Case Title: Patricia J. Holt, Charles Holt, and Cori Nicole Howard, a minor, by her grandmother andnext friend Patricia J. Holt v. Lauderdale County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1050740

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-11-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 11/07/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1050740
____________________
Patricia J. Holt, Charles Holt, and Cori Nicole Howard, a
minor, by her grandmother and next friend Patricia J. Holt
v.
Lauderdale County
Appeal from Lauderdale Circuit Court 
(CV-03-17)
PARKER, Justice.
Case History
The genesis of this case is a motor-vehicle accident that
occurred on county road 88 in Lauderdale County. On January
11, 2003, Patricia J. Holt and Cori Nicole Howard, Holt's
granddaughter, were traveling to Lexington Elementary School
1050740
2
in a vehicle that Holt was driving. To get to the school they
had to travel across a narrow bridge over a creek bed. Before
arriving at the bridge, Holt's vehicle crested a hill, entered
an "S" curve, which turned to the left and then to the right.
As Holt approached the bridge, her car began to slide,
apparently on ice, and she lost control of the vehicle. The
vehicle hit the end of a concrete barrier on the side of the
bridge, overturned, and landed upside down in the creek bed 10
feet below. Paramedics took Holt and Howard to the hospital.
Howard was treated and released; however, Holt remained in the
hospital for approximately 25 days. 
This case originated in the Lauderdale Circuit Court
where Holt, her husband Charles Holt, and Howard, a minor, by
her grandmother and next friend Patricia J. Holt (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "Holt") sued Lauderdale County and
the county engineer, Ken Allamel, alleging negligence in that
they breached their duty to maintain county roads in a safe
manner, under both Ala. Code 1975, § 23-1-80, and the common
law. Specifically, they contend that a guardrail, extending
from the edge of the concrete barrier on the bridge, should
have been erected and that such a guardrail would have
1050740
3
prevented her vehicle from dropping into the creek bed. Both
defendants filed motions for a summary judgment. On February
10, 2005, the trial court, with Holt's consent, granted
Allamel's summary-judgment motion. On January 31, 2006, the
trial court entered a summary judgment for Lauderdale County.
On March 7, 2006, Holt filed a notice of appeal from the
summary judgment for Lauderdale County. We reverse and remand.
    Standard of Review
On appeal, this Court reviews a summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard of review as did the trial court.
Hornsby v. Session, 703 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 1997). To defeat a
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show substantial
evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Ex parte
General Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1999). "Our review
is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review
the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must
resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant." Hobson v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So. 2d 341, 344 (Ala. 1977).
In a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that a duty
existed, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the
breach caused the plaintiff's injury. See Bowden v. E. Ray
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Watson Co., 587 So. 2d 944 (Ala. 1991); Thompson v. Lee, 439
So. 2d 113 (Ala. 1983). Lauderdale County contends that Holt
has failed to meet her burden as to duty, breach, and
causation.
Legal Analysis
A. Duty
"A county, by virtue of its exclusive authority to
maintain and control its roads, is under a common law duty to
keep its roads in repair and in reasonably safe condition for
their intended use." Mixon v. Houston County, 598 So. 2d 1317,
1318 (Ala. 1992). A county also has a statutory obligation to
maintain the safety of its roadways. Section 23-1-80, Ala.
Code 1975, provides that a county has "general superintendence
of the public roads ... so as to render travel over the same
as safe and convenient as practicable." 
Lauderdale County attempts to limit its general duty,
stating that there is "no authority ... that a county has a
legal duty to install guardrails or other devices." Lauderdale
County's brief at 13. Lauderdale County also contends that no
duty exists because at the time the bridge was built the
bridge was in compliance with all safety regulations then in
1050740
5
effect. Id. 
Lauderdale County appears to be arguing that in order to
have a duty to perform a specific renovation to a county road,
there must be some statutory authority requiring it to do so.
However, Lauderdale County cites no Alabama caselaw that
suggests such a rule. It relies instead on a Kansas decision
that refers to a line of cases, based upon a since-repealed
statute, that held that "failure to place (or replace) a
guardrail ... does not constitute a defect unless there is a
statutory duty to erect such a ... guardrail." Schmeck v. City
of Shawnee, 232 Kan. 11, 23, 651 P.2d 585, 595 (1982). Alabama
does not have the same statutory scheme as did Kansas when
Schmeck was decided. To the contrary, this Court has
recognized that a county's duty may require it to do more than
is even required by a manual issued by the Sate and regulating
roadways. In Jefferson County v. Sulzby, 468 So. 2d 112, 114
(Ala. 1985), this Court, affirming a judgment against
Jefferson County in an action arising out of a one-vehicle
accident, said: "Claiming that because the Alabama Manual of
Uniform Control Devices (AMUTCD) does not require edge-of-
pavement markings or curve warning signs at the accident site,
1050740
6
the County contends that it was under no duty, statutory or
otherwise, to install such devices. We disagree." 
In Springer v. Jefferson County, 595 So. 2d 1381 (Ala.
