Case Title: William R. Jewett v. Lester Boihem

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1071534

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 05/15/09
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1071534
_________________________
William R. Jewett
v.
Lester Boihem
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-07-900012)
WOODALL, Justice.
William R. Jewett appeals from a judgment in favor of
Lester Boihem in Boihem's action seeking restitution of money
he paid Jewett and a company Jewett owned in an aborted
business transaction.  We affirm.
1071534
2
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This 
dispute 
arose 
out 
of 
events 
that 
began 
in
approximately December 2005.  At that time, Jewett was the
sole owner and manager of Accu-Crete, LLC ("the company"). By
a "letter of agreement" dated December 21, 2005 ("the letter
agreement"), Jewett agreed to sell 50% of the company to
Boihem for the sum of $2,000,000.  The letter agreement stated
that the company's assets, which included "ready mix concrete
trucks, concrete plants w/computers, heavy equipment ..., good
will, bank accounts and accounts receivable," would not be
"alienate[d], 
encumber[ed] 
or 
impair[ed] 
... 
pending 
closing."
The letter agreement required (1) the payment of $675,000 "to
William Jewett personally," and (2) the payment of $1,325,000
to the company "as a membership contribution."  The
transaction was to close "on or before March 15, 2006."
Additionally, Boihem's duty to complete the purchase was
expressly made "contingent upon there being no material
adverse change to the business or assets of [the company]
prior to closing." 
On December 30, 2005, Boihem sent Jewett a payment of
$375,000.  On January 30, 2006, Jewett sent Boihem an e-mail
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3
requesting an additional payment of $640,000.  That sum was
broken down 
as 
follows: 
(1) "$300,000.00 for 
re-imbursement 
on
ex-partner buy out," (2) "$150,000.00 for down payment on
plant at factory," (3) "$40,000.00 for down payment on 5 front
discharge trucks," and (4) "$150,000.00 for set up cost on
Spanish Fort Plant and Additional Foley Plant for Condos."
Attached to the e-mail were "wiring instructions" directing
Boihem to send the payment to the company's account.  Boihem
made that payment as directed on February 27, 2006. 
The sale did not close by March 15, 2006, as provided in
the letter agreement.  Nevertheless, on March 23, 2006, Boihem
wired a $300,000 payment to the company's account.  On May 24,
2006, over two months after the deadline for closing, Boihem
received another e-mail from Jewett requesting a payment of
$685,000 to complete the purchase price as set out in the
letter agreement.  
Meanwhile, in early 2006, Jewett was receiving offers
from 
Delta 
Industries, 
Inc. ("Delta"), 
a 
Mississippi
corporation, to purchase the assets of the company, and
negotiations between Jewett and Delta subsequently began in
earnest.  Evidence at the trial of this case was in direct
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4
dispute as to the extent, if any, of Boihem's knowledge of
these negotiations.  In any event, on October 16, 2006, Jewett
executed an "asset purchase agreement" with Delta, which
transferred a number of the company's assets to Delta for
$1,849,000.
Approximately one month later, on November 21, 2006,
Jewett sent Boihem an e-mail, declaring him to be in default
of the letter agreement.  Specifically, the e-mail stated:
"Per our Letter of Agreement dated December 21,
2005, it was agreed 'Whereas, it is agreed upon by
all parties the full purchase price of the ownership
interest is to be transferred pursuant to paragraph
3 of this document on the same day of closing.'
This has not happened to date.  I have talked to you
and emailed you on quite a few occasions about this.
To date all monies have not been transferred.  It
has been almost a year since we started this
negotiation.  Also, I have made purchases personally
on real estate for the progress of Accu-Crete and
have given this information to [you] for [you] to do
your part, this has not happened.  To this date [you
have] not held to [your] part of the agreement and
are in default of the agreement.  Not to mention
that I have not ever received [your] signed part of
the agreement.  I believe that I have given you more
than enough time and chance to make good on your end
of the Agreement.  Therefore, I am saying you ...
are in default of the Agreement.  I will be
returning your monies that are owed to you ...
before December 31, 2006.  You should be receiving
a letter via certified mail confirming this email."
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(Emphasis added.)  None of the $1,315,000 Boihem paid was ever
returned. 
On January 10, 2007, Boihem sued Jewett, alleging (1)
breach of contract, (2) money had and received, and (3) unjust
enrichment.  However, during the course of the subsequent non-
jury trial, Boihem indicated in open court that he was seeking
only restitution.   Specifically, it was stated:
"Q.
