Case Title: State ex rel. Sawicki v. Court of Common Pleas of Lucas Cty.

Citation: 2009-Ohio-1523

Docket Number: 20081160

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Sawicki v. Court of Common Pleas of Lucas Cty., 121 Ohio St.3d 507, 
2009-Ohio-1523.] 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SAWICKI, APPELLEE, v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF 
LUCAS COUNTY ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Sawicki v. Court of Common Pleas of Lucas Cty., 
 121 Ohio St.3d 507, 2009-Ohio-1523.] 
Procedendo — Appeal from judgment granting writ of procedendo to compel a 
common pleas court and judge to vacate a stay and proceed in underlying 
action — Court of appeals’ grant of writ reversed — Intervention — 
Nonparties who were denied intervention lacked standing to appeal merits 
of grant of procedendo. 
(No. 2008-1160 ─ Submitted February 3, 2009 ─ Decided April 8, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, 
No. L-07-1386, 2008-Ohio-2479. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a denial of a motion to intervene in a 
procedendo case and an appeal from a judgment granting a writ of procedendo to 
compel a common pleas court and its judge to vacate a stay and proceed in a 
pending medical-malpractice case.  Because Associated Physicians of MCO, Inc. 
(“Associated”) was denied intervention in the court of appeals, it lacks standing, 
and we dismiss the portion of its appeal that challenges the court’s issuance of the 
writ.  We affirm the judgment denying the motion to intervene.  On the appeal by 
the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County and Judge Gene A. Zmuda, because 
the court of appeals erred in granting summary judgment and issuing the writ of 
procedendo based upon an unargued and erroneous ground, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals granting the writ of procedendo and remand the 
cause to that court for further proceedings upon the parties’ motions for summary 
judgment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Common Pleas Case, Sawicki v. Temesy-Armos 
{¶ 2} The underlying case facts are alleged in the complaints filed by 
appellee, Henry J. Sawicki Jr.  In early October 2003, Sawicki was referred to the 
former Medical College of Ohio Hospital1 in Toledo by his primary-care 
physician after being diagnosed with atrial flutter.  He was prescribed 
anticoagulant medication by Peter N. Temesy-Armos, M.D., but this therapy 
stopped when he complained of severe pain in his right groin.  Sawicki’s 
anticoagulant therapy was interrupted a couple more times but was finally 
discontinued after a CT scan of his abdomen revealed internal bleeding.  Sawicki 
was then transferred to the hospital’s intensive care unit, where a neurologist 
noted that he had developed an unstable gait, a loss of sensation over the 
anterolateral thigh, and a decreased sensation of the inner thigh on the right side.  
After being discharged from the hospital, Sawicki continued to experience severe 
pain, impairment of function, and significant numbness of the leg.  He was 
eventually diagnosed with a proximal femoral nerve lesion causing atrophy of his 
leg. 
{¶ 3} In September 2004, Sawicki filed a medical-malpractice action in 
the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas against Dr. Temesy-Armos and 
appellant Associated Physicians of MCO, Inc. (“Associated”).  Sawicki’s 
complaint alleged a claim of medical negligence against Dr. Temesy-Armos and a 
claim of respondeat superior against Associated for the doctor’s alleged medical 
negligence.  During Sawicki’s treatment, Dr. Temesy-Armos was an employee of 
both the medical college and Associated. 
{¶ 4} In 2006, Judge Thomas J. Osowik dismissed Sawicki’s claims 
against Dr. Temesy-Armos because the doctor was a state employee at the time of 
the alleged malpractice, and the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction to 
                                                 
1.  According to appellant, this facility is now known as the University of Toledo Medical Center. 
January Term, 2009 
3 
determine whether Dr. Temesy-Armos was immune from liability.  Judge Osowik 
refused, however, to dismiss Associated from the case because even if Dr. 
Temesy-Armos was immune, Associated, which was his private employer, could 
still be liable for his actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
{¶ 5} The case was subsequently dismissed without prejudice and refiled 
in the common pleas court.  On August 24, 2007, Judge Zmuda issued an entry 
staying the remaining respondeat superior claim against Associated “pending a 
ruling from the Ohio Court of Claims as to whether Dr. Temesy Armos was 
acting within the scope of employment with [the Medical College of Ohio] at the 
time he rendered treatment to [Sawicki] and subject to personal immunity as a 
state employee.” 
