Case Title: Matter of a Member of the Bar: Schaeffer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 73-2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

In the Matter of a Member §
of the Bar of the Supreme Court §
of the State of Delaware: §
§
PETER K. SCHAEFFER, JR., § No. 73,2012
§
Respondent. § Board Case No. 2010-0093-B)
Submitted: May 16, 2012

 

Decided: May 21, 2012
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.

ORDER

This 21* day of May 2012, it appears to the Court that the Board on
Professional Responsibility has filed a Report on this matter pursuant to
Rule 9(4) of The Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
Respondent, through counsel, declined to file objections. Objections to the
Board’s Report were filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. The Court
has reviewed the matter pursuant to Rule 9(e) of The Delaware Lawyers’
Rules of Disciplinary Procedure and concludes the Board’s Report should be
approved.

‘NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Report filed by the
Board on Professional Responsibility on February 14, 2012 (copy attached)
ishereby APPROVED.
The Court hereby imposes a public reprimand. The Office of
Disciplinary Counsel is directed to file within ten days of the date of this
Order the costs of the disciplinary proceedings. ‘Thereafter, the Respondent
is directed to have all costs paid within thirty days.

‘The matter is hereby CLOSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Carolyn Berger

 
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(OF THE SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE

INTHE MATTEROF AMEMBER —)—— CONFIDENTIAL
‘OF THE BAR OF THE SUPREME )
‘COURT OF DELAWARE ) Board Case No. 2010-0093-B
)
PETER K. SCHAEFFER, JR., 2
)
‘Respondent )

1. Procedural Backeround

Pending before the undersigned pane (the “Panel” of the Board on Professional
‘Responsibility (the “Board” is a pttion (the “Petition” for discipline fled bythe Ofice of
Diseipinary Counsel (the “ODC") on October 5, 2011 in Case No, 2010-0053-B agninst Peter K.
Schaeffer, Jr. (the “Respondent”, « member of the Bar ofthe Supreme Court ofthe State of
‘Delaware (the “Court”. Respondent, then acting pros filed Respondent's Answer to Petition
for Discipline (the “Rexponse”) in which Respondent effectively denied mos ofthe factual
sllegations and legal conclusions related tothe violations alleged i the Petition.

‘The Board convened a hearing (he “Hearing”) which was held before the Panel
on November 16,2011, The transcript of the Hearing is cited herein as “TR.

 

Atthe

‘Hearing, the Pane! received into evidence without objection ODC Exhibits 1 through 3 which

‘had been attached tothe Petition as Exhibits 1 through 3 (TR. 13-16), a CD axdio 911 recording
‘ss ODC Exhibit 4 (TR. 18), a DVD videotape as ODC Exhibit § (TR. 18-19), additional emails
‘ss ODC Exhibits 6-10 (TR. 36-37), the transcript of «proceeding inthe Court of Chancery in the
State of Delaware Civil Action No. $273 (CC) (the “Chancery Action”) eneaptioned Gerry Grey,
Esquire and Gerry Gray, Individually, Plaintiffs vs, Peter K. Schaeffer, r., Individually and Peter

ox: nerea sonns006
K. Schaeffer, Jr, as owner of PeterK. Schaeffer, Jr, Inc, Defendants dated Febrasy 19,2010 a8,
‘ODC Exhibit 11 (TR. 177) ad a report from the Georgetown, Delaware Police dated February
15,2010 from Complaint 81-10-000718 as Respondent Exhibit 1. The Hearing included playing
‘of the audio tape (ODC Exhibit 4 and the videotape (ODC Exhibit 5). The Panel heard
testimony from Respondent, Gerard Francis Gray, Esquire ("Gray"), Frederick W. lobst,
‘Eaquir, Chief Disciplinary Counsel forthe ODC (“Iobs”), Mr. Bradley A. Carrey
(CCordrey"), an employee ofthe City of Georgetowm Police Department, and Ms, Kelly Rene
Jansen, a licensed Delaware private investigator, as well as legal argument from Patricia Batley-
‘Schwartz, Esquire of ODC, end Charles Slanina, Esquire, who had entered an sppesrance on.
‘behalf of Respondent subsequent to the ling of Respondent's Response and served as counsel to
Respondent atthe Hewing.

Following the conclusion ofthe Hearing, the Panel advised that it would study the
transcripts, exhibits and applicable law and advise if future proceedings relating to imposition of
sanctions would be necessary.

By letter datod December 6, 2011, Richard A. Levine, Esquire, Chairman of the
Panl, advised thatthe Panel had reached a determination that Respondent had violsted the
Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct the “Rules”) 8.4(b), 8.4), and 8.4(8) as
slleged in Counts 1, I and Il ofthe Petition’ and therefore the Panel wished to convene a
subsequent hearing (the “Sanction Hearing”) to hear testimony and/or argument ftom counsel
with respect to the approprite sanction tht the Panel should impose upon Respondent.

‘The Sanction Hearing was held before the Panel on January 6,2012. The
‘uansorip ofthe Sanction Hearing is cited herein as “TRSH. __ At the Sanction Hearing the

 

"Te Panel dtrmined at id not have sufilnt evidence to make fnding with rppecto Counts Vand V of|
the Petition.

2
on: teen sone
‘Panel heard oral argument from Respondent's counsel and ODC counsel as well as testimony
‘rom Respondent and two character witesses(TRSH. 4 called by Reapondent's counsel, James
‘D. Griffin, Eaquire and Mr. Edwin K. Speraw.

