Case Title: People v. Drake

Citation: 2019 IL 123734

Docket Number: 123734

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 IL 123734 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
 
(Docket No. 123734) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.  
GERALD DRAKE, Appellee. 
 
 
Opinion filed March 21, 2019. 
 
 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Garman, Burke, Theis, and 
Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
Defendant, Gerald Drake, was convicted of aggravated battery following a 
bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County. The appellate court reversed his 
conviction and held that retrial was barred by the double jeopardy clause. Based on 
the facts of this case, we hold that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial of 
defendant. Accordingly, we reverse in part the appellate court’s judgment and 
 
 
 
 
 
- 2 - 
remand to the trial court for a new trial. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
Defendant was charged by indictment with aggravated battery of a child (720 
ILCS 5/12-4.3(a) (West 2008)), heinous battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4.1(a) (West 
2008)), and aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2008)). The 
indictments alleged that defendant caused great bodily harm to his six-year-old 
stepson, J.H., by immersing him in hot water. 
¶ 4 
 
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion seeking to admit J.H.’s out-of-court 
statement to Rosalina Roxas, his nurse at John H. Stroger Jr. Hospital (Stroger 
Hospital). In that statement, J.H. claimed that defendant caused his injuries by 
pouring a cup of hot water on him. The trial court ruled that J.H.’s statement was 
admissible under the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of 
medical diagnosis or treatment. See Ill. R. Evid. 803(4) (eff. Apr. 26, 2012). 
¶ 5 
 
At defendant’s bench trial, Roxas testified that, as a registered nurse, she treated 
J.H. in the pediatric intensive care unit at Stroger Hospital for burns to his buttocks, 
genital area, and legs. When Roxas entered his room one day, J.H. called to her and 
stated he was going to tell her something. J.H. then revealed that defendant poured 
hot water on him while he was in the bathtub. When Roxas asked if J.H. had done 
anything to upset defendant, J.H. replied that he had done nothing. Prior to that 
conversation, J.H. had not disclosed the cause of his injuries but “just started crying 
if [anyone tried] to ask him anything about the incident.” On cross-examination, 
Roxas confirmed that J.H. stated defendant poured a cup of hot water on him and 
that she did not ask J.H. about the size of the cup. 
¶ 6 
 
The State also offered expert testimony from Dr. Marjorie Fujara, a specialist in 
child abuse pediatrics at Stroger Hospital. J.H. was admitted with burns covering 
13% of his body. J.H. had third-degree burns through the full thickness of his skin 
on the tops of his feet up to his ankles and second-degree burns on the soles of his 
feet, buttocks, and genital area. Full thickness burns often require skin grafting 
because the tissue is damaged beyond recovery. Dr. Fujara stated the burn pattern 
was “very distinctive” with a clear line between the burned and healthy skin. The 
burns ended at J.H.’s ankles with no splash marks extending upward onto his legs. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 3 - 
She opined that the burns resulted from forcible immersion in hot water, explaining 
that the soles of J.H.’s feet and his buttocks were burned less severely because they 
were in contact with the cooler surface of the bathtub. Dr. Fujara stated splash 
marks would be expected if J.H. had been moving around in the bathtub. Based on 
the specific burn pattern, Dr. Fujara ruled out alternative causes, observing that if 
J.H. had stepped into a bathtub filled with hot water he would have “reflexively” 
withdrawn his foot and he would not have suffered burns to both feet and his 
buttocks. Alternatively, if J.H. had been sitting in the bathtub when the hot water 
was turned on, he would have flailed around when the water contacted his skin, 
resulting in splash marks.  
¶ 7 
 
On cross-examination, Dr. Fujara stated she was aware that the hot and cold 
water lines had been reversed and the hot water was measured at 160 degrees. That 
information, however, did not alter her opinion that J.H.’s burns resulted from 
forced immersion. Dr. Fujara also acknowledged that J.H.’s siblings were 
examined and did not demonstrate any indication of abuse. 
¶ 8 
 
Thomas White, a retired investigator with the Department of Children and 
Family Services (DCFS), testified that defendant stated his wife, J.H.’s mother, 
was at work when the injury occurred. Defendant was at home caring for their 
children. White’s memory was “a little foggy” on how many children defendant 
stated he was caring for, but it was either eight or nine, and they ranged in age from 
infancy to 12 years old. Defendant acknowledged he felt “a little overwhelmed.” At 
some point that morning, J.H. and his brother were wrestling and fell into feces that 
had leaked from the baby’s diaper onto the floor. Defendant told them to go take a 
bath. 
¶ 9 
 
White further testified that defendant did not explain how he became aware of 
J.H.’s injuries. During his investigation, however, White learned that two of the 
other children told their mother that J.H.’s feet were peeling after she came home 
from work between 10:30 and 11:30 that night. Defendant and J.H.’s mother then 
immediately took J.H. to the hospital. Defendant acknowledged that he falsely 
identified himself as “Joe Campbell” at the hospital. He also stated he was J.H.’s 
uncle and falsely claimed that J.H. was with a babysitter prior to arriving at the 
hospital. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 4 - 
¶ 10 
 
On cross-examination, White testified that defendant stated he was not angry 
when he sent J.H. to take a bath. Defendant informed White that a new water heater 
had been installed a couple of days before the incident. White turned the cold water 
knob in the bathtub and observed the water temperature rise rapidly to 161 degrees. 
White noted the water temperature normally should not exceed 119 degrees. He 
then went to the basement and determined that the hot and cold water lines had been 
reversed when installed on the new water heater. White did not observe any signs of 
abuse in the other children and stated they “[s]eemed appropriately adjusted.” 
¶ 11 
 
Based on the evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty of the charged 
offenses. The trial judge emphasized that the unrebutted expert testimony 
established that J.H.’s injuries resulted from forcible immersion, defendant was the 
sole caregiver present when the injuries occurred, and defendant exhibited 
consciousness of guilt by giving false information at the hospital. 
¶ 12 
 
Defendant subsequently elected to be sentenced under the amended aggravated 
battery statute. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(2), (b)(1) (West 2014). The trial court 
merged the remaining counts into the aggravated battery conviction and sentenced 
defendant to 20 years’ imprisonment for that offense. 
¶ 13 
 
On appeal, defendant contended, in pertinent part, that Rosalina Roxas’s 
testimony recounting J.H.’s out-of-court statement was inadmissible hearsay and 
that the State failed to prove the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 2017 
IL App (1st) 142882, ¶ 20. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in 
admitting J.H.’s statement identifying defendant as the offender under the hearsay 
exception for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. 
The appellate court concluded the hearsay statement was not made for that purpose 
and admission of the statement could not be considered harmless error. 2017 IL 
App (1st) 142882, ¶¶ 24-29. 
¶ 14 
 
The appellate court further held that the double jeopardy clause barred retrial 
because the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to prove defendant 
guilty of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 2017 IL App (1st) 142882, 
¶¶ 30-41. The appellate court reasoned that J.H.’s hearsay statement was the only 
identification evidence placing defendant in the bathroom when the injury occurred 
and the evidence showed that other people were in the house when J.H. was injured. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 5 - 
2017 IL App (1st) 142882, ¶ 40. Defendant’s conviction was, therefore, reversed. 
2017 IL App (1st) 142882, ¶ 41. 
¶ 15 
 
Justice Gordon dissented from the portion of the majority’s opinion holding 
that the double jeopardy clause barred retrial. 2017 IL App (1st) 142882, ¶ 48 
(Gordon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The partial dissent 
maintained that the majority failed to consider the excluded hearsay statement 
properly in its analysis of that issue. 2017 IL App (1st) 142882, ¶ 60 (Gordon, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The partial dissent concluded that this 
matter should be remanded for a new trial because the evidence presented at trial, 
including J.H.’s hearsay statement, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 2017 IL App (1st) 142882, ¶ 60 
(Gordon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
¶ 16 
 
We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 
2018)). 
 
