Case Title: Comptroller v. Comcast

Citation: 

Docket Number: 32/22

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2023-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Comptroller v. Comcast of California, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, 
LLC, et al., No. 32, September Term, 2022. 
 
EXHAUSTION 
OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES 
– 
TAX-GENERAL 
ARTICLE §§ 13-501–13-532 – DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS – COURTS & 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE § 3-409 
 
Companies sought a declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
to challenge the constitutionality of a new tax on digital advertising gross revenues.  The 
circuit court awarded summary judgment in favor of the companies and declared the tax 
unconstitutional and illegal.  The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the special statutory 
administrative remedies provided in the Tax-General Article are exclusive with respect to 
the companies’ challenge and, therefore, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the 
declaratory judgment action and was required to dismiss it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case No. C-02-CV-21-000509 
 
Argued:  May 5, 2023 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
OF MARYLAND* 
 
No. 32 
 
September Term, 2022 
 
            ______________________________________ 
 
 
COMPTROLLER OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
COMCAST OF CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, 
PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, WEST 
VIRGINIA, LLC, et al. 
 
 ______________________________________   
  
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
Eaves, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Fader, C.J. 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
Filed: July 12, 2023 
 
 
 
* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional 
amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court 
of Maryland.  The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials 
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this 
document is authentic. 
 
Gregory Hilton, Clerk 
 
This appeal arises from a challenge to Maryland’s Digital Advertising Gross 
Revenues Tax Act, codified at Title 7.5 of the Tax-General Article.  The Act, which was 
enacted in 2021 and became effective on January 1, 2022, imposes a tax on annual gross 
revenues of certain high revenue businesses derived from digital advertising services in the 
State.  In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, the challengers, various subsidiaries 
of Comcast Corporation and Verizon Communications Inc. (collectively, the 
“Companies”),1 obtained a declaratory judgment that the digital advertising tax was 
unconstitutional and illegal under federal law.  The Comptroller timely appealed, arguing, 
among other things, that the Companies did not exhaust the comprehensive administrative 
remedies provided in the Tax-General Article for resolution of tax disputes.  We granted 
certiorari before decision in the Appellate Court of Maryland.2 
In a per curiam order issued after oral argument, we vacated the orders of the circuit 
court, held that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the action because the Companies 
failed to exhaust the mandatory administrative and judicial review remedies provided in 
the Tax-General Article for the resolution of tax disputes, and remanded to the circuit court 
with directions to dismiss the action.  Comptroller v. Comcast of California, Maryland, 
 
1 The challengers, the plaintiffs below and appellees here, are Comcast Cable 
Communications Management, LLC, Comcast of Maryland Limited Partnership, Comcast 
of Baltimore City, LLC, Comcast of California/Maryland/Pennsylvania/Virginia/West 
Virginia, LLC, Comcast of Delmarva, LLC, Comcast of Maryland, LLC, Comcast of 
Potomac, LLC, and Verizon Maryland LLC. 
2 At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a 
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
to the Appellate Court of Maryland.  The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. 
 
 
2 
 
 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, LLC, ___ Md. ___, 2023 WL 3313208 (May 9, 
2023) (per curiam).  In this opinion, we explain the basis for our order.  As will be apparent 
from our discussion, our resolution is not premised on any view of the merits of the 
challenges raised by the Companies.   
BACKGROUND 
A. 
The Digital Advertising Gross Revenues Tax Act 
Title 7.5 of the Tax-General Article imposes a tax on annual gross revenues of more 
than $1 million derived from digital advertising services in the State by certain businesses3 
with at least $100 million in global annual gross revenues.  Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. 
§§ 7.5-103; 7.5-201(a) (2022 Repl.).  “Digital advertising services” generally include 
“advertisement services on a digital interface, including . . . banner advertising, search 
engine advertising, interstitial advertising, and other comparable advertising services.”  Id. 
§ 7.5-101(e)(1).  The tax rate is progressive, beginning at 2.5% for entities with global 
annual revenues between $100 million and $1 billion, and topping out at 10% for 
businesses with global annual revenues exceeding $15 billion.  Id. § 7.5-103.  The tax rate 
is calculated based on an entity’s global annual revenues but is then applied only to the 
entity’s annual gross revenues derived from digital advertising services in Maryland.  Id. 
§§ 7.5-102; 7.5-101(c).   
The digital advertising tax applies to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
2021.  2021 Md. Laws ch. 669, § 6.  Thus, the first year in which digital advertising services 
 
3 The tax does not apply to advertising services on digital interfaces owned or 
operated by a broadcast or news media entity.  Id. § 7.5-101(d), (e)(2), (g).   
 
 
3 
 
 
were taxed was 2022, and the first tax returns on which the digital advertising tax had to 
be reported were due in April 2023.  
B. 
Factual Background 
The Companies provide digital advertising services in Maryland.  Because their 
global revenues are over the statutory threshold, they are subject to the digital advertising 
tax.  The Companies have neither paid the tax nor explicitly declined to pay the tax.     
C. 
Procedural Background 
Without first pursuing any administrative remedies, the Companies filed a 
complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in which 
they sought a declaration that the digital advertising tax is unconstitutional and illegal under 
federal law.  Specifically, as stated in their amended complaint, the Companies contend 
that the digital advertising tax violates the United States Constitution’s Commerce Clause 
and First Amendment, as well as the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 note, a 
federal statute that bans states from imposing discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.  
The Comptroller moved to dismiss the Companies’ complaint, arguing, among other 
things, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the action because the Companies had 
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.  The Companies responded that their 
declaratory judgment action was permitted by a constitutional exception to the exhaustion 
requirement.  Following a hearing, the court agreed with the Companies and denied the 
Comptroller’s motion to dismiss.  
 
 
4 
 
 
The Comptroller and the Companies each thereafter filed motions for summary 
judgment.  The Comptroller again argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the 
action because the Companies had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.  The 
Companies restated their argument that the digital advertising tax violates the Constitution 
and the Internet Tax Freedom Act, and sought a declaration to that effect.  The court again 
agreed with the Companies, granted their motion for summary judgment, and denied the 
Comptroller’s motion.  In a final declaratory judgment order, the circuit court declared that 
the “Maryland Digital Advertising Gross Revenues Tax violates the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution and the Internet Tax Freedom Act . . . , the dormant 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution . . . , and the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution[.]”  
The Comptroller timely appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland and, before 
decision by that court, sought certiorari from this Court, which we granted.  Comptroller 
v. Comcast of California/Maryland/Pennsylvania/Virginia/West Virginia, LLC, 482 Md. 
535 (2023).4 
DISCUSSION 
“Whether a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing suit is 
a legal issue which [this Court] reviews” without deference.  United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Md. 
Ins. Admin., 450 Md. 1, 14 (2016). 
 
4 The Comptroller also filed a Motion to Stay Enforcement Pending Appeal, which 
we denied. 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE TAX-GENERAL ARTICLE ARE 
EXCLUSIVE.  
A. 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Generally 
When the General Assembly enacts legislation giving rise to statutory claims, it 
frequently also provides for special statutory administrative remedies to be pursued under 
an administrative scheme, subject to judicial review.  See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t 
§§ 20-1001–20-1017 (2021 Repl.; 2022 Supp.) (establishing an administrative scheme 
applicable to employment discrimination claims); Id. §§ 20-1020–20-1037 (same for 
housing discrimination claims); Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 9-701–9-750 (2016 
Repl.; 2022 Supp.) (same for workers’ compensation claims); Id. §§ 8-501–8-508, 
8-5A-01–8-5A-12 (same for unemployment insurance claims); Md. Code Ann., Tax-Prop. 
§§ 14-501–14-516 (2019 Repl.; 2022 Supp.) (same for property tax claims); see also, e.g., 
Md. Code Ann., Local Gov’t § 10-305 (2013 Repl.; 2022 Supp.) (authorizing counties to 
enact local laws to establish county boards of appeals with jurisdiction over, among other 
things, zoning, licensing, and permitting).   
When the General Assembly has provided such “an administrative and judicial 
review remedy,” “the relationship between that administrative remedy and a possible 
alternative judicial remedy will ordinarily fall into one of three categories.”  Zappone v. 
Liberty Life Ins. Co., 349 Md. 45, 60 (1998).  “First, the administrative remedy may be 
exclusive, thus precluding any resort to an alternative remedy.”  Id.  Where an 
administrative remedy is exclusive, the only manner of obtaining judicial involvement is 
by pursuing judicial review of the final administrative decision.   
 
 
6 
 
 
“Second, the administrative remedy may be primary but not exclusive.”  Id. at 60.  
In that circumstance, a claimant may file an action to pursue an alternative judicial remedy, 
but the “claimant must invoke and exhaust the administrative remedy, and seek judicial 
review of an adverse administrative decision, before a court can properly adjudicate the 
merits of the alternative judicial remedy.”  Id.; see also Monarch Acad. Balt. Campus, Inc. 
v. Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 457 Md. 1, 13 (2017) (stating that just because a claim 
is properly within the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency “does not mean that 
the circuit court is divested of jurisdiction over the claim[], or necessitate[] the dismissal 
of the action before the court”; instead, the appropriate course of action is to stay 
proceedings pending ‘“a final administrative determination’” (quoting Arroyo v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Howard County, 381 Md. 646, 660 (2004))); State Ret. & Pension Sys. v. 
Thompson, 368 Md. 53, 66 (2002) (“[A]lthough the court may well have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the action before it, the exhaustion doctrine bars the court from exercising 
that jurisdiction, thereby gratifying the paramount legislative intent that the matter be dealt 
with first by the Executive Branch agency.”).  In other words, the claimant maintains the 
right to pursue an alternative judicial remedy, but generally not until first exhausting the 
administrative remedy.   
“Third, the administrative remedy and the alternative judicial remedy may be fully 
concurrent, with neither remedy being primary[.]”  Zappone, 349 Md. at 61.  In that 
 
 
7 
 
 
circumstance, a claimant need not exhaust available administrative remedies before 
pursuing an available judicial remedy.5  Id.   
Determining whether an available administrative remedy is exclusive, primary to an 
alternative judicial remedy, or concurrent with an alternative judicial remedy, “is ordinarily 
a question of legislative intent.”  Id.  Although the General Assembly will occasionally 
“expressly set forth its intent in this regard,” “most often statutes fail to specify the category 
in which an administrative remedy falls,” leaving the matter to be resolved through 
statutory interpretation by the courts.  Id. at 61-62.   
The rationale behind the exhaustion requirement is well-established.  An 
administrative agency has the “expertise which [it] can bring to bear in sifting the 
information presented to it,” and thus “should be afforded the initial opportunity . . . to 
apply that expertise.”  Soley v. Md. Comm’n on Hum. Rels., 277 Md. 521, 526 (1976).  
“[T]o permit interruption for purposes of judicial intervention at various stages of the 
administrative process might well undermine the very efficiency which the Legislature 
intended to achieve in the first instance.”  Id.  Thus, “where there exists a special statutory 
remedy for a specific type of case, and the Legislature intends that remedy to be exclusive 
 
5 Whether an administrative remedy is exclusive, primary, or concurrent has nothing 
to do with the availability of judicial review of the final decision of the administrative 
agency.  The availability of judicial review is governed by statute, local law, or ordinance 
or, where not provided by one of those sources, through administrative mandamus.  See 
Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. ProVen Mgmt., Inc., 472 Md. 642, 666, 669-70, 669 n.9 
(2021).  Instead, whether an administrative remedy is exclusive, primary, or concurrent 
affects (1) whether a judicial remedy that is independent of and alternate to the 
administrative remedy may be pursued, and (2) if so, when it may be pursued.   
 
