Case Title: U.S. Bank National Association v. Kimball

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 VT 81













U.S. Bank
National Association (2010-169)
 
2011 VT 81
 
[Filed 22-Jul-2011]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to notify
the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that
corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2011 VT 81
 
No. 2010-169
 
U.S. Bank National Association
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
     v.
Grand Isle Superior Court
 
 
 
 
Christine Kimball
January Term, 2011
 
 
 
 
Ben
  W. Joseph, J.
 
Andre D. Bouffard of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
 
Grace B. Pazdan,
Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.
 
 
PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J.,
Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.
 
 
¶ 1.            
BURGESS, J.   Plaintiff US Bank National Association,
as trustee for RASC 2005 AHL1, appeals from a trial court order granting
summary judgment for defendant homeowner and dismissing with prejudice US
Bank's foreclosure complaint for lack of standing.  On appeal, US Bank
argues that it had standing to prosecute the foreclosure claim and the court's
dismissal with prejudice was in error.  Homeowner cross-appeals, arguing
that the court erred in not addressing her claim for attorney's fees.  We
affirm the dismissal and remand for consideration of homeowner's motion for
attorney's fees.
¶ 2.            
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, "the nonmoving party
receives the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences."  Samplid Enters., Inc. v. First
Vt. Bank, 165 Vt. 22,
25, 676 A.2d 774, 776 (1996).  We review the decision de
novo under the same standard as the trial court.  Id.  Summary
judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and a
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.; see
V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3).
¶ 3.            
So viewed, the record reveals the following facts.  Homeowner
purchased property on June 16, 2005.  To finance the purchase, she
executed an adjustable rate promissory note in favor of Accredited Home
Lenders, Inc. (Accredited) in the amount of $185,520.  The note was
secured by a mortgage deed to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
(MERS) as nominee for Accredited.  
¶ 4.            
On January 12, 2009, US Bank filed a foreclosure complaint for
homeowner's failure to make required payments.  The complaint alleged that
the mortgage and note were assigned to US Bank by MERS, as nominee for
Accredited, by an instrument dated January 6, 2009.  Attached to the
complaint was a copy of the instrument entitled "Assignment of Mortgage,"
signed by Jeffrey Stephan, identified therein as Duly Authorized Agent and Vice
President of MERS.  The promissory note was also attached to the
complaint, and appended to it was an undated allonge[1] signed by a corporate officer of
Accredited, endorsing the note in blank.
¶ 5.            
Homeowner initially filed a pro se answer.  After procuring
counsel, homeowner filed an amended answer, claiming, among other things, that
US Bank failed to present sufficient evidence that it held homeowner's note and
corresponding mortgage.  Homeowner also filed a counterclaim alleging
consumer fraud.  In March 2005, homeowner filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing that US Bank lacked standing to bring the foreclosure
complaint because it failed to establish that it held an interest in the debt
secured by homeowner's property.  Homeowner argued that US Bank had not
established proper assignment of the mortgage because MERS as nominee for Accredited
lacked authority to assign the mortgage.  Homeowner further argued that US
Bank failed to demonstrate that it held or had a right to enforce the
promissory note.  In July 2009, in support of the motion for summary
judgment, homeowner submitted an affidavit, averring that in mid-June 2009 she
received a letter from her mortgage servicer, Homecomings Financial, notifying
her that the servicing rights to her loan were being assigned not to US Bank,
but to GMAC Mortgage, LLC effective July 1, 2009.  She also averred that
she received a concurrent letter from GMAC, confirming that it was servicing
the loan on behalf of Residential Funding Corporation (RFC).  The letters
referred to in the affidavit were attached.  
¶ 6.            
US Bank opposed the request and responded with its own cross-motion for
summary judgment on the merits, claiming that whatever deficiencies were
present in its original complaint were now resolved because it had produced and
sent to homeowner "a copy of the fully endorsed note specifically payable to
[US Bank]."  In its statement of undisputed facts, US Bank asserted that
it had the original note, and that it was endorsed from Accredited to RFC and
then to US Bank.  No dates, however, were provided for these endorsements. 
In support, US Bank attached an affidavit attesting to these facts, but still
devoid of any dates for the purported assignments.  The affidavit was
signed by Jeffrey Stephan, the same man who had signed the assignment attached
to original complaint, but this time identifying himself as a "Limited Signing
Officer" for GMAC, the mortgage servicer for homeowner's loan.  In the
affidavit, Stephan claims that he has "familiarity with the loan documentation
underlying the mortgage loan entered at issue in the present foreclosure
case."  The copy of the note attached had an allonge,
appearing to be the same allonge previously submitted
as endorsed in blank, but this time with "RFC" stamped in the blank spot and
containing a second endorsement from RFC to US Bank.  Neither endorsement
was dated.  
¶ 7.            
The court held a hearing on the summary judgment motions. 
Following the hearing, the court issued a written order on October 27,
2009.  The court concluded that to enforce a mortgage note, "a plaintiff
must show that it was the holder of the note at the time the Complaint was
filed," and here there was "simply no evidence of an assignment to a party in
