Case Title: State ex rel. Sunset Estate Props., LLC, v. Village of Lodi

Citation: 2015-Ohio-790

Docket Number: 2013-1856

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Sunset Estate Properties, L.L.C., v. Lodi, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-790.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-790 
THE STATE EX REL. SUNSET ESTATE PROPERTIES, L.L.C., ET AL., APPELLEES, v. 
THE VILLAGE OF LODI, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Sunset Estate Properties, L.L.C., v. Lodi,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-790.] 
One sentence of village zoning code section addressing abandonment of 
nonconforming use is unconstitutional on its face. 
(No. 2013-1856—Submitted September 10, 2014—Decided March 10, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County,  
No. 12CA0023-M, 2013-Ohio-4973. 
_________________ 
O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to determine whether Section 1280.05(a) 
of the zoning code of the village of Lodi is unconstitutional on its face.  We 
conclude that a portion of it is. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} The facts in this case are largely undisputed by the parties.  
Appellees, Sunset Properties, L.L.C., and Meadowview Village, Inc., each own 
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property in the village of Lodi on which they operate licensed manufactured-
home parks (also called “mobile-home parks” herein).  Both properties are in 
areas currently zoned as R-2 Districts, and R-2 Districts do not permit 
manufactured-home parks.  Because the mobile-home parks in this case existed 
prior to the passage of the ordinance creating the R-2 Districts, the mobile-home 
parks are legal nonconforming uses under R.C. 713.15. 
{¶ 3} In 1987, appellant, the village of Lodi, passed an ordinance 
enacting Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a), a provision addressing discontinuation or 
abandonment of nonconforming uses.  In general, the provision states that when a 
nonconforming use has been discontinued for six months, that discontinuance is 
conclusive evidence of the intention to legally abandon the nonconforming use.  
The final sentence of Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a) is specific to mobile homes.  
The provision states that the absence or removal of a mobile home from its lot 
constitutes discontinuance from the time of removal.  In reliance on this 
provision, when a tenant left one of appellees’ mobile-home-park lots and the lot 
was vacant for longer than six months, Lodi would refuse to reconnect water and 
electrical service when a new tenant wanted to rent the lot.  As a result, appellees 
were not able to rent these lots and essentially lost a property right as to that 
portion of their property. 
{¶ 4} Appellees filed a complaint against Lodi seeking a declaratory 
judgment, a mandatory injunction, and a writ of mandamus.  They requested a 
declaration from the trial court that the ordinance is unconstitutional and that the 
ordinance constitutes a taking of their properties.  They also sought a mandatory 
injunction and a writ of mandamus ordering Lodi to institute appropriation 
proceedings.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lodi on all 
counts.  The court concluded that the zoning ordinance is not unconstitutional on 
its face or as applied, that it does not constitute an unreasonable interference with 
appellees’ property rights as guaranteed by the United States and Ohio 
January Term, 2015 
 
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Constitutions, and that the ordinance does not constitute a taking of appellees’ 
property.  Appellees appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of Lodi.  The Ninth District agreed and reversed the 
trial court’s judgment.  The court concluded that the zoning ordinance was 
unconstitutional on its face.  The appellate court ordered the cause remanded to 
the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy for appellees. 
{¶ 5} Lodi appeals to this court asserting the following proposition of 
law: “A municipal zoning ordinance which precludes a property owner from re-
establishing a nonconforming use after a specified period of nonuse does not 
facially violate the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” 
Analysis 
{¶ 6} We review de novo a decision granting or denying summary 
judgment.  Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-
Ohio-2220, 767 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 7} “In a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance, the challenger alleges 
that the overall ordinance, on its face, has no rational relationship to a legitimate 
governmental purpose and it may not constitutionally be applied under any 
circumstances.”  Jaylin Invests., Inc. v. Moreland Hills, 107 Ohio St.3d 339, 
2006-Ohio-4, 839 N.E.2d 903, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio 
St.3d 132, 137, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000) (Cook, J., dissenting).  See also State v. 
Beckley, 5 Ohio St.3d 4, 7, 448 N.E.2d 1147 (1983). 
{¶ 8} “This court has consistently approved the constitutionality of 
comprehensive zoning ordinances * * *.”  Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 
385, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953).  “Zoning is a valid legislative function of a 
municipality’s police powers.”  Jaylin Invests. at ¶ 10, citing Euclid v. Amber 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926); Article I, Section 
19, Ohio Constitution (“Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but 
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subservient to the public welfare”).  “[A] strong presumption exists in favor of the 
validity of [an] ordinance.”  Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St.3d 69, 71, 458 
N.E.2d 852 (1984), citing Downing v. Cook, 69 Ohio St.2d 149, 151, 431 N.E.2d 
995 (1982).  “The basis for this presumption is that the local legislative body is 
familiar with local conditions and is therefore better able than the courts to 
determine the character and degree of regulation required.”  Id., citing Wilson v. 
Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St.2d 138, 142, 346 N.E.2d 666 (1976). 
{¶ 9} As this case demonstrates, there are occasions when a particular 
land use predates a zoning ordinance.  In such cases, the property owner’s use of 
the property remains legal but is considered a nonconforming use.  The Ohio 
Revised Code has a general provision addressing nonconforming land use.  R.C. 
713.15 provides:  
 
