Case Title: Buffalo Crushed Stone Inc. v. Town of Cheektowaga

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 118  
Buffalo Crushed Stone Inc.,
            Appellant, 
        v. 
Town of Cheektowaga, 
            Respondent.
John G. Horn, for appellant.
David J. Seeger, for respondent.
New York State Construction Materials Association, 
   Inc., amicus curiae.
CIPARICK, J.:
In this zoning case, the issue is whether Buffalo
Crushed Stone, Inc. (BCS) established a prior nonconforming use
to quarry certain subparcels of its 280-acre property, thereby
relieving it from the Town of Cheektowaga’s zoning ordinances. 
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1  Federal was previously known as Cheektowaga Crushed Stone
Corporation.  It later merged with Bituminous Products
Corporation to form Buffalo Slag Company.  In 1983, BCS purchased
Buffalo Slag and acquired its land.
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Applying the analysis set forth in Matter of Syracuse Aggregate
Corp. v Weise (51 NY2d 278, 284-287 [1980]), we hold that the
long and exclusive quarrying operation of BCS and its
predecessors and their preparations to use areas left as
aggregate mineral reserves –- consistent with the nature of
quarrying -- established a right of prior nonconforming usage on
the disputed subparcels.  We conclude, however, that this right
does not extend to subparcel 25D and to the thoroughfares, or
roadway subparcels, (28A/28B, 29A/29B, 30A/30B and 31-33) because
there are factual issues remaining as to whether BCS acquired
these areas prior to the 1969 zoning ordinance.
 I 
BCS owns approximately 280 acres of property in the
Town of Cheektowaga, where it operates a hard-rock quarry.  For
the past 80 years, BCS and its predecessors, including Federal
Crushed Stone Corporation (Federal),1 have devoted the land
exclusively to quarrying.  The quarry consists of mineral
extraction sites located primarily in the center of the property,
along with processing areas, buffer zones and roads.  BCS and its
predecessors acquired the land in a number of transactions,
either by purchase or lease, between 1929 and 1991.  Only some of
these subparcels –- comprising four geographic regions located in
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the east, south and west -- are relevant in this case.  The
disputed subparcels are mainly areas that BCS maintained as
mineral reserves, which have not been quarried. 
     
Before 1942, there were no zoning ordinances or other
limitations on the property’s usage.  The Town then enacted
ordinances, demarcating the property into certain zones or
districts, and denominating such zones as residential, industry
and an airport.  Federal’s land was classified within the Second
Industrial District.  The ordinance allowed gravel pits and stone
quarries to be constructed in this zone, provided that the quarry
company procure a permit.  The ordinance explicitly permitted
nonconforming uses to continue unabated upon the condition that
no buildings in the Second Industrial District be enlarged or
destroyed.  
In 1969, the Town repealed the 1942 ordinance, enacting
the 1969 zoning ordinance that divided Federal’s lands into four
zoning districts: a residential district, a business district, a
manufacturing district and a “special” district.  Section 7-01 of
the ordinance, entitled “Non-conforming Use . . . Regulations,”
permitted the continuation of nonconforming activities on the
property, but prohibited their extension or enlargement.  Thus,
this ordinance permitted Federal to continue its mining operation
within the “AG Special Aggregate District” (AG district) in what
is now the center of BCS’s operation.  In 1992, the Town repealed
its 1969 zoning ordinance, adopting new zoning laws that were
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No. 118
2  BCS does not challenge Supreme Court’s order with respect
to certain subparcels that it deemed not integral to its mining
operation.  Also, the Town has conceded that BCS enjoys lawful
nonconforming use of certain other subparcels. 
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amended in 1996 and 1997; none of these ordinances altered the
boundaries and relevant regulations of the AG district. 
In 1998, BCS commenced this action, seeking a
declaratory judgment that zoning restrictions applicable to the
unexcavated areas of its property were void, and a judgment to
enjoin the Town from enforcing its zoning regulations as to those
areas.  The Town moved for summary judgment and for a declaration
that its zoning ordinances were enforceable.  BCS then cross-
moved for summary judgment on its claims.  
