Case Title: State v. Longworth

Citation: 438 S.E.2d 219

Docket Number: 

State: south-carolina

Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1993-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
438 S.E.2d 219 (1993) The STATE, Respondent, v. Richard LONGWORTH, Appellant. No. 23943. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard June 8, 1993. Decided October 25, 1993. Rehearing Denied January 5, 1994. *220 South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense and John H. Blume, of South Carolina Death Penalty Resource Center, Columbia, for appellant. Attorney Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and Asst. Atty. Gen. Norman Mark Rapoport, Columbia, and Sol. Holman C. Gossett, Spartanburg, for respondent. MOORE, Justice: Appellant was convicted of kidnapping, armed robbery, and two counts of murder in connection with the deaths of Alex Hopps and James Todd Greene, employees of the Westgate Mall Cinema in Spartanburg. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murders and kidnapping plus twenty-five years for armed robbery.[1] We affirm. Appellant moved for a change of venue based on pre-trial publicity. The State agreed appellant should not be tried by a Spartanburg County jury and consented to selection of a jury in another county pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 17-21-85 (Supp. 1992). This statute provides in part: The trial judge ruled that jury selection would be held in York County and the jury transported to Spartanburg for trial. Appellant objected to this procedure "based upon the inherent psychological pressure which jurors would face if they are essentially taken from their homes and brought to this county where everyone around them knows something about the case ... and they are the only ones who don't." A motion for change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and his ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse thereof. State v. Caldwell, 300 S.C. 494, 388 S.E.2d 816 (1990); State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982). Transfer of a jury pursuant to § 17-21-85 is similar in effect to a change of venue and is subject to the same scope of review. Further, it is the defendant's burden to demonstrate actual juror prejudice as a result of pre-trial publicity. State v. Caldwell, supra. Here, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's decision to transfer a jury to Spartanburg pursuant to § 17-21-85. Appellant has failed to show the jury was tainted by any actual juror prejudice from pretrial publicity. Appellant further contends the trial judge failed to consider the statutory factors necessary to transfer a jury pursuant to § 17-21-85. The statute requires the trial judge consider: In this case, fifty-eight witnesses from the Spartanburg area were noticed to testify at trial. We hold the record supports the trial judge's finding that transferring a jury was the least expensive and most convenient alternative to afford appellant a fair and impartial jury. Appellant complains the trial judge improperly limited his voir dire of venireman Billy Poore, a retired highway patrolman. Appellant attempted to ask him whether he would "tend to give more credibility to the testimony of a police officer than you would to the defendant or a civilian witness?" Appellant also claims he would have asked the same question of venireman Keith Pruett who was the son of a retired highway patrolman. Neither Mr. Poore nor Mr. Pruett was seated on the jury since appellant exercised two of his peremptory strikes to remove them.[2] In reviewing a challenge to juror qualification, we focus on those jurors who are seated to determine whether a defendant received a fair trial. State v. Green, 301 S.C. 347, 392 S.E.2d 157 (1990). Here, appellant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice since the two veniremen he would have questioned were not seated. Moreover, there is no error in disallowing questions regarding the weight a juror would give one witness over another. State v. Davis, ___ S.C. ___, 422 S.E.2d 133 (1992). Appellant contends potential juror Linda Hall was erroneously disqualified because of her reluctance to vote for a death sentence. In a capital case, a juror may not be excluded for his or her attitude against capital punishment unless it would render *222 that juror unable to return a verdict according to law. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(E) (Supp.1992). The standard is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror. State v. Green, supra. The determination whether a juror is qualified or disqualified to serve in a capital case is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed on appeal unless wholly unsupported by the evidence. Id.; State v. Plemmons, 286 S.C. 78, 332 S.E.2d 765 (1985). Further, in reviewing the trial judge's qualification or disqualification of prospective jurors, the responses of a challenged juror must be examined in light of the entire voir dire. State v. Green, supra; State v. Spann, 279 S.C. 399, 308 S.E.2d 518 (1983). Here, Ms. Hall stated because she had a son appellant's age (twenty-two), she would find it "very difficult" to impose the death penalty on a young person. She stated she could not vote for death in this case and responded to defense counsel's further questioning as follows: We find the record supports the disqualification of Ms. Hall on the ground her views would substantially impair her performance as a juror since, contrary to her views, age is not a bar to capital punishment in this case. Because Ms. Hall could not consider imposition of a penalty allowed by law, she was properly excused. Appellant contends veniremen Steve Penland and Kay Johnson were improperly disqualified because of their reluctance to impose a death sentence on a non-triggerman. Ms. Johnson stated she could not vote for death no matter what the degree of the defendant's involvement. Mr. Penland stated during the course of questioning that he "probably could" consider it but then finally responded: We find the record of the voir dire as a whole supports the trial judge's ruling these jurors were disqualified because their views would substantially impair their performance as jurors. Major participation in the crimes committed combined with reckless indifference to human life is sufficient culpability to impose the death penalty upon a defendant liable for murder under a theory of accomplice liability. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1987). Since neither juror could consider imposition of a death sentence allowed by law, they were properly excused. The murders in this case occurred on the night of January 7, 1991. An off-duty employee, David Hopkins, returned to the Westgate Mall Cinema and found no employees *223 present although films were still being shown. The body of nineteen-year-old Alex Hopps was discovered behind the theatre outside an exit door. He had been shot at close range in the left temple. When Hopkins arrived at the theatre he had seen and recognized appellant's co-defendant, David Rocheville, rummaging through James Greene's car in the parking lot.[3] Greene was the other employee on duty with Alex Hopps and he was missing from the theatre. Police arrested Rocheville at 5:00 a.m. the next morning. A few hours later, Rocheville led police to the body of James Greene which was found in a shallow ditch on the side of a rural road several miles from the cinema. Appellant was arrested later that day. Appellant consented to be interviewed by police officers after waiving his rights. At the end of the interview, Chief Murray prepared the following statement from his notes: When asked to sign this statement, appellant declined saying he wanted an attorney to read it first. The statement was admitted at trial during Chief Murray's testimony. The Solicitor then asked Murray if he recalled anything else not included in the statement and Murray responded: Appellant objected and the trial judge sent the jury out. Appellant then complained he had never received notice of any statement to the effect that he knew what was going to happen before Rocheville killed Alex Hopps. The trial judge questioned Chief Murray himself and determined that such a statement was not included in Murray's notes. *225 The trial judge then called the jury back and gave the following instruction: Appellant claims the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a mistrial because the Solicitor knowingly attempted to use false testimony and the curative instruction was not sufficient to cure the prejudice. We find the record of the trial judge's colloquy with the Solicitor indicates the Solicitor did not know Chief Murray was going to testify as he did. Further, the curative instruction was clearly sufficient to ensure the jury did not attribute Chief Murray's statement to appellant. Appellant complains, however, he was prejudiced because the trial judge told the jury it was Chief Murray's "interpretation" of what appellant had said, thereby giving the statement "the imprimatur of credibility." An instruction to disregard incompetent evidence is usually deemed to cure any error in its admission. State v. Dawkins, 297 S.C. 386, 377 S.E.2d 298 (1989). Here, the trial judge emphatically told the jury to totally disregard the challenged testimony. Even if the jury could have inferred from the trial judge's instruction that Chief Murray's "interpretation" was valid, we find no prejudice. Under a theory of accomplice liability, it is immaterial whether appellant knew beforehand that Rocheville was going to shoot Hopps. See, State v. Bell, 305 S.C. 11, 406 S.E.2d 165 (1991) (accomplice liability applies to murder which is natural and probable consequence of armed robbery). Nor is such knowledge material to imposition of the death penalty under the law set forth in Tison v. Arizona, supra. Accordingly, we find no error. Appellant contends the trial judge erred in failing to include the element of intent in his charge on kidnapping. Appellant made no request nor objected to the charge given and this issue is therefore not properly before us. In any event, the trial judge did state that to constitute kidnapping a carrying away must be "with a purpose to violate the law." See State v. Ferguson, 302 S.C. 269, 395 S.E.2d 182 (1990) (equating "purpose" and "intent"). Appellant contends the trial judge's charge on reasonable doubt in both phases of the trial did not comply with this Court's decision in State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E.2d 372 (1991). The charge given in this case suffers none of the infirmities found in Manning to improperly allow a lessened degree of proof. See also, State v. Baker, ___ S.C. ___, 424 S.E.2d 492 (1992) (reversible error to charge reasonable doubt as "strong uncertainty"). Nor did we mandate in Manning that a specific charge be given. Accordingly, we find no error here. Appellant contends the trial judge erred in refusing his request that the jury be charged not to speculate whether the sentence imposed would deter others. We recently held in State v. Simmons, ___ S.C. ___, 427 S.E.2d 175 (1993), that the propriety of this charge need not be considered where the State does not argue deterrence. Here the Solicitor did not mention general *226 deterrence. We find no error in the refusal of appellant's requested charge. Further, appellant contends the trial judge improperly limited his closing argument regarding general deterrence. Counsel argued: At this point, the Solicitor objected. The trial judge then ruled: Appellant claims disallowing his argument regarding general deterrence is error under "principles of fundamental fairness" in view of our previous decisions allowing the Solicitor to argue general deterrence. See State v. Truesdale, 301 S.C. 546, 393 S.E.2d 168 (1990); State v. Jones, 298 S.C. 118, 378 S.E.2d 594 (1989); State v. Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982). While we decline to reconsider at this time the propriety of allowing argument regarding general deterrence, we hold the restriction of appellant's argument in this case resulted in no fundamental unfairness since the trial judge permitted neither the Solicitor nor appellant to argue it. We find no reversible error. Appellant's remaining exceptions are affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR. Issue 6: State v. Davis, ___ S.C. ___, 422 S.E.2d 133 (1992); Issue 9: State v. Rocheville, ___ S.C. ___, 425 S.E.2d 32 (1993); Issue 10: State v. Rocheville, supra; Issue 11: State v. Davis, supra; Issue 12: State v. Green, 301 S.C. 347, 392 S.E.2d 157 (1990). We have conducted the mandatory review provided in S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (1985) and conclude the sentence is not arbitrary, successive, or disproportionate and the evidence supports the finding of aggravating circumstances. AFFIRMED. HARWELL, C.J., and CHANDLER and TOAL, JJ., concur. FINNEY, J., dissents in separate opinion. FINNEY, Justice, (dissenting): For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in State v. Rocheville, ___ S.C. ___, 425 S.E.2d 32 (1993), I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I would remand for a new sentencing proceeding. [1] Appellant's co-defendant, David Rocheville, was convicted in a separate trial and sentenced to death. See State v. Rocheville, ___ S.C. ___, 425 S.E.2d 32 (1993). [2] Appellant exercised only seven of the ten strikes permitted him under S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1110 (Supp.1992). [3] Both appellant and Rocheville were former employees of the theatre owner.