Case Title: McKenzie v. Shepard

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
McKenzie v. Shepard1991 WY 104814 P.2d 701Case Number: 91-22, 91-23Decided: 08/07/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHARLES 
ALVIN McKENZIE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
VICTORIA 
LYNN SHEPARD, FORMERLY VICTORIA LYNN McKENZIE, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
VICTORIA 
LYNN SHEPARD, FORMERLY VICTORIA LYNN McKENZIE, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
CHARLES 
ALVIN McKENZIE, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

 
 
Michael 
K. Shoumaker, Sheridan, for Victoria 
Lynn Shepard.

 
 
Robert 
W. Brown, Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, for Charles Alvin 
McKenzie.

 
 
Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and RAPER, J. 
(Retired).

 
 
RAPER, 
Justice, Retired.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal involves 
the validity of an agreement between a divorced husband and wife which settled 
all past due and future child support payments for a sum considerably less than 
that due or to become due under the original divorce decree made by the court 
some years previously. The trial judge allowed recovery of child support accrued 
and unpaid to the date of the agreement, i.e., from the date of divorce decree 
on July 3, 1974 to the date of agreement, June 15, 1984, but denied prospective 
support.

 
 

[¶2.]     We will affirm in part 
and reverse in part.

 
 

[¶3.]     On July 3, 1974, the 
parties were divorced. The decree incorporated a stipulation and property 
settlement agreement which in part provided that the father would pay the sum of 
$75 per month for each of the parties' two minor children. On March 2, 1979, the 
parties entered into an agreement and stipulation stating that for the sum of 
$3,000, all claims for back child support through April 1, 1979 would be 
considered paid. The agreement also modified the decree by changing the custody 
of the boy and providing $200 per month to the mother for the girl. This 
agreement was submitted to the district court which approved the same by its 
order. Payments of child support as modified were not timely paid or in full. 
The wife obtained a judgment on December 15, 1980, in the sum of $5,075 for 
unpaid support and the court returned custody of the boy to the mother.1

 
 

[¶4.]     In 1984, the mother 
filed a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Action in Rosebud, Montana, where the father 
was living at the time. After such filing, the parties signed a Waiver Agreement 
by which wife "voluntarily waives all claims for * * * past or future child 
support contributions with full knowledge of her rights. This waiver is given in 
exchange for a lump sum payment of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) from 
Charles A. McKenzie to Victoria L. Shepard, the receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged." This waiver agreement was filed with the Montana court but not filed with the Wyoming court in SheridanCounty until admitted into evidence in 
1990. No order of the court was applied for or made in Montana or Wyoming approving the 1984 modification 
entered into between the parties. Apparently the Montana filing was only made in order to 
obtain dismissal of the U.R.E.S.A. proceeding against the 
father.

 
 

[¶5.]     W.S. 20-2-113(a) 
(emphasis added), in effect at the time, provides:

 
 
In 
granting a divorce or annulment of a marriage, the court may make such 
disposition of the children as appears most expedient and beneficial for the 
well-being of the children. The court shall consider the relative competency of 
both parents and no award of custody shall be made solely on the basis of gender 
of the parent. On the petition of either 
of the parents, the court may revise the decree concerning the care, custody and 
maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit 
of the children requires.

 
 
That 
statutory provision, emphasized above, is the crucial determinant in this case. 
Jurisdiction in divorce matters is purely statutory, Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953 
(1937). Under this statute, only the court may "revise the decree" concerning 
the maintenance of the children.

 
 

[¶6.]     While agreements and 
stipulations between the divorced parties are presumed fair and favored by the 
courts, Beard v. Beard, 368 P.2d 953 (Wyo. 1962), Rinehart v. Rinehart, 52 Wyo. 363, 75 P.2d 390 (1938), such agreements must be promptly submitted to the district 
court having jurisdiction to revise the original decree. W.S. 20-2-113(a). The 
parties may not independently revise the decree, only the district court can do 
that, when warranted. A substantial change in circumstances outweighs 
consideration of finality. Parry v. 
Parry, 766 P.2d 1168 (Wyo. 1989). Parry went on to 
say:

 
 
The 
first issue we will discuss is whether the district court had authority to 
retrospectively modify a decree of divorce with respect to child support. We 
hold that it did not have that authority. * * *

 
 
* 
* * If a court could retrospectively modify the rights of a party under a decree 
incorporating a settlement agreement, the agreement becomes virtually worthless. 
This development would violate well-established Wyoming law favoring settlement agreements. Mentock [v. Mentock], 638 P.2d 156 
[Wyo. (1981)]; Lewis [v. Lewis], 716 P.2d 347 
[Wyo. (1986)]. 
Furthermore, allowing retrospective modifications of divorce decrees may 
encourage default. A party might decide to stop payment and allow arrearages to 
accrue to a substantial amount, with the hope and anticipation that the court 
will cancel the accrued payments owed to the receiving party. We prefer a rule 
which encourages a party to seek modification of a divorce decree at the moment 
his financial situation changes. In the present case, appellant chose to simply 
stop making the required payments. We will not sanction this type of self-help 
by allowing retrospective modification of the decree.[2]

 
 

Id. 
at 1170 (footnote omitted).

 
 

[¶7.]     The district court here 
did not allow retrospective modification. Therefore, we must affirm the district 
court in that regard. When it comes to waiver of prospective support, the rule 
is different. We have already set out the rule in the last sentence of the 
foregoing quotation from Parry, 766 
P.2d at 1170: "We will not sanction this type of self-help by allowing 
retrospective modification of the decree." The divorced husband's failure to 
seek modification by approval of the waiver as to future support killed his 
chances of avoiding payment of support following execution of the stipulation. 
It is immaterial that the children are emancipated or of age at the time of 
hearing. The debt was fixed by the modified divorce 
decree.

 
 

[¶8.]     We must accordingly 
reverse that part of the district court's order which denied recovery of support 
following execution of the stipulation and agreement dated June 15, 1984, until 
the dates each of the children came of age or were emancipated as provided in 
the divorce decree previously modified and approved by the trial 
judge.

 
 

[¶9.]     Affirmed and reversed 
accordingly. We remand to the district court to enter an appropriate order in 
accordance with the sense of this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
The judgment included support money for the boy at $75 per month in that the 
husband never actually took custody as he could have under the 
modification.

 
 

2 
See also W.S. 20-2-113(a) providing that a decree may be modified only as to 
payments accruing subsequent to a petition for modification cited in Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907 (Wyo. 
1991).