Case Title: State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman

Citation: 

Docket Number: S47733

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  December 20, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of
Jacara Murelle Ahlgren-Stillman,
a Minor Child.
STATE ex rel STATE OFFICE FOR SERVICES
TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
	Petitioner on Review,
	and
LAURA AHLGREN,
	Respondent,
	v.										
DONALD E. STILLMAN,
aka Donnie Stillman,
	Respondent on Review.
_____________________________
In the Matter of
Keith Alexander Stillman,
a Minor Child.
STATE ex rel STATE OFFICE FOR SERVICES
TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
	Petitioner on Review,
	and
LAURA AHLGREN,
	Respondent,
	v.
DONALD E. STILLMAN,
aka Donnie Stillman,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 96-275J-05; CA A107034; SC S47733)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted January 9, 2001.
	Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. 
With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	James A. Palmer, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review.
	Lynn M. Travis and Mary Kane, of the Juvenile Rights
Project, Inc., Portland, filed a response for minor children.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, and De Muniz, Justices.**
	GILLETTE, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed. 
	*Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Jack A. Billings, Judge. 167 Or App 446, 1 P3d 500 (2000).
    **Kulongoski, J., resigned June 14, 2001, and did not
participate in the decision of this case; Balmer, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
		GILLETTE, J.
		In this termination of parental rights case, the trial
court terminated father's parental rights in his two minor
children, because of his incarceration and drug-related
activities.  See ORS 419B.504 (1997) (providing for termination
of parental rights if court finds, inter alia, parent unfit by
reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to child). 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence did not
demonstrate that father was unfit at the time of the termination
hearing.  State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 167 Or App 446, 1 P3d
500 (2000).  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
		In reviewing a decision of the Court of Appeals that is
essentially an appeal from a suit in equity, ORS 419A.200(5); ORS
19.415(3), this court may review de novo or may limit its review
to questions of law.  ORS 19.415(4); see also Ken Leahy
Construction, Inc. v. Cascade General, Inc., 329 Or 566, 571, 994
P2d 112 (1999) (so stating).  In this instance, because we reach
issues that the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not
address, and some of those issues are fact-dependent, we elect to
review the record de novo.
Before his most recent conviction and incarceration,
father abused methamphetamines and, before father met mother, he
had been convicted twice on drug charges.  In fact, father met
mother when both were in a drug treatment program.  They
eventually had a daughter (born in 1991) and a son (born in
1993).  After father's third arrest in 1996 on a federal charge
of possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and in
light of mother's persistent drinking and methamphetamine use,
the State Office of Services to Children and Families (SOSCF) (1)
sought to terminate their parental rights.  SOSCF postponed
action on that petition, notwithstanding father's impending
criminal trial and likely incarceration, and ultimately withdrew
the petition in January 1998, after father entered prison,
because mother appeared to be doing well in her efforts to
overcome her own drug problem.  However, mother again relapsed
and, in August 1998, SOSCF filed another petition to terminate
both mother's and father's parental rights.  At the subsequent
termination hearing in June 1999, mother conditionally stipulated
to terminating her rights; father did not. (2) 
		When father was arrested, SOSCF initially placed the
children for a short period in temporary care.  Soon afterwards,
however, SOSCF placed the children with a foster parent in the
extended family, namely, mother's former step-mother.  At the
time of the termination hearing, that foster parent could retain
the children only for a few more months.  Thus, at least one
transition was in the offing for the children, although that
transition likely would to be to another member of the highly
supportive extended family. 
		At the termination hearing, SOSCF's case centered on
the children's need for permanence.  A social worker who provided
counseling to the children testified on behalf of SOSCF that the
children needed permanency, predictability, and stability in
their lives, and that changes, such as those that might follow
from the pending termination proceeding, created tension for
them.  For example, she testified that the older child exhibited
"parentified" behavior in the months preceding the termination
hearing, in that the child assumed an adult role in the foster
home in trying to take control of her situation.  The child also
had gained a significant amount of weight during that period. 
According to the social worker, that weight gain indicated "a
great deal of anxiety in her life and that she was probably
overeating to try to reduce that."  Further, the social worker
testified:
		"[T]hese children are very similar to other
children I work with that have been in long-term foster
care.  They need permanency, they need safety, they
need to know where they're going to be next week, next
month, next year, and where they go to high school and
where they're going to be coming home from vacations.
		"* * * * *
		"Their life goes on hold, it continues to be on
hold developmentally.  It's very difficult for a child
to continue to make progress in their life, go through
the developmental stages that they need to go through
to become adults if even their present is tentative,
that they don't know what's going to be predictable for
them. 
		"* * * Sometimes I've referred to children like
this as the ghost children because they seem
insubstantial in their connection with the world and
with reality and with present time because they're so
insecure about what's going to happen for them." 
	Other than that general testimony, which principally
concerned the effect of foster care on the children, there is
very little psychological evidence in the record pertaining to
the children.  The record contains no written mental health
evaluation of either child.  Indeed, the only testimony
concerning the psychological condition of the younger child was
that he was relatively quiet and reserved, and that he worried
about his parents.  Moreover, there is virtually nothing in the
record that sheds light on any ill effects that the children
might have suffered from their parents' involvement with drugs
before the children were placed in foster care. (3)
	SOSCF also focused on the possibility that father would
be unable to overcome his addiction to drugs and the likelihood
of a relapse.  The agency introduced a psychological evaluation
of father, which was performed over two years before the
termination hearing, and several months before father's
conviction and sentencing.  The psychologist who examined father
concluded that father at that time was likely to relapse because
he was externally motivated, i.e., he was motivated to cooperate
with counseling and treatment not through a sincere desire to
improve himself, but merely out of a desire to avoid the
consequences of noncompliance.  
	The psychological report concluded, however, that
"[c]hemical dependency is the primary psychological problem that
would impair [father's] ability to function as a parent."  At the
termination hearing, the psychologist elaborated, testifying
that, other than chemical dependency, father had no serious
mental health problems:  "He has * * * the ability to [be a good
parent] and lacks any serious psychological problems that would *
* * make that impossible or prevent him from doing that if that
is what he tried to do."  SOSCF presented no more recent evidence
of father's mental health status.  
	Father, on the other hand, submitted evidence that he
had made progress in rehabilitation during his incarceration. 
Father completed a multi-phase drug treatment program that began
before father's trial on the drug charges.  The clinical
supervisor in charge of that program testified that, when father
entered the program, he was angry and resistant, he minimized the
significance of his addiction, and he was motivated to complete
the program out of a desire to obtain a lighter sentence at his
trial.  However, after several weeks, the counselor observed that
father had made a significant turnaround in his attitude.  At the
completion of the first phase of his treatment, father asked for
an additional four weeks of treatment.  He was highly successful
in that program.  The clinical supervisor also testified that
father sincerely came to appreciate the effect that his drug use
had had on his children and was addressing the deficits in his
life so that he could maintain custody of the children.  
	In addition, father's therapist for the second phase of
the drug treatment program stated that, notwithstanding a brief
relapse before beginning that phase, father was the most
successful client with whom she had ever worked. (4)  Father also
took parenting classes, including an extensive, 72-hour parenting
class accredited through Chemeketa Community College.  He
completed a 12-week human sexuality class and a 62-hour real
estate class.  Father organized a prison 12-step program and
worked for the forest service.  In all those endeavors, father
drew uniformly high praise from the officials in charge. (5)  
	At the time of the termination hearing, father's
remaining prison time was approximately four months.  After that,
father predicted that he would reside in a halfway house or
possibly in home confinement.  Father admitted that the children
might have to remain in foster care for as long as a year, until
he was able to find a job and provide a home for them.  An SOSCF
representative testified that, given the amount of time that the
children already had spent in foster care, that period was simply
too long.  She stated that SOSCF "is not willing to consider
[father] and is not able to consider him as a resource for his
children because he is incarcerated.  What the children need is
permanency."  The representative also testified that it was "in
the best interests of these children not to continue to wait any
longer as they've already waited for three years."  She added
that 
	"the concern is his current incarceration, the length
of time it would take him to transition back into the
community to demonstrate that he is in fact clean and
sober.  And that will take a long period of time in
order for him to demonstrate that.  Based on that, the
agency does not feel it's in the children's best
interest to have them remain in foster care
indefinitely while the father demonstrates that to the
agency and to the community."	
	The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence
that father was unfit.  See ORS 419B.521(1) (setting clear and
convincing evidence standard).  It based that finding on what
that court styled as father's "criminal conduct which impairs his
ability to adequately care for [the children], that's by virtue
of his incarceration."  It also found that the children needed
permanency immediately.  It found that father's desire to make
the children wait until he had established himself was an example
of father putting his needs ahead of the children's.  The court
also thought that father's continued incarceration and the
likelihood that father would relapse into addiction upon release
from prison "pose[d] an unacceptable risk to the mental and
emotional well being of the children."  The trial court therefore
terminated father's parental rights and committed the children to
the care of SOSCF.
	On father's appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.  The
court reviewed the evidence regarding father's incarceration and
noted that, in light of the short duration of the balance of his
sentence and potential time to be spent in a halfway house, "such
a relatively short period of separation" does not render a parent
unfit.  Stillman, 167 Or App at 457.  In addition, the court held
that SOSCF had not proved that father's prior drug use had made
him unfit as a parent.  "[T]he point is not that we are certain
that father will succeed.  Rather, the record does not show, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he will not."  Id. at 459. 
The court concluded:
		"On this record, neither father's incarceration
nor the possibility of a relapse provides clear and
convincing evidence that father is presently unfit
under ORS 419B.504 (1997).  Accordingly, we need not
decide whether the conduct or condition that makes
father unfit also makes integration of his children
into his home improbable within a reasonable time."
Id. (citations omitted).  Chief Judge Deits dissented,
maintaining that father was unfit and that the children's
integration into the father's home was improbable within a
reasonable time.  Id. at 459-67 (Deits, C. J., dissenting).  We
granted SOSCF's petition for review.
	Generally, a court may terminate parental rights for
the purpose of freeing a child for adoption if the court finds
that termination is in the best interest of the child.  ORS
419B.500.  The specific bases for termination are set out in ORS
419B.502 to ORS 419B.508.  Those statutes provide for termination
based on such circumstances as extreme parental misconduct,
unfitness, neglect, or abandonment.  The statute that sets out
the formula for a termination upon a finding of parental
unfitness, ORS 419B.504, provides: 
		"The rights of the parent or parents may be
terminated as provided in ORS 419B.500 if the court
finds that the parent or parents are unfit by reason of
conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child
and integration of the child into the home of the
parent or parents is improbable within a reasonable
time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change.
In determining such conduct and conditions, the court
shall consider but is not limited to the following:
		"(1) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental
deficiency of the parent of such nature and duration as to
render the parent incapable of providing proper care for the
child for extended periods of time.
		"(2) Conduct toward any child of an abusive, cruel
or sexual nature.
		"(3) Addictive or habitual use of intoxicating
liquors or controlled substances to the extent that
parental ability has been substantially impaired.
		"(4) Physical neglect of the child.
		"(5) Lack of effort of the parent to adjust the
circumstances of the parent, conduct, or conditions to
make the return of the child possible or failure of the
parent to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable
efforts by available social agencies for such extended
duration of time that it appears reasonable that no
lasting adjustment can be effected.
		"(6) Criminal conduct that impairs the parent's
ability to provide adequate care for the child."
(Emphasis added.)  The emphasized parts of the statute were added
in 1997.  Or Laws 1997, ch 873, § 7.
		Until 1997, ORS 419B.504 had provided that "integration
of the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable
in the foreseeable future due to conduct or conditions not likely
to change."  ORS 419B.504 (1995) (emphasis added); see Or Laws
1997, ch 873, § 7 (indicating changes to statute).  The effect of
the amendment was to substitute the phrase "reasonable time" for
the phrase "foreseeable future."  The former version of the
statute did not define "foreseeable future."  By contrast, a
"reasonable time" now is defined.  It "means a period of time
that is reasonable given a child's emotional and developmental
needs and ability to form and maintain lasting attachments."  ORS
419A.004(21).  
		The legislative intent respecting the statute is
crucial to this case.  To determine that intent, we look first to
the text and context of the statute.  PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  The text of
the statute is the best evidence of legislative intent.  Id. at
610.  If that intent is clear from the text, read in context,
further analysis is unnecessary.  Id. 
		ORS 419B.504 sets out a two-part test for determining
whether to terminate parental rights, both parts of which must be
met before the court orders termination.  First, the court must
address a parent's fitness:  The court must find that the parent
is "unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental
to the child."  That, in turn, requires a two-part inquiry:  The
court must find that: (1) the parent has engaged in some conduct
or is characterized by some condition; and (2) the conduct or
condition is "seriously detrimental" to the child.  Second -- and
only if the parent has met the foregoing criteria -- the court
also must find that the "integration of the child into the home
of the parent or parents is improbable within a reasonable time
due to conduct or conditions not likely to change."  That second
part of the test for termination requires the court to evaluate
the relative probability that, given particular parental conduct
or conditions, the child will become integrated into the parental
home "within a reasonable time."  
		The use of that phrase, "within a reasonable time,"
reflects a legislative concern that SOSCF and the courts achieve
a permanent home for a child more promptly than the phrase that
formerly was in the statute, "the foreseeable future," suggested. 
In amending the statute, the legislature did not provide for a
specific time period for integration, but provided instead for
such a period of time as "is reasonable given a child's emotional
and developmental needs and ability to form and maintain lasting
attachments."  ORS 419A.004(21).  That inquiry is child-specific. 
It calls for testimony in psychological and developmental terms
regarding the particular child's requirements.
		ORS 419B.090 demonstrates the broader context of the
two inquiries under ORS 419B.504.  That statute declares that it
is the "policy of the State of Oregon to recognize that children
are individuals who have legal rights."  ORS 419B.090(2)(a). 
Those rights include the right to "[p]ermanency with a safe
family."  ORS 419B.090(2)(a)(A).  The legislature added that
statement of policy in 1997, during the same session in which it
revised ORS 419B.504.  See Or Laws 1997, ch 873, § 2a (adding
statement).  Consistent with the foregoing legislative policy,
the focus of both parts of the test for termination under ORS
419B.504 is on the detrimental effect of the parent's conduct or
condition on the child, not just the seriousness of the parent's
conduct or condition in the abstract.  Thus, the court first must
identify the parent's conduct or condition, and then measure the
degree to which that conduct or condition has had a seriously
detrimental effect on the child. 
		In ORS 419B.504, the legislature has provided a non-exclusive list of six examples of conduct and conditions that
courts must consider, both in determining whether a parent is
unfit and in determining whether the parent's disqualifying
circumstances are not likely to change.  But those statutory
examples are just that -- examples.  The focus of that part of
the statute is on the parent's conduct or condition.
		A significant part of the discussion and briefing in
this case has centered on the directive to the court to consider
"criminal conduct that impairs the parent's ability to provide
adequate care for the child."  ORS 419B.504(6).  As noted, the
trial court relied on that factor in concluding that father is
unfit and it was one of the bases for SOSCF's petition to
terminate father's parental rights.  
		The wording of ORS 419B.504(6) is broad.  It authorizes
the court to consider any "[c]riminal conduct" that "impairs the
parent's ability to provide adequate care for the child." 
"Criminal conduct" refers to an act -- under this statute, a
criminal act of the parent; it is not a reference to a
"condition" that affects the parent.  Moreover, the criminal
conduct must "impair" the parent's ability to provide adequate
care for the child.  Criminal conduct that meets those statutory
requirements could include such conduct as abetting the child's
own criminal conduct, stealing the child's property, or
soliciting the child to commit a crime.  The question is,
however:  Do the sequellae of a parent's criminal acts, such as
flight, concealment, or incarceration, also qualify as "criminal
conduct" under ORS 419B.504(6)?
		That depends.  The plain words of the statute require
the conduct to be "criminal."  Flight and concealment -- to use
but two examples -- themselves may be criminal acts and, hence,
"criminal" conduct.  Incarceration, on the other hand, is a
possible consequence of criminal conduct, but it is not, itself,
such conduct.  Thus, it would be error for a court to rely on an
incarceration as "criminal conduct" and to base a decision to
terminate parental rights specifically on the basis of ORS
419B.504(6). (6)
		However, the foregoing discussion does not place
incarceration, and its consequences for the children, outside the
purview of the court.  A parent's imprisonment for a criminal act
is, in any event, a "condition" of the kind that the court is
entitled to consider under the wording of the first part of ORS
419B.504.  It cannot be disputed reasonably that any prolonged
incarceration could be a condition so "seriously detrimental to
the child" as to warrant a finding of unfitness." (7)  With that in
mind, we return to the analysis that the Court of Appeals
majority followed in this case.
		The Court of Appeals began its analysis of father's
fitness by considering his conduct or condition.  In so doing,
the court focused principally on father's history of substance
abuse and the possibility that he would relapse.  The court
concluded that the record did not establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that that conduct or condition rendered
father presently unfit under ORS 419B.504, given father's
activities while in prison in attempting to overcome his
addiction and to become a more responsible parent.  Stillman, 167
Or App at 459.  
		We agree with the Court of Appeals that, given father's
sincere and substantial efforts to address his drug problem while
in prison, father's history of drug abuse was not "conduct or
condition" that rendered him unfit at the time of the termination
hearing.  In reaching that conclusion, we do not mean to minimize
the significant risks to which father subjected the children by
operating a drug manufacturing laboratory in the family home,
both in terms of the danger from the laboratory itself and of the
risks associated with having dangerous individuals in the home. 
Indeed, it even might be true that, as the Court of Appeals
suggested, an attempt by SOSCF to terminate father's parental
rights at around the time of his arrest might have led to a
different outcome.  But all that has occurred since that time
indicates that father's irresponsible behavior will not be
repeated.  The statute requires us to evaluate whether father
presently, i.e., at the time of the termination hearing, was
unfit.  On this record, the state has not shown that he was.  
		The Court of Appeals considered only briefly the fact
of father's incarceration.  It noted that, at the time of trial,
father had four months left on his federal sentence and then
would have to spend several more months in a halfway house
establishing his ability to care for the children.  The court
concluded that, in light of that relatively short period of
separation remaining before the family could be reunited,
father's incarceration also did not render him unfit. (8)  That line
of analysis, however, improperly conflated the requirements of
the two parts of the test for determining whether termination of
parental rights is appropriate.  It is only under the second,
"integration" part of the test under ORS 419B.504 that the court
considers whether there is a probability of integration of the
child into the parent's home "within a reasonable time."  As we
have explained, the "fitness" inquiry comes first, and the period
of time that father's inability personally to care for the
children would continue adds nothing to the court's initial
determination respecting father's fitness.  
		As we have said, father's incarceration is a condition
of the kind that we may consider under ORS 419B.504 and, if it
were seriously detrimental to the children, would be sufficient
to warrant a finding of unfitness, notwithstanding the relatively
short period that it was likely to continue.  Clearly, father's
unfinished incarceration and the period of time that he would be
required to spend in a halfway house precluded him personally
from providing adequate care for the children or otherwise
maintaining a normal parental role as the children's father.    
		Having concluded that father's "conduct or condition"
satisfies one of the statutory criteria for a finding of
unfitness, we turn to the second part of that fitness inquiry,
viz., whether that conduct or condition is "seriously
detrimental" to the children. (9)  On that subject, the trial court
found that the children suffered serious anxiety about their
future.  Our own de novo review of the record shows that evidence
concerning the "detriment" that the children have suffered was
related to and stemmed principally from the children's worry
about their parents' well-being and the uncertainty surrounding
the termination proceeding itself. (10)  
		Generally, the record demonstrates that the children
are relatively happy and well-adjusted.  The foster mother
testified at length that the children have friends, play sports, are actively involved in other extra-curricular activities, and
do well in school.  Indeed, virtually all the evidence of
detriment in the record concerned the older child (her
"parentified" behavior, her recent problems in school, and her
weight gain) and appeared to have been tied either to SOSCF's
curtailing of telephone conversations between father and the
children or to the pending termination proceeding itself. 
Testimony concerning the younger child was simply that he was
quiet and worried about his parents.  The children's therapist
summarized the effect on the children as follows:  "They need
permanency, they need safety, they need to know where they are
going to be next week, next month, next year, and where * * *
they're going to be coming home from vacations."  
		The question before this court, then, is whether the
children's anxiety about their future, caused by father's 
incarceration, is the sort of serious detriment contemplated in
the parental rights termination statute.  
		This court has considered the phrase "seriously
detrimental" in ORS 419B.504 on only one previous occasion, in
State v. McMaster, 259 Or 291, 486 P2d 567 (1971).  In that case,
the child initially was removed from the parents' home as a baby
and placed in foster care because of the parents' neglect.  The
child subsequently was not returned to the parents; the state
moved to terminate parental rights, based on the parents'
inability to stabilize themselves financially or to find and
maintain adequate housing.  With regard to the detriment to the
child, this court stated the following:
		"There was testimony which was uncontradicted that
if the child were now taken from the foster parents and
placed with her natural parents it would have a
seriously detrimental effect upon the child.  This same
testimony developed, however, that this is primarily
because the child has lived with foster parents for
almost all of her now almost six years.  The
detrimental effect is not necessarily because of the
conduct of her natural parents, except that the child
may resent being taken from the better all-around
environment provided by her foster parents as compared
to that which would be provided by her natural parents. 
		"* * * * *
		"We are of the opinion that the state of the
McMaster family is duplicated in hundreds of thousands
of American families, - transiency and incapacity,
poverty and instability.  The witness was undoubtedly
correct when he stated that living in the McMasters'
household would not 'allow this child to maximize her
potential.'  However, we do not believe the legislature
contemplated that parental rights could be terminated
because the natural parents are unable to furnish
surroundings that which would enable the child to grow
up as we would desire all children to do.  When the
legislature used the phrase, 'seriously detrimental to
the child,' we believe that they had in mind a more
serious and uncommon detriment than that caused by the
conduct of parents such as the McMasters." 
Id. at 302-03 (emphasis added).  
		We recognize that father's "conduct or condition" is
substantially different from that of the McMasters.  We also
recognize that the legislature amended ORS 419B.504 after this
court's decision in McMaster to include conduct similar to the
McMasters' as grounds for termination.  See Or Laws 1993, ch 33,
§ 140 (adding, among other things, rule that parent's lack of
effort to adjust circumstances to make return of child possible
itself may be ground for termination).  Nonetheless, the evidence
concerning the resulting detriment to the children, viz., anxiety
relating to an impending transition, was similar.  It does not
strike us as extraordinary that children involved in a
termination proceeding would experience anxiety about their
future.  However, as in McMaster, we do not think that the level
of anxiety that the children have experienced here is the sort of
serious detriment that the legislature contemplated as providing
the basis for a conclusion that a parent is unfit.  
		This court has stated that "[t]he reason for
terminating parental rights ought to be related to the parent's
conduct as a parent."  Simons et ux v. Smith, 229 Or 277, 280,
366 P2d 875 (1961).  In this case, nothing in the record suggests
that father's personal relationship with his children was
anything but loving, strong, and positive. (11)  The evidence was
uncontroverted that the children have enjoyed their visits with
father and are attached to him, and that father consistently has
written and telephoned the children throughout his incarceration. 

We are aware that the fact that the children are doing
as well as they are, and even the fact that father has been able
to maintain the relationship with the children that he has, is
due largely to the fortuitous circumstance of a strong extended
family structure, which includes relatives who are willing to
serve as foster parents.  In another case, given similar conduct
or condition on the part of the parent, but absent the strong
family support that has been and is present here, the children
might suffer such serious detriment as to satisfy the
requirements of ORS 419B.504.  However, on this record, SOSCF has
failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that father's
conduct or condition was seriously detrimental to his children so
as to warrant a finding of unfitness.  The Court of Appeals'
similar conclusion was correct.  
		Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial
court erred in terminating father's parental rights.  The
decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court was
correct.  
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed. 



1. 	The 2001 Legislature abolished SOSCF and transferred
all its functions to the Department of Human Services.  Or Laws
2001, ch 900, §§ 1, 5.  That action has no effect on this
proceeding.

2. 	Mother stipulated that, if father's parental rights
were terminated, then her rights would be terminated as well. 
Father's testimony--which we accept--was that he intended to
divorce mother, because mother either was unable or unwilling to
abandon her lifestyle of drug abuse.  Thus, although this opinion
concludes that father's parental rights will not be terminated,
it should not be read as a basis for a similar disposition--or
any disposition--of mother's case.

3. 	In that regard, there is evidence in the record to the
effect that, after the arrest, the older child told the foster
mother that she remembered having seen a green liquid being
stirred in the family home.  The trial court found, on that
basis, that "[f]ather was engaged in full-scale drug
manufacturing and the children knew it."  Our own review of the
record does not support that finding with respect to the
children, for two reasons.  First, the reference to a "green
liquid," without more, is not a sufficient basis for concluding
that either child had seen drugs.  Indeed, the foster mother's
testimony indicated that even she was not certain that that was a
reference to drugs.  Second, the older child was no more than
four years old at the time and, thus, even if the green liquid
had been drugs, it is not reasonable to infer that the child knew
that her father was involved in criminal activity.  What the
record does support--and we so find--is that father's drug
manufacturing activity for a time placed the children in serious
physical danger. 

4. 	In fact, father had contacted the therapist and
requested individual counseling to address the relapse.  The
second phase of the drug treatment program ended in September
1997.  Father was convicted and sentenced in June 1997 and
entered prison in November 1997.  As of the time of the
termination hearing, father had been clean and sober for 26
months.  
		The psychologist who testified on behalf of SOSCF
expressed his opinion at the termination hearing that the fact
that father was able to maintain his sobriety in prison was not a
valid indicator of whether father would be able to do the same
outside of the controlled prison setting.  The psychologist
conceded, however, that he had not seen father in over two years
and that additional information on father's behavior while in
prison, such as his voluntarily quitting smoking, organizing a
12-step program for the prison, and working cooperatively with
SOSCF, might alter the psychologist's opinion of father's chances
for success.

5. 	For example, the instructor of the prison parenting
class stated that father's "positive outlook and enthusiasm
served as a model for other students."  The instructor of the
human sexuality class stated that father had shown himself to be
"a man of high principles and consistent sincerity."  He
concluded that father was sincerely motivated by a desire to
enhance his parenting skills and found him to be "an engaging and
motivated student."  The instructor of the real estate class
stated that father 
	"has shown extreme discipline and desire to learn.  At
his request I have provided him personal attention
because of his exhibited desire and obvious ability to
comprehend the subject matter.  I * * * have offered
this acknowledgment because [father] is one of the few
that deserves recognition for his devotion to his
family and his future in Society."
The forestry crew supervisor stated that father "demonstrated
outstanding work ethics in whatever he does."

6. 	In the present case, as noted, the trial court did rely
on father's incarceration to establish the "criminal conduct"
factor.  However, father did not make an objection on that basis
and, therefore, the error was not preserved.  In any event,
however, we do not believe that the mislabeling of incarceration
as "criminal conduct" rather than as a "condition" made a
difference.  All the parties were aware, at all pertinent times,
that it was the fact of the incarceration and its effect on the
children that were at issue in the case. 

7. 	In State v. Grady, 231 Or 65, 371 P2d 68 (1962), this
court declined to terminate the parental rights of a young mother
simply because she was incarcerated.  Subsequently, that case was
cited for the proposition that "imprisonment was not held conduct
'seriously detrimental to the child.'"  State v. McMaster, 259 Or
291, 299, 486 P2d 567 (1971).  Whether or not that statement in
McMaster was a fair characterization of the holding in Grady, it
is not a fair characterization of the determination that a trial
court is authorized to make.  The court may inquire into the
extent to which a parent's imprisonment is detrimental to the
child.  If the court finds that the incarceration is seriously
detrimental to the child, then the first part of ORS 419B.504
permits--but does not require--the court to find that the parent
is unfit by reason of that condition.

8. 	In that connection, we observe that the Court of
Appeals did not cite ORS 419B.504(6) or otherwise acknowledge in
its analysis of the weight to be given father's incarceration
that the trial court based its finding of unfitness on its
conclusion that father's incarceration established that statutory
factor.

9. 	Because the Court of Appeals concluded that neither
father's incarceration nor his substance abuse made him unfit,
that court did not need to, and did not, address the detrimental
effect of father's conduct on the children.  Neither did it need
to address whether integration of the children into father's home
was improbable within a reasonable time.  

10. 	In that regard, we note that, other than the hearing
testimony of the children's therapist, the record contains no
psychological reports or evaluations of the children's mental or
emotional health; neither does it contain any evidence shedding
light on the effects of father's conduct or condition as a parent
on the children.   

11. 	In that connection, we note that the trial court stated
that father's view that the children would not be harmed
seriously by waiting a few more months for him to become
available to parent them is "an example of father's continued
inability to put the children's needs ahead of his own."  With
that comment, the trial court effectively told father that, by
asserting his desire to continue to parent the children, he
placed his own needs ahead of the children's; concomitantly, the
way to demonstrate his commitment to parenting the children was
to cease his efforts to do so.  That clearly placed father in an
untenable position.  This court took the opposite view of similar
behavior in State v. Grady, 231 Or at 68, commenting that "[w]e
deem it of no little significance and a display of the depth of
[mother's] maternal regard that, notwithstanding her penal
situation, she elected to contest the effort to take the child
away from her forever, and failing in the trial court, initiated
this appeal."