Case Title: State v. Acremant

Citation: 

Docket Number: S44772

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  March 17, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
ROBERT JAMES ACREMANT,
Appellant.
(CC995133C1; SC S44772)
On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentences of death imposed by the Jackson County Circuit
Court.
Ross G. Davis, Judge.
Argued and submitted July 21, 2004.
Eric Johansen, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for appellant.  With him on the appellant's brief was David
E. Groom, Public Defender.  With him on the appellant's
supplemental brief was Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director,
Office of Public Defense Services.  With him on the appellant's
reply brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter
Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Robert J. Acremant, pro se, Salem, filed the appellant's pro
se second supplemental brief and reply brief.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent.  With her on the briefs were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and
Kaye E. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
CARSON, C. J.
The judgment of conviction and sentences of death are
affirmed.  The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings. 
*Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
CARSON, C. J.
This case is before us on automatic and direct review
of defendant's convictions for four counts of aggravated murder
involving two victims and his sentences of death.  See former ORS
163.150(1)(g) (1997), repealed by Or Laws 1999, ch 1055, §
1; (1) ORAP 12.10 (providing for such review).  Defendant asks
this court to reverse his convictions and sentences of death or,
alternatively, to vacate his sentences of death and remand for
resentencing.  We affirm the judgment of conviction and the
sentences of death.  Because the trial court erred by entering
more than one aggravated murder conviction for each victim,
however, we remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment of
conviction to reflect defendant's guilt as to the charge of
aggravated murder for each victim based upon alternative
aggravating factors.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As discussed below, defendant pleaded guilty to four
counts of aggravated murder for the deaths of two victims.  The
state introduced evidence of the following facts relating to
those murders during defendant's subsequent penalty trial.
Defendant murdered Roxanna Ellis ("Ellis") and Michelle
Abdill ("Abdill") in Medford, Oregon, on December 4, 1995. 
Before her death, Ellis had operated a property management
company with her daughter, Lori Ellis ("Lori").  On the morning
of December 4, Ellis left her office for an 11:00 a.m.
appointment to show a residence on Sheraton Court in Medford. 
When Ellis later missed a 2:00 p.m. appointment scheduled for
that day, Lori became concerned for her mother.  Lori repeatedly
paged and called Ellis on her cellular telephone but initially
received no response.  Eventually, at about 4:00 p.m. that
afternoon, Ellis telephoned Lori and told Lori that she was doing
some shopping.  Lori testified that Ellis normally responded
immediately to any page or telephone call from Lori and that
Ellis was uncharacteristically quiet during their telephone
conversation.  When Lori asked Ellis why she had missed her 2:00
p.m. appointment, Ellis responded that she must have had the
wrong address.  When Lori asked Ellis why she had not answered
Lori's pages and telephone calls, Ellis responded that all the
telephone circuits must have been busy.  
Abdill was Ellis's domestic partner.  At about 4:30
p.m. on December 4, Abdill received a telephone call at her
workplace.  After she got off the telephone, Abdill informed a
coworker that Ellis had a problem with her vehicle and that
Abdill was leaving to help her.  Abdill also left a message on
Lori's telephone answering machine, stating that she was going to
help Ellis with a dead battery and that she would call Lori back
to let her know what was happening. 
Later that night, after she did not hear from either
Ellis or Abdill again, Lori drove to the Sheraton Court residence
where Ellis had had her 11:00 a.m. appointment.  When she turned
on to Sheraton Court, Lori saw Ellis's pickup truck driving away. 
Lori attempted to follow the truck and to get the driver's
attention by honking and flashing her lights, but the driver did
not stop and eventually eluded her.  After she lost sight of the
truck, Lori stopped at a service station and called Abdill's
mother to tell her that "something was wrong."  Lori then
returned to the Sheraton Court residence, where she met with Dan
Abdill ("Dan"), Abdill's brother.  After finding Abdill's
unlocked vehicle parked in front of that residence with Abdill's
purse in plain view, Lori and Dan contacted the police.  
During their subsequent investigation of the
disappearance of Ellis and Abdill, the police interviewed two
neighbors of the Sheraton Court residence, Toni Newman ("Newman")
and her then-14-year-old son Chris Newman ("Chris"), who also
were tenants of Ellis.  Chris reported that, on the afternoon of
December 4, he had seen Ellis's truck parked in front of the
Sheraton Court residence and then, later that evening, backed
into the garage of that residence.  Chris also reported that, on
that same afternoon, he had spoken with a man –- whom he
identified during the penalty trial as defendant -- in the
driveway of the Sheraton Court residence.  Chris reported that
the man had told Chris that he was going to be Chris's new
neighbor and that he was moving a few things.  Newman also
reported that, when she returned home from work on the evening of
December 4, she had seen a man in front of the Sheraton Court
residence.  Both Newman and Chris described the man whom they had
seen in front of the Sheraton Court residence to a police sketch
artist.   
On December 7, 1995, Ellis's truck was located in a
parking lot in Medford.  The bodies of Ellis and Abdill were
discovered in the bed of the truck, wrapped in drapes and covered
by cardboard boxes and an assortment of other things.  The bodies
of both women had been bound with duct tape, and both women had
been shot twice in the head.  A witness, Van Duser, reported to
the police that, on the evening of December 4, he had seen and
spoken with a man –- whom he identified during the penalty trial
as defendant –- who had parked Ellis's truck in that parking lot
and then walked away.  Van Duser also described the man whom he
had seen in the parking lot to a police sketch artist. 
On December 10, 1995, defendant's mother, Bradshaw,
contacted the police to report her fear that defendant might be
responsible for the murders of Ellis and Abdill based upon
defendant's behavior on the day of their disappearance and his
resemblance to the composite sketch that the police had
publicized of the suspect in the case.  Bradshaw informed the
police that she recently had moved from California to Medford
with defendant and that, when they first had arrived in Medford,
Ellis had taken them to view the residence on Sheraton Court. 
During that interview, Bradshaw showed the police cardboard boxes
that she had used during her move to Medford.  The police
recognized address labels on those boxes as matching address
labels found on boxes covering the victims' bodies in Ellis's
truck.
That same day, the police interviewed defendant's
brother, Kenneth Acremant, Jr. ("Kenneth Jr."), who also resided
in Medford.  Kenneth Jr. reported that, before the disappearance
of Ellis and Abdill, defendant had made a telephone call from
Kenneth Jr.'s workplace, the "Tiki Lodge."  A caller
identification device on Ellis's telephone showed that Ellis had
received a telephone call from the "Tiki Lodge."
Subsequently, after obtaining a copy of defendant's
fingerprints from the California Department of Justice, the
police identified fingerprints found on the duct tape wrapping
the victims' bodies as belonging to defendant.  The police also
identified fingerprints found inside the Sheraton Court residence
as belonging to defendant.  In addition, the police determined
that a footprint found on the bumper of Ellis's truck was
consistent with tennis shoes that belonged to defendant. 
At approximately 4:15 a.m. on December 13, 1995,
defendant was arrested in Stockton, California.  Pursuant to a
warrant, the police searched the motel room where they had found
and arrested defendant.  During that search, the police
discovered a .25 caliber gun that later proved to be the weapon
used in the murders of Ellis and Abdill.  The police also found a
homemade silencer device covered with DNA material that later
proved to be consistent with being a mixture of DNA material from
both Ellis and Abdill.  
Subsequently to his arrest, defendant made several
statements to the police in which he confessed to the murders of
Ellis and Abdill, as well as confessed to the unrelated murder of
a man, Scott George ("George"), in Visalia, California.  In his
statements about the Ellis and Abdill murders, defendant told the
police that, on the morning of December 4, 1995, he had used the
telephone at the Tiki Lodge to set up an 11:00 a.m. appointment
with Ellis to view the residence on Sheraton Court as part of a
robbery plan.  Defendant reported that he had targeted Ellis
because he had thought that her position as a property manager
would give her access to large sums of cash.  When Ellis met
defendant at the Sheraton Court residence, defendant handcuffed
her and took her purse, but came to realize over the course of
the day that Ellis lacked means to make immediate withdrawals of
cash from either her credit cards or from the bank accounts of
the property management company.  Eventually, defendant allowed
Ellis to telephone her daughter to explain her absence from the
office.  In an effort to salvage his robbery plan, defendant also
directed Ellis to telephone Abdill and to ask Abdill to come to
the Sheraton Court residence.  After Abdill arrived, defendant
tied up and gagged both women.  Later that evening, he forced
Ellis and Abdill to climb into the back of Ellis's truck. 