Supreme Court, declaring the rights of the parties, 
held that subparcels within the Town’s AG district are entitled
to nonconforming use status, and thus quarrying in those
subparcels was permissible.  The court further held that
subparcels 17C/25C and 25I/12B, south of the AG district –- in a
residential zone -- were entitled to prior nonconforming usage
because they were subject to quarrying permits issued by the Town
before the 1969 ordinance.  However, the court did not grant such
status to parcels located to the east (subparcel 5), to the west
(subparcel 25D) and to certain remaining parcels.2  Both parties
appealed.  
The Appellate Division considered whether BCS had
established a nonconforming use for four geographic subparcels:
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(1) the large eastern area (subparcel 5); (2) the western area
(subparcel 25D); (3) the southern and eastern thoroughfares or
roadways (subparcels 28A/28B, 29A/29B, 30A/30B and 31-33); and
(4) the southern parcels adjacent to the AG area (subparcels
17C/25C, 12B/25I). 
Subparcel 5 is a relatively large area, located in the
northeastern portion of the property, immediately adjacent to the
AG district.  Most of this area is divided from the AG district
by Indian Road, a relatively narrow roadway of approximately 49.5
feet in width, extending south to north.  Indian Road then turns
eastward, dividing this subparcel into a northern portion and a
southern portion.  BCS’s predecessors in interest acquired this
area in 1931, but did not quarry it.  
Indian Road once extended further north, separating all
of subparcel 5 from the AG district.  Prior to 1951, the
northernmost portion of the road was rerouted over Federal’s
property, rendering it inaccessible to the public.  BCS claims
that 5 million tons of aggregate material suitable for excavation
is available for appropriation in subparcel 5.  
Subparcel 25D is situated in the westernmost region of
BCS’s property.  BCS contends that, in 1959, Federal leased the
area from a Dr. Reinstein for the explicit purpose of quarrying
and mining limestone.  The Town asserts, however, that BCS did
not acquire a possessory interest or legal title to the area
until 1991 –- long after the enactment of its zoning ordinances. 
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It is undisputed that neither BCS nor its predecessors obtained a
permit to quarry the area before 1969. 
Subparcels 28A/28B, 29A/29B, 30A/30B and 31-33 are
thoroughfares or roadways located in the southern and eastern
portions of the AG district.  BCS avers that these roads are long
abandoned.  They are part of the property leased and conveyed to
Federal, contiguous to the AG district, and have been actively
mined by BCS and its predecessors for several decades.  BCS’s
predecessors received quarrying permits for portions of these
areas in 1955 and 1960.  
Subparcels 17C/25C and 12B/25I were leased in
approximately 1952, and the Town issued BCS a permit to quarry
parts of these subparcels at that time.  They are also contiguous
to the AG district.  Although BCS cleared this area by stripping
it of topsoil before 1969, it has not been actively quarried.     
The Appellate Division modified Supreme Court’s
decision by additionally granting the Town summary judgment as to
subparcels 17C/25C and 12B/25I.  The court held that these
subparcels were not entitled to prior nonconforming usage because
BCS had not mined them prior to 1969 (55 AD3d 1228, 1231-1232
[4th Dept 2008]).  Two Justices dissented as to these subparcels,
stating that BCS should not be required to demonstrate actual
quarrying activities on each contested subparcel, because such a
predicate is not required under controlling prior nonconforming
use precedent on quarrying enterprises, and these subparcels
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should generally be viewed in the context of the entire property
as a whole (see id. at 1232-1234).  The dissent further stated
that BCS and its predecessors had engaged in substantial
quarrying activities on the entire 280-acre property for many
years; had never utilized the land for any other purpose; and
these subparcels were contiguous to BCS’s excavation sites. 
Thus, the dissenters concluded that BCS satisfied the prior
nonconforming use standard (see id. at 1232-1234). 
Addressing subparcel 5, the Appellate Division stated 
that this subparcel’s physical separation by Indian Road from
other parts of the property prevents prior nonconforming use
status for that area (see id. at 1233).  The entire panel was
unpersuaded by BCS’s evidence that it manifested an intent to use
this area for quarrying. 
