Case Title: MARK ADAMS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-86

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARK ADAMS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 94117 P.3d 1210Case Number: 04-86Decided: 08/17/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
MARK 
ADAMS,

 
 
Petitioner,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Respondent.

 
 
 
 
Original 
Proceeding:  Writ of 
Review

From the 
DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Petitioner:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; and Tonya A. Morse, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Morse.

            

Representing 
Respondent:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Morgan.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
            
KITE, Justice. 

 
 
[¶1]      After engaging in 
sexually explicit communication in a chat room over the Internet with a person 
whom he thought was a 15 year old female, Mark Adams proposed meeting the young 
woman for purposes of engaging in sexual activity.  He arrived at the proposed meeting place 
armed with alcohol and condoms and approached a young woman he thought to be the 
one he had been soliciting, but who was instead an employee of the Casper Police 
Department, and he was arrested.  A 
jury convicted him of attempted sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-4-303(b)(ii) and 6-1-301 (LexisNexis 2003), and one count 
of attempted solicitation to engage in illicit sexual relations, in violation of 
§ 6-1-301 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-104 (LexisNexis 2003). He appeals claiming 
the district court erred in not dismissing the charges because the Internet 
communications were between him and a police officer, not a child, and, 
consequently, the State had produced insufficient evidence of a violation of the 
statutes.  He also contends the 
district court improperly allowed computer generated evidence to be admitted 
while refusing to allow him access to the police department's computer, and the 
prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Adams 
presents the following issues for review:

 
 
I.          
Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's (Petitioner herein) 
pretrial motion to dismiss?

 
 
II.          
Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for acquittal 
because the State's evidence was insufficient?

 
 
III.         
Whether prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced the jury and denied the 
defendant his right to a fair trial?

 
 
IV.        
Whether petitioner was denied a right to a fair trial and denied his 
constitutional right to present a defense due to evidence being withheld by the 
State?

 
 
The 
State phrases the issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Does the Wyoming general attempt statute, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-1-301, apply to situations where a law enforcement officer pretends to 
be a child on the internet?

 
 
II.          
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct during closing 
argument?

 
 
III.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of 
the online communications between petitioner and law enforcement, and did the 
State withhold evidence from petitioner such that he was denied his right to a 
fair trial?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On December 4, 
2002, an adult male Casper Police Department detective entered an online "chat 
room" and posed as a 15 year old female with the screen name 
"caspurgirl88."  He provided a 
profile indicating he was a female named "Amber" who lived in Casper and whose 
hobbies were "shopping, boys, partying, and boys," but did not indicate an age 
or date of birth.  Mr. Adams, whose 
screen name was "maradam21," contacted "Amber" through instant messaging in the 
Yahoo.com chat room under the category "romance" on the night of December 4, 
2002.  Two minutes into the 
conversation, Mr. Adams asked "Amber" how old she was and her response was 
15.  He proceeded to ask 
increasingly sexually graphic questions including questions about her anatomy 
and sexual experience. He offered to teach her about sex and, ultimately, sent 
nude pictures of himself, including pictures of his penis.  After inviting her to his house and 
describing what he intended to teach her, "Amber" responded that she was afraid 
of getting pregnant.  He told her 
not to worry about it because he had condoms.  

 
 
[¶4]      Arrangements were 
made to meet at McDonald's on Saturday night, December 7, 2002.  In an instant message on December 6, 
2002, Mr. Adams again initiated discussion of sexual matters.  In this conversation, he admitted he 
could get in trouble because of their ages and asked her to keep their meeting a 
secret.  "Amber" again expressed her 
fear of getting pregnant and he agreed to bring wine coolers and condoms with 
him to McDonald's.  Prior to their 
meeting on December 7, another short instant message conversation occurred at 
9:00 p.m. 

 
 
[¶5]      Shortly 
thereafter, the police took a young female dispatcher, fitted with a wire 
transmitter, to the McDonald's parking lot in an unmarked police car.  After driving through the parking lot 
several times, Mr. Adams parked next to the car and began speaking with the 
woman. After he told her he had alcohol and condoms, the police arrested 
him.  He was ultimately charged with 
one count of attempting to cause, induce, entice or coerce a child to engage in, 
or be used for any explicit sexual conduct, in violation of §§ 6-1-301 and 
6-4-303(b)(ii), and one count of attempting to solicit, procure or knowingly 
encourage anyone under the age of 16 years to engage in illicit sexual 
penetration or sexual intrusion, in violation of §§ 6-1-301 and 
14-3-104.

