Case Title: SEIVEWRIGHT v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-56

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
SEIVEWRIGHT v. STATE2000 WY 1247 P.3d 24Case Number: 98-56Decided: 05/31/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

Stanley SEIVEWRIGHT, III, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

                                 

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

  

    Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; and T. Alan Elrod, Assistant Public Defender. Argument by Mr. 
Elrod.

     
Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Kimberly A. Baker, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Baker.

 

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

 

    
LEHMAN, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]          A Natrona County jury found 
Stanley Seivewright III guilty of conspiracy, aggravated robbery, and aggravated 
burglary. On appeal, Seivewright's complaints revolve around the testimony of an 
orthodontist who concluded Seivewright had taken a bite from a piece of cheese 
found in the victim's kitchen. His chief complaint is that, despite repeated 
discovery requests, the State did not disclose the orthodontist's report and 
curriculum vitae. Because we conclude that the district court erred in failing 
to take any action to determine whether its discovery order had been violated, 
we reverse and remand for a new trial.

 

                                     
ISSUES

 

[¶2]          Seivewright presents the 
following issues: Did discovery violations and evidentiary errors deny Appellant 
a fair trial?

 

a. Did the State's failure to disclose information 
about an orthodontist which the State proffered as an expert deprive Appellant 
of his right to confront the witnesses against him through effective 
cross-examination?

 

b. Did the district court's failure to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on Dr. Huber's testimony deprive Appellant of a fair trial 
as it invited the jury to convict Appellant based on inadmissible 
evidence?

 

c. Can the combined prejudice of the State's refusal 
to abide by the district court's discovery order and the district court's 
erroneous rulings be dismissed as harmless error?

 

   [¶3]   The State of Wyoming restates the 
issue: Whether appellant received a fair trial?

 

                                     
FACTS

 

[¶4]          The victim testified to the 
following events. Around 9 a.m. on October 28, 1996, two masked men entered the 
Casper home of the victim as she and her two-year-old daughter watched 
television. The shorter of the two men pointed a gun at the victim and did the talking, 
asking the victim where her `stuff' was. When the victim proved uncooperative, 
the shorter man taped the victim's hands together with duct tape while the 
taller man held a gun. After the victim managed to break free from the initial 
taping, the shorter man then alternated between hitting the victim, taping her, 
and telling her to shut up. The shorter man also held a gun to the back of the 
victim's head and pulled the trigger. Although the victim heard a click, no 
bullet fired. The taping job was finally completed when the men taped the 
victim's head and hands to the headboard of her bed.

 

[¶5]          After the intruders left, 
the victim freed herself and telephoned the police. Her home had been ransacked, 
though it seemed only her wallet, containing $700, was missing from inside the 
home. Gone, too, was the victim's van, which was recovered a few days later. The 
victim also noticed, on a kitchen counter, a block of cheese with a bite taken 
out of it. The victim reported that no one in her family was responsible for the 
bite of cheese, and the block of cheese was taken into 
evidence.

 

[¶6]          After an investigation, 
Seivewright was arrested on November 21, 1996, and charged with aggravated 
burglary, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy. A search warrant issued permitting 
law enforcement to obtain a dental impression (dentition) from Seivewright, and 
the State retained Dr. Emerick Huber, a local orthodontist, to take 
Seivewright's dentition and to make an impression from the 
cheese.

 

 [¶7]        Identity was the main issue at the 
trial of Seivewright and his codefendant. Over Seivewright's objection, Dr. 
Huber testified. On the basis of his comparison of the impressions from the 
cheese with Seivewright's dentition, Dr. Huber concluded that Seivewright was 
the person who bit the cheese. Seivewright offered no expert testimony on the 
subject.

 

[¶8]          The jury found Seivewright 
guilty of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy. The jury 
could not reach a unanimous verdict on the same charges against Seivewright's 
codefendant, and a hung jury resulted on all three charges. The jury further 
determined that Seivewright is a habitual criminal, and he was sentenced to a 
term of 20 to 25 years. This appeal followed.

 

                                   
DISCUSSION

 

  
Discovery Violations

 

 [¶9]        Seivewright argues the State 
failed to disclose Dr. Huber's report and curriculum vitae, materials 
Seivewright contends were discoverable pursuant to a district court order. The 
district court's discovery order directed "[p]ursuant to Rule 26.2 of the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, to be produced before trial begins, any 
written or recorded statement of a witness . . . in the possession of the 
attorney for the State of Wyoming or which the attorney for the State of Wyoming 
may reasonably obtain and which relate to the subject matter about which the 
witness . . . will testify."

 

[¶10]       Prior to trial, Seivewright 
filed a "Motion for Daubert1 Hearing," which, in addition to 
requesting a hearing on the admissibility of expert testimony, requested 
"discovery related to this issue such as any reports, calculations, tests, 
examinations, and any other information this doctor used in arriving at his 
conclusions, as well as a copy of this doctor's curriculum vitae." The trial 
court did not rule on this request for discovery, and the State did not reply to 
the request. The State correctly points out that Seivewright did not schedule a 
pretrial hearing with the trial court for consideration of these matters.  However, immediately before Dr. Huber 
testified, Seivewright requested a hearing to clarify what Dr. Huber's testimony 
would be and demanded the documents he requested in his pretrial motion. 
Specifically, Seivewright's counsel informed the court that, despite repeated 
requests to the prosecutor, he had not received a copy of Dr. Huber's curriculum 
vitae. Without argument from the State, the trial court denied Seivewright's 
motion and allowed the State to proceed with Dr. Huber's testimony "subject to 
objections to particular questions." After Dr. Huber completed his trial 
testimony, Seivewright moved to strike Dr. Huber's testimony, arguing the State 
failed to provide him with the report or the curriculum vitae in violation of 
the discovery order. The trial court denied this motion, without 
explanation.

 

[¶11]       The district court's failure 
to do anything to determine if there was a discovery violation is contrary to 
our case law and that of other jurisdictions which have considered the proper 
procedure for determining whether a statement or report of a State's witness 
should be produced upon demand by the accused. We have 
written:

 

Although a defendant cannot obtain a review or 
combing of any or all reports having to do with interviews of witnesses, he is 
entitled to the production of a specific "statement." If he makes a prima facie 
showing of a probable existence of a specific document but the State either 
denies its existence or that it is a "statement" within the definition of the 
rule, the trial court has the duty to determine such issues by in camera 
inspection or otherwise.

 

Hubbard v. State, 618 P.2d 553, 556 (Wyo. 1980) (citing U.S. v. Nickell, 552 F.2d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 1977)) 
(court has "inherent power to require the prosecution to produce [witness 
statements] so that the defense may get the full benefit of cross-examination 
and the truth-finding process may be enhanced.") (quoting U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231, 95 S. Ct. 2160, 2166, 45 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975)); Harney v. U.S., 306 F.2d 523, 533 (1st Cir. 1962); U.S. v. Robinson, 585 F.2d 274, 280-81 (7th Cir. 
1978) (once defendant meets burden of specifying with reasonable particularity 
that a certain document exists, that there is reason to believe it is a 
"statement,"  and that the 
government failed to provide it in violation of the Jencks Act, "a court must 
then conduct an in camera inspection to determine whether the document is both 
relevant and a competent `statement.'"); U.S. v. Resnick, 483 F.2d 354, 358 (5th 
Cir. 1973); Jordan v. U.S., 633 A.2d 373, 375 (D.C.App. 1993) (The defendant has 
the burden of moving for production and is entitled to crossexamine witnesses to 
probe for the information. "The trial judge has the affirmative duty to 
determine, out of the presence of the jury, whether statements exist and are in 
the possession of the government, and if so, whether they qualify as statements 
under the [Jencks] Act." The trial court must conduct whatever inquiry is 
necessary to aid the judge in discharging this responsibility to enforce the 
statute. "The duty to determine whether a statement . . . exists `rests with the 
trial judge; neither party bears a burden of proof or persuasion that may skew 
the result.'"); Annotation, Proper Procedure for Determining Whether Alleged 
Statement or Report of Government Witness Should be Produced on Accused's 
Demand, Under Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. § 3500), 1 A.L.R. Fed. 252    (1969).2

 

[¶12]      Seivewright made a "prima facie 
showing" of the probable existence of two statements, the report and the 
curriculum vitae, in his pretrial motion and again at trial. At the trial court 
level, the State neither denied their existence nor argued they were not 
statements within the definition found in W.R.Cr.P. 26.2. The documents were 
clearly in existence or reasonably obtainable before the discovery deadline. The 
State attempted to have the doctor's March 4, 1997 signed report admitted into 
evidence, and the doctor repeatedly referred to the report during his testimony. 
The doctor also admitted he had a curriculum vitae but failed to send it to the 
State. In addition, there is strong reason to believe both the curriculum vitae 
and the report are material statements under the rule because both could qualify 
as "written statement[s] . . . adopted or approved by the witness." W.R.Cr.P. 
26.2 (1). In the case of an expert witness, in which qualifications go to both 
admissibility and weight, a vitae is material information by which the opposing 
party's counsel can challenge the expert's qualifications and credibility. See, 
e.g., U.S. v. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. 57, 63 (D.Mass. 1994) (informant's 
handwritten list of criminal history is a "statement"). A signed report 
including measurements, observations, and conclusions can likewise be used to 
impeach the expert's analysis and conclusions. But cf Fortner v. State, 932 P.2d 1283, 1286-87 (Wyo. 1997) (decided under W.R.Cr.P. 16; no evidence supported 
defendant's claim that expert conducted tests or experiments). When a district 
court fails to consider a defendant's claim that the State is violating a 
discovery order and, therefore, the rules of criminal procedure, it fails to 
perform its duty. Hubbard, 618 P.2d  at 556. When Seivewright moved for 
production of the statements, the trial court had a duty to determine, by in 
camera inspection or otherwise, whether the documents should be 
produced.

 

 [¶13]     In accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 26.2, 
if a party elects not to comply with an order to deliver a statement, the 
district court has three options for sanctioning that behavior. The rule 
requires that the trial court "shall order" (1) that the witness not be 
permitted to testify; or (2) that the testimony of the witness be stricken from 
the record; or (3) if the attorney for the State elects not to comply, the court 
shall declare a mistrial if required in the interest of justice. W.R.Cr.P. 26.2 
(e). The rule is mandatory in all respects; it does not allow the district court 
any discretion to refuse to act in the face of uncontradicted allegations of 
discovery violations in a criminal prosecution. Allowing Seivewright to object 
to "particular questions" at trial is not one of the sanctions mandated by the 
rule. Thus, it cannot be argued that the district court's ruling was within the 
parameters of the rule despite its failure to determine if the discovery order 
had been violated.

 

[¶14]       When Seivewright alleged the 
State failed to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 26.2, the district court should have 
ordered the State to submit the documents for in camera inspection or held a 
hearing to determine whether the report and the curriculum vitae fell within the 
purview of the rule or the pretrial discovery order. Failure to take any action 
at all violated the rule and was reversible error.

 

[¶15]       Before moving on, we must 
address an issue raised at oral argument before this court. In the process of 
moving to strike Dr. Huber's testimony, Seivewright's counsel informed the 
district court that, while he had never been provided a copy of Dr. Huber's 
report, he had received a letter stating Dr. Huber's conclusions. At oral 
argument in this court, the State asserted that the report and the letter to 
counsel were alternate terms used to describe the same document. However, we 
have neither the letter nor the report before us to verify this assertion. If 
counsel believed assertion of that fact was necessary at oral argument, the 
record should have been supplemented by the State in accordance with W.R.A.P. 
3.04. No motion to supplement the record was made.

 

  
Confrontation Clause

 

[¶16]       Seivewright also contends 
the State's failure to provide discovery of Dr. Huber's report and curriculum 
vitae deprived him of his constitutional right to confrontation. Because we are 
confident that, upon reversal, the district court will require compliance with 
its discovery order, this issue will not arise again, and we need not address it 
here.

 

  Expert 
Testimony

 

[¶17]       Seivewright complains the 
district court erred in failing to grant a hearing to determine the 
admissibility of Dr. Huber's testimony. When determining the admissibility of 
expert testimony, the district court's gatekeeping function requires it to 
perform several duties:

 

First, the district court must determine whether the 
methodology or technique used by the expert to reach his conclusions is 
reliable. If so, the court must determine whether the proposed testimony "fits" 
the facts of the particular case.

 

Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 471 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993)). In Bunting 
v. Jamieson, we cited Daubert's non-exclusive list of four criteria to be used 
to guide the trial court's assessment of reliability: 1) whether the theory or 
technique in question can be and has been tested; 2) whether it has been 
subjected to peer review and publication; 3) its known or potential rate of 
error along with the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique's operation; and 4) the degree of acceptance within the relevant 
scientific community. Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d  at 472.  These criteria, however, cannot be 
applied in every case: "[t]he initial step in reviewing the admissibility of 
expert testimony is the determination whether the Daubert factors apply to the 
specific testimony at issue. Where they are reasonable measures of reliability, 
these factors should be considered." Id. at 475. We also emphasized that 
methodology

 

should be distinguished from the conclusion of the 
expert. Thus, a trial judge need not and should not determine the scientific 
validity of the conclusions offered by an expert witness. Rather, to decide 
admissibility, the trial judge should 
only consider the soundness of the general scientific principles or reasoning on 
which the expert relies and the propriety of the methodology applying those 
principles to the specific facts of the case.

 

  Id. at 
472-73.

 

[¶18]       In performing our review, it 
is well established that the decision of the district court to admit or reject 
expert testimony is a decision solely within that court's discretion. 
Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 438 (Wyo. 1993); Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1022 (Wyo. 1993); Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Wyo. 1987). 
Recently, we expanded on that standard of review.

 

The 
trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an 
expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other 
proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides 
whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is reliable. Our opinion in 
Joiner [General Electric Co. V. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1997)] makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an 
abuse-of-discretion standard when it "review[s] a trial court's decision 
to admit or exclude expert testimony." 
522 U.S.  at 138-39, 118 S. Ct. 512. That standard applies as much to the trial 
court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate 
conclusion. . . . Thus, whether Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, 
reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law 
grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.

 

Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d  at 470 (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999)).  
"Otherwise, the trial judge would lack the discretionary authority needed 
both to avoid unnecessary `reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the 
reliability of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted, and to require 
appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases where cause for 
questioning the expert's reliability arises." Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct.  at 1176. The district court's decision to 
decline to hold a reliability hearing is therefore reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Id.; U.S. v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1266 (10th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. 
Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1999).

 

 [¶19]     Because Seivewright's motion for a 
Daubert hearing provided the district court with little reason to hold an 
evidentiary hearing to analyze Dr. Huber's testimony, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's refusal to hold such a hearing. Seivewright's 
motion provided the district court neither with authority to establish the 
methodology or technique being applied was unreliable nor did it assert that 
another expert would refute reliability. In short, Seivewright did nothing more 
than boldly assert that Dr. Huber's testimony was unreliable. Under these 
circumstances, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to hold a 
Daubert hearing.

 

 [¶20]     Our conclusion on this issue 
requires examination of the scientific principle being applied. Bite mark 
identification is based on the theory of uniqueness. "Identification of a 
suspect by matching his dentition with a bite mark found on the victim of a 
crime [or a substance] rests on the theory that each person's dentition is 
unique." 1 Paul C. Giannelli and Edward J. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence, p. 
583 (3rd ed. 1999); State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1979). 
Although several methods of bite mark analysis have been reported, "[a]ll 
methods involve three steps: (1) registration of the bite mark and the suspect's 
dentition, (2) comparison of the dentition and bite mark, and (3) evaluation of 
the points of similarity or dissimilarity." Imwinkelried at 
585.

 

 [¶21]     Seivewright does not seriously 
contend that bite mark identification is not a proper subject for expert 
testimony. Indeed, the courts faced with this question have unanimously 
concluded that bite mark comparison is a proper subject for expert testimony. 
See Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence Tending to Identify Accused by His Own 
Bite Marks, 77 A.L.R.3d 1122 (1977 & 1999 Supp.). While the majority of 
cases involve flesh bites, courts have also approved bite mark identification in 
cases involving various foods. See State v. Ortiz, 198 Conn. 220, 502 A.2d 400, 
401 (1985) (partially eaten apple); Banks v. State, 725 So. 2d 711, 714-16 (Miss. 
1997) (bologna sandwich; conviction reversed because state destroyed sandwich 
before defense could examine); Doyle v. State, 159 Tex.Crim. 310, 263 S.W.2d 779 
(1954) (cheese, but not raised as issue on appeal). Given the wide acceptance of 
bite mark identification testimony and Seivewright's failure to present evidence 
challenging the methodology, we find no abuse of discretion in the district 
court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing to analyze Dr. Huber's 
testimony.  The district court was 
simply exercising its "discretionary authority . . . to avoid unnecessary 
`reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert's 
methods is properly taken for granted." 
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct.  at 1176, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238. While this is not true for all subjects of expert testimony, we are 
comfortable that it is true under the circumstances of the case at 
bar.

 

 [¶22]     Based on the foregoing, we also 
conclude that Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, is distinguishable. There we 
wrote:

 

[W]e believe that the trial court's decision to 
dispose of a case by precluding expert testimony requires the same level of 
judicial explanation supporting its discretionary decision as the admission 
of testimony under the catch-all 
exception. A single conclusory statement applying one nondispositive Daubert 
factor is insufficient.

 

Id. at 475. Read too 
broadly, this statement could be interpreted to require findings in every case 
of expert testimony. However, not every subject of expert testimony is 
appropriate for application of the Daubert factors. Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d  at 475.  Moreover, unlike the 
expert testimony in Bunting v. Jamieson, the reliability of the expert's methods 
(bite mark identification) can be taken for granted in this case, and findings 
were unnecessary. On a related note, to the extent Seivewright challenges Dr. 
Huber's conclusion that Seivewright bit the cheese, these challenges go to the 
weight of the testimony, not to reliability of the methodology (bite mark 
identification), and are matters best left to a jury. Id. at 472-73. We find no 
abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to hold a Daubert 
hearing.

 

 [¶23]     Seivewright also complains that 
the district court's failure to hold a hearing resulted in the admission of 
inadmissible testimony. He contends the testimony was inadmissible because Dr. 
Huber was not qualified to offer expert testimony in the field and that the 
doctor's admissions under cross examination bear this out. In reviewing the 
qualification issue, we keep in mind that the determination of the qualification 
of a witness as an expert is vested within the discretion of the trial court and 
that determination will be overturned only when an abuse of discretion is shown. 
Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d  at 1022; Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 366 (Wyo. 
1991); Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579, 583 (Wyo. 1986). Unless a expert 
witness is clearly unqualified, deficiencies in qualifications normally go to 
the weight accorded the witness's testimony rather than its admissibility. 
Betzle, 847 P.2d  at 1023.

 

 [¶24]     In attacking Dr. Huber's 
qualifications, Seivewright's chief complaint is that Dr. Huber was not 
qualified to offer expert testimony because he is not certified by the American 
Board of Forensic Odontologists (ABFO), which has established standards for 
qualification to testify as an expert in the field of forensic odontology. 
However, Seivewright directs us to no authority establishing that ABFO 
certification is a prerequisite to testifying as an expert in the field of 
forensic odontology. Indeed, an expert need only have sufficient "knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education" to qualify as an expert. W.R.E. 702. 
Therefore, the question is simply whether Dr. Huber was qualified to testify 
despite his lack of ABFO certification.

 

 [¶25]     The record establishes that Dr. 
Huber has been a practicing orthodontist for nearly 20 years. In addition to 
being a board certified orthodontist with a master's degree in the field, he 
previously qualified to testify as an expert. He has also worked in the field of 
forensic odontology, for the local coroner, since 1980 and has completed 
numerous courses in that field. Given these credentials, we can find no abuse of 
discretion in permitting Dr. Huber to testify despite his lack of ABFO 
certification. See People v. Williams, 128 Ill. App.3d 384, 83 Ill.Dec. 720, 470 N.E.2d 1140, 1150 (1984) (Trial court properly allowed dentist to testify as 
bite mark identification expert despite lack of board certification in field of 
forensic odontology. "An expert need only have experience and knowledge which is 
not common to the world.").

 

[¶26]       Seivewright also complains 
Dr. Huber was not qualified to testify because of admissions the doctor made 
under cross-examination. In addition to admitting he was not an expert, but 
"most qualified," Dr. Huber stated that, without training as a dentist or 
orthodontist, even Seivewright's trial counsel could have rendered an opinion on 
whether a particular person took a bite of a piece of cheese. It is, however, 
the function of the jury to sort out the weaknesses and the strengths of expert 
testimony. Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d  at 1023; Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307, 
1309 (Wyo. 1975). "Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Bunting v. 
Jamieson, 984 P.2d  at 471 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S.  at 596, 113 S.Ct. at 2798).

 

[¶27]       We find an analogous 
situation in Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d  at 1310.  There, a highway patrolman offered 
expert testimony on the speed of the plaintiffs vehicle at the time of its 
collision with the defendant's. On appeal, the plaintiff complained the 
patrolman's testimony was improper because he admitted he was not an expert. 
This court wrote:

  

With some modesty, the highway patrolman, on 
cross-examination, in answer to the question, `You don't qualify yourself as an 
expert?', replied, `No.'  Regardless 
of how the witness classified himself, he did [d]o a pretty good job and was expert, in the 
light of his experience and knowledge and ability to use the skid calculator 
tools given to him by the highway department, which had an accepted basis in 
accident investigation. Apparently, the jury was not impressed that he was as 
uninformed as the cross-examiner attempted to make him 
out.

 

Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d  
at 1310. The situation here is similar, and we conclude Dr. Huber's statements 
go to the weight to be given his testimony, and not to 
admissibility.

 

[¶28]       Finally, Dr. Huber's 
testimony was more involved than his admission under cross-examination would 
indicate and thus helpful to the trier of fact. Not only did he make the 
impressions of the cheese and Seivewright's teeth, Dr. Huber performed a more 
thorough examination than the naked-eye analysis suggested by defense counsel. 
Dr. Huber explained how he measured the teeth spacings in reaching his 
conclusions, explained in detail the peculiar idiosyncracies found in 
Seivewright's dentition, and ultimately concluded that Seivewright had bitten 
the cheese. The testimony was thus helpful to the trier of fact, and we find no 
abuse of discretion in its admission.

 

                                   
CONCLUSION

 

 [¶29]    
The district court's failure to determine compliance with its discovery 
order requires reversal in this instance. The judgment and sentence entered in 
the district court is reversed, and this case is remanded for a new 
trial.

 

FOOTNOTES

1 Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).

 2 The 
substance of the Jencks Act was later adopted into F.R.Cr.P. 26.2., which is 
comparable, although not identical, to W.R.Cr.P. 26.2.  See 3B Charles Alan Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Criminal, App. C at 274-75 (1999); Campbell v. U.S., 365 U.S. 85, 81 S. Ct. 421, 5 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1961); State v. Watson, 173 W. Va. 
553,  318 S.E.2d 603, 609 (1984) 
("Because many of the provisions of the Jencks Act are incorporated into Rule 
26.2, commentators, as well as courts, have used Jencks Act cases to interpret 
it.")

 

    

    
THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, with whom HILL, Justice, 
joins.

 

 [¶30]      I dissent from the 
resolution of this case according to the majority opinion. It treats the failure 
to furnish the curriculum vitae of an expert witness to the defense as error per 
se. I have some question as to whether it constituted error at all, but I am 
convinced that, conceding error for purposes of this debate, any error was 
harmless. The majority opinion, with respect to the claims of error by Stanley 
Seivewright, can be briefly summarized. First, it holds that the failure of the 
trial court to take any of the steps articulated in W.R.Cr.P. 26.2 was 
reversible error. Then it is noted that Seivewright had received a letter 
stating Dr. Huber's conclusions. The claim of violation of the constitutional 
right to confrontation was not addressed, as well it should not be. The majority 
opinion then addresses the failure to hold a so-called Daubert1 hearing, and rules that no abuse of 
discretion occurred with respect to the failure to hold such a hearing. Next, 
the majority refutes the argument that the orthodontist was not qualified to 
offer expert testimony. The net effect is that no error occurred in the 
admission of the testimony of the orthodontist into evidence, but reversible 
error occurred because the trial court never ordered the production of the 
report or the curriculum vitae prior to trial.

 

 [¶31]     One would normally expect some 
explanation of how that failure was prejudicial, but prejudice is simply 
assumed, not explained. Before the orthodontist testified, defense counsel 
offered these objections:

 

Your Honor, I had filed a motion I believe back in 
late May, where I requested a Daubert hearing concerning the State's evidence of 
their expert witness, Dr. Huber. And I would request again that we have a hearing  a Daubert hearing  with respect to 
that type of testimony.

 

My 
understanding is that the State's evidence is going to be that the dentist can 
offer testimony concerning dental impressions of this piece of cheese that has 
been admitted into evidence.

 

I 
would challenge this type of testimony as being  as not being Proven to have 
been scientifically reliable, and I think we need a hearing to clarify what 
exactly the testimony is.

