raw emotions 
(i.e., recounting the anecdote concerning prosecutor Cox’s cancer-stricken father); 
and by introducing improper evidence (i.e., the blown-up photo of the bloody head; 
testimony concerning the unrelated robbery charge; and testimony concerning the 
unrelated gun).”).  Appellate counsel was not deficient for using the alleged 
 
- 34 - 
inconsistencies in testimony as support for evidence tampering claims that were 
successful in previous direct appeals rather than as support for a novel 
prosecutorial misconduct claim.14   
 
Accordingly, we deny habeas relief. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the postconviction court’s order 
granting Hurst relief but denying Murray’s other initial postconviction motion 
claims.  We also affirm the summary denial of Murray’s successive postconviction 
motion and deny his habeas petition. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion. 
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
 
ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED 
ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER 27, 2018.  A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION 
FOR REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MAY BE FILED ON OR BEFORE 
JANUARY 2, 2019.  NOT FINAL UNTIL THIS TIME PERIOD EXPIRES TO 
FILE A REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MOTION AND, IF FILED, 
DETERMINED. 
                                          
 
 
14.  Murray also raised a Giglio claim in his initial postconviction motion, 
which the postconviction court denied, based upon the inconsistent testimony 
resolving the chain of custody discrepancies.   
 
- 35 - 
PARIENTE, J., concurring. 
 
I agree with the majority’s decision affirming the postconviction court’s 
order granting Murray a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst15 and denying 
Murray’s separate petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  I write separately to, again, 
emphasize the arbitrariness in the discrepancy between Murray, who is receiving 
Hurst relief, and his accomplice, Taylor, who was denied Hurst relief.  See Taylor 
v. State, No. SC18-520, slip op. at 26-28 (Fla. Dec. 20, 2018) (Pariente, J., 
concurring in result). 
 
Taylor and Murray were both convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death for the same crime—the 1990 murder of Alice Vest.  Id. at 28.  
Taylor’s conviction and sentence of death became final in 1994.  Id. at 26.  
However, as I explained in my concurring in result opinion in Taylor, Murray’s 
conviction and sentence did not become final until 2009 because he received three 
retrials.  Id. at 27.  Therefore, “[e]ven though both defendants received 
nonunanimous recommendations for death—Taylor received a 10-2 jury 
recommendation for death and Murray received an 11-1 jury recommendation—
Murray will receive a new penalty phase . . . but Taylor will not.”  Id.  This 
discrepancy between Taylor and Murray’s cases illustrates how “the Court’s line-
                                          
 
 
15.  Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 2161 (2017); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 
- 36 - 
drawing for the retroactivity of Hurst creates unconstitutional results for 
defendants.”  Id. at 28. 
LAWSON, J., concurring specially. 
 
I concur in that portion of the opinion affirming the postconviction court’s 
order granting Hurst relief for the reasons explained in Okafor v. State, 225 So. 3d 
768, 775-76 (Fla. 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially), and I fully concur as to 
all other issues addressed in the majority opinion.   
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision except its affirming the grant of a new 
penalty phase pursuant to Hurst.  
CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
Appeals from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Russell L. Healey, Judge - Case No. 161992CF003708AXXXMA  
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer A. Donahue, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Cross-Appellee/Respondent 
 
Rick A. Sichta, Susanne K. Sichta, and Joe Hamrick of The Sichta Firm, LLC, 
Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Cross-Appellant/Petitioner