Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Jose Carlos Marrero

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1780 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
JOSE CARLOS MARRERO, 
Respondent. 
 
[June 2, 2016] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Respondent, Jose 
Carlos Marrero, be found guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from 
the practice of law for ninety days, followed by three years’ probation.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. 
BACKGROUND 
In September 2011, The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Respondent, 
Jose Carlos Marrero, alleging that he had violated rules 4-8.4(c) (engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) and 5-1.1(b) 
(trust accounts) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.  A referee was appointed 
 
 
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and hearings were held over four days in April and May 2012.  The referee 
submitted a report recommending that Respondent not be found guilty of any rule 
violations.  On review, the Court disapproved this recommendation.  In its opinion, 
the Court recited the following facts:   
The Florida Bar alleged that Respondent violated the Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar by his conduct when serving as an escrow 
agent for a loan provided by Ms. Gonzalez, and when processing a 
related loan from Countrywide Bank.  As the referee found in its 
report, Respondent and Mr. Pedrosa were officers of Weston 
Professional Title Group, Inc.  Respondent was the President and 
registered agent of Weston.  Pedrosa was a mortgage broker. 
Occasionally, Pedrosa made business arrangements with Ms. 
Gonzalez.  She would make cash loans, through Pedrosa, to his 
clients. 
The evidence demonstrates that on December 13, 2005, 
Respondent accepted a $200,000 check from Gonzalez that was to be 
used for a loan.  She provided the check through an arrangement she 
made with Pedrosa.  Although Respondent did not negotiate the 
agreement with Gonzalez, he knew the funds were for a loan to 
borrowers Gutierrez and Carrero.  Gonzalez testified that Pedrosa 
informed her the funds were to be used for a second mortgage. 
Bank statements show that Respondent deposited the $200,000 
cashier’s check into his escrow account on December 15, 2005, and 
he disbursed the entirety of the loan funds by wire transfer to the 
borrowers the next day, on December 16, 2005.  He did not require 
the borrowers to sign any agreements at the time.  The funds were 
provided to Gutierrez and Carrero before the note and mortgage were 
prepared or signed.  In fact, the mortgage and note were not created 
until three weeks after the funds were disbursed.  Respondent did not 
draft the “second mortgage” and promissory note until January 10, 
2006, which was 25 days after he gave the borrowers the entire 
$200,000.  This conduct did not protect the interests of lender 
Gonzalez.  As Respondent was a fiduciary responsible for the funds 
and to all involved parties, these deliberate acts are not negligence.  
He intentionally disbursed the funds the day after receiving them from 
 
 
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Gonzalez, without having the borrowers sign any documents at that 
time.  He performed these actions deliberately and knowingly. 
Furthermore, in the “second mortgage” Respondent listed the 
property at issue as collateral for the loan.  However, when the 
mortgage and note were executed on January 11, 2006, and witnessed 
by Respondent, the borrowers had no ownership interest in the 
property that was listed as collateral.  The borrowers did not purchase 
the property until six days later on January 17, 2006. 
Although Gonzalez received the loan closing documents on 
January 11, 2006, Respondent did not record the Gonzalez mortgage 
until six months later.  The deed of mortgage, which Respondent 
prepared, was executed by Gutierrez and Carrero on January 11, 2006, 
but was not recorded until June 22, 2006.  Thus, Gonzalez did not 
have a recorded interest in the property until six months after 
Respondent gave the borrowers the $200,000.  At no time during 
these events did Respondent inform Gonzalez that the funds were 
being used by the borrowers to purchase the house.  Gonzalez had 
been told that the funds were to be used to make repairs on a house 
that the borrowers already owned; her loan was to serve as a second 
mortgage. 
Borrowers Gutierrez and Carrero did not own the property until 
January 17, 2006, which is the date a loan was settled between lender 
Countrywide Bank and the borrowers.  It is significant that the 
mortgage loan application executed by Carrero to obtain the 
Countrywide Bank loan failed to disclose the $200,000 loan from 
Gonzalez as a liability.  In addition, because Respondent delayed for 
many months before recording the $200,000 Gonzalez loan, his 
actions prevented the loan from being found by any title search 
performed for the Countrywide Bank closing on January 17, 2006.  
Further, the compliance form failed to disclose the $200,000 loan 
from Gonzalez.  The title insurance loan policy, which Respondent 
signed, also failed to list the Gonzalez loan.  Similarly, the Owner’s 
Policy of Title Insurance did not reflect the $200,000 loan. 
Respondent’s title company closed the loan and Respondent signed 
the policy. 
Eventually, after purchasing the property, the borrowers 
stopped making payments on the Gonzalez loan. Gonzalez’s efforts to 
recover her funds were unsuccessful. 
 
