Case Title: Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-194

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler1984 WY 66685 P.2d 13Case Number: 83-194, 83-195Decided: 07/12/1984PINE CREEK CANAL NO. 1 A/K/A LEE DITCH, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

and 

JACK D. RICHARDSON, PAUL C. AND BETTE HAGENSTEIN, AND DAVID MAYTAG, APPELLANTS (COUNTERCLAIMANTS), 

v. 

NICHOLAS STADLER, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). 

NICHOLAS STADLER, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

PINE CREEK CANAL NO. 1 A/K/A LEE DITCH, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT), 

and 

JACK D. RICHARDSON, PAUL C. AND BETTE HAGENSTEIN, AND DAVID MAYTAG, APPELLEES (COUNTERCLAIMANTS).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
PINE CREEK CANAL NO. 1 
A/K/A LEE DITCH, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

and 

JACK D. RICHARDSON, PAUL 
C. AND BETTE HAGENSTEIN, AND DAVID MAYTAG, APPELLANTS (COUNTERCLAIMANTS), 

v. 

NICHOLAS STADLER, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). 

NICHOLAS STADLER, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

PINE CREEK CANAL NO. 1 
A/K/A LEE DITCH, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT), 

and 

JACK D. RICHARDSON, PAUL 
C. AND BETTE HAGENSTEIN, AND DAVID MAYTAG, APPELLEES 
(COUNTERCLAIMANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SubletteCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
Don W. Riske and 
Warren R. Darrow of Riske & Edmonds, P.C., Cheyenne, Nelson Hayes of 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Pine Creek Canal No. 1, Richardson, 
Hagenstein and Maytag.

William Twichell 
of Mason & Twichell, Pinedale, Thomas A. Fennell, Cheyenne, for Stadler.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In case No. 83-194, an 
appeal is brought by Pine Creek Canal No. 1 arising from a negligence action 
originally filed by landowner Nicholas Stadler to recover damages which resulted 
from the failure of the Pine Creek irrigation canal. PineCreekCanal counterclaimed for damages to its 
irrigation ditch, alleging that Stadler negligently impaired its lateral 
support. Damages were stipulated and the case was tried to the court. The trial 
judge apportioned 45% of the negligence to Stadler and 55% to Pine Creek Canal 
No. 1, and awarded monetary damages to Stadler in the sum of 
$24,750.

FACTS

[¶2.]     PineCreekCanal was originally built sometime prior 
to 1905 when there were no residences in the immediate area. However, the town 
of Pinedale grew 
such that the canal now crosses a slope along the eastern border of the present 
city limits. Stadler's residence and garage, together with personal property, 
were located below this slope, and he owns the slope itself as well as a flat 
area below. The slope is a glacial outwashed deposit of sand and gravel which is 
of granular consistency and is porous.

[¶3.]     In June, 1980, the 
slope sloughed back toward the PineCreekCanal, the canal failed, 
and mud, water and dirt flowed down the slope and destroyed Stadler's garage and 
equipment. The PineCreekCanal irrigators lost the 
use of the water from the canal for the 1980 irrigation season and incurred the 
cost of repair of the canal.

[¶4.]     In October, 1979, 
Stadler had excavated a portion of the slope so that he would have more space 
for his equipment and vehicles. He then built a wall along the excavation, which 
wall was approximately 120 feet in length and seven feet high for approximately 
100 feet, after which it tapered down to two to three feet high. This 
construction was completed in the spring of 1980 but Stadler only partially 
backfilled the retaining wall and never did complete the backfill 
operation.

[¶5.]     The evidence shows that 
for years there had been canal and embankment seepage in the area of the 
failure, of which the appellant was aware. In the early part of June, 1980 and 
prior to the failure on June 21, the canal company worked on the canal by 
applying bentonite through a discing process which did not include the 
recommended compaction procedure. In the course of this operation, the canal 
company disced the bottom and sides of the ditch, which had the effect of 
increasing the soil's permeability as well as the amount of water seeping from 
the ditch. This operation created "a piping effect beneath the ditch and in the 
slope which leads up to the embankment of the ditch."1

[¶6.]     According to the court, 
the canal company's primary negligence consisted of the 
following:

"(a) Failing to properly 
maintain the ditch, which flowed through pervious soil,

"(b) In failing to 
properly maintain the ditch by negligently and unskillfully attempting to 
bentonite the ditch in an improper manner;

"(c) By continuing to 
operate the ditch under the existing conditions and 
circumstances."

