Case Title: State v. Cummings

Citation: 2014 WI 88

Docket Number: 2012AP000520-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 88 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR  
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Carlos A. Cummings, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
------------------------------------------------ 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Adrean L. Smith, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 346 Wis. 2d 279 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished)  
----------------------------------------------- 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 346 Wis. 2d 280, 827 N.W.2d 929 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished) 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 24, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 19, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit/Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Portage/Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas T. Flugaur/Thomas P. Donegan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
PROSSER, BRADLEY, JJ., concurs in part, dissents 
in part. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
defendant-appellant-petitioner 
Carlos 
A. 
Cummings, 
there were briefs by David R. Karpe, Madison, and oral argument 
by David R. Karpe. 
 
 
 
 
2 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Jacob 
J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
For defendant-appellant-petitioner Adrean L. Smith, there 
were briefs by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state public 
defender, and oral argument by Dustin C. Haskell. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
2014 WI 88
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR 
(L.C. Nos. 2008CF418 & 2010CF5837) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Carlos A. Cummings, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 24, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Adrean L. Smith, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of decisions of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of 
two per curiam decisions of the court of appeals, State v. 
Cummings, No. 2011AP1653-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Jan. 
10, 
2013), 
and 
State 
v. 
Smith, 
No. 
2012AP520-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2013).  In Cummings 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
2 
 
the court of appeals affirmed the orders of the Portage County 
Circuit Court,1 denying Carlos A. Cummings' ("Cummings") motion 
to suppress and motion for postconviction relief.  In Smith the 
court of appeals affirmed the order of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court2 denying Adrean L. Smith's ("Smith") motion to 
suppress. 
¶2 
Both Cummings and Smith argue that they unequivocally 
invoked the right to remain silent prior to making incriminating 
statements to police.3  Both Smith and Cummings argue that, as a 
result, 
their 
incriminating 
statements 
should 
have 
been 
suppressed.  Cummings separately argues that the circuit court 
should have granted his motion for postconviction relief because 
the sentence imposed on him was unduly harsh. 
¶3 
The State argues that neither Cummings nor Smith 
unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent, and further 
argues that Cummings' sentence was not unduly harsh. 
¶4 
We 
conclude 
that 
neither 
Cummings 
nor 
Smith 
unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent during their 
interrogations.  As a result, the circuit court properly denied 
each defendant's motion to suppress the incriminating statements 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Thomas T. Flugar presided. 
2 The Honorable Thomas P. Donegan presided. 
3 We note at the outset that in both cases, the asserted 
invocations of the right to remain silent occurred after the 
suspects had been taken into custody, had received Miranda 
warnings, had waived their Miranda rights, and were being 
interrogated by police.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
3 
 
made to police.  We also conclude that Cummings' sentence was 
not unduly harsh.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals in 
both cases. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. State v. Cummings 
¶5 
On November 18, 2008, police responded to a reported 
shooting at a park in Stevens Point, Wisconsin.  On arriving at 
the 
scene, 
officers 
found 
the 
victim, 
James 
Glodowski 
("Glodowski"), conscious and responsive despite having been shot 
a number of times in the head and upper body.4  Glodowski told 
police that he had been shot by a woman named "Linda," later 
identified as Linda Dietze ("Dietze"). 
¶6 
Glodowski explained that Dietze had called him and 
asked him to meet her at the park.  Dietze had told Glodowski 
during the call that she wanted to repay $600 that she had 
previously borrowed from him.  Dietze also told Glodowski that 
she had video evidence of an affair between his wife, Carla 
Glodowski ("Carla"), and a man named "Carlos."  When Glodowski 
arrived at the park, Dietze handed him the videotape, pulled out 
a .22 caliber pistol, and shot him.  Before fleeing the scene on 
foot, Dietze told Glodowski that she was sorry for shooting him 
but that it was his wife's fault. 
¶7 
As part of their investigation, Stevens Point police 
officers interviewed Cummings on the afternoon of the shooting.  
                                                 
4 As a result of the shooting, Glodowski lost the use of his 
eye.  He continues to have a bullet lodged near his brain stem 
that cannot be removed surgically. 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
4 
 
During his interview with police, Cummings denied any knowledge 
or involvement in the shooting, though he admitted that he was 
friendly with both Dietze and Carla.  At this point, Cummings 
had not been arrested, nor had he been advised of his Miranda 
rights.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Cummings 
was subsequently released. 
¶8 
Later that evening, police located Dietze at her 
apartment and arrested her.  Dietze admitted to shooting 
Glodowski, but told police that meeting Glodowski at the park 
had been Cummings' idea.  Dietze further stated that Cummings 
had driven her to and from the shooting, and that she had left a 
backpack containing the pistol used in the shooting in Cummings' 
vehicle.  Officers also obtained surveillance footage of Dietze 
being dropped off at a gas station near her apartment after the 
shooting.  The vehicle which dropped Dietze at the gas station 
was similar to Cummings' vehicle. 
¶9 
Following the interrogation of Dietze, police returned 
to Cummings' home and asked whether he would be willing to 
return to the station for further questioning.  After being 
assured that he was still not in custody, Cummings agreed.  
Officers then transported Cummings back to the police station. 
¶10 Following some preliminary questions, Cummings was 
advised of his Miranda rights.  Cummings agreed, both orally and 
in writing, to waive those rights and speak with the officers.  
The officers then questioned Cummings about the inconsistency 
between his prior statements and the version of events given by 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
5 
 
Dietze.  During that discussion the following exchange took 
place: 
[OFFICER]:  You've got a lot to lose, and at this 
point, I'm telling you right now Carlos, no . . . all 
bullshit aside, there's enough to charge you right 
now!  Okay?  This is your opportunity to be honest 
with me, to cut through all the bullshit and be honest 
about what you know. 
[CUMMINGS]:  I'm telling you. 
[OFFICER]:  So why then do we got Carla and 
[Dietze] telling us different? 
[CUMMINGS]:  What are they telling you? 
[OFFICER]:  I'm not telling ya!  I'm not gonna 
fuckin' lay all my cards out in front of you Carlos 
and say, "This is everything I know!" 
[CUMMINGS]:  Well, then, take me to my cell.  Why 
waste your time? Ya know? 
[OFFICER]:  Cuz I'm hoping . . .  
[CUMMINGS]:  If you got enough . . .  
[OFFICER]:  . . . to get the truth from ya. 
[CUMMINGS]:  If you got enough to fuckin' charge 
me, well then, do it and I will say what I have to 
say, to whomever, when I plead innocent.  And if they 
believe me, I get to go home, and if they don't . . .  
[OFFICER]:  If who believes you? 
[CUMMINGS]:  . . . and 
if 
they 
don't, 
I 
get 
locked up. 
¶11 The interrogation continued and Cummings eventually 
admitted that he had driven Dietze to a location near the park 
where the shooting had occurred.  Cummings further stated that, 
when Dietze returned to Cummings' car she told him that she had 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
6 
 
