Case Title: Commonwealth v. Dew

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12225

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12225 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DASHEEM DEW. 
 
 
 
Essex.     May 1, 2017. - November 6, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, 
& Cypher, JJ.1 
 
 
Robbery.  Identification.  Constitutional Law, Identification.  
Due Process of Law, Identification.  Evidence, 
Identification.  Practice, Criminal, Identification of 
defendant in courtroom. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 20, 2014. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Timothy 
Q. Feeley, J., and the case was tried before him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
James L. Brochin, of New York, Patrick Levin, Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, & Chauncey B. Wood for Committee for 
Public Counsel Services & others. 
                     
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Steven Penrod, pro se. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  This appeal from the defendant's convictions 
in the Superior Court of masked armed robbery and of being a 
subsequent offender raises two issues concerning eyewitness 
identification:  first, whether the defendant established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a showup identification 
procedure was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
misidentification as to deny him the due process of law; and 
second, whether the trial judge committed prejudicial error in 
denying the defendant's motion to preclude the victim from 
making an in-court identification.  In raising this second 
claim, the defendant argues that an inherently suggestive showup 
identification can never serve as a prerequisite to an 
eyewitness's in-court identification under the rule we adopted 
in Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 259-267 (2014). 
The case was entered in the Appeals Court, and we allowed 
the defendant's motion for direct appellate review.  We conclude 
that the defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating that 
the showup identification procedure was unnecessarily 
suggestive.  We conclude also that there was no abuse of 
discretion in the judge's decision to allow the in-court 
identification testimony.  In so holding, we decline to extend 
our holding in Collins, supra, to preclude all in-court 
3 
 
 
 
identifications preceded by out-of-court showup identification 
procedures.  Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions. 
1.  The robbery and showup procedure.  Our summary of the 
facts is based on the findings of the motion judge, who was also 
the trial judge, after a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the 
defendant's motion to suppress, supplemented where necessary 
with undisputed evidence at the motion hearing.  See 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 670 (2001). 
 On December 18, 2013, at approximately 7:30 P.M., the 
victim, a pizza delivery driver, telephoned 911 to report that 
he had been robbed at knifepoint on Park Street in Beverly.  He 
described the armed robber as a black male, wearing a dark 
jacket and a red scarf.  Beverly police Officer Erik Abrahamson 
responded to the scene and spoke to the victim. 
Given the general description of the suspect, and the fact 
that the victim had observed the robber flee toward Rantoul 
Street, Abrahamson immediately drove to Jose Torres's apartment, 
located a short distance away on Rantoul Street.  Abrahamson 
suspected, from previous interactions with Torres and the 
defendant, who is African-American, that the two might have been 
involved in the armed robbery.  Torres's mother allowed 
Abrahamson to enter the apartment.  Once inside, Abrahamson 
found the defendant hiding in Torres's bedroom.  The defendant 
was dressed in a red T-shirt; a black jacket was nearby.  Other 
4 
 
 
 
occupants of the apartment informed Abrahamson that the 
defendant had left the apartment earlier in the evening wearing 
a black jacket and a red scarf.  Torres's mother told Abrahamson 
that she had overheard the defendant using his cellular 
telephone to order a pizza. 
Abrahamson brought the defendant and another person who had 
been in the apartment to the end of the driveway for a showup 
identification.2  The defendant "had his hands cuffed behind his 
back, and a black jacket over his shoulder(s)."  Officer Mark 
Panjwani of the Beverly police department drove the victim to 
the front of Torres's apartment building.  Panjwani briefly 
instructed the victim about the showup identification procedure, 
including that the robber may or may not be shown to him.  The 
victim immediately identified the defendant as the robber.  The 
showup was conducted "[n]o more than thirty minutes, and perhaps 
less" from the time that the victim reported the crime. 
2.  Suppression of showup identification evidence.  The 
defendant claims that the judge erred in denying his motion to 
suppress the results of the showup identification conducted 
within thirty minutes of the masked armed robbery.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the judge denied the motion, concluding 
                     
 
2 The judge found that Abrahamson brought Torres out of the 
apartment.  Abrahamson testified, however, that he brought an 
individual named Terrence Carter, not Torres, outside for the 
showup. 
5 
 
 
 
that "the procedure used in this case was not unnecessarily or 
impermissibly suggestive." 
 
We repeatedly have held that one-on-one identification 
procedures, such as showup identifications, are generally 
disfavored as inherently suggestive.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 217 (2014); Commonwealth v. Meas, 467 
Mass. 434, 441, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 150 (2014); 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 279 (2006).  A showup 
identification conducted in the immediate aftermath of a crime 
is not, however, presumptively impermissible.  In order for the 
results of a showup identification to be excluded, a defendant 
is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, "that 
the showup was 'so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
irreparable mistaken identification as to deny [the defendant] 
due process of law'" (citation omitted).  See Martin, supra at 
279-280.  "If the identification passes muster under this test, 
then it is for the jury to decide what weight to give to the 
identification."  Commonwealth v. Amaral, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 143, 
148 (2012). 
Police are permitted to conduct a showup identification if 
there is a "good reason" to secure the prompt identification of 
a suspect.  See Figueroa, 468 Mass. at 217-218 ("good reason" to 
conduct showup identification two and one-half hours after fatal 
shooting).  The existence of "good reason" for a show up 
6 
 