 
 
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Fla. Bar v. Marrero, 157 So. 3d 1020, 1022-23 (Fla. 2015).  Based on these facts, 
the Court found that Respondent violated rule 4-8.4(c) by: (1) drafting, executing, 
and witnessing a mortgage loan document containing the misrepresentation that the 
borrowers had the legal authority to encumber the subject property; (2) deliberately 
and knowingly failing to inform Gonzalez that the funds she provided were not 
being used in accordance with her agreement and failing to inform her of the delay 
in recording the loan and recording her interest in the property; and (3) failing to 
disclose the Gonzalez loan in the course of his handling of the Countrywide Bank 
loan.  The Court also found that Respondent violated rule 5-1.1 by failing to 
dispense the funds provided by Gonzalez and held by him as escrow agent in 
accordance with terms of the agreement between Gonzalez and the borrowers.  Id. 
at 1023-26.  The Court referred the case back to the referee to hold a hearing and 
recommend a disciplinary sanction.  Id. at 1026.     
At the hearing before the referee, Respondent presented the testimony of 
several character witnesses, who testified regarding Respondent’s honesty and 
integrity.  Respondent also testified on his own behalf.  Based on the testimony and 
other evidence at the hearing, the referee found the following mitigating factors: 
(1) absence of prior disciplinary record; (2) full and free disclosure and cooperative 
attitude; (3) inexperience in the practice of law; (4) good character and reputation; 
and (5) interim rehabilitation.  In aggravation, the referee found the following: (1) 
 
 
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dishonest or selfish motive; and (2) indifference to making restitution.  The referee 
recommends that Respondent be suspended for ninety days, followed by a three-
year probationary period, during which Respondent must complete several courses 
pertaining to real estate contracts and closings, settlement statements, escrow, and 
ethics.  The referee also recommends that Respondent be required to pay the costs 
of supervision during the probationary period and pay the Bar’s costs in this case 
in the amount of $11,573.24.  The Bar seeks review of the referee’s disciplinary 
recommendation and contends that Respondent should be disbarred.     
ANALYSIS 
In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, 
ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  However, generally speaking, this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).   
Here, in making her disciplinary recommendation, the referee considered 
three standards under which suspension is the appropriate sanction: standards 4.12, 
4.52, and 7.2.  Those standards address improperly dealing with client property, 
 
 
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lack of competence, and violating duties owed as a professional.  Fla. Stds. 
Imposing Law. Sancs. 4.12, 4.52, 7.2.  The referee also considered standard 5.11(f) 
which provides that disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer engages in intentional 
conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely 
reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.  Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sancs. 
5.11(f).  We conclude that the referee correctly considered these standards given 
the findings and conclusions made in the prior opinion in this case.  Further, 
although standard 5.11(f) provides for the presumptive sanction of disbarment, 
considering the five mitigating factors found by the referee and not challenged by 
the Bar in this case, we conclude that suspension is supported under these 
standards.   
Based on her consideration of the rule violations found by the Court in its 
opinion, the referee found Florida Bar v. Watson, 76 So. 3d 915 (Fla. 2011), and 
Florida Bar v. Erlenbach, 138 So. 3d 369 (Fla. 2014), to be relevant and 
instructive.  In Watson, an attorney was suspended for three years after being 
found guilty of three violations of rule 4-8.4(c) and four violations of rule 5-1.1(b).  
The attorney facilitated his client’s fraudulent transactions and mishandled the 
funds of multiple investors in his client’s development project.  The investors had 
entrusted various sums of money to be held in the attorney’s trust account for the 
purpose of serving as collateral for a standby letter of credit.  However, at his 
 
 
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client’s direction, the attorney improperly disbursed the money.  The attorney also 
wrote a letter to other investors stating that the funds would be held in his trust 
account which was a misrepresentation upon which the investors relied.  Id. at 918-
21.1   
In Erlenbach, the attorney repeatedly failed to file her personal income tax 
returns, repeatedly failed to pay income taxes owed, and withheld federal income 
tax, social security tax, and Medicare tax from her employees but failed to pay 
those sums to the Department of the Treasury as required.  Erlenbach, 138 So. 3d 
at 370-71.  In doing so, Erlenbach violated rules 3-4.3 (commission of an act that is 
unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice) and 4-8.4(c).  The Court rejected the 
referee’s recommendation of an eighty-nine-day suspension and instead imposed a 
one-year suspension followed by two years’ probation.  There were several 
mitigating circumstances, including personal and emotional problems and good 
character, but the attorney had significant experience in the practice of law, three 
prior instances of discipline, and there was a pattern of misconduct.  Id. at 371-72. 
Here, the misconduct committed by Respondent is quite similar to that 
which occurred in Watson, and although Erlenbach is factually different, both 
Erlenbach and Respondent committed several violations of rule 4-8.4(c), violations 
                                          
 
 
1.  The attorney in Watson was eventually disbarred for additional violations 
in a later case.  Florida Bar v. Watson, 88 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 2012) (table). 
 
 
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that the Court does not view lightly.  See Watson, 76 So. 3d at 926 (stating that 
violations of rule 4-8.4(c) are not viewed as minor and attorney dishonesty cannot 
be tolerated).  Given the serious nature of Respondent’s violations, we disapprove 
the referee’s recommendation and conclude that Respondent, like Watson and 
Erlenbach, should receive a suspension requiring proof of rehabilitation prior to 
reinstatement.   
 
Accordingly, Jose Carlos Marrero is hereby suspended from the practice of 
law for three years.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of 
this opinion so that Respondent can close out his practice and protect the interests 
of existing clients.  If Respondent notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer 
practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court 
will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  Respondent shall 
fully comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(g).  Further, Respondent 
shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until he is 
reinstated. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Jose Carlos Marrero 
in the amount of $11,573.24, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
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THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; 
Adria E. Quintela, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, Sunrise, Florida; and Jennifer 
R. Falcone, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Richard Benjamin Marx of the Law Offices of Richard B. Marx & Associates, 
Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent