Case Title: Craig v. Traylor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Robert CRAIG v. Mike TRAYLOR

95-789                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 12, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- appellate court does not consider matters
     outside the record -- on the record supplied, notice of appeal
     was timely. -- Where the manufacturer's post-trial motion and
     the trial court's order, if any, disposing thereof were not
     included as part of the record in this case, the court could
     not consider them; on the record before the court appellant's
     notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of the final
     judgment and was therefore timely.

2.   Workers' compensation -- jurisdiction is concurrent in the
     courts and commission -- trial court properly found that it
     had concurrent jurisdiction to determine applicability of
     Workmen's Compensation Law. -- Both sources cited by appellee
     suggested that for determination of workmen's compensation
     claims exclusive jurisdiction in the agency is superior to
     concurrent jurisdiction in the courts and agency; however,
     Arkansas cases suggest to the contrary; therefore, the trial
     court did not err in holding that it had concurrent
     jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Workers'
     Compensation Law.

3.   Appeal & error -- trial court failed to rule on whether
     Workers' Compensation Law applied here -- issue waived on
     appeal. -- Although the trial court ruled it had concurrent
     jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Workers'
     Compensation Law to this case, it never ruled whether the
     Workers' Compensation Law did or did not apply; the
     applicability issue was left unresolved below, and was
     therefore waived on appeal. 

4.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- standards on review. -- It
     need only be decided if the granting of summary judgment was
     appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented
     by the moving party in support of the motion left a material
     question of fact unanswered; the burden of sustaining a motion
     for summary judgment is always the responsibility of the
     moving party; all proof submitted must be viewed in a light
     most favorable to the party resisting the motion, and any
     doubts and inferences must be resolved against the moving
     party; summary judgment is proper when a claiming party fails
     to show that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact
     and when the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as
     a matter of law; it is further well-settled that once the
     moving party establishes a prima facie entitlement to summary
     judgment by affidavits or other supporting documents or
     depositions, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and
     demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact.

5.   Negligence -- comparative fault requires a determination of
     proximate cause -- proximate cause defined. -- Under the
     comparative fault statute, there must be a determination of
     proximate cause before any fault can be assessed against a
     claiming party, and proximate cause is generally a question
     for the jury; proximate cause becomes a question of law only
     if reasonable minds could not differ; proximate cause is
     defined as "that which in a natural and continuous sequence,
     unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
     injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." 
     
6.   Judgment -- trial court invaded province of the jury in making
     a proximate cause determination -- trial court erred in
     granting summary judgment as a matter of law. -- Where
     appellant presented some evidence that appellee failed to
     instruct appellant on operating and cleaning procedures for
     the spreader and that appellee failed to take steps to protect
     appellant from inadvertent contact with the sprocket mechanism
     as required by 29 C.F.R. 1928.57, reasonable minds could
     therefore differ as to whether appellee's or appellant's
     actions were the proximate cause of the accident; in addition,
     violation of a safety statute is evidence of negligence to be
     considered by a jury, provided the violation is the proximate
     cause of the injury; consequently, the trial court invaded the
     province of the jury, at least by resolving the proximate
     cause issue, and thereby erred in granting judgment as a
     matter of law.  


     Appeal from Washington Circuit Court, Second Division; Kim M.
Smith, Judge; reversed and remanded.
     Everett, Mars & Stills, by:  David D. Stills, for appellant.
     Davis, Cox & Wright, PLC, by:  Tim E. Howell, for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.Associate Justice Donald L.
Corbin, 2-12-96 *ADVREP6*





ROBERT CRAIG,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

MIKE TRAYLOR,
                    APPELLEE,



95-789



APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND
DIVISION, NO. CIV 92-108,
HON. KIM M. SMITH, JUDGE,



REVERSED AND REMANDED.






     Appellant, Robert Craig, appeals the order of the Washington
County Circuit Court granting summary judgment to appellee, Mike
Traylor, on appellant's complaint for negligence.  This appeal
presents questions about the law of torts.  Our jurisdiction is
pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(16).  
     While employed by appellee, appellant injured his hand in a
chain-and-sprocket mechanism of a fertilizer spreader owned by
appellee.  Appellant filed suit against appellee and the
manufacturer of the spreader.  The trial court entered an order
granting summary judgment to appellee.  That order is the sole
subject of this appeal.  Appellant's remaining claims against the
manufacturer were tried to a jury that found in favor of appellant. 
The manufacturer has appealed the judgment entered pursuant to the
jury verdict but is not a party to this appeal.  
     For reversal of the summary judgment, appellant contends there
are disputed questions of fact.  Prior to addressing these
arguments, we consider two jurisdictional arguments raised by
appellee.  First, we address appellee's claim that appellant's
notice of appeal was untimely because a timely notice of appeal is
essential to this court's jurisdiction.  Binns v. Heck, 322 Ark.
277, 908 S.W.2d 328 (1995); LaRue v. LaRue, 268 Ark. 86,