Case Title: Rowe v. Lavanway

Citation: 180 Vt. 505, 2006 VT 47, 904 A.2d 78

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rowe v. Lavanway (2005-043); 180 Vt. 505; 904 A.2d 78

2006 VT 47

[Filed 30-May-2006]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2006 VT 47

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2005-043

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 2005

  James Rowe and Valerie Banschbach     }        APPEALED FROM:
                                        }
       v.                               }        Chittenden Superior Court
                                        }  
  Michael Lavanway and Janet Lavanway   }
                                        }        DOCKET NO. S1159-02 CnC

                                                 Trial Judge:  Matthew I. Katz

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Plaintiffs James Rowe and Valerie Banschbach appeal from the
  trial court's order, which found that defendants Michael and Janet Lavanway
  possessed a right-of-way across their property pursuant to the terms of an
  1881 deed.  They argue that the trial court erred in:  (1) interpreting the
  1881 deed; (2) rejecting their claim that their predecessor-in-interest had
  extinguished the right-of-way; and (3) concluding that automobile use was
  allowed on the easement.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  Plaintiffs and defendants are neighboring landowners in
  Jericho, Vermont.  Defendants own a significant portion of acreage to the
  north of plaintiffs, and they claimed a right-of-way extending northerly
  from Palmer Lane across the easternmost lands of plaintiffs, terminating at
  and affording access to their meadow.  In September 2002, plaintiffs filed
  a complaint against defendants, alleging that defendants had trespassed on
  their property by accessing the alleged right-of-way.  Plaintiffs sought
  injunctive relief against any further trespass by defendants.  A court
  trial was held, which included a site visit, and the court found in favor
  of defendants.
    
       ¶  3.  The court concluded that an appurtenant right-of-way had been
  created by an 1881 deed (from Eastman and Nutting to Brown) that was within
  defendants' chain-of-title.  The deed provided in part:

    Said Brown his heirs or assigns are forever to have the right to
    pass through other lands now owned by said Eastman and Nutting in
    the lane as it now is in passing to and from the land hereby
    conveyed to said Brown for all purposes whatever.

                                 * * *
   
    We also hereby mean to convey to the said Brown the lane about
    thirty-feet wide on the southeasterly side of the land now
    occupied by Levi Nutting as a pasture and leading to land now and
    heretofore owned by said Brown, and bounded on the southeasterly
    side by land now belonging to Harmon Sherman's Estate.  Said Brown
    agrees to put up all bars in the lane in passing to and from the
    land hereby conveyed.

    TO HOLD SAID GRANTED PREMISES WITH THE APPURTENANCES THEREOF
    FOREVER.  

       ¶  4.  The court found that the passage cited above in bold
  constituted the description and grant of the right-of-way at issue, and the
  passage in small capitals was the deed's habendum.  See Kipp v. Chips
  Estate, 169 Vt. 102, 104 n.1,