Case Title: Management Council of Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Management Council of Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer1998 WY 12953 P.2d 839Case Number: 97-307Decided: 02/11/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
The 
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL OF the WYOMING LEGISLATURE, and the following designated 
members of the Management Council in their capacities as duly-elected members of 
the Wyoming State Senate and State House of Representatives and as taxpayers and 
citizens of the State of Wyoming; Robert Grieve, Bruce Hinchey, Henry "Hank" 
Coe, James Twiford, Guy Cameron, Mark Harris, Tom Kinnison, Peg Shreve, Eli 
Bebout, Louise Ryckman and Leo Garcia, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

Jim GERINGER, Governor of 
the State of Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Dan J. Pauli and 
David K. Gruver (argued), Legislative Service Office, Cheyenne, for 
Appellants.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General and Michael L. Hubbard (argued), Deputy Attorney General, 
for Appellee. 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The significant 
substantive question certified to this Court by the district court is whether 
the Governor has constitutional authority to veto portions of a bill which makes 
appropriations, but which does not make any appropriation in the portion of the 
bill that is vetoed. A threshold question is whether the plaintiffs in this 
declaratory judgment action have standing to pursue that remedy. In an effort to 
add focus to the standing question, this Court requested the parties to brief 
certain additional questions, and of its own motion raised the possibility of a 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine if the Court instead of the 
Legislature were to override the veto. We will recognize standing under the 
doctrine that acknowledges standing in matters of great public interest and 
importance, and we uphold the partial vetoes by the Governor as comporting with 
the clear language of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. The first 
certified question is answered "Yes," and the second certified question is 
answered "Yes."

[¶2]      The certified 
questions the Court agreed to answer are:

1. Did the 
Governor have the power under Article 4, Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution 
to veto portions of House Enrolled Act No. 2, enacted during the 1997 Special 
Session on School Finance Reform?

2. Do individual 
legislators or the Management Council of the Legislature have legal standing to 
sue the Governor regarding the exercise of his partial veto power under Article 
4, Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution?

These are stated 
as the issues in both the Brief of Appellants and the Brief of Appellee. No new 
issue is suggested in the Reply Brief of Appellants. In their Supplemental 
Briefs, the parties addressed the questions set forth by the Court, which 
were:

1. Whether WYO. 
STAT. § 28-8-114 (1997) constitutes a special law regulating the practice in 
courts of justice, in contravention of Article 3, § 27 of the Constitution of 
the State of Wyoming?

2. Whether 
Article 4, § 8 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides an adequate 
remedy to the legislative department, making declaratory relief 
inappropriate?

3. Whether the 
judicial department is being requested, in effect, to exercise the authority of 
the legislative department under Article 4, § 8 of the Constitution of the State 
of Wyoming, and, if so, whether the action of the judicial department would 
infringe upon the powers reserved to the legislative department, in violation of 
Article 2, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming?

4. Whether, in 
light of the allegations of Paragraph 17 of the Complaint for Declaratory 
Relief, the individual plaintiffs were disqualified from voting in this instance 
by the provisions of Article 3, § 46 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming?

[¶3]      During a special 
session of the Legislature called by the Governor in 1997, the Legislature 
adopted House Enrolled Act 2 (HEA 2). This legislation was the response by the 
Legislature to the decision of this Court in Campbell County School Dist. v. 
State, 907 P.2d 1238 (1995). After it was signed by the appropriate officers of 
the legislature and its staff, it was presented to the Governor. In the enacting 
clause, HEA 2 states that it is an act "providing for appropriations," and 
multiple appropriations of moneys appear in the body of the act.1 The Legislature adjourned promptly 
after its action on HEA 2 was completed, and the Governor could not return it 
within 3 days in accordance with the constitutional process for vetoing 
legislation.2 Since the Legislature, by its 
adjournment prevented the return of HEA 2 by the Governor in three days, he had 
fifteen days to return the bill to the Secretary of State with his objections. 
The Governor did that, and he exercised his perceived constitutional authority 
to veto portions of HEA 2 that did not encompass appropriations and which were 
substantive in nature.3

[¶4]      Article 4, 
Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming encompasses the authority 
which the Governor exercised in his message to the Secretary of State. It 
provides:

The governor 
shall have power to disapprove of any item or items or part or parts of any 
bill making appropriations of money or property embracing distinct items, 
and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or 
items and part or parts disapproved shall be void unless enacted in the 
following manner: If the legislature be in session he shall transmit to the 
house in which the bill originated a copy of the item or items or part or parts 
thereof disapproved, together with his objections thereto, and the items or 
parts objected to shall be separately reconsidered, and each item or part shall 
then take the same course as is prescribed for the passage of bills over the 
executive veto.

(Emphasis 
added). The essence of the debate in this case is captured within the emphasized 
language of Article 4, Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, 
with the Management Council of the Wyoming State Legislature and the associated 
parties (Management Council) asserting that the authority to veto is limited to 
appropriations only, while the Governor contends that the veto authority is much 
broader.

[¶5]      As a threshold 
question, we turn to the certified question relating to standing. We accept the 
standing of the Management Council to pursue the relief sought by way of a 
declaratory judgment under the doctrine of great public interest or importance. 
We first acknowledged the doctrine of great public interest or importance in 
connection with the existence of a justiciable controversy to support the 
invocation of the authority of the court to make a declaratory judgment. We said 
that the requirement of a justiciable controversy is relaxed or not followed in 
such instances. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (Wyo. 1974). We invoked Brimmer 
in our first school finance case. Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. 
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980). In Memorial Hosp. of Laramie County v. 
Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyo., 770 P.2d 223, 226 (Wyo. 
1989), we began to extend the doctrine of great public interest or importance 
from a relaxation of the requirement for a justiciable controversy to a 
justification for standing when we said:

Declaratory 
relief should be liberally administered if the elements of a justiciable 
controversy exist to give the trial court jurisdiction. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 577 (Wyo. 1974). For that controversy to exist, a genuine right or 
interest must be at issue between adversarial parties, and the trial court must 
be able to make an effective judgment which will finally determine the rights of 
the parties. Id. at 578. Even these prerequisites, however, may properly be 
avoided or relaxed when matters of great public interest or importance are 
presented to the trial court. Id.; Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Development 
Company, Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 44 (Wyo. 1985). If the hospital could establish the 
existence of an actual controversy with the department, there is no doubt the 
trial court could effectively and finally determine that dispute. Thus, the only 
question remaining is whether the department has so affected an interest of the 
hospital so as to create an actual controversy. "Standing is a concept utilized 
to determine if a party is sufficiently affected to insure that a justiciable 
controversy is presented to the court." Washakie County School District No. 1 v. 
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo. 1980).

The transition 
became complete when we said:

We have also 
recognized an exception to the standing requirement when we are faced with a 
matter of great public interest or importance. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 
(Wyo. 1974). Without deciding whether Petitioners have standing to seek the 
issuance of a writ of mandamus which requires Governor Sullivan to implement the 
Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act, we hold that the issue of whether the 
Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act is constitutional is of great public 
importance and, therefore, merits a decision from this 
Court.

State ex rel. 
Wyoming Ass'n of Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826, 828-29 (Wyo. 1990) (footnotes omitted). We hold that the issue presented in 
the second certified question is of great public importance that merits a 
decision from this Court, and we, therefore, recognize the standing of the 
Management Council to seek a declaratory judgment on that 
question.

[¶6]      In presenting 
this case, the Governor relies upon a very broad philosophy of partial veto 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to be vested in the governor of 
that state. The cases that have addressed the constitutional authority in 
Wisconsin are Citizens Utility Bd. v. Klauser, 194 Wis.2d 484, 534 N.W.2d 608 
(Wis. 1995); State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis.2d 429, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988); State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis.2d 679, 264 N.W.2d 539 
(1978); State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis.2d 118, 237 N.W.2d 910 (1976); 
State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 289 N.W. 662 (1940); State ex 
rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 622 (1936); State ex rel. 
Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 260 N.W. 486 (1935). The 
constitutional language in Wisconsin is different from the language of Article 
4, Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution, but the Governor contends that the 
product of the reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court should be adopted in 
Wyoming.

[¶7]      The Management 
Council calls to our attention cases from our sister states which support the 
position of the Management Council that the Governor is not authorized to veto 
those portions of any piece of legislation that do not make an appropriation. 
Those cases include Harbor v. Deukmejian, 43 Cal. 3d 1078, 240 Cal. Rptr. 569, 742 P.2d 1290 (1987); Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1985); 
Cenarrusa v. Andrus, 99 Idaho 404, 582 P.2d 1082 (1978); State ex rel. Teachers 
v. Holder, 76 Miss. 158, 23 So. 643 (1898); State ex rel Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1979); Thirteenth Guam Legislature v. Bordallo, 430 F. Supp. 405 (1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1978); and Bengzon v. Secretary of 
Justice of Philippine Islands, 299 U.S. 410, 57 S. Ct. 252, 81 L. Ed. 312 
(U.S.Phil.Islands 1937). The Management Council relies upon State ex rel. 
Jamison v. Forsyth, 21 Wyo. 359, 133 P. 521 (1913), as precedent for the 
proposition that we will look to persuasive authority from other jurisdictions 
in interpreting our Wyoming Constitution. We find no fault with the decisions of 
the highest courts of other jurisdictions with respect to the constitutions of 
those states. Indeed, it is the right and therefore the obligation of any 
independent sovereign to interpret and apply the document that defines its 
sovereign powers. We agree that these cases do support the position of the 
Management Council generally, but all of them, except for State ex rel. Link, 
are distinguishable because of differences in constitutional language. Further, 
State ex rel. Jamison is itself distinguishable from this case, and the portion 
of that opinion reporting on the views of other jurisdictions is 
dictum.

