Case Title: State v. Keenan

Citation: 2015-Ohio-2484

Docket Number: 2013-1731

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Keenan, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2484.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-2484 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. KEENAN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Keenan, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-2484.] 
Criminal law—Sanctions for discovery violations—Retrial after issuance of writ 
of habeas corpus due to suppression of discovery material in violation of 
Brady v. Maryland—Trial court abused discretion by dismissing case with 
prejudice without giving parties opportunity to develop the record. 
(No. 2013-1731—Submitted September 9, 2014—Decided June 25, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 99025,  
2013-Ohio-4029. 
_______________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 1} Appellee, Thomas M. Keenan, was found guilty of murdering 
Anthony Klann and was sentenced to death.  See State v. Keenan, 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 57565, 1990 WL 212119, *5, 7 (Dec. 27, 1990).  This court 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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reversed the conviction.  State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 613 N.E.2d 203 
(1993).  Following a second trial, at which Keenan was convicted, the court of 
appeals affirmed Keenan’s conviction and death sentence.  State v. Keenan, 8th 
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67452, 1996 WL 476437 (Aug. 22, 1996).  This court also 
affirmed the conviction and sentence of death.  State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 
133, 136, 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998). 
{¶ 2} Ultimately, after “a long and complex history,” the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted a writ of habeas corpus.  
Keenan v. Bagley, N.D.Ohio No. 1:10 CV 2139, 2012 WL 1424751, *3, 85 (Apr. 
24, 2012).  The court found that “Keenan was denied the right to due process 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), which forbids the prosecution 
from suppressing material information that is favorable to an accused.”  Id. at *85.  
The court ordered the state of Ohio to either “set aside Keenan’s conviction for 
aggravated murder and [the attendant] death sentence” or to “conduct another trial 
within 180 days” of the effective date of the court’s order.  Id. 
{¶ 3} New proceedings commenced in the trial court on June 7, 2012.  
Keenan filed a motion to dismiss, and on September 6, 2012, the trial court 
granted the motion, stating, “In light of the State’s egregious prosecutorial 
misconduct and the Brady violations in Keenan’s prior two trials, Keenan cannot 
receive the fair and Constitutional trial that he is entitled to today.”  The judge 
also stated that although he had “an obligation to impose the least severe sanction 
that is consistent with the purposes of the rules of discovery,” he found that 
“Keenan’s case is the unique and extraordinary case where the prejudice created 
cannot be cured by a new trial.”  The court dismissed the case with prejudice. 
{¶ 4} The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that “we cannot state that 
the trial court’s decision to grant Keenan’s motion to dismiss the indictment with 
prejudice was so arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable as to be an abuse of 
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the trial court’s discretion.”  State v. Keenan, 2013-Ohio-4029, 998 N.E.2d 837,  
¶ 38 (8th Dist.). 
{¶ 5} We granted the state’s discretionary appeal.  138 Ohio St.3d 1413, 
2014-Ohio-566, 3 N.E.3d 1215. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 6} If anything, the district court’s assessment of the history of this case 
as “long and complex” is something of an understatement.  By our count, at least 
40 judicial decisions have been rendered in this case since the original murder 
conviction in 1989.  Nevertheless, more are in the offing.  We conclude that 
whether it is possible for Keenan to receive a fair trial remains to be seen and that 
the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case with prejudice was premature and, 
therefore, not justified.  We remand to the trial court with instructions to proceed 
to trial. 
{¶ 7} As did the court of appeals, we review the trial court’s decision 
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  See State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 
343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 33, citing State v. Parson, 6 Ohio St.3d 
442, 445, 453 N.E.2d 689 (1983).  “A trial court abuses its discretion when it 
makes a decision that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.”  Id. at ¶ 34, 
citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). 
{¶ 8} The issue in this case is not whether Keenan’s rights have been 
violated—they have been, and that is why the district court granted the writ of 
habeas corpus.  The issue is whether, given those violations, it is possible for 
Keenan to receive a fair trial.  Obviously, this is a highly subjective 
determination, requiring the analysis of a voluminous record with appropriate 
adjustments for the absence of certain key witnesses who are now unavailable 
because they have died. 
{¶ 9} “Without first giving the parties the opportunity to develop the 
record,” Darmond at ¶ 39, the trial court determined that it is impossible for 
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Keenan to receive a fair trial.  We consider that an abuse of discretion.  Although 
it may not be possible for Keenan to receive a fair trial, it is impossible for us to 
reach that determination at this time. 
{¶ 10} At oral argument, Keenan argued persuasively that the absence of 
Edward Espinoza (among others) as a witness will be detrimental to his efforts to 
defend himself.  We do not doubt that this is true.  The United States Supreme 
Court stated long ago in a case involving murder and deceased witnesses that  
 
[t]he fact that one party has lost the power of contradicting his 
adversary’s witness is really no greater hardship to him than the 
fact that his adversary has lost the opportunity of recalling his 
witness and explaining his testimony would be to him. There is 
quite as much danger of doing injustice to one party by admitting 
such testimony as to the other by excluding it. 
 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 250, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). 
{¶ 11} That something is hard to do does not mean that it is 
unconstitutional.  We understand that Keenan will have difficulties based on the 
passage of time, deceased witnesses, decreased memories, and so forth.  But so 
will the state; for example, the late Mr. Espinoza was the state’s sole source of 
direct eyewitness testimony about Klann’s murder.  In the event that these 
difficulties render it impossible for Keenan to defend himself, the trial court can at 
that time determine that a fair trial is not possible.  But that day, if it comes, is in 
the future—at a minimum, after it is determined whether the state is able to 
establish its case in chief. 
{¶ 12} In so holding, we reject the state’s argument that because the Brady 
violations led to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus, they cannot also serve 
as the basis of a dismissal with prejudice.  It is possible for a Brady violation (or 
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other type of discovery abuse) to be so severe, so detrimental to the interests of 
justice that it can be the basis for the granting of a great writ and for the 
subsequent granting of a motion for dismissal. 
{¶ 13} We 
conclude 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
acted 
unreasonably, 
unconscionably, and arbitrarily when it found that it was impossible for Keenan to 
receive a fair trial, without first giving the parties the opportunity to develop the 
record.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand 
to the trial court with instructions for it to proceed to trial.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and HENSAL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs. 
LANZINGER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
JENNIFER L. HENSAL, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for 
O’DONNELL, J. 
_________________________ 
PFEIFER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 14} Although I authored the majority opinion in this case, I write 
separately to emphasize that this case underscores one reason that the death 
penalty should be abolished.  Over 17 years ago, this court affirmed the sentence 
of death in this case; I concurred in that decision.  State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 
133, 136, 156, 689 N.E.2d 929 (1998).  It is possible that Keenan could have been 
executed before it became known that the prosecution had suppressed exculpatory 
evidence.  It would be an unspeakable travesty if the great state of Ohio were to 
execute a defendant and then determine that it had done so based on deliberate 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
{¶ 15} The system worked in this case, in that Keenan now has access to 
information that should have been made available to him years ago.  That is 
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encouraging, but it is not a guarantee that the system will work in every instance 
or that it will always work in time.  In this case, because Keenan has not been 
executed, there is still time for justice to be rendered appropriately.  If he had 
been executed, there would have been no way for the state to cleanse itself from 
the awful reality of having executed a person who had not received his full 
measure of legal protection.  To ensure that that never happens, the General 
Assembly should abolish the death penalty. 
_________________________ 
FRENCH, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 16} As the majority aptly notes, it is an understatement to describe the 
history of this case as “long and complex.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 6.  Almost 24 
years after Anthony Klann’s death, for which Thomas Keenan was convicted and 
sentenced to death, a federal court found that the state of Ohio’s “serious and 
disturbing violations” of its constitutional obligation to produce all exculpatory 
information in its possession and its “continued * * * stonewall[ing] for nearly 
twenty years after” Keenan’s trials violated Keenan’s right to due process.  
Keenan v. Bagley, N.D.Ohio No. 1:01 CV 2139, 2012 WL 1424751, *45 (April 
24, 2012).  As a result, the federal district court issued a writ of habeas corpus and 
ordered the state to either set aside Keenan’s conviction and death sentence or to 
conduct a new trial within 180 days.  Id. at *85.  The state elected to retry 
Keenan. 
{¶ 17} Back in the trial court, Keenan moved for a dismissal with 
prejudice pursuant to Crim.R. 16, Crim.R. 48(B), the court’s inherent power, and 
the due-process and/or double-jeopardy provisions of the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions.  The trial court relied on Crim.R. 16(L)(1), Crim.R. 48(B), and 
State v. Larkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85877, 2006-Ohio-90, to grant Keenan’s 
motion.  It stated, “In light of the State’s egregious prosecutorial misconduct” and 
violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 
January Term, 2015 
 
7
(1963), in Keenan’s prior trials, “Keenan cannot receive the fair and 
Constitutional trial that he is entitled to today.” 
{¶ 18} The state appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to 
dismiss Keenan’s indictment because the federal district court had already 
sanctioned the state for its discovery violations by issuing the writ of habeas 
corpus, that the trial court failed to consider a less severe sanction, and that 
Keenan failed to demonstrate prejudice.  The Eighth District rejected these 
contentions, found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s dismissal of the 
indictment, and affirmed.  State v. Keenan, 2013-Ohio-4029, 998 N.E.2d 837,  
¶ 13, 31, 37-38 (8th Dist.). 
{¶ 19} This court accepted the state’s jurisdictional appeal to address two 
propositions of law.  138 Ohio St.3d 1413, 2014-Ohio-566, 3 N.E.3d 1215.  The 
state first asks this court to hold that for a violation of Crim.R. 16, a trial court 
must impose the least severe sanction consistent with the purpose of the criminal 
discovery rules and that a court may not impose multiple sanctions for the same 
discovery violation.  The state also asks this court to hold that a trial court may 
not dismiss an indictment for lack of due process unless the defendant establishes 
prejudice. 
{¶ 20} The majority opinion does not address either the Eighth District’s 
analysis or the state’s propositions of law.  Instead, based solely on the unique 
facts of this case, the majority simply holds that the trial court could not 
determine whether Keenan could receive a fair trial—24 years after his alleged 
crime and after the death of the sole alleged eyewitness—without giving the 
parties the opportunity to further develop the record.  Majority opinion at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 21} Despite its acknowledgment that we must apply the deferential 
abuse-of-discretion standard, majority opinion at ¶ 7, the majority improperly 
second-guesses the trial court without any clear indication that the trial court’s 
decision was unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.  I respectfully dissent 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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because the well-developed record, from which the trial court made extensive 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, provides a sufficient basis for the 
reasonable determination that “ ‘the harm done to * * * Keenan has been so 
egregious that this is the extraordinary case where the court has no other option’ ” 
but to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.  See 2013-Ohio-4029, 998 N.E.2d 
837, at ¶ 11, quoting the trial court’s order. 
{¶ 22} Crim.R. 16 is intended “to provide all parties in a criminal case 
with the information necessary for a full and fair adjudication of the facts, to 
protect the integrity of the justice system and the rights of defendants, and to 
protect the well-being of witnesses, victims, and society at large.”  Crim.R. 16(A).  
Crim.R. 16(L)(1) authorizes a trial court to make orders regulating discovery that 
are consistent with Crim.R. 16.  A trial court may dismiss a criminal case with 
prejudice for a violation of Crim.R. 16 where it “determines that a lesser sanction 
would not be consistent with the purposes of the criminal discovery rules.”  State 
v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 41. 
{¶ 23} When deciding whether to impose a sanction for a discovery 
violation, a trial court “ ‘must inquire into the circumstances surrounding [the] 
violation and * * * must impose the least severe sanction that is consistent with 
the purpose of the rules of discovery.’ ”  Id. at syllabus, quoting Lakewood v. 
Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 511 N.E.2d 1138 (1987), paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  Both the trial court and the Eighth District acknowledged the obligation 
to impose the least severe sanction consistent with the discovery rules, but the 
state argues that the trial court nevertheless should have imposed a lesser 
sanction. 
{¶ 24} In addressing Keenan’s motion to dismiss, the trial court applied 
the three-pronged analysis outlined in State v. Parson, 6 Ohio St.3d 442, 453 
N.E.2d 689 (1983).  Parson counsels that, in formulating and imposing a sanction 
for a discovery violation, a judge should consider (1) whether the failure to 
January Term, 2015 
 
