Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Dockry

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5014

Docket Number: 2012-0287

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Dockry, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5014.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5014 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. DOCKRY. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Dockry,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5014.] 
Attorney misconduct, including failing to hold client funds in an interest-bearing 
account, separate from the attorney’s funds; failing to perform a monthly 
reconciliation of the funds held in the trust account; and failing to 
maintain a record for each client on whose behalf funds are held—One-
year suspension, stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2012-0287—Submitted May 22, 2012—Decided October 31, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-044. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Michael Brian Dockry of Youngstown, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0002845, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1982.  On April 11, 2011, relator, disciplinary counsel, filed a complaint alleging 
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that Dockry had committed professional misconduct by depositing and 
maintaining personal funds in his client trust account, using that account to pay 
his personal and business expenses, borrowing client funds from the account for 
his personal use, failing to maintain ledgers of the client funds held in that 
account, and failing to reconcile the account. 
{¶ 2} The parties submitted stipulations of fact and agreed that Dockry’s 
conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold client funds in 
an interest-bearing client trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own funds), 
1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for each client on whose behalf 
funds are held), and 1.15(a)(5) (requiring a lawyer to perform a monthly 
reconciliation of the funds held in the lawyer’s client trust account and to retain 
evidence of the reconciliation).  Dockry, however, contested allegations that his 
conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and 8.4(h) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law) as alleged in the complaint. 
{¶ 3} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline conducted a hearing at which it heard Dockry’s testimony and admitted 
the parties’ stipulations, 16 stipulated exhibits, and 25 exhibits offered by Dockry.  
The panel issued a report finding that Dockry committed all of the charged 
misconduct and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law for 
one year, with six months stayed on the conditions that he serve one year of 
monitored probation and engage in no further misconduct.  The board adopted the 
panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 4} Dockry objects to the recommended sanction and argues that a six-
month suspension stayed on conditions will adequately protect the public from 
any further misconduct.  We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct.  
However, for the reasons that follow, we sustain Dockry’s objection in part and 
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impose a one-year suspension, all stayed on the conditions recommended by the 
board. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} The board, based upon the parties’ stipulations, the exhibits 
presented, and Dockry’s testimony at the hearing, made the following finding of 
facts.  Dockry began his solo practice in 1982 and has maintained a client trust 
account at PNC Bank and its predecessor, National City Bank, since 1983.  
Though he continuously maintained a personal checking account beginning in 
1982, he did not open an operating account for his law practice until November 
2010. 
{¶ 6} Since February 1, 2007, Dockry has handled cases on an hourly fee 
basis and deposited the fee advances received from his clients into his client trust 
account.  He has also always deposited and maintained personal funds in his client 
trust account beyond the amount permitted by Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(b), which allows 
lawyers to deposit their own funds in a client trust account for the sole purpose of 
paying bank fees or obtaining a waiver of bank fees.  For example, in April 2009, 
he deposited $212 of his personal funds into his client trust account, and in May 
2010, he deposited $3,035.24 of his personal funds.  Dockry estimated that 
typically 75 percent of the funds held in his client trust account belonged to his 
clients. 
{¶ 7} Dockry also used his client trust account to pay his personal and 
business expenses, including his office rent and telephone service, his personal 
membership dues for the Austintown Kiwanis Club, and his family’s medical 
expenses. 
{¶ 8} On one occasion, in April 2009, Dockry wrote a $2,000 trust-
account check to himself to cover a deficiency in his personal checking account.  
He returned the funds to his trust account two days later, noting on the check that 
the funds had been a loan.  The board found that Dockry also loaned $300 to a 
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friend from personal funds that Dockry had improperly maintained in his client 
trust account and that he later reimbursed the account for the loan with personal 
funds.1  In addition, the board found that from February 1, 2007, to early 2010, 
Dockry did not maintain ledgers of the client funds held in his client trust account 
and did not properly reconcile the account. 
{¶ 9} The parties stipulated and the board found that the conduct 
described above is consistent with the way Dockry used his client trust account 
from February 2007 until the commencement of relator’s investigation of this 
matter. 
{¶ 10} The board found that Dockry’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 
1.15(a), 1.15(a)(2), 1.15(a)(5), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h) as charged in relator’s complaint.  
We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 11} In recommending a sanction, the panel and board considered the 
ethical duties that respondent had violated, the applicable aggravating and 
mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10, and the sanctions imposed in 
similar cases.  See, e.g., Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 
2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 
Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 12} The board adopted the parties’ stipulated factors in mitigation—
absence of a prior disciplinary record, payment of restitution, cooperation with the 
disciplinary proceedings, and good character and reputation apart from the 
charged misconduct.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), (d), and (e).  The board 
adopted the sole stipulated aggravating factor—that Dockry’s conduct was 
motivated by a dishonest or selfish motive, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b). 
                                                 
1 Dockry also stipulated that in February 2010, he issued a check from his client trust account that 
exceeded his personal funds in the account.  He reimbursed the account the following month.  
Relator did not amend the complaint to charge any violations related to this conduct.  