1. Eastual Findings

‘Based on the few factual allegations of the Petition admitted by Respondent and
‘the Pane!'s evaluation ofthe testimony received at the Hearing fom Respondent and the other
‘witnesses and the Pane!'s review ofthe Exhibits, particularly ODC Exhibits 4 and S, the Board
makes the factual findings which follow:

1, Respondents a member ofthe Bar ofthe Supreme Court of Delaware.
He was admitted to practice in 2009 (Petition in Response). At al times relevant to matters in
the Petition, the Respondent was engaged inthe practice of law with offices located inter alia st
6 North Railroad Avenue, Georgetown, Delaware (the “Building”) (Petition in Response $2).
Respondent had been previously admitted to the Bar ofthe State of New York in 1998 following
‘guuation from Widener Law School (TR. 10-11). Prior to his admissions to the Br,
‘Respondent had freelanced for various sates and territories ofthe United States to perform
‘financial solvency audits and market conduct audits on insurance companies doing business or
domiciled in those states (TR. 11).

2. Gray was admitted as a member ofthe Deleware Bar in 1989 and
specializes in the are of bankruptcy (TR. 64). Iti uncontroverted thet Gray practiced in the
same Building as Respondent and oocupied two offices on the second floor ofthe Building, one
cccupied by his staf of two paralegals and the other by himself (TR. 14). The Building was
‘owned by Georgetown atomey James D. Griffin, Baquire and leased to Respondent, who
‘cccupicd a portion of the Building for his own prectice with the remainder ofthe Building

een soon
‘occupied by Georgetown attomey William M. Chasnoff, Esquire (TR. 26) and Gray. While the
testimony as othe professional relationship between Respondent and Gray nd the legal basis
under which Gray occupied his space atthe Building was at variance itis clear tht ws of Friday,
February 12,2010, Gray wns conducting his legal practice inthe Building and paying rent
therefor (Respondent Bx. 1 Pages 2-23). Respondent contended that Gray was his employee at
that time (TR. 13) and Gray contended that he was en independent contractor and sub-tnant of
‘Respondent (Respondent Ex. 1, Pages 11-12)? There was no written partnership agreement.
‘between Gray and Respondent. (Respondent Ex. 1, Page 23).
3. As Gray was exiting the Building a the conclusion ofthe day on Friday,

‘February 12, 2010 at sbout 7:00 P.M., he popped his head into Mr. Schaeffer's office and asked
‘if Mr. Schaeffer wanted to grab a beer with him and Mr. Schaeffer said “No.” (TR. 65).
‘Approximately three hours Inter, Mt. Schacffer directed an e-mail to Mr. Gray (ODC Exhibit 1)
advising as follows:

“Mr. Gray, effective today you are no longer associated

‘with this firm. The locks and security codes at $ North

Railroad Avenue have been changed, Please do not attempt

to enter the building at any time inthe future.

{eft your email and calender accessible temporarily in

‘order that you may obtain necessary items, Email me alist

‘tw me and | will have same delivered to you by Monday,

February 15,2010."

Respondent explained thet his abrupt fring of Gray and Gray's exclusion from

‘the Building were justified by Respondent's discovery of what he considered financial reporting
inconsistencies by Gray which Respondent felt exposed him to financial reporting risk (TR. 156-

"The noeriny with he respect othe legates ofthe rlatlonahp beween Respondent and Grays appara he
sce fini, rai Canny Aron end nt a's vw, pe te eed rer
‘ater.

4
1 tnee0n sora cons
 

77-182) in his capacity as Gray's employer. Respondent's abrupt termination of the
‘elationship with Gray began the chain of events tht led to the Hearing,

4, Gray responded to Respondent's e-mail at 4:09 A.M. on Saturday,
February 13,2010 (ODC Exhibit 2) requesting that Respondent provide him “a week or soto
retiove my belongings and get my staff re-established.” Respondent replied at 8:09 A.M. that
_momning requesting that Gray “Please work on the lst oftems you will ned on Monday. Your
casliest cooperation willbe greatly appreciated” (ODC Exhibit 6). Gray replied at 11:44 AM.
‘that moming requesting that Respondent call him on his home telephone number and advising
Respondent “do us both a favor and don't force a confrontation about whatever is bothering,
‘you." (ODC Exhibit 8). Gray subsequently left a phone message with Respondent and
confirmed it in an e-mail at 5:08 PM. on Saturday, Febroary 13, 2010 as follows:

“Just wanted to reiterate that we tll have a day lft if you want to

talk things over. ‘There is absolutely no reason why two adults

should not be able to work out their differences, particularly where

have no idea what you are upset about

‘To reiterate what [le on my phone message:

{Lam not your employee, you cannot fire me, We share office

xyes nde out coos ofthe bling Templo youto

, You cannot legally change the locks and keep me

ted ny saffotof e ball”

5. On Sunday morning, February 14,2010 at 7:23 A.M,, Respondent advised
Gray allegedly fora thir time, to “provide alist of items he needed to minimize any
{interruptions in your personal and professional life” (ODC Exhibit 3). The e-mail goes on to
‘admonish Gray “Please do not attempt to enter my office at 6 North Railroad Avenue. You have
been fred. You are not welcome.” and advised Gray “when you provide the list, hopefily today
{n order to minimize interuptions in my personal and professional life, I wil tll you when and

