Case Title: Semadeni v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-199

Docket Number: 19942356

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Semadeni, Exr., Appellant, v. Ohio Department of Transportation, 
Appellee. 
[Cite as Semadeni v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1996),  ______ Ohio St. 3d 
________.] 
Torts -- Negligence -- Streets and highways -- Death resulting when 
chunk of concrete thrown from overpass through automobile 
windshield -- Court of Claims -- Pursuant to R.C. 2743.02, Ohio 
Department of Transportation not immune from claims of liability, 
when. 
 
(No. 94-2356 -- Submitted December 13, 1995 -- Decided March 4, 
1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 
93API10-1434. 
 
On March 22, 1990, Pietro B. Semadeni suffered fatal injuries when 
a six-pound chunk of concrete approximately eight inches in width 
crashed through the windshield of his automobile and struck him in the 
head while he was driving on I-71 in Cincinnati.  The concrete had been 
 
 
 
 
2
dropped or thrown by an unidentified person or persons from a four-lane 
overpass bridge (the "Blair Avenue overpass”). 
 
Semadeni's executor, Brigitte R. Semadeni, filed an action in the 
Court of Claims against appellee, Ohio Department of Transportation 
("ODOT") alleging that, in or before 1986, ODOT had adopted a policy 
which required the Blair Avenue bridge to be equipped with protective 
fencing.  She claimed that Semadeni's injuries and death were the direct 
and proximate result of ODOT's negligent failure to install protective 
fencing on the Blair Avenue overpass.  
 
ODOT admitted that it had, by 1986, adopted a policy regarding the 
installation of fencing on existing freeway bridges.  It further admitted that 
no fencing had been installed on the Blair Avenue bridge on the date of 
Semadeni's accident in March 1990.  ODOT denied, however, that it had 
been negligent, and asserted several defenses, including one it 
characterized as "the doctrine of discretionary function immunity." 
 
 
 
 
3
 
Evidence shows that in May 1985 ODOT proposed a new policy 
("Policy 1005.1") addressing installation of protective fencing on existing 
bridges, and that, on July 30, 1985, ODOT received Federal Highway 
Administration approval of the new policy.  The purpose of the policy, in 
part, was to discourage the throwing or dropping of objects from bridges 
onto lower roadways and other property.  Included in Policy 1005.1 was a 
table which established a system for calculating an index number for 
bridges in Ohio based on ten identified criteria, e.g., whether the 
overpass is unlighted, whether it had previously been the site of a falling 
object, or whether it passed over property with high vehicular or 
pedestrian traffic or damage-sensitive property.  The policy established 
that "[a] total index number of 10 or more shall be considered sufficient 
justification for the installation of protective fencing" but that "retrofitting of 
bridges which qualify according to the total index number is not 
mandatory if adequate justification for not doing so can be furnished."  
 
 
 
 
4
 
A year later, on August 12, 1986, Wayne H. Kauble, Chief Engineer 
of Planning and Design for ODOT, took the first step to implement Policy 
1005.1 by notifying ODOT’s district deputy directors located throughout 
the state of its adoption.  Coincidentally, on September 1, 1986, two 
young women were raped and murdered in Akron after the murderers 
forced their car off the road by throwing concrete from an interstate bridge 
(the “Stoner Street bridge”). 1     
 
On September 8, 1986, the acting district planning engineer for 
ODOT district eight, which included the city of Cincinnati, asked city 
officials  to score its bridges pursuant to the criteria of Policy 1005.1.  
When, in response, the city of Cincinnati returned its list of scored bridges 
to ODOT in November 1986, its cover letter informed ODOT that the city 
had received "numerous complaints from citizens and police concerning 
objects being thrown from overpasses onto the Interstate Highways 
below."  Moreover, an interoffice communication between two ODOT 
district eight employees in November 1986 demonstrated awareness on 
 
 
 
 
5
their part that "the City of Cincinnati wants to proceed with this program in 
their area as quickly as possible" indicating that "[t]here should be no 
problem with this."  Working independently, both ODOT and Cincinnati  
scored the Blair Avenue overpass with twelve index points.   
 
On December 16, 1986, Kauble notified district deputy directors 
throughout the state that retrofitting of bridges should not be postponed to 
coincide with other planned bridge repair work, as to do so would "not 
[be] a suitable response to the growing public concern and the 
prolifteration [sic] of incidents involving objects being thrown from 
overpasses."  Kauble advised the deputy directors that a "positive 
program with visible results [is needed] to adequately deal with this very 
real problem."   
 
On January 15, 1987, the district eight deputy director advised 
ODOT's central office in Columbus of all bridges located in the district, 
including the Blair Avenue overpass, which scored ten or more Policy 
1005.1 index points.  Ultimately,  a total of four hundred sixty-one bridges 
 
 
 
 
6
throughout Ohio were identified as scoring ten or more index points 
pursuant to ODOT's 1985 Policy 1005.1 criteria.   
 
A year later, in January 1988, ODOT established its initial funding 
program for fencing bridges in Ohio.  The program established funding for 
forty-four bridges throughout Ohio, representing ten per cent of the total 
number of bridges required to be fenced by Policy 1005.1.  All of the 
forty-four bridges  either scored more than twenty Policy 1005.1 index 
points, or were located in the immediate vicinity of a bridge with more 
than twenty index points, with one exception: the Stoner Street bridge, 
site of the Akron murder incident, was included in the funding program.  
That bridge, like the Blair Avenue overpass, was rated at twelve points.  
The Blair Avenue overpass was not approved for funding.  
 
By the date of Semadeni's accident on March 22, 1990 (two years 
after formulation of the initial funding program, and nearly five years from 
the date Policy 1005.1 had been adopted), ODOT had, however, entered 
into contracts for only two projects that were solely for the purpose of 
 
 
 
 
7
retrofitting existing bridges with protective fencing. Construction had not 
yet begun on one of the two projects.  Of the two retrofitting projects, one 
involved installation of fencing on six bridges in the Akron area (including 
the  Stoner Street bridge) and the second involved construction of 
protective fencing on five bridges in the Youngstown area. 
 
After Semadeni's death, Kauble advised district eight that the 
Department had determined that the bridge fencing program should be 
"accelerated."  District eight was instructed to install fences within its 
district on all bridges that scored ten or more index points and to do so 
within eight months.  The installation of protective fencing on the Blair 
Avenue overpass was completed on March 26, 1992, over six years after 
the adoption of Policy 1005.1. 
  
Following trial solely on issues pertaining to liability, the court 
rendered judgment in favor of ODOT.  The court held that ODOT is not 
liable for the criminal misconduct of third parties, and does not have a 
duty to provide protection against criminal misconduct.  The court further 
 
 
 
 
8
held that ODOT's "decisions regarding the need for and prioritizing of 
fences was [sic] discretionary in nature and afforded immunity to the 
state."  The court further held that "ODOT was not unreasonable in the 
amount of time expended in determining when and how protective 
fencing would be installed on the appropriate overpasses."  
 
The court of appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the judgment 
entered in favor of ODOT. 
  
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal.  
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, Mark A. Vander Laan, Joel S. Taylor and David 
K. Mullen, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Teri Jo Finfrock, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
 
Moyer, C.J.   In 1975 the state of Ohio enacted R.C. 2743.02, 
which provides, with certain exceptions not relevant herein, that "[t]he 
state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, 
 
 
 
 
9
and have its liability determined, *** in accordance with the same rules of 
law applicable to suits between private parties ***."  R.C. 2743.02(A)(1). 
 
