Case Title: Humphrey v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR96-904

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Marko Donnell HUMPHREY v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-904                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered March 24, 1997


1.   Criminal procedure -- custodial statements -- waiver of Miranda rights --
     inquiry. -- The appellate inquiry into waiver of one's Miranda
     rights has two distinct dimensions: the first is whether the
     waiver was voluntary in the sense that it was the product of
     a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
     coercion, or deception; the second is whether the waiver was
     made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right
     being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
     abandon it.

2.   Criminal procedure -- custodial statements -- State's burden. -- A
     custodial statement is presumptively involuntary, and it is
     the State's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
     that a custodial statement was given voluntarily, and was
     knowingly and intelligently made.

3.   Criminal procedure -- voluntariness of confessions -- factors on review. -
     - When reviewing the voluntariness of confessions, the
     appellate court makes an independent determination based on
     the totality of the circumstances and reverses the trial court
     only if its decision was clearly erroneous; in determining
     whether a confession was voluntary, the court considers the
     following factors: the age, education, and intelligence of the
     accused; the lack of advice concerning his constitutional
     rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged
     nature of questioning; or the use of physical punishment.

4.   Criminal procedure -- voluntariness of confessions -- age and mental
     capacity alone are not sufficient to suppress confession. -- Statements
     made by the interrogating officer and the vulnerability of the
     accused are pertinent factors in considering the totality of
     the circumstances; while age and mental capacity are factors
     that are considered, these factors standing alone are not
     sufficient to suppress a confession.

5.   Criminal procedure -- voluntariness of confessions -- trial court was not
     clearly erroneous in determining that appellant's statement was voluntary.
     -- A confession obtained through a false promise of reward or
     leniency is invalid; where the only evidence that appellant's
     custodial statement was obtained through a false promise of
     reward came from his own testimony, the issue was one of
     credibility best resolved by the trial court; the supreme
     court could not say that the trial court was clearly erroneous
     in determining that appellant's statement was voluntary.
6.   Criminal procedure -- waiver of Miranda rights -- appellant's waiver was
     knowingly and intelligently made. -- A form with an express waiver
     provision is not a prerequisite to a finding of a knowing and
     intelligent waiver; rather, the rights form used is simply
     part of the totality of the circumstances in making the
     determination; under the circumstances, where the evidence
     demonstrated that the rights form was executed about fifteen
     minutes after appellant was brought to the county jail, that
     the videotaped confession was not given until approximately
     fice hours later, that appellant wrote "yes" on each line
     acknowledging the individual rights and initialed each
     acknowledgment, and that appellant and his grandmother signed
     their names at the end of the form, the supreme court
     concluded that appellant's waiver was knowingly and
     intelligently made.

7.   Search & seizure -- probable cause and exigent circumstances required for
     warrantless and nonconsensual entries. -- All warrantless and
     nonconsensual entries into the home are prohibited by the
     Fourth Amendment, unless at the time of entry there exists
     probable cause and exigent circumstances.


8.   Arrest -- warrantless arrest -- grounds for -- burden of demonstrating
     error. -- Under Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.1(a)(i), a police officer
     may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has
     reasonable cause to believe that the person committed a
     felony; probable cause exists where there is a reasonable
     ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
     strong in themselves to warrant a cautious person to believe
     that a crime has been committed by the person suspected; the
     degree of proof sufficient to sustain a conviction is not
     required for probable cause to arrest; all presumptions are
     favorable to the trial court's ruling on the legality of the
     arrest, and the burden of demonstrating error rests on the
     appellant. 

9.   Arrest -- warrantless arrest -- police officers had probable cause to
     arrest appellant for committing felony. -- The supreme court held
     that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the police
     officers had reasonable cause to arrest appellant for
     committing a felony where two officers heard gunshots and
     arrived at the crime scene only minutes after the shots; where
     a witness immediately told an officer that appellant had shot
     the victims; where a victim told the officer that appellant
     had shot her, identifying him by name; where the officer knew
     who appellant was and where he lived (and that the house was
     nearby); and where only a short amount of time elapsed between
     the time of the crime and the arrest, and appellant could have
     easily walked or run the few blocks between the crime scene
     and his grandmother's house.

10.  Search & seizure -- warrantless search -- State's burden. -- If the
     officers do not have valid consent for a warrantless search,
     there must be exigent circumstances justifying the entry;
     consent to a warrantless search of one's home must be given
     freely and voluntarily; the State has a heavy burden to prove
     by clear and positive testimony that consent was freely and
     voluntarily given; on appeal, the supreme court makes an
     independent determination based on the totality of the
     circumstances to determine if the State has met its burden.