Procedendo Case 
{¶ 6} In November 2007, Sawicki filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Lucas County for a writ of procedendo to compel appellants Lucas 
County Court of Common Pleas and Judge Zmuda to vacate the stay and proceed 
to judgment on his claim against Associated.  The court of appeals denied 
Associated’s motion to intervene.  Sawicki filed a motion for summary judgment, 
and the common pleas court and Judge Zmuda filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment. 
{¶ 7} In May 2008, the court of appeals granted Sawicki’s motion for 
summary judgment, denied the cross-motion for summary judgment, and granted 
a writ of procedendo ordering Judge Zmuda to vacate the stay and proceed in the 
underlying medical-malpractice case. 
{¶ 8} This case is now before us upon Associated’s appeal, the common 
pleas court and Judge Zmuda’s appeal, and Sawicki’s motion to dismiss 
Associated’s appeal. 
Motion to Dismiss Associated’s Appeal:  Denial of Motion to Intervene 
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{¶ 9} On June 16, 2008, Associated filed a notice of appeal from both 
the court of appeals’ January 14, 2008 entry denying its motion to intervene in the 
procedendo action and the May 22, 2008 judgment granting the writ of 
procedendo. 
{¶ 10} Sawicki has filed a motion to dismiss Associated’s appeal.  He first 
argues that insofar as Associated challenges the entry denying its motion to 
intervene, Associated’s appeal was not filed within the applicable period after the 
January 14, 2008 entry.  The Supreme Court Rules of Practice govern appeals 
from a court of appeals to the Supreme Court.  State ex rel. Sautter v. Grey, 117 
Ohio St.3d 465, 2008-Ohio-1444, 884 N.E.2d 1062, ¶ 19.  “To perfect an appeal 
from a court of appeals to the Supreme Court, * * * the appellant shall file a 
notice of appeal in the Supreme Court within 45 days from the entry of the 
judgment being appealed.”  S.Ct.Prac.R. II(2)(A)(1)(a).  If an appeal is filed more 
than 45 days after the entry of the judgment being appealed, it is untimely and 
must be dismissed.  See, e.g., State v. Williams, 116 Ohio St.3d 1516, 2008-Ohio-
497, 880 N.E.2d 924. 
{¶ 11} Appeals as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court in 
cases originating in courts of appeals, including actions involving extraordinary 
writs.  Section 2(B)(2)(a)(i), Article IV, Ohio Constitution; State ex rel. Scruggs 
v. Sadler, 97 Ohio St.3d 78, 2002-Ohio-5315, 776 N.E.2d 101, ¶ 4.  “R.C. 
2505.03 restricts the appellate jurisdiction of this court to the review of final 
orders, judgments, or decrees.”  State ex rel. Downs v. Panioto, 107 Ohio St.3d 
347, 2006-Ohio-8, 839 N.E.2d 911, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 12} Sawicki claims that because the court of appeals’ denial of 
Associated’s motion to intervene was a final, appealable order, Associated was 
required to appeal the court’s decision within 45 days of its entry on January 14, 
2008, but failed to do so.  Sawicki contends that the denial of the motion to 
January Term, 2009 
5 
intervene is a final, appealable order because it affects a substantial right in an 
action that in effect determines the action. 
{¶ 13} “R.C. 2505.02 defines a final order for purposes of appeal.”  
Downs, 107 Ohio St.3d 347, 2006-Ohio-8, 839 N.E.2d 911, ¶ 18.  Under R.C. 
2505.02(B)(1), “[a]n order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, 
modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is * * * [a]n order that 
affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and 
prevents a judgment.” 
{¶ 14} “There is no authority to support the general proposition that [the 
denial of a] motion to intervene always constitutes a final, appealable order.”  
Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St.3d 514, 2007-Ohio-607, 861 
N.E.2d 519, ¶ 36.  Although intervention constitutes a substantial right under R.C. 
