Case Title: Verizon New England, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Boston

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12034

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12034 
 
VERIZON NEW ENGLAND INC.  vs.  BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF BOSTON 
(and a consolidated case1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 7, 2016. - November 2, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, 
JJ.2 
 
 
Telephone Company.  Taxation, Assessors, Personal property tax: 
value.  Constitutional Law, Taxation. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
William Hazel for the taxpayers. 
 
Anthony M. Ambriano for board of assessors of Boston. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Daniel J. Hammond, 
Assistant Attorney General, for Attorney General & another, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Kenneth W. Gurge, for Massachusetts Municipal Association & 
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                     
 
1 RCN BecoCom LLC vs. Board of Assessors of Boston. 
 
 
2 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  Two telephone companies appeal from a 
decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) upholding the 
property tax assessments by the board of assessors of Boston 
(assessors) for fiscal year (FY) 2012 on certain personal 
property each company owns.  At issue is whether the tax 
assessments, which were based on a "split" tax rate structure 
determined in accordance with G. L. c. 40, § 56 (§ 56), 
constituted a disproportionate tax that, as such, violated the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth.  More particularly, the 
question is whether the split tax rate structure authorized by 
§ 56 -- a rate structure that provides for taxable personal 
property to be taxed at a rate identical to the rate applied to 
commercial and industrial real property but higher than the rate 
that would apply if all taxable property, real and personal, 
were taxed at a single, uniform rate -- violates the 
proportionality requirement of Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of 
the Constitution of the Commonwealth, as amended by art. 112 of 
the Amendments to the Constitution, as well as art. 10 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  We conclude that the split 
tax structure authorized by § 56 and related statutes does not 
violate the Massachusetts Constitution.  We affirm the board's 
decision.3 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus curiae briefs submitted by the 
Attorney General and the Commissioner of Revenue; and by the 
3 
 
 
 
1.  Background.4  a.  Procedural background.  Verizon New 
England Inc. (Verizon) and RCN BecoCom LLC (RCN) (collectively, 
taxpayers) are subject to property tax in the city of Boston on 
personal property consisting primarily of machinery, poles, 
underground conduits, wires, and pipes (§ 39 property) that they 
own and use for business purposes.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 59, 
§ 39, the Commissioner of Revenue (commissioner) is required on 
an annual basis to centrally determine and certify the valuation 
of this type of property owned by telephone and telegraph 
companies, including the taxpayers; the commissioner's certified 
central valuations then become the basis for tax assessments by 
the assessors in each city and town where such property is 
located and subject to taxation, including Boston.  For purposes 
of property tax assessments for fiscal year 2012, the 
commissioner centrally valued the § 39 property owned by Verizon 
in Boston at $215,846,800, and the § 39 property owned by RCN in 
Boston at $48,444,900.5  The assessors thereafter assessed a 
                                                                  
Massachusetts Municipal Association, Massachusetts Association 
of Assessing Officers, and Massachusetts Municipal Lawyers 
Association. 
 
 
4 The background facts are undisputed.  These cases were 
submitted to the Appellate Tax Board (board) on the parties' 
statement of agreed facts and accompanying exhibits; the board 
made findings based on the statement of agreed facts. 
 
 
5 The taxpayers do not contest the values of their § 39 
personal property determined by the Commissioner of Revenue 
(commissioner) for fiscal year (FY) 2012. 
4 
 
 
property tax for FY 2012 on Verizon's § 39 property at the tax 
rate of $31.92 per thousand dollars of value for a total 
assessment of $6,889,829.86; they assessed a FY 2012 tax on 
RCN's § 39 property at the same rate of $31.92 per thousand for 
a total assessment of $1,546,361.21.  The taxpayers timely paid 
the personal property taxes thus assessed, and then timely filed 
abatement applications with the assessors.6  The requested 
abatements were denied, and both taxpayers filed timely appeals 
with the board.  On April 24, 2013, the board consolidated the 
taxpayers' petitions for hearing.  On October 24, 2014, the 
board issued its decision denying the taxpayers' appeals, and 
thereafter issued findings of fact and a report.  The taxpayers 
timely appealed to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the 
case on our own motion. 
 