[¶7.]     The court concluded 
that:

"* * * defendant's 
negligence to the extent of 55% was the direct and proximate cause of the 
erosion, washout and failure of the subject ditch, resulting in the damages 
suffered by the plaintiff."

[¶8.]     The court found that 
appellee Stadler was secondarily negligent by reason of his digging into the toe 
of the slope and cutting away the canal's lateral support, which negligence was 
found to be a proximate cause of the damage, and the court assigned 45% of the 
total negligence to him.

Questions for 
Decision

"I. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANTS NEGLIGENT ABSENT ANY PROOF OF A STANDARD 
OF CARE BY WHICH THEIR CONDUCT COULD BE MEASURED AND ABSENT ANY PROOF THAT THEIR 
CONDUCT FELL BELOW ANY STANDARD OF CARE.

"II. WHETHER THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANTS NEGLIGENT ABSENT ANY PROOF THAT THEIR 
CONDUCT CONSTITUTED A DIRECT OR PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE SLOPE 
FAILURE.

"III. WHETHER THE EXPERT 
AND OPINION TESTIMONY PRESENTED BY APPELLEE WAS COMPETENT, BASED UPON ADEQUATE 
FOUNDATION AND SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

"IV. WHETHER THE 
APPORTIONMENT OF NEGLIGENCE BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
PROPER."

DISCUSSION

Issue No. 
1

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANTS NEGLIGENT ABSENT ANY PROOF OF A STANDARD OF CARE 
BY WHICH THEIR CONDUCT COULD BE MEASURED AND ABSENT ANY PROOF THAT THEIR CONDUCT 
FELL BELOW ANY STANDARD OF CARE."

[¶9.]     Section 41-5-101, W.S. 
1977, imposes the following duty on ditch owners:

"The owner or owners of 
any ditch for irrigation, or other purposes, shall carefully maintain the 
embankments thereof so that the water of such ditch may not flood or damage the 
premises of others."

[¶10.]  The standard of care imposed by the trial 
judge is to be found in the judge's Conclusion of Law No. 3, which 
is:

"The rule of owners and 
operators of irrigating ditches is that the owner of an irrigating ditch is 
bound to exercise reasonable care and skill to prevent injury to other persons 
from such ditch, and he will be liable for all damages occurring to others as a 
result of his negligence or unskillfulness in constructing, maintaining or 
operating the ditch."

[¶11.]  PineCreekCanal urges that Stadler presented no 
"proof of the standard of care" to which Wyoming ditch owners are held in the 
maintenance of their ditches. It is further asserted that there was no evidence 
introduced as to what is commonly done to maintain ditches and no evidence was 
introduced as to what the canal company should or could have done in that 
regard. PineCreekCanal points out that unless the standard 
of care is within the common knowledge and experience of the trier of fact, an 
expert witness is needed to establish the standard. The canal company argues 
that this court is unable to know what knowledge the trial judge possessed on 
this subject since he failed to make any factual finding as to the applicable 
standard of care.

[¶12.]  We are not exactly sure we understand 
what appellant PineCreekCanal means when it argues 
that appellee has presented no "proof of a standard of care." We are involved 
here with a negligence case and it is the proponent's duty to prove the elements 
of the case - that is, duty, breach, proximately causing damage. Danculovich v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187 
(1979). The identification of the appropriate standard of care in a negligence 
case is a question of law - not of fact. Vassos v. Roussalis, Wyo., 625 P.2d 768, 772 (1981), citing Maxted v. 
Pacific Car & Foundry Company, Wyo., 527 P.2d 832 (1974). See Buttrey Food Stores Division v. Coulson, Wyo., 620 P.2d 549 (1980); Matter of Estate of 
Mora, Wyo., 611 P.2d 842 (1980); Diamond Management Corporation v. Empire Gas 
Corporation, Wyo., 594 P.2d 964 
(1979).