11.  Arrest -- warrantless entry -- trial court was not clearly erroneous in
     determining appellant's grandmother consented to officers' entry. -- The
     supreme court determined that the testimony of police officers
     constituted clear and positive evidence that appellant's
     grandmother voluntarily let them in her house after they
     informed her that they were there to talk to appellant; an
     officer is not required to inform a person that consent may be
     withdrawn; the failure to so advise an individual does not
     invalidate consent; at most, appellant's grandmother's
     arguably conflicting testimony simply required a credibility
     determination by the trial court; in such cases, the appellate
     court defers to the trial court's superior position to
     evaluate the credibility of witnesses; therefore, the supreme
     court could not say that the trial court was clearly erroneous
     in determining that appellant's grandmother had consented to
     the officers' entry into her home.

12.  Arrest -- warrantless entry -- exigent circumstances defined. -- Exigent
     circumstances are those requiring immediate aid or action,
     and, while there is no definite list of what constitutes
     exigent circumstances, several established examples include
     the risk of removal or destruction of evidence, danger to the
     lives of police officers or others, and the hot pursuit of a
     suspect.

13.  Arrest -- warrantless entry -- six potential exigent circumstances. -- Six
     potential exigent circumstances that may render a warrantless
     entry to arrest reasonable are: (1) the commission of a grave
     offense; (2) belief that the suspect is armed; (3) a clear
     showing of probable cause; (4) strong reason to suspect that
     the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) the
     likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly
     apprehended; and (6) danger of the destruction of evidence.

14.  Arrest -- warrantless entry -- trial court was not clearly erroneous in
     denying motion to suppress on illegal-arrest ground. -- Where murder,
     clearly a most grave offense, had been committed; where,
     because the victims were shot, and no murder weapon was
     immediately apparent at the crime scene, police officers had
     good reason to believe that the suspect was armed and
     dangerous; where the officers testified that they heard
     gunshots at about 3:35 a.m., and the sheriff testified that
     they arrived at the residence at 4:21 a.m., less than an hour
     after the shootings; where the officers had strong probable
     cause to believe that appellant was the perpetrator, and one
     officer also knew that appellant lived with his grandmother,
     giving the officers a strong reason to suspect that appellant
     was in the premises being entered, the supreme court concluded
     that under these particular facts, sufficient exigent
     circumstances existed to justify a warrantless entry into the
     home, even if appellant's grandmother did not consent to the
     entry; therefore, the trial court was not clearly erroneous in
     denying the motion to suppress on the ground that the officers
     illegally arrested appellant.

15.  Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- circuit court need not give equal weight
     to statutory factors. -- In considering motions to transfer to
     juvenile court, the circuit court does not have to give equal
     weight to the statutory factors found in Ark. Code Ann.  9-
     27-318 (Supp. 1995); it is permissible to give substantial
     weight to the criminal information.

16.  Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- trail court did not err in denying
     motion to transfer to juvenile court. -- Given the most serious
     nature of the crimes charged and the substantial evidence
     supporting the charges, the supreme court held that the trial
     court did not err in denying the motion to transfer to
     juvenile court.