2505.02(A)(1), “[t]he denial of a motion to intervene, when the purpose for which 
intervention was sought may be litigated in another action, does not affect a 
substantial right under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) that determines the action and prevents 
the judgment.”  Id. at ¶ 29 and paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 15} Associated sought to intervene in the procedendo case because “a 
decision in favor of [Sawicki] on his Complaint in Procedendo would impair or 
impede its ability to protect its interest in the underlying” medical-malpractice 
case.  But Associated could litigate the substance of the medical-malpractice case 
in that case.  In fact, in Sawicki’s memorandum in opposition to Associated’s 
motion to intervene, he conceded that resolution of the procedendo case would 
not “in [any way] impair or impede [Associated’s] ability to protect its interests in 
the underlying litigation.” 
{¶ 16} In addition, “[f]or an order to determine the action, it must dispose 
of the merits of the cause or some separate and distinct branch thereof and leave 
nothing for the determination of the court.”  VIL Laser Sys., L.L.C. v. Shiloh 
Industries, Inc., 119 Ohio St.3d 354, 2008-Ohio-3920, 894 N.E.2d 303, ¶ 8.  The 
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court of appeals’ denial of Associated’s motion to intervene did not dispose of the 
merits of either the procedendo case or the underlying medical-malpractice case 
or a distinct branch of either. 
{¶ 17} Therefore, because the entry denying its motion to intervene did 
not constitute a final, appealable order, Associated timely challenges that entry in 
its appeal.  We thus deny Sawicki’s motion to dismiss to the extent it challenges 
Associated’s appeal from the denial of its motion to intervene. 
Motion to Dismiss Associated’s Appeal:  Judgment on the Merits 
{¶ 18} Sawicki also seeks to dismiss that portion of Associated’s appeal 
that challenges the propriety of the court of appeals’ issuance of the writ of 
procedendo.  It is well settled that “an appeal from the denial of a motion to 
intervene is limited solely to the issue of intervention.”  State ex rel. Montgomery 
v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-963, 2003-Ohio-2658, ¶ 33; Tomrob, Inc. v. 
Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. (Sept. 11, 1997), 8th Dist. Nos. 71596 and 71688, 
1997 WL 565971, * 3 (appeal from denial of a motion to intervene “is limited 
solely to the issue of intervention, not the merits of the underlying appeal”); 
Fouche v. Denihan (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 120, 126, 583 N.E.2d 457; cf. 
Southside Community Dev. Corp. v. Levin, 116 Ohio St.3d 1209, 2007-Ohio-
6665, 878 N.E.2d 1048, ¶ 11 (“We hold that a person’s assertion that it has a legal 
right to be a party to the BTA appeal makes it a ‘party’ * * * for one limited 
purpose:  to seek the court’s determination of whether the asserted right exists”).  
As a nonparty, Associated lacks standing to challenge the court of appeals’  
determination on the merits.  Montgomery at ¶ 33. 
{¶ 19} Associated’s reliance on our decision in State ex rel. Bd. of State 
Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis, 113 Ohio St.3d 410, 2007-Ohio-2205, 
865 N.E.2d 1289, to avoid the foregoing precedent is misplaced because in that 
case, we did not decide whether nonparties who had been denied intervention 
lacked standing to appeal the merits of the procedendo case.  Instead, our 
January Term, 2009 
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disposition of the case rendered moot any decision concerning the motions to 
intervene.  Id. at ¶ 51. 
{¶ 20} Therefore, we grant Sawicki’s motion in part and dismiss that 
portion of Associated’s appeal that challenges the court of appeals’ grant of the 
writ of procedendo. 
Associated’s Appeal:  Denial of Motion to Intervene 
{¶ 21} On that portion of Associated’s appeal that is properly before us, 
the court of appeals did not err by denying Associated’s motion to intervene 
because Associated did not file any pleading with its motion.  State ex rel. Citizen 
Action for a Livable Montgomery v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 437, 2007-Ohio-5379, 875 N.E.2d 902, ¶ 22.  “Civ.R. 24(C) requires that 
any * * * motion [to intervene] be accompanied by a pleading ‘setting forth the 
claim or defense for which intervention is sought.’ ”  Tatman v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 102 Ohio St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 11; see 
generally State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106, 2003-Ohio-2506, 
789 N.E.2d 203, ¶ 12, fn. 1, and cases cited therein.  Although the court of 
appeals did not rely on this ground in its decision denying Associated’s motion to 
intervene, “ ‘[r]eviewing courts are not authorized to reverse a correct judgment 
on the basis that some or all of the lower court’s reasons are erroneous.’ ”  
Goudlock v. Voorhies, 119 Ohio St.3d 398, 2008-Ohio-4787, 894 N.E.2d 692, ¶ 
12, quoting State ex rel. McGrath v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 100 Ohio St.3d 72, 
2003-Ohio-5062, 796 N.E.2d 526, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 22} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals denying 
Associated’s motion to intervene. 
