Case Title: Ex Parte Taylor

Citation: 636 So. 2d 1246

Docket Number: 1920698

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1993-09-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
636 So. 2d 1246 (1993)
Ex parte Thomas Edward TAYLOR.
(Re Eddie Taylor
v.
State).
1920698.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 10, 1993.
William J. Baxley and Randy James of Baxley, Dillard, Dauphin & McKnight, Birmingham, for petitioner.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Cecil G. Brendle, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
SHORES, Justice.
We granted certiorari review in this case to determine whether § 13A-11-72, Code of Ala.1975, which prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a pistol, is a strict liability statute or whether a convicted felon who is charged with possessing a firearm may raise the defense of self-defense. We hold that he can. We reverse the judgment affirming Taylor's conviction and remand with instructions.
The petitioner, Thomas Edward Taylor, has placed the following facts before us by way of his petition and a Rule 39(k), A.R.App.P., statement of facts. Taylor is 41 years old, has been employed by the City of Gadsden for 16 years, and is presently its director of public works. Before working for the city, he worked for the sheriff's department, and he is still an honorary deputy sheriff.
In the fall of 1989, the city garbage workers of Gadsden were on strike. During that time, because of threats of violence against him and his family, Taylor carried with him in his truck a pistol belonging to his brother. The gun was in the truck on the night of October 5, 1989, when he and his brother were accosted by a group of strikers while they were at a service area of a shopping mall where Taylor maintained the grounds. The strikers drove up "cussing and screaming" and swinging baseball bats and clubs; one of the strikers had a gun. The strikers accused Taylor and his brother of picking up garbage in defiance of the strike. The Taylors denied that they were picking up garbage and asked the strikers to let them go. The strikers refused. Taylor pulled the gun and gave it to a man who worked at the theaters in the mall, asking him to hold it on the strikers until the he could telephone the police. Taylor went into the mall and telephoned the police, who came and took him home and remained with him for some time. Thereafter, the mayor had Taylor taken out of town for his safety.
In December 1989, Taylor was indicted and charged with violating § 13A-11-72(a), which prohibits persons convicted of a felony from possessing a pistol. The indictment was based upon the fact that in 1976, when Taylor was 24 years old, he had pleaded guilty to, and had been convicted on, a charge of burglary.
During Taylor's 1989 trial, the judge refused to allow Taylor to raise the defense of self-defense and to introduce evidence that he had appeared before the State Board of Pardons and Paroles to seek a pardon from *1247 the burglary conviction and that the Board could find no record of a conviction. The trial judge's ruling was based upon the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in Johnson v. State, 620 So. 2d 661 (Ala.Crim.App.1991). In Johnson, the Court of Criminal Appeals cited Mason v. State, 39 Ala.App. 1, 103 So. 2d 337 (1956), as supporting the proposition that a pardon does not destroy the effect of § 13A-11-72. The holding in Mason has now been specifically overruled by State ex rel. Sokira v. Burr, 580 So. 2d 1340, 1344-45 (Ala.1991). This Court affirmed Johnson v. State by an opinion of May 15, 1992; however, this Court withdrew its May 15, 1992, opinion, and this Court's final opinion in the Johnson case does not hold that § 13A-11-72(a) is a strict liability offense. See Ex parte Johnson, 620 So. 2d 665 (Ala.1993).
Taylor cites us to cases from the courts of Florida and Louisiana, holding that this offense is not a strict liability offense; we are persuaded by the reasoning of those courts. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has held that self-defense is a valid defense to the charge of possessing a firearm:
State v. Blache, 480 So. 2d 304 (La.1985). In Mungin v. State, 458 So. 2d 293 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1984), the Florida District Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's judgment concerning the presentation of evidence (in this case the weapon was a knife) as to self-defense, stating:
Id. at 295.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment is due to be reversed and the cause remanded for the Court of Criminal Appeals to set aside the conviction and order a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., concurs specially.
MADDOX, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in this judgment because I believe it comports with legislative intent. Even though I cannot agree that the statute forbidding a convicted felon to possess a pistol requires a showing of a specific intent or scienter, I do agree that the defense of self-defense is available in what I consider to be a public welfare crime.
As the author of Ex parte Harper, 594 So. 2d 1181 (Ala.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 330, 121 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1992), I discussed the distinctions between strict liability crimes and those requiring the showing of a specific intent:
594 So. 2d  at 1183-1184. Although, as the majority notes, "this Court's final opinion in the Johnson case does not hold that § 13A-11-72(a) is a strict liability offense," neither does it hold to the contrary. Rather, it is the classification of this crime as a "public welfare offense" that provides the distinguishing factor that supplies for Taylor an opportunity to raise the defense of self-defense. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56, 72 S. Ct. 240, 246, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952), as quoted in Ex parte Harper, 594 So. 2d  at 1186.
Section 13A-11-73 forbids a convicted felon to own or possess a pistol; that section appears under the heading "Offenses Against Public Order and Safety." My reading of the statute does not reveal that the legislature required a showing of a specific intent or scienter for this offense; however, I do agree with the majority that the defense of self-defense is available to one charged with this crime against the public welfare.