Case Title: Perkins v. City of Lawrence

Citation: 177 Kan. 612, 281 P.2d 1077

Docket Number: 39,566

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1955-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
177 Kan. 612 (1955)
281 P.2d 1077
A.A. PERKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE CITY OF LAWRENCE, KANSAS, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 39,566

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 9, 1955.
A.A. Perkins, of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the briefs pro se.
Charles D. Stough, of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the briefs for defendant-appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SMITH, J.:
This is an action for damages alleged to have been sustained when gasoline alleged to have been negligently spilled in the street by three of defendants was negligently ignited by an employee of the defendant city and plaintiff's automobile was destroyed. The demurrer of the defendant city to the petition was sustained. Plaintiff has appealed.
The petition named as defendants The City of Lawrence, the fire chief, a fireman and three other corporate and personal defendants. It alleged the incorporation of Lawrence; the official capacity of the firemen; that Powell operated as the Powell Construction Company; that Parker operated the Parker Buick Company in Lawrence and that the Standard Oil Company was a corporation; that Parker's Standard Oil Service Station, located at 700 New Hampshire Street, was under the joint control of the Parker Buick Company and the Standard Oil Company on January 30, 1952; that they were engaged in removing gasoline storage tanks from the ground, pursuant to a contract between them; that plaintiff's automobile was parked nearby in the street; that defendants, Standard Oil Company, Parker Buick Company and Powell Construction Company, negligently *613 spilled large quantities of gasoline on to the street along the curbings and it accumulated under cars, especially plaintiff's car, creating a dangerous hazard for the lives and property of the public; the fire department of the city was called and Fireman Bowen at the direction of Chief Ingels negligently touched a cigarette lighter to the surface of the street, causing gasoline fumes to burst into flame and destroying plaintiff's automobile; that the spilling of the gasoline and its spreading created a dangerous condition and the destruction of plaintiff's automobile was the direct result of the negligence stated.
The petition then set out four particulars in which the three companies were negligent and alleged the city's fire department was negligent as follows:
The petition then alleged demand on the city and nonpayment.
The defendant city demurred to this petition on the ground it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against it.
The plaintiff argues the rule long followed by us that a city is not liable for torts committed by its employees and agents in the operation of its governmental capacity should be overruled. He concedes that following our decisions, cities are liable for torts committed by the employees and agents of a city while acting for a city in its proprietary capacity, but argues there is no sound basis for any distinction as to liability between the two activities.
*614 Barcus v. City of Coffeyville, 129 Kan. 238, 282 Pac. 698, was an action by a widow and children for damages for the death of the husband and father alleged to have been caused by negligence of the city when its fire truck driven by its firemen on the way to a fire collided with the car in which he was riding.
The defendant city's demurrer to the petition was overruled and it appealed. We held:
In the opinion we referred to 9 A.L.R. 143 and 33 A.L.R. 688 for notations.
We quoted 9 A.L.R. to the following effect:
We then remarked that more than two hundred cases were collected in those two notes to the effect that the fire department belonged to the governmental branch of the municipality and in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, the city was not liable for any injuries to person or property resulting from negligence connected with the maintenance and operation of it.
In Perry v. City of Independence, 146 Kan. 177, 69 P.2d 706, we held to the same effect.
See, also Rhodes v. City of Kansas City, 167 Kan. 719, 208 P.2d 275, where we said:
There we held:
But little can be gained by adding more citations to this opinion.
*615 The plaintiff makes an argument to the effect that there is no real reason for drawing a distinction between the proprietary capacity and the governmental capacity of a city. This opinion is scarcely the place to engage in a debate on that question. For many years courts in general have been committed to the doctrine that there is such a distinction.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.