Appeal of Lucas County Court of Common Pleas and Judge Zmuda 
{¶ 23} In their appeal, the named respondents in the procedendo action, 
the common pleas court and Judge Zmuda (“judicial appellants”), assert that the 
court of appeals erred in granting the writ of procedendo.  The judicial appellants 
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initially assert that the court of appeals erred in granting summary judgment 
because the decision was based upon an argument that was not raised in Sawicki’s 
motion for summary judgment.  The court of appeals granted Sawicki’s summary-
judgment motion and granted the writ of procedendo based on its holding that in 
the underlying medical-malpractice case, Sawicki sought a declaratory judgment, 
which the judicial appellants had jurisdiction to determine within the exception 
specified in R.C. 2743.03(A)(2): 
{¶ 24} “In our view, when a plaintiff sues a dual-status employee (both 
privately and state employed) solely upon the basis of the defendant’s non-state 
employee status, then the initial determination of the employee’s status during the 
alleged injury becomes more in the nature of a declaratory judgment.  * * * 
{¶ 25} “In this case, relator’s complaint in the trial court sought recovery 
only from Associated Physicians and Dr. Temesy-Armos on the basis of his 
private employment.  Thus, the determination of the scope of his private 
employment status is within the exceptions provided by R.C. 2743.03(A)(2) and no 
prejudice will occur to the state.  As a result, we conclude that the Court of 
Claims does not have exclusive jurisdiction and [Judge Zmuda] retains 
jurisdiction to determine the employment status of Dr. Temesy-Armos.  
Therefore, [Judge Zmuda] improperly granted a stay, pending such determination 
by the Court of Claims.”  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Sawicki v. Court of 
Common Pleas of Lucas Cty., Lucas App. No. L-07-1386, 2008-Ohio-2479, ¶ 7-8. 
{¶ 26} The court of appeals erred in so holding.  Sawicki did not raise a 
declaratory judgment or R.C. 2743.03(A)(2) argument in his motion for summary 
judgment or in his reply to the judicial appellants’ memorandum in opposition and 
cross-motion for summary judgment. 
{¶ 27} As the same court of appeals has itself long recognized, “[i]t is 
reversible error to award summary judgment on grounds not specified in the 
motion for summary judgment.”  See Patterson v. Ahmed, 176 Ohio App.3d 596, 
January Term, 2009 
9 
2008-Ohio-362, 893 N.E.2d 198, ¶ 14, and the various Sixth District Court of 
Appeals cases cited therein; see also Ranallo v. First Energy Corp., 11th Dist. No. 
2005-L-187, 2006-Ohio-6105, ¶ 26; Butler v. Harper, 9th Dist. No. 21051, 2002-
Ohio-5029, ¶ 28.  By relying on an unargued summary-judgment ground, the 
court of appeals denied the judicial appellants a meaningful opportunity to 
respond.  See Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798, 
syllabus (“A party seeking summary judgment must specifically delineate the 
basis upon which summary judgment is sought in order to allow the opposing 
party a meaningful opportunity to respond”). 
{¶ 28} Moreover, even if that ground had been argued in Sawicki’s 
motion for summary judgment, the court of appeals’ reliance on it to grant the 
requested extraordinary relief in procedendo would have been erroneous.  Under 
Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, “[s]uits may be brought against the 
state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.”  In 1975, 
the “General Assembly enacted legislation [R.C. Chapter 2743, the Court of 
Claims Act] creating the Court of Claims and specifying the forum and manner in 
which actions may be brought against the state and its officers and employees.”  
Conley v. Shearer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 286, 595 N.E.2d 862.  “Under the 
Court of Claims Act, the state ‘waives its immunity from liability’ and ‘consents 
to be sued’ in the Court of Claims.”  Johns v. Univ. of Cincinnati Med. Assocs., 
Inc., 101 Ohio St.3d 234, 2004-Ohio-824, 804 N.E.2d 19, ¶ 16, quoting R.C. 
2743.02(A)(1). 
{¶ 29} R.C. 2743.03(A)(2) provides that if the claimant in a civil action 
against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in R.C. 2743.02 
“also files a claim for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or other equitable 
relief against the state that arises out of the same circumstances that gave rise to 
the civil action described in division (A)(1) of this section, the court of claims has 
exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear and determine that claim in that civil 
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action.”  R.C. 2743.03(A)(2) recognizes an exception to the foregoing general 
provision:  “This division does not affect, and shall not be construed as affecting, 
the original jurisdiction of another court of this state to hear and determine a civil 
action in which the sole relief that the claimant seeks against the state is a 
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or other equitable relief.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 30} In granting the writ of procedendo, the court of appeals held that a 
resolution of Sawicki’s underlying medical-malpractice case required a 
determination of an issue in the nature of a declaratory judgment that fit within 
the R.C. 2743.02(A)(2) exception to the general rule that cases brought against 
the state be initially brought in the Court of Claims.  But Sawicki’s medical-
malpractice case does not seek a declaratory judgment as the “sole relief.”  
Instead, Sawicki seeks monetary damages.  In addition, as the underlying case is 
now limited to his claim against Associated, he does not seek relief against the 
state. 
{¶ 31} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Sawicki on this unargued and incorrect basis. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment granting the writ 
of procedendo and remand the cause to the court of appeals for further 
proceedings  based upon the parties’ motions and evidence.  In so holding, we 
also deny Associated’s motion for oral argument because the parties’ briefs are 
sufficient to resolve the dispositive issues in the present appeal.  See Rosen v. 
Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241, 2008-Ohio-853, 883 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 11 
(“notwithstanding the parties’ contentions that this case raises issues of first 
impression and great public importance, the parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve 
the legal issues”). 
Judgment accordingly. 
January Term, 2009 
11 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 33} I respectfully dissent from the decision to remand this matter for 
further proceedings.  Instead, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and deny the writ; grant the motion of Associated Physicians of MCO, Inc. 
(“Associated”), to intervene; and hold that Judge Zmuda correctly stayed the 
action because the Court of Claims has exclusive original jurisdiction under 
R.C.2473.02(F) to decide the issue of Dr. Temesy-Armos’s status as a state 
employee at the time of the alleged negligence. 
{¶ 34} I agree that the denial of the motion to intervene was not a final, 
appealable order; however, I believe that the court of appeals should have 
permitted Associated to intervene.  If Associated can appeal only the denial of 
intervention, while the remaining parties proceed to the merits, Associated would 
be left with a hollow victory and no voice in the actual debate — an illogical 
result.  I believe that State ex rel. Bd. of State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. 
Davis, 113 Ohio St.3d 410, 2007-Ohio-2205, 865 N.E.2d 1289, is persuasive.  In 
that case, we determined that any error by the court of appeals in denying the 
motions to intervene was not prejudicial because the interveners’ motions to 
dismiss would not have warranted a different result. Thus, the issue of 
intervention was moot.  Id. at ¶ 51.  Here, I believe that Associated’s motion to 
intervene was not moot, and we should consider the merits of its appeal. 
{¶ 35} As for the portion of Associated’s appeal before the court, I 
disagree with the court’s conclusion to deny intervention because Associated did 
not file a pleading with its motion.  Associated did file a responsive pleading 
under Civ.R. 7(A) on January 4, 2008, that sufficiently addressed the issues.   
 
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{¶ 36} I believe we have plenary authority in extraordinary actions to 
consider this appeal as if it had been filed in this court originally.  State ex rel. 
Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-4798, 874 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 9.  
The parties have adequately briefed the issue of whether Judge Zmuda had the 
authority to stay the action in the court of common pleas until the Court of Claims 
decided the issue of Dr. Temesy-Armos’s status as a state employee.  Therefore, I 
would decide this case on the merits and deny the writ on the basis that Sawicki 
must first seek a determination in the Court of Claims as to Dr. Temesy-Armos’s 
status before Sawicki may proceed in the common pleas court on a theory of 
respondent superior against Associated. 