¶ 17 
 
 
 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 18 
 
On appeal to this court, the State does not dispute the appellate court’s holding 
that admission of J.H.’s out-of-court statement was reversible error. Rather, the 
State only argues that the appellate court erred in concluding retrial is barred by the 
double jeopardy clause. The State contends the evidence submitted at trial, 
including J.H.’s hearsay statement, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. According to the State, the appellate 
court failed to give adequate weight to J.H.’s out-of-court statement identifying 
defendant as the offender in its double jeopardy analysis. 
¶ 19 
 
Defendant responds that the appellate court considered all of the evidence 
presented in this case, including J.H.’s statement, and correctly held it was 
insufficient to prove defendant guilty of aggravated battery beyond a reasonable 
doubt. J.H.’s hearsay statement that defendant poured hot water on him was the 
only evidence that defendant was even present in the bathroom, but the statement is 
inconsistent with Dr. Fujara’s opinion that the burns could have resulted only from 
forcible immersion. Additionally, the evidence showed the hot and cold water lines 
were reversed, and the hot water temperature was 160 degrees, indicating the burns 
 
 
 
 
 
- 6 - 
could have been caused accidentally. Defendant, therefore, concludes that this 
court should affirm the appellate court’s judgment. 
¶ 20 
 
The applicable law is well established. The double jeopardy clause prohibits a 
second, or successive, trial to afford the prosecution another opportunity to provide 
evidence that it failed to present at the first trial. People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 
367 (2008) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)). The double 
jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial when a conviction has been overturned 
because of an error in the trial proceedings, but retrial is barred if the evidence 
introduced at the initial trial was insufficient to sustain the conviction. Lopez, 229 
Ill. 2d at 367 (citing People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 173-74 (1990)). “[F]or 
purposes of double jeopardy all evidence submitted at the original trial may be 
considered when determining the sufficiency of the evidence.” People v. Olivera, 
164 Ill. 2d 382, 393 (1995) (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40 (1988)). 
¶ 21 
 
Retrial is the proper remedy if the evidence presented at the initial trial, 
including any improperly admitted evidence, was sufficient to sustain the 
conviction. People v. McKown, 236 Ill. 2d 278, 311 (2010) (citing Lopez, 229 Ill. 
2d at 367). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must 
consider whether “ ‘ “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Ross, 229 
Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008) (quoting People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985), 
quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 
¶ 22 
 
In this case, a rational trier of fact could have credited Dr. Fujara’s testimony 
that J.H.’s burns resulted from forcible immersion in hot water. Indeed, Dr. Fujara 
provided the only expert testimony explaining J.H.’s burns. 
¶ 23 
 
Defendant 
contends, 
however, 
that 
Dr. 
Fujara 
acknowledged 
on 
cross-examination that the burns on J.H.’s buttocks did not exhibit the “doughnut 
pattern” characteristic in forcible immersion cases. Defendant quotes an article 
from the United States Department of Justice entitled Burn Injuries in Child Abuse, 
as explaining that “[w]hen a child is held in scalding hot bathwater, the buttocks are 
pressed against the bottom of the tub so forcibly that the water will not come into 
contact with the center of the buttocks, sparing this part of the buttocks and causing 
the burn injury to have a doughnut pattern.” Office of Juvenile Justice and 
 
 
 
 
 
- 7 - 
Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, Burn Injuries in Child Abuse, 
at 6 (2d ed. June 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/91190-6.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q97P-6LCD]. According to defendant, Dr. Fujara testified on 
cross-examination that J.H. did not have that type of burn, thus undermining her 
opinion that the burns resulted from forcible immersion. Defendant posits that J.H. 
could have been burned accidentally because the water lines were reversed and the 
water coming from the hot water tank was 160 degrees. 
¶ 24 
 
A review of the record, however, shows Dr. Fujara actually testified that J.H.’s 
burns exhibited a doughnut pattern. When defense counsel questioned whether a 
picture of J.H.’s buttocks “demonstrate[d] that kind of pattern,” Dr. Fujara 
responded “I think it does.” Dr. Fujara explained that “probably because the water 
was so hot there is no absolute sparing,” but she noted that “the area where he 
actually is sitting on the porcelain is less burned, so I do—I believe if the water 
temperature weren’t as high, we might see that doughnut pattern of the slight 
sparing in the center.” Dr. Fujara also noted that a doughnut pattern is only 
“commonly” or “sometimes” seen when the burns result from forcible immersion. 
¶ 25 
 
