Case Title: Richart v. Jackson

Citation: 171 Vt. 94, 758 A.2d 319

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Richart v. Jackson (98-157); 171 Vt. 94; 758 A.2d 319 

[Filed 26-May-2000]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 18-Jul-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision  before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, 
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that  corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-157

Frank and Barbara Richart, Fred and	         Supreme Court
Nancy Seigler, James & Peggy Sharp,
Mark and Claudia Pfaff, Paul and 
Catherine Arthaud, et al.
                                                 On Appeal from
     v.		                                 Chittenden Superior Court

Bryan S. Jackson and Nancy F. Jenkins	         March Term, 1999

Linda Levitt, J.

Douglas D. Le Brun of Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, for 
  Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Vincent A. Paradis and Daniel P. O'Rourke of Bergeron, Paradis & Fitzpatrick, 
  Essex Junction, for Defendants-Appellants.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Jenkins, 
          Supr.J., Specially Assigned

       SKOGLUND,  J.    Defendants appeal from a summary judgment of the
  Chittenden Superior  Court enforcing plaintiffs' right to the use and
  enjoyment of certain improvements located in a  common beach area on
  defendants' property, and requiring defendants to pay a share of the
  insurance  costs for the beach area and improvements.   Defendants contend
  the court erred in ruling that they  were bound by the terms of a
  Declaration of Conditions, Restrictions and Uses relating to the beach 
  area and improvements because: (1) the failure to record the Declaration
  prior to the conveyance of  their property to a predecessor-in-title
  extinguished any easements or covenants as applied to  defendants; and (2)
  the Declaration was recorded outside defendants' chain of title. 
  Plaintiffs have  cross-appealed, contending the court erred in failing to
  enforce a provision in the Declaration  requiring defendants to contribute
  to the overall maintenance costs of the beach-front improvements.  We
  affirm in part and reverse in part.   

 

       Defendants and plaintiffs own properties located in the Town of
  Charlotte.  All of the  properties in question derive  from a common
  grantor, J. Graham Goldsmith.  In 1986, Goldsmith   began to develop the
  property by dividing and selling lots.  The first eight developed lots
  comprised  Black Willow Farms Phase I.  Because not every lot had beach
  access to Lake Champlain, Goldsmith  granted to each Phase I lot that was
  sold an easement for a right-of-way leading to a common beach  area on two
  lots he continued to own.  Reference to this easement and right-of-way
  appeared in every  deed of the Phase I lots as they were sold.  The deeds
  provided: 

     Included herewith in common with others is an easement and right of 
     way over a ten foot wide pedestrian access trail as the same is shown 
     on the aforementioned Plan to provide access to the shores of Lake 
     Champlain, together with the use of a 60' x 60' beach area as shown 
     on the aforementioned Plan.

  Plaintiffs are the owners of five lots in Phase I of the subdivision and
  members of the Black Willow  Farms Homeowners Association.  The use
  easements encumber Lots 10 and 11 of what became  known as Black Willow
  Farms Phase II development.

       In March 1987, Goldsmith and the Association executed a Declaration
  that subjected the  access and beach area to several conditions,
  restrictions, and uses and recognized the Association's  right  to
  construct and maintain a ten-by-ten foot storage shed and to use, maintain,
  and store a fifty-foot dock.  The Declaration also required the owners of
  Lots 10 and 11 to each pay one-tenth of the  annual budget for maintenance
  of the area, including the purchase of general liability and 
  indemnification insurance.  For unexplained reasons, the Declaration was
  not recorded until March  17, 1992.

       On May 10, 1991, Goldsmith conveyed Lot 11 to Barry J. Mossman,
  defendants' predecessor- in-interest.  The 1991 warranty deed from
  Goldsmith to Mossman stated in part:

     The within parcel is subject to and has the benefit of a pedestrian 
     easement and right of way along the southerly boundary, in common 
     with others, in the area generally depicted on the Plat as "10 Foot 
     Wide Right of Way," and in the beach area on the within parcel as 
     generally shown on the Plat.

  Although the warranty deed contained the easement, no mention was made of
  the Declaration, and 

 

  Mossman did not recall receiving a copy of the Declaration or being aware
  of its existence. The  Association installed a dock in the beach area in
  the summer of 1992.   Thereafter, the dock was used  by residents to access
  boats during the summer, and was stored on land adjacent to the beach area 
  during the winter.  On May 31, 1994, Mossman conveyed Lot 11 by warranty
  deed to defendants.   The deed contained the same easement language that
  was in the Goldsmith-to-Mossman deed, but  again did not reference the
  Declaration.  

       A dispute arose between defendants and the Association over the
  applicability of provisions  in the Declaration, culminating in defendants'
  removal of the dock from their property.   Plaintiffs   thereupon filed a
  complaint against defendants, seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting 
  defendants from interfering with their use and enjoyment of the
  right-of-way, beach area, and dock.   Defendants filed an answer denying
  plaintiff's right to use the dock and storage area, and a  counterclaim
  seeking to enforce certain provisions of the Declaration against
  plaintiffs, including the  obligation to obtain general liability insurance
  to cover the common beach area and improvements.   The parties filed
  cross-motions for summary judgment.

       The court issued two separate decisions.   In the first, it ruled in
  favor of  plaintiffs' right to  use and maintain the shed and dock in the
  common beach area.  In the second, it ruled that  defendants were obligated
  to pay one-tenth of the cost of insurance for the common beach area and 
  structures thereon, but not the costs of construction and maintenance of
  the improvements.  Plaintiffs'  motion for reconsideration was subsequently
  denied, and these appeals followed.  

       In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard
  as the trial court:   summary judgment should be granted when, taking all
  allegations made by the nonmoving party as  true, there are no genuine
  issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
  of  law.  See Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 165 Vt. 306, 309,