Case Title: Byrd v. Wesley Med. Center

Citation: 237 Kan. 215, 699 P.2d 459

Docket Number: 56,718

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1985-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
237 Kan. 215 (1985)
699 P.2d 459
ELLA M. BYRD, Appellant,
v.
WESLEY MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee.
No. 56,718

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 10, 1985.
M. Ralph Baehr, of Nieto, Baehr & Hollander, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Jerry G. Elliott, of Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.:
When a normal, healthy child is born to a mother upon whom an unsuccessful sterilization procedure has been performed, are the costs of rearing and educating the child items of damage which are recoverable in a medical negligence action? That is the primary question posed in this proceeding.
Perhaps for clarity we should point out that we are not concerned here with the ordinary damages arising from a claim of medical malpractice in the performance of a sterilization operation  the expense of the unsuccessful operation, the pain and suffering of the patient, any medical complications caused by the unsuccessful sterilization or by the pregnancy, the costs of delivery, lost wages, or loss of consortium. Likewise, we are not concerned here with an unsuccessful sterilization proceeding followed by the birth of a mentally retarded or physically handicapped child. Our concern here is only with one item of damages claimed when it is alleged that a sterilization procedure was negligently performed, and that thereafter a normal, healthy child was born to the "sterilized" parent. Should the parent be permitted to recover as damages the full cost of rearing the child? That is the issue.
Plaintiff Ella M. Byrd underwent tubal ligation at Wesley *216 Medical Center (hereafter, the hospital) in Wichita. The surgery was performed by Dr. Darrel Neuschafer and Dr. Truman Grauel. One purpose of the operation was to prevent plaintiff from having any more children. The operation, however, was unsuccessful, and plaintiff later became pregnant and delivered a normal, healthy child. She then filed this action against the hospital and the surgeons, alleging that the surgery was negligently performed. She sought damages, including the cost of rearing her child to majority. At the district court level, plaintiff dismissed as against the physicians, and the hospital remains the sole defendant.
The trial court partially sustained the hospital's motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiff could not recover as damages the projected costs of rearing her unplanned child. The trial judge, in announcing his decision, said:
From this ruling plaintiff brings this interlocutory appeal.
We agree with the trial judge that there are three views: (1) The no recovery rule: the parent may not recover the costs of rearing the child; (2) the full recovery rule: the parent may recover all costs of rearing the child; and (3) the "benefits" rule: the parent may recover the costs of rearing the child, less the *218 benefits the parent will receive from having a normal, healthy child.
The full recovery rule has little support. In the case of Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976), cited in support of the rule, the opinion makes clear that the Ohio Supreme Court was called upon to determine, and that it decided, only two issues: that the sterilization consent form signed by the patient did not relieve the surgeon and the hospital of liability, and that a damage action based upon a negligently performed and unsuccessful sterilization procedure is not against public policy. The plaintiffs brought suit for damages, including the costs of rearing the unplanned children, twins born after the unsuccessful operation. Plaintiffs apparently recovered "rearing costs" in the lower court. The Ohio Supreme Court, in a footnote to its opinion, says:
The case cited by the trial court, Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), does not fully support the second view. That court said:
....
The Custodio court thus did not decide whether or not damages for the cost of rearing the child could be recovered.
In Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App.3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981), the Illinois Court of Appeals held that the mother was entitled to recover the cost of rearing the child without deduction for the "benefits of parenthood." That decision, however, was short-lived. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983), reversed the Court of Appeals, affirmed the trial court, and adopted the no recovery rule that "rearing costs"  the cost of rearing a child to maturity  are not recoverable in Illinois in actions for negligent sterilization.
*219 The most frequently cited case supporting the "benefits" rule  that the damages, including costs of rearing the child, may be recovered but that they must be reduced by the pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits which parents will receive from their parental relationship with a normal, healthy child  is University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983). The opinion discusses all three rules and the bases for them, noting that the courts which do not permit the recovery as damages of the costs of rearing the child give various reasons for adopting that view:
....
The Arizona opinion also discusses the full recovery rule. The court ultimately rejected both the no recovery and the full recovery rules and adopted the benefits rule, allowing recovery of rearing costs less the benefits of parenthood. It said:
....
