Case Title: State ex rel. Singh v. Kemper

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2013AP001724

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP1724 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Aman Singh, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Paul Kemper, Warden, Racine Correctional 
Institution, 
          Respondent-Respondent-Cross 
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 353 Wis. 2d 520, 846 N.W.2d 820) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No: 2014 WI App 43 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Gerald P. Ptacek 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: ZIEGLER, J. and GABLEMAN, J. concur and dissent 
(Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
 
 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ROGGENSACK, C. J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, R. G., J. and ROGGENSACK, C. 
J.(joining part C.) dissent (Opinion filed).     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., Brett H. Ludwig, Philip C. Babler, 
and Foley & Lardner LLP, Milwaukee and oral argument by Philip 
C. Babler. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent-cross-petitioner, the cause 
was argued by Sara Lynn Shaeffer, assistant district attorney 
with whom on the briefs was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
2016 WI 67
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP1724  
(L.C. No. 
2013CV1540) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Aman Singh, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul Kemper, Warden, Racine Correctional 
Institution, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Cross 
          Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   We are presented with both a 
petition 
and 
a 
cross-petition 
for 
review 
involving 
the 
constitutionality of legislation that repealed and modified a 
law, 2009 Wis. Act 28, that allowed inmates the opportunity to 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
2 
 
earn "positive adjustment time," by which inmates could obtain 
early release from prison.1 
¶2 
The constitutionality of two provisions of 2011 Wis. 
Act 38 relating to 2009 Wis. Act 28, which adopted positive 
adjustment time, are at issue in this case:  (1) the retroactive 
                                                 
1 The mandate is to affirm in part and reverse in part the 
opinion of the court of appeals.  Five justices are in accord 
with this mandate (Abrahamson, J., Ann Walsh Bradley, J., 
Prosser, J., Ziegler, J., and Gableman, J.).  Accord on the 
individual issues, however, is mixed.   
A majority of the court concludes that Wis. Stat. § 973.198 
violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto 
laws because it makes the punishment for an offense more 
burdensome after it was committed.  Five justices reverse the 
court of appeals determination on this issue (Abrahamson, J., 
Ann Walsh Bradley, J., Prosser, J., Ziegler, J., and Gableman, 
J.). 
Likewise a majority of the court concludes that the 
retroactive repeal of positive adjustment time violates the ex 
post facto clause vis-à-vis the July 2011 offense.  Five 
justices would affirm the court of appeals determination of that 
issue (Abrahamson, J., Ann Walsh Bradley, J., Prosser, J., 
Ziegler, J., and Gableman, J.). 
However, no majority has been garnered as to whether the 
retroactive repeal violates the ex post facto clause vis-à-vis 
the 2008 offense.  Three justices conclude that it does 
(Abrahamson, J., Ann Walsh Bradley, J., and Prosser, J.); two 
justices conclude that it does not (Roggensack, C.J. and Rebecca 
G. Bradley, J.); and two justices do not address the issue 
(Ziegler, J., and Gableman, J.).  
Finally, there are two justices who would vote to remand 
this case to the circuit court for a determination of whether 
Singh is entitled to relief (Abrahamson, J., Ann Walsh Bradley, 
J.).  However, a majority of the court would not remand 
(Roggensack, C.J., Prosser, J., Ziegler, J., Gableman, J. and 
Rebecca G. Bradley, J.). 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
3 
 
repeal of positive adjustment time, and (2) the preservation of 
positive adjustment time earned while 2009 Wis. Act 28 was in 
effect and alterations to the process for obtaining early 
release based on positive adjustment time, which we refer to as 
Wis. Stat. § 973.198. 
¶3 
The 
petitioner, 
Aman 
Singh, 
seeks 
review 
of 
a 
published court of appeals decision that reversed in part and 
affirmed in part the circuit court's order dismissing his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.2  Singh contends that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.198 delays inmates' release from prison by up to 90 
days, thereby violating the ex post facto clauses of the 
Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.3 
¶4 
He argues that under Wis. Stat. § 973.198, inmates who 
are eligible for positive adjustment time are released up to 90 
days later than under 2009 Wis. Act 28.  Asserting that this 
change results in a longer period of incarceration, Singh claims 
                                                 
2 State ex rel. Singh v. Kemper, 2014 WI App 43, 353 
Wis. 2d 520, 846 N.W.2d 820 (affirming in part and reversing in 
part an order quashing writ of habeas corpus and dismissing 
petition entered by the circuit court for Racine County, Gerald 
P. Ptacek, J., presiding). 
3 The prohibition on ex post facto laws in the Wisconsin 
Constitution is found in Article 1, Section 12, which provides: 
"No . . . ex post facto law . . . shall ever be passed . . . ." 
The prohibition on ex post facto laws in the United States 
Constitution is found in Article I, Sections 9 and 10.  Section 
9 provides:  "No bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed."  Section 10 provides: "No state shall . . . pass 
any . . . ex post facto Law. . . . " 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
4 
 
that § 973.198 violates the ex post facto clauses.  We agree 
with Singh that Wis. Stat. § 973.198 violates the constitutional 
prohibition against ex post facto laws because it results in a 
longer period of incarceration, thus making the punishment for 
an offense more burdensome after it was committed.4 
¶5 
Cross-petitioner, Paul Kemper, in his capacity as 
warden of the Racine Correctional Institute, seeks review of 
that part of the court of appeals' decision that reversed the 
circuit court's order dismissing Singh's petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  He asserts that because Singh committed one of 
his crimes before the enactment of positive adjustment time in 
2009 Wis. Act 28, the court of appeals erroneously concluded 
that the retroactive application of 2011 Wis. Act 38, which 
eliminated the opportunity for inmates to continue earning 
positive adjustment time, was an ex post facto violation of the 
Wisconsin and United States Constitutions. 
¶6 
This case presents the unusual circumstance of a 
defendant who was convicted and sentenced under 2009 Wis. Act 
28, which made positive adjustment time available when it was 
not originally available at the time of the offense.  Kemper 
argues that the court of appeals erred because it focused on 
changes in the law when the defendant was convicted and 
sentenced, rather than changes in the law at the time the 
defendant committed the offenses. 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
5 
 
¶7 
We disagree with Kemper because in this case, due to 
the retroactive application of positive adjustment time, Singh 
was convicted and sentenced while 2009 Wis. Act 28 was in 
effect.  Both Wisconsin and United States Supreme Court 
precedent supports assessing the ex post facto effect of a law 
in reference to the time the defendant committed the offense, 
was convicted, or was sentenced. 
¶8 
Like the court of appeals, we conclude that because 
the early release provisions of 2009 Wis. Act 28 were 
retroactively in effect when Singh was convicted and sentenced 
for the first offense, as well as at the time he committed the 
second 
offense, 
that 
the 
retroactive 
repeal 
of 
positive 
adjustment time in 2011 Wis. Act 38 violates the ex post facto 
clauses of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.  
However, unlike the court of appeals, we conclude that Wis. 
Stat. § 973.198 also violates the constitutional prohibition 
against ex post facto laws because it makes the punishment for 
an offense more burdensome after it was committed. 
¶9 
Accordingly, 
we 
affirm 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
determination that the retroactive repeal of positive adjustment 
time 
is 
an 
ex 
post 
facto 
violation, 
but 
reverse 
its 
determination that Wis. Stat. § 973.198 does not violate the 
constitutional 
prohibition 
against 
ex 
post 
facto 
laws.  
Additionally, I would remand the cause to the circuit court for 
a determination of whether under the current circumstances it is 
now appropriate to grant the writ and what additional relief, if 
any, is warranted. 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
6 
 
I 
¶10 The relevant facts of this case as presented by the 
parties are not in dispute.  They involve two legislative 
changes made by 2011 Wis. Act 38.  One retroactively repealed 
positive adjustment time.  The other created Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.198, a new statute that preserved the opportunity of early 
release for certain individuals and altered the procedure 
obtaining early release based on positive adjustment time. 
¶11 During the time period when Singh was first charged in 
2008 until he began serving his prison sentence in early 2012, 
the Legislature enacted and then repealed 2009 Wis. Act 28, 
which provided inmates with the opportunity to earn early 
release from prison. 
¶12 Enacted in 2009, Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009-10), 
provided inmates convicted of Class F to I felonies the 
opportunity to earn one day of positive adjustment time for 
every two days of confinement.5  Positive adjustment time was 
                                                 
5 Some inmates not eligible for positive adjustment time 
under Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009-10) were instead eligible 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1)(bg)1. (2009-10).  Under the 
latter statute, inmates earned one day of positive adjustment 
time 
for 
every 
three 
days 
served. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 304.06(1)(bg)1. (2009-10) provided: 
A person sentenced under s. 973.01 for a Class F to 
Class I felony or a misdemeanor that is not a violent 
offense, as defined in s. 301.048(2)(bm)1., and who is 
ineligible 
for 
positive 
adjustment 
time 
under 
s. 302.113(2)(b) pursuant to s. 973.01(3d)(b) or for a 
Class F to Class I felony that is a violent offense, 
as defined in s. 301.048(2)(bm)1., may earn one day of 
positive adjustment time for every 3 days served that 
(continued) 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
7 
 
earned for every two days that the inmate did not violate any 
regulation of the prison or refuse or neglect to perform 
required or assigned duties. 
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009-10) provided in 
relevant part: 
An inmate sentenced under s. 973.01 for a misdemeanor 
or for a Class F to Class I felony that is not a 
violent offense, as defined in s. 301.048(2)(bm)1., 
may earn one day of positive adjustment time for every 
2 days served that he or she does not violate any 
regulation of the prison or does not refuse or neglect 
to perform required or assigned duties. 
¶14 In 2011 the Legislature passed 2011 Wis. Act 38 as 
part of a budget bill, which repealed the early release 
provisions in 2009 Wis. Act 28.  Consequently, after August 3, 
2011, prisoners were generally precluded from earning positive 
adjustment time. 
¶15 The 2011 Act also created Wis. Stat. § 973.198, which 
preserved the opportunity for certain individuals to earn early 
release based on positive adjustment time earned between 
October 1, 2009 and August 3, 2011, but altered the procedures 
                                                                                                                                                             
he or she does not violate any regulation of the 
prison or does not refuse or neglect to perform 
required or assigned duties. The person may petition 
the earned release review commission for release to 
extended supervision when he or she has served the 
term of confinement in prison portion of his or her 
bifurcated sentence, as modified by the sentencing 
court under s. 302.045(3m)(b)1. or 302.05(3)(c)2.a., 
less positive adjustment time he or she has earned. 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
8 
 
for procuring early release.  Section 973.198 provides in 
relevant part: 
(1) 
When an inmate who is serving a sentence imposed 
under s. 973.01 and who has earned positive 
adjustment time under s. 302.113, 2009 stats., or 
under s. 304.06, 2009 stats., has served the 
confinement portion of his or her sentence less 
positive 
adjustment 
time 
earned 
between 
October 1, 2009, and August 3, 2011, he or she 
may petition the sentencing court to adjust the 
sentence under this section, based on the number 
of days of positive adjustment time the inmate 
claims that he or she has earned. 
(3) 
Within 60 days of receipt of a petition filed 
under sub. (1), the sentencing court shall either 
deny the petition or hold a hearing and issue an 
order 
relating 
to 
the 
inmate's 
sentence 
adjustment and release to extended supervision. 
(5) 
If the court determines that the inmate has 
earned positive adjustment time, the court may 
reduce the term of confinement in prison by the 
amount 
of 
time 
remaining 
in 
the 
term 
of 
confinement in prison portion of the sentence, 
less up to 30 days, and shall lengthen the term 
of extended supervision so that the total length 
of the bifurcated sentence originally imposed 
does not change. 
¶16 Under the Wis. Stat. § 973.198, inmates are not 
permitted to file a petition requesting early release until the 
day that they are actually eligible for release.  Filing a 
petition under § 973.198 starts a process for early release that 
can take up to 90 days, even though the inmate is eligible for 
release on the day he files the petition. 
¶17 In contrast, under the repealed 2009 Act, 90 days 
before an inmate was eligible for release the DOC was required 
to notify the sentencing court that it intended to modify the 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
9 
 
inmate's 
sentence 
and 
release 
the 
inmate 
to 
extended 
supervision. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 302.113(2)(c)1. 
(2009-10) 
provided: 
When an inmate is within 90 days of release to 
extended supervision under par. (b), the department 
shall notify the sentencing court that it intends to 
modify the inmate's sentence and release the inmate to 
extended supervision under par. (b), and the court may 
hold a review hearing.  If the court does not schedule 
a review hearing within 30 days after notification 
under this subsection, the department may proceed 
under par. (b). 
¶18 Under the 2009 Wis. Act 28, the sentencing court had 
the discretion to hold a hearing within 30 days after it 
received notice from the DOC.  Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2)(c)1.  If 
the sentencing court opted to conduct a review, it was required 
to hold the hearing and issue an order relating to the inmate's 
early release within 60 days of receiving the DOC's notice.  
Section 302.113(c)2.a.  In contrast to the current law, an 
inmate could then be released on the first day he was eligible. 
¶19 Singh's case arose in the midst of rapid legislative 
changes to the laws governing inmates' ability to earn early 
release from prison based on positive adjustment time.  In 2008, 
Singh was charged with obtaining a controlled substance by fraud 
in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.43(1)(a).6  He was convicted and 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 961.43(1)(a) provides:  "It is unlawful 
for any person:  To acquire or obtain possession of a controlled 
substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or 
subterfuge."  Any person who violates this section is guilty of 
a class H felony.  Wis. Stat. § 961.43(2). 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
10 
 
sentenced in 2010 to three years of probation, with a three-year 
bifurcated sentence imposed and stayed.  Singh's sentence 
included six months of jail time as a condition of probation.7 
¶20 In July of 2011, Singh committed another violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 961.43(1)(a).  After the second offense, Singh's 
probation for his first offense was revoked.  He received a 
five-year bifurcated sentence for the second offence, to be 
served consecutively to his first sentence. 
¶21 In 
2012, 
Singh 
filed 
a 
petition 
for 
positive 
adjustment 
time 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.198. 
 
The 
Department of Corrections (DOC) denied Singh's request for early 
release because he did not serve any time in prison between 
October 1, 2009 and August 3, 2011. 
¶22 After the DOC denied Singh's petition for positive 
adjustment time, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
with the circuit court.  The circuit court entered an order 
                                                 
7 At oral argument this court was advised that on July 14, 
2015, Singh's judgment of conviction for the 2008 Waukesha 
County offense was amended from prison time to one year served 
in the county jail.  Such an amendment may give rise to an issue 
of whether Singh would be entitled to positive adjustment time 
for time served in the county jail.  It also raises the question 
of whether Singh's claim is moot if he was eligible for positive 
adjustment time only for the time served in prison, rather than 
the county jail.  See ¶24 n.8, infra. Because we first learned 
of this at oral argument and those issues were neither briefed 
nor argued before this court, I do not now address them.  I 
would remand to the circuit court for a determination of this 
issue. 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
11 
 
quashing 
the 
writ 
and 
dismissing 
Singh's 
petition 
with 
prejudice. 
¶23 On appeal, Singh argued that the retroactive repeal of 
positive adjustment time and the enactment of Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.198 were ex post facto laws.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the retroactive repeal of positive adjustment 
time was unconstitutional, but that § 973.198 was not an ex post 
facto law. 
¶24 Singh filed a petition for review on the issue of 
whether Wis. Stat. § 973.198 was an ex post facto law.8  Kemper 
                                                 
8 Singh also petitioned for review on an issue that we did 
not accept involving the open records law. 
After this court accepted the petition and cross-petition 
for review, Singh informed the court that he had been released 
to extended supervision and was no longer incarcerated.  This 
court ordered the parties to file briefs on the issue of 
mootness due to Singh's release from custody. 
Singh argues that the issue of whether Wis. Stat. § 973.198 
is an ex post facto law is not moot because he remains on 
extended supervision and subject to incarceration until 2018.  
He further asserts that even if his case is moot, this court 
should address this issue. 
The State argues that both the issue Singh raises in his 
petition and the issue the State raises in its cross-petition 
are moot. Nevertheless, the State argues that this court should 
consider the issue raised in its cross-petition because other 
inmates who were eligible for positive adjustment time are 
likely to raise the issue of whether the retroactive repeal of 
early release is an ex post facto violation. 
(continued) 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
12 
 
cross-petitioned on the issue of whether 2011 Wis. Act 38's 
retroactive repeal of 2009 Wis. Act. 28's positive adjustment 
time was an ex post facto law. 
II 
¶25 A circuit court's order denying a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus presents a mixed question of fact and law.  State 
v. Pozo, 2002 WI App 279, ¶6, 258 Wis. 2d 796, 654 N.W.2d 12.  
We will not reverse the circuit court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Whether a writ of habeas 
corpus is available to the party seeking relief is a question of 
law that we review independently of the determinations rendered 
by the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Id. 
¶26 Similarly, whether a statute violates the ex post 
facto clauses of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions 
is a question of law that this Court reviews independently of 
the determinations of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  State v. Elward, 2015 WI App 51, ¶5, 363 Wis. 2d 628, 
866 N.W.2d 756.  There is a strong presumption that legislative 
enactments are constitutional.  Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage 
Dist., 
2013 
WI 
78, 
¶76, 
350 
Wis. 2d 554, 
835 
N.W.2d 160.  Singh has the burden of establishing beyond a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Even if they are moot, we address both the issue raised in 
Singh's petition and the issue raised in the State's cross-
petition.  Both issues are of public importance, are likely to 
affect other inmates, and involve the constitutionality of a 
statute.  State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Cir. Ct. for 
La Crosse Cty., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 229, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983). 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
13 
 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
the 
challenged 
legislation 
is 
unconstitutional.  Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 184-85, 401 
N.W.2d 568 (1987). 
III 
¶27 We address first the issue raised by Kemper's cross-
petition because it is foundational to our discussion of the 
issue Singh raised in his petition for review.  Before we can 
decide Singh's claim that Wis. Stat. § 973.198 delays early 
release by up to 90 days, we must first decide whether he was 
eligible for early release under 2009 Wis. Act. 28. 
¶28 In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990), the 
United State Supreme Court explained that any statute that makes 
the punishment for a crime more burdensome after it is committed 
is prohibited as an ex post facto law.  This court explicitly 
adopted the standard set forth in Collins, concluding that: 
[A]n ex post facto law, prohibited by the Wisconsin 
Constitution, is any law: 'which punishes as a crime 
an act previously committed, which was innocent when 
done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime, after its commission, or which deprives one 
charged with crime of any defense available according 
to law at the time the act was committed . . . .'   
State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 703, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994) 
(quoting Collins, 497 U.S. at 42). 
¶29 Kemper asserts that the court of appeals erred when it 
determined that a law violates the ex post facto clauses if it 
imposes a greater punishment than the law in effect at the time 
an inmate was convicted and sentenced for an offense.  See State 
ex rel. Singh v. Kemper, 2014 WI App 43, ¶10, 353 Wis. 2d 520, 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
14 
 
