Case Title: Michael Thomas v. James S. Silvers

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC91-860

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1999-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. 91,860
____________
MICHAEL THOMAS, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
JAMES S. SILVERS, et al.,
Respondents.
[October 21, 1999]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Thomas v. Silvers, 701 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997),
in which the district court certified conflict with Mid-Florida Associates, Ltd. v.
Taylor, 641 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), and Comisky v. Rosen Management
Service, Inc., 630 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V,
§ 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  The issue underlying the conflict is whether an order denying
a motion to dismiss which is based on untimely service under Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.070(j) is a nonfinal, appealable order under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).  While this case was pending review in this Court, we
amended rule 1.070(j).  We conclude that the amended rule should apply to this
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case and that under the amended rule the challenged order is not a proper subject
for interlocutory appeal under rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).
I.  Facts
The Thomases filed a motion to dismiss this mechanic's lien foreclosure
action, arguing that Silvers failed to serve the initial summons and complaint
within 120 days of the filing of his lawsuit as required by rule 1.070(j).  After a
hearing, the trial court denied the motion.  The Thomases appealed that ruling.  The
district court dismissed the appeal, concluding that an order denying a motion to
dismiss which was based on untimely service is a nonfinal order and that it does
not fall within any of the categories set forth in Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.130(a)(3).  Thomas v. Silvers, 701 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 3d DCA
1997).  The court noted our decision in Morales v. Sperry Rand Corp., 601 So. 2d
538 (Fla. 1992), and found that it did not expand Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to include an order which denies a motion to dismiss based
solely on the failure to obtain timely service of process.  The court recognized that
its decision conflicted with the decisions in Taylor and Comisky.
II.  Analysis
Article V, section 4 of the Florida Constitution states that district courts may
review interlocutory orders to the extent provided in rules adopted by the Supreme
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Court.  Rule 9.130 governs interlocutory review of nonfinal orders.  Specifically,
rule 9.130 (a)(3)(C)(i) allows district courts to entertain interlocutory appeals from
lower court orders which determine "jurisdiction of the person."  The issue in this
case is whether an order denying a motion to dismiss which is based on untimely
service of process is an order which determines "jurisdiction of the person."  In
considering this issue, we remain vigilant in guarding the policy underlying rule
9.130 restricting piecemeal review of nonfinal orders because allowing such a
review, in most cases, only serves to waste court resources and needlessly delay
final judgment.  See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959, 960 (Fla. 1984).
The Thomases rely on the Fourth District's decision in Comisky v. Rosen
Management Service, Inc., 630 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), which held that
the timeliness of service related to the validity of service and was therefore
appealable under rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).  This decision was premised upon our
decision in Morales v. Sperry Rand Corp., 601 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1992), in which we
held that a trial court must dismiss a complaint under rule 1.070(j) when service is
not effected within the 120-day limit and the plaintiff fails to establish good cause
for the delay.  Our decision in Morales, however, is no longer viable 
and, therefore, neither is Comisky, in light of a recent amendment to rule 1.070(j).
In Amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j), 24 Fla. L.
1See Troxell v. Fedders of North America, Inc., 160 F.3d 381, 383 (7th
Cir.1998); De Tie v. Orange County, 152 F.3d 1109, 1111 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998);
Boley v. Kaymark, 123 F.3d 756, 758 (3d Cir.1997); Thompson v. Brown, 91 F.3d
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Weekly S109 (Fla. Mar. 4, 1999), we amended rule 1.070(j) to read as follows:
(j) Summons; Time Limit.  If service of the initial process and
initial pleading is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after
filing of the initial pleading and the party on whose behalf service is
required does not show good cause why service was not made within
that time, the court, on its own initiative after notice or on motion,
shall direct that service be effected within a specified time or shall
dismiss the action shall be dismissed without prejudice or drop that
defendant dropped as a party on the court's own initiative after notice
or on motion.; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause or
excusable neglect for the failure, the court shall extend the time for
service for an appropriate period.  A dismissal under this subdivision
shall not be considered a voluntary dismissal or operate as an
adjudication on the merits under rule 1.420(a)(1).
We stated that this amended rule was to apply to all civil cases commenced after
the issuance of the opinion and, insofar as just and practicable, to all civil cases
pending as of the date of issuance of the opinion.  Id.  We find that applying this
amended rule in this case, which was pending on review as of the date of issuance
of the opinion amending rule 1.070(j), is just and practicable.
The newly amended rule broadens a trial court's discretion to permit an
extension of time for service of process absent a showing of good cause.  This
amendment brings rule 1.070(j) in line with its federal counterpart, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(m).1  The amended rule provides that when a plaintiff fails to
20, 21 (5th Cir.1996); Adams v. Allied Signal Gen. Aviation Avionics, 74 F.3d
882, 887 (8th Cir.1996); Espinoza v. United States, 52 F.3d 838, 840-41 (10th
Cir.1995); Petrucelli v. Bohringer, 46 F.3d 1298, 1304 (3d Cir. 1995).
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effect timely service of process without showing good cause or excusable neglect,
the trial court retains the discretion to (1) extend the period for service, (2) dismiss
the action without prejudice, or (3) drop that defendant as a party.  Based on this
broadened discretion, we hold that an order denying a motion to dismiss which is
based on untimely service under rule 1.070(j) is not an order which determines
"jurisdiction of the person" and therefore is not an order which is directly
appealable under rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i).  This holding is consistent with the judicial
policy of restricting piecemeal review of nonfinal orders.  See Bruns, 443 So. 2d at
960.
III.  Conclusion
We decline to address the second issue raised by the Thomases, as it was not
addressed by the district court.  See Provident Management Corp. v. City of
Treasure Island, 718 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla. 1998) ("[A]s a rule, we eschew those
claims not first subjected to the crucible of the appellate process.").  We approve
the decision below, disapprove the decisions in Comisky and Mid-Florida
Associates in light of the recent amendment to rule 1.070(j), and remand this case
to the district court for further action consistent with this opinion.
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It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., and
OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Third District - Case No. 97-2617
(Dade County)
Thomas F. Luken, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Petitioners
Stephen N. Zack and John Arrastia, Jr. of Zack, Sparber, Kosnitzky, Spratt & Brooks,
P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Respondents