{¶ 37} There is no dispute that Dr. Temsey-Armos was a state employee.  
However, Sawicki is claiming that the doctor had dual employment, thus 
implicating the liability of Associated.  The Court of Claims has exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine whether the doctor was acting in the scope of 
employment with the state at the time of the alleged negligence.  Johns v. Univ. of 
Cincinnati Med. Assoc., Inc., 101 Ohio St.3d 234, 2004-Ohio-824, 804 N.E.2d 19. 
{¶ 38} I believe that Sawicki filed his action in the court of common pleas 
only because he failed to timely file in the Court of Claims and is now trying to 
circumvent the statute of limitations.  Even if the statute of limitations has 
expired, a court of common pleas lacks original jurisdiction to determine the issue 
of state employment.  Furthermore, a party may not waive such a determination 
by the Court of Claims.  See State ex rel. Sanquily v. Court of Common Pleas of 
Lucas Cty. (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 78, 573 N.E.2d 606.  In that case, the court of 
appeals rejected a similar attempt to avoid filing in the Court of Claims.  Sanquily 
had alleged that the doctor in the underlying civil case was a state employee and a 
loaned servant to a private hospital at the time of the malpractice.  The doctor 
filed an action for prohibition to prevent the Lucas County Court of Common 
January Term, 2009 
13 
Pleas from proceeding in the underlying case until the Court of Claims decided 
the issue of immunity.  In allowing the writ, this court stated:   
{¶ 39} “Irrespective of whether Sanquily was a ‘loaned servant,’ he was 
employed by the state when the cause of action arose.  He was therefore an 
‘officer or employee’ of the state for purposes of R.C. 2743.02(F).  We therefore 
hold that the common pleas court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the merits of the 
case is unauthorized by law until the Court of Claims decides whether Sanquily is 
immune from suit. 
{¶ 40} “ * * *  
{¶ 41} “R.C. 2743.02(F) vests exclusive original jurisdiction in the Court 
of Claims to determine whether Sanquily is immune from suit.  Until that court 
decides whether Sanquily is immune, the common pleas court is totally without 
jurisdiction over the litigation against him.  Accordingly, Sanquily is entitled to a 
writ prohibiting the common pleas court from exercising jurisdiction over the 
merits of the case until the Court of Claims has decided whether he is entitled to 
personal immunity under R.C. 9.86 and whether the common pleas court has 
jurisdiction over the malpractice action.”  Id. at 79-81, 573 N.E.2d 606. 
{¶ 42} Any liability imputed to Associated would arise only under a 
theory of respondent superior based on the negligence of Dr. Temesy-Armos 
while acting within the scope of his employment as a private physician.  
Regardless of whether Sawicki is pursuing an action against the state, only the 
Court of Claims may determine Dr. Temesy-Armos’s employment status at the 
time of the alleged negligence – whether a state employee or a private physician.  
Sawicki cannot circumvent a determination by the Court of Claims merely by 
proceeding only against Associated. 
{¶ 43} In Conley v. Shearer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 595 N.E.2d 862, 
we rejected Conley’s attempt to avoid filing in the Court of Claims even when he 
had filed an affidavit waiving his claims against the state in an attempt to maintain 
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his action against a state employee in the court of common pleas.  “Although 
Conley has waived any claim he had against the state, Shearer is still entitled to 
any immunity from suit that may exist.  Such a rule bars plaintiffs with claims 
against state officers and employees from waiving claims against the state in the 
hope of maintaining an action against the officer or employee individually, 
thereby avoiding the jurisdictional prerequisite of R.C. 2743.02(F).  Only after the 
Court of Claims determines that a state employee acted outside the scope of his or 
her employment or acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or 
reckless manner may a plaintiff bring an action against the employee in a court of 
common pleas.”  Id. at 288. 
{¶ 44} In conclusion, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and deny the writ.  I also would grant Associated’s motion to intervene.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
Barkan & Robon, Ltd., James M. Tuschman, and R. Ethan Davis, for 
appellee. 
 
Marshall & Melhorn, L.L.C., Elizabeth E. Baer, and Kristen A. Connelly, 
for appellant Associated Physicians of MCO, Inc. 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and John A. Borell, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellants Court of Common Pleas of Lucas 
County and Judge Gene A. Zmuda. 
______________________