Case Title: Simms v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 78/14

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2015-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Joseph E. Simms v. State of Maryland 
No. 78, September Term 2014 
 
 
Criminal Procedure – Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statute – Withdrawal of 
Appointed Counsel.   Counsel appointed for an indigent petitioner in connection 
with a proceeding under the post-conviction DNA testing statute may seek to 
withdraw his or her appearance.  Such a motion is best considered under the rule 
governing withdrawal of an attorney’s appearance in a civil case (Maryland Rule 2-
132) rather than the rule governing withdrawal of defense counsel in a criminal case 
(Maryland Rule 4-214(d)).  In this case, the Circuit Court acted within its discretion 
under Rule 2-132 when it granted the motion.  Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure 
Article, §8-201; Maryland Rule 2-132. 
 
 
Criminal Procedure – Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statute – Appointment 
of Counsel.  A circuit court has discretion under Maryland Rule 4-707(b), as 
construed in Fuster v. State, 437 Md. 653, 89 A.3d 1114 (2014), to appoint counsel for 
an indigent petitioner in a proceeding under the post-conviction DNA testing statute.  
In this case, the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to appoint 
new counsel for a petitioner who already had the benefit of appointed counsel in 
seeking the testing of evidence that was later determined to have been destroyed.   
Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article, §8-201; Maryland Rule 4-707(b).  
 
 
Criminal Procedure – Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statute – Reasonable 
Probability Determination.  In light of the documentation produced by the State 
that the evidence that the petitioner sought to test had been destroyed long ago, the 
Circuit Court was not clearly erroneous when it determined that there was no 
reasonable probability that a search of a database or further proceedings under the 
post-conviction DNA testing statute would produce exculpatory or mitigating 
evidence for the petitioner.  Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article, §8-201. 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No.: 196029012,13 
Argued:  September 9, 2015 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 78 
September Term, 2014 
 
 
JOSEPH E. SIMMS 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
 
Battaglia 
 
Greene 
 
Adkins 
 
McDonald 
 
Watts 
Harrell, Jr., Glenn T., 
  
(Retired, Specially          
Assigned), 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by McDonald, J. 
 
 
 
Filed: November 23, 2015 
 
 
 
In this case, both sides have sought to prove a negative.  The Appellant, Joseph 
E. Simms, was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses in 1996.  In 2008, 
well after his conviction had become final, he embarked on an effort under the post-
conviction DNA testing statute, Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”), 
§8-201, to prove that one item of the prosecution’s evidence – socks he had allegedly 
worn at the time of the murders – lacked his DNA.  The State ultimately responded 
with documentation that the socks no longer existed, having been destroyed long ago, 
along with other items seized in the case after his conviction had become final.  Mr. 
Simms apparently accepted the fact that the socks had been destroyed and 
unsuccessfully pursued other post-conviction relief for several years on the theory 
that the socks had been destroyed in bad faith. 
This case arose when Mr. Simms sought to reopen the proceedings under CP 
§8-201 and obtain a hearing to explore the circumstances of the destruction of the 
socks. The pro bono counsel who had assisted him in the earlier proceedings under 
that statute moved to strike their appearance.  The Circuit Court granted the motion 
to withdraw and denied Mr. Simms’ request for new court-appointed counsel.  The 
Circuit Court also turned down his request to conduct further proceedings under the 
post-conviction DNA testing statute. 
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the rulings of the Circuit Court. 
2 
 
I 
Background 
 
We describe first the post-conviction DNA testing statute that is the basis for 
this proceeding and then the factual and procedural history of this particular case. 
A. 
The Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statute 
In 2001, the General Assembly enacted the post-conviction DNA testing 
statute to provide a mechanism for a person who has been convicted of certain serious 
crimes to obtain exculpatory or mitigating evidence through DNA testing of items 
related to that conviction.  Chapter 418, Laws of Maryland 2001, codified as later 
amended at CP §8-201; see Thompson v. State, 395 Md. 240, 252-53, 909 A.2d 1035 
(2006).  In 2009, this Court adopted rules to govern proceedings under the statute.  
Maryland Rules 4-701 et seq. 
Petition, Answer, and Court Action 
Under the statute, a convicted person may ask a circuit court to order testing 
of “scientific identification evidence” – that is, evidence in the possession of the State 
related to the individual’s prosecution that contains biological evidence in which there 
may be DNA.  See CP §8-201(b)(1)1; CP §8-201(a)(5) (definition of “scientific 
                                            
1 In particular, the statute provides: 
 
(b) Notwithstanding any other law governing postconviction relief, a 
person who is convicted of [certain crimes] may file a petition: 
 
(1) for DNA testing of scientific identification evidence that the 
State possesses … that is related to the judgment of conviction; or 
 
3 
 
identification evidence”); Maryland Rules 4-703, 4-704.   The petition may also seek 
to have a law enforcement agency search a data base or log to identify the source of 
physical evidence used for DNA testing.  CP §8-201(b)(2). 
A copy of the petition is to be provided to the State.  CP §8-201(e); Maryland 
Rule 4-705.   The State is to file an answer to the petition that states, among other 
things, the existence, location, and amenability to testing of the evidence specified in 
the petition.  Maryland Rule 4-706(c).  If the evidence is missing or has been 
destroyed, the State is to provide certain details as to its search or the circumstances 
of the destruction.  Id.  The petitioner may then file a response to the State’s answer 
contesting the accuracy or the adequacy of the State’s answer, and requesting a 
search of other databases or logs.  Maryland Rule 4-708. 
 
