Case Title: STACEY LYNN BJORK v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, A Delaware Corporation; THE CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS; RAY JENSON; HOWARD VANVALKENBERG; BYRON SUNBERG; and MICHAEL B. HICKMAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
STACEY LYNN BJORK v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, A Delaware Corporation; THE CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS; RAY JENSON; HOWARD VANVALKENBERG; BYRON SUNBERG; and MICHAEL B. HICKMAN1985 WY 78702 P.2d 146Case Number: 84-131Decided: 06/27/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
STACEY LYNN BJORK, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

CHRYSLER CORPORATION, A 
DELAWARE CORPORATION; THE CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS; RAY JENSON; HOWARD VANVALKENBERG; BYRON SUNBERG; 
AND MICHAEL B. HICKMAN, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

 
 

Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, J.

 
 

Terry W. Mackey 
and Robert W. Tiedeken of Terry W. Mackey, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Michael Golden 
and Patrick J. Murphy of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for appellee 
Chrysler Corp.

Timothy G. 
Williams of Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, Cheyenne, for appellee The Corp. 
of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.

George E. Powers 
of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for appellee Ray Jenson.

Rebecca A. Lewis 
of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellees Howard Vanvalkenberg 
and Michael B. Hickman.

Robert M. 
Shively of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellee Byron Sunberg.

Thomas E. 
Campbell of Hanes, Gage & Burke, P.C., Cheyenne, filed a brief for the Amicus Curiae 
Committee of the Wyoming Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Before THOMAS*, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY**, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral arguments.

ROSE, Justice.

FACTS

[¶1.]     While yet in her 
minority years, appellant Stacey Lynn Bjork was rendered an "incomplete 
quadriplegic"1 in a highway accident which 
happened on April 22, 1979 near Wamsutter, Wyoming. Stacey was riding in an automobile 
driven by David Oberholtzer on the return of a round trip from Rawlins, Wyoming, to 
Salt Lake City, Utah, which was sponsored by the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints of Rawlins, First Ward and Second Ward. On 
November 9, 1983, Ms. Bjork brought suit and the appellees-defendants who remain 
in this appeal are Chrysler Corporation; The Corporation of the President of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints; Ray Jenson; Howard Vanvalkenberg; 
Byron Sunberg; and Michael B. Hickman.

[¶2.]     Stacey Bjork's father 
was appointed her guardian, and, through him, she settled for policy limits with 
his insurance company which policy not only furnished coverage to Mr. Bjork, but 
also covered the Chrysler car and its driver. In these settlement negotiations, 
appellant's guardian executed a form release furnished by the insurance company 
which Stacey ratified a few years later when she attained her majority. The 
handwritten section of the document specifically released David Oberholtzer and 
his and his father, Paul. By its printed words, the instrument also purported to 
discharge

"* * * all other persons, 
firms or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable * * * from any 
and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind 
or nature whatsoever * * *."

The parties do 
not question the validity of the release to the Oberholtzers.2

[¶3.]     At the conclusion of 
the summary-judgment proceedings - which were predicated upon the pleadings, the 
release in question and affidavits of the guardian and his attorneys stating 
that they did not intend that the release should discharge any persons but those 
specifically named therein - the trial court found that the above-quoted "all 
other persons" catch-all language of the release document had the effect of 
discharging all unidentified tortfeasors and alleged tortfeasors including the 
appellees. In coming to its conclusion, the court found that the release 
satisfied the requirements of § 1-1-113(a)(i), W.S. 1977, of Wyoming's version of the 
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.3 Section 1-1-113 
provides:

"Release or covenant not 
to sue.

"(a) When a release or a 
covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one (1) 
of two (2) or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same 
wrongful death:

"(i) It does not 
discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful 
death unless its terms so provide; 
but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount 
stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration 
paid for it, whichever is the greater; and

"(ii) It discharges the 
tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other 
tortfeasor." (Emphasis added.)

The trial court 
held, therefore, that the language of the printed form releasing

"* * * all other persons, 
firms or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable, * * 
*"

were the "terms" 
of the instrument which satisfied the emphasized proviso language contained in § 
1-1-113(a)(i), supra.

[¶4.]     We will reverse the 
trial court. 

THE ISSUE

[¶5.]     The appellant 
identifies the issue for our decision as follows:

Did the trial court err 
"in granting summary judgment to the appellees on the grounds that they had been 
released by appellant's guardian on September 27, 1980"?

[¶6.]     We would say that the 
issue is even more precisely this:

When the release 
instrument and Wyoming's Right to Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors statutes, 
§§ 1-1-110 through 1-1-113, W.S. 1977, are read together, can it even then be 
said that it was the intention of the contracting parties and the legislature 
that a general release would also discharge unidentified tortfeasors who were 
not parties to the contract and who had offered no consideration to the 
plaintiff in return for the release, and whose adverse damage judgments - if any 
- would be reduced in the amount that settling tortfeasors paid or agreed to pay 
in return for their releases?

Decision

[¶7.]     We agree with the trial 
judge's conclusion that a decision in this case requires that the Right to 
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors statutes and the release document must be 
considered together as constituting the entire agreement of the parties because, 
under § 1-1-113, the release of one tortfeasor no longer releases the remaining 
tortfeasors by operation of law as was the case at common law.4 Since the "terms" of the instrument 
- according to the directive of § 1-1-113(a)(i) - will decide whether 
tortfeasors who are not parties to the release contract will enjoy discharge, it 
therefore becomes necessary to read all of Wyoming's Right to Contribution Among 
Joint Tortfeasors statutes together with the release in order to ascertain 
whether the instrument contains such "terms" as will have the effect of excusing 
tortfeasors and/or claimed tortfeasors who are not specifically identified - who 
are not parties to the release agreement - and who have paid no consideration 
for their release.

[¶8.]     When § 1-1-113 and the 
release are considered as one, their provisions formulate an instrument which 
contains:

(1) a handwritten 
discharge in favor of the Oberholtzers which does not profess to be in full 
satisfaction of all of Ms. Bjork's damages;5

(2) a purported printed 
release of unidentified persons who had not been sued and who had paid no 
consideration for the release;

(3) a statutory directive 
that a release or covenant not to sue will not discharge any tortfeasor - 
"unless its terms so provide";

(4) a statutory provision 
which holds that the plaintiff's claim against tortfeasors who do not settle 
will be reduced by the amount stipulated or paid by the settling tortfeasor; 
and

(5) a statutory provision 
which provides that a settling tortfeasor is relieved of contribution 
obligations.

The Common-Law Release 
Rule

[¶9.]     Prior to the adoption 
of Wyoming's 
version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, and absent the "all 
other persons" release language, the instrument in issue here would have been 
interpreted to be a common-law release, the effect of which would have been to 
discharge not only the Oberholtzers but all other joint tortfeasors.

[¶10.]  We said in Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 31 
Wyo. 284, 225 P. 586, 587 (1924):

"* * * A release of one 
joint tortfeasor operates as a discharge of both, but a covenant not to sue one 
will not discharge the other."

Accord Day v. Smith, 46 Wyo. 515, 30 P.2d 786 
(1934).

[¶11.]  A release of one was said to discharge 
all joint tortfeasors for the reason that, even though the parties may not have 
so intended, the instrument had the effect of extinguishing the cause of action, 
and there could therefore be but one satisfaction of the obligation. Natrona Power Company v. Clark, supra.6 This rule was held to operate in 
favor of unreleased tortfeasors even where the instrument contained an express 
reservation of the right to sue. We said in Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 225 P. at 
588:

"* * * The effect of such 
a reservation in an instrument which would otherwise be a release has frequently 
been the subject of judicial inquiry, and there are many cases in this country 
holding that the reservation can be given no effect at all, and that the 
instrument operates as a release of all persons jointly liable. [Citations.] The 
idea underlying these cases is that the primary purpose to release is the thing 
to be carried out, and that the reservation of the right to sue others, being 
inconsistent with the purpose to release, must be disregarded. Walsh v. New York, C. & H.R. Co., 
204 N.Y. 58, 97 N.E. 408, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1137. In other words, the injured 
person cannot release one wrongdoer and at the same time reserve the right to 
pursue another for the same wrong."

[¶12.]  In a more recent case involving the 
effect of a release by the original tortfeasor upon a successive wrongdoer, the 
Ohio Supreme Court said in Whitt v. 
Hutchison, 43 Ohio St.2d 53, 330 N.E.2d 678 (1975):

"In some cases, it was 
even held that a release of one jointly liable acted as a release of all, even 
though the release contained an express provision to the contrary. Ellis v. Bitzer (1925), 2 Ohio 89. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Boone 
(Fla. 1956), 
85 So. 2d 834; Getzendaner v. United 
Pacific Ins. Co. (1958), 52 Wn.2d 61, 322 P.2d 1089."7

The Injustice of The 
Common Law

[¶13.]  These common-law doctrines have been 
roundly criticized as being "harsh" and "very unfair," Calamari and Perillo, The 
Law of Contracts § 20-3 (2d Ed. 1977). In Whitt v. Hutchison, 330 N.E.2d  at 681, 
the court said:

"The injustice of the 
traditional rule was that it frequently acted to extinguish a cause of action 
which was only partly compensated, even though the parties themselves had no 
such intention. The rule also made it very difficult for a claimant to settle a 
claim by partial settlements with several persons who were jointly liable for 
his injury. A major cause of these difficulties was the doctrine of joint 
liability itself, a doctrine largely grounded in a policy of assuring 
compensation for injured plaintiffs, but which the traditional rule 
paradoxically converted into a burden and a trap for unwary plaintiffs. Prosser, 
Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 413."

[¶14.]  In Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts, § 
49, Release, p. 333 (5th Ed. 1984), the authors say:

"This result has been 
justly condemned because it compels the plaintiff either to forego any 
opportunity of obtaining what he can get from one defendant without suit, or to 
give up the entire claim against the other without full compensation. 
Historically, and on policy grounds, it has no justification, since causes of 
action against mere concurrent tortfeasors not acting in concert have always 
been separate, and their separate character should not be affected by the 
possibility of joinder for procedural convenience. A surrender of one therefore 
should not on any reasonable basis discharge the other, except to the extent 
that there has been full compensation. Even as applied to cases of concerted 
action, the rule seems at best an antiquated survival of an arbitrary common law 
procedural concept, arising out of long forgotten semi-criminal forms of action; 
and it has no reasonable application at all to cases of mere concurrent 
negligence."

[¶15.]  In Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 407, Release 
of one joint tortfeasor as discharging liability of others: modern trends, we 
find these thoughts expressed:

"* * * The rule has been 
vigorously attacked by law writers.[8] It has been described as merely a 
`surviving relic of the Cokian period of Metaphysics.'[9] It tends to defeat the fair 
expectations and intentions of the parties to the release.[10]"

[¶16.]  In Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665, 668, 73 A.L.R.2d 390 (1958), the New Jersey Supreme Court said:

"In the 
United 
States the English release rule has been under 
vigorous attack for many years. In 1923 Dean Wigmore referred to it as a 
surviving relic which was based on false logic and, although accepted by many 
courts, was fortunately being repudiated in some states by judicial decisions 
and in others by legislative action. See Wigmore, `Release to One 
Joint-Tortfeasor,' 17 Ill.L.Rev. 563 (1923). In his 1930 edition of Cooley on 
Torts, Professor Throckmorton referred to the growing tendency on the part of 
American courts to view with disfavor the English release rule and to replace it 
with the `sound and reasonable' rule that unless the parties so intended a 
release should not absolve strangers thereto. See Throckmorton's Cooley on 
Torts, § 80 (1930). In 1941 Dean Prosser referred to the rule as `at best an 
antiquated survival of an arbitrary common law procedural concept' and suggested 
that a plaintiff should never be compelled to surrender his cause of action 
against any wrongdoer `unless he has intentionally done so, or unless he has 
received such full compensation that he is no longer entitled to maintain it.' 
See Prosser, Torts, 1109, 1110 (1941); Prosser, Torts, 244-245 (2d ed. 1955). 
Cf. Prosser, `Joint Torts and Several Liability,' 25 Calif.L. Rev. 413, 424 
(1937). In 1951 Professor Corbin's work on contracts included devastating 
comments on the English release rule in the field of torts as well as contracts 
(4 Corbin, Contracts §§ 931-935 (1951)), and in 1956 Professors Harper and James 
joined in advocating the modern view that the legal effect of a release on 
strangers thereto should justly be determined by the intent of the parties to 
the release and the extent of the compensation paid to the releasor rather than 
upon outmoded concepts of ancient times. See 1 Harper & James, Torts, 
711-712 (1956). See also Notes, 22 Minn.L.Rev. 692 (1938); 18 U.Cin.L.Rev. 378 
(1949); 33 Notre Dame Law 291 (1958)."

Courts and Legislatures 
Are Abandoning the English Rule

[¶17.]  In the last 50 years, the courts of 
America have been abandoning the 
common-law-release rule.11 Many states, including Wyoming, have enacted 
statutes.12 Even where statutes have not been 
enacted, courts have retreated from the common-law rule.13 A device commonly employed is to 
interpret a release instrument to be a covenant not to sue,14 by which the plaintiff does not 
surrender the cause but merely agrees not to enforce it. Such a covenant does 
not release other tortfeasors,15 even where rights to sue are not 
reserved unless full satisfaction is shown.16 The courts have said, in their 
effort to avoid the unjust result of the English rule, that intent governs 
rather than form, and that the court will look to the statute (where there is 
one) and the purported release instrument together in order to ascertain 
intent.17

[¶18.]  Prosser and Keeton explain how the 
English rule has otherwise been moderated in the American court system when they 
observe at 334 of their work on the Law of Torts:

"There still remain some 
instruments which by any fair construction are not covenants, but releases. Even 
as to these the common law rule has been changed in some states. Statutes have 
been enacted, and even without a statute, a substantial number of jurisdictions 
have held that the release does not discharge the second tortfeasor if it 
provides in terms that it shall not do so. Some of them even have recognized an 
accompanying oral agreement to that effect, and have met the objection of the 
parol evidence rule with the argument that the second tortfeasor is not a party 
to the instrument. Still others have accomplished the same result by the short 
and simple method of calling a release with reservation of rights against others 
a covenant not to sue."

[¶19.]  We find ourselves in agreement with 
Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts, § 49, Release, supra at 335-336, where the 
authors express the opinion that:

"The only desirable rule 
would seem to be that a plaintiff should never be deprived of a cause of action 
against any wrongdoer when the plaintiff has neither intentionally surrendered 
the cause of action nor received substantially full compensation. If the 
statutes are taken into account, this is now the rule actually applied in most 
American jurisdictions. 

Where there has been such 
full satisfaction, or where it is agreed that the amount paid under the release 
is so received, no claim should remain as to any other tortfeasor; but these are 
questions of fact, and normally to be determined by the jury, where the amount 
of the claim is unliquidated. * * * If it is clear that the satisfaction 
received was understood to be only partial, it should not discharge the claim 
against the second tortfeasor. It is commonly held, however, that a credit is 
allowed to diminish the amount of damages recoverable against the second 
tortfeasor, irrespective of an agreement that it shall not, and regardless of 
whether it is received under a release or a covenant not to sue."

Wyoming Release 
History

[¶20.]  As early as the late years of the last 
century, courts interpreting Wyoming law undertook to soften the harshness 
of the common-law release rule. In Union 
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Artist, 60 F. 365 (8th Cir. 1894), the federal circuit 
court, in addressing an appeal from the federal district court for Wyoming, held 
that a release for settlement of a claim for certain personal injuries specified 
in the release, and

"`* * * from all manner 
of actions, causes of action, * * * claims and demands, whatsoever, * * * from 
the beginning of the world to this day,'" 60 F.  at 366,

does not 
discharge responsibility for personal injuries not therein specified and not 
known to exist at the time the release was executed, since the general terms in 
the release are limited by the preceding specifications.

[¶21.]  In Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, supra, 
almost 50 years before the enactment of Wyoming's Right to Contribution Among 
Joint Tortfeasors legislation, we said that, where an instrument contained a 
reservation of right to sue others, we would interpret it as being a covenant 
not to sue, rather than a release, in which case the unnamed tortfeasors would 
not be discharged by the execution of the instrument. The rationale for this 
holding is that where the release and the reservation are considered with the 
intent of the parties in mind - as that intention is gleaned from the whole 
instrument - and where the writing can operate two ways - one consistent with 
intent and the other repugnant to it -

"* * * the court will 
give it the construction best calculated to carry out the intent." Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 225 P.  at 588.

It was the 
court's thought that, if the instrument containing a reservation be construed as 
a release, then the language of the instrument is repugnant to its operational 
effect because the language says the releasor intends to retain a cause of 
action against other tortfeasors while the legal effect of a release is to 
extinguish the plaintiff's cause of action. However, if the document is 
construed as a covenant not to sue, then the language of the instrument is not 
internally repugnant, nor is the language repugnant to the legal effect of the 
covenant; thus the effect of this interpretation is to carry out the intention 
of the parties.

[¶22.]  Since the passage of Wyoming's Right to 
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors legislation, we have considered the effect 
of the contribution statutes upon a general release which did not contain a 
reservation of right and have reached an intention of the parties' 
interpretation which calls for a different conclusion than that which would have 
been compelled by the common-law release rule. In Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580, 586 
(1979), where the suit was against "successive tortfeasors,"18 we said: 

"When a general release 
discloses it has been given to named [releasees] who denied liability but made 
payment in settlement, then other alleged 
wrongdoers who were not parties to the release and made no payment toward 
satisfaction can fairly be called on to show that either the release which they 
rely on was intended to discharge them or that the releasor has received full 
compensation." (Emphasis added.) Citing: Fieser v. St. Francis Hospital, 212 Kan. 
35, 510 P.2d 145, 151 (1973); Missouri v. 
Crandall, Mo., 581 S.W.2d 829 (1979); Summey v. Lacy, 42 Colo. App. 1, 588 P.2d 892, 894 (1978); Callan v. O'Neil, 
20 Wn. App. 32, 578 P.2d 890, 892-893 (1978); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat, Alaska, 
568 P.2d 916, 928-930 (1977); Rock v. 
Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720, 346 N.E.2d 520 (1976); Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 260 (1971); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 
639 (1966).

[¶23.]  Given the effect of the applicable 
statutes (particularly § 1-1-113(a)(i) and (ii)), the purported release 
instrument and the holding in Harris v. 
Grizzle, supra, it can be seen that the common-law rule no longer holds in 
Wyoming because, at common law, a general release - either with or without 
reservation language - would serve to discharge all unnamed tortfeasors. Under 
the statute, on the other hand, unidentified tortfeasors are not released unless 
the terms of the agreement so provide, and, according to our holding in Harris v. Grizzle, the burden is upon 
those who are not parties to the release and have made no payment toward 
satisfaction of the claim, to (a) establish that the parties intended that they 
be discharged by producing proof to that effect or (b) prove the releasor has 
received full compensation.

Full Compensation Is Not 
Shown In the Case at Bar

[¶24.]  Recalling Harris v. Grizzle, supra, and reading 
the summary-judgment pleadings, affidavits and supporting documents together 
with the statute and release instrument in the appeal which is here for our 
consideration, it becomes apparent that the record contains no evidence that the 
releasor has received full compensation for her injuries. By its own terms, the 
release only purports to have been executed as a "compromise adjustment," and 
the record reveals that Ms. Bjork received the policy limit of $50,000 from the 
Oberholtzers' insurance carrier. If Stacey Bjork is an "incomplete paraplegic" - 
as alleged - we are certainly not prepared to say as a matter of law in this 
appeal from a summary judgment that she has received the "full compensation" of 
which Harris v. Grizzle 
speaks.

Intention of the 
Parties

[¶25.]  In support of their contention that the 
"all other persons" catch-all language of the release is all that is necessary 
to provide the court with the parties' intent, the appellees rely upon our 
opinion in Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, 
Wyo., 624 P.2d 1199 (1981). Preliminarily, it should be noted that the Coulter 
case is in contract rather than the law of torts which furnishes the 
underpinning for the case at bar. Additionally, the release in Coulter purported 
to discharge the releasee in recognition of full payment of the debt, rather than a 
settlement for a part thereof - which is what we are compelled to assume to be 
the situation in the appeal before the court here.19 In comparing the Coulter release problem with the issue 
with which we are concerned in the case at bar, it is also to be remembered that 
in our search for the intent of the parties, in Coulter, we were able to analyze 
a release contract document unencumbered by statutory impact, where here it is 
necessary to read the release agreement and the contribution statutes together 
in order that the parties' intentions may be ascertained.

[¶26.]  In Coulter, we acknowledged that the 
release should be construed according to the law of contract in order to 
ascertain the intention of the parties. We said, quoting Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463, 465 (1980):

"`Our basic purpose in 
construing or interpreting a contract is to determine the intention and 
understanding of the parties. [Citations.] If the contract is in writing and the 
language is clear and unambiguous, the intention is to be secured from the words 
of the contract. [Citations.] And the contract as a whole should be considered, 
with each part being read in light of all other parts. [Citations.] The 
interpretation and construction is done by the court as a matter of law. 
[Citations.]

"`If the contract is 
ambiguous, resort may be had to extrinsic evidence. [Citations.] An ambiguous 
contract "is an agreement which is obscure in its meaning, because of 
indefiniteness of expression, or because a double meaning is present." 
[Citation.] Ambiguity justifying extraneous evidence is not generated by the 
subsequent disagreement of the parties concerning its meaning. 
[Citation.]

"`* * * Whether ambiguity 
exists is a question of law. * * *'

"See Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 31 
Wyo. 284, 225 P. 586 (1924); and Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580 (1979) 
for instances in which releases were construed as a matter of law.

"`Generally the 
construction and legal effect of an ambiguous contract are questions of law, 
although where its meaning depends on extrinsic evidence which is in material conflict, or 
capable of more than one inference, a question of fact as well is presented.' 
(Emphasis supplied.) 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 617." 624 P.2d  at 
1203-1204.

When the Statute and the 
Release Are Taken Together They Do Not 
Form a "Clear and Unambiguous" Contract As Was the Case in Coulter, Inc. v. Allen

[¶27.]  In Coulter, we applied the above-quoted 
rules from Amoco Production Company v. 
Stauffer Chemical Company, supra, to the instrument in question and held 
that the language of the release was clear and unambiguous as a matter of law, 
and that the instruction giving the jury the authority to find whether or not 
the release was effective as a factual determination was, therefore, error. We 
cannot say as a matter of law, in the case at bar, that the relevant release 
provisions are in full payment for the injuries suffered, nor can we say that 
the discharge provisions which are contained in the release and the applicable 
contribution statutes are "clear and unambiguous." That this same boilerplate 
catch-all release language, taken together with the provisions of Wyoming's 
Right to Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors law combines to formulate a 
meaning which is "capable of more than one inference,"20 thereby structuring an ambiguous 
contract which lends itself to interpretations of law and fact concerning the 
intention of the parties and the legislature, is a proposition which finds its 
support in numerous authorities throughout the country.

[¶28.]  In an appeal where the statute abrogates 
the common-law rule by providing that the release does not discharge any other 
tortfeasor "unless its terms otherwise provide" (which is similar to the 
language contained in Wyoming's § 1-1-113(a)(i)), the Ohio Supreme Court, in Beck v. Cianchetti, 1 Ohio St.3d 231, 
439 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1982), held that the intention of the parties governs the 
interpretation of releases, and went on to say:

"Apparently the General 
Assembly intended to change the common law; otherwise, there would have been no 
reason to enact the statute. The legislative mandate in R.C. 2307.32[21] abrogates the common law rule 
which provided that a release given to one tortfeasor was a release to all 
others (see Whitt [v. Hutchison], 
supra) and often entrapped the average person into reasonably assuming that 
settling a claim with one person would have no effect upon rights against others 
with whom he did not deal. Instead, R.C. 2307.32 provides that a release to one 
tortfeasor does not discharge any other tortfeasor `unless its terms otherwise 
provide.' The thrust of the section is to 
retain the liability of tortfeasors and, thus, the phrase `unless its terms 
otherwise provide' should be narrowly construed and require a degree of 
specificity. Allowing a discharge based upon general language which does not 
name or identify a tortfeasor perpetuates the common law rule and is contrary to 
the statute.[22] "The statutory phrase `unless its 
terms otherwise provide' requires a release to expressly designate by name or to 
otherwise specifically describe or identify any tortfeasor to be discharged. 
For example, a release could meet the statutory requirement by naming an 
individual or specifically identifying a tortfeasor such as stating the driver 
of the car which struck the motorcycle.

* * * * * *

"We conclude that R.C. 
2307.32 requires that a release designate by name or otherwise specifically 
identify a party to be released. Broad general language, such as `all other 
persons,' is not sufficient. Thus Cianchetti, 
appellant's decedent, was not released because he was not specifically 
identified." (Emphasis added.)

[¶29.]  In Young v. State, Alaska, 455 P.2d 889 
(1969) (accord Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. 
Sweat, supra), Justice Rabinowitz, writing for a unanimous court, analyzed 
facts and law similar to the case at bar. There, a passenger was injured in a 
construction area and sued the driver, the road contractor and the State of 
Alaska. The 
plaintiff subsequently released the driver with a discharge instrument which not 
only named him personally, together with his heirs, agents, etc., but also 
purported to release "all other persons," with essentially the same language as 
is contained in the release between Bjork and the Oberholtzers.

[¶30.]  The contractor and the State moved for 
summary judgment in reliance upon the above-quoted language; the trial court 
granted the motion, and the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed. Having reviewed 
the historical injustice produced by the common-law rule, the Alaska court went on to 
notice that courts have persistently sought ways to employ judicial distinctions 
in order to avoid applying the English rule. These efforts have included 
interpreting instruments as covenants not to sue (see Natrona Power Company v. Clark, supra); 
the making of judicial distinctions between independent and concurring torts 
(see Prosser, Joint Torts and Several 
Liability, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 413 (1937)); and statutory exceptions to the 
common-law rule (as in Wyoming's Right to Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors 
legislation).

[¶31.]  The Alaska court observed that these 
judicial distinctions have resulted in the formulation of three identifiable 
rules which have been set out in Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation v. 
Winchester Drive-In Theatre, Inc., 351 F.2d 925, 928-929 (9th Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied 382 U.S. 1011, 86 S. Ct. 620, 15 L. Ed. 2d 526, they being: 

"(1) A release given one 
joint tort-feasor necessarily releases all others even though it expressly 
reserves rights against them. This is generally referred to as the common law 
rule.

"(2) A release of one 
tort-feasor does not release other joint tort-feasors unless the release 
expressly so provides.

"(3) A release of one 
tort-feasor releases all others jointly liable unless the release expressly 
reserves rights against joint tort-feasors."

[¶32.]  The Supreme Court of Alaska opted for the 
second of these positions, and reversed the trial court with the following 
rationale:

"In our opinion the rule 
which will bring most clarity to this area of ambiguous and conflicting release 
rules is one under which a release of one tort-feasor does not release other 
joint tort-feasors unless such tort-feasors are specifically named in the 
release. We are of the further view that adoption of this rule will insure that 
the intent of the parties to the release is given effect and will greatly 
minimize the possibility of any party being misled as to the effect of the 
release."23 Young v. State, 455 P.2d  at 
893.

[¶33.]  In Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Company, 101 Ill. 2d 196, 77 Ill.Dec. 738, 461 N.E.2d 361 (1984), the 
plaintiff's car was struck by a second car. Suit was filed against the driver of 
the second vehicle and also Firestone, who had manufactured the tires for the 
second vehicle. Plaintiffs settled with the driver and executed a release, 
whereupon Firestone moved for summary judgment in reliance upon the release. The 
trial court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. The 
issue in the case was this:

"`Whether the terms of a 
release which include the payer "and all persons, firms and corporations, both 
known and unknown, of and from any and all claims' provide for the release of an 
alleged joint tortfeasor pursuant to Section 302(c) of the Illinois Contribution 
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, sec. 302(c)), where 
plaintiffs investigated whether an action could be brought against the alleged 
joint tortfeasor and believed that no cause of action existed and where 
plaintiffs have stated in affidavits that they did not intend to release the 
alleged joint tortfeasors, but where plaintiffs executed the release after 
consultation with their attorneys?'" 77 Ill. Dec. at 739, 461 N.E.2d  at 
362.

[¶34.]  Section 2(c) of the Illinois Contribution 
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act contained the same provisions as our § 
1-1-113(a)(i). As a predicate for decision, the Illinois Supreme Court 
observed:

"Our statute is based 
upon the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.

"The language of the 
releases given by the plaintiffs, from which we have quoted, is general and 
broad. The releases purport to release the payers and `all other persons, firms, and corporations, 
both known and unknown' from any and all claims resulting from the accident 
in which the plaintiffs were injured. As appears above, section 2(c) of the Act 
provides that a release `does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from 
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide.' The 
question for decision is whether the releases given by the plaintiffs satisfied 
the condition, viz, `unless its terms so provide.'

"The plaintiffs contend 
that the Act requires a release to name, or otherwise specifically identify, 
another tortfeasor in order to discharge that tortfeasor from liability. They 
say that the inclusion of general language such as `all other persons, firms, 
and corporations' is not effective to release persons other than the tortfeasor 
or tortfeasors who specifically contract for the release." (Emphasis added.) 77 
Ill.Dec. at 740, 461 N.E.2d  at 363.

 

[¶35.]  After noting that there were cases to the 
contrary, the Illinois court observed that a purpose of the 
uniform act was to abrogate the common-law rule that the release of one 
tortfeasor was a release of all tortfeasors and that if literal effect were 
given to every use of a general release form

"* * * and `all other 
persons, firms, and corporations' * * * were to be discharged, the purpose of 
the Act would be thwarted by the unintended release of persons who were 
strangers to the release contract." 77 Ill.Dec. at 741, 461 N.E.2d  at 
364.

The court went on to 
say:

"The legislature intended 
to abolish the common law rule that produced an involuntary discharge of joint 
tortfeasors. Section 2(c) states that a release will not operate to `discharge 
any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury * * *.' We do not 
consider that the modifying language that follows, i.e., `unless its terms so 
provide,' should be interpreted to allow the legislative intendment of 
nullifying the common law rule to be frustrated through the use of what are 
often general release forms. The legislature surely was aware of the criticism 
that the common law rule often operated to violate the intentions of persons 
giving releases. We consider that the legislature's intendment was that under 
section 2(c) a release was not to discharge `other tortfeasors' from liability 
unless they were designated by name or otherwise specifically identified." 77 
Ill.Dec. at 741, 461 N.E.2d  at 364.

[¶36.]  Other courts have followed these various 
opinions. When the issue of releasing successive tortfeasors (as in the case of 
Harris v. Grizzle, supra) was before 
the Supreme Court of Texas in McMillen v. 
Klingensmith, Tex., 467 S.W.2d 193 (1971), the court said, after examining 
the common-law rule, the statutes abrogating it, and the recent 
cases:

"The rule [which the 
court adopts] is a simple one. Unless a party is named in a release, he is not 
released." 467 S.W.2d  at 196.

The Texas 
Supreme Court observed that this rule avoids many of the problems of the 
unity-of-release rule and particularly it avoids the necessity of proving by 
parol evidence the releasor's subjective intent at the time the release was 
executed.

[¶37.]  In the recent Texas decision, Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 
Tex., 665 S.W.2d 414 (1984), the release discharged the named tortfeasor and

"`* * * any other corporations or persons 
whomsoever responsible therefor, whether named herein or not * * * (emphasis 
added).'" 665 S.W.2d  at 418.

[¶38.]  The court held that tortfeasors who were 
not specifically named would not be released by this language, 
stating:

"* * * Our purposes in 
abolishing the `unity of release' rule and requiring specific identification of 
nonsettling tortfeasors were to encourage both partial and full settlements; to 
avoid unfairly depriving injured Texas residents of their full satisfactions; to 
avoid providing an incentive to tortfeasors to delay or to stay out of early 
settlement negotiations; and to ensure that Texas claimants do not inadvertently 
lose their valuable rights against unnamed and perhaps unknown tortfeasors by 
settling with only one of the wrongdoers. See Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 807-08 (Tex. 1980); McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d  at 
195-96. To effectuate these policies, we must narrowly construe general, 
categorical release clauses. A nonsettling tortfeasor should not fortuitously 
escape compensating his Texas victim simply because of settlement 
arrangements that did not encompass him or his conduct and to which he 
contributed nothing. If Cessna obtains the benefit of the Duncan release, then the policies underlying 
McMillen will obviously be 
frustrated."

[¶39.]  In Rosano v. Lustgarten, 54 A.D.2d 758, 387 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1976), where plaintiff was struck with a golf ball and thereafter 
released the defendant who struck him - such release being by means of an 
instrument containing the "all other persons, firms or corporations" language 
which is contained in the release executed by Mr. Bjork in the appeal at bar - 
the New York Supreme Court held that the release was properly modified to 
reflect the true intent of the parties which was to release only the named 
tortfeasor. Accord Sage v. Hale, 
N.Y., 75 Misc.2d 256, 347 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1973).

[¶40.]  In Robertson v. McCarte, 13 Mass. App. 441, 433 N.E.2d 1262 (1982), the Appeals Court of Massachusetts considered an identical 
statute and a release which contained the same broad language which concerns us 
here. One tortfeasor was released, unidentified alleged tortfeasors were 
claiming the benefit of the discharge, and the court held that the effect of the 
statute (identical with our § 1-1-113(a)(i), including the "unless its terms so 
provide" language) is that a release or covenant not to sue given in good faith 
to one of a number of tortfeasors does not include those not named in the 
release or covenant.

Conclusion

[¶41.]  The question to be answered, then, in the 
case at bar is:

Given the language of the 
release and the provisions of Wyoming's Right to Contribution Among Joint 
Tortfeasors statutes, what was the intent of the parties when they executed the 
release in issue here with reference to the unnamed tortfeasors?

Without the 
language,

"* * * all other persons, 
firms or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable * * * from any 
and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind 
or nature whatsoever * * *,"

the appellees 
would not have been discharged because § 1-1-113(a)(i) so provides. Paraphrased, 
it says that when a release is given in good faith24 to one of two or more tortfeasors, 
it does not discharge the other tortfeasors - "unless its terms so provide." 
Whether the "terms so provide" - that is, whether the "all other persons" 
language will include the appellees - is a question of intent. Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, supra; Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company, supra; Harris v. 
Grizzle, supra; Natrona Power Co. v. 
Clark, supra. Viewing a release instrument as a contract, as we said we must 
do in Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, supra, 
quoting Amoco Production Company v. 
Stauffer Chemical Company, supra, we must ascertain the intention of the 
parties by first looking within the four corners of the instrument - which, in 
this appeal, includes both the contract and the statutes - in the hope that we 
will find the relevant writings free of ambiguity. If this is possible, we need 
only look to the plain meaning of the words in our effort to ferret out the 
intention of the parties. If, however, the language is not clear and is 
ambiguous - i.e., if its meaning is obscure because of indefiniteness of 
expression or because a double meaning is present, Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, supra - then 
applicable rules of contract interpretation must be applied in order that 
intention may be ascertained. If necessary, resort to extrinsic evidence may be 
had. Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, supra; 
Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company, supra; Harris v. 
Grizzle, supra. Whether ambiguity exists is a question of law. (See 
quotations supra from the Coulter 
opinion.) When the broad language of the release and the contribution statutes 
are considered as constituting the entire agreement, we hold the agreement to be 
ambiguous.

[¶42.]  In the case which is here on appeal, the 
issue of release-contract ambiguity must be settled by viewing the question in 
an historical setting. This is so because it is the court's duty to undertake to 
discover what evil the legislature sought to remedy through the Right to 
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors legislation. In our pursuit of this 
purpose, we are mindful of the fact that, in too many instances, the 
common-law-release rule has not served to fulfill the purpose of the settling 
parties for the reason that, even though the parties may not have so intended, 
its effect has been to extinguish the plaintiff's cause of action before full 
compensation was received. Whitt v. 
Hutchison, supra; Prosser, Joint 
Torts and Several Liability, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 413 (1937). The English rule made 
it difficult to settle with several persons who were jointly liable. Prosser, 
supra. The effect of the rule was to compel the plaintiff to forego any 
opportunity of obtaining that which was available from one defendant - although 
incomplete and inadequate compensation - without giving up his cause of action 
against other tortfeasors. Prosser, supra.

[¶43.]  In their effort to alleviate these unjust 
consequences, it became the policy of the courts to encourage settlement and, to 
this end, to avoid the English rule whenever possible. Some courts recognized an 
accompanying oral agreement to the effect that the release will not discharge 
the remaining tortfeasors if the oral agreement so provided. Other courts found 
ways to hold that the instruments in issue were covenants not to sue rather than 
releases, in order to take advantage of a rule which permits the plaintiff to 
agree not to enforce his right of action in lieu of surrendering it. Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, supra; Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903); Prosser, supra. Courts have looked at the composition of the 
instrument in an effort to avoid the English rule and have held that, in 
ascertaining the intent of the releasor, where the release is structured so that 
particular words precede general recitals - as in the case at bar - the release 
will be restricted to the matters particularly recited. 66 Am.Jur.2d Release § 
31, citing Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
Dashiell, 198 U.S. 521, 25 S. Ct. 737, 49 L. Ed. 1150 
(1905); Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Artist, 
supra; Reggio v. Warren, 207 
Mass. 525, 93 N.E. 805 (1911); Williams 
v. Riley, Mo. App., 243 S.W.2d 122 (1951); Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444 (1869); Kent v. Fair, 392 Pa. 272, 140 A.2d 445 
(1958); Quebe v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. 
Co., 98 Tex. 6, 81 S.W. 20 (1904). Legal scholars have observed that, unless 
the intention is clear and compensation has been fully paid, a release should 
not be held to absolve strangers to the instrument. Cooley, Law of Torts § 40 
(1932); 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts § 10.1, pp. 711-712 (1956); Legislation 
and Administration, Torts, Tort-Feasors - 
Release of One Tort-Feasor Not a Release of All Tort-Feasors Who May Be Liable 
for the Same Tort, 33 Notre Dame Law 291 (1958); Recent Cases, Unqualified Release of One Concurrent Tort 
Feasor Acts as Release for All, 18 U.Cin.L.Rev. 378 (1949); Notes, Joint Tort-Feasors - Release of One Joint 
Tort-Feasor as a Bar to Right of Action Against Others - Satisfaction - 
Judgments, 22 Minn.L.Rev. 692 (1938).

[¶44.]  In an effort to overcome the harsh 
effects of the common law, states have passed statutes, among which are the 
Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors acts. (Wyoming's version is §§ 
1-1-110 through 1-1-114, W.S. 1977.) As has been noted, these statutes hold that 
a release of one joint tortfeasor will no longer release other tortfeasors 
unless the "terms" of the release so provide. Section 1-1-113(a)(i). In the 
instant case, there is a "term" which must be interpreted - namely, the 
purported release of not only the specifically identified releasees, 
but

"* * * all other persons, 
firms or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable * * 
*."

The presence of 
this phrase raises the question which asks whether it was intended by these 
parties to include the appellees.

[¶45.]  By reason of the above considerations, we 
are brought to these conclusions:

[¶46.]  The thrust of the public policy announced 
in § 1-1-113(a)(ii) is to retain the liability of tortfeasors, thus abrogating 
the common-law release rule. Therefore the phrase "unless its terms so provide" 
should be narrowly construed. Beck v. 
Cianchetti, supra. To permit discharge of noncontributing tortfeasors where 
a plaintiff has received only partial compensation, based upon broad, general 
language which does not identify the tortfeasors, effectively perpetuates the 
English rule in contravention of the legislature's intention, Beck v. Cianchetti, supra. The phrase 
"unless its terms so provide" (§ 1-1-113(a)(i)) compels the releasor to name or 
otherwise specifically identify the released tortfeasors in order that the 
intent of the parties be fulfilled. Beck 
v. Cianchetti, supra. These resolutions are fortified, not only by Beck v. Cianchetti, but by other 
well-reasoned opinions. See Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat, supra; Young 
v. State, supra; Alsup v. Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Company, supra; Robertson v. McCarte, supra; Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 
supra; McMillen v. Klingensmith, 
supra.

[¶47.]  Such a rule will most nearly assure that 
courts will be able to identify the intention of the parties with certainty, and 
it will have the effect of eliminating the ambiguity factor which, without the 
rule, will forever plague release agreements in tort actions.

[¶48.]  This holding effectively obviates the 
necessity of resorting to the Harris v. 
Grizzle rule which sanctions the taking of testimony to ascertain whether or 
not the parties intended that tortfeasors not named in a release should be 
discharged through the instrument's general provisions.

Reversed.

1 A term employed by the 
appellant in her brief to this court.

2 The release in question 
is in words and figures as follows:

"Release

"For the Sole 
Consideration of Fifty Thousand and 00/100 Dollars, the receipt and 
sufficiency whereon is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned hereby releases and 
forever discharges Paul Oberholtzer & David Oberholtzer their heirs, 
executors, administrators, agents and assigns, and all other persons, firms or 
corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable, none of whom admit any 
liability to the undersigned but all expressly deny any liability, from any and 
all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or 
nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all injuries, known and 
unknown, both to person and property, which have resulted or may in the future 
develop from an accident which occurred on or about the 22 day of 
April, 1979 at or near Wamsutter, Wyoming.

"This release expressly 
reserves all rights of the parties released to pursue their legal remedies, if 
any, against the undersigned, their heirs, executors, agents and assigns. 
"Undersigned hereby declares that the terms of this settlement have been 
completely read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the 
purpose of making a full and final compromise adjustment and settlement of any 
and all claims, disputed or otherwise, on account of the injuries and damages 
above mentioned, and for the express purpose of precluding forever any further 
or additional claims arising out of the aforesaid accident. "Undersigned hereby 
accepts draft or drafts as final payment of the consideration set forth 
above.

"In Witness Whereof, I 
have hereunto set my hand(s) and seal(s) this 27th day of 
September, 1980. In presence of Marge W. Todd.

Signed x s/Ronald J. 
Bjork

"s/Marge W. Todd 

"Witness"

3 In remarks from the 
bench, the trial court said:

"First of all, I don't 
think there's any dispute among counsel that this release is nothing more, nor 
less than another type of a contract. It is an instrument that must be construed 
in accordance with the law of contracts. And we are helped, I think, in making 
that determination to some extent by 1-1-113, subtopic subparagraph (1) of the 
statutes, and it says in part: `It does not discharge any of the other tort 
feasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so 
provide.'

"If its terms so provide, 
then the converse of that language would be, I guess, that it discharges those. 
It doesn't say in that statute that unless it names those in the release, but it 
says that unless its terms provide. Its terms are to include `their heirs, 
executors, administrators, agents, assigns and all other persons, firms or 
corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable, none of whom admit any 
of the liability to the undersigned, but all expressly denying liability from 
any and all claims.' Those are its terms and they so provide by those terms in 
accordance with the language of Section 1-1-113, subparagraph (1) of that 
statute."

4 For discussions of the 
common-law rule in Wyoming, see Natrona 
Power Co. v. Clark, 31 Wyo. 284, 225 P. 586 (1924). Accord Casper National Bank v. Jones, 79 
Wyo. 38, 329 P.2d 1077 (1958); Day v. Smith, 46 Wyo. 515, 528, 30 P.2d 786 (1934).

5 The release undertakes 
to make a "compromise adjustment" - it does not purport to fully compensate Ms. 
Bjork for her injuries and her damages.

6 A modern expression of 
this rule is to be found in Whitt v. 
Hutchison, 43 Ohio St.2d 53, 330 N.E.2d 678, 681 (1975), where it was 
said:

"* * * The somewhat 
metaphysical theory of this rule is that for a single injury there is a single, 
indivisible cause of action, and that a general release for valuable 
consideration (or even, in some cases, for none), is a satisfaction of the 
injury and a release of the cause of action. Cocke v. Jennor (K.B. 1614), 80 Eng. 
Rep. 214; Price v. Baker (1959), 143 
Colo. 264, 352 P.2d 90 (overruled in part by Cox v. Pearl Investment Co. [1969], 168 
Colo. 67, 450 P.2d 60); Dougherty v. 
California Kettleman Oil Royalties (1939), 13 Cal. 2d 174, 88 P.2d 690; Muggenburg v. Leighton (1953), 240 Minn. 
21, 60 N.W.2d 9 (but, see, Gronquist v. 
Olson [1954], 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159); Salmond on Torts (14 Ed.) 
635."

7 In interpreting the 
intent of the parties where the original tortfeasor executed a general release 
and a "successive tortfeasor" doctor sought sanctuary under its protective 
umbrella, the Ohio Supreme Court reaches a conclusion which is diametrically 
opposed to that which we reached under the same fact situation in Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580 
(1979), where we held that the release of the original tortfeasor did not serve 
to release a subsequent independent tortfeasor doctor - i.e., "successive 
tortfeasor" - in a malpractice suit.

8 See the pertinent 
discussion in Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 
351, 146 A.2d 665, 73 A.L.R.2d 390 (1958). See also comment, Torts - Joint Tortfeasors - Release of One 
Not Release of All, 12 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 1414 (1959).

"* * * [T]extwriters, 
without notable exception, have expressed the view that the reasons given for it 
have been inadequate * * *." Havighurst, The Effect of a Settlement With One 
Co-Obligor Upon the Obligations of the Others, 45 Cornell L.Q. 1 
(1959).

9 Friday v. United 
States, 239 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1957). See 
Breen v. Peck, supra n. 
8.

10 Breen v. Peck, supra n. 
8.

11 For authority for this 
proposition, Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts, § 49, Release, supra at 333, n. 
20, say:

"* * * The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws entered this field early. 
Relevant provisions appeared in its Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Acts 
of 1939 and 1955. The latter Act stands `for possible use by states not adopting 
the principle of comparative fault,' and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 
1977, contains relevant provisions on the effect of releases for states 
accepting the principle of comparative fault. See 12 Uniform Laws Annotated, 
1982 Pocket Part, 34."

12 See Harris v. Grizzle, supra n. 7, for a 
Wyoming 
decision under the Right to Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors 
statutes.

13 See Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Artist, 60 F. 365 (8th Cir. 1894); Coulter, Inc. v. 
Allen, Wyo., 624 P.2d 1199 (1981); Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, supra, for 
cases arising in Wyoming courts prior to the enactment of Wyoming's Right to 
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors statutes. In an effort to avoid the English 
rule, the court, in Union Pacific Ry. Co. 
v. Artist, supra, seized upon the theory that the released tortfeasor must 
be specifically identified, and, in Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, supra, we 
said that a discharge which contained a reservation of right should be held to 
be a covenant not to sue rather than a release.

14 Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 
supra.

15 Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 
supra.

16 Prosser and Keeton, Law 
of Torts, § 49, Release, supra at 334.

17 Prosser and Keeton, Law 
of Torts, § 49, Release, supra at 334.

18 Where death ultimately 
resulted, our opinion refers to an injured plaintiff's treating doctor as a 
"successive tortfeasor." In the case note on Harris v. Grizzle, supra, contained in 
XV Land and Water L.Rev. 337 (1980), the doctor is referred to as a "subsequent 
independent tortfeasor." In any event, the wrong of each tortfeasor was one of 
the proximate causes of death, and, at common law, the release of one would have 
had the effect of releasing the other, because the cause of action would have 
been extinguished upon the execution of the release. Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 
supra.

19 While the presence of 
the release instrument may be sufficient to shift the burden of proof in a trial 
on the merits, Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts, § 49, Release, supra at 353, 
there is no proof that the damages obligation to Stacey Bjork has been 
discharged by the payment from Oberholtzers' insurance carrier, and, in 
summary-judgment proceedings, it is the movant's burden to show that there 
exists no genuine issue of material fact. Sanders v. Lidle, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1291 (1984).

20 Language quoted from 17A 
C.J.S. Contracts § 617, as quoted in Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company, supra, and requoted with approval in Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, 
supra.

21 R.C. 2307.32, being one 
of the sections in Ohio's adoption of the Uniform Contribution 
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, is nearly the same as our § 1-1-113.

22 The holding in Beck v. Cianchetti, supra, is remarkably 
similar to Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
Artist, supra.

23 This is the same 
conclusion which the federal courts reached in the Wyoming case of Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Artist, supra, 
91 years ago.

24 There is no good-faith 
issue in this appeal.

ROONEY, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom BROWN, Justice, 
joins.

[¶49.]  The majority opinion correctly states the 
well-recognized common law relative to release of a joint tortfeasor; i.e., the 
release of one joint tortfeasor releases all. It correctly refers to the change 
in common law in Wyoming through the adoption of § 1-1-113, 
W.S. 1977,1 a version of the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. And it correctly recognizes (1) that the 
release should be construed and interpreted to ascertain the intention of the 
parties, and (2) that this statute should be construed and interpreted to 
ascertain the intention of the legislature.

[¶50.]  However, in its lengthy recital, the 
majority opinion fails to apply our well-recognized rules of construction to § 
1-1-113 and to the release with which we are concerned in this case.2 It errs in finding ambiguity in § 
1-1-113. It errs in finding ambiguity in the release. And it errs in finding 
ambiguity in the result when the two are read together. It errs in undertaking 
to legislate into § 1-1-113, the words "unless the other tortfeasors to be 
released are specifically identified" in lieu of the words "unless its terms so 
provide" as used by the legislature.

[¶51.]  The majority opinion jumps from the 
premise that § 1-1-113 is designed to modify the common law to the conclusion 
that such modification must be intended to go much further than the limiting 
language used by the legislature, such language being plain, simple and easily 
understood in directing that the release of one tortfeasor does not release 
others "unless its terms so provide." It would have been easy for the 
legislature to have said so if it intended to restrict the application of a 
release to those specifically named therein. It could have said so in so many 
words, but it did not. It opted to have the release apply to those as provided 
by the release terms. Our legislature expressly provided that a release of one 
tortfeasor does not release other tortfeasors "unless its terms so provide." The 
plain and ordinary meaning of the language permits the terms of the release to 
provide discharge from liability to a specifically designated person or persons 
or organization or organizations, or to "all other persons, firms or 
corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable" as done in this 
release.

[¶52.]  The contrary holding of the majority 
opinion is not in accordance with precedent established by this 
court:

"* * * [T]he intention 
and meaning of the legislature must be determined from the language of the 
statute itself and not from conjecture aliunde. * * *" Mahoney v. L.L. Sheep Company, 79 
Wyo. 293, 333 P.2d 712, 715 (1958).

"* * * [C]ourts will not 
usurp the power of the legislature by deciding what should have been said * * 
*." Barber v. State Highway 
Commission, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 725 (1959), citing State v. Hungary, 75 Wyo. 423, 296 P.2d 506 (1956); and State ex rel. Board of 
Com'rs of Laramie County v. Wright, 62 Wyo. 112, 163 P.2d 190 
(1945).

"* * * [C]ourts cannot 
supply omissions in a statute and will not read into a statute exceptions not 
made by the legislature. [Citations.]

"* * * [I]t is a 
universal rule that courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute 
to matters not falling within its express provisions. * * *

"* * * [I]t is our duty 
to construe and enforce the law as enacted by the legislature, and not to make 
laws." Lo Sasso v. Braun, 
Wyo., 386 P.2d 630, 631, 632 
(1963).

"* * * Intent must be 
found in the language of the statute itself. [Citation.] Where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys clear and definite meaning, there 
is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory construction; and the court 
has no right to look for and impose another meaning. [Citation.] The plain, 
ordinary and usual meaning of words used in a statute controls in the absence of 
clear statutory provisions to the contrary. [Citation.] Courts will not enlarge, 
stretch, expand or extend a statute to matters not falling within its [sic] 
express provisions. [Citation to Lo Sasso 
v. Braun, supra.] Courts will not usurp the power of the legislature by 
deciding what should have been said. [Citation to Barber v. State Highway Commission, 
supra.] * * *" Board of County 
Commissioners of County of Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174, 1184, 
reh. denied 627 P.2d 163 ([Wyo]. 1981).

"* * * First off, it is a 
well-established principle that in construing a legislative enactment we must, 
if possible, ascertain the intent of the legislature from the wording of the 
statute. * * * Also, words utilized in the statute are to be given their plain 
and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated. * * *" Wyoming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681, 684 (1982). "* * * We are 
guided by the principle that the court may not construe a statute in such a 
manner as will enlarge, stretch, expand or extend it to matters not falling 
within its express provisions. [Citations, including LoSasso v. Braun, supra.] It is our duty 
to ascertain the intention of the legislature as completely as possible from the 
language used in the statute itself. [Citations, including Wyoming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, supra.] * * *" State 
Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. Andrews, 
Wyo., 671 P.2d 1239, 1246 (1983).

[¶53.]  Our legislature has expressly provided 
that a release of one tortfeasor does not release other tortfeasors "unless its 
terms so provide." The language should not be "enlarged" or "extended" or 
interpreted so as to read into it that which is not there, or to refer to that 
not "falling within its express provisions." The language of the statute is 
plain and clear. It is not ambiguous. It is unnecessary to determine its meaning 
"from conjecture aliunde." We should acknowledge the integrity and intelligence 
of the legislature and assume it would have so provided if it intended the 
result as legislated by the majority opinion.

[¶54.]  Likewise, the language of the release 
does not require interpretation or construction. It is not ambiguous. It is 
simple and easily understood. It would be difficult to state more clearly the 
concept that every person or organization is released from any and all liability 
resulting from the accident and that the release was made voluntarily with such 
being fully understood.

[¶55.]  The majority opinion sets forth the basic 
rules for construing or interpreting a contract by quoting the following from Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463, 465 (1980):

"Our basic purpose in 
construing or interpreting a contract is to determine the intention and 
understanding of the parties. [Citation.] If the contract is in writing and the 
language is clear and unambiguous, the intention is to be secured from the words 
of the contract. [Citations.] And the contract as a whole should be considered, 
with each part being read in light of all other parts. [Citations.] The 
interpretation and construction is done by the court as a matter of law. 
[Citations.]

"If the contract is 
ambiguous, resort may be had to extrinsic evidence. [Citations.] An ambiguous 
contract `is an agreement which is obscure in its meaning, because of 
indefiniteness of expression or because a double meaning is present.' 
[Citation.] Ambiguity justifying extraneous evidence is not generated by the 
subsequent disagreement of the parties concerning its meaning. 
[Citation.]

"* * * Whether ambiguity 
exists is a question of law. * * *"

[¶56.]  The release was signed with full 
knowledge of its contents. It recites tht its terms

"* * * have been 
completely read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted * * * for the 
express purpose of precluding forever any further or additional claims arising 
out of the aforesaid accident."

[¶57.]  There is no ambiguity in either the 
statute or the release. The language is clear and plain in both of them. The 
expression is definite in both. The meaning is not obscure in either of them. 
There is not a double meaning in either of them. But the majority opinion 
attributes ambiguity to them when 
considered together. This cannot be. One cannot put two elephants together 
and have them be a donkey. The statute is clear and plain. The release is clear 
and plain. There is no ambiguity when they are read together.

[¶58.]  The majority opinion quotes from and 
refers to nine cases from six other jurisdictions to support the contention 
that, under the Uniform Contributions Among Tortfeasors Act, a release which 
recites a discharge of all others liable or potentially liable for damages, etc. 
is effective only to discharge those specifically named in the release. The 
Uniform Contributions Among Tortfeasors Act was not involved in three of these 
cases: Young v. State, Alaska, 455 P.2d 889 (1969), was decided before Alaska adopted the Act; McMillen v. Klingensmith, Tex., 
467 S.W.2d 193 (1971); and Duncan v. 
Cessna Aircraft Company, Tex., 665 S.W.2d 414 (1984). The two New York 
cases, Sage v. Hale, 75 Misc.2d 256, 
347 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1973), and Rosano v. 
Lustgarten, 54 A.D.2d 758, 387 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1976), are not only opinions 
from the general trial court of Suffolk County (one concerned an appeal from an 
inferior court) but concern a General Obligations Statute, which provides that 
release of one joint tortfeasor does not release others "unless its terms 
expressly so provide" (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that our legislature 
chose to enact the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act rather than the 
General Obligations Act which was preferred by some other states. The Wyoming choice resulted 
in an enactment in which the "unless" clause did not include the word 
"expressly." Alaska had adopted the Uniform Contributions Among Tortfeasors Act 
before the decision in Alaska Airlines, 
Inc. v. Sweat, Alaska, 568 P.2d 916 (1977), a three-to-two decision, but the 
covenant not to sue construed in that case specifically stated that Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. was not discharged. The three remaining cases, Beck v. Cianchetti, 1 Ohio St.3d 231, 
439 N.E.2d 417 (1982), a five-to-two decision, Robertson v. McCarte, 13 Mass. App. 441, 
433 N.E.2d 1262 (1982), and Alsup v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, 101 Ill. 2d 196, 77 Ill.Dec. 738, 461 N.E.2d 361 (1984), a five-to-two decision, do involve the Uniform Contributions 
Among Tortfeasors Act and releases similar to the one in this case. These three 
cases came out about the same as the majority opinion in this case, but neither 
these three cases nor the others referred to in the majority opinion designate 
wherein there is ambiguity in the statute, and none of them address the 
impropriety of judicial legislation in arriving at their conclusions. The 
dissent of Chief Justice Ryan, joined by Justice Underwood, in Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Company, supra, reflects the comparative holding of the several 
jurisdictions:

"I do not believe that in 
order to discharge other tortfeasors they must be designated by name or be 
otherwise specifically identified in the release. This is not what section 2(c) 
of the Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, 
par. 302(c)) provides. That section requires only that a release given to a 
tortfeasor does not discharge any other tortfeasor `unless its terms so provide 
* * *.' The limitation of that statute, applied to the facts of this case, means 
only that the release given by plaintiffs Alsup to tortfeasor Williams and his 
parents will not release anyone else by operation of law. That is, by virtue of 
the statute, the common law principle that the release of one joint tortfeasor 
releases all no longer applies. But under the statute, if the terms of the 
release provide that others than the specific tortfeasor to whom the release is 
given are released, the release operates to release from liability more than 
just the one to whom the release is given. Nothing in the statute requires that 
the others released be identified by name or otherwise specifically identified. 
In this case, the release ran to the named individuals `and all other persons, 
firms and corporations both known and unknown.' Thus, the release did provide 
that it was to release others than those to whom it was given. Nothing in the 
statute prevents the giving of such a general release. I shall discuss this 
further later in this dissent.

"A majority of the 
jurisdictions that have considered the question now before this court have 
reached a result contrary to that reached in the majority opinion. In those 
cases, general releases similar to that which we are considering here were held 
to be effective. The provisions of the statutes of those jurisdictions which 
provided that a release of one joint tortfeasor does not release other joint 
tortfeasors unless the release so provides were held not to require the other 
tortfeasors to be named or specifically identified. (See Johnson v. City of Las Cruces (1974), 86 
N.M. 196, 521 P.2d 1037; Battle v. 
Clanton (1975), 27 N.C. App. 616, 220 S.E.2d 97; Peters v. Butler (1969), 253 Md. 7, 251 A.2d 600; Hasselrode v. Gnagey 
(1961), 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764; Liberty v. J.A. Tobin Construction Co. 
(Mo. App. 1974), 512 S.W.2d 886.) In a Federal case, Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co. 
(8th Cir. 1982), 670 F.2d 791, 794, the court stated that the majority of 
cases from other jurisdictions have held that language releasing any and all 
persons in addition to the named parties satisfies the `"unless the release so 
provides"' provision of the uniform act. In addition to Peters v. Butler, Johnson v. City of Las 
Cruces, and Hassesrode [sic] v. 
Gnagey, cited above, the court in Douglas cites Morison v. General Motors Corp. (5th 
Cir. 1970), 428 F.2d 952; Doganieri v. 
United States (N.D.W.Va. 1981), 520 F. Supp. 1093; Stefan v. Chrysler Corp. (D.Md. 1979), 
472 F. Supp. 262, aff'd (4th Cir. 1980), 622 F.2d 587; Fuls v. Shastina Properties, Inc. 
(N.D.Cal. 1978), 448 F. Supp. 983; Bonar 
v. Hopkins (W.D. Pa. 1969), 311 F. Supp. 130, aff'd (3rd Cir. 1970), 423 F.2d 1361, and Dorenzo v. General Motors 
Corp. (E.D.Pa. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1155. " 77 Ill.Dec. at 742, 461 N.E.2d  at 
365.

 

[¶59.]  The Wyoming cases cited and quoted from in the 
majority opinion do not sustain the conclusion there reached. The language 
quoted from Union Pacific Railway Co. v. 
Artist, 60 F. 365 (8th Cir. 1894), decided before adoption of § 1-1-113, 
W.S. 1977, refers to a release given by Artist and the issue has to do with the 
scope of it as it pertains to him and not as it pertains to release of others. 
Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580 
(1979), decided after adoption of § 1-1-113, concerned successive tortfeasors, 
but more important to its lack of pertinency to this case is the fact that the 
release specifically named the parties to be discharged from liability and did 
not purport to release, as third-party beneficiaries, "all other persons, firms 
or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable," as here. Natrona Power Company v. Clark, 31 
Wyo. 284, 225 P. 586 (1924), decided before adoption of § 1-1-113, held only that a covenant 
not to sue designated persons or organizations was not a release which would 
discharge other tortfeasors from liability. Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, Wyo., 624 P.2d 1199 (1981), decided after adoption of § 1-1-113, also, as in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Artist, 
supra, involved the scope of a release as it pertained to the one receiving it 
and not to other persons or organizations.

[¶60.]  I would affirm.

1 Section 1-1-113, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"(a) When a release or a 
covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one (1) 
of two (2) or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same 
wrongful death:

"(i) It does not 
discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful 
death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others 
to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the 
amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; 
and

"(ii) It discharges the 
tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other 
tortfeasor."

2 The release is quoted in 
fn. 2 of the majority opinion.