Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 485, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
ANDREW BROWN, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 485, 2006 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID. No. 0504010190 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  October 9, 2007 
Decided:  December 17, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the court en banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED in part and 
REMANDED in part. 
 
 
Jerome M. Capone, Law Office of Jerome M. Capone, Wilmington, 
Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
 
 
 
2
Defendant-appellant, Andrew Brown, confessed that he murdered Steven 
Cleveland to New York Police Department officers (the “NYPD statement”).  
Brown confessed while NYPD officers transported him between stations in 
Brooklyn, New York after an unconstitutional interrogation by Wilmington police 
officers.  At trial, Brown moved to suppress the initial interrogation conducted by 
the Wilmington police officers based on violations of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments, which the State conceded.  Brown further sought suppression of the 
later NYPD statement as “fruit” of the unconstitutional interrogation.  The State 
opposed that application.   
Under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, a statement obtained after a 
defendant invokes his right to counsel cannot be admitted if the police 
“deliberately elicited” it.  At the suppression hearing, the Superior Court judge 
admitted the NYPD statement.  The trial judge, though, only considered whether 
Brown made the statement in response to a police interrogation.  The trial judge 
believed that the evidence demonstrated that the interrogation had ended for the 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.   Because the trial judge failed to consider 
whether the police “deliberately elicited” Brown’s statement under the Sixth 
Amendment, we must REMAND for a further factual inquiry about the statement’s 
admissibility.  
 
3
Brown argues that the trial judge made two additional reversible errors at 
trial.  Brown contends, first, that the trial judge improperly admitted two 
videotaped statements; and, second, that the trial judge should have ordered a 
mistrial after the State failed to release a transcript of an interview with one of the 
State’s witnesses until after that witness testified.  We discuss those arguments at 
the end of this opinion.  However, because we find no error, we AFFIRM those 
rulings.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Steven Cleveland was shot and killed in Wilmington in March 2005.  On the 
night of the shooting, Steven and Dion Gibbs walked back to Steven’s house after 
visiting some friends.  When they turned the corner at Kirkwood Street, three men 
attacked Steven and Dion.  One of the attackers held a gun to Dion’s head and 
rummaged through his clothing, looking for valuables.  The attacker demanded that 
Dion remove his clothes and ordered him to run away, leaving Steven behind.  As 
Dion ran away, he heard gun shots.  The attacker shot Steven four times.  Steven 
died from massive internal bleeding. 
 
The Wilmington Police (WPD) investigated the homicide.  They eventually 
determined that Andrew Brown killed Steven.  A Grand Jury indicted Brown on 
first degree murder and eight other related charges.  However, the police could not 
find Brown.   
 
4
 
The search for Brown continued for several months.  Eventually a joint task 
force of Federal Marshals and the NYPD found and arrested 17 year-old Brown in 
Brooklyn, New York.  After the officers arrested Brown, they contacted the WPD, 
and the chief investigating officer for the case, Detective Donna DiClemente, went 
to New York. 
DiClemente and Detective Bower, also a Wilmington police officer, 
interrogated Brown at the police station in Brooklyn without any involvement from 
and outside the presence of NYPD officers.  After the WPD interrogation, Brown 
made an incriminating statement to NYPD officers as they transported him from 
the interrogation to the central booking station in New York.  Brown told NYPD 
officers: 
She [DiClemente] stated that the reason I shot Steven Cleveland was 
because he wouldn’t do what I wanted him to do.  She doesn’t know 
what she is talking about.  That’s not why I shot him.  If you were 
there and looked at his body, you would have seen he was doing 
exactly what I wanted him to do, taking off his clothes, as you can see 
his pants were down to his knees when they found him.  I shot him 
because he wasn’t doing it fast enough. 
 
Before trial, Brown sought to have both the interrogation and the later statement to 
the NYPD officers suppressed.  At the suppression hearing, the State conceded the 
impropriety of the first interrogation but still sought to introduce the NYPD 
statement.  The trial judge admitted the NYPD statement after a bench ruling 
focusing solely on a Fifth Amendment analysis. 
 