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Adams filed a 
motion to dismiss the charges arguing the statutes required the victim of the 
crimes charged to be a child, and, under these facts, there was no child 
victim.  The district court denied 
the motion.  Mr. Adams also filed a 
motion to preserve evidence complaining that he had sought the police 
department's computer files and that they had not been provided and could be 
destroyed. The district court granted the motion requiring the police to 
preserve the e-mail addresses involved in the investigation, the messages 
between Mr. Adams and "Amber," the chat room profile of "caspurgirl88," any 
other information stored on the police department's computer relevant to the 
case, and all notes and reports generated by the police in the course of the 
investigation. 

 
 
[¶7]      After a two day 
trial, the jury found Mr. Adams guilty on both counts.  The district court sentenced him to 24 to 
60 months in the Wyoming State Penitentiary on Count I, which was suspended in 
favor of a split sentence of 60 days in the NatronaCountyDetentionCenter and 48 months of supervised 
probation.  On Count II, he was 
sentenced to a consecutive term of 18 to 36 months in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary, which was suspended in favor of 48 months of supervised probation 
ordered to run concurrently with the probation for Count I.  The judgment and sentence was filed on 
September 22, 2003.  The notice of 
appeal filed February 11, 2004, was not timely and the district court denied Mr. 
Adams' motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal.  However, this Court reinstated the 
appeal.  

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 
Denial 
of Motions to Dismiss and for Aquittal/Sufficiency of 
Evidence

 
 
[¶8]      The same theme 
runs through Mr. Adams' claims that the district court erred in not granting his 
motion to dismiss the claims prior to trial and not granting his motion for 
acquittal for lack of sufficient evidence  his contention that he was charged 
with solicitation of a minor when no actual minor was involved.  In both arguments, he appears to ignore 
the fact that the information charged him, and the jury convicted him, of attempted violation of the 
statutes.  Whether the statutes 
proscribing attempted inducement of a child to engage in sexual conduct and 
attempted solicitation of a child to engage in illicit sexual penetration or 
intrusion require an actual child victim is a question of law which this Court 
reviews de novo.  Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶9, 100 P.3d 394, ¶9 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶9]      Our standard of 
review for sufficiency of the evidence is well 
established.

 
 
 
 
[W]e 
must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential 
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  We do not consider conflicting evidence 
presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which 
may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful party's evidence.  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence. (citing Wetherelt v. State, 864 P.2d 449, 452 
(Wyo.1993)).  "We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury, ... our only duty is to determine 
whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, 
have come to the same result as the jury actually did."  Id.

 
 

Blakeman 
v. State, 2004 WY 
139, ¶11, 100 P.3d 1229, ¶11 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶10]   Without question, no child victim 
exists in this case.  However, 
because the State did not charge Mr. Adams with violation of the child 
solicitation statutes but with attempting such a violation, that fact is not 
relevant.  The evidence established 
Mr. Adams believed he was conversing with, and intending to meet and have sexual 
relations with, a 15 year old girl.  He seems to suggest that before charges 
can be brought under the general attempt statute, there must be an actual minor 
victim.  However, he provides no 
authority or cogent argument in support of that position.

 
 
[¶11]   Section 6-1-301 
provides:

 
 
            
(a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if:

 
 
            
(i) With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a 
substantial step towards commission of the crime.  A "substantial step" is conduct which is 
strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the 
commission of the crime;  
or

            
(ii) He intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime 
had the attendant circumstances been as the person believes them to 
be.

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Adams was charged with 
attempting to cause, induce, entice, or coerce a child to engage in, or be used 
for any explicit sexual conduct in violation of § 6-4-303(b)(ii) and attempting 
to solicit, procure, or knowingly encourage anyone under the age of 16 years to 
engage in illicit sexual penetration or sexual intrusion in violation of § 
14-3-104.  We have held "absent a 
showing that the legislature intended to preclude use of the general attempt 
statute by the enactment of a special statute making the attempt a crime," a 
prosecutor may charge under the general attempt statute.  Bueno-Herandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132, 
1140 (Wyo. 
1986).  Neither statute in question 
here criminalizes the attempt to commit the described crimes.  Thus, the general attempt statute 
applies. 

