Case Title: JEFFREY TODD LAYLAND V. DAVID STEVENS

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0046

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
JEFFREY TODD LAYLAND V. DAVID STEVENS2007 WY 188171 P.3d 1070Case Number: S-07-0046Decided: 12/04/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
JEFFREY 
TODD LAYLAND,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.DAVID 
STEVENS,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal from theDistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Robert 
T. Moxley of Robert T. Moxley, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Christine Cox, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Thomas W. Rumpke, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. Cox.           

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Jeffrey Todd Layland was arrested and 
charged with kidnapping and witness intimidation.  He filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against David Stevens, the deputy who arrested him, alleging various civil 
rights violations.  Both parties 
filed motions for summary judgment and, after a hearing, the district court 
granted Deputy Stevens' motion and dismissed the case.  Mr. Layland appeals claiming error in 
the district court's order, including its ruling that qualified immunity barred 
his civil rights claims against Deputy Stevens. We affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]  Of the three issues raised by Mr. 
Layland, the following is determinative:

 
 
            
Was Deputy Stevens entitled to qualified immunity from suit for 
constitutional violations allegedly arising out of Mr. Layland's arrest?          

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On January 18, 2005, Deputy Stevens of 
the Laramie County Sheriff's Department responded to a call from UnitedMedicalCenter in Cheyenne, Wyoming indicating that an individual named 
Jerry Young wanted to speak with law enforcement.  When Deputy Stevens arrived at the 
hospital, he was directed to the emergency room where Mr. Young was being 
treated.  Mr. Young's right eye was 
severely bruised, cut and bleeding.  
He had bruises on both of his cheeks.  The nurse reported that there were also 
scratches on Mr. Young's eye itself.  

 
 
[¶4]  Mr. Young told Deputy Stevens that he 
had gone to Mr. Layland's shop at 4506 Woodhouse 
Road in Cheyenne to retrieve a 
propane heater that Mr. Layland had borrowed from him.1  He said that as he stepped into the 
shop, Mr. Layland locked the door behind him, put his arm around him and began 
punching him in the face.  Mr. Young 
reported that he tried to leave but Mr. Layland prevented him from doing 
so.  He said at one point when he 
tried to get to the door Mr. Layland's brother pushed him to the ground.  He said that Mr. Layland yelled at him, 
"This is only the beginning if you do not testify for me."  He said Mr. Layland wanted him to lie 
for him in court in a case filed against him. Mr. Layland said if Mr. Young 
refused, he or a member of his family would be killed.  Once Mr. Young agreed to speak with Mr. 
Layland's lawyer, Mr. Layland let him leave the building.  Mr. Young said he drove straight to the 
hospital for treatment of his injuries.  

 
 
[¶5]  After speaking with Mr. Young at the 
hospital, Deputy Stevens went back to the sheriff's office where he spoke with 
his supervisor about what Mr. Young had reported.  Deputy Stevens and/or his supervisor 
also contacted the district attorney and a detective.  It was decided that Deputy Stevens would 
attempt to locate and speak with Mr. Layland.  

 
 
[¶6]  Deputy Stevens found Mr. Layland at the 
address where Mr. Young reported having been assaulted.  Accompanied by his dog, Deputy Stevens 
knocked on the door of the building.  
Mr. Layland opened the door.  
Deputy Stevens asked if he could talk with him about what had happened 
earlier with Mr. Young.  Mr. Layland 
was cooperative and agreed to talk with Deputy Stevens.  

 
 
[¶7]  Mr. Layland's dog was in the building, 
one or both dogs were barking and Deputy Stevens asked Mr. Layland to confine 
his dog somewhere.  Mr. Layland 
complied by putting his dog in a van parked inside the building.  Two other deputies arrived at the 
scene.  Because Mr. Layland seemed 
cooperative and non-threatening, Deputy Stevens asked one of the deputies to 
take his dog and put it back in the patrol car.  As the dogs were being removed from the 
immediate area, Deputy Stevens stepped into the building followed by the other 
deputies and asked Mr. Layland what had happened with Mr. Young earlier.  Mr. Layland said Mr. Young came to the 
shop and tried to assault him and he had punched Mr. Young.  He said he did not know why Mr. Young 
tried to assault him. 

