Case Title: State ex rel. Black v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio

Citation: 2013-Ohio-4550

Docket Number: 2012-1163

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Black v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4550.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4550 
THE STATE EX REL. BLACK, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO 
ET AL.; PARK OHIO INDUSTRIES, INC., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Black v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4550.] 
Workers’ compensation—Permanent total disability compensation—Voluntary 
retirement—Abandonment of the work force—Court of appeals’ judgment 
granting a limited writ of mandamus reversed—Writ denied. 
(No. 2012-1163—Submitted July 9, 2013—Decided October 17, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 10AP-1168,  
2012-Ohio-2589. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam.  
{¶ 1} Appellant, Park Ohio Industries, Inc., appeals from the judgment 
of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting a limited writ of mandamus that 
ordered the Industrial Commission to vacate its order denying permanent total 
disability compensation to appellee, Billy G. Black, and to enter a new order that 
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properly determines whether Black is eligible for permanent total disability 
compensation, after he has retired from the workforce. 
{¶ 2} Because the record contained some evidence to support the 
commission’s decision that Black’s retirement was voluntary and not injury-
induced, we hold that the commission did not abuse its discretion when it 
determined that Black was ineligible for permanent total disability compensation.  
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and deny the writ. 
{¶ 3} Black was employed as a press operator for Park Ohio, a self-
insured employer, when he injured his lower back on October 17, 2000.  He was 
seen by Dr. Elizabeth Mease, who diagnosed lumbar strain and placed him on 
modified activity with restrictions.  He returned to work two days later and was 
assigned to clean bathrooms.  After a few hours, he returned to Dr. Mease, who 
indicated that Black should not engage in any activity. 
{¶ 4} On November 10, 2000, Dr. Mease authorized Black to return to 
work with restrictions and referred him to Dr. Mark Panigutti, an orthopedic 
physician.  Black saw Dr. Panigutti on November 15, 2000, and again on 
December 11, 2000. 
{¶ 5} On December 11, Dr. Panigutti opined that Black had not yet 
reached maximum medical improvement, but that his prognosis was good.  He 
authorized Black to return to work on December 13, 2000, with weight and 
standing restrictions for one month, and after one month, to return to full duty.  
Also on December 11, Black notified his employer that he intended to retire on 
February 28, 2001. 
{¶ 6} Black returned to work on modified duty on December 13, 2000.  
On January 22, 2001, Black saw Dr. Panigutti for back pain and a possible hernia.  
Dr. Panigutti increased Black’s weight restrictions based in part on complaints of 
pain unrelated to his back injury. 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
{¶ 7} Black worked until February 9, 2001.  He retired on February 28, 
2001, at the age of 55 with 38 years of service.  At no time following his 
retirement did Black pursue vocational training or seek other employment.  In 
September 2001, he began receiving Social Security disability benefits.  The 
record does not contain an explanation of the reasons for granting these benefits, 
but Black testified in 2009 that they may have included, in part, his lack of 
education and medical conditions not related to his industrial injury. 
{¶ 8} On August 14, 2009, Black applied for permanent total disability 
compensation.  Following a hearing on July 1, 2010, a hearing officer denied his 
application.  The hearing officer noted that there was no medical evidence that 
any physician had advised Black to retire because of his previously allowed 
injuries and that Black had not worked or looked for work since his retirement on 
February 28, 2001.  Thus, the hearing officer concluded that Black’s retirement 
was both voluntary and an abandonment of the entire workforce, making him 
ineligible for subsequent permanent total disability compensation. 
{¶ 9} Black sought a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion and arbitrarily 
denied his request for permanent total disability compensation. 
{¶ 10} A magistrate determined that Dr. Panigutti’s December 11, 2000 
office note—describing Black as unable to perform his regular job duties but able 
to perform light or modified job duties with certain restrictions for a month—was 
medical evidence that Black’s decision to retire “could have been” induced by his 
industrial injury.  10th District Franklin No. 10AP-1168, 2012-Ohio-2589, ¶ 55.  
According to the magistrate, the December 11, 2000 note was “medical evidence 
upon which the commission could have relied in determining whether the job 
abandonment was injury induced,” and thus it was clearly inaccurate for the 
commission, through its staff hearing officer, to declare that “ ‘[t]here is no 
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medical evidence that [the retirement] was induced by the industrial injury.’ ”  Id. 
at ¶ 56. 
{¶ 11} The magistrate also concluded that the commission appeared to 
improperly shift the burden of proof to Black when it stated that there was no 
medical evidence that a physician advised Black to retire, strongly suggesting that 
the lack of medical evidence was a determinative factor in its decision to deny 
benefits.  Consequently, the magistrate recommended that the court of appeals 
issue a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to enter a new order 
that properly determined Black’s eligibility.  Id. at ¶ 57-59. 
{¶ 12} Both Park Ohio and the commission filed objections to the 
magistrate’s recommendation, and Black responded to those objections.  The 
court of appeals overruled the objections and issued a limited writ ordering the 
commission to vacate the order denying benefits based on ineligibility and enter 
an order that properly determines Black’s eligibility for permanent total disability 
compensation. 
{¶ 13} Park Ohio filed an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 14} A claimant’s eligibility for permanent total disability compensation 
may be affected if the claimant has voluntarily retired or abandoned the job 
market for reasons not related to the industrial injury.  State ex rel. McAtee v. 
Indus. Comm., 76 Ohio St.3d 648, 670 N.E.2d 234 (1996);  State ex rel. Rockwell 
Internatl. v. Indus. Comm., 40 Ohio St.3d 44, 531 N.E.2d 678 (1988).  Thus, the 
character of the employee’s retirement—whether voluntary or involuntary—is 
critical to the commission’s analysis of a claimant’s right to permanent total 
disability compensation.  State ex rel. Cinergy Corp./Duke Energy v. Heber, 130 
Ohio St.3d 194, 2011-Ohio-5027, 957 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 15} Park Ohio appeals the court of appeals’ decision requiring the 
commission to redetermine the character of Black’s retirement.  According to 
Park Ohio, the commission did consider evidence of Black’s medical condition at 
January Term, 2013 
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or near the time of his retirement and based on its review of that evidence, 
concluded that no physician had advised him to retire and that his retirement was 
not induced by his industrial injury.  The commission specifically considered Dr. 
Panigutti’s report of January 22, 2001, the date most contemporaneous with 
Black’s retirement:   
 
