Case Title: Dempsey v. Denman

Citation: 442 So. 2d 63

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1983-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
442 So. 2d 63 (1983)
Jerome V. DEMPSEY
v.
Robert R. DENMAN.
82-485.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 2, 1983.
Jack W. Smith of Smith & Smith, Dothan, for appellant.
James F. Martin of Martin & Brackin, Dothan, for appellee.
FAULKNER, Justice.
Dempsey appeals from a judgment of the circuit court dismissing his counterclaim. We affirm.
The facts of this case are that on July 30, 1982, the plaintiff, Robert R. Denman, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, alleging malicious prosecution arising out of the arrest of Denman on or about the 28th day of October, 1981, on a warrant obtained by the defendant, Jerome V. Dempsey.
Dempsey filed an answer to the complaint and a counterclaim alleging abuse of legal process. This counterclaim stated, in part:
Denman moved to dismiss Dempsey's counterclaim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court dismissed the counterclaim. Dempsey then filed an amended counterclaim based on abuse of legal process, which averred, in part:
Denman moved to dismiss each count of Dempsey's amended counterclaim on the grounds that none of the statements of the counterclaims stated a cause of action upon which relief would be granted; that in the juvenile proceedings Dempsey was not involved as a party; that no legal process was instigated concerning the carrying of a pistol by Dempsey's wife; and, on the matter of the suit for a right of way, that an action is described that does not say any more about the bringing of that action than that it was brought to harass, embarrass, humiliate and cause Dempsey great expense.
The circuit court entered a final order dismissing each count of the counterclaim on June 24, 1983. Dempsey appealed to this court from that order, alleging that the amended counterclaim did state a good and valid cause of action within the meaning of A.R.C.P. 8(a) and, further, that the court erred in dismissing the amended counterclaim without a hearing on the motion to dismiss and without considering affidavits or other verified evidence. We do not agree.
A.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) requires that a pleading set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Under this rule the prime purpose of pleadings is to give notice. Fraternal Order of Police, Strawberry Lodge # 40 v. Entrekin, 294 Ala. 201, 314 So. 2d 663 (1975). A.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) interacts with A.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), which permits *65 dismissal of a complaint, or counterclaim, for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
The classic statement of the proper test of the sufficiency of a complaint, under 12(b)(6), appears in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
355 U.S.  at 45-46, 78 S. Ct.  at 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d  at 84.
This rule has been adopted by this court. See, e.g. Lavoie v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 374 So. 2d 310 (Ala.1979); Pugh v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc., 369 So. 2d 796, 798 (Ala.1979); Entrekin, supra.
Implicit in Conley and our cases is the requirement that the relief to which plaintiff may be entitled under a provable set of facts must be relief according to a cognizable theory of law. Entrekin, supra. The theory of recovery espoused by Dempsey, in asserting his claim for relief, is abuse of legal process. This tort is defined as the perversion of a regular and valid process, which has been duly and properly issued, whereby a result not lawfully or properly attainable under it is secured. Duncan v. Kent, 370 So. 2d 288 (Ala.1979); Dickerson v. Schwabacher, 177 Ala. 371, 58 So. 986 (1912). To maintain an action for abuse of process, existence of an ulterior motive must be proved. Clikos v. Long, 231 Ala. 424, 165 So. 394 (1936).
72 C.J.S. Process § 120 (1951) states, at 1190-91:
Furthermore, 1 Am.Jur.2d Abuse of Process § 13 (1962) states:
See also Duncan v. Kent, supra.
An examination of Dempsey's amended counterclaim, in view of the principles set out above, leads us to conclude that Mr. Dempsey has failed to state a claim for abuse of legal process. Viewing the counterclaim even in a light most favorable to Mr. Dempsey, we are convinced that he could prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief under any of the three counts.
First, under Count One of the complaint concerning the action brought against Dempsey's children, abuse of process will not lie because no result was obtained that is unlawful or improperly attainable under the law. The charges were dismissed, and the count does not aver that Dempsey was damaged in any way before the bringing of this action.
Second, it is clear that abuse of process will not lie for Count Two concerning the alleged charge against Dempsey's wife made to the Board of Commissioners of Houston County, since no regular and valid process was issued against Mrs. Dempsey in that instance.
In Count Three, the fact that the civil suit instituted against Dempsey has not terminated will not bar Dempsey's claim for abuse of process. See Tarver v. Household Finance Corp., 291 Ala. 25, 277 So. 2d 330 (1973). However, the result of the suit alleged to have been intended and accomplished by Denman, i.e., the securing of a right of way, is precisely the result intended by the law to be effected by the process that is issued in such a suit. Abuse of process, therefore, cannot be under *66 the facts alleged in Count Three of Dempsey's counterclaim.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Dempsey's amended counterclaim, and, thus, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and ALMON, EMBRY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.