Case Title: Floyd v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore

Citation: 

Docket Number: 35/18

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Joan Floyd, et al. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, No. 35, September Term, 2018 
 
COMPREHENSIVE REZONING – TAXPAYER STANDING – SPECIAL 
INTEREST REQUIREMENT – NEXUS – Court of Appeals held that trial court 
properly granted motion to dismiss because plaintiffs, Baltimore City taxpayers, failed to 
allege facts sufficient to establish taxpayer standing to maintain challenge to 
comprehensive rezoning and zoning map.  Court held that plaintiffs failed to show special 
interest in subject matter of case distinct from that of general public by failing to show that 
allegedly illegal or ultra vires acts may reasonably result in pecuniary loss or increase in 
taxes.  Court determined that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate nexus between any alleged 
potential pecuniary loss and challenged act, i.e., connection between allegedly illegal or 
ultra vires act and harm caused to taxpayer.  Court also determined plaintiffs failed to seek 
remedy that, if granted, would alleviate any alleged tax burden or pecuniary loss that would 
result if zoning map remains in place.   
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 35 
 
September Term, 2018 
______________________________________ 
 
JOAN FLOYD, ET AL. 
 
v. 
 
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF 
BALTIMORE 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Adkins, Sally D. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
Barbera, C.J., McDonald and Adkins, JJ., 
concur. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: April 1, 2019 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-17-003021 
Argued: November 30, 2018  
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2019-04-01 14:32-04:00
 
 
This case concerns taxpayer standing, and, specifically, whether certain individuals 
satisfied the requirements of taxpayer standing to maintain a challenge against 
comprehensive rezoning ordinances and a new zoning map enacted in Baltimore City.  
Recently, in Anne Arundel Cty. v. Bell, 442 Md. 539, 576-77, 113 A.3d 639, 661-62 
(2015), we explained that taxpayer standing is a “common law standing doctrine [that] 
permits taxpayers to seek the aid of courts, exercising equity powers, to enjoin illegal and 
ultra vires[1] acts of public officials where those acts are reasonably likely to result in 
pecuniary loss to the taxpayer” or an increase in taxes.  (Cleaned up).  Under the taxpayer 
standing doctrine, among other things, a “complainant must have a special interest in the 
subject[ ]matter of the suit distinct from that of the general public.”  Id. at 576, 113 A.3d 
at 661 (cleaned up).  The “special interest” requirement is satisfied where a complainant 
alleges “both 1) an action by a municipal corporation or public official that is illegal or 
ultra vires, and 2) that the action may injuriously affect the taxpayer’s property, meaning 
that it reasonably may result in a pecuniary loss to the taxpayer or an increase in taxes.”  
Id. at 577, 113 A.3d at 662 (cleaned up).  Importantly, “there must be a ‘nexus’ between 
the showing of potential pecuniary damage and the challenged act.”  Id. at 579, 113 A.3d 
at 663 (citation omitted).  Indeed, “[t]here must be [] a connection between the alleged[ly] 
illegal or ultra vires act, the harm caused to the taxpayer, and the potential for the remedy 
to alleviate the harm incurred.”  Id. at 579, 113 A.3d at 663 (citation omitted).  And, “th[e] 
                                              
1“Ultra vires” means “[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or 
granted by a corporate charter or by law[.]”  Ultra vires, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014). 
- 2 - 
 
nexus must be true not only for the complainant, but also [for] all similarly situated 
taxpayers.”  Id. at 579, 113 A.3d at 663 (citation omitted).  
Here, Joan Floyd, Paul Robinson, and Deborah Tempera (together, “Petitioners”), 
Baltimore City taxpayers, filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City a complaint for 
declaratory judgment against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (“Respondent”), 
challenging a new comprehensive rezoning and a new zoning map, as enacted through two 
ordinances.  Respondent filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, alleging 
that Petitioners lacked the requisite taxpayer standing to maintain their case.  Following a 
hearing, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that Petitioners failed to 
allege a specific harm unique to them or their property and that Petitioners lacked taxpayer 
standing.  Petitioners filed a notice of appeal, and while this case was pending in the Court 
of Special Appeals, they filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari.  Before the 
Court of Special Appeals heard oral argument or issued an opinion, we granted the petition.  
See Floyd v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 460 Md. 494, 190 A.3d 1037 (2018). 
Against this backdrop, we decide whether the circuit court properly determined that 
Petitioners failed to establish the requisite taxpayer standing to proceed with this case, and, 
in turn, whether the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss.  We hold that the 
circuit court correctly granted the motion to dismiss because Petitioners failed to allege 
facts sufficient to establish taxpayer standing to maintain a challenge to the comprehensive 
rezoning and zoning map.  We conclude that Petitioners failed to show a special interest in 
the subject matter of this case distinct from that of the general public by failing to 
sufficiently allege illegal or ultra vires acts by Respondent that may result in a pecuniary 
- 3 - 
 
loss or an increase in taxes.  Moreover, we determine that Petitioners failed to demonstrate 
a nexus between any alleged potential pecuniary harm and the challenged act, i.e., a 
connection between the allegedly illegal or ultra vires act and the harm caused to the 
taxpayer.  Petitioners also failed to seek a remedy that, if granted, would alleviate any 
alleged tax burden or pecuniary loss.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
On October 22, 2012, City Council Bill 12-0152, also known as “TransForm 
Baltimore,” was introduced, and assigned to the Council’s Land Use and Transportation 
Committee (“the Committee”).  Bill 12-0152 involved comprehensive rezoning in 
Baltimore City.2  Over the next several years, the Committee held a public hearing on Bill 
12-0152 that was recessed and reconvened numerous times.  On October 20, 2016, the 
Committee voted on a Committee Report, in which the Committee recommended that the 
Council consider Bill 12-0152 favorably with amendments.  On October 24, 2016, the 
Council held a meeting and voted favorably on Bill 12-0152 with amendments.  On 
December 5, 2016, the Council voted to pass Bill 12-0152, the Mayor signed it, and it was 
enacted as Ordinance 16-581.  The Mayor and the Council President also signed the 
accompanying Zoning Map, which was dated October 24, 2016.  Ordinance 16-581 was to 
take effect on June 5, 2017.  As of the date it was enacted, Ordinance 16-581 stated, in 
relevant part, that it was “ORDAINED[ t]hat the Zoning Map dated October 22, 2012[,] 
and accompanying this Ordinance is enacted as a part of new City Code Article 32 – 
                                              
2According to Respondent, Baltimore City had not enacted a new, modernized 
zoning code and zoning map since 1971.   
- 4 - 
 
Zoning.”   
After Ordinance 16-581 was enacted, typographical errors in the Ordinance were 
noticed, and, on February 27, 2017, City Council Bill 17-0021 was introduced.  Bill 17-
0021 was entitled “Baltimore City Zoning Code – Legalization – Corrections[,]” and 
included the following purpose paragraph: 
FOR the purpose of legalizing new City Code Article 32 . . . as enacted by 
Ordinance 16-581 . . . and edited, codified, and published by the Baltimore 
City Department of Legislative Reference; further amending new Article 32 
to correct various technical errors, omissions, and inconsistencies and to 
correct, clarify, and conform various references and language; providing for 
a special effective date; and generally relating to the zoning and development 
laws of the City of Baltimore.   
 
On April 5, 2017, the Committee held a public hearing on Bill 17-0021, and voted 
favorably on the bill with amendments.  On April 24, 2017, the Council held a meeting, 
and approved amendments to Bill 17-0021.  One of the amendments that was adopted was 
the inclusion of the following language (with additions shown by capitalization, and 
deletions shown by brackets): 
That the Zoning Map dated [October 22, 2012] OCTOBER 24, 2016, and 
accompanying this Ordinance, AS THAT MAP WAS SIGNED AND 
APPROVED BY THE MAYOR AND CO-SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE CITY COUNCIL, BOTH UNDER DATE OF DECEMBER 5, 
2016, is enacted as part of new City Code Article 32 – Zoning. 
 
In other words, from the amended language, it appeared that reference to the October 22, 
2012 Zoning Map, as opposed to the October 24, 2016 Zoning Map, was a typographical 
error or inadvertent discrepancy.  On May 8, 2017, the Council voted to pass Bill 17-0021.  
On May 16, 2017, the Mayor signed Bill 17-0021, which was enacted as Ordinance 17-
015.  Ordinance 17-015’s effective date was the same as Ordinance 16-581’s, i.e., June 5, 
- 5 - 
 
2017.   
Ten days later, on May 26, 2017, Petitioners filed in the circuit court a complaint 
for declaratory judgment against Respondent, challenging the comprehensive rezoning, 
adopted and enacted through Bill 12-0152/Ordinance 16-581 and Bill 17-0021/Ordinance 
17-015, as ultra vires or illegal.  In the complaint, Petitioners alleged that they were 
Baltimore City taxpayers who were bringing the “action on behalf of all Baltimore City 
taxpayers pursuant to the principle of taxpayer standing as set forth in” Bell, 442 Md. 539, 
113 A.3d 639.  And, according to Petitioners, the comprehensive rezoning would 
“injuriously affect the property of Baltimore City taxpayers, who [would] suffer pecuniary 
losses or increased taxes as a result.”  In the complaint, among other things, Petitioners 
alleged that various required notices were not mailed or published.   
In the complaint, Petitioners also alleged the following in paragraphs thirty-six 
through fifty:   
36.  
The approval and enactment of the “October 22, 2012” Zoning Map 
as part of Bill 12-0152/Ordinance 16-581 was ultra vires and illegal. 
 
