Case Title: Michigan v. Tanner (Opinion - Leave Granted)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 146211

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
PEOPLE v TANNER 
Docket No. 146211.  Argued November 6, 2013 (Calendar No. 7).  Decided 
June 23, 2014. 
 
 
George R. Tanner was charged with open murder, MCL 750.316, and mutilation of a 
dead body, MCL 750.160, in the Livingston Circuit Court.  After his arrest, he was taken to jail 
and read his rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).  Defendant invoked his right to 
counsel and questioning ceased.  The next day, while speaking with a jail psychologist, 
defendant stated that he wanted to “get something off of his chest.”  The psychologist informed 
jail staff of defendant’s request.  The jail administrator then spoke with defendant.  Defendant 
told the administrator that he wanted to speak with someone about his case and asked if the 
administrator could obtain an attorney for him.  The administrator stated that he could not 
provide an attorney for defendant, but could contact the police officers who were handling the 
case.  Defendant agreed.  The administrator then contacted both the police and the prosecutor.  
The prosecutor apparently informed the court of defendant’s request for an attorney, and the 
court sent an attorney to the jail.  After the attorney and the police officers arrived at the jail, the 
jail administrator took the police officers to speak with defendant and asked the attorney to wait 
in the jail lobby while the officers determined defendant’s intentions.  Defendant was again read 
his Miranda rights, which he waived without again requesting an attorney and without being 
made aware of the attorney’s presence at the jail.  Defendant then made incriminating statements 
concerning his involvement in the murder.  Defense counsel moved to suppress the statements, 
and the court, David J. Reader, J., granted the motion.  The prosecution sought leave to appeal.  
The Court of Appeals denied the application.  The prosecution then sought leave to appeal in the 
Supreme Court, which granted the application. 493 Mich 958 (2013). 
 
 
In an opinion by Justice MARKMAN, joined by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices KELLY, 
ZAHRA, and VIVIANO, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his or her rights was 
uncoerced, that at all times the suspect knew he or she could stand mute and request a lawyer, 
and that the suspect was aware of the state’s intent to use the suspect’s statements to secure a 
conviction, the analysis is complete and a waiver of those rights is valid as a matter of law, 
overruling People v Bender, 452 Mich 594 (1996).   
 
 
1.  Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of 
Michigan’s 1963 Constitution, no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Corbin R. Davis 
against him or herself.  In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that the accused must 
be given a series of warnings before being subjected to custodial interrogation in order to protect 
the constitutional right against self-incrimination.  A suspect’s waiver of the Miranda rights must 
be made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly.   
 
 
2.  In Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that 
the failure of the police to inform a suspect of the efforts of an attorney to reach the suspect does 
not deprive the suspect of his or her right to counsel or otherwise invalidate a Miranda waiver.  
Michigan’s Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in Bender, holding that for a suspect’s 
Miranda waiver to be made knowingly and intelligently, the police must promptly inform the 
suspect that an attorney is available when that attorney has made contact with them.  Article 1, 
§ 17 of Michigan’s 1963 Constitution concerns compelled statements.  At the time of the 
Constitution’s ratification, the word “compelled” was commonly understood to refer to the use of 
coercion, violence, force, or pressure.  Accordingly, Article 1, § 17 can be reasonably understood 
to protect a suspect from the use of his or her involuntary incriminating statements.  The 
language of Article 1, § 17 does not support the decision reached in Bender, which pertained not 
to whether a statement was made voluntarily, but whether it was made knowingly.  The lead and 
majority opinions in Bender engaged in an unfounded creation of constitutional rights. 
 
 
3.  Prior Michigan caselaw did not foreshadow or otherwise provide support for Bender’s 
per se exclusionary rule.  Before Bender, the Michigan Supreme Court examined the effect of an 
attorney’s attempts to contact a suspect on the admissibility of the suspect’s confession in People 
v Cavanaugh, 246 Mich 680 (1929), and People v Wright, 441 Mich 140 (1992).  Neither 
decision supported Bender’s assertion that Michigan courts have historically interpreted 
Michigan’s Self-Incrimination Clause to provide criminal suspects with greater protections than 
those afforded by the Fifth Amendment.  Rather, under Michigan law before Miranda, 
voluntariness constituted the sole criterion for a confession to be admissible under either the Due 
Process Clause or Michigan’s Self-Incrimination Clause.   
 
 
4.  Although Michigan’s Supreme Court need not interpret a provision of the Michigan 
Constitution in the same manner as a similar or identical federal constitutional provision, the 
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment in Moran constitutes the proper interpretation of Article I, § 17 as well.  Full 
comprehension of Miranda rights is sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the 
interrogation process, and the waiver of those rights cannot be affected by events that are 
unknown and unperceived, such as the fact that an attorney is available to offer assistance.   
 
 
5.  The application of stare decisis is generally the preferred course, but the Court is not 
constrained to follow precedent when governing decisions are “unworkable or []badly reasoned.”  
Overruling Bender would not produce practical real-world dislocations, and less injury would 
result from overruling it than from maintaining it.   
 
 
6.  In this case, defendant was read his Miranda rights and invoked his right to counsel, 
but then reinitiated contact with the police when he indicated that he wanted to “get something 
off of his chest.”  He was again afforded his Miranda rights, and waived them, choosing not to 
reassert his right to counsel.  Defendant’s lack of awareness of the appointed attorney’s presence 
at the jail did not invalidate his Miranda waiver.  Therefore, the trial court erred by suppressing 
defendant’s incriminating statements.   
 
 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
Justice CAVANAGH, dissenting, believed that Bender correctly determined that Article 1, 
§ 17 of the Michigan Constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart, 
requiring the police to inform the suspect when an attorney is immediately available to consult 
with him or her.  The majority improperly rooted its contrary conclusion in a hyper-textualist 
analysis of the word “compelled.”  In 1929, in Cavanaugh, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled 
that holding an accused incommunicable was forbidden under the laws of this state, 
foreshadowing Miranda’s understanding of the nature of the right protected by the constitutional 
guarantee that a person will not be compelled to be a witness against him or herself.  Although 
Cavanaugh used terminology addressing whether the accused’s statement was voluntary, the 
Cavanaugh analysis was consistent with Miranda’s knowing-and-intelligent-waivers analysis, 
indicating that the Michigan Supreme Court did not interpret the Michigan Constitution to 
prohibit the use of only those confessions obtained through the use of physical force or cruel 
treatment.  The majority’s decision ignores the jurisprudential history of the Court embodied in 
Cavanaugh and continued in Bender and Wright.  Further, under Article 1, § 20 of Michigan’s 
1963 Constitution, the accused has the right to the assistance of counsel in every criminal 
prosecution, including the specific right to be informed of an attorney’s attempts to contact the 
accused.  A defendant cannot waive the right to speak with an attorney who is immediately 
available and trying to contact him when he is unaware that the attorney is available and trying to 
contact him.  Bender reached the correct result, provided a practical and workable rule, and 
should have been upheld under the doctrine of stare decisis.   
 
 
Justice MCCORMACK, dissenting, agreed with Justice CAVANAGH that the Bender rule 
was grounded in Article I, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution with its jurisprudential roots set in 
Cavanaugh, and declined to join the majority’s decision, which improperly reached beyond the 
facts of the case to overrule Bender’s settled and sound precedent.  Although the fractured 
treatment of this issue in Bender was dissatisfying, none of Bender’s shortcomings were 
sufficient to undermine the substantive integrity of its conclusion or render it wrongly decided.  
Nor did any other consideration favor disruption of the Bender precedent.  To the contrary, the 
facts of this case counseled further against that course of action, as the defendant here, unlike the 
defendants in Bender, made his incriminating statements only after he repeatedly expressed his 
desire for counsel, but to no avail.  The defendant’s frustrated attempts to invoke his right to 
counsel plainly implicated Cavanaugh, which persisted regardless of whether Bender was 
overruled.  This case thus did not implicate the majority’s core concerns with Bender, and 
overruling that precedent did little to resolve whether the defendant’s incriminating statements 
should be suppressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
©2014 State of Michigan 
 
FILED June 23, 2014 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 146211 
 
GEORGE ROBERT TANNER, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
This Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the rule announced in 
People v Bender, 452 Mich 594; 551 NW2d 71 (1996), should be maintained.  Bender 
requires police officers to promptly inform a suspect facing custodial interrogation that an 
attorney is available when that attorney attempts to contact the suspect.  If the officers fail 
to do so, any statements made by the suspect, including voluntary statements given by the 
suspect with full knowledge of his Miranda rights,1 are rendered inadmissible.  Because 
                                              
1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
 
2 
there is nothing in this state’s Constitution to support that rule, we respectfully conclude 
that Bender was wrongly decided and that it must be overruled.  We therefore reverse the 
trial court’s suppression of certain incriminating statements made by defendant, which 
suppression was justified solely on the grounds of Bender, and remand to the trial court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  FACTS 
Defendant George Tanner was arrested for murder and taken to jail on October 17, 
2011.  He was read his Miranda rights, and when police officers attempted to interview 
defendant at the jail, he invoked his right to counsel.  As a result, the officers informed 
defendant that he would have to reinitiate contact if he subsequently changed his mind 
and wished to speak to them.  The next day, while a psychologist employed by the jail to 
interview inmates was speaking with defendant, he said that he wanted to “get something 
off his chest.”  The psychologist told defendant that he should not further discuss the case 
with her, that he might wish to speak to an attorney, and that she could make 
arrangements for him to speak to the police officers.  Defendant again stated that he 
wanted to “get things off his chest,” so the psychologist told defendant that she would 
inform jail staff of his request.  She then contacted the jail administrator and informed 
him that defendant wished to speak to police officers about his case. 
The administrator spoke with defendant, told him that the psychologist had 
indicated that he wanted to “get something off his chest,” and inquired whether he still 
wished to speak to someone about his case.  Defendant replied “yes” and asked if the 
administrator could obtain an attorney for him.  The administrator responded that he 
 
3 
could not, because this was not his role, but explained that he could contact the police 
officers who were handling the case.  Defendant replied that this would be fine, and the 
administrator contacted the officers.  The administrator also called the prosecutor, who 
advised him that the court would appoint an attorney for defendant should he request one.  
The prosecutor apparently informed the court of defendant’s request, as a result of which 
an attorney was sent to the jail.   
 One of the police officers testified that he was contacted by the administrator and 
apprised that defendant might now be amenable to speaking with the officers.  The police 
officer further testified that he confirmed with the administrator that defendant had not 
requested that an attorney be present during the interview, and that the administrator 
believed an attorney had been appointed merely as a contingency in the event defendant 
sought an attorney during the interview.  Subsequently, both the police officers and an 
attorney appeared at the jail.  Apparently unsure of his role, the attorney asked the 
officers and the administrator if they knew why he was there.  The administrator 
responded and told him to wait in the jail lobby while he took the officers back to speak 
with defendant and determine his intentions.    
Defendant was again read his Miranda rights, which he waived this time without 
requesting an attorney and without being made aware of the attorney’s presence.  The 
administrator then instructed the attorney that he could leave.  Defendant shortly 
thereafter made incriminating statements concerning his involvement in the murder.  He 
was eventually charged with open murder, MCL 750.316, and mutilation of a dead body, 
MCL 750.160. Defendant was bound over to circuit court following a preliminary 
examination.  During this process, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress defendant’s 
 
4 
statement to the police, alleging that because he had not been informed that an attorney 
had been appointed for him before his interrogation, his Miranda waiver was invalid 
under this Court’s decision in Bender.  A hearing was held on October 12, 2011, after 
which the trial court suppressed defendant’s statement.  The court determined that 
defendant had requested an attorney at his October 17, 2011 interrogation, but that he had 
affirmatively reinitiated contact with police officers on October 18, 2011, without 
reasserting his right to counsel.  However, it also determined that defendant’s statement 
required suppression under Bender, because the police officers had failed to inform him 
that an attorney was present at the jail and had established contact with the officers. 
The prosecutor filed an application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, 
which was denied for lack of merit, and he then filed an application for leave to appeal in 
this Court, requesting that Bender be reconsidered.  We granted this application, People v 
Tanner, 493 Mich 958 (2013), and heard oral argument on this case on November 6, 
2013. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This court “review[s] a trial court’s factual findings in a ruling on a motion to 
suppress for clear error.  To the extent that a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 
involves an interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional standard to 
uncontested facts, our review is de novo.”  People v Attebury, 463 Mich 662, 668; 624 
NW2d 912 (2001).   
 
5 
III.  BACKGROUND 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  US 
Const, Am V.  See also Const 1963, art 1, § 17 (containing an identical Self-
Incrimination Clause).  This federal constitutional guarantee was made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1, 3; 84 S Ct 1489; 
12 L Ed 2d 653 (1964).  Prior to 1966, a suspect’s confession was constitutionally 
admissible if a court determined that it was made “voluntarily.”2  Despite the apparent 
textual emphasis on the voluntariness of a suspect’s confession (“no person shall be 
compelled”), the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 
444-445, 477-479; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), that the accused must be given 
a series of warnings before being subjected to “custodial interrogation” in order to protect 
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.3  The right to have counsel present 
during custodial interrogation is, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, a 
corollary of the right against compelled self-incrimination, because the presence of 
counsel at this stage affords a way to “insure that statements made in the government-
                                              
2 See Brown v Mississippi, 297 US 278; 56 S Ct 461; 80 L Ed 682 (1936) (a confession is 
inadmissible if extorted by brutality and violence); Chambers v Florida, 309 US 227, 
238-239; 60 S Ct 472; 84 L Ed 716 (1940) (the defendant’s confession was inadmissible 
when made “under circumstances calculated to break the strongest of nerves and stoutest 
resistance”); Ashcraft v Tennessee, 322 US 143; 64 S Ct 921; 88 L Ed 1192 (1944) (the 
modern voluntariness test began to emerge in Ashcraft, in which the Court examined the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a confession was voluntary). 
3 “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, 
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a 
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”  Id. at 444.     
 
6 
established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.”  Id. at 466.  See also id. at 
470.  If a suspect is not afforded Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation, “no 
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.”  Id. at 479 
(citations omitted).  
Once a suspect invokes his right to remain silent or requests counsel, police 
questioning must cease unless the suspect affirmatively reinitiates contact.4  Id. at 473-
474.  In Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477, 484-485; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 
(1981) (citations omitted), the United States Supreme Court created “additional 
safeguards” for when the accused invokes his right to have counsel present during 
custodial interrogation:  
[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present 
during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be 
established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated 
custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. . . .  
                                              
4 Some have referred to Miranda as establishing what is essentially the equivalent of a 
“right not to be questioned”:  
A final innovation of the Miranda decision was the creation of a 
right on the part of arrested persons to prevent questioning. The Court 
stated: “If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or 
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must 
cease . . . .  If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the 
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” 
The right not to be questioned was an addition to the traditional right 
to refrain from answering questions on grounds of potential self-
incrimination.  At the time of the Constitution, suspects had no right to cut 
off custodial interrogation, and no right of this sort was recognized in the 
Supreme Court’s decisions prior to Miranda . . . .  [United States 
Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, The Law of Pretrial 
Interrogation, 22 U Mich J L Reform 393, 484 (1989), quoting Miranda, 
384 US at 473-474.] 
 
7 
[H]aving expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, 
[an accused] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates 
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. 
However, when a suspect has been afforded Miranda warnings and affirmatively waives 
his Miranda rights, subsequent incriminating statements may be used against him.  
Miranda, 384 US at 444, 479.  A suspect’s waiver of his Miranda rights must be made 
“voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.”  Id. at 444.  The United States Supreme Court 
has articulated a two-part inquiry to determine whether a waiver is valid:  
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been “voluntary,” in 
the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than 
intimidation, coercion or deception.  Second, the waiver must have been 
made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned 
and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.  Only if the “totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal both an uncoerced 
choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly 
conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.  [Moran v Burbine, 
475 US 412, 421; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986), citing Fare v 
Michael C, 442 US 707; 99 S Ct 2560; 61 L Ed 2d 197 (1979).] 
Under the Fifth Amendment construct set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court, the defendant in the instant case was afforded his Miranda rights by the police and 
invoked his right to counsel on October 17, 2011.  Defendant then reinitiated contact with 
the police the next day when he indicated that he wanted to “get something off his chest” 
and speak with the officers.  He was then afforded his Miranda rights a second time, and 
on this occasion waived those rights and chose not to reassert his right to counsel.  
During the following custodial interrogation by the police officers, defendant made an 
incriminating statement concerning his involvement in a murder.  The only pertinent 
question then is whether defendant’s lack of awareness of the appointed attorney’s 
presence at the jail at the time of his Miranda waiver following his reinitiation of contact 
 
8 
with the police calls into question the validity of that waiver, including the waiver of his 
right to counsel-- rendering it something other than “voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent”-- and thus requires suppression of any subsequent incriminating statements. 
A.  MORAN V BURBINE 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed this question for purposes of the 
federal criminal justice system in Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 
2d 410 (1986), in which it held that the failure of police to inform a suspect of the efforts 
of an attorney to reach that suspect does not deprive the suspect of his right to counsel or 
otherwise invalidate the waiver of his Miranda rights.  In Moran, the defendant confessed 
to the murder of a young woman after he had been informed of, and waived, his Miranda 
rights.  While the defendant was in custody, his sister retained an attorney to represent 
him.  The attorney then contacted the police and was assured that all questioning would 
cease until the next day.  However, less than an hour later, the police resumed 
interrogation of the defendant, and he confessed soon thereafter.  At no point during the 
interrogation did the defendant request an attorney, and at no point did the police inform 
him that an attorney had contacted them.  Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress 
his confession on the basis that “the police’s failure to inform him of the attorney’s 
telephone call deprived him of information essential to his ability to knowingly waive his 
Fifth Amendment rights.”  Id. at 421.  However, the trial court denied the defendant’s 
motion, concluding that he had received Miranda warnings, and had “knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his privilege against self-incrimination [and] his 
right to counsel.”  Id. at 418.  The defendant was subsequently convicted of murder.  The 
 
9 
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, and the federal district court denied 
his habeas corpus petition.  The federal appellate court, however, reversed the conviction.  
On further appeal, the United States Supreme Court reinstated the defendant’s conviction, 
asserting as follows:   
Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely 
unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend 
and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.  Under the analysis of the 
Court of Appeals, the same defendant, armed with the same information 
and confronted with precisely the same police conduct, would have 
knowingly waived his Miranda rights had a lawyer not telephoned the 
police station to inquire about his status.  Nothing in any of our waiver 
decisions or in our understanding of the essential components of a valid 
waiver requires so incongruous a result.  No doubt the additional 
information would have been useful to respondent; perhaps even it might 
have affected his decision to confess.  But we have never read the 
Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of 
information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to 
speak or stand by his rights.  Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision 
not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could 
stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s 
intentions to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is 
complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.  [Id. at 422-423 
(citations omitted).]  
Any culpability on the part of the police inherent in their failing to inform the 
defendant of the attorney’s availability had no bearing on the validity of his Miranda 
waiver:  
[W]hether intentional or inadvertent, the state of mind of the police 
is irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and voluntariness of [the 
defendant’s] election to abandon his rights.  Although highly inappropriate, 
even deliberate deception of an attorney could not possibly affect a 
suspect’s decision to waive his Miranda rights unless he were at least aware 
of the incident. . . .  Granting that the “deliberate or reckless” withholding 
of information is objectionable as a matter of ethics, such conduct is only 
relevant to the constitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a defendant 
of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights 
 
