Case Title: Sublette County Rural Health Care Dist. v. Miley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sublette County Rural Health Care Dist. v. Miley1997 WY 94942 P.2d 1101Case Number: 96-162Decided: 07/18/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

SUBLETTE COUNTY RURAL HEALTH CARE DISTRICT; and David 
Rachich, Secretary, in his official capacity, Appellants (Defendants),

v.

Robin MILEY, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

                               

 

Appeal from District Court, Sublette County, Nancy 
Guthrie, J.

 

    Gerald R. Mason, argued, of 
Mason & Graham, P.C., Pinedale, Dale Aronson, Pinedale, for 
Appellants. 

    Michael J. Krampner, Todd 
Hambrick, argued, of Krampner & Fuller, L.L.C., Casper, for 
Appellee.

 

    Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

    THOMAS, 
Justice. 

 [¶1]        This case presents, as the primary 
issue, a novel question in Wyoming relating to the applicability of an exception 
from disclosure under the Wyoming Public Records Act, WYO. STAT. § 16-4-201 
through 205 (1990). Sublette County Rural Health Care District and its 
Secretary, David Rachich (collectively District) appeal an Order of the district court that required 
the District to disclose to Robin Miley (Miley) "the year end financial reports 
for 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 submitted to Sublette County Rural Health Care 
District Board by Dr. Tom Johnston in relation to the Pinedale Medical Clinic 
and the year end financial reports submitted by Dr. Ron Glas for 1994 and 1995 * 
* *." Doctors Johnston and Glas were the lessees of a medical clinic building in Pinedale owned by the District, 
although no rental payment was required. In addition, the District agreed to 
make monthly payments of a fixed amount to the doctors, who managed the clinic 
on behalf of the District. The doctors also charged fees to the public for 
services provided at the clinic.  
The District contended that the documents sought by Miley were exempt 
from disclosure pursuant to the provisions of WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(v) 
(1990). The district court ruled against the District and ordered disclosure. We 
hold that the documents sought are exempt under the statute, and the Order 
entered in the district court is reversed.

 

[¶2]          In the Brief of Appellants, 
the issues are stated in this way:

 

            I. 
Did the trial court err in its factual determinations that disclosure of the 
requested information would not 
impair the Appellants' ability to obtain necessary information in the future 
nor cause substantial harm to the 
competitive position of Dr. Johnston and Dr. Glas?

 

II. Did the trial court err in its conclusion of law 
that the information sought does not fall within the statutory 
exception?

 

  Miley, in the Brief of the Appellee, 
asserts that the only issue is:

 

            1. 
Are periodic financial reports of a publicly owned health clinic, operated by a 
doctor who is not an employee, 
excepted from public inspection and copying under W.S. § 16-4-203(d)(v) as 
trade secrets, privileged 
information or confidential commercial or financial data?

 

  Appellant's Reply Brief sets forth "New 
Issues Raised By The Brief Of Appellee," which are said to 
be:

 

            I. 
Whether trade secrets and privileged information are different from confidential 
information.

 

            
III[sic]. Whether the doctors' obligations of disclosure are 
voluntary.

 

            III. 
Whether appellee can now attack the affidavit testimony.

 

            IV. 
Whether appellee correctly cites persuasive law.

 

            V. 
Whether the district subsidizes the doctors.

 

[¶3]          The District owns a medical 
clinic building in Pinedale. The clinic has been leased on an annual basis to 
Dr. Johnston since 1992, and in 1994 and 1995 a similar lease was made with Dr. 
Glas. The purpose of these leases is to provide for the operation of a medical 
facility, and under the contracts, the District agreed to rent the building for no charge, and to pay 
Dr. Johnston and Dr. Glas a monthly stipend in consideration for their services. 
In addition to the stipend, Dr. Johnston and Dr. Glas charge patients for 
services that are furnished. The doctors, from the remuneration paid by the 
District and the fees they earn from the 
furnishing of medical services, hire their employees, purchase supplies, obtain 
insurance, and generally provide everything that is necessary to make 
twenty-four hour a day, seven days a week medical services available to the 
public in Pinedale. Each contract between the District and the doctors 
provided that the doctors would retain 
all revenues generated through their billings as their sole and exclusive 
property.

 

[¶4]          The doctors have provided 
information about the income and expenses from the operation of the clinic to 
the District. This is the information that Miley sought to have disclosed, and 
as to which the District took the position that it was exempt from disclosure. 
Affidavits by the doctors establish that public disclosure of the information is objectionable to 
them and would cause them to withhold that information from the District. The 
affidavits also assert that disclosure of the information would place them at a 
competitive disadvantage with other physicians who are not required to make such 
a disclosure and would adversely affect 
staff morale by revealing their salaries and benefit packages to the 
public.

 

[¶5]          On January 24, 1996, Miley 
requested the District to furnish copies of Dr. Johnston's financial reports for 
the years 1992 through 1995, and also Dr. Glas' financial reports for the years 
1994 and 1995. Miley's request was made pursuant to the Wyoming Public Records 
Act, and the District, through its custodian, denied the right to inspect the documents and denied 
copies, advising Miley that the disclosure of the reports would "impair the 
District's ability to obtain necessary information in the future and could cause 
substantial harm to the competitive position of the affected individuals." The 
District relied upon the exception articulated in WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(v) 
which provides:

 

            (d) The custodian 
shall deny the right of inspection of the following records, unless 
otherwise provided by 
law:

 

          
  *      *      *      *      *      
*

 

                        
(v) Trade secrets, privileged information and confidential commercial, 
financial, geological or geophysical data furnished by or obtained from any 
person;

 

 [¶6]        The denial of the information was 
followed by the filing of a Complaint and Petition for Access to Records by 
Miley. The matter was submitted to the district court on the affidavits of the 
doctors together with the pleadings and briefs of the parties. On May 20, 1996, 
the trial court entered its Order finding that the request of financial information did not fall within 
the exception to the Wyoming Public Records Act and ordered production of the 
requested documents. This appeal is taken from that Order.

