Case Title: YELLOWBEAR v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
YELLOWBEAR v. STATE1994 WY 54874 P.2d 241Case Number: 93-123Decided: 05/19/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Vincent 
YELLOWBEAR, Sr.,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court, Fremont County,

D. 
Terry Rogers, J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Leonard 
D. Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director of Defender Aid 
Program, and Diane M. Lozano, Student Intern for Defender Aid 
Program.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director of Prosecution Assistance 
Program, and Doni M. Phillips, Student Intern for Prosecution Assistance 
Program.

 

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

MACY, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Vincent 
YellowBear, Sr. appeals from the order which denied his motion to correct an 
order revoking his probation.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

I. 
Whether the trial court erred by denying Mr. Yellow[B]ear's motion to correct 
probation revocation order in refusing to credit Mr. Yellow[B]ear's prison 
sentence with presentence confinement in the Fremont County 
jail.

II. 
Whether the trial court erred by denying Mr. Yellow[B]ear's motion to correct 
probation revocation order in refusing to credit Mr. Yellow[B]ear's prison 
sentence with time served in a community correctional facility in 
Casper.

III. 
Whether the trial court erred by denying Mr. Yellow[B]ear's motion to correct 
probation revocation order in refusing to credit Mr. Yellow[B]ear's prison 
sentence with time spent in alcohol rehabilitation in the Thunder [C]hild 
Treatment Center in Sheridan and in the Sho-Rap Treatment Center in Ft. 
Washakie.

[¶3]      A Riverton police 
officer was dispatched to 1503 West Main Street on August 28, 1991, in response 
to a call which reported that Appellant was intoxicated and would not leave the 
house. When the officer arrived, he observed Appellant knocking his wife off the 
porch and pushing his children out of the way while he was fleeing into the 
house. The officer followed Appellant into the house. Upon seeing Appellant draw 
a kitchen knife from his waistband and take a step forward, the officer drew his 
service revolver and ordered Appellant to drop the knife. Appellant made no 
attempt to drop the knife and, instead, took another step toward the officer. 
The officer immediately kicked Appellant on the thigh, causing him to go down to 
the floor and drop the knife. The officer handcuffed Appellant and placed him in 
confinement. Appellant was charged with and pleaded not guilty to attempting to 
cause bodily injury to a peace officer (first offense).

[¶4]      Appellant 
remained in the Fremont County jail until November 22, 1991, when he was 
admitted to the Thunder Child Treatment Center in Sheridan, Wyoming, for 
alcoholism treatment. Appellant completed the Thunder Child program and returned 
to jail on December 20, 1991. On December 30, 1991, he was released on his own 
recognizance to await his trial.

[¶5]      On March 21, 
1992, Appellant was arrested (second offense) for driving a vehicle while he was 
under the influence of alcohol. On March 23, 1992, the prosecutor filed a motion 
for revocation of the release order for Appellant's first offense, contending 
that Appellant had violated the conditions of his release. On April 22, 1992, 
after entering into a plea agreement on the first offense, Appellant pleaded no 
contest to possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent in violation of 
WYO. STAT. § 6-8-103 (1988).

[¶6]      The district 
court sentenced Appellant for his first offense, ordering him to serve a term in 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary of not less than two years nor more than four 
years with a credit of ninety-eight days for presentence confinement being given 
toward both the minimum and the maximum terms of his sentence. The district 
court suspended Appellant's sentence and placed him on supervised probation for 
a period of three years. The court's probation order required Appellant to first 
attend and complete the substance abuse program at the Sho-Rap Lodge in Fort 
Washakie, Wyoming, and to then attend Community Alternatives of Casper in 
Casper, Wyoming. After being discharged from the Sho-Rap substance abuse 
program, Appellant failed to return to be transported to Community Alternatives; 
consequently, he was arrested on September 11, 1992.