b.  Constitutional and statutory background.  Part II, 
c. 1, § 1, art. 4 (art. 4), of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth, as amended in 1978 by art. 112 of the Amendments 
(art. 112) authorizes the Legislature 
                     
6 Verizon sought a tax abatement in the amount of 
$2,952,784.23, and RCN sought a tax abatement in the amount of 
$662,726.23.  The abatements sought in each case represented the 
difference between the amount of property tax assessed at $31.92 
per thousand dollars of value and what the assessment would have 
been if the taxpayer's § 39 property had been assessed at $18.24 
per thousand dollars, the rate that would have been applied if 
all taxable real and personal property were taxed at a single 
rate in FY 2012, give the total amount of Boston's FY 2012 tax 
levy. 
5 
 
 
"to impose and levy proportional and reasonable 
assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, 
and persons resident, and estates lying, within the said 
commonwealth, except that, in addition to the powers 
conferred under Articles XLI and XCIX of the Amendments,[7] 
the general court may classify real property according to 
its use in no more than four classes and to assess, rate 
and tax such property differently in the classes so 
established, but proportionately in the same class, and 
except that reasonable exemptions may be granted" (emphasis 
supplied).8 
 
 
Before it was amended by art. 112, art. 4 had been 
consistently interpreted by this court to require that 
"all taxes levied under [the taxing authority of art. 4] be 
'proportional and reasonable,' and [art. 4] forbids their 
imposition upon one class of persons or property at a 
different rate from that which is applied to other classes, 
whether that discrimination is effected directly in the 
assessment or indirectly through arbitrary and unequal 
methods of valuation." 
 
Cheshire v. County Comm'rs of Berkshire, 118 Mass. 386, 389 
(1875).  See, e.g., President, Directors, & Co. of the Portland 
Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252, 255 (1815); Oliver v. Washington 
Mills, 11 Allen 268, 275 (1865); Opinion of the Justices, 220 
Mass. 613, 618-619, 621 (1915); Opinion of the Justices, 332 
                     
 
7 Article 41 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution, as amended by art. 110 of the Amendments, and art. 
99 of the Amendments grant the Legislature broad authority over 
the taxation of wild or forest lands (art. 41) and agricultural 
or horticultural lands (art. 99). 
 
 
8 The portion of Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4 (art. 4), of the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth highlighted in the text was 
added to art. 4 by art. 112 of the Amendments to the 
Constitution (art. 112). 
6 
 
 
Mass. 769, 778-779 (1955); Bettigole v. Assessors of 
Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 230-231 (1961). 
 
In practice, however, local municipal assessors -- to whom 
the Legislature has delegated for over two centuries the power 
to assess local property taxes, see Opinion of the Justices, 378 
Mass. 802, 810 & n.11 (1979) -- did not follow this 
constitutional mandate of strict proportionality, or the 
statutory requirement that local assessment of property taxes be 
based on "a fair cash valuation of all the estate, real and 
personal, subject to taxation therein."  G. L. c. 59, § 38.  See 
Bettigole, 343 Mass. at 231-232.  See also Sudbury v. 
Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 366 Mass. 558, 563 (1974); 
Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366, 
371-372 (1965).  Rather, there was a widespread practice of 
employing varying percentages of fair cash values that favored 
residential properties at the expense of commercial and 
industrial properties.  See Keniston v. Assessors of Boston, 380 
Mass. 888, 890-891 (1980); Bettigole, supra at 227-228.  
Particularly beginning in the 1960s this court more insistently 
declared disproportionate assessments of property illegal and 
also broadened remedies available to taxpayers bringing claims 
of disproportionate taxation.  See Sudbury, supra at 568-569; 
Shoppers' World, Inc., supra at 372-373 (1965); Bettigole, supra 
at 236-237; Stone v. Springfield, 341 Mass. 246, 248 (1960).  
7 
 
 
However, in the midst of the "accelerated judicial enforcement 
of the [proportionate taxation and] fair cash valuation 
requirement, . . . there was public challenge to the concept of 
100% valuation" (citation omitted), Keniston, 380 Mass. at 891, 
and in response to this public sentiment, the General Court 
approved in 1975 and again in 1977 the constitutional amendment 
embodied in art. 112; the amendment was ratified by the voters 
on November 7, 1978 -- by a two-to-one margin.9  See Associated 
Indus. of Mass., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 378 Mass. 657, 
659 (1979); Opinion of the Justices, supra at 804.  Accord 
Keniston, supra.  Article 112 empowered the Legislature to 
establish a property tax system that would impose "different 
rates of taxation on different classes of real property," 
Opinion of the Justices, supra, and that in practical effect 
would resemble and legitimize the long-time local practice of 
establishing relatively lower property tax assessments for 
residential property and vacant land or open space as compared 
to other classes of property.  See id. at 804-805. 
Article 112 permits the Legislature to establish different 
classes of real property and to tax the different classes at 
different rates, so long as all real property within a class is 
taxed at the same rate.  In anticipation of the ratification of 
                     
 
9 See Rogers, Classification Guidelines Ahead, Boston Globe, 
Nov. 9, 1978, at 45. 
8 
 
 
art. 112, the Legislature enacted legislation, St. 1978, c. 580, 
that, pursuant to the authority contained in the proposed 
amendment, created a property tax system based on classifying 
real property in four classes.  In 1979, following the 
amendment's ratification, the Legislature considered a somewhat 
different classification system and submitted two questions to 
this court concerning the constitutionality of certain of its 
features.10  See Opinion of the Justices, 378 Mass. at 802, 806-
815.  Following receipt of our affirmative answers to its 
questions, the Legislature enacted new legislation, St. 1979, 
c. 797, to implement art. 112, establishing a property tax 
structure almost identical to that proposed.  At the same time, 
the Legislature also repealed the classification provisions of 
St. 1978, c. 580.  See St. 1979, c. 797, § 23.  See also St. 
1980, c. 261, § 16. 
 
The implementing legislation set out in St. 1979, c. 797, 
is codified as G. L. c. 40, § 56; G. L. c. 58, § 1A; and G. L. 
c. 59, § 2A, and remains in effect;11 the assessors here 
                     
 
10 The constitutional questions we answered in Opinion of 
the Justices, 378 Mass. 802 (1979), did not directly concern the 
central issue in this case about the meaning of "proportional 
and reasonable assessments" as it relates to personal property 
in art. 4, as amended by amendment art. 112.  Our opinion in 
that case is nonetheless of some relevance here, as we discuss 
in note 22, infra. 
 
 
11 The sections of the General Laws cited in the text that 
were added by St. 1979, c. 797, have been subsequently amended 
9 
 
 
implemented the split tax structure in place in Boston for 
FY 2012 pursuant to these statutes.12  Under them, the 
commissioner is required every three years to determine, within 
each city and town in the Commonwealth, whether the locally 
assessed values represent the full and fair cash valuation for 
each class of real property, defined in c. 59, § 2A,13 and for 
all personal property not exempt from local taxation.  See G. L. 
c. 40, § 56; G. L. c. 58, § 1A.14  For every municipality that 
the commissioner determines is using full and fair cash 
valuation, the commissioner also ascertains a "minimum 
residential factor" (MRF).15  See G. L. c. 40, § 56; G. L. c. 58, 
§ 1A. 
                                                                  
in a number of respects, but the amendments do not affect the 
parties' arguments in the present case. 
 
 
12 In FY 2012, there were 108 municipalities, including 
Boston, that elected a split rate tax scheme pursuant to § 56, 
and 243 municipalities that elected a single rate tax scheme. 
 
 
13 Under G. L. c. 59, § 2A, real property may be classified 
into four classes:  residential, open space, commercial, and 
industrial; § 2A defines each such class. 
 
 
14 When the commissioner certifies that the municipality's 
assessments are at full and fair cash value, the certification 
may be relied on for the year in which it is made and the two 
years following.  See G. L. c. 40, § 56 (§ 56). 
 
 
15 The minimum residential factor (MRF) caps the degree to 
which the city or town may shift the over-all tax burden from 
the residential and open space property classes to the 
commercial and industrial real property classes and to personal 
property.  See G. L. c. 58, § 1A, second par. 
10 
 
 
 
The municipality next determines "the percentages of local 
tax levy to be borne by each class of real property, as defined 
in [G. L. c. 59, § 2A], and personal property."  G. L. c. 40, 
§ 56.  To do so, the municipality first adopts a residential 
factor (RF) to be applied in making the determination of local 
levy percentages for each class of property; the RF may not be 
less than the MRF determined by the commissioner.  Id.  The 
municipality then determines the tax rate per thousand dollars 
of value for each class of property by dividing the share of the 
levy to be raised by each class by the total assessed valuation 
for that class, and multiplying the result by 1,000.16  Id. 
                     
 
16 In adopting a residential factor (RF), the municipality 
chooses whether to use a split tax structure or a unified tax 
structure in assessing property taxes.  If it chooses to use an 
RF of one, a single tax rate applies equally to all taxable 
property and the percentage of the local tax levy borne by each 
type of property should equal the percentage of the total value 
of real and personal property represented by that type of 
property.  By way of illustration, if residential property 
comprises eighty per cent of the total assessed valuation of all 
real and personal property in a city, under an RF of one, 
residential property owners collectively will pay eighty per 
cent of the total property tax levy.  If the city elects to use 
an RF of less than one, the share of the total tax levy borne by 
the residential and open space classes of real property will be 
reduced to a point lower than the percentage of the total 
property valuation represented by these two types of property, 
and the relative share of the total tax levy for which other 
classes of real property as well as personal property are 
responsible will correspondingly increase.  The result is a 
percentage shift in tax obligations in favor of residential and 
open space real property. 
 
 
The statutory formula is set out in § 56, and also draws on 
G. L. c. 58, § 1A.  For present purposes, the formula may be 
11 
 
 
 
c.  Factual background.  Turning to this case, for FY 2012, 
Boston elected to adopt a split rate tax structure pursuant to 
§ 56.17  The city having elected to use an RF of 59.6005%, the 
                                                                  
most easily explained by way of illustration.  Assume that in a 
particular city or town, the total value of property by class is 
as follows: 
 
Residential: 
$ 500,000 
Open Space: 
$ 20,000 
Commercial: 
$ 200,000 
Industrial: 
$ 200,000 
Personal: 
$ 80,000  
Total Property Valuation: 
$ 1,000,000 
 
Assume further that the city elects a residential factor of .80, 
or 80%, and chooses to multiply the RF by 75% for the open space 
determination.  The percentage of tax levy borne by each class 
would be as follows: 
 
Residential: ($500,000/$1,000,000) x 80% 
= 
40.0% 
Open Space: 
($20,000/$1,000,000) x (80% x 75%) 
= 
1.2% 
Commercial: 
($200,000/$480,000) x (100% - 41.2% 
[i.e., sum of residential and open 
space percentages]) 
= 
24.5% 
Industrial: 
($200,000/$480,000) x (100% - 41.2%) = 
24.5% 
Personal: 
($80,000/$480,000) x (100% - 41.2%) 
= 
9.8% 
 
Assuming the city's total tax levy for this year is $50,000, to 
determine the tax rate for each class, the percentage of the 
levy per class is divided by the total assessed valuation for 
that class and multiplied by 1,000: 
 
Residential: ($50,000 x 40%)/500,000 x 1,000 
= $40.00 
Open Space: 
($50,000 x 1.2%)/20,000 x 1,000 
= $30.00 
Commercial: 
($50,000 x 24.5%)/200,000 x 1,000 
= $61.25 
Industrial: 
($50,000 x 24.5%)/200,000 x 1,000 
= $61.25 
Personal: 
($50,000 x 9.8%)/80,000 x 1,000 
= $61.25 
 
 
17 The commissioner had certified in December, 2009, that 
the assessors were assessing the real and personal property in 
Boston at full and fair cash value, and that certification 
remained in effect for FY 2012.  See G. L. c. 40, § 56. 
12 
 
 
assessors determined the following percentages of the total tax 
levy to be borne by each class of real property and by personal 
property: 
 
Classification 
Levy Percentage 
Tax Rate Per Thousand 
Residential 
38.7353% 
$13.04 
Open Space 
0% 
$0.00 
Commercial 
50.39987% 
$31.92 
Industrial 
1.3352% 
$31.92 
Personal 
8.9308% 
$31.92 
 
 
On December 12, 2011, the commissioner approved and certified 
Boston's FY 2012 tax rates. 
 
Under the FY 2012 tax rates in Boston, personal property as 
a whole constituted 8.9308% of the tax levy, but it accounted 
for 5.1033% of the total valuation of all real and personal 
property situated in the city; residential property made up 
38.7353% of the total tax levy, but accounted for 64.9915% of 
the total valuation of all real and personal property located in 
the city.  With respect to the two taxpayers in this case, 
Verizon's taxable property situated in Boston for FY 2012 was 
approximately .2439% of the value of all taxable property in the 
city, but Verizon was required to pay .4269% of the total tax 
levy; RCN's taxable property was approximately .0547% of the 
total taxable property, but RCN was required to pay .0958% of 
the total tax levy.  At the same time, the value of Verizon's 
§ 39 property was approximately 4.78% of the total valuation of 
13 
 
 
personal property and approximately 0.6966% of the total 
valuation of property in the commercial, industrial, and 
property (CIP) classes located in Boston for FY 2012, and the 
tax assessed on that property represented these exact same 
percentages of the total taxes levied on all personal property 
and all CIP property, respectively.  For RCN, the value of its 
§ 39 property was 1.07% of the total valuation of personal 
property and 0.156% of the total valuation of property in the 
CIP classes for FY 2012, and the same respective percentages of 
the total taxes levied on all personal property and CIP 
property, for that year. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The taxpayers argue that art. 112 created 
a limited exception to art. 4's overarching proportionality 
requirement, an exception that applies solely to the taxation of 
real property, and based on the plain language of art. 112, the 
tax treatment of personal property remains unchanged by art. 
112.  That is, the taxpayers argue that, just as was true before 
the ratification of art. 112, in order to conform to art. 4's 
mandate that tax assessments be "proportional and reasonable," 
the assessors should have imposed a tax rate on personal 
property that would result in owners of personal property being 
responsible only for their proportionate share of the tax levy, 
measured by the relative value of their personal property 
compared to the total value of all the taxable property in 
14 
 
 
Boston, real and personal.  On the facts of this case, that 
measurement would have yielded a tax rate of $18.24 per thousand 
dollars of value, rather than the rate of $31.92 per thousand 
dollars of value applied by the assessors, which is 1.75 times 
greater.  The taxpayers contend that because the tax rate 
applied to their personal property in FY 2012 exceeded this 
permissible limit, the tax was unconstitutionally 
disproportionate in violation both of art. 4 and of art. 10 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  We disagree. 
 
As the board's decision states, and the taxpayers do not 
dispute, the assessors determined the challenged FY 2012 tax 
rates and assessments in compliance with the provisions of 
§ 56.18  The taxpayers' challenge, therefore, is that the split 
tax structure permitted by § 56 is unconstitutional because it 
imposes a disproportionate tax on owners of personal property 
and there is no constitutional authority to do so.  The board 
disagreed, and its opinion sets forth the board's reasoning in 
some detail, but questions of constitutional interpretation are 
questions of law, and we review them de novo.  See RCN-BecoCom, 
LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue, 443 Mass. 198, 201-202 (2005).  
                     
 
18 Section 56 is the specific statute providing the option 
of a split tax structure and therefore the focus of the 
taxpayers' challenge in this case, but it is undisputed that 
implementation of the split tax structure option under § 56 also 
brings into play the related statutes, G. L. c. 58, § 1A, and 
G. L. c. 59, § 2A.  The taxpayers do not challenge the 
constitutionality of these two statutes. 
15 
 
 
See also Geoffrey, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 453 Mass. 
17, 22, cert. denied, 557 U.S. 920 (2009). 
"We start from the premise that '[a] tax measure is 
presumed valid and is entitled to the benefit of any 
constitutional doubt, and the burden of proving its invalidity 
falls on those who challenge the measure."  WB&T Mtge. Co. v. 
Assessors of Boston, 451 Mass. 716, 721 (2008), quoting Opinion 
of the Justices, 425 Mass. 1201, 1203-1204 (1997).  A party 
challenging the validity of a tax measure must "establish[] its 
invalidity 'beyond a rational doubt'" (citation omitted).  
Geoffrey, Inc., 453 Mass. at 22.19 
                     
 
19 The taxpayers argue that their constitutional challenge 
to § 56 is to the statute as applied to them rather than a 
facial challenge.  Their argument appears to be based on the 
ground that the statute gives municipalities the option of 
imposing either a single tax rate to all classes of property, 
real and personal, or a split tax rate that differentiates 
between residential (and open space) property and other classes 
of property.  The argument seems to be that if Boston had 
elected to adopt a single rate tax structure for FY 2012, § 56 
would have been constitutionally applied to them, and was only 
unconstitutional in this case because the split tax rate 
alternative was chosen.  The argument fails.  Because § 56 
explicitly authorizes municipalities to implement a split rate 
tax structure, the taxpayers' challenge represents a facial 
attack on the statute itself.  A facial challenge is "the 
weakest form of challenge, and the one that is the least likely 
to succeed."  Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 652 (2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003).  But whether facial or as applied, 
when bringing a constitutional challenge to a tax statute, as 
stated in the text, the challenger bears a heavy burden to 
overcome a strong presumption of validity.  See Andover Sav. 
Bank v. Commissioner of Revenue, 387 Mass. 229, 235 (1982). 
16 
 
 
Determining the constitutional validity of § 56 requires an 
examination of art. 112 and in particular, how art. 112 affected 
the proportionality requirement within art. 4.  Our cases have 
defined principles that guide our analysis:  "A constitutional 
amendment should be 'interpreted in the light of the conditions 
under which it . . . [was] framed, the ends which it was 
designed to accomplish, the benefits which it was expected to 
confer, and the evils which it was hoped to remedy.'"  Mazzone 
v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 515, 526 (2000), quoting Tax Comm'r 
v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 524 (1917).  See Attorney Gen. v. 
Methuen, 236 Mass. 564, 573 (1921).  "An amendment to the 
Constitution is one of the most solemn and important of 
instruments.  It commonly is a brief and comprehensive statement 
of general principle of government. . . .  Its words should be 
interpreted in a sense most obvious to the common understanding 
at the time of its adoption, because it is proposed for public 
adoption and must be understood by all entitled to vote" 
(citation omitted).  Cohen v. Attorney Gen., 357 Mass. 564, 571 
(1970). 
 
As discussed earlier in this opinion, before art. 112 was 
ratified, beginning early in the Nineteenth Century, see 
President, Directors, & Co. of the Portland Bank, 12 Mass. at 
255, and continuing, art. 4 was uniformly interpreted to forbid 
the imposition of taxes "upon one class of persons or property 
17 
 
 
at a different rate from that which is applied to other classes, 
whether that discrimination [was] effected directly in the 
assessment or indirectly through arbitrary and unequal methods 
of valuation."  Cheshire, 118 Mass. at 389.  See Bettigole, 343 
Mass. at 230-232.  As also discussed, because of popular 
dissatisfaction with the combined effect of the constitutional 
proportionality requirement and the statutory obligation of 
municipalities to assess residential property and vacant land 
(open space) at full and fair cash value and in the same manner 
as all other types of property, the Legislature in response 
proposed art. 112 as an amendment to art. 4.  See Associated 
Indus. of Mass., Inc., 378 Mass. at 659; Opinion of the 
Justices, 378 Mass. at 804. 
 
This history reflects that the animating purpose of art. 
112 was to change the meaning of proportionality in art. 4 in 
order to enable residential property to be treated differently 
from other property classes.  Article 112 must be interpreted to 
give effect to this purpose, see, e.g., Mazzone, 432 Mass. at 
526, and our review of the constitutionality of § 56, in turn, 
must consider whether the statute helps to effectuate this 
purpose.  It does. 
 
Section 56 -- in combination with G. L. c. 58, § 1A, and 
G. L. c. 59, § 2A, see St. 1979, c. 797 -- authorizes a city or 
town to adopt a split tax rate structure that enables it to tax 
18 
 
 
residential and open space property at a lower effective tax 
rate than all other classes or types of property.  At the same 
time, § 56 adheres to or at least supports the principle of 
proportionality with respect to all such other property types by 
treating commercial real property, industrial real property, and 
personal property -- the CIP classes -- in the exact same 
manner.20  In contrast, the taxpayers' interpretation of art. 112 
would contradict the concept of proportionality by creating a 
single and separate tax rate for personal property, treating it 
differently from all other classes of property. 
 
The taxpayers argue that art. 112 effected a "narrow" 
exception to the proportionality requirement of art. 4, one 
limited to real property, and they suggest that, as an 
exception, art. 112 must itself be construed narrowly.  Their 
argument might have more force if it were directed at the 
language of a statute rather than a constitutional amendment; we 
have certainly stated that "[e]xceptions to statutory provisions 
are construed narrowly."  See LeClair v. Norwell, 430 Mass. 328, 
336 (1999).  Cf. New England Forestry Found., Inc. v. Assessors 
of Hawley, 468 Mass. 138, 148 (2014) ("Exemption statutes [here, 
property tax exemption statute] are strictly construed . . .").  
                     
 
20 Boston's effective tax rates for FY 2012 illustrate this 
point:  residential property had an effective tax rate of $13.04 
per thousand dollars of value, and commercial, industrial, and 
personal property had an effective tax rate of $31.92 per 
thousand dollars of value. 
19 
 
 
But a constitutional amendment "is a statement of general 
principles and not a specification of details. . . .  It is to 
be interpreted as the Constitution of a State and not as a 
statute or an ordinary piece of legislation.  Its words must be 
given a construction adapted to carry into effect its purpose."  
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 415 Mass. 
545, 559 (1993), quoting Cohen, 357 Mass. at 371.  In the case 
of art. 112, its purpose of enabling cities and towns to tax 
residential property at an effective rate different from and 
lower than other property is clear, and because art. 112 is a 
constitutional amendment, we do not interpret it narrowly, 
despite its inclusion of the phrase, "except that."  The 
Legislature understood from the outset -- as shown by the fact 
that it enacted contingent legislation to implement art. 112 
before the amendment had even been ratified by the voters, see 
Associated Indus., 378 Mass. at 659, 662-663 -- that art. 112 
did indeed state "general principles" that would require 
fleshing out in implementing statutes.  Section 56 is such a 
statute.  It effectuates the overarching objective of art. 112, 
and does so in a manner that retains proportionality to a large 
extent by treating nonexempt personal property -- which, as in 
this case, is used for business purposes21 -- the same as 
commercial and industrial real property.22 
                     
 
21 It may well be the case that most nonexempt personal 
20 
 
 
 
We conclude that the board's decision rejecting the 
taxpayers' challenge to the constitutionality of § 56 and 
upholding the commissioner's denial of the requested tax 
abatements was correct. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The decision of the Appellate Tax Board is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                                  
property is used for business purposes; much if not all personal 
property used by individuals for nonbusiness purposes is exempt 
from property tax.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 59, § 5, Twentieth. 
 
 
22 Finally, although the taxpayers are correct that Opinion 
of the Justices, 378 Mass. 802 (1979), did not address directly 
the proportionality challenge they raise in this case, we think 
it is of significance that the bill reviewed there by the court, 
like § 56, treated personal property differently from (and less 
favorably than) residential and open space property, and exactly 
the same as commercial and industrial real property, and the 
court's opinion clearly indicates that it reviewed and 
understood this aspect of the proposed legislation.  See id. at 
807-808.  The court expressed no reservation about the proposed 
legislation's treatment of personal property, and certainly did 
not suggest that insofar as personal property was treated as 
part of the same "class" as industrial and commercial real 
property and permitted to be taxed at a higher effective rate 
than residential and open space property, the constitutionality 
of the proposed legislation might be in question because of a 
possible conflict with the general proportionality requirement 
of art. 4.