Case Title: John W. Strasburg v.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP000305-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0305-D 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John W. Strasburg, 
Attorney at Law. 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST STRASBURG 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
April 21, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
September 9, 1997 
Oral Argument: 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For John W. Strasburg there were briefs by Steven 
M. Epstein and Law Offices of Steven M. Epstein, Milwaukee. 
 
 
For the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility there was a brief by Dennis M. Sullivan and 
Sullivan & Stevenson, Milwaukee. 
 
 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0305-D 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against JOHN W. STRASBURG, Attorney at 
Law. 
FILED 
 
APR 21, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney 
held 
in 
contempt, sanction imposed; license revoked. 
¶1 
PER CURIAM   John W. Strasburg appealed from that 
portion of the referee’s report recommending that he be required 
to make restitution to a business client for an excessive fee he 
had charged and obtained, that he be required to pay the costs 
of this disciplinary proceeding, and that the court impose a 
remedial sanction for his contempt of this court for each day 
following the issuance of the court’s opinion in this proceeding 
that he engages in those business activities he pursued while 
his license to practice law was suspended that the referee found 
constituted the practice of law. Mr. Strasburg did not appeal 
from the referee’s recommendation that his license to practice 
law in Wisconsin be revoked as discipline for having engaged in 
the practice of law and in law work activity customarily done by 
law students, law clerks or other paralegal personnel while his 
license to practice law was suspended, for misrepresenting on a 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
2 
statutory power of attorney that he had witnessed the signature 
of the grantee of the power in her presence and directing or 
knowingly allowing his employee to represent falsely that she 
had witnessed the grantor’s signature and had notarized it in 
the presence of the grantor and the grantee, and for failing to 
cooperate in the investigation of the Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility (Board) into these matters.  
¶2 
We 
determine 
that 
Mr. 
Strasburg’s 
conduct, 
particularly his continuing to engage in activities prohibited 
by our rules to an attorney whose license to practice law has 
been suspended, warrants the revocation of his license to 
practice 
law. 
In 
his 
business 
activities 
following 
the 
disciplinary suspension of his license to practice law, Mr. 
Strasburg has attempted to use his position of attorney to 
induce others to retain his services, at times to the extent of 
suggesting that he was authorized to practice law in connection 
with those services. By so doing, Mr. Strasburg sought to 
accomplish precisely what the prohibition we impose on lawyers 
suspended or disbarred from practice is designed to prevent. We 
determine further that the remedial sanction recommended by the 
referee for Mr. Strasburg’s continuing contempt of this court’s 
license suspension order imposing that prohibition is the 
appropriate means of protecting the public from any further 
contemptuous misconduct by Mr. Strasburg in the pursuit of his 
business. In respect to the unearned retainer he obtained from a 
business client while purporting to have the professional status 
of an attorney, we order the restitution recommended by the 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
3 
referee. In addition, we require Mr. Strasburg to pay the full 
costs of this disciplinary proceeding.  
¶3 
Mr. 
Strasburg 
was 
admitted 
to 
practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin in 1972 and practiced in Milwaukee. In 1990, the court 
suspended his license for two years as discipline for charging a 
clearly excessive fee and threatening legal action for his fee 
prior to completing the legal work in an estate, for overbilling 
several clients, for allowing a relative of a client to direct 
his professional judgment and legal services on behalf of that 
client and failing to communicate with the client prior to 
taking actions on her behalf, and for acting in the presence of 
conflicting interests of a client and the client’s mother, whose 
assets he was transferring to the client, and charging a clearly 
excessive fee for the routine legal services he provided in that 
matter. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Strasburg, 154 Wis. 2d 
90, 452 N.W.2d 152  
¶4 
In its complaint and amended complaint in the instant 
proceeding, the Board alleged that while his license to practice 
law remained suspended, Mr. Strasburg engaged in the practice of 
law and in law work activity customarily done by law students, 
law clerks and other paralegal personnel, contrary to SCR 
22.26(2), 1 engaged in misrepresentation by failing to inform 
                     
1 SCR 22.26 provides, in pertinent part: Activities on 
revocation or suspension of license. 
 . . .  
No.  96-0305-D 
 
4 
potential clients who asked if he was an attorney that his 
license had been suspended, charged unreasonable “legal fees” in 
several matters, misrepresented to a client that he was an 
attorney when his license to practice law remained suspended, 
used trust assets obtained from a client for matters unrelated 
to that trust and placed some of those assets in accounts other 
than trust accounts, failed to notify beneficiaries of the 
existence of that trust and provide them annual statements of 
his administration of it, misrepresented to the client the 
account balance of a portion of that trust, and failed to 
respond to inquiries from the Board concerning his conduct and 
refused 
to 
produce 
his 
records 
of 
the 
matters 
under 
investigation. In response, Mr. Strasburg denied many of those 
allegations, insisting that his business activities did not 
constitute the practice of law. Thereafter, Mr. Strasburg 
refused to appear for a deposition scheduled by the Board and 
attended the rescheduled deposition only to assert his Fifth 
Amendment right in refusing to respond to each of the Board’s 
initial two questions, one of which asked where he had attended 
law school. He stated that he would assert that right in 
response to any subsequent question that might be asked, 
whereupon he left the deposition. In response to his failure to 
attend the deposition, the referee, Attorney Norman Anderson, 
                                                                  
(2) A suspended or disbarred attorney may not engage in the 
practice of law or in any law work activity customarily done by 
law students, law clerks or other paralegal personnel, except 
that he or she may engage in law related work for a commercial 
employer not itself engaged in the practice of law.  
No.  96-0305-D 
 
5 
struck Mr. Strasburg’s responsive pleading and granted the 
Board’s motion for default judgment.  
¶5 
When it commenced this proceeding, the Board filed a 
motion asking that Mr. Strasburg be held in contempt of the 
court’s 1990 suspension order for continuing to practice law, in 
violation of SCR 22.26(2), and that a remedial sanction be 
imposed for that contempt. We directed the referee to hold a 
hearing on the contempt motion at the same time as the hearing 
on 
the 
Board’s 
disciplinary 
complaint 
and 
to 
file 
a 
recommendation for a remedial sanction for the contempt, if any 
were found. After granting the Board’s default judgment and 
contempt motions and holding a hearing on the appropriate 
contempt sanction to be imposed, the referee recommended a 
remedial contempt sanction of a $500 per day forfeiture for each 
day Mr. Strasburg continues to violate SCR 22.26(2) by engaging 
in the activities described in the amended complaint. The 
factual basis of the referee’s contempt finding is as follows.  
¶6 
Prior to the suspension of his license in 1990, Mr. 
Strasburg established ElderCare Asset Protection Plans, Inc. 
(ElderCare), a business corporation he served as president and 
treasurer that provided advice and services concerning financial 
planning and qualification for Title 19 (Medicaid) benefits. In 
the course of that business, Mr. Strasburg prepared a variety of 
legal documents, including trusts, powers of attorney, living 
wills, declarations to physicians, and health care powers of 
attorney, 
all 
designed 
to 
transfer 
and 
preserve 
through 
divestiture the assets of persons, usually elderly, infirm or 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
6 
both, and render them eligible for medical assistance. Mr. 
Strasburg also prepared deeds and provided other assistance in 
the transfer of assets and property. In addition to himself, 
ElderCare had two office personnel, who were responsible for 
answering 
telephones, 
sending 
out 
marketing 
material 
to 
prospective clients, and preparing under his direction documents 
such as trusts, durable powers of attorney, health care powers 
of attorney, living wills, and deeds. The business did not 
employ a licensed attorney to advise clients, prepare legal 
documents, or review documents prepared by Mr. Strasburg or his 
staff.  
¶7 
While disclaiming that it was a law firm, ElderCare’s 
marketing material stated that it was comprised of “Title 19 
estate planning specialists” and that it “provides a completely 
legal family financial and estate plan” and guides its clients 
“through the proper, legal steps” to protect parents’ assets. 
That material identified Mr. Strasburg as “John W. Strasburg, 
J.D., Marquette University Law School, 1972.” Advertisements for 
ElderCare stated that its counseling “will qualify parents for 
Title 19 (Medicaid), provide a unified system to administer and 
protect their assets, and eliminate probate after their death” 
and can help prevent “entire life savings and other assets from 
being wiped out if age or illness overtakes [them].” It 
encouraged people to “get sound advice and avoid costly mistakes 
or possible Medicaid disqualification before applying for Title 
19.”  
No.  96-0305-D 
 
