Case Title: BARNTHOUSE v. CITY OF EDMOND

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97350

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
BARNTHOUSE v. CITY OF EDMOND  BARNTHOUSE v. CITY OF EDMOND 2003 OK 42 73 P.3d 840 Case Number: 97350 Decided: 04/22/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA TIMOTHY RAY BARNTHOUSE, ANCEL SCOTT FEES and JAMES DALLAS TEEL, II, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. CITY OF EDMOND, a municipal corporation and DENNIS COCHRAN, individually and in his capacity as the Chief of Police of the City of Edmond, Defendants/Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA HONORABLE CAROLYN R. RICKS, JUDGE ¶0 Appellants, police sergeants for the City of Edmond, were demoted to their previous rank after a third party's grievance, filed pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement and the Fire and Police Arbitration Act (FPAA), invalidated the promotional process under which Appellants were promoted. After Appellants' grievance was denied, they filed this action in the district court, alleging, inter alia, the Appellees, City and Chief of Police, violated their constitutional rights to due process when they demoted them without a hearing or an opportunity to be heard. The trial court granted summary judgment motions filed by City and Chief of Police and entered judgment in their favor. This appeal followed in which Appellants contend they had a property interest in their employment and rank and that they should have been afforded a hearing before being demoted. Appellants' motion to retain this case in the Supreme Court was granted on March 6, 2002. REVERSED AND REMANDED Philip W. Anderson, Kent R. McGuire, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellants, Richard J.Goralewicz, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Stephen T. Murdock, City of Edmond, Edmond, Oklahoma, for Appellees. OPINION WATT,Chief Justice: ¶1 The dispositive questions in this appeal are: (1) Did Appellants have a property interest in their employment and rank as Sergeants? (2) If so, did Appellees deprive them of that interest and violate their due process rights by demoting them without a hearing? (3) Did the trial court erroneously hold City and Cochran were entitled to judgment as a matter of law? We answer all questions in the affirmative. We reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Edmond and Chief of Police Cochran, and remand to the trial court. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Timothy Ray Barnthouse, Ancel Scott Fees and James Dallas Teel, II, (Appellants) are police officers for the Appellee, City of Edmond. Their employment is subject to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), between the City and the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 136 (F.O.P.), which is governed by the Fire and Police Arbitration Act, a. Violations of their due process rights, under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and Art. 2, §7 of the Oklahoma Constitution; b. Relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for depriving Appellants of their constitutional rights pursuant to City's policies and a deliberate choice to demote them; c. Negligence for breaching their duty to Appellants to administer properly the written examinations and assessment centers in accordance with their own policies and procedures; d. Breach of contract; e. Intentional infliction of emotional distress; and f. Negligent infliction of emotional distress. They each sought damages in excess of $10,000.00. ¶3 Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. The trial court denied Appellants' motion for partial summary judgment and granted the motions filed by City and Cochran. This appeal was brought pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 1.36, Accelerated Procedure for Summary Judgments and Certain Dismissals, 12 O.S. 2001, Ch. 15, App. 1. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ¶4 Appellants took part in the promotional process for the rank of Sergeant, which is comprised of a written examination and an oral "assessment center". At the time, their rank was Detective. This process, which ended on July 29, 1998, culminated in an "eligibility list" of candidates for promotions to Sergeant. The list ranks the candidates in order of their overall scores, and Appellants' names were among the top four positions. ¶5 Appellants alleged in their motion for partial summary judgment their constitutional rights were violated, in that their protected property interests in their employment and rank were taken without due process, contrary to §1983. III. DISCUSSION ¶6 As a threshold issue, we consider the argument of City and Cochran that Appellants failed to follow the CBA in pursuing their grievance, thus failing to exhaust their remedies under the CBA. Following their demotions, Appellants filed their grievance on May 10, 2000. After Cochran denied the grievance, it was submitted to the F.O.P., which denied it on June 14, 2000. Appellants did not pursue the grievance proceeding when the F.O.P. denied their grievance. They contended, in their response to Cochran's motion for summary judgment, that they were prohibited from continuing the process because their grievance did not concern a disciplinary action. We agree. ¶7 The grievance procedure is covered in Article 10 of the CBA. Section 10.3 provides that the "F.O.P. or any employee may file a grievance" and that "[g]rievances shall be presented within fifteen (15) calendar days of said occurrence or after the F.O.P. becomes aware of said occurrence". Section 10.5 provides the manner in which grievances will be processed. In Step 1, the aggrieved employee shall present the grievance to his or her immediate supervisor, who makes a decision in writing within seven calendar days. It provides: STEP 1. The aggrieved employee(s) shall present the grievance