Case Title: Lamay v. Vermont

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Moira Lamay f/k/a Moira Conway v.
State of Vermont (2011-162)
2012 VT 49
[Filed 14-Jun-2012]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2012 VT 49
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2011-162
 
DECEMBER TERM, 2011
 
Moira Lamay
  f/k/a Moira Conway
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
     v.
}
Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,
 
}
Civil Division
 
}
 
State of Vermont
}
DOCKET NO. S0763-08 Cnc
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Helen M. Toor
 
In
the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Plaintiff, a former Vermont state trooper, appeals from a summary judgment in
favor of the State on her claim of employment discrimination.  Plaintiff
contends the trial court erred in: (1) finding that she had presented
insufficient evidence of gender bias as a motivating factor in her discharge;
and (2) declining to consider the allegations in her complaint to the Vermont
Human Rights Commission.  We affirm. 
¶ 2.            
The record discloses the following undisputed facts; additional material facts
will be set forth in the discussion which follows.  Plaintiff voluntarily
resigned from her position as a state trooper in February 2002, and was rehired
in August 2003.  In October 2004, following an internal investigation,
plaintiff admitted that she violated state police policy by filing a report
concerning a high-speed chase that contained factual errors and
inaccuracies.  She accepted a letter of reprimand.  Shortly
thereafter, plaintiff became the subject of a second internal affairs
investigation stemming from a traffic stop and drug-seizure that had occurred
about a year earlier.  The issue came to light when a deputy state's
attorney learned of discrepancies between plaintiff's affidavit and deposition
testimony and a police videotape of the incident.  The state's attorney
informed plaintiff's supervisor.  Plaintiff was suspended with pay pending
the investigation, and the following day asked a fellow officer to dispose of
some marijuana in her desk that she considered a "loose end" from an earlier
matter.  This was reported to her supervisor as well, and resulted in a
third referral to internal affairs.  Plaintiff was ultimately charged with
providing false and inaccurate statements, and misuse of evidence.   
¶ 3.            
In July 2005, plaintiff received a letter of dismissal from the Commissioner of
Public Safety.  The Commissioner cited the prior reprimand and the
"overwhelming evidence" in support of the additional charges.  Plaintiff
thereafter filed a complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission but
ultimately withdrew the charge and filed suit against the State, alleging she
was discharged because she was a "single woman and single mother," in violation
of the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act, 21 V.S.A. §§ 495-96 (FEPA) and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. 
    
