Case Title: People v. Stacey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87104

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87104-Agenda 7-January 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
 RUSSELL STACEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 21, 2000.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Russell Stacey, was convicted in the circuit court
of Cook County by two separate juries of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West 1994)) and criminal
sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-15(a)(1) (West 1994)), which arose
out of separate acts in which defendant grabbed the breasts of two
teenage girls. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 25 years'
imprisonment for the aggravated criminal sexual abuse conviction
and 25 years' imprisonment for the criminal sexual abuse
conviction, with the sentences to run consecutively. Defendant
appealed to the appellate court challenging his sentences as being
excessive. The appellate court affirmed defendant's convictions
and sentences. No. 1-98-0307 (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). We allowed defendant's petition for leave to
appeal, which raises only the issue relating to the excessiveness of
the sentences. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse the judgment of the appellate court, and affirm but modify
the judgment of the circuit court to impose consecutive six-year
terms of imprisonment.
FACTS
	The record of defendant's first trial established that, on May
30, 1995, the then 15-year-old victim, Susy S., was walking to
school with her friend, Jillian G., who was 14 years old at the
time. Defendant, who was 33 years old at the time, appeared from
an alley and began walking toward them, staring at them. When
the girls tried to move to one side, defendant moved to the same
side. When defendant approached the victim, he forced his hand
between her crossed arms and grabbed her breast for a few
seconds, until she knocked his arm away. As defendant walked
away, he blew her a kiss. The victim proceeded to her friend's
house and contacted her mother and the police. Later, the victim
went to school and gave a description of defendant to a school
police officer. On June 2, 1995, the victim identified defendant at
the police station as the man who attacked her.
	Defendant testified on his own behalf and denied grabbing
Susy S.'s breast. After considering the evidence, the jury found
defendant guilty of the aggravated criminal sexual abuse of Susy
S. 
	The record of defendant's second trial established that, on
June 2, 1995, the victim, Lisa G., who was 18 years old at the time
and attended the same high school as Susy S., was walking by
herself to school. As she approached school, defendant walked
toward her and stared at her. Defendant then stepped in front of
her, blocked her path, grabbed her breast, and squeezed it. After
the victim pushed his hand away, defendant blew her a kiss. As the
victim turned to get a good look at defendant, he said, "Don't even
try it or I will knock the shit out of you." Shortly thereafter,
defendant yelled, "Suck my dick," and grabbed his genitals in an
obscene manner. The victim proceeded to school, informed a
security officer of what had happened, and described defendant.
That same day, the victim identified defendant as the offender
after he was detained near school during an investigation of the
earlier offense. 
	The record also included the testimony of Monica A. for the
limited purpose of presenting evidence of defendant's
identification, intent, modus operandi, and absence of accident. In
February of 1992, Monica A., who was age 12, was walking to
school with her 9-year-old sister when defendant approached her
and tried to grab her breast. Monica crossed her arms over her
chest and leaned away from defendant. However, when defendant
walked along side of her, he grabbed her buttocks for a few
seconds and commented that she had a nice "ass." As Monica and
her sister walked away, defendant unzipped his pants, pulled out
his penis and said, "[H]ey, girls, suck on this." Monica
subsequently identified defendant as her attacker in a lineup.
	The second jury found defendant guilty of the criminal sexual
abuse of Lisa G. 
	At the sentencing hearing on both convictions, the State
presented evidence in aggravation. Chicago police officer Thomas
Lynch testified that, on September 8, 1990, he interviewed Betsy
C., who was then 11 years old, and Renell G., who was then 27
years old, regarding an investigation of a sexual attack. They
stated that, while they were walking down the street, defendant
approached them and grabbed Betsy C.'s buttocks. As they tried
to walk away, defendant grabbed Renell G.'s breasts. Both Betsy
C. and Renell G. subsequently identified defendant as their
attacker. 
	Chicago police officer Walter Siudut testified that, on March
11, 1991, he spoke to 15-year-old Tina S. She indicated to him
that, as she was walking to school that morning, a man walked up
behind her and grabbed her buttocks. Tina S. later identified
defendant's photograph from a photo array.
	The State also introduced victim impact statements from Susy
S. and Lisa G. Both girls expressed their fears resulting from their
encounter with defendant. Susy S. stated that she is afraid to go
anywhere alone and is never at ease. Lisa G. indicated that she
does not walk anywhere alone, no longer feels safe, and does not
trust anyone.
	The presentence investigation report, which was presented to
the court, set forth defendant's prior convictions for aggravated
criminal sexual abuse (1993); assault (1991); criminal sexual
abuse (1991); attempted burglary (1990); burglary (1985); retail
theft (1983); possession of a stolen motor vehicle (1980); and
burglary (1979).
	Defense counsel did not present any mitigating witnesses, but
argued in mitigation that the nature of defendant's actions did not
deserve severe punishment.
	After considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, the
trial court initially ruled that defendant would be sentenced as a
Class X offender in light of his prior felony burglary convictions.
The court then indicated that defendant's criminal history showed
a propensity to commit the same offense despite attempts by the
criminal justice system to deter him from committing such crimes.
More specifically, the court referred to the fact that defendant's
prior sentences have included counseling, probation, and
imprisonment. The court therefore sentenced defendant to 25-year
terms of imprisonment for each offense. The court further ordered
that such sentences run consecutively so as to protect the public
from further criminal conduct by defendant.
	Defendant appealed his sentences to the appellate court,
where he argued that his sentences were excessive. The appellate
court rejected defendant's argument and determined that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant.
ANALYSIS
	Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
abused its discretion by sentencing defendant to consecutive 25-year prison terms. According to defendant, his 50-year sentence is
excessive given the nature of the crime.
	The State responds that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in sentencing defendant where the sentences were
within the statutory limits, were based on defendant's extensive
criminal background, and were required to protect the public from
further criminal activity by defendant.
	It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretionary
powers in imposing a sentence (People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53
(1999)), and the trial court's sentencing decision is entitled to great
deference (People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977)). The
trial court is granted such deference because the trial court is
generally in a better position than the reviewing court to determine
the appropriate sentence. The trial judge has the opportunity to
weigh such factors as the defendant's credibility, demeanor,
general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and
age. People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991); Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d  at 154. Consequently, the reviewing court must not substitute
its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would
have weighed these factors differently. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d  at 19.
	Although the trial court is vested with wide discretion in
sentencing, such discretion is not without limitation. Supreme
Court Rule 615(b)(4) grants the reviewing court the power to
reduce the sentence imposed by the trial court. 134 Ill. 2d R.
615(b)(4). The rule itself, however, does not set forth the scope of
this power or the circumstances under which it should be
exercised. Rather, decisions of this court have established that,
absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, the sentence may
not be altered on review. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d  at 19; Perroquet, 68 Ill. 2d  at 153. For example, a sentence within statutory limits will be
deemed excessive and the result of an abuse of discretion by the
trial court where the sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit
and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d  at 54.
	Applying these principles to the instant case, we hold that the
trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to 25-year
prison terms. Parenthetically, we note that defendant's conviction
for aggravated criminal sexual abuse is a Class 2 felony (see 720
ILCS 5/12-16(g) (West 1994)), and defendant's conviction for
criminal sexual abuse is elevated to a Class 2 felony because of his
prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse (see 720
ILCS 5/12-15(d) (West 1994)). Moreover, because of defendant's
two prior Class 2 felony burglary convictions, defendant is eligible
to be sentenced as a Class X offender on each conviction. See 730
ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1994). A Class X felony carries a
statutory sentence of not less than 6 years and not more than 30
years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1994). Consequently, the
trial court's 25-year sentence for each offense is within statutory
limits.