[¶7]      The district 
court revoked Appellant's probation on September 29, 1992, but deferred further 
disposition of his sentence until "a future date." Appellant was transferred to 
Community Alternatives on October 9, 1992. The district court gave its 
permission in December 1992 for Appellant to leave Community Alternatives to 
attend a second twenty-eight-day alcoholism treatment program at the Thunder 
Child Treatment Center. Appellant returned to Community Alternatives after he 
completed the Thunder Child program.

[¶8]      Appellant was 
allowed to leave Community Alternatives on March 19, 1993, so that he could 
attend the funeral of a family member in Arapahoe. While he was gone, he failed 
to maintain contact with Community Alternatives personnel. The prosecution filed 
a petition on March 22, 1993, for revocation of Appellant's probation, alleging 
that Appellant had been arrested on March 21, 1993, (third offense) in Lander 
for public drunkenness. Appellant admitted the allegations. On April 20, 1993, 
the district court imposed the sentence for Appellant's first 
offense.

[¶9]      The district 
court awarded a credit of 130 days for the presentence confinement toward both 
the minimum and the maximum terms of Appellant's sentence. The district court 
stated:

5. 
The defendant should receive 130 days credit off the minimum and maximum 
sentences for jail time served to date. The defendant should not receive credit 
for time in alcohol treatment or at [Community Alternatives of 
Casper].

Appellant 
filed a motion for a correction of the order which revoked his probation, 
claiming that he was entitled to receive additional credits toward his sentence. 
The district court denied his motion. Appellant claims that the district court 
erred when it failed to award the correct amount of credit toward his sentence 
for the time he had spent in the Fremont County jail.

"Our 
established rule is that, on appeal, we do not set aside a sentence if it is 
within the legislatively mandated minimum and maximum terms in the absence of a 
clear abuse of discretion."

A 
defendant who has been confined prior to being sentenced because of his or her 
inability to post bail is entitled to receive a credit against the sentence for 
the amount of his or her presentence confinement. When a sentencing court 
erroneously fails to award a presentence confinement credit, a later denial of a 
motion to correct the illegal sentence constitutes an abuse of 
discretion.

Eustice 
v. State, 
871 P.2d 682, 684 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 
1024 (Wyo. 1993)) (citations omitted).

[¶10]   Appellant's maximum term fell below 
the five-year maximum sentence which could have been imposed for possession of a 
deadly weapon with unlawful intent, and his minimum term was less than ninety 
percent of his maximum term. Van Duser v. State, 796 P.2d 1322, 1325 
(Wyo. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 7-13-201 (1987); § 6-8-103.

[¶11]   The record shows that Appellant had 
been jailed for at least 127 days before his sentence was 
imposed:

· 
From his arrest on August 28, 1991, until November 22, 1991, when he was 
transferred to the Thunder Child Treatment Center (87 
days);

· 
From his return to jail on December 20, 1991, until December 30, 1991, when he 
was released (11 days); and

· 
From his arrest on September 11, 1992, until October 9, 1992, when he was 
transferred to Community Alternatives (29 days).

Appellant 
was entitled to receive a credit of at least 127 days toward his sentence. 
Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 498 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶12]   Appellant was jailed for two 
additional periods: from his arrest for his second offense on March 21, 1992, 
until April 22, 1992, when he was transferred to the Sho-Rap Lodge; and from his 
arrest for his third offense on March 21, 1993, until April 20, 1993, when his 
sentence was imposed. A portion of each of these periods may have been 
attributable to the first offense.

[¶13]   The record does not contain the 
judgment and sentence which was entered for Appellant's second offense, and the 
district court in this case did not make any reference concerning the length of 
that sentence. Appellant would be entitled to receive a credit for any time he 
spent in jail from the conclusion of his jail term for his second offense until 
April 22, 1992. Eustice, 871 P.2d  at 685-86. The record also does not contain 
the judgment and sentence which was entered for Appellant's third offense. 
Appellant would be entitled to receive a credit for any time he spent in jail 
from the conclusion of his jail term for his third offense until April 20, 1993. 
Id.