 
 
identification is a question of law to be decided by an 
appellate court, based on facts found by the motion judge.  
Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 362 (1995).  Factors 
relevant to this inquiry include "the nature of the crime 
involved and corresponding concerns for public safety; the need 
for efficient police investigation in the immediate aftermath of 
a crime; and the usefulness of prompt confirmation of the 
accuracy of investigatory information, which if in error, will 
release the police quickly to follow another track."  Id.  See 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 235-236 (2014) ("there 
is generally 'good reason' where the showup identification 
occurs within a few hours of the crime, because it is important 
to learn whether the police have captured the perpetrator or 
whether the perpetrator is still at large, and because a prompt 
identification is more likely to be accurate when the witness's 
recollection of the events is still fresh"). 
 
Even where there is a good reason to conduct a one-on-one 
identification procedure, the evidence must be excluded "[i]f 
there are special elements of unfairness, indicating a desire on 
the part of the police to 'stack the deck' against the 
defendant."  Commonwealth v. Leaster, 395 Mass. 96, 103 (1985), 
citing Commonwealth v. Moon, 380 Mass. 751, 756-759 (1980).  See 
Figueroa, 468 Mass. at 217. 
The defendant suggests that the Commonwealth, at "a 
7 
 
 
 
superficial level," appears to have satisfied the requirements 
for a showup identification because the procedure "occurred in 
close temporal proximity" to the crime, while the witness's 
memory was fresh, and the showup enabled an efficient police 
investigation.  He argues, however, that a more thorough 
examination of the facts reveals a need for per se exclusion 
because (1) the police had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant and therefore ample time to assemble a nonsuggestive 
photographic array; (2) the police inserted special elements of 
unfairness by improperly draping a black jacket over the 
defendant in order to influence the victim's identification of 
the suspect; and (3) the police further stacked the deck by 
placing a person with a lighter complexion next to the 
defendant.  Having considered each of the defendant's arguments, 
we conclude that he has not demonstrated error in the denial of 
his motion to suppress. 
The defendant focuses first on the judge's conclusion that 
the need for an efficient police investigation constituted a 
good reason to conduct the showup identification here.  The 
judge determined that, "although probable cause may have existed 
to arrest [the defendant] prior to the show-up, good police 
practices warranted immediate confirmation of Abrahamson's 
investigation, in order to permit the investigation to pursue 
other avenues in the event of a negative identification."  The 
8 
 
 
 
defendant argues, however, that the investigators should have 
arrested him and then asked the victim to review a nonsuggestive 
photographic array the following morning. 
In Martin, 447 Mass. at 280, we held that the failure of 
the police to pursue alternative investigatory techniques does 
not, standing alone, render an identification suggestive.  The 
fundamental question is whether the police "acted permissibly" 
in conducting the showup identification procedure.  Id.  The 
answer does not depend on the availability or reasonableness of 
pursuing an alternative identification procedure.  See 
Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 476, 478 n.15 (2014) 
(rejecting claim that one-on-one display of defendant's image on 
videotape was unnecessarily suggestive because police were 
required to first show eyewitness photographic array or conduct 
lineup after arrest). 
Applying the Austin factors to the circumstances in this 
case, we discern no reason to disturb the judge's finding that 
the police had a good reason to conduct the showup 
identification.  Officers were investigating a crime of violence 
involving the robbery of a delivery driver at knifepoint.  The 
victim immediately called 911 and told the first responding 
police officer that he would be able to identify his assailant.  
Within thirty minutes of the 911 call, the police tracked a 
likely robbery suspect to a nearby apartment.  There was a 
9 
 
 
 
corresponding need promptly to confirm or dispel the 
investigating officer's suspicions.  See Meas, 467 Mass. at 441-
442; Commonwealth v. Phillips, 452 Mass. 617, 629 (2008). 
The defendant argues that the police improperly draped a 
black coat over his shoulders in order to conflate the victim's 
identification of an individual with his identification of an 
article of clothing.  As a threshold matter, the defendant must 
clear a procedural hurdle because he did not raise this argument 
in the Superior Court.  In his motion to suppress, the defendant 
argued, in general terms, that the identification was "so 
unnecessarily suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of misidentification."  During the hearing on the 
motion, the defendant did not argue that the police draped the 
jacket over his shoulders in order to exert an improper 
influence on the victim's identification.  Rather, he argued 
that the police "could have arrested him and taken him back to 
the police station and done a proper line-up," and that they 
stacked the deck by placing him next to someone "who clearly 
does not match the description given by the victim." 
Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2), as appearing in 
442 Mass. 1516 (2004), a motion to suppress "shall state the 
grounds on which it is based and shall include in separately 
numbered paragraphs all reasons, defenses, or objections then 
available, which shall be set forth with particularity."  "This 
10 
 
 
 
requirement alerts the judge and the Commonwealth to the 
suppression theories at issue, and allows the Commonwealth to 
limit its evidence to these theories."  Commonwealth v. Silva, 
440 Mass. 772, 781 (2004). 
Abrahamson testified at the motion hearing that the 
defendant "was handcuffed behind his back and we had draped the 
black jacket over his shoulders" and that the jacket helped 
conceal the defendant's hands from the witness.3  On cross-
examination, defense counsel did not make any inquiry about that 
decision.  The judge noted that "[The defendant] had his hands 
cuffed behind his back, and a black jacket over his 
shoulder(s)," but did not discuss the impact of the black jacket 
on the victim's identification of the defendant. 
Because the defendant did not raise this issue before the 
motion judge, he has waived the argument.  See Commonwealth v. 
Garcia, 409 Mass. 675, 678 (1991).  We nonetheless review to 
determine whether there was a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Arzola, 470 Mass. 809, 814 
(2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 792 (2016).  We discern no such 
                     
 
3 At trial, Abrahamson offered another reason for police 
having draped the black jacket over the defendant's shoulders -- 
the robbery suspect was wearing a black jacket, and Abrahamson 
had seen the defendant wearing a black jacket in the past.  
"[I]n reviewing a judge's ruling on a motion to suppress, an 
appellate court 'may not rely on facts developed at trial' even 
where the testimony differed materially from that given at 
trial" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 
410, 416 (2014). 
11 
 
 
 
error. 
The defendant's claim that the identification procedure 
"treated identification of the jacket police draped over [him] 
as identification of him as an individual" is factually flawed. 
The victim was not asked to identify the robber's clothing.  
Panjwani instructed the victim to identify the "person who had 
robbed him," and to describe the robber by the clothing he was 
wearing.  The victim immediately identified the defendant as the 
robber and, following Panjwani's instructions, stated that the 
robber was the person wearing the dark jacket.4 
 
The defendant argues also that the police "stacked the 
deck" by placing him next to Carter, rather than next to Torres.  
Abrahamson testified that he brought Carter outside to stand 
with the defendant for two reasons.  First, Carter also left the 
Rantoul Street apartment near the time of the robbery.  Second, 
Carter was wearing a "mostly" black jacket, and "at night on 
Park Street . . . he loosely matched the description of the 
robbery suspect."  Abrahamson stated that both Carter and Torres 
had been wearing dark jackets on the evening of the robbery.  
Carter wore a black varsity-type jacket with red sleeves, and 
Torres wore a dark-colored pea coat.  Abrahamson described 
Carter as looking like "someone from an island descent," with 
                     
 
4 According to Abrahamson, the victim stated that he focused 
on the robber's facial features above the red scarf, describing 
the robber's eyes, skin color, and width of his nose. 
12 
 
 
 
light eyes and a "tannish" complexion.  He described Torres as 
Hispanic, with dark hair. 
The defendant has not shown that this part of the showup 
identification inserted a special element of unfairness.  The 
defendant, who bore the burden of proof, did not introduce any 
evidence at the hearing of the differences in skin tone between 
Carter and Torres.  On this record, there is no factual basis 
from which to conclude that the police inserted special elements 
of unfairness against the defendant by placing him next to a 
"tannish" person, as opposed to a "Hispanic" person.  Contrast 
Moon, 380 Mass. at 758-759 (special elements of unfairness 
occurred in manner in which police conducted showup, including 
showing victim single photograph pulled from vehicle associated 
with crime). 
3.  In-court identification.  We turn to the issue of in-
court identification, first summarizing the testimony introduced 
at trial, and at a hearing on the defendant's motion in limine 
seeking to preclude the Commonwealth from asking the victim to 
identify him in front of the jury. 
The jury could have found the following facts.  In the 
early evening of December 18, 2013, an individual ordered two 
pizzas and a bottle of soda from a local pizza parlor in 
Beverly, and provided a delivery address on Park Street.  A 
short time later, the caller changed the delivery address to a 
13 
 
 
 
different street number on Park Street.  The victim was familiar 
with the area, but could not locate the specific street address.  
During his search for the address, the victim drove past an 
individual standing on the corner of Park Street and Roundy 
Street.  He described the individual (later identified as the 
defendant) as a black man, dressed in a dark or black jacket 
with the hood pulled up. 
The victim pulled into a parking lot and unsuccessfully 
attempted to contact the pizza customer by dialing the telephone 
number printed on the delivery slip.  He then drove slowly 
toward the defendant.  The defendant waved him over, and said 
that the order was for him.  When the victim remarked that he 
could not find a number the given address on Park Street, the 
defendant replied, "[T]hat's my house."  On closer examination, 
the victim observed that the defendant was wearing a red scarf, 
which covered his face "from below the eyes down."  This did not 
alarm the victim because it was very cold and cloudy. 
Once the defendant confirmed that he had ordered two pizzas 
and a bottle of soda, the victim pulled over to the side of the 
road and got out of the vehicle.  As soon as he did so, the 
defendant produced a folding knife from his pocket, which he 
opened with a "click[ing]" sound, and demanded "all the money."  
The defendant initially pressed the knife to the victim's 
throat, but lowered it to the victim's rib cage when a vehicle 
14 
 
 
 
passed by.  The victim attempted to talk the defendant out of 
robbing him.  When this proved unsuccessful, he handed over a 
small amount of cash. 
As soon as the defendant walked away, the victim telephoned 
911, got back into his vehicle, and followed the defendant down 
Park Street.  The defendant turned left onto Creek Street, and 
continued walking toward Rantoul Street.  On the advice of the 
police dispatcher, the victim stopped following the defendant; 
he stopped at the corner of Park and Creek Streets to await 
their arrival. 
 
At 7:30 P.M., Abrahamson arrived at the victim's vehicle.  
The victim repeated the description he had provided to the 
dispatcher:  the assailant was a black male, wearing a dark 
jacket and a red scarf.  He also told Abrahamson that he would 
be able to identify the robber.  Based on this description, 
Abrahamson drove a few blocks away to an apartment on Rantoul 
Street.  He knew the residents, Torres and his mother, from 
previously "interacting with them in [his] capacity [of] being a 
police officer."  Abrahamson also was aware that a group of 
young men frequented the apartment, and that the defendant was 
the only African-American in that group. 
 
After Abrahamson knocked on her door, Torre's mother 
allowed Abrahamson to enter.  Her son was in the apartment, 
along with a group of his friends, including the defendant.  
15 
 
 
 
Abrahamson found the defendant in Torres's bedroom pressed up 
against a wall.  He was wearing jeans, sneakers, and a red T-
shirt.  The defendant's black winter jacket was located on 
either the floor or the mattress.  There was snow on the ground, 
and the bottoms of the defendant's sneakers were wet. 
 
Abrahamson decided to conduct a showup identification.  He 
testified that he brought the defendant outside to the end of 
the driveway, explaining that he had draped the defendant's 
black jacket over him because he "had personally seen [the 
defendant] wearing a black jacket prior to this date.  And 
additionally, [the defendant] had been handcuffed, and 
[Abrahamson] believe[d] the jacket covered that behind his 
back."  Abrahamson had Carter, another person who had been with 
the group in the apartment, stand next to the defendant. 
Panjwani brought the victim to Rantoul Street to identify 
or exclude "a suspect."  Panjwani explained to the victim that 
"[they] were going to drive by a location, and if he recognized 
an individual, the individual that may have been responsible for 
robbing him, to let [Panjwani] know."  When they arrived in 
front of the defendant's apartment building on Rantoul Street, 
the victim was able to observe four men standing at the entrance 
to the driveway:  the defendant and Carter next to each other, 
and one uniformed police officer on each side.  The area was 
illuminated by street lights and headlights from the police 
16 
 
 
 
cruisers.  While seated in the rear of a police sport utility 
vehicle, at a distance of approximately fifteen feet, and 
"within ten seconds" or "fairly immediately" after they pulled 
up, the victim identified the defendant as the robber.  He told 
Panjwani that he recognized the defendant from "the unique shape 
of his nose, as well as his eyes." 
The Commonwealth introduced evidence to corroborate the 
victim's identification.  The defendant's friends testified that 
he had left the apartment between 6:30 and 7 P.M. that evening, 
wearing a black jacket; they did not know his whereabouts for a 
short period of time; and he returned to the apartment breathing 
a little heavily.  Police also found a silver folding knife, 
which opened with a distinctive "clicking" sound, and a red 
bandana in Torres's bedroom.  One of the defendant's friends 
testified that the knife belonged to the defendant. 
The defendant and the Commonwealth each filed motions in 
limine regarding an in-court identification of the defendant by 
the victim.  The judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion to 
permit an in-court identification.  He determined that the 
victim had made an unequivocal out-of-court identification, 
noting that, under Collins, "it has to be certain.  In other 
words, if someone does an out-of-court [identification] and 
says, well, I think that's the one, I don't think he can come 
into court and say, yes, I'm certain he's the one." 
17 
 
 
 
We have established rules governing the admissibility of 
in-court identifications.  In Crayton, 470 Mass. at 236, we 
examined the admissibility of an in-court identification that 
was not preceded by an eyewitness's prior, nonsuggestive, out-
of-court identification.  We observed that "in-court 
identification is comparable in its suggestiveness to a showup 
identification."  To lessen the unfairness of suggestive in-
court identification testimony, we concluded that, "[w]here an 
eyewitness has not participated before trial in an 
identification procedure, we shall treat the in-court 
identification as an in-court showup, and shall admit it in 
evidence only where there is 'good reason' for its admission."  
Id. at 241.  A "good reason," in this context, consists of 
circumstances where an in-court identification is not material 
to a determination of guilt or innocence, and serves merely to 
inform the jury that "the person sitting in the court room is 
the person whose conduct is at issue."  Id. at 242.  For 
example, a police officer would be entitled to identify a person 
he or she had placed under arrest, and a spouse would be 
entitled to identify his or her domestic abuser.  Id. at 242-
243. 
In Collins, 470 Mass. at 258, we addressed the 
admissibility of an in-court identification preceded by a less 
than certain out-of-court identification.  In that case, the 
18 
 
