Case Title: William C. McConkey v. J. B. Van Hollen

Citation: 2010 WI 57

Docket Number: 2008AP001868

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1868 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
William C. McConkey, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
     v. 
J. B. Van Hollen, in his role as Attorney 
General of Wisconsin, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 3, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard G. Niess   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent there were 
briefs by Lester A. Pines, Tamara B. Packard, and Cullen Weston 
Pines & Bach LLP, Madison, and Edward S. Marion and Edward S. 
Marion Attorney-At-Law LLC, Madison, and oral argument by Lester 
A. Pines. 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant the cause was 
argued by Lewis W. Beilin, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was Raymond P. Taffora, deputy attorney general, 
and J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Brian W. Raum, James A. 
Campbell, and Alliance Defense Fund, Scottsdale, Ariz., and 
Samuel R. Taylor, Jr. and Samuel R. Taylor Jr. LLC, Kenosha, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Family Council. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William M. Conley, 
Callie M. Bell, Katherine C. Smith, and Foley & Lardner LLP, 
Madison, 
and 
Laurence 
J. 
Dupuis 
and 
ACLU 
of 
Wisconsin 
Foundation, Inc., Milwaukee, on behalf of Lambda Legal Defense 
and Education Fund, Inc., Fair Wisconsin, and ACLU of Wisconsin. 
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Matthew W. O’Neill, 
Sara Elizabeth Dill, and Friebert, Finerty & St. John, S.C., 
Milwaukee, on behalf of League of Women Voters of Wisconsin 
Education Fund. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael D. Dean, 
Michael D. Dean, LLC, and First Freedoms Foundation, Inc., 
Waukesha, and Richard M. Esenberg, on behalf of Community 
Leaders Dedicated to Children Raised by Married Mothers and 
Fathers. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 57
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP1868  
(L.C. No. 
2007CV2657) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
William C. McConkey, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
J. B. Van Hollen, in his role as Attorney 
General of Wisconsin, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Dane County, Richard G. Niess, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   In November 2006, the people 
of Wisconsin approved the adoption of the following amendment to 
the Wisconsin Constitution: 
Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be 
valid or recognized as a marriage in this state.  A 
legal status identical or substantially similar to 
that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not 
be valid or recognized in this state.1 
                                                 
1 Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 13. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
2 
 
¶2 
In July 2007, William McConkey, a voter and taxpayer, 
filed suit alleging, among other things, that this amendment 
(the "marriage amendment") was submitted to the people in 
violation of the constitution's requirement that voters must be 
allowed to vote separately on separate amendments (the "separate 
amendment rule").  In other words, McConkey claimed that the two 
sentences of the marriage amendment constituted two amendments, 
not one, and that because voters were not able to vote for or 
against each sentence, the marriage amendment was not validly 
adopted.  The Attorney General countered that McConkey did not 
have standing to bring this claim because he suffered no actual 
injury, and maintained that the amendment was adopted in 
conformity with the separate amendment rule. 
¶3 
The Dane County Circuit Court, Richard G. Niess, 
Judge, held that McConkey did have standing to bring suit 
because, assuming his claims are true, his rights as a voter 
were violated.  Regarding the substance of his claim, the 
circuit court held that the two sentences of the amendment 
related to the same subject and furthered the same general 
purpose.  Therefore, the two sentences constituted only one 
amendment.  The court of appeals certified the case to this 
court, and we accepted review. 
¶4 
The two issues before us are: 
(1) 
Does McConkey have standing to challenge the 
marriage amendment? 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
3 
 
(2) 
Was the marriage amendment adopted in violation of 
the Wisconsin Constitution's separate amendment 
rule? 
¶5 
Though the precise nature of McConkey's alleged injury 
is 
difficult 
to 
define, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
policy 
considerations 
underlying 
our 
standing 
doctrine 
support 
addressing the merits of McConkey's claim, which we therefore 
choose to do. 
¶6 
We hold that Article XIII, Section 13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution——the marriage amendment——was adopted in conformity 
with the separate amendment rule in Article XII, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, which mandates that voters must be 
able to vote separately on separate amendments.  Both sentences 
of the marriage amendment relate to marriage and tend to effect 
or carry out the same general purpose of preserving the legal 
status of marriage in Wisconsin as between only one man and one 
woman. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶7 
During both the 2003 and 2005 sessions, the Wisconsin 
State Assembly and Senate adopted a joint resolution to amend 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  Though the 2003 and 2005 versions 
contained 
minor 
procedural 
variations, 
the 
text 
of 
the 
resolution 
itself 
was 
identical. 
 
Both 
versions 
of 
the 
resolution contained what the parties have referred to as the 
title: 
"To 
create 
section 
13 
of 
article 
XIII 
of 
the 
constitution; relating to: providing that only a marriage 
between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
4 
 
marriage in this state."  The substance of the resolution 
contained two sections.  Section 1 stated the text of the 
proposed marriage amendment.  Section 2 of the resolution 
addressed the numbering of the new proposed amendment.2 
¶8 
Because the joint resolution was passed by two 
successive legislatures, the amendment was submitted to the 
people for ratification.3  Wisconsin voters were asked the 
following question: 
                                                 
2 The 2003 joint resolution also contained a further 
resolution that the "proposed amendment be referred to the 
legislature to be chosen at the next general election and that 
it be published for 3 months previous to the time of holding 
such 
election." 
 
