Case Title: State v. Goyette

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-440


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
Gary Goyette                                 Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

                                             June Term, 1990


John P. Connarn, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

Mark T. Cameron, Windsor County Deputy State's Attorney, White River
Junction, for plaintiff-appellee

Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate
Defender, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.



     PECK, J.   Defendant appeals from a jury verdict convicting him of
possession of cocaine.  We affirm.
     On September 11, 1987, a confidential informant told Vermont state
police that someone from another state (FN1) would be transporting cocaine into
Vermont, would be staying at the home of Robert Stillwell, and would be
taking part in a substantial drug deal the following day.  Acting upon this
information, a state police officer went to the Stillwell residence, where
he observed two out-of-state cars, one registered to Mr. Stillwell's wife
and the other registered to defendant.
     The next morning, the informant told police that Peter Holl, a man
known to police through other drug investigations, would be introducing the
out-of-state resident to a suspected drug dealer living in Chester, Vermont.
At that point, police set up surveillance at the dealer's residence.  That
same morning, the surveillance units observed the dealer leave his Chester
residence.  Shortly thereafter, they observed Holl and defendant arrive,
stay approximately two hours, and then depart.  Defendant was a front-seat
passenger in the car, which was driven by Holl and owned by Holl's
girlfriend.
     The police followed the car after it left the residence and stopped it
approximately three or four miles from the dealer's residence.  As the
police were pulling the car over, two of the police officers noticed
defendant duck down as if he were placing or retrieving something from under
his seat.  When the car was stopped, the police officers ordered the
occupants out of the vehicle and immediately seized two bags of what
appeared to be cocaine from underneath the front passenger seat.  The two
occupants of the car were arrested after the cocaine was discovered.
     Holl pled guilty to a reduced charge and received a suspended sentence
in return for his agreement to testify against defendant.  A jury found
defendant guilty of possession of cocaine, and he was sentenced to serve
thirty months to five years.  On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the
police lacked probable cause to search the car; (2) the prosecutor elicited
exculpatory evidence from a witness under a promise of immunity and failed
to reveal the evidence to the defense in a timely manner; (3) a testifying
officer wilfully violated the trial court's order prohibiting comment about
the existence of a confidential informant; and (4) the trial court errone-
ously charged the jury that it could infer defendant's knowing possession
of cocaine from the fact that he was an occupant of the car at the time the
cocaine was found.
                                    I.
     Defendant first argues that the court erred in not suppressing the
evidence seized from the car because the police lacked probable cause to
search the car.  Specifically, defendant claims that the search violated
V.R.Cr.P. 41(c) and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
because the police had no knowledge of the source of the informant's
information.  We conclude that the police had sufficient probable cause to
search the car.
     Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search of a vehicle is valid
if based on probable cause.  State v. Platt, 154 Vt. 179, 184, 574 A.2d 789,
792 (1990) (citing federal case law).  The central inquiry in determining
whether there was probable cause for the search of a vehicle is whether the
police reasonably concluded that the car contained evidence of a crime.
State v. Girouard, 135 Vt. 123, 129,