[¶13.]  Normally, the mythical "reasonable man" 
standard is employed, except in those cases where the subject at bar is highly 
technical or otherwise specialized in nature. In such a case, the standard of 
care is that which reasonable persons of comparable or like skills would 
reasonably employ in the same or similar circumstances. For example, when 
addressing the standard of care to which a physician is required to adhere, we 
said in Vassos v. Roussalis, supra, 
625 P.2d at 772: 

"* * * [A] physician or 
surgeon must exercise the skill, diligence and knowledge, and must apply the 
means and methods, which would reasonably be exercised and applied under similar 
circumstances by members of his profession in good standing and in the same line 
of practice. Govin v. Hunter, 
Wyo., 374 P.2d 421 (1962); DeHerrera v. MemorialHospital of Carbon 
County, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1342 
(1979); Smith v. Beard, 56 Wyo. 375, 110 P.2d 260 
(1941); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 41; 61 Am.Jur.2d Physicians, 
Surgeons and Other Healers § 205 (1981)."

[¶14.]  Bringing this discussion to the case at 
bar, in 1905, we said in Howell v. Big 
Horn Basin Colonization Co., 14 Wyo. 14, 81 P. 785, 790, 1 LNS 596 (1905), 
and in 1974 in Taylor Ditch Company, Inc. 
v. Carey, Wyo., 520 P.2d 218, 222-223 (1974):

"The well-settled rule is 
that the owner of an irrigating ditch is 
bound to exercise reasonable care and skill to prevent injury to other 
persons from such ditch, and he will be liable for all damages occurring to 
others as a result of his negligence or unskillfulness in constructing, 
maintaining, or operating the ditch." (Emphasis added.)

[¶15.]  In these two cases, this court found no 
necessity to go to expert testimony in order to apply any standard other than 
the "reasonable man" standard of care as the duty and obligation of the ditch 
owner.

[¶16.]  In the Taylor Ditch Company case, the trial 
judge found that damage resulted when the Taylor Ditch seeped onto the property 
of the plaintiff as a result of the ditch company's negligent maintenance and 
operation of the ditch. The trial judge found that there was an identifiable 
causal correlation between the presence of water in the ditch and the seepage on 
plaintiff's property. He went on to find that the failure of the ditch company 
to take proper precautions in constructing and maintaining the ditch through 
pervious soil constituted negligence. We held these findings to be consistent 
with Howell, where we sustained the 
trial court's holding to the effect that seepage without negligence would not 
justify recovery but reversed the trial court's finding that the record in Howell did not contain evidence of 
negligence. We said:

"If the company saw fit 
to construct its ditch through soil naturally incapable of holding water, it 
should at least have made all proper and reasonable efforts to prevent seepage 
therefrom. Failing to do so, it was clearly negligent." 81 P.  at 
791.

[¶17.]  In Howell, we cited Farnham on Waters & 
Water Rights, § 634, to the following effect:

"The measure of the care which the ditch 
owner is bound to use is that which ordinarily prudent men exercise under like 
circumstances when the risk is their own. And if he fails to exercise this 
degree of care, he is liable for the injuries which the water causes to the 
adjoining property in consequence of his negligence." (Emphasis added.) 81 P.  at 
790.

[¶18.]  Given this background and this standard - 
long-since established - we again hold, as did the trial judge, that the 
standard of conduct for a ditch or canal owner is that of a reasonable, prudent 
ditch owner and, in the case at bar, the court did not need any expert testimony 
to determine whether this standard has been breached.

Issue No. 
2

"WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANTS NEGLIGENT ABSENT ANY PROOF THAT THEIR CONDUCT 
CONSTITUTED A DIRECT OR PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE SLOPE 
FAILURE."

[¶19.]  An appellate court inquiring of a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence question, assumes evidence in favor of the 
successful party to be true, leaves out of consideration entirely the evidence 
of the unsuccessful party which is in conflict therewith, and gives to the 
evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may reasonably 
and fairly be drawn from it. Krist v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety, Wyo., 667 P.2d 665 (1983), citing Crown Cork and Seal Co., Inc. v. Admiral 
Beverage Corp., Wyo., 638 P.2d 1272 (1982); City of Rock Springs v. Police Protection 
Association, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 (1980).

[¶20.]  In this case, the court found 
that

"* * * the primary cause 
of the subject canal failure and plaintiff's damages was due to the defendant's 
negligence in improperly maintaining the canal * * *."

[¶21.]  While we do not intend to review all the 
evidence on the subject, we note the following for purposes of showing that the 
trial court had sufficient evidence upon which its finding securely 
rests.

