Case Title: Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc.1986 WY 29714 P.2d 328Case Number: 84-162, 84-163, 84-233Decided: 02/03/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
RIALTO THEATRE, INC., A 
WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
COMMONWEALTH THEATRES, 
INC., A MISSOURI CORPORATION, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT). (TWO CASES) 

 
 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH THEATRES, 
INC., A MISSOURI CORPORATION, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

RIALTO THEATRE, INC., A 
WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, J.

 
 
 
 

James R. McCarty, 
Casper, for Rialto Theatre, Inc.

 
 

Robert Jerry Hand, of 
Hand, Hand & Hand, P.C., Casper, for Commonwealth Theatres, 
Inc.

 
 

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN, and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Justice Rose circulated 
the opinion of the Court October 22, 1985, and retired November 1, 
1985.

 
 

** Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

ROSE, Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Procedurally the 
instant three combined appeals are unusual as they are taken from two separate 
lawsuits filed by Rialto Theatre, Inc. against Commonwealth Theatres, Inc. for 
asserted violations of a lease agreement between the parties originally executed 
in 1968. The object of that agreement was the operation of theatres owned by 
Rialto in Casper, Wyoming, by Commonwealth. Rialto sought 
injunctive relief and monetary damages for asserted violations of a lease 
provision which prohibited competition between the parties and which required 
future cooperation in protecting the market from outside competition by 
construction of additional theatres when deemed necessary by either 
party.

 
 

[¶2.]     In its original 
complaint filed on May 14, 1982, Rialto sought an injunction preventing the 
opening of a new theatre by Commonwealth and monetary damages for lost rents as 
a result of the opening of a second theatre by Commonwealth in 1974. The 
district court dismissed the cause of action praying for injunctive relief. 
Trial on the remaining count resulted in a determination by the jury that, 
although Commonwealth had breached the lease, Rialto failed to prove the amount of its 
damages with reasonable certainty. Rialto has appealed the dismissal of the 
injunctive count and additionally argues the jury erred in awarding only nominal 
damages (Appeal No. 84-162). Commonwealth has also appealed, asserting that the 
district court should have ruled as a matter of law that the paragraph of the 
lease relied upon by Rialto was unenforceable (Appeal No. 
84-163).

 
 

[¶3.]     The second lawsuit 
filed by Rialto 
sought to enjoin Commonwealth from continued operation of the additional 
theatres until the lease term expired. This complaint was filed on April 16, 
1984, some 12 days after the jury returned its verdict in the original lawsuit 
but prior to the entry of the court's judgment on May 9, 1984. A motion to 
dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel was granted on 
August 9, 1984. Rialto has appealed (Appeal No. 84-233), and 
this court has combined the cases for purposes of decision.

 
 

[¶4.]     We shall affirm the 
district court's decision in No. 84-162 and No. 84-233, and dismiss the claims 
for injunctive relief. We shall remand No. 84-163 for entry of an order 
dismissing the claim for damages for violation of the lease 
agreement.

 
 

[¶5.]     By a lease and sublease 
agreement1 executed on August 6, 1968, Rialto 
Theatre, Inc. rented various theatre properties located in Casper, Wyoming, and 
nearby communities to Commonwealth Theatres, Inc. for a term of 15 years with an 
option to renew for an additional five years. Rent on all the properties was set 
at a minimum fixed amount per year plus percentages of gross revenues from 
ticket sales, concessions and other sources. As part of that document, the 
parties agreed that:

 
 
"14. Lessor and Lessee 
respectively warrant to each other that neither they nor their respective 
officers, directors or stockholders shall, during the term hereof, enter 
directly or indirectly into the business of owning, operating or managing 
theatres within twenty-five (25) miles of the city limits of Casper, Wyoming, without the prior written consent of 
the other. In the event either Lessor or Lessee desires or deems it necessary to 
build another theatre in Casper, Wyoming, then it is agreed that Lessor and 
Lessee will enter into an agreement to construct the same and will enter into a 
lease thereof."

 
 

[¶6.]     During the next several 
years relations between the parties were handled primarily by Russell W. Schulte 
for Rialto and 
Richard H. Orear on behalf of Commonwealth, the presidents of the respective 
corporations. As is frequently the case in family-oriented closely held 
corporations, such as Rialto and Commonwealth, communications between 
the parties began to deteriorate in 1976, following the death of one of the 
principals, Russell W. Schulte. Prior to that time, Commonwealth and Rialto had jointly participated in developing and opening 
the Mile-Hi Drive-In Theatre in Casper. Similarly, the parties actively pursued 
the possibility of opening a new indoor theatre together during 1971 within the 
provisions of the lease agreement. Plans for this project were scrapped when the 
contractor who was to do the work on the new theatre was unable to obtain a 
building permit.

 
 

[¶7.]     In 1973, Commonwealth 
again approached Rialto with a proposal that 
Rialto participate in the opening of a new indoor 
theatre in Casper which was to be built in the 
BeverlyPlazaShopping 
Center. A number of unsuccessful discussions were 
held between Orear and Schulte in an attempt to persuade Rialto to participate in 
the venture. On March 6, 1973, Orear sent a letter to Schulte urging that 
Rialto participate in the project; however, 
Schulte declined, as Rialto was involved in the 
construction of a theatre in Glenwood 
Springs, Colorado, at 
the time. The Beverly Twin Cinema opened in Casper in February of 1974, and is one of the 
theatres whose operation is complained of in this case.

 
 

[¶8.]     In February of 1977, 
after Russell Schulte's death, Orear, who was now chairman of the board of 
Commonwealth, wrote Russell's son, Edward J. Schulte, M.D., who had assumed the 
presidency of Rialto, that there were rumors that a new theatre would be built 
in Casper and it was necessary that they work together to keep out the 
competition. Dr. Schulte wrote back on May 30, 1977, questioning whether a new 
theatre was needed and, even if built, whether competition would be kept out. 
Figures regarding the success of the Beverly Twin were requested, and 
Commonwealth was notified that:

 
 
"* * * [T]he Schulte 
Family is quite interested in protecting their basic theatre interests in 
Casper. In that 
regard we want to be included in any decision making concerning future theatre 
operations in Casper. It is also expected of Commonwealth 
that they will uphold Paragraph 14 of the lease, the provisions of which were 
apparently ignored when the Beverly Twins were built."

 
 
Orear responded on behalf 
of Commonwealth on June 7, 1977, outlining the events leading to the opening of 
the Beverly Twin and requesting to meet together with representatives of 
Rialto to 
determine their future plans together. Such a meeting was held in July, 1977, in 
Denver, Colorado.

 
 

[¶9.]     In 1978 two significant 
events occurred: Fred Schulte took over as president of Rialto, and Commonwealth 
acquired a company called Westco Theatres. One of the assets acquired by 
Commonwealth in this purchase was an option to operate a theatre in the 
Eastridge Mall which was to be built in Casper by 
Price Development Company of Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The record 
is conflicting as to whether or not Rialto knew of Commonwealth's interest in 
moving into the Eastridge Mall. Applying our usual appellate standard of review 
in favor of the jury's verdict, we will assume that Rialto did not discover 
Commonwealth's interest in the Eastridge venture until sometime in 1981. 
Contemporaneously, the parties were investigating the possibility of jointly 
participating in the opening of a new multi-screen theatre complex on the site 
of the Mile-Hi Drive In.

 
 

[¶10.]  Commonwealth exercised the option to 
renew the 1968 agreement on December 30, 1981. Plans to build a new theatre on 
the Mile-Hi site were actively discussed by the parties. In addition, Rialto was informed of the 
proposal to build a new theatre in the Eastridge Mall. In June of 1981, Orear 
sent a letter to Fred Schulte urging that a decision with respect to building on 
the Mile-Hi site be reached soon to ensure the building could be enclosed prior 
to the onset of winter. Again, in August of 1981, Orear wrote Rialto stating that it was 
vital to start construction on the Mile-Hi. In addition, Schulte was informed 
that Commonwealth had engaged in further discussions with the developers of the 
Eastridge Mall and the developers were threatening, in no uncertain terms, to 
bring a competitor into the Casper area to lease the new 
theatre.

 
 

[¶11.]  On November 20, 1981, Orear wrote a 
letter on behalf of Commonwealth, outlining a plan whereby Commonwealth and 
Rialto would 
create a new jointly held corporation which would take over the existing lease, 
lease the yet-to-be-constructed Westwood Theatre on the Mile-Hi site, and lease 
or sublease the Eastridge project. An alternative proposal which would have 
required Rialto 
to finance construction of the Westwood by its own resources was also discussed. 
In a follow-up letter on December 7, 1981, Commonwealth requested that a 
decision be made on the construction of the Westwood Theatre. In the meantime, 
negotiations on the Eastridge project had stalled, as the developer refused to 
return Commonwealth's calls and desired a combination lease coupling a project 
in Idaho Falls, Idaho, to the lease on the Casper theatre.

