Case Title: In re Taft Corners Associates

Citation: 160 Vt. 583, 632 A.2d 649

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN_RE_TAFT_CORNERS_ASSOCIATES.92-215; 160 Vt. 583; 632 A.2d 649


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-215


 In re Taft Corners Associates, Inc.          Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              Environmental Board

                                              December Term, 1992


 Elizabeth Courtney, Chair

 Robert B. Hemley and Stewart H. McConaughy of Gravel and Shea, Burlington,
    for appellant

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and J. Wallace Malley, Jr., Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for appellee Agency of Natural Resources

 Francis X. Murray and Susan Gilfillan of McNeil & Murray, Burlington, for
    appellee City of Burlington

 Gerald R. Tarrant of Tarrant and Marks, Montpelier, for appellee Williston
    Citizens for Responsible Growth

 John T. Sartore of Paul, Frank & Collins, Inc., Burlington, and Stephen S.
    Ostrach, New England Legal Foundation, Boston, Massachusetts, for amici
    curiae Greater Burlington Industrial Corporation, Franklin County
    Industrial Development Corporation, Rutland Industrial Development
    Corporation, Bank of Vermont, Chittenden Bank, Franklin Lamoille Bank,
    Howard Bank, Merchants Bank, Vermont Federal Bank, and Vermont National
    Bank.


 PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Martin, Supr. J.,
           Specially Assigned


