Case Title: Colandrea v. Wilde Lake

Citation: 361 Md. 371

Docket Number: 24/00

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Richard C. Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Association, Inc., et al.
No. 24, September Term, 2000
Headnote:
In the case at bar, the community had a restrictive covenant that stated that no home
industry could be conducted without the approval of an Architectural Committee.  In
respect to the Fair Housing Act, the restrictive covenant had been found to be facially
neutral in a prior proceeding.  The Architectural Committee denied one of the two
applications for a home business submitted by the appellant.  We hold that the trial court
was not clearly erroneous for its determination that the Architectural Committee’s decision
to deny the application was reasonable.  We have held, in numerous cases, that injunctive
relief is appropriate for violations of private covenants.  We also hold that the trial court’s
granting of a permanent injunction to enforce the restrictive covenant in this case was not
an abuse of discretion. 
Circuit Court for Howard County
Case # 13-C-96-30540
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 24
September Term, 2000
RICHARD C. COLANDREA
v.
WILDE LAKE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION,
INC., et al.
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:   November 8, 2000
 We initially note that had appellant’s brief contained a complete history of the litigation in respect
1
to his efforts to maintain such facilities in the Village of Wilde Lake, we may not have granted certiorari in
this case.  We were led by appellant’s brief to surmise that appellant’s concerns in respect to the Fair
Housing Act and the rights of the disabled had not previously been addressed.  As we shall point out, that
is not precisely the case. 
Richard C. Colandrea, appellant, appealed from a decision of the Circuit Court for Howard County
in favor of the Wilde Lake Community Association, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Association).  Appellant
alleges that the trial court erred in its ruling on the applicability of one of the Association covenants, and on
its ruling that the enforcement of that covenant by the Association’s Architectural Committee (hereafter
referred to as Committee) was appropriate.  We granted certiorari on our own motion prior to
consideration by the Court of Special Appeals.   Colandrea presents three issues, as follows:
1
I. Whether the Circuit Court erred in rejecting Colandrea’s Fair Housing Act counterclaim
where it was demonstrated at trial that: (1) the Village steadfastly refused to make any
reasonable accommodation for the group home; (2) the Village’s enforcement of the
restrictive covenant evinced certain Architectural Committee members’ discriminatory
intent and retaliation against Colundrea for providing housing to the disabled; and (3) the
Village’s selective enforcement of the restrictive covenant has a disparate impact on the
disabled.
II. Whether the Circuit Court erred in granting a permanent injunction which will result in
the permanent closure of housing for the disabled without requiring the Village to
demonstrate the four prerequisites for such relief.
III. Whether the Circuit Court erred in holding that the Architectural Committee’s decision
to close the senior-assisted facility was reasonable, made in good faith, and was not
whimsical, capricious or high-handed, where the decision was not supported by any
competent evidence and in any event was a mere pretext for improper motives harbored
by at least some of the Committee members.   
We answer each issue in the negative.  The trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion.  We
shall affirm.
Facts
 The properties are, of course, also subject to local and state government land use restrictions,
2
such as zoning, environmental regulations, etc.  Generally, when property is subject to both zoning and
other governmental regulations, and conditions created by real property covenants, that property must
satisfy the most restrictive of the regulations or conditions.
 In a previous case in the circuit court involving the same properties, No. 93-CA-21562, the
3
(continued...)
-2-
The Village of Wilde Lake is one of the unincorporated, planned, largely residential communities
encompassed under the larger unincorporated, planned community of Columbia in Howard County. The
various communities, including The Village of Wilde Lake are managed, i.e., governed, by community
associations.  These associations utilize covenants in the nature of contractual obligations that run with the
land, in order to regulate the uses of the properties under their purview.   The parties do not contest the
2
existence of the restriction at issue, or that it is a covenant running with the land. The covenant at issue
provides:
Section 11.02.  No profession or home industry shall be conducted in or on
any part of a Lot or in any improvement thereon on the Property without the specific
written approval of the Architectural Committee. The Architectural Committee, in its
discretion, upon consideration of the circumstances in each case, and particularly the effect
on surrounding property, may permit a Lot or any improvement thereon to be used in
whole or in part for the conduct of a profession or home industry.  No such profession or
home industry shall be permitted, however, unless it is considered, by the Architectural
Committee, to be compatible with a high quality residential neighborhood.  The following
activities, without limitation, may be permitted by the Architectural Committee in its
discretion: music, art and dancing classes; day nurseries and schools; medical and dental
offices; fraternal or social club meeting place; seamstress services.
Colandrea owns two abutting properties, with existing dwellings, located at 10433 and 10461
Waterfowl Terrace in the Village of Wilde Lake.  The Committee approved 10461 Waterfowl Terrace,
but not 10433 Waterfowl Terrace, when considering Colandrea’s applications to use the properties as
senior-assisted living facilities.  The decision of the Committee was, in relevant part, as follows:
3
(...continued)
3
circuit court in 1995 found that under the covenant, the senior-assisted living facilities required Committee
approval. Because appellant had not previously sought that approval, the trial court remanded the case in
order to give appellant an opportunity to apply.  Had approval been granted for both properties, the
present issue, at least as presented in this case, would not have arisen.  When, however, the Committee
failed to approve of the use of 10433 Waterfowl Terrace, the present litigation commenced.    
-3-
With respect to 10461 Waterfowl Terrace [Log No. 4432(b)], the Committee has
approved the application, but only upon the following conditions, as previously explained
at the February 27, 1996 meeting:
. . . .
With respect to 10433 Waterfowl Terrace [Log No. 4432(a)], the Committee
disapproved the application at the February 27, 1996 meeting. Based upon the
Committee’s review and consideration of all the documents submitted in regard to the
application, as well as the testimony at the Architectural Committee meetings on February
13 and February 27, 1996, it is the Committee’s judgement that the incremental increase
in the amount of traffic, congestion, noise, trash and waste, as well as parking problems
attributable to an additional facility at that location, have had and would continue to have
a detrimental impact on the residential character of the neighborhood, particularly in view
of the unique configuration of the street and the surrounding properties. [Alterations in
original.]