Defendant subsequently shot both women twice, drove them to the
parking lot where their bodies later were discovered, and then
covered their bodies with materials that he found in Ellis's
truck.  The next morning, defendant returned to the parking lot
and covered the victims' bodies with additional cardboard boxes
that he had brought.
After his arrest, the state extradited defendant from
California to Oregon.  For his crimes against Ellis and Abdill,
the state charged defendant with four counts of aggravated
murder, ORS 163.095(1)(d) and ORS 163.095(2)(d) (counts one to
four of the indictment); (2) two counts of first-degree
kidnaping, ORS 163.235(1)(c) (counts five and six); (3) and one
count of first-degree robbery, ORS 164.415(1)(a) (count
seven). (4) 
On September 11, 1996, defendant pleaded guilty to all
the charged offenses, and the trial court sentenced defendant on
the noncapital crimes.  Beginning on September 23, 1997, the
trial court conducted a separate penalty trial to allow a jury to
determine defendant's sentences for the aggravated murder
convictions.  On October 27, 1997, the jury unanimously concluded
as to both murders that defendant had acted deliberately, that he
posed a continuing risk to society, and that he should receive a
death sentence. (5)  The trial court accordingly sentenced
defendant to death for each murder.  See ORS 163.150(1)(f) (trial
court shall sentence defendant to death if jury affirmatively
answers each issue under ORS 163.150(1)(b)).  This court's
automatic and direct review of defendant's judgments of
convictions and sentences of death followed.
II.  ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On review before this court, defendant raises 25
assignments of error. (6)  We have reviewed all those
assignments of error and conclude that, except for one relating
to the entry of multiple aggravated murder convictions for each
victim, none is well taken.  A number of defendant's assignments
of error have been answered in other decisions by this court, are
moot, or otherwise do not merit further discussion. (7)  We
address defendant's remaining assignments of error below in the
order that he presented them.
A. Application of ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) to Defendant's
Penalty Trial
Before the start of his penalty trial and again before
the trial court instructed the jury, defendant objected to the
application of the statutory jury instruction in ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) to his penalty trial, because he had
committed his crimes before its effective date.  See Or Laws
1997, ch 784, § 1 (effective date of Oct 4, 1997).  That
statutory provision, set out post, requires the trial court to
instruct the jury to consider any aggravating evidence and any
victim-impact evidence, along with any mitigating evidence, in
answering the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D).  The
trial court overruled defendant's objections and instructed the
jury pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997).  
In two assignments of error, defendant contends that
the application of ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) to his penalty
trial violated the prohibitions against ex post facto laws
contained in Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution
and Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution. (8)  This court previously resolved defendant's
state and federal constitutional arguments relating to the
retroactive application of the victim-impact evidence provision
of ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) in the state's favor in State v.
Guzek, 336 Or 424, 86 P3d 1106 (2004) (Guzek III).  As explained
below, in this case, we further reject defendant's constitutional
arguments relating to the aggravating evidence provision of ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997), because the 1997 amendment to that
statutory jury instruction did not alter the evidence admissible
in an Oregon death-penalty sentencing proceeding. 
Before turning to defendant's arguments, we first
provide background relating to the statutory framework at issue. 
ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) is the statutory jury instruction
that accompanies the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D),
that is, "[w]hether the defendant should receive a death
sentence."  The question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) was
added to the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute in 1989 and
was amended to its current wording in 1991.  Or Laws 1989, ch
790, § 135b; Or Laws 1991, ch 885, § 2. (9)  Unlike the three
other statutory questions under ORS 163.150(1)(b), ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D) frames a discretionary determination for the
jury and is not subject to any burden of proof.  See State v.
Fanus, 336 Or 63, 70, 79 P3d 847 (2003), cert den, __ US __, 124
S Ct 2416, 158 L Ed 2d 987 (2004) (noting same).
Although a version of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) has been
part of the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute since 1989,
the evidence relevant to the jury's consideration of that
question has changed in recent years.  In construing the 1989
version of the sentencing statute, a majority of this court
concluded that the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D)
operated solely as a mechanism for the jury to consider
mitigating circumstances in deciding whether a defendant should
be sentenced to death.  See State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 263, 906
P2d 272 (1995) (so holding as to ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989))
(Guzek II).  Based upon that conclusion, this court held that
only evidence relating to the existence of mitigating
circumstances was relevant to the jury's determination under ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989).  Id.
In 1995, however, the legislature amended ORS
163.150(1)(a) to provide explicitly that, in addition to evidence
relating to mitigating circumstances, victim-impact evidence and
aggravating evidence also may be relevant to the jury's
determination of the question under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D).  See
Fanus, 336 Or at 70 (noting same).  ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995)
provided, in part:   
"In the [aggravated murder sentencing] proceeding,
evidence may be presented as to any matter that the
court deems relevant to sentence including, but not
limited to, victim impact evidence relating to the
personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of
the crime on the victim's family and any aggravating
and mitigating evidence relevant to the issue in
paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection[.]"



Or Laws 1995, ch 531, § 2 (emphasis added). (10)  Defendant
here committed his crimes in December 1995, after the effective
date of that 1995 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(a).  See Or Laws
1995, ch 531, § 2 (effective date of July 7, 1995).
At the time when the 1995 Legislative Assembly amended
ORS 163.150(1)(a), the jury instruction set out in ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) did not direct the jury to consider either
victim-impact evidence or aggravating evidence in answering ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D).  Instead, ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1995) provided:
"In determining [whether the defendant should
receive a death sentence], the court shall instruct the
jury to answer the question 'no' if one or more of the
jurors find there is any aspect of the defendant's
character or background, or any circumstances of the
offense, that one or more of the jurors believe would
justify a sentence less than death."  Subsequently, however, the 1997 Legislative Assembly
amended the jury instruction in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) to reflect
the 1995 changes to ORS 163.150(1)(a) respecting the
admissibility of victim-impact evidence and aggravating evidence
relevant to the jury's determination under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). 
ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) provided:"The court shall instruct the jury to answer the
question in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection 'no'
if, after considering any aggravating evidence and any
mitigating evidence concerning any aspect of the
defendant's character or background, or any
circumstances of the offense and any victim impact
evidence as described in subsection (1)(a) of this
section, one or more of the jurors believe that the
defendant should not receive a death sentence."
Or Laws 1997, ch 784, § 1 (emphasis added).  Over defendant's
objections, the trial court instructed the jury in defendant's
penalty trial pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997),
notwithstanding the fact that that statutory provision became
effective after defendant had committed his crimes.  
With that background in mind, we turn to the merits of
defendant's arguments.  As briefly noted above, __ Or at __ (slip
op at 12), this court previously has held that retroactive
application of the victim-impact provisions of both ORS
163.150(1)(a) (1995) and ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) is not
prohibited by either the state or the federal constitutions.  See
Guzek III, 336 Or at 439-47 (so holding). (11)  We therefore
consider below only defendant's constitutional challenges to the
application of the aggravating evidence provision of ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997).
  In Guzek III, this court observed that both the state and federal constitutions prohibit application of laws fitting
within the "fourth category" of laws that Justice Chase had
described in his opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 US (3 Dall) 386,
390-91, 1 L Ed 648 (1798) –- that is, "'[e]very law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different
testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offen[s]e, in order to convict the offender.'"  Guzek III,
336 Or at 434, 445.  Despite that shared acceptance of Calder,
however, this court has interpreted the Oregon Constitution as
prohibiting a broader range of evidentiary changes than the
United States Supreme Court had delineated for purposes of the
United States Constitution.  Specifically, this court has
identified evidentiary changes triggering the state
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws as
including any "laws that alter the rules of evidence in a one-sided way that makes the conviction of the defendant more
likely."  Id. at 435 (quoting State v. Fugate, 332 Or 195, 213,
26 P3d 802 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  By
contrast, the Supreme Court has identified evidentiary changes
triggering the federal constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws as including only evidentiary changes that "alter[]
the sufficiency-of-evidence standard or otherwise 'reduc[e] the
quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof' to
convict."  Id. at 445-46 (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 US 513,
532-33, 120 S Ct 1620, 146 L Ed 2d 577 (2000)).  Finally, because
it is analogous to a guilt-phase criminal trial, the court in
Guzek III determined that both the state and the federal
constitutional protections against such evidentiary changes
extend to a death-penalty sentencing proceeding.  Id. at 436, 436
n 11.
