Case Title: State v. Roberts

Citation: 2017-Ohio-2998

Docket Number: 2014-0989

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Roberts, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-2998.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-2998 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ROBERTS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Roberts, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-2998.] 
Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Death penalty—Sentence of death imposed 
after resentencing hearing—Death penalty affirmed. 
(No. 2014-0989—Submitted February 7, 2017—Decided May 30, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Trumbull County, 
No. 2001 CR 793. 
______________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} This is the third time this case has been appealed to this court.  After 
our review of the first appeal, we affirmed convictions for aggravated murder, 
aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery but vacated the death sentence 
imposed on Donna Roberts and remanded the matter to the trial court for 
resentencing because the trial court had engaged in an ex parte communication with 
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the prosecuting attorney and allowed the prosecutor to participate in drafting the 
sentencing opinion.  On remand, the trial court again imposed capital punishment. 
{¶ 2} On the second appeal, we again vacated the death sentence and 
remanded the case, this time because we concluded that the trial court had failed to 
consider the defendant’s allocution, since it was not referenced in the sentencing 
opinion. 
{¶ 3} Pending our appeal, the trial judge retired and subsequently died, and 
therefore a different judge presided over the third resentencing and imposed a 
sentence of death. 
{¶ 4} Roberts now appeals from that third sentence and presents four 
propositions of law.  For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} Previous opinions in this case have set forth the facts of the killing in 
detail.  See State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168 
(“Roberts I”), ¶ 1-86; State v. Roberts, 137 Ohio St.3d 230, 2013-Ohio-4580, 998 
N.E.2d 1100 (“Roberts II”), ¶ 1-7.  For purposes of this opinion, we summarize the 
facts as follows. 
{¶ 6} On December 12, 2001, Roberts reported the shooting death of 
Robert Fingerhut at their home in Howland Township, located in Trumbull 
County.  After a week-long investigation, police arrested Roberts and Nathaniel 
Jackson,1 a man she had been dating for two years and with whom she had been 
having an affair.  Roberts was separately indicted and tried for the aggravated 
murder of Fingerhut.  A jury found her guilty of aggravated murder with death 
                                                 
1 Jackson was separately tried and convicted of murdering Fingerhut and sentenced to death.  
See State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-1, 839 N.E.2d 362, and State v. Jackson, ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-5488, __ N.E.3d __.   
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penalty specifications and recommended a sentence of death, and at sentencing, the 
trial court imposed that sentence. 
{¶ 7} The evidence presented at that trial reveals that although she and 
Fingerhut were divorced, they lived together and were regarded as husband and 
wife.  Fingerhut owned two insurance policies on his life with a total benefit 
amount of $550,000, both of which named Roberts as the sole beneficiary. 
{¶ 8} Roberts began an affair with Nathaniel Jackson, who later went to 
prison on convictions unrelated to this case.  During his incarceration, he and 
Roberts exchanged numerous letters, which police recovered from her house and 
the trunk of her car.  Prison authorities also recorded 18 of their telephone 
conversations. 
{¶ 9} The letters and conversations included extensive discussion of how 
they intended to deal with Fingerhut upon Jackson’s release from prison.  
Jackson repeatedly avowed that when he obtained his release, he would kill 
Fingerhut.  In one letter, Roberts complained about Fingerhut’s control of her 
finances and urged Jackson to “[d]o whatever you want to him ASAP.”  At 
Jackson’s request, Roberts bought a ski mask and a pair of gloves for Jackson 
to use during the murder. 
{¶ 10} On December 9, 2001, upon Jackson’s release, Roberts picked him 
up at the prison and spent that night and much of the next two days with him. 
{¶ 11} On December 11, Fingerhut left work around 9:00 p.m.  A witness 
saw Roberts in her car around 9:30 p.m.  She had given her cell phone to Jackson, 
and telephone records show six calls from her cell phone to the phone in her car 
between 9:45 and 10:00 p.m., and two more at 11:01 and 11:44 p.m.  One call had 
been placed from her car phone to her cell phone at 10:03 p.m. 
{¶ 12} That night, Roberts went to the Days Inn in Boardman, Ohio, and 
reserved a room for a week.  Police later found Jackson’s fingerprints in that 
room. 
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{¶ 13} After midnight on December 12, Roberts called 9-1-1 from her 
residence and told the operator that something was wrong with her husband.  
When police arrived, they found Fingerhut’s body on the kitchen floor.  An 
autopsy revealed that he had been shot and died from multiple gunshot wounds. 
{¶ 14} At 3:38 a.m., while officers were processing the crime scene, 
the telephone rang.  Howland Township Detective Sergeant Paul Monroe 
answered, but after a pause, the caller hung up without speaking.  At trial, the 
state established that this call originated from Roberts’s cell phone.  Roberts later 
admitted to detectives that “Nate [Jackson] must have had the phone.  He’s always 
borrowing it.” 
{¶ 15} On the afternoon of December 12, Monroe and Detective Sergeant 
Frank Dillon interviewed Roberts at Howland Township police headquarters.  
Roberts described her relationship with Fingerhut as “loving,” but claimed that 
sexually, Fingerhut “did his thing [and] she did hers.”  She also told the detectives 
that she had been in a sexual relationship for six months with someone named 
Carlos.  When Monroe asked Roberts if she had relationships with anyone else, 
Roberts replied, “No, there’s nobody else.  I told you everybody.”  Monroe then 
asked about Jackson, and Roberts claimed she had forgotten about him. 
{¶ 16} She then admitted that she had been dating Jackson for two years, 
that he had phoned her from prison, and that they had corresponded.  She also 
stated that she had last seen Jackson on December 9, when she picked him up at 
the prison, but she added that she had last spoken to him over the telephone on 
the morning of December 11. 
Indictment, Trial, and Verdict 
{¶ 17} A grand jury indicted Roberts on two counts of aggravated murder, 
R.C. 2903.01(A) (purposely causing death with prior calculation and design) and 
(B) (felony murder).  Both counts contained two death specifications pursuant 
to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7): one charging aggravated murder during the commission 
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5
of aggravated burglary and one charging aggravated murder during the 
commission of aggravated robbery, with each alleging prior calculation and design 
and/or that Roberts was the principal offender.  The indictment also charged her 
with aggravated burglary, R.C. 2911.11, with a firearm specification, R.C. 
2941.145, and aggravated robbery, R.C. 2913.01, with a firearm specification.  The 
jury found Roberts guilty of all counts and specifications.  At sentencing, the 
state elected to proceed on Count One (prior calculation and design), and the 
trial court dismissed Count Two (felony murder) and its specifications. 
Sentencing 
{¶ 18} Before the mitigation hearing, Roberts informed her counsel that 
she did not wish to present any mitigating evidence except an unsworn statement.  
As a result, the court conducted an Ashworth hearing and found her competent to 
make that decision.  See generally State v. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 N.E.2d 
1231 (1999), paragraph one of the syllabus.  At the mitigation hearing, Roberts 
exercised her right pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) to make an unsworn statement 
to the jury and declined to present any other evidence.  The jury recommended a 
death sentence, and the trial court sentenced Roberts to death. 
First Appeal 
{¶ 19} On direct appeal, we affirmed her convictions for aggravated 
murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, but we vacated the death 
sentence and remanded the case to the trial court because the judge had improperly 
allowed the prosecutor to participate in drafting the sentencing opinion, and in 
doing so had engaged in ex parte communication with the prosecutor.  Roberts I, 
110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1186, ¶ 153-164.  We ordered 
the trial judge on remand to “afford Roberts her right to allocute” provided by 
Crim.R. 32(A)(1), to “personally review and evaluate the evidence, weigh the 
aggravating circumstances against any relevant mitigating evidence, and 
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determine anew the appropriateness of the death penalty,” and to prepare “an 
entirely new penalty opinion.”  Roberts I at ¶ 167. 
{¶ 20} On remand, the trial court afforded Roberts her right to allocution, 
and one week later, after asking her if she had anything further to say and hearing 
argument from defense counsel, the court sentenced her to death and filed its 
sentencing opinion pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F). 
Second Appeal 
{¶ 21} Roberts appealed as of right from the second judgment imposing 
the death sentence.  On that appeal, we sustained the second proposition of law, 
concluding that the court had failed to consider her allocution in determining her 
sentence during the proceeding on remand.  Roberts II, 137 Ohio St.3d 230, 2013-
Ohio-4580, 998 N.E.2d 1100, ¶ 51-76.  For the second time, we vacated the death 
sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.  We directed the trial court as 
follows: 
 
