Case Title: People v. Arroyo

Citation: 

Docket Number: S219178

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
SEE CONCURRING OPINION 
Filed 1/14/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S219178 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G048659 
ISAIAS ARROYO, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 12ZF0158 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d), adopted as part 
of Proposition 21, the ―Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 
1998,‖ allows prosecutors the option of filing charges against certain juveniles 
accused of specified offenses, directly in criminal court.  Here we determine 
whether this provision allows prosecutors to charge such juveniles in criminal 
court by grand jury indictment.  We conclude it does, and thus affirm the Court of 
Appeal. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
Because the issue before us is a purely legal one, the factual and procedural 
context in which the case arises may be summarized briefly.  As set forth in 
defendant‘s demurrer, on the evening of October 19, 2012, police officers saw a 
car drive slowly along West Myrtle Street in Santa Ana.  Officers believed 
occupants of the car were Los Compadres gang members.  Police ultimately 
2 
stopped the car, found a loaded revolver, and arrested the occupants, including 
defendant Isaias Arroyo. 
The district attorney presented the case to the Orange County grand jury.  
The grand jury returned an indictment against defendant Arroyo and six 
codefendants on charges of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, §§ 182, 
subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a)) (count 1) and active participation in a criminal street 
gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (a)) (count 2), with an allegation that defendant engaged 
in the conspiracy for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a 
criminal street gang, Los Compadres, with the intent to promote, further, and assist 
in criminal conduct by members of that gang.  The grand jury specifically found 
reasonable cause to believe defendant came within the provisions of Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d)(4) (hereafter section 707(d)(4)). 
Defendant was arraigned and initially pleaded not guilty.  He later demurred 
to the indictment on the ground that Welfare and Institutions Code section 
707(d)(4) requires the prosecution to proceed by way of a preliminary hearing and 
information when filing criminal charges against a minor in adult court, and 
because he was a juvenile at the time of the alleged commission of the offenses the 
grand jury had no legal authority to inquire into the offenses charged.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1004, subd. 1 [demurrer challenging grand jury‘s authority].)  The trial court 
allowed defendant to withdraw his plea; sustained his demurrer, agreeing with him 
that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) ―requires a magistrate‘s 
determination that [a] juvenile‖ qualifies for prosecution in adult court; and 
dismissed him from the indictment. 
The prosecution appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed.   
ANALYSIS 
We review de novo the Court of Appeal‘s decision on the purely legal 
question before us.  (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. 
3 
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.)  ― ‗In interpreting a voter initiative‘ ‖ such as 
Proposition 21, ― ‗we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction.  
[Citation.]  Thus, [1] ―we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words 
their ordinary meaning.‖  [Citation.]  [2]  The statutory language must also be 
construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme 
[in light of the electorate‘s intent].  [Citation.]  [3]  When the language is 
ambiguous, ―we refer to other indicia of the voters‘ intent, particularly the 
analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet.‖ ‘ ‖  (Robert L. 
v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 900–901.)  ―In other words, our ‗task is 
simply to interpret and apply the initiative‘s language so as to effectuate the 
electorate‘s intent.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 901.) 
In adopting Proposition 21 at the March 7, 2000, primary election, voters 
expanded prosecutorial authority to file charges against minors in adult court.  
Before Proposition 21 became law, a minor could not be prosecuted in a court of 
criminal jurisdiction unless a juvenile court first found the minor unfit for 
treatment under juvenile court law.  Exceptions existed for minors who were 
alleged to have committed certain very serious offenses enumerated in Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (b), and were consequently required 
to be charged in adult court, and for minors who had previously been found unfit.  
(Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 602, as amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 996, § 12.2, 
pp. 7560–7561; Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 707, subds. (a)–(c), as amended by 
Stats. 1998, ch. 936, § 21.5, pp. 6912–6918; Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 707.01, 
subd. (a)(5), (6).)   
As amended by Proposition 21, section 707 gives prosecutors discretionary 
authority to file charges against minors directly in criminal court for specified 
offenses and under specified circumstances.  The provisions of subdivision (d)(1) 
through (3) set out those offenses and circumstances.  (§ 707, subd. (d).)  Section 
4 
707, subdivision (d)(4) provides:  ―In any case in which the district attorney or 
other appropriate prosecuting officer has filed an accusatory pleading against a 
minor in a court of criminal jurisdiction pursuant to this subdivision, the case shall 
then proceed according to the laws applicable to a criminal case.  In conjunction 
with the preliminary hearing as provided in Section 738 of the Penal Code, the 
magistrate shall make a finding that reasonable cause exists to believe that the 
minor comes within this subdivision.  If reasonable cause is not established, the 
criminal court shall transfer the case to the juvenile court having jurisdiction over 
the matter.‖  (Italics added.)   
Penal Code section 738 provides that ―[b]efore an information is filed there 
must be a preliminary examination of the case against the defendant and an order 
holding him to answer made under Section 872.  The proceeding for a preliminary 
examination must be commenced by written complaint, as provided elsewhere in 
this code.‖  In turn, Penal Code section 872, among other things, specifies that 
when it appears from the examination that a public offense has been committed 
and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant is guilty, the magistrate must 
hold the defendant to answer.  Sections 738 and 872, which apply to all 
prosecutions initiated by information, read together articulate the applicable 
requirements for proceeding against a defendant by way of information; they do 
not limit the prosecutor‘s options for commencing a prosecution. 
Defendant contends section 707(d)(4) entitles him to a preliminary hearing.  
He first focuses on the language of the statute, in particular the sentence italicized 
above.  He observes that the Court of Appeal in People v. Superior Court 
(Gevorgyan) (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 602, 610–611, found this language 
unambiguously provides such a right and concluded that because there is no right 
to a postindictment preliminary hearing under California law (see Cal. Const., art. 
I, § 14.1), the prosecution of a juvenile in criminal court cannot be initiated by 
5 
indictment.  In support, he notes that while Proposition 21 eliminated the express 
right to a preliminary hearing formerly conferred by Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 602, subdivision (c), it at the same time added the reference to a 
preliminary hearing in section 707(d)(4).   
The People acknowledge that Welfare and Institutions Code section 
707(d)(4) requires the magistrate, at the preliminary hearing, to make a finding 
―that reasonable cause exists to believe the minor comes within‖ the provisions of 
the statute, but they contend the requirement of a magistrate‘s finding comes into 
play only if prosecution of the minor is commenced by information; the statute 
does not itself require that a prosecution be initiated by information.  As the 
People soundly point out, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4), 
provides that in any case in which the district attorney has exercised discretion to 
file against a juvenile in criminal court, ―the case shall then proceed according to 
the laws applicable to a criminal case.‖  The Penal Code defines the initial 
pleading in a felony case as ―the indictment, information, or the complaint in any 
case certified to the superior court under Section 859a.‖  (Pen. Code, § 949.)  
Consequently, as the People contend, a prosecution that is commenced by 
indictment ―proceed[s] according to the laws applicable to a criminal case.‖  
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707(d)(4).)  
Defendant‘s reading takes in isolation a single sentence of the statute—i.e., 
that in conjunction with the preliminary hearing ―the magistrate shall make a 
finding that reasonable cause exists‖ (§ 707(d)(4))—contrary to long-standing 
principles of interpretation by which ―we look to ‗the entire substance of the 
statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . . 
[Citation.]‘  [Citation.]  That is, we construe the words in question ‗ ―in context, 
keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute . . . .‖  [Citation.]‘ 
[Citation.]  We must harmonize ‗the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by 
6 
considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory 
framework as a whole.‘ ‖  (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 907–908.)   
The People‘s reading of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) 
better accounts for the statutory language as a whole.  Had the provision‘s drafters 
intended that prosecutions under this statute be commenced only by way of 
information, they would have so specified instead of using the broad term 
― ‗accusatory pleading,‘ ‖ which includes an indictment.  (Pen. Code, §§ 691, 
subd. (c), 949.)  The indictment, although returned by the grand jury, becomes the 
accusatory pleading of the prosecutor once it is presented in superior court.  
(Guillory v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 168, 173–175, 177 (Guillory).)  
Since prosecutions initiated by information and those commenced by indictment 
both normally proceed ―according to the laws applicable to a criminal case,‖ we 
see nothing in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) that precludes 
indictment as the mechanism for initiating the prosecution of a minor in a 
discretionary direct-file case. 
Rather than creating a right to a preliminary hearing (and thus inferentially 
precluding prosecution by indictment in discretionary direct-file cases), Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4)‘s reference to a preliminary hearing 
simply recognizes that in cases where the prosecution chooses to proceed against a 
minor in adult court by way of information, the preliminary hearing is where the 
existence of reasonable cause to believe the criteria of section 707(d) are met is 
litigated.   
The People acknowledge, and we agree, that in prosecutions initiated by 
indictment the grand jury must make the equivalent finding, i.e., that reasonable 
cause exists to believe the minor comes within the provisions of Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 707(d).  Such a finding may, but need not, be express.  A 
grand jury properly instructed to make the finding will be deemed to have done so 
7 
by returning an indictment if the record contains sufficient supporting evidence.  
(Cf. Pen. Code, § 939.8 [―The grand jury shall find an indictment when all the 
evidence before it, taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would, in its 
judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury‖ (italics added).].)  
Further in support, the People observe that Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 707(d)(4) contains no explicit limitation on the grand jury‘s historical 
power to ―inquire into all public offenses committed or triable within the county 
and present them to the court by indictment‖ (Pen. Code, § 917; see People v. 
Aguirre (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 373, 378 [recognizing the grand jury‘s power to 
indict minors]), whereas defendant‘s reading of the statute ―would implicitly 
create a class of individuals—i.e., minors who commit felonies under the 
conditions set out in section 707(d)—whom the grand jury would no longer have 
the authority to indict.‖  Nothing in the language of Proposition 21, Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d), or the ballot materials, they 
contend, supports such a reading.  Indeed, as the People note, in Guillory, a 
mandatory direct-file case, we agreed that ― ‗[b]y any fair reading of Proposition 
21, the measure was intended to expand, not revoke, the authority of courts of 
criminal jurisdiction over juveniles, including the authority of grand juries over 
juveniles.‘ ‖  (Guillory, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 177 [prosecution of juvenile under 
mandatory direct-file provisions of Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (b), may 
proceed by indictment].)  ―It therefore seems unlikely,‖ we said, ―such a limitation 
on the grand jury‘s historic authority to indict minors . . . would go unmentioned.‖  
(Guillory, supra, at p. 176.)  Although Guillory does not control the outcome here, 
its reasoning is persuasive. 
Defendant asserts that the historical power of the grand jury, as articulated in 
Penal Code section 917, is the wrong point of comparison; rather, we should 
examine the power, if any, of the grand jury to indict juveniles immediately 
8 
preceding the passage of Proposition 21.  At that time, he observes, (1) except in 
the narrow circumstances set forth in subdivision (b) of section 602 of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code, only the juvenile court had jurisdiction over persons who 
were under the age of 18 at the time they violated a law; (2) juvenile court 
proceedings to declare a minor a ward of the court under section 602 could be 
commenced only by the prosecuting attorney‘s filing of a petition (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 650, subd. (c)); and (3) juveniles falling within the narrow subdivision (b) 
exception who were directly charged in adult court had, under former subdivision 
(c) of section 602, the explicit right to a preliminary hearing.  From these 
circumstances, defendant argues the omission from Proposition 21 of language 
limiting the power of the grand jury to indict juveniles has no significance, as the 
grand jury lacked the power in the first place.   
We are not persuaded.  The purpose of Proposition 21, as noted, was to 
expand the authority of courts of criminal jurisdiction over juveniles who commit 
criminal offenses.  (Guillory, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 177.)  Grand jury authority 
under Penal Code section 917, as we have seen, encompasses the power to inquire 
into all public offenses committed within the county and to present them to the 
court by indictment.  When the electorate broadened the categories of minors 
subject to prosecution in courts of criminal jurisdiction, it necessarily—absent an 
explicit limitation not found in Proposition 21—expanded the reach of the grand 
jury over minors who commit public offenses.  Viewed another way, had the 
electorate not intended to permit the initiation of prosecutions against minors in 
adult court to be by grand jury indictment, one would expect it to have made such 
an intention plain by explicitly limiting the grand jury‘s statutory authority.  We 
will not read such a limitation into the relevant statutes, especially as Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) specifically states that, in a direct-file situation, 
―the case shall . . . proceed according to the laws applicable to a criminal case.‖ 
9 
Defendant observes that Guillory, in rejecting the argument a minor has a 
constitutional right to a preliminary hearing in mandatory direct-file cases, found it 
―significant that [Welfare and Institutions Code,] section 602[, subdivision] (b), as 
amended by Proposition 21, contains no express reference to a preliminary 
hearing, despite petitioner‘s argument that a preliminary hearing is the only 
method by which [he or she] may be prosecuted under that statute.‖  (Guillory, 
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 176.)  In contrast to Welfare and Institutions Code section 
602, subdivision (b), he observes, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) 
does refer to a preliminary hearing.  Defendant‘s observation, albeit correct, does 
not compel an inference that such a hearing must be held in every discretionary 
direct-file case, given the absence from section 707(d)(4) of any language 
expressly conferring a right to a preliminary hearing.  (Cf. Welf. & Inst. Code, 
former § 602, subd. (c), as amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 996, § 12.2, p. 7561 
[referring to ―the right to a preliminary hearing‖]; see Guillory, supra, 31 Cal.4th 
at p. 175.)1 
Contrary to defendant‘s argument, nothing in Manduley v. Superior Court 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 compels a different interpretation of Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 707(d)(4).  Manduley addressed the constitutionality of 
the direct-file provisions of Proposition 21, rejecting separation-of-powers, due 
process, equal protection, and single-subject challenges.  (Manduley, supra, at 
pp. 546, 552, 562, 570, 576, 581.)  Defendant relies on the following language in 
our opinion:  ―To the extent [section 707, subdivision (d)] creates a protected 
                                              
1  
In light of our reading of section 707(d)(4), People v. Superior Court 
(Gevorgyan), supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 602 (disapproved on another point in 
Guillory, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 178, fn. 5) is disapproved to the extent it holds 
section 707(d)(4) requires that the prosecution of a juvenile by discretionary direct 
filing in a court of criminal jurisdiction be initiated by information. 
10 
liberty interest that minors will be subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal court 
only upon the occurrence of the conditions set forth therein, the statute does 
require a judicial determination, at the preliminary hearing, ‗that reasonable cause 
exists to believe that the minor comes within the provisions‘ of the statute.‖  
(Manduley, at p. 564.)  That observation must be understood in light of, and is 
consistent with, our conclusion that section 707(d)(4) requires the grand jury, in 
prosecutions initiated by indictment, to make the equivalent finding.   
As we have observed, ―the grand jury serves as the functional equivalent of a 
magistrate who presides over a preliminary examination on a felony complaint.‖  
(Guillory, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 174; see Stark v. Superior Court (2011) 52 
Cal.4th 368, 406.)  Defendant calls our attention to certain ways in which grand 
jury proceedings differ from preliminary hearings, such as in not affording the 
rights to be present and to have an attorney present, to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, and to present exculpatory evidence.  He further observes that, in 
discretionary direct-file cases, the same agency that makes the determination 
whether or not to file directly in criminal court is responsible for the presentation 
of evidence to the grand jury.  He recites various ways in which, in his view, the 
prosecutor ―overreached‖ in presenting defendant‘s case to the grand jury, and 
concludes that ―it is logical to assume that the legislature and the courts would 
require that a probable cause determination, at the earliest litigated stage of 
criminal proceedings, be made by a magistrate,‖ not a grand jury.  If overreaching 
violative of defendant‘s rights indeed occurred, a question not before us and on 
which we express no opinion, defendant may move under Penal Code section 995 
to set aside the indictment.  The same mechanism likewise defeats defendant‘s 
related arguments that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(4) 
unconstitutionally reduces the quantum of proof necessary to convict a juvenile 
against whom the prosecutor exercises discretion to proceed in adult court by way 
11 
of indictment, and deprives such a juvenile of his right to equal protection of the 
law as compared with juveniles charged by information who receive a preliminary 
hearing.   
12 
 
 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
 
I agree with today‘s opinion that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, 
subdivision (d)(4) does not require prosecution by way of a preliminary hearing 
before a magistrate in discretionarily filed cases under section 707, 
subdivision (d)(2).  I also agree that because ―the grand jury serves as the 
functional equivalent of a magistrate who presides over a preliminary examination 
on a felony complaint‖ (Guillory v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 168, 174), 
the grand jury must make a finding ―that reasonable cause exists to believe the 
minor comes within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 
707(d)(4).‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) 
But I question the propriety of the court‘s declaration that ―[s]uch a finding 
may, but need not, be express.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)  Here, the grand jury 
made an express finding that Arroyo ―was fourteen (14) years of age and older 
when [he] committed an offense in violation of Section 187(a) of the Penal Code 
which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by death or imprisonment in 
the state prison for life.‖  Thus, the issue of whether such a finding must be 
express is not before us, and the court‘s pronouncement is dictum. 
In all other respects, I join the court‘s opinion. 
LIU, J. 
I CONCUR: 
KRUGER, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Arroyo 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 225 Cal.App.4th 1378 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S219178 
Date Filed: January 14, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: William R. Froeberg 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney, and Stephan Sauer, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
 
Frank Davis, Alternate Defender, and Antony C. Ufland, Deputy Alternate Defender, for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Stephan Sauer 
Deputy District Attorney 
Post Office Box 808 
Santa Ana, CA  92702 
(714) 347-8790 
 
Antony C. Ufland 
Deputy Alternate Defender 
600 W. Santa Ana Boulevard, #600 
Santa Ana, CA  92701 
(714) 568-4160