Case Title: Roberts v. Upper Verdigris Watershed

Citation: 193 Kan. 151, 392 P.2d 914

Docket Number: 43,490

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1964-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
193 Kan. 151 (1964)
392 P.2d 914
In the Matter of the Condemnation of Land for Watershed Purposes. SARAH ROBERTS, HERBERT J. MADDOX, HETTIE REES, MARY JAMES and JANE RUSSELL, Appellants,
v.
UPPER VERDIGRIS WATERSHED JOINT DISTRICT No. 24, Appellee.
No. 43,490

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 6, 1964.
*152 Jerry W. Hannah and Frank C. Sabatini, both of Topeka, argued the cause, and Clayton M. Davis and Mark L. Bennett, both of Topeka, and William J. Dick, of Emporia, were with them on the briefs for the appellants.
Elvin D. Perkins, of Emporia, argued the cause, and Everett E. Steerman, of Emporia, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is an appeal challenging the procedure followed by the trial court in an appeal from a condemnation award.
The facts which present the procedural questions may be briefly stated.
The Upper Verdigris Watershed Joint District No. 24, Chase, Lyon, Greenwood, Woodson and Coffey Counties, Kansas, filed a petition, under G.S. 1949, 24-438, to condemn certain land of the plaintiffs, consisting of all portions of the landowners' land below 1320 feet mean sea level, which covered 60 acres. The land was taken for the permanent storage and temporary detention, either or both, of any waters that are impounded, stored or detained by the detention structure and for the operation of said waters and the inspection and maintenance of said area to be flooded.
The district court appointed three commissioners (24-438, supra.) who made an award of damages and filed their report with the county clerk (G.S. 1949, 24-439.)
The report, so far as material to this controversy, reads:
..............
*153 The commissioners' award was in the amount of $1885.00, for the easement and damages. In conformity with G.S. 1961 Supp., 24-443, the landowners appealed to the district court from the amount of the award.
Prior to the trial in district court the parties stipulated that the landowners owned a 600 acre tract and that the 60 acres, which was being condemned, was located in the north half of the tract. The dam, which is referred to as the detention structure, was located on an adjoining tract.
The case was tried by a jury. The landowners presented their case on the basis of full use of a permanent easement covering the 60 acres and damages to the remaining acreage.
In its opening statement, and on cross-examination of the landowners' witnesses, the condemner attempted to inject into the case its theory of restricted use of the land condemned.
The trial court stated:
The witnesses for the landowners testified that prior to the taking, the land had a value of $70 to $80 per acre; that as a result of the taking of a permanent easement on 60 acres, the 60 acres would be a total loss, the damage ranging from $4,200 to $4,800 loss, and that the 540 acres remaining was damaged from $7 to $10 per acre, or the damage ranging from $3,780 to $5,600. The total damage ranging from $8,280 to $12,900.
After the landowners had rested their case the condemner attempted to present evidence as to its limited use and intended use of the condemned 60 acres. The following discussion occurred in Chambers:
"Mr. Perkins: That's right.
After further argument the trial court reversed its position and stated:
The condemner, over the objections of the landowners, introduced the structural plans and specifications of the dam as an exhibit and other evidence as to its intended limited use of the 60 acres being taken. A hydrologist was permitted to testify, based on rain studies, that only portions of the 60 acres would be completely flooded at certain times and at other times it would be completely flooded. On this theory, each of the expert witnesses for the condemner testified as to the amount of the damage to the 60 acres and the damage to the remainder. Each of the appraisers for the condemner testified that, based on the intended use as told to them by the condemner, they arrived at their opinion as to damages.
The condemner's appraisers valued the land, before the taking, at $70 to $80 per acre. One testified that the total damage was $1,200 based upon $20 per acre for the land taken and no damage to the remainder. Another testified that the total damage was $1,885 based upon information given by condemner that 44 acres would be flooded probably once in 50 years.
Each of the condemner's witnesses was permitted to base his opinion as to damage on the amount of use, or intended use, which use was based upon assumed rainfall.
At the close of the evidence the landowners requested the following instructions:
The trial court refused the requested instructions and over the objection of the landowners instructed the jury in part as follows:
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the landowners which reads:
"Value of easement over 60 acres ....................... $2600.00 "Damage to the remaining 540 acres ..................... 700.00 _________ "TOTAL VERDICT ......................................... $3300.00"
This appeal followed.
Although the landowners allege numerous trial errors as to the admission of evidence, the instructions and the presentation of the case to the jury on two theories for determination of damages the errors so alleged all hinge on the determination of a single question.
The question is  may the report of the commissioners as to the extent of the easement and the extent of its use be varied *156 by evidence as to an intended more limited use for the purpose of reducing the landowners' damages?
An examination of the particular statutes governing the involved condemnation proceeding will give us a positive answer.
The authority for watershed districts to condemn land is to be found in G.S. 1961 Supp., 24-1209, which reads in part:
..............
The sections of the statute to which the above quotation refers provided one of the numerous particular proceedings for condemnation before the enactment of Chapter 234 of the Laws of 1963. The special procedure was designed to compensate a railroad company where its right-of-way was being crossed by a levee, but also covered the taking of private land in connection therewith. The unusual provisions which were made to apply to watershed districts will be noted.
The commencement of the proceeding is provided by G.S. 1949, 24-438, which in part reads:
The district court does not participate further in the proceedings. Notice to the landowners and the proceedings to be followed by the commissioners in appraising the land are covered by the provisions of G.S. 1949, 24-439, which also provides that all reports shall be filed with the county clerk.
Pertinent portions of G.S. 1949, 24-440 read:
*157 G.S. 1949, 24-441, provides for the filing of a copy of the commissioners' report with the county treasurer by the county clerk and for receipts and disbursements.
The next section, G.S. 1949, 24-442, should determine the question now under consideration. It provides:
The statute makes it crystal clear that the watershed district took the right to the full and perpetual use of all lands shown by the commissioners' report to have been appropriated and for the purpose for which the same were condemned as shown by the report.
The commissioners' report, and only their report, is evidence of the land appropriated, the extent of the easement and its use.
In Mercantile Co. v. O.H. & G. Rld. Co., 56 Kan. 174, 42 Pac. 712, it is stated:
The above case was cited with approval in our recent case of Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan. 33, 325 P.2d 338, where we said:
The landowners and the condemner may, and must, rely on the language of the commissioners' report as to the extent of the *158 easement and the extent of the use. If the landowners are not compensated in full for the full use, as set out in the report, the condemner can take the full use in the future without further compensation to the landowners.
The evidence introduced on appeal from a condemnation award does not become a part of the commissioners' report which is filed with the register of deeds and determines the extent of the easement and the extent of the use. The injustice that would result to the landowners is readily apparent, if a condemner could introduce evidence as to a limited use for the purpose of reducing the amount of damages to the landowners, and later exercise the full use by virtue of the commissioners' report.
The extent of the easement and the extent of the use, that is the rights required, are not questions of fact. They are questions of law to be determined from the language used in the commissioners' report. The general rule is well stated in 7 A.L.R.2d 366 as follows:
The condemner contends that it was entitled to show the nature of the detention structure which would cause the impoundment of water on the easement condemned, the purpose being to show only an infrequent or limited use of the easement. The fallacy of the contention is that the nature of the dam or detention structure was not made a part of the commissioners' report which controls the extent of the easement and the use.
It is suggested that watershed districts are a matter of public benefit and their construction will be rendered impracticable if damages must be paid in full for the value of land which is only infrequently and temporarily inundated. The suggestion has no merit. If the condemner desires only an infrequent limited use of the easement condemned it need only make certain that the limited *159 use is properly stated in the petition and incorporated in the commissioners' report which is filed with the register of deeds and governs the extent of the easement and the extent of the use. That has not been done in this case.
We must conclude that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence as to the condemner's future intended use which varied the extent of the use set out in the commissioners' report, i. e., "For the permanent storage and temporary detention, either or both, of any waters that are impounded, stored or detained ..."
It necessarily follows that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence as to damages to the landowners based on the evidence of the intended use, notwithstanding the fact that the commissioners' report, which controlled the extent of the use, gave the condemner the right to the full use of a permanent easement.
It also follows that the trial court's instructions erroneously left to the jury the determination of the extent of the use based on the condemner's evidence as to the intended use.
Moreover, we have little difficulty in concluding that the requested instructions of the landowners, heretofore quoted, properly stated the measure of damages.
The measure of damages should have been based on the rights acquired by the condemner and not upon testimony as to the intended use. The landowners were entitled to compensation based on the full use which the condemner had the right to exercise over the easement condemned as described in the commissioners' report.
On appeal from the commissioners' award the only matter to be litigated is the amount of damages. The trier of facts is not concerned with evidence as to the intended extent of the use. The extent of the use is to be determined from the language in the commissioners' report as a matter of law.
See, e.g., Cline v. Kansas Gas & Electric Company, 182 Kan. 155, 318 P.2d 1000, which states:
*160 Although what has been said up to this point is sufficient to require the granting of a new trial, the landowners raise another question which should receive attention. They contend that the trial court erred in permitting the case to be tried on two theories as to measure of damages and in submitting the case to the jury on the two theories. We are forced to agree with this contention.
The record shows that the trial court permitted the landowners to present their evidence on the theory of the full use of a permanent easement on the 60 acres. The landowners, on numerous occasions, objected to the condemner injecting the theory of limited use into the case. The trial court sustained the objections and in doing so made remarks before the jury such as:
..............
..............
After the landowners rested their case the trial court switched the theory upon which damages were to be established. Notwithstanding the landowners' objections it permitted the condemner to submit evidence as to a limited use and permitted evidence of damages based on such limited use. It is clear that the case was submitted on two opposing theories as to the measure of damages. The remarks of the trial court in ruling on the objections in the presence of the jury must have confused it.
Based upon the numerous reasons stated in the opinion we are forced to conclude that the landowners did not receive a fair trial on the question of just compensation for the easement condemned.
Therefore, the judgment is reversed with directions to grant a new trial.
WERTZ and FATZER, JJ., dissenting.