5
 
Brown appeals the trial judge’s decision admitting the statement.  In order to 
assess Brown’s suppression argument, we set out the relevant facts about the initial 
unconstitutional interrogation to determine the relative impact of that interrogation 
on the admissibility of the later NYPD statement.  We then follow with a review of 
the NYPD statement.  Finally, we discuss the trial judge’s bench ruling admitting 
the statement.  
The Interrogation 
After reviewing the record, we have encountered some difficulty 
determining what exactly happened at the initial interrogation.  Our difficulty 
stems from two critical decisions made at the suppression hearing.  First, the State 
conceded that the interrogation violated Brown’s constitutional rights.  That 
concession obviated any need to review the interrogation to determine its 
admissibility.1  Second, the trial judge admitted the NYPD statement without a 
thorough review or fact findings on the initial interrogation.2   
                                                 
1  
When the State conceded the suppression of the interrogation, it did not clearly indicate 
what constitutional norm it violated at the interrogation.  The violation could have been a Fifth 
Amendment Miranda violation, or it could have been a Sixth Amendment violation because 
Brown had already been indicted.  The State now concedes on appeal that, in addition to any 
potential Fifth Amendment Miranda violation, it violated Brown’s Sixth Amendment rights.   We 
note that our analysis, today, focuses on the interrogation as a violation of the Sixth Amendment.   
 
2  
The trial judge indicated that “if I’m going to have to get into exactly what happened 
during that interview, I’m going to have to have more evidence in front of me.”  However, the 
trial judge did not seek nor did either party produce additional evidence about the interrogation. 
 
 
6
The record before us today is, therefore, limited to the transcript of the 
interrogation without any additional fact findings.3    From this cold transcript, we 
cannot possibly draw any significant factual conclusions or inferences from the 
events and circumstances surrounding the interrogation without a more elaborate 
factual record.  We do believe, however, that the record sheds light on a few key 
factors and discrepancies in the record that weigh against the admissibility of 
Brown’s NYPD statement. 
After the police officers first recited the Miranda warnings, Brown, an 
indicted juvenile, responded “I ain’t talking about nothing now, hell no” and then 
made some additional statements.  But instead of ending their questions, the police 
officers continued.  The officers then reread the Miranda warnings individually, 
seeking Brown’s acknowledgment of each right.  First, the officers told Brown that 
he had the right to remain silent.  Brown indicated that he was a minor and that his 
“parents might have.”  But according to the transcript, the officers apparently cut 
him off and asked “Do you understand that?”  Brown responded that he 
understood, but it is not apparent what he, in fact, understood.   
The officers continued saying that “[a]ny thing you say can and will be used 
against you in a court of law, do you understand that?”  Brown answered, “Yes if 
                                                 
3  
The trial judge partly based her ruling on the fact that Brown had been advised of his 
Miranda rights.  We do not believe that this finding of fact was “sufficiently supported by the 
record” before the trial judge, Wright v. State 633 A.2d 329, 333 (Del. 1993), because of 
inconsistencies in the transcript of the interrogation.  This fact finding must be reevaluated after a 
more thorough review of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.   
 
7
you got it on tape.”  The officers replied, “Okay.  You have the right to talk to a 
lawyer.”  Brown acknowledged that right.  The officers explained the remaining 
rights, which Brown also acknowledged.  The officers asked Brown if he wanted to 
talk.  Brown responded that he would not talk about the incident in March that he 
read about in the papers.   
Nevertheless, the interrogation continued.  DiClemente told Brown that she 
would recite the Miranda warnings again.  Brown retorted, “You read them 
twice!”  The officers responded “I understand that, but you said I don’t want to talk 
to you and now you want to talk to your lawyer.”  Brown repeated “No, I ain’t 
talking to you, no.”   
From this point on, the ensuing events become muddled because the 
transcript shows that the tape stopped and suddenly, without any indication about 
the extent of lapsed time, the officers said “Alright Andrew, you expressed that 
you wanted to talk to us again, I’m going to read your rights again.”  But, neither 
the tape nor any other evidence explained Brown’s radical reversal in course or 
what exactly occurred after the tape stopped and before it resumed.    
After the officers read Brown his rights again, they asked him to repeat the 
rights back to them.  DiClemente asked, “In your words what does that [i.e. his 
rights] mean?”  Andrew responded, “It means I’m willing to talk to [the officers] 
all about the crime that you all accusing me of.”  The officers asked Brown, “Do 
 
8
you know that you don’t have to talk to us right now?” Andrew answered “I know 
that.”   
 
During the interview Brown made some potentially incriminating statements 
but flatly denied shooting Steven.  The record fails to show the length of the 
interview, but the parties estimate that it may have lasted up to two hours.  At the 
end of the interview the officers attempt to establish Brown’s motive by saying that 
“[Steven] embarrassed you first and you tried to embarrass him.”  Brown says 
“that ain’t the same dude.”  Then one of the officers repeats the question, suddenly 
someone (unidentified) yells “I’m done!” and the interview ends. 
The NYPD Statement 
A short but otherwise indefinite period of time elapsed after the interview 
concluded and before two NYPD officers drove Brown from the Brooklyn station 
to Central Booking.  While the NYPD transported Brown during a five to ten 
minute car ride, Brown made his incriminating statement.  The trial judge found 
that the NYPD officers did not engage Brown or attempt to solicit any statement 
and that these officers were unaware of any of the facts surrounding the case.  The 
record supports each of those findings. 
 
9
 
The Suppression Hearing 
The State initially sought to introduce both the interview and the NYPD 
statement.  Brown moved to suppress both statements.  The State did not oppose 
suppressing the initial interview.  The State, however, argued that Brown’s 
comments to the NYPD should be admitted.  During the suppression hearing, the 
trial judge stated: 
Well I don’t think – I mean, if I’m going to have to get into exactly 
what happened during that interview, I’m going to have to have more 
evidence in front of me.  What I’m going to decide on is whether or 
not the suppressed statement is sufficiently removed in time, place, 
identity of person to – so that the taint is removed from the fruit of the 
poisonous tree.  I can tell you now that I do find that the testimony of 
the two police officers is consistent and credible.  And for purposes of 
this motion, I find that this was not a custodial interrogation.  And I 
find that neither officer said anything which resulted in the statement 
which was made by the defendant.  So that’s my ruling with regard to 
that issue.  So now the question becomes whether or not his statement 
is part of a continuum of an otherwise prohibited interview. 
 
 
A few minutes later the trial judge held: 
 
Well I don’t think that the case law that has been presented to me is 
going to resolve this issue one way or another.  I think it is a factual 
question as to whether or not there’s been a sufficient separation 
between the interview and the unsolicited utterance.  As I already 
said, I do find that the statement was not made as part of any 
interrogation, custodial or otherwise.  I credit the testimony of the two 
officers when they stated that they did not say anything to the 
defendant. I’m not going to suppress the statement.  I’m going to deny 
that motion for several reasons.  First of all, I find that what the 
defendant commented on was what Detective DiClemente told the 
defendant and not to clarify what the defendant had told Detective 
 
10
DiClemente.  Therefore, even – it was not part of a clarification of any 
statement that the defendant made at the interrogation, which was 
suppressed.  I also find that although the time between the 
interrogation and the statement is relatively short, I think all the 
parties testified that it was within the range of about five to ten 
minutes.  The interrogating detectives had left, it was two different 
officers, the defendant was not only removed from the building, but 
was being transported.  It would be clear to any reasonable person that 
the interrogation had ceased.  There’s no evidence of coercion at the 
time the statement was made.  Indeed, both officers who were in the 
car testified that they were unaware of the content of the interview’ 
and, in fact, the New York Police Department detective testified that 
he – I should say both testified that they, under their own procedures, 
would not have conducted an interrogation at that point, but rather 
would have preferred to have it under more optimal circumstances in 
police headquarters.  The fact that the defendant was a juvenile at the 
time does not affect my ruling.  I do find that the age of the defendant 
is relevant.  He was 17.  He had obviously had some contact with the 
criminal justice system.  He, himself, stated that he did not like cops.  
Obviously, he has had some experience with police officers, and for – 
and he also had been advised of his rights, although the police did 
continue to interrogate after that.  So that factor, I think, is a natural 
factor, the fact that he had been made [sic] his Miranda rights. But I 
find that not to be dispositive because this was an unsolicited 
utterance. 
 
