Case Title: Rose v. Jaques

Citation: 

Docket Number: 032014

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
HOWARD WILSON ROSE, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 032014 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
June 10, 2004 
ANNE-MARIE WESEN JAQUES 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 
Christopher W. Hutton, Judge 
 
 
In this personal injury case arising out of a motor vehicle 
accident, the appellants, Howard W. Rose and Stow Mills, Inc. 
(collectively, “Stow Mills”), assign multiple errors to the 
trial court’s judgment confirming a jury award of $7.5 million 
to the appellee, Anne-Marie Wesen Jaques.  Jaques asserts one 
assignment of cross-error regarding the trial court’s granting 
leave to appeal under Code § 8.01-428(C). 
I.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
On the night of December 29, 1996, Jaques was driving 
eastward in the far right lane on Interstate 64 near the Hampton 
Coliseum.  To Jaques’ right was a guardrail and no emergency 
stopping lane. 
Rose was driving a tractor-trailer for his employer, Stow 
Mills, Inc., in the far left lane.  Rose moved his tractor-
trailer into the center lane behind Jaques’ car in the right 
lane.  A short time later, Rose’s tractor and part of the 
trailer moved ahead of Jaques’ car with the remainder of the 
trailer abreast of her car.  Without signaling an intent to do 
 
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so, Rose moved the tractor-trailer into Jaques’ lane of travel.  
The side of the rear wheels of the trailer collided with Jaques’ 
vehicle and “bounced” it between the tractor-trailer and the 
guardrail several times before the car came to rest near an off-
ramp where the guardrail ended.  Rose later pled guilty in the 
City of Hampton General District Court to making an improper 
lane change. 
Jaques filed a motion for judgment in the Circuit Court of 
the City of Hampton against Stow Mills for injuries Jaques 
claimed she received in the accident.  At trial, the jury 
returned a verdict for Jaques in the amount of $7.5 million 
dollars and an order was entered by the trial court awarding 
that amount to Jaques.  We awarded Stow Mills an appeal from the 
trial court’s judgment on the assignments of error discussed 
below as well as Jaques’ assignment of cross-error.  For the 
reasons stated below, the judgment of the trial court will be 
affirmed. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Jaques’ Assignment of Cross-Error 
 
Jaques’ assignment of cross-error stems from a convoluted 
course of events concerning the date of the final order in this 
case.  We begin our analysis here because if Jaques prevails on 
this issue, Stowe Mills’ appeal is not timely and the trial 
court’s judgment would be affirmed without further review. 
 
3
 
On March 24, 2003, the jury returned its verdict for Jaques 
in the amount of $7.5 million.  After the jury was dismissed, 
the following colloquy ensued between Stow Mills’ counsel and 
the trial court: 
MR. PROTOGYROU:  Judge, if we could, we would 
like to preserve our post-trial motions at this 
time and set a date in the future. . . 
 
THE COURT:  . . . So if we don’t hear anything 
from you in 21 days, Mr. Protogyrou, we will 
assume that no motion is to be made. 
 
 
On April 11, 2003, within the 21-day period, Stow Mills 
moved for judgment non obstante veredicto, a new trial and 
remittitur.  A hearing on these motions was scheduled for May 
30, 2003. 
 
Nothing further appears in the written record of the trial 
court before May 2, 2003.  On that day, a Friday, counsel for 
Stow Mills received an envelope from the clerk of court, 
postmarked May 1, 2003, which contained a copy of a one-page 
order, signed by the trial court and dated March 24, 2003 (the 
“March 24th order”).  This order recited the trial events of 
that date, including the verdict of the jury, and concluded with 
the following paragraph. 
It is therefore considered by the Court that the 
plaintiff, Ann-Marie Wesen Jaques, recover from 
the defendants, Howard Wilson Rose and Stow 
Mills, Inc., the sum of seven million five 
hundred thousand dollars, the damages by the jury 
in its verdict fixed, until paid, and her costs 
 
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by her about her prosecution in this behalf 
expended.  Entered this 24th day of March, 2003. 
 
 
The March 24th order bears no date stamp or other indicia 
of receipt by the clerk of the court and bears no endorsements 
by counsel or reference to Rule 1:13.  While the March 24th 
order does not recite on its face that it is a final order, the 
parties do not contest that it is the trial court’s final order 
by its terms.1 
 
The following Tuesday, May 6, 2003, Stow Mills filed a 
motion requesting the entry of an order pursuant to Code § 8.01-
428(C) preserving its right to appeal and requested a hearing 
prior to May 23, 2003, the sixtieth day after the March 24th 
order.  Stow Mills averred that the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to modify or suspend the March 24th order under 
Rule 1:1 and further contended that its right to appeal had 
expired under Rule 5:9 on April 23, 2003: all prior to any 
notification of the entry of the March 24th order. 
 
The next day, May 7, 2003, the trial court wrote counsel 
for both parties stating, inter alia:  
It is the intention of the court to protect all 
parties’ right of appeal in this case and should 
I have made a mistake post trial, I will correct 
                     
 
1 At the hearing on Stow Mills’ Code § 8.01-428(C) motion, 
the trial court stated:  “. . . at the time I signed it was 
intended only to be a daily record of what had, in fact, 
occurred on March the 24th of 2003.  But in its form, as it was 
entered, [it] gives every appearance of being a final order in 
this matter.” 
 
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that mistake.  The clerk further informs me that 
the trial orders in this case were actually 
entered on April 15, 2003. 
 
On May 19, 2003, the trial court heard argument on Stow 
Mills’ motion to which Jaques raised numerous objections.  
Jaques contended that since the trial court had represented the 
March 24th order was actually signed on April 15, 2003, Rule 1:1 
required the later date be deemed the date of entry regardless 
of what the written order indicated on its face.2  Further, 
Jaques argued that the trial court had the authority to change 
the date on the March 24th order to April 15 as a clerical 
mistake cognizable under Code § 8.01-428(B).3 
In the alternative, Jaques averred that Stow Mills did not 
meet the statutory criteria for relief under Code § 8.01-428(C) 
because: (1) Stow Mills had notice at least by the May 7th 
letter that the trial court “entered” the order on April 15th, 
so it then had until May 15th to file a notice of appeal, but 
affirmatively chose not to do so, (2) Stow Mills failed to 
                     
 
2 Jaques cites the following part of Rule 1:1 as the basis 
of her position:  “The date of entry of any final judgment, 
order, or decree shall be the date the judgment, order or decree 
is signed by the judge.” 
 
3 Code § 8.01-428(B) states in pertinent part: 
 
Clerical mistakes. - Clerical mistakes in all 
judgments or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or from an 
inadvertent omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time on its own initiative or upon 
the motion of any party and after such notice, as 
the court may order. 
 
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exercise due diligence to learn of the entry of the trial 
court’s order before May 2nd, and (3) since Stow Mills had 
notice before May 15th of the entry of the order on April 15th, 
it had not been denied all opportunity to timely note an appeal.4 
 
Jaques’ counsel proffered to the court that he “was able to 
learn on April 15, through a telephone conversation with the 
clerk’s office, that there was an order entered as of that 
date.”  The record does not disclose with whom Jaques’ counsel 
spoke or the location of the order at that time.  Jaques 
contends that Stow Mills should not be deemed to have exercised 
due diligence for purposes of Code § 8.01-428(C) if she was able 
to learn of the order’s entry and Stow Mills failed to do so. 
 
Stow Mills responded that the trial court was bound by the 
March 24th date because that date had not been altered pursuant 
to Rule 1:1 within 21 days.  Further, Stow Mills argued that the 
trial court had no authority to change the date on the March 
                     
4 Code § 8.01-428(C) states in its entirety: 
 
C. Failure to notify party or counsel of final 
order. − If counsel, or a party not represented by 
counsel, who is not in default in a circuit court 
is not notified by any means of the entry of a 
final order and the circuit court is satisfied 
that such lack of notice (i) did not result from 
a failure to exercise due diligence on the part 
of that party and (ii) denied that party an 
opportunity to file an appeal therefrom, the 
circuit court may, within sixty days of the entry 
of such order, grant the party leave to appeal. 
The computation of time for noting and perfecting 
an appeal shall run from the entry of such order, 
and such order shall have no other effect. 
 
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24th order to April 15, or any other date, because changing the 
date of a final order is not a “clerical error” cognizable under 
Code § 8.01-428(B), when the issue before the court involves 
lack of notice that affects a party’s right to appeal.  To hold 
otherwise, Stow Mills argued, would nullify Rule 1:1, ignore the 
General Assembly’s intent as expressed in subsection C of Code 
§ 8.01-428 and would lead to chaos in the judicial system.  Stow 
Mills contended that its appeal rights had expired under the 
March 24th order on April 23rd, prior to any notice, and that 
relief was appropriate under Code § 8.01-428(C). 
 
Stow Mills proffered that it had intermittently checked the 
trial court’s web site and found no computer record reflecting 
that the March 24th order had been entered.  Stow Mills’ counsel 
also proffered, without contradiction, a representation from the 
deputy clerk of court who handled the March 24th order, that it 
had not been received in the clerk’s office until “sometime 
. . . the week of April the 28th.” 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated: 
I am satisfied that the lack of notice to counsel 
as to the entry of the order dated March 24th, 
2003 did not result from a failure to exercise 
due diligence on the part of the defendant . . . 
and that the defendants were denied an 
opportunity to appeal. 
 
 
The trial court then entered an order on May 19, 2003 (the 
“May 19th order”), granting the parties the right to file a 
 
8
notice of appeal from the March 24th order pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-428(C).  Stow Mills filed its notice of appeal the next 
day.  
 
Since the General Assembly amended Code § 8.01-428 in 1993 
to add subsection C, we have not had occasion to address its 
application.5  The Court of Appeals of Virginia did review this 
subsection in Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va. App. 126, 562 S.E.2d 336 
(2002), examining the interplay between subsections B and C, and 
concluded:  “the authority and procedure to extend the filing 
deadline, where lack of notice is the issue, is provided only 
under Subsection C.”  Id. at 136, 562 S.E.2d at 339. 
 
