Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF ALAN D. BOE, AN EMPLOYEE OF JIM BRIDGER POWER PLANT, ALAN D. BOE V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex. rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0240

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF ALAN D. BOE, AN EMPLOYEE OF JIM BRIDGER POWER PLANT, ALAN D. BOE V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex. rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2009 WY 115216 P.3d 494Case Number: S-08-0240Decided: 09/17/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF ALAN D. BOE, AN EMPLOYEE OF JIM 
BRIDGER POWER PLANT, ALAN D. 
BOE,Appellant(Petitioner),v.STATE OF WYOMING, ex. 
rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ethelyn 
"Lynn" Boak, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; James Michael Causey, Senior Assistant Attorney General; M. Kristen 
Doolittle Rieman, Assistant Attorney General. 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; BURKE, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Alan D. Boe 
appeals from the district court's order affirming the Office of Administrative 
Hearings' (OAH) denial of his claim for worker's compensation benefits for 
failure to timely file his application for temporary total disability (TTD) 
benefits.  He claims that he was 
excused from filing the application because an OAH decision was pending on an 
earlier claim he filed involving the same injury.  Alternatively, he asserts that the 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division) should be estopped from 
denying him benefits by its failure to request recertification despite knowing 
that he had returned to TTD.  We 
reverse, although on different grounds than those asserted by Mr. Boe. 

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Boe presents 
the following issue for this Court's consideration:

 
 
Was 
the Denial of Temporary Total Disability Benefits for failure to file a new 
application for TTD in accordance with the law?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the same issue.

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3]  Mr. Boe injured his right arm on May 27, 
2005, while working at the Jim Bridger Power Plant near Point of Rocks in 
Sweetwater County, Wyoming.  He 
continued to work until June 14, 2005, when orthopedist Nick DiGiovine diagnosed 
his condition as an injury to his right ulnar nerve with some medial and lateral 
epicondylitis ("tennis elbow"), and restricted him from work.  Mr. Boe then applied for worker's 
compensation benefits.  The Division 
initially took the position that the injury was not compensable and denied the 
claim.  The Division later withdrew 
its objection and the OAH set for hearing the matter of Mr. Boe's entitlement to 
TTD benefits.   

 
 
[¶4]  In the meantime, on June 30, 2005, Dr. 
DiGiovine had released Mr. Boe to work with the limitation that he was not to 
lift more than eleven to twenty-five pounds.  The lifting restriction remained in 
effect through August, when Dr. DiGiovine determined Mr. Boe could not work even 
with the restriction and ordered additional medical tests.  Dr. DiGiovine then certified that Mr. 
Boe was unable to work until December 15, 2005.  On that date, he released him to return 
to full duty work.

 
 
[¶5]  Despite the release to return to work, 
Mr. Boe continued to have problems with his right arm and, in April of 2006, Dr. 
DiGiovine placed him back on restricted duty.  Mr. Boe did not file a claim for further 
TTD benefits allegedly because a Division claims analyst told him there was 
nothing the Division could do until his earlier claim was decided.  On August 29, 2006, the OAH awarded him 
TTD benefits retroactively for the period beginning June 30, 2005, through 
December 14, 2005, the date Dr. DiGiovine had released him to return to full 
duty work.    

 
 
[¶6]  The present matter began on January 29, 
2007, when Mr. Boe filed an application for TTD benefits for the period from 
April 13, 2006 through December 14, 2006.  
The Division denied the claim for the period from April 13 to November 
30, 2006, on the ground that Mr. Boe failed to timely file for TTD benefits for 
that period.1  Mr. Boe requested a hearing.  After the hearing, the OAH upheld the 
denial, finding that his failure to timely file for TTD benefits was not excused 
by the fact that his earlier claim was pending.  The OAH also rejected his claim that the 
Division should be estopped from denying his claim because it knew he had 
returned to TTD but had not requested recertification.  Mr. Boe filed a petition for review of 
the OAH decision in district court.  
The district court affirmed the OAH, and he appealed to this Court.        