10 
and the consequences of abandoning them.  Because respondent’s voluntary 
decision to speak was made with full awareness and comprehension of all 
the information Miranda requires the police to convey, the waivers were 
valid.  [Id. at 423-424 (citations omitted).] 
A rule requiring a suspect to be kept apprised of an attorney’s presence in order for his 
Miranda waiver to be valid would unsettle Miranda’s balance between protection of a 
suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights and the maintenance of effective and legitimate law 
enforcement practices: 
Because, as Miranda holds, full comprehension of the rights to 
remain silent and request an attorney are sufficient to dispel whatever 
coercion is inherent in the interrogation process, a rule requiring the police 
to inform the suspect of an attorney’s efforts to contact him contribute to 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege only incidentally, if at all.  
This minimal benefit, however, would come at a substantial cost to 
society’s legitimate and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt.  
[Id. at 427.] 
Moran concluded that “nothing disables the States from adopting different requirements 
of the conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state law.”  Id. at 428. 
B.  PEOPLE V BENDER 
This Court reached a different conclusion from that of Moran in Bender, 452 Mich 
594 (1996), holding that for a suspect’s Miranda waiver to be made “knowingly and 
intelligently,” police officers must promptly inform a suspect that an attorney is available 
when that attorney has made contact with them.  In Bender, two defendants, Jamieson 
Bender and Scott Zeigler, were arrested for a series of thefts and taken into custody.  An 
officer informed Bender’s mother of his arrest.  Subsequently, Bender’s father called an 
attorney, who agreed to represent his son.  When the attorney called the police and sought 
to speak with Bender, she was not permitted to do so.  Defendant Ziegler’s mother called 
 
11 
an attorney, who instructed her go to the police station and tell her son not to speak with 
anyone before speaking with the attorney.  Police also did not allow Ziegler’s mother to 
see her son and communicate the attorney’s message.  Without informing the defendants 
of their attorneys’ efforts to contact them, police read the defendants their Miranda 
rights, defendants waived these rights, and each offered incriminating statements 
concerning their involvement in the thefts.  At no point did the defendants request an 
attorney or assert their rights either to remain silent or to have counsel. 
This Court adopted a per se rule that a suspect who has an attorney waiting in the 
wings does not make a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of his Miranda rights when the 
police have failed to inform him that an attorney has been made available to him and is at 
his disposal.  Id. at 620 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.).  See also id. at 621 (opinion by 
BRICKLEY, C.J.).  Although Justices LEVIN and MALLETT concurred with Justice 
CAVANAGH’s lead opinion grounding the rule in Michigan’s 1963 Constitution, the 
Court’s holding was not ultimately grounded upon constitutional principles.  Rather, 
Chief Justice BRICKLEY concurred with the result reached in the lead opinion, but 
declined to rely upon its interpretation of the Constitution, instead declaring that the 
requirement that an accused must be informed of an attorney’s efforts to contact him 
constituted, as did Miranda itself at the time, a “prophylactic,” or precautionary, rule.  Id. 
at 620-621 (opinion by BRICKLEY, C.J.).5  Justices CAVANAGH, LEVIN, and MALLETT 
                                              
5 In Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 438-440, 444; 120 S Ct 2326; 147 L Ed 2d 
405 (2000), the United States Supreme Court determined that although Miranda is 
“prophylactic in nature,” it is nonetheless a “constitutional rule that Congress may not 
supersede legislatively.”  
 
12 
also joined Chief Justice BRICKLEY’s concurrence, making it the operative opinion in the 
case.6  Justice BOYLE, joined by Justices RILEY and WEAVER, dissented.  
Although it did not provide the operative holding, the lead opinion grounded its 
reasoning upon independent state constitutional grounds, concluding, “we hold that, on 
the basis of Const 1963, art 1, § 17, neither defendant Bender nor defendant Zeigler made 
a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, because the 
police failed to so inform them [that attorneys had been retained and sought to contact 
them] before they confessed.”7  Id. at 614 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.).  Holding 
otherwise would “encourage the police to do everything possible, short of a due process 
violation, to prevent an attorney from contacting his client before or during 
interrogation.”  Id. at 615.  To further sustain its conclusion, the lead opinion also noted 
that this Court has held that “the Michigan Constitution imposes a stricter requirement for 
a valid waiver of the rights to remain silent and to counsel than those imposed by the 
federal constitution.”  Id. at 611, citing People v Wright, 441 Mich 140, 147; 490 NW2d 
351 (1992).  The lead opinion declined to adopt a “totality-of-the-circumstances test,” 
because the “inherently coercive nature of incommunicado interrogation requires a per se 
                                              
6 “The clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the Court must agree on a ground for 
decision in order to make that binding precedent for future cases.”  People v Anderson, 
389 Mich 155, 170; 205 NW2d 461 (1973), overruled on other grounds by People v 
Hickman, 470 Mich 602; 684 NW2d 267 (2004). 
7 The lead opinion acknowledged that “neither defendant’s statement was involuntary.” 
Id. at 604.  Consequently, the only focus was upon whether the defendants’ statements 
were made “knowingly and intelligently.” 
 
13 
rule that can be implemented with ease and practicality to protect a suspect’s rights to 
remain silent and to counsel.”  Bender, 452 Mich at 617 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.). 
In Chief Justice BRICKLEY’s “majority opinion,”8 he stated that 
[t]his case rather clearly implicated both the right to counsel (Const 1963, 
art 1, § 20) and the right against self-incrimination (Const 1963, art 1, 
§ 17).  I conclude that rather than interpreting these provisions, it would be 
more appropriate to approach the law enforcement practices that are at the 
core of this case in the same manner as the United States Supreme Court 
approached the constitutional interpretation task in Miranda v Arizona; 
namely, by announcing a prophylactic rule.   
The right to counsel and the right to be free of compulsory self-
incrimination are part of the bedrock of constitutional civil liberties that 
have been zealously protected and in some cases expanded over the years. 
Given the focus and protection that these particular constitutional 
provisions have received, it is difficult to accept and constitutionally justify 
a rule of law that accepts that law enforcement investigators, as part of a 
custodial interrogation, can conceal from suspects that counsel has been 
made available to them and is at their disposal.  If it is deemed to be 
important that the accused be informed that he is entitled to counsel, it is 
certainly important that he be informed that he has counsel.  [Id. at 620-621 
(opinion by BRICKLEY, C.J.) (citations omitted).] 
Thus, the majority opinion, although referring to Michigan’s Constitution for its 
“implications,” declined nonetheless to interpret its provisions.  Rather, it concluded that 
“we invite much mischief if we afford police officers ‘engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime’ the discretion to decide when a suspect can and cannot 
see an attorney who has been retained for a suspect’s benefit.”  Id. at 622, quoting 
Girodenello v United States, 357 US 480, 486; 78 S Ct 1245; 2 L Ed 2d 1503 (1958).  
Instead, according to Chief Justice BRICKLEY, Bender’s rule would ensure that the 
                                              
8 Although Chief Justice BRICKLEY’s opinion is labeled as a concurrence, it is practically 
speaking a majority opinion, and thus I will refer to it as such throughout this opinion. 
 
14 
criminal justice system remained accusatorial and not inquisitorial in nature, because the 
“good will of state agents is often insufficient to guarantee a suspect’s constitutional 
rights.”  Bender, 452 Mich at 623 (opinion by BRICKLEY, C.J.). 
Justice BOYLE, joined by Justices RILEY and WEAVER, dissented:  
[W]ithout a single foundation in the language, historical context, or 
the jurisprudence of this Court, a majority of the Court engrafts its own 
“enlightened” view of the Constitution of 1963, art 1, § 17, on the citizens 
of the State of Michigan. With nothing more substantial than a 
disagreement with the United States Supreme Court as the basis for its 
conclusion, a majority of the Court ignores our obligation to find a 
principled basis for the creation of new rights and imposes a benefit on 
suspects that will eliminate voluntary and knowledgeable confessions from 
the arsenal of society’s weapons against crime.  [Id. at 624 (BOYLE, J., 
dissenting).] 
According to the dissent in Bender, the guarantee against compelled self-incrimination 
found in Article 1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution provides no greater protection than 
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and there is no justification for an 
interpretation of Michigan’s Constitution that affords protections differently than the 
federal Constitution.  Id. at 628-629.  The Bender dissent concluded that 
[i]n its haste to create a novel “Miranda-like right[],” a majority of the 
Court blurs the distinction between the constitutional right to be free from 
compelled self-incrimination and the safeguards — Miranda warnings — 
created to protect that right.  In effect, a majority of the Court creates 
prophylactic rules to protect prophylactic rights.  The argument seems to be 
that it is necessary to inform a suspect that an attorney is attempting to 
contact him, which, in turn, effectuates the suspect’s right to counsel, 
which, in turn, effectuates a suspect’s right to remain silent, which, in turn, 
effectuates a suspect’s right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.  
Safeguards for safeguards is absurd and is not required by the Michigan 
Constitution, the federal constitution, or Miranda. 
Given . . . that neither the Michigan nor the federal constitution 
require extension of the Miranda litany, the majority’s only possible 
 
15 
justification for requiring the police to inform a suspect that an attorney 
wishes to speak with him must be grounded on policy concerns, not 
constitutional mandates. But policy concerns also fail under proper 
analysis.  [Id. at 644.] 
In sum, while Bender concluded that the failure of police officers to inform a suspect of 
an attorney’s attempts to communicate with the suspect invalidates his Miranda waiver, 
there was no agreement as to whether Michigan’s Constitution required that rule. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The question presently before this Court is whether the rule of Bender should be 
maintained.9  The first and most consequential inquiry in resolving this question must, of 
course, pertain to whether Bender was correctly decided.  We conclude that it was not, 
concurring with the Bender dissent that the lead and majority opinions in that case 
                                              
9 In Justice MCCORMACK’s dissent, she asserts that the instant case does not afford an 
appropriate vehicle to overrule Bender because, unlike defendants in Bender, defendant 
here repeatedly expressed his desire for counsel before ultimately making an 
incriminating statement to the police.  According to the dissent, the rule in Bender is 
“sufficient” to sustain the suppression of defendant’s statement, but is not “necessary” in 
order to do so, because the voluntariness of defendant’s statement was implicated, or 
called into question, by defendant’s failed attempts to invoke his right to counsel.  
However, in defendant’s motion to suppress, he acknowledged that his statement to law 
enforcement was entirely voluntary, and argued only that his Miranda waiver had not 
been undertaken knowingly and intelligently pursuant to Bender and Wright, on the basis 
of the police’s failure to inform him that an attorney had been appointed on his behalf and 
had sought to meet with him.  Thus, whether defendant’s statement was undertaken 
voluntarily is not an issue that has been raised in this Court.  Furthermore, because 
defendant clearly and explicitly relied on Bender in his motion to suppress, and because 
the trial court also clearly and explicitly relied on Bender in granting this motion, the 
instant case does indeed afford an appropriate vehicle by which to assess the precedential 
value of Bender.  Whether defendant’s statement should be suppressed on other 
constitutional grounds can be considered on remand, provided both that such 
constitutional arguments have not been precluded by defendant’s pursuit of the current 
motion and that counsel offers the appropriate pretrial motions. 
 
16 
engaged in an unfounded creation of “constitutional rights,” given that the lead opinion 
failed to undertake a constitutional analysis sufficient to ground rights in our “organic 
instrument of state government,” Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 744, 760; 506 
NW2d 209 (1993), and the majority opinion failed even to consider that same “organic 
instrument,” instead relying on policy concerns and fears of law enforcement “mischief.”   
A.  THE BENDER RULE 
The Bender majority cited no Michigan law to justify its creation of a state 
constitutional rule different from the United States Supreme Court’s federal constitutional 
rule in Moran, ironically citing only several United States Supreme Court decisions at 
variance with Moran.  Nonetheless, Moran rightly acknowledged, as it must, that its 
decision did not “disable[] the States from adopting different requirements for the 
conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state law.”  Moran, 475 US at 428.10  
However, the Bender majority neither analyzed nor compared and contrasted to its 
federal counterpart the text of Article 1, § 17; cited no Michigan caselaw contrary to 
Moran; and most notably declined to ground its decision upon any interpretation of state 
constitutional provisions.  At the same time nonetheless, the majority clearly sought to 
                                              
10 “Under the Supremacy Clause, the courts of this state are obliged to enforce the rights 
conferred by the United States Supreme Court even if the state constitution does not 
provide such rights.”  Sitz, 443 Mich at 759 (citation omitted).  However, an “organic 
instrument of state government” need not be “interpreted as conferring the identical 
right.”  Id. at 760.  “It is only where the organic instrument of government purports to 
deprive a citizen of a right granted by the federal constitution that the instrument can be 
said to violate the constitution.”  Id. at 760-761 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, this 
Court may interpret our Constitution in a manner that confers greater protections on a 
suspect than those mandated by federal law. 
 
 
17 
characterize its rule as being one of constitutional provenance.11  Indeed, two years after 
Bender, in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43, 70-72; 580 NW2d 404 (1998), then Justice 
BRICKLEY explained in his dissenting statement that 
[w]hile the Bender rule is prophylactic in nature like Miranda, that fact 
does not detract from its constitutional underpinnings.  Its very purpose is 
to protect a suspect’s right to counsel and the privilege against self-
incrimination.  To deny the constitutional import of this rule is to ignore the 
plain language set forth in Bender.  [Citation omitted.] 
Thus, the majority purported to articulate a state constitutional rule in Bender, 
prophylactic or otherwise, distinct from the federal constitutional rule in Moran,12 while 
apparently disclaiming all reliance on state constitutional provisions.     
B.  THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION 
To determine whether Michigan’s Constitution supports Bender, we must construe 
our Constitution.  It is “a fundamental principle of constitutional construction that we 
determine the intent of the framers of the Constitution and of the people adopting it,” 
                                              
11 For example, the majority acknowledged that “[t]his case rather clearly implicates both 
the right to counsel and the right against [compulsory] self-incrimination” before 
concluding that a prophylactic rule was appropriate.  Bender, 452 Mich at 620-621 
(opinion by BRICKLEY, C.J.) (citations omitted).  The majority continued that “the right 
to counsel and the right to be free of compulsory self-incrimination are part of the 
bedrock of constitutional civil liberties that have been zealously protected and in some 
cases expanded over the years,” and that “[g]iven the focus and protection that these 
particular constitutional provisions have received, it is difficult to accept and 
constitutionally justify a rule of law that accepts that law enforcement investigators, as 
part of a custodial interrogation, can conceal from suspects that counsel has been made 
available to them and is at their disposal.”  Id. at 621.  
12 The Bender Court had the undeniable authority to articulate a state constitutional rule 
as long as the individual protections set forth in Moran were not contracted. 
 
18 
Holland v Heavlin, 299 Mich 465, 470; 300 NW 777 (1941), and we do this principally 
by examining its language.  Bond v Ann Arbor Sch Dist, 383 Mich 693, 699-700; 178 
NW2d 484 (1970).  And we must do this even in the face of existing decisions of this 
Court pertaining to the same subject because there is no other judicial body, state or 
federal, that possesses the authority to correct misinterpretations of the Michigan 
Constitution. 
“In interpreting our Constitution, we are not bound by the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution, even where the language is 
identical.”  People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 534; 682 NW2d 479 (2004) (citation 
omitted).  Rather, “[this Court] must determine what law ‘the people have made.’ ”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  “[W]e may not disregard the guarantees that our constitution confers 
on Michigan citizens merely because the United States Supreme Court has withdrawn or 
not extended such protection” under the federal Constitution.  Sitz, 443 Mich at 759.  As 
explained in Sitz: 
[T]he courts of this state should reject unprincipled creation of state 
constitutional rights that exceed their federal counterparts.  On the other 
hand, our courts are not obligated to accept what we deem to be a major 
contraction of citizen protections under our constitution simply because the 
United States Supreme Court has chosen to do so.  We are obligated to 
interpret our own organic instrument of government.  [Id. at 763.] 
While members of this Court take an oath to uphold the United States Constitution, we 
also take an oath to uphold the Michigan Constitution,13 which is the enduring expression 
                                              
13 Const 1963, art 11, § 1 states: “All officers, legislative, executive and judicial, before 
entering upon the duties of their respective offices, shall take and subscribe the following 
oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of 
 
 
19 
of the will of “we, the people” of this state.14  In light of these separate oaths of office, we 
need not, and cannot, defer to the United States Supreme Court in giving meaning to the 
latter charter.15  Instead, it is this Court’s obligation to independently examine our state’s 
Constitution to ascertain the intentions of those in whose name our Constitution was 
“ordain[ed] and establish[ed].”16  Accordingly, we must examine the text and history of 
                                              
the United States and the constitution of this state, and that I will faithfully discharge the 
duties of the office . . . according to the best of my ability.”  See also US Const, art VI.  
14 Const 1963, art 1, § 1 states: “All political power is inherent in the people.  
Government is instituted for their equal benefit, security and protection.” 
15 There is a reason why the United States and Michigan Constitutions should be read 
differently; namely, “we, the people” of the State of Michigan created Michigan’s 
Constitution, and interpretations of this Constitution must reflect that will, and “we the 
people of the United States” created the United States Constitution, and interpretations of 
that Constitution must reflect that will.  These are distinct constitutions and distinct 
citizenries, and this Court must independently analyze our state Constitution to ensure 
that our citizens are receiving the measure of the protections that they created, which 
protections may or may not extend beyond those set forth by the federal Constitution.  
16 While there might well be an informal presumption that a United States Supreme Court 
interpretation of a federal constitutional provision constitutes the proper interpretation of 
a similar or identical state constitutional provision, this Court need not apply that 
presumption, and it need not defer to an interpretation of the United States Supreme 
Court, unless we are persuaded that such an interpretation is also most faithful to the state 
constitutional provision.  This Court has on occasion seemed to suggest that there is some 
specific burden on this Court to identify a “compelling reason” or justification for 
interpreting the words of the Michigan Constitution differently than the words of the 
United States Constitution.  See, e.g., People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 214-215; 341 NW2d 
439 (1983) (“We have, on occasion, construed the Michigan Constitution in a manner 
which results in greater rights than those given by the federal constitution, and where 
there is compelling reason, we will undoubtedly do so again.”) (citations omitted); People 
v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 25; 475 NW2d 684 (1991) (“[A]rt 1, § 11 is to be construed to 
provide the same protection as that secured by the Fourth Amendment, absent 
‘compelling reason’ to impose a different interpretation.”) (citations omitted).  However, 
this cannot precisely describe this Court’s relationship with the federal judiciary, even 
with the United States Supreme Court.  While it may almost always be prudent and 
 
 
20 
Article 1, § 17, as well as this Court’s precedents pertaining to this provision, in order to 
ascertain both whether Bender was correctly decided and whether there is persuasive 
force in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Moran.17 
1.  CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 
“The primary objective in interpreting a constitutional provision is to determine 
the text’s original meaning to the ratifiers, the people, at the time of ratification.”  Wayne 
Co v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 468; 684 NW2d 765 (2004).  “The first rule a court should 
                                              
responsible for this Court to examine federal precedents when they pertain to the same or 
similar language as in the Michigan Constitution, our responsibility in giving meaning to 
the Michigan Constitution must invariably focus upon its particular language and history, 
and the specific intentions of its ratifiers, and not those of the federal Constitution. 
Simply put, our exercise of judgment concerning the reasonable meaning of the 
provisions of our state Constitution cannot, consistently with our oath of office and our 
structure of constitutional federalism, be delegated to another judicial body. 
 