 
8 
 
 
or primary, a party may not bypass the special statutory remedy by bringing an action for 
a declaratory judgment or for equitable relief.”  Furnitureland S., Inc. v. Comptroller, 364 
Md. 126, 133 (2001).   
One limited exception to the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies 
is the so-called constitutional exception, which we discuss below in more detail.  In 
essence, the constitutional exception “permits a judicial determination without 
administrative exhaustion when there is a direct attack upon the power or authority . . . of 
the legislative body to adopt the legislation from which relief is sought.”  County Council 
of Prince George’s County v. Chaney Enters. Ltd. P’ship, 454 Md. 514, 538 (2017) 
(quoting Harbor Island Marina, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Calvert County, 286 
Md. 303, 308 (1979)).  However, the constitutional exception is “extremely narrow,” and 
is subject to several specific limitations.  See Prince George’s County v. Ray’s Used Cars, 
398 Md. 632, 650-54 (2007).  One such limitation, which is dispositive here, is that it does 
not apply when an administrative remedy is exclusive, as opposed to primary.  Id. at 650.  
Notably, this Court has long held that many administrative agencies in Maryland, including 
the Tax Court, are “fully competent to resolve issues of constitutionality and the validity 
of statutes,” Furnitureland S., Inc., 364 Md. at 137-38 (quoting Montgomery County v. 
Broad. Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438, 451 n.8 (2000)), and, therefore, that “[t]he presence of 
constitutional issues does not authorize a party to circumvent the statutorily prescribed 
administrative remedies.”  Furnitureland S., Inc., 364 Md. at 138. 
 
 
9 
 
 
B. 
Administrative Exhaustion of Tax Claims 
Our prior opinions have “consistently treated the special statutory administrative 
remedies for the determination of tax questions to be exclusive or primary.”  Id. at 134.  In 
examining whether the General Assembly intended those remedies to be exclusive or 
primary here, we begin with the comprehensive nature of the remedies.   
The Comptroller is charged with administering certain enumerated taxes, including 
the digital advertising tax.  Tax-Gen. § 2-102(a)(3).  An aggrieved taxpayer has two 
available administrative paths to challenge a tax administered by the Comptroller:  (1) a 
post-deprivation remedy path, in which the taxpayer pays the tax and then seeks a refund, 
see id. §§ 13-901, 13-902, 13-904, 13-508, 13-510; or (2) a pre-deprivation remedy path, 
in which the taxpayer declines to pay the tax, awaits an assessment, and then appeals the 
assessment, see id. §§ 13-401, 13-402, 13-508, 13-510.   
The post-deprivation remedy path permits a taxpayer to pay a disputed tax and then 
seek a refund.   See id. § 13-901(a).  As applicable here, a refund claim may be filed with 
the Comptroller in two scenarios:  (1) where the taxpayer erroneously pays “a greater 
amount of tax . . . than is properly and legally payable;” or (2) where the taxpayer “pays to 
the State a tax . . . that is erroneously, illegally, or wrongfully assessed or collected in any 
manner[.]”  Id.  A claim for a refund must be made under oath in the form provided by the 
Comptroller, supported with proper documentation, id. § 13-902, and filed within the time 
required by statute (three years from the date of payment in most scenarios, including for 
refunds under the digital advertising tax), id. §§ 13-903; 13-1104.  If a taxpayer pursues a 
 
 
10 
 
 
post-deprivation remedy, the Comptroller will “(1) investigate each claim for refund; and 
(2) conduct a hearing at the request of the claimant prior to a final determination on the 
claim.”  Id. § 13-904(a).  The Comptroller will then issue a notice of “the determination of 
the claim for refund.”  Id. § 13-904(b).  If the taxpayer disagrees with the Comptroller’s 
determination, the taxpayer can appeal to the Tax Court within 30 days after the notice of 
the determination is mailed.  Id. § 13-510(a)(6).  If the Comptroller does not issue a 
determination within six months after the taxpayer filed the claim, the taxpayer may 
consider the claim disallowed and appeal to the Tax Court.  Id. §13-510(b). 
The pre-deprivation remedy path permits a taxpayer to challenge a tax that has been 
assessed against it without first paying the tax.  Id. § 13-401.  If the Comptroller, upon 
examining or auditing a tax return, determines that a taxpayer’s “tax due exceeds the 
amount shown on the return, the tax collector shall assess the deficiency.”  Id. § 13-401(a).  
A taxpayer may contest such a final assessment by filing an appeal with the Tax Court 
within 30 days after the notice of assessment is mailed.  Id. § 13-510(a)(1).   
As noted, whether following the post-deprivation remedy path or the pre-
deprivation remedy path, a taxpayer’s right of appeal from a final determination or a final 
assessment of the Comptroller is to the Maryland Tax Court.  The Tax Court is not part of 
the judicial branch but “is an adjudicatory administrative agency in the executive branch 
of state government.”  Comptroller v. FC-GEN Operations Invs. LLC, 482 Md. 343, 358 
(2022) (quoting Comptroller v. Wynne, 431 Md. 147, 160 (2013), aff’d, 575 U.S. 542 
(2015)).  Proceedings on appeal to the Tax Court are thus a continuation of a taxpayer’s 
 