interest."  Because neither note submitted by US Bank was dated, the court
concluded that there was no evidence that the note was endorsed to US Bank
before the complaint was filed.  Therefore, the court held that US Bank
lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action.  The court granted
homeowner's motion for summary judgment, dismissed the foreclosure action, and
set the matter for hearing on homeowner's counterclaim.  
¶ 8.            
On November 23, 2009, US Bank moved for reconsideration.[2]  US Bank acknowledged that it had
created "confusion" by attaching to the complaint "an outdated copy of the note
prior to its transfer to [US Bank], and a mortgage assignment that purports to
assign the note along with the mortgage."  It claimed, however, that
because it now held the original note, it was entitled to enforce it. 
Homeowner did not dispute that US Bank possessed what appeared to be the
original note, but she insisted US Bank was required to authenticate the
endorsements through credible affidavits and to demonstrate that it had
possession when the complaint was filed.  As to this timing issue, US Bank
contended that homeowner's mortgage had been endorsed to it in September
2005.  In support, US Bank submitted an affidavit signed by Scott Zeitz, who is identified as a litigation analyst with
GMAC.  In the affidavit, Zeitz avers that
homeowner's mortgage note was endorsed to RFC and then to US Bank in September
2005.  The affidavit does not explain the obvious inconsistencies with the
prior affidavits offered by US Bank or with the letter homeowner received from
GMAC identifying RFC as the holder of her note in June 2009.  It also does
not explain how Zeitz obtained this knowledge given
that GMAC did not begin servicing the loan until July 1, 2009.  In the
alternative, US Bank argued that, even if did not hold an interest in the note
at the time the complaint was filed, it could cure the deficiency by now
substituting itself as the real party in interest under Rule of Civil Procedure
17(a).  US Bank also filed a motion to amend its complaint to properly
reflect the manner in which it now alleged that it acquired an interest in
homeowner's note and mortgage.
¶ 9.            
Homeowner opposed the motions, contending that the numerous
inconsistencies in the information offered by US Bank made it unreliable. 
In addition, homeowner argued that the Zeitz
affidavit was not based on personal knowledge and therefore insufficient to
support the motion.  Homeowner moved for reasonable attorney's fees under
Rule 56(g), claiming that US Bank acted in bad faith by filing affidavits
lacking a basis in personal knowledge and contradicting undisputed evidence.[3]  Homeowner explained that as a
result her attorney "spent numerous hours responding to and refuting the
validity of the affidavits."  
¶ 10.         Following
a hearing, the court denied the motions for reconsideration and to amend the
complaint.  The court concluded that US Bank had submitted a defective
complaint and the deficiencies therein were not mere technicalities, but
essential items, without which the case could not proceed.  The court held
that US Bank lacked standing when the complaint was filed, and dismissed the
complaint "with prejudice."  US Bank appeals.
¶ 11.         On appeal,
US Bank argues that the court erred in (1) dismissing the complaint with
prejudice; (2) concluding there was no standing when there was evidence
demonstrating that US Bank was the holder of the note before the complaint was
filed; and (3) denying US Bank's request to substitute itself as the real
party in interest.  Homeowner cross-appeals, arguing
that the court failed to address her request for attorney's fees and requesting
a remand.
¶ 12.         We
begin with the issue of standing.  "[O]ur review
of dismissal for lack of standing is the same as that for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.  We review the lower court's decision de novo,
accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true."  Brod v. Agency of Natural Res., 2007 VT 87, ¶
2, 182 Vt. 234, 936 A.2d 1286.  We have the same
standing requirement as the federal courts in that our jurisdiction is limited
to "actual cases or controversies."  Parker v. Town
of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 76-77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998). 
Therefore, to bring a case "[a] plaintiff must, at a minimum, show (1) injury
in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability." 
Id. at 77, 726 A.2d  at 480 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).  This means a plaintiff "must have suffered
a particular injury that is attributable to the defendant," id. at 77, 726 A.2d  at 480, and a party who is not injured has
no standing to bring a suit.  Bischoff v. Bletz,
2008 VT 16, ¶¶ 15-16, 183 Vt. 235, 939 A.2d 420. 
And, as the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, "standing is to be determined as
of the commencement of suit."  Lujan, 504 U.S.  at
570 n.5.
¶ 13.         To
foreclose a mortgage, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it has a right to
enforce the note, and without such ownership, the plaintiff lacks standing. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ford, 15 A.3d 327, 329 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).  While a plaintiff in a foreclosure
should also have assignment of the mortgage, it is the note that is important
because "[w]here a promissory note is secured by a mortgage, the mortgage is an
incident to the note."  Huntington v. McCarty,
174 Vt. 69, 70, 807 A.2d 950, 952 (2002).  Because the note is a
negotiable instrument, it is subject to the requirements of the UCC. 
Thus, US Bank had the burden of demonstrating that it was a " [p]erson entitled to enforce' " the note, by showing it
was "(i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the
rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who
is entitled to enforce the instrument."  9A V.S.A. § 3-301.  On
appeal, US Bank asserts that it is entitled to enforce the note under the first
categoryas a holder of the instrument.  
¶ 14.         A person
