Case Title: ROBERT RAY JOHNSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT RAY JOHNSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 79137 P.3d 903Case Number: 05-163Decided: 06/29/2006
 
 
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
ROBERT RAY 
JOHNSON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The Honorable Jeffrey A. 
Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Vaughn H. Neubauer, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.                  

                        
            

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Robert Ray 
Johnson was driving a rental car when he was stopped for speeding.  When it was discovered that Mr. Johnson 
was an unauthorized driver of the rental car, the car was impounded.  An inventory search led to the discovery 
of narcotics in a duffle bag belonging to Mr. Johnson.  Mr. Johnson filed a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained during the inventory search.  The district court denied the 
motion.  Subsequently, Mr. Johnson 
entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver and one count of felony possession of a 
controlled substance.  On appeal, he 
contends the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Johnson 
presents two issues on appeal:

 
 

I.                     
The district court erred 
when it concluded that Trooper Dyer had a right to include Mr. Johnson's 
belongings with an impounded vehicle when he was not under arrest and Trooper 
Dyer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that his baggage contained 
contraband or weapons.

 
 

II.                   
The district court erred 
when it concluded that Article One, Section Four of the Wyoming Constitution as 
applied to Mr. Johnson permits the opening of closed containers during inventory 
searches when the Trooper lacked any objective indication that his baggage 
contained contraband or weapons.

 
 
The State frames the 
issue on appeal as:

 
 
Did the district court 
properly deny [Mr. Johnson's] motion to suppress?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On August 8, 
2004, Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Dan Dyer stopped a rental car driven by Mr. 
Johnson for traveling 89 miles per hour in a 75 mile per hour zone on Interstate 
80.  Trooper Dyer approached the 
vehicle and requested a driver's license.  
He also obtained the rental car agreement from Mr. Johnson.  Upon examination of the agreement, 
Trooper Dyer determined that Mr. Johnson and his passenger were not authorized 
drivers.  Trooper Dyer contacted 
dispatch to inquire whether the rental company wanted the vehicle 
impounded.  While waiting for a 
response, Trooper Dyer prepared a speeding citation for Mr. 
Johnson.

 
 
[¶4]      Dispatch advised 
Trooper Dyer that the rental company wanted the vehicle impounded.  Trooper Dyer informed Mr. Johnson of the 
impoundment and that an inventory of the vehicle's contents would be taken 
pursuant to Wyoming Highway Patrol policy.  
In the course of conducting the inventory, Trooper Dyer unzipped a duffle 
bag.  He discovered two clear sacks 
containing what he believed to be marijuana.  

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Johnson was 
arrested and subsequently charged with one count of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver, one count of felony possession of a controlled 
substance, and one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance.  The conspiracy charge was eventually 
dismissed.  On September 30, 2004, 
Mr. Johnson filed a motion to suppress evidence, contending that the search 
violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  After a hearing, the district court 
denied the motion.

 
 
[¶6]      On November 22, 
2004, Mr. Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea to the two remaining counts 
specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  A sentencing hearing was 
held on April 5, 2005.  Mr. Johnson 
was sentenced to not less than three nor more than five years incarceration on 
count one and not less than two nor more than four years incarceration on count 
two.  The sentences were ordered to 
be served concurrently.  The 
district court recommended that Mr. Johnson participate in the boot camp 
program.  Mr. Johnson timely filed 
this appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      We recently set 
forth our standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress in O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2005):

 
 
Rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶ 39, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶ 39 (Wyo. 2003). We will not disturb such rulings absent a clear 
abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of 
discretion occurs when it is shown the trial court reasonably could not have 
concluded as it did. Hannon v. State, 
2004 WY 8, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 320, ¶ 13 (Wyo. 2004).  Factual findings made by a trial court 
considering a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous. Meek v. State, 
2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2002). Because the trial court has the 
opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness credibility, and draw the 
necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination. Id. Whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights 
presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480 
(Wyo. 
1999).

 
 

DISCUSSION

            

[¶8]      Mr. Johnson 
asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress for two 
reasons.  First, Mr. Johnson claims 
that his personal belongings should not have been included in the inventory of 
the rental vehicle.  Second, Mr. 
Johnson contends that even if his belongings were properly included in the 
search, article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution prohibits the search of 
closed containers during an inventory search.  

