Case Title: State v. Yalon

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

No. 27290

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

JOSELITO YALON, Defendant~Appellant.

 

ME SEIaY LI day so02

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT couRT |
(FC-CR. NO. 05-1-0082)

‘SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
7 Acoba, and Duffy JJ.)

‘Levinson, Nakayal

  

(By: Moon, C.J.,
Defendant/appellant Joselito Yalon appeals fron the

Family Court of the Second Circuit's May 3, 2005 “Judgment;
Guilty Conviction and Sentence; Notice of Entry” and its May 5,

2005 “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Denying Expedited
Sentencing." Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court

erred in concluding that the presumption in favor of imposing

expedited sentencing pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statues (HRS)

§ 106-606.3(10) (Supp. 2005)* was rebutted: (2) Findings of Fact

 

* the Honorable shackley F. Raffetto presided over this matter. The
Honorable Reinette W. Cooper presided by special assignment over the waiver of

Inalctment/preliminazy hearing, and entry of plea.

HRS § 106-€06.3(10) provides

 

There shall be # rebuttable presumption in favor of the
court inposing a sentence in accordance with this section when @
Gefendart queiities for the expedites sentencing program, anc
Written notice of "no objection” is issued by the presecuting
Sothority. The court shall provide written findings of fact.
Ntting forth specific reasons Justifying Imposition of @ sentence

that ie not in accordance with this section.

 

 

aa
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(FOFs) numbers 1 through 4 are factors that “have already been

considered by the legislature because they are present in most,

 

Af not all, intra-familial sexual assault and incest cases(,]”
and thus, they do not constitute sufficient justification to
rebut the presumption of the expedited sentencing program; (3)
FOF number $ is clearly erroneous because “as a matter of course,
compliance with voluntary, pre-sentence, sex-offender treatment
by and through a polygraph test is never available to anyone
being considered for expedited sentencing”; and (4) the Answering
Brief of the State of Hawai'i (hereinafter, the prosecution]
should be stricken because the prosecution breached the plea
agreement .?

upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to

 

> yalon raises six additional issues in his reply brief, to wit, that
‘the trial court, the Honorable Resnette W. Cooper presiding by special’
assignment, erred when it? (1) refused to bing itself to the parties’ plea
Sgreenent; (2) refused to schedule Yalon’s sentencing proceeding before the
Same court that accepted his plea; and the trial court, the Honorable shackley
Raffetto presicing, exred when it: (1) rejected the option of expedited
Sentencing before the sentencing proceeding hed occurred), (2) relied on the
Presentence report that had omitted expedited sentencing 2s one of che
Sentencing optionss (3) initially refused to approve the parties’ stipulation
that Yalen qualified for the expedited sentencing program; and (4) denied
Yalon any meaningfsl opportunity to respond to the facts relied upon by the
Court. These assertions are belng raised for the first time in Yelon's reply
brief, andwere not included in the statenent of questions on appeal set forth
in his opening brief. As such, having found no plain errer, these issues are
vaived.  savai't Rules of Appellate Procedure (SRAP) Rule 26(b) (4) ("Points
hot prévented in accsedance with thie section will be disregarded.”) and HRAP
Rule 28. (5) (7)

 

 

 

   

 

 

   

   
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the arguments advocated and the issues raised, we hold as
follows:

(2) The plain meaning of HRS § 706-606.3(10) gives the

 

court discretion to impose a sentence that is not in
accordance with the expedited sentencing program
notwithstanding the defendant's fulfillment of the
requirements of the statute and the prosecution’ s
notice of “no objection.” See State v. Solomon, 107
Hawai" 117, 126, 111 P.3d 12, 21 (2005) (“the
applicable standard of review for sentencing or
resentencing matters is whether the court committed
plain and manifest abuse of discretion in its
decision.” (Citations omitted.))+ Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Gepava, 103 Hawai'i 142, 145, 80 P.3d 321,
324 (2003) ("When construing a statute, our foremost
obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained
primarily from the language contained in the statute
itself.” (Quoting Tkover v. Adams, 102 Hawai'i 399,
409, 77 P.3d 83, 93 (2003).))7

(2) The trial court’s finding that Yalon’s compliance could
not be verified is not clearly erroneous,

notwithstanding testimony that compliance with
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voluntary, pre-sentence, sex-offender treatment by and
through a polygraph test is never available to anyone
being considered for expedited sentencing. See
Taylor-Rice v, State, 91 Hawai'i 60, 69, 979 P.2d 1086,
1095 (1999) (stating that findings of facts shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous); LeMay v._
Leander, 92 Hawai'i 614, 626, 994 P.2d 546, S58 (2000)
("This court has long observed that it is within the
province of the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and
to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and this
court will refrain from interfering in those
determinations.” (Citation omitted.));

(3) Given the trial court’s consideration of the witnesses
at the hearing, the nature and extent of the crime, and
the consequences of the crime on the victim, as well as

the factors set forth in HRS § 706-606 (1993),* the

 

+ Rs § 706-606, titled “Factors to be considered in inposing 2

sentence,” provides

The court, in determining the particular sentence te

bbe Anposed, shall consider:

(1) "The sature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant?

(2) The sees for the sentence inposes:

 

(ah 3
rs me and te provide ase
ssnishnent for the offen:
(b)  To-aftord adequate deterrence to criminal
conducts
(c) To protect the public from further crines of the

Setenaant; and
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see

“

court did not clearly exceed the bounds of reason or
disregard rules or principles of law or practice to the
substantial detriment of Yalon in concluding that the
presumption in favor of expedited sentencing was
rebutted. See Solomon, 107 Hawai'i at 126, 111 P.3d at
21 (*{To constitute an abuse it must appear that the
court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or
disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to
the substantial detriment of @ party litigant.”
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.})7
‘The prosecution's Answering Brief need not be stricken
inasmuch as the prosecution only agreed that Yalon was
eligible for the expedited sentencing program, and that
the prosecution had no objection to Yalon being
considered for such program. The acreenent did not
provide that, if the court rejected such agreement, the
prosecution had to advocate on Yalon’s behalf or remain

silent on appeal. Therefore,

(a) To provide the defendant with needed educational
Or vocational training, medical cere, or other
Correctional treatment in the most effective

 

(3) The kinds of sentences available: and
(2) The need to avoid umarranted sentence dispariti

   

Gnong defendants ith similar records who have bs
found guilty of similar conduct

 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the trial court’s May 3, 2005
judgment and sentence is affirmed,
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, April 17, 2006.

on the briefs:

Hayden Aluli and

Mini Desjardins .

for defendant-appellant See HSbrnsom

Joselito Yalon

Peter A. Hanano, Peseta ON eaeey ane

Deputy Prosecuting

Mere raaays