After the decision of the Committee, appellant continued to operate and expressed his intention to
continue to operate, a senior-assisted living facility at 10433 Waterfowl Terrace in spite of the Committee’s
disapproval of his application.  In response, the  Association instituted the present proceedings in the circuit
court seeking injunctive relief, asking the court to enjoin the operation of the business at 10433 Waterfowl
Terrace.  That court, after discussing the evidence presented to it, granted injunctive relief.  It discussed
the evidence, in part, as follows and then granted an injunction:
Michael Deets [a member and Chair of the Architectural Committee] . . . stated
that numerous concerns were expressed by residents at the February 13 meeting, including
issues pertaining to excessive trash, noise, traffic flow problems, parking problems, and
 This was important, we presume, because appellant was seeking approval of a “home” industry
4
or business.
-4-
concerns about whether Mr. Colandrea or his mother actually resided on the property.[
4
]
. . .
 
Mr. Deets testified that similar concerns were advanced at the February 27
meeting. One resident spoke about the possibility of medical waste and the lack of
information concerning the storage of such waste; while another commented upon the issue
of adult diapers and potential sewer problems. The Committee voted to approve the
application for 10461 . . . and voted disapproval of the application for 10433. . . . 
. . . . 
The Plaintiff [the Association] produced as a witness, James Meale, a member of
the Architectural Committee. . . .  He described the February 13 meeting as follows:
“There were a number of residents there. . . .  There was some
emotion certainly. I would say in general I found it to be reasoned.  There
were the general complaints against trash, traffic, congestion, lights shining
at people’s homes from the property.  That the general feeling was that
this was a residential neighborhood and that two (2) homes were
disruptive to that neighborhood.  The general comments, as I recall them,
were that one (1) home would be alright, two (2) homes were too many.”
Mr. Meale described the February 27 meeting, as follows:
“There were more people at that meeting, maybe twenty-five (25).
There was more discussion, much of it along the same lines.  I believe it
was at this second meeting that the issue of medical waste and whether
there was medical waste being discarded at the homes, was brought up.
I remember there were several medical people there, who basically led
that discussion. There was the same discussion of traffic congestion,
emergency vehicles, feeling of lack of maintenance of the property during
snow storms was brought up. The ambulance had to pull in across the
street at one point.”           
             
  
Mr. Meale stated that he believed observations of his neighbors was “accurate.”
He found their information credible.  He stated that he voted for approval of the 10461
application and against the 10433 application.  He explained his vote as follows:
-5-
“I am . . . have been involved with working with elderly my whole
career. . . .  I came in really believing that I would vote for two
applications.  I came to believe listening to a testimony and also looking
at the history of the application process, the fact that Mr. Colandrea did
not want to even apply for an in-home business and then when he was
ordered to do so, delayed it . . . .  I came to the conclusion that two (2)
houses really did overtax the neighborhood.  That in my view this was one
(1) business with two (2) locations.  It’s advertised that way, it’s still
advertised that way and that the house at 10461, the one I supported, has
a long driveway, which if properly used, could handle a good deal of the
traffic or the visitors and the staff.  That the house on the corner [10433
Waterfowl Terrace], the one I voted against, seemed to me to be on the
corner of a moderately busy street, in a particularly congested area and
that the obstructions on the street and to the neighbors and to the
community were serious at that point and there wasn’t much way to
correct them because the driveway was small, one car length, relatively
narrow and that two (2) houses were overtaxing the infrastructure of the
area of this particular neighborhood.”
This Court finds the testimony of Mr. Meale regarding the Committee’s reasons
for denying the application of 10433 particularly persuasive.  This Court finds that the
decision of the Architectural Committee to disapprove the facility at 10433 was based
upon concerns by the residents relating to trash, noise, parking, traffic, sewage and health.
These concerns were heightened by a realization that Colandrea had been insensitive to
his neighbors in the past and a further realization that it was unlikely that he would attempt
to minimize any negative impact that would result in the future from a business operation
being conducted in a residential neighborhood.  In sum, the decision of the Committee was
a reasonable, good faith exercise of discretion, based upon legitimate concerns regarding
the impact of the facility upon the surrounding neighborhood.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
. . . An injunction will lie to enforce a restrictive covenant with respect to the use
of the land conveyed, provided proper ground therefor exists. . . .  Furthermore, the
restrictive covenants provide for enforcement by means of injunctive relief. . . . 
The Defendant [Colandrea] contends that the Plaintiffs [Association] are not
entitled to injunctive relief because the Plaintiff is unable to satisfy four criteria: (1) success
on the merits, (2) the injury suffered if the injunction is granted is less than the harm that
would result from its refusal; (3) irreparable injury, and (4) public interest.  Maryland
Commission on Human Relations v. Downey [Communications], 110 Md. App.
-6-
493[, 678 A.2d 55 (1996)]; NCAA v. Johns Hopkins University, 301 Md. 574[, 483
A.2d 1272 (1984)].  Defendant’s emphasis on these two cases is misplaced.  They set
forth a four pronged test for the issuance of an interlocutory injunction as distinguished from
relief by means of a permanent injunction.
This Court finds that injunctive relief is necessary in the instant case in order to
maintain the integrity of a restrictive covenant, which was enforced by the Plaintiffs in a
reasonable and fair manner. [Some citations omitted.]
The trial court then addressed the remaining counts of Colandrea’s counterclaim.  In respect to
Colandrea’s Fair Housing Act claims, the trial court noted that: “Judge Sybert ruled [in case No. 93-CA-
21562 (see n.3 supra)] that the FHA did not relieve Colandrea from complying with the requirements of
the covenants . . . .  Thus, [Colandrea’s] claim under the FHA, is restricted, as a matter of law, to events
that occurred after he submitted an application for approval to the Committee.”   
As to appellant’s fair housing argument before this Court, he contends that “(2) the [Association’s]
enforcement of the restrictive covenant evinced certain Committee members’ discriminatory intent and
retaliation against Colandrea for providing housing to the disabled.”  The trial judge in the present litigation
addressed those concerns in his written memorandum finding that there was no “targeting.”  In respect to
the events occurring since the 1995 case, the trial court, addressing the FHA allegations, stated:
There is no evidence to establish that the Plaintiffs “targeted” senior assisted living facilities
in general, or Colandrea’s facilities in particular, nor does the evidence suggest that the
Plaintiffs have excluded such facilities from their community.  To the contrary, the Plaintiffs
approved Colandrea’s application at 10461 and three additional facilities.  Three out of
four such applications submitted by persons other than Colandrea were approved.
[Colandrea’s] contention that the Plaintiffs have imposed arbitrary spacing requirements
is simply not supported by the evidence.  In fact, correspondence between the Committee
and others indicate a contrary intent. (Plaintiff’s exhibits 22, 23 and 24).
In a FHA claim based upon an alleged failure to make a reasonable
accommodation, [Colandrea] bears the burden of proving that the requested
accommodation is (1) reasonable and (2) necessary (3) to afford handicapped persons
 This case, initiated by Colandrea via his corporation, Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., challenged on
5
Federal Housing Act grounds Howard County’s refusal to approve zoning for one of the subject properties
of the instant case so as to accommodate an assisted living facility for up to fifteen residents.  Colandrea’s
claims were rejected by the United States District Court for Maryland and the United State’s Court of
Appeals (4th Cir.).
-7-
equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.  Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard
County, 124 F.3d. 597 (4  Cir. 1997). . . .  
th
[5]
. . . Phyllis Madachy, Administrator of Howard County Office of Aging, testified
that there are presently sixty-three senior assisted housing facilities in Howard County,
thirty-two of which are located in Columbia. . . .  The current vacancy rate is
approximately twenty-five percent.  This Court finds that the approval of a facility at 10433
Waterfowl Terrace is not necessary to afford disabled persons equal opportunities in
housing, in . . . light of the presence of a facility operated by Colandrea nearby, and the
existence of adequate assisted living facilities located in Columbia and Howard County.
 
All of the trial court’s findings discussed, supra, are supported by evidence in the record.  It is clear that
the trial court also addressed appellant’s FHA claims relating to the applicability of the covenant and its
application in the instant case, and determined that the Act’s provisions had not been violated by the
Association’s conduct following the circuit court’s decision in the 1995 litigation.  We agree.
The trial court then addressed Colandrea’s claim that the denial of approval for 10433 Waterfowl
Terrace violated the public policy of the State.  The court discussed, at some length, the testimony of Gene
Heisler, Assistant Director of Licensing and Certification Administration, of the Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene.  Mr. Heisler, testifying on behalf of appellant, stated that it was the State’s policy to
promote affordable and accessible housing for the elderly and to encourage “aging in place,” described as
being able to stay in the home they have chosen as their health deteriorates.  He also testified as to the
public policy of the State, saying in relevant part:
Q. Could you describe . . . the policies of the State of Maryland, with respect to
-8-
assisted living homes for elderly persons with disabilities?
A. Well, the policies . . . envisions a system of regulation where individuals are
given their choice of where that they want to live. Also, the policies are to promote the
affordable and accessible housing for the elderly. Also, to encourage the concept of aging
in place . . . .  Their [sic] some of the policies that we advocate.
. . . . 
A. My opinion is, that the relief sought by the association is contrary to the policies
of the State, in that prospective residents would be denied a choice of going into that
home, so in affect, you would diminish the choices that people have for assisted living
facilities. 
On re-cross-examination, Mr. Heisler testified:
Q. But, it’s not the public policy of the State of Maryland, that some specific
address on a specific street should be an assisted living facility or not or how big it should
be, is it?
A. No, that’s not the idea. The idea is that people have choices as to where they
want to live. 
The court initially noted that this issue had already been resolved against Colandrea in the 1995 litigation
when Judge Sybert had found the covenant at issue to be “facially neutral.” 
Moreover, the trial court, in the instant case, noting the large number of senior assisted-living
facilities in the area and the high vacancy rate for such units, independently found that “the Plaintiffs’
conduct as it relates to the Colandrea application was reasonable and did not violate public policy of the
State of Maryland.”  Additionally, in its fashioning of injunctive relief, the trial court created a remedy that
fully comported with the State’s “aging in place” preferences, one of the State’s “public policy” concerns.
The trial court concluded by finding that there had been no interference with appellant’s contractual
relationships; that there had been no evidence presented showing any adverse impact upon Colandrea’s
-9-
“contractual relations or how he was damaged as a result.” The court then enjoined appellant from
“admitting any new residents or filling any vacancies, as they may occur, at the senior assisted-living facility
. . . at 10433 Waterfowl Terrace . . . .”
RESOLUTION
We shall address, as necessary, the issues resolved by the trial court.  We shall note the standard
of review applicable in this case, then discuss the legal nature of restrictive covenants in general, and the
one at issue in particular.  First, we address appellant’s FHA issues.
I. Fair Housing Act
In prior Case No. 93-CA-21562, The Columbia Association, Inc. v. Richard C. Colandrea
(Colandrea I), the Circuit Court for Howard County rendered a finding against the appellant in the case
at bar.  In relevant part, that trial court stated in 1995:
The Plaintiffs’ Complaint seeks an injunction ordering the Defendant to cease and desist
operation of the Senior Assisted Housing facilities at 10461 and 10433 Waterfowl Terrace
[the identical properties at issue in the case sub judice] . . . .
Mr. Colandrea operates the Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. out of two residences in the
Village of Wilde Lake. . . .  The Plaintiffs argue that the operation of these facilities violates
express terms of the restrictive covenants governing the properties, and contend that the
activities therefore require prior approval from the Wilde Lake Architectural Review
Committee. 
. . . Moreover, the Defendant has filed a Counter-Claim which alleges that the
actions of the Plaintiff violate the provisions of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601,
et seq.
. . . . 
Having ruled that the Defendant’s activities are subject to regulation under the
covenants, the Court shall next consider the Defendant’s Counter-Claim alleging violations
of the Fair Housing Act. . . .  Nevertheless, the Court is of the opinion that the Wilde Lake
-10-
covenant at issue is facially neutral. The covenant is applicable to the conduct of any
business activity, industry, or profession, not merely group homes. . . .  That goal is, on its
face, non-discriminatory, and it seems as though the Architectural Review Committee
approval process is a legitimate way of addressing that concern.
          
Colandrea appealed that decision to the Court of Special Appeals.  Before that court heard the
appeal, Colandrea dismissed it.  Accordingly, the prior decision that the covenant was neutral on its face,
and that on its face it was non-discriminatory and that the  Committee’s approval process is a legitimate
way of addressing the issue of discrimination under the FHA, was a final decision on the merits on those
issues there presented and as to the FHA issues resolvable at that time.  Accordingly, to the extent we
address FHA related issues, if we do, it is limited to the Association’s actions occurring after the final
judgment in the prior case. 
Additionally, Colandrea, while Colandrea I was pending, filed a Complaint with the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) against the same appellees in the present case,
and others, asserting violations of the Fair Housing Act.  HUD investigated the claim and ultimately found
that “reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred.
Accordingly, the above-referenced complaint is hereby dismissed.”  
In Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 711 A.2d 1319 (1998), we stated that:
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, began life and retains life as a common law
doctrine.  A common and well-established articulation of the doctrine is that “[w]hen an
issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and
the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a
subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”
Murray International v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547, 555 A.2d 502, 504 (1989),
quoting from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 27 (1982).  The functions
of this doctrine, and the allied doctrine of res judicata, are to avoid the expense and
vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and foster reliance on judicial
action by minimizing the possibilities of inconsistent decisions.  Graham, supra, 315 Md.
-11-
at 547, 555 A.2d at 504, citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99
S. Ct. 970, 973-74, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210, 217 (1979).
Id. at 295, 711 A.2d at 1324; see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.
Ed. 2d 469 (1970) (“[Collateral estoppel] means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been
determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in
any future lawsuit.”); Gibson v. State, 328 Md. 687, 693, 616 A.2d 877, 880 (1992) (“The collateral
estoppel doctrine operates to a preclusive end, so that when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined
once by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot be litigated again between the same parties in a future
action.”); Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 398, 354 A.2d 825, 834 (“Collateral estoppel prevents the
State from litigating a second time an issue of ultimate fact where there has already been a final
determination of that issue in the accused’s favor.”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027, 97 S. Ct. 652, 50 L.
Ed. 2d 631 (1976).  In further distinguishing collateral estoppel, we have stated that:
This Court has repeatedly recognized that there is a distinction between the principles of
res judicata and collateral estoppel.  Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of New York v.
Electro Enterprises, Inc., 287 Md. 641, 652, 415 A.2d 278, 284 (1980); Cook v.
State, 281 Md. 665, 668-69, 381 A.2d 671, 673 (1978); LeBrun v. Marcey, 199 Md.
223, 226-27, 86 A.2d 512, 514 (1952).  This distinction was recently expressed in MPC,
Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 32, 367 A.2d 486, 489 (1977), (quoting Sterling v. Local
438, 207 Md. 132, 140-41, 113 A.2d 389, 393, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875, 76 S. Ct.
119[, 100 L. Ed. 773] (1955)):
“‘. . . If the second suit is between the same parties and is upon the same
cause of action, a judgment in the earlier case on the merits is an
absolute bar, not only as to all matters which were litigated in the earlier
case, but as to all matters which could have been litigated [res
judicata].  If, in a second suit between the same parties, even though the
cause of action is different, any determination of fact, which was
actually litigated in the first case, is conclusive in the second case
[collateral estoppel].’”  (Citation omitted) (emphasis added).
-12-
Thus, if a proceeding between parties involves the same cause of action as a
previous proceeding between the same parties, the principle of res judicata applies and all
matters actually litigated or that could have been litigated are conclusive in the subsequent
proceeding.  Alvey v. Alvey, 225 Md. 386, 390, 171 A.2d 92, 94 (1961); Snodgrass
v. Stubbs, 192 Md. 287, 290-91, 64 A.2d 130, 132 (1949); State v. Brown, 64 Md.
199, 204, 1 A. 54, 56 (1885).  If a proceeding between parties does not involve the same
cause of action as a previous proceeding between the same parties, the principle of
collateral estoppel applies, and only those facts or issues actually litigated in the previous
action are conclusive in the subsequent proceeding.  Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of
New York, 287 Md. at 652, 415 A.2d at 284; MPC, Inc., 279 Md. at 33, 367 A.2d at
489; Prescott v. Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 570-73, 296 A.2d 150, 154-55 (1972).
When the principle of collateral estoppel applies, facts or issues decided in the previous
action are conclusive only if identical to facts or issues presented in the subsequent
proceeding.  MPC, Inc., 279 Md. at 35, 367 A.2d at 490; see Washington
Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. TKU Assocs., 281 Md. 1, 18-19, 376 A.2d 505,
514 (1977).
Mackall v. Zayre Corp., 293 Md. 221, 227-28, 443 A.2d 98, 101-02 (1982) (alteration in original).
 We stated in FWB Bank v. Richman, 354 Md. 472, 731 A.2d 916 (1999), that:
The basic rule of claim preclusion in this context is not difficult: “A valid and final
personal judgment rendered in favor of the defendant bars another action by the plaintiff
on the same Claim.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 (1982).  As we
pointed out in deLeon v. Slear, 328 Md. 569, 580, 616 A.2d 380, 385 (1992), the
traditional principle of res judicata has three elements: “(1) the parties in the present
litigation should be the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier case; (2) the second
suit must present the same cause of action or claim as the first; and (3) in the first suit, there
must have been a valid final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.”.
. .
When an earlier court has actually ruled on the matter sought to be litigated in a
second court, the “same claim” analysis is usually straightforward. . . .  It has long been
established that a judgment between the same parties or their privies upon the same cause
of action is conclusive “not only as to all matters that have been decided in the original suit,
but as to all matters which with propriety could have been litigated in the first suit.”  Alvey
v. Alvey, 225 Md. 386, 390, 171 A.2d 92, 94 (1961); MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md.