Trial followed, and the jury found Brown guilty on every count. 
DISCUSSION 
We must address what appropriate legal standard should be applied to 
determine whether to admit the NYPD statement.  The trial judge believed that the 
NYPD statement is admissible and rested her decision on a factual determination 
that the NYPD officers did not obtain Brown’s statement in response to 
 
11
interrogation.  We review the trial judge’s formulation of the appropriate 
constitutional legal standard de novo.4 
Delaware law, if not United States constitutional law, applies “special 
scrutiny” to any confessions and incriminating statements made by juveniles.5  We 
have continually reaffirmed the need for “special scrutiny” of juvenile’s statements 
and reaffirm that process today.6   
The Sixth Amendment provides “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”7  “The 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered at or after the time that judicial 
proceedings have been initiated whether by way of formal charge, preliminary 
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”8   
Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has held that the state violates 
the Sixth Amendment when it uses a defendant’s own incriminating words 
                                                 
4  
See Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 481 (Del. 1996) (reviewing an alleged Constitutional 
violation de novo). 
 
5  
Haug v. State, 406 A.2d 38, 43 (Del. 1979). 
 
6  
See Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144, 1150 (Del. 2007); Brown v. State, 1991 Del. LEXIS 
372 (Del. 1991); Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1197 (Del. 1990); Blankenship v. State, 447 
A.2d 428, 431 (Del. 1982). 
 
7  
U.S. Const. amend. VI.  Applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963).  
 
8  
Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 
387, 398 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)) (internal quotations omitted); 
Alston v. State, 554 A.2d 304, 308 (Del. 1989). 
 
 
12
‘“deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his 
counsel.’”9 A suspect, “having expressed his desire to deal with the police only 
through counsel, [cannot be] subject[ed] to further interrogation by the authorities 
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates 
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”10  “[T]he 
reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked 
for the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally charged with 
an offense than before.”11  “[A]fter a formal accusation has been made – and a 
person who had previously been just a ‘suspect’ has become an ‘accused’ within 
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment – the constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel is of such importance that the police may no longer employ techniques for 
eliciting information from an uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely 
proper at an earlier stage of their investigation.”12  “Once the right to counsel has 
attached and been asserted, the State must of course honor it. This means more 
than simply that the State cannot prevent the accused from obtaining the assistance 
                                                 
9  
Fellers, 540 U.S. at 523 (quoting Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)). 
 
10  
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626 (1986) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477, 485 (1981)). 
 
11  
Id. at 631. 
12  
Id. at 632. 
 
13
of counsel. The Sixth Amendment also imposes on the State an affirmative 
obligation to respect and preserve the accused’s choice to seek this assistance.”13 
The State conceded that the original interrogation violated Brown’s 
constitutional rights.  The State now admits, and we recognize, that it violated 
Brown’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel because Brown had already been 
indicted when the police arrested and interrogated him.  The State contends that the 
NYPD statement should not be suppressed because it was a voluntary statement 
made without any taint of the earlier Sixth Amendment violation–i.e., in the words 
commonly found in Sixth Amendment analysis–Brown initiated his statement to the 
NYPD.  The State maintains the burden of proving “an intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”14   
The trial judge found that Brown made an unsolicited utterance, and 
admitted the statement into evidence.  After reviewing the trial judge’s bench 
ruling, we find it plainly evident that the transcript of the interrogation was the 
only evidence that the trial judge considered to support her finding that Brown 
made an unsolicited utterance.  The trial judge’s analysis appears to consider the 
earlier interrogation a violation of Miranda and the Fifth Amendment, because the 
trial judge refers to the fact that the police mirandized Brown and then focused on 
                                                 
13  
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170–171 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
 
14  
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, (1938)); see Id. 
 