shot someone and asked to be taken home.  Cummings admitted that 
Dietze left her backpack with him but claimed that he found only 
Dietze's wallet and keys inside.  Cummings denied that he knew 
Dietze intended to shoot Glodowski before driving her to the 
park.  He further denied that he ever possessed the gun used in 
the shooting.  Cummings was then informed that he was being 
placed on a probation hold.5 
¶12 Police then questioned Carla regarding the shooting.  
Carla claimed to be having an affair with Cummings.6  She stated 
that her husband would never grant her a divorce.  Carla 
explained that she and Cummings planned to have a third person 
shoot and kill her husband so that they could collect his life 
insurance policy and then flee together.  Carla admitted her 
part in the plan, which included a contribution of money towards 
hiring the shooter. 
                                                 
5 At the time of the shooting, Cummings was on probation 
term for three misdemeanor convictions of issuing worthless 
checks, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.23(1) (2007-08). 
6 Subsequent investigation would reveal that Cummings and 
Carla were not, in fact, having an affair.  Rather, it appears 
from the record that Cummings was using Carla's affection for 
him to secure the proceeds of her husband's life insurance 
policy and never intended to have a relationship with her.  This 
fact, along with Dietze's documented mental health issues, 
supports the circuit court's later conclusion that Cummings "was 
using two women [who] were basically . . . cognitively disabled 
for financial gain." 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
7 
 
¶13 On November 19, 2008, the day following the shooting, 
police conducted a search of Cummings' home.7  The search 
uncovered a case and magazine for a .22 caliber Smith & Wesson 
pistol, and five .22 caliber shell casings hidden in the 
basement.  A subsequent search of the garage revealed the .22 
caliber Smith & Wesson pistol used to shoot Glodowski hidden in 
a box. 
¶14 On December 2, 2008, Cummings made his initial 
appearance on a criminal complaint filed by the State.  The 
complaint 
charged 
Cummings 
with 
Attempted 
First 
Degree 
Intentional Homicide As a Party to the Crime, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 939.05, 939.32, and 940.01(1) (2007-08),8 a Class B 
felony.  On December 17, 2008, the court held a preliminary 
hearing and bound Cummings over for trial. 
¶15 On January 5, 2009, Cummings was arraigned on the 
information which charged him with one count of Attempted First 
Degree Intentional Homicide With a Dangerous Weapon, As a Party 
to the Crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05, 939.32, 939.63, 
and 940.01(1), a Class B felony, and two counts of Aiding a 
Felon, contrary to § 946.47(1)(a) and (b), a Class G felony.  
Due to Cummings' prior convictions for passing worthless checks, 
all three charges included habitual criminal penalty enhancers 
                                                 
7 Cummings had provided his consent for the search the 
previous day, and thus no warrant was required.  State v. 
Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, ¶11, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59 (citing 
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006)). 
8 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes in 
this section of the opinion are to the 2007-08 version. 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
8 
 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  Cummings entered pleas of not 
guilty to all three charges. 
¶16 On November 25, 2009, Cummings filed a motion to 
suppress all the statements he made to police prior to being 
given Miranda warnings and all the statements he made to police 
after he asked, "Well, then, take me to my cell.  Why waste your 
time?  Ya know?" during his interrogation. 
¶17 In support of his motion, Cummings asserted that he 
was "in custody" prior to being given Miranda warnings, and that 
he had unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent when he 
asked to be taken to a cell.  He therefore argued that allowing 
the prosecution to use those statements would violate his right 
against self-incrimination.  See U.S. Const. amend. V; Wis. 
Const. Art. I, § 8. 
¶18 The State opposed Cummings' motion.  The State argued 
that Cummings was not in custody at the time the interrogation 
began, and was not interrogated until after he had received 
Miranda warnings.  The State further argued that Cummings' 
statement——"Well, then, take me to my cell.  Why waste your 
time?  Ya know?"——was not an unequivocal invocation of his right 
to remain silent. 
¶19 On December 2, 2009, the court held a hearing on 
Cummings' motion.  With respect to the first issue, the court 
concluded that Cummings was "in custody" prior to being read 
Miranda warnings and that a brief portion of the interrogation 
occurred prior to Cummings being given the warnings.  The court 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
9 
 
therefore suppressed the "limited responses" that Cummings gave 
to police prior to being given Miranda warnings. 
¶20 On second issue, however, the court concluded that 
Cummings' statement was not an unequivocal invocation of the 
right to remain silent, and therefore denied his motion to 
suppress.  The court determined, relying on State v. Markwardt, 
2007 WI App 242, 306 Wis. 2d 420, 742 N.W.2d 546, that Cummings 
was "clearly" making an "attempt[] to get information from the 
detectives" 
and 
was 
thus 
not 
attempting 
to 
end 
the 
interrogation. 
¶21 On January 8, 2010, Cummings pled no contest to First 
Degree Reckless Injury, As a Party to the Crime, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05 and 940.23(1), a Class D felony, pursuant 
to a plea agreement.9  In exchange for Cummings' plea, the State 
agreed to dismiss and read in the remaining counts for 
sentencing purposes and to dismiss the penalty enhancers.  The 
court accepted Cummings' plea, adjudged him guilty, and ordered 
a presentence investigation report. 
¶22 On March 5, 2010, the circuit court sentenced Cummings 
to 24 years of imprisonment, with 14 years of initial 
confinement to be followed by 10 years of extended supervision.  
The court further ordered that Cummings pay $110,188.37 in 
restitution to Glodowski. 
                                                 
9 The State filed an amended information on the day of 
Cummings' no contest plea which substituted the charge of 
Attempted First Degree Intentional Homicide with the charge of 
First Degree Reckless Injury. 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
10 
 
