Case Title: CHARLES WAYNE PALMER, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-273

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
CHARLES WAYNE PALMER, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 7174 P.3d 1298Case Number: 06-273Decided: 01/25/2008
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
CHARLES 
WAYNE PALMER, JR.,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Lynn 
Boak, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dana J. Lent, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Convicted of 
three counts of sexual assault, Charles Wayne Palmer claims that trial counsel 
was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty, and that the district court 
should have granted a post-sentence motion to withdraw Palmer's guilty 
plea.

 
 
[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Palmer states his 
only issue as follows:

 
 

1.      
Did 
[Palmer] receive effective assistance of counsel in entering his guilty plea and 
did the district court abuse its discretion in denying [Palmer's] motion to 
withdraw plea?

 
 
The 
State separates Palmer's issue into two separate issues:

 
 

1.      
Did 
[Palmer] receive effective assistance of counsel when entering his guilty 
plea?

2.      
Did the 
District court abuse its discretion by denying [Palmer's] motion to withdraw 
plea?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Palmer lived with 
his girlfriend and her three teenaged daughters in Wheatland, Wyoming.  
On September 29, 2005, the daughters, TW, SW, and JW, ages fourteen, 
sixteen, and seventeen, reported to Wheatland police that Palmer had been 
sexually assaulting them three times a week for nearly two years.  That same day, Palmer agreed to go to 
the police station to discuss his involvement in an ongoing 
case.

 
 
[¶5]      At the station, 
Palmer was informed that TW, SW, and 
JW had accused him of sexually assaulting them for the past two years.  After being read his Miranda rights, and after reading them 
to himself, Palmer signed a Statement of Miranda Rights, verifying that he "read 
the above statement of my rights and I understand them."  Furthermore, the statement provided that 
Palmer was "willing to answer questions now without having an attorney 
present."

 
 
[¶6]      Apparently, after 
signing the waiver, Palmer confessed in detail about his ongoing sexual 
encounters with the three girls.1  Palmer was arrested on September 30, 
2005, and charged with three counts of second degree sexual assault.  However, on October 31, 2005, an amended 
information was filed charging Palmer 
with thirty-seven counts of second and third degree sexual assault and one count 
of aggravated assault and battery.

 
 
[¶7]      In May of 2006, 
Palmer decided to change his plea from not guilty to guilty.  According to a plea agreement negotiated 
with the prosecuting attorney, Palmer pled guilty to three counts of second 
degree sexual assault in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining thirty-four 
counts.  A change of plea hearing 
was held on June 6, 2006, wherein the court explained Palmer's rights to 
him.  The court also explained the 
punishments he faced.  When given an 
opportunity to ask questions, Palmer declined.

 
 
[¶8]      At his sentencing 
on September 12, 2006, Palmer received three consecutive sentences of 8-16 
years.  His sentences were handed 
down after each victim testified, giving detailed accounts of Palmer's repeated 
assaults.  Each girl also testified 
regarding her recovery, indicating that she was functioning well and 
improving.  Defense witnesses also 
testified before Palmer was sentenced.  
Friends and family attested to the network of support that would be 
available to him, and Palmer's counselor testified regarding Palmer's 
remorse.

 
 
[¶9]      A few days after 
sentencing, Palmer sought new legal counsel.  Five days after the Judgment and 
Sentence were entered, Palmer filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
claiming his first confession was given while under the influence of drugs, and 
that defense counsel was ineffective because of his personal distaste for 
Palmer's conduct.  After a hearing, 
the district court denied Palmer's motion, finding that he failed to present any 
evidence to substantiate his claims and demonstrate manifest injustice.  Palmer appeals the district court's 
denial of his Motion to Withdraw Plea and the entry of the Judgment and 
Sentence.2

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 

 

 

[¶10]   The examination of a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that counsel's performance 
was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  Ingersoll v. State, 2004 WY 102, 
¶ 13, 96 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Wyo. 2004).  
In other words, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, an appellant must show that his counsel failed to render the sort of 
assistance offered by a reasonably competent attorney, and that the failure to 
render such assistance prejudiced the defense of the case.  Id., ¶ 14, 96 P.3d  at 1050.  When a guilty plea is challenged based 
upon ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant, to establish prejudice, 
must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, a plea of 
guilty would not have been entered and the defendant would have insisted on 
going to trial.  Ingersoll, 
¶ 13, 96 P.3d  at 1050. A strong presumption is invoked that counsel 
rendered adequate and reasonable assistance.  The burden is on the defendant to 
overcome this presumption. Id.

