Case Title: State ex rel. Morenz v. Kerr

Citation: 2004-Ohio-6208

Docket Number: 20041760

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Morenz v. Kerr, 104 Ohio St.3d 148, 2004-Ohio-6208.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MORENZ v. KERR, JUDGE, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Morenz  v. Kerr,104 Ohio St.3d 148, 2004-Ohio-6208.] 
Domestic relations – Child custody – Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act — 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act — Prohibition lies to prevent Ohio 
court from proceeding in child-custody matter when Illinois court has 
greater access to relevant evidence and has exercised jurisdiction over the 
matter – Generalized allegations by Ohio parent of child abuse by Illinois 
parent insufficient to confer jurisdiction on Ohio court. 
(No. 2004-1760 ─ Submitted November 17, 2004 ─ Decided November 22, 
2004.) 
IN PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS, AND PROCEDENDO. 
____________________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
{¶1} 
In this case, we hold that an Ohio court patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a child-custody case commenced 
when a child-custody case is already pending in a court of another state and that 
court is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act (“PKPA”), Section 1738A, Title 28, U.S.Code, and the state’s 
version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”). 
{¶2} 
On May 21, 1993, relator, Denise Patricia Morenz, and Daniel 
William Payne were divorced in the Circuit Court of Brooke County, West 
Virginia.  The West Virginia court awarded custody of the parties’ minor child, 
Casandra Elizabeth Payne, d.o.b. June 23, 1990, to Morenz and ordered Payne to 
pay child support.  Payne has been a resident of Jefferson County, Ohio, since 
1994, and in November 2000, Morenz and Casandra moved from West Virginia 
to Springfield, Illinois. 
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{¶3} 
In December 2003, respondent Jefferson County Child Support 
Enforcement Agency (“JCCSEA”), on behalf of Morenz and Casandra, filed a 
petition in the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to 
register and enforce the May 21, 1993 West Virginia child-support order pursuant 
to R.C. 3115.01 to 3115.59, Ohio’s version of the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act.  On December 29, 2003, respondent Judge Samuel W. Kerr of the 
Jefferson County, Ohio juvenile court authorized the issuance of an order/notice 
to Payne’s employer to withhold a portion of his income for child support. 
{¶4} 
In June 2004, Casandra left Illinois for her summer visitation with 
Payne in Ohio.  On July 28, 2004, Morenz filed a petition in the Circuit Court of 
the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, Illinois, to register and enforce 
the May 21, 1993 West Virginia child-custody order and a 1994 supplemental 
order pursuant to the Illinois version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement Act, 750 Ill.Comp.Stat. 36/101 et seq.  In her petition, Morenz 
alleged that West Virginia was no longer the appropriate jurisdiction for 
determination of child-custody and visitation issues concerning Casandra and that 
registration of the West Virginia orders in Illinois would be appropriate to enforce 
the judgment in Illinois. 
{¶5} 
On August 4, 2004, Morenz filed a petition in the Illinois court for 
expedited enforcement of the West Virginia child-custody determination.  Morenz 
alleged that Payne had failed to return Casandra to her custody.  On August 6, 
2004, Payne filed a motion in the Jefferson County, Ohio juvenile court to modify 
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities.  Payne sought custody of 
Casandra.  Payne alleged that Casandra had expressed a desire to live with him 
because she is disturbed by Morenz’s “lack of time and attention to her and the 
other two (2) children as well as by the step-father’s habits, behavior and 
offensive words and deeds.”  Payne claimed that Morenz’s husband “menaces the 
child,” that he “frequently drinks Coke and Old Turkey Whiskey,” and that “[t]his 
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mixture is taken with him in motor vehicles and especially when he and [Morenz] 
are on the road.”  Payne was “concerned that if the minor child is made to return 
to [Morenz], the minor child will be verbally, emotionally and perhaps physically 
abused.”    Payne did not expressly allege that Morenz’s husband operated motor 
vehicles while intoxicated when Casandra was a passenger.  Nor did he specify 
any facts indicating harm to Casandra. 
