Case Title: STATE v GOPHER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-485 IN THE SUPRENE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . MICHAEL GOPHER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade. Honorable John McCarvel, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: John C. Koch argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mark Murphy argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Randall Snyder argued,Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana Submitted: June 11, 1981 ~ecided : JUL 9 - 1981 . " . . u - - Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Defendant was charged w i t h f e l o n y b u r g l a r y and f e l o n y t h e f t . A f t e r a h e a r i n g on May 9 , 1980, d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d evidence was d e n i e d . A j u r y t r i a l was held on August 1 8 , 1980, and d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d on both c o u n t s . Defendant a p p e a l s , s u b m i t t i n g t h a t t h e Cascade County D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying h i s motion t o s u p p r e s s . A t about 5:00 a.m. on March 15, 1980, a s i l e n t b u r g l a r alarm went o f f a t t h e Warehouse Pawn Shop i n G r e a t F a l l s , Montana. O f f i c e r S t a n Johnston a r r i v e d a t t h e scene about a minute l a t e r . H i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e a l e d a broken window, two l a r g e rocks on t h e f l o o r , a number of empty s p a c e s i n a r i f l e r a c k , and a f r e s h s e t of t i r e t r a c k s i n t h e parking l o t . While i n v e s t i g a t i n g he n o t i c e d a s i n g u l a r v e h i c l e d r i v i n g slowly p a s t t h e scene and observed t h a t t h e occupants e x h i b i t e d an unusual c u r i o s i t y i n t h e crime s i t e . Johnston t e s t i f i e d t h a t he knew from p a s t e x p e r i e n c e t h a t it was n o t uncommon f o r b u r g l a r s t o r e t u r n t o t h e scene of t h e crime a f t e r simply breeking a window. I f t h e break-in was undiscovered, t h e y would t h e n e n t e r and t a k e t h e goods. O n t h e b a s i s of t h e s e f a c t s , Johnston c a l l e d an a s s i s t i n g o f f i c e r (Sharpe) and r e q u e s t e d him t o s t o p t h e v e h i c l e . O f f i c e r Sharpe stopped and approached t h e v e h i c l e s h i n i n g h i s f l a s h 1 i g h t i n t o t h e passenger compartment. He n o t i c e d s e v e r a l r i f l e s on t h e f l o o r . While examining t h e l i c e n s e of t h e d r i v e r , d e f e n d a n t Michael Gopher, t h e o f f i c e r n o t i c e d t h e p a s s e n g e r ' s arm dropping toward t h e guns. When t h e o f f i c e r drew h i s weapon and o r d e r e d t h e occupants of t h e c a r t o g e t o u t of t h e v e h i c l e , t h e d r i v e r a c c e l e r a t e d and headed n o r t h . A subsequent p u r s u i t by p o l i c e t e r m i n a t e d w i t h t h e a r r e s t of both p e r s o n s i n t h e c a r . The s o l e i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s Court is whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d when it r e f u s e d d e f e n d a n t Gopher's motion t o s u p p r e s s evidence he a l l e g e s was i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d . The g i s t of d e f e n d a n t ' s argument is t h a t t h e o f f i c e r who i n i t i a l l y "stopped" h i s c a r d i d n o t have probable c a u s e t o do s o . He m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s must have probable cause t o b e l i e v e he had committed a c r i m i n a l a c t and s u f f i c i e n t cause t o a r r e s t him t o j u s t i f y t h e s e a r c h . See s e c t i o n 46-5-101(1), MCA. Without p r o b a b l e c a u s e , t h e r e can be no l a w f u l a r r e s t , and without t h e lawful a r r e s t , a s e a r c h cannot be p r o p e r l y made a s being i n c i d e n t t o t h e a r r e s t . See s e c t i o n 46-6-401(4), MCA. O f f i c e r Sharpe, defendant m a i n t a i n s , must have had knowledge of s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s t o b e l i e v e d e f e n d a n t had committed t h e b u r g l a r y and t h a t he must be immediately a r r e s t e d . Gopher emphasizes t h a t t h e f a c t s s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o p e r l y a r r e s t a d e f e n d a n t must be known a t t h e moment of t h e a r r e s t and n o t d i s c o v e r e d d u r i n g or a f t e r t h e a r r e s t . S t a t e v . Rader ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 252, 581 P.2d 437. C i t i n g Rader, d e f e n d a n t concludes t h a t t h i s Court h a s made a c l e a r s t a t e m e n t t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t s t o p and f r i s k p r i n c i p l e s do n o t a p p l y t o a d e f e n d a n t i n a v e h i c l e . 