 
 
witness had observed the perpetrator outside her bedroom door 
for a few seconds before gunshots were fired.  A month later, 
police showed the witness a photographic array consisting of 
eight separate photographs.  Id. at 258-259.  At first, the 
witness said "no" after viewing each photograph in a sequential 
order.  Id. at 259-260.  She then stated that she believed the 
perpetrator either was no. eight (a filler) or no. four (the 
defendant).  Id. at 260.  In a trial conducted more than two 
years after the shooting, the witness identified the defendant 
in-court, without hesitation, as the shooter.  Id. 
We noted that the witness's in-court identification posed a 
"danger . . . that the jury may disregard or minimize the 
earlier failure to make a positive identification during a 
nonsuggestive identification procedure, and give undue weight to 
the unnecessarily suggestive in-court identification."  Id. 
at 262.  To remedy this unfairness, in Collins, supra at 265, we 
expanded our jurisprudence, and concluded that an eyewitness who 
makes "less than an unequivocal" identification of a defendant 
in a nonsuggestive, out-of-court, identification procedure, 
subsequently may not offer an in-court identification of that 
defendant without good reason. 
The defendant and the Commonwealth dispute the application 
of the Crayton-Collins in-court identification rules to the 
circumstances.  The defendant contends that an inherently 
19 
 
 
 
suggestive showup identification is always questionable, and 
therefore can never produce an "unequivocal" identification 
within the meaning of Collins.  He argues that the trial judge 
erred by treating the witness's expressed level of verbal 
certainty as controlling "without regard to the suggestiveness 
of the procedure that produced that certainty." 
The Commonwealth, on the other hand, maintains that the 
trial judge properly found that the victim made an unequivocal 
out-of-court identification "even though it arose from an 
inherently suggestive procedure."  According to the 
Commonwealth, the term "unequivocal" means precisely what it 
says -- "unambiguous; clear; free from uncertainty."  The 
Commonwealth suggests that a judge would have the discretion to 
exclude an in-court identification if its probative value were 
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 
 Although the defendant raises important issues regarding 
the potential disproportionate impact of inherently suggestive, 
in-court identification testimony on the jury, the Commonwealth 
has the better argument in these circumstances.  The judge 
properly applied the standard articulated in Collins, and found 
that the victim made an unequivocal positive identification of 
the defendant.  The police officer conducting the showup 
instructed the victim to "give [the officer] a clothing 
description if he recognized the individual."  The victim, 
20 
 
 
 
"within ten seconds," or "fairly immediately," identified the 
defendant as the robber.  This was not a case, as it was in 
Collins, 470 Mass. at 262, where the eyewitness was "unable to 
make a positive identification of the defendant or lacked 
confidence" in her out-of-court identification. 
We take this opportunity to clarify the standard governing 
in-court identifications preceded by an admissible out-of-court 
identification.  In-court identifications will not be permitted 
(absent good cause) where a witness participated in an out-of-
court identification procedure that "produced something less 
than an unequivocal positive identification."  See Collins, 470 
Mass. at 262.  A witness makes an "unequivocal positive 
identification" when he or she successfully identifies the 
defendant as the perpetrator, such that the statement of 
identification is clear and free from doubt. 
Finally, we set forth an alternative theory for a trial 
judge to consider in deciding whether to permit an eyewitness to 
identify a defendant in the court room.  A judge applying 
"[c]ommon law principles of fairness" has the discretion to 
exclude unreliable eyewitness identification testimony (citation 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 473 Mass. 594, 598-599 
(2016).  "Even if otherwise admissible, a judge may suppress 
identification evidence if 'its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice'" (citation 
21 
 
 
 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 518 (2016).  
See Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 473 Mass. 606, 616 (2016) (judge 
must weigh probative value of identification against danger of 
unfair prejudice "where a judge finds an identification to be 
especially suggestive"); Commonwealth v. Alcide, 472 Mass. 150, 
166 (2015) (judge's authority to exclude unreliable 
identification testimony is "closely related" to general 
discretion to exclude evidence more prejudicial than probative); 
Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2017) (court may exclude relevant evidence 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of 
unfair prejudice). 
In a case such as this, for example, the judge would be 
required to balance the probative value of the victim's 
potential in-court identification of the defendant against the 
danger of unfair prejudice.  The victim's in-court 
identification is probative because it serves to corroborate 
other evidence that the person accused of the crime is, in fact, 
the perpetrator.  See United States v. Cotto-Aponte, 30 
F.3d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1994).  Here, the other evidence of the 
defendant's guilt included the showup identification and the 
circumstantial evidence introduced to demonstrate that the 
defendant robbed the victim.  The judge would be required to 
examine the probative value of the identification testimony in 
light of "the strength of its source independent of the 
22 
 
 
 
suggestive circumstances of the identification."  Carter, 475 
Mass. at 518-519, quoting Johnson, 473 Mass. at 601.  "Relevant 
factors include 'the witness's opportunity to observe the 
offender at the time of the crime, the amount of time between 
the crime and the identification, whether the witness's earlier 
description of the perpetrator matches the defendant, . . . 
whether the witness earlier identified another person as the 
perpetrator or failed to identify the defendant as the 
perpetrator,' and 'the witness's prior familiarity with the 
person identified.'"  Carter, supra at 519, quoting Johnson, 
supra.  On the other side of the scale, in this determination, 
the judge would balance the probative value of this evidence 
with the danger of unfair prejudice inherent in an in-court 
identification taking into account that the jury may give unfair 
weight to this suggestive evidence.  See Collins, 470 Mass. at 
265. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring, with whom Budd, J., joins).  I 
agree with the court that the judge did not err in admitting in 
evidence the victim's out-of-court showup identification where 
the defendant waived the argument that draping a black jacket 
over the shoulders of the defendant needlessly added to the 
suggestiveness inherent in a showup identification.  See 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 236 (2014), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 217 (2014) ("[e]ven 
where there is 'good reason' for a showup identification, it may 
still be suppressed if the identification procedure so 
needlessly adds to the suggestiveness inherent in such an 
identification that it is 'conducive to irreparable mistaken 
identification'"); Commonwealth v. Leaster, 395 Mass. 96, 103 
(1985) (even where showup occurs promptly after crime, "if there 
are special elements of unfairness, indicating a desire on the 
part of the police to 'stack the deck' against the defendant, an 
identification resulting from such a confrontation would be 
inadmissible").  I also agree that the convictions in this case 
should be affirmed.  I write separately because I disagree with 
the court's analysis regarding the admissibility of the victim's 
in-court identification of the defendant. 
   
The court errs when it concludes that "[t]he judge properly 
applied the standard articulated in Collins" by admitting the 
in-court identification after finding that the victim made an 
2 
 
 
 
unequivocal positive identification of the defendant.  Ante 
at    .  As the court correctly notes, in Collins, the prior 
out-of-court identification procedure by the eyewitness was a 
nonsuggestive photographic array with eight photographs.  
Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 260 (2014).  It was 
neither a suggestive lineup or photographic array, nor a showup 
identification.  Because the court was not presented with a 
suggestive out-of-court identification procedure, we expressly 
declared in Collins, supra at 262 n.8, "We do not address the 
admissibility of an in-court identification where there has been 
a suggestive pretrial identification procedure."  Consequently, 
the judge could not possibly have "properly applied the standard 
articulated in Collins," because the standard articulated in 
Collins expressly did not apply to a showup identification, 
which we have long recognized to be inherently suggestive.  See 
Crayton, 470 Mass. at 235, quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 
Mass. 274, 279 (2006) ("[o]ne-on-one identifications are 
generally disfavored because they are viewed as inherently 
suggestive").1 
                     
 
1 We noted in Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 236 
n.13 (2014): 
 
"Showups pose an additional risk of misidentification that 
is not present with lineups or photographic arrays.  As the 
Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness Testimony 
explained:  '[U]nlike lineups, showups have no mechanism to 
distinguish witnesses who are guessing from those who 
3 
 
 
 
 
The appropriate question, then, is not whether the judge 
correctly applied the Collins standard, which expressly did not 
apply to suggestive identification procedures, but what standard 
should apply to the admission of an in-court identification 
after an unequivocally positive identification of the defendant 
by an eyewitness at a showup identification that is admissible 
in evidence.2  The court correctly recognizes that the "[c]ommon 
law principles of fairness" that we applied in both Crayton and 
Collins to the admission of the in-court identification in those 
cases is essentially a determination whether the probative value 
of the in-court identification evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  Ante at    , 
citing Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2017).  That same weighing of 
                                                                  
actually recognize the suspect.  In an unbiased lineup, an 
unreliable witness will often be exposed by a "false 
positive" response identifying a known innocent subject.  
By contrast, because showups involve a lone suspect, every 
witness who guesses will positively identify the suspect, 
and every positive identification is regarded as a "hit."  
For that reason, misidentifications that occur in showups 
are less likely to be discovered as mistakes.'  Supreme 
Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence:  Report 
and Recommendations to the Justices 76 (July 25, 2013) 
. . . .  See generally Dysart & Lindsay, Show-Up 
Identifications:  Suggestive Technique or Reliable Method?, 
in 2 Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology 137 (2007)." 
 
 
2 I do not address the admissibility of an in-court 
identification where the out-of-court identification was 
suppressed because the identification procedure was so 
suggestive that it was conducive to irreparable mistaken 
identification.  Those circumstances are not presented here. 
4 
 
 
 
probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice should be 
applied here, but the analysis is a bit different.  
 