	Nevertheless, we find that the sentence is manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offenses. In these separate
offenses, defendant momentarily grabbed the breasts of two young
girls, who were fully clothed at the time, and he made lewd
comments and gestures. Although such behavior is appalling and
harmful, it is not severe enough to warrant a 25-year sentence.
Given the nature of the crimes, the 25-year sentences imposed are
excessive and an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
In so holding, we are not reweighing any aggravating or mitigating
factors. In fact, defendant does not contend that the trial judge
considered any improper factors in imposing sentence. Moreover,
we do not condone defendant's actions. We acknowledge that
defendant's conduct is reprehensible. Nevertheless, we must
adhere to our constitution's mandate that penalties be determined
according to the seriousness of the offense. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
§11. Here, the level of seriousness of the offenses does not warrant
25-year sentences.
	Although the trial court abused its discretion in imposing 25-year sentences, we nevertheless find no such abuse of discretion
regarding the consecutive nature of the sentences. Consecutive
sentences may be imposed where the trial court "having regard to
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
character of the defendant, it is of the opinion that such a term is
required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the
defendant." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 1994). Here, the trial
court relied on defendant's prior criminal history, which included
other such acts against young girls, and defendant's repeated
failure at rehabilitation, to conclude that the imposition of
consecutive sentences was necessary to protect the public from
defendant's conduct. There is no abuse of discretion in such a
conclusion.
	Having determined that 25-year sentences are excessive and
the result of an abuse of discretion, we must determine whether to
impose a new sentence or remand the matter for resentencing by
the trial court. We find it unnecessary in this case to remand to the
trial court for resentencing. See People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256,
272 (1986). In the exercise of our authority under Supreme Court
Rule 615(b)(4) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)), we reduce defendant's
sentence to six years for each offense, the minimum period of
incarceration provided for a Class X offense, with each sentence
to run consecutively. Such a reduction in defendant's sentence
comports with the nature of the offenses while not diminishing the
seriousness of defendant's actions.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is
reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed but
modified to impose consecutive sentences of six years'
imprisonment for defendant's aggravated criminal sexual abuse
and criminal sexual abuse convictions.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed as modified.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	I respectfully dissent. In my view, defendant's aggregate
sentence of 50 years exceeds the limit mandated by the legislature
as set forth in the sentencing statutes applicable to defendant.
Therefore, the court errs when it states that the imposed sentence
is within the statutory limits. See slip op. at 5. Because the record
affirmatively demonstrates that both the parties and the trial judge
misapprehended the parameters of the sentencing range to be
utilized in this case, I would remand the matter for resentencing.
	As noted in the court's opinion, defendant was convicted by
two separate juries of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and
criminal sexual abuse. At the ensuing sentencing proceedings, the
trial judge and the parties proceeded under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of
the Unified Code of Corrections, which provides in pertinent part
that
			"When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is
convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having
twice been convicted of any Class 2 or greater Class
felonies in Illinois, and such charges are separately
brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts,
such defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender."
730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1994).
Moreover, defendant, having been convicted of two separate
offenses, was to receive two sentences. At the sentencing hearing,
the State, citing to section 5-8-4(b) of the Code, requested that the
trial judge impose "consecutive terms of sentencing with respect
to each incident up to 60 years." Section 5-8-4 allows the
sentencing judge to determine whether multiple sentences are to
be served concurrently or consecutively. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4
(West 1994). According to section (b) of the statute, consecutive
sentences "shall not be imposed" unless the sentencing judge,
having considered the nature and circumstances of the offense and
history and character of the defendant, "is of the opinion that such
a term is required to protect the public from further criminal
conduct by the defendant." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) (West 1994).
The trial judge expressed his belief on the record that consecutive
sentences were warranted based on the evidence adduced at the
hearing: "the sentence that I give here today must be targeted at the
goal of keeping Mr. Stacey from committing further instances of
sexual crimes *** to protect the public ***."
	Due to the dual applicability of both section 5-5-3(c)(8) and
section 5-8-4(b) of the Code, the trial judge and the parties
considered 6 to 30 years (the range for Class X offenses) to be the
appropriate range for each sentence to be imposed. The State
sought two 30-year sentences to be imposed consecutively for an
aggregate sentence of 60 years. Defense counsel asked that the
minimum be imposed. The trial judge ultimately decided upon two
25-year sentences to be served consecutively for an aggregate
sentence of 50 years.
	Neither the trial judge nor the parties, however, took into
account the limiting language contained in section 5-8-4(c)(2),
which states:
			"[T]he aggregate of consecutive sentences shall not
exceed the sum of the maximum terms authorized under
Section 5-8-2 for the 2 most serious felonies involved."
730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)(2) (West 1994).
Section 5-8-4(c)(2) plays an important role in fashioning
consecutive sentences. The aim of the statute "is to limit the total
length of consecutive sentences imposed on a defendant, while
still fairly punishing the defendant in relation to the severity of the
crimes. Such a purpose is reasonable in the context of punishing
a defendant for a series of crimes, where the stacking of penalties
can result in sentences of extraordinary harshness." (Emphasis
added.)  People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 436 (1995), citing 3
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice §18-4.5 (2d ed. Supp. 1986). 
See also People v. Pullen, No. 87542, slip op. at 7 (July 6, 2000)
(same).(1)
	We recently explained in Pullen that section 5-8-4(c)(2)
limits the aggregate of consecutive sentences to be imposed upon
a defendant who has been convicted of Class 1 or 2 felonies, but
is eligible for sentencing as a Class X offender because of prior
convictions.  We noted that section 5-5-3(c)(8) has been
construed by this court to mean that, while defendant is to be
sentenced as a Class X offender, the classification and character of
the felonies committed does not change.  See People v. Pullen,
No. 87542 (July 6, 2000); People v. Olivo, 183 Ill. 2d 339, 340-41
(1998); People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 224 (1996); People v.
Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 290 (1994).  In other words, section
5-5-3(c)(8) leaves unaffected the classification of a defendant's
offenses. We explained in Thomas that the legislative intent
behind the provision was to subject defendants convicted of Class
1 and Class 2 felonies to an enhanced sentencing range of from 6
to 30 years.  See Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d  at 224.  However, the fact
that a defendant is to be sentenced as a Class X offender, pursuant
to section 5-5-3(c)(8), does not change the classification of the
"two most serious felonies involved" for purposes of consecutive
sentencing under section 5-8-4(c)(2).  Pullen, slip op. at 5-6 (and
cases cited therein).  In light of these principles, we held in Pullen
that where, as here, a defendant has been convicted of two Class
2 felonies and is eligible for sentencing as a Class X offender, the
aggregate of the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court
may not exceed the sum of the maximum terms authorized under
section 5-8-2 for Class 2 felonies.
	 The maximum term authorized for a Class 2 felony, under
section 5-8-2, is 14 years.  See 730 ILCS 5-8-2(a)(4) (West
1994).  Therefore, the maximum aggregate sentence authorized in
this case was 28 years. The trial judge sentenced defendant to an
aggregate sentence of 50 years of imprisonment, a sentence that
exceeds, by 22 years, the sentence authorized by statute. 
Defendant's sentence is therefore void.  See Pullen, slip op. at 5.
	In light of the foregoing, our precedent mandates that we
vacate defendant's sentences and remand the matter for
resentencing.
	JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.
1.      1The legislature amended section 5-8-4(c)(2) in response to this
court's decision in Tucker.  Pub. Act 90-128, §5 (eff. July 22, 1997). 
The amendment eliminated the aggregate limitation in cases, such as
this, where the offenses were not committed as part of a single course
of conduct.  This amendment could not be applied in this case because
it was not in effect on the dates defendant committed the crimes at issue. 
Moreover, a retroactive application of the amendment would violate the
ex post facto clause of the Constitution, which forbids the imposition of
punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by the law when
the act to be punished occurred.