Case Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Hunter

Citation: 2011-Ohio-5788

Docket Number: 2011-1040

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Hunter (Slip Opiinion), Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5788, 
2011-Ohio-5788.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-5788 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSN. v. HUNTER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Hunter,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5788.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2011-1040—Submitted August 8, 2011—Decided November 15, 2011.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-071. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Kyle Lee Hunter of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No.  0069099, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1998.  
On May 24, 2010, we suspended Hunter’s license to practice law on an interim 
basis following his felony conviction for failure to report a cash payment of more 
than $10,000 in his law practice in violation of Sections 5331 and 5322(a), Title 
31, U.S.Code and former 31 C.F.R. 103.30  In re Hunter, 125 Ohio St.3d 1431, 
2010-Ohio-2261, 927 N.E.2d 4. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
{¶ 2} In August 2010, relator, Columbus Bar Association, filed a 
complaint alleging that the conduct underlying Hunter’s felony conviction also 
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Relator later amended its complaint 
to allege additional misconduct arising from Hunter’s handling of two client 
matters and his client trust account. 
{¶ 3} The parties submitted stipulations of fact and misconduct and 
jointly waived a formal hearing on the matter.  A panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline adopted the stipulations without 
modification and recommended that Hunter be indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law and that his reinstatement be conditioned upon the completion of 
his supervised release and satisfaction of any fee-arbitration award entered in 
favor of a client harmed by his misconduct.  The board adopted the stipulated 
facts and the recommended sanction, except that rather than conditioning 
Hunter’s reinstatement upon the satisfaction of a potential arbitration award, the 
board recommends requiring him to make restitution to those harmed by his 
misconduct.  We adopt the stipulated findings of fact and misconduct, as well as 
the sanction and conditions for reinstatement recommended by the board. 
Misconduct 
Count One 
{¶ 4} The parties have stipulated and the board has found that on January 
6, 2010, Hunter pleaded guilty to one felony count of receiving more than 
$10,000 in cash in the course of his trade or business as an attorney and failing to 
report it as required by law.  In April 2010, a federal court accepted Hunter’s plea, 
sentenced him to a six-month term of imprisonment, and fined him $100.  Now 
released from federal prison, he is subject to three years of supervision that will 
require him to participate in testing and treatment for drug and alcohol abuse, to 
receive mental-health treatment, and to perform 50 hours of community service 
within the first year of his release. 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
{¶ 5} The parties have stipulated, and the board has found, that Hunter’s 
conduct violates Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an 
illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness), 
8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law). 
Count Two 
{¶ 6} With respect to count two, the parties have stipulated that in April 
2008, Hunter agreed to represent Trina M. Scott on a contingent-fee basis in a 
personal-injury and property-damage matter arising from a vehicle collision.  
Scott gave Hunter all the documentation he requested.  Hunter assured Scott that 
he would handle the case in a timely and effective manner, represented that he 
was working on the case, and gave her the impression that he had submitted her 
claim to the appropriate insurance carrier.  In fact, he did little or nothing to 
advance her case.  Scott had difficulty reaching Hunter, and in November 2009, 
he advised her that he would soon face criminal charges that would render him 
ineligible to practice law.  Scott had to obtain new counsel to pursue her claims.  
Due to respondent’s inaction, Scott did not timely receive the compensation to 
which she was entitled, and some of her medical providers filed collection actions 
against her. 
{¶ 7} The parties have stipulated and the board has found that Hunter’s 
conduct in the Scott matter violates Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to 
provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with 
reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4 (requiring a lawyer to 
reasonably communicate with a client), and 8.4(h). 
Count Three 
{¶ 8} In June 2009, Charles Brian Strickler III paid a $2,000 retainer to 
secure Hunter’s representation in a divorce and custody proceeding.  In the fall of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
2009, Hunter stopped keeping Strickler fully informed about the status of his case.  
Although a significant amount of legal work still remained, in November 2009, 
Hunter advised Strickler that he would have to withdraw from his case due to 
personal problems with the Internal Revenue Service. 
{¶ 9} Hunter sought new counsel for Strickler, arranged for him to meet 
with the other lawyer, and gave him some documents to take to the meeting.  He 
later sent the case materials in his possession to the other attorney.  Although 
Hunter stated that he would file a notice of withdrawal with the court, he did not 
do so.  He was removed from the case when Strickler’s new attorney filed a notice 
of substitution of counsel. 
{¶ 10} Hunter maintains that he has earned all the fees he received from 
Strickler, but he has not provided an accounting to substantiate his claim.  Hunter 
stipulates that if called as a witness, Strickler would testify that he requested an 
accounting and a refund of some or all of his fees.  Despite Hunter’s belief that he 
has earned the fees he has received in this case, Hunter has stipulated that if and 
when Strickler seeks binding fee arbitration through the Columbus Bar 
Association’s fee-arbitration program, he will immediately agree to participate.  
Hunter further stipulated that his conduct harmed Strickler by delaying his case 
for many months, causing him to obtain new counsel, and depriving him of the 
full value of the fees paid to Hunter. 
{¶ 11} The parties have stipulated and the board has found that these facts 
clearly and convincingly demonstrate violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 
8.4(h). 
Count Four 
{¶ 12} Between April and June 2010, Hunter held client funds that should 
have been in his client trust account.  On two occasions, however, Hunter wrote 
checks that caused the account to become overdrawn—once by $298.17 and 
another time by $38.88.  Hunter stipulates that he did not maintain adequate 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
accounting procedures and reconciliation methods to prevent such overdrafts and 
that his conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold 
property of clients separate from the lawyer’s own property in an interest-bearing 
client trust account) and 8.4(h). 
Findings of Fact and Misconduct 
{¶ 13} We adopt the facts and findings of misconduct as stipulated by the 
parties and found by the board.  The board has dismissed several alleged 
violations for lack of sufficient evidence.  We find, however, that the parties have 
also failed to submit any evidence tending to demonstrate that respondent has 
violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 
1.16(d) 
(requiring 
a 
lawyer 
withdrawing 
from 
representation to take steps reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interest) 
and 1.16(e) (requiring a lawyer to promptly refund any unearned fee upon the 
lawyer’s withdrawal from employment) as charged in count two of the amended 
complaint.  Therefore, we dismiss those alleged violations as well. 
Sanction 
{¶ 14} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.   
{¶ 15} The parties have stipulated and the board has found that the 
aggravating factors in this case are a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of 
misconduct involving multiple offenses, and the vulnerability of and resulting 
harm to victims of the misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
and (h).  Mitigating factors include the absence of a prior disciplinary record, full 
and free disclosure to the board, a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary 
proceeding, and the imposition of other penalties or sanctions in Hunter’s criminal 
case.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (d), and (f). 
{¶ 16} Citing his acceptance of responsibility for his actions and his 
cooperation in this disciplinary proceeding, Hunter argues that an 18-month 
suspension is the appropriate sanction for his misconduct.  But Hunter offers no 
caselaw to support his requested sanction. 
{¶ 17} Relator observes: “ It is not a minor, harmless event when a [] 
lawyer betrays the trust placed in him by the courts, the profession and the public.  
If a lawyer defending people accused of crime becomes enmeshed in a criminal 
enterprise himself, it is a stain upon the profession and a detriment to the public’s 
view of lawyers.” 
{¶ 18} Relator cites a number of cases imposing suspensions on attorneys 
who have engaged in criminal conduct, ranging from two years to permanent 
disbarment.  See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Zins, 116 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007-Ohio-5263, 
875 N.E.2d 941, ¶ 14 (imposing a two-year suspension with no credit for time 
served under an interim felony suspension for an attorney convicted of identity 
fraud); Disciplinary Counsel v. Stern, 106 Ohio St.3d 266, 2005-Ohio-4804, 834 
N.E.2d 351 ¶ 8 (permanently disbarring an attorney convicted of federal drug 
crimes, maliciously damaging a building by fire, and money laundering). 
{¶ 19} The majority of opinions cited by relator, however, imposed 
indefinite suspensions for similar criminal conduct.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Smith, 128 Ohio St.3d 390, 2011-Ohio-957, 944 N.E.2d 1166, ¶ 6, 10 (imposing 
an indefinite suspension with credit for time served on an attorney convicted of 
conspiracy to defraud the IRS, making false tax returns, and corruptly 
endeavoring to obstruct and impede an IRS investigation.  Reinstatement was 
conditioned on the completion of federal supervised release, execution of a final 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
agreement to pay restitution, and completion of federal supervised release); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Zapor, 127 Ohio St.3d 372, 2010-Ohio-5769, 939 N.E.2d 
1230, ¶ 12 (imposing an indefinite suspension and conditioning reinstatement on 
the extension of and compliance with an Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program 
Contract, for an attorney convicted of felony theft from a ward’s account); 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Kellogg, 126 Ohio St.3d 360, 2010-Ohio-3285, 933 
N.E.2d 1085, ¶ 2, 26 (imposing an indefinite suspension and requirement that 
federal supervised release be completed prior to any petition for reinstatement for 
attorney convicted of money laundering, conspiracy to commit money laundering, 
and conspiracy to obstruct proceedings before both the United States Federal 
Trade Commission and Food and Drug Administration); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Gittinger, 125 Ohio St.3d 467, 2010-Ohio-1830, 929 N.E.2d 410, ¶ 33, 35, 49 
(imposing an indefinite suspension with credit for time served under an interim 
felony suspension and conditioning reinstatement on completion of supervised 
release for an attorney convicted of money laundering and  conspiracy to commit 
bank fraud); and Disciplinary Counsel v. Bennett, 124 Ohio St.3d 314, 2010-
Ohio-313, 921 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 2, 28 (imposing an indefinite suspension, with 
credit for time served under an interim felony suspension and conditioning 
reinstatement on completion of supervised release for an attorney convicted of 
illegally structuring currency transactions to evade taxation). 
{¶ 20} The panel recommended that Hunter be indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio and that reinstatement be contingent on his 
successful completion of supervised release and his payment of any restitution 
ordered by an arbitrator of the Columbus Bar Association’s fee-arbitration 
program.  The board adopted the panel’s recommended sanction but recommends 
that respondent be required to make “restitution to persons harmed by 
Respondent’s misconduct,” rather than leave the issue of restitution to an 
arbitrator.  Neither party has objected to the board’s recommendation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 21} Having 
considered 
respondent’s 
conduct, 
the 
applicable 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sanctions imposed for similar 
misconduct, we conclude that an indefinite suspension, with reinstatement 
conditioned upon completion of Hunter’s federal supervised release and the 
payment of restitution to persons harmed by his misconduct, is the appropriate 
sanction for Hunter’s ethical violations. 
{¶ 22} Accordingly, Kyle Lee Hunter is indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio and ordered to make restitution to Charles Brian Strickler 
III of his entire $2,000 retainer and reimburse the Clients’ Security Fund for the 
total amount of any awards paid by the fund to former clients of respondent as a 
result of his misconduct in this case.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jeffrey C. Rogers, Bruce A. Campbell, Bar Counsel, and A. Alysha Clous, 
Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
Kyle Lee Hunter, pro se. 
______________________