There is no medical evidence that any physician advised 
the Injured Worker to retire as a result of the allowed injuries.  The 
Injured Worker saw his treating orthopedist in January 2001.  At 
the time the lifting restriction was increased to fifty pounds due to 
groin pain which the doctor stated was unrelated to the Injured 
Worker’s back condition. 
 
{¶ 16} According to Park Ohio, this statement in the commission’s order 
demonstrated that the hearing officer had reviewed the medical evidence as 
required by Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d) and had concluded that the 
evidence did not support Black’s assertion that his retirement was induced by his 
industrial injury. 
{¶ 17} 
Next, Park Ohio contends that the commission did not 
wrongfully shift the burden of proof from Park Ohio to Black.  Park Ohio 
maintains that the lack of medical evidence that Black’s retirement was injury-
induced was simply a factual finding based on the evidence produced and 
reviewed, i.e., Dr. Panigutti’s January 2001 report and Black’s notice of intent to 
retire submitted after he was released to return to work on December 11, 2000.  
Park Ohio argues that this evidence, along with Black’s failure to work or to look 
for work following his retirement, demonstrated that Park Ohio had met its 
burden of proving that Black had voluntarily abandoned the workforce.  State ex 
rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman, 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 83, 679 N.E.2d 706 (1997). 
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{¶ 18} Whether a claimant has voluntarily retired or has abandoned the 
workforce is a question of fact for the commission to determine.  State ex rel. 
Pierron v. Indus. Comm., 120 Ohio St.3d 40, 2008-Ohio-5245, 896 N.E.2d 140, 
¶ 10.  This court has described the question of abandonment as “ ‘primarily * * * 
[one] of intent * * * [that] may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and 
other objective facts.’ ”  State ex rel. Diversitech Gen. Plastic Film Div. v. Indus. 
Comm., 45 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 544 N.E.2d 677 (1989), quoting State v. 
Freeman, 64 Ohio St.3d 291, 297, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980).  Accordingly, the 
commission must consider all relevant circumstances, including evidence of the 
claimant’s medical condition at or near the time of departure from the workforce, 
if submitted, and any other evidence that would substantiate a connection between 
the injury and retirement.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d);  Cinergy Corp., 
130 Ohio St.3d 194, 2011-Ohio-5027, 957 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 19} The commission is exclusively responsible for evaluating the 
weight and credibility of the evidence.  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc., 
31 Ohio St.3d 18, 20-21, 508 N.E.2d 936 (1987).  If the commission’s order is 
supported by some evidence in the record, then the commission has not abused its 
discretion and mandamus is not appropriate.  Id. at 21. 
{¶ 20} Here, the commission focused on Black’s return to work and the 
contemporaneous notice of his intent to retire in two months.  The order 
specifically referred to his return to work on December 13, 2000, two days after 
he had decided to retire.  The order also addressed Black’s subsequent visit to Dr. 
Panigutti in January 2001, when the doctor increased Black’s weight restrictions 
due to pain unrelated to his industrial injury.  Based on this evidence, the 
commission concluded that there was no medical evidence submitted at or around 
the time Black announced his planned retirement that a physician had advised him 
to retire.  The commission did not abuse its discretion by basing its determination 
that Black’s retirement was voluntary in part on the failure to present evidence 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
that he had retired because he was unable to perform his job due to his injuries.  
See State ex rel. Mackey v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 130 Ohio St.3d 108, 2011-Ohio-
4910, 955 N.E.2d 1005, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 21} In addition, the order noted that Black’s last day of work was on 
February 9, 2001, that he had officially retired on February 28, 2001, and that he 
had neither worked nor looked for work since his retirement.  Based on these 
facts, the commission concluded that Black’s retirement was not only voluntary 
but also was an abandonment of the entire workforce.  See State ex rel. Baker 
Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 631 N.E.2d 138 
(1994), paragraph two of the syllabus (employee whose retirement is voluntary 
and an abandonment of the entire job market is ineligible for permanent total 
disability compensation). 
{¶ 22} A reviewing court’s role is to determine whether there is some 
evidence in the record to support the commission’s decision.  When doing so, a 
court must not substitute its judgment for that of the commission or second-guess 
the commission’s evaluation of the evidence.  State ex rel. Guthrie v. Indus. 
Comm., 133 Ohio St.3d 244, 2012-Ohio-4637, 977 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 11.  That is 
what the appellate court has done in this case.  The court of appeals did not find a 
lack of evidence to support the commission’s decision, but rather determined that 
the commission had misconstrued the evidence considered.  The court erred in 
doing so. 
{¶ 23} Because the record contained some evidence to support the 
commission’s decision that Black’s retirement was voluntary and not injury-
induced, we hold that the commission did not abuse its discretion when it 
determined that Black was ineligible for permanent total disability compensation.  
Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and deny the writ. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ denied. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Stephen Plymale, Assistant 
Attorney General, for Industrial Commission. 
Fisher & Phillips, L.L.P., Daniel P. O’Brien, and Mark E. Snyder, for 
appellant. 
________________________