[¶14]   Appellant was entitled to receive a 
credit toward his sentence in this case of at least 127 days for his presentence 
confinement in jail. Although the district court awarded a credit of 130 days to 
Appellant for his presentence confinement in jail, the order did not contain 
adequate findings of fact which would support that award. W.R.CR.P. 32(c)(2)(E) 
& (F). We remand this case to the district court for a finding of the 
precise amount of credit which Appellant was entitled to receive for the time he 
spent in jail before his sentence was imposed. See Eustice, 871 P.2d  at 
684-86. See also Griebel v. State, 763 P.2d 475, 478 (Wyo. 1988) ("we 
assume appellants will not be punished for exercising their constitutional right 
to appeal").

[¶15]   The State contends that, pursuant 
to W.R.A.P. 2.07(a), we should not review Appellant's claim that he was entitled 
to receive a credit for the time he spent at Community Alternatives and 
attending the alcoholism treatment programs. The State claims that Appellant 
limited his notice of appeal to the scope of his motion to correct the order 
revoking his probation wherein he only sought an additional credit for the time 
he spent in jail. We agree that Appellant's motion was limited in scope. 
Although Appellant properly should have initially raised all his claims in the 
district court, in the interest of judicial economy, we will consider the claims 
which he has raised for the first time on appeal. Kahlsdorf v. State, 823 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶16]   Appellant claims that the district 
court erroneously denied him a credit for the three periods of time he spent 
attending alcoholism treatment programs.

[¶17]   When a probationer spends time at 
an alcoholism treatment facility as a condition of his probation, he is entitled 
to receive a credit for that time toward his sentence if a charge of escape from 
official detention will lie. Craig v. State, 804 P.2d 686, 688 (Wyo. 
1991); WYO. STAT. § 6-5-206(a) (1988). WYO. STAT. § 6-5-201(a)(ii) (1988) 
defines official detention:

(ii) 
"Official detention" means arrest, detention in a facility for custody of 
persons under a charge or conviction of crime or alleged or found to be 
delinquent, detention for extradition or deportation, or detention in any manner 
and in any place for law enforcement purposes. "Official detention" does not 
include supervision on probation or parole or constraint incidental to release 
on bail[.]

[¶18]   Appellant attended his first 
alcoholism treatment program at the Thunder Child Treatment Center between 
November 22, 1991, and December 20, 1991, while he was awaiting his trial. The 
district court's order stated:

Upon 
completion or notification that the Defendant has failed to complete treatment, 
Sho-Rap shall return the Defendant to the Fremont County Jail and Defendant's 
bond will be continued as before until further order of the 
Court.

IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that the Defendant shall not leave the treatment center except in the custody of 
the Fremont County Sheriff's Department, and that the Defendant is considered to 
be in custody while at the program. If the Defendant fails to obey Thunder 
[Child] rules or leaves the Thunder [Child] Program or facility[,] any sheriff 
or other peace officer in the State of Wyoming is ordered to take him into 
custody to be held for transportation back to the Fremont County 
Jail.

The 
district court did not send Appellant to the Thunder Child Treatment Center as a 
condition of probation, parole, or release on bail. Appellant was not subject to 
"supervision on probation or parole or constraint incidental to release on 
bail." Section 6-5-201(a)(ii).

[¶19]   The district court's order defined 
a level of custody which was tantamount to confinement at the Fremont County 
jail. The order contemplated that the custody would be at the level of official 
detention. See, e.g., Slaughter v. State, 629 P.2d 481, 482 (Wyo. 1981) 
("it would not matter if the escape were actually made from a place other than a 
building labeled the county jail, so long as the defendant was committed to the 
custody of the county jail at the time" (citing the predecessor to § 
6-5-206(a))). Appellant was entitled to receive a credit of an additional 27 
days1 toward his 
sentence.

[¶20]   Appellant attended his second 
alcoholism treatment program at the Sho-Rap Lodge from April 22, 1992, until 
sometime in late July or early August 1992 while he was on probation. The 
conditions of Appellant's probation included:

6. 
You shall immediately enroll in and successfully complete an inpatient 
drug/alcohol treatment program at the Sho-Rap program at or near Fort Washakie, 
Wyoming;

7. 
Should you leave the Sho-Rap program without authority or be terminated before 
you complete treatment, the Fremont County Sheriff's office shall be notified 
immediately by the program and any peace officer locating you is hereby 
authorized and directed to detain you and keep you in jail or other suitable 
detention facility pending transportation back to the Fremont County 
Jail;

8. 
You shall submit to search and seizure of your person, residence or automobile 
at any time of the day or night when requested by the Department of Probation 
and Parole or any law enforcement officer[.]

(Emphasis 
in original.) The conditions for Appellant's release to the Sho-Rap Lodge 
constituted supervision on probation or parole; therefore, Appellant was not in 
official detention. Section 6-5-201(a)(ii); see Craig, 804 P.2d  at 688. 
He was not entitled to receive a credit for the time he spent attending the 
Sho-Rap alcoholism treatment program. See also Kupec v. State, 835 P.2d 359, 364 (Wyo. 1992) (home electronic monitoring system as a probation condition 
constituted probation supervision and was not official 
detention).

[¶21]   Appellant attended his third 
alcoholism treatment program back at the Thunder Child Treatment Center, which 
program continued for twenty-eight days beginning sometime after December 1, 
1992, between the time when his probation was revoked and the time when his 
sentence was imposed. The court's instructions were:

Mr. 
YellowBear should be permitted to go to the Thunder Child Treatment Center in 
Sheridan, Wyoming, to be transported by that agency, to attend the 28-day 
residential treatment program.

Mr. 
YellowBear should be released only to Community Alternatives of Casper upon the 
completion of his treatment program at Thunder Child Treatment 
Center.

The 
district court's instructions indicated that the degree of Appellant's 
confinement was intended to be less than that imposed during his first trip to 
the Thunder Child Treatment Center. We conclude that Appellant was not subject 
to official detention while he attended his second Thunder Child treatment 
program. Section 6-5-201(a)(ii); see Craig, 804 P.2d  at 688. Appellant was not 
entitled to receive a credit for the time he spent attending his second Thunder 
Child treatment program.

[¶22]   Appellant also claims that the 
district court erred when it refused to give him a credit for the time he spent 
at Community Alternatives. We agree.

[¶23]   When a probationer is ordered to 
attend a community correctional program as a condition of his probation, a 
charge of escape from official detention will lie. Peper v. State, 768 P.2d 26, 29 (Wyo. 1989). The probationer is entitled to receive a credit toward 
his sentence for the time he spent attending the program. Prejean v. 
State, 794 P.2d 877, 878-79 (Wyo. 1990). Appellant was at Community 
Alternatives from October 9, 1992, until March 19, 1993, except for the time he 
spent attending his second Thunder Child treatment program. Because Appellant 
was in official detention while he was at Community Alternatives, he would be 
entitled to receive a credit toward his sentence of an additional 161 days2 minus the number of full days he 
spent attending his second Thunder Child treatment program. 

[¶24]   Reversed and remanded with 
directions that a finding be made as to the amount of time Appellant spent in 
presentence confinements and that an order be entered awarding a credit for that 
presentence confinement time against the minimum and the maximum terms of 
Appellant's sentence.

Footnotes

1 Appellant was in jail on November 22, 1991, and he returned to jail on 
December 20, 1991; therefore, the credit for those days was included in the 
credit calculated for his jail time.

2 Appellant was in jail on October 9, 1992; therefore, the credit for that 
day was included in the credit calculated for his jail time.