The 
2005 
version 
contained 
additional 
resolutions related to the submission of the amendment to the 
people, including the question to appear on the ballot. 
3 Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
which contains the separate amendment rule, specifies one of the 
procedures for amending the constitution (the other is via a 
constitutional convention, see Wis. Const. art. XII, § 2).  It 
provides in relevant part: 
Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may 
be proposed in either house of the legislature, and if 
the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the 
members elected to each of the two houses, such 
proposed amendment or amendments shall be . . . 
referred to the legislature to be chosen at the next 
general election . . . and if, in the legislature so 
next chosen, such proposed amendment or amendments 
shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members 
elected to each house, then it shall be the duty of 
the legislature to submit such proposed amendment or 
amendments to the people in such manner and at such 
time as the legislature shall prescribe; and if the 
people shall approve and ratify such amendment or 
amendments by a majority of the electors voting 
thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become 
part of the constitution; provided, that if more than 
one amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
5 
 
Marriage.  Shall section 13 of article XIII of the 
constitution be created to provide that only a 
marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid 
or recognized as a marriage in this state and that a 
legal status identical or substantially similar to 
that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not 
be valid or recognized in this state? 
On November 7, 2006, Wisconsin voters approved this 
amendment by a vote of 59 percent to 41 percent. 
¶9 
William McConkey is a registered voter and taxpayer 
who 
opposed 
both 
propositions 
contained 
in 
the 
marriage 
amendment and voted against it.  He filed suit on July 27, 2007, 
challenging the marriage amendment on the grounds that it 
violated the due process and equal protection guarantees in the 
Wisconsin and United States Constitutions, and on the grounds 
that it was adopted in violation of the separate amendment rule 
in Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The 
Attorney General countered that McConkey suffered no actual 
injury and therefore did not have standing to bring any of his 
claims.  The Attorney General further argued that neither the 
substance of the amendment nor the process by which it was 
adopted violated the state or federal constitutions. 
¶10 On a motion to dismiss by the Attorney General, the 
Dane County Circuit Court, Richard G. Niess, Judge, held that 
McConkey did not have standing to bring his due process and 
equal protection claims, but did have standing as a voter to 
challenge the process by which the amendment was adopted.  If an 
                                                                                                                                                             
such manner that the people may vote for or against 
such amendments separately. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
6 
 
amendment were invalidly submitted to voters, the circuit court 
reasoned, all voters were injured no matter how an individual 
would have voted had the different propositions been submitted 
separately.  On the merits of McConkey's claim, the court held 
that the marriage amendment satisfied the requirements of the 
separate amendment rule, explaining that both propositions 
related to the subject matter of marriage and were designed to 
accomplish the same purpose: "the preservation and protection of 
the unique and historical status of traditional marriage." 
¶11 McConkey appealed, challenging the circuit court's 
holding on the merits of his separate amendment rule challenge.4  
The Attorney General cross-appealed, challenging the circuit 
court's grant of standing.  The court of appeals certified both 
questions to this court, and this court accepted certification. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 Whether a party has proper standing to bring suit is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  Krier v. Vilione, 2009 
WI 45, ¶14, 317 Wis. 2d 288, 766 N.W.2d 517.  Whether an 
amendment 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
was 
adopted 
in 
conformity with the proper procedures is also a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Milwaukee Alliance v. Elections Bd., 
106 Wis. 2d 593, 604, 317 N.W.2d 420 (1982). 
                                                 
4 McConkey's due process and equal protection arguments are 
not before us on appeal. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
7 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶13 Before we can address the merits of McConkey's 
challenge, we must first confirm whether McConkey's suit is 
properly before us——that is, whether McConkey has standing to 
bring his claim.  Part A examines this question, concluding that 
the 
policies 
undergirding 
our 
standing 
doctrine 
support 
addressing the merits of McConkey's challenge.  In Part B, we 
address 
whether 
the 
marriage 
amendment 
violates 
the 
constitution's separate amendment rule, concluding that it does 
not. 
A. Does McConkey Have Standing? 
¶14 The Attorney General argues that McConkey does not 
have standing to challenge the marriage amendment.  He asserts 
that 
because 
McConkey 
would 
have 
voted 
"no" 
on 
both 
propositions, which McConkey concedes is true, he suffered no 
actual injury to a legally protectable interest.5  McConkey, on 
the other hand, frames this case as a violation of his basic 
voting and speech rights. 
¶15 As 
a 
general 
matter, 
a 
litigant 
advancing 
a 
constitutional claim must have suffered an actual injury to a 
legally protected interest.  See State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank 
v. M & I Peoples Bank, 95 Wis. 2d 303, 308, 290 N.W.2d 321 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that McConkey's standing argument 
comes to us under the procedural mechanism of a motion to 
dismiss, meaning that we take all facts alleged by McConkey to 
be true in determining whether he has standing to bring his 
claim.  See Repetti v. Sysco Corp., 2007 WI App 49, ¶2, 300 
Wis. 2d 568, 730 N.W.2d 189. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
8 
 
(1980).  The law of standing in Wisconsin is construed 
liberally, and "even an injury to a trifling interest" may 
suffice.  Fox v. DHSS, 112 Wis. 2d 514, 524, 334 N.W.2d 532 
(1983).  Unlike in federal courts, which can only hear "cases" 
or "controversies,"6 standing in Wisconsin is not a matter of 
jurisdiction, but of sound judicial policy.7  Zehetner v. 
Chrysler Fin. Co., 2004 WI App 80, ¶12, 272 Wis. 2d  628, 679 
N.W.2d 919. 
¶16 Standing 
requirements in Wisconsin are aimed at 
ensuring that the issues and arguments presented will be 
carefully developed and zealously argued, as well as informing 
the court of the consequences of its decision.  See Moedern v. 
McGinnis, 70 Wis. 2d 1056, 1064, 236 N.W.2d 240 (1975) ("[T]he 
gist of the requirements relating to standing . . . is to assure 
that the party seeking relief has alleged such a personal stake 
in the outcome of the controversy as to give rise to that 
adverseness necessary to sharpen the presentation of issues for 
illumination of constitutional questions."); In re Carl F.S., 
2001 WI App 97, ¶5, 242 Wis. 2d 605, 626 N.W.2d 330 ("The 
purpose of the requirement of standing is to ensure that a 
concrete case informs the court of the consequences of its 
                                                 
6 The United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of 
federal courts to only "cases" or "controversies."  See U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
7 We do, however, look to federal case law as persuasive 
authority regarding standing questions.  Wisconsin's Envtl. 
Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 69 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 230 
N.W.2d 243 (1975). 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
9 
 
decision and that people who are directly concerned and are 
truly adverse will genuinely present opposing petitions to the 
court."). 
¶17 We sympathize with the argument that all voters are 
harmed by an amendment invalidly submitted to the people.  
Still, it is difficult to determine the precise nature of the 
injury here, and we are troubled by the broad general voter 
standing articulated by the circuit court.  However, whether as 
a matter of judicial policy, or because McConkey has at least a 
trifling interest in his voting rights, we believe the unique 
circumstances of this case render the merits of McConkey's claim 
fit for adjudication. 
¶18 Numerous reasons support our conclusion.  First, 
McConkey has competently framed the issues and zealously argued 
his case.  Second, it is likely that if his claim were dismissed 
on standing grounds, another person who could more clearly 
demonstrate standing would bring an identical suit, raising 
judicial efficiency concerns.  Third, the consequences of our 
decision are sufficiently clear; a different plaintiff would not 
enhance our understanding of the issues in this case.  Fourth, a 
detailed analysis of the nature of an injury here might 
inappropriately 
require 
us 
to 
prematurely 
interpret 
the 
substance of the amendment.  Fifth, as a law development court, 
we think it prudent that the citizens of Wisconsin have this 
important issue of constitutional law resolved.  The question of 
whether an amendment was effectually adopted weighs heavily in 
favor 
of 
addressing 
the 
merits 
of 
McConkey's 
challenge.  
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
10 
 
Finally, none of our prior cases concerning the separate 
amendment rule involved a challenge on standing grounds.  
Instead, we addressed the issue without articulating a specific 
injury, and were animated by policy considerations similar to 
those articulated today.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Hudd v. 
Timme, 54 Wis. 318, 332-33, 11 N.W. 785 (1882) (deciding to 
address 
the 
separate 
amendment 
claim 
because 
"forcible" 
arguments against the amendment's validity were presented and 
because of the importance of settling whether an amendment is 
part of the constitution or not). 
¶19 Because we conclude that the merits of McConkey's 
claim are fit for consideration, we now move to the substance of 
his claim. 
 
B. Was the Marriage Amendment Adopted in Violation of the 
Separate Amendment Rule? 
¶20 Article XII of the Wisconsin Constitution defines the 
procedures for amending the constitution.  Section 1 provides 
that a proposed amendment passed by each house in successive 
legislatures is to be submitted "to the people in such manner 
and at such time as the legislature shall prescribe."  Wis. 
Const. art. XII, § 1.  It further specifies that if a majority 
of the voters approve the amendment, it shall become part of the 
constitution "provided, that if more than one amendment be 
submitted, they shall be submitted in such manner that the 
people may vote for or against such amendments separately."  Id.  
This is the separate amendment rule. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
11 
 
¶21 After passage by both houses in two successive 
legislatures and approval by voters in a referendum on November 
7, 
2006, 
Section 13 
of 
Article 
XIII 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution was created to read: 
Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be 
valid or recognized as a marriage in this state.  A 
legal status identical or substantially similar to 
that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not 
be valid or recognized in this state. 
This is the marriage amendment. 
¶22 McConkey 
argues that the marriage amendment was 
adopted 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
separate 
amendment 
rule.  
Specifically, McConkey argues that the marriage amendment is 
comprised of two amendments that should have been presented to 
the voters separately, and that because it was not so presented, 
the marriage amendment was not properly adopted and is invalid, 
i.e., not currently part of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶23 To be clear, the question before us is not whether the 
marriage amendment is good public policy or bad public policy, 
nor is its interpretation or application before us today.  The 
issue before us is whether the marriage amendment was adopted in 
conformity with the constitutional requirement that the people 
be allowed to vote separately on separate amendments.  See 
Milwaukee Alliance, 106 Wis. 2d at 602 ("What is not before this 
court is the wisdom or constitutionality of the substance of the 
amendment.  The issue, instead, is whether the legislature met 
the constitutional and statutory requirements for submitting the 
amendment to the electorate."). 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
12 
 
¶24 We begin our analysis in Part 1 by reviewing the text 
of the constitution's separate amendment rule and the three 
prior cases that have applied it.  In Part 2, we define the test 
for determining whether an amendment violates the separate 
amendment rule.  Finally, in Part 3, we apply the test to 
McConkey's challenge of the marriage amendment in this case. 
1. The Constitution and Prior Case Law 
¶25 Article XII, Section 1 states that amendments may be 
submitted to the people "in such manner . . . as the legislature 
shall prescribe."  Thus, the constitution assigns considerable 
authority and discretion to the legislature in the way it 
submits amendments to the people for a vote.  Our inquiry is 
"whether the legislature in the formation of the question acted 
reasonably and within their constitutional grant of authority 
and discretion."  Milwaukee Alliance, 106 Wis. 2d at 604. 
¶26 This is not to say the legislature's discretion is 
without limit.  The constitution is clear that the people must 
be able to vote for or against each amendment "if more than one 
amendment be submitted."  Wis. Const. art. XII, § 1 (emphasis 
added).  On its face, this language does not prohibit a single 
constitutional amendment from being complex or multifaceted, or 
from 
containing 
a 
variety 
of 
specific 
prescriptions 
and 
proscriptions.  The constitutional text suggests that the 
separate amendment rule is implicated only when the substance of 
an amendment cannot be said to constitute a single amendment. 
¶27 Our case law affirms this understanding.  This court 
has examined whether a constitutional amendment violates the 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
13 
 
separate amendment rule on three prior occasions.  Each merits 
discussion. 
¶28 This court first encountered a separate amendment rule 
challenge in State ex rel. Hudd v. Timme, 54 Wis. 318, 11 
N.W. 785 (1882).  In that case, the constitutional amendment 
contained four distinct propositions: (1) members of the 
Assembly would serve two-year terms instead of one-year terms, 
and be elected from single districts; (2) senators would serve 
four-year terms instead of two-year terms, and be elected 
alternately in odd and even numbered districts every two years; 
(3) the legislature would meet no more than once every two 
years; and (4) legislative salaries would increase to $500.  Id. 
at 326. 
¶29 We rejected as absurd the contention that each 
distinct proposition must be submitted separately.  Such an 
approach would make amending the constitution unduly difficult, 
especially for complex issues or when an overall change might be 
impossible to effectuate if the voters could choose to adopt 
certain parts of the proposed amendment and not others.  Id. at 
335-36. 
¶30 Instead, we construed the separate amendment rule to 
require separate votes on "amendments which have different 
objects and purposes in view."  Id. at 336.  As such, we stated 
the following test: "In order to constitute more than one 
amendment, the propositions submitted must relate to more than 
one subject, and have at least two distinct and separate 
purposes not dependent upon or connected with each other."  Id. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
14 
 
¶31 Applying this test to the facts of the case then 
before us, we concluded that all of the propositions related to 
the purpose of changing from annual to biennial sessions of the 
legislature.  Id.  Most interesting and relevant to McConkey's 
claim was our discussion of the legislative pay raise.  This 
proposition was "less intimately and necessarily connected with 
the change to biennial sessions, yet it was clearly connected 
with it."  Id. at 337.  We explained that it was "proper" to 
increase the pay of legislators because of the increased duties 
and service required by the amendment.  Id.  Though the 
legislature certainly could have submitted the propositions as 
separate amendments, it did not need to do so because the 
constitution grants the legislature discretion in this area.  
Id.  As long as there is one general purpose, and the items are 
connected with that purpose, the legislature has great latitude 
as to how it drafts amendments.  Id. 
¶32 Our 
opinion 
went 
further 
and 
discussed 
other 
amendments that had been adopted.  Article IV, Section 31 (since 
amended twice), for example, prohibited the legislature from 
passing special or private laws in nine different circumstances, 
and required the legislature to enact general laws for anything 
not prohibited by the amendment.  Id. at 337-38.  We noted that 
this amendment was far more open to challenge than the change 
from an annual to biennial legislature, but no one thought to 
challenge its validity.  Id.  Even so, we stated that the 
amendment constituted a single amendment.  Id. at 338.  The 
general purpose of the amendment was to "restrict the power of 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
15 
 
the legislature in the matter of enacting special and private 
laws."  Id.  Again we stated that while each of the specifically 
prohibited types of private or special laws could have been 
submitted separately, the legislature had the discretion to 
submit them together.  Id.  In fact, all of the seven amendments 
that had been adopted up to that point were subject to similar 
objections, we explained, but all were acceptable because they 
had "one general purpose in view."  Id. at 339.  All of the 
propositions in each "were connected with and intended to carry 
into effect" the one general purpose.  Id. 
¶33 We addressed the separate amendment rule again (among 
other issues) in State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 
Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953).  In that case, a constitutional 
amendment approved by the people made the following changes: (1) 
State Senate districts were to be created taking land area and 
population into account, not just population; (2) military 
personnel and "Indians not taxed," who were previously not 
counted in creating Senate and Assembly districts, were now to 
be counted; (3) Assembly districts were to be created using 
town, village, and ward lines, where previously they were to 
include county, precinct, town, and ward lines; and (4) Assembly 
districts no longer needed to fall entirely within a single 
Senate district.  Id. at 653-54.  The referendum question 
submitted to voters asked:  "Shall sections 3, 4 and 5 of 
article IV of the constitution be amended so that the 
legislature shall apportion, along town, village or ward lines, 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
16 
 
the senate districts on the basis of area and population and the 
assembly districts according to population?"  Id. at 651. 
¶34 The 
Attorney 
General 
argued 
that 
the 
amendment 
followed the requirements announced in Hudd because all of the 
provisions were "necessary, or at least convenient and proper, 
for the accomplishment of the main purpose" of taking area as 
well 
as 
population 
into 
account 
in 
apportioning 
Senate 
districts.  Id. at 656.  The Thomson court accepted without 
discussion8 that the main purpose was to take area as well as 
population into account in apportioning Senate districts, but 
concluded that two of the propositions did not support this 
general purpose.  Id.  The changes to the Assembly districts 
eliminated the previous requirement that Assembly districts were 
to contain whole counties, a "drastic, revolutionary alteration" 
to the current constitutional scheme.  Id.  Relying on Hudd, we 
held that this change had "no bearing on the main purpose of the 
proposed amendment, . . . nor does it tend to effect or carry 
out that purpose."  Id.  Similarly, we held that the counting of 
untaxed Indians and military personnel was also "not a detail of 
a main purpose to consider area in senate districts."  Id. at 
                                                 
8 The beginning of the Thomson opinion does discuss the 
legislative "agitation" for including land area as well as 
population in the formation of legislative districts.  State ex 
rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 649, 60 N.W.2d 416 
(1953).  It is unclear how important this was in the court's 
determination of the general purpose of the amendment. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
17 
 
657.  Therefore, we concluded that the amendment was adopted in 
violation of the separate amendment rule.  Id. at 660.9 
¶35 The most recent case challenging an amendment under 
the separate amendment rule is Milwaukee Alliance v. Elections 
Bd., 106 Wis. 2d 593, 317 N.W.2d 420 (1982).  In that case, the 
amendment contained a series of changes to Article I, Section 8 
permitting courts to deny or revoke bail for certain accused 
persons, and allowing courts to set conditions for release——bail 
among them——for the purposes of assuring the accused person's 
appearance in court, protecting the community, or preventing 
intimidation of witnesses.  Id. at 602.  The changes included 
both general statements of a court's power, as well as specific 
conditions tied to certain crimes.  Id. at 601. 
¶36 In that case, the issue was "whether the legislature 
in the formation of the question acted reasonably and within 
their constitutional grant of authority and discretion."  Id. at 
604.  Citing Hudd, we asserted, "It is within the discretion of 
the legislature to submit several distinct propositions as one 
amendment if they relate to the same subject matter and are 
designed to accomplish one general purpose."  Id. at 604-05. 
¶37 We explained that the purpose of the amendment was "to 
change the constitutional provision from the limited concept of 
                                                 
9 We also struck down the amendment on the grounds that the 
referendum question was invalid and "did not present the real 
question."  See Thomson, 264 Wis. at 657-61. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
18 
 
bail to the concept of 'conditional release.'"10  Id. at 607.  We 
concluded that the anti-monetary bail and conditional release 
provisions did not need to be submitted separately because 
defeat of one of the propositions would have destroyed the 
overall purpose of the amendment.11  Id.  The Hudd standard was 
again key——the legislature may submit multiple propositions 
within one proposed amendment so long as those propositions tend 
to effect and carry out one general purpose and are connected 
with one subject.  Id. 
                                                 
10 The joint resolution stated that the amendment related to 
"revising the right to bail and authorizing the legislature to 
permit circuit courts to deny release on bail for a limited 
period to certain accused persons."  Milwaukee Alliance v. 
Elections Bd., 106 Wis. 2d 593, 600, 317 N.W.2d 420 (1982).  
This "relating to" clause was certainly very similar to our 
articulation of the purpose.  Nevertheless, we did not adopt or 
appear to consider it in our formulation of the purpose. 
11 We explained as follows: 
The Alliance argues that the issues of conditional 
release and anti-monetary bail should have been 
submitted to the voters as separate questions, because 
the successful adoption of either one would not have 
destroyed the usefulness of the other. That is not 
realistic. When the purpose of the proposed amendment 
was to change the historical concept of bail with its 
exclusive purpose of assuring one's presence in court, 
as defined by common law, to a comprehensive plan for 
conditional release, the defeat of either proposition 
would have destroyed the overall purpose of the total 
amendment. 
Milwaukee Alliance, 106 Wis. 2d at 607. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
19 
 
2. Defining the Test 
¶38 This is the fourth case challenging the validity of an 
amendment under the separate amendment rule.  The dispute 
between the parties can be broken down into three issues.  
First, the parties disagree about the proper way to test the 
validity of an amendment under the separate amendment rule.  
Second, while both parties agree that the general purpose of the 
amendment is an important element of the test, they diverge over 
the method the court should use to determine the purpose.  And 
third, the parties disagree over how the amendment in this case 
fares under the applicable test.12 
¶39 First, 
the 
parties 
offer 
dramatically 
different 
versions of the operative test arising from these cases.  
McConkey focuses on the anti-logrolling purpose13 of the separate 
amendment rule and contends that, in order to survive review, 
the various propositions in an amendment must be aimed at a 
single purpose and be interrelated and interdependent such that 
if the propositions had been submitted as separate questions, 
the defeat of one proposition would destroy the overall purpose 
of the multi-proposition proposal.  The Attorney General, 
quoting Milwaukee Alliance, counters that "[i]t is within the 
discretion of the legislature to submit several distinct 
                                                 
12 This third issue is discussed in Part 3. 
13 "Logrolling" is the joining of "unrelated provisions and 
creating a union of interests to secure passage" of legislation, 
or here, a proposed constitutional amendment.  State ex rel. 
Wisconsin 
Senate 
v. 
Thompson, 
144 
Wis. 2d 429, 
445, 
424 
N.W.2d 385 (1988). 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
20 
 
propositions as one amendment if they relate to the same subject 
matter and are designed to accomplish one general purpose."  106 
Wis. 2d at 604-05.  He rejects the claim that propositions must 
be mutually dependent in order to be submitted as a single 
amendment. 
¶40 We agree with the Attorney General.  We reaffirm this 
court's repeated holdings that the constitution grants the 
legislature considerable discretion in the manner in which 
amendments are drafted and submitted to the people.  The inquiry 
is "whether the legislature in the formation of the question 
acted reasonably and within their constitutional grant of 
authority and discretion."  Milwaukee Alliance, 106 Wis. 2d at 
604.  An otherwise valid amendment will therefore be construed 
as 
more 
than 
one 
amendment 
only 
in 
exceedingly 
rare 
circumstances. 
¶41 The proper test is laid out in Milwaukee Alliance: "It 
is within the discretion of the legislature to submit several 
distinct propositions as one amendment if they relate to the 
same subject matter and are designed to accomplish one general 
purpose."  Id. at 604-05.  As we stated in Thomson, all of the 
propositions must "tend to effect or carry out" the purpose.  
Thomson, 264 Wis. at 656. 
¶42 McConkey's 
position 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
constitution's grant of discretion to the legislature, and is 
irreconcilable 
with 
these 
prior 
holdings. 
 
The 
distinct 
propositions need not be, as McConkey urges, interconnected and 
dependent upon one another such that if one proposition failed, 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
21 
 
the total purpose would be destroyed.  While Hudd uses the 
phrase "dependent upon," the Hudd court did not use it to 
suggest an interdependency requirement as McConkey asserts.  
Instead, Hudd established the principle that the propositions 
must relate to the same subject and be "dependent upon or 
connected with" the same general purpose.  Hudd, 54 Wis. at 336 
(emphasis added).  In Hudd, we explicitly rejected the notion 
that the propositions had to be interdependent; we required only 
a "connection" between the provisions.  Hence, the legislative 
pay raise did not doom the amendment in Hudd because, though it 
was "less intimately and necessarily connected with the change 
to biennial sessions," it was nonetheless "clearly connected 
with it" and "proper."  Id. at 337.  McConkey's approach 
undoubtedly would have required striking down the legislative 
pay raise in Hudd, and likely would have also doomed the 
amendment challenged in Milwaukee Alliance because of some of 
its specific provisions.14  The propositions, then, need only 
                                                 
14 One provision in the amendment at issue in Milwaukee 
Alliance, for example, stated, "In determining the 10-day and 
60-day periods [specified in the amendment], the court shall 
omit any period of time found by the court to result from a 
delay caused by the defendant or a continuance granted which was 
initiated by the defendant."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(3).  The 
defeat of this proposition would surely not have defeated the 
overall purpose of the amendment of changing "from the limited 
concept of bail to the concept of 'conditional release.'"  
Milwaukee Alliance, 106 Wis. 2d at 607.  However, it was 
connected with and tended to effect or carry out that purpose, 
and its inclusion therefore did not violate the separate 
amendment rule. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
22 
 
relate to the same subject and tend to effect or carry out one 
general purpose.15 
¶43 This, of course, raises the second issue on which the 
parties spend considerable time——how should the general purpose 
of an amendment be determined?  McConkey proposes that the best 
method for determining the purpose is to look to the "relating 
to" clause in the title of the joint resolution.  In this case, 
the joint resolution states the amendment relates to "providing 
that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be 
valid or recognized as a marriage in this state."  Going 
further, McConkey argues that this is the only source the court 
can use to determine purpose.  This approach, he asserts, is 
consistent with the approach used in Article IV, Section 18 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution16 relating to private bills, and 
utilizes the rules of statutory construction by focusing on a 
plain reading of the joint resolution's title.  The Attorney 
                                                 
15 Our prior cases have described, and we affirm here today, 
a test inquiring into both the subject matter and purpose of an 
amendment, suggesting a two-part test.  See Milwaukee Alliance, 
106 Wis. 2d at 604-05.  In practice, however, the analysis in 
our prior cases has blended these two, often neglecting to 
discuss or analyze the subject matter of an amendment.  See, 
e.g., 
Hudd, 
54 
Wis. at 
337-39 
(generally 
neglecting 
the 
discussion of the "subject" component of the test in its 
analysis).  This is probably why the parties focus their 
arguments on how the purpose of an amendment should be 
determined; they do not debate how the subject of an amendment 
should be determined. 
16 Article IV, Section 18 provides: "No private or local 
bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more 
than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
23 
 
General 
counters 
that 
an 
amendment's 
purpose 
should 
be 
determined from its text and the context in which it was adopted 
following the constitutional interpretive approach outlined in 
Dairyland Greyhound Park v. Doyle.17 
¶44 The general purpose of a constitutional amendment is 
not an interpretive riddle.  Text and historical context should 
make the purpose of most amendments apparent.  A plain reading 
of the text of the amendment will usually reveal a general, 
unified purpose.  A court might also find other extrinsic 
contextual sources helpful in determining what the amendment 
sought 
to 
change 
or 
affirm, 
including 
the 
previous 
constitutional structure, legislative and public debates over 
the amendment's adoption, the title of the joint resolution, the 
common name for the amendment, the question submitted to the 
people for a vote, legislative enactments following adoption of 
the amendment, and other such sources. 
¶45 This appears to have been the general approach 
followed in Hudd.  In that case, this court identified the four 
propositions contained in the amendment from its text, and the 
general move from an annual to biennial legislature was 
apparent.  The amendment was also known to the public as the 
"biennial sessions amendment."  Hudd, 54 Wis. at 325. 
                                                 
17 Dairyland 
states 
that 
the 
constitution 
should 
be 
construed by reference to the plain meaning of the provision, 
the debates and practices at the time, and the earliest 
legislative action following adoption.  Dairyland Greyhound Park 
v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶19, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
24 
 
¶46 In Milwaukee Alliance, the court described the purpose 
of the amendment with particularity: 
The purpose of the amendment was to continue the 
guarantee of bail to those entitled to it, to allow 
release of some persons without requiring money bail 
but with other reasonable conditions, and at the same 
time, under a structured system, to hold persons for 
limited periods without the option of bail when a 
court determines that such action is necessary to 
protect the community from serious bodily harm or to 
protect society's interest in the administration of 
justice by preventing the intimidation of witnesses. 
Milwaukee Alliance, 106 Wis. 2d at 608.  This purpose appears to 
be gleaned from the text of the amendment.  The court also 
described a general purpose of changing "from the limited 
concept of bail to the concept of 'conditional release.'"  Id. 
at 607.  The court appeared to decipher this purpose by 
comparing 
the 
previous 
constitutional 
structure 
with 
the 
provisions in the new amendment.18 
¶47 The method for determining the purpose advocated by 
McConkey——adopting verbatim the "relating to" clause in the 
title of the joint resolution——is supported neither by case law 
nor by common sense.  None of our cases follow McConkey's 
approach.  Neither Hudd nor Thomson even discuss the title of 
the joint resolution.  In Milwaukee Alliance, we noted the 
                                                 
18 The Thomson case, on the other hand, is a bit of an 
anomaly with regard to the determination of purpose.  The court 
appeared to accept the statement of purpose proffered by the 
Attorney General, the officer charged with defending the 
amendment.  See Thomson, 264 Wis. at 656.  The court did not 
attempt to craft a purpose of its own, and seemed to suggest 
that the parties agreed on the purpose of the amendment. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
25 
 
statement of purpose contained in the title of the joint 
resolution, but did not adopt it as McConkey suggests we must do 
here. 
¶48 McConkey's analogies to the restrictions on private 
bills in Article IV, Section 18 are also inapposite.  The text 
of that provision itself states that private or local bills may 
encompass only one subject, "and that shall be expressed in the 
title."  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 18.  The separate amendment 
rule, 
however, 
contains 
no 
similar 
stricture, 
strongly 
suggesting the joint resolution's title should not be the 
conclusive, much less exclusive, statement of purpose.  See 
Weber v. Town of Saukville, 209 Wis. 2d 214, 231, 562 N.W.2d 412 
(1997) 
(stating 
the 
rule 
of 
construction 
that 
when 
the 
terminology of similar provisions is different, an inference is 
drawn that different meanings are intended). 
¶49 Finally, while the statement of purpose in the title 
is relevant and helpful, limiting review to the title alone 
makes little practical sense.  McConkey argues that limiting 
review to the text of the title is akin to statutory 
construction.  It is not.  McConkey's approach does not even 
allow the court to read the text of the amendment itself, much 
less the text of the entire joint resolution!  Far from being 
comparable 
to 
statutory 
construction, 
McConkey's 
approach 
requires the court to put on blinders with regard to the 
amendment's content. 
¶50 In summary, "It is within the discretion of the 
legislature to submit several distinct propositions as one 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
26 
 
amendment if they relate to the same subject matter and are 
designed 
to 
accomplish 
one 
general 
purpose." 
 
Milwaukee 
Alliance, 106 Wis. 2d at 604-05.  The general purpose of an 
amendment may be deduced from the text of the amendment itself 
and from the historical context in which the amendment was 
adopted.  And all of the propositions must "tend to effect or 
carry out" that purpose.  Thomson, 264 Wis. at 656. 
3. Applying the Test 
¶51 The marriage amendment contains two propositions: (1) 
"Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or 
recognized as a marriage in this state"; and (2) "A legal status 
identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for 
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized in this 
state."  The text of this amendment and historical context in 
which it was adopted make its general subject and purpose plain. 
¶52 A plain reading of the text of the amendment, in which 
both propositions expressly refer to "marriage," makes clear 
that the general subject of the amendment is marriage.  McConkey 
does not seem to dispute this point. 
¶53 Before the marriage amendment was adopted, marriage in 
Wisconsin was already limited by statute to the unions of one 
man and one woman.  See Wis. Stat. § 765.001(2) (2005-06)19 
("Under the laws of this state, marriage is a legal relationship 
between 2 equal persons, a husband and wife."); § 765.01 
                                                 
19 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
27 
 
("Marriage, so far as its validity at law is concerned, is a 
civil contract, to which the consent of the parties capable in 
law of contracting is essential, and which creates the legal 
status of husband and wife.").20  This amendment was therefore an 
effort to preserve and constitutionalize the status quo, not to 
alter the existing character or legal status of marriage. 
¶54 The first sentence preserves the one man-one woman 
character of marriage by so limiting marriages entered into or 
recognized in Wisconsin.  The second sentence, by its plain 
terms, ensures that no legislature, court, or any other 
government entity can get around the first sentence by creating 
or recognizing "a legal status identical or substantially 
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 765.001(2) states the public policy 
objectives and intent of the legislature in its regulation of 
marriage.  It provides in relevant part: 
It is the intent of chs. 765 to 768 to promote the 
stability and best interests of marriage and the 
family.  It is the intent of the legislature to 
recognize the valuable contributions of both spouses 
during the marriage and at termination of the marriage 
by dissolution or death.  Marriage is the institution 
that is the foundation of the family and of society.  
Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, 
and of vital interest to society and the state.  The 
consequences 
of 
the 
marriage 
contract 
are 
more 
significant to society than those of other contracts, 
and the public interest must be taken into account 
always. . . . The impairment or dissolution of the 
marriage relation generally results in injury to the 
public wholly apart from the effect upon the parties 
immediately concerned.  Under the laws of this state, 
marriage is a legal relationship between 2 equal 
persons, a husband and wife, who owe to each other 
mutual responsibility and support. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
28 
 
similar to that of marriage."21  We need not decide what legal 
statuses identical or substantially similar to marriage are 
prohibited by this clause in order to understand its plain and 
general purpose. 
¶55 Why preserve the status quo through a constitutional 
amendment?  This is no secret either.  The sponsors of the 
amendment were quite clear that state supreme court decisions 
overturning the marriage laws of other states were the primary 
reason for the amendment.22  In short, the sponsors of the 
                                                 
21 McConkey argues that the second sentence has nothing to 
do with the first, an assertion that strains credulity.  While 
the second sentence attempts to accomplish something different 
than the first sentence, it is plainly related to and connected 
with the overall purpose of the amendment. 
22 In the appendix to its brief, the Attorney General 
provided a copy of a memo dated January 29, 2004, from the 
sponsors of the amendment to fellow state legislators soliciting 
co-sponsorship of the proposed amendment.  A copy is also 
available 
online 
at 
http://graphics2.jsonline.com/graphics/multimedia/media/oct06/le
gis3.pdf. (last visited June 25, 2010).  The sponsors explained 
their proposal as follows: 
We are introducing LRB 4072/2 for first consideration.  
LRB 4072/2 is a proposed constitutional amendment that 
would preserve the institution of marriage in this 
state as it has always been——between a man and a 
woman. 
Last fall, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
used 
the 
Massachusetts 
State 
Constitution 
to 
completely redefine marriage. . . .   
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
29 
 
amendment wanted to protect the current definition and legal 
status of marriage, and to ensure that the requirements in the 
first 
sentence 
could 
not 
be 
rendered 
illusory 
by 
later 
legislative or court action recognizing or creating identical or 
substantially similar legal statuses.  The purpose of the 
marriage amendment, then, was to preserve the legal status of 
marriage in Wisconsin as between only one man and one woman.  
Both propositions in the amendment tend to effect or carry out 
this general purpose.23 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nothing in our state constitution presently protects 
against our State Supreme Court doing the same thing 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court did in 2003 (or the 
Vermont Supreme Court did in 1999 or the Hawaii 
Supreme Court did in 1993, followed up by a state 
constitutional amendment there) and legislating from 
the bench to radically alter marriage in this state 
and 
judicially 
impose same-sex marriage on this 
state. . . . 
This proposal would prevent same-sex marriages from 
being legalized in this state, regardless of the name 
used by a court or other body to describe the legal 
institution.  The proposal preserves "marriage" as it 
has always been in this state, as a union between one 
man and one woman.  In addition, the proposal states 
that a legal status identical or substantially similar 
to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall 
not be valid in this state, regardless of what 
creative term is used . . . . 
23 Five other state supreme courts have addressed similar 
questions regarding similarly worded marriage amendments and 
challenges under their own separate amendment rules.  All have 
reached the same result we do here.  See Arizona Together v. 
Brewer, 149 P.3d 742 (Ariz. 2007); Advisory Opinion to the 
Attorney General re Florida Marriage Prot. Amendment, 926 
So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 2006); Perdue v. O'Kelley, 632 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. 
2006); Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 715 (La. 
2005); Albano v. Attorney General, 769 N.E.2d 1242 (Mass. 2002). 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
30 
 
¶56 To conclude, the two propositions contained in the 
marriage amendment plainly relate to the subject of marriage.  
And as the text of the amendment and context of its adoption 
make clear, the general purpose of the marriage amendment is to 
preserve the legal status of marriage in Wisconsin as between 
only one man and one woman.  Both propositions in the marriage 
amendment relate to and are connected with this purpose.  
Therefore, the marriage amendment does not violate the separate 
amendment rule of Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Rather, the marriage amendment was adopted by the 
people of Wisconsin using the process prescribed by the 
constitution, and is properly now part of our constitution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶57 In summary, though the precise nature of McConkey's 
alleged injury is difficult to define, we conclude that the 
policy considerations underlying our standing doctrine support 
addressing the merits of McConkey's claim, which we therefore 
choose to do. 
¶58 We hold that Article XIII, Section 13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution——the marriage amendment——was adopted in conformity 
with the separate amendment rule in Article XII, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, which mandates that voters must be 
able to vote separately on separate amendments.  Both sentences 
of the marriage amendment relate to marriage and tend to effect 
or carry out the same general purpose of preserving the legal 
status of marriage in Wisconsin as between only one man and one 
woman. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
31 
 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are Affirmed. 
No. 
2008AP1868   
 
 
 
1