¶23 On December 13, 2010, Cummings filed a motion for 
postconviction relief in the circuit court.  In his motion, 
Cummings alleged that his trial counsel had been ineffective for 
failing to ask the court for a risk reduction sentence, and that 
the sentence imposed by the court was unduly harsh.  On this 
basis, Cummings asked to be resentenced or alternatively, for a 
modification of his sentence.  Cummings subsequently added a 
request that the court vacate the DNA surcharge it had imposed, 
pursuant to State v. Cherry, 2008 WI App 80, 312 Wis. 2d 203, 
752 N.W.2d 393. 
¶24 On July 1, 2011, the circuit court granted in part and 
denied in part Cummings' postconviction motion.  The court 
granted the portion of Cummings' motion related to the DNA 
surcharge, but denied his request for resentencing or sentence 
modification.  The court rejected Cummings' claim that his trial 
counsel had been ineffective for failing to request a risk 
reduction sentence.  The court concluded that, given the 
seriousness of the offense, requesting a risk reduction sentence 
would have been "a complete waste of time."  The court further 
concluded that the sentence it had imposed was not unduly harsh: 
[T]his court rarely gives a sentence that is maximum 
or something close to the maximum.  
But in this case, it felt that it was required, 
it was necessary, or it would unduly depreciate the 
seriousness of the offense, and there was a real need 
to protect the public.  When the court finally learned 
what the motive was behind this, it was rather shocked 
that Mr. Cummings was using two women [who] were 
basically . . . cognitively 
disabled 
for 
financial 
gain. 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
11 
 
¶25 On 
July 
15, 
2011, 
Cummings 
appealed 
both 
his 
conviction 
and 
the 
court's 
denial 
of 
his 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief.  Cummings argued that the circuit court 
had erred in concluding that his statement——"Well, then, take me 
to my cell. Why waste your time? Ya know?"——was not an 
unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent.  Cummings 
further argued that the sentence imposed by the circuit court 
was unduly harsh. 
¶26 On January 10, 2013, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court in all respects.  Cummings, No. 2011AP1653-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1. 
¶27 The court of appeals first concluded that Cummings' 
statement was not an unambiguous invocation of the right to 
remain silent.  The court found that "a competing, and indeed 
more compelling, interpretation [of Cummings' statement] is that 
he was merely attempting to obtain more information from the 
police about what his co-conspirators had been saying."  Id., 
¶9.  Because Cummings' statement was subject to a "reasonable 
competing inference" the court concluded that it was not 
unambiguous.  Id., ¶7 (citing Markwardt, 306 Wis. 2d 420, ¶36). 
¶28 The court further concluded that Cummings' sentence 
was not unduly harsh, finding that "a sentence of fourteen years 
of initial confinement and ten years of supervision, for 
involvement in an offense that left the victim with the loss of 
an eye and a bullet lodged near his brain stem, does not shock 
the conscience of this court."  Id., ¶14. 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
12 
 
¶29 On February 15, 2013, Cummings petitioned this court 
for review, which we granted on December 17, 2013. 
B. State v. Smith 
¶30 In late November 2010 Smith was interviewed by 
Milwaukee Police Department Detective Travis Guy ("Detective 
Guy") regarding a series of violent armed robberies involving a 
stolen van.10  At the outset, Smith was given Miranda warnings 
and agreed to waive his rights and speak to police.  Smith then 
discussed his involvement in the theft of the van, and readily 
answered Detective Guy's questions. 
¶31 When Detective Guy began asking about the armed 
robberies, however, Smith stated as follows: 
Smith:  See, I don't want to talk about, I don't 
want to talk about this. I don't know nothing about 
this. 
Detective Guy:  Okay. 
Smith:  I don't know nothing.  See, look, I'm 
talking about this van. I don't know nothing about no 
robbery.11  Or no -- what's the other thing? 
Detective Guy:  Hmmm? 
Smith:  What was the other thing that this is 
about? 
                                                 
10 The record does not reveal the precise date of Detective 
Guy's initial interview with Smith. 
11 The context of this statement, following extensive 
discussion of Smith's knowledge of the stolen van, and his later 
statement——"I'm talking about this van. This stolen van."——
strongly indicate that Smith intended this sentence to convey 
that he didn't know anything about the involvement of a van in 
any robberies. 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
13 
 
Detective Guy:  Okay. 
Smith:  I don't want to talk . . . I don't know 
nothing about this, see.  That's --I'm talking about 
this uh van.  This stolen van.  I don't know nothing 
about this stuff.  So, I don't even want to talk about 
this. 
Detective Guy:  I got a right to ask you about 
it. 
 
. . .  
Smith:  I don't know nothing about this.  I'm 
here for the van. 
 
. . .  
Detective Guy:  You don't know anything about 
this robbery that happened at [address] on the 23rd of 
November where a woman was approached . . . ? 
Smith:  No. Uh-uh.  I don't know nothing about 
this. 
¶32 Following this exchange, Detective Guy returned his 
questioning to the topic of the stolen van.  Later during the 
interrogation, Detective Guy again returned to the topic of the 
robberies, asking Smith "do you want to tell me about [the 
robberies]?"  Smith replied, "What I got to do with it?  What 
that got to do with me?  I don't know nothing about no robbery, 
see, that's what I'm saying!  I don't rob people."  Detective 
Guy 
continued 
to 
ask 
Smith 
for 
information, 
and 
Smith 
subsequently admitted his involvement in the armed robberies. 
¶33 On November 29, 2010, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Smith charging him with seven counts of Armed 
Robbery, as a Party to the Crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
14 
 
§§ 943.32(2), 939.50(3)(c), and 939.05 (2009-10),12 a Class C 
felony; three counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Felon, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 941.29(2)(b) and 939.50(3)(g), a Class 
G felony; two counts of Attempted Armed Robbery, as a Party to 
the Crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 943.32(2), 939.50(3)(c), 
939.05, and 939.32, a Class C felony; two counts of Burglary, as 
a Party to the Crime, by Use of a Dangerous Weapon, contrary to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 943.10(2)(e), 
939.50(3)(e), 
939.05, 
and 
939.63(1)(b), 
a 
Class 
E 
felony; 
two 
counts 
of 
False 
Imprisonment, as a Party to the Crime, by Use of a Dangerous 
Weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.30, 939.50(3)(h), 939.05, 
and 939.63(1)(b), a Class H felony; one count of First Degree 
Reckless Injury by Use of a Dangerous Weapon, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 940.23(1)(a), 939.50(3)(d), and 939.63(1)(b), a Class D 
felony; and one count of Operating a Vehicle Without the Owner's 
Consent, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 943.23(3), and 939.50(3)(i), 
a Class I felony. 
¶34 On 
November 
30, 
2010, 
Smith 
made 
his 
initial 
appearance.  Smith received a copy of the complaint, and waived 
its reading.  The court found probable cause to continue holding 
Smith, and set cash bail of $200,000.  On December 9, 2010, 
Smith waived his right to a preliminary hearing. 
¶35 On January 10, 2011, Smith was arraigned on the 
Information, which charged him with six counts of Armed Robbery, 
                                                 