 
 
[¶11]   The standard for withdrawing a 
guilty plea is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 32(d). Ingersoll, ¶ 12, 96 P.3d  
at 1050.  Pursuant to that rule, a 
defendant must show "manifest injustice" when he seeks to withdraw his plea 
after sentencing.  We review whether 
or not a trial court properly denied a post-sentence motion for withdrawal under 
an abuse of discretion standard, meaning that we determine whether or not the 
trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether or not any facet of 
its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  
Id.  The findings of fact that led to denial 
of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea are subject to the clearly erroneous 
standard of review.  McCard v. 
State, 2003 WY 142, ¶ 8, 78 P.3d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]   Following the State's lead, we will 
divide Palmer's single issue on appeal into two separate discussions.  In the first, we will address whether or 
not Palmer received effective assistance of counsel when entering his guilty 
plea.  In the second, we will 
address whether or not the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
Palmer's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

 
 
Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶13]   Palmer insists that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing wherein his counsel 
"did no adversarial testing of the prosecution's case."  Palmer also claims that his defense 
counsel coerced him into pleading guilty on the basis of the "overwhelming 
evidence against him," specifically his confession, which Palmer characterizes 
as having "enough discrepancies," including whether or not his Miranda rights were read prior to the 
confession, such that counsel should have sought suppression of the 
confession.

 
 
[¶14]   Contrary to Palmer's claims, the 
State argues that the record on appeal shows that Palmer pled guilty to avoid 
potential conviction on an additional thirty-five charges, which carried a 
potential aggregate sentence of six hundred and seventy years, and that his 
counsel was indeed effective.  The 
State further contends that the record proves Palmer acknowledged receiving the 
Miranda warning prior to confessing, 
and that the confession was valid.  
Finally, the State points out Palmer's failure to refer to any portion of 
the record that substantiates his claim that defense counsel was deficient or 
that prejudice occurred.  

 
 
[¶15]   Here, the only ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims that survived Palmer's guilty plea are those 
directly related to the voluntariness of his plea.  Reichert v. State, 2006 WY 62, ¶ 40, 134 P.3d 268, 279 
(Wyo. 2006).

 
 
Where a 
defendant has entered a guilty plea, he may challenge his subsequent conviction 
on appeal only with respect to matters which affect the voluntariness of his 
plea or the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court.  When a guilty plea has been entered upon 
the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of that plea may depend on the extent 
to which that advice comports with the constitutional guarantee to the effective 
assistance of counsel.

 
 

Id. 
(quoting Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, 
¶ 21, 100 P.3d 394, 404 (Wyo. 2004) (citations omitted)).  Palmer bears the 
burden of proving both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the 
deficient performance produced actual prejudice.  Id.

 
 
[¶16]   In analyzing Palmer's 
ineffectiveness claim, we must determine whether or not trial counsel's actions 
were outside the range of professionally competent assistance, and if the 
representation so undermined the adversarial process, that the outcome cannot be 
relied upon as having produced a just result.  Reyna v. State, 2001 WY 105, ¶ 19, 
33 P.3d 1129, 1134-35 (Wyo. 2001).  
We have previously addressed a post-sentencing allegation of ineffective 
assistance of counsel regarding the entry of a guilty plea in both Reichert and Rutti.  In reviewing that claim in the latter 
case, this Court required Rutti to demonstrate that, in deciding to plead 
guilty, he placed special emphasis on the challenged aspect of his attorney's 
advice.  Rutti, ¶ 23, 100 P.3d  at 405.  We applied a two-part test to determine 
if Rutti suffered prejudice resulting from counsel's advice: (1) Whether or not 
the recommendation of a reasonably competent attorney regarding the plea would 
differ from that given; and (2) whether or not, absent the error, the outcome of 
the case would have been more advantageous than the terms of the plea 
agreement.  Id.

