Case Title: Kristine H. v. Lisa R.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S126945

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 8/22/05 (opns. filed this date should appear in this sequence:  S125912, S125643, & S126945) 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
KRISTINE H., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S126945 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B167799 
LISA R., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. PF001550 
___________________________________ ) 
 
We granted review in this case as well as in Elisa B. v. Superior Court 
(Aug. 22, 2005, S125912) __ Cal.4th __, and K.M. v. E.G. (Aug. 22, 2005, 
S125643) __ Cal.4th __, to consider the parental rights and obligations, if any, of a 
woman with regard to a child born to her partner in a lesbian relationship. 
The present action arises from a judgment stating that both Kristine H. and 
her lesbian partner, Lisa R., are the parents of a child born to Kristine H.  The 
judgment was entered pursuant to a stipulation of the parties when Kristine H. was 
pregnant.  The Court of Appeal ruled that the judgment is void but that Lisa R. 
still may have parental rights as a presumed parent under Family Code section 
7611, subdivision (d), and remanded the matter for further proceedings. 
We conclude that Kristine is estopped from attacking the validity of the 
judgment to which she stipulated, and the Court of Appeal therefore erred in 
 
 
2
reversing the superior court judgment denying Kristine’s motion to vacate the 
judgment. 
FACTS 
On or about September 1, 2000, Kristine H. as plaintiff and Lisa R. as 
defendant jointly filed in superior court a “Complaint to Declare Existence of 
Parental Rights” that alleged that Kristine was seven months pregnant and Lisa 
was her “partner.”1  They alleged that “[t]he hospital requires a legal judgment 
establishing parental rights from this Superior Court in order to properly issue the 
birth certificate,” that the parties are “the only legally recognized parents of said 
child,” and that Lisa “is the legal second mother/parent” of the unborn child.  The 
parties requested a stipulated judgment declaring Kristine and Lisa “the joint 
intended legal parents” of the unborn child with Kristine being listed on the birth 
certificate “as mother” and Lisa being listed “in the space provided for ‘father.’ ” 
On September 8, 2000, a judgment was filed in superior court declaring 
that Kristine is the “biological, genetic and legal mother/parent” of the unborn 
child and shall have joint custody with her “partner” Lisa, that Lisa “is the second 
mother/parent” of the unborn child and shall have joint custody with Kristine, and 
ordering that the child’s birth certificate list Kristine as “mother” and that Lisa “be 
listed in the space provided for ‘father.’ ”  The judgment states that Kristine and 
Lisa “are the only legally recognized parents of [the unborn child] and take full 
and complete legal, custodial and financial responsibility of said child.” 
The child was born on October 3, 2000.  She was given a surname formed 
by hyphenating Kristine’s and Lisa’s surnames.  
                                              
1  
In order to protect the confidentiality of the minors, we will refer to the 
parties by their first names. 
 
 
3
Kristine and Lisa separated in September, 2002, when the child was almost 
two years old. 
On December 19, 2002, Kristine filed in the superior court a motion to set 
aside the stipulated judgment.  Kristine declared in support of the motion that she 
and Lisa “began an intimate and caring relationship” in April, 1992.  After about 
six years, Kristine attempted without success to bear a child, engaging the services 
of a fertility clinic.  She later accepted the offer of a male friend to provide his 
semen for a fee of $500 every three months.  The friend agreed in writing that he 
would not seek custody or visitation rights regarding any resulting child.  After 
about a year of trying, Kristine became pregnant through artificial insemination at 
home using the friend’s semen.  Kristine asserted that the stipulated judgment was 
void because the superior court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the 
stipulated judgment because the child had not yet been born. 
On December 20, 2002, Lisa filed a separate action for custody of the child. 
The superior court denied the motion to vacate the stipulated judgment, 
ruling that a judgment determining parentage may be entered before the birth of 
the child.  The Court of Appeal reversed on a different ground, ruling that the 
stipulated judgment is void because “[t]he family court could not accept the 
parties’ stipulation as a basis for entering the judgment of parentage.”  The court 
further ruled, however, that Lisa “may be able to establish parentage under the 
[Uniform Parentage] Act” as a presumed parent under a gender-neutral application 
of Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), which provides that a man is 
presumed to be a father if “[h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds 
out the child as his natural child.”  Holding that a child could have two parents of 
the same sex, the court remanded the matter to the superior court “to conduct, in 
accordance with the views expressed herein, such further proceedings and 
 
 
4
amendment of pleadings as are appropriate in order to resolve the issues of Lisa’s 
parentage and her rights, if any, to visitation and/or custody.” 
We granted review. 
DISCUSSION 
The superior court denied Kristine’s motion to vacate the judgment, 
rejecting Kristine’s sole argument that the judgment was void because it had been 
issued prior to the birth of the child.  The Court of Appeal reversed on a different 
ground, concluding that the judgment was void because it was based upon a 
stipulation of the parties, stating:  “A determination of parentage cannot rest 
simply on the parties’ agreement.” 
We need not decide, however, whether the stipulated judgment is valid, 
because we conclude that Kristine is estopped from challenging the validity of that 
judgment.2 
Estoppel long has been utilized to prevent a party from contesting the 
validity of a judgment that was procured by that party.  In Watson v. Watson 
(1952) 39 Cal.2d 305, for example, the plaintiff obtained a divorce decree from his 
first wife in Nevada and married the defendant, but the defendant filed for divorce 
a year and a half later.  While divorce proceedings were pending, the defendant 
caused the plaintiff to be arrested for battery.  The plaintiff was acquitted of 
battery and sued the defendant for malicious prosecution.  The defendant, 
however, asserted the former defense that the plaintiff was precluded from suing 
the defendant for a tort committed during the marriage.  (See Peters v. Peters 
                                              
2  
We address only whether Kristine is estopped from challenging the validity 
of the judgment.  Nothing we say affects the rights or obligations of third parties, 
whatever they may be. 
 
 
5
(1909) 156 Cal. 32, overruled in Self v. Self (1962) 58 Cal.2d 683.)  The parties’ 
marriage later was annulled on the ground that the plaintiff’s Nevada divorce from 
his first wife was invalid, rendering the plaintiff’s marriage to the defendant 
bigamous and void. 
The plaintiff in Watson asserted that the rule precluding persons from suing 
their spouses for torts committed during marriage did not apply, because their 
marriage was bigamous and, thus, void from its inception.  The plaintiff asserted, 
in essence, that there had been no marriage, because the divorce decree he had 
obtained in Nevada was invalid.  This court held that it was unnecessary to 
determine whether the parties were legally married, because the plaintiff was 
estopped from denying the validity of the Nevada divorce.  (Watson v. Watson, 
supra, 39 Cal.2d 305, 307.)  The court relied upon the decision in Rediker v. 
Rediker (1950) 35 Cal.2d 796, 805, for the proposition that “ ‘the validity of a 
divorce decree cannot be contested by a party who has procured the decree or a 
party who has remarried in reliance thereon or by one who has aided another to 
procure the decree so that the latter will be free to marry.’ ”  (Watson v. Watson, 
supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 307; Spellens v. Spellens (1957) 49 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; 
Dietrich v. Dietrich (1953) 41 Cal.2d 497, 505.) 
In Harlan v. Harlan (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 657, the plaintiff husband had 
assisted the defendant in obtaining from Mexico a “mail order” divorce from her 
first husband, who lived in Cuba, so that the plaintiff and the defendant could be 
married.  The divorce was invalid, because neither the defendant nor her first 
husband resided in Mexico.  Later, the plaintiff moved to annul his marriage to the 
defendant on the grounds that the marriage was invalid because the defendant was 
already married and had not been divorced.  Although recognizing that the 
defendant’s “mail order” divorce was invalid, the Court of Appeal held that the 
 
 
6
plaintiff was “not in a position to take advantage of the invalidity of the Mexican 
divorce,” having helped the defendant to obtain it and having enjoyed its benefits.  
(Id. at p. 661.)  The court observed:  “His interest then was to procure the result 
which he now seeks to nullify, after having lived with defendant as husband and 
wife for over twelve years. That the sweet may have turned sour does not make it 
conscionable that the plaintiff should be allowed now to undo what his own hand 
and mind had so much to do in creating.  Plaintiff is therefore not in a position to 
question the validity of defendant’s divorce.  This is on the principle . . . ‘that one 
“with full knowledge of the facts shall not be permitted to act in a manner 
inconsistent with his former position or conduct to the injury of another.” 
[Citations.] Another way of stating the same general principle (applicable directly 
to the instant case) is that one who has invoked the exercise of a jurisdiction 
within the general powers of the court cannot seek to reverse its orders upon the 
ground of lack of jurisdiction. “The principle opposing such action is one of 
estoppel in the interest of a sound administration of the laws whereby the 
regularity or even validity of an act procured by one himself cannot be raised – not 
that the act is valid, for it may not be, and estoppel does not make valid the thing 
complained of, but merely closes the mouth of the complainant.” ’ ”  (Id. at pp. 
661-662.) 
In In re Marriage of Recknor (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 539, the husband 
married the wife before her divorce was final in her previous marriage.  Fifteen 
years later, the wife petitioned for dissolution of the marriage, and the husband 
responded by contending, in part, that he could not be ordered to pay spousal 
support and attorney fees because the marriage was void.  The wife testified that 
she became pregnant with the husband’s child shortly after she had filed for 
divorce, and that the husband had insisted that they get married before the child 
 
 
7
was born even though they knew her divorce was not final.  The Court of Appeal 
upheld the superior court’s orders that the husband pay spousal support and 
attorney fees.  Relying upon our decision in Spellens v. Spellens, supra, 49 Cal.2d 
210, 220-221, the court recognized that although the marriage may not have been 
valid, the husband was estopped from challenging its validity, stating:  “In this 
case, Ralph was properly estopped from denying that he was validly married to 
Eve. He went through a formal marriage ceremony with her, knowing that her 
divorce was not final, and continued to live with her as her husband for 15 years, 
during which time they had two children. Further, Ralph waited almost 15 years to 
attempt to assert the invalidity of his marriage to Eve.”  (Recknor, supra, at 
p. 547.) 
The estoppel doctrine was applied to preclude a party to a stipulated 
judgment of paternity from challenging its validity in Adoption of Matthew B. 
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1239.  In that case, a married couple arranged with a 
surrogate mother to have her artificially inseminated with the husband’s semen.  
After the baby was born, the surrogate and the husband stipulated to entry of a 
judgment of paternity declaring the husband to be the father, and the surrogate 
permitted the wife to adopt the child.  Ten months later, the surrogate petitioned to 
withdraw her consent to the adoption and, eight months after that, moved to vacate 
the judgment of paternity.  The Court of Appeal held that the surrogate was 
estopped from challenging the validity of the judgment to which she had 
stipulated.  (Id. at p. 1269.)  After noting that the superior court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to issue the judgment of paternity (id. at pp. 1268-1269), the Court of 
Appeal held:  “[E]ven were we to assume that the entry of judgment was an act in 
excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction, [the surrogate]’s execution of the stipulation 
estops her from urging this point on appeal.  Where a court has subject matter 
 
 
8
jurisdiction, a party’s request for or consent to action beyond the court’s statutory 
power may estop the party from complaining that the court’s action exceeds its 
jurisdiction.  [Citation.]  Whether estoppel applies ‘depends on the importance of 
the irregularity not only to the parties but to the functioning of the courts and in 
some instances on other considerations of public policy.’  [Citation.]  Given [the 
surrogate]’s stipulation to a judgment establishing [the husband]’s paternity and 
her designation of [the husband] as [the child]’s natural father in numerous 
documents, including the birth certificate and the petition to withdraw consent, to 
entertain her attack on the paternity judgment would impermissibly permit her 
‘ “. . . to trifle with the courts.”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  It would also contravene 
the public policy favoring the finality of paternity judgments . . . , the policy in 
favor of speedy determinations of paternity, and the policy that ‘abhors bastardy 
proceedings . . . .’ [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 1269, fns. omitted.) 
In In re Marriage of Hinman (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 711, the wife petitioned 
for dissolution of her marriage of over seven years, listing five minor children of 
the marriage, including two children who had been born prior to the marriage and 
had been fathered by the wife’s former husband.  The parties stipulated that the 
wife and husband would share joint physical and legal custody of all five children, 
and a judgment was entered.  Two months later, the wife moved to strip the 
husband of all custody over the two children fathered by her former husband, 
arguing that the judgment was in excess of the court’s jurisdiction because the 
husband had no biological connection to the children.  The Court of Appeal held 
that the wife could not attack the validity of the judgment to which she had 
stipulated:  “Here, [the wife] herself invoked the jurisdiction of the court by 
alleging in her petition that both [children] were minor children ‘of the marriage.’  
That allegation ‘confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court to determine 
 
 
9
custody, a jurisdiction which does not vanish even if later it is shown there are no 
such children.’ [Citations.] [¶] Having initially invoked the court’s power to 
determine custody, [the wife] then stipulated to a judgment giving [the husband] 
joint custody.  A party who participates in or consents to a judgment which 
otherwise would be beyond the court’s authority is precluded from attacking it 
collaterally, absent exceptional circumstances.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 716.) 
We need not, and do not, therefore, determine whether the stipulated 
judgment entered into by Kristine and Lisa is valid; we hold only that Kristine 
may not now challenge the validity of that judgment.  (11 Witkin, Summary of 
Cal. Law (9th ed. 1990) Husband and Wife, § 110, p. 130 [“Application of the 
estoppel doctrine does not give the decree any validity, but merely prevents certain 
persons from achieving inequitable ends by attacking it.”].)  Kristine invoked the 
jurisdiction of the superior court to determine the parentage of the unborn child 
under the Uniform Parentage Act.  The court thus had subject matter jurisdiction.3  
Family Code section 7630, subdivision (b), provides that “Any interested party 
                                              
3  
“Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire 
absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the 
subject matter or the parties.  [Citation.]  Familiar to all lawyers are such examples 
as these:  A state court has no jurisdiction to determine title to land located outside 
its territorial borders, for the subject matter is entirely beyond its authority or 
power.  [Citation.]  A court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the marital 
status of persons when neither is domiciled within the state.  [Citations.]  A court 
has no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against one not personally served 
with process within its territorial borders, under the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714 [24 L. Ed. 565]. [Citation.] A court has no jurisdiction to hear or 
determine a case where the type of proceeding or the amount in controversy is 
beyond the jurisdiction defined for that particular court by statute or constitutional 
provision.  [Citation.])  Other examples of lack of jurisdiction in this fundamental 
sense will readily occur.”  (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 
280, 288.) 
 
 
10
may bring an action at any time for the purpose of determining the existence or 
nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under subdivision (d) 
or (f) of Section 7611.”  Family Code section 7633 provides that “An action under 
this chapter may be brought before the birth of the child.”  The chapter to which 
section 7633 refers governs the determination of both the father and child 
relationship and the mother and child relationship.  Kristine then stipulated to 
entry of a judgment naming Lisa as the child’s other parent, obtained a birth 
certificate naming Lisa as the child’s other parent, and co-parented the child with 
Lisa for nearly two years.  We held in the companion case of Elisa B. v. Superior 
Court, supra, __ Cal.4th at page ___ [at p. 10], that the superior court can 
determine that a child has “two parents, both of whom are women.”  The superior 
court, thus, had subject matter jurisdiction to issue the judgment establishing 
parentage in the present case. 
Given that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine the 
parentage of the unborn child, and that Kristine invoked that jurisdiction, 
stipulated to the issuance of a judgment, and enjoyed the benefits of that judgment 
for nearly two years, it would be unfair both to Lisa and the child to permit 
Kristine to challenge the validity of that judgment.  To permit her to attack the 
validity of the judgment she sought and to which she stipulated would “ ‘ “trifle 
with the courts.” ’ ”  (Adoption of Matthew B., supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1239, 
1269.)  It would also contravene the public policy favoring that a child has two 
parents rather than one.  (Elisa B. v. Superior Court, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. ___ [at 
p. 16].)  Kristine, therefore, is estopped from challenging the validity of the 
stipulated judgment.  (Adoption of Matthew B., supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1269.) 
 
 
11
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
1
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Kristine H. v. Lisa R. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 120 Cal.App.4th 143 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S126945 
Date Filed: August 22, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Richard A. Curtis, Temporary Judge* 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Honey Kessler Amado and Lynn Langley for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Liberty Counsel, Mathew D. Staver, Rena M. Lindevaldsen and Mary E. McAlister for Kristina Sica as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Leslie Ellen Shear; Goodman & Metz and Diane M. Goodman for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Law Offices of Robert S. Scuderi, Robert S. Scuderi; Law Offices of Emanuel Sedacca and Emanuel 
Sedacca as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Shannon Minter, Courtney Joslin; Jennifer C. Pizer and Amber Garza for Children of Lesbians and Gays 
Everywhere, Equality California, Family Matters, Family Pride Coalition, Growing Generations, Lambda 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Our Family Coalition, the Pop 
Luck Club and Southern California Assisted Reproduction Attorneys as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Clare Pastore, Christine Sun, Martha Matthews; ACLU 
Foundation of Northern California, Alan Schlosser, Tamara Lange; ACLU Foundation of San Diego and 
Imperial Counties, Jordan Budd, Elvira Cacciavillani; ACLU Foundation, Inc., Romana Mancini; Lesbian 
and Gay Rights Project, James Esseks; Manatt Phelps & Phillips, Vanessa H. Eiseman; Maxie Rheinheimer 
Stephens & Vrevich and Darin L. Wessel for the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, the American Civil Liberties Union of San 
Diego and Imperial Counties and the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
*Pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 21. 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – counsel continued – S126945 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Maxie Rheinheimer Stephens & Vrevich, Darin L. Wessel; Laura J. Maechtlen; and Vanessa H. Eisemann 
for Tom Homann Law Association, Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, Lesbian and Gay Lawyers 
Association of Los Angeles, and Sacramento Lawyers for the Equality of Gays and Lesbians as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Shannan Wilber; Diane Michelsen; Van Deusen,Youmans and Walmsley and Robert R. Walmsley for 
Legal Services for Children as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Debra Back Marley and Robert C. Fellmeth for Children’s Advocacy Institute as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Katina Ancar for National Center for Youth Law as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
Law Offices of Willard K. Halm and Willard K. Halm for Southern California Assisted Reproduction 
Attorneys, Family Pride Coalition and the Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Alice Bussiere for The Center for Children’s Rights at Whittier Law School, The Legal Aid Foundation of 
Los Angeles, The National Center for Youth Law, The Youth Law Center and Joan Heifetz Hollinger and 
the Children’s Advocacy Project, Boalt Hall as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent and 
Minors. 
 
Donna Wickham Furth; Wilke, Fleury, Hoffelt, Gould & Birney and William A. Gould, Jr., for Northern 
California Association of Counsel for Children, National Association of Counsel for Children and The 
California Psychological Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Minors. 
 
Geragos & Geragos, Gregory R. Ellis; and Rebekah A. Fye for The Los Angeles County Bar Association, 
The San Fernando Valley Bar Association and its Family Law Center, The Family Law Section of the 
Beverly Hills Bar Association, The Bar Association of San Francisco, The Association of Certified Law 
Specialists and Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles as Amici Curiae on behalf of Minors. 
 
Morrison & Foerster, Ruth N. Borenstein and Johnathan E. Mansfield for California NOW, Inc., and 
California Women’s Law Center as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
3
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Honey Kessler Amado 
261 South Wetherly Drive 
Beverly Hills, CA  90211 
(310) 550-8214 
 
Leslie Ellen Shear 
16830 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 347 
Encino, CA  91436-1749 
(818) 501-3691 
 
Shannon Minter 
National Center for Lesbian Rights 
870 Market Street, Suite 370 
San Francisco, CA  94102 
(415) 392-6257