Upon consideration of the filings, the Court may dismiss the petition in certain 
circumstances.  Maryland Rule 4-707(a).  If it does not dismiss the petition, it may 
appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner.  Maryland Rule 4-707(b); Fuster v. State, 
437 Md. 653, 668, 89 A.3d 1114 (2014).  In certain circumstances, the court must hold 
a hearing on the petition.  Maryland Rule 4-709.2 
                                            
(2) for a search by a law enforcement agency of a law enforcement 
data base or log for the purpose of identifying the source of physical 
evidence used for DNA testing. 
 
CP §8-201(b). 
 
 
2 Maryland Rule 4-709(a) provides, in pertinent part:  
 
 
(a) 
When required.  Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (b)(2) of this Rule, the court shall hold a hearing if, from the 
petition, answer, and any response, the court finds that the petitioner 
4 
 
The court is to order DNA testing of the physical evidence if the State agrees 
to the testing.  Maryland Rule 4-710(a)(2)(A)(i).  The court is also to order testing if it 
finds: 
(i) 
a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing 
has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or 
mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful 
conviction or sentencing; and  
 
(ii) 
the requested DNA test employs a method of testing 
generally accepted within the relevant scientific 
community. 
 
                                            
has standing to file the petition and the petition is filed in the 
appropriate court, and finds one of the following: 
 
       
 
(1)  
specific scientific identification evidence exists or 
may exist that is related to the judgment of conviction, a method of DNA 
testing of the evidence may exist that is generally accepted within the 
relevant scientific community, and there is or may be a reasonable 
probability that the testing has the scientific potential to produce 
exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful 
conviction or sentencing; 
 
 
 
(2)  
if the State contends that it has been unable to locate 
the evidence, there is a genuine dispute as to whether the State’s search 
was adequate; 
 
 
 
(3) 
if the State contends that the evidence existed or 
may have existed but was destroyed, there is a genuine dispute whether 
the destruction was in conformance with any relevant governing 
protocols or was otherwise lawful.  
 
 
 
(4) 
the State is unable to produce scientific evidence 
that the State was required to preserve pursuant to Code, Criminal 
Procedure Article, §8-201(i)(1); or 
 
 
 
(5) 
there is some other genuine dispute as to whether 
DNA testing or a DNA database or log search by a law enforcement 
agency should be ordered. 
 
5 
 
CP §8-201(d)(1); see also Maryland Rule 4-710(a)(2)(A)(ii).  In addition, the court is to 
order a database search by a law enforcement agency if the court finds that “a 
reasonable probability exists that the database search will produce exculpatory or 
mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing.”  CP §8-
201(d)(2).3  The court is also to deny the petition if it concludes that there is no 
reasonable probability that DNA testing has the potential to produce exculpatory or 
mitigating evidence.  Maryland Rule 4-710(a)(1)(B).4 
 
Resolving the Adequacy of the State’s Search 
 
If the State has been unable to locate the evidence and there is a genuine 
dispute at to the adequacy of its search, the court must conduct a hearing.  Maryland 
Rule 4-709(a)(2).  Similarly, a hearing must be conducted if the evidence was 
                                            
 
3 We note that paragraph (2) of subsection (d) – along with the related 
paragraph (2) of subsection (b) − was added to the statute shortly after Mr. Simms 
filed the petition that is the basis of this action.  Chapter 337, Laws of Maryland 2008.  
To the extent that paragraph (2) may be pertinent to this case, we note that this Court 
has previously held that a provision of the DNA testing statute concerning the 
conditions for requiring testing may be applied retroactively in light of the procedural 
and remedial nature of the statute.  See Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 714-16, 976 A.2d 
999 (2009). 
 
 
We also note that the Legislature amended the statute during the pendency of 
this appeal, largely to expand the class of persons who may file a petition for DNA 
testing by adding other offenses to the list of qualifying convictions.  Chapter 396, 
Laws of Maryland 2015.  As Mr. Simms was already eligible to file a petition under 
the prior version of the statute, the 2015 amendment has no bearing on this case.  
  
      
4 The court is also to deny the petition if the proposed method of testing is not 
generally accepted in the scientific community.  Maryland Rule 4-710(a)(1)(B).  There 
does not appear to be any issue in this case concerning the proposed method of testing. 
 
6 
 
destroyed and there is a genuine dispute over the lawfulness of the destruction.  
Maryland Rule 4-709(a)(3).  
 
If the petitioner challenges the adequacy of the State’s search, the State has 
the burden of establishing that it conducted a reasonable search for the evidence.   If 
the State is unable to locate the evidence, it is to submit a detailed affidavit 
concerning its search for the evidence.  Maryland Rule 4-706(c)(2)(B).    
If the evidence has been destroyed, the State is to submit an affidavit 
containing a description of relevant protocols and legal requirements, stating 
whether the destruction complied with those requirements, and documenting the 
destruction.  Maryland Rule 4-706(c)(2)(C); see also Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 503-
4, 929 A.2d 501 (2007) (“Because the State was the custodian of evidence, the State 
needs to check any place the evidence could reasonably be found, unless there is a 
written record that the evidence had been destroyed in accordance with then existing 
protocol.”) (emphasis added).  The State must make “a prima facie case, either directly 
or circumstantially, that the requested scientific identification evidence no longer 
exists….”  Washington v. State, 424 Md. 632, 651, 37 A.3d 932 (2012); Johnson v. 
State, 440 Md. 559, 568, 103 A.3d 650 (2014).  If the State establishes that it has 
conducted a reasonable search, either by documenting the destruction of the evidence 
or by demonstrating that a diligent search has proved fruitless, the State has satisfied 
its burden of persuasion.  Arey, 400 Md. at 505.   
 
If the court finds that the State has conducted an adequate search and that the 
evidence sought to be tested is not within its possession and was not “intentionally 
7 
 
and willfully destroyed,” the court is to deny the petition.  Maryland Rule 4-
710(a)(1)(A).   
 
State’s Obligation to Preserve Evidence 
 
The statute requires the State to preserve scientific identification evidence 
that may be subject to testing under the statute for a defined period of time and 
creates procedures for the earlier disposal of such evidence.  CP §8-201(j), (k)(1)-(4).  
If evidence that should have been preserved is unavailable as a result of “intentional 
and willful destruction,” the court is to infer that testing would have been favorable 
to the petitioner.  CP §8-201(j)(3)(ii); Maryland Rule 4-710(a)(3).   
 
The State’s preservation obligation is not retroactive – i.e., it applies only to 
evidence in possession of the State on or after October 1, 2001, the date the statute 
became effective. Washington, 424 Md. at 666-67; Chapter 418, §§2, 3, Laws of 
Maryland 2001. 
 
Post-Testing Actions 
If the court orders DNA testing, depending on the results of the test, the court 
will either dismiss the petition, open post-conviction proceedings, or order a new trial.  
CP §8-201(i); Maryland Rule 4-711. 
 
Other Provisions 
 
Other provisions of the statute concern the timing of the testing and the 
allocation of the costs of testing.  CP §8-201(g),(h).  An appeal from an order issued in 
a proceeding under the post-conviction DNA testing statute is taken directly to this 
Court.  CP §8-201(k)(6).   
8 
 
B. 
Factual and Procedural History  
 
1. 
Trial, Sentencing, Appeal, and Post-Conviction Petition 
On the morning of December 13, 1995, the bodies of Mr. Simms’ former 
girlfriend, Belinda Baynor, and Peter W. Williams were discovered inside Mr. 
Williams’ house.5  Both victims had died from stab wounds.  Law enforcement officers 
found Mr. Simms at the crime scene.  They took Mr. Simms to the police station for 
questioning.  At the police station, Mr. Simms admitted that he had visited the 
Williams residence the prior evening and had quarreled with Ms. Baynor.  He also 
admitted to a prior altercation with Mr. Williams.  The police tested the hair on Mr. 
Simms’ hand, as well as his right hand, for the presence of blood.  Both tests yielded 
positive results.  Mr. Simms was charged with the murders of Ms. Baynor and Mr. 
Williams and additional weapons-related offenses.   
At trial, the State introduced into evidence several articles of clothing − 
including a jacket, boots, socks, and a towel − that had been found in a trash bag close 
to the home of Mr. Simms’ aunt.  The aunt testified that she observed Mr. Simms 
acting nervously and wearing those clothes in the early morning hours of December 
13, 1995.   The State also presented expert testimony that the clothing had blood 
stains with DNA profiles that matched those of Mr. Williams and Ms. Baynor. 
                                            
 
5 This summary is derived in part from the recent decision by the Court of 
Special Appeals concerning its disposition of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed by Mr. Simms.  Simms v. Shearin, 221 Md. App. 460, 463-64, 109 A.3d 1215 
(2015).   
9 
 
On April 6, 1998, the jury convicted Mr. Simms of two counts of first degree 
murder and two counts of weapons-related offenses.  He was sentenced to two 
consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  Mr. 
Simms appealed.  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions in an 
unreported opinion in 1999.  Mr. Simms subsequently sought post-conviction relief, 
basing his petition on a long list of contentions concerning alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.  His post-conviction petition was 
denied by the Circuit Court in a thorough opinion filed in June 2001 addressing each 
of his issues.6  
 
2. 
Petition for DNA Testing 
 
On January 7, 2008, Mr. Simms filed a pro se petition for relief pursuant to CP 
§8-201.  He alleged that a more sophisticated DNA test7 of the clothes found in a trash 
bag near his aunt’s home that the State introduced into evidence at trial would 
establish that he had never worn those clothes.   Mr. Simms alleged that he has dry 
                                            
 
6 The Court of Special Appeals denied his application for leave to appeal the 
Circuit Court’s decision.  The Circuit Court later denied his motion to reopen the post-
conviction proceeding. 
   
 
7 In his petition, Mr. Simms alleged that the State had conducted DNA testing 
under the restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) method with 
inconclusive results.  According to a copy of a police lab report attached to the petition, 
the State had also conducted DNA testing by the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
method.  Based on the PCR test, the analyst concluded that the blood stain on the 
jacket matched Ms. Baynor’s DNA profile.  Mr. Simms asserted that DNA testing by 
the STR (short tandem repeats) method would support his contention that he was 
innocent, presumably by showing that someone else – or at least not Mr. Simms – 
had worn the socks found in the trash bag. 
 
