Case Title: Aguilar-Raygoza v. State

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 27

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
427 Nev., Advance Opinion 27
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

PEDRO AGUILAR-RAYGOZA,
Appellant,

‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

No.54667

FILED

 

Appeal from a judgment of convietion, pursuant to a jury
verdict, of folony driving under the influence, Second Judicial District
Court, Washoe County; Connie J. Steinheimer, Judge.

Affirmed,

Jeremy '. Bosler, Public Defender, and Cheryl Bond, Deputy Public
Defender, Washoe County,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Richard A.
Gammick, District Attorney, and Joseph R. Plater, Deputy District

Attorney, Washoe County,
for Respondent.

BEFORE CHERRY, GIBBONS and PICKERING, JJ.

OPINION
By the Court, CHERRY, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether it is unconstitutional to

deny to defendants who exercise their right to a jury trial eligibility for the

MW -/6ldl

 
alcohol treatment diversion program set forth in NRS 484C.340.'
Appellant Pedro Aguilar-Raygoza argues that NRS 484C.340 is patently
unconstitutional because it impermissibly burdens exercise of the right to
a trial and treats defendants differently based on their exercise of that
constitutional right in violation of due process and equal protection. We
conclude that the provisions of NRS 484C.340 are constitutional and that,
as the law is written, Aguilar-Raygoza is not eligible for the diversion
program,
FACTS

‘The State charged Aguilar-Raygoza, by way of information,
with his third offense of driving under the influence, a felony. See NRS
484.110; NRS 484C.400(1)(¢).Aguilar-Raygoza pleaded not guilty and
went to trial, where a jury convicted him. Prior to the sentencing hearing,
Aguilar-Raygoza requested to enter an alcohol treatment program as set
forth in NRS 484C.340. The district court subsequently held a hearing to
determine his eligibility for the program, At that hearing, Aguilar-
Raygoza argued that he was a suitable candidate for the program and that
the statute's requirement that he must enter a guilty plea to be eligible for
treatment was unconstitutional because it penalized him for exercising his
fundamental right to a jury trial and deprived him of the equal protection
of the law.

‘The district court determined that while there is a

fundamental right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses, there is no

*The parties refer to the statute in question as NRS 484.37941, but
it was renumbered NRS 484C.340 after the parties filed their briefe. As
such, we will refer to it as NRS 484C.340.

 
om

 

fundamental right to participate in the alcohol treatment diversion
program provided in NRS 484.340, See Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489
US. 538, 541-43 (1989) (drawing a distinction between “petty” and
‘serious” offenses with respect to whether there is a Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial), The district court analyzed NRS 484C.340 under a

rational basis review and found that the statute is constitutional because

 

it does not significantly interfere with a defendant’s fundamental right to
a jury trial, The district court then concluded that Aguilar Raygoza wa
ineligible for the alcohol treatment program because he had elected to go
to trial rather than plead guilty or nolo contendere. The district court
sentenced Aguilar-Raygoza to 30 months in prison and ordered him to pay
a $2,000 fine, This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

‘The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which
this court reviews de novo. Collins v. State, 125 Nev. 60, 62, 203 P.3d 90,
91 (2009). Because statutes are presumed to be valid, Aguilar-Raygoza
bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that NRS 484C.340 is
unconstitutional. Douglas Disposal, Inc. v. Wee Haul, LLC, 123 Nev. 552,
567, 170 P.3d 508, 512 (2007).

‘Under NRS 484.340, a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo
contendere to his first felony DUI that is punishable under NRS
484C.400(1)(©) may apply to the court to undergo a program of treatment
for alcoholism or drug abuse? The State may “request a hearing on the

"The statute excludes defendants who have previously applied to
receive treatment under the statute and defendants who have certain
prior DUI convictions. NRS 484C.340(7)..

 
matter” and “present the court with any relevant evidence.” NRS
484C.340(2), (3). The court has discretion to deny the application and
sentence the defendant pursuant to NRS 484C.400(1)(c). See NRS
484C.340(1), (4). If the court decides to grant the application,

the court shall:... [iJmmediately, without
entering a judgment of conviction... suspend
further proceedings and place the offender on
probation for not more than 5 years upon the
condition that the offender be accepted for
treatment by a treatment facility, that the
offender complete the treatment satisfactorily and
that the offender comply with any other condition
ordered by the court.

NRS 484C.340(4)(a). ‘If a defendant completes the treatment
satisfactorily, the district court will enter a judgment of convietion for a
second-offense DUI, a misdemeanor, under NRS 484C.400. NRS
484C.340(4)(b)(3); NRS 484C.400(1)(b). But if a defendant is not accepted
for treatment, fails to satisfactorily complete treatment, or violates @
court-imposed condition, the court will enter a judgment of conviction and
ant with NRS 484C.400(1)(0)
for a felony DUI. NRS 484C.340(4)(b)(2), (5)(b)..

Aguilar-Raygoza argues that NRS 4840.340 places an

sentence the defendant to prison time con:

 

unconstitutional burden on his right to a trial by conditioning his
eligibility for a diversion program upon the waiver of that right and
violates due process and equal protection by treating defendants
differently based on their exercise or waiver of that right. We dis
Burden on exercise of constitutional rights

Relying primarily on United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968), Aguilar-Raygoza argues that NRS 484C.340 penalizes defendants

 

gree,

who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial by withholding

 

 
eligibility for a treatment program. ‘The State argues that the statutory
scheme provides a benefit for guilty or nolo contendere plea that does not
unconstitutionally burden a defendant's constitutional rights, similar to
the statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Corbitt v. New
Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978). We agree with the State,

sked to decide whether the United

 

In Jackson, the Court wa

 

 

States Constitution permits the establishment of a death penalty that is
applicable only to those defendants who assert the right to contest their
guilt before a jury, given that such a scheme discourages defendants from
exercising their right to a trial, 390 U.S. at 581. Under the federal
statute challenged in Jackson, a death sentence could be imposed for
kidnapping only upon a jury recommendation, whereas the maximum
penalty for defendants who pleaded guilty or executed a jury waiver was
life imprisonment. Id, at 672-81. The Court explained that “[iJf the
provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of
constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then
it would be patently unconstitutional.” Id, at 581. In evaluating the
provision’s purpose, the Court acknowledged that it could “be viewed as
ameliorating the severity of the more extreme punishment” by limiting the
death penalty to cases in which a jury recommends that penalty and that
such a goal “is an entirely legitimate one.” Id. at 582. But the Court
explained that Congress could not achieve that goal “by means that
needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights” and therefore
“the question is whether that [chilling] effect is unnecessary and therefore
excessive.” Id. The Court then concluded that the challenged provision

achieved its goal in a manner that needlessly penalized the assertion of

 

 
the constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. at 582-83. The Court thus
invalidated the death-penalty provision in the statute. Id, at 583, 591.
‘The Supreme Court later went on to distinguish Jackson in
Corbitt. There, the Court rejected a claim that a New Jersey statute
placed an unconstitutional burden on the exercise of the rights to a trial
and against self-incrimination by allowing a judge to choose between a
mandatory life sentence and a lesser sentence for a defendant who pleaded
non_vult (je, nolo contendere) to a murder indictment, whereas a
defendant who proceeded to trial would be sentenced based on the degree
of murder found by the jury, with a first-degree murder verdict carrying a
mandatory life sentence. 439 U.S, at 214-15, 218, Relying on Jackson, the
defendant complained that the statute burdened his constitutional rights
by providing more flexibility in the sentencing of a defendant who chose to
forgo a trial. Id, at 218. In distinguishing Jackson, the Court noted that
“the pressures to forgo trial and to plead to the charge in this case are not
what they were in Jackson” for two reasons, Id, at 217. First, unlike in
Jackson, the death penalty was not involved, and second, unlike in
Jackson, pleading non_vult would not avoid any risk of suffering the
maximum penalty because the judge accepting the non vult plea still had
authority to impose a life sentence. Id, The Court further explained that
based on the tolerance for and encouragement of plea negotiations that
offer substantial benefits in exchange for a plea, id, at 218-21, its cases
‘since Jackson “clearly established that not every burden on the exercise of
constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive
such a right, is invalid.” Id, at 218. The Court also noted that there was
“no element of retaliation or vindictiveness against Corbitt for going to
trial” and that “withholding the possibility of leniency from [those who

 
choose to go to trial] cannot be equated with impermissible punishment as
long as our cases sustaining plea bargaining remain undisturbed.” Id, at
223-24. ‘The Court in Corbitt thus recognized that defendants are often
put to difficult choices because the criminal justice system offers
opportunities to minimize risks by waiving constitutional rights but that

those difficult choices are permissible so long

 

the encouragement doos
not unnecessarily burden the exercise of the right.

In summarizing Corbitt and the other relevant cases in this
line of authority in the context of an alleged violation of the right against,
self-incrimination, we have noted that many courts distinguish between
an act of leniency and a penalty—a distinction that is based on the
accepted use of plea bargaining and the practice of granting leniency in
sentencing to those defendants who accept responsibility:

Several courts have distinguished between a
denied benefit (an act of leniency) and a penalty (a
harsher sentence) and have concluded that denial
of a sentencing reduction based on a defendant's
refusal to accept responsibility for his actions does
not constitute a penalty nor a sentence
enhancement and thus does not violate the
[United States Constitution]. These decisions rely
on a line of United States Supreme Court cases
upholding plea bargains and rejecting claims that
offers of lower sentences in exchange for guilty
pleas impermissibly compel defendants to
incriminate themselves as well as on the Iong-
standing practice of sentencing more leniently
those defendants who evidence contrition.

Dzulv. State, 118 Nev. 681, 692, 56 P.3d 875, 882-83 (2002).
ssibility of entering an alcohol

 

We conclude that the p.
treatment program provided in NRS 484C.340 is a form of leniency that is
available in exchange for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and is not an

 

 
unconstitutional penalty for refusing to enter such a plea or a burden on
the exercise of constitutional rights, Here, as in Corbitt, the pressures on
Aguilar-Raygoza to forgo trial and to plead to the charge are not what they
were in Jackson for two reasons. First, the death penalty is not a
possibility. Second, the maximum punishment for felony DUI is not
reserved only for those who insist on a jury trial; the defendant who
abandons the right to a jury trial is not assured that he will not be
sentenced to imprisonment under NRS 484C.400(1)(c). ‘The defendant
who pleads guilty or nolo contendere still must qualify for a treatment
program and, even if the defendant qualifies for a treatment program, the
judge accepting the plea has the authority to deny the application for
treatment and sentence the defendant to imprisonment for the same term
as a defendant who has been convicted upon a jury verdict. NRS.
484C.340; NRS 484C.400(1)(€); see also Picotti v, State, 124 Nev. 782, 794,
192 P.3d 704, 712 (2008) ({T]he provisions set forth in NRS
[484C.340]... merely give the district court discretion to allow a
defendant to complete a treatment program in order to obtain a conviction
and sentence for a lesser offense.”). And we see no reason to believe that
NRS 484C.340 “exerts such a powerful influence to coerce inaccurate pleas
[of guilty or nolo contendere] that it should be deemed constitutionally
suspect,” Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 225; rather, the choice confronting a
defendant charged with felony DUI gives rise to no more compulsion than
that present in a typical plea bargain. Nor is there any reason to conclude
that NRS 484C.340 was intended to punish defendants who insist on
going to trial. Like the possibility of probation at issue in Dzul, the
availability of a treatment program for defendants who accept

responsibility “is consistent with the historical practice and understanding

 

 
—s

 

that a sentence imposed upon a defendant may be shorter if rehabilitation
looks more certain and that confession and contrition are the first steps
along the road to rehabilitation.” 118 Nev. at 693, 56 P.3d at 883, While
Aguilar-Raygoza “was not given a benefit that may be extended to
defendants who accept responsibility for their wrongs,” id,, we conclude
that the deprivation of that benefit does not place an unconstitutional
burden on his constitutional rights.
Equal protection challenge

Aguilar-Raygoza also contends that NRS 484C.340 violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Again, we

disagree.

"We acknowledge that unlike the provisions at issue in Corbitt, NRS
484C.340 offers a benefit to defendants who plead guilty that is not
available to defendants who insist on going to trial. We are not convinced,
however, that this distinction turns NRS 484C.340 into an
‘unconstitutional burden on the exercise of the right to a jury trial.

“Additionally, Aguilar-Raygoza argues that NRS 484C.340 violates
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, The
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
the State may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1. “Substantive due
process guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property for arbitrary reasons.” Matter of Guardianship of L.S. & H.S.
120 Nev. 157, 166, 87 P.3d 521, 527 (2004) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Here, Aguilar-Raygoza was charged with felony DUI,
chose to go to trial, and was convicted by a jury based on evidence that
proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on that conviction, he
was lawfully sentenced pursuant to the provisions of NRS 484C.400(1)().
NRS 484C.340 did not operate to deprive Aguilar-Raygoza of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law or for arbitrary reasons.

 
‘The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no State may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Equal
protection of the law “has long been recognized to mean that no class of

 

persons shall be denied the same protection of the law which is enjoyed by
other classes in like circumstances.” Allen v. State, Pub. Emp. Ret. Bd.,
100 Nev. 130, 135, 676 P.2d 792, 795 (1984). According to Aguilar-
Raygoza, NRS 484C.340 is subject to strict scrutiny because it penalizes
him for exercising his right to a trial in that he was made ineligible for a
treatment program and the possibility of a lesser sentence and conviction
that comes with successful completion of a treatment program. See Arata
vy, Faubion, 123 Nev. 153, 169, 161 P.3d 244, 248 (2007) (explaining that
the level of scrutiny depends on whether the challenged statute infringes
We

 

on a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect cla
ais

 

ree.

Aguilar-Raygoza's equal protection challenge fails under the
holding in Corbitt. All defendants charged with felony DUI under NRS
484C.400(1)(c) have the same choice. Those choosing to proceed to trial
face a certainty of prison time if convicted, but they may be acquitted
instead. ‘Those choosing to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere forgo
the possibility of an acquittal and face the same prison sentence, but they
gain the possibility of leniency in the form of diversion to a treatment
program. Aguilar-Raygoza was not penalized for exercising his right to a
trial—regardless of whether he entered a plea or went to trial, either
action required him to give up the chance of a possible outcome. Aguilar-

Raygoza freely made the choice to go to trial. As the Supreme Court
observed in Corbitt, “[e]qual protection does not free those who made a bad

 

 
assessment of risks or a bad choice from the consequences of their
decision.” 439 U.S. at 226. We cannot conclude that, as a result of NRS
484C.340, those who choose to go to trial are “denied the same protection
of the law which is enjoyed by other classes in like circumstances.” Allen,
100 Nev. at 135, 676 P.2d at 795, Because the statute does not penalize a
defendant for exercising the fundamental right to a jury trial, it is not
subject to strict scrutiny. And we conclude that the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose, See Arata, 123 Nev. at 159,
161 P.3d at 248 (explaining the level of scrutiny that applies in the
absence of impingement on fundamental rights or a suspect classification).
In particular, the statute furthers the legitimate governmental purpose of
which
conserves scarce prosecutorial resources.’ See Corbitt, 499 U.S. at 221-23

extending a proper degree of leniency in return for @ guilty pl

 

&n.12, Consequently, Aguilar-Raygoza’s equal-protection claim must fail

5We recognize that the Legislature focused primarily on the reduced
recidivism rates and savings in incarceration costs produced by a pilot
DUI treatment program in Clark County, Nevada, when adopting NRS
484C.340, but courts are not limited to only considering justifications
asserted by the Legislature, as any conceivable rational basis for
enactment of the statute at issue will suffice. Sereika v. State, 114 Nev.
142, 149, 955 P.2d 175, 179 (1998). It may be that similar decreases in
recidivism and incarceration costs would be realized by allowing
defendants who are convicted after a jury trial to apply for a treatment
program. But because there is no constitutional violation in failing to do
80, it is for the Legislature to decide whether this program should be
available to all defendants charged with felony DUI regardless of how they
plead. See Clark County v. Sun State Properties, 119 Nev. 329, 340, 72
P.3d 954, 961 (2003) (stating that “[iJf the statute results in unfairness, it
is for the Legislature, not this court, to change the statutory scheme”).

 

 

un

 
Accordingly, we conclude that the portion of NRS 484C.340 at
issue is constitutional, and the district court did not err in denying
Aguilar-Raygoza’s request to be considered for the treatment program,

‘Therefore, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

5

Cherry

200)
Koos

 

ring