Case Title: STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. JAMES ROBBINS

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0077

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. JAMES ROBBINS2008 WY 148197 P.3d 1243Case Number: No. S-08-0077Decided: 12/15/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
JAMES 
ROBBINS,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; 
Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael Thomas Kahler, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Mike 
Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, 
KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      James Robbins 
initiated this declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of 
the statutes under which the Wyoming Department of Transportation disqualified 
him from operating commercial motor vehicles.  Rather than deciding the constitutional 
question, the district court ruled that the Department lacked authority to 
disqualify Mr. Robbins because he had not been convicted of any crime relating 
to driving while under the influence of alcohol.  On this basis, the district court ruled 
that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and in turn, that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the declaratory judgment 
action.

 
 
[¶2]      The Department 
appealed.  We conclude that the 
district court did have subject matter jurisdiction.  We will reverse and remand this case to 
the district court to consider Mr. Robbins' claim that the applicable 
statutes are unconstitutional.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶3]      The single 
dispositive issue in this case is whether the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over Mr. Robbins' declaratory judgment 
action.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      On March 31, 
2006, James Robbins stopped his semi-tractor and trailer at the port of entry in 
Evanston, Wyoming.  
The clerks smelled alcohol on his breath, and contacted the highway 
patrol.  A patrolman arrived at the 
port of entry and confronted Mr. Robbins, who admitted that he had been drinking 
earlier in the day.  Mr. Robbins 
consented to chemical breath testing.  
Two tests were done, with respective blood alcohol concentrations of 
0.040% and 0.041%. 

 

[¶5]      Mr. Robbins was 
not arrested, nor was he charged with any crime relating to this event.  However, the Wyoming Department of 
Transportation notified Mr. Robbins that he would be disqualified from driving 
commercial motor vehicles.  Mr. 
Robbins requested a contested case hearing before the Office of Administrative 
Hearings.  At his hearing, 
Mr. Robbins asserted that he could not be disqualified because he had not 
been convicted of any crime.  The 
hearing examiner rejected Mr. Robbins' argument, and upheld the 
Department's disqualification of Mr. Robbins.

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Robbins filed 
a petition for judicial review in the district court, repeating his argument 
that he could not be disqualified because he had not been convicted of a 
crime.  Later, however, 
Mr. Robbins dismissed his petition for review, and instead filed a 
declaratory judgment action asserting that the applicable statutes were 
unconstitutional because they did not establish an appropriate burden of proof 
for his disqualification.  The 
constitutional issues were briefed, and a hearing was held, but the district 
court declined to decide the issues presented.  Instead, it ruled that the Department 
lacked authority to disqualify Mr. Robbins because he had not been 
convicted of a crime.  Further, the 
district court ruled that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction, 
which in turn deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to 
consider Mr. Robbins' declaratory judgment action.  The Department appealed the district 
court's decision.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      "Inasmuch as the 
facts are not in dispute and the issues present questions of law, this [C]ourt 
conducts a de novo review of the district court's conclusions of 
law."  Anderson v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 961 
(Wyo. 
1996).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court's decision hinged upon this statutory provision:

 
 
(a)  Any 
person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a period of 
not less than one (1) year if convicted of: . . .

 
 
(ii)  Driving 
or in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle while the alcohol 
concentration of the person's blood, breath or other bodily substance is four 
one-hundredths of one percent (0.04%).

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-7-305 (LexisNexis 2007).  
The district court interpreted this provision to mean that a person may 
be disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle only if he is convicted 
of the listed offense.  It 
interpreted the term "convicted" as referring to a criminal conviction.  The district court then reached this 
conclusion:

 
 
The 
decision by WYDOT to disqualify Robbins as a commercial driver without a 
conviction of one of the offenses stated in W.S. § 31-7-305(a), "falls 
outside the confines of the statutory guidelines articulated by the legislature 
[and] is contrary to law and cannot stand."  Tri County Telephone Association, Inc. v. 
Wyoming Public Service Commission, 910 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Wyo. 1996). . . .  The Court must conclude that neither 
WYDOT nor the OAH officer had subject matter jurisdiction to disqualify Robbins 
in the absence of a conviction of an offense specified under W.S. 
§ 31-7-305(a).  Because the 
agency did not have subject matter jurisdiction, this Court will not address the 
constitutional issues raised by Robbins.

 
 
[¶9]      We need not 
decide if the district court was correct in its ruling that a criminal 
conviction is required before a person may be disqualified from driving a 
commercial motor vehicle.1  Even if that is so, it does not mean 
that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction to disqualify 
Mr. Robbins.  This is 
demonstrated in the case relied upon by the district court.  In Tri County Telephone, 910 P.2d  at 1361, 
we ruled that the agency's action was "not supported by the requisite statutory 
authority."  We therefore reversed 
the agency decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.  We did not hold that the agency lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction, or that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the 
case.

 
 
[¶10]   In State v. Kraus, the Department suspended 
Mr. Kraus's driver's license because of "three convictions, one in the 
justice court for Sheridan County, Wyoming; one in the justice court for Hardin, Montana; and one 
in the justice court for Townsend, Montana."  706 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Wyo. 1985).  Under the statutes then in effect, 
however, "convictions for driving while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor in other states or under Wyoming municipal ordinances cannot be relied 
upon to suspend drivers' licenses."  
Id.  Mr. Kraus filed a declaratory judgment 
action seeking to have his license restored.  We agreed with Mr. Kraus that the 
Department had improperly suspended his license.  However, we did not rule that the 
Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Kraus's case, or 
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Kraus's 
declaratory judgment action.  
Rather, we affirmed the district court's order requiring the Department 
to restore Mr. Kraus's driver's license.  We would not have done that  we could 
not have done that  if the Department, the district court, or this Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

 
 
[¶11]   The Department's authority to 
disqualify Mr. Robbins from operating commercial motor vehicles is found in 
the statutes.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 31-7-307.  The Department had 
subject matter jurisdiction to decide Mr. Robbins' disqualification 
case.  Whether that decision was 
consistent with the statutory requirements or not, the Department still had 
subject matter jurisdiction to consider Mr. Robbins' 
case.

 
 
[¶12]   The statutes also provide the 
district court with subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Robbins' 
declaratory judgment action.  
Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-37-102:

 
 
Courts 
of record within their respective jurisdictions may declare rights, status and 
other legal regulations whether or not further relief is or could be 
claimed.  No proceeding is open to 
objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed 
for.  The declaration may be either 
affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the 
effect of a final judgment.

 
 
Even though 
Mr. Robbins dismissed his petition for judicial review of the Department's 
decision, he may still challenge the constitutionality of the underlying 
statutes through a declaratory judgment action.  As we have 
explained:

 
 
Ordinarily, 
a declaratory judgment action is not a substitute for an appeal [from 
administrative decisions.] . . .  
If, however, such desired relief concerns the validity and construction 
of agency regulations, or if it concerns the constitutionality or interpretation 
of a statute upon which the administrative action is, or is to be, based, it 
should be entertained.

 
 

Wyoming 
Community College Comm'n v. Casper Community College Dist., 2001 WY 
86, ¶ 13, 31 P.3d 1242, 1248 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Rocky Mountain Oil 
& Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1168 (Wyo. 1982)).  As the quotation suggests, the district 
court should entertain Mr. Robbins' declaratory judgment action in this 
case.

 
 
[¶13]   We therefore reverse the district 
court's decision that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  We decline to decide the constitutional 
issues at this point because the parties did not brief those issues for this 
Court.  We therefore deem it prudent 
to have the district court decide those issues in the first instance.  Accordingly, we remand this case to the 
district court to consider Mr. Robbins' declaratory judgment action challenging 
the constitutionality of the statutes under which the Department disqualified 
him from driving commercial motor vehicles.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
Department contends that conviction of a criminal offense is not required 
because "conviction" is defined by statute to "include . . . a 
determination of a violation in a court of original jurisdiction or an 
administrative proceeding."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-102(a)(xi)(A) (emphasis 
added).