581 P.2d a t 440. A t t h e o u t s e t we recognize t h e Rader r u l e r e g a r d i n g s t o p and f r i s k . Although dictum, such a c l e a r e x p r e s s i o n by t h i s Court p r o h i b i t i n g a p p l i c a t i o n of s t o p and f r i s k r u l e s t o automobiles cannot be ignored. W e a l s o recognize t h a t t h e f a c t s known t o O f f i c e r Johnston at the time he directed Officer Sharpe to stop defendant's automobile fall short of probable cause. We, therefore, must determine whether Rader should continue to be the law in this State and, if not, what standard should be applied in circumstances such as exist before us here. The State maintains that the "stop and frisk" doc- trine should apply to vehicular stops, citing Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. In 'Terry, the Supreme Court ruled that it can be constitu- tionally permissible for an officer to stop and search a . person, even in the absence of probable cause. 392 U.S. at 15. This type of encounter must be reviewed as to its "reasonableness," and take into account the police interest involved and existence of specific and articulable facts. The most recent post-Terry decision regarding stop and frisk is United States v. Cortez (1981), I - U.S. 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. In Cortez, the Supreme Court ruled that objective facts and circumstantial evidence suggesting that a particular automobile is involved in some sort of criminal activity is sufficient to warrant a limited investigatory stop. Chief Justice Burger writes: "The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of which must be present before a stop is permissible. First, the assessment must be based upon all the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions--inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person. "The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articu- l a t e d a s such, p r a c t i c a l people formulated c e r t a i n common s e n s e c o n c l u s i o n s about human behavior; j u r o r s a s f a c t f i n d e r s a r e p e r m i t t e d t o do t h e same--and s o a r e law enforcement o f f i c e r s . F i n a l l y , t h e evidence t h u s c o l - l e c t e d must be seen and weighed n o t i n terms of l i b r a r y a n a l y s i s by s c h o l a r s , b u t a s understood by t h o s e v e r s e d i n t h e f i e l d of law enforcement." 101 S.Ct. a t 695, 66 L.Ed.2d a t 629. I t should be noted h e r e t h a t O f f i c e r Johnston is an experienced and knowledgeable member of t h e G r e a t F a l l s p o l i c e department, having been w i t h t h e f o r c e f o r over twelve y e a r s . T h i s is an important element of t h e C o r t e z a n a l y s i s , which emphasizes t h a t experienced law enforcement a u t h o r i t i e s a r e allowed t o draw c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s which laymen could n o t p r o p e r l y draw i n d e t e r m i n i n g i f a s p e c i f i c v e h i c u l a r s t o p i s l e g a l l y v a l i d . The --- C o r t e z c o u r t concludes: ". . . Thus, t h e t e s t is n o t whether o f f i c e r s Gray and Evans had probable cause t o conclude t h a t t h e v e h i c l e t h e y stopped would c o n t a i n 'Chevron' and a group of i l l e g a l a l i e n s . Rather t h e q u e s t i o n is whether, based upon t h e whole p i c t u r e , t h e y , a s e x p e r i e n c e d B o r d e r P a t r o l a g e n t s , c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y s u r m i s e t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r v e h i c l e t h e y stopped was engaged i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . On t h i s r e c o r d , t h e y could s o conclude." 101 S.Ct. a t 697, 66 L.Ed.2d a t 631. T h i s C o u r t i s c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e f a c t s a t t h e o f f i c e r ' s d i s p o s a l i n t h i s c a s e a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o a f f i r m under C o r t e z . F u r t h e r , our review of c a s e s from neighboring j u r i s d i c t i o n s r e v e a l s t h a t t h e g r e a t t r e n d of a u t h o r i t y is i n accord. C i t i n g S t a t e v . Ruiz ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 19 Ariz.App. 84, 504 P.2d 1307, t h e c o u r t i n S t a t e v. Dean ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 112 A r i z . 