Case Title: Smith v. St. Louis County Police

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC99715, SC99714

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2023-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
BROCK SMITH, 
) 
Opinion issued January 31, 2023 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
No.  SC99715 
 
) 
ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE, ET AL., ) 
 
) 
 
Respondents. 
) 
  
and 
  
GARY NELSON FORD, 
) 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
No.  SC99714 
 
) 
COL. JON BELMAR, CHIEF OF 
) 
POLICE AS CHIEF LAW 
) 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF 
) 
ST.  LOUIS COUNTY, PURSUANT 
) 
TO COUNTY CHARTER, 
) 
AND 
) 
MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY 
) 
PATROL, 
) 
AND 
) 
JIM BUCKLES, SHERIFF OF 
) 
ST. LOUIS COUNTY AS "CHIEF LAW  ) 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL" AS 
) 
DEFINED BY RSMO 589.404(3), 
) 
 
) 
 
Respondents. 
) 
2 
APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Virginia W. Lay, Judge  
Brock Smith appeals a St. Louis County circuit court's judgment denying his 
petition for removal from the Missouri sex offender registry.  Smith argues, because he is 
a tier I sex offender, § 589.400.1(7)1 does not mandate he remain on the Missouri sex 
offender registry for his lifetime.  The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.   
Gary Nelson Ford appeals a St. Louis County circuit court's judgment denying his 
petition for removal from the Missouri sex offender registry.  Ford argues the circuit 
court misstated and misapplied the law in concluding he must remain on the Missouri sex 
offender registry for his lifetime.  The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.     
Facts and Procedural History 
Brock Smith 
In May 2005, the State charged Smith with the offense of "sexual misconduct in 
the first degree."  On December 18, 2005, Smith pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct in 
the first degree, pursuant to § 566.090, RSMo Supp. 2004, as charged.  The circuit court 
suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for two years, which 
Smith successfully completed.  As a result of his guilty plea, Smith registered as a sex 
offender pursuant to the Missouri Sex Offender Registration Act, §§ 589.400, et seq. 
("MO-SORA"), within the time period prescribed.   
On January 20, 2021, Smith filed a petition for removal from the sex offender 
registry, pursuant to § 589.401.  Smith alleged he is a tier I sex offender and is entitled to 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2018, unless otherwise indicated.  
3 
removal from the registry because he satisfied all registration requirements and more than 
10 years had passed since he was required to register.  The State denied Smith's 
allegations and requested his petition be dismissed.  At a hearing on the petition, the 
State's sole objection was that, pursuant to § 589.400.1(7), Smith was not permitted to 
have his name removed from the Missouri sex offender registry because he is required to 
register under the separate requirements of the federal Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901, et seq. ("SORNA").  The circuit court denied 
Smith's petition.  The circuit court concluded MO-SORA, specifically § 589.400.1(7), 
requires lifetime registration for anyone who has ever had to register in Missouri for an 
offense that required registration under SORNA.   
Smith appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  This Court granted transfer and 
has jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.   
Gary Nelson Ford 
In January 2004, the circuit court convicted Ford, after he pleaded guilty, to three 
counts of child molestation in the second degree for subjecting a minor to sexual contact, 
pursuant to § 566.068, RSMo 2000.  Ford's conviction renders him a tier I sex offender 
subject to a 15-year registration period.  Ford was required to register as a sex offender 
pursuant to MO-SORA, and he has been registered in Missouri since 2004.   
In December 2018, Ford filed a petition for removal from the sex offender 
registry.  Ford alleged that, as a tier I offender, he was eligible for removal from the 
Missouri registry, pursuant to § 589.401.  The Missouri State Highway Patrol and other 
defendants argued solely that, pursuant to § 589.400.1(7), Ford was not entitled to have 
4 
his name removed from the Missouri sex offender registry because of his separate 
obligation to register under SORNA.  Ford does not dispute that he had previously been 
required to register under SORNA.  The circuit court denied Ford's petition for removal.  
The circuit court concluded that MO-SORA, specifically § 589.400.1(7), requires lifetime 
registration for anyone who has ever had to register in Missouri for an offense that 
required registration under SORNA.   
Ford appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  This Court granted transfer and 
has jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.   
Standard of Review 
When reviewing a court-tried case, this Court will affirm the circuit court's 
judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of 
the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.  Murphy v. Carron, 536 
S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). 
"This Court's primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue."  Parktown Imps., Inc. v. 
Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. banc 2009).  "If the intent of the legislature 
is clear and unambiguous, by giving the language used in the statute its plain and 
ordinary meaning, then [this Court is] bound by that intent and cannot resort to any 
statutory construction in interpreting the statute."  Goerlitz v. City of Maryville, 333 
S.W.3d 450, 455 (Mo. banc 2011).  "Courts look elsewhere for interpretation only when 
the meaning is ambiguous or would lead to an illogical result defeating the purpose of the 
legislature."  Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Mo. banc 1998).  
 
5 
"[A] court must presume that the legislature acted with a full awareness and 
complete knowledge of the present state of the law."  State v. Rumble, 680 S.W.2d 939, 
942 (Mo. banc 1984).  "Accordingly, when the legislature amends a statute, we presume 
the legislature intended to change the existing law."  State ex rel. T.J. v. Cundiff, 632 
S.W.3d 353, 357 (Mo. banc 2021).  "In determining legislative intent, no portion of a 
statute is read in isolation, but rather is read in context to the entire statute, harmonizing 
all provisions."  Aquila Foreign Qualifications Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 362 S.W.3d 1, 4 
(Mo. banc 2012).   
[W]here a statute is amended only in part, or as respects only certain 
isolated and integral sections thereof and the remaining sections or parts of 
the statute are allowed and left to stand unamended, unchanged, and 
apparently unaffected by the amendatory act or acts, it is presumed that the 
Legislature intended the unamended and unchanged sections or parts of the 
original statute to remain operative and effective, as before the enactment 
of the amendatory act. 
 
