Case Title: SHERRY L. BAUER v. STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL., WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHERRY L. BAUER v. STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL., WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION1985 WY 38695 P.2d 1048Case Number: 84-77Decided: 03/01/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
SHERRY L. BAUER, 
APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT), 

v. 

STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL., WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, 
APPELLEE (OBJECTOR-DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

 
 
Donald L. 
Painter, Casper, 
for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for appellee.

Before THOMAS,* C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The parties in this 
case stipulated to the following facts: The town of Saratoga had taken over supervision of the ambulance 
service from CarbonCounty approximately thirty days prior to 
this injury. The appellant was employed part time by the town of Saratoga as a member of 
the ambulance service. She suffered a ruptured eardrum in the course of her 
employment on December 14, 1981, and sought medical treatment the next day. She 
was advised by her supervisor that she was not covered by worker's compensation 
because she was a part-time employee.1

[¶2.]     Appellant underwent 
surgery on March 24, 1982. In March 1983, when it became apparent that 
additional surgery would be necessary, appellant requested that the hospital 
apply for payment under worker's compensation. The second surgery for the injury 
that occurred during her employment was performed on April 6, 1983. At that time 
she again discussed worker's compensation with the chief executive officer of 
her employer, the mayor of Saratoga, who agreed that she should be 
covered. Appellant then, during April 1983, attempted to file a worker's 
compensation claim. The clerk of court rejected the claim because it was not 
timely filed.2 Appellant was allowed to file her 
claim on July 19, 1983. The court, thereafter, determined that the claim was 
barred by the statute of limitations.

[¶3.]     We 
reverse.

[¶4.]     The only issue 
presented by appellant is: "Whether Appellant has a legally, excusable reason 
for failure to comply with § 27-12-503, W.S. 1977." This statute provides in 
part:

"(a) No order or award 
for compensation involving an injury which is the result of a single brief 
occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, shall be 
made unless in addition to the reports of the injury, an application or claim 
for award is filed with the clerk of court in the county in which the injury 
occurred, within one (1) year after the day on which the injury occurred or for 
injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of the injury 
by the employee. The reports of an accident do not constitute a claim for 
compensation."

[¶5.]     We stated in In re Martini, 38 Wyo. 172, 265 P. 707 
(1928), that the legislature had fixed the applicable time in which a claim 
could be filed and, therefore, an exception could not be read into the law 
because the result would be legislation rather than statutory construction. We, 
however, expressly did not resolve the question here presented, 
stating:

"Whether the limitation, 
notwithstanding the fact that it is said to be jurisdictional, may be waived under certain circumstances, as 
is held by some of the courts, need not 
be decided, for the question does not arise here. It is clear that without 
such waiver, the limitation is, under the authorities already cited, mandatory." 
(Emphasis added.) In re Martini, 
supra, 265 P.  at 708-709.

[¶6.]     The question we treat 
here does not involve statutory construction. The statute is clear and 
unambiguous. It contains no provision for tolling because of excusable neglect 
or to relieve hardship in particular circumstances. Thus, the statute here has 
run and is a bar to this claim unless the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
prevents raising the statute-of-limitations defense.

[¶7.]     It is established 
policy that worker's compensation statutes and the law applicable thereto should 
be liberally construed to the end that just claims of workers will be paid 
whenever possible. Jurisdictions such as ours, with statutes not providing 
tolling for excusable neglect, apply waiver or equitable estoppel to prevent the 
employer from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense where the 
lateness was the result of the employer's assurances, misrepresentations, 
negligence, or fraudulent deceptions. 3 Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation § 78.45.

