Case Title: Twine v. State

Citation: 395 Md. 539

Docket Number: 138/05

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for M ontgomery County
Case No. 101708
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 138
September Term, 2005
RAYMOND TWINE
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:   November 15, 2006
1 All subsequent statutory references herein shall be to the Criminal Procedure Article,
Md. Code (2001, 2005 Cum. Supp.), unless otherwise indicated.  After briefing and oral
argument in the instant case, the General Assembly enacted changes to the sex offender
registration scheme.  See 2006 Maryland Laws 1st Sp. Sess., Chap. 4 (hereinafter “Chap. 4").
Although Chap. 4 changed some of the sections of the statute implicated by the issue sub
judice, none of these changes altered any portion of the statute essential to our holding today.
Raymond Twine, appellant, was convicted of failing to register as a sexually violent
offender by failing to provide notice of change of address to the Department of Public Safety
and Correctional Services in violation of Md. Code (2001, 2005 Cum. Supp.), § 11-721 of
the Criminal Procedure Article.1  We must decide whether Maryland’s statutory sex-offender
registration scheme, § 11-701 et seq., permits conviction of a homeless person who falls
within the statutory definition of those persons who are obligated to register under the statute
for failure to notify the appropriate State agency of the person’s change in residence.  We
shall hold that the sex offender registration statute does not impose such a notice obligation
on appellant and shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court.
Appellant was convicted on July 12, 2002 of a third degree sex offense which, under
the Maryland Sex Offender Statute, required him to register with the Department of Public
Safety and Correctional Services (“the Department”), his supervising authority, and if he
changed residences, to send written notice of the change to the Department within seven days
after the change occurred.  A registration statement includes, inter alia, the registrant’s full
name and address, a description of the crime for which the registrant was convicted, and
anticipated future residence, if known at the time of registration.  § 11-706.  A registrant who
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changes residences must send written notice of the change to the Department within seven
days after the change occurs.  § 11-705(d).
Appellant was charged in a one count criminal information filed in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County for knowingly failing to provide written notice of a change of
residence as required by § 11-705(d), in violation of § 11-721(a).  Appellant entered a not
guilty plea, waived his right to a trial by jury, and proceeded before the court on an agreed
statement of facts.  The State proffered the following facts:
“Your Honor, we would have, and we are showing that,
the defendant was convicted back on July 12, 2002 for a third-
degree sex offense in Montgomery County, Maryland.  Pursuant
to that, he is required to register on the Sex Offenders Registry
which is marked as State’s Exhibit 2 as a sexually violent
offender.  The requirements are, as you will see on State’s
Exhibit No. 2 which the defendant did sign, that he is required
to register pursuant to the rules under the Registry.  Your Honor,
the defendant, the registration process he was told would take
place and would be conducted at the Montgomery County
Headquarters, located at 2350 Research Boulevard in Rockville,
Montgomery County, Maryland.
“The defendant, on July 14 of 2004, responded to
Headquarters and changed his current address which at the time
was Eagles Roost in Germantown, Montgomery County,
Maryland, which was the last time he had registered, to a new
address of 20013 Sweetgum Circle, Germantown, Montgomery
County, Maryland.  Your Honor, the State is presenting into
evidence State’s Exhibit number 1 which is Mr. Twine’s
registration and notice card of his address on Sweetgum in
Germantown, Montgomery County, Maryland.  At the time of
this registration, Your Honor, the State would have Bob
Landfair tell the Court that the defendant was advised of his
duties and responsibilities under the Maryland State Sex
Offender Registry Law.  One of those duties and responsibilities
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is that he must report any changes of residence to the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections Services within 7
days of the residence change.  Landfair would tell the Court that
the defendant acknowledged his duty and responsibility and
signed that notice of registrant which the Court has before it.