 
 

[¶12.]  On April 6, 1982, Orear wrote a letter 
advising that the Eastridge developer had rescinded its demand for a combination 
lease but that it appeared unlikely Commonwealth would accede to the remaining 
terms demanded for the Eastridge project. The possibility of building a 
multi-screen theatre on the Mile-Hi site was again renewed, but it was noted 
that this would be a near impossibility unless Commonwealth had a very favorable 
ground rent from Rialto. Orear suggested that, in order to allow 
Commonwealth to build a new theatre, it was imperative that the Rialto Theatre 
be closed and that rent be eliminated from the lease between the 
parties.

 
 

[¶13.]  Further negotiations with the Eastridge 
developers were conducted by Commonwealth. On April 14, 1982, Orear wrote 
Schulte, confirming a planned meeting between the parties and extending the 
opportunity for Rialto to participate in that 
project.

 
 

[¶14.]  A meeting between the parties was held on 
April 20 and 21, 1982, in Casper. At that time, it was proposed 
Commonwealth buy out the Rialto interests, and other options were 
explored. Unfortunately, the parties were unable to reach an agreement and 
remained at an impasse. Shortly thereafter, Commonwealth closed the deal on the 
Eastridge project, thereby precipitating the institution of legal 
proceedings.

 
 

[¶15.]  Procedurally, the instant appeals are 
deceptively simple. Rialto filed a two-count complaint on May 14, 
1982 against Commonwealth, seeking pecuniary damages for breach of the lease 
agreement as a result of the operation of the Beverly Twin Cinema, and 
injunctive relief preventing Commonwealth from leasing or operating the 
Eastridge Mall theatre. Commonwealth answered on June 4, 1982, and moved for 
dismissal of the count praying for injunctive relief on the grounds that 
Rialto failed to 
allege a claim. Summary judgment on the count seeking monetary damages was also 
requested and supported by affidavit of Richard H. Orear. Following a hearing 
held on June 30, 1982, the district court denied the motion for summary judgment 
but granted dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief by an order dated July 
9, 1982. At the time of pretrial conference, Rialto sought and was granted the right to 
amend its pleading to ask for additional damages as a result of the opening of 
the Eastridge Mall theatre. On August 16, 1983, Commonwealth renewed its motion 
for summary judgment, and this motion was denied after hearing by an order 
entered December 29, 1983.

 
 

[¶16.]  Trial on the matter began on April 2, 
1984 and ended on April 4, 1984, with the jury returning a verdict in favor of 
Rialto but 
assessing damages to be only one dollar. Judgment on the verdict was not entered 
until May 9, 1984. Various post-judgment motions, including a motion for 
reconsideration of application for injunctive relief, and a motion for new trial 
or for order granting additur, were filed by Rialto and denied by the court on June 25, 
1984. Rialto 
filed a premature notice of appeal2 on June 15, 1984. Commonwealth 
perfected a cross-appeal by filing its notice of appeal on June 29, 
1984.

 
 

[¶17.]  Less than two weeks after the jury 
returned its verdict in the original suit, Rialto filed a second complaint in 
the district court, seeking to enjoin Commonwealth from "directly or indirectly 
owning, operating or managing the Beverly Twin Theatres, and the Eastridge 
Cinema until after March 31, 1987." A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 9(e) 
and 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., was filed by Commonwealth on May 24, 1984, asserting res 
judicata or collateral estoppel as bars to the bringing of this second suit. A 
hearing on the matter was held on July 19, 1984, and the court entered an order 
dismissing the second complaint on August 9, 1984. A notice of appeal was filed 
by Rialto on 
August 17, 1984.

 
 
No. 
84-162

 
 

[¶18.]  Our initial inquiry is whether the 
district court erred in dismissing count two of Rialto's original complaint which sought to 
enjoin Commonwealth from opening the Eastridge Cinema. In his decision letter 
denying Rialto's 
motion for reconsideration of injunctive relief, the district judge provided the 
following insight into his justification for dismissal of that part of the 
complaint:

 
 
"* * * The Court did not 
rule that there was an adequate remedy at law; it determined that plaintiff had 
not shown that there was no adequate remedy. I think this is simply a way of 
saying that the burden is plaintiff's, and in this and in numerous other cases 
an applicant for injunction does not carry that burden."