437, 543 P.2d 425, h e l d t h a t "I . . . [ a ] founded s u s p i c i o n is a l l t h a t is n e c e s s a r y , some b a s i s from which t h e c o u r t can determine t h a t t h e d e t e n t i o n was n o t a r b i t r a r y o r h a r a s s i n g . ' " 543 P.2d 425, 427 ( q u o t i n g Wilson v. P o r t e r ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 6 6 ) , 361 F.2d 412, 4 1 5 ) . I n People v. Waits ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 196 Colo. 35, 580 P.2d 391, t h e Colorado Supreme Court a p p l i e d t h e s t a n d a r d s of Stone v. People ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495, s t a t i n g : " ' I n o r d e r l a w f u l l y t o d e t a i n an i n d i v i d u a l f o r q u e s t i o n i n g , (1) t h e o f f i c e r must have a r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l h a s committed, o r is about t o commit, a crime; ( 2 ) t h e purpose of t h e d e t e n t i o n must be r e a s o n a b l e ; and ( 3 ) t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e d e t e n t i o n must be r e a s o n a b l e when c o n s i d e r e d i n l i g h t of t h e p u r p o s e . ' 174 Colo. a t 509, 485 P.2d a t 497. "We have p r e v i o u s l y a p p l i e d t h e s e s t a n d a r d s t o i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o p s i n v o l v i n g automobiles. P e o p l e v . Mangum, C o l o . , 539 P.2d 1 2 0 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . " 580 P.2d a t 393. See a l s o S t a t e v. Bartosz ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 34 0r.App. 123, 578 P.2d 426; Washington v. S t a t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 94 Nev. 181, 576 P.2d 1126. P r i m a r i l y applying t h e r u l e s of C o r t e z , t h e S t a t e submits t h a t s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c u l a r i z e d s u s p i c i o n e x i s t e d t o j u s t i f y t h e s t o p of d e f e n d a n t ' s c a r . The S t a t e ' s burden h a s two elements: (1) o b j e c t i v e d a t a from which an experienced o f f i c e r can make c e r t a i n i n f e r e n c e s ; and ( 2 ) a r e s u l t i n g s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e occupant of a c e r t a i n v e h i c l e is o r h a s been engaged i n wrongdoing o r was a w i t n e s s t o c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . The fundamental f a c t s persuade us t h a t t h e burden was met i n t h i s c a s e . The o f f i c e r s knew t h a t a crime had been committed-- probably t h e f t , b u t c e r t a i n l y c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . They b e l i e v e d s e v e r a l guns had been t a k e n . They knew a v e h i c l e was probably involved. They observed one v e h i c l e d r i v i n g v e r y slowly p a s t t h e crime s c e n e . Although h i s p o l i c e c a r was n o t on t h e f r o n t s t r e e t and d i d n o t have its f l a s h i n g l i g h t s o n , t h e o c c u p a n t s o f t h e v e h i c l e e x p r e s s e d a n i n o r d i n a t e amount of i n t e r e s t i n t h e scene. These known f a c t s , combined with t h e d e d u c t i o n s made i n l i g h t of twelve y e a r s ' e x p e r i e n c e i n c r i m e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , l e d O f f i c e r Johnston t o s u s p e c t d e f e n d a n t was involved i n , or w i t n e s s t o , t h e crime. W e r e a f f i r m t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e of t h i s Court tha.t dictum is n o t binding a s c o n t r o l l i n g p r e c e d e n t , S t a t e v . D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 139 Mont. 453, 471, 365 P.2d 512, 521, and f e e l compelled t o abandon t h e language of Rader which a p p e a r s t o p r e c l u d e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e T e r r y s t o p and f r i s k r u l e s t o v e h i c u l a r s t o p s . I n l i g h t of t h e C o r t e z d e c i s i o n , and o t h e r p e r s u a s i v e a u t h o r i t y , we now hold t h a t when a t r a i n e d p o l i c e o f f i c e r has a p a r t i c u l a r i z e d s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e occupant of a v e h i c l e is or h a s been engaged i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y , o r w i t n e s s t h e r e t o , a l i m i t e d and r e a s o n a b l e i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o p and s e a r c h is j u s t i f i e d . The d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s and h i s subsequent c o n v i c t i o n a r e a f f i r m e d . W e concur: / 1 2-/+J< 4 % e d w Chief J u s t i c e