37.  
The “October 24, 2016” Zoning Map signed by the Mayor and City 
Council President on December 5, 2016 had not been adopted by the [] 
Council. 
 
38.  
The notice, hearing, and other due process requirements of the Land 
Use Article and Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance were violated, both in 
letter and in spirit, in the processing, approval[,] and enactment of new 
Baltimore City Zoning Maps as part of Bill 12-0152/Ordinance 16-581 and 
Bill 17-0021/Ordinance 17-015. 
 
39.  
The ultra vires or illegal imposition of a new Zoning Map on 
Baltimore City will cause Baltimore City taxpayers to suffer pecuniary losses 
or tax increases. 
 
- 6 - 
 
40.  
A Zoning Map adopted by ultra vires or illegal means lacks the 
presumption of validity afforded in Maryland to lawful comprehensive 
rezonings. 
 
41.  
With no statute of limitations for claiming error in a comprehensive 
rezoning, an unlawfully adopted Zoning Map will bring prolonged instability 
to Baltimore City. 
 
42.  
The presumption of validity will effectively be replaced by the 
presumption of error, and rezoning applications based on allegations of 
mistake in the comprehensive rezoning will be the norm rather than the 
exception. 
 
43.  
A Zoning Map adopted by ultra vires or illegal means will be 
challengeable whenever a permit or zoning authorization is applied for or 
issued. 
 
44.  
A Zoning Map adopted by ultra vires or illegal means may 
overburden the taxpayer-funded resources of City agencies, boards[,] and 
commissions that review and issue permits and zoning authorizations. 
 
45.  
A Zoning Map adopted by ultra vires or illegal means will place extra 
burdens on the taxpayer-funded resources of the City Law Department, 
which routinely defends decisions made by City agencies, boards[,] and 
commissions. 
 
46.  
The efforts by private entities and [Respondent] to respond to or 
correct errors and allegations of mistake will be costly to Baltimore City 
taxpayers. 
 
47.  
Baltimore City real property will be plagued by uncertainty over 
regulations as to the potential construction and use of buildings and 
properties. 
 
48.  
A Zoning Map adopted by ultra vires or illegal means may cause the 
assessed value or market value of real property to erroneously increase or 
decrease. 
 
49.  
Property tax credits for the improvement of property may be 
erroneously granted or denied. 
 
50.  
Bonds may be issued to support the development of unlawfully 
rezoned property.   
- 7 - 
 
 
In the complaint, Petitioners sought declaratory judgment that Respondent had 
failed to mail and publish certain notices; that Bill 17-0021/Ordinance 17-015 was “null 
and void as to its adoption and enactment of a Baltimore City Zoning Map”; that the 
adoption and enactment of the “Zoning Maps was ultra vires or illegal, and [thus] null and 
void”; and that the Zoning Maps were “of no effect.”   
On May 26, 2017, the same day that the complaint was filed, Petitioners filed a 
motion for summary judgment and accompanying memorandum in support,3  in which they 
argued: 
The procedures by which [Respondent] adopted and enacted new 
Baltimore City Zoning Maps, first in December of 2016 and later in May of 
2017, are not found in the Land Use Article and Baltimore City Zoning 
Ordinance.  There were multiple[] egregious failures: failure to provide 
Baltimore City property owners with notice of changes proposed to the 
zoning or their properties; failure to conduct all required hearings; failure to 
provide required hearing notice, both mailed and advertised; and[,] in the 
case of the most recent action, failure to hold Bill 17-0021 over for one 
regular City Council meeting before giving final approval to the new Zoning 
Map.  That Zoning Map, scheduled to become effective on June 5, 2017, was 
adopted and enacted by ultra vires and illegal means and must not become 
the new Baltimore City Zoning Map.   
 
A few days later, on May 31, 2017, Petitioners filed a motion for a temporary 
restraining order, seeking to block the Zoning Map from going into effect on June 5, 2017.  
On June 2, 2017, Respondent filed an opposition to the motion.  On the same date, the 
circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order.  During 
                                              
3Petitioners also filed a motion for interlocutory injunctive relief.  Respondent filed 
an opposition to the motion.  Because the circuit court later granted Respondent’s motion 
to dismiss, it did not rule on the motion for interlocutory injunctive relief.   
- 8 - 
 
the hearing, Petitioners’ counsel argued that Petitioners were bringing this case “as a 
taxpayer suit, . . . [b]ased on the fact that the taxpayers of the City of Baltimore will be 
taxed to the limit for challenges that will occur” to the Zoning Map.  Petitioners’ counsel 
contended that “irreparable harm” would occur to all Baltimore City taxpayers, in “that 
permits will be issued under the new illegal zoning map . . . [t]hat will then cause 
challenges[.]”  When asked to clarify what the irreparable harm would be, Petitioners’ 
counsel asserted: “Irreparable harm is the City will be forced to defend [] multiple 
violations of issuing a permit based on an illegal map.”  Petitioners’ counsel contended that 
the harm to Baltimore City taxpayers would be “higher [cost]s, more money spent[,]” and 
that, “[b]ecause it’s a taxpayer’s suit in which monies will be expended by the City[,] that 
will ultimately be bo[]rne by the taxpayer.”   
The circuit court heard argument from Respondent’s counsel and brief rebuttal 
argument from Petitioners’ counsel.  At the conclusion of the hearing, ruling orally from 
the bench, the circuit court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order.  On the 
same day, the circuit court issued an order denying the motion for a temporary restraining 
order, stating, in relevant part: 
[Petitioner]s have not shown by any “specific facts” in their motion, affidavit, 
and memorandum that any harm will result.  They assert that taxpayers 
“may” suffer a pecuniary loss.  This is insufficient for a motion for such 
extraordinary relief.  The list of potential burdens and uncertainty does not 
bolster [Petitioner]s’ position.  Without a defined harm, [Petitioner]s cannot 
show a likelihood of success on the merits.   
 
On June 5, 2017, the new Zoning Code and Map became effective.  
On June 29, 2017, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary 
- 9 - 
 
judgment and opposition to Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment, and an 
accompanying memorandum of law.  Respondent argued that Petitioners failed to establish 
taxpayer standing for three reasons: (1) Petitioners failed to “allege a special interest in the 
subject[ ]matter of the suit distinct from that of the general public”; (2) the allegedly illegal 
and ultra vires acts had “no reasonable relationship to the likelihood of a potential tax 
increase”; and (3) Petitioners failed to establish a nexus between the potential pecuniary 
damage and the challenged act.  (Cleaned up).  As to the failure to allege a special interest, 
Respondent asserted that Petitioners alleged a harm that was applicable to the general 
public, and was not specific to them.  Respondent maintained that taxes in Baltimore City 
were not being raised as a result of the comprehensive rezoning, and zoning classifications 
in the ordinances and accompanying Zoning Map had no relationship to taxes, as a 
“property taxpayer’s tax rate is not based or premised upon his or her zoning 
classification[.]”  And, as to the nexus requirement, Respondent contended that Petitioners 
were not seeking a remedy that, if granted, would alleviate an impact on taxes as alleged.   
On July 19, 2017, Petitioners filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and/or for 
summary judgment.  In pertinent part, Petitioners contended that they had taxpayer 
standing, and that the relief they requested—voiding of the Zoning Maps—was an 
available remedy.  Petitioners argued that they had established taxpayer standing under 
Bell, 442 Md. 539, 113 A.3d 639, and that “[a]dministration of an unlawfully updated 
Zoning Map [would] be costly to the taxpayers.”  Petitioners asserted that, in the complaint, 
they had alleged “numerous negative impacts on the taxpayers if” the “unlawfully adopted 
Zoning Map” were utilized, and that the allegations of the complaint demonstrated the 
- 10 - 
 
necessary “nexus between the taxpayers and an unlawfully adopted Zoning Map[.]”  
(Cleaned up).   
On August 7, 2017, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss.  
During the hearing, Petitioners’ counsel contended that Petitioners had taxpayer standing, 
and argued that the allegations of the complaint demonstrated the effects on taxpayers.  
And, Petitioners’ counsel reiterated that, if the Zoning Map and ordinances stood as is, 
there would “be substantial litigation against the City or about the City’s action, and that 
is where the taxpayers will end up paying more taxes to support . . . an expanding law 
department[.]”  At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court held the matter sub curia.   
One week later, on August 14, 2017, the circuit court issued an order granting the 
motion to dismiss, stating, in relevant part: 
FOUND that [Petitioner]s’ suit is a challenge to a purely legislative 
action of the [] Council, and it is further 
 
FOUND that [Petitioner]s do not allege a specific harm [that] is 
unique to them or their property as described in [] Bell, 442 Md. 539[, 113 
A.3d 639], and it is further 
 
ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, as 
[Petitioner]s lack standing to maintain this taxpayer’s challenge[.]   
  