In this case, defendant contends that, by instructing
the jury to consider aggravating evidence in answering ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D), the 1997 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B)
altered the rules of evidence in a one-sided way that made the
imposition of a death sentence more likely.  In Guzek III, this
court held that Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution
prohibited the retrospective application of the "any aggravating
evidence" provisions of both ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995) and ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) to the defendant's penalty trial for
aggravated murders committed in June 1987.  In reaching that
conclusion, this court explained that, because the state
previously had been limited to introducing only aggravating
evidence relevant to the first three statutory questions under
ORS 163.150(1)(b), ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995) and ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) expanded the scope of aggravating
evidence admissible in a death-penalty sentencing proceeding by
purportedly authorizing the state also to introduce aggravating
evidence specifically relevant to ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D).  Because
such a change in the law benefits only the state, this court
unanimously concluded that it "undoubtedly qualifies as a 'one-sided' change that makes the imposition of a sentence of death
more likely[.]"  Id. at 438.  
By contrast to the defendant in Guzek III, however,
defendant here committed his crimes after the effective date of
the 1995 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(a).  Thus, at the time when
defendant committed his crimes, the legislature already had
modified the sentencing statute to provide for the introduction
of aggravating evidence relevant to ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, nothing about the 1997
amendment to the jury instruction in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) either
expanded the scope of aggravating evidence, or diminished the
scope of the mitigating evidence, admissible under ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D).  Although it is true that ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B)
(1995) did not require the trial court to instruct the jury to
consider aggravating evidence in deciding ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D),
such an instruction would not have been impermissible at the time
that defendant had committed his crimes.  That is so because the 1997
amendment to the jury instruction in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) merely
conformed that jury instruction to the evidentiary change that
the 1995 Legislative Assembly already had made.  See ORCP 59 B
("In charging the jury, the court shall state to them all matters
of law necessary for their information in giving their
verdict."); see also ORS 136.330(1) (ORCP 59 B applies to
criminal trials).  In short, defendant's state and federal ex
post facto arguments lack merit, because the 1997 amendment to
ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) did not alter the evidence admissible in an
Oregon death-penalty sentencing proceeding so as to make
imposition of a death sentence more likely or so as to reduce the
quantum of proof necessary to impose such a sentence.  The trial
court therefore did not err in instructing the jury pursuant to
ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997). (12)
B. Motion to Suppress Statements to Police Following Arrest
Before the start of his penalty trial, defendant moved
to suppress inculpatory statements that he had made in response
to police questioning on the day of his arrest.  The trial court
denied defendant's motion, and defendant assigns error to that
ruling.
The following undisputed facts relating to defendant's
assignment of error are taken from the trial court's findings of
fact and from the record.  See State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 135,
806 P2d 92 (1991) (this court is bound by trial court's findings
of historical fact if constitutionally sufficient evidence in
record supports them).  As noted previously, __ Or at __ (slip op
at 5-6), defendant was arrested in Stockton, California, at
approximately 4:15 a.m. on December 13, 1995.  After his arrest,
defendant was transported to a station house of the Stockton
Police Department, where he was placed alone in an interview room
and was fed breakfast.  At approximately 7:30 a.m. that same
morning, Medford Police Detectives Newell and Skinner met with
defendant.  Defendant was not handcuffed.  At the outset of the
interview, the detectives identified themselves and informed
defendant that their interview with him was being recorded.  The
detectives also read defendant standard Miranda warnings (13)
and confirmed that defendant understood the rights that those
warnings described.  
After initially speaking with the detectives for a
short time, defendant stated, "I think that I do need a lawyer. 
I do."  The detectives responded to that statement by informing
defendant that the interview would end if defendant wished to see
a lawyer.  The detectives then continued to speak with defendant
for approximately 13 more minutes.  During that time, the
detectives stated that they were "disappointed" that defendant
had elected to terminate the interview, that they were interested
in hearing defendant's side of the story, and that they were
curious about defendant's motive for the murders.  They also
discussed the extradition process with defendant and informed him
that he would have the opportunity to see a judge that same day. 
In response to those statements, defendant asked the detectives
about their theory of the motive for the crimes, as well as asked
whether any arrest warrants had issued for him in California. 
Finally, before leaving the interview room, Newell stated:
"We're going to be here a few days.  Uhm, we're
doing search warrants and we're conducting interviews
so, and I'm telling you this just for information. 
Uhm, if you change your mind and would like to talk to
us, you can do so.  All you need to do is contact the
jail staff and say get a hold of Stockton detectives
immediately.  I want to talk to Medford detectives and
these guys here will know how to get in touch with us. 
We spent last night in Visalia.  Uhm, we will probably
spend the night here I'm guessing.
"* * * * *
"Yeah, we're out of here.  Wish you luck, bud.  I
think we'll be seeing you again, all right."
Shortly after the detectives exited the interview room,
another police officer entered the room, handcuffed defendant,
and then left him alone again.  Approximately one hour later,
defendant knocked on the door to the interview room and requested
to speak with the Medford detectives.  
In response to defendant's request, two different
detectives, Medford Police Detectives George and Doney, met with
defendant.  At the outset of that interview, those detectives
identified themselves and removed defendant's handcuffs.  Those
detectives also reminded defendant that the interview with him
was being recorded and again read him standard Miranda warnings. 
Defendant subsequently made inculpatory statements relating to
both the Ellis and Abdill murders and to the George murder.
As noted above, before the start of the penalty trial,
defendant moved to suppress the statements that he had made
during the interview with George and Doney on the day of his
arrest, as well as any evidence that had derived from those
statements.  He argued that suppression was required under both
the state and federal constitutions because the police had failed
to cease all questioning after he requested a lawyer and because
his statements to George and Doney had been involuntary. 
Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion,
stating:
"I am of the view that [defendant] did invoke his
right to counsel.  The law directs when that is done
that all questioning cease.  That did not occur
precisely in this case.  There was some conversation
that took place after that[,] that is an irregularity. 
They could have done more as far as affording him an
opportunity to contact an attorney.  That also is an
irregularity.
"I further find that [defendant] did on his own,
quite apart from any law enforcement officers,
reinitiate contact and ask to talk with the police
officers.  There [were] two different officers that
[sic] than the two that he originally talked with.  The
two original ones were Newell and Skinner, and the
other two were Officer Doney and Officer Tim George.
"The question posed to the Court, as I see it, is
whether or not the irregularities enumerated were so
egregious that the law should not recognize
[defendant's] reinitiation of contact, and I am going
to find that there were irregularities, but they were
not so egregious that the law should not allow
recontact, so the recontact was appropriate and was
done voluntarily on the part of [defendant], and there
were two other considerations.
"I did closely scrutinize what was said, and what
[defendant] said to the police officers during the time
after he asked for a lawyer was not any incriminating
statement.  In other words, he didn't let any cat out
of the bag.  He was not psychologically overcome.  I
don't think that he was in a position where he could as
a reasonable person say 'Well, I've already told
them[,] so what's the use of not talking?'  So there
was no psychological overburden, and he didn't make any
disclosures that were so serious that he felt he had
already told them what they wanted to know.  That is a
pivotal consideration, in the Court's view, and it is
for those reasons that I'll deny the Motion to Suppress
in its entirety."
Before this court, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements. 
Defendant contends that the admission of those statements during
his penalty trial was contrary to ORS 163.150(1)(a) (14) and
violated his right against compelled self-incrimination and the
derivative right to counsel under Article I, section 12, of the
Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, (15) and his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. (16)  For the reasons explained below, we
reject defendant's arguments. (17)
1. Validity of Defendant's Waiver of Right to Have Counsel
Present at Custodial Interrogation
We first consider whether defendant made a valid waiver
of his right to counsel under Article I, section 12, and the
Fifth Amendment at the time when he made the challenged
statements to George and Doney.  To be valid under both the state
and federal constitutions, a waiver of the right to counsel must
be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the
circumstances.  State v. Joslin, 332 Or 373, 386, 29 P3d 1112
(2001) (Article I, section 12); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477,
482, 101 S Ct 1880, 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981) (Fifth Amendment). 
Although we are bound by its findings of historical fact, we
review a trial court's conclusions regarding a defendant's waiver
of the right to counsel for legal error.  State v. Montez, 309 Or
564, 571-73, 789 P2d 1352 (1990). 
Consistently with our usual practice, we begin by
considering defendant's arguments under the Oregon Constitution. 
See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (court
considers all questions of state law before reaching federal
constitutional claims).  This court previously has held that,
when a suspect in custody unequivocally asserts his or her right
to counsel, then the police must cease further questioning and
grant the suspect's request for a lawyer.  State v. Kell, 303 Or
89, 95-100, 734 P2d 334 (1987).  As explained in Montez, this
court adopted that rule to "protect a suspect in custody from
being 'badgered' by the police."  309 Or at 572 (quoting Oregon
v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1044, 103 S Ct 2830, 77 L Ed 2d 405
(1983)).  After a suspect in custody asserts the right to
counsel, however, the suspect remains free to waive that right by
initiating further contact with the police.  Kell, 303 Or at 95-100. 