      GIBSON,J.   Appellant Taft Corners Associates, Inc. (TCA) appeals from
 a decision of the Environmental Board, claiming that the Board exceeded the
 scope of its authority by deciding issues that were not raised before the
 district commission.  We hold that the Board had no jurisdiction to decide
 issues that were not before the commission and reverse.
      In October 1986, TCA filed an application for a permit to develop a
 223-acre commercial and industrial park at Taft Corners in Williston.  On
 July 31, 1987, the district commission issued findings of fact and
 conclusions of law under Act 250, 10 V.S.A. {{ 6001-6092, and granted a
 permit (1987 permit) authorizing Phase I of the development.  The 1987
 permit allowed TCA to construct 4,400 feet of roads and utilities and to
 subdivide 10 to 14 lots of a planned 37-lot commercial and industrial
 subdivision.  The commission approved Phase I provided that TCA complied
 with thirty-six conditions contained in the permit.  Condition 5 allowed a
 maximum of 999 parking spaces and 145 peak-hour vehicle trips.  Condition 6
 provided:
         Prior to the commencement of construction on any lot
         within this subdivision the Permittee, Taft Corners
         Associates, and any purchaser or tenant of any lot shall
         file an amendment application under criteria 1(Air),
         1(E), 1(B), 4, 7(fire services), 8 and 9(F).  This
         amendment application shall be accompanied by evidence
         of conformance to the Findings under criteria 1(B), 2
         and 3, 5 and 9(J) and shall file a cumulative impact
         statement.
 Thus, the 1987 permit, known as an "umbrella permit" because it established
 conditions for the development as a whole, required TCA to obtain commission
 approval prior to construction on any lot in order to ensure that the
 conditions of the permit were fulfilled.
      In January 1988, TCA filed a second application, requesting
 reconsideration of some conditions of the 1987 permit and approval for Phase
 II of the park.  On April 27, 1988, the commission issued an amended
 umbrella permit (1988 permit) approving subdivision of the remaining lots
 and incorporating all conditions previously established, including the 1987
 permit condition 6 that TCA obtain commission approval before construction
 on any lot.  The 1988 permit amended condition 5, allowing 4,900 parking
 spaces (if there were no objections to the air quality permit, when filed)
 and 2,825 peak-hour vehicle trips.
      In May 1991, TCA filed an amendment application seeking approval to
 construct a 114,513-square-foot Wal-Mart retail store and a 132,500-square-
 foot Sam's Discount Price Club for warehouse sales.  Williston Citizens for
 Responsible Growth (WCRG) petitioned for party status on criteria 5
 (traffic), 8 (aesthetics), and 10 (conformance with local and regional
 plans).  The petition was accompanied by a motion to apply criterion 10,
 alleging that TCA's application constituted a significant change to the
 character of the development approved by the umbrella permit and did not
 comply with the revised town plan adopted after the permit was issued.
      The district commission granted WCRG party status on criterion 8
 (aesthetics), one of the criteria left open for consideration under
 amendment applications.  The commission determined, however, that WCRG would
 not materially assist the commission in determining whether the application
 was in conformance with criterion 5.  Further, it concluded that the
 application proposed no "material change" in the project; thus, there were
 no grounds to reconsider criterion 10 beyond compliance with the umbrella
 permit.  Accordingly, it denied WCRG's request for party status on criteria
 5 and 10.
      On November 15, 1991, the district commission issued findings of fact
 and conclusions of law on the amendment application under all criteria set
 forth in condition 6 of the 1987 permit, and granted a permit (1991 permit)
 to construct Wal-Mart/Sam's subject to thirty-four conditions.  WCRG ap-
 pealed the decision to the Environmental Board and requested a de novo
 hearing on all ten Act 250 criteria.  The City of Burlington moved for
 party status on several criteria.
      Prior to an evidentiary hearing, the Board requested briefs on
 preliminary issues related to the scope of review.  On March 31, 1992, the
 Board ruled that its Umbrella Permit Policy required specific identification
 of the type and character of activities proposed "so that the potential
 impacts can be meaningfully reviewed," and that final approval under the
 Umbrella Permit Policy may be granted only on those aspects of a proposed
 project for which the impacts may be evaluated, such as natural resources at
 the site.  Thus, the Board concluded that potential offsite impacts and
 impacts from individual uses cannot be addressed until the specific use of
 each tenant is identified.  It determined that TCA's umbrella permit
 applications had not provided the specificity required by simply identifying
 a proposed project as "retail" or "major retail."
      The Board also ruled that the district commission had not properly
 reviewed the earlier applications under several criteria and that each of
 those criteria must be reconsidered.  The Board disagreed with TCA's
 argument that only those criteria listed in condition 6 of the 1987 permit
 were still open for review, maintaining that it had authority to "reopen[]
 parts of an umbrella permit in certain circumstances."  Further, the Board
 ruled that the amendment application constituted a substantial change to the
 development approved in the umbrella permit "because many of the potential
 impacts from this project were never considered."  Consequently, the Board
 remanded the amendment application to the district commission to review
 under the criteria it had identified as inadequately reviewed during the
 umbrella permit application process.
      TCA appeals from this decision, claiming that the Board exceeded its
 authority by addressing issues that were not raised before the district
 commission.  It also argues that the Board (1) violated the doctrine of res
 judicata by overturning the umbrella permit, (2) offended due process by
 failing to provide notice that the permit was in jeopardy, and (3)
 disregarded rulemaking requirements by announcing that umbrella permits may
 not grant final approval on several criteria.  Appellee Agency of Natural
 Resources (ANR) maintains that the Board's authority is not limited to
 issues raised before the district commission and that the other issues TCA
 raises are not properly before this Court because they were not brought
 before the Board.  Further, it argues that the Board's determination that
 the amendment application proposed a substantial change to the umbrella
 permit was supported by substantial evidence, and that remanding to the
 district commission for review of the additional criteria was proper.
 Amici on both sides raise additional issues.
                                     I.
      We first address this Court's authority to consider this appeal prior
 to an administrative decision on the merits.  WCRG and the City of
 Burlington argue that the Court has no jurisdiction to consider the appeal
 because the order from which TCA appeals is not a final order.  We agree
 that TCA has not exhausted all administrative remedies as the Board's order
 remanded the case to the district commission for consideration of various
 criteria.  See In re Pelham North, Inc., 154 Vt. 651, 652, 578 A.2d 124, 124
 (1990) (memo.) (Board's order remanding to district commission for further
 proceedings is not a final order).
      Ordinarily, we decline to review a decision that is not a final
 disposition of the matter.  Id.  Nevertheless, where an agency has clearly
 exceeded its jurisdiction in an intermediate ruling, interlocutory review is
 appropriate.  See id. at 652, 578 A.2d  at 125.  The Court has previously
 considered interlocutory appeals that challenge the extent of the authority
 of an administrative board.  See, e.g., In re Green Mountain Power Corp.,
 133 Vt. 107, 109,