7 
¶8 
Finding as fact by default the Board’s allegations 
that Mr. Strasburg drafted trusts and advised clients regarding 
trusts, wills, and powers of attorney, the referee stated, “To 
advise clients regarding trusts and their consequences and to 
draft such instruments and to charge fees for doing so is 
unquestionably, in the mind of this Referee, the practice of 
law,” in violation of SCR 22.26(2). Noting the potential 
applicability 
of the statute proscribing the 
unauthorized 
practice of law, Wis. Stat. § 757.30, he said, “Although the 
unauthorized practice of law also constitutes a criminal 
offense, the Supreme Court in exercising its responsibility to 
govern the practice of law should not be wholly dependent upon 
the discretion of local prosecuting attorneys to enforce its 
rules.”  
¶9 
In addition to the contempt, the referee made findings 
consistent with the Board’s allegations in respect to Mr. 
Strasburg’s conduct in six Eldercare matters. In the first of 
those, a woman and her brother met with Mr. Strasburg to discuss 
their mother’s qualification for Title 19 benefits, having read 
ElderCare’s newspaper advertisements. When the woman asked if he 
was an attorney, Mr. Strasburg said he was and gave her a 
business card identifying himself as “John W. Strasburg, J.D.” 
but did not tell her that his license to practice law had been 
suspended since 1990. He told these people he would prepare a 
trust, a durable power of attorney, a health care power of 
attorney, and a living will for their mother for a fee of $600, 
plus an $800 fee to be paid to a title company for recording 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
8 
those documents. After paying him a consultation fee of $150, 
the woman decided to look into Mr. Strasburg’s credentials and 
contacted the Board, among others. When she learned of his 
license suspension, she filed a grievance with the Board.  
¶10 In another matter, a woman and her sister met with Mr. 
Strasburg in June, 1994, to discuss the divestiture and 
preservation 
of 
their 
father’s 
assets 
and 
his 
Title 
19 
qualification. The outline of services he gave the woman stated 
that Mr. Strasburg would prepare a trust, a physician’s 
declaration and, if the documents they already had were 
inadequate, a durable power of attorney and a health care power 
of attorney. When the woman subsequently contacted several 
attorneys for a cost comparison for those services, she learned 
that they would perform the same or similar services for less 
than half the $5000 fee Mr. Strasburg was charging. The woman 
telephoned Mr. Strasburg in July to terminate his services and 
requested a refund of the unused $2500 retainer she had paid 
him, but Mr. Strasburg refused to refund any portion of it.  
¶11 In September, 1994, a woman met with Mr. Strasburg 
seeking to obtain assistance for her husband. The woman 
apparently was confused about the services his business offered, 
for she was seeking assistance such as meal service. Mr. 
Strasburg drove the woman to a bank so she could get a cashier’s 
check for $3000 for his fee. The woman later asked him to refund 
the money, but he refused.  
¶12 In the course of its investigation into these matters, 
Mr. Strasburg refused to respond to the Board’s investigators 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
9 
and to the district professional responsibility committee. 
Ultimately, 
in 
January, 
1995, 
he 
wrote 
to 
the 
Board 
acknowledging receipt of its most recent letter requesting an 
interview but refused to appear, asserting that he had submitted 
to this court a written resignation of his membership in the 
State Bar of Wisconsin. The Board then attempted to serve a 
notice of investigative meeting on Mr. Strasburg at his office, 
and two days thereafter his signature was notarized on the 
petition 
for 
voluntary 
resignation 
from 
the 
State 
Bar 
subsequently filed with the court. We held that petition in 
abeyance pending disposition of the Board’s investigation and 
any disciplinary proceeding that might ensue.  
¶13 In April, 1995, a man and his brother met with Mr. 
Strasburg to discuss the preservation of their mother’s assets. 
The man had learned of ElderCare through a radio advertisement, 
as a result of which he believed Mr. Strasburg was an attorney. 
At that meeting, Mr. Strasburg gave the man his business card 
with the notation “John W. Strasburg, J.D.” and stated that he 
had a law degree. He did not, however, tell the man then or at 
anytime thereafter that his license to practice law had been 
suspended or that he was not authorized to practice law.  
¶14 During that meeting, Mr. Strasburg stated that he 
could preserve up to half of the mother’s assets, estimated at 
$18,000, and said he would prepare a trust and a power of 
attorney for a $2800 fee. The following day, the man learned 
that Mr. Strasburg’s license to practice law had been suspended 
and decided not to retain him. The man filed a grievance with 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
10
the Board, and Mr. Strasburg did not respond to three letters 
from the Board requesting information about the matter.  
¶15 In March, 1994, a woman contacted ElderCare concerning 
the preservation of her father’s assets after seeing an 
advertisement for the business in the newspaper. All contacts 
between the woman and Mr. Strasburg were by telephone or by 
mail; 
they 
never 
met 
in 
person. 
Mr. 
Strasburg 
had 
no 
communication with the woman’s father but agreed to handle the 
divestiture of his assets and qualification for Title 19 
benefits for a fee of $3700, which was paid from the father’s 
assets in April, 1994.  
¶16 Mr. Strasburg sent the daughter a packet of documents, 
including a statutory power of attorney and a trust, to review 
with her father, have them executed, and return to him. The 
statutory power of attorney set forth that it had been signed by 
the daughter and by her father on May 18, 1994, some six weeks 
after the father had been declared medically incapable of 
understanding or exercising his rights and responsibilities for 
health care as a result of organic brain syndrome and dementia.  
¶17 The power of attorney had a space for the signature of 
a witness to the daughter’s signature and a space for the 
notarization of her father’s signature, but the document was 
neither witnessed nor notarized at the time they signed it. When 
he received the unwitnessed and non-notarized power of attorney, 
Mr. Strasburg and one of his employees signed as witnesses to 
the daughter’s signature, and the employee notarized the 
father’s signature, notwithstanding that neither the daughter 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
11
nor the father signed the document in their presence and that 
the employee had never met or even spoken with the father.  
¶18 Mr. Strasburg did not respond to the Board’s letter 
requesting information in the course of its investigation into 
this matter, and he refused delivery of a certified letter from 
the Board. He also failed to appear as directed at an 
investigative meeting and produce his file and billing records.  
¶19 On the basis of those facts in these matters, the 
referee 
concluded 
that 
Mr. 
Strasburg 
engaged 
in 
conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), by failing to inform potential 
clients of ElderCare who asked if he was an attorney that his 
license to practice law was suspended and by misrepresenting on 
a statutory power of attorney that he had witnessed the 
grantee’s signature in her presence and by directing or 
knowingly allowing his employee to represent falsely that she 
had witnessed the grantor’s signature and had notarized it in 
their presence. He also engaged in the practice of law and in 
law work activity customarily done by law students, law clerks 
and other paralegal personnel, in violation of SCR 22.26(2) and 
20:5.5(a),2 by his work with ElderCare following the suspension 
of his license, including his drafting powers of attorney, 
                     