The trial court in this case concluded that defendant
made an unequivocal request for counsel when he told Newell and
Skinner, "I think that I do need a lawyer.  I do."  The trial
court also concluded that, despite defendant's unequivocal
request, those detectives failed to cease the interrogation.  
We agree with both of those legal conclusions.  See
State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38, 55, 913 P2d 308 (1996) (court
examines whether defendant's request for lawyer unequivocal as
matter of law); Montez, 309 Or at 572-73 (examining whether
officer's questions constituted continued interrogation as matter
of law).  Defendant's statement, when viewed in its entirety,
expressed unambiguously that he wished to speak with a lawyer
before talking to the detectives.  Although Newell and Skinner
appeared to recognize defendant's intent in making that
statement, they nevertheless continued to probe defendant by
repeatedly expressing curiosity about his motive for the crimes
and by informing defendant that they were interested in hearing
defendant's side of the story.
As the trial court observed, defendant did not respond
to that probing by making any further inculpatory statements to
Newell and Skinner.  Defendant nevertheless argues, however, that
the failure of Newell and Skinner to cease the interrogation and
provide him with a lawyer rendered his subsequent statements to
George and Doney inadmissible.  Although he acknowledges that he
initiated that subsequent police contact, defendant contends that
he did so only because Newell and Skinner's failure to provide
him with a lawyer had caused him to think that "his attempt to
gain counsel was futile, and that he might as well talk to the
police."    
We are unpersuaded by defendant's argument.  Although
Newell and Skinner unlawfully continued the first interview after
defendant had invoked his right to counsel, that unlawful conduct
did not induce defendant's subsequent statements to George and
Doney.  Instead, the police left defendant alone after
terminating that first interview, and defendant himself
reinitiated contact with the Medford detectives after having no
further police contact for the period of one hour.  When George
and Doney responded to defendant's request to speak with the
detectives, they again ensured that defendant understood that he
had the right to remain silent and to have counsel present for
any police interrogation.  Defendant confirmed that he understood
those rights and then asked the detectives what they wished to
know about the crimes.  Although it is true that George and Doney
met with defendant before any effort had been made to secure a
lawyer for him, nothing in the record suggests that defendant
reinitiated contact with the police because he believed that the
police would not fulfill that request.  Indeed, as noted above,
George and Doney began the interview by confirming that defendant
understood that he had the right to counsel, and Newell and
Skinner also had informed defendant that he would have a hearing
before a judge that same day.  We further reject defendant's
suggestion that the passage of an hour's time gave rise to a
reasonable inference that the police had planned to deny
defendant's request for counsel.  In view of the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that defendant made a knowing and
voluntary waiver of his right to counsel under Article I, section
12, before making the challenged statements to George and Doney.
We reach that same conclusion when we consider
defendant's arguments under the Fifth Amendment.  Similarly to
this court, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
Fifth Amendment requires the police to cease all questioning
after a suspect invokes his or her right to counsel, unless the
suspect initiates further contact on his or her own.  Edwards,
451 US at 484.  As described above, defendant here initiated the
interview with George and Doney without any police prompting.  In
addition, as the trial court stressed, defendant did not make any
inculpatory statements in response to Newell and Skinner's
probing after he had invoked his right to counsel.  Cf. Missouri
v. Seibert, __ US __, 124 S Ct 2601, 159 L Ed 643 (2004)
(recitation of Miranda warnings insufficient to render confession
admissible under Fifth Amendment when warnings came during same
interrogation in which defendant already had made essentially
same confession before receiving any warnings).  In sum, the
trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's argument that
his statements were inadmissible because they had been obtained
in violation of his right to counsel under Article I, section 12,
and the Fifth Amendment.
2. Voluntariness of Defendant's Statements
We next consider whether defendant's statements to
George and Doney were voluntary for purposes of Article I,
section 12, the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The test for voluntariness under both
the state and federal constitutions is whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, it is apparent that the
"defendant's will was not overborne and his capacity for self-determination was not critically impaired."  State v. Vu, 307 Or
419, 425, 770 P2d 577 (1989); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 US 218, 93 S Ct 2041, 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973) (applying same
test for purposes of Fifth Amendment and Due Process Clause).  In
reviewing the voluntariness of a defendant's statements, we are
bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact, but must
assess independently the ultimate legal determination of
voluntariness.  Stevens, 311 Or at 135.  
In this case, defendant contends that his statements
during his interview with George and Doney were involuntary
because he had been held "isolated" and sometimes handcuffed in
an interrogation room for several hours before making those
statements.  As further support for his argument, he points out
again that Newell and Skinner failed to terminate the first
interview immediately after his request for a lawyer and then
failed to take any steps to obtain a lawyer for him.  
We agree with the trial court that those facts are
insufficient to provide the basis for the conclusion that
defendant's statements were involuntary.  As discussed above,
defendant made no additional inculpatory statements to Newell and
Skinner after his request for counsel during the first interview. 
The conditions of defendant's custody also certainly were not so
oppressive as to undermine defendant's ability to exercise his
free will.  Finally, none of the detectives made any promise of
leniency or otherwise employed subterfuge to obtain defendant's
statements.  The trial court did not err by denying defendant's
motion to suppress those statements.
C. Admission of Evidence of Body of Unrelated Victim
In another assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to exclude evidence
of the body of George (the man who defendant confessed to killing
in California) during defendant's penalty trial.  Before turning
to defendant's arguments, we first provide the relevant factual
background.  See Stevens, 311 Or at 126-27 (this court bound by
trial court's findings of fact and, if trial court did not make
express findings respecting all pertinent historical facts, then
court presumes that trial court found facts consistent with its
ultimate conclusion).
 During the above-described interview with defendant on December 13, 1995, about the Ellis and Abdill murders, Detectives
George and Doney also asked defendant about the earlier murder of
George in California and, specifically, questioned defendant
about where he had hidden George's body.  Although he admitted to
murdering George, defendant refused to disclose the location of
George's body to the detectives.  
At some point during that interview, defendant's
father, Kenneth Acremant, Sr. ("Kenneth Sr."), arrived at the
station house of the Stockton Police Department where defendant
was being held.  Detective Newell, along with two other
detectives, spoke with Kenneth Sr. about defendant's confessions
to the three murders and requested that Kenneth Sr. ask defendant
about the location of George's body.  Without informing defendant
that the detectives had instructed him to do so, Kenneth Sr.
asked defendant where he had hidden George's body when he spoke
with defendant that same day.  Defendant also refused to disclose
the location of George's body to Kenneth Sr.  
After having failed to obtain any information from
defendant, Kenneth Sr. informed the police that he suspected that
defendant had hidden George's body in one of the mine shafts or
in the cave on Kenneth Sr.'s ranch. (18)  The police made
arrangements with Kenneth Sr. to search his ranch on December 18,
1995.  The police did not ask Kenneth Sr. to speak with defendant
again about the location of George's body.
On December 17, 1995, Kenneth Sr. had another visit
with defendant.  During that visit, Kenneth Sr. informed
defendant that the police would be searching Kenneth Sr.'s ranch
the next day with police dogs trained to detect a deceased human
body.  Kenneth Sr. again did not disclose to defendant that the
detectives previously had asked him to question defendant about
the location of George's body.  Defendant advised Kenneth Sr.
that he had hidden George's body in a particular mine shaft on
Kenneth Sr.'s ranch that was used for dumping trash.  The police
searched that mine shaft the next day and discovered George's
body.    
Before the start of his penalty trial, defendant moved
to exclude evidence of the statements that he had made to Kenneth
Sr. on both December 13 and 17, along with the derivative
evidence of George's body.  Defendant argued that, because the
police had directed Kenneth Sr. to ask defendant about the
location of George's body, Kenneth Sr. had acted as an agent of
the state during both his interviews with defendant and, for that
reason, should have provided defendant with Miranda warnings
before questioning defendant.  The state disputed that Kenneth
Sr. had acted as an agent of the state during his second
interview with defendant and asserted that, in any event, the
police would have discovered George's body through ordinary
investigative procedures even if defendant had not disclosed its
location to Kenneth Sr. 
After a hearing, the trial court determined that, as a
matter of law, Kenneth Sr. "was still acting as an agent of the
police" during the second interview with defendant on December
17.  As the factual basis for that legal conclusion, the trial
court stated:
"I think the time frame, the closeness in time is
strong –- is a strong indicator that there had not been
enough lapse of time.