[¶22.]  At the outset, witnesses below the canal 
testified that when the water was in the canal seepage covered their properties, 
but, when the canal was empty, their properties were not affected. Thus, we know 
the canal leaked onto the properties below the canal. The appellants attempted 
to bentonite the ditch in the area of the appellee's property a few months 
before the canal gave way. The evidence is that the discing was done improperly. 
After the bentonite was introduced, the bottom and sides of the ditch were never 
compacted, and according to the expert witnesses who testified on the subject, 
the entire procedure was not carried out in an approved manner. The testimony 
was that without compaction, after discing and the introduction of bentonite, 
the soil would be even more permeable and the water would more easily seep 
through.

[¶23.]  One of the experts put it this 
way:

"* * * [W]ould tend to 
disturb the inside parameter of the ditch, destroying the sealing effect that 
the natural deposit of silt into the ditch bottom had had, and increased the 
permeability of the ditch bottom and allow more water to escape from the ditch 
into the hillside."

When asked to 
give his opinion as to the cause of the canal's failure, the expert 
said:

"The action of disking 
increased the permeability of the bottom of the ditch and increased the amount 
of water that was in the hillside or entering into the 
hillside.

* * * * * 
*

"The disking of the ditch 
bottom was a significant factor in the cause of the ditch 
failure."

[¶24.]  The expert expressed his opinion as to 
the cause of the ditch failure when he said:

"I believe that waters 
seeping from the ditch went into the hillside, loaded the hillside and 
encountered some anomaly that concentrated the seepage forces and removed the 
material from the hillside backing up into the ditch and taking out the 
ditch."2

[¶25.]  Given this and other evidence just as 
telling, the trial judge was able to structure the following Findings of 
Fact:

"15. That during the 
early part of June, 1980, prior to the failure of the subject ditch, which 
occurred on June 21, 1980, defendant worked on the canal installing bentonite in 
an effort to seal and line the ditch, but this effort 
failed.

"16. Defendant failed to 
consult with or retain the services of a professional engineer to determine the 
proper method of bentoniting this particular canal.

"17. That defendant, in 
installing the bentonite, disced the bottom and sides of the ditch located on 
plaintiff's property and property upstream from plaintiff's 
property.

"18. That the discing of 
the bottom and sides of the ditch increased the permeability of the ditch and 
increased the volume of water seeping from the ditch.

"19. The increased volume 
of water seeping from the ditch caused and created a piping effect beneath the 
ditch and in the slope which leads up to the embankment of the ditch, eventually 
leading to and causing the failure of the embankment and the canal on June 21, 
1980."

[¶26.]  The court then 
concluded:

"[t]hat the bentoniting 
procedure performed by defendant, which included the discing, was done in a 
negligent manner without regard for the obvious consequences thereof, and the 
defendant negligently maintained and operated the canal."

[¶27.]  When discussing sufficiency of the 
evidence, we have said that the judgment will stand under a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence attack if there is some or any evidence. In Diamond Management Corporation v. Empire Gas 
Corporation, supra, 594 P.2d 964, we held that the findings and judgment of 
the trial court are generally affirmed if there is any evidence to support them. 
In Bentzen v. H.N. Ranch, Inc., 78 
Wyo. 158, 320 P.2d 440, 68 A.L.R.2d 1213 (1958), we held that the findings and 
judgment of the trial court will stand if there is any evidence to support 
them.

[¶28.]  It seems to this court that the trial 
court was possessed of more than sufficient evidence to reach the conclusion 
that the primary cause of the failure was the negligence of the appellant, which 
negligence included the manner in which it undertook the bentonite 
operation.

[¶29.]  This being so, and applying our appellate 
obligation to accept the testimony favorable to the prevailing party as true and 
give it every favorable inference, we find that the evidence in this case was 
sufficient to support the trial court's holding that the primary cause of the 
canal's failure was the negligence of the appellant canal 
company.

Issue No. 
3

"WHETHER THE EXPERT AND 
OPINION TESTIMONY PRESENTED BY APPELLEE WAS COMPETENT, BASED UPON ADEQUATE 
FOUNDATION AND SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE."

[¶30.]  This issue was never raised before the 
trial court. The expert, based upon foundation inquiry, was asked for an opinion 
as to the cause of the canal's failure and gave it without objection or motion 
to strike. It is too late to raise the question now. We said in ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 925 (1981) that we will not consider on appeal questions not properly 
raised in the district court. See City of 
Rock Springs v. Police Protection Association, supra, 610 P.2d 975.

Issue No. 
4

"WHETHER THE 
APPORTIONMENT OF NEGLIGENCE BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
PROPER."