 
 
Inclusion of Mr. 
Johnson's Belongings in the Inventory Search

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Johnson 
claims that his belongings were impermissibly searched because he was not under 
arrest at the time of the search and Trooper Dyer did not have reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to search for evidence of a crime.  To support his contention, Mr. Johnson 
states that a traffic stop is a seizure of both the person and the vehicle 
stopped and, therefore, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or consent was 
required for Trooper Dyer to detain Mr. Johnson.  Further, Mr. Johnson states that 
detentions must not be unnecessarily prolonged and they must be reasonable under 
all the circumstances.  He asserts 
that Trooper Dyer had "no objectively reasonable reason to suspect Mr. Johnson 
of doing anything wrong other than speeding and violating a rental 
contract."  He claims that absent 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, Mr. Johnson should have been able to 
proceed on his way.  In making his 
claim, Mr. Johnson does not contend that it was improper to impound the rental 
car or that an inventory search of the vehicle was impermissible.  Rather, he contends he should have been 
permitted to retrieve his baggage prior to the search.  

 
 
[¶10]   As Mr. Johnson correctly notes, 
searches and seizures are governed by a standard of reasonableness under the 
circumstances.  See O'Boyle, 117 P.3d  at 401; Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 488 
(Wyo. 1999). 
  "An investigative detention 
must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its 
underlying justification."  
Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 12, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004).  The detention 
of a driver and his vehicle must only be for a period of time reasonably 
necessary to complete routine matters.  
Id.  We must consider whether the detention 
of Mr. Johnson was reasonable in light of the circumstances.  

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Johnson does not contest the 
validity of the initial traffic stop.  
His claim is that once he was issued the citation, he should have been 
permitted to retrieve his belongings and allowed to leave.  We have previously held that once a 
driver "has produced a valid driver's license and proof that he is entitled to 
operate the vehicle, he must be allowed to proceed without further delay."  Campbell, ¶ 12, 
97 P.3d  at 785.  However, in the 
course of this traffic stop, Trooper Dyer discovered that Mr. Johnson was an 
unauthorized driver of the rental car.  
At that point, it became necessary to detain Mr. Johnson while the rental 
company was contacted.  See Lindsay v. State, 2005 WY 34, ¶ 25, 
108 P.3d 852, 859 (Wyo. 2005) (finding that the investigation of the potential 
unauthorized use of a rental vehicle was a reasonably sufficient reason to 
continue to detain the driver after a traffic stop).  

 
 
[¶12]   Under the circumstances, we also 
find the length of the detention was not unreasonable.  The entire stop took forty minutes  
twenty minutes of which were related to the impoundment and search of the 
vehicle.  Of those twenty minutes, 
seven minutes expired while Trooper Dyer waited to hear how the rental company 
wished to handle the situation.  
Another five of those minutes were spent explaining to Mr. Johnson why 
the impoundment was necessary and the Wyoming Highway Patrol's policy on 
inventory searches.  The remaining 
time was spent conducting the inventory.  
Compare Lindsay, ¶ 25, 108 P.3d  at 859 (one hour and sixteen minute detention found reasonable to permit 
the officers to investigate the possible unauthorized use of a rental 
vehicle).

 
 
[¶13]   We disagree with Mr. Johnson that 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause was required to justify an inventory of 
the items in the vehicle.  Inventory 
searches are a well recognized exception to the prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  See Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 481 
(Wyo. 
1988).  "The requirement for a 
warrant is excused because probable cause is irrelevant when a search is 
undertaken for the purpose of an inventory rather than for an 
investigation."  Id. at 482.  See also Williams v. State, 557 P.2d 135, 139 (Wyo. 
1976) (stating that "probable cause, as it is usually required, is not necessary 
for an inventory search.").  This is 
so because a "standardized inventory search is a routine, non-criminal 
administrative caretaking function."  
U.S. v. Hall, 391 F. Supp. 2d 760, 766 
(Dist. Iowa 2005).   

  

[¶14]   Mr. Johnson's contention that his 
baggage should have been released to him prior to the inventory, if taken to its 
logical conclusion, would defeat the purpose for inventory searches.  Inventory searches serve to protect the 
owner's property while it remains in police custody; protect police against 
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and protect the police from 
potential danger.  South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 
(1976).  Inventory searches of 
impounded vehicles are not unreasonable if conducted pursuant to standardized 
police procedures.  See Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1166 
(Wyo. 1996); Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 767 
(Wyo. 
1995).  

