Case Title: Ex parte Louis Murray.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1131010

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 02/27/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1131010
____________________
Ex parte Louis Murray
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Louis Murray
v.
State of Alabama)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-83-462.64;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-12-1534)
STUART, Justice.
WRIT QUASHED.  NO OPINION.
1131010
Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Stuart, J., concurs specially.
Moore, C.J., and Bryan, J., dissent.
2
1131010
STUART, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with this Court's decision to quash the writ of
certiorari.  I write to explain my reasoning. 
In April 2013, Louis Murray filed his fifth Rule 32, Ala.
R. 
Crim. 
P., petition for postconviction relief, attacking his
sentence for his 1983 conviction for first-degree robbery,
which had been enhanced pursuant to the Habitual Felony
Offender Act, § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975, in light of the
State's proof that Murray had three prior felony convictions,
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  In
his Rule 32 petition, Murray alleged, among other grounds,
that his sentence was illegal because, he said, the trial
court had  improperly enhanced his sentence by applying a 1975
robbery conviction for which, he alleged, he had been
pardoned.  The circuit 
court 
summarily dismissed the petition;
Murray appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals.  The Court
of Criminal Appeals determined that the circuit court had
erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing on Murray's
claim that his sentence was illegal, and it remanded the case
by order for the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary
3
1131010
hearing to address Murray's claim that his sentence was
illegal.
 
Accordingly, on remand the circuit court conducted an
evidentiary hearing.  At the hearing, Murray testified that in
July 1980 the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the
Board") had granted him a full pardon, including the
restoration of his civil and political rights, for his 1975
robbery conviction. In support of his testimony, Murray
introduced into evidence a copy of a document entitled
"Certificate Granting Restoration of Civil and Political
Rights."  Murray also submitted the affidavit of Sarah Still,
a pardon-unit manager with the  Board.  In her affidavit,
Still averred that she had attempted to find Murray's file to
verify the 
authenticity 
of 
the 
"Certificate 
Granting
Restoration of Civil and Political Rights" but that she had
been unable to locate the file.  The circuit court also
admitted into evidence the facsimile cover sheet for Still's
affidavit.  The cover sheet states:
"Please see the attached pardon certificate on
Willie James Brown, aka Louis Murray, AIS# 109980.
[He] was pardoned on a 1975 Montgomery Co. robbery
case.  The pardon did not have any restrictions." 
4
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At the hearing, Murray argued that the pardon he received
in 1980 forgave not only the 1975 robbery conviction named in
the certificate granting the restoration of his civil and
political rights, but also his convictions that occurred
before the 1975 conviction, i.e., a 1966 felony receiving-
stolen-property conviction and a 1974 felony grand-larceny
conviction.  Additionally, Murray maintained, because he had
also been pardoned for the 1966 and 1974 felony  convictions,
those convictions could not be used to enhance his sentence
for his 1983 conviction.  Murray further contended that his
1981 conviction for being a felon in possession of a pistol,
see § 13A-11-72(a), Ala. Code 1975, could not be used to
enhance his sentence for the 1983 conviction because, he said,
the 1980 pardon had eradicated the legal effect of the felony
convictions (the robbery and larceny convictions) upon which
the 1981 conviction was based.  
In response, the State argued that, even if Murray had
been pardoned for the 1975 robbery conviction, that pardon did
not preclude the use for sentence-enhancement purposes of
convictions entered before the 1975 robbery conviction.  The
State introduced into evidence a certified copy of Murray's
5
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1975 robbery conviction as well as certified copies of three
other felony convictions attributable to Murray -- a 1966
receiving-stolen-property conviction, a 1974 grand-larceny
conviction, and a 1981 conviction for possession of a pistol
after having been convicted of a crime of violence.  Each of
those 
convictions 
were 
entered 
before 
Murray's 
1983
conviction, the sentence for which was at issue during the
hearing.
Following the hearing, the circuit court issued an order
finding that the Board had granted Murray a pardon for his
1975 robbery conviction and that that conviction had been
improperly used to enhance Murray's sentence for his 1983
conviction.  The circuit court further found that Murray was
not entitled to relief from the sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole imposed pursuant to his 1983
conviction because, it determined, even without the 1975
conviction Murray had three prior felony convictions that
could have been used to enhance his sentence.