(Bolding and capitalization in original). 
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal.  On June 15, 2018, while this case was pending 
in the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioners filed in this Court a petition for a writ of 
certiorari, raising the following issue: 
Did Petitioners sufficiently plead taxpayer standing to allow their challenge 
to the enactment of new comprehensive zoning maps to be adjudicated, and 
did the [c]ircuit [c]ourt err when it granted the Motion to Dismiss for lack of 
- 11 - 
 
taxpayer standing?   
 
On August 30, 2018, before the Court of Special Appeals heard oral argument or issued an 
opinion, this Court granted the petition.  See Floyd, 460 Md. 494, 190 A.3d 1037. 
DISCUSSION 
The Parties’ Contentions 
Petitioners contend that they sufficiently pled taxpayer standing to permit a 
challenge to the enactment of the new Zoning Maps to go forward on the merits, and that, 
as such, the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of 
taxpayer standing.  Petitioners argue that the circuit court’s grant of the motion to dismiss 
essentially constituted a determination that there could never be taxpayer standing 
sufficient to challenge comprehensive rezoning in Baltimore City.  Petitioners assert that, 
in the complaint, they alleged numerous potential effects that unlawful comprehensive 
rezoning could have on Baltimore City taxpayers.  Petitioners maintain that, in the 
complaint, as to potential harm, they alleged, among other things, that “[t]he ultra vires or 
illegal imposition of a new Zoning Map . . . will cause Baltimore City taxpayers to suffer 
pecuniary losses or tax increases[,]” and that “[t]he efforts by private entities and 
[Respondent] to respond to or correct errors and allegations of mistake will be costly to 
Baltimore City taxpayers.”    
Respondent counters that the circuit court properly granted the motion to dismiss on 
the ground that Petitioners had failed to establish taxpayer standing.  Respondent contends 
that Petitioners failed to adequately demonstrate a special interest distinct from that of the 
general public, and that the alleged harm, i.e., the allegedly illegal or ultra vires act, has no 
- 12 - 
 
reasonable relationship to taxes in Baltimore City.  Respondent argues that taxpayer 
standing is usually satisfied in cases where taxpayers challenge a government action in the 
form of “a large[-]scale public expenditure, capital investment, or transaction for which the 
government could reasonably be expected to raise taxes to effectuate.”  Respondent asserts 
that, by contrast, in this case, the bills at issue were not spending or tax bills, taxes are not 
being raised as a result of the enactment of the ordinances, and zoning classifications and 
the Zoning Map have no relationship to taxes.  Respondent maintains that Petitioners did 
not clearly show potential pecuniary loss or a reasonable relationship to government 
expenditure or taxation.  Respondent contends that Petitioners failed to show the required 
nexus for taxpayer standing and argues that there is no meaningful connection between the 
specific allegedly illegal or ultra vires acts and the harms claimed.   
Respondent argues that Petitioners fail to seek a remedy that, if granted, would 
alleviate the tax burden they allege will result if the Zoning Map is allowed to remain in 
place.  Respondent asserts that Petitioners, in actuality, allege that Baltimore City will be 
forced to expend funds to correct errors allegedly made under the Zoning Map and to enact 
new legislation to replace the Zoning Map.  Respondent maintains that the remedy 
sought—nullification of the new Zoning Map, but not of the new Zoning Code—would 
create chaos because Baltimore City would be governed by a Zoning Code that is designed 
for a Zoning Map that would no longer be valid, and the remedy does not alleviate any 
alleged pecuniary loss or increase in taxes.   
As a final matter, Respondent contends that concluding that taxpayer standing exists 
in this case would run counter to public policy as recognized in Bell, 442 Md. 539, 113 
- 13 - 
 
A.3d 639, in which this Court eliminated property owner standing as a basis to maintain a 
challenge to comprehensive rezoning.  According to Respondent, permitting Petitioners to 
proceed under their “theory of taxpayer standing would be no different than allowing 
property owner standing to exist in the comprehensive rezoning context because every 
taxpayer, like every property owner, could bring such a challenge.”  (Emphasis omitted).   
In a reply brief, Petitioners contend that applying taxpayer standing to a 
comprehensive rezoning challenge as in this case does not conflict with or undermine the 
doctrine of taxpayer standing.   
Standard of Review 
In State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 496-97, 92 A.3d 
400, 426-27 (2014), this Court explained that we review without deference a trial court’s 
grant of a motion to dismiss, stating:  
Considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, a court must assume the truth of, and view in a 
light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and 
allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the allegations 
and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, 
i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be 
granted.  Consideration of the universe of “facts” pertinent to the court’s 
analysis of the motion are limited generally to the four corners of the 
complaint and its incorporated supporting exhibits, if any.  The well-pleaded 
facts setting forth the cause of action must be pleaded with sufficient 
specificity; bald assertions and conclusory statements by the pleader will not 
suffice.  Upon appellate review, the trial court’s decision to grant such a 
motion is analyzed to determine whether the court was legally correct. 
 
(Citation omitted).  Similarly, where, in considering a motion to dismiss, a trial court 
considers materials, such as affidavits, outside of the complaint (i.e., the complaint and 
- 14 - 
 
documents attached thereto), we treat the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss as a 
grant of summary judgment, and we review the matter without deference for legal 
correctness.  See Bell, 442 Md. at 552, 113 A.3d at 647. 
Taxpayer Standing 
In Maryland, “[c]hallengers to comprehensive zoning ordinances . . . are required 
to satisfy the requirements of taxpayer standing, rather than property owner standing[,]” to 
maintain their actions.  Bell, 442 Md. at 575, 113 A.3d at 661.4  As we have stated: 
“[P]laintiffs wishing to challenge in Maryland courts the legislative process and final action 
adopting a comprehensive zoning are required to demonstrate taxpayer standing—the 
standing doctrine applicable to judicial challenges to legislative actions.”  Anne Arundel 
Cty. v. Harwood Civic Ass’n, Inc., 442 Md. 595, 598, 113 A.3d 672, 674 (2015) (citation 
omitted).   Taxpayer standing is a “common law standing doctrine [that] permits taxpayers 
to seek the aid of courts, exercising equity powers, to enjoin illegal and ultra vires acts of 
public officials where those acts are reasonably likely to result in pecuniary loss to the 
taxpayer.”  Bell, 442 Md. at 576, 113 A.3d at 661 (cleaned up).  Under the doctrine of 
taxpayer standing, “[t]he taxpayer does not assert a private cause of action but, instead, that 
                                              
4In Bell, 442 Md. at 558, 113 A.3d at 650, we explained that property owner 
standing generally exists where “an adjoining, confronting[,] or nearby property owner is 
deemed, prima facie, to be specially damaged and, therefore, a person aggrieved[,]” or 
where “a person whose property is far removed from the subject property . . . meets the 
burden of alleging and proving that his [or her] personal or property rights are specially 
and adversely affected.”  (Cleaned up).  And, in Bell, id. at 574-75, 113 A.3d at 660, we 
concluded that “[e]xtending the doctrine of property owner standing to challenges to the 
legislative process of adopting comprehensive zoning ordinances [would be] inconsistent 
with our prior cases[.]”  
- 15 - 
 
of his [or her] government.  Therefore, a taxpayers’ suit is essentially a derivative 
proceeding akin to a corporate shareholders’ suit.”  State Ctr., 438 Md. at 541, 92 A.3d at 
543 (cleaned up).  The doctrine of taxpayer standing “exists to ensure that government acts 
within the bounds of the law[,]” and to “protect [] citizen[s] from the consequence of [] 
unauthorized or illegal acts.”  Bell, 442 Md. at 576, 113 A.3d at 661 (cleaned up).  
Importantly, however, the doctrine of taxpayer standing does not “provide unfettered 
access to the courts to citizens unhappy with all actions taken by [S]tate or local governing 
bodies[.]”  Id. at 576, 113 A.3d at 661. 
As an initial matter, a complainant must demonstrate that he, she, or it is eligible 
under the taxpayer standing doctrine; specifically, “[t]o establish eligibility to maintain a 
suit under the taxpayer standing doctrine, a complainant must allege two things: (1) that 
the complainant is a taxpayer[;] and (2) that the suit is brought, either expressly or 
implicitly, on behalf of all other taxpayers.”  Id. at 577, 113 A.3d at 662 (cleaned up).5  
After a complainant establishes eligibility to bring a suit, the complainant must, among 
other things, show “a special interest in the subject[ ]matter of the suit distinct from that of 
the general public.”  Bell, 442 Md. at 578, 576, 113 A.3d at 662, 661 (cleaned up).  The 
“special interest” requirement is satisfied where a complainant alleges “both 1) an action 
                                              