Regarding subparcel 25D, the Appellate Division held
that BCS did not demonstrate its right to quarry that subparcel
before 1969 because Federal’s lease of the property contained a
description of the land that could be quarried that did not
expressly include this area (see id. at 1231).  Further, the
court noted that BCS had not conducted substantial quarrying
activities on subparcel 25D before 1969 (see id.).  In response,
the dissenters stated that summary judgment was inappropriate
because an issue of fact remained as to whether BCS acquired
rights to quarry this subparcel in 1969 (see id. at 1234).  They
cited affirmations from a title examiner and attorney concluding
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that 25D was acquired in fee or by lease prior to 1969, as well
as an affidavit submitted by a BCS executive vice-president,
stating that this subparcel was leased in 1959 by plaintiff’s
predecessor in interest (see id.). 
Finally, as for the thoroughfares, subparcels 28A/B,
29A/B, 30A/B and parcels 31-33, the Appellate Division held that,
although they are contiguous to the AG district and they had been
abandoned as roadways –- having not been traveled or used as a
highway for six years (see Highway Law § 205 [1]) –- BCS is not
entitled to quarry those areas because it did not conduct mining
operations on them before the adoption of the zoning ordinances
(see id. at 1231).  However, the court found that the northern
part of Parcel 31 is located within the AG district, rendering
quarrying is a permitted use there (see id.).  The dissenters
agreed that the streets were abandoned as a matter of law, but
disagreed with the majority on the ground that Syracuse Aggregate
(51 NY2d at 285-287) does not require every inch of the property
be mined to trigger prior nonconforming use (see 55 AD3d at 1232-
1233).  BCS appeals as of right, pursuant to CPLR 5601 (a), and
we now modify.   
  II
As a preliminary matter, the Town contends that BCS is
barred from bringing this action by a 1997 settlement agreement. 
But the dispute ending in that settlement arose from an action
brought by BCS seeking a tree removal permit –- it did not
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encompass the more extensive claims brought in this action. 
Additionally, the settlement reveals that BCS stipulated to
narrow terms as to its quarrying operation -- “(c) BCS will
adhere to the mining restrictions contained in Section 82-28 of
the Town Zoning Law (i.e., setbacks).”  The only mining
restriction contained in Zoning Law § 260-38 is section B, which
provides for excavation setbacks from areas used by the public
(see id.).  More specifically, it provides that no structure, use
or excavation “shall be closer than two hundred (200) feet from a
public right-of-way or adjacent property line.”  Hence, the 1997
agreement does not prevent BCS’s action from going forward, as it
does not affect any quarrying rights disputed in this case. 
III
Turning to the merits, prior nonconforming uses in
existence when a zoning ordinance is adopted are, generally,
constitutionally protected even though an ordinance may
explicitly prohibit such activity (see People v Miller, 304 NY
105, 107 [1952]).  Courts and municipal legislators have shown a
“grudging tolerance” towards this doctrine, disfavoring its broad
application, as “the law . . . generally views nonconforming uses
as detrimental to a zoning scheme, and the overriding public
policy of zoning in New York State and elsewhere is aimed at
their reasonable restriction and eventual elimination” (Matter of
Toys R Us v Silva, 89 NY2d 411, 417 [1997] [internal quotation
marks omitted]).  Although nonconforming uses are “generally
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permitted to continue, they may not be enlarged as a matter of
right” (Matter of Rudolf Steiner Fellowship Found. v DeLuccia, 90
NY2d 453, 458 [1997]).  However, property owners engaging in a
particular activity may have secured a “vested right” to use
their land accordingly (Miller, 304 NY at 107-108).  Courts
strive to see that “the public interest in eliminating
nonconforming uses at a legally opportunistic time is placed in
reasonable balance with the owner’s interest in not having a
property investment abruptly altered or terminated” (Matter of
Pelham Esplanade v Board of Trustees of Vil. of Pelham Manor, 77
NY2d 66, 72 [1990]). 
A party advancing a prior nonconforming use exception
to a zoning ordinance must establish specific actions
constituting an overt manifestation of its intent to utilize the
property for the ascribed purpose at the time the zoning
ordinance became effective; a mere contemplation of purpose,
lacking supportive evidence of undertakings to effectuate such
intentions, will not suffice (see Syracuse Aggregate, 51 NY at
284-285, citing Matter of Harbison v City of Buffalo, 4 NY2d 553,
559-560 [1958]).  Every inch of the land need not have been
employed for the asserted purpose, but utilizing just a portion
of the property will not necessarily trigger the protections of
this doctrine (see id.).  Central to this standard is “an
examination of the nature of the particular nonconforming use in
issue as well as the activities engaged in by the landowner in
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effectuating that use prior to the adoption of the restrictive
ordinance” (id.).
In Syracuse Aggregate, we held that a quarrying company
was entitled to prior nonconforming use status because its
activities sufficiently demonstrated an intent to appropriate an
entire parcel of land for excavation and quarrying prior to the
passage of a restrictive zoning law (see 51 NY2d at 286).  There,
the landowner purchased a 25-acre parcel of land in 1978 that had
been used as a quarry for more than 50 years (see id. at 282). 
The land was zoned as a residential district in 1961 (see id.). 
In discussing the nature and character of quarrying, we stated:
“[b]y its very nature, quarrying involves a
unique use of land.  As opposed to other
nonconforming uses in which the land is
merely incidental to the activities conducted
upon it, quarrying contemplates the
excavation and sale of the corpus of the land
itself as a resource.  Depending on customer
needs, the land will be gradually excavated
in order to supply the various grades of sand
and gravel demanded.  Thus, as a matter of
practicality as well as economic necessity, a
quarry operator will not excavate his entire
parcel of land at once, but will leave areas
in reserve, virtually untouched until they
are actually needed” (id. at 285 [internal
citations omitted]). 
Consequently, a prior nonconforming use for quarrying
cannot be limited solely to the land that was actually excavated
before the zoning law, because -- in this unique type of industry
–- landowners commonly leave portions of their land as mineral
reserves to be excavated at a future time (see id.).  A landowner
who engages in substantial quarrying activities within its
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property and demonstrates an intention to do so in other portions
of the land may sufficiently establish a prior nonconforming use
extending to the boundaries of that property, notwithstanding the
fact that quarrying may not have actually begun in that specific
area.  
Conversely, merely preparing to engage in a quarrying 
enterprise or “undertaking a few self-serving acts of a very
limited nature” will not satisfy the requisite standard (see
id.).  Nor does prior nonconforming use status extend to
adjoining parcels separated by physical boundaries (see id.).  In
this regard, Syracuse Aggregate does not afford quarrying
companies “carte blanche” to engage in future excavation of their
lands contrary to zoning regulations (see id. at 286-287).  
As in Syracuse Aggregate, BCS and its predecessors
acquired the property exclusively for mining and quarrying
operations –- “[n]o part of the land was ever dedicated to a use
other than . . . quarrying” (id. at 286).  Similar to Syracuse
Aggregate, BCS constructed a processing structure in the center
of the 280-acre property, where bulk materials were removed for
decades, and service roads constructed to move the materials
after they are processed (see id.).  Further, the processing
plant contains a building for packaging materials, a repair shop
and offices.  In Syracuse Aggregate, we determined that “given
such outward manifestations of intent and in light of the unique
character of the business engaged in, it can only be concluded
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that the nonconforming use extends throughout the property even
though the principal excavation was limited to a five-acre
portion of the parcel” (id. at 286).  The same pertinent factors
are present here.   
  IV
We now analyze the four specific geographic areas in
dispute, applying the rationale of Syracuse Aggregate. 
Subparcel 5:
As noted, because of the nature and character of the
quarrying industry, landowners commonly quarry one portion of
their land at a time and leave other areas as reserves (see id.
at 285-286).  Reviewing BCS’s quarrying activity both in the
center of its property and in the respective subparcels, it is
clear that it manifested an intent to quarry subparcel 5.  BCS
and its predecessors have (1) prepared maps of the area to survey
potential materials that could be extracted from the land; (2)
put in place 6,000 feet of 16-inch piping from the property to
the pumping station; (3) negotiated, from 1963 to 1969, with the
Town to relocate Indian Road for unfettered use of its entire
parcel for mining, thereby providing the Town with notice of its
intent to use the area accordingly; (4) sent letters to the Town
expressing an intent to mine the area in 1963; (5) made
preparations to have a company remove dirt from the region to
allow for excavation; and (6) drilled “auger holes,” which are
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used to identify areas for quarrying.    
Although Indian Road separates subparcel 5 from the
aggregate zone, this relatively narrow roadway (49.5 feet) is not
a physical impasse that cuts off subparcel 5 from the contiguous
parcels.  Nor does it substantially alter the nature and
character of the property as a whole, as BCS and its predecessor
companies have long manifested their intent to mine both sides of
the road, and jointly with the Town have maintained the road,
using the same for trucks and pipelines incident to their
quarrying operation. 
In this regard, the dissent’s reliance on Dolomite
Prods. Co. v Kipers (23 AD2d 339, 343-345 [4th Dept 1965]) –- a
pre-Syracuse Aggregate case –- is misplaced (see dissenting opn
at 2, 6).  In Dolomite, the Appellate Division considered whether
a quarrying company could extend its enterprise from one parcel
of land to two southern parcels physically separated from the
quarrying area by railroad tracks (see id.).  Although the
northern portion of the land had been used for quarrying, the two
areas below the railroad tracks had been used, for 40 years, as a
farm and a nursery (see 23 AD2d at 341).  During that time,
thousands of homeowners purchased homes in the area encircling
the two parcels (see id.).  The Appellate Division held that the
quarrying company could not extend its nonconfoming use to the
two separate regions that had been used for entirely different
purposes, especially given the patent unfairness to the multitude
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of residents now living in those areas who would be deleteriously
affected by the quarrying operations so close to their homes (see
id. at 342-343).  
Here, in contrast, BCS has appropriated subparcel 5 as
a reserve for quarrying and no other purpose -- it is not
extending its nonconforming use –- but seeking to realize its
vested right to use the land in accord with a longstanding
manifested intent to quarry this area.  Significantly, because
most of subparcel 5 borders a landfill, fairness concerns,
arising in Dolomite, for people moving into properties
constructed adjacent to the quarry, are not raised here. 
Further, BCS does not dispute that there are 200-foot setbacks in
place, pursuant to its 1997 Settlement Agreement with the Town,
prohibiting it from excavating within 200 feet from a public
right-of-way or adjacent property lines.  Finally, there is no
evidence that Indian Road is a physical separation that alters
the nature and character of the property, such that it would
render a quarrying operation as foreign, unexpected or adverse to
that area. 
Contrary to the dissent, the mere fact that a roadway
runs through a portion of a property, later classified as a
subparcel by a town attempting to impose zoning restrictions on
its usage, is not a per se barrier to the recognition of prior
nonconforming use rights to that area.  An easement, a roadway or
any other narrow area does not necessarily create a physical
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separation of the land, divesting it of its character so as to
prevent a vested right to use that land for its intended purpose. 
This was also true in Dolomite, where the court based its holding
–- not on the per se basis of the railroad tracks traversing the
land –- but on the patent unfairness to property owners who had
come to live in the area abutting the lands and on the fact that
the land south of the railroad tracks had been used for entirely
different purposes for many years.  Similarly, in this quarrying
case, our analysis must take into account the nature of the
easement and the character of the land in relation to the areas
already quarried. 
Subparcel 25D:
Federal leased this subparcel from a Dr. Reinstein for
the sole purpose of mining.  It is undisputed that this region is
contiguous with areas that have been extensively quarried.  BCS
has not quarried nor acquired a permit to quarry this subparcel
before the 1969 ordinance.  
The dissent’s claim that permits are a prerequisite to
establishing prior nonconforming use rights is without authority
(see dissenting opn at 4-5).  As we held in Syracuse Aggregate, a
quarrying company may hold lands in reserve, instead of mining
them immediately.  Such a company would not necessarily seek a
permit for lands that it did not intend to excavate immediately,
or at least not until sometime in the future.  Imposing this
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requirement in a quarrying case is a very narrow reading of
Syracuse Aggregate, and fails to consider the realities of the
industry.  Nevertheless, mining permits are strong evidence of a
manifestation of intent to mine a given area.  They are an
important piece of evidence in analyzing the standard set forth
in Syracuse Aggregate, though not necessary in determining the
manifested intent of the quarrying company.   
Given all of these factors, we hold that an issue of
fact remains as to when BCS received legal title to this land. 
