Case Title: Huerter v. Hassig

Citation: 175 Kan. 781, 267 P.2d 532

Docket Number: 39,191

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1954-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
175 Kan. 781 (1954)
267 P.2d 532
LAURENCE HUERTER, et al., Appellants,
v.
CHARLES HASSIG, et al., Appellees.
No. 39,191

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 6, 1954.
Charles Rooney, of Topeka, was on the briefs for the appellants.
Harold R. Fatzer, attorney general, Paul E. Wilson, assistant attorney general, and Noel Mullendore, special assistant attorney general, were on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WEDELL, J.:
This action was instituted by plaintiffs, landowners, whose farms are located in the vicinity of Lake Nemaha in Nemaha county, against members of the state forestry, fish and game commission, the headquarters of which is in Pratt county.
Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus to compel members of that commission and its director to remove an obstruction in the Nemaha river which the state constructed in the building of Lake Nemaha and which plaintiffs allege is damaging their lands.
The action was filed in the district court of Nemaha county and summons was served on the secretary of state. Plaintiffs appeal from an order quashing the service summons pursuant to the motion of defendants.
Appellees appeared specially and moved to quash the service on the ground it conferred no jurisdiction on that district court for the reason the proper venue of the action was in Pratt county. The sole question for review is one of venue.
One of the statutes on which appellants rely is G.S. 1949, 75-417, which reads:
The statute is not applicable. It pertains to actions in rem. The state is not a lien holder and claims no lien on the land. No claimed interest in the land is involved in this action. It is conceded the state owns the land on which the lake and dam are located. The relief sought by appellants, if granted, would operate solely on the members of the commission. It is distinctly an action in personam.
*783 Appellants also rely on the provisions of G.S. 1949, 75-418, the pertinent part of which reads:
Careful examination of this statute discloses it is not a venue enactment but pertains solely to service of process which may be issued only by a court, referee or commission having jurisdiction. The question of a court's jurisdiction, therefore, remains the point at issue and it depends on venue.
Appellants also cite a portion of G.S. 1949, 60-501, which reads:
The portion of that statute relied on by appellants, as well as the remaining portion of that statute, clearly disclose it likewise pertains to actions concerning realty and is not applicable here.
Appellants argue the tax and corporation commissions are not governed by the same statutes as the instant commission and that our decisions involving the venue of appeals from their decisions are not controlling. They direct attention to G.S. 1949, 74-2414 relating to the tax commission. It provides:
G.S. 1949, 74-606, relating to the corporation commission, reads:
G.S. 1949, 74-3301, which creates the instant commission, provides:
"Headquarters," according to Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd ed., unabridged, means:
Appellants concede this court has held acts of the tax and corporation commissions are performed in Topeka and hence the venue of appeals from their orders is in Shawnee county. They argue that at least a part of the orders of the instant commission, which caused damage, were actually performed in Nemaha county and therefore under G.S. 1949, 60-503 the venue of the instant action is in that county. The portion of that statute relied on reads:
..............
It is true the actual labor of constructing the dam and lake was performed in Nemaha county. This commission has authority to make orders involving its functions which are executed in every part of the state. The foregoing statutes pertaining to the tax and corporation commissions disclose they also may act in other counties than at the state capital in Shawnee county. If appellants' contention is sound the members of the instant commission may be compelled to respond to actions in every county of the state in which its orders are carried into effect, if any damage results where work is performed.
This brings us to the pivotal point in this appeal. It involves the proper interpretation of the legislative intent as disclosed in G.S. 1949, 60-503. As previously stated, appellants' contention is the venue of the instant action was properly laid in Nemaha county because a part of the work ordered to be done by the commission was performed in that county. It should be observed the statute does not pertain to physical labor performed in the execution of the commission's orders. It is a statute which determines in what county an action may be brought against "a public officer for an act done by him. ..." (Our emphasis.) Appellants cite State, ex *785 rel., v. Flannelly, 96 Kan. 372, 152 Pac. 22. It supports appellees' rather than appellants' contention that the instant action should have been instituted in Pratt county where official action by the commission is taken.
In construing the statute in question it was there said:
Although in Freund v. Commission of Revenue and Taxation, 156 Kan. 109, 131 P.2d 678, the appeal to this court involved the construction of various statutes in order to determine the venue of an appeal from orders of the state tax commission, the exact intent of G.S. 1949, 60-503 was again specifically determined and it was pointedly said:
Appellants also rely on Smith v. Miller, 147 Kan. 40, 75 P.2d 273. That was "essentially an action for the determination of a right or interest in the land itself" and it is not in point.
We do not deem it necessary to review additional decisions which confirm the correctness of the order quashing the service of process in this case. The judgment of the district court was sound and it is affirmed.