Case Title: STEVE B. GLENN V. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0016

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEVE B. GLENN V. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,2008 WY 16176 P.3d 640Case Number: S-07-0016Decided: 02/08/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
STEVE B. 
GLENN,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
UNION PACIFIC 
RAILROAD COMPANY,

a Delaware 
corporation,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

The 
Honorable Nena R. James, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Frederick J. Harrison, Frederick J. 
Harrison, P.C., Rawlins, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Mark C. Hansen, Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, Denver, Colorado; George E. Lemich, Lemich Law Center, Rock 
Springs, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Hansen.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Mr. Glenn 
was injured while closing the "dump doors" of a rail car in a Union Pacific 
Railroad Company coal train.  He 
filed suit, claiming that his injury was the result of the railroad's 
negligence.  The district court 
granted summary judgment in Union Pacific's favor, and Mr. Glenn appealed.  We reverse the district court's 
decision.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]           
The 
single dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred in 
granting Union Pacific's summary judgment motion.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
Mr. Glenn 
was employed at the Black Butte coal mine in SweetwaterCounty.  His regular job was working with 
explosives, but on the night of June 30, 2000, he was asked to work at the coal 
plant, where a Union Pacific coal train was waiting to be loaded.  The train consisted of 102 rail cars, of 
a type that unload through dump doors in the floors of the cars.  When the train arrived at Black Butte, 
the dump doors on approximately 40 of the cars either were open, or were closed 
but not securely locked.1  It seems obvious that coal cannot be 
loaded into a rail car with open doors.  
Less obviously, if coal is loaded into a rail car with closed but 
unlocked doors, the doors might fall open immediately, or later during travel, 
creating a risk of derailment.  It 
is not uncommon for mine employees to close and lock rail car doors before 
loading a coal train.2  

 
 

[¶4]           
Mr. Glenn 
had never before closed rail car doors.  
A co-worker from Black Butte showed him what to do.  Using a pry bar, the two proceeded to 
close the open doors.  To lock the 
closed but unlocked doors, they first opened the doors, then swung them closed 
again to engage the locking mechanism.  
Upon opening the closed but unlocked dump doors, they discovered that 
some of the rail cars contained coking coal (coal processed into small, hard, 
rounded pellets somewhat like charcoal briquettes) that was left over from the 
train's previous cargo.  According 
to Mr. Glenn, when they opened the unlocked doors of one particular car, a 
substantial amount of coking coal spilled out and trapped his right foot in 
place so that, as he fell backward, his right leg was 
broken.

 
 

[¶5]           
Mr. Glenn 
filed suit against Union Pacific, claiming that the railroad's negligence caused 
his injury.  Union Pacific moved for 
summary judgment and the district court granted that motion.  Mr. Glenn appeals the district court's 
decision. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶6]           
The 
district court properly granted summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  We employ a familiar standard when 
reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment:

 
 
The 
propriety of a summary judgment is evaluated

 
 
by 
employing the same standards and by examining the same material as the district 
court. We examine de novo the record, 
in the light most favorable to  the party opposing the motion, affording to 
that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the 
record. If upon review of the record, doubt exists about the presence of issues 
of material fact, that doubt must be resolved against the party seeking summary 
judgment. We accord no deference to the district court's decisions on issues of 
law.

 
 
[Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc.], 
[2005 WY 63,] ¶ 7, 113 P.3d [26,] 28 [(Wyo. 2005)] (citations 
omitted).  "Summary judgment is not 
favored in a negligence action and is, therefore, subject to more exacting 
scrutiny.  We have, however, 
affirmed summary judgment in negligence cases where the record failed to 
establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶ 9, 
113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo. 2005) (citations omitted).

 
 

Jacobson 
v. Cobbs, 2007 
WY 99, ¶ 7, 160 P.3d 654, 656-57 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

[¶7]           
In Natrona County v. Blake, 2003 WY 170, 
¶ 6, 81 P.3d 948, 951 (Wyo. 2003), we listed the following elements of a 
negligence claim:

 
 
(1) The defendant owed the plaintiff 
a duty to conform to a specified standard of care, (2) the defendant breached 
the duty of care, (3) the defendant's breach of the duty of care proximately 
caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is 
compensable by money damages.

 
 
Mr. Glenn correctly recited these 
elements in his district court pleadings, and our task here is to determine 
whether the district court was correct in ruling that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact with regard to these elements.

