Case Title: Commonwealth v. Fredette

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11931

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11931 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOHN FREDETTE. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     November 7, 2017. - July 13, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Kidnapping. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 15, 2012. 
 
 
The case was tried before Janet Kenton-Walker, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on September 23, 2015, was heard 
by her. 
 
 
 
Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Joseph A. Hanofee for the defendant. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In 2014, a Superior Court jury convicted the 
defendant, John Fredette, of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of felony-murder, with aggravated kidnapping as the 
2 
 
 
predicate felony.1  The jury based their finding of aggravated 
kidnapping on the third paragraph of the current version of the 
kidnapping statute, which punishes a kidnapping committed "while 
armed with a dangerous weapon and inflict[ing] serious bodily 
injury thereby upon another person."  G. L. c. 265, § 26, third 
par. 
The defendant appealed and, after his appeal was entered in 
this court, he filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the 
trial judge erred in not providing a merger doctrine instruction 
to the jury sua sponte.  As discussed infra, the merger doctrine 
limits the application of the felony-murder rule by requiring 
the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant committed or 
attempted to commit a felony that is independent of the conduct 
necessary to cause the victim's death.  This prevents every 
assault that results in a homicide from serving as the predicate 
for felony-murder.  The defendant claimed that because a single 
act of violence (a shooting) caused the victim's death and 
satisfied an element of the aggravated kidnapping, the felony of 
aggravated kidnapping merged with the killing and could not 
serve as the predicate for felony-murder.  The motion judge, who 
was also the trial judge, agreed.  The judge concluded that a 
new trial was required because the omission of an instruction on 
                                                          
 
 
1 The jury did not find the defendant guilty of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. 
3 
 
 
merger created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
The Commonwealth appealed from that ruling, which is the matter 
presently before us.2  We conclude that because the underlying 
predicate felony -- kidnapping -- has an intent or purpose 
separate and distinct from the act causing physical injury or 
death, aggravated kidnapping is sufficiently independent of the 
resulting homicide and, therefore, the merger doctrine is 
inapplicable.  Accordingly, the omission of a merger instruction 
was not an error, and the defendant's motion for a new trial 
should not have been granted on that ground. 
In the course of deciding the Commonwealth's appeal, 
however, we discovered that the current version of the 
kidnapping statute, G. L. c. 265, § 26, under which the 
defendant was prosecuted, is materially different from the 
version that was in effect when the killing occurred in 1994. 
Specifically, in 1994, G. L. c. 265, § 26, did not include the 
form of aggravated kidnapping that the Commonwealth relied on as 
the predicate for murder in the first degree on a theory of 
felony-murder (i.e., kidnapping aggravated by being armed with a 
dangerous weapon and inflicting serious bodily injury on the 
                                                          
 
2 At our request, the parties submitted additional briefing 
concerning whether the merger doctrine is applicable to the 
predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping. 
4 
 
 
victim).3  Moreover, G. L. c. 265, § 26, as it existed in 1994, 
carried a maximum sentence of ten years in prison and, as it 
relates to the defendant's case, could not have supported a 
conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-
murder because it was not a felony punishable by up to life 
imprisonment (i.e., a life felony).  The Commonwealth now 
acknowledges that, because of this error, the defendant's 
conviction of murder in the first degree cannot stand.  
Accordingly, we also vacate the defendant's conviction of murder 
in the first degree and remand the case to the trial judge to 
determine whether, on this record, a conviction of murder in the 
second degree should enter or whether the defendant is entitled 
to a new trial.4 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts the jury 
could have found as set forth by the judge in her written 
decision on the defendant's motion, supplemented with 
uncontroverted testimony from trial.  On the evening of February 
15, 1994, the victim walked out of a bar in Worcester, leaving 
                                                          
 
3 At our request, the parties submitted additional briefing 
concerning whether this discrepancy constituted an ex post facto 
violation and, if so, what would be the appropriate disposition 
for the defendant's appeal. 
 
 
4 If the Superior Court judge determines that a new trial is 
warranted, we note that, as discussed in note 9, infra, 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 807 (2017), eliminated 
felony-murder in the second degree as a theory of murder for 
cases tried after Brown was decided. 
5 
 
 
behind his favorite Boston Celtics jacket, house keys, a package 
of cigarettes, and an unfinished beer.  He was never seen again.  
The victim's disappearance remained unsolved for eighteen years.  
On February 15, 2012, a Worcester County grand jury returned an 
indictment charging the defendant with murder.  Matteo Trotto 
and Elias Samia, two of the defendant's cohorts in his illegal 
drug operation, were also indicted for the murder.5 
 
The defendant had been arrested for trafficking in cocaine 
a few months before the victim disappeared, following an 
undercover investigation into the defendant's drug operation.  
The defendant and Trotto believed that the victim might have 
been the informant who provided the police with information 
leading to the defendant's arrest.  To evade conviction, the 
defendant and Trotto concocted a scheme to have the victim 
testify on the defendant's behalf and offer an exculpatory, 
perjured story.  According to this plan, the victim would 
testify that he was the confidential informant who provided the 
information to the police that established probable cause to 
arrest the defendant, and explain that the information he 
provided was false.  To ensure that the victim would testify, 
the defendant and Trotto gave him copious amounts of cocaine, 
while also threatening his life. 
                                                          
 
 
5 Matteo Trotto and Elias Samia were tried separately and 
were both convicted.  Their appeals are currently pending. 
6 
 
 
 
On the day of the defendant's trial, the victim never 
appeared in court to testify.  As a result, on February 14, 
1994, the defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced offense.  He was 
sentenced to a State prison sentence, but execution of that 
sentence was stayed. 
 
On the evening of February 15, 1994, the victim was sitting 
in the bar when Trotto appeared, coaxed the victim outside, and 
ushered him into a motor vehicle occupied by the defendant and 
Samia.  Soon after the victim entered the vehicle, the defendant 
and Samia began severely beating him.  In the course of the 
beating, Samia shot and killed the victim.  The defendant, 
Samia, and Trotto buried the victim's body in a shallow grave.  
The victim's body was never recovered. 
 
2.  The jury instructions.  Insofar as relevant here, the 
judge instructed the jury on murder in the first degree as a 
joint venturer on the theories of deliberate premeditation and 
felony-murder, with aggravated kidnapping as the predicate 
felony.6  Specifically, she instructed the jury that the 
Commonwealth had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that 
                                                          
 
6 Although the defendant was not charged separately with 
aggravated kidnapping, likely because the statute of limitations 
had expired, the Commonwealth relied on it as the predicate 
felony for the prosecution of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of felony-murder. 
7 
 
 
"the defendant committed the kidnapping while armed 
with a dangerous weapon and inflicted serious bodily 
injury against [the victim], or knowingly participated 
with Matteo Trotto and Elias Samia in doing so, with 
the knowledge that Elias Samia possessed a weapon and 
that the defendant knew Elias Samia would or could use 
that weapon in the commission of the crime." 
 
See G. L. c. 265, § 26, third par.7 
 
 
The judge also instructed the jury that the Commonwealth 
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the kidnapping while armed with a dangerous weapon and 
that a firearm was a dangerous weapon.8  The defendant did not 
request a merger instruction, and the judge did not provide such 
an instruction sua sponte.  The jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder. 
3.  The defendant's motion for a new trial.  Although the 
defendant did not request a merger instruction at trial, he 
contended in his motion for a new trial that the trial judge's 
                                                          
 
7 The Commonwealth did not request an instruction on 
aggravated kidnapping under G. L. c. 265, § 26, second par., and 
such an instruction was not provided.  In contrast to aggravated 
kidnapping under the third paragraph of G. L. c. 265, § 26, 
aggravated kidnapping under the second paragraph of G. L. 
c. 265, § 26, would have been required the Commonwealth to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt only that the defendant committed a 
kidnapping "while armed with a firearm, rifle, shotgun, machine 
gun or assault weapon," or knowing that Elias Samia was so 
armed. 
 
