Case Title: Bd. Of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Am. Educ. Enters., LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-2251

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-2251 
____________ 
 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST 
FUND, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISES, LLC, 
Respondent. 
 
[September 27, 2012] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund seeks review 
of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in American Educational 
Enterprises, LLC v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 45 
So. 3d 941 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (AEE), on the basis that it expressly and directly 
conflicts with decisions of this Court and other district courts of appeal with regard 
to the proper standard for common law certiorari relief.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
 
- 2 - 
FACTS 
The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (the Board) 
is the Florida entity responsible for the disposition of state-owned property.  See § 
253.03, Fla. Stat. (2011).1  American Educational Enterprises, LLC (American) is 
the assignee of Florida National College’s (FNC) right, title, and interest to and 
under a contract for the sale and purchase of state-owned property.  This dispute 
arises from a discovery ruling in litigation concerning the purchase by American of 
certain state-owned real property from the Board. 
In 1994, the State of Florida purchased the property at issue for $3,750,000 
for use by the Department of Corrections.  The property consisted of two lots with 
a building on one that was referred to as Glenbeigh Hospital, a treatment facility 
for substance abuse offenders.  On April 18, 2001, the Board sent a bidding 
package to prospective purchasers, including FNC, regarding the sale of the 
property.  Each bidding package disclosed that the property was being sold “as is” 
and at a minimum price of $3,750,000.  In addition to the minimum price, the 
bidding package included information as to the tax-assessed value of the property 
                                          
 
1.  Although the Board is the entity responsible for the disposition of the 
property at issue, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (the FDEP) 
performs all duties involved in the disposition and sale of state property.  See § 
253.002, Fla. Stat. (2011) (stating that the FDEP “shall perform all staff duties and 
functions related to the acquisition, administration, and disposition of state lands, 
title to which is or will be vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal 
Improvement Trust Fund”).  References to the Board also extend to the FDEP. 
 
 
- 3 - 
($4,642,063), its need for repairs, the buyer’s responsibility for financing, that a 
site inspection would be arranged upon request, and that a buyer “should 
independently verify all facts related to th[e] property.”  On April 23, 2001, FNC 
submitted a bid of $4,025,000 as well as an earnest money deposit of $402,500.  
The Board accepted the bid and deposit from FNC, and the parties executed a 
purchase and sale contract for the amount of the bid. 
To complete the purchase of the property, FNC sought financing from 
Citibank, which obtained an appraisal of the property.  The appraisal obtained by 
Citibank concluded that the market value of the property was only $2,850,000.  
FNC also received a 1999 appraisal of the property that valued it at $3,275,000.  
The Board had not included the 1999 appraisal in the bidding package.  FNC 
requested that the contract be modified to reflect the lower appraisal value as the 
purchase price.  The Board declined to renegotiate and stated that FNC would 
forfeit its earnest money deposit if it did not close on the property.  On June 30, 
2001, FNC closed on the sale of the property. 
Thereafter, FNC assigned its rights under the contract to American.  
American, in turn, filed an action against the Board, claiming negligent 
misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, unjust enrichment, and reformation of 
the contract.  The Board filed an answer, asserted twenty-two affirmative defenses 
and a counterclaim for fraud in the inducement, and demanded attorneys’ fees.  
 
 
- 4 - 
The Board contended that FNC misrepresented its position after the Board refused 
to reduce the purchase price prior to closing. 
During discovery, the Board obtained financial documents that FNC had 
submitted to Citibank to obtain financing for the property.  The documents covered 
the years 1998-2004, and specifically included FNC’s independent auditor’s 
reports, balance sheets, income statements, statements of cash flow, tax returns, 
and underlying information for its 2001 through 2008 budgets, in addition to 
American’s balance sheets, income statements, statements of cash flow, and tax 
returns.  The Board and American entered into a Stipulated Confidentiality 
Agreement (the Agreement) that governed this information.  The trial court 
approved the Agreement which was not limited to any specific time frame.  The 
Agreement provided, in relevant part, that the financial information disclosed to 
the Board and provided by Citibank would be treated as confidential. 
Relevant to this case, in March 2009, the Board propounded to American a 
request for the production of documents (the Request) seeking, in pertinent part, 
the following items: 
 
1.  FNC’s independent auditor’s reports for 2005-2007; 
2.  FNC’s balance sheets, income statements and statements of cash flow for 
2006 and 2007;  
3.  FNC’s federal tax returns for 2005-2007; 
4.  Budgets prepared by FNC for 2001-2008; 
5.  American’s balance sheets, income statements, and statements of cash 
flows for 2006 and 2007; 
6.  American’s tax returns for 2001, 2002, and 2005-2007; and 
 
 
- 5 - 
7.  All financial reports filed with the Department of Education for Title IV 
programs. 
 
American objected to the request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, 
irrelevant to the asserted claims, and not reasonably calculated to lead to 
admissible evidence.  The Board, in turn, moved to compel American to provide 
the requested documents.  Along with its motion, the Board provided an affidavit 
from an expert appraiser who opined that the requested information was necessary 
to defend the claims of economic damages asserted by American.  American, in 
response, contended that the request violated its privacy rights because it was only 
seeking the difference between the amount paid for the property and its value.  
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Board’s motion to compel 
production and ordered American to produce items 1-7 of the Request. 
 
American petitioned the Third District Court of Appeal for a writ of 
certiorari in which it requested that the court quash the order compelling 
production.  The Third District quashed the order and held that certiorari relief was 
merited because the order of the trial court compelling production was overbroad.  
See AEE, 45 So. 3d at 946.  The Third District specified that three elements caused 
the order to be overbroad: (1) it compelled disclosure of corporate financial 
documents that did not fall within the relevant time frame; (2) it required the 
disclosure of corporate financial documents without regard to the issues involved 
in the case; and (3) the Board’s defense to American’s claim to reform the contract 
 
 
- 6 - 
did not support discovery of corporate financial documents far removed from the 
time of the purchase of the property.  See id. at 944-46.   
The Board petitioned this Court to review the decision below on the basis 
that the Third District’s reliance on overbreadth did not satisfy the standard for 
certiorari relief and was in express and direct conflict with the decisions of this 
Court in Allstate Insurance Company v. Boecher, 733 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 1999) and 
Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1987), superceded by statute 
on other grounds, § 768.72, Fla. Stat. (1989). 
ANALYSIS 
When determining whether an appellate court has properly invoked its 
certiorari jurisdiction to review a non-final order, this Court has explained that the 
following judicial policy informs the analysis: 
“[C]ommon law certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and should not 
be used to circumvent the interlocutory appeal rule which authorizes 
appeal from only a few types of non-final orders.”  Martin-Johnson, 
Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Fla. 1987); see also Belair v. 
Drew, 770 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 2000); Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 
720 So. 2d 214, 214-15 (Fla. 1998). . . .  “A non-final order for which 
no appeal is provided by Rule 9.130 is reviewable by petition for 
certiorari only in limited circumstances.”  Martin-Johnson, Inc., 509 
So. 2d at 1099; see also Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 
1957) . . . .  Limited certiorari review is based upon the rationale that 
“piecemeal review of nonfinal trial court orders will impede the 
orderly administration of justice and serve only to delay and harass.”  
Jaye, 720 So. 2d at 215. 
 
 
 
- 7 - 
Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004) 
(emphasis supplied); see also Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 
1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010). 
Here, we address whether the Third District erroneously granted a petition 
for a writ of certiorari and quashed a discovery order that compelled the production 
of financial information on the basis of overbreadth.  We conclude that the Third 
District erred and applied an incorrect standard for certiorari, and we therefore 
quash the decision below.   
The Florida Constitution provides the district courts of appeal with the 
discretionary jurisdiction to issue, inter alia, writs of certiorari.  See art. V, § 
4(b)(3), Fla. Const.  Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 authorizes the 
district courts to consider interlocutory appeals of certain non-final orders in 
specific circumstances.  See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(4).  A non-final order for 
which no appeal is provided by rule 9.130 may be reviewable by petition for a writ 
of certiorari, but only in very limited circumstances.  The petitioning party must 
demonstrate that the contested order constitutes “(1) a departure from the essential 
requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the 
case[,] (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.”  Reeves, 889 So. 2d 
at 822 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Snyder, 826 So. 2d 382, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2002)); see also Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011); Brooks, 97 
 
 
- 8 - 
So. 2d at 695.  A finding that the petitioning party has “suffered an irreparable 
harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal” is a “condition precedent to 
invoking a district court’s certiorari jurisdiction.”  Jaye, 720 So. 2d at 215; see 
Williams, 62 So. 3d at 1132 (“The last two elements are jurisdictional and must be 
analyzed before the court may even consider the first element.”); Martin-Johnson, 
Inc., 509 So. 2d at 1099; McDonald v. Johnson, 83 So. 3d 889, 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2012) (“This court considers the second and third prongs first because they are 
used to determine jurisdiction.”); Killinger v. Guardianship of Grable, 983 So. 2d 
30, 32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Harley Shipbuilding Corp. v. Fast Cats Ferry Serv., 
LLC, 820 So. 2d 445, 448 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).   
If the party seeking review does not demonstrate that it will suffer material 
injury of an irreparable nature, then an appellate court may not grant certiorari 
relief from a non-appealable non-final order.  See Capital One, N.A., v. Forbes, 34 
So. 3d 209, 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).  Similarly, if the alleged harm can be 
remedied on appeal, the harm is not considered irreparable, and thus certiorari 
relief is not merited.  See Pepsi Bottling Grp., Inc. v. Underwood, 8 So. 3d 1260, 
1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). 
In Martin-Johnson, Inc., this Court expressed an unwillingness to “creat[e] a 
new category of non-final orders reviewable on interlocutory appeal.”  509 So. 2d 
at 1099; id. at 1100 (“Even when the order departs from the essential requirements 
 
 
- 9 - 
of the law, there are strong reasons militating against certiorari review.”).  See also 
Topp Telecom, Inc. v. Atkins, 763 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) 
(quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 531 (Fla. 1995) 
(noting that “[a]n erroneous order compelling discovery when the cost and effort to 
do so is burdensome but not destructive is simply not ‘sufficiently egregious or 
fundamental to merit the extra review and safeguard provided by certiorari,’ ” and 
thus declining to grant certiorari review of the disputed order)).  Time and again, 
Florida courts have reiterated that certiorari relief is an “extremely rare” remedy 
that will be provided in “very few cases.”  Martin-Johnson, Inc., 509 So. 2d at 
1098-99 (citing Taylor v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Duval Cnty., 131 So. 2d 504, 
506 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)); see also Haridopolos v. Citizens for Strong Schs., Inc., 
78 So. 3d 605, 608 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Anderson v. Vander Meiden ex rel. 
Duggan, 56 So. 3d 830, 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Acevedo v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 
68 So. 3d 949, 951 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).  In Martin-Johnson, Inc., this Court 
addressed whether the denial of a motion to dismiss or strike a claim for punitive 
damages constituted irreparable harm such that the appellate court should have 
granted certiorari relief.  See 509 So. 2d at 1098.  Although courts have since 
retreated from the specific holding of Martin-Johnson, Inc. with regard to punitive 
damage claims in light of the adoption of section 768.72, Florida Statutes (1989), 
the foundation of the case—that common law certiorari may be invoked only when 
 
 
- 10 - 
a party will suffer irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal—
remains sound law.  See Williams, 62 So. 3d at 1134; Forbes, 34 So. 3d at 212; 
Underwood, 8 So. 3d at 1262; Hargrett v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 705 So. 
2d 1009, 1009 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). 
Here, the parties do not dispute the extraordinary nature of certiorari or the 
standard an appellate court must apply when reviewing a petition for a writ of 
certiorari.  Instead, the dispute focuses on whether the Third District applied the 
correct standard when it evaluated American’s petition.  American contends that 
the opinion of the Third District evidences that the appellate court concluded that 
American satisfied the standard of irreparable harm ipso facto by analogizing this 
case to another Third District case, Redland Company, Inc. v. Atlantic Civil, Inc., 
961 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).  The Board, however, disagrees, and 
contends that the decision of the Third District should be quashed because the 
actual opinion and decision, which does not discuss irreparable harm, demonstrates 
that the court did not apply the correct standard. 
In Redland, the Third District granted a petition for writ of certiorari to 
quash an order that compelled production of corporate financial documents.  See 
961 So. 2d at 1005.  The Redland court explained that it granted the petition 
because the trial court order “depart[ed] from the essential requirements of the law 
by requiring overbroad discovery that [would] cause material injury to Redland 
 
 
- 11 - 
and leave them with no adequate remedy on appeal.”  Id. at 1006 (emphasis 
supplied).  The Redland court noted that “[a]lthough not every erroneous discovery 
order creates certiorari jurisdiction, certiorari is the proper remedy for overbroad 
discovery orders ‘because once discovery is wrongfully granted, the complaining 
party is beyond relief.’ ”  Id. (quoting Caterpillar Indus., Inc. v. Keskes, 639 So. 2d 
1129, 1129 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (emphasis supplied)).  In Redland, the Third 
District held the order was overbroad because it required the production of 
documents spanning an “unreasonably broad” time frame “without regard to the 
issues framed by the alleged breaches” of the agreement.  See id. at 1006-07.  In so 
holding, the Redland opinion replaced the requirement that a reviewing court 
determines whether a proposed order will cause material harm of an irreparable 
nature to the party petitioning for certiorari relief with simply allowing the 
petitioning party to establish that the proposed order was overbroad.  This different 
standard, however, is one that this Court has previously confronted and expressly 
rejected.  Consequently, we expressly disapprove Redland here as well.  
Overbreadth is not a proper basis for certiorari review of discovery orders. 
This Court and other district courts of appeal have restated with frequency 
that overbreadth is not sufficient, nor is it a basis, for certiorari relief.  “Certiorari 
jurisdiction does not lie to review every erroneous discovery order,” see Katzman 
v. Rediron Fabrication, Inc., 76 So. 3d 1060, 1062 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing 
 
 
- 12 - 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla. 1995)), and overbreadth 
alone is not a basis on which such jurisdiction will be granted.  In Katzman, the 
Fourth District added that appellate courts should not provide certiorari review for 
orders that deny “a party’s over-breadth or burdensomeness objections to 
discovery.”  See 76 So. 3d at 1062; see also Megaflight, Inc. v. Lamb, 749 So. 2d 
594, 595 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“[W]e agree with those who suggest that erroneous 
orders that require overbroad discovery of nonprivileged documents should be 
subjected to certiorari review more cautiously than erroneous orders requiring 
discovery of confidential or privileged matters.”).  Similarly, in Killinger, 983 So. 
2d at 32, the Fifth District commented that “[w]hile certiorari may be used to 
review pre-trial orders compelling discovery, it is generally not appropriate simply 
based on an argument that the discovery request is overbroad, irrelevant, or 
burdensome.”  See also Topp Telecom, 763 So. 2d at 1200 (“It seems clear to us 
that the mere fact of unwarranted effort and expense is not, by itself, synonymous 
with a ‘departure from the essential requirements of law’ [e.s.] for which 
immediate review is necessary.”). 
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Langston, we held that “irrelevant discovery 
alone is not a basis for granting certiorari,” and disapproved other cases to the 
extent that they could “be interpreted as automatically equating irrelevant 
discovery requests with irreparable harm,” even though certiorari may be relied 
 
 
- 13 - 
upon at times to limit abusive discovery practices.  See 655 So. 2d at 94-95.  In 
Langston, we recognized that although irrelevant materials sought in a discovery 
request do not necessarily cause irreparable harm, a litigant is not entitled carte 
blanche to irrelevant discovery.  See id. at 95.  Based upon this recognition, we 
quashed the decision of the Fourth District to the “extent that it permit[ted] 
discovery even when it ha[d] been affirmatively established that such discovery 
[wa]s neither relevant nor [would] lead to the discovery of relevant information.”  
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
In Langston, we provided the following insight with regard to when a 
discovery request may cause material injury, thus satisfying the requirements for 
certiorari jurisdiction:  
Discovery in civil cases must be relevant to the subject matter 
of the case and must be admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to 
admissible evidence.  Brooks, 97 So. 2d at 699; see also Amente v. 
Newman, 653 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1995) (concept of relevancy is 
broader in discovery context than in trial context, and party may be 
permitted to discover relevant evidence that would be inadmissible at 
trial if it may lead to discovery of relevant evidence); Krypton, 629 
So. 2d at 854 (“It is axiomatic that information sought in discovery 
must relate to the issues involved in the litigation, as framed in all 
pleadings.”); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1) (discovery must be relevant to 
the subject matter of the pending action). 
This Court has held that review by certiorari is appropriate 
when a discovery order departs from the essential requirements of 
law, causing material injury to a petitioner throughout the remainder 
of the proceedings below and effectively leaving no adequate remedy 
on appeal.  Martin-Johnson, 509 So. 2d at 1099; see also Brooks; 
Kilgore. 
 
 
- 14 - 
Discovery of certain kinds of information “may reasonably 
cause material injury of an irreparable nature.”  Martin-Johnson, 509 
So. 2d at 1100.  This includes “cat out of the bag” material that could 
be used to injure another person or party outside the context of the 
litigation, and material protected by privilege, trade secrets, work 
product, or involving a confidential informant may cause such injury 
if disclosed.  Id.  
 
655 So. 2d at 94 (footnote omitted). 
 
In keeping with the decisions of this Court and numerous other district 
courts of appeal addressing the proper standard for certiorari relief, we quash the 
decision below which held that relief was appropriate solely because the discovery 
order at issue was overbroad.  In holding that “certiorari is the proper remedy for 
overbroad discovery orders” because overbroad orders leave the complaining party 
“ ‘beyond relief,’ ” AEE, 45 So. 3d at 944 (quoting Redland, 961 So. 2d 1006), the 
Third District improperly supplanted and expanded the scope of certiorari 
jurisdiction by replacing the requirement of establishing irreparable harm with a 
requirement that the requesting party merely demonstrate overbreadth.  This is an 
incorrect and improper alteration of the standard for certiorari jurisdiction.  
Overbreadth is not a basis for this relief. 
Discovery of Financial Information 
Generally, private individual financial information is not discoverable when 
there is no financial issue pending in the case to which the discovery applies.  See 
Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, 863 So. 2d 189, 194 (Fla. 2003); Aspex 
 
 
- 15 - 
Eyewear, Inc. v. Ross, 778 So. 2d 481, 481-82 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Ordinarily 
the financial records of a party are not discoverable unless the documents 
themselves or the status which they evidence is somehow at issue in the case.”).  
However, “where materials sought by a party ‘would appear to be relevant to the 
subject matter of the pending action,’ the information is fully discoverable.”  See 
Friedman, 863 So. 2d at 194 (quoting Epstein v. Epstein, 519 So. 2d 1042, 1043 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1988)). 
The concept of relevancy has a much wider application in the discovery 
context than in the context of admissible evidence at trial.  See Amente v. 
Newman, 653 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 1995).  A party’s financial information, if 
relevant to the disputed issues of the underlying action, is not excepted from 
discovery under this rule of relevancy, and courts will compel production of 
financial documents and information if shown to be relevant to a pending action.  
See Friedman, 863 So. 2d at 194; see also Aspex Eyewear, 788 So. 2d at 481-82.  
The information sought here is relevant and it is discoverable.  We note that 
whether this information may be admissible at trial is an issue that we neither need 
nor endeavor to address.  The value of real estate is approached in many ways 
including an income approach.  Admittedly, the underlying real estate is being 
used to produce income.  The financial information may at the very least lead to 
admissible evidence.   
 
 
- 16 - 
In the Request, the Board sought various financial documents—auditor 
reports, balance sheets, income statements, cash flows, federal tax returns, budgets, 
and other financial reports—from American from 2001 to 2008.  The disputed real 
estate purchase closed during the course of 2001.  Financial documents from 1998 
to 2004 were provided to the Board in previous discovery requests through a third 
party subpoena.  FNC had submitted these documents to Citibank when it sought 
financing for the real estate purchase. 
The Board asserts that it seeks this additional financial information to 
corroborate its claim that the bid American submitted for the property was 
calculated based, at least in part, on economic projections regarding the value of 
the property.  More specifically, the Board contends that the information in the 
Request is relevant because: 
(1) 
American has invoked the equitable jurisdiction of the trial 
court by suing the Board for reformation of the contract.  The Board 
alleges that American’s bid was the result of a considered business 
decision.  The Board contends that American factored into its 
valuation of the property its unique, highest, and best use, determining 
budgets and projected profits expected from locating its business upon 
this highly visible property with a ready market for students.  The 
financial information ordered disclosed is reasonably calculated to 
lead to admissible evidence such as the value of the property to 
American based upon projected profits; expert opinion as to the 
validity of the budgets used by American at the time of the purchase; 
American’s intention to outbid another prospective purchaser based 
upon financial projections contained in the financial information 
ordered disclosed; and an expert valuation of the property employing 
an income method or other appraisal method which employs all 
financial information available up to the time of trial. 
 
 
- 17 - 
 
(2) 
The financial information at issue is also discoverable because 
it could reasonably be employed to impeach any attempt by American 
to claim that it would be inequitable not to reduce the purchase price 
based upon alleged losses.   
 
Whether this information may be ultimately admitted into evidence need not 
be resolved here.  Rather, we address whether these documents may lead to 
admissible evidence relevant to resolving the dispute at hand to determine the 
appropriateness of the trial court’s order mandating disclosure.  Financial 
projections and information here are interwoven into an assessment of property 
value and are discoverable.  The financial information sought in the disclosure 
order may lead to evidence to resolve the underlying action based upon the parties’ 
contentions regarding the value of the property as compared to the purchase price. 
The Board has admitted, conceded, and agreed that the requested documents 
from American remain confidential in this case as is the case with earlier 
documents.  The rules of discovery provide sufficient means to limit the use and 
dissemination of discoverable information via protective orders, and it is the 
responsibility of the trial court to decide whether to employ those means in this 
case.  See Martin-Johnson, Inc., 509 So. 2d at 1100.   
Here, the order compels the production of relevant financial information and 
does not result in irreparable harm.  Thus, discovery is permissible and certiorari 
relief by the Third District was not merited. 
 
 
- 18 - 
CONCLUSION 
 
The basis stated for certiorari relief in the decision below is incorrect and in 
express conflict with numerous Florida decisions.  Consequently, we quash the 
decision of the Third District in AEE.  We disapprove of other decisions that have 
provided certiorari relief on the basis of overbreadth including, but not limited to, 
Stihl Southeast, Inc. v. Green Thumb Lawn & Garden Center Newco, Inc., 974 So. 
2d 1200 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Caterpillar Industrial, Inc. v. Keskes, 639 So. 2d 
1129 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); First City Developments of Florida v. Hallmark of 
Hollywood Condominium Assoc., Inc., 545 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); 
Redland Co. v. Atlantic Civil, Inc., 961 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Royal 
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., v. Doe, 964 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); and 
Caribbean Security Systems, Inc. v. Security Controls Systems, Inc., 486 So. 2d 
654 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).  Furthermore, because the requested information is 
relevant to the disputed issues, and American has not demonstrated irreparable 
harm through its disclosure, we conclude that the information is discoverable, and 
therefore the petition for certiorari relief should have been denied.   
 
It is so ordered.   
 
 
- 19 - 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
Third District – Case No. 3D09-3492  
 
(Miami-Dade County) 
 
Paul Morris of the Law Offices of Paul Morris, P.A., Miami, Florida and Richard 
Alan Alayon of Alayon & Associates, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida,  
 
for Petitioner  
 
Elio F. Martinez, Jr., Barbara Viniegra and Scott Allen Burr of Concepcion, 
Martinez & Bellido, Coral Gables, Florida,  
 
for Respondent