2 SCR 20:5.5 provides, in pertinent part: Unauthorized 
practice of law  
A lawyer shall not:  
(a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates 
the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction;  
No.  96-0305-D 
 
12
wills, and trusts. His charging an unreasonable legal fee for 
work to be performed in protecting the assets of three persons 
violated SCR 20:1.5(a).3 By leading a business client to believe 
he was an attorney authorized to practice law, Mr. Strasburg 
made a false or misleading communication about himself and his 
services, in violation of SCR 20:7.1(a).4 Finally, his failure to 
                     
3 SCR 20:1.5 provides, in pertinent part: Fees  
(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include 
the following:  
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform 
the legal services properly;  
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the 
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other 
employment by the lawyer;  
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
legal services;  
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;  
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;  
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship 
with the client;  
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer 
or lawyers performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.  
4 SCR 20:7.1 provides, in pertinent part: Communications 
concerning a lawyer’s services  
(a) A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading 
communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A 
communication is false or misleading if it:  
No.  96-0305-D 
 
13
cooperate with the Board’s investigation violated SCR 22.07(2) 
and (3)5 and 21.03(4).6  
                                                                  
(1) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, 
or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a 
whole not materially misleading;  
(2) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about 
results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the 
lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law;  
(3) compares the lawyer’s services with other lawyers’ 
services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated; 
or  
(4) 
contains 
any 
paid 
testimonial 
about, 
or 
paid 
endorsement of, the lawyer without identifying the fact that 
payment has been made or, if the testimonial or endorsement is 
not made by an actual client, without identifying that fact.  
5 SCR 22.07 provides, in pertinent part: Investigation.  
 . . .  
(2) 
During 
the 
course 
of 
an 
investigation, 
the 
administrator or a committee may notify the respondent of the 
subject being investigated. The respondent shall fully and 
fairly disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct or medical incapacity within 20 days of being 
served by ordinary mail a request for response to a grievance. 
The administrator in his or her discretion may allow additional 
time 
to 
respond. 
Failure 
to 
provide 
information 
or 
misrepresentation 
in 
a 
disclosure 
is 
misconduct. 
The 
administrator or committee may make a further investigation 
before making a recommendation to the board.  
(3) 
The 
administrator 
or 
committee 
may 
compel 
the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents and present 
any information deemed relevant to the investigation. Failure of 
the respondent to answer questions, furnish documents or present 
relevant information is misconduct. The administrator or a 
committee may compel any other person to produce pertinent 
books, papers and documents under SCR 22.22.  
6 SCR 21.03 provides, in pertinent part: General principles.  
No.  96-0305-D 
 
14
¶20 The sixth matter addressed in this proceeding concerns 
Mr. Strasburg’s dealings with a man who lived in a residential 
facility for the elderly and who had no close relatives. That 
man had consulted Mr. Strasburg in May, 1994 concerning an 
annuity he owned that was due to be renewed. Pursuant to that 
consultation, Mr. Strasburg drafted a custodial trust for the 
benefit 
of 
eight 
charitable 
organizations 
and 
the 
legal 
documents for that trust, including a transfer under the 
Wisconsin Uniform Custodial Trust Act and a declaration of 
trust, each of which designated himself as custodial trustee for 
the benefit of the charities. He used a legal form to prepare a 
statutory power of attorney appointing himself the man’s agent 
authorized to handle his property, and he prepared a health care 
power of attorney and a declaration to physicians on forms 
furnished by the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social 
Services. Those documents designated Mr. Strasburg as the man’s 
health care agent and one of Mr. Strasburg’s employees as 
alternate.  
¶21 The proceeds of the annuity, approximately $215,500, 
were used to fund the trust, and shortly thereafter Mr. 
Strasburg 
disbursed 
$50,000 
of 
that 
amount 
to 
himself, 
purportedly for the man’s medical or nursing home expenses. Mr. 
                                                                  
 . . .  
(4) Every attorney shall cooperate with the board and the 
administrator in the investigation, prosecution and disposition 
of grievances and complaints filed with or by the board or 
administrator.  
No.  96-0305-D 
 
15
Strasburg then deposited that $50,000 into a checking account he 
had opened in the name of the trust and immediately issued a 
check from that account to himself in the amount of $49,650, 
which he deposited into a checking account he opened that day in 
his own name. On the same day, when the only funds in his own 
account were funds belonging to the trust, Mr. Strasburg issued 
a check for $35,000 payable to ElderCare and deposited it into 
another checking account, not identified as a trust account. He 
then wrote seven checks totaling $14,000 on that account and 
deposited them into an account at an investment broker where he 
had established a family trust in which he was grantor, trustee, 
and sole beneficiary. Those checks, each in the amount of $2000, 
were not in numerical sequence and bore different dates to make 
it look as if they had been issued over a period of six months. 
In fact, all of them were deposited with the broker on the same 
day. Prior to depositing the funds from his client’s trust 
account, the funds in the account on which he wrote those checks 
were insufficient to pay all of the checks.  
¶22 Mr. Strasburg also used almost $14,000 of this 
client’s trust funds to pay for newspaper advertising for his 
business. In addition he took $14,000 of the man’s funds from 
the family trust account and deposited it into a joint checking 
account he had with his wife.  
¶23 In January, 1995, Mr. Strasburg prepared a schedule of 
assets over which he exercised authority and control as 
custodial trustee of the client’s trust, attaching to it the 
transfer document and the declaration of trust he had prepared 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
16
for the client. That schedule misrepresented the amount of funds 
in one of the accounts as $49,650, when in fact only $350 
remained in it after Mr. Strasburg used the balance for various 
matters unrelated to the trust. Thereafter, in August, 1995, Mr. 
Strasburg transferred $51,307 from his own money market account, 
that had been funded with this client’s funds, to a brokerage 
account in the name of the trust.  
¶24 Although obligated by law to do so, Mr. Strasburg did 
not give seven of the eight charitable beneficiaries written 
notice of the client’s trust describing the trust property and 
did not notify the eighth charity that he had accepted trust 
property on its behalf until over a year after he had taken 
control of the trust assets. He failed to provide any of the 
beneficiaries annual written statements required by statute 
concerning his administration of the custodial trust properties, 
and none of them received any funds from the trust.  
¶25 When the client asked him for a copy of all documents, 
including trust and investment statements and the statement of 
his fees to be charged, Mr. Strasburg sent him a copy of the 
documents he had drafted to create the trust but, other than the 
schedule of assets attached to those documents, did not provide 
any investment statements or information concerning the location 
of all the trust assets. He also misrepresented to the client 
the balance of one of the accounts, which had been overstated on 
the schedule of assets, and he did not provide the client any 
statement concerning his past, current or future fees.  
No.  96-0305-D 
 
17
¶26 Mr. Strasburg did not respond to numerous inquiries 
from the Board concerning his dealings with this client and the 
trust, and he did not appear or produce his file in the matter. 
He asserted to the Board that he was not required to attend an 
investigative meeting because he was not engaged in the practice 
of law and his client records were confidential.  
¶27 The referee concluded that Mr. Strasburg engaged in 
the practice of law and law work activity customarily done by 
law students, law clerks or other paralegal personnel in this 
matter by drafting custodial trust documents, a statutory power 
of attorney and a health care power of attorney, and a 
declaration to physicians, in violation of SCR 22.26(2) and 
20:5.5(a). He also charged the client an unreasonable legal fee 
in respect to the work to be performed, in violation of SCR 
20:1.5(a), and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), by 
using trust assets for matters unrelated to the trust, by 
transferring trust assets through multiple accounts, most of 
which were not designated trust accounts, by failing to notify 
seven of eight beneficiaries of the existence of the trust and 
provide 
any 
of 
the 
beneficiaries 
with 
annual 
statements 
regarding his administration of it, and by misrepresenting to 
the client the balance of one of the accounts. His failure to 
cooperate with the Board’s investigation into this matter 
violated SCR 22.07(2) and (3) and 21.03(4).  
¶28 As discipline for his conduct in all of these matters, 
the referee recommended that Mr. Strasburg’s license to practice 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
18
law in Wisconsin be revoked and that he be required to make 
restitution of the $2500 advance fee paid by a woman and her 
sister for services to be performed for their father, which Mr. 
Strasburg refused to refund when they terminated his services. 
The referee specified that the restitution should be paid to the 
father’s estate, as the daughters had used the father’s funds to 
pay Mr. Strasburg’s fee. In addition, the referee recommended 
that Mr. Strasburg be required to pay the costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding. In the matter of the contempt, the 
referee recommended imposition of a remedial sanction of a $500 
forfeiture for each day Mr. Strasburg continues to engage in the 
activities specified in this proceeding as constituting the 
practice of law in violation of SCR 22.26(2).  
¶29 In this appeal, Mr. Strasburg first contended that the 
recommended remedial contempt sanction is improper because it is 
based on the 1990 license suspension order, which he asserted 
will be superseded by the order issued in this proceeding -– one 
he has not yet been found in contempt of. Further, he argued, 
the sanction would be imposed for past conduct -- his business 
activities since the 1990 license suspension -- and for which he 
is unable to purge the contempt.  
¶30 We find no merit to Mr. Strasburg’s contentions. The 
referee found him in contempt of the court’s order issued in the 
license suspension proceeding requiring him to comply with SCR 
22.26, including the prohibition of engaging in the practice of 
law or in any law work activity customarily done by law 
students, law clerks or other paralegal personnel. The order in 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
19
the instant proceeding will continue that prohibition, whether 
Mr. Strasburg’s license were to remain suspended or be revoked. 
Thus, his obligation to comply with SCR 22.26(2) is a continuing 
one, not one that arose upon issuance of the license suspension 
order and will cease and recommence when the order issues in 
this proceeding.  
¶31 Also, 
the 
contempt 
sanction 
we 
impose 
in 
this 
proceeding, while based on the referee’s determination that Mr. 
Strasburg was in contempt of the court’s 1990 order, is a 
prospective forfeiture, applicable in the event Mr. Strasburg 
continues to engage in the activities for which he has been held 
in contempt. Contrary to his assertions, Mr. Strasburg has the 
ability to purge that contempt merely by ceasing to engage in 
those activities.  
¶32 Likewise without merit is Mr. Strasburg’s assertion 
that the appropriate response in the event he continues the 
business activities found to have constituted contempt is 
referral to the district attorney for possible prosecution under 
the unauthorized practice of law statute, Wis. Stat. § 757.30. 
The activities proscribed by SCR 22.26(2) are not limited to 
those specified in the statute. Moreover, it is the contempt of 
this court, not a criminal violation, for which we impose a 
remedial sanction.  
¶33 Mr. Strasburg next argued that he should not be 
required to make the restitution recommended by the referee for 
the following reasons: the money used to pay his fee came not 
from the persons to whom restitution would be made but to their 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
20
father; restitution is not properly an instrument of punishment 
for his conduct but is a remedy for a person who has been 
harmed; there was no showing that the father was harmed by his 
conduct. None of those assertions has merit. They ignore not 
only the fact that the recommended restitution is to be paid to 
the father’s estate but also that Mr. Strasburg performed no 
services to warrant his retention of the $2500 payment he 
received for those services.  
¶34 Finally, Mr. Strasburg argued that he should not be 
required to pay all of the costs of this proceeding for the 
reason that he never opposed the license revocation sought by 
the Board. He contended that the Board needlessly pursued the 
revocation and, consequently, should not be entitled to recover 
its costs incurred in doing so. That argument fails to take into 
consideration that it was Mr. Strasburg’s conduct that made this 
disciplinary proceeding necessary and that his refusal to obey 
the 
license 
suspension 
order 
by 
engaging 
in 
activities 
prohibited by SCR 22.26(2) required the Board to establish the 
facts and circumstances that would warrant the revocation of his 
license. 
Further, 
before 
this 
proceeding 
commenced, 
Mr. 
Strasburg could have petitioned for the consensual revocation of 
his license, which would have required that he acknowledge his 
inability to defend against the misconduct alleged; during the 
proceeding he could have entered a no contest plea or, at a 
minimum, stipulated to the allegations of misconduct. Mr. 
Strasburg chose none of those options but instead refused to 
submit to the discovery sought by the Board and, other than by 
No.  96-0305-D 
 
