Case Title: City of Altamont v. Finkle

Citation: 224 Kan. 221, 579 P.2d 712

Docket Number: 48,627

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1978-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
224 Kan. 221 (1978)
579 P.2d 712
CITY OF ALTAMONT, KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
KENNETH L. FINKLE, Appellant.
No. 48,627

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 10, 1978.
Charles F. Forsyth, of Erie, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
John F. Amos, of Oswego, was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOLMES, J.:
This is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Kenneth L. Finkle, from a conviction by the court of a violation of Section 37 of Ordinance No. 248, of the City of Altamont. Ordinance No. 248 is the Standard Traffic Ordinance for Kansas Cities prepared by The League of Kansas Municipalities.
Section 37 reads:
This section of the ordinance is similar to K.S.A. 8-1565(a), (b) and (c).
Defendant was charged, by citation, on a Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint with driving his automobile in an unlawful "exhibition of speed." Defendant, at all stages of the proceedings in both the Municipal Court and District Court, contended the citation failed to charge a crime under the ordinance. While defendant does not question the constitutionality of the ordinance itself, he does contend that an allegation of "exhibition of speed" fails to state a crime and is so vague and indefinite that a person charged in such terms could not be expected to understand the nature and elements of the alleged violation.
We agree.
In the instant case there was no evidence of racing or drag racing as defined in the statute. There was no evidence of any race, competition, contest or test. The only evidence was the testimony of a city police officer. The officer testified that while off-duty he observed the defendant drive his automobile from a parked position at the curb, spin his tires, throw some gravel and turn the corner at a speed of 10 to 15 miles per hour. The officer described this activity as a "jackrabbit start." During cross-examination the officer answered questions as follows:
"Q. Does that involve two cars?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Or long distance endurance driving?
"A. It don't state this  not in here.
"Q. That's in your opinion?
"A. In my opinion, yes.
*223 The question of the sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint or information has been before this court numerous times in a variety of situations.
In State v. Williams, 196 Kan. 274, 411 P.2d 591 (1966), the court said:
The test to be applied to a criminal statute or ordinance when attacked as being vague and indefinite was recently repeated in State v. Kirby, 222 Kan. 1, 563 P.2d 408 (1977):
See also Kansas City Millwright Co., Inc. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658, 562 P.2d 65 (1977); State v. Gunzelman, 210 Kan. 481, 502 P.2d 705 (1972); State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 369 P.2d 365 (1962).
We have held that a complaint, even though phrased in the words of the statute and even though not attacked on a constitutional basis is still void if it does not advise the defendant of the nature of the accusation against him.
The ordinance when considered in its entirety appears to speak *224 primarily to racing, speed and acceleration tests, contests or competition. The mere charge of an "exhibition of speed" against a driver not engaged in any such test, contest or competition fails to charge any violation of the ordinance.
Nowhere in the ordinance is there any attempt to define the words "exhibition of speed or acceleration" or to delineate the proscribed conduct. Any interpretation of that portion of the ordinance, without additional allegations, is such that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and may differ as to its application and therefore the language standing alone does not meet the minimum standards required. Every attempt by a driver to proceed from a stopped position or to increase speed from a moving position could be considered by some persons as an "exhibition of speed or acceleration." How is the driver to know when he is committing an offense, and when he is not, where the question of an "exhibition of speed or acceleration" is a matter for subjective determination lacking any objective standards?
Although appellee has submitted no case authority supporting the validity of the charge in this case our research indicates that similar language has been considered sufficient in two states. See People v. Grier, 226 Cal. App. 2d 360, 38 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1964) and People v. Heckard, 164 Colo. 19, 431 P.2d 1014 (1967). We have carefully considered both cases and, in view of what we have said above, do not consider them persuasive.
The judgment of the district court is reversed with directions to discharge the defendant.
PRAGER, MILLER and McFARLAND, JJ., concur in result.