 
 
[¶13]   The elements of the crime of 
attempt are: 1) an intent to do an act or bring about certain consequences which 
would in law amount to a crime; and 2) an act in furtherance of that intent 
which, as it is most commonly put, goes beyond mere preparation.  Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 940 (Wyo. 1997).  We clarified in Compton the 
purpose of the general attempt statute is not to deter the completion of a 
particular crime, but to impose punishment and "corrective action" on those who 
have shown their dangerousness.  
Id.  Mr. Adams clearly communicated his 
intent to entice a minor to engage in sexual acts and to encourage a minor to 
engage in sexual intrusion.  He then 
took specific action to effectuate that intent, including driving to the 
proposed meeting place armed with wine coolers and condoms, thus meeting the 
requisite elements of the general attempt statute.

 
 
[¶14]   Although he does not specifically 
characterize it as such, Mr. Adams posits his claim of error on the common law 
doctrine of legal impossibility which stems from a historical reluctance to 
punish defendants for unconsummated crimes. Audrey Rogers, "New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting 
Operations and Attempt Liability," 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 477 (2003-2004).  Courts in jurisdictions which have 
adopted this defense have concluded a defendant cannot be convicted of 
attempting a crime if the circumstances are such that ultimate commission of the 
crime would have been impossible.  
However, we find no precedent in the jurisprudence of this state wherein 
that defense has been recognized.  
In fact, in Rutti, ¶38, it was 
expressly rejected.  While the facts 
in Rutti are somewhat different from 
those in the instant case, in holding that no prosecutorial misconduct had 
occurred, we noted that an actual child victim is not required for a conviction 
of attempted solicitation of a minor.  
The defendant in Rutti also 
thought he was soliciting sex over the Internet from a minor when it was 
actually an adult agent of the Division of Criminal Investigation.  Seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, the 
defendant claimed the prosecution should have informed the court that it was 
legally impossible for him to have solicited a minor when the recipient of his 
advances was an adult law enforcement agent.  This Court did not address the 
prosecutorial misconduct claim because it was clear that legal impossibility was 
not a defense to a charge of attempt and  
stated:

 
 
 Under Wyoming law, a person is guilty of attempting 
to commit a crime if "[h]e intentionally engages in conduct which would 
constitute the crime had the attendant circumstances been as the person believes 
them to be."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-301(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  
Rutti allegedly believed he was chatting with a minor.  As such, he could be prosecuted for 
attempted solicitation of a minor. See generally Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430, 436 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("A person is guilty of an attempted child 
solicitation if the evidence demonstrates that he had a specific intent to 
commit the substantive offense and under the circumstances as he believed them 
to be took actions to consummate the substantive offense, even though 
circumstances unknown to him made completion of the substantive offense 
impossible, and the fact that the receiver of the 'luring' communications was an 
adult undercover agent posing as a child is irrelevant to the culpability of the 
sender of the communications for attempting to lure a child to commit an illegal 
sexual act.") 

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶15]   Furthermore, it appears plain from 
the language of the general attempt statute the legislature intended the same 
result. One is guilty of attempt if he or she engages in conduct which would 
constitute the crime had the attendant circumstances been as he or she believed 
them to be.  Section 
6-1-301(a)(ii).  The focus of the 
statute is upon the subjective intent of the perpetrator, not the actual 
circumstances involved.

 
 
[¶16]   Our reasoning in Rutti is similar to that followed by the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United 
States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 869 (10th 
Cir. 2005), which also involved an adult undercover police officer communicating 
with the defendant over the Internet.  
Affirming Mr. Munro's conviction for attempted commission of the crime, 
the Tenth Circuit noted that the undercover agent did nothing to initiate the 
conversations about sex or meeting with the defendant, but that the defendant's 
actions without question indicated his intent to solicit a minor for sexual 
activity and he undertook a substantial step toward completion of the crime by 
going to the prearranged meeting place.  Id. 
at 869-870.  This reasoning is in 
concert with many other jurisdictions which have upheld attempt convictions 
where law enforcement officers pose as minors on the Internet.  Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 2004); People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (2000); Laughner v. 
State; 769 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2002); United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1223 (llth Cir. 2002).  
See also, Rogers, supra.  As noted by commentators, Internet cases 
such as this one obviate the concern which spawned the impossibility doctrine 
that persons could be convicted of "bad thoughts." Instead, the very nature of 
these cases, which capture the attempted communication with, and solicitation 
of, children, justifies the purpose of statutes which criminalize attempt and 
punish the dangerous conduct before it impacts a child.  Rogers, supra.  As a matter of law, we hold the presence 
of a minor victim is not a requisite for a conviction of attempted solicitation 
of a minor under § 6-4-303(b)(ii) or § 14-3-104. 