17 This Court has referred to various factors that may be relevant in determining whether 
Michigan’s Constitution supports an interpretation that differs from that of the United 
States Constitution: 
1) the textual language of the state constitution, 2) significant textual 
differences between parallel provisions of the two constitutions, 3) state 
constitutional and common-law history, 4) state law preexisting adoption of 
the relevant constitutional provision, 5) structural differences between the 
state and federal constitutions, and 6) matters of peculiar state or local 
interest.  [Collins, 438 Mich at 31 n 39, citing People v Catania, 427 Mich 
447, 466 n 12; 398 NW2d 343 (1986).] 
 
We continue to believe that the application of these factors will often prove helpful to this 
Court in the interpretation of particular state constitutional provisions.  However, we also 
believe that examination of these factors collectively supports the conclusion that the 
ultimate task facing this Court in cases requiring interpretation of particular Michigan 
constitutional provisions is to respectfully consider federal interpretations of identical or 
similar federal constitutional provisions, but then to undertake by traditional interpretive 
methods to independently ascertain the meaning of the Michigan Constitution.   
 
21 
follow in ascertaining the meaning of words in a constitution is to give effect to the plain 
meaning of such words as understood by the people who adopted it.”  Bond, 383 Mich at 
699.  “In applying this principle of construction, the people are understood to have 
accepted the words employed in a constitutional provision in the sense most obvious to 
the common understanding and to have ‘ratified the instrument in the belief that that was 
the sense designed to be conveyed.’ ”  People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 573-574; 677 NW2d 
1 (2004) (citation omitted).  
The text of Article 1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution does not, in our judgment, 
provide for the rights articulated in Bender, when it states in the same words as the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution that “no person shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”18  Ascertaining the “plain meaning” of 
“compelled” is of critical importance to our textual analysis, as we must determine 
precisely what type of protection the ratifiers intended to confer.  The 1828 edition of 
Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language defined “compel” as “[t]o drive 
or urge with force, or irresistibly”; “to constrain”; “to oblige”; or “to necessitate, either by 
physical or moral force.”  At the time that our 1963 Constitution was ratified, the term 
                                              
18 Michigan’s Constitution of 1835 did not contain a self-incrimination provision; 
however, the current provision was incorporated shortly thereafter in 1850.  Const 1850, 
art 6, § 32.  This provision remained unchanged in Article 2, § 16 of Michigan’s 
Constitution of 1908 and in Article 1, § 17 of Michigan’s Constitution of 1963.  In 1963, 
Article 1, § 17 was amended to add “the right of all individuals, firms, corporations and 
voluntary associations to fair and just treatment in the course of legislative and executive 
investigations and hearings shall not be infringed,” but the self-incrimination part of the 
provision remained unchanged.  Thus, the language of the Michigan Constitution’s self-
incrimination provision has remained consistent since its incorporation in 1850.  
 
 
22 
“compel” was commonly defined as “to force by physical necessity or evidential fact”; 
“to urge irresistibly by moral or social pressure”; “to domineer over so as to force 
compliance or submission”; or “to obtain by force, violence, or coercion.”  Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary (1961).  Thus, at the time of the ratification of 
Article 1, § 17, the word “compel” referred to the use of coercion, violence, force, or 
pressure, all of which are relevant factors in assessing the genuine voluntariness of a 
confession. 
The remainder of the terms contained in Article 1, § 17 require no individual 
examination, as their plain meanings appear “obvious to the common understanding.”  
Accordingly, applying the definition of “compel” to the remainder of the language of 
Article 1, § 17, we find that the compelled self-incrimination provision in its entirety can 
be understood to provide that “no person shall be [coerced, forced, or pressured] in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  Given the provision’s focus on a coercive 
custodial environment, Article 1, § 17 can be reasonably understood to protect a suspect 
from the use of his involuntary incriminating statements as evidence against him in a 
criminal case.  Consequently, the text of Article 1, § 17 does not support Bender, which 
pertains not to the voluntariness of the confession itself, but to whether a suspect’s 
Miranda waiver has been made “knowingly.”  That is, there was no dispute in Bender as 
to the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession, only as to whether his Miranda waiver 
could be made “knowingly” absent awareness of an attorney’s efforts to contact him; the 
 
23 
coercion or pressure contemplated by the text of Article 1, § 17, which relates to the 
voluntariness of a confession, was not implicated.19  
2.  CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
When interpreting a constitutional provision, “[r]egard must also be given to the 
circumstances leading to the adoption of the provision and the purpose sought to be 
accomplished.”  People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 209; 341 NW2d 439 (1983) (citation 
omitted).  In determining the meaning of particular constitutional provisions to the 
ratifiers of the Constitution, this Court has noted that “constitutional convention debates 
and the address to the people, though not controlling, are relevant.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).20  The primary focus should be on “any statements [the delegates] may have 
                                              
19 We need not decide whether our interpretation of “compel” for purposes of Article 1, 
§ 17 is fully in accord with Miranda’s interpretation of the same term for purposes of the 
Fifth Amendment, given that Miranda has established an irreducible minimum standard 
for purposes of all custodial interrogations in Michigan, as well as those in every other 
state.  Further, such a comparison would be irrelevant to our assessment of Bender, as 
Bender’s interpretation of “compel” goes beyond its meaning as contemplated by either 
Article 1, § 17 or Miranda.  Pursuant to Bender, a suspect’s voluntary Miranda waiver, 
made with full knowledge of his Miranda rights, can nonetheless be considered 
“compelled” for purposes of Article 1, § 17, and therefore invalid, solely because that 
suspect was not informed of an attorney’s efforts to contact the suspect.  Accordingly, 
Bender renders incriminating statements or confessions inadmissible by finding 
“compulsion” when there existed no form of the coercion, violence, force, or pressure 
contemplated by either the text of Article 1, § 17, or by the United States Supreme Court 
in its analysis of what it viewed as more subtle and nuanced forms of coercion in 
Miranda. 
 
20 Indeed, constitutional conventions, as a distinctive form of “super legislative history,” 
deriving from the source of authority of the constitution itself, “we, the people,” may be 
highly valuable in interpreting constitutional provisions:  
 
“[T]he constitutional convention is a distinctively American 
contribution to political theory and action . . . .  [I]t is the personification of 
 
 
24 
made that would have shed light on why they chose to employ the particular terms they 
used in drafting the provision to aid in discerning what the common understanding of 
those terms would have been when the provision was ratified by the people.”  Studier v 
Mich Pub Sch Employees’ Retirement Bd, 472 Mich 642, 656-657; 698 NW2d 350 
(2005) (citation omitted).21   
However, the records pertaining to Article 1, § 17 provide few such clues.  There 
appears to have been no debate on the provision when it was first incorporated.  When 
the Constitution was ratified in 1908, the Self-Incrimination Clause remained unchanged 
from the 1850 version, and the accompanying Address to the People in 1908 stated 
simply, “[n]o change from Sec. 32, Art. VI of the present constitution.”  Journal of the 
Constitutional Convention 1907-1908, p 1542.  Although Article 1, § 17 was ratified in 
1963, the only change was the addition of language that had no bearing on the Self-
Incrimination Clause, and it was only the new language that was the subject of any 
convention debate or explication.  1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, 
                                              
the sovereign people assembled for the discharge of the solemn duty of 
framing their fundamental law.”  [Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, 
Independent Interpretation, & Political Culture, 43 DePaul L Rev 269, 320 
n 148 (1994), quoting Walker, Myth & Reality in State Constitutional 
Development, in Major Problems in State Constitutional Revision (Graves, 
ed, 1960), p 15 (alterations in original).] 
 
21 For example, in People v Nash, this Court concluded that it should interpret Michigan’s 
Constitution differently than the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment, in part because the records of the Michigan Constitutional 
Convention of 1961 indicated that the addition of an anti-exclusionary-rule provision was 
made in a particularly aggressive attempt by the delegates to assert state sovereignty in 
reaction to the United States Supreme Court decision in Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S 
Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961).  Nash, 418 Mich at 211-213.    
 
 
25 
pp 545-553; 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3364.  We find nothing 
in the records of the constitutional conventions to suggest that Article 1, § 17 means 
anything different from what its text most reasonably expresses. 
3.  CONSTITUTIONAL CASELAW 
Although the text of Article 1, § 17 has mirrored its federal counterpart since its 
incorporation, the conclusion does not follow that this Court has interpreted the provision 
identically to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.  
Consequently, it is necessary to examine this Court’s precedent to determine whether 
caselaw in any way supports or contradicts Bender. 
Before Bender, this Court had previously addressed the effect of an attorney’s 
attempts to contact a suspect on the admissibility of the suspect’s confession in People v 
Cavanaugh, 246 Mich 680; 225 NW 501 (1929), and People v Wright, 441 Mich 140; 
490 NW2d 351 (1992), the latter cited in Bender and both cited by defendant in this case.  
However, neither opinion provides the foundation for Bender’s proposition that Michigan 
courts have historically interpreted Michigan’s compulsory self-incrimination provision 
to provide criminal suspects with greater protections than those afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment.   
In Cavanaugh, the juvenile defendant was sentenced to prison for life for 
committing a rape in light of evidence that the victim identified his voice and given his 
alleged confession of guilt.  The defendant testified at trial that the police had questioned 
him at night, that he had not been permitted to sleep, and that he asked for and was 
denied an attorney.  An attorney who had been retained by the defendant’s father came to 
 
26 
the police station, but was refused access to the defendant until the attorney proceeded to 
the courthouse to obtain a writ of habeas corpus.  It is unclear if the defendant was aware 
of the attorney’s presence, but in any event, he admitted to committing the crime.  At 
trial, the defendant repudiated this confession, claiming it had been extorted by duress, 
brow-beating, intimidation, and by holding him incommunicado.  The lower court 
sustained the prosecutor’s objection to the defendant’s proposed testimony regarding the 
circumstances surrounding his confession and did not permit the defendant to introduce 
evidence pertaining to his claim that police officers had held him incommunicado.  
On appeal, this Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new 
trial, concluding that the “[d]efendant had an undoubted right to lay before the jury his 
full claim of what the police said to him, and it was for the jury to say whether, under all 
the circumstances, the confession was voluntary.”  Cavanaugh, 246 Mich at 686.  This 
Court continued: 
[A] confession, extorted by mental disquietude, induced by 
unlawfully holding an accused incommunicable, is condemned by every 
principle of fairness, has all the evils of the old-time letter de cachet, is 
forbidden by the constitutional guaranty of due process of law, and 
inhibited by the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel . . . .  
Holding an accused incommunicable to parents and counsel is a subtle and 
insidious method of intimidating and cowing, tends to render a prisoner 
plastic to police assertiveness and demands, and is a trial of mental 
endurance under unlawful pressure. 
*   *   * 
The defendant was held incommunicable.  He could not send for or 
employ counsel.  His father was refused right to see him.  When an 
attorney, presumably employed by his father, appeared at the jail and asked 
to see defendant, he was refused the right to do so until the attorney started 
for the courthouse to get a writ of habeas corpus.  In this State a parent may 
not be denied the right to see and have conversation with a child in jail and 
 
27 
accused of crime.  Neither may police, having custody of one accused of 
crime, deny an attorney, employed by or in behalf of a prisoner, the right to 
see and advise the accused.  [Id. at 686, 688 (emphasis added).] 
This Court concluded that “[w]hether defendant’s call for father, mother, attorney, and 
priest did not make any difference upon the question of his alleged confession being 
voluntary was for the jury.”  Id. at 688-689.  Consequently, defendant was entitled to a 
new trial, “at which the most searching examination of all the circumstances surrounding 
his alleged confession will be permitted.”  Id. at 689.  
Although Cavanaugh, like Bender, addressed the admissibility of a confession in a 
circumstance in which an attorney had been denied access to a person facing custodial 
interrogation, Cavanaugh is distinguishable from Bender in at least three significant 
ways, and cannot provide its foundation.  First, whereas Bender pertained to whether the 
defendants’ waivers of their Miranda rights were made “knowingly,” Cavanaugh 
pertained only to whether the defendant’s confession was made voluntarily, as Miranda 
had not yet introduced into the Fifth Amendment analysis the rule that a defendant cannot 
be subject to custodial interrogation absent a “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” 
waiver of Miranda rights.22  Because there was no dispute in Bender regarding the 
voluntary nature of defendants’ incriminating statements, Cavanaugh’s analysis 
concerning voluntariness cannot provide support for Bender.  Second, Cavanaugh 
appropriately considered multiple factors-- only one of which was the police officer’s 
                                              
22 There are two distinct “voluntariness” inquiries that must be considered in analyzing 
the admissibility of an incriminating statement or confession.  First, the incriminating 
statement or confession itself must have been made voluntarily.  Second, a suspect’s 
Miranda waiver must have been made voluntarily.  These distinct concepts of 
“voluntariness” must be borne in mind in assessing both Bender and Moran. 
 
28 
refusal to allow an attorney access to the defendant-- in its “totality of the circumstances” 
analysis to assess whether the defendant’s confession was made voluntarily, an analysis 
which at that time was the accepted mechanism for determining compliance with 
constitutional standards.  However, Bender’s rule, invalidating all “unknowing” Miranda 
waivers, is a per se rule that pertains to just a single factor.  Cavanaugh cannot possibly 
support this per se rule, given that Cavanaugh provided no indication that this Court had 
ever determined that just one of its several factors-- the police officer’s refusal to allow 
the attorney to see the defendant-- gave rise to an independent and per se constitutional 
right.23  Third, in Cavanaugh, the juvenile defendant requested and was refused an 
attorney.  This Court properly considered the defendant’s rejected request for an attorney 
as one factor in its voluntariness analysis.  In contrast, in Bender, the defendants never 
requested an attorney before waiving their Miranda rights and providing incriminating 
                                              
23 Justice CAVANAGH’s dissent misapprehends this point by stating “the majority argues 
that Cavanaugh cannot support Bender because Cavanaugh employed a ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ rule rather than the per se rule applied in Bender.  The fact that 
Cavanaugh and Bender differed on what test should result from police interference with 
counsel’s efforts to speak to a suspect does not lessen the fact that both Cavanaugh and 
Bender agreed that such police conduct is unconstitutional under the Michigan 
Constitution.”  Post at 12.  However, our point is not that Cavanaugh’s application of a 
totality of the circumstances test instead of a per se rule is fatal to Bender, but is instead 
that by concluding that the police’s refusal to allow the attorney to see the defendant was 
only one factor among many that might have rendered the defendant’s confession 
involuntary, Cavanaugh nowhere concluded that such failure alone would render a 
confession inadmissible.  In other words, because this Court concluded that the jury 
should hear a host of factors to determine whether the defendant’s confession was 
voluntary, a single factor-- that counsel’s requests to speak to the defendant were refused-
- cannot be identified and cited for the proposition that Cavanaugh established as a matter 
of constitutional principle that a defendant must be informed of an attorney’s attempts to 
contact him in order for his subsequent confession to be admissible.   
 
29 
statements.24  Accordingly, the defendants perceived no rejected request that could act to 
create a coercive atmosphere and potentially call into question the voluntariness of their 
statements.  Given these significant differences, Cavanaugh lends no support, we believe, 
to the notion that Michigan’s Constitution supports the per se rule of Bender.25   
In Wright, the defendant was arrested for murder, taken to the police station at 
around 5:00 a.m., and informed of his Miranda rights.  The defendant ultimately offered 
an incriminating statement to police officers after being deprived of food, water, and a 
place to sleep for a total of eleven hours while awaiting questioning.  Before the 
defendant made his statement, his family retained an attorney who made at least two trips 
to the police station, requesting to speak with the defendant.  Police officers refused the 
attorney’s request both times.  The defendant ultimately gave a statement to the police 
without being informed of the attorney’s efforts to reach him.  Before trial, the defendant 
filed a motion to suppress his statement.  At the suppression hearing, the trial court 
denied the defendant’s motion, concluding that the defendant had never expressly asked 
for an attorney.  The trial court relied on Moran, reasoning that “although the police 
conduct was reprehensible, the law did not require the suppression of defendant’s 
                                              
24 Similarly, in the case at hand, defendant failed to request an attorney after reinitiating 
contact with police and before waiving his Miranda rights and making an incriminating 
statement, despite the fact that defendant knew he could request an attorney, as he had 
done so the day before. 
 
25 It should be noted that, were the circumstances in Cavanaugh to arise today, the 
confession would be inadmissible, as the officers ignored the defendant’s assertion of his 
right to counsel and continued to interrogate him, contrary to Miranda, 384 US at 473-
474. 
 
30 
statements.”  Wright, 441 Mich at 145-146 (opinion by MALLETT, J.).  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed, declining to impose more stringent standards on police conduct than 
the United States Supreme Court imposed in Moran.  The defendant then appealed in this 
Court, and we granted leave to appeal to consider “whether a defendant has a right to 
know of his attorney’s efforts to contact him” and “whether the failure by police to 
provide a defendant with proper food, water, or opportunity to sleep, renders a 
defendant’s statements involuntary.”  Id. at 146.  
In an opinion by Justice MALLETT, joined by Justice LEVIN, and separate opinions 
by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justice BRICKLEY, this Court suppressed the 
defendant’s statements.  The fragmented decision resulted in no binding precedent.  In 
the lead opinion, Justice MALLET concluded that the confession had to be suppressed 
because a suspect must be informed of an attorney’s in-person attempts to contact him, as 
Michigan’s Constitution provides for such a right.  Id. at 154-155.  This opinion stated as 
follows: 
[U]nder our state’s laws, we conclude that [defendant] did not make 
a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights when the police, 
before he made a statement, refused to inform him that retained counsel 
tried or was currently trying to contact him.  Without this knowledge, [the 
defendant] could not make a truly voluntary waiver of his essential rights.  
Given the opportunity to speak to a specific, retained and available 
attorney, [defendant’s] decision may have been different.    
 
*   *   * 
Under Const 1963, art 1, § 17, a criminal suspect is given the right 
against self-incrimination, a right similar to that provided in the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  This Court has held that the 
interpretation of our constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and 
that of the Fifth Amendment are the same.  In re Moser, 138 Mich 302, 
305; 101 NW 588 (1904).  However, as the United States Supreme Court 
 
31 
concluded in Moran, states are free to adopt more protective standards 
under state law.  Because we believe that it was necessary, in order to allow 
[defendant] to make a knowing and fully voluntary waiver of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, we extend the rights afforded under Const 1963, art 1, 
§ 17, to include information of retained counsel’s in-person efforts to 
contact a suspect.  [Id. at 153-154 (citations omitted.] 
In his separate concurrence, Chief Justice CAVANAGH agreed with Justice MALLETT’s 
conclusion that the defendant’s statement had to be suppressed and with Justice 
MALLETT’s analysis in interpreting Michigan’s constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination “more broadly” than the Fifth Amendment.  Chief Justice CAVANAGH 
wrote separately to emphasize that the “conclusion is even more clearly supported on the 
ground that the police conduct in this case violated defendant’s right to counsel under 
Const 1963, art 1, § 20.”  Id. at 155-156 (CAVANAGH, C.J., concurring).  In a separate 
concurring opinion, Justice BRICKLEY agreed that suppression of the defendant’s 
statement was necessary, but based his decision on his conclusion that the defendant’s 
Miranda waiver was made involuntarily, citing the “eleven-hour incommunicado 
interrogation during which [the defendant] was deprived of food, sleep, and contact with 
friendly outsiders, combined with the fact that he was not informed of available retained 
counsel.”  Id. at 172 (BRICKLEY, J., concurring).  Justice RILEY dissented, joined by 
Justices BOYLE and GRIFFIN, concluding that defendant had knowingly waived his right 
to consult with an attorney before making his statement, and that the “objectionable” 
police conduct did not amount to a constitutional violation.  Id. at 179-180 (RILEY, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent noted that “[t]here is nothing conspicuous in the language of the 
Michigan Constitution that would distinguish it from the rights guaranteed by the federal 
constitution.”  Id. at 177.   
 
32 
Wright cannot provide the foundation for Bender, because it produced no 
consensus that Article 1, § 17 of Michigan’s Constitution imposes greater requirements 
for a valid waiver of the rights to remain silent and to counsel than those imposed by the 
federal Constitution,26 and its lead opinion, much like Bender’s majority opinion, 
suffered from scant analysis.  The lack of analysis in both opinions is accounted for by 
the simple fact that there is no basis in the Michigan Constitution for the decisions 
reached in those opinions.  That is, it is not the failure of analyses in these opinions that 
militates against their extension of Miranda; it is the absence of any language in the 
Michigan Constitution that would sustain such an analysis, and that is why each of these 
opinions is so barren of constitutional exegesis.  Only Justice MALLETT’s lead opinion in 
Wright explicitly “extend[ed] the rights afforded under Const 1963, art 1, § 17” to 
provide greater protection than those afforded by the Fifth Amendment.  Wright, 441 
Mich at 154 (opinion by MALLETT, J.).  Justice LEVIN concurred, and Justice CAVANAGH 
agreed with Justice MALLETT’s analysis, but no other member of this Court accepted the 
lead opinion’s proposition, and Justice RILEY, joined by Justices BOYLE and GRIFFIN, 
explicitly rejected such a conclusion in her dissent.  In any event, the lead opinion cannot 
provide a foundation for Bender, as it peremptorily concluded that the “accusatorial” 
nature of our criminal justice system warranted an “exten[sion of] the rights afforded 
                                              
26 Despite this, Bender’s lead opinion stated that “[i]n Wright, this Court held that the 
Michigan Constitution imposes a stricter requirement for a valid waiver of the rights to 
remain silent and to counsel than imposed by the federal constitution.”  Bender, 452 Mich 
at 611 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.).   
 
33 
under Const 1963, art 1, § 17,” without anywhere confronting the language of this 
provision or assessing in any way the intentions of the ratifiers.   
Instead, in opining that Article 1, § 17 requires police to inform suspects of an 
attorney’s efforts to contact a suspect in order that a Miranda waiver be valid, the lead 
opinion acknowledged that it “disagree[d]” with the Supreme Court’s conclusion to the 
contrary in Moran, and noted that “states are free to afford their citizens greater 
protection than that granted by the federal government.”  Wright, 441 Mich at 148 
(opinion by MALLETT, J.).  Doubtless this is true, but such authority on our part does not 
relieve us from the obligation to ground our actions within our own Constitution.  The 
lead opinion opined further, “[o]ther states have considered [Moran’s] question and have 
concluded that it is necessary for a suspect to be informed of an attorney’s attempted 
contacts,” and proceeded to summarize the decisions of the highest state courts of 
Connecticut, Delaware, and Oregon.  Id. at 148-153.  Such an observation, while also 
entirely appropriate as a prelude to extending Miranda, also does not relieve us of the 
obligation to “determine what law ‘the people [of Michigan] have made.’ ”  Sitz, 443 
Mich at 759.  This obligation is best accomplished by some effort to examine the 
language of our Constitution that purportedly supplies the basis for the newly discovered 
constitutional right, Bond, 383 Mich at 699-700, in this instance, Article 1, § 17.  
However, without engaging in any such analysis, the lead opinion turned to the facts of 
Wright, and offered the following:  
As Justice Stevens so eloquently stated, “[t]he recognition that ours 
is an accusatorial, and not an inquisitorial system nevertheless requires that 
the government’s actions, even in responding to this brutal crime, respect 
those liberties and rights that distinguish this society from most others.”  
Moran, [475 US] at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accordingly, under our 
 
34 
state’s laws, we conclude that Mr. Wright did not make a knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights when the police, before he 
made a statement, refused to inform him that retained counsel tried or was 
currently trying to contact him.  Without this knowledge, Mr. Wright could 
not make a truly voluntary waiver of his essential rights.  Given the 
opportunity to speak to a specific, retained and available attorney, Mr. 
Wright’s decision may have been different.  [Wright, 441 Mich at 153 
(opinion by MALLETT, J.).] 
The lead opinion concluded that while “this Court has held that the interpretation of our 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and that of the Fifth Amendment are 
the same,” it was nevertheless appropriate to “extend the rights afforded by Const 1963, 
art 1, § 17, to include information of retained counsel’s in-person efforts to contact a 
suspect.”  Id. at 154.  The opinion was correct that this Court may interpret our 
constitution to afford greater protections than those afforded by the Fifth Amendment.  
However, the opinion did not perform the constitutional analysis necessary to “determine 
the intent of the framers and of the people adopting it,” Holland, 299 Mich at 470.  
Consequently, Wright’s “exten[sion of] the rights afforded under Const 1963, art 1, 
§ 17,” cannot provide Bender’s foundation, because that extension was not supported by 
a majority of this Court, and it was not based on any semblance of the constitutional 
analysis necessary to ground new rights in the Michigan Constitution, an analysis that 
would seem to be of particular prudence in distinguishing an interpretation of a provision 
of the Michigan Constitution from a United States Supreme Court interpretation of the 
United States Constitution.  Cf. Nash, 418 Mich at 209.  
 
35 
While this analysis indicates that there is no precedent specifically undergirding 
Bender,27 it is also relevant to examine this Court’s caselaw pertaining to Article 1, § 17, 
as well as to the admissibility of confessions in general, to inquire whether there is any 
other historical support from this Court for Bender.  Specifically, we examine whether 
there is any precedent that foreshadowed Bender by suggesting either that (a) this Court 
has interpreted the self-incrimination provision of Article 1, § 17 to extend beyond the 
protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment; or (b) this Court has interpreted the self-
incrimination provision of Article 1, § 17 as focused on something other than the 
voluntariness of a confession.   
Concerning the first matter of exploration, there is no precedent that serves as a 
precursor to Bender by affording protections under Article 1, § 17 greater than those 
                                              
27 Justice CAVANAGH’s dissent alleges that Cavanaugh provided specific support for 
Bender, as the justices in support of Bender “necessarily relied on Cavanaugh (as 
evidenced by the Bender opinion’s citations to the Wright opinions, which cited 
Cavanaugh) as the primary source for the broader interpretation of the right against self-
incrimination under the Michigan Constitution.”  Post at 19.  However, Bender did not 
once cite Cavanaugh, and although several opinions in Wright did cite Cavanaugh, none 
cited it for the proposition that Michigan’s right against compulsory self-incrimination 
affords greater protections than those afforded by the Fifth Amendment.  In Wright, 
Justice MALLETT did not cite Cavanaugh in the lead opinion; Justice CAVANAGH cited 
Cavanaugh in his concurrence in support of his belief that the police conduct in Wright 
violated defendant’s right to counsel under Article 1, § 20 and the due process provision 
now contained in Article 1, § 17,  Wright, 441 Mich at 156-157 (opinion by CAVANAGH, 
J.); Justice BRICKLEY cited Cavanaugh in his concurrence for the proposition that 
incommunicado interrogation affects the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, id. at 168-
169 (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.); and Justice RILEY cited Cavanaugh in her dissent to rebut 
the argument that Michigan’s Constitution requires officers to inform a defendant of an 
attorney’s presence for that defendant’s waiver to be made voluntarily and knowingly, id. 
at 178-180 (opinion by RILEY, J.).  Thus, this Court did not rely on Cavanaugh for the 
proposition that the compulsory self-incrimination provision contained in Article 1, § 17 
provides protections that extend beyond those afforded by the Fifth Amendment. 
 
36 
afforded under the Fifth Amendment.  To the contrary, on at least two occasions, this 
Court had discussed the meaning of Michigan’s Self-Incrimination Clause in comparison 
to the Fifth Amendment and indicated that Michigan’s Self-Incrimination Clause is 
identical to its federal counterpart.  In In re Moser, 138 Mich 302, 305; 101 NW 588 
(1904), we noted that “[u]nder the Constitutions of Michigan and of the United States, no 
witness can be compelled to give testimony which might tend to criminate himself or 
expose him to a criminal prosecution.  The provision in each Constitution is the same.”  
Eighty years later, in Paramount Pictures Corp v Miskinis, 418 Mich 708, 726; 344 
NW2d 788 (1984), we cited Moser and stated that “[h]aving examined prior decisions of 
this Court, we find nothing which requires an interpretation of our constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination different from that of the United States Constitution.”  Moser 
and Paramount are instructive in that they provide insight concerning the legal 
environment at the time Bender was decided.  Until that point, our interpretations of 
Article 1, § 17 provided no indication that this Court was prepared to extend the 
protections of Article 1, § 17 to exceed those of the Fifth Amendment.28   
Concerning the second matter of exploration, while Bender implicates the 
“knowing” prong of a Miranda waiver, this Court’s precedents indicate that Article 1, 
                                              
28 As we have indicated, we do not understand the assertions in Moser and Paramount as 
communicating that this Court, in carrying out its obligation to interpret Article 1, § 17, 
will forever adhere to all future interpretations of the Fifth Amendment by the United 
States Supreme Court, but merely that, in our judgment, the framers of these 
constitutional provisions possessed similar intentions with regard to their purposes, and 
possibly also that until that time, judicial understandings of Article 1, § 17 and the Fifth 
Amendment were in general accord.      
 
37 
§ 17 pertains solely to the voluntariness of a confession.  “Under Michigan law, initially 
the admissibility of confessions was governed solely by common law, which adhered to 
the rule that involuntary confessions were inadmissible.”  People v Conte, 421 Mich 704, 
721; 365 NW2d 648 (1984) (citations omitted).  Subsequently, this Court recognized a 
constitutional basis for this rule, acknowledging that both the Due Process Clause, 
Cavanaugh, 246 Mich at 686, and the right against self-incrimination, People v Louzon, 
338 Mich 146; 61 NW2d 52 (1953), provide alternate bases for holding involuntary 
confessions inadmissible.  Before Miranda, few cases analyzed the admissibility of a 
confession in light of the Self-Incrimination Clause, but this Court did so in People v 
Louzon:  
We recognize the rule that confessions are inadmissible when 
secured by inflicting physical force or its equivalent by means of harsh or 
cruel treatment or false promises. The confession must be voluntary, but 
this does not mean that it must be volunteered.  No one may be forced to be 
a witness against himself.  [Louzon, 338 Mich 153-154 (emphasis added).] 
Thus, this Court’s use of the Self-Incrimination Clause to analyze the admissibility of a 
confession focused entirely on the voluntariness of the confession, referring to the type of 
force or coercion that is contemplated in part by the text of Article 1, § 17.  Sometime 
after Louzon, Miranda transformed the inquiry pertaining to the admissibility of 
confessions, introducing the concept of a “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” waiver of 
a suspect’s Miranda rights.  Before Miranda under Michigan law, voluntariness 
constituted the sole criteria for a confession to be admissible, under either the Due 
Process Clause, or Michigan’s Self-Incrimination Clause, providing no support for 
 
38 
Bender’s proposition that Article 1, § 17 pertains in any way to whether a Miranda 
waiver is made “knowingly.” 
In his dissent, Justice CAVANAGH disagrees with this conclusion, and instead 
asserts that Cavanaugh foreshadowed Miranda’s “knowing and intelligent” requirement 
by holding that defendant’s confession was obtained in violation of what is now Article 
1, § 17, due to the “incommunicable” nature of the defendant’s interrogation.  According 
to the dissent, “incommunicado interrogation was at the center of the United States 
Supreme Court’s explanation of the ‘knowing and intelligent’ requirement in Miranda,” 
and “[b]ecause Cavanaugh’s explanation of the impropriety of the incommunicado 
interrogation methods used to extract the defendant’s confession is strikingly similar to 
the impermissible interrogation methods that Miranda discussed, Cavanaugh is . . . more 
properly classified as consistent with Miranda’s ‘knowing and intelligent’ standard.”  
Post at 8.   
However, as previously noted, Cavanaugh explicitly pertained only to the 
voluntariness of a confession, and the “incommunicable” nature of defendant’s 
interrogation was only one factor among many that persuaded this Court to remand for a 
determination whether defendant’s confession was voluntary.29  Although Cavanaugh in 
                                              
29 In his dissent, Justice CAVANAGH asserts that our “hyper-textualist” definition of 
“compulsion” is inconsistent with Cavanaugh’s understanding of the term, as Cavanaugh 
recognized that “incommunicable” interrogation may render a confession involuntary, 
and such “incommunicable” interrogation is not the type of “coercion, violence, force, or 
pressure” contemplated by our definition.  However, Cavanaugh did not hold that a 
confession made in an “incommunicable” environment is involuntary, which is what the 
dissent would seem to suggest.  Cavanaugh instead acknowledged only that the 
incommunicable nature of a confession might be one factor, combined with a host of 
others-- including sleep deprivation, duress, and “brow-beating,” all factors that were 
 
 
39 
no way transformed this Court’s traditional voluntariness analysis, even assuming 
arguendo that Cavanaugh recognized that more subtle forms of coercion might render a 
confession involuntary, there is simply no indication that Cavanaugh contemplated the 
“knowing and intelligent” requirement set forth almost four decades later in Miranda, as 
Cavanaugh nowhere hinted that a defendant must have some idea of his or her “rights” 
and the consequences of waiving those rights in order for his or her confession to be 
admissible.  As Miranda had not yet introduced the concept of a waiver made 
“knowingly and intelligently,” it is highly unlikely that Cavanaugh contemplated such a 
requirement, or that the ratifiers of the 1963 Constitution perceived Cavanaugh as setting 
forth such a requirement, particularly in view of the fact that Cavanaugh performed the 
traditional totality of the circumstances voluntary analysis that was routinely undertaken 
in determining the admissibility of a confession at that time.30  As even Justice 
CAVANAGH’s dissent acknowledges, “when interpreting the Michigan Constitution, we 
must recognize the law as it existed in Michigan at the time the relevant constitutional 
provision was adopted, and ‘it must be presumed that a constitutional provision has been 
                                              
traditionally considered in a voluntary analysis-- that might potentially render a 
confession involuntary.  This Court should not isolate a single factor from Cavanaugh in 
order to establish the meaning of “compulsion” or “voluntariness” in Michigan, in 
disregard of what Article 1, § 17, and the body of caselaw both preceding and succeeding 
Cavanaugh, would otherwise suggest. 
30 Notably, even Justice BRICKLEY, writing for the majority in People v Hill, 429 Mich 
382, 392-393; 415 NW2d 193 (1987), acknowledged that “[a]t the time of the drafting of 
our 1963 Constitution (pre-Miranda), the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth 
Amendment was only implicated when an extrajudicial statement was found to have been 
elicited involuntarily.” 
 
40 
framed and adopted mindful of prior and existing law and with reference to them.’  
People v Kirby, 440 Mich 485, 492; 487 NW2d 404 (1992).”  Post at 3 (emphasis added).  
The trajectory of our constitutional development under our equivalent of the Fifth 
Amendment, as well as this Court’s consistent emphasis on the voluntariness of a 
confession, including in Cavanaugh, indicated no anticipation of Miranda, a notion as to 
which defense counsel himself agreed at oral argument.31  Furthermore, Cavanaugh was 
decided under the Due Process Clause, and not the Self-Incrimination Clause, further 
suggesting that the ratifiers of the 1963 Constitution would not have perceived 
Cavanaugh as establishing that Michigan’s provision against compulsory self-
incrimination provided any greater protections than those afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment.  Accordingly, neither Cavanaugh, nor any other precedent of this Court, 
supports the dissent’s assertion that Article 1, § 17 was ratified in contemplation of the 
“knowing” requirement later set forth in Miranda.32 
                                              
31 At oral argument, defense counsel acknowledged that Cavanaugh established a right to 
counsel as a condition of voluntariness, and that the Court could not have been 
contemplating a “knowing and intelligent” standard at that time.  Specifically, he stated, 
“I don’t think really the courts had entertained as much beyond the voluntariness as came 
later on with Miranda—where it talks about voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.  So as 
the law progressed, I think they weren’t really addressing knowing and intelligent.” 
Moreover, defendant has cited no caselaw apart from Cavanaugh that hints at either a 
“knowing” requirement, or a different “voluntariness” definition, than the one 
contemplated by Article 1, § 17. 
32 Going one step further, even assuming arguendo that Cavanaugh in some way did 
contemplate Miranda’s “knowing” prong, there is certainly no indication that Cavanaugh 
further contemplated the additional and specific protections placed on this prong by 
Bender. 
 
41 
Moreover, this Court’s precedent provides no support for the proposition that this 
Court has placed extra emphasis on the “knowing” prong of a Miranda waiver in the 
period since Miranda.  Before and after Miranda, “[w]here conditions did not overbear a 
defendant’s will, statements have been held admissible.”  Wright, 441 Mich at 167, citing 
People v Brannan, 406 Mich 104; 276 NW2d 14 (1979); People v Farmer, 380 Mich 
198; 156 NW2d 504 (1968); People v Boyce, 314 Mich 608; 23 NW2d 99 (1946).  Even 
after Miranda and Bender, this Court has referred to Moran for the appropriate “knowing 
and intelligent” waiver standard, and stated that “[t]o knowingly waive Miranda rights, a 
suspect need not understand the ramifications and consequences of choosing to waive or 
exercise the rights that the police have properly explained to him” and “[l]ack of foresight 
is insufficient to render an otherwise proper waiver invalid.”  People v Cheatham, 453 
Mich 1, 28-29; 551 NW2d 355 (1996) (citations omitted).  Thus, Bender’s heightened 
requirement for a Miranda waiver to be made “knowingly” is inconsistent with this 
Court’s previous treatment of the requirement.    
This Court’s precedents did not foreshadow, or otherwise provide support, for 
Bender.  Nor do this Court’s precedents support a finding that Article 1, § 17 requires a 
greater showing that a Miranda waiver was made “knowingly” than is required by the 
Fifth Amendment, given that this Court’s interpretation of Article 1, § 17 has indicated 
that it pertains solely to the voluntariness of a confession itself, not to whether a 
confession is made with full knowledge of its consequences.33 
                                              
33 Justice CAVANAGH’s dissent alleges that the right to counsel articulated in Article 1, 
§ 20 of Michigan’s Constitution, which states that, “[i]n every criminal prosecution, the 
accused shall have the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his or her defense,” 
 
 
42 
4.  BENDER V MORAN 
This Court’s independent constitutional analysis of Article 1, § 17 leads us to the 
conclusion that Moran, not Bender, best analyzes the issue presented in this case.  Our 
analysis indicates that Article 1, § 17 protects a suspect only from the use of confessions 
or incriminating statements obtained by coercion, violence, force, or pressure.  However, 
Bender’s rule renders confessions and incriminating statements inadmissible that were in 
no way influenced by the type of coercive or compelling atmosphere contemplated by the 
provision.   
Miranda was initially intended by the United States Supreme Court (at least until 
its later decision in Dickerson)34 to serve as “one possible formula” by which to dispel 
the coercive atmosphere implicit in custodial interrogation; its purpose was to alleviate 
                                              
lends additional support for Bender.  See post at 19-23.  However, in Kirby v Illinois, 406 
US 682, 688; 92 S Ct 1877; 32 L ED 2d 411 (1972), the United States Supreme Court 
held that the right to counsel attaches “only at or after the time that adversary judicial 
proceedings have been initiated against him.”  Although this Court initially recognized 
that there may be instances in which the right to counsel attaches prior to formal charging 
in People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155; 205 NW2d 461 (1973), and People v Jackson, 391 
Mich 323, 338; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), we expressly overruled Anderson and its progeny, 
including Jackson, to the extent they “go[] beyond the constitutional text and extend[] the 
right to counsel to a time before the initiation of adversarial criminal proceedings” in 
People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602, 603-604, 608-609; 684 NW2d 267 (2004), and 
reaffirmed that the right to counsel attaches at or after the initiation of adversarial judicial 
criminal proceedings.  In both Bender, and the instant case, defendants waived their 
Miranda rights and made incriminating statements before charges were issued, and 
therefore before the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings, signifying that 
the right to counsel had not yet attached.  While the dissent articulates its own belief that 
Anderson and Jackson were overruled in error, and that Kirby’s restriction is “arbitrary,” 
the majority of this Court did not agree and current law clearly indicates that the right to 
counsel had not yet attached at the time of defendant Bender and defendant Tanner’s 
Miranda waivers.  Therefore, Article 1, § 20 also does not support Bender.  
34 See note 5 of this opinion. 
 
43 
what it viewed as the increasingly subtle and nuanced forms of coercion that sometimes 
typified the custodial interrogation process and undermined the genuine voluntariness of 
statements produced by this process.  In fact, the United States Supreme Court has 
explained that “Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them 
to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that.”  
Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 170; 107 S Ct 515; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986).  However, 
the situation in Bender falls considerably outside the scope of the custodial interrogation 
process that defined the constitutional rationale for Miranda.  That is, Bender’s rule 
renders inadmissible even statements and confessions made following an indisputably 
voluntary and informed Miranda waiver absent even the slightest hint of the subtle or 
nuanced forms of coercion that served as the justification for Miranda.  Miranda’s 
treatment of such forms of coercion at least sought to remain faithful to the Fifth 
Amendment’s traditional voluntariness standard.35    
                                              
35 The United States Supreme Court has determined that, despite its initial “prophylactic” 
character, Miranda is now a “constitutional rule.” Dickerson, 530 US at 438-440, 444.  
However, this does not necessarily mean that Bender’s “prophylactic” rule is also 
constitutional in character.  Although Miranda affords protections that seem to exceed 
the textual boundaries of the Fifth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the point of Miranda is to protect against the coercive nature of the 
custodial interrogation environment, which clearly does implicate the Fifth Amendment. 
However, because Bender is implicated even when a confession is altogether voluntary 
and non-coercive, and because Bender pertains to whether the Miranda waiver was 
knowing, and not to the voluntariness of the confession, it is hardly self-evident that 
Bender is “prophylactic” in the same way in upholding the Constitution as was Miranda.  
Because Bender invalidates confessions made absent any evidence of the type of coercive 
custodial interrogation environment that motivated Miranda, Bender does not further 
Miranda’s purpose of dissipating the impact of this environment, or at the very least does 
so in a far more indirect and attenuated manner by, in the words of the Bender dissent, 
“creat[ing] prophylactic rules to protect prophylactic rights.”  Bender, 452 Mich at 644.  
Contrary to Justice CAVANAGH’s dissent, we do not conclude that it is Bender’s 
 
 
44 
Our independent examination of Article 1, § 17 supports Moran’s conclusion that 
“full comprehension of [the Miranda rights] are sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is 
inherent in the interrogation process,” Moran, 464 US at 427, because the warnings 
provide a suspect with the necessary information both to apprehend these rights and to 
make an intelligent and knowing waiver of the rights if he chooses.  The waiver of rights 
cannot logically be affected by events that are unknown and unperceived, such as the fact 
that an attorney is somewhere present to offer assistance.  As explained by one scholar: 
If there is any police misconduct, the suspect is unaware of such 
events because it is directed toward the attorney.  Facts and events 
unknown to the suspect cannot have a coercive effect on the suspect.  
Therefore, the attorney’s efforts and/or presence is irrelevant to the 
suspect’s ability to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his 
Miranda rights.  Moreover, as the suspect is still read his Miranda rights, 
such events do not operate to deprive the suspect of the knowledge of his 
rights. 
To argue or conclude that a defendant, who by the good fortune of a 
family member hiring an attorney, must be told of the attorney’s attempts to 
make contact in order to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda 
rights is illogical and nonsensical.  In fact, for the majority’s reasoning to 
make sense, the majority would have to conclude that persons who are 
capable of retaining an attorney, or have family or friends who are capable 
of hiring a retained attorney, are not capable of making a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of Miranda rights even when the attorney is not present.  
As is evident by the admissibility of a suspect’s Miranda waiver in the 
ordinary custodial interrogation situation, the majority would not so 
conclude.  [Carroll, A Look at People v Bender: What Happens when the 
Michigan Supreme Court Oversteps Its Power to Achieve A Results-
Oriented Decision, 74 U Det Mercy L Rev 211, 236-237 (1997) (citations 
omitted).]  
                                              
“prophylactic” character that “deprives the [Bender] rule of constitutional status,” post at 
14, but rather the nature of the rule itself. 
 
45 
We therefore agree with Moran that an outside and unperceived development, such as an 
attorney’s presence and initiation of contact with police, “can have no bearing on [a 
suspect’s] capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.”  
Moran, 475 US at 422.36  Instead, as noted by the United States Supreme Court in 
Colorado v Spring, 479 US 564, 577; 107 S Ct 851; 93 L Ed 2d 954 (1987), “the 
additional information could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its 
essentially voluntary and knowing nature.”  It might not be in a suspect’s best interest to 
make a statement, but this Court need not concern itself with the wisdom of a suspect’s 
confession.  To the contrary, voluntary but “foolish” confessions should be welcomed, as 
a suspect’s perhaps unwise but purely voluntary urge to tell the truth is vital in assisting 
the fact-finder in ultimately ascertaining the truth of what occurred.37    
                                              
36 The fact that counsel in this case was appointed, whereas counsel in Bender was 
retained, makes no difference to our analysis, or to Bender itself as far as we can see.  In 
neither instance can an attorney’s unsuccessful efforts to contact a defendant affect the 
defendant’s ability to apprehend and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. 
 
37 This case illustrates the problems with Bender.  Defense counsel concedes that 
defendant’s waiver was made voluntarily, and there are no allegations that defendant did 
not understand the Miranda rights that he waived.  Because defendant did not invoke his 
right to counsel after reinitiating discussion with the police and being advised of his 
Miranda rights a second time, and because the adversarial proceedings had not yet begun, 
the prosecutor was not required to contact the court, and the court was not required to 
appoint an attorney for defendant.  Had the prosecutor and court not been proactive in 
effecting the appointment of an attorney, Bender never would have been implicated, 
because there would have been no attorney of whose presence defendant needed to be 
informed.  Instead, the prosecutor, on behalf of the people, was effectively sanctioned by 
the suppression of defendant’s voluntary statements for having taken the precaution of 
seeking out counsel in the event that defendant requested counsel before or during his 
interrogation.  Consequently, Bender has the effect of discouraging the type of initiative 
shown by the prosecutor, because police officers and prosecutors will almost certainly be 
 
 
46 
In sum, independent examination of Article 1, § 17 persuades us that the United 
States Supreme Court correctly interpreted this issue in Moran. This examination further 
supports Moran’s conclusions that “[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the 
suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to 
comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right,” that the “ ‘deliberate or 
reckless’ withholding of information . . . is only relevant to the constitutional validity of a 
waiver if it deprives a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the 
nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them,” and that the Miranda 
warnings alone “are sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation 
process.”  Moran, 475 US at 422-424, 427.  Because our constitutional analysis 
demonstrates that Article 1, § 17 does not confer the protections set forth in Bender, but 
instead supports Moran’s analysis and conclusion, we conclude that Bender was wrongly 
decided.  We conclude, as did the United States Supreme Court in Moran, that the failure 
of police to inform a suspect of an attorney’s efforts to contact him does not invalidate an 
otherwise “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” Miranda waiver. 
C.  STARE DECISIS 
When this Court determines that a case has been wrongly decided, as we do here 
with regard to Bender, it must next determine whether it should overrule that precedent, a 
decision that should never be undertaken lightly.  The application of stare decisis is 
“generally ‘the preferred course, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 
                                              
more reluctant to facilitate counsel before one is legally required if the consequence is the 
suppression of evidence.   
 
47 
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ ”  Robinson v 
Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), quoting Hohn v United States, 524 
US 236, 251; 118 S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998).  However, “stare decisis is a 
‘principle of policy’ rather than ‘an inexorable command,’ and . . . the Court is not 
constrained to follow precedent when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly 
reasoned.”  Robinson, 462 Mich at 464 (citations omitted).  This Court has discussed the 
proper circumstances under which it will overrule prior case law: 
This Court has stated on many occasions that “[u]nder the doctrine 
of stare decisis, principles of law deliberately examined and decided by a 
court of competent jurisdiction should not be lightly departed.” . . . [.]  
“Before this court overrules a decision deliberately made, it should be 
convinced not merely that the case was wrongly decided, but also that less 
injury will result from overruling than from following it.”  When it 
becomes apparent that the reasoning of an opinion is erroneous, and that 
less mischief will result from overruling the case rather than following it, it 
becomes the duty of the court to correct it.  [People v Graves, 458 Mich 
476, 480-481; 581 NW2d 229 (1998) (citations omitted) (alteration in 
original).] 
When performing a stare decisis analysis, this Court should review inter alia “whether 
the decision at issue defies ‘practical workability,’ whether reliance interests would work 
an undue hardship, and whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the 
questioned decision.”  Robinson, 462 Mich at 464 (citation omitted).  As for the reliance 
interest, “the Court must ask whether the previous decision has become so embedded, so 
accepted, so fundamental to everyone’s expectations that to change it would produce not 
just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations.”  Id. at 466.  
 
48 
When questions before this Court implicate the Constitution, this Court arguably 
has an even greater obligation to overrule erroneous precedent.  “[A] judicial tribunal is 
most strongly justified in reversal of its precedent when adherence to such precedent 
would perpetuate a plainly incorrect interpretation of the language of a constitutional 
provision or statute.”  Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 181; 615 NW2d 
702 (2000), citing Robinson, 462 Mich at 463-468.  This is because “the policy of stare 
decisis ‘is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation 
can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions.’ ”  
Kyser v Kasson Twp, 486 Mich 514, 534, n 15; 786 NW2d 543 (2010), quoting Agostini v 
Felton, 521 US 203, 235; 117 S Ct 1997; 138 L Ed 2d 391 (1997).  Thus, it is “our duty 
to reexamine a precedent where its reasoning or understanding of the Constitution is 
fairly called into question.”  Robinson, 462 Mich at 464, quoting Mitchell v W T Grant 
Co, 416 US 600, 627-628; 94 S Ct 1895; 40 L Ed 2d 406 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).  
Although Bender disclaimed reliance on Michigan’s Constitution, it nonetheless vaguely 
referred to its provisions in enacting its “prophylactic” rule, suggesting that this Court has 
a duty to review this decision under less deferential standards of stare decisis in light of 
our role as the final judicial arbiter of this Constitution.38 
                                              
38 Justice CAVANAGH’s dissent emphasizes that a stare decisis analysis should begin with 
the presumption that upholding precedent is the preferred course of action and that “when 
our caselaw concludes that the Michigan Constitution provides greater protection to our 
citizens than that provided by the federal Constitution, . . . ‘this Court should be required 
to show a compelling reason to depart from [that] past precedent.’ ”  Post at 24 (alteration 
in original) (citation omitted).  We agree that precedent should not be lightly overruled, 
and that a presumption should generally obtain in favor of upholding precedent, although 
we do not understand why particular precedents that have interpreted our Constitution in 
 
 
49 
We conclude that overruling Bender would not produce “practical real-world 
dislocations,” primarily because Bender obviously cannot be said to have caused suspects 
to “alter their conduct in any way.”  See People v Petit, 466 Mich 624, 635; 648 NW2d 
193 (2002).  As Moran noted, “[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect 
and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend 
and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.”  Moran, 475 US at 422.  It seems highly 
unlikely that a suspect being interrogated, after a day earlier having expressly refused to 
waive his right to counsel and then reconsidering that decision by affirmatively seeking 
to speak with police and then expressly waiving his right to counsel, would thereafter rely 
on Bender in determining that he need not ask for an attorney because the officers have a 
legal duty to inform him that an attorney has initiated contact with them.  Although a 
suspect might later come to have second thoughts and prefer that he had not waived his 
right to counsel, “[s]uch after-the-fact awareness does not rise to the level of a reliance 
interest because to have reliance the knowledge must be of the sort that causes a person 
or entity to attempt to conform his conduct to a certain norm before the triggering event.”  
Robinson, 462 Mich at 466-467.  Consequently, Bender has not become so “fundamental 
to everyone’s expectations” that to overrule it would result in “real-world dislocations.”  
Id. at 466.  Further, that Bender can fairly be considered to be “workable,” in the sense 
that the police may clearly understand their legal obligations to a defendant and his 
                                              
a manner different than similar language in the federal constitution should give rise to 
any special rule of stare decisis.    
 
50 
attorney, does not render “practically unworkable” a regime in which a defendant’s rights 
are just as clearly understood.  
Contrary to Bender, we do not believe that increased “mischief” will result from 
this Court’s failure to maintain the rule expounded in that case as the constitutional law 
of this state.  As already noted, we agree with Moran that the constitutional 
“voluntariness” of a confession or incriminating statement is not implicated by the failure 
of police to inform the defendant of the presence of an attorney before proceeding with a 
custodial interrogation after Miranda warnings have been given and Miranda rights 
waived.  Whether a defendant does or does not possess knowledge of an attorney’s 
outside presence cannot affect whether that defendant understands the rights that he or 
she is waiving, and neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has ever 
accepted the proposition that an attorney must be present in order that a Miranda waiver 
be characterized as “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”   
Moran accurately highlighted the competing policies informing both Miranda and 
its progeny, including Moran itself: 
Custodial interrogations implicate two competing concerns.  On the 
one hand, “the need for police questioning as a tool for effective 
enforcement of criminal laws” cannot be doubted.  Admissions of guilt are 
more than merely “desirable,” they are essential to society’s compelling 
interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.  On 
the other hand, the Court has recognized that the interrogation process is 
“inherently coercive” and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial 
risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between 
legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible 
compulsion.  Miranda attempted to reconcile these opposing concerns by 
giving the defendant the power to exert some control over the course of the 
interrogation. . . .  Police questioning, often an essential part of the 
investigatory process, could continue in its traditional form, the Court held, 
but only if the suspect clearly understood that, at any time, he could bring 
 
51 
the proceeding to a halt or, short of that, call in an attorney to give advice 
and monitor the conduct of his interrogators. 
The position urged by [defendant] would upset this carefully drawn 
approach in a manner that is both unnecessary for the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege and injurious to legitimate law enforcement.  
Because, as Miranda holds, full comprehension of the rights to remain 
silent and request an attorney are sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is 
inherent in the interrogation process, a rule requiring the police to inform 
the suspect of an attorney’s efforts to contact him would contribute to the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege only incidentally, if at all.  
This minimal benefit, however, would come at a substantial cost to 
society’s legitimate and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt.  
[Moran, 475 US at 426-427 (citations omitted).] 
The Moran Court’s concern that further protections against self-incrimination, such as 
those set forth in Bender, would impinge on the effectiveness of law enforcement are 
entirely valid, in our judgment.  Neither the Fifth Amendment nor Article 1, §  17 is 
hostile to custodial interrogations-- only to those in which there is some coercive 
environment.  Similarly, neither the Fifth Amendment nor Article 1, § 17 is hostile to 
confessions and self-incrimination-- only to those which are “compelled.”  Indeed, 
confessions and incriminating statements constitute perhaps the most compelling and 
important evidence available to fact-finders in the justice system’s search for truth.  
Suppression of such evidence as the result of a Bender violation deprives these fact-
finders of evidence allowing them to distinguish truth from falsity and innocence from 
guilt, while avoiding the conviction of innocent persons and the exoneration of guilty 
persons, all in pursuit of a principle that has never since the founding of our republic or 
state been viewed as a constitutional violation.39   
                                              
39 In his dissent, Justice CAVANAGH disagrees with the conclusion that Bender 
“impinge[s] on the effectiveness of law enforcement,” instead noting that “it does not 
appear that Michigan’s law enforcement has suffered from a serious inability to 
 
 
52 
Although overruling Bender will undeniably result in some unknown number of 
confessions and incriminating statements that might otherwise not have been provided, 
such evidence will have been voluntarily offered and have been preceded by “voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent” waivers of Miranda rights.  This evidence is to be welcomed, 
not repudiated, by any rational and effective criminal justice system.  It is hard to 
comprehend a societal interest that is furthered by protecting persons who have engaged 
in serious criminal activities from the consequences of their own voluntary and intelligent 
decisions.  While Justice CAVANAGH’s dissent claims that “this statement entirely ignores 
the overriding principle of our criminal justice system: that a suspect is presumed 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” post at 27, we are inclined 
instead to concur with Justice BOYLE who observed in her Bender dissent that, “[i]f 
properly administered and validly waived, the Miranda warnings ensure protection of a 
defendant’s right against compulsory self-incrimination, while at the same time allowing 
the police to fulfill their duty in a constitutionally permissible manner.”  Bender, 452 
Mich at 626 (BOYLE, J., dissenting). 
Because we believe that less, not more, “mischief” will likely result from 
overruling the case, we are further persuaded of the need to overrule Bender.  See 
                                              
effectively enforce the law in the 18 years since Bender was decided.”  Post at 28.  
However, as the prosecutor explained at oral argument, Bender violations frequently 
arise, and many of the negative effects of Bender are not obviously seen, but nonetheless 
exist, because “[b]y following Bender, confessions are never made so there’s never the 
motion to suppress . . . or the case is never solved so charges are never filed . . . .  [And] 
plea bargains are entered into that otherwise should not be, but have to be because of a 
Bender issue.”   
 
53 
Graves, 458 Mich at 480-481, citing McEvoy v Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich 172, 178; 98 
NW 1006 (1904) (stating that in reversing precedent, the Court “should be convinced not 
merely that the case was wrongly decided, but also that less injury will result from 
overruling than from following it”).  
V.  CONCLUSION 
An examination of Michigan’s Constitution and a review of this Court’s 
precedents compel the conclusion that Bender was wrongly decided and should now be 
overruled.  In accordance with Moran, we hold that “[o]nce it is determined that a 
suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he 
could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention to 
use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid 
as a matter of law.”  Moran 475 US at 422-423.  Although this Court need not interpret a 
provision of our Constitution in the same manner as a similar or identical federal 
constitutional provision, we are persuaded in the present instance, on the basis of our 
examination of Article 1, § 17, that the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment in Moran constitutes the proper 
interpretation of Article I, § 17 as well.  We reverse the trial court’s suppression of 
incriminating statements made by defendant during custodial interrogation and remand to 
that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
David F. Viviano 
 S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v   
No. 146211 
 
GEORGE ROBERT TANNER, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
 
 
In People v Bender, 452 Mich 594, 620; 551 NW2d 71 (1996) (opinion by 
CAVANAGH, J.); id. at 623 (opinion by BRICKLEY, C.J.), we held that police cannot 
conceal from suspects that counsel has been made available to them.1  Although that 
decision has stood for nearly 20 years, today the majority casts Bender aside as “wrongly 
decided.”  Because I continue to believe that Bender correctly announced a rule firmly 
rooted in the Michigan Constitution, I dissent.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The majority explains its decision by first stating that, in Moran v Burbine, 475 
US 412; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986), the United States Supreme Court reached 
the opposite conclusion.  However, as the majority acknowledges, the divergent results in 
                                              
1 This Court also reached the same conclusion in an earlier plurality opinion.  See People 
v Wright, 441 Mich 140; 490 NW2d 351 (1992). 
 
 
 
2 
Moran and Bender cannot support the majority’s conclusion that Bender was wrongly 
decided.  Indeed, according to the United States Supreme Court, “a State is free as a 
matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this 
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards.”  Oregon v Hass, 420 
US 714, 719; 95 S Ct 1215; 43 L Ed 2d 570 (1975), citing Cooper v California, 386 US 
58, 62; 87 S Ct 788; 17 L Ed 2d 730 (1967), and Sibron v New York, 392 US 40, 60-61; 
88 S Ct 1889; 20 L Ed 2d 917 (1968).  Moreover, Moran extended this broad premise to 
the exact issue at hand, stating, “[n]othing we say today disables the States from adopting 
different requirements for the conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state 
law.”  Moran, 475 US at 428.  Finally, we have consistently concluded that we are not 
bound in our understanding of the Michigan Constitution by any particular interpretation 
of the United States Constitution.  See, e.g., Harvey v Michigan, 469 Mich 1, 6 n 3; 664 
NW2d 767 (2003).    
 
Given that we are clearly free to interpret our Constitution more broadly than the 
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal Constitution, and the United 
States Supreme Court has permitted the creation of rules like the one from Bender, one 
must ask what is so wrong about Bender that it must be abandoned after nearly two 
decades of problem-free application in our state?  According to the majority, Michigan’s 
Constitution does not support Bender’s rule.  I disagree. 
 
 
 
3 
Although the language of Const 1963, art 1, § 17,2 is nearly identical to the 
language in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,3 that does not 
necessarily indicate that we must interpret our Constitution in a manner consistent with 
the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution.  Rather, 
when interpreting the Michigan Constitution, we must recognize the law as it existed in 
Michigan at the time the relevant constitutional provision was adopted, and “it must be 
presumed that a constitutional provision has been framed and adopted mindful of prior 
and existing law and with reference to them.”  People v Kirby, 440 Mich 485, 492; 487 
NW2d 404 (1992).  Accordingly, I will begin with a review of an opinion decided long 
before the ratifiers adopted the 1963 Constitution and cited for support in People v 
Wright, 441 Mich 140; 490 NW2d 351 (1992), and Bender: People v Cavanaugh, 246 
Mich 680; 225 NW 501 (1929).   
II.  PEOPLE V CAVANAUGH: THE ORIGIN OF BENDER’S FOUNDATION IN THE 
MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION 
In support of its conclusion that Bender is not rooted in the Michigan Constitution, 
the majority toils away for page after page of analysis arguing that the Michigan 
Constitution only protects a suspect from involuntary confessions.  Moreover, the 
majority limits the scope of “involuntary confessions” to only those confessions that 
satisfy the dictionary definition of “compelled.”   
                                              
2 Const 1963, art 1, § 17 states, in relevant part, “[n]o person shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” 
3 US Const, Am V, states in part that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself . . . .” 
 
 
 
4 
The result is that in the majority’s view, a confession is inadmissible under art 1, 
§ 17 only if the confession is obtained through “the use of coercion, violence, force, or 
pressure . . . .”  Ante at 22.  In fact, the majority concludes that our caselaw “focused 
entirely on the voluntariness of the confession,” which only excludes confessions 
“ ‘secured by inflicting physical force or its equivalent by means of harsh or cruel 
treatment . . . .’ ”  Ante at 37, quoting People v Louzon, 338 Mich 146, 153-154; 61 
NW2d 52 (1953) (emphasis added).4 
The problem with the majority’s view is twofold: first it is rooted in a hyper-
textualist analysis of the word “compelled” in art 1, § 17, an approach rejected in this 
area of law by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S 
Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), and throughout Miranda’s progeny.  See, e.g., Edwards 
v Arizona, 451 US 477, 484-485; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981) (explaining the 
protections applicable when an accused invokes the right to have counsel present during 
custodial interrogation).  Second, the majority singularly focuses on pre-Miranda 
caselaw.  Not surprisingly, that pre-Miranda caselaw does not use the terminology 
adopted in Miranda to explain the “knowing and intelligent” requirements.  Thus, by 
                                              
4 I recognize that the majority acknowledges that “Miranda has established an irreducible 
minimum standard for purposes of all custodial interrogations in Michigan,” ante at 23 
n 19, and thus agrees that a confession may also be inadmissible if a suspect’s waiver of 
rights is not made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.  However, by arguing that 
only “involuntary confessions” are prohibited under the Michigan Constitution and that 
the other limitations are only the product of Miranda’s interpretation of the federal 
Constitution, the majority erroneously concludes that our state courts never adopted a 
broader interpretation of the Michigan Constitution pre-Miranda, as will be explained 
later in this opinion. 
 
 
 
5 
focusing exclusively on the fact that pre-Miranda caselaw used the “voluntary 
confession” terminology, the majority determines that the pre-Miranda caselaw only 
prohibited the use of confessions obtained by “inflicting physical force” or “cruel 
treatment.”  However, simply because Michigan’s pre-Miranda caselaw did not use the 
terminology adopted in Miranda does not necessarily mean that our caselaw did not 
adopt an understanding of art 1, § 17 that is broader than the hyper-textualist meaning 
espoused by the majority.  Rather, we must consider the actual interrogation 
circumstances in those pre-Miranda opinions to determine whether we have historically 
interpreted our state Constitution to provide broader protection against self-incrimination 
than is provided in the federal Constitution. 
In 1929, long before adoption of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, we considered a 
case in which the police denied counsel’s request to speak with his client, whom the 
police were interrogating.  Cavanaugh, 246 Mich at 687.  In Cavanaugh, we found the 
police conduct impermissible, stating: 
“[H]olding an accused incommunicable, is condemned by every principle 
of fairness, . . . is forbidden by the constitutional guaranty of due process of 
law, and inhibited by the right of an accused to have the assistance of 
counsel. . . .  Holding an accused incommunicable to parents and counsel is 
a subtle and insidious method of intimidating and cowing . . . .”  [Id. at 686 
(emphasis added).] 
 
Cavanaugh also provided, “In this State . . . police [may not], having custody of one 
accused of crime, deny an attorney, employed by or in behalf of a prisoner, the right to 
see and advise the accused.”  Id. at 688 (emphasis added). 
 
 
 
6 
As I explained in Wright, “it is clear that Cavanaugh, in view of its reference to 
the law ‘[i]n this State,’ . . . was not referring to any rights under the federal constitution; 
rather, it was referring to the rights existing under our state constitution.”  Wright, 441 
Mich at 158 (opinion by CAVANAGH, C.J.) (emphasis added).  Indeed, this Court later 
concluded that Cavanaugh relied on “the Michigan constitutional guarantee of due 
process,” which was then contained in Const 1908, art 2, § 16, and is now found in the 
constitutional provision at issue—Const 1963, art 1, § 17.  People v Conte, 421 Mich 
704, 722; 365 NW2d 648 (1984).   
After understanding that Cavanaugh interpreted the Michigan Constitution, the 
next question is whether Cavanaugh interpreted the state constitutional language more 
broadly than the language of its federal counterpart.  As previously noted, Cavanaugh 
concluded that “holding an accused incommunicable . . . is forbidden by the 
constitutional guaranty of due process of law, and inhibited by the right of an accused to 
have the assistance of counsel.”  Cavanaugh, 246 Mich at 686 (emphasis added).  
Holding a suspect “incommunicable” is substantially different from “inflicting physical 
force” or “cruel treatment,” which, according to the majority, is the only type of 
“compulsion” that the Michigan Constitution prohibited pre-Miranda.  Nevertheless, 
Cavanaugh concluded that the defendant’s confession was obtained in violation of what 
is now art 1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution.  Thus, the majority’s claim—that we 
have not previously interpreted Michigan’s Constitution to provide protection against 
self-incrimination except with respect to confessions obtained by “ ‘inflicting physical 
 
 
 
7 
force’ ” or “ ‘by means of harsh or cruel treatment,’ ” ante at 37 (citation omitted)—is 
inconsistent with Cavanaugh. 
In order to sidestep this inconsistency, the majority argues that Cavanaugh is 
distinguishable from Bender because Cavanaugh concluded that the defendant’s 
confession was not voluntary, whereas Bender concluded that the defendant’s waiver of 
rights was not made knowingly.  The majority is correct that Cavanaugh did not mention 
whether the defendant’s waiver of rights was made “knowingly” under the Michigan 
Constitution and instead referred to the “voluntariness” of the confession.  However, as 
previously discussed, that is not surprising, given that Cavanaugh was decided 37 years 
before Miranda established the “knowing and intelligent” terminology referred to in 
Bender.  Yet, concluding that Cavanaugh did not create the foundation for Bender on 
these grounds is, in my opinion, an oversimplification of Cavanaugh. 
 
In my view, Cavanaugh foreshadowed Miranda’s understanding of the nature of 
the right protected by the constitutional guarantee that a person will not be “compelled” 
to be a witness against himself.  Because Cavanaugh referred to the “voluntariness” of 
the defendant’s confession, the majority insists that Cavanaugh is nothing more than a 
typical “voluntariness” case.  As a result, the majority assumes that Cavanaugh 
concluded that the confession was the product of impermissible “compulsion,” which the 
majority defines as “the use of coercion, violence, force, or pressure . . . .”  Ante at 22.  
However, by focusing on only the terms used in Cavanaugh, the majority overlooks the 
context in which the terms were used as well as the fact that Cavanaugh never mentioned 
the types of “compulsion” the majority discusses.  In fact, a police officer whose 
 
 
 
8 
testimony described the interrogation in Cavanaugh stated that the defendant “was not 
threatened in any manner by the officers nor was he offered any hope of reward nor any 
promises held to him for the signing of the statement . . . .”  Cavanaugh, 246 Mich at 
686-687.  Rather, Cavanaugh only referred to the impermissibility of “holding an 
accused incommunicable.”  Id. at 686 (emphasis added).  See, also, id. at 688 (noting that 
“[t]he defendant was held incommunicable”) (emphasis added).   
Critically, incommunicado interrogation was at the center of the United States 
Supreme Court’s explanation of the “knowing and intelligent” requirement in Miranda: 
“The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation’s 
most cherished principles—that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate 
himself.”  Miranda, 384 US at 457-458 (emphasis added).  Moreover, Miranda expressly 
acknowledged that incommunicado interrogation is not like coercion, violence, force, or 
pressure that the majority in this case discusses.  See id. at 457 (“To be sure, 
[incommunicado interrogation] is not physical intimidation . . . .”).  Nevertheless, 
Miranda concluded that incommunicado interrogation “is equally destructive of human 
dignity,” id., and, therefore, violates a suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
Because Cavanaugh’s explanation of the impropriety of the incommunicado 
interrogation methods used to extract the defendant’s confession is strikingly similar to 
the impermissible interrogation methods that Miranda discussed, Cavanaugh is, in my 
view, more properly classified as consistent with Miranda’s “knowing and intelligent” 
standard.  Stated differently, although Cavanaugh did not use the yet-to-be-created 
Miranda terminology, Cavanaugh nevertheless is consistent with Miranda’s analysis and 
 
 
 
9 
conclusion concerning knowing and intelligent waivers because Cavanaugh did not 
address coercive police conduct that affected the voluntariness of a suspect’s confession.5  
The majority rejects this view and instead concludes that Cavanaugh never “hinted that a 
defendant must have some idea of his or her ‘rights’ . . . .”  Ante at 39.  I disagree 
because, in my view, an obvious result of holding a suspect incommunicado is that the 
suspect will lack knowledge of his or her rights, a conclusion that is even truer when the 
suspect is unaware that counsel, who could educate the suspect on those rights, is actively 
seeking to communicate with the suspect.  Thus, in my view, Cavanaugh evidences that 
this Court did not interpret the Michigan Constitution to prohibit only confessions 
obtained by “inflicting physical force” or “cruel treatment.”  When viewed in this light, 
Cavanaugh supports Bender’s conclusion that denying counsel’s request to communicate 
with a suspect amounts to impermissible incommunicado interrogation in violation of 
Const 1963, art 1, § 17.6 
                                              
5 The fact that defense counsel did not adopt this view at oral argument is of no moment: 
“this Court is not bound by the [parties’] interpretation of the case and may consider and 
analyze the facts and issues independent of such concession.”  Camaj v S S Kresge Co, 
426 Mich 281, 290 n 6; 393 NW2d 875 (1986), citing  Sibron v New York, 392 US 40, 
58-59; 88 S Ct 1889; 20 L Ed 2d 917 (1968). 
6 The majority cites In re Moser, 138 Mich 302; 101 NW 588 (1904), and Paramount 
Pictures Corp v Miskinis, 418 Mich 708; 344 NW2d 788 (1984), in support of its 
conclusion that the Michigan Constitution has not been interpreted to provide more 
protection regarding self-incrimination than the federal Constitution.  However, Moser 
pre-dates Cavanaugh.  Because Cavanaugh granted the protection under the state 
Constitution, and the framers of the 1963 Michigan Constitution are presumed to have 
been aware of Cavanaugh, I do not believe that Moser supports the majority’s 
conclusion.  Regarding Paramount Pictures, that opinion did not cite Cavanaugh and 
thus provides no insight regarding Cavanaugh’s impact on our pre-Miranda 
 
 
 
 
10 
The majority also attempts to distinguish Cavanaugh from Bender by arguing that 
Miranda protects only against police coercion and Bender therefore “falls considerably 
outside the scope of the custodial interrogation process which defined the constitutional 
rationale for Miranda.”  Ante at 43, citing Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 170; 107 S 
Ct 515; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986).  Accordingly, the majority appears to argue that there is 
no material difference between the pre-Miranda test to determine whether a suspect’s 
confession was voluntary and the post-Miranda test to determine whether a suspect’s 
waiver was “knowing and intelligent.”  However, that approach ignores that Miranda 
requires analysis of two distinct prongs—the voluntariness prong and the knowing and 
intelligent prong.  Thus, the majority makes the 
fallacious assumption of a complete unity between the determinative 
factors of the pre-Miranda Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis 
(which was concerned solely with coercive police conduct that affected the 
voluntariness of a suspect’s confession) and the post-Miranda waiver 
analysis (which requires analysis of two distinct prongs, only one of 
which—i.e., voluntariness—is logically, or in any other respect, related to 
coercive police practices).  [People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 52-53; 551 
NW2d 355 (1996) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part).] 
Connelly does not, however, support the majority’s conclusion that Miranda protects 
only against police coercion.  Rather, Connelly simply held that “coercive police activity 
is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and determined that 
“[t]here is obviously no reason to require more in the way of a ‘voluntariness’ inquiry in 
the Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession context.”  
                                              
interpretation of the Michigan Constitution. 
 
 
 
11 
Connelly, 479 US 167, at 169-170 (emphasis added).  Thus, although it is unmistakable 
that coercive police conduct is as necessary to a finding of involuntariness under 
Miranda as it is under the substantive protection of the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause, “[i]t is only with respect to the completely distinct ‘knowing and 
intelligent’ prong of a Miranda waiver analysis . . . that coercive police conduct is not 
required, either by logic or by law.”  Cheatham, 453 Mich at 54 (CAVANAGH, J., 
concurring in part). 
That is not to say that courts should ignore police conduct when applying the 
knowing-and-intelligent prong of a Miranda analysis.  Police conduct may still be 
relevant to the knowing-and-intelligent prong because “any police conduct that could 
have an effect on a suspect’s requisite level of comprehension must be factored into the 
analysis[,]” which was clear before Connelly.  Id. at 55.  In fact, Moran, the very opinion 
the majority follows today, recognized that “the ‘deliberate or reckless’ withholding of 
information is objectionable as a matter of ethics,” but concluded that “such conduct is 
only relevant to the constitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a defendant of 
knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the 
consequences of abandoning them.”  Moran, 475 US at 423-424 (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, because Miranda protects suspects against more than just police coercion, 
Bender is not “outside the scope” of Miranda.   
The majority also argues that Cavanaugh is irrelevant because, in Cavanaugh, the 
police denied the suspect’s request for counsel, whereas Bender addressed denial of 
counsel’s request to communicate with a suspect.  However, Cavanaugh clearly 
encompassed police refusal to honor counsel’s requests to speak to the suspect.  
 
 
 
12 
Specifically, Cavanaugh quoted police testimony establishing that the police denied a 
request by the suspect’s father and a request by the suspect’s counsel to speak to the 
suspect.  Cavanaugh, 246 Mich at 686-687.  Citing those facts, Cavanaugh condemned 
the police conduct, stating: 
In this State a parent may not be denied the right to see and have 
conversation with a child in jail and accused of crime.  Neither may police, 
having custody of one accused of crime, deny an attorney, employed by or 
in behalf of a prisoner, the right to see and advise the accused.  [Id. at 688 
(emphasis added).] 
 
Thus, Cavanaugh is applicable not only to situations in which the suspect’s request for an 
attorney is denied, but to situations in which counsel’s request to speak to a suspect is 
denied, as well. 
 
Finally, the majority argues that Cavanaugh cannot support Bender because 
Cavanaugh employed a “totality of the circumstances” rule rather than the per se rule 
applied in Bender.  The fact that Cavanaugh and Bender differed on what test should 
result from police interference with counsel’s efforts to speak to a suspect does not lessen 
the fact that Cavanaugh and Bender agreed that such police conduct is unconstitutional 
under the Michigan Constitution.  Indeed, the police also ignored the defendant’s express 
request for counsel in Cavanaugh, but Cavanaugh nevertheless applied a totality of the 
circumstances rule.  As the majority recognizes, were those circumstances to occur today, 
the subsequent confession would be per se inadmissible under Miranda, 384 US at 474.  
However, Cavanaugh’s conclusion that ignoring the defendant’s request for counsel was 
unconstitutional is no less correct today simply because Cavanaugh applied a totality of 
 
 
 
13 
the circumstances rule rather than the Miranda per se rule.  Similarly, Cavanaugh’s 
conclusion that ignoring counsel’s request to communicate with the suspect was 
unconstitutional is no less correct today simply because Cavanaugh applied a totality of 
the circumstances rule rather than the Bender per se rule. 
 
Moreover, as I explained in Bender, “ ‘a purported waiver [of Miranda] can never 
satisfy a totality of the circumstances analysis when police do not even inform a suspect 
that his attorney seeks to render legal advice.’ ”  Bender, 452 Mich at 616 (opinion by 
CAVANAGH, J.), quoting Bryan v State, 571 A2d 170, 176 (Del, 1990) (emphasis 
omitted).  “ ‘When the opportunity to consult counsel is in fact frustrated, there is no 
room for speculation what defendant might or might not have chosen to do after he had 
that opportunity.’ ”  Bender, 452 Mich at 617 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.), quoting State 
v Haynes, 288 Or 59, 75; 602 P2d 272 (1979).  In fact, “ ‘police deception of a suspect 
through omission of information regarding attorney communications greatly exacerbates 
the inherent problems of incommunicado interrogation and requires a clear principle to 
safeguard the presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights.’ ”  Bender, 452 
Mich at 617 n 23 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.), quoting Moran, 475 US at 452 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting).  Accordingly, I continue to believe that the nature of “incommunicado 
interrogation requires a per se rule that can be implemented with ease and practicality to 
protect a suspect’s rights to remain silent and to counsel.”  Bender, 452 Mich at 617 
(opinion by CAVANAGH, J.).  
 
Once it is understood that Cavanaugh prohibited police interference with 
counsel’s efforts to communicate with a suspect based on the same state constitutional 
 
 
 
14 
language that was applied in Bender, the next question is whether Bender merely 
continued to apply Cavanaugh’s previously created rule or, as the majority argues, 
created a rule that did not exist before Bender.  Therefore, I will review Bender and the 
plurality opinions from Wright, 441 Mich 140, Bender’s predecessor. 
III.  PEOPLE V WRIGHT AND PEOPLE V BENDER 
 
As the majority explains, Bender resulted in multiple opinions, and only Chief 
Justice BRICKLEY’S opinion garnered four votes.  In addition, as the majority states, Chief 
Justice BRICKLEY’S opinion labeled the result of its holding a “prophylactic rule.”  
Bender, 452 Mich at 621 (opinion by BRICKLEY, C.J.).  However, I disagree with the 
majority that the arguably “prophylactic” character of the Bender rule deprives the rule of 
constitutional status.  Rather, considering Chief Justice BRICKLEY’S opinion in its 
entirety, it is clear that he viewed Bender’s “prophylactic” rule in the same mold as 
Miranda’s “prophylactic” rule.  See id. at 620-621 (expressing a preference to “approach 
the law enforcement practices that are at the core of this case in the same manner as the 
United States Supreme Court approached the constitutional interpretation task in 
[Miranda]; namely, by announcing a prophylactic rule”).  And, notably, the United States 
Supreme Court has since explained that although Miranda is labeled a “prophylactic” 
rule, it is nevertheless a constitutional rule.  See Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428, 
438-440, 444; 120 S Ct 2326; 147 L Ed 2d 405 (2000). 
 
Moreover, Chief Justice BRICKLEY’S Bender opinion indisputably recognized the 
constitutional underpinnings of its analysis.  For example, Chief Justice BRICKLEY noted 
that the case “rather clearly implicates both the right to counsel (Const 1963, art 1, § 20) 
 
 
 
15 
and the right against self-incrimination (Const 1963, art 1, § 17),” which are “part of the 
bedrock of constitutional civil liberties . . . .”  Bender, 452 Mich at 620, 621 (opinion by 
BRICKLEY, C.J.) (emphasis added).  Additionally, Chief Justice BRICKLEY determined 
that “it is difficult to accept and constitutionally justify a rule of law that accepts that law 
enforcement investigators, as part of a custodial interrogation, can conceal from suspects 
that counsel has been made available to them and is at their disposal.”  Id. at 621 
(emphasis added).  Thus, Chief Justice BRICKLEY concluded that any other rule would be 
“insufficient to guarantee a suspect’s constitutional rights.”  Id. at 623 (emphasis added). 
 
We also have the benefit of then Justice BRICKLEY’S further explanation of his 
Bender opinion by way of his dissent in People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43; 580 NW2d 404 
(1998).  In Sexton, a majority of this Court concluded that Bender did not apply 
retroactively and implied that Bender lacks a constitutional basis, as the majority 
concludes today.  However, Justice BRICKLEY explained that Bender’s “very purpose is 
to protect a suspect’s right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination”; 
therefore, “[t]o deny the constitutional import of [Bender] is to ignore the plain language” 
of the Bender opinion.  Id. at 70 (BRICKLEY, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, Justice BRICKLEY flatly concluded that “the majority’s conclusion that 
Bender does not implicate a defendant’s constitutional rights [is] wrong and without any 
viable legal support.”  Id. at 72. 
Regardless of whether Chief Justice BRICKLEY’S Bender opinion definitively 
rooted its analysis in the Michigan Constitution, I nevertheless retain my belief that the 
Bender rule is a product of our Constitution, because art 1, § 17 “requires the police to 
 
 
 
16 
inform the suspect that a retained attorney is immediately available to consult with him, 
and failure to so inform him before he confesses per se precludes a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent and to counsel.”  Bender, 452 Mich at 597 
(opinion by CAVANAGH, J.).   
As I did in Bender, I continue to recognize that “[u]nder federal law, a waiver is 
knowingly and intentionally made where no police coercion was involved and where the 
defendant understands that he has the right to remain silent and that the state intends to 
use what he says to secure a conviction.”  Id. at 612, citing Moran, 475 US at 422-423.  
However, it is also my opinion that “in Michigan, more is required before the trial court 
may find a knowing and intelligent waiver.”  Bender, 452 Mich at 612 (opinion by 
CAVANAGH, J.).  Specifically, “in order for a defendant to fully comprehend the nature of 
the right being abandoned and the consequences of his decision to abandon it, he must 
first be informed that counsel, who could explain the consequences of a waiver decision, 
has been retained to represent him.”  Id. at 612-613.  This is true because  
“[w]hen that information is withheld, the suspect’s waiver of the right to 
counsel and to remain silent is more abstract than real, becoming, in effect, 
a waiver of a theoretical right that is uninformed by the material knowledge 
that retained counsel, present and available to assist the suspect in the full 
exercise of his or her rights, is just outside the door.”  [Id. at 612 n 16, 
quoting State v Reed, 133 NJ 237, 274; 627 A2d 630 (1993).] 
 
Stated differently, I am  
 
“unwilling . . . 
to 
dismiss 
counsel’s 
effort 
to 
communicate 
as 
constitutionally insignificant to the capacity of the suspect to make a 
knowing and intelligent choice whether he or she will invoke the right to 
counsel.  Miranda warnings refer only to an abstract right to counsel.  That 
a suspect validly waives the presence of counsel only means that for the 
moment the suspect is foregoing the exercise of that conceptual privilege.  
 
 
 
17 
Faced with a concrete offer of assistance, however, a suspect may well 
decide to reclaim his or her continuing right to legal assistance.  To pass up 
an abstract offer to call some unknown lawyer is very different from 
refusing to talk with an identified attorney actually available to provide at 
least initial assistance and advice, whatever might be arranged in the long 
run.  A suspect indifferent to the first offer may well react quite differently 
to the second.  We cannot therefore conclude that a decision to forego the 
abstract offer contained in Miranda embodies an implied rejection of a 
specific opportunity to confer with a known lawyer.”  [Bender, 452 Mich at 
612 n 16 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.), quoting State v Stoddard, 206 Conn 
157, 168; 537 A2d 446 (1988) (quotation marks omitted).] 
 
Finally, in response to today’s majority, I reiterate my response to the Bender 
dissent’s assertion that the Michigan Constitution’s privilege against self-incrimination 
provides no greater protection than the Fifth Amendment: “when interpreting art 1, § 17, 
there is an absence of a direct link to federal interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.  
Thus, it does not logically follow that in interpreting art 1, § 17, we must find compelling 
reasons to interpret our constitution more liberally than the federal constitution.”  Bender, 
452 Mich at 613 n 17 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.).  Rather, this Court must conduct a 
searching examination to discover what law the people of this state have made.  Id. 
I also note that Justice BRICKLEY’S dissent in Sexton, 458 Mich at 69-70 
(BRICKLEY, J., dissenting), and my opinion in Bender, 452 Mich at 611-612 (opinion by 
CAVANAGH, J.), cited the plurality opinions in Wright.  Thus, although no opinion in 
Wright garnered majority support, Wright provides further insight into the constitutional 
basis for the Bender rule. 
In Wright, Justice MALLETT, joined by Justice LEVIN, explained that “[u]nder 
Const 1963, art 1, § 17, a criminal suspect is given the right against self-incrimination, a 
right similar to that provided in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”  
 
 
 
18 
Wright, 441 Mich at 154 (opinion by MALLETT, J.) (emphasis added).  Thus, Justice 
MALLETT recognized that the right against self-incrimination under the Michigan 
Constitution is not necessarily exactly the same as the “similar” right under the federal 
Constitution merely because the language of the two Constitutions is nearly the same.  
Rather, the state right may be broader.  Indeed, Justice MALLETT concluded just that 
when he explained that the defendant’s “confession, made without [knowledge of his 
attorney’s efforts to speak to him], violated the rights afforded under the Michigan 
Constitution.”  Id. at 155 (emphasis added). 
I concurred with Justice MALLETT’S conclusion that the privilege against self-
incrimination under the Michigan Constitution is broader than the privilege under the 
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.  Wright, 441 Mich 
at 155-156 (opinion by CAVANAGH, C.J.).  I provided further support for that conclusion 
by noting that, as far back as 1929, this Court had determined that the privilege against 
self-incrimination under the state Constitution made it unlawful for police to deny an 
attorney access to his client.  Id. at 157-158, citing Cavanaugh, 246 Mich 680.  Finally, 
Justice BRICKLEY also authored a concurring opinion in Wright, emphasizing the holding 
in Cavanaugh in support of the conclusion that the Michigan Constitution provides a 
broader privilege against self-incrimination than the federal Constitution.  Wright, 441 
Mich at 168 (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.), citing Cavanaugh, 246 Mich 680. 
Therefore, after tracing the rule prohibiting the police from denying an attorney 
access to a client undergoing police interrogation from Bender back to Wright, it is clear 
that although there has not always been majority support for a single view, the justices in 
 
 
 
19 
support of the Bender rule rooted their analysis in the Michigan Constitution.  Moreover, 
those justices necessarily relied on Cavanaugh (as evidenced by the Bender opinions’ 
citations of the Wright opinions, which cited Cavanaugh) as the primary source for the 
broader interpretation of the right against self-incrimination under the Michigan 
Constitution.7 
By rejecting Bender on the grounds that it lacks moorings in the Michigan 
Constitution, the majority erroneously adopts a “literal application” of Const 1963 art 1, 
§ 17, and “ignore[s] the jurisprudential history of this Court” embodied in Cavanaugh 
and continued in Wright and Bender “in favor of the analysis of the United States 
Supreme Court . . . .”  Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 744, 758; 506 NW2d 209 
(1993).  In doing so, the majority “disregard[s] the guarantees that our constitution 
confers on Michigan citizens merely because the United States Supreme Court has . . . 
not extended such protection.”  Id. at 759. 
 
 
                                              
7 The majority rejects this conclusion, positing that “this Court did not rely on 
Cavanaugh for the proposition that the compulsory self-incrimination provision 
contained in Article 1, § 17 provides protections that extend beyond those afforded by the 
Fifth Amendment.”  However, in the same breath, the majority concedes that my opinion 
in Wright cited Cavanaugh for the premise that a violation of the protections that are now 
contained in art 1, § 17 occurs when the police conceal from a suspect that counsel has 
been made available to him.  See Wright, 441 Mich at 157-158 (opinion by CAVANAGH, 
C.J.).  Moreover, Bender cited Wright for support.  See, e.g., Bender, 452 Mich at 611-
612 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.).  Accordingly, the majority is misguided in its 
interpretation of Cavanaugh’s effect on the analysis in Wright and Bender. 
 
 
 
20 
IV.  ADDITIONAL AND INDEPENDENT SUPPORT FOR BENDER IN THE 
MICHIGAN CONSTITUTION 
Although I believe that art 1, § 17 of our Constitution fully supports Bender, as I 
explained in Wright, 441 Mich at 156-157 (opinion by CAVANAGH, C.J.), a rule 
prohibiting police efforts to deprive a suspect of the knowledge that his lawyer is 
attempting to contact him is also alternatively supported by art 1, § 20.8  See, also, 
Bender, 452 Mich at 611 n 14 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.) (citing Wright for the 
conclusion that “Const 1963, art 1, § 20 . . . supported suppression of the defendant’s 
statement”). 
“There is some overlap between the privilege against self-incrimination . . . and 
the right to counsel;” however, “ ‘the right to counsel cases are concerned with the 
integrity of the adversarial process.’ ”  Wright, 441 Mich at 156 n 2 (opinion by 
CAVANAGH, C.J.), quoting Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: 
Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used 
Evidence, 87 Mich L Rev 907, 928 (1989).  As I stated in Wright, 441 Mich at 156 n 2 
(opinion by CAVANAGH, C.J.), I believe that permitting police to frustrate counsel’s 
efforts to communicate with a suspect “threatens the adversarial system by allowing the 
police to manipulate the interrogation process,” which is particularly problematic in 
Michigan, given that under the decision of a majority of this Court in People v Cipriano, 
431 Mich 315; 429 NW2d 781 (1988), police can purposely delay a suspect’s 
                                              
8 Const 1963, art 1, § 20 states, in relevant part, “[i]n every criminal prosecution, the 
accused shall have the right to . . . have the assistance of counsel for his or her 
defense . . . .” 
 
 
 
21 
arraignment.  In my view, the majority today exacerbates the errors in Cipriano by 
sanctioning police efforts during that prearraignment period to obstruct a lawyer’s 
attempts to contact and advise his client, and to keep the suspect in the dark about the 
lawyer’s attempts. 
Kirby v Illinois, 406 US 682, 688; 92 S Ct 1877; 32 L Ed 2d 411 (1972), 
established the federal limitation on when the right to counsel attaches: the right attaches 
“only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against 
him.”  Kirby further stated that, as an example, the right attaches “at the time of 
arraignment . . . .”  Id.   However, in Michigan, the federal limitation was at least partially 
rejected in People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155; 205 NW2d 461 (1973), and People v 
Jackson, 391 Mich 323, 338; 217 NW2d 22 (1974) (stating that “independent of any 
Federal constitutional mandate, . . . both before and after commencement of the judicial 
phase of a prosecution, a suspect is entitled to be represented by counsel at a corporeal 
identification or a photographic identification”).9  Therefore, “[a]lthough Jackson and 
Anderson were not explicitly premised on either the Sixth Amendment or Const 1963, 
art 1, § 20, they support the view that prearraignment events can trigger our state 
constitutional right to counsel.”  Wright, 441 Mich at 159-160 (opinion by CAVANAGH, 
C.J.).   
                                              
9 I recognize that, in People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602; 684 NW2d 267 (2004), a majority 
of this Court overruled Anderson and its progeny, including Jackson.  However, I 
continue to believe that this Court erred when it overruled Anderson for the reasons stated 
in Justice MARILYN KELLY’s dissent in Hickman.  Id. at 611-621 (MARILYN KELLY, J., 
dissenting). 
 
 
 
22 
I continue to believe that Jackson’s and Anderson’s rejection of the Kirby 
restriction is proper because the Kirby restriction is arbitrary.  Specifically, as explained 
in Patterson v Illinois, 487 US 285, 290 n 3; 108 S Ct 2389, 101 L Ed 2d 261 (1988), 
post-indictment Miranda waivers are sufficient only until an actual attorney-client 
relationship is established and nothing changes at the time of formal charging if there was 
no attorney-client relationship yet established.  Thus, “[t]he converse must also hold true: 
If an attorney-client relationship exists before arraignment, nothing will change at the 
time of arraignment to cause the right to counsel to suddenly blossom where none existed 
before.”  Wright, 441 Mich at 160 (opinion by CAVANAGH, C.J.).  Accordingly, Anderson 
and Jackson correctly recognized that there are “critical stages” in prosecution that can 
occur before formal charging.  I continue to believe that “custodial interrogation of an 
accused who is represented by counsel is just such a situation.”  Id. at 160-161.  
Moreover, in my view, “the police can be held accountable for knowing that the accused 
is represented by counsel ‘to the extent that the attorney or the suspect informs the police 
of the representation.’ ” Id. at 161, quoting Moran, 475 US at 460 n 46 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).   
Accordingly, because I believe that a suspect “faced with custodial interrogation 
has the specific right, as part of his overall right to counsel, to be informed of his 
attorney’s attempts to contact him,” I would hold that “a waiver of that right cannot be 
valid when the police merely inform the suspect, in generalized terms, that he has the 
right to a lawyer if he wishes.”  Wright, 441 Mich at 161 n 5 (opinion by CAVANAGH, 
C.J.).  Simply stated, “[a] defendant cannot knowingly and intelligently waive his specific 
 
 
 
23 
right to speak with an attorney who is immediately available and trying to contact him 
when he is unaware that the attorney is available and trying to contact him.”  Id.  Instead, 
in my view, “the waiver can only be valid if the suspect is timely and accurately informed 
of his attorney’s immediate availability and attempts to contact him, and then knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to see the attorney.”  Id. 
In summary, contrary to the majority’s conclusion that Bender lacks any 
connection to the Michigan Constitution, our caselaw establishes that Bender is firmly 
rooted in art 1, § 17.  Accordingly, Bender was properly decided and should not be 
overruled.  Moreover, in my view, Bender is also supported by the right to counsel under 
art 1, § 20.   
V.  STARE DECISIS 
In light of the preceding analysis, it is clear that Bender is founded on the 
Michigan Constitution and is consistent with this Court’s prior precedent.  Bender was 
correctly decided and no further stare decisis consideration is needed.  However, even 
accepting the majority’s faulty conclusion that Bender was wrongly decided, I do not 
agree that its decision to overrule Bender is supported by stare decisis principles. 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that the doctrine of stare decisis 
“promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, 
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity 
of the judicial process.”  Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 827; 111 S Ct 2597; 115 L Ed 
2d 720 (1991).  Our longstanding doctrine of stare decisis provides that “principles of law 
deliberately examined and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction should not be 
 
 
 
24 
lightly departed.”  Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452 Mich 354, 365; 550 NW2d 215 
(1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197; 731 NW2d 41 (2007).  As a result, 
“a stare decisis analysis should always begin with the presumption that upholding the 
precedent involved is the preferred course of action.”  Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 
300, 317; 773 NW2d 564 (2009) (opinion by MARILYN KELLY, C.J.).  Thus, “overturning 
precedent requires more than a mere belief that a case was wrongly decided,” McCormick 
v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 211; 795 NW2d 517 (2010), and the presumption in favor of 
upholding precedent “should be retained until effectively rebutted by the conclusion that 
a compelling justification exists to overturn the precedent.”  Petersen, 484 Mich at 317 
(opinion by MARILYN KELLY, C.J.). 
Moreover, when our caselaw concludes that the Michigan Constitution provides 
greater protection to our citizens than that provided by the federal Constitution, I believe 
“this Court should be required to show a compelling reason to depart from [that] past 
precedent.”  Goldston, 470 Mich at 559 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting), citing People v 
Collins, 438 Mich 8, 50; 475 NW2d 684 (1991) (CAVANAGH, C.J., dissenting).   
Several of the criteria discussed in Petersen10 weigh in favor of upholding Bender 
rather than overruling it: (1) Bender provides a practical and workable rule; (2) facts and 
                                              
10 In Petersen, Chief Justice MARILYN KELLY provided a nonexhaustive list of criteria for 
consideration when a court engages in a stare decisis analysis, but no single criterion is 
determinative, and a given criterion need only be evaluated if relevant.  Petersen, 484 
Mich at 320 (opinion by MARILYN KELLY, C.J.).  By expanding on the test from 
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), which the majority 
applies, Petersen’s test is also more respectful of precedent than Robinson. 
 
