Case Title: Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1987-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc.1987 WY 28733 P.2d 1029Case Number: 86-96Decided: 03/12/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT STOCKWELL, AKA 
ROBERT COZAD, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
PARKER DRILLING CO., 
INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT), LARSON CONSTRUCTION CO., 
INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 
 
Robert C. Wilson, 
Casper, for appellant.

 
 
Cameron S. Walker of 
Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for appellee. 

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
summary judgment for the owner, Parker Drilling Company, Inc. (Parker), who was 
sued by appellant, Robert Stockwell, a/k/a Robert Cozad (Stockwell), for 
injuries he suffered while employed by an independent contractor, MATO, 
Inc.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     On June 29, 1979, 
Parker entered into a general construction agreement with Larson Construction 
Company, Inc. (Larson) in which Larson agreed to construct two buildings on 
Parker's land. The buildings were to be attached and housed under a common roof. 
Thereafter Larson hired MATO, Inc. (MATO), a subcontractor, to install 
insulation in the buildings. Appellant Stockwell was an employee of MATO and 
worked at the Parker building construction site.

 
 

[¶4.]     On October 24, 1979, 
Larson employees and MATO employees, including Stockwell, installed the roof 
insulation and attached the roof panels. After the last roof panel was attached 
by the crew, Stockwell proceeded toward the edge of the building to trim off 
excess insulation; the roof panel buckled, and Stockwell was thrown to the 
ground and sustained serious injury.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant Stockwell 
filed a complaint in the district court naming as defendants Parker, the owner, 
and Larson, the general contractor. MATO, appellant Stockwell's employer, was 
not sued due to the immunity afforded by the applicable worker's compensation 
statute, § 27-12-103, W.S. 1977. Parker moved for summary judgment. Based upon 
the affidavits, depositions, interrogatories and other materials before it, the 
court found that Parker owed the appellant Stockwell no duty of reasonable care 
and entered summary judgment in favor of Parker. The court, in its decision 
letter of February 5, 1986, set forth the rationale for its decision as 
follows:

 
 
"Plaintiff contends that 
the case comes within exceptions outlined by sections 413, 416, and 424 of the 
Restatement, Second, of Torts. Sections 413 and 416 require a finding that there 
was a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm or a peculiar risk of physical 
harm to others. There is no evidence of any peculiar risks in this case. Also, 
it does not appear that the term `others' includes the employees of the 
independent contractor but refers to the general public or others who have no 
relationship to the independent contractor. Conover v. Northern States Power 
Co., 313 N.W.2d 397, [1981] Schlenk v. Northwestern Bell, 329 N.W.2d 605, [1983] 
and Parsons v. Amerada Hess Corp., 422 F.2d [610] 612 
[1970].

 
 
"Section 424 is also 
inapplicable. The OSHA regulations do not impose a duty upon the landowner in a 
case of this kind. The regulations speak in terms of duties owed by the employer 
to the employee. Obviously, the plaintiff was not an employee of the defendant. 
Otherwise, the claim would be barred by the Worker's Compensation laws. The 
safety standards do not create a nondelegable duty resting upon the employer of 
an independent contractor in favor of employees of that independent contractor. 
Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power and Light Co., 
635 P.2d 426 [1981]. Absent that specific requirement, employees of an 
independent contractor are not in the protected class as used by section 
424."

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellant Stockwell 
raises the following issue on appeal:

 
 
"Whether the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment by finding:

 
 
"(1) That there was no 
duty owed by the landowner to the employees of a 
subcontractor.

 
 
"(a) The term `other' in 
Sections 410-415 of the Restatement of Torts 2d should [not] include employees 
of independent contractors in Wyoming.

 
 
"(2) That there was no 
particular unreasonable risk of physical harm to others unless special 
precautions were taken."

 
 
Appellee Parker states 
the issue as follows:

 
 
"Did the District Court 
below err in determining that appellee was entitled to a summary judgment; or * 
* * do employees of an independent contractor or subcontractor fall within the 
meaning of others' as used in Section 413 of the Restatement of Torts 
2d?"

 
 

[¶7.]     Our oft-recited 
standard of review on appeal from summary judgment is:

 
 
"When reviewing a summary 
judgment on appeal, our duty is the same as that of the district court in that 
we have before us the same material and must follow the same standards. The 
party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving there exists no 
genuine issue of material fact and that [he] is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. We look at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving him every favorable inference which may be drawn 
from facts in the affidavits, depositions, and other material properly submitted 
in the record." (Citations omitted.) Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 160, 162 
(1986). See also Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Wyo., 718 P.2d 890, 893 
(1986).

