Case Title: State v. Peter J. McMaster

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP001159-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1159-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :               
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Peter J. McMaster, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 13, 1996 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.  The issue in this case is whether 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution prohibits the criminal prosecution of the 
defendant 
for 
violations 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 
346.63
1 
and 
                     
1 McMaster was charged with a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a) and (b).  Wis. Stat. § 346.63 provides, in 
relevant part,  as follows: 
(1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle 
while: 
(a) Under the influence of an intoxicant or a 
controlled substance or a combination of an intoxicant 
and a controlled substance, under the influence of any 
other drug to a degree which renders him or her 
incapable of safely driving, or under the combined 
influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a 
degree which renders him or her incapable of safely 
driving; or 
(b) 
The 
person 
has 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration. 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
2
346.65,
2 subsequent to the administrative suspension of his 
driving privileges under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(7) and (8).
3  We 
                     
2 McMaster was charged under this section because he had 
previous convictions under Wis. Stat. § 346.63 in the previous 
five years. Wisconsin Statute § 346.65 provides, in relevant 
part, as follows:  
Penalty for violating sections 346.62 to 346.64.  
. . . . 
(2) Any person violating s. 346.63 (1): 
(a)  Shall forfeit not less than $150 nor more 
than $300, except as provided in pars. (b) to (e). 
(b)  Shall be fined not less than $300 nor more 
than $1,000 and imprisoned for not less than 5 days nor 
more than 6 months if the total number of suspensions, 
revocations  and convictions counted under s. 343.307 
(1) 
equals 
2 
in 
a 
5-year 
period, 
except 
that 
suspensions, revocations or convictions arising out of 
the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as 
one.  
 
3 Wis. Stat. § 343.305(7) and (8) provides, in relevant 
part:  
(7) CHEMICAL TEST; ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION. (a) 
If a person submits to chemical testing administered in 
accordance with this section and any test results 
indicate a prohibited alcohol concentration, the law 
enforcement officer shall report the results to the 
department and take possession of the person's license 
and forward it to the department. The person's 
operating privilege is administratively suspended for 6 
months. 
(b) If a person who was driving or operating or on 
duty time with respect to a commercial motor vehicle 
submits to chemical testing administered in accordance 
with this section and any test results indicate any 
measured alcohol concentration above 0.0, the law 
enforcement officer may take possession of the person's 
license and retain the license for 24 hours. The person 
may reclaim a seized license in person or request 
return of the license by mail. The law enforcement 
officer shall issue a citation for violation of s. 
346.63 (7) (a) 1., issue citations for such other 
violations as may apply and issue an out-of-service 
order to the person for the 24 hours after the testing, 
and report both the out-of-service order and the test 
results to the department in the manner prescribed by 
the department. If the person is a nonresident, the 
department shall report issuance of the out-of-service 
order to the driver licensing agency in the person's 
home jurisdiction. 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
3
hold that the criminal prosecution of the defendant after the 
administrative suspension of his driving privileges is permitted  
because we find that the primary purpose of Wis. Stat. § 343.305 
is remedial. 
There is no dispute over the facts in this case.  On July 
16, 1994, Peter McMaster received a citation for operating while 
under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 346.63(1)(a) and 346.65.  McMaster had previous convictions 
for violations of the drunk driving statutes and was therefore 
charged with a criminal offense.  A blood alcohol test 
administered after his arrest showed an ethanol concentration of 
0.178 percent in McMaster's blood.  Because his blood alcohol 
concentration was above the prohibited level, McMaster's driving 
privileges were administratively suspended for six months in 
accordance with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(7).  A citation was also 
issued charging McMaster with a violation of Wis. Stat. § 
346.63(1)(a) and (b).   
 
After his initial appearance before the trial court, 
McMaster filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the criminal 
                                                                  
(8) CHEMICAL TEST; ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION; 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW. (a) 
The law 
enforcement officer shall notify the person of the 
administrative suspension under sub. (7) (a). The 
notice shall advise the person that his or her 
operating privilege will be administratively suspended 
and 
that 
he 
or 
she 
has 
the 
right 
to 
obtain 
administrative 
and 
judicial 
review 
under 
this 
subsection. This notice of administrative suspension 
serves as a 30-day temporary license. An administrative 
suspension under sub. (7) (a) becomes effective at the 
time the 30-day temporary license expires. The officer 
shall submit or mail a copy of the notice to the 
department. 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
4
prosecution under Wis. Stat. § 346.63 was barred by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.
4  McMaster argued that because the State had 
already punished him for driving while intoxicated by revoking 
his driving privileges, he could not also be criminally 
prosecuted for the same offense.  The circuit court for Waukesha 
County, Judge J. Mac Davis, denied the motion to dismiss based on 
its finding that the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 343.305 is remedial 
and therefore does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes.  McMaster was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle 
with a blood alcohol content in excess of 0.10 percent contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) and sentenced to 90 days in the 
county jail. 
 
McMaster appealed to the court of appeals.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court judgment of conviction.  In 
its decision, the court found that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(7) and 
(8) is remedial in nature, noting that the fact that the statute 
may also serve some deterrent and punitive goals does not make 
its primary purpose one of punishment.  State v. McMaster, 198 
Wis. 2d 542, 543 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1995). Despite McMaster's 
urging, the court declined to consider this case under the United 
States Supreme Court case Department of Revenue of Montana v. 
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994), because the holding in Kurth 
Ranch is limited to situations where taxes are imposed on illegal 
                     
4 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall 
“be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb. . . .” U.S. Const. amend. V.   
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
5
activities.  Instead, the court found that the statute should be 
considered under United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). 
Thus the court of appeals held that under Halper, Wis. Stat. § 
343.305(7) and (8) is primarily remedial and does not constitute 
punishment for a double jeopardy claim.   
 
This 
case 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
constitutional 
interpretation and a determination of statutory purpose.  Whether 
a statute is considered punishment is a finding of constitutional 
fact and is an issue of law.  State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 
715, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984).  Therefore, this court may decide the 
issue independently of the circuit court or the court of appeals. 
State v. Thierfelder, 174 Wis. 2d 213, 218, 495 N.W.2d 669 
(1993). 
 
A party 
challenging 
a 
statute 
must show 
it 
to be 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Carpenter, 
197 Wis. 2d 252, 263, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).  There is a strong 
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the statute.  
See id.  Therefore, McMaster bears “the burden of overcoming the 
strong presumption that [Wis. Stat. § 343.305(7) and (8)]  does 
not subject a person to multiple punishment.”  Id. at 264.  A 
careful analysis of the statute itself in light of controlling 
precedent is necessary to determine if the challenged statute is 
in fact violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
 
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
civil sanctions imposed in separate proceedings from a criminal 
prosecution stemming from the same incident do not violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
6
States Constitution.   For example, in Various Items of Personal 
Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931), the Waterloo 
Distilling Corporation was ordered to forfeit a distillery, 
warehouse, 
and 
denaturing 
plant 
on 
the 
ground 
that 
the 
corporation conducted its business in violation of federal law.  
The corporation had been convicted of criminal violations prior 
to the initiation of the forfeiture proceeding and argued that 
the forfeiture action violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.  
Basing its decision in part on long-standing common law 
principles, the Court unanimously held that the clause was 
inapplicable to civil forfeiture actions.  The Court did not 
again consider a double jeopardy case involving civil forfeiture 
until 40 years later, when it reaffirmed the rule of Various 
Items.  In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 
232 (1972) (per curiam), the Court upheld a civil forfeiture of 
jewels following an acquittal on a smuggling charge against a 
double jeopardy challenge.  In United States v. One Assortment of 
89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984), the Court unanimously upheld 
the civil forfeiture of firearms following the acquittal of the 
gun owner on a charge of the illegal sale of firearms.  The Court 
stated that “[u]nless the forfeiture sanction was intended as 
punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal in 
character, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not applicable.”  89 
Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362.  
 