"I think there's a –- you know, always a
tremendous psychological conversion, the forces on any
parent in this situation.  And I think that the
tremendously conflicting position that a parent finds
himself in in this situation is very –- and these facts
that are before the Court –- is one of great difficulty
and great desire to cooperate.  And I think that the
suggestion by the police enlisted him as an agent, and
he still wanted to comply, and that was part –- and he
testified that that was part of the motivating feature. 
So, I believe that he was still an agent of the police
[during the interview on December 17, 1995]." 
Based upon that conclusion, the trial court determined that
Kenneth Sr. had been required to provide defendant with Miranda
warnings and that his failure to do so required the court to
suppress defendant's statements. (19)  The trial court further
ruled, however, that the evidence of George's body was admissible
because the state had proved that it was "absolutely inevitable"
that the police would have discovered George's body in any event
through ordinary investigative procedures.  Defendant assigns
error to that ruling.
Before this court, defendant focuses his arguments upon
whether the trial court correctly concluded that the state had
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
discovered George's body in any event through ordinary
investigative procedures.  See State v . Johnson, 335 Or 511,
522-26, 73 P3d 282 (2003) (discussing "inevitable discovery"
doctrine).  For its part, the state challenges the trial court's
conclusion that Kenneth Sr. had acted as an agent of the state
during his second interview with defendant.  The state also
argues that, even if Kenneth Sr. had been acting as an agent of
the state, he was not required to inform defendant of his rights
under Article I, section 12, because the "compelling"
circumstances giving rise to the warnings requirement under
Article I, section 12, are not present when a suspect is unaware
that he or she is speaking to a police agent.  See State v.
Smith, 310 Or 1, 7, 791 P2d 836 (1990) (warning of rights under
Article I, section 12, of Oregon Constitution required when
police questioning occurs in "setting which judges would and
officers should recognize as 'compelling'" (quoting Magee, 304 Or
at 265; internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Illinois v.
Perkins, 496 US 292, 294, 110 S Ct 2394, 110 L Ed 2d 243 (1990)
(Fifth Amendment does not require Miranda warnings when suspect
is unaware that he or she is speaking with state agent). 
We do not address defendant's argument regarding the
trial court's inevitable discovery ruling or the state's second
argument regarding the circumstances when Article I, section 12,
requires a police agent to provide warnings to a suspect. 
Instead, we affirm the trial court's ruling because we conclude
that, as a matter of law, Kenneth Sr. was not acting as a police
agent on December 17 and, therefore, that his actions did not
implicate Article I, section 12.  See Outdoor Media Dimensions
Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60, 20 P3d 180 (2001)
(discussing "right for the wrong reason" principle for affirming
judgment of trial court). (20)
In Smith, this court explained that, in deciding
whether a private citizen acted as a "police agent" as a matter
of law, a court must examine "if the police were directly or
indirectly involved to a sufficient extent in initiating,
planning, controlling or supporting" the citizen's activities.
310 Or at 13 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
In that case, this court rejected the defendant's argument that
his cellmate had acted as an agent of the state when the cellmate
obtained information from the defendant that incriminated him in
his wife's murder.  In reaching that conclusion, this court
observed that the cellmate had initiated contact with the
sheriff's deputies about the defendant's statements and that the
deputies had informed the cellmate that he could pass the
information along, but was not required to do so.  Id. at 14. 
The court also pointed out that the deputies had not made any
deals with the cellmate for the information and that the cellmate
had testified that his principle motivation for his information
gathering "was his revulsion at the manner in which the victim
was killed."  Id.
In this case, we similarly conclude that the facts do
not support the legal conclusion that Kenneth Sr. had been acting
as an agent of the state at the time of his second interview with
defendant on December 17.  Although the police had asked Kenneth
Sr. to question defendant about the location of George's body on
December 13, the police had not instructed Kenneth Sr. to
continue to try to obtain that information after defendant
refused to disclose it.  Rather, the police proceeded to make
plans with Kenneth Sr. to search his ranch and to follow other
leads that had surfaced.  Indeed, the trial court found that, as
a factual matter, Kenneth Sr.'s primary motivation for
questioning defendant a second time about the location of
George's body was Kenneth Sr.'s own personal desire to provide
assistance to the police in the face of his son's crimes. 
Because the police lacked sufficient involvement in controlling
and directing Kenneth Sr.'s actions on December 17 to render him
a state agent, Kenneth Sr.'s actions did not implicate Article I,
section 12.  For that reason, the trial court did not err in
admitting evidence of George's body during defendant's penalty
trial.   
D. Entry of Multiple Aggravated Murder Convictions for Each
Victim
As noted previously, defendant pleaded guilty to two
counts of aggravated murder involving Ellis, ORS 163.095(1)(d)
and (2)(d), and two counts of aggravated murder involving Abdill,
ORS 163.095(1)(d) and (2)(d).  In its judgment, the trial court
entered two aggravated murder convictions for each victim without
any objection from defendant.
Citing this court's decision in State v. Barrett, 331
Or 27, 10 P3d 901 (2000), defendant assigns error to the entry of two aggravated murder convictions for each victim.  Defendant
acknowledges that, because he did not object to the imposition of
multiple convictions for each victim, he did not preserve this
assignment of error.  He urges, however, that this court should
consider this claim of error as an "error apparent on the face of
the record[.]"  ORAP 5.45(6); see State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or
431, 435, 7 P3d 522 (2000) (explaining and applying plain error
doctrine).  For its part, the state concedes that the judgment is
erroneous and further agrees that, although it is unpreserved,
this court nevertheless should exercise its discretion to review
and correct that error.
In Barrett, this court determined that, although the
state properly may charge a defendant with multiple counts of
aggravated murder for a single victim based upon the existence of
different aggravating circumstances under ORS 163.095, the
aggravating circumstances listed under ORS 163.095 do not
constitute "separately punishable offenses" for purposes of
former ORS 161.062(1). (21)  Id. at 36.  Based upon that
conclusion, this court held that, when a trial court convicts a
defendant of multiple counts of aggravated murder for the death
of a single victim based upon different aggravating
circumstances, the trial court should enter only one judgment of
conviction of aggravated murder for that victim, with the
judgment enumerating each of the supporting aggravating factors. 
Id. at 37.
In light of this court's holding in Barrett, we agree
with defendant and the state that the judgment entered is
erroneous.  We therefore remand the case for entry of corrected
judgment of conviction reflecting defendant's guilt on the charge
of aggravated murder for each victim, with the judgment
separately enumerating the aggravating factors upon which each
conviction is based.  
E. Trial Court's Grant of State's Motion to Supplement the
Record
In another assignment of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred by granting the state's motion to
supplement the record after the trial court reporter
inadvertently erased approximately 90 minutes of the audio
recording of defendant's penalty trial.  Before turning to our
discussion of defendant's arguments, we first provide the
relevant factual background.
As noted previously, __ Or at __ (slip op at 9), after
the jury made the requisite findings under ORS 163.150(1)(b), the
trial court entered the judgment of conviction and sentenced
defendant to death on October 27, 1997.  On November 13, 1997,
the trial court's electronic reporter was duplicating the
audiotapes of defendant's penalty trial at the request of the
district attorney's office in Tulare County, California, for the
preparation of that state's case against defendant for the murder
of George.  In the process of duplicating the tapes, the trial
court reporter inadvertently reversed the original tape and the
blank tape on the duplicator, and 90 minutes of the audio
recording of defendant's penalty trial on October 10, 1997, were
erased.
On November 26, 1997, the trial court clerk submitted
to this court the death-penalty review packet relating to
defendant's case.  See ORAP 12.10(3), (4) (immediately after
entry of judgment of conviction and sentence of death, trial
court clerk shall prepare death-penalty review packet and send
original copy to State Court Administrator).  On December 30,
1997, after learning about the erased audiotape, the prosecutor
filed a motion with the trial court to supplement the record or,
alternatively, to submit an agreed narrative statement. (22) 
The prosecutor supported his motion with an affidavit from the
trial court reporter describing how the audiotape inadvertently
had been erased, along with the trial court reporter's log of the
trial events that the erased tape had recorded.  The trial court
reporter's log showed that the erased tape had included the
entire testimony of seven state witnesses and the beginning of
the testimony of an eighth state witness.