[¶8.]     There are no 
jurisdictions which always hold their statutes of limitation to be a total bar 
in worker's compensation cases. All jurisdictions allow late filings under some 
circumstances. These circumstances range from good faith misrepresentations by 
employers to a requirement of deliberate and actual fraud. Fraud, either actual 
or legal, will toll the statute of limitations, Perkins v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 
147 Ga. App. 662, 249 S.E.2d 661 (1978), as will a reasonable reliance on 
incorrect information and active misleading conduct. Cohen v. Industrial Comm'n of Arizona, 133 Ariz. 24, 648 P.2d 139 (1982). Thus, where the 
failure to file the claim resulted from the direct intervention of the 
employer's agents and all parties believed that the accident was not covered by 
worker's compensation, equitable estoppel prevented the defense of statute of 
limitations. Levo v. 
General-Shea-Morrison, 128 Mont. 570, 280 P.2d 1086 (1955). Estoppel 
flows from the actual consequences produced by the conduct of A on B regardless 
of whether A intended those consequences or not. Pino v. Maplewood Packing Co., 
Me., 375 A.2d 534 (1977). It is immaterial whether the conduct falsely misrepresented the 
situation or fraudulently concealed the truth. The employer is estopped to plead 
the statute of limitations. Cambron v. 
Co-operative Distributing Co., Ky., 405 S.W.2d 687 (1966); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial 
Accident Comm'n, 66 Cal. App. 2d 376, 152 P.2d 501 (1944). Where the 
employer's carrier gave information with no intent to deceive or mislead but his 
conduct did just that, estoppel applied because the employer, having assisted 
the employee, could not complain about action taken or not taken. Robertson v. Brissey's Garage, Inc., 270 
S.C. 58, 240 S.E.2d 810 (1978). The employer is estopped when the claimant is 
deceived; the deception occurs when the employee is lulled into a false sense of 
security. Taglianetti v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Board, 63 Pa.Cmwlth. 456, 439 A.2d 844 (1981); Ashcraft v. Hunter, 268 Ark. 946, 597 S.W.2d 124 
(App. 1980).3 But fraud should not be the only 
basis for relief in worker's compensation cases. The limitation period is short 
- just one year. The injury resulting to the worker during the course of her 
employment is our concern. If she has a valid claim which is lost because of 
some action by the employer or the insurance provider (here the state of 
Wyoming) 
reasonably relied upon by the employee to her detriment, relief should be 
granted.

[¶9.]     In McKaskle v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Arizona, 135 Ariz. 168, 659 P.2d 1313 (1982), the injured 
employee was told by the employer that he was not covered by worker's 
compensation because he was an independent contractor and not an employee. Later 
he learned that he was covered. The court stated:

"The claimant may be 
equally harmed by his reasonable reliance on either `positive' or `negative' 
assertions. Nor are we persuaded that a characterization of coverage or 
compensability as a `question of law' renders the principle of estoppel 
inapplicable." Id. 659 P.2d  at 
1317-1318.

In Levo v. General-Shea-Morrison, supra, 
the court stated:

"The doctrine of 
equitable estoppel is a flexible one, founded in equity and good conscience; its 
object is to prevent a party from taking an unconscionable advantage of his own 
wrong while asserting his strict legal rights. Seemingly the only strict legal 
right that we are asked to adhere to is the statute which was passed solely for 
the benefit of the employer and the insurance carrier, i.e., the Statute of 
Limitations.

* * * * * 
*

"It is contended that 
there is involved a question of law as opposed to a question of fact and that 
the claimant is as responsible for knowing the law regarding the situation as 
were the insurance company, the employer, the industrial accident board and 
those others involved. However, even if we were to ascribe to the contention 
that it is solely a question of law, it would be a very narrow construction of 
the statutes regarding Workmen's Compensation if this court were to say that a 
claimant should find it his duty to examine all the technicalities concerning 
the Workmen's Compensation Act and come to a right conclusion while the employer 
and the insurance carrier, whose responsibilities are far greater, should be 
excused because of their misinterpretation of the Act itself, which 
misinterpretation the employer in turn foisted off upon the claimant." 280 P.2d  
at 1090.

[¶10.]  The State here contends that estoppel is 
not warranted because the bad advice was merely an honest mistake and cites 
Larson for the proposition,

"[i]f the employer's bad 
advice was the result of an honest mistake due to the uncertain state of the law 
at the time, estoppel is not warranted." 3 Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation § 78.45.

The basis for 
that statement is a California case which held that the city's 
advice was reasonable when given "due to the uncertain state of the law" at that 
time. City of Los Angeles v. Industrial 
Accident Commission, 63 Cal. 2d 255, 46 Cal. Rptr. 105, 404 P.2d 809 (1965). 
In the instant case, the state of the law is not uncertain. The worker here was 
covered by worker's compensation. That is not disputed. And had she, contrary to 
the advice of her employer, filed a claim, it would have been 
paid.

[¶11.]  The State also contends that even if 
estoppel should be applied to the town of Saratoga,

"* * * it would not be 
appropriate as to the Appellee State of Wyoming, as the Appellee State of 
Wyoming not only administers and defends the Town of Saratoga's industrial 
accident account, but also all the monies in the worker's compensation 
fund."

Section 
27-12-608, W.S. 1977, provides:

"The director or his 
designee may for any reason appear in the district court and defend against any 
claim and shall in all respects have the 
same rights of defense as the employer. Failure to contest a claim does not 
constitute waiver by the director of his right to reopen an award where he does 
not appear and defend at the original trial." (Emphasis 
added.)

The purpose of 
this statute is to establish the rights of the State "as broad as the right of 
the employer and employee, so as to give the state full measure of protection." 
Wyoming State Treasurer, ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Div. v. Svoboda, Wyo., 573 P.2d 417, 420 (1978), quoting Marsh v. Aljoe, 41 Wyo. 220, 227, 284 P. 260 (1930). Although the worker's compensation division of the state of 
Wyoming is 
granted rights as broad as those of the employer, there is nothing in the 
statute which confers greater rights or would permit the State to assert 
defenses not available to the employer.

[¶12.]  Appellant had a valid, meritorious claim 
that was not filed because of reliance upon her employer's representation that 
she was not covered by worker's compensation. We hold that the employer's 
misleading statements, although unintentional, were sufficient to constitute 
estoppel and prevent the employer and the state of Wyoming from invoking the 
statute of limitations as a defense. This case is, therefore, reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

1 The dissenting opinion 
of Justice Rooney is misleading when it states:

"It is difficult to treat 
Ann White's advice, given in the doctor's office while treating appellant on 
behalf of the doctor, as being given on behalf of the Town of Saratoga * * 
*."

No one testified 
in this case. Nowhere in the record is it stated that Ann White's advice was 
given in the doctor's office while treating appellant. The case was presented to 
the trial court upon stipulated facts, agreed to by the parties. With respect to 
this matter, the stipulation states:

"When the subject injury 
occurred, and thereafter, Employee had considerable conversation and 
consultation with the same Ann White, who did not believe that Worker's 
Compensation coverage existed because of the minimal part-time nature of the 
occupation."

Further, 
appellee conceded that Ann White was acting on behalf of the town of Saratoga when it agreed in 
its brief that:

"In the case at bar, the 
employer, Town of Saratoga, did no more than give bad advice 
which was the result of an honest mistake as to the existence/non-existence of 
coverage."

The appellee 
having stipulated that the town of Saratoga gave bad advice as a result of an 
honest mistake, it is inappropriate to suggest the contrary by stating that Ann 
White "was probably acting as a nurse 
for an attending physician at the time" (emphasis added) in a private capacity 
when she advised appellant concerning coverage under worker's 
compensation.

2 Section 27-12-601(a), 
W.S. 1977, states in part:

"[T]he clerk or his 
designee shall review the reports of the injury to ascertain whether the case 
should be docketed."

However, § 
27-12-602(a), W.S. 1977, requires that "* * * the judge shall set the case for 
hearing at the earliest possible date and direct notice of the hearing to be 
issued by the clerk of the court * * *." In situations where there is a dispute 
as to the right of the employee to compensation or the amount to be awarded, a 
right to a hearing is provided. The procedural protections include the right to 
a judicial decision on the matter. It is not within the province of the clerk of 
court to determine whether cases are barred by the statute of limitations. See, 
R.L. Manning Co. v. Millsap, Wyo., 687 P.2d 252 (1984), and Herring v. Welltech, 
Inc., Wyo., 660 P.2d 361 
(1983).

3 Chief Justice Thomas in 
his dissenting opinion relies upon Turner 
v. Turner, Wyo., 582 P.2d 600 (1978), for his conclusion that this court for 
all time committed itself to the proposition that the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel will arise only where action of the employer lulls the employee "into a 
false sense of security or causes him to believe he will be taken care of 
without filing a claim." Fraudulently misrepresenting to the employee that he is 
not covered by worker's compensation, knowing that to be false, for the purpose 
of causing him not to file a claim would not "lull" him into a false sense of 
security. And so it would seem that an employee can be "lulled" into a false 
sense of security only where the employer promises something, such as the 
payment of a sum of money in settlement or payment of his medical bills thus 
making it unnecessary for him to file a worker's compensation claim. The Chief 
Justice, here, is talking about the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 28 
Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 48. See also, Anno., Promises to Settle or 
Perform as Estopping Reliance on Statute of Limitations, 44 A.L.R.3d 482, 488 
(1972) wherein it is stated that:

"One of the broadest 
generalizations employed by the courts as a starting point is a statement to the 
effect that one cannot justly or equitably lull his adversary into a false sense 
of security * * *."

This is the 
starting point, not the end. In Turner v. 
Turner, supra, parties to the lawsuit were making offers and counter offers 
of settlement, dealing at arms length, when the statute of limitations expired. 
There was no firm settlement or promise to pay, and plaintiff was not lulled 
into believing the litigation was settled when the statute expired. Turner v. Turner, supra, dealt with 
offers/promises, not misrepresentations of fact.

In the instant 
case, no promises were made to the worker, no offers of settlement nor promise 
to pay her medical bills were made, and she could not be lulled into a false 
sense of security under these circumstances. She was simply given false 
information by her employer concerning her right to have her surgery covered by 
worker's compensation. To say that equitable estoppel will apply if her employer 
makes a false promise, but will not apply if he makes a false statement, is 
irrational. That is not the holding of Turner v. Turner, supra, which also 
stated:

"`[A]ctual fraud in the 
technical sense, bad faith or intent to mislead are not essential to the 
creation of an estoppel, but it is sufficient that the defendant made 
misrepresentations or so conducted himself that he misled a party, who acted 
thereon in good faith, to the extent that such party failed to commence the 
action within the statutory period * * *.'" At p. 602 (quoting from In re Pieper's Estate, 224 Cal. App. 2d 670, 37 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1964)).

If we hold as 
the dissenting opinion suggests now, it would be only a matter of time until we 
would have before us a case in which an employer falsely and fraudulently 
misrepresented to an employee his rights under worker's compensation for the 
express purpose of inducing him not to file a claim within the period of 
limitation provided by the statute. Better that we lay that matter to rest now. 
The rule proposed by the dissent is not the majority rule, nor are the cases 
listed for that proposition the "better reasoned 
opinions."

Finally, it is 
stated that the cases cited in the opinion of the court "do not all stand for 
the propositions for which they are cited * * *." The cases referred to were not 
cited for their holdings, but are merely illustrative of the approach of various 
courts of the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to raising the 
bar of the statute of limitations in worker's compensation 
cases.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶13.]  I must dissent from the decision of the 
majority of the court in this instance. In Turner v. Turner, Wyo., 582 P.2d 600 
(1978), this court dealt with the question of estoppel to assert the bar of the 
statute of limitations. That case did not involve a claim for worker's 
compensation, but my examination of the law in this area does not disclose any 
distinction between worker's compensation cases and other cases with respect to 
the application of equitable estoppel.

