Case Title: VERNON EDGAR CYR v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PLATTE COUNTY, A Political Subdivision in the State of Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-87

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-10-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
VERNON EDGAR CYR v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PLATTE COUNTY, A Political Subdivision in the State of Wyoming1989 WY 184780 P.2d 986Case Number: 89-87Decided: 10/06/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming

VERNON EDGAR CYR, APPELLANT, 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

BOARD OF COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF PLATTECOUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION IN THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE, (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, PlatteCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Robert T. Moxley 
of Whitehead, Gage & Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Richard Boley of 
Lathrop, Rutledge & Boley, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Vernon Edgar 
Cyr challenges an order granting summary judgment to appellee, Board of County 
Commissioners of PlatteCounty (County), in his action for 
overtime compensation. Cyr's primary argument is that the oral contract by which 
he and his wife (not a party to the action) provided jailer and matron services 
to Platte County violates W.S. 27-5-101 (June 1987 Repl.) and is therefore void. 
On that assumption Cyr then asserts that he is entitled to a remedy of 
compensation for hours worked beyond eight hours a day and forty hours a week. 
After careful review of the record, we hold that summary judgment was 
proper.

[¶2.]     
Affirmed.

[¶3.]     The facts are not in 
dispute. Vernon Edgar Cyr and his then wife provided jailer and matron services 
to PlatteCounty for 19 1/2 months 
beginning on June 30, 1983. The parties agreed that the Cyrs would provide 
24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week coverage for the jail. If they were absent for 
more than a short time they were to provide a substitute jailer at their own 
expense. Under the agreement the Cyrs received $2500 a month and living quarters 
in the Platte County Courthouse in return for their 
services.

[¶4.]     The PlatteCounty attorney prepared a written 
contract after the Cyrs undertook their responsibilities, but Cyr never signed 
it. Cyr rejected the contract as drafted because he felt that he should have 
more autonomy from the sheriff, that he should not have to assist in 
transporting prisoners, and, most importantly, that the County should provide 
liability insurance to cover jail operations. Although Cyr expressed his 
willingness to sign a contract if the County was responsible for the liability 
insurance, which was ultimately the case, a new contract was not 
prepared.

[¶5.]     Nevertheless, Cyr and 
his then wife continued performing the agreed upon services for the next year 
and one half in return for the living quarters and $2500 a month. At the time 
Cyr entered into the agreement with the County he understood the duties and 
responsibilities of the position, and believed it was a "good job." Cyr 
subsequently tried unsuccessfully to negotiate for more money, but continued to 
perform the duties after his requests were rejected.

[¶6.]     The County sent Cyr to 
courses and seminars on jail management where he learned how other jails were 
being operated. As a result, he became concerned about overtime hours and 
minimum wage requirements, and he calculated that he was receiving less than the 
minimum wage. Cyr asked the County to institute eight hour shifts in the jail, 
but this was not done; later on he left the jailer position 
voluntarily.

[¶7.]     Cyr initially filed a 
complaint against the County in mid-1986, alleging violation of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Cyr then filed the complaint in 
issue in July, 1988, alleging violation of W.S. 27-5-101. The district court 
granted the County's motion for summary judgment in March, 1989, and this appeal 
followed.

[¶8.]     Summary judgment is 
properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and judgment 
for the prevailing party was proper as a matter of law. Johnson v. Anderson, 768 P.2d 18, 23 (Wyo. 1989). We consider appeals of summary 
judgment using our well-established standard of review, "view[ing] the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, [and] 
giving him all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts." Milligan 
v. Big Valley Corporation, 754 P.2d 1063, 1068 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶9.]     The district court 
granted summary judgment for the County because it was unable to find any legal 
basis for Cyr's claim for overtime compensation. The district court noted that 
Cyr was fully informed of his responsibilities, hours of employment, and the 
compensation he would receive, and that the County had made no 
misrepresentations. Further, it found that Wyoming has no overtime or minimum wage law, 
including specifically W.S. 27-5-101, that applies to these facts. Finally, it 
rejected a quantum meruit claim because Cyr did not plead an implied contract or 
allege facts that would support it.

[¶10.]  Cyr argues initially that he was a county 
employee rather than an independent contractor, and therefore his employment was 
subject to W.S. 27-5-101. He asserts that the contract with the County is void 
because it was in violation of what he argues is a prohibition of uncompensated 
overtime in the statute.

[¶11.]  It is not necessary however to establish 
whether or not Cyr was an employee of the County. Even if he was, W.S. 27-5-101 
does not offer Cyr the protection that he would read into it. The statute 
neither prohibits work in excess of eight hours a day, nor mandates overtime 
compensation for all work in excess of eight hours a day, or 40 hours a week. 
Consequently, the parties' oral contract is valid whether or not W.S. 27-5-101 
applies to its terms.

[¶12.]  Cyr relies on language in W.S. 27-5-101, 
which reads, in pertinent part:

(a) The period of 
employment of state and county employees is eight (8) hours per day and forty 
(40) hours per week which constitute a lawful day's and week's work 
respectively.

(b) Except for employees 
whose maximum salary is limited by statute, any state or county employee may be 
compensated at a rate one and one-half (1 1/2) times their regular compensation 
for each hour of service required to be performed because of emergency 
situations in excess of eight (8) hours per day and forty (40) hours per week. 
If overtime compensation is paid pursuant to this section, no additional 
benefits, such as compensatory time off, shall be allowed to the employee 
receiving the overtime compensation.