1992), Jefferson County was sued for negligently failing to
erect a guardrail on an allegedly unsafe stretch of road. This
Court proceeded on the assumption that if Springer presented
substantial evidence indicating that Jefferson County had
negligently acted or failed to act and that a guardrail would
have prevented the injury, then a summary judgment against
Springer was inappropriate. 595 So. 2d at 1384. There was no
mention as to whether the guardrail was specifically required
by statute, but the analysis proceeded under a county's
general duty to keep its roads safe. Clearly, under applicable
Alabama law, the lack of explicit statutory obligation does
not automatically eliminate a county's general statutory and
common-law duty to maintain safe roadways. 
Lauderdale County also cites no Alabama law for the
proposition that the appropriate standard for bridge and
guardrail 
construction 
and 
safety 
are 
the 
standards
applicable at the time of construction of the bridge and not
at the time of the accident. Alabama law clearly describes a
1050740
7
county's duty to "'keep its roads in a reasonably safe
condition.'" Mixon, 598 So. 2d at 1318 (quoting Elmore County
Comm'n v. Ragona, 540 So. 2d 720, 724 (Ala. 1989))(emphasis
added). None of the limitations of that duty Lauderdale County
proposes are sufficient to defeat its general statutory and
common-law duty to keep its roadways in a reasonably safe
condition. Thus, it is clear that Lauderdale County had a duty
to keep the bridge and the roadway approaching it in a
reasonably safe condition.
B. Breach of Duty
Once a duty is established, the question then becomes
whether that duty was breached. A county's "standard of care
is to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition for
travel, and to remedy defects in the roadway upon receipt of
notice." Sulzby, 468 So. 2d at 114. Constructive notice of a
defect, however, is enough to support an action based on a
breach of duty. Tuscaloosa County v. Barnett, 562 So. 2d 166,
168 (Ala. 1990). 
Lauderdale County alleges that there was no evidence
presented indicating that there was a defect in the roadway.
Lauderdale County's brief at 11. However, Holt's expert, in
1050740
8
his deposition, noted the speed limit on the road on which the
accident occurred, the narrowness of the paved area on the
bridge, the raw end of the bridge-barrier rail, and the
steepness of the slope to the creek below and concluded that
"any of those four factors by themselves would warrant a
guardrail, but all four of them combined just almost makes it
a necessity."
Lauderdale County appears to contend that the lack of a
guardrail cannot be considered a defect in the roadway.
Lauderdale County's brief at 11. A county could breach its
duty by failing to erect a guardrail. Springer, 595 So. 2d at
1386 ( Houston, J., concurring in the result). This Court has
stated: "The duty [to keep streets safe for travel] extends
the entire width of the street and one injured by a defect or
obstruction outside the prepared part may still be entitled to
recover, if the defect is so near the traveled part as to
render its use unsafe." Jacks v. City of Birmingham, 268 Ala.
138, 143, 105 So. 2d 121, 126 (1958). 
Lauderdale County contends that, even if the lack of a
guardrail can be considered a defect, it had no notice of the
alleged defect. Lauderdale County's brief at 11. However, as
1050740
9
previously noted, notice can be constructive. Barnett, 562 So.
2d at 168. Lauderdale County clearly has maintained control of
the bridge since its construction in 1937. Further,  Holt's
expert, 
Dr. 
Deatherage, 
testified 
that 
"safety 
and
construction standards such as the Roadside Design Guide
require the construction of guardrails at points such as the
place where this accident occurred." Holt's brief at 6. There
is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lauderdale
County was put on constructive notice that the approach to the
bridge was not reasonably safe. 
Lauderdale County states that "there is no accident data
that would indicate that guardrails should be placed extending
back from the end of that bridge," and it uses the lack of
such accident data to support its argument that it had no
constructive notice of any defect in the bridge or the
approach to the bridge. Lauderdale County's brief at 5.
However, the record reveals that there was no accident data
available because Lauderdale County did not release the data.
In response to the question, "Are you aware of any accident
data that would indicate that guardrails should be placed at
this place that we see on exhibit 1," county engineer Allamel
1050740
Exhibit 1 is mentioned in a partial transcript from
1
Allamel's deposition that was attached to Lauderdale County's
motion for a summary judgment. The available portion of the
transcript does not say what the exhibit is.
10
responded with a simple "no."  The transcript  of Allamel's
1
deposition reveals, however, that he was instructed not to
disclose any accident data during the deposition, for fear
that the State of Alabama would revoke Lauderdale County's
privilege of reviewing accident data in the future. Holt's
expert testified that "the physical evidence would indicate
that there have been other impacts at this sight [sic]." But
the absence of other accident reports in the record does not
offset the testimony of Holt's expert witness as to the road
conditions at the scene of the accident and the existence of
those conditions over time, which creates an issue of fact as
to whether Lauderdale County had constructive knowledge of
this alleged defect. Funera v. Jefferson County, 727 So. 2d
818, 822 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).  
C. Causation
     Lauderdale County also contends that Holt failed to show
by substantial evidence that negligence on its part was the
cause of her injury. In fact, Lauderdale County states that
"the absence of guardrails extending back from the end of the
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11
bridge was not the proximate cause of the accident."
Lauderdale County's brief at 15. Lauderdale County relies on
Jones v. General Motors Corp., 557 So. 2d 1259 (Ala. 1990),
and implies that Holt's failure to establish why her vehicle
left the road makes her claim the "'product of pure
supposition, conjecture and guesswork.'" Jones, 557 So. 2d at
1265 (quoting trial court's order). Lauderdale County's
reliance on Jones, however, is misplaced. The above-quoted
text is from the trial court's order. Neither in Jones nor
subsequently has this Court endorsed the trial court's
rationale. "In Jones, this Court equivocated –- saying that
'we do not necessarily agree with the trial court's "proximate
cause" rationale' set out in the trial court's judgment.
Jones, 557 So. 2d at 1265." Peters v. Calhoun County Comm'n,
669 So. 2d 847, 851 (Ala. 1995). Accord Ward v. Morgan County,
769 So. 2d 884, 888 (Ala. 2000).      In Peters, basically in
response to the very same argument presented here, this Court
held, in part: 
"We find that the circuit court erred in basing the
summary 
judgment 
upon 
this 
ground 
[that 
the
unreasonable condition of the roadway was the cause
of the accident], because Mr. Peters readily
concedes that he does not know why his tires dropped
off onto the road shoulder and because Mr. Peters's
1050740
12
theory of the Commission's liability in this case is
not based upon the Commission's having proximately
caused his tires to leave the pavement. Mr Peters
seeks to prove, through expert testimony of an
accident reconstructionist, that the Commission's
alleged negligent failure to perform necessary
shoulder work prevented him, after leaving the road
surface for whatever reason, from safely steering
back onto Coldwater Road."
669 So. 2d at 850. Similarly, in Ward, this Court held:
"Under the facts of this case, reasonable
persons could disagree as to whether it was
foreseeable that injury or death could result from
Morgan County's failure to repair the shoulder
drop-off on Indian Hills Road or to warn of the
drop-off level that existed after the resurfacing.
The trial court stated in Morgan County's summary
judgment that it was not foreseeable that any part
of Anthony Ward's vehicle would leave the paved
portion of the road in an area where the roadway was
straight 
and 
during 
daylight 
hours. 
This 
is
tantamount to concluding that it is unforeseeable
that a driver will leave the road in an attempt to
avoid an object, to avoid a collision with another
vehicle, or as a result of simple inadvertence--all
of these things, in fact, can happen on a straight
road during daylight hours. Why Anthony Ward's
vehicle left the road is not the central issue in
this case, given the fact that the complaint alleges
that his death occurred because the low shoulder
drop-off prevented him from being able to return to
the road safely. Moreover, the county's own engineer
testified that it was 'a known fact' that vehicles
leave the road for various reasons.
"Ward presented substantial evidence from which
a jury could conclude that the county knew or should
have known that a member of the motoring public
might experience difficulty returning a vehicle to
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13
the paved portion of Indian Hills Road and might as
a 
result 
of 
that 
difficulty, 
caused 
by 
an
unreasonably dangerous shoulder-drop-off level or
caused by a failure to warn motorists of that
danger, be involved in an accident."
769 So. 2d at 888-89.
Holt is not arguing here that any negligence on
Lauderdale County's part caused her vehicle to leave the road;
instead, she is arguing that Lauderdale County negligently
maintained the approach to the bridge by failing to install
guardrails. It is this failure, she alleges, that caused her
vehicle  to roll over into the creek.  She maintains, through
an expert witness, that had the guardrails been there, her
vehicle would have been deflected back toward the road and
would not have gone off the bridge into the creek. Holt's
brief at 6. Her proof for this claim goes beyond "mere
conclusory allegations." Brown v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 899 So.
2d 227, 238 (Ala. 2004). Her expert stated that, had a
guardrail been in place, Holt's vehicle would have "been
deflected back into County Road 88, or spun around to where
she would have basically been protected sideways from going
off the edge of the bridge," and he opined that "had those
guardrails been in place at the ... bridge, ... the accident
1050740
14
would have been much less severe."
A defendant will not usually be liable for harm that is
unforeseeable, even when it is proven that the defendant
breached a duty. Thetford v. City of Clanton, 605 So. 2d 835,
840 (Ala. 1992). The Peters Court stated that "a jury should
decide whether Mr. Peters's leaving the road, under the
circumstances, was so far outside the bounds of reasonable
driving as to be unforeseeable by the Commission." 669 So. 2d
at 850. Applying this same test to the facts here, we conclude
that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the
foreseeability of the vehicle's leaving the road under the
circumstances. The hill and the curves approaching the bridge,
the narrow bridge, and the possible ice on the roadway are all
pertinent facts that could allow a juror to find that it is
reasonable for Lauderdale County to foresee that a vehicle
might leave the paved portion of the road.          
Conclusion
The trial court's ruling was in error. In this case,
there were genuine issues of material facts, and those issues
should have been presented to a jury for its decision. The
summary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for
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15
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Murdock, JJ., concur.
See, Lyons, Stuart, and Bolin, JJ., concur in the result.