[¶14.]  It appears that Ann White's role at the 
time that she spoke with the appellant may have been equivocal. Even assuming 
that she was acting as an agent of the Town of Saratoga, the strongest interpretation that can 
be given to the stipulated information is that she stated there was no coverage. 
I am satisfied that the better reasoned opinions, which I believe represent a 
majority rule, dealing with the denial of coverage or liability hold that the 
employer is not estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of 
limitations. Lee v. Kimberly-Clark 
Corporation, Ala. Civ. App., 418 So. 2d 164 (1982); Joyce v. Paul Hayes Amoco Service 
Station, 161 Ga. App. 373, 288 S.E.2d 266 (1982); Miller v. Olinkraft, Inc., La. App., 395 So. 2d 902 (1981); Drane v. City of New 
Orleans, La. App., 328 So. 2d 752 (1976); Kohlbeck v. City of Omaha, 211 Neb. 372, 
318 N.W.2d 742 (1982); Kushner v. Strick 
Trailer Co., 10 Pa. Cmwlth. 518, 312 A.2d 471 (1973); and Trzoniec v. General Controls Co., 100 
R.I. 448, 216 A.2d 886 (1966). These cases distinguish between the denial of 
liability and conduct which lulls the employee into a false sense of security or 
causes him to believe he will be taken care of without filing a 
claim.

[¶15.]  With respect to the authorities relied 
upon by the majority opinion, my reading of several of those cases persuades me 
that a strict application of the concept of ratio decidendi results in a 
conclusion that they do not all stand for the propositions for which they are 
cited, although there is broad language included which could lead one to the 
interpretation placed upon them by the majority. In Taglianetti v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal 
Board, 63 Pa.Cmwlth. 456, 439 A.2d 844 (1981), for example, the court held 
that estoppel did not prevent the assertion of the statute, because while the 
employee was confused, the employee was not lulled by the employer's 
conduct.

[¶16.]  The decisions in those cases which have 
limited estoppel to instances in which the employee was lulled in such a way 
that the claim was not asserted, but do not permit estoppel where the employee 
was informed that there was no coverage, are consistent with what we said in Turner v. Turner, supra. The statement 
by White that there was no worker's compensation coverage would not be conduct 
which would justify an estoppel against the town to raise the statute of 
limitations.

[¶17.]  For these reasons I would affirm the 
judgment of the trial court.

ROONEY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶18.]  The majority opinion correctly accepts 
the fact that the statute of limitations, without more, would bar appellant's 
claim. The legislature has so provided:

"(a) No order or award 
for compensation involving an injury which is the result of a single brief 
occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, shall be 
made unless in addition to the reports of the injury, an application or claim 
for award is filed with the clerk of court in the county in which the injury 
occurred, within one (1) year after the day on which the injury occurred * * *." 
Section 27-12-503(a), W.S. 1977.

Appellant 
recognized that she had suffered a compensable injury on December 14, 1981. The 
claim was not filed until April, 1983. See Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 108 A.L.R. 304 (1936); Bemis v. Texaco, Wyo., 401 P.2d 708 (1965). The statutory time limit in 
which to file a claim had expired.

[¶19.]  Nor does appellant's situation afford to 
her the exception to the limitation period provided by the 
legislature:

"If an injured employee 
is mentally incompetent or a minor, or where death results from the injury if 
any of his dependents are mentally incompetent or minors, at the time when any 
right or privilege accrues under this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804], no 
limitation of time provided for in this act shall run so long as the incompetent 
or minor has no guardian." Section 27-12-505, W.S. 1977.

[¶20.]  Nonetheless, the majority opinion finds 
an exception to the statute of limitations in a waiver by the employer or an 
estoppel through the acts of the employer. With this, I 
disagree.

[¶21.]  In the first place, I question the 
assumption that the employer was involved in any waiver or estoppel. Appellant 
does not contend for any fraudulent or intentionally deceptive action on the 
part of the employer. In her brief, appellant states, "* * * we do not contend 
the Employee was deceived any more than negligently by Ann White * * *." Ann 
White was a Nurse Practitioner in the office of Dr. John Lunt, M.D., in 
Saratoga. 
CarbonCounty maintains an airplane ambulance for flights 
from CarbonCounty to Laramie, 
Denver, etc. Ann 
White and appellant worked part time on the ambulance EMT crew. Ann White was 
the supervisor of the crew. About thirty days before appellant suffered a 
ruptured eardrum on a flight of the airplane ambulance, the Town of Saratoga had taken over 
the operation of the airplane ambulance from the county. The day after her 
injury, appellant sought medical attention from Dr. Lunt, where she was treated 
by Ann White. It was Ann White's statement that she did not believe worker's 
compensation coverage existed for the injury because of the part-time nature of 
the employment which is the basis for the claimed estoppel or waiver against the 
Town of Saratoga.

[¶22.]  Was Ann White speaking as a nurse for Dr. 
Lunt? Or was she speaking as a part-time employee supervisor of the EMT unit on 
Saratoga's 
airplane ambulance? And, if the latter, did she have authority to waive the 
statute of limitations on behalf of Saratoga or 
to act or speak on behalf of Saratoga in this 
matter so as to estop Saratoga from application of the statute of 
limitations? It is difficult to treat Ann White's advice, given in the doctor's 
office while treating appellant on behalf of the doctor, as being given on 
behalf of the Town of Saratoga under these 
circumstances.

"* * * The doctrine of 
implied agency or ostensible authority applied to private parties or 
corporations is limited very much, so far as municipal corporations are 
concerned * * *." S. Goldberg & Co. 
v. City of Cedar Rapids, 200 Iowa 139, 204 N.W. 216 
(1925).

The Iowa court pointed out 
that the extent of authority is a matter of record in statutes and ordinances 
for municipal matters and not known only to the principal and agent as is the 
case with private parties.

[¶23.]  The only reasonable appraisal of the 
situation is that appellant could not have relied on Ann White's comments as 
those of the town. She should be charged with knowledge contained in the placard 
which is required to be posted by every employer, and which she is taken to have 
read. It notified her of the necessity of filing a timely claim. She should not 
be allowed to rely on advice received from another part-time employee, albeit a 
supervisor of a limited and special activity who was probably acting as a nurse 
for an attending physician at the time, for a waiver of the statute of 
limitations by the employer or to establish an estoppel against the employer to 
assert such statute.

[¶24.]  Inasmuch as the privilege of the statute 
of limitations is personal, a waiver, in this instance, can only be by the Town 
of Saratoga or 
someone empowered to act for it. Stryker 
v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 136 A.L.R. 770, reh. 
denied 113 P.2d 963 (1941). The power to act for a municipality in most respects 
is statutorily given to the governing body of the municipality. Section 
15-1-103, W.S. 1977. See §§ 15-2-201 and 15-2-202, W.S. 1977, re restrictions on 
acceptance of claims by governing bodies of towns.

[¶25.]  Finally, the advice given by Ann White 
pertained to a matter of law.

"The well-recognized rule 
is that a representation as to a matter of law will not ordinarily support an 
action for fraud or deceit, nor constitute an estoppel to rely upon the statute 
of limitations, the reason for the rule being that representations as to matters 
of law are ordinarily considered as expressions of opinion, and justifiable 
reliance cannot be had upon the mere opinion of another. * * *" 51 Am.Jur.2d 
Limitations of Actions § 451, p. 913 (1970).

[¶26.]  I would affirm.