Case Title: Thompson v. State

Citation: 444 P.2d 171

Docket Number: 

State: alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Date: 1968-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
444 P.2d 171 (1968) Tommy Tillman THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee. No. 907. Supreme Court of Alaska. August 12, 1968. Chancy Croft, Croft & Bailey, Anchorage, for appellant. Douglas B. Baily, Dist. Atty., Edmond Burke, Asst. Dist. Atty., Anchorage, for defendant. Before NESBETT, Chief Justice, DIMOND and RABINOWITZ, JJ. NESBETT, Chief Justice. Appellant was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon. He was sentenced to three years and placed on probation for two and one-half years after service of six months' incarceration. Appellant's first point on appeal is that the court committed prejudicial error in admitting the testimony of Trooper Ulfers which related certain obscene language used by Richard Dale Martin at the time of the assault. The only evidence offered by the state was the testimony of Trooper Ulfers. He established that he and Troopers Hagen and Chafin had gone to McHugh Park, located on the Seward Highway south of Anchorage, in response to an anonymous tip that a drinking party was being conducted *172 there. Upon their arrival they observed a group of teenagers running into the surrounding hills. Trooper Ulfers testified that he pursued them alone and came upon a group whom he instructed to return to the patrol car. All complied with the exception of the appellant and Richard Dale Martin. Appellant and Martin hung back. Trooper Ulfer's testimony in connection with the assault is reported as follows: After the direct examination was completed appellant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the obscene language had no bearing on any issue before the court; that it could not have had the effect of placing Trooper Ulfers in fear and that with nine ladies and three men on the jury the language could only shock the jury and cause them to feel that the appellant was a foul-mouthed individual. The court later instructed the jury that obscene language used by Dale Martin had no bearing whatsoever on the guilt or innocence of appellant for the crimes with which he was charged and that they were instructed to disregard that language, if any such language was used, entirely. The trial court did not err in admitting the testimony. Martin was more than a mere bystander. He was a participant according to Trooper Ulfer's testimony. The issue was whether appellant had assaulted the officer with a beer bottle. All of Trooper Ulfer's testimony which related to the physical acts of appellant, Martin and himself, was relevant to the question of whether or not an assault had been committed. Any words spoken during the assault by any party to the assault were relevant and admissible as a part of the res gestae.[1] The fact that Martin was not himself charged with assault cannot render his remarks irrelevant under the facts of this case. Since the trial court later instructed the jury to disregard the testimony entirely, appellant received an advantage to which he was not entitled. Appellant's second point on appeal is that the court erred in instructing the jury that it was not necessary that there be found present a specific intent to actually inflict death or serious bodily harm before finding appellant guilty of the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon; but that it was sufficient if there be found to exist a general criminal intent to use the weapon as the means of offering or attempting bodily injury coupled with an actual ability to inflict great bodily harm. Appellant contends that a specific intent to inflict injury on the particular victim is required before the jury would be warranted *174 in returning a verdict of guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon. Appellant points out that the Alaska statute is silent with respect to the requirement of intent and that therefore the common law requirement of an intention to do harm prevails.[2] We do not agree. In Burke v. United States[3] the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, relying upon the Oregon case of State v. Godfrey[4] and an earlier 9th Circuit case which construed Alaska law,[5] said: We adopt the above interpretation of AS 11.15.220 and hold that no error was committed. Appellant also argues that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as follows: Since we have held that a specific intent was not required it follows that the trial court committed no error in refusing the above instruction. Appellant's last point on appeal is that the alleged errors which have been discussed in this opinion plus the cumulative effect of "other errors" resulted in a verdict contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Since we have held that no error was committed with respect to the main points briefed by appellant and since the "other points" concededly are not substantial and have not been seriously briefed, we assign no weight to this facet of the argument. Appellant's argument that seven impartial defense witnesses testified contrary to the state's sole witness is without weight since the questions of fact raised by the conflicting evidence were submitted to the jury which chose to believe the state's witness. The judgment below is affirmed. [1] Cavazos v. State, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 322, 186 S.W.2d 990, 992 (1945); Ramar v. State, 27 Ala.App. 178, 168 So. 456, 457 (1936); Williams v. State, Okl.Cr., 373 P.2d 91, 96 (1961). [2] AS 11.15.220 states: A person armed with a dangerous weapon, who assaults another with the weapon, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than 10 years nor less than six months, or by imprisonment in jail for not more than one year nor less than one month, or by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100. [3] 282 F.2d 763, 768 (9th Cir.1960). [4] 17 Or. 300, 20 P. 625 (1889). [5] Jackson v. United States, 102 F. 473 (9th Cir.1900).