Case Title: State v. Asboth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP002052-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 76 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2052-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Kenneth M. Asboth, Jr., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 372 Wis. 2d 185, 888 N.W.2d 23  
(2016 – Unpublished)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 19, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dodge 
 
JUDGE: 
John R. Storck 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Andrew Hinkel, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Andrew Hinkel. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief by Ryan J. 
Walsh, chief deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief 
were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Misha Tseytlin, 
solicitor general.  Oral argument by Ryan J. Walsh. 
 
 
2017 WI 76
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP2052-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF384) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Kenneth M. Asboth, Jr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Wisconsin courts have 
long applied a community caretaker exception to the warrant 
requirement under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  In this case, Kenneth M. Asboth, Jr., asks us to 
decide whether law enforcement officers' warrantless seizure of 
his car was a reasonable exercise of a bona fide community 
caretaker function.  He also asks us to determine whether 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), requires officers to 
follow "standard criteria" when conducting a community caretaker 
impoundment.  We hold that Bertine does not mandate adherence to 
standard criteria, and because we further conclude that officers 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
2 
 
reasonably 
effected 
a 
community 
caretaker 
impoundment 
of 
Asboth's car, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Asboth was a wanted man in November 2012.  He was a 
suspect in the armed robbery of a Beaver Dam bank, and there was 
an outstanding probation warrant for his arrest.  When police 
received a tip that he was at a storage facility in Dodge 
County, outside the City of Beaver Dam, both the Dodge County 
Sheriff's Department and Beaver Dam Police responded by sending 
officers to the storage facility to apprehend him. 
¶3 
The sheriff's deputy arrived first and saw a person 
matching Asboth's description reaching into the back seat of a 
car parked between two storage sheds.  Drawing his weapon, the 
deputy ordered the person to come out of the vehicle with his 
hands up.  Asboth, complying with the command, confirmed his 
identity after the deputy arrested him.  Officers from Beaver 
Dam soon arrived at the storage facility, and Asboth was placed 
in the back seat of a squad car until they could transport him 
for questioning. 
¶4 
After Asboth's arrest, his car remained parked at the 
storage facility.  None of the arresting officers asked Asboth 
if he could arrange to have the car moved.  Although the car sat 
in the middle of the alley between two storage sheds, space 
remained available for a vehicle to maneuver around it and drive 
through the alley.  The car, however, entirely blocked access to 
one storage unit, and it impeded access to several others.  When 
the officer ran a check of the car's registration, it identified 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
3 
 
the car's owner as not Asboth but a different person with a City 
of Madison address.1  Rather than abandoning the car on private 
property, or contacting the storage facility's owner about it, 
the officers chose to impound the car. 
¶5 
Both the Beaver Dam Police Department and the Dodge 
County Sheriff's Department had policies for officers to follow 
when deciding whether to impound a vehicle.  The Beaver Dam 
policy provided:   
Any officer having a vehicle in lawful custody may 
impound said vehicle.  The officer will have the 
option not to impound said vehicle when there is a 
reasonable alternative; however, the existence of an 
alternative does not preclude the officer's authority 
to impound. 
The Dodge County policy provided more specific guidance: 
Deputies of the Dodge County Sheriff's Department 
are authorized to arrange for towing of motor vehicles 
under the following circumstances: 
When any vehicle has been left unattended upon a 
street or highway and is parked illegally in such a 
way as to constitute a definite hazard or obstruction 
to the normal movement of traffic; 
. . . . 
When the driver of a vehicle has been taken into 
custody by a deputy, and the vehicle would thereby be 
left unattended; 
. . . . 
                                                 
1 Subsequent investigation revealed that the registered 
owner sold the car to Asboth, but neither Asboth nor the former 
owner notified the Department of Transportation of the transfer.  
Because of this omission, the officers did not know at the time 
of the arrest that Asboth actually owned the car. 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
4 
 
When removal is necessary in the interest of 
public safety because of fire, flood, storm, snow or 
other emergency reasons; 
. . . . 
Unless otherwise indicated, the deputy always has 
the discretion to leave the vehicle at the scene and 
advise the owner to make proper arrangements for 
removal. 
¶6 
Because the impound lot at the Dodge County Sheriff's 
Department was full, the officers and deputies agreed to tow the 
car to the Beaver Dam police station.  Consistent with police 
department procedures, officers conducted an inventory search of 
the seized vehicle at the police station.  The search turned up 
several items that the department held for safekeeping:  a video 
game system, a cell phone, an MP3 player, keys, and an orange 
water bottle containing green leafy material.  In the spare tire 
compartment beneath a false floor in the trunk, officers also 
found a pellet gun, which resembled the handgun used in the 
Beaver Dam robbery. 
¶7 
The State charged Asboth with armed robbery,2 and he 
filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the 
seizure and search of the car.  Asboth's motion initially 
challenged the constitutionality of the inventory search itself.  
After hearing testimony from four police officers and sheriff's 
deputies involved with Asboth's arrest and with the seizure and 
search of his car, the Dodge County Circuit Court3 denied 
                                                 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 943.32(1)(b) and (2), § 939.50(3)(c), and 
§ 939.62(1)(c) (2015-16). 
3 The Honorable John R. Storck, presiding. 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
5 
 
Asboth's motion.  In its order denying the motion, the circuit 
court made findings relevant to the impoundment:  "[t]he vehicle 
could not be left where it was and needed to be impounded"; 
"[t]he officers involved believed that the vehicle belonged to 
someone other than [Asboth]"; and "[i]t is undisputed that 
Beaver Dam police conducted the inventory search according to 
established procedures." 
¶8 
Asboth filed a motion for reconsideration.  Relying on 
State v. Clark, 2003 WI App 121, 
265 Wis. 2d 557, 666 
N.W.2d 112, Asboth argued that the officers unconstitutionally 
seized the car from the storage facility.  Following a hearing 
at which Asboth supplemented the record with testimony by more 
officers, 
the 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
motion 
and 
made 
additional findings: 
(1) Both the Dodge County Sheriff's Department 
and 
the 
Beaver 
Dam 
Police 
Department's 
written 
policies favor[ed] impoundment . . . . 
(2) The 
vehicle 
was 
parked 
on 
another 
individual's property, not legally parked on a public 
street. 
(3) The vehicle was blocking access to more than 
one of the business's storage lockers and impeding 
travel by other customers through the complex. 
(4) There were valuable items in the vehicle 
including electronics. 
(5) Defendant was arrested while in possession of 
the vehicle, and was actually observed reaching into 
the vehicle. 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
6 
 
