Case Title: Ex Parte Coleman

Citation: 705 So. 2d 392

Docket Number: 1960680

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1997-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
705 So. 2d 392 (1997)
Ex parte Osmund A. COLEMAN.
(In re Osmund A. COLEMAN v. Michael A. HARPER).
1960680.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 1, 1997.
*393 J. Garrison Thompson of Pitts, Pitts & Thompson, Selma, for petitioner.
Bobby H. Cockrell, Jr., of Cockrell & Cockrell, Tuscaloosa; and John M. Karrh, Tuscaloosa, of counsel, for respondent.
HOUSTON, Justice.
On July 14, 1994, Michael Anthony Harper was injured when he tried to reposition an outside air conditioning unit located on the house he rented from Osmund A. Coleman. Harper sued Coleman, alleging that Coleman had negligently or wantonly installed, or had negligently or wantonly had someone else install an air conditioning unit in the home Harper leased from Coleman and that Harper was injured as a result. The trial court entered a summary judgment for Coleman, holding that as a lessor Coleman was not liable for injuries caused by latent defects that were not known to him at the time he leased the home to Harper. The Court of Civil Appeals, in a three-to-one decision, with Judge Crawley dissenting and Judge Thigpen recused, reversed and remanded, writing as follows:
Harper v. Coleman, 705 So. 2d 388, 391 (Ala. Civ.App.1996). (Citations omitted.) Coleman petitioned for certiorari review, which we granted.
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the burden to make a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P.; Willingham v. United Insurance Co. of America, 642 So. 2d 428 (Ala. 1994). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating a fact question. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12. "[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).
On June 2, 1994, Harper and his wife, Theresa Renee Harper, rented a house in Greensboro, Alabama, from Osmund A. Coleman. Mrs. Harper handled the rental negotiations, but she never discussed with anyone Coleman's responsibility for the air conditioning unit, and Coleman did not obligate himself to make repairs to the appliances and the air conditioner in the househe did not reserve the right to inspect or maintain the air conditioner, nor did he undertake, or promise, to repair the unit. There was no written lease. The Harpers moved into the house between June 4, 1994, and June 10, 1994. On July 14, 1994, one of the Harpers' daughters turned off an air conditioning unit in one of the bedrooms because, she said, it "smelled funny and wasn't keeping the room cool." Mrs. Harper later turned the unit on, but she immediately turned the unit off when it blew only hot air. When Harper came home from work that evening, Mrs. Harper told him that the plumbing in the bathroom *395 was leaking,[1] but no one told him about any problem with the air conditioning unit. When Harper went out to the utility shed to get tools to fix the latest plumbing problems, he noticed that one of the two brackets that secured the air conditioning unit to the house was loose. He was afraid that the unit might fall, so he tried to place it back on the bracket. When he touched the bracket, he suffered electrical shock and was injured. Before that day, the air conditioning unit had worked properly. Coleman had never been notified by the Harpers that the air conditioner was not working properlyhe was never given any notice of any defect with the unit. The first time Coleman knew that there was a problem with the air conditioning unit was after Harper had been injured.
Harper's experts testified that the air conditioner had been improperly installed, specifically stating that the installation of the unit violated the standards of the National Electric Code, and that this improper installation caused the wiring of the unit to malfunction, with the malfunctioning ultimately causing Harper's injury. These experts also testified that the defect would not be apparent to someone who merely approached the unit from outside, but would have been apparent to the person or persons who installed or repaired the air conditioner or the air conditioning hook-up.
Coleman's expert testified that two defects existed inside the unit and that, although the wiring in the house was not up to national code standards, if the house had been properly wired the circuit breaker would not have tripped and the hazardous condition would still have existed. He further testified that these defects were latent and would not have been known by Coleman.
In Casey v. Estes, 657 So. 2d 845, 848 (Ala. 1995), this Court reiterated the general rule, as follows:
(Citations omitted.)
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 358 (1965), states the general rule as follows:
See Avon-Avalon, Inc. v. Collins, 643 So. 2d 570, 574 (Ala.1994); Dunson v. Friedlander Realty, 369 So. 2d 792 (Ala.1979). "Under the law, a landlord is not an insurer of the safety of the premises." Dunson v. Friedlander, at 795.