BCS asserts that it acquired a possessory interest in this parcel
before the 1969 zoning ordinance.  At that time, BCS received a
permit to quarry its then-existing mining operations on the
Reinstein estates.  Although the permits do not specifically
cover this subparcel, Federal extensively mined an area
contiguous to that section before 1969.  
The issue of fact relates to whether subparcel 25D was
acquired by BCS’s predecessors.  If the parcel was part of a
subparcel actively quarried, then it would be entitled to prior
nonconforming use.  On the other hand, if it was not, and BCS
acquired it in 1991, as the Town contends, then it would not be
so entitled.
Subparcels 28A/B, 29A/B, 30A/B 31-33 (the roadway parcels):
Highway Law § 205 (1), in pertinent part, states that
if a highway “has not been traveled or used as a highway for six
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years it shall cease to be a highway.”  These subparcels are
small dead end streets that abut property controlled by BCS’s
predecessors since at least 1967.  The Appellate Division found
no evidence that these thoroughfares have been used for a period
of six years.  However, the issue is whether they were left
abandoned at least six years prior to the 1969 zoning ordinances
so that BCS may demonstrate that it controlled these areas and
had an ability to quarry there before the adoption of the
ordinances.  It is unclear from the record whether these areas
were either abandoned or in use prior to 1969.  If the Town
abandoned these thoroughfares for six years preceding the zoning
ordinances, then BCS would be entitled to prior nonconforming use
of these areas, since deeming them abandoned does not curtail any
longstanding right of enjoyment that the public may have to these
areas, but rather creates a property right for the abutting
owners, here BCS, in the form of an easement of access to the
abutting streets.  In addition, we note that for at least 40
years quarrying has occurred on the property abutting the
roadways.  
Subparcels 17C/25C and 12B/25I: 
These areas were leasehold interests before the 1969
ordinance, and are located directly contiguous to the immediate
south of the AG district.  Aerial maps demonstrate that these
areas were cleared, grubbed and stripped of topsoil before 1969. 
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Further, they were the subject of quarrying permits before 1969. 
Applying the principles announced in Syracuse Aggregate, we hold
that BCS made clear its intent to quarry these areas at a future
time, as it was already making preparations to undertake
quarrying activity by 1969.  Thus, we would confer prior
nonconforming use rights to these subparcels, as well.   
V
In conclusion, under our holding in Syracuse Aggregate, 
and given the peculiar nature of quarrying, it is unrealistic and
unreasonable to require BCS to have actively mined all areas
within its 280-acre property prior to the passage of the 1969
zoning ordinances to establish prior nonconfoming use protection
for its mining operation.  Quarrying contemplates a gradual
unearthing of the minerals in the land, and so excavation of
portions of the land may be sufficient to manifest an intention
to conduct quarrying on the property as a whole.  Of crucial
importance is the fact that BCS and its predecessors, quarrying
companies, have exclusively, and for decades, utilized the land
for quarrying.  Additionally, they have exhibited the usual
indicia of a quarrying enterprise, showing preparations to quarry
the subparcels in dispute.  Therefore, we hold that BCS is
entitled to a declaration that the subparcels at issue are
subject to prior nonconforming usage, except for subparcel 25D
and the thoroughfare properties, where issues of fact remain
unresolved.  
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Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be modified, without costs, in accordance with the opinion herein
and, as so modified, affirmed.      
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LIPPMAN, Chief Judge (dissenting in part):
While we agree with the majority that parcels 17C/25C
and 12B/25I are entitled to nonconforming use status under our
decision in Matter of Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v Weise (51 NY2d
278 [1980]), and while we further agree that remittal for a
determination of when the roadway parcels were abandoned is
appropriate, we conclude that the nonconforming use principles
outlined in Syracuse Aggregate and Matter of Dolomite Products
Co. v Kipers (23 AD2d 339 [4th Dept 1965], affd 19 NY2d 739
[1967]) mandate a different result for parcels 5 and 25D. 
Therefore we respectfully dissent.