“On December 14th of 2004, Ms. Gallagher, the property
manager from Canterbury Apartments, informed Detective
Parker that the defendant had moved out of the apartment
several months prior.  Detective Parker checked with the
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Service database
and [it] showed the defendant had not changed his residence of
record.  The database still shows Twine’s residence at 20013
Sweetgum Circle, Apartment 23, Germantown, Montgomery
County, Maryland.  Detective Parker, as a result, filed the
charges on the violations of the defendant failing to submit any
change of address within the 7-day period.”
Appellant proffered the following additional facts, to which the State did not object:
“Your Honor, I would include, actually I’m just going to
reintroduce the Notice to Registrant that was signed on
November 13, 2003 as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1.  It does in
fact indicate that a registered sexually violent offender must
register annually for the next ten years.
* * * * * *
“Then Defendant’s number 2, which is the initial
registration that Mr. Twine completed, or a copy of that which
includes the fingerprints and the information that he was at that
time on October 29th of 2002 living at 18517 Eagles Roost
Drive in Montgomery County.  Mr. Twine did comply with the
requirements of the registration statute in filling out that
information and submitting fingerprinting and giving his address
of residence at that time.  In November of 2003 he again
submitted to fingerprinting as required by Montgomery County
and produced a change of residence for 11651 Nebel Street
which was the pre-release center, this is Defendant’s Exhibit
No. 3, pursuant to a sentence that was imposed for a violation of
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probation.  Then Defendant’s No. 4, which I think is a duplicate
of what [the Assistant State’s Attorney] introduced as a State’s
exhibit, is the change of address that Mr. Twine submitted for
the 20013 Sweetgum Circle on July 14th of 2004, again as
required by the statute.  He did provide the change of address
form.
“And finally, Your Honor, Defendant’s Exhibit No. 5,
which is the neighborhood fliers distributed.  This is a form the
Montgomery County police keep.  This is for the offender,
Raymond Twine, indicates that on October 31st of 2002, 25
fliers were distributed into the Eagles Roost Drive address and
then on July 28th of 2004, 48 fliers were distributed regarding
the 20013 Sweetgum Circle address indicating that there was a
registered sex offender living in that neighborhood.
“The additional evidence that would be introduced, Your
Honor, and [the Assistant State’s Attorney] has stipulated to
without the calling of witnesses although there is a witness
present in court, was that as a result of these fliers being
distributed in the address, Mr. Twine was evicted from the
residence at Sweetgum Circle.  This occurred during the month
of August of 2004.  As a result, he became homeless, he had no
permanent residence, he was staying wherever he could.
“Mr. Twine called Detective Don Inman, who was one of
the detectives who monitors the Sexual Offender Registry,
called him and spoke to him on the phone on at least two
occasions, and informed [him] of his homeless status and the
fact that he had no place to live.  That between the time he
became homeless in August of 2004 and the filing of the
charges against him on December 14th of 2004, he had no
address or residence as is required for purposes of providing a
change of residence but that he did in fact orally indicate that he
did not have a residence.”
Before the Circuit Court, appellant argued that he was not guilty because he had
complied with the statutory requirements by orally advising a Montgomery County detective
2 This was so, he maintained, because as a homeless person, he could not comply with
the statute through no fault of his own and he was given absolutely no guidance as to what
to do if he did not have a residence or a mailing address.
3 Appellant also argues before this Court that § 11-705(d) and § 11-721(a) are
unconstitutionally vague as applied to homeless persons because in the absence of a statutory
definition of “residence,” the sex offender registration statute “does not provide clear notice
to a person who becomes homeless on how to comply with” § 11-705(d).  Given that we shall
hold that the evidence was insufficient to support appellant’s conviction, we do not reach this
issue.  See Automobile Trade Ass’n v. Ins. Comm’r, 292 Md. 15, 21, 437 A.2d 199, 202
(1981) (observing that “[i]t is elementary that appellate courts do not decide issues of
(continued...)
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that he had been evicted, and that he was homeless.  He argued also that he had not violated
the statute because the statute only required him to provide notification in the event that he
moved from one address to another address.  Finally, he argued in the alternative that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to homeless defendants because it does not
adequately define “residence.” 2
The court rejected his arguments and found him guilty of violating § 11-721(a).  He
was sentenced to a term of incarceration of ten days, concurrent with the sentence he was
then serving as a result of a parole violation on the 2002 sex offense conviction.
Appellant noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  We granted
certiorari on our own initiative prior to decision by that Court.  Twine v. State, 392 Md. 724,
898 A.2d 1004 (2006).
Before this Court, appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to
support his conviction, as he “could not register a change of residence . . . because he had no
residence to register.”3  The State responds that the evidence was sufficient to support
3(...continued)
constitutionality except as a last resort”).
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appellant’s conviction because one’s “residence,” as the term is used in § 11-705(d), is
simply the location that a person occupies at a given time.  Consequently, the State contends,
appellant’s residence changed when he became homeless, and he could have reported this
change by notifying the appropriate authority of the location or locations he was occupying
once he became homeless. 
Twine does not dispute the State’s contention that he had been convicted of a sex
offense which required him to register with the Department of Corrections and that he had
complied with the statutory requirements in the past.  Instead, he contends that because he
was homeless, he could not comply with the statute, and that the registration requirement of
the statute does not apply to homeless persons because the statute imposes no registration
duties upon people who have no “address” or “residence.”
Every state has enacted a sex offender registration law, although the various statutes
differ as to the offenses covered, registration and notification procedures.  See Cain v. State,
386 Md. 320, 330 n.9, 872 A.2d 681, 687 n.9 (2005) (collecting statutes).  The tragic deaths
of two young children, Megan Kanka of New Jersey, and Jacob Wetterling of Minnesota,
were the impetus for the states and federal government to enact sexual offender registration
and community notification statutes.  Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program (“Wetterling Act”), which was
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enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.  See Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006).  The
Wetterling Act addressed crimes of violence and molestation committed against children in
the United States and required the states to adopt sex offender registration laws within three
years of the Act’s passage in order to receive federal law enforcement funding.  Id. §
14071(g).  The Wetterling Act was amended in 1996, renamed as Megan’s Law, and directed
the states to require the release of certain sex offender registrant information necessary to
protect the public.  See Cain, 386 Md. at 329, 872 A.2d at 686 (citing H.R. 2137, 104th
Cong. (1996), reprinted in 110 Stat. 1345 (1996)).
Maryland first enacted sex offender registration legislation in 1995, setting forth
registration requirements for certain sexual offenders, notice of registrant’s change of address
and prohibited acts, see 1995 Md. Laws, Chap. 142, and has amended the statute on several
occasions.  See Cain, 386 Md. at 331-34, 872 A.2d at 687-89 (discussing subsequent changes
to sex offender registration statute).  In light of appellant’s arguments, we must interpret the
registration statute.  
Appellant was convicted of a violation of § 11-721(a), which provides as follows:
“(a) Prohibited act. — A registrant may not knowingly fail to
register, knowingly fail to provide the written notice required
under § 11-705(d), (e), or (f) of this subtitle, or knowingly
provide false information of a material fact as required by this
subtitle.”
4 Chapter 4 altered § 11-705(d) to require the written notice to be sent to the “State
Registry” created by Chap. 4, and to require the notice to be sent within five days rather than
seven.
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He was convicted under this subsection for failure to provide the written notice required
under § 11-705(d),4 which provides as follows:
“(d) Change of registrant’s residence. — A registrant who
changes residences shall send written notice of the change to the
Department within 7 days after the change occurs.”
It is undisputed that appellant is a “registrant” within the meaning of that statute.
The sex offender registration statute uses the words “residence” and “address”
interchangeably.  This is evident in several sections of the statute.  For example, § 11-710,
Notice of Registrant’s Change of Address, provides in relevant part as follows:
“(a) In general. — As soon as possible but not later than 5
working days after receipt of notice of a registrant’s change of
address, the Department shall give notice of the change:
(1) if the registration is premised on a conviction
under federal, military, or Native American tribal
law, to the designated federal unit; and
(2)(i) to the local law enforcement unit in whose
county the new residence is located; or
(ii) if the new residence is in a
different state that has a registration
requirement, to the designated law
enforcement unit in that state.”      
(Emphasis added.)  In this subsection, “residence” is used in the same sense as “address.”
This is evident from the fact that subsections (a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii) use “the new residence”
to refer to the “change of address” discussed in subsection (a).  The interchangable use of
“residence” and “address” is apparent in other sections as well.  See § 11-706(a)(1) (requiring
5 Although not effective at the time relevant to this case, the changes to § 11-709(c)
effected by Chap. 4 further supports this interpretation.  Chap. 4 altered § 11-709(c) to add
§ 11-709(c)(3), which requires a local law enforcement unit that receives a notice from a
supervising authority to send a copy of that notice to the “police department, if any, of a
municipal corporation if the registrant . . . is to change address to another place of residence
within the municipal corporation.”  As in the other sections discussed infra, “residence” is
used here in a such a way that it is presupposed that one with a residence has an “address.”
Section 11-711, however, was repealed by Chap. 4.   
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registration statement to include “the registrant’s . . . address”); § 11-708(a) (requiring the
supervising authority of a registrant to inform the registrant of “the duties of a registrant
when the registrant changes residence address in this State”); § 11-711 (requiring the
Department to mail verification forms “to the last reported address” of an offender).5
The sex offender registration statute does not define “residence” or “address.”  The
question is one of statutory construction, and the sole question of statutory construction
before us is whether appellant changed residences when he was evicted from the Sweetgum
Circle residence in August of 2004 and became homeless as a result.
We reiterate the familiar rule of statutory construction: our goal when interpreting a
statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.  See Oakland v. Mountain Lake, 392
Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006).  In ascertaining legislative intent, we first
examine the plain language of the statute, and if the plain language of the statute is
unambiguous and consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, we give effect to the statute
as it is written.  See Mackey v. Compass, 391 Md. 117, 141, 892 A.2d 479, 493 (2006).  If
a statute has more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous.  See Moore v. State,
388 Md. 446, 453, 879 A.2d 1111, 1114 (2005).  If the language of the statute is ambiguous,
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we resolve the ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, considering the legislative history,
case law, and statutory purpose.  See Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 591, 865 A.2d
590, 594 (2005).  We consider both the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute and
how that language relates to the overall meaning, setting, and purpose of the act.  See Deville
v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004).  We avoid a construction of the statute
that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.  See Gwin v. MVA, 385
Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005).  We also “construe a statute as a whole so that no
word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or
nugatory.”  Moore, 388 Md. at 453, 879 A.2d at 1115.
We hold that appellant did not change residences within the meaning of § 11-705(d)
when he became homeless, because he did not acquire a new “residence” within the meaning
of the statute.  “Residence,” as noted above, is used interchangeably with “address” in this
statutory scheme.  Because the ordinary meanings of “residence” and “address” connote
some degree of permanence or intent to return to a place, and appellant was homeless, he had
not acquired a residence within the contemplation of the statute.  The statute does not address
how compliance can be achieved by a person in appellant’s circumstances.
The state of Washington considered a similar issue and reached the same conclusion
as we reach today.  State v. Pickett, 975 P.2d 584 (Wash. App. 1999), is instructive.  The
Washington Court of Appeals held that Washington’s sex offender registration statute did
6 The Washington Legislature responded to State v. Pickett, 975 P.2d 584 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999) and amended the Washington sex offender registration statute to require sex
offenders, specifically including those who lack a fixed residence, to register and report
changes in living situation.  See 1999 1st Sp. Sess. Wash. Sess. Laws Chap. 6, §§ 1-2; Wash.
Code Rev. § 9A.44.130(3)(b) (1999); Wash. Code Rev. § 9A.44.130(4)(a)(vii) (1999); Wash.
Code Rev. § 9A.44.130(6)(a)-(b) (1999).
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not impose an obligation on homeless persons to report a change in residence.6  Id. at 586-87.
The Washington statute stated, in relevant part, as follows:
“If any person required to register pursuant to this section
changes his or her residence address within the same county, the
person must send written notice of the change of address to the
county sheriff at least fourteen days before moving.  If any
person required to register pursuant to this section moves to a
new county, the person must send written notice of the change
of address at least fourteen days before moving to the county
sheriff in the new county of residence and must register with
that county sheriff within twenty-four hours of moving.  The
person must also send written notice within ten days of the
change of address in the new county to the county sheriff with
whom the person last registered.  If any person required to
register pursuant to this section moves out of Washington state,
the person must also send written notice within ten days of
moving to the new state or a foreign country to the county
sheriff with whom the person last registered in Washington
state.”
Id. at 586 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.130 (1999)) (emphasis added).  The Pickett
court, rejecting the State’s contention that a homeless person could report a “residence
address” as required under the statute by notifying the appropriate authority of his or her
location by means of descriptions like “under the bridge,” concluded as follows:
“The evidence is undisputed that Pickett was living on the
streets, sometimes staying in parks in Everett and Seattle,
sometimes on the sidewalks of downtown Seattle.  Pickett’s
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situation is not contemplated by the statute.  Because . . .
‘residence address’ connote[s] some permanence or intent to
return to a place, it is impossible for Pickett to comply with the
statute as written.”
Id. at 586-87.
In State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 2003), the Minnesota Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion, holding that the Minnesota sex offender registration statute did
not impose an obligation on all homeless registrants to notify the authorities of a change of
residence.  The Court began its analysis by reviewing the Minnesota statutory scheme,
noting that the statute used “residence,” “address,” and “living address” interchangeably.  Id.
at 351-52.  As a result, the Court saw its task as providing a common definition for these
terms as used in the statute.  Id. at 352.
Applying this analytical approach, the Iverson court rejected the intermediate appellate
court’s construction, under which these terms were interpreted to mean a person’s “living
location,” i.e., wherever a person happens to be staying at the moment.  Id. at 352-353.  The
Iverson court rejected this interpretation as inconsistent with two portions of the statute.  Id.
at 352.  The first of these required a registrant to provide five days advance notice of an
intended change in “living address,” and the second required a registrant to return a
verification form “mail[ed] . . . to [his] last reported address[.]”  Id. (alteration in original).
Relying on these features of the statute, the Iverson court rejected the “living location”
construction, reasoning that if someone does not “live somewhere where mail can be
received and they can provide five days’ notice that they will be going there,” the person
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cannot comply with these provisions of the statute, but nonetheless would be obligated to
under the statute if the “living location” construction were adopted.  Id. at 352-53.  The court,
however, cautioned that “a bald assertion that one is homeless” would not necessarily place
an offender outside the statute, indicating that one who may in some sense be “homeless,”
but who could comply with these requirements, would have a reporting obligation under the
statute.  Id. at 353.
The Minnesota court pointed out that “not all homeless people suffer from the same
degree of instability in their living situation.”  The court set forth the following examples:
“[A]n offender who sleeps one night on a park bench,
the next under a bridge, the next at a bus stop, and so on, is in
a significantly different position from an offender who lives in
a shelter for three weeks or on a couch in a friend's apartment
for six months.  The first of these homeless offenders does not
enjoy a ‘living location’ to which the statute could apply
because he never has five days notice of where he will be and
he cannot receive mail at any of those locations.  The second of
these homeless offenders, however, can comply with the statute
because each of his ‘living locations’ is such that he can provide
sufficient notice of his intent to move there and he can receive
mail there.  
For the foregoing reason, we conclude that a bald
assertion that one is homeless may not preclude application of
the residence requirements of the statute.  A factual inquiry into
the offender’s living situation is required to determine whether
compliance is possible.  Compliance is required, even for
homeless offenders, if they live somewhere where mail can be
received and they can provide five days notice that they will be
going there.  If the location fits both of these criteria, then the
offender must register the location.”
Id. at 352.
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Although the Maryland sex offender statute is in some respects different than the
Washington and Minnesota statutes, we reach a conclusion similar to that of the Pickett and
Iverson courts.  We conclude, on the basis of the plain meaning of “residence” and “address,”
that the General Assembly did not intend the notification requirement in § 11-705(d) to apply
to “homeless” persons.  Similar to the task before the Iverson court, we interpret “residence”
as used in § 11-705(d) in such a way that it is synonymous with “address” and “residence
address.”  Given the plain meanings of “residence” and “address,” we conclude that a
registrant has a “residence” within the meaning of § 11-705(d) only if that person has a fixed
location at which the registrant is living, or one to which the registrant intends to return upon
leaving it.  See Pickett, 975 P.2d at 586-87 (plain meaning of “residence address” as used in
Washington sex offender registration statute “connote[s] some permanence or intent to return
to a place”); W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 24-25, 1931 (1963)
(defining “address” as “the designation of a place . . . where a person or organization may
be found or communicated with,” and defining “residence” as “a temporary or permanent
dwelling place, abode, or habitation to which one intends to return as distinguished from a
place of temporary sojourn or transient visit”); W EBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2119 (2d ed. 1950) (defining “residence” as the “act or fact of abiding or
dwelling in a place for some time”).
Applying this interpretation of § 11-705(d), we hold that the evidence was insufficient
to support appellant’s conviction.  When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the
evidence, the court views the evidence, and all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence,
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in a light most favorable to the State.  See Rivers v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___, 2006
WL 2095784, at *5 (2006).  The duty of the appellate court is to determine whether, after
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could
have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. Albrecht, 336
Md. 475, 478-79, 649 A.2d 336, 337-38 (1994).  As stipulated by the State and defense
counsel, after appellant was evicted he was “homeless,” and “was staying wherever he
could.”  Given that appellant was “staying wherever he could,” no rational trier of fact could
conclude that appellant had a fixed living location to which he intended to return.
Accordingly, no rational trier of fact could conclude that appellant moved to a new residence
after he was evicted from the Sweetgum Circle residence and became homeless.
Consequently, the evidence was insufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
The Iverson court’s admonition that more than a mere assertion that one is homeless
is necessary to preclude the application of the residence requirements of the Minnesota sex
offender registration statute is true under the Maryland statute.  An individual may be, in
some sense, “homeless,” but nonetheless have a “residence” within the meaning of § 11-
705(d).  For example, a person staying in a homeless shelter for a period of time may, in
some sense, be “homeless,” but would not lack a “residence” within the meaning of § 11-
705(d).  See also Iverson, 664 N.W.2d at 352-53 (offering similar examples).  Our holding
today rests not merely on the stipulation that appellant was “homeless,” but also on the
7 A defendant who is charged with violating § 11-721(a) by knowingly failing to
provide the written notice required by § 11-705(d) and wishes to defend against the charge
by arguing that he or she was homeless and thus did not acquire a new “residence” within the
meaning of § 11-705(d) must generate this issue by presenting some evidence tending to
show that the defendant was homeless, and therefore did not acquire a new residence.  Once
the issue is generated, the State0 carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant acquired a new residence.
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stipulated fact that he “was staying wherever he could.”7  This latter stipulation implies that
appellant had not acquired a fixed location where he intended to return on a regular basis,
and consequently, he did not have a “residence” within the meaning of the statute.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
MONTGOMER Y
COUNTY REVERSED.  COSTS TO
BE 
PAID 
BY 
MONTGOMER Y
COUNTY.