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]  The interpretation and correct 
application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act are 
questions of law.  Alcorn v. Sauer Drilling Co., 2006 WY 
15, ¶ 6, 126 P.3d 924, 925 (Wyo. 2006).  
We apply a de novo standard 
when reviewing questions of law.  Id.  Conclusions of law made by an 
administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law.  Id.  We afford no deference to the agency's 
determination, and will correct any error made by the agency in interpreting or 
applying the law.  Id.  We also afford no deference to the 
district court's decision, but review this case as if it had come directly to 
this Court from the agency.  Id.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]  Mr. Boe contends that he was not 
required to apply for benefits for the period from April 13, 2006 through December 14, 2006, 
while his earlier claim was pending.  
He cites State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Comp. Div. v. Gerdes, 951 P.2d 1170 (Wyo. 1997) as support for his 
contention.  In Gerdes, the claimant received TTD 
benefits from the time of her injury in 1993 until June 7, 1995, when her 
physician certified that she had reached maximum medical improvement.  The Division notified Ms. Gerdes that 
her TTD benefits were terminated as of June 7, 1995.  She objected and, following a hearing, 
the OAH awarded her TTD benefits retroactively for the period from June 7, 1995, 
until the hearing and continuing benefits until she could undergo recommended 
surgery.  The Division objected, 
contending that she had not filed claims for benefits during the pendency of the 
contested case pursuant to § 27-14-404(d).  
The OAH rejected the argument and awarded the benefits.  The Division appealed to this Court and 
we affirmed the OAH.  Noting that 
the provision was silent regarding the procedural requirements for continuing 
benefits, we concluded that § 27-14-404(d) did not apply to claims that accrue 
during the pendency of a contested case.  Mr. Boe contends the same reasoning 
applies here and he was not required to apply for additional TTD benefits while 
his contested case was pending.    

 
 

[¶9]  The Division asserts that Gerdes is factually different, and 
therefore not controlling.  The 
Division relies on Alcorn, ¶ 13, 
126 P.3d  at 927-28, in which this Court affirmed the denial of TTD benefits on the 
ground that Mr. Alcorn did not file a timely claim properly certified by one of 
his healthcare providers for the time period at issue.  In contrast to the claim in Gerdes, Mr. Alcorn's claim for retroactive TTD 
benefits was an initial, rather than a continuing, claim.  We concluded the statutes were not 
silent regarding the procedural requirements for filing an initial TTD 
claim.  We 
said:

 
 
The 
unambiguous language of the pertinent statutes and rules requires timely filing 
of the TTD claim and certification by a healthcare provider.  A claimant's failure to file a timely 
claim limits the Division's opportunity to effectively monitor and evaluate a 
claimant's entitlement to TTD benefits.  
The failure to properly file an initial TTD claim also undermines an 
employer's right to offer light duty work to the employee in lieu of TTD 
benefits.   

 
 

Id.  Just as Mr. Alcorn's claim for TTD 
benefits was untimely, the Division argues, so was Mr. Boe's 
claim.

 
 
[¶10]  We conclude that neither Gerdes nor Alcorn is controlling under the facts of 
Mr. Boe's case; rather, the plain language of § 27-14-404(d) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-605(a) (LexisNexis 2007) is determinative.  Section 27-14-404 provides in pertinent 
part as follows:

 
 
§ 
27-14-404.  Temporary total 
disability; benefits; determination of eligibility; . . .; period of 
certification limited; temporary light duty employment

 
 
(a) 
If after a compensable injury is sustained and as a result of the injury the 
employee is subject to temporary total disability as defined under W.S. 
27-14-102(a)(xviii), the injured employee is entitled to receive a temporary 
total disability award for the period of temporary total disability as provided 
by W.S. 27-14-403(c).  The period 
for receiving a temporary total disability award under this section for injuries 
resulting from any one (1) incident or accident shall not exceed a cumulative 
period of twenty-four (24) months, except that the division pursuant to its 
rules and regulations and in its discretion may in the event of extraordinary 
circumstances award additional temporary total disability benefits. . . .   

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
            
(c)  Payment under subsection 
(a) of this section shall cease prior to the expiration of the twenty-four (24) 
month maximum period specified under subsection (a) of this section 
if:

            
(i)  Recovery is complete to 
the extent that the earning power of the employee at a gainful occupation for 
which he is reasonably suited by experience or training is substantially 
restored; or

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
            
(d) Disability payments under this section shall not be allowed for the 
first three (3) days of disability unless the incapacity extends beyond eight 
(8) days.  If payments cease for a period of eight (8) 
days or more, the employee may apply for reinstatement under W.S. 27-14-605 and 
any award granted shall be treated as an initial award. . . . Benefits under 
subsection (a) of this section shall not be paid if:

            
(i) An employee or his personal representative fails to file a claim for 
benefits within thirty (30) days after the first day immediately succeeding the 
first thirty (30) days of any certified period of temporary total 
disability;

            
(ii) A claim is filed without the signature of the claimant and 
certification by the attending health care provider; . . .

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
(g)  Only a health care provider may certify 
temporary total disability under this act.  
The length of time of the initial certification or recertification of 
temporary total disability shall be established by the department after 
considering the recommendation of the health care provider and current medical 
literature.  Subject to W.S. 
27-14-609, the employer, employee or division may request recertification of the 
period of temporary total disability at intervals of not less than sixty (60) 
days, provided that in the event of extraordinary circumstances, the division 
may reconsider recertification at any time.  . . .

 
 
(emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶11]  Pursuant to § 27-14-404(a), the OAH 
determined Mr. Boe was entitled to receive TTD benefits for the period beginning 
June 30, 2005, and ending December 14, 2005.  In accordance with § 27-14-404(c)(i), 
payment of TTD benefits to Mr. Boe ceased after December 14, 2005, when his 
orthopedist released him to return to work without restrictions; that is, in the 
language of § 27-14-404(c)(i), Mr. Boe's earning power at the occupation for 
which he was reasonably suited by experience or training was substantially 
restored.  Mr. Boe continued to work 
without restrictions until April 13, 2006, when his orthopedist notified the 
Division that, because Mr. Boe was continuing to experience problems involving 
his right arm, he was keeping him off of work until he received the results of 
an EMG and nerve conduction studies.  
Pursuant to § 27-14-404(d), Mr. Boe was entitled at that point to apply 
for reinstatement of TTD benefits under § 27-14-605 because, as stated in § 
27-14-404(d), payments had ceased "for a period of eight days or more."  Section 27-14-605 provides as 
follows:   

            

§ 
27-14-605.  Application for 
modification of benefits; time limitation; grounds; termination of case; 
exceptions.

 
 

(a)          
If 
a determination is made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any benefits 
under this act, an application may be 
made to the division by any party within four (4) years from the date of the 
last payment for additional benefits or for a modification of the amount of 
benefits on the ground of increase or 
decrease of incapacity due solely to the 
injury, or upon grounds of mistake or fraud. . . .

(b)          
Any 
right to benefits shall be terminated and is no longer under the jurisdiction of 
this act if a claim for any benefit is not filed with the division within the 
four (4) year limitation prescribed under subsection (a) of this section.  

(c)          
A 
claim for medical benefits which would otherwise be terminated under subsection 
(b) of this section and barred under W.S. 27-14-503(a) and (b) may be paid by 
the division if the claimant:

(i)            
Submits 
medical reports to the division substantiating his claim:

(ii)          
Proves 
by competent medical authority to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that 
the condition is directly related to the original injury; 
and

(iii)         
Submits 
to an examination by a health care provider selected by the division and results 
of the examination validate his claim.