[¶8]      The New Mexico 
case of State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974) is 
relied upon by both the Management Council and the Governor. It supports the 
Governor's position with respect to the broader power to veto, but it does 
attach a condition to the effect that such a partial veto must only be exercised 
as a negative power to disapprove and cannot "distort, frustrate or defeat the 
legislative purpose by a veto of proper legislative conditions, restrictions, 
limitations or contingencies placed upon an appropriation and permit the 
appropriation to stand." State ex rel. Sego, 524 P.2d  at 982. In North Dakota, 
which adopted identical constitutional language, the Supreme Court spoke in a 
way favorable to the Management Council in State ex rel. Link. The difficulty 
with that decision, however, is that the Supreme Court assumed that it was 
confronted with ambiguous constitutional language that required construction 
rather than interpretation.

[¶9]      Our tradition in 
Wyoming is different. A century ago the Court said:

The primary 
principle underlying an interpretation of constitutions or statutes is that the 
intent is the vital part, and the essence of the law. * * * Such intent, 
however, is that which is embodied and expressed in the statute or instrument 
under consideration. * * * If the language employed is plain and unambiguous, 
there is no room left for construction. It must be presumed that in case of a 
constitution the people have intended whatever has been plainly expressed. 
Courts are not at liberty to depart from that meaning which is plainly declared. 
* * * "* * * We are not at liberty to presume that the framers of the 
constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not understand the force of 
language."

Rasmussen v. 
Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897). This same rule is in vogue still. As 
the Court said in Campbell County School Dist., 907 P.2d at 
1257:

In the case of a 
constitution, it must be presumed the people have intended whatever has been 
plainly expressed and that intent must be given effect and enforced. Rasmussen 
v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897).

If the 
constitutional language is clear and unambiguous, we must accept and apply the 
plain meaning of that language. The same rules apply to the construction of 
provisions of the constitution as apply to the construction of statutes. 
Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 991 (1918), 
followed by, County Court Judges Ass'n v. Sidi, 752 P.2d 960, 962 (Wyo. 
1988).

[¶10]   The principles articulated in 
Rasmussen have been followed faithfully. We are charged with discerning the 
intent of the Constitutional Convention, and we look first to the plain and 
unambiguous language to discern that intent. E.g., Griess v. Office of the Atty. 
Gen., Div. of Criminal Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 737 (Wyo. 1997); Newton v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 922 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 1996); 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 984 (Wyo. 1996); Laramie County Bd. 
of Equalization v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 915 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Wyo. 
1996); General Chemical Corp. v. Unemployment Ins. Com'n, Div. of Unemployment 
Ins., Dept. of Employment, 906 P.2d 380, 381 (Wyo. 1995); Casper Oil Co. v. 
Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 225 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶11]   There is a degree of irony to be 
found in the fact that a decision relating to a school reorganization statute 
becomes an occasion to review principles of grammar. We do so with the wisdom of 
the Supreme Court of the United States in mind:

This Court 
naturally does not review congressional enactments as a panel of grammarians; 
but neither do we regard ordinary principles of English prose as irrelevant to a 
construction of those enactments.

Flora v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 145, 150, 80 S. Ct. 630, 4 L. Ed. 2d 623, 633, 627 (1960) 
(citation omitted). When addressing the plain and unambiguous meaning of Article 
4, Section 9, we must look at the structure and position of the words in the 
constitutional provision.

[¶12]   According to accepted principles of 
grammar, the language set forth is clear and unambiguous. The participial phrase 
"making appropriations * * *" immediately follows and modifies "any bill." The 
applicable principle is addressed in JOHN M. KIERZEK & WALKER GIBSON, THE 
MACMILLIAN HANDBOOK OF ENGLISH, 414 (6th ed., Revised by, Robert F. Willson, Jr. 
1977):

Since English is 
not a highly inflected language (i.e., not one in which words change form to 
reflect grammatical relations), the meaning of an English sentence depends 
largely on the arrangement of the words in it. The reader naturally assumes that 
the parts of a sentence that are placed next to each other are logically related 
to each other. You must therefore be careful to arrange words in a sentence in 
such a way that its meaning will be clear on the first reading. The rule that 
will guide you may be stated in two parts: (1) place all modifiers, whether 
words, phrases, or clauses, as close as possible to the words they modify; (2) 
avoid placing these elements near other words they might be taken to 
modify.

See also, JUDITH 
NADELL ET AL., THE MACMILLAN WRITER, 655 (3rd ed. 1997); JOHN C. HODGES ET AL., 
HARBRACE COLLEGE HANDBOOK, 248 (12th ed. rev. 1994); L. SUE BAUGH, ESSENTIALS OF 
ENGLISH GRAMMAR, 110 (2nd ed. 1993); RUTH PARLE CRAIG ET AL., 1001 PITFALLS IN 
ENGLISH GRAMMAR, 58-59 (3rd ed. 1986). One authority states that "[n]oun 
modifiers have fixed positions before and after the noun." VINCENT F. HOPPER ET 
AL., ESSENTIALS OF ENGLISH, 89 (4th ed. 1990).

[¶13]   Since the participial phrase, 
"making appropriations of money or property embracing distinct items * * *," is 
directly positioned after the noun "bill," the only logical, grammatical 
conclusion is that the participial phrase is used as an adjective modifying the 
word "bill." Hence, the Governor shall have the power to veto any item or items 
or part or parts of "any bill making appropriations * * *." If the drafters of 
the constitution had intended the participial phrase "making appropriations of 
money or property embracing distinct items * * *" to modify the words "items or 
items or part or parts," Article 4, Section 9 would read, "In any bill, the 
governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items or part or parts 
making appropriations of money or property, embracing distinct items * * *." The 
members of the Constitutional Convention did not draft Article 4, Section 9 in 
this way, and we hold that the Governor has the power to use his line-item veto 
for any portion of any bill making appropriations.

[¶14]   The Management Council has taken a 
lexical approach in endeavoring to persuade this Court that the constitutional 
provision is ambiguous. We are offered definitions of the words "item" and 
"part," and the point is made that the definitions are disparate, leading to a 
conclusion of ambiguity in the constitutional language. We are not persuaded 
that these definitions lead to ambiguity when the words are read in the context 
of the sentence. We are intrigued, however, that none of the parties wanted to 
deal with the definition of the word "any."

[¶15]   The word "any" is defined in 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 96 (1993) in this 
way:

1: one 
indifferently out of more than two: one or some indiscriminately of whatever 
kind: a: one or another: this, that, or the other - used as a function word esp. 
in interrogative and conditional expressions to indicate one that is not a 
particular or definite individual of the given category but whichever one chance 
may select b: one, no matter what one: EVERY - used as a function word esp. in 
assertions and denials to indicate one that is selected without restriction or 
limitation of choice < ~child would know that> c: one or some of whatever 
kind or sort; esp: one or some however imperfect - used as a function word to 
indicate one that is selected with indifference to quality < ~plan is better 
than no plan> 2: one, some, or all indiscriminately of whatever quantity: a: 
one or more: not none - used as a function word to indicate a positive but 
undetermined number or amount b: ALL-used as a function word to indicate the 
maximum or whole of a number or quantity c: a or some no matter how great or 
small - used as a function word to indicate what is considered despite its 
quantity or extent 3a: great, unmeasured, or unlimited in amount, quantity, 
number, time, or extent: up to whatever measure may be needed or desired b: 
appreciably or at all large, prolonged, or extended in amount, quantity, time, 
or extent - used with a preceding negative .

BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 94 (6th ed. 1990) contains this definition:

Any. Some; one out of many; 
an indefinite number. One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity. Federal 
Deposit Ins. Corporation v. Winton, C.C.A.Tenn., 131 F.2d 780, 782. One or some 
(indefinitely). Slegel v. Slegel, 135 N.J. Eq. 5, 37 A.2d 57, 58. "Any" does not 
necessarily mean only one person, but may have reference to more than one or to 
many. Doherty v. King, Tex.Civ.App., 183 S.W.2d 1004, 
1007.

Word "any" has a 
diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate "all" or "every" as well as 
"some" or "one" and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and 
the subject matter of the statute. Donohue v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of 
Norwalk, 155 Conn. 550, 235 A.2d 643, 646, 647.

It is often 
synonymous with "either", "every", or "all". Its generality may be restricted by 
the context; thus, the giving of a right to do some act "at any time" is 
commonly construed as meaning within a reasonable time; and the words "any 
other" following the enumeration of particular classes are to be read as "other 
such like," and include only others of like kind or 
character.

The conclusion 
that must be drawn from these definitions is that the Constitutional Convention 
chose to vest in the Governor broad powers with respect to the partial veto 
authorized by Article 4, Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution. An 
interpretation like that advocated by the Management Council results in 
substituting the word "only" for the word "any" the first time it appears in 
this provision.

[¶16]   Indeed, this is the effect of the 
argument by the Management Council that when all pertinent constitutional 
provisions are read together, in pari materia, Article 4, Section 9 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming authorizes the Governor to veto only 
appropriations. Our cases explain that every statement in the constitution must 
be interpreted in light of the entire document. County Court Judges Ass'n, 752 P.2d  at 964; Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778, 790 
(Wyo. 1982); Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 77 Wyo. 80, 307 P.2d 593, 597 
(1957). The constitution should not be interpreted to render any portion of it 
meaningless, with all portions of it read in pari materia and every word, clause 
and sentence considered so no part will be inoperative or superfluous. Johnson 
v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 165 (Wyo. 1992). County Court 
Judges Ass'n, 752 P.2d  at 964; Parker v. Energy Development Co., 691 P.2d 981, 
986 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶17]   Appropriations are addressed in 
several sections in Article 3 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
(emphasis added):

Section 
22:

No bill for 
the appropriation of money, except for the expenses 
of the government, shall be introduced within five (5) days of the close of the 
session, except by unanimous consent of the house in which it is sought to be 
introduced.

Section 24: 

No bill, 
except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general 
revision of the laws, shall be passed 
containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; 
but if any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in the title, 
such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so 
expressed.

Section 
34:

The general 
appropriations bills shall embrace nothing 
but appropriations for the ordinary expenses of the legislative, executive and 
judicial departments of the state, interest on the public debt, and for public 
schools. All other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each 
embracing but one subject.

Section 
35:

Except for 
interest on public debt, money shall be paid out of the treasury only on 
appropriations made by the legislature, and in no case otherwise than upon 
warrant drawn by the proper officer in pursuance of law.

Section 
36:

No 
appropriation shall be made for 
charitable, industrial, educational or benevolent purposes to any person, 
corporation or community not under the absolute control of the state, nor to any 
denominational or sectarian institution or association.

[¶18]   In the instant case, our 
interpretation of the clear language of Article 4, Section 9 of the Constitution 
of the State of Wyoming, authorizing the Governor to veto substantive provisions 
of a bill containing appropriations, does not render the plain meaning of any 
other constitutional provision inoperative or superfluous. The framers of our 
constitution uttered different expressions: bill for the appropriation of money; 
general appropriations bills; appropriations; and appropriations made by the 
legislature in Article 3 of the Wyoming Constitution. It follows that when the 
framers gave the governor the "power to disapprove of any item or items or part 
or parts of any bill making appropriations of money or property embracing 
distinct items * * *" in Article 4, Section 9, the framers contemplated giving 
the Governor broad veto authority. Our review of Article 4, Section 9 in pari 
materia, with all other provisions relating to appropriations, supports our 
holding that the Governor has authority to veto substantive provisions of any 
bill making appropriations, even though the vetoed substantive provision 
does not appropriate money.

In a separate 
segment of the Brief of Appellants, the Management Council explains the 
application of its construction of Article 4, Section 9 of the Constitution of 
the State of Wyoming with respect to each of the vetoes set forth in the 
Appendix. In view of our interpretation of the plain and unambiguous language of 
Article 4, Section 9, we need not address the perceived application of the 
Management Council's theory to each of the vetoed items or 
parts.

[¶19]   The first certified 
question:

1. Did the 
Governor have the power under Article 4, Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution 
to veto portions of House Enrolled Act No. 2, enacted during the 1997 Special 
Session on School Finance Reform?

is answered 
"Yes."

[¶20]   The second certified 
question:

2. Do individual 
legislators or the Management Council of the Legislature have legal standing to 
sue the Governor regarding the exercise of his partial veto power under Article 
4, Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution?

is answered 
"Yes."

[¶21]   The case is remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

APPENDIX

[¶22]   Part I. 1997-1998 SCHOOL 
YEAR

A. General 
Operations. 21-13-309. Determination of amount to be included in foundation 
program for each district.

21-13-309(b) 
partially vetoed ......................... ____ 

[¶23]   Part II. STATE 
ADMINISTRATION

D. State 
Education Technology Plan Section 210. Appropriation and Expenditure 
Requirements. Section 210(a)(i) partially vetoed ................... 
____

[¶24]   Part III. 1998-1999 SCHOOL 
YEAR

A. Basket of 
Educational Goods and Services. Section 301(b) vetoed 
................................ ____ B. General Operations - 1998-1999 School 
Year. 2. Distribution and Administration of School Revenues 21-13-310. Annual 
computation of district revenues. 21-13-310(h) vetoed 
.............................. ____ 39-2-402. Authorized mill levies. 
39-2-402(d)(i) partially vetoed .................. ____ 3. Phase-In Section 306. 
1998-1999 and following. Section 306(a)(i) & (ii) partially vetoed 
............ ____ Section 306(d) vetoed ................................ 
____

[¶25]   Part IV. 1999-2000 FUNDING FOR 
OPERATIONS No vetoes in this part of the bill.

