Case Title: Connerly v. State Personnel Bd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S125502

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 3/2/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
WARD CONNERLY, 
) 
 
 
) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S125502 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C043329 
STATE PERSONNEL BOARD et al., 
) 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
Defendants and Respondents; 
) 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 96CS01082 
THE CALIFORNIA BUSINESS COUNCIL 
) 
FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
Real Parties in Interest and Appellants. ) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
This case involves litigation over private attorney general fees awarded 
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.51 in an action “which has 
resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest . . . .”  
Here, plaintiff Ward Connerly successfully pursued litigation to invalidate several 
state statutes as unconstitutional under article I, section 31 of the California 
Constitution, enacted in 1996 as Proposition 209, which outlawed governmental 
preferential treatment by race, sex, and other categories.  The state agencies that 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated. 
 
2
were the respondents in this writ of mandate action for the most part opted not to 
defend the statutes, or to litigate only issues of standing and justiciability.  It fell to 
various amici curiae advocacy groups that were in favor of affirmative action to 
defend the state programs and statutes on the merits.  At some point in the 
litigation, as will be elaborated below, the amici curiae were redesignated real 
parties in interest.  After the litigation concluded, the trial court awarded section 
1021.5 attorney fees, to be paid both by the state agencies and the advocacy 
groups as real parties.  The award was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 
The advocacy groups contend that they were in essence amici curiae, and 
were not liable for attorney fees in litigation to declare unconstitutional statutes 
they were not responsible for enacting or enforcing.  Connerly, on the other hand, 
contends that the advocacy groups should be liable for such fees because they 
were authentic real parties in interest, inasmuch as they had a direct interest in the 
litigation and were active participants that often shaped the defense of the statutes.  
We conclude that the advocacy groups were not “opposing parties” within the 
meaning of section 1021.5, and therefore reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
The underlying litigation involved state and federal constitutional 
challenges to five statutory programs that fall within the general rubric of 
“affirmative action.”  (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 16, 
27.)  The litigation challenged the programs of six state agencies and officials: the 
State Personnel Board, the State Treasurer, the California Community Colleges, 
the Department of General Services, the State Controller, and the Lottery 
Commission.  Pete Wilson, in his capacity as the Governor of California, 
 
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commenced the litigation by filing, in the Court of Appeal, a petition for writ of 
mandate against these agencies and their officials.  
 
A group of organizations and associations who were generally in favor of 
the challenged programs, the California Business Council for Equal Opportunity, 
California Coalition of Hispanic Organizations, California Hispanic Chamber of 
Commerce, California Teachers Association, Hispanic Contractors Association, 
and Society of Hispanic Professional Engineers, Greater Los Angeles Chapter2 
obtained permission from the Court of Appeal to appear as amicus curiae.  Amicus 
curiae asserted, among other things, that there was no justiciable controversy 
because the action was between the Governor and his subordinate executive 
officers and agencies, and because no real parties in interest had been named.  In 
response, the Governor filed an amended petition for writ of mandate naming the 
amici curiae as real parties in interest.  The California Business Council argued 
that such designation did not cure the justiciability problem because it was not an 
authentic real party in interest, with a direct interest in litigation, but rather an 
amicus curiae that disagreed with the Governor’s policies and positions on 
affirmative action.  
 
The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition, and this court denied 
review without prejudice to filing in superior court.  Governor Wilson then filed 
his petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court.  In so doing, he again 
                                              
2  
Originally, there were 14 organizations and associations who joined 
together to appear as amici curiae in this court.  Only the above six groups actively 
participated in the litigation on the merits.  Because the six organizations can for 
present purposes be treated as a single association, we generally will refer to them 
collectively in the singular as the “California Business Council.”  
 
4
named the California Business Council as real party in interest.  Later, plaintiff 
Ward Connerly was permitted to join the litigation as a taxpayer litigant.  
(Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 27.)  Connerly 
continued the litigation after Governor Wilson left office.  (Ibid.) 
 
The California Business Council actively participated in the litigation.  It 
initially sought to remove the case to federal court, an action in which the state 
defendants did not join, and which was rejected because of the state defendants’ 
lack of concurrence.  Once back in superior court, the California Business Council 
filed a motion to peremptorily challenge the trial judge, Thomas Cecil, which 
ultimately was successful.  (See California Business Council v. Superior Court 
(1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107-1108.)  It sought discovery regarding the 
affirmative action policies and practices of the various state agencies named in the 
litigation, and filed a successful motion to compel discovery when the Governor 
was not forthcoming. 
 
Shortly after the case was returned to the superior court, the voters passed 
Proposition 209, adding article I, section 31 to the California Constitution, 
prohibiting the state, inter alia, from granting “preferential treatment to . . . any 
individual or group on the basis of race . . . .”  Three of the six state agencies and 
officials that were sued, the State Personnel Board, the Department of General 
Services, and the State Controller, took no position on the litigation, claiming only 
that they were compelled to enforce existing statutes under article III, section 3.5 
of the California Constitution.  The State Treasurer and the Lottery Commission 
opposed the lawsuit on grounds of standing,  justiciability, and lack of adversity, 
but did not otherwise defend on the merits any affirmative action program or 
statute.  The Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges is the only 
 
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state agency that appears to have defended its programs and the pertinent statutes 
on the merits as well as on issues of standing and justiciability. 
 
Eventually, the trial court entered a judgment invalidating one of the 
statutory schemes, as well as a portion of another, but otherwise upholding them. 
(Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 27.)  Connerly 
appealed and the California Business Council cross-appealed those portions of the 
judgment at variance with its members’ respective positions.  (Id. at p. 28.) 
 
The Court of Appeal held that the statutory schemes were unconstitutional 
for the most part, but that certain portions of three of those schemes could be 
severed and upheld.  (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 
28.)  After judgment was entered, Connerly moved for an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to section 1021.5.  The trial court determined that this was an appropriate 
case in which to make an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 1021.5, a 
ruling that was not challenged on appeal.  The total attorney fee award was 
eventually calculated at $488,067.64.  The trial court ordered that the State 
Personnel Board, the California Community Colleges, the State Treasurer, the 
Lottery Commission, the Department of General Services, and the California 
Business Council each pay one-sixth of the total amount of attorney fees, rejecting 
the California Business Council’s contention that it should not be liable for such 
fees.  The California Business Council appealed, and plaintiff Connerly cross-
appealed to challenge the disallowance of a portion of the fees claimed by his 
attorneys. 
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s attorney fee award.  It 
reviewed various Court of Appeal cases, discussed below, holding that real parties 
in interest that actively participate in litigation may be assessed attorney fees, even 
 
6
though they were not responsible for initiating or enforcing the policies that were 
the subject of the underlying litigation.  The Court of Appeal focused on the trial 
court’s finding that the California Business Council groups “participated in the 
litigation as full-fledged parties,” distinguishing themselves from the typical 
amicus curiae.  The Court of Appeal also rejected Connerly’s cross-appeal.  We 
granted the California Business Council’s petition for review.3 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial court’s award of fees under an abuse 
of discretion standard.  The parties argue about the proper standard, with the 
California Business Council contending that the issue before us should be 
reviewed de novo, and Connerly arguing in favor of the abuse of discretion 
standard. 
 
The proper standard of review was set forth in Carver v. Chevron USA, Inc. 
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142:  “On review of an award of attorney fees after 
trial, the normal standard of review is abuse of discretion.  However, de novo 
review of such a trial court order is warranted where the determination of whether 
                                              
3  
Connerly acknowledges that the state respondents have paid the entire 
$581,376 award to his counsel, which represents the total fee and costs awarded 
plus interest at the government rate of 7 percent.  Connerly contends the appeal is 
not moot, however, because if his counsel had recovered from the California 
Business Council, that portion of the award would have been calculated at the 
legal interest rate of 10 percent.  He also seeks fees related to proceedings in this 
court and the Court of Appeal.  Because there is at least the potential of a greater 
recovery for Connerly if he prevails, we conclude that the appeal is not moot. 
 
7
the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs in this context have been 
satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of law.”   
 
