Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 274, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JERON BROWN,  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 274, 2005 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr. I.D. No. 0401017178 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  February 22, 2006 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  April 6, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Thomas D. Donovan, Esquire, Schwartz & Schwartz, Dover, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
The defendant-appellant, Jeron Brown, appeals from his convictions 
of Burglary in the Second Degree, Theft, two counts of Receiving Stolen 
Property, and Criminal Mischief.  In this appeal, Brown alleges that the 
Superior Court erred by:  first, denying his motion to suppress evidence 
obtained during a search incident to his arrest because the police did not 
have probable cause to arrest him; second, denying his request for a mistrial 
after the State disclosed potentially exculpatory evidence during the trial; 
and third, failing to provide, sua sponte, a missing evidence jury instruction 
because a witness was unavailable to testify at trial.  We conclude that there 
was no reversible error.  Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court 
must be affirmed.   
Facts 
 
On January 20, 2004, the Del-Mar Appliance store and two private 
residences in Dover, Delaware, were burglarized.  After the third burglary, 
the police reviewed a video surveillance tape from a local 7-11 store that 
showed an African American male and female attempting to sell items to the 
store clerk.  Anwar Al-Rasul, the third burglary victim, had earlier identified 
the items on the tape as items that were stolen from his home.  Later that 
day, the police received a tip from Mr. Al-Rasul’s wife that an African 
 
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American man would soon attempt to sell items similar to those stolen from 
her home at a nearby store, named the Closet.   
 
The police set up surveillance outside the Closet.  Jeron Brown 
approached the store carrying a duffel bag and wearing a jacket similar to 
the jacket worn by the man whose image was captured in the 7-11 video 
surveillance tape.  Brown was also the same race, height, and build of the 
man shown in the tape.  Brown entered the Closet and left shortly thereafter. 
 
As he exited the store, the police approached Brown and immediately 
handcuffed him.  The officers asked Brown if they could pat him down.  
They also asked Brown if they could search his jacket and duffel bag.  
Brown consented to both requests.  Mr. Al-Rasul identified the items found 
by the police in Brown’s jacket and duffel bag as his stolen property.  The 
police then obtained a search warrant for Brown’s residence, where they 
searched and seized more stolen property. 
 
Probable Cause Established 
 
Before trial, Brown moved to suppress the evidence seized from his 
person and his home. The Superior Court denied Brown’s motion and held 
that the police had probable cause to arrest Brown when they approached 
him and handcuffed him.  In this appeal, Brown argues that the police had 
no reasonable and articulable suspicion to arrest him at the time he exited the 
 
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Closet because the tip to the police was anonymous and uncorroborated and 
Brown did not attempt to sell anything inside the Closet.  The State argues 
that the arrest was proper.   
The police handcuffed Brown immediately after approaching him.  
That action placed Brown in police custody.1  Consequently, the appropriate 
inquiry, as correctly determined by the Superior Court, is whether the police 
had probable cause to arrest Brown at that point in time.2 
 
Whether probable cause exists in a given case is a mixed question of 
fact and law.3  The trial court’s basic factual findings will be upheld on 
appeal if they are supported by the record and are the product of an orderly 
and logical deductive process.4  The trial court’s ultimate findings, however, 
implicate questions of law and, therefore, the standard of appellate review is 
de novo.5   
 
The police may, by statute, make a warrantless arrest where “[t]he 
officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has 
committed a felony. . .”6  This Court has interpreted “reasonable ground to 
                                          
 
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); Quarles v. State, 696 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Del. 
1997).   
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1904(b)(1) (2001). 
3 Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del. 1990). 
4 Lopez v. State, 861 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (Del. 2004). 
5 Id.   
6 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1904(b)(1) (2001). 
 
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believe” as the legal equivalent of “probable cause.”7  That standard is 
measured by the totality of the circumstances.8 
 
An informant’s tip may provide probable cause for a warrantless 
arrest where the totality of the circumstances, if corroborated, indicates that 
the information is reliable.9  In making that determination, a court must 
consider the reliability of the informant, the details contained in the 
informant’s tip, and the degree to which the tip is corroborated by 
independent police surveillance and information.10  Where the informant is a 
known, law-abiding citizen reporting a crime, the informant is considered 
presumptively reliable, because the informant has no connection to the 
criminal world and no reason to fabricate the story.11   
 
The evidence of record supports the Superior Court’s determination 
that the police had probable cause to arrest Brown.  The police knew the 
informant’s identity.  The information provided in the tip was corroborated 
by independent police observations of Brown approaching the Closet at the 
time reported in the tip.  One of the burglary victims, Mr. Al-Rasul, had 
identified the items from the 7-11 surveillance tape as those stolen from his 
                                          
 
7 Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (Del. 1988). 
8 Id. 
9 Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Del. 1985) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 233 (1983)). 
10 Id.   
11 Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997, 999 (Del. 1982). 
 
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home.  Brown was wearing a jacket similar to the jacket worn by the man in 
the 7-11 tape.  Brown also was carrying a duffel bag and was of similar 
build, race and height as the man shown in the tape.  These circumstances, 
when viewed in their totality, establish that probable cause existed to arrest 
Brown.  The Superior Court properly denied Brown’s motion to suppress the 
evidence resulting from the police search incident to Brown’s arrest.   
Mistrial Properly Denied 
 
On the morning of the third day of Brown’s trial, his defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial because alleged Brady material was not disclosed by 
the prosecution until the preceding Friday, following two days of Brown’s 
trial.  The alleged Brady material at issue was a laptop computer stolen 
during the January 20, 2004 burglary of the Del-Mar Appliance store in 
Dover.  The stolen laptop computer was recovered by the Delaware 
Probation Department from an individual named Moustapha Bobbo.  After a 
probation officer took the laptop from Bobbo, it was turned over to 
Detective Virdin of the Dover Police Department.  Detective Virdin then 
returned the computer to its rightful owner, Bruce Nygard. 
 
Brown contends that, because the State did not inform him of 
information regarding Nygard’s recovered laptop computer and because the 
computer was found in the possession of Bobbo, not Brown, this prevented 
 
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Brown from introducing witnesses at trial to trace the whereabouts of the 
computer after it was stolen from the Del-Mar Appliance store.  In denying 
the mistrial motion, the trial judge noted that Brown’s contention concerning 
the laptop computer related to only one of his three pending burglary 
charges. 
 
The State tried to mitigate any potential prejudice to Brown by the late 
disclosure of the information regarding the laptop computer.  The State was 
able to locate both Moustapha Bobbo and Antonio Medina, another witness 
who had some information as to how the laptop computer came to be in the 
possession of Bobbo.  Both Bobbo and Medina appeared at Brown’s trial 
and testified as defense witnesses. 
 
The Superior Court has a variety of remedies available for a discovery 
violation under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16(d)(2).  As this Court has 
noted, “[I]n determining the question of whether sanctions should be 
imposed, the trial court should weigh all relevant factors, such as the reason 
for the State’s delay and the extent of prejudice to the defendant.”12  As we 
pointed out in Doran,13 “Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 sets forth four 
alternative sanctions:  1) order prompt compliance with the discovery rule; 
                                          
 
12 Snowden v. State, 677 A.2d 33, 39 (Del. 1996).  See also Doran v. State, 606 A.2d 743, 
745 n.3 (Del. 1992). 
13 Doran v. State, 606 A.2d at 745. 
 
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2) ‘grant a continuance;’ 3) ‘prohibit the party from introducing in evidence 
material not disclosed;’ or 4) such other order the Court ‘deems just under 
the circumstances.’”14  At trial, the only remedy requested for the 
prosecution’s late discovery disclosure was the ultimate sanction of a 
mistrial on the third day of trial. 
 