becomes the holder of an instrument when it is issued or later negotiated to
that person.  9A V.S.A. § 3-201(a). 
Negotiation always requires a transfer of possession of the instrument.  Id. § 3-201 cmt.  When
the instrument is made payable to bearer, it can be negotiated by transfer
alone.  Id. §§ 3-201(b), 3-205(a). 
If it is payable to orderthat is, to an identified personthen negotiation is
completed by transfer and endorsement of the instrument.  Id. § 3-201(b).  An instrument payable to order
can become a bearer instrument if endorsed in blank.  Id.
§ 3-205(b).  Therefore, in this case, because the note was not
issued to US Bank, to be a holder, US Bank was required to show that at the
time the complaint was filed it possessed the original note either made payable
to bearer with a blank endorsement or made payable to order with an endorsement
specifically to US Bank.  See Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435, 439-40 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 2010) (reciting requirements for bank to demonstrate that it was
holder of note at time complaint was filed).
¶ 15.         US
Bank lacked standing because it has failed to demonstrate either
requirement.  Initially, US Bank's suit was based solely on an assignment
of the mortgage by MERS.  The complaint did not allege that US Bank held
the original note.  US Bank simply attached a copy of the note with an allonge endorsement in blank.  Homeowner challenged
this evidence as insufficient to show that US Bank held an interest in her
note.  Because homeowner supported her position with an affidavit and
documentary evidence, US Bank was required to "come forward with an opposing
affidavit or other evidence that raises a dispute as to the fact or facts in
issue."  Alpstetten Ass'n, Inc. v. Kelly, 137 Vt.
508, 514, 408 A.2d 644, 647 (1979).  At this point, US Bank
abandoned its claim of assignment of the mortgage and instead asserted that it
held the original note.  It submitted the note with an allonge
containing two undated specific endorsements, one to US Bank.  The
supporting affidavit claimed that the note had been endorsed to US Bank, but
provided no information about when and failed to explain why a note with a
blank endorsement was the basis for the complaint.  
¶ 16.         Based
on this contradictory and uncertain documentation, the trial court did not err
in concluding that there was no evidence to show that US Bank was a holder of
the note at the time it filed the complaint.  US Bank failed to allege or
demonstrate that it held the original note endorsed in blank when it commenced
the foreclosure action.  In fact, US Bank asserted that the note with the
blank endorsement was an earlier copy that was mistakenly attached to the
complaint.  It also alleged that the blank endorsement was stamped with
RFC's name in 2005.  Therefore, it could not possibly have held the
original note with a blank endorsement when the complaint was filed. 
Further, there is no evidence to show that US Bank held the original note
endorsed to its name before the complaint was filed.  While US Bank
eventually produced the original note with an endorsement to it, none of the
evidence submitted at summary judgment by US Bank established the timing of the
endorsement.  Given US Bank's failure to show it had standing, the foreclosure
complaint was properly dismissed.  
¶ 17.         US
Bank argues that whatever shortcomings were present in its earlier filings were
cured by the documents attached to its motion to reconsider, and, therefore,
the court erred in denying this motion.  We disagree.  The additional
affidavit submitted with the motion to reconsider did nothing to establish the
timing of the endorsement to US Bank because it was not based on personal
knowledge and contained conclusions rather than facts.  Affidavits must be
"made on personal knowledge [and] set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein."  V.R.C.P. 56(e). 
The affiant, Zeitz, declared himself to be an employee
of GMAC, the servicer of homeowner's loan.  Zeitz
averred that the note was endorsed to US Bank in September 2005 but provided no
explanation of how he gained personal knowledge about this endorsement that
supposedly took place several years before his company began servicing
homeowner's loan.  Further, the affidavit failed to explain the obvious
contradictions with other evidence.  Specifically, Zeitz
did not account for the letter from his company, submitted by homeowner, that identifies RFC, the predecessor-in-interest
to US Bank, as the holder of the loan in July 2009, months after the complaint
was filed.  Having already failed to succeed on its summary judgment
motion, reconsideration of the same issues on new evidence was up to the
court's sound discretion.  See Crosby v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 143 Vt. 537, 539, 468 A.2d 567, 568 (1983)
(per curiam) (affirming court's denial of plaintiffs'
motion to reconsider summary judgment ruling using an abuse-of-discretion
standard).  Fraught with contradictions and evidently lacking information
based on personal knowledge, the affidavit was insufficient to establish that
US Bank had an interest in the note prior to the time the complaint was
filed.  Thus, it was no abuse of discretion for the court to deny the
motion to reconsider.
¶ 18.         In
the alternative, US Bank argues that even if it did not hold the note at the
time the complaint was filed, this should be overlooked because it has now
produced the original note with a chain of endorsements ending in US Bank.[4]  Thus, US Bank contends it can now
be substituted as the real party in interest under Rule 17(a).  US Bank
argues that this Court allows liberal substitution of parties, citing Korda v. Chicago Insurance Co., 2006 VT 81,
180 Vt. 173, 908 A.2d 1018.  In that case, the trial court dismissed an
estate's claims against a tortfeasor's employer's
insurance company where the employer did not assign its rights to the estate
until three years after the complaint was filed.  This Court reversed,
holding that "where, as here, a plaintiff acquires capacity to sue after the
suit is filed, and before the action is dismissed for lack of capacity, the