8 The jury also were instructed on murder in the second 
degree as a lesser included offense of murder in the first 
degree committed by deliberate premeditation and felony-murder 
in the second degree as a lesser included offense of felony-
murder in the first degree. 
8 
 
 
failure to provide the instruction, sua sponte, created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Specifically, he 
claimed that because a single act of violence (the shooting) 
caused the victim's death and thus completed an element of 
aggravated kidnapping (inflicting serious bodily injury), the 
felony of aggravated kidnapping merged with the killing and 
could not have served as the predicate for felony-murder.  As 
mentioned, the judge agreed, and the Commonwealth appealed from 
that ruling. 
Discussion.  We review the disposition of a motion for a 
new trial to determine whether there has been "a significant 
error of law or other abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).  We conclude that the judge 
erred in granting the defendant's motion for a new trial because 
the intent or purpose underlying the felony of aggravated 
kidnapping was separate and distinct from the assault that 
resulted in the homicide; thus, the merger doctrine was 
inapplicable. 
Before we explain the reasons for our conclusion, we 
reiterate the analytical framework required to determine whether 
a felony merges with a subsequent killing, as it applies to 
cases tried prior to Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 807 
(2017), where this court prospectively abolished the concept of 
9 
 
 
constructive malice, which in turn eliminated our common-law 
felony-murder rule as an independent theory of murder.9 
                                                          
 
9 After Brown, 477 Mass. at 807, "felony-murder" serves only 
to enhance a murder occurring during the commission of a life 
felony to a murder in the first degree.  Id. at 832 (Gants, 
C.J., concurring).  Although we need not decide whether this 
change renders the merger doctrine obsolete, Brown eliminated 
the perceived injustice of the felony-murder rule that the 
merger doctrine was designed to mitigate.  Id. at 831 (Gants, 
C.J., concurring).  In Brown, we also observed that Michigan had 
already abolished the felony-murder rule under its common law.  
Id. at 833 (Gants, C.J., concurring), citing Commonwealth v. 
Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269, 277 n.9 (2015) (discussing People v. 
Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 727-729 [1980]).  We note that following 
the abolition of the felony-murder rule in Michigan, appellate 
courts in that State have rejected the claim that the merger 
doctrine is still applicable.  See People v. Magyar, 250 Mich. 
App. 408, 411-412 (2002); People v. Jones, 209 Mich. App. 212, 
214-215 (1995).  We did not address this issue in Brown and we 
do not do so here because the merger doctrine is inapplicable to 
aggravated kidnapping. 
 
Were we to assume, without deciding, that the merger 
doctrine is generally obsolete after Brown, a vestige of the 
doctrine would nevertheless apply to certain cases.  Where a 
murder occurred prior to our decision in Brown, but the 
defendant's trial were to begin after our decision in Brown, and 
the Commonwealth were to proceed on a theory of felony-murder 
where the predicate felony did not have an independent purpose 
from the intent to cause physical injury or death (e.g., armed 
assault in a dwelling), the jury should be instructed on the 
merger doctrine -- i.e., that the conduct constituting the 
felony must be separate from the acts of personal violence 
necessary to commit the killing.  A merger instruction in those 
circumstances would protect against possible disparate outcomes, 
e.g., if the case had been tried prior to our decision in Brown.  
If, after having been provided the merger instruction, the jury 
should conclude that the felony merged with the killing, the 
defendant could be found guilty of, at most, murder in the 
second degree (assuming there were no other theories of murder 
in the first degree presented by the Commonwealth).  In those 
circumstances, the defendant could be found guilty only of 
murder in the second degree, but not on a felony-murder theory 
because Brown eliminated felony-murder in the second degree. 
10 
 