 
 
[¶15]   The Wyoming Highway Patrol has a 
standardized policy which states in pertinent part:

 
 
Any time a Trooper takes 
charge of a vehicle, he/she is responsible for the safety of the contents, to a 
reasonable degree.  A property 
inventory is necessary to confirm the presence and condition of personal 
property within the vehicle.

 
 
When a vehicle is towed 
to a place of safe-keeping or a Trooper takes charge of a vehicle for any 
reason, the vehicle and contents shall be inventoried and recorded on the 
proper form.  The inventory shall also include the 
inspection of closed and sealed containers. 

 
 
(Second emphasis 
added.)  This policy was introduced 
at the suppression hearing in conjunction with testimony from Trooper Dyer 
concerning the policy.  The policy 
was explained to Mr. Johnson prior to the initiation of the inventory 
search.  Mr. Johnson does not 
contend that the policy itself was unreasonable or ambiguous or that Trooper 
Dyer failed to follow standardized procedures.  

 
 
[¶16]   Mr. Johnson did not request his 
belongings prior to the inventory search.  
Even if he had, we find Trooper Dyer was not required to provide them 
until after the contents were inventoried.  
Pursuant to the Wyoming Highway Patrol's policy, once a Trooper takes 
control of a vehicle, he or she is responsible for the safety of its 
contents.  Trooper Dyer took control 
of the vehicle upon determining that Mr. Johnson was an unauthorized 
driver.  At that point, Trooper Dyer 
was required to conduct the inventory.  
Trooper Dyer had no way of knowing whether the contents in the car 
belonged to Mr. Johnson or a third party.  
By taking an inventory of the items prior to releasing them, Trooper Dyer 
was protecting against future claims.  
Trooper Dyer also protected himself from the possibility of hidden 
weapons that Mr. Johnson would have acquired if the baggage was returned to him 
prior to inspection and inventory.  

  

[¶17]   In sum, we find that Mr. Johnson 
was not unreasonably detained during the traffic stop.  Due to the non-investigatory nature of 
the inventory, individualized suspicion was not required for Trooper Dyer to 
temporarily keep Mr. Johnson's belongings with the vehicle until the inventory 
was concluded.  Furthermore, in 
order to fulfill the purposes behind inventory searches, it is reasonable to 
conduct an inventory before releasing any items from an impounded vehicle.  As a result, the district court did not 
err by denying the motion to suppress on this issue.  

 
 
Closed Container 
Searches

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Johnson contends that even if 
his belongings were properly included in the search, article 1, § 4 of the 
Wyoming 
Constitution1 prohibits the opening of 
closed containers during an inventory.  
In making his contention, Mr. Johnson acknowledges that this Court has 
"long recognized the doctrine of inventory searches."  He concedes that under the Fourth 
Amendment, a bright line rule permits inventory searches of closed containers, 
if conducted in good faith pursuant to standardized police policy, and the 
search is not a ruse for the general rummaging for criminal evidence.  See Opperman, 428 U.S.  at 369; Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 
(1990).  This bright line rule 
exists under the Fourth Amendment because "a single familiar standard is 
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to 
reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the 
specific circumstances they confront."  
Bertine, 479 U.S.  at 375.

 
 
[¶19]   We recently provided a general 
overview for conducting a state constitutional analysis in O'Boyle, ¶ 23, 117 P.3d  at 408.  We reiterated that we use six "non-exclusive neutral criteria" for 
consideration in analyzing a claim under our state constitution:  1) the textual language of the 
provisions; 2) differences in the texts; 3) constitutional history; 4) 
preexisting state law; 5) structural differences; and 6) matters of particular 
state or local concern.  Id., ¶ 24, 117 P.3d  at 408.  See also Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 
622 (Wyo. 
1993).  

 
 
[¶20]   For his analysis under the 
foregoing factors, Mr. Johnson first points to our discussion in O'Boyle where we found that the first 
three criteria are of little assistance.  
O'Boyle, ¶ 24, 117 P.3d  at 
408-409.  We stated that with the 
exception of "the affidavit requirement for search warrants, the text of 
Wyoming's 
search and seizure provision is substantially the same as the Fourth 
Amendment."  Id.  No further discussion of those factors 
is necessary.  Factor four requires 
an examination of preexisting state law.  
Wyoming 
precedent dating back as early as 1976 has permitted the opening of closed 
containers during inventory searches.  
See, e.g., Williams, 557 P.2d  
at 139; Roose, 759 P.2d  at 483; Vargas-Rocha, 891 P.2d  at 767; Perry, 927 P.2d  at 1165-66.  Mr. Johnson does not identify any 
preexisting state law proscribing the opening of closed containers during an 
inventory search.  Mr. Johnson 
provides no analysis under the fifth factor.  As a result, our review is limited to 
factor six  matters of particular state or local concern.