It is not necessary in the present appeal to resolve the 
question whether there may be instances where the date of an 
order may be corrected under Code § 8.01-428(B).  Since the 
trial court speaks only through its written orders, McMillion v. 
Dryvit Sys., Inc., 262 Va. 463, 469, 552 S.E.2d 364, 367 (2001), 
and − on its face − the order Stow Mills received on May 2 
indicated entry on March 24th, the issue in this case is lack of 
notice of the entry of a final order and the consequent 
expiration of a party’s appeal rights. 
                     
 
5 Although this Court does have cases addressing Code 
§ 8.01-428(C), those cases concern the version of the statute in 
effect prior to the 1993 amendment.  Former Code § 8.01-428(C) 
concerning independent actions to relieve a party from judgment 
is now Code § 8.01-482(D). 
 
9
Whether the trial court might also have proceeded under 
subsection B of Code § 8.01-428 in the present circumstance is 
not dispositive.  By specific legislative act the General 
Assembly has authorized trial courts to remedy lack of notice 
for the filing of an appeal through subsection C of Code § 8.01-
428.  
Because Stow Mills chose to proceed under Code § 8.01-
428(C) and the trial court has the authority to afford relief 
under that subsection, our inquiry is whether the trial court 
made the necessary findings under the statute and whether those 
findings are supported by the record.  A trial court may enter 
an order under Code § 8.01-428(C) extending a party’s time to 
notice an appeal if that party received no notification, by any 
means, of the entry of a final order and the circuit court 
is satisfied that such lack of notice (i) did not 
result from a failure to exercise due diligence 
on the part of that party and (ii) denied that 
party an opportunity to file an appeal therefrom 
. . . . 
 
Code § 8.01-428(C). 
 
The trial court made the following findings in its May 19th 
order: 
1.  The Court’s Order of March 24, 2003, was 
entered without notice to counsel for Defendants 
and without notice to the Defendants themselves, 
 
2.  The lack of notice was not a result of the 
failure of counsel to exercise due diligence, 
 
 
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3.  The lack of notice denied Defendants an 
opportunity to file an appeal from the March 24, 
2003, order . . . . 
 
 
The trial court thus made the findings required by the 
statute, and based on the record before us, we cannot say the 
trial court’s determinations were plainly wrong or without 
supporting evidence.  Nothing in the record indicates that Stow 
Mills had notice of the March 24th order prior to May 2nd.  
Thus, Stow Mills’ time for noting an appeal under Rule 5:9 had 
expired under the March 24th order on April 23rd, absent relief 
under Code § 8.01-428(C). 
 
The record also supports the finding that the lack of 
notice of the March 24th order was not the result of a failure 
to exercise due diligence by Stow Mills.  While Jaques makes 
much of the proffer by its counsel that he learned the order had 
been entered on April 15, nothing in the record indicates that 
anyone could have determined from the court’s file that the 
order had been entered until sometime the week of April 28th, if 
then.  Indeed, nothing in the record indicates any person could 
have determined from the court’s file the order had been entered 
prior to its receipt by Stow Mills on May 2nd.  Neither the 
March 24th order nor any other entry in the record supports the 
supposition that the court’s file contained the order prior to 
 
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May 2nd.6  If the court’s file does not contain the order, 
counsel cannot be deemed to have failed to exercise due 
diligence when discovery of that order was not available to the 
public. 
 
As Stow Mills did not receive timely notice of the March 
24th order and that lack of notice was not the result of its 
failure to exercise due diligence, it is self-evident that the 
lack of notice denied Stow Mills an opportunity to file a timely 
appeal because the period within which to do so expired prior to 
receipt of the March 24th order on May 2nd.  Accordingly, we 
find no error in the trial court’s order of May 19th and 
conclude the filing of Stow Mills’ notice of appeal on May 20, 
2003, was timely.  Jaques’ assignment of cross-error will 
therefore be denied. 
B.  Contributory Negligence 
 
At the close of its case, Stow Mills moved to strike the 
plaintiff’s evidence on the basis that Jaques was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law for failing to keep a proper 
                     
 
6 Stow Mills contends that it was entitled to rely on its 
colloquy with the trial court after return of the jury’s verdict 
which it interprets to mean the trial court would not enter a 
final order until it had ruled on Stow Mills’ post-trial 
motions.  We need not speculate on the legal effect, if any, the 
dialogue between the trial court and a party may have in the 
absence of the entry of an order suspending judgment within the 
appropriate 21-day period of Rule 1:1.  Nonetheless, the trial 
court’s discussion with counsel is a factor, among others, the 
trial court could consider in its overall determination of 
whether Stow Mills exercised due diligence. 
 
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lookout.  Stow Mills argued to the trial court that Jaques’ 
failure to see the tractor-trailer moving into her lane and to 
brake or take other evasive action constituted contributory 
negligence.  The trial court rejected Stow Mills’ request for a 
jury instruction on contributory negligence and denied Stow 
Mills’ motion to strike holding that, as a matter of law, Jaques 
was not contributorily negligent. 
 
