Case Title: In Re Estate of Wilson

Citation: 202 N.W.2d 41

Docket Number: 55524

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1972-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
202 N.W.2d 41 (1972) ESTATE of Sharrine Kay WILSON, Deceased. No. 55524. Supreme Court of Iowa. November 15, 1972. Bell & Hansen, New London, for appellant. *42 Elgar Law Office, Mt. Pleasant, for appellee. Submitted to MOORE, C. J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REES, and REYNOLDSON, JJ. RAWLINGS, Justice. Appeal by Dorothy Wilson, guardian for and conservator of the property of two minors, from court order authorizing payment of reasonable administration fees, costs and expenses from life insurance proceeds paid the estate of Sharrine Kay Wilson, deceased. We affirm. June 27, 1970, Sharrine died intestate survived by her husband Frank and two minor children. Frank was convicted of manslaughter in connection with Sharrine's death. Decedent's estate assets totaled $12,225.85, of which $12,000 was derived from proceeds of two insurance policies on her life, Frank being the designated primary beneficiary, Sharrine's estate being secondary. Alanson K. Elgar, attorney for the estate, was also appointed administrator. Dorothy Wilson was designated guardian for the children and conservator of their property. Pursuant to The Code 1971, Sections 633.535-633.536, Frank was judicially barred from any inheritance. Insurance proceeds were also held exempt from claims of creditors. June 8, 1971, an order was entered, without notice, allowing a $540 fee to the attorney-administrator, and $25 to the guardian ad litem, payable from estate assets to the extent possible, any remainder owing to be paid from life insurance proceeds. September 20, 1971, upon proper notice to all concerned, after hearing absent any objections, an order was duly entered approving administrator's final report and ordering his discharge upon filing of a compliance report. Twenty-three days later Dorothy, as guardian-conservator, filed an instrument designated "Objections to the Final Report and the Supplemental Final Report", thereby disputing liquidation of estate administration costs and fees from insurance derived funds. November 29, 1971, a supplemental order was filed by which attorney-administrator fees were found not allowable from insurance receipts on the basis of statutory percentages, therefore reducing same to $300, the admeasurement thereof not being here involved. With court approval (Iowa R.Civ.P. 333) guardian-conservator appeals contending trial court, sitting in probate, erred in ordering estate administration costs, fees and expenses be paid from any part of funds derived from the life insurance policies. Administrator-attorney counters the order approving his final report was res judicata, and offers no brief in resistance to the argument here advanced by appealing guardian-conservator. I. Our review is de novo. See The Code 1971, Section 633.33; Iowa R. Civ.P. 334, 344(f) (7); In re Estate of Cory, 184 N.W.2d 693, 696-697 (Iowa 1971). II. At the threshold, any attempt to understandably resolve the instant problem necessitates a reference to some statutory provisions in the 1971 Code. Section 633.197 provides, in substance, personal representatives shall be allowed a reasonable fee for services rendered not in excess of specified percentages upon the value of gross assets listed in the probate inventory for state inheritance tax purposes. See also 1925-1926 Op.Atty.Gen. at 380-381; J. Hyland, "Probate FeesAre You Correctly Computing Yours?", Workshop Outlines, Ninety-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Iowa State Bar Association at 38 (1968); 26 Iowa L.Rev. 579, 581 (1941). *43 By § 633.198 the estate representative's attorney shall be allowed fees on the same basis, to be taxed as part of administration expenses. Then § 633.199 permits an award of additional fees to estate representatives and their counsel for extraordinary services and expenses incurred. Significantly, § 633.200 states: And § 633.333 says: Finally, in this vein, § 511.37 declares: Noticeably, the exemption provisos set forth in each of the foregoing statutes relate exclusively to debts of a decedent, rights independent of creditors, or debts of a widow-beneficiary. In that regard, this court has held the term "debts of a decedent" is not synonymous with "costs of administration." See In re Estate of Cory, 184 N.W.2d at 696. From this it unavoidably follows the exemptions found in those statutes alluded to above do not relate to probate fees, costs and expenses. III. The question thus posed is whether, absent statutory preclusion, life insurance proceeds payable to a decedent's estate are subject to costs of administration thereof. The guardian-conservator claims this question must be resolved adverse to administrator-attorney by reason of these pronouncements in the case of In re Estate of Galloway, 222 Iowa 159, 161, 269 N.W. 7, 8 (1936): See also In re Estate of Clemens, 226 Iowa 31, 36, 282 N.W. 730 (1938). Inceptionally we find no basis upon which to fault the foregoing statement regarding debts or rights of creditors. But as to both last cited cases reference to "costs of administration" is first dictum and next overlooks the clear-cut distinction noted in Cory, supra. Furthermore, a duly appointed executor is a fiduciary, thus frequently referred to as a trustee for all parties interested in an estate. See In re Estate of Swanson, 239 Iowa 294, 302, 31 N.W.2d 385 (1948); 31 Am.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 2; 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 142. See also Restatement, Second, Trusts § 6. This court has also held, in the field of statutory construction, legislative intent is expressed by omission as well as by inclusion. Stated otherwise, the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others. See Richardson v. City of Jefferson, 257 Iowa 709, 715, 134 N.W.2d 528 (1965). And as heretofore indicated, no statute has been cited and we find none foreclosing payment of reasonable costs, fees and expenses out of insurance proceeds paid to a decedent's estate. Moreover, decedent's surviving children do benefit by the collection, processing, accounting for and general administration of any such insurance derived funds. We therefore now hold trial court, sitting in probate, correctly ordered payment of costs, fees and expenses attendant upon administration of this decedent's estate, to the extent reasonably necessary, out of funds received by the estate from any carrier of insurance on decedent's life. All prior holdings by this court to the contrary are, to that extent, hereby overruled. Affirmed.