 

[¶7]          We previously have 
determined that the Wyoming Public Records Act and the Federal Freedom Of 
Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, have a common objective, which is that 
disclosure, not secrecy, should prevail. 
Sheridan Newspapers, Inc., v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 793 (Wyo. 1983); 
Laramie River Conservation Council v. Dinger, 567 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo. 
1977).  The implementation of that 
goal is provided by affording a liberal interpretation to the Wyoming Public 
Records Act and construing its 
exceptions narrowly. Sheridan Newspapers, 660 P.2d  at 794. In Houghton v. 
Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 1056 (Wyo. 1994), we held the act requires disclosure 
of physician recruitment contracts, and those contracts were not hospital 
records under the exception articulated in WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(vii) (1990). 
We also refused to permit a police department to maintain the secrecy of certain 
categories of records from the public by 
the simple proclamation that they were for law enforcement or prosecution 
purposes under WYO. STAT. § 9-9-103 (1977), the predecessor of WYO. STAT. § 
16-4-203(d)(i).  Sheridan 
Newspapers, 660 P.2d  at 794. In Laramie River Conservation Council, 567 P.2d  at 
732, we stated that we will afford scrutiny to any agency memos to determine 
their status under what now is WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(v) (formerly WYO. STAT. 
§ 9-692.3(b)(v) (Supp. 1975)).

 

[¶8]          We find our statutory 
language to be clear and unambiguous. We could resolve this case under the 
application of our general rule that we look to the ordinary and obvious meaning 
of a statute when the language is unambiguous. Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993).  The language encompassing this exception 
from disclosure, provided in WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(v) is quite parallel to a 
similar exception in the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1994), which provides for 
the exception in this way:

 

            (b) 
This section does not apply to matters that are 

 

          
  *      *      *      *      *      
*

 

                        
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a 
person and privileged or 
confidential;

 

Because we have noted the 
parallel language of our statute and the federal statute, it is appropriate also 
to examine persuasive authority, particularly pertinent federal 
cases.

 

[¶9]          We perceive a dual rationale 
for this exception, as articulated in National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. 
Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (addressing the commercial and financial 
exception found in the FOIA). The 
exception serves to encourage cooperation on the part of those who otherwise 
could not be required to provide information to a governmental agency, and it 
also serves to protect the rights of those who are required to provide such 
information. A similar rationale is found in Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Denver and Rio Grande R. 
Co., 731 P.2d 740, 743 (Colo. App. 1986) (interpreting the Colorado Open Records 
Act exception that encompasses identical language to the Wyoming's Public Records Act).

 

[¶10]       In National Parks and 
Conservation Ass'n, a two factor test was articulated for determining the 
confidentiality of commercial or financial matters. Under that case, to fit 
within this exception to the FOIA, such matters must be likely either: (1) to 
impair the government's future ability to obtain necessary information; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the 
competitive position of the persons providing the information. National Parks, 
498 F.2d  at 770. This test has received wide spread acceptance outside the 
District of Columbia Circuit. Critical Mass. Energy Project v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Com'n, 975 F.2d 871, 876-77 
(D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984, 113 S. Ct. 1579, 123 L. Ed. 2d 147 
(Dist.Col. 1993) (listing the jurisdictions that have adopted National 
Parks).

 

[¶11]       In Critical Mass, the 
District of Columbia Circuit, en banc, announced that the confidential financial 
and commercial exception would be determined by whether the information was 
compelled by the government or submitted voluntarily. Compelled information 
still is to be examined under the National Parks criteria. Voluntary information, however, will be 
considered "confidential" if it is of a "kind that would customarily not be 
released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained." Critical Mass, 
975 F.2d  at 879.

 

[¶12]       In this instance, we adopt 
as the criteria for discerning confidential, commercial or financial data the 
test articulated in National Parks. While the doctors voluntarily entered into 
the contracts with the District, the critical information was required to be 
furnished under the contracts. Consequently, the National Parks rule is a better 
fit for these circumstances than the Critical Mass rule. Furthermore, if the 
information had been furnished as a completely voluntary submission, the first 
test under the two part criteria of National Parks would furnish an adequate basis for a determination of 
confidentiality.  We understand 
National Parks also to be a better fit with our articulated policy of a 
preference for disclosure because the rule as it has been applied around the 
country seems to be more restrictive of exceptions than the rule adopted in 
Critical Mass. See International Broth. of Elec. v. Denver Metropolitan Major 
League Baseball Stadium Dist., 880 P.2d 160, 166 (Colo. App. 
1994).

 

[¶13]       Our application of the 
National Parks criteria to these circumstances persuades us that disclosure of 
the doctors' financial reports would be likely to impair the future ability of 
the District to obtain necessary information. The doctors could not be expected 
to agree to turn over sensitive financial data if the District, in turn, is required by law to 
disseminate that information to the public. In addition, based upon the 
information in the record, we agree with 
the proposition that release of these financial reports would be likely to cause 
substantial harm to the competitive positions of the doctors.  These rulings are supported by the 
information in the affidavits furnished by the doctors, which is not refuted on 
the record.  These facts also fit 
the clear and unambiguous language of the Wyoming statute.

 

[¶14]       We reverse the Order entered 
by the district court in this case, and we remand the case for the entry of a 
judgment consistent with this opinion.