Case Title: Toledo Bar Assn. v. Scott

Citation: 2011-Ohio-4185

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Toledo Bar Assn. v. Scott, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4185.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4185 
TOLEDO BAR ASSOCIATION v. SCOTT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Toledo Bar Assn. v. Scott, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4185.] 
(No. 2010-2265 — Submitted February 16, 2011 — Decided August 25, 2011.) 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Fabrication of evidence submitted to disciplinary 
authority — Failure to account for client funds — Failure to advise client of 
lack of malpractice insurance — Failure to deposit fees not yet earned into 
trust account — Engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to 
practice law — One-year suspension, six months stayed, on conditions. 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-016. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Robert Bernal Scott, Attorney Registration No. 
0073411, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2001.  On February 8, 
2010, the Toledo Bar Association, relator, filed a two-count complaint against 
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respondent.  After a first amendment of the complaint on May 28, 2010, a second 
amended complaint was filed on July 2, 2010, adding a third count. 
{¶ 2} On August 9, 2010, the parties submitted stipulations of fact and 
misconduct for some of the allegations, and a panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline conducted a hearing on the 
remaining allegations.  The panel accepted the parties’ agreed stipulations, made 
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommended that 
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with six months of 
the suspension stayed, upon conditions.  The board adopted the panel’s findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 3} On January 12, 2011, this court issued an order directing the 
parties to show cause why the recommendation of the board should not be 
confirmed by the court.  The parties did not file objections to the show-cause 
order.  We adopt the board’s findings and conclusions that respondent violated 
ethical standards incumbent on Ohio lawyers.  However, we reject the board’s 
recommended sanction.  Although the board accepted the parties’ stipulations to 
certain violations of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, the stipulations do 
not tell the entire story of misconduct in this case and the board’s reliance on our 
precedent related to the stipulated violations is misplaced.  For the reasons that 
follow, we suspend respondent’s license to practice law in Ohio for two years, 
with one year  of the suspension stayed on the conditions set by the panel. 
Misconduct 
Count 1 (The Jameson Matter) 
{¶ 4} Respondent stipulated that in 2007, he was hired by Lawrence 
Jameson to represent him on a charge of aggravated murder.  Prior to representing 
Jameson, respondent had never tried a murder case.  The parties stipulated that 
Jameson signed a general power of attorney (“POA”) in favor of respondent and 
gave respondent his ATM card and personal identification number. 
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{¶ 5} Over the next several weeks, respondent made seven ATM 
withdrawals of $500 each from Jameson’s bank account, none of which were 
deposited into a trust account.  In November 2007, respondent, using the POA, 
closed Jameson’s 401(k) account and deposited $24,456 from that account into 
his business account before he had earned a fee of that size based on his hourly 
fee agreement with Jameson.  Respondent also used the POA to gain access to 
Jameson’s home, where he took possession of some of Jameson’s personal 
property, including a pair of Cleveland Browns football tickets.  Respondent 
claimed that he had intended to use the tickets as evidence in Jameson’s trial.  
However, respondent used the tickets to attend the game with a friend. 
{¶ 6} During the representation, respondent also obtained possession of 
Jameson’s 1983 Porsche 928 and a 1990 Cadillac Fleetwood by causing Jameson 
to sign the backs of the titles to both vehicles as transferor.  Respondent then 
filled in his own name as transferee on both vehicles without any written 
authorization from Jameson.  Respondent then had a secretary notarize Jameson’s 
signature on the titles, even though she had not seen Jameson sign them.  
Respondent stipulated that he had failed to keep records of, or account to Jameson 
for, the personal property he received. 
{¶ 7} Respondent stipulated that during the investigation into the 
Jameson grievance, he had produced copies of hourly bills, claiming that they 
were bills he had delivered to Jameson periodically during the representation.  But 
these documents were not copies of actual bills that respondent presented to 
Jameson.  Rather, respondent fabricated and submitted false documents for the 
purpose of misleading the investigator.  Included in the fabricated bills were 
claims of time spent conferring with Jameson at the jail.  However, for ten of 
these entries, totaling 22 hours, the visitor log at the jail did not show respondent 
signing in. 
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{¶ 8} After deducting amounts expended on Jameson’s behalf, 
respondent received, according to his attorney’s calculation, approximately 
$21,900 in cash and other property in connection with his representation of 
Jameson.  Respondent stipulated that he had not adequately accounted for these 
funds. 
Count 2 (The Triplett Matter) 
{¶ 9} Respondent stipulated that he had been retained by the family of 
Timothy Triplett to represent Triplett in an appeal of a criminal conviction in late 
2007 or early 2008.  At the time he was retained, respondent did not have a 
malpractice insurance policy and did not provide his client with the notice 
required by Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c). 
Count 3 (Trust Account) 
{¶ 10} During December 2009 through February 2010, respondent 
maintained a client trust account with Huntington Bank.  While respondent 
maintained the account, he authorized debits of $40 per month to be paid to a 
credit-card servicing company for its processing of credit-card charges by 
respondent’s clients for fees payable to respondent.  Respondent held client funds 
in the account, but he failed to maintain adequate and accurate records of those 
funds.  During the first week of February 2010, despite the fact that respondent’s 
trust account continued to hold client funds, the debits for the credit-card 
company caused the account to become overdrawn.  The bank issued a notice to 
respondent that the account contained insufficient funds to meet further debits or 
other demands on the account. 
Stipulated Violations 
{¶ 11} The panel and board accepted the parties’ stipulations, and we 
agree that the above conduct resulted in violations of the following disciplinary 
rules:  Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c) (respondent failed to deposit fees paid in advance into 
a trust account), 8.1(a) (respondent made a false statement of material fact in 
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connection with a disciplinary matter), 8.4(h) (by requesting a notary public to 
notarize Jameson’s signature improperly, respondent engaged in conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 1.15(a) (respondent 
failed to adequately safeguard and to maintain adequate records of client funds 
and other property), and 1.4(c) (respondent failed to notify his client that 
respondent had no professional-liability insurance). 
Aggravation and Mitigation 
{¶ 12} The panel found the following aggravating factors: multiple 
offenses (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d)) and the submission of false evidence and 
false statements during the disciplinary process (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(f)).  
Further, the panel also concluded that the submission of false evidence and 
statements implied a dishonest or selfish motive.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b). 
{¶ 13} In mitigation, the panel adopted the parties’ stipulation that 
respondent has no prior disciplinary record (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a)) and 
that respondent has acknowledged his wrongful conduct.  The panel also found a 
timely good-faith effort to make restitution (BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c)) and a 
cooperative attitude after acknowledging the fabricated record (BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(d)). 
Sanction 
{¶ 14} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the duties violated by the lawyer in question and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  Before making a 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10.  See Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Troy, 121 Ohio St.3d 
51, 2009-Ohio-502, 901 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 15} As a sanction, respondent and relator jointly recommended a one-
year suspension with six months stayed upon the following conditions: respondent 
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shall work with a mentoring attorney for one year, the mentoring attorney and 
respondent shall meet monthly, the mentor shall submit a quarterly report to 
relator, and respondent shall take three hours of courses on law-office 
management within the first six months of the suspension.  The board 
recommends that we accept the stipulated sanction, but we decline to do so. 
{¶ 16} To determine the appropriate length of a suspension, we have 
recognized that our primary purpose in imposing disciplinary sanctions is not to 
punish the offender but to protect the public.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 
Schwieterman, 115 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007-Ohio-4266, 873 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 34, citing 
Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 
N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53.  We look to similar cases for the sanctions that are most 
appropriate for similar misconduct.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-5709, 938 N.E.2d 1021, ¶ 27. 
{¶ 17} If one were to read only the stipulated violations, the 
recommended sanction would seem to align with the sanctions we previously 
have imposed for similar violations.  The facts as stipulated by the parties depict 
misconduct of a very serious nature.  Respondent used his client’s ATM card to 
withdraw large sums of money for purposes unrelated to client services.  Using 
the power of attorney he caused his client to execute, respondent closed his 
client’s retirement account and deposited over $24,000 from that account into 
respondent’s own business account.  Respondent took two Cleveland Browns 
tickets from his client’s home and used them to attend a game with his friend. 
{¶ 18} Respondent also obtained possession of two motor vehicles, a 
Porsche and a Cadillac, by causing his freelance secretary to commit fraud by 
notarizing an affidavit without observing his client’s signature.  Respondent did 
all of this while his client was in jail on a murder charge.  Moreover, respondent 
lied to disciplinary authorities about how often he met with his client and 
fabricated billing statements to mislead the investigator.  Taken in totality, this 
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course of conduct falls far below the professional standards lawyers should 
uphold and merits more than a six-month actual suspension from the practice of 
law. 