The air conditioner was installed before the Harpers and Coleman entered into *396 the lease agreement; Coleman did not inspect the air conditioning unit before leasing the premises to the Harpers, nor after he had leased the house to them; the Harpers had no discussions with Coleman about the air conditioner, either before leasing the premises or afterwards; Coleman did not reserve the right to inspect or maintain the air conditioner; the air conditioning unit had worked properly until the day of the accident; and when the Harpers learned of the problem with the unit, they did not notify ColemanColeman became aware of the problem only after Harper was injured. Furthermore, in this case, the defect was latent because it was hidden or concealed or because it could not have been discovered by a reasonable inspection. All the expert witnesses testified that the defective wiring was not visibly apparent.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that Coleman made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed; therefore, the burden shifted to Harper to present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. This he failed to do.
We note that in spite of well-established law applicable to cases involving landlord liability for injuries to a tenant, the Court of Civil Appeals held that Coleman had failed to make a prima facie showing that he did not have reason to know of the defects and, thus, that there was an issue of material fact. The Court of Civil Appeals based that holding on its finding that Coleman should have known that the wiring of the air conditioner was defective because the air conditioner had been installed by someone other than a licensed electrician, i.e., someone Coleman might have supposed was not qualified to install an air conditioning unit. That is, if Coleman allowed installation by someone not qualified to install the air conditioner, then Coleman knew or had reason to know that it was likely that the unit had been improperly installed and that, as a result, there was a risk that the unit might cause injury to future tenants.
However, there was no evidence presented to indicate that the air conditioner was not installed by an electrician or by someone otherwise qualified; rather, Coleman merely testified that he could not remember whether the units in the house had been replaced by a former tenant for whom he had reduced the rent, but that he thought he probably had replaced the units, because they were so old:
The fact that Coleman did not definitively testify that the air conditioning unit had been installed by a licensed electrician does not support Harper's bare allegation that the unit was installed by a "nonelectrician"; and that bare allegation was insufficient to rebut Coleman's prima facie showing that he did not know or have reason to know of the defects in the air conditioning unit. That bare allegation did not create a genuine issue of material fact.
We also note the Court of Civil Appeals' attempts to distinguish this case from those cases holding that lessors are not liable for latent defects that are unknown to them at the time of the leasing; the Court of Civil Appeals distinguished it on the basis that in the other cases there was no allegation as to the qualifications of the installers. This is a faulty premise on which to hold a landlord liable for injuries resulting from a latent defect, and a premise that we cannot let stand.
We further note that it appears that the Court of Civil Appeals reached its conclusion in this case by basing an inference on an inference. The first inference was that the unit was replaced; the second inference was that the replacement was performed by a "nonelectrician," either a tenant or some other unqualified person. Dean Gamble has suggested that Rule 401, Ala.R.Evid., effective *397 January 1, 1996, may permit a reasonable inference to be drawn from another reasonable inference, see, C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 21.01(8) (5th ed.1996); however, in this case, the second inference the Court of Civil Appeals made cannot be reasonably drawn from the first inference. In reaching its conclusion, that court created a duty to inspect where otherwise no such duty would have existed.
In addition, although the Court of Civil Appeals stated that it declined to adopt what it called the equivalent of an implied warranty of habitability in the landlord-tenant context, stating that it agreed with this Court that the adoption of new laws is a function for the Legislature, see, Murphy v. Hendrix, 500 So. 2d 8 (Ala.1986); Osborn v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 82 (Ala.1978), by holding as it did, the Court of Civil Appeals did exactly what it professed not to do.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the case for an order or further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES, KENNEDY, BUTTS, and SEE, JJ., concur.
ALMON and COOK, JJ., concur in the result.
[1]  The Harpers had had plumbing problems with a commode in the house; Mr. Harper had tried to fix it himself, but he did not have the proper equipment. Coleman was notified of this problem and had sent a plumber out to correct the problem.