 
 
[¶8]  Inside the building, Deputy Stevens 
observed a dead bolt lock on the door which seemed consistent with Mr. Young's 
story.  He also observed bruises on 
Mr. Layland's knuckles.  
Additionally, Deputy Stevens knew prior to speaking with Mr. Layland that 
he had been arrested previously, a charge against him was pending and Mr. Young 
was a potential witness in the case.2  Believing that he had probable cause to 
arrest Mr. Layland for kidnapping, Deputy Stevens arrested Mr. Layland and 
transported him to jail.  Deputy 
Stevens later testified that he was concerned at the time of the arrest that Mr. 
Layland possibly posed a continuing danger to Mr. Young or his family.  

 
 
[¶9]  Mr. Layland was charged with kidnapping 
and witness intimidation.3  On January 21, 2005, while being held in 
the Laramie County Detention Center, Mr. Layland filed a complaint against 
Deputy Stevens in district court in which he alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and gross 
negligence.  He filed an amended 
complaint on February 1, 2005, in which he added a claim for trespass in 
violation of § 1983.  

 
 
[¶10]  Deputy Stevens moved to dismiss Mr. 
Layland's complaint on the ground that the district court in which the criminal 
charges were pending was not the proper forum to consider Mr. Layland's civil 
rights claims because the latter claims undermined the validity of his arrest on 
the criminal charges.  On April 28, 
2005, at the close of a hearing, the district court denied the motion to dismiss 
but granted a stay in the §1983 action until the criminal case was 
resolved.  In mid-August, the court 
entered a written order to that effect.  
On September 26, 2005, the district court entered an order lifting the 
stay on the ground that the criminal charges giving rise to the civil rights 
claims were no longer pending.4 

 
 
[¶11]  Upon lifting of the stay, Deputy Stevens 
answered the civil rights complaint and asserted affirmative defenses, including 
qualified immunity.  Both parties 
filed motions for summary judgment.  
Mr. Layland asserted in his motion for partial summary judgment that he 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his claim that he was arrested 
without probable cause.  Deputy 
Stevens asserted in his motion that Mr. Layland's complaint:  1) did not state a cause of action under 
§1983; 2) was barred by Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994) in which 
the Court held that a § 1983 action challenging the validity of a criminal 
matter is barred absent a favorable termination of the criminal proceeding and 
dismissal based upon a plea agreement was not a favorable termination; and, 3) 
must be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity.  Following a hearing on the motions, the 
district entered an order granting Deputy Stevens' motion for summary judgment 
finding that the claims were barred by qualified immunity and the Heck line of cases.     

             

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]  The issue we find determinative is 
whether qualified immunity bars Mr. Layland's claims against Deputy 
Stevens.  The presence or absence of 
qualified immunity presents a question of law which is reviewed on appeal de novo.  Lucero v. Mathews, 901 P.2d 1115, 1118 
(Wyo. 
1995).  The issue is a purely legal 
one:  whether the law the deputy 
allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the challenged action 
or actions.  Id.  

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶13]  Qualified immunity shields public 
officials from suit on § 1983 civil rights claims when they are performing 
discretionary functions unless their conduct violates "clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known."  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982).  When a plaintiff names a public official 
as a defendant in a § 1983 action and the defendant pleads the defense of 
qualified immunity, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the official's actions 
violated constitutional or statutory rights and that the allegedly violated 
rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.  Id.  For a plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
right was clearly established, "the contours of the right must be sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates 
the right."  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987). 

 
 
[¶14]  The right at issue here is the right 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizure.  To avoid the qualified immunity defense, 
Mr. Layland was required to show that Deputy Stevens' arrest of him without a 
warrant violated his Fourth Amendment right and that the contours of that right 
were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have understood his 
actions violated the right. Mr. Layland argued that a reasonable deputy would 
have understood he could not enter private property to arrest someone without a 
warrant absent consent or exigent circumstances, neither of which existed.   In response, Deputy Stevens 
argued, first, that he did not unreasonably seize Mr. Layland and, second, that 
he had probable cause to arrest Mr. Layland; therefore, he asserted, Mr. 
Layland's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.

