Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Chambers

Citation: 2010-Ohio-1809

Docket Number: 20081991

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Chambers, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1809.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1809 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CHAMBERS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Chambers, Slip Opinion No. 2010-
Ohio-1809.] 
Attorney misconduct, including neglecting an entrusted legal matter, failing to 
promptly deliver to client all funds the client was entitled to receive, and 
failing to cooperate in disciplinary investigation — One-year suspension 
with entire suspension stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2008-1991 — Submitted December 16, 2009 — Decided April 29, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 07-098. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Joseph Chambers of Fairview Park, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0064627, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
May 1995. 
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{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
recommends that we suspend respondent’s license to practice for a period of one 
year, stayed upon the conditions that he complete a three-year probationary period 
during which he remain subject to, and in compliance with, his Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program (“OLAP”) contract, continue to be monitored by an 
appointed monitoring attorney, regularly attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, 
commit no further misconduct, and pay the costs of these proceedings.  The board 
makes this recommendation based upon stipulations and findings that respondent 
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him, intentionally failed to carry out a 
contract of employment, failed to promptly pay or deliver to the client all funds 
that the client was entitled to receive, and refused to assist in a disciplinary 
investigation.  Additionally, the board found that although not stipulated by the 
parties, respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
and adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law, and intentionally failed to 
seek the lawful objectives of a client.  We agree that respondent violated the 
former Code of Professional Responsibility and current Rules of Professional 
Conduct1 as found by the board, and that a one-year suspension with the entire 
suspension conditionally stayed is appropriate. 
Procedural History 
{¶ 3} Relator, Disciplinary Counsel, initially charged respondent with a 
single count of failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation of a grievance 
filed against him by Michael David Wilmore.  See Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G).  In April 
2008, relator amended its complaint to add a second count arising from a 
grievance filed by Thomas G. Stump and alleged that respondent violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(a) (no lawyer shall violate or attempt to violate the Ohio Rules 
                                                 
1 Relator charged respondent with misconduct pursuant to applicable rules for acts occurring 
before and after February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
supersede the Code of Professional Responsibility.  
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3 
 
