Case Title: Commonwealth v. Cole

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11346

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11346 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LESLIE COLE. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     October 9, 2015. - December 18, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Medical record, Consciousness of guilt, 
Hearsay, Expert opinion.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  Witness, 
Expert.  Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Hearsay, Instructions to 
jury, Confrontation of witnesses, Discovery, Argument by 
prosecutor, Required finding. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 3, 2006. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Robert J. Kane, J. 
 
 
 
James E. Methe for the defendant. 
 
Mary O'Neil, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant, 
Leslie M. Cole, of the murder in the first degree of Rudolph 
Santos (victim) on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder, in violation of G. L. 
2 
 
c. 265, § 1.1  On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the 
trial judge erred by admitting in evidence unredacted medical 
records purportedly belonging to the defendant, together with 
related testimony from a nurse practitioner, and by instructing 
the jury on consciousness of guilt; (2) the admission of expert 
testimony concerning the statistical significance of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence violated the defendant's 
constitutional right to confront witnesses; (3) the trial judge 
erred by admitting in evidence the victim's T-shirt, 
notwithstanding a purported discovery violation by the 
Commonwealth; (4) the prosecutor made improper remarks during 
her opening statement and her closing argument; and (5) the 
judge erred in denying the defendant's motion for required 
findings of not guilty.  The defendant also requests that we 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the 
conviction of murder to a lesser degree of guilt or to order a 
new trial.  For the reasons detailed below, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions and decline to grant relief pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
                     
 
1 The jury also convicted the defendant of the assault of 
Christopher Busby by means of a dangerous weapon (knife), in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, §  15B (b); armed robbery, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 17; and home invasion, in violation 
of G. L. c. 265, § 18C.  The jury found the defendant not guilty 
of assaulting Busby with the intent to murder. 
3 
 
 
1. Background.  We summarize the facts the jury could have 
found, reserving further details for our discussion of the 
alleged errors. 
 
Shortly before Christmas in 2005, the defendant and William 
Fields, who sold drugs together, discussed the possibility of 
robbing an unspecified drug dealer in order to resolve a cash 
flow problem.  One day when the two men were visiting the New 
Bedford home of Fields's friend, Shannon Almeida, they asked her 
if she knew anyone who had a gun.  Almeida responded that she 
did, and she introduced them to Vincent Wadlington.  On the 
evening of December 24, while at Almeida's house, the defendant, 
Fields, and Wadlington discussed plans to commit a robbery.  
They then drove to an apartment in Brockton, where Wadlington 
retrieved a sawed-off rifle and some ammunition.  The three men 
drove back to New Bedford, stopping at another house so the 
defendant could get some dark clothes to wear.  At around 10 
P.M., the defendant, Fields, and Wadlington returned to 
Almeida's home, and, approximately ninety minutes later, they 
decided that they were "ready to go and do this."  The three men 
traveled in the defendant's motor vehicle to a multifamily home 
on Hillman Street, parked nearby, put on gloves and masks, 
walked to the house, and approached the back door.  Wadlington 
was carrying the rifle. 
4 
 
 
That night, Christopher Busby was at home in that Hillman 
Street residence, spending time with his friend, the victim.  
The two men sold drugs from Busby's apartment, typically to 
people they already knew.  They kept larger quantities of their 
supply in the cellar, which was always locked.  The victim had 
possession of the key that night. 
 
Sometime before midnight, Wadlington knocked on the 
apartment's door.  In response to Busby's inquiry about who was 
there, Wadlington replied that it was "Eddie," but neither Busby 
nor the victim recognized the voice.  Busby told "Eddie" to step 
near a window so he could see his face.  Wadlington complied 
with the request, and he handed the rifle to the defendant.  
Busby did not recognize "Eddie," told the man that he would not 
sell him any drugs, and watched him walk away from the 
apartment.  Several minutes later, Busby started to open the 
door so he could look outside.  The defendant, Wadlington, and 
Fields kicked the door and rushed into the apartment. 
 
The defendant fought with Busby.  As Busby tried to defend 
himself, he felt someone striking him from behind, and he turned 
to see Fields hitting him with a metal pipe.  Wadlington fought 
with the victim.  Shortly after the altercation began, Fields 
left the apartment, returned to the defendant's vehicle, drove 
to a nearby house, knocked on the front door, and asked the man 
5 
 
who answered to call the police because he had heard gunshots.2  
Fields then drove the vehicle back to where the three men 
originally had parked it, and he fled the scene on foot. 
 
Meanwhile, back at the apartment, Busby was stabbed 
multiple times with a knife before collapsing and passing out.  
When he regained consciousness, he heard men's voices in the 
kitchen questioning the victim about the location of the drugs 
and demanding the key to the cellar.  Busby quickly grabbed a 
Samurai sword that was leaning against a wall in the kitchen, 
swung it at the two assailants, and stabbed one of the men in 
the leg.  After fighting with someone as he made his way down a 
hallway, Busby managed to reach his bedroom, where he fell onto 
the bed.  He had difficulty breathing and was bleeding.  Busby 
still could hear voices from the kitchen, and he realized that 
the victim had surrendered the key to the cellar when he heard 
one of the men running down the cellar stairs and back up again, 
asking, "Where are the drug[s]?  Where are the drugs, Ru?"  
Busby then heard the sound of a gunshot and someone saying, 
"It's only a .22 rifle."  The next thing Busby remembered was 
being treated by a paramedic. 
                     
 
2 William Fields testified that he had not actually heard 
gunshots, but that he said he did in the hope that emergency 
personnel would respond to the scene more quickly.  Fields 
testified pursuant to a cooperation agreement by which, in 
return for his testimony, the Commonwealth agreed to allow him 
to plead guilty to lesser charges, and to receive a more 
favorable sentence. 
6 
 
 
Shortly before 1 A.M. on December 25, New Bedford police 
Officer Barry Pacheco and Sergeant Francis Rodriques arrived at 
the Hillman Street residence.  After entering the apartment, 
which was in complete disarray, they observed a man lying on the 
floor, showing no signs of life.  They then heard yelling from 
another room and discovered Busby lying face down on a bed, 
covered in blood, saying that he had been stabbed.  Paramedics 
soon arrived and determined that the victim was dead.  Busby, 
who had puncture wounds all over his body, was transported to a 
hospital and subsequently spent a week in a different hospital 
recovering from numerous stab wounds.  State police criminalists 
processed the crime scene, including the stairs and walls 
leading down to the cellar, and collected evidence. 
 
Following the events at Busby's apartment, Fields 
eventually returned to Almeida's home where he encountered the 
defendant, who had a bloody cloth wrapped around his thigh.  
When Fields asked the defendant what had happened to his leg, 
the defendant replied, "Well, you know, this is what happened in 
the house."  The defendant left Almeida's home at around 6 A.M. 
on December 25.  That same day, an individual named "Derrick 
Williams" was treated in the emergency room of Rhode Island 
Hospital (hospital) for a laceration to his thigh.  A few days 
later, Fields looked in the trunk of the defendant's car and saw 
what appeared to be a Samurai sword, along with the clothes that 
7 
 
the defendant had worn on the night of the assault.  The two men 
drove to the docks located in the south end of New Bedford and 
threw the items in the ocean. 
 
Dr. William Zane, a medical examiner for the Commonwealth, 
performed the autopsy on the victim.  He testified that the 
victim had a gunshot wound to his right cheek, lacerations to 
his left upper eyelid and lower lip, contusions to his left 
cheek and forehead, abrasions on his right cheek and jaw, a 
gaping cut on the back of his left hand that went to the bone, 
cuts to his right wrist and forearm, and an eight-inch deep stab 
wound to his left buttock.  Dr. Zane concluded that the victim 
died from the gunshot wound to his head, which penetrated his 
brain.  He further concluded that a contributing factor in the 
victim's death was the stab wound to his buttock, which 
penetrated his lower abdominal cavity. 
 
2.  Admission of medical records, related testimony, and 
instruction on consciousness of guilt.  The defendant first 
contends that the judge should not have allowed medical records 
from the hospital to be admitted in evidence because there was 
no foundational showing that the defendant was the same person 
who was treated at the hospital.  The defendant objected to the 
judge's ruling, so we review any error in the admission of the 
medical records under the prejudicial error standard.  See 
Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). 
8 
 
 
General Laws c. 233, § 79, excepts certain hospital records 
from the common-law rule against hearsay evidence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 139 (2007); Bouchie v. 
Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 527 (1978).  The statute provides that 
"[r]ecords kept by hospitals . . . under [G. L. c. 111, § 70,] 
shall be admissible . . . as evidence . . . so far as such 
records relate to the treatment and medical history of such 
cases."  G. L. c. 233, § 79.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 803(6)(B) 
(2015).  Section 79 was enacted to relieve medical personnel 
from "the hardship and inconvenience of attending court as 
witnesses to facts which ordinarily would be found recorded in 
the hospital books."  Commonwealth v. Gogan, 389 Mass. 255, 263 
(1983), quoting Leonard v. Boston Elevated Ry., 234 Mass. 480, 
482 (1920).  See Francis, supra.  "More importantly, however, 
the statute allows admission of the substantive content of 
hospital records because of the presumption of reliability which 
attaches to statements relating to treatment and medical history 
in these records.  This presumption of reliability . . . arises 
primarily from the fact that entries in these records are 
routinely made by those charged with the responsibility of 
making accurate entries and are relied on in the course of 
treating patients."  Bouchie, supra at 527-528.  A trial judge 
has the discretion to exclude medical records in appropriate 
circumstances.  See Doyle v. Dong, 412 Mass. 682, 687 (1992). 
9 
 
 
The medical records at issue here were for a patient named 
"Derrick Williams," who was treated in the emergency room of the 
hospital on December 25, 2005, for a laceration to his right 
thigh.  According to these records, the patient stated that he 
had been wrestling the previous evening when he fell to the 
floor and onto a knife.  The medical records also specified that 
"Derrick Williams" was born on November 15, 1979, and his 
mother's name was "Esther." 
 
At a pretrial hearing, a nurse practitioner employed in the 
hospital's emergency department testified that she was working 
the 10 A.M. to 6 P.M. shift on December 25, 2005.  She stated 
that she treated a dark-skinned male3 for a laceration on one of 
his thighs.4  State police Lieutenant Keith Blaney testified at 
trial that when he interviewed the defendant on January 11, 
2006, he began by asking some biographical information.  The 
defendant stated, among other things, that his date of birth was 
November 15, 1979, that he lived in Rhode Island, and that his 
mother's name was "Esther."  When Blaney asked the defendant 
                     
 
3 The defendant is African-American. 
 
 
4 At the pretrial hearing, the nurse also testified that on 
March 31, 2006, a State police trooper showed her one photograph 
of an individual, and she recognized that individual as the 
patient she had treated on December 25, 2005.  The judge ruled 
that the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive 
and, therefore, not admissible.  The judge indicated that the 
nurse could testify at trial regarding what she recalled about 
treating this individual, but she was not permitted to give any 
identification testimony. 
10 
 
whether he used any other names, the defendant responded that he 
had used "Derrick Williams" in the past, although not on 
Christmas Day.  In response to another inquiry from Blaney, the 
defendant denied that he had a leg injury but, when he lowered 
his pants, Blaney observed a wound to the defendant's right leg, 
just above the knee, that was "still puffy and swollen."  The 
defendant denied having gone to the hospital, first telling 
Blaney that the wound had healed by itself, and then stating 
that he had glued it.  When asked how he had sustained the 
injury, the defendant gave Blaney several different 
explanations, including that he had been wrestling. 
 
Following this testimony from Lieutenant Blaney, the judge 
admitted the medical records, stating that the evidence was 
sufficient to permit the jury to infer reasonably that the 
defendant was the person who was treated at the hospital on 
December 25.5  We agree.  The judge properly determined that an 
adequate foundational showing for the admission of the medical 
records had been made. 
 
The defendant next asserts that the judge erred in failing 
to redact statements in the medical records that indicated how 
                     
 
5 The judge subsequently instructed the jury that they were 
the ones who had to decide, based on the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, whether the 
defendant was the patient to whom the medical records pertained.  
The judge cautioned the jury that they should avoid guesswork, 
and he also instructed that an individual's use of a different 
name is not illegal. 
11 
 
the person who was treated at the hospital was injured.  In the 
defendant's view, these statements were statements of liability 
and did not relate to the patient's treatment and medical 
history.  In addition, he continues, even if the statements did 
relate to the patient's medical history, they could not be 
deemed reliable where these particular medical records were not 
sufficiently linked to the defendant, and, consequently, the 
individual who made the statements was unknown.  We disagree 
with the defendant's arguments. 
 
The admissibility of medical records relating to "treatment 
and medical history" is limited by the proviso that "nothing 
therein contained shall be admissible as evidence which has 
reference to the question of liability."  G. L. c. 233, § 79.  
We have treated this proviso's reference to "liability" as 
encompassing criminal culpability.  See Commonwealth v. Dargon, 
457 Mass. 387, 394 (2010); Commonwealth v. Dube, 413 Mass. 570, 
573 (1992).  We also have said that "a record which relates 
directly and mainly to the treatment and medical history of the 
patient, should be admitted, even though incidentally the facts 
recorded may have some bearing on the question of liability."  
Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 242 (1998), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 362 Mass. 653, 656 (1972).  See 
Dube, supra. 
12 
 
 
Here, the statements in the medical records that, the 
previous evening, the patient had fallen to the floor and onto a 
knife while wrestling were relevant to his treatment by medical 
personnel.  The amount of time that had elapsed since the 
patient had sustained the wound, the exact nature of the wound, 
and the circumstances of its occurrence, which could give rise 
to concerns about infection, were all important factors that 
would have a direct bearing on his treatment at the hospital.  
Given that there was ample evidence for the jury to infer that 
the medical records were those of the defendant, the statements 
could be presumed to be reliable.  The judge properly determined 
that there was no need to redact the challenged portion of the 
medical records.  We conclude that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in admitting the medical records in evidence. 
 