5
ox tterean roma 8
‘where on Monday you may pick up what you've requested.” Respondent's e-mail ended with a
_waming that “IT do not receive this positive response by 3:00 P.M. today I wil take lawful
‘measures in order to keep the peace.” At 12:35 A.M, on Monday, February 15,2010, Gray seat
‘tn e-mail to Respondent advising that a partial lst of tems included all of his client files, his
computers and software. (ODC Exhibit 10)

6. While the exchange of emails between Respondent and Gray was
‘ongoing, on Sunday, February 14,2010, Respondent contacted Kelly Rene Jansen (“Jansen”), «
licensed Delaware private investigetor with whom Respondent had had some previous contact
(TR. 119-122; TR. 149). Respondent requested that Jansen be a the Building on Monday
‘moming “because he was worried about what might happen if Mr, Gray appeared at the office.
He just wanted a witness to be there.” (TR. 123). Ms Jansen suggested that she bring a video
camera because in hr experience the presence of «camera usually would serve to keep &
situation from escalating because it reminds everyone that their actions will be considered by a
court or another body at some later point (TR. 123). Respondent agreed (TR. 124).

7. On Monday moming, February 15, 2010, Mr. Gray went to the Building
‘ccompaniod by his two paralegals, Rhonda Palmer and Maris Foulke, Ms, Foulke's husband,
Ms, Foulke's teenage daughter, «fiend of Ms. Foulke’s teenage daughter and Ms. Palmer's 16
(or 15-year old son (TR. 65). Gray and those sccompanying him carried Tupperware containers
and bores to retrieve files and computers (TR. 66). Mr. Gray and the others attempted to enter
the Building through the back door andthe side door, exch of which were locked, vo they went to
the front of the Building which was unlocked (TR. 66). Respondent was atthe Building together
‘with Ms, Jansen and hed his cellphone out (TR. 6). ODC 5 shows that as Gray entered the

ot: neene0n sone
‘Building, Respondent stood inthe doorway and Gray pushed around him, although no altercation
rupted.

 

‘Me. Gray and those accompanying him headed up the staircase to the
second floor where there were two offices on either side ofthe hal, one occupied by Me. Gray's
paralegals and the ather by Mr. Gray (TR. 67). Respondent reveated to the top ofthe stairway
‘nd was engeged in some back and forth pushing with Ms. Foulke who loudly accused
Respondent of “touching” her (TR.21). Upon hearing her accusations, Ms. Foulke's husband
then ran up the stairs toward Respondest (TR. 21). Respondent claims tha this course of events
made him “scared tothe point where I had become nauseous” (TR. 23). It was at this time that
‘Respondent placed the 911 call which is documented as ODC Exhibit 4.

9. Respondent's phone call to 911 begins by identifying the location ofthe
‘Building, first advises that there is “an emergency situation, altercation,” but then repeatedly
states in an elevated voice “hostage situation.” (ODC 5)

10. The Panels reviewed the audiotape and the videotape and concludes
‘that while there was substantial confusion in the Building, at no time did the events constitute w
“bostage situation.” While Respondent may have reasonably believed that he was possibly going
{tobe assaulted by Mr. Foulke or possibly comered by Mr. Foulke in an office, there is no
‘evidence that Mr, Foulke ever assaulted Respondent nor that Mr. Foulke nor anyone else
restrined Respondent. Respondent himself testified that he characterized the incident as a
“hostage sitation” to speed up the police response (TR. 19; TR. 137; TR. 152). Indeed, the
Videotape shows that a the very time that Respondent claims to have retreated into a rear office
‘of the Building from which there was no exit (TR. 22), Mr. Foulkes standing inthe doorway of
‘the office across the hal. The videotape further shows that within minutes of placing the 91

a: uermon songs
«all, Respondent is physically unharmed and walking freely through the Building onthe frst
floor. Indeed, Respondent conceded that there was no actual hostage situation (TR. 137; TR.
206; TR. 208).

11, Prior tothe aval ofthe police, Respondent, while frely walking around
‘the Building, placed a second call to the police asking “where the hell they were” (TR. 167; TR.
182), Respondent did not advise the police during this cal that his prior call repeatedly claiming
‘hostage situation” was nether tru a the time of his call nor ha it materialized,

12, Ultimately, the Georgetown police arrived atthe Building (TR. 93-94)
responding with lights and sirens (TR. 139) and heavily armed (TR. 132) o what was dispatched
‘sa hostage situation (TR. 105), Apparently seven to ten police officers from the Georgetown
Police and the Delaware State Police responded (TR. 106). Because it was deemed a hostage
call, ome ofthe officers had rifles and others had semi-automatic weapons. The Delaware Sie
Police had a tactical shotgun (TR. 106). These weapons were draw and displayed upon the
police offices” arival atthe Building (TR. 106-107), This large showing of police force was a
specific response tothe characterization by Respondent thatthe events atthe Building
constituted a “kidnapping” (TR. 115-116), Even Respondent was fightened by the presence of
the police with drawn guns and characterized his thoughts as “I thought I was going to de.” (TR.
145), The Georgetown Police Department report of the incident (Respondent Exhibit 1) reported
‘that “Ms. Gray was detained for further investigation, without incident” and that “Me. Schaeffer
‘dvised that he was just robbed/burplarized/assaultod,”

13, While Gray was walking tothe back ofthe Building's parking lot, a poice
‘officer came around the comer wearing fill body armor and pointed an assault rifle at Gray and
told him to freeze (TR. 68). Gray was subsequently pushed tothe ground, handcuffed and

o1stiere08 e010 206
placed in a squad car (TR. 141) for approximately 30 minutes. Gray was subsequently taken to
the Georgetown Police Department (TR. 68) as was Respondent.