5In State Ctr., 438 Md. at 547, 92 A.3d at 457, we explained that, “[f]or purposes of 
[the] taxpayer standing doctrine, the conceptual basis of the doctrine is that the action is 
brought by complainants, as taxpayers and on behalf of all other similarly situated 
taxpayers.”  (Emphasis omitted).  Stated otherwise, under the doctrine of taxpayer standing, 
“a complainant’s standing rests upon the theoretical concept that the action is brought not 
as an individual action, but rather as a class action by a taxpayer on behalf of other similarly 
situated taxpayers.”  Id. at 547, 92 A.3d at 457. 
- 16 - 
 
by a municipal corporation or public official that is illegal or ultra vires, and 2) that the 
action may injuriously affect the taxpayer’s property, meaning that it reasonably may result 
in a pecuniary loss to the taxpayer or an increase in taxes.”  Id. at 577, 113 A.3d at 662 
(cleaned up).   
As to the first requirement—that the government’s action is “illegal or ultra 
vires”—we have observed that the requirement is “applied leniently and seems rather easy 
to meet[ as] the taxpayer need not be right ultimately in his, her, or its contention, so long 
as the allegation is advanced in good faith.”  Id. at 578, 113 A.3d at 662 (cleaned up).  The 
second requirement—that the taxpayer has suffered a “specific injury”—“has been 
interpreted repeatedly to require a showing that the action being challenged results in a 
pecuniary loss or an increase in taxes.”  Id. at 578, 113 A.3d at 662 (cleaned up).  “The 
harm alleged must be particularized and pecuniary, as opposed to harms to the general 
public (e.g., changes to the neighborhood, increased traffic, or increased noise), and caused 
potentially by the comprehensive rezoning.”  Cty. Council of Prince George’s Cty. v. 
Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. 490, 509 n.10, 120 A.3d 677, 688 n.10 (2015) (citing Bell, 442 
Md. at 578-79, 585, 113 A.3d at 662-63, 667).  That said, “[t]he facts alleged need not lead 
necessarily to the conclusion that taxes will increase; rather, the taxpayer must allege that 
he, she, or it will suffer pecuniary damage potentially.”  Bell, 442 Md. at 578, 113 A.3d at 
663 (citation omitted).   
Significantly, “there must be a ‘nexus’ between the showing of potential pecuniary 
damage and the challenged act.”  Id. at 579, 113 A.3d at 663 (citation omitted).  The 
“nexus” requirement has been “perhaps the most frequent stumbling block for 
- 17 - 
 
complainants claiming taxpayer standing.”  Id. at 579, 113 A.3d at 663 (cleaned up).  
Indeed, to demonstrate a nexus, “the taxpayer must be asserting a challenge and seeking a 
remedy that, if granted, would alleviate the tax burden on that individual and others; 
otherwise, standing does not exist.”  Id. at 579, 113 A.3d at 663 (citation omitted).  “There 
must be[,] therefore[,] a connection between the alleged[ly] illegal or ultra vires act, the 
harm caused to the taxpayer, and the potential for the remedy to alleviate the harm 
incurred.”  Id. at 579, 113 A.3d at 663 (citation omitted).  And, “th[e] nexus must be true 
not only for the complainant, but also [for] all similarly situated taxpayers.”  Id. at 579, 113 
A.3d at 663 (citation omitted). 
In Bell, id. at 579-80, 113 A.3d at 663-64, we observed that “taxpayer standing has 
been pled successfully in a number of cases pertaining to executive, administrative, or 
quasi-land use actions[,]” and “in cases challenging legislation generally.”  (Citations 
omitted).  We noted that “[c]hallenges to comprehensive rezoning ordinances are brought 
often by parties whose properties were rezoned, usually to categories less desirable by the 
owner or contract purchaser than enjoyed previously.”  Id. at 580, 113 A.3d at 664 
(citations omitted). 
In Boitnott v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 356 Md. 226, 228, 234, 738 A.2d 
881, 882 (1999), a case involving a challenge to the validity of a Baltimore City ordinance 
amending an urban renewal plan, this Court observed that the plaintiffs had successfully 
alleged taxpayer standing.  In that case, several taxpayers filed a complaint for declaratory 
relief and a motion for an interlocutory injunction against Respondent, seeking to invalidate 
the ordinance.  See id. at 232, 738 A.2d at 884.  The trial court determined that the 
- 18 - 
 
ordinance was valid, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  See id. at 233-34, 738 
A.2d at 885.  The plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the ordinance 
was invalid for several reasons, including that property could not be changed from private 
to public ownership after the adoption of an urban renewal plan, and that a zoning 
ordinance could not be incorporated by reference into an urban renewal plan.  See id. at 
234-35, 738 A.2d at 885-86.  In this Court, before addressing the merits of the case, we 
briefly addressed the standing of the plaintiffs, and observed that the plaintiffs had 
sufficiently alleged taxpayer standing in the complaint.  See id. at 234, 738 A.2d at 885.  
Although standing was not at issue before this Court because the trial court had not 
dismissed Boitnott for lack of standing, see id. at 233 n.7, 738 A.2d at 885 n.7, we stated: 
“The allegation by the [plaintiff]s that the City has expended [t]wenty million dollars in 
developing Inner Harbor East prior to the present litigation is [a] sufficient allegation of 
potential pecuniary damage by way of [a] tax increase to withstand a standing challenge.”  
Id. at 234, 738 A.2d at 885. 
In Inlet Assocs. v. Assateague House Condo. Ass’n, 313 Md. 413, 417, 441, 545 
A.2d 1296, 1298, 1310 (1988)—“a taxpayers’ action to enjoin, and conversely a real estate 
developer’s suit to compel, the conveyance of a municipality’s public right-of-way in part 
of a dedicated street, together with riparian rights[6] purported to accrue as a result of the 
municipality’s interest in the dedicated street”—this Court agreed with the trial court that 
                                              
6A “riparian right” is “[t]he right of a landowner whose property borders on a body 
of water or watercourse. [] Such a landowner traditionally has the right to make reasonable 
use of the water.”  Riparian right, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
- 19 - 
 
the plaintiffs had taxpayer standing.  In that case, various taxpayers and property owners 
sued Ocean City, its Mayor, and the City Council President, alleging that public property 
was being given to private persons without adequate consideration.  See Inlet Assocs., 313 
Md. at 422, 545 A.2d at 1300.  The real estate developer intervened as a defendant and 
contended that the plaintiffs lacked standing.  See id. at 423, 545 A.2d at 1301.  In relevant 
part, among other things, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs had standing.  See id. 
at 424, 545 A.2d at 1301.  The trial court “found that [the plaintiffs] were taxpayers and 
property owners in Ocean City, all but one of whom lived in close proximity to the project 
proposed by” the developer.  Id. at 440, 545 A.2d at 1310.  The trial court determined that 
the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that they suffered “a special pecuniary injury” that 
“flowed from the ultra vires action of the municipality, i.e., that the value of their properties 
may be adversely impacted by the [] proposal and that they had also suffered damage, 
having shown that their taxes might be increased as a result of the project.”  Id. at 440, 545 
A.2d at 1310.   
In this Court, the developer contended that the plaintiffs lacked standing because 
they failed to establish “that the proposed conveyances of municipal property caused them 
any special damage distinct in character from any injury sustained by members of the 
general public.”  Id. at 440, 545 A.2d at 1310.  And, the developer argued that the plaintiffs 
had failed to “show that the challenged action would increase their taxes or otherwise cause 
them any pecuniary loss.”  Id. at 440, 545 A.2d at 1310.  We observed that a “taxpayer 
plaintiff is not required to allege facts [that] necessarily lead to the conclusion that taxes 
will be increased; rather, the test is whether the taxpayer reasonably may sustain a 
- 20 - 
 
pecuniary loss or a tax increase—whether there has been a showing of potential pecuniary 
damage.”  Id. at 441, 545 A.2d at 1310 (cleaned up).  We “agree[d] with the trial [court] 
that the plaintiffs had standing[,]” explaining:  
It was alleged[,] and sufficient proof [was] adduced[,] that the [] unit owners 
looked directly upon [the developer]’s proposed project, including [a] 
restaurant.  There was some evidence that the municipality’s property 
interests were valued in excess of one million dollars[,] and[,] if it received 
fair value for it[, Ocean] City might reduce taxes or forego a tax increase in 
the future; and that there would be a loss of substantial revenue from the 
metered parking spaces on that part of [the s]treet[,] which was to be closed[,] 
and that this would have an adverse impact on [the] plaintiffs’ taxes.  There 
was also evidence that guests and invitees of the property owners now use 
that part of [the s]treet to be conveyed to [the developer] for parking[,] and 
that this usage enhances the value of their respective properties.  It was also 
alleged and shown that[,] as a 75-foot wide street, [the s]treet was of extreme 
value in itself; that, in particular, it provided public access to the [Sinepuxent 
B]ay, the loss of which would adversely affect the value and use of the 
plaintiffs’ properties; that the restaurant in particular would obstruct the view 
of the bay and lessen the value of the plaintiffs’ properties.  In these ways, 
the plaintiffs claimed that they would be specially harmed in a manner 
distinct from the general public[,] in that their properties would [] decrease[] 
in value, as found by the trial [court].  And, finally, the plaintiffs alleged 
that[,] as taxpayers[,] they would sustain a loss from the expenditure of City 
funds [that] would be necessary for the City to defend the legality of the 
proposed conveyances. 
 
Id. at 441-42, 545 A.2d at 1310-11.  We rejected the developer’s contention that the 
plaintiffs’ taxes would likely decrease, rather than increase, if the project were to proceed, 
stating that, “in determining a taxpayer’s pecuniary interest resulting from a[n allegedly] 
unlawful governmental act, the court will not weigh potential gains against potential losses 
and speculate on a net result.”  Id. at 442, 545 A.2d at 1311 (citation omitted).  We 
concluded that, based on the record, we could not say that the trial court had “erred in 
finding [] standing[.]”  Id. at 443, 545 A.2d at 1311. 
- 21 - 
 
In State Ctr., 438 Md. at 583, 92 A.3d at 479, this Court concluded that the plaintiffs 
had taxpayer standing.  State Ctr. concerned “a $1.5 billion, multi-phase redevelopment 
projected intended to replace aged and obsolete State office buildings with new facilities 
for State use and to revitalize an approximately 25-acre property owned by the State of 
Maryland in midtown Baltimore [], without burdening unduly the State’s capital budget.”  
Id. at 473, 92 A.3d at 413.  To that end, the State solicited and selected a master developer, 
and the master developer and State agencies executed various agreements concerning the 
project.  See id. at 473-74, 92 A.3d at 413.  Fifteen plaintiffs, all of whom were taxpayers 
of the State and owners of property in downtown Baltimore—“many with available office 
space for rent”—filed suit seeking an injunction to halt the project, and a declaratory 
judgment that the formative contracts for the project were void.  See id. at 474, 92 A.3d at 
413.  We considered whether the plaintiffs had either property owner standing or taxpayer 
standing.  See id. at 474, 92 A.3d at 413.7   
As to taxpayer standing, we stated, in relevant part, that the plaintiffs’ allegation 
that the State had violated applicable procurement laws by entering into formative contracts 
for the project through means other than a public competitive bidding process was “alone 
[] sufficient (for pleading purposes) to meet th[e] element of the requisite injury component 
of the taxpayer standing doctrine as to [the plaintiff]s for those challenges.”  State Ctr., 438 
Md. at 570, 92 A.3d at 471.  We also concluded that there was a nexus between the 
plaintiffs’ allegations of taxpayer harm and the allegedly illegal acts of public officials.  
                                              
7This Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have property owner standing.  See 
State Ctr., 438 Md. at 538, 92 A.3d at 451.  
- 22 - 
 
See id. at 577, 92 A.3d at 475.  We noted that the plaintiffs had alleged that: the project 
was expected to cost $1.5 billion; a State agency had assumed the obligation to design, 
finance, construct, operate, and maintain an underground garage for the project, and agreed 
to contribute up to $28 million in taxpayer funds toward the cost of the garage design and 
construction; and issuance of $33 million in bonds supported by taxpayer revenues to build 
the parking garage had been approved.  See id. at 577, 92 A.3d at 475.  Moreover, the 
plaintiffs had alleged that they would “uniquely bear the excessive costs” and increased 
taxes as a result of the State’s failure to use a competitive bidding process.  Id. at 579, 92 
A.2d at 476-77.  We determined that these “allegations [were] sufficient” to establish a 
nexus.  Id. at 580, 92 A.3d at 477.  Finally, we stated that, although a plaintiff must make 
“a clear showing that a monetary burden is alleged[,]” a taxpayer is “not required to prove 
an exact amount of pecuniary damage that he[,] she[, or it] will suffer.”  Id. at 580, 92 A.3d 
at 477.  As such, we determined that the plaintiffs had “pleaded sufficiently a loss of 
revenue from the public funds as contributed by them as taxpayers.”  Id. at 581, 92 A.3d at 
478.  This Court ultimately “conclude[d] that [the plaintiff]s pleaded [the] taxpayer 
standing doctrine sufficiently[.]”  Id. at 583, 92 A.3d at 479. 
In Citizens Planning and Housing Ass’n v. Cty. Exec. of Balt. Cty., 273 Md. 333, 
345, 329 A.2d 681, 687 (1974), this Court determined that plaintiffs had taxpayer standing.  
In that case, the plaintiffs—“a metropolitan-area civic organization, a group of 
neighborhood and area civic improvement associations, and several individuals alleging 
[that] they [were] residents, citizens, taxpayers[,] and property owners of Baltimore 
County”—alleged that the Baltimore County Executive and Baltimore County 
- 23 - 
 
Administrative Officer “initiated a reorganization of the Office of Planning and Zoning in 
violation of . . . the Baltimore County Charter, which confer[red]” such responsibility upon 
the Baltimore County Council.  Id. at 334-35, 329 A.2d at 682.  The plaintiffs alleged 
“special damages” in two ways: (1) the actions of the defendants would make the Office 
less efficient, resulting in an impairment of the property tax base, “therefore causing a 
prospective pecuniary loss incident to the increase in the amount of taxes the [p]laintiffs 
and other [] taxpayers [would] be constrained to pay”; and (2) “a charter[-]created 
mechanism to assure proper planning and zoning practices and processes within 
[Baltimore] County had been made less efficient and more costly[,] and [the plaintiffs’] 
property [stood] to depreciate in value[.]”  Id. at 335-36, 329 A.2d at 682-83.  In other 
words, the plaintiffs anticipated pecuniary loss and higher taxes as a result of the allegedly 
ultra vires and illegal actions of the defendants.  See id. at 337, 329 A.2d at 683.  We 
observed that “[t]here [was] considerable force in the argument . . . that[,] if the 
reorganization [was] unlawful, the expenditure of public funds to finance that program may 
thereby be open to question.”  Id. at 343, 329 A.2d at 686.  We further stated that “the 
waste of tax-derived monies that will have resulted from funding positions declared to be 
illegally created [w]as sufficient to confer standing.”  Id. at 343, 329 A.2d at 686.  
Moreover, we noted that it was “not illogical to expect that the county might incur some 
expense or loss, to the detriment of the taxpayers, including [plaintiff]s, in an effort to fend 
off the charges of illegality.  Such potential losses alone may be sufficient to establish 
standing.”  Id. at 343, 329 A.2d at 687 (citation omitted). 
Similarly, in other cases, this Court has concluded that taxpayer standing existed 
- 24 - 
 
where a local government had expended public funds or levied taxes.  For example, in 
James v. Anderson, 281 Md. 137, 139-40, 142, 377 A.2d 865, 866-67, 868 (1977), where 
an individual challenged a county executive’s expenditure of $5 million in bond proceeds 
for the construction of a new courthouse, this Court concluded that taxpayer standing 
existed, explaining: “The plaintiff challenges, as ultra vires, the actions of a County 
Executive, and points to a claimed decrease in efficiency [that] would result from the 
alleged ultra vires acts. . . . [T]his is sufficient for a taxpayer of the county involved to 
maintain a suit.”  (Cleaned up).  And, in McKaig v. Mayor and City Council of 
Cumberland, 208 Md. 95, 103, 116 A.2d 384, 388 (1955), this Court concluded that the 
plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that he would be “pecuniarily affected[,]” and thus, had 
standing.  In that case, the plaintiff challenged “an agreement between the City [of 
Cumberland] and the State Roads Commission for the construction of a crosstown 
expressway or viaduct and other highways in the [c]ity[.]”  Id. at 99, 116 A.2d at 386.  In 
concluding that there was standing, we noted that the plaintiff had alleged that “$70,000 a 
year [was] to be diverted for seven years from moneys [that] would otherwise be available 
to the [c]ity for highway maintenance and like purposes and [was] to be used to help [] pay 
the cost of construction of the expressway[,]” and the circumstance that the city’s budget 
“provide[d] more than $127,000 for streets and alleys [made clear] that these funds will 
have to be replaced by moneys derived through increased taxes, of which the [plaintiff 
would] have to pay his share.”  Id. at 102, 116 A.2d at 388.  
By contrast, in Bell, 442 Md. at 546, 583, 113 A.3d at 643, 665, where the plaintiffs 
challenged the County Council for Anne Arundel County’s “adoption of a comprehensive 
- 25 - 
 