12 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes in 
this section are to the 2009-10 version. 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
15 
 
as a Party to the Crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 943.32(2), 
939.50(3)(c), and 939.05, a Class C felony; and one count of 
First Degree Reckless Injury While Armed, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.23(1)(a), 939.50(3)(d), and 939.63(1)(b), a Class D 
felony.  Smith acknowledged receipt of the Information, waived 
its reading, and pled not guilty to all counts. 
¶36 On March 30, 2011, Smith filed a motion to suppress 
the statements he made to Detective Guy regarding the robberies.  
Smith argued that he had unequivocally invoked his right to 
remain silent prior to admitting his involvement in the crimes, 
and that his statements had been the product of coercion on the 
part of Detective Guy. 
¶37 The State opposed Smith's motion, arguing that Smith's 
statements regarding the right to remain silent were ambiguous 
and that his admissions had not been obtained through coercion. 
¶38 On July 14, 2011, the circuit court held a hearing on 
Smith's motion to suppress.  After hearing brief argument from 
the parties, the court denied Smith's motion.  With respect to 
Smith's invocation of the right to remain silent, the court 
concluded that "[t]he defendant did not clearly assert his right 
to remain silent.  There was ambiguity."  The court further 
rejected Smith's argument regarding coercion, stating that it 
"didn't find anything close to what would be considered coercive 
tactics under the case law." 
¶39 On July 27, 2011, Smith pled guilty to three counts of 
armed robbery and one count of first degree reckless injury, 
pursuant to a plea agreement.  In exchange for Smith's pleas, 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
16 
 
the State agreed to dismiss and read in the remaining counts for 
sentencing purposes.  The court accepted Smith's pleas and 
adjudged him guilty.  The court then sentenced Smith to 35 years 
imprisonment, with 25 years initial confinement to be followed 
by 10 years of extended supervision. 
¶40 On March 8, 2012, Smith appealed his convictions, 
again arguing that he unambiguously invoked his right to remain 
silent and that his incriminating statements should have been 
suppressed. 
¶41 On January 23, 2013, the court of appeals affirmed.  
Smith, No. 2012AP520-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶1.  The court 
concluded that Smith was not attempting to terminate the 
interview when he made his statements, but was rather indicating 
that he did not wish to discuss one particular line of 
questions.  Id., ¶9.  Because Smith continued his conversation 
with police despite stating that he "[didn't] want to talk about 
this," he had not unequivocally invoked his right to remain 
silent.  Id., ¶8. 
¶42 On February 21, 2013, Smith petitioned this court for 
review, which we granted on December 17, 2013. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶43 Whether a person has invoked his or her right to 
remain silent is a question of constitutional fact.  Markwardt, 
306 Wis. 2d 420, ¶30 (citing State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶20, 
252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142; State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 74, 
94, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990)). 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
17 
 
¶44 "When presented with a question of constitutional 
fact, this court engages in a two-step inquiry."  State v. 
Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463 
(citations omitted).  "First, we review the circuit court's 
findings of historical fact under a deferential standard, 
upholding them unless they are clearly erroneous."  Id. 
(citations 
omitted). 
 
"Second, 
we 
independently 
apply 
constitutional principles to those facts."  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
¶45 "'We review a trial court's conclusion that a sentence 
it imposed was not unduly harsh and unconscionable for an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.'"  State v. Grindemann, 2002 
WI App 106, ¶30, 255 Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting State v. Giebel, 198 Wis. 2d 207, 220, 541 
N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1995)).  "We will not set aside a 
discretionary ruling of the trial court if it appears from the 
record that the court applied the proper legal standards to the 
facts before it, and through a process of reasoning, reached a 
result which a reasonable judge could reach."  Id. (citing Loy 
v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Right to Remain Silent 
¶46 "Both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions 
protect persons from state compelled self-incrimination."  State 
v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 67, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997); see also 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
18 
 
U.S. Const. amend. V; Wis. Const. art. I, § 8.13  In order to 
protect suspects from the "inherently compelling pressures" of 
custodial interrogation, the United States Supreme Court has 
developed procedural guidelines to be followed by police during 
such interrogations.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; see also 
Markwardt, 306 Wis. 2d 420, ¶23.  "A suspect's right to counsel 
and the right to remain silent are separately protected by these 
procedural guidelines."  Markwardt, 306 Wis. 2d 420, ¶23 (citing 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–73). 
¶47 After a suspect has been taken into custody, given the 
Miranda warnings, and waived his Miranda rights, the right to 
remain silent still guarantees a suspect's "right to cut off 
questioning" during a custodial interrogation.  Id., ¶24 (citing 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975)). 
¶48 Under 
these 
circumstances, 
a 
suspect 
must 
"unequivocally" invoke the right to remain silent in order to 
"cut off questioning."  See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 
386 (2010)(quotation marks omitted); Markwardt, 306 Wis. 2d 420, 
                                                 
13 This 
court 
has 
previously 
held 
that 
"[t]he 
state 
constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination is 
textually almost identical to its federal counterpart."  State 
v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶40, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142.  
Where "the language of the provision in the state constitution 
is 'virtually identical' to that of the federal provision or 
where no difference in intent is discernible, Wisconsin courts 
have normally construed the state constitution consistent with 
the United States Supreme Court's construction of the federal 
constitution."  State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 180–81, 593 
N.W.2d 427 (1999) (citing State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 
133, 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988); Kenosha County v. C&S Management, 
Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999)). 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
19 
 
¶26 (citing State v. Ross, 203 Wis. 2d 66, 75-79, 552 N.W.2d 428 
(Ct. App. 1996)); see also Fifth Amendment-Invocation of the 
Right to Cut Off Questioning, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 189, 196-97 
(2010). 
¶49 This 
standard, 
sometimes 
called 
the 
"clear 
articulation rule," was originally developed by the United 
States Supreme Court to govern invocation of the right to 
counsel.  See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).  In 
State v. Ross, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals extended the rule 
to cover invocations of the right to remain silent, requiring 
suspects to "unequivocally" invoke the right in order to cut off 
questioning by police.  Ross, 203 Wis. 2d at 70. 
¶50 Recently, the Supreme Court confirmed that invocation 
of the right to counsel and invocation of the right to cut off 
questioning both required unequivocal invocation by a suspect.  
See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381-82 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 
459). 
 
Berghuis 
further 
confirmed 
that 
the 
unequivocal 
invocation standard is an objective test.  560 U.S. at 381; see 
also Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59. 
¶51 If a suspect's statement is susceptible to "reasonable 
competing inferences" as to its meaning, then the "suspect did 
not sufficiently invoke the right to remain silent."  Markwardt, 
306 Wis. 2d 420, ¶36 (citation omitted).  If a suspect makes 
such an ambiguous or equivocal statement, "police are not 
required to end the interrogation . . . or ask questions to 
clarify whether the accused wants to invoke his or her Miranda 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
20 
 
rights."  Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 
461-62). 
¶52 Once a suspect has invoked the right to remain silent 
"all police questioning must cease——unless the suspect later 
validly waives that right and 'initiates further communication' 
with the police."  Ross, 203 Wis. 2d at 74 (quoting Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 473–74; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 
(1981)).  Thus, the "key question" is whether the suspect 
unequivocally invoked the right to cut off questioning during 
the interrogation.  Markwardt, 306 Wis. 2d 420, ¶25 (citing 
Ross, 203 Wis. 2d at 74). 
1. State v. Cummings 
¶53 Cummings argues that his statement——"Well, then, take 
me to my cell.  Why waste your time?  Ya know?"——constituted an 
unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent, and thus, 
should have served to cut off further questioning.  We disagree. 
¶54 In the context of the ongoing back and forth between 
Cummings and the officers, this statement was susceptible to at 
least two "reasonable competing inferences" as to its meaning.  
Markwardt, 306 Wis. 2d 420, ¶36.  Cummings is correct that his 
statement could be read literally: as a request that he be 
removed from the room because he was no longer interested in 
talking to the officers.  Another possibility, however, is that 
his statement was a rhetorical device intended to elicit 
additional information from the officers about the statements of 
his co-conspirators.  Indeed, the plain language of the 
statement seems to be an invitation to the officer to end the 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
21 
 
interrogation, presumably because continued questioning would 
prove 
fruitless 
unless 
the 
officer 
provided 
additional 
information to Cummings.  Such a statement is not an unequivocal 
assertion that Cummings wanted to end the interrogation. 
¶55 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals 
considered this second interpretation to be the more compelling 
one of the two.  See Cummings, No. 2011AP1653, unpublished slip 
op., ¶8.  We need not choose one as more compelling than the 
other in order to conclude that Cummings' statement was not an 
unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent.  See 
Markwardt, 306 Wis. 2d 420, ¶36. 
¶56 Cummings further argues that his statement was an 
unequivocal invocation because it was very similar to the 
statements of the suspect in State v. Goetsch, 186 Wis. 2d 1, 
519 N.W.2d 634 (1994).  In Goetsch the suspect stated, "I don't 
want to talk about this any more.  I've told you, I've told you 
everything I can tell you.  You just ask me any questions and I 
just want to get out of here.  Throw me in jail, I don't want to 
think about this."  Id. at 7.  The court of appeals in Goetsch 
concluded 
that 
this 
statement 
constituted 
an 
unequivocal 
invocation of the right to remain silent.  Id. at 7-9. 
¶57 While the statement in 
Goetsch is superficially 
similar to the one at issue in this case, there are critical 
differences.  First, the suspect in Goetsch, in addition to 
referencing jail, clearly stated that he did not wish to speak 
with police.  Cummings did not make any such additional 
statements.  Second, the suspect in Goetsch expressed that he 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
22 
 
was exhausted, and he had disengaged from the conversation.  
Cummings, on the other hand, made his statement while verbally 
sparring with police.  Finally, the suspect in Goetsch had 
nothing to gain from being thrown in jail except the end of the 
interview.  Thus his statement is not susceptible to any 
"reasonable competing inferences" as to its meaning.  Markwardt, 
306 Wis. 2d 420, ¶36.  As we have discussed, this is not the 
case with Cummings' statement. 
¶58 In fact, Cummings' statement in the case at issue is 
more similar, in terms of context, to the statement in Markwardt 
than the one in Goetsch.  In Markwardt the suspect stated 
"[t]hen put me in jail.  Just get me out of here.  I don't want 
to sit here anymore, alright.  I've been through enough today."  
Markwardt, 306 Wis. 2d 420, ¶35.  The suspect in Markwardt made 
her statement during a sequence of verbal "fencing," wherein the 
interrogating officer repeatedly caught the suspect "in either 
lies or at least differing versions of the events."  Id., ¶36.  
Because of this context, the court of appeals concluded that the 
suspect's 
statement 
was 
subject 
to 
"reasonable 
competing 
inferences" as to its meaning.  As a result, the court of 
appeals concluded that the suspect's statement was not an 
unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent, and thus 
did not serve to cut off questioning.  Id. 
¶59 Cummings' statement——"Well, then, take me to my cell.  
Why waste your time?  Ya know?"——similarly occurred during a 
period of verbal back and forth between Cummings and the 
officers, and is thus similarly subject to reasonable competing 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
23 
 
inferences.  As a result of these competing inferences, we 
conclude that Cummings' statement was not an unequivocal 
invocation of the right to remain silent.  We therefore affirm 
the court of appeals. 
2. State v. Smith 
¶60 Smith argues that his statement——"See, I don't want to 
talk about, I don't want to talk about this.  I don't know 
nothing about this."——in response to Detective Guy's questions 
constituted an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain 
silent.  Smith further notes that he repeated his assertion that 
he didn't want to talk three different times within the space of 
just a few sentences. 
¶61 We agree that, standing alone, Smith's statements 
might constitute the sort of unequivocal invocation required to 
cut off questioning, and we further acknowledge that Smith's 
statement presents a relatively close call.  In the full context 
of his interrogation, however, Smith's statements were not an 
unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent. 
¶62 When placed in context it is not clear whether Smith's 
statements were intended to cut off questioning about the 
robberies, cut off questioning about the minivan, or cut off 
questioning entirely.  Some of Smith's statements are also 
exculpatory statements or assertions of innocence, which do not 
indicate a desire to end questioning at all.  Prior to Smith's 
statement, Detective Guy had been asking Smith about his 
involvement in the theft of the minivan.  Smith had been 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
24 
 
