Case Title: SuperValu, Inc. v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 071995

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee,
1 JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
 
SUPERVALU, INC., ET AL.  
 
v.   Record No. 071995   
 
      OPINION BY 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
                      September 12, 2008 
JONATHAN F. JOHNSON 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Margaret P. Spencer, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in refusing to set aside a jury verdict in favor of a 
plaintiff on claims of constructive fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
I. Procedural History 
 
In July 2005, Jonathan F. Johnson, former owner of 
several grocery stores in the Richmond area, filed an amended 
motion for judgment in the circuit court, in his individual 
capacity, against SuperValu, Inc. (SuperValu), a grocery 
wholesaler and retailer, and its subsidiary Richfood, Inc. 
(Richfood).  In his pleading, Johnson alleged that SuperValu 
and Richfood had committed actual fraud, constructive fraud, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious 
interference with business expectancy. 
                     
1 Justice Agee participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to his retirement from the Court on June 30, 
2008. 
 
The case proceeded to a twelve-day jury trial.  During 
the trial, SuperValu and Richfood made a motion to strike the 
evidence at the conclusion of Johnson’s case in chief and at 
the end of all the evidence.  The circuit court denied both 
motions. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of SuperValu and 
Richfood on the claims of actual fraud and tortious 
interference with business expectancy, and a verdict in favor 
of Johnson on the claims of constructive fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  The jury awarded Johnson 
$15,500,000 in damages on the constructive fraud claim, and 
$500,000 in damages on the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim. 
 
SuperValu and Richfood filed a post-trial motion, in 
which SuperValu contended that the evidence was insufficient 
as a matter of law to support the verdict in favor of Johnson.  
The circuit court denied the post-trial motion and entered 
final judgment in accordance with the jury verdict.  We 
awarded SuperValu and Richfood this appeal. 
II. Evidence 
 
The evidence at trial showed that Johnson owned 
Marketplace Holdings, Inc., which served as a holding company 
for The Market, LLC, and Community Pride, Inc. (all three 
corporations will be referred to collectively as MPH 
 
2 
 
Companies).  Between 1992 and 2004, MPH Companies owned and 
operated eight grocery stores in the Richmond area.  During 
his time in the grocery business, Johnson developed several 
successful strategies for marketing to urban consumers. 
 
Richfood, in its capacity as a wholesale grocery 
distributor, had supplied MPH Companies with grocery products 
for many years.  After SuperValu acquired Richfood in 1999, 
SuperValu became the exclusive grocery supplier for MPH 
Companies.  SuperValu, one of the nation’s largest grocery 
wholesalers, also provided MPH Companies with other services, 
including warehousing and accounting, and extended to MPH 
Companies credit and loans. 
 
In 2001, MPH Companies entered into a settlement 
agreement with SuperValu to resolve several long-standing 
problems between MPH Companies and Richfood.  In the 
agreement, SuperValu forgave MPH Companies’ and Johnson’s 
personal debt to SuperValu, which exceeded $17 million.  
SuperValu also agreed to provide financing for MPH Companies 
to open and operate a new store, the Market at Tobacco Row 
(the Market) in Richmond. 
 
Under the terms of the settlement agreement, SuperValu 
also entered into a consulting contract with Johnson and 
agreed to pay him $2 million over a five-year period.  
However, the evidence showed that SuperValu never asked 
 
3 
 
Johnson to perform any consulting services under this 
contract.  Finally, the parties’ settlement agreement stated 
that SuperValu would “provide appropriate assistance for other 
growth opportunities, subject to [the] SuperValu standard 
screening approval process.”  Two years after the settlement 
agreement, MPH Companies experienced financial difficulties.  
Johnson and Kenneth W. Smither, president of Marketplace 
Holdings, Inc., both concluded that in order for MPH Companies 
to remain in business, they needed to expand.  Executives from 
SuperValu, however, testified that they cautioned Johnson to 
stabilize his current store operations before attempting to 
acquire new stores. 
 
In March 2003, Smither sent a letter to K. Richard Lane, 
president of SuperValu’s eastern region, detailing MPH 
Companies’ accomplishments and problems in the past year and 
outlining strategic plans.  In the letter, Smither stated that 
MPH Companies had depleted their capital funds due to overhead 
expenses and the opening of the Market, which had failed to 
meet sales forecasts and had experienced shortfalls in 
relation to those forecasts ranging between $50,000 and 
$70,000 per week. Smither indicated that due to recent 
financial performance problems, MPH Companies could not obtain 
additional bank loans.  Smither explained that MPH Companies 
needed SuperValu’s assistance to replenish MPH Companies’ 
 
4 
 
capital funds, to renovate one store, and to explore expansion 
opportunities. 
 
SuperValu executives testified that they were concerned 
about the amount of credit SuperValu had already extended to 
MPH Companies.  Therefore, according to the executives, 
SuperValu declined Smither’s requests for additional funding 
but agreed to provide to Johnson advance payment under his 
consulting agreement so that Johnson could invest those funds 
and complete the proposed store remodeling. 
 
After this decision, Johnson contacted Michael Jackson, 
president and chief operating officer for SuperValu, and asked 
him to reconsider SuperValu’s denial of additional funding.  
Jackson testified that he explained to Johnson that SuperValu 
would not provide MPH Companies with additional money, but 
discussed with Johnson specific strategies for stabilizing his 
business and reducing overhead costs.  According to Jackson, 
Johnson stated that he planned to invest in MPH Companies the 
money he obtained from the consulting agreement in order to 
stabilize his existing store operations. 
 
Johnson, however, testified that he agreed to invest in 
MPH Companies the funds he received from the consulting 
agreement because Jackson promised Johnson that SuperValu 
would support MPH Companies’ efforts to expand.  According to 
Johnson, Jackson told him, “[I]f you put your money where your 
 
5 
 
mouth is, we’ll put our money where our mouth is.”  Johnson 
testified that he relied on this statement, and on Jackson’s 
other assurances that SuperValu would support MPH Companies’ 
expansion plans, when Johnson invested in MPH Companies the 
sum of $827,000 obtained from the advancement of the 
consulting fees. 
 
In July 2003, Johnson approached the owner of Camellia 
Food Stores, Inc. (Camellia) and discussed Johnson’s interest 
in purchasing Camellia.  Camellia owned 18 stores in the 
Eastern Shore region of Virginia and had experienced financial 
difficulties, having declared bankruptcy in 2001. 
 
Also in July 2003, Johnson and Smither met with SuperValu 
executives to discuss MPH Companies’ possible acquisition of 
Camellia.  MPH Companies needed SuperValu’s approval because 
both Camellia and MPH Companies operated under supply 
agreements with SuperValu. 
 
Joseph Della Noce, executive vice president of market 
support services for SuperValu, testified that when this 
meeting occurred, SuperValu had not yet made a decision about 
MPH Companies’ proposed acquisition of Camellia.  However, 
Della Noce stated that he became concerned about the proposal 
after the meeting.  Della Noce explained that the demographics 
of the Eastern Shore region, where the Camellia stores were 
located, were different from Richmond’s demographics.  When 
 
6 
 
asked by Johnson’s counsel, “Did you have concerns of whether 
or not [Johnson] could serve the Caucasians in the Eastern 
Shore,” Della Noce replied, “Yes.”  
 
In August 2003, Johnson and Smither met with executives 
from SuperValu and requested assistance in funding the 
acquisition of Camellia.  Johnson asked the executives to 
consider several options for funding, including an option in 
which MPH Companies would sell one of its stores and use the 
proceeds to purchase Camellia, and SuperValu would provide 
additional funding for MPH Companies to renovate the Camellia 
stores.  Della Noce testified that he was concerned about the 
amount of risk and additional debt that would result from the 
acquisition.  SuperValu ultimately denied MPH Companies’ 
request for funding. 
 
Despite this decision by SuperValu, Johnson continued MPH 
Companies’ efforts to acquire Camellia.  Johnson and Smither 
testified that SuperValu attempted to prevent the acquisition 
of Camellia by requiring MPH Companies to purchase SuperValu’s 
stock options in Camellia and by requiring payment on an 
outstanding debt before the acquisition.  In addition, Johnson 
presented evidence that during MPH Companies’ negotiations 
with Camellia, SuperValu had revealed confidential information 
concerning MPH Companies to another potential buyer for 
Camellia.  According to Johnson and Smither, these actions by 
 
7 
 
SuperValu ultimately caused the negotiations with Camellia to 
fail. 
 
By April 2004, MPH Companies could no longer meet current 
and past-due financial obligations, and MPH Companies’ 
remaining grocery stores closed.  At that time, MPH Companies 
owed SuperValu about $3.7 million. 
 
Susan E. Rydberg, a former employee in SuperValu’s 
information technology department, testified that in 2001 she 
heard members of SuperValu’s senior management team discuss 
“phasing out” Johnson because he was a “complainer” and 
because SuperValu wanted to replace Johnson’s stores with 
stores owned by SuperValu.  When asked whether SuperValu’s 
plans regarding Johnson, who is African-American, could have 
been racially motivated, Rydberg stated that SuperValu 
generally appeared to “phase out” a large number of women, 
African-Americans, and people over the age of 40. 
 
SuperValu executives testified that they had never heard 
the terms “phasing out” or “staging out” and had no reason to 
attempt to damage Johnson’s business enterprises.  Jeffrey 
Noddle, chief executive officer of SuperValu, testified that 
SuperValu’s wholesale business is dependent upon the success 
of independent retailers.  Richard Lane, former president of 
SuperValu’s “eastern region,” acknowledged, however, that 
 
8 
 
SuperValu owned several Save-A-Lot grocery stores, which 
competed with the stores owned by MPH Companies. 
 
Several witnesses testified that they observed a drastic 
decline in Johnson’s physical and emotional health after the 
MPH Companies’ stores closed.  Johnson also presented expert 
medical testimony indicating that Johnson suffered from post-
traumatic stress disorder, severe depression, and other 
physical health problems. 
 
In addition, Johnson testified that after the stores 
closed, he was embarrassed and suffered a loss of credibility, 
which negatively affected his consulting business.  Eric C. 
Frye, a financial analyst who qualified as an expert on the 
subject of “economic loss,” testified that Johnson suffered 
various monetary losses in the total amount of $12.5 million 
as a result of SuperValu’s actions. 
III. Jury Instructions 
 
The jury received 46 instructions addressing Johnson’s 
four different claims.  The instructions relevant to this 
appeal were read to the jury in the order described below. 
 
In jury instruction 23, the circuit court provided a 
definition of actual fraud, which stated: “Actual fraud is a 
misrepresentation of a material fact, knowingly and 
intentionally made, with the intent to mislead another person, 
which that person relied upon with the result that he was 
 
9 
 
damaged by it.”  The jury then received instructions 24-26, 
which defined the concepts of material fact and reliance, and 
discussed certain circumstances that may be considered in 
deciding claims involving fraud. 
 
Next, the circuit court read instruction 27 to the jury, 
stating: 
If you find that Plaintiff’s fraud claims are premised on 
promises to be carried out in the future, as distinct 
from past or present facts, you may not make a finding of 
fraud merely because the promise was not kept.  Rather, 
you may only find in favor of the Plaintiff if he 
demonstrates by clear and convincing proof that at the 
time the representation was made the Defendant did not 
intend to perform the future promise. 
 
 
Jury instructions 28-31 addressed the concepts of 
fiduciary duty, the elements of an actual fraud claim, and the 
damages recoverable for actual fraud when a plaintiff has 
proved that the defendant acted with actual malice.  Jury 
instruction 32 informed the jury that in considering damages 
on the actual fraud claim, the jury could consider Johnson’s 
loss of earnings in the past or future, his personal financial 
losses directly related to the loss of business, his damages 
caused by embarrassment or humiliation as a result of the loss 
of business, and mental anguish Johnson suffered in the past 
and may suffer in the future. 
 
Jury instruction 33, the first instruction specifically 
addressing constructive fraud, defined constructive fraud as 
 
10 
 
“a misrepresentation of a material fact, innocently or 
negligently made, with the intent that a person will rely on 
it and which that person relied upon with the result that he 
was damaged by it.”  Jury instruction 34 defined the term 
“misrepresentation” and cautioned that a misrepresentation 
“must be made concerning an actually existing or past fact.  A 
promise, an expression of interest, or an expectation or 
opinion concerning the future is not a misrepresentation.” 
 
Jury instructions 35-38 addressed the concepts of 
negligence and contributory negligence in the context of a 
constructive fraud claim.  Thereafter, jury instruction 39 
reviewed the elements of a constructive fraud claim, and jury 
instruction 40 informed the jury that if it found in favor of 
Johnson on the constructive fraud claim, the jury was 
permitted to “award those damages which would restore the 
plaintiff to the financial position he would have been in but 
for his detrimental reliance on the alleged fraud.” 
IV. Analysis 
Constructive Fraud 
 
SuperValu and Richfood (collectively, SuperValu) argue 
that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to 
support the jury verdict on the claim of constructive fraud.  
Distinguishing constructive fraud from actual fraud, SuperValu 
contends that an action for constructive fraud must be based 
 
11 
 
on an innocent or negligent misrepresentation of present fact 
and, as the jury was instructed in this case, may not be based 
on a promise of future action.  SuperValu asserts that Johnson 
solely alleged and sought to prove that SuperValu did not 
fulfill promises to assist Johnson’s business in the future.  
SuperValu further observes that while promises of future 
action can form the basis of a claim for actual fraud, the 
jury in this case rejected Johnson’s claim of actual fraud. 
 
In response, Johnson asserts that the law of the case 
doctrine bars SuperValu’s argument.  Johnson contends that 
jury instruction 27 permitted the jury to reach a verdict for 
Johnson on constructive fraud, based on evidence that 
SuperValu made promises to Johnson that SuperValu never 
intended to keep, because that instruction referred only to 
“fraud,” rather than to “actual fraud.”  According to Johnson, 
instruction 27 presented a legally inaccurate definition 
encompassing constructive fraud that nevertheless was binding 
on the parties because SuperValu failed to raise an objection 
to this instruction.  Thus, Johnson maintains that because he 
proved that SuperValu made promises to aid Johnson in his 
business in the future without any intent to keep those 
promises, the jury could have based its constructive fraud 
award on the language in jury instruction 27.  We disagree 
with Johnson’s arguments. 
 
12 
 
 
When reviewing jury instructions on appeal, we read the 
instructions together and consider them as a whole.  H. W. 
Miller Trucking Co. v. Flood, 203 Va. 934, 937, 128 S.E.2d 
437, 440 (1962); Van Duyn v. Matthews, 181 Va. 256, 261, 24 
S.E.2d 442, 444 (1943); see Edlow v. Arnold, 243 Va. 345, 350, 
415 S.E.2d 436, 438-39 (1992); Lerwill v. Regent Van & 
Storage, 217 Va. 490, 496, 229 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1976).  Jury 
instructions that contain incorrect statements of law but were 
agreed upon by the parties become the law of the case.  Ulloa 
v. QSP, Inc., 271 Va. 72, 80, 624 S.E.2d 43, 48 (2006); King 
v. Sowers, 252 Va. 71, 76-77, 471 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1996). 
The law of the case doctrine, however, is inapplicable 
here because the parties did not agree to an improper jury 
instruction.  Rather, instruction 27 provided a correct 
statement of law regarding actual fraud, and the instructions 
regarding constructive fraud unequivocally informed the jury 
that a claim of constructive fraud may not be based on a 
promise of future action. 
The jury instructions given with regard to each of 
Johnson’s claims were read together and were comprehensive, 
including the elements of the respective claims and the 
damages that could be recovered for each claim.  The fact that 
jury instruction 27 referred to “fraud” and not to “actual 
fraud” is not determinative.  That instruction was given after 
 
13 
 
the instruction defining “actual fraud,” and before both the 
instruction stating the required elements of an actual fraud 
claim and the instruction explaining the damages recoverable 
for actual fraud.  When considered in the context of the 
entire jury charge, it is apparent that jury instruction 27 
applied only to the claim of actual fraud, and that the jury 
was instructed separately with regard to the constructive 
fraud claim. Therefore, we conclude that the law of the case 
doctrine does not apply to bar SuperValu’s challenge to the 
jury verdict on the constructive fraud claim. 
We next consider whether the evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury verdict on the constructive fraud claim.  To 
prevail on a constructive fraud claim, a plaintiff must show 
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant 
negligently or innocently made a false representation of 
material fact, and that the plaintiff suffered damage as a 
result of his reliance upon that misrepresentation.  Prospect 
Dev. Co. v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 86, 515 S.E.2d 291, 297 
(1999); Richmond Metro. Auth. v. McDevitt Street Bovis, Inc., 
256 Va. 553, 558, 507 S.E.2d 344, 347 (1998); Blair Constr. v. 
Weatherford, 253 Va. 343, 346, 485 S.E.2d 137, 138 (1997). 
Because fraud must involve a misrepresentation of a 
present or a pre-existing fact, fraud ordinarily cannot be 
predicated on unfulfilled promises or statements regarding 
 
14 
 
future events.  Prospect Dev. Co., 258 Va. at 86, 515 S.E.2d 
at 297; Tate v. Colony House Builders, 257 Va. 78, 82, 508 
S.E.2d 597, 599 (1999); Patrick v. Summers, 235 Va. 452, 454, 
369 S.E.2d 162, 164 (1988).  Nevertheless, if a defendant 
makes a promise that, when made, he has no intention of 
performing, that promise is considered a misrepresentation of 
present fact and may form the basis for a claim of actual 
fraud.2  Richmond Metro. Auth., 256 Va. at 559-60, 507 S.E.2d 
at 348; Colonial Ford Truck Sales v. Schneider, 228 Va. 671, 
677, 325 S.E.2d 91, 94 (1985); see Blair Constr., 253 Va. at 
346-47, 485 S.E.2d at 139. 
 
Under no circumstances, however, will a promise of future 
action support a claim of constructive fraud.  See Richmond 
Metro. Auth., 256 Va. at 560, 507 S.E.2d at 348; Colonial Ford 
Truck Sales, 228 Va. at 677, 325 S.E.2d at 94.  The rationale 
underlying this rule is plain.  If unfulfilled promises, 
innocently or negligently made, were sufficient to support a 
constructive fraud claim, every breach of contract would 
                     
2 In Eden v. Weight, 265 Va. 398, 578 S.E.2d 769 (2003), 
we stated that to prevail on a claim of constructive fraud, 
“misrepresentations must relate to a present or pre-existing 
fact, not statements involving promises or future events, 
unless the evidence shows an intent not to fulfill such 
promises when made.”  265 Va. at 405, 578 S.E.2d at 773.  To 
the extent that this statement implies that an action for 
constructive fraud may lie if the evidence demonstrates a 
present intent not to fulfill a promise of future action, we 
overrule that statement. 
 
15 
 
potentially give rise to a claim of constructive fraud.  See 
Richmond Metro. Auth., 256 Va. at 560, 507 S.E.2d at 348; 
Blair Constr., 253 Va. at 347, 485 S.E.2d at 139; Lloyd v. 
Smith, 150 Va. 132, 145, 142 S.E. 363, 365 (1928). 
 
We hold that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of 
law to support the verdict on the constructive fraud claim.  
Johnson failed to present any evidence that SuperValu 
negligently or innocently misrepresented a present or pre-
existing material fact.  Instead, viewed in the light most 
favorable to Johnson, the evidence showed only that SuperValu 
and its executives made promises to Johnson that SuperValu 
would provide future financial support and assistance to MPH 
Companies.3 
 
Because Johnson’s constructive fraud claim was based 
solely on SuperValu’s promises of assistance to MPH Companies, 
Johnson failed as a matter of law to present an issue for the 
jury’s consideration on the constructive fraud claim.  See 
Richmond Metro. Auth., 256 Va. at 559-60, 507 S.E.2d at 348; 
Colonial Ford Truck Sales, 228 Va. at 677, 325 S.E.2d at 94.  
                     
3 In view of our holding that the evidence is insufficient 
as a matter of law to support Johnson’s constructive fraud 
claim, we do not address the separate issue raised by 
SuperValu whether Johnson, individually, could recover damages 
for constructive fraud based on conduct SuperValu directed 
toward MPH Companies and its business operations.  
 
16 
 
Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in failing to 
set aside the jury verdict of constructive fraud. 
 
Our conclusion is not altered by Johnson’s contention 
that SuperValu waived its present argument that constructive 
fraud may not be based on promises of future action, because 
SuperValu did not raise the issue in its motions to strike 
during trial but first made the argument in its motion to set 
aside the jury verdict.  We consistently have held that while 
a motion to strike made during trial is an appropriate method 
of testing the sufficiency of the evidence, a party may also 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by a motion to set 
aside the verdict.  Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 718, 652 
S.E.2d 129, 141 (2007); Gabbard v. Knight, 202 Va. 40, 43, 116 
S.E.2d 73, 75 (1960); see Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Trimiew, 253 
Va. 22, 24, 480 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1997).  Either approach is 
acceptable, because in both instances the trial judge is 
presented with the same question of law, whether the evidence 
is sufficient to support a jury verdict on the claim alleged.  
Accordingly, SuperValu’s argument concerning the sufficiency 
of the evidence of constructive fraud was properly preserved 
for appeal. 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
 
SuperValu argues that the evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law to support the jury verdict for intentional 
 
17 
 
infliction of emotional distress.  In particular, SuperValu 
contends that such a claim may not be based on mere “garden 
variety business decisions,” such as SuperValu’s decision not 
to lend MPH Companies additional funds when MPH Companies 
already owed SuperValu significant amounts of money.  
SuperValu further asserts this Court has never permitted a 
plaintiff to recover on a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress “based solely on business dealings.” 
 
In response, Johnson contends that the jury necessarily 
found that SuperValu’s actions were outrageous and that, 
viewed in the light most favorable to Johnson, the evidence 
supports such a finding.  According to Johnson, SuperValu used 
its economic power to “break” Johnson.  Johnson asserts that 
the jury was entitled to believe that SuperValu took these 
actions because it thought that Johnson, an African-American, 
was incapable of serving customers of a different race.  We 
disagree with Johnson’s arguments. 
 
In order to recover on a claim of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, a plaintiff must satisfy four elements 
of proof.  The plaintiff must show that 1) the wrongdoer’s 
conduct was intentional or reckless; 2) the conduct was 
outrageous or intolerable; 3) there was a causal connection 
between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the resulting emotional 
distress; and 4) the resulting emotional distress was severe.  
 
18 
 
Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 77, 639 S.E.2d 182, 186 (2007); 
Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 
(1974); accord Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 203, 624 
S.E.2d 24, 33 (2006); Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 
259 Va. 125, 136, 523 S.E.2d 826, 833 (2000); Jordan v. 
Shands, 255 Va. 492, 498-99, 500 S.E.2d 215, 218-19 (1998). 
 
As we have recognized, the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress is “not favored” in the law, because 
there are inherent problems in proving a claim alleging injury 
to the mind or emotions in the absence of accompanying 
physical injury.  Almy, 273 Va. at 77, 639 S.E.2d at 187; 
Harris, 271 Va. at 203-04, 624 S.E.2d at 33; Russo v. White, 
241 Va. 23, 26, 400 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1991); Ruth v. Fletcher, 
237 Va. 366, 373, 377 S.E.2d 412, 415-16 (1989).  Thus, we 
have held that a plaintiff alleging intentional infliction of 
emotional distress must prove his case by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Russo, 241 Va. at 26, 400 S.E.2d at 162; Ruth, 237 
Va. at 373, 377 S.E.2d at 416. 
In the present case, based on SuperValu’s argument, we 
focus our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence on the 
question whether SuperValu’s conduct, which occurred in the 
course of its business dealings with MPH Companies, was 
sufficient to support Johnson’s claim of personal injury for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Johnson’s claim 
 
19 
 
involving SuperValu’s corporate conduct is uniquely different 
from our prior decisions addressing the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, because those prior 
decisions have involved allegations of conduct on the part of 
individual persons directed against other individual persons. 
 
Here, viewed in the light most favorable to Johnson, the 
evidence showed that SuperValu executives sought to eliminate 
MPH Companies’ stores from the Richmond market in favor of 
other stores owned by SuperValu, while promising to assist MPH 
Companies in expanding its business to other locations.  
Johnson also presented evidence that SuperValu executives 
targeted MPH Companies for elimination because those 
executives regarded Johnson as a “complainer,” and that 
SuperValu generally appeared to “phase out” from its corporate 
relationships a large number of businesses operated by women, 
African-Americans, and persons over 40 years of age. 
 
We hold that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of 
law to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  This tort is directed at prohibiting conduct 
intended to cause personal, emotional damage to an individual, 
rather than conduct intended to cause economic damage to a 
business.  See Luddeke v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 239 Va. 
203, 207, 381 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1990) (stating that intentional 
infliction of emotional distress is action for personal 
 
20 
 
injury, governed by two-year statue of limitations for 
personal injuries, Code § 8.01-243.)  Although a person may be 
so closely associated with the operation of a business that 
economic damage to that business may result in damage to the 
individual’s emotional state, the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress does not encompass such 
personal consequences of business conduct. 
 
The evidence in the present record completely failed to 
establish that SuperValu’s conduct was directed at harming 
Johnson, rather than at causing MPH Companies’ grocery stores 
to be eliminated from competition in the grocery business.  
The absence of any evidence that SuperValu intended to harm 
Johnson personally is fatal to his claim from the outset.  A 
predicate requirement for any claim of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress is that the alleged harmful conduct was 
directed intentionally toward the affected individual.  In the 
absence of such conduct directed at a person individually, the 
law will not recognize a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
 
Because the evidence before us was insufficient to 
support the jury verdict on the claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, the circuit court erred in 
failing to set aside the jury verdict on this claim.  
Accordingly, we hold that both the constructive fraud claim 
 
21 
 
and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, 
which formed the basis of the jury’s award in favor of 
Johnson, should not have been submitted to the jury for 
consideration, because the evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law to support either claim.4 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment and enter final judgment in favor of SuperValu. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS joins, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority 
opinion holding that jury instruction 27 applied only to the 
actual fraud claim.  While the majority concludes that the 
instruction’s use of the term “fraud” instead of the term 
“actual fraud” is not determinative, the majority’s analysis 
ignores one salient fact – jury instruction 27 referred to 
“Plaintiff’s fraud claims.”  (Emphasis added.)  In my view, 
the reference to “fraud claims” is dispositive of this issue. 
Generally, jury instructions are to be read together and 
viewed as a whole.  H. W. Miller Trucking Co. v. Flood, 203 
Va. 934, 937, 128 S.E.2d 437, 440 (1962); Clinchfield Coal 
Corp. v. Redd, 123 Va. 420, 446, 96 S.E. 836, 844 (1918).  
                     
4 Based on our holdings, we do not address SuperValu’s 
remaining assignments of error.  
 
22 
 
When reading the instructions together in this case, it is 
clear that the circuit court instructed the jury about two 
distinct fraud claims: one for actual fraud and one for 
constructive fraud.  The verdict form also required the jury 
to make separate findings with regard to the claims for actual 
fraud and constructive fraud.  Viewed in this context, I 
conclude that jury instruction 27 necessarily applied to both 
fraud claims.  Because it uses the plural term “claims,” it 
simply cannot be limited in scope to the actual fraud claim.  
Rather than actually looking at the jury instructions as a 
whole, as required by our precedent, the majority places all 
its emphasis on the grouping and numbering of the jury 
instructions, as well as the order in which the circuit court 
read them to the jury. 
However, in doing so, the majority fails to acknowledge 
that the circuit court read to the jury several other 
instructions that were applicable to both the claim for actual 
fraud and the claim for constructive fraud, and these 
instructions were grouped in what the majority considers the 
set of actual fraud instructions.  For example, the 
definitions of the terms “material fact” and “reliance” were 
numbered 24 and 25, respectively, and were read to the jury 
immediately after the definition of actual fraud and before 
jury instruction 27.  Those definitions were not repeated when 
 
23 
 
the circuit court later read the instructions specifically 
referencing constructive fraud, but those definitions 
undoubtedly applied to both fraud claims.  Like actual fraud, 
the definition of constructive fraud includes, among other 
things, a misrepresentation of a material fact upon which a 
person relies.  Similarly, jury instruction 25 told the jury 
that “[i]n deciding whether fraud exists,” it could consider 
certain circumstances such as the parties’ “relative 
knowledge” and “their respective motives and intentions.”  
(Emphasis added.)  In other words, jury instruction 27 was not 
the only instruction that pertained to both fraud claims and 
was, nevertheless, included in the so-called group of actual 
fraud instructions. 
I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that “the 
instructions regarding constructive fraud unequivocally 
informed the jury that a claim of constructive fraud may not 
be based on a promise of future action.”  That statement is 
true only if jury instruction 27 is limited to the actual 
fraud claim.  Jury instruction 34, titled “Fraud-Definition of 
Misrepresentation” stated, in relevant part: 
A misrepresentation is any words or conduct 
which produce a false or misleading impression of 
fact in the mind of another.  The misrepresentation 
must be made concerning an actually existing or past 
fact.  A promise, an expression of interest, or an 
expectation or opinion concerning the future is not 
a misrepresentation. 
 
24 
 
 
Jury instruction 27 did not conflict with that statement of 
law but actually amplified it by telling the jury: 
If you find that plaintiff’s fraud claims are 
premised on promises to be carried out in the 
future, as distinct from past or present facts, you 
may not make a finding of fraud merely because the 
promise was not kept.  Rather, you may only find in 
favor of the plaintiff if he demonstrates by clear 
and convincing proof that at the time the 
representation was made, the defendants never 
intended to perform the future promise. 
 
Thus, reading the jury instructions as a whole, I conclude 
that the jury was informed that both fraud claims could not be 
premised on promises to be carried out in the future and that 
a finding in favor of Johnson could be made only if, at the 
time of making such promises, SuperValu and Richfood never 
intended to fulfill them. 
This conclusion does not end my analysis.  Jury 
instruction 27 is legally incorrect since “representations 
predicated upon future events or promises cannot form the 
basis of an action for constructive fraud.”  Tate v. Colony 
House Builders, Inc., 257 Va. 78, 84, 508 S.E.2d 597, 600 
(1999).  However, as Johnson asserts, jury instruction 27 is 
the law of this case because it was given without objection.  
See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Thomas Baker Real Estate, Ltd., 
237 Va. 649, 652, 379 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1989) (“It is well 
settled that instructions given without objection become the 
 
25 
 
law of the case and thereby bind the parties in the trial 
court and this Court on review.”); accord Ulloa v. QSP, Inc., 
271 Va. 72, 80, 624 S.E.2d 43, 48 (2006); Oberbroeckling v. 
Lyle, 234 Va. 373, 379, 362 S.E.2d 682, 686 (1987).  And, “if 
there is any credible evidence which clearly and convincingly 
establishes a pertinent element of the instruction, the 
verdict” must be sustained.  Oberbroeckling, 234 Va. at 379, 
362 S.E.2d at 686. 
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence 
viewed in the light most favorable to Johnson showed only that 
SuperValu and Richfood made promises about future financial 
support and assistance.  But, considering the law of this case 
as stated in jury instruction 27, that evidence supported the 
jury verdict in favor of Johnson on the constructive fraud 
claim. 
 
SuperValu and Richfood, however, are correct that Johnson 
can recover only those damages that he personally sustained as 
a result of the constructive fraud.  Because Johnson filed 
this action in his individual capacity, and not as a 
derivative action, he cannot recover damages suffered by the 
MPH Companies, which are separate legal entities.*  See Keepe 
                     
* The inverse of this principle was recently decided by 
this Court in Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 708-13, 652 S.E.2d 
129, 136-38 (2007), holding that damages to individual 
 
26 
 
 
27 
 
v. Shell Oil Co., 220 Va. 587, 591, 260 S.E.2d 722, 724 (1979) 
(“The corporation is a legal person, separate and distinct 
from the persons who own it[;] and the corporation, as the 
alleged owner and operator of the business, is the person 
entitled to its profits and the person injured by the 
[alleged] wrongs.”). 
At trial, Johnson proved that he invested $827,000 of his 
own funds into the MPH Companies, but the evidence showed that 
he recouped $500,000 of that investment.  The other damages 
that Johnson claimed were actually sustained by the MPH 
Companies.  Thus, while I disagree with the majority and would 
reinstate the jury’s finding that Johnson proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that SuperValu and Richfood committed 
constructive fraud against him, I would reduce the amount of 
the jury’s award of compensatory damages from $15.5 million to 
$327,000, the amount that would compensate Johnson for the 
damages he personally suffered. 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur, in part, and 
dissent, in part. 
                                                                
partners were not recoverable when the suit was brought as a 
derivative suit on behalf of the partnership.