Case Title: ROY GLENN REAY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0053

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROY GLENN REAY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 13176 P.3d 647Case Number: S-07-0053Decided: 02/08/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
ROY GLENN 
REAY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, State Public 
Defender; Ryan R. Roden, Deputy Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Public 
Defender.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; 
Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Roy Glenn 
Reay was convicted of burglary, aggravated kidnapping, and battery against a 
household member.  He claims that 
the district court, at trial, allowed inadmissible testimony on three separate 
occasions.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]           
Mr. Reay 
presents his issue in the form of an assertion:

 
 
The district court violated W.R.E. 
404(b) by allowing the State of Wyoming to introduce evidence of prior crimes, 
wrongs, or acts of Mr. Reay to prove character, and that Mr. Reay acted in 
conformity with that character.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
Following 
her divorce, Kelly Meyer moved to Casper, Wyoming, where she met Mr. Reay.  They developed a romantic relationship, 
and eventually lived together.  In 
the autumn of 2003, however, Ms. Meyer broke off their relationship.  She moved out of the apartment they had 
shared.  After living in her car for 
a time, she moved into a trailer home with two acquaintances, hoping that 
Mr. Reay would not find her there.  

 
 

[¶4]           
Shortly 
after Ms. Meyer moved into the trailer, however, Mr. Reay broke in, awakened her 
in her bedroom, pushed her to the floor, knelt on top of her, and pinned her to 
the floor.  He began strangling her 
and beating her with his fist.  He 
twisted her arm behind her back until she thought it was going to break.  He yelled at her and called her names 
too graphic to repeat here.  He told 
her she would not live to see her next birthday because he was going to kill 
her, take her up to CasperMountain, and burn her body in a pile of 
tires.  He continued beating her and 
strangling her, then bit her on the nose.  
She lost consciousness at least three times, but during periods of 
consciousness, she begged and pleaded for him to stop.

 
 

[¶5]           
Eventually, Mr. Reay told Ms. Meyer 
to get up and get dressed so he could take her up to the mountain.  As the two exited the trailer, Ms. Meyer 
stepped out of the door and attempted to lock Mr. Reay inside.  She broke away and ran, screaming for 
help, but Mr. Reay caught up with her, grabbed her, and started dragging her 
along the street toward his car.  
Ms. Meyer continued to scream for help, and two neighbors, Ronnell 
Haddon and Jeffrey Simmons, responded.  
They observed Mr. Reay holding Ms. Meyer in a "headlock" and trying 
to "stick her in the car."  Ms. 
Meyer screamed that he was going to kill her, and Mr. Haddon confronted 
Mr. Reay, demanding that he let Ms. Meyer go.  Mr. Reay responded that Ms. Meyer 
was his "old lady," but she was cheating on him.  According to Mr. Haddon, he "knew 
that this girl was in some serious trouble," so he raised his fists and again 
demanded that Mr. Reay release her.  
Finally, Mr. Reay let her go, and the two neighbors quickly pulled her 
away from the scene.  As Mr. Reay 
drove away, Mr. Simmons wrote down the car's license plate number.  

 
 

[¶6]           
The 
neighbors took Ms. Meyer to Mr. Haddon's trailer, where they called an ambulance 
and the police.  The two observed 
that she had blood on her hands and face, red marks on her face, swollen eyes, 
and cuts and bruises.  She also had 
scratches on her back, and was bleeding "pretty bad" from a wound on her 
finger.  The neighbors described Ms. 
Meyer as "scared to death," "fearful for her life," and "crying and just really 
extremely distraught."  
Ms. Meyer was taken to the hospital for emergency medical treatment. 

[¶7]           
Because 
Mr. Simmons had written down the license plate number, the police soon located 
and stopped Mr. Reay's car.  The 
driver was not Mr. Reay, however, but a friend of his.  The friend reported that Mr. Reay 
loaned him the car because Mr. Reay was going to Denver.  
Mr. Reay's whereabouts in the interim are not documented in the 
record, but he was not arrested until more than two years after the 
incident.  He was charged with 
burglary, aggravated kidnapping, and battery against a household member.  After trial, the jury convicted 
Mr. Reay of all three charges.  
The district court sentenced him to prison for forty years to life on the 
charge of aggravated kidnapping, four to six years on the charge of burglary, 
and one year on the charge of battery.  
Mr. Reay now appeals his convictions and 
sentence.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8]           
Mr. 
Reay's counsel objected to the challenged testimony at trial, and so we review 
the district court's rulings for abuse of discretion.