We have previously recognized that imposition of tort liability upon 
a private bridge contractor may be justified when damage is caused by 
third parties who have dropped objects from bridges under the 
contractor's control.  In Fed. Steel & Wire Corp. v. Ruhlin Constr. Co. 
(1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 171, 543 N.E.2d 769, the plaintiff alleged 
negligence on the part of a private bridge contractor in failing to adopt 
adequate measures to prevent the dropping of objects from a bridge it 
was repairing, and which had been the site of similar past incidents.  The 
vandalism caused damage to the property of the plaintiff located below 
the bridge.   We concluded that the trial court erred in directing a verdict 
in favor of the bridge contractor, holding in the syllabus that  "[i]f a person 
exercises control over real or personal property and such person is aware 
that the property is subject to repeated third-party vandalism, causing 
injury to or affecting parties off the controller's premises, then a special 
 
 
 
 
10
duty may arise, to those parties whose injuries are reasonably 
foreseeable, to take adequate measures under the circumstances to 
prevent future vandalism."   
 
We find Ruhlin to be factually analogous to the case at bar.  In light 
of ODOT's adoption of Policy 1005.1, and applying "the same rules of law 
applicable to suits between private parties" to the facts before us, we 
conclude that ODOT possessed a duty to foreseeable travelers such as 
Semadeni to take adequate measures to timely implement Policy 1005.1. 
 The Court of Claims, however, accepted the state's contentions that 
ODOT was immune from liability for Semadeni's death pursuant to 
Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E. 2d 
776, and its progeny, e.g.,  Garland v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 48 
Ohio St.3d 10, 548 N.E.2d 233; Anderson v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. (1991), 58 
Ohio St. 3d 215, 569 N.E.2d 1042.   
 
In Reynolds we held that the state's consent to be sued pursuant to 
R.C. 2743.02 in accordance with the rules of law applicable to suits 
 
 
 
 
11
between private parties preserved the state's immunity “for its legislative 
or judicial functions, or the exercise of an executive or planning function 
involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by 
the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion."  Id. at 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Those functions are not engaged in by 
private parties.  We recognized, however, that once such a basic policy 
decision has been made, and the state has determined to engage in a 
certain activity or function, “the state may be held liable, in the same 
manner as private parties, for the negligence of the actions of its 
employees and agents in the performance of such activities.”  Id. 
 
In Garland we reaffirmed Reynolds and further held that "[o]nce a 
governmental entity has made a discretionary decision, it has a 
reasonable amount of time to implement that decision without incurring 
tort liability."  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.   
 
In Anderson we held in paragraph one of the syllabus that "[w]hen 
carrying out the mandates of a public employer, the actions of the agents 
 
 
 
 
12
or employees of that employer are distinguishable from the original 
decision to take action and thus could be actionable."  We there rejected 
the state's argument that decisions as to the manner in which a basic 
policy decision is implemented fall within the scope of the state's reserved 
sovereign immunity, even if implementation decisions require state 
employees to exercise some degree of discretion.  Anderson, 58 Ohio 
St.3d at 217-218, 569 N.E.2d at 1044-1045. 
 
Applying this precedent we find that adoption of Policy 1005.1 in 
1985 was a "basic policy decision," and that ODOT failed to implement 
Policy 1005.1 within a reasonable amount of time.  The Court of Claims 
erred in its legal conclusion that subsequent “time and manner” decisions 
made to implement Policy 1005.1 were themselves entitled to immunity.  
   
When it adopted Policy 1005.1 ODOT determined that the 
installation of protective fencing  was mandatory for all existing bridges in 
Ohio which scored ten index points or more according to criteria 
established within the policy, unless "adequate justification for not doing 
 
 
 
 
13
so [could] be furnished."   The policy became effective in July 1985 when 
it received federal approval.  The evidence was uncontroverted that the 
Blair Avenue overpass at all relevant times justified a score in excess of 
ten points.  However, on the date of Semadeni's accidents, nearly five 
years later, no fencing had yet been installed on the Blair Avenue bridge.  
 
It is clear that ODOT recognized dangers to the traveling public as 
early as May 1985 when it transmitted Policy 1005.1 to the Federal 
Highway Administration for approval, and that ODOT was aware in 1985 
and 1986 that incidents of debris being dropped from freeway bridges 
were occurring throughout the state.  As early as December 1986, 
ODOT's chief engineer characterized the dropping of objects from 
bridges onto interstates as a "very real problem."  ODOT was informed in 
November 1986 that the city of Cincinnati had received "numerous 
complaints from citizens and police concerning objects being thrown from 
overpasses onto the Interstate Highways below."  In 1986, ODOT officials 
acknowledged Cincinnati’s concern that fencing on its interstate bridges 
 
 
 
 
14
be implemented quickly.  At least as early as January 1988 ODOT was 
aware of the Akron incident in which two women had been raped and 
murdered in connection with a dropped object incident.  
 
The record discloses, however, no attempt on the part of ODOT to 
implement Policy 1005.1 for over a year from the date the policy became 
effective in 1985.  ODOT  failed to even notify its district deputy directors 
located throughout the state of the adoption of Policy 1005.1 until August 
12, 1986.  Despite clear expressions of concern by both Cincinnati and 
ODOT officials about the problem of dropped objects, it was not until 
January 1988, well over two years from the time Policy 1005.1 was 
adopted and approved, that ODOT established funding for any protective 
fencing anywhere in the state.  Even then, the program established 
funding for only  ten per cent of the qualifying bridges in Ohio.   The Blair 
Avenue overpass was one of more than four hundred bridges scoring ten 
index points or more which were not approved for funding.  
 
 
 
 
15
 
The Blair Avenue bridge justified a score of twelve index points by 
ODOT'S own criteria, and pursuant to Policy 1005.1, ODOT's agents and 
employees were under a mandatory duty to complete its fencing within a 
reasonable time. In a nearly five-year period, ODOT fenced only a small 
minority of the bridges which it had itself deemed to be in mandatory 
need of fencing, including the Blair Avenue overpass.  Failure to timely 
implement Policy 1005.1 as to bridges highest in priority undoubtedly 
resulted in even greater delay in fencing bridges further down the list of 
priority, such as the Blair Avenue bridge.  
 
We hold that, pursuant to R.C. 2743.02, ODOT is not immune from 
plaintiff's claims of liability.  We conclude on this record that reasonable 
minds could only find that ODOT was negligent in failing to timely 
implement Policy 1005.1, and that its negligence was a proximate cause 
of Pietro Semadeni's death.  We therefore remand this case to the Court 
of Claims for it to determine the amount of damages to be awarded 
Semadeni's estate. 
 
 
 
 
16
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
WRIGHT and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1  See State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895. 
 
Cook, J., dissenting.    I respectfully dissent 
from the majority decision because I would find that 
ODOT is not liable. 
 
A state is immune for “the exercise of an 
executive or planning function involving the making 
of a basic policy decision which is characterized by 
the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or 
discretion.” Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 
68, 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776, paragraph one of the 
 
 
 
 
17
syllabus.  Once such a discretionary decision is 
made, however, the agency must implement its decision 
within a “reasonable amount of time” or it may be 
subject to tort liability. Garland v. Ohio Dept. of 
Transp. (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 10, 548 N.E.2d 233, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.   
 
In Garland, we extended the state’s immunity 
beyond the discretionary  decision to install a 
traffic light at a busy intersection to the decision 
regarding the type of traffic signal to install. Id. 
at 
paragraph 
one 
of 
the 
syllabus. 
The 
court 
recognized that discretionary decision-making also 
included the timing of an installation and decisions 
as to funding the installation of the traffic light. 
 
As in Garland, ODOT’s decision-making process in 
this case extended from the decision to install 
protective fences statewide, to the determination of 
 which bridges needed to be fenced, when they needed 
 
 
 
 
18
to be fenced and how the project would be funded.  
ODOT’s decisions required ODOT not only to prioritize 
the protective fence program but also to coordinate 
the fence project with other highway safety projects, 
such 
as 
road 
resurfacing, 
traffic 
signals, 
intersection improvements, bridge replacements and 
new highway construction.  Making these decisions was 
part of the executive planning stages of Policy 
1005.1, for which ODOT was immune from liability. 
 
Without the benefit of expert testimony on the 
magnitude of ODOT’s undertaking of this as well as 
other ODOT projects at the relevant time and without 
following 
or 
adopting 
any 
defined 
standard 
of 
“reasonableness,” the majority determines that ODOT 
was negligent in implementing its policy and subject 
to 
liability. 
 
The 
majority 
measures 
the 
reasonableness of ODOT’s actions from July 1985, when 
the policy received Federal Highway Administration 
 
 
 
 
19
approval and concludes that the time from federal 
approval until the accident was an unreasonable 
period 
in 
which 
to 
implement 
Policy 
1005.1.   
However, in January 1988, ODOT made its final 
discretionary decision -- the initial funding for 
forty-four bridges.  From that time ODOT was subject 
to liability if it did not implement the policy 
within a reasonable period. 
 
In Garland, this court determined that fourteen 
months was a reasonable period of time to implement 
the installation of a single traffic light at a 
single intersection. 48 Ohio St.3d at 12, 548 N.E.2d 
at 235.  Here, unlike in Garland, ODOT sought to 
install protective fencing on hundreds of bridges 
throughout the state.  The undertaking involved 
multiple 
steps, 
several 
districts, 
millions 
of 
dollars, and numerous decisions which could, and did, 
 
 
 
 
20
take several years.  Semadeni’s accident occurred 
roughly two years after the initial funding decision. 
 If fourteen months has been found to be a reasonable 
time, 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law, 
to 
implement 
the 
installation of a single traffic light, then two 
years should be  a reasonable period of time in which 
to implement a policy to fence more than four 
hundered bridges across the state at a cost of $26 
million.  
 
Even if ODOT did not implement its policy 
decision within a reasonable amount of time, there is 
a further legal step before the state may be found 
liable.  A state is not subject to tort liability 
unless the state or agency owed a special duty to 
plaintiff that is separate and distinct from the duty 
the agency owed to members of the general public. 
Anderson v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 
215, 218, 569 N.E.2d 1042, 1045; Sawicki v. Ottawa 
 
 
 
 
21
Hills (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 525 N.E.2d 468.  The 
majority does not consider whether ODOT had a special 
duty to Mr. Semadeni.  If there is no special duty to 
Mr. Semadeni, then ODOT is not liable to him for 
breach of its duty to the general public.  
 
Four elements must be proven in order to 
establish the existence of a special duty: (1) the 
state must assume an affirmative duty to act on 
behalf of the injured party; (2) the state must be 
aware that its inaction would lead to the alleged 
harm; (3) there must be direct contact between the 
state and the injured party; and (4) the injured 
party 
must 
justifiably 
rely 
upon 
the 
state’s 
affirmatively 
undertaking 
its 
promised 
form 
of 
relief. Anderson, 58 Ohio St.3d at 219, 569 N.E.2d at 
1045.  Upon review of the record, I would find that 
ODOT owed a general duty to the public, rather than a 
 
 
 
 
22
special duty to Mr. Semadeni, to take measures to 
prevent vandalism on highway bridges. 
 
The majority relies on Fed. Steel & Wire Corp. v. 
Ruhlin Constr. Co. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 171, 543 
N.E.2d 769, to find that ODOT owed a special duty to 
Semadeni take adequate measures to prevent vandalism. 
 In Ruhlin we held that a construction company, 
repairing a single bridge that had been the site of 
repeated vandalism, owed a special duty to the 
property owner located near the bridge.   In 
contrast, ODOT was responsible for more than four 
hundred 
bridges 
that 
needed 
to 
be 
fenced.  
Furthermore, the majority does not cite any facts 
which indicate that ODOT was aware that the Blair 
Avenue bridge was the subject of repeated vandalism. 
 Rather, the majority relies on the fact that ODOT 
knew vandalism on bridges was a state-wide problem, 
knew Cincinnati considered vandalism from bridges a 
 
 
 
 
23
serious problem and knew of the Akron incident.  None 
of these facts indicates that ODOT had notice that 
the Blair Avenue bridge was the subject of repeated 
vandalism.    
 
For these reasons, I would find that ODOT was not 
subject to liability and would affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
 
WRIGHT, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.