Case Title: Sparks v. Matthews

Citation: 

Docket Number: 350, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
 
DERRICK M. SPARKS,1 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 
350, 2013 
 
Respondent Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Family Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and for 
 
v. 
§ 
Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
PAULA D. MATTHEWS, 
§  C.A. No. CS09-02122 
 
 
§ 
 
Petitioner Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  October 16, 2013 
 
 
Decided:   December 31, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 31st day of December 2013, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
This case arises out of the divorce of Derrick Sparks (“Sparks”) and 
Paula Matthews (“Matthews”).  Sparks appeals from two Family Court orders.  
The first order found Sparks in contempt of a Decision and Order on Ancillary 
Matters, and required Sparks to list the former marital home for sale, to divide the 
sale proceeds, and to pay Matthews alimony on a monthly basis.  The second order 
                                                 
1 This Court sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties by Order dated July 3, 2013, 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
 
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denied Sparks’ motion for new trial and re-argument.  We find that Sparks’ claims 
lack merit, and, therefore, affirm both Family Court orders.  
2. 
Derrick Sparks and Paula Matthews were married in 1986.  After 23 
years, a final decree of divorce ended their marriage in 2009.  On June 22, 2011, 
the Family Court entered a Decision and Order on Ancillary Matters (the “June 
2011 Order”), awarding Matthews 50% of the marital property—consisting of the 
marital home valued at $55,000 and a truck valued at $5,400—plus monthly 
alimony payments.  More specifically, the order allowed Sparks to retain 
possession of the marital home, but required him to pay Matthews $30,200 (one-
half the value of the marital property) within 120 days, and if he did not, to (i) list 
the home for sale immediately and pay Matthews one-half of the net sale proceeds, 
and (ii) pay Matthews $2,700 (one-half the value of the truck).  The order also 
directed Sparks to pay Matthews $1,100.83 in monthly alimony, beginning on July 
15, 2011.2  This Court affirmed the June 2011 Order on January 19, 2012.3  
3. 
By his own admission, at least as of September 4, 2012 Sparks has not 
paid Matthews $30,200 or sold the house.  Nor has he paid Matthews the full 
amount of alimony due.  On August 30, 2011, Matthews filed a petition for a rule 
to show cause and specific performance, claiming that Sparks had failed to make 
                                                 
2 The court determined that Sparks received an annual income of approximately $42,000, while 
Matthews received an annual income of $17,736.  
3 Samson v. Mack, 38 A.3d 1255 (Del. 2012) (TABLE). 
 
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alimony payments as the June 2011 Order required.4  On September 4, 2012, the 
Family Court held a hearing on the petition that addressed Sparks’ failure to make 
the required alimony payments and to pay Mathews $30,200 or take steps to sell 
the marital home.  Sparks testified that he had signed an agreement with a realtor 
to list the marital home for $39,900 at the end of August 2012.  Sparks also 
testified that he had made thirteen payments of $300 and one payment of $250 to 
Matthews, but that many of his monthly expenses had “gone up” since the June 
2011 Order, thereby preventing him from making the full monthly alimony 
payment.  Sparks’ girlfriend testified from memory about Sparks’ monthly 
expenses.5  Matthews testified that it was she (Matthews) who had spoken to a 
realtor and initiated the listing of the marital home in August 2012.  Matthews also 
testified that she had received only eleven payments of $300, plus one payment of 
$250 from Sparks.   
4. 
In a November 2, 2012 order (the “November 2012 Order”), the Family 
Court found that Sparks was in contempt of the June 2011 Order.6  Specifically, the 
                                                 
4 Matthews also claimed that Sparks failed to pay $200 in fees awarded by a May 2010 order, but 
that claim was dropped during the proceedings.  
5 During her testimony, Sparks’ girlfriend at times had her memory “refreshed” by expense lists 
she had prepared in contemplation of the hearing.  She also testified that she did not know 
whether Sparks’ expenses had increased since he had filed the documents upon which the June 
2011 Order was based.   
6 The court applied the criteria set forth in Watson v. Givens for a finding of contempt.  “Three 
criteria must be met to support a finding of contempt: 1) there must exist a valid . . . order; 2) the 
[respondent] must have had the ability to abide by the valid . . . order; and, 3) the [respondent] 
 
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court found that (i) the June 2011 Order required Sparks to list the marital home 
for sale immediately after October 22, 2011;7 (ii) Sparks violated that order by 
failing to list the home until August 2012; (iii) Sparks is responsible for any 
depreciation in value of the marital home and must pay Matthews one-half of the 
difference between $55,000 and the ultimate sale price of the home; and (iv) 
Sparks did not show that it was or would have been impossible for him to pay the 
full alimony award.  The court ordered Sparks to pay $10,460.79 in arrears,8 plus 
$627.65 in interest.  
5. 
On November 13, 2012, Sparks moved for a new trial and re-argument.9  
He advanced four grounds in support of his motion.  First, he argued that under the 
June 2011 Order he was not solely responsible for listing the home, and that, as a 
matter of law, he could not list the marital home for sale without Matthews’ 
cooperation.  Second, he offered new evidence to demonstrate that he had made 
                                                                                                                                                             