[¶26]   Part V. PUBLIC EDUCATION - 
REFINEMENTS AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS No vetoes in this part of the 
bill.

[¶27]   Part VI. GENERAL FISCAL PROVISIONS 
No vetoes in this part of the bill.

[¶28]   Part VII. EFFECTIVE DATES No vetoes 
in this part of the bill.

[Part I. 
1997-1998 SCHOOL YEAR]

A. General 
Operations.

Section 101. 
W.S. 21-13-309(b) is amended to read:

21-13-309. 
Determination of amount to be included in foundation program for each 
district.

[¶29]   (b) The amount to be included in 
the foundation program of a district for transportation shall be seventy-five 
percent (75%) sixty-eight and five-tenths percent (68.5%) of the 
amount actually expended by the district during the previous school year for 
the operation and maintenance of transportation routes for the transportation of 
children. to and from regular school sessions, or seventy five percent (75%) of 
one and four tenths (1.4) times the statewide average per route mile expenditure 
for all districts during the previous school year for the operation and 
maintenance of transportation routes for transporting children to and from 
regular school sessions, whichever is less. If the district is a member of a 
board of cooperative educational services which operates and maintains all 
transportation routes for the transportation of children to and from regular 
school sessions, the amount to be included in that district's foundation program 
for transportation shall be eighty percent (80%) of the eligible operation and 
maintenance costs of the routes for the previous school year. In addition, 
the foundation program transportation amount for each district shall include 
one-sixth (1/6) of the amount actually expended by the district during the 
previous four (4) years as transportation capital outlay for purchase or lease 
of all school busses meeting minimum design and operation standards imposed by 
regulation of the state department of education under W.S. 31-5-118. Only 
administration expenses directly related to transportation shall be included in 
the calculation of transportation costs. In addition, the state department of 
education shall by rule and regulation establish criteria and standards for 
determining eligible operation and maintenance costs used in calculating 
transportation amounts under this subsection. If any district or districts 
form a board of cooperative educational services for the purpose of 
transportation, the state department of education shall report to the 
legislature annually the cost of the five percent (5%) incentive and the savings 
generated by the forming of the board for transportation purposes. 
Effective July 1, 1997, any modifications to computations under this 
subsection shall be submitted as recommendations in a report to the joint 
education interim committee, which may, after review, propose legislation to 
implement necessary modifications. Nothing in this subsection shall supersede 
rules and regulations promulgated under this subsection prior to July 1, 1997, 
except as otherwise provided in this subsection.

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*

[Part II. STATE 
ADMINISTRATION]

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*

D. State 
Education Technology Plan

* * 
*

[¶30]   Section 210. Appropriation and 
Expenditure Requirements.

(a) Three 
million seven hundred thousand dollars ($3,700,000.00) is appropriated from the 
general fund to the state superintendent for the development and implementation 
of the state education technology plan as established under W.S. 
21-2-202(a)(xx). The legislature recognizes that this appropriation is the first 
phase of a five (5) year plan that is estimated to cost forty million dollars 
($40,000,000.00). Expenditures under this section shall be subject to the 
following:

(i) The 
recommendations of the committee established by the governor and the state 
superintendent pursuant to Chapter 80, 1997 Sessions Laws, for purposes of 
implementing the communications system and contracting system components. These 
recommendations shall be submitted to the joint appropriations interim committee 
(JAC) during its hearings on the state's budget for the 1998 budget session. No 
funds appropriated under this section shall be expended until the 1998 general 
appropriations act (state budget bill) has been enacted into law. Expenditure of 
these funds shall be subject to terms and conditions contained in the 1998 
general appropriations act (state budget bill) as enacted;

(ii) The 
student-to-computer ratio should be as low as feasible, but shall be within the 
range of four (4) students for every one (1) available computer to twelve (12) 
students for every one (1) available computer;

(iii) The costs 
of the plan shall be reduced by making the greatest use possible of existing 
computers and computer networks compatible with the statewide plan and capable 
of handling the data transmission brought to the schools pursuant to the 
statewide plan;

(iv) The 
implementation of the statewide plan shall be accomplished 
by:

(A) July 1, 
1999, for data transmissions connectivity for every school with priority given 
to the wiring and connectivity for a necessary small school as defined by W.S. 
21-13-101; and

(B) July 1, 
2001, for interactive two-way video capability within each high 
school.

[Part III. 
1998-1999 SCHOOL YEAR]

A. Basket of 
Educational Goods and Services.

* * 
*

[¶31]   Section 301. (b) Effective July 1, 
1997, any rules and regulations under subsection (a) of this section shall be 
submitted as recommendations in a report to the joint education interim 
committee, which may, after review, propose legislation to implement the 
provisions of this section. Nothing in this subsection shall supersede rules and 
regulations promulgated under this section prior to July 1, 1997, except as 
otherwise provided in this subsection.

* * * 

B. General 
Operations - 1998-1999 School Year.

* * 
*

2. Distribution 
and Administration of School Revenues

* * 
*

21-13-310. 
Annual computation of district revenues.

[¶32]   (a) To ensure revenues available 
to each district are uniformly sufficient to enable compliance with the uniform 
standards for educational programs prescribed under W.S. 21-9-101 and 21-9-102 
and to secure state board accreditation of educational programs under W.S. 
21-2-304(a)(ii), the revenues specified under this subsection shall be deemed 
state revenues and shall be considered in determining the amount to be 
distributed to each district under W.S. 21-13-311. A district shall make an 
annual computation of the sum of local district resources, limited to the 
following revenues:

(ix) 
Seventy-five percent (75%) of The amount of tuition paid to the 
district during the previous school year, including any amount it may be 
required to charge charged under W.S. 21-4-501. No district shall 
include in its annual computation under this subsection any tuition paid to the 
district during the previous school year by another district for the education 
of pupils with any mental or physical handicap because of services available in 
the receiving district and any amount assessed in excess of the costs 
incurred for adult education programs, summer school programs, programs provided 
under an agreement for cooperative educational programs under W.S. 21-20-101 
through 21-20-111 and any amount assessed for programs and services for children 
with disabilities;

(xi) 
Interest, capital gains and any other earnings on funds held by the district 
earned during the previous school year;

(xii) The 
district's share of interest and penalties on delinquent taxes under W.S. 
39-3-101(b) and 39-5-101 distributed to it during the previous school year by 
the county treasurer;

(xiii) The 
district's share of railroad car company taxes distributed to it during the 
previous school year by the county treasurer under W.S. 
39-2-207(e);

(xiv) Any 
amount received by the district during the preceding school year from the sale 
of real or personal property which was not owned by the district prior to July 
1, 1997;

(xv) All 
other revenues received or collected by the district during the previous school 
year, but excluding any amount received from private contributions and gifts, 
excluding any revenues dedicated by law to the payment of bonded indebtedness 
and excluding fees or other charges imposed by the district for goods or 
services, such as rental fees and the price paid for admission into any place 
for recreation, entertainment or an athletic event. Upon application of a 
district, the department shall exclude from this paragraph revenue received by 
the district if the department finds that the revenue could not be used by the 
district to provide educational services to students.

(h) There is 
created the educational equity revenue program. In addition to all other mill 
levies authorized by law, each school district board of trustees is authorized 
to impose a levy of only two (2) additional mills for two (2) years under this 
subsection subject to the following:

(i) Each 
district imposing the levy under this subsection is entitled to receive an 
amount equal to the following:

(A) The ratio 
of the district's guaranteed amount to the total guaranteed amount for all 
districts in the state as computed under W.S. 21-13-309(p); 
times

(B) One 
hundred fifty percent (150%) times two (2) mills times the statewide assessed 
valuation.

(ii) The 
state superintendent shall make payments to districts from the school foundation 
program to each district in amounts necessary to implement this paragraph. 
Payments necessary to implement this section shall be made under the same 
schedule as other payments provided from the foundation program under W.S. 
21-13-313(c). Revenues actually received by the district from the levy under 
this subsection shall be counted toward the entitlement in paragraph (i) of this 
subsection. Districts shall rebate to the state foundation program amounts 
received in excess of the entitlement provided under this paragraph in 
accordance with the schedule specified in W.S. 21-13-102(b) as it was in effect 
on July 1, 1997. This paragraph is subject to the following:

(A) The data 
used in making computations required under this paragraph shall be the same used 
for making other computations under W.S. 21-13-309 and 
21-13-310;

(B) Effective 
for each fiscal year beginning on and after July 1, 1998, on or before August 15 
of each succeeding fiscal year, each district shall report the actual amount of 
revenue received from the levy under this subsection for the preceding fiscal 
year. If the revenues actually received are greater than the amount used in the 
computation for the entitlement under this subsection, the amount shall be 
considered a local revenue under W.S. 21-13-310 for the succeeding fiscal year. 
If the revenues actually received are less than the amount used in the 
computation for the entitlement under this subsection, the amount shall be paid 
to the district by August 15 of the succeeding fiscal 
year.

(iii) A board 
may approve this optional mill levy at a regular or special meeting following a 
public hearing announced by the board, which shall publish notice of intent to 
levy under this subsection two (2) additional mills for two (2) years for 
general operation in a newspaper of general circulation within the district at 
least ten (10) days prior to the hearing;

(iv) Revenues 
from the levy under this paragraph shall not be expended for capital 
construction or for capital facility repair, maintenance and renovation needs of 
the district, including deferred maintenance.