 
11 
 
 
administrative remedies, not judicial review, and are governed by Part IV of Subtitle 5 of 
Title 13 of the Tax-General Article.  Sections 13-514 through 13-527 provide rules 
governing proceedings in the Tax Court, including:  (1) prohibiting taking an appeal to the 
Tax Court “[u]nless a person has exhausted all available administrative remedies before 
the appropriate tax determining agency,” Tax-Gen. § 13-514; (2) requiring the appealing 
party to file a petition with certain elements and the opposing party to file a response, Id. 
§ 13-516; (3) permitting the Tax Court to allow or require the filing of briefs, memoranda, 
and amendments to pleadings, id. §§ 13-517, 13-518; (4) requiring the Tax Court to “hear 
and determine appeals promptly,” id. § 13-519; (5) authorizing the Tax Court to issue 
subpoenas for witnesses and documents and providing a mechanism for enforcement 
through a circuit court, id. §§ 13-520, 13-522; (6) authorizing depositions, id. § 13-521; 
(7) providing that appeals are to be considered without deference and in the manner of a 
bench trial, although not bound by “the technical rules of evidence,” id. §§ 13-523, 13-524; 
(8) permitting the Tax Court to address questions of law submitted to it and to submit “an 
issue of fact to a circuit court for a jury trial,” id. §§ 13-525, 13-526; and (9) providing for 
the recording of proceedings, id. § 13-527.   
The Tax Court has “full power to hear, try, determine, or remand any matter before 
it,” including the ability to “reassess or reclassify, abate, modify, change or alter any 
valuation, assessment, classification, tax or final order appealed to” it.  Id. § 13-528(a).  In 
every case it hears, the Tax Court is required to “issue a written order that sets forth its 
decision.”  Id. § 13-529(a).  A final order of the Tax Court, which constitutes the final 
 
 
12 
 
 
administrative decision in a case, is then “subject to judicial review as provided for 
contested cases in” the State Administrative Procedure Act.  Id. § 13-532(a).   
We and the Appellate Court of Maryland have both described the special statutory 
administrative remedies for resolving tax disputes as “comprehensive.”  See Furnitureland 
S., Inc., 364 Md. at 135; Holzheid v. Comptroller, 240 Md. App. 371, 391 (2019) (“The 
Tax-General Article is . . . comprehensive in nature in that it details specific procedures an 
aggrieved party must take when seeking relief from an adverse decision of a tax 
collector[.]”).  We agree with the Appellate Court that “the extensive and comprehensive 
administrative remedies available to taxpayers under the Tax-General Article” constitute 
persuasive evidence of “the necessity of exhausting those remedies before seeking relief in 
the circuit court[.]”  Comptroller v. Zorzit, 221 Md. App. 274, 293-94 (2015); see also 
United Ins. Co., 450 Md. at 17 (in the context of determining whether the special statutory 
administrative remedy at issue was primary or concurrent, identifying “the 
comprehensiveness of the administrative remedy in addressing an aggrieved party’s claim” 
as a relevant factor).   
C. 
Other Manifestations of Legislative Intent 
The comprehensive nature of the special statutory administrative remedies available 
for resolving tax disputes suggests that the General Assembly intended them to be either 
exclusive or primary rather than concurrent, as we have consistently held.  See 
Furnitureland S., Inc., 364 Md. at 134.  As the Companies point out, however, the statutory 
scheme does not expressly state that the remedies provided are either exclusive or primary.  
 
 
13 
 
 
Nonetheless, two statutory provisions leave us with no doubt as to the legislative intent.  
See Monarch Acad., 457 Md. at 60 (“Unless the legislature expressly states that the remedy 
before the agency is exclusive, courts must make this determination.”).  The first, § 13-505 
of the Tax-General Article, broadly prohibits judicial action that would interfere with the 
assessment or collection of taxes.  The second, § 3-409 of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article (2020 Repl.), prohibits the use of declaratory judgment actions as an 
end-run around special statutory administrative remedies.  Together, they establish a 
legislative intent that the special statutory administrative remedies provided for the 
resolution of tax disputes are exclusive.   
Section 13-505 of the Tax-General Article provides:  “A court may not issue an 
injunction, writ of mandamus, or other process against the State or any officer or employee 
of the State to enjoin or prevent the assessment or collection of a tax under this article.”  
The Comptroller interprets the language of § 13-505 broadly, as an unambiguous 
expression of legislative intent to preclude judicial intervention in tax cases until a final 
administrative determination is issued.  The Companies interpret that provision more 
narrowly, precluding only the use of certain remedies, specifically coercive ones, in tax 
matters.  Because a declaratory judgment is not referenced in § 13-505 and is not coercive, 
the Companies contend that the circuit court had jurisdiction over their complaint seeking 
a declaratory judgment.  
In determining whose interpretation of § 13-505 is correct, we resort to our familiar 
canons of statutory interpretation.  As we set forth earlier this term: 
 
 
14 
 
 
“Our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature and 
we begin that exercise by reviewing the statutory language itself.”  
[Comptroller v.] Citicorp[ Int’l Commc’ns, Inc.], 389 Md. 156, 165 [2005] 
(quotations omitted).  We read the plain meaning of the language of the 
statute “as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered 
surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.”  Wheeling v. Selene Fin. 
LP, 473 Md. 356, 376 (2021) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 
25-26 (2013) (internal quotations omitted)).  “Additionally, we neither add 
nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and 
unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with 
forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.”  
Wheeling, 473 Md. at 376-77 (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 
274 (2010)) (cleaned up).  “If the language of the statute is unambiguous and 
clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to 
legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without 
resorting to other rules of construction.”  Id. at 377 (quoting Lockshin, 412 
Md. at 275).  That said, as the Court recently reiterated in Wheeling, 
[w]e, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we 
confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the 
isolated section alone.  Rather, the plain language must be viewed 
within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, 
considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting 
the statute.  We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to 
operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, 
thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the 
extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope. 
Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than 
one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and 
unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when 
read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the 
ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, 
including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources 
intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.  In resolving 
ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it 
relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality 
and legal effect of various competing constructions. 
In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, 
not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense. 
 
