Case Title: State v. Flagg

Citation: 160 Vt. 141, 624 A.2d 864

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_FLAGG.92-027; 160 Vt. 141; 624 A.2d 864


[Filed 12-Mar-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-027


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Rutland Circuit

 Mark Flagg                                   December Term, 1992



 Theodore S. Mandeville, Jr., J.

 Marc D. Brierre, Rutland County Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for
   plaintiff-appellee

 E.M. Allen, Defender General, and William Nelson and Henry Hinton, Appellate
   Attorneys, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant appeals from a denial of his motion to dismiss,
 arguing that new legislation reclassifying his offense as a civil violation,
 rather than a criminal offense, should be applied retroactively under 1
 V.S.A. { 214(c).  We reverse.
      On June 1, 1991, defendant was arrested for operating a motor vehicle
 with a suspended license (DLS) after his suspension period had expired and
 prior to the reinstatement of his license.   On August 22, 1991, defendant
 was charged with violating 23 V.S.A. { 674 as it existed at the time of
 defendant's conduct.  The Legislature had, however, reclassified
 defendant's offense, effective July 1, 1991, from a criminal misdemeanor to
 a civil traffic violation by enacting an amendment to 23 V.S.A. { 674 and a
 new section, 23 V.S.A. { 676.  The penalty for defendant's particular
 conduct was decreased under the new law.  Compare 23 V.S.A. {{
 674(a)(1)(prior to the 1991 amendment)(fine not more than $500 or
 imprisonment not more than thirty days or both for first offense),
 2502(a)(3)(A)(ten points assessed to license) with 23 V.S.A {{ 676 (civil
 traffic violation), 2302(c)(civil penalty of $175), 2502(a)(4)(C)(five
 points assessed to license).
      Defendant's motion to dismiss the criminal charge, on the ground that,
 under 1 V.S.A. { 214(c), only a civil charge could be brought, was denied.
 Defendant pled guilty to violating 23 V.S.A. { 674, as the statute existed
 at the time of his offense, reserving the right to seek review of the denial
 of his motion to dismiss.
      Vermont, like many other states, has a general saving statute designed
 to permit the prosecution of individuals who violate a law that is repealed
 prior to the prosecution and sentencing of their cases.  Under Vermont's
 saving statute, the amendment or repeal of an act shall not, except as pro-
 vided in subsection (c), "[a]ffect any violation of the act . . . amended
 or repealed, . . . prior to the effective date of the amendment or repeal."
 1 V.S.A. { 214(b)(3).  Where, however, an amendment reduces the punishment
 for an offense, Vermont law provides the following ameliorative amendment
 clause, which is an exception to the saving clause:
           If the penalty or punishment for any offense is
         reduced by the amendment of an act or statutory pro-
         vision, the same shall be imposed in accordance with
         the act or provision as amended unless imposed prior to
         the date of the amendment.
         1 V.S.A. { 214(c).
      Defendant argues that because Public Law No. 55 of 1991 reduced the
 penalty that could be imposed for his conduct, the new law should be
 applied retroactively under { 214(c).  We agree.  Section 214(c) applies
 where "the penalty or punishment for any offense is reduced."  1 V.S.A. {
 214(c).  Under the prior law, defendant's conduct constituted an offense
 carrying a penalty for the first offense of a fine of not more than $500 or
 imprisonment of not more than thirty days or both and ten points against his
 driving license.  23 V.S.A. { 674(a)(1)(prior to the 1991 amendment).  Under
 the new law, this same conduct carries a reduced penalty of a maximum fine
 of $175 and five points against his driving license.  23 V.S.A. {{ 676,
 2302(c), 2502(a)(4)(C).  Thus, { 214(c) applies.
      The State argues that the new legislation repealed the criminal
 offense of DLS after the suspension period has expired and prior to
 reinstatement of the license, and, therefore, { 214(c) regarding amendment
 of statutes does not apply.  To support its argument, the State compares the
 language of the prior { 674, which criminalized defendant's conduct, to the
 new { 674, which does not include defendant's conduct as an offense.  The
 new { 676, however, classifies defendant's conduct as a civil violation and
 provides for civil penalties.  Taken as a whole, the 1991 amendment cannot
 be said to have removed all liability for defendant's conduct.
      The State emphasizes the Legislature's choice in the numbering of the
 new laws and contends that the new laws effected a repeal of the prior {
 674.  As we have noted in the past, mere renumbering of a law does not
 indicate a repeal of the prior law; rather, the substance of the prior and
 new laws must be examined to determine whether the new scheme is essentially
 an amendment of the existing scheme.  See Myott v. Myott, 149 Vt. 573, 576,