 
 

[¶8.]     The parties agree that 
appellant Stockwell was an employee of an independent contractor hired by the 
general contractor, Larson. There is no claim that the owner is not covered by 
the Restatement because Larson, not the owner, employed the subcontractor who 
was an independent contractor. The owner did employ Larson who apparently had 
authority to employ subcontractors and do what was necessary to complete the 
job. The parties thought that sufficient, and we agree. Appellant claims, 
nonetheless, that as the employee of the independent contractor on this job he 
is the "other" to whom appellee owes a duty of care under §§ 413 and 416 of the 
Restatement, Second, Torts. Each of these sections speaks to a duty to 
"others":

 
 

[¶9.]     Section 413, 
Restatement, Second, Torts:

 
 
"One who employs an 
independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely 
to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to 
others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the 
employer

 
 
"(a) fails to provide in 
the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, 
or

 
 
"(b) fails to exercise 
reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such 
precautions."

 
 

[¶10.]  Section 416, Restatement, Second, 
Torts:

 
 
"One who employs an 
independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely 
to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are 
taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure 
of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even 
though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or 
otherwise." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶11.]  This court has already held that the 
employee of an independent contractor is not the "other" to whom an owner owes a 
duty of care under § 416. Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
supra, 718 P.2d 890, 899, 901. We explained the reasoning behind that 
decision:

 
 
"[M]ost jurisdictions 
that have decided the issue have refused to apply the exception when an employee 
of the contractor is the injured party. Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & 
Light Company, [Wyo.,] 635 P.2d 426, 429 and n. 2 [1981]. 
There are several good reasons for this view. First, if a bystander is injured 
by the negligence of a financially irresponsible contractor, the owner may be 
the bystander's only source of recompense. The bystander is a totally innocent 
third party having no involvement in the work; and, if it is inherently 
dangerous and likely to cause harm, the owner undertaking the work should be 
responsible for the harm. The employee, on the other hand, is covered by 
worker's compensation even if the contractor is insolvent. The owner should not 
have to pay for injuries caused by the contractor when the worker's compensation 
system already covers those injuries. Sloan v. Atlantic Richfield Company, 
Alaska, 552 P.2d 157, 160-161 (1976). The owner `has in a sense already assumed financial 
responsibility for the injuries' because the independent contractor passes along 
his worker's compensation costs to the owner. Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power 
& Light Company, supra, at 430; Eutsler v. United States, 
376 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir. 1967).

 
 
"Second, under worker's 
compensation, an employer is released from tort liability for his employee's 
job-related injuries. If we held an owner vicariously liable for injuries to the 
contractor's employees, then the owner would be subject to greater liability 
than if he employed his own workers to do the job. Owners might be encouraged to 
use their own inexperienced employees instead of experienced independent 
contractors who specialize in hazardous work. Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power 
& Light Company, supra, at 430-431.

 
 
"Finally, if the owner 
maintains control over the work and exercises that control negligently, he can 
be directly liable to the employee for his own negligence. Rather than imposing 
vicarious liability in these cases, it is better to hold the contractor and the 
owner directly responsible for their own fault. The contractor will pay via 
worker's compensation and the owner through the tort system. Conover v. Northern 
States Power Company, [Minn.,] 313 N.W.2d [397] at 405 [1981]." 
Id. at 
899.

 
 

[¶12.]  The same logic and reasoning applies to § 
413, and we agree that § 413 also does not apply to the employee of an 
independent contractor. Mason v. Arizona Public Service Company, 127 Ariz. 546, 622 P.2d 493, 
498 (1980); Jones v. New York Blower Company, Ind. App., 442 N.E.2d 382, 386, 34 A.L.R.4th 904 (1982); 
Conover v. Northern States Power Company, Minn., 313 N.W.2d 397, 407 (1981); Donch v. 
Delta Inspection Services, Inc., 165 N.J. Super. 567, 398 A.2d 925, 927-929 
(1979); Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Company, 96 Wn.2d 274, 635 P.2d 426, 429 (1981); Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072, 1081 (4th 
Cir. 1978); Scofi v. McKeon Construction Company, 666 F.2d 170, 171-173 (5th 
Cir. 1982); Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 474-478 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Parsons v. Amerada Hess Corporation, 422 F.2d 610, 614 (10th Cir. 1970). Notable 
commentators state the rule excluding employees of an independent contractor as 
follows:

 
 
"The possessor of land is 
not free to delegate his responsibility for * * * activities carried on upon 
[his land] where the work to be done is regarded as `inherently dangerous' to those outside of the land, and he 
remains liable for the negligence of the contractor in such a case." (Emphasis 
added.) Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 57 at 392 (5th ed. 
1984).

 
 
We now hold that § 413, 
like § 416, does not apply to employees of an independent 
contractor.

 
 

[¶13.]  Nor is appellant the "other" to whom a 
statutory or regulatory duty of care is said to be owed pursuant to § 424 of the 
Restatement, Second, Torts, which provides:

 
 
"One who by statute or by 
administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specified safeguards or 
precautions for the safety of others 
is subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is imposed 
for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such 
safeguards or precautions." (Emphasis added.)

 
 
The Wyoming Occupational 
Health and Safety Act Regulations (W.O.H.S.A.R.) in effect at the time of the 
accident provided:

 
 
"The purpose and scope of 
these rules and regulations is:

 
 
"(1) To provide standards 
and rules & regulations to safeguard the life, limb and health of employees 
and employers." (Emphasis added.) W.O.H.S.A.R., Ch. I, § 1, 
Authority, Purpose and Scope, June 23, 1974.

 
 
The W.O.H.S.A.R. apply 
between employers and employees, not to owners such as Parker who employ 
independent contractors such as Larson and MATO under the circumstances of this 
case. Here Larson not only controlled the details of the work but exercised full 
authority in all safety considerations with regard to the project. Accordingly, 
appellee owed appellant no regulatory duty of care under § 
424.

 
 

[¶14.]  This court has, however, previously held 
that the employee of an independent contractor may be owed a duty of care by the 
owner under § 414 which provides:

 
 
"One who entrusts work to 
an independent contractor, but who retains control of any part of the work, is 
subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer 
owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to 
exercise his control with reasonable care."

 
 
Jones v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., supra, 718 P.2d  at 896, 
states:

 
 
"[A]n owner of a work 
site who retains the right to direct the manner of an independent contractor's 
performance or assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety owes a duty of 
reasonable care to an employee of the independent contractor * * 
*."

 
 
The question thus becomes 
whether appellee retained the right to direct the manner of MATO's performance 
or assumed affirmative duties with respect to safety. Comment (c) to § 414 
explains:

 
 
"In order for the rule 
stated in this Section to apply, the employer must have retained at least some 
degree of control over the manner in 
which the work is done. It is not enough that he has merely a general right to 
order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive 
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be 
followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right 
is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is 
controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There must be 
such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely 
free to do the work his own way." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶15.]  The record is devoid of evidence that 
Parker either retained control or assumed safety duties. The record indicates 
Parker is a drilling contractor and is unfamiliar with the business of 
constructing buildings. Larson was hired as a specialist and given full control 
of the buildings' construction. Larson prepared the plans and specifications for 
the buildings, ordered the material, and exercised an unrestrained power in 
directing the buildings' erection. Parker inspected the site solely to insure 
that construction was being completed in a smooth and orderly manner. Parker did 
not exercise any control over how the construction was to be performed. Larson 
was free to perform work in his own manner. Parker simply retained the right to 
inspect the construction progress and prescribe where Parker desired windows and 
doorways to be located. Parker did not retain control of safety or any operative 
detail or method of work. Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to 
apply § 414.

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellant's final argument is that "[t]o 
allow Wyoming to be included in the states that do not include the employees of 
an independent contractor in the term `other' [as discussed in the Restatement, 
Second, Torts §§ 413, 416, and 424] would be to violate the state Constitution, 
Article 10, Section 4," and would circumvent the rule that the worker's 
compensation scheme in Wyoming does not preclude a common law right of action 
against third persons other than the employer by an injured workman or his 
heirs. Appellant presents no cogent authority or persuasive rationale in support 
of this argument.

 
 

[¶17.]  The statement in Art. 10, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution that "[n]o law shall be enacted limiting the amount of 
damages" does not limit the authority of this court or any other court in the 
state of Wyoming to determine liability. We have 
consistently held that an injured worker or his heirs can maintain a common law 
right of action against third persons other than the employer when liability 
exists. Cities Service Company v. Northern Production Company, Inc., Wyo., 705 P.2d 321 (1985); Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 
Wyo., 697 P.2d 606 (1985); Cottonwood Steel 
Corporation v. Hansen, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1226 (1982); Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 641 P.2d 1235 (1982); Markle v. Williamson, Wyo., 518 P.2d 621 (1974); § 27-12-103, W.S. 
1977.

 
 

[¶18.]  This court declines the opportunity to 
address the claim that the state of Wyoming should not have enacted § 27-12-705, 
W.S. 1977, which provides that the state subsidize all claims over the amount of 
$3,000, because it is economically and financially unfeasible. A determination 
of this issue is not within the jurisdiction of this court and is more properly 
addressed to the Wyoming legislature.

 
 

[¶19.]  The district court did not err in finding 
the exceptions stated in §§ 413, 414, 416, and 424 of the Restatement, Second, 
Torts not applicable to this case. There was nothing presented here that would 
cause us to depart from the general rule of owner nonliability for injury to 
employees of an independent contractor. The court properly granted Parker 
summary judgment.

 
 

[¶20.]  Affirmed.