In this case, Dr. Fujara offered persuasive expert testimony that J.H.’s burns 
resulted from forcible immersion in hot water. Dr. Fujara’s testimony ruling out 
alternative causes rebuts defendant’s argument that J.H. may have been burned 
accidentally as a result of the faulty water heater installation. We conclude that the 
trial court reasonably credited Dr. Fujara’s testimony that J.H.’s injuries resulted 
from forcible immersion. 
¶ 26 
 
The critical issue, therefore, becomes whether the evidence was sufficient to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the offender. The evidence 
showed defendant was the only adult present in the house at the time J.H. was 
injured. He did not seek prompt treatment for the severe injuries suffered by J.H. 
Rather, J.H. was taken to the hospital for treatment only after the other children 
informed their mother that J.H.’s feet were peeling. The injuries apparently 
occurred when J.H. took a bath at some point in the morning, and J.H.’s mother did 
not return home from work until late that night. When defendant and J.H.’s mother 
finally took J.H. to the hospital, defendant gave an incorrect name, falsely stated he 
was J.H.’s uncle, and told hospital staff that J.H. was with a babysitter prior to 
arriving at the hospital. The trial court may have viewed each of those statements as 
 
 
 
 
 
- 8 - 
evidence of consciousness of guilt. See People v. Harris, 225 Ill. 2d 1, 26-27 (2007) 
(use of false identification may be admitted as evidence of consciousness of guilt); 
People v. Milka, 211 Ill. 2d 150, 181 (2004) (a false exculpatory statement is 
probative of consciousness of guilt). Accordingly, substantial evidence pointed to 
defendant as the offender even without the excluded hearsay statement. 
¶ 27 
 
Finally, although the appellate court mentioned the excluded hearsay statement 
in its analysis, we do not believe that statement was given the proper weight. Before 
concluding that the evidence was insufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the appellate court observed that “J.H.’s erroneously admitted 
hearsay statement was the only piece of evidence placing defendant in the 
bathroom where the injury occurred” and “[t]he State provided no other 
identification evidence.” 2017 IL App (1st) 142882, ¶ 40. Defendant similarly 
argues that the State did not present any live witness testimony showing defendant 
was even present in the bathroom when J.H. was injured. The State was not 
necessarily required to provide other evidence on that point, however. As 
previously noted, a reviewing court must consider evidence admitted improperly 
when determining the sufficiency of the evidence. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d at 393 (citing 
Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40). The excluded hearsay statement is, therefore, competent 
evidence that defendant caused J.H.’s injuries for the purpose of the sufficiency of 
the evidence analysis. 
¶ 28 
 
Further, all of the evidence, including J.H.’s hearsay statement, must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Given that standard, we believe a 
rational trier of fact could have considered J.H.’s hearsay statement simply as an 
identification of the person who caused his injuries. The trial judge was not 
required to parse six-year-old J.H.’s statement in a technical manner. As a 
six-year-old, J.H. may not have been able to explain the precise way defendant 
harmed him. Nonetheless, we do not believe a rational trier of fact is required to 
completely discount the part of J.H.’s statement identifying defendant as the person 
who caused his injuries merely because part of his statement is not perfectly 
consistent with the expert’s testimony. 
¶ 29 
 
In sum, our decision in this case is guided by the standard for reviewing this 
issue. We must determine whether “ ‘ “after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
 
 
 
 
 
- 9 - 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Ross, 
229 Ill. 2d at 272 (quoting Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261, quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 
319). We believe the evidence, including J.H.’s hearsay statement identifying 
defendant as the person who caused his injuries, was sufficient when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution for a rational trier of fact to find defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the double jeopardy clause does 
not bar retrial, and this case must be remanded to the circuit court for retrial without 
the excluded hearsay evidence. 
 
¶ 30 
 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶ 31 
 
For the above reasons, we reverse the portion of the appellate court’s judgment 
barring retrial of defendant for the charged offenses. We remand to the circuit court 
for a new trial. 
 
¶ 32 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
¶ 33 
 
Circuit court judgment reversed. 
¶ 34 
 
Cause remanded.