Case Title: In re Laws

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Laws (2005-320)

2007 VT 54

[Filed 22-Jun-2007]

       NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2007 VT 54

                                No. 2005-320


  In re Richard Laws                             Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
                                                 Addison Superior Court

                                                 September Term, 2006


  Christina C. Reiss, J.

  Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, and Richard Laws, Pro Se,
    Beattyville, Kentucky, for Petitioner-Appellant.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, John Treadwell, Assistant Attorney
    General, Montpelier, and John T. Quinn, Addison County State's Attorney,
    Middlebury, for Respondent-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.
        
       ¶  1.  BURGESS, J.  Petitioner appeals an order of the superior
  court granting summary judgment in favor of the State on his request for
  post-conviction relief (PCR).  The superior court denied relief, concluding
  that under 13 V.S.A. § 7131 it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. 
  The court also concluded, in the alternative, that all of petitioner's
  claims were barred because he failed to raise them in a prior PCR.  We hold
  that the superior court erred in dismissing the PCR under § 7131 because
  the language the court relied on affects venue only and does not limit a
  court's subject matter jurisdiction over a PCR.  We further hold that
  petitioner may go forward with his claims, even though he did not raise
  them in his first PCR, to the extent he can demonstrate (1) cause for not
  raising the issues previously and (2) prejudice if the issues are not
  heard.  Claims that do not meet this standard, as well as those claims
  actually raised and decided on the merits in connection with petitioner's
  first PCR, are properly barred from relitigation.  Accordingly, we reverse
  the superior court's decision and remand the matter for further proceedings
  consistent with the standard articulated in this opinion.

       ¶  2.  We summarized the facts underlying petitioner's criminal
  convictions in our decision affirming denial of his first PCR:

    The crimes occurred in the late evening of June 19, 1992.  While
    driving from Mad Mountain Tavern in Waitsfield that evening, the
    victim's tires went flat; the evidence suggested that defendant
    himself had punctured her tires.  Defendant pulled up to her
    stopped vehicle and offered her a ride, which the victim accepted. 
    Rather than bring her home, however, defendant drove the victim to
    the Granville Gulf area where he raped her.  After raping her,
    defendant drove the victim to a more remote location and beat her
    severely with a blunt instrument.  The victim left behind a large
    deposit of blood with head hair that the police later discovered
    during their investigation.  The victim's injuries were life
    threatening and included a fractured skull. 

  In re Laws, 2004-118, slip op. at 1 (Vt. Sept. 29, 2004) (unreported mem.). 
  Based on these facts, petitioner was charged with kidnapping, aggravated
  sexual assault, and aggravated assault.
   
       ¶  3.  There was apparently some initial uncertainty as to whether
  the crime should be prosecuted in Addison or Washington County.  The
  charges were originally filed in Washington County district court, but
  petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that venue was improper
  because the offenses had not taken place in that county.  See 13 V.S.A. §
  4601 (providing that criminal charges be tried in county where offense was
  committed).  The State conceded the issue, dismissed the charges filed in
  Washington County, and then filed charges in Addison County.  Despite the
  change in venue, however, the Addison County State's Attorney appointed a
  Washington County State's Attorney to prosecute the matter.  Ultimately,
  petitioner entered into a plea agreement that was signed by petitioner, his
  attorney, and the Washington County State's Attorney (acting on behalf of
  Addison County).  The plea agreement was entered in Washington County
  district court, and it was the Washington County district court that
  sentenced petitioner to twenty to thirty-five years to serve.  Petitioner
  did not pursue a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence.

       ¶  4.  Petitioner filed his first PCR (FN1) in Washington Superior
  Court in July 2000, asserting that his guilty plea violated double
  jeopardy.  The superior court entered judgment in favor of the State,
  concluding that petitioner's voluntary plea waived any double jeopardy
  claim.  This Court affirmed on appeal.  See In re Laws, No. 2004-118, slip
  op. at 1-2 (Vt. Sept. 29, 2004) (unreported mem.).
                                             
       ¶  5.  Petitioner then filed a second PCR in Addison Superior Court
  in October 2004, arguing: (1) the plea agreement violated double jeopardy;
  (2) the Washington County district court lacked jurisdiction to accept the
  plea agreement; (3) the Washington County State's Attorney lacked the
  authority to sign the plea agreement; (4) the plea colloquy did not meet
  the requirements of Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f); and (5)
  petitioner's attorney provided ineffective assistance.  The State moved for
  summary judgment on the merits of these claims, but also argued that the
  superior court did not need to decide the PCR on the merits because it was
  a second or successive petition barred by 13 V.S.A. § 7134.  The superior
  court entered judgment for the State, concluding that it did not have
  jurisdiction over the PCR under 13 V.S.A. § 7131, and, alternatively, that
  it was not obligated to hear the PCR because it was a second or successive
  petition.  Petitioner appealed.

                                     I.

       ¶  6.  In his pro se appellate brief, petitioner reiterates his
  argument on the merits of his claim that the Washington County district
  court lacked jurisdiction to accept his plea in the underlying criminal
  proceeding.  He also asserts in passing that the plea colloquy did not
  comply with Rule 11(f).  Petitioner does not address the superior court's
  conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the PCR, or the alternative
  ground that the claims failed under the bar against second or successive
  PCRs.  The State, in turn, responds to petitioner's merits-based argument,
  only briefly reiterating the § 7134 argument.

       ¶  7.  Dismissing the PCR, the superior court did not engage the
  merits of petitioner's claims.  Rather, the court concluded that it lacked
  jurisdiction to consider the PCR, relying on the language of 13 V.S.A. §
  7131, which provides:

     A prisoner who is in custody under sentence of a court and claims
    the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was
    imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the United
    States, or of the state of Vermont, or that the court was without
    jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or that the sentence was in
    excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject
    to collateral attack, may at any time move the superior court of
    the county where the sentence was imposed to vacate, set aside or
    correct the sentence.

  (Emphasis added.)  While it is true that the post-conviction-relief statute
  requires that a defendant seek relief in "the superior court of the county
  where the sentence was imposed," id., we have previously explained that
  this provision goes to venue and not subject matter jurisdiction:
   
    Section 7131 . . . does not concern subject-matter jurisdiction of
    the court in which the PCR petition is heard.  The statute
    indicating the county where the PCR should be brought was enacted
    to simplify the often cumbersome procedures associated with habeas
    corpus.  Requiring the superior court of the county of sentencing
    to hear the PCR petition was designed to provide a more convenient
    forum for obtaining relevant records and witnesses.  As a venue
    provision, the statute does not purport to limit subject-matter
    jurisdiction.

  In re Hanson, 160 Vt. 111, 113,