Case Title: Whipple v. Fehsenfeld

Citation: 173 Kan. 427, 249 P.2d 638

Docket Number: 38,270

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1952-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
173 Kan. 427 (1952)
249 P.2d 638
IVAN WHIPPLE, ARTHUR C. BROWN, FRANK A. TAYLOR, ANDREW B. CLINE, MALLOY S. HAGEMANN, R.E. AYRAULT, WM. E. MILLER, JOSEPH H. CAUDRON, EVERETT M. WATT, A.D. WING, RAY RUSSELL, JAMES C. MANN, for and in behalf of themselves and in behalf of others similarly situated, Appellees and Cross-Appellants,
v.
DEL A. FEHSENFELD, JOHN WILKES, JOHN DICKERSON, IRWIN FERREIRA, PAUL DICKERSON, T.W. BEACHBOARD, GENE MEEKS, JOHN PITTMAN, EARL CHAMBERS, V.A. VANCE, MRS. J.L. JENKINS, ELI EDMINSTON, MRS. JOHN DICKERSON, ZELLA MOBERLY, ELMER AMMERMAN and others similarly situated, THE INDUSTRIAL STATE BANK, a Corporation, Appellants and Cross-Appellees.
No. 38,270

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 8, 1952.
Preston P. Reynolds, of Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellants and cross-appellees.
Buford E. Braly, of Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellees and cross-appellants.
Thomas C. Forbes and Harold G. Forbes, both of Eureka, and Harold C. Mann and G. Dennis Sullivan, both of Kansas City, Missouri, for "Baptist Liberties, Inc.", as amici curiae.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.:
This is an injunction proceeding arising from differences existing between discordant factions in a Baptist church. The plaintiffs were granted a permanent injunction and the defendants appeal.
The action was commenced by the persons named as plaintiffs in the title of this case as members of the Argentine Baptist Church, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, against Del A. Fehsenfeld, the then pastor of the church, and the other individuals named in such title as members thereof. The defendant, The Industrial State Bank, a corporation, was also made a defendant in the action but only for the reason it was the custodian of the church funds.
Lengthy pleadings filed by the parties are not in controversy and for that reason require no immediate attention except to say they join issue on all questions relating to the relief prayed for in the petition and are sufficiently inclusive, so far as their factual averments are concerned, to warrant and sustain the judgment and decision of the trial court, presently to be mentioned, granting the plaintiffs injunctive relief.
Prior to trial on the merits before the judge of the district court, obviously for the purpose of facilitating progress of the trial, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby it was agreed that certain facts could be and were to be admitted as evidence in the case without necessity of further proof. For purposes of appellate review many of these admissions are of little moment and can be disregarded. *429 However, two of them are of particular importance and should be noted. One of such admissions provides:
The other reads:
For reasons important only because one of them is referred to in findings of fact made by the trial court, to which we shall refer later in this opinion, it should be stated at this point that in connection with the foregoing admissions and as a part of the same stipulation the parties set forth denials of certain facts which are conceded to be controversial and which would have to be established by evidence. It should also be added that Denial No. 7, mentioned in such findings, is to the effect that all allegations beginning with line 21 of paragraph 7 on page 3 of the amended petition are denied.
Following an extended trial, at which many witnesses testified at great length, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and rendered judgment in conformity therewith. Omitting preliminary statements, of no consequence to this opinion, the findings and conclusions to which we have referred read:
"(A) FINDINGS OF FACT.
"(B) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Hereafter, although contrary to our usual practice, in the discussion of questions essential to a proper disposition of issues raised on appellate review, we shall refer to the parties as plaintiffs and defendants.
It would add nothing to our reports and of a certainty it will neither reflect credit upon nor do favor to the respective individuals of the contending discordant factions here involved to detail the voluminous evidence disclosing the sad and regrettable state of affairs *432 existing in the Argentine Baptist Church at the time of the filing of the petition. It suffices to say we have carefully reviewed the record and, while it must be conceded the testimony is conflicting in many particulars, find substantial competent evidence to support the factual findings made by the trial court. The result, since this court in a long unbroken line of decisions (See Shotzman v. Ward, 172 Kan. 272, 279, 239 P.2d 935; and cases there cited; Thom v. Thom, 171 Kan. 651, 653, 237 P.2d 250; Goodell v. Olin, 170 Kan. 393, 399, 227 P.2d 126; and numerous other decisions of like import to be found in West's Kansas Digest, Appeal and Error, §§ 1010[1], 1011[1]; Hatcher's Kansas Digest, Appeal and Error, §§ 507, 508) has committed itself to the rule that findings of fact supported by substantial competent evidence are conclusive and will not be disturbed on appellate review even though the record discloses some evidence which might have warranted the trial court in making findings to the contrary, is that the findings of the trial court in the instant case must be accepted as made and cannot be disturbed.
With facts established, as heretofore indicated, we have little difficulty in concluding the trial court did not err in its conclusions of law. Indeed, in view of the second admission to which reference was made early in this opinion it would be difficult to reach a contrary conclusion. But we need not base our decision entirely upon such premise. In the oral presentation of his cause on appellate review counsel for defendants frankly, and we may add with commendable candor, admitted that in order to sustain his clients' position and hold the judgment rendered by the trial court is erroneous this court will be required to overrule its decision, and repudiate the rule announced, in Hughes v. Grossman, 166 Kan. 325, 201 P.2d 670, where, among other things, we held:
In view of defendants' admission and because, from the standpoint of facts and principles involved the case just mentioned is on all fours with the one now under consideration, we have reviewed our decision in Hughes v. Grossman, supra, and have concluded the doctrine therein announced is sound in principle and should be adhered to. Therefore, based upon what is said and held in that decision, we are impelled to hold the trial court's judgment, which *433 is conceded to have been rendered in accord with its conclusions of fact and law, must be upheld.
In conclusion it should be said we have rejected, not overlooked, contentions advanced by plaintiffs in support of their cross-appeal to the effect the trial court erred in finding and adjudging that defendant, Del A. Fehsenfeld, was entitled to his salary as pastor of the church up to June 4, 1950, and that defendant, John Wilkes, was entitled to his salary as janitor of the church in the amount of $99. The record presented does not make it affirmatively appear that the judgment with respect to such matters is erroneous or should be reversed. Hence, under our decisions (State, ex rel., v. Rural High School District No. 3, 169 Kan. 671, 220 P.2d 164; Jones v. Crowell, 167 Kan. 415, 419, 207 P.2d 435, and cases there cited) we have no other alternative.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPENDIX "A"
APPENDIX "B"
APPENDIX "C"