Asboth pled no contest, and the circuit court imposed sentence 
of 10 years initial confinement followed by 10 years extended 
supervision. 
¶9 
In the court of appeals, Asboth challenged the circuit 
court's denial of his suppression motion, but he limited his 
argument to the constitutionality of the seizure of the car.  
State v. Asboth, No. 2015AP2052-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶1 
(Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2016).  Specifically, Asboth argued 
that the warrantless seizure was unconstitutional because it was 
not conducted pursuant to sufficiently detailed standardized 
criteria or justified by a bona fide community caretaker 
purpose.  Id.  Assuming without deciding that Bertine requires 
law enforcement officers to follow standardized criteria when 
seizing a vehicle, the court of appeals concluded that the Dodge 
County Sheriff's Department's policy applied and authorized the 
seizure.  Id., ¶¶11, 20.  Turning to Asboth's community 
caretaker argument, the court of appeals first rebuffed Asboth's 
contention that an investigatory purpose negated the bona fide 
community 
caretaker 
justification 
for 
the 
seizure, 
then 
concluded that the public need to move the car outweighed 
Asboth's privacy interests.  Id., ¶¶24, 44.  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of the 
motion to suppress.  Id., ¶45.  Asboth petitioned this court for 
review, again limiting his argument to the constitutionality of 
the seizure, and we granted his petition. 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
7 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 We review an order granting or denying a motion to 
suppress evidence as a question of constitutional fact, which 
requires a two-step analysis.  State v. Matalonis, 2016 WI 7, 
¶28, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 N.W.2d 567, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
296.  "First, we review the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact under a deferential standard, upholding them 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Second, we independently 
apply constitutional principles to those facts."  Id. (quoting 
State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 
N.W.2d 463). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶11 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated" and that "no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."  Article I, § 11 
of the Wisconsin Constitution likewise provides that "[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated" and that "no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause."  Because the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 
§ 11 provide substantively identical protections, we have 
historically 
interpreted 
this 
section 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution in accordance with United States Supreme Court 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Dumstrey, 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
8 
 
2016 WI 3, ¶14, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502 (citing State v. 
Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748). 
¶12 "A seizure conducted without a valid warrant is 
presumptively unreasonable."  State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, 
¶24, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369 (citing United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982)).  "[B]ecause the ultimate 
touchstone 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
'reasonableness,'" 
however, 
"the 
warrant 
requirement 
is 
subject 
to 
certain 
exceptions."  Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).  
This court has recognized one such exception where a law 
enforcement officer is "serving as a community caretaker to 
protect persons and property."  State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 
¶14, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592. 
¶13 Specifically, law enforcement officers may conduct a 
warrantless seizure without violating the Fourth Amendment when 
performing community caretaker functions——those actions "totally 
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of 
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."  
State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶¶19-20, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 
N.W.2d 598 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 
(1973)). 
 
When 
evaluating 
a 
claimed 
community 
caretaker 
justification for a warrantless search or seizure, Wisconsin 
courts apply a three-step test, which asks 
(1) whether a search or seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment has occurred; (2) if so, whether 
the police were exercising a bona fide community 
caretaker function; and (3) if so, whether the public 
interest outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
9 
 
the individual such that the community caretaker 
function was reasonably exercised . . . . 
Matalonis, 
366 
Wis. 2d 443, 
¶31 
(quoting 
Pinkard, 
327 
Wis. 2d 346, ¶29). 
¶14 There is no dispute that a seizure of Asboth's car 
occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, so this 
case turns on the second and third steps of Wisconsin's 
community caretaker test.  Asboth contends that the seizure 
satisfied neither the second nor the third steps because an 
overriding investigatory purpose negated the officers' bona fide 
community caretaker justification for moving the car, and the 
public interest in seizing his car did not outweigh his privacy 
interest in leaving it at the storage facility.  Further, he 
insists that the seizure was not reasonable because it was not 
governed by standardized criteria sufficient to satisfy Bertine.  
We therefore consider in turn the second and third steps of the 
community caretaker test. 
A.  Bona Fide Community Caretaker Function 
¶15 The community caretaker exception to the warrant 
requirement accounts for the multifaceted nature of police work.  
Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶32.  As this court has observed, 
"Police officers wear many hats:  criminal investigator, first 
aid 
provider, 
social 
worker, 
crisis 
intervener, 
family 
counselor, 
youth 
mentor 
and 
peacemaker, 
to 
name 
a 
few. . . .  They are society's problem solvers when no other 
solution is apparent or available."  Matalonis, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 
¶29 (quoting Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 607 n.5 (Fla. Dist. 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
10 
 
Ct. 
App. 
2009) 
(Torpy, 
J., 
concurring 
and 
concurring 
specially)).  Although a court assessing whether an officer 
acted for a bona fide community caretaker purpose "may consider 
[the] officer's subjective intent," this step of the test 
ultimately turns on whether the officer can "articulate[] an 
objectively 
reasonable 
basis" 
for 
exercising 
a 
community 
caretaker function.  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶31 (quoting 
Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶36). 
¶16 In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
noted 
that 
"automobiles 
are 
frequently taken into police custody" by officers engaged in 
community caretaker functions.  Id. at 368.  The Court cited two 
non-exclusive examples of situations where police officers often 
take custody of vehicles:  "[v]ehicle accidents," after which 
officers take custody of vehicles "[t]o permit the uninterrupted 
flow of traffic and in some circumstances to preserve evidence," 
and 
vehicles 
that 
"violate 
parking 
ordinances," 
"thereby 
jeopardiz[ing] both the public safety and the efficient movement 
of vehicular traffic."  Id. at 368-69.  In short, "[t]he 
authority of police to seize and remove from the streets 
vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and 
convenience is beyond challenge" in the community caretaker 
context.  Id. at 369. 
¶17 Citing 
Opperman's 
subsequent 
analysis 
of 
the 
constitutionality of an inventory search, the primary issue in 
that case, Asboth asserts that the officers' interest in 
investigating him as a potential suspect in the bank robbery 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
11 
 
predominated over any bona fide community caretaker function 
they performed by moving the car.  Furthermore, focusing on 
Opperman's 
examples——impoundment 
following 
an 
accident 
and 
impoundment following a parking ordinance violation——Asboth 
argues that the officers here did not have an objectively 
reasonable basis to tow his car from the storage facility to the 
police station. 
¶18 For multiple reasons, we conclude that the officers 
possessed a bona fide community caretaker justification for 
impounding Asboth's car.  First, if left unattended, the car 
would have inconvenienced a private property owner and customers 
at the storage facility by impeding the beneficial use of the 
property.  Cf. United States v. Brown, 787 F.2d 929, 932-33 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (concluding that officers "could reasonably have 
impounded" arrestee's vehicle "because the car could have 
constituted a nuisance in the area in which it was parked").  
Asboth's car obstructed the alley between the storage sheds, 
making it difficult for larger vehicles to pass through.  The 
car wholly or partially blocked several storage units, limiting 
access for customers seeking to access their stored belongings.  
Because the car was on a third-party's private property, any 
expense for removing the obstruction would have fallen to a 
private property owner uninvolved in the arrest.  By removing 
the 
car, 
the 
officers 
immediately 
remedied 
a 
potential 
disruption created by Asboth's arrest at the private storage 
facility, thus limiting the inconvenience to the property owner 
and customers. 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
12 
 
