Case Title: Blackmon v. First Real Estate Corp.

Citation: 529 So. 2d 955

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1988-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
529 So. 2d 955 (1988)
Sim BLACKMON and Lynda Blackmon
v.
FIRST REAL ESTATE CORPORATION.
87-338.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 1, 1988.
*956 William J. Baxley and Kearney Dee Hutsler III, of Baxley, Dillard & Dauphin, Birmingham, for appellants.
Charles H. Clark, Jr., of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, Birmingham, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Sim and Lynda Blackmon appeal from a summary judgment in favor of First Real Estate Corporation in an action for negligence. We affirm.
In 1984, the Blackmons, through their agent, Bill Hogan, purchased a used home from Robert Dow and L.S. Ward, who had listed the house with First Real Estate. Shortly after the Blackmons moved into their house, they discovered sewage problems, and, as a result, instituted a suit against Dow, Ward, and First Real Estate, alleging fraudulent deceit, pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-104. The Blackmons later amended their complaint to include a negligence claim against First Real Estate. The trial court granted First Real Estate's motion for summary judgment as to both claims and made the judgment final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. The Blackmons appeal only as to their negligence claim against First Real Estate. This appeal does not involve the Blackmons' pending claims against Dow and Ward.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P. All reasonable doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of fact must be resolved against the moving party. Autrey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 481 So. 2d 345 (Ala.1985); Fountain v. Phillips, 404 So. 2d 614 (Ala.1981).
On appeal, in support of their negligence claim, the Blackmons argue that First Real Estate breached a duty of care by failing to perform a reasonable inspection of their house prior to the closing and to disclose the defective sewer system. They further argue that the health and safety risks associated with the defective sewer system render the doctrine of caveat emptor inapplicable. Both contentions are meritless.
The Blackmons predicate their negligence claim on the premise that real estate agents representing sellers of used homes owe purchasers a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of the property and to disclose any easily discoverable defects. However, in the absence of a confidential relationship, the law does not impose such a duty.
This Court in Speigner v. Howard, 502 So. 2d 367 (Ala.1987), unequivocally rejected the exact argument that the Blackmons propound in this case, and, in doing so, reaffirmed the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor to the purchase of used houses. In Speigner, the plaintiff purchased a used house that he later discovered to be defective and, as a result, he filed a five-count complaint against the seller's real estate agency, Lowder Realty Company, and one of its listing agents, Sunnie Howard. In count four of his complaint, *957 the plaintiff charged Lowder and Howard with negligence, arguing that Lowder and Howard had breached a duty to discover defects. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to all counts, and we affirmed. In doing so, we rejected the imposition of a duty on the seller's real estate company and one of its brokers in the absence of a confidential relationship:
Id. 502 So. 2d  at 373.
In this case also, the doctrine of caveat emptor should apply. The record is devoid of any evidence of a confidential relationship between First Real Estate and the Blackmons. It is undisputed that the sellers, Dow and Ward, listed their house with First Real Estate and that First Real Estate's broker, Bob Moore, represented Dow and Ward during the sale of the house. It is also undisputed that the Blackmons were represented by their own agent, Bill Hogan of Byrd Real Estate. The record indicates that the Blackmons visited and inspected the house twice prior to the closing and that on both occasions Hogan was the only agent present. At all times, Hogan was the only agent representing the Blackmons relative to the inspection and purchase of the property. Moreover, the record reveals that Bob Moore of First Real Estate never made any representations to the Blackmons concerning the condition of the house, and, in fact, never even met with the Blackmons until the closing. The following testimony of Lynda Blackmon clearly indicates the absence of a confidential relationship:
Alternatively, the Blackmons argue that the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply in sales of used houses when defects affect health and safety. But, because we find an absence of a confidential relationship, First Real Estate was not bound by a duty to inspect and to disclose, regardless of whether the malfunctioning sewage system posed a risk to the health and safety of the Blackmons. In an analogous case, Cooper & Co. v. Bryant, 440 *959 So. 2d 1016 (Ala.1983), we addressed the same issuethat is, whether a seller's listing agent owes a legal duty to a buyer to disclose defects that affect the health and safety of the buyerand concluded that the listing agent did not owe the buyer such a duty. Finding an absence of evidence showing misconduct or negligence on the part of the listing agent, we observed:
Id. 440 So. 2d  at 1018-19. (Emphasis added.)
The main principle to be gleaned from Cooper & Co. relative to the instant case is that a listing agent representing a seller of a used home does not owe the buyers a duty to disclose defects affecting health and safety unless a confidential relationship exists between the parties. In short, the doctrine of caveat emptor still applies in this area of the law.
In this case, as in Cooper & Co., there was no evidence of any confidential relationship between the buyers and the realtor that would have created a duty on the realtor's part to disclose defects affecting health and safety. "Where there is no duty, there can be no negligence." Rose v. Miller & Co., 432 So. 2d 1237 (Ala.1983). Therefore, First Real Estate was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment for First Real Estate is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and BEATTY, JJ., concur.