 
 
[¶15] In 
concluding that Mr. Layland's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, the 
district court relied on U.S. v. 
Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1994) in which the court 
considered the factors for determining whether a person has been illegally 
seized. Among those factors are the threatening presence of several officers; 
the brandishing of a weapon, physical touching, aggressive language, or 
retention of the person's personal belongings by an officer; a request to 
accompany the officer to the police station; the absence of other members of the 
public; and whether the interaction occurs in a nonpublic, small or enclosed 
space.  Id.  The district court applied these factors 
and concluded that Mr. Layland had failed to show that he had a clearly 
established right not to be arrested under the circumstances.  On that basis, the district court held 
that Deputy Stevens was entitled to qualified immunity.  We agree with the district court's 
conclusion that Deputy Stevens was entitled to qualified immunity; however, we 
reach that result by a different analysis. 

 
 
[¶16]  Controlling precedent makes clear that 
qualified immunity shields Deputy Stevens from suit for damages if a reasonable 
officer could have believed Mr. Layland's arrest to be lawful, in light of 
clearly established law and the information Deputy Stevens possessed.  Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S. Ct. 534, 116 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1991), quoting Anderson, 483 U.S.  at 641.  Even if Deputy Stevens reasonably, but 
mistakenly, concluded that probable cause was present, he is entitled to 
immunity.  Id.  The question is whether he acted 
reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether another 
reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can be construed 
after the fact.  Hunter, 502 U.S.  at 
228.  Even if Deputy Stevens was 
mistaken in concluding that probable cause existed, he nevertheless is entitled 
to qualified immunity if his decision was reasonable.

 
 
The 
qualified immunity standard "gives ample room for mistaken judgments" by 
protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
law."  This accommodation for 
reasonable error exists because "officials should not err always on the side of 
caution" because they fear being sued.

 
 

Id. 
at 229 
(citations omitted).

 
 
Officers 
can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the 
existence of probable cause or exigent circumstances . . . and in those 
situations courts will not hold that they have violated the Constitution.  Yet, even if a court were to hold that 
the officer violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable, 
warrantless search [or arrest], Anderson still 
operates to grant officers immunity for reasonable mistakes as to the legality 
of their actions.  

 
 

Saucier 
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001).  Thus, the standard is one of 
reasonableness at the moment.  
Id.   "Probable cause existed if at the 
moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within [the 
officer's] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information 
were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing'" a crime had been 
committed.  Hunter, 502 U.S.  at 
228.    

 
 
[¶17]  Applying these standards, the Court in 
Hunter concluded secret service 
agents were immune from suit on claims that they violated Mr. Bryant's Fourth 
Amendment rights when they arrested him without a warrant after questioning him 
at his apartment for making threats against President Reagan.  The Court 
concluded:

 
 
When 
Agents Hunter and Jordan arrested Bryant, they possessed trustworthy information 
that Bryant had written a letter containing references to an assassination 
scheme directed against the President, that Bryant was cognizant of the 
President's whereabouts, that Bryant made an oral statement that "he should have 
been assassinated in Bonn," and that Bryant refused to answer questions about 
whether he intended to harm the President.  

 
 
These 
undisputed facts establish that the Secret Service agents are entitled to 
qualified immunity.  Even if we 
assumed, arguendo, that they . . . 
erred in concluding that probable cause existed to arrest Bryant, the agents 
nevertheless would be entitled to qualified immunity because their decision was 
reasonable, if mistaken. 

 
 

Id. at 
228-29 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶18]  Similarly, in Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472 
(10th Cir. 1995), the court held that a police officer was entitled 
to qualified immunity from claims arising out of a warrantless arrest.  After interviewing two witnesses who 
implicated Romero in Douglas' murder, Officer 
Fay arrested Romero without a warrant at his place of work.  Romero later filed a civil rights claim 
against Officer Fay alleging that his constitutional rights were violated 
because, among other claims, he was arrested without probable cause after an 
unreasonable investigation.  
Id. at 
1474.

 
 
[¶19]  The court of appeals held that upon 
submission of Officer Fay's sworn statement that he concluded he had probable 
cause to arrest Romero based on the two witness interviews, Romero had the 
burden to show that the witness statements were not sufficiently trustworthy to 
lead a prudent police officer to conclude he had probable cause to arrest 
without a warrant.  The Court 
concluded Romero failed to show the information known to Officer Fay was 
insufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe that probable cause 
existed for a warrantless arrest.  
Id. at 
1476.

 

[¶20]  More recently, in Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff's 
Department, 500 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 
2007), the Court again held that a deputy was entitled to qualified immunity 
from suit on claims that he violated an arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights.  Based upon the statements of two 
witnesses, the deputy arrested Robertson without a warrant for violating a 
temporary protection order.  One of 
the witnesses reported that Robertson was on her property in violation of the 
protection order.  The witness' 
daughter stated that she was playing in the living room and saw Robertson 
looking through the window.  Her 
mother stated that she then saw Robertson running from their property toward his 
own residence.  The deputy arrested 
Robertson without a warrant the same day.  The Court concluded the witness 
statements were sufficient to cause a reasonable deputy to believe probable 
cause to arrest existed.   Id. 
at 1191-92.

 
 
[¶21]  In the present case, prior to Mr. 
Layland's arrest, Deputy Stevens had spoken with Mr. Young at the hospital.  He was bruised and his right eye was cut 
and bleeding.  He said he had gone 
to Mr. Layland's shop to retrieve a heater and Mr. Layland locked the door 
behind him and proceeded to punch him. He further reported that Mr. Layland 
prevented him from leaving and threatened him and his family if he did not 
testify for him in the receipt of stolen property trial. He indicated that Mr. 
Layland allowed him to leave only after he said he would to talk to Mr. 
Layland's lawyer.

 
 
[¶22]  Before locating Mr. Layland, Deputy 
Stevens spoke with his supervisor, the district attorney and a detective.  The record indicates no disagreement 
that Mr. Layland should be located and, upon corroboration of Mr. Young's 
statement, arrested.  When Deputy 
Stevens located Mr. Layland at the building where Mr. Young indicated the 
incident occurred, Mr. Layland opened the door and indicated he was willing to 
talk about what happened.  He did 
not refuse entry to Deputy Stevens and cooperated fully in answering his 
questions.  He admitted that he had 
punched Mr. Young.  The deadbolt 
lock on the inside of the door and bruises on Mr. Layland's knuckles 
corroborated Mr. Young's story.  
Additionally, Deputy Stevens knew, consistent with Mr. Young's report, 
that Mr. Layland was facing trial on another criminal charge and Mr. Young was a 
potential witness.  He also believed 
Mr. Layland possibly posed a continuing danger to Mr. Young. 

 
 
[¶23]  From these circumstances, we conclude a 
reasonable officer could have believed Mr. Layland's arrest was lawful, in light 
of clearly established law and the information Deputy Stevens possessed.  Even if Deputy Stevens' conclusion that 
he had probable cause to arrest was mistaken, the circumstances provided 
substantial grounds for a deputy to reasonably believe that he had legitimate 
justification under the law for arresting Mr. Layland.  That he may have been mistaken in that 
belief does not deprive him of his entitlement to qualified immunity.  

 
 
[¶24]  Mr. Layland argues that Deputy Stevens 
is not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established and a 
reasonable officer would have known that entry onto Mr. Layland's rental 
property to arrest him without a warrant was not permitted without probable 
cause and consent or exigent 
circumstances.  Mr. Layland asserts 
that he did not consent to the entry and no exigent circumstances existed 
justifying his arrest without a warrant.  In advancing this argument, Mr. Layland 
relies heavily on Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 
(1980) and Mickelson v. State, 906 P.2d 1020 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶25]  In Payton, the Court held that absent 
exigent circumstances or the owner's consent, a warrantless arrest inside a 
private dwelling violates the Fourth Amendment.  The United States Supreme Court has not 
extended the rule enunciated in Payton to premises other than a private 
home.  To overcome this difficulty, 
Mr. Layland argues that this Court in Mickelson extended the Payton rule to include not only private 
homes, but private places of business; thus, he argues, the law is clearly 
established in Wyoming that warrantless arrests inside 
private business premises violate the Fourth Amendment absent consent or exigent 
circumstances.     

 
 
[¶26]  There are at least two difficulties with 
Mr. Layland's reliance on Mickelson.  First, even assuming that Mickelson extended the Payton rule to include private 
businesses, Mr. Layland has gone to great lengths in his reply brief to persuade 
this Court that the building in which this incident occurred was not a place of 
business.  There is no contention it 
was a home.  Therefore, neither Payton nor Mickelson are 
controlling.

 
 
[¶27]  Second, and more importantly, the 
evidence presented does not establish a lack of consent as it clearly did in Mickelson.  There, officers observed men inside a 
bar after hours.  The officers 
approached the door and Mickelson refused them entry.  The officers contacted the bar owner by 
telephone and she informed them that her son and some friends were probably 
closing up the bar.  She did not 
give the officers permission to enter. Thereafter, a female officer persuaded 
Mickelson to let her enter the bar alone.  
When she did so, another officer forced his way in behind her, along with 
several other officers, and arrested Mickelson for interference with a peace 
officer. 

 
 
[¶28]  Under those circumstances, we held the 
warrantless arrest was unlawful.  
Specifically addressing the consent exception to the warrant requirement, 
we concluded there was no consent where the owner had not given consent, the 
occupant and owner's son had expressly refused consent, and the only consent 
given was limited to the female officer, not to the male officers who forced 
their way in behind her.  Because 
Mickelson's consent was conditionalhe agreed only that the female officer could 
enterand he did not consent to the other officers' entry, we concluded his 
consent did not justify the officers' entry and warrantless 
arrest.

 
 
[¶29]  In contrast to the circumstances in Mickelson, Mr. Layland did not refuse 
police entry and no one convinced him to allow entry, conditional or 
otherwise.  Instead, the evidence 
showed that Deputy Stevens knocked on the door, Mr. Layland opened it, and 
Deputy Stevens asked him a few questions which Mr. Layland cooperatively 
answered as the deputy stepped into the building.  This evidence simply is not sufficient 
to establish that Deputy Stevens violated clearly established law by entering 
the building without consent and arresting Mr. Layland without a warrant.  We conclude a reasonable officer could 
have concluded the entry into the building and Mr. Layland's subsequent arrest 
were lawful under clearly established law and in light of the knowledge Deputy 
Stevens possessed.  

 
 
[¶30] 
Mr. Layland's further assertion that, at the very least, the evidence 
establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he consented to the 
entry is likewise unavailing.  As 
the Court reiterated in Saucier, 533 U.S.  at 201 (some citations 
omitted),

 
 
Where 
the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made 
early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided 
where the defense is dispositive.  
Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the 
other burdens of litigation."  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985).  The privilege is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere 
defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a 
case is erroneously permitted to go to trial."  As a result, we have repeatedly stressed 
the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in 
litigation.

 
 
To deny 
summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains would "undermine the 
goal of qualified immunity to avoid excessive disruption of government and 
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment."  Id. 
at 202.  Therefore, "if the law did 
not put the officer on notice that his conduct would clearly be unlawful, 
summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate."  Id.  Under the facts presented, we conclude 
as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have concluded he had consent 
to enter the building to question Mr. Layland and probable cause to arrest him 
without a warrant.

            

[¶31]   The district court's order granting 
summary judgment is affirmed on the basis of qualified immunity.5

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The building 
in which the incident occurred was variously described in the testimony as a 
shop, a shed, and a garage.  In his 
appellate brief, Mr. Layland states that it was a large building that he had 
rented for several years in which he kept several vehicles, tools and other 
materials.

  

2In late 
2004, Mr. Layland was arrested and charged with receiving stolen property in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403 (LexisNexis 2007). [R Vol. III 439, 
447]  He posted a bond and was out 
of jail awaiting trial on that charge at the time of the altercation with Mr. 
Young.

 
 

3The latter 
charge was based on Mr. Young's report that Mr. Layland attempted to intimidate 
him into testifying for him in the case pending on the receipt of stolen 
property charge. 

 

4On August 
16, 2005, the district court entered an order dismissing the charges of 
kidnapping and witness intimidation filed against Mr. Layland.  [R Vol. III 436]  Dismissal of those charges was part of a 
plea agreement entered into between the State and Mr. Layland in which the State 
agreed to dismiss the kidnapping and witness intimidation charges and amend the 
receipt of stolen property charge to a misdemeanor in exchange for Mr. Layland's 
agreement to plead guilty to the misdemeanor.  [R Vol. III 
445]

    

5Our 
resolution of the qualified immunity issue disposes of Mr. Layland's claims in 
their entirety.  His argument, 
presented for the first time on appeal, that qualified immunity does not protect 
Deputy Stevens from suit for state tort claims is not well-taken.  In his original complaint and first 
amended complaint, Mr. Layland clearly alleged claims under § 1983 and did not 
allege separate state law claims.  
Throughout the district court proceedings, this matter was framed and 
treated accordingly.