Case Title: Columbus Park Housing Corporation v. City of Kenosha

Citation: 2003 WI 143

Docket Number: 2002AP000699

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 143 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0699 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Columbus Park Housing Corporation,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
City of Kenosha,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 310 
Reported at:  259 Wis. 2d. 316, 655 N.W.2d 495 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 19, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
David M. Bastianelli   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Robert I. DuMez and O’Connor, Willems, DuMez, Alia & McTernan, 
S.C., Kenosha, and oral argument by Robert I. DuMez. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there were briefs by David L. 
Kinnamon, Anthony A. Tomaselli, David C. Swanson, and Quarles & 
Brady LLP, Madison, and oral argument by David L. Kinnamon. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gregg C. Hagopian and 
Genevieve O’Sullivan-Crowley, assistant city attorneys, and 
Grant F. Langley, city attorney, on behalf of the City of 
Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Claire Silverman, 
Madison, on behalf of League of Wisconsin Municipalities. 
 
2003 WI 143 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0699  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 745) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Columbus Park Housing Corporation,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Kenosha,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 19, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   City of Kenosha (Kenosha) seeks 
review of a published court of appeals decision, Columbus Park 
Housing Corporation v. City of Kenosha, 2002 WI App 310, 259 
Wis. 2d 316, 655 N.W.2d 495, that affirmed an order of the 
Kenosha County Circuit Court, David M. Bastianelli, Judge, 
granting summary judgment in favor of Columbus Park Housing 
Corporation (Columbus Park), finding that Columbus Park was 
exempt form certain real property taxes under Wis. Stat. § 70.11 
No. 
02-0699   
 
2 
 
(4) (1999-2000).1  Because we determine that Columbus Park has 
failed to satisfy the lessee identity condition in the preamble 
of § 70.11, we reverse the court of appeals' decision.   
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The parties to this action have stipulated to the 
essential facts.  Columbus Park is a nonstock, nonprofit 
Wisconsin 
corporation 
that 
acquires 
blighted 
property 
in 
Kenosha, rehabilitates the property, and makes the property 
available for rent to qualified low-income families.  The 
parties agree that Columbus Park is a benevolent association, 
within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4), whose mission is to 
improve the living conditions of the poor and underprivileged in 
Kenosha by providing safe, affordable housing.   
¶3 
Columbus Park seeks to fulfill its mission by engaging 
in two principal activities.  First, Columbus Park rehabilitates 
dilapidated 
buildings 
by 
providing 
work 
and 
training 
opportunities to several at risk groups, including Kenosha 
County Jail inmates, who restore the buildings.  Once the 
buildings 
are 
refurbished, 
Columbus 
Park 
rents 
units 
to 
qualifying low-income families who might otherwise be homeless.  
All of Columbus Park's rental units, with the exception of one 
unit occupied by its executive director and resident manager, 
are occupied by individuals with annualized income below the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.  While the tax 
years in question predate the 1999-2000 version, there are no 
differences in the applicable statutory sections. 
No. 
02-0699   
 
3 
 
federal poverty level.  Columbus Park then uses the rental 
income from its leased properties, in part,2 for maintenance and 
construction debt reduction of its leased properties.  
¶4 
Columbus Park participates in the federal rent subsidy 
program under section 8 of the Federal Fair Housing Act.  42 
U.S.C. § 1437f (1999).3  Columbus Park charges its tenants 30% of 
their income and receives subsidies from the federal government 
through the Kenosha Housing Authority (the Authority), which 
bring the rents to reasonable market rates.  The disputed taxes 
were levied on properties that had been rehabilitated and were 
rented to low-income individuals or awaiting occupancy.   
¶5 
The affidavit of Kathy Rippon, Executive Director of 
Columbus Park, provides that in 1998 and 1999 Columbus Park 
"used all of the leasehold income received from its tenants and 
all the lease subsidies received [from the federal government] 
for maintenance of the leased property, construction debt 
retirement of the leased property or both."  Further, it states, 
"[g]ifts, grants and contributions made to [Columbus Park] by 
individuals, 
corporations, 
charitable 
organizations 
and 
governmental entities covered net losses incurred by [Columbus 
                                                 
2 Kenosha disputes that all of Columbus Park's leasehold 
income is used for such purposes. 
3 All references to the federal statutes and regulations 
governing the section 8 housing program are to the 1999 version 
unless otherwise noted.  Any difference between the 1998 and 
1999 versions of the United States Code and Code of Federal 
Regulations are immaterial to the provisions cited.  
No. 
02-0699   
 
4 
 
Park] on properties leased to low-income lessees in both 1998 
and 1999." 
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶6 
Columbus Park instituted this declaratory judgment 
action, seeking a determination that taxes assessed and levied 
on certain real property of Columbus Park by Kenosha in 1998 
were illegal and that Columbus Park was entitled to a refund for 
taxes assessed by Kenosha and paid by Columbus Park on certain 
pieces of real estate in 1999.  The circuit court granted 
Columbus Park summary judgment, finding it exempt from taxation 
under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4); Kenosha appealed.   
¶7 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment, determining that Columbus Park 
"exclusively used the properties in question for benevolent 
purposes in both 1998 and 1999."  Columbus Park, 259 Wis. 2d  
316, ¶16.  The court of appeals also determined that Columbus 
Park 
met 
the 
rent 
use 
condition 
in 
the 
preamble 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.11.  Id., ¶24.  Finally, the court of appeals 
held that Columbus Park satisfied the lessee identity condition 
in the preamble of § 70.11.  Id., ¶28.   
III. ISSUES 
¶8 
Kenosha raises three issues on appeal to this court:  
(1) whether a benevolent association satisfies the lessee 
identity condition in the preamble of Wis. Stat. § 70.11 when it 
rents property to 
low-income 
individuals participating in 
section 8 of the Federal Fair Housing Act; (2) whether a 
benevolent association meets the requirement in § 70.11 that it 
No. 
02-0699   
 