 
15 
 
 
473 Md. at 377 (quoting Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275-76) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
Additionally, because we are tasked with interpreting a tax statute, “this 
Court recognizes that any ambiguity within the statutory language must be 
interpreted in favor of the taxpayer.”  Citicorp, 389 Md. at 165 (quoting 
Supervisor of Assessments of Anne Arundel County v. Hartge Yacht Yard, 
Inc., 379 Md. 452, 461 (2004) (quoting Comptroller v. Clyde’s of Chevy 
Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471, 484 (2003))). 
FC-GEN, 482 Md. at 379-81. 
Turning to the plain language of the statute, § 13-505 is a limitation on the power 
of “[a] court” to take certain actions “against the State or any officer or employee of the 
State.”  Tax-Gen. § 13-505.  The prohibited actions are the issuance of “an injunction, writ 
of mandamus, or other process . . . to enjoin or prevent the assessment or collection of a 
tax under this article.”  Id.  Here, there is no dispute over the “who” elements of § 13-505:  
the relevant court is the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and the relevant State actor 
is the Comptroller.  Instead, the dispute centers on the “what” elements, and specifically 
whether the circuit court was prohibited by § 13-505 from:  (1) issuing an order granting 
the Companies’ motion for summary judgment against the Comptroller; and (2) issuing a 
declaratory judgment that the “Maryland Digital Advertising Gross Revenues Tax violates 
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and the Internet Tax Freedom Act 
. . . , the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution . . . , and the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution[.]”  As those orders were neither injunctions 
nor writs of mandamus, the resolution of the dispute turns on whether those orders 
 
 
16 
 
 
constitute “other process . . . to enjoin or prevent the assessment or collection” of the digital 
advertising gross revenues tax.  Tax-Gen. § 13-505. 
We begin with the meaning of “process.”  The statute does not define the term.  As 
defined in our Rules, “process” “means any written order issued by a court to secure 
compliance with its commands or to require action by any person and includes a summons, 
subpoena, an order of publication, a commission or other writ.”  Rule 1-202(x).  Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines it to include “[a] summons or writ, esp. to appear or respond in 
court.”  Process, Black’s Law Dictionary 1458 (11th ed. 2019).  At the time the predecessor 
to § 13-505 was enacted, “process” in the legal context included, among other definitions, 
“any writ, order, notice, summons, or other writing by which a court exercises its 
jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter of any action or proceeding.”  Process, 
Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary of the English Language 1972 (2d ed. 1934); see also 
Process, Black’s Law Dictionary 1432-33 (3d ed. 1933) (defining “process” to include “[a] 
writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person 
or [that person’s] property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment,” and “all other 
writs which may be issued during the progress of an action”).  From these definitions, the 
Comptroller emphasizes that “process” can include “any order,” while the Companies 
emphasize the link in some of the definitions to coercion.  Finding some merit in both 
arguments, we do not view the dictionary definitions as dispositive. 
The Companies also point to our canon of statutory interpretation requiring that we 
read terms in the context in which they are used.  They then look to the doctrine of ejusdem 
 
 
17 
 
 
generis6 in arguing that we must construe “other process” consistent with the two more 
specific terms that precede it—“injunction” and “writ of mandamus”—and conclude that 
“other process” must also refer to only “coercive remedies” that “command[] or restrict[] 
some action.”  
Although we agree with the Companies that the context in which “other process” is 
used sheds light on the General Assembly’s intent, we find the most critical context to be 
the General Assembly’s statement of the purpose for which process may not be used:  “to 
enjoin or prevent the assessment or collection of a tax under this article.”  Tax-Gen. 
§ 13-505.  If not for that final phrase, the Companies’ reliance on ejusdem generis would 
be more persuasive.  But we need not look to the terms “injunction” or “writ of mandamus” 
for insight into what the General Assembly was trying to prohibit by invoking “other 
process,” because the General Assembly has told us directly:  court action that will enjoin 
or prevent tax assessment or collection.   
With that understanding, a declaratory judgment that declares a tax unlawful, 
including the one sought by the Companies and entered by the circuit court here, 
necessarily runs afoul of § 13-505.  Although the Companies protest that the purpose of a 
declaratory judgment is not to “prevent the assessment or collection” of a tax, but merely 
 
6 As we stated in Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Cos., 482 Md. 159, 189 n.8 (2022):   
Ejusdem generis is Latin for “of the same kind or class[.]” Ejusdem Generis, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  It is “[a] canon of construction 
holding that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the 
general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same 
class as those listed.”  Id. 
 
 
18 
 
 
to afford a defense if the Comptroller initiates legal action against them, we see no daylight 
between those scenarios when it comes to compliance with the purpose underlying 
§ 13-505.  Indeed, we cannot conceive of any purpose for the Companies’ lawsuit or the 
court’s declaration other than to (1) prevent the Comptroller from assessing the digital 
advertising tax against them as an initial matter or (2) ultimately prevent the Comptroller 
from collecting that tax through eventual legal action.  See, e.g., Prevent, Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1439 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “prevent” as to “stop from happening; to hinder 
or impede”); Prevent, Merriam-Webster 984 (11th ed. 2014) (defining “prevent” as “to 
keep from happening or existing”; “to hold or keep back”; “to deprive of power or hope of 
acting or succeeding”; “to interpose an obstacle”); see also Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-412(a) 
(“Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted if necessary or 
proper.”).7   
 
7 We find the plain language of the current version of § 13-505 to be unambiguous.  
The statutory history of that provision provides yet further support for our interpretation.  
The predecessor to § 13-505, which was first adopted in 1947, initially applied only to the 
State’s sales-and-use tax.  See 1947 Md. Laws ch. 281, § 286; see id. § 260; id. ch. 681, 
§ 309.  That statute provided: 
No injunction or writ of mandamus or other legal or equitable process shall 
issue in any suit, action or proceeding in any court against this State or any 
officer or employee thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection under this 
subtitle of any tax sought to be collected, and no suit or proceeding shall be 
maintained in any court by any taxpayer for the recovery of any amount of 
taxes alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected 
except as is provided by §§ 351 [providing for administrative remedy] and 
352 [providing for judicial review of the Comptroller’s final determination 
under § 351] of this subtitle. 
Md. Code Ann., art. 81 § 350 (1957).  The predecessor provision thus expressly applied to 
“other legal or equitable process,” and “in any suit, action or proceeding in any court.”  Id.  
 
 
19 
 
 
Stated another way, the Companies’ attempts to carve declaratory judgment suits 
out of the scope of § 13-505 run head-long into one of our core canons of statutory 
construction, which is that “[i]n every case, the statute must be given a reasonable 
interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.”  See 
FC-GEN, 482 Md. at 380 (quoting Wheeling, 473 Md. at 377).  The Companies’ 
protestations that a declaratory judgment cannot prevent the assessment or collection of a 
tax because it “stands by itself[,] and does not involve executory process or coercive relief,” 
(quoting Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 389 (1944)) (emphasis omitted), simply cannot be 
squared with logic or common sense.  The only reason for the Companies to seek a 
declaratory judgment from the circuit court is the expectation that such a judgment would 
prevent the Comptroller from assessing or collecting the digital advertising tax from them.  
Indeed, a declaratory judgment may be granted only if “it will serve to terminate the 
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding[.]”  Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-409(a).  
 
It also expressly cross-referenced statutory provisions providing for administrative 
remedies and judicial review of administrative determinations.  Id.   
Two 1988 legislative changes led to the current version of § 13-505.  First, as part 
of the State’s ongoing recodification process, the General Assembly established the Tax-
General Article.  1988 Md. Laws ch. 2.  According to a Revisor’s Note, any linguistic 
change made to what then became § 13-505 was meant to be “new language derived 
without substantive change.”  1988 Md. Laws ch. 2, § 1, at 517 Revisor’s Note.   
Second, Chapter 569 of the 1988 Laws of Maryland made two substantive changes 
to the new § 13-505 that had been proposed during the revision process:  (1) adding 
“assessment or” before “collection” in the statute; and (2) expanding the reach of the statute 
from the sales-and-use tax to any “tax under this Article.”  Thus, the only substantive 
changes made in the adoption of § 13-505 were intended to broaden its scope when 
compared to its already broadly worded predecessor. 
 
 
20 
 
 
For that reason, the Companies asserted in their complaint that the declaratory judgment 
they sought would “terminate” an “actual controversy exist[ing] between the [Companies] 
and the Comptroller.”  It is difficult to see how the circuit court’s declaratory judgment 
could terminate the present controversy between the Companies and the Comptroller if it 
did not have the effect of preventing the collection of the digital advertising gross revenues 
tax.  
A declaratory judgment may be a slightly less effective mechanism to prevent 
assessment and collection of a tax than an injunction, if only because additional steps would 
be necessary for the ruling to be directly enforceable.  But would there be any question 
about the Comptroller’s ability to successfully assess or collect the digital advertising tax 
from the Companies if this Court were to uphold the circuit court’s declaratory judgment 
that the tax is unconstitutional and illegal?  To ask the question is to answer it.  As the 
Supreme Court of the United States has noted, “there is little practical difference between 
injunctive and declaratory relief,” California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 
(1982), and a declaratory judgment “procedure may in every practical sense operate to 
suspend collection of the state taxes until the litigation is ended[.]”  Id. (quoting Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943)). 
Ultimately, to allow a declaratory judgment action to be pursued as an exception to 
the scope of § 13-505 would permit an end-run around the legislative intent to resolve tax 
disputes through the special statutory administrative remedy process.  We cannot faithfully 
interpret the broad language and stated purpose of § 13-505 to implicitly leave such a large 
 
 
21 
 
 
loophole through the special statutory administrative remedy scheme the General 
Assembly has established.  For the same reason, we reject the Companies’ contention that 
even if declaratory judgment actions are not generally available to resolve tax disputes, 
they are permissible if they are filed before the tax is due (and so before an administrative 
remedy claim can be initiated).  Such an interpretation would incentivize early court 
challenges to new or altered tax regimes.  Although we express no opinion on the 
Companies’ policy argument for permitting such early court challenges,8 that is not the 
scheme the General Assembly has adopted.  Like the United States Supreme Court, we are 
“hard pressed to conclude that” the General Assembly “intended to prohibit taxpayers from 
seeking one form of anticipatory relief,” such as an injunction, “while permitting them to 
seek another,” like a declaratory judgment, “thereby defeating the principal purpose” of 
the remedial administrative scheme.  Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 408. 
The plain language of § 13-505 thus evidences the General Assembly’s intent to 
generally preclude courts from interfering with the collection or assessment of taxes.  And 
even if the broad language of the provision could still be interpreted to leave open a window 
 
8 In their brief, the Companies made a public policy argument that “[i]t is far better 
for taxpayers and the Comptroller to have [a] determination made [by way of a declaratory 
judgment] before the tax is assessed and before taxpayers pay millions of dollars in tax 
only for the State to have to refund those amounts at some later, undetermined time.” 
Whether we agree or disagree with that argument is, for purposes of this case, irrelevant, 
because the General Assembly has discretion to decide whether to require taxpayers to 
exhaust their administrative remedies.  Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted to 
suggest that the General Assembly lacks the authority to permit early court challenges to 
new and innovative tax regimes as a way of minimizing uncertainty and disruption in the 
event a tax is found to be unconstitutional.  All we decide today is that the General 
Assembly has not done so. 
 
 
22 
 
 
for a declaratory judgment action like the one filed by the Companies here, § 3-409(b) of 
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article shuts it tight.  Section 3-409(b), which is part 
of the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, states:  “If a statute provides a 
special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy shall be followed 
in lieu of a proceeding under this subtitle.”9  Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-409(b).  “We have, in 
numerous opinions, taken the position that where the General Assembly enacts an 
exclusive or primary special form of remedy, no action under the Declaratory Judgments 
Act may be maintained.”  Laurel Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Video Lottery Facility Location 
Comm’n, 409 Md. 445, 465 (2009) (citing several opinions expressing that position).10  We 
specifically applied that rule in the context of a tax dispute in Furnitureland South, Inc., in 
which we concluded that the Comptroller could not file an action in court without first 
exhausting prescribed statutory administrative remedies.  364 Md. at 128.  Citing 
§ 3-409(b), we reaffirmed “that where there exists a special statutory remedy for a specific 
type of case, and the Legislature intends that remedy to be exclusive or primary, a party 
 
9 The General Assembly enacted the special remedies exclusion to the Declaratory 
Judgments Act (now codified at Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-409(b)) just two years 
before adopting the precursor to Tax-General § 13-505.  1945 Md. Laws ch. 724, § 1.  Like 
the current version of the special statutory remedies exclusion, the 1945 version precluded 
pursuit of a declaratory judgment when “a statute provides a special form of remedy for a 
specific type of case,” and mandated that in such cases the “statutory remedy must be 
followed.”  Id.    
10 See also Ray’s Used Cars, 398 Md. at 647-50; Sprenger v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
400 Md. 1, 24-25 (2007); id. at 33-38 (Eldridge, J., concurring); Md. Reclamation Assocs., 
Inc. v. Harford County, 382 Md. 348, 362 (2004); Fosler v. Panoramic Design, Ltd., 376 
Md. 118, 128-29 (2003); Utilities, Inc. of Md. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 362 
Md. 37, 44-45 (2000); Hartman v. Prince George’s County, 264 Md. 320, 323 (1972). 
 
 
23 
 
 
may not bypass the special statutory remedy by bringing an action for a declaratory 
judgment or for equitable relief.”11  Id. at 133. 
In sum, the comprehensive nature of the special statutory administrative remedies 
that are provided for the resolution of tax disputes suggests that those remedies must be at 
least the primary, if not the exclusive, mechanisms for resolving tax disputes.  The 
combined effect of (1) the general prohibition against judicial remedies that would prevent 
the assessment or collection of taxes in § 13-505 of the Tax-General Article and (2) the 
specific prohibition against the use of a declaratory judgment action as an end-run around 
special statutory administrative remedies in § 3-409(b) of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article, make clear the General Assembly’s intent that the special statutory 
administrative remedies for resolution of tax disputes are exclusive.  We so hold.12 
 
11 In their efforts to differentiate declaratory judgments from coercive judicial 
mechanisms, the Companies rely on Professor Edwin Borchard’s 1941 treatise on 
declaratory judgments, in which the professor states that “[t]he main characteristic of the 
declaratory judgment . . . is the fact that it conclusively declares the pre-existing rights of 
the litigants without the appendage of any coercive decree.”  (quoting Edwin Borchard, 
Declaratory Judgments xiii (2d ed. 1941)).  However, as this Court noted more than 80 
years ago, Professor Borchard also agreed that the prescription of a special statutory 
remedy renders a declaratory judgment unavailable:  “[A]s Professor Borchard, who is 
regarded as an authority on the subject, points out in his work, ‘where, however, a special 
statutory method for the determination of the particular type of case has been provided, it 
is not proper to permit that issue to be tried by declaration.’”  Williams v. Tawes, 179 Md. 
224, 229 (1941) (quoting Edwin Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 156 (1st ed. 1934)).   
12 We observe that our holding aligns with the persuasive analysis of the Appellate 
Court of Maryland in its decision in Comptroller v. Zorzit, 221 Md. App. 274, 297 (2015).  
There, the intermediate appellate court engaged in a thorough review of the remedial 
statutory scheme in the Tax-General Article and concluded that “[t]he General Assembly 
has unambiguously expressed its intent to preclude judicial intervention in tax cases.”  Id. 
at 296.  The court observed that interpreting § 13-505 along with Tax-General § 13-514 
(requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies with the tax collector before appeal to the 
 