The theory of recovery of those courts adopting the benefits rule appears to be based on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 (1977):
In addition to Arizona, the benefits rule has been adopted in five other states. See Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
The rule that the parent may not recover rearing costs for the unplanned child is, as indicated in the Arizona case, the majority view, having been adopted in nineteen or twenty jurisdictions. One of the most recent cases adopting the rule is McKernan v. Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984). In that case, as in ours, a healthy, normal child was born after an unsuccessful sterilization operation. The parents brought suit against the physician to recover damages, including the costs of rearing and educating the unplanned child. The trial court held that rearing costs could not be recovered, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. The court first acknowledged that the majority of courts of other jurisdictions have held that no damages may be recovered for the costs of rearing and educating a healthy, normal child born as a result of medical malpractice. The court then reviewed the reasons advanced by various courts in support of the rule. These include:
(1) A parent cannot be said to have been damaged by the birth and rearing of a normal and healthy child.
(2) Benefits of joy, companionship, and affection which a healthy child can provide outweigh the costs of rearing that child.
(3) The recovery of rearing costs would be a windfall to the parents and an unreasonable burden on the negligent health care provider, wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the physician.
(4) Recovery should be denied to protect the mental and emotional health of the child, sometimes described as an "emotional bastard," who will one day learn that he or she not only *222 was not wanted by his or her parents, but was reared by funds supplied by another person.
(5) Other reasons include the speculative nature of damages and the possibility of fraudulent claims.
The Washington court found unpersuasive the arguments that the benefits of parenthood always outweigh the costs of rearing a child; that the burden on health care providers would be "unreasonable"; and that some parents might bring fraudulent claims. The court then explained its reasons for adopting the nonrecovery of rearing costs rule as follows:
Among the cases from other jurisdictions which have adopted the majority rule are these: Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), rev. denied 399 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1981); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. *224 Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied 464 U.S. 846, 78 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1983); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984); White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146 (D. Kan. 1981) (interpreting Georgia law); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v. Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); O'Toole v. Greenberg, 64 N.Y.2d 427, 488 N.Y.S.2d 143, 477 N.E.2d 445 (1985); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 App. Div.2d 339, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983; Sorkin v. Lee, 78 App. Div.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 App. Div.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 927 (1974); McNeal v. United States, 689 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.1982) (interpreting Virginia law); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis.2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); and Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
Many of these courts have criticized the third or "benefits" rule, requiring the deduction of the benefits, which requires a jury to place a value on the joy and pleasure, the satisfaction and companionship, of parenthood. These items are imponderable; they have no fixed or measurable monetary value. The Texas court in Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, spelled out some of the inherent problems with the benefits rule. The Alabama Supreme Court, in Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d  at 718, quotes from the Terrell opinion as follows:
....
Having considered the three views and the arguments advanced in support of each of them, we conclude that the majority rule should apply in this jurisdiction and we adopt it. In a medical malpractice action for negligent sterilization, the projected cost of rearing a normal, healthy child to majority may not be recovered.
As a matter of public policy, the birth of a normal and healthy child does not constitute a legal harm for which damages are recoverable. We recognize wrongful death actions because of the great value we place on human life. Conversely, we cannot recognize actions for wrongful birth or wrongful conception of a normal, healthy child. The birth of a normal, healthy child may be one of the consequences of a negligently performed sterilization, but we hold that it is not a legal wrong for which damages should or may be awarded.
We agree with the rationale of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, as expressed in Weintraub v. Brown, 98 App. Div.2d 339, 348-49, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1983):
Many other reasons for the adoption of the majority rule are stated in the cited cases, but we need not base our opinion upon them. We hold simply that under the public policy of this state, a *226 parent cannot be said to be damaged by the birth of a normal, healthy child, and the parent may not recover damages because of the birth of such a child.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.