Case Title: Matter of TR

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-88-10

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of TR1989 WY 158777 P.2d 1106Case Number: C-88-10Decided: 07/21/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter 
of the Parental Rights to TR and JS, a/k/a JTS, minor children. PR, a/k/a PS, 
Appellant (Respondent)

 
 
v.

 
 
Charles W. 
SHANNON, Director of the Big HornCounty Office of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, Appellee (Petitioner)

 
 
John W. Davis of Davis, Donnell, 
Worrall & Bancroft, P.C., Worland, for Appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General; 
Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Attorney General; and Richard E. Dixon, Assistant 
Attorney General, for Appellee. 

 
 
Before Thomas, Urbigkit, Macy, and 
Golden, JJ., and Raper, J. (Ret.).

 
 
Macy, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This case is before the 
Court for a second time. In the prior appeal, P.R. v. Shannon, 726 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1986), we reversed and remanded a decision terminating the parental 
rights of PR, due to the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem to 
represent the best interests of the minor children in the termination 
proceeding. The instant appeal is from an order of the district court which, 
upon the motion of the State of Wyoming, Division of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, dismissed the petition for termination of parental rights but 
upheld the validity of relinquishments of custody and consents for adoption 
previously executed by appellant PR in relation to her minor children, TR and 
JS. In resolving the issues presented in this appeal, we must examine the 
validity of the relinquishments and consents for adoption, including the effect 
of appellant's attempted revocation thereof, and determine whether the 
procedural mechanisms involved in this case were sufficient to free these 
children for adoption.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant presents 
these issues:

 
 
1. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
WHEN IT APPLIED AN IMPROPER STANDARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A 
RELINQUISHMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WAS VALID.

 
 
2. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE FACTS DEVELOPED TO THE PROPER 
STANDARD.

 
 

[¶4.]     The Big Horn County 
Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (DPASS) first became 
involved with appellant in 1976 or 1977 when it arranged for her placement in 
the Job Corps. In 1981, while unmarried and pregnant with TR, appellant was 
referred to DPASS by a physician who was concerned about her ability to 
adequately care for the child. DPASS unsuccessfully attempted to persuade 
appellant[*1108]to relinquish the baby for adoption. TR was bornin October of 
1981. Appellant did not marry TR's father. Thereafter, DPASS provided various 
services to appellant, primarily involving public assistance benefits. Appellant 
subsequently married, and a second child, JS, was born in early 1983.1 In September 1983, DPASS received a 
child abuse complaint regarding TR, and from that point forward DPASS became 
actively involved in attempting to improve appellant's parenting skills in order 
that she could properly care for her children.

 
 

[¶5.]     Efforts by DPASS to 
improve appellant's abilities as a parent and to protect the children included 
parenting classes, mental health counseling, protective day care, and temporary 
foster care for the children. These efforts were largely unsuccessful, however, 
as continued incidents of neglect and complaints of abuse were documented. 
Beginning in the fall of 1984, as a result of the continuing problems, 
appellant's DPASS caseworker began discussing with appellant the possibility or 
option of relinquishing her children for adoption.In October of 1984, appellant 
was not willing to relinquish her children for adoption but she did agree to a 
voluntary thirty-day foster placement for them. In the ensuing months, 
appellant's mental health counselor also discussed with her the possibility of 
relinquishing her children for adoption.

 
 

[¶6.]     As further incidents 
and complaints of neglect and abuse occurred, it became apparent to the agencies 
involved that efforts on behalf of appellant and her children were not 
succeeding and that more drastic measures might be needed. These concerns were 
communicated to appellant. Finally, during a counseling session with her mental 
health counselor on May 24, 1985, appellant declared she was ready to relinquish 
the children for adoption. Her mental health counselor telephoned the 
caseworker, informed her of appellant's decision, and then transported appellant 
to the DPASS office where appellant executed relinquishment and consent for 
adoption documents for both children in the presence of her mental health 
counselor, the caseworker, and a notary public. Physical relinquishment of the 
children occurred later that day.

 
 

[¶7.]     A few days later, 
appellant called the DPASS office and indicated she wishedto revoke the 
relinquishments, and this telephone call was followed by a letter to the same 
effect dated June 4, 1985. In her telephone call and letter, appellant indicated 
that she had not fully understood the consequences of relinquishment and that 
she wanted her brother and sister-in-law in Alaska to adopt the 
children.

 
 

[¶8.]     In an action apparently 
reflecting some uncertainty regarding the validity of the relinquishments and 
consents for adoption, DPASS filed a petition on June 28, 1985, seeking 
termination of appellant's parental rights and those rights of the children's 
fathers. Following a hearing held February 4 and 5, 1986, the district court 
entered its order terminating appellant's parental rights on the basis of 
neglect and failure of efforts to rehabilitate pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
14-2-309(a)(iii) (1977). The district court also terminated the parental rights 
of TR's father by default on the basis of his election, as communicated to the 
court by his appointed counsel, not to appear and contest. JS' father had been 
dismissed from the termination action pursuant to his motion to dismiss, 
presented at the close of the State's case, upon the district court's finding 
that the Statehad failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he was 
unfit to have custody of JS. As previously mentioned, the termination decision 
was overturned by this Court on the procedural ground that a guardian ad 
litem had not been appointed to represent the interests of the children as 
required in termination proceedings by this Court's decision in DB v. MM, 
617 P.2d 1078 (Wyo. 1980), and by Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-211(a) (1977).2

 
 

[¶9.]     Mandate on reversal 
issued from this Court on October 28, 1986. On November 17, 1986, the 
State/DPASS filed a motion to dismiss the termination proceedings on the ground 
that the voluntary relinquishments and consents to adoption had effectively 
extinguished appellant's parental rights, thereby rendering termination 
proceedings unnecessary. The State also noted in this motion that JS' father had 
executeda relinquishment with respect to JS since the original hearing. 
Appellant resisted the motion to dismiss, indicating to the district court that 
she should have a forum in which to challenge the validity of the consents. An 
attorney was appointed as guardian ad litem for the children. Thereafter, 
upon the stipulation of the parties, the district court allowed appellant to 
amend her answer to the original termination petition by adding a counterclaim 
for declaratory relief regarding the validity of the relinquishments. The 
district court's September 25, 1987, order granting appellant leave to amend her 
answer effectively provided for a bifurcated hearing in which the validity of 
the relinquishments would be considered as a threshold 
matter.

 
 

[¶10.]  The matter was heard on January 6 and 7, 
1988, and the district court, in its subsequent decision letter and order, found 
the relinquishments and consents to adoption executed by appellant to be valid 
and binding. The termination proceedings, consequently, were dismissed. This 
appeal followed. This Court, upon its own motion, noted that the order appealed 
from did not dispose of the claims relating to the two fathers and remanded for 
entry of a finalorder with respect to those claims. Accordingly, the district 
court entered an order indicating that the parental rights of the fathers had 
previously been resolved. The district court noted that JS' father had signed a 
voluntary relinquishment with respect to JS and that the parental rights of TR's 
father to TR were terminated by the original order in this case, from which he 
did not appeal.

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellant's primary contention in this 
appeal is that the district court applied an improper standard in determining 
whether or not the relinquishments executed by appellant were valid. We cannot 
agree.

 
 

[¶12.]  We first observe that this action is 
predicated on the Wyoming adoption statutes, Wyo. Stat. §§ 
1-22-101 to -116 (1977), and not on the termination of parental rights statutes, 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-2-308 to -319 (1977). In PAA v. Doe, 702 P.2d 1259 
(Wyo. 1985), 
we observed that the adoption statutes and termination statutes do not serve 
identical purposes and, therefore, they are subject to different standards. We 
have also stated that "consent lies at the foundation of statutes of adoption 
and that the first duty of the judge is to see that all necessary consents are 
given." MVF v. MF, 766 P.2d 550, 552 (Wyo. 1988).

 
 

[¶13.]  As it existed in relation to this case, § 
1-22-109, entitled "Consent to adoption," provided:3

 
 
(a) A written relinquishment of the 
child and written consent to adoption shall be filed with the petition to adopt 
and shall be signed by:

 
 
(i) Both parents, if living; 
or

 
 
(ii) The surviving parent; 
or

 
 
(iii) The mother and putative father 
of the child if the name of the putative father is known; 
or

 
 
(iv) The mother alone if she does 
not know the name of the putative father, in which case she shall sign and file 
an affidavit so stating; or

 
 
(v) The legal guardian of the person 
of the child if neither parent is living or if parental rights have been 
judicially terminated; or

 
 
(vi) The executive head of the 
agency to whom the child has been relinquished for adoption, or the state board 
of charities and reform if the child has been committed to the Wyoming state 
children's home and has been maintained by or in said home for[*1110]a period of 
one (1) year prior to the filing of the petition for adoption; 
or

 
 
(vii) The person having exclusive 
legal custody of the child by court order; or

 
 
(viii) The legally appointed 
guardian of any parent or putative father who has been adjudgedmentally 
incompetent.

 
 
(b) If the child to be adopted is 
over the age of fourteen (14) years his written consent to adoption shall also 
be filed with the petition to adopt.

 
 
(c) The consent may be signed at any 
time and shall be acknowledged before a notary public, an officer authorized to 
take acknowledgments, or by a representative of the division of public 
assistance and social services within the department of health and social 
services or of a certified agency to whom the child is being relinquished for 
adoption, or a consent may be approved by the court after the person giving his 
consent has appeared before the court in an informal hearing in court chambers 
and if the court finds that the consent is knowingly and voluntarily 
given.

 
 
(d) Consent to adoption and the 
relinquishment of a child for action are irrevocable unless obtained by fraud or 
duress, except that if the court should deny the adoption on account of a 
claim or objection of the putative father of the child, the court may also allow 
the mother of the child to withdraw her consent and relinquishment. The 
consentor relinquishment by a parent who is a minor is valid and may not be 
revoked solely because of minority.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶14.]  The question before us is whether the 
consents executed by appellant are valid. Appellant's challenge to the validity 
of the consents focuses on subsection (d) of the statute regarding revocability 
of consents. Appellant contends that the district court improperly limited its 
consideration of the grounds for revocation of consent to fraud and duress and 
erroneously failed to consider undue influence. We observe, however, that the 
district court in fact did address and reject appellant's claim of undue 
influence, although it did so after indicating doubt as to whether such 
consideration was required under the statute. The State, on the other hand, 
persuasively argues that courts are not free to graft a new standard onto the 
statute and thus consideration of undue influence was unnecessary and 
improper.

 
 

[¶15.]  Adoption was unknown at common law, and 
adoption statutes are subject to strict construction.MVF, 766 P.2d  at 
552; SKMD v. SLM, 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982). Additionally, since adoption is 
entirely statutory, the proceedings must be conducted in substantialconformity 
with the statutory provisions.MVF, 766 P.2d  at 552; Lucas v. 
Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948). In SKMD, 
652 P.2d  at 978, we noted that the legislature, as a matter of public policy, 
provided that relinquishment of a child for adoption and consent to adoption are 
irrevocable, unless obtained by fraud or duress. We further noted in that case 
that written consent is recognized as a meaningful document which is intended to 
be given effect and which must not be easily set aside.Id. at 
979.

 
 

[¶16.]  This Court has said that duress exists 
"whenever one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to perform some act 
under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will." Id. at 978. See 
also In re Adoption of D.P., 583 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1978), and Annotation, 
What Constitutes "Duress" in Obtaining Parent's Consent to Adoption of Child 
or Surrender of Child to Adoption Agency, 74 A.L.R.3d 527 (1976). In 
SKMD, we cited the above annotation for

 
 
the general rule that where the 
natural parent has executed the consent after having been given an opportunity 
to deliberate and reflect on the decision and to seek independent advice and 
counselingand to ponder the alternatives available to her, duress does not 
exist.

 
 
652 P.2d  at 
978.

 
 

[¶17.]  We recognize, however, that, although 
duress usually requires wrongful circumstances, some courts have 
expanded[*1111]the meaning of duress to include "force of circumstances" and 
"undue influence." See Annotation, supra, 74 A.L.R.3d at 530, and 
H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 21.5 at 
621 (2d ed. 1987). Indeed, this Court discussed "undue influence" in In re 
Adoption of D.P., 583 P.2d  at 708. We are not inclined, nevertheless, to 
expand the grounds upon which a revocation of consent to adoption may be 
premised. This is an area particularly within the province of the legislature. 
As the State correctly points out, the legislature, in recent enactments, has 
specifically employed the term "undue influence" in other contexts. See Wyo. 
Stat. § 2-6-114 (1977) regarding self-proving wills and Wyo. Stat. § 
35-20-102(a)(ix) (1977) where, within the chapter on adult protective services, 
the legislature defines "exploitation" in relation to disabled adults as taking 
advantage of by, inter alia, "undue influence" or "duress." We agree with 
the State that thesestatutes indicate that the legislature regards the terms as 
separate and distinct. Additionally, in Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 
485 (Wyo. 1976), we noted the following pertinent rules of statutory 
construction: (1) omission of words from a statute must be considered 
intentional; (2) words may not be inserted into a statute in the guise of 
statutory interpretation; (3) we will not supply omissions from a 
statute--redress being with the legislature; and (4) it is just as important to 
recognize what a statute does not say as what it does say. We conclude that 
undue influence is not a separate ground for revocation of a consent for 
adoption, and we need not reach the question of whether the evidence supports 
the district court's finding of a lack of undue influence.

 
 

[¶18.]  Although the foregoing effectively 
disposes of the precise issues formulated by appellant in this appeal, fairness 
to appellant requires that we address what we perceive as her underlying issue: 
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's conclusion 
that the relinquishments and consents were executed without fraud or duress and 
thus were valid. This is a factual inquiry, and our standard of reviewof factual 
questions is well settled. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
trier of fact.In re Adoption of D.P., 583 P.2d 706. We presume the 
findings of fact are correct, and they will be set aside on appeal only when 
they are clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence.O's Gold Seed Company v. United Agri-Products Financial Services, 
Inc., 761 P.2d 673 (Wyo. 1988); Yost v. Harpel Oil Company, 674 P.2d 712 (Wyo. 1983). Additionally, we assume that the evidence of the prevailing 
party is true, leaving out of consideration the other party's evidence in 
conflict therewith and giving every favorable inference to the evidence of the 
successful party which may fairly be drawn from it.O's Gold Seed Company, 
761 P.2d 673; DS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 
607 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1980).

 
 

[¶19.]  With respect to fraud, the district court 
observed in its decision letter that "the evidence on fraud, if any, was so 
slight as to have escaped the Court's recognition." We agree with the district 
court's conclusion that the relinquishments were not obtained by fraud, and 
appellant does not contend otherwise.

 
 

[¶20.]  As previously noted,this Court has stated 
that duress exists whenever a person is induced, by the unlawful act of another, 
to perform some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of 
free will.SKMD, 652 P.2d 974; In re Adoption of D.P., 583 P.2d 706. The district court concluded that the relinquishments and consents were not 
obtained by duress. The evidence supports that conclusion.

 
 

[¶21.]  The record reveals that the option of 
relinquishment had been discussed periodically with appellant by her caseworker 
and by her mental health counselor for several months prior to the actual 
execution of the documents. These discussions reflected the ongoing failure of 
appellant to profit from DPASS' efforts to intervene and improve her ability to 
properly care for her children. Events came to a head in the spring of 1985. On 
April 17th of that year,[*1112]DPASS received yet another complaint, apparently 
the third or fourth, of appellant's child abuse or neglect. In this instance, 
appellant, presumably in frustration with the child's "dawdling," tied JS to the 
family dog while they were out walking, and the dog ran off dragging the child 
behind it, resulting in various scrapes and bruises on the child.Thereafter, the 
caseworker informed appellant that, if there were any further incidents 
involving the children's safety, she would seek court action. On May 23, 1985, 
the caseworker received a physical examination report regarding the children 
which indicated that both children had lost weight, that both were anemic, and 
that their diet was "barely adequate, if that." A decision was made within DPASS 
to refer the case to the county attorney for termination 
proceedings.

 
 

[¶22.]  The following day appellant attended a 
scheduled counseling session with her mental health counselor, who had been 
informed of DPASS' decision. The topic of relinquishment again arose, and 
appellant stated that she wanted to relinquish the children and that it would be 
for the best. The mental health counselor telephoned the caseworker and informed 
her that appellant wanted to relinquish the children. The mental health 
counselor then drove appellant to the DPASS office to meet with her caseworker 
and to execute the relinquishments and consents for 
adoption.

 
 

[¶23.]  Appellant signed the documents in the 
caseworker's DPASS office in the presence of the caseworker, the mental health 
counselor, and a notary public. Initially, uponarriving at the caseworker's 
office, appellant expressed some reservations about relinquishing TR but, after 
further discussion, she decided to relinquish both children. Prior to execution 
of the documents, the caseworker carefully explained to appellant the 
significance and consequences of the relinquishments. Appellant testified that 
the caseworker read the documents to her word for word and that she, appellant, 
indicated that she understood them. Appellant testified that she was offered 
more time to think about it and that she was told it was not necessary for her 
to sign the documents that day. The caseworker testified that she repeatedly 
asked appellant if she was sure that this was what she wanted to do and whether 
she needed more time to consider the decision. Even after the relinquishments 
were signed, the caseworker gave appellant an opportunity to change her mind, 
offering to tear up the documents, but appellant declined, indicating that she 
was sure of her decision. It was not until after the papers had been executed 
that the caseworker informed appellant of DPASS' prior decision to seek court 
termination. Appellant testified at trial that she understood the finality ofthe 
relinquishments when she signed them. The caseworker picked up the children at 
appellant's home on the same day that the relinquishments were signed. The 
caseworker testified that appellant had the children ready to go with all their 
belongings packed and that appellant was calm and unemotional upon this actual 
physical relinquishment of her children.

 
 

[¶24.]  The above recited evidence, with 
conflicts properly resolved in favor of appellee, is sufficient to support the 
district court's finding that the relinquishments were obtained voluntarily and 
without duress. The district court correctly observed that the evidence was 
"completely devoid of any unlawful acts on the part of anyone which induced 
[appellant] to sign the relinquishments under circumstances which deprived her 
of the exercise of her free will." The evidence further supports the district 
court's observations that appellant's actual execution of the relinquishment and 
consent documents "was simply a culmination of something she had been 
considering, both pro and con, over a long period of time" and that she "fully 
understood what she was doing at the time she signed the 
relinquishments."

 
 

[¶25.]  Evidence in the record also supportsthe 
district court's conclusion that appellant's later attempted revocation of the 
relinquishments was in the nature of an ineffectual conditional revocation in 
that appellant did not request that the children be returned to her but rather, 
as the district court noted, "merely attempted to conditionally revoke the 
relinquishment[s] unless[*1113]the adoption could be carried out by her brother 
so that she would be able to visit the children." Finally, testimony in the 
record indicates that appellant's attempted revocation may have been partly or 
largely inspired by her mother's opposition to the 
relinquishments.

 
 

[¶26.]  We cannot say on this evidence that the 
findings of the district court are clearly erroneous or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence. We hold, therefore, that the relinquishments and 
consents for adoption executed by appellant are valid, binding, and irrevocable 
pursuant to the mandates of § 1-22-109(d).

 
 

[¶27.]  At this juncture, having determined that 
the relinquishments and consents for adoption executed by appellant are valid, a 
review of the status of the children is appropriate. Appellant has relinquished 
both children for adoption. JS' father has similarly executed a 
relinquishmentand consent for adoption, and he has not subsequently challenged 
that relinquishment. Thus, upon issuance of this opinion, JS will be immediately 
available for adoption.

 
 

[¶28.]  A different situation is presented with 
respect to TR and her natural father. As noted earlier in this opinion, the 
district court, responding to a request from this Court, entered an order 
relating to the claims of the fathers in which it indicated that the claims of 
TR's father had been terminated by court order dated May 30, 1986, and that he 
did not appeal that order. That termination order, however, was reversed on 
jurisdictional grounds by this Court, and the failure of TR's father to appeal 
from that defective order does not render it valid as to him. It will be 
incumbent upon the State/DPASS, in order to free TR for adoption, to either 
secure a relinquishment and consent to adoption from TR's father or proceed with 
termination proceedings against him. In the original proceeding TR's father 
notified the district court, through counsel, that he elected not to appear and 
proceed in the matter. Thus, under the circumstances, it might be anticipated 
that he will voluntarily relinquish TR for adoption.

 
 

[¶29.]  We also note,as the culminating effect of 
these rather convoluted proceedings, that once a final decree of adoption is 
entered for these children, the remaining parental rights of the natural 
parents, such as they may be, will come to an end.Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-114 
(1977).4 See also ALT v. DWD, 640 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 
1982) (decrees of adoption terminated natural father's parental rights); Unif. 
Adoption Act § 14, 9 U.L.A. 58 (1971) (final decree of adoption terminates 
parental rights of natural parents); and H. Clark, supra, § 21.1 at 565 
and § 21.4 at 606 (adoption decree ends legal rights and obligations between 
child and his natural parents). Cf.PAA, 702 P.2d 1259 (parental rights of 
nonconsenting parent terminated by operation of law pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
1-22-110 (1977)).5 The district court's order in this 
case, however, stated in part:

 
 
1. The relinquishment and consent to 
adoption executed by [appellant] on May 24, 1985, with regard to [TR] and [JS] 
are valid and binding, effectively extinguishing the parental rights of 
[appellant] with regard to the children in question as of the date upon which 
said documents were executed[.]

 
 

[¶30.]  To the extent that the order purports to 
formally terminate appellant's parental rights, it is in error. Actual and final 
termination of parental rights can only be accomplished in Wyoming either 
through proceedings brought pursuant to the termination statutes or, as just 
discussed, upon the entry of a final decree of[*1114]adoption. Thus, although we 
affirm, we will remand to the district court with instructions to modify its 
order by deleting the reference to a termination of parental rights. See 
Gregory v. Sanders, 635 P.2d 795 (Wyo. 
1981), appeal after remand 652 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1982), and Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137 
(Wyo. 1976) 
(affirming but directing district court to modify 
judgment).

 
 

[¶31.]  As a final matter, we should acknowledge 
our concern with the inordinatelapse of time involved in these proceedings from 
the time the consents were obtained until the subject children will finally be 
available for adoption. We are aware that the ability of agencies such as DPASS 
to find adoptive homes for specific children generally diminishes over time as 
the children grow older. In the instant case, the delay in placing these 
children in adoptive homes is the direct result of the continuous litigation 
since 1985 concerning the availability of the children for adoptive placement. 
DPASS has been precluded from placing these children in adoptive homes because 
of the unsettled legal status of the children. We anticipate that our decision 
herein regarding the validity of relinquishments and consents for adoption will 
avert many such problems in the future. A question arises, nevertheless, as to 
the duration of valid consents. In this respect, we observe that § 1-22-109(d) 
provided that relinquishments and consents were irrevocable, with the 
limited exceptions as discussed, and the statute did not provide for any 
expiration of the consents if adoption had not occurred within a prescribed 
period of time.6 In 2 C.J.S., supra, § 68c at 
495, the rule isstated that "mere lapse of time before the consent is acted on 
and adoption proceedings prosecuted does not render the consent ineffective." 
This case does not involve a failure or inability of DPASS, over an extended 
period of time, to secure an adoptive placement for a child clearly freed for 
that purpose by relinquishing parents. In this case, the agency's hands have 
been tied by litigation.

 
 

[¶32.]  TR is now seven years old, and JS is six 
years old. The record reveals that the children initially exhibited emotional 
and behavioral problems in their foster placements after being relinquished. 
Consequently, in order to prepare the children for an adoptive placement, DPASS 
placed them in a group foster care-treatment program for troubled children. 
Testimony by their supervising social worker at the hearing below indicated the 
children responded well to this placement. We anticipate that DPASS will be able 
to expeditiously arrange for an adoptive placement for these young children, 
provided, however, in the case of TR, that no further difficulties are 
encountered in freeing her for adoption.Affirmed but remanded to the district 
court for modification of the order in accordance with this opinion. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In late 1983 
or early 1984, appellant's husband was sentenced to the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary upon a conviction for a sexual assault not involving appellant or 
her children.

 
 

2More 
precisely, the defect in the original proceeding was the failure to provide 
counsel to represent the children's best interests in the termination 
proceeding, as in fact DPASS had been appointed as guardian ad litem for 
the children. The opinion in the earlier appeal, P.R., 726 P.2d 500, does 
not make this distinction entirely clear.

 
 

3Section 
1-22-109 was amended in both 1986 and 1987. This case arose prior to these 
amendments.

 
 

4Section 
1-22-114(a) provides:

 
 
Upon the entry of a final 
decree of adoption the former parent, guardian or putative father of the child 
shall have no right to the control or custody of the child. The adopting persons 
shall have all of the rights and obligations respecting the child as if they 
were natural parents.

5The adoption 
statutes of some states provide, and some courts have held, that a valid 
relinquishment deprives the natural parents of parental rights but that it may 
not always terminate certain parental obligations to the child, such as support, 
which may continue until the entry of a final decree of adoption. See 2 
C.J.S., Adoption of Persons § 12 (1972), and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-5-104 
(Cum. Supp. 1988).

 
 

6The 1986 and 
1987 amendments to § 1-22-109 did not change subsection 
(d).

 
 
Thomas, J., idssents and files an 
opinion in which Golden, J., joins.

 
 
Golden, J., dissents and files an 
opinion in which Thomas, J., joins.

 
 
URBIGKIT,Justice, concurring in the 
result.

 
 

[¶33.]  Nothing in this case can give me comfort, 
but somewhere out of this litigative morass the interest of two children must 
receive some present priority. We have a mother, two different fathers and two 
children, now age seven and six, that have been intrinsically involved with the 
Big Horn County Office of Public Assistance and Social Services since their 
birth. For everyone and specifically these two children, there has been more 
than sufficient catastrophe for any providence in a single 
lifetime.

 
 

[¶34.]  In 1985, now four years ago, a consent to 
relinquishment was signed and the future of these two children has been in 
litigation ever since while being placed in a parade of foster home care. 
Although I concur in the result, it is not to approve the course of this 
litigation from relinquishment form execution, which was obviously distrusted, 
to termination for cause, granted, and then reversed and returned for retrial. 
My particular disaffinity is derived from the present course of this litigation 
where the[*1115]distrusted relinquishment and consent to adoption form was 
pulled back off of the shelf after reversal of the termination decision as a 
different predicatefor termination of the mother's parental rights. This is 
where we are today. By now, we do not have definable knowledge whether anything 
more substantively remains in this litigation beyond the aimless visitations of 
the litigative affect on defenseless children in addition to the intransigence 
of continued litigation, although unquestionably manifesting deep-seated 
sincerity and concern of the courts, counsel and social 
agency.

 
 

[¶35.]  In any event, I now say enough, without 
necessarily adopting a preclusive attitude of the validity of the original 
relinquishment or its viability as a consent to adoption. In adopting this 
thesis which portends in estoppel by inability to terminate litigation, I 
conclude that these children deserve stability and, for this reason, concur in 
the result to achieve for them some finality before it becomes too late for 
society to provide any chance of normality during their childhood. Another 
trial, another year or more and what has been won?Within the application of 
practical experience, it is contemplated that following some stability of 
remaining childhood, these children can sort out their family relationships as 
adults as the choice may then be presented.

 
 

[¶36.]  The mother, during this four year course 
of litigation, has failed in two separate contested trials to convince the trial 
court that the children should be returned to her to raise. See Matter of 
T.R., 726 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1986). The time must come when litigation 
ends and stability is achieved. Cf.Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist. v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1986) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) and Matter of 
Adoption of BGD, 713 P.2d 1191, reh'g granted 716 P.2d 983, 
opinion confirmed 719 P.2d 1373 (Wyo. 1986). Even though the original trial 
judge who conducted the two trials has now retired, I disfavor putting these 
children through the process one more time after this delay. In their best 
interest, finality of decision is due and litigation must end. In Interest of 
J.L., 761 P.2d 985 (Wyo. 1988).

 
 

[¶37.]  I concur in the result to permit a 
present conclusion to this compendium of litigation and to establish some 
permanency for these two children within whatever choices society can now 
afford. 

 
 
THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, with 
whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

 
 

[¶38.]  I join in the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Golden. I perceive the process approved in this case to beakin to the 
riddle about whether a tree falling in the forest makes a sound if no one is 
there to hear. The riddle is unsolvable and leads nowhere. This is true of a 
relinquishment and consent to adoption when there is no adoption. A legal limbo 
results. The relationship of parent and child is effectively severed, but there 
is no resolution of the status of either. The result is quite different from 
that described in § 14-2-317, W.S.1977 (July 1986 Repl.). Resolution can 
be attained only by a final decree of adoption, which probably will never occur. 
For this reason, I add some thoughts of my own.

 
 

[¶39.]  When DPASS initiates a proceeding to 
terminate parental rights, it does so on the premise that the action, even 
though it interferes with a fundamental liberty interest, is necessary in order 
to protect the safety and welfare of the child. When DPASS is pursuing a valid 
adoption proceeding, the primary concern is the best interest of the child 
advanced with the concurrence of the natural parent or parents and, in that 
instance, the necessity of protecting the safety or welfare of the child, which 
justifies the deprivation of the fundamental liberty interest of the parent, is 
not an issue.The motivation and justification for these different proceedings 
are quite disparate. The burden of proof in a termination proceeding is upon 
DPASS, and clear and convincing evidence is required. Obviously, that burden of 
proof is very different from simply defending a claim of fraud or duress in a 
proceeding in which the parent seeks to revoke a relinquishment and consent to 
adoption. In this[*1116]latter situation, the burden of proof is upon the 
natural parent.

 
 

[¶40.]  It is the obligation of the state agency 
to decide whether it needs to protect the safety or welfare of the child or 
whether it is advancing an adoption of the child and then to choose its ground 
and proceed accordingly. In this instance, DPASS did choose the ground. It chose 
to proceed with a termination of parental rights. When that was frustrated 
because of the failure to comply with essential requirements, the state agency 
offered an executed relinquishment and consent to adoption as an alternative to 
the termination of parental rights proceeding that it had initiated. It 
substituted an orange for an apple. This court now permits DPASS to make that 
shift and to avoid its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing 
evidencethe necessity for interfering with the fundamental liberty interest of 
the parent and child. Instead, DPASS is permitted to assert that the burden is 
on the natural parent to show fraud or undue influence. As Justice Golden 
astutely points out, the majority imposes this requirement in the absence of the 
policy that justifies the rule. There are no adoptive parents whose interests 
demand that the relinquishment and consent be essentially 
irrevocable.

 
 

[¶41.]  By the majority decision, we have 
approved a tactic of DPASS that never will permit us to determine whether the 
State could meet its appropriate burden. Agents of DPASS are entitled to assume 
that, after initiating a termination proceeding, the burden of proof always can 
be avoided by obtaining a relinquishment and consent for adoption which would be 
irrevocable. There is a manifest opportunity for, and a strong implication of, 
duress in such a process. I would avoid that difficult dilemma by a rule that a 
misrepresentation is present whenever a relinquishment and consent to adoption 
is obtained by DPASS without a planned adoption. (While styling this situation 
an artifice may be apt, that word for me falls short of describing the 
event,which is a fraud.) Absent a pending adoption, DPASS is unable to 
articulate the proper ground for seeking the relinquishment and consent for 
adoption. It cannot speak the truth, that it is choosing to avoid proof by clear 
and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for terminating the rights of the 
parent. Its silence is very much like the tree falling when there is no one 
there to hear. I would treat the unsolvable circumstance as fraud as a matter of 
law unless the record very clearly demonstrated that the parent executing the 
consent and relinquishment for adoption was apprised of the fact that it was to 
be used as a substitute for termination of parental rights; that DPASS 
deliberately chose the alternative; that DPASS was avoiding a difficult burden 
of proof; and that all the effects of the consent and relinquishment without a 
planned adoption were clearly presented to the executing 
parent.

 
 

[¶42.]  I recognize, in this instance, that there 
really is nothing likely to happen that will save these children from the foster 
home process. My concern is the development of a legal principle that will 
inflict this unfortunate result on unknown numbers of children in the future. 
Given the prospectof future harm, it is inappropriate to approve this facile 
maneuver by an agency of the State. I would reverse and remand for resolution of 
the proceeding to terminate parental rights.

 
 
GOLDEN, Justice, dissenting, in 
which THOMAS, J. joins.

 
 

[¶43.]  I dissent, and I also join in the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas.

 
 

[¶44.]  I would reverse the district court's 
decision since I believe that W.S. 1-22-109(d) (1977), the irrevocability 
provision, does not apply where, as here, no petition of adoption has been filed 
or is reasonably likely to be filed in the future.

 
 

[¶45.]  When a petition for adoption is filed and 
an adoption is in the offing, the irrevocability provision promotes the public 
policy of the adoptive child's complete integration into the new adoptive 
family. As expressed in Smith v. Welfare Department of City and County of 
Denver, 144 Colo. 103, 355 P.2d 317, 320 (1960), "policy 
dictates that persons assuming the role and responsibilities of adoptive parents 
be assured[*1117]that in doing so they are not adopting a lawsuit in the 
bargain." This court clearly spoke of this policy when it 
said:

 
 
[Adoption] affords in so many 
instances a future in every respect which a child may not otherwise enjoy.It 
fills a void for those not blessed as natural parents and those others who also 
have the capability and overwhelming desire to care for and raise the helpless. 
They, too, must not be deprived when they take a lawful, sincere, caring, and 
good faith course, especially when they have been committed to and are willing 
to assume or have assumed parental responsibilities.

 
 
The legislature has recognized 
irrevocable consent as a meaningful device through which such a commitment may 
be made secure. This is a matter of public policy which is the business of the 
legislature.

 
 

In re Adoption of 
MM, 652 P.2d 974, 
978 (Wyo. 
1982).

 
 

[¶46.]  In this case no petition for adoption has 
been filed, and at oral argument the court was told that no petition for 
adoption of these children will ever likely be filed. Consequently, the public 
policy supporting the application of the irrevocability provision does not come 
into play.1 There is no new family 
into which the relinquished children will be integrated, there are no adoptive 
parents to be assured, and there is no commitment to be made secure. It is 
axiomatic that when the reason for the rule ceases to exist, the rule ceases to 
exist.

 
 

[¶47.]  In 2 H. Clark, The Law of Domestic 
Relations in the United States, § 2.15, at 613-14 (2d ed. 1987), appears the 
following statement: "If the children do not appear to be adoptable, such a 
relinquishment might condemn them to years of foster homes, possibly shifting 
from one foster home to another a fate which hardly seems preferable to a more 
stable life with their natural [parent]." I fear Clark's words are cruelly prophetic for P.R.'s 
children.

 
 

[¶48.]  I have an additional reason for believing 
that the irrevocability provision does not apply to the facts of this case. We 
recently observed that:

 
 
Termination of parental rights is 
accomplished in Wyoming either by a proceeding pursuant to the 
termination statutes or, in the case of an adoption proceeding, by the entry of 
a final decree of adoption subsequent to a validly executed relinquishment of 
custody and consent to adoption. See Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-114 (1977) (entry of 
final decree of adoption ends parental rights of former 
parent).

 
 

State of Wyoming, ex rel. TRL, a 
minor v. RLP and DLL, 772 P.2d 1054, 1057-58 (1989). 
There, this court refused to recognize a natural father's attempted voluntary 
relinquishment and consent to adoption,agreed to by the natural mother and 
approved by the district court. In particular, we found that there had been a 
failure to appoint a disinterested guardian ad litem for the child and to 
otherwise accomplish the termination proceeding in accordance with the 
statutorily established procedures.Id., at 1057. In agreeing with the 
state's characterization of the natural father's consent to adoption as a sham, 
and after concluding that the termination proceeding was not saved by styling it 
as a voluntary relinquishment of custody and consent to adoption in accordance 
with W.S. 1-22-109, we stated forcefully:

 
 
It is clear, however, that adoption 
was never contemplated in this case. As argued by the State in the proceeding 
below, the mother has no plans for marriage and hence no plans for an adoption 
of the child by a stepfather. We can only conclude that the attempt by these 
parents to posture this case as an adoption case is merely an artifice designed 
to detour attention from the fact that they bargained away the fundamental 
rights of the child in a proceeding in which the child's best interests, if they 
were considered, were given short shrift.

 
 

Id., at 1058.

 
 

[¶49.]  That passageapplies here with full force. 
D-PASS's attempt to posture this case as[*1118]an adoption case is an artifice 
designed to deter attention from D-PASS's apparently successful effort of 
extinguishing the fundamental liberty interests2 of the children and the 
natural mother to be with each other as a family unit without a court of law 
ever considering whether the children's condemnation to years of foster homes is 
in their best interests. Unlike the parental rights termination proceeding which 
requires the court's express determination of the best interests of the child, 
and unlike the true adoption proceeding, which also requires that express 
determination, D-PASS's "Irrevocable voluntary relinquishment and consent" 
procedure establishes a third statutory device, hitherto unknown to the law, by 
which the fundamental liberty interests of the natural child and natural parent 
are extinguished by agency fiat without a determination by a factfinding court 
of law of what placement is in the best interests of the child. In my judgment 
the legislature never intended this "irrevocable voluntary relinquishment and 
custody" scheme.

 
 

[¶50.]  Being faithful to this court's past 
pronouncements on the subject, I would strictly construe the adoption statutes, 
particularly W.S. 1-22-109(d), containing the irrevocability 
provision.Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d  at 979. The title of W.S. 1-22-109 is 
"Consent to Adoption," and the language of the statute provides that the written 
relinquishment and consent shall be filed with the petition to adopt. In 
Matter of Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 1264-65 (Wyo. 1985), this court 
said: "Terminating parental rights by operation of law under § 1-22-110 is 
always in connection with an adoption. Terminating parental rights under §§ 
14-2-309 through 14-2-318 may be for purposes other than the possibility of an 
adoption." (Emphasis added.) We noted earlier, in our quotation from RLP, 
that under § 1-22-114, only entry of the final decree of adoption ends the 
parental rights of the former natural parent. I would apply the concept that we 
must look to the statutory scheme as an integrated plan. I would give primacy to 
the basic principles permeating the law of adoption: We are dealing with 
fundamental liberty interests and the best interests of children. As a result of 
the foregoinganalysis, I would conclude that the irrevocability provision does 
not apply to the facts of this case, and the natural mother revoked her 
relinquishment and consent as she had a right to do.

 
 

[¶51.]  I would vacate the order of the district 
court and remand for that court's entry of an order immediately returning these 
children to their mother.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"If a 
statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed purpose. 
A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense." 
K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 374 
(1960).

 
 

2DS and RS 
v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 918 
(Wyo. 
1980).