5 
 
use all leasehold income for the purposes of maintenance of the 
leased property, debt retirement, or both when it applies a 
portion of the leasehold income from one property to the 
maintenance and/or construction debt retirement of another 
property; and (3) whether a benevolent association meets the 
requirement in § 70.11(4) 
that the 
benevolent association 
"exclusively use" the properties in question when it leases such 
property to individual tenants.  Because we conclude that 
Columbus Park has not satisfied the lessee identity condition in 
the preamble of § 70.11, we do not address the other two issues 
raised by Kenosha.  
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
This case arises from the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment to Columbus Park.  We review the grant of 
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the 
circuit court.  Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis. 2d 737, 748, 
470 N.W.2d 625 (1991).  This court reverses a grant of summary 
judgment if it was based on an incorrect interpretation of a 
legal issue.  St. John's Lutheran Church v. City of Bloomer, 118 
Wis. 2d 398, 
400, 
347 
N.W.2d 619 
(Ct. 
App. 
1984). 
 
The 
resolution of this dispute involves the interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4) and the application of this statute to a 
particular set of facts.  These are questions of law that this 
court reviews de novo.  Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of 
Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 79-80, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999).   
¶10 In construing a statute, our primary purpose is to 
give effect to the legislative intent embodied in the language 
No. 
02-0699   
 
6 
 
of the statute.  Id. at 80.  However, when the language of a 
statute is unambiguous, "'[s]tatutory interpretation . . . is 
confined to [] the language of the statute[.]'"  Burg ex rel. 
Weichert 
v. Cincinnati Cas. 
Ins. 
Co., 2002 
WI 76, 254 
Wis. 2d 36, ¶16, 645 N.W.2d 880 (citations omitted).  Pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1), all words and phrases shall be given 
their ordinary and accepted meaning but technical words shall be 
given their accepted legal meaning.   
 
¶11 In addition, in construing tax exemption statutes, 
"taxation of property is the rule and exemption is the 
exception."  Deutsches Land, 225 Wis. 2d at 80.  See also 
Wis. Stat. § 70.109.  Thus, this court applies a "strict but 
reasonable" interpretation to tax exemption statutes.  Id.  
"Since exemption from the payment of taxes is an act of 
legislative grace, the party seeking the exemption bears the 
burden of proving that it falls within a statutory exemption."  
Id.  Thus, any ambiguity in the statute is resolved in favor of 
taxation.  Id.   
V. 
ANALYSIS 
 
¶12 In resolving whether Columbus Park is entitled to a 
tax exemption under § 70.11(4), this court must answer a single 
question:  Does Columbus Park fall within the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4)?  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.11(4) exempts from 
taxation 
"[p]roperty 
owned 
and 
used 
exclusively 
by . . . benevolent 
associations . . . but 
not 
exceeding 
10 
acres of land necessary for location and convenience of 
buildings while such property is not used for profit."  Further, 
No. 
02-0699   
 
7 
 
§ 70.11(4) provides:  "Property that is exempt from taxation 
under this subsection and is leased remains exempt from taxation 
only if, in addition to the requirements specified in the 
introductory phrase of this section, the lessee does not 
discriminate on the basis of race."   
 
¶13 The introductory section of Wis. Stat. § 70.11——the 
preamble——provides:  
Leasing a part of the property described in this 
section does not render it taxable if the lessor uses 
all of the leasehold income for maintenance of the 
leased property, construction debt retirement of the 
leased property or both and if the lessee would be 
exempt from taxation under this chapter if it owned 
the property. 
Wis. Stat. § 70.11 (emphasis added). 
¶14 In Deutsches Land, this court construed the preamble 
of § 70.11 as containing the following requirements: 
(1) the exempt organization must use the leasehold 
income for maintenance of the property, construction 
debt retirement, or both (the "rent use condition") 
and (2) the lessee would itself be entitled to an 
exemption if it owned the property (the "lessee 
identity condition").  If the exempt organization uses 
the rental income in ways other than provided for by 
the statute, no exemption can be claimed on the leased 
part of the property.  Likewise, if the lessee itself 
is not an exempt organization but rather a for-profit 
organization, no exemption can be claimed on the 
leased part of the property. 
Deutsches Land, 225 Wis. 2d at 93. 
¶15 We conclude that Columbus Park is not entitled to a 
tax exemption under § 70.11(4) because it cannot meet the lessee 
identity requirement in § 70.11.  Columbus Park cannot meet the 
lessee identity condition because the individuals to whom 
No. 
02-0699   
 
8 
 
Columbus 
Park 
rents——its 
lessees——would 
not 
qualify 
under 
§ 70.11 as tax exempt if they owned the property, as § 70.11 
only exempts property owned by certain organizations and 
institutions that meet the statutorily specified criteria.   
¶16 Columbus Park asks us to follow the approach utilized 
by the court of appeals in construing the lessee identity 
condition. The court of appeals reasoned that although the 
Authority "is not the true lessee of the properties within the 
technical definition of the term, the Authority's control is a 
relevant consideration in making a determination as to the 
ability of Columbus Park to qualify for an exemption."4  Columbus 
Park, 259 Wis. 2d  316, ¶26.  The court of appeals further 
reasoned that because Columbus Park's tenants would not be able 
to pay rent but for the federal government subsidies provided by 
the Authority and because the lessees were not for-profit 
businesses,  
                                                 
4 According to Columbus Park, the involvement of the 
authority is as follows:  The Authority (1) requires new tenants 
of publicly-subsidized housing in the city to attend an 
orientation session that the Authority holds; (2) issues 
vouchers to income-qualified tenants that allows them to 
participate in the section 8 housing program; (3) conducts an 
initial inspection of the rental units to ensure compliance with 
minimum housing standards; (4) conducts an annual inspection of 
the rental units to ensure compliance with minimum housing 
standards; (5) requires the low-income tenants to make reports 
directly to the Authority showing a change in income; and (6) 
adjusts the monthly rent subsidies based on changes in the 
tenant's income.  The Authority also enters into a contract 
directly with the owner to make payments on behalf of a family.  
24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(2).   
No. 
02-0699   
 