 
 
A trial 
court's decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to 
considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  
"[A]s long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's 
ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on appeal."  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 2006).

 Leyva v. 
State, 2007 
WY 136, ¶ 17, 165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2007).  Even if the district court admitted 
evidence in error, we must consider whether the error was prejudicial or 
harmless.  Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 
(Wyo. 
1999).  Error is prejudicial if 
there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the defendant if the error had not been made.  Id.  Prejudicial error requires reversal, 
while harmless error does not.  
W.R.A.P. 9.04.  

 DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶9]           
W.R.E. 
404(b) provides as follows:

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

 
 
Mr. Reay claims that, three times 
during his trial, the district court allowed testimony about his past assaults 
or threats against Ms. Meyer.  This 
evidence, he asserts, had no evidentiary value in proving the crimes charged, 
but was offered only to prove that he was prone to committing domestic violence, 
and acted in conformity with that character.  To evaluate his claims, we consider each 
of the three pieces of challenged testimony in context.

 
 

[¶10]       
First, on 
direct examination, the prosecution asked Ms. Meyer to describe what happened on 
the morning she was attacked.

Q.        
Okay.  Can you describe to 
the ladies and gentlemen of the jury how it was that you woke up that 
morning[?]

A.        I 
woke up, and I was being  I was held down.  I couldn't move.  I didn't know what was going on, why I 
couldn't move.  And I was  the next 
thing that I realized was that [Mr. Reay] was there and that he was choking 
me.  He was yelling at me; telling 
me that I was stupid, thinking that he wasn't going to find me, because he would 
always find me; saying that I thought I was so smart; choking me and hitting me; 
telling me he was going to kill me, going to take me up to the mountain and burn 
my body in tires.  And he was 
hitting me fast and hard.  And he  
he flipped me over on my back, twisted my arm behind my back.  Was saying that if I  if I thought that 
he abused me before, he didn't abuse me before; this was abuse.  And then he was hitting and choking me 
again.

 
 
Defense counsel objected that the 
testimony "specifically went into instances of former conduct" in violation of 
W.R.E. 404(b), and asked for a mistrial.  
The district court responded that the testimony was "a statement made by 
the defendant in the course of this incident, which is  I mean, she is allowed 
to say what he said.  And if he 
referred to an earlier abuse, I don't know how we keep that out."  The district court ruled that the 
testimony was not prohibited by W.R.E. 404(b) because it "is part of what 
happened in this incident."

 
 

[¶11]       
The 
district court's comments suggest that it considered Mr. Reay's statement to 
Ms. Meyer to be intrinsic 
evidence.  "[E]vidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is intrinsic when it and the evidence of the crime 
charged are inextricably intertwined or both acts are part of a single criminal 
episode or the other acts were necessary preliminaries to the crime 
charged.'"  Leyva, ¶ 22, 165 P.3d  at 453, quoting Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 12, 
42 P.3d 483, 487 (Wyo. 2002).  We 
have expressly held that intrinsic evidence is still subject to analysis under 
W.R.E. 404(b).  Leyva, ¶ 23, 165 P.3d  at 453.  Accordingly, the fact that this evidence 
involved Mr. Reay's own statement, made to the victim while committing the 
actions for which he was charged, does not exempt it from W.R.E. 
404(b).

