Case Title: Hammons v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR96-413

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Billy Lowell HAMMONS v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-413                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 10, 1997


1.   Motions -- motion to suppress -- standard of review. -- In reviewing a
     trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, the supreme
     court makes an independent determination based on the totality
     of the circumstances and reverses only if the ruling is
     clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

2.   Search & seizure -- "reasonable suspicion" defined for purposes of Ark. R.
     Crim. P. 3.1. -- For purposes of Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1, which
     authorizes a law enforcement officer to stop and detain any
     person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has
     committed, or is about to commit a felony or a misdemeanor
     involving danger of forcible injury, "reasonable suspicion" is
     defined as suspicion based upon facts or circumstances that
     give rise to more than a bare, imaginary, or purely
     conjectural suspicion.

3.   Criminal law -- allowable scope of investigation of criminal activities. -
     - So long as a law enforcement officer does not invade the
     privacy and freedom of others, he is free to investigate any
     police matter in any manner not prohibited by law, including
     the use of anonymous tips. 
4.   Search & seizure -- when person is "seized" -- approach of police officer
     to car does not constitute seizure. -- A person is "seized" for
     purposes of the Fourth Amendment when, in view of all of the
     circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
     would have believed that he was not free to leave; the mere
     approach of a police officer to a car parked in a public place
     does not constitute a seizure.

5.   Search & seizure -- actual criminal activity is not test for determining
     whether stop passes muster. -- Actual criminal activity is not the
     test for determining whether a stop passes muster; it is
     whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists.

6.   Search & seizure -- denial of motion to suppress affirmed -- actions
     raised reasonable suspicion to warrant stop and detention. -- The
     supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of appellant's
     motion to suppress the drugs seized in his arrest where the
     combined circumstances -- including information gathered from
     anonymous tips, the hour of the night, the location, the
     police department's policy of assisting the Alcoholic Beverage
     Control Commission in policing illegal drug and alcohol
     consumption in motor vehicles, and the dome light of
     appellant's vehicle being on -- justified an approach by
     police for investigative purposes under Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.2,
     and where a law enforcement officer saw appellant reach under
     the front seat of the vehicle and produce what he believed was
     a gun raised reasonable suspicion to warrant a stop and
     detention under Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1 as either a potential
     felonious act or a misdemeanor causing injury by force. 


     Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court; Floyd G. Rogers, Judge;
affirmed.
     Eddie N. Christian, by: Eddie Christian, Jr., for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Brad Newman, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellant Billy Lowell Hammons appeals his convictions and
sentences for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver
and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.  He was
sentenced to 40 years in prison with 10 years suspended on the
first conviction and to 10 years on the second conviction, with the
two sentences to run concurrently.  He appeals and urges that the
trial court erred in refusing to suppress the drugs seized in what
he terms was an illegal arrest.  We find no error in the trial
court's ruling, and we affirm.
     On March 1, 1995, Hammons was arrested for possession of
controlled substances.  He was charged on March 3, 1995, with
possession of methamphetamine and marijuana with intent to deliver
and with possession of dilaudid.  The dilaudid charge was later
nolle prossed.  On June 12, 1995, Hammons moved to suppress certain
drugs that were seized by a Fort Smith police detective following
his March 1, 1995 arrest.  At the hearing on Hammons's motion, Fort
Smith Police Detective Dennis Alexander described the events
surrounding the arrest.  He testified that he received an anonymous
call from a woman on February 23, 1995.  The caller informed him
that a man called "Wild Bill" of Wilburton, Oklahoma, was supplying
a number of smaller dealers with methamphetamine in both eastern
Oklahoma and western Arkansas.  She said these smaller dealers were
friends of hers who had been arrested.  One was the caller's
roommate, and one was a woman named Shannon Smith.  She related to
Detective Alexander that "Wild Bill" drove a 70 or 80 model black
Corvette, and that he was in his late 30's or early 40's, had a
slender build, and often wore a mustache and a beard.  Detective
Alexander testified at the hearing that the caller's information
was reliable because she was "very knowledgeable" about the
methamphetamine trade in the area and about people who had been
arrested for methamphetamine sales.
     Detective Alexander next testified that on March 1, 1995, he
received information from Fort Smith Police Detective Wayne
Barnett, who had received information from the police dispatcher
about a second anonymous call from a female who stated that one of
the largest drug suppliers in the area would be at Old Town Grain
and Feed, a local bar that sold alcoholic beverages, that evening
and that he would be driving a black Corvette.  Based on the tip,
Detective Alexander and Detective Barnett drove through the area of
Old Town three times and did not see the black Corvette.  At
approximately 11:30 p.m. that night, Detective Alexander, who was
now alone and driving a Chevrolet Astro minivan, drove by Old Town
and saw a black Corvette backed into a parking spot with two people
sitting in the car.  The dome light in the Corvette was on, which
Detective Alexander testified was significant because he routinely
checked cars in parking lots of drinking establishments with dome
lights on to assist the State Alcoholic Beverage Commission in
policing illegal drug and alcohol consumption in motor vehicles.
     Detective Alexander stated that he circled the block and
entered the parking lot, which was open to the public.  As he
pulled within five to ten feet of the Corvette, his headlights
illuminated two people in the car.  They both looked up and then
began "scrambling" inside the car.  Detective Alexander explained
that they "began reaching down under the seat, turning and twisting
as if they were trying to conceal something or put something up." 
He could look down inside the car from his vantage point and
testified that he saw the driver (later identified as Hammons)
reach under his seat and come up with what the police detective
believed to be a gun.  At that point, Detective Alexander stated
that he turned his blue light on to let the two people know that he
was a police detective.  (On cross-examination Detective Alexander
contradicted himself and testified that he turned on his blue light
when he saw the "scrambling.")  He drew his pistol, stepped down
from the minivan, and ordered the passengers to show their hands. 
The passenger (later identified as Michael David Rhea) complied,
but Hammons had to be told five or six times to show his hands. 
After reaching under the seat again, Hammons did as he was
instructed.
     Hammons was ordered to exit the vehicle, and while doing so,
he dropped a brown pouch on the ground.  The police detective
patted Hammons down for weapons and discovered a vial in his right
coat pocket that contained an off-white, rock-like substance that
he believed to be methamphetamine.  He testified that he also found
suspicious items on Rhea and in the pouch that Hammons dropped on
the ground.  Hammons told Detective Alexander that his nickname was
"Wild Bill," and that he was from Wilburton, Oklahoma.  A pistol
was found in the Corvette under the driver's seat, with the
magazine sitting on the console.
     On cross-examination, Hammons's counsel attacked the
reliability of the information received by Detective Alexander from
the anonymous caller on February 23, 1995.  Hammons's counsel
emphasized that much of the caller's references to the
methamphetamine trade could have been garnered from public records. 
He also questioned the accuracy of the information that had been
relayed to Detective Alexander from the March 1, 1995 anonymous
caller and later noted during examination of the police dispatcher
that no details regarding name, time, or whether illegal drug
transactions would transpire were imparted to the dispatcher.
     The trial court denied Hammons's motion to suppress, and in
doing so stated that it was basing its ruling primarily on the
police detective's statement that the grounds for arrest developed
on the parking lot where a dome light was on and where the
detective saw the occupants "squirming" about in the Corvette,
trying to avoid something.  The trial court concluded that these
actions raised reasonable suspicion for the police detective to at
least check out the circumstances.  The trial court also concluded
that in simply pulling the minivan up to the Corvette, the police
detective had not blocked the Corvette's path, and that Hammons was
free to leave.  The court further observed that the sighted gun
properly played a role in Detective Alexander's actions.  Following
this ruling by the trial court, Hammons entered a conditional plea
of nolo contendere to the charges pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3
and was sentenced accordingly.
     The sole issue on appeal is whether Detective Alexander had
grounds to effect a seizure of Hammons under Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1. 
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, this
court makes an independent determination based on the totality of
the circumstances and reverses only if the ruling is clearly
against the preponderance of the evidence.  Evans v. State, 326
Ark. 279, 931 S.W.2d 136 (1996).  See also Illinois v. Gates,