 

I 
would further add, Your Honor, that when I filed this motion, I had requested 
that I be provided with the dentist's credentials, and I have talked to [the 
prosecutor], I believe, a couple of times and have asked him just before I 
approached the podium here today, and I asked if he had the dentist's 
credentials, and he does not.

 

So 
I have not seen what the dentist's credentials are and whether or not he's ever 
done this type of thing before or whether or not he's qualified to do it. And I 
feel those are issues that we need to get into before he is allowed to testify. 
And I would demand that the State provide those documents to me before the 
witness takes the stand and testifies in this courtroom.

 

 [¶32]     Defense counsel then made no 
effort, nor was any request submitted, to conduct a voir dire of the 
orthodontist prior to his testimony being received. Defense counsel did 
successfully object to the admission into evidence of the report, which the 
orthodontist referred to throughout his testimony. When the conclusion of the 
orthodontist was offered, defense counsel renewed the objection previously 
stated, and objected to testimony relating to the cheese because it had not been 
admitted into evidence for failure to establish the chain of custody. The 
orthodontist then explained what he had done in order to compare Seivewright's 
dental characteristics with the block of cheese. On cross-examination, defense 
counsel questioned the orthodontist extensively about his education, special 
training and experience with respect to testifying. In the course of his testimony, the orthodontist testified that he 
never had accomplished the delivery of his curriculum vitae to the district 
attorney.

 

[¶33]       At the conclusion of the 
orthodontist's cross-examination and redirect examination, defense counsel 
renewed his objections, saying:

 

Your Honor, I would again like to renew my Motion to 
Strike the Testimony of Dr. Huber. I believe it is inadmissible for two reasons. 
One is that I believe my request for a Daubert hearing is now deemed 
appropriate. I believe the doctor testified to scientific types of information, 
which I believe had to be deemed appropriate prior to his 
testimony.

 

Also, the second reason I would move to strike is 
that his entire testimony was in violation of this Court's discovery order. 
First off, we did not receive any information whatsoever dealing with his 
credentials, and obviously that affects 
my ability to cross-examine and to effectively represent my 
client.

 

Furthermore, he testified that he took calculations 
and notes of his analysis. Well, we had absolutely no information on his 
analysis. All we have is one letter basically  or stating his 
conclusions.

 

And, Your Honor, to effectively represent my client, 
I obviously need his analysis and any other information pertaining to that. And 
I believe any expert testifying  if they are going to testify to any scientific knowledge or anything involving any 
type of scientific analysis or mathematical analysis  the defense is entitled 
to that information prior to coming to court for being able to cross-examine 
him, and also for being able to evaluate that and determine whether or not we 
need to have someone else evaluate it and determine if it's valid or 
not.

 

Your Honor, the State has had months and months and 
months to provide that information. They had never    done so. The witness gets on 
the stand and says, "I just didn't provide my curriculum vital to the district 
attorney after being asked to do so, because I didn't get around to 
it."

 

Your Honor, that is no reason for my client to suffer 
prejudice when he's looking at life in the penitentiary, because this doctor 
didn't get around to it. For those reasons, Your Honor, I move to 
strike.

 

  (Emphasis added.) The nature of the 
prejudice suffered is not identified, beyond the claim that it is present, any 
more than it is identified in the majority opinion.

 

[¶34]      The foregoing tells me that 
Seivewright wanted neither the so-called report nor the curriculum vitae, but he 
wanted the opportunity to complain about not having them. Trial began on June 
30, 1997 and it continued through July 3, 1997. The Motion for Daubert Hearing 
was filed on May 27, 1997, and it recites, among other things, as a reason for 
the motion:

 

1.  The 
state has presented evidence to defense counsel that it intends to introduce 
evidence of bite analysis concerning the defendant. Specifically, the state 
intends to introduce evidence that the defendant took a bite out of a piece of 
cheese while inside the complaining witnesses' home. The state seized 
defendant's false teeth and had Emerick Huber, D.D.S., M.S., conduct an 
examination of the cheese as well as defendant's teeth. Dr. Huber concluded that 
defendant's dental impression matches the dental    
impression taken from the piece of cheese taken from the 
home.

 

It is clear to me that as of 
May 27, 1997, defense counsel had enough information to know what the 
orthodontist was going to testify about, and at least enough information to 
include his dental degree and his masters degree in the motion. The defense must 
have had a copy of the report, which was offered as a prosecution exhibit and 
excluded when Seivewright objected.

