Case Title: Anderson v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 062051

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.1 
 
ANGEL M. ANDERSON 
 
v.  Record No. 062051 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
September 14, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-310.2:1, the taking of a person's DNA upon arrest for 
certain crimes constitutes an unconstitutional seizure.  We 
also consider whether the presentation of DNA evidence in this 
case violated the defendant's right of confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On July 23, 1991, Laura M. Berry ("Berry") was raped, 
sodomized, and robbed while walking to the school where she 
worked.  After the attack, Berry walked to the school and 
notified police.  Berry was taken to the hospital where 
Detective Steven G. Milefsky ("Milefsky") took her statement.  
Dr. Val Chapman ("Dr. Chapman") examined Berry and used a 
physical evidence recovery kit ("PERK") to collect specimens 
for evidence.  Dr. Chapman then gave the PERK to Milefsky. 
                     
 
1 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 
August 16, 2007. 
 
2
 
Milefsky took the PERK he received from Dr. Chapman to 
the Virginia Forensic Laboratory in Fairfax County (the 
"laboratory") and gave the PERK to a clerk at the laboratory.  
On July 25, 1991, Karen C. Ambrozy ("Ambrozy"), a forensic 
scientist employed by the Commonwealth of Virginia's Division 
of Forensic Science obtained the PERK.  Ambrozy received the 
PERK from another person working in the laboratory's forensic 
biology section.  Ambrozy analyzed and conducted DNA analysis 
on vaginal swabs contained in the PERK.  On January 9, 1992, 
Milefsky picked the PERK up from a clerk at the laboratory and 
returned it to the Fairfax County police property room (the 
"police property room"). 
 
In 2001, Milefsky took the PERK to the laboratory and 
again left it with one of the laboratory clerks.  During the 
time the PERK was at the laboratory in 2001, Ambrozy conducted 
more DNA analysis.  As part of the process, Kari Yoshida 
("Yoshida"), a laboratory technician, prepared the product gel 
as part of the process for Ambrozy to determine if she had 
obtained any amplified DNA.  Then, on September 4, 2001, 
Milefsky picked the PERK up from the laboratory and returned 
it to the police property room. 
 
From 1991 to 2003, Berry's case was not investigated.  In 
early 2003, Angel M. Anderson ("Anderson") was arrested in 
Stafford County on unrelated charges of rape and sodomy.  
 
3
Pursuant to Code § 19.2-310.2:1, a sample of Anderson's DNA 
was taken upon his arrest and entered into a DNA databank.  
Upon entry into the DNA databank, a routine analysis resulted 
in a “cold hit” that appeared to match Angel’s DNA to that 
found in Berry’s PERK. 
 
In December of 2003, Milefsky received a certificate of 
analysis from the laboratory preliminarily identifying 
Anderson as a possible suspect in Berry's attack.  As a result 
of the investigative lead provided by the certificate of 
analysis, on January 6, 2004, Milefsky went to Stafford County 
to serve Anderson with a search warrant.  The search warrant 
permitted a sample of Anderson's DNA to be obtained "by means 
of buccal (cheek) swabs in sufficient quantity to obtain 
laboratory results." 
 
Pursuant to the search warrant, Milefsky obtained two 
buccal swabs from Anderson and took them to the laboratory 
along with Berry's PERK.  Ambrozy compared the buccal swabs 
taken from Anderson with the DNA found in the PERK.  Milefsky 
then received a certificate of analysis prepared by Ambrozy 
which stated that the sperm fraction from the vaginal swabs 
taken from Berry were "consistent with the DNA profile of 
Angel M. Anderson." 
 
On March 15, 2004, the case was presented to the grand 
jury which indicted Anderson for the rape, robbery, and sodomy 
 
4
of Berry.  At trial, a jury found Anderson guilty on all 
counts, and the trial court imposed the recommended two life 
terms plus ten years.  Anderson appealed to the Court of 
Appeals, where his convictions were affirmed.  Anderson v. 
Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 704, 718, 634 S.E.2d 372, 379 
(2006).  Anderson appeals to this Court upon two assignments 
of error: 
 
1. 
The Court of Appeals erred when [it] held that it is 
not a Constitutional violation to seize Mr. Anderson's DNA, 
pursuant to Va. Code § 19.2-310.2:1, upon arrest for an 
unrelated felony. 
 
