Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 255 Ind. 594, 265 N.E.2d 699

Docket Number: 370S68

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1971-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
255 Ind. 594 (1971)
265 N.E.2d 699
BROWN
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 370S68.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed January 29, 1971.
Rehearing denied March 5, 1971.
*595 Frank E. Spencer, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, R. Michael Bruney, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
ARTERBURN, C.J.
Defendant was charged with the offense of First Degree Murder by an indictment filed in the Marion Criminal Court. The defendant entered a plea of "not guilty" and the cause was submitted to a trial by jury on December 1, 1969, in Marion Criminal Court, Division I, before Judge John T. Davis. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of the crime of Second Degree Murder and defendant was subsequently sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for life.
Considering only the evidence most favorable to the State, we find that on the evening of November 14, 1968, the decedent, Robert Ecton, picked up his girl friend, Barbara Lewis, and drove to the home of the defendant. About ten minutes after they arrived (around midnight) the defendant walked into the house and went into the bedroom. A short time later he walked out of the bedroom carrying a gun and shot into the floor, about three feet from where Robert Ecton and his girl friend were sitting. Loretta Moore, who had been living with the defendant previous to the shooting incident, arrived outside the house just in time to hear the gun shot. She entered the house and, seeing that the defendant had a gun in his hand, proceeded to tell him what was wrong with him. She testified: "I told him I was tired of that stuff *596 and I said I was going out to my daddy's house, then he said wasn't nobody going anywhere."
Loretta Moore further testified that Willie Brown shot the decedent in the back, and then shot him several more times. The decedent's girl friend, Barbara Lewis, testified to substantially the same facts.
Prior to the preliminary instructions and opening statements, but after the jury was sworn in, the defendant moved for separation of the witnesses. The court refused to grant the request at that time, however, on the basis that there were as yet no witnesses inasmuch as they had not been sworn in at that time. The trial judge took the motion under advisement until after the opening statements were made by counsel for the State and counsel for the defendant. The witnesses were then sworn in and the motion to separate the witnesses was granted. The defendant alleges that a new trial should therefore be ordered since the court abused its discretion in allowing the statement of evidence by the State before granting the motion for separation of witnesses.
This Court has previously stated that granting a motion for separation of witnesses is wholly within the discretion of the court and that it is not required by statute or common law. Separation of witnesses is not a right, but may be granted at discretion. Butler v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 241, 97 N.E.2d 492. The trial court did not err in delaying action on the motion until after the witnesses were sworn. Permitting the witnesses to hear the opening statement of both counsel for the State and counsel for the defendant would not be grounds for reversal in order that a new trial could be granted.
Defendant next urges this Court to reverse the conviction on the basis that no foundation was laid as to when and where a picture was taken that the State introduced into evidence as State's Exhibit Number 1. The testifying witness identified the exhibit as being a true picture of her son, Robert Ecton. The face was clearly identifiable *597 by the mother. A photograph of a person, if relevant, is admissible upon evidence that it is a true and accurate representation of such a person. 1 Ewbanks Indiana Criminal Law, Evidence, § 395; 32 C.J.S. Evidence, § 709. The defendant states in his reply brief that the exhibit consisted of only a nude photograph, of only part of a body, with very little distinguishable other than the chest. The significance of the exhibit is that it reveals a wound. Additionally, State's Exhibit Number 3, to which the defendant did not object, is substantially the same picture taken from a different angle. Thus, the admission of State's Exhibit Number 1 would be deemed harmless error, even if it had been admitted improperly.
At the close of all the evidence, the defendant tendered the following Instruction Number 6:
The instruction was refused by the court inasmuch as Final Instruction Number 24 given by the court was complete and covered all of the points set out in tendered Instruction Number 6. McPhearson v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 579, 219 N.E.2d 907; Greenwalt v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 608, 209 N.E.2d 254. Final Instruction Number 24, as given by the court, reads as follows:
No errors having occurred at the trial, the judgment is affirmed.
Givan, Hunter and Prentice, JJ., concur; DeBruler, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 265 N.E.2d 699.