Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Gary R. George

Citation: 2010 WI 116

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 116 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1978-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Gary R. George,  Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Gary R. George, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST GEORGE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
September 30, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
December 8, 2009   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Mark 
Hazelbaker and Hazelbaker & Associates, S.C., Madison. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Thomas 
J. Basting, Sr., Madison. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 116
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1978-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Gary R. George, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary R. George, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
SEP 30, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.   Reinstatement granted.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the recommendation of the 
referee, James J. Winiarski, that Attorney Gary R. George's 
petition seeking the reinstatement of his license to practice 
law in Wisconsin be denied.  Attorney George filed an appeal 
from the referee's report and recommendation pursuant to 
SCR 22.33,1 requesting this court grant the petition for 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.33 provides as follows:  Review; appeal. 
(1) The director or the petitioner may file in 
the supreme court an appeal from the referee's report 
within 20 days after the filing of the report.  
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
2 
 
reinstatement.  After consideration of the parties' briefs, the 
referee's report and the entire record, we conclude that 
Attorney George's petition for reinstatement should be granted.  
We also direct that the costs of the reinstatement proceeding, 
which total $9,702.01 as of December 18, 2009, be paid by 
Attorney George.   
¶2 
Attorney George was admitted to the State Bar of 
Wisconsin in 1979.  He served in the Wisconsin Senate for 23 
years.  On April 1, 2004, this court summarily suspended 
Attorney George's license to practice law upon learning he had 
entered a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to commit 
offenses involving federal program funds in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371.  See United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470 (7th 
Cir. 2005).  Attorney George had not previously been disciplined 
for professional misconduct.   
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) An appeal from the report of the referee is 
conducted under the rules governing civil appeals to 
the supreme court.  The supreme court shall place the 
appeal on its first assignment of cases after the 
briefs are filed. 
(3) If no appeal is timely filed, the supreme 
court 
shall 
review 
the 
referee's 
report, 
order 
reinstatement, 
with 
or 
without 
conditions, 
deny 
reinstatement, or order the parties to file briefs in 
the matter.  
(4) If the supreme court denies a petition for 
reinstatement, 
the 
petitioner 
may 
again 
file 
a 
petition for reinstatement commencing nine months 
after the denial. 
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
3 
 
¶3 
The order and memorandum in the federal court case 
stated Attorney George received approximately $270,000 in 
illegal kickbacks from another attorney for legal fees to that 
attorney as a result of Attorney George exercising his political 
influence over federal grants as well as programs financed by 
state revenues.  In addition, Attorney George secured state 
construction contracts for a businessman as a reward for the 
businessman making cash payments to a business owned by Attorney 
George's family.  Attorney George also used State of Wisconsin 
employees to conduct his personal business involving his private 
law practice.  Attorney George was sentenced to 48 months in 
prison and three years of extended supervision.  He was ordered 
to pay $568,596.48 in restitution.  See United States v. George, 
No. 03-CR-259, Memorandum Decision (E.D. Wis. May 3, 2006), 
aff'd after remand, United States v. George, 198 Fed. Appx. 552 
(7th Cir. 2006).2 
¶4 
On March 26, 2008, following a full disciplinary 
proceeding, this court suspended Attorney George's license to 
practice law for four years and three months, retroactive to 
April 1, 2004, the date of the summary suspension.  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against George, 2008 WI 21, 308 
Wis. 2d 50, 746 N.W.2d 236. 
                                                 
2 Attorney George successfully challenged this restitution 
order.  On March 24, 2009, the federal court reduced Attorney 
George's restitution obligation to $327,278.48.  The record in 
this disciplinary proceeding was supplemented to reflect this 
reduction. 
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
4 
 
¶5 
On June 23, 2008, Attorney George filed a petition 
seeking reinstatement of his license to practice law.  A public 
hearing on the reinstatement petition was held on December 8, 
2008.  Seven character witnesses testified in support of 
Attorney George's petition and Attorney George testified as 
well.  The parties filed post-hearing memoranda.  On February 2, 
2009, the referee filed a report recommending denial of the 
petition.  Attorney George filed a timely appeal from the 
referee's report and recommendation.  The Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) opposes reinstatement.  The matter is now 
before the court pursuant to SCR 22.33(2).   
¶6 
Supreme court rule 22.31(1) provides the standards to 
be met for reinstatement.  Specifically, the petitioner must 
show by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that he or 
she has the moral character to practice law, that his or her 
resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the 
administration of justice or subversive of the public interest, 
and that he or she has complied with SCR 22.26 and the terms of 
the order of suspension.  In addition to these requirements, 
SCRs 22.29(4)(a) to (4m) provide additional requirements that a 
petition for reinstatement must show.  All of these additional 
requirements are effectively incorporated into SCR 22.31(1).   
¶7 
When we review a referee's report and recommendation, 
we will adopt a referee's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 
14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.   
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
5 
 
¶8 
The 
referee made the following factual findings 
relevant to Attorney George's petition for reinstatement: 
[1]  [Attorney George] does desire the return of his 
law license.  
[2]  During the course of his suspension, [Attorney] 
George acted as a paid "consultant" for two business 
entities.  His consulting activities included law 
related work and the giving of legal advice.  
[3]  [Attorney George] remains on federal supervised 
release following his prison term.  His supervised 
release is currently scheduled to end in August, 2010. 
The terms of his supervised release include that he is 
not 
allowed to hold employment having fiduciary 
responsibilities without the consent of his probation 
officer.  He is allowed to only maintain one checking 
account into which all income must be deposited and 
expenses paid.  All other accounts must be disclosed 
to his probation officer.  He is not allowed to 
dispose of any assets exceeding a fair market value of 
$500.00 without the approval of his probation officer.  
Subject to the discretion of his probation officer, 
[Attorney] George may be required to notify third 
parties of risks that may be occasioned by [Attorney] 
George's criminal record or personal history.  
[4]  [Attorney George] recently filed a motion in 
Federal Court asking that his supervised release be 
terminated or modified.  The motion was denied.  
[Attorney George] intends to continue efforts to 
modify or end his supervised release.  
[5]  [Attorney George] believes his prosecution in 
Federal Court was politically motivated.  He does not 
believe he did anything wrong.  He pled guilty only to 
avoid the risk of greater penalties.  He believes that 
the "truth" will ultimately come out and show he did 
nothing wrong.  
[6]  During the last year, while [Attorney George's] 
income has fluctuated, it appears that he has averaged 
approximately $8,000 per month in gross income.  
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
6 
 
[7]  [Attorney George] has paid very little of the 
$568,596.48 in restitution ordered by the Federal 
Court. [Attorney George] continues to dispute the 
restitution and the precise remaining balance of 
restitution due.  
[8]  [Attorney George] has paid very little of the 
court 
ordered 
costs of his Wisconsin suspension 
proceeding, which amounted to $14,064.71.  However, 
communications have occurred between OLR and [Attorney 
George], and [Attorney George] believes he has an 
agreement with OLR to pay $150 per month for now, but 
more in the future.  OLR believes he can and should 
pay more. 
[9]  As a result of being imprisoned and having his 
law license suspended, [Attorney George] has been 
unable to pay all past debts, family obligations, 
current living expenses, Federal restitution, and the 
cost of his suspension proceeding.  However, he should 
be paying more on a monthly basis towards costs and 
restitution.  
[10]  [Attorney 
George] 
has 
attended 
necessary 
courses and appears compliant with CLE requirements.  
However he must obtain and submit proof.  
We adopt these findings of fact.   
¶9 
The referee concluded Attorney George had failed to 
meet his burden of proof under SCR 22.31.  In reaching this 
conclusion the referee made specific conclusions of law and 
discussed the reasoning underlying those conclusions.  The 
referee concluded Attorney George has not shown by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that during his period of 
suspension, he has not engaged in law-related work in violation 
of SCR 22.26(2).  He concluded Attorney George has not complied 
fully with the terms of the order of suspension and that his 
conduct since the suspension or revocation has not been 
exemplary and above reproach.  The referee concluded further 
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
7 
 
that Attorney George does not have a proper understanding of and 
attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of 
the bar, and that he has not shown he will act in conformity 
with such standards.  The referee concluded Attorney George 
cannot safely be recommended to the legal profession, the 
courts, and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others 
and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and 
confidence, and in general to aid in the administration of 
justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the courts. 
The referee concluded Attorney George has not complied fully 
with the requirements set forth in SCR 22.26.  The referee 
concluded Attorney George has not shown by clear, satisfactory, 
and convincing evidence that he has the moral character to 
practice law in Wisconsin; that his resumption of the practice 
of law will not be detrimental to the administration of justice 
or subversive of the public interest; that his representations 
in the petition, including the representations required by 
SCRs 22.29(4)(a) to [(m)] and 22.29(5), are substantiated; and 
that he has complied fully with the terms of the order of 
suspension and with the requirements of SCR 22.26.  
¶10 We consider these conclusions de novo.  We begin by 
acknowledging that some of Attorney George's past conduct has 
been deeply flawed.  He has been professionally disciplined and 
criminally prosecuted for that bad conduct.  He has been less 
than forthcoming with information about his activities while 
under suspension.  He has steadfastly maintained that he did 
nothing wrong and that his criminal prosecution was politically 
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
8 
 
motivated.  He appears to operate under the misapprehension that 
he is somehow entitled to reinstatement upon the expiration of 
his license suspension.  Indeed, Attorney George's approach to 
this entire reinstatement proceeding has made it a more 
difficult and time-consuming inquiry than it might otherwise 
have been. 
¶11 However, we focus on the specific question before us 
today: Whether Attorney George has demonstrated by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that his license to 
practice law should be reinstated at this time.  After careful 
review of the entire record, we conclude the answer to this 
question is, "Yes." 
¶12 The referee concluded Attorney George did meet certain 
of the requirements necessary for reinstatement.  There is no 
dispute Attorney George desires to have his license reinstated 
and that he has maintained competence and learning in the law by 
attendance at identified educational activities.  We agree with 
these conclusions. 
¶13 The referee commented that Attorney George could have 
done more to pay his restitution obligations in federal court 
and his costs due in the disciplinary proceeding in this court.  
However, the referee concluded Attorney George should not be 
denied reinstatement even though he has not yet fully paid his 
restitution obligations. 
¶14 More specifically, the referee found that as "a result 
of being imprisoned and having his law license suspended, 
[Attorney George] has been unable to pay all past debts, family 
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
9 
 
obligations, current living expenses, Federal restitution, and 
the cost of his suspension proceeding." The referee concluded 
Attorney George "should be paying more on a monthly basis toward 
costs and restitution."  We agree with these findings, and we 
also agree with the referee's observation that Attorney George 
should not be denied reinstatement on the basis that those costs 
have not been paid.  As to the restitution ordered in his 
federal case, as the referee found, Attorney George continues to 
challenge the remaining amount of restitution.  Again, we agree 
with the referee's conclusion that his failure to pay more 
toward this restitution obligation should not preclude his 
reinstatement.3 
¶15 The referee was particularly troubled by evidence that 
Attorney George may have practiced law while under suspension, 
may have failed to comply with the terms of the suspension 
order, has failed to acknowledge any wrongdoing, and remains on 
federal supervised release on terms that would seem to preclude 
the practice of law.  We address these serious matters in turn. 
¶16 The reinstatement process requires Attorney George to 
show by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that during 
                                                 
3 On April 22, 2010, Attorney George signed a stipulation 
for 
final 
order 
of 
garnishment 
acknowledging 
that 
the 
restitution balance on that date was $191,023.50.  In this 
stipulation Attorney George reserved the right to challenge the 
calculation of the amount of restitution.  On August 6, 2010, 
Attorney George filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
which he seeks to vacate his conviction. 
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
10 
 
his period of suspension, he has not engaged in law-related work 
in violation of SCR 22.26(2), which provides: 
An attorney whose license to practice law is 
suspended or revoked or who is suspended from the 
practice of law may not engage in this state in the 
practice 
of 
law 
or 
in 
any 
law 
work 
activity 
customarily done by law students, law clerks, or other 
paralegal personnel, except that the attorney may 
engage in law related work in this state for a 
commercial employer itself not engaged in the practice 
of law. 
This is a critical inquiry because it implicates several related 
rule provisions relevant to reinstatement.  Supreme court rule 
22.29(4)(b) requires a petitioner demonstrate he has not 
practiced law during the period of suspension or revocation.  
Supreme court rule 22.29(4)(c) requires a showing that the 
petitioner has complied fully with the terms of the order of 
suspension or revocation.  Supreme court rule 22.29(4)(h) 
requires a demonstration that the "petitioner has fully complied 
with the requirements set forth in SCR 22.26."  Supreme court 
rule 22.31(1)(d) requires Attorney George demonstrate that he 
has complied fully with the terms of the order of suspension or 
revocation and with the requirements of SCR 22.26.  Proof of 
compliance 
with 
SCR 
22.26 
"is 
a 
condition 
precedent 
to 
reinstatement of the attorney's license to practice law."  See 
SCR 22.26(3). 
¶17 During the course of his suspension, Attorney George 
acted as a paid consultant for two business entities.  Attorney 
George worked as a consultant for Pennebaker Enterprises LLC, a 
business engaged in commercial roofing and sheet metal, for 
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
11 
 
approximately one year during his suspension.  As a consultant, 
Attorney George "help[ed] [Pennebaker Enterprises] with [its] 
insurance issues, worker's comp issues, stuff like that, or 
general HR matters."  Attorney George was paid $5,000 per month 
for his services with Pennebaker Enterprises LLC. 
¶18 Attorney George also has worked as a consultant for 
R.J. Harris and Associates, a marketing company, during his 
suspension.  Attorney George apparently worked on diversity, 
personnel, and legislative issues on behalf of R.J. Harris and 
Associates' clients.  Attorney George has been paid $3,000 a 
month for at least eight months of work during his suspension.   
¶19 The referee was concerned about several aspects of 
Attorney George's activities while under suspension.  In 
particular, the referee noted that the evidence Attorney George 
provided regarding his activities while under suspension was 
"not clear." 
¶20 The referee ultimately concluded that Attorney George 
had violated SCR 22.26 by providing law-related work for more 
than one commercial employer, reasoning that the intent of 
SCR 22.26(2) "is to prohibit a suspended lawyer from engaging in 
law related work, as a consultant, or otherwise, for multiple 
employers, entities, and individuals."  The referee commented 
that "[p]roviding law related work, as a consultant, for 
multiple employers or entities, circumvents the rule and amounts 
to the practice of law."    
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
12 
 
¶21 We disagree with this conclusion.  Supreme court rule 
22.26(2) does not preclude a suspended attorney from engaging in 
law-related work on behalf of more than one employer.   
¶22 With respect to the allegations that Attorney George 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, we agree that the 
details 
Attorney 
George 
provided 
in 
his 
petition 
for 
reinstatement regarding his law-related activities during his 
suspension were somewhat cursory, complicating our inquiry.  
That said, we conclude that Attorney George satisfied the 
requirements of SCR 22.26(2).  
¶23 The 
referee 
expressed 
legitimate 
concern 
about 
Attorney George's failure to acknowledge wrongdoing.  As the 
referee noted, Attorney George believes his prosecution in 
federal court was politically motivated: 
He does not believe he did anything wrong.  He pled 
guilty only to avoid the risk of greater penalties.  
He believes that the "truth" will ultimately come out 
and show he did nothing wrong.  
What are the ramifications of Attorney George's belief?  Should 
this preclude his reinstatement?  The referee ultimately 
determined that he could not conclude that Attorney George has 
the proper understanding of legal standards or that he will act 
in conformity with the standards.  The referee explained: 
Several 
times 
during 
the 
hearing, 
I 
asked 
[Attorney] George to address his current feelings on 
the conduct that led to his discipline.  It was clear 
to me that he has difficulty expressing remorse for 
his conduct, given the fact that he does not feel he 
did anything wrong.  [Attorney] George did indicate 
that his past problems were the result of his 
political career.  He testified that those problems 
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
13 
 
will not reoccur, given that he can no longer be an 
elected politician.  
¶24 We respect the referee's insightful observations, but 
we reach a different conclusion based on the same facts.  There 
is nothing in the supreme court rules that requires Attorney 
George to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his actions before 
reinstatement.  The rules do require Attorney George to have a 
proper understanding of and attitude towards the standards 
imposed on members of the Wisconsin bar and to act in conformity 
with those standards if reinstated.  We note that each of the 
seven witnesses who testified on Attorney George's behalf 
believes Attorney George would not engage in further misconduct 
in the future.  All of the witnesses believe Attorney George to 
be honest and all stated they would also trust Attorney George 
with their future legal affairs.  The record evidence shows 
Attorney George greatly regrets the embarrassment he has brought 
to his family and his family name.  Indeed, the referee 
acknowledged the evidence "strongly suggests that [Attorney] 
George will avoid further misconduct" albeit because "he does 
not wish to go to prison again or lose his license to practice 
law again, and not because he appreciates the wrongfulness of 
his previous misconduct."   
¶25 We are reluctant to hold that an individual must 
explicitly admit wrongdoing to be reinstated.  Attorney George 
has entered a guilty plea to criminal conduct and that fact is a 
matter of public record.  He has been criminally sanctioned, 
incarcerated, and professionally disciplined for his offenses.  
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
14 
 
The evidence supports a conclusion that Attorney George will not 
commit professional misconduct in the future.  As such, we are 
persuaded that he has met his burden of showing that he has a 
proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards 
imposed on members of the Wisconsin bar, and that he will act in 
conformity with those standards.  
¶26 The 
most 
troubling 
aspect 
of 
Attorney 
George's 
reinstatement petition for this court was the fact that Attorney 
George remained on federal supervised release with conditions 
that made it potentially difficult for him to resume the 
practice of law and comply with supreme court rules.  The 
referee 
stated, 
"While 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
rules 
do 
not 
specifically address the issue of reinstatement of a lawyer who 
remains under Federal supervised release, conflict of interest, 
fiduciary, and confidentiality issues are apparent, given the 
current conditions of petitioner's supervised release." 
¶27 We share the referee's concern that the terms of 
Attorney George's supervised release could constrain his ability 
to practice law.  He was not allowed to hold employment having 
fiduciary responsibilities without the consent of his probation 
officer.  He was allowed to maintain only one checking account 
into which all income must be deposited and expenses paid.  He 
was required to disclose all other accounts to his probation 
officer.  He was not allowed to dispose of any assets exceeding 
a fair market value of $500 without the approval of his 
probation officer.  Subject to the discretion of his probation 
officer, Attorney George might have been required to notify 
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
15 
 
third parties of risks that may be occasioned by Attorney 
George's criminal record or personal history.  
¶28 Attorney's George's period of supervised release ended 
on August 9, 2010.  Therefore, the strict conditions imposed 
upon him are no longer potential impediments to his practice of 
law.   
¶29 Attorney George is a high-profile individual whose 
criminal and professional misconduct has been well publicized.  
However, we must guard against a temptation to "re-try" the 
disciplinary case or revisit the criminal conduct for which 
Attorney George has been punished.  At the same time, Attorney 
George is not "entitled to reinstatement" simply because the 
period of suspension has lapsed.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Hyndman, 2002 WI 6, ¶4, 249 Wis. 2d 650, 638 
N.W.2d 293.   
¶30 Upon careful consideration of the entire record, we 
conclude Attorney George has met his burden of proof with 
respect to the elements necessary to justify reinstatement.  We 
conclude Attorney George can safely be recommended to the legal 
profession, the courts, and the public as a person fit to be 
consulted by others as a lawyer. 
¶31 In 
granting 
Attorney 
George's 
petition 
for 
reinstatement, we stress that he is not being held to a 
different or higher standard of conduct than other attorneys in 
this state.  All attorneys licensed to practice in Wisconsin are 
held to the highest standard of conduct, and we expect nothing 
less from Attorney George.  
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
16 
 
¶32 IT IS ORDERED that Gary R. George's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin is reinstated effective the date of 
this order. 
¶33 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Gary R. George shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs are not 
paid within the time specified, and absent a showing to this 
court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, the 
license of Gary R. George to practice law in Wisconsin shall be 
suspended until further order of the court. 
¶34 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
2005AP1978-D   
 
 
 
1