 
2. 
The Court of Appeals erred by holding that the 
presenting of DNA evidence did not violate Mr. Anderson's 
Constitutional right of confrontation. 
II. Analysis 
A.  The DNA Sample 
 
Anderson first argues that the Court of Appeals erred 
when it held that it was not a constitutional violation to 
seize Anderson's DNA, pursuant to Code § 19.2-310.2:1, upon 
arrest for an unrelated felony.  Code § 19.2-310.2:1 states in 
relevant part that: 
Every person arrested for the commission or 
attempted commission of a violent felony as 
defined in § 19.2-297.1 or a violation or attempt 
to commit a violation of § 18.2-31, 18.2-89, 
18.2-90, 18.2-91, or 18.2-92, shall have a sample 
of his saliva or tissue taken for DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis to determine 
identification characteristics specific to the 
person. 
 
5
This Court as well as the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit has held that Code § 19.2-310.2, requiring 
a convicted felon to provide a blood, saliva, or tissue sample 
for DNA analysis, does not violate the Fourth Amendment.  
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 672, 529 S.E.2d 769, 779 (2000).  
While Code § 19.2-310.2:1 requires a DNA sample after an 
arrest for specific offenses, as opposed to a conviction, like 
Code § 19.2-310.2, it too does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Upon arrest, the accused is subjected to a routine 
booking process, including the taking of fingerprints.  A DNA 
sample of the accused taken upon arrest, while more revealing, 
is no different in character than acquiring fingerprints upon 
arrest. 
[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, 
his identification becomes a matter of legitimate 
state interest and he can hardly claim privacy in 
it. We accept this proposition because the 
identification of suspects is relevant not only 
to solving the crime for which the suspect is 
arrested, but also for maintaining a permanent 
record to solve other past and future crimes. 
This becomes readily apparent when we consider 
the universal approbation of "booking" procedures 
that are followed for every suspect arrested for 
a felony, whether or not the proof of a 
particular suspect's crime will involve the use 
of fingerprint identification. 
 
 
6
Jones, 962 F.2d at 306.  Like fingerprinting, the "Fourth 
Amendment does not require an additional finding of 
individualized suspicion" before a DNA sample can be taken.  
Id. at 306-07. 
 
The analogous treatment of the taking of DNA samples to 
the taking of fingerprints has been widely accepted.  In 
addition to the Fourth Circuit in the Jones case, the Second 
Circuit held “[t]he collection and maintenance of DNA 
information, while effected through relatively more intrusive 
procedures such as blood draws or buccal check swabs, in our 
view plays the same role as fingerprinting.”  Nicholas v. 
Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 
U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 384 (2006).  The Third Circuit held that 
“[t]he governmental justification for [DNA] identification 
. . . relies on no argument different in kind from that 
traditionally advanced for taking fingerprints and 
photographs, but with additional force because of the 
potentially greater precision of DNA sampling and matching 
methods.”  United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 185-86 
(3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2930 
(2006).  The Ninth Circuit said “[t]hat the gathering of DNA 
information requires the drawing of blood rather than inking 
and rolling a person’s fingertips does not elevate the 
intrusion upon the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment interests to a 
 
7
level beyond minimal.”  Rise v. State, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th 
Cir. 1995).  
 
Some state appellate courts have also concluded that DNA 
samples should be treated like fingerprints.  See State v. 
Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 33 (Md. 2004) (“The purpose [of the DNA 
profile] is akin to that of a fingerprint.  As such, appellee 
and other incarcerated individuals have little, if any, 
expectation of privacy in their identity.”); State v. O’Hagen, 
914 A.2d 267, 280 (N.J. 2007) (“We harbor no doubt that the 
taking of a buccal cheek swab is a very minor physical 
intrusion upon the person . . . .  [T]hat intrusion is no more 
intrusive than the fingerprint procedure and the taking of 
one’s photograph that a person must already undergo as part of 
the normal arrest process.”); and State v. Brown, 157 P.3d 
301, 303 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (“Because [using a swab to take a 
DNA sample from the mucous membrane of an arrestee’s cheek] is 
akin to the fingerprinting of a person in custody, we conclude 
that the seizure of defendant’s DNA did not constitute an 
unreasonable seizure under [the Constitution.]”). 
 
Fingerprinting an arrested suspect has long been 
considered a part of the routine booking process.  Similarly, 
the taking of a DNA sample by minimally intrusive means “is 
justified by the legitimate interest of the government in 
knowing for an absolute certainty the identity of the person 
 
8
arrested, in knowing whether he is wanted elsewhere, and in 
ensuring his identification in the event he flees 
prosecution.”  3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(c), 
at 168 (4th ed. 2004). 
 
Anderson argues that the saliva samples taken from him 
upon his arrest in Stafford County led to the "cold hit" 
implicating him in the offenses involved in this appeal.  He 
maintains that the taking of saliva was a "suspicionless" 
seizure2 contrary to the Fourth Amendment and that all evidence 
flowing from such a search must be suppressed as "fruit of the 
poisonous tree."  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
484-85 (1963).  In support of his argument, Anderson cites 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000), 
wherein the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
"[w]hen law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general 
crime control purposes at checkpoints . . . stops can only be 
justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion." 
 
Further, Anderson relies upon Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), for the proposition that 
searches conducted for general law enforcement purposes cannot 
                     
 
2 While Anderson refers to the taking of buccal swabs as a 
"seizure," it is more appropriately referred to as a "search."  
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-
17 (1989); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973); Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966).  See also United 
States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 
9
be excepted from requirements of probable cause.  Ferguson 
involved a cooperative program between hospital authorities 
and law enforcement officers to gather evidence of pregnant 
women using illegal drugs.  Id. at 69-73.  The analysis used 
by the Court focused upon a line of cases comprising the so-
called "special needs doctrine" justifying suspicionless 
searches in narrowly defined circumstances.3  The Court, in 
Ferguson, rejected the argument that the cooperative program 
between hospital personnel and law enforcement officers met 
the test of the "special needs doctrine."  Id. at 84. 
 
Anderson’s reliance upon Edmond and Ferguson is 
misplaced.  As previously established, the taking of a DNA 
sample pursuant to § 19.2-310.2:1 is permissible as a part of 
routine booking procedures.  As such, no “additional finding 
of individualized suspicion” much less probable cause, must be 
established before the sample may be obtained.  Jones, 962 
F.2d at 306. 
In Jones, the court held that pursuant to Code § 19.2-
310.2 "in the case of convicted felons who are in custody of 
the Commonwealth, . . . the minor intrusion caused by the 
                     
3 Such circumstances include public schools, public 
employment, and pervasively regulated industries.  See, e.g., 
Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 
(1989).  
 
10
taking of a [DNA] sample is outweighed by Virginia's interest 
. . . in determining inmates' 'identification characteristics 
specific to the person' for improved law enforcement."4  962 
F.2d at 307.  We hold that the same rationale holds true for 
persons "arrested for the commission or attempted commission 
of a violent felony" under Code § 19.2-310.2:1.  In 
conclusion, we hold that the taking of Anderson's DNA sample 
upon arrest in Stafford County pursuant to Code § 19.2-310.2:1 
is analogous to the taking of a suspect's fingerprints upon 
arrest and was not an unlawful search under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
B. 
Confrontation Clause 
Anderson next argues that the "Court of Appeals erred by 
holding that the presenting of DNA evidence did not violate 
[his] [c]onstitutional right of confrontation."  This 
assignment of error is limited to the objection made at trial.  
Rule 5:25.  At trial, when the Commonwealth sought to 
introduce the certificate of analysis that linked Anderson to 
Berry's attack, Anderson’s counsel stated: 
I still have an objection to the chain of 
evidence because I believe that Crawford comes 
into play now and we have a right to cross 
                     
 
4 Anderson does not assign error to the Court of Appeals' 
holding that he "does not challenge the specific manner in 
which his DNA sample was taken or the nominal degree of 
physical invasiveness it may have involved."  Anderson, 48 Va. 
App. at 710, 634 S.E.2d at 375. 
 
11
examine anyone who – under Crawford, Your Honor, 
our contention of [Code § 19.2-]187[.01] becomes 
unconstitutional because we don't have the right 
– there shouldn't be a presumption afforded a 
document that is testimonial in nature. 
 
Based on this objection, Anderson argues that his 
constitutional right of confrontation was violated upon 
admission of the certificate of analysis linking Anderson to 
Berry's attack and the statutory presumption contained in Code 
§ 19.2-187.01 providing that the duly attested report of 
analysis “shall be prima facie evidence in a criminal or civil 
proceeding as to the custody of the material described therein 
from the time such material is received by an authorized agent 
of such laboratory until such material is released subsequent 
to such analysis or examination.” 
 
The Confrontation Clause guarantees an accused the right 
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. 
amend. VI.  Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has held:  "Where testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the 
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:  
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination."  
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  Since 
Crawford, a significant inquiry in Confrontation Clause cases 
has been whether the hearsay evidence sought to be admitted 
into evidence was testimonial in nature and consequently, 
subject to Confrontation Clause requirements. 
 