9
disclose was a willful violation of Crim.R. 16, (2) whether foreknowledge of the 
undisclosed material would have benefited the accused in preparing a defense, 
and (3) whether the accused was prejudiced.  See id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 25} The trial court found all three Parson factors satisfied.  The trial 
court first stated, “[I]t is without question * * * that the State willfully withheld 
exculpatory evidence from Keenan and his attorneys.”  It next found that 
knowledge of the withheld information “would have clearly benefited” Keenan’s 
defense.  Consistent with the federal district court’s findings in Keenan’s habeas 
proceedings, the trial court found that the withheld information could have 
established that someone else had a motive for Klann’s murder, could have cast 
doubt on the state’s theory of the case, and could have had “significant 
impeachment value.”  Finally, the trial court expressly found that Keenan was 
severely prejudiced as a result of the state’s failure to disclose the exculpatory 
information: 
 
Keenan’s case is now 24 years removed from the crime.  
The witnesses would have to testify to detailed issues that took 
place that long ago, including the date and time of this alleged 
murder which have never been decisively established. 
 
The only alleged eyewitness, Edward Espinoza, is 
deceased.  And his testimony is not admissible because he was 
never able to be cross-examined with the newly-discovered 
exculpatory material.  Additionally, Keenan was never able to use 
the exculpatory evidence to impeach Espinoza. 
 
Other witnesses of importance are also deceased including 
Detective Timothy Horval, Lee Oliver, Angelo Crimi, and James 
Russell.  None of whom have been able to be cross-examined or 
confronted with the exculpatory evidence. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10
 
The majority opinion offers no explanation why the trial court could not 
reasonably make its findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the record 
before it. 
{¶ 26} The majority cites Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 
986 N.E.2d 971, in support of its conclusion that the trial court abused its 
discretion by not affording the parties an opportunity to develop the record before 
ruling on Keenan’s motion to dismiss.  But in Darmond, application of the Parson 
factors was unclear: the state’s discovery violation was unintentional, the trial 
court could not ascertain whether the undisclosed information was exculpatory or 
inculpatory, and it was not clear that the defense would have benefited from 
foreknowledge of the information or that the defense was prejudiced.  Id. at ¶ 37.  
In stark contrast to Darmond, the exculpatory nature of the undisclosed 
information here and the detrimental effect on Keenan’s defense are clear.  Unlike 
in Darmond, further development of the record is unnecessary. 
{¶ 27} The trial court’s determination, based upon the record before it, 
that Keenan could not receive a fair and constitutional trial was not unreasonable, 
unconscionable, or arbitrary.  Further, contrary to the state’s argument, the trial 
court did not fail to consider less severe sanctions before dismissing Keenan’s 
indictment with prejudice.  The trial court had already held that Espinoza’s prior 
testimony would not be admissible on retrial because the state’s withholding of 
the exculpatory evidence, coupled with Espinoza’s death, precluded Keenan from 
impeaching Espinoza or cross-examining him with respect to the exculpatory 
evidence.  In its findings of facts and conclusions of law, the trial court expressly 
noted the inadmissibility of Espinoza’s prior testimony.  Nevertheless, the court 
concluded that Keenan could not be fairly and constitutionally retried.  In making 
that determination, the trial court viewed the circumstances as they existed at the 
time of its ruling and considered the evidence that would be admissible in a new 
January Term, 2015 
 