¶ 4.            
The State moved for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff failed to adduce
evidence sufficient to show that gender was a motivating factor in her
discharge, or to support such an inference.  Plaintiff opposed the motion,
claiming that she had adduced direct evidence of discrimination by the
Stateprincipally statements attributed to her supervisor, Lt. Harrington,
following her discharge to the effect that plaintiff was "a single mother and
continually had problems with day care," that she had been compelled "to call
in late due to issues with daycare availability," and that she was "sometimes
not . . . available for call outs because of this need to care for her
child."  Plaintiff also alleged that she had adduced evidence of disparate
treatment and a hostile work environment.
¶ 5.            
The trial court issued a written ruling in March 2011.  The court
concluded that plaintiff's evidence, at best, "constitute[d] weak
circumstantial evidence" and was insufficient to show that gender bias was a
motivating factor in the State's decision.  Moreover,
even if sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the court
found that the State had produced ample evidence of nondiscriminatory grounds for
plaintiff's termination and that plaintiff, in turn, had not shown that the
State's grounds were pretextual.
 Accordingly, the court granted the motion, and entered final judgment in
favor of the State.  Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was denied. 
This appeal followed. 
¶ 6.            
We review summary judgments under the same standard as the trial court,
affirming when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Campbell
v. Stafford, 2011 VT 11, ¶ 10, 189 Vt. 567, 15 A.3d 126 (mem.).  The nonmoving party is entitled to the
benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences.  Id.  
¶ 7.            
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence was
insufficient to establish "mixed motive" discrimination entitling her to a
trial on the merits.  The claim implicates settled standards that govern
the burdens of proof under FEPA and Title VII.  See Robertson
v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 2004 VT 15, ¶ 32, 176 Vt.
356, 848 A.2d 310 (noting that "we have generally followed the burden
allocation rules applicable to Title VII").  We have explained
that, "[u]nder a mixed motive analysis, which is
guided by Price Waterhouse [v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989)], a plaintiff
has the initial burden of showing that the adverse employment action at the
moment it was made was motivated by a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
reasons.  Once the plaintiff shows that the decision was at least
partially motivated by an illegitimate reason, the burden then shifts to the
employer to show that the same decision would have been made even if the
illegitimate reason had not been considered."  McIsaac
v. Univ. of Vt., 2004 VT 50, ¶ 36, 177 Vt. 16, 853 A.2d 77 (quotation
omitted).  
¶ 8.            
This standard has traditionally been distinguished from the three-part
burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), which applies when the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case by showing he or she is a member of a protected group, was
qualified for the position, and suffered an adverse employment action under
circumstances that "permit an inference of discrimination."  Robertson, 2004 VT 15, ¶ 25.  In these
circumstances, a presumption of discrimination arises and the burden shifts to
the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the
employment decision.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.  at 802; accord Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 160 Vt. 150,
159, 624 A.2d 1122, 1127 (1992).  If the employer meets this burden, the
presumption disappears, "and the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to
prove that the employer's justification is a mere pretext for
discrimination."  Robertson, 2004 VT 15, ¶ 27.
¶ 9.            
As noted, plaintiff rests her claim on the mixed-motive Price Waterhouse
framework and maintains that her evidence was sufficient to show that gender
was a motivating factor in her discharge.  Although plaintiff makes
several valid preliminary points, the claim is ultimately unpersuasive. 
Thus, we agree at the outset that characterizing evidence as circumstantial, as
the trial court did below, is unimportant in determining whether it is
sufficient to show improper motive.  See In re McCort,
162 Vt. 481, 492, 650 A.2d 504, 511 (1994) (declining to read Price
Waterhouse as requiring direct evidence of discriminatory motive and
observing that "[o]ur decisions have clearly
authorized the use of circumstantial evidence to show that one of the employer's
motives was improper in mixed-motive cases").[1]  We also agree that evidence of
stereotyping single mothers and mothers with young children may show gender
bias.  See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist.,
365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting assertion that comments in the
workplace about the commitment of mothers with young children "cannot, without
comparative evidence of what was said about fathers, be presumed to be on the
basis of sex' "). 
¶ 10.        
Plaintiff's difficulty here is that her evidence, whether characterized as
direct or circumstantial, was insufficient to support a finding that gender or
gender stereotyping was a motivating factor in her termination.  "Remarks
at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender
played a part in a particular employment decision."  Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S.  at 251.  Thus, "stray" remarks in the workplace can suggest a
stereotyped attitude or hostile environment but do not necessarily demonstrate
an illegitimate motive sufficient to require the employer to prove that its
decision was based on legitimate criteria.  Id.   The
remarks attributed to plaintiff's supervisor, Lt. Harrington, fall in this
category.[2] 
As the trial court found, his comments following plaintiff's termination were
essentially descriptive of actual problems plaintiff had with
childcareplaintiff conceded in her opposition to the motion for summary
judgment that she "had trouble getting childcare on immediate call-ins"and
do not convey the kind of invidious gender stereotyping that has been found
sufficient to show discriminatory motive.  Cf. Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2009)
(informing plaintiff that she was denied promotion not because of what she "did
or didn't do" on the job but rather because she had "kids and . . . a lot on
your plate" held sufficient to demonstrate that gender-based stereotype
concerning mothers with young children played role in decision); Back,
365 F.3d  at 115 (holding that tenure evaluations questioning whether plaintiff
should "reconsider whether [she] could be a mother and do this job," expressing
concern as to whether plaintiff "could possibly do this job with children," and
opining that the job was "not for a mother" were sufficient to show that
gender-based stereotypes played a part in denial of tenure); Santiago-Ramos
v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding
that employer's questioning of plaintiff's "ability to balance her current work
and parental responsibilities" and "to fulfill her work responsibilities should
she have a second child" was sufficient evidence of discriminatory motive to
avoid summary judgment).  Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that
the evidence did not support a finding that plaintiff's status as a woman or a
single mother was a motivating factor in her discharge.  
¶ 11.        
In opposing the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff also relied to a lesser
extent on evidence allegedly showing that the state police treated similarly
situated officers more favorably than plaintiff.  Upon examination,
however, the evidence does not support the claim of improper gender-based
discipline.  Plaintiff contended, for example, that two other officersa
state trooper and a municipal police officerinvolved in the same vehicle stop
that resulted in the second disciplinary investigation made similar
inconsistent statements about the incident, but were not similarly
disciplined.  As the trial court found, however, nothing in the record
showed that the complaining prosecutor was either aware of the other state
trooper's alleged misstatements or referred the matter to Lt. Harrington for
investigation.  The second officer was female and not employed by the
State Police, but by a municipal police department, and so presented no
evidentiary value for purposes of finding disparate treatment by the State.
¶ 12.        
Plaintiff also claimed that she was compelled to live near her assigned
barracks while a male trooper was exempted from this requirement.  Even if
true, plaintiff did not allege or show that she and the other officer were
similarly situated.  See Boulton v.
CLD Consulting Eng'rs, Inc., 2003 VT 72, ¶ 19,
175 Vt. 413, 834 A.2d 37 ("To establish circumstances giving rise to an
inference of gender discrimination, a plaintiff may show that she was treated
differently from a similarly situated male employee.").  Indeed, plaintiff
does not expressly dispute the State's assertion that the male sergeant in
question was granted a waiver from the requirement because he was differently
situated due to overseas deployment.      
¶ 13.        
Plaintiff also cited an incident of another trooper referred to Lt. Harrington
by the state's attorney's office for sworn misstatements that did not result in
similar discipline.  The trial court found plaintiff's evidentiary support
lacking, however, noting that the claimed referral was not in evidence, and the
court later rejectedas filed too latethe deputy's affidavit in support of
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.  The court was fully entitled to
reject the supplemental evidence as untimely.  See Bostock
v. City of Burlington, 2011 VT 89, ¶ 17, ___ Vt. ___, 30 A.3d 651 (mem.) (observing that it was
plaintiffs' "burden to prove their case during the pendency of the summary
judgment motions by putting forth sufficient evidence" and thus holding that
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for reconsideration). 
Furthermore, the belated proffer suggested only that the deputy discovered and
reported an inconsistency in the officer's affidavit; there was no clear proof
that the trooper was neither investigated nor disciplined as plaintiff claimed.

¶ 14.        
Plaintiff also claimed disparate treatment in being disciplined for asking
another officer to dispose of the marijuana in her desk.  Plaintiff relied
on testimony from a state police sergeant that it was a common practice among
troopers not to follow protocol in the disposal of small amounts of seized
drugs.  As the trial court found, however, the issue was not whether other
troopers failed to follow the rule, but "how they were treated" where, as here,
the violation was reported by a fellow trooper.  Furthermore, the sergeant
acknowledged that the  circumstances were
distinguishable where, as here, plaintiff was specifically directed by her
supervisor to "follow-up" on the case in question and "[i]f
a smaller amount of marijuana is involved and you can apply for a search
warrant, do so."  Accordingly, we discern no error in the trial court's
finding that the evidence failed to support plaintiff's claim that her
termination was motivated by gender.    
¶ 15.        
Lastly, plaintiff faults the trial court's refusal to consider the allegations
in her complaint to the Human Rights Commission because she had not sworn to
the truth of its contents.  Notably absent from her argument on appeal,
however, is any claim that the alleged error was prejudicial.  See Boehm
v. Willis, 2006 VT 101, ¶ 12, 180 Vt. 615, 910 A.2d 908
(mem.) (noting that trial
court's evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion
resulting in prejudice to party's substantial rights).  Moreover, even if
the complaint were considered, its allegations are based largely on
"information and belief," inadmissible hearsay, and conclusory allegations
insufficient to provide a factual basis to evaluate the claim of improper
motivation.[3] 
See Starr Farm Beach Campowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Boylan, 174
Vt. 503, 506, 811 A.2d 155, 160 (2002) (mem.)
(upholding trial court's finding that affidavit contained  "wholly
conclusory" statement, as it supplied no factual basis for court to evaluate,
and thus was insufficient to defeat motion for summary judgment); Creaser v.
Bixby, 138 Vt. 582, 584, 420 A.2d 102, 103 (1989) (holding that allegations
based on inadmissible hearsay "are not supporting affidavits" sufficient to
defeat summary judgment).  Accordingly, the complaint did not support a
claim of disparate treatment motivated by gender. 
¶ 16.        
To be clear, we agree with plaintiff's assertion that a factually-established
pattern of disparate treatment and gender stereotyping may circumstantially
support an inference that a specific employment decision was improperly
motivated.  See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838,
845-46, 860 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff'd
539 U.S. 90 (2003) (upholding discrimination claim where plaintiff proved that
she was subjected to vulgar sexual slurs at work, was suspended for three days
when she filed a complaint about the abuse, was told that a male co-worker "has
a family to support" when she complained about differential treatment in
overtime assignments, and ultimately was terminated for a physical altercation
that netted the other employee involved, a male co-worker, a mere five-day
suspension).  As the trial court here correctly concluded, however,
plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that her discipline was
gender-motivated.  Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the judgment.
Affirmed. 
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber,
  Chief Justice
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Michael S. Kupersmith, Superior Judge,
Specially Assigned
 

[1]  Our holding in McCort
essentially forecastand is entirely consistent withthe U.S. Supreme Court's
holding in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100-101 (2003),
that, under Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a plaintiff
may prove improper motivation by either direct or circumstantial
evidence.  The 1991 Civil Rights amendments also made clear that an
unlawful employment practice is established if an employment decision was
motivated by an improper factor even though other factors also motivated the
decision, and altered the remedial scheme by allowing injunctive relief even
where the employer is able to establish as an affirmative defense that it would
have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) & 2000e-5(g)(2);
see Desert Palace, 539 U.S.  at 94.  In view of our holding that
plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to show that gender was a motivating
factor in her discharge, neither of these amendments is relevant
here.     
 
[2]  Like the trial court here, we assume
without deciding that any discriminatory animus by Lt. Harringtonplaintiff's
supervisor who filed the complaintscould be attributable to the ultimate decisionmaker.  See Staub
v. Proctor Hosp., 527 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011) (holding that
employer may be liable for discriminatory employment decision "if a supervisor
performs an act motivated by [discriminatory] animus that is intended by the
supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a
proximate cause of the ultimate employment action" (emphasis
omitted)).   
 
[3]  Plaintiff's complaint to the
Commission contained numerous unsupported allegations of hostile work
environment and disparate treatment.  In this regard, she allegedwithout
adducing and citing specific evidencethat she was denied the opportunity
afforded other troopers to share "on call" duty; that she was denied leave to
work toward a college degree, in contrast to a male trooper who "used to do"
college work while on duty; that she was publicly reprimanded for offenses that
were dealt with privately for male troopers; and that rumors of disputed origin
about sexual affairs made her working conditions formal and stilted.  Also
in the complaint were hearsay allegations that she was told by another trooper
to "fly low" because "they" were "gunning" for her; that two sergeants advised
her that she was "in the Lieutenant's cross-hairs," and that she had heard of,
but had not seen, an email by the Lieutenant intended to portray her in a bad
light by "saying something to the effect of let bygones be bygones.' "  The
complaint related further, but without any particularized gender-based context,
that her supervisors asked whether she was afraid while on duty and that her
training officer described another female trooper who had children as "not a
team player."  The complaint further alleged that, in response to her
concerns, Lt. Harrington told plaintiff that he had contacted the
personnel department's sexual harassment liaison to report that he may have
been creating a hostile work environment and he directed plaintiff to talk to
the liaison.  Lt. Harrington acknowledged the self-report in his
deposition testimony.  The trial court found, however, that the
request for an investigation did not establish that a hostile environment
existed or was fueled by gender prejudice, and plaintiff has not shown that
this finding was erroneous.