acquisition of capacity relates back to the filing of the action for all
purposes, including compliance with the statute of limitations."  Id. ¶ 16.  US Bank contends it is similarly
situated and is entitled to substitution as the real party in interest now that
it has obtained an interest in the note.  
¶ 19.         The
merit of this argument might have been better received by the trial court had
it been supported by the necessary documentation and proffered before summary
judgment was granted for defendant.  US Bank had notice of the standing
deficiency from the start of the litigation and had an opportunity to prove its
case.  It was unable to do so.  Having failed to support its
position, the court was not required to give US Bank another opportunity to
prove its case following the grant of summary judgment, and did not abuse its
discretion in denying the request at that late stage in the proceeding. 
See V.R.C.P. 17(a) (directing that action not be dismissed for absence of real
party in interest "until a reasonable time has been allowed").  
¶ 20.         US
Bank argues that for reasons of policy it should be permitted to proceed
because it would be wasteful to prevent it from being able to "cure" its
standing problem.  While we are sympathetic to the desire to avoid
wasteful and duplicative litigation, the source of the unnecessary proceedings
in this case was not an overly wooden application of the rules, but US Bank's
failure to abide by them.  It is neither irrational nor wasteful to expect
a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the
note, and have the proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit.[5]  Nor is it irrationally demanding to
expect the foreclosing party to provide adequate, satisfying proof in response
to a motion for summary judgment challenging standing to bring suit.  What
should have here been a fairly straightforward, if not a summary, proceeding
under the rules, was rendered inefficient by US Bank's failure to marshal its
case before compelling homeowner and the court to waste time and resources,
twice, by responding to what could not be proven.  There was nothing
inequitable in dismissing this matter.  
¶ 21.         We
turn next to the question of whether the court erred in dismissing the
complaint "with prejudice."  US Bank argues this was in error and
homeowner contends that the court's determination bars US Bank from filing
again to foreclose.  At a minimum, the court certainly intended to put an
end to US Bank's instant foreclosure action and dismissal was appropriate because,
as another court explained, when a plaintiff is not able to establish that it
possessed the note on the date the complaint was filed, the complaint should be
subject to dismissal "if only to provide a clear incentive to plaintiffs to see
that the issue of standing is properly addressed before any complaint is
filed."  Raftogianis, 13 A.3d  at 455.  
¶ 22.         Nevertheless,
and despite the court's invocation of "with prejudice" in its dismissal order,
US Bank cannot be precluded from pursuing foreclosure on the merits should it
be prepared to prove the necessary elements.  Although postured as
cross-motions for summary judgment, the motion practice addressed only whether
the bank had standing for jurisdictional purposes.  The merits of foreclosure
were not, and on this record could not have been, litigated.  The court's
dismissal on just jurisdictional grounds was no adjudication on the
merits.  See V.R.C.P. 41(b)(3) (providing that
any involuntary dismissal, "other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction,
. . . operates as an adjudication upon the merits" (emphasis added)); see also Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 2008-Ohio-4603, ¶¶ 18-20, 897 N.E.2d 722 (Ct.
App.) (reversing trial court's dismissal with
prejudice of foreclosure complaint as inappropriate where dismissal was for
lack of standing).
¶ 23.         Thus,
this may be but an ephemeral victory for homeowner.  Absent adjudication
on the underlying indebtedness, the dismissal cannot cancel her obligation
arising from an authenticated note, or insulate her from foreclosure
proceedings based on proven delinquency.  Cf. Indymac
Bank, F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239,
240 (App. Div. 2010) (reversing trial court's order canceling mortgage and
debt).  Homeowner's arguments supporting a dismissal with prejudice are
not convincing.[6] 
Homeowner relies on Nolen v. State, but that unpublished three-justice
decision simply affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss with prejudice
plaintiff's constitutional claim for lack of standing without a challenge to or
any analysis of the "with prejudice" designation.  No.
08-131, 2009 WL 2411832, at *2 (Vt. May 29, 2009) (unpub.
mem.), available at
http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/d-upeo/upeo.aspx.  Further, the
court's order does not support plaintiff's assertion that the court was
warranted in dismissing with prejudice on equitable grounds given what
homeowner characterizes as inconsistent and "likely fraudulent filings"
submitted by US Bank.  See New Eng. Educ. Training Serv., Inc. v.
Silver St. P'ship, 156 Vt. 604, 613, 595 A.2d 1341, 1345-46 (1991) (affirming dismissal of foreclosure action where recovery
on the underlying note would be unconscionable).  While the trial court
may have had discretion to exert its equitable powers in this manner, no
findings were made to support such a conclusion, and we will not speculate on a
matter of such importance. 
¶ 24.         Finally,
we address homeowner's cross-appeal.  In response to US Bank's motion to
reconsider, homeowner filed a motion for attorney's fees asserting that US Bank
had filed affidavits in bad faith.  We agree that the request for
attorney's fees under Rule 56(g) was timely and properly raised in the trial
court, and that the court erred in failing to consider the motion. 
Therefore, we remand for consideration of homeowner's request.
The foreclosure complaint is
dismissed and the case is remanded for consideration of defendant's motion for
attorney's fees.
 