9 
 
[i]t would be an unreasonable construction of the word 
"lessee" in the context of this statute to apply it to 
the very individuals who are the objects of the tax-
exempt activity.  Consequently, we conclude that the 
term "lessee" should not be so technically defined so 
as to preclude the applicability of the tax exemption 
to Columbus Park. 
Id., ¶29.  
¶17 We consider the court of appeals' rationale flawed 
because, as noted by Judge Synder's dissent, the majority of the 
court of appeals did not cite to any legal authority for the 
proposition 
that 
an 
organization 
that 
is 
involved 
in 
establishing a lease on behalf of another and partially 
subsidizes the lease, but does not occupy the property or retain 
any possessory interest in that property, may nonetheless be 
considered the lessee of said property.  Id., ¶34.  Moreover, 
the court of appeals did not explain what it meant by "relevant 
consideration"; nor 
did 
it 
elucidate 
what 
"non-technical" 
definition of "lessee" it was invoking.   
¶18 The term "lessee" is an unambiguous legal term; under 
the applicable statutory rules of construction, we must ascribe 
to it its technical legal meaning.  The term "lessee" is defined 
as "[o]ne who has a possessory interest in real or personal 
property under a lease; TENANT."  Black's Law Dictionary 914 
(7th ed. 1999).  The court in Deutsches Land, 225 Wis. 2d at 94 
n.13, interchangeably referred to this provision of the preamble 
of § 70.11 as "the tenant identity condition," and the "'lessee 
identity condition.'"  Id. at 93.  "Tenant" is defined as "[o]ne 
who pays rent for the temporary use and occupation of another's 
No. 
02-0699   
 
10 
 
land under a lease or similar arrangement."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 1479 (7th ed. 1999). 
¶19 Further, although the record does not contain a 
properly authenticated copy of an actual lease between Columbus 
Park and one of its lessees, the record does contain a sample 
lease with the signature of Executive Director Rippon.5  This 
sample lease states, "[l]andlord and [t]enant understand that 
their rights and obligations under the [c]ontract are subject 
to . . . Wis. Stat. Chapter 704, Wis. Admin. Code Chapter ATCP 
134 . . . ."6  Wisconsin Admin. Code § ATCP 134.02(12) defines 
"tenant" as "a person occupying, or entitled to present or 
future 
occupancy 
of 
a 
dwelling 
unit 
under 
a 
rental 
agreement . . . ."  Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.02(12)(June 
1999)(emphasis added).  Section ATCP 134.02(6) incorporates the 
definition of "lease" found in Wis. Stat. § 704.01(1).  Section 
                                                 
5 This "sample lease" was marked in the record as Exhibit 1 
and was attached as part of Kenosha's brief in opposition to 
summary judgment.  While Columbus Park objected to this sample 
lease in its briefs to the circuit court, the record does not 
indicate that Columbus Park ever made a motion to strike this 
material or that the circuit court did in fact strike this 
exhibit from the record.  In any event, the sample lease is part 
of the record before us.  While the lease is dated March 2001, 
we note that it is a standard lease form, drafted by an 
attorney, and it contains a 1999 copyright.   
6 Even if the sample lease was not authenticated, and thus 
not "properly" part of the record before us, Wis. Admin. Code 
Chapter ATCP 134 "applies to the rental of dwelling units 
located in this state."  Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.01 (June 
1999).  Thus, the above-cited provisions would be applicable to 
any lease executed in 1998 or 1999 regardless of whether the 
lease included a specific reference thereto.   
No. 
02-0699   
 
11 
 
704.01(1), Stats., defines "lease" as "an agreement, whether 
oral or written, for transfer of possession of real property, or 
both real and personal property, for a definite period of time."  
Wis. Stat. § 704.01(1) (emphasis added). 
¶20 Under the established legal definition of "lessee," 
there can be no other conclusion except that Columbus Park's 
"lessees" are the low-income individuals to whom Columbus Park 
rents.  It is undisputed that the Authority does not sign the 
leases, occupy the property, or retain any possessory interest 
in any of the rental units in question.  At the court of 
appeals, Columbus Park conceded "its low-income tenants, who are 
not tax-exempt organizations, sign the leases . . . ."  Columbus 
Park, 259 Wis. 2d 316, ¶25.  Moreover, Columbus Park itself 
refers to the low-income individuals to whom it rents as 
"tenants" and the affidavit of Executive Director Rippon refers 
to Columbus Park's tenants as "lessees."   
¶21 More important, however, is the undisputed fact that 
Columbus Park receives rent subsidies from the Authority under 
section 8 of the Federal Fair Housing Act.  In order to 
participate in the assisted housing program, the federal 
government requires the Authority to approve of the lease 
entered 
into 
"between 
tenant 
and 
owner." 
 
24 
C.F.R. 
§ 982.308(b)(1).7   
                                                 
7 We note the current version of the regulation is more 
specific and requires that "[t]he tenant and the owner must 
enter a written lease for the unit.  The lease must be executed 
by the owner and the tenant."  24 C.F.R. § 982.308(b)(1) (2003).   
No. 
02-0699   
 
12 
 
¶22 Further review of the regulations governing section 8 
housing programs supports the obvious conclusion that the low-
income individuals, not the Authority, are Columbus Park's 
lessees.  For instance, in order to receive rent subsidies, 
"[t]he tenant must have legal capacity to enter a lease 
 . . . ."  24 C.F.R. § 982.308(a).  An entity such as the 
Authority cannot lack legal capacity to sign a lease.   
¶23 Moreover, the regulations provide:  
The PHA [Public Housing Authority] failure to pay the 
housing assistance payment to the owner is not a 
violation of the lease between the tenant and the 
owner.  During the term of the lease the owner may not 
terminate the tenancy of the family for nonpayment of 
the PHA housing assistance payment. 
24 C.F.R. § 982.310(b)(2) (emphasis added).  Likewise, if a 
tenant defaults on payments, the Authority is not evicted; the 
low-income family is evicted.  In fact, every reference to the 
"lessee" or "tenant" in the regulations governing section 8 
No. 
02-0699   
 
13 
 
programs refers to the lessee or tenant as the low-income 
individual or family actually renting a unit.8   
¶24 In addition, we find it significant that the Authority 
is involved in both sides of the landlord-tenant, lessor-lessee 
relationship.  If Columbus Park's tenants cannot be considered 
independent lessees because of the Authority's involvement in 
administering 
the 
section 
8 
program, 
Columbus 
Park, 
259 
Wis. 2d 316, ¶26, then under the same rationale, Columbus Park 
itself 
can 
hardly 
be 
considered 
an 
independent 
lessor.  
Utilizing the court of appeals' methodology, we note that the 
Authority: (1) approves of a family's unit and tenancy, 24 
C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(2); (2) may provide information regarding 
tenancy and drug history to owner to assist in owner's screening 
of tenants, 24 C.F.R. § 982.307(b)(2); (3) receives a copy of a 
notice of termination of the lease from the family, 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.309(d)(2); (4) may determine the composition of a family 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 982.301(b)(12)(Public Housing 
Authority (PHA) must provide a list of landlords "willing to 
lease 
a 
unit 
to 
the 
family . . . ."); 
24 
C.F.R. 
§ 982.310(c)(2)(owner may terminate tenancy if tenant is engaged 
in 
various 
criminal 
activities); 
24 
C.F.R. 
§ 982.309(d)(2)(family must give PHA notice of termination if it 
decides to terminate lease); 24 C.F.R. § 982.4309(d)(2)(housing 
assistance payment includes a payment by the PHA to the owner 
for rent under the family's lease; lease between owner and 
tenant establishes conditions for occupancy of the dwelling unit 
by the family); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(2) (the family selects and 
rents a unit); 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(d)(1)(i)(owner may terminate 
lease for failure of family to accept offer of new lease or 
revision); 24 C.F.R. § 982.309(b)(3)(providing that while the 
Authority may cancel the contract with the owner or terminate 
assistance to the family, the lease itself terminates only when 
either the tenant or the owner terminate the lease).  
No. 
02-0699   
 
14 
 
that will receive housing assistance for rental unit, 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.201(c)(3); and (5) may provide, although not require, a 
model lease form for the owner and tenant to use,  24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.308(c)(2).  Finally, the lease itself, which is generally 
chosen or drafted by the landlord, must contain certain 
provisions mandated by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). 24 C.F.R. § 982.308(c)(1). 
¶25 Therefore, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
Authority's 
involvement in administering the section 8 leasing program does 
not render it a de jure lessee for the purposes of § 70.11(4), 
as it does not occupy any of the units and none of the 
activities the Authority engages in confers upon it a possessory 
interest in any of the rental units.  The Authority is no more a 
lessee simply because it makes payments on behalf of the low-
income renters than the parents of college students are lessees 
because they subsidize their son or daughter's housing.  
¶26 Columbus Park further argues that under Town of 
Menominee v. Skubitz, 53 Wis. 2d 430, 192 N.W.2d 887 (1972), 
this court may "enlarge" the meaning of the word lessee to 
encompass the Authority.  In Skubitz, the appellant, a member of 
the Menominee Indian Tribe, owned several buildings on land 
owned by Menominee Enterprises, Inc.  Id. at 433.  Appellant 
repeatedly refused to enter into a lease or purchase the 
property upon which her buildings were located; however, she did 
pay a "land-use" fee to Menominee Enterprises.  Id.  The issue 
on appeal was whether Wis. Stat. § 70.17 permitted the Town of 
Menominee to assess personal property taxes on the land that was 
No. 
02-0699   
 
15 
 
owned by Menominee Enterprises but occupied by the appellant.  
Id. at 434.  Although the court found that there was no formal 
or implied lease between the parties, id. at 435-36, after 
examining the legislative intent, the court concluded: 
It is evident that the legislature intended to define 
the treatment to be given to certain property situated 
on the land of another and did not mean to limit the 
relationship of the occupier of the land and the owner 
of 
the 
real 
estate 
to 
that 
of 
lessor-
lessee. . . . [T]he term "leased lands" contained in 
sec. 70.17, Stats., should be construed broadly enough 
to encompass a multitude of situations in which the 
occupier of lands not owned by him places improvements 
on those lands. 
Id. at 438-39.  The court applied the rule that "the meaning of 
some words in a statute may be enlarged or restricted in order 
to harmonize them with the legislative intent of the entire 
statute."  Id. at 437.  
¶27 However, Skubitz is readily distinguishable from the 
case at hand.  First, the court in Skubitz enlarged the term 
"leased lands" to include the situation where an individual 
owned buildings on land owned by another and paid a land use fee 
but had no formal lease.  The appellant in Skubitz actually 
occupied the lands and possessed the buildings thereon.  As 
discussed supra, a lessee necessarily is someone who pays 
consideration for the temporary possession and occupancy of 
property.  In contrast, as previously noted, the Authority has 
absolutely no possessory rights in Columbus Park's property, nor 
does it occupy the property.  Under no judicial contortion of 
the word "lessee" can the term be expanded to include someone 
No. 
02-0699   
 
16 
 
who partially pays for the possessory rights of another in a 
piece of property.   
¶28 Further, the rule in Skubitz is limited to situations 
where such an expanded or restricted construction of a word 
would further the legislative intent of the statute.  As 
discussed 
infra, 
we 
find 
no 
clear 
indication 
that 
the 
legislature intended to exempt benevolent associations, such as 
Columbus 
Park, 
who 
rent 
their 
property 
to 
low-income 
individuals.  Also, to apply the rationale of Skubitz in this 
case would violate the rule that in construing tax exemption 
statutes, "taxation of property is the rule and exemption is the 
exception."  Deutsches Land, 225 Wis. 2d at 80.  See also 
Wis. Stat. § 70.109.  Finally, application of the rationale in 
Skubitz to this case would be repugnant to the established rules 
that any ambiguity in a tax exemption statute is resolved 
against the taxpayer, Deutsches Land, 225 Wis. 2d at 80, and 
that the taxpayer must "take the statute as it stands and bring 
[itself] plainly within [the statute's] terms."  Bowman Dairy 
Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm'n, 240 Wis. 1, 5, 1 N.W.2d 905 (1942).   
¶29 Thus, it is clear that under the standard legal 
definition of the word "lessee" and the facts and circumstances 
present, the "lessees" for purposes of § 70.11 are the low-
income individuals to whom Columbus Park rents.  It is 
undisputed that these low-income individuals would not qualify 
as tax-exempt under § 70.11 if they owned the property in 
question because § 70.11 only exempts property owned by certain 
specified organizations and institutions that meet the statutory 
No. 
02-0699   
 
17 
 
criteria.  Therefore, we hold that Columbus Park is not entitled 
to a property tax exemption under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4) because 
under the plain language of § 70.11, its lessees would not 
qualify as tax exempt if they owned the units they rent.   
¶30 We now turn to Columbus Park's arguments that despite 
the fact that it cannot meet the lessee identity condition in 
the preamble of § 70.11, it is nonetheless entitled to a tax 
exemption.  First, Columbus Park asks us to construe the lessee 
identity 
condition 
as 
applying 
only 
where 
a 
benevolent 
association leases to a for-profit business entity.  Columbus 
Park relies on our language in Deutsches Land that "if the 
lessee itself is not an exempt organization but rather a for-
profit organization, no exemption can be claimed on the leased 
part of the property."  Deutsches Land, 225 Wis. 2d at 93.   
¶31 In Deutsches Land, this court analyzed whether a 
benevolent association devoted to the preservation of Germanic 
culture and heritage was entitled to a property tax exemption 
under § 70.11(4) when it leased a portion of the land it owned, 
the Bavarian Inn, to a for-profit entity.  Id. at 76-79.  Our 
language in Deutsches Land in no way limited the applicability 
of the lessee identity condition contained in the preamble of 
§ 70.11 to situations where the benevolent association leases to 
a for-profit business.   The language in Deutsches Land was 
couched in those terms merely because those were the facts 
presented to us in that case.   
¶32 Moreover, Columbus Park's proposed reading of § 70.11 
would ignore the plain language of the statute.  First, the 
No. 
02-0699   
 
18 
 
preamble itself does not contain any language that would limit 
its application to situations where a benevolent organization 
leases to a for-profit business.  Further, § 70.11(4), the 
particular exemption here, explicitly refers to the language in 
the preamble:  "Property that is exempt from taxation under this 
subsection and is leased remains exempt from taxation only if, 
in addition to the requirements specified in the introductory 
phrase of this section, the lessee does not discriminate on the 
basis of race."  Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4)(emphasis added).  Thus, 
we conclude that under the plain language of the statute, the 
lessee identity condition in the preamble of § 70.11 is not 
limited to those instances where a benevolent association rents 
to a for-profit business entity. 
¶33 Next, Columbus Park argues that it is entitled to a 
tax exemption as a matter of public policy. A good portion of 
its briefs and oral argument was concerned with the extent to 
which Columbus Park is engaged in eleemosynary activities, the 
fact that its lessees are the object of its benevolent 
activities, and the possibility that but for its benevolence, 
the low-income individuals to whom it rents would be homeless.  
In essence, Columbus Park asks this court to carve out an 
exception to the lessee identity condition and hold that this 
No. 
02-0699   
 
19 
 
condition does not apply if the lessees are the objects of the 
organization's benevolence.9   
¶34 Whether this court is of the opinion that Columbus 
Park should receive a tax exemption is irrelevant.  Certainly 
Columbus Park's efforts to serve the poor are indeed laudable.  
However, whether an organization should benefit from a tax 
exemption is a policy decision, as tax exemptions exist purely 
by 
virtue 
of 
"legislative 
grace." 
 
Deutsches 
Land, 
225 
Wis. 2d at 80.  "This court has long held that it is the 
province of the legislature, not the courts, to determine public 
policy."  Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 539, 576 N.W.2d 245 
(1998).  Under our tripartite system of government, it is the 
duty of this court to apply the policy the legislature has 
codified in the statutes, not impose our own policy choices——to 
do otherwise would render this court little more than a super-
legislature.  Id. at 529.  Thus, we must apply the statute as 
written, not interpret it as we think it should have been 
written. 
¶35 As 
noted 
by 
Columbus 
Park 
at 
oral 
argument, 
Wis. Stat. ch. 70 is not a comprehensive, perfectly woven web of 
                                                 
9 This could also be an alternative interpretation of the 
court of appeals' decision, as it found that although the 
Authority was not the true lessee, because of Columbus Park's 
altruism and the economic plight of its tenants, it would be "an 
unreasonable construction of the term 'lessee' in the context of 
this statute to apply it to the very individuals who are the 
objects of the tax-exempt activity."  Columbus Park Housing 
Corp. v. City of Kenosha, 2002 WI App 310, ¶¶26-29, 259 
Wis. 2d 316, 655 N.W.2d 495.    
No. 
02-0699   
 
20 
 
tax exemptions covering the entire universe of tax paying 
entities; rather, it represents a conglomeration of exemptions 
granted to specific and well-delineated entities and property 
used in a certain fashion.  The plain language of § 70.11(4) and 
§ 70.11 
limits 
the 
tax-exempt 
status 
of 
a 
benevolent 
organization that leases property to situations where the lessee 
would be tax-exempt if it owned the property——where the lessee 
is another tax-exempt organization.  It does not contain an 
exception for individual lessees that are the subject of the 
benevolent organization's charity.  If the legislature had not 
meant the lessee identity condition to apply in circumstances 
such 
as 
these, 
it 
could 
have 
explicitly 
limited 
the 
applicability 
of 
the 
preamble 
in 
subsection 
four. 
 
Our 
conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the legislature has 
carved out exceptions to the lessee identity requirement in 
other subsections.  For example, subsection two, relating to 
municipal property states:  "Leasing property exempt under this 
subsection, regardless of the lessee and the use of leasehold 
income, 
does 
not 
render 
that 
property 
taxable."  
Wis. Stat. § 70.11(2)(emphasis added).   
¶36 Having determined the statute is unambiguous, our 
interpretation is confined to its plain language. Weichert, 254 
Wis. 2d 36, ¶16.  Nevertheless, analysis of the legislative 
history validates our conclusion that the exemption does not 
apply to Columbus Park.  The lessee identity requirement in the 
preamble of § 70.11 and the reference thereto in § 70.11(4) were 
added to the statute effective 1984 by virtue of 1983 Wis. Act 
No. 
02-0699   
 
21 
 
327.  Essentially, the legislature moved the lessee identity and 
rent use condition from subsection four to the preamble and 
added a reference to the preamble in subsection four.  In adding 
the 
reference 
to 
the 
preamble 
in 
subsection 
four, 
the 
legislature deleted the following language:  "Leasing a portion 
of such property to an organization which if it owned the 
property itself would be exempt from taxation under this section 
 . . . shall not render the property taxable, if all the 
leasehold income is used for maintenance."  1983 Wis. Act 327, 
§ 4(emphasis added).  
¶37 As the previous version allowed an exemption to leased 
property only if the property was leased to another charitable 
organization, 
and 
§ 70.11 
currently 
only 
exempts 
certain 
property owned by specific organizations or institutions, there 
is no indication that the legislature intended to expand the 
exemption to cover benevolent organizations that rent to 
individuals.  Rather, the legislature merely eliminated what 
would have been a redundancy when it reorganized the statute.  
The statutory revision did not change the nature of the lessee 
identity condition.  The result of the change was simply that 
the rent use and lessee identity conditions now apply to all 
subsections, unless specifically excluded.   
¶38 The most persuasive indication that the exemption 
Columbus Park seeks was not intended is that the legislature 
added the exact exception that Columbus Park asks this court to 
impose 
to 
the 
lessee 
identity 
requirement 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 70.11(3)(b) by virtue of the same Act that amended 
No. 
02-0699   
 
22 
 
subsection four and the preamble.  Section 70.11(3)(b) was 
amended by 1983 Wis. Act 327 to read as follows: "In addition to 
the exemption of leased property specified in the introductory 
phrase of this section, a university or college may also lease 
property for educational or charitable purposes without making 
it taxable if it uses the income derived from the lease for 
charitable purposes."  1983 Wis. Act 327, § 4 (emphasis added).  
This is the exact same exception to the lessee identity 
requirement that Columbus Park asks this court to judicially 
graft onto subsection four.  The fact that the legislature added 
this language to subsection three but not subsection four when 
it reorganized subsection four is a strong indication that it 
did not wish to exempt charitable organizations that lease 
property to individuals in order to further their charitable 
purposes.  
¶39 Analysis of the proposed bill also confirms our 
conclusion that the lessee identity condition applies with equal 
force to Columbus Park as does the rent use condition contained 
in the preamble.  The Report of the Joint Survey Committee on 
Tax Exemption analyzed the bill as follows:  
This bill would allow a person who owns property which 
is exempt under s. 70.11 to lease a part of that 
property without changing the tax-exempt status of the 
property if: 
1. 
The lessor used all of the rental income for 
"maintenance, construction debt retirement or both" 
and 
2. 
If the lessee would be exempt from taxation under 
ch. 70, Stats., if it owned the property. 
No. 
02-0699   
 
23 
 
Report of the Joint Survey Committee on Tax Exemption (Sept. 
1983) (emphasis in original).  The analysis by the Legislative 
Reference Bureau is substantially similar.  See Legislative 
Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1983 Wis. Act 327, Analysis 
by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 1983 A.B. 89.  Thus, the 
legislative history of § 70.11(4) indicates that the legislature 
intended to exempt property owned and leased by benevolent 
organizations from taxation only when the property was leased to 
another tax-exempt organization under § 70.11. 
¶40 Because our duty is to apply a "strict but reasonable" 
interpretation to tax-exemption statutes, and the language of 
§ 70.11(4) is clear and unambiguous, we decline to carve out an 
exception to the preamble of § 70.11 to meet Columbus Park's 
situation.  Contrary to Columbus Park and the dissent's 
assertion, to apply an unambiguous statute as written is not 
unreasonable; rather, it would be unreasonable to ignore the 
plain language of § 70.11 simply because of Columbus Park's 
humanitarian efforts.  As this court stated in Engineers and 
Scientists 
of 
Milwaukee, 
Inc. 
v. 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
38 
Wis. 2d 550, 562, 57 N.W.2d 572 (1968), "while an exemption for 
activities of this kind might well serve a public purpose, the 
decision to allow the exemption must be clearly spelled out by 
the legislature."  Columbus Park remains free to lobby the 
legislature 
to 
create 
a 
specific 
exemption 
for 
its 
circumstances.   
¶41 Columbus Park also directs our attention to a series 
of cases where Wisconsin courts have purportedly concluded that 
No. 
02-0699   
 
24 
 
certain 
benevolent 
organizations 
were 
tax-exempt 
under 
§ 70.11(4), where their lessees were the objects of their 
benevolence.  See Family Hosp. Nursing Home, Inc. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 78 Wis. 2d 312, 254 N.W.2d 268 (1977); Milwaukee 
Protestant 
Home for the 
Aged v. 
City of 
Milwaukee, 41 
Wis. 2d 284, 164 N.W.2d 289 (1969); Friendship Vill. of Greater 
Milwaukee, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 181 Wis. 2d 207, 511 
N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1993); and St. John's Lutheran Church v. 
City of Bloomer, 118 Wis. 2d 398, 347 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 
1984).  However, none of these cases addressed the lessee 
identity requirement found in current § 70.11.  These cases 
merely addressed the question of whether certain nursing and 
retirement homes constituted benevolent organizations within the 
meaning of § 70.11(4).10  Not a single one of these cases stands 
for the proposition that an organization seeking an exemption 
under § 70.11(4) that does not meet the lessee identity 
                                                 
10 The issue in Family Hospital Nursing Home, Inc. v. City 
of Milwaukee, 78 Wis. 2d 312, 314, 254 N.W.2d 268 (1977), was 
whether the nursing home in question was a benevolent nursing 
home under the 1970-1971 version of Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4).  
Likewise, in Milwaukee Protestant Home for the Aged v. City of 
Milwaukee, 41 Wis. 2d 284, 291, 164 N.W.2d 289 (1969), this 
court merely considered whether retirement homes operating on a 
fee-charging but nonprofit basis qualified as charitable or 
benevolent associations under § 70.11.  In Friendship Village of 
Greater Milwaukee, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 181 Wis. 2d 207, 
220, 511 N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1993), the court was only required 
to determine which entity owned and used the property in 
question.   Finally, in St. John's Lutheran Church v. City of 
Bloomer, 118 Wis. 2d 398, 400, 347 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1984), 
the court again only addressed whether a retirement home for the 
aged constituted a benevolent association.  
No. 
02-0699   
 
25 
 
requirement is nonetheless entitled to a tax exemption simply 
because of its benevolence.   
¶42 Finally, Columbus Park argues that if we are to give 
§ 70.11(4) its literal interpretation, severe consequences will 
result because a variety of property owned by benevolent 
organizations including, inter alia, nursing homes, summer 
camps, and portions of hospitals dedicated to the treatment of 
drug and alcohol abuse, would be denied tax exemptions.  
Columbus Park relies upon the court of appeals' decision in M&I 
First 
National 
Bank 
v. 
Episcopal 
Homes 
Management, 
195 
Wis. 2d 485, 536 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1995) as evidence of the 
supposed absurd results our decision will create.   
¶43 The issue in M&I First National Bank was which party 
had a priority security interest in a fund in excess of 
$1,000,000 that contained entrance fees paid by the residents of 
Lake Oaks at DeKoven, an assisted living center for the elderly, 
when said facility defaulted on its mortgage obligation.  Id. at 
488.  In affirming the circuit court's imposition of a 
constructive trust on the fund in favor of the residents, the 
court of appeals concluded that the "residency agreement" 
entered into between the tenants and the owner constituted a 
leasing arrangement under Wis. Adm. Code §  ATCP 134.02, despite 
language in the contract stating it was not a lease.  Id. at 
500-502.   
¶44 In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals 
noted that the dominant and primary purpose of the residency 
agreement was to pay rent for the use and occupation of property 
No. 
02-0699   
 
26 
 
and not the provision of services to the elderly.  Id. at 501.  
The court noted that the facility was marketed as an assisted 
living center, not as a nursing home or life-care facility, and 
that the owner reserved the right to terminate the resident 
agreement if the resident could no longer independently care for 
himself.  Id. at 504-05.  Specifically, the court stated that 
DeKoven "was neither a nursing home nor a continuing care 
facility."  Id. at 505.  Thus, the thrust of the court of 
appeals opinion in M&I First National Bank, for our purposes, is 
that an agreement whereby residents pay an entrance fee and 
continue to make monthly payments in exchange for the use and 
occupation of property constitutes a lease under Wis. Adm. Code 
§  ATCP 134.02, in the absence of evidence that the primary or 
dominant purpose of the agreement was the provision of services.  
¶45 We are not persuaded by Columbus Park's slippery slope 
argument, as we see nothing in the language of M&I First 
National Bank that would lead to the cataclysmic results 
Columbus Park predicts.  Both nursing homes and continuing care 
facilities charge fees for the primary and dominant purpose of 
the provision of services.  Residents in these facilities would 
not constitute "lessees" for purposes of § 70.11, as there is no 
"lease" in existence under the rationale of M&I First National 
Bank.  A hospital providing alcohol and drug treatment and 
counseling similarly charges fees for the primary and dominant 
purpose of remuneration for the counseling and treatment 
services it provides.  Likewise, it can hardly be said that the 
dominant and primary purpose of charging fees for various summer 
No. 
02-0699   
 
27 
 
camps is for the use and occupation of property.  Thus, our 
decision today will not undermine the tax-exempt status of these 
types of organizations.   
VI. SUMMARY 
¶46 In conclusion, we hold that under the plain language 
of Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4), Columbus Park does not qualify for a 
tax exemption on the leased properties in question because 
Columbus Park cannot meet the lessee identity condition in the 
preamble of § 70.11, as its lessees——the low-income individuals 
to whom it rents——would not be entitled to a tax exemption if 
they owned the property.  Columbus Park has failed to "take the 
statute as it stands and bring [itself] plainly within [the 
statute's] 
terms." 
 
Bowman 
Dairy 
Co., 
240 
Wis. 
at 
5.  
Furthermore, we decline to limit the application of the preamble 
of § 70.11 to situations in which a benevolent association 
leases its property to a for-profit business.  Finally, we 
decline to carve out a judicially created exemption to the 
lessee identity requirement where the lessees are the subjects 
of the organization's benevolence.  We hold that Columbus Park 
is not entitled to a tax exemption under § 70.11(4) because it 
has not met the lessee identity requirement in § 70.11.  We 
therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  02-0699.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶47 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Applying 
a 
strict 
but 
reasonable 
interpretation 
to 
tax 
exemption 
statutes,11 I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals 
and the judgment of the circuit court.  I dissent because the 
majority opinion's approach is more strict than reasonable. 
¶48 The issue in this case is whether Columbus Park 
Housing Corp., a not-for-profit benevolent housing association, 
is entitled to a tax exemption under Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4).  The 
City of Kenosha stipulated that Columbus Park is a benevolent 
association within the meaning of § 70.11(4).  Indeed, the City 
granted tax exemptions to Columbus Park's properties while they 
were being rehabilitated.  The City denied exempt status to the 
properties only when the properties were subsequently occupied 
by low-income individuals.  The sole dispute between Columbus 
Park and the City is over whether Columbus Park satisfies the 
lessee identity requirement contained in the preamble of 
Wis. Stat. § 70.11. 
¶49 The court of appeals in this case concluded that the 
City's interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 70.11 and 70.11(4)  
produces an absurd result, namely, that Columbus Park qualifies 
for a tax exemption so long as it does not rent its properties 
to low-income individuals.  The incongruity arises because 
Columbus Park cannot be a tax-exempt benevolent association to 
provide low-income housing to the poor and at the same time 
                                                 
11 Deutsches Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 
80, 591 N.W.2d 583 (1999). 
No.  02-0699.ssa 
 
2 
 
provide the benevolent service if it wishes to take advantage of 
the property tax exemption under § 70.11(4).  In essence, the 
majority opinion's interpretation undermines the benevolent 
purpose of the benevolent institution.  This is a strange 
interpretation and outcome, and our court has consistently held 
that "an absurd or unreasonable" construction of a statute is to 
be avoided.12  An exemption should not be construed so narrowly 
as to defeat the legislative purpose. 
¶50 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4) shows 
that similar restrictions on leasing have been part of the 
statute since the 19th century.  The statutory history about the 
meaning of the restriction is inconclusive.  I agree with 
Columbus Park that the primary concern of the legislature and 
courts seems to have been to limit the leasing of otherwise tax-
exempt property for commercial purposes, not to prevent leasing 
to individuals who are the objects of a benevolent association's 
benevolent activities. 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶14, 259 
Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416 ("[W]e may construe a clear and 
unambiguous statute 'if a literal application would lead to an 
absurd or unreasonable result'").  For cases reiterating the 
same interpretive rule, see, e.g., State v. Jennings, 2003 WI 
10, ¶11, 259 Wis. 2d 523, 657 N.W.2d 393; State v. Zielke, 137 
Wis. 2d 39, 51, 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987); DeMars v. LaPour, 123 
Wis. 2d 366, 370, 366 N.W.2d 891 (1985); Green Bay Redevelopment 
Auth. v. Bee Frank, Inc., 120 Wis. 2d 402, 409, 355 N.W.2d 240 
(1984); City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 
236, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983); Braun v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 6 
Wis. 2d 262, 94 N.W.2d 593 (1959); Guse v. Indus. Comm'n, 189 
Wis. 471, 476, 205 N.W. 428 (1925); Ricco v. Riva, 2003 WI App 
182, ¶35, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 669 N.W.2d 193. 
No.  02-0699.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶51 The majority opinion makes much of the fact that the 
word "lessee" is an unambiguous legal term and resorts to the 
legal dictionary for its meaning.13  Yet case law has recognized 
that the word "leased" in a statute does not always mean leased14 
and that the word "owned" in a statute does not always mean 
absolute ownership.15  These words depend on their context and 
legislative intent.  
¶52 The majority opinion focuses on the fact that an 
individual signs the "lease," and the individual, not the 
Kenosha Housing Authority, is evicted on a breach of that 
lease.16  While these are legitimate points that explain why, as 
conceded by the court of appeals, the Housing Authority is not a 
true lessee, the majority opinion does not account for the fact 
that the low-income tenants are not true lessees.  True lessees 
do not require large subsidies from the government to secure 
housing.  Likewise, true lessees need not comply with the 
stringent requirements of a government agency in order to 
maintain their leasehold.17 
                                                 
13 Majority op., ¶18. 
14 Town of Menominee v. Skubitz, 53 Wis. 2d 430, 438, 192 
N.W.2d 887 (1972) (the term "leased lands" in a tax statute 
"should be construed broadly enough to encompass a multitude of 
situations").  
15 State v. Jelco, 1 Wis. 2d 630, 635, 85 N.W.2d 487 (1957) 
(the word "owned" can be used to designate a great variety of 
interests in property and does not have to be restricted to 
absolute ownership). 
16 Majority op., ¶¶19-24. 
17 As the court of appeals explains: 
No.  02-0699.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶53 The court of appeals wisely acknowledged that although 
the Housing Authority "is not the true lessee of the properties 
within the technical definition of the term, the Authority's 
control is a relevant consideration in making a determination as 
to the ability of [Columbus Park] to qualify for an exemption."18  
The court of appeals determined that even though the Housing 
Authority's name is not on the lease, "to pretend that [Columbus 
Park's] tenants are independent lessees ignores the role of the 
Authority in administering and subsidizing the tenants."19  I 
agree with the court of appeals that the Kenosha Housing 
Authority's pervasive control over the housing rentals coupled 
with its substantial financial contribution to the rent of the 
low-income occupants rendered the Housing Authority a lessee for 
purposes of this tax exemption statute. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Authority: (1) requires new tenants of publicly-
subsidized 
housing 
in 
the 
City 
to 
attend 
an 
orientation session that the Authority holds, (2) 
issues 
vouchers 
to 
income-qualified 
tenants 
that 
allows them to participate in the Section 8 housing 
program, (3) conducts an initial inspection of any 
Columbus Park rental unit selected by an income-
qualified tenant to ensure compliance with applicable 
minimum housing standards, (4) conducts an annual 
inspection of Columbus Park's Section 8 rental units 
to ensure compliance with applicable minimum housing 
standards, (5) requires reports to be made by Section 
8 tenants directly to the Authority showing any 
changes in monthly income, and (6) makes monthly 
adjustments to Section 8 tenants' rent subsidies based 
on changes in their income. 
Columbus Park, 259 Wis. 2d 316, ¶25 n.4. 
18 Id., ¶26. 
19 Id. 
No.  02-0699.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶54 A 
strict 
but 
reasonable 
construction 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 70.11 and 70.11(4) would appreciate that the 
relationship between the Housing Authority and the low-income 
individuals occupying Columbus Park's housing is sufficiently 
substantial to qualify the Housing Authority as a lessee for 
purposes of § 70.11.  This interpretation of the statute is the 
better interpretation because it avoids the illogical result of 
discouraging benevolent associations created to provide low-
income housing from providing low-income housing.   
¶55 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  02-0699.ssa 
 
 
 
1