 
 
[¶17]   In a related argument, Mr. Adams 
claimed the State's failure to identify a named minor victim hampered him in 
preparing a defense. We find this contention unpersuasive.  He was fully informed prior to trial of 
the date of his alleged offense, the content of his alleged conversations with 
the undercover agent, and the substantial steps he took to complete the 
crime.  He was well-prepared for 
trial.  While our opinion in Walker v. State 847 P.2d 542, 545 
(Wyo. 1993) 
held a victim should be identified before trial, the purpose was to avoid 
prejudicing the defendant by the absence of such identification.  Mr. Adams experienced no such prejudice 
in this case.

 
 
 
 
Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Adams claims his conviction 
should be reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct during the State's 
closing argument.  Prosecutorial 
misconduct has always been condemned and we focus on whether the defendant's 
substantial right to a fair trial has been violated.  Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶5, 100 P.3d 386, ¶5 (Wyo. 2004).   Closing arguments must be based upon the 
evidence.  Prosecutors may comment 
upon the evidence and suggest inferences from the evidence to the jury.  The propriety of a prosecutor's comments 
in closing arguments must be viewed in context.  Id., ¶12.  Mr. Adams did not object to the State's 
closing argument and, therefore, his claims must be reviewed under the plain 
error standard.  Id., ¶10.  Trial counsel may decide, for tactical 
reasons, not to object during closing argument concluding that calling further 
attention to a particular statement may add to its credibility. Consequently, we 
are inclined to defer to trial counsel and the district court when arguments of 
prosecutorial misconduct are raised for the first time on appeal.  Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 
1992).

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Adams complains about the 
following statements made by the prosecutor concerning the police department's 
conduct

 
 
What are 
the pros?  The pros are essentially 
that the police department can say that we want to go out and we want to try to 
catch these guys before the damage is done.  We want to catch these guys before we 
have a child who has been solicited on the Internet and has decided to and 
agreed to meet a person for the purpose of having sex.

 
 
                                    
* * *

 
 
And what 
do we all know?  Did you at all ask 
yourself maybe or try to come up with an example of what other proactive 
approach is out there that law enforcement is involved with?  Well, you have solicitation of 
prostitution for example.  We all 
know from watching TV and watching the programs on TV about law enforcement 
agencies . . .."

 
 
            
* * *

 
 
Why did 
the Casper Police Department decide whether or not or decide to even do an 
actual meeting at the end in the first place?  Because they know the 
law.

 
 
[¶20]   Throughout the trial proceedings 
Mr. Adams claimed law enforcement entrapped him.  In response, the prosecutor discussed 
why law enforcement uses the computer chat rooms in this fashion and why that 
process is in accordance with the law.  
Immediately after comments concerning the "pros and cons" of proactively 
seeking persons willing to violate the statutes prohibiting solicitation of 
minors, the prosecutor discussed the entrapment  instruction and how it applied to the 
facts of this case.  The comment 
regarding the police "knowing the law" was made in the context of explaining why 
their actions were not entrapment and was not improper.  

 
 
[¶21]   Finally, Mr. Adams complains about 
the prosecutor characterizing the photographs he sent by e-mail as "totally 
inappropriate."  Such a comment is 
well within the confines of acceptable commentary on the evidence. Mr. Adams has 
failed to meet his burden under the plain error standard that the prosecutor's 
comments violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

 
 
 
 
 Admission of Computer Printouts of Internet 
Communication

 
 
[¶22]   Mr. Adams claims the district court 
violated W.R.E. 1002, which requires use of the best evidence, when it admitted 
edited printouts of the chat room communications.  He also claims the State's refusal to 
allow him access to the police department's computer to examine the 
communications as they existed on the computer hard drive violated the rule of 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) by failing to disclose favorable evidence 
material to the guilt or punishment of the defendant.  Evidence is material under Brady only when a reasonable probability 
exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the 
evidence been disclosed.  Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635 (Wyo. 
2000).  Evidentiary rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence are reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion and we 
will not disturb those rulings if the court could have reasonably concluded as 
it did.  Boykin v. State, 2005 WY 15, ¶5, 105 P.3d 481, ¶5 (Wyo. 2005); Seward v. 
State, 2003 WY 116, ¶13, 76 P.3d 805, ¶13 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶23]   The district court ordered the 
State to preserve all communications between Mr. Adams and the Casper police detective 
posing as the 15 year old "Amber." At trial, the State produced printouts of 
instant messages between Mr. Adams and the detective.  Mr. Adams objected to those exhibits 
contending they did not constitute the best evidence of the content of the 
dialogue between the two.  He 
informed the court he had not been able to obtain the electronic counterparts of 
the exhibits which were the "original documents" for the purposes of W.R.E. 
1002, and he had been unable to verify that the dialogue between Mr. Adams and 
the officer was accurately represented in the printouts.1

 
 
[¶24]   The State's witness explained they 
could not allow Mr. Adams or his representatives unlimited access to the police 
department's computer because it held all of the other pending cases, 
information about other suspects, and images of child pornography.  He testified that the computer was used 
exclusively for these types of investigations and that it is only accessible by 
personnel conducting those investigations.  He likened the computer to an evidence 
locker where evidence pertaining to a particular case is segregated by saving 
the pertinent dialogue to a specific folder on the computer and the only way to 
preserve the information was to "cut and paste" it to a file on the hard drive 
of the computer.  Although Mr. Adams 
questioned the authenticity of this document under W.R.E. 901, the State's 
witnesses testified the entire dialogue was contained in the folder and no 
additions or deletions were made.  
The chat log exhibits introduced at trial were the hard copies of the 
evidence file folder.  The district 
court ruled a proper foundation had been laid for the exhibits, authenticity had 
been shown, and they were true and correct copies of the original as required by 
W.R.E. 1002. 

 
 
[¶25]   The Wyoming Rules of Evidence 
require an original when the objective at trial is to prove the content of a 
writing.  W.R.E. 1002.  An original is defined as including any 
computer printout or other readable output of data stored in a computer or 
similar device, which is "shown to reflect the data accurately."  W.R.E. 1001(3).  If a computer printout is deemed to be a 
"duplicate" of the original record, its introduction is subject only to proof of 
the authenticity of the original.  W.R.E. 1003.  Authentication is shown by evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the 
proponent claims it is.  W.R.E. 
901(b)(9).  Whether other evidence 
of the contents of a writing (other than the original) "correctly reflects the 
contents, the issue is for the trier of fact."  W.R.E. 1008.

 
 
[¶26]   The State's witness testified that 
the chat log exhibits were exact copies of the communication between the parties 
contained in the computer and thus, they were either appropriate computer 
"originals" or duplicates which were properly authenticated.  Whether they accurately reflected the 
contents of the instant messages sent between the parties was an issue for the 
jury to decide and it had adequate evidence upon which to make such a decision. 
The district court found adequate foundation was laid for the documents and they 
were properly authenticated. Nothing in the record indicates that ruling was an 
abuse of discretion.

 
 
[¶27]   On appeal, Mr. Adams contends, for 
the first time, the State's refusal to allow him access to the computer to 
verify the accuracy of the chat logs constituted a Brady violation.  However, the record indicates that 
argument was not made in the district court.  We have repeatedly said we will not 
address issues raised for the first time on appeal.  Davis v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, 
¶26, 88 P.3d 481, ¶26 (Wyo. 2004).  In addition, Mr. Adams offers no 
explanation regarding what material evidence might have been withheld that was 
favorable to him and would have been material to his guilt or innocence.  

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶28]   We affirm Mr. Adams' conviction and 
hold that an actual child victim is not a prerequisite to a charge of attempted 
violation of § 6-4-303(b)(ii) or § 14-3-104.  When reviewed in context, the prosecutor 
did not commit prosecutorial misconduct in his closing argument.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion by admitting the State's exhibits containing logs of the chat room 
communications between Mr. Adams and the police.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1On 
appeal, Mr. Adams appears to claim the chat logs were inadmissible hearsay. 
However, that objection was not made in the district court and the prosecutor 
correctly noted that if there were such an objection, the defendant's statements 
on the logs would have been admissible as admissions of a party opponent under 
W.R.E. 801(d)(2).