¶19 Second, because Asboth was a suspect in a crime who 
also allegedly violated the terms of his probation, he likely 
faced a lengthy detention, and the possibility of a concomitant 
lengthy abandonment of the car counseled in favor of its removal 
from the premises.  See United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 
240 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that "officers properly made 
arrangements for the safekeeping of the [arrestee's] vehicle" 
when they anticipated that he "would be indisposed for an 
indeterminate, and potentially lengthy, period").  Impounding 
rather than abandoning Asboth's car protected the vehicle and 
its contents from potential theft or vandalism in his absence.  
See United States v. Kornegay, 885 F.2d 713, 716 (10th Cir. 
1989) (citing potential "vandalism or theft" as one factor 
supporting impoundment).  Indeed, the impoundment's protective 
function undermines Asboth's argument that the officers could 
have towed the car somewhere other than the police station; his 
car likely would have faced greater risk of vandalism or theft 
if abandoned in a public place rather than on private property.  
Although the later-discovered valuables were not in plain view 
at the time the officers towed the vehicle for impoundment, 
Asboth no doubt would have been upset to learn that his personal 
property was stolen from the car——regardless of whether officers 
decided to abandon it at the storage facility or in some other 
public place. 
¶20 Finally, the registered owner of the car at the time 
of Asboth's arrest was someone other than Asboth.  With no one 
else 
immediately 
present 
claiming 
ownership 
or 
otherwise 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
13 
 
available to take possession of the vehicle, the possibility 
existed that officers would need to make arrangements to reunite 
the car with its registered owner.  Moreover, the protective 
function of impoundment described above carries no less force 
(and perhaps more) for an absent registered owner than it would 
if officers knew that Asboth owned the car. 
¶21 Collectively, the functions of removing an obstruction 
inconveniencing 
the 
property's 
users 
and 
protecting 
an 
arrestee's 
property 
during 
his 
detention, 
combined 
with 
uncertainty regarding the true ownership of the vehicle, 
establish that the officers had a bona fide community caretaker 
purpose when impounding Asboth's car.  Because we identify these 
objective justifications for the impoundment, our cases make 
clear that, even if the officers had an additional investigatory 
interest in conducting a subsequent inventory search, the 
officers' subjective interests do not render the warrantless 
seizure 
of 
the 
car 
unconstitutional. 
 
See 
Kramer, 
315 
Wis. 2d 414, ¶32 ("[T]he officer may have law enforcement 
concerns, even when the officer has an objectively reasonable 
basis 
for 
performing 
a 
community 
caretaker 
function.").  
Consequently, we now proceed to the third step of the community 
caretaker test and assess the reasonableness of the seizure of 
Asboth's car. 
B.  Reasonableness of the Seizure 
1.  Standard Criteria 
¶22 Before 
we 
consider 
the 
public 
interest 
in 
the 
impoundment along with Asboth's competing privacy interest, we 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
14 
 
first address Asboth's argument that the seizure of his car was 
unreasonable because it was not impounded according to standard 
criteria.  In particular, he contends that in Bertine the United 
States Supreme Court established that an impoundment will be 
constitutionally valid only if governed by "standard criteria" 
set forth in law enforcement procedures.  See Bertine, 479 U.S. 
at 375. 
¶23 Asboth's argument turns on language at the end of the 
Bertine opinion.  Although Bertine generally focused on the 
constitutionality of an inventory search of Bertine's van, the 
Court concluded by addressing Bertine's argument that "the 
inventory search of his van was unconstitutional because 
departmental regulations gave the police officers discretion to 
choose between impounding his van and parking and locking it in 
a public parking place."  479 U.S. at 375.  Rejecting Bertine's 
argument, the Supreme Court explained:  "Nothing in Opperman or 
[Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983),] prohibits the 
exercise of police discretion so long as that discretion is 
exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of 
something 
other 
than 
suspicion 
of 
evidence 
of 
criminal 
activity."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶24 A split exists among the federal courts of appeals 
regarding 
Bertine's 
impact 
on 
impoundments 
by 
officers 
performing community caretaker functions.  Several circuits 
agree with Asboth, to varying degrees, that law enforcement 
officers may constitutionally perform a warrantless community 
caretaker impoundment only if standard criteria minimize the 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
15 
 
exercise of their discretion.  See United States v. Sanders, 796 
F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2015) ("[I]mpoundment of a vehicle 
located on private property that is neither obstructing traffic 
nor 
creating 
an 
imminent 
threat 
to 
public 
safety 
is 
constitutional only if justified by both a standardized policy 
and 
a 
reasonable, 
non-pretextual 
community-caretaking 
rationale."); Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 866 
(9th Cir. 2005) ("The decision to impound must be guided by 
conditions which 'circumscribe the discretion of individual 
officers' in a way that furthers the caretaking purpose." 
(quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376 n.7)); United States v. Petty, 
367 
F.3d 
1009, 
1012 
(8th 
Cir. 
2004) 
("Some 
degree 
of 
'standardized criteria' or 'established routine' must regulate 
these police actions . . . ."); United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 
346, 351 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Among those criteria which must be 
standardized are the circumstances in which a car may be 
impounded.").4  Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit has 
                                                 
4 See also People v. Torres, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48, 56 (Ct. 
App. 2010); Patty v. State, 768 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2000); State v. Weaver, 900 P.2d 196, 199 (Idaho 1995); 
People v. Ferris, 9 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); Fair 
v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 433 (Ind. 1993); State v. Huisman, 544 
N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 1996); State v. Fox, 2017 ME 52, ¶¶23-26, 
157 A.3d 778; Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 47 N.E.3d 395, 398 
(Mass. 2016); People v. Toohey, 475 N.W.2d 16, 22-23 (Mich. 
1991); State v. Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96, 104 (Minn. 2000); State v. 
Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d 181, 186 (Mo. 1990) (en banc); People v. 
O'Connell, 591 N.Y.S.2d 641, 642 (App. Div. 1992); State v. 
O'Neill, 2015-Ohio-815, ¶39, 29 N.E.3d 365 (Ct. App., 3d Dist.); 
McGaughey v. State, 2001 OK CR 33, ¶44, 37 P.3d 130. 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
16 
 
held that, "if a standard impoundment procedure exists, a police 
officer's failure to adhere thereto is unreasonable and violates 
the Fourth Amendment."  United States v. Proctor, 489 F.3d 1348, 
1349 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
¶25 In contrast, three federal circuits do not afford 
dispositive weight to the existence of standardized criteria or 
to law enforcement officers' adherence thereto, instead treating 
such criteria as, at most, one factor to consider when assessing 
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of a warrantless community 
caretaker impoundment.5  The Fifth Circuit flatly rejects any 
need 
to 
consider 
standardized 
criteria 
as 
part 
of 
a 
reasonableness analysis.  See United States v. McKinnon, 681 
F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 2012) ("Since Opperman and Bertine, we 
have focused our inquiry on the reasonableness of the vehicle 
impoundment for a community caretaking purpose without reference 
to any standardized criteria.").  The Third Circuit has 
expressly recognized that a law enforcement officer's "decision 
to impound a vehicle contrary to standardized procedures or even 
in the absence of a standardized procedure should not be a per 
se violation of the Fourth Amendment."  United States v. Smith, 
522 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008). 
¶26 Most persuasively, the First Circuit explained in 
United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233 (1st Cir. 2006), its 
                                                 
5 See also People v. Shafrir, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 721, 721-28 
(Ct. App. 2010); Cannon v. State, 601 So. 2d 1112, 1115-16 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1992). 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
17 
 
reasons for "read[ing] Bertine to indicate that an impoundment 
decision made pursuant to standardized procedures will most 
likely, although not necessarily always, satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment."  Id. at 238.  After noting the established principle 
that "impoundments of vehicles for community caretaking purposes 
are consonant with the Fourth Amendment so long as the 
impoundment decision was reasonable under the circumstances," 
the court added that Fourth Amendment "reasonableness analysis 
does not hinge solely on any particular factor."  Id. at 239.  
Like any other factor, standard criteria do not provide "the 
sine qua non of a reasonable impound decision": 
Virtually by definition, the need for police to 
function as community caretakers arises fortuitously, 
when unexpected circumstances present some transient 
hazard which must be dealt with on the spot.  The 
police cannot sensibly be expected to have developed, 
in advance, standard protocols running the entire 
gamut of possible eventualities.  Rather, they must be 
free to follow "sound police procedure," that is to 
choose freely among the available options, so long as 
the option chosen is within the universe of reasonable 
choices.  Where . . . the police have solid, non-
investigatory reasons for impounding a car, there is 
no need for them to show that they followed explicit 
criteria in deciding to impound, as long as the 
decision was reasonable. 
Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 
787 (1st Cir. 1991)).  The First Circuit then proceeded to 
assess the reasonableness of the challenged impoundment.  Id. at 
239-41. 
¶27 We agree with the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits 
that 
in 
cases 
involving 
warrantless 
community 
caretaker 
impoundments the fundamental question is the reasonableness of 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
18 
 
the seizure.  Accordingly, we hold that the absence of standard 
criteria does not by default render a warrantless community 
caretaker 
impoundment 
unconstitutional 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard.  Nor does law enforcement 
officers' lack of adherence to standard criteria, if they exist, 
automatically render such impoundments unconstitutional. 
¶28 The absence of a standard criteria requirement does 
not, as Asboth suggests, imbue law enforcement officers with 
"uncontrolled" discretion to impound vehicles at will as a 
pretext for conducting investigatory inventory searches.  As the 
First Circuit observed in Coccia, under the reasonableness 
standard, "a police officer's discretion to impound a car is 
sufficiently cabined by the requirement that the decision to 
impound be based, at least in part, on a reasonable community 
caretaking concern and not exclusively on 'the suspicion of 
criminal activity.'"  Coccia, 446 F.3d at 239 (quoting Bertine, 
479 U.S. at 375).  The second step of Wisconsin's community 
caretaker test requires law enforcement officers to establish 
that the warrantless impoundment occurred pursuant to a bona 
fide community caretaker purpose.  Far from leaving officers 
with 
unlimited 
discretion 
to 
impound, 
Wisconsin's 
test 
authorizes law enforcement officers to conduct such warrantless 
seizures only if they have "an objectively reasonable basis for 
performing a community caretaker function."  Kramer, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, ¶32. 
¶29 Finally, our conclusion that Bertine does not mandate 
adoption of or adherence to standard impoundment criteria for 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
19 
 
all circumstances should not discourage law enforcement agencies 
from developing general impoundment procedures.  "[A]doption of 
a 
standardized 
impoundment 
procedure . . . supplies 
a 
methodology by which reasonableness can be judged and tends to 
ensure that the police will not make arbitrary decisions in 
determining which vehicles to impound."  Smith, 522 F.3d at 312.  
Indeed, adherence to sufficiently detailed standard criteria can 
enhance the reasonableness of an impoundment by limiting the 
exercise of discretion and encouraging compliant officers to 
identify and pursue the least-intrusive means of performing the 
community caretaker function.  See United States v. Sharpe, 470 
U.S. 
675, 
687 
(1985) 
(noting 
that 
courts 
assessing 
law 
enforcement officers' actions must ask "not simply whether some 
other alternative was available, but whether the police acted 
unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it").  As we 
discuss further below, a Wisconsin court may consider the 
existence of, and officers' adherence to, standard criteria as a 
relevant factor when assessing the reasonableness of a community 
caretaker seizure.6 
                                                 
6 Although in this case we discuss the standard impoundment 
criteria while assessing the reasonableness of the seizure, 
nothing in this opinion forecloses Wisconsin courts from 
considering officers' adherence to standard criteria when 
determining whether officers exercised a bona fide community 
caretaker function. 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
20 
 
2.  Reasonableness Inquiry 
¶30 Under 
the 
third 
step 
of 
Wisconsin's 
community 
caretaker test, we evaluate the reasonableness of the law 
enforcement 
officer's 
exercise 
of 
a 
bona 
fide 
community 
caretaker function by "balancing [the] public interest or need 
that is furthered by the officer's conduct against the degree of 
and nature of the restriction upon the liberty interest of the 
citizen."  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶40.  We generally consider 
four factors:   
(1) the degree of the public interest and the exigency 
of the situation; (2) the attendant circumstances 
surrounding the seizure, including time, location, the 
degree of overt authority and force displayed; (3) 
whether an automobile is involved; and (4) the 
availability, 
feasibility 
and 
effectiveness 
of 
alternatives 
to 
the 
type 
of 
intrusion 
actually 
accomplished. 
Id., ¶41 (quoting State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, ¶36, 243 
Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777). 
¶31 Taking the third factor first, we note that evaluation 
of a car's impoundment necessarily involves an automobile.  This 
factor enters the analysis because "[i]n some situations a 
citizen has a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile."  
State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 169 n.4, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. 
App. 1987) (citing New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-13 
(1986)).  Although many of our recent community caretaker cases 
have raised questions regarding the appropriate scope of 
warrantless searches of homes, see, e.g., Matalonis, 366 
Wis. 2d 443, ¶2; Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶1, this case 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
21 
 
involved 
Asboth's 
lesser 
privacy 
interest 
in 
his 
car.  
Therefore, law enforcement officers impounding a vehicle as 
community caretakers need not demonstrate the same extraordinary 
public interest necessary to justify a warrantless community 
caretaker entry into the home.  See Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 
¶56 (observing that, as compared to an automobile, "one has a 
heightened privacy interest in preventing intrusions into one's 
home"). 
¶32 Turning to the public interest advanced by the 
impoundment, we circle back to the effect of Asboth's arrest on 
the storage facility's owner and customers:  The public has a 
significant interest in law enforcement officers seizing from 
private property a vehicle that, if left unattended, would 
inconvenience the property's owner and users by impeding 
beneficial use of the property and creating a potential hazard——
particularly when the officers are in lawful custody of the car.  
See Brown, 787 F.2d 929, 932-33.   One of this court's decisions 
approving limited warrantless home entry by officers performing 
a community caretaker function specifically contemplates the 
possibility of officers acting for the similar purpose of 
abating a nuisance.  See Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶20 n.6 
(quoting with approval United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 
1522-23 (6th Cir. 1996), which held that "officers' 'failure to 
obtain a warrant [did] not render that entry unlawful' where 
officers entered defendant's home to 'abat[e] an ongoing 
nuisance by quelling loud and disruptive noise'" (alterations in 
original)).  Although we reserve judgment on such a home-entry 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
22 
 
question for a future case, we do not hesitate to recognize 
that, even in the absence of the exigencies that often accompany 
community caretaker actions, the law enforcement officers here 
served a legitimate public interest by impounding an unattended 
vehicle that inconvenienced a private business and its customers 
and created a hazard by obstructing vehicle traffic through the 
storage facility. 
¶33 The circumstances surrounding the impoundment also 
reflect the seizure's reasonableness.  If abandoned by the 
officers, the car would have intruded on private property owned 
by a third party who had nothing to do with the arrest.  And 
because Asboth was already under arrest at the time of the 
impoundment, officers did not make an improperly coercive show 
of 
authority 
to 
effect 
the 
seizure. 
 
See 
Kramer, 
315 
Wis. 2d 414, ¶43.  To the contrary, the seizure actually 
complied with the terms of both the Beaver Dam and the Dodge 
County procedures governing impoundments.7  The Beaver Dam policy 
permitted officers to impound a vehicle held "in lawful 
custody," and the officers took possession of the car after 
lawfully arresting Asboth.  Additionally, the policy permitted 
officers 
to 
decide 
against 
impoundment 
if 
a 
"reasonable 
alternative" existed, but there was no sensible alternative 
available here.  Providing more targeted guidance, the Dodge 
                                                 
7 Because we conclude that the seizure complied with both 
departments' impoundment procedures, we need not decide which 
procedures actually governed. 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
23 
 
County policy authorized deputies to tow a vehicle "[w]hen the 
driver of a vehicle has been taken into custody by a deputy, and 
the vehicle would thereby be left unattended."  Again, officers 
lawfully arrested Asboth, and it was reasonable under the 
circumstances to infer that the person alone with the vehicle at 
the storage facility was its driver.  The fact that the seizure 
did actually comply with the policies of the acting law 
enforcement agencies indicates that this impoundment was not an 
arbitrary decision but a reasonable exercise of discretion.  See 
Smith, 522 F.3d at 312. 
¶34 Notably, the fact that both policies actually cabined 
the officers' exercise of discretion also indicates that the 
officers acted reasonably when seizing Asboth's car.  In Clark, 
the court of appeals disapproved of a policy permitting officers 
to tow a vehicle if "[the] vehicle is to be towed and the 
owner/driver is unable to authorize a tow."  265 Wis. 2d 557, 
¶6.  The court of appeals recognized that this policy was 
"wholly unhelpful" because it "offer[ed] no insight into why or 
when a vehicle may be seized," instead essentially "stat[ing] 
that 'a vehicle is to be towed for safekeeping when a vehicle is 
to be towed.'"  Id., ¶15.  Here, the Beaver Dam and Dodge County 
policies avoided such circular reasoning by limiting impoundment 
to situations where officers had custody of, respectively, the 
vehicle itself or its driver.  Rather than allowing officers to 
impound a vehicle at will any time the vehicle's driver was 
unavailable, as the policy in Clark authorized, both policies in 
this case permitted impoundment only as a natural consequence of 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
24 
 
law enforcement action that would otherwise result in the 
vehicle's abandonment. 
¶35 Finally, 
the 
lack 
of 
realistic 
alternatives 
to 
impoundment 
further 
reinforces 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
the 
seizure.  Asboth was alone at the storage facility, so he did 
not have a companion who could immediately take possession of 
the car.  Admittedly, the officers did not offer Asboth the 
opportunity to make arrangements for moving his car after his 
arrest, but nothing required them to do so.  See United States 
v. Arrocha, 713 F.3d 1159, 1164 (8th Cir. 2013) ("Nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment requires a police department to allow an 
arrested person to arrange for another person to pick up his car 
to avoid impoundment and inventory." (quoting United States v. 
Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 873 (8th Cir. 1994), which cited Bertine, 
479 U.S. at 372)); see also Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 786.  
In fact, given the uncertainty arising from the fact that Asboth 
was not the car's registered owner, taking possession of the car 
to investigate its ownership may have been more reasonable than 
outright returning the car to Asboth.8 
                                                 
8 The clear absence of feasible alternatives to impounding 
Asboth's car further distinguishes this case from State v. 
Clark, 2003 WI App 121, 265 Wis. 2d 557, 666 N.W.2d 112, in 
which the court of appeals also held that the public interest in 
towing an unlocked vehicle from the Milwaukee streets did not 
outweigh the intrusion into the owner's privacy.  Id., ¶27.  An 
officer investigating shots fired in the area ordered the 
legally parked but unlocked vehicle towed "to ensure that the 
vehicle itself and any property inside the vehicle would not be 
stolen."  Id., ¶23.  The court of appeals held that the 
community caretaker exception did not apply because the officer 
could have "(1) locked the vehicle and walked away; [or] (2) 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
25 
 
¶36 Considering all of these factors together, we conclude 
that law enforcement's removal of an unattended car that would 
otherwise create a potential hazard while also inconveniencing 
owners and users of private property9 outweighed Asboth's lesser 
privacy interest in that car.  Because the officers advanced 
that public interest in pursuit of a bona fide community 
caretaker function, we hold that the warrantless seizure of 
Asboth's car after his arrest was constitutionally reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶37 "The 
touchstone 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
reasonableness." State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶29, 359 
Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 
248, 250 (1991)).  Applying Wisconsin's test for the community 
caretaker 
exception 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
warrant 
requirement, we conclude that law enforcement officers acted 
                                                                                                                                                             
attempted to contact the owners of the vehicle in light of his 
belief that the vehicle or its contents may be stolen."  Id., 
¶27. 
9 The array of factors demonstrating the reasonableness of 
the officers' decision to impound Asboth's car defeats any 
argument 
that 
this 
opinion 
delineates 
a 
per 
se 
rule 
"justify[ing] the seizure of every vehicle after its driver has 
been arrested."  Dissent, ¶76.  As with any warrantless 
community caretaker search or seizure, law enforcement officers 
acting as bona fide community caretakers may impound an arrested 
person's vehicle without a warrant only if the facts establish a 
countervailing public interest in conducting the seizure that 
outweighs any infringement on the arrested person's liberty 
interest. 
No. 
2015AP2052-CR 
 
26 
 
reasonably when seizing Asboth's vehicle for impoundment.  
Although we conclude that the officers here complied with both 
relevant departmental impoundment policies, we also hold that 
Bertine does not mandate such adherence to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness standard.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶38 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
bucks the nationwide trend when it determines that the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require 
that police follow standardized procedures during a community 
caretaker impoundment.  Adopting the minority rule followed by 
three federal circuits, it reasons that standardized procedures 
are unnecessary because police discretion is sufficiently 
limited by the requirement that impoundments be based on a 
reasonable community caretaker concern.  
¶39 Compounding its misdirection, the majority further 
errs by expanding an already bloated community caretaker 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.  It 
appears that yet again this court's "expansive conception of 
community caretaking transforms [it] from a narrow exception 
into a powerful investigatory tool."  State v. Matalonis, 2016 
WI 7, ¶106, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 N.W.2d 567 (Prosser, J., 
dissenting).   
¶40 Contrary to the majority, I would follow the national 
trend as illustrated by the well-reasoned approach of the Tenth 
Circuit in U.S. v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241 (2015).  It determined 
that "impoundment of a vehicle located on private property that 
is neither obstructing traffic nor creating an imminent threat 
to public safety is constitutional only if justified by both a 
standardized policy and a reasonable, non-pretextual community-
caretaking rationale."  Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1248. 
¶41 Applying the Sanders test, I conclude that the 
warrantless impoundment of Asboth's vehicle violated his Fourth 
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
Amendment rights.  His vehicle neither obstructed traffic nor 
created an imminent threat to public safety.  Additionally, the 
standardized policies here fail to place any meaningful limits 
on police discretion and the asserted rationale for the 
community caretaker impoundment is unreasonable. 
¶42 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶43 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause. . . ." 
 
Community 
caretaker 
impoundments 
are 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement.  State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 
¶14, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592.  Given the importance of 
the privacy interests involved, this exception should be 
narrowly construed.  See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 
(2009) (instructing that a motorist's privacy interest in his 
vehicle 
is 
"important 
and 
deserving 
of 
constitutional 
protection."). 
¶44 In Gant, the United States Supreme Court expanded 
motorists' privacy rights when it narrowed its prior decision in 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).  Belton had previously 
been read so broadly as to authorize a vehicle search incident 
to every arrest of any occupant of a vehicle.  See Gant, 556 
U.S. at 343.   
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶45 The Gant court explained that "[c]onstruing Belton 
broadly to allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would 
serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it 
is anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless 
search on that basis."  Id. at 347.  Accordingly, Gant limited 
searches incident to arrest to two circumstances:  either when 
the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search or when it is 
reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest might be found in the vehicle.  Id. at 343. 
¶46 In order to address the same concerns in the context 
of vehicle impoundments, the national trend has been to adopt a 
two-part test that resembles Gant's narrowing of Belton.  This 
test, like the test adopted in Gant, prioritizes motorists' 
privacy rights over deference to police discretion.  It limits 
police discretion regarding impoundments by requiring both a 
standardized policy governing impoundment and a "reasonable, 
non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale."  Sanders, 796 
F.3d at 1248. 
¶47 The 
question 
of 
whether 
a 
community 
caretaker 
impoundment of a vehicle must be governed by a standardized 
policy is an issue of first impression in Wisconsin.  However, 
the United States Supreme Court has instructed that the exercise 
of police discretion must be "exercised according to standard 
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of 
evidence of criminal activity."  Colorado v. Bertine, 479 
U.S. 367, 375 (1987).  
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶48 A majority of federal and state appellate courts that 
have addressed this issue have concluded that a warrantless 
community caretaker impoundment is constitutional only if there 
exists standardized criteria limiting police discretion.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 
2015); United States v. Proctor, 489 F.3d 1348, 1353-54 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007); Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 866 (9th 
Cir. 2005); United State v. Petty, 367 F.3d 1009, 2012 (8th Cir. 
2004); United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 
1996); Patty v. State, 768 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000); State v. Weaver, 900 P.2d 196, 199 (Idaho 1995); 
People v. Ferris, 9 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014); Fair 
v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 433 (Ind. 1993); State v. Huisman, 544 
N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 1996); Com. v. Oliveira, 47 N.E.3d 395, 
398 (Mass. 2016); State v. Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96, 104 (Minn. 
2000); State v. Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d 181, 186 (Mo. 1990); State 
v. Filkin, 494 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Neb. 1993); People v. O'Connell, 
188 A.D.2d 902, 903 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); State v. O'Neill, 29 
N.E.3d 365, 374 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015); McGaughey v. State, 37 
P.3d 130, 142–43 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001). 
¶49 Yet, the majority follows the minority view of three 
federal 
circuits, 
determining 
that 
in 
cases 
involving 
warrantless community caretaker impoundments that standardized 
policies are not necessary.  United States v. McKinnon, 681 
F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Smith, 522 F.3d  
305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233, 
238 (1st Cir. 2006).  It reasons that standardized procedures 
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
are unnecessary because police discretion is sufficiently 
limited by the requirement that impoundments be based on a 
reasonable community caretaker concern.     
¶50 According to the majority, "the fundamental question 
is the reasonableness of the seizure."  Majority op., ¶27.  It 
contends that the absence of standard criteria does not "imbue 
law enforcement officers with 'uncontrolled' discretion to 
impound 
vehicles 
at 
will 
as 
a 
pretext 
for 
conducting 
investigatory searches."  Majority op., ¶28.  However, as set 
forth in more detail below, that is exactly what happened here.  
¶51 The 
Tenth 
Circuit's 
decision 
in 
Sanders 
is 
illustrative of the national trend.  In Sanders, for "reasons 
not articulated in any policy, [police] impounded a vehicle 
lawfully parked in a private lot after arresting its driver as 
she exited a store."  Id. at 1242.  The police made "no 
meaningful attempt to allow the driver, her companion, or the 
owner of the parking lot to make alternative arrangements."  Id. 
¶52 Sanders acknowledged that "[t]he authority of police 
to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic 
or 
threatening 
public 
safety 
and 
convenience 
is 
beyond 
challenge."  Id. at 1244 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976)).  It further explained that Opperman 
and Bertine establish "two different, but not inconsistent, 
rules regarding when impoundments are constitutional."  Id. at 
1245.  
Opperman establishes that warrantless impoundments 
required by the community caretaking functions of protecting 
public safety and promoting the efficient movement of traffic 
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
are constitutional.  Id.  Bertine establishes that warrantless 
impoundments are unconstitutional if justified by either a 
"pretext for a criminal investigation or not exercised according 
to standardized criteria" that limits police discretion.  Id. 
¶53 After surveying United States Supreme Court and 
federal circuit precedent, Sanders concluded that "impoundment 
of a vehicle located on private property that is neither 
obstructing traffic nor creating an imminent threat to public 
safety 
is 
constitutional 
only 
if 
justified 
by 
both 
a 
standardized policy and a reasonable, non-pretextual community-
caretaking rationale."  Id. at 1248. 
¶54 Deviating from the nationwide trend, the majority 
limits motorists' privacy rights.  Contrary to the majority, I 
would follow the national trend protecting motorists' privacy 
rights 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
and 
require 
both 
a 
standardized 
policy 
that 
limits 
police 
discretion 
and 
a 
reasonable community caretaker rationale. 
A 
 
¶55 Applying the test set forth above, I turn to the 
question of whether the policies in this case sufficiently 
limited officer discretion to impound vehicles from private 
lots.1 
                                                 
1 The parties disagree regarding which policy governed the 
impoundment, but as set forth below, this issue is not 
dispositive to my analysis because neither policy sufficiently 
limits police discretion.    
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶56 The Beaver Dam Police Department policy provides no 
limitations.  In essence, it states that any officer having a 
vehicle in lawful custody may impound that vehicle: 
Any officer having a vehicle in lawful custody may 
impound said vehicle.  The officer will have the 
option not to impound said vehicle when there is a 
reasonable alternative; however, the existence of an 
alternative does not preclude the officer's authority 
to impound. 
¶57 Likewise, the Dodge County Sheriff's Department policy 
governing impoundment provides that deputies are authorized to 
tow when "the driver . . . has been taken into custody by a 
deputy, and the vehicle would thereby be left unattended."  
Additionally, it states that unless otherwise indicated, "the 
deputy always has the discretion to leave the vehicle at the 
scene and advise the owner to make proper arrangements for 
removal."2 
                                                 
2 The sheriff's department policy states in relevant part: 
Deputies of the Dodge County Sheriff's Department are 
authorized to arrange for towing of motor vehicles 
under the following circumstances: 
When any vehicle has been left unattended upon a 
street or highway and is parked illegally in such a 
way as to constitute a definite hazard or obstruction 
to the normal movement of traffic; 
 . . .  
When the driver of a vehicle has been taken into 
custody by a deputy, and the vehicle would thereby be 
left unattended; 
 . . .  
(continued) 
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶58 Having determined that standardized policies are not 
constitutionally required, the majority nevertheless considers 
the policies in the context of whether the seizure was 
reasonable. 
¶59 According to the majority, both policies cabined the 
officers' 
discretion 
because 
they 
limit 
impoundment 
"to 
situations where officers had custody of, respectively, the 
vehicle itself or its driver."  Majority op., ¶34.  After 
concluding that the standardized policies in this case are 
sufficient, the majority determines that "[t]he fact that the 
seizure did actually comply with the policies of the acting law 
enforcement agencies indicates that this impoundment was not an 
arbitrary decision but a reasonable exercise of discretion."  
Majority op., ¶33. 
¶60 The majority errs because neither policy limits police 
discretion.  First, it is unclear how the Beaver Dam policy, 
which allows impoundments whenever officers have custody of a 
vehicle, provides any limitation at all.  How can the police 
impound a vehicle without having custody of it?  The policy's 
directive is circular.   
                                                                                                                                                             
When removal is necessary in the interest of public 
safety because of fire, flood, storm, snow or other 
emergency reasons; 
 . . .  
Unless otherwise indicated, the deputy always has the 
discretion to leave the vehicle at the scene and 
advise the owner to make proper arrangement for 
removal. 
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
¶61 Second, the majority errs because the Dodge County 
policy limits police discretion only when a driver is not in 
custody.  The Fourth Amendment's protections against warrantless 
seizures of property continue to apply after a driver has been 
arrested. 
 
Indeed, 
the 
question 
of 
whether 
standardized 
procedures are required has arisen in such seminal cases as 
Bertine only after the defendant has been arrested.  See, e.g., 
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 368-369.   
¶62 The majority misses the point because the question in 
this case is whether the policies limit police discretion in 
determining whether to impound a vehicle after a defendant has 
been arrested.  Both policies give the police unfettered 
discretion to impound a vehicle when a driver such as Asboth has 
been arrested.    
¶63 The purpose of standardized criteria is to establish 
why or when a vehicle may be taken into custody, but here 
neither policy offers any guidance on this question.  In State 
v. Clark, the court of appeals addressed the Milwaukee Police 
Department towing policy, explaining that when a policy offers 
no insight into why or when a vehicle may be seized, it is 
"wholly unhelpful."  2003 WI App 121, ¶15, 265 Wis. 2d 557, 666 
N.W.2d 112. 
¶64 Neither policy limits officer discretion "in deciding 
whether to impound a vehicle, leave it at the scene, or allow 
the arrestee to have it privately towed."  Sanders, 796 F.3d at 
1250.  In contrast, the policy in Bertine "related to the 
feasibility and appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle 
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
rather than impounding it."  Bertine, 479 U.S. at 378.  No such 
detail governs officer discretion here.    
¶65 Accordingly, the policies in this case, as in Sanders, 
"insufficiently limited officer discretion to impound vehicles 
from private lots."  Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1250. 
B 
¶66 Having determined that the impoundment was not done in 
accordance 
with 
constitutionally 
sufficient 
standardized 
policies, I could end my analysis here because a community 
caretaker impoundment is unconstitutional without standardized 
procures that limit police discretion.  The majority, however, 
concludes that the police reasonably effected a community 
caretaker impoundment of Asboth's car.  Majority op., ¶1.  
Accordingly, I turn now to the question of whether the police 
conduct in this case was a valid exercise of the community 
caretaker authority.   
¶67 The majority concludes that there are a number of 
"objective justifications for the impoundment" that establish 
the police had a bona fide community caretaker purpose.  
Majority op., ¶21.  Initially, it contends that if left 
unattended, Asboth's car would have "inconvenienced a private 
property owner and customers at the storage facility by impeding 
the beneficial use of the property."  Majority op., ¶18.  Yet, 
the hearing testimony demonstrates that it was possible to 
"drive around" Asboth's vehicle, contradicting this rationale.  
Beneficial use of the property was not impeded because Asboth's 
vehicle was not blocking traffic through the storage facility. 
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶68 Because of the lack of evidence that the vehicle was 
obstructing traffic at the storage facility, the majority offers 
a number of additional rationalizations.  First, it advances 
that "any expense for removing the obstruction would have fallen 
to a private property owner uninvolved in the arrest."  Majority 
op., ¶18.  Next, it asserts that the police protected the 
vehicle and its contents from theft and that "Asboth no doubt 
would have been upset to learn that his personal property was 
stolen from the car."  Majority op., ¶19.  Finally, it contends 
that because the registered owner of the vehicle was someone 
other than Asboth, police were faced with the possibility of 
needing to make arrangements to return the vehicle to its 
registered owner.  Majority op., ¶20.  
¶69 The hearing testimony demonstrates that each of these 
proffered rationales is purely speculative.  None of the 
officers contacted the storage facility to see whether the owner 
wanted the car removed nor did they contact the registered owner 
of the vehicle.  Additionally, none of the officers recalls 
speaking with Asboth about whether he could arrange to have 
someone move the vehicle.   
¶70 After 
dispensing 
with 
the 
majority's 
speculative 
justifications for its conclusion that this was a bona fide 
community caretaker function, I turn now to examine the 
reasonableness of the warrantless impoundment.  A reasonableness 
analysis calls for consideration of both "the degree of public 
interest and the exigency of the situation."  State v. Pinkard, 
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
2010 WI 81, ¶41, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (quoting In re 
Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, ¶36, 243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777). 
¶71 In its analysis of reasonableness, the majority 
repeats the same justifications offered as support for its 
conclusion that the impoundment was a bona fide community 
caretaker function.  Essentially, it contends that the public 
has a significant interest in impounding a vehicle that would 
"inconvenience the property's owner and users by impeding 
beneficial use of the property and creating a potential hazard."  
Majority op., ¶32. 
¶72 Even if the majority could sufficiently explain how 
Asboth's vehicle posed a potential hazard to public safety, it 
errs in stating that it need not consider the exigency of the 
situation.  Id.  Acknowledging that this was not an emergent 
situation, the majority simply omits this consideration from its 
analysis.  Id.  Instead, it considers only the public interest, 
which does not justify the seizure because Asboth's vehicle was 
parked on private property and there was testimony that there 
was room to drive around it. 
¶73 Finally, I turn to the majority's argument that "the 
lack of realistic alternatives to impoundment further reinforces 
the reasonableness of the seizure."  Majority op., ¶35.  As set 
forth above, however, no alternatives to impoundment were 
considered so there is no evidence as to whether there were 
realistic alternatives to impoundment.  Again, this is pure 
speculation on the part of the majority.  
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
¶74 Considering the facts of this case, it appears that 
the impoundment may have been a pretext for an investigatory 
police motive.  See, e.g., Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1245 (explaining 
that Bertine establishes that impoundment is unconstitutional 
where police discretion is "exercised as a pretext for criminal 
investigation."). 
¶75 Just before the vehicle was impounded, Asboth was 
arrested on a probation warrant.  The car was towed to a city 
police impound lot, where it was subsequently searched.  During 
the search, police removed and held all items of apparent value, 
including a pellet gun that was found in the vehicle.  The 
officers conducting the search testified that they considered it 
to be an inventory search, and conducted it according to their 
inventory search procedures.  However, one officer conducting 
the search filled out a form indicating that it was done to 
obtain "evidence," rather than the other possible purposes 
listed on the form, including "abandoned," "parked in traffic" 
or "safekeeping." 
¶76 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the lack of 
a compelling public safety need to move Asboth's car suggests 
that the police were motivated by the investigation of the armed 
robbery in which he was a suspect.  Not only are the rationales 
offered by the majority hypothetical, but they could be applied 
to virtually any vehicle, parked anywhere, at any time.  In 
Clark, this court rejected a policy that "might lead to the 
police towing every unlocked vehicle on the street."  265 
Wis. 2d 557, ¶16.  Likewise, the majority's conclusion may 
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
justify the seizure of every vehicle after its driver has been 
arrested. 
¶77 Thus, I conclude that the impoundment of Asboth's 
vehicle was unconstitutional.  His vehicle was parked on private 
property, was not obstructing traffic and posed no imminent 
threat to public safety.  Under such circumstances, in order to 
survive 
constitutional 
scrutiny, 
the 
impoundment 
must 
be 
justified by both a standardized policy that limits police 
discretion and a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking 
rationale.  Here there was neither.  
II 
¶78 Ultimately, I comment on what I and other members of 
this court have repeatedly warned:  a broad application of the 
community caretaker doctrine "raises the specter that the 
exception 
will 
be 
misused 
as 
a 
pretext 
to 
engage 
in 
unconstitutional searches that are executed with the purpose of 
acquiring evidence of a crime."  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶75. 
¶79 I have previously voiced the concern that "today's 
close call will become tomorrow's norm."  Id., ¶66.  Over the 
years, that is exactly what has happened.  In case after case, 
this exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement has 
expanded well beyond the limits of a bona fide community 
caretaker function that is "totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the 
violation of a criminal statute."  State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 
¶23, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598 (internal quotes and 
citations omitted).   
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
¶80 With today's decision, community caretaking has again 
become an end in itself, justifying warrantless impoundments so 
long as the police can articulate "a hypothetical community 
need." 
 
Matalonis, 
366 
Wis. 2d 443, 
¶106 
(Prosser, 
J., 
dissenting).  The majority embraces the State's hypothetical.  
It reasons that the police served a legitimate public interest 
by impounding a vehicle that inconvenienced a private business 
and its customers and created a hazard by obstructing vehicle 
traffic through the storage facility.  Majority op., ¶32.  
¶81 Not only has the majority opinion lowered the floor by 
deviating 
from 
the 
national 
trend 
requiring 
standardized 
criteria, it also has opened a trap door so that the community 
caretaker exception may become bottomless.  If the community 
caretaker impoundment of Asboth's vehicle parked on private 
property can be justified due to inconvenience, would any 
warrantless seizure be unreasonable in this context?  When an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment becomes the rule, the privacy 
rights 
of 
motorists 
do 
not 
receive 
the 
constitutional 
protections they deserve. 
¶82 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶83 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
No. 2015AP2052-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1