On appeal, Stow Mills asserts that it was error for the 
trial court: (1) “to hold, as a matter of law, that [Jaques] was 
free from contributory negligence,” (2) “to fail to hold that 
[Jaques] was contributorily negligent as a matter of law,” and 
(3) “to refuse to instruct the jury on contributory negligence.”7 
Contributory negligence involves an objective test, “i.e., 
whether a plaintiff failed to act as a reasonable person would 
have acted for his own safety under the circumstances.”  Artrip 
v. E.E. Berry Equip. Co., 240 Va. 354, 358, 397 S.E.2d 821, 823-
24 (1990).  “Whether a plaintiff is guilty of contributory 
negligence is generally a question of fact to be decided by the 
                     
 
7 On appeal, Jaques argues that Rule 5:11(b) bars Stow 
Mills’ assignments of error pertaining to contributory 
negligence because Stow Mills failed to file all portions of the 
transcript necessary for adjudication of those issues on appeal.  
However, Jaques made no objection to the transcript in the trial 
court as required by Rule 5:11(d).  Thus, this objection is 
waived on appeal.  Rule 5:25.  Moreover, Jaques filed a full 
transcript, which leaves this Court with a complete record on 
appeal.  Stow Mills’ motion for costs incurred in reproducing 
“non-germane” portions of the appendix will be denied. 
 
13
trier of fact.”  Sawyer v. Comerci, 264 Va. 68, 74, 563 S.E.2d 
748, 752 (2002); Artrip, 240 Va. at 358, 397 S.E.2d at 823.  A 
defendant asserting contributory negligence as a defense bears 
the burden of proving, by the greater weight of the evidence, 
that the plaintiff was negligent and that her negligence was the 
proximate cause of the injury.  Karim v. Grover, 235 Va. 550, 
552, 369 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1988).  This means "the burden is upon 
the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
such contributory negligence, unless it is disclosed by the 
plaintiff's evidence or can be fairly inferred from the 
circumstances of the case."  Sawyer, 264 Va. at 75, 563 S.E.2d 
at 752 (quoting Southern Railway v. May, 147 Va. 542, 552, 137 
S.E. 493, 496 (1927)). 
We first address Stow Mills’ assignment of error on refusal 
of the jury instruction because it presents the least 
evidentiary burden.  Stow Mills’ failure to meet that burden 
would vitiate any need to address the other two assignments of 
error. 
As the proponent of a rejected jury instruction on 
contributory negligence, we will view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the defendant, Stow Mills.  Commonwealth v. 
Vaughn, 263 Va. 31, 33, 557 S.E.2d 220, 221 (2002) ("When 
reviewing a trial court's refusal to give a proffered jury 
instruction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
 
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the proponent of the instruction"); Doe v. Dewhirst, 240 Va. 
266, 268, 396 S.E.2d 840, 842 (1990).  However, “more than a 
scintilla of evidence is necessary to establish each of the 
elements of contributory negligence before such instruction may 
be given to a jury.”  Sawyer, 264 Va. at 75, 563 S.E.2d at 753; 
see also Gravitt v. Ward, 258 Va. 330, 335, 518 S.E.2d 631, 634 
(1999); Ring v. Poelman, 240 Va. 323, 327, 397 S.E.2d 824, 827 
(1990).  The prima facie case is demonstrated when there is more 
than a scintilla of evidence produced on each of the elements of 
contributory negligence.  The record in this case does not 
contain that threshold level of evidence on any of these 
elements and, therefore, Stow Mills was not entitled to a jury 
instruction. 
On direct examination, Rose admitted that at the time he 
moved the tractor-trailer into the right lane, he did not see 
Jaques’ vehicle.  Tommy Meade (“Meade”), who was driving behind 
both Rose and Jaques on the interstate at the time of the 
accident, witnessed the collision between Rose’s tractor-trailer 
and Jaques’ vehicle.  He testified that, just prior to the 
accident, Jaques was driving in the right lane and Rose was 
driving in the left lane.  According to Meade’s testimony, he 
observed Rose move into the center lane and then, approximately 
five seconds later, move into the right lane striking Jaques’ 
vehicle.  The tractor-trailer then bounced Jaques’ car between 
 
15
the trailer and the guardrail “four to five times . . . and 
there came a point where the tractor trailer got off of her, and 
that was at a off-ramp where the guardrail had ended.”  Meade 
also testified that he did not observe anything in the operation 
of Jaques’ vehicle that would have caused her to strike the 
tractor-trailer and that based on his observations, there is no 
way Jaques could have avoided the accident. 
Brian S. Vance (“Vance”), Jaques’ boyfriend at the time of 
the accident, was in the passenger seat when the accident 
occurred.  He testified that the tractor-trailer “drug the car, 
I would think close to a hundred yards” along the guardrail.  He 
stated that Jaques’ vehicle was traveling approximately 55 miles 
per hour when the tractor-trailer struck them. 
 
Stow Mills read into the record portions of Jaques’ 
deposition testimony.  In that testimony, Jaques stated that she 
was driving 55 miles per hour in the right lane.  She testified 
that just prior to the collision she had checked her left side 
and there were no vehicles in that lane.  It was only when Vance 
screamed that she “saw a truck coming at me.  His cab, the side 
of his cab and the lights along the side of the truck, the 
reflector lights.”  She testified, through her deposition 
testimony, that after the tractor-trailer hit her vehicle,  
we were going back and forth between the 
guardrail and the truck itself . . . I tried to 
hit my horn, and I couldn’t because the air bag 
 
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had deployed . . . you know, it was just a moment 
that I was trying to do something to show that I 
was there, and there was nothing I could do. 
 
 
Stow Mills contends on appeal that Jaques was 
contributorily negligent for failing to see the tractor-trailer 
and not taking measures to avoid the collision.  It argues that 
Jaques had no explanation for failing to see an 
eighteen-wheeler as the large truck came up on 
her side of the car, moved past her, and then 
moved into her lane.  Nor did she explain why she 
did not apply her brakes and let the truck pass 
given that she saw the truck before it hit her 
car.  Moreover, she never explained how it was 
that her passenger − who was farthest from the 
truck − saw the truck before she did, gave her a 
warning before the truck hit her, and yet she 
took no steps to avoid the collision. 
 
 
The record does not support Stow Mills’ allegation that 
Jaques failed to apply her brakes so as to avoid the collision; 
there was simply no testimony on that point.  Meade, the witness 
in the best position to see the events unfold, testified that 
from what he observed, Jaques could not have avoided the 
collision.  She was in her lane of travel and not traveling at 
an excessive speed.  The driver of the truck testified that he 
did not see her before attempting to enter her lane.  There is 
nothing in the record to indicate that Jaques failed to act as a 
reasonable person would have acted under the circumstances.  A 
jury finding that Jaques was negligent would have required 
unreasonable speculation beyond the evidence presented at trial.  
The trial court properly held that Jaques was not contributorily 
 
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negligent as a matter of law and precluded Stow Mills from 
asserting that defense to the jury. 
C.  Questioning of Witness by the Trial Court 
 
Dr. Anuradha Daytner (“Dr. Daytner”), one of Jaques’ 
treating physicians, testified at trial regarding the medical 
care Jaques received.  Jaques’ counsel asked Dr. Daytner if, 
during treatment, she assessed with a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty whether Jaques was being truthful and honest. 
Stow Mills objected, arguing that Dr. Daytner could not testify 
as to truthfulness, as that was an impermissible assessment of 
character.  After several attempts to rephrase the question and 
further objections from Stow Mills, the trial court, on its own 
initiative, questioned Dr. Daytner in the following exchange: 
THE COURT: 
Doctor, one of the things you have to do with any 
patient is to determine whether or not you are 
getting accurate information, correct? 
[DR. DAYTNER]: Correct. 
THE COURT: 
Did you make such determination with [Jaques]? 
[DR. DAYTNER]: Yes. 
THE COURT: 
Did you find the information that she gave you to 
be credible? 
[DR. DAYTNER]: Yes. 
THE COURT: 
Need anything else, [Jaques’ counsel]? 
[DR. DAYTNER]: No, Your Honor.  Thank you. 
 
Stow Mills asserts on appeal that the trial court showed bias by 
the act of questioning Dr. Daytner. 
 
Although Stow Mills objected to the questioning of Dr. 
Daytner by Jaques’ counsel on the basis that it called for 
impermissible testimony regarding the plaintiff’s capability for 
 
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veracity, no objection was made to the questioning of the 
witness by the trial court.  Stow Mills did not alert the trial 
court that it contended the court’s questioning showed bias.  
Rule 5:25 requires that objections be “stated with reasonable 
certainty at the time of the ruling.”  Rule 5:25; Flippo v. CSC 
Assocs. III, L.L.C., 262 Va. 48, 61, 547 S.E.2d 216, 224 (2001).  
We will not consider an objection raised for the first time on 
appeal as Stow Mills does here.  Buck v. Jordan, 256 Va. 535, 
545-46, 508 S.E.2d 880, 885-86 (1998). 
D.  Damages for Deposition-Related Stress 
 
Stow Mills’ next assignment of error asserts that Jaques 
sought to recover damages for stress allegedly caused by the 
litigation she initiated against Stow Mills.  In particular, 
Stow Mills alleges that Jaques sought damages related to 
symptoms caused by having to give deposition testimony during 
the pendency of the litigation.  Stow Mills avers such a 
“damage-by-litigation” claim is not cognizable in law. 
 
Although Jaques’ pleadings never mention a purported 
“damage-by-litigation” claim, Stow Mills construes several 
instances in the record where her deposition is mentioned as an 
attempt to recover for damages arising out of the litigation.  
For example, during closing argument, Jaques’ counsel stated 
that “[s]he fought to overcome all of the disabilities until she 
crashed and burned after these depositions.”  In addition, 
 
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Jaques’ psychologist testified as follows about her reaction to 
the May 2002 deposition: 
[PSYCHOLOGIST]: 
Well, she came in − I was saying, I was going 
to go outside, and she just looked at me, 
and when she looked at me[,] her eyes − and 
I’ve never seen her like that − were just 
full of tears, and I said do you need to go 
inside and she said yes.  Her posttraumatic 
stress disorder symptoms were just flagrant.  
She discussed her deposition issues.  Crying 
about things that were said, things that 
were implied, the events that occurred. 
 
. . . . 
 
[JAQUES’ COUNSEL]: Doctor, from a purely clinical perspective 
with a reasonable degree of psychological 
certainty, what is your opinion with respect 
to the effect of the deposition, having to 
relive the wreck at the deposition, had on 
her condition and as it exists today? 
[PSYCHOLOGIST]: 
I think it exacerbated her PTSD symptoms to 
a full-blown posttraumatic stress disorder 
diagnosis that she will never be able to get 
rid of. 
 
 
An examination of the record shows that Stow Mills did not 
object to any of the testimony from Jaques’ witnesses relating 
to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) stemming from the 
deposition.  Any such argument on appeal is thus barred by Rule 
5:25. 
E.  Exclusion of Expert Testimony on Malingering 
Stow Mills retained a neuropsychologist, Dr. Edward A. 
Peck, to conduct an independent medical examination, including a 
 
20
psychological test for malingering,8 on Jaques.  Dr. Peck 
proffered testimony outside the presence of the jury about his 
testing of Jaques.  At the conclusion of that proffer the trial 
court excluded all of his testimony regarding malingering.  Stow 
Mills assigns error to the trial court’s exclusion of Dr. Peck’s 
testimony. 
“A trial court's exercise of its discretion in determining 
whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be overturned on 
appeal absent evidence that the trial court abused that 
discretion."  Wright v. Kaye, 267 Va. 510, 517, 593 S.E.2d 307, 
310 (2004) (quoting May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 362, 568 S.E.2d 
690, 692 (2002)).  This Court will not consider testimony 
excluded by the trial court “without a proper showing of what 
that testimony might have been.”  O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 
Va. 672, 697, 364 S.E.2d 491, 505 (1988).  "When testimony is 
rejected before it is delivered, an appellate court has no basis 
for adjudication unless the record reflects a proper proffer."  
Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 968, 234 S.E.2d 79, 81 
(1977). 
                     
 
8 Malinger means “to pretend to be ill or otherwise 
physically or mentally incapacitated so as to avoid duty or 
work,” or “to deliberately induce, protract, or exaggerate 
actual illness or other incapacity so as to avoid duty or work.”  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1367 (1993). 
 
21
The record contains a transcript of Dr. Peck’s testimony 
given outside the presence of the jury.  During that testimony, 
the following exchange between the court and Dr. Peck occurred: 
THE COURT: 
Okay.  And your diagnosis [−] are the three 
diagnoses there on page 12 [of the report]? 
[DR. PECK]: 
That’s correct. 
THE COURT: 
That’s really the bottom line of your assessment? 
[DR. PECK]: 
That would be correct. 
 
Following Dr. Peck’s proffer and the arguments of counsel, the 
trial court stated: “[a]bout malingering, I’m not going to allow 
the issue of malingering to be discussed.  What [Dr. Peck] 
basically said [was] he doesn’t know whether there’s sufficient 
evidence for a formal diagnosis of malingering.” 
The trial court had the opportunity to hear Dr. Peck’s 
testimony and view his independent medical examination report, 
including the diagnoses.  The report does not appear in the 
record.  The only portion of Dr. Peck’s report relevant to 
malingering and available in the record is found excerpted in a 
pleading Jaques submitted to the circuit court where he stated 
his concerns “are not sufficient to a degree where a formal 
diagnosis of malingering can be offered.”  If Dr. Peck did, as 
Stow Mills asserts, conclude in his independent medical 
examination report that Jaques was malingering, Stow Mills has 
failed to present this Court with a properly preserved record.  
There is thus no evidence that the trial court abused its 
 
22
discretion by excluding Dr. Peck’s testimony concerning 
malingering. 
F.  Exclusion of Surveillance Videos 
 
In an attempt to impeach testimony from Jaques’ witnesses 
that injuries from the accident had severely limited her daily 
activities, Stow Mills made videotape recordings, while the 
trial was ongoing, of Jaques performing various activities 
outside the courtroom.9  Stow Mills sought to introduce the 
videotapes into evidence.  The trial court denied Stow Mills’ 
request.  On appeal, Stow Mills asserts that “[i]t was error for 
the trial court to exclude surveillance videos, taken at the 
very time the trial was underway, which graphically depicted 
[Jaques] engaged in activities that her witnesses were telling 
the jury she could not engage in.” 
 
The admission of photographic evidence rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court.  Bailey v. Commonwealth, 
259 Va. 723, 738, 529 S.E.2d 570, 579 (2000).  However, as we 
previously noted, “[w]hen testimony is rejected before it is 
delivered, an appellate court has no basis for adjudication 
unless the record reflects a proper proffer.”  Whittaker, 217 
Va. at 968, 234 S.E.2d at 81 (citing Jackson v. Commonwealth, 98 
Va. 845, 846-47, 36 S.E. 487, 488 (1900)).  The record on appeal 
                     
 
9 Except for the day she testified, Jaques did not attend 
the trial. 
 
23
consists of “each exhibit offered in evidence, whether admitted 
or not, and initialed by the trial judge.”  Rule 5:10(a)(3). 
After the trial court granted Jaques’ motion to exclude the 
surveillance videotape, Stow Mills’ counsel requested “that a 
set [of the videotapes] be filed with the record at some point 
during this trial as proffered evidence as to what would have 
been put before the Court.”  No such filing appears in the 
record.  The appellant is charged with presenting a proper 
record on appeal sufficient for this Court to review the error 
assigned.  Phillips v. Orlins, 208 Va. 615, 617, 159 S.E.2d 667, 
669 (1968).  Stow Mills having failed in this duty, the issue 
cannot properly be considered on appeal. 
G.  Exclusion of Employment Records 
 
At trial Stow Mills sought to introduce employment records 
from Jaques’ employer, USAA.  Specifically, Stow Mills wished to 
introduce Jaques’ employment application and performance 
evaluations from 1999, 2000, and 2001, to rebut Jaques’ 
testimony of “what she did at USAA, how it affected her, [and] 
how she couldn’t do certain things.”  Stow Mills argued to the 
trial court that the performance evaluations “deal with a lot of 
what [Jaques] said and how well she did at these things and how 
she passed certain courses and got certain CLE-type credits in 
insurance.” 
 
24
 
Marva A. Smith (“Smith”), USAA’s executive director of 
human resources for the mid-Atlantic region, testified outside 
the presence of the jury that the records were kept in the 
normal course of business within USAA’s human resources system.  
She testified that the documents were copies of originals kept 
by USAA.  Smith also testified, on cross-examination, that the 
actual custodian of the records was a corporate representative 
in another state though she was personally responsible for the 
custody of the files in Virginia.  She stated that she did not 
personally witness and could not describe the steps taken to 
collect the files Stow Mills sought to introduce because that 
was done by personnel at USAA’s corporate headquarters in Texas.  
After extensive examination of Smith by both parties, the trial 
court ruled the documents were not admissible because “there 
were sufficient gaps in [her] testimony that places in question 
some reliability of these documents.”  Stow Mills assigns error 
to that ruling. 
 
Assuming, without deciding, that the records at issue 
should have been admitted, any error in excluding that evidence 
was harmless.  A review of the record demonstrates there was 
testimony from a rehabilitation counselor regarding Jaques’ 
salary during the course of her employment.  One of Jaques’ 
former employers testified about her licensing in the insurance 
business, her salary, and her continuing education in the 
 
25
insurance field.  Jaques’ husband testified about her employment 
and Jaques herself, via her deposition testimony, testified 
about her graduation from college.  There was ample evidence 
before the jury that after her accident Jaques had graduated 
from college, been employed, earned licenses, and received 
salary increases: all items Stow Mills asserted the USAA records 
would prove.  The trial court’s exclusion of the USAA records 
was thus harmless error, if error at all. 
H.  Unicare and Dr. O’Shanick 
Stow Mills also assigned error to two rulings of the trial 
court which are of limited substance.  During the cross-
examination of a defense expert regarding his IRS 1099 tax 
forms, Jaques’ counsel asked the doctor if “Unicare” was a 
plaintiff.  Because Unicare could be an insurance company, Stow 
Mills moved for a mistrial.  The trial court admonished Jaques’ 
counsel but denied the motion for a mistrial.  Stow Mills 
assigns error to that ruling. 
 
In saying “Unicare” Jaques’ counsel did not mention 
insurance.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that the 
jury was aware that Unicare was an insurer, if indeed it is.  
Under such circumstances it cannot be said the appellants were 
prejudiced and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Stow Mills’ motion for a mistrial. 
 
26
 
Another assignment of error concerned the testimony of Dr. 
Gregory J. O’Shanick, one of Jaques’ expert witnesses, which 
included sensitive financial data.  The trial court sealed that 
portion of Dr. O’Shanick’s testimony and Stow Mills assigns 
error.  However, no objection to sealing the testimony was made 
at trial and it will not be considered on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
I.  Improper Closing Argument 
1.  Statements by Counsel 
 
Stow Mills alleges on appeal that Jaques’ counsel made 
several improper and prejudicial statements during closing 
argument to the jury.  While making his closing argument, 
Jaques’ counsel stated, “if you look at it, this is the 
undisputed evidence.  The trucking company was at fault.  
[Jaques] wasn’t.  She will have − they do not dispute this, and 
I’ll tell you about this.”  Stow Mills objected and the trial 
court responded “I believe they do dispute that.”  However, Stow 
Mills failed to ask the trial court for a ruling on its 
objection and did not ask for a curative instruction or 
mistrial.  It cannot now raise an objection it failed to perfect 
in the trial court.  Rule 5:25. 
 
Stow Mills next complains that Jaques made two improper 
“Golden Rule” arguments to the jury.  In the first instance 
Jaques’ counsel asked the jury to “imagine one day to wake up 
and look in that mirror and think you’re looking at the same 
 
27
person, and think that − what’s wrong with these people around 
me?  Why are they acting bad?  Because that’s the tragedy of the 
person.”  Stow Mills did not object to this statement and our 
review is thus barred by Rule 5:25. 
 
The second allegedly impermissible “Golden Rule” argument 
occurred during Jaques’ rebuttal when counsel stated, “I just 
want you to imagine what she goes through every day of her life, 
and imagine what you can do.”  In response to Stow Mills’ 
objection the trial court acknowledged “[t]hat’s probably over 
the line” but did not explicitly sustain the objection.  Again, 
Stow Mills failed to ask the trial court for a ruling and did 
not request a curative instruction or move for a mistrial.  Rule 
5:25 thus bars our consideration of this claim.10 
2.  Altered Exhibit 
 
Stow Mills sought to preclude Jaques’ counsel from using an 
exhibit during his closing argument which, in an itemized 
fashion, correlated the damages suffered to the jury 
instructions.  At the time the trial court approved the use of 
the exhibit, there were no dollar amounts written on the 
                     
 
10 We note that neither of these instances were “Golden 
Rule” arguments as that doctrine is typically expressed.  
Neither argument specifically asked the jurors to put themselves 
“in the plaintiff’s shoes.”  Cf. Velocity Express Mid-Atlantic 
v. Hugen, 266 Va. 188, 197-203, 585 S.E.2d 557, 562-66 (2003); 
Seymour v. Richardson, 194 Va. 709, 715, 75 S.E.2d 77, 81 
(1953).  Furthermore, Jaques’ counsel did not “persist[] in such 
argument after the admonition of the court,” as was the case in 
Velocity Express.  266 Va. at 202, 585 S.E.2d at 565. 
 
28
exhibit.  However, when Jaques’ counsel prepared to use the 
exhibit during his closing argument, numbers had been filled in.  
Stow Mills objected and the trial court stated that “[t]hose 
numbers weren’t on there [when the exhibit was approved] so 
you’re not going to use it.” 
 
Stow Mills could not have been prejudiced by the exhibit 
because the trial court sustained their objection and prevented 
Jaques’ counsel from using it.  There is no evidence in the 
record that the exhibit was shown to the jury or that any juror 
ever saw it.  Therefore, there can be no error.  Moreover, Stow 
Mills did not request a curative instruction or move for a 
mistrial. 
J.  Excessive Verdict 
 
Stow Mills’ final assignment of error challenges the 
verdict on the basis that it is “excessive.”  “Setting aside a 
verdict as excessive . . . is an exercise of the inherent 
discretion of the trial court and, on appeal, the standard of 
review is whether the trial court abused its discretion."  
Poulston v. Rock, 251 Va. 254, 258-59, 467 S.E.2d 479, 482 
(1996).  The thrust of Stow Mills’ argument is that the jury’s 
verdict is excessive when compared to other PTSD cases, 
statewide and nationally.  However, aside from language in 
P. Lorillard Co. v. Clay, 127 Va. 734, 104 S.E. 384 (1920), Stow 
Mills cites no other case where this Court has sanctioned a 
 
29
verdict comparison analysis as the measure of a verdict’s 
excessiveness.  Instead, Stow Mills correctly cites the test set 
out in Shepard v. Capitol Foundry of Va., Inc., 262 Va. 715, 554 
S.E.2d 72 (2001), as the appropriate measure: 
When a verdict is challenged on the basis of 
alleged excessiveness, a trial court is compelled 
to set it aside “if the amount awarded is so 
great as to shock the conscience of the court and 
to create the impression that the jury has been 
motivated by passion, corruption or prejudice, or 
has misconceived or misconstrued the facts or the 
law, or if the award is so out of proportion to 
the injuries suffered as to suggest that it is 
not the product of a fair and impartial 
decision.” 
 
Id. at 720-21, 554 S.E.2d at 75 (quoting Edmiston v. Kupsenel, 
205 Va. 198, 202, 135 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1964)).  We find nothing 
in the record, as addressed above concerning Stow Mills’ other 
assignments of error, to suggest the verdict was the product of 
“passion, corruption or prejudice,” or that the jury 
“misconceived or misconstrued the facts or the law.”  Id. 
The amount of the verdict was supported by credible 
evidence in the record.  Jaques’ life care expert, Dr. Robert 
Voogt, projected the cost of her future care would exceed $5 
million.  Jaques introduced evidence that her medical expenses 
exceeded $77,000.  A vocational rehabilitation expert testified 
that Jaques’ lost earnings would amount to $2,050,000.  There is 
thus credible evidence in the record to support the verdict and, 
based on the analysis in Shepard, we cannot say from the 
 
30
evidence of damages presented at trial that the trial court 
abused its discretion or that the “award is so out of proportion 
to the injuries suffered as to suggest that it is not the 
product of a fair and impartial decision.”  Id. at 721, 554 
S.E.2d at 75.  For these reasons, Stow Mills’ request for 
remittitur will also be denied. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the trial 
court will be affirmed. 
Affirmed.