 
 
[¶12]  Mr. Boe satisfied the first requirement 
in subsection (a) of this provision because a determination in his favor on his 
claim for TTD benefits was made in August of 2006.   Thus, he was entitled to apply for 
additional TTD benefits on the ground of increased incapacity due solely to the 
injury, or upon grounds of mistake or fraud, within four years from December 14, 
2005.  His January 29, 2007, 
application clearly fell within the four year limitations period for applying 
for additional TTD benefits.  
Additionally, the orthopedist's order in April 2006 that Mr. Boe was not 
to work was evidence of increased incapacity within the meaning of § 
27-14-605.  As we said in State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. 
Div. v. Henriksen,  2001 WY 42, 
¶ 9, 21 P.3d 1185, 1187 (Wyo. 2001), increased incapacity can result when an 
employee follows the order of his or her medical provider not to work for a 
reasonable time in order to promote recovery from an injury.  Section 27-14-404(d) clearly directed 
Mr. Boe to proceed under § 27-14-605 and having satisfied the requirements the 
plain language of that provision imposes, Mr. Boe's claim was not precluded 
because he failed to file it within the sixty days provided in § 
27-14-404(d)(i).  

 
 

[¶13]  In concluding otherwise, the OAH did not 
address the language in § 27-14-404(d) allowing an employee who had received an 
earlier TTD award to apply for additional benefits under § 27-14-605.  Rather, the OAH appears simply to have 
assumed that the sixty day claim filing requirement contained in § 
27-14-404(d)(i) applied to Mr. Boe.  
In its Order, the district court focused on the language in § 
27-14-404(d) stating that upon application for additional benefits under § 
27-14-605, "any award granted 
shall be treated as an initial award."  
The district court interpreted this language as requiring Mr. Boe to 
satisfy the sixty day filing requirements contained in § 27-14-404(d)(i).  The difficulty with this interpretation 
is twofold.  First, § 27-14-404(d) 
expressly allows an employee who has received an earlier award under § 
27-14-404(a) to apply for an additional award under § 27-14-605, which contains 
no sixty day filing requirement.  
Second, the sixty day filing requirement contained in § 27-14-404(d)(i) 
expressly applies to "[b]enefits under subsection [§27-14-404](a)" which governs 
initial claims for TTD benefits after a compensable injury is sustained.  Mr. Boe's January 2007 claim was not an 
initial claim for TTD benefits after his work injury, but a claim under § 
27-14-605 for additional benefits after a prior determination in his favor 
involving the same injury.

 
 
[¶14]  The language in § 27-14-404(d) stating 
that "any award granted [under § 27-14-605] shall be treated as an initial award" lends itself to 
misinterpretationhence, the district court's conclusion that an application for 
additional benefits under § 27-14-605 must meet the procedural requirements 
imposed by § 27-14-404(d)(i) on claims made under § 27-14-404(a).  Our reading of the language at issue, 
however, convinces us that it was not intended to subject an application for 
additional benefits under § 27-14-605 to the sixty day filing requirement.  Instead, the language means, just as it 
says, that after an award is granted 
under § 27-14-605, it "shall be treated as an initial award."  Had the legislature intended to impose a 
sixty day filing requirement for applications made under § 27-14-605, it would 
have said so clearly by stating that "[b]enefits under subsection (a) of this 
section and W.S. 27-14-605 shall not 
be paid if an employee or his personal representative fails to file a claim" 
within sixty days.  Had the 
legislature intended that result, it also would have clearly stated that applications under § 27-14-605 are 
subject to the same filing requirements as initial claims for benefits.  The fact that the legislature stated 
instead that awards under § 27-14-605 
"shall be treated as an initial award" suggests they are to be so treated after the award is made.2  Giving the statutory language its plain 
and ordinary meaning, it does not state that applications under § 27-14-605 are 
treated as initial applications and, as such, must be filed within sixty 
days.