14
whether the statement was a continuation of the interrogation.  These are critical 
issues for violations of the Fifth Amendment—but not the Sixth Amendment.  Thus, 
the trial judge apparently never conducted a Sixth Amendment violation analysis.   
Under the Sixth Amendment, if Brown invoked his right to counsel, the 
police could not use any of his later statements after the police initiated contact 
even if Brown purportedly later waived those rights.15  Brown’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel undoubtedly attached upon indictment, and Brown may have 
invoked his right to counsel.  The transcript shows that DiClemente believed that at 
some point Brown invoked his right to counsel.  After DiClemente indicated she 
would read the Miranda warnings again, Brown responded “You read them twice!”  
She responded “I understand that, but you said I don’t want to talk to you and now 
you want to talk to your lawyer.”  We cannot, however, despite DiClemente’s 
assertion, find any clear indication in the transcript that Brown specifically 
demanded counsel.16  Because of this inconsistency, it was essential for the trial 
                                                 
15  
Jackson, 475 U.S. at 631. 
 
16  
We do know that a lapse occurred in taping the interrogation.  However, no one inquired 
at the suppression hearing about the consequences of the untaped time interval.  We do know 
that some time during the untaped interval, Brown may have expressed the view that “you 
(Brown) expressed the view that you wanted to talk to us again . . . .”  That lull followed by the 
interrogator’s comment confirms that at least at some point Brown had cut off the interrogation. 
 
 
15
judge to request additional evidence before determining the admissibility of 
Brown’s statement. 17 
After Brown invoked his right to counsel, admissibility of any of his 
statements rested on whether the police “deliberately elicited” information from 
him.18  The deliberate elicitation standard differs from custodial interrogation.19  
Deliberate elicitation focuses on whether “the police officer deliberately and 
designedly set out to elicit information from the accused . . . .”20  In United States 
v. Henry, the United States Supreme Court suppressed statements made by the 
defendant to a jailhouse informant because the informant “had ‘some conversations 
with Mr. Henry’ while he was in jail and Henry’s incriminatory statements were 
‘the product of this conversation.’”21  “By intentionally creating a situation likely 
to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of 
                                                 
17  
See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991) (“If the police do subsequently 
initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel (assuming there has been no break in custody), the 
suspect’s statements are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible as substantive 
evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be 
considered voluntary under traditional standards. This is ‘designed to prevent police from 
badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights[.]’”) (quoting 
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)). 
 
18  
Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. 
 
19  
See string citation in Fellers , 540 U.S. at 524 (2004), listing cases that distinguish 
between deliberate elicitation and custodial interrogation.  
 
20  
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977). 
 
21  
447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980). 
 
 
16
counsel, the Government violated Henry’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”22  
Thus, deliberate elicitation means any action taken by the State designed to result 
in a response by Brown.23 
The trial judge’s decision to admit the statement rested on her belief that 
Brown did not make his statement to the NYPD officers in response to 
interrogation.  In her ruling, the trial judge stated: “I find that what the defendant 
commented on was what Detective DiClemente told the defendant and not to 
clarify what the defendant had told Detective DiClemente.  Therefore, even – [sic] 
it was not part of a clarification of any statement that the defendant made at the 
interrogation, which was suppressed.”; “It would be clear to any reasonable person 
that the interrogation had ceased.”; and, finally, “I should say both [NYPD 
officers] testified that they, under their own procedures, would not have conducted 
an interrogation at that point . . . .”  Because the trial judge admitted Brown’s 
statement without a full analysis of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation, under the “deliberate elicitation” standard, we must remand this case 
for a further factual inquiry focused on whether the police deliberately elicited 
Brown’s statement. 
                                                 
22  
Id. at 274. 
 
23  
In contrast, incriminating statements obtained by “luck or happenstance” after the right to 
counsel has attached do not violate the Sixth Amendment.  See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176. 
 
17
We conclude that the trial judge must undertake a more detailed review of 
all the circumstances, including the initial interrogation. The trial judge indicated 
that “if I’m going to have to get into exactly what happened during that interview, 
I’m going to have to have more evidence in front of me.”  We agree with that 
observation.   
Although the cold transcript may have been sufficient evidence under a Fifth 
Amendment analysis, the confusing transcript does not support the finding of an 
unsolicited utterance for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.  Viewed in absolute 
isolation, Brown spontaneously erupted, confessing murder to the police without 
any spark.  But put in context, Brown’s NYPD statement alludes to and arguably 
remains at least partially yoked with the earlier WPD illegal interrogation and, 
thus, may be a response that DiClemente “deliberately elicited” from Brown.   
On remand, the trial judge must, first, assess whether Brown invoked his 
right to counsel, at least at some point.  DiClemente apparently believed he did.  
Then, second, under the deliberate elicitation standard of the Sixth Amendment, the 
trial judge needs to engage in a broader factual inquiry than simply a review of the 
transcript and the events at play in the NYPD police car.  The trial judge indicates 
in her ruling that Brown responded to something said by Detective DiClemente.  
The question that must be addressed on remand is whether, by making whatever 
remarks she did, DiClemente, during her WPD interrogation, “intentionally 
 
18
creat[ed] a situation likely to induce [Brown] to make incriminating statements”24 
after the unconstitutional WPD interrogation ended.  The trial judge must consider 
whether any actions by DiClemente were deliberately designed to elicit Brown’s 
incriminating remarks.25  If DiClemente intended that Brown respond to her 
question at any time after he had requested counsel, the statement must be 
suppressed as a “deliberate elicitation.”   
At least one interpretation of the incomplete factual record would support an 
inference that DiClemente deliberately elicited Brown’s response.  In particular, 
we are concerned how DiClemente made her final accusation followed by an 
immediate and sudden end to the interrogation signaled by the unidentified taped 
voice.  This tactic might have been purposefully coercive and supports an inference 
that DiClemente deliberately intended to elicit a response from Brown.  Under this 
possible interpretation of the transcript, DiClemente interrogated Brown in blatant 
disregard of his Sixth Amendment rights, heatedly accused him of committing 
murder, and cut him off before giving him an opportunity to respond.  Suddenly, at 
his first opportunity to speak after the abrupt end to the interrogation, Brown 
anxiously—and perhaps compulsively—explained to the NYPD officers how 
DiClemente “had it all wrong,” and then “confessed” to the murder while 
                                                 
24  
Henry, 447 U.S. at 270. 
 
25  
See Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). 
 
19
correcting the accusations about him at the initial interrogation.  If a full record 
supported this account, one could rationally conclude that WPD “deliberately 
elicited” Brown’s utterance to the NYPD.26 
In order for the trial judge to admit Brown’s NYPD statement, the State 
must introduce additional evidence about the interrogation that would support a 
conclusion that despite its connection to comments made in the initial 
interrogation, the WPD officers did not deliberately elicit further comment by 
Brown after he invoked his right to counsel.  As we have explained above, the 
transcript, alone and without more, does not carry the State’s burden to show that 
DiClemente did not deliberately elicit Brown’s statement.   
Accordingly, we remand this case for further factual findings about whether 
DiClemente deliberately elicited Brown’s response.  If the trial judge determines 
that the statement must be excluded, the trial judge has the power to vacate the 
conviction and require a new trial.  If the trial judge finds that the NYPD statement 
passes Sixth Amendment muster, Brown can appeal that decision and we would 
have an appropriate factual record to review that decision on appeal. 
                                                 
26  
We do not imply that these inferences must be drawn.  We merely rely on this narrative 
to explain how the obfuscated record before us can lead to number of potential different 
interpretations.  Moreover, although we believe this set of circumstances would demonstrate that 
the police deliberately elicited Brown’s utterance, this is not the only possible interpretation of 
what happened.  If the trial judge is satisfied that DiClemente sought to have Brown respond to 
her accusation then his statement would have been “deliberately elicited” regardless of to whom 
or which officers he directed his “response.” 
 
