Case Title: Carroll v. Select Board of Norwell

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13410

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-01-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13410 
 
BRIAN CARROLL & another1  vs.  SELECT BOARD OF NORWELL & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 11, 2023. - January 5, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Public Land.  Municipal Corporations, Acquisition of real 
estate, Use of municipal property.  Housing.  Practice, 
Civil, Summary judgment, Continuance, Discovery. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on 
December 22, 2021. 
 
 
The case was heard by Kevin T. Smith, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Brian Carroll, pro se. 
Robert W. Galvin (Anthony J. Riley also present) for the 
defendants. 
Tim Wall, pro se, was present but did not argue. 
Joseph N. Schneiderman, for Massachusetts Association of 
Realtors, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
1 Tim Wall. 
 
2 Three members of the select board of Norwell. 
2 
 
GEORGES, J.  Under G. L. c. 40, § 15A, if town-owned land 
is "held . . . for a specific purpose," that land cannot be 
diverted to another, inconsistent use until it has been 
determined by the "board or officer having charge of [the] land" 
that the land is no longer needed for that purpose.  In this 
case, several residents of the town of Norwell (town) brought a 
complaint in the Land Court to compel the town's select board 
(board) to transfer municipal land to the town's conservation 
commission.  A Land Court judge granted the board's motion for 
summary judgment, concluding that the municipal land had been 
designated for a specific purpose -- the development of 
affordable housing -- and therefore, pursuant to G. L. c. 40, 
§ 15A, the parcels could not be transferred without a 
determination by the board that the land was no longer needed 
for this purpose. 
The issue on appeal is whether the totality of the 
circumstances test articulated in Smith v. Westfield, 478 Mass. 
49, 63-64 (2017), applies to the determination whether land is 
"held by a city or town . . . for a specific purpose" under 
G. L. c. 40, § 15A.  We answer that question affirmatively and 
conclude that town-owned land is held for a specific municipal 
purpose under G. L. c. 40, § 15A, where the totality of the 
circumstances indicates a clear and unequivocal intent by the 
town to hold the land for such purpose. 
3 
 
Applying the totality of the circumstances test to the 
summary judgment record presented here, we conclude that there 
is no material dispute of fact regarding the town's intent to 
dedicate the municipal land at issue for the purpose of 
affordable housing.  Accordingly, we further conclude that the 
allowance of summary judgment for the board was correct.3 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the material, 
undisputed facts from the record.  See Arias-Villano v. Chang & 
Sons Enters., Inc., 481 Mass. 625, 626 (2019).  We reserve 
further recitation of the facts for our discussion infra. 
The subject of this appeal is a two-parcel property on 
Wildcat Lane in, and owned by, the town (Wildcat land).  The 
town acquired the land in 1989 through tax foreclosures and 
thereafter foreclosed all rights of redemption for each parcel.  
The subject parcels total approximately 6.3 acres. 
On May 11, 2004, town meeting unanimously voted to 
authorize the board to make the Wildcat land "available . . . 
for affordable housing."  Subsequently, around 2005, the town's 
master plan committee discussed the idea of granting a private 
developer permission to construct a roadway over a portion of 
the Wildcat land in exchange for the developer constructing 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Realtors in support of affirming 
the Land Court's decision. 
4 
 
affordable housing units on that land.  However, the board was 
not interested in such an arrangement. 
In 2007, to support the development of affordable housing 
in the town, residents voted at town meeting to adopt an 
affordable housing trust bylaw, which authorized the creation of 
a community housing trust (trust).4  The trust then hired 
consultants in 2013 and 2019 to delineate the wetlands located 
on the Wildcat land and to perform a "site assessment" on it for 
the purpose of advising the town on what type of affordable 
housing would be appropriate for the land. 
In 2009, a private developer who owned vacant land abutting 
the Wildcat land obtained a permit to construct a residential 
subdivision known as Wildcat Hill Open Space Residential 
Development (Wildcat Hill).  The plaintiffs, Brian Carroll and 
Tim Wall, are residents of Wildcat Hill.  That same year, the 
board granted a revocable license to the private developer to 
construct and maintain an unpaved, rustic path for pedestrians 
and bicycles across a portion of the Wildcat land close to the 
boundary line with Wildcat Hill. 
 
4 The 2007 town meeting vote that created the trust did not 
authorize it to hold or control undeveloped land.  Although the 
trust was granted expanded authority to hold property in 2012, 
the board has not transferred the wildcat land to the trust or 
any other body. 
5 
 
In September 2019, the trust published an update to the 
town's "Housing Production Plan" that identified the Wildcat 
land as being "in the planning or predevelopment phases."  The 
same document noted that the Wildcat land was "designated for 
developing affordable housing" by town meeting.  In early 2021, 
the trust met with the board to discuss the development of 
affordable housing on the Wildcat land. 
Shortly thereafter, Carroll drafted a citizens' petition 
seeking to authorize and direct the board to transfer the 
Wildcat land to the conservation commission to be reserved for, 
among other things, conservation purposes.  After amassing the 
requisite number of signatures, the petition was added to the 
2021 town meeting warrant as article 26.  Specifically, article 
26 called for a vote "to authorize and direct the Board of 
Selectmen to transfer care, custody, maintenance and control of 
[the Wildcat land] to the Conservation Commission, to be held 
for conservation, passive recreation and historic preservation 
purposes in perpetuity."  At the 2021 town meeting, article 26 
received the required two-thirds majority vote. 
In October 2021, at one of its regular meetings, the board 
discussed transferring the Wildcat land to the conservation 
commission as authorized and directed by article 26.  Several 
board members expressed their belief that, before the board 
could vote on a measure directing town counsel to draft 
6 
 
documents for the transfer of the Wildcat land, the board first 
was required to determine that the land was no longer needed for 
affordable housing purposes.  The board then held a vote on a 
motion to declare that the Wildcat land was no longer needed for 
affordable housing purposes.  The vote did not pass; thus, the 
board did not direct town counsel to draft documents to transfer 
the land to the conservation commission.  Two months later, this 
suit followed. 
b.  Procedural history.  Carroll, Wall, and eight other 
residents of the town5 filed a complaint in the Land Court 
against the board and three individual members in their 
representative capacity, seeking equitable relief in the nature 
of mandamus under G. L. c. 249, § 5.  Specifically, the 
plaintiffs requested an order from the Land Court compelling the 
board to transfer the Wildcat land to the conservation 
commission as directed by article 26.  Shortly thereafter, the 
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. 
A Land Court judge granted the board's motion for summary 
judgment, explaining that the Wildcat land had been designated 
for a specific purpose within the meaning of G. L. c. 40, § 15A, 
because it was the intent of the board to designate the land for 
 
5 Of the ten plaintiffs, only Carroll and Wall appealed from 
the Land Court judgment.  In reference to the appeal, 
"plaintiffs" refers to Carroll and Wall. 
7 
 
affordable housing, as reflected by the 2004 town meeting vote 
and the town's subsequent steps to explore the development of 
affordable housing on the land.  Accordingly, the Land Court 
judge held that the Wildcat land could not be transferred to 
another public use without the board first determining that the 
land was no longer needed for affordable housing -- a 
determination the board had not made. 
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the land was not set 
aside for a specific municipal purpose within the meaning of 
G. L. c. 40, § 15A, because any such restriction must be 
recorded through an official instrument under this court's 
decision in Selectmen of Hanson v. Lindsay, 444 Mass. 502 
(2005).  The board cross-appealed, challenging the plaintiffs' 
standing to bring a mandamus action under G. L. c. 249, § 5, and 
arguing that the outcome in this case should be controlled by 
our decision in Harris v. Wayland, 392 Mass. 237 (1984), which 
held that undeveloped land, purchased for school purposes, could 
not be sold to the town housing authority for construction of 
elderly and low-income housing absent the school committee's 
determination that the land was no longer needed for school 
purposes.6  We transferred this case sua sponte from the Appeals 
 
6 Because we conclude that summary judgment for the board 
was proper on the merits, we decline to resolve the question of 
standing.  See Trigones v. Attorney Gen., 420 Mass. 859, 860 
 
8 
 
Court to clarify the standard for assessing specific-use 
designations within the meaning of G. L. c. 40, § 15A. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "We review a 
grant of summary judgment de novo."  Regis College v. Weston, 
462 Mass. 280, 284 (2012).  "Summary judgment is appropriate 
where there is no material issue of fact in dispute and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" 
(citation omitted).  Adams v. Schneider Electric USA, 492 Mass. 
271, 280 (2023).  "Where both parties have moved for summary 
judgment, 'the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the party against whom judgment' has been entered," in this 
case, the plaintiffs (citation omitted).  Smiley First, LLC v. 
Department of Transp., 492 Mass. 103, 108 (2023). 
b.  Statutory framework.  Under Massachusetts law, there 
are several ways a municipality can hold real estate.  See 
Harris, 392 Mass. at 240.  General Laws c. 40, § 3, allows 
municipalities to hold real estate "for the public use of the 
inhabitants."  The property is placed under the charge of a 
town's select board as part of the town's general corporate 
inventory.  See G. L. c. 40, § 3 ("All real estate . . . of the 
town, not by law or by vote of the town placed in the charge of 
 
(1995) ("Assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiff has 
standing to challenge the statute's constitutionality, we 
address his claim"). 
9 
 
any particular board, officer or department, shall be under the 
control of the selectmen . . .").  Alternatively, a municipality 
may hold real estate for a specific municipal purpose.  Unlike a 
municipality's general corporate inventory, such property can be 
placed in the charge of either a particular board or the select 
board for a specific municipal purpose.  See G. L. c. 40, § 15A.  
If land is held for a specific municipal purpose within the 
meaning of § 15A, that land cannot be diverted to another use 
until the "board or officer having charge of [the] land" 
determines that the land is no longer needed for that purpose.  
Id.  See Harris, 392 Mass. at 240. 
Accordingly, if the town "held" the Wildcat land for the 
"specific purpose" of affordable housing, transferring the 
Wildcat land to the conversation commission would entail a two-
step process:  first, the board, which has control of the land, 
must make a determination that the land is no longer needed for 
affordable housing, and second, the town by a two-thirds vote 
must authorize transferring the custody of the land to the 
conservation commission.  See G. L. c. 40, § 15A; Harris, 392 
Mass. at 243.  Alternatively, if the Wildcat land is not held 
for a specific purpose, the land could be transferred to the 
conservation commission without a separate vote by the board to 
determine that it is no longer needed for affordable housing.  
See G. L. c. 40, § 3. 
10 
 
c.  Specific purpose designations under G. L. c. 40, § 15A.  
Before turning to the question whether the Wildcat land was held 
for affordable housing on these facts, we must first discuss the 
appropriate legal standard to determine whether land is held for 
a specific purpose under § 15A. 
The parties disagree as to the proper standard.  The board 
asks this court to consider all attendant circumstances in 
analyzing whether the town intended to dedicate the Wildcat land 
to affordable housing.  The plaintiffs, by contrast, assert that 
to designate land for a specific municipal purpose under § 15A, 
a town must either transfer public land from the control of the 
select board to another board or impose a deed restriction on 
the land.  We conclude that the totality of the circumstances 
test articulated in Smith, 478 Mass. at 63-64, should be applied 
to determine whether a town has designated land for a specific 
use under § 15A. 
In support of our conclusion, we draw upon the common-law 
doctrine of prior public use.  Under that doctrine, land devoted 
to one public use cannot be diverted to another, inconsistent 
public use without plain and explicit legislation authorizing 
the diversion.  See Sudbury v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 
485 Mass. 774, 783 (2020) ("The doctrine of prior public use is 
a firmly established creation of the common law, dating back to 
the Nineteenth Century.  Under this doctrine, public lands 
11 
 
devoted to one public use cannot be diverted to another 
inconsistent public use . . ." [quotation and citation 
omitted]).7 
Article 97 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution, adopted in 1972, is a constitutional codification 
of the common-law prior public use doctrine that affords 
protections to public lands held for conservation.  Under art. 
97, "[l]ands and easements taken or acquired for [conservation] 
purposes shall not be used for other purposes or otherwise 
disposed of except by laws enacted by a two-thirds vote, taken 
by yeas and nays, of each branch of the general court." 
First enacted in 1951,8 G. L. c. 40, § 15A, embodies the 
same legal principle -- land designated for one use may not be 
diverted for an inconsistent use absent explicit determination 
 
7 The prior public use doctrine protects all public land, 
resolving potential disputes over intergovernmental transfers.  
See, e.g., Selectmen of Braintree v. County Comm'rs of Norfolk, 
399 Mass. 507, 511 (1987) (use of hospital grounds for prison 
improper where land was obtained for purpose of constructing 
hospital); Bauer v. Mitchell, 247 Mass. 522, 528 (1924) ("The 
appropriation by the county commissioners as trustees of the 
hospital of land bought for and dedicated to the uses of the 
school . . . [for use as a leaching field for the hospital] was 
without legal right"); Higginson v. Treasurer & Sch. House 
Comm'rs of Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 591 (1912) (land devoted to 
parkland could not be used to construct schoolhouse); Old Colony 
R.R. v. Framingham Water Co., 153 Mass 561, 563 (1891) (where 
land was previously appropriated for specific public use, 
municipal corporation could not take land for another use 
without explicit legislative authorization). 
8 See St. 1951, c. 798, § 4. 
12 
 
that the land is no longer needed for such use by the relevant 
municipal board in charge of the land and a two-thirds vote by 
the town authorizing the diversion.  Indeed, much like art. 97, 
§ 15A, in pertinent part, provides that "[w]henever a board 
. . . having charge of land . . . constituting the whole or any 
part of an estate held by a city or town for a specific purpose 
. . . [determines] that such land is no longer needed for such 
purpose . . . the town by a two thirds vote . . . may transfer 
. . . such land . . . for another specific municipal purpose."  
As such, the plain language of § 15A makes clear that if the 
Wildcat land is held for the specific municipal purpose of 
affordable housing, it cannot be diverted to an inconsistent use 
of conservation until a diversion has been approved pursuant to 
§ 15A. 
While the case law establishing the standard for assessing 
specific-use designations under § 15A is scarce, this court has 
addressed the corresponding standard under art. 97 on several 
occasions.  Because art. 97 imposes similar restrictions to 
those in § 15A on land that has been designated for conservation 
purposes, our decisions in cases involving art. 97 provide a 
useful framework for determining specific municipal use 
designations under § 15A. 
Accordingly, this case requires us to reconcile our 
reasoning in three cases -- Harris, Selectmen of Hanson, and 
13 
 
Smith -- that touch upon these standards.  In Harris, 392 Mass. 
at 243, we clarified the relationship between G. L. c. 40, 
§ 15A, and G. L. c. 40, § 3.  However, because the issue in 
Harris was whether land taken by eminent domain for school 
purposes was in the charge of the school committee absent a 
separate vote placing the land in the committee's control, the 
Harris decision is silent on what test should be applied to 
determine whether a town has designated the land for a specific 
use under § 15A, where, as here, the land was originally 
acquired for general municipal purposes.  The Selectmen of 
Hanson and Smith decisions, on the other hand, articulate a 
totality of the circumstances test for specific-use designations 
but do so in the context of municipal land held for conservation 
under art. 97.  However, this distinction is without 
consequence.  Both G. L. c. 40, § 15A, and art. 97 are 
codifications of the prior public use doctrine, developed in our 
common law as a means to resolve potential conflicts over the 
use of public lands between various governmental entities.  See 
Sudbury, 485 Mass. at 787. 
Indeed, in Selectmen of Hanson, we did not differentiate 
between G. L. c. 40, § 15A, and art. 97 in our analysis of 
whether the land at issue had been designated for a specific 
use.  See Selectmen of Hanson, 444 Mass. at 509 ("Because the 
[land] was not held for a specific purpose, namely conservation, 
14 
 
compliance with the provisions of art. 97 and G. L. c. 40, 
§ 15A, was not required" [emphasis added]).  Thus, our 
interpretation of what it means to "designate" land for 
conservation purposes in a manner sufficient to invoke art. 97 
protection is helpful in clarifying what it means to "hold" land 
for a specific municipal purpose within the meaning of § 15A. 
In Selectmen of Hanson, 444 Mass. at 504, the town of 
Hanson acquired title to a parcel by tax taking.  Fourteen years 
later, the Hanson town meeting voted unanimously "'to accept for 
conservation purposes, a deed, or deeds, to' the locus, [but] no 
further action was taken by the town in connection with this 
vote."  Id.  Although the town vote authorized the select board 
to transfer the land to the conservation commission or execute a 
deed imposing a conservation restriction, the select board 
retained control of the property, which was never used for 
conservation.  Id.  Some twenty-seven years after the town 
meeting vote, the tax custodian circulated a list of properties 
to be auctioned, and subsequently sold the land to a third-party 
purchaser.  See id.  The town sued the third-party purchaser, 
arguing that the sale of the land was invalid because the town 
had not complied with the two-step process set forth in G. L. 
c. 40, § 15A, to determine that the land was no longer needed 
for conservation purposes.  See id. at 503-504.  However, we 
held that the town meeting vote only "evidenced an intent by the 
15 
 
town to impose a conservation restriction on the locus, and that 
an instrument creating such a property restriction had to be 
filed with the registry of deeds in order for the town's 
interest to prevail over that of any subsequent bona fide 
purchaser for value."  Id. at 505. 
To be clear, the court in Selectmen of Hanson did not 
adopt, as the plaintiffs argue, a bright-line rule requiring 
towns to file deed restrictions or transfer control of property 
to specific entities in order to hold it for a specific purpose 
under G. L. c. 40, § 15A.  See Selectmen of Hanson, 444 Mass. at 
505 ("We agree with the town that the 1971 vote did not have to 
be filed with the registry of deeds").  See also Mahajan v. 
Department of Envtl. Protection, 464 Mass. 604, 615 (2013), 
citing Selectmen of Hanson, supra at 508-509 ("The critical 
question . . . [is] whether the land was taken for those 
purposes [identified in art. 97], or subsequent to the taking 
was designated for those purposes in a manner sufficient to 
invoke the protection of art. 97"). 
Indeed, since the Selectmen of Hanson case was decided, we 
have clarified the standard for specific-use designations under 
art. 97.  In Smith, 478 Mass. at 50, the issue on appeal was 
whether a parcel of land owned by the city of Westfield had been 
dedicated as parkland within the meaning of art. 97, and thus 
required a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to divert the land 
16 
 
to an inconsistent use.  There was no restriction recorded in 
the registry of deeds that limited the parcel's use to 
conservation or recreation purposes.  Id.  We, nonetheless, 
explicitly declined to interpret Selectmen of Hanson to require 
recorded deed restrictions to invoke art. 97 protections in all 
cases.  See id. at 58.  We ultimately concluded that in 
assessing whether the land was sufficiently designated as 
parkland to invoke art. 97 protections, courts should apply the 
following standard: 
"Under our common law, land is dedicated to the public as a 
public park when the landowner's intent to do so is clear 
and unequivocal, and when the public accepts such use by 
actually using the land as a public park.  There are 
various ways to manifest a clear and unequivocal intent.  
The recording of a deed or a conservation restriction is 
one way of manifesting such intent but it is not the only 
way. . . . 
 
"The clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate public land 
as a public park must be more than simply an intent to use 
public land as a park temporarily or until a better use has 
emerged or ripened.  Rather, the intent must be to use the 
land permanently as a public park, because the consequence 
of a dedication is that the general public for whose 
benefit a use in the land was established . . . obtains an 
interest in the land in the nature of easement, and upon 
completion of the dedication it becomes irrevocable."  
(Quotations and citations omitted.)9 
 
9 The question in Smith, 478 Mass. at 63, whether the public 
had accepted the dedicated land "by actually using the land as a 
public park," is inapplicable in this context.  Unlike G. L. 
c. 40, § 15A, under art. 97, once a city or town offers land it 
owns for use as a public park, and the public accepts it, the 
"general public," rather than residents of the particular town, 
obtains an interest in the land in the nature of an easement.  
See Smith, supra at 59-60.   Under G. L. c. 40, § 15A, even 
 
17 
 
 
Id. at 63. 
Given the similarities in the statutory language and the 
identical common-law roots of art. 97 and G. L. c. 40, § 15A, we 
hold that the totality of the circumstances test articulated in 
Smith should likewise be applied in assessing specific-use 
designations within the meaning of G. L. c. 40, § 15A.  That is, 
in assessing whether land has been designated for a specific 
municipal use within the meaning of § 15A, courts should 
consider whether the totality of the circumstances indicate a 
clear and unequivocal intent to dedicate the land to that 
purpose. 
d.  Application.  "An order granting . . . summary judgment 
will be upheld if the trial judge ruled on undisputed material 
facts and [the] ruling was correct as a matter of law."  
Commonwealth v. One 1987 Mercury Cougar Auto., 413 Mass. 534, 
536 (1992).  To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, a 
moving party "may satisfy [its] burden of demonstrating the 
absence of triable issue either by submitting evidence that 
negates an essential element of the opposing party's case or by 
demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable 
 
where a town dedicates land for a particular municipal purpose, 
it retains full proprietary interest in the land.  Thus, the 
sole inquiry for the purpose of § 15A designations should be the 
town's intent to "hold" land for a specific municipal purpose. 
18 
 
expectation of proving an essential element of [his] case at 
trial" (citation omitted).  Hill-Junious v. UTP Realty, LLC, 492 
Mass. 667, 672 (2023).  "The burden on the moving party may be 
discharged by showing that there is an absence of evidence to 
support the non-moving party's case."  Kourouvacilis v. General 
Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 711 (1991). 
To prevail at the summary judgment stage, the board had the 
burden to show that there was no genuine dispute of material 
fact regarding whether the Wildcat land was dedicated for 
affordable housing under G. L. c. 40, § 15A, and that it was 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.  As discussed 
supra, this entails showing the town's clear and unequivocal 
intent to set aside the property for that specific use.  We 
conclude that the board met its burden, as there are no genuine 
disputes of material fact concerning the town's intent, even 
when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, as we must on summary judgment. 
The board put forth undisputed evidence showing that the 
town dedicated the Wildcat land for affordable housing.  To 
begin with, town meeting unanimously voted in 2004 to "make 
available [the Wildcat land] for affordable housing."  While it 
is true that the 2004 town meeting vote is not, on its own, 
sufficient to establish a clear and unequivocal intent to set 
aside the land for affordable housing, it is nonetheless 
19 
 
indicative of such an intent.  See Harris, 392 Mass. at 241 
("The warrant for the special town meeting . . . shows 
that . . . it was commonly understood that the property remained 
in the charge of the school committee in the twenty-five years 
that it had been held by the town"). 
In addition, the town took several other steps that shed 
further light on its intent to set aside the Wildcat land for 
affordable housing.  In 2007, town meeting voted to adopt an 
affordable housing trust bylaw establishing the trust, a 
municipal entity whose sole purpose is the development of 
affordable housing in the town.  In furtherance of its purpose, 
the trust hired several outside engineering consultants in 2013 
and 2019 to delineate the wetlands on the Wildcat land and 
perform a site assessment of the property for a multiunit 
affordable housing development.  These consultants prepared a 
concept plan in 2013 for an affordable housing project on the 
Wildcat land, which included ten "cottage-style" single-family 
units.  That same year, the trust ordered a feasibility study on 
the Wildcat land to assess the site's ability to handle 
stormwater and wastewater. 
In 2019, an outside architectural firm prepared yet another 
conceptual housing development plan, in which it proposed a 
potential twenty-six unit affordable housing development.  Later 
that year, the trust published an update to the town's housing 
20 
 
production plan, which identified the Wildcat land as being 
"designated for developing affordable housing" and referenced 
the twenty-six unit 2019 conceptual project design prepared by 
the architectural firm.  Finally, in 2021, the trust met with 
the board to discuss the development of the Wildcat land.  Thus, 
it is undisputed that, consistent with the 2004 town meeting 
authorization, the board, primarily through the trust, explored 
the development of the Wildcat land for affordable housing in 
several different ways. 
Other information presented by town officials corroborates 
these efforts.  For example, the town administrator stated in an 
affidavit that the town expended considerable public funds to 
assess the feasibility of affordable housing on the Wildcat land 
by identifying wetland resource areas, conducting site 
assessments, and engaging experts to advise the town on what 
type of affordable housing would be appropriate for the 
property.  The town administrator also stated that, in 2021, 
before Carroll drafted and submitted the 2021 town meeting 
article, the trust recommended that the town request proposals 
from developers to develop affordable housing on the Wildcat 
land. 
Notably, an affidavit from the trust chair provides context 
concerning the length of time that the board controlled the 
Wildcat land for affordable housing.  Specifically, the trust 
21 
 
chair stated that, although the initial feasibility studies on 
the Wildcat land were prepared in 2013, the trust decided to 
place the development of the Wildcat land on hold while it 
developed an affordable housing project at a different location.  
The 2019 update to the housing production plan further 
elucidates why the development of the Wildcat land was 
temporarily put on hold -- "[t]he property's slope and 
infrastructure demands in the project design drove up projected 
costs considerably," thereby informing the trust's decision to 
develop another property first.  However, that is not to say 
that the town was abandoning the development of affordable 
housing on the Wildcat land; instead, consistent with the town 
administrator, the trust chair asserted that when the other 
affordable housing project was near completion in 2018, the 
trust moved forward with preparing a conceptual development 
design plan for the Wildcat land in 2019. 
Moreover, the chair stated that, after the 2021 town 
meeting vote, the board asked the trust to consider whether the 
Wildcat land was still needed for affordable housing.  The trust 
then voted unanimously that the Wildcat land was still needed 
for that purpose, since the town's affordable housing inventory 
was far below ten percent, a threshold requirement under G. L. 
c. 40B, § 20, and the Wildcat land was the only town-owned 
property not designated for other purposes. 
22 
 
Taken together, this evidence shows that following the 2004 
town meeting vote, the board, acting primarily through the 
trust, took several steps to explore the use of the Wildcat land 
for affordable housing.  This evidence also indicates that, 
since the 2004 town meeting vote, the board considered the 
Wildcat land to be set aside for a specific municipal use, 
affordable housing, to the exclusion of all other uses. 
Because the board produced undisputed evidence showing that 
the town intended to designate the Wildcat land for affordable 
housing, the crucial question is whether the plaintiffs have 
produced any evidence to create a material dispute of fact 
regarding the town's intent.  See Barbetti v. Stempniewicz, 490 
Mass. 98, 116 (2022) ("If the moving party establishes the 
absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must 
respond and allege specific facts which would establish the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat 
a motion for summary judgment" [citation omitted]).  While it is 
certainly true that courts do not usually reach the factual 
question of intent at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiffs 
did not produce any evidence to create a material dispute of 
fact as to whether the board intended to hold the Wildcat land 
for affordable housing.  See e.g., National Assn'n of Gov't 
Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 
231 (1979) (party against whom summary judgment is sought not 
23 
 
entitled to trial simply because cause of action has state of 
mind as material element; there must be some indication that 
opposing party can produce requisite quantum of evidence to 
support its claim). 
Indeed, instead of pointing to specific evidence in the 
record, the plaintiffs relied on mere allegations and conclusory 
denials, which cannot defeat summary judgment.  For example, in 
its statement of material facts, the board asserted that the 
trust placed the development of the Wildcat land on hold while 
it developed an affordable housing project on another property.  
In responding to this statement, the plaintiffs merely asserted 
that this material fact was disputed, as "information regarding 
this assertion [was] solely within the possession, custody, and 
control of [the defendants], and discovery [was] ongoing." 
A fact is not disputed merely because it has been denied by 
a nonmoving party.  See Adams, 492 Mass. at 287.  See also 
Barron Chiropractic & Rehabilitation, P.C. v. Norfolk & Dedham 
Group, 469 Mass. 800, 804 (2014) ("Bare assertions made in the 
nonmoving party's opposition will not defeat a motion for 
summary judgment").  Rather, an affirmative response by an 
opposing party is crucial to its ability to survive a motion for 
summary judgment.  Indeed, the requirement of an affirmative 
response, supported by specific facts, by the party opposing 
24 
 
summary judgment is spelled out in the rule itself.  Under Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 56 (e), 365 Mass. 824 (1974): 
"When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial" (emphasis added). 
Mere denials coupled with a nonmoving party's hope that 
something will materialize in discovery will not prevent a court 
from ordering summary judgment.  As such, the plaintiffs' vague 
and general statements are wholly inadequate.  See LaLonde v. 
Eissner, 405 Mass. 207, 209 (1989) (party cannot rest on mere 
assertions of disputed facts to defeat motion for summary 
judgment). 
Despite their inadequate responses to the board's statement 
of material facts, the plaintiffs now point to evidence in the 
summary judgment record to support their position that the 
Wildcat land was held as part of the town's general corporate 
property under G. L. c. 40, § 3.  Specifically, they point to 
the following evidence:  (1) an affidavit by one board member 
stating that, in 2005, the board rejected a private developer's 
proposal to construct affordable housing on the Wildcat land; 
(2) meeting minutes of the board showing that, in 2009, the 
board granted a revocable license to a private developer to 
construct a walking path across a portion of the Wildcat land 
25 
 
close to the boundary of Wildcat Hill; and (3) the length of 
time that has passed since the board initially made the Wildcat 
land available for affordable housing in 2004, without the board 
actually developing the land for that purpose or transferring 
the Wildcat land to the trust's custody.   None of this 
evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, creates a genuine issue of material fact for 
purposes of the board's motion for summary judgment. 
According to the board member's affidavit, a member of the 
town's master plan committee met with a private developer in 
2005 and discussed the idea of granting the developer permission 
to construct a roadway over the town-owned property in exchange 
for the developer constructing affordable housing units on the 
Wildcat land.  However, after this proposal was brought to the 
board, the board was "not interested in such an arrangement."  
Because the board rejected this single proposal, the plaintiffs 
ask us to infer that the board was not interested in 
constructing affordable housing on the Wildcat land.  Such an 
inference is a bridge too far. 
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court makes 
"all logically permissible inferences" in favor of a nonmoving 
party.  See Willitts v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 411 
Mass. 202, 203 (1991).  Thus, a court should not indulge a 
nonmoving party's inferences if they do not "flow rationally 
26 
 
from the underlying facts" (citation omitted).  Rubinovitz v. 
Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 911 (1st Cir. 1995).  The inference that 
the plaintiffs ask us to make -- that the board was not 
interested in any proposal to build affordable housing -- is not 
logically permissible where the board was merely declining a 
single proposal that was contingent on a condition unrelated to 
any intent to develop affordable housing (i.e., the construction 
of a roadway).  This inference is even more tenuous considering 
that the board's rejection of this proposal predates subsequent 
actions by the town that show a continued interest in using the 
Wildcat land for affordable housing -- such as conducting 
studies to determine whether it was feasible to use the property 
for affordable housing. 
The plaintiffs also contend that granting a revocable 
license to construct a walking path over a small portion of the 
Wildcat land shows that the board intended to hold the entire 
parcel for another purpose -- public recreation -- rather than 
intending to hold the land exclusively for affordable housing.  
However, "[a] license merely excuses acts done by one on land in 
possession of another that without the license would be 
trespasses, conveys no interest in land, and may be contracted 
for or given orally."  Baseball Publ. Co. v. Bruton, 302 Mass. 
54, 55 (1938).  Further, a license is freely revocable at the 
will of the promisor.  See Spencer v. Rabidou, 340 Mass. 91, 93 
27 
 
(1959).  Therefore, an inference that granting a revocable 
license to build a trail on a small portion of the Wildcat land 
indicates that the board intended to hold the entire six-acre 
parcel for the purpose of recreation is unreasonable because the 
board was free to revoke the license at any time.  Further, this 
inference is even less rational considering the town 
administrator's affidavit, which states that the trail was 
approved next to the boundary line so that it would not 
interfere with the development of the rest of the Wildcat land. 
Lastly, the mere fact that the Wildcat land remained 
undeveloped and under the control of the board, as opposed to 
the trust, for approximately thirty years does not create a 
material dispute of fact as to the town's intent.  First, as 
discussed in Harris, 392 Mass. at 243, the two-step procedure 
required by G. L. c. 40, § 15A, applies even if "the land [held 
for a specific municipal purpose] was in the charge of the 
selectmen rather that another board or officer."  Thus, the 
plain language of § 15A does not require the board to transfer 
the custody of the land held for a specific municipal purpose to 
another board or officer.  See id.  Stated differently, the 
dispositive question is not which municipal entity retained 
custody of the Wildcat land, but whether, under the totality of 
the circumstances, the town intended to hold the land for the 
specific municipal purpose of affordable housing. 
28 
 
Further, the delay in the development of the Wildcat land 
does not indicate the town's intent to hold it as a part of the 
town's general corporate inventory.  Indeed, the record evidence 
suggests that the delay was caused by factors other than the 
town's lack of interest in using the Wildcat land for affordable 
housing.  In particular, the trust's 2019 update to the town's 
housing production plan indicates that the Wildcat land's "slope 
and infrastructure demands" drove up the projected costs of the 
development, prompting the town to set the development of the 
Wildcat land on hold.  The update further states that the town 
was only then, in 2019, revisiting the wildcat property project 
after finishing a similar development elsewhere.  This evidence 
suggests that the practical, topographic difficulties associated 
with developing the Wildcat land informed the trust's decision 
to develop another town-owned property first and revisit the 
Wildcat land development plans later.  Thus, the mere fact that 
the property remained undeveloped does not support the 
plaintiffs' suggested inference.  See Harris, 392 Mass. at 242 
("To require town boards in control of land to [develop the 
land] would encourage unnecessary and premature development and 
preclude careful planning for future needs"). 
Even taken together, (i) the town's rejection of a 
developer proposal for affordable housing, (ii) the grant of a 
revocable license for a walking path, and (iii) the length of 
29 
 
time it has taken to develop affordable housing on the Wildcat 
land do not support a rational inference that the board did not 
intend to hold the Wildcat land exclusively for affordable 
housing purposes.  As we explained supra, the inferences that 
the plaintiffs have asked us to make in response to these facts, 
individually, are improbable.  Given that each separate 
inference is on its own improbable, combining them together 
cannot defeat summary judgment.  See e.g., Grant's Dairy-Me., 
LLC v. Commissioner of Me. Dep't of Agric., Food & Rural 
Resources, 232 F.3d 8, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) ("Despite the 
generosity of [the summary judgment] standard, conclusory 
allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation 
are entitled to no weight" [quotation and citation omitted]); 
Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 962 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(rejecting plaintiff's "attempt[] to build one vague inference 
upon another vague inference to produce a factual issue").10 
 
10 We note that because the Massachusetts rules of civil 
procedure were patterned on the Federal rules of civil 
procedure, it is well established that we may take guidance from 
the relevant Federal jurisprudence in construing rule 56 (e).  
See Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 
174, 179-180 (1975) ("This court having adopted comprehensive 
rules of civil procedure in substantially the same form as the 
earlier Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the adjudged 
construction theretofore given to the Federal rules is to be 
given to our rules, absent compelling reasons to the contrary or 
significant differences in content"). 
30 
 
e.  Continuance to obtain further discovery.  In the 
alternative, the plaintiffs contend that the motion judge abused 
his discretion in granting the board's cross motion for summary 
judgment without permitting them an opportunity to first engage 
in discovery.  We are not persuaded. 
"A continuance is appropriate if the party opposing a 
summary judgment motion shows that it cannot, without further 
discovery, 'present by affidavits facts essential to justify 
[its] opposition.'"  Commonwealth v. Fall River Motor Sales, 
Inc., 409 Mass. 302, 307 (1991), quoting Mass. R. Civ. P. 
56 (f).  Rule 56 (f) requires a nonmoving party to file an 
affidavit explaining the reasons why he or she cannot present 
facts to justify his or her opposition and requesting a 
continuance to obtain further discovery.  See Herbert A. 
Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 387, 400-401 
(2003) ("Had [the party opposing summary judgment] filed such an 
affidavit and obtained a continuance of the summary judgment 
proceedings, it could have gone forward with discovery and 
secured necessary evidence to support its . . . claim"); First 
Nat'l Bank v. Slade, 379 Mass. 243, 244-245 (1979) (failure to 
file rule 56 [f] affidavit or to explain failure was "fatal" to 
argument for opportunity to obtain discovery).  See also Coastal 
Orthopaedic Inst., P.C. v. Bongiorno, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 61 
31 
 
n.8 (2004) (informal request asking for additional discovery is 
nullity absent affidavit requesting continuance). 
The plaintiffs did not file an affidavit requesting a 
continuance as required by rule 56 (f).  They, nevertheless, 
assert that their "repeated and consistent objections in this 
case are more than sufficient to invoke [r]ule 56(f)."  The 
plaintiffs overstate these objections.  While they did respond 
to some of the board's statements of material facts suggesting 
that the town was in the possession of the relevant information 
and that discovery was "ongoing," a request for continuance to 
obtain additional discovery in accordance with rule 56 (f) must 
be presented explicitly; it is not on the motion judge to infer 
whether the plaintiffs' vague objections to the board's 
statement of undisputed facts functioned as a request for more 
discovery.  Moreover, in February 2022, at a case management 
conference before the Land Court, "[t]he parties agreed that 
fact discovery [was] not required in this case because there 
[were] no disputes of material fact." 
A request made pursuant to rule 56 (f), together with the 
supporting affidavit, must point to the issues of material fact, 
and set forth both (i) the additional discovery an opposing 
party needs and (ii) how much time the party needs to develop 
the facts essential to its opposition.  See Slater v. Traynor 
Mgt., Inc., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 709-710 (2022).  Here, the 
32 
 
plaintiffs' responses did not specify what additional discovery 
they needed, nor how much time they needed to complete it. 
For these reasons, the plaintiffs' right to further 
discovery was waived.  See Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc., 439 Mass. 
at 401 ("By failing to invoke rule 56 [f], [the party opposing 
summary judgment] waived its right to further discovery before 
the judge issued his decision on [the] motion for summary 
judgment").  Accordingly, the motion judge did not abuse his 
discretion in granting the board's motion for summary judgment 
without ordering further discovery.  See Alake v. Boston, 40 
Mass. App. Ct. 610, 612 (1996) (plaintiff failed to present 
materials to motion judge demonstrating that there was genuine 
issue for trial or, alternatively, invoke rule 56 [f] to seek 
additional discovery). 
3.  Conclusion.  Based on the undisputed facts, the Wildcat 
land was held exclusively for a specific municipal purpose -- 
the development of affordable housing -- within the meaning of 
G. L. c. 40, § 15A.  Accordingly, we affirm the Land Court's 
decision on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.