Case Title: Hsu v. Great Seneca Financial Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 325, 2007

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LIFENG L. HSU,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 325, 2007 
 
Appellant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County   
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
GREAT SENECA FINANCIAL 
§  
CORP., a Maryland corporation, 
§ 
assignee of Madison Street  
 
§ 
Investments, Assignee of Chase 
 
§ 
Manhattan Bank,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee Below,  
 
§ 
C.A. No. 06A-07-005 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 24, 2007 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
October 25, 2007 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 25th day of October 2007, upon consideration of the Clerk’s 
notice to show cause and the appellant’s response to the notice, it appears to 
the Court that: 
 
(1) 
On June 29, 2007, the appellant, Lifeng L. Hsu (Hsu), filed an 
appeal from the Superior Court’s order of June 7, 2007 in a Court of 
Common Pleas debt action that Hsu had appealed to the Superior Court.  
 
2
The Superior Court’s order in part remanded Hsu’s case for further 
proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas.1 
 
(2) 
On July 16, 2007, the Clerk issued a notice directing that Hsu 
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for his failure to comply 
with Supreme Court Rule 42 when taking an appeal from an apparent 
interlocutory order.2  Absent compliance with Supreme Court Rule 42, this 
Court does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an interlocutory 
order.3 
 
(3) 
In Delaware, an order of remand is interlocutory if it requires 
further action of a discretionary nature.4  Therefore when filing an appeal 
from an interlocutory order of remand, the appellant must comply with the 
requirements of Supreme Court Rule 42.5 
 
(4) 
Hsu’s response to the notice to show cause indicates that he 
understands that the Superior Court remanded his case to the Court of 
Common Pleas for additional fact-finding proceedings.  Hsu also 
                                          
 
1 See Hsu v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., Del. Super., C.A. No. 06A-07-005, Johnson, J. 
(June 7, 2007) (order) (affirming in part, reversing in part and remanding for further 
proceedings).  
2 See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 29(b) (governing involuntary dismissal upon notice of the Court). 
3 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(a); Werb v. D’Allessandro, 606 A.2d 117 (Del. 1992). 
4 Mayor of Elsmere v. DiFrancesco, Del. Supr., No. 360, 2007, Holland, J. (Sep. 21, 
2007) (citing McClelland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 214 A.2d 847 (Del. 1965)). 
5 Id. 
 
3
acknowledges correctly that the additional fact-finding proceedings will 
culminate in a discretionary ruling by the Court of Common Pleas. 
 
(5) 
Hsu explains in his response to the notice to show cause that he 
mistakenly believed that, for the purpose of an appeal, a remand for a fact-
finding proceeding is a final order.  Hsu states that he does not object “to the 
dismissal of this appeal if it is found appropriate to have it dismissed 
because of the procedural requirements” of Supreme Court Rule 42. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rules 29(b) and 3(b)(2),6 that the dismissal of this appeal is unopposed, and 
the appeal is DISMISSED for Hsu’s failure to comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 42 when taking an appeal from an interlocutory order.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
6 See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 3(b)(2) (providing that a single justice may enter unopposed 
dismissal of appeal).