     Appeal from Woodruff Circuit Court; Harvey Yates, Judge;
affirmed.
     Arkansas Public Defender Commission Capital, Conflicts and
Appeals Office, by: Richard Lewallen and Teri Chambers, for
appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Sandy Moll, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
for appellee.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and second-
degree battery.  On appeal, he challenges the trial court's rulings
on his motion to suppress and motion to transfer to juvenile court. 
We find no error and affirm.  
     On March 6, 1994, Officers Bobby Bozarth and Willie Dinwiddie
of the Augusta Police Department were on duty parked at a pharmacy
located in Augusta, Arkansas.  Around 3:35 a.m., they heard
gunshots.  Bozarth and Dinwiddie individually proceeded to the
general area where they thought the shots came from.
     While driving, Dinwiddie saw a young man, Frank Galloway,
running behind a church.  Galloway approached Dinwiddie and took
him to the crime scene, which was about three-and-a-half blocks
away from where the officers were originally parked.  At the scene,
two bodies were lying face down on the driveway of a residence. 
One girl, Shinika Ford, had been shot twice in the back and was
dead.  She was thirteen years old.  The other girl was fifteen-
year-old Stacy Johnson.  Johnson had been shot once in the leg and
was conscious.  Both Galloway and Johnson told Dinwiddie that Marko
Humphrey, fifteen years old, was the perpetrator.
     Bozarth arrived on the scene immediately after Dinwiddie. 
They secured the crime scene, and called the Sheriff's office. 
Woodruff County Sheriff Jack Caperton arrived on the scene shortly
thereafter.  They discussed how to proceed.  Dinwiddie knew that
Humphrey lived with his grandmother and guardian, Earsie Lee
Richardson.  Her house was only a few blocks away from the scene.
Caperton decided that they needed to pick up Humphrey because, as
far as they knew, he was still armed and dangerous.
     By the time the officers arrived at the house, less than an
hour had passed from when they initially heard the gunshots. They
knocked on the door and told Richardson that they were there to
talk to Humphrey.  Though disputed, Caperton said that Richardson
let them in the house.  Humphrey was arrested and taken to the
county jail; Richardson also went along.
     At the booking room, Caperton testified that he read Humphrey
his Miranda rights, and that Humphrey executed a "Statement of
Rights" form.  Humphrey initially told Caperton, Dinwiddie and
Bozarth that Earl Lockhart shot the girls.  He said that Lockhart
threw the gun down on the street, and then he picked it up and
threw the gun in a nearby culvert.  Caperton and Dinwiddie left to
investigate the area where Humphrey said the gun was.  About thirty
inches inside a culvert, the officers found a Llama 9mm pistol.
     When Caperton returned to the jail, Humphrey was interviewed
by Sergeant Henry Lamar of the Arkansas State Police Crime
Investigation Division.  Subsequently, Humphrey told Lamar that he
wished to give another statement.  Humphrey then gave a videotaped
confession.  He explained that he and a number of other people were
at Archie Neville's house.  While there, he got into an argument
with Stacy Johnson.  Apparently, someone had thrown water on
Johnson, and she accused Humphrey of doing it.  He said that Stacy
Johnson threatened to have him killed the following week, and that
previously Johnson had pulled a .22 gun on him in Newport. 
Humphrey also said that Johnson's friend, Shinika Ford, had once
before tried to have him beat up in Newport.  Johnson subsequently
left the house with her boyfriend, Frank Galloway, and Shinika
Ford.  Humphrey followed after them, along with a number of other
boys.  Once he caught up to them, he shot Johnson and Ford using a
gun he had obtained from Earl Lockhart.  Afterwards, he placed the
gun in the culvert and went back home to his grandmother's house. 
This concluded the substance of the statement, and it was his only
custodial statement admitted into evidence at trial.
     The investigation revealed that Ford had been shot twice in
the back, and that Johnson had been shot once in her leg. 
Additionally, the following ammunition was found: three live rounds
of 9mm ammunition near the victims;  one round in the chamber of
the recovered gun; one additional round in the gun's clip;  two
spent shell casings at the scene; and one bullet lodged in the wall
of the carport adjacent to the driveway where the victims were
found.  Ballistics tests on the bullet revealed that it was fired
from the gun that was recovered from the culvert.                
     Humphrey was charged with capital murder and first-degree
battery.  At trial, Humphrey testified that he intentionally shot
Johnson in the leg because he was angry with her, but that he had
no intention of killing her.  He testified that after he shot
Johnson, Frank Galloway hit him and attempted to grab his hand.  In
the ensuing struggle, the gun discharged, accidentally shooting
Ford.  Humphrey then said that both he and Galloway let go of the
gun, after which he picked up the gun and threw it in the culvert.
     Humphrey also explained that only part of his videotaped
statement was true.  He testified that while the portion describing
the shooting of Johnson was accurate, he had no intention of
shooting Ford and had never argued with her.  He testified that he
confessed to shooting Ford because he felt pressured to do what the
police "wanted him to do."
     The jury convicted Humphrey of first-degree murder and second-
degree battery.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment and six
years' imprisonment, respectively, along with a $10,000 fine.  On
appeal, Humphrey argues that the trial court erroneously ruled on
his motion to suppress and on his motion to transfer to juvenile
court. 
                      I. Motion to Suppress
     Humphrey's first point on appeal is that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress statements.  Specifically, he
asserts two separate grounds in support of this argument: (A) that
his statements were not the result of a knowing, voluntary and
intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; and (B) that his
statements were the result of an illegal arrest.     
     A.   Whether Humphrey's statements were the result of a     
          knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his Miranda
          rights.
     As stated in Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235,