Case Title: State v. Callihan

Citation: 320 So. 2d 155

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
320 So. 2d 155 (1975) STATE of Louisiana v. Willie E. CALLIHAN. No. 56227. Supreme Court of Louisiana. October 1, 1975. Rehearing Denied October 31, 1975. *156 Timothy A. O'Brien, III, Student Practitioner, Arthur A. Lemann, III, Supervising Atty., Loyola Law School Clinic, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leonard E. Yokum, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. DIXON, Justice. This is an out-of-time appeal,[1] coupled with an application for a writ of habeas corpus, from the defendant's conviction on November 5, 1969 for manslaughter. On June 28, 1966 Mrs. Dorothy Gatlin succumbed to stab wounds she had received the night before. The defendant, Willie Callihan, was taken into custody on June 28, 1966 and was subsequently indicted and convicted. In this out-of-time appeal, defendant relies on two bills of exceptions taken at the trial, and four additional assignments of error.[2] Since we find merit in the bills of exceptions, we pretermit discussion of the additional assignments of error.[3] Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4 and 8 relate to the trial court's ruling, on a motion to suppress, that an inculpatory statement given by the defendant and reduced to writing on June 29, 1966 was admissible. The defendant was taken into custody by Tangipahoa Parish deputies on June 28, 1966 between 9:00 and 10:00 a. m. after questioning at his home. He was brought to the jail and questioned further by officers about the Gatlin stabbing. At no time before or during this questioning was he advised of his right to remain silent or to have an attorney present during questioning. Around 4:00 p. m. on June 29, 1966 (either the same day or the day after he was first taken into custody) the defendant told the deputies he would make a statement. Thereupon, an attorney was secured to advise the defendant of his rights. When this attorney arrived from his office across the street, he advised the defendant that he did not have to make a statement and that he should not do so. Nevertheless, the defendant made a statement, in which he confessed to entering Mrs. Gatlin's home and stabbing her when she confronted him. The trial judge ruled that the statement was free and voluntary, and therefore admissible at the trial. This ruling constitutes reversible error. On June 13, 1966, some three years before this trial,[4] the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The Supreme Court summarized its holding as follows: It is clear from the record that the defendant was not informed of these rights before questioning began. He was advised of his rights only after he informed the deputies that he would make a statement, and then by the attorney. An after-the-fact attempt to ritualize the safeguards of Miranda cannot be used to deprive the defendant of the very rights the Miranda decision sought to protect: In Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), a companion case to Miranda, handed down that same day, the Supreme Court recognized that a post-interrogation attempt to meet the Miranda requirements cannot succeed. In the Westover case, the defendant had been questioned by state authorities without being informed of his right against self-incrimination. Immediately thereafter, he was turned over to FBI agents who advised him of his rights before questioning him. The FBI agents secured a confession which was used against him in a federal prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the confession was inadmissible: Like Westover, in the instant case the warnings came only at the end of the interrogation process, that is, only after the defendant, having already been questioned, decided to make a statement. The fact that a lawyer was called at this point to advise the defendant that he did not have to make any statements cannot serve to render the statement admissible. *158 This court has held that the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the legal requirements for the voluntariness of statements made during custodial interrogation were complied with. State v. Monroe, 305 So. 2d 902 (La.1974); State v. Bray, 292 So. 2d 697 (La.1974); State v. Skiffer, 253 La. 405, 218 So. 2d 313 (1969). One of those legal requirements is that the defendant be given the "Miranda" warnings before custodial interrogation begins. State v. Levy, 292 So. 2d 220 (La.1974); see State v. Tarrance, 252 La. 396, 211 So. 2d 304, 308 (1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 1038, 89 S. Ct. 662, 21 L. Ed. 2d 586, wherein this court discussed Miranda as follows: Since the record is clear that the defendant was not informed of his rights at the time custodial interrogation began, the motion to suppress the inculpatory statement should have been granted. For the reasons assigned, the judgment and conviction are reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded for a new trial in accordance with law. SANDERS, C. J., dissents and will assign written reasons. SUMMERS and MARCUS, JJ., dissent. SANDERS, Chief Justice (dissenting). In 1970, the manslaughter conviction of Willie E. Callihan was before this Court on appeal. He was represented by able counsel and relied upon nine bills of exceptions for the reversal of his conviction. After review, a unanimous Court affirmed his conviction. See State v. Callihan, 257 La. 298, 242 So. 2d 521 (1970). Three years later, this Court denied defendant's application for habeas corpus. State ex rel. Callahan v. Henderson, La., 275 So. 2d 787 (1973). In 1974, in a habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court, the court ordered an out-of-time, second appeal to this Court. The majority has reversed the conviction because of a failure to advise defendant, who confessed the crime, of his constitutional rights in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). I disagree. It is true that the Miranda warnings were not given at the time of his arrest and first interrogation. The day following his arrest, however, an attorney was appointed to represent him. Before making the statement complained of, defendant was advised of his rights. His attorney was present at the time he made the statement. The attorney testified that the defendant's statement was free and voluntary. In my opinion, the confession was sufficiently insulated from the first interrogation to make it admissible. See Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S. Ct. 1338, 18 L. *159 Ed.2d 423 (1967); Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 88 S. Ct. 1488, 20 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1968). For the reasons assigned, I respectfully dissent. [1] Defendant's conviction was first upheld by this court in State v. Callahan, 257 La. 298, 242 So. 2d 521 (1970). A subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. State ex rel. Callahan v. Henderson, 275 So. 2d 787 (La.1973). Subsequent federal habeas relief resulted in this out-of-time appeal. State ex rel. Callahan v. Parish of Tangipahoa et al., # 73-2016, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of La. [2] The four additional assignments of error allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel. [3] On the prior appeal to this court the same bills were considered, but only as explained by the per curiam of the trial judge; even though the evidence was in the record before us, the court declined to consider it because the bills of exceptions did not purport to incorporate it. [4] Miranda applies to trials beginning after June 13, 1966. State v. Page, 251 La. 810, 206 So. 2d 503 (1968).