Case Title: Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12237

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-10-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12237 
 
MARIANNE AJEMIAN, coadministrator,1 & another2  vs.  YAHOO!, INC. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     March 9, 2017. - October 16, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.3 
 
 
Internet.  Personal Property, Ownership.  Executor and 
Administrator, Recovery of assets, Contracts.  Contract, 
Service contract.  Agency, What constitutes. Statute, 
Construction.  Consent.  Federal Preemption. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint filed in the Norfolk Division of the Probate and 
Family Court Department on September 15, 2009. 
 
 
Following review by the Appeals Court, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 
565 (2013), the case was heard by John D. Casey, J., on motions 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Robert L. Kirby, Jr. (Thomas E. Kenney also present) for 
the plaintiffs. 
                     
 
1 Of the estate of John G. Ajemian. 
 
 
2 Robert Ajemian, individually and as coadministrator of the 
estate of John G. Ajemian. 
 
 
3 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
Marc J. Zwillinger (Jeffrey G. Landis also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Mason Kortz, for Naomi Cahn & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
James R. McCullagh & Ryan T. Mrazik, of Washington, & 
Joseph Aronson, for NetChoice & another, amici curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  This case concerns access sought by the personal 
representatives of an estate to a decedent's electronic mail (e-
mail) account.  Such an account is a form of property often 
referred to as a "digital asset."  On August 10, 2006, forty-
three year old John Ajemian died in a bicycle accident; he had 
no will.  He left behind a Yahoo!, Inc. (Yahoo), e-mail account 
that he and his brother, Robert Ajemian,4 had opened four years 
earlier; he left no instructions regarding treatment of the 
account.  Robert and Marianne Ajemian, John's siblings, 
subsequently were appointed as personal representatives of their 
brother's estate.  In that capacity, they sought access to the 
contents of the e-mail account.  While providing certain 
descriptive information, Yahoo declined to provide access to the 
account, claiming that it was prohibited from doing so by 
certain requirements of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.  Yahoo also maintained that the terms of 
service governing the e-mail account provided it with discretion 
to reject the personal representatives' request.  The siblings 
                     
 
4 Because they share a last name, we refer to the members of 
the Ajemian family by their first names. 
3 
 
 
commenced an action in the Probate and Family Court challenging 
Yahoo's refusal, and a judge of that court allowed Yahoo's 
motion for summary judgment on the ground that the requested 
disclosure was prohibited by the SCA.  This appeal followed. 
We are called upon to determine whether the SCA prohibits 
Yahoo from voluntarily disclosing the contents of the e-mail 
account to the personal representatives of the decedent's 
estate.  We conclude that the SCA does not prohibit such 
disclosure.  Rather, it permits Yahoo to divulge the contents of 
the e-mail account where, as here, the personal representatives 
lawfully consent to disclosure on the decedent's behalf.  
Accordingly, summary judgment for Yahoo on this basis should not 
have been allowed. 
In its motion for summary judgment, Yahoo argued also that 
it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of 
the terms of service agreement, claiming thereby to have 
discretion to decline the requested access.  Noting that 
material issues of fact pertinent to the enforceability of the 
contract remained in dispute, the judge properly declined to 
enter summary judgment for either party on that basis.  
Accordingly, the judgment must be vacated and set aside, and the 
matter remanded to the Probate and Family Court for further 
4 
 
 
proceedings.5 
 
1.  Background.  In reviewing the allowance of a motion for 
summary judgment, "we 'summarize the relevant facts in the light 
most favorable to the [non-moving parties].'"  Chambers v. RDI 
Logistics, Inc., 476 Mass. 95, 96 (2016), quoting Somers v. 
Converged Access, Inc., 454 Mass. 582, 584 (2009).  We recite 
the facts based on the parties' joint statement of facts, the 
Probate and Family Court judge's decision, and the documents in 
the summary judgment record.  See Mass R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 
824 (1974). 
 
In August, 2002, Robert6 set up a Yahoo e-mail account for 
his brother John.  John used the account as his primary e-mail 
address until his death on August 10, 2006.  He died intestate 
and left no instructions concerning the disposition of the 
account.  Shortly before a Probate and Family Court judge 
appointed Robert and Marianne as personal representatives for 
John's estate,7 Marianne sent Yahoo a written request for access 
                     
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus briefs of Naomi Cahn, James D. 
Lamm, Michael Overing, and Suzanne Brown Walsh, and of NetChoice 
and the Internet Association. 
 
 
6 The personal representatives assert that Robert set up the 
electronic mail (e-mail) account for the benefit of John, but 
that both brothers had the password to the account, and that, 
with John's permission, Robert used it occasionally.  Since he 
used it rarely, he has forgotten the password.  Yahoo!, Inc. 
(Yahoo), claims that John set up the account. 
 
 
7 The Uniform Probate Code defines a personal representative 
5 
 
 
to John's e-mail account.  Yahoo declined to provide such 
access; it wrote that it would instead furnish subscriber 
information8 only if presented with a court order mandating 
disclosure to the account holder's personal representatives.  
Robert and Marianne subsequently obtained such an order, and 
Yahoo provided them the subscriber record information. 
 
In September, 2009, Robert and Marianne filed a complaint 
in the Probate and Family Court seeking a judgment declaring 
that they were entitled to unfettered access to the messages in 
the decedent's e-mail account; they also asked that Yahoo be 
ordered to provide the requested access.  After the judge 
allowed Yahoo's motion to dismiss their complaint, the Appeals 
Court vacated the judgment.9  It remanded the matter to the 
                                                                  
as the "executor, administrator, successor personal 
representative, special administrator, special personal 
representative, and persons who perform substantially the same 
function under the law governing their status."  G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 1-201 (37). 
 
 
8 The subscriber information provided by Yahoo includes e-
mail "header" information -- i.e., the sender, addressees, and 
time stamp for e-mail messages -- for each e-mail message sent 
and received, and basic information about the subscriber. 
 
 
9 The Probate and Family Court judge (the same judge who 
later ruled on the cross motions for summary judgment) dismissed 
the complaint on the grounds that a forum selection clause in 
the terms of service for the decedent's e-mail account required 
that the action be brought in California.  He also determined 
that res judicata precluded the personal representatives from 
filing their claim in Massachusetts.  The Appeals Court 
concluded that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to the 
allegations in the complaint and that the forum selection and 
6 
 
 
Probate and Family Court for a determination whether the SCA 
bars Yahoo from releasing the contents of John's e-mail account 
to his siblings as the personal representatives of the estate.  
See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 580 (2013). 
 
On remand, the parties filed cross motions for summary 
judgment.  Robert and Marianne claimed that they were entitled 
to access the contents of the Yahoo account because those 
contents were property of the estate.  Yahoo's position was two-
fold:  the SCA prohibited the requested disclosure and, even if 
it did not, any common-law property right that the decedent 
otherwise might have had in the contents of the e-mail account 
had been contractually limited by the terms of service.  In 
Yahoo's view, the terms of service granted it the right to deny 
access to, and even delete the contents of, the account at its 
sole discretion, thereby permitting it to refuse the personal 
representatives' request. 
 
The judge framed the issue before him as, first, whether 
the SCA prohibited Yahoo from disclosing the contents of the e-
mail account and, if it did not, whether the contents are 
property of the estate.  While the judge allowed Yahoo's motion 
for summary judgment solely on the basis that the SCA barred 
                                                                  
limitations clauses in the terms of service could not be 
enforced against the personal representatives.  See Ajemian v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 572-573, 577 (2013).  These 
issues are not before us on appeal. 
7 
 
 
Yahoo from complying with the requested disclosure, he also 
addressed Yahoo's alternative contention that the terms of 
service contractually limited any property interest that the 
decedent had in the contents of the account and thereby allowed 
it to refuse access to such contents. The judge concluded both 
that the estate had a common-law property interest in the 
contents of the account and that the record before him was 
insufficient to establish that the terms of service agreement, 
purportedly limiting any such property interest, was itself 
enforceable.  More specifically, he determined that there were 
disputed issues of material fact concerning the formation of 
that agreement. The judge accordingly denied Yahoo's motion for 
summary judgment on this separate basis. 
 
Robert and Marianne appealed, and we transferred the case 
to this court on our own motion.10 
 
2.  Whether the SCA prohibits Yahoo from disclosing the 
contents of the e-mail account.  a.  Statutory overview. 
Congress enacted the SCA in 1986 "to update and clarify Federal 
privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic changes 
                     
 
10 Yahoo did not cross-appeal as to the common-law property 
issue, and does not appear to have contested in the trial court 
or on appeal that, absent the terms of service, the decedent's 
estate would have a common-law property interest in the contents 
of the e-mail account. 
 
8 
 
 
in new computer and telecommunications technologies."11  
S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555.  Given these vast technical advances, 
the purpose of the SCA is "to protect the privacy of users of 
electronic communications by criminalizing the unauthorized 
access of the contents and transactional records of stored wire 
and electronic communications, while providing an avenue for law 
enforcement entities to compel a provider of electronic 
communication services to disclose the contents and records of 
electronic communications."12  Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 
                     
 
11 The Stored Communications Act (SCA) was enacted as Title 
II of the broader Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. 
No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
 
12 More broadly, the SCA serves to fill a potential gap in 
the protection afforded digital communications under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  When the SCA was 
enacted in 1986, the United States Supreme Court repeatedly had 
held that information revealed to third parties does not warrant 
Fourth Amendment protection because there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in something that already has been 
disclosed.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-746 (1979) 
(no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone numbers that 
have been called from particular telephone because such 
information shared with third-party telephone company); United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (banking records).  
Digital communications, including e-mail, are by nature shared 
with the Internet service providers that store them.  See Kerr, 
A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 
1210 (2004) (Kerr).  When Congress enacted the SCA, it did so, 
at least in part, in an effort to ensure that digital 
communications would be protected, in light of the United States 
Supreme Court's third-party doctrine.  See S. Rep. No. 541, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557, 
citing Miller, supra ("because [digitally stored information] is 
9 
 
 
Mass. 230, 235 (2014), quoting In re Application of the U.S. for 
an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 286-287 
(4th Cir. 2013). 
To achieve this purpose, the SCA provides a tripartite 
framework for protecting stored communications managed by 
electronic service providers.13  First, subject to certain 
exceptions, it prohibits unauthorized third parties from 
accessing communications stored by service providers.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2701.  Second, it regulates when service providers 
voluntarily may disclose stored electronic communications.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2702.  Third, the statute prescribes when and how a 
government entity may compel a service provider to release 
                                                                  
subject to control by a third party computer operator, the 
information may be subject to no constitutional privacy 
protection"). 
 
13 The SCA distinguishes between "electronic services -- 
electronic communication services [ECS] and remote computing 
services [RCS]"  Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail 
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 
197, 206 (2d Cir. 2016) (Matter of a Warrant).  The act defines 
ECS as any service which allows users to "send or receive wire 
or electronic communications," and RCS as a service that 
provides "storage or processing services by means of an 
electronic communications system."  18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2711.  
Today, the distinction between ECS and RCS providers essentially 
has gone the way of the switchboard operator, as most service 
providers deliver both ECS and RCS services to subscribers.  See 
Kerr, supra at 1215 (most network service providers provide both 
ECS and RCS services); Matter of a Warrant, supra.  In any 
event, this distinction is not material here, as the 
restrictions against voluntary disclosure of the contents of 
communications to private parties apply to both equally.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2702.  For convenience, we therefore refer to both 
types of providers as "service providers." 
10 
 
 
stored communications to it.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
 
b.  Analysis.  At issue here is 18 U.S.C. § 2702, which 
restricts the voluntary disclosure of stored communications.  
That section prohibits entities that provide "service[s] to the 
public" from voluntarily disclosing the "contents"14 of stored 
communications unless certain statutory exceptions apply.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)-(8).  The exceptions contained in 
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) allow a service provider to disclose such 
contents without incurring civil liability under the SCA.15 
Yahoo contends that 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) prohibits it from 
disclosing the contents of the e-mail account, while the 
personal representatives argue that they fall within two of the 
enumerated exceptions.  The first of these, the so-called 
"agency exception," allows a service provider to disclose the 
                     
 
14 The SCA defines "contents" as "any information concerning 
the substance, purport, or meaning of [a] communication."  
18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), as incorporated in 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1).  
The term has been construed to mean "a person's intended message 
to another (i.e., the 'essential part' of the communication, the 
'meaning conveyed,' and the 'thing one intends to convey')."  In 
re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014).  
The personal representatives here agree that they are seeking 
access to "contents," i.e., the decedent's stored 
communications. 
 
15 The SCA affords a civil right of action to "any provider 
of electronic communication service, subscriber, or other person 
aggrieved by any violation of [the SCA] in which the conduct 
constituting the violation is engaged in with a knowing or 
intentional state of mind."  18 U.S.C. § 2707(a).  Successful 
litigants are entitled to equitable relief, damages, and 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs.  18 U.S.C. § 2707(b). 
11 
 
 
contents of stored communications "to an addressee or intended 
recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or 
intended recipient."  18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1).  The second, the 
"lawful consent" exception, allows disclosure "with the lawful 
consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient 
of such communication, or the [originator] in the case of remote 
computing service." 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3).  We address the 
applicability of each exception in turn. 
 
i.  Agency exception.  The personal representatives contend 
that they are John's agents for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2702(b)(1).  Because "agent" is a common-law term, and the SCA 
does not provide an alternate definition, we look to the common 
law to determine its meaning.  When Congress uses a common-law 
term, we must assume, absent a contrary indication, that it 
intends the common-law meaning.  See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 
Partnership, 564 U.S. 91, 101 (2011); Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 
494, 500-501 (2000) ("when Congress uses language with a settled 
meaning at common law, Congress 'presumably knows and adopts the 
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the 
body of learning from which it was taken'" [citation omitted]); 
Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 212 
(2d Cir. 2016) ("In construing statutes, we interpret a legal 
term of art in accordance with the term's traditional legal 
12 
 
 
meaning, unless the statute contains a persuasive indication 
that Congress intended otherwise"). 
Under the common law, both as construed in the Commonwealth 
and more generally, an "agent" "act[s] on the principal's behalf 
and [is] subject to the principal's control."  Restatement 
(Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006).  See Theos & Sons, Inc. v. Mack 
Trucks, Inc., 431 Mass. 736, 743 (2000) ("An agency relationship 
is created when there is mutual consent, express or implied, 
that the agent is to act on behalf and for the benefit of the 
principal, and subject to the principal's control").  The 
decedent's personal representatives do not fall within the ambit 
of this common-law meaning; they were appointed by, and are 
subject to the control of, the Probate and Family Court, not the 
decedent.  See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-601 (personal representatives 
appointed by Probate and Family Court); G. L. c. 190B, § 3-611 
(personal representative subject to removal by Probate and 
Family Court); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14F (1958) ("A 
person appointed by a court to manage the affairs of others is 
not an agent of the others"); Restatement (Third) of Agency 
§ 1.01 comment f ("A relationship of agency is not present 
unless the person on whose behalf action is taken has the right 
to control the actor.  Thus, if a person is appointed by a court 
to act as a receiver, the receiver is not the agent of the 
person whose affairs the receiver manages because the appointing 
13 
 
 
court retains the power to control the receiver").  Accordingly, 
the personal representatives do not fall under the SCA's agency 
exception. 
 
ii.  Lawful consent exception.  The personal 
representatives claim also that they lawfully may consent to the 
release of the contents of the decedent's e-mail account in 
order to take possession of it as property of the estate.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3); G. L. c. 190B, § 3-709 (a) ("Except as 
otherwise provided by a decedent's will, every personal 
representative has a right to, and shall take possession or 
control of, the decedent's property . . .").  Yahoo contends 
that the personal representatives of the estate cannot lawfully 
consent on behalf of the decedent, regardless of the estate's 
property interest in the e-mail messages.16  In Yahoo's view, the 
                     
16 The question whether the e-mail messages are the property 
of the estate was raised in the personal representatives' 
complaint.  As previously discussed, on remand from the Appeals 
Court, the Probate and Family Court judge addressed the 
question, in dicta, concluding that the e-mail messages were the 
property of the estate.  Yahoo in essence leaves this holding 
unchallenged for purposes of this case, see note 10, supra, 
contending instead that the terms of service agreement is a 
binding contract that regulates access to the contents of the 
account and supersedes any common-law property rights asserted 
by the estate.  Given this, we do not address the judge's ruling 
that the estate had a common-law property right in the contents 
of the account.  We note, however, that numerous commentators 
have concluded that users possess a property interest in the 
contents of their e-mail accounts.  See Darrow & Ferrera, Who 
Owns A Decedent's E-Mails:  Inheritable Probate Assets or 
Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 281, 
311–312 (2007) (arguing that e-mail should be construed as 
14 
 
 
lawful consent exception requires the user's actual consent -- 
i.e., express consent from a living user. 
We thus are confronted with the novel question whether 
lawful consent for purposes of access to stored communications 
properly is limited to actual consent, such that it would 
exclude a personal representative from consenting on a 
decedent's behalf.17  We conclude that interpreting lawful 
                                                                  
probate asset).  See also Arner, Looking Forward by Looking 
Backward:  United States v. Jones Predicts Fourth Amendment 
Property Rights Protections in E-Mail, 24 Geo. Mason U. Civ. 
Rts. L.J. 349, 372-375 (2014); Lopez, Posthumous Privacy, 
Decedent Intent, and Post-Mortem Access to Digital Assets, 24 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 183, 215–216 (2016); Watkins, Digital 
Properties and Death:  What Will Your Heirs Have Access to After 
You Die?, 62 Buff. L. Rev. 193, 198–200 (2014). 
 
17 There is no Federal or State case law of which we are 
aware construing the meaning of lawful consent in this context.  
The only potentially relevant case, cited by the parties, is In 
re Request for Order Requiring Facebook, Inc., to Produce 
Documents & Things, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (In re 
Facebook).  That case concerned the Facebook account of a young 
woman who died after falling from the twelfth floor of an 
apartment building.  Id. at 1205.  While the police apparently 
came to the conclusion that her death was a suicide, the woman's 
parents disputed this account and sought to access her Facebook 
account to present evidence of her state of mind in the days 
leading up to her death.  Id.  The parents filed an ex parte 
application to subpoena records from her Facebook account.  Id.  
Facebook moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that it 
violated the SCA.  Id.  The District Court judge ruled in favor 
of Facebook on the ground that "civil subpoenas may not compel 
production of records from providers like Facebook."  Id. at 
1206.  The judge did, however, note in dictum that "nothing 
prevents Facebook from concluding on its own that [the parents] 
have standing to consent on [the woman's] behalf and providing 
the requested materials voluntarily."  Id. 
 
Yahoo emphasizes the holding of the decision quashing the 
15 
 
 
consent in such a manner would preclude personal representatives 
from accessing a decedent's stored communications and thereby 
result in the preemption of State probate and common law.  
Absent clear congressional intent to preempt such law, however, 
there is a presumption against such an interpretation.  See 
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001) 
("[R]espondents emphasize that the Washington statute involves 
both family law and probate law, areas of traditional [S]tate 
regulation.  There is indeed a presumption against pre-emption 
in areas of traditional [S]tate regulation such as family law"); 
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) ("[s]tatutes 
which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a 
presumption favoring the retention of long-established and 
                                                                  
subpoena on the ground that it violated the SCA.  Id.  That 
holding is inapposite here, however, as the issue before us is 
not whether the personal representatives may compel Yahoo to 
provide them access to the decedent's e-mail account, but 
whether Yahoo may provide them such access without violating the 
terms of the SCA.  The personal representatives emphasize the 
dictum at the end of the decision in support of their contention 
that "nothing prevents" Yahoo from concluding that they may 
lawfully consent on the decedent's behalf.  Id. 
 
Yahoo also points to a decision issued after argument in 
this case concerning an executor's attempt to provide lawful 
consent on behalf of a decedent.  See PPG Indus., Inc. vs. 
Jiangsu Tie Mao Glass Co., Ltd., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 2:15-CV-
965, slip op. at 1-2 (W.D. Pa. July 21, 2017).  Like In re 
Facebook, however, that decision does not answer the question 
before us.  See id. at 4 ("[T]he [c]ourt need not decide whether 
[the executor's consent] to production of [the decedent's] 
emails is sufficient to establish 'lawful consent' under 
§ 2702[b][3]"). 
16 
 
 
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the 
contrary is evident" [citation omitted]).  The statutory 
language and legislative history of the lawful consent exception 
in the SCA do not evidence such a congressional intent. 
 
A.  Presumption against preemption.  In interpreting a 
Federal statute, we presume that Congress did not intend to 
intrude upon traditional areas of State regulation or State 
common law unless it demonstrates a clear intent to do so.  See 
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151; Texas, 507 U.S. at 534; Jones v. Rath 
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("we start with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were 
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress" [citation omitted]); 
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ("Statutes 
which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a 
presumption favoring the retention of long-established and 
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the 
contrary is evident").  This presumption ensures that the 
"[F]ederal-[S]tate balance . . . will not be disturbed 
unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts" 
(citation omitted).  See Jones, supra. 
Congress enacted the SCA against a backdrop of State 
probate and common law allowing personal representatives to take 
17 
 
 
possession of the property of the estate.18  To construe lawful 
                     
 
18 When the SCA was enacted, the probate laws of a majority 
of States allowed a personal representative to take control of 
the property of a decedent for the purpose of marshalling the 
assets of the estate.  See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 13.16.380, 
inserted by 1972 Alaska Sess. Laws, c. 78, § 1 (every personal 
representative has right to take possession or control of 
decedent's property); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-3709, inserted 
by 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws, c. 75, § 4; Ark. Code Ann. § 28-49-
101, as amended by 1961 Ark. Acts, Act 424, § 1; Idaho Code Ann. 
§ 15-3-709, inserted by 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws, c. 111, § 1; Ind. 
Code § 29-1-13-1, as amended through 1979 Ind. Acts, P.L. 268, 
§ 45; Iowa Code § 633.350, inserted by 1963 Iowa Acts, c. 326, 
§ 350; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-1401, as amended through 1985 Kan. 
Sess. Laws, c. 191, § 20; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 18-A, § 3-709, 
inserted by 1979 Me. Laws, c. 540, § 1; Md. Code Ann., Est. & 
Trusts § 7-102, inserted by 1974 Md. Laws, c. 11, § 2; Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 700.601, as amended by 1979 Mich. Pub. Acts, no. 
51; Minn. Stat. § 524.3-709, inserted by 1974 Minn. Laws, 
c. 442, art. 3, § 524.3-709; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:10-29, 
inserted by 1981 N.J. Laws, c. 405, § 3B; Okla. Stat. tit. 58, 
§ 290, inserted by 1910 Okla. Sess. Laws § 6322; Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 114.225, inserted by 1969 Or. Laws, c. 591, § 121; 20 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3311, inserted by 1972 Pa. Laws, P.L. 508, no. 
164, § 2; Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-708, inserted by 1975 Utah Laws, 
c. 150, § 4; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-401, as appearing in 1980 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, c. 54, § 1.  See also Uniform Probate Code § 3-
709 (1969), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs 
/probate%20code/upc_scan_1969.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG32-ZUHY] 
("Except as otherwise provided by a decedent's will, every 
personal representative has a right to, and shall take 
possession or control of, the decedent's property, except that 
any real property or tangible personal property may be left with 
or surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto 
unless or until, in the judgment of the personal representative, 
possession of the property by him will be necessary for purposes 
of administration"); Uniform Law Commission, Probate Code, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Probate%20Code 
[https://perma.cc/EZ9C-HURN] (Uniform Probate Code has been 
adopted by Virgin Islands and eighteen States, including 
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, and South Dakota); Uniform 
Probate Code, 8 U.L.A., Index, at 1 (Master ed. 2013). 
 
 
At common law, personal representatives also have the right 
18 
 
 
consent as being limited to actual consent, thereby preventing 
personal representatives from gaining access to a decedent's 
stored communications, would significantly curtail the ability 
of personal representatives to perform their duties under State 
probate and common law.  Most significantly, this interpretation 
would result in the creation of a class of digital assets -- 
stored communications -- that could not be marshalled.19  
Moreover, since e-mail accounts often contain billing and other 
financial information, which was once readily available in paper 
form, an inability to access e-mail accounts could interfere 
                                                                  
to take possession of a decedent's property on behalf of the 
estate.  See, e.g., Goodwin v. Jones, 3 Mass. 514, 518 (1807) 
(personal representative has right at common law to take 
possession of decedent's property); Matter of the Estate of 
Heinze, 224 N.Y. 1, 8 (1918) (court-appointed administrator has 
power over property of decedent under common law); Felton v. 
Felton, 213 N.C. 194, 194 (1938) (court-appointed administrators 
possess "legal title to the personal assets of their intestate's 
estate" pursuant to common law). 
 
 
19 See Banta, Inherit the Cloud:  The Role of Private 
Contracts in Distributing or Deleting Digital Assets at Death, 
83 Fordham L. Rev. 799, 852 (2014) ("Email accounts and social 
networking sites are the new letters and personal records of 
today's society.  The historical importance of our digital 
records cannot be underestimated"); Edwards & Harbinja, 
Protecting Post-Mortem Privacy:  Reconsidering the Privacy 
Interests of the Deceased in A Digital World, 32 Cardozo Arts & 
Ent. L.J. 83, 117 (2013) ("More than ever before, 'ordinary 
people,' leave digital relics which may be highly personal and 
intimate, and are increasingly preserved and accessible in large 
volume after death"); Lamm, Kunz, Riehl, & Rademacher, The 
Digital Death Conundrum:  How Federal and State Laws Prevent 
Fiduciaries from Managing Digital Property, 68 U. Miami L. Rev. 
385, 389–390 (2014) ("A 2011 survey found that U.S. consumers 
valued their digital assets, stored across multiple digital 
devices, at an average of $55,000 per person"). 
19 
 
 
with the management of a decedent's estate.  See Banta, Inherit 
the Cloud:  The Role of Private Contracts in Distributing or 
Deleting Digital Assets at Death, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 799, 811 
(2014) (noting importance of access to online accounts to 
individuals trying to manage deceased person's estate). 
Nothing in the statutory language or the legislative 
history of the SCA evinces a clear congressional intent to 
intrude upon State prerogatives with respect to personal 
representatives of a decedent's estate. 
B.  Statutory language.  The SCA does not define the term 
"lawful consent," and, unlike the hundreds of years of common 
law defining the meaning of the term "agent," there is no 
similar State common-law backdrop with respect to the phrase 
"lawful consent."  Accordingly, we begin with the ordinary 
meaning of the words.  See BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 
541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (statutory interpretation inquiry 
"begins with the statutory text").  "[C]onsent" is defined as 
"[a] voluntary yielding to what another proposes or desires."  
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  "[L]awful" is defined 
as "[n]ot contrary to law; permitted or otherwise recognized by 
law."  Id. at 1018.  The plain meaning of the term "lawful 
consent" thus is consent permitted by law. 
Nothing in this definition would suggest that lawful 
consent precludes consent by a personal representative on a 
20 
 
 
decedent's behalf.  Indeed, personal representatives provide 
consent lawfully on a decedent's behalf in a variety of 
circumstances under both Federal and common law.  For example, a 
personal representative may provide consent to the disclosure of 
a decedent's health information pursuant to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d 
et seq. (HIPAA).  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502.  In like manner, a 
personal representative may provide consent on a decedent's 
behalf to a government search of a decedent's property.  See 
United States v. Hunyady, 409 F.3d 297, 304 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 1067 (2005). 
At common law, a personal representative also may provide 
consent on a decedent's behalf to the waiver of a number of 
rights, including the attorney-client,20 physician-patient,21 and 
                     
 
20 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Brabazon, 264 Mass. 276, 286 
(1928) (personal representative may waive decedent's attorney-
client privilege); Marker v. McCue, 50 Idaho 462 (1931) (same); 
Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 271 (1950) (same); 
Holyoke v. Holyoke's Estate, 110 Me. 469 (1913) (same); Grand 
Rapids Trust Co. v. Bellows 224 Mich. 504, 510-511 (1923) 
(same); Canty v. Halpin, 294 Mo. 96 (1922) (same); In re 
Parker's Estate, 78 Neb. 535 (1907) (same); Martin v. Shaen, 22 
Wash. 2d 505, 512 (1945) (same). 
 
 
21 See Calhoun v. Jacobs, 141 F.2d 729, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1944) 
(personal representative may waive decedent's patient-physician 
privilege); Schirmer v. Baldwin, 182 Ark. 581 (1930) (same); 
Morris v. Morris, 119 Ind. 341 (1889) (same); Denning v. 
Butcher, 91 Iowa 425 (1894) (same); Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kan. 237 
(1911) (same); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Newman, 311 Mich. 368, 373 
(1945) (same); In re Estate of Koenig, 247 Minn. 580, 588 (1956) 
(same); In re Gray's Estate, 88 Neb. 835 (1911); Grieve v. 
21 
 
 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.22  Under the Uniform Probate 
Code,23 a personal representative may sell a decedent's property, 
Uniform Probate Code § 3-715(23); bring claims on the decedent's 
behalf, id. at § 3-715(22); and vote the decedent's stocks, id. 
at § 3-715(12).  Thus, a construction of lawful consent that 
allows personal representatives to accede to the release of a 
decedent's stored communications accords with the broad 
authority of a lawfully appointed personal representative to act 
on behalf of a decedent. 
Finally, had Congress intended lawful consent to mean only 
actual consent, it could have used language such as "actual 
consent" or "express consent" rather than "lawful consent."  
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(2) (prohibiting State departments 
of motor vehicles from releasing personal information "without 
the express consent of the person to whom such information 
applies" [emphasis supplied]); Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 176 (1994) 
(Congress knew how to provide for liability for aiding and 
                                                                  
Howard, 54 Utah 225 (1919) (same). 
 
 
22 See Dist. Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Magraw, 417 
Mass. 169, 172-174 (1994) (personal representative may waive 
psychotherapist-patient privilege); Rittenhouse v. Superior 
Court of Sacramento County, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1584, 1588 (1991) 
(same). 
 
 
23 See note 18, supra (listing jurisdictions that have 
adopted Uniform Probate Code). 
22 
 
 
abetting but chose not to do so); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 
650 (1988) ("When Congress wished to create [substantial factor 
liability for an offense], it had little trouble doing so"); 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975) 
("When Congress wished to provide a remedy to those who neither 
purchase nor sell securities, it had little trouble doing so 
expressly"). 
Accordingly, nothing in the language of the "lawful 
consent" exception evinces a clear congressional intent to 
preempt State probate and common law allowing personal 
representatives to provide consent on behalf of a decedent. 
C.  Legislative history.  To the extent there is any 
ambiguity in the statutory language, we turn to the legislative 
history of the SCA.  See Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 
U.S. 340, 349 (1984) (all presumptions used in interpreting 
statutes may be overcome by "specific legislative history that 
is a reliable indicator of congressional intent"); United States 
v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 
U.S. 1056 (2005) (court may look to statute's legislative 
history where text is ambiguous).  The reports of the House and 
Senate committees on the judiciary shed light on the purpose of 
the SCA and on 18 U.S.C. § 2702 in particular.  The Senate 
committee report explains that the purpose of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the broader Federal statute 
23 
 
 
that includes the SCA, is to "protect against the unauthorized 
interception of electronic communications" and to "update and 
clarify Federal privacy protections and standards in light of 
dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications 
technologies."  S. Rep. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted 
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555.  With regard to the ECPA, the 
House committee report states, 
 
"The purpose of the legislation is to amend title 18 
of the United States Code to prohibit the interception of 
certain electronic communications; to provide procedures 
for interception of electronic communications by [F]ederal 
law enforcement officers; to provide procedures for access 
to communications records by [F]ederal law enforcement 
officers; to provide procedures for [F]ederal law 
enforcement access to electronically stored communications; 
and to ease certain procedural requirements for 
interception of wire communications by [F]ederal law 
enforcement officers." 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 16 (1986).  This 
stated purpose demonstrates congressional concern with the 
protection of stored communications against "unauthorized 
interception" by "overzealous law enforcement agencies, 
industrial spies and private parties."  S. Rep. No. 541, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555, 3557.  
It does not suggest congressional concern over personal 
representatives accessing stored communications in conjunction 
with their duty to manage estate assets.24 
                     
24 Given the nascent state of digital technology at the time 
of the SCA's enactment in 1986, the congressional silence on the 
24 
 
 
Beyond Congress's overarching purpose in passing the SCA, 
the House committee report notes that "lawful consent" "need not 
take the form of a formal written document of consent."  H.R. 
Rep. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 66.  Instead, such 
consent "might be inferred to have arisen from a course of 
dealing . . . -- e.g., where a history of transactions between 
the parties offers a basis for reasonable understanding that a 
consent to disclosure attaches to a particular class of 
communications."  Id.  Moreover, lawful consent could "flow from 
a user having had a reasonable basis for knowing that disclosure 
or use may be made with respect to a communication, and having 
taken action that evidences acquiescence to such disclosure or 
use -- e.g. continued use of such an electronic communication 
system."  Id. 
Congress thereby intended lawful consent to encompass 
certain forms of implicit consent, such as those that arise from 
a course of dealing.  At the very least, this suggests that 
                                                                  
impact of the SCA on personal representatives is understandable.  
When the statute was enacted, the New York Times had mentioned 
the Internet a total of once.  See Matter of a Warrant, 829 F.3d 
at 206, quoting Rosenzweig, Wizards, Bureaucrats, Warriors, and 
Hackers:  Writing the History of the Internet, 103 Am. Hist. 
Rev. 1530, 1530 (1998).  The World Wide Web had yet to be 
invented, and the use of e-mail by the general public was years 
in the future.  Matter of a Warrant, supra.  As one commentator 
noted, Congress at that time did not have any reason to foresee 
the development of digital communications "as a set of assets 
capable of inheritance or facilitating access to other assets."  
See Naomi Cahn, Probate Law Meets the Digital Age, 67 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1697, 1715 (2014). 
25 
 
 
Congress did not intend to place stringent limitations on lawful 
consent even for living users.  In sum, we discern nothing in 
the legislative history of the SCA to indicate a clear intent by 
Congress to limit lawful consent to "actual consent," such that 
it could thereby intrude upon State probate and common law. 
 
Absent such clear congressional intent, "we . . . have a 
duty to accept the reading [of the statute] that disfavors pre-
emption."  See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 
(2005).  Because we must presume, then, that Congress did not 
intend the SCA to preempt such State laws, we conclude that the 
personal representatives may provide lawful consent on the 
decedent's behalf to the release of the contents of the Yahoo e-
mail account. 
 
This does not, however, require Yahoo to divulge the 
contents of the decedent's communications to the personal 
representatives.  We conclude only that the SCA does not stand 
in the way of Yahoo doing so and that summary judgment for Yahoo 
on this basis was not warranted.25 
                     
 
25 The Legislature is, of course, not precluded from 
regulating the inheritability of digital assets.  Indeed, the 
Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, which 
addresses this issue, has been enacted by a majority of States, 
including more than a dozen that have done so in 2017, and eight 
more States currently are considering whether to do so.  See 
Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, Revised (2015),  
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Fiduciary%20Access%20 
to%20Digital%20Assets%20Act,%20Revised%20%282015%29 [https:// 
perma.cc/9BAP-3WUW]. 
26 
 
 
 
3.  Terms of service agreement.  Yahoo maintains that the 
allowance of its motion for summary judgment also was 
appropriate on the independent ground that the terms of service 
agreement, binding upon the decedent and his estate, confers on 
it the right to refuse the personal representatives access to 
the contents of the account.  Otherwise put, Yahoo contends that 
the terms of service trump the personal representatives' 
asserted property interest. 
 
In support of this position, Yahoo relies on the 
"termination provision" in the terms of service, which purports 
to grant Yahoo nearly unlimited rights over the contents of the 
e-mail account.  That provision states: 
"You agree that Yahoo, in its sole discretion, may 
terminate your password, account (or any part thereof) or 
use of the Service, and remove and discard any Content 
within the Service, for any reason, including, without 
limitation, for lack of use or if Yahoo believes that you 
have violated or acted inconsistently with the letter or 
spirit of the [terms of service].  Yahoo may also in its 
sole discretion and at any time discontinue providing the 
Service, or any part thereof, with or without notice.  You 
agree that any termination of your access to the Service 
under any provision of [these terms of service] may be 
effected without prior notice, and acknowledge and agree 
that Yahoo may immediately deactivate or delete your 
account and all related information and files in your 
account and/or bar any further access to such files or the 
Service.  Further, you agree that Yahoo shall not be liable 
to you or any third-party for any termination of your 
access to the Service." 
 
The express language of the termination provision, if 
enforceable, thus purports to grant Yahoo the apparently 
27 
 
 
unfettered right to deny access to the contents of the account 
and, if it so chooses, to destroy them rather than provide them 
to the personal representatives.26 
Because the record before him was not adequate to establish 
the essentials of valid contract formation, the judge was unable 
to determine -- even as an initial matter -- whether the terms 
of service agreement could constitute an enforceable contract.27  
The judge observed that Yahoo had not established that a 
                     
 
26 Yahoo's decision not to grant access to the contents of 
the account and its asserted right to destroy such contents 
(which it apparently has preserved thus far) is grounded in the 
substantive rights it claims to have under the terms of service 
agreement.  It has forborne the exercise of those asserted 
rights during the pendency of this litigation, in which the 
enforceability of that contract is squarely at issue.  See note 
27, infra.  To the extent that the dissent may suggest 
otherwise, we are unaware of any reason to believe that, upon 
remand, were the agreement in whole or pertinent part to be 
deemed unenforceable for any reason, Yahoo would engage in acts 
of spoliation or otherwise fail to comply with court orders 
requiring access to the contents of the account. 
 
 
27 The record does not include the parties' legal memoranda 
supporting their cross motions for summary judgment.  
Nonetheless, we infer from the judge's ruling, and the parties' 
briefs on appeal, that the focus of the issue regarding the 
enforceability of the agreement was as to matters of contract 
formation.  Other considerations, such as consistency with 
public policy or any putative unconscionability of the terms of 
service, had yet to be reached.  Nor does it appear that any 
dispute was raised regarding the meaning of the termination 
provision.  We note further that Yahoo has agreed not to 
exercise its asserted rights under the terms of service "to 
remove and discard" any content of the e-mail account during the 
pendency of this litigation.  The terms of service, however, 
include a provision stating that "[t]he failure of Yahoo to 
exercise or enforce any right or provision of the [terms of 
service] shall not constitute a waiver of such right or 
provision." 
28 
 
 
"meeting of the minds" had occurred with respect to the terms of 
service, including whether they had been communicated to, and 
accepted by, the decedent.  The judge accordingly denied Yahoo's 
motion for summary judgment on this alternative ground.  We 
discern no error in this regard, and remand the matter for 
further proceedings. 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The judgment is vacated and set aside.  
The matter is remanded to the Probate and Family Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  I 
agree with the court that the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., does not prohibit Yahoo!, Inc. 
(Yahoo), from disclosing to the personal representatives of an 
estate the electronic mail (e-mail) messages in the decedent's 
account so that the personal representatives may perform their 
duties under our State probate and common law.  I also agree 
with the court that the judge's allowance of summary judgment on 
behalf of Yahoo must be vacated.  I write separately because, 
where there were cross motions for summary judgment, I would go 
beyond the court's order of remand and issue an order directing 
judgment in favor of the personal representatives on their 
motion for summary judgment. 
 
In deciding the cross motions for summary judgment, the 
Probate and Family Court judge made two rulings of law.  First, 
he ruled that "the content of the decedent's e-mails are 
property of the [e]state; there is no genuine issue of material 
fact as to this issue."  Second, he ruled that "the SCA 
prohibits [Yahoo] from divulging the contents of the decedent's 
e-mails to the [p]ersonal [r]epresentatives."  Yahoo does not 
challenge the first ruling on appeal.  This court has determined 
that the second ruling is an error of law.  However, rather than 
order that judgment issue in favor of the personal 
representatives on their complaint seeking a declaration that 
2 
 
 
they are entitled to complete access to the contents of the 
decedent's e-mail account, the court orders that the matter be 
remanded to the Probate and Family Court to adjudicate disputed 
issues of material fact as to whether the "terms of service" 
agreement constitutes a binding, enforceable contract that 
"trump[s] the personal representatives' asserted property 
interest" in the contents of the account.  Ante at    . 
 
The order of remand is unnecessary.  I recognize that there 
remain disputed issues of fact as to whether the terms of 
service agreement was executed by the decedent and binds the 
estate, and unresolved disputed issues of law as to whether it 
would be contrary to public policy to enforce an agreement 
comprised of eleven pages of boilerplate language that a 
prospective user must accept "as is" before Yahoo will grant the 
user access to its service.  Therefore, for purposes of this 
opinion, I assume for the sake of argument that the terms of 
service agreement is both binding and enforceable against the 
estate.  But even with this assumption, when one looks closely 
at the specific section (section thirteen, governing 
termination) that Yahoo claims is relevant to the issue on 
appeal, it cannot as a matter of law yield a judgment in favor 
of Yahoo. 
 
Section thirteen allows Yahoo "for any reason" to terminate 
a user's password, account, or use of the service, and to 
3 
 
 
"remove and discard any Content within the service."1  It further 
provides that Yahoo is not liable "for any termination of your 
access to the Service."  Yahoo does not and cannot contend that 
the authority claimed in this termination provision gives it any 
ownership interest in a user's content.  In fact, section eight 
of the terms of service provides, "Yahoo does not claim 
ownership of Content you submit or make available for inclusion 
on the Service."  All that section thirteen does is allow Yahoo 
to discard any of the content owned by the user (or, here, the 
estate of the user) on its servers without risk of liability for 
doing so.  Thus, it would permit Yahoo to discard e-mail 
messages in a terminated account without fear that it will be 
held liable if, many years later, the user's estate seeks access 
to those messages. 
 
The issue on appeal, however, is not whether Yahoo is 
liable to the estate for content that it previously discarded, 
but whether a court may order Yahoo to provide the plaintiffs 
with content it continues to retain.  The provision cannot 
reasonably be interpreted to mean that Yahoo has the contractual 
right to destroy a user's e-mail messages after the user 
initiates a court action to obtain the messages.  Such 
destruction would violate our prohibition against the spoliation 
                     
 
1 See ante at     for the full text of section thirteen of 
the "terms of service" agreement. 
4 
 
 
of evidence.  See Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc., 439 
Mass. 223, 234 (2003) (doctrine of spoliation of evidence "is 
based on the premise that a party who has negligently or 
intentionally lost or destroyed evidence known to be relevant 
for an upcoming legal proceeding should be held accountable for 
any unfair prejudice that results").  Nor can it justify the 
destruction of such e-mail messages after a court orders that 
they be provided to the user or his or her personal 
representatives.  Such destruction would constitute contempt of 
a court order. 
 
If the motion judge on remand were to rule that this 
provision contractually allows Yahoo to destroy e-mail messages 
in its possession that are owned by a user (or a personal 
representative of the estate of the user) after the user has 
filed a court action to obtain access to these messages, we 
would surely reverse that ruling.  So why remand the case to 
permit that possibility? 
 
Not only is the remand unnecessary, but it also is unfair 
to the plaintiffs.  The additional cost of further litigation is 
a financial pinprick to a Web services provider such as Yahoo, 
but it is a heavy financial burden on the assets of an estate, 
even a substantial estate.  The plaintiffs should not have to 
spend a penny more to obtain estate property in the possession 
of Yahoo that they need to administer the estate.