The Court in 89 Firearms concluded that whether a statute is 
criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial, is a matter of 
statutory interpretation.  As such, the Court adopted a two-prong 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
7
test established in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 
(1980), 
to 
aid 
courts 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
statutory 
interpretation: 
 
'Our inquiry in this regard has traditionally proceeded 
on two levels.  First, we have set out to determine 
whether 
Congress, 
in 
establishing 
the 
penalizing 
mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a 
preference for one label or the other.  Second, where 
Congress has indicated an intention to establish a 
civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the 
statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or 
effect as to negate that intention.' 
89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362-63 (citations omitted).  The theme 
in all of these cases is consistent:  forfeitures of this type 
are 
primarily 
remedial 
sanctions 
that 
do 
not 
constitute 
punishment for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis. 
 
Despite the consistent trend in Various Items and its 
progeny, three United States Supreme Court cases in recent years 
have created some confusion in the area of double jeopardy 
jurisprudence.  In 1989, the Supreme Court decided United States 
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). Halper involved a situation where 
a man was convicted of 65 counts of violating the criminal false-
claims statute involving $585 actual loss.  After he was 
sentenced in the criminal proceeding, the government brought an 
action under the civil False Claims Act, exposing Halper to a 
potential liability of $130,000.  Because the Court found that 
the penalty was “entirely unrelated” to the actual damages 
suffered, it held that the civil penalty was a “second 
punishment” in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Halper, 
490 U.S. at 447-49.  The Court noted that “the labels 'criminal' 
and 'civil' are not of paramount importance,” for “a civil as 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
8
well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the 
sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of 
punishment.” Id.  
 
The Halper decision seemed to indicate the beginning of a 
changing tide in modern jurisprudence, particularly with respect 
to the civil/criminal distinction.  It was followed by the 
Court's decision in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).  
In Austin, the government initiated civil forfeiture proceedings 
against a body shop and a mobile home after the owner pleaded 
guilty to a drug offense.  Relying on the distinction in Halper 
between punitive and remedial goals, the Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to in rem civil 
forfeiture proceedings and, because the forfeiture at issue did 
not serve solely a remedial purpose, it was invalidated by the 
Court.  Id. at 622.   
 
The case of Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 
511 U.S. 767 (1994), shed more confusion on the proper means of 
analyzing statutes to determine if they are punitive in nature.  
In Kurth Ranch, the Court concluded that the imposition of a drug 
tax on the parties after their criminal conviction for drug 
offenses was, in this case, a violation of double jeopardy 
because the tax could fairly be characterized as punishment.  The 
Court cited to Halper, but rejected the Halper mode of analysis 
to determine whether a statute is remedial or punitive.  Kurth 
Ranch, 511 U.S. at __, 114 S.Ct. at 1948.  Instead, the Court 
decided that the imposition of the tax after the criminal 
prosecution violates double jeopardy because it applies only to 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
9
an illegal activity and, in fact, is imposed only after the 
arrest of a person for an illegal activity.  Kurth Ranch, 511 
U.S. at __, 114 S.Ct. at 1947. 
 
There has been some confusion as to whether Halper, Austin, 
and Kurth Ranch represent a shifting tide in double jeopardy 
jurisprudence, and under what situations they will apply.  
Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court has cleared up this 
confusion with its recent decision in Ursery v. United States, __ 
U.S. __, 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996).  Ursery involved forfeiture 
proceedings against property allegedly used to manufacture 
marijuana which were started after the criminal prosecution of 
the defendant.  The appellate court decided that under Halper and 
Austin civil forfeitures could categorically be deemed to 
constitute punishment.  The Supreme Court reversed,  holding that 
in rem civil forfeitures are neither “punishment” nor criminal 
for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Relying on 
Various Items, One Lot Cut Emerald Stones, and 89 Firearms, the 
Court reasoned that it has had a history of viewing in rem 
forfeitures subsequent to a criminal proceeding as not violative  
of double jeopardy because they do not impose punishment.   
 