On remand, the trial court is to review the entire record, 
including Roberts’s allocution of October 22, 2007.  The trial court 
shall consider the entire record—again, including the allocution—
in determining whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  The trial court shall 
then write and file a sentencing opinion pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F) 
reflecting that it has complied with these instructions. 
In accordance with our holding as to Roberts’s first 
proposition of law, Roberts is not entitled to present any further 
evidence on remand.  Moreover, because Roberts has been given her 
opportunity to make allocution pursuant to Crim.R. 32, she is not 
entitled to make another one. 
January Term, 2017 
 
7
 
 
Finally, while the trial court must consider Roberts’s 
allocution, nothing in today’s opinion should be interpreted as a 
determination that the matters discussed in her allocution are true or 
that the trial court must afford them any particular weight.  It is for 
the trial court to determine in the first instance what mitigating 
factors, if any, are present in the case, and what weight, if any, they 
should be given. 
 
Id. at ¶ 73-75.  We further specified that “the trial court must make an independent 
determination of whether a death sentence is appropriate and may not give 
deference to the sentences previously entered.”  Id. at ¶ 96. 
{¶ 22} The original trial judge in this case retired and subsequently died 
during the pendency of the second appeal.  Id. at ¶ 78.  On remand, Judge Ronald 
Rice presided over the resentencing. 
{¶ 23} Roberts filed a motion in the trial court to preclude a death sentence, 
or in the alternative, to order a full penalty-phase hearing.  In this motion, Roberts 
argued that because Judge Rice had neither presided over the trial nor personally 
heard her allocution, he could not properly weigh the aggravating circumstances 
against the mitigating factors and sentence her to death. 
{¶ 24} On April 30, 2014, Judge Rice heard arguments on the defense 
motion.  He denied the motion on the grounds that (1) our instructions in Roberts 
II regarding the proceedings on remand precluded granting the motion and (2) this 
court in Roberts II had “already considered and rejected [Roberts’s] arguments” 
with regard to the presentation of additional evidence. 
{¶ 25} Judge Rice then imposed sentence.  He stated that he had carefully 
reviewed the entire record, including the guilt and penalty phases of Roberts’s trial, 
the record of proceedings on remand, including Roberts’s allocution, and all 
exhibits.  He also announced that he had “given no deference to the prior decisions 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
of” the original trial judge.  Finally, he announced his finding that “the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors by proof beyond a reasonable doubt” 
and that death was an appropriate sentence.  He incorporated those findings into a 
sentencing opinion that was later reissued nunc pro tunc to correct “editing 
inconsistencies” in the original version.  At the hearing, he also reimposed 
sentences on the noncapital counts and notified Roberts about postrelease control. 
{¶ 26} On this appeal, Roberts presents four propositions of law.  Finding 
merit in none, we overrule them all and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Substitute Judge 
{¶ 27} Roberts’s first and fourth propositions of law are related and will be 
discussed together. 
{¶ 28} Roberts contends that when a capital case is remanded for 
resentencing before a judge other than the one who originally imposed sentence, 
capital punishment is precluded because no statutory provision specifically permits 
such a procedure.  She further argues that the Eighth Amendment precludes a death 
sentence in these circumstances unless the substitute judge at least permits the 
defendant to make a new allocution.  In her fourth proposition, Roberts contends 
that, if a death sentence is permissible in such a situation, R.C. 2929.06(B) requires 
that the substitute judge empanel a new jury and conduct a new mitigation hearing 
before imposing a death sentence. 
{¶ 29} We begin by examining the statutory arguments presented. 
Statutory Arguments 
{¶ 30} In the first proposition of law, Roberts argues that “[t]he sentencing 
option of death should have been precluded” on remand because “Ohio’s statutory 
scheme does not provide a procedure for a * * * rewriting of the R.C. 2929.03(F) 
opinion where the original judge is no longer available to write the opinion.” 
{¶ 31} Roberts bases this argument on State v. Penix, 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 
513 N.E.2d 744 (1987).  In Penix, a capital defendant appealed his conviction of 
January Term, 2017 
 