 
 
[¶17]   This principle, adopted by this 
Court in Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 
1990), provides two ways a defendant 
may demonstrate prejudice from ineffective assistance pertaining to a guilty 
plea.  See Ingersoll, ¶ 12, 96 P.3d  at 
1050; Kitzke v. State, 2002 WY 147, ¶ 9, 
55 P.3d 696, 699 (Wyo. 2002); Becker 
v. State, 2002 WY 126, ¶ 11, 53 P.3d 94, 98 (Wyo. 2002); Reyna, 
¶ 9, 33 P.3d  at 1132; Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 
18 P.3d 1164, 1168 (Wyo. 2001); Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 
1999); Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 
1112-13 (Wyo. 1993); but see Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1258 
(Wyo. 1982) (citing only trial 
outcome as method of proving prejudice).

 
 
[¶18]   We take this opportunity to clarify 
Rutti, which could be read as 
limiting a defendant's means of demonstrating prejudice to a single test:  whether or not the outcome of a trial 
would have been more advantageous than the terms of the plea.  While we emphasized in Rutti that, in many circumstances, a 
defendant's complaint concerning his counsel's performance will often lead to an 
objective analysis regarding the outcome of a trial, we adhere to the principle 
introduced in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985), that when a guilty 
plea is challenged based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant, 
to establish prejudice, must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, a plea of guilty would not have been entered and the 
defendant would have insisted on going to trial.

 
 
[¶19]   We consider the rule introduced in 
Hill, and later applied in Lower, consonant with Rutti.  Rutti simply emphasized that if a 
defendant does not assert a plausible reason why he would have forsaken the 
benefits of the plea agreement had counsel's advice been different, the probable 
outcome of a trial provides an objective measure of the risk he faced.  Taking into consideration the risks of 
trial, we can then weigh the likelihood that the defendant would have rejected 
the plea agreement.

 
 
[¶20]   Similarly, in examining prejudice 
pursuant to Hill, other courts have 
considered the strength of the prosecution's case as circumstantial evidence of 
whether or not the defendant would have pled guilty.  See, e.g., Weeks v. Snyder, 219 F.3d 245, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2000); Witherspoon v. Purkett, 210 F.3d 901, 
903-04 (8th Cir. 2000); Warner 
v. United States, 975 F.2d 1207, 1214 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 
835-36 (D.C. Circ. 1993); Panuccio v. 
Kelly, 927 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1991); Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 
1551 (11th Cir. 1989); Hooper 
v. Garraghty, 845 F.2d 471, 475-76 (4th Cir. 1988); Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865-66 
(9th Cir. 1986); Key v. United 
States, 806 F.2d 133, 138-39 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Giardino, 797 F.2d 30, 
32 (1st Cir. 1986).  
However, none of these cases held that the defendant must show that the 
prosecution's case would have failed at trial.  Inquiry into the probable outcome of a 
trial as a factual circumstance does not create a new standard for establishing 
prejudice.  Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1074-75 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1140, 122 S. Ct. 1092, 151 L. Ed. 2d 990 (2002).

 
 
Accordingly, 
in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lockhart, our own precedent 
concerning prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, and the overwhelming 
weight of authority among the other federal circuits, we hold the district court 
erred by requiring Miller to prove a reasonable probability existed not only 
that he would have insisted on trial but for his counsel's mistakes, but also 
that there was a likelihood that he would have prevailed at trial. Of course, 
the "assessment [of whether the defendant would have insisted on changing his 
plea] will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely 
would have changed the outcome of the trial," Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.  at 59, but 
the ultimate issue that the court has to determine is whether the defendant 
would have changed his plea.

 
 

Miller, 262 F.3d  at 
1074-1075.

 
 
[¶21]   In Rutti, we held that when the defendant 
pled guilty to sexual assault pursuant to a plea agreement, admitted committing 
multiple acts of sexual assault, and the victim corroborated his admission, he 
was not denied effective assistance of counsel.  Furthermore, Rutti made absolutely no 
argument that the outcome of a trial would have produced a more advantageous 
result than the plea agreement, and as a result, we noted that the plea 
agreement was "extremely advantageous to Rutti" because it reduced the total 
number of charges against him.  Rutti, ¶¶ 30-31, 100 P.3d  at 
408.

