Case Title: Howell v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KARIEEM J. HOWELL, 
§ 
 
§ No. 372, 2020 
 
Defendant Below, 
§  
 
Appellant, 
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
 
§ of the State of Delaware  
 
v. 
§  
 
§ Cr. ID No. 1802010652(N) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§           
              
§ 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
Appellee. 
§  
 
Submitted: September 29, 2021 
Decided: 
December 14, 2021 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
Joseph A. Hurley, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant Karieem Howell. 
 
Carolyn S. Hake, Esquire, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
TRAYNOR, Justice: 
 
At the heart of the State’s prosecution of Karieem Howell for numerous drug 
and weapons offenses stood the testimony of Brian Caldwell, a witness who had 
agreed to cooperate with the prosecution in return for a favorable plea agreement.  It 
is permissible, of course, for the trier of fact in a criminal case to consider a witness’s 
agreement to testify for the prosecution in exchange for favorable treatment in the 
witness’s separate case when assessing the witness’s credibility.  Yet during 
Howell’s trial, the trial judge instructed Howell’s jurors, at the beginning of 
Caldwell’s damning testimony, that they could not consider Caldwell’s agreement 
with the prosecution in weighing his credibility. 
 
That the court’s instruction was legally erroneous the State concedes.  But, 
because Howell’s lawyer did not object to the instruction, we may only review the 
mistake for plain error—that is, error that so affected Howell’s substantial rights that 
his failure to object is excused.  The State contends that the strength of the evidence 
independent of Caldwell’s testimony and the correct instructions regarding witness 
credibility provided to the jury at the close of evidence suffice to erase any prejudice 
that Howell might have suffered because of the erroneous instruction.   
 
Our review of the trial record persuades us otherwise.  Caldwell’s testimony 
was pivotal evidence upon which the jury’s determination of key elements of the 
crimes charged likely turned.  Those issues include the quantity of marijuana Howell 
3 
 
possessed, his delivery of the marijuana to others, and his knowing possession of an 
illegal firearm.  Without Caldwell’s testimony, the prosecution’s case was 
susceptible to doubt; with it—if the jury found it credible—the likelihood of 
conviction increased dramatically.  The trial court’s instruction, however, unduly 
restricted the jury’s assessment of Caldwell’s credibility and undermined the fairness 
of Howell’s trial. Therefore, we reverse his convictions and remand to the Superior 
Court for a new trial. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Howell and his co-defendants—his brother Malique, mother Sharon, and 
cousin Harrison Dorsey—were indicted on multiple charges of drug dealing and 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (PFDCF), single counts 
of conspiracy and possession of a weapon with an obliterated serial number, and two 
misdemeanor drug charges.  The indictment was the product of a joint investigation 
by the Delaware State Police and the New Castle County Police Department, which 
culminated on February 16, 2018 in the execution of search warrants at two New 
Castle County residences: one at 12 Bradbury Drive in New Castle—Sharon’s 
home—and the other at 23 Aldershot Drive in Newark, where Howell and Malique 
lived. 
 
 
4 
 
 
A. 
The Bradbury Search 
 
Detective Patrick McAndrew of the Delaware State Police, the investigation’s 
chief officer, executed the search warrant at 12 Bradbury.  He first went to the “back 
bedroom”1 where he found an illegal sawed-off shotgun next to the bed and a 
handgun on the nightstand.  He also found and seized $2,406 in cash from a bureau 
in the bedroom. 
 
Detective McAndrew then went to the basement where he noticed “an area 
that appeared to be designated as a bedroom.”2  On one of the bedroom’s walls hung 
“curved letters . . . that said Reem,”3 which the detective understood to stand for 
Karieem.  About ten feet from the bedroom in an unfinished area sat a picnic table 
that, to Detective McAndrew, “appeared to be a drug packaging and resale 
location. . . .”4  On the table were a vacuum-sealer machine, multiple freezer bags, 
many of which appeared to have marijuana residue either on or in them.  Although 
McAndrew described the residue—he referred to it as “shake”—as a “large quantity 
of green marijuana pieces,”5 the amount of marijuana recovered in this search was 
immeasurably small.  Though virtually empty when he seized them, the freezer bags 
(according to McAndrew, there were “upwards of 100” of them6) were capable of 
 
1 State v. Howell, No. 1802010652(N), Trial Tr. at 54, Mar. 13, 2019. 
2 Id. at 59. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 60.   
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 61. 
5 
 
holding “about a pound of marijuana.”7  McAndrew also found a large chest that 
contained ammunition, an assault rifle magazine, a handgun holster, and “a large 
quantity of small particles of marijuana.”8 
 
B. 
The Aldershot Search 
 
Detective Michael Macauley, also of the Delaware State Police, executed the 
search warrant along with other officers at 23 Aldershot, a split-level house 
approximately 50 yards from an elementary school, which Howell rented and where 
he and Malique were then living.  The Superior Court summarized the searching 
officers’ haul at 23 Aldershot: 
In the basement of that residence, police found 28 grams of marijuana 
in a clear plastic bag, a cigar blunt, and $1,300 in cash, along with a 9 
millimeter handgun.  The handgun had an extended magazine and an 
obliterated serial number.  The part of the gun where the serial number 
was removed visibly was discolored and “clearly . . . altered.”  In the 
basement bedroom, police found a digital scale, a grinder with 
marijuana residue, $2,300 in cash, 57 grams of marijuana, and a box of 
ammunition containing various brands of 9 millimeter ammunition.  
Police found Malique’s passport in a drawer in that basement bedroom.  
The basement bedroom closet also contained several vacuum sealer 
bags that were empty but appeared to have been used previously. 
 
In the upstairs bedroom of 23 Aldershot, police found a passport and 
vehicle title belonging to Howell.  In a hallway closet adjacent to that 
bedroom, police located $24,000 in cash and a blue backpack 
containing Howell’s driver’s license, social security card, and medical 
cards, along with a box containing 9 millimeter, .40 caliber, .45 caliber, 
and .223 caliber ammunition.  A money counter also was found in that 
closet.  Outside 23 Aldershot, behind a shed in the backyard, the police 
 
7 Id. at 64.   
8 Id. at 60. 
6 
 
found four firearms, including two shotguns, a .223 caliber rifle, and a 
.22 caliber rifle.9 
 
C. 
Howell’s Arrest 
 
Later that day, Detective McAndrew applied for, and the Justice of the Peace 
granted, a warrant for Howell’s arrest.  The affidavit of probable cause attached to 
the warrant application focused exclusively on what was found at 23 Aldershot; it 
did not mention the search at 12 Bradbury.  Accordingly, the complaint10 
accompanying the warrant consisted of seven charges, all alleged to have been 
committed at 23 Aldershot.  The charges ranged from drug dealing—specifically, 
possession with intent to deliver 132 grams of marijuana—to possession of a firearm 
with an obliterated serial number.  Five days later, Howell turned himself in and was 
arrested on this warrant. 
 
D. 
Caldwell’s Arrest 
 
Less than a week after the simultaneous searches of 12 Bradbury and 23 
Aldershot and the day after Howell’s arrest, the police raided the home of Brian 
Caldwell, seizing 340 grams (or 12 ounces) of marijuana, $11,400 in cash, and used 
plastic vacuum-sealer bags with markings similar to those on the bags found at 12 
 
9 Howell, 2020 WL 1492787, at *2 (footnotes omitted). 
10 According to Justice of the Peace Court Criminal Rule 4, “[t]he complaint is a written statement 
of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. . . .”  By statute, “the complaint shall be 
attached to the [arrest] warrant.”  11 Del. C. § 5906(d). 
7 
 
Bradbury.  The police arrested Caldwell, a development that did not bode well for 
Howell. 
 
When the police interviewed Caldwell on the night of his arrest, he admitted 
that he purchased marijuana—a pound to two pounds at a time—for resale.  But 
Caldwell did not say how frequently he purchased marijuana.  And, although he told 
the interviewing officer the nicknames of his supplier, the record does not disclose 
that nickname.   
 
Four months later, things changed.  According to Howell’s counsel, “[i]n 
June, Mr. Caldwell, with counsel, comes forward and wants to be a cooperating 
witness, and he provides a second video statement, which is parallel[] in many 
respects to that which was given in February, but is contradictory in other respects 
that are material to his credibility.”11 
 
As far as we can tell, neither Caldwell’s February 22 statement nor his June 
statement are part of the record in this case.12  But it would appear that, at the very 
least, when Caldwell spoke with the police officers in June, having expressed his 
desire to cooperate, he fingered Howell as his supplier and tied him to the drug 
dealing operation, evidence of which the police found during their search of the two 
residences.  We derive that conclusion from the fact that, when Howell was arrested 
 
11 App. to Opening Br. at A21. 
12 Three brief, marginally relevant snippets from the February statement were played for the jury 
and introduced as Court Exhibits 2, 3, and 4. 
8 
 
in February, he was only charged with offenses tied to 23 Aldershot.  But when the 
State sought, and the grand jury returned, Howell’s indictment in July of 2018, it 
included weapons charges related to the weapons seized at the Bradbury property.  
And a month later, Howell was reindicted, this time under an indictment that 
included drug dealing charges related to activity at both 12 Bradbury and 23 
Aldershot.  As will be seen, Caldwell’s trial testimony was instrumental in linking 
Howell to the drug dealing enterprise, including the activity at 12 Bradbury. 
 
E. 
Scheduling Issues 
 
In early January 2019, Howell’s three co-defendants entered into plea 
agreements, acknowledging varying levels of culpability in the drug dealing 
operation that gave rise to Howell’s indictment.  Howell’s mother, Sharon, pleaded 
guilty to three felonies—drug dealing, conspiracy in the second degree, and 
possession of a destructive weapon.  His brother, Malique, pleaded guilty to two 
felonies—possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and drug 
dealing.  And Harrison Dorsey entered a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor-level 
conspiracy. 
 
By contrast, Howell was determined to go to trial, which was scheduled to 
begin on January 23, 2019.  By that time, Howell’s indictment had been refined to 
include drug dealing and weapons charges linked to both 12 Bradbury and 23 
Aldershot.  Specifically, Howell faced three drug dealing counts, seven PFDCF 
9 
 
counts, three counts of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, two counts of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, single counts of conspiracy in the second degree, 
possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, non-compliance with bond 
conditions, possession of a destructive weapon, possession of marijuana. 
 