[By Boihem's counsel:] Mr. Boihem, tell Judge
Reid what it is you are asking for this court
to do in any ruling that it makes in this case,
please.
"A.
[By Boihem:] Just to get my money back that I
wired and any interest that might be due on
that money."
(Emphasis added.)  Subsequently, the trial court entered a
judgment awarding Boihem $1,495,547, and Jewett appealed.
On appeal, Jewett challenges the judgment on two grounds.
First, he argues that the judgment is "so unsupported by the
evidence as to be plainly and palpably wrong."  Jewett's
brief, at 14.  According to Jewett, the judgment is contrary
to the evidence, because, he insists, "[i]t is undisputed that
Boihem did not fulfill his obligations under the [letter
agreement]" and, therefore, that he "could not establish a
claim for [b]reach of [c]ontract."  Jewett's brief, at 13.
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Also, Boihem's restitution claims must fail, because, Jewett
argues, "Jewett received no money from Boihem and was not
unjustly enriched."  Jewett's brief, at 13.  Second, he argues
that the judgment must be reversed for failure to name the
proper defendant, namely, the company. 
II. Discussion
A. Evidentiary Challenges
"It is well established that '[w]hen a trial court hears
ore tenus testimony "its findings on disputed facts are
presumed correct and its judgment based on those findings will
not be reversed unless the judgment is palpably erroneous or
manifestly unjust."'"  Black Diamond Dev., Inc. v. Thompson,
979 So. 2d 47, 52 (Ala. 2007) (quoting New Props., L.L.C. v.
Stewart, 905 So. 2d 797, 799 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn
Philpot v. State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002)).  
1. Breach of Contract
Jewett's first evidentiary argument focuses on the weight
of the evidence as to the breach-of-contract count in Boihem's
complaint.  However, as pointed out previously in this
opinion, Boihem essentially abandoned his breach-of-contract
claim at trial by requesting only the return of the money he
1071534
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wired to Jewett and/or the company, with interest. By
contrast, "[f]or breach of contract the law of damages seeks
to place the aggrieved party in the same economic position he
would have had if the contract had been performed."  John D.
Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 14-4 (3d
ed. 1987) (emphasis added).
There is no evidence, or contention, that the trial
court's award consisted of damages for breach of contract.
Jewett challenges only the judgment itself, not the amount of,
or the method of calculating, the award.  Also, Jewett does
not argue that the letter agreement or the claim that it was
breached precludes restitution or recovery on an implied
contract theory.  See Kennedy v. Polar-BEK & Baker Wildwood
P'ship, 682 So. 2d 443, 447 (Ala. 1996) ("[W]here an express
contract exists between two parties, the law generally will
not recognize an implied contract regarding the same subject
matter.").  We, therefore, are not presented with such
contractual issues as (1) which party first breached the
letter agreement, (2) whether the breach by the first party
excused further performance by the other party, or (3) the
proper amount of the damages.  The only issues presented
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concern 
the 
propriety 
of 
the 
judgment 
under 
the 
implied-in-law
contract or restitution theories relied on in the trial court.
"The intention of the parties in such a contract is entirely
disregarded while in cases of express contracts and contracts
implied in fact, the intention is of the essence of the
transaction." Jenelle Mims Marsh & Charles W. Gamble, Alabama
Law of Damages § 34:2 (5th ed. 2004) (hereinafter "Marsh &
Gamble").
2. Unjust Enrichment/Money Had and Received
"[An action for money had and received] is founded
upon the equitable principle that no one ought
justly to enrich himself at the expense of another,
and is maintainable in all cases where one has
received money under such circumstances that in
equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it
because in justness and fairness it belongs to
another."
Marsh & Gamble, § 34:2.  "[A] cause of action for money had
and received is 'less restricted and fettered by technical
rules and formalities than any other form of action.  It aims
at the abstract justice of the case, and looks solely to the
inquiry, whether the defendant holds money, which ... belongs
to the plaintiff.'"  Staats v. Miller, 150 Tex. 581, 584-85,
243 S.W.2d 686, 687-88 (1951)(quoting United States v.
1071534
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Jefferson Elec. Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 386, 402-03 (1934)
(emphasis added)).
According to Jewett, the judgment for Boihem is plainly
and palpably wrong, because, he insists, Jewett does not "hold
money" paid by Boihem.  Jewett contends that the money Boihem
paid was paid to the company; therefore, he says, he is not
the proper defendant in this case.  We disagree.
"Whenever one person adds to the other's advantage in any
form, whether by increasing his holdings or saving him from
expense or loss, he has conferred a benefit upon the other."
Opelika Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lamb, 361 So. 2d 95, 99 (Ala.
1978).  Moreover, "[i]t is not necessary ... to prove that
money belonging to the plaintiff was actually and physically
given to, and received by the defendant, as it is sufficient
to show that ... the defendant has received the benefit
indirectly." 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts § 19, at 27  (2007)
(emphasis added).  "'Often a person owes restitution for a
benefit he received through entirely innocent behavior, and
even through a transaction in which he took no part.'"  Pratt
v. Watkins, 946 F.2d 907, 909 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1991)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Restitution § 1(b), at 10
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10
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983) (emphasis added)).  Cf. Weakley v.
Brahan, 2 Stew. 500, 501 (Ala. 1830) ("[T]he rule [that one
cannot make another his debtor without his consent] extends to
all payments made to another's use, where the action is
brought in the name of him who advances the money."); Oliver
v. Camp, 9 Ala. App. 232, 234, 62 So. 469, 470 (1913) ("An
action for money paid does not lie except upon a request on
the part of the defendant or his authorized agent.  The
request may be either express or implied.  One's request of
another to make a payment for him may be implied from his
subsequent ratification of the payment."). 
Boihem paid a total of $1,315,000 toward acquiring a 50%
interest in the company.  Under the evidence, the trial court
was authorized to find (1) that, while Jewett was requesting
$685,000 from Boihem to complete the purchase, he was actively
-- and secretly -- negotiating with Delta to strip the company
of a substantial portion of the assets Boihem expected to
receive for his payments; (2) that it was only after the Delta
deal was concluded that Jewett declared Boihem in default of
the letter agreement;  (3) that Jewett initially signaled an
intention to refund Boihem's consideration; (4) that Boihem
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has received nothing for his consideration; (5) that the
company, as bargained for, has been substantially compromised
through no fault of Boihem's; and (6) that the consideration
Boihem paid belongs, in "justness and fairness," to him. 
It is no answer to say, as Jewett does, that he owes no
obligation simply 
because Boihem 
made 
payments 
to 
the company,
rather than to him personally.  Indeed, $375,000 was paid
directly to Jewett.  Thus, to that extent, Jewett "holds
money" directly that in "justness and fairness" belongs to
Boihem.  
As for the rest of the money, it was paid to the company
at the instance of Jewett.  To the extent that the company is
in Jewett's hands, the money is in his hands.  As the sole
owner and manager of the company, Jewett had absolute
authority over its assets and accounts payable as evidenced by
the sale of company assets to Delta.  In other words, Boihem's
payments enriched the company.  The enrichment of the company
in turn enriched Jewett as of the time, and to the extent, of
his choosing.  Jewett cannot avoid restitutionary principles
by mere form, that is, by arbitrarily directing payment to one
of two bank accounts, both of which were under his ultimate
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control.  In short, the trial court's judgment is not, as
Jewett contends, "so unsupported by the evidence as to be
plainly and palpably wrong."
B. Proper Party 
Finally, Jewett contends that the company is not only the
proper party, 
but 
also an indispensable party, and, therefore,
that the trial court's judgment must be reversed for failure
to join the company, pursuant to Ala. R. Civ. P. 19(a).  Rule
19(a) states, in pertinent part: "A person who is subject to
jurisdiction of the court shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot
be accorded among those already parties ...."  According to
Jewett, because Boihem was seeking reimbursement of money he
paid to the company, "[p]roper and complete relief was not
afforded to the parties as a result of Boihem's failure to
name [the company] as a defendant."  Jewett's brief, at 18.
These objections are sufficiently answered by the
discussion in the preceding section.  As Boihem correctly
points out, he had no agreement with the company and he seeks
no money from the company.  His agreement was with Jewett, and
it is from Jewett that he seeks restitution.  To countenance
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13
Jewett's objection to nonjoinder would only revive the
argument already rejected in this opinion, namely, that
restitution cannot be had from Jewett because he did not
receive the money directly.  That is not the law as applied to
the facts of this case.
III. Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is not palpably erroneous or
manifestly unjust.  That judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.