Case Title: HIGHLAND-HOWELL DEVELOPMENT CO LLC V TOWNSHIP OF MARION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122843

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court  
Lansing, Michigan 48909  
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 14, 2004 
HIGHLAND-HOWELL DEVELOPMENT CO, LLC, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122843 
TOWNSHIP OF MARION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CAVANAGH, J.   
The Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.701 et seq., defines the 
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Michigan Tax 
Tribunal as review of a final decision “of an agency 
relating 
to 
assessment, 
valuation, 
rates, 
special 
assessments, allocation, or equalization under property tax 
laws.” 
MCL 205.731(a). 
Plaintiff’s complaint contained a 
count alleging that defendant breached a promise to 
construct a sewer line through plaintiff’s property. 
The 
issue 
before 
us 
is 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
has 
 
 
 
 
jurisdiction to hear this claim or whether it lies within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. 
We affirm 
the Court of Appeals holding that plaintiff’s claim for 
breach of promise falls outside the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Tax Tribunal. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Count I of plaintiff’s first amended complaint sought 
damages for an alleged breach of promise and for the 
adoption of “a special assessment roll which allocated a 
disproportionate 
share 
of 
the 
cost 
of 
the 
sewer 
improvements 
to 
Plaintiff’s 
property.” 
Plaintiff’s 
complaint alleged that defendant promised to construct a 
sewer line through certain property and plaintiff relied on 
that 
promise 
in 
making 
several 
decisions, 
including 
purchasing the property and declining sewer service from 
the city of Howell. 
Count II of the complaint challenged 
the validity of the special assessment. 
Defendant’s motion for summary disposition argued that 
plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed pursuant to MCR 
2.116(C)(4) 
because 
it 
was 
within 
the 
exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Michigan Tax Tribunal, as well as under 
MCR 2.116(C)(8) because count I failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. 
The trial court 
granted defendant’s C(4) motion and dismissed both counts. 
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Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of count I. 
The 
Court of Appeals considered the scope of the Tax Tribunal’s 
exclusive jurisdiction and concluded that because count I 
of plaintiff’s complaint fell outside the Tax Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, 
the 
trial 
court’s 
grant 
of 
summary 
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) was premature.1 
Defendant sought leave to appeal, claiming that the Court 
of Appeals erred.2  We granted defendant’s application for 
leave.3 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary 
disposition on the basis of its interpretation of the 
jurisdictional provisions of the Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 
205.731. 
The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction in this 
case turns on the interpretation of the provisions of a 
statute. 
Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed 
1 Unpublished opinion per curiam issued November 19,
2002 (Docket No. 231937). 
2 The trial court did not rule on defendant’s MCR 
2.116(C)(8) motion, having instead ruled in favor of 
defendant on its C(4) motion. 
However, the Court of
Appeals 
examined 
defendant’s 
C(8) 
motion 
because 
it 
“present[ed] an alternate basis for affirming the trial
court’s decision.” 
Slip op at 3. 
The Court of Appeals
held that summary disposition pursuant to defendant’s C(8)
motion likewise would have been premature, but defendant 
did not appeal that decision to this Court. Defendant only
appealed the C(4) jurisdictional issue. 
3 468 Mich 942 (2003). 
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de novo. 
American Federation of State, Co & Municipal 
Employees v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 398; 662 NW2d 695 
(2003). 
Likewise, this Court reviews the grant or denial 
of summary disposition de novo. Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
We must determine whether plaintiff’s claim for 
damages resulting from defendant’s alleged breached promise 
to construct a sewer line is within the original and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal, as delineated 
in the Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.731. 
We follow the 
analysis employed by the Court of Appeals to determine the 
scope of the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction. 
Section 31 of the Tax Tribunal Act provides: 
The 
tribunal’s 
exclusive 
and 
original
jurisdiction shall be: 
(a) A proceeding for direct review of a
final decision, finding, ruling, determination,
or order of an agency relating to assessment,
valuation, 
rates, 
special 
assessments,
allocation, or equalization, under property tax
laws. 
(b) 
A 
proceeding 
for 
refund 
or 
redetermination of a tax under the property tax
laws. 
The language of the statute limits the Tax Tribunal’s 
exclusive jurisdiction to matters “relating to assessment, 
valuation, 
rates, 
special 
assessments, 
allocation, 
or 
equalization, under property tax laws.” Plaintiff’s claims 
for breaches of promise or contract are not within the 
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scope of the statutory provision, and therefore are within 
the circuit court’s jurisdiction.4 
In 1982, this Court examined the scope of the Tax 
Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction in two cases: Wikman v 
Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982), and Romulus City 
Treasurer v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 413 Mich 728; 322 NW2d 
152 (1982). 
In Wikman, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in 
the circuit court, alleging that the special assessments 
imposed on them had been determined in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner. 
This Court ruled, inter alia, that the 
challenge to the special assessments was within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal because the 
action was one “seeking direct review of the governmental 
unit’s decision concerning a special assessment for a 
public improvement.” Wikman at 626. 
Unlike the direct challenge to the special assessment 
in Wikman, the plaintiffs in Romulus City Treasurer filed a 
constructive fraud claim in the circuit court, challenging 
the drain commissioner’s use of funds collected through 
special assessments. 
This Court held that the circuit 
4 Paragraph 9 of plaintiff’s first amended complaint
alleges that the special assessment roll allocated a 
“disproportionate” share of the cost of improvements to
plaintiff’s property. 
This allegation is within the Tax
Tribunal’s exclusive and original jurisdiction pursuant to
Wikman v Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982).
5 
 
 
 
 
 
   
court had jurisdiction to hear the case because the 
question was whether the drain commissioner could pay 
administrative costs with special assessment funds and, 
therefore, 
this 
question 
was 
outside 
the 
exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. 
In reaching the decision in Romulus City Treasurer, 
this Court noted that MCL 205.721 designates the Tax 
Tribunal as a “’quasi-judicial agency’” comprised of seven 
members; only two must be attorneys with experience either 
in property tax matters or in the discharge of a judicial 
or quasi-judicial office. 
Romulus City Treasurer at 737. 
In addition, 
[o]ne member must be a certified assessor; one,
an 
experienced 
professional 
real 
estate 
appraiser; and one, a certified public accountant
with experience in state-local tax matters. 
Not 
more than three of the seven members are to be 
members of any one professional discipline and
persons who are not members of any of the 
enumerated 
disciplines 
are 
required 
to 
have 
experience in state or local tax matters. 
The expertise of the tribunal members can be
seen to relate primarily to questions concerning
the factual underpinnings of taxes. [Id.] 
This Court also noted that the Tax Tribunal’s membership is 
qualified 
to 
resolve 
disputes 
concerning 
assessments, 
valuations, rates, allocation, and equalization, as well as 
to 
determine 
whether 
special 
assessments 
are 
levied 
according to the benefits received. Id. 
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While the Tax Tribunal’s membership is particularly 
competent to resolve disputes related to the basis for and 
amounts of taxes, its membership is not qualified to 
resolve common-law tort or contract claims. 
Clearly, this 
supports our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend 
the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction to encompass 
matters outside the realm of those tax matters specified in 
the statute. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While we express no opinion on whether plaintiff’s 
claim can withstand a summary disposition motion on the 
basis of MCR 2.116(C)(8), we do find that, except for the 
allegations 
contained 
in 
paragraph 
9, 
count 
I 
of 
plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleged issues of law 
outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. 
Common-law tort and contract claims are not within the 
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal, as 
defined by MCL 205.731. 
We affirm the ruling of the Court 
of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
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