12
In this case, the statement in question was the 
certificate of analysis.  However, Ambrozy was the author of 
the certificate of analysis, appeared at trial in person, 
testified as to its contents, and Anderson had the opportunity 
to cross-examine her. 
Code § 19.2-187.01 states in relevant part: 
A report of analysis duly attested by the person 
performing such analysis or examination in any 
laboratory operated by . . . the Department of 
Forensic Science or any of its regional 
laboratories . . . shall be prima facie evidence 
in a criminal or civil proceeding as to the 
custody of the material described therein from 
the time such material is received by an 
authorized agent of such laboratory until such 
material is released subsequent to such analysis 
or examination. Any such certificate of analysis 
purporting to be signed by any such person shall 
be admissible as evidence in such hearing or 
trial without any proof of the seal or signature 
or of the official character of the person whose 
name is signed to it. The signature of the person 
who received the material for the laboratory on 
the request for laboratory examination form shall 
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person 
receiving the material was an authorized agent 
and that such receipt constitutes proper receipt 
by the laboratory for purposes of this section. 
(Emphasis added).  Code § 19.2-187.01 contains a presumption 
that the Department of Forensic Science maintained a proper 
chain of custody at all times while the samples were in its 
possession.  Code § 19.2-187.01 states that a "duly attested" 
"report of analysis" shall be "prima facie evidence" as to the 
custody of the material while it is in the laboratory.  The 
 
13
effect of a prima facie showing under this statute is to 
create a "presumption."  See e.g., Martin v. Moore, 263 Va. 
640, 645-46, 561 S.E.2d 672, 676 (2002) ("This presumption of 
a grant or adverse right is prima facie only and may be 
rebutted by evidence to the contrary.").  Anderson challenges 
the presumption in Code § 19.2-187.01 regarding the chain of 
custody of the DNA evidence. 
A challenge to the presumption afforded by Code § 19.2-
187.01 focuses upon the admissibility of the evidence.  "[A] 
chain of custody is properly established when the 
Commonwealth's evidence affords reasonable assurance that the 
exhibits at trial are the same and in the same condition as 
they were when first obtained."  Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 
Va. 459, 469, 522 S.E.2d 170, 177 (1999).  Whether the 
foundation is sufficient to properly establish the chain of 
custody is a question within the sound discretion of the trial 
court.  Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 285, 322 S.E.2d 
216, 223 (1984). 
What Anderson contests is the presumption of regularity 
regarding the custody of the material described in the 
certificate “from the time such material is received by an 
authorized agent of such laboratory until such material is 
released subsequent to such analysis or examination.”  Code 
 
14
§ 19.2-187.01.  Such a challenge is to the admissibility of 
the evidence, and not to the substance of the evidence itself. 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court relied upon the text of an 
1828 dictionary to define “witnesses” against the accused as 
those who “bear testimony,” and “testimony” as “[a] solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.”  541 U.S. at 51 (citing 2 
N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 
(1828)).  To the extent that Anderson challenges the content 
of the certificate, Anderson has suffered no Confrontation 
Clause violation because it was the subject of testimony by 
the author who was available for cross-examination.  See 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62, 68 and id. at 59 n.9 (citing 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)).  Furthermore, 
Anderson has no Confrontation Clause violation regarding the 
presumption afforded by Code § 19.2-187.01 because the 
presumption is not testimonial in nature.  Simply stated, the 
evidentiary presumption regarding chain of custody is relevant 
to the admissibility of the evidence.  It is the substance of 
the evidence, namely the content of the certificate, that is a 
"solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact” accusatory to Anderson.5 
                     
 
5 The Colorado Court of Appeals in a case involving proof 
of prior conviction held, "the affidavits at issue here were 
 
15
The presumption afforded by Code § 19.2-187.01 is not 
testimonial in nature.  The content of the certificate was the 
subject of testimony by its author who was subject to cross-
examination.  Anderson’s right of confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment was not violated. 
III. Conclusion  
 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
                                                                
provided solely to verify the chain of custody and 
authenticity of the underlying documentary evidence.  It is 
the underlying documentary evidence, and not the 
authenticating affidavits, that reference (and are thus used 
to prove) the facts material to habitual criminal proceedings, 
namely, a defendant's prior convictions."  People v. Schreck, 
107 P.3d 1048, 1060-61 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).