* * 
*

39-2-402. 
Authorized mill levies.

[¶33]   (d) There shall be annually levied 
and assessed upon the taxable value of property within the limits of Wyoming 
school districts the following school taxes when 
applicable:

(i) Not to 
exceed the number of mills provided by W.S. 21-13-102 and 
21-13-310(h);

3. 
Phase-In

Section 306. 
1998-1999 and following.

[¶34]   (a) Notwithstanding W.S. 
21-13-309(p) as created in this act and using computations of district general 
fund revenues by the state department based upon reports from districts required 
by the department:

(i) For school 
year 1998-1999, revenues available to any school district shall not be more than 
one hundred fifteen percent (115%) nor less than ninety-five percent (95%) of 
the total general fund revenues available to that district during the 1997-1998 
school year, except that any district imposing two (2) mills under the 
educational equity revenue program pursuant to W.S. 21-13-310(h) shall receive 
not less than one hundred percent (100%) of the total general fund revenues 
available to that district during the 1997-1998 school year and the one hundred 
fifteen percent (115%) limit on the gain shall not apply;

(ii) For school 
year 1999-2000, revenues available to any school district shall not be more than 
one hundred fifteen percent (115%) nor less than ninety-five percent (95%) of 
the total general fund revenues available to that district during the 1998-1999 
school year, except that any district imposing two (2) mills under the 
educational equity revenue program pursuant to W.S. 21-13-310(h) shall receive 
not less than one hundred percent (100%) of the total general fund revenues 
available to that district during the 1998-1999 school year and the one hundred 
fifteen percent (115%) limit on the gain shall not apply.

[¶35]   (b) In addition to any other 
payment and for school years 1998-1999, three hundred thousand dollars 
($300,000.00) is appropriated from the general fund for boards of cooperative 
educational services such that each board of cooperative educational services 
providing services for children with disabilities shall receive up to one 
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) during school year 
1998-1999.

[¶36]   (c) The legislature recognizes that 
additional legislation in 1998 and 1999 will be necessary to fully comply with 
the court's decision, that it will take time for the state department of 
education to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement this act 
and such subsequent legislation, and that it will take additional time for 
school districts to fully comply with all such requirements. School districts 
shall continue to comply with existing state department of education standards 
during the transition to full implementation of school finance reform under this 
act. Nothing in this act shall be construed to require any district to be in 
full compliance with requirements that result from this act until the state 
department of education has promulgated necessary rules and regulations and a 
reasonable opportunity for districts to achieve compliance has been 
provided.

[¶37]   (d) Effective July 1, 1997, any 
rules and regulations under Section 303, 304 and 306 of this act shall be 
submitted as recommendations in a report to the select committee on school 
finance, which may, after review, propose legislation to implement the 
provisions of these sections. Nothing in this subsection shall supersede rules 
and regulations promulgated under Sections 303, 304 and 306 of this act prior to 
July 1, 1997, except as otherwise provided in this 
subsection.

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*

Footnotes

1 The 
enacting clause for HEA 2 reads:

AN 
ACT relating to public schools; prescribing school reform in response to the 
supreme court decision in Campbell County School District, et al., v. State of 
Wyoming, et al.; authorizing limited local option ad valorem tax levies; 
modifying Wyoming school system provisions as specified; providing for 
appropriations; authorizing positions; and providing for effective 
dates.

2 Article 4, 
Section 8 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
provides:

Every bill which has passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a 
law, be presented to the governor. If he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, 
he shall return it with his objections to the house in which it originated, 
which shall enter the objections at large upon the journal and proceed to 
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members elected 
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the 
other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if it be approved 
by two-thirds of the members elected, it shall become a law; but in all such 
cases the vote of both houses shall be determined by the yeas and nays, and the 
names of the members voting for and against the bill shall be entered upon the 
journal of each house respectively. If any bill is not returned by the governor 
within three days (Sundays excepted) after its presentation to him, the same 
shall be a law, unless the legislature by its adjournment, prevent its return, 
in which case it shall be a law, unless he shall file the same with his 
objections in the office of the secretary of state within fifteen days after 
such adjournment.

3 In order to 
furnish those not familiar with this matter pertinent information, there is 
attached to this opinion an Appendix setting forth the specific vetoes made by 
the Governor. There were seven parts in House Enrolled Act No. 2, but the vetoes 
occurred only in the first three parts of the bill. The appendix begins with a 
table of contents, and there follows the entire text of each section of the bill 
as to which a veto was made. This provides a general sense of the context of 
each veto, although a study of the entire bill would be appropriate for an in 
depth understanding of the significance of the 
vetoes.