Case Title: State v. Jennifer L. Ward

Citation: 2009 WI 60

Docket Number: 2007AP000079-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 60 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP79-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jennifer L. Ward, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 312 Wis. 2d 480, 751 N.W.2d 902 
(Ct. App. 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 8, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Oneida   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark Mangerson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
T. Christopher Kelly and Kelly, Habermehl & Bushaw, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by T. Christopher Kelly. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Mark 
A. Neuser, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 60
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP79-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF243) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jennifer L. Ward, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
JUN 30, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals,1 which 
affirmed the circuit court's judgment2 convicting defendant 
Jennifer L. Ward (Ward) of first-degree reckless homicide.  The 
dispositive 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
is 
whether 
incriminating 
statements Ward made during the police investigation subsequent 
to the death of her seven-week old nephew were not voluntary and 
therefore, should have been suppressed.   We conclude that once 
                                                 
1 State v. Ward, No. 2007AP79-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2008). 
2 The Honorable Mark A. Mangerson of Oneida County presided. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
2 
 
in police custody, Ward knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
waived her Fifth Amendment rights to silence and to counsel and 
that under the totality of the circumstances, her statements 
were 
voluntarily 
made 
because 
neither 
her 
personal 
characteristics 
nor 
police 
conduct 
resulted 
in 
coerced 
statements.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
On the morning of December 1, 2004, Ward called 911 to 
inform police that her seven-week old nephew, who had been left 
in Ward's exclusive care by the child's parents five days 
earlier 
on 
November 
26, 
2004, 
had 
stopped 
breathing.  
Tragically, the child was later pronounced dead.  Ward was taken 
to the hospital along with the child, and once there, was 
interviewed by Detective Sergeant Glenn Schaepe (Schaepe) of the 
Oneida County Sheriff's Department.   
¶3 
During this recorded interview, which started at 9:30 
a.m., Schaepe repeatedly informed Ward that she was not under 
arrest, and was free to leave at any time.  In addition, 
hospital personnel came and went at various times throughout the 
interview.  However, Ward's family members were not permitted to 
enter the room.  While Ward was being questioned, she made 
incriminating statements suggesting that she was responsible for 
the death of her nephew.  Schaepe also told her that her 
daughter had told him that she had seen Ward shaking the child; 
however, Ward's daughter saw Ward shake the child only when Ward 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
3 
 
was administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) at the 
direction of 911 phone staff. 
¶4 
Later that day, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, Ward 
accompanied the police to an interrogation room at the police 
station, where she was informed of her rights pursuant to 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Ward signed a Miranda 
waiver form, and was then questioned for several hours by 
Schaepe and his partner, Detective Sergeant Jim Wood (Wood).  
During this interview, Ward made incriminating statements to the 
police, further implicating her in the death of her nephew.   
¶5 
While Ward was being questioned, Attorney Jeffrey 
Jackomino (Jackomino), who had been retained by Ward's husband 
to represent Ward, appeared at the police station and requested 
to speak with Ward.  Schaepe left the interrogation room, spoke 
with Jackomino, and informed Jackomino that he would not be 
permitted to speak with Ward because Ward had not personally 
invoked her right to counsel.  Ward never unequivocally asked 
for an attorney, and Jackomino was never permitted to see Ward 
while she was being questioned.  The officers also did not 
inform Ward that her husband was outside of the interrogation 
room, even though she asked several times about him. 
¶6 
Around 5:20 p.m., the detectives ceased questioning, 
and Ward was informed that she would be spending the night in 
jail.  Schaepe informed Ward that she would not be permitted to 
make any phone calls, although at approximately 7:00 p.m., 
Shaepe instructed the jailer to inform Ward that she would be 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
4 
 
permitted to call a lawyer if she so requested.  Ward never 
asked to call a lawyer. 
¶7 
The following morning, Ward asked to speak with the 
detectives.  She was brought into the interrogation room, and 
Schaepe and Wood questioned her a third time.  Ward again was 
given Miranda warnings.  She asked several times to speak with 
her husband, but the officers did not permit her to do so.  Ward 
never asked to speak with a lawyer, however, and she once again 
made incriminating statements implicating herself in the death 
of her nephew.  Ward was subsequently charged with first-degree 
reckless homicide. 
¶8 
Prior to trial, Ward moved to suppress her statements.  
She challenged the interview at the hospital, arguing that her 
statements were involuntary because she had been in pain at the 
time and had suffered one or more seizures.  Ward also argued 
that her statements were inadmissible because of Schaepe's 
incomplete and misleading statement about the circumstances 
under which Ward's daughter said she had seen Ward shaking the 
baby.   
¶9 
With respect to her statements at the police station, 
Ward argued that they were involuntary because (1) she was not 
initially permitted to make phone calls during the night in 
jail; (2) she was not informed that her lawyer wanted to speak 
with her; (3) she was not informed of her husband's status and 
location; and (4) she was not adequately informed of her right 
to counsel when she discussed calling a lawyer.  
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
5 
 
¶10 The circuit court denied Ward's suppression motion 
with respect to all three questioning sessions.  Regarding the 
first session in the hospital, the court concluded that Ward was 
not in custody because her movement was not restricted; she was 
told several times that she was not under arrest and was free to 
leave at any time; and hospital personnel were entering and 
exiting Ward's room on a regular basis.  Because Ward was not in 
custody, Miranda warnings were not required, and the circuit 
court merely considered the voluntariness of Ward's statements 
under the totality of the circumstances.   
¶11 The circuit court found that Ward did not possess 
personal characteristics suggesting that she was particularly 
susceptible to coercion, and found that Schaepe did not use 
tactics sufficient to result in coercion.  Even though Schaepe 
did not tell Ward the circumstances under which Ward's daughter 
said that she saw Ward shaking the baby, the court noted that 
police deception does not necessarily make subsequent statements 
inadmissible.  As a result, the court held, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, that Ward's statements were 
voluntary and therefore admissible. 
¶12 With respect to the second questioning session, which 
took place at the police station, the State conceded that Ward 
was in custody.  The circuit court concluded that Ward 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived her rights to 
remain silent and to have counsel present.  The court held that 
Ward's statements made subsequent to that waiver were voluntary 
because Ward did not possess personal characteristics that made 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
6 
 
her vulnerable, and the detectives' methods, while aggressive, 
did not constitute coercion.   
¶13 The circuit court further held, under the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
412 (1986), that the detectives' failure to inform Ward of 
Attorney Jackomino's presence outside of the interrogation room 
did not render her statements inadmissible.  In addition, the 
circuit court concluded that Ward's equivocal statements about 
calling a lawyer were insufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel.  Finally, the court held that the detectives' 
evasiveness in response to Ward's repeated inquiries regarding 
her husband did not affect the admissibility of her statements 
because there is no constitutional right to have anyone other 
than counsel present during custodial interrogation.  In light 
of all these circumstances, the court concluded that Ward's 
statements at the second interview were admissible. 
¶14 In analyzing the third interview, the circuit court 
began by noting that even though Ward was initially denied the 
opportunity to make any phone calls subsequent to the second 
interview, she was later informed by the jailer that she could 
call a lawyer if she wished.  As a result, the court rejected 
Ward's argument that she was held "incommunicado."  The court 
once again found that, once the third questioning session 
actually began, Ward was cognizant of her rights before speaking 
to the police.  As a result, Ward's statements were admissible. 
¶15 Following denial of Ward's motion to suppress, the 
case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted Ward of first-
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
7 
 
degree reckless homicide.  Ward challenged her conviction in the 
court of appeals, arguing that the circuit court had erred by 
failing to suppress her statements.  She advanced many of the 
same arguments before the court of appeals that she had put 
forth in the circuit court.  The court of appeals affirmed her 
conviction. 
¶16 We granted review and now affirm. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶17 Whether a waiver of the rights to silence and to 
counsel was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made is a 
question of law for our independent review.  State v. Badker, 
2000 WI App 27, ¶8, 240 Wis. 2d 460, 623 N.W.2d 142.  In 
deciding whether Ward's incriminating statements should have 
been suppressed, we must determine whether those statements were 
made voluntarily. "The question of voluntariness involves the 
application of constitutional principles to historical facts."  
State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶34, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 
407.  We uphold a circuit court's findings of historical fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, 
¶12, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748 (citing State v. Fonte, 
2005 WI 77, ¶11, 281 Wis. 2d 654, 698 N.W.2d 594).  A finding of 
historical fact is not clearly erroneous unless "it is against 
the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence."  
State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶21 n.7, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 
277 (quoting State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶36, 254 Wis. 2d 
502, 648 N.W.2d 367).  We independently review the application 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
8 
 
of constitutional principles to those facts.  Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 
742, ¶12 (citing State v. Vorburger, 2002 WI 105, ¶32, 255 
Wis. 2d 537, 648 N.W.2d 829). 
B. 
General Principles 
¶18 There 
are 
"two 
constitutional 
bases 
for 
the 
requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into 
evidence:  the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (citing 
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897); Brown v. 
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)).3  Ward's statements were 
voluntary if they were "the product of a free and unconstrained 
will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the 
result of a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the 
pressures brought to bear on the defendant by representatives of 
the State exceeded the defendant's ability to resist."  State v. 
Davis, 2008 WI 71, ¶36, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332 (quoting 
Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶36).  In conducting this inquiry, we 
look at the totality of the circumstances.  Id., ¶37.  
                                                 
3 Our interpretation of Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution has generally been consistent with the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution.  State v. Arias, 2008 WI 
84, ¶19, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748.  However, on occasion 
we have interpreted Article I, Section 8 more broadly.  See 
State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶56, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 
899; State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶¶40-44, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 
N.W.2d 582.  Here, we interpret Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.  State v. Hanson, 
136 Wis. 2d 195, 213, 401 N.W.2d 771 (1987); see also infra note 
5. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
9 
 
¶19 The 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
contemplates 
balancing the characteristics of the suspect against the type of 
police tactics that were employed to obtain the suspect's 
statement.  Id. (citing Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶¶38-39).  In 
evaluating the suspect's characteristics, we consider his or her 
"age, education, intelligence, physical or emotional condition, 
and prior experience with law enforcement."  Id. (same).  The 
more sophisticated and less vulnerable the suspect is, the more 
likely it becomes that his or her statements were voluntary.   
¶20 In evaluating the police conduct, we examine "the 
length of questioning, general conditions or circumstances in 
which the statement was taken, whether any excessive physical or 
psychological pressure was used, and whether any inducements, 
threats, methods, or strategies were utilized in order to elicit 
a statement from the defendant."  Id. (citing Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 
294, ¶39).   
¶21 The ultimate question of whether Ward's statements to 
police were voluntarily made is analyzed under the teachings of 
State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 
(1965).  However, many of the arguments that Ward makes are 
phrased in a 
manner that also appears to question the 
voluntariness, and therefore the validity, of the waiver of her 
rights to remain silent and to have counsel provided.  Those are 
rights explained during the Miranda warnings she was given.  In 
order to avoid potential confusion of the two kinds of 
voluntariness that arise in this case, we separately analyze the 
validity of Ward's waiver of rights when the Miranda warnings 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
10 
 
were given and then examine the voluntariness of her statements.  
In some instances, this will require us to discuss her 
contentions twice, once in order to analyze her waiver of the 
rights contained in the Miranda warnings, and a second time to 
analyze the effect of her contention on the voluntariness of her 
statements.    
C. 
Police Interviews  
1. 
Personal characteristics 
¶22 With respect to Ward's personal characteristics, the 
circuit court found that she was relatively sophisticated and 
intelligent.  This was not a clearly erroneous finding, and is 
supported by the record.  First, Ward was 35 years old at the 
time of these interviews, and was a high school graduate.  
Second, the interview transcripts do not suggest any lack of 
intelligence; Ward evinced a strong command of language.  Third, 
Ward had a prior conviction, and she is the daughter of a police 
officer.  State v. Franklin, 228 Wis. 2d 408, 413, 596 N.W.2d 
855 (Ct. App. 1999).  For example, the following dialogue 
occurred when Ward was read her Miranda warnings the first time: 
[Schaepe]:  . . . [N]umber one.  You [] have the right 
to remain silent.  Do you understand that? 
[Ward]:  Yes. 
[Schaepe]:  Okay. 
[Ward]:  You have the right to an attorney. 
[Schaepe]:  What's that? 
[Ward]:  If you cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for you. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
11 
 
[Schaepe]:  Oh you know [] 'em pretty well? 
[Ward]:  Yeah. 
That is, Ward herself demonstrated an unprompted understanding 
of her rights while in custody without having first been told 
those rights by the police.  This indicates that Ward was not 
particularly vulnerable to police questioning. 
¶23 Ward's only basis for challenging the voluntariness of 
her statements based on her own personal characteristics relates 
to her allegations of suffering seizures and experiencing back 
pain while at the hospital during the first questioning session.  
However, the circuit court made a finding of historical fact on 
this point, noting: 
There's no reason to believe that this perceived 
seizure earlier in the day and some confusion perhaps 
based on the excitement of the events made her 
particularly 
vulnerable 
to 
interrogation. . . .  
[T]here is really insufficient proof for this court to 
determine that her back pain or any type of seizure 
[was] actually [a]ffecting her ability to respond 
appropriately to Officer Schaepe.  There is no real 
proof 
that 
those 
medical 
problems 
made 
her 
particularly vulnerable . . . . 
This finding does not go "against the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence," i.e., it was not clearly 
erroneous.  Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 742, ¶21 n.7 (quoting Tomlinson, 
254 Wis. 2d 502, ¶36).   
¶24 Therefore, Ward's physical and mental condition did 
not cause her to become vulnerable to police interrogation.  As 
a 
result, 
none 
of 
Ward's 
personal 
characteristics 
favor 
concluding that her statements were made involuntarily. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
12 
 
 
 
2. 
Police conduct 
¶25 Ward's remaining basis for suppression lies in her 
contention that Schaepe's and Wood's police tactics resulted in 
coerced statements.  Ward was interviewed by the police on three 
occasions.  We review each in turn. 
a. 
first interview 
¶26 Ward concedes that she was not in custody at the 
hospital, so Schaepe had no obligation to provide Miranda 
warnings.  State v. Brockdorf, 2006 WI 76, ¶39, 291 Wis. 2d 635, 
717 N.W.2d 657 (holding that the police are not required to give 
Miranda warnings if the suspect is not in custody).  Ward does 
not argue that a Miranda violation occurred at this time.   
¶27 Instead, Ward asserts that Schaepe's conduct rose to 
the level of coercion because he told her that her daughter had 
seen her shaking the baby, but he did not tell her all that her 
daughter said about that event.  In addition, Ward argues that 
she was coerced because her family members were not allowed to 
enter the hospital room while Schaepe questioned her.  The 
description of the "shaking" episode to which Schaepe referred, 
but incompletely described, was Ward's daughter describing 
Ward's CPR on the baby at the direction of 911 staff.  As a 
result, although Schaepe's statement was true, because of its 
incompleteness, Schaepe misrepresented what Ward's daughter 
said.  However, misrepresentations by police "do not necessarily 
make a confession involuntary"; rather, they are a relevant 
factor in the totality of the circumstances.  State v. Triggs, 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
13 
 
2003 WI App 91, ¶17, 264 Wis. 2d 861, 663 N.W.2d 396 (citing 
United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1088 (3d Cir. 1989)); 
see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (concluding 
that while it was relevant that police misrepresented facts to 
the suspect, those misrepresentations were insufficient to make 
an 
otherwise 
voluntary confession inadmissible); State v. 
Fehrenbach, 118 Wis. 2d 65, 66-67, 347 N.W.2d 379 (Ct. App. 
1984) (concluding "that an interrogator's use of deceit, while 
relevant, does not by itself make an otherwise voluntary 
confession inadmissible") (citing Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739).   
¶28 Even though this misrepresentation is relevant in 
determining the voluntariness of Ward's statements, it is 
insufficient to render her statements involuntary.  Ward 
repeatedly denied shaking the baby, and would acknowledge only 
later that she had "tossed" or "plopped" the child on the bed, 
actions inconsistent with Schaepe's description of Ward's 
daughter's statement.  In addition, the effect of denying Ward's 
family members access to Ward's hospital room was minimal, as 
hospital personnel were frequently entering and exiting the room 
throughout the interview, and Schaepe told Ward that she could 
stop the interview at anytime.  The rest of the interview at the 
hospital was relaxed, with Ward and Schaepe at times joking with 
one another.  As a result, the tone of the interview was 
conversational 
and 
indicates 
that 
it 
was 
not 
coercive.  
Accordingly, 
we 
conclude, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, that the statements Ward made at the hospital 
were voluntary. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
14 
 
b. 
second interview 
¶29 The second interview took place at the police station.  
The State has conceded that Ward was in custody during this 
interview.  As a result, prior to interrogating Ward, the 
detectives were required to administer Miranda warnings.  They 
did so.  The following dialogue recounts the reading of those 
rights, and Ward's subsequent waiver of them: 
[Schaepe]:  . . . [N]umber one.  You[] have the right 
to remain silent.  Do you understand that? 
[Ward]:  Yes. 
[Schaepe]:  Okay. 
[Ward]:  You have the right to an attorney. 
[Schaepe]:  What's that? 
[Ward]:  If you cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for you. 
[Schaepe]:  Oh you know [] 'em pretty well? 
[Ward]:  Yeah. 
[Schaepe]:  Okay.  Number two.  Anything you say can 
be used against you in a court of law.  Do [you] 
understand that? 
[Ward]:  Yes I do. 
[Schaepe]:  Okay.  Number three.  You have the right 
to consult with a lawyer before questioning and to 
have a lawyer present with you during questioning.  Do 
you understand that? 
[Ward]:  Does that mean I need a lawyer right now? 
[Schaepe]:  Well see that's a decision that you make.  
I can't make those decisions for you.  What I'm saying 
is that we do wanna ask you about the death of [your 
nephew].  And you are here.  We didn't bring you here 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
15 
 
in handcuffs.  We asked you to come here and you were 
gracious enough to come with us and sit here and uh 
. . .  
[Ward]:  Well I . . . 
[Schaepe]:  . . . listen to us. 
[Ward]:  . . . I'm sorry.  This is law enforcement so 
if I get up and leave I feel like I'm doing something 
wrong. 
[Schaepe]:  Oh.  Well you can . . . 
[Ward]:  That's me. 
[Schaepe]:  . . . you can do that right? 
[Ward]:  What? 
[Schaepe]:  Ya know get up and leave if that's what 
you want. 
[Ward]:  I can? 
[Schaepe]:  Sure. 
[Ward]:  Where am I gonna go? 
[Schaepe]:  (Laughing) Well . . . 
[Ward]:  I I have no ride (laughing). 
[Schaepe]:  . . . well uh we're . . . 
[Ward]:  'Cuz I don't know where my husband is. 
[Schaepe]:  Well a ride could be uh afforded you uh 
somehow. 
[Ward]:  Okay. 
[Schaepe]:  But if we . . . 
[Ward]:  But I I'm sorry to interrupt.  But I told you 
I wanna try to get this taken care of as quickly and 
as soon as possible that way everything like you said 
is fresh. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
16 
 
[Schaepe]:  Okay.  And [] that's what I understood you 
to say before.  And that's [] why I would like to talk 
to you yet and uh I understand what you just said.  Um 
in any event you understood that statement I read to 
you.  You have the right to consult with a lawyer 
before questioning and to have a lawyer present with 
you during questioning. 
[Ward]:  Yes. 
[Schaepe]:  Okay.  And number four.  You cannot if you 
cannot afford to hire [] a lawyer one would be 
appointed to represent you at public expense before or 
during any questioning if you so wish.  Do you 
understand that? 
[Ward]:  Yes. 
[Schaepe]:  Okay.  And then number five.  If you 
decide to answer questions now without a lawyer 
present you have the right to stop the questioning and 
remain silent at any time you wish and the right to 
ask for and have a lawyer any time you wish including 
during the questioning.  Okay? 
[Ward]:  (No verbal response) (Head shake up and down—
affirmative). 
[Schaepe]:  And then I'll just turn this to you and uh 
there's a Waiver of Rights right below it.  Maybe you 
can just follow along.  Okay.  I'll read it to ya 
though. 
[Ward]:  Sorry. 
[Schaepe]:  That's alright.  I have read or have had 
read to me the statement of my rights and I understand 
what my rights are.  I am willing to make a statement 
and answer questions.  I do not want a lawyer at this 
time.  I understand and know what I am doing.  No 
promises or threats have been made to me and no 
pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against 
me. 
[Ward]:  True. 
Ward then signed the Miranda waiver form and proceeded to make 
incriminating statements. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
17 
 
¶30 In order to be valid, a Miranda waiver must be 
knowing, voluntary and intelligent.  See Burbine, 475 U.S. at 
421.  A waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent where it is 
"the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than 
intimidation, coercion, or deception," and has "been made with a 
full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned 
and the consequences of the decision to abandon it."  Id.  Here, 
Ward verbally, and by her signature, acknowledged that her 
Miranda waiver was obtained without any promises, threats, 
pressure or coercion.  North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 
373 (1979) ("An express written or oral statement of waiver of 
the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually 
strong proof of the validity of that waiver . . . .").   
¶31 It is apparent from the above dialogue that Ward's 
waiver was valid.  Ward understood her rights, even reciting 
them unprompted while Schaepe was administering Miranda warnings 
to her.  Ward understood what she was giving up, and made a 
conscious decision to make a statement to the police despite her 
right to remain silent.  As a result, we conclude that Ward's 
waiver of her rights was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. 
¶32 Nevertheless, 
Ward 
attacks 
the 
admissibility 
of 
statements she made subsequent to her waiver, arguing that those 
statements were made involuntarily because they were coerced.  
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 ("The requirement that Miranda 
warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the 
voluntariness inquiry."); but see id. ("[C]ases in which a 
defendant 
can 
make 
a 
colorable 
argument 
that 
a 
self-
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
18 
 
incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that 
the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of 
Miranda are rare." (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 
433 n.20 (1984))).   
¶33 Ward's arguments can be broken down as follows:  (1) 
she should have been informed that Attorney Jackomino was 
waiting to talk to her outside of the interrogation room; (2) 
she should have been informed about the status and location of 
her husband, who was also waiting outside; and (3) the police 
should have asked for further clarification from and given 
further information to Ward when she made equivocal statements 
about contacting an attorney.4  We note that, while Ward makes 
these arguments in an attempt to show that her statements were 
not voluntary, these arguments are more appropriately addressed 
to the validity of her waiver.  Nevertheless, under the totality 
of the circumstances, this police conduct does not rise to the 
level 
of 
coercion, 
and 
police 
coercion 
is 
a 
necessary 
prerequisite to finding that a defendant's statement was 
involuntarily made.  Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶37 (citing 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)).  We therefore 
reject Ward's arguments in turn. 
¶34 Ward's first contention, that her waiver was invalid 
because the police failed to inform her that Attorney Jackomino 
                                                 
4 Ward also asserts that, at the second interview, Schaepe 
again made misleading statements regarding Ward's daughter's 
description of Ward shaking the baby.  Our conclusions on this 
point with respect to the first interview apply with equal force 
to the second interview.  See supra ¶¶27-28.  
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
19 
 
was waiting outside, is squarely addressed by the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Burbine, which we adopted in State 
v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 213, 401 N.W.2d 771 (1987).  In 
Burbine, the Supreme Court held that the police's failure to 
inform a suspect that his attorney was attempting to call him, 
and the police's deliberate deception of the attorney in stating 
that they would wait for him to arrive before questioning his 
client, did not affect the suspect's knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights to remain 
silent and have counsel present.  Burbine, 475 U.S. at 423-24.  
The Court held that "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence 
of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no 
bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a 
constitutional right."  Id. at 422.  In language directly 
applicable here, the Court further stated:  
Granting that the "deliberate or reckless" withholding 
of information is objectionable as a matter of ethics, 
such conduct is only relevant to the constitutional 
validity of a waiver if it deprives a defendant of 
knowledge essential to his ability to understand the 
nature 
of 
his 
rights 
and 
the 
consequences 
of 
abandoning 
them. 
 
Because 
respondent's 
voluntary 
decision to speak was made with full awareness and 
comprehension of all the information Miranda requires 
the police to convey, the waivers were valid. 
Id. at 423-24.   
¶35 As we noted in Hanson, "the United States Supreme 
Court has imposed on the police an obligation to inform a 
suspect of his right to have counsel present at a custodial 
interrogation. . . .  The Fifth Amendment, however, does not 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
20 
 
require the police to advise the suspect of the immediate 
availability of a particular attorney."  Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 
208.   
¶36 In this case, nothing in the record suggests that Ward 
was not fully apprised of her rights, and no authority required 
Schaepe and Wood to tell her that Jackomino was there.  
Furthermore, as we have already concluded above, the colloquy 
between Ward and Schaepe as Ward was read her rights indicates 
that Ward's "voluntary decision to speak was made with full 
awareness and comprehension of all the information Miranda 
requires the police to convey."  Burbine, 475 U.S. at 424.  
Accordingly, the fact that the police did not inform Ward that 
Jackomino was outside did not affect the validity of her waiver.   
¶37 In 
addition, 
this 
fact 
did 
not 
affect 
the 
voluntariness of Ward's subsequent statements.  In order for 
police conduct to be coercive, "the pressures brought to bear on 
the defendant by representatives of the State [must] exceed[] 
the defendant's ability to resist."  Davis, 310 Wis. 2d 583, ¶36 
(quoting Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶36).  However, that the police 
did not tell Ward about Jackomino brought no additional 
pressures to bear on Ward.  Therefore, this lack of knowledge 
did not affect, much less exceed, her ability to resist police 
questioning.  She simply was unaware of this circumstance.  
Accordingly, the fact that the police did not inform Ward of 
Jackomino's presence is not a relevant factor, under the 
totality of the circumstances, in regard to whether her 
statements were voluntary.  
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
21 
 
¶38 Ward's second basis for challenging her Miranda 
waiver, which she also characterizes as a challenge to the 
voluntariness of her statements subsequent to that waiver, is 
the detectives' "evasiveness" in response to Ward's questions 
regarding the status and location of her husband, who, unknown 
to Ward, was actually waiting outside the interrogation room.  
Ward now argues that, had she been permitted to speak with her 
husband, he might have advised her to invoke her rights.  
However, as we have explained:  
Since the right to counsel and the right to remain 
silent are given by the constitution to the defendant, 
he alone can exercise those rights.  Neither his 
family 
nor 
his 
attorney 
are 
threatened 
with 
accusations, 
nor 
do 
they 
have 
the 
defendant's 
knowledge of the case, including the defendant's 
knowledge of his own guilt or innocence, nor are they 
subject to the pain of the defendant's possibly guilty 
conscience.  Therefore, no one but the accused can 
make the decision to make a statement to the police or 
to ask for the assistance of counsel in making his 
decision. 
Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 213.  It was Ward's responsibility, not 
her husband's, to determine whether she wanted to exercise her 
Fifth Amendment rights.  Id. 
¶39 A request to speak with family members triggers no 
constitutional rights in the manner that a request to speak with 
counsel does, and under Burbine, the police had no obligation to 
inform Ward that her husband was waiting outside.  As a result, 
Ward's second argument does not affect the validity of her 
waiver of rights.  
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
22 
 
¶40 We also note that the police's failure to inform Ward 
of the status and location of her husband did not affect the 
voluntariness of statements Ward made subsequent to her waiver 
of rights.  That is, failing to give Ward this information did 
not place additional pressure on her, sufficient to overcome her 
free will.  In order for police conduct to be coercive, it must 
be shown to be the type of conduct that prevents a defendant's 
statements from being "the product of a free and unconstrained 
will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the 
result of a conspicuously unequal confrontation."  Davis, 310 
Wis. 2d 583, ¶36.  Ward would have made incriminating statements 
if her husband had in fact been unavailable, as he very well 
could have been.  Therefore, no coercion occurred due to the 
detectives' responses to Ward's inquiries regarding her husband.  
Stated otherwise, the detectives' conduct did not defeat the 
voluntariness of Ward's statements subsequent to her waiver of 
rights. 
¶41 We 
note 
that 
the 
circumstances 
here 
are 
distinguishable from our decision in State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 
WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110, where we held that 
refusing Jerrell's (a juvenile) request to speak with his 
parents prior to custodial interrogation, under the totality of 
the 
circumstances, 
rendered 
his 
subsequent 
statements 
involuntary.  Id., ¶43 (holding that the "failure 'to call the 
parents for the purpose of depriving the juvenile of the 
opportunity to receive advice and counsel' will be considered 
'strong evidence that coercive tactics were used to elicit the 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
23 
 
incriminating statements'" (quoting Theriault v. State, 66 
Wis. 2d 33, 48, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1974))).   
¶42 The holding in Jerrell was based in substantial part 
on the suspect's status as a juvenile.  Id.  Ward is not a 
juvenile; she is an adult of average intelligence and education, 
with 
an 
above 
average 
familiarity 
with 
law 
enforcement 
procedures. 
 
As 
a 
result, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, Schaepe and Wood did not have an obligation to 
contact Ward's husband in order for Ward's statements to be 
voluntary. 
¶43 Ward's third argument is that when she asked Schaepe 
and Wood if she should call an attorney, their failure to 
further clarify her statements and further explain her rights 
rendered her waiver of rights invalid, and her subsequent 
incriminating statements involuntary.  However, all Ward had to 
do was unequivocally ask for an attorney.  Had she done so, 
Schaepe and Wood would have been obligated to immediately cease 
all questioning.  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 
(1981) ("[A]n accused, . . . having expressed his desire to deal 
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."); 
State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶26, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 
142 ("[T]he police must immediately cease questioning a suspect 
who clearly invokes the Miranda right to counsel at any point 
during custodial interrogation.").  Ward did not do this.  
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
24 
 
Instead, she asked the detectives what they thought she should 
do.  This is an equivocal statement.  We have provided guidance 
in the past directly on this point: 
If a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is 
ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in 
light of the circumstances would have understood only 
that the suspect might be invoking the right to 
counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation 
of questioning. 
Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶29 (quoting Davis v. United States, 
512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (emphasis in original)).  That is, 
Ward's equivocal reference to an attorney, by asking the 
officers if she should call one, did not require Schaepe and 
Wood to cease questioning Ward.5  In addition, the officers had 
                                                 
5 We note that, after a defendant has been formally charged, 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies, and in contrast to 
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, an equivocal request for 
counsel in a Sixth Amendment context is sufficient to invoke 
that right.  See State v. Hornung, 229 Wis. 2d 469, 477-78, 600 
N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that the "strict 
requirements for 'unequivocally and unambiguously' asserting 
one's right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment are somewhat 
less stringent under the Sixth Amendment") (citing Patterson v. 
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290-91 (1988)); see also State v. 
Dagnall, 228 Wis. 2d 495, 504-05, 596 N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(reasoning that greater leeway is afforded charged defendants in 
invoking the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment than 
uncharged suspects under the Fifth Amendment).   
The court of appeals discussed this distinction in Hornung.  
Hornung, 229 Wis. 2d at 477-78.  In Hornung, the court held that 
Hornung's equivocal request to speak with an attorney was 
sufficient to invoke the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, id. 
at 479-80, because Hornung had been charged with a crime, id. at 
476.  In the case now before us, Ward's equivocal statements 
about an attorney took place in a pre-charging custodial 
interrogation.  Therefore, we have examined her statements and 
the 
police's 
responses 
to 
them 
under 
Fifth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence.   
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
25 
 
no need to clarify Ward's statements regarding whether to call 
an attorney.  Id., ¶32 ("[O]fficers need neither stop an 
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice Crooks' dissent acknowledges this distinction, 
Justice Crooks' dissent, ¶¶92-94, but nevertheless urges the 
court to interpret Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution more broadly than the Fifth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution, such that a suspect would not be required 
to make an unequivocal request for counsel in the pre-charging 
context in order to invoke the right to counsel under state law.  
We decline to do so. 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that stronger 
protections exist in the Sixth Amendment context than in the 
Fifth Amendment context.  This distinction has been made because 
when a defendant has been formally charged, "the government has 
committed itself to prosecute, and [it is] only then that the 
adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified.  
It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the 
prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the 
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."  United 
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (quoting Kirby v. 
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).   
Furthermore, while we are sensitive to Justice Crooks' 
concerns about Ward's rights, the loss of life of a young child 
is an equally compelling concern.  This seven-week old boy was 
in Ward's exclusive care five full days before he died.  We 
acknowledge the significant concerns present in ensuring that a 
suspect's rights are honored; however, there are significant 
countervailing concerns in the effective investigation of crimes 
and the meaningful interrogation of criminal suspects.  Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) ("'[T]he need for police 
questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal 
laws' cannot be doubted." (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973))); id. ("Admissions of guilt are more 
than merely 'desirable,' . . . they are essential to society's 
compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those 
who violate the law.") (citing United States v. Washington, 431 
U.S. 181, 186 (1977)).  Justice Crooks discusses a variety of 
circumstances surrounding shaken infant deaths, Justice Crooks' 
dissent, ¶84 n.4, but this discussion fails to acknowledge the 
fact that this child was in Ward's exclusive care not just on 
the day that he tragically died, but for the five days prior to 
his death. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
26 
 
interrogation nor ask clarifying questions when a suspect makes 
an equivocal request for counsel.") (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 
461).   
¶44 However, in response to Ward's question, Schaepe did 
provide Ward with further information about her right to 
counsel, even though he was not required to do so. Schaepe 
stated, "Well see that's a decision that you make.  I can't make 
those decisions for you."  This is a completely accurate 
statement of Ward's rights.  As we stated in Hanson, "no one but 
the accused can make the decision to make a statement to the 
police or to ask for the assistance of counsel in making his 
decision."  Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 213.  It was up to Ward, not 
Schaepe or Wood, to decide whether to call an attorney.  Since 
Ward's statements were equivocal, Schaepe and Wood had no 
obligation to cease questioning or to ask Ward to clarify her 
statements.  Accordingly, this conduct did not affect the 
validity of Ward's waiver of rights at the second interview.   
¶45 In addition, the officers' conduct cannot be said to 
have rendered Ward's subsequent statements involuntary.  The 
officers gave Ward additional information.  They were hesitant 
to speak with her without being certain she wanted to talk with 
them.  Accordingly, she was not coerced and no remedy of 
suppression is available for these statements.  Hoppe, 261 
Wis. 2d 294, ¶37 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167) (explaining 
that police coercion is a necessary prerequisite for a finding 
of involuntariness). 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
27 
 