On return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the circuit court's judgment by an unpublished
memorandum.  Murray v. State (No. CR-12-1534, April 25, 2014),
6
1131010
___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014)(table).  This Court
granted certiorari review to determine the effect of  the
pardon for Murray's 1975 robbery conviction, i.e., whether 
the pardon of that conviction precluded the use for sentence-
enhancement 
purposes 
of 
convictions 
preceding 
the 
1975 
robbery
conviction.   
1
In my opinion, the circuit court and the Court of
Criminal Appeals properly determined that Murray was not
entitled to a new sentencing hearing.  To obtain the requested
relief of a new sentencing hearing, Murray had to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that the pardon of his 1975
robbery conviction also pardoned his "prior disqualifying
convictions."   Murray did not meet this burden.
2
Murray's contention that use of his 1981 felon-in-
1
possession-of-a-pistol conviction to enhance his sentence was
improper is not properly before us.  Murray's argument
challenges the propriety of the felon-in-possession-of-a-
pistol conviction.  Such an argument must be made in a Rule 32
petition 
challenging 
that 
conviction, 
and 
a 
determination 
that
that conviction is invalid must be made before a determination
that the use of that conviction to enhance his 1983 sentence
was improper can be made.  Sanford v. State, 784 So. 2d 1080,
1082 n.2 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000)("A Rule 32 petition can
challenge only one conviction or the convictions that arose
out of one proceeding.  LeBlanc v. State, 609 So. 2d 9 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1992).").
Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides that a petitioner
2
shall have the burden of "proving by a preponderance of the
7
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The Board's authority to act is governed by § 15-22-36,
Ala. Code 1975, which states, in pertinent part:
"(a) 
In 
all 
cases, 
except 
treason 
and
impeachment and cases in which sentence of death is
imposed and not commuted, as is provided by law, the
Board of Pardons and Paroles shall have the
authority and power, after conviction and not
otherwise, to grant pardons and paroles and to remit
fines and forfeitures.
"(b) Each member of the Board of Pardons and
Paroles favoring a pardon, parole, remission of a
fine or forfeiture, or restoration of civil and
political rights shall enter in the file his or her
reasons in detail, which entry and the order shall
be public records, but all other portions of the
file shall be privileged.
"(c) No pardon shall relieve one from civil and
political 
disabilities 
unless 
specifically 
expressed
in the pardon. ..."3
(Emphasis added.)
"In determining the meaning of a statute, this
Court looks to the plain meaning of the words as
written by the legislature. As we have said:
"'"Words used in a statute must be given
their 
natural, 
plain, 
ordinary, 
and
commonly understood meaning, and where
evidence facts 
necessary to 
entitle the petitioner 
to relief."
Although § 15-22-36 has been amended several times since 
3
1980, when Murray received his pardon for the 1975 robbery
conviction, with the exception of several minor changes in
capitalization and punctuation, the quoted portion of the
statute remains unchanged.
8
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plain language is used a court is bound to
interpret that language to mean exactly
what it says. If the language of the
statute is unambiguous, then there is no
room for judicial construction and the
clearly 
expressed 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature
must be given effect."'
"Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d
293, 296 (Ala. 1998)(quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems
Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala.
1992))."
DeKalb Cnty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270,
275–76 (Ala. 1998). 
A plain reading of § 15-22-36 reveals that the
legislature vested in the Board the authority to grant an
individual a pardon, a parole, the remission of a fine or
forfeiture, or the restoration of civil and political rights. 
The use of the conjunction "or" in § 15-22-36(b) indicates
that the legislature viewed each act by the Board as separate
and distinct.  In § 15-22-36(c), the legislature has
specifically provided that, if the Board grants a pardon, the
pardoned individual's civil and political rights are not
restored by that pardon unless the pardon includes language
expressly restoring those rights.  Additionally,  nothing in
the language of § 15-22-36 indicates that the Board's 
restoration of civil and political rights to an individual who
9
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has been convicted of an offense means that the Board thereby
grants a pardon for that particular conviction.  Indeed,
treating the Board's restoration of an individual's civil and
political rights as necessarily including a pardon for the
particular conviction would ignore the fact that, under § 15-
22-36(b) and (c), the restoration of a person's civil and
political rights and a pardon are separate and distinct
matters.  Cf.  Harrison v. Wigington, 269 Ga. 388, 389, 497
S.E.2d 568, 569 (1998)(recognizing that the authority of the
Georgia Board of Pardon and Paroles "to grant pardons is an
entirely separate and distinct power from its authority to
remove disabilities imposed by law").
Unfortunately, it appears that this Court, in its
election-contest caselaw, has used the term "pardon" as a
blanket expression for different acts of the Board.  For
example, in  Hogan v. Hartwell, 242 Ala. 646, 649, 7 So. 2d
889, 890 (1942), an election-contest case, this Court, when
interpreting the import of the Board's act of restoring "'all
Alabama Civil and Political Rights,'" labeled the Board's act
as a "pardon" rather than identifying the specific act of the
Board and refining its analysis to that specific act. 
10
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Likewise, in State ex rel. Sokira v. Burr, 580 So. 2d 1340
(Ala. 1991), another election-contest case, this Court again
used the blanket term "pardon" when analyzing the import of
the Board's grant of a "Certificate of Discharge from Parole
with Restoration of Civil and Political Rights."4
In Ex parte Casey, 852 So. 2d 175 (Ala. 2002), this Court
was asked to determine the import of the Board's grant of a
pardon that included the restoration of 
the 
individual's civil
and political rights.  After considering the holding in Burr,
that a "pardon," which included language expressly restoring
an individual's civil and political rights, restored the
individual's civil and political privileges taken away by the
felony conviction, removing all legal incapacities resulting
from that conviction, this Court held that a full and
unconditional pardon for a specific conviction that included
a 
reference 
to 
"all 
prior 
disqualifying 
convictions" 
precluded
the use of the specific conviction named in the pardon as well
as the use of all convictions received before the named
conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes under the
An appellate court can take judicial notice of the record
4
of other appellate proceedings before the same court.  Veteto
v. Swanson Servs. Corp., 886 So. 2d 756, 764 n. 1 (Ala. 2003).
11
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Habitual Felony Offender Act.   The record in Ex parte Casey
5
unequivocally established that the Board had granted Casey a
pardon that included the restoration of his civil and
political rights.  This Court held that the language in the
pardon certificate established that the Board's grant of a
pardon had "blotted out" Casey's guilt with respect to the
named 
1968/1969 
convictions 
as 
well 
as 
any 
"prior
disqualifying convictions" and that any legal disabilities
resulting from those convictions had been removed.  852 So. 2d
at 181.  This Court stated that the pardon made Casey "a new
and innocent man" and, consequently, that any convictions
entered before the  1968/1969 convictions named in the pardon
certificate could not be used for sentence-enhancement
purposes.  Id. 
In my opinion, for the holding in Ex parte Casey to apply
in this case and for Murray to establish that he was entitled
to a new sentencing hearing, Murray was required to present
evidence demonstrating that the Board granted a pardon for his
I recognize the principle of stare decisis and that Ex
5
parte Casey is precedent.  However, I adhere to my dissent in
Ex parte Casey; I believe that the case was wrongly decided
and should be overruled.  
12
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1975 robbery conviction and that the pardon included a
reference to 
"all prior disqualifying convictions."  Here, the
circuit court found that the Board granted Murray a pardon for
his 1975 robbery conviction.  However, unlike Ex parte Casey,
in which the circuit court admitted into evidence a document
that unequivocally stated that Casey had been pardoned for his 
1968/1969 
forgery 
convictions 
and 
for 
"all 
prior 
disqualifying
convictions," the record in this case does not include any
evidence of the legal effect of the pardon with regard to
Murray's prior convictions.  The circuit court did not find,
and none of the evidence admitted at the hearing established,
that the Board's grant of a pardon for Murray's 1975 robbery
conviction included forgiveness for Murray's convictions that
precede his 1975 robbery conviction.  I cannot agree with the
dissent that an unverified statement, which generally is
inadmissible under the Alabama Rules of Evidence, by a pardon-
unit manager satisfies Murray's burden of proof and supports
reversal of the circuit court's judgment. Therefore, the
circuit court properly held that Murray was not entitled to a
new sentencing hearing. 
13
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Moreover, I cannot agree with the dissent that the
Board's act of restoring Murray's civil and political rights
is equivalent to a pardon by the Board.  The certificate of
restoration of political and civil rights admitted into
evidence does not contain any language establishing that the
Board granted Murray a pardon for the 1975 robbery conviction
and that the pardon included language forgiving "all prior
disqualifying convictions."  Indeed, the only time the word
"pardon" is used in the certificate admitted into evidence is
to identify the issuing party, the "State Board of Pardons and
Paroles."  Because nothing in the record establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that Murray's pardon for the
1975 robbery conviction requires the preclusion of the use for
sentence-enhancement purposes of convictions preceding the
1975 robbery conviction, the circuit court did not err in
refusing to conduct a new sentencing hearing.
Furthermore, I cannot interpret this Court's caselaw to
require that any and all acts by the Board are pardons that
"blot out" an individual's guilt.  In both Hogan and Burr, the
Court focused on the implication of the restoration of an
individual's civil and political rights with regard to the
14
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individual's eligibility to run for public office.  These
cases should not be read to mean that any and all acts of the
Board are pardons or that any and all acts of the Board "blot
out" individuals' guilt for the named convictions as well as
any prior disqualifying convictions, making the individuals
"new and innocent" men or women.  To the extent that Hogan and
Burr can be interpreted to hold that any and all acts by the
Board are "pardons," those cases should be overruled. 
15
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MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
This Court granted Louis Murray's petition for a writ of
certiorari to review whether the 1980 pardon for his 1975
robbery conviction also made his earlier felony convictions
unavailable as predicate acts for sentence enhancement under
the Habitual Felony Offender Act, § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975
("the HFOA"), and for purposes of a felon-in-possession-of-a-
pistol conviction, § 13A-11-72(a), Ala. Code 1975. Because I
have determined, as explained below, that Murray's sentence
was illegal, I dissent from this Court's order quashing the
writ.
I. Background
In 1983 Murray, then 37 years old, was convicted of armed
robbery. See Murray v. State, 453 So. 2d 774 (Ala. Crim. App.
1984). Finding that Murray had three prior 
felony 
convictions,
the trial court sentenced him under the HFOA to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  Now 68 years
6
old, Murray seeks review of the denial of his fifth Rule 32,
At the time of Murray's sentencing in 1983, the HFOA
6
provided that a defendant who had been previously convicted of
three felonies and who then was convicted of a Class A felony
"must be punished by imprisonment for life without parole." §
13A-5-9(c)(3), Ala. Code 1975.
16
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Ala. R. Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief. His
argument that his sentence is illegal is sufficient to avoid
the Rule 32 bars of untimeliness and successiveness. Rule
32.2(b) and (c). "[A] challenge to an illegal sentence is
jurisdictional and can be raised at any time." Ginn v. State,
894 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
At the time of Murray's 1983 armed-robbery conviction, he
had four prior felony convictions: receiving stolen property
(1966); grand larceny (1974); robbery (1975); and being a
felon in possession of a pistol (1981). The "Certificate
Granting Restoration of Civil and Political Rights" 
to 
Murray,
dated July 14, 1980, reads as follows:
"It having been made to appear to the Alabama
State Board of Pardons and Paroles that [Murray] was
convicted in Montgomery County [in 1975] of robbery,
was sentenced to a term of Ten (10) years and was
released from incarceration on February 19, 1979,
and the term of the maximum sentence has now
expired, and 
"It further appearing to the Board from the
official report of the Parole Supervisor which is a
part of the record in this case, and with no further
information to the contrary, that the above named
has so conducted himself since release as to
demonstrate his reformation and to merit restoration
of civil and political rights;
17
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"NOW, 
in 
compliance 
with the 
authority vested 
in
the State Board of Pardons and Paroles by the
Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama to
restore civil and political rights, it is
"ORDERED that all disabilities resulting from
the 
above 
stated 
conviction 
and 
all 
prior
disqualifying convictions be and they are hereby
removed and the civil and political rights of the
above named are restored."
(Capitalization in original; emphasis added.)
Murray argues that the 1980 pardon of his 1975 robbery
conviction eliminated that conviction as a predicate act for
enhanced sentencing. Because the three remaining felonies
would still support his enhanced sentence, he further argues
that language in the restoration-of-rights certificate
exonerated him from all prior felony convictions, not just the
1975 conviction specifically identified in that document. He
thus argues that he would have only one prior felony
conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes -- the 1981
conviction for being a felon in possession of a pistol. He
further argues that the 1981 conviction was improper because
the 1980 certificate fully restored his civil rights,
including the right to carry a firearm. Thus, as Murray stated
in the circuit court: "I stand before Judge Reese today as a
first offender felon."
18
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At the time Murray was sentenced for the 1983 first-
degree robbery conviction, the sentencing range for first-
degree robbery, a Class A felony, § 13A-8-41(c), Ala. Code
1975, was imprisonment for life or for 10 to 99 years. § 13A-
5-6(1), Ala. Code 1975. If a firearm or deadly weapon were
used in the commission of the robbery, the minimum sentence
was 20 years. § 13A-5-6(4), Ala. Code 1975. Murray thus argues
that his sentence of life imprisonment without 
the 
possibility
of parole is illegal. Alternatively, he argues that, even if
the restoration-of-rights certificate is not viewed as a
pardon of anything other than the 1975 conviction, the
restoration of his civil rights, which applied to "all prior
disqualifying convictions," removed the underpinnings of his
felon-in-possession-of-a-pistol conviction, thus entitling
him, at a minimum, to be resentenced on the basis of two prior
felony convictions -- the 1966 and 1974 convictions -- rather
than three.7
The phrase "and all prior disqualifying convictions" is
7
not meaningless boilerplate. Other pardons have omitted this
phrase. For instance, in a 1991 case, this Court construed a
certificate that stated: "'Ordered that all disabilities
resulting from the above stated conviction be and they are
hereby removed and the civil and political rights of the above
named are restored.'" State ex rel. Sokira v. Burr, 580 So. 2d
1340, 1341 (Ala. 1991). That certificate, unlike the one in
19
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II. Analysis
A. Effect of the 1980 Pardon on Prior Convictions
Murray's "Certificate Granting Restoration of Civil and
Political Rights" does not specifically use the 
word "pardon."
However, the circuit court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, and
the State of Alabama as the appellee all construe Murray's
restoration certificate, which specifically identifies his
1975 robbery conviction, as a pardon for that conviction. In
its remand order of October 25, 2013, the Court of Criminal
Appeals noted that Sarah Still, the pardon-unit manager with
the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, had transmitted a
facsimile to the Montgomery County District Attorney's office
"stating that Murray had received a pardon for his 1975
conviction and that '[t]he pardon did not have any
restrictions.'"  In that facsimile, the pardon-unit manager
8
this case, made no mention of removing disabilities from "all
prior disqualifying convictions." See also United States v.
Swanson, 947 F.2d 914, 915-16 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that
a restoration certificate that also applied to "any prior
disqualifying 
convictions" 
restored 
political 
and 
civil 
rights
not only for the conviction specified in the certificate but
also for a prior conviction).
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that "'pardoned
8
convictions cannot be used to enhance [a] sentence under the
Habitual Felony Offender Act.'" Remand Order 
(quoting 
Ex 
parte
Casey, 852 So. 2d 175, 181 (Ala. 2002)).
20
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specifically identified the "Certificate Granting Restoration
of Civil and Political Rights" as a "pardon certificate." The
facsimile states: "Please see the attached pardon certificate
on Willie James Brown, aka Louis Murray, AIS #109,980.
S[ubject] was pardoned on a 1975 Montgomery Co. robbery case.
The pardon did not have any restrictions." This cover sheet
from the manager of the pardon unit uses the word "pardon"
three times to describe Murray's "Certificate Granting
Restoration of Civil and Political Rights."  
In its order of November 20, 2013, denying on remand
Murray's petition for a new sentencing hearing, the circuit
court 
stated: 
"Petitioner's 
earlier 
conviction 
for 
Robbery 
was
Pardoned and cannot be used for HFOA purposes." In its
subsequent unpublished memorandum of April 25, 2014, 
on 
return
to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that Murray
had introduced into evidence in his remand hearing "a copy of
that pardon." The only such document in the record is the
restoration 
certificate. 
The 
Court 
of 
Criminal 
Appeals 
further
stated that the circuit court's finding that Murray had
received a full pardon for his 1975 robbery conviction "is
supported by the record, and we agree that Murray's 1975
21
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robbery conviction was fully pardoned and was improperly used
for sentence enhancement under the [HFOA]." The 
State 
concurs:
"The trial court and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
correctly held that Murray's pardoned conviction, the 1975
robbery conviction, could not be used to enhance his sentence
...." State's brief, at 9 (emphasis added).
The interpretation that a restoration certificate
operates as a pardon finds further support in two controlling
opinions of this Court. In Hogan v. Hartwell, 242 Ala. 646,
649, 7 So. 2d 889, 890 (1942), this Court was interpreting
"the order of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles restoring
to said Hartwell 'all Alabama Civil and Political Rights.'"
Responding to the argument that "there was no pardon and that
restoration of 
[appellee's] 
civil rights was 
without
foundation," the Court stated that "this argument overlooks
the broad and comprehensive meaning of the word 'pardon' as
found in the authorities to the effect that it is a
declaration on record by 'the chief magistrate of a state or
country that a person named is relieved from the legal
consequences of a specific crime.'" 242 Ala. at 650, 7 So. 2d
22
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at 891. This statement is consistent with the proposition that
a restoration certificate operates as a pardon.  
9
In State ex rel. Sokira v. Burr, 580 So. 2d 1340, 1341
(Ala. 1991), this Court interpreted a certificate that
contained restoration language identical to that in Murray's
certificate. The certificate in Burr was not styled as a
pardon, but instead was entitled "Certificate of Discharge
from Parole with Restoration of Civil and Political Rights."10
This Court referred to that document as a "certificate of
pardon," Burr, 580 So. 2d at 1341, and stated that "the
pardon, expressly restoring all of Burr's civil and political
rights, returned to him each civil and political privilege
taken away by his felony conviction." 580 So. 2d at 1345
(emphasis added).
Thus, under this Court's precedents and also under the
facts of this case, Murray's restoration certificate pardoned
In 1980, the Board may have given Murray a certificate
9
restoring rights rather than one also expressly pardoning the
offense because he had already served his sentence and thus
had no need for relief from the penalty of imprisonment.
The certificate at issue in Burr is in the record on
10
appeal in that case, which is available on microfilm at the
Alabama State Law Library.
23
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not only his 1975 robbery conviction, but also, as stated in
the certificate, "all prior disqualifying convictions."
B.
The Felon-in-Possession-of-a-Pistol Conviction
Even if Murray's restoration certificate is construed
merely to restore civil rights and not to operate as a pardon,
he is still entitled to have his felon-in-possession-of-a-
pistol conviction disregarded for HFOA purposes. Because the
restoration certificate did restore Murray's civil and
political rights, including removing "disabilities resulting
from ... all prior disqualifying convictions," he was legally
entitled to be in possession of a firearm a year after the
restoration certificate was executed when he was convicted of
being a felon in possession of a pistol.
The right to bear arms is a civil right protected under
both the state and federal constitutions. See Art. I, § 26,
Ala. Const. 1901; Amend. II, U.S. Const. "Under Alabama law,
then, the Board's restoration to [Murray], without express
limitation, of 'all civil and political rights' means exactly
what it says: It nullifies 'any and all legal incapacities,'
including the right to possess firearms." United States v.
Swanson, 947 F.2d 914, 918 (11th Cir. 1991) (footnote
24
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omitted). By contrast the "Certificate of Restoration 
of 
Civil
Rights" at issue in James v. United States, 19 F.3d 1, 2 (11th
Cir. 1994) "expressly grant[ed] the restoration of civil
rights 'except the specific authority to possess or own a
firearm.'" Interpreting Alabama law, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit logically concluded that
James's "restoration of civil rights excluded the right to
possess firearms." Id. 
In Sanders v. State, 854 So. 2d 143 (Ala. Crim. App.
2002), a case on all fours with this one on the felon-in-
possession-of-a-pistol issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals
considered a Rule 32 petition that sought reversal of a 1983
felon-in-possession-of-a-pistol 
conviction 
that 
was 
based 
upon
a 1969 robbery conviction for which Sanders had been pardoned
in 1979. Sanders's felon-in-possession conviction arose from
a guilty plea, as did Murray's. Finding that Sanders's claim
was jurisdictional and thus not time-barred, the Court of
Criminal Appeals remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing
"regarding Sanders's allegation that the court was without
jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea for possessing a pistol
as a violent offender where, before the indictment for the
25
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offense of possession of a pistol, the Board had formally
reinstated Sanders's civil and political rights following his
1969 conviction." 854 So. 2d at 145. The Sanders court also
noted that the "possession-of-a-pistol conviction" could not
be used for enhancement purposes under the HFOA because the
"1969 robbery conviction could not be used as a predicate
offense." 854 So. 2d at 144 n.3.
Sanders relied upon United States v. Fowler, 198 F.3d 808
(11th Cir. 1999), which states: 
"Alabama law empowers the State Board of Pardons and
Paroles to restore the right of a person convicted
of a crime of violence to possess a firearm. Without
an express limitation on the certificate restoring
civil and political rights to Fowler, under Alabama
law the restoration of civil and political rights
restores 
the 
firearm 
rights 
limited 
by 
§
13A-11-72(a)[, Ala. Code 1975]."
198 F.3d at 811 (emphasis added). Murray's counsel argued this
point as follows at the circuit court hearing on Murray's Rule
32 petition:
"[T]his restoration of rights and full pardon with
no restrictions at a minimum allowed [Murray] -- it
pardoned his 1975 conviction for which it was for
and also restored his right to carry a firearm, 
which would negate his later conviction for carrying
a firearm."
26
1131010
Because 
Murray's 
felon-in-possession-of-a-pistol
conviction was invalid and his 1975 robbery conviction was
pardoned, the 1983 sentencing court had only two prior
felonies with which to enhance Murray's sentence: grand
larceny (1974) and  receiving stolen property (1966). As
Murray's counsel argued at the remand hearing in the circuit
court: "So it would remove at a minimum those two convictions
and leave him with a maximum of two felony convictions." Under
the HFOA in effect at that time, the trial court could have
sentenced Murray based on two prior felonies to life
imprisonment or a fixed term of at least 99 years. § 13A-5-
9(b)(3). In that event he would have been eligible for
parole.11
III. Conclusion
The special concurrence seeks to avoid this conclusion
11
by stating that Murray must bring a new and separate Rule 32
proceeding to challenge the legality of his 1981 felon-in-
possession-of-a-pistol conviction. See ___ So. 3d at ___ n.1.
In this proceeding, however, Murray is challenging his 1983
sentence, which depended for its legality upon the validity of
the 
1981 
felon-in-possession 
conviction. 
Thus, 
that 
conviction
is properly at issue in this case. The determination of its
validity requires no additional facts but depends completely
on the interpretation of the 1980 certificate, which is the
issue before us in this case.
27
1131010
The circuit court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the
pardon-unit manager, and the State of Alabama all concede that
Murray received a pardon for his 1975 robbery conviction. The
only plausible reading of the record is that the "Certificate
Granting Restoration of Civil and Political Rights" is also
Murray's pardon certificate. The "and all prior disqualifying
convictions" 
language 
in 
that 
certificate 
thus 
eliminates 
both
the 1966 conviction for receiving stolen property and the 1974
conviction for grand larceny as predicate acts for both HFOA
purposes and for the felon-in-possession-of-a-pistol statute.
Accordingly, Murray, who is serving a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, is 
entitled 
to
be resentenced "as a first offender felon" for his 1983 first-
degree robbery conviction and would be eligible for parole. In
the alternative, even if the restoration certificate is
interpreted only to restore civil rights and not to pardon,
Murray should have been sentenced under the HFOA based on two
prior felonies rather than three and thus would also be
eligible for parole. In either case, "[s]ince the first
sentence imposed on [the defendant] was invalid, the trial
court had not only the power, but the duty, to sentence [the
28
1131010
defendant] as required by law." Hughes v. State, 518 So. 2d
890, 891 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
29