10 
 
peeling skin on his lower legs as a result of a degenerative skin condition (relying on 
a prison medical record that described him as having that condition in 2007) and that, 
as a result, some of his epithelial cells would be found on the socks if he had worn 
them at the time of the murders in 1995.  He sought a DNA test to prove that the 
socks from the trash bag did not contain any of his epithelial cells.   In the petition, 
he also asked the court to appoint counsel for him. 
The Circuit Court summarily denied Mr. Simms’ petition without requiring the 
State to respond.  Mr. Simms appealed to this Court, which held that his pro se 
petition, when liberally construed, presented a prima facie case for DNA testing and 
therefore should not have been denied summarily.  Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 733, 
976 A.2d 1012 (2009).  The Court remanded the case to the Circuit Court with 
directions to require the State to respond to the petition, to allow Mr. Simms’ 
attorney8 to reply to the State’s response, and to hold a hearing if necessary to resolve 
any disputes material to the disposition of the petition.  The Court cautioned that it 
was not directing the Circuit Court to grant the relief sought in the petition.  409 Md. 
at 734.  
On remand, at the request of the Public Defender, pro bono attorneys from the 
University of Baltimore School of Law Innocence Project Clinic – Michele Nethercott, 
the clinic’s director, and Justin Esworthy – represented Mr. Simms in his quest for 
DNA testing.  The State apparently did not oppose DNA testing of the socks.  On July 
                                            
 
8 The Court noted in its opinion that the Public Defender, which had 
represented Mr. Simms in the appeal, had agreed to represent him on the remand.    
11 
 
16, 2010, the Circuit Court held a brief hearing.  At the hearing, the Assistant State’s 
Attorney advised that the socks themselves had been destroyed, but that “cuttings” 
from the socks that still existed were being made available for the DNA testing 
requested by Mr. Simms.  Appearing on behalf of Mr. Simms, Mr. Esworthy advised 
the Circuit Court that the lab was not expected to have results for approximately two 
months.  The Circuit Court directed Mr. Esworthy to provide a status report and to 
request a further hearing upon receipt of the lab results.   
On March 3, 2011, the State filed an affidavit by Sgt. Larry Bazzle, the 
custodian of records for the Evidence Control Unit of the Baltimore Police 
Department.  In the affidavit, Sgt. Bazzle stated that he had determined from a 
review of the unit’s records that the socks recovered from the trash bag had been 
destroyed on October 23, 2000, along with the other evidence obtained from the trash 
bags, in accordance with the existing protocols of the unit.  Attached to the affidavit 
was supporting documentation, including a copy of the police report concerning 
seizure of the evidence, a property sheet listing the evidence obtained from the bags, 
chain of custody reports concerning those items and recording their destruction, and 
a report listing the status of various items of evidence.   
Shortly thereafter, on March 15, 2011, Mr. Esworthy sent a status report to 
the Circuit Court.  He informed the court that it had been determined that the 
cuttings that had been sent to the lab were not from the socks that Mr. Simms sought 
12 
 
to have tested.9   He stated that a further search had determined that the correct pair 
of socks had been destroyed on October 23, 2000, after Mr. Simms’ conviction had 
been affirmed on direct appeal, and referenced Sgt. Bazzle’s affidavit.  In light of this 
development, Mr. Esworthy explained that “we will not be pursuing any further 
action on behalf of Mr. Simms at this time.”  Mr. Esworthy also informed Mr. Simms 
of the destruction of the socks and his view that there was nothing more to be done 
in the case under the post-conviction DNA testing statute.10  Mr. Simms did not take 
any action then – or for the next two and a half years – to question the fact that the 
particular evidence he sought to have tested no longer existed. 
An outside observer might well have concluded that the proceeding under the 
post-conviction DNA testing statute was over.  The Circuit Court apparently did.  On 
September 28, 2011, it closed the case.  
 
3. 
Habeas Corpus Petition Based on Destruction of Socks 
 
While he did not pursue further action in the proceeding under CP §8-201, Mr. 
Simms did institute a separate action seeking relief based on the destruction of the 
socks.  On August 1, 2011, he filed a pro se petition in the Circuit Court for a writ of 
                                            
 
9 The letter does not elaborate on how it was determined that the cuttings came 
from the incorrect pair of socks. 
 
10 Mr. Esworthy’s communication with Mr. Simms does not appear in the 
record of this case, although there appears to be no dispute that Mr. Esworthy notified 
Mr. Simms at that time.  The letter is referenced in the opinion of the Court of Special 
Appeals in his appeal of the denial of his habeas corpus petition.  Simms v. Shearin, 
221 Md. App. 460, 465, 109 A.3d 1215 (2015).  In addition, Mr. Simms stated, in the 
motion he later filed for further relief under the post-conviction DNA testing statute, 
that he had received such a communication on March 16, 2011. 
13 
 
habeas corpus.  In that petition, he asserted that he was denied due process and equal 
protection when the State destroyed the evidence that had been admitted at trial.  He 
also asserted that the State should have notified him when it destroyed the evidence.   
The State responded to that petition.  The Circuit Court ultimately denied the 
petition in October 2012, holding that Mr. Simms failed to show that the State had 
acted in bad faith when it destroyed the socks.   
Mr. Simms, represented by the Public Defender, appealed the Circuit Court’s 
decision.  The Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal.  Simms v. Shearin, 221 
Md. 460, 479, 109 A.3d 1215 (2015).11   
 
4.     Motion for Further Relief under the Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statute 
 
On December 23, 2013, more than a year after the Circuit Court had denied 
relief to Mr. Simms with respect to his allegation that the State had improperly 
destroyed the socks, Mr. Simms seemingly reversed course and questioned whether 
the socks had been destroyed on the date set forth in the Bazzle affidavit.  He renewed 
his request for relief under the post-conviction DNA testing statute by a pro se 
“Petitioners [sic] Motion for Appropriate Relief Under DNA Postconviction State 
Section 8-201(c)(i).”   In that document, he argued that the Bazzle affidavit, which 
had been filed two years earlier, was insufficient by itself to establish when the socks 
had been destroyed or that the socks did not exist.  He asked the Circuit Court to hold 
a hearing and to appoint counsel for him.  
                                            
11 The intermediate appellate court held that Mr. Simms’ only avenue of appeal 
from the Circuit Court ruling would be under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure 
Act (UPPA), CP §7-101 et seq., but that the UPPA did not authorize his appeal.   
14 
 
The Circuit Court reopened the proceeding under CP §8-201 and issued a 
scheduling order.  Although Mr. Simms had asked for appointment of counsel, the 
court appeared to assume that the Innocence Project attorneys continued to represent 
him, copying them on the scheduling order.  Soon thereafter, Ms. Nethercott informed 
Mr. Simms that she intended to withdraw the appearance of the Innocence Project 
attorneys, and filed a motion to that effect.12  
 
On May 14, 2014, the Circuit Court held a hearing to address the motion to 
withdraw the appearance of the Innocence Project attorneys, Mr. Simms’ request for 
appointment of counsel, and Mr. Simms’ motion for relief under CP §8-201.  The 
Circuit Court first granted the motion to withdraw the appearance of the Innocence 
Project attorneys and denied Mr. Simms’ motion for appointment of new counsel.   
The Court then considered the merits of Mr. Simms’ request for relief under CP §8-
201.   
                                            
12 The introductory portion of the motion literally sought to withdraw the 
appearance of “University of Baltimore Innocence Project” – an entity that technically 
could not enter an appearance, as only properly qualified attorneys may represent a 
party.  See Maryland Rules 1-311, 1-312, 2-131, cf. Gonzales v. State, 408 Md. 515, 
536-37 & n. 12, 970 A.2d 908 (2009) (“individuals rather than law firms appear on 
behalf of parties”).  The Circuit Court properly treated it as a motion to withdraw the 
appearance of the attorneys associated with the Innocence Project – Ms. Nethercott 
and Mr. Esworthy.  
 
 
The motion also purported to be filed under Maryland Rule 4-214(d) – a rule 
governing withdrawal of counsel in criminal cases.  As explained later in the text, 
Maryland Rule 2-132 is likely the more applicable rule, given that the proceeding is 
civil in nature.  Moreover, it is arguable that there was no need to withdraw the 
appearance of counsel, given the automatic termination provision of Maryland Rule 
2-132(d).  See Part II.A. of this opinion below.  
15 
 
 
Mr. Simms argued that the State had destroyed the evidence without providing 
him with 120 days’ notice, as now required by CP §8-201(k)(2).  The Assistant State’s 
Attorney responded that the evidence had been destroyed in 2000, pursuant to the 
then-current practice after the conviction had become final and before the passage or 
effective date of the 2001 legislation that enacted the post-conviction DNA testing 
statute with its preservation and notification obligations.  In response, Mr. Simms 
argued that the statutory preservation and notification obligations should be treated 
as retroactive.  He also asserted that he should have been given an opportunity to 
cross-examine Sgt. Bazzle as to the extent of the State’s search for the evidence.  
Consistent with the allegations in his habeas corpus motion, at the hearing on his 
renewed petition under CP §8-201, Mr. Simms did not dispute that the evidence had 
been destroyed.  Rather, he argued that the socks had been destroyed in bad faith.  
The Circuit Court took the motion under advisement. 
 
Three weeks later, the Circuit Court rendered its decision in a memorandum 
opinion dated June 3, 2014.   Consistent with this Court’s approach in Mr. Simms’ 
prior appeal under the post-conviction DNA testing statute, the Circuit Court 
construed his pro se motion liberally.  But, even giving his renewed petition a liberal 
reading, the court found that he was not entitled to the relief that he sought. 
 
In its opinion, the Circuit Court held that the State had made an adequate 
search for scientific identification evidence, that there was “no reasonable 
probability” that a further search would produce relevant evidence, and that the relief 
sought by Mr. Simms had already been fully granted.  With respect to Mr. Simms’ 
16 
 
assertion that the State failed to preserve evidence in compliance with the statute, 
the court noted in a footnote that the statutory obligation to preserve such evidence 
was not effective at the time of the destruction of the evidence sought by Mr. Simms.   
Mr. Simms appealed that decision directly to this Court.  His pro se notice of 
appeal, filed July 1, 2014, appeared to raise, as its primary argument, the question 
whether the socks had actually been destroyed.  It also reiterated his contention – 
made in his habeas corpus petition and at the hearing on his motion under CP §8-201 
– that the evidence had been destroyed in bad faith.  Before us, Mr. Simms was 
represented by able and experienced pro bono counsel. 
II 
Discussion 
In this appeal we must decide the following questions:   
1 - Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion when it granted the motion of the 
Innocence Project counsel to strike their appearance?  
2 - Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion when it declined to appoint new 
counsel for Mr. Simms?  
3 - Was the Circuit Court clearly erroneous when it declined to order relief 
under CP §8-201?  
 