c. 
night in jail 
¶46 Ward's second interview ended at approximately 5:20 
p.m.  Wood and Schaepe explained to Ward that she would be 
spending the night in jail because she had implicated herself in 
the death of her nephew.  They also told Ward the following: 
[Schaepe]:  And what we're gonna do also just so you 
know is your phone calls are gonna be restricted at 
this time.  So I'm gonna tell them that.  And then 
tomorrow morning we'll assess that and [] see if we 
can lift that or not.  But right now we're in the 
process of investigating and we're gonna be searching 
your house.  And we don't want any interference with 
that type of activity so we are restricting your phone 
calls until tomorrow and then we'll reassess.  Okay? 
[Ward]:  And that means not making any phone calls? 
[Schaepe]:  Right. 
Ward argues that because she could not make any phone calls, she 
was held "incommunicado" and denied her right to counsel. 
¶47 In response, the State notes that at approximately 
7:00 p.m., Schaepe told the jailer to tell Ward that she could 
call a lawyer if she wanted.  Ward argues that there is no 
evidence in the record to support this.  However, the circuit 
court made the following finding of fact: 
[O]fficer Schaepe told the jailer about 7 o'clock on 
the evening of December 1st that of course if [Ward] 
wanted to call an attorney she could call an attorney, 
and 
the 
evidence 
here 
on 
record 
is 
that 
that 
information was communicated to her.  So on the night 
of December 1st, [Ward] was reminded that she could 
call an attorney . . . . 
¶48 Ward argues that this finding is clearly erroneous 
because there is no evidence that Ward was informed by the 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
28 
 
jailer that she could call an attorney.  We disagree.  On the 
morning of December 2, at the start of the third interview, Ward 
and Schaepe had the following exchange: 
[Schaepe]:  The only restrictions that you've had up 
until this point is calling out to make a personal 
phone call.  Um if you want an attorney you can call 
an attorney and that's what it says there.  At any 
time you can call an attorney.  And that's why the 
jailer came to you yesterday as well and said that um 
you don't have any you can't have any personal phone 
calls out but you can have a phone call to your 
attorney if you'd like.  That's what he told you last 
night too. 
[Ward]:  And I didn't have one.  And I didn't know who 
to call.  And usually they're gone by that time. 
When Schaepe recalled to Ward that the jailer had told her that 
she could call an attorney if she wanted, Ward did not deny that 
this was true, and her statements imply that the jailer did tell 
her she could make a call to a lawyer.  Therefore, the circuit 
court's finding does not go "against the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence"; i.e., it is not clearly 
erroneous.  Sykes, 279 Wis. 2d 742, ¶21 n.7. 
¶49 Satisfied with the circuit court's findings of fact, 
we note that the concept of "incommunicado" detention, to which 
Ward argues she was subject, may contemplate both that visitors, 
such as family members and/or counsel, are prevented from seeing 
or contacting the suspect, and that the suspect is prohibited 
from communicating with individuals other than the police.  See, 
e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 745 (1966) (noting 
that a defendant was held incommunicado where there was an 
instruction not to permit anyone access to Davis and not to 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
29 
 
allow him to communicate with others); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 
U.S. 
560, 
563 (1958)6 (noting incommunicado status where 
defendant's family members and lawyer were not permitted to 
visit him and he asked to make a phone call but was not allowed 
to do so).   
¶50 However, in Burbine, which provided guidance on the 
application 
of 
Miranda, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
explained that, where the dictates of Miranda are otherwise 
followed, 
the 
only 
impermissible 
aspect 
of 
incommunicado 
questioning is that which prevents a suspect from speaking with 
those to whom he or she has a constitutional right to speak.7   
                                                 
6 Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) and Payne v. 
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), arose prior to Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Therefore, the analysis employed 
by the United States Supreme Court differed from the analysis 
that has been employed in cases that arose subsequent to 
Miranda.   
7 In his dissent, Justice Crooks cites several pre-Burbine 
cases in support of his argument that Ward's detention here was 
incommunicado in an impermissible manner because visitors, 
including Ward's attorney and daughter, were not permitted to 
contact her.  Justice Crooks' dissent, ¶¶77-79, 81.  However, 
our decision today operates under the holding of Burbine, which 
we adopted in Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 213.  We decline to apply 
the pre-Burbine, pre-Hanson case law cited by Justice Crooks.  
As his opinion expressly notes, Burbine "undoubtedly cleared the 
way" for the conclusions we reach here.  Justice Crooks' 
dissent, ¶88.  He is correct. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
30 
 
Burbine, 475 U.S. at 433 n.4 (noting that denying visitors the 
right to contact an individual in custody who has been given the 
Miranda warnings will not require suppression because the 
Miranda decision itself "embodies a carefully crafted balance 
designed to fully protect both the defendant's and society's 
interests," and "'the interrogation must cease until an attorney 
is present' only '[i]f the individual states that he wants an 
attorney'" (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n.10 
(1975) (emphasis in Burbine)).  That is, preventing others from 
contacting the suspect has no impact on the suspect's ability to 
waive his or her rights or on his or her choice to speak 
voluntarily with the police.  Id. at 422. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice Crooks also cites pre-Burbine case law to argue 
that by declining to permit Ward to contact her husband, the 
police 
created 
a 
coercive 
interrogation 
environment 
that 
rendered her statements involuntary.  Id., ¶¶77-78.  However, 
Burbine expressly notes that "'the interrogation must cease 
. . .' only '[i]f the individual states that he wants an 
attorney.'"  Burbine, 475 U.S. at 433 n.4 (quoting Michigan v. 
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n.10 (1975)).   
Accepting Justice Crooks' approach would create a slippery 
slope in which the subjective characteristics of individual 
suspects would require law enforcement to determine whether the 
family members and acquaintances with whom the suspect wished to 
speak were sufficiently important to the suspect such that a 
denial 
of 
contact 
would 
render 
subsequent 
statements 
involuntary.  For example, Justice Crooks suggests that Ward's 
statements are involuntary here because she could not talk to 
her husband.  Would her statements also have been involuntary 
had she asked to speak with her uncle, or with her coworker, or 
with her minister?  We decline to venture into such a tangled 
web.  The state and federal Constitutions provide suspects with 
the right to have counsel present whenever the suspect requests 
a lawyer.  That right was not infringed upon here.   
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
31 
 
¶51 The Burbine court reasoned that "vents occurring 
outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to 
him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and 
knowingly relinquish a constitutional right."  Id.  That is, 
although the accused has a Fifth Amendment right to be free from 
compelled self-incrimination, his or her decision to waive that 
right and to speak voluntarily with the police cannot be 
affected by events of which he or she has no knowledge.  Id.  
Therefore, if the suspect is unaware that the police have 
prevented someone from making contact, this fact has no bearing 
on the suspect's waiver of rights or the voluntariness of his or 
her 
statements. 
 
Once 
Miranda 
has 
been 
followed, 
"full 
comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request a 
[lawyer] are sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent 
in the interrogation process."  Id. at 427.   
¶52 Based on these principles and the circuit court's 
findings, we conclude that Ward is correct in asserting that she 
was held in a constitutionally impermissible status during the 
hour and 40 minutes that she could not contact a lawyer, if she 
had asked to do so.  However, preventing others from contacting 
Ward 
cannot have 
affected her waiver of rights or the 
voluntariness of her statements, because she was not aware that 
anyone was trying to contact her.  Id. at 422.  Furthermore, as 
soon as Ward was informed by the jailer that she could contact a 
lawyer, her constitutionally impaired status ceased and she was 
once again free to speak with a lawyer if she requested to do 
so.  Id. at 433 n.4.  And finally, this is not a case where Ward 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
32 
 
was held by the police for an extended period of time.  She 
agreed to accompany the police to the station in the afternoon 
of the day that her nephew died; she was kept overnight; and she 
was charged the next day.    
¶53 However, even though Ward was allowed to call a 
lawyer, she made no attempt to do so at any time.  Even assuming 
that Ward would have attempted to contact an attorney between 
5:20 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. on December 1, the remedy for her brief 
deprivation of 
the 
right to contact a lawyer would be 
suppression of any incriminating statements that she made during 
that time.  See Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349 (1968) 
(per 
curiam) 
(holding 
that 
prolonged 
"incommunicado" 
interrogation 
rendered confession made during that period 
involuntary and inadmissible); see also Haynes v. Washington, 
373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (holding that "incommunicado detention" 
rendered 
confession 
made during that period involuntary).  
However, Ward made no statements, much less incriminating 
statements, during the hour and 40 minutes that she may have 
been unable to contact an attorney had she so desired.   
¶54 We 
acknowledge 
that 
Darwin 
and 
Haynes 
did 
not 
expressly 
address 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
a 
period 
of 
impermissible 
detention 
could 
nevertheless 
result 
in 
the 
suppression of incriminating statements obtained subsequent to 
that detention.  However, even if it could, Ward's conduct at 
the third interview in this case (which we discuss below), in 
personally requesting to speak with the officers, demonstrating 
a clear willingness to talk once the interview began, and 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
33 
 
subsequently waiving her rights to silence and to counsel, 
demonstrate that, under the totality of the circumstances, her 
brief period of impermissible detention did not affect the 
voluntariness 
of 
statements 
she 
made 
subsequent 
to 
that 
detention.  That is, because it was for such a brief period of 
time, it did not rise to a level of coercion such that 
statements that she made the next day should have been 
suppressed. 
¶55 In his dissent, Justice Crooks argues, both expressly 
and impliedly, that we should reject the United States Supreme 
Court's holding in Burbine and conclude that the police conduct 
here rendered both Ward's waiver invalid and her subsequent 
statements involuntary.  Justice Crooks' dissent, ¶¶80, 85, 101 
& n.15.  In response, we note that in State v. Hanson, which is 
not a recent case and which demonstrates that many of the 
arguments presented by Justice Crooks are not new, six justices 
took the opportunity to expressly adopt the holding in Burbine.  
Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 213.  The Hanson court's logic in doing 
so applies with equal force today: 
 
We do not believe that the suspect's knowledge of 
the location of a particular counsel can affect the 
intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights as 
described in Miranda warnings.  Since the knowledge of 
the location of counsel adds no constitutional rights, 
does not alter the facts of the case as the suspect 
knows them, and does not give rise to any coercive 
influence by the police, such knowledge is not 
relevant to the suspect's voluntary decision to waive 
his rights.  Although a suspect who was ready to waive 
his rights might change his mind when told an attorney 
was waiting to see him, the critical factor would be 
the convenience of seeing the attorney, not the 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
34 
 
intelligent perceived need for legal counsel.  Since 
the 
convenience 
of 
the 
defendant 
is 
not 
constitutionally 
protected, 
the 
location 
of 
a 
particular attorney is not constitutionally required 
information. 
 
If this information were required, distinctions 
between suspects would unfairly develop depending on 
whether third persons were able to engage the services 
of an attorney.  A new area of law would develop 
regarding 
actions 
of 
police 
in 
particular 
fact 
situations, i.e., was the attorney in the building, 
was the attorney on the telephone, was the attorney on 
his way to the building, was the attorney not 
immediately available but would be by a definite time, 
would a substitute attorney satisfy the requirement.  
Another line of cases could develop around who 
requested such representation:  the accused's family, 
friends, or perhaps a criminal accomplice, or the 
attorney himself who has a reduced caseload.  Would 
the police be required to inform the accused no matter 
who was seeking representation for the accused, even 
if such representation is sought out of the self-
interest of the party seeking the representation? 
 
An infinite number of circumstances could be 
envisioned only to create a new extension of the 
exclusionary rule.  The Supreme Court in Burbine found 
Miranda 
sufficient 
protection 
of 
the 
suspect's 
constitutional rights before interrogation and found 
no need to further extend the exclusionary rule.  We 
believe Burbine to be a reasonable consideration of 
the limit to which Miranda will be extended and that 
the Wisconsin Constitution does not require greater 
protection.  Since the right to counsel and the right 
to remain silent are given by the constitution to the 
defendant, 
he 
alone 
can 
exercise 
those 
rights.  
Neither his family nor his attorney are threatened 
with accusations, nor do they have the defendant's 
knowledge of the case, including the defendant's 
knowledge of his own guilt or innocence, nor are they 
subject to the pain of the defendant's possibly guilty 
conscience.  Therefore, no one but the accused can 
make the decision to make a statement to the police or 
to ask for the assistance of counsel in making his 
decision.  Since both the rights and the person the 
rights are granted to, the accused, are the same under 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
35 
 
both the federal and Wisconsin Constitutions, there is 
no logical reason to find that someone other than the 
accused 
could 
exercise 
those 
rights 
under 
the 
Wisconsin Constitution. 
Id. at 211-13.  To accept Justice Crooks' suggestion would be to 
overrule Hanson and the two decades of established Wisconsin 
precedent that have followed it.  We decline to do so.  Instead, 
we take this opportunity to emphasize that Hanson is still good 
law in this state.  Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides the same protections prior to charging a 
suspect as does the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Id.     
d. 
third interview 
¶56 We now address Ward's challenge to the admissibility 
of incriminating statements she made at the third interview on 
the morning of December 2.  As was the case with respect to the 
second interview, Ward contends that her waiver of the right to 
counsel was not valid and her subsequent statements were 
inadmissible because she did not give them voluntarily.  Her 
argument in this regard is based on the officers not permitting 
her to consult with her husband about whether to contact an 
attorney.  As noted above, Ward also argues that the nature of 
her 
detention 
the 
previous 
night 
made 
her 
incriminating 
statements at the third interview involuntary.  However, we note 
that it was Ward, not the officers, who initiated the third 
interview.  In addition, the following dialogue demonstrates how 
Ward was once again given Miranda warnings, and once again 
waived her rights, prior to making any incriminating statements: 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
36 
 
[Schaepe]:  Well I'll read these uh five statements to 
you again uh Jennifer.  And if you don't understand 
any of 'em let me know.  Uh if you say yes that you do 
understand I'll put a little checkmark in front of 
them.  And then there's a Waiver of Rights below that 
and I'll have you just read it to yourself because uh 
I had already read that to you yesterday.  And then uh 
I would ask if you're willing to talk to us just to 
sign it here.  And uh then we'll ask ya a few 
questions and you can tell us what else you know. 
[Ward]:  Oh question. 
[Schaepe]:  Uh huh (affirmative). 
[Ward]:  If I wasn't willing to talk to you why would 
we be in here? 
[Schaepe]:  That's [] a good point. 
[Wood]:  That is a good point. 
[Schaepe]:  Right.  You're here because you wanted to 
talk to us.  So let me just get through this and then 
we . . . 
[Ward]:  Okay. 
[Schaepe]:  . . . can discuss it. 
[Ward]:  You said any questions ask. 
[Wood]:  Yeah . . . 
[Schaepe]:  No. 
[Wood]:  . . . that's a good one. 
[Schaepe]:  Yeah.  I you got me on that one. 
[Wood]:  (Laughing). 
[Schaepe]:  Number one.  You do have the right to 
remain silent.  Do you understand that? 
[Ward]:  Yes. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
37 
 
[Schaepe]:  Okay.  Number two.  Anything you say can 
be used against you in a court of law.  Do you 
understand that? 
[Ward]:  Yes. 
[Schaepe]:  Number three.  You have the right to 
consult with a lawyer before questioning and to have a 
lawyer present with you during questioning.  Do you 
understand that? 
[Ward]:  Yes.  But I at the time was like okay I 
didn't know who to call. 
[Schaepe]:  Well and uh there's a phonebook with uh 
plenty of attorneys uh in the book.  Uh Rhinelander 
has loads of 'em.  So uh ya know if you want an 
attorney uh ya know you can look in the phonebook if 
you'd [] like or pick one out or if ya know one or 
what have you.  But I will ask you this uh and tell 
you this that you do have the right to consult a 
lawyer before questioning and to have a lawyer present 
with you during questioning.  Do you understand that? 
[Ward]:  Yes I do.  And should I have? 
[Schaepe]:  Well that's a decision that that you can 
make.  Um the Waiver of Rights we'll go over these 
again.  If you understand these five statements that I 
read to you you can make that decision if you want to 
talk to us or not.  I mean but it's entirely up to 
you.  All we can do is explain what this [] is.  Uh 
and then you make the decision of whether you wanna 
talk to us or not. 
[Ward]:  Well I do wanna talk to you. 
[Schaepe]:  Number four.  If you cannot afford to hire 
a lawyer one would be appointed to represent you at 
public expense before any questioning if you so [] 
wish.  Do you understand that? 
[Ward]:  Yes. 
[Schaepe]:  Okay.  And then number five.  If you 
decide to answer questions now without a lawyer 
present you have the right to stop the questioning and 
remain silent at any time you wish and the right to 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
38 
 
ask for and have a lawyer anytime you wish including 
during the questioning.  Do you understand that? 
[Ward]:  Yes. 
[Schaepe]:  Okay. 
[Ward]:  Well this is why I wanted to call my husband 
yesterday to ask him what I should do. 
[Schaepe]:  Oh.  You wanted his advice.  Well um we're 
asking you now.  I mean you're the one that's gonna 
have to make that decision at this point in time.  Um 
so that's the Waiver um ya know here maybe you oughta 
hold it.  You could read it better.  This is the 
Waiver of Rights right here.  If you wanna read that 
to yourself and then decide on whether you wanna talk 
to us.  That's up to you. 
. . . . 
[Schaepe]:  The only restrictions that you've had up 
until this point is calling out to make a personal 
phone call.  Um if you want an attorney you can call 
an attorney and that's what it says there.  At any 
time you can call an attorney.  And that's why the 
jailer came to you yesterday as well and said that um 
you don't have any you can't have any personal phone 
calls out but you can have a phone call to your 
attorney if you'd like.  That's what he told you last 
night too. 
[Ward]:  And I didn't have one.  And I didn't know who 
to call.  And usually they're gone by that time. 
[Schaepe]:  Okay.  Well now we're here and it's ten 
o'clock ten thirty ten twenty-five in the morning.  
Um . . . 
[Ward]:  Actually what time is it? 
[Schaepe]:  Ten twenty-five. 
[Ward]:  Okay. 
[Schaepe]:  And there's uh attorneys in their offices 
at this time.  So uh the question is do you wanna talk 
to us at this time without an attorney or not?  That's 
uh that's up to you. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
39 
 
[Wood]:  And that is ya know that's your personal 
decision Jennifer.  I mean that's . . . 
[Schaepe]:  We cannot make that decision for you. 
[Wood]:  Yeah.  I understood this morning that you 
wanted to talk to us to resolve something.  Or at 
least that's what I thought you were contacting us 
for. 
[Ward]:  Yes. 
[Wood]:  Okay. 
. . . . 
[Wood]:  And I think before we talk anymore you need 
to make a decision on that form.  'Cuz we really can't 
talk to you about things unless uh you make that 
decision. 
[Ward]:  Not even what we discussed yesterday? 
[Wood]:  Um um (negative). 
[Ward]:  Why is that?  'Cuz I already . . . excuse me. 
[Wood]:  It today's a different day though. 
[Ward]:  You have to do it for every day you talk to 
somebody? 
[Wood]:  Yeah.  If you're in . . . 
[Ward]:  Oh.  That's too much paperwork. 
[Wood]:  . . . if you're in custody.  Well it is but I 
mean again it's an important issue. 
[Schaepe]:  The question is do you wanna waive those 
Rights that I had read to you and talk to us without 
an attorney present.  That is your decision to make. 
[Ward]:  Yeah.  Because what I'm saying to you is the 
truth anyway. 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
40 
 
At this point Ward signed the waiver form and questioning began.  
Ward then made further statements implicating her in the death 
of her nephew. 
¶57 We resolve whether Ward's waiver of rights at the 
third and final questioning session was knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent in much the same way we resolved the validity of her 
waiver at the second questioning session.  Again, it is apparent 
that Ward's waiver "was the product of a free and deliberate 
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception," and 
was "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right 
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon 
it."  Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421.  In fact, Ward's desire to waive 
her rights was so apparent that she stated, "If I wasn't willing 
to talk to you why would we be in here?"  Furthermore, at this 
third session, the detectives repeatedly emphasized to Ward the 
importance of counsel, yet she did not invoke that right.  
Schaepe and Wood told her that attorneys' offices were open and 
that she could call one immediately.  Ward elected not to do so.  
Ward apparently saw no need to call an attorney, because, as she 
stated, "what I'm saying to you is the truth anyway." 
¶58 Now, Ward complains to us that her waiver was not 
valid because she wanted to talk to her husband in order to 
decide whether to invoke her right to counsel, and the 
detectives did not permit her to do so.  Again, we emphasize 
that the decision whether to invoke the right to counsel is 
personal to the suspect, and cannot be made by anyone else.  
Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 213.  The officers had no constitutional 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
41 
 
obligation to permit Ward to speak to her husband.  Their only 
obligation was to permit Ward to speak to an attorney if she 
asked to do so.  All she had to say was, "I want a lawyer."  
Ward never did this.  Instead, she again asked the detectives if 
they thought she should get an attorney, but under Hanson, that 
decision was Ward's alone, id., and under Jennings, the 
detectives had no obligation to cease questioning or ask Ward to 
further clarify her remarks, Jennings, 252 Wis. 2d 228, ¶32.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Ward's waiver was knowing, 
voluntary and intelligent. 
¶59 In addition, we conclude that Ward's statements made 
subsequent to her waiver of rights were obtained voluntarily and 
are admissible.  In determining the voluntariness of Ward's 
statements, we note that the officers' refusal to permit Ward to 
speak with her husband was not coercive because it did not 
prevent her from speaking with "a free and unconstrained will, 
reflecting deliberateness of choice."  Davis, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 
¶36.  Furthermore, any effect that Ward's brief deprivation of 
the right to counsel the previous night may have had on the 
voluntariness of her subsequent statements is negated by her 
initiating the interview, her obvious willingness to talk and 
her clear waiver of rights.  As Ward stated at this very 
interview prior to incriminating herself, "If I wasn't willing 
to talk to you why would we be in here?"  Accordingly, Ward's 
statements were voluntary.   
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
42 
 
3. 
Cumulative effect  
¶60 Ward's final argument is that the totality of the 
circumstances test for the voluntariness of her statements 
contemplates that all three questioning sessions should be 
evaluated as a single event.  She asserts that the combined 
effect of police conduct constituted coercion sufficient to 
render all of her statements involuntary.   
¶61 We reject this argument.  It appears that Ward is 
attempting to have the voluntariness of her statements at these 
questioning sessions evaluated without any consideration for the 
validity of her waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel.  
However, as the Supreme Court has noted, "cases in which a 
defendant 
can 
make 
a 
colorable 
argument 
that 
a 
self-
incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact that 
the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of 
Miranda are rare."  Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (quoting 
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 433 n.20).  Accordingly, Ward's waiver of 
rights and her conversational demeanor during those waivers, 
where she completed the officer's statements with an accurate 
recitation of the right he was expressing, is part of the 
context 
in 
which 
we 
evaluate 
Ward's 
assertion 
that 
her 
subsequent incriminating statements were not voluntary.  See id.   
¶62 To hold otherwise would alter the principles courts 
have explained that guide police conduct to assure that a 
suspect's rights are respected.  When the courts set out 
principles that explain constitutional rights, police are better 
able 
to 
understand 
what 
they 
can 
and 
cannot 
do 
when 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
43 
 
interrogating suspects.  Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 
(1979) (noting that, in the context of questioning a juvenile, 
the current system of rigid specificity in regard to what is 
appropriate police conduct has the virtue of informing police 
what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation).  These 
principles create a balance that protects the rights of 
individuals, while at the same time permitting the police to do 
their job. 
¶63 We perceive no basis for Ward's contention that the 
sequence of permissible police actions that occurred here, when 
combined, renders her statements inadmissible under the totality 
of the circumstances.  We understand Ward's argument to be that 
the combination of circumstances to which she was subjected 
resulted 
in 
coerced 
statements, 
even 
if 
none 
of 
these 
circumstances 
were 
individually 
sufficient 
to 
result 
in 
coercion.  See People v. Washington, 413 N.E.2d 170, 174 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1980) (reviewing whether in a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel context a "combination of circumstances, even if they 
would not be coercive if taken singly may, in combination, 
produce intolerable pressure"). 
¶64 Police coercion is a necessary predicate to a finding 
that a confession is not voluntary.  Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶37 
(citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167); see also Withrow v. 
Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 708 (1993) (holding that police coercion 
is a "crucial element" to a determination of involuntariness).  
The only instances of potentially improper police conduct in 
this case were Schaepe's incomplete representation of Ward's 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
44 
 
daughter's description of Ward shaking the baby, and the brief 
deprivation of her right to contact an attorney during her night 
in jail, if she had requested to do so.  We have concluded that 
those factors did not cause Ward to incriminate herself.  See 
supra ¶¶26, 53-54.  Throughout the interviews, all of the 
detectives' 
conduct 
either 
was 
expressly 
authorized 
by 
principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the 
waiver context, or did not constitute factors sufficient under 
the totality of the circumstances to undermine the voluntariness 
of Ward's incriminating statements.  Therefore, while relevant, 
Schaepe's omission and Ward's brief deprivation of the right to 
counsel are "insufficient . . . to make [] otherwise voluntary 
confession[s] inadmissible."  Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739.  We do 
not accept Ward's contention that the combination of police 
conduct 
rendered 
her 
waivers 
invalid 
or 
her 
statements 
involuntary. 
¶65 Furthermore, 
Ward's 
assertion 
would 
detrimentally 
affect the waiver analysis in that her argument represents a 
dramatic step away from the clear principles established by the 
United States Supreme Court and a return to the type of fuzzy 
distinctions that have been rejected in the past because they 
made it all but impossible for the police to do their job and 
for suspects to understand their rights.  See, e.g., Charles D. 
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 109, 113, 123-26 
(1998) (noting that pre-Miranda standards were impossible to 
apply due to the nearly infinite variety of circumstances in 
which interrogation might take place, and bright-line rules, 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
45 
 
which would make the job of the police manageable, while 
effectively informing suspects of their rights, were necessary); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 Mich. L. 
Rev. 865, 869-72 (1981) (criticizing the pre-Miranda standard 
for confessions, noting its complete failure to provide either 
protection to suspects or guidance to the courts and the 
police). 
¶66 We note that the police generally have been successful 
operating under the system of principles pertaining to waiver of 
rights that were put in place by Miranda, Edwards and Burbine.  
The Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent and to have counsel 
provided are now firmly rooted in the public consciousness.  
Furthermore, as has been recognized,  
[t]he years after Miranda have not diminished the need 
for bright-line rules.  Abandoning the original vision 
of Miranda leaves courts and police to struggle with 
case-by-case determinations of voluntariness.  In 
contrast, by complying with Miranda, officers largely 
avert the need for a voluntariness inquiry.  In the 
overwhelming majority of cases, a court will find that 
a suspect who received proper warnings and waived his 
or her Fifth Amendment rights made a voluntary 
statement.  Furthermore, apart from the notion that a 
fully informed waiver usually negates a claim of 
coercion, Miranda has made it easier to resolve a 
motion to suppress a statement under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Because courts typically view an officer's 
violation of Miranda as a significant indicator of a 
coerced 
statement 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
analysis, 
complying 
with 
Miranda 
bolsters a prosecutor's position under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L. Rev. at 166.  To 
argue for a return to the situation that existed prior to the 
No. 
2007AP79-CR   
 
46 
 
promulgation of these clear principles, essentially the result 
of accepting Ward's approach, would be to argue for a return to 
a scheme which provides no real guidance.   
¶67 Because the police conduct in this case was lawful, we 
cannot conclude that putting it all together results in Ward's 
waiver of rights being invalid or her subsequent statements 
being coerced.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of 
appeals, 
which 
affirmed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
judgment 
convicting Ward of first-degree reckless homicide. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶68 The 
dispositive 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
is 
whether 
incriminating 
statements 
Ward 
made 
during 
the 
police 
investigation subsequent to the death of her seven-week old 
nephew 
were 
not 
voluntarily 
made 
and 
should 
have 
been 
suppressed.  We conclude that once in police custody, Ward 
knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived her Fifth 
Amendment rights to silence and to counsel and that under the 
totality of the circumstances, her statements were voluntarily 
made because neither her personal characteristics nor police 
conduct resulted in coerced statements.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
¶69 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (dissenting).  As a Justice on 
this court, but also as a father and a grandfather, I abhor the 
abuse of the baby, Thomas, that resulted in his death.  While I 
am repulsed by the mistreatment of this baby and of any child, I 
write to caution the great majority of excellent Wisconsin law 
enforcement 
officers 
that 
they 
should 
not 
emulate 
the 
interrogation tactics that were used in this matter. Such 
tactics resulted in statements here that should not have been 
found reliable and trustworthy and should instead have been 
suppressed under the totality of the circumstances test.  Even 
when medical evidence of an earlier brain injury and internal 
bleeding suffered by this baby was brought to the attention of 
law enforcement, it appears that such evidence was ignored, and 
the focus remained on just one suspect, Jennifer Ward, to the 
exclusion of any other person who could have caused the injuries 
that were ultimately fatal.  
¶70 I agree wholeheartedly with the majority's observation 
that "[w]hen the courts set out principles that explain 
constitutional rights, police are better able to understand what 
they can and cannot do when interrogating suspects."  Majority 
op., ¶62.  That is precisely why I dissent in this case.  The 
majority is content to give the court's stamp of approval to the 
tactics used here, but it should not be oblivious to the message 
this ruling will send.   
¶71 I find that message very disturbing in light of much 
case law from this court, from the courts of numerous other 
states, and from the United States Supreme Court, discussing the 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
very real dangers of incommunicado questioning,1 a method of 
investigation which impinges on both rights at issue here:  the 
right to have only voluntarily made statements entered in 
evidence and the right to counsel.  A primary concern of mine is 
for the reliability and trustworthiness of the statements that I 
fear, as a result of the majority's opinion, will be used as 
evidence in the future.   
¶72 In finding that statements by Ward were voluntary, the 
majority focuses on technicalities——such as that Ward was told 
in the nighttime hours that the strict prohibition placed on 
phone calls by her did not preclude a call to an attorney——and 
understates by at least 23 hours the amount of time Ward was 
held incommunicado,2 a key factor in the totality of the 
circumstances.   
¶73 For the reasons given below, I therefore respectfully 
dissent. 
                                                 
1 The 
word 
incommunicado 
is 
defined 
in 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary as "[w]ithout any means of communication" and "([o]f 
a prisoner) having the right to communicate only with a few 
designated people."  Black's Law Dictionary 780 (8th ed. 2004).  
It is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as meaning 
"[w]ithout 
the 
means 
or 
right 
of 
communicating 
with 
others . . . ."  American Heritage Dictionary 914 (3d ed. 1992). 
2 Majority 
op., 
¶53 
(citing 
cases 
on 
incommunicado 
interrogations and characterizing the period of time Ward was 
incommunicado as "[an] hour and 40 minutes"——apparently counting 
the time between approximately 5:20 p.m., when Ward was made to 
understand that she could not make any phone calls, and 
approximately 7 p.m., when Detective Glenn Schaepe told a jailer 
to inform her that the restriction on phone calls did not apply 
to a call to an attorney). 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
 
I 
A. 
The voluntariness of the statements 
¶74 A determination of a statement's voluntariness is made 
based on the totality of the circumstances, "balancing . . . the 
personal characteristics of the defendant against the pressures 
imposed upon the defendant by law enforcement officers."  State 
v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶38, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W. 2d 407. 
¶75 While I agree that Ward's characteristics tend to 
weigh in favor of a finding of voluntariness, the tactics of the 
police should give us all pause.  The statements at issue here 
were 
obtained 
through 
a 
troubling 
mix 
of 
deceptive 
and 
manipulative methods, employed on a suspect who was at every 
turn blocked from contact with anyone, including a lawyer and 
family members who were present and waiting just outside a door.  
This methodical isolation began at the hospital before Ward was 
even in custody and continued throughout the remainder of a day, 
a night, and the next morning, for a total of more than 24 hours 
until the third interrogation produced the statements the police 
were seeking. 
¶76 The first questioning of Ward began at approximately 
9:30 a.m. in her hospital room.  It would be well into the next 
day before she spoke to anyone besides her interrogators or the 
jailer.  When Detective Glenn Schaepe (Schaepe) arrived at the 
hospital, he sent Ward's daughter out of the room.  He later 
turned away a friend of Ward who asked to speak to her in the 
hospital room.  He turned Ward's husband away.  He turned her 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
attorney away on one occasion and ignored him when he made a 
second attempt to see Ward at the jail. 
¶77 The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
holding a suspect incommunicado is problematic.  When the Court 
addressed a situation in which the suspect in police custody had 
been told that he could not make a call to his wife until he had 
signed a confession, the Court noted, "We cannot blind ourselves 
to what experience unmistakably teaches: that even apart from 
the express threat, the basic techniques present here——the 
secret 
and 
incommunicado 
detention 
and 
interrogation——are 
devices adapted and used to extort confessions from suspects."  
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).   
¶78 Haynes "gave in only after consistent denials of his 
requests to call his wife, and the conditioning of such outside 
contact upon his accession to police demands."  Id.  Similarly, 
it was only at the beginning of the third interrogation session, 
on the second day, that Ward had the first indication from 
Schaepe that she could contact her husband.  The first words out 
of her mouth were, "[Can I] make a phone call and talk to my 
husband?"  Schaepe's response:  "Yeah.  Yeah.  As soon as we're 
done here."  An hour later, at the end of the interrogation, she 
asked again, "The call thing[--] are you gonna [--?]"  He then 
responded, "Yeah.  That's lifted."  It was then 11:17 a.m., 
almost 26 hours after Schaepe had begun the initial questioning 
of Ward.  She had been held incommunicado until that point in 
time. 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
¶79 In Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346 (1968), the 
United States Supreme Court again addressed the tactic of 
holding a suspect without contact until a confession is 
extracted: 
The inference is inescapable that the officers kept 
petitioner incommunicado for the 30 to 48 hours during 
which they sought and finally obtained his confession. 
Considering the "totality of the circumstances[,]" we 
conclude that the court erred in holding that the 
confession 
and 
the 
partial 
re-enactment 
were 
voluntary. The denial of access to counsel and the 
outside world continued throughout, and there was "no 
break in the stream of events" from arrest throughout 
the concededly invalid confessions of [the first day] 
to the confession and re-enactment of [the second day] 
"sufficient to insulate" the final events "from the 
effect of all that went before."  
Id. at 349 (citations omitted). 
¶80 In dissent in Moran v. Burbine, Justice Stevens 
decried the majority's willingness to accept the incommunicado 
questioning of a suspect in the service of obtaining a 
confession where the police failed to notify the suspect of the 
presence of an attorney retained on his behalf: 
The core of the Court's holding is that police 
interference with an attorney's access to her client 
during that period is not unconstitutional.  The Court 
reasons that a State has a compelling interest, not 
simply in custodial interrogation, but in lawyer-free, 
incommunicado 
custodial 
interrogation. 
 
Such 
incommunicado interrogation is so important that a 
lawyer may be given false information that prevents 
her presence and representation; it is so important 
that police may refuse to inform a suspect of his 
attorney's communications and immediate availability.  
This conclusion flies in the face of this Court's 
repeated 
expressions 
of 
deep 
concern 
about 
incommunicado questioning.  Until today, incommunicado 
questioning 
has 
been 
viewed 
with 
the 
strictest 
scrutiny 
by 
this 
Court; 
today, 
incommunicado 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
questioning is embraced as a societal goal of the 
highest order that justifies police deception of the 
shabbiest kind. 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 437-439 (1986) (Stevens, J. 
dissenting).   
¶81 Our court has had occasion to discuss similar police 
tactics as well.  In Phillips v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 521, 139 
N.W.2d 41 (1966), we addressed, among other things, the 
propriety of holding a suspect incommunicado from 4:45 p.m. one 
day until the next morning.  While the court's strong language 
was made in the context of a discussion of how long a person 
could be detained before being brought before a magistrate, the 
opinion made some trenchant observations about the discretion of 
police to hold suspects incommunicado: 
The usual investigatory methods of the police lend 
themselves to the search for a confession and we point 
out again as we did in Pulaski v. State (1964), 23 
Wis. (2d) 138, 126 N.W. (2d) 625, that long detentions 
are looked upon with disfavor by this court and 
seriously impair the voluntariness of the confession 
from the standpoint of psychological aspect of the 
usual police-station hazards. We find no justification 
in holding a person under investigation incommunicado 
no matter for what length of time.  Such device smacks 
of the star chamber and is an indication in itself of 
overbearing on the part of the police.  Delaying of a 
request of an accused to talk to his family or friends 
or his attorney should be considered strong evidence 
of overbearing pressure to obtain a confession or 
inculpatory statements. 
Id. at 535-536 (emphasis added). 
¶82 The pattern of coercion undoubtedly began at the 
hospital.  For example, it is clear that Schaepe had already 
decided that Ward would be going to the Sheriff's Department for 
further questioning even before he asked her whether she would 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
7 
 
be willing to do so.  Near the end of the interview, when only 
the two of them were in the room, Schaepe stated that Ward had 
not admitted what "specifically occurred": 
[Y]ou don't want to take responsibility for what 
happened.  You're talking you know general in general 
terms you are that you were the caretaker, but as far 
as what [] specifically occurred, I don't think you 
want to get into that.  And that's why I believe 
you're having a hard time remembering things and 
you're having [] pain in your head.  I'll make one 
more phone call here.  And then maybe we can get on 
our way. . . .  (Emphasis added.) 
¶83 Only later did Schaepe tell Ward that he would like to 
"go over to the Sheriff's Department" and that someone "can give 
[Ward] a ride over to the Sheriff's Department" because he knew 
she "didn't have a ride now."  He knew that because he had sent 
away the person who had come to drive her home.  While I note 
that no party specifically identifies at what point Ward was 
taken into custody, the State concedes that Ward was in custody 
by the second interrogation.  Majority op., ¶12.  Ward made no 
inculpatory statements while in the hospital room.  The 
statements Ward made in that interrogation were consistent:  she 
repeatedly said that she had not shaken the baby.  (Even when 
Schaepe falsely stated that Ward's daughter had told police 
"that the child was crying hard and she saw you shake the baby," 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
8 
 
Ward responded, "I don't remember shaking him though."3)  While 
the pattern that would continue throughout the next day did 
begin there, nothing that Schaepe did at the hospital, standing 
alone, rose to the level of coercion that would render those 
statements involuntary. 
¶84 I am satisfied under the totality of the circumstances 
that the tactics used here, including holding Ward incommunicado 
and using deceit, rendered the statements given by Ward in the 
                                                 
3 The majority wrongly characterizes Schaepe's statement as 
true but incomplete.  Majority op., ¶27.  Schaepe's statement is 
absolutely false.  The child was unresponsive, not "crying 
hard," at the time that Ward's daughter saw her trying to revive 
him.  As the majority points out, "use of deceit . . . does not 
by itself make an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible."  
Id. (quoting State v. Fehrenbach, 118 Wis. 2d 65, 66-67, 347 
N.W.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1984).  There is no need, therefore, for 
the majority to assert the truth of a statement that was in no 
respect true.  In any event, as the majority concedes, deceit 
remains a significant factor that is entirely appropriate to 
consider in an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.  
Majority op., ¶¶27, 28.  In a recent United States Supreme Court 
case, the significance of such deceit was highlighted.  Montejo 
v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. ___ (2009) (remanding for a determination 
of whether a waiver was knowing and voluntary and noting that 
the determination may turn on the factor of misrepresentations 
made by police).  There the deceit potentially affects the valid 
waiver of counsel; here it affects the voluntariness of the 
statements obtained from Ward. 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
9 
 
two 
subsequent 
interrogations 
and 
the 
many 
reenactments 
involuntary; such statements thus should have been suppressed.4 
                                                 
4 I note in addition that the admission of the statements 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The prosecution 
relied heavily on Ward's statements in the State's case and 
buttressed that evidence with testimony from medical experts.  
This is especially troubling in this type of case.  Medical 
evidence in so-called "shaken baby" cases is very much in 
dispute at the moment, and the risk of wrongful convictions 
based on powerful but ultimately discredited expert testimony is 
significant.  Given the evidence of prior brain injury, it is 
relevant, but not dispositive, that Ward was the person who was 
with the baby when he died.  Majority op., ¶43 n.5.  Scientific 
understanding of these tragic injuries is rapidly advancing, and 
in a similar case our court of appeals noted that "a significant 
and legitimate debate in the medical community has developed in 
the past ten years over whether infants can be fatally injured 
through shaking alone, whether an infant may suffer head trauma 
and yet experience a significant lucid interval prior to death, 
and whether other causes may mimic the symptoms traditionally 
viewed as indicating shaken baby or shaken impact syndrome."  
State v. Edmunds, 2008 WI App 33, ¶15, 308 Wis.2d 374, 746 
N.W.2d 590, review denied, 2008 WI 40, 308 Wis. 2d 609, 612, 749 
N.W.2d 661 (unpublished table decision).  In Texas, the court of 
appeals recently granted a stay of execution in a similar case, 
where the defendant had consistently explained the child's 
injuries as resulting from being accidentally dropped onto a 
concrete floor.  The court explained: 
At the time of trial Dr. Roberto Bayardo, the highly 
experienced 
medical 
examiner 
for 
Travis 
County, 
testified that it was "impossible" for Brandon's 
extensive brain injuries to have occurred in the way 
that applicant stated.  He testified that her story 
was false and "incredible."  In his opinion (and that 
of Dr. Sparks Veasay of Lubbock County), Brandon's 
injuries 
had 
to 
have 
resulted 
from 
a 
blow 
intentionally struck by applicant.  He concluded, "I 
would say the baby was caught up with the hands by the 
arms along the body and then swung and slammed very 
hard against a flat surface."  In his 1995 opinion, 
Brandon 
was 
an 
abused 
baby 
whom 
applicant 
had 
intentionally murdered. 
But 
according 
to 
the 
affidavits 
and/or 
reports 
submitted by Drs. John J. Plunkett, Peter J. Stephens, 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
10 
 
B. 
Waiver of the right to counsel 
¶85 In finding that the waiver of counsel was valid, the 
majority accepts the surprisingly low standard set by the United 
State Supreme Court in Burbine.   Courts in at least thirteen 
states have made clear that they will not accept Burbine's 
standard and will not tolerate actions like those that occurred 
in this case.  The fact that Ward did not know (because police 
refused to tell her) that her attorney came to the building 
where she was being interrogated on two separate occasions and 
asked to speak to her is indeed significant.  Such jurisdictions 
have rightly concluded that a waiver of counsel made under such 
circumstances cannot be "knowing" when police conduct keeps the 
accused from knowing that counsel is present and available.  
Those jurisdictions have therefore ruled any waiver of counsel 
invalid where police engage in that kind of conduct, generally 
on the grounds that such conduct by police violates the state's 
constitutional guarantees of due process.  We should do the 
same. 
¶86 In finding that the waiver of counsel was valid, the 
majority also utilizes what amounts to a legal technicality, the 
strained 
and 
artificial 
distinctions 
in 
Fifth 
and 
Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Under that jurisprudence, the analysis 
                                                                                                                                                             
Janice J. Ophoven, and Kenneth L. Monson, recent 
advances in the area of biomechanics and physics 
suggest that it is perhaps possible that Brandon's 
head injuries could have been caused by an accidental 
short-distance fall. 
Ex parte Henderson, 246 S.W.3d 690, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
11 
 
of a waiver's validity often turns on the rather arbitrary 
question of when charges were filed.  It appears, given the fact 
that the same law enforcement officer who was involved in State 
v. Hornung, 229 Wis. 2d 469, 600 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1999), 
conducted the investigation here, that the lesson of Hornung has 
not been lost on some police officers.  In this case, there was 
a conspicuous delay in filing charges until after multiple 
interrogations and reenactments, and the police thus succeeded 
in avoiding any danger that Ward would be eligible for the 
greater protections of the Sixth Amendment.  But this case 
clearly illustrates the plain unfairness of the legal line-
drawing 
between 
Fifth 
and 
Sixth 
Amendment 
constitutional 
protections and the legal artifices that control which Amendment 
is technically in play at a given point.  We should do as other 
jurisdictions have done and, under our state constitution, treat 
a waiver of the right to counsel the same regardless of whether 
it occurs before or after charges are filed. 
¶87 Ward's waiver of her right to counsel should therefore 
be found invalid for two reasons.  First, it was not knowing and 
voluntary because police refused on two occasions to inform her 
that her attorney was present in the building where she was 
being interrogated and was available to assist her.  We should 
follow the lead of the many states that have established that 
under such conditions, a waiver of counsel cannot be knowing and 
is thus invalid.  Second, Ward's statements to the police about 
wanting to talk with her husband about getting an attorney 
should be considered a sufficient invocation of her right to 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
12 
 
counsel, and we should follow the lead of the jurisdictions that 
have, relying on state constitutions, erased the arbitrary lines 
drawn by the United States Supreme Court as to how the timing of 
the filing of charges against a defendant determines what is 
sufficient to invoke the right to counsel under the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments. 
¶88 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
decision 
in  
Burbine——affirming the validity of a waiver notwithstanding the 
failure of police to notify the defendant of the presence nearby 
of an attorney retained on his behalf——undoubtedly cleared the 
way for the sort of holding we have from the majority in this 
case, but the case included some notable reservations.  In 
Burbine, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the floor it was 
setting for compliance with the Fifth Amendment was below what 
certain states were willing to countenance:  "We acknowledge 
that 
a number of 
state courts have reached a contrary 
conclusion."  Burbine, 475 U.S. at 427.  That has certainly 
continued to be the case.  The Court also recognized that its 
rule 
was 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
American 
Bar 
Association 
Standards of Criminal Justice.  Id.  The Court paid little 
attention to what it conceded was "the numerical preponderance 
of lower court decisions" that would have held otherwise.  Id. 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
13 
 
¶89 Indeed, at least thirteen states5 have asserted their 
unwillingness to set the bar as low as Burbine does, to "permit 
police to delude custodial suspects, exposed to interrogation, 
into falsely believing they are without immediately available 
legal counsel and to also prevent that counsel from accessing 
and assisting their clients during the interrogation."  People 
v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923, 929 (Ill. 1994) (noting that "[t]he 
incommunicado interrogation and surrounding coercive environment 
likely to result from this objectionable practice is exactly the 
sort of scenario previously condemned by the United States 
Supreme Court in Escobedo6 and Miranda7").  As the New Jersey 
Supreme Court stated, the common thread among state courts' 
rejection of Burbine is "one supervening principle:  the 
atmosphere 
of 
custodial 
interrogation 
is 
inherently 
coercive . . . ."  State v. Reed, 627 A.2d 630, 640 (N.J. 1993).  
That court got to the heart of the matter when it stated, "[O]ur 
decision today should be governed by a two-fold purpose:  to 
enhance the reliability of confessions by reducing the inherent 
                                                 
5 See State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 452 (Conn. 1988); 
Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170, 175 (Del. 1990); Haliburton v. 
State, 514 So.2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. 1987); People v. McCauley, 645 
N.E.2d 923, 929 (Ill. 1994); Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071, 
1079 (Ind. 2003); West v. Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Ky. 
1994); Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 178 (Mass. 
2000); People v. Bender, 551 N.W.2d 71, 72 (Mich. 1996); State 
v. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d 799, 801-802 (Minn. 1992); State v. 
Roache, 803 A.2d 572, 578 (N.H. 2002); State v. Reed, 627 A.2d 
630, 643 (N.J. 1993); Dennis v. State, 990 P.2d 277, 286 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1999); State v. Isom, 761 P.2d 524, 527 (Or. 1988). 
6 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
14 
 
coercion of custodial interrogation and diminish the likelihood 
of unreasonable police conduct in those situations where police, 
knowing that an attorney has been retained for the suspect and 
is asking for contact with his or her client, are desperate to 
acquire a confession before the suspect speaks with the 
attorney."  Id. at 642. 
¶90 The majority's holding that Ward's statements were 
insufficient to invoke her Fifth Amendment right to counsel and 
that her waiver of that right is thus valid depends on the fact 
that the waivers being challenged occurred prior to the time 
Ward was charged.8  However, the timing of the filing of charges 
is something that is usually within the power of the law 
enforcement personnel who are conducting the investigation; 
through their manipulation of the chain of events, they can, as 
they did here, keep a suspect incommunicado for almost 26 hours, 
delay filing charges, and delay the time that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches.  I find it troubling that 
such manipulation can be dispositive of the validity of a waiver 
of the right to counsel under Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
¶91 In Hornung, the court of appeals found that the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated 
                                                 
8 In overruling Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), a 
case prohibiting police from initiating interrogation of a 
defendant once he or she has requested an attorney at an 
arraignment or similar criminal proceeding, the United States 
Supreme Court recently decided that a waiver of right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment is not presumed invalid when police 
initiate interrogation.  Montejo, 556 U.S. ___.  Montejo does 
not apply directly to the issues now before this court. 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
15 
 
when officers failed to permit the defendant to make telephone 
calls when he asked to do so.  As noted above, the police 
detective involved in the present case was the same person who 
conducted some of the interrogation there, and, interestingly, 
the same attorney, Jeff Jackomino, waited at the Sheriff's 
Department, requesting to speak to the person being questioned.  
Hornung, 229 Wis. 2d at 474. 
¶92 The court of appeals noted that, in contrast to 
requirements under a Fifth Amendment analysis, "[a]ny language 
requiring 
an 
'unequivocal 
or 
unambiguous' 
request 
for 
counsel . . . is conspicuously absent from the Patterson Court's 
discussion 
of 
the 
petitioner's 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
counsel."  Id. at 478 (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 
285 (1988)).  It therefore noted, "As Hornung's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel was effectively triggered by its attachment and 
subsequent assertion, any subsequent inculpatory statements or 
fruits therefrom must be suppressed as violative of Hornung's 
constitutional rights."  Hornung, 229 Wis. 2d at 480. 
¶93 In the Hornung case, the interrogation occurred after 
a criminal complaint and warrant were filed against Hornung, and 
Hornung's rights under the Sixth Amendment were at issue.  Here 
the interrogation of Ward occurred before the filing of criminal 
charges, and thus, because case law establishes that the right 
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment does not attach until 
charges are filed, it is Ward's protections under the Fifth 
Amendment that are at issue. 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
16 
 
¶94 Under the applicable case law, an "unequivocal and 
unambiguous" request for counsel seems to be required to comply 
with the Fifth Amendment prior to the filing of charges; the 
requirement for such a clear invocation appears considerably 
less stringent under the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 476-480.  See 
Patterson, 487 U.S at 296 n.9 ("This does not mean, of course, 
that 
all 
Sixth 
Amendment 
challenges 
to 
the 
conduct 
of 
postindictment questioning will fail whenever the challenged 
practice would pass constitutional muster under Miranda.  For 
example, we have permitted a Miranda waiver to stand where a 
suspect was not told that his lawyer was trying to reach him 
during questioning; in the Sixth Amendment context, this waiver 
would not be valid." (emphasis added)). 
¶95 In this case, Ward's repeated references in the 
interrogations to her wish to speak to her husband about 
retaining an attorney and her clear statements that it was 
unrealistic to expect her to be able to reach an attorney during 
nighttime hours would be viewed quite differently had she 
already been charged and had the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel attached.9  
¶96 Even if the circumstances presented here can be 
squared with the constitutional case law on waiver of right to 
                                                 
9 It may well be of some significance in a Sixth Amendment 
analysis that, as to statements made in the third interrogation, 
Ward initiated contact with the officers, given the language in 
Hornung:  "As noted, once the Sixth Amendment has attached and 
been asserted, any subsequent waiver of the right to counsel is 
invalid, unless contact is initiated by the defendant."  State 
v. Hornung, 229 Wis. 2d 469, 480, 600 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
17 
 
counsel, it is worth considering bringing coherence to the odd 
patchwork of case law governing this area.  To do so, we should 
turn, as many states have done, to our own constitution.   
¶97 Courts in many states, including Alaska, Hawaii, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, have invoked 
their own state constitutions to create clearer and fairer rules 
about the conditions under which the right to counsel attaches10 
and to provide a more robust right to counsel than the United 
States Supreme 
Court has found in the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.11  As the Supreme Court of Minnesota said: 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977) 
(holding that right to counsel applies at pre-indictment 
lineup); State v. Liulama, 845 P.2d 1194, 1200 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1992) cert. denied, Feb. 22, 1993, (holding waiver invalid and 
any post-arrest statements by a defendant to the police 
inadmissible absent prior advice from a court or defendant's own 
counsel of his right to counsel); State v. Risk, 598 N.W.2d 642, 
647 (Minn. 1999) (requiring police to cease questioning an 
accused who makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement invoking 
the right to counsel and noting that the holding "provides more 
protection than is required by the United States Constitution"); 
Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. 1974) (holding 
that the right to counsel attaches at arrest). 
11 In addition to states rejecting Moran v. Burbine, 475 
U.S. 412 (1986), on state law grounds (see supra, ¶89 n.5), see, 
e.g., Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910, 914-15 
(Alaska 1971) (extending types of cases to which right to 
counsel is applicable); State v. Sanchez, 609 A.2d 400, 407 
(N.J. 1992) (establishing higher standard for the state to show 
valid waiver of right to counsel and noting that the state 
constitution affords "greater protection of the right to counsel 
than is provided under the federal Constitution"); People v. 
West, 81 N.Y.2d 370, 375 (N.Y. 1993) (imposing on police the 
burden 
of 
determining 
whether 
representation 
by 
counsel 
continued where a suspect was interviewed a second time after 
three years had elapsed and noting that "[t]he State right to 
counsel is a cherished principle, rooted in this State's 
prerevolutionary constitutional law and developed independent of 
its Federal counterpart"). 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
18 
 
We acknowledge that this rule provides more protection 
than is required by the United States Constitution.  
We do not cavalierly interpret our state constitution 
more expansively than the United States Supreme Court 
has interpreted the federal Constitution.  However, 
the rule we . . . reaffirm here[] is consistent with 
our "long tradition of the assuring the right to 
counsel." 
State v. Risk, 598 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 1999) (citations 
omitted). 
¶98 Similarly, in State v. Liulama, the Intermediate Court 
of Appeals of Hawaii stated: 
Logic and sound regard for the purposes of article I, 
section 14, as exemplified by case law and the HRPP, 
favor the extension of the protection of article I, 
section 14, beyond that of the sixth amendment as 
expressed in Patterson.  We do not believe that the 
pragmatic approach expressed by the Patterson court is 
in keeping with the importance attached by the Hawaii 
Supreme Court to the right to counsel under article I, 
section 14, as indicated above. 
Accordingly, we hold that where an accused has been 
arrested and interrogated by the police and has not 
been specifically advised by a court or by his own 
counsel that he has the constitutional right to 
counsel at every stage of the proceeding following 
that arrest, he cannot be held to have knowingly and 
intelligently waived that right, and any statements 
made by him to the police absent such advice are 
inadmissible. 
State v. Liulama, 845 P.2d 1194, 1203 (Haw. Ct. App. 1992), 
cert. denied, Feb. 22, 1993. 
¶99 Previously, we have adopted higher standards of 
conduct for law enforcement personnel of the State of Wisconsin.  
We have stated before that this court "will not be bound by the 
minimums which are imposed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States if it is the judgment of this court that the Constitution 
of Wisconsin and the laws of this state require that greater 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
19 
 
protection of citizens' liberties ought to be afforded."  State 
v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶59, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 
(quoting State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.W.2d 210 
(1977)).  This court should apply Article I, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution,12 a provision that parallels the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution, to cases 
like 
this 
one 
rather 
than 
continue 
to 
allow 
artificial 
distinctions to be drawn based on something as subject to 
manipulation as whether charges have been filed.  I disagree 
with the majority's view that, unlike the approach we took in 
Knapp and Dubose, Article I, Section 8 should be interpreted 
here 
consistent 
with 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.  Majority op., ¶18 n.3. 
II 
¶100 In summary, my great concern here is protecting the 
search for the truth that is supposed to be the point of a 
trial.  This court should hold, under the totality of the 
circumstances, that the tactics used, including holding Ward 
incommunicado for almost 26 hours and using deceit, resulted in 
involuntary statements that should have been suppressed.  After 
                                                 
12 "[O]n occasion, we have interpreted a provision in the 
Wisconsin Constitution more broadly than the United States 
Supreme Court has interpreted a parallel provision in the United 
States Constitution.  State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶56, 285 Wis. 
2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (interpreting Article I, § 8 more broadly 
than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth 
Amendment); State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶45, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 
699 N.W.2d 582 (also interpreting Article I, § 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution more broadly than the Fifth Amendment)."  
State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶19, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 
748. 
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
20 
 
all, a large part of the reason for banning involuntary 
confessions is that they are unreliable.  Jackson v. Denno, 378 
U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964).  While a confession extracted over the 
course of three interrogations of a suspect whose family members 
and counsel were fended off over the course of two days may 
technically resolve a case, such tactics——sure to be used, I 
fear, now that this court has given its blessing——leave 
lingering 
questions 
as 
to 
whether 
the 
right 
person 
was 
prosecuted and whether justice was served.   
¶101 Further, we should follow the lead of other states and 
utilize Article I, Section 813 of our constitution to eliminate 
the artificial distinctions that exist between Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and we should utilize Article I, 
Section 714 of our constitution to find that a waiver of the 
right to counsel cannot be knowing, and therefore valid, where 
police have refused to inform an accused person that counsel is 
present and available.15  On the facts of this case, we should 
therefore find Ward's waiver of her right to counsel invalid. 
                                                 
13 Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution states 
in relevant part, "No person may be held to answer for a 
criminal offense without due process of law . . . nor may be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself 
or herself." 
14 Article 1, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution states 
in relevant part, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall 
enjoy 
the 
right 
to 
be 
heard 
by 
himself 
and 
counsel . . . ." 
15 Justice Shirley Abrahamson, now Chief Justice, in her 
dissent in State v. Hansen, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 401 N.W.2d 771 
(1987), supported the position I take today.  Writing about 
Burbine, she noted:  
No.  2007AP79-CR.npc 
 
21 
 
¶102 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
¶103 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
By not imposing a federal constitutional requirement 
on the states and by encouraging the states to adopt 
their own rules governing police conduct, the United 
States Supreme Court recognizes the importance of the 
state courts in protecting individual rights and 
societal interests in our federal system.  
The majority struggles to show that the police conduct 
in this case fits within the letter of the law which 
entitles an accused to be represented during police 
questioning. But it is clear that the police conduct 
violates the spirit of the law. It is with good reason 
that the Wisconsin Constitution exhorts us that "the 
blessings of a free government can only be maintained 
by a firm adherence to justice . . . and by frequent 
recurrence to fundamental principles." Art. I, sec. 
22. 
While I am aware of and give due weight to the needs 
of law enforcement officers and the weighty social 
objectives of crime investigation, I conclude that 
this court demeans the defendant's statutory and 
constitutional rights to consult with an attorney by 
giving its seal of approval to conduct that kept an 
accused from seeing a lawyer his family retained for 
him.   
Hansen, 136 Wis. 2d at 220-221 (Abrahamson, J. dissenting) 
(citations omitted).