Case Title: Akron Bar Assn. v. Thomas

Citation: 1999-Ohio-358

Docket Number: 19981796

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Thomas, 84 Ohio St.3d 395, 1999-Ohio-358.] 
 
 
 
 
 
AKRON BAR ASSOCIATION v. THOMAS. 
[Cite as Akron Bar Assn. v. Thomas (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 395.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Two-year suspension with second year of 
suspension stayed with condition, when — Conviction of conspiracy to 
distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. 
(No. 98-1796 — Submitted October 28, 1998 — Decided January 20, 1999.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 97-88. 
 
On April 11, 1997, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Ohio convicted respondent, Gary Lee Thomas of Akron, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0039133, upon his guilty plea, of conspiracy to distribute and 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of Section 846, Title 21, 
U.S.Code, a federal felony offense.  The federal court fined respondent $7,500, 
and sentenced him to thirty months in prison followed by four years of supervised 
release with specified conditions. 
 
On July 1, 1997, we suspended respondent from the practice of law in Ohio 
for an interim period under Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A) based upon his federal felony 
conviction.  In re Thomas (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1439, 680 N.E.2d 1014.  We 
ordered that the matter be referred to relator, Akron Bar Association, for 
investigation and commencement of disciplinary proceedings.  Id.  On October 13, 
1997, relator filed a complaint charging respondent with misconduct based upon 
the federal felony conviction.  Respondent filed an answer admitting his drug 
conviction.  The case was heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”).  Respondent testified 
and was represented by counsel at the hearing. 
 
 
2
 
The panel found that in the mid-1980s, respondent began using cocaine 
casually, purchasing the drug from a supplier who had attended the same high 
school as his brother.  In the 1990s, respondent’s cocaine use escalated because of 
his bankruptcy, divorce, and a postdivorce custody dispute.  In 1995 and 1996, 
respondent became so addicted to cocaine that he loaned money to his supplier so 
that the supplier could purchase cocaine to sell to respondent and other people.  
All of the cocaine that respondent bought himself was for his personal use.  After 
being charged in connection with his conduct in 1995 and 1996, respondent 
accepted responsibility by pleading guilty, and he fully cooperated with law 
enforcement officials. 
 
The panel further found that following his conviction and sentence, 
respondent spent seven months in prison, including a six-month period in a federal 
program that resembles a military boot camp.  Respondent served the next four 
months of his sentence in a halfway house, and is serving the remainder of the 
sentence under electronically monitored home confinement. 
 
In mitigation, the panel found that respondent has been participating in drug 
treatment programs since 1996, that he has passed random drug tests since that 
time, and that he is currently enrolled in three drug treatment programs.  When his 
period of home confinement ends, respondent will continue participating in a drug 
treatment program and be subject to regular drug testing under the terms of his 
four-year supervised release, as ordered by the federal district court.  Respondent 
also testified that he had not practiced law since the 1980s, that he had worked in 
the insurance industry until his conviction, and that retention of his license to 
practice law would be beneficial in his search for  future employment in the 
insurance business.  There is no evidence that respondent’s cocaine addiction ever 
interfered with his practice of law or damaged his clients. 
 
 
3
 
The panel concluded that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in 
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 1-102(A)(6) 
(engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law).  The 
panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two 
years with the second year of the suspension stayed, provided that respondent 
continue to successfully control his drug addiction, and that relator monitor 
respondent’s drug test results and verify his participation in drug treatment 
programs. 
 
The board adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the 
panel, except that there be no monitoring requirement. 
__________________ 
 
Stephen D. Hardesty and James S. Thomasson, for relator. 
 
Hennenberg & Brown and John A. Fatica, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We adopt the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of 
the board.  Although respondent was convicted of a felony relating to his cocaine 
addiction, any penalty must be tempered by respondent’s demonstrated 
commitment to drug counseling and rehabilitation.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Gallagher (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 693 N.E.2d 1078, 1079, citing 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Norris (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 93, 666 N.E.2d 1087.  In 
light of respondent’s demonstrated commitment to sobriety, his cooperation with 
law enforcement officials, his four-year supervised release with conditions, and 
the lack of any established negative impact on his legal or business clients, a two-
year suspension with one year stayed is an appropriate sanction for respondent’s 
misconduct.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. McElrath (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 
 
 
4
131, 642 N.E.2d 370 (similar penalty imposed in case involving convictions that 
included trafficking in drugs and drug abuse for possession or use of cocaine); see, 
also, Norris. 
 
Based on the foregoing, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of 
law for two years with the second year of the suspension stayed, provided that 
respondent continue to successfully control his drug addiction.  Costs taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  Because I believe that the majority’s 
sanction is insufficient to properly address respondent’s problem, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
Respondent was convicted of trafficking in cocaine, a felony conviction.  
Although I acknowledge the respondent’s commitment to treatment, it may be 
motivated, at least in part, by his parole status and the possibility of being returned 
to prison.  In addition, the two-year suspension with the second year stayed is too 
short to ensure that respondent can remain drug free.  An indefinite suspension 
would better enable this court to monitor respondent’s progress before allowing 
him to apply for reinstatement. 
 
Therefore, due to the seriousness of the respondent’s conviction and the 
continued need to ensure that respondent is indeed drug free, I would impose an 
indefinite suspension with credit for time served. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.