14, While Gray and Respondent were a the Georgetown police station,
CCondrey was in telephone contact with Jobst (TR. 40-41; TR. 108-109). Following the cll with
lobst, Cordrey advised Respondent that he was going to permit Mr. Gray and his associates beck
into the Building t tke their personal goods and ther files (TR. 143). Respondent advised that
bbe had no problem with Mr. Gray removing personal items, but had concern about files lsving
the office before he could get clarification from the ODC (TR. 143) and Respondent then spoke
ircty to Tobst himself (TR. 144).

15, While Respondent's recollections and lobst’s recollections ofthat
‘conversation are not the same, following the discussion with Tobt, the incident concluded with
Me. Gy being permitted to remove personal items and certain fles from the Building.
‘Apparently, the remaining files were removed following a teleconference before Chancellor
William B, Chandler It in the Chancery Action on Friday, February 19, 2010.

16. Apart from the differences in their recollections ofthe February 15,2010
convertion between Respondent and lobst, Respondent contends (and lobst denies) thet
‘Respondent hada second conversation with Jobst te following dey that abst does not recall
(TR. 48-49). Because Counts TV and V of the Petition are premised onthe telephone discussions
between Iobst and Respondent, the Panel finds that the inconsistencies between the testimony of
Jobst and Respondent relating to those telephone cals cannot be reconciled and rather than
lectin to resolve the differences basod on evaluations of credibility, the Panel as determined
‘not to make an adjudication with respect tothe violation alleged in Counts TV and V of the
Petition
‘TH Standard of Proof

‘Allegations of professional misconduct set forth in the ODC’s Petition must be
cstablished by clear and convincing evidence. Delaware Lawyers' Rule of Disciplinary
Procedure (‘DLRFDP") 15,

TV. Violations of the Rules

(Count I I and II of te Petition allege that Respondent violeted Rule 8.4(b)
‘When be falsely reported to police that a “hostage situation” was taking place (Count 1 ia
‘violation of 11 Del. §1245 that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) whe be falsely reported to
police that «hostage situation was taking place (Count M, and that Respondent violated Rule
8.444) when be falsely reported a hostage situation (Count II). The factual gravarnen of each of
‘the three counts is that Respondent falsely reported to the police that a “hostage situation” was
taking place on February 14,2010, The Panel has determined that, asset fort in its Fecal
Findings, ODC established by clear and convincing evidence (1) Respondent knowingly,
Intentionally and recklessly filed an exaggerated 911 report of a “hostage situation” when he
‘knew that no hostage situation had occurred or was infact about to oocur and infact, didnot
‘occur, (2) Respondent's actions resulted in a Soresceable dangerous police overreaction that even
Respondent claimed made him fer for his life (TRSH Ex. 1) and (3) Respondent's actions
therefore constituted violations of Rules 8.4(0), 8.4) and 8.4(€).

Count alleges that Respondent's actions constituted a violation of 11 Del C,
£91245, Class A misdemeanor when, knowing the information reported was false, he reported
sn allegedly impending occurence of an offense or incident which di not infact cour (11 De.
©. §1245(3)0) or reported false information relating to an actual offense or incident (11 Del.
{$1245@(@)). Although counsel for Respondent vehemently challenged the factual basis for &

10
ena soon
violation of 11 Del. C. §1245, counsel for Respondent didnot challenge the ODC assertion that a
‘violation of 11 Del. C. $124 would constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(b)°. While the Panel is
‘unaware of any Delaware case finding hata violation of 11 Del. §1245 constitutes a violation
of Rule 8.4(b), the Board and the Delaware Supreme Court have held tht commission of various
other criminal acts constitute violations of Rule 84(b). In Re Melvin, Del. Supr. 807 A.2d 530
(2002), In Re Howard, Del. spr. 765 42d 39 (2000), In Re Dorsey, Del. Sup. 683 4.24 1046,
‘Ine Agostini, Del Supr. 632 4.24 80 (199%), In Re Tennenbaxom, Del. Spr. 880 42d 1025
(2005), in Re Erna, Del. Supr. 971 4.24 110 (2009), In Re Steiner, Del. Supr. 817 4.24795
(2003). The Pane! has determined that, although not baseless, Respondent's report ofa “hostage
situation” was a knowing and intentional exaggertion of the situation occurring on February 15,
2010, There was no hostage situation 0 that Respondent's report constinted a violation of 11
Del. C. §1245(3)(b) and (c). This criminal act unquestionably reflects adversely on
Respondent's honesty and constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4(0). See Jn the Matter of Samuel
abel, MJ Supr. 640 A.2d 837 (1994) (ling ofa flse police report in violation of New Jersey
statute constitutes violation of Rules &.4(t), (6) and () and CE. Jn the Matter of Neal L
Grossman, Mich Supr. 211 N.W. 24 21 (1973) (Sling ofa false police report constitutes
engaging in condoct involving dishonesty, frend, deceit o misrepresentstion).

‘Respondent's conduct in making a false report to the police also constitutes a
Violation of Rule 84(¢) as alleged in Count I ofthe Petition since the making ofthat report was
engaging in conduct involving “dishonesty” and “misrepreseatation,” two alterate grounds for
Violations of Rule £4(¢). See In Re Mebvin supra at 553; In Re Gielata, Dela. Supr, 933.424
1249 (2007) at Page 3; In the Matter of Asbel, supra, at 843.

