Case Title: Taylor v. State Ex Rel. Kirkpatrick

Citation: 529 S.W.2d 692

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1975-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
529 S.W.2d 692 (1975) Grady TAYLOR et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Tennessee on relation of Carl K. KIRKPATRICK, District Attorney General for Sullivan County, Tennessee, Appellee. Grady TAYLOR and Eastern Amusement, Inc., a corporation, Appellants, v. STATE of Tennessee on relation of Carl K. KIRKPATRICK, District Attorney General for Sullivan County, Tennessee, Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee. October 20, 1975. *694 Harry C. Bowyer, Kingsport, Frierson M. Graves, Jr., Heiskell, Donelson, Adams, Williams & Wall, Memphis, for appellants. William C. Koch, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, R.A. Ashley, Jr., Atty. Gen., for appellee. BROCK, Justice. The issues in the three captioned causes are identical and involve the construction and validity of Chapter 510, Public Acts of 1974, regulating obscenity. We are deciding all of them in this single opinion. In each case the trial court has found certain motion picture films being exhibited to the public by the appellants to be obscene according to the provisions of Chapter 510 of the Public Acts of 1974, codified as T.C.A. §§ 39-3010 39-3022. Under the provisions of that Act, the Court has permanently enjoined the defendants from further exhibition of the films and ordered that said films be remanded to the custody of the clerk of the Court and by him made available for use as evidence in any criminal case which might be brought arising out of the exhibition of said films, or, in the event no such criminal prosecution ensued, that the films be destroyed, all as provided by the terms of said Chapter 510 of the Public Acts of 1974. The primary insistence of the appellants is that the Act in question is unconstitutional for various reasons. The first insistence made is that the Act, in general, and Section 3(A) thereof, in particular, in defining unlawful conduct does not contain a requirement of "scienter" and for this reason is unconstitutional. Defendants rely upon Ellenburg v. State, 215 Tenn. 153, 384 S.W.2d 29 (1964) and Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S. Ct. 215, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1959). The pertinent language of the statute is as follows: We conclude that the quoted language clearly requires scienter in the only sense in which it is demanded by the First Amendment. To render constitutional a statute which prohibits the exhibition or distribution of obscene material, it is not necessary to require that a defendant know or believe that the material in question is legally obscene; it is sufficient to require that the defendant have knowledge of the contents or character of the obscene material. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1974); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 16 S. Ct. 434, 40 L. Ed. 606 (1896); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 86 S. Ct. 958, 16 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1966); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1968). In Hamling the Supreme Court said: In the Rosen case the Supreme Court, in rejecting a claim that it was constitutionally necessary to show that the defendant knew or believed that the material in question was obscene, stated: In the Mishkin case the Supreme Court, after noting that the New York statute in question had been construed to require an awareness on the part of the defendant of the character of the obscene material distributed, said: Obviously, the statute before us complies with the scienter requirement of the First Amendment as construed in the foregoing cases. Section 3(A) requires that the prohibited act of exhibition, distribution, etc., be knowingly done; and, "knowingly" is defined in Section 2(F) as meaning actual knowledge of the subject matter or actual knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable and prudent man on notice of the suspect nature of the material in question. Ellenburg v. State, supra, and Smith v. California, supra, are simply not in point for the reason that in those cases the courts were dealing with statutes which required no knowledge by the defendant of the contents of the alleged obscene material which *696 he distributed or exhibited. The defendants would have us give to Section 3(A) a strained construction by holding that the word "knowingly" applies only to importation into this state of obscene material and does not apply to the remainder of said section dealing with acts within the state of Tennessee. We refuse to do violence to the legislative intent by giving the statute such a construction. It must be remembered that the Legislature, when considering this statute, had the benefit of the wisdom that in Ellenburg v. State, supra, this Court had held the predecessor to this statute unconstitutional because it did not require scienter. As we construe this Act, the element of scienter is required for every offense defined by the Act. We, therefore, conclude that the contention of the appellants that Chapter 510 of the Public Acts of 1974 violates the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it allegedly fails to require scienter is without merit. Cf. ABC Books, Inc. v. Benson, 315 F. Supp. 695 (Tenn. 1970). Next, the defendants assert that the definitions contained in Section 2(H) of the Act are so vague and indefinite that they violate Article I, § 19 of the Constitution of Tennessee and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Section 2(H) provides: Section 2(I) defines "patently offensive" as meaning "that which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters." These definitions in Section 2(H) and 2(I) constitute further refinements of the definition of "obscene" found in Section 2(A) of the Act which provides: In our view, the contention that the foregoing definitions are unconstitutionally vague cannot be seriously maintained. The words used give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and set out boundaries sufficiently distinct for courts to fairly administer the law; no more is required. This statute represents a good faith effort by our General Assembly to comply with the standards recently announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973), and most of the *697 language attacked as vague is taken verbatim from that opinion. We hold that the definitions here attacked comply with the applicable standards of substantive due process. Section 9 of the Act empowers the Circuit, Chancery and Criminal Courts, upon sworn complaint filed by a district attorney general, to issue all proper restraining orders, injunctions and other writs and processes appropriate for enforcement of the Act, and, provides that: The defendants have been required, as provided in the quoted provisions of Section 9, to produce, for use as evidence at the hearings in the trial court, certain motion picture films which were being exhibited to the public and which were alleged to be obscene. Each defendant contends that this procedure violates the privilege "not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 9 of the Constitution of Tennessee. We have concluded, for the reasons presently to be stated, that this contention is without merit. The claim of the corporate defendant must fail because a corporation has no privilege from self-incrimination; only persons are protected. Wilson v. U.S., 221 U.S. 361, 382, 31 S. Ct. 538, 544, 55 L. Ed. 771 (1911); People v. Modern Amusement Co., Inc., 72 Misc.2d 950, 340 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1973). Individuals are protected only from (1) extortion by the state of incriminating personal testimony, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) and (2) the forced production of personal and private papers and effects. Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886). Testimony is not involved here for the Act does not provide for compulsory testimony by defendants and these defendants were not required to utter one word. Thus, the issue is whether motion picture films being used for public exhibition are to be treated as "private papers and effects" within the protection of the Boyd rule. Papers and effects with respect to which "there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy" are not protected by the privilege. Couch v. U.S., 409 U.S. 322, 93 S. Ct. 611, 34 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1973). Obviously, no such "expectation of privacy" exists with respect to a motion picture film which is used for exhibition in a public theatre. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1973). Accordingly, it has been held that no violation of the privilege occurs when one in possession of such a film is compelled to produce it in court for use as evidence. People v. Modern Amusement Co., Inc., supra; Houston v. Manerbino, 521 P.2d 166 (Colo. 1974); 1024 Peachtree Corp. v. Slaton, 228 Ga. 102, 184 S.E.2d 144 (1971). We, therefore, hold that the individual defendants *698 were not privileged to refuse production of the films in question since they were not private but were held and used for exhibition to the public. Moreover, the individual defendants are not entitled to claim the privilege with respect to these films for another reason, viz., there is no showing that said films belong to them. An officer or employee of a corporation is not privileged to refuse production of documents belonging to the corporation even though they prove his guilt. U.S. v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542 (1944). In the White case, supra, the Court said: Appellants rely upon Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 95 S. Ct. 584, 42 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1974). But, that case dealt with a different issue from that presented in this case. The Court there said: In a footnote to that opinion the Court further observed: We, therefore, conclude that Maness furnishes no support to appellants. Next, the defendants contend that the Act is invalid because it blends together civil and criminal sanctions. It is said that the statute "violates the principles of equity," by authorizing the issuance of injunctions "in a criminal matter." The short answer to this complaint is that the Legislature may vest such jurisdiction in the Chancery Court as it chooses. The Legislature may provide any legitimate means to regulate obscenity including the employment of varied judicial remedies. We note that the Supreme Court of the United States has expressed approval of a procedure similar to that provided by the Act here under consideration. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra. It is also asserted that Section 9(B) of the Act authorizes an impermissible restraint of the exhibition of films for a period of six (6) months. This argument is wholly unfounded since the six (6) months restraint cannot be applied unless and until "a final order or judgment of injunction" is entered after a full adversary hearing and an adjudication of obscenity vel non. This procedure fully complies with constitutional standards. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 93 S. Ct. 2789, 37 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1973). Once a film is judicially determined to be obscene it becomes contraband and may properly be destroyed without violating the rights of anyone. Appellants next assert that the search warrant provisions of Section 6(A) of the Act are unconstitutional. We need not, and do not, determine this claim for the reason that appellants have no standing to *699 raise it, no search warrant having been issued in this case. Lastly, appellants contend that the films here involved are not obscene. Having viewed these films, we have no hesitation in concluding that said films are grossly obscene. Indeed, they are "hard core pornography." The films are in the record and we do not deem it necessary to describe them in detail in this opinion. They clearly come within the definitions of obscene materials set out in Section 2 of the Act. We hold (1) that the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that each of these films, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) that each film depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct; and (3) that each film, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. It is clear, therefore, that these films are not protected by the First Amendment. Miller v. California, supra. That great guarantee of free expression affords no protection to obscenity. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957); Miller v. California, supra. In Roth the Court said: And, the Court, in Miller said: We hold that the Act under consideration, in its definitions of obscenity, comports with the requirements of the First Amendment, Miller v. California, supra, and that the films in question clearly come within the terms of those definitions and are, therefore, obscene. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in each case. Costs are adjudged against the appellants and sureties. FONES, C.J., and COOPER, HENRY and HARBISON, JJ., concur.