Case Title: Leithead v. American Colloid Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Leithead v. American Colloid Co.1986 WY 139721 P.2d 1059Case Number: 85-199Decided: 06/24/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Vance S. LEITHEAD, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

AMERICAN COLLOID COMPANY, 
a Delaware 
corporation, and Myron Durtsche, Jr., Appellees 
(Defendants).

No. 
85-199

Appeal from District 
Court, Big HornCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

Michael K. Davis 
of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellant.

Robert M. 
Shively of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ. 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     After he was discharged 
from his job, appellant Vance Leithead sued his former employer, American 
Colloid Company, and his former supervisor, Myron Durtsche, Jr., alleging breach 
of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith, slander, misrepresentation of 
employment, promissory estoppel, tortious interference with contract, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the employer on all the claims except slander, which the 
parties then settled. We must decide whether the court properly granted summary 
judgment.

FACTS

[¶2.]     In June of 1978, 
appellant telephoned Myron Durtsche about a job opening at American Colloid's 
Lovell plant. The company mines and processes bentonite, a clay that is used in 
the oil industry. In their initial conversation, Mr. Durtsche offered appellant 
the job and invited him to start the following Monday. On his first day of work, 
appellant was given a handbook entitled "For the New Employee of American 
Colloid Company." Under the heading, "Employment Policies and Objectives," the 
following statements appeared:

"Probation

"All new employees are automatically on a 
probationary period at the beginning of their employment. During this period, 
their abilities and work performance are closely evaluated by their supervisor. 
If for any reason, on or before the end of this period, it is determined that an 
employee is not suited for the job for which he was hired, his employment may be 
terminated. At the completion of the probationary period, you will become a 
permanent employee."

"Absence from Work

* * * * * 
*

"If you are absent for 
three days, and do not report to your supervisor, it is possible that your 
employment will be considered as automatically terminated.

"If you are chronically 
absent, or late in arriving to work, you will seriously jeopardize your 
employment. Please do not let this happen."

"Our Rules of 
Conduct

* * * * * 
*

"Of course, it is 
impossible to list every possible type of misconduct which may result in a 
disciplinary action. If you will act as a reasonable, law-abiding citizen, and 
do your job well, you will get along all right and enjoy your membership in the 
family of American Colloid's employees."

"Termination of 
Employment

"Employees wishing to 
terminate their services should give a minimum of two weeks' notice to their 
supervisors in order to leave in good standing.

"If you are dismissed, 
and we certainly hope this never happens, a full explanation for the reasons 
given to you by your supervisor will be provided."

[¶3.]     Sometime in 1982, a new 
loose-leaf personnel policy handbook entitled "Employee Information Handbook" 
was given to appellant. It contained essentially identical rules regarding the 
probationary period, conduct, absences, and termination.

[¶4.]     Appellant changed jobs 
within the company several times between 1978 and his termination on June 29, 
1983. In his capacity as a driller and surveyor, appellant had access to 
confidential information about the location of potential bentonite claims. It 
was important to the company that this information stay confidential and, to 
that end, Mr. Durtsche requested, in 1981, that the employees under his 
supervision sign a secrecy agreement which stated in part:

"[The employee] agrees 
that either during or after termination of his employment he will not disclose 
to any person, firm or corporation any information concerning such matters as 
have been disclosed to him as confidential or treated by Company as confidential 
during his employment with Company."

[¶5.]     Until May of 1983, Mr. 
Durtsche had considered appellant to be an excellent employee. But his opinion 
began to change when he became suspicious that appellant was leaking 
confidential information to American Colloid's competitors. According to Mr. 
Durtsche, appellant was the only one who could have been responsible for the 
leaks. But in his affidavit attached to the motion opposing summary judgment, 
appellant denied leaking any information to competitors. Mr. Durtsche also had 
become disgruntled with appellant because of poor work performance in the summer 
of 1982 and a change in appellant's attitude reported by appellant's immediate 
supervisor, Ned Walker.

[¶6.]     On June 29, 1983, Mr. 
Durtsche called appellant into his office and fired him. Mr. Durtsche told him 
that he did not fit into the company's long-range plan but did not accuse him of 
leaking information. Appellant later learned the reasons for his discharge from 
fellow employees who attended a safety meeting at the American Colloid Plant 
several months after the firing. According to Art Schatz, one of those 
employees, Mr. Durtsche told them:

"Most of you know now 
that I have fired Vance Leithead. Some son-of-a-bitch is talking too much. I 
think we have got him now, but if I did not get the right one, I will fire every 
damn one of you in here until I get the right one. Even if I have to run this 
whole field department by myself. I don't know who the mole is or what he is 
gaining by running to our competitors and telling them everything we are 
doing."

[¶7.]     In October of 1983, 
appellant filed a complaint against appellees American Colloid Company and Myron 
Durtsche alleging slander, breach of contract, and malicious conspiracy and 
interference with employment. On June 19, 1984, the appellees moved for partial 
summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, and after a hearing, the court 
granted the motion. The court held that the employment contract was at will, so 
appellant could be discharged at any time for any reason.

[¶8.]     With the court's 
permission, appellant filed an amended complaint on July 3, 1984, in which he 
added claims for breach of the covenant of good faith, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, misrepresentation of permanent employment, and promissory 
estoppel. Appellees then filed a second motion for summary judgment on May 15, 
1985. After a hearing, the court granted the motion on all claims except the 
claim for slander which the parties eventually settled.1

INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONTRACT

[¶9.]     Without the handbooks, 
the contract was at will, which meant that the employer could discharge 
appellant without cause. Alexander v. Phillips Oil Company, Wyo., 707 P.2d 1385, 1386 
(1985). The district court held that the two handbooks did not become part of 
appellant's employment contract, because they were not supported by 
consideration running from appellant to the company. The court quoted the 
following from 53 Am.Jur.2d Master & Servant § 32, at 
107:

"It is the general rule 
that a contract to give a person permanent employment, in the absence of some 
further express or implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment or 
of a good consideration in addition to the services contracted to be rendered, 
is no more than an indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of either 
party."

[¶10.]  The rule of additional consideration 
relied on by the district court is directly contrary to established Wyoming authority. A 
handbook may change the employer's unfettered right to discharge an employee 
even if the handbook is given to the employee after his employment has begun. 
The benefits extended to the employee in the handbook are enforceable contract 
terms, because they are supported by consideration flowing to the employer. That 
consideration consists of the benefit of an orderly, cooperative and loyal work 
force. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, Wyo., 704 P.2d 702, 707 (1985). The terms in 
the handbooks became part of appellant's employment 
contract.

[¶11.]  The mere existence of a handbook or 
employer's manual will not

"make employment other 
than at will in all instances. Each case must be considered on its own merits. 
Some handbooks or manuals may not contain provisions which negate the employment 
at will. Some handbooks or manuals may be ambiguous or may not have apparent 
meaning, making the determination of their effect on at will employment a 
question of fact. Normally, the construction and interpretation of a contract is 
for the court as a matter of law. If the meaning of a contract is ambiguous or 
not apparent, it may be necessary to determine the intention of the parties from 
evidence other than the contract itself, and interpretation becomes a mixed 
question of law and fact." (Citations omitted.) Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. 
Parks, supra, at 706.

[¶12.]  Our review of the handbooks convinces us 
that their terms are clear and unambiguous. Under the heading "Probation," the 
handbooks describe a probationary period during which an employee may be 
discharged, if he "is not suited for the job for which he was hired."2

Then, the handbooks 
state:

"At the completion of the 
probationary period, you will become a permanent 
employee."

[¶13.]  By contrasting the permanent employee 
with the probationary employee, and by defining the probationary employee as one 
that can be discharged at will, the handbooks strongly imply that a permanent 
employee is one that can be discharged only for cause. This use of the term 
"permanent employee" is not unusual.

"Permanent employment has 
been defined as employment which continues `"indefinitely, and until one or the 
other of the parties wish, for some good reason, to sever the relation."' Pugh 
v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924 (1981), 
quoting from Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 601-602, 22 P. 1126 (1889)." 
(Emphasis in original.) Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., Wyo., 685 P.2d 25, 28 n. 
2 (1984).

In other words, 
a permanent employee is one that can only be fired for 
cause.

[¶14.]  By listing misconduct that could result 
in discharge, the handbooks imply that cause is required. Alexander v. Phillips 
Oil Co., supra, 707 P.2d  at 1388; Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., v. Parks, supra, 
704 P.2d  at 705. For example, the handbooks state:

"If you are absent for 
three days, and do not report to your supervisor, it is possible that your 
employment will be considered automatically terminated.

"If you are chronically 
absent, or late in arriving to work, you will seriously jeopardize your 
employment."

[¶15.]  Statements in the handbooks under the 
heading "Termination of Employment" are also revealing. Employees are expressly 
permitted to terminate their employment but are to give two weeks' notice if 
they wish to leave in good standing. But, there is no corresponding language 
expressly reserving the company's right to terminate the employee at any time 
for any reason. The handbooks merely state,

"If you are dismissed, a 
full explanation for the reasons given to you by your supervisor will be 
provided."

[¶16.]  We hold that both the specific terms and 
the general tenor of the handbooks gave appellant an enforceable right to be 
discharged only for cause.

[¶17.]  In most appeals from summary judgment, we 
either affirm the district court or reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
There are cases, however, in which we reverse and remand with instructions to 
the district court to enter summary judgment, or partial summary judgment, in 
favor of the unsuccessful party. This is exactly what occurred in Alexander v. 
Phillips Oil Company, supra, 707 P.2d 1385. There, after determining that the 
contract was "at will," the district court held that the employer was entitled 
to summary judgment on the employee's claim for wrongful discharge. On appeal, 
we held that the employee handbook allowed discharge only for cause. Id. at 1389, n. 4. Our 
interpretation of the contract was conclusive, and we remanded solely for a 
determination of whether the employer had cause for the 
discharge.

[¶18.]  It is not clear whether the employee made 
a cross-motion for partial summary judgment in Alexander v. Phillips Oil 
Company, supra. But, even if no such a motion was made, it was still proper for 
this court to grant partial summary judgment to the employee on 
appeal.

"[A] district court may 
resolve a motion for summary judgment in favor of either party, even though only 
one has filed such a motion." Young v. Hawks, Wyo., 624 P.2d 235, 239 
(1981).

Since a district 
court can grant summary judgment to a nonmoving party, this court, which reviews 
summary judgment in the same light as the district court, can do the same. 
Garner v. Hickman, 
Wyo., 709 P.2d 407 
(1985).

[¶19.]  In the case at bar, appellant has not 
made a cross-motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, we reach the same result 
that we reached in Alexander v. Phillips Oil Company, supra. We reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer and remand 
with instructions that the district court enter partial summary judgment in 
favor of appellant on the issue of the contract's basic 
meaning.

[¶20.]  The summary judgment materials reveal 
that there remains a factual dispute as to whether appellant was divulging 
company secrets, an occurrence which appellant concedes would provide cause for 
discharge. Further proceedings will be required to determine what is sufficient 
cause for discharge under the contract and whether appellant was discharged for 
cause as the contract requires.

COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH

[¶21.]  In some jurisdictions, an implied 
covenant of good faith is imposed on employers when they discharge employees 
under a contract at will. See Mobil Oil Producing, Inc. v. Parks, supra, 704 P.2d  at 704, and Rompf v. John G. Hammons Hotels, Inc., supra, 685 P.2d 25, for 
discussions of the doctrine's status in Wyoming. The covenant has no application here, 
however, because the parties' contract was not at will.

PROMISSORY 
ESTOPPEL

[¶22.]  Appellant introduced promissory estoppel 
as an alternative to his contract argument. In his brief he 
states:

"The Appellant 
accordingly urges the court to enforce the expectations of Appellant through the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel, if the court determines that neither of the 
other two theories in support of that obligation on the part of American Colloid 
Company can be sustained."

Because of our 
holding in favor of appellant on the contract issue, there is no need for us to 
reach his promissory estoppel argument.