Whether a mistrial should be declared is a matter entrusted to the trial 
judge’s discretion.15  The trial judge is in the best position to assess the risk 
of any prejudice resulting from trial events.16  “A trial judge should grant a 
mistrial only where there is ‘manifest necessity’ or the ‘ends of public 
justice would be otherwise defeated.’”17  The remedy of a mistrial is 
“mandated only when there are ‘no meaningful and practical alternatives’ to 
that remedy.”18   
In this case, the practical alternative to granting a mistrial was to 
permit Brown to present the testimony of both Moustapha Bobbo and 
Antonio Medina regarding the stolen laptop computer.  Both could testify 
                                          
 
14 See also Ray v. State, 587 A.2d 439, 441 (Del. 1991). 
15 See Flowers v. State, 858 A.2d 328, 332-33 (Del. 2004); Taylor v. State, 827 A.2d 24, 
27 (Del. 2003); Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del. 2002); Steckel v. State, 711 
A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998).   
16 See Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d at 1022; Hope v. State, 570 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Del. 1990); 
Bowe v. State, 514 A.2d 408, 410 (Del. 1986).   
17 Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d at 11 (quoting Fanning v. Superior Court, 320 A.2d 343, 345 
(Del. 1974)).  Accord Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1075-78 (Del. 1987). 
18 Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 62 (Del. 1994) (quoting Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d at 
1077). 
 
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that Jeron Brown had no ostensible connection with that particular item of 
stolen property before its seizure by a probation officer and ultimate return 
to the true owner.  In fact, Brown presented testimony to that effect by both 
of those witnesses.   
Brown argues on appeal that, had he known about this information at 
an earlier date, his trial examinations of Medina and Bobbo would have been 
different.  He fails to explain, however, how their examinations would have 
been different and how the difference(s), if any, would have mattered.  The 
record reflects that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s 
refusal to grant Brown’s motion for a mistrial.   
No Plain Error 
 
Finally, Brown contends that the trial judge, sua sponte, should have 
given a missing evidence instruction pursuant to Deberry v. State.19  
Brown’s request for the Deberry missing evidence jury instruction did not 
involve the physical evidence at issue (the laptop computer), but, rather, 
related to a missing witness, Laura Johansen, who was not available to 
testify at Brown’s trial.  Johansen was the person who gave the stolen laptop 
computer to Bobbo and presumably could have testified that she purchased 
the laptop computer from someone other than Brown. 
                                          
 
19 Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 750-53 (Del. 1983). 
 
10
 
Brown made no request at trial for a Deberry missing evidence jury 
instruction.  Therefore, that claim has been waived by Brown and may now 
be reviewed on appeal only for plain error.20  To be plain, the alleged error 
must affect substantial rights, generally meaning that it must have affected 
the outcome of Brown’s trial.21  In demonstrating that a forfeited error is 
prejudicial, the burden of persuasion is on Brown.22 
Brown was found in possession of a digital camera and camera printer 
taken from the Del-Mar Appliance store when he was arrested by the police.  
The digital camera and printer that the police discovered in Brown’s 
possession linked him to the stolen property from the Del-Mar appliance 
burglary.  Accordingly, there was an independent evidentiary basis for the 
jury to conclude that Brown was guilty of receiving that other stolen 
property.   
Brown was not convicted of the Del-Mar Appliance store burglary.  
He was convicted only of receiving stolen property resulting from that 
                                          
 
20 Supr. Ct. R. 8; Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 652-53 (Del. 2001). 
21 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993); Wainwright v. State, 504 
A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986) (“Under the plain error 
standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial 
rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”); Floray v. State, 
720 A.2d 1132, 1137 (Del. 1998). 
22 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (federal plain error rule).  See also Brown v. 
State, 729 A.2d 259, 265 (Del. 1999); Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619, 633 (Del. 1998). 
 
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burglary, property that included the digital camera and the printer.23  
Consequently, Brown cannot demonstrate plain error, because even if 
Johanson had appeared at trial and testified that she purchased the stolen 
laptop computer from someone other than Brown, the ultimate result at trial 
would have been the same.   
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
 
                                          
 
23 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 856(b) (2001).