Case Title: Steven Douglas Hayward v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: 562005

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1234 
____________ 
 
STEVEN DOUGLAS HAYWARD,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[August 27, 2009] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Steven Douglas Hayward appeals from a judgment of conviction of first-
degree murder and sentence of death.1  He also appeals his convictions for armed 
robbery, armed burglary of a conveyance, and possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the convictions and the 
sentence of death. 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b) (1), Fla. Const. 
 
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OVERVIEW 
 
Steven Douglas Hayward (Hayward) was convicted of the first-degree 
murder of Daniel Destefano (Destefano) in St. Lucie County.  Hayward was also 
convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon, burglary of a conveyance while 
armed, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  Destefano, a newspaper 
delivery man in Fort Pierce, was robbed and shot while filling up a newsstand at a 
convenience store in the early morning hours of February 1, 2005.  The jury found 
Hayward guilty of all charges.  During the penalty phase, after considering several 
aggravating circumstances, including Hayward‘s prior conviction for second-
degree murder, and mitigation presented by the defense, the jury voted eight to 
four to recommend a sentence of death, which the trial court imposed.   
Hayward raises nine claims on appeal.  In addition to considering the claims 
raised by Hayward, we have a mandatory duty to examine the sufficiency of the 
evidence and to determine if Hayward‘s death sentence was proportionate.  We 
first examine the facts surrounding the murder. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Circumstances of the Murder and the Investigation 
 
Sometime before 4 a.m. on the morning of February 1, 2005, Destefano 
arrived at a convenience store and began filling the vending machine with 
newspapers.  Destefano had secured a concealed weapons permit for a .357 caliber 
 
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silver revolver which he was wearing in a holster on his belt.  Roosevelt McDowell 
(McDowell), a resident of a nearby rooming house, heard ―hollering‖ and heard 
Destefano shout, ―I don‘t have no more, I don‘t have no more.‖  McDowell then 
heard two gunshots followed by another, louder gunshot.  He opened the door to 
his room and saw a person he described as Mexican2 on one knee who was 
continuing to say, ―I don‘t have no more.‖  McDowell saw a black man searching 
through a nearby car.  McDowell testified that the man then went to the street light 
on the corner where McDowell could see the man examining his bleeding left 
hand.  According to McDowell, the man was wearing some sort of head covering.  
McDowell then saw Destefano limp away in an easterly direction and saw the 
black man take a short-cut around McDowell‘s rooming house, leaving the area in 
a westerly direction.  
 
Sometime shortly after 4 a.m., Destefano was found about a block away by 
an early morning fisherman, who called 911.  Officer James Grecco of the Fort 
Pierce Police Department received the 911 dispatch and quickly responded, 
arriving about two or three minutes before the paramedics arrived.  As the 
paramedics prepped Destefano for transport, Officer Grecco asked Destefano, 
―What happened?‖  Destefano stated that a black male with a black stocking cap 
over his face ran up to him and shot him.  He also told the officer that he fired back 
                                          
 
 
2.  Destefano was of Italian descent with dark olive skin. 
 
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with his handgun, but that he ―didn‘t know what happened to it.‖  Soon thereafter, 
Destefano lost consciousness and died. 
 
Dorothy Smith, Hayward‘s girlfriend, lived in a rooming house a few blocks 
away from the convenience store where Destefano was shot.  According to Smith, 
on the morning of the shooting, Hayward arrived at her room just before dawn with 
an injury to his hand.  He claimed the injury was inflicted by two black men who 
robbed him and shot him in the hand.  Smith immediately urged him to go to the 
hospital and asked if he wanted her to call an ambulance or the police.  Hayward 
vehemently refused Smith‘s offer and even unplugged the telephone to prevent her 
from calling anyone.  Hayward then went around the rooming house asking various 
residents to sew up his hand, but no one would do so.  
 
A few hours later, when Smith learned from a television newscast that 
someone had been shot at the convenience store, she asked Hayward about the 
shooting.  He denied any involvement and told her that he had been shot at a 
different location.  Just before Smith left for the store that morning to buy 
something for breakfast, she retrieved a bloody ten-dollar bill Hayward had placed 
in a drawer that morning.  When she returned, she found Hayward packing his 
bags to leave, but she convinced him to stay.  Shortly thereafter, Hayward sold a 
silver handgun for $100.3   
                                          
 
 
3.  Destefano‘s fiancée testified that Destefano‘s gun was silver. 
 
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Two days after the shooting, the police responded to Smith‘s rooming house 
after receiving a report that someone there had a possible gunshot wound to the 
hand and had been asking the residents to sew it up.  When the officers arrived, 
they found the front door open but asked and received permission from other 
residents to enter the common area.  The residents then directed the officers to 
Smith‘s open door where they knocked on the door frame and Smith answered.  As 
Smith was talking to the officers, Hayward came out of the communal bathroom 
located directly across from Smith‘s room and walked into the hallway where the 
officers were standing.  The officers immediately noticed his bandaged hand and 
asked if they could see the wound.  Hayward removed the bandage and, when the 
officers asked him what happened, he and Smith both indicated that Smith had 
―cut‖ him with a knife.  At this point, Detective Dan Flaherty asked Officer Darren 
Mace and Hayward to go outside so he could talk with Smith alone.  Hayward 
complied and stepped outside with the officer, where Officer Mace asked him to 
come to the police station to talk about the ―cut‖ on his hand.  Hayward agreed and 
was handcuffed before being placed in the back seat of the police car.  Officer 
Mace told Hayward that he was not under arrest, and that it was police policy to 
handcuff anyone being transported in a police car.    
 
After being handcuffed, but just before entering the car, Hayward suddenly 
stated to Officer Mace that he ―wasn‘t going to lie,‖ that he had been robbed the 
 
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other day and thought he had been shot.  Officer Mace left Hayward in the squad 
car and went to inform Detective Flaherty of Hayward‘s statement.  Smith, who 
was within hearing distance of the officers‘ conversation, then revised her story as 
well.  She said that she had gotten in an argument with Hayward the afternoon 
before the murder and had stabbed him in the hand.  She added that when he 
returned the next morning, he told her that he had been shot in the very same hand 
by two black men who robbed him. 
  
Once at the police station, Officer Mace took off Hayward‘s handcuffs but 
secured him by an ankle bracelet to a table in an interview room.  Hayward was 
then advised of his Miranda rights.4  After waiving his Miranda rights and agreeing 
to discuss the incident, Hayward provided the officers with several different 
versions of how his hand was injured.  He told the officers that he lied when he 
first claimed he had been stabbed.  He explained that he had actually been robbed 
by two men, one black and one Mexican, while trying to sell marijuana at the 
convenience store.  Hayward told the officers that he was shot in the hand as he 
tried to take the gun away from the black robber.   
                                          
 
 
4.  In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme 
Court held that any statements made in response to interrogation by a defendant in 
police custody would be admissible at trial only if the defendant was informed of 
the right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning and of the right 
against self-incrimination prior to questioning by police, and the defendant 
understood these rights and voluntarily waived them.  Hayward does not claim that 
the interview statements admitted into evidence were obtained in violation of the 
requirements of Miranda. 
 
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Hayward subsequently changed his story again, this time stating that he was 
not robbed at all, but instead had witnessed Destefano being robbed and shot by a 
lone black man.  Hayward said that he attempted to pick up a gun left at the scene 
but dropped it and it went off, shooting him in the hand.  He told the officers that 
even though his hand was bleeding, he went through Destefano‘s car looking for 
anything of value.  After concluding his statement, Hayward was arrested for 
Destefano‘s murder. 
 
A few months later, when the common laundry room in Smith‘s rooming 
house was renovated, a black .22 caliber revolver identified as the murder weapon 
was found behind a board covering a vent in the wall.  Hayward‘s blood was 
discovered inside the gun‘s firing chambers. 
Medical Examiner Dr. Charles Diggs testified that Destefano suffered a 
nonfatal injury to his left thigh from a .22 caliber bullet that entered the thigh 
horizontally, which was consistent with Destefano standing up when the shot was 
fired.  Destefano died as a result of internal bleeding caused by a second .22 caliber 
bullet that entered Destefano‘s upper left chest area and traveled downward at a 
forty-five-degree angle, coming to rest in his lower intestine.  This was consistent 
with Destefano having been shot from above, while kneeling.   
Because he bled internally, Destefano‘s blood was not found at the crime 
scene.  On the other hand, a great deal of Hayward‘s blood was found at the crime 
 
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scene, on several of Destefano‘s personal items found strewn around his car, on the 
door frame of Destefano‘s car, on several locations on the outside walls of 
McDowell‘s rooming house, and on a fence post adjacent to the rooming house.  
The hooded jacket that Hayward was wearing the morning of the murder 
evidenced a number of heavy blood transfer stains5 originating from Hayward.  
There was a large tear on the inside pocket of the jacket, which also bore evidence 
of Hayward‘s blood.  Criminalist Earl Ritzline testified that the tear was big 
enough to have been used as a hiding place for two guns.  Significantly, even 
though in his statement to the police Hayward denied touching Destefano, the front 
and back of Destefano‘s pants were stained with large amounts of Hayward‘s 
blood, including heavy transfer blood stains on Destefano‘s back pockets.  Ritzline 
opined that the perpetrator had pushed his bloody hand inside the pockets while 
searching them. 
 
The jury also heard portions of two taped telephone calls Hayward made to 
Smith from jail shortly after his arrest, which the State offered as proof of 
Hayward‘s consciousness of guilt and to show Hayward was attempting to coach 
Smith in her testimony.  At the close of the evidence, the defense argued in a 
motion for judgment of acquittal that the State had not refuted Hayward‘s 
                                          
 
 
5.  Blood transfers or wipes on fabric are usually highly concentrated.  This 
can occur, for example, when a person presses a bloody object, such as a hand, 
against the fabric, in essence crushing large quantities of blood into the fabric. 
 
 
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hypothesis that he was only an observer and not the actual shooter.  The motion 
was denied and the case was submitted to the jury.  The jury found Hayward guilty 
of first-degree murder, robbery, burglary of a conveyance, and possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon.   
Penalty Phase and Sentencing 
 
During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence of Hayward‘s 1988 
convictions for second-degree murder and two counts of armed robbery.  A witness 
to the 1988 crimes testified that he was standing outside a bar talking to the victim 
when Hayward and his codefendant began shooting Uzis in the parking lot.  
Hayward approached the victim from behind and said, ―Let me have it.‖  When the 
victim looked over his shoulder and laughed, Hayward shot the victim from 
behind.  The witness stated that after the first shot, Hayward repeatedly pulled the 
trigger on the Uzi, but it had apparently jammed and only made a clicking sound.  
The lead detective in that case testified that the victim was shot in the groin area 
and bled to death.  The detective testified that when questioned, Hayward admitted 
he was present when the murder occurred, but claimed that he was only an 
observer.  Hayward also told the police that two black youths from Fort Lauderdale 
committed the murder, and he offered a location where the perpetrators might be 
found.  Hayward eventually pled nolo contendere to the crimes.   
 
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Victim impact testimony was offered by Destefano‘s mother, sister and 
fiancée.  They spoke about Destefano‘s character, his hard work, and how much he 
would be missed by them. 
 
In mitigation, Hayward presented the testimony of psychologist Dr. Michael 
Reardon, as well as the testimony of four family members: Hayward‘s brother, his 
two sisters, and his mother.  Dr. Reardon testified that Hayward had the potential 
to be rehabilitated because he had shown an ability to focus on learning despite his 
low average IQ (91), as exemplified by his attainment of a GED while in prison for 
the first murder.  The psychologist also indicated that Hayward had made license 
plates and worked in other areas while in prison.  Hayward‘s mother testified that 
due to the family‘s financial difficulties, she had to work two jobs and was absent 
from the home quite often.  In her absence, Hayward‘s older half-siblings took care 
of and disciplined him.  Hayward‘s mother testified that his siblings often picked 
on Hayward and even beat him up.  She testified that Hayward‘s stepfather was 
present in the home during Hayward‘s early years, but later, Hayward‘s biological 
father, an alcoholic, came to live with the family.  Hayward grew up without a 
consistent father-figure in his life.  The jury recommended a death sentence by a 
vote of eight to four.   
 
In sentencing Hayward to death, the court found three aggravators: (1) that 
Hayward had prior violent felony convictions based on his convictions for second-
 
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degree murder and two counts of armed robbery, to which the court assigned 
―extremely great weight‖; (2) that the murder was committed during the course of 
a robbery; and (3) that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain.  The court 
found that the second and third aggravators merged and gave the single 
aggravating circumstance ―great weight.‖  There were no statutory mitigators 
offered or found, but the court found the following nonstatutory mitigators 
applicable: (1) Hayward could have received a life sentence; (2) he grew up 
without a father; (3) he was loved by his family; (4) he had academic problems; (5) 
he obtained a GED in prison; (6) he would make a good adjustment to prison; (7) 
he had financial stress at the time of the crime; and (8) he had some capacity for 
rehabilitation.  Each was given ―little weight‖ except for the factor that Hayward 
could have gotten a life sentence, which was given ―very little weight,‖ and the 
factor that he grew up without a father, which was given ―some weight.‖  The trial 
court, in the sentencing order, summarized its reasoning in sentencing Hayward to 
death as follows: 
 
Not only does this Court find that the totality of the aggravating 
circumstances in this case far outweigh the mitigating circumstances, 
but the Court expressly finds that each statutory aggravator, when 
considered alone outweighs the totality of the mitigating 
circumstances. 
 
The facts supporting the Defendant‘s previous conviction for 
Second Degree Murder and Armed Robberies, which formed the basis 
of the first statutory aggravating circumstance are compelling.  When 
compared to the facts and circumstances of the murder and robbery in 
this case, they are alarming.  The Defendant had been released from 
 
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the Department of Corrections eighty-seven (87) days prior to 
committing another murder and robbery in which the life of another 
innocent human being was senselessly ended.  It is difficult to imagine 
how the Defendant could have robbed and killed a person in 1988, 
served 16 years in prison for those crimes with more than enough time 
to contemplate the horrific, irreversible and unforgivable 
consequences of his actions, yet within ninety days of release from 
prison, commit the same crimes resulting in the same horrific, 
irreversible and unforgivable consequences. 
 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
On appeal, Hayward asserts that (1) the statements of the murder victim to 
police describing his attacker were improperly admitted under the excited utterance  
and dying declaration exceptions to the hearsay rule, and in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause; (2) introduction of Hayward‘s statements to police at the 
rooming house and their observations while there violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights; (3) introduction of the recorded jail conversations between Hayward and 
Smith were more prejudicial than probative due to the vulgarity of the language 
used, affecting both the guilt and penalty phases; (4) comments made by the 
prosecutor in closing argument during the penalty phase comparing the life choices 
made by the victim and Hayward constituted prosecutorial misconduct requiring 
resentencing; (5) there was insufficient evidence concerning the identity of the 
shooter; (6) there was insufficient evidence as to whether a robbery was actually 
accomplished; (7) there was insufficient evidence establishing premeditation; 
(8) the standard jury instruction on premeditation is insufficient; (9) Florida‘s 
 
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sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002);6 and (10) imposition of a death 
sentence based on an eight-to-four jury recommendation is unconstitutional.  We 
will first analyze Hayward‘s claims challenging the admission of evidence in the 
guilt phase of the trial.   
EVIDENTIARY CLAIMS 
 
Hayward asserts that the trial court committed a number of errors in 
admitting evidence.  In this section, we will discuss the following claims of error: 
(1) that the statements of the murder victim to police describing his attacker were 
improperly admitted under the excited utterance and dying declaration hearsay 
exceptions, and in violation of the Confrontation Clause; (2) that admission of 
statements Hayward made to police and their observations at the rooming house 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights; and (3) that the introduction of the recorded 
telephone conversations between Hayward and Smith was more prejudicial than 
probative due to the vulgarity of the language used.   
Hearsay Claim 
Hayward asserts that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence 
Destefano‘s statement describing his attacker to the first responding police officer.  
                                          
 
 
6.  In Ring, the Supreme Court held that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment 
right to have a jury find all facts upon which the Legislature conditions an increase 
in the maximum punishment.  See 536 U.S. at 589. 
 
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He contends that the statement was improperly admitted under the dying 
declaration and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule, and that admission 
of the statement violated the Confrontation Clause.  See U.S. Const.  amend. VI.   
Officer Grecco testified at trial that as Destefano was being prepped for 
transport by the paramedics, Grecco asked him, ―What happened?‖  Destefano was 
able to tell Officer Grecco that a black male with a black stocking cap over his face 
ran up to him and shot him.  He also told the officer that he fired back with his 
handgun but that he ―didn‘t know what happened to it.‖  Soon thereafter, 
Destefano lost consciousness and died.  The trial court overruled Hayward‘s 
hearsay objection, ruling that the statement was admissible both as an excited 
utterance and a dying declaration.  As discussed below, we conclude that 
Destefano‘s statement qualified as an excited utterance but not as a dying 
declaration.  We also conclude that even though the statement qualified as an 
excited utterance, its admission violated the Confrontation Clause because the 
statement was testimonial.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  
However, any error in admitting the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.   
A.  Excited Utterance Exception 
 
A trial judge‘s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion.  Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 156 (Fla. 1998).  
 
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The trial court‘s discretion is constrained, however, by the application of the rules 
of evidence, Johnston v. State, 863 So. 2d 271, 278 (Fla. 2003), and by the 
principles of stare decisis.  McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 326 (Fla. 2007).  
In order for a statement to qualify as an excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule pursuant to section 90.803(2), Florida Statutes (2007), ―the statement must be 
made: (1) ‗regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement‘; 
(2) ‗before there was time to contrive or misrepresent‘; and (3) ‗while the person 
was under the stress or excitement caused by the event.‘ ‖  Hudson v. State, 992 
So. 2d 96, 107 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 251 (Fla. 
1996)).  
First, Destefano had been shot during the course of a robbery—clearly an 
event startling enough to cause the nervous excitement required by section 
90.803(2).  It is not necessary that the statement illustrate the startling event; it is 
enough that the statement relate to the event.  See Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 
950 (Fla. 2007).  Here, Destefano‘s statement that the robber was a ―black man 
wearing a black stocking cap‖ relates to the event that caused the startling nervous 
excitement.     
Second, this Court has explained that ―[w]hile an excited utterance need not 
be contemporaneous to the event, it must be made while the declarant is under the 
stress of the startling event and without time for reflection.‖  Hudson, 992 So. 2d at 
 
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107 (quoting Hutchinson v. State, 882 So. 2d 943, 951 (Fla. 2004)).  The statement 
must be made without time for reflective thought because it is the lack of time to 
contrive or misrepresent the facts that provides the reliability for such statements.  
See Hudson, 992 So. 2d at 107.  Although the exact amount of time that passed 
between when Destefano was shot and when he made his statement to Officer 
Grecco is unclear, ―[t]he test regarding the time elapsed is not a bright-line rule of 
hours or minutes.‖  Rogers v. State, 660 So. 2d 237, 240 (Fla. 1995); see also 
Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 297, at 856 (3d ed. 1984). We have 
held that the ―[f]actors that the trial judge can consider in determining whether the 
necessary state of stress or excitement is present are the age of the declarant, the 
physical and mental condition of the declarant, the characteristics of the event and 
the subject matter of the statements.‖  Hudson, 992 So. 2d at 108 (quoting 
Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 748 (Fla. 2007)). 
In Williams, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting as an excited utterance a statement made by a victim twenty minutes 
after the incident.  In so holding, we noted that the trial court had before it 
evidence of the physical and mental condition of the declarant and the 
characteristics of the event.  See Hudson, 992 So. 2d 108 (reiterating factors that 
may be considered in determining if the declarant is still under the stress of the 
event).  This evidence included the fact that the declarant was ―still grievously 
 
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injured,‖ having suffered multiple stab wounds and punctured lungs, and was 
―upset, and fading in and out of consciousness‖ at the time of the statement.  
Williams, 967 So. 2d at 749.   
In Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1996), the defendant kidnapped a 
mother and her two children.  He raped the mother, shot her four times and left her 
for dead, although she ultimately survived.  He took the children to another 
location where he shot and killed them both.  We held that the mother‘s statements 
to a police officer were properly admitted as excited utterances even though she 
made her statements several hours after the shooting.  Id. at 251.  After being left 
on the side of the road, the mother lost consciousness for a few hours.  When she 
regained consciousness, she made her way to a nearby house where she collapsed 
on the porch and the occupants called the police.  When an officer arrived, the 
victim was hysterical but coherent when she told him about the event.  At trial, the 
officer was permitted to testify that immediately after his arrival, she told him that 
two young black males raped and shot her and then took her children.  We held the 
officer‘s testimony was proper as an excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule 
and stated, ―While the length of time between the event and the statement is a 
factor to be considered in determining whether that statement may be admitted 
under the excited utterance exception, the immediacy of the statement is not a 
statutory requirement.‖  Id. (citation omitted).   
 
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Here, although some amount of time passed between the shooting and the 
time that Destefano spoke to the police officer, the medical examiner testified that 
Destefano was bleeding internally and that someone in his condition would 
become increasingly light-headed and dizzy.  Additionally, Officer Grecco testified 
that Destefano was having difficulty breathing and appeared ―scared, frightened, 
and terrified.‖  The officer added that Destefano ―wasn‘t verbal [or] speaking at 
all‖ within minutes of Grecco‘s arrival at the scene.   Given Destefano‘s physical 
and emotional condition following his devastating injuries, the evidence clearly 
indicates he was still under the effect of the startling events of that early morning, 
thus supporting a conclusion that he did not engage in reflection prior to making 
the statement.  We therefore conclude that the statement qualified as an exception 
to hearsay pursuant to section 90.803(2) and that the trial court did not err in 
finding the statement to be an excited utterance.   
B.  Dying Declaration Exception 
We now examine whether Destefano‘s statement was admissible under the 
dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule.  Pursuant to section 90.804(2)(b), 
Florida Statutes (2007), and this Court‘s prior rulings, the deceased must have 
known and ―appreciated his condition as being that of an approach to certain and 
immediate death,‖ although it is not necessary that the declarant ―make express 
utterances‖ that he would never recover.  Henry v. State, 613 So. 2d 429, 431 (Fla. 
 
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1992) (quoting Lester v. State, 20 So. 232, 233 (Fla. 1896)).  ―Rather, the court 
should satisfy itself, on the totality of the circumstances,‖ that the deceased knew 
he was dying.  Id. (quoting Lester, 20 So. at 233).  This Court has said the 
―absence of all hope of recovery, and appreciation by the declarant of his speedy 
and inevitable death, are a preliminary foundation that must always be laid to make 
such declarations admissible.‖  McRane v. State, 194 So. 632, 636 (Fla. 1940) 
(quoting Lester, 20 So. at 233).   Further, the declarant must not have merely 
considered himself in imminent danger, but he must have ―believed he was without 
hope of recovery.‖  Dixon v. State, 13 Fla. 636, 640 (1870); see also Morris v. 
State, 130 So. 582, 584 (Fla. 1930) (―[The declarant] knew unquestionably, that he 
had been mortally wounded.‖).   
Thus, under our established precedent, in order for Destefano‘s statement to 
be considered a dying declaration, he must have believed his death was imminent.   
A clear example of an admissible dying declaration is found in Williams, where  
we concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting a statement as a dying 
declaration.  There, the evidence showed that the declarant, who suffered grievous 
injuries, expressed numerous times that she believed she was dying and that she 
would not survive her injuries.  Williams, 967 So. 2d at 749.  In the present case, 
although the medical examiner testified that someone in Destefano‘s condition 
would ―know something was radically wrong,‖ the evidence showed that he also 
 
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knew the ambulance had arrived and that he was receiving medical attention.  
There is no evidence suggesting that Destefano lacked all hope of recovery or 
believed his death was imminent.  Thus, we must conclude that the trial judge 
erred in admitting the statement as a dying declaration. 
C.  Crawford v. Washington   
Even though Destefano‘s statement qualified as an excited utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule, its admission resulted in a violation of Hayward‘s 
rights under the Confrontation Clause.  ―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .‖  
U.S. Const.  amend. VI.  The Supreme Court laid the analytical framework for a 
Confrontation Clause violation when it stated ―[w]here testimonial evidence is at 
issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: 
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.‖  Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 68.7  Prior to Crawford, the issue was controlled by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56, 66 (1980), which held that a hearsay statement could be introduced in a 
criminal trial without resulting in a Confrontation Clause violation if it was shown 
that the declarant was unavailable and the out-of-court statement bore adequate 
                                          
 
7.  The State also argues that the common law doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing allows the introduction of statements by a witness if the witness is 
unavailable to testify due to the ―means or procurement‖ of the defendant.  See 
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2683 (2008).  The State urges us to hold that 
forfeiture applies in Hayward‘s case because he ―procured‖ Destefano‘s absence 
by killing him.  We decline to adopt such a theory. 
 
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indicia of reliability.  In Roberts, the Court focused on the reliability of the 
statement, concluding that a statement had ―adequate indicia of reliability if it 
either fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or it bore ‗particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.‘ ‖  Blanton v. State, 978 So. 2d 149, 154 (Fla. 2008) 
(quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).   
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Crawford abandoned the Roberts indicia of 
reliability test and held that the introduction of a hearsay statement will result in a 
violation of the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation if (1) the 
statement is testimonial; (2) the declarant is unavailable; and (3) the defendant 
lacked a prior opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant.  ―Only 
[testimonial statements] cause the declarant to be a ‗witness‘ within the meaning of 
the Confrontation Clause.‖  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006).  ―It is 
the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, 
while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the 
Confrontation Clause.‖  Id.  This Court has also recognized that ―[t]he mere fact 
that evidence meets the requirements of an exception to the hearsay rule does not 
necessarily mean it is admissible as evidence.‖  State v. Lopez, 974 So. 2d 340, 
345 (Fla. 2008).   
In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that the statements made by 
the victim to a 911 operator during the course of an attack were not testimonial, 
 
- 22 - 
and were therefore admissible, because the victim ―simply was not acting as a 
witness; she was not testifying.‖  Id. at 828.  In the companion case of Hammon v. 
Indiana, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-5705), the victim was waiting on the front 
porch and the assailant was inside when the police arrived.  The victim was 
escorted to a separate room where she was questioned and filled out a complaint 
affidavit about the incident.  The Supreme Court held that the victim‘s statement in 
Hammon was testimonial because ―[t]here was no emergency in progress‖ and the 
―primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a 
possible crime.‖  Id. at 829-30. 
The Supreme Court in Davis discussed other factors that may be considered 
when determining whether a statement is testimonial, such as (1) whether the 
declarant was speaking about events that were currently happening or 
circumstances that could currently be responded to, as opposed to events that were 
clearly in the past and could only be investigated and litigated; (2) whether the 
declarant was facing an ongoing emergency (describing or seeking help for current 
physical danger); and (3) whether the setting of the declarant‘s statement was a 
perilous crime scene or a safe location.  Thus, we shall examine the evidence in 
this case in light of the above-mentioned factors.  As discussed below, based on 
application of the three factors set forth in Davis, we conclude that while 
 
- 23 - 
Destefano‘s statement qualifies as an excited utterance, its admission violated the 
Confrontation Clause because it was testimonial. 
First, Destefano was speaking about past events that could only be 
investigated or litigated.  He had already been robbed and shot, and his statement 
described that past occurrence.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (distinguishing 
between the interrogation in Davis from Crawford on the basis that in Davis, the 
victim ―was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than 
‗describ[ing] past events‘ ‖ (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999)). 
 
Second, at the time Destefano made his statement, he was receiving medical 
attention and was being prepped for transport to a hospital.  Officer Grecco already 
knew that he was responding to a shooting incident, and Destefano‘s statement 
simply answered Officer Grecco‘s question as to ―what happened.‖  The statement 
was not meant to help the officer respond to an emergency; rather, it was aimed at 
assisting the officer in investigating, locating, and prosecuting the perpetrator.  
―When we said . . . that ‗interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely 
within [the] class‘ of testimonial hearsay, we had immediately in mind . . . 
interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to 
identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator.‖  Davis, 547 U.S. at 826 
(quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53).    
 
- 24 - 
Third, Destefano found help approximately one block away from the scene 
of the attack and his assailant had already left, heading in the opposite direction.  
See, e.g. People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 217-218 (Cal. 2007) (finding statements 
made by the victim to be testimonial in nature where the statements were made in a 
different location than the attack and there was no danger of further violence).  
Because Destefano was being attended to by numerous professionals, including a 
police officer, he was not in peril at the time of his statement. 
Accordingly, given these findings, we conclude that even though 
Destefano‘s statement to Officer Grecco constituted an excited utterance, his 
statement was testimonial in nature, and therefore its admission into evidence 
violated the Confrontation Clause.8 
D.  Harmless Error Analysis 
Even though we have determined that admission of Destefano‘s statement 
was erroneously admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause, we conclude 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  In State v. DiGuilio, 491 
So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), this Court articulated the inquiry which must be 
undertaken to determine if an error requires reversal or is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Once error has been established, ―[t]he question is whether there 
                                          
 
 
8.  We have determined that Destefano‘s statement did not constitute a dying 
declaration.  Therefore, we need not address whether a dying declaration might be 
an exception to the Confrontation Clause requirements set forth in Crawford.   
 
- 25 - 
is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.‖  Id. at 1139.   The 
burden is on the State, ―as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, 
alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed 
to the conviction.‖  Id. at 1135.  In making this analysis, the Court will consider 
both ―the permissible evidence on which the jury could have legitimately relied‖ 
and ―the impermissible evidence which might have possibly influenced the jury 
verdict.‖  Id.   
Given the strength and nature of the other evidence connecting Hayward to 
the crime on which the jury could have relied, we find that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the admission of Destefano‘s statement affected the verdict.  First, 
the statement did not specifically identify Hayward—it simply identified the 
perpetrator as a ―black male‖ with a cap.  Further, more than one witness provided 
the police with virtually the same description given by Destefano to Officer 
Grecco.   McDowell also testified that the perpetrator was a black man with some 
sort of head covering or hat, and Hayward himself testified that the perpetrator was 
a ―black guy with [a] mask on.‖  Thus, the information that the assailant was a 
black man with some sort of head covering was properly introduced at trial through 
two witnesses other than Destefano, and the jury would have heard it even if 
Officer Grecco had not testified.   Additionally, Hayward confessed to the burglary 
 
- 26 - 
and confirmed all the events of the robbery, and there was extensive forensic 
evidence tying Hayward to the murder.  ―[W]here the evidence introduced in error 
was not the only evidence on the issue to which the improper evidence related, the 
introduction can be harmless.‖  Hojan v. State, 3 So. 3d  1204, 1210 (Fla. 2009); 
see also Henyard, 689 So. 2d at 251 (finding the introduction of the victim‘s 
statements through the officer‘s testimony constituted harmless error where the 
statements were also introduced through the victim‘s testimony).  Because there 
was additional substantial, reliable and admissible evidence that the perpetrator 
was a black male with some sort of head covering, the admission of Destefano‘s 
statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and Hayward is not entitled to 
relief on this issue. 
The Police Encounter at the Rooming House, Hayward’s Statements, 
and the Issue of Probable Cause 
 
 
We now examine the evidence of Hayward‘s statements made both at the 
rooming house and at the police station, as well as the observations made by the 
police at the rooming house, to determine if introduction of any of that evidence 
violated Hayward‘s constitutional rights.  We also examine Hayward‘s claim that 
the police had no probable cause to detain him.   
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 12 of 
Florida‘s Declaration of Rights guarantee citizens the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  See U.S. Const. amend. IV; art. I, § 12, Fla. 
 
- 27 - 
Const.  Evidence obtained in violation of those constitutional protections is 
generally excluded.  Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174, 1179-80 (Fla. 2006).  The 
Fourth Amendment requires all warrantless ―seizures‖ of a person to be founded 
upon at least reasonable suspicion that the individual seized is engaged in 
wrongdoing.  See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980) (plurality 
opinion).  However, only when the police, ―by means of physical force or show of 
authority, [have] in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen‖ is there a 
―seizure‖ of that person.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19  n.16 (1968).  ―Seizures of 
the person‖ include both formal arrests and ―seizures that involve only a brief 
detention short of traditional arrest.‖  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551 (quoting United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).  As the Supreme Court has 
observed, the inquiry in law enforcement encounter cases is whether there has been 
an ―intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights.‖  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 
(plurality opinion) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16).   
In Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1, 14-15 (Fla. 2003), we discussed the three 
levels of encounter that a person may have with law enforcement: (1) a consensual 
encounter that involves only minimal police contact during which a citizen may 
either voluntarily comply with a police officer‘s requests or choose to ignore them 
and leave; (2) an investigatory stop as enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968), during which a police officer may detain a citizen temporarily if the officer 
 
- 28 - 
has a reasonable, well-founded, and articulable suspicion that a person has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime; and (3) an ―arrest,‖ 
which must be supported by probable cause that a crime has been or is being 
committed.  ―When determining whether a particular encounter is consensual, the 
Court must look to the ‗totality of the circumstances‘ surrounding the encounter to 
decide ‗if the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that 
the person was free to leave or terminate the encounter.‘ ‖  Taylor, 855 So. 2d at 15 
(quoting Voorhees v. State, 699 So. 2d 602, 608 (Fla. 1997)).     
In order to determine if Hayward‘s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, 
we must first determine if and when Hayward was ―detained.‖  We do so by 
dividing the police encounter with Hayward into four time frames: (1) the initial 
encounter when Hayward exited the bathroom into the hallway inside the rooming 
house; (2) the instance when Detective Flaherty asked Officer Mace to take 
Hayward outside; (3) the instance outside the rooming house when Hayward 
asserted that he had actually been robbed and shot, not stabbed; and (4) the official 
statement made by Hayward at the police station after having been advised of his 
Miranda rights.  We will also discuss whether there was probable cause to detain 
him and whether his Fourth Amendment rights were violated during any of these 
police encounters. 
 
- 29 - 
A. The First Time Frame: In the Hallway 
Hayward‘s initial encounter with the police occurred at Smith‘s rooming 
house after he stepped out of the bathroom and into the hallway, which was 
occupied by a number of police officers.  Hayward asserts that due to the number 
of officers, the fact that he stepped directly into the group, and that a rifle or 
shotgun was present (although not aimed at anyone), the entire police encounter 
was nonconsensual from the start.  He argues that under these circumstances, his 
statements and actions were not voluntary, but rather resulted from compelled 
acquiescence to the apparent authority of the police and that the encounter was an 
―arrest.‖   Moreover, Hayward argues that the police had no physical evidence 
linking him to the crime, no murder weapon, and ―nothing‖ putting him at the 
scene of the crime, thereby rendering his arrest without probable cause.  We 
disagree. 
 
Applying the three-level police-encounter criteria set forth in Taylor, we 
conclude that Hayward‘s initial encounter with the police inside Smith‘s rooming 
house was consensual.  While the police were clearly looking for a suspect (a black 
man with a gunshot wound to his hand), they did not know Hayward was in the 
bathroom and did nothing to compel him to come out of the bathroom into the 
hallway.  Rather, Hayward emerged from the bathroom of his own accord.  After 
the police inquired about his bandaged hand, Hayward and Smith indicated that 
 
- 30 - 
Smith had stabbed him following a domestic dispute.  When Hayward removed his 
bandage, it was in response to Officer Mace simply asking if he could take a look 
at it.  At no point did Officer Mace, or any other member of law enforcement, have 
a weapon drawn or demand to see the wound.  Accordingly, the initial report that 
Hayward‘s wound was the result of a stabbing incident and the police officer‘s 
testimony that the wound appeared to be an infected gunshot wound, not a stab 
wound, were properly admitted.  
B. The Second Time Frame: Stepping Outside with Officer Mace 
 
We next examine the level of police encounter associated with the request 
that Officer Mace and Hayward step outside of the rooming house while Detective 
Flaherty spoke with Smith.  Detective Flaherty testified that Smith appeared very 
nervous and he thought she might want to say something to the officers but was 
afraid to do so in Hayward‘s presence.  Considering the assertion that Hayward 
sustained the wound on his hand during a domestic dispute with Smith, the officers 
reasonably separated Smith and Hayward.  Thus, when Hayward and Officer Mace 
stepped outside while Detective Flaherty and Smith spoke, this action was not a 
detention.  Further, since a crime had allegedly been committed against Hayward 
by Smith (i.e., that Smith had stabbed him), Officer Mace‘s subsequent request that 
Hayward come to the station to discuss ―the cut‖ was not a detention.   
 
- 31 - 
C. The Third Time Frame: Sudden Change of Story as to the Wound 
 
Next, we examine the circumstances surrounding the handcuffing of 
Hayward for the trip to the police station and his subsequent statement.  Once 
Hayward agreed to accompany Officer Mace to the police station, he was 
handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the patrol car.  Prior to handcuffing 
Hayward, Officer Mace explained to him that it was police policy to handcuff all 
persons transported in police vehicles.  As he was entering the vehicle, Hayward 
suddenly stated that he ―wasn‘t going to lie.‖  He then told Officer Mace that he 
had been robbed and shot.   
The State concedes that handcuffs are restraining devices but contends that 
Hayward was not detained because the use of handcuffs during transport was a 
routine safety measure followed by the police.  Although Hayward was in the 
process of being handcuffed pursuant to police policy at the time of his statement, 
the totality of the circumstances, including the purpose of the officer‘s conduct and 
the spontaneous nature of Hayward‘s statement, demonstrate that his statement was 
not the result of any alleged illegal detention.  See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 603-04 (1975).  In addition to this Fourth Amendment analysis, we must also 
consider any Fifth Amendment implications.  See Voorhees, 699 So. 2d at 611.  
Hayward agreed to accompany the police to the station for further questioning and 
his statement was clearly spontaneous and voluntary and thus not the product of 
 
- 32 - 
interrogation.   See Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 573 (Fla. 1999) 
(―Interrogation takes place . . . when a person is subjected to express questions, or 
other words or actions, by a state agent, that a reasonable person would conclude 
are designed to lead to an incriminating response.‖) (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 
So. 2d 957, 966 n.17 (Fla. 1992)); see also Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648, 659 
(Fla. 1995) (concluding that the defendant‘s statement was voluntary and 
spontaneous and not elicited by any interrogation); State v. Foster, 562 So. 2d 808, 
810 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding that spontaneous statements are not always the 
product of an interrogation); Rosher v. State, 319 So. 2d 150, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1975) (―Spontaneous statements are admissible in evidence [when they] are not the 
product of interrogation.‖).  Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is no 
merit to Hayward‘s claim that his voluntary, unsolicited statement that he had been 
shot, not stabbed, should have been suppressed. 
D. The Fourth Time Frame: Hayward’s Statement at the Police Station 
 
Once at the station, Officer Mace took Hayward‘s handcuffs off, but secured 
him by an ankle bracelet to a table in an interview room, where he was advised of 
his Miranda rights.  Thereafter, Hayward agreed to discuss the incident and gave 
the officers several versions of how his hand was injured.  While we agree with 
Hayward that he was clearly ―detained‖ when he made these statements, we find 
that the statements were properly admitted into evidence because they were made 
 
- 33 - 
after he had been advised of his Miranda rights and after he indicated that he 
wished to proceed with the questioning.9 
E. Probable Cause 
 
Finally, we reject Hayward‘s contention that the police did not have 
probable cause to detain or arrest him, had they actually chosen to do so at the 
rooming house.  In Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1997), we explained: 
Probable cause for arrest exists where an officer ―has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the suspect has committed a felony.  The 
standard of conclusiveness and probability is less than that required to 
support a conviction.‖  Blanco v. State, 452 So. 2d 520, 523 (Fla. 
1984).  The question of probable cause is viewed from the perspective 
of a police officer with specialized training and takes into account the 
―factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.‖  Schmitt v. 
State, 563 So. 2d 1095, 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). 
 
Id. at 312.  Utilizing these criteria here, we conclude that the police had probable 
cause to detain Hayward for further questioning.  By the time the police 
encountered Hayward at the rooming house, they had already interviewed 
McDowell, who described the assailant as being a black man with what appeared 
to be a bleeding left hand, who fled the scene in the general direction of Smith‘s 
                                          
 
 
9.  Of course, constitutional errors committed prior to an official arrest 
cannot be ―cleansed‖ by the simple remedy of administering Miranda warnings 
later.  See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (subsequent Miranda 
warnings do not cure Fourth Amendment violations).  However, since we have 
found no constitutional violations in the admission of evidence obtained pursuant 
to Hayward‘s police encounter at the rooming house prior to his being given such 
warnings, there was no violation and thus no need for any ―cleansing.‖   
 
- 34 - 
rooming house.  McDowell‘s statements, including the description of the different 
sounds of the gun shots, along with Destefano‘s statement to the officer that he 
shot at his assailant, provided reasonable grounds to believe that Destefano‘s 
assailant had in fact been shot.10  Smith‘s rooming house was only a few blocks 
away from the crime scene, and police found a blood trail leading in that general 
direction.  Only two days after the shooting, the police were notified that a person 
at the rooming house had a possible gunshot wound to the hand and had been 
asking residents to sew it up.  When the police saw Hayward‘s wound, they 
observed that it looked like a gunshot wound.  Finally, when Hayward‘s story 
drastically changed during the encounter, it became clear that he had lied about the 
cause of the injury to his hand.  Based on the totality of the circumstances, the 
police had reasonable grounds, and therefore probable cause, to conclude that a 
felony had been committed and that Hayward had committed it.  Thus, relief is 
denied on this claim. 
                                          
 
 
10.  Hearsay can be used to establish probable cause to arrest, even if it may 
not be used at trial.  See Gerstein v. Pugh,  420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975) (discussing 
the standards of proof in various types of detentions and stating that for probable 
cause to arrest, hearsay may be utilized).  Further, Hayward objected only to 
Officer Grecco‘s description of the attacker, not to Destefano‘s statement that he 
had shot at his attacker. 
 
- 35 - 
The Recorded Jail Conversations 
 
We now turn to Hayward‘s assertion that the recorded conversations he had 
with Smith from jail were improperly admitted into evidence because the 
conversations were more prejudicial than probative.11  He contends that the profane 
language he used during these conversations unduly prejudiced the jury during the 
guilt and penalty phases.     
 
At trial, the State sought to play portions of two telephone calls Hayward 
made to Smith from the jail shortly after his arrest.  Their asserted purpose was to 
show that Hayward had called Smith to tell her what he had told the officers, so 
that her statement would mirror his.  The State also asserted that Hayward‘s 
instructions to Smith in one of the telephone calls to get rid of the ―reefer,‖ which 
both knew did not exist, was code instructing Smith to get rid of the murder 
weapon.12  Hayward clearly knew that the calls were taped or monitored—he 
specifically told Smith, ―They record these phones.‖   
The State argued that redacting the extensive vulgarity in the tapes would 
leave such a void as to render them meaningless.  Further, the State urged, it was 
significant that Hayward‘s language increasingly worsened as Smith failed to listen 
                                          
 
 
11.  Hayward does not contend that the calls were illegally intercepted, only 
that their prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.   
 
12.  The police had already searched Smith‘s apartment. 
 
- 36 - 
to what he was telling her to say and do.  During one of the conversations between 
Hayward and Smith, the following colloquy took place: 
HAYWARD: Soon as you get [off] this phone, you hear me.  
Huh?  Do you hear me, Dot? .  .  .  Soon as you get [off] this phone . . 
. . Go get up Charles. 
  
       
SMITH: Huh? 
  
       
HAYWARD: Go get up Charles, you know what I‘m talking 
about. 
  
      
SMITH: Okay.  No, I can‘t do that. 
  
      
HAYWARD: Why? 
  
      
SMITH: Not-uh.  No, I ain‘t trusting nobody, no.  No.  .  .  .    
 
 
HAYWARD: I told you - -  
 
 
SMITH: But I, they ain‘t got the gun though. 
 
Although Hayward‘s language throughout his conversations with Smith contained 
extensive vulgarity, Hayward‘s obscenity became extreme after Smith‘s reference 
to the gun.  The State argued that Hayward‘s explosion of anger over the use of the 
word ―gun‖ constituted admissible evidence of consciousness of guilt.  The trial 
court concluded that ―the relevance [of the tapes] is not outweighed by any 
prejudicial [e]ffect‖ and allowed the tapes to be played for the jury, with a 
transcript provided for their review during the playing of the tapes.  Before we 
begin our analysis of this issue, we review the test to be applied in such cases. 
 
- 37 - 
Admission of probative but potentially prejudicial evidence is controlled by 
section 90.403, Florida Statutes.  It states in pertinent part: 
90.403  Exclusion on the grounds of prejudice or 
confusion—Relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
 
§ 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2007).  In State v. McClain, 525 So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1988), 
we explained the balancing test a trial court must perform under section 90.403 in 
determining whether relevant evidence is admissible against a defendant at trial.  
We stated: 
This statute compels the trial court to weigh the danger of 
unfair prejudice against the probative value.  In applying the 
balancing test, the trial court necessarily exercises its discretion.  
Indeed, the same item of evidence may be admissible in one case and 
not in another, depending upon the relation of that item to the other 
evidence. 
   
At issue in this case was the identity of Destefano‘s killer.  Central to this 
issue was the presence of Hayward‘s blood on a number of items found at or near 
the crime scene.  As noted earlier, Hayward provided several explanations for the 
presence of his blood at the crime scene.  The tapes, including the language used as 
well as the context in which the conversations took place, provided relevant 
information for the jury to consider when assessing the reliability of his 
explanations.  Professor Ehrhardt explained the application of section 90.403 under 
these circumstances as follows:  
 
- 38 - 
Evidence of conduct or speech of the accused which demonstrates a 
consciousness of guilt is relevant since it supplies the basis for an 
inference that the accused is guilty of the offense. 
 
Charles W.  Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 403.1, at 189 (2008 ed.). 
Here, Hayward‘s thinly disguised attempts to instruct Smith to dispose of the 
murder weapon, his futile attempts to convey to Smith the statements he had given 
to the police, and his explosive reaction to Smith‘s use of the word ―gun‖ in 
response to one of his statements were highly relevant to his consciousness of guilt 
and rebutted his claim that he merely found the gun at the scene.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the trial court correctly determined that any prejudice caused by 
Hayward‘s extensive use of profanity during his taped conversations with Smith 
was outweighed by the highly probative value that such evidence offered.  
Moreover, the jurors were well aware of Hayward‘s propensity to use profanity 
since they previously heard and saw his videotaped statement, which also 
contained similar profanity.    
 
Although we have concluded that admission of the tapes was not error, even 
if it had been, such error would have been harmless.  Under DiGuilio, in 
conducting a harmless error analysis, the focus is on the effect on the trier of fact.  
491 So. 2d at 1139.  The question to be considered is whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the error affected the verdict, with the burden being on the State to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not.  Id.  Given the strength of 
 
- 39 - 
the evidence connecting Hayward to the crime, we find that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the profanity used by Hayward during his taped conversations with 
Smith affected the verdict.  Hayward confessed to the burglary of Destefano‘s car 
and confirmed all of the events of the robbery and murder while claiming he was 
watching someone else do the shooting.  McDowell gave testimony of his own 
eyewitness account, and there was extensive forensic evidence connecting 
Hayward to the murder.   
 
We also conclude that any impact that the admission of the tapes may have 
had on the jury during the penalty phase was insignificant and did not affect the 
jury‘s death sentence recommendation.  Even if the language used by Hayward 
portrayed him in a derogatory light, any possible prejudice would have been 
overshadowed by the significant aggravating circumstances: (1) that the defendant 
had prior violent felony convictions; and (2) that the murder was committed during 
the course of a robbery; merged with (3) that it was committed for pecuniary gain.  
The prior violent felony aggravator has been regarded as one of the weightiest 
aggravators.  See Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 586 (Fla. 2008) (reiterating that 
the prior violent felony aggravator is one of ―the most weighty in Florida‘s 
sentencing calculus‖ (quoting Sireci v. Moore, 825 So. 2d 882, 887-88 (Fla. 
2002))).  Moreover, in Hayward‘s case, the trial court found a complete absence of 
statutory mitigation and found only relatively weak nonstatutory mitigation.   
 
- 40 - 
Given the evidence of weighty aggravators presented to the jury, there is no 
reasonable possibility that the manner in which Hayward spoke to his girlfriend 
and the profanity he used affected the jury‘s sentencing recommendation or the 
trial court‘s ultimate decision to sentence Hayward to death.  As the trial court 
noted, ―each statutory aggravator, when considered alone, outweighs the totality of 
the mitigating circumstances‖ and justifies a sentence of death.  Thus, the error, if 
any, was harmless and relief is denied on the claim. 
PROSECUTORIAL COMMENTS  
 
We next address Hayward‘s claim that reversible error occurred when the 
State improperly commented on Hayward‘s character and drew a comparison 
between his worth and that of Destefano.  Prior to the commencement of the 
penalty phase, Hayward moved to prevent or limit the presentation of victim 
impact evidence before the jury.  Among other things, he objected to the use of 
evidence which ―may invite jurors to gauge the relative worth of particular 
victims‘ lives.‖  When the State agreed to refrain from using any such information 
to make ―characterizations and opinions about . . . the defendant,‖ the trial court 
denied the defense motions and allowed victim impact statements to be read to the 
jury.  During the victim impact portion of the penalty phase, Destefano‘s mother 
talked about how her son had worked hard and saved up to buy a Harley-Davidson 
motorcycle, which had been his dream.   
 
- 41 - 
During the penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury 
about how Destefano had worked toward his goal of buying a Harley-Davidson, 
and then stated, in part, as follows: 
One thing we learned about Danny was that Danny set his 
sights on something and then worked towards that .  .  .  goal.  .  .  .   
Because he had a goal in mind.  And he recognized that choices, you 
see, choices that he made in his life will take him to his goal.  Because 
in the end, ladies and gentlemen, it all comes down to choices we 
make.  As human beings we have free will.  We have the ability to 
control our destiny.  When you make a choice, you may make a 
choice that is well [intentioned] and bad things happen.  And we 
recognize it that unfortunately you may have to pay the consequences 
for that.  Sometimes you make decisions, good things happen, they 
turn out the way you want. 
Sometimes you make decisions in your life for the wrong 
reasons but knowing why.  Steven Hayward did just that.  Steven 
Hayward sits at this table today not as a result of anything anybody 
did to him, any of the conditions in his life, but because of very 
simply he made some choices.  He exercised his free will and his free 
will brings him here today and this places him in this condition of life. 
However, no contemporaneous objection was made to this argument.   
 In order to preserve a claim of improper prosecutorial argument, ―[c]ounsel 
must contemporaneously object to improper comments.‖  Bailey v. State, 998 So. 
2d 545, 554 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1061 (Fla. 
2007)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2395 (2009).  In this case, Hayward failed to make 
an objection either during or after the prosecutor‘s comments concerning the life 
choices of both Destefano and Hayward.  Thus, this issue is unpreserved and 
fundamental error must be shown for resentencing to be required.  See Simpson v. 
 
- 42 - 
State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1146 (Fla. 2009) (recognizing the general rule that failure to 
make a contemporaneous objection to improper closing argument ―waives any 
claim concerning such comments for appellate review‖ unless ―the unobjected-to 
comments rise to the level of fundamental error‖) (quoting Brooks v. State, 762 So. 
2d 879, 898-99 (Fla. 2000)), petition for cert. filed, No. 08-10414 (U.S. May 11, 
2009).  ―This is a high burden which requires an error that ‗goes to the foundation 
of the case or the merits of the cause of action and is equivalent to a denial of due 
process.‘ ‖  Bailey, 998 So. 2d at 554 (quoting Johnson v. State, 969 So. 2d 938, 
955 (Fla. 2007)).   
Fundamental error is error that ―reaches down into the validity of the trial 
itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the 
assistance of the alleged error.‖  Simpson, 3 So. 3d at 1146 (quoting Brooks, 762 
So. 2d at 898-99).  Error during the penalty phase is fundamental if it is ―so 
prejudicial as to taint the jury‘s recommended sentence.‖  Jones v. State, 949 So. 
2d 1021, 1037 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 609 (Fla. 
2003)).  We first examine whether the prosecutor‘s argument was improper and 
then turn to the question of whether the improper argument constituted 
fundamental error. 
The prosecutor‘s comments were based on victim impact evidence admitted 
during the penalty phase.  Victim impact evidence is admissible, but its purpose is 
 
- 43 - 
―to demonstrate the victim‘s uniqueness as an individual human being and the 
resultant loss to the community‘s members by the victim‘s death.‖  § 921.141(7), 
Fla. Stat. (2007); see also Wheeler v. State, 4 So. 3d 599, 607 (Fla. 2009), petition 
for cert. filed, No. 08-11026 (U.S. May 28, 2009); Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 
98 (Fla. 2007); Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 765 (Fla. 2004).  Section 921.141 
specifically states that ―[c]haracterizations and opinions about the crime, the 
defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as a part of victim 
impact evidence.‖  § 921.141(7), Fla. Stat.  Hayward argues that the State did not 
follow the law and improperly used victim impact information to compare the 
characters and choices of Destefano and Hayward during the penalty phase closing 
argument.  We agree.  Although the victim impact evidence itself was proper, the 
prosecutor‘s use of it in his closing argument—comparing the choices made by the 
victim and those made by Hayward—was improper. 
 
The prosecutor characterized Destefano as a goal-oriented, hard worker who 
made important choices in his life, followed by a statement that Hayward had also 
made choices and ―Steven Hayward sits at this table today not as a result of 
anything anybody did to him, any of the conditions in his life, but because of very 
simply he made some choices.‖  This is clearly a comparison of the choices made 
by the victim versus the choices made by Hayward, which is not within the scope 
of the victim impact statute.   
 
- 44 - 
 
Recently, this Court examined a similar claim in Wheeler, where victim 
impact evidence was used to comment on and compare the choices made by the 
victim and the defendant.  In Wheeler, the State made the following comment in 
closing argument during the penalty phase: 
The choices that Jason Wheeler made had a devastating impact on not 
just the family of Deputy Koester, but his family as well.  If you tried 
to sit and count the number of people that have been affected by what 
was done, it numbers in the dozens . . . . 
 
Id. at 609-10.  At this point, defense counsel objected and the trial court warned the 
prosecutor to make clear he was not arguing victim impact based on the number of 
persons affected.   The prosecutor then stated: 
But you see, the rules tell you that that‘s not what you base your 
decision on.  That‘s the whole purpose of the process is for you to try 
to look objectively at the choices that were made and what is the just 
consequence of those choices. 
 
Id. at 610.  The defense did not object to this comment, or to the following 
additional comment: 
But within all this realm of choicelessness, we do choose how 
we will live.  Either courageously or cowardly, or honorably or 
dishonorably, with purpose or a drift [sic], we decide what‘s important 
and trivial in life.  We decide what makes us significant is either what 
we do or what we refuse to do.   
But no matter how indifferent the entire universe may be to 
these choices, these choices and decisions are ours to make.  We 
decide.  We choose.  And as we decide and as we choose, our 
destinies are formed.  That‘s what I want you to look at as we walk 
through this case and these facts and these aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. 
 
 
- 45 - 
Id. (quoting ―writer Joseph Epstein‖).  We concluded in Wheeler that these 
statements constituted prosecutorial error but, as was the case here, no 
contemporaneous objection was made.  We found that the comparison was 
improper but that the argument did not to rise to the level of fundamental error. 
In the instant case, the prosecutor‘s statement comparing Destefano‘s 
choices in life to Hayward‘s choices are similar to the improper comparisons made 
by the prosecutor in Wheeler.  In both instances, the prosecutors improperly used 
victim impact information to compare the characters and choices of the victims and 
the defendants.  Accordingly, we find that the prosecutor‘s statement constituted 
prosecutorial error in this case.  We must now determine whether the conduct was 
so egregious as to rise to the level of fundamental error requiring resentencing. 
Reversal for improper prosecutorial comment is not automatic, State v. 
Murray, 443 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1984), and ―[i]n the penalty phase of a murder 
trial, resulting in a recommendation which is advisory only, prosecutorial 
misconduct must be egregious indeed to warrant our vacating the sentence and 
remanding for a new penalty-phase trial.‖  Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 
(Fla. 1985).   In this case, because Hayward failed to make a contemporaneous 
objection to the erroneous argument, he must also demonstrate the error is 
fundamental; that is, he must demonstrate that the error ―reaches down into the 
validity of the trial itself‖ and that a sentence of death ―could not have been 
 
- 46 - 
obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.‖  Simpson, 3 So. 3d at 1146 
(quoting Brooks, 762 So. 2d at 898-99).   In determining whether fundamental 
error has occurred, we review the totality of the circumstances.  Power v. State, 
886 So. 2d 952, 963 (Fla. 2004).  Having reviewed the improper prosecutorial 
comments in the context of the entire closing argument and in light of the evidence 
presented in the penalty phase, we conclude that the improper prosecutorial 
comments in this case do not rise to the level of fundamental error.  Given the 
strength of the evidence against Hayward and the gravity of the aggravators, we 
cannot say that the jury would not have recommended a death sentence or that the 
trial court would not have imposed a death sentence if the prosecutor had not made 
the improper victim impact comparison.   
However, we feel compelled to once again voice our disapproval of this type 
of prosecutorial comment comparing the life or choices of the victim with that of 
the defendant.  The misconduct was exacerbated by the prosecutor‘s 
acknowledgment immediately prior to the commencement of the penalty phase of 
the impropriety of the use of victim impact evidence in such a manner.  Despite his 
agreement to refrain from using victim impact evidence to make ―characterizations 
and opinions about . . . the defendant,‖ the prosecutor proceeded to needlessly stain 
the record with the clearly improper remarks.  As we did in Wheeler, we again 
hold that victim-defendant comparisons are improper and again ―caution the State 
 
- 47 - 
and its prosecutors to remain mindful of the limited purpose for which victim 
impact evidence may be introduced and to stay strictly within those parameters.‖  
Wheeler, 4 So. 3d at 611.      
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FLORIDA’S SENTENCING SCHEME 
 
Hayward has also challenged Florida‘s sentencing scheme as 
unconstitutional, making three claims: (1) imposition of the death penalty based on 
an eight-to-four jury recommendation is unconstitutional; (2) the standard jury 
instruction for premeditation is insufficient; and (3) the United States Supreme 
Court‘s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), does not allow a system 
in which the jury may render an advisory nonunanimous verdict.  We address each 
claim in turn. 
 
Hayward asserts that section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2008), Florida‘s 
capital sentencing statute, does not authorize a bare majority advisory sentence and 
that a bare majority jury recommendation of death is unreliable, thereby depriving 
him of due process. 13  Hayward‘s claim has no merit for two reasons.  First, section 
921.141 (3) makes specific reference to a sentencing recommendation by ―a 
majority of the jury,‖ and we have previously recognized that Florida‘s capital 
                                          
 
 
13.  Even though Hayward recognizes that the jury in this case 
recommended death by a vote of eight to four, which is not a ―bare majority,‖ he 
contends his advisory verdict was unreliable for the same reasons he argues that a 
―bare majority‖ verdict is unreliable. 
 
- 48 - 
sentencing statute ―allows the death penalty to be imposed even though the 
penalty-phase jury may determine by a mere majority vote‖ whether to recommend 
death.  State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 550 (Fla. 2005).  Second, Hayward has 
provided the Court with no basis on which to find that the capital sentencing 
statute results in an unreliable or unconstitutional penalty.   Therefore, Hayward‘s 
claim that his sentence is unconstitutionally unreliable is without merit and relief is 
denied on this claim. 
 
Hayward also asserts that the standard instruction for premeditated murder 
fails to properly inform the jury about the required ―premeditated design‖ and that 
there must be proof of deliberation both before and at the time of the killing.  At 
trial, without objection from Hayward, the jury was provided with the standard 
jury instruction for first-degree premeditated murder.  Thus, this issue has not been 
preserved for appeal.  Overton v. State, 801 So. 2d 877, 901 (Fla. 2001) (―Issues 
pertaining to jury instructions are not preserved for appellate review unless a 
specific objection has been voiced at trial.‖).  However, even if the issue had been 
preserved, Hayward would not be entitled to relief because this Court has upheld 
the standard jury instructions on premeditated murder.  See, e.g., Kilgore v. State, 
688 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1996) (―[T]he standard jury instructions are sufficient to 
explain premeditation.‖); Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1994) (holding that 
the standard first-degree murder instruction addresses all of the points discussed in 
 
- 49 - 
McCutchen14 and properly instructs the jury about premeditated design).  Because 
we have previously rejected this same claim and found the standard instruction 
sufficiently instructs the jury as to premeditated design, this claim is without merit. 
 
As his last constitutional challenge, Hayward contends that Florida‘s capital 
sentencing scheme under section 921.141, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional 
based on Ring because it does not require that the finding of aggravators be made 
by a unanimous jury.  He concedes that this Court has held the statute 
constitutional in the face of the same challenge but asks the Court to revisit its 
rulings. 
In this case, the trial court found in aggravation that Hayward had previously 
been convicted of three prior violent felonies (the 1988 second-degree murder and 
two armed robberies).  We have ―repeatedly held that where a death sentence is 
supported by the prior violent felony aggravating factor, as is the case here, 
Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme does not violate Ring.‖  Peterson v. State, 
2 So. 3d 146, 160 (Fla. 2009), petition for cert. filed, No. 09-5057 (U.S. June 25, 
                                          
 
 
14.  McCutchen v. State, 96 So. 2d 152, 153 (Fla. 1957) (holding that a 
premeditated design to effect the death of a human being is a fully formed and 
conscious purpose to take human life, formed upon reflection and deliberation, 
entertained in the mind before and at the time of the homicide and that if the party 
at the time was fully conscious of a settled and fixed purpose to take the life of a 
human being, and of the consequences, the intent or design would be premeditated 
within the meaning of the law).  
 