846 N.W.2d 820.  He argues that the repeal of 2009 Wis. Act 28 
cannot be an ex post facto violation as applied to Singh's 2008 
offense because it did not increase the punishment beyond what 
it was at the time of the 2008 offense. 
¶30 Relying on State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 511, 509 
N.W.2d 712 (1994), Kemper advances that one of the fundamental 
aspects of ex post facto analysis is its focus on changes in the 
law relative to the time of the defendant's allegedly illegal 
behavior.  He concludes that Singh was not eligible for early 
release because Singh committed the 2008 offense prior to the 
enactment of 2009 Wis. Act. 28. 
¶31 We are not persuaded by Kemper's argument that the 
court of appeals erred in determining that an ex post facto law 
increases the punishment imposed at the time of conviction and 
sentencing, as well as at the time it was committed.  Rather, we 
agree with the court of appeals that an ex post facto law 
increased the punishment imposed after an offense has been 
committed.  In determining whether such a change in punishment 
occurred here, we must examine how the progression of Singh's 
criminal cases fit within the timeline of rapid changes in the 
law governing early release from prison. 
¶32 Although 2009 Wis. Act 28 was not in effect when Singh 
committed his first offense in 2008, it was enacted to apply 
retroactively.  2009 Wis. Act 28, §§ 2722, 9311.  Pursuant to 
2009 Wis. Act 28, inmates sentenced on or after December 31, 
1999 could begin earning positive adjustment time staring on 
October 1, 2009.  At the time Singh was sentenced in 2010 for 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
15 
 
the offense he committed in 2008, 2009 Wis. Act. 28 was in 
effect. 
¶33 Subsequently, the Legislature passed 2011 Wis. Act 38, 
which repealed and modified the early release provisions in 2009 
Wis. Act 28.  Under 2011 Wis. Act 38, prisoners were precluded 
from earning positive adjustment time after August 3, 2011.  
When Singh committed his second offense on July 25, 2011, 2009 
Wis. Act 28 was still in place.  By the time he was convicted 
and sentenced later that year, as well as when he began to serve 
his sentence in prison in 2012, the 2009 Act had been repealed. 
¶34 Singh's case is complicated by the fact that he did 
not serve time in prison prior to the 2011 repeal of 2009 Wis. 
Act. 28.  After his first offense in 2008, Singh was convicted 
and sentenced to three years of probation, with six months of 
jail time as a condition of probation.  It was not until Singh's 
second offense in 2011 that his probation for the first offence 
was revoked.  Later, he received a five-year bifurcated sentence 
for the second offense to be served consecutively with his first 
sentence.  Singh's first day in prison was January 4, 2012. 
¶35 The court of appeals determined that "[w]hen Singh 
committed or was convicted and sentenced on his offenses, the 
2009 act and its multiple early release opportunities were the 
law."  Singh, 353 Wis. 2d 520, ¶19 (emphasis added).  It 
concluded that eliminating Singh's eligibility for early release 
ensured that he would serve his full sentence in prison, 
resulting in a significant risk that he would serve more 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
16 
 
confinement time than under 2009 Wis. Act 28.  Id.  "The ex post 
facto clauses prohibit this."  Id. 
¶36 We recognize that ordinarily an inmate will be 
convicted and sentenced under the law that was in effect at the 
time the offense was committed.  In this case, however, Kemper's 
focus on the timeframe for when an ex post facto violation may 
occur 
is 
too 
narrow 
because 
2009 
Wis. 
Act 
28 
applied 
retroactively to inmates sentenced on or after December 31, 
1999.  At the time Singh committed the 2008 offense the 
sentencing structure for a Class H felony did not offer the 
opportunity to earn positive adjustment time.  However, the 
retroactive application of positive adjustment time means that 
2009 Wis. Act 28 applied at the time Singh was convicted and 
sentenced. 
¶37 Even if for the sake of argument we accept Kemper's 
focus on changes in the law at the time the defendant committed 
the offense, he is incorrect that Singh was not eligible for 
early release.  Although Singh committed his first offense in 
2008, prior to the enactment of 2009 Wis. Act 28, he committed 
his second offense on July 25, 2011.  At the time that Singh 
committed his second offense, the early release provisions of 
2009 Wis. Act 28 were in place.  After his second offense, 
Singh's probation for his first offense was revoked and he 
served his sentences for both offenses consecutively.  Thus, 
Singh was entitled to earn positive adjustment time for the time 
he served in prison as a result of the offense he committed on 
July 25, 2011. 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
17 
 
¶38 Kemper does not dispute that the retroactive repeal of 
early release would violate the ex post facto clauses if Singh 
had been eligible for positive adjustment time.  Instead, he 
asserts that Singh was never eligible for early release based 
upon positive adjustment time because Singh committed his crime 
before the enactment of 2009 Wis. Act 28.  However, both 
Wisconsin and United States Supreme Court precedent prohibiting 
ex post facto laws support including the time an inmate is 
convicted and sentenced. 
¶39 The animating principle underlying the ex post facto 
clauses is the concept of fair warning.  Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d at 
513 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92 
(1977)).  As the United States Supreme Court explained, 
"[t]hrough [the ex post facto] prohibition, the Framers sought 
to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their 
effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until 
explicitly changed."  Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 
(1981). 
¶40 Kemper 
seems 
to 
believe 
that 
the 
repeal 
of 
a 
mitigating law that was in place when Singh was sentenced will 
simply put Singh in the position that he would have been in at 
the time he committed the crime.  However, we cannot ignore the 
fact that Singh relied on 2009 Wis. Act 28 as the law at the 
time of his plea and sentencing. 
¶41 In Weaver, the United States Supreme Court considered 
whether the retroactive application of a revised "gain-time" 
provision was an ex post facto law.  450 U.S. at 31.  The Weaver 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
18 
 
court explained that "a prisoner’s eligibility for reduced 
imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the 
defendant’s decision to plea bargain and the judge’s calculation 
of the sentence to be imposed."  Id. at 32.  Accordingly, Weaver 
concluded that for prisoners who committed crimes before the 
statute was enacted, it substantially altered the consequences 
attached to a crime already completed and therefore "change[d] 
the quantum of punishment."  Id. at 33. 
¶42 Likewise, in Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 446-47 
(1997), the Supreme Court concluded that it was an ex post facto 
violation to cancel good-time credits that had been awarded 
pursuant to statutes enacted after the date the defendant 
committed his offense.  In Lynce, a retroactive statute took 
away good-time credits that existed at the time of conviction 
and sentencing, but did not exist at the time the defendant 
committed the offense.  Id. at 447.  The Lynce court remanded 
the case for a determination of the number of good-time credits 
that the defendant accumulated under the statutes that existed 
at the time of his conviction and sentencing, concluding that 
they could not be cancelled by the retroactive law.  Id. at 449. 
¶43 Lynce acknowledged that "[t]he bulk of our ex post 
facto jurisprudence" involves claims that a law inflicted a 
greater punishment than at the time the offense was committed."  
Id. at 441.  However, it explained that an ex post facto law 
must simply be retrospective in that it "must apply to events 
occurring before its enactment."  Id. 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
19 
 
¶44 Applying the ex post facto protection to conviction 
and sentencing is consistent with the principle that "the 
Constitution places limits on the sovereign's ability to use its 
lawmaking power to modify bargains it has made with its 
subjects."  Id. at 440.  This basic principle protects a 
"defendant 
engaged 
in 
negotiations 
that 
may 
lead 
to 
an 
acknowledgment of guilt and a suitable punishment."  Id. 
¶45 Similarly, in State ex rel. Eder v. Matthews, 115 
Wis. 2d 129, 340 N.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1983), the Wisconsin court 
of appeals addressed the issue of whether application of a "good 
time" calculation violated the ex post facto clauses.  The 
Matthews court explained that the application of the "good time" 
formula 
would 
increase 
the 
period 
of 
the 
defendant's 
confinement.  Id. at 133.  Matthews concluded that "[a] law 
which increases or alters the punishment of an offender to his 
detriment, 
after 
he 
has 
been 
convicted 
and 
sentenced, 
constitutes an ex post facto law . . . ."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶46 If this court adopted the position advanced by Kemper 
that a law can retroactively increase the length of time an 
inmate is incarcerated after sentencing, we would have to 
overrule Matthews.  We decline to do so because it is consistent 
with United States Supreme Court precedent.  
¶47 The early release provisions of 2009 Wis. Act 28 were 
in effect when Singh was convicted and sentenced for the first 
offence, as well as at the time he committed the second offence.  
Just as in Weaver and Matthews, the repeal of early release 
would impermissibly retroactively increase Singh's punishment 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
20 
 
after he was convicted and sentenced.  Under both Wisconsin and 
Supreme Court precedent, the repeal of early release after the 
commission of an offense violates the ex post facto clauses. 
¶48 Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that 
retroactive repeal of positive adjustment time in 2011 Wis. Act 
38 violates the ex post facto clauses of the Wisconsin and 
United States Constitutions. 
IV 
 
¶49 We address next the issue raised in Singh's petition 
for review.  He contends that the newly created Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.198 violates the ex post facto clauses because it extends 
the amount of time an inmate is incarcerated by up to 90 days 
after he is eligible for early release.9 
¶50 Under 2009 Wis. Act 28, the DOC was required to notify 
the sentencing court 90 days before an inmate was eligible for 
release that it intended to modify the inmate's sentence and 
release the inmate to extended supervision.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 302.113(2)(c)1. (2009-10).  The sentencing court had the 
discretion to hold a hearing within 30 days after it received 
notice from the DOC.  Id. 
                                                 
9 At the court of appeals, Singh challenged the role of the 
sentencing court under Wis. Stat. § 973.198.  Singh raised this 
issue in his petition for review.  We need not address that 
issue because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.198 is an ex 
post facto law due to the fact that it adds up to a 90 day delay 
in release compared to the prior law. 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
21 
 
¶51 If the sentencing court opted to conduct a review 
hearing, it was required to hold the hearing and issue an order 
relating to the inmate's early release within 60 days of 
receiving the DOC's notice.  Wis. Stat. § 302.113(c)(2)a. (2009-
10).  When the court did not schedule a review hearing within 30 
days after notification from the DOC, the inmate would be 
released on the first day he was eligible.  § 302.113(2)(b) & 
(c)1. (2009-10). 
¶52 Although 
2011 
Wis. 
Act 
38 
eliminated 
positive 
adjustment time after August 3, 2011, by enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.198, 
it 
allowed 
those 
inmates 
who 
earned 
positive 
adjustment time while 2009 Wis. Act 28 was in effect to petition 
for early release.  Rather than retain the procedures set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 302.113 (2009-10), the Legislature enacted 
§ 973.198, which now governs the process for early release for 
inmates who earned positive adjustment time under 2009 Wis. Act 
28. 
¶53 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.198(1), an inmate who 
earned positive adjustment time under Wis. Stat. § 302.113 
(2009-10) may petition for early release after he has served the 
confinement 
portion 
of 
his 
sentence 
minus 
any 
positive 
adjustment time earned.  Within 60 days of receiving the 
inmate's petition, the sentencing court "shall either deny the 
petition or hold a hearing and issue an order relating to the 
inmate's 
sentence 
adjustment 
and 
release 
to 
extended 
supervision."  § 973.198(3).  If the court determines that an 
inmate has earned positive adjustment time, it "may reduce the 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
22 
 
term of confinement in prison by the amount of time remaining in 
the term of confinement in prison portion of sentence, less up 
to 30 days. . . ."  § 973.198(1). 
¶54 Singh argues that Wis. Stat. § 973.198 violates the ex 
post facto clauses because it delays the release of inmates who 
have earned positive adjustment time.  Under 2009 Wis. Act 28, 
the process for obtaining early release began 90 days before 
inmates were eligible to be released.  Then, the procedures for 
processing an inmate's release were completed within 90 days and 
the inmate was released on his eligibility date. 
¶55 In contrast, under Wis. Stat. § 973.198, an inmate 
cannot file a petition for early release based on positive 
adjustment time until the date on which he is first eligible for 
release.  The filing of the petition begins a process for 
determining eligibility for release that can take up to 90 days.  
For inmates who have earned positive adjustment time, § 973.198 
adds up to 90 days of incarceration to a sentence in comparison 
to early release under Wis. Stat. § 302.113 (2009-10). 
¶56 Kemper counters that the change in the law introduced 
by Wis. Stat. § 973.198 was merely procedural.  Although a 
procedural change may have a substantive impact that violates 
the ex post facto clauses, Kemper asserts that the speculative 
and attenuated possibility of an increase in an inmate’s actual 
term of confinement is not an ex post facto law.  See, e.g., 
Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995).  
Relying on Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94 (1977), he 
argues that § 973.198 may have altered the methods employed in 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
23 
 
determining the punishment imposed, but did not change the 
quantum of punishment attached to the crime. 
¶57 According to Kemper, Wis. Stat. § 973.198 does not 
violate the ex post facto clauses because the sentencing court 
retained discretion to grant or deny an inmate’s request for 
positive adjustment time under both laws.  Thus he asserts that 
any claim of increased confinement § 973.198 would be too 
speculative and attenuated to constitute an ex post facto 
violation.  We disagree with Kemper because the unavoidable 
delay in an inmate's release under Wis. Stat. § 973.198 is 
neither speculative nor attenuated. 
¶58 Kemper's reliance on Dobbert is misplaced.  In 
Dobbert, the defendant argues that a change in the role of the 
judge and jury in the imposition of the death sentence 
constituted an ex post facto violation.  432 U.S. at 292.  The 
Dobbert court determined that the law at issue in that case was 
clearly procedural because "there was no change in the quantum 
of punishment attached to the crime."  Id. at 293-94.  Unlike in 
Dobbert, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.198 
may 
increase 
an 
inmate's 
incarceration by up to 90 days. 
¶59 In Morales, the United States Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of when a claim of increased confinement is too 
speculative and attenuated to constitute an ex post facto 
violation.  514 U.S. 499.  Morales involved a change to the 
frequency of parole suitability hearings that is distinguishable 
from the facts of this case as well as Weaver, 450 U.S. 24, 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
24 
 
Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937), and Miller v. 
Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987).  See Morales, 514 U.S. at 507-08. 
¶60 The amendment at issue in Morales made only one change 
to the law.  541 U.S. at 507.  It introduced the possibility 
that after the initial parole hearing, the board would not have 
to hold another hearing for two years if it found no reasonable 
probability that the inmate would be deemed suitable for parole 
during that period.  Id.  Rather than changing the sentencing 
range for an offense, the amendment altered the method to be 
followed in fixing a parole release date under identical 
substantive standards.  Id. at 507-08. 
¶61 Morales explained that many legislative adjustments to 
parole and sentencing procedures might produce "some remote risk 
of impact on a prisoner's expected term of confinement."  Id. at 
508.  As examples, Morales identified certain "innocuous 
adjustments" such as changes to the membership of the board of 
prison terms or restrictions on hours that inmates may use the 
prison library.  Id. 
¶62 The 
changes 
to 
early 
release 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.198 are not innocuous adjustments.  An inmate who would 
have been released on his eligibility date under the now 
repealed Wis. Stat. § 302.113 (2009-10), cannot file a petition 
for release until he reaches that same date.  Then, the 
procedure for obtaining release will take up to 90 days after 
the petition is filed.  Thus, § 973.198 increases the length of 
incarceration for every inmate who is eligible for early release 
based on positive adjustment.  This arbitrary increase in 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
25 
 
punishment violates the ex post facto clauses of the Wisconsin 
and United States constitutions. 
¶63 We agree with Singh that this court's decision in 
State ex rel. Mueller v. Powers, 64 Wis. 2d 643, 221 N.W.2d 692 
(1974), is analogous.  In Mueller, inmates in the state prison 
system sought a declaration that a change in the law that 
extended their initial eligibility date for parole from two 
years to five years into their imprisonment violated the ex post 
facto clauses of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.  
Id. at 645. 
¶64 This court determined that the statute at issue in 
Mueller was unconstitutional because the new law increased "the 
time that must be served by petitioners before they are eligible 
for parole consideration from two to five years in a very real 
and practical sense imposes an additional penalty and violates 
the 
constitutional 
inhibition 
against 
ex 
post 
facto 
legislation." Id. at 647.  Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 973.198 
imposes additional punishment because it increases the time 
served by inmates before they are eligible for early release. 
¶65 This opinion should not be read to revive the 
alternative definition of an ex post facto violation stated in 
Mueller as any law "which alters the situation of the accused to 
his disadvantage."  Id. at 646 (citation omitted).  In Thiel, 
188 Wis. 2d at 703, this court withdrew this language from 
Mueller, explaining that an ex post facto violation must 
increase the punishment for an offense, not simply alter the 
situation of a defendant to his disadvantage. 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
26 
 
¶66 Although important to note, this discrete narrowing of 
Mueller does not affect the issues in this case.  Mueller's 
conclusion that changing parole eligibility from two years to 
five years is an ex post facto violation is also based on the 
proper legal standard that it "imposes an additional penalty."  
64 Wis. 2d at 647.  Likewise, Singh argues that the up to 90 day 
delay 
in 
release 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.198 
imposes 
an 
additional penalty that was not imposed under the prior law. 
¶67 A similar conclusion reached by the United States 
Supreme Court further supports this court's determination.  In 
Weaver, 450 U.S. at 26, the court determined that a change in 
Florida's "gain time for good conduct" statute extended the time 
that inmates were required to spend in prison.  Similar to the 
statutory change at issue in this case, the Florida law 
"reduce[d] the number of monthly gain-time credits available to 
an inmate who abides by prison rules and adequately performs his 
assigned tasks."  Id. at 33.  The Weaver court explained that 
"this reduction in gain-time accumulation lengthens the period 
that someone in petitioner's position must spend in prison."  
Id. 
¶68 Under both Wisconsin and United States Supreme Court 
precedent, a retroactive change in the law that increases the 
length of an inmate's sentence violates the ex post facto 
clauses.  We agree with Singh that under Wis. Stat. § 973.198, 
inmates who are eligible for positive adjustment time are 
released up to 90 days later than under 2009 Wis. Act 28.  Thus, 
we 
conclude 
that 
§ 973.198 
violates 
the 
constitutional 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
27 
 
prohibition against ex post facto laws and that the circuit 
court erred when it dismissed the writ of habeas corpus. 
V 
¶69 I would remand to the circuit court to address whether 
under the current circumstances it is now appropriate to grant 
the writ and what additional relief, if any, is warranted.  
Although Singh has been released from prison, he remains on 
extended supervision which is considered "custody" for the 
purposes of a writ of habeas corpus. 
¶70 United States Supreme Court precedent leaves "no 
doubt" that in addition to physical imprisonment, there are 
other restraints on liberty that are considered "custody for 
habeas corpus purposes——including post-release supervision: 
History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, 
besides 
physical 
imprisonment, 
there 
are 
other 
restraints on a man's liberty, restraints not shared 
by the public generally, which have been thought 
sufficient in the English-speaking world to support 
the issuance of habeas corpus.   
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963); see also Earley 
v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[p]ost-release 
supervision, 
admitting 
the 
possibility 
of 
revocation 
and 
additional jail time, is considered to be 'custody'" for the 
purposes of habeas corpus.). 
¶71 Following the clear directive in Jones, the Wisconsin 
court of appeals explained that it is "settled" that habeas 
corpus does not require actual physical imprisonment.  State ex 
rel. 
Wohlfahrt 
v. 
Bodette, 
95 
Wis. 2d 130, 
133-34, 
289 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
28 
 
N.W.2d 366 (1980).  Rather, the focus is on whether one is 
subject to restraints not shared by the public generally: 
Reviewing federal law, we find that federal habeas 
corpus is available to one "in custody."  It is 
settled that the use of habeas corpus has not been 
limited to situations where the applicant is in actual 
physical custody, but is available to one subject to 
restraints not shared by the public generally.  It has 
been held that the language "in custody" is synonymous 
with "restraint of liberty." 
Id. 
¶72 At oral argument, Singh's counsel suggested that 
changing the conditions of extended supervision or reducing the 
term of extended supervision may be appropriate remedies in this 
case.  As the United States Supreme Court explained in Carafas 
v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968), "the [federal habeas 
corpus] statute does not limit the relief that may be granted to 
discharge of the applicant from physical custody.  Its mandate 
is broad with respect to the relief that may be granted.  It 
provides that '[t]he court shall . . . dispose of the matter as 
law and justice require.'" 
¶73 Although the law may be well settled on this issue, 
the facts of this case certainly are not.  The facts of this 
case have been a moving target, in part due to the disposition 
of at least one of the number of post-conviction motions that 
Singh has filed.  At oral argument, this court learned for the 
first time that Singh's sentence for the 2008 offense was 
modified to one year in jail, but we do not know the grounds for 
this modification.  Apparently, Singh also received credit for 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
29 
 
time served and had the extended supervision portion of the 
sentence vacated.  See Justice Ziegler's concurrence/dissent, 
¶149. 
¶74 As one of the dissents acknowledges, there are 
questions of fact in this case relevant to the issue of whether 
Singh is entitled to positive adjustment time that cannot be 
answered by reference to the evidentiary record before this 
court.  See generally Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent, ¶218-
21.  For instance, the dissent states that there was an 
opportunity for Singh to earn positive adjustment time on the 
July 2011 offense which had the potential to be an ex post facto 
violation, but "from the record before us, it is not possible to 
make that factual determination . . . ."  Id. ¶218.  See also 
id. ¶219 ("The potential for an ex post facto violation on the 
second crime due to repeal of PAT is not possible to determine 
due 
to 
the 
following 
circumstances 
presented 
by 
this 
case . . . "); id., ¶200 ("His first day of confinement for the 
July 25, 2011 crime is uncertain due to the modification of the 
Waukesha County Judgment"); id., ¶221 ("It may be that Singh can 
prove, as a factual matter, that he was confined on the second 
sentence longer than should have occurred and that some type of 
relief 
may 
be 
accorded . . . )"; 
Justice 
Ziegler's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶148 n.10 ("It is unclear from the record 
exactly what date this petition was filed . . ."). 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
30 
 
¶75 Because this court is not a fact-finding court, the 
circuit court is better suited to make a determination regarding 
whether Singh is entitled to relief.10  See, e.g., Mitchell Bank 
v. Schanke, 2004 WI 13, ¶84, 268 Wis. 2d 571, 676 N.W.2d 849 
(remanding to the circuit court for specific findings because 
"this court is not a fact-finding body.  The circuit court is 
better 
suited 
to 
make 
these 
precise 
determinations."). 
Accordingly, I would remand to the circuit for a determination 
of whether under the current circumstances it is now appropriate 
to grant the writ and what additional relief, if any, is 
warranted. 
VI 
¶76 In sum, we conclude that because the early release 
provisions of 2009 Wis. Act 28 were in effect when Singh was 
convicted and sentenced for the first offense, as well as at the 
time he committed the second offense, retroactive repeal of 
positive adjustment time in 2011 Wis. Act 38 violates the ex 
post 
facto 
clauses 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
United 
States 
Constitutions.  We also conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.198 
violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto 
                                                 
10 Justice Ziegler's concurrence/dissent reaches out for 
facts that are not in the record and were not briefed or argued 
by either party.  For example, the concurrence/dissent conducted 
a DOC Offender Locator internet search to try to determine 
Singh's 
maximum 
discharge 
date. 
 
Justice 
Ziegler's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶149 & n.12.  It seems to want to gather 
facts not of record and based upon these uncertain facts to deny 
Singh any relief. 
No. 2013AP1724    
 
31 
 
laws because it makes the punishment for an offense more 
burdensome after it was committed. 
¶77 Accordingly, 
we 
affirm 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
determination that the retroactive repeal of positive adjustment 
time 
is 
an 
ex 
post 
facto 
violation, 
but 
reverse 
its 
determination that Wis. Stat. § 973.198 does not violate the 
constitutional 
prohibition 
against 
ex 
post 
facto 
laws.  
Additionally, I would remand the cause to the circuit court for 
a determination of whether under the current circumstances it is 
now appropriate to grant the writ and what additional relief, if 
any, is warranted. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶78 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  This complicated 
case presents numerous issues for the court.  Some are factual; 
some are legal.  Sorting out these issues is indispensable to 
understanding this case.  Recognizing the multitude of fact 
situations that will be affected by our decision is critical in 
explaining the law. 
I 
¶79 The petitioner, Aman D. Singh (Singh), has been 
convicted of multiple offenses.  Three of his convictions are 
pertinent to this case. 
¶80 On December 8, 2008, Singh was charged in Waukesha 
County with five counts of violating Wis. Stat. § 961.43(a), a 
Class H felony.  His offenses were committed in 2008.  On March 
29, 2010, he pled guilty to Count 1 of the Complaint.  He was 
sentenced on April 29, 2010. 
¶81 On August 26, 2011, Singh was charged with two 
additional counts of violating Wis. Stat. § 961.43(a), still 
Class H felonies, in Milwaukee County.  He also was charged with 
a misdemeanor.  The felonies were committed on July 25, 2011, 
and August 10, 2011.  Singh pled guilty to all three charges on 
November 9, 2011, and he was sentenced on December 29, 2011. 
II 
¶82 In June 2009 the legislature passed and the governor 
approved 
the 
executive 
budget 
for 
the 
2009-11 
biennium.  
Included in the budget were extensive changes to Wis. Stat. 
§ 302.113, which is entitled "Release to extended supervision 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
2 
 
for felony offenders not serving life sentences."  The changes 
to § 302.113 did not take effect until October 1, 2009. 
¶83 Prior to this effective date, the statute required 
most inmates sentenced to prison to serve the full confinement 
portion of their sentence.  Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2) (2007-08).  
There were several exceptions to this general rule. 
¶84 The 2009 legislation made numerous changes in the 
sentencing law, including changes that permitted certain persons1 
sentenced to prison to earn "positive adjustment time" (PAT) 
that shortened the period of confinement before these persons 
were released to extended supervision.  See 2009 Wis. Act 28, 
§§ 2720-2733.2  Pertinent to this case, Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2) 
was amended to add paragraph (b), which read, in part, 
 
(b) An inmate sentenced under s. 973.01 for a 
misdemeanor or for a Class F to Class I felony that is 
not 
a 
violent 
offense, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 301.048(2)(bm)1., may earn one day of positive 
adjustment time for every 2 days served that he or she 
does not violate any regulation of the prison or does 
not refuse or neglect to perform required or assigned 
duties.  An inmate convicted of a misdemeanor or a 
Class F to Class I felony that is not a violent 
offense, as defined in s. 301.048(2)(bm)1., shall be 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 973.01(3d)(b) 
(2009-10) 
made 
PAT 
unavailable to persons determined by the DOC to "pose[] high 
risk of reoffending." 
2 For additional context regarding recent amendments to 
Wisconsin's sentencing laws, see Cecelia Klingele, The Early 
Demise of Early Release, 114 W. Va. L. Rev. 415, 436-39 (2012); 
Jesse 
J. 
Norris, 
The 
Earned 
Release 
Revolution: 
Early 
Assessments and State-Level Strategies, 95 Marq. L. Rev. 1551, 
1566 (2012); Michael O'Hear, Good Conduct Time for Prisoners: 
Why (and How) Wisconsin Should Provide Credits Toward Early 
Release, 98 Marq. L. Rev. 487, 504-07 (2014). 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
3 
 
released to extended supervision when he or she has 
served the term of confinement in prison portion of 
his or her bifurcated sentence, as modified by the 
sentencing 
court 
under 
s. 301.045(3m)(b)1. 
or 
302.05(3)(c)2.a., 
if 
applicable, 
less 
positive 
adjustment time he or she has earned. 
¶85 Section 9311(4) of 2009 Wis. Act 28 provided that 
Section 302.113(2) of the statutes first applies "to a person 
sentenced on December 31, 1999."  In other words, Wis. Stat. 
§ 302.113(2)(b) applied retroactively to persons sentenced on or 
after December 31, 1999. 
¶86 The budget bill contained a sentence stating that 
§ 302.113(2)(b) did not apply prospectively to a "person 
sentenced on or after the effective date of the subdivision."  
However, the governor vetoed that sentence. 
¶87 The 
2009 
legislation 
also 
created 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 302.113(2)(c), which prescribed the procedures for releasing 
an inmate to extended supervision after he or she accrued PAT: 
302.113(2)(c)1.  When an inmate is within 90 days 
of release to extended supervision under par. (b), the 
department shall notify the sentencing court that it 
intends to modify the inmate's sentence and release 
the inmate to extended supervision under par. (b), and 
the court may hold a review hearing.  If the court 
does not schedule a review hearing within 30 days 
after 
notification 
under 
this 
subsection, 
the 
department may proceed under par. (b). 
¶88 In 2011 the legislature passed 2011 Wis. Act 38, which 
substantially revised the law with respect to early release to 
extended supervision.  Section 38 of the new legislation 
repealed the PAT provisions in Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2)(b) that 
were created during the previous legislative session. 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
4 
 
¶89 Section 39 of the Act also repealed the release 
procedures specified in Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2)(c) (2009-10).  
In their place, Section 96 of the Act created Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.198: 
973.198  Sentence adjustment; positive adjustment 
time.  (1)  When an inmate who is serving a sentence 
imposed under s. 973.01 and who has earned positive 
adjustment time under s. 302.11, 2009 stats., or under 
s. 304.06, 2009 stats., has served the confinement 
portion 
of 
his 
or 
her 
sentence 
less 
positive 
adjustment time earned between October 1, 2009, and 
the 
effective 
date 
of 
this 
subsection . . . [LRB 
inserts date], he or she may petition the sentencing 
court to adjust the sentence under this section, based 
on the number of days of positive adjustment time the 
inmate claims that he or she has earned. 
(3)  Within 60 days of receipt of a petition 
filed under sub. (1), the sentencing court shall 
either deny the petition or hold a hearing and issue 
an order relating to the inmate's sentence adjustment 
and release to extended supervision. 
(5)  If the court determines that the inmate has 
earned positive adjustment time, the court may reduce 
the term of confinement in prison by the amount of 
time remaining in the term of confinement in prison 
portion of the sentence, less up to 30 days, and shall 
lengthen the term of extended supervision so that the 
total length of the bifurcated sentence originally 
imposed does not change. 
(6)  An inmate who submits a petition under this 
section may not apply for adjustment of the same 
sentence under s. 973.195 for a period of one year 
from the date of the petition. 
(Alterations in original.) 
 
¶90 New Section 973.198 preserved for an inmate the PAT 
that had been earned between October 1, 2009 and August 3, 2011, 
but it prevented the inmate from taking full advantage of what 
had been earned by delaying the date for the inmate's petition 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
5 
 
until the date the inmate was eligible for release, which took 
into account the period of confinement reduced by the PAT earned 
under the repealed 2009 law. 
III 
¶91 Evaluation of the changes to the law at issue in this 
case is grounded in three dates: December 31, 1999; October 1, 
2009; and August 3, 2011.  To help the reader understand the big 
picture, the following discussion will refer to four periods of 
time based on these dates. 
¶92 First, the "PAT window" refers to the time period 
beginning October 1, 2009, and ending on August 3, 2011.  2009 
Wis. Act 28 made PAT available under Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2)(b) 
for inmates sentenced for eligible crimes during this time 
period. 
¶93 Second, the "retroactivity window" refers to the time 
period beginning on December 31, 1999, and ending on September 
30, 2009——the day before October 1, 2009.  Section 9311(4) of 
2009 Wis. Act 28 made PAT available to inmates sentenced for 
eligible crimes during the retroactivity window. 
¶94 Third, the period of time before December 31, 1999. 
¶95 Fourth, the period of time after August 3, 2011, the 
date 2011 Wis. Act 38 repealed the PAT provisions in Wis. Stat. 
§ 302.113(2)(b). 
¶96 Every relevant "event" described below occurs in one 
of these four time periods.  The court must consider the dates 
of the following events: (1) the date a person committed an 
eligible offense; (2) the date the person was sentenced for the 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
6 
 
eligible offense; (3) the date the person's confinement began as 
part of the person's bifurcated sentence; and (4) the date the 
person's confinement ended as part of that sentence. 
¶97 Examining the four time periods in conjunction with 
the four events reveals 35 categories of persons who might be 
analyzed for possible ex post facto impact following the 2011 
change in the law.3  The chart in the Appendix lists the 35 
categories of persons. 
                                                 
3 Calculating the total number of combinations of dates and 
events is a question of mathematics.  The product rule is a 
fundamental mathematical principle: "[S]uppose that A is a set 
of a objects and B is a set of b objects.  Then the number of 
ways to pick one object from A and then one object from B is 
a x b."  Fred S. Roberts & Barry Tesman, Applied Combinatorics 
17 (2d ed. 2009) (emphasis omitted).  For example, a guest 
attending a wedding might have two choices of appetizer (soup or 
salad) and three choices of main course (beef, chicken, or 
vegetarian).  To determine the total number of combinations of 
appetizers and main courses available to each guest, multiply 
the number of appetizers (2) times the number of main courses 
(3) for a total of 6 possible combinations of appetizers and 
main courses. 
Applying the product rule to the dates and events under 
review in this case returns 256 different combinations of 
relevant events and time periods.  A person convicted of an 
eligible offense may have committed the offense during any of 
the four time periods, been sentenced for the offense during any 
of the four time periods, begun serving the confinement portion 
of a sentence during any of the four time periods, and ended the 
confinement portion of the sentence during any of the four time 
periods.  This means that a person could have committed an 
eligible 
crime 
before 
December 
31, 
1999, 
during 
the 
retroactivity window, during the PAT window, or after August 3, 
2011.  Because we consider four time periods for each relevant 
event, we multiply 4 x 4 x 4 x 4 to return 256 combinations of 
events and time periods. 
Fortunately, the laws of physics render impossible most of 
the 256 combinations of time periods and events.  As one 
example, it is impossible for a person who committed an eligible 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
7 
 
¶98 Thirteen 
categories 
on 
the 
chart 
are 
clearly 
irrelevant to any ex post facto analysis. 
● 
Categories 1-10 are irrelevant because the legislature 
never made PAT available to persons sentenced before 
December 31, 1999, for committing an eligible offense.  
The 2011 changes in the law had no effect upon persons 
in these categories. 
● 
Categories 11 and 21 are irrelevant because persons in 
these categories ended the confinement portion of 
their sentences before October 1, 2009.  These persons 
ended 
their 
confinements 
before 
the 
legislature 
created PAT and thus never qualified for it. 
● 
Category 35 is irrelevant because the legislature 
never made PAT available to persons who committed an 
"eligible" offense after August 3, 2011. 
¶99 Seven additional categories may be removed from 
consideration because they involve persons who ended the 
confinement portion of their sentences before August 3, 2011.  
Whether sentenced during the retroactivity window, as were 
persons in categories 12, 14, 22, and 24, or during the PAT 
window, as were persons in categories 17, 27, and 31, these 
persons were eligible to accrue PAT during the portions of their 
confinement that overlapped with the PAT window.  Any PAT earned 
                                                                                                                                                             
offense after August 3, 2011, to end the confinement portion of 
the sentence for that offense before December 31, 1999.  
Removing temporally impossible combinations leaves 35 remaining 
categories of persons. 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
8 
 
should have been applied to their sentences of confinement to 
accelerate their release to extended supervision.  The 2011 law 
change had no effect on these persons absent additional facts 
not stated.  Removing these additional 7 categories reduces the 
number of relevant categories to 15. 
¶100 The persons in the remaining 15 categories4 did not end 
the confinement portion of their prison sentences until after 
the legislature changed the law in 2011 to end PAT.  These 
persons are entitled to all the PAT, if any, that they earned 
during the PAT window.  That time was preserved by the 2011 
legislation. 
¶101 What is at issue here is whether persons in these 15 
categories are entitled to earn PAT after August 3, 2011. 
¶102 The 2011 statute does not seem to permit any person to 
earn PAT after August 3, 2011.  However, some inmates committed 
eligible offenses, were sentenced on their offenses, and 
commenced 
their 
confinement 
within 
the 
PAT 
window.  
Theoretically, these inmates have the strongest case under the 
Ex Post Facto Clauses to challenge the termination of their 
ability to earn PAT after August 3, 2011.  It must be 
remembered, however, that the 2009 legislation treated inmates 
who 
were 
sentenced 
for 
eligible 
offenses 
during 
the 
retroactivity window exactly the same as inmates who committed 
offenses and were sentenced during the PAT window. 
                                                 
4 To be clear, the remaining 15 categories are 13, 15, 16, 
18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, and 34. 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶103 Consequently, 
the 
court 
must 
analyze 
whether 
categories of persons who either committed eligible offenses or 
were sentenced for such offenses during the retroactivity window 
are qualified to make the same ex post facto claims as 
categories of persons who committed eligible offenses and were 
sentenced during the PAT window.  Once this issue is resolved, 
the question must be answered whether any categories of persons 
are entitled, under ex post facto principles, to earn PAT after 
August 3, 2011. 
IV 
¶104 By enacting 2009 Wis. Act 28, the legislature not only 
prospectively changed the law of sentencing beginning on October 
1, 2009, but also changed all sentences imposed during the 
retroactivity window for eligible inmates who committed eligible 
crimes.  This change to the law had an immediate mitigating 
effect on confined persons sentenced during the retroactivity 
window.  Although at sentencing these persons anticipated that 
their confinement would last for the entire term specified by 
the sentencing court, 2009 Wis. Act 28 gave them the opportunity 
to earn PAT and thereby reduce the length of their confinement. 
¶105 Notably, the mitigation of these persons' sentences 
turned upon the date of sentencing, rather than the date on 
which they committed the underlying eligible offense.  See 2009 
Wis. 
Act 
28, 
§ 9311(4) 
("[T]he 
creation 
of 
section[] 
302.113(2)(b) . . . of the statutes first appl[ies] to a person 
sentenced on December 31, 1999.").  The legislature extended the 
mitigating effects of PAT to all qualified persons sentenced on 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
10 
 
or after December 31, 1999——regardless of whether they committed 
an eligible offense before or after that date.  Furthermore, a 
person 
who 
committed 
an 
eligible 
offense 
during 
the 
retroactivity window might nevertheless have gained access to 
PAT if he or she received a sentence during the PAT window. 
¶106 After October 1, 2009, a person sentenced for an 
eligible 
offense 
during 
the 
retroactivity 
window 
had 
an 
expectation of PAT access identical to that of a person 
sentenced during the PAT window.  Because 2011 Wis. Act 38 
eliminated the opportunity to continue earning PAT for persons 
sentenced during the retroactivity window and persons sentenced 
during the PAT window, both groups experienced the same increase 
in the term of confinement.  Accordingly, we can analyze both 
groups together when determining whether the repeal of PAT after 
August 3, 2011, violated the constitutional prohibitions on ex 
post facto laws. 
V 
¶107 Under the United States Constitution, "No State 
shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or 
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . "  U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  Wisconsin's Constitution provides: "No 
bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the 
obligations of contracts, shall ever be passed . . . ."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 12.  "We have long looked to the pronouncements 
of the United States Supreme Court in construing the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution as a guide to 
construing 
the 
Ex 
Post 
Facto 
Clause 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
11 
 
Constitution."  State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 699, 524 
N.W.2d 641 (1994) (footnote omitted). 
¶108 The Supreme Court of the United States conducted an 
extensive review of its own Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence 
in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).  In an opinion by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court began with language from 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), in which Justice 
Samuel Chase "expounded those legislative Acts which in his view 
implicated the core concern of the Ex Post Facto Clause."  
Collins, 497 U.S. at 41-42. 
¶109 Justice Chase described four types of laws that he 
understood to contravene the constitutional prohibition: 
I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, 
within the words and the intent of the prohibition.  
1st.  Every law that makes an action done before the 
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, 
criminal; and punishes such action.  2d.  Every law 
that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it 
was, when committed.  3d.  Every law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than 
the law annexed to the crime, when committed.  4th.  
Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and 
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law 
required at the time of the commission of the offence, 
in order to convict the offender. 
Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis 
omitted). 
¶110 Characterizing 
the 
language 
from 
Justice 
Chase's 
Calder opinion as a comprehensive explanation of ex post facto 
laws, the Supreme Court in Collins emphasized a twentieth 
century formulation of the definition from Beazell v. Ohio, 269 
U.S. 167 (1925): 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
12 
 
It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well 
known that their citation may be dispensed with, that 
any 
statute 
which 
punishes 
as 
a 
crime 
an 
act 
previously committed, which was innocent when done; 
which makes more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime, after its commission, or which deprives one 
charged with crime of any defense available according 
to law at the time when the act was committed, is 
prohibited as ex post facto. 
Collins, 497 U.S. at 42 (quoting Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169-70). 
¶111 After the Supreme Court decided Collins, this court 
reviewed Wisconsin's ex post facto jurisprudence in State v. 
Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994).  In that case, 
this court acknowledged that "Collins underscored that the 
proper definition of an ex post facto law is the definition 
originally stated in Calder and later summarized in Beazell."  
Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d at 702. 
¶112 Two of my colleagues have written at length regarding 
Singh's first eligible offense, which he committed during the 
retroactivity window and for which he was sentenced during the 
PAT window.  They argue that, when determining whether a 
subsequent act of the legislature is unconstitutional, ex post 
facto analysis should look solely to the law as it was at the 
time of the commission of the offense.  Chief Justice 
Roggensack's dissent, ¶217 ("Because the August 3, 2011 repeal 
of PAT caused the law to be as it was in 2008 when Singh 
committed the first of his crimes, the 2011 legislation did not 
impose punishment that was greater than it was at the time Singh 
committed the first of his crimes."); Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley's dissent, ¶234 ("The 2011 law does not increase Singh's 
sentence attached to the 2008 crime because it makes no change 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
13 
 
to the punishment that existed at the time Singh committed the 
2008 crime.").5 
¶113 I am not persuaded that ex post facto analysis is 
always limited to mere comparison of the law as it existed at 
two discrete times.  To say that the 2011 legislation repealing 
PAT is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law because the 
punishment in 2011 is the same as the punishment in 2008 fails 
                                                 
5 The exclusive use of the date on which a person committed 
an eligible offense carries with it a concerning implication: 
the legislature could have entirely eliminated PAT earned by 
certain inmates during the PAT window.  As Justice Rebecca 
Bradley sets forth the argument, 
At the time Singh committed the 2008 crime, the PAT 
opportunity did not exist; therefore, 2011 Wis. Act 
38's repeal of it does not implicate any ex post facto 
concerns regarding the 2008 crime.  The 2011 law does 
not increase Singh's sentence attached to the 2008 
crime because it makes no change to the punishment 
that existed at the time Singh committed the 2008 
crime. 
Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's dissent, ¶234 (footnote omitted). 
Consider a person who committed and was sentenced for an 
eligible offense before October 1, 2009, served the confinement 
portion of a prison sentence during the entire PAT window, and 
continued that confinement after August 3, 2011.  If ex post 
facto analysis is limited to a strict focus on the date of 
commission of the offense, then the legislature could have 
eliminated all PAT earned by that person during the PAT window 
without implicating ex post facto concerns because eliminating 
the earned PAT would "make[] no change to the punishment that 
existed" when the crime was committed before October 1, 2009.  
Under such an analysis, the 2011 repeal of PAT would seem to 
survive constitutional scrutiny for ex post fact purposes even 
without the reasonable preservation of earned PAT set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.198 (2013-14). 
 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
14 
 
to acknowledge the objective evolution of the law in the interim 
period. 
¶114 In Wisconsin, "No law repealed by a subsequent act of 
the legislature is revived or affected by the repeal of such 
repealing act."  Wis. Stat. § 990.03(1) (2013-14); see also 
Goodno v. City of Oshkosh, 31 Wis. 127, 130 (1872) ("The 
original section, as an independent and distinct statutory 
enactment, ceased to have any existence the very moment the 
amendatory act was passed and went into effect . . . .  The 
original section, as a separate statute, was as effectually 
repealed and obliterated from the statute book, as if the repeal 
had been made by direct and express words . . . ."). 
¶115 The 2011 legislation repealing PAT did not "reinstate" 
the statutory scheme for punishment as it existed before October 
1, 2009.  Rather, in 2011 the legislature amended the punishment 
scheme for the second time in as many legislative sessions.  An 
appropriate analysis requires review of the ex post facto 
consequences of the change in the law in 2009, followed by 
review of the further changes to the law in 2011.  Comparing the 
punishment for eligible crimes in 2011 to the punishment for the 
same crimes in 2008 is not sufficient where 2009 Wis. Act 28 
retroactively altered the law as it existed in 2008. 
¶116 Clearly, the retroactive creation of PAT in 2009 was 
not unconstitutional.  "Although the Latin phrase 'ex post 
facto' literally encompasses any law passed 'after the fact,' it 
has 
long 
been 
recognized . . . that 
the 
constitutional 
prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
15 
 
which disadvantage the offender affected by them."  Collins, 497 
U.S. at 41; see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 
(1977) ("It is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it 
must be more onerous than the prior law.").  Consequently, 2009 
Wis. Act 28 did not violate the prohibitions on ex post facto 
laws by retroactively reducing the confinement period of some 
sentences imposed during the retroactivity window. 
¶117 Resolving whether the 2011 legislation repealing PAT 
constituted an unconstitutional ex post facto law, however, 
requires a more careful review.  Before proceeding to an 
analysis of whether eliminating the opportunity to earn PAT 
after it had been granted actually makes the punishment for 
eligible offenses more burdensome, it is necessary to determine 
who may claim an ex post facto violation in this case. 
¶118 As stated already, see supra Part IV, the repeal of 
PAT had an identical effect on persons sentenced during the 
retroactivity window and persons sentenced during the PAT window 
by depriving both groups of the opportunity to earn PAT after 
August 3, 2011.  In effect, the legislature created a statutory 
entitlement to PAT mitigating confinement for any person 
sentenced for an eligible offense during the retroactivity 
window or the PAT window.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 
258 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("A statutory parole system 
that reduces a prisoner's sentence by fixed amounts of time for 
good behavior during incarceration can realistically be viewed 
as an entitlement——a reduction of the prescribed penalty——rather 
than a discretionary grant of leniency."). 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
16 
 
¶119 Because 
the 
legislature 
in 
2009 
created 
that 
entitlement to a sentence with confinement mitigated by PAT for 
persons sentenced during either the retroactivity window or the 
PAT 
window, 
the 
2011 
legislation 
withdrew 
a 
continued 
opportunity to earn PAT from both groups.  A change in the law 
that "makes more onerous the punishment for crimes committed 
before its enactment . . . runs afoul of the prohibition against 
ex post facto laws."  Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 35-36 
(1981).  Eliminating access to PAT after August 3, 2011, for 
persons sentenced during the retroactivity window and the PAT 
window risked making the punishment more burdensome: where they 
previously had an opportunity to mitigate their term of 
confinement, the 2011 legislation guaranteed that many of those 
inmates would 
be required to serve a longer period of 
confinement than they would have had the law not been changed. 
¶120 Though 
people 
sentenced 
during 
the 
retroactivity 
window and PAT window did not necessarily contemplate PAT at the 
time they committed eligible crimes, the legislature in 2009 saw 
fit to mitigate——retroactively or prospectively——all of their 
sentences when it created PAT.  To say that ex post facto 
analysis is inappropriate because the law changed only after 
people were sentenced is to deny the plain fact that the 2011 
legislative action risked making more severe the term of 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
17 
 
confinement for persons already in prison.6  Accordingly, it is 
appropriate 
to 
consider 
persons 
sentenced 
during 
the 
retroactivity window and the PAT window alongside persons who 
committed eligible offenses during the PAT window when deciding 
whether the repeal of PAT was an unconstitutional ex post facto 
law. 
¶121 Under the Beazell formulation of the definition of ex 
post facto laws——embraced by the Supreme Court in Collins and 
adopted by this court in Thiel——the repeal of PAT in 2011 
allegedly "makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, 
after its commission."  Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d at 700 (quoting 
Collins, 497 U.S. at 42).  In cases where a change in the law is 
alleged to make the punishment for a crime more burdensome after 
commission of the offense, "[t]he touchstone of [a court's] 
inquiry is whether a given change in law presents a '"sufficient 
risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the 
covered crimes."'"  Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 
                                                 
6 Chief Justice Roggensack argues that the lead opinion 
"employs a new definition of ex post facto law when it changes 
the act from which ex post facto effect is measured to include a 
temporary change in a law that was repealed subsequent to 
conviction and sentencing."  Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent, 
¶214.  She contends that "[n]o United States Supreme Court 
opinion supports the lead opinion's definition of ex post facto 
law, nor does any opinion from this court."  Id., ¶215.  But it 
bears noting that changes in the law after sentencing also occur 
after commission of the crime.  The Ex Post Facto Clauses 
prohibit legislative action that "makes more burdensome the 
punishment for a crime, after its commission." State v. Thiel, 
188 Wis. 2d 695, 700, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994) (quoting Collins v. 
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990)).  It undermines the 
prohibition's purpose if the legislature may increase the term 
of confinement for prisoners after their confinement has begun. 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
18 
 
2082 (2013) (quoting Garner, 529 U.S. at 250, which had quoted 
Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995)).  
"[M]ere speculation or conjecture that a change in law will 
retrospectively increase the punishment for a crime will not 
suffice to establish a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause," 
but neither must "a law increase the maximum sentence for which 
a defendant is eligible in order to violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause."  Id. at 2081-82. 
¶122 Here, the repeal of PAT ensured that many persons 
convicted of eligible offenses would actually serve a longer 
term of confinement than the mitigated term available by law 
when they committed the offense or were sentenced for it.  
Admittedly, a person confined to prison for an eligible offense 
may engage in behavior that precludes accrual of much, or any, 
PAT.  But that possibility in some cases does not change the 
fact that the 2011 legislation eliminated PAT's mitigating 
effect for all eligible persons with eligible sentences who 
served all or part of their prison sentence after August 3, 
2011. 
¶123 The Supreme Court has identified as unconstitutionally 
ex post facto various laws that "had the purpose and effect of 
enhancing the range of available prison terms."  Morales, 514 
U.S. at 507 (first citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 
(1937); then citing Weaver, 450 U.S. 24; and then citing Miller 
v. Florida, 482 U.S. at 433-34).  The cases discussed in Morales 
involved unconstitutional laws that amended state sentencing 
guidelines that were "intended to, and did, increase the 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
19 
 
'quantum of punishment'" for crimes in the category at issue, 
Miller, 482 U.S. at 433-34; reduced "gain-time accumulation" so 
as to "lengthen[] the period that someone . . . must spend in 
prison," Weaver, 450 U.S. at 33 (overturning Florida statute 
reducing the number of gain-time days an inmate could earn each 
month); and "ma[de] mandatory what was before only the maximum 
sentence," Lindsey, 301 U.S. at 400.  See also Peugh, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2084 ("A retrospective increase in the Guidelines range 
applicable to a defendant creates a sufficient risk of a higher 
sentence to constitute an ex post facto violation."); Lynce v. 
Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 443 (1997) (explaining that in "post-
Weaver cases, [the Court has] . . . considered whether the 
legislature's action lengthened the sentence without examining 
the purposes behind the original sentencing scheme," and noting 
that in Miller, the Court's conclusion that the sentencing 
guidelines made the punishment more burdensome "rested entirely 
on an objective appraisal of the impact of the change on the 
length of the offender's presumptive sentence"). 
¶124 Cases involving an objective increase in sentence 
length stand in contrast to those in which the Court concluded 
that laws permitting discretionary decisions did not have an 
unconstitutional ex post facto effect.  See Garner, 529 U.S. at 
256 
(declining 
to 
conclude 
that 
"change 
in 
Georgia 
law 
lengthened [an inmate's] time of actual imprisonment" where 
state parole board exercised its discretion to increase time 
period between parole  hearings); Morales, 514 U.S. at 505-07 
(concluding that law permitting parole board to schedule 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
20 
 
subsequent parole hearings two years in the future rather than 
annually after initial hearing did not unconstitutionally change 
"the 
substantive 
formula 
for 
securing 
any 
reductions 
to 
[the] . . . sentencing range"). 
¶125 The repeal of PAT by 2011 Wis. Act 38 hews much closer 
to the cases involving lengthening of prison terms than to those 
involving discretionary parole decisions.  Even though PAT is 
contingent on inmate conduct during the term of confinement——
meaning that an eligible inmate does not receive PAT as a matter 
of right without appropriate conduct——the 2011 legislation had 
the effect of preventing accrual of PAT for perfect behavior 
after August 3, 2011. 
¶126 As a result, eligible persons who were sentenced for 
eligible offenses during the retroactivity window, eligible 
persons who were sentenced for eligible offenses during the PAT 
window, and eligible persons who committed eligible offenses 
during the PAT window had their imposed or expected sentences 
transformed.  Where they could once expect a term of confinement 
as mitigated by PAT earned during the entirety of confinement, 
they could now expect a term of confinement as mitigated by PAT 
(if any) earned only during the PAT window.  For an eligible 
person who began confinement close in time to August 3, 2011, 
such a change in the law could mean years added to the length of 
time he or she could expect to spend in prison, assuming 
behavior conforming to the standards necessary to earn PAT. 
¶127 In 2011 the legislature repealed PAT prospectively not 
just for persons who committed offenses after August 3, 2011, 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
21 
 
but also for persons already eligible to earn PAT based on the 
dates they committed or were sentenced for eligible offenses.  
For persons sentenced during the retroactivity window, persons 
sentenced during the PAT window, and persons who committed 
offenses during the PAT window, a prohibition on earning PAT 
after August 3, 2011, creates an obvious and "sufficient" risk 
that they will serve longer sentences than they would have had 
PAT not been repealed.  Therefore, I would hold that 2009 Wis. 
Act 38 was an unconstitutional ex post facto law to the extent 
that it denied those persons the opportunity to earn PAT during 
confinement after August 3, 2011.7 
VI 
¶128 I agree with the lead opinion's conclusion that the 
amended release procedure in Wis. Stat. § 973.198 created by 
2011 Wis. Act 38 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law 
because it may lengthen the term of confinement for inmates who 
have earned PAT by as many as 90 days.  Lead op., ¶68.  I write 
separately to emphasize that the amendment to the release 
procedure for earned PAT clearly results in an ex post facto 
violation. 
¶129 It is important to observe that the amended release 
procedure necessarily requires more time in confinement for a 
person who has earned PAT than did the previous procedure.  The 
procedure created in 2009 required the Department of Corrections 
to notify the sentencing court "within 90 days of release to 
                                                 
7 By the reasoning stated in this opinion, I thus reach the 
same conclusion as the lead opinion.  Lead op., ¶47-48. 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
22 
 
extended supervision" of an intent to modify a sentence and 
release a person early because of earned PAT.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 302.113(2)(c)1. (2009-10).  Thus, a person could complete the 
review process before the date of eligibility for release and 
conceivably begin extended supervision on that date. 
¶130 The revised procedure created by 2011 Wis. Act 38 
makes it impossible for an inmate who has earned PAT to begin 
extended supervision on the date that PAT makes that person 
eligible for release from confinement.  Under the new procedure, 
"[w]hen an inmate . . . who has earned positive adjustment 
time . . . has served the confinement portion of his or her 
sentence less positive adjustment time . . . , he or she may 
petition the sentencing court to adjust the sentence."  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.198(1) (2013-14).  The sentencing court must hold a 
hearing on the petition within 60 days of receiving it, and the 
sentencing court then "may reduce the term of confinement in 
prison by the amount of time remaining in the term of 
confinement in prison portion of the sentence, less up to 30 
days."  Wis. Stat. § 973.198(3)-(5). 
¶131 In effect, the result of this change is to reduce by 
as many as 90 days the amount of PAT that an inmate has earned.  
An inmate under the new system may not petition for release 
until the date that the old system would have permitted release.  
As revised, the release procedure essentially eliminates at 
least 1 and as many as 90 days of earned PAT. 
¶132 Characterizing this change to the release process as 
"procedural" rather than "substantive" does not save it for 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
23 
 
constitutional purposes.  Although the Supreme Court stated in 
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), that "[e]ven though it 
may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural change 
is not ex post facto," the Court went on to explain that the law 
at issue in the case was "procedural" because "[t]he new statute 
simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the 
death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the 
quantum of punishment attached to the crime."  Dobbert, 432 U.S. 
at 293-94.  The legislature has the prerogative to alter the 
procedure for exercising earned PAT, but we must evaluate 
whether any changes have a substantive impact on the length of 
punishment. 
¶133 It has already been established that an ex post facto 
violation occurs when a law retroactively extends the amount of 
time 
that 
a 
person 
must 
spend 
in 
prison. 
 
"By 
definition, . . . reduction in gain-time accumulation lengthens 
the period that someone . . . must spend in prison."  Weaver, 
450 U.S. at 33.  Because the new release procedure eliminates 
anywhere from 1 to 90 days of earned PAT, the procedure 
undoubtedly lengthens the term of confinement and therefore also 
has an unconstitutional effect. 
VII 
¶134 To conclude, I return to Singh and review the 
consequences for him of the law discussed thus far. 
¶135 At the outset, I conclude that Singh is not eligible 
to earn PAT on the offense committed on August 10, 2011.  
Because that offense was committed after the repeal of PAT on 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
24 
 
August 3, 2011, Singh has no basis to claim (and does not 
assert) that he is eligible for PAT on this offense. 
¶136 Next, I conclude that Singh is eligible for PAT on the 
offense committed on July 25, 2011.  Because he committed that 
offense 
during 
the 
PAT 
window, 
denying 
him 
PAT 
would 
unconstitutionally lengthen the term of his confinement.  He is 
eligible to earn PAT during any time confined in prison under 
sentence for that offense——including any time confined after 
August 3, 2011. 
¶137 Finally, I conclude that Singh is eligible for PAT on 
the 2008 Waukesha County offense.  Because he was sentenced 
during the PAT window, denying him PAT would unconstitutionally 
lengthen the term of his confinement.  He is eligible to earn 
PAT during any time confined in prison under that sentence——
including any time confined after August 3, 2011. 
¶138 To be clear, Singh has not asked this court to 
precisely determine how much PAT, if any, he earned while 
confined under these sentences.  As Singh explains in his brief 
in response to Warden Kemper's cross-petition, "It would be 
trivial for this Court to assess the specific positive-
adjustment-time calculations to which Mr. Singh was entitled.  
That is particularly so given Mr. Singh's circumstances——his 
other sentence, and his current status of having been released 
from prison."  Indeed, given the complex factual circumstances 
relating to these sentences and Singh's time in and out of 
confinement during the time periods at issue, there is a 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
25 
 
distinct possibility that any PAT he earned would not have 
resulted in his earlier release. 
¶139 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.  I 
agree with many of the conclusions and much of the reasoning in 
the lead opinion.  I would affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals regarding Singh's eligibility for PAT and reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals regarding the procedure for 
securing release pursuant to earned PAT. 
 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
26 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Cat. # 
Committed 
Sentenced 
Confinement Begun 
Confinement Ended 
1 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
2 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
3 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
4 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
After 8/3/11 
5 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
6 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
7 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 8/3/11 
8 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
9 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
10 
Before 12/31/99 
Before 12/31/99 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
11 
Before 12/31/99 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
12 
Before 12/31/99 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
13 
Before 12/31/99 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 8/3/11 
14 
Before 12/31/99 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
15 
Before 12/31/99 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
16 
Before 12/31/99 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
17 
Before 12/31/99 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
18 
Before 12/31/99 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
19 
Before 12/31/99 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
20 
Before 12/31/99 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
21 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
22 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
23 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 8/3/11 
24 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
25 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
26 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
27 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
28 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
29 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
30 
On/After 12/31/99 & 
Before 10/1/09 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
31 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
32 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
33 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
34 
After 10/1/09 & 
Before 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
35 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
After 8/3/11 
No.  2013AP1724.dtp 
 
27 
 
 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
1 
 
¶140 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).   I agree only with the lead opinion's 
conclusion to affirm in part and reverse in part the court of 
appeals.  The opinion of Justice Ann Walsh Bradley is joined 
only by Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson.  Justice David T. Prosser 
concurs, but does not join Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's opinion.1  
While Justice Prosser engages in a thorough, reasonable, and 
persuasive analysis concerning Singh's ex post facto challenge, 
the facts of this case are so unique that regardless of the ex 
post facto analysis, the conclusion is the same.  As will be 
discussed in this writing, the peculiar facts of this case leave 
Singh with no habeas relief.   
¶141 As the old adage warns, "bad facts make bad law."  
This case is a prime example of bad facts, and I am concerned 
that by undertaking an unnecessary review of the scope of the ex 
post facto clause we risk creating bad law.  Fortunately, we do 
not need to do so here.  I write to explain that under either 
interpretation of the proper scope of the ex post facto clause 
proffered by the other members of the court, the result in this 
unusual case remains the same.  Put simply, Singh is due no 
relief on his writ of habeas corpus.  Judicial restraint 
requires that we resolve cases on the narrowest possible 
grounds.  See, e.g., DOJ v. DWD, 2015 WI 114, ¶29, 365 
Wis. 2d 694, 875 N.W.2d 545 ("[W]e are generally obliged to 
decide our cases on the 'narrowest possible grounds'" (quoting 
                                                 
1 Chief Justice Roggensack and Justice Rebecca G. Bradley 
have authored separate but dissenting opinions.     
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
2 
 
State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, ¶143, 357 Wis. 2d 41, 849 
N.W.2d 748 
(Ziegler, 
J., 
concurring).)). 
 
Accordingly, 
a 
decision on the precise scope of the ex post facto clause is 
unnecessary because Singh is entitled to no habeas corpus 
relief.  Consequently, remand is also inappropriate in this 
case.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶142 Singh committed an array of offenses between 2008 and 
2011, a period of time during which a series of legislative 
changes to the sentencing statutes was enacted.  For example, as 
of June 30, 2009, the legislature put into effect several early 
release opportunities for offenders who received sentences for 
certain eligible offenses after December 1, 1999.  See 2009 
Wis. Act 28.2  The program at issue here provided that inmates 
                                                 
2 Creating Wis. Stat. 302.113 (2009-10), which provided in 
relevant part: 
(1) An inmate is subject to this section if he or 
she is serving a bifurcated sentence imposed under s. 
973.01. An inmate convicted of a misdemeanor or of a 
Class F to Class I felony that is not a violent 
offense, . . . and 
who 
is 
eligible 
for 
positive 
adjustment 
time 
under 
sub. 
(2)(b) . . . may 
be 
released to extended supervision under sub. (2)(b) or 
(9h).  . . .  
(2)  . . .   
(b) An inmate sentenced under s. 973.01 for a 
misdemeanor or a Class F to Class I felony that is not 
a violent offense, as defined in s. 301.048(2)(bm)1., 
may earn one day of positive adjustment time for every 
2 days served that he or she does not violate any 
regulation of the prison or does not refuse or neglect 
to perform required or assigned duties. An inmate 
convicted of a misdemeanor or a Class F to Class I 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
3 
 
serving prison sentences for misdemeanors or nonviolent Class F 
to Class I felonies could earn one day of "Positive Adjustment 
Time" (PAT) for every two days served "that he or she does not 
violate any regulation of the prison or does not refuse or 
neglect to perform required or assigned duties."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 302.113(2)(b) (2009-10).3  PAT did not decrease the total 
length of the sentence, but rather allowed inmates to convert 
one-third of their confinement time into extended supervision 
time.4  Wis. Stat. § 302.113(3)(e) ("If an inmate is released to 
extended supervision under sub. (2)(b) after he or she has 
served less than his or her entire confinement in prison portion 
of the sentence imposed under s. 973.01, the term of extended 
supervision is increased so that the total length of the 
bifurcated sentence does not change."); § 302.113(2)(a) ("[A]n 
inmate subject to this section is entitled to release to 
extended supervision after he or she has served the term of 
confinement in prison portion of the sentence [as modified by 
                                                                                                                                                             
felony that is not a violent offense, . . . shall be 
released to extended supervision when he or she has 
served the term of confinement in prison portion of 
his or her bifurcated sentence, . . . less positive 
adjustment time he or she has earned. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes will 
be to the 2009-10 version of the Wisconsin Statutes unless 
otherwise indicated.  
4 For instance, if an inmate received a bifurcated sentence 
consisting of three years confinement and three years extended 
supervision, PAT would allow the sentence to be modified to two 
years confinement and four years extended supervision. The 
inmate would be released to extended supervision after serving 
two years confinement in prison. 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
4 
 
the appropriate reviewing entity under the PAT statutes]" 
(emphasis added).).  
¶143 An inmate's eligibility for PAT was not discretionary 
on the part of the Department of Corrections ("DOC"), but 
instead was dependent on the classification of the inmate's 
offense.  See Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2)(b) ("An inmate sentenced 
under s. 973.01 for a misdemeanor or for a Class F to Class I 
felony that is not a violent offense, . . . may earn one day of 
positive adjustment time for every 2 days served that he or she 
does not violate any regulation of the prison or does not refuse 
or neglect to perform required or assigned duties.")  The 
statutes required the DOC to keep a record of the conduct of 
each 
inmate 
subject 
to 
§ 302.113. 
 
See 
§ 302.113(3)(a).  
Qualifying inmates were entitled to early release to extended 
supervision when they had served the confinement portion of 
their sentences less PAT earned.  See § 302.113(2)(b) ("An 
inmate convicted of a misdemeanor or a Class F to Class I felony 
that is not a violent offense, . . . shall be released to 
extended supervision when he or she has served the term of 
confinement 
in 
prison 
portion 
of 
his 
or 
her 
bifurcated 
sentence, . . . less positive adjustment time he or she has 
earned.").  When an inmate was within 90 days of release to 
extended supervision based upon PAT earned, the DOC notified the 
sentencing court that it intended to modify the inmate's 
sentence.  § 302.113(2)(c)1.  The sentencing court could, but 
was not required to, hold a review hearing.  Id. ("[T]he [DOC] 
shall notify the sentencing court . . . and the court may hold a 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
5 
 
review hearing.")  If the sentencing court did not schedule a 
hearing, the DOC proceeded with release.  Id. ("If the court 
does not schedule a review hearing within 30 days after 
notification under this subsection, the [DOC] may proceed under 
par. (b).") 
¶144 In 2008, prior to the enactment of the PAT statutes, 
Singh forged prescriptions for narcotics and was charged in 
Waukesha County with violating Wis. Stat. § 961.43(a), Obtain 
Controlled Substance by Fraud, a class H felony.  Singh was 
convicted and sentenced for the 2008 Waukesha County offense in 
2010, while PAT was in effect.  He received three years 
probation with six months of conditional jail time and an 
imposed-and-stayed bifurcated prison sentence consisting of 18 
months confinement and 18 months extended supervision, to be 
served upon revocation.  Because he was sentenced for a 
qualifying offense after December 1, 1999, at the time of 
sentencing PAT at least arguably applied to the bifurcated 
prison portion of this sentence.5 
¶145 While on probation for the 2008 Waukesha offense, 
Singh committed two offenses in Milwaukee County.  The first was 
committed on July 25, 2011, while PAT was in effect.  The PAT 
statutes were repealed August 3, 2011.  Singh committed his 
                                                 
5 Singh did not earn any PAT on this sentence at this time, 
however, because he was placed on probation and his bifurcated 
prison sentence was imposed and stayed.  Thus, until his 
probation was revoked, Singh was not "serving a bifurcated 
sentence imposed under s. 973.01" as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 302.113.  See Wis. Stat. § 302.113(1). 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
6 
 
second Milwaukee County offense on August 10, 2011, seven days 
after PAT's repeal.  Singh pled guilty to one count of Obtain 
Controlled Substance by Fraud6 for the July 25 offense, and to 
one count of Obtain Controlled Substance by Fraud for the 
August 10 offense.  
¶146 On December 13, 2011, Singh's probation for the 
Waukesha offense was revoked and his stayed sentence of 
imprisonment (consisting of 18 months confinement plus 18 months 
extended supervision) was imposed.  He was returned to jail to 
await sentencing on the Milwaukee County offenses. 
¶147 On December 29, 2011, Singh was sentenced for the 
Milwaukee County offenses.  For the July 2011 Milwaukee offense, 
he was sentenced to 24 months initial confinement and 36 months 
extended supervision, to be served consecutively to the Waukesha 
sentence.7  For the August 2011 Milwaukee offense, he was 
sentenced to 24 months initial confinement and 36 months 
extended 
supervision, 
to 
run 
concurrently 
to 
all 
other 
sentences.  In other words, the August 2011 Milwaukee sentence 
was concurrent to both the Waukesha sentence (18 months 
                                                 
6 Singh also pled guilty to one count of Obtain Prescription 
Drug with Fraud in this case.  This is an unclassified 
misdemeanor.  See Wis. Stat. § 450.11(7)(a) (2011-12).  For this 
count, he was sentenced to six months in a house of correction, 
to run concurrently with all sentences.  Because this sentence 
is irrelevant to the issue at hand, I will not discuss it 
further. 
7 When consecutive sentences are imposed, they are computed 
as one continuous sentence.  Wis. Stat. § 302.113(4).  A person 
serves all terms of confinement before serving any terms of 
extended supervision.  Id. 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
7 
 
confinement and 18 months extended supervision) as well as the 
July 2011 Milwaukee sentence (24 months confinement and 36 
months extended supervision).  Singh's first day in prison was 
January 4, 2012.8 
¶148 Singh filed a petition for positive adjustment time on 
the Waukesha case with the Racine Correctional Institution.9  
When the DOC refused to process his request, Singh filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Racine County 
circuit court on June 28, 2013, alleging he was also due PAT on 
the July 2011 Milwaukee sentence.10  The DOC filed a motion to 
quash the writ, which the circuit court granted.  The court of 
appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding that the 
ex post facto clause required the DOC to allow Singh to earn PAT 
credit toward his sentences for both his Waukesha and July 2011 
Milwaukee offenses.  This appeal followed. 
                                                 
8 He received 159 days of credit for the conditional jail 
time served on the Waukesha sentence, as well as 234 days of 
confinement time credit for days he spent in jail awaiting 
hearings and awaiting transfer to the prison.  This amounted to 
a total of 13 months confinement credit toward the Waukesha and 
July 2011 Milwaukee sentences, which he in fact received. 
9 Singh has filed numerous motions with various entities 
related to his convictions.  I will only discuss those necessary 
to the disposition of this case. 
10 After his arrival in prison, Singh filed a petition for 
positive adjustment time on the Waukesha sentence.  It is 
unclear from the record exactly what date this petition was 
filed.  On May 2, 2012, the DOC sent a letter to the circuit 
court explaining that it refused to verify Singh's eligibility 
for PAT.  Singh's June 2013 petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
was based upon the DOC's refusal to process his PAT eligibility 
petition upon his arrival in prison. 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
8 
 
¶149 While the appeal was pending before this court, Singh 
was released to extended supervision.11  On July 14, 2015, the 
Waukesha County circuit court modified Singh's sentence to one 
year in jail with credit for time served and vacated the 
extended supervision portion of the sentence.12   
¶150 Consequently, we find the case before us in the 
following posture:  Singh's sentence in the Waukesha case is now 
one year in jail and has been served.  The initial Waukesha 
bifurcated sentence of imprisonment——18 months confinement and 
18 months extended supervision——no longer exists.  As for the 
two Milwaukee concurrent sentences, Singh has served 29 months 
of confinement and is currently on extended supervision for both 
the July 2011 and August 2011 Milwaukee offenses.  According to 
the information the DOC is representing to the world at large, 
Singh's maximum discharge date is now November 28, 2016.13   
¶151 Nonetheless, I proceed to discuss this case in terms 
of the sentences that existed when Singh filed his writ of 
                                                 
11 Because Singh's jail credit amounted to 13.1 months and 
he received no PAT on either sentence, his release-to-extended-
supervision date for the consecutive 18-month Waukesha and 24-
month July 2011 Milwaukee confinement terms was June 2, 2014 (18 
months minus 13 months, plus 24 months, for a total of 29 months 
from January 4, 2012:  June 4, 2014).   
12 The amendment to the Waukesha sentence was not revealed 
to this court until oral argument.  The details of the amended 
sentence in Waukesha County Case No. 2008CF1368 are available on 
CCAP (the Consolidated Court Automation Program case management 
system). Available at https://wcca/wicourts.gov/index.xsl.  
13 This date was obtained using the DOC's Offender Locator 
search, 
available 
at 
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/ 
lop/home.do  
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
9 
 
habeas corpus and at a time when the Waukesha sentence had not 
been modified so as to moot its consideration of PAT credit.  I 
then will discuss the fact that habeas relief is unavailable to 
Singh considering the facts as they now exist. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The Ex Post Facto Clauses 
¶152 As a general proposition, the ex post facto clause 
requires fundamental fairness and that individuals have fair 
notice of the consequences of their crimes.  Both the United 
States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution have ex post 
facto clauses.14  We follow United States Supreme Court precedent 
that interprets the federal constitution's prohibition of ex 
post facto laws when interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution's 
ex post facto clause.  State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 699, 524 
N.W.2d 641 (1994). 
¶153 The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that 
the purpose of the ex post facto clause is to ensure "that 
legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit 
individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed."  
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981).  It is also meant 
to protect fundamental fairness by making the government "abide 
by the rules of law it establishes," Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 
513, 532 (2000), and to "restrict governmental power by 
restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation."  
Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.   
                                                 
14 See U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9 and 10; Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 12. 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
10 
 
¶154 Though the Supreme Court has "declined to articulate a 
single 'formula' for identifying those legislative changes that 
have a sufficient effect on substantive crimes or punishments to 
fall within the constitutional prohibition," California Dep't of 
Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995), the formulation 
"faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of 
the Ex Post Facto Clause" is that stated in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 
U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925): 
It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well 
known that their citation may be dispensed with, that 
any 
statute 
which 
punishes 
as 
a 
crime 
an 
act 
previously committed, which was innocent when done; 
which makes more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime, after its commission, or which deprives one 
charged with crime of any defense available according 
to law at the time when the act was committed, is 
prohibited as ex post facto. 
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1990).  Following the 
lead of the Supreme Court of the United States, this court in 
Thiel adopted verbatim the Beazell formulation of ex post facto 
laws.  Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d at 703. 
¶155 Consequently, the ex post facto clause prohibits only 
those laws that fall into one of the Beazell categories.  The 
fact that the legislature changes a sentencing statute does not 
automatically entitle a defendant to relief pursuant to the ex 
post facto clause.  Rather, the ex post facto clause provides 
that "[l]egislatures may not retroactively alter the definition 
of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts."  
Collins, 497 U.S. at 43.   
¶156 It is the question of whether the repeal of PAT 
"increased the punishment" for Singh's 2008 Waukesha crime that 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
11 
 
has divided this court.  Some members of this court conclude 
that the ex post facto clause prohibits the legislature from 
making the punishment for an offense more burdensome than it was 
at the time of commission, conviction, or sentencing for an 
offense.  They conclude that because Singh was sentenced in 2010 
to bifurcated sentences that included the opportunity to earn 
PAT, repeal of PAT retroactively increases the punishment Singh 
received for that offense and is thus an ex post facto law.  
Other members of this court contend that the ex post facto 
clause requires only that the punishment for an offense not be 
made more burdensome than it was on the day the offense was 
committed.  They conclude that because PAT was not the law in 
2008 when Singh committed his Waukesha crime, the retroactive 
repeal of PAT does not increase Singh's punishment for that 
offense. 
¶157 I write to explain that under either articulation of 
the proper scope of the ex post facto clause, in this case, 
Singh spent five more months in confinement than he should have 
due to PAT's retroactive repeal.  Thus, as will be demonstrated 
below, regardless of whether the ex post facto inquiry compares 
a new law to the law in effect (1) at the time of commission, 
conviction, or sentencing, or (2) to the law in effect on only 
the date of the commission of the offense, retroactive repeal of 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
12 
 
PAT 
increased 
Singh's 
punishment 
for 
an 
offense 
already 
committed in doing so and violated the ex post facto clause.15  
 
1.  PAT for both the 2008 Waukesha and July 2011  
Milwaukee Sentences 
¶158 If the ex post facto clause requires Singh to earn PAT 
on both the original Waukesha bifurcated prison sentence and the 
July 2011 Milwaukee prison sentence, Singh should have been 
released to extended supervision on January 4, 2014.16  He was 
released from confinement five months later.  I will explain why 
this is so. 
¶159  Singh's original sentence for the Waukesha offense 
consisted of 18 months confinement and 18 months extended 
supervision.  A full grant of PAT on that sentence (one-third of 
18 months, so 6 months) would change that sentence to 12 months 
(18 – 6 = 12) confinement and 24 months extended supervision 
(18 + 6 = 24).  The 6 months of PAT credit against confinement 
prolongs the extended supervision by that same amount so not to 
                                                 
15 While I recognize that the Waukesha sentence would no 
longer qualify for PAT because it is a jail sentence, I analyze 
these sentences in terms of how they existed at the time he 
filed his request for PAT. 
16 I recognize that the DOC uses certain procedures for 
calculating release dates and that consequently, an inmate's 
actual release date does not always correspond exactly to the 
date upon which the average person would consider that a "month" 
has passed on the calendar.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 302.113(8) 
("Releases to extended supervision from prison shall be on the 
Tuesday or Wednesday preceding the date on which he or she 
completes 
the 
term 
of 
imprisonment."). 
 
Though 
small 
discrepancies in the exact day Singh would have been released in 
the scenarios given here may exist, they do not impact my 
analysis.   
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
13 
 
change the overall length of the sentence.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 302.113(3)(e). 
¶160 The consecutive July 2011 Milwaukee sentence consisted 
of 24 months confinement and 36 months extended supervision.  A 
full grant of PAT on that sentence (one-third of 24 months, so 8 
months) would change that sentence to 16 months confinement 
(24 – 8 = 16) and 44 months extended supervision (36 + 8 = 44). 
¶161 Singh was otherwise also due approximately 13 months 
(393 days) of jail credit to the confinement portion of his 
sentence for time otherwise spent in custody for the Waukesha 
and July 2011 Milwaukee offenses.  This would further affect the 
sentences so to then require essentially 15 total months of 
confinement because the Waukesha sentence of 12 months is less 
than the 13 months credit due, and the remaining July sentence 
of 16 months would receive the remaining one month of credit in 
order to give him full credit for the time spent in custody.17  
As was demonstrated above, he would still have 44 months 
extended supervision, but that part of the sentence would begin 
only after all confinement was served.  
¶162 So, assuming he was due PAT for the Waukesha and July 
2011 Milwaukee sentences, Singh should have served 15 months 
confinement (the Waukesha sentence usurped by the credit due 
plus 15 months (16 – 1 = 15) for the July 2011 Milwaukee 
                                                 
17 When two consecutive sentences are imposed, jail credit 
for custody that is connected to both sentences reduces the term 
of confinement of the "first" sentence to be served.  See State 
v. Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 100, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988). 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
14 
 
sentence).  Singh's first day in prison on this sentence was 
January 4, 2012.  If Singh was entitled to a full grant of PAT 
on both sentences, the confinement term of this sentence should 
have ended March 4, 2013——15 months from January 4, 2012. 
¶163 However, Singh would not have been released March 4, 
2013, because Singh was also serving the concurrent August 2011  
Milwaukee sentence of 24 months confinement and 36 months 
extended supervision at this time (concurrent to both the above 
Waukesha sentence and July 2011 Milwaukee sentence).  It is 
undisputed that for the August 2011 Milwaukee offense, Singh was 
due neither PAT nor jail credit under the statute.  The August 
2011 Milwaukee sentence also began on January 4, 2012, because 
it was concurrent to all other sentences (including the Waukesha 
sentence which came first and began on January 4, 2012).  The 
confinement term on this August 2011 Milwaukee sentence would 
have thus ended January 4, 2014——24 months from January 4, 2012.  
As a result, while this concurrent sentence would be the reason 
for keeping Singh in confinement until January 4, 2014, it could 
not be the reason for keeping Singh in confinement another five 
months, as he was, until June 2, 2014. 
¶164 Consequently, if the ex post facto clause looks to the 
law at the time of commission, conviction, or sentencing (as 
some of my colleagues would conclude), and Singh was due PAT on 
both the Waukesha sentence and the July 2011 Milwaukee sentence, 
he should have been released to extended supervision on 
January 4, 2014, not June 2, 2014.  Because the DOC refused to 
process Singh's PAT request and no court hearing was held, he 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
15 
 
thus 
served 
a 
full 
29 
months 
of 
confinement  
(18 – 13 + 24 = 29).  He was released June 2, 2014——29 months 
from the day his sentences began on January 4, 2012.   
¶165 The only way to conclude that Singh should have spent 
29 months in confinement would be to surmise that he was due no 
PAT credit on either sentence.  Only one of my colleagues would 
so decide that is the case.  Indeed, it is difficult to conclude 
that he would not be due PAT on at least the July 2011 Milwaukee 
sentence given the fact that PAT was the law in place on the 
date of commission of that offense.18 
¶166 However, as I have otherwise discussed in this 
section, if the ex post facto inquiry compares a new law to the 
law in effect at the time of commission, conviction, or 
sentencing for an offense, PAT's repeal unconstitutionally 
increased the punishment for Singh's Waukesha and July 2011 
Milwaukee offenses and caused him to serve an extra five months 
confinement.  He was released June 2, 2014, and PAT combined 
with the concurrent August 2011 Milwaukee sentence would have 
allowed him to be released five months earlier on January 4, 
2014, even with consideration of the concurrent August 2011 
Milwaukee case.   
                                                 
18 The law in effect on July 25, 2011, when Singh committed 
the offense, required Singh to serve 16 months confinement in 
prison on the sentence he received for that offense.  The law in 
effect after PAT's repeal on August 3, 2011, required Singh to 
serve 24 months confinement in prison on the sentence he 
received for the same offense.  This is an increase in 
punishment for the July 25, 2011 Milwaukee offense that took 
effect after July 25, 2011.  Under any reading of Beazell and 
Thiel, the ex post facto clause prohibits this. 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
16 
 
2.  PAT For Only the July 2011 Milwaukee Sentence 
¶167 It seems that all but one of my colleagues could agree 
that Singh is at least due PAT for the July 2011 Milwaukee 
sentence which ran consecutive to the earlier Waukesha sentence.  
Even under this narrower interpretation of the ex post facto 
clause——comparing a new law only to the law that existed on the 
date of commission of the offense——PAT's repeal still caused 
Singh to spend an additional five months in prison.  Even 
according to the narrowest view of the ex post facto inquiry 
being put forth by members of this court, Singh should have 
earned PAT on the July 2011 Milwaukee sentence.  I will now 
demonstrate how even under this narrower interpretation, PAT's 
repeal unconstitutionally required Singh to serve five extra 
months confinement in prison.   
¶168 Singh's original sentence for the Waukesha offense 
consisted of 18 months confinement and 18 months extended 
supervision.  If no PAT was due on this sentence, it remains as-
is. 
¶169 The July 2011 Milwaukee sentence consisted of 24 
months confinement and 36 months extended supervision and was 
consecutive to the Waukesha case.  A full grant of PAT on that 
sentence alone (one-third of 24 months, so 8 months) would 
change that sentence to 16 months confinement (24 – 8 = 16) and 
44 months (36 + 8 = 44) extended supervision.   
¶170 As has been discussed, Singh was also otherwise due 
approximately 13 months jail credit on the confinement portion 
of his sentence.  After all confinement is served, he would then 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
17 
 
begin his 44 months of extended supervision (the concurrent 
August 2011 sentence of 36 months extended supervision would 
conclude within this 44 months). 
¶171 So, if Singh was due PAT for only the July 2011 
Milwaukee 
sentence, 
Singh 
should 
have 
served 
21 
months 
confinement (18 months for the Waukesha sentence, minus 13 
months for sentence credit due, plus 16 months for the July 2011 
Milwaukee sentence) (18 – 13 + 16 = 21).  Singh's first day in 
prison on the consecutive sentences was January 4, 2012.  If 
Singh was entitled to PAT on only the July 2011 Milwaukee 
sentence, the confinement term of his consecutive sentences 
should have ended October 4, 2013——21 months from January 4, 
2012.  Below, I will explain why it did not. 
¶172 Recall, Singh was also serving the concurrent August 
2011 Milwaukee sentence of 24 months confinement and 36 months 
extended supervision at this time.  Singh was due no PAT or jail 
credit for the August 2011 Milwaukee offense.  The August 2011 
Milwaukee sentence also began on January 4, 2012.  The 
confinement term on this August 2011 Milwaukee sentence (24 
months concurrent, for which all agree no PAT is due) would have 
nonetheless 
kept 
Singh 
incarcerated 
until 
January 
4,  
2014——24 months from January 4, 2012. 
¶173 Consequently, even if the ex post facto clause looks 
only to the law on the date of commission of the offense and 
Singh was due PAT only on the July 2011 Milwaukee sentence, 
Singh still should have been released to extended supervision on 
January 4, 2014.  On that date, he would have completely served 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
18 
 
his terms of confinement on all three sentences.  Because the 
DOC refused to process Singh's PAT request, he served a full 29 
months confinement (18 months for the Waukesha sentence, minus 
13 months for sentence credit, plus 24 months for the July 2011 
Milwaukee sentence, equals 29 months confinement).  
¶174 He was released June 2, 2014——29 months from the day 
his sentences began on January 4, 2012.  Only one of my 
colleagues asserts that he could never be due PAT for any of the 
sentences, and thus release on June 2, 2014 (29 months 
confinement) according to her, is the appropriate term of 
confinement.  The other six members of this court could 
conclude, however, that Singh is at least due PAT for the 
July 2011 Milwaukee sentence.  Thus, under the facts of this 
case, all but one justice should agree that Singh should have 
been required to be released January 4, 2014, as there is no 
sentence that would have required him to be confined longer.   
¶175 Even though it seems apparent that Singh should have 
been released five months earlier, regardless of whether the ex 
post facto clause analysis is as stated in section II.A.1., or 
it is as stated in section II.A.2, the bottom line is that under 
either 
analysis, 
PAT's 
repeal 
unconstitutionally 
increased 
Singh's punishment by five months confinement in prison.  Under 
the particular facts of this case, Singh however finds himself 
in the unique position of being entitled to no relief under his 
petition for habeas corpus.  As I will explain below, even if 
habeas relief may have been appropriate in the past, the writ is 
not now available to Singh.  
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
19 
 
B.  Habeas Corpus 
¶176 Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding with origins in 
the common law, and its availability is guaranteed by the 
Wisconsin and United States constitutions.19  State ex rel. Haas 
v. McReynolds, 2002 WI 43, ¶11, 252 Wis. 2d 133, 643 N.W.2d 771.  
It is an equitable remedy that is available to a prisoner "when 
there is a pressing need for relief or where the process or 
judgment by which a petitioner is held is void."  Id. (citation 
omitted).  "The writ of habeas corpus is a procedural device for 
subjecting executive, judicial, or private restraints on liberty 
to judicial scrutiny.  Where it is available, it assures among 
other things that a prisoner may require his jailer to justify 
the detention under the law."  Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 
(1968).  The purpose of the writ "is to protect and vindicate 
the petitioner's right of personal liberty by releasing the 
petitioner from illegal restraint."  State ex rel. Hager v. 
Marten, 226 Wis. 2d 687, 692, 594 N.W.2d 791 (1999). 
¶177 "Because it is an extraordinary writ, habeas corpus 
relief is available only where the petitioner demonstrates: (1) 
a restraint of his or her liberty, (2) which restraint was 
imposed contrary to constitutional protections or by a body 
lacking jurisdiction and (3) no other adequate remedy available 
at law."  State v. Pozo, 2002 WI App 279, ¶8, 258 Wis. 2d 796, 
654 N.W.2d 12 (citation omitted).  Importantly, "a writ will not 
be issued where the 'petitioner has an otherwise adequate remedy 
                                                 
19 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Wis. Const. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 2. 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
20 
 
that he or she may exercise to obtain the same relief.'"  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
¶178 With these principles in mind and regardless of 
whether the principle of fair notice allows either the ex post 
facto inquiry to (1) compare a new law to the law at the time of 
commission, conviction, or sentencing for an offense, or (2) 
compare a new law to the law in effect only at the time of 
commission of the offense, I conclude that Singh is not entitled 
to any relief in his petition for habeas corpus.   
¶179 In Singh's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he 
stated that he was serving a consecutive sentence composed of 18 
months initial confinement and 18 months extended supervision 
for the Waukesha case, and 24 months initial confinement and 36 
months extended supervision for the July 2011 Milwaukee case.20  
He contended that denying PAT to inmates who had committed 
offenses prior to PAT's August 3, 2011 repeal was an ex post 
facto violation pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), 
and Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987).  Consequently, he 
alleged, he was eligible to earn PAT and had earned sufficient 
PAT on these two sentences so to entitle him to release, thus 
his continuing detention was illegal.  See State ex rel. 
Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 251, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965) 
(holding that Goodchild's claims of constitutional error that 
would invalidate his murder conviction could be reviewed by 
                                                 
20 Singh's petition made no mention of the August 2011 
Milwaukee concurrent sentence. 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
21 
 
habeas corpus even though he could not be discharged from 
custody due to a concurrent burglary sentence).  As will be 
demonstrated next, even though there was a violation of the ex 
post facto clause, Singh is not entitled to relief by way of his 
habeas petition. 
¶180 First, 
Singh's Waukesha sentence has since been 
reduced to one year in jail.  Contrary to the suggestion of the 
lead opinion in footnote 7, the plain language of the statutes 
is 
very 
clear 
that 
PAT 
is 
earned 
only 
on 
a 
prison  
sentence——it cannot be earned on a jail sentence.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 302.113(1) (2009-10) ("An inmate is subject to this 
section if he or she is serving a bifurcated sentence imposed 
under s. 973.01.").  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01 is the sentencing 
statute for prison sentences.21  While it once was, Singh's 
Waukesha sentence is no longer a prison sentence.  He is 
entitled to no habeas relief on this sentence because he could 
not be entitled to PAT for a jail sentence.22  He cannot be due 
habeas relief for being denied something for which he does not 
qualify. 
 
See 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Wohlfahrt 
v. 
Bodette, 
95 
                                                 
21 "[W]henever a court sentences a person to imprisonment in 
the Wisconsin state prisons for a felony committed on or after 
December 31, 1999, or a misdemeanor committed on or after 
February 1, 2003, the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence 
under this section."  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1). 
22 The record is not clear as to why the Waukesha sentence 
was amended, but it is clear that Singh is in a better position 
now because he no longer has any extended supervision in that 
case, he could not be returned to prison on that sentence, and 
he received a result better than could have been given had he 
received the requested relief in his habeas petition.   
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
22 
 
Wis. 2d 130, 132, 289 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1980) ("[T]he extent 
of an equitable remedy is limited only by the effect of the 
constitutional violation" (citation omitted).) 
¶181 Second, even if Singh were granted all of the relief 
requested in his petition for habeas corpus, he would have a 
longer, not shorter, term of extended supervision to serve.23  
Nonetheless, the record reflects that his extended supervision 
terms have now been reduced by six months, as a publicly-
available website reflects that Singh's maximum release date is 
now November 28, 2016.24  Once again, he finds himself in a 
better, and not worse, position with an earlier release date 
than had he received PAT and his confinement time was converted 
to extended supervision.  
¶182 Third, his current status as an offender on extended 
supervision is indeed a legally-imposed status such that he 
could not be entitled to habeas relief.  It is the sentence 
imposed by the sentencing judge that authorizes——legally——the 
custody of the defendant.25  See Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71, 
74 (2d Cir. 2006).   Consequently, the current restraint on 
Singh's liberty is not "imposed contrary to constitutional 
                                                 
23 Recall from sections II.A.1. and II.A.2., had he received 
all of the relief requested in his habeas petition, he would 
have at least 44 months extended supervision to serve. 
24 Presumably, his release date has been backdated to 
reflect the change in the Waukesha sentence.   
25 Assuming, of course, that the sentencing court considers 
the appropriate factors and imposes a sentence within the 
statutorily authorized range.  See, e.g., State v. Gallion, 2004 
WI 42, ¶43, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
23 
 
protections" as would be required for Singh to be entitled to a 
writ of habeas corpus.  In other words, he is currently on 
extended supervision and should be.  
¶183 Fourth, if somehow further relief is due Singh, 
because he would have other remedies at law, he is not due any 
relief by a writ of habeas corpus.26  Habeas relief is not due to 
one who has other adequate remedies at law.  To the extent that 
further relief is warranted, Singh indeed has other adequate 
remedies at his disposal.  For example, Singh can petition the 
DOC for application of any extra time he may have spent in 
confinement toward any confinement he will serve if his extended 
supervision is revoked; he can seek sentence credit under Wis. 
Stat. § 973.155; or he can bring a civil suit for monetary 
damages, if due.  Because this is so, Singh's relief does not 
come by way of a writ of habeas corpus.  See Haas, 252 
Wis. 2d 133, ¶14 ("We have long and consistently held that the 
extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is not available to a 
petitioner when the petitioner has other adequate remedies 
available" (citations omitted).).  
¶184 For the above stated reasons, I agree only with the 
lead opinion's conclusion to affirm in part and reverse in part 
the court of appeals.  The opinion of Justice Ann Walsh Bradley 
is joined only by Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson. Justice 
David T. Prosser concurs, but does not join Justice Ann Walsh 
                                                 
26 I am not opining as to whether Singh may have other civil 
remedies to pursue. 
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
24 
 
Bradley's opinion.27  While Justice Prosser engages in a 
thorough, reasonable, and persuasive analysis concerning Singh's 
ex post facto challenge, the facts of this case are so unique 
that regardless of the ex post facto analysis, the conclusion is 
the same.  As discussed in this writing, the peculiar facts of 
this case leave Singh with no habeas relief.   
¶185 As the old adage warns, "bad facts make bad law."  
This case is a prime example of bad facts, and I am concerned 
that by undertaking an unnecessary review of the scope of the ex 
post facto clause we risk creating bad law.  Fortunately, we do 
not 
need 
to 
do 
so 
here. 
 
As 
explained, 
under 
either 
interpretation of the proper scope of the ex post facto clause 
proffered by the members of the court, the result in this 
unusual case remains the same.  Put simply, Singh is due no 
relief on his writ of habeas corpus.  Judicial restraint 
requires that we resolve cases on the narrowest possible 
grounds.  See, e.g., DOJ v. DWD, 365 Wis. 2d 694, ¶29 ("[W]e are 
generally obliged to decide our cases on the 'narrowest possible 
grounds'" 
(quoting 
Subdiaz-Osorio, 
357 
Wis. 2d 41, 
¶143 
(Ziegler, J., concurring).)).  Accordingly, a decision on the 
precise scope of the ex post facto clause is unnecessary because 
Singh is entitled to no habeas corpus relief. Consequently 
remand is inappropriate in this case.  
¶186 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
                                                 
27 Chief Justice Roggensack and Justice Rebecca G. Bradley 
have authored separate but dissenting opinions.     
No.  2013AP1724.akz 
 
25 
 
¶187 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶188 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
United States Supreme Court and this court have concluded that 
the ex post facto clauses of both Constitutions forbid enactment 
of laws that impose punishment for an act that was not 
punishable at the time the act was committed or that impose 
punishment that is greater than it was at the time the act was 
committed.  Peugh v. United States, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 
2078 (2013); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981); State v. 
Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 511, 509 N.W.2d 712 (1994).  The lead 
opinion attempts to expand the definition by which we evaluate 
whether a statute violates the ex post facto clauses of the 
federal and state constitutions because it concludes that when a 
law changes after conviction or sentencing, an ex post facto 
violation occurs.1   
¶189 Therefore, although I conclude that one of Aman 
Singh's three crimes under review herein has potential for an ex 
post facto violation under the correct ex post facto analysis, I 
do not join the lead opinion because I conclude the lead 
opinion's definition of ex post facto law is incorrect.  
Furthermore, I agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that 
the procedural change in the duties of circuit courts did not 
contravene ex post facto prohibitions.2  The lead opinion's 
                                                 
1 Lead op., ¶¶36, 44, 47.   
2 Because Justice Rebecca G. Bradley ably discusses and 
decides this issue, I join her opinion in that regard rather 
than writing about this issue myself.  See Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley's dissent, ¶¶248-49.  
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
2 
 
expansion of the definition of an ex post facto law misstates 
United States Supreme Court precedent and the precedent of this 
court.  Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals' 
decision in part; affirm it in part; and I respectfully dissent 
from the lead opinion herein. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶190 The lead opinion and the concurrence/dissent of 
Justice Annette Ziegler ably set out the factual foundation that 
bears on Singh's claim.  Therefore, I repeat only those facts 
necessary to enable the reader to understand the discussion that 
follows.  
¶191 The 
issues 
in 
this 
appeal 
arise 
from 
Singh's 
confinement in prison as a result of prescription forgeries for 
narcotics in Waukesha and Milwaukee counties and from a 
statutory enactment, effective October 1, 2009 and repealed 
August 3, 2011, that provided an opportunity for a confined 
inmate to earn positive adjustment time (PAT) that was applied 
to reduce the inmate's period of confinement.  The legislative 
repeal of PAT permitted credit for PAT earned between October 1, 
2009 and August 3, 2011.  Wis. Stat. § 973.198.  
A.  Dates of Criminal Conduct 
¶192 Singh committed the crimes that we review herein on 
three 
different 
dates. 
 
He 
committed 
the 
first 
offense 
October 16, 2008 in Waukesha County, before the October 1, 2009 
effective date of the PAT statutes, Wis. Stat. § 302.113 (2009-
10) and Wis. Stat. § 304.06 (2009-10).   
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
3 
 
¶193 Singh committed his second offense July 25, 2011 in 
Milwaukee County, while PAT was possible.  He committed his 
third offense on August 10, 2011 in Milwaukee County, after PAT 
was repealed on August 3, 2011.  
B.  Singh's Convictions 
¶194 On March 29, 2010, Singh pled guilty in Waukesha 
County Circuit Court to the crime committed October 16, 2008.  
Four other alleged violations of Wis. Stat. § 961.43(1)(a) were 
dismissed but read-in.   
¶195 On November 9, 2011, at a joint plea hearing, Singh 
pled guilty to the Milwaukee County July 25, 2011 offense, and 
to the Milwaukee County August 10, 2011 offense.  A joint 
sentencing hearing was scheduled for December 29, 2011. 
C.  Singh's Sentences 
¶196 On April 29, 2010, the Waukesha County Circuit Court 
sentenced Singh to a bifurcated prison sentence of 18 months' 
confinement and 18 months' extended supervision for the 2008 
crime.  The court stayed imprisonment and imposed three years' 
probation conditioned on six months' jail time with Huber 
privileges.   
¶197 On December 13, 2011, the Waukesha County Circuit 
Court revoked Singh's probation due to Milwaukee County offenses 
and vacated the stay of the initial sentence of 18 months' 
confinement 
and 
18 
months' 
extended 
supervision. 
 
Any 
opportunity for PAT based on confinement in prison for the 
Waukesha County crime could occur only if Singh's confinement 
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
4 
 
occurred before August 3, 2011 when PAT was repealed.3  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.198.  However, Singh's first day of confinement for 
any crime was January 4, 2012. 
¶198 On August 6, 2010, the Waukesha County Circuit Court 
entered an order, which related that, before Singh's confinement 
began, the court had granted Singh 159 days of sentence credit 
for conditional jail time.  On December 13, 2011, pursuant to 
the order of the Division of Hearing and Appeals, Singh received 
an additional 234 days of sentence credit for custody subsequent 
to 
revocation 
and 
prior 
to 
Singh's 
receipt 
at 
prison.  
Therefore, as of Singh's first day of confinement, he received 
393 days of sentence credit, approximately 13 months, that was 
applied against his sentence for the Waukesha County crime.   
¶199 On July 14, 2015, the Waukesha County Circuit Court 
entered an amended judgment that documented the credit given and 
also converted the Waukesha County sentence to one year in jail, 
with credit for time served.  The court also vacated the 18 
months of extended supervision initially imposed.   
                                                 
3 When an inmate who is serving a sentence imposed 
under s. 973.01 and who has earned positive adjustment 
time under s. 302.113, 2009 stats., or under s. 
304.06, 2009 stats., has served the confinement 
portion 
of 
his 
or 
her 
sentence 
less 
positive 
adjustment time earned between October 1, 2009, and 
August 3, 2011, he or she may petition the sentencing 
court to adjust the sentence under this section, based 
on the number of days of positive adjustment time the 
inmate claims that he or she has earned.   
Wis. Stat. § 973.198(1) (2011-12) (emphasis added). 
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶200 On December 29, 2011, Singh was sentenced for both 
Milwaukee County offenses.  For the July 25, 2011 offense, he 
was sentenced to 24 months' initial confinement and 36 months' 
extended supervision, to be served consecutively to the Waukesha 
County sentence, but concurrently with the other Milwaukee 
County sentence.  His first day of confinement for the July 25, 
2011 crime is uncertain due to the modification of the Waukesha 
County judgment.4 
¶201 For the August 10, 2011 offense, Singh was sentenced 
to 24 months' initial confinement and 36 months' extended 
supervision, to run concurrently with all other sentences.5  On 
the sentence for the August 10, 2011 Milwaukee County crime, 
Singh had no opportunity to earn PAT because the PAT statutes 
were repealed August 3, 2011.   
                                                 
4 The amended judgment removed confinement and extended from 
Singh's sentence for the Waukesha County crime, converting his 
sentence to jail time.  This may have resulted in the 
confinement for both Milwaukee County crimes to actually have 
been served concurrent with each other from the first day. 
5 The sentencing provisions for the two Milwaukee County 
crimes also could have resulted in the confinement for the 
August 10, 2011 crime beginning before the confinement for the 
July 25, 2011 crime.  This was possible because the sentence for 
the July 25 crime was consecutive to the sentence for the 
Waukesha County crime, while the sentence for the August 10 
crime was concurrent with the sentence for the Waukesha County 
crime.  The first day of confinement for any crime was 
January 4, 2012. 
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
6 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶202 Singh brings an as-applied constitutional challenge to 
Wis. Stat. § 973.198, claiming that it is an unconstitutional ex 
post facto law when applied to him.  In such a challenge, we 
assume that the statute is constitutional, just as we do when a 
facial challenge to a statute is made on constitutional grounds.  
Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶47, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 
N.W.2d 854.  However, we do not presume that the State has 
applied the statute in a constitutional manner.  Id., ¶48.  
Rather, our test of the statute's application is driven by the 
analysis for the right that the proponent asserts has been 
burdened by the statute.  Id., ¶¶49-51.   
¶203 Here, Singh asserts in his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus that application of Wis. Stat. § 973.198 to the crimes he 
committed and for which he was convicted and sentenced would 
burden his personal liberty in contravention of the ex post 
facto provisions of the federal and state constitutions.  
¶204 Whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus has been 
properly denied presents a mixed question of fact and law.  
State v. Pozo, 2002 WI App 279, ¶6, 258 Wis. 2d 796, 654 N.W.2d 
12.  We will not overturn findings of historic fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous.  Id.  However, under the facts presented, 
we independently review as a question of law whether habeas 
should have been granted.  State ex rel. Woods v. Morgan, 224 
Wis. 2d 534, 537, 591 N.W.2d 922 (Ct. App. 1999).  Here, the 
historic facts are not in dispute.  Therefore, we decide whether 
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
7 
 
a writ of habeas corpus should have issued as a matter of law.  
Id.  
B.  Ex Post Facto Prohibitions 
1.  General principles 
¶205 Both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution have clauses that prohibit ex post facto laws.6  Ex 
post facto is a Latin phrase that means "after the fact."  
Black's Law Dictionary 661 (9th ed. 2009).  The question this 
case presents is:  which fact is the determining "fact" when 
evaluating a contention that a particular law violates ex post 
facto clauses.  Stated otherwise:  whether the correct ex post 
facto analysis turns on the fact of crime commission, the fact 
of conviction for the crime, the fact of sentencing for the 
crime, or some combination thereof is the question presented in 
this review.   
¶206 The United States Supreme Court interprets the federal 
constitution's ex post facto clause as prohibiting laws that 
change the punishment for a crime after commission because crime 
commission is the act for which notice of punishment is 
required.  Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990).  We 
follow United States Supreme Court precedent that interprets the 
federal constitution's prohibition of ex post facto laws when 
interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution's ex post facto clause.  
State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 699, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994).   
                                                 
6 See U.S. Const. Art. I, §§ 9 and 10; Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 12.   
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
8 
 
¶207 Thiel is an important case because in it we reviewed 
United States Supreme Court decisions that had broadened the 
definition of ex post facto laws in ways that the Supreme Court 
later concluded were erroneous.  Id. at 699-703.  In following 
Supreme Court precedent, initially, we had adopted that more 
expansive definition of ex post facto laws.  Id. at 701.  
However, we later concluded our expansion was erroneous because 
we had done so in reliance on subsequently overruled Supreme 
Court decisions.  Id. at 703.   
¶208 To explain further, we noted in Thiel that the United 
States Supreme Court in Collins withdrew language from Kring v. 
Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), which included within the 
definition of ex post facto "laws that altered a defendant's 
situation to his or her disadvantage."  Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d at 
700.     
¶209 We had earlier adopted this broad definition of ex 
post facto laws to include laws that altered a defendant's 
situation to his or her disadvantage in State ex rel. Mueller v. 
Powers, 64 Wis. 2d 643, 646, 221 N.W.2d 692 (1974).  In Mueller, 
we relied on Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890).  
Mueller, 64 Wis. 2d at 645-46.  Medley had followed the 
expansive definition in Kring that, in Collins, the Supreme 
Court concluded was erroneous.7  See Medley, 134 U.S. at 171.  
                                                 
7 The lead opinion relies on State ex rel. Mueller v. 
Powers, 64 Wis. 2d 643, 221 N.W.2d 692 (1974), as did the court 
of appeals.  Lead op., ¶¶63-66.  That reliance is in direct 
contravention of State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 703, 524 
N.W.2d 641 (1994) and of Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 
(1990), which we followed in Thiel.  Similarly, the lead opinion 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶210 Before us, Thiel had relied on the Mueller recitation 
that expanded the definition of ex post facto laws to include 
laws that "alter the situation of an accused to his or her 
disadvantage."  Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d at 702.  Because we follow 
United States Supreme Court precedent when interpreting both the 
United States Constitution's and the Wisconsin Constitution's ex 
post facto clauses, we concluded that Mueller set forth an 
incorrect 
definition 
and 
we 
withdrew 
that 
overly 
broad 
definition from our interpretations of ex post facto clauses.  
Id. at 703.   
¶211 Collins was clear in overruling prior United States 
Supreme Court decisions that had held that any change in the law 
that alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage 
violated the ex post facto prohibition and explicitly reaffirmed 
the definition set out in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390-92 
(1798): 
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the 
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, 
criminal; and punishes such action.  2d. Every law 
that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it 
was, when committed.  3d. Every law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than 
the law annexed to the crime, when committed.  4th. 
Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
relies on State ex rel. Eder v. Matthews, 115 Wis. 2d 129, 133, 
340 N.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1983), for the proposition that "[a] law 
which increases or alters the punishment of an offender to his 
detriment, 
after 
he 
has 
been 
convicted 
and 
sentenced, 
constitutes an ex post facto law . . . ." (emphasis omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Lead op., ¶45.  However, 
Matthews solely relies on Mueller; therefore, Matthews also is 
in contravention of our subsequent holding in Thiel.  See 
Matthews, 115 Wis. 2d at 133.    
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
10 
 
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law 
required at the time of the commission of the offence, 
in order to convict the offender. 
Collins, 497 U.S. at 42 (emphases removed).   
¶212 Subsequent to Collins and in order to avoid future 
errors about the definition of ex post facto laws under the 
Wisconsin Constitution, we held: 
[A]n ex post facto law, prohibited by the Wisconsin 
Constitution, is any law:  "which punishes as a crime 
an act previously committed, which was innocent when 
done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime, after its commission, or which deprives one 
charged with crime of any defense available according 
to law at the time when the act was committed." 
Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d at 703 (quoting Collins, 497 U.S. at 42).   
¶213 United States Supreme Court decisions issued after 
Collins, consistently employ crime commission as the act for 
which notice of punishment is required under the ex post facto 
clause.  Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2078; see also Weaver, 450 U.S. at 
28-29 (citing 12 cases).8  As the Supreme Court explained in 
Peugh: 
The Framers considered ex post facto laws to be 
"contrary to the first principles of the social 
compact and to every principle of sound legislation."  
The Federalist No. 44, p. 282 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) 
(J. Madison).  The Clause ensures that individuals 
have fair warning of applicable laws and guards 
against vindictive legislative action. 
                                                 
8 The lead opinion cites Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 
(1981), as though it supports the broad definition of ex post 
facto laws that the lead opinion creates.  Lead op., ¶¶39, 41, 
47, 67.  However, Weaver does not do so.  Weaver employs the 
date the crime was committed as the act from which it measures 
whether a law is ex post facto.  Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28.   
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
11 
 
Peugh, 
133 
S. Ct. 
at 
2084-85. 
 
Stated 
otherwise, 
crime 
commission is the act for which notice of consequences is 
required.  "[T]he principle on which the Clause is based——the 
notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct 
which will give rise to criminal penalties——is fundamental to 
our concept of constitutional liberty."  Marks v. United States, 
430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977); Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d at 511.  
¶214 The lead opinion employs a new definition of ex post 
facto law when it changes the act from which ex post facto 
effect is measured to include a temporary change in a law that 
was repealed subsequent to conviction and sentencing.9  The lead 
opinion states, "the early release provisions of 2009 Wis. Act 
28 were retroactively in effect when Singh was convicted and 
sentenced for the first offense, [the Waukesha County crime] as 
well as at the time he committed the second offense."10   
¶215 The definition created by the lead opinion affects 
defendants who could not earn PAT when they committed the 
criminal act, but due to a statutory enactment, could earn it at 
the time of sentencing even though the opportunity was repealed 
before the start of confinement.11  No United States Supreme 
Court opinion supports the lead opinion's definition of ex post 
facto law, nor does any opinion from this court. 
                                                 
9 Lead op., ¶¶36, 44, 47. 
10 Id., ¶8. 
11 Id., ¶33. 
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
12 
 
¶216 In regard to Singh's first crime, which was committed 
in Waukesha County October 16, 2008, there was no opportunity 
for PAT in 2008.  In 2009, PAT was enacted.  Singh was convicted 
and sentenced for the 2008 crime in 2010.  The 2009 legislation 
permitted him to benefit until PAT was repealed August 3, 2011, 
if he were confined between October 1, 2009 and August 3, 2011.   
¶217 Because the August 3, 2011 repeal of PAT caused the 
law to be as it was in 2008 when Singh committed the first of 
his crimes, the 2011 legislation did not impose punishment that 
was greater than it was at the time Singh committed the first of 
his crimes.  In addition, Singh was not confined for any of his 
crimes 
until 
January 4, 
2012, 
after 
PAT 
was 
repealed.  
Therefore, no ex post facto violation occurred with the repeal 
of PAT for the 2008 Waukesha County crime, nor was he denied PAT 
he earned before the repeal.   
¶218 In regard to Singh's second crime, which was committed 
in Milwaukee County on July 25, 2011, there was the opportunity 
for PAT and accordingly, the potential for an ex post facto 
violation if the PAT he earned had an effect on the duration of 
his confinement.  However, from the record before us, it is not 
possible to make that factual determination, and even if it 
were, habeas will not provide relief under the facts of this 
case.  
¶219 The potential for an ex post facto violation on the 
second crime due to repeal of PAT is not possible to determine 
due to the following circumstances presented by this case:  (1) 
Singh's third crime was committed on August 10, 2011, after PAT 
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
13 
 
was repealed, and therefore, had no potential for PAT; (2) 
initially, Singh received the same Wis. Stat. § 973.01 sentence 
for the third crime as he received for his second crime, 24 
months' confinement and 36 months' extended supervision and the 
sentences were to be served concurrently; (3) however, the 
sentence for Singh's second crime also was consecutive to the 
sentence for Singh's first crime; (4) the sentence for Singh's 
first crime, for which he initially was sentenced pursuant to 
§ 973.01, was converted to a one-year jail sentence, with 
extended supervision vacated, for which he received 13 months' 
credit and from which he was released on "time served." 
¶220 If the modification of the Waukesha County sentence 
caused it to be only a one-year jail sentence for which he was 
given 13 months' credit, then the sentences for his second and 
third crimes both began January 4, 2012.  Because the third 
crime had no opportunity to earn PAT, it would not matter 
whether Singh earned PAT on the sentence for his second crime 
because he would not have been released from confinement any 
earlier due to the concurrent sentence for his third crime.   
¶221 In addition, Singh is no longer confined.  He was 
released to extended supervision on June 2, 2014; therefore, the 
remedy of habeas——release from custody——provides nothing to 
Singh at this point.  It may be that Singh can prove, as a 
factual matter, that he was confined on the second sentence 
longer than should have occurred and that some type of relief 
No.  2013AP1724.pdr 
 
14 
 
may be accorded, but it is not due under a writ of habeas 
corpus.12     
¶222 In summary, by relying on the acts of conviction and 
sentencing, the lead opinion creates an ex post facto violation 
for Singh that is contrary to the constitutional precedent of 
the United States Supreme Court and of this court.13  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶223 We continue to follow United States Supreme Court 
precedent in regard to defining ex post facto laws.  Because the 
lead opinion does not do so and instead attempts to create an 
expanded definition of ex post facto law, I do not join the lead 
opinion in any respect.  Furthermore, I agree with the court of 
appeals' conclusion that the procedural change in the duties of 
circuit courts did not contravene ex post facto prohibitions.  
Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals' decision in 
part; affirm it in part; and I respectfully dissent from the 
lead opinion herein.14   
 
 
 
                                                 
12 See Justice Ziegler's concurrence/dissent, ¶¶167-75. 
13 Lead op., ¶¶36, 44, 47. 
14 As 
the 
lead 
opinion 
acknowledges, 
remand 
is 
not 
appropriate as a majority of justices so conclude.  Id., ¶1 n.1. 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
1 
 
¶224 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I dissent from 
the lead opinion because Singh has not proven any ex post facto 
violation in this case.  As the lead opinion explains, Singh 
contends 
that 
2011 
Act 
38, 
which 
repealed 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 302.113(2)(b)(2009-10) 
and 
§ 304.06(1)(bg)1.(2009-10) 
and 
created Wis. Stat. § 973.198 (2011-12), was an ex post facto 
law.1  Singh argues the repealed statutes eliminated the 
opportunity that previously existed to earn early release 
through positive adjustment time (PAT), which Singh argues 
increased his punishment.  He also contends the process 
established in § 973.198 delays up to 90 days the release of 
inmates who earned PAT under the 2009 law and the standards for 
early release changed under the 2011 law. 
¶225 In challenging the 2011 law, Singh must overcome the 
presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional.  See 
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶11, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 
328.  This court will indulge "every presumption to sustain the 
law if at all possible," and will resolve any doubts in favor of 
upholding the constitutionality of the challenged statute.  Id. 
(citation omitted).  Singh bears the heavy burden of proving 
that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Id. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to Wis. Stat. § 302.113 and 
§ 304.06 will be to the 2009-10 version of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, and all subsequent references to Wis. Stat. § 973.198 
will be to the 2011-12 version of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
2 
 
¶226 Because Singh has failed to meet this heavy burden, I 
would reverse the court of appeals' conclusion that the repeal 
of the PAT statutes constituted a violation of the ex post facto 
clause and I would affirm the court of appeals' holding that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.198 is a procedural change, which does not 
implicate ex post facto concerns. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶227 This case presents an unusual factual scenario because 
Singh committed his first crime before the PAT statutes were 
enacted, committed his second crime when the PAT statutes were 
in effect, and committed his third crime after the PAT statutes 
had been repealed.  He was convicted and sentenced on the first 
crime when the PAT statutes were in effect, but this sentence 
was stayed and not revoked until after the PAT statutes were 
repealed.  Singh's second and third crimes were joined for the 
purposes of accepting his plea and sentencing.  The plea and 
sentence on the joined second and third crimes occurred after 
the PAT statutes were repealed. 
¶228 Thus, it is critical to decide what date is used in 
analyzing whether Singh established an ex post facto violation:  
is it the date Singh committed the crime, the date he was found 
guilty of the crime, the date he was sentenced, or some 
combination of the three?  The timeline of Singh's crimes, 
convictions, and sentences against the backdrop of truth-in-
sentencing law and the enactment and repeal of the PAT statutes 
is as follows: 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
3 
 
 October 16, 2008:  Singh commits the first crime, a class 
H felony in Waukesha. 
 2008:  A class H felony had a maximum total sentence of 
six years, with a maximum initial confinement of three 
years, plus up to a $10,000 fine.  Truth-in-sentencing 
law is in effect. 
 October 1, 2009:  2009 Wis. Act 28 becomes effective.  
Act 43 created Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2)(b) and Wis. Stat. 
§ 304.06(1)(bg)1, giving inmates the opportunity to earn 
PAT days which, if approved by the circuit court, allowed 
release to extended supervision earlier than originally 
imposed.  This did not ever change the overall length of 
the sentence; instead, any approved PAT days would be 
added on to the extended supervision portion of a 
sentence. 
 2009:  A class H felony had a maximum total sentence of 
six years, with a maximum initial confinement of three 
years, plus up to a $10,000 fine, which is the same 
penalty as in 2008. 
 March 29, 2010:  Singh pleads guilty to the Waukesha 
crime. 
 April 29, 2010:  Waukesha County Circuit Court sentences 
Singh to three years, consisting of 18 months initial 
confinement, followed by 18 months extended supervision.  
The sentence is stayed and Singh is given probation with 
six months of conditional jail time. 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
4 
 
 2010:  A class H felony had a maximum total sentence of 
six years, with a maximum initial confinement of three 
years, plus up to a $10,000 fine, which is the same 
penalty as in 2008 and 2009. 
 July 25, 2011:  Singh commits the second crime, a class H 
felony in Milwaukee County. 
 August 3, 2011:  2011 Wis. Act 38 goes into effect.  The 
Act repeals inmates' opportunity to earn PAT days, except 
that current inmates are allowed to keep the PAT days 
earned between October 1, 2009 (the effective date of 
this part of 2009 Wis. Act 43) and August 3, 2011.  2011 
Wis. Act 38 also created Wis. Stat. § 973.198, which 
provides: 
(1) When an inmate who is serving a sentence 
imposed under s. 973.01 and who has earned 
positive adjustment time under s. 302.113, 2009 
stats., or under s. 304.06, 2009 stats., has 
served the confinement portion of his or her 
sentence less positive adjustment time earned 
between October 1, 2009, and August 3, 2011, he 
or she may petition the sentencing court to 
adjust the sentence under this section, based on 
the number of days of positive adjustment time 
the inmate claims that he or she has earned. 
(3) Within 60 days of receipt of a petition 
filed under sub. (1), the sentencing court shall 
either deny the petition or hold a hearing and 
issue an order relating to the inmate's sentence 
adjustment and release to extended supervision. 
(5) If the court determines that the inmate 
has earned positive adjustment time, the court 
may reduce the term of confinement in prison by 
the amount of time remaining in the term of 
confinement in prison portion of the sentence, 
less up to 30 days, and shall lengthen the term 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
5 
 
of extended supervision so that the total length 
of the bifurcated sentence originally imposed 
does not change. 
(6) An inmate who submits a petition under 
this section may not apply for adjustment of the 
same sentence under s. 973.195 for a period of 
one year from the date of the petition. 
 August 10, 2011:  Singh commits another class H felony in 
Milwaukee County, the third crime. 
 November 9, 2011:  Singh is convicted in Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court on both the July 25 and August 10 crimes. 
 December 13, 2011:  Singh's probation on his Waukesha 
conviction is revoked. 
 December 29, 2011:  Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
sentences Singh to five years each on the two Milwaukee 
crimes, consisting of two years' initial confinement, 
followed by three years' extended supervision.  The 
sentence on the July 25, 2011 crime was consecutive to 
his 2008 Waukesha sentence, but concurrent with the 
August 10, 2011 sentence.  The August 10, 2011 sentence 
was imposed concurrent to any other sentence. 
 2011:  A class H felony had a maximum total sentence of 
six years, with a maximum initial confinement of three 
years, plus up to a $10,000 fine, which is the same 
penalty as in 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
 January 4, 2012:  Singh starts his prison sentence. 
 June 28, 2013:  Singh files his habeas petition in 
circuit 
court 
after 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
6 
 
rejected Singh's request for PAT early release under Wis. 
Stat. § 302.113(2)(b). 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A 
¶229 Given this timeline, it is essential to determine what 
date to use in the ex post facto analysis.  The lead opinion 
followed the court of appeals' direction and lumped together 
Singh's dates of commission, conviction, and sentencing:  "Like 
the court of appeals, we conclude that because the early release 
provisions of 2009 Wis. Act 28 were retroactively in effect when 
Singh was convicted and sentenced for the first offense, as well 
as at the time he committed the second offense that the 
retroactive repeal of positive adjustment time in 2011 Wis. Act 
28 violates the ex post facto clauses of the Wisconsin and 
United States Constitutions."  Lead op., ¶8.  The law does not 
support this conclusion. 
¶230 In analyzing whether a law is unconstitutionally ex 
post facto, the date a crime was committed is the correct date 
to use.  Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)("The ex post 
facto prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact 
any law which imposes a punishment for an act which was not 
punishable at the time it was committed."  (emphasis added; one 
set of quotation marks and quoted source omitted)).  The United 
States Supreme Court consistently uses the date of commission in 
conducting an ex post facto analysis.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 
U.S. 244 (2000); Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013).  
This court agreed in State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 509 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
7 
 
N.W.2d 712 (1994), that "ex post facto analysis is concerned 
with changes in the law relative to the time the defendant 
engaged in his allegedly illegal behavior."  Id. at 513. 
¶231 Courts use the date of commission because the purpose 
of the ex post facto clause is to provide fair warning as to 
what conduct will give rise to criminal penalties and what those 
penalties will be.  See Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d at 511 (citing 
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1977)).  Our 
Founders included a prohibition against ex post facto laws in 
the Constitution to ensure against "manifestly unjust and 
oppressive" laws that punish a person after the fact for conduct 
that was not punishable before the law existed.  See Calder v. 
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798)(opinion of Chase, J.).  
Calder explained: 
The prohibition against their making any ex post facto 
laws was introduced for greater caution, and very 
probably arose from the knowledge, that the Parliament 
of Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass 
such 
laws, 
under 
the 
denomination 
of 
bills 
of 
attainder, or bills of pains and penalties; the first 
inflicting capital, and the other less, punishment.  
These acts were legislative judgments; and an exercise 
of judicial power.  Sometimes they respected the 
crime, by declaring acts to be treason, which were not 
treason, when committed, at other times, they violated 
the rules of evidence (to supply a deficiency of legal 
proof) by admitting one witness, when the existing law 
required two; by receiving evidence without oath; or 
the oath of the wife against the husband; or other 
testimony, which the courts of justice would not 
admit; at other times they inflicted punishments, 
where the party was not, by law, liable to any 
punishment; and in other cases, they inflicted greater 
punishment, 
than 
the 
law 
annexed 
to 
the 
offence. . . .  
With 
very 
few 
exceptions, 
the 
advocates of such laws were stimulated by ambition, or 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
8 
 
personal resentment, and vindictive malice.  To 
prevent such, and similar, acts of violence and 
injustice, 
I 
believe, 
the 
Federal 
and 
State 
Legislatures, were prohibited from passing any bill of 
attainder; or any ex post facto law. 
Id. at 389 (footnotes omitted). 
¶232 The ex post facto clause prohibits: 
1st.  Every law that makes an action, done before the 
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, 
criminal; and punishes such action.  2nd.  Every law 
that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it 
was, when committed.  3rd.  Every law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than 
the law annexed to the crime, when committed.  4th.  
Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and 
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law 
required at the time of the commission of the offence, 
in order to convict the offender. 
Id. at 390 (emphasis added).  The ex post facto clause's 
historical meaning is based on fundamental fairness.  See id. at 
389-90.  Singh's case is concerned with the third prohibition:  
did the 2011 law change his punishment by "inflict[ing] a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 
committed." 
¶233 What is clear from the ex post facto case law and the 
reason for the clause's inclusion in our Constitution is that a 
proper ex post facto analysis focuses on the laws in effect at 
the time Singh committed the crimes.  As seen from the timeline, 
the PAT laws were not in effect when Singh committed his 
Waukesha crime in 2008 or when he committed his August 10, 2011 
Milwaukee crime.  Singh cannot (and does not) argue that his 
August 10, 2011 crime falls within his ex post facto challenge 
because this crime occurred after 2011 Wis. Act 38 went into 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
9 
 
effect.  The August 10, 2011 crime is referenced because it is 
tied to the July 25, 2011 crime via the joint sentencing 
hearing. 
¶234 Because a proper ex post facto analysis focuses on the 
laws in effect at the time Singh committed his crimes, Singh 
cannot establish any ex post facto violation relating to his 
2008 Waukesha crime.  At the time Singh committed the 2008 
crime, the PAT opportunity did not exist; therefore, 2011 Wis. 
Act 38's repeal of it does not implicate any ex post facto 
concerns regarding the 2008 crime.2  The 2011 law does not 
increase Singh's sentence attached to the 2008 crime because it 
makes no change to the punishment that existed at the time Singh 
committed the 2008 crime.3 
B 
¶235 The only crime in this case that was committed when 
the PAT statutes were in effect was Singh's July 25, 2011 
Milwaukee crime.  Thus, the dispositive issue is whether Singh 
                                                 
2 Although the 2009 law allowed inmates sentenced after 
December 31, 1999 to earn PAT days (and Singh was sentenced on 
the 2008 crime after December 31, 1999), Singh was never an 
inmate during the effective dates of the 2009 law.  By the time 
Singh became an inmate, the 2011 law was in effect.  In 
comparing the 2011 law to the laws in effect when Singh 
committed his 2008 crime, no ex post facto concerns arise. 
3 As noted in the lead opinion at footnote 7, Singh's 2008 
Waukesha sentence was amended to one-year jail time.  Because 
PAT only applied to inmates in prison, this sentencing amendment 
further supports my conclusion that PAT does not apply to 
Singh's 2008 Waukesha crime.  See Singh v. Kemper, 2014 WI App 
43, ¶¶26-29, 353 Wis. 2d 520, 846 N.W.2d 820 (PAT only applied 
to time in prison, not time spent in jail). 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
10 
 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the enactment of 2011 Wis. 
Act 38 violated the ex post facto clause by taking away Singh's 
opportunity to earn PAT days on the sentence imposed for the 
July 25, 2011 crime.  Singh has failed to prove the repeal of 
the PAT statutes resulted in an ex post facto violation. 
¶236 At the time Singh committed the July 25th Milwaukee 
crime, Wis. Stat. § 302.113(2)(b) allowed inmates to earn PAT 
days while in prison.  2011 Wis. Act 38 repealed the PAT 
statutes, but allowed inmates to keep any PAT days earned from 
the date the PAT statutes were enacted until the date the PAT 
statutes were repealed.  See Wis. Stat. § 973.198(1).  Singh 
contends 2011 Wis. Act 38 is an unconstitutional ex post facto 
law because it eliminated his opportunity to earn PAT days, 
thereby increasing the time he was in prison.  The lead opinion 
holds the 2011 law is an ex post facto law because it makes "the 
punishment 
for 
an 
offense 
more 
burdensome 
after 
it 
was 
committed."  Lead op., ¶4. 
¶237 In order for Singh to succeed on his claim, he must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 2011 law changed his 
punishment, and inflicted a greater punishment than the law 
annexed to the crime when committed.  See Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.  
Although the United States Supreme Court strayed from this 
historical meaning of the ex post facto clause over the years, 
by expanding it to include any change in punishment that 
disadvantaged a defendant, see Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 
(1883), Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937), Weaver, 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
11 
 
450 U.S. at 32, and Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433-34 
(1987), the Court later rejected the "disadvantaged" test. 
¶238 In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 50, (1990), the 
Supreme Court overruled Kring v. Missouri: 
The holding in Kring can only be justified if the Ex 
Post Facto Clause is thought to include not merely the 
Calder categories, but any change which "alters the 
situation of a party to his disadvantage."  We think 
such a reading of the Clause departs from the meaning 
of the Clause as it was understood at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution, and is not supported by 
later cases.  We accordingly overrule Kring. 
Collins, 497 U.S. at 50.  Further, in California Department of 
Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995), the Court said the 
"disadvantage the defendant" language used in Lindsey, Weaver, 
and Miller "was unnecessary to the results in those cases and is 
inconsistent with the [ex post facto] framework developed in 
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990)."  Morales, 415 
U.S. at 506 n.3.  The Court explained: 
After Collins, the focus of the ex post facto inquiry 
is not on whether a legislative change produces some 
ambiguous sort of "disadvantage," nor, as the dissent 
seems to suggest, on whether an amendment affects a 
prisoner's 
"opportunity 
to 
take 
advantage 
of 
provisions for early release," . . . but on whether 
any such change alters the definition of criminal 
conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is 
punishable. 
Morales, 415 U.S. at 506 n.3 (emphasis added).   
¶239 In that case, Morales was convicted for a murder 
committed in 1971 and a second murder in 1980.  At the time he 
committed 
the 
murders, 
California 
law 
required 
annual 
suitability hearings after the initial parole hearing.  Id. at 
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503.  In 1981, the California legislature authorized the Board 
of Prison Terms (Board) to defer subsequent suitability hearings 
for up to three years in certain circumstances.  Id.  In 1989, 
Morales was denied parole after his initial parole hearing.  Id. 
at 502-03.  The Board scheduled his next parole hearing for 
three years later pursuant to the 1981 law.  Id. at 504.  
Morales claimed he was entitled to an annual parole hearing 
because that was the law when he committed his crimes, and, as a 
result, the 1981 law violated the ex post facto clause.  Id.  
The Court refused to interpret the ex post facto clause in a 
manner to require the judiciary to micromanage an "endless array 
of legislative adjustments to parole and sentencing procedures," 
that 
"might 
create 
some 
speculative, 
attenuated 
risk 
of 
affecting a prisoner's actual term of confinement by making it 
more difficult for him to make a persuasive case for early 
release."  Id. at 508-09.  Instead, the Court examined whether 
the new legislation produced "a sufficient risk of increasing 
the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes."  Id. 
at 509.  The Court went on to conclude the legislation at issue 
in Morales did not violate the ex post facto clause.  Id. at 
510-14. 
¶240 In Peugh, 133 S. Ct. 2072, the Supreme Court again 
analyzed the ex post facto clause.  It held that a defendant who 
committed crimes in 1999 and 2000, but was not sentenced until 
2010, should be sentenced using the sentencing guidelines that 
were in effect at the time he committed the crimes, rather than 
at the time he was sentenced.  Id. at 2078-79, 2081.  In Peugh, 
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the Court emphasized that the "basic principles of fairness that 
animate the Ex Post Facto Clause" are ensuring that individuals 
have fair warning of applicable laws and are not saddled with 
vindictive legislative action.  Id. at 2084-85.  The Court 
described the ex post facto inquiry as "whether a given change 
in law presents a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of 
punishment attached to the covered crimes" and emphasized that 
"mere speculation or conjecture that a change in law will 
retrospectively increase the punishment for a crime will not 
suffice to establish a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause."  
Id. at 2081-82 (two sets of quotation marks and quoted sources 
omitted).  Because the retrospective increase in the sentencing 
guidelines changed Peugh's sentencing range from 30-37 months to 
70-87 months, id. at 2078-79, the Court held the new guidelines 
constituted an ex post facto violation.  Id. at 2084. 
¶241 The Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on ex post 
facto law focuses on whether the retrospective law causes an 
increase in the measure of punishment that was attached to the 
crime when it was committed.  There is no doubt that 2011 Wis. 
Act 38 eliminated the opportunity for inmates then serving 
sentences to earn PAT days after August 3, 2011.  The 2011 law, 
however, like the change in parole policy in Morales, did not 
change the sentence Singh received for his July 25, 2011 crime.  
Rather, it eliminated the opportunity to earn PAT days, which 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
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possibly could have led to converting some confinement days to 
extended supervision time.4 
¶242 Under the original meaning of the ex post facto 
clause, courts should "draw a distinction between the penalty 
that a person can anticipate for the commission of a particular 
crime, and opportunities for mercy or clemency that may go to 
the reduction of the penalty."  Garner, 529 U.S. at 258 (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
¶243 The PAT statutes at issue here were very different 
from the mandatory parole cases where courts held the new law 
produced ex post facto violations.  For example, in Weaver, the 
ex post facto law involved reducing mandatory gain time credits.  
                                                 
4 In Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997), the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional a Florida law that cancelled already 
earned provisional early release credits.  Lynce had been 
released from prison because he completed his sentence based on 
time served plus provisional early release credits.  Id. at 435-
36.  Lynce was rearrested and reincarcerated as a result of the 
new law cancelling the provisional early release credits.  Id. 
at 436.  The Court held the Florida statute violated the ex post 
facto clause because Lynce had already earned and used the early 
release credits——the law did not merely remove "an opportunity 
for early release."  Id. at 447.  The new law put Lynce, who had 
been released because he completed his sentence, back in prison.  
Id.  As Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin 
Scalia explained in a concurring opinion:  "The present case 
[Lynce] involves not merely an effect on the availability of 
future release credits, but the retroactive elimination of 
credits already earned and used."  Id. at 451.  The facts in 
Singh's case are quite different than Lynce.  The 2011 law did 
not take away PAT days Singh had already earned and used, and 
the 2011 law did not lengthen the overall sentence imposed.  The 
2011 law Singh challenges removed an opportunity to possibly 
convert confinement days to supervision days.  It affected the 
availability of future PAT days, but did not eliminate credits 
already earned or used. 
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The gain-time credits were automatic under both the old and new 
legislation.  Id., 450 U.S. at 36.  Under the old law, an inmate 
was automatically entitled to receive 5, 10 or 15 days off the 
sentence according to the good conduct formula whereas the new 
law substantially reduced the gain-time formula to 3, 6 or 9 
days off the sentence.  Id. at 26, 36.  In Mueller, the new law 
changed parole eligibility from two years to five years.  Id., 
64 Wis. 2d at 645.  Under the old law, inmates were "as a matter 
of right" considered for parole after serving two years in 
prison.  Id. at 647.  The new law changed that "right" to five 
years.  Id. at 645.  These facts distinguish between an 
automatic right, which was known to be a part of the sentence, 
and the situation presented here where an inmate had an 
opportunity to possibly earn PAT early release, which does not 
change the overall length of the sentence imposed.5  Neither 
Weaver nor Mueller involved the opportunity to possibly have PAT 
days shorten confinement days but lengthen supervision time.  It 
                                                 
5 Mueller v. Powers applies the ex post facto doctrine both 
relative to the date of commission of the crime and laws that 
change after conviction and sentencing.  64 Wis. 2d 643, 646, 
221 N.W.2d 692 (1974).  This does not change my conclusion that 
the critical time is what law is in effect on the date of 
commission of the crime.  New legislation will often come after 
conviction and sentencing as these events naturally occur after 
the commission of the crime.  See also State ex rel. Eder v. 
Matthews, 115 Wis. 2d 129, 132-133, 340 N.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 
1983)(citing Mueller for the "convicted and sentenced" language 
in a case where the issue was "when a mandatory release parole 
violator is returned to prison to serve forfeited good time 
credit, can the Department order that the forfeited time be 
treated as a 'new sentence' for the purpose of calculating good 
time.")(footnote omitted). 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
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is also significant that both Weaver and Mueller relied on the 
"disadvantage to a defendant" language to conclude that the laws 
in those cases violated the ex post facto clause.  As noted, 
that language has been withdrawn, and is not the proper test to 
use in this ex post facto analysis.  See Collins, 497 U.S. at 
50; State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 702-03, 524 N.W.2d 641 
(1994)(withdrawing Mueller's language that ex post facto test 
reviews whether new law "disadvantages" a defendant). 
¶244 It is also worth noting that the punishment for 
Singh's crime——a class H felony——has not changed.  It was six 
years with up to a maximum of three years' confinement plus up 
to a $10,000 fine in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.  2011 Wis. Act 
38 did not change the punishment annexed to the crime Singh 
committed at the time he committed it.  See State ex rel. Britt 
v. Gamble, 2002 WI App 238, ¶24, 257 Wis. 2d 689, 653 N.W.2d 143 
(holding that subsequently repealing the law in existence at the  
time the crime was committed that gave defendant the opportunity 
to ask for early release was not ex post facto because the 
sentence imposed was not extended).  The 2011 law did not change 
the punishment "attached" to the crime Singh committed on July 
25, 2011.  It removed Singh's hope or opportunity to earn 
conversion of confinement days into extended supervision days, 
but it did not increase the sentence attached to the crime he 
committed. 
¶245 It is further significant that the 2011 legislation 
does not offend a faithful application of the ex post facto 
clause's historical meaning.  The 2011 law did not inflict a 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
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greater punishment than what already existed for Singh's crime 
when he committed it.  The 2009 PAT statutes gave inmates an 
opportunity to earn PAT days with the possibility of converting 
confinement days into extended supervision days.  The 2009 PAT 
statutes were not mandatory and release under the statutes was 
not guaranteed.  The 2009 PAT statutes did not change the 
overall length of the sentence imposed and there is nothing to 
suggest the legislature repealed the PAT statutes to be 
oppressive 
or 
vindictive. 
 
To 
the 
contrary, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.198(1) included language to ensure inmates could keep the 
PAT time already earned, which demonstrates fairness and mercy. 
¶246 Furthermore, Singh cannot benefit from PAT even though 
it existed at the time he committed his July 25, 2011 crime 
because he was not an inmate when the opportunity to earn PAT 
days existed.  Singh's claim that the 2011 legislation increased 
the measure of his punishment is speculative.  Even if Singh had 
been an inmate and able to earn PAT days, there is no evidence 
that his request for early PAT release would have been granted.  
Thus, his claim is pure speculation, which cannot support an ex 
post facto violation. 
¶247 Accordingly, I conclude Singh failed to establish any 
ex post facto violation.  I would reverse that part of the court 
of appeals' opinion holding that the 2011 legislation violated 
the ex post facto clause. 
C 
¶248 Singh also argues Wis. Stat. § 973.198 violates the ex 
post facto clause because it delays the time, up to 90 days, to 
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release inmates who have successfully petitioned for early 
release and because it changes the standard associated with 
making PAT-based early release decisions.  Section 973.198 does 
change the procedure with respect to PAT petitions.  Under the 
2009 
law, 
inmates 
petitioned 
the 
"earned 
release 
review 
commission" and the commission notified the sentencing court, 
which then decided whether to grant or deny the inmate's 
request.  Under the 2011 law, the commission's participation in 
the 
process 
is 
eliminated 
and 
the 
inmate 
petitions 
the 
sentencing court directly.  In addition, Singh argues the 2011 
law altered the timing of the PAT petitions:  in 2009, the 
process started before the eligibility date and in 2011, the 
process starts on the eligibility date. 
¶249 The court of appeals held that the changes in Wis. 
Stat. § 973.198 are procedural and therefore do not implicate ex 
post facto.  I agree with the court of appeals on this issue for 
the reasons it explained in its opinion: 
A procedural change in the law is one that 
"simply alter[s] the methods employed in determining" 
whether the punishment is to be imposed rather than 
"chang[ing] . . . the quantum of punishment attached 
to the crime."  And while a procedural change, in some 
cases, may have a substantive impact that violates the 
ex post facto clauses, "speculative and attenuated 
possibilit[ies]" of increasing a prisoner's actual 
term of confinement do not violate the clauses.  
Because a significant risk of prolonged confinement is 
not inherent in the framework of the Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.198 
procedural 
change, 
such 
risk 
must 
be 
demonstrated on the record or an ex post facto 
violation will not be found.  Singh has not met his 
burden of proving this change in the method for 
securing early release based upon PAT violates the ex 
post facto clauses. 
No.  2013AP1724-CR.rgb 
 
 
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Singh v. Kemper, 2014 WI App 43, ¶22, 353 Wis. 2d 520, 846 
N.W.2d 820 (citations omitted).  Although the parties disagree 
as to whether the language of the statutes under the 2009 law 
and the 2011 law differ with respect to when the request to 
start 
the 
potential 
early 
release 
process 
starts, 
this 
disagreement need not be resolved.  The change in the law 
removing the commission as the intermediary and altering the 
timing of petitions are both procedural changes, which do not 
implicate ex post facto concerns.  See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 
U.S. 282, 293-94 (1977)("Even though it may work to the 
disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex post 
facto.").  I would affirm that part of the court of appeals 
opinion holding § 973.198 did not violate the ex post facto 
clause because the new statute addresses procedure rather than 
"the quantum of punishment attached to the crime."  See id. at 
294. 
¶250 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶251 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins part C of this opinion. 
 
 
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