Case Title: Mitchell v. Rawls

Citation: 493 So. 2d 361

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1986-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
493 So. 2d 361 (1986) Charles L. MITCHELL, d/b/a Mitchell Real Estate v. James M. RAWLS and Kerry M. Rawls. No. 55759. Supreme Court of Mississippi. August 20, 1986. *362 Ronald W. Lewis, Hill & Lewis, Oxford, for appellant. William C. Spencer, Holly Springs, for appellee. Before DAN M. LEE, ROBERTSON and GRIFFIN, JJ. GRIFFIN, Justice, for the Court: This is a suit for a real estate commission appealed from the Chancery Court of Marshall County. At the conclusion of the complainant's case, the appellees moved to dismiss on the ground that the complainant had not made out a case. The chancellor agreed and, near the end of his ruling, he made the following statement: Appellant argues here that the chancellor erred in that he did not follow the accepted standard for direction of a verdict. The general rule is that on a motion for directed verdict the court should consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party presenting it, and indulge in all favorable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and, if either be sufficient to support a verdict, overrule the motion. Edwards v. Cleveland Food, Inc., 437 So. 2d 56 (1983); King v. Dudley, 286 So. 2d 814 (Miss. 1973); Paymaster Oil Mill Company v. Mitchell, 319 So. 2d 652, 655 (Miss. 1975). The chancellor inadvertently cited Rule 50. Actually the Rule applicable is Rule 41(b), Miss.R.Civ.P., the pertinent part of which reads as follows: We have heretofore considered this question in Davis v. Clement, 468 So. 2d 58, 61-62 (Miss. 1985), wherein we said: Now, having pointed out the proper standard of proof, a short recitation of the facts of the case is in order. The appellant is a real estate broker and on April 28, 1982, the appellees listed their property with him. The listing was for a 90-day period and during that time the appellant was to be paid a commission regardless of who might have secured the sale and if the property was sold within a six-month period of the termination of the agreement to a purchaser to whom the appellant had shown the property or negotiated with concerning it, the commission was still due. The property was sold to a Mr. James L. Luvene in late June of 1983. Mr. Luvene had been shown the property by the appellant and another real estate broker. Appellant did not show Luvene the property during the 90-day period but contends that the listing agreement was orally extended because of the following testimony by Mr. C.L. Mitchell: Mr. Mitchell further testified: Two witnesses other than the appellant testified on his behalf, Cecil Mitchell, his father, and James Luvene, the buyer. Their testimony was conflicting as to both events and dates leading up to the eventual sale of the house. There appears to be no dispute, however, that the efforts of the appellant were terminated prior to the sale. Also Luvene testified that the appellant was a "hindrance to the sale". The chancellor, in a colloquy with the attorneys after the close of the case but before his final ruling, made the following statement: The evidence here would support a finding that the contract was not extended beyond its termination date. The chancellor went to great length to point out the conflicts in the testimony, and at one point made the following statement: "It just appears to me from what I have heard at this point that the plaintiffs unfortunately have been derelict." This would appear to support a finding that the appellants were in fact a "hindrance". There appears to be a lack of specificity as to ultimate finding of facts. We proceed on the assumption that his findings of fact are consistent with the *364 judgment. In Cotton v. McConnell, 435 So. 2d 683, 685 (Miss. 1983), we said the following: See also PMZ Oil Co. v. Lucroy, 449 So. 2d 201, 205 (Miss. 1984). We should not disturb the chancellor's finding unless manifestly wrong. We are unable to state that the chancellor's findings were manifestly wrong. Therefore, the first assignment of error is without merit. We believe and now hold that Davis v. Clement, supra, properly announces the law applicable to a motion to dismiss in an action tried by the court without a jury, and does not overrule any prior cases but simply follows Rule 41(b) Miss.R.Civ.P. Our reasoning might better be explained by a short trip into the past. Prior to adoption of Chapter 265, Laws of 1938, now appearing as Mississippi Code Annotated § 11-5-71 (1972), a motion to exclude plaintiff's evidence and find for the defendant was allowed only on condition that defendant consider his proof closed. Further, if the motion was overruled, the complainant would then be entitled to a final decree. Griffith's Mississippi Chancery Practice, Sec. 584 (2d. Ed., 1950); Skrmetta v. Moore, 202 Miss. 585, 595, 30 So. 2d 53 (1947); Partee v. Pepple, 197 Miss. 486, 502, 20 So. 2d 73 (1944); Stewart v. Coleman & Co., 120 Miss. 28, 81 So. 653 (1919); Pearce v. Tharpe, 118 Miss. 107, 118, 79 So. 69 (1918); Carter v. Studdard, 118 Miss. 345, 79 So. 225 (1918). Section 11-5-71 reads as follows: In Partee v. Pepple, supra, the statute was construed to make the practice in chancery analogous to that in circuit court. Judge Griffith doubted the soundness of the statute and its construction. In a footnote to section 584, we find the following: We have, by the adoption of Rule 41(b) Miss.R.Civ.P., reverted partially to the law applicable prior to the enactment of section 11-5-71. Most of the language of the statute appears in Rule 41(b); however, it has been modified and expanded to give the judge trying a case without a jury, when considering a 41(b) motion, the discretion *365 to rule on the facts as well as the law and to enter a final judgment on the merits. We do not hold that the defendant would suffer the penalty of having his case considered as closed on presentation of the motion. We hold simply that the chancellor may then rule on the merits. In ruling on the appellees' motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge stated, among other things, the following: It is urged that basing his statement on his prior experience in the real estate business was reversible error, inasmuch as the chancellor judicially noticed his background in the business. We do not so interpret his remarks. It was simply an admonition to the appellant that he should make some notes as to where and when he contacted his clients, and the failure to do so had hurt his case. This assignment is without merit. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P. JJ., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. WALKER, C.J., not participating.