Case Title: Ex Parte Hospital Espanol De Auxilio Mutuo De Puerto Rico, Inc.

Citation: 945 So. 2d 437

Docket Number: 1050685

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
945 So. 2d 437 (2006)
Ex parte HOSPITAL ESPANOL DE AUXILIO MUTUO DE PUERTO RICO, INC.
In re Lisa M. Holsomback and Bobby Holsomback
v.
Alabama Organ Center et al.
No. 1050685.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 26, 2006.
*438 Jennifer Devereaux Segers of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner Hospital Espanol de Auxilio Mutuo de Puerto Rico, Inc.
Jack Owen of Ball, Ball, Matthews & Novak, P.A., Montgomery, for respondent LifeLink Foundation, Inc.
Stephen D. Heninger of Heninger Garrison Davis, LLC, Birmingham, for respondents Lisa M. Holsomback and Bobby Holsomback.
Thomas M. Powell of Marsh, Rickard & Bryan, P.C., Birmingham, for amicus curiae Alabama Trial Lawyers Association, in support of the respondents.
STUART, Justice.
Hospital Espanol de Auxilio Mutuo de Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Auxilio Mutuo"), petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order denying its motion to dismiss Lisa M. Holsomback and Bobby Holsomback's claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction and to enter an order dismissing the Holsombacks' complaint insofar as it asserts claims against Auxilio Mutuo. We grant the petition.
On August 1, 2003, Lisa M. Holsomback and her husband, Bobby, sued LifeLink Foundation, Inc., Alabama Organ Center, and others, alleging that a kidney she had received by transplant at University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital was infected with hepatitis C. By amendment, the Holsombacks substituted Auxilio Mutuo for the fictitiously named defendant who was identified in the complaint as the entity "responsible for the testing and suitability of the donor kidney." The Holsombacks allege that Auxilio Mutuo negligently or wantonly caused or allowed "inadequate, improper, and erroneous testing to be performed on the serology tests for the donor kidney."
Auxilio Mutuo moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the trial court lacked in personam jurisdiction over it. Auxilio Mutuo stated:
*439 (Auxilio Mutuo's petition, Appendix 3.) In support of its motion, Auxilio Mutuo attached an affidavit from the hospital administrator at Auxilio Mutuo, stating:
(Auxilio Mutuo's petition, Appendix 4.)
The trial court conducted a hearing on Auxilio Mutuo's motion to dismiss. At the hearing, the Holsombacks opposed the dismissal of Auxilio Mutuo, arguing that the court had in personam jurisdiction over Auxilio Mutuo because, they said, "its contacts with Alabama, while few, gave rise to this lawsuit" and its "conduct and connection with Alabama are such that [Auxilio Mutuo] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." In support of their argument, the Holsombacks submitted an affidavit from Jean A. Davis, the executive vice president, OPO (organ procurement organization) services of LifeLink Foundation. She stated:
(Auxilio Mutuo's petition, Appendix 7.) Auxilio Mutuo submitted another affidavit from its hospital administrator, Jorge L. Matta, in response to Davis's affidavit; that affidavit stated:
(Auxilio Mutuo's petition, Appendix 8.)
Auxilio Mutuo also submitted its answer to certain interrogatories, in which Auxilio Mutuo stated that it did not deliver organs or bone grafts to any state in the United States for transplantation, that when conducting serological testing pursuant to an agreement between Auxilio Mutuo and LifeLink Foundation, it communicated directly with LifeLink by either lab reports or telephone or both; that it does not communicate with the recipient of the organ or bone-graft material; and that at the time it tested the blood serum from the kidney transplanted into Holsomback, Auxilio Mutuo did know that there was a possibility that the kidney might be sent to a state within the United States.
After considering the arguments and the evidence, the trial court denied Auxilio Mutuo's motion to dismiss, stating, in pertinent part, in its order:
(Auxilio Mutuo's petition, Appendix 10.)
Ex parte Bufkin, 936 So. 2d 1042, 1044-45 (Ala.2006).
Auxilio Mutuo argues that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the Holsombacks' claims against it because, it says, it does not have the minimum contacts with the State of Alabama necessary for the court to have personal jurisdiction over it.
The determination of a court's jurisdiction over a foreign entity falls within the purview of this State's "long-arm statute," which is actually Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ. P. Although Rule 4.2 was significantly revised effective August 1, 2004, because the underlying conduct occurred and this complaint was filed before that date, this Court applies Rule 4.2 as it existed before the amendment to the facts of this case.
In Leithead v. Banyan Corp., 926 So. 2d 1025, 1029-30 (Ala.2005), this Court addressed a similar situation and applied the law existing before the August 1, 2004, amendment to Rule 4.2, stating:
*445 926 So. 2d  at 1029-30 (footnotes omitted; some bracketed language added.)
Auxilio Mutuo contends that the Holsombacks cannot establish that the Jefferson Circuit Court has either general or specific personal jurisdiction over it. Specifically, Auxilio Mutuo argues that neither has it engaged in "continuous and systematic" contacts with Alabama, nor is there any nexus between its conduct and the Holsombacks' allegations. Auxilio Mutuo emphasizes that Alabama law requires that the "substantial connection" required to support a finding of minimum contacts must be by an action of the nonresident defendant "purposefully directed toward" Alabama and not the result of the "unilateral activity of another person or a third person." Auxilio Mutuo maintains that the evidence establishes that its contacts are solely with LifeLink and that it has no contact whatsoever with the donor of the organ or bone-graft materials or with the arrangements for the ultimate donation and transplant of the organ or bone graft. Therefore, it maintains that it does not have minimum contacts with Alabama sufficient to be haled into court here.
The Holsombacks argue that Auxilio Mutuo has minimum contacts with this State because, they say, Auxilio Mutuo is a member of the United Network of Organ Sharing ("UNOS") and the nature of the operations of UNOS in procuring, testing, and transplanting human organs is narrow and highly regulated, and, consequently, creates "reasonable anticipation" that its members will be subjected to the jurisdiction of Alabama.
In support of their argument, the Holsombacks urge that the trial court properly applied a lesser standard in determining that Auxilio Mutuo had minimum contacts with Alabama because they agree with the trial court that the human organ placed in Alabama's stream of commerce was "inherently dangerous." In its order, the trial court relied on the holdings in Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir.1980), and O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706 (D.R.I.1988), which involved the placement of a handgun and hazardous waste, respectively, into the stream of commerce. In Poyner and O'Neil, the courts required a lesser showing of minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction because of the nature of the product the defendants had placed in the respective state's stream of commerce.
Auxilio Mutuo and LifeLink[2] argue, and we agree, that a human organ is not an "inherently dangerous product" and, therefore, that the lesser standard applied in the trial court's analysis was improper.[3]
In Defore v. Bourjois, Inc., 268 Ala. 228, 105 So. 2d 846 (1958), this Court, in determining whether a perfume bottle was inherently dangerous, quoted the following definition of a product that is inherently dangerous to human life or health from 42 A.L.R. 1243 at 1244:
268 Ala. at 231-32, 105 So. 2d  at 848-49.
Applying the above definition, we hold that a human organ is not an inherently *447 dangerous product. While the human kidney involved in is this particular case was defective, human kidneys in general are not inherently dangerous. Therefore, we need not address the argument of Auxilio Mutuo and LifeLink regarding the propriety of the trial court's use of a lower standard for finding the existence of minimum contacts for defendants placing inherently dangerous products into the stream of commerce.
We also agree with Auxilio Mutuo that the Holsombacks' evidence does not establish that Auxilio Mutuo has minimum contacts with this State so as to establish personal jurisdiction. In particular, the evidence does not establish a nexus between Auxilio Mutuo and Alabama arising out of "`an action of [Auxilio Mutuo that was] purposefully directed toward [Alabama].'" Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 731 (Ala.2002)(quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987)). While we agree with the Holsombacks and respondent LifeLink that Auxilio Mutuo provided an important link in the organ-transplant process, the evidence does not establish that Auxilio Mutuo had a substantial connection with Alabama. Although Auxilio Mutuo does test organs and bone grafts that appear to have been distributed in Alabama, it does not determine where the organs and bone grafts it tests are delivered; it does not engage in any aspect of the delivery of the organs and bone grafts to this State; and it does not solicit directly or indirectly business in this State. Cf. Slaughter v. Life Connection of Ohio, 907 F. Supp. 929 (M.D.N.C.1995)(holding that Life Connection of Ohio had sufficient contacts with North Carolina to establish specific jurisdiction because, among other factors, Life Connection of Ohio sent organs to North Carolina), and Bergherr v. Sommer, 523 N.W.2d 17 (Minn.Ct.App.1994)(holding that a Minnesota court had personal jurisdiction over a Texas laboratory that tested a Minnesota plaintiff's pap smear because, among other reasons, the Texas laboratory solicited business from Minnesota through its agreement with an intermediary laboratory). Nothing before us establishes that Auxilio Mutuo purposefully directed any action toward Alabama.
Because the Holsombacks have failed to present evidence indicating that Auxilio Mutuo had contacts with Alabama sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Auxilio Mutuo, the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss filed by Auxilio Mutuo.
Auxilio Mutuo has established a clear legal right to a dismissal of the Holsombacks' claims against it. Therefore, we grant the petition and issue the writ of mandamus. We direct the trial court to vacate the order denying the motion to dismiss and to enter an order dismissing the Holsombacks' complaint insofar as it asserts claims against Auxilio Mutuo.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
NABERS, C.J., and SEE, LYONS, HARWOOD, SMITH, BOLIN, and PARKER, JJ., concur.
WOODALL, J., dissents.
[1]  A CLIA certified laboratory is a laboratory that has been certified as compliant with the quality standards required to perform laboratory testing of materials derived from the human body, as established by the federal regulations promulgated for Medicare and Medicaid services.
[2]  LifeLink, although a defendant below, is a respondent to this petition for the writ of mandamus. It is in agreement with Auxilio Mutuo, however, on the issue whether a human organ is an inherently dangerous product.
[3]  The trial court cited in its order Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, supra, and O'Neil v. Picillo, supra, for the proposition that the standard to be met before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is lowered when the product the defendant has placed in the stream of commerce is inherently dangerous. Neither of the cases cited in the trial court's order is binding on this Court, and we find no Alabama caselaw that allows for such a lowered standard when an inherently dangerous product is involved; however, it is not necessary for us to address that question.