 

 

I fit, Respondent's counsel dd ot challenge te appicbity of any of Rules 8.4(0), 8.4%) 84)
‘Respondent’ alleged conduct,

u
ox n6enen sows
(Count IT of the Petition alleges that Respondent's conduct violated Rule 84(6)
‘which provides that itis misconduct fr a lnwyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial tothe
‘dministation of justice. Although the Pane is not aware of any Delaware case in which abuse
of police resources was found tobe a violation of Rule 8.4) as “prejudicial to the
‘dministration of justice," the Delaware Supreme Court has held tht fling fivolous lawsuits,
‘Steiner, supra, or other matters involving cour proceedings, In Re Abbot, Del. Sup. 925 4.24
482 (2007) not involving actual civil proceedings are violation of Rule 8.4(4) Violations of
Rule 8.4(4) have also been found by the Deleware Supreme Court for false certifications of
_somey books and records In Re Nowak Del. Supr. 5S A.3d 631 (2010), In Re Witherell, Del
‘Supr. 998 A.2d 852 (2010), In Re Otlowshi, Del. Supr. 976 A.2d 172 (2008), 2s well as for
failures to be fortacoming with other governmental agencies such esa failure to file taxes. Jn Re
‘Mekier, 89 4.24 1171 (1976), In Re Tos, 6104.24 1370 (1992), In Re Sandbach, 546 A.2d 345
(1988). Its the Panel's view that false reporting tothe police is prejudicial to the administration
of justice since filing of charges withthe police is often startin place for charges inthe
criminal justice system, Indeed, a foreseeable result of Respondent's police call would have
‘been initiation of criminal charges against Gray or others involved in the alleged “hostage
situation.” The Panel’s conclusion in this regard is supported by the decision of the New Jersey
‘Supreme Court Inthe Matte of Asbell, supra. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
suspended a former Camden County prosecutor who staged en assassination attempt on his own
life and filed a false police repor, citing Rule 8.4(4) in addition to Rules 8.4(8) and 8.4(¢). In Re
Asbell, supra at 843.

12
ox reer sons 10s
‘V. Sanctions

1. Objectives and Standanis for imposing Sanctions. The Delaware Supreme
(Court has authority and wide latitude in disciplinary matters respecting members ofthe Delaware
ber, Jn Re Howard, supra, at 42, including wide litude in determining the appropriate form of
Aisipline, In Re Steiner, supra. at 796. The objectives of the lawyer disciplinary system are to
protect the public, to protect administration of justice, to preserve confidence in the legal
‘profession and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. Jn Re McCann, Del. Sup. 894
‘A.2d 1087, 1088 (2007); In Re Doughty, Del. Supr. 832 4.24724, 735-736 (2003). In
formulating an appropriate sanction, the Supreme Court looks tothe framework set forth in the
[ABA Standards for imposing lawyer sanctions (the “ABA Standards") and to relevant precedent
‘in making an initial determination ofan appropriate or presumptive sanction, the Court begins by
cxamining three key factors: (othe ethical duty violated; (b) the lwyer’s mental state, and (¢)
the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct. After weighing
these thre factors and malting an initial determination of an appropriate sanction the Court will
‘then look st the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the particular case to determine if
‘he discipline should be increased or decreased. In Re Howard, supra. ot 42. Notwithstanding
‘thatthe final decision lies withthe Supreme Court, it isthe Board's esponsibility to recommend
‘an appropriate sanction in the first instance (DLR FDP 9(¢)iv) and what follows i the Pane!'s
‘recommendation for sanction based on te foregoing standards, legal authorities and precedent.

2, Contention of Parties and Board Recommendation ODC recornmended
sanction ofa suspension of at least one year (TRSH. 35) and counsel for Respondent
‘recommended «private admonition (TRSH. 57-58) with or without imposition of conditions

3
ox neenon seme 06
(TRSH. 56). The Pane! has concluded thatthe appropriate sanction isa public reprimand with
{imposition of costs.

3. Ethical Duty Violated. Respondent's actions violated duties to the genera
public by breaking the law and filing to maintain the public's trust as an officer ofthe court,
Respondent's misconduct didnot implicate any duty toa particular client. Both ODC (TRSH.
25) and counsel for Respondent (TRSH. 37) contend thatthe matter involves a violation of the
duty owed tothe public. ABA Standard 5.0 provide as follows, citing Rule 8.40):

“The most fundamental duty which a lawyer owes the public is
the duty to maintain the standards of personal integrity upon
wich the community relies. The public expects the lawyer to
be honest and to abide by the law; public confidence is the

integrity of officers of the court is undermined when lewyers
engage in illegal conduct.”

4. Mental Ste, The Panel has determined that Respondent acted
knowingly, intentionally and recklessly. The ABA Standards discuss meatal states as follows:
“The most culpable mental state is that of intent, wen the
lwyer acts with conscious objective or purpose to accomplish
‘particular result. The next most culpable mental stat is that
‘of knowledge, when the Inwyer acts with conscious awareness
of the nature or attendant circumstances of his or her conduct,

‘both without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish

‘particular result.” (ABA Standards Page 6)

inthis case, the evidence supports the Panel's conclusion that Respondent’ report of @ non-
existing “hostage situation” was intentionally made withthe conscious purpose to obtain an
‘expedited police response, Respondent's behavior was also knowing, Counsel for Respondent
oes not really challenge the ODC contention that Respondent acted intentionally and
‘knowingly, but focuses on Respondents state of mind, contending that, while pehaps
intentional and knowing, Respondent's actions were not motivate to impose harm on others, but
to protect himself fom what he believed was impending harm (TRSH. 47) and under

4
circumstances thet approprittely clouded Respondent's judgment (TRSH. 40). The Pane! will
‘reat these arguments of Respondent's counsel as part ofits discussion ofthe aggravating and
mitigating circumstances below.

5. Extent of Actual or Potential Injury, Asa result of Respondent's ectons,
sn overstated police response was obtained, thus burdning th resources of the State of
Delaware and the City of Georgetown. The unnecessarily armed police response created fear
‘and apprehension to both Respondent and Mr. Gray. Gray was also subject to treatment by the
police that would not have been characteristic ofa simple trespass or breach of the peace police
complaint. While there was potential for seious injury due tothe presence of armed police,
fortunately no such injury occurred.

6. Presumptive Sanction. Based on the foregoing, the Panel has conchuded
‘that the presumptive sanction is either suspension as submitted by ODC in accordance with ABA.
Standard 5.12 or reprimand as submited by Respondent's counsel pursuant to ABA Standard
513.

‘ABA Standard 5.12 provides that suspension is generally appropriate when @
lnwyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in
‘Standard 5.11 and that seriously edversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice. The
commentary to ABA Standard 5.12 provides that lawyers who engage in criminal conduct other
‘than that descibed above in ABA Standard $.11 shouldbe suspended in cases where their
conduct seriously adversely reflects on their fitness to practice. The Standards provide that a
suspension can be imposed even when no criminal charges have been filed against a lawyer
‘which isin accord with Delaware precedents cited above. However, the commentary to ABA
‘et OD Renn cum cd tt Raptr peng ADA

1s
1 nges001 son 208
‘Standard 5.12 continues, “not every lawyer who commits «criminal ation be suspended,
however” and observes that “the most common cases involve lawyers wi commit felonies other
than those listed above, such asthe possession of narcotics or sexual assault.” ABA Standard
5.13 provides that reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any
other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and tht adversely
reflects on the lawyer’ fitness to practice law, The main distinction between Standard 5.12 and
Standard 5.13 appear to be the seriousness ofthe conduc, with Standard 5,12 focused on
“criminal conduct” that “seriously adversely reflects on the lawyers fitness to practice” end
Standard 5.13 focused on “otber [presumably non-<ciminal] conduct.”

Although Respondent was neither charged with nor convicted ofa crime inthis
case, the Pane concludes thatthe presumptive sanction under the ABA Standards is no more
severe than suspension pursuant to Standard 5.12,

7. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. As stated above, both Delaware
‘Supreme Court precedent and ABA Standard 9.1 provide that aggravating (as delineated in ABA
‘Standard 9.22) and mitigating (as delineated in ABA Standard 9.32) circumstances should be
considered to increase or decrease the degre of discipline to be imposed. In Re Balley, Del.
Sir. 821 4.2d 851, 866 (2003) The aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified in the
ABA Standards and ther applicability to this matter are discussed below.

‘A. Agarmvating Factors
@ Prior disciplinary offenses —ODC (TRSH. 27) and Respondent's
counsel agree that Respondent has no prior disciplinary offenses,
(i) Dishonest or selfish motive — ODC contends that Respondent's
sections on February 15,2010 were motivated by the dishonest and selfish motive of attempting

16
een son es
to seize Mr Gray's bankruptcy practice (TRSH. 27-28). Respondent's counsel disagrees and
contend that there was a good faith dispute as to the ownership ofthe files (TRSH 41-42). The
Panel need not determine what Respondents intentions were with respec o matters relating 10
the recovery of Me. Gray's files since the relationship between Respondent and Gray isnot the
‘asia ofthe ODC Petition and is the subject of civil litigation between them, Rather, wih
respect o the gravamen ofthe ODC Petition, the false report ofa “hostage situation” tothe
police, the Panel believes thet Respondent was not motivated by dishonest or selfish motives, but
rather by a desire to expedite the police response, lbet improperly or recklessly.

(Gi) Patter of misconduct - ODC (TRSH. 28) and Respondent's
counsel (TRSH. 45) agree there was no pattem of misconduct.

(jv) Multiple offenses - ODC (TRSH. 28) and Respondent's counsel
(TRSH.45) agree there were no multiple offenses.

(8) Bad faith obstruction ofthe disciplinary proceeding by
‘intentionally filing to comply with rules or onder ofthe disciplinary agency ~ ODC (TRSH. 28)
‘and Respondent's counsel (TRSH. 46) agree there was no such bed fith obstruction.

(i) Submission of false evidence, false statements or other deceptive
practies during the disciplinary process - ODC (TRSH. 28) contends that thee is evidence that
Respondent provided false statements tothe ODC in connection with the matter, Respondent's
‘counsel (TRSH. 47) denies ths. The Panel made no finding with respect to Respondent's
‘communications with ODC and does not treat submission of false evidence, eo. as an
aggravating circumstance,

(ii) Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct - ODC
(TRSHL 28) contends that Respondents refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his

Ww
ox trea sons
conduct atthe November 16,2011 hearing isan aggravating factor despite his January 6,2012
Hearing statements of apology (TRSH. 17) and his admission that he wished he had handled
raters differently (TRSH. 16). Counsel for Respondent rejects ODC's postion (TRSH. 48),
“The Panel recognizes that inthe context ofa bifurcated hearing with a spirited defense to the
claims of misconduct, it would have been awkward for Respondent to have acknowledged the
‘wrongful nature of is conduct at the November 16,2011 hearing so tht the Panel doos not
‘consider Respondent's failure to do so an aggravating circumstance.

(i) Vulnerability of victim; Substantial experience inthe practice of
law; Indifference to making restitution; egal conduct, inchuding that involving the use of
‘controlled substances - Neither ODC (TRSH. 29) or Respondent's counsel argued that any of
these aggravating circumstances ae involved in this mater,

‘Based onthe foregoing, the Pane! finds no reason to increase the presumptive
sanction of suspension,
eee

(@ Absence of prior disciplinary record - ODC (TRSH. 27) end
[Respondent's counsel agree that Respondent has no prior disciplinary offenses.

(i) Absence ofa dishonest or selfish motive — As discussed in Section
VOXAXii) above, the Pane! has concluded that Respondent acted with an absence ofa dishonest
cor selfish motive, but was motivated by an improper and reckless desire to expedite the police
response,

(li) Personal or emotional problems ~ Respondents counse submits
that the fear, excitement and panic ofthe events taking place on February 15,2010 were
‘mitigating circumstances and « partial explanation for Respondent's exaggersed police report of

18
neeren sromne s
‘ “hostage situation.” The Panel agrees tat the circumstances surround Respondent's police call
rea mitigating factor, although nota sufficient excuse for Respondent's actions,

(Gv) Timely good faith effort to make resiution orto retify
‘consequences of misconduct ~ The Pane rejects Respondent's counsel's contention that
Respondent’ allege efforts to resolve the civil mater with Mr. Gray should be treated as &
mitigating fictor (TRSH. 46). In fact, the Panel believes that when it transpired thet Respondent
‘was not confined to his office and tht is feared hostage sitution did not occur, he should have
recontacted the police to advise thatthe “hostage situation” did not exist.

(v) Ful and free disclosure to Disciplinary Bosrd or cooperative
stttude toward proceedings - The Panel agrees with Respondent's counsel that there was no
evidence presented that Respondent has been uncooperative in the course of this matter (TRSH.
46), but the Panel views that circumstance as a neutral rater than a mitigating, circumstince,

(vi) Inexperience inthe practice of law — Both ODC (TRSH. 29) and
‘Respondent's counsel (TRSH. 46-47) agree that Respondent was inexperienced in the practice of
law.

(i) Character or reputation ~ The character testimony of James D.
Griffith, Eogure (TRSH. 8-9) is uncontroverted. Likewise, the testimony of Edwin K. Spearow
‘with respect to Respondent's character and public service was uncontroverted (TRSH, 11-14)

(vil) Physical disability ~ Although Respondent's counsel submitted
that Respondent's charscterstios as older and smaller than his feared attacker (TRSH. 47), the
Panel has previously considered those factors in connection with its evaluation of Respondent's
motives and does not treat his physical condition as a separate mitigating factor,

19
1164004 senna 208
(Gx) Menta disability or chemical dependency ~ These factors were
not the subject of any evidence atthe hearing.

(%)_ Imposition of other penalties or sanctions — Although
Respondent's counsel pointed tothe civil litigation between Respondent and Mr, Gray a a
‘mitigating factor, the Panel docs not see how those proceedings mitigate Respondent's violation
of 1 Del. © $1245.

(xi) Remorse ~ See discussion in Section V(7WAXvii) above relating
‘to Respondent's alleged refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.

(ii) Remoteness of prior offenses Since there were no prior

offenses (TRSH. 27), this factor is not relevant.

 

‘Based on its analysis of the ABA Standards, the Pane! has concluded that the
appropriate sanction is «public reprimand with imposition of costs. Ifthe presumptive sanction
‘would be suspension in aocordance with ABA Standard 5.12 as advanced by ODC (TRSH. 35),
‘the balance ofthe aggravating and mitigating factors would cause the Pane! to reduce the
sanction to reprimand pursuant to ABA Standard 5.13. Ifthe presumptive sanction would be &
reprimand pursuant to ABA Standard 5.13, as contended by Respondent's counsel (TRSH. 45),
the Panel does not find that the weight of the mitigating factors would reduce the appropriate
sanction toa private admonition in accordance with ABA Standard 5.14 as advocated for by
Respondent's counsel (TRSH. 57-58).

‘The Pane will discuss the legal arguments advanced by ODC and counsel for
Respondent and the consistency of the Panel's decision with prior precedent in Section VI

below.

20
ox nieroa sean 06
‘VL Conclusion and Precedence

‘The Panel has concluded that the appropriate sanction isa public reprimand, The
Panel's conclusion is based on the assumption that if the presumptive sanction is suspension
pursuant to Standard 5.12, the weight of the mitigating factors would reduce the recommendation
to reprimand pursuant to ABA Standard 5.13 or, ifthe presumptive sanction is reprimand
‘pursuant to ABA Standard 5.13, the aggravating factors do not warrant an increase ofthat
‘sanction and the mitigating factors do not justify a reduction of that sanction. Moreover, the
‘Pane! believes that based upon the authorities and argument presented to it by ODC and counsel
{for Respondent, the sanction of « public reprimand conforms to precedent both within and
‘outside Delaware.