 
 

[¶19.]  Although authorized by statute, § 
1-28-101 et seq., W.S. 1977, an action for injunction is a form of equitable 
relief which is not granted as a matter of right, but the issuance of which is 
addressed to the court's equitable discretion. Kincheloe v. Milatzo, Wyo., 678 P.2d 855 (1984); Lee v. Brown, 
Wyo., 357 P.2d 1106 (1960); Alaska Development Co. v. Brannan, 40 
Wyo. 106, 275 P. 115 (1929). This court has previously noted the extraordinary character of 
the remedy of injunction, and has stated that a court must proceed with caution 
and deliberation before exercising the remedy. Simpson v. Petroleum, Inc., Wyo., 548 P.2d 1 (1976); 
Lee v. Brown, supra, 357 P.2d  at 
1110-1111. One of the prerequisites to the issuance of an injunction is that 
there is no adequate remedy at law. Crawford v. City of 
Sheridan, Wyo., 392 P.2d 519 
(1964); Miller v. Hagie, 59 
Wyo. 383, 140 P.2d 746 (1943); Ward v. Rees, 11 Wyo. 459, 72 P. 581 
(1903). Specifically, it has been noted that where an award of monetary damages 
would provide adequate compensation, injunctive relief is inappropriate. Lee v. Brown, supra, 357 P.2d  at 1111; 
Holly Sugar Corporation v. Goshen County 
Cooperative Beet Growers Association, 725 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1984). This 
does not, however, prevent the issuance of injunctive relief to restrain the 
breach of a contract where the other requisites for the exercise of equitable 
jurisdiction, including the inadequacy of a remedy at law, are present. Cody Community Television Corp. v. Way, 
Wyo., 356 P.2d 1113 (1960); 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 87, pp. 835-836. Among circumstances in 
which injunctive relief may be appropriate are where such action may be 
necessary to prevent a multiplicity of suits, or where the defendant is 
insolvent or financially unable to respond in damages. 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions 
§ 93, p. 843.

 
 

[¶20.]  In Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil 
Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 153 
(1981), we noted the preventative nature of injunctive 
relief:

 
 
"* * * It would be 
foolhardy to require that before the granting of an injunction that there be 
actual physical violence in order to constitute the threat of interference with 
another's right enforceable by way of the extraordinary remedy of injunction. 
One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain 
preventative relief. Injunctive relief is designed not to deal with past 
violations, but to avoid future wrongs. If injury is certainly impending, that 
is enough. Prevention of impending future injury is a recognized function of a 
court of equity. Carter v. Carter Coal 
Company, 298 U.S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 
(1936); Swift & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 311, 48 S. Ct. 311, 72 L. Ed. 587 
(1928). * * *"

 
 

[¶21.]  Procedurally, suits for injunctive relief 
are civil suits and are governed by the same rules of procedure. Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 
Wyo., 519 P.2d 972 (1974). In the present case, the district court granted a motion pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., on the basis that Rialto failed to state a cause of action upon 
which relief could be granted. Recently, this court reiterated the standards 
under which we review the grant of a motion to dismiss:

 
 
"`When considering a 
motion to dismiss a complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., on the 
ground that it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the facts 
alleged in the complaint are admitted and the allegations must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs. State Highway Commission v. Bourne, 
Wyo. 1967, 425 P.2d 59. We therefore treat as true all the allegations of plaintiffs' 
complaint.'" Allen v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., Wyo., 699 P.2d 277, 281 (1985), 
quoting from Moxley v. Laramie Builders, 
Inc., Wyo., 600 P.2d 733, 734 
(1979).

 
 

[¶22.]  In addition, in passing upon the 
sufficiency of the allegations of Rialto's complaint in this instance, we bear 
in mind the admonition of this court in Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v. 
City of Gillette, Wyo., 525 P.2d 3, 10 (1974), wherein it 
stated:

 
 
"The extraordinary 
character of the injunction remedy requires that the complaint clearly set out 
all the facts necessary to establish such right * * *."

 
 
It is insufficient, 
however, to merely state by means of conclusion that irreparable injury will 
ensue if relief is not granted or that there is no adequate remedy at law. The 
complaint must allege a set of facts which, if proven, would provide a proper 
basis for the intervention of a court of equity. 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions §§ 
269-270, pp. 1062-1065.

 
 

[¶23.]  Examining Rialto's complaint in light of the foregoing 
principles, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing the 
claim for injunctive relief. The allegations of the complaint establish the 
existence of an agreement between the parties which Commonwealth intended to 
breach by opening a new theatre in the Eastridge Mall complex, which would 
result in damages to Rialto in the form of lost rentals, receipts 
and other nonspecified damages. Rialto's complaint lacks allegations of facts 
justifying its conclusions that it has no adequate remedy at law, and failure to 
grant the injunction would result in its suffering irreparable injury. In 
particular, the complaint fails to state why an action at law for recovery of 
monetary damages, which is all that is pleaded, would be an insufficient remedy. 
It may well be that it is impossible to adequately measure or prove such damages 
or that an injunction would be necessary to avoid a multiplicity of suits; 
however, these are matters which must be capable of being established based on 
the facts pled in the complaint.