In anticipation of trial, on January 11, 2019, the State produced a transcript of 
Brian Caldwell’s December 2018 interview, subject, however, to a protective order 
that prohibited Howell’s counsel from disclosing Caldwell’s identity to anyone, 
including Howell, without leave of court.  This disclosure prompted Howell to 
request a continuance of the January 23 trial so that his counsel could “investigate 
sources and resources that could provide impeachment information”13 on the newly 
disclosed witness.  The Superior Court granted the request and rescheduled Howell’s 
trial for March 12, 2019. 
 
It also came to light in early February that the police had seized Caldwell’s 
phone from which they had extracted data, presumably relevant to Howell’s case.  
According to Howell’s counsel, however, the prosecutors assigned to Howell’s case 
told him that “the police were unsuccessful in being able to open, or to complete, the 
cell phone dump.”14 
 
13 App. to Answering Br. at B17. 
14 App. to Opening Br. at A22.  
10 
 
 
Then “sometime within . . . the three weeks”15 preceding Howell’s March 12 
trial date, Howell’s counsel noticed in a police report that the police had in fact 
“completed” the download of Caldwell’s cell phone—a fact that was apparently 
unknown by the prosecutors in Howell’s case.16  From the sketchy record, it seems 
that it was not that the police had not downloaded the contents of Caldwell’s phone 
but that they had done so to a disk that was difficult to open.  In any event, after 
much discussion about how Howell’s counsel might gain access to the information 
on Caldwell’s phone, one of the prosecutors produced a flash drive containing 
Caldwell’s cell phone data at 5:30 p.m. on March 11, the day before Howell’s trial 
was scheduled to begin. 
 
According to Howell’s counsel, through all of this the prosecutors were 
“extraordinarily agreeable, going far beyond what [was] required [] in providing 
discovery and cooperation . . . .”17  Even so, on the morning of March 12, Howell’s 
counsel advised the court that he needed more time to review the recently provided 
flash drive, presenting a scheduling request in the alternative:  either select the jury 
that day but defer swearing the jurors and the start of trial until the next day, or 
continue the trial.  The trial judge selected the first of these options, and the jury was 
selected on the morning of March 12.  And based upon its understanding that the 
 
15 Id. at A22. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. at A18. 
11 
 
trial would begin the following day, the State agreed to lift the protective order that 
until then had prohibited counsel from disclosing Caldwell’s identity to Howell. 
 
On the morning of March 13 and before the jury was sworn, Howell’s counsel 
asked the court to continue the trial for two weeks.  The crux of counsel’s request 
was that, having now had the previous afternoon and evening to review the cell 
phone data, counsel believed that he needed more time to put this newly discovered 
information to effective use when it came time to cross-examine Caldwell.  The State 
objected, noting that it had provided the disk with Caldwell’s cell phone contents on 
it—albeit a disk that Howell’s counsel was unable to open—two months earlier, and 
counsel neglected to complain about the information’s inaccessibility until the week 
before trial.18  The State also complained that it would be prejudiced by a 
continuance because it had agreed to lift the order protecting Caldwell’s identity in 
reliance upon the court’s assurance that the trial would only be delayed by one day. 
 
The trial court agreed with the State and denied Howell’s request.  According 
to the court, not only had Howell failed to show substantial prejudice, but it had 
acceded to Howell’s request for a one-day delay, which provided an adequate 
opportunity for Howell’s counsel to review the materials in question.  The trial judge 
 
18 It is worth noting here that the record seems to indicate that the data was not truly inaccessible 
but that certain software was required to gain access to it.  At oral argument in this Court, Howell’s 
counsel acknowledged that he made no independent effort to extract the data on the disk the State 
produced to him.  Oral Arg. 8:06–8:35, (Sept. 29, 2021). 
12 
 
also allowed that, should Caldwell be called by the prosecution that day, the trial 
would be halted so that Howell’s counsel would have another evening to continue 
his review of the materials.  The trial judge also pointed out that the State had agreed 
to lift the protective order on the premise that the trial would not be subject to further 
continuances.  Hence, the court found that another continuance would be prejudicial 
to the State.  
 
F. 
Howell’s Pretrial Motions 
 
Immediately following jury selection, the trial court addressed three motions 
and three requested jury instructions Howell had filed that morning.  Only one of the 
motions and one of the requested instructions are implicated in this appeal. 
 
1. 
Howell’s D.R.E. 404(b) Motion 
 
In an application fashioned “Motion for D.R.E. 404(b) Admissibility 
Hearing,” Howell expressed concern about a recorded interview of an unidentified 
confidential informant by the prosecutor and the chief investigating officer.  Because 
the recording was, according to Howell, “replete with multiple references [to] other 
bad acts and/or criminal misconduct that represent[] uncharged offenses vis-á vis the 
issues to be presented at trial,”19 Howell asked the court “to conduct a voir dire 
 
19 State v. Karieem Howell, ID. 1802010652(N), Docket Item (“D.I.”) 47 at 1.  
13 
 
hearing to determine the admissibility of offered testimony sought to be introduced 
via the State’s confidential informant. . . .”20 
 
When the Superior Court took up the motion after jury selection but before 
any witnesses were called, Howell’s counsel conceded that the court’s consideration 
of the motion was premature and that the court would benefit from hearing from the 
witnesses other than the informant before conducting the Rule 404(b) analysis.  The 
court agreed and deferred its ruling on the motion. 
 
2. 
Howell’s Proposed “Cooperating Witness” Instruction 
 
Among other instructions that Howell asked the court to give the jury in 
relation to Caldwell’s anticipated testimony, one focused on the jury’s consideration 
of Caldwell’s credibility in light of the terms of his cooperation.  The instruction 
read, in full, as follows 
INSTRUCTION ON COOPERATING WITNESS TESTIMONY 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, you are about to hear testimony of a 
witness who has entered into an agreement with the State to provide 
testimony, in this trial, and which cooperation may be considered by 
the State in making a final sentence recommendation to the sentencing 
judge whenever this witness is sentenced. 
 
The fact that this agreement has been made must not be 
considered by you as implying that the credibility of this witness is 
enhanced by it. 
 
20 Id. 
14 
 
 
You will determine the credibility of this witness, as you do all 
witnesses in this matter, subject to the instructions that I will give you 
at the conclusion of the trial.21 
The State did not oppose Howell’s request, and the court said that, subject to some 
“wordsmith[ing],”22 it would give the instruction. 
 
G. 
Howell’s Trial 
 
To assess the impact of the trial court’s rulings on the fairness of Howell’s 
trial, we cannot view those rulings in isolation.  Instead, we must review them in the 
context of the entire record.  And because the rulings with which we are most 
concerned involve the testimony of Brian Caldwell, we pay special attention to the 
role that testimony played in the prosecution’s case.  
 
Not counting the day when the jury was selected, Howell’s trial in the Superior 
Court lasted four days.  In his opening statement, Howell’s counsel conceded that 
the evidence seized at 12 Bradbury and 23 Aldershot indicated that both properties 
were used by a drug-dealing operation.  Speaking of 12 Bradbury, Howell’s counsel 
admitted that “[a]ll that stuff [that] was found in the basement [e.g., digital scale, 
ammunition, vacuum sealed bags; marijuana remnants].  No doubt about it, it relates 
to drug distribution.”23  And after running through the items found at 23 Aldershot 
(cash, marijuana, vacuum bags, weapons), Howell’s counsel conceded that they 
 
21 App. to Answering Br. at B21. 
22 Trial Tr. at 56, Mar. 12, 2019.  
23 Id. at 36. 
15 
 
pointed to drug dealing.24  The trial’s focus, then, was not on whether a drug dealing 
operation was being conducted at 12 Bradbury and 23 Aldershot but, instead, on 
when that happened, and whether Karieem Howell participated in it. 
 
On the first day of trial, the State called the police officers responsible for the 
searches at 12 Bradbury and 23 Aldershot and at Brian Caldwell’s residence.  
Detective McAndrew first described the various items seized at 12 Bradbury and, as 
noted before, opined that what he saw in the basement “appeared to be a drug 
packaging and resale location. . . .”25  But he also offered testimony linking Howell 
to 12 Bradbury beyond the letters spelling Howell’s nickname—R-E-E-M—posted 
on the basement wall.  Detective McAndrew also explained how he had recovered 
and photographed an electric bill for 12 Bradbury Road in Karieem Howell’s name.  
Moreover, during pre-search surveillance of 12 Bradbury, the police noted that 
Howell had visited this residence “at least twice.”26   
 
Detective McAndrew also served as the testimonial conduit for certain text 
messages the police recovered after seizing Malique’s cellphone during the search 
of 23 Aldershot.  The messages take the form of text “conversations” between 
Howell and his brother Malique.  Although the language Howell and Malique used 
was, for the most part, cryptic, one exchange on January 31—within the indictment 
 
24 Id. at 40 (“Drug dealing.  Okay.  Let’s concede that.”). 
25 Id. at 60. 
26 Id. at 104. 
16 
 
date-range of January 17 to February 16—is relevant to the parties’ respective 
theories of the case: 
Karieem Howell: 1550 a jawn Ard. 
 
 
 
Jeremy Lin bag should have 26 jeans in it. 
 
 
 
Nasty and duly should have 37.27 
Malique Howell: Crown roil 
Karieem Howell: Yea just take the folded stacks outta there. 
 
 
 
Call me after it’s all counted and Jeremy Lin is in  
 
 
 
one bag and nasty is in the other and lmk what’s  
 
 
 
left.28 
 
Based on his experience, Detective McAndrew testified—without 
objection—that “[i]n this context [jawn is] referring to drugs[] [though] sometimes 
it refers to firearms.”29  The detective also inferred that “[‘]jeans[’] was an auto-
correct.”  He observed further that “$1,550 is consistent with a pound of marijuana.”  
Thus, crediting Detective McAndrew’s interpretation, one might conclude that this 
exchange describes an anticipated sale of 26 pounds for $37,000, or slightly more 
than $1,400 pound. 
 
27 It was later revealed that “Nasty” and “Duly,” whose name is Abdula, were two of Howell’s 
customers. 
28 State’s Ex. 26. 
29 Trial Tr. at 85, Mar. 13, 2019.  “Jawn” is a catchall that has been described as “the Philadelphia 
all-purpose noun.”  Merriam Webster, Some Jawn About Jawn,  https://www.merriam-
webster.com/words-at-play/jawn-meaning-origin (Last Accessed: Dec. 10, 2021).  Although not 
included in traditional dictionaries, “jawn” has been defined as “an all encompassing substitute for 
any person, place, or thing” and as “Philadelphia slang for anything . . . literally anything.” 
Dictionary.com, What Does Jawn Mean, https://www.dictionary.com/e/slang/jawn/ (Last 
Accessed: Dec. 10, 2021).  
17 
 
 
Next Detective Michael Macauley testified about the execution of the search 
warrant at 23 Aldershot, a split-level home approximately 50 yards from an 
elementary school where, at the time, Howell and Malique were living.  Detective 
Macauley described the items seized inside the residence as well as behind the shed 
in the backyard.  All told, the police seized approximately 110 grams (a little under 
four ounces)30 of marijuana, over $26,000 in United States currency, numerous types 
of ammunition, four long guns, and a handgun with an obliterated serial number.  
Howell was not present when 23 Aldershot was searched, but Malique and Harrison 
Dorsey were, and both were arrested. 
 
The first day of trial testimony was rounded out by the testimony of Detective 
Bradley Landis, who told the jury about his receipt of information from a 
confidential source in early 2018 that Brian Caldwell was selling large amounts of 
marijuana from his residence in Bear, Delaware.  That tip led to a search of that 
residence where, as mentioned, the police recovered three-quarters of a pound of 
marijuana, $11,400 in cash, used plastic vacuum-sealer bags with markings similar 
to those on the bags found at 12 Bradbury, and Caldwell’s cell phone.  That seizure 
led to Caldwell’s arrest and confession and eventually to his agreement to cooperate 
with the State and testify against Howell.  Caldwell’s testimony would come the 
following day, but not until the jury first heard from Howell’s brother, Malique.  
 
30 State’s Ex. 32.  
18 
 
 
Malique took the stand to begin the second day of trial testimony.  During 
direct examination, the prosecutor asked Malique to read various text messages—an 
exercise of only marginal utility given the cryptic nature of the messages and 
Malique’s general unhelpfulness in translating them.  For example, when asked what 
the elusive “jawn” meant in the context of the exchange quoted above—the one 
about which Detective McAndrew said that “jawn” meant “drugs” and that “jeans” 
was an auto-correct—Malique responded that he did not know.  By contrast, 
however, what the word “jeans” meant in the same exchange, was clear to Malique:  
“things that people wear,”31 that is, clothing made of denim.  And so Malique then 
translated the ensuing references to “stacks,” not to stacks of money but stacks of 
clothes.  Thus, for Detective McAndrew, this brief text exchange described an 
anticipated sale of marijuana at the price of $1,550 per pound, while for Malique it 
had something to do with blue jeans. 
 
The prosecution concluded its direct examination by playing two video-
recorded police interviews of Malique, both conducted on the day of his arrest, 
February 16, 2018, following the search of 23 Aldershot.  In the first interview, 
Malique admitted to ownership of the Taurus handgun with the obliterated serial 
number, knowledge of two of the long guns found near the shed, and regular 
 
31 Trial Tr. at 24, Mar. 14, 2019.  
19 
 
consumption of marijuana.  But he denied any wrongdoing beyond that.  In the 
second interview, Malique said nothing that would incriminate his brother. 
 
Up to this point in the trial, the prosecution had introduced ample evidence on 
the issue Howell had conceded in his opening statement—that someone was dealing 
drugs from 12 Bradbury and 23 Aldershot.  But there was scant evidence, save the 
scarcely intelligible text communications, of the identity of the drug enterprise’s 
participants and the timing of the enterprise’s activities.  Enter Brian Caldwell. 
 
The prosecution wasted no time on its way to the heart of the matter, as 
evidenced by the following exchange within minutes of Caldwell’s taking of the 
witness’s oath: 
Q. 
Mr. Caldwell, do you understand why you are here today? 
A. 
Yes, sir. 
 
Q. 
Were you arrested on or about February 22nd of 2018? 
A. 
Yes, sir. 
 
Q. 
What were you charged with? 
A. 
Possession of a firearm and selling marijuana. 
 
Q. 
You were charged with drug dealing? 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q. 
When you [were] arrested on February 22, 2018, did you 
consider yourself to be a drug dealer? 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q. 
What were you selling? 
A. 
Marijuana. 
 
20 
 
Q. 
Where were you getting that marijuana from that you were 
selling? 
A. 
Karieem Howell.32 
 
 
The prosecutors then turned to Caldwell’s cooperation agreement with the 
State.  Recall here that, two days before, the court had agreed to give a 
“wordsmithed” version of Howell’s requested instruction, which advised the jury 
that Caldwell’s cooperation did not “imply[]” that his credibility was “enhanced.”33  
But after the cooperation agreement was marked as an exhibit, the trial judge turned 
to the jury and instructed them: 
Ladies and gentlemen, you are about to hear testimony of a witness who 
has entered into an agreement with the State to provide testimony in 
this trial.  The agreement provides something to the effect that the State 
will consider the witness’ cooperation when the State makes a final 
sentencing recommendation to the judge who will ultimately sentence 
this witness.  You may not consider this agreement in weighing the 
witness’ credibility.34 
Apparently, and regrettably,35 no one noticed the substantive change in the requested 
instruction, and, hence, no one objected. 
 
When Caldwell’s testimony resumed, he explained that a couple months 
earlier—around the time Malique Howell, Sharon Howell, and Harrison Dorsey 
resolved their cases by way of plea agreements—he too had entered into a plea 
 
32 App. to Answering Br. at B100. 
33 See infra notes 18 and 19. 
34 App. to Answering Br. at B101 (emphasis added). 
35 We are confident that, had a timely objection been made, the trial judge would have clarified 
this instruction. 
21 
 
agreement with the State.  Under his agreement, Caldwell had pleaded guilty to Tier 
I possession of marijuana, a Class F felony, and agreed to forfeiture of $11,400 and 
the firearm seized from his house.  Following this explanation, Caldwell made an 
in-court identification of Howell. 
 
These formalities out of the way, the prosecutor’s questioning of Caldwell 
returned to the subject of his dealings with Howell.  As of the date of his arrest in 
February of 2018, Caldwell had been a purveyor of marijuana for approximately two 
years.  During that time, Caldwell would purchase his marijuana—typically “[a] 
couple pounds”36—from Howell “[o]nce every week or two.”37  These transactions 
occurred at both the Bradbury and Aldershot addresses, but primarily at 12 
Bradbury.  Occasionally, Howell’s mother would be involved, but Caldwell “usually 
got the weed from [Howell].”38 
 
According to Caldwell, he had obtained the marijuana for which he was 
arrested on February 22, 2018, from Howell the night before the police raided the 
Bradbury and Aldershot houses.  On that evening, Howell, who had business 
elsewhere, told Caldwell to pick up the marijuana on his own at the Bradbury 
residence.  Caldwell then texted Sharon, who was at the residence, to alert her of his 
anticipated arrival time.  During their investigation, the police retrieved this text 
 
36 App. to Answering Br. at B109. 
37 Id. at B126. 
38 Id. at B109. 
22 
 
message exchange between Caldwell and Sharon Howell, which Caldwell read in 
the presence of the jury.  Upon his arrival, Caldwell went to the basement and into a 
closet and helped himself to the agreed upon amount of marijuana.  Though this 
“self-service” might seem unusual, it was not without precedent—Caldwell had 
done the same once before. 
 
The prosecution then turned its attention, over Howell’s objection under 
D.R.E. 404(b), to the longevity of Caldwell’s business relationship with Howell, as 
evidenced by text exchanges between them.  Two text messages, read by Caldwell 
for the jury’s benefit, are illustrative of the others.  On October 22, 2016, Howell 
texted Caldwell:  “Well what’s up I pay him for the plug go drive and do it and sell 
him jawns 2900 all day not threw the mail and I’ll do 3000 for you what’s up.”39  
And on November 26:  “Ard give me the 3000 next Tim if the cash isn’t there for 3 
it’s not 3100 Idc if I gotta come back, Ard.”40  Caldwell explained that these 
messages were discussing how much he was paying for a pound of marijuana. 
 
The prosecution also deployed Caldwell to plug another critical hole in its 
case—the weight of the marijuana.  Keep in mind that the police recovered 110 
grams or slightly less than four ounces of marijuana at 23 Aldershot and a negligible 
amount at 12 Bradbury.  But to make its case on the charge of drug dealing under 
 
39 Id. at B120; State’s Ex. 51 at 12. 
40 Id. at B120, State’s Ex. 51 at 6.  Caldwell translated “Ard” to mean “alrighty.” B119. 
23 
 
Count X41 of the indictment, the State had to prove that Howell possessed with the 
intent to deliver 4,000 grams or 8.8 pounds or more of marijuana.  Once again, 
Caldwell filled the gap. 
 
On this topic, Caldwell testified that Howell had confided in him that two of 
his other customers—individuals named “Nasty” and Abdula—would buy 
“[a]nywhere from 15, 20, 25 pounds”42 of marijuana from Howell.  The record is not 
clear as to when these transactions took place.  But Caldwell also testified that he 
had seen as much as 140 pounds at Howell’s residence, and this time the testimony 
was tethered to early February 2018, squarely within the indictment’s date range.43 
 
Caldwell was also an essential witness on the obliterated-serial number 
charge.  That morning, the jury had watched and listened to the two recorded 
interviews of Malique Howell.  And during the first of those interviews, Malique 
admitted that the gun with the obliterated serial number seized at 23 Aldershot 
belonged to him.  That, of course, did not preclude a finding that Howell also 
 
41 Throughout this opinion, the indictment’s counts are numbered in accordance with the re-
indictment filed on January 7, 2019, which was the operative indictment as the trial began.  
Because the trial court granted Howell’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts I-IV and 
the State entered nolle prosequis as to certain other counts, the court renumbered the counts in its 
jury instructions following the reception of evidence and counsel’s closing arguments. 
42 App. to Answering Br. at B129. 
43 To be sure, there are ambiguities surrounding when Caldwell claimed to have seen the 140 
pounds.  On the one hand, a question posed by Howell’s counsel and Caldwell’s responses seem 
to peg the date to the night before Howell’s house was raided by the police.  See App. to Answering 
Br. at B166–67.  On the other hand, Caldwell testified that he saw the 140 pounds at a time when 
Howell was home, which is inconsistent with his earlier testimony that he had to retrieve the 
marijuana himself that night because Howell was not home.  See supra pp. 21–22. 
24 
 
possessed the gun; in fact, the indictment charged that both Howell and Malique 
possessed it.  Caldwell lent credence to this allegation when he testified that Howell 
had asked him—it is not clear when—if he was interested in buying a “dirty 
weapon.”44  Caldwell understood a “dirty weapon” to be a gun without a serial 
number.45  
 
On cross-examination, Caldwell acknowledged that, in June 2018 when he 
agreed to cooperate with the police, he was “pissed off”46 at Howell.  This anger was 
a product of Caldwell’s belief that Howell somehow set him up to be arrested back 
in February.  In consequence, Caldwell provided another statement to the police 
implicating Howell.  Eventually, Caldwell’s cooperation was memorialized in a 
written cooperation agreement. 
 