In addition to those materials, the prosecutor also
supported his motion with his own affidavit attesting to the
trial events that the erased audiotape had recorded.  In that
affidavit, the prosecutor attested that the following trial
events had occurred before the trial court: (1) defense counsel
submitted a motion in limine to exclude victim-impact testimony
relating to the murder of George, which the trial court granted;
(2) defense counsel renewed his previously denied motion to
exclude evidence of George's body, which the trial court declined
to revisit; and (3) the state submitted a proposed written order
relating to the trial court's previous ruling on defendant's
constitutional challenges to the composition of the jury pool,
which the trial court declined to sign to allow defense counsel
the opportunity to respond.  In addition to those events, the
prosecutor also averred that the following trial events had
occurred before the jury: (1) Deputy Mark Moore, Department of
Corrections, testified on behalf of the state about a rope made
of bed sheets that he found in defendant's cell; (2) Shawn
Harper, defendant's former cellmate, testified on behalf of the
state about witnessing defendant practicing a stabbing motion
with a pencil; (3) Kevin Louis Clark, Deputy Coroner for
Calaveres County, California, testified on behalf of the state
about picking up George's body from Kenneth Sr.'s ranch, and he
identified state exhibit 98 as a photograph of George's body
wrapped in a body bag; (4) Thomas Crabtree, Deputy Coroner for
Tulare County, California, testified on behalf of the state about
taking x-rays of George's body while it was still in the body
bag, and he identified state exhibit 98 as a photograph of
George's body wrapped in a body bag; (5) Dr. John Miller
testified on behalf of the state about having been George's
dentist, and he identified state exhibits 101 and 102 as x-rays
that Miller had taken of George's jaw on July 31, 1991; (6) Dr.
Peter Raventos, forensic odontologist for Tulare County,
California, testified on behalf of the state about removing the
upper and lower jaws from George's body, about making a positive
identification of George's body from his dental records, and
identified state exhibits 103 and 104 as the x-rays that he had
taken of George's jaws; and (7) Timothy Sola, a crime technician
with the Visalia Police Department in California, testified on
behalf of the state about George's body having been wrapped in
several layers of plastic and duct tape, about attending George's
autopsy, about physical evidence removed from George's body
during the autopsy, and he identified state exhibit 4 as a
photograph of George's body on the autopsy table.  Following that
testimony, the prosecutor further attested that the defense
counsel had objected outside the presence of the jury to the
introduction of state exhibit 108, a color photograph of the
bullet wounds to George's head.  The prosecutor attested that the
trial court had overruled defendant's objection and also had
denied defendant's subsequent request that a black-and-white
photograph be substituted for that color photograph.  Finally,
the prosecutor averred that the state had called Dr. Gary Walter,
whose erased testimony concerned his qualifications as a forensic
pathologist licensed to practice in California.
In his response to the state's motion, defendant agreed
with the state that the erasure of the audiotape had been
inadvertent.  Defendant argued, however, that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to rule upon the state's motion because the
death-penalty review packet for defendant's case already had been
filed with this court.  See also ORAP 12.10(1), (3) (providing
that no notice of appeal is required and describing requirements
for death-penalty review packet).  Defendant also rejected the
state's offer to stipulate to an agreed narrative statement and
asserted that neither defense counsel nor defendant had
sufficient memory of the trial events to advise the trial court
"as to how the missing record can be adequately reconstructed."
At the hearing on the state's motion on January 27,
1998, the trial court rejected defendant's argument that it
lacked jurisdiction to supplement the record.  The trial court
also allowed the state's motion to supplement the record, stating
specifically:
"[The prosecutor's affidavit] corresponds to my
recollection of the testimony, the issues raised, and
the rulings of the Court.
"I cannot supplement that Affidavit with
specificity regarding the State and Federal
Constitutional grounds that the defense raised –- just
as [the prosecutor] has indicated in his cross-examination that he cannot –- other than to say that
every state and federal –- and [defense counsel's]
consistency and thoroughness and professionalism in –-
professionalism –- in citing both the State and Federal
grounds on each of [defense counsel's] objections was
routine during the trial and occurred, and I believe
occurred on these rulings also.
"As far as the victim impact statements or the
victim impact issue regarding what was admissible in
relation to the Scott George murder, his death, he was
not a victim in these proceedings.  [Defense counsel]
moved against that.  The State conceded that, and I
ruled that that would not come in; it didn't come in.
"As far as the Motion to Suppress, my clear
recollection, as far as the father's statements,
whether or not the father was an agent of the police
and needed to Mirandize, that no new legal grounds or
factual grounds were discovered during the trial
portion that had not been fully articulated in the
Motion to Suppress itself.
"I'm going through the Affidavit, which is the pause.  Regarding Deputy Mark Moore from the Oregon
intake center, this was the law enforcement person that
testified about the two feet of rope made from strips
of sheeting, bed sheets, I agree with [the
prosecutor's] Affidavit that there was one objection
made, and it was sustained.  And it was made by the
defense, and it was sustained as to whether or not
prisoners sometimes use ropes as weapons, and I
sustained that objection.  At that point I wasn't
concerned what other inmates did.
"I have nothing to add in relation to the
testimony of Shawn Harper beyond the Affidavit.  Again,
I find it is accurate.  I find the whole thing, the
whole Affidavit, is accurate.
"As far as the pictures were concerned, I ruled on
several pictures in this case, and I ruled that the
amount of pictures were not excessive; that they were
not unduly inflammatory, and once I ruled that way on
the color photos, there was no reason for me, then, to
want to insert or think that it was appropriate, in
their place, to put a black and white photo.
"The black and white photo, had it been available
–- I don't know if it was available or not –- I ruled
that I would not order a substitution of that.  Clearly
a black and white photo is less vivid and, perhaps,
less demonstrative than a color photo.
"I admitted the color photos because I did not
believe that they were unduly gruesome, inflammatory,
would not counter the balance of fairness that the law
requires in this case.  And they were not unduly
numerous in number, the photos that were received, and
that's the same ruling I made on all the photos.
"I did not tie that ruling to any particular
statutory, Constitutional, or evidentiary rule basis. 
It was just a fact decision that I made.  I recall that
the testimony of Dr. Gary Walter was the testimony that
–- which is on the record except for, I believe, the
first part of his describing his credentials and the –-
and I do not believe that his credentials were
challenged, and I firmly know that, had they been, I
would have recognized him as an expert because I
believe that it was clear that he was an expert; that
the balance of his testimony which is on the record is
the culmination of all the testimony regarding the
body, photographs, and all that stuff that led up, and
that is with us.
"That concludes what I'm going to say about that. 
Once again, I rule that I have jurisdiction to do this. 
I have it as Judge in this court; that the Affidavit
attached to the Motion to Supplement the Record by [the
prosecutor] is accurate; and that I will supplement the
record with that Affidavit and the comments that I have
just made."
After the trial court granted the state's motion to supplement
the record, the transcript settled without further objection. 
Defendant then filed a motion with this court titled "Objection
To Settling Transcript/Motion to Vacate Trial Court Order
Supplementing Transcript."  The state opposed that motion, and
this court denied it. (23)
On review, defendant repeats his argument that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to supplement the record after
the trial court clerk filed the death-penalty review packet
relating to defendant's case with this court.  Defendant also
argues that, in any event, this court should grant defendant a
new penalty trial under ORS 19.420(3) because the appellate
record is insufficient for the prosecution of an appeal of
defendant's death sentences.  For the reasons stated below, we
reject both defendant's arguments.
1. Trial Court's Authority to Supplement Record
We first address defendant's argument that the trial
court lacked authority to grant the state's motion to supplement
the record.  Former ORS 163.150(1)(g) (1997) provided that, when
a defendant is sentenced to death, "[t]he judgment of conviction
and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic and direct
review" by this court. (24)  ORAP 12.10 does not require a
defendant sentenced to death to file a notice of appeal, and,
instead, charges the trial court clerk with filing a packet with
the State Court Administrator that includes a copy of the
judgment of conviction and sentence of death, along with a
certificate and cover sheet providing information about the
underlying trial court proceeding.  
Defendant is correct in asserting that those provisions
vest this court with jurisdiction immediately upon entry of the
judgment of conviction and sentence of death.  Contrary to
defendant's arguments, however, that conclusion does not mean
that the trial court lacked authority to consider the state's
motion to supplement the transcript.  
ORAP 12.10(5) (25) prescribes the manner and the
timing for the preparation of a transcript of a trial court
proceeding resulting in the imposition of a death sentence.  That
rule provides that, as in other criminal appeals, the trial court
settles the transcript pursuant to ORS 138.185 and ORS 19.370. 
See also Fry v. Ashley, 228 Or 61, 71, 363 P2d 555 (1961) ("It is
elementary that it is the circuit court, not this court, which
determines the correctness of the transcript which comes to this
court on an appeal.").