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 

[1] 
An allonge is "[a] slip of paper sometimes attached
to a negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with indorsements."  Black's Law Dictionary 83 (8th ed.
2004).  The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) accepts the use of such
endorsements, explaining that "a paper affixed to the instrument is a part of
the instrument."  9A V.S.A. § 3-204(a). 
Although at one time an allonge could be used only
when there was no room on the original document, the official comment to the
UCC explains that now an allonge "is valid even
though there is sufficient space on the instrument for an indorsement." 
Id. § 3-204 cmt.
[2] 
Because final judgment had not yet been entered, the motion was filed pursuant
to Rule of Civil Procedure 56.  See Kelly v. Town of Barnard, 155
Vt. 296, 307, 583 A.2d 614, 620 (1990) (holding that trial court retains
jurisdiction to modify or rescind order prior to entry of final decree and may
grant summary judgment motion after denying prior similar motion).
[3] 
In pertinent part, Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) states:
 
Should it appear to
the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith . . . , the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused the other
party to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party
or attorney may be adjudged in contempt.
[4] 
This argument in and of itself underscores the extent of confusion created by
US Bank's evidence.  While, on the one hand, US Bank wishes us to accept
that it has uncontroverted evidence that it has held homeowner's note since
September 2005, on the other hand, it argues that it has acquired an interest
in the note recently and can now be substituted as the real party in
interest.  It appears that even US Bank is unsure of when the note was
endorsed to it.  
[5] 
We note that the foreclosure rule as amended now specifically requires a plaintiff
to attach to the complaint "the original note and mortgage deed and proof of
ownership thereof, including copies of all original endorsements and
assignments of the note and mortgage deed."  V.R.C.P. 80.1(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2010); see 2009, No. 132 (Adj. Sess.) § 1.
[6] 
We note that two cases cited by homeowner to support dismissal of a foreclosure
complaint with prejudice have since been reversed.  U.S. Bank N.A. v.
Emmanuel, No.  19271/09, 2010 WL 1856016  (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 11, 2010), reversed by 921 N.Y.S.2d 320
(App. Div. 2011); IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v.
Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 2009), reversed by 912 N.Y.S.2d 239 (App. Div. 2010).