9
aggravated murder and sentence of death.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
conviction, but vacated the death sentence due to erroneous penalty-phase jury 
instructions and remanded the case for resentencing.  We affirmed the judgment of 
the court of appeals.  Id. at 370-372. 
{¶ 32} We then considered “the procedure to be employed, and the penalties 
which may be imposed, upon resentencing.”  Id. at 372.  We held that a death 
sentence could not be imposed on resentencing, because R.C. 2929.03(C)(2)(b) 
specifically provided that “the trial jury and the trial judge shall sentence a 
defendant who has been tried by jury and convicted of aggravated murder and one 
or more [death] specifications.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id.  Further, we noted that R.C. 
2929.03(D)(2) makes repeated reference to “the trial jury” weighing mitigating 
factors 
against 
aggravating 
circumstances 
and 
making 
a 
sentencing 
recommendation.  Id. at 372-373.  “Thus, the decisions leading to a death sentence 
must be made by the same jury that convicted the offender in the guilt phase.  There 
are simply no statutory provisions for another jury to make these crucial 
determinations.”  Id. at 373.  Absent statutory authority, we declined to “create such 
a procedure out of whole cloth.”  Id. 
{¶ 33} In 1996, the General Assembly enacted legislation abrogating the 
specific holding of Penix.  See State v. White, 132 Ohio St.3d 344, 2012-Ohio-2583, 
972 N.E.2d 534, ¶ 6, 21, and paragraph one of the syllabus (discussing effect of 
1996 amendments to R.C. 2929.06(B)). 
{¶ 34} Roberts argues by analogy that because no statutory provision 
specifically authorizes a judge who has not previously presided over the case to 
sentence a capital defendant on remand, such a procedure is as impermissible as the 
retrial of the defendant’s sentencing phase before a new jury was in Penix. 
{¶ 35} The analogy fails.  In Penix, we relied heavily on the language of 
R.C. 2929.03(C)(2)(b) and 2929.03(D)(2), which specifically entrust the trial jury 
with making the necessary findings in capital cases.  At that time, and until the 
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enactment of R.C. 2929.06(B), no provision of law authorized any other jury to 
perform that task. 
{¶ 36} It is true that R.C. 2929.03(C)(2)(b)(ii) similarly provides that a 
capital defendant shall be sentenced “[b]y the trial jury and the trial judge, if the 
offender was tried by jury.”  (Emphasis added.)  However, R.C. 2929.06(B) now 
authorizes resentencing on remand in capital cases.  And R.C. 2929.06(B) does not 
require that the “trial judge” preside over a capital defendant’s resentencing.  
Rather, it provides that if a death sentence is set aside due to sentencing error, “the 
trial court that sentenced the offender shall conduct a new hearing to resentence the 
offender.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 37} The General Assembly’s use of the term “trial court” in R.C. 
2929.06(B) suggests that it did not intend to require that the “trial judge,” i.e., the 
individual who presided over the capital defendant’s trial, necessarily must also 
preside over that defendant’s resentencing.  See Metro. Secs. Co. v. Warren State 
Bank, 117 Ohio St. 69, 76, 158 N.E. 81 (1927) (when General Assembly uses 
certain language in one instance and wholly different language in another, it will 
“be presumed that different results were intended”); Indus. Comm. v. Snyder, 113 
Ohio St. 405, 415, 149 N.E. 397 (1925); State v. Herbert, 49 Ohio St.2d 88, 113, 
358 N.E.2d 1090 (1976) (Corrigan, J., dissenting) (“the use of different language 
gives rise to a presumption that different meanings were intended”). 
{¶ 38} In addition, the Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically authorize a 
trial judge who has not presided over a trial to sentence a defendant.  Crim.R. 25(B) 
provides:  
 
 
If for any reason the judge before whom the defendant has been tried 
is unable to perform the duties of the court after a verdict or finding 
of guilt, another judge designated by the administrative judge, or, in 
the case of a single-judge division, by the Chief Justice of the 
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Supreme Court of Ohio, may perform such duties.  If such other 
judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those duties because he did 
not preside at the trial, he may in his discretion grant a new trial. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 39} Thus, it is “entirely proper” for a substitute judge to sentence a 
defendant after the retirement or death of the judge who presided over the 
defendant’s trial.  State v. Green, 122 Ohio App.3d 566, 571, 702 N.E.2d 462 (12th 
Dist.1997).  See also State v. Fitzpatrick, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-930413, C-
930439, B-927123, and B-928955, 1994 WL 164189 (May 4, 1994) (Crim.R. 25(B) 
authorized substitution of judge on sentencing when substitute judge stated on 
record that trial judge “would not be available for several months” and substitute 
“had familiarized himself with the file”). 
{¶ 40} Crim.R. 25(B) applies to sentencing in general.  We can find nothing 
in its language that precludes its operation in a capital case.  Moreover, the rule 
applies by its terms to the situation in this case.  Because the original trial judge 
retired and subsequently died before we remanded the case in Roberts II,2 he was 
“unable to perform the duties of the court after a verdict or finding of guilt.”  
Crim.R. 25(B). 
{¶ 41} Roberts contends that we should take “guidance” from R.C. 
2901.04(A), the rule of lenity.  But the rule of lenity is not relevant here.  R.C. 
2901.04(A) provides that “sections of the Revised Code defining offenses or 
penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in 
favor of the accused.”  (Emphasis added.)  No statutory definition of “offenses or 
                                                 
2 Roberts incorrectly states that when we ordered resentencing in Roberts II, we assumed the trial 
judge would conduct the resentencing.  In fact, we understood that resentencing “necessarily 
[would] be conducted by a different judge.”  Roberts II, 137 Ohio St.3d 230, 2013-Ohio-4580, 998 
N.E.2d 1100, ¶ 78.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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penalties” is at issue here.  This case involves the procedure for imposing a death 
sentence on remand.  “[S]ections of the Revised Code providing for criminal 
procedure shall be construed so as to effect the fair, impartial, speedy, and sure 
administration of justice.”  R.C. 2901.04(B). 
{¶ 42} For the foregoing reasons, we reject Roberts’s claim that Ohio law 
does not authorize the resentencing of a capital defendant on remand by a judge 
other than the judge who presided over the trial. 
{¶ 43} The fourth proposition of law urges that if we reject the first 
proposition of law, R.C. 2929.06(B) should apply to the resentencing and require a 
de novo penalty-phase hearing before a new jury. 
{¶ 44} Roberts cites the following language of the statute: 
 
Whenever any court of this state or any federal court sets 
aside, nullifies, or vacates a sentence of death imposed upon an 
offender because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of 
the trial and if division (A) of this section does not apply, the trial 
court that sentenced the offender shall conduct a new hearing to 
resentence the offender.  If the offender was tried by a jury, the trial 
court shall impanel a new jury for the hearing. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C 2929.06(B). 
{¶ 45} However, the error that invalidated the death sentence imposed in 
this case—i.e., the trial court’s failure to consider Roberts’s allocution—took place 
after the trial court discharged the jury.  And the general rule is that “[u]pon remand 
from an appellate court, the lower court is required to proceed from the point at 
which the error occurred.”  State ex rel. Stevenson v. Murray, 69 Ohio St.2d 112, 
113, 431 N.E.2d 324 (1982); see also State v. Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 565, 709 
N.E.2d 1166 (1999).  We find no indication in R.C. 2929.06(B) that the General 
January Term, 2017 
 