Prior to today's decision, our nonconforming use
analysis was straightforward and well settled.  The "overriding
policy of zoning is aimed at the ultimate elimination of
nonconforming uses," but "a zoning ordinance cannot prohibit an
existing use to which the property has been devoted at the time
of the enactment of the ordinance" (Syracuse Aggregate, 51 NY2d
at 284).  Necessarily, the owner seeking to use property in a
manner that is inconsistent with a zoning ordinance must not only
have been able to legally use the property in that manner prior
to the passage of the zoning ordinance, but the owner must also
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have actually used the property in that manner or manifested an
intent to so use the property prior to the zoning ordinance
becoming effective (id. at 284-286).  The inquiry may be
succinctly stated as a two-step process: (1) could the property
lawfully be used in the manner desired at the time the
restrictive zoning ordinance became effective, and (2) did the
property owner either actually use the property in that manner or
manifest an intention to so use the property.  If the answer to
both questions is yes, then the owner is entitled to
nonconforming use status; if the answer to either is no, then the
owner is not entitled to nonconforming use status.  We have
further explained that it is not "possible to extend the
protection of a permitted nonconforming use established on one
parcel of land to physically separate though adjoining parcels"
(id. at 286 [citing, inter alia, Matter of Dolomite Prods. Co.,
23 AD2d 339]).  
The majority, without saying so, casts aside our prior
straightforward analytical framework for nonconforming uses but
fails to replace it with any coherent new framework.  With
respect to parcel 5, on this record (which includes detailed maps
as well as aerial photographs of the land), it is plain that
Indian Road separates parcel 5 from the land that has been
actively quarried.  Parcel 5 is, very simply, a "physically
separate though adjoining" parcel that under a straightforward
application of well settled law should be subject to the zoning
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1  Moreover, it is entirely unclear how Indian Road may be
characterized as a "relatively narrow roadway (49.5 feet)"
(majority op at 14).  The maps and photographs in the record make
clear that Indian Road is just that -- a road -- and at a width
of 49.5 feet, it is a roadway wide enough to accommodate several
lanes of traffic.
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ordinance (id.).  Instead, the majority creates an entirely new
test and tells us that, despite the fact that parcel 5 "is
divided from the AG District by Indian Road" (majority op at 5),
the road should not be understood to separate parcel 5 from the
rest of BCS's property because the road "is not a physical
impasse" and it "does not substantially alter the nature and
character of the property as a whole" (majority op at 14).  It
seems fairly clear, however, that BCS itself did not see the road
as insubstantial; as the majority notes, BCS "negotiated, from
1963 to 1969, with the Town to relocate Indian Road for
unfettered use of its entire parcel for mining" (majority op at
13).  Rather than just demonstrating BCS's intent to mine parcel
5, as the majority concludes, these negotiations demonstrate that
BCS itself recognized the reality that Indian Road separated
parcel 5 from the remainder of its land such that it did not have
"unfettered use" of parcel 5.1
The majority has concluded that a factual question
exists as to when BCS acquired parcel 25D and therefore does not
decide today whether parcel 25D is entitled to nonconforming use
status.  It is certainly true, as the majority explains, that if
BCS did not acquire parcel 25D until 1991 BCS would not be
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entitled to mine parcel 25D.  There is, however, no need to
determine whether parcel 25D was in fact acquired as part of the
1959 Reinstein lease because, even if it was acquired then, it
still could not have been lawfully mined at the time the zoning
ordinance went into effect in 1969.  After the 1942 zoning
ordinance, there is no dispute that the owner or lessee of parcel
25D would have been required to obtain a permit to use parcel 25D
as a quarry.  It is further undisputed that parcel 25D was not
covered by the permits BCS and/or its predecessors obtained from
the Town.  Thus, again applying our previously straightforward
framework for nonconforming uses, because parcel 25D could not be
lawfully mined at the time the 1969 zoning ordinance became
effective, it cannot now be entitled to nonconforming use status.
The majority conflates the manifestation of intent to
mine with the lawful ability to mine.  The majority explains that
"mining permits are strong evidence of a manifestation of intent
to mine a given area" and that permits "are an important piece of
evidence in analyzing the standard set forth in Syracuse
Aggregate" (majority op at 17).  There is no question here that
BCS and its corporate predecessors intended to mine parcel 25D;
the question is whether or not they could have lawfully done so
at the time the 1969 zoning ordinance became effective, a
question the majority never squarely addresses.  Intent to mine
and lawful ability to mine are two separate issues.  Although
BCS's predecessor manifested an intention to mine parcel 25D,
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until today that alone was not enough: it also must have been
lawful to mine parcel 25D at the time the ordinance went into
effect.  As BCS concedes, no mining permit was issued for parcel
25D as of 1969, therefore it was not lawful to mine parcel 25D at
that time.  
