Case Title: Waskiewicz v. General Motors Corp.

Citation: 342 Md. 699

Docket Number: 105/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 105
  September Term, 1995
___________________________________
Robert Waskiewicz
v.
General Motors Corporation
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
Eldridge, Chasanow, and Bell, JJ.,
dissent
___________________________________
      Filed:  July 29, 1996        
      All statutory references herein are to Maryland Code (1991), Labor &
1
Employment Article, unless otherwise indicated.
         
The Maryland Workers' Compensation Act, Maryland Code (1991
Repl. Vol.), § 9-101 et seq. of the Labor & Employment Article
(hereinafter "the Act") , provides in § 9-502 for compensation for
1
workers who are disabled as a result of an occupational disease.
Such diseases are by nature insidious and gradual, worsening over
time as an employee is continually exposed to the hazards of the
disease.  We are asked today to determine whether such continued
exposure to hazardous workplace duties constitutes the basis for a
new claim for benefits within the meaning of § 9-502, when the
exposure does not cause a new disability but exacerbates an
existing one for which the employee has already claimed workers'
compensation benefits.  We hold that, under § 9-502, an employee
who has already claimed benefits for a disability caused by an
occupational disease cannot base a new claim for benefits upon
additional injurious exposures which cause a worsening of his or
her condition but not a new disability.
I.
      Carpal tunnel syndrome is defined as "a complex of symptoms resulting from
2
compression of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel, with pain and burning or
tingling paresthesias in the fingers and hand, sometimes extending to the elbow."
The Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary (Richard Sloane, ed.)
(1987) p.689.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi provided perhaps a more useful
description, describing carpal tunnel syndrome as "an inflammatory disorder in
which the tendons in the wrist area which are bound down by ligaments in a band-
like fashion surrounding the wrist [become inflamed] due to excessive use,
especially that might be seen with factory type work where one movement, motion,
or job is done continuously. . . ."  Segar v. Garan, Inc., 388 So.2d 164, 165
(Miss. 1980).  If the syndrome is "bilateral," it is occurring in both wrists.
      "Occupational disease" is defined in § 9-101(g) of the Act thus:
3
"(g) Occupational disease. — "Occupational disease"
means a disease contracted by a covered employee:
(1) as the result of and in the course of
employment; and
(2) that causes the covered employee to become
temporarily or permanently, partially or totally
incapacitated."
Early on in the history of workers' compensation law we described an
occupational disease as some ailment, disorder, or illness "which is the
expectable result of working under conditions naturally inherent in the
employment and inseparable therefrom, and is ordinarily slow and insidious in its
approach."  Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 486, 6 A.2d 48, 53 (1939).  Carpal
tunnel syndrome certainly meets both the statutory definition as well as our
description of an occupational disease, and appears in the case law to be
generally accepted as an occupational disease compensable under the Act.
The parties to this case stipulated in Circuit Court to the
facts we recite here.  Robert Waskiewicz, claimant and petitioner
in this case, was employed as an assembly line worker by General
Motors Corporation (hereinafter "GM") for twenty years.  Early on
in his employment, in 1973, he developed bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome  as a result of his repetitive motion work on the assembly
2
line.  He underwent surgery for his condition, and filed a claim
for workers' compensation benefits based on occupational disease.3
In an order dated April 21, 1976, the Workers' Compensation
Commission (hereinafter "the Commission") found that Mr. Waskiewicz
had indeed fallen prey to the occupational disease of carpal tunnel
-3-
      Mr. Waskiewicz also injured his right wrist in a workplace accident in
4
1988 unrelated to the carpal tunnel syndrome, according to the stipulated facts
submitted to the trial judge.  We cannot determine from the record whether Mr.
Waskiewicz pursued a successful workers' compensation claim for that injury or
to what extent the injury caused the later surgeries and diminished capacity.
As the parties have made no arguments concerning the incident or how it relates
to his current total disability, we will not speculate further.
syndrome.  It awarded him certain temporary total and permanent
partial disability benefits based on its finding that he had
sustained a permanent disability of 15% loss of use of both hands.
Mr. Waskiewicz had further treatment for his carpal tunnel
syndrome, including several surgeries, in 1976, 1983, 1986, 1987,
1988, and 1989.   The medical records in this case reflect that in
4
1987, as a result of his continuing pain and aggravation of his
carpal tunnel syndrome, GM placed Mr. Waskiewicz on "light duty"
involving no use of power tools or heavy lifting.  Meanwhile, he
continued under the constant care and treatment of his surgeon, Dr.
Dennis Franks.   In May 1991, Dr. Franks recommended to GM certain
restrictions on Mr. Waskiewicz's work duties, including "no
lifting, no repetitive motion and no use of air guns."  Despite the
physician's recommendation, and for reasons unexplained in the
record, GM decided to place Mr. Waskiewicz back on the line in a
job requiring the use of hand tools in a repetitive manner.  As a
result, his carpal tunnel syndrome worsened in both hands,
confirmed by a nerve conduction test performed on February 27,
1992.  On March 3, 1992, Dr. Franks recommended to Mr. Waskiewicz
that he not return to work; the doctor performed more surgery in
September 1992, but apparently to no avail, because Mr. Waskiewicz
-4-
never returned to work.  In March 1994, according to the joint
"Stipulation of Agreed Facts and Agreed Issues" submitted to the
trial judge in this case, "the doctor stated that as a result of
[Mr. Waskiewicz's] carpal tunnel syndrome, caused by repetitive
motion of the hands and the use of power tools, he could no longer
engage in gainful employment."  Although not specifically stated in
the stipulated facts, the parties' briefs to this Court portray the
claimant as suffering 100% loss of use of both hands. 
On August 25, 1992, Mr. Waskiewicz filed the instant claim for
compensation for disability beginning on March 3, 1992, resulting
from carpal tunnel syndrome.  He noted on his claim form that this
was the only workers' compensation claim he had filed for "this
Accident or Occupational Disease."  At trial, however, he
stipulated to the contrary that "the Claimant's bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome is the disease from which he has suffered in
varying degrees since it was first diagnosed in the early 1970s 
. . . ."  Mr. Waskiewicz did not file a request to reopen his
previous claim for carpal tunnel syndrome, for which he had last
received permanent partial disability compensation in 1976.
The Commission disallowed Mr. Waskiewicz's claim on May 26,
1993, tersely stating that "the claimant did not sustain an
occupational disease of carpal tunnel syndrome arising out of and
in the course of employment as alleged to have occurred on 3/3/92
. . . ."  The reasoning of the Commission is not illuminated either
by the transcript of the Commission hearing or the one-sentence
-5-
order, but we glean from its holding that the Commission did not
regard Mr. Waskiewicz's condition in 1992 as a new occupational
disease.  Mr. Waskiewicz appealed the Commission's decision to the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, where the case was tried before
a judge without a jury.  The trial judge reversed the Commission in
an oral opinion.  He reasoned that the 1992 date of Mr.
Waskiewicz's most recent injurious exposure to the hazards of the
occupational disease, which caused total disability, effectively
constituted a new compensable event.  To relate Mr. Waskiewicz's
current condition and most recent exposures back to the first date
of partial disablement in the 1970s, the trial judge ruled, would
"unnecessarily create a hardship and would result in an
unreasonable interpretation of [§ 9-502]." 
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court in an
unreported opinion, agreeing with the Commission that Mr.
Waskiewicz did not sustain a new disablement in 1992 and finding
his current injury instead to be an aggravation of an existing
disability from 1973.   The intermediate appellate court noted that
continued injurious exposures to hazards of an occupational disease
leading to aggravation of the existing disease and resulting
disability could not be the basis for a new claim under § 9-502.
The court also pointed out that Mr. Waskiewicz could only have
recovered compensation for his current 100% disability through a
reopening and modification of his 1973 claim, but that the five-
-6-
year statute of limitations on the reopening of claims found in §
9-736 of the Act barred any attempt to reopen.
  
II.
The question of first impression the instant case presents is
simply whether a new workers' compensation claim, rather than a
request for modification of an existing award, can be based on an
additional injurious exposure to hazards aggravating an existing
disability resulting from an occupational disease.  The answer is
no.  Mr. Waskiewicz's increase in disability due to carpal tunnel
syndrome from 15% loss of use of both hands to 100% loss of use is
non-compensable under the current statutory scheme.  We review the
parties' arguments within the context of the relevant law to
explain our holding.  
a.
Mr. Waskiewicz argues that the Court of Special Appeals
misinterpreted the facts when it first regarded his claim of August
25, 1992, as an attempt to reopen his original 1973 claim, an
attempt barred by the statute of limitations found in § 9-736(b)(3)
of the Act.  Instead, contends Mr. Waskiewicz in his brief to this
Court, the 1992 claim is "an entirely new claim for a new exposure
which caused him to become totally disabled due to the occupational
disease," brought under § 9-502.  Mr. Waskiewicz essentially asks
-7-
us to hold that any injurious exposure worsening a disability for
which compensation has already been paid is sufficient to support
a new claim, not simply a reconsideration of the existing claim. 
GM, naturally, disputes Mr. Waskiewicz's interpretation of the
stipulated facts and the law.  The company contends to the contrary
that, while the worsening of an existing disability caused by an
additional injurious exposure may support a modification of an
original award within the limitations period of § 9-736, it does
not create a right to file a new claim.
Section 9-502 of the Act provides in relevant part:
"§ 9-502. Occupational disease — Compensation.
(a) `Disablement' defined. — In this section,
`disablement' means the event of a covered
employee 
becoming 
partially 
or 
totally
incapacitated:
(1) because of an occupational disease; 
and
(2) from performing the work of the
covered employee in the last occupation in
which the covered employee was injuriously
exposed to the hazards of the occupational
disease.
(b) Scope of application to employer and
insurer. — Subsection (c) of this section
applies only to:
(1) the employer in whose employment the
covered employee was last injuriously exposed
to the hazards of the occupational disease; 
and
(2) the insurer liable for the risk when
the covered employee, while employed by the
-8-
      Mr. Waskiewicz actually bases his argument to this Court on § 9-502's
5
predecessor statute, § 22(a) of Article 101.  The claim at issue here, his second
claim for workers' compensation for carpal tunnel syndrome, was filed in 1992,
after the revision of the Code and the recodification of the Workers'
Compensation Act in Title 9 of the Labor & Employment Article.  The current
statute applies and we discuss his arguments within the context of § 9-502.
employer, was last injuriously exposed to the
hazards of the occupational disease.
(c) Liability of employer and insurer. —
Subject to subsection (d) of this section and
except as otherwise provided, an employer and
insurer to whom this subsection applies shall
provide compensation in accordance with this
title to:
(1) a covered employee of the employer
for 
disability 
of 
the 
covered 
employee
resulting from an occupational disease;
. . . .
  
To bolster his claim that he is entitled to compensation, Mr.
Waskiewicz proposes a strained interpretation of subsection (a) of
§ 9-502, which merely defines "disablement."   By his account,
5
"[b]y this provision, the Legislature intended that whenever an
employee is exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease and
he thereby becomes `precluded from performing his work in the last
occupation in which he was injuriously exposed,' he `shall be
entitled to compensation.'"  (Emphasis added.)  Although we are not
insensitive to Mr. Waskiewicz's predicament, we find his
interpretation of the statute rather disingenuous. 
We note preliminarily that Mr. Waskiewicz has misquoted the
statutory provisions when he uses the phrase "precluded from
performing his work"; the statute includes "partial" incapacitation
-9-
in the definition of "disablement," such as Mr. Waskiewicz's
partial incapacitation of 15% loss of use of his hands in 1974,
which hindered but did not "preclude" him from performing his work.
Second, Mr. Waskiewicz mistakenly interprets the language in
subsection (a), ". . . in the last occupation in which the covered
employee was injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational
disease," to argue that the last injurious exposure to the hazards
of a disease, whether occurring before or after the disease becomes
disabling, is effectively a compensable event.  This is simply an
incorrect reading of the language of the statute, a reading which
conflicts with the rest of § 9-502 as well as other parts of the
Act.  
GM argues correctly that under § 9-502(a) an event of
disablement resulting from an occupational disease is the only
event entitling a claimant to compensation.  Compensation is
awarded under § 9-502(c) on the basis of the singular event of
disablement:  ". . . an employer . . . shall provide compensation
in accordance with this title to . . . a covered employee of the
employer for disability of the covered employee . . . ."  
The language Mr. Waskiewicz cites is merely a part of the
definition of "disablement."  "Disablement," by the plain meaning
of the language, is defined as a singular "event" of becoming
partially or totally incapacitated because of an occupational
disease, not as a series of exposures to the hazards of the same
-10-
disease.  Included within the definition of "disablement" is
phrasing indicating exactly what the employee is "partially or
totally incapacitated . . . from . . . ":  not simply the
performance of any work whatsoever, but specifically from
performing "the work of the covered employee in the last occupation
in which the covered employee was injuriously exposed to the
hazards of the occupational disease."  In other words, in order to
be found "disabled," an employee does not have be precluded by
virtue of his disability from doing anything, but rather must be
incapacitated only from the last type of occupation which exposed
him to the disease.  See Adams v. Western Electric Co., 63 Md. App
587, 592-93, 493 A.2d 392, 395 (1985).  The purpose of the phrase
upon which Mr. Waskiewicz bases his claim is simply to clarify that
disablement refers only to a limited scope of incapacitation from
"the last occupation in which the covered employee was injuriously
exposed." 
 Allowing new claims for each exposure after the date of
disablement would render subsection (c) meaningless, because one
could never pinpoint the compensable event of "disability."
Moreover, a careful reading of subsection (b) demonstrates that an
injurious exposure only has relevance in identifying the liable
employer on the date of disablement:  the "last" injurious exposure
is the last exposure contributing to the onset of a disability, not
-11-
      Subsection (b) of the statute assigns liability for disability caused by
6
an occupational disease to the last "causal employer"; that is, in the words of
the statute, to the employer "in whose employment the covered employee was last
injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease."  Known as "the
last injurious exposure rule," the cited language in § 9-502 is typically used
when the employee has endured in multiple workplaces the same hazards ultimately
causing the occupational disease leading to disability.  See, e.g., Lowery v.
McCormick Asbestos Co., 300 Md. 28, 475 A.2d 1168 (1984); CES Card v. Doub, 104
Md. App. 301, 656 A.2d 332 (1995).
  
The Court of Special Appeals carefully reviewed the relationship between
date of disablement and date of last injurious exposure to the hazards of an
occupational disease in CES Card, supra, another carpal tunnel syndrome case.
In CES Card, an issue arose over which of two successive employers exposing Ms.
Doub to the hazards of carpal tunnel syndrome would be liable for her workers'
compensation benefits.  In the course of determining the last injurious exposure
which would then identify the liable employer, the intermediate appellate court
noted that it was impossible for the date of the last injurious exposure to be
later than the date of disablement, because the last injurious exposure by
definition "caused" the disablement rather than aggravated it:
"[W]e hold that in occupational disease cases the date
of last injurious exposure can never come after the date
of disability.  In effect, we are defining `injurious
exposure' as an exposure that contributed to the onset
of disability — not one that may have exacerbated an
existing disability."  CES Card, supra,  104 Md. App. at
314, 656 A.2d at 338.
The Court of Special Appeals' reasoning in CES Card is sound and we adopt
it.
      Certainly, however, if only one employer has exposed the employee to the
7
hazards of the occupational disease in the employee's work history, then that
single employer will be the liable party under § 9-502.  In this case, therefore,
if Waskiewicz is indeed entitled to compensation, GM would be, without question,
the liable employer.
its exacerbation.   Once the date of disability is determined,
6
insurers and courts use the "last" exposure before a disability
arises only to determine where the employee was working on the date
of disablement and which employer will therefore be charged with
compensation under subsection (c).   CES Card v. Doub, 104 Md. App.
7
301, 656 A.2d 332 (1995).  An injurious exposure is not, and cannot
by definition be, in itself a trigger for compensation, or a liable
-12-
employer could never be ascertained and subsection (b) would also
be meaningless.  
   Mr. Waskiewicz's theory of exposure to the hazards of an
occupational disease as a compensable event in itself, if put into
practice, would lead to untenable outcomes.  For example, if his
theory prevailed, one might successfully argue that each day of
work following the first claim of disability contributed, however
slightly, to a worsening of the disability, thereby entitling the
claimant to a new claim each day.  
b.
On the plain language of the statute, therefore, Mr.
Waskiewicz's interpretation of § 9-502(a) is not persuasive.
Moreover, the General Assembly could not have intended such an
outcome, or they would not have enacted the reopen provision found
in § 9-736 of the Act to address the aggravation of existing
disabilities.  Section 9-736 grants continuing jurisdiction over
workers' compensation claims to the Commission and provides for
modification of a workers' compensation award if aggravation of a
disability occurs after the original rate of compensation has been
set or terminated:
"§ 9-736. Readjustment; continuing powers and
jurisdiction; modification.
(a) Readjustment of rate of compensation. — If
aggravation, diminution, or termination of
disability takes place or is discovered after
-13-
      Subsection (c) of § 9-736 addresses estoppel or fraud preventing a
8
claimant from filing an application for modification under this section; the
subsection has no relevance to the instant case.
the 
rate 
of 
compensation 
is 
set 
or
compensation is terminated, the Commission, on
the application of any party in interest or on
its own motion, may:
(1) readjust for future application the
rate of compensation; or
(2) 
if 
appropriate, 
terminate 
the
payments.
(b) 
Continuing 
powers 
and 
jurisdiction;
modification. 
— 
(1) 
The 
Commission 
has
continuing powers and jurisdiction over each
claim under this title.
(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this
subsection, the Commission may modify any
finding or order as the Commission considers
justified.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (c)
of this section, the Commission may not modify
an award unless the modification is applied
for within 5 years after the last compensation
payment.8
The statute expressly and unequivocally grants power to the
Commission to modify awards as it considers just, even on its own
motion.  It also, unfortunately for Mr. Waskiewicz, limits the
power of the Commission to make modifications to an original award
to a five-year period following the last payment of compensation to
the claimant.  
We extensively reviewed the history and purposes of the
statute of limitations on modifications of awards most recently in
Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 329 Md. 461, 620 A.2d 340 (1993),
-14-
and reiterated the straightforward rule of the statute.   The
petitioner Vest suffered a compensable back injury and received
temporary total and then partial disability benefits over the
course of eighteen months.  Seven years from the date of his last
payment of compensation, Vest attempted to reopen his claim based
on a worsening of his back condition, arguing in part that the
statute of limitations in § 40 (c) of Article 101 (predecessor
statute to § 9-736) was inapplicable because his case was decided
on the record without a hearing.  
In rejecting his contention, we held that the five-year period
of limitations for modifications applies to all awards, quoting
from a well-known authority on workers' compensation on the purpose
of statutory time limits on reopening cases:
"As Professor Larson has noted:
`[A]ny attempt to reopen a case
based on an injury ten or fifteen
years old must necessarily encounter
awkward problems of proof, because
of the long delay and the difficulty
of 
determining 
the 
relationship
between some ancient injury and a
present 
aggravated 
disability.
Another 
argument 
is 
that 
the
insurance carriers would never know
what kind of future liabilities they
might 
incur, 
and 
would 
have
difficulty in computing appropriate
reserves.' (Footnotes omitted.)
2 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation, § 81.10,
at 15-94 to 15-95 (Desk ed. 1976).  A total
absence of any limitations period for the many
cases decided on the record would only further
-15-
compound such risks and potentially overload
the Commission's docket."
Vest, 329 Md. at 471, 620 A.2d at 344.  We further noted in Vest
that the Commission could not even reserve to itself the power to
reopen a case past the five-year time period, as the same statute
granting the broadest power of continuing jurisdiction over prior
awards to the Commission also explicitly limited its exercise to a
defined five-year period, and thereafter actually divested the
Commission of any authority to reopen:  
"The Commission cannot bypass the statutory
restriction on its authority.  An agency
`cannot override the plain meaning of the
statute or extend its provisions beyond the
clear import of the language employed.' It is
clear from the history of § 40(c) that, by
enacting a limitations provision, the General
Assembly restricted the Commission's ability
to exercise its authority to reopen prior
awards." (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 475-76, 347.  
Mr. Waskiewicz must have recognized that he could not prevail
under the plain meaning of the reopening statute as well as our
case law, because his original award was made more than five years
before his condition worsened so dramatically.  Therefore, he did
not file an application for modification, and before us attempts to
distinguish his particular situation from a simple reopening of an
existing claim.  The essence of Mr. Waskiewicz's argument is that
his additional and injurious exposure to the hazards of carpal
tunnel syndrome, caused by his return to the assembly line after
-16-
having been removed from the assembly line, was more analogous to
a new accidental personal injury than an aggravation of an existing
disability.  Thus, just as employees who are re-injured on the job
because of another accident are entitled to file a new workers'
compensation claim under § 9-501 of the Act, so should he be
entitled to file a new claim because of another "injurious
exposure" under § 9-502(a) of the Act.  
We question the underlying assumptions in Mr. Waskiewicz's
analogy.  It seems quite clear that if Mr. Waskiewicz had suffered
the disability in the 1970s and stayed on the assembly line without
interruption, and his carpal tunnel syndrome continued to worsen
over that time, his only opportunity for increased benefits would
be under the reopening provision.  Thus we must assume that Mr.
Waskiewicz's argument before us is founded on the notion that the
employer's actions in removing him from and then reassigning him to
the repetitive motion work were the significant events triggering
a new claim.  Although Mr. Waskiewicz does not explicitly argue
that 
his 
employer 
acted 
in 
bad 
faith, 
negligently, 
or
intentionally, GM's "fault" impliedly underlies Mr. Waskiewicz's
entire theory of recovery.  Workers' compensation is a "no-fault"
system, rendering the very foundation of Mr. Waskiewicz's argument
quite shaky.
Second, Mr. Waskiewicz asserts in his brief that the five-year
limitations period on reopening a claim simply does not apply in
his circumstances:
-17-
"The five year limitations provision, however,
was never intended to bar a new claim when the
employer again exposed such an employee to the
distinct 
employment 
hazards 
of 
the
occupational disease and thereby caused an
increased disablement.  He is certainly
entitled to maintain a claim for additional
compensation 
for 
the 
increase 
in 
his
disability, just as any employee would be
entitled if he sustained a new accidental
injury which worsened his prior disability."
(Citations omitted and emphasis added.)
Mr. Waskiewicz does not support his analysis of the intention
of the Legislature with any legislative history of § 9-736 or other
authority, nor could we locate any.  While we must acknowledge some
seeming unfairness in the instant case, we have also recognized the
legitimate purposes of limitations periods, and noted that all
bright-line rules will occasionally result in some individual
unfairness.  See Debusk v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, ___ Md. ___, ___
A.2d ___ (1996), No. 110, Sept. Term 1995, filed June 3, 1996;
Lowery, supra.   That the result in an particular case seems harsh
is thus not enough to overcome the bar on reopening a claim after
five years.  See Stevens v. Rite-Aid Corp., 340 Md. 555, 568, 667
A.2d 642, 649 (1995) ("The general rule of liberal construction of
the Workers' Compensation Act is not applicable to the limitations
provision of § 9-736"); Montgomery County v. McDonald, 317 Md. 466,
472, 564 A.2d  797, 800 (1989) ("a liberal rule of construction
does not mean that courts are free to disregard the provisions
comprising the Act").
-18-
Moreover, his contention that his claim is analogous to a new
injury is simply unpersuasive, on the basis of the facts to which
he stipulated.  
  In Stevens, supra, we noted that the reopening provision
typically exists "for situations in which a claimant's condition
degenerates, entitling the claimant to increased benefits."  Id. at
565 n.11, 647 n 11.  Such is the simple case here:  Mr. Waskiewicz
has been suffering from a condition which has drastically
degenerated since his original rate of permanent partial disability
compensation was set.  Mr. Waskiewicz, in the "Stipulation of
Agreed Facts and Agreed Issues" submitted to the trial court,
admitted that his current carpal tunnel syndrome is "the disease
from which he has suffered in varying degrees since it was first
diagnosed in the early 1970s," with the recent aggravation from 15%
permanent loss of use to 100% permanent loss of use occurring "as
a result of his last injurious exposure on March 2, 1992."  We are
in accord with the intermediate appellate court that this
stipulated fact alone prevents us from ruling in favor of Mr.
Waskiewicz:
"[Waskiewicz] first suffered a disability for
carpal tunnel syndrome in 1973.  His last
injurious exposure for purposes of filing a
claim, therefore, occurred prior to his
disability from carpal tunnel syndrome in
1973.  His subsequent exposures cannot be the
basis of filing a new claim.  In short, any
recovery for his current injury could only
have been secured by a reopening of his
original claim.  Since it is now too late to
-19-
reopen that claim, his current injury is not
compensable.  While this is a harsh result,
the statute does not permit a subsequent claim
in accordance with the facts agreed upon."
III.
We recognize that the recent aggravation of Mr. Waskiewicz's
disability occurred at least in part because GM knowingly removed
him from light duty and placed him at risk of such aggravation by
assigning him back to an assembly line job where his duties would
include repetitive hand motions.  Were the issue before us a
question of equity rather than statutory law, GM would surely not
fare so well.  Unfortunately for Mr. Waskiewicz, however, the
workers' compensation statutory scheme specifically addresses his
situation and thus preempts exercise of our equitable powers.
We conclude that, for Mr. Waskiewicz to prevail, we would have
to hold that the removal from line work and then harmful re-
exposure constituted a new compensable event not recognized in the
Act.  Although the reassignment to a hazardous set of duties is
somewhat analogous to a new accidental injury causing a new
disability, as Mr. Waskiewicz has argued, the analogy is not
persuasive enough to cause this Court to overstep its boundaries by
judicially modifying the Act.  As we discussed recently in Debusk,
supra, one of the key virtues of a statutory workers' compensation
system is its predictability.  The General Assembly has determined
that both a disablement resulting from an occupational disease and
-20-
      Of course, if an employee entered a workplace with some type of
9
preexisting impairment or condition, and then suffered a subsequent workplace
accident or occupational disease, he would be entitled to compensation for the
proportion of the disability attributable to the subsequent accident or disease.
Sections 9-655, 9-656 and 9-802 govern both the liability of the last place of
employment and the ultimate compensation to the claimant. 
Sections 9-655 and 9-656 provide for statutory apportionment of
compensation between a "preexisting disease or infirmity," and a subsequent
accident or occupational disease, in cases of permanent disability of less than
50% of the body as a whole.  The claimant is entitled to benefits for the
proportion of the disability reasonably attributable to the subsequent accident
or disease, but not for the proportion of the disability attributable to the
preexisting disease or infirmity.  
If a covered employee with a preexisting permanent impairment suffers a
subsequent accident or occupational disease resulting in disability of more than
50% of the body as a whole, § 9-802 and the Subsequent Injury Fund become
relevant.  Section 9-802 requires that the disability be substantially greater
due to the combined effects of the preexisting permanent impairment and the
subsequent compensable event; the employer is then responsible for only the
compensation which would have been payable for the subsequent compensable event.
If the numerous factors in § 9-802(b) are met, the employee may also be entitled
to additional benefits from the Subsequent Injury Fund.
Neither apportionment under § 9-656 nor the Subsequent Injury Fund under
§ 9-802 are applicable in this case, because both require both a preexisting
impairment and a subsequent accidental injury or occupational disease.  Mr.
Waskiewicz did return to his line job with a preexisting disease, but did not,
as we have discussed at length already, suffer a subsequent occupational disease.
an accidental personal injury on the job constitute compensable
events under the statutory scheme; it has not determined, at least
as of the date of this opinion, that an employer's knowing
reassignment of an already disabled worker to hazardous duty,
without more, is a compensable event.   Perhaps it should make such
9
a determination, as the situation before us, on the stipulated
facts, appears particularly unfair; but if we held that GM's
actions in re-assigning Mr. Waskiewicz to job duties he had held in
the past constituted a compensable event, we would be in essence
writing new legislation.  This Court cannot and will not usurp the
-1-
General Assembly's authority to expand the scope of the Act in this
manner.  
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
Dissenting Opinion follows next page:
Dissenting Opinion by Chasanow, J.:
The majority holds that the Workers' Compensation Act (the
Act), Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), Labor and
-2-
     All statutory references are to Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1995
1
Supp.), Labor and Employment Article.
Employment Article, § 9-101 et. seq.,  bars a disabled worker from
1
maintaining a claim for a permanent total disability from an
occupational disease that occurred in 1992, simply because the
worker received an award for a 15 percent disability from the same
occupational disease 16 years earlier.  In reaching this result,
the majority recognizes that its holding has "some seeming
unfairness," ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority. op. at 16),
and "appears particularly unfair," ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
(Majority op. at 19).
 
The facts in the instant case are undisputed.  Waskiewicz
developed carpal tunnel syndrome in 1973, and in 1976 he received
workers' compensation benefits for a permanent partial disability
of 15 percent.  During the 1980s, Waskiewicz continued to receive
further treatment for carpal tunnel syndrome and was placed on
light duty that involved no use of power tools and no heavy
lifting.  In 1991, Waskiewicz's physician specifically directed
General Motors to assign Waskiewicz only to jobs with "no lifting,
no repetitive motion and no use of air guns."  Despite this
warning, General Motors again placed Waskiewicz in a job where he
was required to use hand tools in a repetitive manner.  As a result
of this new workplace exposure, Waskiewicz's carpal tunnel syndrome
worsened, and the parties have agreed that he is now totally
disabled and unable to engage in any gainful employment.
-3-
  
In ruling against Waskiewicz, the majority asserts that he
"does not support his analysis of the intention of the Legislature
with any legislative history of § 9-736 or other authority, nor
could we locate any."  ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Majority
op. at 16).  I disagree.  The legislature has mandated in § 9-102
that the Act is to be construed liberally in favor of workers like
Waskiewicz.  That mandate can be considered a part of the Act's
legislative history.  Moreover, the fundamental rule that the Act
should be construed liberally in favor of workers has been
recognized by this Court in numerous cases.  See Para v. Richards
Group, 339 Md. 241, 251, 661 A.2d 737, 742 (1995)(noting that the
Act "`should be construed as liberally in favor of injured
employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its
benevolent purposes'")(citations omitted); Vest v. Giant Food
Stores, Inc., 329 Md. 461, 467, 620 A.2d 340, 342 (1993); Howard
Co. Ass'n., Retard. Cit. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210,
1213 (1980).  
Instead of construing the Act liberally in favor of the
disabled employee, the majority seems to construe all ambiguous
provisions against the worker and holds that Waskiewicz cannot
recover compensation for his increased disability either through a
reopening of his 1976 claim or by filing a new claim based solely
on his 1992 increase in disability.  According to the majority,
once a worker is deemed "disabled" from an occupational disease,
-4-
that worker cannot recover for any increase in disability, even
though it was caused by a new exposure to workplace hazards, unless
the worker files for a reopening of his or her original award
within five years of the last payment on the original claim.
Because Waskiewicz did not file for a reopening of his original 15
percent disability claim within five years, the majority holds that
he is barred under § 9-736 from recovering for his increased
disability.  
Of course, the reason Waskiewicz could not apply for an
increase in his compensation within five years of the 1976 award
was because the second injurious exposure that caused his increased
disability did not even occur until 1992, more than 15 years later.
In essence, the majority holds that the statute of limitations on
Waskiewicz's claim for total disability expired ten years before
the total disability had even occurred.  Surely the legislature did
not intend that the five-year limitation on reopening an award
would bar recovery for an increase in disability caused, not by the
natural progression of the disease, but by a subsequent injurious
exposure to workplace hazards.  See Uninsured Employers' v. Lutter,
342 Md. 334, 346, 676 A.2d 51, 57 (1996)(noting that courts should
avoid absurd or unreasonable results when construing statutes).
The majority's holding should result in a great increase in
trivial motions to modify permanent partial disability awards.  A
worker who receives an award based on a permanent partial
-5-
disability from an occupational disease will have to file for a
modification for any increase in disability every four or five
years or risk losing the right to additional compensation should
his or her occupational disease worsen substantially due to
continued exposure to employment hazards. 
The majority apparently concedes that if Waskiewicz's increase
in disability had resulted from a new accidental injury he suffered
more than five years after his 1976 disability award ended, he
would be entitled to additional compensation under § 9-501 for the
increase in his disability.  ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
(Majority op. at 15).  But because Waskiewicz's increase in
disability resulted from additional exposure to the hazards of an
occupational disease, the majority holds that he is not entitled to
additional compensation.  There is no reason to treat employees
whose disabilities are exacerbated because of an additional
accidental injury on the job differently from employees whose
occupational disease is exacerbated because of an additional
injurious exposure on the job.  Nothing in § 9-501 or § 9-502, or
any other provision in the Act, requires such unfair and disparate
treatment of employees with occupational diseases.  In fact, this
Court has previously recognized that the Act reflects the
legislature's intent to treat disability "from occupational disease
... much like an injury caused by accident."  Shifflett v.
-6-
     Section 9-656 applies in cases where the combined effects of a preexisting
2
infirmity and a subsequent occupational disease result in a permanent disability
that does not exceed 50 percent of the body as a whole.  See § 9-655.  In cases
where the combined effects result in a disability that does exceed 50 percent of
the body as a whole, § 9-802 applies.  Under § 9-802(a), the employer is liable
only for the disability caused by the subsequent occupational disease.  The
employee is also entitled to additional compensation from the state Subsequent
Injury Fund if the combined effects of the preexisting condition and the
subsequent occupational disease cause a "substantially greater" disability than
would have been the case from the subsequent occupational disease alone.  § 9-
802(b).    
Powhattan Mining Co., 293 Md. 198, 202, 442 A.2d 980, 983 (1982).
 
Contrary to the majority's construction, I believe the
legislature intended to allow workers who have suffered partial
disability as a result of an occupational disease to recover for
any increased disability resulting not from a natural progression
of the disease but from a new exposure to employment hazards.  If
the increase in disability occurs within five years of the last
compensation payment, the legislature has provided that the
employee may file to reopen the claim under § 9-736.  If, on the
other hand, there is an additional work-induced increase in the
disability that occurs more than five years after the last payment,
the worker should be allowed to file a new claim for benefits for
the additional disability under § 9-656 or § 9-802.   Section 9-656
2
provides:
"(a) Determination by Commission. -- If
it appears that a permanent disability of a
covered employee following an accidental
personal injury or occupational disease is due
partly to the accidental personal injury or
occupational 
disease 
and 
partly 
to 
a
-7-
preexisting 
disease 
or 
infirmity, 
the
Commission shall determine:
(1) the proportion of the disability that
is reasonably attributable to the accidental
personal injury or occupational disease; and
(2) the proportion of the disability that
is reasonably attributable to the preexisting
disease or infirmity.
(b) Payment of compensation. -- The
covered employee:
(1) is entitled to compensation for the
portion of the disability of the covered
employee that is reasonably attributable
solely to the accidental personal injury or
occupational disease; and
(2) is not entitled to compensation for
the 
portion 
of 
the 
disability 
that 
is
reasonably attributable to the preexisting
disease or infirmity."  (Emphasis added).
Section 9-802 provides in pertinent part:
"(a) Limitation on liability of employer and
insurer. -- If a covered employee has a
permanent impairment and suffers a subsequent
accidental 
personal 
injury, 
occupational
disease, or compensable hernia resulting in
permanent 
partial 
or 
permanent 
total
disability that is substantially greater due
to the combined effects of the previous
impairment and the subsequent compensable
event than it would have been from the
subsequent 
compensable 
event 
alone, 
the
employer or its insurer is liable only for the
compensation payable under this title for the
subsequent 
accidental 
personal 
injury,
occupational disease, or compensable hernia."
(Emphasis added). 
There is nothing in the language of § 9-656 or § 9-802 to preclude
Waskiewicz's original 15 percent disability from carpal tunnel
-8-
syndrome from being considered a "preexisting disease" or a
"permanent impairment."  If his original disability is a
preexisting impairment under § 9-656 or § 9-802, it seems clear
that Waskiewicz should be entitled to compensation for the portion
of his current disability reasonably attributable to his new
exposure.    
The majority dismisses this construction of § 9-656 and § 9-
802 summarily in a footnote by simply pronouncing that Waskiewicz
did not "suffer a subsequent occupational disease."  ___ Md. at ___
n.9, ___ A.2d at ___ n.9 (Majority op. at 19 n.9).  Apparently, the
majority concludes that Waskiewicz cannot maintain a new claim for
additional compensation under § 9-656 or § 9-802 because
Waskiewicz's preexisting infirmity as well as his subsequent
occupational disease were both carpal tunnel syndrome.  In other
words, the majority engrafts onto § 9-656 and § 9-802 a requirement
that the worker suffering from a preexisting infirmity suffer a
subsequent and different occupational disease in order to qualify
for compensation.  The majority cites no authority or legislative
history to support its view that this admittedly unfair result is
what the legislature intended.
Neither § 9-656 nor § 9-802 contains any requirement that an
employee suffer a subsequent and different occupational disease in
order to qualify for compensation.  These provisions merely require
that an employee be permanently disabled due partly to a
-9-
preexisting disease and partly to a subsequent occupational
disease.  That is exactly what is alleged to have occurred in the
instant case.  There is no dispute that Waskiewicz suffered from
carpal tunnel syndrome when General Motors assigned him in 1991 to
work with hand tools in a repetitive manner.  It is also stipulated
that this repetitive work in 1991 and 1992 resulted in a subsequent
worsening of the carpal tunnel syndrome to the point that
Waskiewicz became unable to work.  Sections 9-656 and 9-802 do not
require that a worker's preexisting disease be of a different type
than the subsequent occupational disease.  We should not read such
a requirement into the statute, especially when the result is to
unfairly deny Waskiewicz workers' compensation benefits for a
disability he received as a result of his employment. 
The right to workers' compensation for a disability caused by
an occupational disease is conferred by § 9-502(c), which provides:
"(c) Liability of employer and insurer. --
Subject to subsection (d) of this section and
except as otherwise provided, an employer and
insurer to whom this subsection applies shall
provide compensation in accordance with this
title to:
(1) a covered employee of the employer
for 
disability 
of 
the 
covered 
employee
resulting from an occupational disease; or
(2) 
the 
dependents 
of 
the 
covered
employee for death of the covered employee
resulting from an occupational disease."
-10-
     This Court on at least one occasion has tacitly approved the filing of two
3
separate claims for disablement from the same occupational disease. In Montgomery
County v. McDonald, 317 Md. 466, 564 A.2d 797 (1989), the employee suffered two
heart attacks, one in 1977 and another in 1984.  In 1984, he filed two separate
occupational disease claims, one dating from the 1977 heart attack and the other
dating from the 1984 heart attack.  It was conceded that both attacks involved
the same occupational disease.  The Workers' Compensation Commission (the
Commission) found the claim for the 1977 attack was barred by the statute of
limitations.  The Commission also found that the claim for the 1984 heart attack
was barred by the statute of limitations because it was casually related to the
1977 heart attack.  On appeal to the circuit court, the two claims were filed
together under one case number.  The circuit court held that the claim for the
1977 heart attack was not barred by the statute of limitations.  The circuit
court, however, did not make a specific ruling on the claim for the 1984 heart
attack.  The employer appealed the ruling on the claim for the 1977 heart attack,
but there was no certification of the circuit court's order for immediate appeal
under Maryland Rule 2-602(b).  This Court reversed the circuit court and held
that the claim for the 1977 heart attack was barred by the statute of
limitations.  In so doing, however, we indicated that the claim for the 1984
heart attack was not dependant on the 1977 claim and was still pending, even
though it was for increased disability caused by the same occupational disease
as the 1977 claim.  McDonald, 317 Md. at 469 n.2, 564 A.2d at 799 n.2.  This was
at least a tacit acknowledgement that the 1984 occupational disease claim was a
separate action and separately maintainable even though it was for the same
disease and causally related to the 1977 claim, which was foreclosed by the
statute of limitations. 
It seems to me that the majority is adopting a strained
interpretation of § 9-502 in order to deny Waskiewicz compensation
for his disability.  The majority construes § 9-502 as only
permitting a single claim for a single type of occupational
disease, although that claim may be reopened within the five-year
statutory period.   The majority's construction completely ignores
3
subsection (e) of the statute that clearly envisions more than one
claim for the same occupational disease and that would have been
totally superfluous if the legislature intended to limit a worker
to one claim for each type of occupational disease.  Section 9-
502(e) provides:
"(e) False representation -- Compensation
prohibited. -- A covered employee or a
-11-
dependent of the covered employee is not
entitled to compensation for a disability or
death that results from an occupational
disease if, when the covered employee began
employment with the employer, the covered
employee falsely represented in writing that
the covered employee had not been disabled,
laid off, or compensated in damages or
otherwise, due to the occupational disease for
which the covered employee or dependent is
seeking compensation."  (Emphasis added).
Under this subsection, an employee is denied a second claim for
compensation for an occupational disease if the employee has
falsely represented in writing that the employee had not been
previously disabled or compensated for the same occupational
disease for which the employee is now seeking compensation.  If a
second claim for compensation for the same occupational disease
were always barred, there would have been no reason for the
legislature to specifically bar a second claim when the employee
has lied about the prior disability or prior compensation.
The majority cites no cases from any jurisdiction to support
its holding.  The only appellate decision I have been able to
locate that is clearly on point decides the issue contrary to the
majority's holding.  In Mikitka v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,
352 A.2d 591 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), the court faced a
set of circumstances similar to that presented in the instant case.
Mikitka, a worker who suffered from work-related asbestosis,
received an award for a seven and one-half percent permanent
disability.  Despite her disability, Mikitka continued to work for
-12-
her employer for several more years before retiring.  After her
retirement, Mikitka filed a new workers' compensation claim seeking
additional compensation for an increase in her disability that
resulted from continued exposure to employment hazards occurring
after the initial award for a seven and one-half percent disability
but before her retirement.  The new claim, however, was filed after
the New Jersey statute's two-year statute of limitations for re-
opening a disability claim had expired.  Nonetheless, the court
held that Mikitka could maintain her claim for increased
disability:
"In the present case, ... petitioner has
filed a new claim petition; she is not seeking
modification of the [original] award.  Rather,
she contends that because of exposure to
alleged deleterious conditions of employment
occurring after entry of the 1967 award, she
has suffered additional disability.  This is a
new claim, not an attempted modification of a
prior award.  [The] two-year time limitation
[has] no application to this new claim.
* * * 
[W]here 
an 
employee 
has 
once 
recovered
compensation for an occupational disease and
thereafter suffers additional disability from
additional exposure to the conditions of
employment after rendition of the original
award, such an employee can file a claim
petition for the disability so caused within a
year (or now two years) after the employee
knew or ought to have known of the increased
disability 
stemming 
from 
the 
continued
employment despite knowledge as to the type of
disability acquired in connection with the
original award.  This rule, to be applied in
these limited circumstances, will avoid the
absurd result of possibly barring claims
-13-
before 
they 
even 
existed." 
 
(Citation
omitted).
Mikitka, 352 A.2d at 593-94.
I believe a similar rationale should be applied in the instant
case.  Waskiewicz should be allowed to maintain a new claim for
compensation for the increased disability he has suffered as a
result of additional exposure to the employment hazards that caused
his carpal tunnel syndrome to worsen.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
Judge Eldridge and Judge Bell have authorized me to state that
they join in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.