Case Title: Harden v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 75, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
WALLACE E. HARDEN,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 75, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. 95-11-0803 
§                   95-11-0804
§                   95-12-1510
Submitted: May 11, 2001
  Decided:   June 28, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices
O R D E R
This 28th day of June 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal
and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Wallace E. Harden, filed this appeal
from an order of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction
relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no merit to the
appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2)
In this appeal, Harden claims that: a) it was improper to charge
him with sex crimes in the Superior Court rather than charge him with incest
in the Family Court; b) the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to indict and
111 Del. C. § 768.
211 Del. C. § 775.
311 Del. C. § 4214(a).
4Harden v. State, Del. Supr., No. 107, 1997, Holland, J., 1998 WL 309841 (May
29, 1998) (ORDER).
-2-
convict him on those charges; c) his due process and equal protection rights
were violated by the Superior Court assuming jurisdiction over the charges;
d) the indictment should have been dismissed because it failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted; and e) his counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to challenge the jurisdiction of the Superior Court.
(3)
In 1996 Harden was convicted by a Superior Court jury of one
count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree1 and two counts of
Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree.2  He was declared an habitual
offender3 and was sentenced to a total of 22 years imprisonment at Level V,
to be suspended after 20 years for 2 years of work release and probation.
This Court affirmed Harden’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal.4  
(4)
When reviewing a motion under Rule 61, this Court must first
determine that the motion satisfies the procedural requirements of the rule
5Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991).
6Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3).
7Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3) (A) and (B).
8Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5).
9Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 61-62 (1988).
-3-
before addressing any substantive issues.5  Because Harden’s claims were not
asserted either at trial or in his direct appeal, they are procedurally barred.6
Moreover, Harden has failed to overcome the procedural bar by
demonstrating cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice from
a violation of his rights.7 
(5)
To the extent Harden seeks to avoid the procedural bar by
characterizing his claims as “jurisdictional,”8 that effort is unavailing because
the claims are baseless. Harden’s first four claims are grounded in his
contention that the Attorney General’s office should not have charged him
with sex crimes in the Superior Court.  As long as a prosecution is undertaken
in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory manner, the State has broad
discretion to determine what charges should be brought.9  In the absence of
any evidence of bad faith or selective prosecution in this case, the State was
10Del. Const. art. IV, § 7; 10 Del. C., Ch. 5.
11Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
12Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990).
-4-
within its discretion to charge Harden as it did and the Superior Court had
jurisdiction to indict him and convict him on those charges.10
(6)
Harden’s final claim that his attorney provided ineffective
assistance by failing to challenge the Superior Court’s jurisdiction is also
unavailing.  In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Harden must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different.11  Although not insurmountable, the Strickland
standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong presumption that the
representation was professionally reasonable.”12  Because there is no merit to
Harden’s underlying “jurisdictional” claims, there is also no basis for
Harden’s claim that his counsel’s failure to challenge the jurisdiction of the
Superior Court constituted ineffective assistance.
-5-
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT:
   s/Joseph T. Walsh
     Justice