In this case, the prosecutor filed the motion to
supplement the transcript pursuant to former ORS 19.370(3)
(1997). (26)  That statute provided, in part:
"Within 15 days after the transcript is filed, any
party may move the trial court for an order to correct
any errors appearing in the transcript or, where the
interests of justice require, to have additional parts
of the proceedings included in the transcript.  A copy
of any such motion shall be filed with the court to
which the appeal is made.  The trial court shall direct
the making of such corrections and the adding of such
matter as may be appropriate and shall fix the time
within which such corrections or additions shall be
made."
(Emphasis added.)  As the state
correctly notes, this court previously has construed the wording
in former ORS 19.370(3) to authorize the trial court to
supplement the record when the court reporter has failed to
record a trial court event.  See Fry, 228 Or at 73 ("If the
stipulation referred to was entered into during the trial, but
not taken down by the reporter, and the appellant wished to rely
upon it here, he could and should have moved the trial court to
have it 'included in the transcript' as 'additional parts of the
proceedings[.]'" (construing former ORS 19.078(3), renumbered as
ORS 19.370(3)).  Thus, consistently with former ORS 19.370(3)
(1997), the trial court had authority to include in the
transcript as "additional parts of the proceedings" the hearing
on the state's motion in which the trial court supplemented the
record with the prosecutor's affidavit and with the trial court's
own statements describing the trial court events that the erased
audiotape had recorded.
2. Defendant's Entitlement to a New Penalty Trial Under
ORS 19.420(3)    
Having concluded that the trial court had authority to
supplement the record in the manner that it did, we now consider
defendant's argument that this court nevertheless should grant
defendant a new penalty trial under ORS 19.420(3).  That statute
provides:  
"Whenever it appears that an appeal cannot be
prosecuted, by reason of the loss or destruction,
through no fault of the appellant, of the reporter's
notes or audio records, or of the exhibits or other
matter necessary to the prosecution of the appeal, the
judgment appealed from may be reversed and a new trial
ordered as justice may require."
In Smith v. Custom Micro, Inc., 311 Or 375, 811
P2d 1371 (1991), this court construed that same statute, then
numbered as former ORS 19.130(3), (27) to determine the
circumstances under which an appellate court should exercise its
discretion to grant an appellant a new trial under that
provision.  As an initial matter, the court observed that the
statute provides an appellate court with discretionary authority
to grant a new trial only when a record or exhibit necessary to
the prosecution of an appeal is destroyed and that destruction
occurred through no fault of the appellant.  Id. at 378.  In this
case, there is no dispute that both those statutory prerequisites
are met.  The question, instead, is whether this court should
exercise its discretion to grant defendant a new penalty trial in
light of the 90 minutes erased from the audio record of
defendant's penalty trial.
  In Smith, this court identified the considerations that guide an appellate court's discretion in deciding whether to
grant a new trial under ORS 19.420(3).  Specifically, this court
instructed that, to be entitled to a new trial under ORS
19.420(3), "[t]he appellant (1) must show due diligence in
attempting to find and supply a record for the purposes of
appeal; and (2) must make 'at least a prima facie showing of
error, or unfairness in the trial, or that there had been a
miscarriage of justice.'"  Id. at 379 (quoting Ethyl Corp. v.
Jalbert, 270 Or 651, 655, 529 P2d 368 (1974)). 
In this case, defendant contends that he has satisfied
both those criteria.  He first argues that defense counsel
attempted to reconstruct the record for purposes of appeal, but
lacked sufficient recall of the erased trial events to do so. 
Defendant also points to "inconsistencies" between the
prosecutor's affidavit and the trial court reporter's log of
trial events, and asserts that, as a result of the missing 90
minutes, appellate counsel and this court are precluded from
identifying possible errors that occurred during defendant's
penalty trial, including instances of prosecutorial misconduct,
instances of inadequate assistance of counsel, and instances of
trial court error.
After considering defendant's arguments, we are
unpersuaded that this is an instance in which we should exercise
our discretion under ORS 19.420(3) to grant a new trial.  The 90
minutes of erased audiotapes represented only a very short part
of defendant's penalty trial, and the trial court was able to
reconstruct a record of the lost trial events with considerable
detail.  Other than pointing to "inconsistencies" between the
prosecutor's affidavit and the trial court reporter's log,
defendant does not allege that the supplemental record that the
trial court added is not an accurate representation of the trial
events that the erased tape had recorded.  In addition, despite
his many suggestions of possible error, defendant fails to make a
persuasive argument that the missing transcript will prevent
review by this court of any error or miscarriage of justice that
actually occurred.  In sum, even assuming that defendant showed
due diligence in attempting to supply a record for purposes of
appeal, defendant is not entitled to a new penalty trial because
he has failed to make "a prima facie showing of error, or
unfairness in the trial, or that there had been a miscarriage of
justice."  Smith, 311 Or 379 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).  III.  CONCLUSION
In summary, we conclude that none of defendant's
assignments of error is well taken, except for one relating to
the entry of multiple aggravated murder convictions for each
victim.  Because the trial court erred by entering more than one
aggravated murder conviction for each victim, we remand the case
for entry of a corrected judgment of conviction to reflect defendant's guilt as to the charge of aggravated murder for each
victim based upon alternative aggravating factors.  We otherwise
affirm the judgment of conviction and the sentences of death.
The judgment of conviction and sentences of death are
affirmed.  The case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
1. This court's authority to review sentences of death now
is provided under ORS 138.012(1).
2. ORS 163.095 provides, in part:
"As used in ORS 163.105 and this section,
'aggravated murder' means murder as defined in ORS
163.115 which is committed under, or accompanied by,
any of the following circumstances:
"(1)(a) * * *
"(d) There was more than one murder victim in the
same criminal episode as defined in ORS 131.505.
"* * * * *
"(2)(a) * * * 
"(d) Notwithstanding ORS 163.115(1)(b), the
defendant personally and intentionally committed the
homicide under the circumstances set forth in ORS
163.115(1)(b)."
ORS 163.115(1) provides, in part:
"* * * * * 
"(b) When it is committed by a person, acting
either alone or with one or more persons, who commits
or attempts to commit any of the following crimes and
in the course of and in furtherance of the crime the
person is committing or attempting to commit, or during
the immediate flight therefrom, the person, or another
participant if there be any, causes the death of a
person other than one of the participants:
"* * * * *
"(G) Robbery in the first degree as defined in ORS
164.415[.]"
3. ORS 163.235(1) provides, in part: 
"A person commits the crime of kidnapping in the
first degree if the person violates ORS 163.225 with
any of the following purposes:
"* * * * * 
"(c) To cause physical injury to the victim[.]"
4. ORS 164.415(1) provides, in part:
"A person commits the crime of robbery in the
first degree if the person violates ORS 164.395 and the
person:
"(a) Is armed with a deadly weapon[.]"
5. In a death-penalty sentencing proceeding, ORS
163.150(1)(b) requires that a jury unanimously answer the
following four questions in the affirmative:
"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;
"(B) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society;
"(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased; and
"(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence."
The jury considers the third question set out in ORS
163.150(1)(b)(C), regarding provocation by the victim, only when
that question is relevant under the facts of the case.  See,
e.g., State v. Terry, 333 Or 163, 182-83 n 12, 37 P3d 157 (2001),
cert den, 536 US 910 (2002) (question set out in ORS
163.150(1)(b)(C) not submitted to jury).  In this case, the jury
did not consider the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(C) as
to either victim.
6. Defendant's counsel raised 24 of those assignments of
error.  With this court's permission, defendant filed a
supplemental pro se brief raising an additional assignment of
error.  Defendant also filed a pro se "Motion to Vacate Judgments
and Reverse Convictions."  This court construed that motion to be
another pro se supplemental brief.
7. In addition to the assignments of error that this court
previously has answered and the assignments of error discussed
below, defendant assigns error to a number of rulings that the
trial court made during his penalty trial, including:  (1) the
trial court's denial of his challenge to the composition of the
jury pool; (2) the trial court's denial of his motion for change
of venue; (3) the trial court's admission of four photographs of
the victims after their deaths; (4) the trial court's failure to
declare a mistrial sua sponte in response to statements regarding
defendant's failure to express remorse in the prosecutor's
opening and closing arguments; (5) the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion in limine to prohibit the prosecutor from
making statements regarding defendant's failure to express
remorse; and (6) the trial court's failure to grant defendant's
motion for a mistrial in response to the prosecutor's questioning
of Janis Lindsey, defendant's aunt, about defendant's failure to
express remorse for the murders.  We have examined each of those
rulings and conclude that the trial court did not err.  Further
discussion of those assignments of error would not benefit the
public, the bench, or the bar. 
8. Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution
provides, in part, that "[n]o ex-post facto law * * * shall ever
be passed * * *."  Article I, section 10, of the United States
Constitution similarly provides, in part, that "[n]o State shall * * * pass any * * * ex post facto Law * * *."
9. ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) provided:
"If constitutionally required, considering the
extent to which the defendant's character and
background, and the circumstances of the offense may
reduce the defendant's moral culpability or
blameworthiness for the crime, whether a sentence of
death be imposed."
The 1991 Legislative Assembly amended ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) to its
current wording in response to this court's decision in State v.
Wagner, 309 Or 5, 786 P2d 93, cert den, 498 US 879 (1990). 
10. Prior to the 1995 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(a), that
statute provided, in part, that, "[i]n the [aggravated murder
sentencing] proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any
matter that the court deems relevant to sentence[.]"  ORS
163.150(1)(a) (1993).
11. In addition to his ex post facto challenges, defendant
raises four other assignments of error relating to the admission
of victim-impact evidence under ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995) and ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) during his penalty trial.  In two of
those assignments of error, defendant raises numerous facial
constitutional challenges to ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995) and ORS
163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997), and also argues that the victim-impact
testimony of Lori Ellis and Karen Brown (the sister of Abdill)
was irrelevant under OEC 401 and was unfairly prejudicial under
both OEC 403 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 US 808, 825, 111 S Ct 2597, 115 L Ed 2d 720 (1991)
(although Eighth Amendment does not prohibit admission of victim-impact evidence, Due Process Clause protects against admission of
victim-impact evidence "so unduly prejudicial that it renders the
trial fundamentally unfair").  Defendant's facial constitutional
arguments raised in those assignments of error either have been
rejected in other decisions by this court or are not well taken. 
Defendant's challenges to the victim-impact testimony of Lori
Ellis and Karen Brown also are not well taken. 
  In another assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude
victim-impact testimony from Art George and Wendy Riley
(respectively, the father and the sister of Scott George) during
his penalty trial.  That assignment of error is moot, however,
because the state ultimately did not introduce victim-impact
testimony from either of those witnesses during the penalty
trial.  
Finally, in the last of those assignments of error,
defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion
for a mistrial based upon the victim-impact testimony of Karen
Brown.  We have reviewed that testimony and conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's
motion.  See State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 164, 786 P2d 161, cert
den, 498 US 879 (1990) (denial of motion for mistrial reviewed
for abuse of discretion).  Further discussion of the above-described assignments of error would not benefit the public, the
bench, or the bar. 
12. Defendant also asserts, without elaboration, that the
application of ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) to his penalty trial
violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, his rights to counsel under
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth
Amendment, his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment, and his rights under the privileges
and immunities clause of Article I, section 20, of the Oregon
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  In view of defendant's failure to develop arguments
in support of those assertions, we reject them without further
discussion.  See State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 604, 789 P2d 1352
(1990) (taking same approach in analogous circumstances).
13. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L
Ed 2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that a criminal
defendant must be advised of his or her right against compelled
self-incrimination and the derivative right to counsel under the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as a
prerequisite to a custodial interrogation.  Subsequent to that
decision, this court similarly required governmental officials to
inform a criminal defendant of those same rights in a custodial
interrogation as a procedural mechanism to protect a defendant's
rights under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. 
State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 744 P2d 250 (1987) (concluding that
Article I, section 12, is independent source of requirement for
warnings like those required under Miranda); see also State v.
Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 88-89, 672 P2d 1182 (1983) (if required by
Oregon Constitution, warnings like those required under Miranda
sufficient to satisfy Article I, section 12).  For ease of
reading, when we refer to those warnings relating to both the
Fifth Amendment and Article I, section 12, we refer to them
simply as "Miranda warnings." 
14. ORS 163.150(1)(a) provides, in part, that "[t]his
subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction
of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the
United States or of the State of Oregon[.]"
15. Article I, section 12, provides, in part, that "[n]o
person shall be * * * compelled in any criminal prosecution to
testify against himself."  The Fifth Amendment similarly
provides, in part, that "[n]o person * * * shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]"  The Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is made
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US 1, 8, 84 S Ct
1489, 12 L Ed 2d 653 (1964). 
16. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that "[n]o
State shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law[.]"  
17. Defendant also asserts that the police obtained his
statements in violation of his right to counsel under Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.  Contrary to defendant's
arguments, however, neither of those constitutional provisions
were applicable at the time when defendant made his disputed
statements.  See State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 259, 834 P2d 1008
(1992) (discussing scope of Article I, section 11); Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 US 625, 629-32, 106 L Ed 2d 631, 106 S Ct 1404
(1986) (discussing scope of Sixth Amendment).  
18. Kenneth Sr.'s ranch encompassed eight mine shafts and
one cave.
19. Although it concluded that Kenneth Sr. also had been
acting as an agent of the state during his interview with
defendant on December 13, the trial court ruled that defendant's
statements from that interview were admissible because the
detectives' recitation of Miranda warnings earlier that day was
"sufficient" for Kenneth Sr.'s interview.  That ruling is not at
issue before us on review.   
20. As noted above, the United States Supreme Court
expressly has held that the Fifth Amendment does not require that
a suspect be given Miranda warnings when "the suspect is
unaware that he [or she] is speaking to a law enforcement officer
and gives a voluntary statement."  Perkins, 496 US at 294.  Thus,
even if Kenneth Sr. had been acting as the state's agent, his
failure to give defendant Miranda warnings would not have
offended the Fifth Amendment.
21. Former ORS 161.062(1), repealed by Or Laws 1999,
chapter 136, section 1, provided:
"When the same conduct or criminal episode
violates two or more statutory provisions and each
provision requires proof of an element that the others
do not, there are as many separately punishable
offenses as there are separate statutory violations."
That sentence now appears in identical form in ORS 161.067(1).
22. ORS 19.380 provides:
"In lieu of or in addition to a transcript, the
parties may prepare an agreed narrative statement of
the proceedings below or parts thereof.  The narrative
statement shall be signed by the parties or their
attorneys and shall be filed with the trial court
administrator within 30 days after the filing of the
notice of appeal.  When such a statement is filed, the
appellant shall promptly notify the State Court
Administrator, at Salem."
23. In a separate assignment of error, defendant also
assigns error to this court's denial of defendant's motion
to vacate the trial court order supplementing the
transcript.  We construe defendant's argument to be a
request for reconsideration of that decision, and we deny
that request.
24. As noted previously, __ Or at __ n 1 (slip op at 1
n 1), the 1999 Legislative Assembly repealed former ORS
163.150(1)(g) (1997).  See Or Laws 1999, ch 1055, § 1. 
Death sentences now are subject to "automatic and direct
review" by this court under ORS 138.012(1). 
25. ORAP 12.10(5) (1997) provided:
"Service of a copy of the packet on a court
reporter shall be deemed to be an order by the trial
court that the court reporter immediately prepare a
transcript of all portions of the criminal proceeding
reported by that reporter, including all pre-trial
hearings but excluding selection of the jury.  If
either the state or the defendant desires that the
report of the jury selection proceedings be
transcribed, that party must apply to the Supreme Court
for an appropriate order, which will be made only upon
a showing of good cause for preparation of that
transcript.  A transcript shall meet the specifications
of Rule 3.35.  A transcript shall be filed within 60
days of the date the packet is served on the court
reporter.  If the court has allowed preparation of a
transcript of jury selection, the transcript shall be
due 30 days after the date of the order allowing the
transcript.  Transcripts shall be settled in the same
manner as on an appeal pursuant to ORS 138.185 and ORS
19.370."
This court amended ORAP 12.10(5) in 2005 to add subsection
numbering, but made no alterations to the substance of that rule.
26. The 2001 Legislative Assembly renumbered former ORS
19.370(3) to 19.370(5), but otherwise did not alter the wording
that is quoted above.  Or Laws 2001, ch 341, § 1.  Pursuant to
its authority under ORS 173.160, Legislative Counsel renumbered
former ORS 19.078 to 19.370 in 1997.  See ORS 173.160 (providing
that Legislative Counsel has authority to "renumber sections and
parts of sections of the Acts").
27. Pursuant to its authority under ORS 173.160,
Legislative Counsel renumbered former ORS 19.130(3) to ORS
19.420(3) in 1997.  See ORS 173.160 (providing that Legislative
Counsel has authority to "renumber sections and parts of sections
of the Acts").