The answer to all of these questions is “no.” 
 
 
17 
 
A. 
Motion to Strike Appearance 
 
At the outset, there is some confusion as to what rule and standards govern a 
motion by counsel to withdraw from representation of a petitioner in a proceeding 
under CP §8-201.  Like other post-conviction proceedings, it has a hybrid nature.  On 
the one hand, courts frequently refer to post-conviction proceedings as “separate and 
distinct civil procedure[s]).”  E.g., Ruby v. State, 353 Md. 100, 107, 724 A.2d 673 
(1999).  Yet some of the rules governing such proceedings, including the rules 
governing proceedings under the post-conviction DNA testing statute, are codified in 
a title of the Maryland Rules called “Criminal Causes.”  See Maryland Rules, Title 4, 
Chapters 400, 700.13   Cf.  Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969) (although 
habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as “civil,” the label is “gross and inexact” 
as such a proceeding is essentially “unique.”) 
 
The Motion to Strike Appearance filed by the Innocence Project counsel was 
purported to be made under Rule 4-214(d),14 a rule governing withdrawal of a defense 
                                            
13 Rules concerning habeas corpus and coram nobis – the post-conviction 
remedies with Latin names – appear in the Special Proceedings title.  See Maryland 
Rules, Title 15, Chapters 300, 1200. 
 
14  The rule provides: 
 
(d)  Striking appearance.  A motion to withdraw the 
appearance of counsel shall be made in writing or in the presence of the 
defendant in open court.  If the motion is in writing, moving counsel 
shall certify that a written notice of intention to withdraw appearance 
was sent to the defendant at least ten days before the filing of the 
motion….  If no other counsel has entered an appearance for the 
defendant, leave to withdraw may be granted only by order of court.  The 
court may refuse to leave to withdraw an appearance if it would unduly 
delay the trial of the action, would be prejudicial to any of the parties, 
18 
 
counsel in a criminal case.  That rule requires an oral motion in the presence of “the 
defendant,” or a written motion served on “the defendant” at least 10 days before the 
filing of the motion.  If no other attorney is entering an appearance to replace the 
departing defense attorney, the motion to withdraw the attorney’s appearance may 
be accomplished only by court order and the court must then conduct proceedings 
under Rule 4-215 governing unrepresented criminal defendants.  The court may 
refuse to permit withdrawal if it would unduly delay trial, would be prejudicial to a 
party, or otherwise would not be in the interest of justice.  The safeguards in this rule 
are obviously designed to vindicate a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to 
counsel – a right not implicated in a post-conviction proceeding.  
 
A better fit is Maryland Rule 2-132, which governs a motion to strike an 
attorney’s appearance in a civil case.   That rule allows for withdrawal by a simple 
notice if the client has another attorney of record.  Rule 2-132(a).  In a situation like 
the instant case, where a substitute attorney is not entering an appearance, the 
departing attorney must file a motion.  Rule 2-132(b).15  If the motion is not 
                                            
or otherwise would not be in the interest of justice.  If leave is granted 
and the defendant is not represented, a subpoena or other writ shall be 
issued and served on the defendant for an appearance before the court 
for proceedings pursuant to Rule 4-215. 
 
15 At the time, the Innocence Project counsel asked to withdraw their 
appearance, Rule 2-132(b) provided: 
 
 
(b)  By motion.  When the client has no other attorney of record, 
an attorney wishing to withdraw an appearance shall file a motion to 
withdraw.  Except when the motion is made in open court, the motion 
shall be accompanied by the client’s written consent to the withdrawal 
or the moving attorney’s certificate that notice has been mailed to the 
19 
 
accompanied by the client’s written consent, the withdrawing attorney must provide 
the client with notice at least five days advance notice of the filing of the motion and 
advise the client to have another attorney enter an appearance or to notify the clerk 
that the client intends to proceed pro se.   After the attorney submits the motion, the 
court may deny the motion if the withdrawal would cause undue delay, prejudice, or 
injustice.  The rule also provides for the automatic withdrawal of an attorney’s 
appearance in a case when no appeal is taken from a final judgment in the case.  Rule 
2-132(d).   
Although the attorneys from the Innocence Project formally filed their motion 
under Rule 4-214(d), we assess the disposition of that motion under Rule 2-132.  A 
circuit court’s decision to grant a motion to withdraw is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Serio v. Baystate Properties, LLC, 209 Md. App. 545, 554, 60 
A.3d 475 (2013).  “An abuse of discretion occurs ‘where no reasonable person would 
take the view adopted by the court’ or if the court acts ‘without reference to any 
guiding rules or principles.’” Id. (quoting North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 13, 648 A.2d 
1025 (1994).   
                                            
client at least five days prior to the filing of the motion, informing the 
client of the attorney’s intention to move for withdrawal and advising 
the client to have another attorney enter an appearance or to notify the 
clerk in writing of the client’s intention to proceed in proper person.  
Unless the motion is granted in open court, the court may not order the 
appearance stricken before the expiration of the time prescribed by in 
Rule 2-311 for responding.  The court may deny the motion if withdrawal 
of the appearance would cause undue delay, prejudice, or injustice.  
The rule was amended slightly in 2015 to take account of a simultaneous amendment 
to Rule 2-131(b) that allows for an attorney to enter a limited appearance under 
certain conditions. 
20 
 
 
In our view, the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the 
motion of the Innocence Project counsel to withdraw their appearance.  Everyone, 
including Mr. Simms, appears to have treated the determination, in early 2011, that 
the socks and other items recovered from the trash bag had been destroyed as the 
conclusion of the proceeding under CP §8-201.  Had that conclusion been embodied 
in a court order at the time, the appearance of the Innocence Project attorneys would 
have automatically terminated under Rule 2-132(d).  Indeed, in his “Motion for 
Appropriate Relief” to reopen the proceedings under CP §8-201 filed two and a half 
years later, Mr. Simms appeared to believe he was unrepresented as he requested 
appointment of counsel.  
When it became apparent that the court was under the impression that the 
Innocence Project attorneys still represented Mr. Simms, counsel sought to withdraw 
their appearance in a way that complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 2-
132(b).  They filed a motion to withdraw their appearance.  They advised Mr. Simms 
in writing a month in advance of filing the motion of their intentions.  That motion 
recounted the history of their representation of Mr. Simms, including the fact that 
they had advised Mr. Simms more than two and a half years earlier that they would 
not pursue further relief under the post-conviction DNA testing statute on his behalf.     
 
The main proposition that Mr. Simms sought to pursue in his “Motion for 
Appropriate Relief” – whether the State had destroyed the evidence in violation of 
the later-enacted post-conviction DNA testing statute – was not the issue for which 
counsel had originally been appointed and was at odds with their representation to 
21 
 
the court that they would not be seeking further relief under the post-conviction DNA 
testing statute.  At the hearing, the Circuit Court noted the representation by the 
Innocence Project counsel that the issue for which they had been appointed had been 
resolved.   It was well within the discretion of the Circuit Court to conclude that the 
granting of the motion would not cause undue delay, prejudice, or injustice.   
Mr. Simms does not identify any particular prejudice that he suffered as a 
result of the withdrawal of the Innocence Project attorneys.  As noted above, they had 
not filed the motion he was seeking to litigate.  At most, he suggests that either Ms. 
Nethercott or Mr. Esworthy may have known the location of other items available for 
testing.  That speculation, again, is contradicted by their representations to the 
Circuit Court and Mr. Simms that further efforts under the CP §8-201 would not be 
fruitful. 
 
In sum, the hearing judge did not abuse his discretion when he granted the 
motion of pro bono counsel to withdraw.   
B. 
Motion to Appoint Counsel 
Maryland Rule 4-707(b) governs appointment of counsel in proceedings under 
the post-conviction DNA testing statute.  That rule provides as follows: 
Appointment of Counsel.  If the court finds that a petitioner who has 
requested the appointment of counsel is indigent, the court shall appoint 
counsel within 30 days after the State has filed its answer unless (1) the 
court denies the petition as a matter of law or (2) counsel has already 
filed an appearance to represent the petitioner 
 
22 
 
Maryland Rule 4-707(b).  Although this rule uses the phrase “shall appoint,” this 
Court has held that a circuit court’s decision whether to appoint counsel is 
discretionary.  Fuster, 437 Md. at 664-69.16   
 
Mr. Simms argues that this Court’s holding in Fuster is inapplicable to his case 
because, unlike the petitioner in Fuster, he requested appointment of counsel in his 
petition.  He further argues that because the Circuit Court did not immediately deny 
his renewed petition as a matter of law, he was entitled to appointment of counsel 
under Rule 4-707(b).   
 
While it is true that the petitioner in Fuster did not request counsel, a circuit 
court’s exercise of discretion is not controlled by whether a petitioner makes a 
request.  The evident purpose of the provision for appointment of counsel is to provide 
a petitioner with the means to develop facts and legal arguments to support a petition 
for testing when the petition clears certain hurdles and the involvement of counsel 
would be beneficial to the petitioner and the court in resolving issues raised by the 
petition.  In our view, the Circuit Court retained discretion to decline to appoint new 
counsel for Mr. Simms even though he had made a request.   
Here, the Circuit Court was faced with a petitioner who had already had the 
benefit of well-qualified and experienced counsel in pursuing DNA testing of a specific 
item of evidence – evidence that the State had established, to the satisfaction of that 
                                            
 
16 This Court recently amended Rule 4-707(b), effective January 1, 2016, to 
substitute “may” for “shall” in conformity with the holding in Fuster.  See Rules Order 
(November 19, 2015) relating to the 188th Report of the Standing Committee of Rules 
of Practice and Procedure.  
23 
 
counsel and Mr. Simms (at least for some period of time), no longer existed.  Moreover, 
when Mr. Simms changed course before the Circuit Court to question the legality and 
timing of the destruction of the evidence, he suggested no basis for contradicting the 
detailed documentation provided by the State.  A circuit court is not required to 
second-guess counsel or to indulge every speculation a petitioner might wish to 
pursue.  The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it should 
not deploy the limited resources available for petitioners in DNA testing cases to 
retread ground that had already been covered or to pursue a legally-doomed theory. 
C. 
Whether Mr. Simms Was Entitled to Further Relief Under CP §8-201 
 