 
1.  The merger doctrine.  "The effect of the felony-murder 
rule is to substitute the intent to commit the underlying felony 
for the malice aforethought required for murder.  Thus, the rule 
is one of 'constructive malice.'"  Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 
Mass. 259, 271 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 
Mass. 492, 502 (1982).  The merger doctrine functions as a 
constraint on the application of the felony-murder rule by 
limiting the circumstances in which a felony may serve as the 
predicate for felony-murder.  See Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 
Mass. 415, 430 (2017).  Specifically, the doctrine requires the 
Commonwealth to prove that the defendant committed or attempted 
to commit a felony that is independent of the act necessary for 
the killing.  See Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 519 
(2017); Morin, supra.  This requirement ensures that not every 
assault that results in a death may serve as the predicate for 
felony-murder.  Morin, supra.  Without the merger doctrine, the 
distinction between murder and other homicides would be rendered 
meaningless because all homicides could be enhanced to murder on 
the theory of felony-murder with the assaultive conduct 
preceding the homicide serving as the predicate felony.  Id., 
quoting Gunter, 427 Mass. at 272.  See Morin, supra, citing 
Crump & Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 359, 377 (1985) (merger doctrine prevents 
prosecution from bootstrapping lesser-included homicide offenses 
11 
 
 
into murder).  For this reason, "where the only felony committed 
[apart from the murder itself] was the assault upon the victim 
which resulted in the death of the victim, the assault merge[s] 
with the killing and [cannot] be relied upon by the state as an 
ingredient of a 'felony murder.'"  Commonwealth v. Quigley, 391 
Mass. 461, 466 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985), 
quoting State v. Branch, 244 Or. 97, 100 (1966). 
As detailed infra, determining whether a predicate felony 
merges with the homicide depends on the resolution of two 
distinct inquiries.  First, if the underlying predicate felony 
has an intent or purpose separate and distinct from the act 
causing physical injury or death, the merger doctrine is 
inapplicable, and the felony may serve as the predicate for 
felony-murder; no further analysis is required.  See Holley, 478 
Mass. at 519-520 ("intent to steal does not cause a homicide"); 
Morin, 478 Mass. at 431.  If the felony does not have an 
independent intent or purpose, the second inquiry is whether the 
conduct constituting the felony is separate and distinct from 
the conduct that caused the homicide itself.  See Commonwealth 
v. Kilburn, 438 Mass. 356, 358-359 (2003) (armed assault in 
dwelling).  If the conduct is distinct, the felony does not 
merge with the homicide.  See id. at 359.  However, where the 
underlying felony does not have an independent intent or 
purpose, and the same act that is necessary to complete the 
12 
 
 
felony also causes the homicide, the felony merges with the 
homicide and cannot serve as the predicate for felony-murder.  
Id. 
a.  First inquiry:  whether there is an independent 
felonious purpose.  Determining whether a felony is capable of 
merging with the resulting homicide appears to be a source of 
confusion in our case law.  Compare Commonwealth v. Christian, 
430 Mass. 552, 556-557 (2000) (analyzing intent of underlying 
felony, armed robbery, to determine whether merger applies), 
overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 
Mass. 1 (2002), with Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 299-
303 (2011) (analyzing assaultive element of felony, armed home 
invasion, to determine whether merger applies).  See 
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 646 (2015) 
(analyzing whether and how analytical frameworks set forth in 
Christian, supra, and Bell, supra, can coexist).  We emphasize 
that the merger doctrine analysis must always begin with 
resolving the first inquiry -- whether the underlying felony is 
capable of merging with the killing.  See Holley, 478 Mass. at 
520, citing Morin, 478 Mass. at 430.  The merger doctrine is 
inapplicable to felonies that have an underlying intent or 
purpose separate and distinct from the intent to cause physical 
injury or death.  Holley, supra.  Morin, supra.  See State v. 
Marquez, 376 P.3d 815, 823 (N.M. 2016) ("there must be a 
13 
 
 
felonious purpose that is independent from the purpose of 
endangering the physical health of the victim before the 
dangerous felony can be used" as predicate for felony-murder). 
Determining whether a felony has an intent or purpose 
separate and distinct from the act causing physical injury or 
death requires an objective analysis of the predicate felony, 
which is not influenced by the defendant's subjective motivation 
or intent to commit the underlying felony.  See id. ("a 
dangerous felony may only serve as a predicate to felony murder 
when the elements of any form of the predicate felony -- looked 
at in the abstract -- require a felonious purpose independent 
from the purpose of endangering the physical health of the 
victim").  See also Holley, 478 Mass. at 520; Christian, 430 
Mass. at 556-557.  We further emphasize that this analysis 
focuses on the intent or purpose underlying the predicate 
felony, irrespective of any assaultive element contained in that 
felony.  See Christian, supra (armed robbery does not merge with 
killing because underlying purpose of armed robbery is to steal, 
which is independent of intent to harm victim);  Commonwealth v. 
Wade, 428 Mass. 147, 153 (1998), S.C., 467 Mass. 496 (2014) and 
475 Mass. 54 (2016) (aggravated rape does not merge with killing 
because underlying purpose of rape is independent of assault 
causing serious bodily injury and death).  We examine the 
purpose of the underlying predicate felony, separate from any 
14 
 
 
assaultive element, because it is the intent to commit the 
underlying felony, not the intent to commit an assault, that 
"serves as the substitute for the malice requirement of murder."  
Morin, 478 Mass. at 431, quoting Christian, supra at 556.  See 
Commonwealth v. Prater, 431 Mass. 86, 96-97 (2000) ("The focus 
of the analysis is on the substitution of the intent, not on the 
number of assaults").  Accordingly, a felony with an independent 
purpose, despite containing an element of assault, is not 
capable of merging with the resulting killing.  See Morin, 
supra.  This analytical framework illustrates why we have long 
held that "rape, arson, robbery and burglary are sufficiently 
independent of the homicide, . . . [but] aggravated battery 
toward the deceased will not do for felony murder" (citation 
omitted).  Quigley, 391 Mass. at 466. 
The felony of armed robbery, which this court has analyzed 
on several occasions, further elucidates the importance of 
analyzing the intent or purpose of the underlying felony to 
determine whether the merger doctrine is applicable.  See 
Holley, 478 Mass. at 520; Morin, 478 Mass. at 430-431; Prater, 
431 Mass. at 96-97; Christian, 430 Mass. at 556.  We have 
concluded that the crime of armed robbery is independent of any 
killing that results in the course of the commission or 
attempted commission of that crime because "it is the intent to 
steal, rather than the intent to assault, which is substituted 
15 
 
 
for malice[, and because] intent to steal does not cause a 
homicide, the armed robbery does not merge with the killing."  
Holley, supra.  See Christian, supra (robbery is "[1] stealing 
or taking of personal property of another [2] by force and 
violence, or by assault and putting in fear," and "[r]obbery is 
enhanced to an armed robbery when a defendant is armed").  Even 
where a single act of violence not only completes the armed 
robbery but also causes the victim's death (e.g., a single 
gunshot), armed robbery does not merge with the killing because 
the intent or purpose underlying an armed robbery is the intent 
to steal, not to cause physical injury or death, regardless of 
the eventual outcome of that crime.  See Christian, supra at 
557.  For this reason, "[w]e can envision no situation in which 
an armed robbery would not support a conviction of felony-
murder."  Id. at 556. 
We do not deviate from analyzing the intent or purpose of 
the underlying felony where the crime at issue is an aggravated 
felony and the aggravating element embodies assaultive conduct.  
See Wade, 428 Mass. at 152-153 (rape enhanced to aggravated rape 
where committed during commission of kidnapping or otherwise 
resulted in serious bodily injury to victim).  Although the 
aggravated form of a felony may enhance that crime to a life 
felony, the assaultive component "does not negate the intent to 
commit the [underlying felony] that is the substitute for the 
16 
 
 
malice requirement of murder."  Id. at 153.  See Christian, 430 
Mass. at 556 (although "[r]obbery is enhanced to an armed 
robbery when a defendant is armed," that does not change 
underlying purpose of felony, i.e., to steal).  For example, in 
Wade, supra, the predicate felony was aggravated rape, where the 
pertinent aggravating factor was the infliction of serious 
bodily injury on the victim.  We concluded that the crime of 
aggravated rape did not merge because it was the "intent to 
commit the rape, not the intent to inflict serious bodily harm, 
[that] was the substitute for the malice requirement of murder."  
Id. at 153.  Although the victim died as a result of the serious 
bodily injury she sustained during the rape, we concluded that 
the crime of aggravated rape did not implicate the merger 
doctrine because the intent to rape was separate and distinct 
from the intent to cause physical injury or death.  Id. 
Thus, where a predicate offense has an independent 
felonious purpose separate and distinct from the intent to cause 
physical injury or death, the merger doctrine is inapplicable 
and the felony may serve as the predicate for felony murder. 
b.  Second inquiry:  whether the conduct constituting the 
felony was separate from the conduct necessary to cause the 
homicide.  If the underlying predicate felony does not have an 
independent felonious purpose, the court must then undertake a 
second step in the analysis, to determine whether the felony 
17 
 
 
merges with the killing as a matter of fact.  See, e.g., 
Kilburn, 438 Mass. at 359 (armed assault in dwelling with intent 
to commit felony capable of merging with resulting killing). 
Not all felonies lacking an independent felonious purpose 
necessarily merge with the resulting homicide.  See id. at 358-
360.  A felony does not merge with the killing if "the conduct 
which constitutes the felony [is] 'separate from the acts of 
personal violence which constitute a necessary part of the 
homicide itself.'"  Gunter, 427 Mass. at 272, quoting Quigley, 
391 Mass at 466.  Otherwise stated, the predicate felony does 
not merge if the assaultive conduct that constituted the felony 
was separate and distinct from the act of violence necessary to 
complete the killing.  See Kilburn, 438 Mass. at 358-359 (first 
instance of armed assault in dwelling completed before assault 
that killed victim).  Because this is a fact-dependent inquiry, 
we review this portion of the analysis "on a case-by-case basis 
[and] with reference to specific facts."  Id. at 359, quoting 
Gunter, 427 Mass. at 275 n.15.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 
Mass. 815, 820 (2015), quoting Kilburn, supra at 359 (second 
step of analysis "defies categorical analysis" and requires 
examination of particular facts of each case). 
We have determined that armed assault in a dwelling, a 
crime without an independent felonious purpose from the intent 
to cause physical injury or death, may serve as the predicate 
18 
 
 
for felony-murder so long as the conduct that constitutes the 
armed assault (the underlying felony) is separate and distinct 
from the conduct necessary to kill the victim.  Kilburn, 438 
Mass. at 358-359.  In the Kilburn case, the defendant, the 
shooter's coventurer, was convicted of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of felony-murder with armed assault in a 
dwelling as the predicate felony.  Id. at 358.  We observed that 
there were two discrete assaults.  The first assault occurred 
when one assailant opened the victim's apartment door, 
brandished a firearm, and pushed the victim backward into the 
apartment.  Id.  "After a short interlude, during which the 
gunman ordered . . . the victim about the apartment, the gunman 
shot the victim in the back of the head, thus violating [the 
armed assault in a dwelling statute] a second time."  Id.  We 
concluded that although the second assault (the fatal shooting) 
merged with the killing, the first did not because the first 
assault was completed when the gunman opened the door, 
brandished a firearm, and pushed the victim backward.  Kilburn, 
supra at 358-359.  Because the first violation of the armed 
assault in a dwelling statute was accomplished by separate and 
distinct acts from the conduct necessary to cause the killing, 
the first assault did not merge with the killing and could serve 
as the predicate for felony-murder.  Id. at 359 (victim "died of 
a gunshot wound; he did not die of fright").  Accord 
19 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. at 823-825 (no merger where 
assailant's struggle with victim at front door constituted first 
assault, and subsequent gunshot that killed victim was second 
independent assault).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Stokes, 460 
Mass. 311, 314 n.8 (2011) (armed home invasion could not serve 
as predicate felony because act of pointing gun at victim in 
course of shooting him was not sufficiently separate from 
shooting itself). 
In sum, where the felony at issue does not have an 
independent purpose from the intent to cause bodily injury or 
death, the court must examine whether the act that constituted 
the felony is separate and distinct from the act causing the 
homicide.  If the underlying felony was separate and distinct 
from the homicide, the felony does not merge and may serve as 
the predicate for felony-murder.  In contrast, if the same act 
accomplished both the felony and the killing, the felony merges 
with the killing. 
2.  The motion for a new trial:  whether aggravated 
kidnapping implicates the merger doctrine.  In this case, the 
predicate crime of kidnapping required the Commonwealth to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, "without lawful 
authority, forcibly or secretly confine[d] or imprison[ed] 
another person within this commonwealth against his will."  
G. L. c. 265, § 26, first par.  Kidnapping itself is not a life 
20 
 
 
felony, however, and thus could not have served as the predicate 
for a finding of felony-murder in the first degree.  But 
kidnapping becomes aggravated kidnapping, which is a life 
felony, when the defendant commits the kidnapping, among other 
things, "while armed with a firearm, rifle, shotgun, machine gun 
or assault weapon," § 26, second par., or "while armed with a 
dangerous weapon and inflicts serious bodily injury thereby upon 
another person," § 26, third par.  Neither form of aggravated 
kidnapping implicates merger because the "essential element of 
kidnapping is not the level of violence [or assaultive element] 
but rather the defendant's forcible or secret confinement or 
imprisonment of the victim against his will."  Commonwealth v. 
Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 548 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Robinson, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 329, 334 (1999).  Given that the 
jury here were instructed only on aggravated kidnapping under 
the third paragraph of G. L. c. 265, § 26, the element that 
enhanced kidnapping to a life felony (being armed with a 
dangerous weapon and inflicting serious bodily injury) did not 
negate the intent to commit the kidnapping that is the 
substitute for the malice requirement of murder.  The intent to 
commit the kidnapping (confining or imprisoning another person 
against his or her will), not the infliction of serious bodily 
injury, is what substituted for the malice requirement of 
murder.  See Wade, 428 Mass. at 153.  Because aggravated 
21 
 
 
kidnapping involves an intent independent from the killing, 
neither form of aggravated kidnapping implicates the merger 
doctrine.10   Accordingly, the judge's order allowing the motion 
for new trial must be reversed. 
3.  Defendant's improper conviction of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of felony-murder based on aggravated 
kidnapping.  As discussed supra, the Commonwealth relied on 
aggravated kidnapping as the predicate felony to support the 
defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree based on a 
theory of felony-murder.  The Commonwealth proved aggravated 
kidnapping under G. L. c. 265, § 26, third par. (i.e., 
kidnapping "while armed with a dangerous weapon and inflict[ing] 
serious bodily injury thereby upon another person"), as the 
statute existed at the time of the defendant's trial in 2014.  
However, this theory of aggravated kidnapping (G. L. c. 265, 
§ 26, third par.) did not exist when the defendant committed the 
killing in 1994.  An amendment in 1998 added what are now the 
second and third paragraphs of § 26.  Compare G. L. c. 265, 
§ 26, as amended through St. 1979, c. 465, § 1, with G. L. 
c. 265, § 26, as amended by St. 1998, c. 180, § 63.  Thus, it 
was not until 1998 that either form of aggravated kidnapping 
                                                          
 
10 Because the crime of aggravated kidnapping has an 
independent felonious purpose from the intent to cause physical 
injury or death, the merger doctrine is inapplicable and we need 
not proceed to the second inquiry. 
22 
 
 
discussed herein first appeared in the statute.  G. L. c. 265, 
§ 26, as amended by St. 1998, c. 180, § 63.  Simply stated, the 
defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree was based 
on a predicate felony that did not exist when the killing took 
place in 1994.  Kidnapping under G. L. c. 265, § 26, as it 
existed in 1994, could not serve as the predicate for a murder 
in the first degree conviction because kidnapping by itself, 
i.e., absent any aggravated form, was not then and is not now a 
life felony and carries a maximum sentence of only ten years in 
State prison.11  See Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 387 Mass. 670, 
673 n.1 (1982) (analyzing substantially similar version of G. L. 
c. 265, § 26, predating inclusion of aggravated forms of 
kidnapping in second and third paragraphs of statute). 
We raised this concern on our own initiative, while the 
Commonwealth's appeal from the order granting a new trial was 
under advisement, and we asked the parties to brief it.  The 
Commonwealth concedes that the defendant's conviction of murder 
in the first degree cannot stand.  The defendant's conviction is 
based on a predicate felony that did not exist when the 
defendant committed the killing in 1994.  Since the defendant 
                                                          
 
11 The Commonwealth did not proceed, and on these facts 
could not have proceeded, at trial on a theory that the 
defendant kidnapped the victim "with intent to extort money or 
other valuable[s]," which was an offense punishable by up to 
life imprisonment at the time the offense was committed, see 
G. L. c. 265, § 26, as amended through St. 1979, c. 465, § 1, 
and which was retained in the current version of the statute. 
23 
 
 
committed the crime in 1994, applying G. L. c. 265, § 26, third 
par., as it existed in 2014, would give ex post facto effect to 
the subsequent law.  See Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559, 
564 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Bargeron, 402 Mass. 589, 590 
(1988) ("An ex post facto law is . . . one that 'changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law 
annexed to the crime, when committed'").  See also Johnson v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 694, 699 (2000) (challenged law must 
operate retroactively, i.e., it must apply to conduct completed 
before its enactment, and it must raise penalty from whatever 
law provided when defendant acted). 
We also asked the parties to brief the question of how best 
to dispose of the matter if we were to conclude, as we now do, 
that the conviction of murder in the first degree cannot stand.  
After careful consideration of their suggestions, we conclude 
that the best course is to vacate the verdict of murder in the 
first degree at this time, as if we had discovered the issue in 
the course of considering the defendant's direct appeal pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  It makes little sense, and would 
require an unnecessary expenditure of time and resources, to 
wait for the direct appeal to be briefed and argued before we 
reach what the parties now agree is this inevitable result.  We 
thus remand the case to the trial judge, who is in the best 
position to determine the appropriate next step.  She may order 
24 
 
 
the entry of a finding of a lesser degree of guilt, i.e., murder 
in the second degree based on the predicate felony of kidnapping 
as it existed at the time of the homicide, if the record 
supports it, or she may grant a new trial if that is necessary 
and appropriate in the circumstances.  Neither side will be 
prejudiced by this approach.  The defendant, who has not yet 
briefed his direct appeal in this court, will be able to pursue 
a direct appeal to the Appeals Court if the judge orders the 
entry of a verdict of murder in the second degree, and the 
Commonwealth may of course appeal to the Appeals Court if the 
judge orders a new trial. 
Conclusion.  The order granting a new trial on the basis of 
merger is reversed, and an order shall enter in the Superior 
Court denying the motion on that ground.  Further, as discussed, 
we vacate the defendant's conviction of murder in the first 
degree, because it was predicated on a theory of aggravated 
kidnapping (G. L. c. 265, § 26, third par.) that did not exist 
at the time of the homicide.  We remand the case to the trial 
judge to determine whether a finding of murder in the second 
degree is supported by the record and should be entered, or 
whether a new trial is necessary and appropriate in these 
circumstances.  The docket of the defendant's direct appeal in 
this court will be closed, and each side will be free to proceed 
25 
 
 
in the Appeals Court with any appeal it may have from the 
judge's order on remand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.