{¶6} 
On August 9, 2004, the Illinois court issued an order directing 
Payne to appear in court with Casandra and ordering that when they did, Morenz 
could take immediate physical custody of the child.  On August 16, 2004, Morenz 
moved to dismiss the Ohio case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
{¶7} 
On August 18, 2004, the Illinois court granted Morenz’s petition 
for enforcement of the West Virginia child-custody determination and ordered 
Payne to immediately return Casandra to Morenz.  The Illinois court determined 
that it had jurisdiction over the child-custody matter, that Payne had been served 
with its August 9 order directing him to appear in court with Casandra, and that 
Payne had not appeared as ordered.  On August 19, Morenz moved the Jefferson 
County, Ohio court to enforce the Illinois custody order and on August 23, the 
Illinois court ordered Payne to show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt. 
{¶8} 
On August 24, 2004, the West Virginia court sent a letter to 
respondent Magistrate Casimir T. Adulewicz of the Jefferson County, Ohio 
juvenile court notifying the court that assuming certain facts, West Virginia no 
longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. 
{¶9} 
On August 25, the Jefferson County, Ohio juvenile court accepted 
and registered the West Virginia divorce decree.  On September 1, 2004, the 
Illinois court granted Morenz’s petition to register the West Virginia child-
custody determination and further ordered that “[a]ll issues of child custody and 
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visitation shall be heard by the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, 
Illinois.” 
{¶10} On September 2, Magistrate Adulewicz of the Jefferson County, 
Ohio juvenile court awarded temporary legal custody of Casandra to Payne and 
referred the matter to JCCSEA for investigation.  The magistrate subsequently 
denied Morenz’s request for findings of fact and conclusions of law to support his 
September 2 order.  On September 22, Morenz filed objections to the magistrate’s 
orders with Judge Kerr.  Morenz requested that the matter be returned to the 
magistrate to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law to support his 
temporary child-custody order. 
{¶11} On October 19, Morenz filed this action against Judge Kerr, 
Magistrate Adulewicz, and JCCSEA.  Morenz requests writs of prohibition to 
prevent Judge Kerr and Magistrate Adulewicz from exercising further jurisdiction 
in Payne’s Ohio child-custody case and to prevent JCCSEA from taking any 
further actions against her pursuant to the magistrate’s September 2 bench order.  
Morenz also requests writs of mandamus and procedendo to order Judge Kerr and 
Magistrate Adulewicz to transfer the Ohio proceedings to the Illinois court.  On 
November 1, the magistrate filed an answer.  JCCSEA’s response was due on 
November 12, and Judge Kerr’s response was due on November 15, but neither 
filed a timely response to Morenz’s complaint. 
{¶12} This cause is now before us for our determination under 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5). 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5):  Standard of Review 
{¶13} Under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5), we must now determine whether 
dismissal, an alternative writ, or a peremptory writ is appropriate.  State ex rel. 
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 301, 2004-Ohio-2894, 
809 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 9.  Dismissal is required if it appears beyond doubt, after 
presuming the truth of all material factual allegations of the complaint and making 
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all reasonable inferences in Morenz’s favor, that Morenz is not entitled to the 
requested extraordinary relief in prohibition, mandamus, and procedendo.  
Tatman v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 102 Ohio St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 
811 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 13.  If, however, after so construing Morenz’s complaint, it 
appears that her claims may have merit, an alternative writ should be granted, and 
a schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs should be issued.  Id.  
Finally, if the pertinent facts are uncontroverted and it appears beyond doubt that 
Morenz is entitled to the requested  writs, we will issue peremptory writs of 
prohibition, mandamus, and procedendo.  State ex rel. Highlander v. Rudduck, 
103 Ohio St.3d 370, 2004-Ohio-4952, 816 N.E.2d 213, ¶ 8. 
Prohibition:  Judge Kerr and Magistrate Adulewicz 
{¶14} In her primary claim, Morenz seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent 
Judge Kerr and Magistrate Adulewicz from further proceeding in the Ohio child-
custody case instituted by Payne.  Morenz asserts that the judge and magistrate 
patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction in the Ohio child-custody matter.  “ 
‘If a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a 
cause, prohibition * * * will issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of 
jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized 
actions.’ ”  State ex rel. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Henson, 102 Ohio St.3d 
349, 2004-Ohio-3208, 810 N.E.2d 953, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Mayer v. 
Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12.  Therefore, 
“[i]n cases of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, the requirement of a 
lack of an adequate remedy of law need not be proven because the availability of 
alternate remedies like appeal would be immaterial.”  State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 
99 Ohio St.3d 97, 2003-Ohio-2476, 789 N.E.2d 195, ¶ 18. 
{¶15} For the following reasons, Judge Kerr and Magistrate Adulewicz 
patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the child-custody proceeding, 
and Morenz is entitled to a peremptory writ of prohibition. 
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{¶16} “To help resolve interstate custody disputes, the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (‘UCCJA’) was drafted in 1968 and adopted by Ohio in 
1977.”  Justis v. Justis (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 312, 314, 691 N.E.2d 264, citing 
R.C. 3109.21 to 3109.37, 137 Ohio Laws, Part I, 359.  Illinois also adopted the 
UCCJA.  See 750 Ill.Comp.Stat. 36/101 et seq.  The purpose of the UCCJA is “ 
‘to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other jurisdictions’ 
” in custody matters.  In re Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Goeller, 103 
Ohio St.3d 427, 2004-Ohio-5579, 816 N.E.2d 594, ¶ 12, quoting In re Palmer 
(1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 194, 196, 12 OBR 259, 465 N.E.2d 1312.  “To bolster the 
effectiveness of the UCCJA, Congress passed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention 
Act (‘PKPA’), Section 1738A, Title 28, U.S.Code, in 1980, mandating that states 
afford full faith and credit to valid child custody orders of another state court.”  
Justis, 81 Ohio St.3d at 315, 691 N.E.2d 264.  When the Ohio version of the 
UCCJA conflicts with the PKPA, the PKPA prevails.  State ex rel. Seaton v. 
Holmes, 100 Ohio St.3d 265, 2003-Ohio-5897, 798 N.E.2d 375, ¶ 16. 
{¶17} Under the PKPA, a “court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction 
in any proceeding for a custody or visitation determination commenced during the 
pendency of a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that 
other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this 
section to make a custody or visitation determination.”  Section 1738A(g), Title 
28, U.S.Code. 
{¶18} “A child custody or visitation determination made by a court of a 
State is consistent with the provisions of [the PKPA] only if –  
{¶19} “(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and  
{¶20} “(2) one of the following conditions is met:   
{¶21} “(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child’s home State within 
six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child 
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is absent from the state because of his removal or retention by a contestant or for 
other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State * * *.”  Section 
1738A(c), Title 28, U.S.Code. 
{¶22} Judge Kerr and Magistrate Adulewicz lack jurisdiction under the 
PKPA to exercise jurisdiction in the child-custody matter.  At the time that Payne 
commenced his Ohio custody proceeding ─ when he filed his motion on August 
8, 2004, to modify allocation of parental rights and responsibilities ─ Morenz’s 
Illinois proceeding for a custody determination was already pending.  That is, 
contrary to Magistrate Adulewicz’s contention, the December 2003 JCCSEA 
Ohio petition for enforcement of the West Virginia child-support order did not 
initiate the Ohio proceeding for a custody determination so as to make Ohio first 
in time for purposes of the PKPA.  See Section 1738A(b)(3) (“ ‘custody 
determination’ means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for 
the custody of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial 
orders and modifications”).  And the Illinois court exercised jurisdiction 
consistent with the PKPA because it had jurisdiction under Illinois law, and 
Illinois was the home state of both Casandra and Morenz at the time the Illinois 
proceeding was commenced.  Consequently, Judge Kerr and Magistrate 
Adulewicz lacked jurisdiction under Section 1738A(g), Title 28, U.S.Code, over 
Payne’s custody action.  See, generally, G.B. v. Arapahoe Cty. Court (Colo.1995), 
890 P.2d 1153, 1160 (“Under section 1738A[g], then, Colorado could not assert 
jurisdiction as long as California proceedings were pending, and as long as 
California was exercising jurisdiction in conformity with the PKPA”). 
{¶23} Similarly, Judge Kerr and Magistrate Adulewicz were also 
precluded from exercising jurisdiction under R.C. 3109.24(A) of Ohio’s version 
of the UCCJA.  R.C. 3109.24(A) provides: 
{¶24} “A court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction, if at the 
time of filing the petition a parenting proceeding concerning the child was 
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pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in 
conformity with sections 3109.21 to 3109.36 of the Revised Code, unless the 
proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because this state is a more 
appropriate forum or for other reasons.” 
{¶25} At the time that Payne filed his Ohio petition for a parenting 
determination, Morenz had already initiated a parenting proceeding in Illinois.  
See R.C. 3109.21(C), defining “parenting proceeding” for purposes of Ohio’s 
version of the UCCJA as “proceedings in which a parenting determination is one 
of several issues”; see, also, R.C. 3109.21(B) (“ ‘Parenting determination’ means 
a court decision and court orders and instructions that, in relation to the parents of 
a child, allocates parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the child, 
including any designation of parenting time rights, and designates a residential 
parent and legal custodian of the child or that, in relation to any other person, 
provides for the custody of a child, including visitation rights”).  Again, 
notwithstanding the magistrate’s claims to the contrary, the JCCSEA petition to 
register and enforce the West Virginia child-support order did not make the Ohio 
court first in time for purposes of the UCCJA because this petition did not request 
a parenting determination.  See R.C. 3109.21(B) (“ ‘Parenting determination’ * * 
* does not include a decision relating to child support or any other monetary 
obligation of any person”). 
{¶26} The Illinois court that is considering Morenz’s child-custody 
proceeding is exercising jurisdiction in conformity with the UCCJA.  See 750 
Ill.Comp.Stat. 36/210 and 36/203.  There is also no evidence that the Illinois court 
has stayed its proceeding and declined jurisdiction in favor of Ohio courts. 
{¶27} Therefore, pursuant to R.C. 3109.24(A), Judge Kerr and 
Magistrate Adulewicz lack jurisdiction under the UCCJA to proceed in Payne’s 
child-custody proceeding.  This result is consistent with precedent.  For example, 
in G.B., the Colorado Supreme Court held that allegations of abuse prompting a 
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refusal to return a child after visitation in California were insufficient to divest 
Colorado of jurisdiction it had first acquired under the UCCJA: 
{¶28} “This case is exactly the type of case to which the UCCJA was 
intended to apply.  The mother wrongfully refused to return C.B. after a period of 
visitation, and then the mother, and not the State, initiated proceedings in 
Colorado which were designed to change custody of C.B. in the mother’s favor.  
We realize that the mother alleges that her actions were necessary to protect C.B. 
from abuse.  However, if we were to allow Colorado to assert jurisdiction as soon 
as the parties allege abuse, it would permit the parties to circumvent the 
requirements of and the policies behind the UCCJA.  Additionally, the mother has 
had a chance to present her abuse allegations before the California court.”  G.B., 
890 P.2d at 1160. 
{¶29} Analogously, Payne’s generalized allegations of neglect and abuse 
are insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Ohio court over the child-custody 
proceeding in the absence of the Illinois court’s declining to exercise jurisdiction 
over Morenz’s child-custody proceeding. 
{¶30} This result is also consistent with the purposes of the UCCJA and 
PKPA to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between courts of different 
states and to assure that the state with the optimum access to the relevant facts 
makes a custody determination that protects the child’s best interests.  See Seaton, 
100 Ohio St.3d 265, 2003-Ohio-5897, 798 N.E.2d 375, ¶ 17.  Illinois, where 
Casandra lived with her mother from November 2000 until June 2004, manifestly 
has greater access than Ohio to any evidence that might support Payne’s 
allegations concerning Morenz’s alleged neglect and Morenz’s husband’s alleged 
misconduct.  There is no indication here that when the Ohio court became aware 
of the pending Illinois proceeding, it engaged in the communication with that 
court required by R.C. 3109.24(B) and (C).  In re Adoption of Asente (2000), 90 
Ohio St.3d 91, 102, 734 N.E.2d 1224 (“When a court of this state is asked to 
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make a custody decision with respect to a child who is the subject of proceedings 
within the jurisdiction of another state, the UCCJA anticipates that a meaningful 
dialogue will occur between the judges in deciding which court is the more 
appropriate forum from which to decide the child custody issues”). 
{¶31} Therefore, because Judge Kerr and Magistrate Adulewicz patently 
and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the underlying child-custody case 
because of the PKPA and UCCJA, Morenz is entitled to a peremptory writ of 
prohibition to prevent them from proceeding further. 
Prohibition:  JCCSEA 
{¶32} Morenz is not entitled to the requested writ of prohibition against 
JCCSEA.  Prohibition will not lie if the respondent is not exercising judicial or 
quasi-judicial authority.  State ex rel. McGrath v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 100 
Ohio St.3d 72, 2003-Ohio-5062, 796 N.E.2d 526, ¶ 7.  “ ‘Quasi-judicial authority 
is the power to hear and determine controversies between the public and 
individuals that require a hearing resembling a judicial trial.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  
State ex rel. Potts v. Comm. on Continuing Legal Edn. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 452, 
455, 755 N.E.2d 886, quoting State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles 
(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908.  JCCSEA is not exercising 
judicial or quasi-judicial authority in the underlying matter. 
{¶33} Therefore, we dismiss Morenz’s prohibition claim against 
JCCSEA. 
Mandamus and Procedendo:  Judge Kerr and Magistrate Adulewicz 
{¶34} Morenz also requests writs of mandamus and procedendo to 
compel Judge Kerr and Magistrate Adulewicz to transfer the child-custody 
proceedings to the Illinois court. 
{¶35} But our issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the Ohio child-
custody case from proceeding renders Morenz’s claim moot.  The Illinois case is 
already proceeding, and because the Ohio court never obtained proper jurisdiction 
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over the underlying case, there is nothing to transfer to the Illinois court.  Neither 
mandamus nor procedendo will issue to compel a vain act.  See State ex rel. 
Moore v. Malone, 96 Ohio St.3d 417, 2002-Ohio-4821, 775 N.E.2d 812, ¶ 38; 
State ex rel. Garnett v. Lyons (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 125, 127, 73 O.O.2d 440, 339 
N.E.2d 628. 
{¶36} Consequently, we dismiss Morenz’s mandamus and procedendo 
claims because they are moot. 
Conclusion 
{¶37} Based on the foregoing, we grant a peremptory writ of prohibition 
to prevent Judge Kerr and Magistrate Adulewicz from proceeding in the Ohio 
child-custody case.  We dismiss Morenz’s claims for a writ of prohibition against 
JCCSEA because JCCSEA is not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial authority.  
Finally, we dismiss Morenz’s claims for writs of mandamus and procedendo 
against Judge Kerr and Magistrate Adulewicz based on mootness. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
 
Rapoport, Spitz, Friedland & Courtney and Alan J. Rapoport, for relator. 
 
Casimir T. Adulewicz, pro se. 
____________________