Case Title: DAROLD SHORES and KATHLEEN SHORES V. ROY BUCKLIN and ANNE BUCKLIN

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0033

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
DAROLD SHORES and KATHLEEN SHORES V. ROY BUCKLIN and ANNE BUCKLIN2009 WY 4199 P.3d 1083Case Number: S-08-0033Decided: 01/22/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
DAROLD 
SHORES and KATHLEEN 
SHORES,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.ROY BUCKLIN and ANNE 
BUCKLIN,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County

The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

J. 
Craig Abraham, Plains Law Offices, LLP, Gillette, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Stephen 
L. Simonton, Stephen L. Simonton, P.C., Cody, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants Darold 
and Kathleen Shores ("the Shores") appeal from the district court's order 
entering judgment in favor of appellees Roy and Anne Bucklin ("the Bucklins") 
quieting title to a parcel of land in Big Horn County, Wyoming.  The court ruled that summary judgment 
was proper, in that the Shores did not have evidence to support a "color of 
title" theory.  Also, there was not 
satisfaction of the 10-year period for adverse possession.  Finally, pursuant to the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure, dismissal was proper as a sanction for failure to comply 
with the scheduling order.  This 
appeal followed.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The Shores raise 
two issues on appeal:

 
 

1.            
Are 
the Bucklins entitled to a judgment in this case in that the Shores, in seeking 
to quiet title under a claim of adverse possession, did not elect and plead the 
theory under which they claim the adverse possession?

2.            
Is 
judgment to the [Bucklins] the proper remedy in this case for the failure to 
comply with the Scheduling Order?

 
 
The 
Bucklins frame the issues as follows:

 
 

1.The 
court should summarily affirm for failure to designate or cite to any record on 
appeal as well as numerous other instances of disregarding the requirements of 
the [Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure].

2.There 
was no reasonable basis for an appeal because WRE 103 explicitly bars [the 
Shores] from assigning error when [the Shores] failed to make a proper offer of 
proof of the substance of the excluded testimony and 
exhibits.

3.There 
was no reasonable ground for this appeal because the issues are moot after the 
district court's subsequent rulings and findings, which the Shores neither 
opposed nor appealed and which are now law of the case and collateral 
estoppel.

4.Even 
apart from the foregoing, there was no reasonable grounds for this 
appeal

5.Attorney 
fees should be awarded under Rule 10.05.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The Bucklins hold 
record title to the parcel in question.  
In January 2006, the Shores filed a complaint claiming the parcel by 
adverse possession.  The Bucklins 
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, to which the Shores 
responded by filing a more definitive statement alleging a claim of "color of 
title" based upon "conflicting surveys."

 
 
[¶4]      The Bucklins then 
responded with a counterclaim seeking to quiet title, asserting, among other 
things, that the Shores were given permission to occupy the parcel in 1979.  During discovery, the Shores conceded 
that, yes, the Bucklins held record title to the parcel.

 
 
[¶5]      The district 
court entered a scheduling order, but the Shores failed to comply with the 
various deadlines contained therein.  
On October 1, 2007, the Bucklins filed a motion for judgment, and on 
October 5, 2007, the district court conducted a final pre-trial conference and 
dispositive motion hearing.  At that 
hearing, the Shores presented their untimely pretrial 
memorandum.

 
 
[¶6]      After the 
hearing, the court entered judgment in favor of the Bucklins, on two 
grounds.  First, the court ruled 
that summary judgment was proper because the Shores had no evidence to support 
either their "color of title" theory or their "claim of right" theory.  The court also ruled that the Shores had 
not satisfied the period for adverse possession, inasmuch as their evidence 
indicated they had openly asserted title only after 2005.  Furthermore, the court ruled that the 
Shores " simply have nothing to present at trial since they did not designate 
any witnesses or exhibits as required [by the scheduling order]."  As a second ground for judgment, the 
court ruled that, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 16(f), dismissal was proper as a sanction 
for failing to comply with the scheduling order.  The non-compliance included no 
designation of witnesses or exhibits, no jury instructions, and an inadequate 
and untimely pretrial memorandum.

 
 
[¶7]      In this appeal, 
the Shores contend that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary 
judgment, and that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the 
case for failure to comply with the scheduling order.  We will affirm.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court ruled that summary judgment was proper in this case.

 

 

Summary 
judgment 
is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." W.R.C.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact 
exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would establish or refute an essential 
element of a cause of action or a defense that a party has asserted. Metz 
Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 
[1055] (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
We 
evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same 
standards and by examining the same material as the district court. 
Id. We examine de novo the record, in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion, affording to that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences that may be drawn from the record. Roussalis v. Wyoming 
Medical Center, Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 229 (Wyo. 2000). If upon review of the 
record, doubt exists about the presence of issues of material fact, that doubt 
must be resolved against the party seeking summary judgment. Id. We 
accord no deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. 
Metz, ¶ 9.

 
 

[¶9]      Seherr-Thoss v. 
Seherr-Thoss, 2006 WY 111, ¶ 9, 141 P.3d 705, 711-712 (Wyo. 2006) 
(citing Knapp v. Landex Corp., 
2006 WY 36, ¶ 7, 130 P.3d 924, 926 (Wyo. 2006)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   The Shores argue on appeal that 
there are genuine issues of material fact which a jury should be allowed to 
determine  namely, whether or not the Shores qualify for a claim of adverse 
possession of property held in title by the Bucklins.  However, we are troubled in this case by 
what seems to be a genuine disregard for the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and we will address that preliminary issue 
first.

 
 
[¶11]   Normally, we will certify no 
reasonable cause for appeal "only in those rare circumstances where an appeal 
lacks cogent argument, where there is an absence of pertinent authority to 
support the claims of error, and/or when there is a failure to adequately cite 
to the record."  Dorsett v. Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶ 13, 61 P.3d 1221, 1225 
(Wyo. 2003) (citing Baker v. Reed, 965 P.2d 1153, 1154-55 (Wyo. 
1998) (citing Amen, Inc. v. Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo.1997)); 
Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 891 (Wyo. 2000).  This Court has also repeatedly held that 
it will presume the district court's orders and rulings were correct when the 
appellant fails to provide and cite a record.  See Arnold v. Day, 2007 WY 86, ¶¶ 9-10, 
158 P.3d 694, 697 (Wyo. 2007); Smith v. 
Smith, 2003 WY 87, ¶ 15, 72 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Wyo. 2003); Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget 
Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 
771 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶12]   The Bucklins identify several 
deficiencies surrounding this appeal, including:

 
 

1.    
In 
violation of W.R.A.P. 2.07(b)(1), the notice of appeal lacked an appendix 
containing pleadings.

2.    
In 
violation of W.R.A.P. 3.05, the Shores failed to transmit the transcript or any 
other part of this record.1

3.    
The 
Shores failed to file a copy of their Notice of Appeal with the Wyoming Supreme 
Court, as required by W.R.A.P. 2.01(a)(1), until the Wyoming Supreme Court 
sanctioned them for failure to do so.

4.    
In 
violation of W.R.A.P. 7.01(j), there is no appendix to the Shores' 
brief.

5.    
In 
violation of W.R.A.P. 7.01(e)(2) and 7.01(f)(1),  the Shores' brief is devoid of record 
citations.

6.    
In 
violation of W.R.A.P. 7.05(b)(3), the Shores' brief is in a font of less than 10 
characters per inch.  See Nathan v. Am. Global Univ., 2005 WY 64, 
¶ 5, 113 P.3d 32, 33 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶13]   In light of these alleged problems, 
the Bucklins request this Court to summarily affirm.  We agree with the Bucklins that the 
Shores did not comply with several of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  As we stated in Rodriguez v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Compensation Division, 
2006 WY 146, ¶ 4, 146 P.3d 487, 488 (Wyo. 2006) (citations 
omitted):

 
 
A 
party seeking judicial review of an administrative action must comply with the 
Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure.  When a party fails to do so, we may 
refuse to consider the offending party's contentions; assess costs; dismiss the 
appeal; or affirm the lower court's or agency's decision.

 
 
Not 
only do the Shores fail in several respects in complying with applicable rules, 
including a failure to provide any citation to the record, they also fail to 
provide relevant argument or legal authority to support their contentions.  The cumulative deficiencies result in a 
failure to present cogent argument.  
We therefore summarily affirm the decision of the district 
court.

 
 
[¶14]   Finally, the Bucklins urge this 
Court to grant sanctions in light of the Shores' appellate shortcomings.  In general:

 
 
[W]e 
are reluctant to grant sanctions and will do so only in those rare circumstances 
where an appeal lacks cogent argument, where there is an absence of pertinent 
authority to support the claims of error, and/or when there is a failure to 
adequately cite to 
the record.

 
 

Amen, 
Inc. v. Barnard, 
938 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1997).  In 
this case, the Shores' failure to comply with any one of these standards leads 
inevitably to the conclusion that there is no reasonable cause for the filing of 
this appeal. Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 532 (Wyo. 1995).  We therefore grant the Bucklins' request 
for costs and attorney's fees in defending this appeal.  A statement of costs and attorney's fees 
shall be submitted to this Court; and, upon review, an appropriate award of 
costs and fees will be ordered by this Court.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   Summary judgment in favor of the 
Bucklins is summarily affirmed.  The 
Shores shall reimburse costs and attorney's fees generated in the defense of 
this appeal.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1W.R.A.P. 3.05(b) states:

 
 
Appellant 
shall, contemporaneously with the filing of its brief in the appellate court and 
service of that brief upon appellee, serve on appellee, file with the clerk of 
the trial court a designation for transmission to the appellate court of all 
parts of the record, without unnecessary duplication, to which appellant intends 
to direct the particular attention of the appellate court in its 
brief.