 

 [¶35]     The Stipulated Order Requiring 
Discovery was filed on March 7, 1997, but according to the orthodontist's 
testimony, his notes of measurements were discarded after he formulated his 
conclusion from the examination he conducted in late February, and likely were not 
available as of the time of the discovery order. In any event, there is nothing 
to demonstrate prejudice as a result of those notes not being available. The 
thrust of the orthodontist's testimony was not much more complicated than 
matching pieces of a picture puzzle.

 

 [¶36]     We have formalized in our Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and our Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure the 
concept of harmless error. The appellate rule provides:

 

Any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded by the reviewing court.

 

  W.R.A.P. 9.04. The criminal rule 
provides: 

(a) 
Harmless error.  Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.

 

W.R.Cr.P. 52 (a). We have 
declared that the criminal rule is procedural in nature, and it did not adjust 
the substantive law in any way. Hays v. State, 522 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Wyo. 
1974).

 

[¶37]       In applying these rules, we 
have said:

 

"If 
the trial court erred by admitting evidence, we then must ascertain whether the 
error affects any substantial rights of the accused, providing grounds for 
reversal, or whether it is harmless. The harmless error standard is set out in 
W.R.A.P. 9.04:

 

`Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing 
court.'

 

See also W.R.Cr.P. 52. An error is harmful if there 
is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to 
the defendant if the error had never occurred. Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 
1247 (Wyo. 1996); Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 641 (Wyo. 1996). To demonstrate 
harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under "circumstances which 
manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public 
sense of fair play.' Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990); see also 
Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 550 (Wyo. 1993)."

 

Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 
52-53 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1999)). The 
difficulty with the majority opinion in this case is that it does not articulate 
how these standards were satisfied any more than Seivewright does in his brief 
and argument.

 

[¶38]       It is clear from the record 
that prior availability of the report of the orthodontist and his curriculum 
vitae could not have affected the cross-examination by the defense attorney. The 
orthodontist testified that he substantially reported the curriculum vitae 
during direct examination by the prosecuting attorney. Defense counsel did not 
request the opportunity to voir dire the orthodontist prior to his testimony 
about the cheese and the dental impressions. Instead, he chose to attack that by 
cross-examination, which may have been a strategic decision. Counsel may have 
preferred that there be no ruling on the expert qualifications of the 
orthodontist prior to his testimony because had he objected to the 
qualifications, the trial judge obviously would have overruled that objection. 
It is abundantly clear from the record that the defense had available, at or 
prior to the cross-examination, the report of the orthodontist, although he 
testified that notes and measurements he made to construct his letter report had 
been destroyed.

 

[¶39]       The majority opinion does 
not include in the discussion of the facts other evidence that has a clear 
impact upon any prejudice to Seivewright. The day before the robbery, 
Seivewright told his neighbor that he and his co-defendant intended to rob some 
females on Pine Street, which is the street where the victim's home is located. 
The information given the neighbor included the fact that Seivewright would do 
the "manhandling" and the accomplice would do the talking. The victim testified 
she would have recognized Seivewright's voice since she had known him for three 
years. Seivewright's co-defendant's ex-girlfriend testified that Seivewright and 
the co-defendant stayed at her house overnight before the robbery. They left 
"the morning of the robbery around 8:45 a.m., and the robbery was initiated 
around 9:00 a.m. They returned about 10:00 a.m., divided some cash, and joked 
about the robbery, including the fact that they had taken the victim's van. The 
ex-girlfriend witnessed the two men changing clothes, and she saw Seivewright 
pull out a gun and lay it on a table. An inmate who had been in jail with 
Seivewright testified that he overheard Seivewright talking about the robbery, 
and later Seivewright told him that he had perpetrated the 
robbery.

 

[¶40]       All this makes it clear 
beyond any peradventure of any doubt that there was no "`reasonable possibility 
that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error 
had never occurred.'" Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 52 (quoting Solis, 981 P.2d at 36). 
Seivewright has failed to meet his burden of showing "`"circumstances which 
manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public 
sense of fair play."'" Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 52-53 (quoting Solis, 981 P.2d at 
36).  His conviction should be 
affirmed. The State of Wyoming, Natrona County, and the citizens should not have 
to bear the expense of another four-day trial in this case. It is not 
appropriate to impose that burden because of the identification of technical 
error.

 

  

Footnotes for the Dissent
 

1 Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).