Case Title: Sheffield v. Rowland

Citation: 1999-Ohio-217

Docket Number: 19981674

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Sheffield v. Rowland, 87 Ohio St.3d 9, 1999-Ohio-217.] 
 
 
 
 
 
VILLAGE OF SHEFFIELD, APPELLANT, v. ROWLAND, D.B.A. ROWLAND ENTERPRISES, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Sheffield v. Rowland (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 9.] 
Municipal corporations — Health and safety — Construction and demolition 
debris — Sections 660.19, 1155.05(o), 1155.05(hh), and 1155.05(nn) of the 
Sheffield Village Codified Ordinances conflict with R.C. Chapter 3714. 
(No. 98-1674 — Submitted May 25, 1999 — Decided October 13, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 97CA006847. 
 
Defendant, Browning-Ferris Industries of Ohio, Inc. (“BFI”), proposed to 
construct and operate a construction and demolition debris facility in an Industrial 
District in the village of Sheffield (“Sheffield”).  Plaintiff-appellant Sheffield 
brought an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against BFI on the 
grounds that the proposed construction would violate several provisions of the 
Sheffield Village Codified Ordinances.  The codified ordinances prohibit, among 
other things, most excavations, Section 660.19; “[g]arbage, offal, dead animals or 
refuse reduction or storage,” Section 1155.05(o); “[s]torage, sorting or baling of 
junk, scrap metal, paper or rags,” Section 1155.05(hh); and “uses which may be 
noxious or offensive by reason of the emission of odor, dust, smoke, vibration or 
noise,” Section 1155.05(nn).  BFI counterclaimed, arguing that the proposed 
 
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construction was not in violation of the codified ordinances, and, in the alternative, 
that state law preempted the ordinances. 
 
Both sides filed motions for summary judgement.  Sheffield’s motion was 
denied; BFI’s motion was granted.  The trial court held that state law preempted 
the ordinances and did not address whether the proposed construction would 
violate those ordinances.  The court of appeals affirmed. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Michael Szekely; Ward & Associates, Alan E. Johnson and Leo R. Ward, for 
appellant. 
 
Baumgartner & O’Toole, Daniel D. Mason and Kenneth S. Stumphauzer, for 
appellee Billy S. Rowland, d.b.a. Rowland Enterprises, assignee in interest to 
Browning-Ferris Industries of Ohio, Inc. 
 
Barrett & Weber, C. Francis Barrett and M. Michele Fleming, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae, Browning-Ferris Industries of Ohio, Inc. 
 
Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Municipal League. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  In this case, we must determine whether Sections 660.19 and 
 
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1155.05 of the Sheffield Village Codified Ordinances are in conflict with R.C. 
Chapter 3714.  For the reasons that follow, we determine that they are. 
 
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution states that 
“[m]unicipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-
government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary 
and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”  The 
enactment of zoning ordinances is an exercise of the police power, not an exercise 
of local self-government.  Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Assn. (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 
259, 17 O.O.3d 167, 407 N.E.2d 1369, paragraph two of the syllabus.  See Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303.  
Zoning ordinances “are subject to the constitutional provision that they not be ‘in 
conflict with general law.’ ”  Garcia at 270, 17 O.O.3d at 174, 407 N.E.2d at 1377, 
citing State ex rel. Klapp v. Dayton Power & Light Co. (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 14, 
39 O.O.2d 9, 225 N.E.2d 230.  See Fondessy Enterprises, Inc. v. Oregon (1986), 
23 Ohio St.3d 213, 23 OBR 372, 492 N.E.2d 797, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
The test to determine when a conflict exists between a municipal ordinance 
and a general law of the state is “whether the ordinance permits or licenses that 
which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.”  Struthers v. Sokol (1923), 
108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519, paragraph two of the syllabus; Fondessy 
Enterprises, paragraph two of the syllabus.  We must first determine whether R.C. 
 
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Chapter 3714 is a general law.  If it is not, the test from Struthers has no 
application. 
 
General laws are defined as those “operating uniformly throughout the state 
* * *, which prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally, and which operate 
with general uniform application throughout the state under the same 
circumstances and conditions.”  Garcia, 63 Ohio St.2d at 271, 17 O.O.3d at 174, 
407 N.E.2d at 1377-1378, citing Leis v. Cleveland Ry. Co. (1920), 101 Ohio St. 
162, 128 N.E. 73.  R.C. Chapter 3714 governs the licensing and regulation of 
construction and demolition debris facilities throughout the state of Ohio.  It 
appears beyond dispute that R.C. Chapter 3714 is a general law and, as neither 
party contends otherwise, we so hold. 
 
We must now determine whether R.C. Chapter 3714 and the Sheffield 
Village Codified Ordinances are in conflict.  No construction and demolition 
debris facility may be established unless the operator of the proposed facility has 
obtained a license from the board of health of the health district in which the 
facility will be located or the Director of Environmental Protection.  R.C. 
3714.06(A).  The license is site-specific and there are limitations as to where 
demolition and construction debris facilities can be licensed.  R.C. 3714.03.  The 
license application must include accompanying plans, specifications, and 
information regarding the facility and its method of operation.  R.C. 3714.06(A).  
 
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R.C. 3714.06(A) states, “[i]f the board of health or the director, as appropriate, 
finds that the proposed facility * * * complies with those rules and standards, the 
board or director shall issue a license for the facility.” 
 
BFI’s proposed construction and demolition debris facility is located in an 
Industrial District in the village of Sheffield.  Although the rules and standards of 
R.C. Chapter 3714 have been met, Sheffield argues that the facility is prohibited by 
the Sheffield Village Codified Ordinances Sections 660.19, 1155.05(o), 
1155.05(hh), and 1155.05(nn).  The ordinances read as follows: 
 
“660.19 EXCAVATIONS 
 
“(a)  No person shall remove or excavate any soil, sand, gravel or other 
deposit from land so as to create a pit, gully, ditch, depression or other change to 
the topography of lands in the Village * * *.” 
 
“1155.05  INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS 
 
“In an Industrial District, land may be used and buildings or structures may 
be erected, altered or used for any purpose except the following 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(o)  Garbage, offal, dead animals or refuse reduction or storage. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(hh) Storage, sorting or baling of junk, scrap metal, paper or rags. 
 
“ * * * 
 
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“(nn) In general, those uses which may be noxious or offensive by reason of 
the emission of odor, dust, smoke, vibration or noise.” 
 
Upon compliance with the requirements of R.C. Chapter 3714 and the 
issuance of a license, the operator of a proposed construction and demolition 
facility is authorized to establish such a facility.  R.C. 3714.06(A).  However, it is 
readily apparent that the Sheffield Village Codified Ordinances prohibit such a 
facility.  Thus, the ordinances prohibit what the statute permits and are therefore in 
conflict with R.C. Chapter 3714. 
 
Sheffield argues that there is no conflict, citing Fondessy, supra.  In 
Fondessy, this court upheld a municipal ordinance that imposed a permit fee on all 
hazardous waste landfills that are located within the city, and required that 
operators of the facilities keep complete and accurate records.  The two additional 
requirements imposed by the ordinance did not “alter, impair, or limit the operation 
of a state-licensed hazardous waste facility” and were held valid.  Id. at 217, 23 
OBR at 375, 492 N.E.2d at 801.  In the case at bar, the Sheffield ordinances do 
more than merely impair or limit the operation of a state-authorized facility:  they 
completely prohibit the facility.  Nothing in this decision should be construed to 
suggest that Sheffield cannot restrict state-authorized facilities to certain districts 
with appropriate zoning.  See Fondessy. 
 
Appellant’s argument that R.C. Chapter 3714 and the Sheffield ordinances 
 
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are not about the same subject matter and therefore present dual conditions for the 
construction and operation of a construction and demolition debris facility is 
likewise not persuasive.  See Set Products, Inc. v. Bainbridge Twp. Bd. of Zoning 
Appeals (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 260, 31 OBR 463, 510 N.E.2d 373.  In Set 
Products, the statutory scheme in question, R.C. Chapter 1514, contained a 
specific provision stating that the applicant must ensure that future land use will 
not conflict with local zoning plans.  Id. at 265, 31 OBR at 467, 510 N.E.2d at 378.  
R.C. Chapter 3714 has no such provision.  While dual conditions have been 
recognized without an explicit statutory provision prohibiting conflict, they are 
valid only when the municipal ordinances do not alter, impair, or limit the 
operation of the state-authorized facility.  Fondessy. 
 
We conclude that Sections 660.19, 1155.05(o), 1155.05(hh), and 
1155.05(nn) of the Sheffield Village Codified Ordinances conflict with R.C. 
Chapter 3714.  When, as here, “there is a direct conflict, the state regulation 
prevails.”  Canton v. Whitman (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 62, 66, 73 O.O.2d. 285, 288, 
337 N.E.2d 766, 770.  We hold that R.C. Chapter 3714 preempts Sheffield Village 
Codified Ordinances Sections 660.19, 1155.05(o), 1155.05(hh), and 1155.05(nn).  
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
 
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JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  Local zoning ordinances proscribing construction and 
demolition debris sites may lawfully coexist with state laws that set minimum 
permit requirements for such sites.  When applying the “conflict” test, the majority 
fails to distinguish statutes that promulgate minimum standards from statutes that 
essentially “preempt the field” by imposing maximum standards. 
 
The majority reasons that because the state permits the operation of 
construction and demolition debris facilities in R.C. Chapter 3714, Sheffield 
municipal ordinances forbidding the operation of these facilities in industrial-zoned 
areas “conflict” with R.C. Chapter 3714 and are therefore invalid under Section 3, 
Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.  The majority’s application of the 
“conflict” test from Struthers, however, neglects this court’s recent decisions that 
acknowledge a difference between statutes establishing statewide maximum 
standards and statutes imposing minimum standards on an activity. 
 
An example of a preemptive statute that establishes a conflict according to 
the “conflict” test is found in Eastlake v. Bd. of Bldg. Standards (1981), 66 Ohio 
St.2d 363, 367, 20 O.O.3d 327, 330, 422 N.E.2d 598, 601.  There, this court 
concluded that ordinances imposing strict building code standards conflicted with 
 
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state statutory provisions establishing less restrictive statewide standards.  See id.  
The language of the statute under consideration, R.C. 3781.12, specified that “[t]he 
issuance of the authorization for the use of the materials or assemblages described 
in the petition shall constitute approval for their use anywhere in Ohio.” 
(Emphasis added.)  In Eastlake, this court reasoned that “[s]tandardization of 
industrialized units, as described in R.C. Chapter 3781, necessarily precludes 
imposition of local requirements which conflict with the practices approved for 
statewide use.”  Eastlake at 367, 20 O.O.3d at 330, 422 N.E.2d at 601. 
 
Likewise, this court concluded that a local ordinance calling for security 
personnel to pay a fee in order to work in a municipality conflicted with state 
regulatory provisions prohibiting locally imposed fees.  Ohio Assn. of Private 
Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmsted (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 245, 602 N.E.2d 
1147, 1149.  Similar to the state law in Eastlake, the statute in Assn. of Private 
Detective Agencies explicitly precluded municipalities from charging fees in 
addition to the fees designated by the state.  R.C. 4749.09 provided that  “[n]o 
license or registration fees shall be charged by the state or any of its subdivisions 
for conducting the business of private investigation, the business of security 
services, or both businesses other than as provided in this chapter.”  In reviewing 
the language of R.C. Chapter 4749, this court held that “[w]here, as here, the fee 
provision in such ordinance conflicts with the statewide regulatory program 
 
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established pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4749 and, specifically, the prohibition against 
the imposition of such fees contained in R.C. 4749.09, it is rendered invalid by 
operation of Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.”  Id. at 245, 602 
N.E.2d at 1150. 
 
On the other hand, when considering a statute imposing minimum standards 
on an activity, this court noted that absent statutory language that limited local 
regulation, state rules providing minimum requirements for fire safety did not 
conflict with local rules that imposed stricter standards.  Middleburg Hts. v. Ohio 
Bd. of Bldg. Standards (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 510, 513-515, 605 N.E.2d 66, 68-69. 
 
This case focuses upon a statute that is similar to the one in Middleburg Hts. 
and that is unlike the statutes in Eastlake and Assn. of Private Detective Agencies.  
The General Assembly included no language in R.C. Chapter 3714 that limits local 
regulation of construction and demolition debris facilities.  Absent is the statutory 
language of “preemption” reviewed in Eastlake or Assn. of Private Detective 
Agencies.  Moreover, nowhere in R.C. Chapter 3714 does the General Assembly 
call for the operation of construction and demolition debris facilities statewide.  
Instead, R.C. Chapter 3714 sets forth minimum requirements for obtaining an 
operation permit, and thus local zoning regulation prohibiting such activity does 
not “conflict” so as to invalidate the zoning. 
 
I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s judgment that the 
 
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Sheffield ordinances conflict with R.C. Chapter 3714, thereby rendering the 
ordinances invalid pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII.  I cannot agree with the 
majority’s conclusion that a conflict exists between this state law imposing 
minimum standards for the operation of construction and demolition debris 
facilities and municipal zoning ordinances disfavoring such activity.  I would 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.