‘ODC advanced two cases from other jurisdictions dealing with making a false
report tothe police as precedential support for ODC’s recommendation that a suspension of st
least one year is the appropriate sanction. In In the matter of Asbell, supra, the New Jersey
‘Supreme Court held that a two-year suspension was appropriate for violations of Rules 8.4(6),
'.4(6) and 8.4(4) where the lnwyer had staged an assassination attempt on his ow life and then
filed a false police report regarding the false attempt. In Jn Re Neisner, supra, the Vermont
Supreme Court assessed a two-year suspension plus probation as the appropriate sanction for a
lawyer convicted ofthe crime of impeding a public officer stemming from the lawyer's conduct
‘of leaving the scene ofa car accident and then falsely reporting tothe police that his wife had
‘caused the accident. The Panel does not consider either ofthese cases as sound precedent for
suspending Respondent. The Asbell case involved a well thought out and orchestrated plot over
‘an extended period of time to which the accused attorney entered a guilty plea. In this case, the
‘ction of Respondent in reporting a “hostage situation” was spontaneous, not planned, and, of

a
‘1s re¢001 smn 206
course, Respondent was not convicted ofa crime, but credibly challenged the facts underlying
‘the charges agninst him, athough the Panel has determined thet notwithstanding his challenge,
‘the allegations were established by clear and convincing evidence. Similarly, in Jn Re Nelaner,
the attomey was convicted of criminal offenses that constituted a felony.

‘ODC also pointed the Panel's attention to three Deleware suspension cases,
ramely In Re Melvin, supra, In Re Howard, supra, end In Re Steiner, supra in suppor of its
‘contention thet Respondent should be suspended. Jn Re Melvin, unlike the current matter which
involves contested claims of « misdemeanor, involved « guilty ple to criminal misdemeanor
charges in a mater that also involved alleged felony counts in connection with violations of
‘family court prevention from abuse order by a member ofthe Delaware bar. Jn Re Howard
{involved a three-year suspension of an storey who pled guilty to two drug related
‘misdemeanors where the initial charges included felonies, In the same vein, In Re Steiner
involved a member ofthe Delaware bar who pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree
‘vehicular assault and one count of driving under the influence where the original charges had
included felonies.

‘Two other cases submitted as precedent by ODC are worthy of discussion. In in
‘Re Grossman, supra, the Supreme Court of Michigan determined that a public reprimand was,
appropriate where the lawyer reported that his car was stolen by a mechanic in connection with a
ispute between the atiomey and a mechanic who performed repair services to the vehicle. Like
the case of Respondent, the lawyer was not criminally charged with a misdemeanor although his
‘sctions were determined to contain the elements of a misdemeanor of filing a false police report
following a contested hearing. The final case cited by ODC, In Re Glelata, De. Sup. 933 A.2d
11249 (2007) involved imposition of public reprimand against a member of the Delaware bar

2
or 113003 sono
who folowing a contested hearing a panel ofthe Board on Profesional Responsibility had
determined violated Rules 8.4(0), 84(c) and 8.4(4) in connection with scheme by the attorney
snd «friend to sel paintings to one another vi the PayPal sevice and to then make claims
agains the company under the company's money-back guarantee, The Panel believes that the
decisions in in Re Grosrman and in Re Gielaia suppor imposition ofa pablic reprimand against
Respondent.

‘Atte January 6 hesring, counsel for Respondent pointed the Panel to sever
Delaware disciplinary cases imposing private admonitions for cases involving false notarizations
‘2 well as numerous other cases involving imposition of private admonitions fr actions that
‘were cither adjudicated 1 be or were characterized as misdemeanors. Because these cases are
‘not reported it is difficult to weigh their precedental valuc, but the descriptions offered up by
Respondent's counsel suggests thatthe circumstances of those matters, unlike the situation
involving Respondent, did not involve the risk of serious harm to third partes.

‘Based on the foregoing considerations, the Panel recommends tothe Court as
‘ction of the Board thatthe sanction of public reprimand be imposed upon Respondent together
With the imposition of costs ofthese disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Disciplinary
Procedural Rule 27.
Dated: February $2012 P JAL RESPONSIBILITY

Richard A. Levine,
layne 7
Baiward 7 Bassett

23
teen sores
ho following a contested hearing « panel ofthe Board on Professional Responsibility had
<etermined violated Rules 8.4(0), 84(¢) and 8.4(4) in connection with a scheme by the attorney
nd a find to sll paintings to one another va the PayPal service and to then make claims
gains the company under the company's money-back guarantee, The Panel believes that the
decisions in In Re Grossman and In Re Gielata support imposition of a pblic reprimand against
Respondent.

At the January 6 hearing, counsel for Respondent pointed the Panel to several
Delaware disciplinary cases imposing private admonitions for cases involving false notarizations
1s well x numerous other cases involving imposition of private admonitions for ations that
‘were either adjudicated tobe or were characterized us misdemeanors. Because these cases are
‘not reported, iti difficult to weigh their precedental value, but the descriptions offered up by
Respondent's counsel suggests that the circumstances of those matters, unlike the situation
{involving Respondent, id not involve the risk of serious harm to third parties.

Based on the foregoing considerations, the Panel recommends to the Cour as
‘ction ofthe Board thet the sanction of « public reprimand be imposed upon Respondent together
with the imposition of costs of these disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Disciplinary
Procedural Rale 27.
Dated: February 7”, 2012

 

eon oon 98