Case Title: Smith v. Garrett

Citation: 287 So. 2d 258

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1973-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
287 So. 2d 258 (1973) Pauline SMITH, Executrix of Estate of Bessle C. Smith, Deceased v. Wayne GARRETT et al. No. 47321. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 17, 1973. Edwin Tharp Cofer, John T. Keeton, Grenada, for appellant. Appellee did not file brief. ROBERTSON, Justice: Under the provisions of Section 11-7-13, Mississippi Code of 1972 Annotated (Supp. 1973), [Section 1453, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1972)], the wrongful death statute, Pauline Smith, as executrix of the Last Will and Testament of Bessie C. Smith, Deceased, brought suit against B.I. Minyard and Ben Hughes in the Circuit Court of Leflore County for the wrongful death of the decedent. The deceased was a widow and left no children, no father, no mother, no brother and no sister. The defendants offered $18,500 in full settlement of the suit. The executrix petitioned the Chancery Court of *259 Grenada County to authorize and approve the compromise offer. The petition also stated: The Last Will and Testament of Bessie C. Smith provided: The executrix and sole residuary legatee was a sister-in-law of the deceased. Eleven first cousins were named as defendants in the petition for approval of the compromise settlement and for distribution to the sole residuary legatee. Personal service of summons was had on the five cousins living in Mississippi and the six non-resident cousins were served by published summons. An attorney for a cousin living in Flint, Michigan, filed an entry of appearance for her but made no answer and was not present at the hearing. Arthur Garrett, a cousin, and a resident of Bolivar County, Mississippi, attended the hearing without counsel. He testified only as to the reasonableness of the compromise offer, but made no claim either orally or in writing to any part of the proceeds of the settlement. The Chancellor ruled: The Final Order contained this language: Pauline Smith appeals and here contends that the court erred in not finding that the net proceeds of the compromise settlement should be paid to her as sole residuary legatee under the last will and testament of the deceased. None of the eleven first cousins, as appellees, was represented by counsel in this Court, and no brief on behalf of any appellee has been filed. We could reverse this case and render judgment for the appellant because of the failure to file a brief under the authority of Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation v. Rogers, 284 So. 2d 304 (Miss. 1973); Jackson v. Walker, 240 So. 2d 606 (Miss. 1970); Charles F. Hayes and Associates v. Blue, 233 So. 2d 127 (Miss. 1970); United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. State, 204 So. 2d 852 (Miss. 1967). But we think it would be helpful to the bench and bar of the State to consider this case on its merits and to determine what the Legislature meant when it said: The other pertinent parts of the wrongful death statute provide: A first cousin is not named or listed as a relative of the deceased who could bring an action for his or her wrongful death. Neither is a first cousin named or listed anywhere in the statute as a dependent or beneficiary of the deceased. Yet the wrongful death statute created a cause of action unknown to the common law, and must be strictly construed. Logan v. Durham, 231 Miss. 232, 95 So. 2d 227 (1957). In construing this statute, we are bound to consider the fact that the Legislature studiously avoided any mention of a first cousin as a dependent, beneficiary, or representative of the deceased who could bring an action for wrongful death. In the case at bar, only Pauline Smith, as executrix, could bring this action as the personal representative of the deceased. *261 The Chancellor construed this language: to mean that after the payment of debts, then the damages should be distributed as intestate property under the provisions of the statute on descent and distribution [§§ 91-1-3 and 91-1-11, Miss. Code 1972 Annotated, §§ 468 and 472, Miss. Code 1942 Annotated]. This would mean that the damages would go to the first cousins, who were not mentioned in the statute nor in the last will and testament of the deceased. The last will and testament of Bessie C. Smith, deceased, solemnly stated: This language from Section 539, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Section 91-7-91, Mississippi Code 1972 Annotated), sheds some light on the intent of the Legislature when it used the term "subject to debts and general distribution" in the wrongful death statute: It appears to us that the intent of the Legislature was that, if there were no surviving heirs as specifically named and listed in the wrongful death statute, the damages recovered in a wrongful death action would become an asset of the estate to be used as any other asset in the payment of the just debts of the estate and then any residue to be distributed according to the last will and testament of the deceased, if there were a will, or under the statute of descent and distribution if there were no will. The Legislature was very careful to provide that if there were surviving heirs among those specifically named and listed that: The Legislature was just as careful to make an exception when there were no surviving heirs among those specifically listed. In that event, the damages recovered would become just another asset of the estate and be subject to debts and then distribution in accordance with the intent of the testatrix as solemnly expressed in her last will and testament. It would have been a simple matter for the Legislature to have provided otherwise if this were not its intent. Alabama, in its wrongful death statute, provided: Likewise, Missouri, in its wrongful death statute, specifically provided: "[A]nd the amount recovered shall be distributed according to the laws of descent." § 537.080 RSMo 1969. The net proceeds recovered under the wrongful death statute should be distributed to Miss Pauline Smith as sole residuary legatee under the last will and testament of the testatrix, Bessie C. Smith. The decree of the Chancery Court is, therefore, reversed and judgment rendered here for the appellant. Reversed and rendered. GILLESPIE, C.J., and INZER, SMITH and BROOM, JJ., concur.