Here, the question is whether the California Business Council can be 
assessed attorney fees under section 1021.5 as an “opposing party[]” within the 
meaning of that statute.  Under some circumstances, this may be a mixed question 
of law and fact and, if factual questions predominate, may warrant a deferential 
standard of review.  (See Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San 
Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888.)  As will become clear below, however, the 
material facts in the present case are largely undisputed.  The controversy is over 
whether a litigant in the California Business Council’s somewhat unusual position 
can be considered an “opposing party.”  This is a question of law and is reviewed 
by us de novo.  (See ibid.) 
 
B.  The Merits 
 
Section 1021.5 provides in pertinent part:  “Upon motion, a court may 
award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in 
any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting 
the public interest . . . .” 4  (Italics added.)  Thus, only an opposing party can be 
liable for attorney fees under section 1021.5. 
                                              
4  
In its entirety, section 1021.5 provides:  “Upon motion, a court may award 
attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any 
action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the 
public interest if:  (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has 
been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity 
and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public 
entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and 
(c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.  
With respect to actions involving public entities, this section applies to allowances 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
8
 
Whether the California Business Council was an opposing party within the 
meaning of section 1021.5 is ultimately a question of statutory construction.  
“ ‘The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of 
the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. . . .  In order to determine 
this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute.’ ”  (In re Marriage 
of Harris (2004) 34 Cal.4th 210, 221.)  Because the term “opposing parties” is not 
defined, it can be assumed that the Legislature was referring to the conventional 
definition of that term.  As we have recognized, the edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary current at the time that section 1021.5 was drafted states that “ ‘[p]arty’ 
is a technical term having a precise meaning in legal parlance; it refers to ‘those by 
or against whom a suit is brought . . . , the party plaintiff or defendant . . . .’ ”  
(Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 570, citing Black’s 
Law Dict. (4th rev. ed. 1968) p. 1278.) 
 
Generally speaking, the opposing party liable for attorney fees under 
section 1021.5 has been the defendant person or agency sued, which is responsible 
for initiating and maintaining actions or policies that are deemed harmful to the 
public interest and that gave rise to the litigation.  (See, e.g., Graham v. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
against, but not in favor of, public entities, and no claim shall be filed therefor, 
unless one or more successful parties and one or more opposing parties are public 
entities, in which case no claim shall be required to be filed therefor under Part 3 
(commencing with Section 900) of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government 
Code. 
 
“Attorneys’ fees awarded to a public entity pursuant to this section shall not 
be increased or decreased by a multiplier based upon extrinsic circumstances, as 
discussed in Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.” 
 
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DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, 34 Cal.4th 553; Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los 
Angeles (2005) 34 Cal.4th 604; Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281.)  By this 
standard, the California Business Council clearly is not an “opposing party” 
because it was responsible neither for enacting nor enforcing the statutes that were 
judged to be unconstitutional in the underlying litigation. 
 
Moreover, amici curiae traditionally have not been considered parties liable 
for attorney fees.  (See, e.g., Choudhry v. Free (1976) 17 Cal.3d 660, 662, 669 
[attorney fees and costs assessed against the real party under federal statute 
awarding attorney fees to prevailing parties in voting rights cases even though 
amicus curiae, rather than the respondent or the real party in interest, litigated the 
case].)  Amici curiae, literally “friends of the court,” perform a valuable role for 
the judiciary precisely because they are nonparties who often have a different 
perspective from the principal litigants.  “Amicus curiae presentations assist the 
court by broadening its perspective on the issues raised by the parties.  Among 
other services, they facilitate informed judicial consideration of a wide variety of 
information and points of view that may bear on important legal questions.”  (Bily 
v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 405, fn. 14.) 
 
The California Rules of Court formalize the distinct role of amici curiae by 
making separate provisions for receipt of amicus curiae briefs.  (See Cal. Rules of 
Court, rules 13(c), 29.1(f).)  The range of groups that may be granted amicus 
curiae status is well illustrated by the participants in the present case.  The 
California Business Council and the other advocacy groups initially appearing as 
amici curiae in this case are groups generally interested in the protection of 
minority and civil rights.  Appearing on their behalf as amicus curiae before this 
court is the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., which seeks to reform 
 
10
product liability law, and counts among its members Chevron Corporation, the 
Dow Chemical Company, and General Motors Corporation.  The law firm 
representing Connerly, the Pacific Legal Foundation, has often appeared in this 
court as amicus curiae to advocate for individual property rights and limited 
government.  (See, e.g., Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 
36 Cal.4th 1, 12.)  The availability of such diverse views through amicus curiae 
participation enriches the judicial decisionmaking process. 
 
Connerly does not dispute that a conventional amicus curiae that files briefs 
on behalf of one of the parties and may participate in oral argument is not an 
opposing party within the meaning of section 1021.5.  Nor does he argue that the 
mere designation of an amicus curiae by one of the parties to litigation as a “real 
party in interest” necessarily makes that amicus an opposing party.  He contends, 
however, that real parties in interest may be considered “opposing parties,” and 
that the California Business Council was a real party in the present case.  The 
California Business Council for its part does not argue against the general 
proposition that real parties can be held liable for attorney fees, but contends that 
they were not authentic real parties. 
 
To address this issue, we begin by examining the meaning of “real party in 
interest.”  As was stated in Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone ’86 v. Superior 
Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 167, 173 (Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone): 
“ ‘Real party in interest’ has been generally defined as ‘any person or entity whose 
interest will be directly affected by the proceeding . . . .’  [Citation.]  While the 
real party in interest is ‘usually the other party to the lawsuit or proceeding being 
challenged [citation], it may be ‘the person or entity in whose favor the acts 
complained of [operate]’ or ‘anyone having a direct interest in the result’ 
 
11
[citation], or ‘the real adverse party . . . in whose favor the act complained of has 
been done.’ ” 
 
Connerly cites Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone in support of his 
position that the California Business Council had an interest that was directly 
affected by the litigation.  In that case, involving the Sonoma County Nuclear Free 
Zone Initiative on the November 1986 ballot, the opponent of the initiative 
(dubbed “Con-NFZ” by the Court of Appeal) had requested that the county clerk 
accept its ballot argument after the clerk’s deadline, and was refused.  Con-NFZ 
then filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court to compel the county 
clerk to accept the late filing, but failed to notify the initiative proponent, Pro-
NFZ.  The superior court granted the writ petition.  Pro-NFZ subsequently filed a 
petition for writ of mandate of its own, claiming the superior court erred, in part 
because Pro-NFZ was a real party in interest in the previous mandate action and 
should have received notice of Con-NFZ’s petition for writ of mandate. 
 
The Court of Appeal agreed.  Stating, as discussed above, that a real party 
is defined as “ ‘any person or entity whose interest will be directly affected by the 
proceeding’ ” (Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 173), the court concluded that Pro-NFZ met that definition.  “Pro-NFZ and Con-
NFZ were two cognizable groups contesting the merits of a county initiative. As 
the group who had authored and filed a direct pro argument for the November 
ballot, Pro-NFZ had a clear, direct interest in the question whether Con-NFZ 
should be permitted a late filing.  Con-NFZ’s writ petition sought relief from 
deadlines set to ensure reasonable time for distribution of sample ballots.  Even 
though the trial court happened to find that the late filing would not jeopardize the 
 
12
printing process, Pro-NFZ had a direct interest in litigating the question and 
participating in the hearing.”  (Id. at p. 174.) 
 
Con-NFZ also made the related argument that Pro-NFZ was not 
“beneficially interested” in the litigation and could not bring the writ of mandate 
action pursuant to section 1086, which requires such interest.  The Court of 
Appeal observed that “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, whether Pro-NFZ 
had a ‘direct interest’ sufficient to make it a real party below, and whether it has a 
‘beneficial interest’ to permit it to file a petition for writ of mandate with this 
court, is essentially the same question resolved by a single analysis.”  (Sonoma 
County Nuclear Freeze Zone, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 174.)  Quoting our 
definition in Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 796, 
that a beneficial interest is a “special interest to be served or some particular right 
to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the 
public at large,” the Court of Appeal concluded that Pro-NFZ clearly met that test 
as the proponent of an initiative potentially jeopardized by the late filing of an 
opposition ballot argument.  (Sonoma County Nuclear Freeze Zone, supra, 189 
Cal.App.3d at p. 175.) 
 
Thus, Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone does not support Connerly’s 
position.  Inasmuch as a real party’s direct interest must be, like a beneficial 
interest, a “special interest to be served or some particular right to be protected 
over and above the interest held in common with the public at large,” then Pro-
NFZ as the proponent of the ballot initiative clearly met that definition when it 
came to litigation involving that initiative.  Connerly identifies no comparable 
special interest for the California Business Council in the present case.  Of course, 
amici curiae almost by definition have a particular ideological or policy focus that 
 
13
motivates them to participate in certain litigation, notwithstanding the lack of a 
direct interest in the litigation’s outcome.  But the California Business Council’s 
policy interest in the present case in maintaining some affirmative action programs 
is no different in kind from that of the typical amicus curiae and no different in 
substance from like-minded members of the general public. 
Connerly cites a number of cases in which real parties were awarded 
section 1021.5 attorney fees.  These cases also do not support his position.  In 
Washburn v. City of Berkeley (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 578, attorney fees were 
imposed against the author of a contested ballot argument in support of a local 
initiative that gave rise to the litigation.  Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of 
mandate against the City of Berkeley challenging the ballot argument as false and 
misleading under Elections Code section 5025.  After entry of a stipulated 
judgment that required several changes to the ballot argument, attorney fees were 
assessed against the author under section 1021.5.  (Washburn, supra, at p. 581.)  
As in Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone, the initiative proponent and author of 
the offending ballot argument was deemed a real party in interest because she 
signed the argument at issue in favor of the recycling measure.  (Washburn, supra, 
at p. 582.)  Moreover, as the author of the partially misleading ballot argument, 
she was largely responsible for causing the conditions that gave rise to the 
litigation. 
 
In Bolsa Chica Land Trust v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 493, 
517-518, the court awarded attorney fees not only against the Coastal Commission 
in a challenge to a defective local coastal plan (LCP), but against two landowners, 
real parties in interest, whose developments were authorized by the plan and who 
participated in the litigation.  Although it is unclear to what extent the landowners 
 
14
participated in devising the LCP, it can be reasonably inferred they had a direct 
interest in the plan, which authorized extensive development.  Thus, although we 
have no occasion to determine whether the case was correctly decided, we note 
that it is distinguishable from the present one inasmuch as the landowners in that 
case, unlike the California Business Council, were bona fide real parties with a 
direct interest in the litigation that differed from the general public. 
 
In San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society, Inc. v. County of San 
Bernardino (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 738, plaintiff Audubon Society successfully 
challenged the approval of a cemetery on the grounds that the environmental 
impact report was inadequate.  The trial court awarded attorney fees to be paid by 
the county and real party in interest Gold Mountain Memorial Park, Inc., the 
owner and would-be developer of the property in question.  Gold Mountain argued 
on appeal that the county alone was found to have acted improperly.  As the court 
further stated:  “As noted in Wilderness Society v. Morton (D.C. Cir. 1974) 495 
F.2d 1026, fees granted under the private attorney general theory are not intended 
to punish those who violate the law but rather to ensure that those who have acted 
to protect public interest will not be forced to shoulder the cost of litigation.  In 
this case, Gold Mountain was a major party, actively litigating from the inception 
of the action in order to protect its interests.  As the real party in interest, it had the 
most to gain.  When a private party is a real party in interest and actively 
participates in litigation along with the governmental agency, it is fair for that 
party to bear half the fees.” (San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society, Inc., supra, 
155 Cal.App.3d at p. 756.)  Thus, it was real party’s pursuit of its direct interest 
that gave rise to the underlying litigation. 
 
15
 
In Friends of the Trails v. Blasius (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 810 (Blasius), 
members of the public sought via a lawsuit to maintain public access to a road on 
private property adjacent to a canal and to quiet title to the public easement, after 
the property owner put up gates blocking such access.  The Nevada Irrigation 
District (NID), which had its own easement giving it access to the canal, was not a 
real party in the action, but a named defendant.  It joined the property owner in 
defending the public access closure, presumably because it was opposed to sharing 
its easement with the public.  (Id. at pp. 826-827 [landowners argue that NID 
easement is incompatible with public easement].)  The trial court entered a 
judgment granting an easement for a public right-of-way “subordinate to the 
easement rights . . . held by the defendant [NID].”  (Id. at p. 819.)   
 
After the plaintiffs prevailed on the public access issue, the trial court 
awarded attorney fees against both the landowner and NID.  NID argued on appeal 
against such fees, not on the grounds that it was not an opposing party, but that the 
plaintiffs were not a “successful” party with respect to NID, because the removal 
of the gate affected the landowner’s property interest, not NID’s.  The Court of 
Appeal, in upholding the attorney fee award, stressed NID’s active role in the 
litigation.  (Blasius, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 836.)  Furthermore, the court, in 
upholding the award of costs to the plaintiff as a prevailing party pursuant to 
section 1032, clarified that plaintiffs’ success in quieting title to the public 
easement made it a prevailing party over NID, which sought to have exclusive 
easement rights to the property in question.  (Id. at p. 839.) 
 
Thus, in all of the above cases, those found liable for section 1021.5 fees 
were either real parties in interest that had a direct interest in the litigation, the 
furtherance of which was generally at least partly responsible for the policy or 
 
16
practice that gave rise to the litigation, or were codefendants with a direct interest 
intertwined with that of the principal defendant.  In no case did the opposing party 
have only an ideological or policy interest typical of an amicus curiae, as the 
California Business Council does in the present case.  Although some of the courts 
above stressed active participation in the litigation as grounds for awarding 
attorney fees, no court has held that active participation alone, without a direct 
interest in litigation, can be grounds for awarding section 1021.5 fees. 
 
Connerly nonetheless argues, in effect, that a litigant’s active participation 
in the litigation by itself can convert an amicus curiae into a real party in interest 
liable for attorney fees under section 1021.5.  As discussed above, the California 
Business Council acted in many respects as lead counsel on the litigation, 
answering the petition for writ of mandate, seeking discovery and litigating a 
discovery motion, seeking to remove the case to federal court, winning recusal of 
a judge, and providing the most substantive briefing on the issue.  It played this 
active role, however, at plaintiff’s invitation and with the encouragement of the 
trial court, in order to conduct litigation that would otherwise not have been 
adversarial.5  There is no indication the Legislature contemplated that someone in 
                                              
5  
Connerly asserted in his brief and at oral argument that the trial court had 
determined that “sufficient adversity existed between the petitioners and 
respondents without the participation of the [California Business Council].”  That 
assertion is not supported by the record.  In fact, the trial court made clear that it 
was troubled by the lack of actual adversity in the case.  It addressed that issue in 
part by quoting Witkin that for the traditional requirement of opposing parties, 
“the court has simply substituted the practical requirement of opposing 
counsel. . . .  The danger of the friendly suit displacing litigation by the real parties 
in interest is minimized by a liberal practice of allowing intervention or its 
equivalent ⎯ briefs and oral argument by amici curiae.”  (3 Witkin, Cal. 
Procedure (2005 supp.) Actions, § 77, p. 141, second italics added.)  The court 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
17
that circumstance, who was neither a defendant nor an authentic real party, could 
be considered an opposing party within the meaning of section 1021.5. 
 
Moreover, as we have stated, “ ‘[T]he fundamental objective of the [private 
attorney general] doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important public policies 
by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigants in such cases.’ ” 
(Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 565.)  Given the 
existence of state defendants, and their uncontroverted liability for attorney fees, 
making the California Business Council also liable for those fees is not necessary 
to fulfill that purpose. 
 
Furthermore, construing section 1021.5 to allow liability against the 
California Business Council would be contrary to the judicial policy discussed 
above of welcoming amici curiae in order to “facilitate informed judicial 
consideration of a wide variety of information and points of view that may bear on 
important legal questions.”  (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 
405, fn. 14.)  The role of an amicus curiae becomes more, not less, important when 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
then stated that the above analysis “has some application to this case given the 
character of the [California Business Council] and the . . . ferocity of their 
responses.”  When the court nonetheless expressed some uncertainty regarding 
adversity with respect to the General Services Administration, Connerly’s counsel 
himself stated: “Again, the [California Business Council] we believe provide[s] 
the adversity.”  In making its final decision that sufficient adversity existed, the 
trial court again referenced the above discussion in Witkin and the “vigorousness” 
of the arguments presented in the court.  It is therefore clear that the California 
Business Council’s participation in the lawsuit was integral to the trial court’s 
determination that there was sufficient adversity to permit the lawsuit to go 
forward. 
 
18
a supposedly opposing party curtails or altogether withdraws its participation in 
the litigation, as largely occurred in the present case, thereby depriving the court 
of reasonable counterarguments to a plaintiff’s position.  Although the California 
Business Council’s role in the litigation was greater than that of the typical amicus 
curiae, its basic function was the same: to advocate a position not out of a direct 
interest in the litigation but from its own views of what is legally correct and 
beneficial to the public interest.  The policy of encouraging amicus curiae 
participation is not compatible with a rule that would place such a litigant at risk 
for attorney fees.  While liability for attorney fees under section 1021.5 is based on 
statute rather than judicial policy, we can discern no indication that the Legislature 
that enacted section 1021.5 intended to undermine the above policy by penalizing 
with attorney fees those in the California Business Council’s position. 
 
Our observation that the state agencies in this case largely declined to 
defend the challenged statutes does not imply that these agencies committed 
misconduct.  Although under article III, section 3.5 of the California Constitution, 
state agencies are obliged to continue to enforce statutes that appear to them to be 
unconstitutional (see Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 1055, 1082-1084), whether they have an obligation to defend such statutes 
in court is a complex issue, which we need not decide here.  Nonetheless, the state, 
through its elected representatives, possessed the power, and indeed the exclusive 
power, to abandon or change the statutory scheme.  Because it declined to do so, 
the burden of paying Connerly’s attorney fees is properly imposed on the state, 
rather than on an amicus curiae that steps into the breach to advocate for the 
 
19
undefended statutes.6 
 
We therefore hold that the California Business Council may not be held 
liable for section 1021.5 fees. 
 
III. 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming an award of attorney fees 
against the California Business Council is reversed. 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
                                              
6  
Both the California Business Council and Connerly cite in support of their 
positions cases involving parties that formally intervened in litigation.  (See 
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes (1989) 491 U.S. 754 (Zipes); 
Charles v. Daley (7th Cir. 1988) 846 F.2d 1057.)  Under California law, at least, 
an intervenor is considered a full-fledged party to an action by virtue of the order 
authorizing the intervention.  (Hospital Council of Northern Calif. v. Superior 
Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 331, 336; see 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) 
§ 207, p. 265.)  In Charles v. Daley, the intervenor acted on behalf of the 
defendant’s position, and the court concluded that attorney fees against the 
intervenor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988 was warranted.  In Zipes, the 
intervenor union acted more as a plaintiff than as defendant, arguing against the 
use of seniority rights as a remedy for past discrimination that would adversely 
affect its membership.  (Zipes, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 757.)  Without deciding issues 
not before us, we note that neither of these cases is particular apposite to the 
present one.  The California Business Council is not an intervenor, and is not 
acting as a plaintiff pursuing its own pecuniary interests. 
 
20
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Connerly v. State Personnel Board 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 5/14/04 – 3d Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S125502 
Date Filed: March 2, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Lloyd Connelly 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Pacific Legal Foundation, Anthony T. Caso, Deborah J. La Fetra and Timothy Sandefur for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Ralph D. Black for Defendants and Respondents Board of Governors of the California Community 
Colleges and Thomas J. Nussbaum, Chancellor of the California Community Colleges. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Louis R. Mauro, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Van Aken and 
Leslie R. Lopez, Deputy Attorney Generals, for Defendants and Respondents Phil Angelides, Treasurer of 
the State of California, Joan Wilson, Director of the California State Lottery and the California State 
Lottery Commission. 
 
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents State Personnel Board and Steve Westly, State Controller. 
 
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Jeffrey L. Bleich, Anne M. Voigts and John C. Day for Real Parties in Interest 
and Appellants. 
 
Hugh F. Young, Jr., and Harvey M. Grossman for The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest and Appellants. 
 
21
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Timothy Sandefur 
Pacific Legal Foundation 
3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200 
Sacramento, CA  95834 
(916) 419-7111 
 
Jeffrey L. Bleich 
Munger, Tolles & Olson 
560 Mission Street, 27th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105-2907 
(415) 512-4000