Case Title: Ochroch v. Kia-Noury

Citation: 345 Pa. Super. 161, 497 A.2d 1354

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
345 Pa. Superior Ct. 161 (1985) 497 A.2d 1354 Jay G. OCHROCH and Joan Ochroch, His Wife, Appellants, v. Mojtaba KIA-NOURY and Gloria Kia-Noury, His wife. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued June 18, 1985. Filed August 30, 1985. Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied January 7, 1986. *162 Gilbert Newman, Philadelphia, for appellants. Leigh P. Narducci, Norristown, for appellees. Before MONTEMURO, POPOVICH and WATKINS, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This is an appeal by appellants, Jay G. Ochroch and Joan Ochroch, from a final decree of the Court of Common Pleas *163 of Montgomery County. The following factual background as found by the chancellor below is unchallenged by appellants: Appellants and appellees, Mojtaba Kia-Noury and Gloria Kia-Noury, are adjoining landowners in Abington Township. In January, 1975, appellees constructed an in-ground swimming pool. In connection with the construction thereof, appellees erected a chain-link fence between the two properties and built up the grade and slope of the ground with fill and debris. The chancellor found that the fence and landfill encroached upon appellants' property. The fill, which is visible from appellants' pool and tennis area, was composed of, among other things, iron pins, lumber, stumps, tar paper, cinderblocks, concrete, stones and various items of rubbish and was covered with weeds and shrubs. The chancellor further found that the fill extended onto appellants' property "to the extent of one hundred (100) feet in length, ten (10) feet in width (at its widest point) and five (5) feet in height". The chancellor viewed the property and ordered, inter alia, that appellees remove the chain link fence which also encroached upon appellants' property and further that (Decree Nisi, Lowe, P.J.) In other words, whereas appellees were required to remove the fence, they were merely ordered to "improve the appearance" of the landfill because (Adjudication, p. 7, Lowe, P.J.) Appellants filed exceptions to the Decree Nisi. After argument, the exceptions were dismissed; and on December 13, 1984, the Decree Nisi was entered as a final decree. Appellants claim that the chancellor below erred in holding that the de minimis doctrine is applicable to an encroachment case where the party alleging harm did not consent or acquiesce in the encroachment and that the chancellor, in fact, erred in initially characterizing the encroachment as "de minimis" or trivial. We reverse. Denhart v. Valicenti, 157 Pa.Super. 143, 145, 41 A.2d 884, 885 (1945). Dailey's Chevrolet v. Worster Realties, Inc., 312 Pa.Super. 275, 458 A.2d 956, 959 (1983). Appellees have no right at law or in equity to occupy or appropriate land that does not belong to them. See Scoppa v. Myers, 341 Pa.Super. 61, 491 A.2d 148 (1985); Pile v. Pedrick, 167 Pa. 296, 31 A. 646 (1895). Moreover, it has been held that Dodson v. Brown, 70 Pa.Super. 359, 361 (1918) (emphasis added). See also Ventresca v. Ventresca, 182 Pa.Super. 248, 253, 126 A.2d 515 (1956). It appears that Denhart, 157 Pa.Super. at 146, 41 A.2d 884. See also Soifer v. Stein, 101 Pa.Super. 135 (1930). Implicitly, the courts in Baugh and Dodson v. Brown, supra, held that there was no restriction on the plaintiffs' recovery since there were no "laches, inducement or acquiescence." This differs from the more recent case of Yeakel v. Driscoll where the court held that the encroachment of a fire wall was de minimis, applying the doctrine espoused by the *166 chancellor below in the instant case, "de minimis non curat lex," which means that "a court will not grant equitable relief to a plaintiff who seeks a decree which will do him no good but which will work a hardship on another." Yeakel v. Driscoll, 321 Pa.Super. 238, 467 A.2d 1342, 1344 (1983). The court in Yeakel based its decision on facts indicating the plaintiff's acquiescence, express consent, as well as her actual utilization of the offending encroachment. Moreover the Yeakel panel noted that the chancellor below found no nexus between the plaintiff's asserted water problems and the encroaching fire wall so that removal of the firewall would not correct the plaintiffs alleged problem. The court held "Thus, the only benefit to be gained by plaintiff is to preserve her exclusivity to her two inches of property by forcing defendant to remove the fire wall from its present location." Yeakel, 321 Pa.Superior Ct. at 243, 467 A.2d at 1344. Further support for its holding was found in the pertinent city codes which require a fire wall. The court therefore held that relocation of the fire wall would do plaintiff no good and be a hardship on the defendant. Indeed, the wall protected both parties. In the instant case, there was no acquiescence, no consent, no appropriation, no utilization of the land fill. We further note that the encroachment was not so trivial in effect that appellants will fail to realize a benefit by removal of the fill since their rights to exclusive ownership and domain will be preserved and protected. The aesthetic value of their property will presumably be improved, and the parcel may be landscaped to their taste and whim. Baugh v. Bergdoll, 227 Pa. 420, 423, 76 A. 207 (1910) (emphasis added). *167 Accordingly, we hold that the chancellor below erred, and we reverse the order of the lower court and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. Order reversed, case remanded and jurisdiction relinquished.