zoning ordinance for a large portion of Anne Arundel County[,]” this Court held that the 
plaintiffs lacked taxpayer standing.  We observed that, in the complaint, the plaintiffs had 
alleged that “the actions taken by [Anne Arundel] County in adopting the [ordinance] 
constituted ‘illegal spot zoning.’”  Id. at 583-84, 113 A.3d at 666.  Nevertheless, the 
plaintiffs were also required to show “that the [allegedly] illegal action [would] result in a 
pecuniary loss or an increase in taxes.”  Id. at 584, 113 A.3d at 666.  As to that requirement, 
we observed that, in the complaint, the plaintiffs had alleged an increase in traffic, the 
destruction of a forest buffer, and increased noise, and had alleged that their “right to 
participat[e] in zoning changes and in the enforcement of the orderly planning procedures 
specified in the County Code ha[d] been harmed.”  Id. at 584, 113 A.3d at 666 (footnote 
omitted).  Significantly, however, the plaintiffs had “not allege[d] that their taxes would be 
increased[,] or that the [allegedly] illegal action would result in any other form of pecuniary 
loss.”  Id. at 584, 113 A.3d at 666 (footnote omitted).  As such, we concluded that the 
plaintiffs “did not satisfy the requirements of taxpayer standing[,]” explaining: 
Frustration with increased traffic, annoyance with increased noise, and 
violations of a right (if any) to participate in zoning changes are not the sort 
of harms with which taxpayer standing is concerned.  Even if these harms 
were within the purview of taxpayer standing, they are not unique to the 
[plaintiff]s, as opposed to the general public.   
 
Id. at 585, 113 A.2d at 667 (footnote omitted). 
And, in Citizens Comm. of Anne Arundel Cty., Inc. v. Cty. Comm’rs of Anne 
Arundel Cty., 233 Md. 398, 399-400, 197 A.2d 108, 108-09 (1964), where “an incorporated 
citizens committee and a group of individual county residents, citizens[,] and taxpayers” 
challenged the constitutionality and validity of local laws authorizing the operation of 
- 26 - 
 
gambling devices and activities, this Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish 
taxpayer standing.  This Court observed that it was undisputed that the incorporated 
citizens committee lacked standing to sue.  See id. at 400, 197 A.2d at 109.  We stated that, 
although the individual plaintiffs had alleged that “carrying out the provisions of the 
alleged[ly] unconstitutional and invalid laws . . . ha[d] resulted in loss and damage to them 
and all other taxpayers in the county, they have failed to prove or show any special damage 
or loss [] peculiar to themselves as taxpayers or otherwise.”  Id. at 400, 197 A.2d at 109. 
We rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that they suffered, or would potentially suffer, 
pecuniary loss and damage in two ways.  See id. at 404, 197 A.2d at 111-12.  First, the 
plaintiffs had argued pecuniary loss due to “the cost of administering [an] amusement 
licensing program” that came from general funds.  Id. at 404, 197 A.2d at 111.  We noted 
that this fact was undisputed, but we observed that “it was also shown that this situation 
was not restricted to the [plaintiff]s[,] and that the revenue from the licensing program 
exceeded the cost of administration by more than $500,000.”  Id. at 404, 197 A.2d at 111.  
Thus, we concluded that it appeared “obvious” that the plaintiffs had “suffered no 
pecuniary loss due to the fact that some of the administration expenses were paid out of 
general public funds.”  Id. at 404, 197 A.2d at 111.   
As to the plaintiffs’ second argument, we explained: 
Their second argument[—]to the effect that[,] should the statutes and 
ordinances be declared void in a fiscal year prior to the time that the bulk of 
the revenue is received from the licensing program, the taxpayers would be 
burdened to meet all expenditures and obligations incurred thereunder[—
]seems to be an effort to attain standing by raising themselves to that position 
by their own ‘bootstraps’ in that they seek to show damage to themselves, 
not by what has occurred or is likely to occur, of which there is no proof, but 
- 27 - 
 
by what might occur should they be successful in having the statutes and 
ordinances declared unconstitutional or invalid.  Even if there were evidence 
that the county had expended general public funds in anticipation of revenues 
from the amusement licensing program, it is evident that the taxpayers would 
be damaged by a discontinuance of the program rather than a continuance of 
it. In any event[,] it is clear that the loss or damage the [plaintiff]s claim to 
have sustained has likewise been proportionately suffered by all other 
taxpayers in the county. 
 
Id. at 404, 197 A.2d at 111-12.  And, we determined that the plaintiffs had failed to prove 
that they had a sufficient interest to test the constitutionality or validity of the statutes at 
issue.  See id. at 405, 197 A.2d at 112.  See also State Ctr., 438 Md. at 573, 92 A.3d at 472-
73 (We described the holding in Citizens Committee, 233 Md. at 405, 197 A.2d at 112, as 
follows: “[T]he Court held that the taxpayer[s] did not prove or show that [they] had a 
sufficient interest to test the constitutionality or validity of the pertinent statute[s] because 
the remedy sought, if granted, would not decrease the taxpayer’s burden.”). 
Analysis 
Here, we hold that Petitioners failed to allege facts sufficient to establish taxpayer 
standing to maintain a challenge to the comprehensive rezoning ordinances and the Zoning 
Map.  We conclude that Petitioners failed to show a special interest in the subject matter 
of this case distinct from that of the general public by failing to show that the allegedly 
illegal or ultra vires acts by Respondent may reasonably result in a pecuniary loss or an 
increase in taxes.  Moreover, we determine that Petitioners failed to demonstrate a nexus 
between any alleged potential pecuniary harm and the challenged act, i.e., a connection 
between the allegedly illegal or ultra vires act and the harm caused to the taxpayer.  
Petitioners also failed to seek a remedy that, if granted, would alleviate any alleged tax 
- 28 - 
 
burden or pecuniary loss that would result if the Zoning Map remains in place.  As such, 
we hold that the circuit court was correct in granting the motion to dismiss.  
To maintain a challenge to the comprehensive rezoning ordinances at issue, 
Petitioners must satisfy the requirements of taxpayer standing.  See Bell, 442 Md. at 575, 
113 A.3d at 661.  As an initial matter, Petitioners have sufficiently demonstrated eligibility 
to maintain the action under the taxpayer standing doctrine by alleging in the complaint 
that they are Baltimore City taxpayers and that the suit was brought on behalf of all other 
Baltimore City taxpayers.  See id. at 577, 113 A.3d at 662 (“To establish eligibility to 
maintain a suit under the taxpayer standing doctrine, a complainant must allege two things: 
(1) that the complainant is a taxpayer[;] and (2) that the suit is brought, either expressly or 
implicitly, on behalf of all other taxpayers.”  (Cleaned up)).  Indeed, in the complaint, 
Petitioners specifically alleged that each of them is a “Baltimore City taxpayer” and that 
they were bringing the “action on behalf of all Baltimore City taxpayers pursuant to the 
principle of taxpayer standing as set forth in” Bell.   
Establishing eligibility to maintain a suit under the taxpayer standing doctrine, 
however, is but the first part of satisfying the requirements of taxpayer standing.  
Petitioners must also show “a special interest in the subject[ ]matter of the suit distinct from 
that of the general public.”  Id. at 576, 113 A.3d at 661 (cleaned up).  Based on the 
allegations in this case, Petitioners fail to satisfy the special interest requirement.  With 
respect to the first part of the special interest requirement—i.e., the illegal or ultra vires 
requirement—a plaintiff must allege an action by a municipal corporation or public official 
that is illegal or ultra vires, and we apply the requirement “leniently” and do not require 
- 29 - 
 
that a plaintiff be ultimately correct in his or her contention, “so long as the allegation is 
advanced in good faith.”  Id. at 578, 113 A.3d at 662 (citation omitted).  To be sure, in this 
case, in light of the leniency with which the illegal or ultra vires requirement is to be 
applied, we have no difficulty in concluding that Petitioners sufficiently alleged illegal or 
ultra vires acts by Respondent.  Indeed, in the complaint, Petitioners alleged numerous 
illegal or ultra vires acts by Respondent related to the adoption and enactment of the 
ordinances and Zoning Map.  For example, Petitioners alleged that Respondent violated 
applicable notice, hearing, and other due process requirements.  Thus, viewed leniently, 
the allegations of the complaint satisfy the requirement that a plaintiff allege governmental 
action that is illegal or ultra vires. 
Petitioners do not fare so well with respect to the second part of the special interest 
requirement, also known as the specific injury requirement.  In Bell, id. at 577, 113 A.3d 
at 662, we explained that a plaintiff must show that the allegedly illegal or ultra vires 
“action may injuriously affect the taxpayer’s property, meaning that it reasonably may 
result in a pecuniary loss to the taxpayer or an increase in taxes.”  (Cleaned up).  This 
means that a plaintiff must show “that the action being challenged results in a pecuniary 
loss or an increase in taxes[,]” id. at 578, 113 A.3d at 662 (cleaned up), and that “[t]he harm 
alleged must be particularized and pecuniary, as opposed to harms to the general public . . 
. , and caused potentially by the comprehensive zoning[,]” Zimmer Dev., 444 Md. at 509 
n.10, 120 A.3d at 688 n.10 (citation omitted).   
In this case, Petitioners have failed to show a special interest in the subject matter 
of this case distinct from that of the general public by failing to sufficiently allege pecuniary 
- 30 - 
 
loss or an increase in taxes.  Put plainly, Petitioners simply have not shown that the 
allegedly illegal or ultra vires acts by Respondent may result in a pecuniary loss or an 
increase in taxes.  Rather, the allegations of the complaint demonstrate that Petitioners’ 
theory of pecuniary loss or increase in taxes is vague and not easily understandable.  At 
oral argument, Petitioners’ counsel argued that Petitioners had sufficiently alleged 
pecuniary loss and an increase in taxes, and drew this Court’s attention to paragraphs 39 
through 50 of the complaint, set forth above.  A review of the complaint, however, 
demonstrates otherwise.  In the complaint, at paragraph 39, Petitioners baldly alleged that 
“[t]he ultra vires or illegal imposition of a new Zoning Map on Baltimore City will cause 
Baltimore City taxpayers to suffer pecuniary losses or tax increases.”  Petitioners did not 
allege, with any explanation or particularity, the pecuniary losses or tax increases expected 
or how the new Zoning Map potentially would result in such harm.   Petitioners simply 
stated that pecuniary loss and tax increases would occur.  This is a bare allegation that, in 
and of itself, is insufficient to establish taxpayer standing.  Were we to conclude otherwise, 
anyone could establish taxpayer standing by merely using the magic words “pecuniary loss 
and an increase in taxes.” 
Similarly, in paragraphs 44 and 45, Petitioners alleged that adoption of the Zoning 
Map by ultra vires or illegal means could “overburden the taxpayer-funded resources of 
City agencies, boards[,] and commissions that review and issue permits and zoning 
authorizations[,]” and would “place extra burdens on the taxpayer-funded resources of the 
City Law Department[.]”  The meaning of these allegations is difficult to discern.  More 
importantly, the allegations fall far short of alleging any pecuniary loss or increase in taxes 
- 31 - 
 
potentially caused by the comprehensive rezoning, and instead appear to refer to potential 
costs caused by defending challenges to the comprehensive rezoning and Zoning Map.  In 
addition, in paragraph 50 of the complaint, Petitioners alleged that “[b]onds may be issued 
to support the development of unlawfully rezoned property.”  Again, this allegation lacks 
any explanation or specificity.  Overall, the complaint fails to allege any injury resulting in 
a pecuniary loss or an increase in taxes due to the comprehensive rezoning. 
In the complaint, Petitioners alleged harm that has no connection whatsoever to a 
pecuniary loss or tax increase.  For example, in paragraph 40 of the complaint, Petitioners 
alleged that “[a] Zoning Map adopted by ultra vires or illegal means lacks the presumption 
of validity afforded in Maryland to lawful comprehensive rezonings.”  And, in paragraph 
41, Petitioners alleged that “an unlawfully adopted Zoning Map w[ould] bring prolonged 
instability to Baltimore City” because there is “no statute of limitations for claiming error 
in a comprehensive rezoning[.]”  The alleged harms—lack of presumption of validity and 
instability—are not the types of injury on which taxpayer standing is predicated.  These 
types of alleged harms have no relationship to the expenditure of public funds or taxation 
in Baltimore City.  The comprehensive rezoning ordinances are not spending or tax bills, 
and there was no well-pled allegation that taxes were, or would be, raised as a result of the 
enactment of the ordinances, or that the enactment of the ordinances would result in 
pecuniary loss. 
Moreover, we determine that, even had Petitioners satisfied the specific injury part 
of the special interest requirement, Petitioners failed to establish taxpayer standing because 
they failed to show a nexus between the potential pecuniary damage and the challenged 
- 32 - 
 
act.  See Bell, 442 Md. at 579, 113 A.3d at 663.  As we explained in Bell, id. at 579, 113 
A.3d at 663, the nexus requirement “is perhaps the most frequent stumbling block for 
complainants claiming taxpayer standing” because, to demonstrate a nexus, “the taxpayer 
must be asserting a challenge and seeking a remedy that, if granted, would alleviate the tax 
burden on that individual and others; otherwise, standing does not exist.”  (Cleaned up).  
Stated otherwise, “[t]here must be . . . a connection between the alleged[ly] illegal or ultra 
vires act, the harm caused to the taxpayer, and the potential for the remedy to alleviate the 
harm incurred.”  Id. at 579, 113 A.3d at 663 (citation omitted).  Here, there is no meaningful 
connection between the allegedly illegal or ultra vires acts and the harms claimed; i.e., 
there is no connection between the comprehensive rezoning and any alleged pecuniary loss 
or tax increase.  Put simply, a sufficient nexus was not alleged.  
In the complaint, Petitioners alleged that Respondent engaged in illegal or ultra 
vires acts by enacting the Zoning Map without the required notices, publication, and public 
hearings.  Significantly, however, the harms alleged are not related to those allegedly 
illegal or ultra vires acts.  As explained above, Petitioners alleged vague, unspecified harm; 
and any alleged potential pecuniary loss or tax increase is simply not related to lack of 
notice, publication, and public hearings.  Rather, the potential pecuniary loss or tax 
increase, as alleged in the complaint, appears to hinge on the increase in taxes that 
Petitioners posit will occur as a result of challenges to zoning under the new Zoning Map 
to, among other things, “respond to or correct errors and allegations of mistake[.]”  As best 
as we can glean, Petitioners’ main claim of increased tax burden appears to be based on 
the allegation that an invalidly enacted Zoning Map will result in Baltimore City having to 
- 33 - 
 
raise taxes to pay for the legal defense to litigation that Petitioners predict will arise from 
an allegedly unlawful Zoning Map.  Petitioners’ reasoning is circular, and depends on the 
Zoning Map being, in fact, invalid, and on taxpayers challenging the Zoning Map.  In other 
words, the harms alleged are unrelated to Respondent’s allegedly illegal or ultra vires 
actions.   
Additionally, Petitioners failed to seek a remedy that, if granted, would alleviate any 
alleged tax burden or pecuniary loss that would result if the Zoning Map remains in place.  
In the complaint, as to the remedy, Petitioners sought declarations that Respondent failed 
to comply with applicable notice, publication, and public hearing requirements in adopting 
and enacting the Zoning Map, and that the Zoning Map was null and void.  However, it is 
difficult to comprehend how nullifying the Zoning Map would alleviate an alleged tax 
burden, which depends on challenges being made to the Zoning Map.  In short, we fail to 
discern not only a nexus between the allegedly illegal or ultra vires acts and the harms 
allegedly caused to taxpayers, but also any nexus between the requested remedy and its 
ability to alleviate the alleged harms. 
As a final matter, we note that this case’s circumstances are readily distinguishable 
from cases in which this Court has concluded or observed that plaintiffs had established 
taxpayer standing to maintain their actions.  Significantly, Petitioners failed to allege with 
any particularity or specificity the expenditure of public funds or an increase in taxes 
potentially resulting from the allegedly illegal or ultra vires acts.  By contrast, in several 
cases in which this Court concluded or observed that taxpayer standing had been 
established, the plaintiffs had specifically alleged pecuniary loss or increased taxes.  For 
- 34 - 
 
example, in Boitnott, 356 Md. at 234, 738 A.2d at 885, the plaintiffs alleged that Baltimore 
City had expended $20 million in development costs prior to the litigation, and we observed 
that such an allegation was sufficient to show “potential pecuniary damage by way of [a] 
tax increase[.]”  In State Ctr., 438 Md. at 577, 92 A.3d at 475, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
project at issue was expected to cost $1.5 billion, that a State agency had agreed to 
contribute up to $28 million in taxpayer funds toward the cost of designing and 
constructing an underground garage for the project, and that issuance of $33 million in 
bonds supported by taxpayer revenues to build the garage had been approved.  In that case, 
we determined that the plaintiffs “pleaded sufficiently a loss of revenue from the public 
funds as contributed by them as taxpayers.”  Id. at 581, 92 A.3d at 478.  Similarly, in James, 
281 Md. at 139, 377 A.2d at 866, the plaintiff alleged that the county executive had 
expended $5 million in bond proceeds for the construction of a new courthouse.  And, in 
McKaig, 208 Md. at 102, 116 A.2d at 388, the plaintiff had alleged that $70,000 per year 
for seven years was to be diverted from a city’s highway maintenance funds to help pay 
for the cost of construction of an expressway, and that the city’s budget provided for more 
than $127,000 for streets and alleys that would have to be replaced by funds derived from 
increased taxes.   
In this case, however, Petitioners failed to make any allegation of the kind like those 
made by plaintiffs in Boitnott, State Ctr., James, or McKaig.  Indeed, Petitioners did not 
allege that Baltimore City has expended funds or that taxes have been increased as a result 
- 35 - 
 
of the enactment of the comprehensive rezoning ordinances and Zoning Map.8  We reiterate 
that Petitioners’ allegations of harm are imprecise and, for the most part, undefined, and 
do not pertain to a type of loss caused by the comprehensive zoning, but rather a type of 
loss caused by the cost of defending against challenges like the one brought by Petitioners.  
We observe that this case is similar to Bell, 442 Md. at 584-85, 113 A.3d at 666-67, in 
which this Court determined that the plaintiffs had failed to establish taxpayer standing 
because they failed to allege with any particularity “that their taxes would be increased or 
that the illegal action would result in any other form of pecuniary loss.”  (Footnote omitted).   
Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth above, we hold that Petitioners did not 
satisfy the requirements of taxpayer standing, and that the circuit court properly granted 
the motion to dismiss. 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR 
BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED.  PETITIONERS 
TO PAY COSTS. 
                                              
8We note that we do not hold that a complainant must allege a specific monetary 
amount to establish taxpayer standing; rather, that happened to be the circumstance in each 
Boitnott, State Ctr., James, and McKaig.  Nothing in our opinion should be read as creating 
a requirement that a complainant allege, in the form of a specific monetary amount, the 
harms that were caused by the allegedly illegal or ultra vires act.  Rather, as we have stated, 
to satisfy the “special interest” requirement, a complainant must allege that the illegal or 
ultra vires act “may injuriously affect the taxpayer’s property, meaning that it reasonably 
may result in a pecuniary loss to the taxpayer or an increase in taxes.”  Bell, 442 Md. at 
577, 113 A.3d at 662 (cleaned up).  And, Petitioners have failed to do so here.  
Circuit Court for Baltimore City  
Case No.: 24-C-17-003021  
Argued: November 30, 2018  
  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
No. 35 
September Term, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JOAN FLOYD, et al. 
v. 
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF 
BALTIMORE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
Adkins, Sally D.,  
     (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concurring Opinion by Adkins, J., which 
Barbera, C.J., and McDonald, J., join. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: April 1, 2019 
 
 
I fully agree with the Majority opinion that Floyd has failed to allege sufficient facts 
to establish taxpayer standing.  Most respectfully, I write this concurring opinion in 
recognition that the history of what constitutes “special interest” for taxpayer standing in 
Maryland is, as we have recently said, “disorganized,” as a whole, and “at times, seemingly 
contradictory . . . .”  State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 540–
41 (2014).  Judge Harrell, authoring State Center, undertook a close examination of that 
history in an effort to clarify the doctrine and, in my estimation, succeeded in untangling 
the web of earlier cases.  For this reason, when examining a taxpayer standing issue, I tether 
my analysis to State Center, eschewing any earlier law that is ambiguous or inconsistent 
therewith.  
State Center explained that to establish eligibility to bring a taxpayer suit, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that: (a) “the complainant is a taxpayer,” and (b) “the suit is 
brought, either expressly or implicitly, on behalf of all other taxpayers.”  Id. at 547.  The 
second broad requirement is that parties must assert a “special interest,” alternatively 
referred to as the “special damage” requirement.  Special interest requires a taxpayer to 
allege: (i) an action by a municipal corporation or public official that is illegal or ultra 
vires; and (ii) that the action may injuriously affect the taxpayer’s property, meaning that 
it reasonably may cause an increased burden relating to taxation.  See id. at 540.  These are 
known as the (1) “illegal or ultra vires act” prong, and (2) the “specific injury” prong.  See 
id. at 555–56.  
In State Center, we examined three discrete topics as part of the “specific injury” 
prong: the type of harm alleged, the nexus between the alleged harm and the illegal or ultra 
2 
 
vires act, and the requisite degree of harm.  See id. at 560.  To demonstrate the type of harm 
necessary for specific injury, the plaintiff must show, first, that the harm is sufficiently 
likely to affect their taxes or result in a pecuniary loss, and, then, that the plaintiff has a 
“special interest distinct from the general public,” id. at 556.  
As to the first showing, only a reasonable possibility of either pecuniary loss, or a 
tax increase, must be shown.  See id. at 559.  In assessing standing, we have never asked 
for more than a “potential” showing of such harms, id., and have “exhibited great leniency 
in [our] interpretation of ‘potential pecuniary loss,’” id. at 561 (citations omitted).  
As to the second showing, Judge Harrell wrote that, “[a] party may be a resident of 
the State (and, thus, have a ‘general interest’ in the State’s actions), but not be a taxpayer 
whose pecuniary interest would be affected by that action (and, thus, not have the requisite 
‘special interest’).”  Id. at 559 n.65.  Surely the “taxpayer” to whom we referred means any 
individual who may be liable to replenish the fisc.  Conversely, the “general public” 
comprises all residents, including those not subject to such liability.  Hence, “taxpayer” 
means those in the relevant jurisdiction subject to the taxation which is alleged to have 
been increased or wasted, while the “general public” amounts to those who are not subject 
to such taxation.  
I agree with the Majority that Appellants’ allegation of potential tax increase or 
pecuniary loss is “vague and not easily understandable.”  Maj. Slip Op. at 30.  Appellants 
do not sufficiently allege “how the new Zoning Map potentially would result” in pecuniary 
losses or tax increases.  Maj. Slip Op. at 30.  Merely alleging that there will be potential 
costs caused by defending challenges to the comprehensive rezoning is insufficient.  This 
3 
 
is tantamount to saying that a plaintiff may self-create the type of harm required just by 
being litigious—a classic bootstrap theory, unworthy of recognition.1  In my mind, the 
Majority need not reach anything past this point.  
Finally, it is also unnecessary for the Majority to distinguish the plaintiffs here from 
more successful plaintiffs in its closing paragraphs: “By contrast, in several cases in which 
this Court concluded or observed that taxpayer standing had been established, the plaintiffs 
had specifically alleged pecuniary loss or increased taxes.”  Maj. Slip Op. at 33.  Although 
the Majority, in a footnote, acknowledges that no specific monetary amount is necessary 
to prevail, the discussion in its closing paragraphs leaves the impression that these specific 
dollar allegations are somehow important.  See State Center, 438 Md. at 577 ($1.5 billion 
project); Boitnott v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 356 Md. 226, 234 (1999) ($20 million 
in development costs); James v. Anderson, 281 Md. 137, 139 (1977) ($5 million bond for 
construction of new courthouse); McKaig v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, 208 
Md. 95, 102 (1955) ($70,000 per year for seven years for construction of expressway).  In 
so doing, it may suggest some narrowing of the cases that will qualify for taxpayer 
standing.  
Indeed, in evaluating the “degree of harm” necessary for specific injury, we have 
never asked for more than a “potential” showing of such harms, State Center, 438 Md. at 
                                              
1 To the extent our past decisions, see Inlet Associates v. Assateague House 
Condominium Association, 313 Md. 413, 442 (1988); Citizen’s Planning & Hous. Ass’n v. 
Cty. Executive of Balt. Cty., 273 Md. 333, 343 (1974), suggest that taxpayer injury can 
result from the expenditure of funds necessary for the city to defend the legality of the 
challenged act, I believe the Court has now specifically rejected such a conclusion.  I agree 
with this result.   
4 
 
559, and have “exhibited great leniency in [our] interpretation of ‘potential pecuniary 
loss,’” id. at 561 (citations omitted).  Certainly, there are, and will be, cases in which we 
conclude that the alleged injury is de minimis—not worthy of recognition.  But this 
conclusion should be reached from an assessment of all the circumstances, without undue 
emphasis on the presence or absence of specific dollar harms and it is not necessary here. 
For the reasons set forth above, I join in the judgment only, in this case. 
Chief Judge Barbera and Judge McDonald have authorized me to state that they 
concur with the views expressed in this opinion.