20
 
Brown’s Other Arguments 
Brown suggests that we should apply the “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
doctrine used for violations of the Fourth Amendment to this violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.27  Specifically he argues that the police obtained his NYPD statement 
as a product of his earlier unconstitutional interrogation, and without sufficient 
attenuation, the statement should be suppressed.  The State, meanwhile, asserts that 
the United States Supreme Court, in Oregon v. Elstad,28 vitiated the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” analysis from Miranda violations and substituted a voluntariness 
evaluation to determine admissibility of a later statement by a defendant.  Because 
we remand for further factual inquiry on whether the police deliberately elicited 
Brown’s response, we need not address this open “fruits” question under the Sixth 
Amendment. 
Brown also argues that two videotaped statements introduced by the State 
should have been excluded from evidence.  Under 11 Del. C. § 3507, the State may 
introduce a “voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness.”  Brown argues 
that the police obtained these video taped statements by coercion and not 
                                                 
27  
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 
28  
470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 
 
21
voluntarily.  We review the trial judge’s admissions of statements under section 
3507 for abuse of discretion.29   
The State introduced videotape statements from two witnesses to the 
shooting, Ruth Ann Clark and JoAnn Brown.  Brown objected and argued that the 
State obtained the statements by coercion.  After voir dire of both witnesses, the 
trial judge admitted both statements.  Although both witnesses appeared reluctant, 
the trial judge found “nothing in the conduct of law enforcement officers was 
inappropriate and which would affect the voluntary nature of the statement.”  On 
appeal, Brown argues that the police coerced the statements when they threatened 
the witnesses with jail time if they did not cooperate with the investigation.  
However, Brown fails to recognize that the voluntariness inquiry rests on “whether 
the behavior of the interrogators was such as to overbear the will of the defendant 
to resist and bring about a statement not the product of a rational intellect and a 
free will.”30  Brown does not point to any conduct by the police that limited Ruth 
Ann and JoAnn from exercising their “rational intellect” and “free will.”  
Therefore, the trial judge properly admitted these statements. 
Finally, Brown contends that the trial judge should have ordered a mistrial 
when the State provided Brown with a transcript of a police interview with Ruth 
                                                 
29  
Barnes v. State, 858 A.2d 942, 944 (Del. 2004). 
 
30  
Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682, 691 (Del. 1986) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
 
22
Ann after she testified.  We review a denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of 
discretion.31  Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 26.2 and Jencks v. United 
States,32 the State must provide the defense, when requested, with recorded 
statements made by the State’s witnesses to the State’s agents.  The State 
apparently failed to disclose a transcript of a police interrogation of Ruth Ann to 
Brown until after Ruth Ann testified.  Brown’s counsel moved for a mistrial.  A 
trial judge must order a mistrial when “no meaningful and practical alternatives” as 
remedies exist.33  Rather than ordering a mistrial to cure the State’s apparent 
inadvertent failure to disclose the transcript, the trial judge gave Brown the option 
to recall Ruth Ann.  Brown did not.  On appeal, Brown concedes that the State did 
not delay disclosure out of “willful avoidance or egregious dereliction.”  Moreover, 
Brown offers no facts to support nor proffers any reason why this delay and the 
trial judge’s proposed remedy prejudiced him.  Therefore, the trial judge properly 
denied Brown’s motion for a mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED, in part, and REMANDED, in part.  Jurisdiction is retained. 
 
                                                 
31  
Taylor v. State, 685 A.2d 349 (Del. 1996) 
 
32  
353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
 
33  
Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Del. 1987).