 
 
[¶21]   Mr. Johnson refers to our 
discussion in O'Boyle where we found 
that drug interdiction efforts along Interstate 80 affect an untold number of 
both interstate and intrastate travelers.  
O'Boyle, ¶ 33, 117 P.3d  at 
411.  Mr. Johnson relies on this 
discussion to support his contention that permitting police to conduct searches 
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing will have a 
negative impact on tourism.  To this 
effect he states:  "If too many 
people have the uncomfortable and embarrassing experience of having a law 
enforcement officer rummage through their private belongings, obviously fewer 
people will choose to drive through Wyoming and spend their money while on 
vacation."

 
 
[¶22]   Unlike the situation in O'Boyle, we have concluded that the 
scope of this traffic stop was reasonable.  
Mr. Johnson was initially pulled over for speeding.  After reviewing Mr. Johnson's driver's 
license and the rental agreement, Trooper Dyer detained Mr. Johnson to 
investigate his possible unauthorized use of the rental car.  Mr. Johnson's concerns relating to a 
negative impact on tourism are unjustified.    

 
 
[¶23]   In addition to the foregoing 
factors, Mr. Johnson asks us to consider the precedent of Montana and Alaska that prohibits the examination of 
closed containers during inventories.  
See, e.g., State v. Sawyer, 
571 P.2d 1131 (Mont. 1977), overruled on other grounds by State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153 (Mont. 1985); State 
v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1979).   He claims that it makes sense to 
follow that precedent because our constitution is made up of a patchwork of 
provisions borrowed from western states.  
Because these states have interpreted their constitutions as prohibiting 
the opening of closed containers, Mr. Johnson urges this Court to follow 
suit.  We decline to do so.  Our constitutional provisions were 
borrowed from many western states including Idaho, North Dakota and 
South 
Dakota.  See, e.g., Richard Kenneth Prien, The Background of the Wyoming 
Constitution § 4, at 41 (1956); T.A. Larson, History of Wyoming 247 (1990). Those 
states permit the opening of closed containers during inventory searches 
authorized under standardized policies.  
See State 
v. Owen, 2006 Ida. App. LEXIS 40 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006); State v. Bray, 834 P.2d 892 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1992); State v. Gregg, 615 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 2000); State v. 
Kunkel, 455 N.W.2d 208, 211 (N.D. 1990) (citing State v. Muralt, 376 N.W.2d 25 (N.D. 
1985)); Flittie v. State, 425 N.W.2d 1, 4-6 (S.D. 1988).  This additional 
consideration is insufficient to warrant an expansion of the protections 
provided by the federal constitution.  
 

 
 
[¶24]   Upon conducting a state 
constitutional analysis in this case, we find that the scope of the protection 
provided by the Wyoming Constitution is the "same as and parallel to" that 
provided by the federal constitution.  
O'Boyle, ¶ 23, 117 P.3d  at 
408.  Consonant with the Fourth 
Amendment, the opening of closed containers during an inventory search is 
permissible if conducted in good faith, pursuant to a standardized police 
policy, and as long as the search is not a ruse for general rummaging for 
evidence of a crime.  See Bertine, 479 U.S.  at 374; Opperman, 428 U.S.  at 
369.  Our prior precedent has 
permitted inventory searches and the opening of closed containers during those 
searches.  See, e.g., Williams, 557 P.2d  at 139; Roose, 759 P.2d  at 483; Vargas-Rocha, 891 P.2d  at 767; Perry, 927 P.2d  at 1165-66.  Mr. Johnson has provided us no reason to 
depart from our prior holdings.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶25]   Mr. Johnson does not contend that 
Trooper Dyer failed to act in good faith or that he failed to follow the 
standardized policy concerning inventory searches.  Inventory searches serve to protect the 
owner's property while it remains in police custody; protect police against 
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and protect the police from 
potential danger.  Opperman, 428 U.S.  at 
369.  An inventory search that does 
not include all of the property within an impounded vehicle undermines the 
purposes for the inventory.  Under 
these circumstances, the district court properly denied Mr. Johnson's motion to 
suppress.

 
 
[¶26]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Article 
1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution provides:

            
§ 4.  Security against search and 
seizure.

            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, 
particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.