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{¶ 13} Relator argues that the appropriate sanction for Dockry’s 
misconduct is a one-year suspension with six months stayed on the condition that 
Dockry serve one year of monitored probation.  Dockry, however, argues that a 
six-month fully stayed suspension coupled with a period of monitored probation 
will adequately protect the public. 
{¶ 14} The board noted that in Disciplinary Counsel v. Wise, 108 Ohio 
St.3d 381, 2006-Ohio-1194, 843 N.E.2d 1198, ¶ 3-6, 10, we imposed an indefinite 
suspension on an attorney who used his client trust account to pay business and 
personal expenses; failed to maintain client ledgers, records, or receipts showing 
the source of some of the funds deposited into the account; and overdrew the 
account 19 times in the span of three years.  But in contrast to the court’s findings 
in Wise, the board found that Dockry had not overdrawn his client trust account 
multiple times, had no prior disciplinary violations, and had cooperated in 
relator’s investigation.  Therefore, the board adopted relator’s recommendation 
that Dockry be suspended from the practice of law for one year with six months 
stayed on the conditions that he serve one year of monitored probation and 
commit no further misconduct. 
{¶ 15} Dockry objects to the recommended sanction, arguing that a six-
month fully stayed suspension on the conditions recommended by the board will 
adequately protect the public from future misconduct.  In support of this 
argument, he cites a number of cases in which we have imposed fully stayed 
suspensions on attorneys who have engaged in comparable misconduct with 
respect to their client trust accounts. 
{¶ 16} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Vivyan, 125 Ohio St.3d 12, 2010-Ohio-
650, 925 N.E.2d 947, ¶ 4, 14, we imposed a six-month, fully stayed suspension on 
an attorney who over a period of approximately one month withdrew $1,535 in 
unearned funds from his client trust account and used those funds for personal 
expenses in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), 1.15(b), and 1.15(c) (requiring 
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lawyers to deposit into client trust account advances to be withdrawn only when 
earned).  In determining that a fully stayed suspension was the appropriate 
sanction, we relied on a number of cases involving attorney use of client trust 
accounts for personal and/or business expenses.  Vivyan at ¶ 8-12, citing 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Fletcher, 122 Ohio St.3d 390, 2009-Ohio-3480, 911 
N.E.2d 897 (imposing a six-month stayed suspension on an attorney who used his 
client trust account for personal and business expenses for approximately five 
years); Disciplinary Counsel v. Johnston, 121 Ohio St.3d 403, 2009-Ohio-1432, 
904 N.E.2d 892 (imposing a one-year stayed suspension on an attorney who 
commingled personal funds with client funds for nearly two years while using his 
client trust account for operating and personal expenses); Cuyahoga Cty. Bar 
Assn. v. Nance, 119 Ohio St.3d 55, 2008-Ohio-3333, 891 N.E.2d 746 (imposing a 
six-month stayed suspension on an attorney who engaged in conduct that 
adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law by using his client trust account 
to pay personal and business expenses and overdrawing the account on at least 
one occasion); Columbus Bar Assn. v. Peden, 118 Ohio St.3d 244, 2008-Ohio-
2237, 887 N.E.2d 1183 (imposing a six-month stayed suspension on an attorney 
who overdrew his client trust account nine times in a two-year period, failed to 
maintain a client trust account for several months, and occasionally deposited 
unearned fees in his office operating account); and Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Newcomer, 119 Ohio St.3d 351, 2008-Ohio-4492, 894 N.E.2d 50 (imposing a six-
month stayed suspension on an attorney who used his client trust account for his 
personal banking needs after his bank closed his personal account for reasons 
related to his poor financial condition). 
{¶ 17} Although some of the attorneys in the cases cited by Dockry were 
found to have engaged in conduct adversely reflecting on their fitness to practice 
law, see, e.g., Johnston at ¶ 10; Peden at ¶ 4; Nance at ¶ 3; Newcomer at ¶ 4, none 
of them was charged with dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation for his 
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misconduct, as Dockry was.  And it is that distinction that relator argues requires 
Dockry to serve an actual suspension from the practice of law. 
{¶ 18} “Generally, misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation warrants an actual suspension from the practice of law.”  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Karris, 129 Ohio St.3d 499, 2011-Ohio-4243, 954 N.E.2d 
118, ¶ 16, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraemer, 126 Ohio St.3d 163, 2010-
Ohio-3300, 931 N.E.2d 571, ¶ 13; and Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 
Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995), syllabus.  However, we have imposed a 
fully stayed suspension on at least one occasion when an attorney engaged in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  In Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Fumich, 116 Ohio St.3d 257, 2007-Ohio-6040, 878 N.E.2d 6, the 
attorney deposited $16,000 of his personal funds into his client trust account and 
told his clients that the money was from settling their case.  The case had actually 
been dismissed two years earlier following the attorney’s failure to respond to 
motions for summary judgment.  Id. at ¶ 5-7, 18.  He also failed to promptly 
return a client’s legal documents on request.  Id. at ¶ 8.  We found that his conduct 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(6) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
neglecting an entrusted legal matter), 9-102(A) (requiring a lawyer to deposit all 
client funds in one or more identifiable bank accounts and to keep the funds 
separate from the lawyer’s own property), and 9-102(B)(4) (requiring a lawyer to 
promptly pay or deliver funds and property to which a client is entitled).  Id. at 
¶ 9.  Finding that there were no aggravating factors and that there were multiple 
mitigating factors, including the absence of a prior disciplinary record, the 
respondent’s payment of restitution, his cooperation in the disciplinary process, 
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his excellent character and reputation, and the absence of a motive to exploit his 
clients, we imposed a one-year fully stayed suspension.  Id. at ¶ 16-18. 
{¶ 19} Despite our holding in Fumich, relator argues that a one-year 
suspension with six months stayed is appropriate here.  He argues that that 
sanction is in line with the sanctions that we imposed for conduct comparable to 
Dockry’s in Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hauck, 129 Ohio St.3d 209, 2011-Ohio-3281, 
951 N.E.2d 83, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Riek, 125 Ohio St.3d 46, 2010-Ohio-
1556, 925 N.E.2d 980. 
{¶ 20} For more than five years, Hauck commingled his personal and 
business funds in a bank account that also contained client funds, and he did so to 
avoid overdraft charges and to avoid tax garnishments by the Internal Revenue 
Service.  Hauck at ¶ 4, 6.  The account was not truly a client trust account, as it 
belonged to a nonprofit entity that Hauck had formed.  The printed checks for the 
account were deceptive because they did not name the nonprofit entity and instead 
bore Hauck’s name, followed by “Attorney at Law” and “IOLTA” (interest on 
lawyers’ trust accounts).  Id. at ¶ 5.  During the course of his deception, Hauck 
stopped payment on a $2,800 check he had issued to a client, representing the 
proceeds of the client’s personal-injury claim, because the account did not contain 
sufficient funds.  Id. at ¶ 3.  For this pattern of deceptive conduct, we imposed a 
one-year suspension with six months stayed on the conditions that Hauck serve 
six months of monitored probation and that he commit no further misconduct.  Id. 
at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 21} Riek, like Hauck, commingled personal and client funds in his 
client trust account.  For almost one year, Riek paid personal expenses directly 
from the account, and he overdrew the account on four occasions.  Riek, 925 Ohio 
St.3d 46, 2010-Ohio-1556, 925 N.E.2d 980, at ¶ 4.  He used settlement funds in 
the account that were due to a client to pay his personal expenses, which caused a 
$2,875.60 check issued to the client to be dishonored by the bank.  Id. at ¶ 6-7.  
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When the client inquired about the dishonored check, Riek falsely represented 
that the settlement check Riek had received had been dishonored.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
{¶ 22} Although Dockry did misappropriate client funds from his client 
trust account, as Hauck and Riek did, he did not make affirmative 
misrepresentations to his clients, as Hauck and Riek did.  Nor did he issue checks 
to clients when there were not sufficient funds in the bank to cover them.  Thus, 
even though Dockry engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation by 
taking an unauthorized loan from his client trust account, we find that his conduct 
is more comparable to that of Vivyan, Fletcher, Johnston, and Fumich. 
{¶ 23} We find that the numerous mitigating factors in this case, including 
the absence of a prior disciplinary record in nearly 30 years of practice, the 
prompt payment of restitution, Dockry’s full cooperation in these disciplinary 
proceedings, and his good character and reputation in the community, outweigh 
the sole aggravating factor—a dishonest or selfish motive, which relates solely to 
Dockry’s unauthorized borrowing of client funds (money he paid back two days 
after borrowing it).  Moreover, there has been no harm to Dockry’s clients. 
{¶ 24} Dockry testified that his practice is limited to five or ten hours a 
week due to his full-time employment as an Austintown Township administrator 
and that he has only three to five clients at any given time.  He handles evictions 
for a property-management company, but the majority of his clients retain him to 
probate estates and prepare wills and powers of attorney.  Notably, Walter 
Terlecky, the president of Dockry’s largest client, submitted a letter praising 
Dockry’s character and integrity over the course of their 20-year working 
relationship and stating that his company intends to continue that relationship 
despite Dockry’s violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
{¶ 25} Since relator initiated his investigation of Dockry’s trust-account 
practices, Dockry has taken corrective measures to ensure that he does not repeat 
his past mistakes.  He watched a webcast sponsored by relator that explained the 
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proper use of a client trust account, and he has stopped depositing personal funds 
into his client trust account.  He has also studied the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and begun to maintain client ledgers and a general ledger that he 
reconciles with his bank statement each month. 
{¶ 26} Based upon the facts of Dockry’s misconduct, the presence of 
significant mitigating factors, and our precedent, we believe that a one-year 
suspension stayed on the conditions that Dockry submit to one year of monitored 
probation and commit no further misconduct will adequately protect the public. 
{¶ 27} Accordingly, we sustain Dockry’s objection in part and suspend 
him from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, all stayed on the conditions that 
he satisfactorily complete one year of monitored probation in accordance with 
Gov.Bar R. V(9) and that he commit no further misconduct.  If Dockry fails to 
comply with the conditions of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the 
full one-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to Dockry. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Philip A. King, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
John B. Juhasz, for respondent. 
______________________