The lawful use of any dwelling, building, or structure and 
of any land or premises, as existing and lawful at the time of 
enacting a zoning ordinance or an amendment to the ordinance, 
may be continued, although such use does not conform with the 
provisions of such ordinance or amendment, but if any such 
nonconforming use is voluntarily discontinued for two years or 
more, or for a period of not less than six months but not more than 
two years that a municipal corporation otherwise provides by 
ordinance, any future use of such land shall be in conformity with 
sections 713.01 to 713.15 of the Revised Code. 
 
{¶ 10} “Zoning ordinances contemplate the gradual elimination of 
nonconforming uses within a zoned area, and, where an ordinance accomplishes 
such a result without depriving a property owner of a vested property right, it is 
generally held to be constitutional.”  (Emphasis deleted.)  Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 
January Term, 2015 
 
5 
 
at 386, 116 N.E.2d 697.  Courts have upheld both the denial of the right to resume 
a nonconforming use after a period of nonuse and “[t]he denial of the right to 
substitute new buildings for those devoted to an existing nonconforming use and 
to add or extend such buildings * * *.  See 58 American Jurisprudence, 1026 and 
1029, Sections 156, 158 and 162 and [State ex rel. City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Stegner, 
120 Ohio St. 418, 166 N.E. 226 (1929)].”  Chapman at 386-387.  See also Brown 
v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St.2d 93, 96, 420 N.E.2d 103 (1981), quoting Chapman at 
paragraph one of the syllabus (“ ‘Uses which do not conform to valid zoning 
legislation may be regulated, and even girded to the point that they wither and 
die’ ”); Curtiss v. Cleveland, 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 (1959); Davis v. 
Miller, 163 Ohio St. 91, 95-97, 126 N.E.2d 49 (Taft, J., concurring). 
{¶ 11} The authority of state and local governments to regulate land use is 
vast but not unbounded: 
 
The right to continue to use one’s property in a lawful 
business and in a manner which does not constitute a nuisance and 
which was lawful at the time such business was established is 
within the protection of Section 1, Article XIV, Amendments, 
United States Constitution, and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution, providing that no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Chapman at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 12} In Chapman, this court recognized that the definition of “property” 
includes the unrestricted possession, use, enjoyment, and disposal of lands or 
chattels.  And “[a]nything which destroys any of these elements of property, to 
that extent destroys the property itself.  The substantial value of property lies in its 
use.  If the right of use is denied, the value of the property is annihilated and 
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ownership is rendered a barren right.”  Id. at 388, citing Spann v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 
350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921), and O’Connor v. Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 
(1949). 
{¶ 13} Here, the village of Lodi enacted the following zoning ordinance 
regarding nonconforming land use: 
 
Whenever a nonconforming use has been discontinued for a 
period of six months or more, such discontinuance shall be 
considered conclusive evidence of an intention to legally abandon 
the nonconforming use.  At the end of the six-month period of 
abandonment, the nonconforming use shall not be re-established, 
and any further use shall be in conformity with the provisions of 
this Zoning Code.  In the case of nonconforming mobile homes, 
their absence or removal from the lot shall constitute 
discontinuance from the time of absence or removal. 
 
Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a). 
{¶ 14} Lodi argues that it enacted Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a) in order 
to protect property values and encourage the development of surrounding 
properties.  Lodi asserts that its goals for the ordinance are unquestionably 
permissible and that the ordinance is unquestionably rationally related to these 
goals.  In support of this assertion, it cites Cent. Motors. Corp. v. Pepper Pike, 73 
Ohio St.3d 581, 653 N.E.2d 639 (1995), which noted that courts have 
“consistently recognized that a municipality may properly exercise its zoning 
authority to preserve the character of designated areas in order to promote the 
overall quality of life within the city’s boundaries,” id. at 585.  Cent. Motors 
provides little support to Lodi’s position in this case.  It is true that we upheld the 
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance at issue in Cent. Motors; however, the 
January Term, 2015 
 
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property owners in Cent. Motors were seeking to change the zoning law to 
accommodate their desire to develop the property.  In this case, the property 
owners are seeking to maintain a legal nonconforming use. 
{¶ 15} The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution provide that no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  The plain 
language of the last sentence of the ordinance imputes a tenant’s abandonment of 
a lot within a mobile-home park on the park’s owner.  In so doing, the provision 
impermissibly deprives the owner of the park of the right to continue the use of its 
entire property in a manner that was lawful prior to the establishment of the 
zoning ordinance.  Pursuant to the due-process clauses of the United States and 
Ohio Constitutions, this impermissible deprivation of the vested private-property 
rights of mobile-home-park owners defeats Lodi’s argument that the provision is 
rationally related to its legitimate goals of protecting property values and 
encouraging development.  Thus, the last sentence of the ordinance is an 
unconstitutional deprivation of a property right and may not be applied. 
Severability 
{¶ 16} R.C. 1.50 provides that statutory provisions are presumptively 
severable:  “If any provision of a section of the Revised Code or the application 
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect 
other provisions or applications of the section or related sections which can be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end are 
severable.” 
{¶ 17} Determining whether a provision is severable requires application 
of the following three-part inquiry: 
 
“ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts 
capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by 
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itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general 
scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the 
apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause is taken out? (3) 
Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the 
constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect 
to the former only?’ ” 
 
{¶ 18} State v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 464-465, 668 N.E.2d 457 
(1996), quoting Geiger v. Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28 (1927), 
quoting State v. Bickford, 28 N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407 (1914), paragraph nineteen 
of the syllabus.  See also Rzepka v. Solon, 121 Ohio St.3d 380, 2009-Ohio-1353, 
904 N.E.2d 870, ¶ 32, quoting Frecker v. Dayton, 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E.2d 851 
(1950) (Taft, J., dissenting) (“ ‘[the] rule, as to the severability of statutes and the 
elimination of unconstitutional provisions, applies to municipal ordinances’ ”). 
{¶ 19} Here, the unconstitutional final sentence in Lodi Zoning Code 
1280.05(a) can be severed from the rest of the ordinance because the remaining 
portion of the ordinance can stand by itself without inserting any words and its 
intended effect is not altered.  We affirm the judgment of the Ninth District and 
remand this case to the trial court to determine what remedy is appropriate. 
Judgment affirmed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., dissent. 
_________________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} Respectfully, I dissent.  I would hold that the court of appeals 
failed to exercise judicial restraint in deciding this case on constitutional grounds 
without first fully addressing nonconstitutional issues that could have resolved 
January Term, 2015 
 
9 
 
this case.  Therefore, I would vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause for the court of appeals to address the nonconstitutional issues. 
{¶ 21} Appellees, Sunset Properties, L.L.C. (“Sunset”), and Meadowview 
Village, Inc. (“Meadowview”), filed an amended complaint seeking a declaratory 
judgment, a mandatory injunction, and a writ of mandamus.  Generally, the 
complaint alleged that Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a), which defines the manner in 
which a nonconforming use is terminated, prohibited Sunset and Meadowview 
from using their properties for the permitted, nonconforming use of 
manufactured-home parks.  The complaint was based on several theories, 
including that Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a) conflicted with state law and that it 
did not authorize the village to classify individual lots in a manufactured-home 
park as nonconforming uses. 
{¶ 22} The trial court granted summary judgment to appellant, the village 
of Lodi, holding that “[t]he Village of Lodi Zoning Ordinance Section 1280.05 is 
not unconstitutional or in conflict with state law[, and] [t]he Zoning Ordinance 
does not amount to a regulatory taking of the Plaintiffs’ property.” 
{¶ 23} On appeal, Sunset and Meadowview raised a single assignment of 
error: “The trial court erred by denying plaintiff-appellants’ motion for summary 
judgment and granting defendant’s-appellee’s motion for summary judgment.”  In 
an opinion to which two judges on the panel concurred in judgment only, the 
court of appeals held that Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a) is unconstitutional on its 
face. 
{¶ 24} “It is well settled that this court will not reach constitutional issues 
unless absolutely necessary.”  State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-
4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 9; see also Hall China Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 50 
Ohio St.2d 206, 210, 364 N.E.2d 852 (1977);  State ex rel. Hofstetter v. Kronk, 20 
Ohio St.2d 117, 119, 254 N.E.2d 15 (1969).  “Even when one of the parties has 
raised a constitutional issue, we do not decide on that basis unless and until 
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absolutely necessary.”  Smith v. Landfair, 135 Ohio St.3d 89, 2012-Ohio-5692, 
984 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 13.  Therefore, “where a case can be resolved upon other 
grounds the constitutional question will not be determined.”  Kinsey v. Bd. of 
Trustees of Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund of Ohio, 49 Ohio 
St.3d 224, 225, 551 N.E.2d 989 (1990).  It follows that courts should exercise 
judicial restraint and determine whether a case can be resolved based on 
nonconstitutional issues before considering constitutional issues.  See Mahoning 
Edn. Assn. of Dev. Disabilities v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 137 Ohio St.3d 257, 
2013-Ohio-4654, 998 N.E.2d 1124 (the court determined that a review of whether 
R.C. 4117.11(B)(8) was constitutional was unnecessary because the case could be 
resolved through statutory interpretation); Norandex, Inc. v. Limbach, 69 Ohio 
St.3d 26, 28, 630 N.E.2d 329 (1994) (the court first considered whether the 
purchases at issue qualified for a retail-sales exception, and only if the purchases 
did not qualify for the exception did the court address the interstate-commerce-
clause issue). 
{¶ 25} The sole basis for the court of appeals’ holding in this case was 
that Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a) is unconstitutional on its face.  However, in its 
analysis, the court of appeals found Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a) to be 
ambiguous with regard to whether Lodi intended to classify individual lots in a 
manufactured-home park as nonconforming uses.  2013-Ohio-4973, ¶ 4, 19-23.  
Ultimately, the court of appeals concluded that “there is no evidence that the 
village has enacted any zoning resolution or ordinance to indicate anything other 
than that the manufactured home park as a whole rather than individual lots within 
the park shall be considered the nonconforming use.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 
¶ 23.  In light of this conclusion, it is unclear why the court of appeals never 
addressed whether Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a) authorized Lodi to extinguish 
the nonconforming use of the properties in question lot by lot. 
January Term, 2015 
 
11 
 
{¶ 26} Moreover, the court of appeals never completed an analysis of 
whether Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a) conflicts with state law.  See Sheffield v. 
Rowland, 87 Ohio St.3d 9, 10, 716 N.E.2d 1121 (Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 
Ohio Constitution permits municipalities “to adopt and enforce within their 
limits” local police-power regulations, such as zoning regulations, so long as they 
do not conflict with state law).  Had the court of appeals fully explored this issue 
and determined that there was a conflict between Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a) 
and state law, the court could have resolved this case without having to consider 
the constitutionality of Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a). 
{¶ 27} Therefore, I would hold that the court of appeals should have 
exercised judicial restraint by analyzing whether it was proper for Lodi to apply 
Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05 to the properties in question and considering whether 
there is a conflict between Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a) and state law before 
considering the constitutionality of the zoning provision.  I express no opinion on 
how these issues should be resolved.  Rather, I merely believe that the court of 
appeal was required to consider these issues before it considered the 
constitutionality of Lodi Zoning Code 1280.05(a).  Accordingly, I would vacate 
the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the court of appeals 
to consider the aforementioned nonconstitutional issues.  Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent.   
FRENCH, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________________ 
Mansour Gavin, L.P.A., John W. Monroe, and Tracey S. McGurk, for 
appellees. 
 
Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., Irving B. Sugerman, Caroline L. Marks, and 
Alexandra V. Dattilo, for appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, Jeffrey Jarosh, Deputy Solicitor, 
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and Hilary R. Damaser, Principal Assistant Attorney General, urging vacation of 
judgment for amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
Elizabeth Birch urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Manufactured 
Homes Association. 
 
John Gotherman, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal 
League. 
_________________________