Under the agreement, Caldwell agreed to “cooperate fully with [the Delaware 
Department of Justice], specifically with regard to the matter of State of Delaware 
v. Karieem Howell (Case ID #1902010652), Malique Howell (Case ID # 
1802010526), and Sharon Howell (Case ID #1802010507).”47  The scope of 
Caldwell’s agreement to cooperate included confirmation that his June 2018 
statement to the police was accurate and a commitment to testify at Howell’s trial.  
 
44App. to Answering Br. at B129.  
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 146. 
47 See D.I. 47 (stipulation) and D.I. 48 (cooperation agreement). 
25 
 
The agreement was explicitly linked to Caldwell’s plea agreement, under which a 
weapons charge carrying a minimum-mandatory prison sentence was dropped and 
the severity of Caldwell’s drug charge was reduced.  In addition to those benefits, 
the State agreed to recommend a prison sentence, suspended though for probation.  
But should Caldwell withdraw from or violate any provision of the agreement, the 
State would be released from its obligations under the cooperation and plea 
agreement, including the sentencing recommendation.  To ensure Caldwell’s 
compliance, his sentencing was deferred until after Howell’s trial. 
 
On the third and final day of trial testimony, Detective McAndrew was 
recalled to the stand but his testimony was uneventful, at least as it relates to the 
issues raised on appeal. 
 
The State’s last witness in its case-in-chief was Detective Trevor Riccobon of 
the New Castle County Police Department.  Under a stipulation of the parties, the 
court admitted Detective Riccobon’s testimony as expert testimony.48  The 
prosecutor asked the detective to comment on various items of evidence  and whether 
that evidence was consistent with possession of marijuana for personal consumption 
or, instead, was indicative of a drug-dealing operation.  Among the evidence 
 
48 The precise scope of Detective Riccobon’s expertise was never delineated.  But when the 
prosecutor, near the conclusion of his direct examination, asked the court to accept the detective’s 
testimony as expert testimony, Howell’s counsel “agree[d] that he’s expert in . . . the drug areas 
he’s spoken about.” Trial Tr. at 88, Mar. 15, 2019.  
26 
 
Detective Riccobon considered were:  the absence of personal-use paraphernalia, 
such as rolling papers, pipes and bongs; the text messages, the subject matter of 
which he concluded were transactions involving multiple pounds of marijuana; the 
number and size of vacuum seal bags found at 12 Bradbury; and the large amount of 
cash found during the two searches.  From all this, Detective Riccobon opined that 
the police had uncovered something “beyond [the] personal use of marijuana.  This 
[was] drug dealing.”49 
 
After the prosecution rested, Howell moved for judgment of acquittal on 
Counts I through IV of the indictment (the PFDCF counts related to guns found near 
the shed at 23 Aldershot) and Count IX (the obliterated-serial-number charge).  The 
court granted the motion as to Counts I through IV, noting that possession for 
purposes of a PFDCF charge includes accessibility and “that the guns that were 
behind the shed were [not] sufficiently close to either the house or the drugs to satisfy 
the accessibility requirement.”  But, the court observed, the possession element 
under the obliterated-serial number count was much broader than under the PFDCF 
statute and includes constructive possession and joint possession with another 
person.  There was evidence that Howell and his brother Malique were engaged in 
drug dealing at 23 Aldershot and that the gun in question was found in the same 
general area as drug dealing paraphernalia.  On top of that, there was evidence that 
 
49 Id. at 92.  
27 
 
Howell offered to sell Caldwell a firearm with an obliterated serial number.  Hence, 
the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that Howell had joint constructive possession with his brother of the 
firearm with the obliterated serial number.  Accordingly, the court denied the motion 
as to Count 9. 
 
At the outset of the defendant’s case, Howell recalled and briefly questioned 
Detectives Landis and McAndrew.  Detective Landis’s testimony was uneventful.  
Detective McAndrew confirmed that Malique Howell’s fingerprints—and not 
Howell’s—were on the digital scale and box found at 23 Aldershot.   
 
The defense then called Loretta McCleary, Sharon’s sister and thus Howell’s 
aunt.  Ms. McCleary resided at 12 Bradbury since March of 2015.  At that time, 
Howell and Malique lived there too, Howell occupying the bedroom in the basement 
and Malique the room next to Sharon’s upstairs.  McLeary’s testimony concerning 
who occupied the bedroom in the basement was confusing.  She first testified that 
she was “staying”50 in the basement from the summer of 2017 onward.  She later 
testified that she moved into the basement in January of 2018.  She did state, 
however, that Howell and his brother moved out of 12 Bradbury in November 2017.  
Immediately before the move, according to McCleary, Malique occupied the 
basement bedroom.  Finally, McCleary acknowledged that she was living in the 
 
50 Id. at 148. 
28 
 
basement bedroom in February 2018 when the police executed the search warrant at 
12 Bradbury, but disclaimed all knowledge of the vacuum seal bags and digital scale, 
which were ten feet from her bedroom. 
 
Having been advised of his right not to testify, Howell nevertheless took the 
stand in his own defense.  Although Howell’s direct examination was lengthy—
according to the time stamps on the trial transcript it was approximately two hours 
and forty minutes long—the preponderance of it did not respond directly to the 
evidence admitted during the State’s case-in-chief.  For instance, the first hour and 
ten minutes consisted of Howell’s description of his pit bull-breeding business and 
related activities.  From there, he proceeded to describe his role as an entertainment 
and night-club promoter with a sideline interest in plugging men’s clothing.  To be 
sure, this background provided the foundation for Howell’s explanation of portions 
of the State’s evidence (e.g., the presence of large amounts of U.S. currency and the 
meaning of the cryptic text messages), but it did little to rebut Brian Caldwell’s 
testimony. 
 
That said, for all its digressions, Howell’s testimony attempted to explain 
away some of the evidence that the State claimed was incriminating.  On the text-
message front, for example, he explained that his reference to “jeans” in the January 
31 text message was to just that—blue jeans—which he was plugging for a friend 
who was trying to start a clothing line.  And a text message—“I need eight”—that 
29 
 
Detective Riccobon translated as a request for one-eighth of an ounce,51 according 
to Howell, was actually referring to eight dog vaccination shots.  Likewise, he said 
that his veterinarian, who lived in a game-rich area of Pennsylvania, had the guns he 
needed to hunt but not the ammunition.  Presumably, the veterinarian’s request that 
Howell bring him the required ammunition explained the presence of ammunition at 
the two houses with which Howell was associated. 
 
More to the point of the prosecution, however, Howell admitted that he was a 
drug dealer in 2016 and 2017, selling marijuana by the pound.  That ended though 
in December of 2017—one month before Count X’s drug-dealing date range—when 
he “got out of the game.”52  In that regard, Howell’s denial of drug dealing did not 
address the January 17-February 16, 2018 date range and was limited to a single 
date—February 16, 2018.53 
 
Finally, Howell said that he did not know why his mother and brother, with 
whom he claimed to be close, had pleaded guilty to drug dealing.  Nor did he refute 
Caldwell’s testimony that he had sold marijuana to Caldwell in February 2018 and 
 
51 We note that Riccobon’s interpretation, found at page 64 of the March 15, 2019 trial transcript, 
is puzzling in that this quantity is starkly out of line with the much larger quantities referred to in 
the indictment and throughout Howell’s trial. 
52 Trial Tr. at 238, Mar. 15, 2019. 
53 Id.  
 
Q.  How about, your [sic] charged on February 16 with drug dealing— 
 
 
A.  No I was staying . . .  
 
Q  …2018? 
 
A.  No, I was staying to myself. 
 
30 
 
had told Caldwell that he sold marijuana to “Nasty” and “Duly” in large quantities—
15 to 25 pounds. 
 
At the conclusion of Howell’s testimony, the defense rested.   
 
The parties’ closing arguments ran along predictable lines.  The prosecution 
drew attention to Howell’s admission that he had been a drug dealer, the guilty pleas 
of his family members, the evidence seized during the two residential searches, and 
the cryptic text messages that, according to the State’s law-enforcement witnesses, 
were indicative of illicit drug transactions.  But what in our eyes is most relevant to 
the resolution of Howell’s appeal is the extent to which the prosecution emphasized 
that its most essential allegations were supported by Brian Caldwell’s testimony 
 
By our count, in the approximately 40 pages of the transcription of the 
prosecutor’s opening closing argument, Caldwell is mentioned by name 26 times on 
12 of those pages.  And these references were not in passing; they went directly to 
the heart of the prosecution’s case, describing Caldwell’s recent purchase of 
marijuana from Howell—with his mother’s assistance—from the residence at 12 
Bradbury; Howell’s longstanding status as Caldwell’s marijuana supplier; 
Caldwell’s first-hand knowledge of Howell’s storage and delivery of large amounts 
of marijuana; and Howell’s offer to sell Caldwell a firearm with an obliterated serial 
number. 
31 
 
 
Not surprisingly, in his closing argument, Howell acknowledged the centrality 
of Caldwell’s testimony to the prosecution.  For instance, on whether Howell 
possessed marijuana at 12 Bradbury with the intent to deliver it, Howell’s counsel 
argued that “[the jury didn’t] have any evidence of that except Brian Caldwell. . . .”54  
In like manner, when addressing the thinness of the proof of Howell’s possession of 
4,000 grams of marijuana—an element of drug dealing under Count X—Howell’s 
counsel “assumed they are relying upon none other than Brian Caldwell, the ever 
trustworthy Brian Caldwell. . . .”55  And this refrain was repeated when Howell’s 
counsel addressed the State’s proof of the obliterated-serial-number charge:  
“[T]here is not an ounce of proof except Brian Caldwell says . . . once upon a time, 
we don’t know when . . . . [T]hey’re going to say because Brian Caldwell said he 
was offered one once and you can believe it happened if Brian Caldwell said so.”56 
 
Following that, the prosecution doubled down on its reliance on Caldwell in 
its rebuttal closing, devoting more than half of its rebuttal argument to Caldwell’s 
testimony.  In sum, if there was a witness who commanded the attention of counsel—
and presumably the jury—during closing arguments, it was not any of the 
investigating officers, it was not Howell’s brother, and it was not Howell himself; it 
was unquestionably Brian Caldwell. 
 
54 Trial Tr. at 71, Mar. 18, 2019. 
55 Id. at 72.   
56 Id. at 77. 
32 
 
 
H. 
The Jury’s Verdict and the Court’s Sentence 
 
Because the State entered nolle prosequis on the four possession-of-a-firearm-
by-a-person prohibited charges and, as mentioned, the court had entered judgment 
of acquittal as to four of the PFDCF charges at the conclusion of the prosecution’s 
case-in-chief, the jury retired to deliberate on six counts:  two counts of drug dealing 
(one for possessing with intent to deliver marijuana within a protected school zone 
and the other for delivering or possession with intent to deliver 4,000 grams or more 
of marijuana) and single counts of PFDCF, conspiracy in the second degree, 
possession of a weapon with an obliterated serial number, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  The jury found Howell guilty of all but the PFDCF charge.  After 
considering and denying a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal over the 
course of the next six months, the court sentenced Howell to 30 years of Level V 
incarceration, suspended after five years for decreasing levels of supervision, and 
Howell appealed.   
 
I. 
Howell’s Claims on Appeal  
 
Howell raises eight claims on appeal.  First, he contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion when it denied his continuance request on the day after the jury 
was selected abut before it had been sworn.  Second, Howell claims that, because 
the courtroom was configured in a way that partially obstructed his view of the jury, 
33 
 
“his constitutional rights to due process and/or right of presence during trial”57 were 
violated.  Howell’s third argument is that the trial court’s “cooperating witness” 
instruction misstated the law and meets the plain-error standard.  Fourth, Howell 
asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to introduce 
text messages containing evidence of prior uncharged misconduct in violation of 
D.R.E. 404(b).  Fifth, Howell argues that the trial court’s instruction relating to the 
possession-of-a weapon-with-an-obliterated-serial-number charge was so flawed as 
to constitute plain error.  Howell’s sixth and seventh arguments challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence as to the obliterated-serial-number count and the weight 
of marijuana necessary to support one of the drug dealing counts.  Finally, and for 
good measure, Howell raises a “cumulative error” claim. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Our analysis of Howell’s arguments, to the extent necessary, proceeds in the 
order of their importance to our resolution of his appeal.  Because we reverse and 
remand for a new trial, consideration of Howell’s claim that the Superior Court’s 
denial of his continuance request was reversible error is unnecessary.  And given our 
reversal and our rejection of all but one of Howell’s appellate claims, neither must 
we consider his “cumulative error.”  Yet because the resolution of the remaining 
 
57 Opening Br. at 13. 
34 
 
argument will affect the scope and conduct of Howell’s new trial—should there be 
one—we address them in turn. 
 
A. 
The trial court’s “cooperating witness” instruction was plainly  
 
 
erroneous 
 
 
Howell contends that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury, during 
Brian Caldwell’s testimony, that it should not consider Caldwell’s cooperation 
agreement with the State in weighing his credibility.  He acknowledges that, because 
he did not object to the instruction, this misstep is subject to review under our plain-
error standard.  The State concedes that the instruction was erroneous, but argues 
that, because the evidence against Howell independent of Caldwell’s testimony, was 
strong and the court provided a correct—though general—witness-credibility 
instruction before the jury deliberated, the error was not plain. 
 
The parties are correct that an unpreserved claim that a jury instruction was 
erroneous is subject to plain-error review.  Not only must Howell show that the 
instruction contained an incorrect statement of the law,58 he must also demonstrate, 
that the error was “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the 
fairness and integrity of the trial.”59 
 
58 See White v. State, 243 A.3d 381, 405 (Del. 2020) (quoting Miller v. State, 224 A. 2d 592, 596 
(Del. 1966)). 
59 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citing Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 
146 (Del. 1982)). 
35 
 
 
The State rightly concedes that Howell has cleared the first hurdle of this test.  
The court’s “cooperating witness” instruction was not a correct statement concerning 
the potential relevance of the witness’s cooperation to the jury’s assessment of 
Caldwell’s credibility. 
 
In Wright v. State,60 this Court recognized that a jury may consider a witness’s 
cooperation with law enforcement and “his repeated willingness to testify in order 
to advance his own legal interests” when weighing the credibility of the witness’s 
testimony.61  What is more, we characterized a witness’s prior agreement to 
cooperate with the prosecution as “useful impeachment evidence for [the defendant] 
at his trial.”62  Although Wright was decided in the context of a claim that the 
prosecution had violated its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland,63 the 
notion that a witness’s cooperation is relevant to the jury’s credibility assessment is 
equally applicable here.  And Wright is but one in a long line of cases in which we 
have recognized that deals made between the prosecution and a witness are 
relevant—and can be damaging—to the witness’s credibility.64 
 
60 Wright v. State, 91 A. 3d 972, 989 (Del. 2014). 
61 Id.   
62 Id. 
63 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  A Brady violation occurs when the state suppresses 
evidence that is favorable—that is, exculpatory or impeaching—to the accused, causing prejudice 
to the defendant. 
64 See, e.g., VanArsdall v. State, 542 A.2d 3, 11–12 (Del. 1987) (denial of cross-examination about 
prosecutor’s offer of a “deal” to witness in order to secure witness’s cooperation and testimony 
was reversible error because, without it, “there was a greater probability that the jury believed [the 
 
36 
 
 
This is so much the case that federal courts are known to instruct juries to 
apply a healthy dose of skepticism to the testimony of cooperating witnesses.  The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, has published a model criminal 
instruction that touches upon this issue: 
4.20 Credibility of Witnesses – Testimony of Informer 
You have heard evidence that (name of witness) has an arrangement 
with the government under which (he) (she) (gets paid) (receives) 
(describe benefit) for providing information to the government.  
(Name of witness)’s testimony was received in evidence and may be 
considered by you.  The government is permitted to present the 
testimony of someone who (gets paid) (receives) (describe benefit) for 
providing information to the government, but you should consider 
the testimony of (names of witness) with great care and caution.  In 
evaluating (name of witness)’s testimony, you should consider this 
factor along with the others I have called to your attention.  You 
may give the testimony such weight as you think it deserves.  It is 
for you to determine whether or not (name of witness)’s information 
 
witness].”  Additionally, revelation to jury that prosecutor made deal with witness “also may have 
affected the jury’s view of the strength of the prosecution’s case as a whole.”); see also Johnson 
v. State, 129 A.3d 882, 2015 WL 852889, at *1 (Del. Dec. 10, 2015) (TABLE) (noting that trial 
counsel whose performance was challenged as ineffective, “adequately impeached [the witness] 
on the plea agreement, which served to undermine [the witness’s] credibility. . . .); Downes v. State 
676 A.2d 902, 1996 WL 145836, at *3 (Del. Mar. 13, 1996) (TABLE) (contrary to defendant’s 
argument that submission of plea agreement and joint indictment to jury impermissibly bolstered 
witness’s credibility, “[i]f anything, the presentation of these documents served to impeach [the 
witness’s credibility in the eyes of the jury, not bolster it.”)  Allen v. State, 878 A.2d 447, 451 (Del. 
2005) (admission of co-defendant’s plea agreement into evidence is for the limited purpose of 
allowing the jury to accurately assess co-defendant’s credibility as witness); and see Phillips v. 
State, 154 A.3d 1146, 1165 (Del. 2017) (jury “could and should take into consideration” witness’s 
plea agreement that contained certain benefits when determining the credibility of witness’s 
testimony). 
37 
 
or testimony may have been influenced by (his) (her) arrangement 
with the government.65 
 
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court, in Hoffa v. United States,66 relied 
in part on a similar instruction when it rejected the defendant’s claim that the 
government’s use of the testimony of an informer, whose charges were dropped and 
whose wife received four monthly installment payments of $300, violated the 
defendant’s due process rights.  The Supreme Court noted the following jury 
instruction with approval: 
You should carefully scrutinize the testimony given and the 
circumstances under which each witness has testified, and every matter 
in evidence which tends to indicate whether the witness is worthy of 
belief.  Consider each witness’ intelligence, his motives, state of mind, 
his demeanor and manner while on the witness stand.  Consider also 
any relation each witness may bear to either side of the case . . . .  All 
evidence of a witness whose self-interest is shown from either benefits 
received, detriments suffered, threats or promises made, or any attitude 
of the witness which might tend to prompt testimony either favorable 
or unfavorable to the accused should be considered with caution and 
weighed with care.67 
 
 
In this case, Howell did not request such a defense-friendly instruction; 
instead, he merely asked the court to instruct the jury that Caldwell’s cooperation 
does not necessarily enhance his credibility.  But, as given, the court’s instruction 
 
65 Third Cir. Comm. on Model Crim. Jury Instructions, Final Instructions: Consideration of 
Particular Kinds of Evidence, Third Circuit Court of Appeals § 4.20 (2021), 
https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/model-criminal-jury-table-contents-and-instructions. (Bold and 
italics in original). 
66 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
67 Id. at 312 n.14.  By quoting this instruction and the Third Circuit’s model instruction, we do not 
comment on their propriety.   
38 
 
effectively removed Caldwell’s status as a cooperating witness who had a selfish 
reason for testifying in a manner favorable to the prosecution from the jury’s 
assessment of his credibility altogether.  And that was error. 
 
We turn next to whether this error undermined the integrity and fairness of 
Howell’s trial.  The State says that it did not because, among other things, Howell 
was “given broad latitude to probe Caldwell’s credibility”68 by cross-examining him 
about his prior truthfulness, his favorable plea, and his agreement with the State.  
The State suggests, moreover, that Howell was permitted to argue to the jury in 
closing that Caldwell’s sentencing fate—still pending when he testified—hinged on 
whether his testimony was satisfactory to the prosecution.  All this is true, but it 
misses the point.  It does not address the trial court’s instruction, which prohibited 
the jury from considering these very facts “in weighing [Caldwell’s] credibility.”69 
 
Next, the State maintains that the erroneous instruction should not undermine 
our confidence in the result of Howell’s trial because the evidence against Howell 
that was not dependent on Caldwell’s testimony was strong.   According to the State, 
“[b]ecause Howell cannot establish that the result would have been different absent 
the error, he is therefore not entitled to reversal.”70  To begin with, this misstates 
Howell’s appellate burden.  The State offers no authority—and we are aware of 
 
68 Answering Br. at 26. 
69 Id. at 25. 
70 Id. at 27. 
39 
 
none—that requires a litigant claiming plain error to show that, but for the error, the 
outcome of the trial would be different.71 
 
But what is more to the point, the State’s claim that overwhelming 
independent evidence pointed to Howell’s guilt cannot be squared with the record.  
To be sure, the State presented a mountain of evidence from which the jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that someone associated with 12 Bradbury and 
23 Aldershot was dealing drugs.  Yet the same cannot be said of certain key elements 
of the offenses with which Howell was charged. 
 
First and foremost among those elements was the identity of the drug dealer.  
It is undisputed that others, including two of Howell’s pleading codefendants—his 
mother Sharon and brother Malique, neither of whom incriminated Howell— had 
unfettered access to the areas in the two residences where the drugs, weapons, cash, 
and other paraphernalia were found.  And though the State might have argued that 
the obscurely worded text messages were suggestive of drug activity on Howell’s 
part, doubt lurked around the question of Howell’s involvement in the operation the 
police uncovered.  If credited, Caldwell’s testimony removed that doubt.  Not only 
did Caldwell describe Howell’s ongoing involvement in the drug-dealing operation, 
 
71 In its answering brief, the States cites two cases in apparent support of its suggestion that 
Howell’s inability to show that the result would have been different had not the erroneous 
instruction been given precludes a finding of plain error, Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781 (Del. 2003) 
and Allen v. State, 1990 WL 254350 (Del. Dec. 14, 1990).  Although both of these cases deal with 
the absence of plain error because of overwhelming evidence of guilt, neither supports the 
application or adoption of the test the State has articulated. 
40 
 
but he also testified that Howell was involved in a recent delivery of marijuana to 
him within the indictment’s date range—evidence otherwise missing from the 
State’s case-in-chief. 
 
Next there is the matter of the weight—4,000 grams (or 8.8 pounds) of 
marijuana—Howell’s delivery or possession of which the State was required to 
prove under Count X of the indictment.  Without Caldwell’s testimony, the State 
would have been reduced to asking the jury to infer that, because Howell possessed 
vacuum-sealer bags capable of containing 4,000 grams of marijuana and an amount 
of cash greater than the value of 4,000 grams, he must have possessed that amount 
of marijuana at one time during the date range charged in the indictment.  Not 
impossible, but hardly ideal. 
 
And finally, Caldwell provided a critical piece of evidence on the charge that 
Howell possessed a weapon with an obliterated serial number.  In light of Malique 
Howell’s admission that the gun with the obliterated serial number belonged to him, 
evidence, beyond its location in 23 Aldershot, linking Howell to that gun was critical 
to the State’s allegation that Malique possessed the gun jointly with Howell.  And 
once again, Caldwell’s testimony provided the missing link. 
 
In light of Caldwell’s central role in the prosecution’s case-in-chief as to these 
key issues, we reject the State’s claim that the other evidence of Howell’s guilt was 
41 
 
so overwhelming that we should overlook the Superior Court’s undue restriction on 
the jury’s consideration of Caldwell’s credibility.  
 
Finally, the State contends that the erroneous “cooperating witness” 
instruction does not amount to plain error when it is considered together with the 
instructions the trial court read to the jury before its deliberations.  Specifically, the 
court told the jury: 
You are the sole judges of the credibility of each witness.  You decide 
the weight to be given to each witness’s testimony.  You should 
consider each witness’s means of knowledge, strength of memory, and 
opportunity for observation, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of 
the testimony, the consistency or inconsistency of the testimony, the 
witness’s motivations, whether the testimony has been contradicted, the 
witness’s bias, prejudice or interest, if any, the witness’s manner or 
demeanor upon the witness stand, and all other facts and circumstances 
shown by the evidence that affect the credibility of the testimony.72 
 
 
No doubt, there are circumstances where a minor flaw in a jury instruction 
that is not objected to in the trial court will not rise to the level of plain error, when 
the instructions viewed in their entirety contain an accurate statement of the law.73  
But the general rule is that “a jury should not have to reconcile two contrary 
statements of the law.”74  And that is precisely what the jury was asked to do as it 
considered the credibility of an important prosecution witness.  As a general matter, 
the jurors were told that they were the sole judges of the credibility of the witness 
 
72 App. to Answering Br. at B260–61. 
73 See Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, 15 A 3d. 1247, 1255–56 (Del. 2011). 
74 Id. at 1256. 
42 
 
and, as such, were entitled to take into account “all facts and circumstances shown 
by the evidence that affect the credibility of the testimony.”75  And one such fact or 
circumstance would be “the witness’s motivations.”76  But when Caldwell was 
sitting before the jury, the court specifically instructed the jurors to the contrary, 
warning them that they were not to consider a very relevant circumstance—
Caldwell’s cooperation agreement—and how that might affect his credibility.   
 
It is unreasonable, in our view, to expect a jury to reconcile these two 
instructions or to determine which of the two is correct and which is erroneous.  We 
are not satisfied that the jury felt free to disregard the trial court’s specific instruction 
concerning its determination of Caldwell’s credibility in favor of the more general 
instruction regarding witness credibility.  And, given Caldwell’s role in this case, 
this compromised the fairness of Howell’s trial and necessitates a new trial. 
 
B. 
Howell’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are without  
 
 
merit 
 
 
Howell contends that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to 
establish the elements of possession of a weapon with an obliterated serial number 
and the weight element (4,000 grams or more of marijuana) of the drug dealing 
offense charged in Count III of the indictment.  In other words, Howell claims that 
the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal as to 
 
75 App. to Answering Br. at B260–61. 
76 Id. at 260. 
43 
 
these two alleged offenses.  Despite our reversal on other grounds, we must yet 
address this claim because of double-jeopardy considerations.77 
 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal 
de novo to determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements, beyond a 
reasonable doubt.78  When we conduct this inquiry, we do not distinguish between 
direct and circumstantial evidence.79 
 
1. 
The obliterated-serial-number charge 
 
The Superior Court neatly summarized the evidence supporting the jury’s 
verdict on the obliterated-serial number count: 
The firearm in question was found in the basement living area of 
Howell’s residence.  Although Malique and Howell testified that area 
exclusively was Malique’s, the jury was free to weigh their credibility 
and their motivations for that testimony.  Even if the jury accepted that 
testimony, other evidence the State presented was sufficient to support 
the jury’s conclusion that Howell constructively possessed the firearm 
and was aware that the serial number was removed or obliterated.  
Howell’s backpack contained 9 millimeter ammunition, which was the 
same caliber as the firearm at issue.  No other 9 millimeter firearm was 
found in the residence.  The obliteration of the serial number on the 
firearm was visible to the naked eye.  Finally, Caldwell testified that 
Howell previously offered to sell him a “dirty” weapon, which Caldwell 
explained was a firearm without a serial number.  That evidence and 
 
77United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90–91 (1978) (“The successful appeal of a judgment of 
conviction, on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, poses 
no bar to further prosecution on the same charge.”) (internal citation omitted); Danks v. State, 229 
A.2d 789, 792 (Del. 1967) (allowing retrial where reversal was "not . . . based on lack of evidence, 
but . . . based upon error of law[.]")).  
78 Cushner v. State, 214 A.3d 443, 446 (Del. 2019). 
79 Robinson v. State, 953 A.2d 169, 173 (Del. 2008). 
44 
 
testimony was enough to allow the jury to find Howell guilty of Count 
V.80 
 
 
Howell asserts—in a conclusory fashion—that, because Malique Howell 
admitted that he had purchased the gun in question and Caldwell did not identify the 
date of Howell’s offer to sell the “dirty weapon,” no rational jury could conclude 
that the gun offered for sale was the gun found in the basement of Howell’s primary 
residence.  We disagree.  The jury was not bound to accept Malique’s testimony 
regarding his purchase of the weapon and, in any event, ownership of the gun, while 
relevant, is not dispositive.  The evidence as outlined above was sufficient, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to support a finding that 
Howell constructively possessed—perhaps jointly with Malique—the gun with an 
obliterated serial number. 
 
2. 
The weight of marijuana alleged in Count III 
 
In finding that the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Howell possessed at least 4,000 grams—or approximately 
8.8 pounds—of marijuana, the Superior Court acknowledged that the quantity of 
marijuana seized at 12 Bradbury was insignificant.  The court nevertheless 
concluded that the evidence “as a whole”81 supported the jury’s finding as to weight.  
Specifically, the court identified the following evidence as supporting the finding: 
 
80 Howell, 2020 WL 1492787, at *6. 
81 Id.  
45 
 
• The $2,400 in cash found at 12 Bradbury 
• Detective Riccobon’s testimony that marijuana sells for between 
$1,500-$3,000 a pound 
• Caldwell’s testimony that he regularly purchased two pounds of 
marijuana from Howell 
• Caldwell’s testimony that Howell had confided in him that he was 
selling marijuana to Abdula and “Nasty” in quantities ranging from 15 
to 25 pounds. 
• The seizure at 12 Bradbury of approximately 100 vacuum-sealer bags, 
an unidentified number of which contained marijuana residue and each 
of which could hold up to one pound of marijuana. 
• The text messages supporting Caldwell’s testimony “namely that 
Malique and Howell were conspiring to deal drugs and that Malique 
regularly was selling as little as a quarter pound of marijuana up to 
multiple pounds.82 
 
If this were the only evidence supporting the jury’s conclusion that Howell 
possessed 4,000 grams of marijuana during the indictment’s date range, the trial 
court’s denial of Howell’s motion for judgment of acquittal would stand on shaky 
ground.  The amount of cash found at 12 Bradbury was in the range of the price of 
one pound or 453.6 grams of marijuana, far below the 4,000 gram threshold.  
Caldwell’s purchases were at approximately one-quarter of the weight to be proved, 
and his testimony about Abdula’s and “Nasty’s” purchases did not suggest that they 
occurred within the indictment’s date range.  And we find the notion that a quantity 
of empty bags sufficient to hold a certain quantity of marijuana is evidence that the 
bags once—and at the same time—held that quantity lacks persuasive force.  
 
