Case Title: JERALD R. BREITENSTINE V. NANCY L. BREITENSTINE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
JERALD R. BREITENSTINE V. NANCY L. BREITENSTINE2006 WY 48132 P.3d 48Case Number: 05-186Decided: 04/19/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JERALD 
R. BREITENSTINE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
NANCY L. 
BREITENSTINE,

)

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

David G. 
Lewis of Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

W. Keith 
Goody of Alpine, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In 2001, the 
district court decided several issues in the divorce action between Jerald 
Breitenstine (Husband) and Nancy Breitenstine (Wife), and ultimately entered a 
judgment.  In 2005, the district 
court awarded Wife $196,930.17 pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111 
(LexisNexis 2005) for the attorney's fees and costs Wife incurred while 
attempting to enforce the judgment against Husband.  Husband now appeals the district court's 
decision, claiming that the statute did not authorize the district court to 
award Wife such fees and costs and that most of the fees and costs were 
unreasonable.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Whether the district court had the 
authority, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111, to award Wife attorney's fees 
and costs in the instant case? 

 
 
2.   Whether Husband has established 
that the district court abused its discretion in finding that such fees and 
costs were reasonable?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties were 
divorced in February 1999.  The 
district court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment 
(collectively "the judgment") concerning custody of the parties' two children, 
child support, alimony, and the equitable division of the marital estate in 
August 2001.  More particularly, the 
district court:  1) granted Wife 
custody of both children; 2) ordered Husband to pay back child support 
($39,021.25 plus interest) and future child support ($3,000 per month); 3) 
ordered Husband to provide (or reimburse Wife for) the children's medical 
insurance and to pay all uncovered medical costs; 4) awarded Wife back alimony 
($204,000 plus interest) and future alimony ($2,000 per month); and 5) 
determined that the marital estate was "at least" $8,764,6731the district court awarded Wife 
one-half of that estate ($4,382,233) and then reduced that amount by the value 
of Wife's residence ($2,000,000), leaving a balance of $2,382,233 (plus 
interest).  Each party was to pay 
his or her respective attorney's fees and costs, except that the district court 
ordered Husband to reimburse Wife for half of a court-appointed expert's 
fees.

 
 
[¶4]      In its findings, 
the district court emphasized Husband's fraudulent conduct leading up to the 
divorce proceedings and clearly anticipated that Wife would experience 
difficulty in collecting the amounts Husband owed pursuant to the judgment. 
 The district court concluded that 
Husband had "taken substantial steps to secrete . . . assets[2] beyond the jurisdiction of [the 
district court] and the courts of the United 
States of America," including transferring "substantial" 
assets to asset protection trusts and other entities in the Bahamas.  The "sole purpose" of these asset 
transfers was to defraud Husband's "creditors and potential creditors, including 
[Wife]" and Husband retained dominion and control over the assets he 
transferred.  The district court 
ordered Husband to repatriate assets, to return the money he fraudulently took 
from his children's trusts (plus interest), and to assign property within his 
control to Wife to the "extent necessary to satisfy the judgment."  Wife was also awarded some stock to 
assist her in collecting "the amounts due"; if the stock ever produced 
"something of value," Husband could petition the court for a 
credit.

 
 
[¶5]      Husband appealed 
the district court's marital property division.  We concluded that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in dividing such property, but modified the district 
court's judgment in one respect.  See Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2003 
WY 16, ¶¶ 1, 26-27, 62 P.3d 587, 589, 594-95 (Wyo. 2003).  We also determined that the district 
court's findings on the fraudulent nature of Husband's conduct leading up to the 
divorce proceedings were supported by the record, and noted that ordering 
Husband to assign assets to Wife "was to aid in collection, which is entirely 
appropriate given Husband's lack of compliance up until that point."  Id., ¶¶ 5, 11, 
15, 18-25, 62 P.3d  at 589-94.

 
 
[¶6]      Husband's lack of 
compliance continued long after the district court entered the judgment in this 
case.  In December 2001, it appears 
that the district court held Husband in civil contempt for failing to comply 
with the judgment and sanctioned Husband $73,000 (plus interest).  In February 2003, Wife sought to present 
the district court an accounting of "money that [she had] collected against the 
judgment" and to have the district court determine the balance Husband owed her 
pursuant to the judgment.  The 
district court held a hearing and concluded that Husband had not paid certain 
amounts for child support, alimony, the children's health insurance and 
uncovered medical costs, the money necessary to reimburse the children's trusts, 
the expert's fees, and the aforementioned contempt sanction.  The district court also found that 
Husband's failure to comply with its orders "forced [Wife] to retain legal 
counsel in both this country and in the [Bahamas] and 
[she] has incurred in excess of $241,000 in attorney's fees in an attempt to 
recover the amounts due."  Wife 
recovered $803,756.55 and a $550,000 Florida condominium "through these efforts," 
for which Husband received credit against the judgment.  The district court ultimately ordered 
Husband to pay Wife $2,419,658.97 and awarded her $241,000 in attorney's 
fees.  It does not appear that 
Husband appealed the district court's order.

 
 
[¶7]      In October 2003, 
Wife filed a motion seeking attorney's fees for her efforts in "Florida and the Bahamas and elsewhere in an attempt 
to enforce the judgment and other" court orders, and additional reimbursement 
for the children's medical insurance and uncovered medical costs.  After a hearing, the district court 
credited Husband for a November 2003 child support payment of $136,055.16,3 but concluded that Husband had not 
otherwise paid certain amounts for alimony, the children's health insurance and 
uncovered medical expenses, the money necessary to reimburse the children's 
trusts, the expert's fees, and the aforementioned contempt sanction.  The district court also found that Wife 
had incurred in excess of $433,017.96 in attorney's fees to recover the amounts 
due from Husband because of his "failure to abide by" its orders, ordered 
Husband to pay Wife $2,488,365.62, and awarded her $433,017.96 in attorney's 
fees.4  It does not appear that Husband appealed 
the district court's order.

 
 
[¶8]      In March 2005, 
Husband filed a motion requesting that Wife account for "all money, shares of 
stock, real estate, or other property, and proceeds, she has obtained, by 
enforcement or other collection efforts" pursuant to the district court's 
original judgment.  Wife submitted 
an accounting.  She also asked the 
district court to award her $196,930.17 for attorney's fees and costs she had 
"incurred since November 2003 because of [Husband's failure] to comply with the 
judgment" and filed the affidavit of an attorney who stated that such fees and 
costs were reasonable.  Husband 
opposed Wife's request because the district court did not award Wife any 
attorney's fees in the original judgment and the district court did not have the 
authority to award Wife attorney's fees or costs for her subsequent efforts to 
enforce the judgment.

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court held a hearing on the matter in May 2005.  At the hearing, Wife testified 
extensively about her difficulty enforcing the district court's judgment against 
Husband; Husband was still not paying willingly, which forced Wife to attempt to 
"garnish" Husband's known assets.  
Wife's efforts, and the bulk of the attorney's fees and costs generated 
therefrom, were concentrated in the Bahamas.5  Wife testified that it was necessary to 
retain attorneys in both Florida and the 
Bahamas because "there are two 
different jurisdictions involved so it requires attorneys in both of those 
places."6  The proceedings in the 
Bahamas included Husband's 
appeal of an asset freeze order, which appeal was ultimately dismissed, and 
"several hearings" involving "all sorts of procedural and philosophical issues" 
in an attempt to persuade a Bahamas court to recognize the Wyoming district court's 
judgment.  Wife testified that she 
recently obtained a partial summary judgment against Husband "personally," "so 
that whatever he holds personally in the Bahamas he is required to pay and they won't let 
the money just stay there in the Bahamas without it being 
distributed."  She must now try to 
pierce Husband's "irrevocable trust" (presumably an asset protection trust) and 
his other business entities in the Bahamas, and she "could be years" 
from actually collecting the amounts Husband owes her in the instant 
case.

 
 
[¶10]   It appears that the balance of 
Wife's attorney's fees and costs stem from:  1) a lawsuit Wife filed in Florida 
relating to the $550,000 condominium previously referred to herein; 2) a 
garnishment involving a Virginia law firm; 3) two garnishments in Ohio, as well 
as consultations with attorneys there regarding the death of Husband's 
motheraccording to Wife, Husband should inherit "several million dollars" and 
Wife began to explore how she might access that money in order to satisfy the 
judgment; 4) a garnishment in Iowaa bank account has been frozen but the bank 
has not distributed any proceeds to Wife; and 5) various related representation 
provided by Wife's Wyoming attorney.

 
 
[¶11]   The district court ordered Husband 
to pay Wife $2,511,236.36 in principal and interest after crediting Husband for 
the $1,603,302.98 in total assets Wife had collected to date ($113,491.27 of 
which Wife had collected via two garnishments since the district court's 
previous order).  The district court 
also found that Husband "continued to fail to abide by [its] orders," forcing 
Wife "to continue to expend funds on legal counsel and costs in both this 
country and [the Bahamas] and [to incur] an additional 
$196,930.17 in attorneys fees and costs.  
These fees are reasonable."  
Wife submitted, and the district court received, an exhibit containing 
itemized bills for the attorney's fees and costs Wife paid in attempting to 
enforce the district court's original judgment.  It ordered Husband to pay Wife the 
attorney's fees that it had previously awarded her, and awarded Wife $196,930.17 
in new attorney's fees.  Husband now 
appeals the district court's decision.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]   Husband contends on appeal that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111 authorized the district court to award Wife 
attorney's fees and costs for "funds needed during the pendency of the 
litigation," but not for "proceedings to enforce a money judgment against her 
former spouse following the divorce decree."  He argues that each party was to pay his 
or her respective attorney's fees and costs according to the original judgment, 
and "it is beyond reason to believe that a person who obtains a money judgment 
in Wyoming can take it to sister states, or to foreign countries, begin 
enforcement proceedings, and return to the Wyoming well' periodically for 
judicially gifted attorney fees and costs, until it is finally satisfied."  This argument poses a legal question, 
and we review such a question de novo 
without affording deference to the district court's decision.  Finch v. Farmers Co-Op Oil Co., 2005 WY 
41, ¶ 7, 109 P.3d 537, 541 (Wyo. 2005).  
 

 
 
[¶13]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111 provides 
as follows:

 
 
            
In every action brought for divorce, the court may require either party 
to pay any sum necessary to enable the other to carry on or defend the action 
and for support and the support of the children of the parties during its 
pendency.  The court may decree 
costs against either party and award execution for the costs, or it may direct 
costs to be paid out of any property sequestered, in the power of the court, or 
in the hands of a receiver.  The 
court may also direct payment to either party for such purpose of any sum due 
and owing from any person.

 
 
[¶14]   We have previously interpreted this 
statutory language "as authorizing the reimbursement of a party's attorney's 
fees in proceedings to modify or enforce divorce decrees, as well as in original 
actions for divorce."  Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1129 
(Wyo. 
1985).  See also Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Wyo. 1991) (statute "interpreted to authorize the reimbursement of a 
party's attorney's fees in proceedings to modify or enforce divorce decrees"); 
Haltom v. Haltom, 755 P.2d 876, 879 
(Wyo. 1988) (statute considered "as authority to award attorney's fees in an 
action for divorce or any continuing litigation of such action"); Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883, 886 
(Wyo. 1977); Karns v. Karns, 511 P.2d 955, 958 (Wyo. 1973); and Ulrich v. 
Ulrich, 366 P.2d 999, 1002 (Wyo. 1961).  This approach clearly anticipates that a 
court may, in its discretion, award attorney's fees and costs to a party in such 
a proceeding subsequent to the entry of the original divorce decree or 
judgment.  See, for example, Rocha v. Rocha, 925 P.2d 231, 233-34 (Wyo. 1996) (custody modification); Delgado v. Delgado, 773 P.2d 446, 448-49 
(Wyo. 1989) (recognizing statutory authority for award of attorney's fees in 
contempt proceeding to enforce visitation rights, but remanding for more 
evidence on the amount and reasonableness of attorney's fees and costs); and  Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Wyo. 1978) (fees awarded for appeal of divorce 
decree).

 
 
[¶15]   Our decision in Haltom is noteworthy.  In that case, the parties had been 
"granted a dissolution of marriage, and a stipulated judgment was entered" by a 
California 
court, which judgment "incorporated by reference the parties' marital and 
property settlement agreement."  Haltom, 755 P.2d  at 877.  The husband subsequently registered the 
California judgment in Wyoming.  Each party then asked a Wyoming district court to enforce the California judgment 
against the other party, particularly with respect to ordering the transfer of 
money and other personal property.  
Id.  The district court resolved the issues 
presented by the parties and awarded the wife $1,502 in attorney's fees and 
costs, as well as accruing attorney's fees.  Id. 
at 877-78.  On appeal, we reversed 
the district court's decision to the extent that it improperly modified the 
California judgment, found that the husband was estopped from claiming an 
interest in some property because he had not complied with the California 
judgment, and upheld the award of attorney's fees and costs to the wife pursuant 
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111.  
Id. at 
878-79.

 
 
[¶16]   The Nebraska Supreme Court 
similarly applied statutory language nearly identical to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-111 in Miller v. Miller, 71 N.W.2d 478 (Neb. 1955).  In Miller, 71 N.W.2d  at 479, the district 
court granted the wife a divorce and ordered the husband to pay the wife 
alimony.  The wife later requested 
that the district court award her attorney's fees "incurred . . . in enforcing 
collection'" of the alimony.  
Id. at 480.  The district court granted this request 
and awarded the wife $1,500 in attorney's fees.  Id.  The husband appealed the district 
court's decision and the Nebraska Supreme Court's reasoning was, in pertinent 
part, as follows:

 
 
            
Appellant [the husband] argues that there was no proceeding in court 
incidental to procuring satisfaction of the alimony judgment and that there is 
neither statute nor uniform course of procedure which authorizes the allowance 
made to appellee [the wife].  This 
contention may not be sustained.  If 
a defendant in a divorce case fails to satisfy a judgment for alimony rendered 
therein in favor of the plaintiff according to its terms, and the plaintiff 
employs counsel to enforce it and this is accomplished with or without court 
proceeding, the court in which the judgment was rendered has discretionary power 
by virtue of section 42-308, R.R.S.1943, to require the defendant to pay to the 
plaintiff a reasonable sum as compensation for the services of her counsel in 
obtaining satisfaction of the judgment.  
The relevant part of section 42-308, R.R.S.1943, provides:  "In every suit brought * * * for a 
divorce * * * the court may, in its discretion, require the husband to pay any 
sum necessary to enable the wife to carry on or defend the suit during its 
pendency; and it may decree costs against either party * * * ."  In Lippincott v. Lippincott, 152 Neb. 
374, 41 N.W.2d 232, 235, it is said:  "* * * the trial court has discretionary 
power and authority in a divorce action to require the husband to pay any sum 
necessary to enable the wife to carry on or defend the suit during its pendency, 
and decree costs against either party.  
Section 42-308, R.S.1943.  
Actions for divorce are conducted in the same manner as other suits in 
courts of equity, and the trial court has authority to decree costs and enforce 
its decrees as in other cases.  
Section 42-307, R.S.Supp., 1949.  
* * *  The action at bar was 
* * * a proceeding in the original action during its pendency, to obtain an 
allowance of expenses and attorneys' fees as a judgm[e]nt for costs, 
necessitated in order to enforce and make effective the provisions of the 
court's decree, which defendant had * * * refused to perform * * * .  In that connection, the court retained 
jurisdiction of the divorce proceedings at all times, whether the decree so 
provided or not, to enforce its decree with regard to compliance with the award 
of alimony.  * * *  Contrary to defendant's contention, 
dissolution of the marital relations by the divorce decree did not terminate the 
authority of the court to allow such expenses and attorneys' fees."  . . .

 
 

Id. at 
483-84 (internal citations omitted).  See also Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 308 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).   

 
 
[¶17]   In the instant case, it is apparent 
from the record (including the accounting and itemized legal bills Wife 
submitted to the district court, as well as Wife's testimony) that Wife incurred 
the attorney's fees and costs at issue while attempting to enforce the district 
court's judgment against Husband.  
Husband does not argue otherwise.  
Wife's efforts were occasioned by Husband's continued failure to comply 
with the judgment and have been further complicated by Husband's fraudulent 
conduct leading up to the divorce proceedings.  We conclude that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-111, as previously interpreted or applied in our decisions, authorized the 
district court to award Wife attorney's fees and costs for this 
purpose.

 
 
[¶18]   Husband also claims, in six 
sentences of argument in his appellate brief, that Wife failed to demonstrate 
that most of the attorney's fees and costs the district court awarded her were 
reasonable.7  It is true that the "party seeking to 
recover attorney's fees bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of 
the fees and must submit an itemized bill reflecting the time and rate 
charged."  Black v. De Black, 1 P.3d 1244, 1252 
(Wyo. 2000).  In that regard, we 
note that Wife testified extensively about the fees during the hearing in this 
matter and submitted itemized bills for the attorney's fees and costs she 
claimed.  She also filed the 
affidavit of an attorney who reviewed these bills (which bills total 
approximately 104 pages), consulted Wife about the bills, and stated that such 
fees and costs were reasonable.  
That evidence essentially remains undisputed in the record.8

 
 
[¶19]   We have said that the 
"determination of reasonableness is within the exercised discretion of the trial 
court."  UNC Teton Exploration Drilling v. 
Peyton, 774 P.2d 584, 595 (Wyo. 1989).  On appeal, the "burden is placed upon 
the party who is attacking the trial court's ruling to establish an abuse of 
discretion, and the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did."  Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 
862 (Wyo. 
1997) (appeal concerning reasonableness of attorney's fees).  Husband's appellate argument consists of 
several general, conclusory statements such as:  1) attorney's fees "must have some 
reasonable connection to the work accomplished, and the result obtained for the 
client"; 2) "there is nothing novel or difficult about drafting a garnishment 
notice and serving it on a bank"; and 3) it is "difficult to understand how a 
Wyoming attorney and financial advisor can render an opinion about the 
reasonableness of attorney time and fees in the Bahamas."  Beyond that, the only pertinent legal 
authority that Husband cites is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126.9  Husband merely states that this statute 
provides "as much guidance as any case law might regarding the determination of 
reasonable' attorney fees" but does not endeavor substantively to analyze the 
factors listed therein in light of the particular evidence received in the 
instant case.  Husband did not present a sufficiently cogent appellate argument to establish 
that the district court abused its discretion in the instant case.  Accordingly, we will not consider this 
issue further, and the district 
court is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1For a 
detailed account of the manner in which the parties accumulated the marital 
estate, see Breitenstine v. 
Breitenstine, 2003 WY 16, ¶¶ 3-6, 62 P.3d 587, 589-90 (Wyo. 
2003).

  

2The 
district court stated that Husband "is a person of some wealth, having an 
interest in real property, stocks, bonds and other securities, trusts, cash and 
various other assets."

 
 

3Wife 
testified that Husband's mother "arranged to pay the child support to have the 
warrant lifted so that [Husband] could come back to the United 
States."

 
 

4The 
$433,017.96 apparently included the $241,000 the district court awarded Wife in 
the prior proceeding.

  

5The 
Bahamas figure prominently in this case.  
After the parties had accumulated substantial assets, Husband "wanted to 
move offshore" in "an effort to minimize taxes," so the parties moved to the 
Bahamas in 1989.  Breitenstine, ¶ 4, 62 P.3d  at 589.  Wife testified that they bought some 
property, including a home and a villa, during the marriage and proceeded to 
live in the Bahamas for about eight years.  However, the Bahamas 
is also where Husband engaged in the fraudulent conduct we previously detailed 
herein, including his transfer of substantial assets into an asset protection 
trust and other entities.

 
 

6She was 
also required to retain an additional Bahamas attorney "from the Queen's Council 
because we were going to have to go to the supreme court in the Bahamas."  According to Wife, this attorney was one 
of only three such attorneys in the Bahamas.

 
 

7Husband's 
counsel stated in the district court that he did not question the reasonableness 
of the fees and costs billed by Wife's Wyoming counsel.

 
 

8Husband's 
counsel cross-examined Wife but did not offer any evidence of his own at the 
hearing, and Husband did not personally appear at the hearing.  Based on our review of the record, none 
of the information Husband's counsel elicited during the hearing contradicted or 
impeached Wife's testimony, the accounting, the itemized bills, or the 
attorney's affidavit.

 
 

9This 
statute lists several factors that a district court may consider in awarding 
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a civil action.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b) (LexisNexis 
2005).