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Mo., 639 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. 
1982) (alteration in original).  
Analysis  
Smith argues the circuit court erred in denying his petition for removal from the 
Missouri sex offender registry because he is a tier 1 sex offender and § 589.400.1(7) does 
not mandate he register as a sex offender in Missouri for his lifetime.  Ford argues the 
circuit court erred in denying his petition for removal from the Missouri sex offender 
registry because (1) § 589.401 provides the right to seek removal from the Missouri sex 
offender registry; (2) the circuit court misstated and misapplied the law; and 
(3) § 589.400.1(7) does not mandate he register as a sex offender in Missouri for his 
 
6 
lifetime.  This Court finds both cases were correctly resolved by the circuit court's proper 
application of § 589.400.1(7).2   
In 1994, Missouri enacted MO-SORA.  See §§ 566.600, et seq., RSMo 1994.  
MO-SORA sets forth the requirements to register as a sex offender.  § 589.400.  Section 
589.400.1(7) imposes a registration requirement in Missouri for "[a]ny person who is a 
resident of this state who . . . has been or is required to register under tribal, federal, or 
military law[.]"3  (Emphasis added).  "The purpose of [MO-SORA], and of similar acts in 
other states, is to protect children from violence at the hands of sex offenders and to 
respond to the known danger of recidivism among sex offenders."  Doe v. Phillips, 194 
S.W.3d 833, 839 (Mo. banc 2006) (internal quotations and citation omitted).   
Since 1994, Congress has required each state to maintain a federally compliant sex 
offender registration program to receive federal funding.  In 2006, Congress enacted 
SORNA.  34 U.S.C. §§ 20901, et seq.4  SORNA sought to make the various state 
programs more comprehensive, effective, and uniform.  In pertinent part, SORNA 
provides, "A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each 
jurisdiction where the offender resides[.]"  34 U.S.C. § 20913(a).  A "sex offender" is "an 
individual who was convicted of a sex offense."  Id. § 20911(1).  A "sex offense" 
includes, among other things, "a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual 
                                              
2 This Court, therefore, need not address Ford's remaining arguments.  
3 This provision was originally added as § 589.400.1(5), RSMo 2000.  MO-SORA was later 
amended, and the provision was moved to § 589.400.1(7), RSMo Supp. 2018.  For clarity, this 
opinion will use the current section number. 
4 Prior to September 2017, SORNA was codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911 et seq. (2006).  It is now 
codified, without substantive change, in 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911, et seq. (2017).  For clarity, this 
opinion will use the current title and section numbers.   
 
7 
act or sexual contact with another" and "a criminal offense that is a specified offense 
against a minor."  Id. § 20911(5)(A)(i), (ii).  A "specified offense against a minor" 
includes, among other things, "[c]riminal sexual conduct involving a minor" and "[a]ny 
conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor."  Id. § 20911(7)(H), (I).  
SORNA divides sex offenders into three categories, based on the severity of the offense: 
tier I, tier II, and tier III.  Id. § 20911(2)-(4).  Tier I offenders are required to register for 
15 years, tier II offenders are required to register for 25 years, and tier III offenders are 
required to register for their lifetimes.  Id. § 20915(a)(1)-(3).  In 2008, SORNA was 
applied to all sex offenders, including individuals who committed a sex offense prior to 
July 20, 2006.  See Doe v. Keathley, 290 S.W.3d 719, 720 (Mo. banc 2009).    
In 2018, the General Assembly amended MO-SORA and made several substantive 
changes.  It added a list of crimes exempt from registration.  § 589.400.9.  It divided sex 
offenders into three tiers, based on the severity of the offense.  § 589.414.5-.7.  Tier I 
offenders must be registered for 15 years, tier II offenders must be registered for 25 
years, and tier III offenders must be registered for life.  § 589.400.4(1)-(3).  It added 
§ 589.400.10, which provides: "Any person currently on the sexual offender registry for 
having been adjudicated for a tier I or II offense or adjudicated delinquent for a tier III 
offense or other comparable offenses listed under [§] 589.414 may file a petition [for 
removal from the registry] under [§] 589.401."  It added § 589.401, which contains 
requirements, according to the tiered system, that an offender must meet to petition to 
have their name removed from the Missouri registry.  A tier I offender may petition to 
have his or her name removed from the registry after 10 years, if certain requirements are 
 