of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another), 8.4(d) (no lawyer shall engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(h) (no lawyer shall engage in 
any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 
and Gov.Bar R. V(F)(G) (no lawyer shall neglect or refuse to testify in a 
disciplinary investigation or hearing). 
{¶ 4} Respondent did not answer either complaint, and relator moved for 
a default judgment.  The board referred the matter to a master commissioner, who 
prepared a report containing findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
recommending a one-year suspension with six months stayed upon the conditions 
that he successfully complete an approved anger-management program, complete 
six months of monitored probation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(9), and pay the costs 
of the proceeding.  The board adopted the master commissioner’s report in its 
entirety. 
{¶ 5} Both relator and respondent objected to the board’s report.  After 
hearing oral argument on those objections, we placed respondent on monitored 
probation pursuant to Gov.Bar R.V(9) and remanded the matter to the board for 
further consideration. 
{¶ 6} On remand, relator filed a second amended complaint to add 
additional facts and allegations of misconduct with respect to respondent’s 
handling of the Wilmore matter.  The parties submitted stipulated facts and 
exhibits and a panel of board members made findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and recommended a one-year suspension stayed upon conditions.  The board 
adopted the report, and the parties have not objected. 
Misconduct 
The Wilmore Grievance 
{¶ 7} In June or July 2005, Michael David Wilmore sought respondent’s 
representation to seek early release from prison.  In August 2005, respondent sent 
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Wilmore a letter stating that he would not pursue the matter until he received his 
$2,500 fee.  The letter further stated: “If you elect to pay my fees, I will promptly 
file the motion for judicial release we discussed and request that Judge Hastings 
bring you back for a full hearing.”  The following month, respondent accepted the 
full $2,500 fee to represent Wilmore.  Despite having received the agreed fee, 
having entered an appearance in Wilmore’s case, and having obtained permission 
from the judge to review the presentence-investigation report, respondent did not 
file any motion on Wilmore’s behalf. 
{¶ 8} Respondent received three letters from relator notifying him of 
Wilmore’s grievance and seeking his response, but he never submitted a reply.  
On or about May 1, 2007, after receiving a subpoena to appear at a deposition at 
relator’s office, respondent called relator and requested an extension of time to 
respond to the letters of inquiry.  Although relator extended the time to respond to 
May 30, 2007, and canceled respondent’s deposition, respondent once again 
failed to submit a response.  Even after relator sent respondent a letter stating that 
probable cause existed to believe that he had committed an ethical violation, 
respondent did not respond. 
{¶ 9} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing 
evidence  that respondent’s conduct violated DR 6-101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not 
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him), 7-101(A)(2) (a lawyer shall not 
intentionally fail to carry out a contract of employment for legal services), and 9-
102(B)(4) (a lawyer shall promptly pay or deliver to the client all funds that the 
client is entitled to receive), and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (no lawyer shall neglect or 
refuse to assist or testify in a disciplinary investigation or hearing).  Additionally, 
the board found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s conduct 
violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), and 7-101(A)(1) (a 
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lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of a client).  We 
accept these findings of misconduct. 
The Stump Grievance 
{¶ 10} The parties stipulated and the board found that on December 7, 
2006, respondent entered a plea of no contest to a charge of misdemeanor 
attempted aggravated disorderly conduct in the Cleveland Municipal Court, 
arising out of an altercation with his neighbor, Thomas G. Stump.  As a result of 
the plea, respondent was sentenced to one year of probation.  Subsequently, 
Stump filed both a civil action and a grievance against respondent arising out of 
the altercation.  In the grievance, Stump alleged that respondent had assaulted him 
because Stump had been called to testify as a witness in a juvenile court matter 
involving respondent’s children.  Although relator sent him two letters regarding 
the Stump grievance, respondent never responded. 
{¶ 11} On December 11, 2007, relator received a letter from Stump 
seeking to withdraw his grievance so that he could pursue civil remedies against 
respondent.  On December 28, 2007, relator received another letter from Stump, 
stating that he refused to settle any of his claims against respondent.  Attached to 
that letter was correspondence from respondent advising Stump’s counsel that in 
order to settle the civil matter Stump would have to immediately dismiss the 
pending disciplinary complaint against respondent.  Also attached was a 
settlement and mutual release of claims, drafted by respondent, which stated:  
“The Plaintiff will immediately send the attached correspondence to Carol A. 
Costa, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel of the Ohio Supreme Court, and withdraw 
grievance # A7-1825.  In [sic, If] the Ohio Supreme Court imposes any discipline 
against Defendant John Chambers due to the allegations set forth in grievance # 
A7-1825, or considers the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s grievance in any way 
as an aggravating factor in any future disciplinary proceedings against Defendant 
John Chambers, the Plaintiff agrees to be subject to a lawsuit for defamation, and 
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specifically waives the applicable statute of limitations.  In lieu of filing a separate 
suit alleging defamation, however, Defendant John Chambers, at his sole option, 
may compel liquidated damages from the Plaintiff in the amount of $15,000.” 
{¶ 12} On the day of trial, respondent and Stump met with the trial judge 
to discuss the possibility of settlement.  Eventually, they agreed to dismiss their 
respective claims and submitted the settlement and mutual release of claims 
prepared by respondent for the court’s approval.  However, during the course of 
the discussions, the trial judge crossed out several provisions of the agreement, 
including all but the first sentence of the paragraph quoted above, and respondent 
initialed the changes.  In accordance with the revised settlement agreement, 
Stump sent a letter to relator seeking to withdraw his grievance. 