It is not, as the majority states, that we conclude
that "permits are a prerequisite to establishing nonconforming
use rights" (majority op at 16) in all nonconforming use cases or
even in all nonconforming use cases involving quarrying.  Rather,
the touchstone in our case law has been lawful use, and, in the
Town of Cheektowaga, the lawful way to mine at the time the
ordinance went into effect (outside of certain districts
delineated for mining) was to first obtain a permit to mine from
the Town.  Because a mining permit was not issued for parcel 25D
it could not have been lawfully mined.  In remitting as to parcel
25D, the majority opens up the possibility that BCS will be able
to mine parcel 25D now, some 40 years after the passage of the
1969 zoning ordinance restricting such usage, despite the fact
that BCS's predecessor could not have lawfully mined the
property.
By failing to adhere to our prior analytical framework
in this context, the majority today muddies an area of law that
ought to be predictable for a host of practical purposes.  For
instance, residents of the Town purchased homes near land that,
until today, BCS had no right to mine and this development
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No. 118
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undoubtedly affects those properties in a variety of ways (see
Matter of Dolomite, 23 AD2d at 342-343 ["Such a philosophy of
planning could stunt or kill the growth of substantial areas of
property surrounding the parcels in question, for abutting owners
would be required to wait, as in the instant case, for decades to
determine the use which could be made of the property."]).  
Moreover, local governments are particularly well-
positioned to plan for the physical and economic development of
the communities and constituencies that they serve.  Here, since
1942 when the Town first enacted a zoning ordinance, the Town has
sought to control the development of Town land used for quarrying
purposes.  The very fact that, outside certain districts, a
permit was required in order to mine land in the Town means that
the Town might disallow that use in certain instances.  When and
in what manner the Town can do so should be predictable and
subject to clear rules.  Before today, these rules were simple:
if a landowner could lawfully use property in a manner restricted
by a new zoning ordinance and either actually used the property
in that manner or manifested an intent to do so at the time the
new zoning ordinance became effective, that landowner could still
use the land in that manner after the passage of the ordinance. 
This, apparently, is no longer the framework we will apply in
nonconforming use cases.  
Finally, we agree with the majority that it is unclear
on this record when the roadway parcels ceased to be used as
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No. 118
2  It appears, at least with respect to the roadway parcels,
that the majority agrees that both lawful use and a manifestation
of intent at the time the restrictive ordinance became effective
are required and that a manifestation of intent alone will not
suffice.
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roadways by the public.  BCS suggests that by at least 1967 they
were not used as roadways.  If the roadway parcels were used as
roadways as late as 1967, then they could not have been abandoned
under section 205 of the Highway Law by 1969, and if they were
not abandoned, then they could not have been mined lawfully.2  On
the other hand, if the roadway parcels were not traveled upon for
the six years prior to the effective date of the zoning ordinance
in 1969, then they would have been abandoned pursuant to the
Highway Law at the time the 1969 ordinance became effective.  If
the roadways within the special quarrying district created by the
Town were abandoned as of 1969, it appears BCS could have
lawfully mined them at the time the 1969 zoning ordinance became
effective and the roadway parcels would be eligible for
nonconforming use status.  When the roadway parcels were
abandoned is an open question.  Therefore, we agree with the
majority's remittal for a determination as to when the roadway
parcels ceased to be used by the public as roadways.
In sum, we agree with the majority as to parcels
17C/25C and 12B/25I and would reverse the Appellate Division as
to those parcels.  We further agree that we should remit for a
determination as to when the roadway parcels were abandoned. 
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However, we disagree with the majority as to parcels 5 and 25D
and would affirm the Appellate Division as to those parcels for
the reasons we have stated.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order modified, without costs, in accordance with the opinion
herein and, as so modified, affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Ciparick.
Judges Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.  Chief Judge Lippman
dissents in part in an opinion in which Judge Graffeo concurs.
Decided June 30, 2009