Case Title: In re Weeks

Citation: 167 Vt. 551, 712 A.2d 907

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Weeks  (97-039); 167 Vt. 551; 712 A.2d 907

[Filed 1-May-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 97-039

Appeal of Lloyd W. & Elizabeth W. Weeks      Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             Environmental Court

                                             September Term, 1997

Merideth Wright, J.

Karl W. Neuse of Neuse, Smith, Roper & Venman, P.C., for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Andrew Jackson, Middlebury, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.  The Town of Shoreham appeals the Environmental Court's
  ruling that two adjoining parcels of land owned by appellees Lloyd and
  Elizabeth Weeks are exempt from the Town's minimum lot size requirement and
  therefore may be developed separately.  The Environmental Court found that,
  although the two exempt undersized lots would ordinarily merge into one
  unit when appellees brought them into affiliated ownership, a steep ravine
  between the parcels divides the lots and prevents them from being used
  functionally as one property and thereby precludes merger.  Because we
  conclude that the Town's zoning ordinance does not mandate the automatic
  merger of adjacent substandard lots that subsequently come into common
  ownership, we affirm the Environmental Court's decision on alternative
  grounds.

       In 1967, appellees purchased a parcel of land located within the Town
  on Lake Champlain's eastern shore.  Less than one acre in size, the parcel
  is designated as Lot 20 on a plot plan of thirty-three lots comprising the
  "Happy Evie Lakeshore Development" which was filed with the Town land
  records in 1964.

 

       In 1974, the Town established a minimum lot size of two acres in the
  district where the subject property is located.  As required under 24
  V.S.A. § 4406(1), the Town's ordinance contains an exception for undersized
  lots which were in "individual and separate and non-affiliated ownership
  from surrounding properties in existence on the effective date" of the
  ordinance.

       In 1982, appellees purchased from Central Vermont Public Service
  Corporation (CVPS) Lot 19, which adjoins and lies directly south of Lot 20,
  and is similarly less than one acre in size.  CVPS originally purchased Lot
  19 along with many other lots from the founders of the Happy Evie Lakeshore
  Development.  Appellees have maintained a garden, parked their mobile home,
  and built a garage for storage and other use on Lot 19.

       In 1995, appellees applied for a zoning permit to sell Lot 20 and
  retain Lot 19 for their own residential use.  The Town's Zoning
  Administrator denied the subdivision permit because neither lot satisfied
  the Town's required two-acre minimum size.  The Zoning Board of Adjustment
  (ZBA) affirmed the permit denial on grounds that (1) Lot 19 was not
  "grandfathered" as an existing small lot in 1974 when the ordinance took
  effect because at that time CVPS owned other lots adjacent to Lot 19, and
  (2) even if Lot 19 was originally grandfathered as an existing small lot,
  it merged with Lot 20 into a single parcel when appellees brought those
  lots into common ownership.  Thus, according to the ZBA, appellees could
  not sell their lots separately.

       Appellees then sought de novo review by the Environmental Court
  pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 4472(a).  The Environmental Court considered two
  principal issues: (1) whether Lots 19 and 20 were in fact held in separate
  and non-affiliated ownership when the amended zoning ordinance went into
  effect, and (2) whether Lot 19 merged with the adjoining Lot 20 to form
  functionally one parcel when appellees brought them into common ownership
  in 1982.

       The court concluded that both undersized lots were held in separate
  and non-affiliated ownership when the zoning ordinance went into effect,
  and thus were originally grandfathered

 

  under the ordinance's existing small lot exception.(FN1)  The court also
  determined that the lots would ordinarily "merge" into a single parcel once
  they were subsequently brought into common ownership, but that merger of
  Lots 19 and 20 was not appropriate because the "steepness, size, and
  placement" of a ravine located on the dividing line between the two lots
  "prevents them from being used functionally as one property."

       To reach its result, the Environmental Court extended our holding in
  Wilcox v. Village of Manchester Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 159 Vt. 193, 616 A.2d 1137 (1992).  In Wilcox, we reaffirmed an earlier holding from
  Drumheller v. Shelburne Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 155 Vt. 524, 586 A.2d 1150 (1990), that when two contiguous parcels of land are held in common
  ownership at the time minimum lot area zoning goes into effect, those
  parcels "merge" into "functionally one property."  Wilcox, 159 Vt. at 196,
  616 A.2d  at 1139.  In Wilcox we also held that merger should not occur if a
  right of way between the two parcels "effectively separate[s]" the parcels
  and prevents them from being "used in the ordinary manner as a single
  `lot.'"  Id. at 197, 616 A.2d  at 1139.  Here, the Environmental Court
  concluded that a steep ravine dividing appellees' lots poses a practical
  barrier that interferes with the ability to enjoy and use the two lots as a
  single parcel.  In reversing the ZBA, the court declined to merge the
  parcels and ruled that appellees could sell their lots separately without
  obtaining a subdivision permit.

       The Town argues that the Environmental Court inappropriately broadened
  Wilcox by concluding that the physical attributes of appellees' land can
  provide a basis to avoid merger and treat what should be viewed as a single
  parcel of land as functionally two separate lots.  The

 

  Town argues in the alternative that, even if the land's attributes can
  provide a basis to avoid merger, the court erred in finding that the
  parcels cannot be enjoyed as one lot.  As support, the Town points out that
  the ravine does not extend along the entire boundary line between the two
  lots, and that appellees can freely pass from one parcel to the other on a
  flat area near the road. We do not reach the issue of whether physical
  attributes of the subject parcel can preclude merger because we conclude
  that the Environmental Court erroneously operated under the presumption
  that our holding in Wilcox mandated the automatic merger of contiguous
  substandard parcels pursuant to the "existing small lot" exception.

       Zoning ordinances are construed according to the general principles of
  statutory construction.  See Houston v. Town of Waitsfield, 162 Vt. 476,
  479,