Case Title: ZINA JASPER, f/k/a ZINA BRINCKERHOFF V. BURTON FIELD BRINCKERHOFF

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0124

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
ZINA JASPER, f/k/a ZINA BRINCKERHOFF V. BURTON FIELD BRINCKERHOFF2008 WY 32179 P.3d 857Case Number: S-07-0124Decided: 03/24/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
ZINA 
JASPER, f/k/a ZINA 
BRINCKERHOFF,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.BURTON FIELD 
BRINCKERHOFF,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
S. Cohen of Jackson, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Douglas 
J. Mason of Mason & Mason, P.C., Pinedale, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Zina 
Jasper (Jasper) filed a complaint on August 4, 2006, seeking to set aside what 
she deemed a fraudulent conveyance of real property, made by her former husband 
and Appellee herein, Burton Field Brinckerhoff (Brinckerhoff).  Jasper and Brinckerhoff were divorced in 
the state of New 
York by decree entered on June 10, 1986.  Under the terms of that divorce, 
Brinckerhoff was to pay Jasper alimony until she remarried or died.  In her complaint, Jasper averred that 
while the two parties were in litigation over past due alimony, as well as 
attorney's fees awards associated with her efforts to obtain judgments against 
Brinckerhoff and then to enforce them in Wyoming courts, Brinckerhoff 
transferred his interest in the home owned by him and his new wife, to his wife 
as trustee for the Brinckerhoff Family Trust.  On March 19, 2007, the district court 
entered summary judgment in favor of Brinckerhoff.  Jasper contends:  (1) that there are genuine issues of 
material fact as to whether or not the transfer, or transfers, made by 
Brinckerhoff were fraudulent; (2) that the district court erred in concluding 
that Brinckerhoff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that the 
district court erred in denying Jasper the opportunity to amend her complaint 
before entering the summary judgment order.  We will affirm the district court's 
summary judgment order.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Jasper states 
these issues:

 
 
1.  The 
district court erred in granting [Brinckerhoff's] Motion for Summary Judgment 
when material issues of fact exist as to whether Brinckerhoff's conveyance of 
property to a trust was [a] fraudulent conveyance pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
34-14-201 et seq.

 
 
2.  The 
district court erred in granting [Brinckerhoff's] Motion for Summary Judgment 
when it held that [he] was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
3.  The 
district court erred by failing to grant [Jasper] an opportunity to amend her 
Complaint prior to granting [Brinckerhoff's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment.

 
 
Brinckerhoff 
rephrases the issues a bit:

 
 
1.  Did 
the district court abuse its discretion by not allowing [Jasper] to amend her 
Complaint?

 
 
2.  Did 
the district court err by finding that no material issues of fact surrounded the 
June 26, 2006 conveyance and by further finding that, as a matter of law, the 
conveyance should not be set aside?

 
 
In her 
reply brief, Jasper makes two counter arguments:

 
 
1.  Whether 
the argument presented by Brinckerhoff in [his] brief regarding the Brinckerhoff 
Family Trust should be stricken because there is no evidence in the record below 
to support his argument and it should not be considered on 
appeal?

 
 
2.  Is 
judicial economy achieved if Jasper is required to file separate causes of 
action for each of the five (5) conveyances between Burt and Sandra Brinckerhoff 
and their estate, or should the district court have allowed Jasper to amend her 
Complaint to combine all causes of action in a single 
proceeding?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      On the date the 
alleged fraudulent conveyance was made (June 26, 2006), the governing statute 
was the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 34-14-101 through 34-14-113 (LexisNexis 2005).  That uniform act was repealed in 2006, 
and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act was enacted in its stead, effective on 
July 1, 2006.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-14 
201 through 34-14-212 (LexisNexis 2007).  
Jasper's statutory citations are primarily to the act in place at the 
time she filed her complaint, and Brinckerhoff's and the district court's 
citations are to the act in force on June 26, 2006.  Although there are differences between 
those two acts, none of the differences plays a role in the resolution of this 
case.  Therefore, our references 
will be to the current statute.  
Although the terms "conveyance" and "transfer" are, to some extent, terms 
of art, they are used as synonymous by the parties in their papers.  For purposes of the disposition of this 
case, we accept that usage. 

 
 
[¶4]      As noted above, 
Jasper filed her complaint on August 4, 2006.  The district court concluded that Jasper 
did not then have any interest in Brinckerhoff's Jackson home, and that she had 
at no time ever had any interest in that property.  The district court also found that 
Brinckerhoff was, at the time of these proceedings, not in arrears on his 
alimony payments, although he had been in arrears on two occasions in the 
past.  Continuing, the district 
court found:

 
 
            
6.  In 2005, [Brinckerhoff] began to do some estate 
planning.  He was 68 years old and 
retired.  As part of this plan 
[Brinckerhoff] and his wife executed Wills and created the Brinckerhoff Family 
Trust.  The primary asset 
transferred into the Trust was the Jackson real estate.  In the summer of 2006, the Brinckerhoffs 
obtained a home equity loan to pay off some taxes and to provide for their 
children's college expenses.  As 
part of the application process, the lender required that the property be 
briefly transferred from the Trust into the names of Mr. and Mrs. Brinckerhoff, 
individually.  The transfer from the 
Family Trust to Mr. and Mrs. Brinckerhoff was filed June 14, 2006.  On June 26, 2006, immediately after the 
loan, the property was transferred back into the Family Trust, where it has 
remained.

 
 
It is 
the last transfer, back into the trust, that Jasper challenged in her 
complaint.  The other transfers 
outlined above were the subject of Jasper's motion to amend her complaint.  Her contention is that the June 26, 2006 
transfer, as well as all the others, were done without adequate consideration 
being paid and with the intent to defraud her.  This contention is founded upon 
Brinckerhoff's previous failures to pay Jasper her alimony on time, as well as a 
contention that such circumstances might recur in the 
future.

 
 
[¶5]      The district 
court then reached these conclusions:

 
 
            
1.  [Brinckerhoff] and his wife created the Brinckerhoff Family 
Trust in 2005 as part of their estate plans.  They then transferred their Jackson, Wyoming home into the Trust.  They had the right to voluntarily 
transfer their own property.  Mr. 
and Mrs. Brinckerhoff have the right to transfer their property and it makes 
good sense for them to do so.  In 
2005, when the Trust was created and funded, Mr. Brinckerhoff was 68 years 
old.  At that age, estate planning 
is certainly an acceptable reason to transfer property.

            
2.  If [Jasper] were successful in voiding the June 26, 2006 
conveyance to the Brinckerhoff Family Trust, two things could happen and neither 
of them benefit [Jasper].  1) The 
property would revert back to ownership by Mr. and Mrs. Brinckerhoff.  This would not benefit [Jasper].  She could not lien or attach the 
property.  2) [Brinckerhoff] and his 
wife could execute another Deed the day after the judgment and re-convey the 
property to the Family Trust.  
[Jasper] still would have no lien or other interest in the property and 
could not prevent such a re-conveyance.

            
3.  A creditor may secure an attachment lien on property 
claimed to have been fraudulently conveyed, without first obtaining a judgment, 
if that creditor has a right to such a judgment, although a decree setting aside 
the conveyance can not be entered until indebtedness is definitely established 
by judgment. Platte County State Bank v. 
Frantz, 239 P. 531 (Wyo. 1925).  Ms. Jasper does not have a judgment 
which would entitle her to attach [Brinckerhoff's] real property, nor does she 
have a right to such a judgment.  
She has not alleged a right to such a judgment.

            
4.  [Jasper] would accomplish nothing by setting aside the June 
26, 2006 conveyance.  There is no 
benefit to her even if she succeeded in this action.

            
5.  "In an action to set aside an alleged fraudulent 
conveyance, plaintiff cannot question the validity of the conveyance in the 
absence of allegation and proof that he is a creditor of the grantor."  First Nat. Bank of Riverside v. Eastman, 77 P. 1043 (Cal. 1904).  While [Jasper] is qualified as a 
creditor of Mr. Brinckerhoff, she is not, nor has she even alleged to be, a 
creditor of Mrs. Sandra Brinckerhoff.  
Both Mr. and Mrs. Brinckerhoff were grantors of the June 26, 2006 
conveyance that [Jasper] is challenging.  
Without being a creditor of both grantors, [Jasper] lacks standing to 
challenge that conveyance.

            
6.  Wyoming's Fraudulent Conveyance Act is to 
protect creditors from a debtor divesting himself of all his assets and then 
being unable to pay the creditor.  
That is not the case.  After 
transferring his home into his Family Trust, [Brinckerhoff] has remained able to 
pay [Jasper's] monthly alimony payment.  
[Jasper] does not have standing to challenge the June 26, 2006 conveyance 
of the Brinckerhoffs' home back into the Trust.  She is not within the protection of the 
Act.  She could not attach the 
property either before or after the conveyance.  Her ability to receive her monthly 
alimony payments has not been harmed or diminished by the 
conveyance.

            
7.  Courts set aside conveyances as fraudulent when a creditor 
has a right to reach the subject asset that was fraudulently conveyed.  In Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2003 WY 16 
[¶¶ 18-25], 62 P.3d 587[, 592-94] (Wyo. 2003), the husband attempted to 
place certain assets out of the reach of his wife as they went through a 
divorce.  Those assets were marital 
assets subject to division by the court as part of the divorce action.  In this case, the home in Jackson is not, nor has it 
ever been, an asset which was subject to any marital asset division with 
[Jasper].  The home is not an asset 
that [Jasper] has ever had a right to attach, lien or 
encumber.

8.  [Jasper] 
has alleged that the June 26, 2006 conveyance to the Trust violated the 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act.  [She] 
asserts that certain "badges of fraud" were present, indicating that the June 
26, 2006 conveyance was fraudulent.  
When considering the "badges of fraud" it is important to consider the 
circumstances of the challenged transfer.  
It would be unrealistic for a court to require Mr. and Mrs. Brinckerhoff 
to pay full monetary value to their Family Trust on June 12, 2006, when the 
property was transferred to them and equally unrealistic to require the Family 
Trust to pay Mr. and Mrs. Brinckerhoff full monetary value for the re-conveyance 
14 days later.

9.  One 
of the badges of fraud is a lack of consideration.  [Jasper] has asserted that 
[Brinckerhoff] did not receive adequate consideration for the conveyance of the 
real property.  While it is true 
that the Family Trust did not pay monetary consideration to Mr. and Mrs. 
Brinckerhoff, they did receive consideration.  Mr. and Mrs. Brinckerhoff received 
estate planning benefits from the conveyance of the property into the Family 
Trust.  Such benefits included 
directing the disposition of one of their primary assets, tax benefits to their 
heirs, and providing that their heirs could avoid probate on that property 
following their deaths.  These are 
real benefits and were adequate consideration for the conveyance.  While not yet addressed in Wyoming case law, other 
jurisdictions have found that inadequate consideration alone is not sufficient 
to establish fraud.  There were no 
suspicious circumstances surrounding the June 26, 2006 conveyance.  Wyoming law does not require monetary 
consideration, it requires adequate consideration.

10.  While 
there are other badges of fraud which should be considered, courts pay 
particular attention to one: the financial condition of the grantor.  Wyoming statutes pay particular attention to 
whether or not the grantor is insolvent. (W.S. §§ 34-14-103, 34-14-105 
[LexisNexis 2005].)  The reason for 
this increased scrutiny is courts find conveyances from destitute debtors more 
suspect, while conveyances from persons with assets sufficient to satisfy their 
debts are less suspect.  The [Act] 
is really designed to protect creditors from debtors who attempt to divest 
themselves of all their assets in order to escape satisfying the debt.  See Smith, Keller & Associates v. Dorr, 
Bently & Pecha, P.C., 875 P.2d 1258, 1269 (Wyo. 1994).  The [Act] is not intended to prevent 
legitimate conveyances such as this.

11.  Other 
badges include; 1) the relationship of the parties; 2) a retention of benefit by 
the grantor; and 3) consummation of the transaction in an abnormal manner.  The grantors are Mr. and Mrs. 
Brinckerhoff and grantee is the Brinckerhoff Family Trust, there is a 
relationship.  The mere existence of 
this relationship does not necessitate a finding that the conveyance was 
fraudulent.  There was retention of 
benefit by Mr. and Mrs. Brinckerhoff.  
They both continue to reside in the Jackson home.  This is no reason to brand the 
conveyance as fraudulent.  The final 
badge deals with whether or not the consummation of the transaction is contrary 
to normal business procedures or in a hurried or secret manner.  This did not happen here.  The Deed at issue was duly executed, 
notarized and recorded with the Teton County Clerk, where it became a public 
record.

12.  In 
order to succeed in her claim, [Jasper] must prove "actual intent, as 
distinguished from intent presumed by law, to hinder, delay or defraud either 
present or future creditors."  (W. 
S. § 34-14-108 [LexisNexis 2005].)  
There is no intent to defraud, delay or hinder [Jasper] or any of 
[Brinckerhoff's] other creditors.  
This intent is a necessary element of a claim under the Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act.  Walsh v. Walsh, 841 P.2d 831 
(1992).  [Jasper] has not specified 
how she believes the June 26, 2006 conveyance hinders her ability to receive 
monthly alimony payments.

13.  Mr. 
Brinckerhoff's estate planning is neither hindering nor delaying [Jasper's] 
collection of her monthly alimony.  
[Brinckerhoff] continues to pay [Jasper].  [Brinckerhoff] has sufficient income to 
pay the monthly payment.  He has 
planned for his retirement so that [he] will be able to continue to support 
[Jasper] until one of them dies.  
[Brinckerhoff] even pays the premiums on a $400,000.00 life insurance 
policy on himself with Mrs. Jasper as the named 
beneficiary.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      As we have 
already noted above, on the date the alleged fraudulent transfer was made (June 
26, 2006), the governing statute was the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-14-101 through 34-14-113 
(LexisNexis 2005).  That Uniform Act 
was repealed in 2006, and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act was enacted in its 
stead.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-14 
201 through 34-14-212 (LexisNexis 2007).  
The amended act took effect on July 1, 2006.  2006 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 55, § 3; also 
see Elaine A. Welle, Is it Time for 
Wyoming to 
Update its Fraudulence Conveyance Laws?, 5 Wyo. Law Rev. 207 (2005).  Also as noted above, the complaint 
appears to have been filed on August 6, 2006.1  In her brief, Jasper refers only to the 
more recent act, and Brinckerhoff and the district court refer only to the act 
in place prior to July 1, 2006.  It 
appears from the record that counsel for Brinckerhoff prepared the order signed 
by the district court.

 
 
[¶7]      Although some 
courts have held that fraudulent conveyance statutes apply retroactively, most 
do not, with an exception made for pending cases.  37 Am.Jur.2d Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers § 5 
(2001); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 417 
(1999); also see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107 (LexisNexis 2007); and Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077 
(11th Cir. 2004).  Neither party raises this circumstance 
as an issue in this appeal, nor was this matter posed to the district court 
below.  We conclude that we need not 
answer the question that we ourselves have posed in this regard because, 
although there are differences between those two acts, none of the differences 
plays a role in the resolution of this case and the result would be the same 
under either set of statutes.  We 
will reserve answering any such question for a case in which its resolution has 
an effect on the litigation before us for review.

 
 
Jasper's 
Motion to Amend her Complaint

 
 
[¶8]      For purposes of 
resolving this issue, we will assume that the district court intended to deny 
Jasper's motion to amend her complaint, by its failure to consider or rule on 
her motion.

 
 
We 
review the denial of a motion to amend a pleading under the following 
standard:

 
 
      A motion to amend 
a pleading under W.R.C.P. 15(a) "shall be freely given when justice so 
requires."   However, a 
district court's decision to grant or deny a motion to amend is a matter best 
left to the judgment of that court and we will not reverse its decision absent 
an abuse of discretion.  Ekberg v. Sharp, 2003 WY 123, ¶ 9, 
76 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo.2003).

 
 

Ray v. 
St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc., 2006 
WY 98, ¶ 7, 139 P.3d 464, 466 (Wyo.2006).

 
 

W.N. 
McMurry Const. Co. v. Community First Ins., Inc. Wyoming, 2007 
WY 96, ¶ 34,160 P.3d 71, 82 (Wyo. 2007); W.R.C.P. 
15(a).

 
 
[¶9]      As shall become 
evident in our discussion of the propriety of the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Brinckerhoff, Jasper's proposed amendment 
of her complaint sought to add to the complaint the occasions upon which 
Brinckerhoff had either transferred or conveyed his interest in the disputed 
real property either to or from his Family Trust, in addition to the June 26, 
2006 transfer, which was the last transfer that placed the Jackson real estate 
in the Family Trust.  For purposes 
of resolution of this appeal, we deem the earlier transfers irrelevant to this 
case and, thus, we are compelled to conclude that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in not ruling upon Jasper's motion to amend her 
complaint.  If she had a valid 
claim, the June 26, 2006 transfer sufficed to sustain that element of the claim 
(i.e., the existence of a conveyance or transfer).

 
 
Did the 
District Court Err in Granting Summary Judgment for 
Brinckerhoff

 
 
[¶10]   When we review a summary judgment, 
we have before us the same materials as did the district court, and we follow 
the same standards which applied to the proceedings below.  The propriety of granting a motion for 
summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual findings that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of an 
asserted cause of action or defense.  
We, of course, examine the record from a vantage point most favorable to 
that party who opposed the motion, affording to that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences that fairly may be drawn from the record.  If the evidence leads to conflicting 
interpretations or if reasonable minds might differ, summary judgment is 
improper.  Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 
2004 WY 145, ¶ 12, 101 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶11]   Under the statutes at issue here, 
we conclude that the district court was correct in concluding that Jasper was a 
"creditor" under the uniform acts in consideration.  Under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 34-14-202(a)(iii) 
and (iv) (LexisNexis 2007) a "creditor" and "claim" are:

 
 
(iii)  "Claim" 
means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, 
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured;

            

            
(iv)  "Creditor" means a person who has a 
claim[.]

 
 
Under 
the 2005 statute a "creditor" is "a person having any claim, whether matured or 
unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-14-102(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  It is a 
well-recognized principle of law that a spouse is entitled to have his or her 
alimony protected against conveyances or transfers that are intended to defraud 
the spouse of the maintenance payments.  
27B C.J.S. Divorce § 751 (2005).

 
 
[¶12]   However, the district court was 
also correct that the uncontroverted evidence in this case established that 
Brinckerhoff was not insolvent after the contested conveyance, nor had he 
transferred property with an actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Jasper 
of her alimony payments.  E.g., Molitor v. Molitor, 184 Conn. 530, 440 A.2d 215, 218-19 (Conn. 1981), and see 
generally 7A Uniform Laws Annotated, Business and Financial Laws, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
(2006).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   The failure of the district court 
to consider or grant Jasper's motion to amend her complaint was not an abuse of 
discretion.  The record on appeal 
establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that 
Brinckerhoff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, the 
district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of him is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We briefly 
mention that the date of filing in the district court is difficult to 
ascertain.  The date stamp was 
placed on the complaint in such a manner that the date is obscured by the 
caption printed on the pleading.  We 
have noted this in several docketed matters from various courts, more and more 
often as time goes by.  It is, of 
course, of great importance that the date on a filed document is crystal clear 
for many reasons, not the least of which is whether the document was timely 
filed.