82 Id. 
46 
 
 
Despite these reservations, our review of the entire record and, in particular, 
one piece of evidence not mentioned by the trial court, convinces us that, when the 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact-
finder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Howell possessed 4,0000 or more 
grams of marijuana within the indictment’s date range.  Specifically, Brian Caldwell 
testified, in response to questions asked by Howell’s counsel, that he had seen “well 
over a hundred pounds”83 of marijuana at 12 Bradbury when he was at the residence 
in early February 2018.  To be sure and as we previously noted, Caldwell’s testimony 
on this point is beset by an apparent inconsistency.84  But for present purposes we 
view this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and, when we do 
that and consider it with the other evidence, Howell’s argument that the weight 
evidence was insufficient collapses.85  We therefore conclude that the trial court did 
not err when it denied Howell’s motion for judgment of acquittal on this ground. 
 
C. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the   
 
 
Caldwell’s testimony about his prior drug transactions with Howell 
 
 
and Howell’s offer to sell him an illegal firearm 
 
 
As mentioned, on the first day of trial, Howell filed a “Motion for D.R.E. 
404(b) Admissibility Hearing,” asking the Superior Court “to conduct a voir dire 
 
83 App. to Answering Br. at B166. 
84 See supra note 40.  
85 See Torres v. State, 979 A.2d 1087, 1097 (Del. 2009) (Cocaine buyer’s testimony that he 
received 500 grams of cocaine from defendant, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, 
was alone sufficient to establish that the cocaine weighed in excess of 100 grams). 
47 
 
Hearing to determine the admissibility of offered testimony sought to be introduced 
via the State’s confidential informant . . . .”86  The motion referred to a recording of 
some unidentified event “conducted by the Prosecutor . . . and the Chief 
Investigating Officer.”87  It alleged that “[t]he recording is replete with multiple 
references of other bad acts and/or criminal misconduct that represents uncharged 
offenses vis-á-vis the issues to be presented at trial.”88  Instead of identifying the 
prior uncharged misconduct and the stating the reasons for its inadmissibility, the 
motion contended that, “to determine the admissibility of such evidence, the Court 
is required to perform a Getz/DeShields analysis with regard to all items of evidence 
sought to be introduced through this witness.”89  At the same time, Howell filed a 
Motion in Limine to Prevent Unfairly Prejudicial Information Presented [sic] to the 
Jury,” in which he identified five categories of “potentially inflammatory and 
unfairly unprejudicial information.90 That the prosecution might seek to place before 
the jury: 
(1) that Howell was the victim of a home invasion that resulted in a 
theft of more than $200,000 in United States currency; 
(2) that Howell’s neighbor was a suspect in the home invasion; 
(3) that Howell would deliver 20 pounds every week of marijuana to 
one individual and 15 to 25 pounds per week to another individual; 
 
86 D.I. 47 at 1. 
87 Id. 
88 Id.   
89 Id.  
90 D.I. 45.  
48 
 
(4) that Howell might have attempted to intimidate Caldwell during a 
chance meeting at an Ocean City, Maryland resort; and 
(5) that Howell’s mother’s boyfriend belonged to a “motorcycle gang 
reported to be responsible for many acts of violence.”91 
 
 
As with his Rule 404(b) motion, this motion asked the court to conduct a voir 
dire hearing before Caldwell testified and to require the State to offer a[n] 
‘evidentiary preview’ of the question and answers that will be presented to 
[Caldwell] during the course of the direct examination.”92  Presumably, this would 
permit Howell to interpose an objection if he thought that any of the questions were 
out of bounds.  
 
When the court took up these motions after jury selection, the State identified 
two additional subjects not identified in Howell’s motions that would likely be 
touched upon during Caldwell’s testimony—that for at least a year before Howell’s 
arrest, he was regularly selling marijuana to Caldwell for redistribution and that 
Howell had offered to sell Caldwell a firearm with an obliterated serial number.  The 
court then asked Howell’s counsel to speak in support of his motion.  Counsel 
suggested that the court defer consideration of his motions until after hearing from 
the other witnesses but before Caldwell’s testimony, and the court agreed. 
 
Two days later, immediately before Caldwell took the stand, the court 
addressed Howell’s motions.  The prosecutor clarified that he intended to address 
 
91 Id. at 3. 
92 Id. 
49 
 
four topics with Caldwell that might implicate D.R.E. 404(b)’s restrictions on the 
admissibility of prior uncharged misconduct:  (1) the home invasion: (2) Caldwell’s 
knowledge of Howell’s sales of large quantities of marijuana to two other 
individuals; (3) Howell’s course of drug dealing; including regular sales of 
marijuana to Caldwell during the year preceding his arrest; and (4) Howell’s offer 
to sell Caldwell a firearm with an obliterated serial number.  As things turned out, 
the State did not ask Caldwell about the home invasion, and Howell withdrew his 
objection to Caldwell’s testimony about Howell’s large marijuana sales to others.93  
Thus, we need only concern ourselves with the Superior Court’s decision to permit 
evidence of Howell’s past sales of marijuana to Caldwell and his offer to sell 
Caldwell a gun with an obliterated serial number.   
 
We review a trial court’s admission of evidence under D.R.E. 404(b) for abuse 
of discretion.94  D.R.E. 404(b) prohibits the prosecution from introducing evidence 
of uncharged misconduct to prove the defendant’s character in order to show that, 
on the occasion giving rise to the charges before the court, the defendant acted in 
 
93 See App. to Answering Br. at B84:  
The Court:  So to be clear, you’re not objecting to the complaining witness 
testifying as to his personal knowledge that this defendant sold quantities of 
marijuana to individuals names Abdulla and Nasty? 
Counsel:  That is correct.  There is logic to that. 
See also id. at B95: 
Counsel: . . . I did not object to the informant indicating that he was present when 
there was a sale of 20 pounds or whatever to Abdula and to Nick Nasty. 
94 Campbell v. State, 974 A.2d 156, 160 (Del. 2009). 
50 
 
accordance with that character.  In other words, the State may not introduce evidence 
of the defendant’s prior bad acts to show that the defendant has the propensity to 
commit—and, in fact, did commit—the act with which he stands charged.  Such 
evidence, however, “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, a 
lack of accident. 
 
In Getz v. State, this Court fixed guidelines for the admissibility of evidence 
under D.R.E. 404(b) 
 
(1) The evidence of other crimes must be material to an issue or 
ultimate fact in dispute in the case.  If the State elects to present such 
evidence in its case-in-chief it must demonstrate the existence, or 
reasonable anticipation, of such a material issue. 
 
(2) The evidence of other crimes must be introduced for a 
purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b) or any other purpose not 
inconsistent with the basic prohibition against evidence of bad 
character or criminal disposition. 
 
(3) The other crimes must be proved by evidence which is “plain, 
clear and conclusive.” 
 
(4) The other crimes must not be too remote in time from the 
charged offense. 
 
(5) The Court must balance the probative value of such evidence 
against its unfairly prejudicial effect, as required by D.R.E. 403. 
 
(6) Because such evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, the 
jury should be instructed concerning the purpose for its admission as 
required by D.R.E. 105.95 
 
 
95 Getz v. State, 538 A. 726, 734 (Del. 1988) (citation and footnote omitted). 
51 
 
 
A decade after Getz, in DeShields v. State,96 this Court shed additional light 
on how a trial court should approach a Rule 404(b) analysis.  Noting that D.R.E. 
404(b) is identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court 
quoted one scholar’s observation that  
[f]rom the language of the [Federal] Rule, as well as its legislative 
history, it is clear that the federal drafters created an open system in 
which a trial judge neither mechanically excludes, nor routinely 
accepts, other crimes evidence:  rather, she . . . determines admissibility 
on the basis of such factors as probative value, potential prejudice, and 
the availability of alternative forms of evidence.97 
 
That same scholar pointed to another treatise that set forth nine factors that a court 
should apply when conducting the Rule 403 balancing test under the fifth step of the 
Getz Analysis.  Now frequently referred to as the “DeShields factors,” they are: 
(1) the extent to which the point to be proved is disputed; 
(2) the adequacy of proof of the prior conduct; 
(3) the probative force of the evidence; 
(4) the proponent’s need for the evidence; 
(5) the availability of less prejudicial proof; 
(6) the inflammatory or prejudicial effect of the evidence; 
(7) the similarity of the prior wrong to the charged offense; 
(8) the effectiveness of limiting instructions; and  
(9) the extent to which prior act evidence would prolong the 
proceedings.98 
 
 
 
96 DeShields v. State, 706 A.2d 502 (Del. 1998). 
97 Id. at 506 (quoting Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence, §5.14, at 169 (3d 
ed. 1996)). 
98 Id. at 506–07 (quoting Lilly, supra; citing C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence §4.21 
at 268–71 (1995)). 
52 
 
 
1.  Howell’s past sales of marijuana to Caldwell 
 
Howell’s challenge to the trial court’s admission of evidence of Howell’s 
marijuana sales to Caldwell during the year and a half preceding his arrest is, in a 
word, odd.  First of all, Howell conceded that Caldwell’s testimony that Howell was 
supplying other individuals—Abdula and Nasty—with large quantities of marijuana 
during the same time period was admissible under D.R.E. 404(b).  What is more, 
Howell himself testified that he was selling marijuana by the pound in 2016 and did 
not get “out of the game”99 until December 2017.  Thus, it is difficult to see how the 
challenged evidence was unfairly prejudicial to Howell. 
 
Be that as it may, we have reviewed the Superior Court’s explanation of its 
reasons for admitting the evidence and find no abuse of discretion there.  The court 
found that the testimony and the related text messages were material to show “a 
common[] plan or scheme, knowledge and intent.”100  We agree that, at a minimum, 
Howell’s intent to deliver the marijuana seized on February 16 was, as an element 
of the crimes charged under Counts VIII and X of the indictment, material.  The 
court next determined that the prior sales were not too remote, and we agree; the 
evidence showed a continuous course of conduct leading up to the charged offenses.  
In addition, the court’s determination that the proof of the prior drug sales was plain, 
 
99 Trial Tr. at 238, Mar. 15, 2019. 
100 Trial Tr. at 82, Mar. 14, 2019.  
53 
 
clear, and conclusive is supported by the fact that it came in through the testimony 
of a witness—Caldwell—with firsthand personal knowledge.  And Howell did not 
contest the propriety of the court’s limiting jury instruction concerning the purpose 
for admitting this evidence as Getz requires. 
 
Howell’s biggest complaint seems to be that, because the trial court did not 
make an explicit reference to the DeShields factors, its balancing of the probative 
value and prejudicial effect of the 404(b) evidence was deficient.  We disagree.  
Although the court’s finding that “the highly probative nature of the course of 
conduct evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,”101 could 
be seen as conclusory, we are mindful that the court anchored its analysis in case 
law addressing similar facts.102  And, as mentioned, Howell confirmed himself that 
he was a drug dealer during the time covered by Caldwell’s testimony and the text 
messages.  This evidence might have been cumulative—an objection Howell did not 
make—but, in light of Howell’s admission, the danger of unfair prejudice was 
negligible. 
 
 
 
101 Id. at 83–84. 
102 See Andreavich v. State, 189 A. 3d 692, 2018 WL 3045599 (Del. June 19, 2018) (TABLE); 
Torres v. State, 979 A.2d 1087 (Del. 2009); State v. Hynson, 608 A.2d 730, 1992 WL 53419 (Del. 
Feb. 24, 1992) (TABLE). 
54 
 
 
2. 
Howell’s offer to sell Caldwell a “dirty” weapon 
 
The Superior Court considered and rejected Howell’s challenge to the 
admissibility of Caldwell’s testimony concerning Howell’s offer—at an 
indeterminate time—to sell Caldwell a “dirty weapon,”103 which Caldwell took to 
mean “[a] gun without a serial number.”104  According to the court, the testimony 
was “circumstantial evidence that the defendant constructively possessed the firearm 
with an obliterated serial number that was recovered from his home.  It seems to be 
introduced for a purpose sanctioned by Rule 404(b) that is the defendant’s 
knowledge and intent to possess that particular firearm.”105 
 
In his briefing in this Court, Howell makes only a passing reference to this 
ruling and has not presented any argument in opposition to it.  We therefore find that 
Howell has abandoned this argument. 
 
D. 
Any flaw in the trial court’s obliterated serial-number instruction  
 
 
was harmless 
 
 
For the first time on appeal, Howell argues that the Superior Court’s jury 
instruction relating to the possession-of-a weapon-with-an-obliterated serial-number 
charge was deficient.  Because Howell did not object to the instruction in the 
 
103 App. to Answering Br. at B129. 
104 Id. 
105 Trial Tr. at 85, Mar. 14, 2019.  Given that the evidence was introduced to show that Howell 
constructively possessed the firearm that is the subject of one of the charges for which he was on 
trial, D.R.E. 404(b) is not applicable.  Put another way, evidence that tends to show that Howell 
possessed the very weapon for which he was charged is not “evidence of a crime, wrong or other 
act” within the meaning of Rule 404(b). 
55 
 
proceedings below, we review this claim under our plain-error standard as 
previously described. 
 
To find Howell guilty, the jury was required to find that Howell knowingly 
possessed a firearm “with the knowledge that the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial 
number has been removed, obliterated or altered in a manner that has disguised or 
concealed the identity or origin of the firearm.”106  Howell does not contest that 
Count V of the indictment, which was reproduced as part of the written jury 
instructions provided to the jury, adequately tracked this statutory language.  And so 
did the written jury instructions, which told the jury, in pertinent part, that 
[i]n order to find the Defendant guilty of Possession of a Weapon With 
a Removed, Obliterated or Altered Serial Number, you must find the 
State proved [the] following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
1.  The Defendant possessed a firearm; 
2. The serial number of the firearm had been removed or 
obliterated in a manner that disguised or concealed the identity 
or origin of the weapon; and  
 
3.  The Defendant acted knowingly. 
“Knowingly” means the Defendant knew or was aware he 
possessed a firearm and knew or was aware the serial number of 
the firearm had been removed to hide the identity or origin of the 
firearm.107 
 
 
Presumably, this written instruction was part of the instructions to which 
Howell assented when the court conferred with counsel about the instructions 
 
106 11 Del. C.§ 1459(a) (emphasis added). 
107 Jury Instructions, D.I. 55 at 27–28 (Mar. 18, 2019). 
56 
 
immediately before closing arguments.108  Yet when the court read the instructions 
following closing arguments, it omitted the definition of “knowingly” and merely 
reminded the jury that, “’[p]ossession,’ ‘firearm,’ and ‘knowingly’ previously have 
been defined for you.”109  All previous definitions of “knowingly,” however, were 
related to the possessory elements of other offenses—that is, that the defendant knew 
or was aware that he possessed marijuana or a firearm; none would, in and of 
themselves, inform the jury that it was required to find that Howell knew of the serial 
number’s obliteration or alteration.  And this, according to Howell, was “plainly 
erroneous.”  We disagree. 
 
For starters, other than to assert that the jury’s acquittal of Howell under Count 
V’s PFDCF charge was inconsistent with its guilty verdict on the obliterated-serial 
number charge and thus evidence of jury confusion, he does not explain how the 
seemingly incomplete—as distinguished from incorrect—instruction amounts to 
plain error.  Moreover, Howell’s “inconsistent verdict” argument is incorrect.  As 
the Superior Court correctly noted when it denied Howell’s motion for judgment of 
acquittal, the standard of proof of the possession element of the obliterated-serial 
number charge is different and more expansive than it is under the PFDCF statute.  
Under the former, constructive possession can suffice, while under the latter, 
 
108 Trial Tr. at 2–12, Mar. 18, 2019. 
109 App. to Answering Br. at B256–256a.  
57 
 
availability and accessibility during the commission of the felony is required.110  For 
this reason, Howell’s claim that the instruction was plainly erroneous because the 
jury’s verdict was internally inconsistent fails. 
 
The manner in which the Superior Court instructed the jury is not plain error 
for other reasons.  As the State correctly observes, jury instructions need not be 
perfect111 and will pass muster if they are not misleading and allow the jury to 
“intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict.”112  Of course, jury instructions 
may not misstate the law.  But that is not what happened here. 
 
Apparently, the court attempted to condense the instructions by eliminating 
redundant definitions.  Unfortunately, this well-intended endeavor caused the court 
to give an instruction that was less than ideal.  But we are satisfied that the 
instruction, when considered together with the instructions in their entirety, though 
arguably incomplete, did not jeopardize the fairness and integrity of Howell’s trial.  
In reaching this conclusion, we note that the trial court accurately set forth the 
elements of the obliterated-serial number charge, including the element of 
knowledge of the serial number’s obliteration, when it reviewed the charges with the 
jury.  And the written jury instructions, which were given to the jury and available 
to it during deliberations, did not suffer from the same omission as did the 
 
110 See Maddrey v. State, 975 A.2d 772, 775 (Del. 2009). 
111 Whalen v. State, 492 A2d 552, 559 (Del. 1985). 
112 Anderson v. State, 2016 WL 618840, at *4 (Del. Feb. 15, 2016). 
58 
 
instructions as read in open court.113  We are therefore confident that the jury was 
able to apply the law to the facts as it found them. 
 
E. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to move 
 
 
Howell’s trial to another courtroom 
 
 
Immediately after the court denied Howell’s continuance request and after the 
jurors had taken their seats in anticipation of opening statements, Howell’s counsel 
raised a concern about the courtroom’s configuration.  In particular, counsel claimed 
that, because of the placement of a large lectern, six of the twelve jurors would be 
unable to observe Howell as he sat at counsel table during the trial.  When the court 
asked what Howell’s counsel would have the court do, he responded: “I would like 
to have a courtroom where [Howell] can be seen.”114  Jurors, according to Howell’s 
counsel, should have an unobstructed view of the defendant to gauge his reaction as 
other witnesses testify.  The court denied Howell’s request that his trial be moved to 
another courtroom. 
 
Although Howell did not couch his request below to move to another 
courtroom in constitutional terms, he now claims that the trial court’s refusal “to 
afford [Howell] an unobstructed view of the jury [was] a violation of his 
 
113 The trial judge encouraged the jury to consult the written instructions should they have 
questions.  Trial Tr. at 122, Mar. 18, 2019, (“Ladies and gentlemen, I’m going to read to you the 
jury instructions that will apply to you during your deliberations.  The good news is you’ll have 
copies of these jury instructions in the deliberation room with you.  So you don’t need to memorize 
what I’m about to say, but please listen carefully.  It will give you a sense of the instructions 
overall, and then if you need [to] refer back to something, you will know where to look.”) 
114 App. to Opening Br. at A48. 
59 
 
constitutional rights to due process and/or right of presence at trial.”115  This, of 
course, is not the claim that Howell made in the trial court; there, it was the jury’s 
view of Howell that was his only concern.  And that claim runs afoul of the principle 
that a defendant’s courtroom demeanor, save when he is testifying, is not evidence 
and is therefore irrelevant.116 
 
In addition to this flaw in Howell’s argument, none of the cases he cites 
supports his contention that, because all jurors did not have an unobstructed view of 
him while seated at counsel table, he was not “present” for his trial.  In all of them, 
the defendant was totally absent from all or a critical portion of his trial.117  Here, 
Howell was physically present at every stage of his trial and was visible to all jurors 
when he testified.  We therefore conclude that neither his right to be present at his 
trial or his due process rights were violated. 
 
 
 
115 Opening Br. at 13.  
116 See Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 572 (Del. 1981) (“[T]he courtroom demeanor of a defendant 
who has not testified is irrelevant.  His demeanor has not been entered into evidence and, therefore, 
comment is beyond the scope of legitimate summary.”); see also Norwood v. State, 991 A.2d 18, 
2010 WL 703107, at *2–*3 (Del. Mar. 1, 2010) (TABLE) (finding no plain error where court did 
not rearrange courtroom to permit juror to view defendant in his seat.”) 
117 Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993) (defendant tried in absentia); Bustamente v. 
Eyman, 456 F. 2d 269 (9th Cir. 1972) (defendant, who had been taken from courthouse to county 
jail when case was submitted to jury, was not returned and therefore not present when court 
reconvened for rereading of jury instructions); Bradshaw v. State 806 A.2d 131 (Del. 2002) 
(defendant absent from courtroom for trial court’s reading of Allen charge). 
60 
 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because we have determined that the Superior Court’s erroneous “cooperative 
witness” instruction was so clearly prejudicial to Howell’s substantial rights as to 
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of his trial, we reverse his convictions and 
remand this matter for a new trial consistent with this opinion.