to the immediate supervisor. It shall be reduced to writing citing the provision or provisions of this Agreement alleged to have been violated, be signed by the aggrieved employee(s). The immediate supervisor shall make their (sic) decision in writing to the employee within seven (7) calendar days of the date of presentation of the grievance. ¶8 If Step 1 does not settle the grievance, the aggrieved employee follows Step 2, which provides: STEP 2. If the grievance is not settled in STEP 1, the aggrieved employee(s) shall present the grievance to the F.O.P. Grievance Committee within seven (7) calendar days of the date of the immediate supervisor's response. The F.O.P. Grievance Committee will make a determination as to the validity of the grievance within (15) calendar days. If the grievance is deemed valid then the grievance will proceed to the next step. Grievances filed concerning disciplinary actions may be processed by the employee regardless of the F.O.P. Grievance Committee's ruling. [Emphasis supplied.] ¶9 Step 3 provides: STEP 3. The F.O.P. Grievance Committee or the aggrieved employee(s) shall present the grievance to the Chief of Police within seven (7) calendar days of the date of the Grievance Committee's determination. The Chief of Police shall refer the grievance to a fact-finding committee which shall be composed of four (4) members, two of which shall be selected by the Chief of Police or his designate through impartial, random choice from a list of available officers with supervisory rank, and two of which shall be selected by impartial, random choice by the aggrieved employee(s). The Chief of Police and the aggrieved employee(s) shall have seven (7) calendar days to select the fact-finding committee. The findings and recommendations of this committee must be reached and presented to the Chief of Police within fifteen (15) calendar days from the time of the selection of all parties, . . . . ¶10 The emphasized language in Step 2 purports to allow the employee to process a grievance determined invalid by the F.O.P. However, the preceding sentence, "If the grievance is deemed valid then the grievance will proceed to the next step", implies the grievance ends at this step if the F.O.P. finds it is invalid. Considering these sentences together, we interpret the provision to mean that the grievance will end at Step 2 if the F.O.P. finds the grievance is invalid unless it involves a disciplinary action; if it does, it continues only if the employee pursues it further. Any other interpretation would render the paragraph ambiguous. It is undisputed in this case that Appellants were not demoted for disciplinary reasons. Under the clear language noted above, they were given no further options under the CBA when the F.O.P. denied their grievance. Accordingly, Appellants did exhaust their administrative remedies under the CBA. IV. ALLEGED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS ¶11 A two-step inquiry is necessary to determine whether a plaintiff was denied procedural due process: (1) did the individual possess a protected interest to which due process protection was applicable? and (2) was the individual given an appropriate level of process? See Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, This court has held that if state statutes or regulations place substantive restrictions on a government actor's ability to make personnel decisions, then the employee has a protected property interest. See Campbell v. Mercer, ¶12 The same analysis is used to determine if there is a protected property interest in a particular employment status, such as rank. If a statute or regulation places substantive restrictions on the discretion to demote an employee, such as providing that discipline may only be imposed for cause, then a property interest is created. Hennigh, at 1254, citing Williams v. Kentucky, ¶13 Based on its prior holdings interpreting Oklahoma law and the decisions of this Court [P]laintiff had a legitimate property interest in his rank. This property interest was created by state law in the form of the CBA, contracted pursuant to state legislation. The CBA gave Plaintiff a legitimate expectation of continued employment as a lieutenant unless the City found "cause shown." ¶14 In the instant case, Article 7, section 7.1(f) of the CBA provides: The Employer, except as otherwise specifically provided for in this Agreement, retains and reserves unto itself, without limitation, all the powers, rights, authority, duties, and responsibilities conferred upon it and vested in it by the laws of the constitutions of the United States and the State of Oklahoma, the Statutes of the State of Oklahoma, and the Charter of the City of Edmond. Further, all rights, which ordinarily vest in and are exercised by employers are reserved to and remain vested in the Employer, including but not limited to the generality of the foregoing and the following managerial rights: . . . (f) To discipline, transfer, demote, and discharge employees for cause, subject to the grievance procedure rights set out herein in Article 10, if such action falls within the definition of grievance. [Emphasis supplied.] ¶15 Additional evidence of a property interest in Appellants' employment and rank is found in the City's General Policy Order, GPO 83-2 Revised, effective June 22, 1998, entitled "Selection Process for Promotion". It provides, under Section V, that candidates from the Assessment Center are placed on an eligibility list for one full year. "At the end of this time period the Promotional Eligibility List shall expire and shall no longer be used." It also provides that the probationary period for a recently promoted officer ends after one year. At that time, the promotion becomes permanent. GPO 86-1 Revised, effective June 22, 1998, entitled "Department Disciplinary Actions", provides that demotions ¶16 In this case, the eligibility list was completed