[¶31.]  Appellants urge this court to find that 
the conduct of Stadler was willful and wanton and, therefore, the trial court 
improperly apportioned negligence between the parties. Once again, the 
appellants did not allege that the appellee was guilty of willful and wanton 
misconduct. The theory was never raised at any stage of the proceedings until it 
came to light for the first time in the appellant's brief in this court. We will 
not consider an issue raised for the first time here unless, of course, it 
speaks to a question of jurisdiction or addresses a fundamental right. See 
citations in Issue No. 3 above. In Dame 
v. Mileski, 80 Wyo. 156, 340 P.2d 205 (1959), we said that the defendant, 
having stated his position in his pleadings could not alter it on appeal. And 
see: In re Appeal of Williams, Wyo., 
626 P.2d 564, cert. denied, Williams v. 
Public Service Commission of Wyoming, 454 U.S. 896, 102 S. Ct. 394, 70 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1981); Burnell v. Roush, 
Wyo., 404 P.2d 836 (1965).

[¶32.]  We pause to note, however, that the issue 
has no merit anyway because even though willful and wanton misconduct will not 
be weighed in the process of assessing liability for negligence-comparing 
purposes, Danculovich v. Brown, 
supra, the judge found Stadler guilty of simple negligence only. Appellants 
point to no law which holds that under the facts similar to those assigned to 
Stadler's negligence his conduct must be found to be willful and wanton as a 
matter of law.

[¶33.]  We therefore conclude that in Case No. 
83-194 the district court's judgment should be affirmed in all 
respects.

[¶34.]  In Case No. 83-195, Stadler is the 
appellant and the issue here is identified as follows:

"DID THE COURT ERR IN 
REDUCING APPELLANT'S RECOVERY AS AGAINST APPELLEE BY COMPARING THE NEGLIGENCE OF 
APPELLANT, AS FOUND BY THE COURT, WITH THAT OF THE APPELLEE ON A COMPARATIVE 
BASIS?"

[¶35.]  Essentially, the appellee's contention is 
this: He reads the trial judge's findings and opinion letter to say that the 
discing and failure to compact with increased porosity was the primary cause of 
the saturation of the embankment and the piping effect which, in turn, brought 
on the canal's collapse and resulting damage and that Stadler's activity only 
increased the damages but was not a causative factor. This being so, argues 
Stadler, it was error for the court to assign 45% of the negligence to him since 
his reduction of lateral support was a remote and not a proximate 
cause.

[¶36.]  The trial court's Findings of Fact hold 
that Stadler performed excavation and dirt work on the toe or bottom of the 
slope which leads up to the bank of the canal, that

"[t]he slope did provide 
lateral support for the irrigation canal,"

and that 
plaintiff negligently built a retaining wall in the area of the excavation in 
that he did not backfill it properly and did not, at any time, seek or obtain 
the advice of an engineering expert with respect to his invasion of the 
integrity of the slope of the canal.

[¶37.]  The appellant argues that the judge did 
not go on to hold that, although the canal gave way in the area of the 
excavation, there was a causal connection between the activity of Stadler and 
the resulting failure of the canal and supporting slope.

[¶38.]  We cannot agree.

[¶39.]  The trial court held that because of 
Stadler's negligence in attacking the integrity of the supporting slope, 
this

"* * * contributed to a 
larger slide than may have occurred had the bank not been 
excavated,"

and the court 
then concluded:

"The Court finds that the failure of the ditch and the damages 
resulting to the plaintiff were the result of the negligence of the parties in 
the following percentages on a comparative basis:

"Plaintiff - 
45%

"Defendant - 55%." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶40.]  Any fair reading of the trial court's 
findings and holdings points to the conclusion that the judge found that the 
appellant's invasion of the supporting slope of the canal was one of the 
proximate causes of the damage. These conclusions are not questioned by Stadler 
on grounds that the excavation did not invade the slope nor is there any 
suggestion that the slope did not support the canal banks, and it is not argued 
that the excavation could not have weakened the bank of the canal. Stadler 
simply urges that the court found that Stadler's weakening of the bank increased 
the damages but was not one of the causes thereof. But this flies in the face of 
what the court actually said. The judge said that

"* * * the failure * * * and the damages * * * 
were the result of the negligence of the parties * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶41.]  Affirmed.

1 Trial judge's Findings 
of Fact.

2 According to this 
expert, the technical term for describing such an occurrence is 
"piping."