Case Title: Bowman v. State

Citation: 362 S.W.2d 255

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1962-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
362 S.W.2d 255 (1962) Wilma BOWMAN v. STATE of Tennessee. Supreme Court of Tennessee. November 9, 1962. *256 Jack Vaughan, Johnson City, Clyde C. Street, Elizabethton, for plaintiff in error. George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., Lyle Reid, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for the State. WHITE, Justice. The plaintiff-in-error, defendant, was adjudged to be guilty of criminal contempt and ordered to pay a fine of $50.00 and serve six months in the Washington County Jail from which she has perfected an appeal to this Court and relies upon the errors assigned in her motion for a new trial. These alleged errors being that the evidence preponderates in favor of the innocence of the defendant and against her guilt and (2) the evidence upon which she was convicted was inadmissible because secured through an illegal search. In disposing of the first assignment of error we have looked to the record and to the brief filed by the plaintiff-in-error and find statements made on her behalf to the effect that "the testimony here is not positive testimony, it is but circumstantial as against the Defendant possessing whiskey for sale". If there is circumstantial evidence in the record, and we find there is, to support the conclusion of the jury that the defendant was guilty of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, then we would not be warranted in disturbing the final judgment in this case. There is no charge made that the jury was not properly instructed by the Court, nor that the issues submitted to the jury were improper. In substance, the issues submitted to the jury were whether whiskey was sold or stored for sale in the property at 112 West Chilhowie Avenue, Johnson City, Tennessee, on November 20th, 1961 or November 22, 1961; was the general reputation of said property that it was a place used for bootlegging on November 22, 1961; and did the plaintiff-in-error, defendant, on November 20th, 1961 and on November 22nd, 1961 sell intoxicating whiskey or possess intoxicating whiskey for sale in Washington County, Tennessee; and finally did the defendant order an employee or agent to destroy intoxicating liquor in Washington County, Tennessee on either November 20th, 1961 or November 22nd, 1961. To all of the foregoing questions submitted to the jury under a proper charge of the Court, it answered in the affirmative and there is ample evidence in the record to sustain such finding, and we so declare. In regard to the search of the premises, the defendant says that the warrant for the search was void because it was returned to the City Judge of Johnson City *257 rather than to the Judge of the General Sessions Court of that county; and because the notation of the return date was made more than five days after the warrant was issued, and that consequently the evidence obtained in the search was inadmissible. The record discloses that the only evidence introduced by the defendant was through the testimony of the owner of the property in question who said that he rented the same to Eunice Barrowman and that he never had at any time rented the property to Wilma Bowman. To bolster her defense, according to her view, she stated in her answer a complete denial that she had any control over or any interest in the premises known as 112 Chilhowie Avenue in Johnson City, Tennessee, on the 20th or 22nd of November, 1961. It is the general law of this State that when one disclaims interest in the premises or possessions searched or in the articles seized he cannot question the legality of the search and seizure and it necessarily follows there can be no valid objection to evidence obtained by such search. Allen v. State, 161 Tenn. 71, 29 S.W.2d 247; Templeton v. State, 196 Tenn. 90, 264 S.W.2d 565; Dobbins v. State, 206 Tenn. 59, 332 S.W.2d 161. With reference to the question of the validity of the warrant and the evidence obtained pursuant thereto because the same was returned to the City Judge of Johnson City rather than to the Judge of the General Sessions Court and because the notation of the return was made more than five days after the warrant was issued, the State has this to say in its brief: The record shows that the preliminary hearing was held within five days of the date of the issuance of the search warrant, although the notation of the return was made at a subsequent date. Returning the warrant before an official other than the one who issued it does not within itself affect the validity of the search or the admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant thereto. In the case of Braggs v. State, 155 Tenn. 20, 290 S.W. 1, the Court said in reply to a similar contention made on behalf of the defendant therein the following: The last clause of Section 40-507 T.C.A. provides that the warrant is void after five days unless executed. The warrant in the case at bar was certainly executed within the period of five day; that is, the search was made and conducted within that time. The failure of the officer to make the return within the five day *258 period was merely a failure on his part to carry out a ministerial duty. His failure to perform this simple act could not and did not in any way affect the validity of the warrant and the execution thereof by the officer. The proof in fact showed that the officer did execute the warrant within the period of five days and that the preliminary hearing was had on the fifth day after the issuance of the warrant. Section 84 on Searches and Seizures in 79 C.J.S. is full authority for the position of the State, which general rule is: In Rettich v. U.S., 1 Cir., 84 F.2d 118. Defendants contended that the evidence obtained by State Officers was inadmissible because it was not returned to the Court issuing the warrant. The Court held that the return on a search warrant is a ministerial act and can be made within a reasonable time. Evans v. U.S., 6 Cir., 242 F.2d 534, certiorari denied, 353 U.S. 976, 77 S. Ct. 1059, 1 L.Ed.2d. 1137, a case involving prosecution for the possession of intoxicating liquors arising in Tennessee, held that the return of a search warrant is a ministerial act and any failure therein does not void the warrant. Wince v. State, 206 Miss. 189, 39 So. 2d 882, holds: Searches, Seizures and Immunities, Varon (Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), under Section 11, Return of Search Warrant, states: Based upon the above statements of the law, it appears that any irregularities in regard to the return do not render the evidence secured thereunder inadmissible. From the evidence in this record we believe that the Trial Court acted properly and in accordance with the law of this state; therefore, all assignments of error are overruled, and the action of the Trial Court is affirmed.