 
 
25 
circumstances have not changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed 
Bender of significant application or justification; (3) other jurisdictions have adopted 
rules similar to Bender that are more protective of the privilege against self-incrimination 
than the federal rule; and (4) overruling Bender is likely to result in serious detriment 
prejudicial to public interests.  See Petersen, 484 Mich at 320 (opinion by MARILYN 
KELLY, C.J.). 
Bender’s per se rule prohibiting police interference with counsel’s efforts to 
communicate with a suspect is easily understood by the police and creates little, if any, 
uncertainty regarding what is required: the police must inform a suspect that counsel has 
been retained for him and is attempting to contact him.  Bender, 452 Mich at 620 
(opinion by CAVANAGH, J.).  See, also, Wright, 441 Mich at 163-164 (opinion by 
CAVANAGH, C.J.) (stating that “if an attorney takes diligent steps to inform the police that 
he represents and wishes to contact a suspect held in custody, the police must take prompt 
and diligent steps to inform the suspect of that fact”).  Accordingly, as even the majority 
admits, Bender provides a practical and workable rule.  See ante at 49-50.  This factor 
therefore weighs heavily in favor of upholding Bender. 
Nevertheless, the majority inexplicably applies an approach that merely pays lip 
service to the obvious practical workability of Bender while primarily considering 
whether a regime other than the Bender rule might be equally workable.  A stare decisis 
analysis focuses on the established rule’s workability; not whether some other rule may 
or may not be applied as easily as the established rule.  See Petersen, 484 Mich at 320 
(opinion of MARILYN KELLY, C.J.) (considering “whether the rule has proven to be 
intolerable because it defies practical workability”) (emphasis added); and Robinson, 462 
 
 
 
26 
Mich at 464 (considering “whether the decision at issue [i.e., the established rule] defies 
‘practical workability’ ”) (emphasis added).  That focus on the established rule is 
consistent with the understanding that upholding the precedent involved is “the preferred 
course, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of 
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and 
perceived integrity of the judicial process.”  Hohn v United States, 524 US 236, 251; 118 
S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  See, also, 
Petersen, 484 Mich at 317 (opinion by MARILYN KELLY, C.J.).  The majority’s faulty 
stare decisis analysis features its attempt to manipulate this factor with an approach that 
lacks any support in caselaw and all but ignores the practical workability of the existing 
rule. 
Further supporting the conclusion that Bender should not be overruled is the fact 
that circumstances have not come to be seen so differently as to have robbed Bender of 
significant justification.  Indeed, protection of a citizen’s constitutional rights within the 
custodial-interrogation setting remains as important today as it was when Bender was 
decided 18 years ago, as evidenced by this Court’s and the United States Supreme 
Court’s repeated consideration of the issue. 
Moreover, many states have, as Michigan did in Bender, recognized that Moran 
merely establishes a minimum requirement and have determined that their citizens enjoy 
greater state constitutional protection than afforded by Moran.11  As a result, Bender is 
                                              
11 See, e.g., Stoddard, 206 Conn at 164-167 (declining to follow Moran based on state 
precedent interpreting the state constitution); Bryan v State, 571 A2d 170, 176-177 (Del, 
1990) (same); Commonwealth v Mavredakis, 430 Mass 848, 858-860; 725 NE2d 169 
 
 
 
 
27 
far from unique in concluding that state law provides greater constitutional protections 
than the federal Constitution regarding the privilege against self-incrimination.  Although 
I recognize that some states have adopted Moran as consistent with the protections 
provided by their state Constitutions, the fact that the states are divided on the issue at 
most renders this factor neutral. 
Finally, in my view, the most significant factor in favor of upholding Bender is 
that the majority’s contrary decision is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to 
public interests.  The majority disagrees, claiming that “[i]t is hard to comprehend a 
societal interest that is furthered by protecting persons who have engaged in serious 
criminal activities from the consequences of their own voluntary and intelligent 
decisions.”  Ante at 52.  To begin with, this statement entirely ignores the overriding 
principle of our criminal justice system: that a suspect is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, whether there is a “societal interest” in 
protecting any particular conduct of a person who has “engaged in serious criminal 
activities” is entirely irrelevant.  However, in my view, the “societal interest” in 
                                              
(2000) (same); State v Roache, 148 NH 45, 49-51; 803 A2d 572 (2002) (same); People v 
McCauley, 163 Ill 2d 414, 423-425; 206 Ill Dec 671; 645 NE2d 923 (1994) (same); State 
v Simonsen, 319 Or 510, 514-518; 878 P2d 409 (1994) (same); Roeder v State, 768 SW2d 
745, 753-754 (Tex App Ct, 1988) (same); Reed, 133 NJ at 250 (declining to follow 
Moran in light of state statutory and common law); Haliburton v State, 514 So 2d 1088, 
1090 (Fla, 1987) (declining to follow Moran and finding a violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Florida Constitution); and West v Commonwealth, 887 SW2d 338, 342-343 
(Ky, 1994) (declining to follow Moran because the Kentucky Constitution provides 
greater protection than the federal Constitution and a state criminal rule providing access 
to counsel predating Moran remained applicable).  See, also, Reed, 133 NJ at 265 (noting 
that “[p]rior to Moran, a majority of states followed a rule similar to” Bender). 
 
 
 
28 
protecting the ability of those merely accused of a crime to make a truly “knowing and 
intelligent” waiver of their constitutional rights is of the highest order.  Moreover, “if law 
enforcement officers adhere to [Bender], there will be no reversal of convictions on the 
basis of failure by officers to inform the suspect that his counsel wished to speak with 
him before he made a confession.”  Bender, 452 Mich at 597 n 1 (opinion by CAVANAGH, 
J.).  Therefore, if a Bender violation occurs, “it will be a government agent, and not this 
Court, that is responsible for thwarting and hampering cases of urgent social 
concern . . . .”  Id.   
Moreover, I disagree with the majority’s subjective and unsupported conclusion 
that Bender “impinge[s] on the effectiveness of law enforcement . . . .”  Ante at 51.  For 
starters, it does not appear that Michigan’s law enforcement has suffered from a serious 
inability to effectively enforce the law in the 18 years since Bender was decided.12  
Apparently, the many other states that have declined to follow Moran have likewise 
managed to avoid becoming lawless wastelands of crime, despite the majority’s concern.  
See, also, Moran, 475 US at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that an argument similar 
to the majority’s “is not supported by any reference to the experience in the states that 
have adopted” a rule similar to Bender), and Goldston, 470 Mich at 568-569 
                                              
12 The majority disagrees, arguing, “the negative effects of Bender are not obviously 
seen . . . .”  Ante at 51 n 39.  In my view, Bender protects our citizen’s constitutional 
rights; accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that Bender’s effects 
are “negative.”  Likewise, the majority’s recitation of the prosecution’s protestations 
against Bender could apply with equal force to other constitutional protections afforded 
to criminal suspects.  Nevertheless, we uphold these constitutional protections.  We 
should do the same with Bender because the goal is justice through proper application of 
constitutional principles, not convictions at any cost. 
 
 
 
29 
(CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) (considering the similar concern of the majority in that case 
“that the high cost of the exclusionary rule exacts too great a toll on our justice system” 
and noting that “our state has managed to exist for decades with the exclusionary rule and 
our streets have yet to become teeming with criminals”). 
Although I think that the majority’s concern that Bender unduly interferes with 
law enforcement is exaggerated, I am nevertheless aware that the Bender rule “may 
decrease the likelihood that interrogating officers will secure a confession.”  Bender, 452 
Mich at 618 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.).  However, that cost must be balanced against 
the result of the majority’s favored rule.  “[P]olice deception of a suspect through 
omission of information regarding attorney communications greatly exacerbates the 
inherent problems of incommunicado interrogation . . . .”  Moran, 475 US at 452 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  Accordingly, while confessions “are not only a valid, but also 
an essential part of law enforcement,” Bender, 452 Mich at 597 n 1 (opinion by 
CAVANAGH, J.), “ ‘[t]he quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely measured by the 
methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law.’ ”  Miranda, 384 US at 480, 
quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv L Rev 1, 26 
(1956).   
 
No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is 
permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, 
[his rights to remain silent and to counsel].  If the exercise of constitutional 
rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then 
there is something very wrong with that system.  [Escobedo v Illinois, 378 
US 478, 490; 84 S Ct 1758; 12 L Ed 2d 977 (1964).]   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Bender has stood undisturbed for nearly 20 years and has foundations as far back 
as 1929.  See Cavanaugh, 246 Mich 680.  Moreover, Bender correctly determined that art 
1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution provides Michigan’s citizens greater protection than 
its federal counterpart.  That conclusion, in my view, is further supported by the Court’s 
interpretation of art 1, § 20 of our Constitution.  Finally, the doctrine of stare decisis 
weighs against overruling Bender.  Accordingly, I dissent.  
 
 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
 
 S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v   
No. 146211 
 
GEORGE ROBERT TANNER, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
MCCORMACK, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to use this case as a vehicle for 
overruling People v Bender, 452 Mich 594; 551 NW2d 71 (1996).  While I agree with the 
majority that “stare decisis is a principle of policy rather than an inexorable command,” I 
do not find adequate reason to depart from the “preferred course” of leaving Bender’s 
settled precedent intact.  Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463-464; 613 NW2d 307 
(2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  First, I do not share the majority’s confidence 
that the rule recognized in Bender lacks a constitutional basis.  Rather, I agree with 
Justice CAVANAGH that this rule is well moored in Article 1, § 17 of the Michigan 
Constitution, with its jurisprudential roots set in People v Cavanaugh, 246 Mich 680; 225 
NW 501 (1929).  I appreciate and, in certain respects, share the majority’s dissatisfaction 
with Bender’s fractured treatment of this issue; none of the shortcomings I see in the 
opinion, however, are sufficient to undermine the substantive integrity of its conclusion 
or render it “wrongly decided.”  
 
 
 
2 
Nor, in my mind, would any other consideration favor disruption of that 
precedent.1  As Justice CAVANAGH aptly explains, in the nearly twenty years since 
Bender was decided, there has been no indication that its straightforward rule has defied 
practical workability in any respect, or has produced the “mischief” and harm of which 
the prosecution and majority warn.2  Rather, by now removing this simple and settled 
rule, the majority works an undue detriment upon the constitutional protection long 
recognized by this Court and relied upon by the people of Michigan: that should they find 
themselves detained as suspects of a crime, they will not be held incommunicado from 
those who have been retained or appointed to advise them.  And I see no changes in the 
law or facts that render Bender’s recognition and implementation of this principle no 
                                              
1 Justice CAVANAGH applies Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 317-320; 773 
NW2d 564 (2009) (opinion by MARILYN KELLY, C.J.), to reach this same conclusion.  
While I do not likewise rely on that case or framework, I find that much of the substance 
of his reasoning applies with equal force under the governing standard set forth in 
Robinson.  See Robinson, 462 Mich at 464 (explaining that, before this Court overrules a 
precedent it deems “wrongly decided,” it “should also review whether the decision at 
issue defies ‘practical workability,’ whether reliance interests would work an undue 
hardship, and whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the questioned 
decision”). 
2 Indeed, I, like Justice CAVANAGH, have difficulty seeing how a rule requiring police to 
inform suspects of their counsel’s availability might produce any sort of detriment with 
which our society should be duly concerned.  I have even more difficulty with the 
majority’s suggestion that such a rule might harm those suspects themselves, because 
“police officers and prosecutors will almost certainly be more reluctant to facilitate 
counsel before one is legally required if the consequence is the suppression of evidence.”  
Ante at 45 n 37.  It is, of course, the deliberate concealment of counsel, not the facilitation 
of it, that merits suppression under Bender.  Bender’s rule would thus only discourage the 
police and prosecution from assisting in the procurement of counsel if they planned to 
withhold that counsel from the suspect—which would be a peculiar form of “facilitation” 
from the suspect’s perspective, to say the least, and one not likely to be missed.  
 
 
 
3 
longer justified.  To the contrary, our current debate over the propriety of that rule simply 
echoes the one taken up by the Bender Court years ago; its contours have remained the 
same, as have the arguments and authority offered by each side in support.  The Justices 
involved have changed (for the most part), but of course that does not warrant 
disturbance of our precedent. 
I do, however, see one meaningful difference between the instant case and Bender, 
and it too counsels against the majority’s chosen course.  As the majority stresses, there 
was no dispute in Bender that the defendants made their incriminating statements to the 
police without requesting or even expressing interest in securing the representation of 
counsel beforehand.  Nonetheless, those statements were suppressed because the police 
did not inform the defendants of the counsel that their parents had unilaterally decided to 
retain for them.  This fact animated the Bender dissent’s chief objections to that 
decision’s per se rule, shared by the majority here: that it permits suppression of 
confessions based strictly on circumstances beyond the cognizance and apparent concern 
of the suspect, the individual to whom the constitutional rights at issue belong.  See 
Bender, 452 Mich at 649-650, 656 (BOYLE, J., dissenting). 
The instant case, however, is not Bender, and these concerns are not implicated.  
For, unlike the defendants in Bender, the defendant’s incriminating statements in this 
case only came after he repeatedly expressed his desire for counsel but to no avail.  The 
first request came when the defendant was initially taken into custody on the morning of 
October 17, 2011.  Upon being read his rights, the defendant indicated that he would not 
waive them and requested that counsel be provided to him.  The interrogating detectives 
acknowledged the request but nonetheless continued to press him into talking; the 
 
 
 
4 
defendant, however, again asserted his right to counsel, reiterating, “I would like a lawyer 
for consultation.”  The defendant was then returned to lock-up, and heard nothing further 
regarding his requests.  His next request came the following day, when the jail 
administrator came to see the defendant in response to his statement to a mental health 
worker that he “had some things he wanted to get off of his chest.”  When the 
administrator asked if the defendant “want[ed] to talk to somebody,” the defendant said 
yes, and asked, “[C]an you get me an attorney?”  After telling the defendant that 
procuring an attorney was not his job, the administrator offered to get the detectives 
instead—the same ones from whom the defendant had already requested counsel.  The 
defendant acquiesced.  The defendant’s interest in the assistance of counsel was 
sufficiently clear at this time that the jail administrator and police contacted the county 
prosecutor, who arranged for counsel to be appointed and sent to the jail.  Nonetheless, at 
no point during his custody was the defendant given any indication that his rightful 
requests for counsel would ever, in fact, be honored, regardless of whom or how often he 
asked—let alone that such counsel had been appointed and was readily available to assist 
him.   
It was under these circumstances that the defendant’s waiver of rights and 
incriminating statements were made.  The defendant stressed these circumstances in 
arguing for suppression,3 and they, in turn, drove the trial court’s determination to that 
effect: 
                                              
3 The majority notes that defense counsel conceded before the trial court that the 
defendant’s eventual waiver of his Miranda rights was “made voluntarily.”  It is entirely 
clear, however, that counsel did not intend this concession to suggest that the defendant’s 
 
 
 
 
5 
Given these facts, the attorney was there, the police knew it, he was not 
permitted to go back and see his client. . . . [The defendant], who had once 
invoked his right to remain silent and had indicated at least on the 18th with 
knowledge to the police officials that he might possibly be interested in an 
attorney, was not told that one was there waiting for him.  Based upon that, 
I will grant the motion of the Defendant to suppress [his] confession . . . . [4]   
                                              
unrequited requests for counsel bore no improper influence over his subsequent waiver 
and confession; rather, counsel consistently emphasized these requests and how they 
made suppression all the more warranted here than in Bender—a proposition, as 
discussed below, with which the trial court appeared to agree.  See Defendant’s Brief in 
Support of Motion to Suppress Statement (explaining that, unlike in Bender, the 
defendant here invoked his right to counsel, “mak[ing] the police officers[’] actions of 
not informing the Defendant that an attorney had been appointed to represent him and 
was present at the jail when they gave him Miranda rights, all the more curious”); 
Evidentiary Hearing Closing Argument by Defense Counsel (stressing at the outset of his 
closing argument in favor of suppression that “once [the defendant] invoked his right to 
an attorney he never really received a benefit from it”; arguing further that the 
defendant’s “case is even stronger than” Bender because, inter alia, when the prosecutor 
was contacted, resulting in appointment of counsel, “it’s uncontested that there was a 
request for a lawyer”; and questioning the prosecution’s suggestion that appointed 
counsel “was only on standby,” to be made available only “if [the defendant] guessed 
after asking for a lawyer twice that somehow one would be there for him”). 
4 Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority’s characterization of the trial court’s 
ruling as simply that the “defendant’s statement required suppression under Bender, 
because the police officers had failed to inform him that an attorney was present at the 
jail and had established contact with the officers.”  Ante at 4.  While this failure was 
certainly enough in itself to warrant suppression under Bender, it is apparent that the trial 
court also found significant that this failure came in the face of the defendant’s repeated 
requests for counsel.  Similarly, the majority states that the trial court ruled that the 
defendant “affirmatively reinitiated contact with police officers on October 18, 2011, 
without reasserting his right to counsel.”  Ante at 4.  While the majority may be 
comfortable with that conclusion, I see no determination by the trial court to that effect.  
Rather, the court recognized, as described above, that the jail administrator came to speak 
with the defendant upon hearing of his desire to “get something off [his] chest”; “the first 
thing that [the defendant] brings up is he asked if [he] could get an attorney”; the 
administrator declined and offered to get the detectives instead; and the defendant 
“seemed to understand that and was agreeable for him to get the detectives.”  Nor, given 
these circumstances, did the trial court put much stock in the prosecution’s “no good deed 
goes unpunished” lament—echoed by the majority here—that counsel’s appointment was 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Both the defendant and the trial court focused on Bender as the legal basis for this 
conclusion, and fairly so, as its settled and straightforward rule plainly sweeps these 
circumstances within its scope.  The defendant’s frustrated attempts to invoke his right to 
counsel, however, just as plainly implicate Cavanaugh, which sits at the core of Bender’s 
rule and persists wholly intact without it.  Taking Bender off the books thus does little to 
resolve the actual evidentiary question at issue in this case: whether the defendant’s 
statements should be suppressed on constitutional grounds.5  Bender’s rule, while 
                                              
simply a precautionary measure, voluntarily undertaken and wholly conditional upon 
whether the defendant (yet again) asked for it.  Instead, the court stressed that, although 
the detective, “and I’m not picking on him, . . . talks about [the attorney] being there only 
if needed,” there was no confusion among the detectives and the jail administrator that 
the attorney had been sent for the defendant, and the attorney, while perhaps unsure of 
the defendant’s name at that time, “knew he was there to talk to somebody and represent 
them regarding possible charges of murder or homicide that would be filed . . . against 
them.”   
 
5 Despite their prominence in both the defendant’s arguments and the trial court’s ruling, 
the majority pays little mind to the defendant’s requests for counsel, summarily 
suggesting that they were constitutionally meaningless and left the defendant here no 
differently situated than the defendants in Bender.  The majority even holds this case out 
as emblematic of “the problems with Bender,” as “the prosecutor, on behalf of the 
people, was effectively sanctioned by the suppression of defendant’s voluntary 
statements for having taken the precaution of seeking out counsel in the event that 
defendant requested counsel before or during his interrogation.”  Ante at 45 n 37.  I, like 
the trial court, cannot so easily disregard the defendant’s requests for counsel.  The record 
here paints a substantially different and more complicated picture than the one now 
offered by the majority—one in which counsel was procured because, indeed, the 
defendant affirmatively desired and repeatedly asked for it, and in which the prosecution 
and police have been “sanctioned” not for acknowledging those requests, but for failing 
to duly honor them.  The trial court saw significance in these complications; in light of its 
due reliance on Bender, however, it was not required to take up the full range of their 
constitutional import.  With Bender now gone, I would leave that assessment to the trial 
court in the first instance, if and when the defendant again seeks suppression of his 
statements on a constitutional basis, state or federal, that demands it. 
 
 
 
7 
certainly sufficient to sustain this relief, is not necessary to it.  The majority may 
disapprove of that rule, but Bender is not the case before us, and I fail to see how the 
instant case invites or enables the majority to act on that disapproval as they have.  
Accordingly, I cannot join in the majority’s decision to reach beyond the facts of this case 
to overrule Bender’s settled and sound precedent. 
 
 
Bridget M. McCormack