 
 
[¶22]   In this instance, Palmer pled 
guilty pursuant to an agreement, admitted committing multiple acts of sexual 
assault, and the victims corroborated his admission.  Moreover, he obtained a substantial 
benefit by accepting the plea agreement whereby thirty-five serious felony 
charges were dropped.  Like Rutti, 
Palmer fails to offer any additional argument whatsoever that the outcome of a 
trial on all counts charged would have produced a more advantageous result than 
the plea agreement and offers no argument or facts demonstrating that, if the 
representation was as he claims it should have been, he would have forsaken the 
benefits of the plea agreement for the risks of trial.  In light of the total number of charges 
and the potential aggregate sentence on those charges of 670 years, Palmer's 
motivation to plead guilty is evident.

 
 
[¶23]   Palmer further complains that he 
was urged to plead guilty by defense counsel based upon the fact that he had 
confessed and could be convicted on his confession alone, and that his 
confession was never challenged by his defense counsel.  Palmer fails, however, to point to 
anything in the record that (1) supports his contention that his confession 
should have been suppressed, and (2) shows that defense counsel was 
lackadaisical in challenging the confession.  In fact, the record supports the State's 
suggestion that the confession was legitimate.  The written confession itself was nine 
pages long and very detailed in its account of repeated incidents with each 
victim, including actions and statements.  
The record is also sparse regarding counsel's "refusal to take the case 
to trial."  Instead, the record 
supports that defense counsel merely advised Palmer that "it was in [his] best 
interest to plead guilty."  Both 
defense counsel and the district court explained the ramifications of pleading 
guilty.  From the record, it is 
apparent that defense counsel did not force Palmer to plead guilty, nor did he 
threaten him or promise him anything.  
Rather, defense counsel provided adequate legal representation under the 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶24]   Palmer fails to present an argument 
that shows how his decision to plead guilty and forego trial prejudiced him. He 
does mention that maybe at trial, one of the victims might not have been clear 
on dates or details of the sexual assaults, and cross-examination may have 
called the lack of clarity further into question.  This appears to be wishful thinking on 
Palmer's part, because, perhaps most importantly, he fails to show how the 
outcome would have been more advantageous to him had he gone to trial rather 
than entering a plea.  The record on 
appeal shows that the evidence against him was fairly substantial, even without 
his confession.  Absent the presentation of any argument on these key 
issues, we hold that Palmer has failed to carry his burden of proving he was 
prejudiced by counsel's alleged ineffectiveness.

 
 
Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea

 
 
[¶25]   W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides in 
pertinent part as follows:

 
 

If a 
motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty . . . is made before sentence is 
imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the 
defendant of any fair and just reason.  
At any later time, a plea may be set aside only to correct manifest 
injustice.

 
 
Because 
Palmer moved to withdraw his guilty plea after sentence was imposed, he was 
required to demonstrate manifest injustice in order to succeed on his motion. 

 
 

"Manifest 
injustice" contemplates a "situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was 
not foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a party."  It is, in part, intended to address a 
"fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of 
justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair 
procedure."

 
 

Reyna, 
¶ 27, 33 P.3d 1137-38 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶26]   Palmer claims that his motion 
should have been granted because his plea was not made knowingly or 
voluntarily.  Specifically, Palmer 
avers that he was under the influence of muscle relaxants and pain medication 
when writing his nine-page confession, and that defense counsel failed to test 
the validity of the confession prior to counseling him to accept the plea 
agreement and was prejudiced against Palmer.  Palmer argues these things together 
constituted manifest injustice.

 
 
[¶27]   The first complaint by Palmer is 
that he did not enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily because he was under 
the influence of pain medication and muscle relaxers, which caused him to black 
out, sometimes for "days."  A guilty 
plea is valid only when it represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among 
the alternative courses of action open to a defendant.  Ingersoll, ¶ 15, 96 P.3d  at 
1051, n.1.  Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b), the district court was required to inform Palmer of:  (1) The nature of and the penalties 
for the charges filed against him; (2) his right to be represented by an 
attorney, plead not guilty, be tried by a jury, and choose not to testify; 
(3) his right to plead guilty and waive his right to trial; and, 
(4) the fact that any statements made by him in court under oath could be 
used against him. Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(d), the district court was required 
to ensure Palmer's plea was voluntary:

 
 

The 
court shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first, by addressing the 
defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and 
not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea 
agreement.  The court shall also 
inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty . . . results 
from prior discussions between the attorney for the state and the defendant or 
the defendant's attorney.

 
 
With the 
W.R.Cr.P. 11 requirements in mind, we begin our analysis of Palmer's claim by 
reviewing what occurred at the re-arraignment, when Palmer changed his plea from 
not guilty to guilty.

 
 
[¶28]   Palmer appeared in person at the 
change of plea.  The district court 
explained Palmer's constitutional rights to him, including the right to an 
attorney, the right to remain silent, the right to a presumption of innocence, 
the right to a speedy trial, the right to confront the evidence against him, the 
right to testify or not testify, and the right to appeal.  When asked if he understood his rights, 
Palmer indicated that he did.

 
 
[¶29]   Next, the district court explained 
the ramifications of being found or pleading guilty, including the restitution 
obligations Palmer would incur, that he would, because of the nature of the 
crimes charged, be required to register as a sex offender, and the loss of 
certain privileges, such as the right to vote, the right to serve on a jury, the 
right to hold public office, and the right to own and possess firearms.  When asked if he understood everything, 
Palmer again said that he did.

 
 
[¶30]   The district court continued its 
dialogue with Palmer, explaining the types of pleas from which Palmer could 
choose and that the court was not a party to any plea bargain that was in 
place.  The court asked if Palmer 
had any questions up to that point in the hearing, and Palmer stated, "No, 
sir."  The prosecuting attorney 
informed the court that there was a 
plea bargain in place, and the court asked Palmer if he had a chance to discuss 
the agreement with his attorney, and whether or not he understood the 
agreement.  Palmer, again, stated 
that he both discussed the agreement with his attorney and understood 
it.

 
 
[¶31]   The district court then explained 
the charges and the elements of the crimes charged, along with the penalties 
associated with each charge.  After 
pleading guilty, Palmer answered questions by his attorney to establish the 
factual basis.  He admitted to 
having sexual intercourse with all three girls.

 
 
[¶32]   The record does not indicate that 
Palmer's guilty plea, or the factual basis for it, was given other than 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The district court fully explained 
the implications behind pleading guilty.  
Furthermore, the transcript of the September 12, 2006 sentencing hearing 
contains nothing suggesting that Palmer wished to withdraw his plea, was coerced 
into entering it, or entered it without being advised of his rights.  The hearing on Palmer's motion to 
withdraw his plea was similarly barren of evidence supporting Palmer's theory 
that his guilty plea was not voluntary.  
Palmer himself testified that his counsel simply advised him that it was in his best 
interest to plead guilty.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Palmer's counsel outright refused 
to take the case to trial.

 
 
[¶33]   The record clearly shows that 
Palmer entered into the plea agreement fully informed of the charges to which he was pleading and 
aware of the maximum penalties.  The 
record is also clear that Palmer entered the pleas under an agreement that, in 
exchange for those pleas, dropped thirty-five other charges.  Taking into account the record on 
appeal, Palmer's argument does not give rise to a "fundamental defect" resulting 
in "a complete miscarriage of justice" or an "omission inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of fair procedure."  
Reyna, ¶ 27, 33 P.3d  at 1137-38.  Palmer did not meet his burden of 
showing that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion. 
Having carefully examined the record before us, we hold that Palmer has not 
demonstrated that the district court's ruling resulted in manifest 
injustice.

 
 
[¶34]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The only 
confession contained in the record on appeal is nine pages and handwritten.  Palmer references a videotaped 
confession, but it was not made part of the appellate 
record.

 
 

2Palmer 
actually filed his notice of appeal on the same day as the hearing on the motion 
to withdraw his plea, November 6, 2006.  
His Notice of Appeal designated the Judgment and Sentence as the 
appealable order.  The Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea was entered two days later, on November 8, 
2006.  While this appeal was 
pending, Palmer filed a motion to remand for an evidentiary hearing on his claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge Palmer's 
confession.  This Court denied the 
motion for remand, noting that " the district court, in denying the motion to 
withdraw plea, has considered and rejected essentially the same 
claims."