In its memorandum opinion, the Circuit Court noted that Mr. Simms, through 
counsel, had conceded in early 2011 that the socks in question had been destroyed 
and that he had not subsequently suggested any basis for questioning the detailed 
documentation attached to the Bazzle affidavit.  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
there was no factual basis for finding a possibility, much less a reasonable probability, 
that further efforts under the post-conviction DNA testing statute would yield 
exculpatory or mitigating evidence.  The Circuit Court also held that Mr. Simms had 
failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that a further search of the law 
enforcement database would yield potentially mitigating or exculpatory evidence.   
This Court reviews a circuit court’s reasonableness determination under the 
post-conviction DNA testing statute according to a “clearly erroneous” standard.  
Johnson, 440 Md. at 570; Washington, 424 Md. at 651; Blake v. State, 418 Md. 445, 
460, 15 A.3d 787 (2011).  Under this standard, “if there is any competent evidence to 
24 
 
support the factual findings below, those findings cannot be held to be clearly 
erroneous.”  Washington, 424 Md. at 651 (brackets omitted) (quoting Solomon v. 
Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 202, 857 A.2d 1109 (2004)). 
 
Mr. Simms argues that the Circuit Court should have conducted further 
proceedings under CP §8-201 to allow him to explore whether the socks had in fact 
been destroyed or might still be available for testing.17  As the Circuit Court noted, 
Mr. Simms had already had ample opportunity to question whether they still existed 
years earlier in the proceeding.  This was not a case where a court ruled on the basis 
of a last minute affidavit to which the petitioner had no opportunity to respond.  See 
Arey, 422 Md. at 335-36.  Indeed, in his “Motion for Appropriate Relief” under CP §8-
201, Mr. Simms did not appear to question that the socks had been destroyed, but 
asked for a hearing to explore the timing of their destruction – presumably in the 
hope that he could show that the destruction actually occurred after the effective date 
of the statute requiring the State to preserve scientific identification evidence or that 
it had otherwise been done in bad faith.  It was only in his brief to this Court that Mr. 
Simms asserted that some evidence may yet exist − a position that contradicted his 
                                            
 
17 On appeal, Mr. Simms also complains for the first time that the 2011 Bazzle 
affidavit did not include the general protocols for the maintenance and disposition of 
evidence.  Although the attachments to the Bazzle affidavit provided detailed 
documentation of the seizure, chain of custody, and destruction of the various items 
of clothing found in the trash bag – as well as an affirmation that the destruction 
occurred pursuant to applicable protocols – the protocols themselves, which would 
have pre-existed the post-conviction DNA testing statute, were not attached.  While 
it would be the better practice, and more compliant with the rules, to include copies 
of any such protocols, their absence does not diminish the weight of the 
documentation that was submitted.  Moreover, no objection was ever raised to the 
absence of those documents in the Circuit Court.  
25 
 
attorney’s status letter to the court in March 2011, his pro se petition for habeas 
corpus relief filed in August 2011, and his own statements at the May 2014 hearing.  
Mr. Simms alleged no facts to support either of his more recent suspicions.   
 
The Circuit Court was not obliged to conduct a fishing expedition to indulge 
every permutation that Mr. Simms might imagine.  Johnson, 440 Md. at 571-72, 
(speculation is not sufficient to overcome a prima facie showing by the State).  Here, 
he had received the assistance of very qualified counsel who determined that the 
evidence in question was no longer available for testing.  Even had the evidence been 
located and been available for testing, it would not have conclusively established Mr. 
Simms’ innocence.  Mr. Simms’ theory was that a sophisticated DNA test of the socks 
would reveal an absence of his skin cells.  This would only be significant if he could 
also show that he had the same skin condition in 1995 as reported in his prison 
medical form in 2007 and that the skin condition would necessarily result in his DNA 
on the socks.  At best, this might be evidence to question his aunt’s testimony that he 
had been wearing various items of clothing on the day of the murders.  It would hardly 
be exculpatory – this was not an instance where DNA testing of a rape kit might 
exonerate the individual convicted of the crime. 
 
The Circuit Court concluded that the Bazzle affidavit, the supporting 
documentation of the chain of custody and destruction of the evidence, and Mr. 
Simms’ admission that the State destroyed the evidence, all indicated that a further 
search would not produce relevant evidence with reasonable probability.  Given the 
26 
 
affirmative and unrebutted evidence that the socks had been destroyed, the Circuit 
Court’s conclusion was not clearly erroneous.  
III 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons explained above, we hold: 
 
1. 
The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the 
motion of the Innocence Project attorneys to withdraw their appearance. 
 
2. 
The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to 
appoint new counsel for Mr. Simms. 
 
3. 
The Circuit Court was not clearly erroneous when it declined to conduct 
further proceedings or to award relief under CP §8-201. 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
FOR 
BALTIMORE 
CITY 
AFFIRMED.  
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.