Ursery analyzes the defendant's double jeopardy claim under 
the two-prong Ward test advocated by the Court in 89 Firearms.  
This decision in Ursery adds another tool for analyzing the 
nature of a statute.  Perhaps more importantly, however, Ursery 
also clarifies and limits the holdings in Halper, Austin, and 
Kurth Ranch.  The Court notes that neither Halper, Austin, nor 
Kurth Ranch was meant to overrule the well-established cases 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
10
involving civil forfeitures.  In fact, the Court explains that 
each of those decisions must be limited in its holding:  
 
In sum, nothing in Halper, Kurth Ranch, or Austin, 
purported to replace our traditional understanding that 
civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for the 
purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Congress long 
has 
authorized the 
Government to 
bring 
parallel 
criminal proceedings and civil forfeiture proceedings, 
and this Court consistently has found civil forfeitures 
not to constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.  It would have been quite remarkable for this 
Court both to have held unconstitutional a well-
established practice, and to have overruled a long line 
of precedent, without having even suggested that it was 
doing so.  Halper dealt with in personam civil 
penalties under the Double Jeopardy Clause; Kurth Ranch 
with a tax proceeding under the Double Jeopardy Clause; 
and Austin with civil forfeitures under the Excessive 
Fines Clause.  None of those cases dealt with the 
subject of this case: in rem civil forfeitures for 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Ursery, __ U.S. __, 116 S.Ct. at 2147 (emphasis added). 
 
The situation in the case at bar is not identical to that in 
any of the cited Supreme Court cases.  Wisconsin Statutes § 
343.305 does not fall squarely into any of the categories set out 
in Ursery:  it is not a civil penalty as in Halper; it is not a 
tax as in Kurth Ranch; it has nothing to do with the Excessive 
Fines Clause as in Austin; and it is not quite a civil forfeiture 
as in Ursery.  However, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(7) and (8) is most 
similar in character and in purpose to an in rem civil forfeiture 
“designed primarily to confiscate property used in violation of 
the law” to protect society from harm.  See Ursery, __ U.S. __, 
116 S. Ct. at 2145.  Consequently, this court will proceed under 
the two-prong Ward analysis as advocated in 89 Firearms and 
Ursery to determine both the legislative intent and the punitive 
or remedial nature of the statute.  An exploration of the statute 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
11
itself and its history in light of Wisconsin case law is 
instructive in this regard.  
 
Whether a criminal prosecution for drunk driving offenses 
after the 
administrative 
suspension 
of 
driving 
privileges 
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause is an issue of first 
impression in Wisconsin.  However, this court has had the 
opportunity to explore similar challenges to other statutes under 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Most recently, this court faced a 
double jeopardy challenge to civil commitments under Wisconsin's 
Sexually 
Violent 
Person 
Commitments 
statute 
in 
State 
v. 
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).  In Carpenter, 
the court held that double jeopardy is not violated where the 
parties were convicted of sex offenses and later faced civil 
commitment proceedings, because the principal purposes of the 
commitment were to protect the public and to treat the offenders.   
The Carpenter court adopted the standard for determining 
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause has been violated from State 
v. Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d 243, 340 N.W.2d 470 (1983).  In 
Killebrew, the court held that administrative discipline for an 
escape from prison does not preclude criminal prosecution for the 
same incident because the administrative action does not 
constitute punishment. The court noted that “[g]overnmental 
action is punishment under the double jeopardy clause if its 
principal purpose is punishment, retribution or deterrence. When 
the principal purpose is nonpunitive, the fact that a punitive 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
12
motive may also be present does not make the action punishment.”
5 
Id. at 251.  Applying this standard, the court in Carpenter 
explains that “a civil sanction is violative of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause if it 'may not fairly be characterized as 
remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.'”  Carpenter, 
197 Wis. 2d at 264, quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.   
While it is accepted in Wisconsin that civil sanctions can 
constitute punishment, the analysis centers on whether the 
sanction is “'so extreme and so divorced from the Government's 
damages and expenses as to constitute punishment' to which double 
jeopardy can attach.”  State v. Thierfelder, 174 Wis. 2d 213, 
228, 495 N.W.2d 669 (1993), quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 442.  In 
Thierfelder, this court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did 
not 
bar 
criminal 
prosecution 
for 
two 
offenses 
involving 
intoxicated use of a motor vehicle subsequent to a civil judgment 
in a municipal traffic ordinance action arising from the same 
incident.  The court explained that the defendant failed to 
demonstrate that the civil sanctions could be characterized as 
criminal penalties.  Thierfelder, 174 Wis. 2d at 229.   
Perhaps the best way to determine whether a statute is 
criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial, is through an 
analysis under the two-prong Ward test as advocated by the 
Supreme Court in 89 Firearms and Ursery.  Even before Ursery was 
                     
5 The ultimate holding of State v. Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d 
243, 340 N.W.2d 470 (1983), was superseded by a statutory change 
eliminating “statutory good time.”  See State v. Fonder, 162 Wis. 
2d 591, 595, 469 N.W.2d 922 (Ct. App. 1991).  However, the 
“principal purpose” test applied in Killebrew has not been 
affected.   
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
13
decided, this court adopted the Ward test to analyze double 
jeopardy challenges.  See Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 264;  State 
v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 114, 369 N.W.2d 145 (1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985). Applying this test to the case at 
hand, this court must consider 1) whether the legislature 
intended Wis. Stat. § 343.305 to be a remedial civil sanction, 
and 2) whether there are aspects of Wis. Stat. §  343.305 that 
are so punitive either in effect or nature as to render the 
overall purpose to be one of punishment.   
In applying the first prong of the test to Wis. Stat. § 
343.305, this court may consider the intent of the legislature, 
the legislative history of the statute, and the historical 
treatment of the statute by the courts.  See Ursery, __ U.S. __, 
116 S. Ct. 2135.  While there is no express legislative intent 
contained within the statute itself, the history of the statute 
clearly indicates the legislature's intent that Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305 serve as a remedial civil sanction.  For example, when 
administrative revocation was first proposed, the Department of 
Transportation was directed to study the feasibility and the 
likely 
results 
of 
administrative 
license 
revocation 
or 
suspension.  Comparing the proposed Wisconsin law to the similar, 
existing Minnesota law, the report noted that in the first six 
years of the implementation of the program, alcohol-related 
revocations increased from 14,000 to 36,000, and traffic deaths 
decreased from 3.00 to 1.98 per million miles traveled.  
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Administrative revocation 
of drunk drivers in Wisconsin: a legislative report, at 5 (1985).   
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
14
The report asserts that “there may be other factors that 
contributed to these documented improvements in highway safety, 
but administrative revocation was definitely a positive factor 
and played a significant role.”  Id.  The report later asserts 
that many other states have experienced improvements in highway 
safety 
after 
adopting 
administrative 
revocation 
programs, 
pointing out that Iowa had a 15 percent decrease in nighttime 
drunk driving fatalities, and Oklahoma saw a 20 percent decrease 
in fatalities and a 41 percent decrease in all drinking-related 
incidents. Id. at 7-8.  Finally, the report explains that other 
states have experienced increased levels of drunk driving 
enforcement without correlating increases in law enforcement 
personnel as a result of their administrative revocation 
programs.  The report states that “[t]his increase resulted from 
a general feeling among law enforcement officers that their 
efforts in enforcing the OWI law had a direct, visible and 
positive impact on highway safety.”  Id. at 9. 
The results of the DOT report clearly indicate that the 
passage of Wis. Stat. § 343.305 was aimed toward promoting public 
highway safety, but further support of this goal can be found in 
the legislative drafting file for this statute.  In a letter 
found in the drafting file written on January 12, 1987, a defense 
attorney admits that the new drunk driving laws such as those 
contained in Wis. Stat. §  343.305 serve the important remedial 
goal of protecting public safety.  The author writes that 
“[a]lthough we already represent persons charged with drunk 
driving, we have generally supported these changes as necessary 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
15
for public safety.”  Letter from Steven P. Doyle, Attorney at 
Law, to John Medinger (January 12, 1987) (found in drafting file 
for 1987 Wis. Act 3).  The letter further notes that the “law is 
good in theory because it gets drunk drivers off the road.”  Id.  
The statute was intended by the legislature to serve as a civil 
remedial sanction to protect innocent people on the highways.  A 
February 9, 1987, analysis of the bill just four days after it 
was passed indicates that the administrative license suspension 
will be effective because it accomplishes the same purpose as the 
former method of pretrial loss by judicial review “without the 
court backlog and delay problems.”  Memorandum from the Assistant 
General Counsel for the Wisconsin Department of Transportation to 
the Act 337 Technical Committee Members (February 9, 1987) (found 
in drafting file for 1987 Wis. Act 3).   
Finally, we conclude that the legislature intended Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305 as a civil remedial sanction because of the 
historical treatment of the statute by this court.  This court 
has noted in several cases that the policy behind Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305 is “to facilitate the identification of drunken drivers 
and their removal from the highways.”  State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 
2d 191, 193, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980).  Accord State v. Nordness, 
128 Wis. 2d 15, 27, n.5, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986).  This court also 
agreed that the statute serves this remedial goal in State v. 
Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 359, 335 N.W.2d 354 (1983), concluding 
that the general purpose behind laws relating to operating while 
under the influence of intoxicants is “to get drunk drivers off 
the road as expeditiously as possible and with as little possible 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
16
disruption of the court's calendar.”  Id. at 359.  Although these 
cases were all decided prior to the passage of the administrative 
license suspension provisions of Wis. Stat. § 343.305, they speak 
to the overarching goal of all drunk driving laws in this state.  
Considering the legislative history of the statute and its 
historical treatment by this court, we conclude that the 
legislature intended the administrative license suspension, Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(7) and (8), to serve as a civil remedial 
sanction. 
Despite the obvious remedial purpose of the statute, this 
court would be remiss to pretend that the administrative license 
suspension does not serve some deterrent effects.  However, the 
test is not whether the statute serves some deterrent or punitive 
goals; rather, the inquiry involves determining whether the 
statute is so punitive in nature or effect as to render it 
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  See 
Ursery, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.  McMaster argues that the 
suspension of his driving privileges is extremely punitive in 
nature.  Given the nature of the problem addressed by Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305, drunk driving, the interest the government has in 
removing the driver from the road is compelling.  The fact that 
the administrative license suspension also inconveniences the 
defendant and might act as a deterrent is inconsequential to the 
overall purpose of public safety.   
In State v. Schulz, 100 Wis. 2d 329, 302 N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 
1981), the court held that a finding of guilt for violating a 
county ordinance does not bar criminal prosecution on the 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
17
homicide by intoxicated user charge.  The court explained that 
Schulz could lose his license, be forced to attend driver safety 
school, and be imprisoned for failure to pay his forfeiture, all 
in addition to the original forfeiture.  However, “[t]hese 
penalties are not so punitive in purpose or effect to negate the 
intent of the legislature.”  Id. at 331.  The court proceeds to 
state that “[l]oss of license . . . is not so punitive as to 
cause us to conclude that jeopardy should attach.”  Id.   
The statute serves to protect the safety of all who travel 
on Wisconsin's public streets and highways.  It is not intended 
primarily as a punishment, and its effects are not so punitive as 
to render it as such.
6  There are adequate procedural guidelines 
                     
6 Cases decided in other jurisdictions in recent years 
overwhelmingly 
have 
recognized 
that 
administrative 
license 
suspension following a drunk driving arrest or refusal to submit 
to required testing is primarily remedial in purpose and effect 
so that a subsequent criminal prosecution does not violate double 
jeopardy.  See Allen v. Attorney General of Maine, 80 F.3d 569, 
577 (1st Cir. 1996) (administrative license suspension under 
Maine law “represents a reasonable effort to protect the public 
from motorists who have demonstrated a dangerous propensity to 
drink before they drive;” because sanction is primarily remedial, 
subsequent criminal prosecution is not barred on double jeopardy 
grounds).  Accord United States v. Imngren, __ F.3d __, 1996 WL 
614637 (4th Cir. 1996); State v. Reichenberg, 915 P.2d 14 (Idaho 
1996); State v. Kocher, 542 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa 1996); State v. 
Hanson, 543 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1996); State v. Mayo, 915 S.W.2d 758 
(Mo. 1996), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 61 (1996); State 
V. Gustafson, 668 N.E.2d 435 (Ohio 1996); State v. Hickman, 668 
A.2d 1321 (Conn. 1995), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 1851 
(1996); State v. Higa, 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Haw. 1995); State v. 
Funke, 531 N.W.2d 124, 126-27 (Iowa 1995); State v. Jones, 666 
A.2d 128 (Md. 1995), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 1265 
(1996); Luk v. Commonwealth, 658 N.E.2d 664 (Mass. 1995); State 
v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1995); State ex rel. Schwartz 
v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 1044 (N.M. 1995); State v. Zimmerman, 539 
N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 1995).  
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
18
in place to ensure that the defendant will not face undue 
“punishment.”  After a person's license has been administratively 
suspended, he or she is entitled to an administrative hearing to 
review the suspension within 30 days after the person files a 
notice with the Department of Transportation.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(8)(b).  Additionally, “a person aggrieved by the 
determination of the hearing examiner may have the determination 
reviewed by the court hearing the action” related to the 
suspension.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(8)(c)1 and 2.  If the person is 
not happy with the circuit court decision, he or she may appeal 
to the court of appeals, and a person not happy with a municipal 
court determination may appeal to the circuit court. Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(8)(c)3.  Finally, any person who has his or her license 
administratively suspended under Wis. Stat. § 343.305 may apply 
for 
an 
occupational 
license 
at 
any 
time. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(8)(d).  These protections indicate that the purpose of 
the statute is not to punish drunk drivers, but simply to keep 
drunk drivers off the roads for the safety and well-being of the 
general public.  
As previously noted, the burden to rebut the presumption of 
constitutionality falls on McMaster in this case.  In Killebrew, 
                                                                  
See also Butler v. Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 
609 So. 2d 790, 795-97 (acknowledging that while license 
suspension statute is to some extent deterrent and thus punitive, 
its primary effect is remedial); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 
513-14 (Vt. 1992) (although there is an element of deterrence in 
the administrative license suspension provisions, it is not the 
primary purpose of the statutory scheme); State v. O'Brien, 609 
A.2d 981 (Vt. 1992).  But see, People v. Uzquiano, 642 N.Y.S.2d 
769 (N.Y.Just. Ct. 1996); Seven Hills v. Adkins, 658 N.E.2d 828 
(Ohio Mun. 1995). 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
19
Thierfelder, Kramsvogel, and Carpenter, this court has rejected 
the defendants' challenges to civil statutes as violative of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  In all of these cases, the court found 
that the defendant had failed to meet his or her burden of 
proving that the statute had a criminal or punitive purpose, 
nature, or effect.  Just like the defendants in those cases, 
McMaster has “failed to show that the principal purpose of the 
statute [Wis. Stat. § 343.305] is punishment, retribution, or 
deterrence so as to render it punishment.”  See Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d at 272.  Further, McMaster has “failed to show that the 
statute has sufficient punitive characteristics” to take it out 
of the realm of a remedial civil sanction and to render it 
punishment.  See id.  
Based on a careful application of the two-prong Ward test, 
we conclude that the legislature intended Wis. Stat. § 343.305 to 
serve as a civil remedial sanction.  We further conclude that the 
statute is not so punitive in effect and nature as to render it 
punishment for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis.  For these 
reasons, we affirm the court of appeals and hold that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution does not prohibit the criminal prosecution of the 
defendant 
for 
violations 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 
346.63 
and 
346.65, subsequent to the administrative suspension of his 
driving privileges under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(7) and (8).  
 
By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  95-1159-CR 
 
 
20
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
95-1159-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Peter J. McMaster, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  198 Wis. 2d 542, 543 N.W.2d 499 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
December 13, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
October 31, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
 
J. MAC DAVIS 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Daniel P. Fay, Joseph M. Amidon and Law Firm of Daniel 
P. Fay, S.C., Pewaukee and oral argument by Joseph M. Amidon and 
Daniel P. Fay.  
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Maureen 
McGlynn Flanagan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.