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

[¶23.]  In Spurlock v. Ely, Wyo., 707 P.2d 188, 
191-193 (1985), we discussed the intentional infliction of emotional distress; 
but we did not have to decide whether it was a viable independent cause of 
action in Wyoming because the plaintiff's claim for mental injuries was 
parasitic to his claim for intentional interference with contract. In this case, 
however, appellant's claim for mental harm is not parasitic. It is set off as a 
separate claim for relief and is drafted in terms of its generally accepted 
elements. 

[¶24.]  In its decision letter, the district 
court recognized the uncertain status of the claim, but without deciding whether 
it was valid, the court held that two of its required elements - outrageous 
conduct and severe mental distress - were not present. If we were to follow the 
district court's analytical approach and avoid the outright adoption or 
rejection of the claim, then other Wyoming district courts and litigants would 
continue to guess about the claim's status. Moreover, it is hard to see what a 
court achieves by discussing an element of a claim without acknowledging that 
the claim is valid. If the claim is legitimate, then the court should say so. If 
the claim is invalid, then the court should not waste its time analyzing its 
hypothetical elements.

[¶25.]  We recently followed this principle when 
we adopted the cause of action for strict tort liability. Ogle v. Caterpillar 
Tractor Company, Wyo., 716 P.2d 334 (1986). We 
stated:

"[B]efore we can begin 
our analysis of the pleadings, the statute of limitations, and defenses raised, 
we must first determine whether the doctrine of strict liability is available to 
state a claim in Wyoming." Id. at 341.

The highest 
courts in several other states have followed this procedure when adopting the 
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. For example, in 
the Maryland case of Harris v. Jones, 281 
Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611, 86 A.L.R.3d 441 (1977), an employee with a speech impediment brought 
an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a supervisor 
who made fun of him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
supervisor on grounds that the employee's mental harm was not severe and the 
intermediate court of appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland also agreed that 
the severity element was missing from the employee's case, but it did not make 
that determination until it had decided that the cause of action was valid and 
that severity was one of its elements. See also Hubbard v. United Press 
International, Inc., Minn., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-439, 38 A.L.R.4th 971 (1983). We 
will follow this same procedure in the case at bar.

[¶26.]  We recently recognized the tort of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, noting that

"[c]ompensation for 
emotional distress is not a new concept in Wyoming. We have permitted recovery for 
emotional harm caused by false imprisonment, Waters v. Brand, Wyo., 497 P.2d 875, 877-878 (1972), malicious prosecution, Cates v. Eddy, Wyo., 669 P.2d 912, 
921 (1983), and work-related stress, Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, Wyo., 
678 P.2d 874 (1984) * * *." Gates v. Richardson, Wyo., 719 P.2d 193, 194 
(1986).

If a person can 
recover damages for negligently inflicted mental harm, then without question he 
should have a cause of action for intentional harm. See Sheltra v. Smith, 136 
Vt. 472, 392 A.2d 431, 432-433 (1978).

[¶27.]  Parties opposing the cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress typically contend that its adoption 
will flood the courts with fraudulent claims and create potentially unlimited 
liability for every type of mental disturbance. While these problems are not to 
be dismissed lightly, they can certainly be solved without rejecting the action 
entirely. That would be the equivalent of "employing a cannon to kill a flea." 
Gates v. Richardson, supra, 719 P.2d 193, 197, quoting Nehring v. Russell, Wyo., 
582 P.2d 67, 79 (1978).

[¶28.]  Section 46 of the Restatement, Second, 
Torts (1965), places several limits on the action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. It provides:

"Outrageous Conduct 
Causing Severe Emotional Distress

"(1) One who by extreme 
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if 
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily 
harm."

 

[¶29.]  Outrageous conduct is defined in comment 
"d" of the Restatement as conduct which goes beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, is regarded as atrocious, and is utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community. Severe emotional distress is defined in comment "j" as distress which 
is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure 
it.

[¶30.]  The limits imposed in § 46 of the 
Restatement, together with the jury's common sense, should prove to be adequate 
protection against fraudulent or frivolous claims. See Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wn.2d 52, 530 P.2d 291, 294-295, 77 
A.L.R.3d 436 (1975); Agis v. Howard Johnson Company, 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315, 318-319 (1976). It is worth noting also, that frivolous claims can be 
weeded out at the summary-judgment stage. Comment "h" to § 46 of the 
Restatement, Second, Torts (1965) states:

"Court and jury. It is 
for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's 
conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit 
recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it 
is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in 
the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to 
result in liability."

[¶31.]  The tort of intentional infliction of 
mental distress as described in § 46 of the Restatement can be safely 
characterized as the general rule in the United States. 
Sheltra v. Smith, supra, 392 A.2d at 432-433; see also Hubbard v. United Press 
International, Inc., supra, 330 N.W.2d  at 438 n. 7.

[¶32.]  As of 1977, 37 jurisdictions had 
recognized the tort. Harris v. Jones, supra, 380 A.2d  at 613, 86 A.L.R.3d at 
447. Only three jurisdictions - Indiana, 
Kentucky, and Texas - have explicitly rejected it. Annot., 
38 A.L.R.4th 998, 1030-1031 (1985). We join the vast majority of states and hold 
that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as reflected in § 
46 of the Restatement, Second, Torts, is a valid cause of action in Wyoming.

[¶33.]  We note here that there are some wrongful 
discharge cases in which an action for intentional infliction of emotional harm 
cannot succeed. First, if the employee's mental distress is caused solely by his 
discharge and if the discharge was permitted in his contract, then the employer 
has a complete defense.

"The actor is never 
liable * * * where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a 
permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to 
cause emotional distress." Restatement, Second, Torts § 46, comment "g." See 
also M.B.M. Company, Inc. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681, 688 
(1980).

[¶34.]  Second, in jurisdictions where 
retaliatory discharge is recognized as a tort action, it is not proper for the 
employee to also claim intentional infliction of emotional harm. This is because 
damages for the employee's mental distress may be awarded for the retaliatory 
discharge. The jury might mistakenly award a double recovery if the court 
instructs on both torts. Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, W. Va., 289 S.E.2d 692, 705 (1982). Neither of 
these qualifications apply in this case.

[¶35.]  Appellant contends that summary judgment 
should not have been granted on his claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional harm, because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
his suffering was severe. We disagree. Comment "j" of § 46 of the Restatement, 
Second, Torts states:

"Severe emotional distress. The rule 
stated in this Section applies only where the emotional distress has in fact 
resulted, and where it is severe. Emotional distress passes under various names, 
such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. 
It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, 
grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, 
and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. Complete 
emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of 
transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among 
people. The law intervenes only where the 
distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to 
endure it. The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be 
considered in determining its severity. Severe distress must be proved; but in 
many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in 
itself important evidence that the distress has existed. * * 
*

"The distress must be 
reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there is no liability 
where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional 
distress, unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of 
which the actor has knowledge. * * *

"It is for the court to 
determine whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is 
for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶36.]  Based on appellant's affidavit and 
deposition the district court correctly concluded that appellant's suffering was 
not severe. Appellant testified in his deposition as 
follows:

"Q. Mr. Leithead, it has 
come to my attention that your attorneys on your behalf have at least moved to 
amend your Complaint to assert additional theories, one of them is intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and my question to you is what emotional 
distress have you suffered as a result of all of this?

"A. The emotions that you 
go through, especially when unemployed, worrying about how in the world you are 
ever going to pay your bills when your bills total more than unemployment pays 
and just, just the constant worry about, and then even yet wondering what your 
future is going to be like where before you thought you had a future with 
American Colloid and then all of a sudden now you don't have a future, so that 
is a great deal of emotional distress.

"Q. What - Have you 
sought any psychiatric or psychological help for this 
distress?

"A. 
No.

"Q. Do you intend 
to?

"A. I haven't thought 
about it.

"Q. Not interrupting your 
sleep at night, is it now?

"A. Sure it 
does.

"Q. How 
often?

"A. I don't know. I don't 
keep track.

"Q. Once a 
month?

"A. Probably more often 
than that.

"Q. Once every two 
weeks?

"A. I don't know, various 
times.

"Q. Ok. What other 
effects has it had, if any?

"A. Worrying about what 
people are thinking about you. That's a big thing. That's quite 
emotional."

[¶37.]  The ordinary person who is fired from his 
job might worry about his future and his ability to pay his bills. He might also 
lose sleep over it. But this is the kind of distress with which the ordinary 
person must be expected to cope. Appellant's allegations of distress are 
insufficient to create a jury question on the severity issue. We can safely say, 
as a matter of law, that his distress is not so severe as to be 
compensable.

[¶38.]  The case law from other jurisdictions 
supports our conclusion. In Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 434 (E.D.Pa. 
1983), for example, a discharged employee claimed that her blood pressure 
increased and that she suffered humiliation, depression and mental distress as a 
result of her firing. But, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania held, as a matter of law, that these distresses were 
not sufficiently severe to allow recovery. The court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the employer. Similarly, in Harris v. Jones, supra, 380 A.2d  at 617, 86 
A.L.R.3d at 452-453, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the emotional 
distress

"manifested by an 
aggravation of [the employee's] pre-existing nervous condition and a worsening 
of his speech impediment, was vague and weak at best."

The employee's 
humiliation

"was not, as a matter of 
law, so intense as to constitute the `severe' emotional distress required to 
recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress." 380 A.2d  
at 617, 86 A.L.R.3d at 453.

[¶39.]  In his affidavit, appellant describes 
mental distress which is slightly more serious than the distress he alleged in 
his deposition. He claims that as a result of Mr. Durtsche's accusation 
regarding the theft of company secrets,

"I have been humiliated. 
I find the accusation * * * constantly on my mind. It has interfered with my 
relationships with my family, and my friends. I have found myself unable to 
sleep on many occasions thinking about the accusation."

But, even if the 
mental distress described in the affidavit can be characterized as "severe," it 
should be disregarded for purposes of the motion for summary judgment. The 
mental distress in the affidavit is not linked to appellant's discharge, but 
instead to Mr. Durtsche's alleged slander. Appellant's claim for slander has 
already been settled, so it would be improper for him to receive additional 
damages for slander under the guise of another cause of action. See Harless v. 
First National Bank in Fairmont, supra, 289 S.E.2d 692.

[¶40.]  In conclusion, the district court 
properly granted summary judgment to appellees Durtsche and American Colloid 
Company on appellant's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Summary judgment was improper, however, as to the claim for wrongful 
discharge.

Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 We will detail the 
court's holdings on each of the claims in appellant's amended complaint except 
tortious interference with contract and misrepresentation of permanent 
employment. He has not discussed those two claims on 
appeal.

2 This vague criterion for 
discharge probably creates an at-will relationship during the probationary 
period. See Richey v. American Automobile Association, Inc., 380 Mass. 835, 406 N.E.2d 675, 678 (1980).

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
concurring and dissenting.

[¶41.]  I agree that the summary judgment in this 
case which was entered in favor of American Colloid Company must be reversed. I 
do not agree that the court should go further and require the entry of a summary 
judgment in favor of Leithead with respect to the proposition that the documents 
presented in this instance demonstrate an employment other than at will as a 
matter of law. In this instance the court has encountered one of those 
situations discussed in Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, Wyo., 704 P.2d 702, 
706 (1985), in this way:

"This is not to say that 
the existence of a handbook or employer's manual will make employment other than 
at will in all instances. Each case must be considered on its own merits. Some 
handbooks or manuals may not contain provisions which negate the employment at 
will. Some handbooks or manuals may be ambiguous or may not have apparent 
meaning, making the determination of their effect on at will employment a 
question of fact. * * * If the meaning of a contract is ambiguous or not 
apparent, it may be necessary to determine the intention of the parties from 
evidence other than the contract itself, and interpretation becomes a mixed 
question of law and fact. * * *"

[¶42.]  I would treat with the employee handbooks 
which were introduced into evidence in this case in accordance with the quoted 
language from Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, supra. I would reverse the 
summary judgment in favor of American Colloid Company, but I would extend the 
scope of the trial to the factual question of the effect of language in these 
employee handbooks which I perceive not to be sufficiently apparent to justify a 
conclusion that this was a contract of employment as a matter of law. In my 
judgment their effect on at will employment in this instance is a question of 
fact, but certainly at the very least they are sufficiently ambiguous to require 
a determination of the intention of the parties from evidence other than the 
contract itself.