(c) Overtime compensation 
may only be authorized by the appropriate employing governing body subject to 
the following:

* * * * * 
*

(iv) For county employees 
pursuant to rules and regulations of the respective boards of county 
commissioners.

Cyr contends 
that subsection (a) prohibits employment of more than eight hours per day, 
unless it is for emergency purposes under subsection (b), in which case he 
argues that overtime pay is mandatory. He evidently claims that his employment 
was covered by the emergency situation language, entitling him to mandatory 
overtime compensation.

[¶13.]  By giving effect to all sections of the 
statute and giving words their ordinary meaning, we find the purpose and 
direction of W.S. 27-5-101 is clear. Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300, 1305 
(Wyo. 1988). 
It is not necessary to resort to construction or interpretation where the 
meaning is plain. State Board of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil Company, 694 P.2d 97, 99 (Wyo. 
1985). This statute simply establishes the standard intervals of full-time 
employment for state and county employees, and makes provision for overtime 
compensation for emergency service beyond those intervals if appropriate rules 
and regulations have been provided governing its 
authorization.

[¶14.]  Nothing in W.S. 27-5-101(a) prohibits an 
employee from voluntarily working more than eight hours per day. Subsection (a) 
simply establishes the eight-hour day and the forty-hour week as the standard 
intervals of full-time employment. Greub v. Frith, 717 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo. 1986). These 
intervals are the maximum that an employer may require of employees except in 
emergencies. An employer may require fewer hours, and an employee may volunteer 
more time. Eight-hour laws such as W.S. 27-5-101(a) are distinct from statutes 
setting maximum hours of labor, and do not prohibit employment contracts which 
set a different interval as full-time employment. State v. A.H. Read Co., 33 
Wyo. 387, 410, 240 P. 208, 215 (1925); 
Schoonover v. City of Viroqua, 244 Wis. 615, 12 N.W.2d 912, 
913-14 (1944). See also 48A Am.Jur.2d, Labor and Labor Relations, §§ 2636-37 
(1979).

[¶15.]  Although subsection (b) does address 
overtime pay for emergency service, it does not make overtime compensation 
mandatory. Subsection (b) states that overtime may be required of state or 
county employees in emergency circumstances, and that the appropriate governing 
body may pay overtime compensation of one and one-half times the employee's 
regular rate of compensation. This subsection must be read in conjunction with 
subsection (c), which establishes prerequisites for the authorization of 
overtime. For county employees, as provided in W.S. 27-5-101(c)(iv), the 
respective board of county commissioners must have adopted rules and regulations 
governing overtime compensation before any such compensation can be authorized. 
Cyr ignores this prerequisite of subsection (c)(iv) rules and regulations, as he 
must, since none had been adopted by the County.

[¶16.]  Cyr then argues that "may be compensated" 
in subsection (b) should be read as "shall be compensated." He relies on Board 
of County Commissioners of County of 
Fremont v. State ex rel. Miller, 369 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 
1962), but that case addressed a different situation. In County of Fremont this 
court held that the word "may" in a statute means "shall" in cases where public 
interests or rights are involved, or a public duty is imposed on public 
officers, and public or third persons have a de jure claim that the power shall 
be exercised. Id. at 542 (quoting Burnham Hotel 
Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 30 Wyo. 458, 465, 222 P. 1 
(1924)).

[¶17.]  A public interest was involved in 
County of 
Fremont, namely maintaining 
unobstructed public roads, and a de jure claim existed based in the statutory 
grant of authority. That is not true in Cyr's case. If W.S. 27-5-101 creates a 
right it does so only after the County has exercised its discretion and 
established rules governing the authorization of overtime pay. Without an 
overtime authorization policy there is simply no de jure claim to overtime 
compensation. Without a de jure claim "may" will not be read as commanding 
action. Instead, "[a]s a general rule, the word `may' when used in a statute is 
permissive only and operates to confer discretion". Appeal of Hamilton Pipeline 
Co., 65 Wyo. 
350, 202 P.2d 184, 188 (1949).

[¶18.]  Consequently, there is no foundation in 
W.S. 27-5-101 on which to construct a claim for additional compensation where, 
as here: 1) the employee voluntarily enters into an agreement to work more than 
eight hours a day and forty hours a week; or, 2) the County has not established 
rules and regulations governing authorization of overtime pay for emergency 
services.

[¶19.]  The district court correctly found that 
Cyr had no other legal basis for recovering additional compensation from the 
County. The record establishes that he entered the agreement knowingly, 
understanding the duties required and the compensation offered. While there was 
a disagreement over the liability insurance term in the written contract 
prepared by the County, the County made no misrepresentations, and Cyr performed 
his part of the bargain and accepted the agreed upon compensation for 
approximately twenty months. The district court also rejected a quantum meruit 
claim, correctly concluding that Cyr failed to plead implied contract or allege 
sufficient facts to support the claim. Pancratz Corp. v. Kloefkorn-Ballard 
Construction/Development, Inc., 720 P.2d 906 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶20.]  The employment contract between Cyr and 
the County did not violate W.S. 27-5-101 in any respect, and he entered into it 
with full knowledge of its terms. Both parties received the benefit of their 
bargain. AppelleeCounty was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, and the summary judgment was properly granted. 
Accordingly, we affirm.