{¶ 19} “Lawyers who choose to engage in fabrication of evidence, deceit, 
misrepresentation of facts, and distortion of truth do so at their peril.” Cleveland 
Bar Assn. v. McMahon, 114 Ohio St.3d 331, 2007-Ohio-3673, 872 N.E.2d 261, ¶ 
29.  Thus, although the board found that respondent actually collected less 
compensation than he was entitled to receive under the fee agreement, the 
credibility of respondent’s later documentation, cobbled from a self-serving 
memory, is weak.  The reality is that respondent’s use of his client’s ATM and 
other personal effects had very little to do with compensation for legal services. 
{¶ 20} The disciplinary panel adopted the parties’ stipulation that 
respondent has acknowledged the wrongfulness of his conduct.  While this 
acknowledgment is an important consideration, it does not change the deceitful 
nature of respondent’s misconduct and the fact that he took advantage of a 
vulnerable client.  Respondent’s conduct amounted to more than just failing to 
deposit fees into a trust account or failing to maintain records of his client’s funds 
(although these are serious violations).  His conduct was intentionally deceptive 
and equates to stealing from his client. 
{¶ 21} Indeed, we have imposed substantial sanctions for attorneys who 
have taken funds from their clients.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Blair, 128 Ohio 
St.3d 384, 2011-Ohio-767, 944 N.E.2d 1161, we suspended an attorney from the 
practice of law for two years with 18 months stayed on conditions because, in her 
capacity as a court-appointed guardian, the attorney withdrew all of the ward’s 
funds from her client’s trust account, bankrupting the ward, but did not use any of 
those funds for the ward’s benefit.  The attorney further authorized her staff to 
prepare false affidavits.  And in Dayton Bar Assn. v. Gross (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 
224, 581 N.E.2d 520, we indefinitely suspended an attorney who, pursuant to a 
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power of attorney, made a series of withdrawals from his mother’s bank account 
without her knowledge or consent, used the funds to meet his personal financial 
needs (eventually depleting her funds), and failed to pay her nursing-home bills. 
{¶ 22} Likewise, we have imposed suspensions greater than the one 
imposed here on attorneys who have deceptively elicited funds from nonclients.  
In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Farrell, 119 Ohio St.3d 529, 2008-Ohio-4540, 895 
N.E.2d 800, we imposed a two-year suspension with one year stayed on 
conditions for an attorney who forged his wife’s signature on a power of attorney 
to obtain a line of credit and fabricated numerous documents to cover up his 
actions.  In Northwest Ohio Bar Assn. v. Archer, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2011-Ohio-
3142, ___ N.E.2d ___, the court imposed a one-year suspension on an attorney 
who not only allowed his malpractice insurance to lapse without informing his 
clients, but had also converted to his own use the taxes he had withheld from his 
secretary’s wages. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 23} The practice of law is not a right, and our Rules of Professional 
Conduct demand the highest standards of conduct from those in our profession.  
McMahon, 114 Ohio St.3d 331, 2007-Ohio-3673, 872 N.E.2d 261, ¶ 29.  
Respondent engaged in offenses that undermined the integrity of the legal 
profession and indicated a selfish indifference to his professional obligations. 
{¶ 24} Having weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case 
as found by the board and having considered the sanctions previously imposed for 
comparable conduct, we reject  the parties’ stipulated sanction.  Accordingly, we 
suspend Robert Bernal Scott from the practice of law for two years, with the final 
12 months  stayed upon the following conditions: (1) respondent shall serve six 
months of probation supervised by a monitor appointed by relator in accordance 
with Gov.Bar R. V(9) and (2) in addition to respondent’s other CLE requirements 
under Gov.Bar R. X(3)(G), respondent shall complete three hours of CLE in law-
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office management within the first six months of his suspension.  If respondent 
fails to comply with these conditions, the stay will be lifted, and respondent shall 
serve the entire two-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to the respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Robison, Curphey & O’Connell and W. David Arnold; and Michael J. 
Manahan; and Jonathan B. Cherry, Bar Counsel, for relator. 
James D. Caruso, for respondent. 
______________________