13 
Assembly intended to abrogate that rule in capital cases.  Thus, on the second 
remand, the trial court was required to proceed from the point of error, not from an 
earlier point in the sentencing proceedings. 
{¶ 46} In Roberts I, we left the jury’s penalty-phase recommendation 
undisturbed because no reversible error infected it.  Because a legally valid penalty-
phase jury verdict has already been rendered in this case, there is no reason to 
empanel a jury and retry the evidentiary portion of either the guilt or penalty phases 
of the proceeding. 
{¶ 47} “It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a statute should 
not be interpreted to yield an absurd result.”  Mishr v. Poland Bd. of Zoning 
Appeals, 76 Ohio St.3d 238, 240, 667 N.E.2d 365 (1996).  It would be absurd to 
read R.C. 2929.06(B) as requiring that a new hearing be held and a new jury be 
empaneled for resentencing in a case where the original jury’s recommendation of 
death is untainted by error.  Such an interpretation would be especially illogical in 
light of recent precedent interpreting R.C. 2929.06(B).  As we have observed, “[i]t 
is evident that the intent of R.C. 2929.06(B) was to abrogate Penix and to make all 
capital offenders whose death sentences are set aside eligible for a death sentence 
on resentencing.”  White, 132 Ohio St.3d 344, 2012-Ohio-2583, 972 N.E.2d 534, 
at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 48} Therefore, when a capital case is remanded to a trial court for 
resentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.06(B), the trial court need not empanel a new 
jury if the case has been remanded for an error, such as a postverdict sentencing 
error on the part of the trial judge, that does not invalidate the jury’s verdict 
recommending a death sentence. 
{¶ 49} Here, the matter involves a postverdict sentencing error on the part 
of a trial judge that can be corrected on remand without the involvement of the jury.  
Thus, we overrule the fourth proposition of law. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Constitutional Argument 
{¶ 50} Stressing the importance of the trial judge’s ability to see and hear 
the defendant’s allocution and the evidence adduced in the penalty phase, Roberts 
contends that it is impossible for a judge to properly consider or weigh the 
mitigating factors present in the case by reviewing a cold record, and she urges that 
such a procedure infringes on a capital defendant’s ability to have mitigation 
properly presented and accurately assessed.  She further contends that the Eighth 
Amendment requires that the sentencer in a capital case “must be allowed to 
consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant’s character 
or record or the circumstances of the offense.”  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
327-328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), overruled on other grounds, 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). 
{¶ 51} Roberts cites Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 
L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (plurality opinion), which states that the sentencer in a capital 
case may “not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of 
a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”  (Emphasis sic.)  See 
also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-114, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 
(1982) (sentencer may not “refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant 
mitigating evidence” [emphasis sic]); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 
S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (testimony about defendant’s good behavior in jail 
pending trial was relevant and therefore could not be excluded); Hitchcock v. 
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (death sentence 
invalid when instructions precluded jury’s consideration of mitigating 
circumstances not enumerated in statute); Penry at 319-328 (instructions 
preventing jury from giving effect to evidence of intellectual disability were 
inconsistent with Lockett and Eddings). 
January Term, 2017 
 
15 
{¶ 52} However, none of these cases address the question presented in this 
case.  In Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 490, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 
(1990), the Supreme Court explained, “There is no dispute as to the precise holding 
in [Lockett and Eddings]: that the State cannot bar relevant mitigating evidence 
from being presented and considered during the penalty phase of a capital trial.”  
See also Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276, 118 S.Ct. 757, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 
(1998) (“Our consistent concern has been that restrictions on the jury’s sentencing 
determination not preclude the jury from being able to give effect to mitigating 
evidence”).  We recognized as much in Roberts II: “Each case in the Lockett-
Eddings-Skipper-Hitchcock tetralogy involved the trial court’s exclusion of, or 
refusal to consider, evidence in the original sentencing proceeding.”  137 Ohio 
St.3d 230, 2013-Ohio-4580, 998 N.E.2d 1100, at ¶ 34. 
{¶ 53} In this case, the issue is not what information is constitutionally 
relevant, but rather, it is whether a sentencing judge in a capital case may consider 
mitigation presented by the defendant without having personally observed its 
presentation in court. 
{¶ 54} Here, the assignment of Judge Rice to conduct the third sentencing 
hearing based on review of the record and without hearing additional mitigating 
evidence did not “bar relevant mitigating evidence from being presented and 
considered during the penalty phase.”  Saffle at 490.  Roberts had an opportunity to 
present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of her trial, but she elected 
not to do so.  Previously, she had made an unsworn statement and had an 
opportunity for allocution.  Judge Rice reviewed and considered her unsworn 
statement, her allocution, and the evidence in the trial record before imposing 
sentence for the third time. 
{¶ 55} Saffle rejected a capital defendant’s attempt to derive from Lockett 
and Eddings “a rule relating, not to what mitigating evidence the jury must be 
permitted to consider in making its sentencing decision, but to how it must consider 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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the mitigating evidence.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Saffle, 494 U.S. at 490, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 
108 L.Ed.2d 415.  Likewise, Roberts seeks to derive from Lockett and Penry a rule 
“relating, not to what mitigating evidence the [judge] must be permitted to 
consider,” but to how the judge must obtain it (i.e., by live presentation as opposed 
to reviewing a record).  Neither Lockett nor its progeny state or imply any such rule. 
{¶ 56} Indeed, the California Supreme Court has rejected similar 
constitutional claims in two capital cases: People v. Espinoza, 3 Cal.4th 806, 12 
Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204 (1992), and People v. Lewis, 33 Cal.4th 214, 14 
Cal.Rptr.3d 566, 91 P.3d 928 (2004). 
{¶ 57} In Espinoza, the trial judge became ill during the guilt phase of the 
trial and another judge reviewed the transcript and completed the trial.  Espinoza at 
827-828.  Lewis, like this case, involved a capital case that had been remanded for 
resentencing due to postverdict error.  Lewis at 218.  The original trial judge 
withdrew, and the resentencing was assigned to a different judge, who denied a 
defense request to present the guilt- and penalty-phase evidence by live testimony 
and proceeded to sentence the defendant on the basis of the record.  Id. at 224. 
{¶ 58} In both cases, the defendants argued that because the substitute judge 
had not personally heard all the evidence, he could not properly impose a death 
sentence.  And in both cases, the court rejected that argument.  Espinoza at 830; 
Lewis at 226.  The court in Lewis explained: “[W]hen the original trial judge is 
unavailable, necessity requires the replacement judge to evaluate the credibility of 
the witnesses as best he or she can from the written record.  We find no 
constitutional obligation to provide more.”  Id. 
{¶ 59} In the instant case, the retirement and death of the original trial judge 
and the substitution of Judge Rice did not deny Roberts the ability to present 
mitigating evidence or to have it considered by the sentencer.  Her claim to the 
contrary is not supported by the Lockett line of cases she cites, and both Lewis and 
Espinoza, the only cases we have found that address this issue in the capital-
January Term, 2017 
 
