Case Title: JOHNSON v. FORD MOTOR CO.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95873

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOHNSON v. FORD MOTOR CO.  JOHNSON v. FORD MOTOR CO. 2002 OK 24 45 P.3d 86 Case Number: 95873 Decided: 04/02/2002 Mandate Issued: 04/26/2002 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA RICKY JOHNSON, Plaintiff/Appellee v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant/Appellant [45 P.3d 88] APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY Honorable Karl Gray, Trial Judge ¶0 The appellee, Ricky Johnson (Johnson) incurred a brain injury in a single-vehicle accident. Johnson's parents initiated an action against Ford Motor Company (Ford/manufacturer), seeking to recover compensatory and punitive damages. They alleged that Ford had distributed and sold a defective, unreasonably dangerous vehicle because the vehicle's seat belt and restraint system failed during Johnson's accident causing him permanent brain damage. The jury found in favor of Johnson. The trial court, Honorable Karl Gray, entered a judgment on the jury verdict and awarded pre-judgment interest which it calculated from the date the initial petition was filed. Ford filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that: 1) the trial court improperly refused to allow its requested jury instruction regarding enhanced injuries; 2) Johnson's evidence was insufficient to support a jury determination that the failure of the seat belt and restraint system caused his injuries; and 3) the calculation of pre-judgment interest should not have begun until the amended petition was filed and Ford was served. The trial court overruled the motion for a new trial. Ford appealed and filed a motion to retain the cause in this Court. We hold, under the facts presented, that: 1) the omission of the manufacturer's requested instruction relating to enhanced injuries does not require reversal; 2) the plaintiff's evidence that the seat belt and restraint system caused his permanent brain injury was sufficient to support the jury verdict; and 3) pre-judgment interest commenced from the date the cause was filed. MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT DENIED; AFFIRMED. James D. Sill, Mary A. Black, James C. Winterringer, Shawnee, Oklahoma, Richard L. Denney, Lydia J. Barrett, Norman, Oklahoma, Brent D. Berry, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee A. Thomas Elder, Jr., Curtis L. Smith, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Geroge E. Wolf, Paul A. Williams, Kansas City, Missouri, Craig A. Morgan, Austin, Texas, for Appellant KAUGER, J.: ¶1 This cause concerns manufacturers' products liability as it relates to automobile accidents in which the alleged defective product did not cause the accident to occur, but allegedly caused injuries after the initial impact. This theory of recovery is commonly known as the "second impact injury" or "second collision" doctrine". FACTS ¶2 On June 16, 1997, the appellee, nineteen-year-old Ricky Johnson (Johnson) apparently lost control of his 1988 Ford Ranger pickup truck while driving on a country road near his home in Tecumseh, Oklahoma. The pickup went off of the right side of the road, swerved to the left side of the road, flew off the road and the edge of a creek bank, smashed into an embankment, and landed at the bottom of the creek bed on its passenger's side. Johnson has no recollection of the accident. ¶3 During the accident, Johnson's seat belt webbing tore apart at the latch plate and he landed against the passenger-side door. Johnson sustained a broken pelvis, broken left arm, broken bone in his spine, ruptured bladder and a severe head injury with bruising and hemorrhaging in the brain. As a result of the brain injury, Johnson has permanent physical impairment and a reduction in his mental functioning. ¶4 On August 6, 1998, Johnson's parents initiated a suit ¶5 Ford defended, denying that the seat belt was defective, or that it was the cause of Johnson's injuries. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Johnson for $5,000,000.00. On October 6, 2000, the trial court entered a journal entry of judgment on the jury verdict and awarded pre-judgment interest. ¶6 I. UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THE OMISSION OF THE MANUFACTURER'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION RELATING TO ENHANCED INJURIES DOES NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL. ¶7 This cause involves a single-car accident, and it is undisputed that the failure of the seat belt and restraint system were not the cause of the accident. Ford asserts that the trial court committed reversible error when it neglected to specifically instruct the jury that if it determined that the seat belt and restraint system were defective, then Johnson could only recover damages for the portions of his injury which were enhanced because the seat belt separated. ¶8 Johnson argues that: 1) the evidence presented at trial showed that, regardless of why Johnson's vehicle left the road, Johnson would not have suffered any permanent disabling brain injury if the defective seat belt had not failed; 2) Ford's proposed jury instruction was unnecessary and it would have mislead the jury because Johnson's brain damage was not merely "enhanced" by the defect, it was caused by the defect; and 3) the jury instructions which were given properly reflected Oklahoma products liability law. ¶9 In giving instructions, the trial court is not required to frame issues, but it must state the law correctly. ¶10 Oklahoma adopted the theory of manufacturers' products liability in Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., ¶11 Ten years later, in Lee v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., ¶12 On appeal we affirmed, recognizing that a manufacturer should be liable for damages if the plaintiff can prove that he or she suffered injures as a result of the defect or "second impact" in addition to those suffered as a result of the latent defect. Regarding the plaintiff's burden to prove causation, we held that: 1) the plaintiff was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the product was in a defective condition which was unreasonably dangerous as defined by ordinary expectations when it left control of the manufacturer; and 2) after the original, initial impact the defect caused an injury or enhanced injuries. ¶13 Rather than require the plaintiff to prove precisely and exactly those injuries which are attributable to the accident and those which are attributable to the alleged design defect, we determined that: 1) the plaintiff should be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the extent of the enhanced injuries resulting from the defect; and 2) the manufacturer is liable for damages only for injuries which resulted from the defect. We also noted that when injuries are sustained which are separate and divisible, the burden of proof remains on the plaintiff including the burden of proving "enhancement". In other words, the plaintiff must offer sufficient proof to prove which of the injuries are attributable to the manufacturer's defective product and the degree of "enhancement" occasioned by the product as distinguished from the injuries flowing from a third party's acts of negligence. ¶14 However, we also recognized that when the principal injury complained of is single and indivisible and therefore incapable of apportionment, there can be no "enhancement." Accordingly, under this theory, the plaintiff has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to prove to the jury that each defendant's act was a contributing factor in producing the plaintiff's injuries. Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden of proving that the plaintiff's injury was either [45 P.3d 92] the result of a third party's negligence or only in part attributable to the manufacturer's defective product shifts to the manufacturer. Under these circumstances, the relationship of the manufacturer and the third party are concurrent tortfeasors in the sense that their independent acts combine to cause a single injury. Should the plaintiff's injuries be indivisible, the defendants are held jointly and severally liable as concurrent tortfeasors for plaintiff's total damage. If reasonable minds could differ on whether the plaintiff's injuries are divisible, the trier of fact determines whether the injury can be reasonably apportioned among the defendants and the extent of each defendant's liability. ¶15 Although Lee involved a third party who caused the accident, we hold that its rationale applies regardless of whether the initial accident is caused by the plaintiff. In the present cause, Johnson sustained several injuries as a result of the accident. Nevertheless, a review of the record reveals that Johnson postulated his claim for damages on the principal brain injury, as a single and indivisible injury which rendered him permanently impaired. ¶16 When reviewing jury instructions, the standard of review requires the consideration of the accuracy of the statement of law as well as the applicability of the instructions to the issues. The instructions are considered as a whole. II. ¶18 THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JURY DETERMINATION THAT THE FAILURE OF THE SEAT BELT AND RESTRAINT SYSTEM CAUSED HIS INJURIES. ¶19 Ford also argues that the jury verdict cannot be allowed to stand because Johnson's evidence was insufficient to support a jury determination that the failure of the seat belt and restraint system caused his injuries. Ford insists that Johnson offered no proof that, under the immense forces of the accident, the seat belt and restraint system would not have failed even if the seat belt and restraint system were not defective. Johnson argues that he offered sufficient evidence to meet his general burden of proof and to support the jury verdict. ¶20 Again, Lee v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., ¶21 A review of the record reveals that Johnson met the causation burden required by Lee. Johnson presented evidence showing that: he suffered permanent, critical brain injuries because the sharp edge of the seat belt latch plate, which was installed by Ford in its pickup truck, sliced through and severed the belt webbing during the collision, and that Ford knew of the dangers posed by the sharp edges of its restraint system. He presented testimony that the latch plate was defective; the seat belt was cut by the latch plate; that his injury was caused by the seat belt's failure; that he would not have sustained the permanent disabling injury had his seat belt remained intact; and that other, safer seat belt and restraint systems were available. Once Johnson met this burden, the burden of proving that Johnson's injury was attributable to the accident and not attributable to the manufacturer's defective product shifted to Ford. III. ¶22 UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST COMMENCED FROM THE DATE THE CAUSE WAS FILED. ¶23 Ford argues that the trial court erred in awarding Johnson pre-judgment interest commencing from August 6, 1998, the date the initial petition was filed, rather than from January 21, 1999, the day the summons was mailed to Ford. Ford relies on Parker v. O'Rion Industries, Inc., ¶24 Pre-judgment interest is only awarded if authorized by statute. Heiman v. Atlantic Richfield Co., ¶25 Parker involved a plaintiff who filed suit in Oklahoma state court and subsequently initiated a suit in federal court, ceasing to pursue its state court action. After the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, she sought pre-judgment interest commencing from the date of the filing of her state court action. The district court granted the plaintiff's request and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. It held that pre-judgment interest should have run only from the date on which the plaintiff filed her action in federal court, and that any delays resulting from the change in courts were the plaintiff's responsibility. ¶26 Parker is clearly distinguishable from the present cause on its facts. The Parker plaintiff filed one cause in state court, ceased to pursue it, and then filed another independent suit in federal court. The judgment awarding the plaintiff damages arose from the second suit. Here, there is only one lawsuit and any delays that occurred did not result from plaintiff's change of courts. Even if Parker were not distinguishable, on matters of state law we are not restrained by federal cases, but look first to our own decisions for authority. ¶27 The record does not disclose why service was not accomplished earlier than January of 1999. Nevertheless, service of process is always timely if made within 180 days after the petition is filed. CONCLUSION ¶28 A judgment will not be disturbed because of allegedly erroneous instructions, unless it appears reasonably certain that the jury was misled thereby. ¶29 A review of the record reveals that the appellee met the causation burden required by Lee v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT DENIED; AFFIRMED ¶30 HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J, HODGES, LAVENDER, KAUGER, SUMMERS, JJ., concur. ¶31 OPALA, J., concurs in part; dissents in part. ¶32 BOUDREAU, WINCHESTER, JJ., dissent. FOOT