 
 
No. 
84-163

 
 

[¶24.]  At the conclusion of trial on Rialto's initial complaint, the jury returned a verdict 
which found Commonwealth had violated the terms of the lease agreement with 
Rialto, but, much to Rialto's dismay, assessed 
only nominal damages of one dollar. Rialto argues that the jury failed to follow 
the court's instructions in establishing the amount of damages. Commonwealth has 
also appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not ruling as a matter of 
law that the paragraph of the lease relied upon by Rialto is unenforceable. 
That paragraph provides as follows:

 
 
"14. Lessor and Lessee 
respectively warrant to each other that neither they nor their respective 
officers, directors or stockholders shall, during the term hereof, enter 
directly or indirectly into the business of owning, operating or managing 
theatres within twenty-five (25) miles of the city limits of Casper, Wyoming, without the prior written consent of 
the other. In the event either Lessor or Lessee desires or deems it necessary to 
build another theatre in Casper, Wyoming, then it is agreed that Lessor and 
Lessee will enter into an agreement to construct the same and will enter into a 
lease thereof."

 
 

[¶25.]  We agree with Commonwealth, and, 
therefore, will not address the issue raised by Rialto at length. Briefly, the record reflects 
that Rialto did 
not object to the court's instructions to the jury, including Instruction No. 
18, which provides:

 
 
"If the jury finds, under 
all of the instructions given, that Commonwealth breached the Lease and Rialto 
is entitled to a verdict but that it would be speculative for you to determine 
the amount of damages, then you can award Rialto only nominal damages in the 
amount of one dollar in recognition of Rialto's right and the technical 
infraction thereof by Commonwealth."

 
 
The jury's verdict is 
consistent with the quoted instruction. In addition, the record does not reflect 
that Rialto 
properly preserved this issue for our review by raising a timely objection to 
the jury's verdict. Our rule is that such objection is required when the verdict 
is perceived as being inconsistent. Goggins v. Harwood, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1282 (1985); DeWitty v. Decker, 
Wyo., 383 P.2d 734 (1963).

 
 

[¶26.]  Commonwealth argues that the portion of 
the agreement relied upon by Rialto is unenforceable for the reason that the 
terms of their agreement are not sufficiently definite. In Action Ads, Inc. v. Judes, Wyo., 671 P.2d 309, 
310-311 (1983), this court noted that:

 
 
"We perceive the initial 
question to be whether the contract, as established by plaintiff-appellee, is 
sufficiently definite to permit the court to determine with reasonable certainty 
the extent of the promissor's contractual duties. Where the terms of a contract 
are not sufficiently definite to permit this initial determination, the court 
lacks the information necessary to rule on the issues of breach of contract, 
damages, or duty to mitigate damages."

 
 

[¶27.]  By its clear and unambiguous language, 
this portion of the lease agreement is merely an agreement to agree in the 
future. While the parties to such an agreement may perceive that a binding 
obligation is created by this type of agreement, the court is incapable of 
ordering enforcement as it cannot supply the terms of agreement for the parties. 
Adobe Oil & Gas Corporation v. Getter 
Trucking, Inc., Wyo., 676 P.2d 560 (1984). In this case the 
parties' agreement provides no guidance as to the terms which are to be 
enforced. Unless the essential terms of such a future agreement are defined with 
reasonable certainty, there is no contract for the court to enforce. Western Airlines, Inc. v. Lathrop 
Company, Alaska, 499 P.2d 1013 (1972); Coleman Engineering Company v. North 
American Aviation, 65 Cal. 2d 396, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1, 420 P.2d 713 (1966); Page & Wirtz Construction Co. v. Van 
Doran Bri-Tico Co., Tex.Civ.App., 432 S.W.2d 731 (1968); Witt v. Realist, Inc., 18 Wis.2d 282, 
118 N.W.2d 85 (1962); 1 Corbin on Contracts § 95, p. 397 (1963); and 17 
Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 26, p. 362. We conclude that the trial court erred in not 
granting Commonwealth's motion for directed verdict and allowing the matter to 
go to the jury.

 
 
No. 
84-233

 
 

[¶28.]  The final issue to be addressed in these 
appeals concerns the propriety of the district court's dismissal of the second 
complaint filed by Rialto some 12 days after trial on its original 
complaint. This second complaint requested that Commonwealth be 
enjoined

 
 
"* * * from directly or 
indirectly owning, operating or managing the Beverly Twin Theatres, and the 
Eastridge Cinema until after March 31, 1987, plus recovery of costs, and such 
other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable."

 
 
The district court in its 
decision letter dated August 2, 1984, noted that in granting Commonwealth's 
motion to dismiss, it felt that "both res judicata, the more directly, and 
collateral estoppel apply here to act as bars." In addition, in apparent 
reference to Rialto's argument that it was 
precluded from presenting the entirety of its claims for damages in the previous 
case as those damages had not yet accrued, the court noted that Rialto's remedy would be 
to appeal.3 The order dismissing Rialto's second complaint 
was entered August 9, 1984 on the grounds stated in the decision 
letter.

 
 

[¶29.]  As argued in the district court, Rialto 
urges in its appeal that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
do not act as a bar to the bringing of a second complaint based upon violations 
of the same lease involved in the prior suit for the reasons that this was the 
first time Rialto requested injunctive relief with respect to the Beverly Twin 
Theatres, that there were new and separate damages which had not accrued as of 
the time of trial in the first action which give rise to new causes of action, 
and that the issues involved in the prior suit did not include those related to 
current damages suffered by Rialto as a result of continued operation of the two 
theatres by Commonwealth. Rialto argues that each month Commonwealth does 
business in the other theatres this competition causes a decrease in the amount 
of gross receipts of the theatre properties owned by Rialto covered by the 
lease, resulting in Rialto being damaged anew each month as the amount of rents 
under the lease are diminished. In essence, Rialto argues that an additional, new breach of 
lease accrues each month when the amount of rent received by it is decreased as 
a result of operations of the other theatres.

 
 

[¶30.]  The rules of law applicable in this 
appeal were summarized by this court in Delgue v. Curutchet, Wyo., 677 P.2d 208, 213-214 
(1984):

 
 
"In this jurisdiction the 
doctrine of res judicata and the related doctrine of collateral estoppel have 
been recognized in a number of decisions over the years. Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, Wyo., 652 P.2d 395 (1982); Roush v. Roush, 
Wyo., 589 P.2d 841 (1979); Bard Ranch 
Company v. Weber, Wyo., 557 P.2d 722 (1976); Blount v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 510 P.2d 294 (1973); Knight v. Boner, 
Wyo., 459 P.2d 205 (1969); Rubeling v. 
Rubeling, Wyo., 406 P.2d 283 (1965); Lee v. Brown, Wyo., 357 P.2d 1106 
(1960); Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 
403, 49 P.2d 670 (1935), reh. denied 49 Wyo. 
296, 54 P.2d 814 (1936); and Cook v. 
Elmore, 27 Wyo. 163, 192 P. 824 (1920). See also Price v. Bonnifield, 2 Wyo. 80 (1878). 
As recognized in this state, these doctrines incorporate a universal precept of 
common-law jurisprudence to the effect that a `right, question or fact 
distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same 
parties or their privies.' Montana v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S. Ct. 970, 973, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979), 
quoting from Southern Pacific R. Co. v. 
United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49, 18 S. Ct. 18, 27, 42 L. Ed. 355 (1897). 
These doctrines are founded upon the interest held by society in having 
differences conclusively resolved in a single action thereby avoiding the 
vexation and expense which are associated with piecemeal litigation. The 
necessity for sustaining this social interest is the justification for the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S.  at 153-154, 99 S.Ct. at 973-74; Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, supra, 652 
P.2d at 398-399; and Rubeling v. 
Rubeling, supra, 406 P.2d  at 284. These doctrines, which inhibit the 
relitigation of claims or issues upon which there has been a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate in a court of competent jurisdiction, promote the 
reliance by citizens of the state upon courts to settle their disputes and they 
conserve judicial resources.

 
 
"The interest served by 
both doctrines is essentially the same, but courts, including this court, have 
been careful to distinguish between the two. Res judicata can be described 
generally as that rule which precludes the presentation by parties or those in 
privity with them of the same claim that was resolved by an earlier judgment. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1877); Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, supra, 557 P.2d  at 727; Willis v. Willis, supra, 
49 P.2d  at 673; and Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 17 (1982). The effect 
of collateral estoppel is that of preventing relitigation of issues which were 
involved actually and necessarily in the prior action between the same parties. 
Roush v. Roush, supra, 589 P.2d  at 
843; Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, 
supra, 557 P.2d at 726-727; Willis v. 
Willis, supra, 49 P.2d at 673-677; and Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 
27 (1982)."

 
 
See also CLS v. CLJ, Wyo., 693 P.2d 774 (1985); Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 
Wyo., 662 P.2d 419 (1983).

 
 

[¶31.]  In presenting this appeal, Rialto relies primarily upon our decision in Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, Wyo., 557 P.2d 722 
(1976). In that case, this court rejected an argument that a judgment in an 
earlier suit between the parties establishing the existence of private roadway 
precluded the bringing of suit to establish any other claims which might have 
been presented in the earlier litigation. Rialto argues that only those facts and matters 
involved in a prior suit which were actually or necessarily adjudicated are 
conclusively established under the principle of res judicata. In Bard Ranch Company v. Weber, supra, 557 P.2d  at 727, we relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United 
States in which the distinctions between the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are discussed. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1877); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S. Ct. 715, 92 L. Ed. 898 
(1948). Rialto's 
argument in this case reflects a basic misunderstanding of those distinctions. 
Summarized, res judicata is a doctrine precluding the bringing of further claims 
by parties or their privities based on the same cause of action. Collateral 
estoppel, in contrast, involves the preclusion of issues which were actually and 
necessarily decided in prior litigation on a different claim or cause of action 
between the parties. Delgue v. 
Curutchet, supra; Montana v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-154, 99 S. Ct. 970, 973, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 
(1979).

 
 

[¶32.]  Closely related to the doctrine of res 
judicata is the rule against splitting causes of action. Hurst v. Davis, Wyo., 
386 P.2d 943 (1963). 

 
 
"* * * The general rule 
against splitting a cause of action is that a single wrong gives rise to one 
cause of action for which only one suit may be maintained, however numerous the 
elements of damages resulting therefrom." Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 
supra, 662 P.2d [419] at 421.

 
 
Like res judicata and 
collateral estoppel, one of the reasons for the rule is that a party should not 
be put to the trouble and expense of defending against alleged liability in 
several suits which could and should be determined in a single action. Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 
supra; Davis v. Davis, 56 Wyo. 524, 111 P.2d 124, 138 A.L.R. 336 (1941); Hennessy v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. 
Co., 24 Wyo. 305, 157 P. 698 (1916). In addition, the 
rule promotes judicial economy. Lane 
Company v. Busch Development, Inc., supra; Atlas Realty Co. v. Rowray, 51 
Wyo. 318, 65 P.2d 1122 (1937).

 
 

[¶33.]  This court has defined a "cause of 
action" as the fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a "suit," the 
latter being a proceeding to enforce a right. Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 
supra, 662 P.2d  at 421; Duke v. 
Housen, Wyo., 
589 P.2d 334, 341, cert. denied 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 
(1979). See also Bliler v. Boswell, 9 Wyo. 57, 59 P. 798, 803 (1900) ("A cause of 
action is defined as matter for which an action may be brought"). As noted in Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 
supra, 662 P.2d at 421:

 
 
"No precise rule has been 
laid down for determining what makes a whole cause of action. Each case is 
decided on its particular facts."

 
 

[¶34.]  In determining what constitutes a cause 
of action for purposes of res judicata, we adopt the approach of the Restatement 
of the Law (Second) of Judgments § 24, p. 196 (1982), which 
provides:

 
 
"§ 24. Dimensions of 
`Claim' for Purposes of Merger or Bar - General Rule Concerning 
`Splitting'

 
 
"(1) When a valid and 
final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant 
to the rules of merger or bar (see §§ 18, 19), the claim extinguished includes 
all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to 
all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of 
which the action arose.

 
 
"(2) What factual 
grouping constitutes a `transaction', and what groupings constitute a `series', 
are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as 
whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether 
they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit 
conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or 
usage."

 
 

[¶35.]  We hold that the principles of res 
judicata act as a bar to Rialto's second complaint in this matter even 
though the remedies sought in the second action may not have been part of the 
first suit. Restatement of the Law (Second) of Judgments § 25(2), p. 209 (1982). 
Each complaint involves the same lease agreement, the same theatres and the same 
basic factual circumstances which are alleged to give rise to Rialto's right to maintain 
an action against Commonwealth. The following is particularly applicable to the 
claims made by Rialto in the present 
appeal:

 
 

"f. Successive actions for different 
remedies. As the result of a single transaction or a connected series of 
transactions giving rise to a unitary claim, the plaintiff may be entitled to a 
number of alternative or cumulative remedies or forms of relief against the 
defendant. In a modern system of procedure it is ordinarily open to the 
plaintiff to pursue in one action all the possible remedies whether or not 
consistent, whether alternative or cumulative, and whether of the types 
historically called legal or equitable.

"Therefore it is fair to 
hold that after judgment for or against the plaintiff, the claim is ordinarily 
exhausted so that the plaintiff is precluded from seeking any other remedies 
deriving from the same grouping of facts." Restatement of the Law (Second) of 
Judgments § 25, comment f, p. 214 (1982).

 
 

[¶36.]  We are not persuaded by Rialto's argument that its 
damages at the time of filing the second complaint differed from those present 
at the time of trial in the first action. In Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company v. 
Huntley, 78 Wyo. 380, 328 P.2d 569 (1958), this court rejected a similar 
argument, noting that, where an automobile accident caused both property damage 
and personal injury, a single cause of action ensued, and plaintiff was required 
to prove all his damages in a single suit. This rule applies with equal force to 
the claims of Rialto. If Rialto was precluded from proving all its 
damages in the initial suit, its remedy was to appeal, not file another 
complaint for recovery of those damages.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶37.]  The district court is affirmed with 
respect to Case No. 84-162 and Case No. 84-233; Case No. 84-163 is remanded to 
the district court for entry of an order vacating the judgment and dismissing 
Rialto's claim 
for monetary damages for breach of the lease.

 
 

1 This agreement is the 
successor to an earlier lease between the parties executed in 1962. As was the 
case at the time the 1968 lease was executed, Rialto owned or operated all the movie theatres in 
Casper, Wyoming, when the original lease was drawn and 
the parties agreed to cooperate to keep competition out of the 
market.

 
 

2 Rule 2.01, W.R.A.P., 
provides in part:

 
 
"A notice of appeal, in a 
civil or criminal case, filed prematurely shall be treated as filed on the same 
day as entry of judgment or final order, provided it complies with Rule 2.02, 
W.R.A.P."

 
 

3 We note that at the time 
of pretrial on its initial complaint, Rialto sought and was granted leave to amend 
its complaint to pray for additional damages resulting from the opening of the 
Eastridge Cinema before trial.

 
 

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶38.]  I have no real quarrel with anything that 
is said in the opinion of the court in this case, but I would reverse Case No. 
84-163 for an additional reason. As this agreement is described in the majority 
opinion, particularly paragraph 14 thereof, I am satisfied that it constitutes 
an effort on the part of these parties to create a monopoly in the movie theatre 
business in the Casper, 
Wyoming area.

 
 

[¶39.]  Article 1, § 30 of the Constitution of 
the State of Wyoming provides in pertinent 
part:

8v"Perpetuities and 
monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state, and shall not be allowed. * * 
*"

 
 
Article 10, § 8 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides:

 
 
8v"There shall be no 
consolidation or combination of corporations of any kind whatever to prevent 
competition, to control or influence productions or prices thereof, or in any 
other manner to interfere with the public good and general 
welfare."

 
 
The legislature of the 
state of Wyoming has implemented these constitutional 
provisions in § 40-4-101, W.S. 1977, by providing:

 
 
"Any person, firm, or 
corporation, foreign or domestic, doing business in the state of Wyoming and 
engaged in the production, manufacture, sale or distribution of any commodity in 
general use, that shall make, enter into, form or be a party to, any plan, 
agreement, consolidation or accommodation of any kind whatsoever to prevent 
competition, or to control or influence production or prices thereof, * * * 
shall be deemed guilty of unfair discrimination; * * *"

 
 
A violation of the 
provisions of that section is punishable by both a fine and 
imprisonment.

 
 

[¶40.]  In both the provisions of the 
constitution and in the statute, the state of Wyoming has articulated a public policy 
against the making of agreements such as the one which is the subject of this 
case. While we recently have said in a public policy context that courts 
unanimously recognize the right to contract freely, and that we will not set 
aside a contract on the basis of public policy unless the policy is well 
settled, unambiguous and not in conflict with any other equally or more 
compelling public policy (Sinclair Oil 
Corp. v. Columbia Cas. Co., Wyo., 682 P.2d 975 (1984) I am convinced that 
the public policy position of the state of Wyoming with respect to contracts in 
restraint of trade and designed to structure a monopoly is clear. The 
appropriate rule then is capsulized in Tate v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co., Wyo., 647 P.2d 58, 61 (1982):

 
 
"Generally, a contract 
which is contrary to public policy will not be recognized by the court, and the 
parties to such contract will be left as the court finds them. Owens v. Capri, 65 Wyo. 325, 202 P.2d 174 (1949); and Claus v. Farmers & Stockgrowers State 
Bank, 51 Wyo. 45, 63 P.2d 781 
(1936)."

 
 

Applying this rule I 
would resolve this case with respect to all issues by holding very simply that 
the contract involved is one which is contrary to public policy and none of the 
parties are entitled to seek relief from the courts of this state.