Following the admission of the medical records, the nurse 
subsequently testified at trial that at around 10 A.M. on 
December 25, 2005,6 she treated a thin, dark-skinned man for a 
laceration to his thigh, and that this patient had told her that 
he was injured the previous evening when, as he was wrestling, a 
knife fell off a counter and hit him in the leg.7  The nurse also 
                     
 
6 Although the prosecutor asked the nurse about her work on 
December 26, 2005, the medical records clearly indicate that she 
treated a patient with a leg laceration on December 25, 2005. 
 
 
7 The judge again instructed the jury that they were the 
ones who had to decide, based on the evidence and the reasonable 
13 
 
identified her signature as the one appearing on the medical 
records.  The defendant contends that because there was 
insufficient evidence that he was this patient, the testimony of 
the nurse constituted hearsay and should not have been admitted.  
We disagree.  As already discussed, there was sufficient 
evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that the defendant was 
the patient who was treated by the nurse.  That being the case, 
the testimony of the nurse was properly admitted because, as the 
defendant recognizes, it was not hearsay in these circumstances.  
See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 434 Mass. 358, 365 (2001) 
(extrajudicial statements by party opponent not hearsay); Mass. 
G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(A) (2015).  We add that the testimony of 
the nurse was relevant to when the defendant had sustained his 
injury, how the injury purportedly had occurred, and where on 
his body the laceration was located.  Accordingly, the judge did 
not err in admitting the nurse's testimony in evidence. 
 
Finally, the defendant contends that the judge erred in 
instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt because there was 
insufficient evidence to support such a charge where, in the 
defendant's view, the medical records and the testimony of the 
nurse should not have been admitted.  During the charge 
conference, the Commonwealth requested a consciousness of guilt 
                                                                  
inferences that could be drawn therefrom, whether the patient 
about whom the nurse testified was the defendant. 
14 
 
instruction referencing use of a false name and false 
statements.  The defendant objected, pointing out that the judge 
already had given an instruction about the use of a false name, 
see note 5, supra, and arguing that the jury could draw their 
own inferences without any further instruction on consciousness 
of guilt.  The judge disagreed, stating to counsel that if the 
jury inferred that the patient who was treated at the hospital 
was the defendant, then they could consider whether the 
defendant had used a false name for the purpose of concealing 
his identity.  The judge later instructed the jury on 
consciousness of guilt in conformity with Commonwealth v. Toney, 
385 Mass. 575, 585 (1982).  As part of his instruction, the 
judge cautioned the jury that there may be numerous reasons why 
an innocent person might use a false name or make false 
statements, and that such conduct did not necessarily reflect 
feelings of guilt. 
 
Because the consciousness of guilt instruction was given 
over the defendant's objection, we review for prejudicial error.  
See Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353.  Such an instruction is 
appropriate when the jury may draw an inference of guilt "'from 
evidence of flight, concealment, or similar acts,' such as false 
statements to the police, destruction or concealment of 
evidence, or bribing or threatening a witness."  Commonwealth v. 
Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 453 (2008), quoting Toney, 385 Mass. at 
15 
 
584.  See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 419 Mass. 716, 730-731 (1995) 
(misrepresentation of identity may reflect consciousness of 
guilt).  "The giving of this instruction presupposes that there 
is evidence of consciousness of guilt, communicates to the jury 
the judge's belief that there is such evidence, and directs the 
jury to decide whether to credit this evidence, and, if so, how 
to factor it into their deliberations."  Commonwealth v. Vick, 
454 Mass. 418, 424 (2009).  "It is within the trial judge's 
discretion whether to instruct the jury regarding the evaluation 
of evidence pertaining to consciousness of guilt."  Commonwealth 
v. Morris, 465 Mass. 733, 738 (2013). 
 
We conclude that the judge acted within his discretion in 
deciding to give an instruction on consciousness of guilt over 
the defendant's objection.  Such instruction was not based on 
inadmissible evidence.  To the contrary, it was based on 
properly admitted evidence -- the medical records and the 
testimony of the nurse -- from which the jury reasonably could 
infer that "Derrick Williams," who was treated for a leg 
laceration at the hospital on December 25, 2005, was, in fact, 
the defendant.  If the jury found that the Commonwealth had 
proved that the defendant had used a false name and made false 
statements, then they properly could consider whether such 
actions were indicative of consciousness of guilt. 
16 
 
 
3.  Admission of DNA statistical probabilities.  Amy Joy, a 
chemist at the State police crime laboratory, performed DNA 
analyses on several unknown samples that were recovered from 
different pieces of evidence.  She targeted sixteen regions on 
the DNA sequence, and then employed a four-step testing process 
to generate individual profiles.  After she had completed her 
testing, Joy compared each unknown profile to the eleven known 
profiles of various individuals that had been generated by other 
chemists at the crime laboratory.  Joy testified on direct 
examination that, when making DNA comparisons, she generated 
statistics to give more meaning to each item of evidence. 
 
After performing the four-step analysis on a swab of the 
tip of a black-handled knife, Joy determined that the DNA 
profile was mixed, meaning it contained the DNA of more than one 
person, and that the major profile was consistent with that of 
the defendant.  She testified that the probability of a randomly 
selected, unrelated individual having a DNA profile that matched 
the major profile on this item was approximately one in 163.8 
trillion of the African-American population.  Joy also analyzed 
a swab taken from a reddish-brown stain on a T-shirt found 
underneath the victim's body at the crime scene.  Again, the DNA 
profile from the swab was mixed.  Joy testified that the major 
profile matched the victim, and the minor profile was consistent 
with that of the defendant.  With respect to this minor profile, 
17 
 
Joy stated that the probability of a randomly selected, 
unrelated individual having contributed DNA to this mixture was 
approximately one in 5.3 million of the African-American 
population.  On cross-examination, Joy testified that once she 
made her comparisons between the unknown and known DNA profiles, 
she used a computer program called "Pop Stat" (Pop Stat) to 
calculate the statistical probabilities.  She further stated 
that she did not create the computer program.  Rather, it had 
been supplied to the State police by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 
 
The defendant contends on appeal that Joy's testimony 
concerning the probability statistics constituted hearsay, and 
that the admission of this testimony, over his objections, 
violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  We review any 
error in the admission of this evidence under the prejudicial 
error standard.  See Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353. 
 
In a criminal trial, we will "not permit the admission of 
test results showing a DNA match (a positive result) without 
telling the jury anything about the likelihood of that match 
occurring."  Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 222 n.7 
(1991).  See Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 851 n.25 
(2010) (DNA test results inadmissible without accompanying 
18 
 
statistical interpretation); Commonwealth v. Daggett, 416 Mass. 
347, 357 (1993) (Abrams, J., concurring) ("expert testimony 
concerning a DNA match must be accompanied by some background 
information indicating the probability that the match in 
question might have occurred by chance").  The rationale for 
such an approach is that evidence of a DNA match has little or 
no value without expert testimony explaining the significance of 
the match, namely, "the mathematical probability that another 
person has this same DNA profile."  Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 
Mass. 391, 402-403 n.2 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. Rosier, 425 
Mass. 807, 813 (1997); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 20 
(1994). 
 
As an initial matter, we conclude that Joy's testimony 
concerning the probability statistics was not hearsay.  The 
function of Pop Stat is to enable DNA analysts to calculate 
statistical probabilities using population databases.  In the 
absence of computer technology, DNA experts would be performing 
statistical analyses by hand.  "We permit experts to base their 
testimony on calculations performed by hand, [and] [t]here is no 
reason to prevent them from performing the same calculations, 
with far greater rapidity and accuracy, on a computer" (citation 
omitted).  Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 412 
Mass. 545, 549 (1992) (concluding that results of computer 
program used to calculate building steam usage were admissible).  
19 
 
See Commonwealth v. Whitlock, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 320, 326-327 
(2009) (testimony regarding distance between two points that was 
based on use of computerized map not hearsay).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Sheldon, 423 Mass. 373, 377 (1996) (blood test 
results presented through person who conducted test or attending 
physician admissible). 
 
When Joy testified that she used Pop Stat to calculate 
statistical probabilities for major and minor DNA profiles, the 
relevant question was not whether her testimony was hearsay, but 
whether the foundation was sufficient for the introduction of 
the observed result.  See Whitlock, supra at 327.  The defendant 
seems to suggest that because Joy did not create Pop Stat and 
was not familiar with how the probability statistics were 
derived, her testimony lacked an adequate scientific foundation.  
To the extent that the defendant wanted to challenge the 
scientific reliability of the Pop Stat program, he was required 
to "file an appropriate pretrial motion stating the grounds for 
the objections and request a hearing in accordance with the 
principles set forth in Canavan's Case, 432 Mass. 304, 309-312 
(2000), and Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 24-27 
(1994)."  Commonwealth v. Sparks, 433 Mass. 654, 659 (2001).  
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-595 
(1993).  See also Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 263, 
268-270 (2005) (judge properly ruled on pretrial motion that 
20 
 
database used by Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratories to make DNA 
profile frequency calculations was adequate and common within 
field); Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 661 (Miss. 2013), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2661 (2014) (expert witness testified 
that Pop Stat generally accepted and used by crime laboratories 
having access to Combined DNA Indexing System database).  
Because the defendant failed to request a Daubert-Lanigan 
hearing to establish the reliability of the methodology 
underlying Joy's testimony, we do not consider the matter 
further.  See Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 349 (2015) 
(failure to request Daubert-Lanigan hearing to establish 
reliability of methodology underlying expert firearms 
identification testimony constituted waiver of issue).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 783 (2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2441 (2011) (where defendant fails to file 
pretrial motion to challenge absence of foundational 
requirements for expert testimony, such testimony may be 
admitted in evidence).  Instead, we turn our attention to the 
defendant's argument that the probability statistics generated 
by the Pop Stat program violated the defendant's confrontation 
rights. 
 
The Sixth Amendment, which is applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . 
21 
 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ."  See 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).  The right of 
confrontation also is protected by art. 12, which provides that 
in a criminal trial "every subject shall have a right to . . . 
meet the witnesses against him face to face."  See Commonwealth 
v. Arrington, 455 Mass. 437, 440 n.4 (2009).  The State 
Constitution has been interpreted to provide a criminal 
defendant more protection than the Sixth Amendment in certain 
respects, see Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 628-632 
(1997), but when the issue involves the relationship between the 
hearsay rule and its exceptions, on the one hand, and the right 
to confrontation, on the other hand, "the protection provided by 
art. 12 is coextensive with the guarantees of the Sixth 
Amendment."  Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 57 n.1 
(2006).  But see Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 Mass. at 404 n.3 
(questioning whether protections remain coextensive in wake of 
fractured plurality decision in Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 
2221 [2012]). 
 
"The confrontation clause bars the admission of testimonial 
out-of-court statements by a declarant who does not appear at 
trial unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the 
defendant had an earlier opportunity to cross-examine him."  
Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 296, cert. denied, 562 
U.S. 874 (2010).  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 
22 
 
(2004).  Whether a particular statement is "testimonial" lies at 
the core of this analysis.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813, 823-824 (2006).  In deciding whether an out-of-court 
statement is testimonial, "[f]irst, we determine whether the 
statement is testimonial per se," that is, whether it was "made 
in a formal or solemnized form (such as a deposition, affidavit, 
confession, or prior testimony) or in response to law 
enforcement interrogation."  Simon, supra at 297, citing 
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 13 (2005), cert. denied, 
548 U.S. 926 (2006).  "[I]f a statement is not testimonial per 
se, we consider whether the statement is nonetheless testimonial 
in fact."  Simon, supra, citing Gonsalves, supra at 12.  "A 
statement is testimonial in fact if 'a reasonable person in the 
declarant's position would anticipate the statement's being used 
against the accused in investigating and prosecuting a crime'" 
(emphasis added).  Simon, supra, quoting Gonsalves, supra at 12-
13. 
 
We conclude that the probability statistics are not 
testimonial.  With respect to the first part of the inquiry, 
they are not statements made in a "formal or solemnized form" or 
"in response to law enforcement interrogation."  Simon, 456 
Mass. at 297, citing Gonsalves, 445 Mass. at 13.  As to the 
second part of the inquiry, the creator of Pop Stat would not 
anticipate that the probability statistics would be used to 
23 
 
prosecute this particular defendant.  See id.  See also United 
States v. Pritchard, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2014) 
(Pop Stat software used by DNA expert not testimonial, and 
statistical testimony given in reliance on such software did not 
violate confrontation clause).  Statistical analyses can be 
performed for many reasons with respect to any number of 
individuals, wholly unrelated to the defendant in this case.  
Significantly, as we have discussed, when expert testimony is 
presented regarding a DNA match, it must include explanatory 
probability statistics so the jury can understand the 
significance of the match.  See Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 20; 
Curnin, 409 Mass. at 222 n.7.  Concluding that testimony 
concerning probability statistics violates a defendant's 
confrontation rights would be inconsistent with our well-
established case law on the requirements for the admission of 
DNA evidence.  Moreover, the defendant here was afforded, and 
took full advantage of, the opportunity to cross-examine Joy on 
the reliability of the probability statistics about which she 
testified.  The defendant cannot claim a violation of his 
confrontation rights where he had the opportunity to expose 
flaws in the basis of Joy's testimony.  See Barbosa, 457 Mass. 
at 785-786.  Accordingly, the admission of the probability 
statistics did not violate the defendant's confrontation rights. 
24 
 
 
4.  Admission of T-shirt.  Maureen Hartnett, a chemist at 
the State police crime laboratory when the murder in this case 
occurred, testified that she had arrived at the crime scene at 
around 3 A.M., spent several hours processing the scene, 
collected a T-shirt from underneath the body of the victim, and 
brought it back to the laboratory for analysis.  When the 
Commonwealth moved to admit the T-shirt in evidence, defense 
counsel objected, asserting that he had never received 
Hartnett's photographs of the T-shirt or a report indicating 
that she had placed it under a so-called "hood" to dry it out.  
The judge overruled the defendant's objection and admitted the 
T-shirt in evidence.  However, the judge stated that Hartnett 
would remain in the court room during the lunch recess so that 
she could show and explain the photographs and any reports to 
defense counsel.  The judge also stated that defense counsel 
would have the opportunity to recall Hartnett the following day 
if he did not feel that he had had sufficient time for cross-
examination.  Following the lunch recess and his cross-
examination of Hartnett, defense counsel stated:  "I did have 
the opportunity to meet with Ms. Hartnett during lunch and she 
showed me her photographs and I went through her notes.  And I 
was satisfied with the documents that were provided." 
 
The defendant contends on appeal that, due to the 
Commonwealth's discovery violation, the judge should not have 
25 
 
admitted the T-shirt in evidence.  We review any error in the 
admission of this evidence under the prejudicial error standard.  
See Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353. 
 
Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (vii), as 
amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005), the Commonwealth is obligated to 
"permit the defense to discover, inspect and copy . . . 
[m]aterial and relevant police reports, photographs, tangible 
objects, all intended exhibits, reports of physical examinations 
of any person or of scientific tests or experiments, and 
statements of persons the party intends to call as witnesses," 
provided that such items are relevant to the case and are within 
the control of the prosecutor.  When a party fails to comply 
with its discovery obligations, Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (c) (2), as 
amended, 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), confers on a judge the 
discretion to exclude evidence based on the party's 
noncompliance.  We are mindful of the fact that discovery 
sanctions "are remedial in nature" and "should be tailored 
appropriately to cure the prejudice resulting from a party's 
noncompliance and to ensure a fair trial."  Commonwealth v. 
Carney, 458 Mass. 418, 427 (2010). 
 
Here, the judge gave defense counsel the opportunity to 
review Hartnett's photographs and report concerning the T-shirt.  
Defense counsel indicated that he was satisfied with the judge's 
approach.  We conclude that the judge acted within his 
26 
 
discretion, and that there has been no showing of prejudicial 
error. 
 
5.  Prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument.  
The defendant maintains that several of the prosecutor's remarks 
during her opening statement and her closing argument were 
improper, thus violating his due process rights and denying him 
a fair trial.  The defendant first contends that the 
prosecutor's references to Christmas in her opening statement 
were an improper appeal to the jury's emotions.8  He acknowledges 
that he did not object to the remarks, but nonetheless argues 
that they created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992).  
We disagree. 
 
While it is improper for the prosecutor to play on the 
jury's sympathy or emotions, see Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 
Mass. 514, 516-517 & n.5 (1987), "the prosecutor is entitled to 
set the scene."  Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 497 
(1997), S.C., 427 Mass. 298 and 428 Mass. 39, cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1003 (1998).  Given that the murder took place in the 
                     
 
8 At the beginning of her opening statement, the prosecutor 
made the following remarks:  "Christmastime, a time that we 
gather with our families and friends to plan how we are going to 
spend our holidays.  Christmas time 2005, three men in New 
Bedford were planning.  They were planning a home invasion and 
an armed robbery."  Then, at the end of her opening statement, 
the prosecutor said, "There was no peace on earth or good will 
towards men that Christmas day at [the apartment on] Hillman 
Street." 
27 
 
minutes between Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, the 
prosecutor's references to Christmas in her opening statement 
merely set the scene with rhetorical flourish.  See Commonwealth 
v. Mejia, 463 Mass. 243, 255 (2012) (prosecutor's rhetorical 
flourish not ground for reversal).  Although her unnecessary 
remarks about "peace on earth" and "good will towards men" would 
have been better left unsaid, their impact was not such that it 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 580 (2002).  
We ascribe "a certain measure of sophistication" to juries, and 
a bare modicum of sophistication was all that was needed to 
discount the prosecutor's yuletide comments.  Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 (1998). 
 
The defendant next argues that the prosecutor's statements 
in her closing argument regarding the location of DNA evidence 
were a distortion of the evidence,9 and that another statement by 
                     
 
9 During her closing argument, the prosecutor first stated, 
"And you heard that, I would suggest to you, the DNA of Vincent 
Waddington [sic] was on those stairs and that the DNA of Vincent 
Waddington [sic] is in the Chevy Lumina. . . .  We also have, I 
would suggest to you, this defendant's DNA found at the scene."  
Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor stated, "[The dog] didn't 
contaminate the scene, he didn't cause this defendant's DNA to 
show up.  [The defendant's] DNA is there because he was there."  
The prosecutor later stated, "I would suggest to you that Mr. 
Fields tells you that on New Year's Eve he's at, he sees this 
defendant, 81 Mill Street, I believe, and he's got that same 
Chevy Lumina, the get-away car, the one that has Vincent 
Wadlington's DNA in it, even though this defendant says he 
doesn't know him." 
28 
 
the prosecutor improperly equated a guilty verdict with 
justice.10  Because defense counsel objected to these statements, 
we review for prejudicial error.  See Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 
353.  Remarks made during closing arguments are considered in 
the context of the whole argument, the evidence admitted at 
trial, and the judge's instructions to the jury.  See 
Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 432 Mass. 657, 659 (2000), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 564 (2000). 
 
"A prosecutor must limit comment in closing statement to 
the evidence and fair inferences that can be drawn from the 
evidence."  Commonwealth v. Kelly, 417 Mass. 266, 270 (1994).  
See Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 412 Mass. 505, 509 (1992) ("A 
prosecutor may, . . . in closing argument, analyze the evidence 
and suggest what reasonable inferences the jury should draw from 
that evidence").  Contrary to the defendant's assertions, the 
prosecutor's statements concerning the DNA evidence were neither 
a distortion of Joy's expert testimony nor statements of 
personal belief.  Rather, they reflected reasonable inferences 
that could be drawn from Joy's testimony concerning the results 
of her DNA analyses and the related statistical probabilities.  
They also encompassed a proper response to defense counsel's 
                     
 
10 At the end of her closing argument, the prosecutor 
stated, "And after, ladies and gentlemen, you consider all the 
evidence, it is the Commonwealth's belief you will come to one 
true and just verdict and that this defendant is guilty of all 
charges." 
29 
 
argument that the DNA samples could have been contaminated.  See 
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 116 (2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).  Similarly, the prosecutor's 
statement regarding "one true and just verdict" amounted to a 
fair comment on the strength of the Commonwealth's case and 
constituted appropriate advocacy.  See Kozec, 399 Mass. at 516 
(prosecutor allowed to make forceful arguments for conviction 
based on evidence); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 374 Mass. 453, 459 
(1978) (prosecutor expected to argue for decision in favor of 
Commonwealth).  We conclude that there was no error in the 
prosecutor's closing argument. 
 
6.  Motion for required findings of not guilty.  At the 
close of the Commonwealth's case, defense counsel moved for 
required findings of not guilty as to all of the charges, which 
the judge denied.  Defense counsel informed the judge that he 
did not intend to introduce any evidence, and he stated that he 
again would move for required findings of not guilty after he 
rested his case.  The judge responded, "I'll preserve it." 
 
The defendant contends on appeal that the evidence was not 
sufficient to convict him of any crime, and, therefore, the 
judge erred in denying his motion for required findings of not 
guilty.  He asserts that because Fields, the only witness who 
placed the defendant at Busby's apartment, testified pursuant to 
a cooperation agreement, Fields had every incentive to minimize 
30 
 
his own involvement in criminal activity.  The defendant argues 
that the only evidence that directly linked him to any crime was 
questionable DNA evidence.  He points out that Joy's testimony 
that his DNA was consistent with the major profile found on a 
knife at the scene was inconsistent with Busby's account of 
having stabbed one of the intruders in the leg with a sword.  In 
the defendant's view, his motion should have been allowed.  We 
disagree. 
 
When reviewing the denial of a motion for a required 
finding of not guilty, we consider "whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).  The inferences drawn by 
the jury from the evidence "need only be reasonable and possible 
and need not be necessary or inescapable."  Commonwealth v. 
Longo, 402 Mass. 482, 487 (1988), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173 (1980).  Moreover, evidence of a 
defendant's guilt may be primarily or entirely circumstantial.  
See Corson v. Commonwealth, 428 Mass. 193, 197 (1998); 
Commonwealth v. Donovan, 395 Mass. 20, 25 (1985).  "If, from the 
evidence, conflicting inferences are possible, it is for the 
jury to determine where the truth lies, for the weight and 
31 
 
credibility of the evidence is wholly within their province."  
Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 
215 (2007).  See Commonwealth v. Merry, 453 Mass. 653, 662 
(2009) (existence of contradictory evidence not sufficient basis 
for granting motion for required finding of not guilty). 
 
Here, the defendant has marshaled the evidence, or the 
purported lack thereof, in the light most favorable to himself.  
This is not the proper lens through which to view the evidence.  
The Commonwealth presented testimony from Fields that the 
defendant was actively involved in the planning and execution of 
the armed robbery and home invasion that resulted in the 
victim's murder and Busby's severe injuries.  The Commonwealth 
also presented evidence showing that a man using the same alias 
that the defendant had used in the past, having the same date of 
birth as the defendant, and having a mother with the same name 
as the defendant's mother, was treated at the hospital on 
December 25, 2005, for a leg injury akin to the one that Busby 
had described inflicting on one of the intruders.  In addition, 
the Commonwealth presented testimony suggesting that DNA 
evidence recovered from a knife and from the victim's T-shirt 
was consistent with that of the defendant.  The evidence and the 
reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom were 
sufficient to warrant findings that the defendant was guilty of 
the crimes alleged in the indictments.  The judge properly 
32 
 
denied the defendant's motion for required findings of not 
guilty and left the assessment of the weight and credibility of 
the evidence for the jury. 
 
7.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
reviewed the entire record and the briefs on appeal and see no 
reason to order a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.