Case Title: Vineyard v. Jenkins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Vineyard v. Jenkins1999 WY 101983 P.2d 1234Case Number: 98-361Decided: 07/13/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
SANDRA LYNN VINEYARD, 
f/k/a SANDRA LYNN JENKINS, Appellant (Defendant/Respondent), v.TERRY 
FRANCIS JENKINS, Appellee (Plaintiff/Petitioner).

Gregg L. 
Goddard, Goddard, Perry & Vogel, Buffalo, WY., representing 
appellant.Kathryn J. Edelman, Law Office of Kathryn J. Edelman, 
Gillette, WY., representing appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice

[¶1] The issue 
on appeal is whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113 (Michie 1997), as amended, 
rejects our previous holdings that the district court in which a custody or 
divorce proceeding was originally filed has continuing and exclusive 
jurisdiction over custody modification proceedings. The district court for the 
Sixth Judicial District, Campbell County, Wyoming, denied Appellant Vineyard's 
motion to dismiss on this basis, holding that the 1997 amendments conferred on 
that court subject matter jurisdiction over Appellee Jenkins' petition for 
modification of child custody, even though the original Decree of Divorce was 
entered in another judicial district. We agree that the 1997 amendment to 
subsection (a) conferred jurisdiction on district courts other than the original 
court, but that jurisdiction is circumscribed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113 (j) 
and (k). Because the record does not show that Appellee filed a certified copy 
of the divorce decree, as required by subsection (j), we must 
reverse.

ISSUE

[¶2] Appellant 
presents a single issue:

Can a District Court 
modify child custody provisions in a divorce decree issued by a District Court 
in another county?

FACTS

[¶3] The 
district court in Johnson County, Wyoming, issued the parties' decree of divorce 
in 1992. The decree awarded primary custody of the three children to Appellant 
(Mother). After the divorce decree, Appellee (Father) moved to Campbell County, 
and Mother moved to Kansas. In 1995, Father filed a petition to modify custody 
with the Johnson County district court but moved to change the venue to Campbell 
County, Wyoming. The district court denied Father's motion for change of venue 
and eventually denied Father's request to modify custody.

[¶4] In 1998, 
Father again petitioned for modification but this time filed his petition with 
the Campbell County district court. Mother then moved to dismiss Father's latest 
petition on the ground that the Johnson County district court retained exclusive 
jurisdiction over the matter. In light of the 1997 amendments to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-113, the Campbell County district court found it had subject matter 
jurisdiction but determined that the case should be transferred back to the 
Johnson County district court, where it now awaits trial. We granted Mother's 
petition for a writ of review to appeal the Campbell County district court's 
denial of her motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶5] The 
interpretation of statutes is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. French 
v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1998). "The fundamental rule we 
invoke in the interpretation of a statute is that we must ascertain, if 
possible, what the legislature intended by the language it used." McCreary v. 
Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 979 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶6] Our review 
of statutory interpretation begins with an inquiry into the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed by the legislature according to the manner in 
which those words are arranged. Id.; Sheridan Commercial Park, Inc. v. Briggs, 
848 P.2d 811, 815 (Wyo. 1993). If more than one reasonable interpretation 
exists, we resort to general principles of statutory construction. Moncrief v. 
Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 856 P.2d 440, 444 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Parker 
Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Wyo. 
1993)). When the legislature has spoken in unambiguous terms, however, "we are 
bound to the results so expressed." State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Div. v. Bergeron, 948 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶7] Platte 
Development Co. v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972, 974 
(Wyo. 1998). We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, 
clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia. Matter of Lyles, 957 P.2d 843, 846 (Wyo. 1998).

DISCUSSION

[¶8] Prior to 
1997, the relevant portion of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113 (a) read as 
follows:

20-2-113. Disposition and 
maintenance of children in decree; modification; access to records; payment to 
court clerk; continuing jurisdiction to modify decree; 
notice.

(a) In granting a divorce 
. . ., the court may make such disposition of the children as appears most 
expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the children. . . . The court 
shall order custody in well defined terms to promote understanding and 
compliance by the parties. Either parent may petition to enforce or revise the 
decree. The court which entered the decree has continuing subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction to enforce or revise the decree concerning the care, 
custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the 
parents and the benefit of the children requires. . . . A court having 
jurisdiction under this subsection or under subsection (j) of this section may, 
upon appropriate motion of either parent, require a parent to appear before the 
court and show just cause why the parent should not be held in contempt, upon a 
showing that the parent has willfully violated the decree as to the care, 
custody, visitation and maintenance of the children.

[¶9] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-113 (a) (Michie 1996 Cum. Supp.) (emphasis added). Mother correctly 
argues that our previous holdings interpreting this language conferred exclusive 
jurisdiction for matters modifying the original decree upon the district court 
which entered the original decree. In Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 
1340 (Wyo. 1988), we recognized the Along standing general rule" that 
jurisdiction acquired by a court in a divorce suit over the custody and 
maintenance of the children excludes other local courts" from maintaining 
jurisdiction over the matter. We held that the language in § 20-2-113 (a) that 
`the court may revise the decree' to be consistent with the majority rule of 
continuing exclusive jurisdiction. " Id. at 1341 (emphasis added); see also 
Glandt v. Taylor, 920 P.2d 647, 649 (Wyo. 1996) (Natrona County district court 
had no authority to transfer the case to Platte County); Smith v. Smith, 863 P.2d 624, 625 (Wyo. 1993) (district court retains continuing jurisdiction); and 
Barron v. Barron, 834 P.2d 685, 688 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶10] In 1997, 
however, the legislature amended this same provision to add the following 
highlighted language:

(a) . . . The court which 
entered the decree or any other district court in the state has continuing 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce or revise the decree 
concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children as the 
circumstances of parents and the benefit of the children 
requires.

[¶11] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-113(a) (Michie 1997). When an amendment is enacted to an existing 
statute, it is presumed that some change in the existing state of the law was 
intended. Brown v. State, 590 P.2d 1312, 1314-15 (Wyo. 1979) (and case cited 
therein). We also presume that the amendment was enacted with full knowledge of 
existing case law and statutes relating to the matter. Id. Therefore, we must 
consider the law as it existed prior to the amendment, the effect and purpose of 
the language changing it, and endeavor to reconcile both, if possible. 
Id.

[¶12] In the 
language amending this provision, the legislature unquestionably conferred 
subject matter jurisdiction to revise a child custody order upon "any other 
district court in the state." However, we must look to the prior law to 
determine the extent of the change intended by the legislature. Prior to the 
1997 amendments, all other district courts maintained jurisdiction to enforce a 
decree if certain conditions were met. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113 (j) and 
(k) (Michie 1996 Cum. Supp.). These provisions were not amended by the 
legislature and remain in effect. Therefore, subsection (a) must be read in pari 
materia with subsections (j) and (k).

[¶13] Subsection 
(j) provides:

(j) A certified copy of a 
decree entered by a Wyoming court pursuant to subsection (a) of this section 
providing for the care, custody, visitation or maintenance of children may be 
filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of any county in this 
state in which either parent resides if neither parent resides in the county of 
original jurisdiction. The district court for the county in which the decree is 
filed has jurisdiction to enforce the decree, provided:

(i) Upon request of the 
district court for the county in which a certified copy of the decree has been 
filed, the court which originally entered the decree shall forward certified 
copies of the transcript of the court record and pleadings, orders, decrees, 
records of hearings, social studies and other pertinent documents relating to 
the original proceeding; and

(ii) The district court 
for the county in which a certified copy of the decree has been filed shall give 
due consideration to the transcript of the record and all other documents 
submitted to it in accordance with paragraph (i) of this 
subsection.

[¶14] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-113(j) (Michie 1997).

[¶15] Subsection 
(k) states: 

(k) A court which has 
jurisdiction to enforce a decree under subsection (j) of this section may 
decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it finds it is an inconvenient forum 
under the circumstances of the case and that the court which entered the 
original decree is a more appropriate forum.

[¶16] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-113(k) (Michie 1997). The plain language of subsection (j) clearly 
expresses the legislature's recognition that a district court, other than the 
court issuing the original decree, is an appropriate forum for consideration of 
that decree only when both parties are no longer in the original jurisdiction. 
Provisions (i) and (ii) in this subsection also acknowledge that no action 
should be taken on the enforcement of the decree without the court's full 
knowledge of the history of the matter as found in previous documents. Surely, 
if this knowledge is necessary to enforce a decree, it is a sine qua non for a 
determination to modify that decree as well.

"We know well the rule 
that in construing statutes an absurd result should be avoided. There is a 
presumption that the legislature intends to adopt legislation that is reasonable 
and logical. " Gerstell v. State ex rel. Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 769 P.2d 389, 394 (Wyo. 1989) (and cases cited therein). Were we to hold that the 
legislature intended to impose the conditions of subsection (j) on enforcement 
matters, but not on modification matters, we would be abandoning logic and 
common sense.

[¶17] Similarly, 
subsection (k) allows the district court to decline its jurisdiction to enforce 
a decree if it finds it is an inconvenient forum, and the original court is a 
more appropriate arena. To find that the district court may decline an 
enforcement case, but not a petition to modify, is absurd. Therefore, we hold 
that the expanded jurisdiction afforded by subsection (a) to the district courts 
in Wyoming remains tempered by the requirements of subsection (j) and the 
discretion of the district court under subsection (k).

[¶18] As a 
result, if a party wishes to file a petition for modification of custody or 
maintenance in a district outside that issuing the original decree, the party 
must file a certified copy of the divorce decree and show that both parties no 
longer reside in the county of original jurisdiction. In addition, one parent 
must reside in the county in which the decree is filed. Even if those conditions 
are met, the district court has broad discretion to decline to hear the matter 
and to return it to the original forum, depending on the circumstances of the 
case.

[¶19] In this 
case, Father filed his petition without a certified copy of the original decree. 
Without the filing of a certified copy of the decree, there is no jurisdiction 
under subsection (j). We, therefore, must reverse the district court's 
determination that jurisdiction existed under the facts of this 
case.

CONCLUSION

[¶20] Once the 
requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113 (j) have been satisfied, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-113 (a) confers subject matter jurisdiction on the district court to 
hear a petition to modify a divorce decree which was issued by another district 
court. However, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113 (k), the district court 
may decline to accept the matter and return it to the original court. Because 
the requirements of subsection (j) were not met in this case, we reverse and 
remand for proceedings in accord with this decision.