must have, in fact, disobeyed the . . . order. . . . [The petitioner] must show a violation . . . by 
clear and convincing evidence.”  Watson v. Givens, 758 A.2d 510, 512 (Del. Fam. 1999) 
(citations omitted).  The court noted that inability to pay may be a defense, but that the 
respondent has the burden of proving his inability to pay.  
7 This is the date calculated by the Family Court.   
8 Because the parties asserted that different amounts had been paid by Sparks towards his 
alimony obligations, the court “split the difference” between the two amounts and awarded 
Sparks a credit of $3,850 for alimony already paid.  
9 On November 30, 2012, Sparks also appealed from the November 2012 Order to this Court.  
We denied that appeal as interlocutory, because the trial court had not yet ruled on Matthews’ 
application for attorney’s fees. Sparks v. Matthews, 2013 WL 1044680 (Del. Mar. 13, 2013).    
 
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efforts to list the home and that Matthews had failed to cooperate.10  Third, he 
claimed that there was no evidence that the home had depreciated in value or that 
he was responsible for any depreciation.  Finally, regarding the alimony, he 
claimed that the court prevented him from submitting evidence regarding his 
expenses and, thus, had erroneously denied his “impossibility” defense.   
6. 
By letter and order dated June 17, 2013 (“June 2013 Order”), the 
Family Court denied Sparks’ motion for new trial and re-argument.  The court 
addressed each of Sparks’ claims in turn.  Regarding Sparks’ obligation under the 
June 2011 Order to sell the marital home, the court clarified that although 
Matthews’ participation was required to sell the home, Sparks was primarily 
responsible for facilitating that sale.  The court reasoned as follows: The June 2011 
Order stated that “[i]n the event [Sparks] is unable to pay [Matthews $30,200] 
within the required period, the real estate shall be immediately listed for sale.  
Once sold, [Sparks] shall pay to [Matthews] one-half of the net proceeds from the 
sale.”  Accordingly, that order imposed the duty to list the former marital residence 
on Sparks.  Because Sparks was in possession of the home, the language of the 
June 2011 Order enabled him to decide whether to keep the home or to sell it.  
Moreover, the order directed Sparks to pay Matthews after the property was sold, a 
                                                 
10 He asserted that his attorney made three phone calls (on November 21, 2011, February 14, 
2012, and June 21, 2012) to Matthews’ attorney in an attempt to list the home.  Sparks, Sparks’ 
attorney, and Sparks’ girlfriend submitted affidavits attesting to these phone calls.   
 
6
fact further supporting the conclusion that Sparks bore the responsibility of 
facilitating the sale.11 
7. 
Next, the court concluded that it could not consider new evidence that 
had not been submitted at trial.  Alternatively, even if the court could consider the 
new evidence, that evidence would not alter the finding of contempt.  The date of 
the first alleged phone call (November 21, 2011) was thirty-two days after the 
expiration of the 120 day period set forth in the June 2011 Order.  Thus, even had 
the call taken place, Sparks would still have been in violation of that order.  
8. 
The Family Court also found Sparks’ claim regarding the depreciation 
of the home to be without merit.  The home was listed for $15,100 less than the 
stipulated value incorporated into the June 2011 Order.  The court reasoned that 
because Sparks was the sole occupant of the home, the loss in value was 
attributable to Sparks, regardless of whether that loss was caused by disrepair or 
market fluctuations.  
9. 
Finally, the court reiterated its conclusion that Sparks had failed to 
prove his inability to make the full alimony payments, even though during the 
hearing the court had given Sparks great latitude in presenting his evidence.  The 
court had weighed the evidence presented, and found that the documentary 
                                                 
11 The court noted that had Sparks sought to comply with the June 2011 Order and had Matthews 
refused to cooperate, he could have petitioned the Court for enforcement.  
 
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evidence was insufficient and that his and Sparks’ girlfriend’s testimony was 
“wholly ineffective.”12  The court further noted that, before the hearing, Sparks had 
not attempted to modify the alimony obligation.   
10. Sparks timely appealed to this Court.  On appeal from a Family Court 
decision, this Court reviews both the facts and the law, as well as inferences and 
deductions made by the trial judge.13  We must review the sufficiency of the 
evidence and test the propriety of the findings.14  This Court will not substitute its 
own judgment for the inferences and deductions made by the trial judge if they are 
supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical reasoning 
process.15  We review issues of law de novo, and will not disturb findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.16   
11. Sparks advances four claims, three of which were raised in his motion 
for new trial and re-argument.  Regarding the listing and sale of the marital home, 
Sparks first (re-)argues that, under the June 2011 Order, he was not solely 
                                                 
12 In addition to the testimony, Sparks had entered a tax bill from September 2012 and a 
medication list into evidence.  
13 Clark v. Clark, 2012 WL 6597798, at *2 (Del. Dec. 17, 2012) (Ridgely, J.) (citing Solis v. Tea, 
468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983)). 
14 Id. (citing Wife (J. F. V.) v. Husband (O. W. V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979)). 
15 Walton v. Walton, 2003 WL 22992210, at *2 (Del. Dec. 17, 2003) (citing Solis, 468 A.2d at 
1279).  
16 Id. (citing Solis, 468 A.2d at 1279-80).  
 
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responsible for listing the property, and that he was legally incapable of listing the 
property without Matthews’ cooperation.  This claim lacks merit.  The Family 
Court’s reasoning—that the June 2011 Order required Sparks to facilitate the 
listing and sale of the property—is logical, supported by the record, and free from 
legal error.  Sparks provides insufficient support for his subsidiary claim that, as a 
matter of law, he alone cannot list the property.17  The Family Court acknowledged 
that Matthews’ cooperation was required to sell the property, but observed that had 
Sparks sought to comply with the June 2011 Order and had Matthews refused to 
cooperate, at that time, then Sparks could have petitioned the Court for 
enforcement. 
12. Second, Sparks claims that the Family Court erred by not considering 
the new evidence offered on his motion for new trial and re-argument.  This claim 
rests on his argument that Matthews’ initial petition did not provide notice that the 
listing and sale of the marital home would be addressed during the trial 
proceedings.  Sparks is correct that Matthews’ petition, filed in August 2011, did 
                                                 
17 Sparks cites two cases, the first of which states, inter alia, that upon divorce, a tenancy by the 
entirety is converted to a tenancy in common.  Townsend v. Townsend, 168 A. 67, 68-69 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1933).  The second case involved a divorced spouse who refused to sign a deed as 
required for the sale and division of marital property.  Klein v. Klein, 2010 WL 5274048, at *1 
(Del. Dec. 16, 2010).  Beyond those cases, Sparks relies on his bare assertion during the hearing 
that he could not list the property alone.  
 
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not raise any issues related to the marital property division.18  Nonetheless, Sparks 
failed to raise the issue of inadequate notice at the September 2012 hearing, in his 
closing submissions, or in his motion for new trial and re-argument.  Therefore, 
Sparks has waived this claim.19  Because the Family Court properly declined to 
consider the new evidence, we affirm the court’s finding that Sparks failed to meet 
his obligations to list the marital property.   
13. Sparks next objects to the Family Court’s determination that the 
depreciation of the marital property must be attributed to him.  He claims that that 
finding is unsupported by the record.  First, Sparks argues, the list price does not 
necessarily reflect the value of the marital home, but only the price that was set in 
order to sell the home quickly.  This argument fails, because Sparks offers no 
reasonable explanation why a realtor would list a home for an amount below its 
market value.  Sparks next argues that the property could have declined in value 
well before the expiration of the 120 day period.  Even if that were true, had 
Sparks taken steps to list the home immediately after the 120 day deadline, there 
                                                 
18 The record reflects that a teleconference with the parties and the presiding judge was held 
approximately three months before the hearing.  However, the record available to this Court does 
not contain a transcript of, or a summary of issues discussed, during the teleconference.  
19 See Christiana Town Ctr., LLC v. New Castle Cnty., 2004 WL 2921830, at *3 (Del. Dec. 16, 
2004) (“[T]he record shows that Christiana voluntarily, knowing and intelligently waived its due 
process rights to adequate notice of the RTC hearing by failing to object to the inadequate notice 
at the actual hearing.”); Preston v. Bd. of Adjustment of New Castle Cnty., 2002 WL 254150, at 
*5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2002) aff'd, 804 A.2d 1067 (Del. 2002) (“Regardless of whether the 
Prestons received the notice mandated by the UDC, the fact is that the Prestons attended the 
hearing and did not object to the alleged inadequate notice at the hearing.”).  
 
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would be no concern that any loss in value was caused by his delay.  Essentially, 
the Family Court found that by violating the June 2011 Order, Sparks assumed the 
risk that the property would sell for less than its stipulated value.  Given its 
conclusion that Sparks violated the June 2011 Order and failed to take action to list 
the property for approximately eight months, the Family Court’s determination is 
reasonable and supported by the record.   
14. Finally, Sparks claims that the Family Court erred by limiting testimony 
regarding his expenses, because he had not filed a petition to modify alimony.  As 
the court noted in its June 2013 Order, Sparks was given great latitude in 
presenting evidence of his expenses.  Indeed, the testimony of Sparks’ girlfriend 
constitutes approximately one-quarter of the hearing transcript.  Nor does the 
record show that Sparks was precluded from submitting any additional 
documentary evidence.  The court made a factual determination that the 
documentary evidence (consisting of a tax bill and a medication list) was 
insufficient, and that the girlfriend’s testimony, together with Sparks’ bare 
assertions that his expenses had “gone up,” were unpersuasive.  As a factual 
matter, that determination was not clearly erroneous, and as a legal matter, it was 
correct.  13 Del. C. § 1519 provides that an alimony award may be modified or 
 
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terminated “only upon a showing of real and substantial change of 
circumstances.”20  Sparks’ claim, therefore, lacks merit.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Justice 
                                                 
20 13 Del. C. § 1519(a)(4) (emphasis added).