29, 32, 367 A.2d 486, 488-89 (1977).  In dealing with that issue, we have adopted the
“transactional” approach set forth in § 24 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS: “When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the
plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar ... the claim extinguished includes all
-13-
rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.”  deLeon
v. Slear, supra, 328 Md. 569, 590, 616 A.2d 380, 390; Kent County Bd. of Educ.
v. Bilbrough, supra, 309 Md. 487, 498, 525 A.2d 232, 237-38.  In deciding whether
a factual grouping constitutes a “transaction,” the RESTATEMENT directs a pragmatic
approach, “giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time,
space, origin or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or
usage.”  RESTATEMENT, supra, § 24(2).
Id. at 492-93, 731 A.2d at 927-28; see Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, 339 Md. 261, 269-70, 661
A.2d 1157, 1161 (1995) (“In deLeon, 328 Md. at 580, 616 A.2d at 385, this Court restated the
elements of the traditional principle of res judicata”).
Judge Wilner, then a member of the Court of Special Appeals, in Klein v. Whitehead, 40 Md.
App. 1, 12, 389 A.2d 374, 381, cert. denied, 283 Md. 734 (1978), described the doctrines known as
res judicata, collateral estoppel, and collateral attack on judgments, saying: “These three doctrines,
though related, are different; they apply in different circumstances and they prevent different things.”  He
defined res judicata and collateral estoppel as branches of estoppel by judgment with res judicata
being a direct estoppel and collateral estoppel “is what its name says it is.”  Id. at 13, 389 A.2d at 381.
After discussing the relative differences between the doctrines, that court opined: “For either to apply, the
second action must be between the same parties or those in privity with them.”  Id. at 15, 389 A.2d at 383;
see also Murray Int’l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 552-53, 555 A.2d 502, 506-07
(1989) (Upon assertion by an employer that a freight hauler was not its employee despite a previous
Commission finding to the contrary, the Court of Appeals opined that the collateral estoppel doctrine did
not apply based partly upon its determination that the party against whom estoppel was asserted could not
have appealed from the prior Commission decision.).
-14-
Collateral estoppel is concerned with the issue implications of the earlier litigation of a different
case, while res judicata is concerned with the legal consequences of a judgment entered earlier in the
same cause.  Burkett v. State, 98 Md. App. 459, 465, 633 A.2d 902, 905 (1993), cert. denied, 334
Md. 210, 638 A.2d 752 (1994).  The two doctrines are based upon the judicial policy that the losing
litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on issues raised, or
that should have been raised.  Department of Human Resources v. Thompson, 103 Md. App. 175,
652 A.2d 1183 (1995).
“Collateral,” for collateral estoppel purposes, denotes that the estopping influence came into the
case in issue from some other outside case, and in the context of a single case, issue-preclusive operation
should actually be called “direct estoppel.”  Burkett v. State, 98 Md. App. at 466, 633 A.2d at 906.
Collateral estoppel is not concerned with the legal consequences of a judgment, but only with the findings
of ultimate fact, when they can be discovered, that necessarily lay behind that judgment.  Id.
In Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. TKU Associates, 281 Md. 1, 18-19,
376 A.2d 505, 514 (1977), we approved a four-part test, which must be satisfied in order for the doctrine
of collateral estoppel to be applicable:
1.
Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in
the action in question?
2.
Was there a final judgment on the merits?
3.
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party
to the prior adjudication?
4.
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a fair opportunity to be
heard on the issue?
-15-
See also Potomac Design, Inc. v. Eurocal Trading, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1993) (when
issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid final judgment, and that determination is
essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a later action between the parties, whether the
same or different claim is asserted).  Thus, for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the probable
fact-finding that undergirds the judgment used to estop must be scrutinized to determine if the issues raised
in that proceeding were actually litigated, or facts necessary to resolve the pertinent issues were adjudicated
in that action.  See Burkett, 98 Md. App. at 466, 633 A.2d at 906.
Under Maryland Law, the requirements of res judicata or claim preclusion are: 1) that the parties
in the present litigation are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier dispute; 2) that the claim
presented in the current action is identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication; and 3) that there
was a final judgment on the merits.  Blades v. Woods, 338 Md. 475, 478-79, 659 A.2d 872, 873
(1995); Cicala v. Disability Review Bd., 288 Md. 254, 263, 418 A.2d 205, 211 (1980); Cook v.
State, 281 Md. 665, 668, 381 A.2d 671, 673, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 839, 99 S. Ct. 126, 58 L. Ed.
2d 136 (1978); Douglas v. First Sec. Fed. Sav. Bank, Inc., 101 Md. App. 170, 181, 643 A.2d 920,
926, cert. denied, 336 Md. 558, 649 A.2d 601 (1994); Major v. First Va. Bank, 97 Md. App. 520,
533-34, 631 A.2d 127, 133 (1993).  Therefore, a judgment between the same parties and their privies
is a final bar to any other suit upon the same cause of action and is conclusive, not only as to all matters
decided in the original suit, but also as to matters that could have been litigated in the original
suit.  Lockett v. West, 914 F. Supp. 1229 (D. Md. 1995); Potomac Design, Inc. v. Eurocal
Trading, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1993); Burkett, 98 Md. App. 459, 633 A.2d 902 (1993),
cert. denied, 334 Md. 210, 638 A.2d 752 (1994).  To avoid the vagaries of res judicata’s
 The HUD proceeding does not, in and of itself, foreclose a claimant from seeking further relief
6
in federal or state courts.  We include the mention of it in our opinion to stress the fact that appellant has
had multiple opportunities to litigate the issue of his rights under the Fair Housing Act vis-a-vis the covenant
in question, and has not prevailed.  
-16-
preclusive effect, a party must assert all the legal theories he wishes to in his initial action,
because failure to do so does not deprive the ensuing judgment of its effect as res judicata.
Lockett, 914 F. Supp. at 1233.  As can be seen, res judicata looks to the final judgment on the merits
earlier entered in the same case or same cause and to the necessary legal consequences of that judgment.
Burkett, 98 Md. App. at 464, 633 A.2d at 905.
In the present cause, the parties are the same parties included in the 1995 circuit court case and
in the HUD proceeding.   Moreover, appellant could have prosecuted his prior appeal to conclusion but
6
declined to do so.  The applicability of the Fair Housing Act, and the question of whether the covenant at
issue, its procedural requirements, or its effects, violated the Fair Housing Act, has been previously finally
litigated.  As to the specific issue, issue preclusion controls.  The issue was presented in appellant’s counter-
claim in the prior case.  To the extent that appellant may argue that not every nuance was presented to the
court in the prior case, every nuance should have been presented under appellant’s then Fair Housing Act
counter-claim.  The judgment in the prior case has collateral estoppel effects on all issues there raised, or
that should have been raised. 
While, upon our review of the lower court’s decision in the case at bar we perceive no error in its
findings, we, because of the preclusive and res judicata effect of the prior proceedings concerning
virtually identical matters and the same cause of action, shall not address further appellant’s facial attack
on the covenants that constitute his primary Fair Housing Act claim.  Moreover, we agree with the trial
-17-
court’s disposition of Colandrea’s Fair Housing Act arguments as to the Association’s conduct occurring
subsequent to the 1995 judgment.
II. Permanent Injunction
We shall note the standard of review applicable in this case, then discuss the legal nature of
restrictive covenants in general, and the one at issue in particular.  
a.  Standard of Review
As we stated in Urban Site Venture II Limited Partnership v. Levering Associates
Limited Partnership, 340 Md. 223, 229-30, 665 A.2d 1062, 1065 (1995):
Both this Court and the Court of Special Appeals, when reviewing a case tried
without a jury, must “review the case on both the law and the evidence.”  Maryland Rule
8-131(c) (1995 Repl. Vol.).  The Court must “not set aside the judgment of the trial court
on the evidence unless clearly erroneous,” and must “give due regard to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”  Id.  In addition, we must
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, e.g., Geo. Bert.
Cropper, Inc. v. Wisterco, 284 Md. 601, 620, 399 A.2d 585[, 595] (1979), and
decide not whether the trial judge’s conclusions of fact were correct, but only whether they
were supported by a preponderance of the evidence.  E.g., State Insurance Comm’r
v. Nat’l Bureau, 248 Md. 292, 305, 236 A.2d 282[, 289] (1967).
The trial court ordinarily has the discretion to grant or deny a request for injunctive relief in general
equity matters of the type here involved and that decision is reviewed by this Court under the “abuse of
discretion” standard.  State Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md.
548, 554, 383 A.2d 51, 55 (1977); Maryland Commission on Human Relations v. Downey
Communications, Inc., 110 Md. App. 493, 521, 678 A.2d 55, 69 (1996); Teferi v. DuPont Plaza
Assocs., 77 Md. App. 566, 578, 551 A.2d 477, 483 (1989); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hart, 73
Md. App. 406, 410-11, 534 A.2d 999, 1001 (1988); Holiday Universal Club, Inc. v. Montgomery
-18-
County, 67 Md. App. 568, 576, 508 A.2d 991, 995, cert. denied, 307 Md. 260, 513 A.2d 314
(1986), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1049, 107 S. Ct. 920, 93 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1987); Seci, Inc. v.
Chafitz, Inc., 63 Md. App. 719, 725, 493 A.2d 1100, 1103 (1985); Anne Arundel County v.
Governor, 45 Md. App. 435, 455, 413 A.2d 281, 290-91 (1980).  An injunction is “a writ framed
according to the circumstances of the case commanding an act which the court regards as essential to
justice, or restraining an act which it esteems contrary to equity and good conscience.”  Downey
Communications, 110 Md. App. at 515, 678 A.2d at 66.  Injunctive relief is relief “prohibiting someone
from doing some specified act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury . . . [g]enerally, it
is a preventive and protective remedy, aimed at future acts, and it is not intended to redress past
wrongs.”  Carroll County Ethics Comm’n v. Lennon, 119 Md. App. 49, 58, 703 A.2d 1338, 1342-
43 (1998).  (Alteration in original.) 
In Downey Communications, the Court of Special Appeals, citing our case of National
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Johns Hopkins University, 301 Md. 574, 580, 483 A.2d
1272, 1275 (1984), stated:
A permanent injunction is, as its name indicates, “an injunction final or permanent
in its nature granted after a determination of the merits of the action.”  Md. Rule BB70d.
But a permanent injunction is not “permanent” in the sense that it must invariably last
indefinitely.  Rather, it “is one granted by the judgment which finally disposes of the
injunction suit.”  The difference between an interlocutory injunction and a permanent
injunction turns on “whether there has been a determination on the merits of the claim.  If
that determination has been made, then the injunction may be final; if not, it is
interlocutory.” [Citation omitted.]
Downey Communications, 110 Md. App. at 517, 678 A.2d at 67.  In the case at bar, a decision has
been made on the merits.  The injunction ordered by the trial court was, therefore, a permanent injunction.
 Accordingly, the essential requirements necessary for the issuance of an interlocutory injunction
7
are not relevant.  The requirements for the issuance of a permanent injunction to enforce contract, i.e., rights
under covenants, are based primarily on contract law except as modified by our cases.  One of the
elements that may be considered is the doctrine of comparative hardship.  An innocent mistake on the part
of the party in breach of the covenant can be considered in that analysis.  See Urban Site, 340 Md. 223,
665 A.2d 1062, Chevy Chase Village v. Jaggers, 261 Md. 309, 320, 275 A.2d 167, 173 (1971).
No issue of innocent mistake exists in the case sub judice.  
-19-
The requirements for the imposition of an interlocutory injunction do not apply.  
7
Generally, covenants affecting property are, even when running with the land, nonetheless
contractual in nature.  A suit to enforce them is in the nature of specific performance.  We have stated that
“[w]here specific performance is proper, equity may accomplish the same result permanently or temporarily
by the use of injunction.”  Lissau v. Smith, 215 Md. 538, 548, 138 A.2d 381, 387 (1958) (citing Smith
v. Myers, 130 Md. 64, 99 A. 938 (1917)).
Maryland courts have held that injunctive relief is entirely appropriate for violations of private
covenants.  Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md. 127, 128 A.2d 430 (1957); Mikolasko v. Schovee, 124 Md.
App. 66, 88, 720 A.2d 1214, 1224 (1998), aff’d, 356 Md. 93, 737 A.2d 578 (1999); Souza v.