- 50 - 
2009).  Therefore, Hayward‘s challenges to Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme 
are without merit. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Hayward has specifically challenged the sufficiency of evidence as to 
identification, premeditation, and whether a robbery was actually accomplished.15  
Even if Hayward had not challenged the sufficiency of evidence, this Court has a 
mandatory obligation to review it in every case in which a sentence of death has 
been imposed regardless of whether the appellant has challenged the evidence.  See 
Jones v. State, 963 So. 2d 180, 184 (Fla. 2007); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(6).  ―In 
determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether, after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could 
have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  
Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1111 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Bradley v. State, 
787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)). 
―[I]f the State‘s evidence is wholly circumstantial, not only must there be 
sufficient evidence establishing each element of each offense, but the evidence 
must also exclude the defendant‘s reasonable hypothesis of innocence.‖  Pagan v. 
State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803(Fla. 2002).  Nonetheless, contrary to Hayward‘s 
                                          
 
15.  The conviction of robbery was utilized in finding an aggravator and was 
the underlying felony for the charge of first-degree felony murder. 
 
 
- 51 - 
assertion, the evidence in his case was not purely circumstantial.  Thus, it is 
unnecessary to apply the special standard of review applicable to circumstantial 
evidence cases and unnecessary to require the State to disprove Hayward‘s 
hypothesis that he was merely an observer.  Moreover, even if this case were 
purely circumstantial, we would find that Hayward‘s hypothesis of innocence was 
disproven by competent, substantial evidence. 
The evidence showed that Destefano told his assailant, ―I don‘t have no 
more,‖ after which Destefano was brought to his knees by a shot from a .22 caliber 
revolver.  Then, while standing above him, the assailant took aim again and shot a 
second time into Destefano‘s chest.  Destefano told the police officer he shot at his 
assailant with his larger .357 caliber revolver and McDowell testified he heard two 
gunshots followed by a louder gunshot and saw the assailant examine his bleeding 
hand under a streetlight.  Hayward suffered a gunshot wound that same morning.  
Destefano also told the officer that he did not know what happened to his revolver.  
Shortly after the murder, Hayward sold a silver revolver that matched the 
description of Destefano‘s revolver.  Additionally, Hayward had a bloody ten-
dollar bill in his possession on the morning after the murder.  Finally, Destefano 
himself told the police officer that he had been robbed.16  This evidence establishes 
                                          
 
 
16.  Hayward did not object to Destefano‘s statement to the police officer 
concerning the fact that he had been robbed, but only challenged that portion of 
 
- 52 - 
not only a robbery by the taking of Destefano‘s money at gunpoint, i.e., by ―use of 
force, violence, assault, or putting in fear,‖17 but it also establishes a premeditated 
intent to kill by the assailant.18 
As to identity, Hayward took the stand at trial and admitted that he was the 
person McDowell saw searching Destefano‘s car.  However, his admitted search of 
the victim‘s vehicle cannot explain the presence of the large amount of Hayward‘s 
                                                                                                                                        
Destefano‘s statement concerning the description of the assailant.  At trial, 
Hayward‘s attorney stated: 
We have no objection to that he was shot, where he was shot, that he 
was robbed, that he was delivering papers, that his car is down the 
street.  We don‘t contest any of that.  It‘s all true, so even if I had a 
legal objection, we‘re not—it‘s the identification of the perpetrator as 
being a black male wearing a stocking cap.  That‘s still—we‘re 
limiting our objection to those two statements. 
 
 
17.  Section 812.13, Florida Statutes, defines robbery as follows:  
 
(1) ―Robbery‖ means the taking of money or other property 
which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of 
another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the 
person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the 
course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or 
putting in fear. 
 
§ 812.13(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). 
 
 
18.  This Court stated in Larry v. State, 104 So. 2d 352, 354 (Fla. 1958), that 
―[e]vidence from which premeditation may be inferred includes such matters as the 
nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, 
previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was 
committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.‖ 
 
- 53 - 
blood found on Destefano‘s pants.  Indeed, bloodstains were found on the pants in 
many varied patterns: spattered horizontally, ―dripped‖ from above, and ―wiped‖ 
or crushed into the fabric of Destefano‘s back pockets.  Nor can the presence of 
Hayward‘s blood on Destefano‘s pants be attributed to a careless police officer 
handling the evidence.  Further, given Hayward‘s multiple versions of what 
happened, the jury reasonably discounted his ―other robber theory.‖  Taken 
together, this provided competent, substantial evidence of identity and rebutted 
Hayward‘s theory of innocence.19  Therefore, we conclude the evidence is 
sufficient to support the convictions in this case. 
PROPORTIONALITY 
Although Hayward does not assert that the sentence is disproportionate, we 
review every death sentence for proportionality ―regardless of whether the issue is 
raised on appeal.‖  England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 407 (Fla. 2006); see also Fla. 
R. App. P. 9.142(a)(6).  In reviewing proportionality, the Court follows precedent 
that requires that the death penalty be ―reserved only for those cases where the 
most aggravating and least mitigating circumstances exist.‖  Terry v. State, 668 So. 
                                          
 
 
19.  However, even if premeditation had not been proven, the conviction 
would still be proper under felony murder as there is factual support for that theory 
of prosecution and the jury in Hayward‘s case was instructed on both premeditated 
and felony murder.  See Mungin v. State, 689 So. 2d 1026, 1030 (Fla. 1995) (even 
if there is or could be error on one theory, if another theory of murder is factually 
supported, there is no need for reversal). 
 
- 54 - 
2d 954, 965 (Fla. 1996).  Therefore, in deciding whether death is a proportionate 
penalty, the Court makes ―a comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether 
the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the least 
mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application of the 
sentence.‖  Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407-08 (Fla. 2003) (citations  
omitted).  Accordingly, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances and 
compares the case with other similar capital cases.  See Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 
33 (Fla. 2003).  This analysis ―is not a comparison between the number of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.‖  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 
(Fla. 1990).  Rather, this entails ―a qualitative review by this Court of the 
underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative 
analysis.‖  Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998).   
Further, in a proportionality analysis, this Court will accept the weight 
assigned by the trial court to the aggravating and mitigating factors.  See Bates v. 
State, 750 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1999).  We ―will not disturb the sentencing judge‘s 
determination as to ‗the relative weight to give to each established mitigator‘ 
where that ruling is ‗supported by competent substantial evidence in the record.‘ ‖  
Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399, 412-13 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Spencer v. State, 
691 So. 2d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 1996)). 
 
- 55 - 
The jury recommended death by an eight-to-four vote.  The trial court found 
in aggravation: (1) prior violent felony (based on three prior violent felonies 
including second-degree murder) which was given great weight; and (2) that the 
murder was committed while Hayward was engaged in a robbery, which was 
merged with the pecuniary gain aggravator and given great weight.  These 
aggravators were weighed against eight nonstatutory mitigating factors which were 
given very little to some weight: (1) Hayward could have gotten a life sentence 
(very little weight); (2) he grew up without a father (some weight); (3) he was 
loved by his family (little weight); (4) he had academic problems (little weight); 
(5) he obtained a GED in prison (little weight); (6) he would make a good 
adjustment to prison (little weight); (7) he had financial stress at the time of the 
crime (little weight); and (8) he had some capacity for rehabilitation (little weight). 
This Court has found the death sentence proportionate in other shooting 
deaths with similar aggravation and mitigation.  In Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 
805, 820 (Fla. 1996), the Court affirmed the death sentence where the aggravators 
were that the murder was committed during the course of a burglary and to avoid 
escape.  These aggravators were weighed against some nonstatutory mitigation.  In 
Miller v. State, 770 So. 2d 1144, 1150 (Fla. 2000), the Court upheld the death 
sentence where it found a prior violent felony and that commission of the murder 
occurred during a robbery, which were weighed against ten nonstatutory 
 
- 56 - 
mitigators.   In Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2008), the gunshot murder 
was committed during the course of a robbery.  The jury recommended death by a 
vote of seven to five and the trial court found in aggravation that Lebron had a 
prior violent felony and that the murder was committed during a robbery and for 
financial gain.  The court found seven nonstatutory mitigators, which were given 
―very little weight‖ to ―some weight.‖  Because the mitigation in Lebron was not 
substantial and was far outweighed by the significant aggravation, just as in the 
instant case, this Court found the death sentence proportionate and affirmed.  Id. at 
668.  Similarly, we conclude that the death sentence in this case is proportionate 
and affirm. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hayward‘s convictions for first-
degree murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, burglary of a conveyance while 
armed, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.20  We also affirm his 
sentence of death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
                                          
 
 
20.  Although Hayward does not separately challenge his convictions for 
burglary of a conveyance while armed and possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, we find sufficient evidence to affirm those convictions as well.  
 
- 57 - 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for St. Lucie County,  
James Walter McCann, Judge – Case No. 562005CF000463A 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant Public 
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee