Case Title: State v. Marks

Citation: 427 P.2d 1008, 71 Wash. 2d 295

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1967-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
71 Wn.2d 295 (1967) 427 P.2d 1008 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. FLOYD D. MARKS, Respondent.[*] No. 39043. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. May 25, 1967. George A. Kain and Lee A. Larson, for appellant. Hamblen, Gilbert & Brooke (Wm. F. Nielsen, of counsel) for respondent (appointed counsel for appeal). DONWORTH, J. Respondent, Floyd D. Marks, was charged by substitute information filed in superior court in Spokane County, with two counts of indecent liberties, committed on or about June 20, 1965, and August 24, 1965, on the person of a female child under the age of 15 years, to wit, 9 years of age. The original information had charged two counts of sodomy. The trial began on May 16, 1966, and the case was submitted to the jury the following day. On May 18, 1966, the jury returned to the courtroom, and the foreman reported that, after having deliberated during the preceding 22 hours, the jury was unable to reach a verdict. His statement to the court was that the members of the jury were fairly far apart, and had indicated that they intended to stick to their decisions. The court told the jury: Approximately an hour and a half later, the jury returned and rendered a verdict of guilty on both counts. On June 1, 1966, a hearing was had on respondent's motion for a new trial. After hearing, the court granted the motion, and, in accordance with Rule of Pleading, Practice *297 and Procedure 59.04W, in its written order stated eight reasons for its ruling. The state thereupon instituted this appeal, its sole assignment of error being that the trial court erred in setting aside the jury verdicts and in granting a new trial. Appellant's essential contention is that the trial court granted the motion for a new trial merely because it disagreed with the jury verdicts. [1] If this were the case, of course, the trial court's decision could not stand. See Knecht v. Marzano, 65 Wn.2d 290, 396 P.2d 782 (1964); Bunnell v. Barr, 68 Wn.2d 771, 415 P.2d 640 (1966). However, unless the reasons given by the trial court for granting a new trial are based merely upon a disagreement with the jury verdicts, the order of the trial court must be affirmed. The reasons given by the trial court in its written order were: *298 These reasons, stated in the written order, are substantially the same as those given in the court's oral opinion granting respondent's motion. Since the written order expressly incorporates, by reference, the oral statement, we shall, on occasion, refer to the oral opinion for the purpose of clarification. We are of the opinion that the most compelling of the reasons stated by the trial court is number 4, relating to the competence of the complaining witness to testify. We note that voir dire examination of the little girl consumed some 17 pages of the record, during which the trial court twice expressed the view that the witness was not competent to testify. Appellant stresses the fact that the examination was conducted in the presence of the jury, and that, therefore, the jury had a sufficient opportunity to determine for themselves the competence of the complaining witness and assess what weight should be given her testimony. [2] But the question presented is not the weight to be given the child's testimony; it is whether she should have been permitted to testify at all. The question of law as to the competency of a witness to testify is solely for the court to decide. The jury has nothing to do with that problem. [3] In State v. Allen, 70 Wn.2d 690, 692, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967), we said: See, also, Stafford, The Child as a Witness, 37 Wash. L. Rev. 303 (1962). In its oral opinion granting a new trial, the court stated: We share the trial court's misgivings concerning the witness' qualifications, particularly with regard to provision (1) of the test stated in State v. Allen, supra, especially when viewed in the context of the circumstances of this case. The first of those circumstances is indicated by the trial court's stated reason number 1 in support of its order relating to the ancient doctrine of "hue and cry." See State v. Murley, 35 Wn.2d 233, 212 P.2d 801 (1949). In the present case, the alleged offenses occurred on or about June 20, 1965, and August 24, 1965. No mention of the incidents was made to anyone by the complaining witness until sometime after she had returned to school in September, 1965. Closely related is the trial court's stated reason number 7, to wit, that the prosecuting witness appeared to be inconsistent in her explanations for failure to make timely complaint, and her admission that she relied on her mother for dates and other details. Following the state's case, respondent made a motion to dismiss the information for insufficiency of the evidence. One ground for such motion was the failure of timely complaint on the part of the prosecuting witness. Although the court denied the motion, it observed: In its oral statement granting respondent's motion for a new trial, the trial court said: Closely involved is the trial court's stated reason number 2, that, due to the surrounding circumstances, there existed the possibility that the prosecuting witness' testimony was influenced by a vindictive mother. In the court's oral opinion, it was stated that: In connection with the last statement, we note here the trial court's stated reason for granting the motion denominated number 3, which was that the mother, although excluded from the courtroom with all witnesses, was, in effect, present in the courtroom through the presence of her older daughter. Early in the proceedings, respondent moved for the exclusion of all witnesses from the courtroom. That motion was granted by the court. The trial court apparently felt that the object to be gained by that procedure was defeated by the older sister's presence in the courtroom. Although two additional reasons are stated by the trial court in support of its decision to grant a new trial, we need not discuss those additional grounds here. We are of the opinion that what has already been reviewed amply shows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial. [4] While possibly none of the facts or circumstances referred to in the order, in and of themselves, would suffice to warrant a new trial (no single factor was solely relied on by the trial court), the combined effect of the several circumstances prompted the trial court's order granting a new trial to respondent. As stated by this court in State v. Badda, 63 Wn.2d 176, 183, 385 P.2d 859 (1963): The order of the trial court in this case was not based entirely upon matters of record, as was the order of the trial court in Bunnell v. Barr, 68 Wn.2d 771, 415 P.2d 640; nor do the reasons stated by the trial court indicate mere disagreement *302 with the jury verdicts. Knecht v. Marzano, 65 Wn.2d 290, 396 P.2d 782. [5] The trial court is invested with broad discretion in granting motions for a new trial, and the trial court's determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Bunnell v. Barr, supra. As we said in State v. Taylor, 60 Wn.2d 32, 42, 371 P.2d 617 (1962). As in the Taylor case, we are not disposed to interfere with the discretion the trial court exercised. The order of the trial court granting a new trial is, accordingly, affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., HAMILTON, J., and BARNETT, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 427 P.2d 1008.