 
24 
 
 
D. 
The Constitutional Exception to the Exhaustion Requirement Does 
Not Apply. 
The Companies invoke the constitutional exception to the administrative exhaustion 
requirement.  That exception generally “permits a judicial determination without 
administrative exhaustion when there is a direct attack upon the power or authority . . . of 
the legislative body to adopt the legislation from which relief is sought.”  County Council 
of Prince George’s County v. Chaney Enters. Ltd. P’ship, 454 Md. 514, 538 (2017) 
(quoting Harbor Island Marina, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Calvert County, 286 
Md. 303, 308 (1979)).  However, the constitutional exception is “extremely narrow,” and 
is subject to several specific limitations.  See Prince George’s County v. Ray’s Used Cars, 
398 Md. 632, 650-54 (2007) (emphasizing that Maryland administrative agencies are 
competent to address and resolve constitutional challenges; that “this Court has 
consistently held that exclusive or primary administrative remedies must be pursued and 
exhausted, before resort to the courts, in cases presenting constitutional issues”; and 
recognizing several specific limitations on the constitutional exception); see also, e.g., 
United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Maryland Ins. Admin., 450 Md. 1, 35-36 (2016) (stating that the 
constitutional exception applies only to challenges that attack a statute as a whole); 
 
Tax Court) and Court & Judicial Proceedings § 3-409(b) “demonstrate[s] the Legislature’s 
intent that tax disputes be resolved through the procedures established in Md. Tax-Gen. 
Code Ann. §§ 13-510 through 13-529.”  Id. at 297 (quoting Bancroft Info. Grp., Inc. v. 
Comptroller, 91 Md. App. 100, 115 (1992)); see also Kuypers v. Comptroller, 173 F. Supp. 
2d 393, 396 (D. Md. 2001) (recognizing that the General Assembly has through § 13-505 
“expressed its intention that no suit may be brought to interfere with the statutory process 
for the assessment or collection of a state tax”).  We agree. 
 
 
25 
 
 
Montgomery County v. Broad. Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438, 455-58 (2000) (discussing 
several limitations on the application of the constitutional exception, including that it 
applies only to challenges that attack the entirety of a statute, does not apply in the absence 
of an alternative judicial remedy, does not apply where the “administrative and judicial 
review remedy” is exclusive, does not apply where there is a need for factual exploration 
to decide the challenge, and generally applies only where the basis for the constitutional 
challenge will terminate the entire controversy). 
One such limitation, which is dispositive here, is that “where the legislature has 
expressly provided or intended that the administrative and judicial review remedy be the 
‘exclusive’ remedy,” the constitutional exception “is inapplicable, and a declaratory 
judgment or equitable action challenging the validity of an enactment ‘as a whole’ will not 
lie.”  Ray’s Used Cars, 398 Md. at 653 (quoting Broad. Equities, Inc., 360 Md. at 457).  
Here, because we have decided that the applicable special statutory administrative 
remedies are exclusive with respect to the Companies’ challenge to the digital advertising 
gross revenues tax, the constitutional exception is not applicable.   
The Companies contend that we have previously applied the constitutional 
exception in tax cases, citing Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78 (1954), 
Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471 (1940), and Jones v. Gordy, 169 Md. 173 (1935).13  
 
13 Our decision in Pressman is particularly instructive concerning the type of case 
in which we have applied the constitutional exception.  See Broad. Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 
at 459 (identifying Pressman as “an illustration of the type of case which is most 
appropriate for resolution by a declaratory judgment under the ‘constitutional exception’”).  
In Pressman, we addressed challenges to a statute that reduced the franchise tax on mutual 
 
 
26 
 
 
However, all three of the cases on which the Companies rely predate both (1) the 1988 
legislative changes that expanded the reach of the predecessor to § 13-505 to all taxes 
assessed under the Tax-General Article, see footnote 7 above, and (2) our articulation of 
the tripartite framework for categorizing special statutory administrative remedy schemes 
in Zappone.  Those cases are not applicable to the existing statutory scheme. 
CONCLUSION14 
The Companies are challenging the digital advertising gross revenues tax, a tax they 
acknowledge the law requires them to pay.  The Tax-General Article provides special 
statutory administrative remedies for the Companies to pursue their challenge.  Instead of 
pursuing those remedies, however, the Companies filed a direct challenge by way of a 
declaratory judgment action in the circuit court.  Absent exhaustion of the special statutory 
administrative remedies provided in the Tax-General Article, the circuit court lacked 
jurisdiction over the challenge and was required to dismiss it.  For that reason, we vacated 
 
savings banks situated in Maryland.  204 Md. at 82.  However, the challenge in Pressman, 
unlike the Companies’ challenge here, “did not involve any of the substantive tax 
provisions . . . which would be administered by the administrative tax officials and 
agencies”; instead, “the only challenge to” the enactment “was that the title of the statute 
was not descriptive of the body of the statute as required by Article III, § 29, of the 
Maryland Constitution.”  Broad. Equities, Inc., 360 Md. at 459 (analyzing Pressman).   
14 The Court wishes to acknowledge the helpful amicus submissions provided in this 
case by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the Maryland Chamber 
of Commerce, and the Maryland Tech Council; Council on State Taxation; Peter A. 
Johnson, Ph.D., Association of National Advertisers, American Advertising Federation, 
Interactive Advertising Bureau, and American Association of Advertising Agencies; 
Silicon Valley Tax Directors Group, Information Technology Industry Council, TechNet, 
NCTA, and National Taxpayers Union Foundation; Tax Executives Institute; and Tax Law 
Professors. 
 
 
27 
 
 
the orders of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and remanded this case to that 
court with directions to dismiss the action. 
In sum, we hold that:  (1) with respect to the Companies’ challenge to the Digital 
Advertising Gross Revenues Tax Act, the administrative remedies in the Tax-General 
Article are exclusive; (2) the Companies were required to exhaust their remedies; and 
(3) their failure to do so deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction to entertain this 
declaratory judgment action.