{¶ 13} Thereafter, relator informed respondent by letter that it had the 
authority to investigate any matters that come to its attention, regardless of a 
grievant’s desire to withdraw a grievance.  The letter further advised respondent 
that an attorney should not require a client to forgo filing, dismiss, or resolve a 
grievance outside of Gov.Bar R. V, and requested a response within two weeks.  
Respondent did not reply. 
{¶ 14} The parties stipulated, and the board found, that respondent’s 
conduct with respect to the Stump matter violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G).  
Additionally, the board noted that in Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Berger (1992), 
64 Ohio St.3d 454, 456, 597 N.E.2d 81, a case in which two attorneys sought to 
limit the response of a former client to a disciplinary inquiry, this court concluded 
that the attorneys had violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) and 1-102(A)(6) (a 
lawyer shall not engage in any conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s 
fitness to practice law).  Respondent never had an attorney-client relationship with 
Stump.  Nonetheless, the panel and board found, and we agree, that respondent’s 
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attempt to have Stump dismiss his grievance violated current Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) 
and (h). 
Sanction 
{¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.   
{¶ 16} Although not considered as aggravating or mitigating factors, the 
board noted the following background to respondent’s misconduct.  Respondent 
has practiced as a sole practitioner since 1997, devoting 90 percent of his practice 
to criminal defense.  After his divorce from his first wife in June 1999, he 
regularly visited his three children until June 2005, when his ex-wife moved with 
the children to California without his knowledge.  The move precipitated child-
custody and child-visitation litigation, as well as respondent’s depression. 
{¶ 17} Contemporaneous with relator’s investigation of the Wilmore 
grievance, respondent, who had been sober since 1997, began drinking after he 
learned that his daughter had been molested.  Shortly thereafter, he suffered a 
stroke and underwent surgery to repair a defect in his heart.  Although respondent 
initially ignored the Wilmore case and relator’s letters regarding the investigation, 
he began to cooperate in the investigation after he sought treatment for alcoholism 
and other issues in 2008. 
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{¶ 18} As aggravating factors, the board found that respondent had 
committed multiple offenses and had failed to cooperate in the disciplinary 
process.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d) and (e).  As mitigating factors, the parties 
stipulated and the board found that respondent (1) did not have a prior 
disciplinary record, see BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a); (2) has made restitution in 
the Wilmore matter, although it took him over three years to do so, see BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c); and (3) had other sanctions imposed in the Stump matter, 
see BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(f). 
{¶ 19} Additionally in mitigation, the board found that clear and 
convincing evidence demonstrates that respondent has been diagnosed with 
bipolar affective disorder and alcohol dependency, both of which significantly 
contributed to his misconduct.  He has successfully completed a treatment 
program at the Cleveland Clinic and is fully compliant with both his 
psychological treatment and a two-year OLAP contract that he entered on 
November 5, 2008.  He has been sober since April 20, 2008, and regularly attends 
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.  Respondent’s treatment providers agree that he 
can return to the competent, ethical practice of law.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv).  The board further found that respondent did not have 
a dishonest or selfish motive for his misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(b). 
{¶ 20} In light of respondent’s eventual cooperation with the disciplinary 
process and his progress in treatment, relator has changed its recommended 
sanction from an indefinite suspension to a two-year suspension all stayed on the 
conditions that respondent complete his OLAP contract, continue to be monitored 
by his monitoring attorney, commit no further misconduct, and pay the costs of 
the proceeding.  Respondent argued that in light of the substantial mitigating 
factors, a one-year suspension stayed on the same conditions was appropriate. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 21} The panel and the board recommend that we suspend respondent 
from the practice of law for one year, all stayed upon the conditions that he 
complete a three-year probationary period during which he remain subject to, and 
in compliance with, his OLAP contract, continue to be monitored by an appointed 
monitoring attorney pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(9), regularly attend Alcoholics 
Anonymous meetings, commit no further misconduct, and pay the costs of these 
proceedings. 
{¶ 22} The board does not cite any cases to support its recommendation.  
However, we note that in Akron Bar Assn. v. Goodlet, 99 Ohio St.3d 355, 2003-
Ohio-3935, 792 N.E.2d 1072, ¶ 10-15, we imposed a one-year suspension stayed 
upon similar conditions for violations of DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2), 7-
101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not prejudice his client during the course of the 
professional relationship), and 1-102(A)(5), and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G).  There, 
testimony established that at the time he committed his misconduct, the attorney 
suffered from severe and untreated depression, but that he had since recognized 
the need for treatment and had a significant chance of recovery if he complied 
with treatment recommendations.  Id. at ¶ 7-8. 
{¶ 23} Based upon the foregoing, we adopt the findings and conclusions 
of the board, as well as the board’s recommended sanction.  Accordingly, John 
Joseph Chambers is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one 
year, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions recommended by the 
board and set forth above.  If respondent fails to meet these conditions, the stay of 
his suspension will be lifted, and respondent will serve one year of actual 
suspension from the practice of law.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, 
ACTING 
C.J., 
and 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
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The late CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS J. MOYER did not participate in the 
decision in this case. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Carol A. Costa, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Mary L. Cibella, for respondent. 
__________________