Case Title: Ogunde v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 050212

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton,∗ S.J. 
 
OLUDARE OGUNDE 
             OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
 
v.  Record No. 050212  
           April 21, 2006 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY 
W. Allan Sharrett, Judge 
 
 
The dispositive question in this appeal is whether the 
trial court erred in ruling that an action filed by a prisoner 
under the Virginia Tort Claims Act (the Act), Code §§ 8.01-
195.1 to -195.9, is governed by the statute of limitations 
applicable to persons confined in state correctional 
facilities, as set forth in Code § 8.01-243.2, and not by the 
statute of limitations prescribed by Code § 8.01-195.7 for 
actions brought under the Act. 
 
Plaintiff Oludare Ogunde is an inmate incarcerated at the 
Greensville Correctional Center in Jarratt.  In August 2004, 
he filed this action under the Act against the Commonwealth 
alleging that the Commonwealth's employees negligently 
assigned him to an upper bunk bed and, in December 2002, 
ordered him to climb down from the bed for roll call when they 
knew, or should have known, that he had an injured knee and 
could fall.  He further alleges that as the result of the 
                     
∗ Senior Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case before his death on April 9, 2006. 
 
2
employees' negligence, he fell and injured his back, for which 
he seeks recovery in damages. 
 
The plaintiff timely filed the notice of claim required 
by Code § 8.01-195.6 of the Act, and likewise timely filed 
this action under the Act's statute of limitations, Code 
§ 8.01-195.7. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a plea of the statute of 
limitations, contending that the action was untimely and was 
barred under Code § 8.01-243.2 (the inmate statute), which 
limits the time that persons confined in correctional 
facilities may bring actions pertaining to conditions of their 
confinement.  The trial court sustained the plea and dismissed 
the action.  The plaintiff appeals. 
 
The inmate statute, § 8.01-243.2, provides: 
"No person confined in a state or local correctional 
facility shall bring or have brought on his behalf 
any personal action relating to the conditions of 
his confinement until all available administrative 
remedies are exhausted.  Such action shall be 
brought by or on behalf of such person within one 
year after [the] cause of action accrues or within 
six months after all administrative remedies are 
exhausted, whichever occurs later." 
 
 
The Act's statute of limitations, § 8.01-195.7, provides, 
as pertinent:  "Every claim cognizable against the 
Commonwealth" under the Act "shall be forever barred, unless 
within one year after the cause of action accrues to the 
claimant the notice of claim required by § 8.01-195.6 is 
 
3
properly filed."  The statute of limitations then refers to 
certain time limits for available administrative remedies and 
provides:  "All claims against the Commonwealth" under the Act 
"shall be forever barred unless such action is commenced 
within eighteen months of the filing of the notice of claim." 
 
The Act refers to claims filed by inmates and provides 
that an inmate must first exhaust administrative remedies.  
Code § 8.01-195.3, in subparagraph (7), requires "[a]ny claim 
by an inmate of a state correctional facility" to be excluded 
from the Act unless the claimant verifies under oath "that he 
has exhausted his remedies under the adult institutional 
inmate grievance procedures promulgated by the Department of 
Corrections." 
 
Subparagraph (7) further provides:  "The time for filing 
the notice of tort claim shall be tolled during the pendency 
of the grievance procedure." 
 
The question in this case then becomes:  When there are 
two potentially applicable statutes of limitations, which 
statute applies to an inmate's claim under the Act?  There is 
no dispute that if the Act's statute of limitations applies, 
this action was timely filed; if the limitation of the inmate 
statute applies the trial court's ruling was correct. 
 
On behalf of the Commonwealth, the Attorney General 
contends that the inmate statute applies.  He relies on the 
 
4
rule of statutory construction "that when one statute speaks 
to a subject in a general way and another deals with a part of 
the same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be 
harmonized, if possible, and where they conflict, the latter 
prevails."  Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 340, 
257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979).  He argues that the inmate statute 
is more specific as it applies only to prisoners while the Act 
applies generally to all plaintiffs. 
 
Continuing, the Attorney General says that both statutes 
are clear and unambiguous and that they can be read 
harmoniously in the following manner.  He notes that the 
purpose of the Act is to carve out an exception to the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity to allow citizens injured by 
state employees' negligence to sue the Commonwealth.  He says 
that the Act provides relief generally to those coming within 
its purview so long as they otherwise comply with the 
procedures prescribed in the Act, including those in 
subparagraph (7) above.  On the other hand, according to the 
Attorney General, the inmate statute specifically applies when 
"the plaintiff is a prisoner and the subject matter relates to 
the conditions of his confinement." 
 
Finally, the Attorney General contends that a later 
enacted statute prevails over an earlier one with which it 
conflicts.  The Act was adopted in 1981.  1981 Acts ch. 449.  
 
5
The inmate statute was enacted in 1998.  1998 Acts ch. 596.  
According to the Attorney General, the legislature was "well 
aware" of the Act's provisions when it enacted the inmate 
statute in 1998.  Thus, he maintains, "the intent of the 
General Assembly was to carve out of the Act a more 
restrictive statute of limitations where the plaintiff was a 
prisoner suing over the conditions of his confinement." 
 
We do not agree with the Attorney General's several 
arguments.  At the outset, it should be noted that in the view 
we take of the case we do not reach for decision the question 
whether this inmate's action involving allegedly negligent 
conduct of state employees relates to "the conditions of his 
confinement," as that phrase is used in the inmate statute.  
For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume, without 
deciding, that this action does relate to conditions of 
confinement. 
 
The trial court's ruling regarding which statute of 
limitations applies was based upon the pleadings and presents 
a pure question of law to be reviewed de novo by this Court.  
Wilby v. Gostel, 265 Va. 437, 440, 578 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2003).  
It is elementary that when construing a statute, courts must 
ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intention.  
Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 547, 587 S.E.2d 
521, 522 (2003).  In determining that intent, the plain 
 
6
language of an unambiguous statute will be applied.  Brown v. 
Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985).  And, 
rules of statutory construction will be used by the courts to 
harmonize enactments when the plain language of two statutes 
apparently conflict.  See Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 
227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 926 (2006). 
 
Employing these settled principles, we hold that the 
Act's statute of limitations applies to this inmate's tort 
action seeking recovery in damages for the ordinary negligence 
of state employees. 
 
The Act is self-contained, incorporating its own statute 
of limitations, which likewise is self-contained.  The Act's 
limited waiver of sovereign immunity is set forth in § 8.01-
195.3.  There, the limited circumstances in which a litigant 
can sue the Commonwealth are described.  Subparagraph (7) of 
that section refers specifically to "[a]ny claim" filed by 
inmates, and requires the inmate to first exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
 
Significantly, the second sentence of subparagraph (7) 
tolls, during the pendency of the grievance (administrative) 
procedure, the time for filing the notice of the tort claim.  
If the inmate statute were to apply here, its final sentence, 
fixing the time limit for filing suit, would impliedly repeal 
the second sentence of subparagraph (7) by potentially 
 
7
eliminating the tolling provision, as the Attorney General 
properly concedes. 
 
 
We will not attribute to the General Assembly an 
intention to impliedly repeal the tolling provided in 
subparagraph (7).  "The implied repeal of an earlier statute 
by a later enactment is not favored.  There is a presumption 
against a legislative intent to repeal where the later statute 
does not amend the former or refer expressly to it."  Sexton 
v. Cornett, 271 Va. 251, 257, 623 S.E.2d 898, 901 (2006).  
Obviously, the inmate statute does not amend the Act nor does 
it refer expressly to it. 
 
These intersecting statutes can be harmonized.  As the 
plaintiff observes, the inmate statute is not limited to tort 
actions.  It may cover, for example, declaratory judgment 
actions, suits for injunctive or other equitable relief, and 
mandamus petitions, so long as they relate to the conditions 
of the prisoner's confinement.  The inmate statute deals with 
all classes of litigation.  On the other hand, the narrower 
Act applies to one type of litigation, tort actions against 
the Commonwealth.  Even if the tort action relates to 
conditions of confinement, the Act nonetheless applies. 
 
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
sustaining the plea of the statute of limitations and in 
 
8
dismissing the action.  The judgment appealed from will be 
reversed and the case will be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded.