Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Nwadike

Citation: 416 Md. 445

Docket Number: 11ag/09

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Ozoemena Maryrose Nwadike, Misc. Docket
AG No. 11, September Term 2009
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE - DISCIPLINARY ACTION - MRPC 1.15(a) AND 8.4(a),
(c), & (d) - INTENTIONAL MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRUST ACCOUNT FUNDS
DISBARMENT IS WARRANTED WHERE AN ATTORNEY: (a) MAINTAINS FUNDS
IN HIS OR HER ESCROW ACCOUNT FOR A FOREIGN ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND
FOR PERSONAL EXPENSES; (b) REPEATEDLY ADVANCES CLIENT MONIES
FROM THE ACCOUNT BEFORE MAKING DEPOSITS NECESSARY TO FUND THESE
DISBURSEMENTS; (c) PROVIDES INACCURATE AND MOSTLY INCOMPLETE
ACCOUNTING OF THE ACCOUNT’S ACTIVITY; AND, (d) OFFERS VAGUE AND
EVASIVE ANSWERS TO INQUIRIES MADE AT AN INVESTIGATIVE HEARING.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 24162-M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 11
September Term, 2009
                                                                             
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
OZOEMENA MARYROSE NWADIKE
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                            
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Bell, C.J., and Murphy, J., 
          Concur and Dissent.
                                                                             
Filed: August 25, 2010
Respondent, Ozoemena Maryrose Nwadike, was admitted to the Maryland Bar on 17
June 1992.  On 1 May 2009, the Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar
Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in which it asserted that
Respondent violated several provisions of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
(“MRPC”) and a number of other rules and a statutory provision governing the practice of
law through her prolonged pattern of mishandling and abuse of funds in her attorney trust
account.  We referred the matter to the Honorable Joseph A. Dugan, Jr., of the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, to conduct an evidentiary hearing and render findings of fact and
recommended conclusions of law with regard to the alleged violations.
Following a two-day hearing at which the parties presented conflicting and confusing
evidence, Judge Dugan concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent
violated MRPC 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property) and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct);
Maryland Rules 16-604 (Required Deposits), 16-607 (Commingling of Funds), and 16-609
(Prohibited Transactions); and Maryland Code (1989, 2004 Repl. Vol.), Business
Occupations and Professions Article, § 10-306 (hereinafter “Business Occupations and
Professions Article § 10-306”) (Misuse of Trust Money).
Petitioner took no exceptions and recommended disbarment.  Respondent noted
several exceptions to Judge Dugan’s findings and conclusions, in which she asserted that she
violated none of the above-noted provisions as alleged by Bar Counsel.  As a fallback
position of sorts, were this Court to conclude that Respondent violated any of the provisions
with which she was charged, the worst case scenario conceived of by Nwadike is that she
may have violated MRPC 1.15(a) and Md. Rule 16-607 because of “commingling resulting
-2-
from not promptly withdrawing her earned attorneys’ fees from the trust account.”  If that
were the Court’s resolve, she urges that we should “impose a sanction that is not in excess
of [a] reprimand or 30 days suspension.”  For reasons we shall explain, we overrule
Respondent’s exceptions and find that her considerable misconduct warrants disbarment.
I.  FINDINGS OF FACT
The Attorney Grievance Commission became alert to Respondent’s potential improper
conduct following entry by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, on 2 August 2006, of
a civil judgment for $14,500 in favor of Mr. Bolly Ba against Respondent on Ba’s claim of
misappropriation of funds.  The Commission’s subsequent investigation of Respondent
revealed a persistent pattern of misconduct with regard to funds in her attorney trust account
as to Mr. Ba and others.
A.  The Ba Law Suit and the Njosa Foreclosure Avoidance Scheme
Ba’s civil claim against Respondent arose out of a contract between Ba and Ivo Fotoh
Njosa (a contract procured by Respondent) in which Ba sought to purchase certain real
property from Njosa.  The record shows that, in 2003, Respondent was engaged in
representing Njosa in his then-ongoing divorce action.  At some point during that
representation, Njosa’s sister, Ba’s co-worker at Long & Foster Realtors, informed Ba that
Njosa’s home was in foreclosure; in response, Ba expressed interest in purchasing the
property.
On 17 July 2003, six days prior to the scheduled date of the foreclosure sale,
Respondent sent a letter to Worthington H. Talcott, the attorney representing the foreclosing
1Respondent claimed at the trial on Ba’s civil action that her first contact with Ba
occurred on 18 July 2003, when Ba, Njosa, and Njosa’s sister met with Respondent in her
office to discuss the sale of the Njosa property.  Ba testified to the contrary, insisting that this
meeting never occurred.  Judge Dugan found, however, that some meeting between Ba,
Respondent, and Njosa had to have occurred (although not necessarily on July 18) before
Respondent proceeded with her scheme on July 22.
2Respondent asserted that Onuma consented to the “loan”; however, Onuma did not
testify to corroborate Respondent’s claim at the evidentiary hearing in the present
disciplinary matter or at the civil trial on Ba’s claim.
-3-
lender’s interest, requesting that the foreclosure sale be postponed for fifteen days so that Ba
could have an opportunity to purchase the property from Njosa and his soon-to-be ex-wife.
Talcott denied the request, advising instead that the lender might reconsider pursuit of its
foreclosure action upon receipt and review of an executed contract of sale.  Judge Dugan
found that, at some point prior to the scheduled foreclosure sale date of July 23,1 Ba and
Njosa met with Respondent, who agreed to find a lender to facilitate the removal of Njosa’s
property from foreclosure.  Apparently, the Njosas were $14,500 in default on the secured
loan.  Ba agreed to purchase the property and repay the loan that Respondent was to secure;
that agreement, however, was never reduced to writing.
To facilitate Ba’s purchase and remove Njosa’s property from default, Respondent
“borrowed” $14,500 from the funds in her attorney trust account, funds which belonged to
Eke Onuma, an individual whom Respondent claimed to represent.2  Respondent withdrew
$14,500 from the trust account on July 22 and caused to be drawn a cashier’s check in like
amount, payable to Talcott’s law firm.  Respondent presented the check to Talcott’s law
office in person that day.
-4-
On August 14, Ba gave Respondent a cashier’s check for $14,500 and executed with
Respondent, who purported to be acting on behalf of Njosa, a document entitled “Offer to
Sell Real Estate.”  Although Respondent did not have power of attorney authorization from
Njosa, she executed nevertheless the contract as a “holder of owner’s/seller’s Power of
Attorney.”  The contract provided that Ba’s $14,500 check was a “deposit” on the purchase
price of the property.  Judge Dugan found, however, that the contract did not depict the true
agreement of the parties’ prior dealings, because, in fact, the $14,500 represented the
repayment of the “loan” made allegedly by Onuma.  Respondent could not explain to Judge
Dugan or Bar Counsel why she executed a contract that did not reflect the agreement of the
parties.
On August 15, Talcott mailed Respondent a refund check in the amount of $468.06
for overpayment of the amount in default required to remove Njosa’s property from
foreclosure.  Respondent did not deposit that refund check into her attorney trust account.
Talcott testified that the refund check never cleared his account, and stated that Respondent
told him not to reissue the refund check to her.
Ultimately, a problem with the appraisal of Njosa’s property prevented Ba from
settling on the contract to purchase the property.  Ba requested that Respondent return his
“deposit” of $14,500.  Respondent refused, replying that Ba had agreed that the money would
go to the bank to remove Njosa’s property from foreclosure.  Instead, in a letter dated 24
September 2003, Respondent referred Ba to the Judgment of Absolute Divorce in Njosa’s
divorce case, wherein Ba was granted the possibility of reimbursement of his $14,500 from
3In addition, Ba secured a judgment of $14,500 against Njosa in the same action.
-5-
the proceeds of the sale of the Njosa property (assuming adequate net proceeds resulted), if
he would submit proof, within 14 days after the divorce judgment, that he had removed the
property from foreclosure.  The letter made no mention that Ba’s funds were used to repay
a “loan” that Respondent “borrowed” from an alleged client to cure the foreclosure.
As a consequence of these dealings, Ba filed a civil claim against Respondent in the
Circuit Court for misappropriation of funds, which resulted in a judgment against Respondent
in the amount of $14,500.3  Although the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Special
Appeals in 2008, it remains unsatisfied.
B.  Respondent’s Additional Misuse of the Funds in Her Attorney Trust Account
Following entry of the judgment against Respondent in Ba’s law suit, Bar Counsel
commenced a general investigation into Respondent’s management of the funds in her
attorney trust account.  As part of this investigation, Bar Counsel served Respondent with a
subpoena on 25 January 2008 requesting that she provide certain financial data and records
regarding her trust account and other professional accounts relevant to the period of 2
January 2002 through 30 June 2006.  In response, Respondent produced only copies of
deposit slips and customer receipts from 21 March 2003 through 7 June 2006, monthly bank
statements from 1 August 2003 through 31 May 2006, and disbursed checks from 25 April
2003 through 22 May 2006 related to the trust account.  Respondent never produced any
requested billing statements, ledger cards, or accounting of funds that she received,
4According to Judge Dugan’s findings of fact, Respondent apparently was unable to
provide documentation to demonstrate that she possessed at least $14,500 of Onuma’s funds
in the trust account when she withdrew, allegedly with Onuma’s consent, the amount
necessary to cure the default on Njosa’s property.  Respondent testified that she deposited
previously $5,000 for Onuma into her trust account, represented by a check from “Homeland
Charities” with the notation “symposium 3 months,” which allegedly brought Onuma’s
balance to almost $15,000; Judge Dugan, however, did not find this testimony credible,
noting specifically that Respondent relied upon uncorroborated hearsay to explain the source
of the funds used to remove Njosa’s property from foreclosure and her authority to expend
those funds.
-6-
maintained, and disbursed from her trust account during this period.4
Although Respondent claimed that she knew whose money was in her attorney trust
account, she provided Bar Counsel with no accounting records upon which its investigation
could proceed.  Bar Counsel was forced to perform its own analysis of Respondent’s account,
using such records as could be found.  This analysis revealed numerous other aspects of
Respondent’s financial malfeasance and nonfeasance regarding other clients and persons.
In what might seem to be the most egregious of the instances of mismanagement of
the funds in the trust account, Respondent deposited monies into the account ostensibly
earmarked for the election campaign of Christopher Ngige, Respondent’s brother and a
gubernatorial candidate in Nigeria.  According to the testimony of Anthony Isama, one of
Respondent’s witnesses and a friend of Ngige, Eke Onuma (who, as noted supra, Respondent
claimed was the client from whom she had “borrowed” funds in the Njosa foreclosure
scheme) is in fact a Nigerian businessman who acted as an intermediary between Respondent
and the Ngige election campaign.  Isama stated that Onuma agreed to pay the Ngige
5“Naira” is the currency of Nigeria.
6For a Maryland attorney to utilize his or her trust account as a holding place for a
pass-through of election contributions (foreign or domestic) is, in and of itself, another issue.
-7-
campaign an amount of naira5 corresponding to funds collected and held for the campaign
in Respondent’s attorney trust account.
Like most of Respondent’s other explanations regarding the use of the funds in her
trust account, her explanation of the funding of the Ngige campaign through her escrow
account was supported by very little documentation.  Respondent claimed to have received
several deposits, totaling $110,493, in her attorney trust account slated to be transferred to
the Ngige campaign, but she failed to provide an accounting reflecting these deposits.  In
addition, there was no documentation offered to corroborate the fact that Onuma’s naira
payments equaling the funds collected and held in Respondent’s account for Ngige in fact
were paid to the campaign.6  Respondent testified that Onuma instructed her to disburse the
ostensible campaign funds in her account for the benefit of his children, who attend school
in the United States.  Again, no records were produced by Respondent showing the amount
of these funds held in her attorney trust account or how she disbursed those funds.
Respondent and her witness, Isama, even disagreed as to who managed the campaign funds;
each claimed that he or she alone was responsible for collecting the funds and
communicating the totals to Onuma and the Ngige campaign.
Respondent’s explanations of amounts credited to her trust account, ostensibly in
connection with the Ngige campaign, were similarly unsupported.  Respondent claimed that
7Respondent explained, rivaling a sphinx, that she “purchased certified fund from the
bank account from her earned fees [and that] her check was deposited and issued to VCR for
the purchase of the ‘certified fund.’”
-8-
$349,975 wired into her attorney trust account on 19 August 2005 “came from [unspecified]
personal injury cases and from attorneys’ fees and reimbursed expenses in the Dr. Ngige
election tribunal case[s] in Nigeria.”  Respondent, however, did not have any corroborative
testimonial or documentary evidence to support these oral assertions.  The record shows that,
on 29 August 2005, she deposited a $120,000 personal check for which Judge Dugan found
she offered again no logical or coherent accounting.7  Respondent also transferred $50,000
into her attorney trust account in September 2005, funds which she claimed belonged to
Ngige.
In addition, Respondent’s refusal even to identify forthrightly Christopher Ngige as
her brother was evasive, at best.  Respondent stated disingenuously that Ngige merely was
“somebody’s name.”  Even though Ngige was not a client of Respondent’s, she asserted an
attorney-client privilege and refused to explain her relationship to him.  When Isama testified
that Ngige is Respondent’s brother, Judge Dugan asked Respondent why she had engaged
in such “subterfuge.”  Respondent stood mute.
The Ngige campaign funds actually were not the crowning underachievement of
Respondent’s misuse of the funds in her trust account.  Judge Dugan found further that
Respondent repeatedly advanced funds for clients prior to depositing funds into her attorney
trust account to cover these disbursements.  From 2002 to 2006, Respondent disbursed from
8The notations with which Respondent inscribed her checks illustrate the personal
nature of these payments.  The check to “Adeline/MaryKay” is for “products;” one of
multiple checks made out to Respondent’s daughter is for “Mercedes payments.”  The
$24,397 check made out to the Knights of Columbus, meanwhile, bears the mysterious
notation “payoff.”
-9-
the account a total of $134,312.85 prior to making deposits necessary to fund those
disbursements.  When asked by Bar Counsel to explain several specific instances of this
practice, Respondent replied to each inquiry that each premature disbursement was due to
an “administrative glitch.”  Settlement sheets for a number of clients showed also that actual
disbursements exceeded the total amount of payment received on behalf of those clients.
Still other settlement sheets did not depict accurately the disbursements made from the
account.  For example, client Georgina Kun-Shermand’s settlement sheet states that Kun-
Shermand’s net settlement was $729 when the actual disbursement was $1,273, and that
$1,172 was disbursed to Greater Washington Orthopaedic when the actual disbursement was
$2,077.
From 1 January 2002 through 24 April 2006, Respondent also maintained personal
funds in her attorney trust account.  During this period, she issued checks from the account
for personal expenses ranging in amounts from $91.25 to $24,397, to (among other
recipients) American Express, Bank of America, the Knights of Columbus,
“Adeline/MaryKay,” and her daughter Linda Nwadike, and had an automatic $1,559.84
monthly mortgage payment debited from her account.8  Isama testified that three suspect
debits on Respondent’s trust account paid to American Express, totaling $7,820, and one
-10-
check issued from the account to “MBNA,” for $35,600, were payments for credit card
purchases Respondent made for Ngige’s wife.  A further $50,000 cash withdrawal
Respondent made from her account on 4 December 2002 was never explained.
II.  CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
After considering the evidence presented by the parties at the hearing, Judge Dugan
determined, on 21 January 2010, that Bar Counsel proved, by clear and convincing evidence,
that Respondent’s actions outlined above violated MRPC 1.15(a) and 8.4(a), (c), and (d);
Maryland Rules 16-604, 16-607, and 16-609; and Business Occupations and Professions
Article § 10-306.  Respondent filed exceptions with this Court challenging each of these
conclusions of law and several of the hearing judge’s findings of fact.
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney discipline
proceedings in Maryland.”  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Thomas, 409 Md. 121, 147, 973 A.2d
185, 200 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Our review of the record in such
cases is independent, but we will not disturb any of a hearing judge’s findings of fact absent
a showing that these findings are clearly erroneous.  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Ugwuonye,
405 Md. 351, 368, 952 A.2d 226, 235-36 (2008).  On the other hand, we review the hearing
judge’s conclusions of law under a non-deferential standard.  Id. at 368, 952 A.2d at 236.
IV.  ANALYSIS
We find no basis to disturb Judge Dugan’s findings of fact in the present case.  We
overrule Respondent’s exceptions and also find that each of the hearing judge’s conclusions
9For reasons explained infra, we conclude that Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(a) as
a result of her violations of the other provisions of the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct.
-11-
of law was proper, considering the credited evidence (and reasonable inferences) before him
in this case.  Accordingly, we hold that Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d);
MRPC 1.15(a); Maryland Rules 16-604, 16-607, and 16-609; and Business Occupations and
Professions Article § 10-306 in staging the Njosa foreclosure avoidance scheme and in
mishandling grossly and intentionally the funds in her attorney trust account.
A.  MRPC 8.4 and Md. Rule 16-604
MRPC 8.4, entitled “Misconduct,” provides, in pertinent part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do
so, or do so through the acts of another;
*     *     *
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation; [or]
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice; . . .
MRPC 8.4.
Violations of MRPC 8.4(c)9 may occur either intentionally or negligently.  See
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 409 Md. 304, 320-29, 974 A.2d 315, 324-29 (2009)
(distinguishing between intentional and negligent misrepresentations made to Bar Counsel
-12-
during a disciplinary action).  The line between intentional and negligent violations is
exemplified in two recent cases.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ellison, 384 Md. 688,
867 A.2d 259 (2005), we held that an attorney violated MRPC 8.4(c) when he rescinded
intentionally an agreement in which he had promised to pay a physical therapist who treated
his client in a personal injury case.  Id. at 711, 867 A.2d at 272.  Ellison sent a letter to the
therapist that stated falsely that he no longer represented the client who had been treated.  Id.
We found that Ellison intended to avoid paying the physical therapist by misrepresenting in
his letter his ongoing representation of the client.  Id.  We noted additionally that Ellison
concealed purposefully during Bar Counsel’s investigation his continuing representation of
the client.  Id. at 715, 867 A.2d at 274-75.  On this basis, we held that Ellison “acted
intentionally, the ‘most culpable state,’ because he acted with a ‘conscious objective or
purpose to accomplish a particular result.’” Id. (quoting Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Glenn,
341 Md. 448, 485, 671 A.2d 463, 481 (1996)).
By contrast, negligent violations of MRPC 8.4(c) are not committed with a “conscious
objective,” but rather in an inadvertent manner.  For example, we found in Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Calhoun, 391 Md. 532, 894 A.2d 518 (2004), that an attorney’s
violation of MRPC 8.4(c) arose from failing to communicate properly to her client the
accumulation of legal fees and costs, as required by the representation agreement.  Id. at 571,
894 A.2d at 541.  We held that Calhoun’s violation of MRPC 8.4(c) was negligent because,
although she had not acted dishonestly or fraudulently, she “misle[d] by silence and lack of
communication.”  Id. at 548, 894 A.2d at 527.
-13-
Here, the facts indicate that Respondent violated intentionally MRPC 8.4(c) because
she acted with a “conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.”  Ellison,
384 Md. at 715, 867 A.2d at 275.  Respondent’s violations of MRPC 8.4(c) arose when she
misrepresented purposefully to Ba that she had power of attorney to execute the property sale
contract on behalf of her client, Njosa.  The following transcript extract from the 19 January
evidentiary hearing in this case is but one clear example of this:
[BAR COUNSEL]: If you look at the second page of the
document [the contract], did you sign on behalf of . . . Ivo
Njosa?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes, I did.
[BAR COUNSEL]: Okay.  And you signed as a power of
attorney, is that correct?
[RESPONDENT]: Yes, that’s what it says here [in the contract].
[BAR COUNSEL]: Okay, and at the time you executed that
document . . . you did not have an executed power of attorney
on behalf of Mr. Njosa, isn’t that also true?
[RESPONDENT]: It is true, I did not.
Moreover, Respondent acted with the intention to conceal from Bar Counsel the
identity of Christopher Ngige, her brother, by responding to Bar Counsel’s inquiry regarding
Ngige’s identity with the vague and evasive answer that it was merely “somebody’s name,”
as opposed to a truthful disclosure of the familial relationship.
Similar to the facts in Ellison, Respondent misrepresented intentionally a fact in the
Njosa/Ba contractual agreement and attempted to conceal facts from Bar Counsel’s
-14-
investigation.  There is no distinction between slight or egregious dishonesty for purposes
of MRPC 8.4(c); “‘[h]onesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney’s
character.’”  Ellison, 384 Md. at 716, 867 A.2d at 275 (quoting Attorney Griev. Comm’n v.
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001)).  Judge Dugan found “the
Respondent to be dishonest.”  Respondent’s actions were not inadvertent; rather, Respondent
decided consciously to act dishonestly with regard to the Ba/Njosa contract and her
interactions with Bar Counsel.  As such, Respondent violated intentionally MRPC 8.4(c).
Respondent’s violation of MRPC 8.4(d) occurred when she signed the 14 August
2003 property sale agreement that did not depict the true agreement between Ba, Njosa, and
Respondent.  We have stated that MRPC 8.4(d) deals with the “complete trust and
confidence” vested in an attorney’s “public calling.”  Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 390, 773 A.2d
at 471.  It is the duty of the courts and of attorneys to “uphold the highest standards of
professional conduct and to protect the public from imposition by the unfit or unscrupulous
practitioner.”  Id.  Here, the Ba/Njosa contract stated that the $14,500 amount represented
Ba’s deposit.  Respondent testified, however, that the $14,500 was, in fact, Ba’s repayment
to Respondent for the amount she paid from Onuma’s escrow monies to avoid foreclosure
of the property and provide Ba the opportunity to purchase the property.
Respondent’s actions in this regard were contrary to the “administration of justice”
because they represented a failure to uphold her obligations and fiduciary duty to Ba and
Njosa.  When Respondent received Ba’s $14,500 check, Respondent had a duty to protect
those funds as a deposit, in the event that someone else might purchase the property.  She did
10Respondent’s failure to return the refunded amount to Ba reflects clearly a violation
of Rule 16-604, entitled “Trust account – Required deposits,” which provides:
Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds,
including cash, received and accepted by an attorney or law firm
in this State from a client or third person to be delivered in
whole or in part to a client or third person, unless received as
payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or in
reimbursement for expenses properly advanced on behalf of the
client, shall be deposited in an attorney trust account in an
approved financial institution.
Md. Rule 16-604.
-15-
not fulfill this obligation.  Although causing to be placed in the Njosas’ Judgment of
Absolute Divorce Decree a provision whereby Ba might be reimbursed the $14,500 “deposit”
could be interpreted as an effort by Respondent to protect Ba’s interest, this effort was
insufficient to safeguard the money that was entrusted to Respondent’s care.  Respondent’s
treatment of the overpayment refund check corroborates further Respondent’s failure to
fulfill her duty to Ba and establishes even more clearly her violation of MRPC 8.4(d).10
In addition, Respondent owed a duty to Njosa to draft a document reflecting
accurately his liability to Ba if Njosa could not return Ba’s deposit because he did not receive
enough funds from the property sale.  Respondent failed to do so.  Her actions fall far short
of adhering to her “public calling” of “complete trust and confidence.”  Vanderlinde, 364
Md. at 390, 773 A.2d at 471.  Ba was foreclosed from recovering directly his $14,500 and
was forced to sue Respondent and Njosa, leading to the civil judgment entered against both.
We agree with the hearing judge’s assessment and find that Respondent’s misconduct in this
-16-
regard constitutes a violation of MRPC 8.4(d).
Respondent’s naked claim that she had Onuma’s authority to use his funds to remove
Njosa’s property from foreclosure is unsubstantiated.  Such an alleged agreement was never
reduced to writing.  Onuma did not testify at trial and therefore there was no corroboration
of Nwadike’s claim that she had such authority.  Given Respondent’s irresponsible and
haphazard accounting records and her pattern of dishonesty, it is easy to appreciate and
endorse Judge Dugan’s assessment that there was no such authorization.  We have observed
that, in cases in which it is shown that the attorney engaged in systemic and far-ranging
financial malfeasance/non-feasance with other persons’ money in his or her trust account and
proceeded to obfuscate and conceal those activities by failing to maintain proper paper or
electronic records, the refusal to maintain proper account records permits adverse inferences
to be drawn against the offending attorney.  See Thomas, 409 Md. at 142-43, 973 A.2d at 198
(upholding hearing judge’s determination that attorney had advanced fee payments before
fees had been earned, contrary to attorney’s statement that he had earned those fees, because
attorney produced no records to support his claim); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Goff, 399 Md.
1, 19, 922 A.2d 554, 565 (2007) (agreeing with lower court finding that several deficiencies
in an attorney’s conduct in managing his accounts, while each insufficient individually to
indicate the attorney’s incompetence, may support a further adverse finding of incompetence
when viewed as a whole); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Roberts, 394 Md. 137, 163-64, 904
A.2d 557, 573 (2006) (finding not clearly erroneous hearing judge’s conclusion that attorney
delayed client payments for his own benefit even though that conclusion relied chiefly on
-17-
contested evidence, because total effect of attorney’s behavior demonstrated a “lack of
diligence”).  Here, the absence of testimonial support from Isama, Onuma, or Ngige, and of
any documentary support of Respondent’s claims, permitted the drawing of reasonable
inferences against Respondent in favor of Bar Counsel’s allegations of misconduct.  See
Bereano v. State Ethics Comm’n, 403 Md. 716, 740-46, 944 A.2d 538, 551-56 (2008)
(explaining the “missing witness rule,” under which adverse inferences may be drawn against
a party who refuses to summon a witness whose testimony could “elucidate [a] transaction”
critical to trial when the party is “peculiarly” able to summon that witness).  Because of the
specific, strict, and affirmative record-keeping obligations placed on attorneys in the
maintenance and operation of their escrow accounts containing the trust funds of clients and
third parties, the failure to maintain those records to document an attorney’s claim of how
and when those funds were received and expended, as well as an attorney’s claimed
authorization to make disbursements, may be disbelieved and an adverse inference drawn
where such required corroboration is not forthcoming.  Thus, we find that Respondent
violated MRPC 8.4(d).
In holding that Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(c) and (d), we also conclude that
Respondent correspondingly violated MRPC 8.4(a).
B.  MRPC 1.15(a) and the Other Financial Malfeasance/Nonfeasance Violations
MRPC 1.15, entitled “Safekeeping Property,” provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or a third person that
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
separate from the lawyer’s own property.  Funds shall be kept in
11The exceptions listed in section b. of Rule 16-607 are:
1.  An attorney or law firm shall either (A) deposit into an
attorney trust account funds to pay any fees, service charges, or
minimum balance required by the financial institution to open or
maintain the account . . . or (B) enter into an agreement with the
financial institution to have any fees or charges deducted from
an operating account maintained by the attorney or law firm. .
. .
2.  An attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust
account funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently
or potentially to the attorney or law firm. . . .
3.  Funds of a client or beneficial owner may be pooled and
commingled in an attorney trust account with the funds held for
other clients or beneficial owners.
Md. Rule 16-607.  None of these exceptions are pertinent to this case.
-18-
a separate account . . . and records shall be created and
maintained . . . .  Other property shall be identified specifically
as such and appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt
and distribution shall be created and maintained.  Complete
records of the account funds and of other property shall be kept
by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five
years after the date the record was created.
MRPC 1.15(a).  Maryland Rule 16-607, entitled “Commingling of funds,” states, in part, that
“[a]n attorney or law firm may deposit in an attorney trust account only those funds required
to be deposited in that account by Rule 16-604 or permitted to be so deposited by section b.
of this Rule.”11
There is evidence demonstrating that Respondent failed to keep her earned fees and
reimbursed expenses in her attorney trust account separate from her clients’ and third parties’
-19-
property.  In addition, she made a host of deposits and received electronic transfers into her
attorney trust account without any accounting.  Respondent stated simply that several of
these deposits were for “Ngige,” who, as she told Bar Counsel and the hearing judge, was
merely “somebody’s name” (albeit her brother’s).  Moreover, Respondent commingled
personal funds with her clients’ monies in her attorney trust account for more than four years.
The $120,000, $50,000, and $349,975 deposits, none of which were explained adequately,
did not belong in escrow because they were not an advancement of fees or expenses.
Furthermore, Respondent issued checks ranging in amounts from $91.25 to $24,397
to pay for her personal expenses, while other checks were written on behalf of individuals
who were not her clients.  She did not claim to be acting as an attorney for Ngige, and she
never represented Onuma or Isama, the individuals on whose behalf she claims certain
checks were issued.  To the contrary, Judge Dugan found aptly that Respondent “made her
attorney trust account available to them as a repository for funds collected and some type of
financial exchange service.”  For none of these transactions did Respondent maintain
complete records, as required by MRPC 1.15.  As a result, Judge Dugan found that she “has
no knowledge of how much money she holds in her trust account on behalf of each client.”
We conclude that the evidence established Respondent’s egregious and intentional violations
of MRPC 1.15(a) and Maryland Rule 16-607.
The evidence shows additionally that Respondent violated Maryland Rule 16-609 and
Business Occupations and Professions Article § 10-306.  Rule 16-609, entitled “Prohibited
transactions,” states, in pertinent part:
-20-
a. Generally.  An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge
any funds required by the Rules in this Chapter to be deposited
in an attorney trust account, obtain any remuneration from the
financial institution for depositing any funds in the account, or
use any funds for any unauthorized purpose.
Rule 16-609.  Business Occupations and Professions Article § 10-306 provides similarly that
“[a] lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for which the
trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.”  Business Occupations and Professions Article § 10-
306.  Respondent violated these regulations when she used continuously trust money for
purposes other than those for which her clients’ monies were designated.  The evidence
shows also that she disbursed a total of $134,312.85 prior to making deposits to fund those
disbursements.
Respondent’s four-year pattern of commingling funds and using funds to pay for
personal expenses are intentional misappropriations of client and third party funds.  We have
viewed intentional misappropriation as “a most egregious violation even without actual loss
[to the client], because the failure to keep client funds separate subjects the funds to the
claims of creditors of the lawyer.  The rule is concerned with the risk of loss, not only the
actual loss.”  Glenn, 341 Md. at 489, 671 A.2d at 483.  Although Respondent apparently did
not lose a third party’s or a client’s funds, the risk of loss was considerable throughout her
four years of shoddy record keeping, commingling, and misuse of funds.
V.  THE PROPER SANCTION
As we have observed frequently, the purpose of disciplinary proceedings against an
attorney is not to punish the attorney, but rather to protect the public.  Attorney Griev.
-21-
Comm’n v. Cassidy, 362 Md. 689, 698, 766 A.2d 632, 637 (2001).  “The public is protected
when sanctions are imposed that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the
violations and the intent with which they are committed.”  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Post,
379 Md. 60, 70-71, 839 A.2d 718, 724 (2003).  The aim of sanctions also is to set the
standard of integrity for members of the legal profession and to demonstrate the kind of
conduct the Court will not tolerate.  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 683, 431
A.2d 1336, 1351-52 (1981).
We have considered several factors in determining an appropriate sanction.
“Aggravating” factors may include:
(a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally
failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (g) refusal
to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of
victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of law; (j)
indifference to making restitution.
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 176-77, 994 A.2d 928, 945-46 (2010).
Respondent does not have a prior disciplinary record.  There is evidence, however,
that: (1) Respondent acted with a dishonest motive; (2) she misrepresented intentionally
facts; (3) there was a “pattern of misconduct”; (4) she made no effort to rectify the
consequences of her misconduct (including satisfying the civil judgment owed to Ba); (5) she
has been dishonest and uncooperative with Bar Counsel; (6) she has been practicing law for
more than fifteen years and ought to know that what she did (and did not do) was improper;
12We interpret Respondent’s singular reference to “the Rule” in her exceptions to
mean all of the rule and code sections which she was charged with violating.  In any case,
a practitioner of 11 to 15 years experience at the Bar (depending on which violations are
considered), who mounts an “ignorance of the law” mitigation defense, wields a two-edged
sword.  We find here that Respondent has run onto her sword.
13Respondent’s decision to insert in the Njosa divorce decree a provision for the
potential recovery of Ba’s $14,500 “deposit” if the sale of the home netted sufficient funds,
if it constitutes a mitigating factor at all, is of so little consequence that it cannot begin to
outweigh the gravity of the misconduct in which Respondent engaged.
-22-
and, (7) she has shown no remorse for her misconduct.
Judge Dugan found no mitigating facts.  In her written exceptions, Respondent argued
in mitigation that she had no prior disciplinary record (a conceded fact); that there was an
absence of a dishonest or selfish motive on her part; that she was a sole practitioner who
never “attended any course or training on trust account and was ignorant of the requirements
of the Rule;”12 and that there was no indication that “this violation” would be repeated.  Other
than the conceded absence of a prior disciplinary record, Respondent’s mitigation arguments
are unconvincing.13
We are not persuaded by Respondent’s mitigation arguments.  In fact, the evidence
and findings demonstrate why the hearing judge could not have rendered mitigating findings
of fact, except concerning Nwadike’s prior disciplinary record.  As the person with the
opportunity to see and hear Respondent testify (an opportunity denied to this Court), Judge
Dugan found her to be incredible and dishonest.  What likelihood then is there that he also
would have found absence of a selfish or dishonest motive, or a likelihood that the proven
misconduct would not re-occur?  In the face of the duration, frequency, and egregiousness
14Likewise, Standard 5.11 of the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1986) provides pertinently that:
Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
*     *     *
(b) a lawyer engages in any . . . intentional conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.
Am. Bar Ass’n, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 5.11 (1986).
-23-
of her mishandling of her attorney trust account, such mitigation findings would be
unsupportable, arbitrary, and capricious.
The only sanction appropriate for Respondent’s misconduct is disbarment.
Disbarment as a sanction protects the public from being “further victimized” by the attorney.
Kahn, 290 Md. at 683, 431 A.2d at 1351.  When reviewing the attorney’s conduct in Ellison,
we held that “intentional dishonesty by a lawyer admitted to the Maryland Bar merits
disbarment.”  384 Md. at 716, 867 A.2d at 275.14  Respondent’s dishonest conduct in
misrepresenting purposefully her power of attorney, failing to fulfill her legal duties to Ba
and Njosa, and concealing purposefully the truth from the disciplinary investigation
constitute the kind of intentional dishonesty that “merits disbarment.”  We would be remiss
in the discharge of our duties to impose anything less.
Further, we have observed generally the principle that any unmitigated
misappropriation of a client’s or third party’s funds, particularly when combined with
dishonesty or misrepresentation, will result “inevitably” in disbarment.  Attorney Griev.
-24-
Comm’n v. Hayes, 367 Md. 504, 512, 789 A.2d 119, 124 (2001).  See also Vanderlinde, 364
Md. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 484-85 (finding that “in cases of intentional dishonesty,
misappropriation cases, fraud, . . . and the like, we will not accept, as ‘compelling
extenuating circumstances,’ anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating
mental or physical health conditions ”); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Bernstein, 363 Md. 208,
227, 768 A.2d 607, 617 (2001) (warning that “‘[a]ppropriating any part of [trust account]
funds to [an attorney’s] own use and benefit without clear authority to do so cannot be
tolerated’” (quoting Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 345, 587 A.2d 511,
516 (1991))); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Tomaino, 362 Md. 483, 498, 765 A.2d 653, 661
(2001) (reaffirming our often-repeated principle that “‘misappropriation of funds by an
attorney is an act infested with deceit and dishonesty’” that ordinarily merits disbarment
(quoting Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 27, 741 A.2d 1143, 1157 (1999)));
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Williams, 335 Md. 458, 474, 644 A.2d 490, 497 (1994) (same).
An attorney who intentionally misappropriates funds entrusted to him or her acts in a way
that is “infected with deceit and dishonesty and, in the absence of compelling extenuating
circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, [the misappropriation] will result in disbarment.”
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Spery, 371 Md. 560, 568, 810 A.2d 487, 491-92 (2002).  This is
certainly not the case in which we should back away from or side step this principle.
The evidence shows that Respondent misappropriated purposefully, rather than merely
mishandled negligently, her clients’ and third parties’ funds.  Although Respondent’s record-
keeping might be categorized generously by some as merely careless, her misuse of funds
-25-
in her attorney trust account for personal expenses, her failure to deposit the refund check
from Talcott, and her commingling of funds constitute intentional misappropriations of funds
entrusted to her.  Respondent’s misuse of client funds was a misrepresentation to her clients
that their monies were secure in her trust account.
The aim of protecting the public is particularly important in cases of dishonesty,
intentional misappropriation, and fraud, where this Court’s “primary function always is to
protect the public, not attorneys.”  Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 388, 773 A.2d at 470.
Respondent was not merely negligent, but intentional, in her misrepresentations and
misappropriation of client and third-party funds, and her misconduct falls well below the
attorney’s standard of “complete trust and confidence.”  Id. at 390, 773 A.2d at 471.  For
these reasons, and because there are no “extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser
sanction,” the only appropriate sanction for Respondent is disbarment.  Spery, 371 Md. at
568, 810 A.2d at 491-92.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT,
FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
A T T O R N E Y  
G R I E V A N C E
C O M M I S S I O N  
A G A I N S T
O Z O E M E N A  
M A R Y R O S E
NWADIKE; MANDATE TO ISSUE
FORTHWITH.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 11 
September Term, 2009
                                                                              
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
    
v.
OZOEMENA MARYROSE NWADIKE
                                                                              
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins   
Barbera, 
      JJ.
                                                                             
Concurring & Dissenting Opinion
by Murphy, J., which Bell, C. J. joins.
                                                                              
Filed: August 25, 2010
If I were persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was not
authorized by Mr. Onuma to use his funds to remove Mr. Njosa’s property from
foreclosure, I would hold that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.  I would, however,
sustain Respondent’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent did not
have Mr. Onuma’s authorization.  Although I am by no means persuaded that there was
such an authorization, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Clements, 319 Md. 289, 572
A.2d 174 (1990), this Court stated:
A refusal to believe evidence of a respondent, however, does
not, of itself, supply affirmative evidence of the dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation charged.  The issue is whether
Bar Counsel presented sufficient evidence of the charge to meet
the clear and convincing standard of proof.
Id. at 298, 572 A.2d at 179.   In my opinion, Bar Counsel simply did not meet its burden
of persuasion on this issue.  
I would also hold that four mitigating circumstances have been established by a
preponderance of the evidence.  First, although Respondent did not have an “executed”
power of attorney signed by Mr. Njosa, she was his attorney of record in Circuit Court
proceedings when she signed the contract on his behalf.  Second, Respondent did make an
effort to protect Mr. Ba’s deposit by requesting that Mr. and Mrs. Njosa’s October 7,
2003 Judgment of Absolute Divorce include a provision that afforded Mr. Ba the
opportunity to obtain reimbursement of his “good faith payment.”  Third, Respondent
does not have a prior disciplinary record.  Fourth, the hearing judge was not clearly
erroneous in finding that Respondent did not commit a theft of Mr. Ba’s money.  During
the closing argument of Respondent’s counsel, the hearing judge stated:
2
I don’t believe your client stole the money, if that’s what
you’re talking about, if that’s what you’re trying to defend her
from.  Although Mr. Bolly Ba’s probably trying to make it
look like that when he testified, I don’t believe she did that.  
As to the appropriate sanction, it is clear that Respondent has not made timely
good faith efforts to rectify the consequences of her misconduct, and she has not made
full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel.  While Respondent has violated Rule 1.15(a), I
am not persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent actually stole any
client’s money or property.  As stated above, Respondent did make an effort -- albeit an
inadequate one -- to protect Mr. Ba’s interest, and the hearing judge expressly found that
Respondent never intended to steal Mr. Ba’s money.
From my evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the case at bar, I agree with
the majority that Respondent’s violations are too serious to justify a suspension for a brief
period of time.  I am persuaded, however, that disbarment is too harsh a sanction.  This
Court should not reject the possibility that Respondent may at some point in the future
persuade us that she is once again fit to practice law in Maryland.  I would therefore hold
that, at this point in time, an indefinite suspension is required to protect the public
interest.  
Chief Judge Bell has authorized me to state that he joins in this concurring and
dissenting opinion.