 
 

[¶15]  Because the parties relied almost 
exclusively on Gerdes and Alcorn in presenting their respective 
positions, it is appropriate to address the reasons why we do not find those 
cases to be controlling.  We begin 
with Alcorn, the more easily 
distinguishable of the two cases.  
To reiterate, the OAH denied Mr. Alcorn's claim for TTD 
benefits on the ground that he did not file a timely claim properly certified by 
one of his healthcare providers for the time period at issue.  Unlike Mr. Boe's claim, Mr. Alcorn's 
claim for retroactive TTD benefits was an initial claim falling within the 
parameters of § 27-14-404(a); that is, it was the first claim Mr. Alcorn filed 
for benefits resulting from the work injury.  It was not, as in Mr. Boe's case, an 
application for additional benefits for a work injury for which he had already 
received benefits that had ceased.  
Because it was an initial claim falling under § 27-14-404(a), it was 
clearly governed by § 27-14-404(d)(i), which sets out the circumstances under 
which benefits under subsection (a) will be denied, including the failure to 
file a claim within sixty days.  
Given this important difference, Alcorn does not support the denial of 
Mr. Boe's claim.

 
 
[¶16]  We likewise do not find Gerdes to be directly on point in 
resolving Mr. Boe's claim.  There, 
the issue was whether the claimant was required to continue to file claims for 
TTD benefits while her objection to the Division's termination of those benefits 
was pending.  We concluded that Ms. 
Gerdes was not required to file claims for TTD benefits while a hearing was 
pending to decide whether the benefits were properly terminated or whether she 
was entitled to continued benefits.  
Mr. Boe's situation was substantially different from Ms. Gerdes.  

 
 
[¶17]  Unlike Ms. Gerdes, the hearing pending 
in Mr. Boe's case was for the purpose of deciding whether he was entitled to 
retroactive TTD benefits for the initial period that he was unable to work 
without restrictions.  He was not 
claiming that his TTD benefits should not have been terminated after December 
14, 2006, when the orthopedist released him to return to work without 
restrictions.  Instead, after the 
initial determination in his favor for TTD benefits under § 27-14-404(a), he 
sought additional TTD benefits on the ground that the orthopedist certified that 
he could not return to work pending the outcome of additional medical 
tests.  Accordingly, his claim fell 
squarely under § 27-14-605 to which the procedural requirements of § 
27-14-404(d) do not apply.

 
 
[¶18]  One additional point merits 
discussion.  In his January 2007 
application for benefits, Mr. Boe did not state that he was seeking additional 
benefits under § 27-14-605.  The 
Division might argue that his failure to identify the statutory provision under 
which he sought benefits should preclude his claim.  However, § 27-14-605 states only that 
"an application may be made to the division by any party within four (4) years 
from the date of the last payment for additional benefits . . . on the ground of 
increase . . . incapacity."  This 
language does not clearly require a claimant to file a particular 
application.  We have reviewed the 
Worker's Compensation Division Rules and have found no rule setting forth 
specific procedures for filing a claim under § 27-14-605.  Here, the health care provider certified 
to the Division that Mr. Boe was unable to work as of April 2006, placing the 
Division on actual notice that he likely would be seeking additional 
benefits.  Mr. Boe then filed an 
application for benefits for the period beginning the same date the orthopedist 
had re-certified that he was unable to work.  Under these circumstances, the January 
2007 application for benefits was sufficient to constitute an application for 
additional benefits under § 27-14-605.3      

 
 

[¶19]  Having concluded that Mr. Boe's claim 
was governed by § 27-14-605, we ordinarily would remand this case to the 
district court with instructions to remand it to the OAH for a determination of 
whether Mr. Boe met his burden of proving that he was entitled to additional 
benefits on the ground of increased incapacity due solely to the injury.  Under 
§ 27-14-605:

 
 
 [T]he claimant must prove to a 
"reasonable degree of medical certainty­" that the increase or 
decrease in capacity is "due solely to 
the injury."  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-605(a) and (c)(ii) (emphasis added).  The claimant must show "he has sustained 
additional incapacity entirely as a result of the injury in order to collect 
additional benefits.  Loghry v. Capshaw Well Serv., 739 P.2d 1227, 1228 (Wyo. 1987).  A 
showing that the increase in incapacity was "more probably than not caused by 
the original injury" is insufficient.  
Woodman v. Grace Bomac 
Drilling, 736 P.2d 313, 315-16 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 

Kaczmarek, 
2009 WY 110, ¶ 11, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Wyo. 2009).  In most cases, the determination of 
whether the claimant met this burden would be one for the fact finder.  Here, however, there was no dispute that 
Mr. Boe's inability to work from April to December of 2006 was due to his May 
2005 work injury.  The only matter 
in dispute before the OAH was whether his January 2007 application for benefits 
was timely.  Under these 
circumstances, there is nothing to be gained by remanding the case to the OAH 
for a factual finding.  

 
 

[¶20]  In addition to asserting that his claim 
was timely under Gerdes, Mr. Boe 
contends alternatively that the Division should be estopped from denying his TTD 
benefits because its actions caused him to delay filing a claim.  He points to the Division's failure to 
request recertification under § 27-14-404(g) despite having actual knowledge 
that he was no longer working as of April 2006.  Because we conclude that Mr. Boe was 
entitled to benefits under § 27-14-605, we do not address his estoppel 
claim.   

 
 
[¶21]  The OAH's order denying Mr. Boe's claim 
on the ground that it was not timely filed is reversed.  The matter is remanded to the district 
court with instructions to vacate its order and remand to the OAH for entry of 
an order awarding TTD benefits from April 14, 2006, through November 30, 2006, 
under § 27-14-605 on the ground of increased incapacity.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Division paid the claim for the period from December 1 to 14, 2006, 
concluding that the claim for that period was timely filed under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-404(d)(i) (LexisNexis 2007), which provision is set out in paragraph 10 
below.

 
 

2The issue 
is not directly before us, but we read the language of § 27-14-404(d) stating 
that an award granted under § 27-14-605 "shall be treated as an initial award" 
to mean that once granted, the award is subject to all provisions governing an 
initial award, such as § 27-14-404(g) requiring certification and 
recertification of TTD by a health care provider, and § 27-14-404(h) providing 
for suspension of benefits under specified circumstances.

 
 

3Of course, the Division has the prerogative to amend its rules and set 
out specific requirements for filing a claim for additional benefits under § 
27-14-605.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 
[¶22]   I respectfully dissent because I am 
uncomfortable with the majority's interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 27-14-404 and -605.  It is a 
plausible interpretation, but it is not the only possible interpretation, as 
demonstrated by the fact that Mr. Boe never asserted that the four-year filing 
limitation set forth in  § 27-14-605 
applied to his claim.  Accordingly, 
the hearing examiner and the district court never considered whether the 
four-year limitation period applied.  
Perhaps most significantly, the Division has never been provided with the 
opportunity to weigh in on this issue.  
The parties did not raise or brief the issue in this appeal.  I appreciate the majority's effort to 
interpret the confusing language of these statutes, but I think it is imprudent 
to undertake that effort without the assistance of the parties. 

 
 
[¶23]   I am also concerned by a practical 
consequence of the majority opinion.  
Following its interpretation, an employee will have only sixty days to 
file an initial claim for temporary total disability benefits, but up to "four 
(4) years from the date of the last payment for additional benefits" to file a 
claim for additional temporary total disability benefits.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-605(a).  The statutes provide no explanation for 
the significant disparity between the treatments of initial claims and 
subsequent claims for additional TTD benefits.  In Alcorn, we stated that the purpose of 
the timely filing requirements was to provide the Division with an opportunity 
"to effectively monitor and evaluate a claimant's entitlement to TTD 
benefits."  ¶ 13, 126 P.3d  at 
928.  We also recognized that 
failure to file a timely claim undermined "an employer's right to offer light 
duty work to the employee in lieu of TTD benefits."  Id.  From a practical perspective, there 
appears to be no reason for different filing time requirements based upon 
whether the claim is an initial or a subsequent claim.

 
 
[¶24]   I would remand to provide the 
parties with the opportunity to present this issue to the 
OAH.