8 
met.  § 589.401.4(1).  A tier II offender may petition to have his or her name removed 
from the registry after 25 years, if certain requirements are met.  § 589.401.4(2).  While 
the General Assembly added language to, and removed language from, subdivision (7) in 
the 2018 amendments to MO-SORA, the language imposing a registration requirement 
for "[a]ny person who is a resident of this state who . . . has been or is required to register 
under tribal, federal, or military law" remained unchanged.   
Before the 2018 amendments to MO-SORA, Missouri courts consistently held that 
pursuant to § 589.400.1(7), sex offenders are required to register in Missouri for their 
lifetimes if they previously were required to register as sex offenders pursuant to 
SORNA, even if they are not presently required to register under SORNA.  See, e.g., Doe 
v. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 165, 167 (Mo. banc 2012); Wilkerson v. State, 533 S.W.3d 755, 
760 (Mo. App. 2017).  "SORNA imposes an independent obligation requiring 
respondents to register as sex offenders in Missouri."  Keathley, 290 S.W.3d at 720; 
Toelke, 389 S.W.3d at 167.  "[MO-]SORA registration requirements apply to any person 
who 'has been' required to register as a sex offender pursuant to federal law."  Toelke, 389 
S.W.3d at 167.  "[E]ven if [the offender] presently is not required to register pursuant to 
SORNA, [the offender] 'has been' required to register as a sex offender and, therefore, is 
required to register pursuant to [MO-]SORA."  Id.  
Because the language of § 589.400.1(7) is clear, it is improper for this Court to 
look beyond the plain language of the statute and to construe § 589.400.1(7) contrary to 
both the plain language and this Court's previous construction of the same statutory 
 
9 
provision.5  The registration requirement pursuant to § 589.400.1(7) continues even after 
the individual's federal registration obligation pursuant to SORNA has expired because 
"the state registration requirement is based on the person's present status as a sex offender 
who 'has been' required to register pursuant to SORNA."  Toelke, 389 S.W.3d at 167; 
§ 589.400.1(7).  The General Assembly was aware of this Court's interpretation of 
§ 589.400.1(7) at the time of the 2018 amendments and chose to leave the language 
regarding federal registration unchanged.  See Selig v. Russell, 604 S.W.3d 817, 824 (Mo. 
App. 2020).  Although Missouri courts have stated this result does not seem to comport 
with legislative intent, when the plain language of the statute is clear, this Court will not 
look beyond it.6 
                                              
5 In reaching its conclusion, the dissenting opinion looks beyond the plain language of 
§ 589.400.1(7).  The dissenting opinion acknowledges § 589.400.1(7) remained unchanged 
through the 2018 amendments to MO-SORA but then goes on to analyze the language of 
additional provisions of MO-SORA to determine § 589.400.1(7), as amended, removed the 
requirement that sex offenders in Missouri must register for their lifetimes if they have been 
subject to federal registration requirements under SORNA.  "The rules of statutory interpretation 
are not intended to be applied haphazardly or indiscriminately to achieve a desired result."  
Parktown Imports., 278 S.W.3d at 672. 
6 See, e.g., Wilkerson, 533 S.W.3d at 761 ("The lifetime registration obligation which results 
from Toelke is far longer than the registration obligation imposed by either State or federal law, 
considered in isolation.  It is not clear that the General Assembly intended that an offender's 
registration obligation would 'ratchet up' in this way."); Khatri v. Trotter, 554 S.W.3d 482, 483 
(Mo. App. 2018) ("Once again, despite the legislative intent that there be a method to be 
removed from the registry, we cannot affirm the judgment because of the requirement under 
[MO-SORA] that a person must register on the Missouri registry if the person has been required 
to register at any time on the federal registry."  (emphasis omitted)); Dixon v. Mo. State Highway 
Patrol, 583 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Mo. App. 2019) ("The 2018 amendments specified that only 
offenders in the highest tier – tier III – would be subject to a lifetime registration obligation."); 
J.B. v. Vescovo, 632 S.W.3d 861, 863-64 (Mo. App. 2021) (same); Bacon v. Mo. State Highway 
Patrol, 602 S.W.3d 245, 247 (Mo. App. 2020) ("Until recently, [MO-]SORA treated all sexual 
offenses the same and imposed on all offenders a lifetime registration requirement, with limited 
exceptions.").  Notably, however, Dixon, J.B., and Bacon do not deal with the specific 
subdivision at issue here, § 589.400.1(7).  Although the dissenting opinion suggests Wilkerson, 
Selig, Khatri, and James "could be read as erroneously interpreting Toelke[,]" the dissenting 
 
10 
There are reasons the General Assembly would want to keep the language of 
§ 589.400.1(7), and its interpretation, the same.  SORNA requires every state "shall 
maintain a jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry conforming to the requirements of this 
subchapter."  34 U.S.C. § 20912(a).  Certain federal funds are linked to Missouri's 
substantial compliance with SORNA.  "For any fiscal year after the end of the period for 
implementation, a jurisdiction that fails, as determined by the Attorney General, to 
substantially implement this subchapter shall not receive 10 percent of the funds that 
would otherwise be allocated for that fiscal year to the jurisdiction under subpart 1 of part 
E of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968[.]"  34 U.S.C. 
§ 20927(a) (citation omitted).  Therefore, it is not unreasonable to presume the General 
Assembly would maintain this "catch-all" provision in § 589.400.1(7) to ensure Missouri 
is fully in compliance with federal registration requirements and safeguard Missouri's 
federal funding.7  Additionally, there may be some persons who were previously required 
to register in Missouri but do not otherwise have SORNA registration requirements; 
therefore, they may seek removal from the Missouri sex offender registry.  See Selig, 604 
S.W.3d at 824 ("There still may be those persons whose offense is exempt pursuant to 
section 589.400.9, who do not otherwise have SORNA registration requirements, and are 
thus exempt from all registration under MO-SORA.").   
                                                                                                                                                  
opinion provides no support for its contention that its interpretation of Toelke, rather than the 
principal opinion's interpretation or the court of appeals' interpretation, is correct.   
7 In arguing the principal opinion's interpretation of § 589.400.1(7) leads to an absurd result, the 
dissenting opinion fails to acknowledge certain federal funding being linked to Missouri's 
substantial compliance with SORNA.   
 
11 
Even more significantly, had the General Assembly not intended for 
§ 589.400.1(7) to continue to be construed in the manner this Court has consistently 
construed it, the General Assembly could have amended that provision in 2018 along 
with the other substantive changes to MO-SORA.  Because § 589.400.1(7) is not 
ambiguous, this Court must apply § 589.400.1(7) according to its plain language.8         
                                              
8 Even if this Court were to resort to rules of statutory interpretation, the result remains the same.  
"Where statutory interpretation is necessary, statutory language is considered in context and in 
comparison with other sections to determine its meaning."  St. Louis Cnty. v. Prestige Travel, 
Inc., 344 S.W.3d 708, 714 (Mo. banc 2011).  Section 589.400.1 provides the provisions of     
MO-SORA "shall apply to" eight different subsections.  Sections 589.400.1(1)-(6), (8) set forth 
the different categories of offenders that impose the registration requirement under MO-SORA.  
Section 589.400.1(1) is the subdivision for violations of law referenced in section 589.414.  
Section 589.400.1(1) provides for the registration of "[a]ny person who, since July 1, 1979, has 
been or is hereafter adjudicated for an offense referenced in [§] 589.414, unless such person is 
exempt from registering under . . . [§] 589.401[.]"  (Emphasis added).  Section 589.400.1(7) is 
the subdivision for violations of federal law and provides in part: "Any person who is a resident 
of this state who has, since July 1, 1979, been or is hereafter adjudicated in any other state, 
territory, the District of Columbia, or foreign country, or under federal, tribal, or military 
jurisdiction for an offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute an offense listed 
under [§] 589.414, or has been or is required to register in another state, territory, the District of 
Columbia, or foreign country, or has been or is required to register under tribal, federal, or 
military law[.]"  (Emphasis added).  The General Assembly did not include the registration 
exemption language found in § 589.400.1(1), applicable to § 589.414 violations, in                       
§ 589.400.1(7), applicable to federal law violations, that would allow a § 589.400.1(7) offender 
to be exempt or removed from the registry pursuant to § 589.401 and the new § 589.414 tiered 
system implemented in 2018.  In fact, the General Assembly did not include such language 
reflecting exemptions or removal in any section other than § 589.400.1(1), applicable to              
§ 589.414 violations.  The lack of an avenue to seek exemption or removal pursuant to           
MO-SORA based on independent federal registration requirements of SORNA can also be seen 
in § 589.400.3.  Section 589.400.3 provides exemptions from the registration requirements of 
MO-SORA.  The two exemptions arguably applicable to these cases are found in subdivisions 
(1) and (2) of section 589.400.3.  Both of these exemptions relate to the right to be removed 
pursuant § 589.401 and the new tier system in § 589.414.  As discussed above, § 589.414 
provides the MO-SORA tiered system and certain tiers of offenders required to register under 
MO-SORA may seek removal pursuant to § 589.401.  The General Assembly did not include the 
registration exemption language found in § 589.400.1(1), applicable to law § 589.414 violations, 
in § 589.400.1(7), applicable to federal law violations, that would allow § 589.400.1(7) offenders 
to be entitled to removal pursuant to subdivisions (1) or (2) of section 589.400.3 exemptions 
related to § 589.401 and § 589.414’s tiered system.  This statutory language, viewed in context 
with the various sections of MO-SORA, illustrates the General Assembly’s intent to retain the 
 
12 
So long as the General Assembly does not change the text of § 589.400.1(7), this Court is 
persuaded it should continue to apply § 589.400.1(7) as mandating a lifetime registration 
requirement in Missouri if an offender "has been" subject to federal registration 
requirements under SORNA.  
Brock Smith  
 
Smith pleaded guilty to sexual misconduct in the first degree.  At the time of the 
offense, sexual misconduct in the first degree was codified under § 566.090, RSMo Supp. 
2004, which provided:  
1. A person commits the crime of sexual misconduct in the first degree if he 
has deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex or he 
purposely subjects another person to sexual contact without that person's 
consent.  
 
2. Sexual misconduct in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor unless 
the actor has previously been convicted of an offense under this chapter or 
unless in the course thereof the actor displays a deadly weapon in a 
threatening manner or the offense is committed as a part of a ritual or 
ceremony, in which case it is a class D felony. 
 
Smith meets the definition of a sex offender under SORNA.  34 U.S.C. § 20911(1).  
Smith's offense meets the definition of a sex offense under SORNA.  Id. § 20911(5)(A).  
Smith is a tier I sex offender, which carries a registration period of 15 years.  Id. 
                                                                                                                                                  
lifetime registration "catch all" requirement via § 589.400.1(7) due to an independent federal 
registration obligation.   
 
The General Assembly's intent in structuring these exemption and removal provisions, without 
reference to the independent registration obligation contained in § 589.400.1(7), is especially 
clear when viewed in light of the Missouri funding at stake in the event of noncompliance with 
federal standards, as discussed in more detail above.  While the General Assembly made 
substantial changes to MO-SORA and shortened the requirements for some offenders required to 
register under MO-SORA, it did not similarly shorten requirements for offenders required to 
register under both MO-SORA and SORNA, as shown in comparing §§ 589.400.1(1), 
589.400.1(7), 589.400.3(2), 589.401, and 589.414.   
 
13 
§ 20915(a)(1).  Smith's registration period commenced when he was "sentenced for the 
offense giving rise to the registration requirement."  28 C.F.R. § 72.5(b)(2).  Smith's       
15-year registration period ran from 2005 to 2020.  Therefore, at a minimum, Smith was 
required to register federally from 2008 to 2020.   
Because Smith had been required to register under SORNA, § 589.400.1(7) 
requires Smith to register in Missouri.  Toelke, 389 S.W.3d at 167.  Therefore, the circuit 
court did not err in denying Smith's petition for removal from the Missouri registry and 
finding Smith is not eligible to have his name removed from the Missouri registry 
because he "has been . . . required to register under . . . federal . . . law[.]"  
§ 589.400.1(7). 
Gary Nelson Ford 
Ford pleaded guilty to three counts of the class A misdemeanor of child 
molestation in the second degree, pursuant to § 566.068, RSMo 2000, which provided:  
1. A person commits the crime of child molestation in the second degree if 
he or she subjects another person who is less than seventeen years of age to 
sexual contact. 
 
2. Child molestation in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor unless 
the actor has previously been convicted of an offense under this chapter or 
in the course thereof the actor inflicts serious physical injury on any person, 
displays a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument in a threatening manner, 
or the offense is committed as part of a ritual or ceremony, in which case 
the crime is a class D felony.  
 
Ford meets the definition of a sex offender under SORNA.  34 U.S.C. § 20911(1).  Ford's 
offense meets the definition of a sex offense under SORNA.  Id. § 20911(5)(A).  Ford's 
offense also meets the definition of a specified offense against a minor.  Id. 
14 
§ 20911(7)(H), (I).  Ford is a tier I sex offender, which carries a registration period of 15
years.  Id. § 20915(a)(1).  Ford's registration period commenced when he was "sentenced 
for the offense giving rise to the registration requirement."  28 C.F.R. § 72.5(b)(2).  
Ford's 15-year registration period ran from 2004 to 2019.  Therefore, at a minimum, Ford 
was subject to federal registration from 2008 to 2019.  
Because Ford had been required to register under SORNA, § 589.400.1(7) requires 
Ford to register in Missouri.  Toelke, 389 S.W.3d at 167.  Therefore, the circuit court did 
not err in denying Ford's petition for removal from the Missouri registry and finding Ford 
is not eligible to have his name removed from the Missouri registry because he "has been 
. . . required to register under . . . federal . . . law[.]"  § 589.400.1(7). 
Conclusion 
The circuit court did not err in concluding Smith and Ford were not entitled to 
removal from the Missouri sex offender registry because § 589.400.1(7) mandates 
registration for a person's lifetime if they "ha[ve] been . . . required to register under . . . 
federal . . . law[.]"  The circuit court's decisions are affirmed.   
  __________________________ 
  Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
Wilson, C.J., Russell, Powell and Ransom, JJ., concur; 
Breckenridge, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; 
Draper, J., concurs in opinion of Breckenridge, J.
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
BROCK SMITH, 
) 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
No.  SC99715 
 
) 
ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE, ET AL., ) 
 
) 
 
Respondents. 
) 
  
and 
  
GARY NELSON FORD, 
) 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
) 
 
) 
v. 
) 
No.  SC99714 
 
) 
COL. JON BELMAR, CHIEF OF 
) 
POLICE AS CHIEF LAW 
) 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF 
) 
ST.  LOUIS COUNTY, PURSUANT 
) 
TO COUNTY CHARTER, 
) 
AND 
) 
MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY 
) 
PATROL, 
) 
AND 
) 
JIM BUCKLES, SHERIFF OF 
) 
ST. LOUIS COUNTY AS "CHIEF LAW  ) 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL" AS 
) 
DEFINED BY RSMO 589.404(3), 
) 
 
) 
 
Respondents. 
) 
2 
 
DISSENTING OPINION  
 
I respectfully dissent because I do not concur with the analysis or conclusion of the 
principal opinion.  The claims of error raised on appeal by Brock Smith and Gary Ford 
should be resolved by properly applying the language of the Missouri Sex Offender 
Registry Act (MO-SORA), sections 589.400 to 589.425.1  In affirming the circuit court’s 
judgments denying Mr. Smith’s and Mr. Ford’s petitions to be removed from Missouri’s 
sex offender registry, the principal opinion reads subdivision (7) of section 589.400.1 out 
of context and misstates this Court’s holding in Doe v. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 165, 167 
(Mo. banc 2012).  In the first instance, the principal opinion ignores the first seven words 
in section 589.400.1 that precede the eight subdivisions that follow.  When properly read, 
the plain language of section 589.400.1(7) does not mandate lifetime registration for every 
person who has been or is required to register under federal law.  The relevant portion of 
section 589.400.1(7) states, “Sections 589.400 to 589.425 shall apply to:  . . . (7)  Any 
person who is a resident of the state who . . . has been or is required to register under . . . 
federal law[.]”  Subdivision (7)  provides merely that residents of Missouri who have ever 
been required to register by federal law are subject to MO-SORA’s provisions. 
Additionally, contrary to the principal opinion’s characterization of this Court’s 
opinion in Toelke, 389 S.W.3d at 167, it did not hold section 589.400.1(7), RSMo Supp. 
2011, imposed a lifetime registration requirement on a person who was, at any time, 
                                              
1 Statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2018, unless otherwise noted.  Although 
technically redundant, references to RSMo Supp. 2018 are occasionally used in the body 
for emphasis.  
3 
 
required to register under federal law.  Instead, the Court, in Toelke, held the lifetime 
registration requirements of sections 589.400 to 589.425, RSMo Supp. 2011, were made 
applicable to persons who had been or were then required to register under tribal, federal, 
or military law by section 589.400.1(7).  The principal opinion’s mischaracterization of the 
Court’s holding in Toelke is the foundation for its finding the General Assembly’s failure 
to amend section 589.400.1(7), when it amended other provisions of MO-SORA in 2018, 
shows its intent to continue mandatory lifetime registration for persons who have ever been 
required to register under federal law.  The principal opinion then employs that 
mischaracterization to justify not applying the registration requirements in section 
589.400.3-.4, enacted in 2018.  The plain language of section 589.400.1(7) and the Toelke 
opinion compel the contrary conclusion – persons who have been or are required to register 
under federal law, such as Mr. Smith and Mr. Ford, must comply with the registration 
requirements in section 589.400.3-.4, RSMo Supp. 2018, and may be entitled to have their 
names removed from the registry under section 589.411.   
The resolution of Mr. Smith’s and Mr. Ford’s claims on appeal is straightforward 
under MO-SORA’s plain language.  First, subdivision (7) of section 589.400.1 provides: 
Sections 589.400 to 589.425 shall apply to:  . . . Any person who is a 
resident of this state who has, since July 1, 1979, been or is hereafter 
adjudicated in any other state, territory, the District of Columbia, or foreign 
country, or under federal, tribal, or military jurisdiction for an offense which, 
if committed in this state, would constitute an offense listed under 
section 589.414, or has been or is required to register in another state, 
territory, the District of Columbia, or foreign country, or has been or is 
required to register under tribal, federal, or military law . . . .  
 
4 
 
Section 589.400.1(7) (emphasis added).2  Because Mr. Smith and Mr. Ford concede they 
each have been required to register under federal law,  section 589.400.1(7) makes 
“sections 589.400 to 589.425” applicable to them.  The  registration requirements 
applicable to all persons subject to MO-SORA’s provisions are established by subsections 
3 and 4 of section 589.400.3 
Subsection 3 of section 589.400 unambiguously provides: “The registration 
requirements of sections 589.400 through 589.425” and, therefore, Mr. Smith’s and 
Mr. Ford’s registration requirements “shall be as provided under subsection 4 of this 
section,” subject to exceptions.4  (Emphasis added).  In turn, subsection 4 provides:  
                                              
2 The purpose of subdivision (7) of section 589.400.1 is to ensure the registration 
requirements of MO-SORA encompass all individuals required to register under  the 
federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) so no federal funds are 
withheld from Missouri for failure to comply with SORNA’s mandates.  See 34 U.S.C. 
§ 20927(a).  Subdivision (7) accomplishes that, in conjunction with section 589.414, by 
making MO-SORA applicable to all offenders required to register under SORNA.  Sections 
589.400.1(7); 589.414.5(2); 589.414.6(3); 589.414.7(4).  Subsections 3 and 4 of section 
589.400 then mandate that those offenders register for durations matching those required 
under SORNA.  Compare section 589.400.4(1)-(3), with 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a)(1)-(3).  
Together, these statutes implement SORNA’s requirements that all sex offenders register, 
including those convicted under tribal, federal, or military law, and that tier I, II, and III 
sex offenders register for 15 years, 25 years, and life, respectively.  See 34 U.S.C. 
§§ 20911(1); 20911(5)(A)(i); 20911(6); 20913(a); 20915(a)(1)-(3). 
3 Because this opinion undertakes an analysis of more than one section of MO-SORA to 
determine the registration requirements applicable to Mr. Smith and Mr. Ford, as 
subdivision (7)’s reference to “sections 589.400 to 589.425” requires, the principal opinion 
asserts this opinion applies the rules of statutory interpretation “haphazardly or 
indiscriminately to achieve a desired result.”  That criticism is misdirected, as is evident 
from a comparison of the analyses in the two opinions.   
4 Registration requirements are as provided in subsection 4 of section 589.400 
unless:   
(1) All offenses requiring registration are reversed, vacated, or set aside;  
 
5 
 
The registration requirements shall be as follows: 
(1) Fifteen years if the offender is a tier I sex offender as provided under 
section 589.414; 
(2) Twenty-five years if the offender is a tier II sex offender as provided 
under section 589.414; or 
(3) The life of the offender if the offender is a tier III sex offender. 
 
Section 589.400.4 (emphasis added).  Assuming Mr. Smith and Mr. Ford are tier I sexual 
offenders, as found by the principal opinion, section 589.400.4(1) requires them to register 
for 15 years. 
 
Rather than apply the registration requirements in subsections 3 and 4 of section 
589.400, RSMo Supp. 2018, that currently apply to all persons required to register under 
MO-SORA, the principal opinion concludes section 589.400.1(7) imposes an independent 
lifetime registration requirement on persons who have been required to register under 
federal law that the General Assembly intended to continue to apply when it amended 
MO-SORA in 2018.  That conclusion, however, is not supported by the plain language of 
the statute or this Court’s precedent.  
 
Prior to 2018, the relevant provision governing the duration of registration was 
section 589.400.3, RSMo 2016.  That section provided, as it had since 2000:  “The 
registration requirements of sections 589.400 through 589.425 are lifetime registration 
requirements . . . .”  Section 589.400.3, RSMo 2016.  Consequently, prior to 2018, a person 
who has been required to register under federal law was required to register in Missouri for 
                                              
(2) The registrant is no longer required to register and his or her name shall 
be removed from the registry under the provisions of section 589.414; or  
(3) The court orders the removal or exemption of such person from the 
registry under section 589.401. 
Section 589.400.3. 
6 
 
life because section 589.400.3, RSMo 2016 – which section 589.400.1(7) made applicable 
to that person – required lifetime registration.  This Court’s decision in Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 
at 167, properly reached this conclusion based on the language in sections 589.400 to 
589.425 at the time it was decided. 
In 2018,  the General Assembly amended MO-SORA in Senate Bill No. 655 (SB 
655).  Under the 2018 amendments, section 589.400.1(7) was unchanged so it continued 
to make “sections 589.400 to 589.425” applicable to the categories of persons it specified 
prior to 2018.  But the General Assembly repealed the lifetime registration requirement for 
all offenders in section 589.400.3.  In its place, the General Assembly enacted new 
language in section 589.400.4 establishing the registration requirements of “sections 
589.400 through 589.425.”  In addition to other amendments in 2018, section 589.400.3-.4 
was amended to provide: 
3. The registration requirements of sections 589.400 through 589.425 are 
lifetime registration requirements shall be as provided under subsection 4 
of this section unless: 
(1) All offenses requiring registration are reversed, vacated, or set aside; 
(2) The registrant is no longer required to register and his or her name shall 
be removed from the registry under the provisions of section 589.414; or 
(3) The court orders the removal or exemption of such person from the 
registry under section 589.401. 
 
 
* * *  
 
4. The registration requirements shall be as follows: 
(1) Fifteen years if the offender is a tier I sex offender as provided under 
section 589.414; 
(2) Twenty-five years if the offender is a tier II sex offender as provided 
under section 589.414; or 
(3) The life of the offender if the offender is a tier III sex offender. 
 
7 
 
(Emphasis added).5  Therefore, when the General Assembly amended MO-SORA in 2018, 
it removed the lifetime registration requirement for all offenders previously imposed under 
section 589.400.3 and, instead, provided a person’s registration requirements are 
determined by his or her classification within the tiered system established in section 
589.414.  Section 589.400.3-.4.  There is no language in SB 655 excepting persons required 
to register under SORNA from the registration requirements in subsection 4 of section 
589.400.  The only language excepting persons from the registration requirements in 
subsection 4 is language in subsection 3 recognizing persons who are no longer required 
to register.  Section 589.400.3(1)-(3).  As part of its new registration scheme, the General 
Assembly also enacted section 589.401 to establish a process for an eligible offender to 
seek removal of his or her name from the registry upon a showing that he or she meets the 
criteria provided therein. 
In ruling otherwise, the principal opinion does not acknowledge the seven words of 
subsection 1 that precede its eight subdivisions and reads the language in subdivision (7) 
out of context.  In addition to reading the language out of context, it holds the language 
imposes a lifetime registration requirement when no language concerns registration 
                                              
5 The registration periods provided in section 589.400.4(1)-(3), RSMo Supp. 2018, 
correspond to those required under SORNA, which provides:  
A sex offender shall keep the registration current for the full registration 
period (excluding any time the sex offender is in custody or civilly 
committed) unless the offender is allowed a reduction under subsection (b).  
The full registration period is-- 
(1) 15 years, if the offender is a tier I sex offender; 
(2) 25 years, if the offender is a tier II sex offender; and 
(3) the life of the offender, if the offender is a tier III sex offender.  
34 U.S.C. § 20915(a). 
8 
 
requirements.  Importantly, the principal opinion holds section 589.400.1(7) imposes a 
lifetime registration requirement when the word “lifetime” is not in the current, or any 
prior, version of section 589.400.1(7). 
Instead of analyzing the language of section 589.400, the principal opinion utilizes 
an interpretation of MO-SORA that predates the 2018 amendments.  It states:  “Before the 
2018 amendments to MO-SORA, Missouri courts consistently held that pursuant to 
§ 589.400.1(7), a sex offender is required to register in Missouri for their lifetime if they 
previously were required to register as a sex offender pursuant to SORNA, even if they are 
not presently required to register under SORNA.”  By that statement, the principal opinion 
suggests any decision by this Court  regarding pre-2018 MO-SORA held the lifetime 
registration requirement was imposed by section 589.400.1(7) and, as a consequence, 
erroneously declares its present effect. 
It is true that, before the 2018 amendments, the Court held a sex offender was 
required to register in Missouri for his or her lifetime if the person was previously required 
to register as a sex offender pursuant to SORNA.  Toelke, 389 S.W.3d at 167.  But the 
Court did not state the lifetime registration requirement was imposed by section 
589.400.1(7).  Rather, in Toelke, the Court held the lifetime requirements imposed by 
sections 589.400 to 589.425, RSMo Supp. 2011, were applicable to certain persons, 
including any person who has been or is required to register under federal law, citing 
section 589.400.1(7),  RSMo Supp. 2011.  It stated: 
Section 589.400.1 provides that the lifetime registration requirements of 
“[s]ections 589.400 to 589.425 shall apply to” any person who meets certain 
conditions.  The mandatory registration requirement of SORA applies to 
9 
 
“[a]ny person who ... has been or is required to register in another state or 
has been or is required to register under tribal, federal, or military law....” 
Section 589.400.1(7). 
 
Toelke, 389 S.W.3d at 167 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).6   
Under the version of MO-SORA in effect at that time, the Court was correct to hold 
“the lifetime registration requirements of sections 589.400 to 589.425” applied to a person 
who has been required to register under federal law.  At that time, section 589.400.3 
provided “the registration requirements of sections 589.400 through 589.425 are lifetime 
registration requirements.”  Section 589.400.3, RSMo Supp. 2011.  And section 
589.400.1(7), RSMo Supp. 2011, made section 589.400.3, RSMo Supp. 2011, applicable 
to any person who had been required to register under federal law.  But this Court did not 
hold section 589.400.1(7), RSMo Supp. 2011, alone, imposed a lifetime registration 
requirement independently of any other provision in sections 589.400-.425, RSMo Supp. 
2011. 
 
Subsequently, the court of appeals issued decisions that could be read as erroneously 
interpreting Toelke to hold section 589.400.1(7) subjected an offender to a “lifetime 
registration obligation under State law, if he or she was ever required to register under 
federal law.”  Wilkerson v. State, 533 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Mo. App. 2017); see also Selig v. 
Russell, 604 S.W.3d 817, 823 (Mo. App. 2020); Khatri v. Trotter, 554 S.W.3d 482, 485 
(Mo. App. 2018); James v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 505 S.W.3d 378, 383 (Mo. App. 
                                              
6 The principal opinion asserts this opinion “provides no support for its contention [its] 
interpretation of Toelke, rather than the principal opinion’s interpretation or the court of 
appeal’s interpretation, is correct.”  That criticism is misdirected, as is again evident from 
a comparison of the analyses in the two opinions. 
10 
 
2016).  Nonetheless, this Court’s decision in Toelke controls over any subsequent decisions 
misinterpreting it.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 2. 
 
Because this Court did not hold, prior to the 2018 amendments, that section 
589.400.1(7), RSMo 2016, or prior versions imposed a lifetime registration requirement 
independently of any other provisions within sections 589.400-.425, it is improper to 
presume the General Assembly intended that nonexistent interpretation of section 
589.400.1(7) when it chose not to amend it in 2018, as the principal opinion argues.  Rather, 
the General Assembly is presumed to know the law,  Roesing v. Dir. of Revenue, 573 
S.W.3d 634, 639 (Mo. banc 2019), so it presumptively knew the law was what this Court 
actually declared in Toelke and not erroneous interpretations of Toelke in any court of 
appeals decision.  As a consequence, the presumption that the General Assembly acted 
with full awareness of existing law and this Court’s interpretations of MO-SORA supports 
only the conclusion the General Assembly intended section 589.400.1(7) to continue to do 
what this Court has always said it does – make “sections 589.400 to 589.425” applicable 
to the categories of persons defined therein.  Toelke, 389 S.W.3d at 167. 
 
Finally, the principal opinion’s interpretation of section 589.400.1(7) leads to an 
absurd result and, for that reason, must be avoided.  “Statutes cannot be interpreted in ways 
that yield unreasonable or absurd results.”  State ex rel. T.J. v. Cundiff, 632 S.W.3d 353, 
358 (Mo. banc 2021).   Nearly every person convicted of a sexual offense in Missouri is 
required to register pursuant to SORNA, and, under the principal opinion’s interpretation, 
section 589.400.1(7) requires all such persons to register for their lifetimes, regardless of 
11 
 
any other provision in sections 589.400 to 589.425.7  The result is that the vast majority of 
persons convicted of a sexual offense in Missouri would have a lifetime registration 
requirement notwithstanding the provisions adopting a tiered scheme corresponding to 
SORNA and the provisions for removal the General Assembly saw fit to enact in 2018.  
Under the principal opinion’s interpretation, almost no one will be entitled to the benefit 
of the tiered scheme or the provision permitting removal from the registry, and the General 
Assembly’s newly enacted provisions have little effect.  Contrary to the principal opinion’s 
interpretation, the plain and ordinary language of sections 589.400.1(7), 589.400.3, and 
589.400.4 gives effect to the registration requirements in section 598.400.4 and allows for 
removal from the registry pursuant to section 589.401, as the General Assembly clearly 
intended. 
Correctly interpreting this Court’s holding in Toelke and applying the plain and 
ordinary language in sections 589.400 to 589.425 shows there is no valid basis to hold 
section 589.400.1(7) imposes a lifetime registration requirement on persons who have been 
or are required to register under federal law.  While section 589.400.1(7) continues to make 
                                              
7 It is true section 589.400.1(7) makes MO-SORA applicable to a person who has been 
required to register under SORNA without regard to whether that person’s offense would 
have otherwise obligated him or her to register under Missouri law.  Therefore, if a person 
commits an offense that requires registration under SORNA, that person must register in 
Missouri pursuant to:  (1) SORNA’s provisions requiring offenders to register “in each 
jurisdiction where the offender resides,” Doe v. Keathley, 290 S.W.3d 719, 720 (Mo. banc 
2009), and (2) section 589.400.1(7), which makes “sections 589.400 to 589.425” applicable 
to that person.  Even in that circumstance, however, an offender’s registration requirement 
under MO-SORA must still be determined by reference to provisions of sections 589.400 
to 589.425 beyond section 589.400.1(7). 
 
12 
 
“sections 589.400 to 589.425” applicable to any person who has been required to register 
under federal law, as it did prior to 2018, the registration requirements of “sections 589.400 
to 589.425” must be applied as amended in 2018.  Because the principal opinion’s analysis 
fails to apply the plain and ordinary language of sections 589.400.1(7), 589.400.3-.4, and 
589.401, RSMo Supp. 2018; misstates this Court’s holding in Toelke; and misapplies the 
rules of construction to presume the legislature’s intent in not amending section 
589.400.1(7), it reaches the incorrect conclusion that section 589.400.1(7) requires 
Mr. Smith and Mr. Ford to register for their lifetimes.  Under the 2018 amendments, tier I 
offenders like Mr. Smith and Mr. Ford are required to register for 15 years, just as they are 
under federal law.  Section 589.400.4(1); 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a).  For these reasons, I 
dissent.  
 
___________________________________ 
 
PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE