Case Title: Gray v. People

Citation: 342 P.2d 627

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1959-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
342 P.2d 627 (1959) Benjamin GRAY, Plaintiff in Error, v. PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 18751. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. July 13, 1959. Rehearing Denied August 17, 1959. Mellman, Mellman & Thorn, Denver, Loesch & Kreidler, Montrose, for plaintiff in error. *628 Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Patterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error. DAY, Justice. Plaintiff in error, defendant in the trial court, was charged with the larceny of six calves each belonging to a different person. He is here by writ of error seeking to reverse a judgment of conviction and sentence to the state penitentiary entered by the court after verdicts of guilty returned by the jury. We will refer to him as defendant or by name. Defendant assigns eight grounds of error. Three refer to instructions given to the jury and to the court's refusal to give an instruction tendered by the defendant. Other claimed errors upon which we will comment are: 1. That the information was improperly drawn and prejudicial to the defendant and 2. That the district attorney was guilty of improper remarks in his opening statement. The remaining assignments relied on we deem without merit. There is little dispute in the evidence. Defendant was apprehended by two state brand inspectors who were on a "stake out" along the highway to intercept any unusual movement of livestock. Defendant had the unbranded calves in his pick-up when apprehended at 1:30 o'clock in the morning. Upon being stopped and questioned he said the calves were his (the defendant's). Subsequent undisputed evidence disclosed that each of the calves belonged to separate Indian owners. Each of the owners testified that they had not given their consent to the taking of the cattle by the defendant. Defendant's explanation of their acquisition was that the calves were sick and were being taken to a veterinarian in Delta. Other evidence, however, was produced to show that the calves were not sick. An eye-witness who helped the defendant cut out the calves from their mothersa witness called as part of the defendant's casetestified concerning the night ride to get the calves, loading them into a pick-up and driving with lights out so that they would not attract attention. The witness' description of defendant's movement when a car appeared unexpectedly in the vicinity is quite revealing, and is quoted here to indicate that a jury might well conclude that defendant's possession and transportation of the calves was not with any lawful intent. We quote: Since the evidence amply supports the verdict of the jury, the judgment of the court should be sustained unless the assignments of error are so prejudicial as to have denied defendant his right to a fair trial. *629 First Question to be Determined: Can objections to the form of the information be raised for the first time on motion for new trial and then made the basis for a writ of error? This question is answered in the negative. The information was in seven separate counts. One count was dismissed on motion of the District Attorney. Each count charged an alleged larceny of a calf therein described and gave the name of the individual owner. The defendant did not, either prior to or during the trial, object to the information. He entered separate pleas of not guilty to each count. He made no objection to the six separate verdicts submitted by the court to the jury. On motion for new trial defendant contended, as he does here, that the taking of the calves from one place at one time constituted but one act or transaction and that if he was guilty of larceny it was but a single offense. To this argument on the motion the trial court commented: It is clear from the evidence that the offense charged was one transaction and might properly have been charged in one count. But the failure of the District Attorney so to do did not prejudice the defendant. The jury was instructed that the information is merely an accusation and that it is not to be considered as evidence. In addition the evidence would have been no different had the information listed the seven calves of the seven defendants in one count in the information. The real objection, if any there be, to charging the defendant in more than one count, was stated in Sweek v. People, 85 Colo. 479, 277 P. 1, 3, as follows: The court, recognizing that only one offense was committed, sentenced the defendant to a term of not less than three nor more than eight years in the state penitenitary, just as though the information contained only one count. The rule governing objections to the form of the information is to be found in C.R.S. `53, 39-3-7, as follows: Cases supporting the statute are: Critchfield v. People, 91 Colo. 127, 13 P.2d 270; Warren v. People, 121 Colo. 118, 213 P.2d *630 381; Cooper v. People, 132 Colo. 548, 291 P.2d 388; Marrs v. People, 135 Colo. 458, 312 P.2d 505. Second Question to be Determined: Did the court err in giving instruction No. 8 with reference to similar offenses? This question is answered in the negative. Defendant contends that the instruction was prejudicial in that there was no evidence in the record of "other offenses" committed by the defendant. The instruction complained of reads as follows: While we do not approve of the language of the instruction, it appearing to label as a matter of law certain conduct of defendant as "other offenses", nevertheless it was given for the benefit of the defendant, having been tendered by defendant's counsel and strenuously resisted by the prosecuting attorney. It was finally given by the court upon the insistence of the defendant. In addition to the rule that instructions not objected to at the trial will not be considered on writ of error, we cannot consider the trial court to be in error for giving an instruction demanded by the defense. Instruction No. 5 is in the same categoryoffered by the defendant and given by the court over objection of the district attorney. Third Question to be Determined: When in the opening statement of the District Attorney there are improper or prejudicial remarks and no objection is made thereto, may the utterances be urged as grounds for reversal on writ of error? This question on this record is answered in the negative. Defendant complains that the district attorney in his opening statement expressed his personal belief in the guilt of the defendant. The remarks of the district attorney are: No objection to this statement was made by the defendant. It was not called to the attention of the court. The court was given no opportunity to admonish counsel for the prosecution or to instruct the jury as to the purpose of opening statements of counsel. Nevertheless the court did by instruction No. 14 tell the jury that the opening statements and final arguments of counsel are not evidence. For comments: on similar situations see Manzoli v. People, 69 Colo. 131, 169 P. 144; Jordan v. People, 19 Colo. 417, 36 P. 218; Morrison v. State, 76 Ind. 335. Fourth Question to be Determined: Did the court err in refusing to give defendant's tendered instruction No. A? This question is answered in the negative. The tendered instruction is: Defendant contends the offering of this instruction was on the theory of the defense and should be given "No matter how improbable or unreasonable the contention, * * *." Jabich v. People, 58 Colo. 175, 143 P. 1092, 1094. As previously noted, *631 instruction No. 5 was also tendered by the defendant as supporting the theory of the defense. His testimony, if believed, was that he had general authority to protect sick cattle, if found. That defendant was hired to ride the fence and repair the same is not disputed. At no time did he contend, however, nor was there testimony of any other witness, that he was in lawful possession or in custody generally of the herds. He did testify that he had been told that if, when repairing fences, he saw any cattle that needed attention he was not to let them die, but was to take them to be doctored. Thus he testified in effect that he had implied consent to take sick cattle to the veterinarian. As was previously noted, the calves involved here were not sick. The jury heard the defendant's testimony. The over-all instruction as to the elements of the crime of larceny, together with instruction No. 5, covered the law of the case adequately. Perceiving no reversible error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.