Case Title: State v. Winford

Citation: 181 S.E.2d 423, 279 N.C. 58

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1971-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
181 S.E.2d 423 (1971)
279 N.C. 58
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Grady DeLaney WINFORD.
No. 110.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
June 10, 1971.
*425 Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan, Asst. Atty. Gen. William F. Briley, and Walter E. Ricks, III, Associate Atty., Raleigh, for the State.
Collier, Harris & Homesley, Mooresville, by Richard M. Pearman, Statesville, and Walter H. Jones, Jr., Mooresville, for defendant.
BRANCH, Justice.
Defendant assigns as error the admission into evidence, over objection, of a small *426 pen knife allegedly found on the body of deceased. Defendant argues that the State failed to lay the necessary foundation before offering the knife into evidence and that the trial judge failed to "adequately discuss the evidence as to the knife." The record shows the following:
Any evidence which is relevant to the trial of a criminal action is admissible. State v. Macklin, 210 N.C. 496, 187 S.E. 785. However, when real evidence (i. e., the object itself) is offered into evidence, it must be properly identified and offered. State v. Eagle, 233 N.C. 218, 63 S.E.2d 170.
In Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence, § 26, p. 47, it is stated:
In instant case defendant testified that he shot deceased in self-defense because deceased was attacking him with a long-bladed "Barlow" knife. The "Barlow" knife was not produced at the trial. Thus, the knife found on the person of deceased contradicted testimony of defendant and was relevant to the trial of this criminal action.
Although the procedures approved for introduction of real evidence were not strictly followed, the knife was sufficiently identified before it was offered. Even had there been error in the former introduction of the knife, it would not have been prejudicial since Police Officer Burnett testified, without objection, that the small pen knife was found on the person of deceased, and he described the knife in detail. The admission of evidence, over objection, where testimony of the same import has been previously introduced without objection, is ordinarily not prejudicial error. State v. Jarrett, 271 N.C. 576, 157 S.E.2d 4; State v. Creech, 265 N.C. 730, 145 S.E.2d 6.
The trial judge did not commit error in allowing the pen knife to be introduced into evidence.
Defendant assigns as error the Court's definition of second degree murder as contained in the following portion of the charge:
An unlawful killing with malice is murder in the second degree. State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E.2d 328.
If the State satisfies the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant intentionally used a deadly weapon and thereby caused the death, then two presumptions arise: (1) that the killing was unlawful, and (2) that it was done with malice; and nothing else appearing, the defendant would be guilty of murder in the second degree. State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 161 S.E.2d 560; State v. Mercer, supra.
The correct principles of law concerning these presumptions were stated in State v. Gordon, 241 N.C. 356, 85 S.E.2d 322, where Bobbitt, J. (now C. J.), speaking for the Court, stated:
In instant case the trial judge in the challenged portion of the charge stated that "when it is admitted or proven that defendant intentionally killed the deceased with a deadly weapon * * * the law raises two presumptions * * *" In the same paragraph the Judge charged correctly. The challenged definition does not conform to the one approved by this Court; however, the erroneous definition, standing alone, does not constitute prejudicial error since the definition complained of placed upon the State the added burden of proving a specific intent to kill. This is patently favorable to defendant, and defendant cannot ordinarily complain of instructions favorable to him. State v. Price, 271 N.C. 521, 157 S.E.2d 127. The only possible vice in this instruction is that the giving of almost contemporaneous instructionsone correct and one incorrectmay have caused confusion in the minds of the jurors.
Defendant further contends that the effect of the above quoted portion of the charge is to require at least a finding of murder in the second degree, when it is proven that defendant with a deadly weapon intentionally inflicted the wound which proximately caused deceased's death.
It is true that when the presumptions of malice and an unlawful killing arise, nothing else appearing, defendant would be guilty of murder in the second degree. However, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to instruct the jury that the law casts upon the defendant the burden of showing to the satisfaction of the jury, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but simply to satisfy the jury as to legal provocation that would deprive the crime of malice and thus reduce it to manslaughter, or that will excuse it on some ground recognized in law as a complete defense. State v. Mercer, supra; State v. Franklin, 229 N.C. 336, 49 S.E.2d 621.
Here, the judicial stipulations and defendant's own testimony establish that defendant intentionally shot McCombs with a .25 caliber pistol, inflicting wounds which proximately caused his death. There was competent evidence showing legal provocation which could have satisfied the jury that defendant was only guilty of manslaughter. Likewise, there was competent evidence which might have satisfied the jury that defendant acted in self-defense so as to require a verdict of not guilty. This record contains adequate charges as to self-defense and as to the legal provocation which could reduce the verdict from second degree murder to manslaughter. Defendant, nevertheless, points to that portion of the charge which states
Obviously, the first sentence above quoted is erroneous, but again appears to be nonprejudicial when considered out of context. However, some contradiction and confusion arises when the whole paragraph is contextually read.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in that it "failed to instruct on the principle of the restoration of the right to kill in self-defense which arises where there is evidence that a defendant at fault in bringing on a difficulty withdrew from the combat and so notified the deceased."
This assignment of error would have merit if the facts show that defendant withdrew from the conflict and so notified the deceased.
In the case of State v. Kennedy, 169 N.C. 326, 85 S.E. 42, the State's evidence tended to show that the defendant went into the deceased's store with pistol in hand, quarreled with decedent, and then shot and killed him. The defendant offered evidence tending to show that he was first assaulted by deceased and his brother, who beat him to his knees, and the defendant thereupon stated, "Boys, get off me," three or four times, then threatened to shoot, and when the assault continued, did shoot and kill the deceased. There, speaking to the question of withdrawal after provocation upon plea of self-defense, Justice Hoke stated:
*430 In 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 121, p. 995, we find the following:
See also State v. Correll, 228 N.C. 28, 44 S.E.2d 334; State v. Robinson, 213 N.C. 273, 195 S.E. 824; State v. Tate, 161 N.C. 280, 76 S.E. 713; State v. Cox, 153 N.C. 638, 69 S.E. 419; State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 116 S.W.2d 42.
The facts presented by this record do not show that defendant attempted, in good faith, to withdraw from the affray, or that defendant clearly indicated to McCombs an intention so to withdraw. Thus, the trial judge was not required to instruct on this facet of the law of self-defense.
Defendant's 14th Assignment of Error is that the trial judge dwelt continually upon "the burden which defendant had to bear, thereby indicating that defendant had to prove his innocence and implanted in the minds of the jurors that the burden of proof lay upon defendant." This Assignment of Error presents one of defendant's more serious contentions.
We quote a portion of the charge pertinent to decision of this Assignment of Error:
In the case of State v. Howell, 239 N.C. 78, 79 S.E.2d 235, the defendant assigned as error this portion of the trial judge's charge:
The Court, speaking through Parker, J., (later C. J.), held the charge to be prejudicial error, and stated:
See also: Graham v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 240 N.C. 338, 82 S.E.2d 346; State v. Hardison, 257 N.C. 661, 127 S.E.2d 244.
The charge here complained of clearly places the burden on defendant to show beyond a reasonable doubt facts which would reduce the charge from second degree murder to manslaughter. This is error and is not cured by the fact that the trial judge did thereafter correctly and fully charge as to the burden which defendant must assume in order to reduce the charge from second degree murder to manslaughter.
In giving the State's contentions, the trial judge stated:
Objections to a statement of contentions must be brought to the court's attention in apt time to allow correction. State v. Butler, 269 N.C. 733, 153 S.E.2d 477. However, when the misstatement presents an erroneous view of the law or an incorrect application of it, counsel is not required to bring the inadvertence to the court's attention. Baxley v. Cavenaugh, 243 N.C. 677, 92 S.E.2d 68; State v. Gause, 227 N.C. 26, 40 S.E.2d 463; State v. Grayson, 239 N.C. 453, 80 S.E.2d 387.
Although the trial judge in other parts of the charge had clearly stated that the only verdicts to be considered by the jury were second degree murder, manslaughter, or not guilty, the misuse of "murder" in lieu of "manslaughter" might well have created some degree of confusion in the minds of the jurors.
Defendant, relying on State v. Ramey, 273 N.C. 325, 160 S.E.2d 56, contends that the trial judge erred by not specifically charging in his final mandate to the jury that if the State had failed to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that deceased came to his death as the proximate result of the pistol wound inflicted by defendant, that they should return a verdict of not guilty.
Admittedly, it would have been the better practice to clearly charge in the final mandate as to all possible verdicts, however, it should be noted that instant case is distinguishable from Ramey in that in Ramey there was no judicial admission that the deceased's death was proximately caused by a bullet wound inflicted by the defendant. Here there was such admission.
Defendant further contends that the trial judge in his final mandate should have stated that if the State had failed to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was either guilty of second degree murder or of manslaughter, that it should return a verdict of not guilty. In this case, when the trial judge correctly stated the law as to self-defense and instructed the jury that if they found to their satisfaction that defendant acted in self-defense *432 they would return a verdict of not guilty, that he thereupon instructed as to the only defense or excuse presented by the facts of this case. We therefore conclude that neither of these contentions concerning the trial judge's final mandate to the jury would, standing alone, constitute prejudicial error.
It should be noted that the trial judge clearly charged as to the proper burden of proof required of the State, and that in other portions of the charge he correctly instructed as to the burden to be placed upon defendant to show self-defense or to show legal provocation which might have reduced the charge from murder in the second degree to manslaughter. The clear and correct statements of the applicable law in these portions of the charge compel the conclusion that errors of transcription created the erroneous and conflicting statements found in the record. In this connection it should be remembered that this Court and defendant's attorneys encountered tremendous difficulty in obtaining the transcript from the court reporter. Perhaps this difficulty in obtaining the transcript also deprived the Solicitor for the State of adequate opportunity to discover, before he agreed to the record and case on appeal, the erroneous additions and omissions which create an awkward and confusing charge.
This Court, however, is bound by the record as certified and judicially knows only that which appears of record. Tomlins v. Cranford, 227 N.C. 323, 42 S.E.2d 100; State v. Morgan, 225 N.C. 549, 35 S.E.2d 621.
This record convinces us that the total charge did not aid the jury in understanding the precise material issues necessary for determination of their verdict.
We have not discussed the remaining assignments of error since in all probability they will not occur upon a new trial.
For reasons stated, there must be a
New trial.