[¶12]       
We 
nevertheless affirm the district court's ruling, because we conclude that 
Ms. Meyer's testimony did not amount to evidence "of other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts."  According to Ms. Meyer, 
Mr. Reay's statement was that "if I thought that he abused me 
before, he didn't abuse me before; this was abuse."  The phrase "this was abuse" was not 
about other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  
It was about the very incident for which Mr. Reay was being tried.  The phrase "if I thought that he abused 
me before, he didn't abuse me before" was conditional, not a positive assertion 
that he had abused her before.  To 
the extent it implied past abuse, it gave no details about any particular 
instance of abuse, and no mention of when, where, or how it may have 
occurred.  Ms. Meyer's testimony was 
simply too ambiguous to constitute evidence of uncharged misconduct, and under 
these circumstances, we find 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

[¶13]       
 Second, on direct examination by the 
prosecution, Ms. Meyer was asked about her efforts, prior to the attack, to get 
her belongings from Mr. Reay's apartment.

 
 
A.        . . . 
There were two times when I had tried to go and get my things. 

 
 
. . .

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  The one you just 
testified to, when did that happen?

 
 
A.        It 
was fairly recently after I moved out.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  And then there was a 
second occasion after that? 

 
 
. . .

 
 
A.        
Yes.

 
 
Q.        Did 
anybody go with you then?

 
 
A.        No; 
but the police were called.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  And did you come in 
contact with [Mr. Reay] then?

 
 
A.        
No.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  So you only had actual 
face-to-face contact with him that [first] time when you went to retrieve your 
furniture?

 
 
A.        It 
wasn't  it wasn't face-to-face.  I 
wasn't  I wasn't ever able to succeed with getting my 
things.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  So you never came in 
face-to-face contact with him, then, again?

 
 
A.        
No.

 
 
Defense 
counsel objected that Ms. Meyer's statement about the police being called 
amounted to "telling this jury . . . there is bad conduct and acts in the 
past."  He asserted that the 
evidence was inadmissible under W.R.E. 404(b).  The district court overruled the 
objection, chiefly on the basis that Ms. Meyer's statement was too vague to 
constitute evidence of uncharged misconduct.

 
 

[¶14]       
We agree 
with the district court.  Indeed, 
this testimony is even more ambiguous than the previous example.  Ms. Meyer did not indicate who called 
the police or why they were called.  
She did not say that the police were called because of something Mr. Reay 
did, much less that they were called because he threatened her or assaulted 
her.  Her testimony that she had had 
no contact with Mr. Reay made it seem unlikely that the police were called 
because Mr. Reay assaulted her.  
This testimony did not amount to evidence of prior misconduct, and so was 
not inadmissible under W.R.E. 404(b).

 
 

[¶15]       
Third, 
we consider the testimony of Mr. Haddon, who related what Ms. Meyer 
said after being rescued.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  Now, did she identify 
who the gentleman was that she was in this altercation 
with?

 
 
A.        She 
did.

 
 
Q.        And 
who did she identify that person as being?

 
 
A.        She 
said his name was Roy Reay.

 
 
Q.        And 
were you relaying this information to the individuals you had on 
9-1-1?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
I was.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  Did she indicate to 
you anything else at that time?

 
 
A.        She 
had said that  that she had woken up with him on top of 
her.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.

 
 
A.        
That's how she was awakened.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  Did she say anything 
else?

 
 
A.        That 
he had stated to her that he was going to take her up to CasperMountain and burn her in a tire 
fire.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  Is that pretty much 
all that you got out of her?

 
 
A.        That, 
and she  and she said that there was previous instances of  of violence 
against her by him.

 
 
Defense 
counsel interrupted Mr. Haddon's testimony with an objection that it "brought up 
the fact of other violence, acts of violence against . . . Ms. Meyer by Roy 
Reay.  That is clearly 404(b)."  Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, 
but the district court denied the motion, stating that the testimony did not 
indicate any specifics or reference any particular event.  The district court did, however, offer 
to instruct the jury to disregard the statement, and when defense counsel 
agreed, this instruction was given:

 
 
Ladies 
and gentlemen, immediately prior to our recess, Mr. Haddon made a statement 
that the alleged victim in this matter had referred to prior inciden[ts] between 
[Ms. Meyer] and Mr. Reay.  
You are to disregard that statement, ignore it completely.  It is to have no bearing and not to be 
considered by you when you retire to make your decision as to whether 
Mr. Reay is or is not guilty of the crimes of which [he has] been 
charged.

