Case Title: Kellogg-Hubbard Library v. Labor Relations Board

Citation: 162 Vt. 571, 649 A.2d 784

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
KELLOGGHUBBARD_LIB_V_LABOR_RELATIONS_BD.93-161; 162 Vt. 571; 649 A.2d 784

[Filed 30-Sep-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                         No. 93-161



 Kellogg-Hubbard Library                      Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Washington Superior Court

 Labor Relations Board                        January Term, 1994



 Stephen B. Martin, J.


 J. Scott Cameron of Paterson & Walke, P.C., Montpelier, for plaintiff-
    appellant

 Colin R. Benjamin and Alan P. Biederman of Biederman and Rakow, P.C.,
    Rutland, for appellee Local 1369, AFSCME


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      JOHNSON, J.   The issue in this case is whether an aggrieved party may
 appeal directly to this Court from orders of the Vermont Labor Relations
 Board (VLRB) pertaining to unit determination and certification under the
 State Labor Relations Act (SLRA), 21 V.S.A. {{ 1501-1623.  Because we agree
 with the superior court that statutory law provides for such review, we
 affirm the court's refusal to assert jurisdiction over appellant's complaint
 under V.R.C.P 75.

 

        In October 1991, appellee, local union 1369 of the American
 Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, filed a petition under
 the SLRA requesting the VLRB to conduct an election among employees of the
 Kellogg-Hubbard Library, a private, nonprofit entity, to determine whether
 the employees wanted Local 1369 to represent them as their collective
 bargaining agent.  Appellant, the library's board of trustees (Library),
 moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the National Labor
 Relations Board (NLRB) had jurisdiction over the matter, not the VLRB.  On
 February 10, 1992, the VLRB denied the Library's motion, ruling that it had
 jurisdiction because the NLRB, through an advisory opinion in an analogous
 case, had declined to assert jurisdiction over the dispute.  See 21 V.S.A. {
 1505 (SLRA does not apply to any employer or labor dispute that affects
 commerce unless NLRB has ceded, or declined to assert, jurisdiction).
 Accordingly, the VLRB granted the union's petition, and in June 1992 the
 employees voted 8-1 to have Local 1369 represent them.  On July 13, 1992,
 the VLRB issued an order certifying the union as the collective bargaining
 agent for the library's employees.
      On August 10, 1992, the Library filed a complaint in superior court
 requesting a declaratory judgment that the VLRB lacked jurisdiction over the
 petition filed by the union.  The Library asserted that relief was available
 in superior court under V.R.C.P. 75 because there was no direct avenue of
 appeal under the SLRA.  The superior court disagreed.  Comparing the SLRA
 with the other two acts administered by the VLRB -- the State Employees
 Labor Relations Act (SELRA), 3 V.S.A. {{ 901-1007, and the Municipal
 Employees Relations Act (MERA), 21 V.S.A. {{ 1721-1735 -- the court
 concluded that the legislature intended that the general principles and

 

 powers set forth in SELRA, including the provision allowing aggrieved
 persons to appeal directly to the Supreme Court on questions of law raised
 by decisions of the VLRB, would also apply in proceedings under SLRA and
 MERA.  The court stated that it would be "absurd and unreasonable" to
 conclude that similar errors of law could be appealed directly to this Court
 under one of the statutes administered by the VLRB, but not the others.
 Accordingly, the court dismissed the Library's complaint for lack of subject
 matter jurisdiction.
      We first examine the relevant statutes.  The SLRA, which applies to
 employees in the private sector, see 21 V.S.A. { 1502(6), (7), was enacted
 in 1967.  It expressly allows an aggrieved party to appeal to this Court
 from a decision in a proceeding involving a charge of an unfair labor
 practice, 21 V.S.A. { 1623(c), but it does not provide a right of appeal in
 any other type of proceeding.  SELRA, which applies to state employees, 3
 V.S.A. { 902(4), (5), was enacted in 1969.  It includes a broad appeal
 provision, which states that "[a]ny person aggrieved by an order or decision
 of the board issued under the authority of this chapter may appeal on
 questions of law to the supreme court."  3 V.S.A. { 1003(a).  MERA, which
 applies to municipal employees, was enacted in 1973.  It also contains a
 broad appeal provision that is virtually identical to 3 V.S.A. { 1003(a).
 See 21 V.S.A. { 1729(c).  In 1976, the legislature passed Act 152, which
 recreated the VLRB within SELRA, 1975 (Adj. Sess.) {{ 1-6, and repealed
 provisions in the SLRA pertaining to the creation and empowerment of the
 VLRB, id. { 7.  Act 152 added, among other things, the following provision
 to the "powers and duties" provision in SELRA:
             (d) In addition to its responsibilities under this
           chapter, the board shall carry out the responsibilities

 

           given to it under [SLRA] and when so doing shall exer-
           cise the powers and follow the procedures set out in
           that chapter.  The board shall also carry out the
           responsibilities given to it under [MERA] and when so
           doing shall exercise the powers and follow the
           procedures set out in that chapter.
 3 V.S.A. { 924(d).
      We agree with the superior court that the three statutes are closely
 related and therefore should be considered in pari materia as part of one
 system intended to oversee labor relations.  See In re Preseault, 130 Vt.
 343, 346,