Case Title: STATE v WILLIAMS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13769 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, DIONISIO WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: John L. Adams argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Mayo Ashley argued, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana - * 7 2 7 Filed: L,. - - - ~ - Submitted: October 4, 1977 Decided : M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court . Defendant Dionisio Williams was charged by a two count Information f i l e d October 25, 1976, with the crimes of carrying a concealed weapon and intimidation, both felonies. A jury t r i a l was held i n the d i s t r i c t court, Yellowstone County, on January 11, 1977. A t the close of t r i a l , the jury returned a verdict acquitting defendant of the crime of carrying a con- cealed weapon, but convicting him of the crime of intimidation. Defendant was subsequently sentenced t o serve five years i n the s t a t e penitentiary and has been incarcerated since early March 1977. Defendant appeals the conviction and the denial of h i s motion for a miswial made a t r t h e close of the s t a t e ' s case. The facts introduced by the s t a t e through testimony a t the t r i a l were, i n certain essential respects, a t variance with those offered by defendant i n h i s t r i a l testimony. The principal witness for the s t a t e was the complaining witness, Joe Thomas. Thomas t e s t i f i e d , over objection, that three weeks prior t o October 19, 1976, the date of the alleged crimes, he purchased $10 worth of the drug "speed" from de- fendant. The purchase was made "on credit". Defendant denied the sale of the drug, and stated he had, in fact, merely "loaned" $10 t o Thomas. On October 19 defendant saw Thomzs a t a Billings bar and demanded payment. Thomas was unable t o pay. Later that day Thomas, together with h i s g i r l friend and two others, were stopped for gas a t a self-service gas station. Defendant arrived a t the station in a car belonging t o and driven by h i s friend, Raymond Best. Defendant got out of the car and approached Thomas, again demanding payment of the $10. Thomas t e s t i f i e d that upon h i s explaining he could not get the $10, defendant opened h i s coat, exposing what appeared t o Thomas t o be the butt of a revolver and "said he was going t o drop me" i f pay- ment was not then made. Defendant, however, denied having a p i s t o l on h i s person a t the time, or that he threatened Thomas. I n any event, Thomas obtained $10 from h i s g i r l friend and immediately gave it t o defendant. A t the close of the s t a t e ' s case, defendant orally moved for a mistrial on the ground the court erred in permitting testimony concerning the drug transaction between defendant and Thomas. Defendant also moved t o dismiss the intimidation charge on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence o r , a l t e r - natively, for a direct verdict. A l l motions were denied. Defendant bases h i s appeal on two grounds: 1. Evidence of the alleged drug transaction was erron- eously permitted by the d i s t r i c t court. 2. The evidence was insufficient t o support the conviction of the crime of intimidation. Defendant contends the evidence pertaining to the alleged drug transaction was irrelevant and immaterial and should have been excluded a s being highly prejudicial. H e maintained the evidence had no probative value and operated t o place defendant i n the position in the eyes of the jurors as a "pusher" who would by inference possess propensities for violent criminal behavior. Further, the evidence had minimal o r no value i n establishing the elements of the crime of intimidation, and should have been excluded, or a mistrial granted. A fundamental principal, applicable t o every criminal proceeding, is that the evidence must be relevant t o the facts in issue a t the t r i a l and must logically tend t o prove or dis- prove such facts. Evidence of collateral facts which f a i l s t o afford any reasonable presumption or inference as t o a principal fact or matter i n dispute, o r evidence too remote, i s irrelevant and inadmissible. State v. Sanders, 158 Mont. 113, 489 P.2d 371 (1971). I n Sanders, defendant was charged with three counts of assault. During the course of t r i a l testimony was presented t o the jury which, among other things, indica ted defendant previously threatened a police officer upon receiving a speeding citation, wrongfully failed t o pay wages due an employee, made improper use of credit cards, and possibly burglarized h i s own business. This Court, i n applying the above mentioned rule, concluded : "* * * The admissibility of such collateral, irrelevant, and prejudicial evidence i n a criminal proceeding constitutes reversible error ." 158 Mont . 118. Here, admission of evidence of the underlying reason for the $10 debt, the alleged drug sale, was such a s t o have made an impression on the jury and was highly prejudicial t o defendant. Given the obvious collateral nature of such evi- dence and the prejudice engendered thereby, its admission over proper objection was error. Defendant's motion for a mistrial should have been granted. I n view of the Court's finding on defendant's f i r s t issue, it i s unnecessary t o discuss the second issue. Accordingly, the conviction i s reversed. I t i s ordered that defendant be released from confinement at the Montana state prison. The case i s dismissed. W e Concur: i / & fi Chief Justice