 
 

[¶16]       
Implicit 
in the district court's offer of a limiting instruction is the conclusion that 
the evidence was inadmissible under W.R.E. 404(b).  See Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 36, 
131 P.3d 348, 358 (Wyo. 2006).  We 
agree.  Unlike Ms. Meyer's vague 
reference to the police being called, or her testimony about Mr. Reay's 
conditional statement, "if I thought that he abused me before, he didn't 
abuse me before," Mr. Haddon's comment was a direct assertion that there had 
been previous instances of violence against Ms. Meyer by 
Mr. Reay.  This was evidence of 
uncharged misconduct, and should not have been admitted into evidence without 
being analyzed as W.R.E. 404(b) requires.

 
 

[¶17]       
However, 
as the district court stated when it was considering post-trial motions, the 
"evidence was so strong against Mr. Reay that this statement didn't add very 
much to that. With or without the statement, I think the conviction would have 
been obtained."  Our review of the 
record confirms that there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict might 
have been more favorable to Mr. Reay without Mr. Haddon's comment.  In particular, Ms. Meyer told the jury 
that Mr. Reay had previously been convicted of a domestic assault against 
her.  The district court had ruled 
that the prosecution could not introduce evidence of this conviction in its 
direct examination of Ms. Meyer, but might be able to use the evidence in 
redirect if the defense challenged Ms. Meyer's testimony that she had tried 
to avoid contact with Mr. Reay.  
Apparently for strategic reasons, it was the defense who asked 
Ms. Meyer about Mr. Reay's prior conviction, and the admission of this 
evidence is not challenged in this appeal.  
Given Ms. Meyer's specific testimony about Mr. Reay's conviction, 
Mr. Haddon's rather off-handed comment about previous instances of violence 
cannot be considered prejudicial.  
Moreover, the district court instructed the jury to disregard and ignore 
the statement, and we must presume that the jury followed that curative 
instruction.  Thomas, ¶ 37, 131 P.3d  at 358.  Given the lack of prejudice and the 
district court's limiting instruction, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's ruling.

 
 

[¶18]       
Finally, 
we consider Mr. Reay's assertion that the district court improperly 
admitted evidence of prior misconduct pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b) without 
following the pretrial procedures mandated by Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 
42 P.3d 483, 491 (Wyo. 2002), and Gleason 
v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶¶ 27-30, 57 P.3d 332, 342-43 (Wyo. 2002).  We emphasize once again that these 
pretrial procedures are important because they "enhance the defendant's 
prospects of receiving due process and a fair trial," as well as "the district 
court's ability to reflect and rule upon a significant evidentiary issue."  Howard, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d  at 
491.

 
 

[¶19]       
However, 
Ms. Meyer's testimony did not amount to evidence of uncharged misconduct, 
so the pretrial procedures required for the admission of evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b) were inapplicable.  
Mr. Haddon's testimony was evidence of uncharged misconduct.  As set forth in Howard and Gleason, upon request by the defense, 
the prosecution must provide notice if it intends to introduce evidence of 
uncharged misconduct, and the district court must hold a pretrial hearing to 
consider the admissibility of the intended evidence.  But the prosecution in Mr. Reay's 
case did not intend to introduce Mr. Haddon's testimony as evidence of uncharged 
misconduct.  The prosecution's 
question  "Is that pretty much all that you got out of her?"  was not an 
intentional attempt to solicit improper evidence.  The district court concluded that the 
prosecution had not elicited Mr. Haddon's comment, and that the comment "was 
somewhat nonresponsive."  The 
prosecution also assured the district court that Mr. Haddon had been 
admonished not to testify about Mr. Reay's previous assaults against Ms. 
Meyer.  Because the prosecution did 
not intend to introduce such evidence, it was not required to provide the 
defense with notice that it would attempt to introduce the evidence.  The mandatory Howard and Gleason procedures did not apply under 
these circumstances.  This is not a case where the 
district court improperly allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of 
uncharged misconduct without following the required procedures.  It is a case where a witness 
inadvertently mentioned such evidence, and the district court promptly 
instructed the jury to disregard it.  
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.

 
 

[¶20]       
Affirmed.