11
trial.  Although it did not expressly address specific alternative sanctions, implicit 
in the trial court’s findings and its dismissal of the indictment is the conclusion 
that less severe sanctions, including the exclusion of Espinoza’s testimony, would 
not suffice to render a retrial fair.  Nothing more is required. 
{¶ 28} The state’s second proposition of law concerns the standard for 
dismissing a criminal case for a violation of due process and states that dismissal 
is unwarranted unless the defendant establishes actual prejudice.  The state 
contends that Keenan’s motion to dismiss, with its argument that he cannot be 
fairly retried due to the passage of time and the unavailability of witnesses, 
implicates due-process concerns. 
{¶ 29} The state argues that a court may not presume prejudice based on 
the passage of time or vague allegations of faded memories.  See State v. 
Cochenour, 4th Dist. Ross No. 98CA2440, 1999 WL 152127, *1 (Mar. 8, 1999) 
(addressing preindictment delay); State v. Glasper, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 
15740, 1997 WL 71818, *4 (Feb. 21, 1997) (same).  While vague allegations of 
witnesses’ faded memories may indeed be insufficient to establish prejudice, the 
prejudice suffered by Keenan is based on far more.  In particular, Espinoza—the 
state’s key witness and the only alleged eyewitness to the crime—is deceased.  
That Espinoza’s prior testimony would not be admissible in a new trial does not 
eliminate the prejudice that Keenan suffered as a result of not being able to 
confront Espinoza with the exculpatory evidence that the state egregiously 
concealed for more than 20 years.  Furthermore, at least four other witnesses, 
whom Keenan was unable to confront with the withheld evidence, are also 
deceased.  Finally, even if they are not independently sufficient to establish 
prejudice, the trial court appropriately noted several additional factors that 
contribute to the prejudice Keenan would suffer if retried in this case, including 
the extraordinary length of time that has elapsed since the underlying events and 
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the importance of particular details in this case that have never been decisively 
established, such as the date and time of the alleged murder. 
{¶ 30} The trial court also had the benefit of the federal district court’s 
discussion of prejudice in Keenan’s habeas proceedings.  After noting the 
difficulty of establishing prejudice under Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 
L.E.2d 215, the district court found that Keenan could have used the withheld 
information to “significantly strengthen his case” and weaken the state’s case and 
that there was a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have 
produced a different verdict.  N.D.Ohio No. 1:01 CV 2139, 2012 WL 1424751, at 
*45.  The district court explained: 
 
[T]he State had only one witness to the murder—Espinoza, an 
accomplice who testified in return for a reduced charge and 
sentence—and no physical evidence at all.  Espinoza’s testimony, 
moreover, was rife with inconsistencies and contradicted numerous 
witnesses on key points.  And the jury already knew that he was 
cooperating with the prosecution. Given these inherent weaknesses 
in the State’s case, then, this Court concludes that the questions 
raised by the suppressed evidence, about Espinoza’s credibility and 
role in the murder; about the thoroughness and integrity of the 
police investigation; and [another person’s] motive to kill Klann, 
are sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of Keenan’s 
trial. 
 
(Footnotes omitted).  Id. 
{¶ 31} The Eighth District was tasked with determining whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in dismissing Keenan’s indictment, and there is no 
basis for concluding that the trial court could not have reasonably reached the 
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same conclusions with respect to prejudice as the federal district court did in 
Keenan’s habeas proceedings.  In light of the extensive record before the trial 
court, the egregious misconduct of the prosecution, and the trial court’s detailed 
findings of facts and conclusions of law, I cannot conclude that the trial court 
acted unreasonably, unconscionably, or arbitrarily in determining that Keenan 
could not be afforded a fair trial and in dismissing Keenan’s indictment with 
prejudice.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the court of 
appeals’ judgment. 
LANZINGER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________________ 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Katherine Mullin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Timothy F. Sweeney, for appellee. 
_________________________