participating in this portion of the questioning in a fairly 
straightforward and cooperative fashion. 
¶63 When the topic of the armed robberies came up, Smith 
stated, "I don't want to talk about this" four times, but also 
stated, "I don't know nothing about this" a total of seven 
times.  In some instances Smith seems to mean the van when he 
uses the words "this" or "that," but in other instances it seems 
he means the robberies.  In listening to the recording of the 
interrogation, it seems that he meant to refer to the robberies 
but this is not the only interpretation. 
¶64 Further, while "I don't want to talk about this" seems 
to indicate a desire to cut off questioning, "I don't know 
nothing about this" is an exculpatory statement proclaiming 
Smith's innocence.  Such a proclamation of innocence is 
incompatible with a desire to cut off questioning. 
¶65 Given the apparent confusion, and although he was not 
required by law to do so, Detective Guy gave Smith an 
opportunity to clarify his statements when he asked, "Do you 
want to tell me about [the robberies]?"  In response, Smith 
again proclaimed his innocence, stating: "I don't know nothing 
about no robbery, see, that's what I'm saying!  I don't rob 
people." 
¶66 Smith's 
own 
words 
also 
indicated 
a 
continued 
willingness to answer questions.  Following the statement that 
Smith emphasizes——"See, I don't want to talk about, I don't want 
to talk about this.  I don't know nothing about this."——Smith 
also stated: "I'm talking about this van.  This stolen van.  I 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
25 
 
don't know nothing about this stuff . . . I don't know nothing 
about this.  I'm here for the van."  These additional statements 
indicate that Smith was willing to continue answering questions 
about the van, but was unwilling, or perhaps unable, to answer 
questions about the robberies. 
¶67 "[A] defendant may selectively waive his Miranda 
rights, deciding to 'respond to some questions but not others.'"  
State v. Wright, 196 Wis. 2d 149, 156, 537 N.W.2d 134 (Ct. App. 
1995) (quoting Bruni v. Lewis, 847 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 
1988)).  Such selective "refusals to answer specific questions," 
however, "do not assert an overall right to remain silent."  Id. 
at 157 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726–27 (1979)). 
¶68 Finally, our determination regarding the meaning of 
Smith's statement need not be definitive to conclude that he did 
not unequivocally invoke the right to remain silent.  The mere 
fact 
that 
Smith's 
statements 
could 
be 
interpreted 
as 
proclamations of innocence or selective refusals to answer 
questions is sufficient to conclude that they are subject to 
"reasonable 
competing 
inferences" 
as 
to 
their 
meaning.  
Markwardt, 306 Wis. 2d 420, ¶36. 
¶69 Thus, under the facts and circumstances of the case at 
issue, Smith did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain 
silent, such that police were required to cut off their 
questioning.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
B. Unduly Harsh Sentence 
¶70 "Within certain constraints, Wisconsin circuit courts 
have inherent authority to modify criminal sentences."  State v. 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
26 
 
Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶35, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828 (citing 
State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 546, 335 N.W.2d 399 (1983)).  
A circuit court may not, however, modify a sentence merely "on 
reflection and second thoughts alone."  Harbor, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 
¶35 (citing State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 474, 480, 230 
N.W.2d 665 (1975)).  Ordinarily a defendant seeking a sentence 
modification must show the existence of a "new factor" unknown 
to the court at the time of sentencing.  See, e.g., State v. 
Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶88, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 N.W.2d 451. 
¶71 In the absence of a new factor, a circuit court has 
authority to modify a sentence only under certain narrow 
circumstances.  Among those circumstances is if "the court 
determines that the sentence is unduly harsh or unconscionable." 
Harbor, 333 Wis. 2d 53, ¶35 n.8 (citing State v. Crochiere, 2004 
WI 78, ¶12, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524; Wuensch, 69 
Wis. 2d 467; 
State 
v. 
Ralph, 
156 
Wis. 2d 433, 
438, 
456 
N.W.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1990)).14 
¶72 A sentence is unduly harsh or unconscionable "only 
where the sentence is so excessive and unusual 
and so 
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public 
sentiment 
and 
violate 
the 
judgment 
of 
reasonable 
people 
concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances."  
                                                 
14 The circuit court may also modify a sentence without a 
new factor if it determines that the sentence originally imposed 
was illegal or void, State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶12, 273 
Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524, or if it relied on inaccurate 
information when it imposed the original sentence.  State v. 
Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶26, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1. 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
27 
 
Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975) 
(citations omitted). 
¶73 Cummings argues that his sentence of 14 years of 
initial confinement to be followed by 10 years of extended 
supervision was unduly harsh.  Cummings asserts that "near 
maximum sentences" are "deserving of greater scrutiny than 
sentences well within the normal statutory limits."  Cummings 
claims that "[s]uch sentences may be due to the erroneous 
exercise of discretion."  We agree with the court of appeals 
that Cummings' sentence was not unduly harsh. 
¶74 Cummings is correct that "[a] sentence well within" 
the statutory limits is unlikely to be "so disproportionate to 
the offense committed as to shock the public sentiment and 
violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is 
right and proper under the circumstances."  State v. Daniels, 
117 Wis. 2d 9, 22, 343 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing 
Ocanas, 70 Wis. 2d at 185).  Near maximum sentences are not, 
however, automatically suspect. 
¶75 "'What constitutes adequate punishment is ordinarily 
left to the discretion of the trial judge.  If the sentence is 
within the statutory limit, appellate courts will not interfere 
unless clearly cruel and unusual.'"  Ninham, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 
¶85 (citation omitted).  Further, we will not disturb the 
exercise of the circuit court's sentencing discretion so long as 
"it appears from the record that the court applied the proper 
legal standards to the facts before it, and through a process of 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
28 
 
reasoning, reached a result which a reasonable judge could 
reach."  Grindemann, 255 Wis. 2d 632, ¶30 (citation omitted). 
¶76 In the case at issue, the circuit court stated the 
proper legal standards to be considered at sentencing.  See 
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.  
The circuit court stated the reasons for the severe sentence on 
the record, stating: 
[T]his court rarely gives a sentence that is maximum 
or something close to the maximum.  
But in this case, it felt that is was required, 
it was necessary, or it would unduly depreciate the 
seriousness of the offense, and there was a real need 
to protect the public. 
¶77 Finally, while it is true that not every judge would 
impose a maximum or near maximum sentence for the offenses 
Cummings committed, it is hard to say that no reasonable judge 
would do so.  As a result, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion and we affirm the 
court of appeals. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶78 We 
conclude 
that 
neither 
Cummings 
nor 
Smith 
unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent during their 
interrogations.  As a result, the circuit court properly denied 
each defendant's motion to suppress the incriminating statements 
made to police.  We also conclude that Cummings' sentence was 
not unduly harsh.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals in 
both cases. 
Nos. 2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR   
 
29 
 
By the Court.—The decisions of the court of appeals are 
affirmed. 
No.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶79 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  In these cases, two defendants claim that they 
effectively asserted their right to remain silent.  The majority 
concludes that both defendants failed.  Majority op., ¶4.  I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
that 
Carlos 
Cummings 
failed 
to 
unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment1 right to remain silent 
after receiving a Miranda2 warning, majority op., ¶4, and I join 
the majority opinion with respect to its Cummings analysis.  
However, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that 
Adrean Smith (Smith) did not unequivocally invoke his right to 
remain silent when he said, "I don't want to talk about this."  
Accordingly, with respect to Adrean Smith, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶80 Detective Travis Guy (Detective Guy) of the Milwaukee 
Police Department conducted an interrogation of Smith regarding 
armed robberies that involved a stolen van.  The majority quotes 
the exchange in paragraph 31.  After Smith initially waived his 
Miranda rights, he talked briefly about the stolen van and then 
said, "That's pretty much all I can say."   
¶81 Detective Guy proceeded to talk about an armed 
robbery, and Smith responded by saying, "See, I don't want to 
talk about, I don't want to talk about this."  He also said, "I 
don't even want to talk about——I don't know nothing about this, 
                                                 
1 "No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
see.  I'm talking about this van. . . .   So, I don't want to 
talk about this."   
¶82 Detective Guy responded, "I got a right to ask you 
about it."  Detective Guy then continued to question Smith. 
¶83 Detective Guy did not have "a right" to question Smith 
after Smith said he did not want to talk.  The detective's 
statement 
to 
the 
contrary 
undercut 
the 
defendant's 
constitutional right to remain silent.3  Despite initially 
informing Smith that he had "the right to stop the questioning 
or remain silent at any time [he] wish[ed]," Detective Guy 
ignored a clear statement that Smith did not want to talk.   
¶84 The majority concludes that Smith's statements were 
equivocal because, although he said "I don't want to talk about 
this" four times, according to the majority, it was unclear 
whether "this" was referring to the van, the robberies, or the 
interrogation in general.  Majority op., ¶63.  I disagree.  True 
confusion can be remedied with follow-up questions.  Even if not 
required, clarifying questions reduce the risk that further 
inquiry will violate the suspect's constitutional rights when an 
officer truly believes a suspect's statement was ambiguous.  
¶85 The statements in this case are not appreciably 
different 
from 
the 
statements 
in 
State 
v. 
Goetsch, 
186 
                                                 
3 An officer's assertion of authority in response to a 
defendant's assertion of a constitutional right is troubling 
when the asserted authority contradicts the right.  See State v. 
Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶27, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(Prosser, J., dissenting).  When Detective Guy asserted that he 
had a right to question Smith, he effectively precluded Smith 
from asserting his right to end questioning. 
No.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
Wis. 2d 1, 7, 519 N.W.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1994).  In Goetsch, the 
defendant said, "I don't want to talk about this anymore.  I've 
told you, I've told you everything I can tell you.  You just ask 
me any questions and I just want to get out of here.  Throw me 
in jail, I don't want to think about this."  Id.  Despite the 
fact that Goetsch continued to speak after he said he did not 
want to talk, the court of appeals determined that he had 
invoked his right to remain silent.  Id. at 7-9.   
¶86 Like Goetsch, Smith told his interrogator that he had 
given all the information he had.  Smith's statement——"I don't 
want to talk about this"——is identical to one of Goetsch's 
statements.  Id. at 7.  Thus, there is no basis for the 
different result in the present case. 
¶87 The Supreme Court said that a defendant may invoke the 
right to cut off questioning by saying "that he want[s] to 
remain silent or that he [does] not want to talk with the 
police."  See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382 (2010).  
When Smith said, "I don't want to talk about this," he 
unambiguously indicated that he did indeed not want to talk 
anymore. 
¶88 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
¶89 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence/dissent. 
 
No.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶90 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).   
"I don't want to talk about it." (Smith) 
"Take me to my cell." (Cummings) 
¶91 Miranda 
guides 
us 
in 
understanding 
a 
suspect's 
invocation during interrogation of the right to remain silent:  
"[I]f [a defendant] . . . indicates in any manner that he does 
not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him."1   
¶92 Recently, the United States Supreme Court adopted the 
Davis2 objective "unequivocal invocation" test for gauging a 
defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent.  See 
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).   
¶93 The 
defendants 
and 
the 
State 
agree 
that 
Davis/Thompkins governs the instant cases but express concern 
that the court of appeals has not followed these Supreme Court 
holdings.   
¶94 Both defendant Cummings and the State agree, as do I, 
that 
under 
the 
Davis 
"unequivocal 
invocation" 
test, 
the 
determination of whether an invocation of a Miranda right is 
unequivocal uses an objective standard.  Whether a defendant has 
unequivocally invoked a right is assessed by determining how a 
reasonable 
police 
officer 
would 
understand 
the 
suspect's 
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) (emphasis 
added). 
2 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
No.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
statement in the circumstances.3  Defendant Cummings and the 
State agree that certain language in State v. Ross, 203 
Wis. 2d 66, 552 N.W.2d 428 (Ct. App. 1996), referring to the 
suspect's 
subjective 
intent, 
is 
problematic 
under 
Davis/Thompkins.     
¶95 The State explicitly asks the court to disavow 
language in Ross referring to the suspect's intent, language 
that has been cited in other court of appeals decisions.  The 
State's request is framed as follows: 
The State agrees with Cummings that language in Ross 
referring to the suspect's subjective intent is 
problematic.  As Cummings observes, the test in Davis 
(and Thompkins) is objective:  whether a suspect has 
unequivocally invoked his or her rights under Miranda 
is "an objective inquiry that 'avoid[s] difficulties 
of proof and . . . provide[s] guidance to officers' on 
how to proceed in the face of ambiguity."  Thompkins, 
560 U.S. at 381-82 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-
59).  To the extent that Ross suggests that courts and 
police must consider a suspect's subjective intent, as 
well as his or her statements and non-verbal cues, in 
determining whether an unequivocal invocation has been 
made, Ross is inconsistent with Davis and Thompkins.  
The State asks the court to address this issue in its 
opinion, and explicitly disavow language in Ross 
referring to the suspect's intent, which was also 
cited in [State v.] Markwardt, [2007 WI App 242,] 306 
Wis. 2d 420, ¶28, [742 N.W.2d 546,] and [State v.] 
                                                 
3 In addressing the unequivocal invocation test of whether a 
suspect seeks to invoke his or her right to counsel, the Court 
explained:  "Although a suspect need not 'speak with the 
discrimination of an Oxford don,' . . . he must articulate his 
desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand 
the statement to be a request for an attorney."  Davis, 512 U.S. 
at 459 (quoted source omitted). 
No.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
Hampton, [2010 WI App 169,] 330 Wis. 2d 531, ¶46[, 793 
N.W.2d 901].4 
¶96 The majority opinion relies on Ross and Markwardt,5 
citing the cases frequently.  The majority opinion does not, 
however, clarify Ross in the manner requested by both the State 
and Cummings.   
¶97 The majority opinion, dwelling on the suspect's 
subjective motives, seems to apply a subjective "unequivocal 
invocation test," contrary to the holdings of the United States 
Supreme Court in Davis and Thompkins.  I think federal district 
court Judge Griesbach got it right in Saeger v. Avila, 930 F. 
Supp. 2d 1009 (E.D. Wis. 2013), overturning an unpublished court 
of appeals decision.6   
¶98 The federal court stated that the Wisconsin court of 
appeals "found that while Saeger's actual words were clear, he 
did not really mean them."  The Saeger court concluded that "if 
this reasoning [of the court of appeals] were accepted, then it 
is difficult to imagine a situation where a suspect could 
meaningfully invoke the right to remain silent no matter what 
words he used."  Saeger, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-16.  
¶99 Saeger correctly stands for the proposition that a 
court should look to the words the suspect uses in the context 
in which they were spoken, but that a court cannot manufacture 
                                                 
4 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent and Supplemental Appendix at 
12-13. 
5 State v. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242, 306 Wis. 2d 420, 742 
N.W.2d 546. 
6 State v. Saeger, No. 2009AP133-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2010).  Saeger was a habeas case. 
No.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
ambiguity "by examining a suspect's possible motive . . . ."  
Saeger, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1019. 
¶100 The 
majority 
opinion 
seems 
to 
assert 
that 
the 
defendants did not mean what they said.7 
¶101 In addition to arguably employing the wrong test, the  
majority opinion finds equivocation where, in my opinion, none 
exists and ignores the plain meaning of the defendants' requests 
in both cases.  The majority opinion's application of the 
"unequivocal invocation" test to the two instant cases, whether 
as a subjective or objective test, ignores the reality of 
colloquial speech. 
¶102 In the end, I conclude that a reasonable person would 
understand that "I don't want to talk about this" and "take me 
to my cell" mean the conversation is at an end.    
¶103 As the law currently stands, law enforcement officers 
are encouraged but not required to ask clarifying questions,8 and 
courts 
are 
encouraged 
to 
resist 
creating 
ambiguity 
in 
straightforward statements.  In both Smith and Cummings, had the 
officers viewed the statements at issue as unclear and asked 
                                                 
7 Majority op., ¶¶54, 58-59, 62 (speculating that Cummings 
was 
"fencing" 
with 
his 
interrogator 
and 
that 
Smith 
was 
professing his innocence). 
8 Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 ("Of course, when a suspect makes 
an ambiguous or equivocal statement it will often be good police 
practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether or not 
he actually wants an attorney.")  
No.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
clarifying questions, appellate review in the court of appeals 
and in this court might have been avoided.9   
¶104 Although 
neither 
the 
State 
nor 
the 
defendants 
challenge the use of the Davis/Thompkins rule, I do.  
¶105 I commented on the shortcomings of the "unequivocal 
invocation" test in my dissent in State v. Subdiaz-Osorio in the 
context of invoking one's Miranda right to counsel10 and in my 
dissent in State v. Wantland in the context of withdrawal of 
consent to a search.11  These comments apply to the present cases 
relating to invocation of a suspect's Miranda right to remain 
silent.   
¶106 Because 
it 
is 
so 
difficult 
to 
find 
a 
clear, 
discernable, bright line between equivocal and unequivocal 
statements, courts employ "selective literalism," sometimes 
viewing a suspect's language as unequivocal, other times 
requiring very clear language.12   
                                                 
9 The interrogating officer in Smith did not merely fail to 
ask clarifying questions; he erroneously stated, "I got a right 
to ask you about it," asserting his authority and undercutting 
the defendant's constitutional right to remain silent.  Accord 
State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶¶81-82, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that an 
officer cannot cut off a defendant's opportunity to refuse to 
give consent to a search by erroneously asserting legal 
authority). 
10 State 
v. 
Subdiaz-Osorio, 
2014 
WI 
87, 
¶¶___, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
11 State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶¶84-91, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
12 Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 
Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 1011, 1062 (citing Peter M. Tiersma & 
Lawrence M. Solan, Cops and Robbers: Selective Literalism in 
American Criminal Law, 38 Law & Soc'y Rev. 229, 256 (2004)). 
No.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶107 As I wrote in my dissents in Subdiaz-Osorio and 
Wantland, the "unequivocal invocation" test invites equivocation 
on the part of courts and has led to inconsistent, subjective 
results in the case law.    
¶108 Inconsistencies are glaringly apparent in courts' use 
of the "unequivocal invocation" test in the context of the right 
to counsel.  Comparing statements that have been deemed 
"unequivocal" by a court with those that have been deemed 
"equivocal" reveals an unsettling arbitrariness.  For instance, 
one court deemed "Can I call my lawyer?" equivocal, whereas 
another deemed "Can I have my lawyer present when [I tell you my 
story]?" unequivocal.13   
¶109 I agree with Justice Sotomayor's dissent in the recent 
5-4 Thompkins decision, which comments on the weaknesses of the 
"unequivocal 
invocation" 
test 
in 
evaluating 
a 
suspect's 
statements as follows:  
The Court asserts in passing that treating ambiguous 
statements or acts as an invocation of the right to 
silence will only marginally serve Miranda's goals.  
Experience suggests the contrary.  In the 16 years 
since [Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 
(1994)] was decided, ample evidence has accrued that 
criminal suspects often use equivocal or colloquial 
language in attempting to invoke their right to 
silence. 
 
A 
number 
of 
lower 
courts 
that 
have 
(erroneously, in my view) imposed a clear-statement 
requirement for invocation of the right to silence 
have rejected as ambiguous an array of statements 
whose meaning might otherwise be thought plain.  At a 
                                                 
13 Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2001); 
Taylor v. State, 553 S.E.2d 598, 601-02 (Ga. 2001).   
For a survey of statements that have and have not been 
deemed equivocal, see Strauss, supra note 12, at 1061-62. 
No.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
minimum, these decisions suggest that differentiating 
"clear" 
from 
"ambiguous" 
statements 
is 
often 
a 
subjective inquiry.14 
¶110 Because the majority opinion fails to uphold the broad 
protection mandated by Miranda and undermines the core principle 
of protecting the defendants' Fifth Amendment right against 
compelled self-incrimination, I dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 410-11 (2010) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks, citation, 
and footnote omitted). 
No.  2011AP1653-CR & 2012AP520-CR.ssa 
 
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