In Collins, 470 Mass. at 262, we recognized the substantial 
danger of unfair prejudice arising from an in-court 
identification where the witness had not made an unequivocal 
positive identification of the defendant in a nonsuggestive 
identification procedure:  "the danger is that the jury may 
disregard or minimize the earlier failure to make a positive 
identification during a nonsuggestive identification procedure, 
and give undue weight to the unnecessarily suggestive in-court 
identification."  There were three sources of such danger.  
First, "[w]here eyewitnesses before trial were unable to make a 
positive identification of the defendant or lacked confidence in 
their identification, they are likely to regard the defendant's 
prosecution as confirmation that the defendant is the 'right' 
person and, as a result, may develop an artificially inflated 
level of confidence in their in-court identification."  Id. at 
262-263.  Second, "cross-examination cannot always be expected 
to reveal an inaccurate in-court identification where 'most 
jurors are unaware of the weak correlation between confidence 
and accuracy and of witness susceptibility to "manipulation by 
suggestive procedures or confirming feedback."'"  Id. at 264, 
quoting Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness 
Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the Justices 20 (July 
5 
 
 
 
25, 2013) (SJC Study Group Report).  Third, "[w]here 
confirmatory feedback artificially inflates an eyewitness's 
level of confidence in his or her identification, there is also 
a substantial risk that the eyewitness's memory of the crime at 
trial will 'improve.'"  Collins, supra at 263.  We noted that 
studies have shown that "an eyewitness, now certain that the 
defendant was the perpetrator of the crime she observed, may 
recall that she saw the perpetrator more clearly, and saw more 
details of his appearance, than the witness had recalled during 
the nonsuggestive out-of-court identification procedure where 
she was unable to make a positive identification."  See id., 
citing SJC Study Group Report, supra at 82-83.  "This 
enhancement of memory makes it more difficult for juries to 
assess the accuracy of an in-court identification."  Collins, 
supra at 263-264.  "As a result, not only is an eyewitness 
likely to have an inflated level of confidence in an in-court 
showup identification, but a jury may give more weight to it 
than to the nonsuggestive pretrial identification that yielded 
something less than a positive identification.'"  Id. at 264. 
 
We also have recognized that in-court identifications 
generally have little probative value.  "Although the defendant 
is not alone in the court room, even a witness who had never 
seen the defendant will infer that the defendant is sitting with 
counsel at the defense table, and can easily infer who is the 
6 
 
 
 
defendant and who is the attorney."  Crayton, 470 Mass. at 237.  
In Crayton, we noted: 
"In fact, in-court identifications may be more suggestive 
than showups. . . .  At a showup that occurs within hours 
of a crime, the eyewitness likely knows that the police 
suspect the individual, but unless the police say more than 
they should, the eyewitness is unlikely to know how 
confident the police are in their suspicion.  However, 
where the prosecutor asks the eyewitness if the person who 
committed the crime is in the court room, the eyewitness 
knows that the defendant has been charged and is being 
tried for that crime.  The presence of the defendant in the 
court room is likely to be understood by the eyewitness as 
confirmation that the prosecutor, as a result of the 
criminal investigation, believes that the defendant is the 
person whom the eyewitness saw commit the crime.  Under 
such circumstances, eyewitnesses may identify the defendant 
out of reliance on the prosecutor and in conformity with 
what is expected of them rather than because their memory 
is reliable."   
 
Id. 
 
In Collins, 470 Mass. at 265, we essentially ruled that, 
where there was not an unequivocal positive identification 
arising from a nonsuggestive out-of-court identification 
procedure, the considerable danger of unfair prejudice arising 
from an in-court identification generally will substantially 
outweigh its probative value, so under our common-law principles 
of fairness the in-court identification should not be admitted 
unless justified for "good reason."  We noted that "good reason" 
in such circumstances "usually would require a showing that the 
in-court identification is more reliable than the witness's 
earlier failure to make a positive identification and that it 
7 
 
 
 
poses little risk of misidentification despite its 
suggestiveness," such as "where the victim was familiar with the 
defendant (as in a domestic violence case) and only failed to 
identify the defendant in the earlier identification procedure 
because of fear or an unwillingness to cooperate with the police 
at the time."  Id. at 265 & n.16. 
 
The balancing analysis is a bit different where the 
eyewitness has made an unequivocal positive identification of 
the defendant in an inherently suggestive procedure such as a 
showup.  The minimal probative value remains the same, but the 
danger of unfair prejudice is less because the witness already 
has declared that he or she is certain that the defendant is the 
perpetrator.  The testimony at trial of a witness who expressed 
such certainty in his or her original identification is less 
vulnerable to the confirmatory or bolstering effects of an in-
court identification.  The danger of unfair prejudice in such 
circumstances is the risk that the jury will focus on, and give 
undue weight to, an in-court identification that has minimal 
probative value rather than focus on, and evaluate the 
appropriate weight to be given to, the witness's showup 
identification. 
This danger of unfair prejudice, although less than the 
danger presented in Collins, is still substantial.  The timing 
of a showup identification significantly affects the probability 
8 
 
 
 
of its accuracy.  As we noted in our Model Jury Instructions on 
Eyewitness Identification, 473 Mass. 1051, 1056 endnote x 
(2015), quoting State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 783 (2012) 
(Appendix): 
"Showups are most likely to be reliable when they occur 
immediately after viewing the criminal perpetrator in 
action, ostensibly because the benefits of a fresh memory 
outweigh the inherent suggestiveness of the procedure.  In 
as little as two hours after an event occurs, however, the 
likelihood of misidentification in a showup procedure 
increases dramatically." 
 
See SJC Study Group Report, supra at 76, citing Yarmey, Yarmey, 
& Yarmey, Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups and 
Lineups, 20 L. & Hum. Behav. 459, 464 (1996) (in study, showup 
conducted immediately after crime produced same error rate as 
lineup conducted in same time frame; delay of two hours 
increased misidentification rate in showup to fifty-eight per 
cent versus fourteen per cent for lineup).  The circumstances of 
the showup may also affect the probability of its accuracy.  See 
SJC Study Group Report, supra, citing Dysart, Lindsay, & Dupuis, 
Show–Ups:  The Critical Issue of Clothing Bias, 20 Applied 
Cognitive Psychology 1009 (2006) (witnesses at showup may be 
more inclined to base identifications on clothing rather than on 
facial features; studies indicate that showups present 
especially high risk of misidentification for suspects wearing 
clothing similar to that of perpetrator).  Allowing an in-court 
identification in addition to a showup identification creates a 
9 
 
 
 
risk that the jury will gloss over these particular aspects of 
the showup identification and simply accept the subsequent in-
court identification. 
Here, the probative value of the in-court identification 
was negligible.  The victim did not know the perpetrator, and 
had never seen him before.  Because the perpetrator was wearing 
a hooded black jacket and covered his face with a red scarf, the 
victim was only able to see part of the perpetrator's nose, his 
eyes, and, perhaps, a bit of his forehead.  The victim's 
testimony at trial occurred approximately one and one-half years 
after the robbery.  The victim had described the robber as a 
black male; the defendant was the only black male in the court 
room.  The likelihood that the victim recalled the perpetrator's 
nose, eyes, and forehead so well that he could reliably identify 
the perpetrator approximately eighteen months after the crime in 
a court room where the defendant was the only black male is so 
small that it borders on the microscopic.3 
 
The court erroneously finds the in-court identification to 
have probative value "because it serves to corroborate other 
evidence that the person accused of the crime is, in fact, the 
                     
 
3 At best, the victim might reliably have identified the 
defendant in the court room as the person he identified in the 
showup.  That would not have been an identification separate and 
distinct from the showup, but that was not the question asked 
and answered.  Instead, the victim was asked whether he could 
identify "the person who robbed" him.  The victim answered "yes" 
and then pointed to the defendant. 
10 
 
 
 
perpetrator."  Ante at    .  But this says nothing more than 
that the positive in-court identification has probative value 
because the other evidence demonstrates the defendant's guilt.  
By this standard, a Ouija board has probative value if it points 
to the guilt of a defendant because it corroborates the other 
compelling evidence of his guilt.  The probative value of 
evidence must be evaluated on whether it fairly adds to the 
weight of the other evidence, not simply on whether it is 
consistent with that evidence. 
 
In contrast, given the circumstances of the showup in this 
case, the danger of unfair prejudice arising from deflecting the 
jury's focus away from the showup identification was 
significant.  This showup had serious flaws and warranted the 
jury's careful scrutiny.  First, it was not a pure showup; the 
victim at trial testified that the police told him they had 
caught two people, and the police showed him two individuals, 
only one of whom was an African-American.4  Second, the victim 
told the police that the robber wore a black jacket, and the 
police officer draped a black jacket over the defendant's 
                     
 
4 The identification was also cross-racial; the victim's 
primary language is Kurdish, so we infer he is not African-
American.  See Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 23 (2015) 
("The existence of the 'cross-race effect' . . . -- that people 
are generally less accurate at identifying members of other 
races than they are at identifying members of their own race -- 
has reached a near consensus in the relevant scientific 
community and has been recognized by courts and scholars alike 
[footnotes omitted]"). 
11 
 
 
 
shoulders during the showup, even though he was not wearing a 
black jacket when he was apprehended by the police.  Third, the 
police officer at the showup asked the victim to describe the 
"person who had robbed him" by the clothing the person was 
wearing, which likely focused the victim's attention on the 
black jacket. 
 
Under these circumstances, where the probative value of the 
in-court identification plainly was substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, I conclude that it was an abuse 
of discretion to admit the in-court identification.  See L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014), quoting Picciotto 
v. Continental Cas. Co., 512 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2008) ("a 
judge's discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of 
discretion where we conclude the judge made 'a clear error of 
judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the decision, 
. . . such that the decision falls outside the range of 
reasonable alternatives").5 
                     
 
5 I do not suggest that it will always be an abuse of 
discretion to admit an in-court identification where there is a 
positive showup identification.  For instance, it might be 
appropriate to admit an in-court identification "where the 
eyewitness was familiar with the defendant before the commission 
of the crime, such as where a victim testifies to a crime of 
domestic violence."  Crayton, 470 Mass. at 242.  In such 
instances, identification often is not truly at issue, and the 
jury will understand that the identification is intended simply 
to confirm that the person the witness is describing is the 
defendant in the court room.  Id. at 242-243. 
12 
 
 
 
 
I nonetheless vote to affirm the defendant's convictions 
because I conclude that the admission of the in-court 
identification, although error, was not prejudicial error.  I 
agree with the court that the evidence of the defendant's guilt 
apart from the identifications was quite strong, and I am 
convinced that the victim's in-court identification here "did 
not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect."  
Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).