21
his initial denials of misconduct, refused to participate 
meaningfully in the proceeding. Nonetheless, the Board was 
required to establish, albeit by default, an appropriate basis 
for the revocation of Mr. Strasburg’s license to practice law.  
¶35 Having found no merit to any of the arguments raised 
in the appeal, we adopt the referee’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and determine that the revocation of Mr. 
Strasburg’s license to practice law in Wisconsin is the 
appropriate discipline to impose for his misconduct established 
in this proceeding. We also adopt the referee’s holding in 
respect to Mr. Strasburg’s contempt of our 1990 license 
suspension order and impose the remedial sanction recommended. 
In addition, we require that Mr. Strasburg make the restitution 
recommended by the referee and pay the full costs of this 
proceeding.  
¶36 Because the remedial contempt sanction we impose is 
prospective, we rely on the Board to monitor Mr. Strasburg’s 
continued activities in connection with his business. In this 
appeal, the Board asserted that in the course of ascertaining 
his compliance with a license revocation order, it will be in a 
position to determine whether Mr. Strasburg has continued to 
engage in law work and, if he has, to bring a motion asking the 
court to enforce the contempt holding by imposition of the 
remedial sanction. The court then will determine whether Mr. 
Strasburg’s contempt continues after requiring him to show cause 
why the sanction should not be imposed.  
No.  96-0305-D 
 
22
¶37 IT IS ORDERED that the license of John W. Strasburg to 
practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective the date of this 
order.  
¶38 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as remedial sanction for 
his contempt of this court’s March 15, 1990 order, John W. 
Strasburg pay a forfeiture of $500 per day for every day his 
contempt of court continues following service of this order upon 
him.  
¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, John W. Strasburg make the restitution as 
specified in the report of the referee in this proceeding.  
¶40 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, John W. Strasburg pay to the Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility the costs of this proceeding.  
¶41 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the provision of the March 
15, 1990 order requiring John W. Strasburg to comply with SCR 
22.26 continues in full force and effect.  
 
 
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