Case Title: The People v. Terrance Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 69  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Terrance Johnson,
            Appellant.
Timothy P. Murphy, for appellant.
Shawn P. Hennessy, for respondent.
GRAFFEO, J.:
In this case, we consider whether defendant's waiver of
his right to appeal became invalid when the court later decided
not to honor two aspects of defendant's plea agreement.  Based on
the facts before us, we conclude that the court's modification of
those sentencing terms voided defendant's prior waiver of appeal
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No. 69
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and required the re-allocution of the waiver.  Because that did
not occur, defendant was entitled to pursue an appeal challenging
his sentence.
In October 2006, defendant Terrance Johnson, a 16-year-
old student, attacked a female teacher with a wooden board near a
school.  After striking her several times, defendant took the
keys to her car and drove away in the teacher's vehicle. 
Defendant was later apprehended and indicted for robbery in the
first degree and two counts of robbery in the second degree.
On the day the trial was scheduled to begin, Supreme
Court was informed that a plea agreement had been reached between
the People and defendant.  In furtherance of the negotiated
agreement, Supreme Court indicated that in exchange for a guilty
plea to first-degree robbery and a waiver of the right to appeal,
defendant would be adjudicated as a youthful offender with a
maximum prison sentence of 1a to 4 years.  During the plea
allocution, defendant acknowledged that he was facing up to 25
years in prison without the plea deal and he agreed to waive his
right to appeal.  The court further warned defendant that the
maximum sentence could be imposed if he failed to appear for
sentencing, did not cooperate with the probation department or
committed another crime.  After allocuting that he injured the
teacher with a board and stole her car, defendant pleaded guilty
to robbery in the first degree.
Before sentencing occurred, Supreme Court reconsidered
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the terms of the plea agreement and decided that it could not
abide by all of the terms because "it would be inappropriate to
grant youthful offender status, in light of the seriousness of
the crime, the injuries to the victim, and other factors."  The
court also noted that the probation department had recommended
against youthful offender treatment.  The judge offered defendant
the option of withdrawing his plea and proceeding to trial, or
retaining the guilty plea and receiving a sentence of five years
of imprisonment and five years of postrelease supervision, but
without adjudication as a youthful offender.  Defense counsel
advised the court that defendant did not wish to withdraw his
plea and the judge thereafter imposed the new agreed-to sentence,
which did not include youthful offender status.
Defendant appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed,
concluding that defendant's waiver of his right to appeal
remained valid despite the modification of the sentencing
component of the plea agreement and that defendant's waiver
encompassed any challenge he might have had regarding the denial
of youthful offender treatment and the severity of his sentence
(60 AD3d 1396 [4th Dept 2009]).  A Judge of this Court granted
leave to appeal (12 NY3d 855 [2009]).
Defendant urges that his waiver of appeal was
invalidated when Supreme Court lengthened his prison sentence and
declined to adjudicate him a youthful offender as this was a
significant change in circumstances.  The People, in contrast,
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No. 69
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contend that the court's inability to adhere to the original
agreement did not undermine the waiver because defendant was
originally advised that he faced imprisonment for up to 25 years
and had been offered the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
A waiver of the right to appeal may be elicited as a
condition of a plea bargain (see People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 5
[1989]), but it must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
entered into by the accused (see e.g. People v Callahan, 80 NY2d
273, 280 [1992]).  We have repeatedly observed that there is no
mandatory litany that must be used in order to obtain a valid
waiver of appellate rights (see e.g. People v Moissett, 76 NY2d
909, 910-911 [1990]) and a waiver will be enforceable if the
record demonstrates that the defendant "intentionally
relinquishe[d] or abandon[ed] a known right that would otherwise
survive a guilty plea" (People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 230 n 1
[2000]).  A court therefore "must make certain that a defendant's
understanding of the terms and conditions of a plea agreement is
evident on the face of the record" (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248,
256 [2006]).
Here, the terms and conditions of the plea agreement
offered to defendant in return for his waiver of the right to
appeal were unequivocal -- Supreme Court promised youthful
offender adjudication and a maximum sentence of 1a to 4 years in
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No. 69
* We reject defendant's contention that the colloquy was
insufficient to demonstrate a valid waiver.
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prison.*  The court's pronouncement of these terms was
unconditional and defendant was not informed that the court
intended to further reflect on the appropriateness of the
promised disposition (see People v Selikoff, 35 NY2d 227, 238
[1974], cert denied 419 US 1122 [1975]).  In other words, when
defendant agreed to waive his right to appeal, he had no reason
to suspect that he would not be treated as a youthful offender or
receive a sentence in excess of the maximum that had been
negotiated.
Because the court did not advise defendant that it was
reserving approval of the negotiated disposition until it
reviewed the presentencing report or other pertinent information,
defendant could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to appeal the court's decision not to abide by the original
promise of youthful offender treatment and a prison sentence of
1a to 4 years (cf. People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 737 [1998]
[general unrestricted waiver of appeal entered without a specific
sentencing promise precludes a challenge to the imposed sentence
as harsh and excessive]).  Supreme Court's subsequent decision to
modify the material terms affecting sentencing therefore vitiated
defendant's knowing and intelligent entry of the waiver of
appeal.  Consequently, once the decision to impose the more
severe sentence was announced, it was incumbent on the court to
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elicit defendant's continuing consent to waive his right to
appeal.  However, there was no need for the judge to reallocute
defendant on his decision to plead guilty because his choice not
to withdraw his plea effectively reaffirmed his knowing and
intelligent consent to concede guilt.  Since defendant was not
asked if he further agreed to waive his right to pursue an appeal
regarding the modified terms of his sentence, he is not
foreclosed from requesting appellate review of the propriety of
the denial of youthful offender treatment or the severity of the
imposed sentence.  We remit this case to the Appellate Division
so that it may consider the merits of those claims.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed and the case remitted for consideration of issues
raised but not determined on the appeal to that court.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed and case remitted to the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, for consideration of issues raised but not
determined on the appeal to that court.  Opinion by Judge
Graffeo.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Read, Smith,
Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided May 4, 2010