Columbia Park and Recreation Association, Inc., 70 Md. App. 655, 657, 522 A.2d 1376, 1377-
78, cert. denied, 310 Md. 130, 527 A.2d 51 (1987).  However, as we have said, “refusal [to approve]
would have to be a reasonable determination made in good faith, and not high-handed, whimsical or
captious in manner.”  Kirkley, 212 Md. at 133, 128 A.2d at 434.
We have held that the doctrine of comparative hardship is available when  considering injunctive
relief in actions involving private covenants.  Beans v. McMullen, 265 Md. 585, 617, 291 A.2d 37, 53
(1972); Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, 137 A.2d 667, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821,
-20-
79 S. Ct. 34, 3 L. Ed. 2d 62, reh. denied, 358 U.S. 901, 79 S. Ct. 219, 3 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1958).  We
described the doctrine of comparative hardship in Chevy Chase Village v. Jaggers, 261 Md. 309,
275 A.2d 167 (1971), in which we stated:
The final argument the doctor makes is that if he must return to his former home
or remove his office to comply with the covenants, he will suffer great hardship and
inconvenience when he has only caused negligible harm to his neighbors.  He invokes the
equitable doctrine of comparative hardship to avoid this result.  That doctrine has been
explained with forceful clarity by Chief Judge Hammond for the Court in Dundalk
Holding Co. v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, 555-57, 137 A.2d 667, [670-71,] cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 821, [79 S. Ct. 34, 3 L. Ed. 2d 62,] rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 901[,
79 S. Ct. 219, 3 L. Ed. 2d 151] (1958), which was recently reaffirmed in Grant v.
Katson, 261 Md. 112, 274 A.2d 88 (1971).  It [the doctrine of comparative hardship]
basically provides that a court may decline to issue an injunction where the hardship and
inconvenience which would result from the injunction is greatly disproportionate to the
harm to be remedied.  Innocent mistake on the part of the party to be enjoined is a factor
to be considered in applying the doctrine.  Overlooking the fact that the doctor, though a
mediate purchaser whose deed only made reference to the restrictive covenants in his
predecessor’s deed, should have been aware of the limits on the use of his property, we
do not think he can invoke the doctrine by characterizing the potential harm that might
result to his neighbors’ homes as comparatively negligible.  Their interest in preserving the
residential integrity of their community is simply not outweighed by his desire to move to
another fashionable and exclusively residential area.  With the facts before us in this case,
had the trial judge declined to issue the injunction because of comparative hardship, we
would not have hesitated to overrule him for a clear abuse of discretion.  As he only went
so far as to find that there had been a change in the neighborhood capable of vitiating the
restrictive covenants, we base our reversal on this fact.  On remand we direct that the
appellees be enjoined from using their property in Chevy Chase Village for the practice of
medicine unless they actually reside on the premises.  
Id. at 320-21, 275 A.2d at 173.
In Grubb v. Guilford Association, Inc., 228 Md. 135, 178 A.2d 886 (1962), suit was
brought by Guilford Association, Inc., against Mr. Grubb, an actively practicing doctor, to enforce a
restrictive covenant that would prevent him from using his residence as his regular and main office.  Mr.
Grubb contended that the doctrine of comparative hardship applied.  This Court stated:
-21-
We think Dr. Grubb’s actual knowledge of the covenant before he bought, his
unwarranted assumptions as to the intent of the Association, his failure either to obtain a
written waiver of the restriction or to require the Association officials to spell out in detail
how far they proposed to unbend, and the substantial interest of the Association in
maintaining its property rights protected by the covenant, leave no room for the application
of the doctrine of comparative hardship, which the appellant urges should be applied to
protect him.  Cf. Easter v. Dundalk Holding Co., 199 Md. 303, 305, [86 A.2d 404
, 405 (1952)] and Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, 555-556, [137
A.2d 667, 670-71 (1958)]. 
Id. at 140, 178 A.2d at 888.
In Liu v. Dunnigan, 25 Md. App. 178, 333 A.2d 338 (1975), suit was brought to enforce a
restrictive covenant, which would enjoin the appellant from using a part of his residence as a doctor’s
office.  Appellant appealed from a decree granting an injunction that enforced the restrictive covenant and
raised the doctrine of comparative hardship.  He contended that the injunction should not have been granted
because, if he was prevented from practicing medicine in his home, he would suffer great hardship
compared to only negligible harm caused to appellees.  The Court of Special Appeals stated:
We conclude that the doctrine has no application to the case at bar.  Here Dr. Liu
testified that he had spent approximately $15,000 to establish his office.  $6,000 of that
total was expended prior to June 1973 which was the first time he admitted being aware
that appellees were opposed to his home practice.  After being so informed, Dr. Liu spent
an additional $9,000 on his office apparently without regard for the possible legal validity
of appellees’ position.  The appellees’ substantial interest in preserving the residential
integrity of their community is not outweighed by appellants’ desire to establish a practice
in his home.
Id. at 193-94, 333 A.2d at 346. 
Private Covenants
The validity of properly created restrictive covenants is well established in Maryland.  We stated
in Steuart Transportation Company v. Ashe, 269 Md. 74, 304 A.2d 788 (1973):
-22-
[O]ne owning a tract of land . . . may validly impose upon the part granted restrictions
upon the use thereof for the benefit of the part retained, and upon the part retained for the
benefit of the part granted, or upon both for the benefit of both; that, where the covenants
. . . are not expressly for or on behalf of the grantor, his heirs and assigns, they are
personal and will not run with the land, but that, if in such a case it appears that it was the
intention of the grantors that the restrictions were part of a uniform general scheme or plan
of development and use which should affect the land granted and the land retained alike,
they may be enforced in equity . . . .
Id. at 88, 304 A.2d at 796-97, quoting McKenrick v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 174 Md. 118,
128, 197 A. 580, 584-85 (1938).  In Jones v. Northwest Real Estate Company, 149 Md. 271,
280-81, 131 A. 446, 450 (1925), we stated:
[W]e are here dealing with an original grantor, who still owns a considerable part of the
land, and the assignees of an original purchaser, and, as the deed specifically states that the
covenants are to bind “the grantees, their heirs and assigns,” there would seem to be no
question, under the authorities, of the grantor’s right to enforce the covenants . . . .
The Court of Special Appeals, similarly, stated in Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md. App. 137, 149, 607 A.2d
82, 88 (1992), that:
It is, therefore, necessary to construe the meaning of the pertinent provisions of the
covenants in order to determine: (1) what, if any, conditions exist affecting the declarant’s
reservation of plan approval; and (2) whether the facts contained in the respective affidavits
of appellants are sufficient to foreclose summary judgment. 
For a more complete review of the Maryland law with respect to covenants and uniform plans of
development, see Steuart Transportation, 269 Md. 74, 304 A.2d 788, and cases therein cited.
In Steuart Transportation, 269 Md. at 88-91, 304 A.2d at 797-98, we said, quoting in part
from McKenrick v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 174 Md. 118, 126, 197 A. 580, 584 (1938), “that
recordation of a deed subjecting land to restrictions afforded constructive notice . . . sufficient to charge
such persons with liability in respect to the restrictive covenants.” Quoting from Turner v. Brocato, 206
  See Markey, 92 Md. App. 137, 607 A.2d 82, a case in which the Court of Special Appeals
8
gave an extensive history of this Court’s treatment of similar restrictive covenants in Maryland, saying in
part:  
A later case, apparently recognizing the reasonableness modification of the strict
(continued...)
-23-
Md. 336, 346, 111 A. 2d 855, 861 (1955), we commented in Steuart Transportation that “[t]he
decisions of this Court have long recognized that equity, under appropriate facts, will enforce what variously
has been called reciprocal negative easements, implied equitable reciprocal servitudes or merely equities
attached to land.”  Id. at 91, 304 A.2d at 798.
In Belleview Construction Company v. Rugby Hall Community Association, 321 Md.
152, 156-58, 582 A.2d 493, 495-96 (1990), we said in relevant part:
The original and extended covenants are covenants running with the land. . . .
They are, by their terms, enforceable by the developer, the association, or any lot owner.
The covenants were clearly established as part of a general plan of development for this
community. . . .
 
In construing covenants, “it is a cardinal principle . . . that the court should be
governed by the intention of the parties as it appears or is implied from the instrument
itself.” . . .  This principle is consistent with the general law of contracts. . . . 
The courts seem to have generally recognized that there is no public policy against a
fair and reasonable construction, in the light of surrounding circumstances, of
restrictions designed, in general, to accomplish the same beneficial purposes as
zoning. [Alteration in original.] [Citations omitted.]  
Because the facial validity of the covenant at issue in the case at bar is not challenged, except on
Fair Housing Act grounds that have already been addressed, we do not have to construe the
reasonableness of the restriction at issue in this case.  We have noted the general standard for construing
such covenants in our cases, most recently in Belleview, supra.  
8
(...continued)
8
construction rule, is the often-cited case of Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 111 A.2d
855 (1955).  In that case, the Court said: “This rule of construction [that doubt must be
resolved in favor of the alienability of land] bows always to the more fundamental rule that
wherever possible effect will be given to an ascertained intention of the parties.”  Id. at
352, 111 A.2d 855. . . . 
. . . .
. . . [T]he Court of Appeals . . . recognized the “modern” or “reasonable” rule
once again in its most recent case of Belleview Construction Co. v. Rugby Hall
Community Association, 321 Md. 152, 582 A.2d 493 (1990).  The Court stated that
it was a “cardinal principle” that the intentions of the parties appearing from, or implied
by, the instrument controls when covenants are construed and that that language should
be considered along with the objects of the parties and the other “circumstances and
conditions affecting the parties and the property.”  Id. at 157, 582 A.2d 493. The Court
further said that: “The rule of strict construction should not be employed . . . to defeat a
restrictive covenant that is clear on its face, or is clear when considered in light of
the surrounding circumstances.”  Id. at 158, 582 A.2d 493 (emphasis added).
Id. at 154-56, 607 A.2d at 90-92 (alterations in original) (some citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
-24-
The powers given to, and the functions of, the Committee in the case sub judice, appear to be
as intended by the original declarants.  Moreover, they appear to be reasonable.  In any event, the
covenant is not challenged on its face, except as we have heretofore stated.
III. Decision of Committee
In respect to whether the Committee actions were reasonable, we said in one of our relatively early
cases, Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md 127, 133, 128 A.2d 430, 434 (1956), in reference to covenants
regulating the manner and design of structures, that
[t]he language used in the covenants . . . makes plain the desire to regulate the construction
of the dwellings in such a manner as to create an attractive and desirable neighborhood.
We think the parties had a right voluntarily to make this kind of contract between
themselves; and the covenant does not create any interference with the fee of the property
Apparently, the proceedings before the Committee were not recorded. If they were, we were not
9
directed to the location of any such records in the Extract or their place in the record.  Mr. Meale, in his
testimony before the trial court relied, at least in part, on the notes he took during the two sessions before
the Committee.  
-25-
that would require it to be stricken down as against public policy. It does not prevent the
owner from conveying the property or impose any unlawful restraint of trade, but affects
only its method of use. We hold that any refusal to approve the external design or location
. . . would have to be based upon a reason that bears some relation to the other buildings
or the general plan of development; and this refusal would have to be a reasonable
determination made in good faith, and not high-handed, whimsical or captious in manner.
The trial judge in the instant case relied in large part on the testimony of James Meale, a member
of the Committee, which we have repeated, supra, in addressing the issue of whether the Committee’s
decision was reasonable.  The court credited Mr. Meale’s testimony as we have indicated previously.  The
9
trial court noted that Mr. Meale had believed the observations of his neighbors; that Mr. Meale found their
information credible. 
The trial court found Mr. Meale’s testimony, that we have heretofore set out, to be “particularly
persuasive,” finding that the decision of the Committee had been based on trash, noise, parking, traffic,
sewage and health concerns. It determined that “[i]n sum, the decision of the Committee was a reasonable,
good faith exercise of discretion, based upon legitimate concerns regarding the impact of the facility upon
the surrounding neighborhood.”  
We perceive no error in the trial court’s findings as to reasonableness and its issuance of an
injunction to enforce the restrictive covenant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO
BE PAID BY APPELLANT.