17 
sentencing context, reject the notion that a capital defendant may be sentenced to 
death only by a judge who has personally presided over one or both phases of the 
trial.  We therefore reject this Eighth Amendment argument. 
{¶ 60} Accordingly, we overrule the first and fourth propositions of law. 
The Sentencing Opinion 
Weighing the Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 61} The second proposition of law concerns the weight the trial court 
afforded the mitigating factors discussed in the allocution.  Roberts concedes that 
“the trial court did identify numerous factors in mitigation” but contends that they 
received little weight because they were not properly considered by the trial court. 
{¶ 62} Roberts further argues that the trial court erred in stating that the 
mitigating factors found in her allocution “do not even draw the Court’s attention 
away from the aggravating circumstances,” and she suggests that the use of this 
phrase reflects improper weighing, because a defendant is not required to offer 
mitigation that “ ‘draw[s] the Court’s attention’ from the [aggravating 
circumstances].” 
{¶ 63} The trial court’s use of this phrase does not constitute error.  The 
opinion of the trial court reflects that the proffered mitigating factors were weak 
and lacked significance in comparison to the aggravating circumstances.  R.C. 
2929.03(D)(3) requires the trial court to determine whether the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, and the language to which Roberts 
objects does no more than express the trial court’s conclusion in that regard. 
{¶ 64} Roberts contends that the trial court engaged in improper speculation 
that she made up allegations of domestic violence to induce Jackson to help her.  
The sentencing opinion notes that Roberts made allegations in her letters to Jackson 
“regarding the physical abuse she suffered at the hand of Mr. Fingerhut.”  The 
opinion later notes that “absolutely no evidence before the Court * * * support[ed] 
the veracity of the physical abuse allegations.”  Roberts claims that the trial court’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
discussion improperly “reduc[ed] the weight domestic violence should have been 
provided.” 
{¶ 65} Roberts’s argument is premised on two misunderstandings of the 
record.  First, contrary to Roberts’s claim, the record does contain evidence that 
Roberts falsely told Jackson that Fingerhut abused her.  She implied as much in her 
unsworn statement when she said: “I said a lot of things that weren’t true to 
Nathaniel.  My husband never touched me.  He never laid a hand on me.”  And 
several of her letters describe physical altercations. 
{¶ 66} Second, as the trial court found, the record contains no evidence to 
corroborate the claim of domestic violence found in Roberts’s letters.  Roberts 
herself repudiated that claim in her unsworn statement.  Thus, the trial court did not 
improperly “reduce the weight” of domestic violence as a mitigating factor; absent 
any evidence of domestic violence, the court properly determined that domestic 
violence should receive no weight. 
{¶ 67} Next, she contends that the trial court gave improper reasons for 
minimizing the weight to be given to her statements in allocution that she had been 
sexually abused as a child and that her auto accidents caused physical and mental 
trauma and related depression.  With respect to childhood sexual abuse, the trial 
court noted the lack of any connection between the abuse and the murder of 
Fingerhut.  Roberts contends that “[t]here is no requirement” that a defendant 
establish a “direct connection” between childhood sexual abuse and a capital crime. 
{¶ 68} It is true that a sentencer may not refuse to consider mitigating 
evidence on the ground that no connection exists between that evidence and the 
murder for which the defendant is being sentenced.  See Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 
37, 45, 48, 125 S.Ct. 400, 160 L.Ed.2d 303 (2004) (evidence of defendant’s 
troubled childhood and low IQ was constitutionally relevant despite lack of nexus 
with murder; hence, instruction preventing jury from giving effect to that evidence 
violated Eighth Amendment). 
January Term, 2017 
 
19 
{¶ 69} But the trial court in this case did not refuse to consider Roberts’s 
claim of childhood sexual abuse.  Nothing in the sentencing opinion suggests that 
the court would exclude or ignore the alleged abuse simply because no nexus could 
be found between it and the murder. 
{¶ 70} Instead, the trial court merely recognized that a childhood trauma 
that did contribute in some way to a defendant’s crime would necessarily have 
greater impact on the defendant’s moral blameworthiness—and therefore would 
deserve greater weight in mitigation—than a childhood trauma having no 
connection to the crime.  Whether mitigating factors help to explain the murder is 
obviously relevant to the weight of those factors and may be considered by the 
sentencer in assigning weight to them.  See State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 
2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 402 (holding defendant’s childhood abuse “entitled 
to weight” but noting that “there was no evidence of any significant connection 
between [the defendant’s] childhood abuse and [the victim’s] murder”). 
{¶ 71} Next, Roberts contends that the sentencing opinion improperly 
“minimized or de-valued” the mitigating weight of her auto accidents (which took 
place in 1963, 1983, and 1999) and her resulting physical injuries, depression, and 
suicide attempt.  The opinion states that “these incidents are isolated and occurred 
in a time frame so far removed from the murder of Mr. Fingerhut that their 
relevance for mitigation is significantly decreased.” 
{¶ 72} Without citation to authority, she asserts: “There is no basis in law 
for discounting mitigation because the court finds the lack of proximity in time to 
the offense.”  In other words, she argues that a sentencer may not attach less 
significance to a mitigating factor on the ground that the factor came into existence 
long before the murder. 
{¶ 73} Yet in assigning weight to a defendant’s traumatic childhood in State 
v. Campbell, 95 Ohio St.3d 48, 765 N.E.2d 334 (2002), we took into account that 
the defendant 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
 
was nearly forty-nine years old when he committed the murder that 
is the subject of this case.  He had reached “an age when * * * 
maturity could have intervened” and “had clearly made life choices 
as an adult before committing [this] murder.”  * * *  At forty-nine, 
[the defendant] had considerable time to distance himself from his 
childhood and allow other factors to assert themselves in his 
personality and his behavior. 
 
(Emphasis and second brackets added.)  Id. at 53, quoting State v. Murphy, 65 Ohio 
St.3d 554, 588, 605 N.E.2d 884 (1992) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 74} The trial court’s reasoning here is similar to ours in Campbell—the 
passage of many years between an alleged traumatic event and an aggravated 
murder can diminish the mitigating weight attributed to the traumatic event—and 
we adhere to the analysis in Campbell in this case. 
{¶ 75} Finally, Roberts complains that the sentencing opinion states that her 
charitable works and “generosity,” as reported by her on allocution, and her claim 
that she suffered from “mental trauma” seem inconsistent with her insistent 
references to her financial success during the same allocution.  Roberts argues that 
the trial court improperly used “evidence of mitigation * * * to cancel out the weight 
to be afforded clearly established mitigation.”  She cites no authority for this 
argument, nor does she explain why it is improper for the sentencing judge to point 
out what appear to be contradictions in the defendant’s presentation. 
{¶ 76} Thus, the second proposition of law is not well taken. 
Consideration of the Nature and Circumstances of the Offense 
{¶ 77} The third proposition of law contends that the trial court improperly 
used the nature and circumstances of the offense as an aggravating circumstance 
based on the following language from the sentencing opinion: 
January Term, 2017 
 
21 
 
 
 
Roberts planned and plotted for the murder of Fingerhut over 
a period of at least three months.  She conspired with Jackson, her 
imprisoned lover, to murder Fingerhut for his life insurance 
proceeds.  The murder plan was well documented through telephone 
calls recorded from Jackson’s residence[:] the Lorain Correctional 
Institut[ion].  In addition, detailed letters were exchanged between 
the loving couple outlining their plans.  These plans included the 
acquisition of supplies, the procurement of a hotel room, and the 
promise of a new vehicle for Jackson—all provided by Roberts.  
Ultimately, Roberts provided access to the residence in order for 
Jackson to carry out the murder as planned. 
Despite these intricate details, Roberts “forgot” to include 
Jackson as one of her named lovers to the police during interviews.  
In addition, Roberts attempted to thwart the investigation into the 
Fingerhut murder by implicating other individuals[,] not Jackson.  
In addition, Roberts’s feigned emotional outbursts over Fingerhut’s 
death do not correlate to the insidious behavior relative to the same. 
Therefore, the court has granted little to no weight to any of 
the mitigating factors outlined by Roberts in her unsworn statement 
or her allocution. 
 
{¶ 78} Roberts argues that her planning and preparation, her pecuniary 
motive, and her attempts to deceive the police and impede their investigation are 
part of the nature and circumstances of the offense.  Pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(B), 
the nature and circumstances of the offense are mitigating factors and may not be 
weighed on the side of aggravation in determining whether aggravation outweighs 
mitigation.  See generally State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 99, 512 N.E.2d 598 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
(1987); State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 354-355, 662 N.E.2d 311 (1996); 
State v. Davis, 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 120, 666 N.E.2d 1099 (1996).  Since the trial 
court used these facts to determine that Roberts’s proffered mitigating factors were 
to be “granted little or no weight,” she contends that the trial court in effect weighed 
them against mitigation. 
{¶ 79} This contention lacks merit.  “When a court correctly identifies the 
aggravating circumstances in its sentencing opinion, we will presume that the court 
relied only on those circumstances and not on nonstatutory aggravating 
circumstances.”  State v. Clemons, 82 Ohio St.3d 438, 447, 696 N.E.2d 1009 
(1998).  That presumption applies here because the sentencing opinion correctly 
identifies the aggravating circumstances in this case, and Roberts failed to 
overcome the presumption. 
{¶ 80} R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) requires the court to consider “the nature and 
circumstances of the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of 
committing.”  Aggravating circumstances here consist of felony-murder 
specifications pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), which include findings that “the 
offender * * * if not the principal offender, committed the offense with prior 
calculation and design.”  Thus, the detailed planning of this killing, which was 
referenced in the sentencing opinion, is evidence that supports the finding of prior 
calculation and design and therefore was properly considered as part of the statutory 
aggravating circumstances in this case. 
{¶ 81} Moreover, it is settled law that the nature and circumstances of the 
offense may also be used to explain why the aggravating circumstances outweigh 
the mitigating factors.  See, e.g., State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-
5048, 873 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 183, citing State v. Sheppard, 84 Ohio St.3d 230, 238, 
703 N.E.2d 286 (1998).  In this case, the facts cited in the sentencing opinion are 
relevant to the mitigation offered because they refute the defendant’s factual 
assertions. 
January Term, 2017 
 
23 
{¶ 82} In her unsworn statement and in her allocution, Roberts asserted that 
she and Fingerhut had a good relationship and loved each other deeply.  The trial 
court reasonably viewed these statements to be inconsistent with the relationship 
she had maintained with Jackson, her conspiracy with him to murder Fingerhut, her 
pecuniary motive for that murder, and her feigned emotional outbursts during 
police interviews.  The sentencing opinion properly referred to these facts to refute 
her claims. 
{¶ 83} The sentencing opinion does not treat the nature and circumstances 
of the offense as nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.  Instead, the opinion 
correctly identifies the aggravating circumstances found by the jury’s verdict and 
then discusses the facts of the case as they relate to those aggravating circumstances 
and to the claimed mitigating factors.  Roberts’s third proposition of law is therefore 
overruled. 
Sixth Amendment Claim 
{¶ 84} During oral argument, Roberts argued that the sentencing procedure 
employed on remand violated Hurst v. Florida, ___ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 
L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), which held that Florida’s capital-sentencing scheme violated 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it “[did] not require the jury to 
make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty” but instead 
allowed the trial judge to increase the defendant’s “authorized punishment based 
on her own factfinding.”  Id. at ___, 136 S.Ct. at 622.  We recognize that the United 
States Supreme Court decided Hurst after the submission of briefs in this case, but 
Roberts could have made essentially the same Sixth Amendment argument by 
relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 
(2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). 
{¶ 85} We therefore decline to address this claim because it has not been 
presented in a proposition of law or briefed by the parties, having been raised for 
the first time during oral argument.  When an appellant’s initial brief fails to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
mention an argument as a basis for reversing the judgment under review, we need 
not address that argument in deciding the appeal.  State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio 
St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 17-19; State v. Carter, 27 Ohio St.2d 
135, 139, 272 N.E.2d 119 (1971) (failure to include issue in brief “would warrant 
our refusal to consider it”).  As we observed in Quarterman, “ ‘justice is far better 
served when it has the benefit of briefing, arguing, and lower court consideration 
before making a final determination.’ ”  Quarterman at ¶ 19, quoting Sizemore v. 
Smith, 6 Ohio St.3d 330, 333, 453 N.E.2d 632 (1983), fn. 2.  Because Roberts failed 
to brief her Sixth Amendment claim, it is not properly before the court. 
Independent Sentence Review 
{¶ 86} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.05, we are directed to independently review 
Roberts’s death sentence and determine whether the evidence supports the jury’s 
finding of aggravating circumstances, whether the aggravating circumstances 
outweigh the mitigating factors, and whether the death sentence is proportionate to 
those affirmed in similar cases. 
Aggravating Circumstances 
{¶ 87} R.C. 2929.04 describes the death-penalty specifications to be 
included in an indictment and provides: 
 
 
(A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is 
precluded unless one or more of the following is specified in the 
indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of 
the Revised Code and proved beyond a reasonable doubt: 
* * * 
(7) The offense was committed while the offender was 
committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after 
committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated 
arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary, and either the 
January Term, 2017 
 
25 
offender was the principal offender in the commission of the 
aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the 
aggravated murder with prior calculation and design. 
 
{¶ 88} In this case, the jury returned verdicts finding Roberts guilty of two 
felony-murder specifications pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7): one predicated on 
aggravated burglary and one predicated on aggravated robbery.  And on each of the 
felony-murder specifications, the jury found that Roberts had acted with prior 
calculation and design in the aggravated murder. 
{¶ 89} We have previously determined that the state presented proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt to support the jury’s verdict on the elements of 
aggravated robbery and on the corresponding R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) capital 
specification.  See Roberts I, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 
1168, ¶ 122-130. 
{¶ 90} The state also presented proof beyond a reasonable doubt to 
support the jury’s finding of guilty in connection with the aggravated-burglary 
specification.  The evidence at trial established that Jackson murdered Fingerhut 
during the commission of aggravated burglary and that Roberts aided and 
abetted in the commission of that crime.  See R.C. 2923.01(A)(1) and (2). 
{¶ 91} On December 8, Jackson told Roberts that he needed to be in the 
house when Fingerhut came home.  The murder that Roberts and Jackson had 
planned over a two-month period took place in the house sometime between 9:00 
p.m., when Fingerhut left work, and 12:01 a.m., when Roberts called 9-1-1.  
Jackson and Roberts were seen together several times on the day of the murder and 
had dinner at a restaurant, where they paid their check at 6:43 p.m. 
{¶ 92} The evidence further showed that Jackson had Roberts’s cell phone 
in his possession, and phone records introduced at trial established that he and 
Roberts were in near-constant communication between 9:45 and 11:45 p.m. on the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
evening of the murder.  And police found no signs of forced entry at the house, 
permitting the inference that Roberts encouraged Jackson to commit the 
aggravated burglary and gave him access to the house on the night of the murder, 
thereby aiding and abetting the killing and the aggravated burglary. 
{¶ 93} Finally, the jury’s finding of prior calculation and design as alleged 
in both capital specifications is supported by evidence of the correspondence and 
taped conversations in which Roberts and Jackson planned the murder, as well as 
Roberts’s purchase of a ski mask and gloves for Jackson’s use in carrying out the 
plan.  See Roberts I, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, at  
¶ 35-84. 
Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 94} When considering whether the aggravating circumstances proved in 
this case outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, we review 
whether there is anything mitigating about the “nature and circumstances of the 
offense, [and] the history, character, and background of the offender,” R.C. 
2929.04(B), as well as the following specific mitigating factors: R.C. 
2929.04(B)(1) (victim inducement), (B)(2) (duress, coercion, or strong 
provocation), (B)(3) (mental disease or defect), (B)(4) (youth of the offender), 
(B)(5) (lack of a significant criminal record), (B)(6) (accomplice only), and (B)(7) 
(any other relevant factors). 
{¶ 95} At the mitigation hearing, Roberts declined to present any 
evidence but did make an unsworn statement.  In that statement, she asserted that 
she would not beg the jury to spare her life.  Instead, she used her statement to 
expose witnesses who she claimed had lied, cheated, and abused their power 
while testifying at trial.  She disputed the testimony of various witnesses and the 
evidence recovered from the Days Inn.  She complained that her home had been 
illegally 
searched and accused 
Sergeant Monroe, who had headed the 
January Term, 2017 
 
27 
investigation, of planting evidence in order to further his ambition to become 
Howland Township chief of police. 
{¶ 96} In her unsworn statement, Roberts contended that the trial had 
shown the jury approximately five percent of her life, including the eight times 
she had been with Jackson in the 14 months preceding the murder.  She decried 
the media coverage of the case because the coverage allegedly had ignored her 
40-year career as a businesswoman.  She also criticized the jurors as “young 
inexperienced people” who did not read newspapers or watch the news. 
{¶ 97} She derided the idea that she would murder someone for $250,000,3 
claiming that she and Fingerhut earned more than $200,000 per year.  Roberts 
stated: “I had everything.  Now I have nothing.  But the most important thing I 
don’t have is Robert [Fingerhut], and my two little girls”—her dogs.  She then 
showed the jury photographs of the dogs. 
{¶ 98} Roberts denied that her correspondence with Jackson reflected an 
actual plot to murder Fingerhut.  She claimed that she had made a number of false 
statements to Jackson and that she actually loved Fingerhut “very much.”  She said 
Fingerhut “never laid a hand on me” and “gave me everything I wanted, the same 
as I did to him.” 
{¶ 99} Roberts also accused the prosecutor of appealing to racial and 
religious prejudice and used her statement “to demand racial equality.”  She 
explained that she had refused to present mitigating evidence so that the jury 
would have no choice but to return a death verdict.  Her case and Jackson’s, she 
argued, differed only in that she is white and he is black.  Because Jackson had been 
sentenced to death, she told the jury, “the right thing” would be to sentence her to 
death too. 
                                                 
3 In reality, Fingerhut’s two life insurance policies had a combined benefit amount of over twice 
that.  Roberts claimed in her unsworn statement that she had not known about one of the policies.    
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
{¶ 100} In her October 22, 2007 allocution, Roberts told her life story.  She 
was born in Youngstown in 1944.  When she was five, her family moved to a farm 
in what is now Austintown.  As a child, Roberts said, she “tried to be happy and 
positive,” but because there were five children in the family, she never got any 
attention or affection, so she “always felt empty.” 
{¶ 101} Roberts stated that she grew up in an abusive household, observing 
her father beat and verbally abuse her mother.  Roberts said she “spent a lot of time 
under [her] bed,” especially “when guns came out.”  She also stated that, when she 
was very young, a cousin raped her, resulting in internal injuries. 
{¶ 102} Roberts said she had always been on the honor roll in school and 
on the dean’s list in college.  After college, she married her first husband, moved 
to Florida, and had a son in 1969.  Her son enlisted in the Army, served in the 
Judge Advocate General Corps, and then worked for the New Hampshire Attorney 
General’s office. 
{¶ 103} Roberts recounted a long history of motor-vehicle accidents and 
resulting injuries.  In 1963, while attending college and working two jobs, she fell 
asleep while driving and had a collision.  As a result, she was hospitalized.  She 
told the jury, “[T]hey spent a long time picking glass out of me and I was like 
spacey for awhile.”  In 1983, a car ran a red light and collided with a car she was 
in.  She was hospitalized again and went to a neurosurgeon for months afterward. 
{¶ 104} In 1999, Roberts sustained serious injuries in a third accident.  
Roberts remembered being in the hospital, but after that she could not remember 
anything “for a long time.”  She said she suffered from depression after the 
accident, culminating in a suicide attempt.  After this incident, she found herself in 
a psychiatric ward, where she claimed to have suffered from auditory 
hallucinations. 
{¶ 105} After the suicide attempt, Roberts began falling down repeatedly, 
hitting her head, and losing track of what day it was.  About seven months after 
January Term, 2017 
 
29 
her hospitalization, the Social Security Administration sent her to a psychiatrist.  
As a result, Roberts began receiving benefits. 
{¶ 106} Roberts stated that she worked for “almost 23 years” in a plastic 
surgeon’s office, where they “helped a lot of people.”  She said that when she 
operated a restaurant in the Youngstown bus terminal that Fingerhut owned, she 
gave food and money to people who were short of money at the end of the month.  
She also gave several thousand dollars to help her sisters and her son. 
{¶ 107} In 1980, Roberts converted to Judaism.  She recounted how she 
had raised money to rescue an Ethiopian Jew who was in danger of being murdered 
in his home country.  She also volunteered to assist wounded soldiers in Israel. 
{¶ 108} Roberts renewed her accusation that the police had committed 
perjury at her trial.  Contrary to both trial testimony and her own letter to Jackson, 
she insisted that she had plenty of money and did not need to ask Fingerhut for it. 
{¶ 109} Roberts stated that she had been a “good writer” in high school and 
college, was “creative,” and “had a great imagination.”  Her correspondence and 
conversations with Jackson, she said, were merely “stories.”  She never initiated 
discussions about “hurting anyone,” but just went along and wrote “what he told 
me to write.” 
{¶ 110} Roberts concluded her allocution by saying: “I never intended for 
anything like that to happen * * * and I still can’t believe it.  We loved each other 
and we had a good life.” 
{¶ 111} The statutory mitigating factor set forth in R.C. 2929.04(B)(6) 
exists in this case, since the evidence at trial establishes that Roberts was not the 
principal offender in the aggravated murder.  Nonetheless, she had a central role 
in the murder, which diminishes the weight of this factor.  See State v. Herring, 
94 Ohio St.3d 246, 267, 762 N.E.2d 940 (2002).  There is no other evidence of 
the statutory mitigating factors in this record.  See Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d at 101-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
102, 512 N.E.2d 598 (defendant bears burden of proving existence of mitigating 
factors). 
{¶ 112} Roberts’s history, character, and background, as recounted in her 
allocution and reflected in the trial record, present some mitigating features.  
Roberts worked for a plastic surgeon in Florida, helped treat wounded soldiers 
in Israel, operated a restaurant, and helped Fingerhut run the bus terminals.  Her 
work history and compassion for others deserve some weight in mitigation.  See, 
e.g., State v. Hand, 107 Ohio St.3d 378, 2006-Ohio-18, 840 N.E.2d 151, ¶ 281 
(work history as mitigating factor).  However, her uncorroborated claims of an 
unhappy childhood are entitled to little weight, as is her claimed history of 
mental problems stemming from injuries resulting from traffic accidents. 
{¶ 113} In light of the trial evidence, her claim that she loved Fingerhut 
lacks credibility.  And although she expressed sadness about Fingerhut’s murder, 
she never accepted any responsibility for it; rather, she chose to deny that she had 
ever made plans with Jackson to kill Fingerhut, notwithstanding overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary. 
{¶ 114} Finally, the nature and circumstances of the offense offer nothing 
in mitigation.  Motivated at least in part by greed, she assisted Jackson in 
murdering Fingerhut in his home, which they planned prior to Jackson’s release 
from prison. 
Sentence Evaluation 
{¶ 115} After our independent review and weighing, we find that the 
aggravating circumstances present in this case outweigh the mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The evidence of the recorded telephone calls and the 
letters exchanged between Roberts and Jackson shows that over a period of 
months, Roberts and Jackson planned to kill Fingerhut and that she facilitated the 
burglary of her home.  Her active participation in the murder of Fingerhut and the 
January Term, 2017 
 
31 
accompanying felonies was essential to successfully committing these crimes.  By 
comparison, the mitigating factors carry little weight. 
{¶ 116} We find that the death penalty in this case is appropriate and 
proportionate when compared with capital cases involving aggravated murder 
committed during aggravated burglary, see State v. Davie, 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 
686 N.E.2d 245 (1997), and for aggravated murder committed during 
aggravated robbery, see State v. Burke, 73 Ohio St.3d 399, 653 N.E.2d 242 
(1995); State v. Raglin, 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 699 N.E.2d 482 (1998). 
{¶ 117} We further find that the death sentence is proportionate to the 
death sentence imposed on Jackson.  See State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 
2006-Ohio-1, 839 N.E.2d 362 (affirming death sentence), and State v. 
Jackson, 149 Ohio St.3d 55, 2016-Ohio-5488, 73 N.E.3d 414 (affirming 
death sentence on appeal from resentencing). 
{¶ 118} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Trumbull County 
Court of Common Pleas. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, for the reasons set forth in 
his dissenting opinion in State v. Wogenstahl, 134 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2013-Ohio-
164, 981 N.E.2d 900. 
_________________ 
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and LuWayne 
Annos and Ashleigh Musick, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
David L. Doughten and Robert A. Dixon, for appellant. 
_________________