on or about July 30, 1998, and had expired before the Arbitrator's ruling was issued on February 23, 2000. At that time, the list could not be held "invalid"; it no longer existed. Further, under the terms of the CBA itself, which incorporates Oklahoma's FPAA, an employer's discretion to demote employees is restricted to demotions for cause. Under Hennigh, the CBA and the General Policy Orders noted, we hold Appellants did possess a protected property interest in their employment and rank. ¶17 As to the second step of the inquiry, we consider whether Appellants received an appropriate level of due process prior to the deprivation of the protected interest. In Hennigh, the Court determined that although the plaintiff did have a protected property interest in his employment and his rank, he nevertheless had received appropriate due process. The Hennigh plaintiff complained that his procedural due process rights were violated because the discipline imposed did not comply with the CBA's requirement for notarized complaints. The Court of Appeals stated: However, the Constitution does not require that each individual receive the procedural guarantees provided for by the instrument which bestows a property interest. . . The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution entitles each citizen to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of a fundamental right. . .This court stated that '[a] failure to comply with state or local procedural requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial of due process; the alleged violation must result in a procedure which itself falls short of standards derived from the Due Process Clause.' [Citations omitted.] Hennigh, ¶18 In Hennigh, prior to his demotion, the plaintiff had been given an informal hearing before the Review Board. The City Manager also allowed plaintiff and his counsel an opportunity to respond to the allegations before imposing discipline. The federal Court of Appeals held this level of process met "the constitutional standard for a pre-termination hearing." Id. at 1256. Additionally, the Court stated the rule that a plaintiff "is not entitled to an extensive or formal pre-termination hearing if there are adequate post-termination procedures." Id., citing Benavidez v. Albuquerque, ¶19 In Hennigh, the plaintiff was given the opportunity, however informal it was, to answer the complaints against him before his demotion. That opportunity was bolstered by Hennigh's post-demotion grievance proceeding, under the CBA procedures, which were deemed adequate by the Court. Appellants in the present case received neither "extensive" nor "formal" pre-demotion due process; they received no pre-demotion due process. In fact, their fate was decided by others following a hearing they could not attend. In this case, Appellants also received no benefit from adequate post-demotion proceedings because their grievance was denied. Clearly, Appellants herein were not afforded an appropriate level of due process to protect their property interests. V. COCHRAN'S LIABILITY ¶20 Cochran contends that as a public official, he is immune from liability for Appellants' §1983 claim under the doctrine of "qualified immunity". In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, ¶21 When defendants move for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must "come forward with facts or allegations to show both that the defendant's alleged conduct violated the law and that the law was clearly established when the violation occurred." Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho, ¶22 Cochran contends that even if Appellants had had some constitutionally protected property interest for which due process would attach, it was not so "clearly established such that reasonable officials would have understood that their conduct violated that right", citing Dill v. City of Edmond, ¶23 In response to Cochran's motion, Appellants cited Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, supra, and Dill v. City of Edmond, supra. ¶24 In Cochran's motion on this issue, he contends that if Appellants had a property interest in their positions as sergeants, he did not deny them due process. Rather, he contends it was the F.O.P., the CBA's procedures and the Arbitrator which were responsible for denying them any such alleged right. However, the arbitrator's function is to enforce the CBA, not to protect the constitutional rights of the grievant. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, ¶25 Appellants sustained their burden of naming the clearly established right, a property interest in their employment and rank, through the clearly established federal law at the time, i.e., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' cases, Hennigh and Dill. While they are not Oklahoma Supreme Court cases, both cases interpret Oklahoma law and were published opinions at the time of the demotions. Dill was certainly known to the City of Edmond and Chief of Police Cochran. It dealt with a CBA virtually identical to the one at issue herein. Moreover, the FPAA, with which the City and Cochran were familiar, requires them to follow the terms of the CBA. Cochran responds with the claim that he had no choice except to follow the Arbitrator's ruling. This position raises material factual issues: did Cochran have to demote Appellants in order to comply with the arbitration award, thereby depriving them of their property interest and due process rights, or was there an alternative method of compliance which also complied with the law and the CBA? Did Cochran disregard the clearly established law at the time? In other words, would reasonable minds differ, or are different inferences possible, as to how to implement the ruling? We determine different inferences are possible, and summary judgment was improperly granted on this issue. ¶26 If the materials subject to consideration on a motion for summary judgment either disclose controverted material facts, or, reasonable minds might reach different conclusions even if the material facts are undisputed, a motion for summary judgment should be denied. Perry v. Green, VI. CITY'S LIABILITY ¶27 In its motion for summary judgment, City alleged that no property interest arose from an invalidated examination. City has cited several cases from other jurisdictions ¶28 None of the cases cited by the City pertain to Oklahoma law. Only one of the cases, City of San Antonio v. Gonzales, 737 S.W.2d 78 (Tex.App. 1987), involves a collective bargaining agreement between a city and a police officers' association. Although the facts involve police officers promoted from an eligibility list later declared invalid, the case does not address their demotions or the rights they had acquired under the CBA after their promotions. We find City's citations of authority are inapplicable. ¶29 City acknowledges this Court has not previously addressed the issue in the context of grievance procedures and the FPAA, although it cited Oklahoma authority for the rule that generally, a void act of any kind confers no right. City also argued that because of Appellants' knowledge of the pending Dill grievance, they had no "legitimate expectation" of their continued employment, as required by Hennigh. However, that argument is not persuasive. Appellants correctly note in their response on this issue to Cochran's motion for summary judgment that there is no provision in the CBA which allows an employee to file a grievance in anticipation of a demotion. ¶30 A municipality is a "person" for purposes of §1983 liability. Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., ¶31 Appellants raised the policymaker issue in their petition. In City's response to Appellants' motion for partial summary judgment, it argued that the reduction in Appellants' rank, which followed as a result of Dill's grievance, occurred by operation of law, not because of the City. Cochran argued it was the F.O.P., CBA procedures and the Arbitrator which denied Appellants their property interests, if any, and that the clearly established law required him to demote Appellants. Appellants argued Cochran and the City failed to follow the CBA and GPO requiring cause for demotions. Cochran argued that the GPO does not prevent a promotion from being voided. ¶32 Cochran initiated the General Policy Orders in his capacity as Chief of Police. An inference arises that both City and Cochran, in effect, argue the policy of the City required Appellants' reduction in rank. Fact questions arise as to: (1) whether as a policymaker, Cochran ordered the Appellants' demotions because the City's policy required it; and (2) whether the absence of a specific GPO provision preventing the promotion from being voided justifies the demotion of officers without a hearing under the City's policy. Because the trial court's orders granting summary judgment were general judgments, ¶33 The trial court could have rendered judgment for Cochran because it found Appellants had no property interest in their employment, and therefore Cochran, individually, did not violate their due process rights. Or, the trial court could have found that although property interests existed in Appellants' employment, the law was not clearly established at the time of the demotions, and Cochran was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. This could also result in judgment for Cochran. However, if Cochran violated Appellants' constitutional rights in his official capacity, despite having qualified immunity in his individual capacity, the City could be liable, although Cochran is immune. This cannot be determined from the face of the orders entered, and we must reverse and remand. VII. OTHER CLAIMS ¶34 Finally, Appellants contended in their petition in error that the trial court abused its discretion in entering judgment for City on their contract and tort claims. They contend these claims were not included in their motion for summary judgment and there are remaining factual issues on these claims. However, their breach of contract claim was raised in their motion for partial summary judgment, and addressed in their reply to Cochran's response. Also, their negligence claim was addressed by City, in its response to Appellants' motion for partial summary judgment, recast by City as a claim for the "negligent deprivation of property". ¶35 However, we agree that both the claims for the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress were not raised in the motions for summary judgment, although they were raised in the petition. On remand, these issues must be resolved by the trier of fact ¶36 Summary judgment is improper if under the evidentiary materials, reasonable men could reach different conclusions from the facts. Indiana Nat. Bank v. State Dept. Of Human Services, VIII. CONCLUSION ¶37 We hold Appellants exhausted their administrative remedies under the CBA. They have a protected property interest in their employment and rank through the CBA and the FPAA, but they were denied procedural due process prior to their demotions. Material issues of fact for a jury exist as to: (1) whether Cochran violated Appellants' clearly established constitutional rights for purposes of his individual qualified immunity defense to the §1983 claim; and (2)whether the City incurred liability for the §1983 claim because of Cochran's conduct in his official capacity. Appellants' remaining claims of the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress should also be resolved by the trier of fact upon remand. ¶38 The judgment in favor of Cochran and the City of Edmond is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. ¶39 REVERSED AND REMANDED. WATT, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, JJ. - concur. WINCHESTER, J. - concurs in part, dissents in part. SUMMERS and BOUDREAU, JJ. - dissent. FOOT