 
 
Duty 
Owed

 
 

[¶8]           
Wyoming law has 
long recognized that a 
railroad has a duty "to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and prudence in 
the operation of its railway, and to take those usual, ordinary, precautionary 
measures which a prudent, reasonable person would take."  Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Gilland, 4 
Wyo. 395, 402, 
34 P. 953, 955 (1893).  When this 
duty is violated and injury is caused, a railroad may be held liable.  For example, when the end door of a rail 
car fell and hurt an employee as he was unloading cargo, and there was evidence 
that the fastening hooks had been worn and loose, we upheld the jury's verdict 
that the railroad was negligent.  Chicago & N.W. R.R. v. Ott, 33 
Wyo. 200, 237 P. 238 (1925).  In Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Murray, 40 Wyo. 324, 338, 277 P. 703, 707 (1929), we 
explained that the railroad's duty "seems not unlike the duty of the owner of 
premises to an invitee.  The owner 
must use care to keep the premises reasonably safe for the protection of the 
invitee."3 

 
 

[¶9]           
Union 
Pacific acknowledges that it has a duty to perform a reasonable inspection of 
its rail cars, and either remedy or warn its customers about dangerous 
conditions.  This is supported by 
numerous cases from other jurisdictions.  
See, e.g., Rouillier 
v. Illinois 
Cent. Gulf R.R., 886 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1989); Hedgcorth v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 
592 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Mo. App. 1979); Stickle v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 122 
Utah 477, 480, 
251 P.2d 867, 868-69 (1952); and cases 
cited in 75 C.J.S. Railroads 
§ 1193 (2002) and 99 A.L.R.2d 165, 
§ 2.  In this instance, the customer was Black 
Butte, and the district court correctly noted that Black Butte, as 
Mr. Glenn's employer, had a duty to provide a safe place to work.  See, e.g., Mellor v. Ten Sleep Cattle Co., 550 P.2d 500, 503 (Wyo. 1976).  However, the customer's duty to provide 
a reasonably safe workplace does not supplant the railroad's duty to provide 
reasonably safe rail cars.  As 
explained in Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. 
v. Williams, 245 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 
1957):

 
 
It is a 
carrier's duty to use ordinary care to deliver cars reasonably safe for the use 
of shippers and their employees while the cars [are] being loaded or 
unloaded.  The employer's duty to 
provide for the employee a safe place in which to work may be added in the 
circumstances but does not supplant the carrier's duty.  The carrier cannot impose this duty to 
furnish cars reasonably safe on the shipper, to its own relief from liability 
for injuries to an employee of the shipper.

 
 
(Internal 
citation omitted.)  Having reviewed 
the cases from Wyoming and other jurisdictions, we conclude 
that Union Pacific owed Mr. Glenn a duty to provide rail cars that were 
reasonably safe for their intended use.

 
 
Duty 
Breached

 
 

[¶10]       
Our 
review of the record reveals sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute 
about whether Union Pacific breached its duty to provide reasonably safe rail 
cars to the Black Butte coal mine on the night Mr. Glenn was injured.  There is evidence that at least one rail 
car contained a substantial amount of coking coal left over from its previous 
cargo.  Mr. Glenn's deposition 
testimony indicates that this was a dangerous condition.  A co-worker who assisted in loading Mr. 
Glenn onto the ambulance testified that the coking coal on the ground caused him 
concern about his footing and his own safety. 

 
 

[¶11]       
As 
expressed by Union Pacific, its duty was to inspect for dangerous conditions and 
remedy or warn about them.  The fact 
that 40 out of 102 rail cars in this train arrived with their doors open or 
unlocked is evidence that no inspection had been performed.  One witness, an experienced railroad 
employee who had retired from Union Pacific, agreed that if a train showed up at 
the mine with 40 cars with open doors, then somebody along the way "hasn't done 
their job."  Asked if he meant that 
somebody on the railroad had not done his job, he answered, "that's certainly 
the way it looks if a train crew brought it out with 40 cars open." 

 
 

[¶12]       
Union 
Pacific could have remedied the potentially dangerous condition by emptying the 
rail cars, or it could have warned Mr. Glenn that the rail cars might contain a 
substantial amount of coking coal.  
There is no dispute that it did neither.  The district court noted, however, that 
this was not the first rail car Mr. Glenn had opened, and coking coal had fallen 
from previous rail cars as well.  On 
this basis, the district court said that Mr. Glenn "had actual notice of 
the presence of coke in the cars."  
The district court relied on Hedgcorth, 592 S.W.2d  at 475, for the 
proposition that Union Pacific had no duty to warn Mr. Glenn about a 
dangerous condition that was obvious, or of which he was already 
aware.

 
 

[¶13]       
Hedgcorth is not 
consistent with Wyoming law.  Under our obvious danger rule, there 
is no duty to correct or warn about "an obvious and known danger resulting from 
natural causes."  O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1282 (Wyo. 1985).  That rule is limited to dangers 
resulting from natural causes such as ice, snow, or wind.  Id. at 1283; Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc., 2002 WY 113, 
¶¶ 10-12, 50 P.3d 697, 701-03 (Wyo. 2002).  For non-natural conditions, even if the danger is 
"perfectly obvious to the plaintiff," it is "the jury's function under the 
comparative negligence statute to compare the plaintiff's negligence with that 
of the defendant."  Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light 
Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1180 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 

[¶14]       
Our 
review of the evidence suggests that the allegedly dangerous condition was not 
so obvious.  Mr. Glenn 
testified that, prior to the accident, only a couple of other rail cars had to 
be opened and then closed.  Coking 
coal had fallen from them, but in Mr. Glenn's version of the event, 
substantially more spilled out of the rail car involved in his injury.  His co-worker, the only other witness to 
the event, agreed that more coking coal spilled from this car than from the 
previous cars.  Given this evidence, 
it is up to the jury to decide if Mr. Glenn was negligent in failing to 
perceive an obvious danger, and to compare his negligence, if 
any, to Union Pacific's negligence, 
if any.

 
 
Proximate 
Cause

 
 

[¶15]       
We have 
said that the "ultimate test of proximate cause is foreseeability of 
injury."  Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 51 
(Wyo. 
1997).  We have also said that 
"[p]roximate cause is usually a question of fact, reserved for the trier of 
fact's determination unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not 
disagree."  Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 553 (Wyo. 1995).  Reasonable minds could determine that it 
was foreseeable that a rail car containing a substantial amount of coking coal 
could cause injury to someone like Mr. Glenn who opened the doors in order to 
lock them.

 
 

[¶16]       
Throughout 
this litigation, Mr. Glenn has emphasized Rule 1.35 of Union Pacific's 
General Code of Operating Rules, which provides as follows:

 
 
Be sure 
dump doors on cars are closed after a load is dumped.  If car must be moved short distances 
with the dump doors open, make sure the doors and chains will clear tracks and 
crossings.

 
 
In 
considering this rule, the district court noted that Mr. Glenn's injury was 
not caused by a rail car with open doors.  
Mr. Glenn could still have been injured even if the railroad had closed 
all the rail car doors.  Therefore, 
the district court reasoned, even if Union Pacific did not comply with Rule 
1.35, that was not a proximate cause of Mr. Glenn's injury.  Limited as it was to the issue of open 
doors, the district court's reasoning was correct.  However, the railroad's duty was not to 
provide rail cars with closed doors, but to provide rail cars that were 
reasonably safe for their intended use.  
It is the alleged breach of that duty that must be evaluated as the 
proximate cause of Mr. Glenn's injury.

                                                

Compensable 
Injury

 
 

[¶17]       
There 
appears to be no dispute that Mr. Glenn suffered an injury "compensable in damages."  That brings us to the final conclusion 
that sufficient evidence exists in the record to create genuine issues of 
material fact with regard to each of the four elements of Mr. Glenn's 
negligence claim against the railroad.  
The district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Union 
Pacific.  

 
 

[¶18]       
We 
reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1It is 
difficult to determine from the written record just how the closing and locking 
mechanism works.   As nearly as 
we can tell, the rail car door is hinged on one side, and has a bar running 
along the other side.  The rail car 
has a hook that catches onto the bar and holds the door closed.  According to one description, the hook 
"has notches where a locking device falls in to hold the hook from popping 
open."  Thus, a door may be closed 
when the hook has caught the bar, but it is closed and locked only when the 
locking device has fallen into place in a notch on the 
hook.

 
 

2A 
railroad company generally does not load or unload its rail cars.  It delivers the rail cars to its 
customers, and the customers do the loading or unloading.  With at least some customers, Union 
Pacific has contracts specifying that customers who unload the rail cars are 
obligated to close the doors afterwards.  
On occasion, however, rail car doors may be left open.  The railroad is supposed to inspect for 
open doors, but only certain employees, including those known as car men, are 
allowed to close rail car doors.  
The crews on the trains are generally instructed not to close the 
doors.  Thus, when Union Pacific 
delivers an empty train to a customer for loading, and some rail car doors have 
been left open, it is not uncommon for the customer's employees to close the 
rail car doors.  By observing this 
industry practice, we do not intend to comment on any legal obligations or 
duties of the railroad or its customers, only to provide context for this 
case.

 
 

3The 
latter two Wyoming cases involved the railroad's 
liability to its own employees.  
Many of the cases relied upon by Mr. Glenn, such as Boston & Maine R.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 
275 F. 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1921), similarly 
involve a railroad's liability to its employees.  Union Pacific asserts that such cases 
are inapplicable because a railroad's liability to its employees is governed, 
not by the common law, but by the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 
§ 51, et seq. (FELA).  However, a railroad's liability under 
FELA is explicitly based on negligence, 45 U.S.C. § 51, and with regard to 
the safety of rail cars, it appears that a railroad owes the same duty to its 
own employees as it does to non-employees who are authorized to load, unload, or 
work on rail cars.  See, e.g., Landes v. Thompson, 235 Mo. App. 772, 
148 S.W.2d 78 (1941).  Accordingly, 
while FELA cases do not apply directly, they still provide useful guidance in 
negligence claims against the railroad.