Case Title: The Community Hospital Group, Inc. v. Jay More, M.D., et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-75-03

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff, the Community Hospital Group, also known as John F. Kennedy Medical Center (JFK) and the New Jersey Neuroscience Institute (Institute), is a not-for-profit hospital in Edison, Middlesex County, New Jersey. In 1992, JFK created the Institute, a not-for-profit medical care provider specializing in the diagnosis and treatment of neurological diseases and neurosurgical conditions. The Institute receives the majority of its patients through referrals from physicians in other specialties. On July 1, 1994, Dr. Jay More began to work as a neurosurgeon at the Institute following his residency at Mt. Sinai Hospital, in New York City. Thereafter, Dr. More entered into three separate employment agreements with the Institute, the most recent one being a five-year agreement effective July 1, 1999. Under the terms of the 1999 agreement, either party could terminate the agreement upon three hundred and sixty-five (365) days written notice to the other party. Critical to this appeal, each of the three employment agreements contained post-employment restrictive covenants that prohibited Dr. More from engaging in certain medical practices within a thirty-mile radius of JFK for two years. The agreement provided that in the event of a breach, JFK would suffer irreparable harm and damage and would be entitled to injunctive relief to enforce the post-employment restraints. On July 17, 2001, Dr. More submitted his letter of resignation to JFK, effective July the following year. At some point, JFK notified Dr. More that it intended to enforce its rights as contained in the 1999 agreement. Dr. More ceased working at JFK on July 17, 2002. He had received offers to join other practices that were located beyond the thirty-mile restrictive area, but declined each one. Between the date of his notice of resignation and his separation date, Dr. More removed documents from the Institute identifying patients names and addresses, as well as the identity and location of the Institute s referral sources. On July 22, 2002, Dr. More affiliated with another neurosurgeon, James M. Chimenti, M.D., as an employee of Neurosurgical Associates at Park Avenues, P.A. (NAPA), located in Plainfield, New Jersey. In addition, Dr. More received medical staff privileges at Somerset Medical Center (Somerset), which is located approximately thirteen and a half miles from JFK. At the time Dr. More joined NAPA, Dr. Chimenti was the only neurosurgeon taking emergency room calls at Somerset. With the addition of Dr. More, Somerset was able to provide complete neurological coverage through the two neurosurgeons. Believing that Dr. More was in violation of the 1999 agreement, on September 6, 2002, JFK filed a complaint against him, seeking among other things a preliminary injunction prohibiting him from the practice of neurosurgery with NAPA or Somerset. On November 21, 2002, the trial court denied JFK s request for a preliminary injunction. JFK s motion for leave to appeal was denied by the Appellate Division on January 8, 2002. Eventually, the Supreme Court granted JFK leave to appeal and summarily remanded the matter to the Appellate Division to consider the appeal on the merits. In a published opinion dated December 29, 2003, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court and awarded JFK injunctive relief. The panel found that the evidence supported the conclusion that the restrictive covenant was necessary to protect JFK s patient and referral relationships. The panel found the two-year period of the restriction was reasonable and consistent with other restrictions that have been upheld and that the thirty-mile geographic restriction was reasonable. In addition, the panel stressed Dr. More s admission that five hospitals, aside from JFK, provided neurosurgery within the restricted area and did not lack qualified neurosurgeons, and as a result, enforcement of the restrictions would not have an impact on the public s access to other qualified neurosurgeons within that area. The panel directed the trial court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining Dr. More from engaging in the practice of neurosurgery within a thirty-mile radius of JFK. The Supreme Court granted a stay of the Appellate Division decision on January 5, 2004, and on March 11, 2004, it granted Dr. More s and Somerset s motions for leave to appeal. The Court also granted amicus curiae status to the Medical Society of New Jersey and the New Jersey Hospital Association. HELD: A restrictive covenant in an employment contract between a hospital and a physician is not per se unreasonable and unenforceable. Under the circumstances of this case, however, the geographic restrictive area is excessive and must be reduced to avoid being detrimental to the public interest. In addition, because the two-year period for the restrictive covenant in this case has expired, the request for injunctive relief is moot. 2. Since Solari and Karlin, the test for determining the validity of restrictive covenants between physicians and restrictive covenants in the commercial context has not changed. We recognize the importance of patient choice in the initial selection and continuation of the relationship with a physician. We also agree that the similarities between the attorney-client and physician-patient relationships are substantial. Notwithstanding those considerations, on the record before us we find insufficient justification to overrule Karlin and adopt a per se rule invalidating restrictive covenants between physicians or between a physician and a hospital. An established rule that has governed those relationships for several decades should not be discarded unless we are reasonably certain that we have a problem in need of a cure. Moreover, on the current record, we cannot conclude that prohibiting restrictive covenants among physicians and hospitals will in fact advance the public interest. (Pp. 21-23) 3. We recognize that several commentators have criticized the distinction our law makes between physicians and attorneys in respect of restrictive covenants. Despite that criticism, we continue to rely on this Court s power to govern the ethical standards of the legal profession as justification for our decision to treat attorneys and physicians differently. In addition, although the American Medical Association (AMA) discourages restrictive covenants between physicians, it only declares them unethical if excessive in geographic scope or duration, or if they fail to make reasonable accommodation of patients choice of physician. (citation omitted) That is essentially the same reasonableness standard we apply under Karlin. Thus, the AMA s ethical rules are consistent with, and not contrary to, the Karlin analysis. (Pp. 23- 26) 4. The test that we now apply requires us to determine whether (1) the restrictive covenant was necessary to protect the employer s legitimate interests in enforcement, (2) whether it would cause undue hardship to the employee, and (3) whether it would be injurious to the public. Karlin, supra, 77 N.J. at 417. We agree with the Appellate Division s conclusion that JFK established that it had several legitimate protectable interests in enforcement of the restriction. Beyond that, three additional factors should be considered in determining whether the restrictive covenant is overbroad: its duration, the geographic limits, and the scope of activities prohibited. On its face, two years appears to be a reasonable period for JFK to replace and train a person to assume Dr. More s prior role. Moreover, JFK only sought to prohibit Dr. More from the practice of neurosurgery. That single restriction was not overbroad. We are satisfied that JFK demonstrated legitimate business reasons for enforcing the restrictive covenant. Furthermore, we are convinced that JFK demonstrated that enforcement of the restriction would not impose an undue hardship upon Dr. More. Finally, the evidence was overwhelming that prohibiting Dr. More from attending to neurological patients in Somerset s emergency room would be injurious to the public interest. Because the geographic restricted area encompassed an area plagued with a shortage of neurosurgeons, the Appellate Division should have decreased the geographical limitation of the covenant. A remand is necessary for the Chancery Division to determine the precise limits of the geographic area of the restriction, but in no event should it exceed thirteen miles or include Somerset. (Pp. 26-35) 5. Under JFK s interpretation of the agreement the two-year period for the term of the restrictive covenant has expired. Because restrictive covenants are not favored in the law, we find no justification to extend the agreement beyond July 17, 2004, and, therefore, JFK s request for injunctive relief is moot. JFK s claim is limited to damages, including but not limited to the loss of patients, as a result of Dr. More s departure. (Pp. 35-36) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. The matter is REMANDED to the Chancery Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stating that because he would affirm in all respects the thoughtful opinion of the Appellate Division, he must respectfully dissent from that part of the majority s opinion that blue pencils the geographic limits of the restrictive covenant and remands the case to the Chancery Division. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE WALLACE s opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAY MORE, M.D. and SOMERSET MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants-Appellants, and DR. JAMES CHIMENTI and NEUROSURGICAL ASSOCIATES AT PARK AVENUE, Defendants. Argued November 30, 2004 Decided April 5, 2005 On appeal from to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 365 N.J. Super. 84 (2003). Robert J. Conroy argued the cause for appellant Jay More, M.D. (Kern Augustine Conroy & Schoppmann attorneys; Mr. Conroy and R. Bruce Crelin, on the briefs). James J. Shrager argued the cause for appellant Somerset Medical Center (Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, attorneys; David R. Strickler, on the briefs). Carmine A. Iannaccone argued the cause for respondent (Epstein, Becker & Green, attorneys; Jatinder K. Sharma, James P. Flynn and Lauren D. Daloisio, on the briefs). Lawrence Downs argued the cause for amici curiae The Medical Society of New Jersey, Union County Medical Society, Somerset County Medical Society and Middlesex County Medical Society. Kevin McNulty argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Hospital Association (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys). Thomas M. Toman, Jr., argued the cause for amicus curiae University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (Genova, Burns & Vernoia, attorneys; Angelo J. Genova, of counsel; Mr. Toman and Michelle A. Brown, on the brief). JUSTICE WALLACE delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case and in the companion case of Pierson v. Medical Health Center, P.A., ___ N.J. ___ (2005), also decided today, we granted leave to appeal to re-examine the issue decided in Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 N.J. 408 (1978), that a post-employment restrictive covenant in an employment contract between physicians or between a physician and hospital is not per se unreasonable and unenforceable. Secondary to that issue, in this case, is whether, assuming Karlin has continuing vitality, the trial court erred in denying plaintiff s application for a preliminary injunction. The trial court denied relief, but the Appellate Division reversed and ordered temporary injunctive relief. We reject the invitation to overrule Karlin. Instead, we hold that a restrictive covenant in an employment contract between a hospital and a physician is not per se unreasonable and unenforceable. We conclude, however, that under the circumstances of this case the geographic restrictive area is excessive and must be reduced to avoid being detrimental to the public interest. During the term of this Agreement and for a period of two (2) years following the date of termination of MORE s employment for any reason whatsoever, MORE shall not, directly or indirectly, for his own account or for the account of others, induce any patients of the HOSPITAL to patronize any professional health care provider other than the HOSPITAL; canvas or solicit any business relationship from any patients of the HOSPITAL; directly or indirectly request or advise any patients of the HOSPITAL to withdraw, curtail, or cancel any patients business with the HOSPITAL; or directly or indirectly disclose to any other person, firm or corporation the names or addresses of any patients of the HOSPITAL. Dr. More further agreed that he would not solicit or induce any employee of JFK to leave his or her employment for a two-year period and that the post-employment restraints were reasonable. Another provision in the agreement provided that in the event of a breach, JFK would suffer irreparable harm and damage and would be entitled to injunctive relief to enforce the post-employment restraints. JFK agreed to pay Dr. More the base annual salary as set forth in the agreement. In addition, JFK bore other costs associated with Dr. More s employment, including expenses associated with continuing education courses, costs related to keeping his medical licenses current, $25,000 annually in medical malpractice insurance, tuition reimbursement, and reimbursement for numerous business related expenses. Dr. More developed a patient referral base and his surgical practice increased each year. On occasion, he was the featured speaker at seminars and programs sponsored by the Institute aimed toward obtaining referral sources. On July 17, 2001, Dr. More submitted his letter of resignation to JFK, effective July the following year, stating that the [Institute s] restrictive environment has become increasingly difficult to work in, and that he had outgrown the Institute s current model. At some point, JFK notified Dr. More that it intended to enforce its rights as contained in the 1999 agreement. Dr. More ceased working at JFK on July 17, 2002. He had received offers to join other practices that were located beyond the thirty-mile restrictive area, but declined each one. Between the date of his notice of resignation and his separation date, Dr. More removed documents from the Institute identifying patients names and addresses, as well as the identity and location of the Institute s referral sources. On July 22, 2002, Dr. More affiliated with another neurosurgeon, James M. Chimenti, M.D., as an employee of Neurosurgical Associates at Park Avenues, P.A. (NAPA), located at 1111 Park Avenue, Plainfield, New Jersey. In addition to joining NAPA, Dr. More also received medical staff privileges at Somerset Medical Center (Somerset), which is located approximately thirteen and a half miles from JFK. At the time Dr. More joined NAPA, Dr. Chimenti was the only neurosurgeon taking emergency room calls at Somerset. Dr. Chimenti had been searching for over eight months for an experienced, board-certified neurosurgeon to join his practice, but until Dr. More became available he was not able to locate a suitable candidate because of the shortage of experienced, skilled neurosurgeons in the area. With the addition of Dr. More to the medical staff, Somerset was able to provide complete neurological coverage through the two neurosurgeons. On August 15, 2002, JFK wrote Dr. More that Somerset had inquired about his application for medical privileges at Somerset. JFK sought written assurance from Dr. More that he had not and did not intend to violate the agreement. Dr. More replied that he had not breached any lawfully enforceable employment agreement with the Institute. Believing that Dr. More was in violation of the agreement, on September 6, 2002, JFK filed a complaint against Dr. More, seeking among other things a preliminary injunction prohibiting him from the practice of neurosurgery with NAPA or Somerset. On November 21, 2002, the trial court denied JFK s request for a preliminary injunction, established a discovery timetable, and set trial for May 12, 2003. The court found that JFK could not show a reasonable likelihood of success because it could not demonstrate that the covenant protected a legitimate interest of JFK, or that such an interest would not be outweighed by undue hardship to Dr. More, or that the covenant would not impair the public interest. JFK s motion for leave to appeal was denied by the Appellate Division on January 8, 2003. While JFK s motion for leave to appeal to us was pending, JFK was granted leave to file an amended complaint adding Somerset as a defendant. JFK sought damages and injunctive relief against Somerset because Somerset had granted Dr. More privileges to practice at Somerset. Eventually, we granted JFK leave to appeal and summarily remanded the matter to the Appellate Division to consider the appeal on its merits. Cmty. Hosp. Group, Inc. v. More, 176 N.J. 70 (2003). In a published opinion dated December 29, 2003, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court and awarded JFK injunctive relief. Cmty. Hosp. Group, Inc. v. More, 365 N.J. Super. 84. The panel applied the four-prong test of Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982), for determining whether injunctive relief should be granted. The court found irreparable harm because a later award of damages would not enable JFK to satisfy its goal of providing clinical care, education, and research in the field of neurology. Id. at 99-100. The panel concluded that the trial court misapplied the Karlin standard in examining the restrictive covenant. Id. at 100-01. The panel applied the three-part test for determining the reasonableness of the restrictive covenant, i.e. whether the covenant in question protects the legitimate interests of the employer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public. Id. at 97 (quoting Karlin, supra, 77 N.J. at 422)(internal quotations omitted). The panel found that the evidence supported the conclusion that the restrictive covenant was necessary to protect JFK s patient and referral relationships. Id. at 102. After rejecting the trial court s conclusion to the contrary, the panel determined that JFK satisfied its burden of showing that enforcement of the restrictive covenant would not impose an undue hardship on Dr. More. Id. at 104. In that regard, the panel noted there was sufficient evidence that Dr. More could find work outside of the geographically restricted area, and that any hardship upon Dr. More was personal and self-induced. Ibid. The panel found the two-year period of the restriction was reasonable and consistent with other restrictions that have been upheld. Id. at 105. The panel then addressed the reasonableness of the thirty-mile geographic restriction. Ibid. After finding that some patients traveled thirty miles or more to seek specialized care such as neurosurgery and that over seventeen percent of JFK s patients resided outside of the thirty-mile radius, the panel concluded that the scope of the restriction was reasonable. Id. at 106. The panel next reviewed the crucial issue of the public interest prong of the Karlin test. Id. at 107. The panel stressed Dr. More s admission that five hospitals, aside from JFK, provided neurosurgery within the restricted area and did not lack qualified neurosurgeons, and as a result, enforcement of the restrictions would not have an impact on the public s access to other qualified neurosurgeons within that area. Id. at 109. In regard to Dr. More s patients living within the geographic area, the panel found the covenant did not restrict the patients from continuing their relationships with him, but merely forced the patients to visit Dr. More outside the restricted area. Id. at 109-10. The panel directed the trial court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining Dr. More from engaging in the practice of neurosurgery within a thirty-mile radius of JFK. Id. at 112-13. We granted a stay of the Appellate Division decision on January 5, 2004, and on March 11, 2004, we granted Dr. More s and Somerset s motions for leave to appeal. 179 N.J. 304 (2004); 179 N.J. 305 (2004). We also granted amicus curiae status to the Medical Society of New Jersey and the New Jersey Hospital Association. [AMA, E-9.02: Restrictive Covenants and the Practice of Medicine, available at www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/ 8519.html (last visited February 10, 2005).] Although the AMA discourages restrictive covenants between physicians, it only declares them unethical if excessive in geographic scope or duration, or if they fail to make reasonable accommodation of patients choice of physician. Ibid. That is essentially the same reasonableness standard we apply under Karlin. See also Derek W. Loeser, The Legal, Ethical, and Practical Implications of Noncompetition Clauses: What Physicians Should Know Before They Sign, 31 J. L. Med. & Ethics 283, 287 (2003) (noting that E-9.02 has limited legal impact because it merely parrots the reasonableness standard applied by most courts ). Thus, the AMA s ethical rules are consistent with, and not contrary to, the Karlin analysis. Before us, amici support the case-by-case approach in Karlin, as contrasted to a per se rule. The briefs submitted by the MSNJ and the NJHA argue against the adoption of a per se rule banning restrictive covenants in employment contracts of physicians. The overwhelming majority of other states apply some type of reasonableness test. See Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contractual Restrictions On Right of Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to Employment Agreement, 62 A.L.R. 3d 1014 (2004)(providing expansive discussion on treatment of restrictive covenants nationwide). See also Di Dio, supra, 20 J. Legal Med. at 476-77; Berg, supra, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. at 4-5. In short, we continue to adhere to and follow the Karlin test because we conclude that it strikes the proper balance between an employer s and employee s freedom to contract on the one hand and the public interest on the other. In addition, we are convinced that the Karlin reasonableness test with emphasis on the public interest, is sufficiently flexible to account for varying factual patterns that may arise. [Id. at 424.] As noted, the geographical restriction in this case is a thirty-mile radius of JFK or a sixty-mile distance from the farthest points on the radius. Dr. More and Somerset presented evidence to show that preventing Dr. More from practicing within the thirty-mile radius will be injurious to the public because there is a shortage of neurosurgeons in that area. Dr. Nossratollah Hooshangi, president of the Medical-Dental Staff, president of the Medical-Executive Committee, and Chief of the Division of Neurosurgery at JFK, stated in his certification that Middlesex and Union counties were suffering from a shortage of qualified neurosurgeons. Dr. Edward Von Der Schmidt, president of the New Jersey Neurosurgery Society, certified that there is a significant shortage of neurosurgeons in the State of New Jersey, in general, and in the Middlesex Union/Somerset County areas. Dr. Hartmann, on behalf of Somerset, certified that Dr. More s services are badly needed at Somerset Medical Center, and that granting injunctive relief to JFK would pose serious harm to the public served by Somerset. Dr. Chimenti certified that because he and Dr. More were the only two neurosurgeons available to provide emergency coverage at Somerset, if Dr. More were prohibited from maintaining his present practice, neurosurgical treatment and evaluation in the emergency room at Somerset Medical Center would be dangerously compromised. The Appellate Division nevertheless concluded that the covenant would not appear injurious to the public interest. The panel found that because six hospitals in the area, including JFK, have qualified neurosurgeons, enforcement of the covenant would not restrict the public s access to other qualified neurosurgeons within that area. Cmty. Hosp., supra, 365 N.J. Super. at 108-10. The panel reasoned that the burden on patients having to travel an increased distance did not automatically prevent Dr. More s patients from seeking treatment from him. Id. at 109. Unfortunately, the panel failed to focus on the adverse impact the geographic restriction would have on neurological patients seeking treatment at Somerset s emergency room. Without Dr. More, Somerset s ability to provide necessary neurological treatment to an emergency room patient could be compromised. Moreover, the panel appeared to consider only patients who had the ability to travel beyond the restrictive area to visit Dr. More, and did not address those patients needing emergency neurological care in the area of Somerset or those patients who might not have the ability to travel beyond the large restricted area. The evidence was overwhelming that prohibiting Dr. More from attending to neurological patients in Somerset s emergency room would be injurious to the public interest. A number of out-of-state-cases have found that similar evidence invalidated a restrictive covenant. See, e.g., Duneland Emergency Physician s Med. Group v. Brunk, 723 N.E.2d 963, 966-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)(finding restrictive covenant unenforceable if it prevents physician from providing care to emergency room patients); Premier Health Care Services, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 2 001 WL 1658167 at *11 (Oh. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001) (finding former employer s interest substantially outweighed by upheaval in medical care in hospital s emergency centers and therefore public interest weighs against granting of injunction); Emergicare Sys. Corp. v. Bourdon, 942 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)(finding restrictive covenant unenforceable because it prevented doctor from continuing to serve public as emergency doctor). Because the geographic restricted area encompassed an area plagued with a shortage of neurosurgeons, the Appellate Division should have decreased the geographical limitation of the covenant. When it is reasonable to do so, courts should not hesitate to partially enforce a restrictive covenant. Karlin, supra, 77 N.J. at 420 n.4. Somerset is located approximately thirteen miles from JFK and therefore is included in the restricted area. We are satisfied that if the covenant were limited to a distance less than thirteen miles so that Somerset was not within the restricted area, the covenant would not have the same adverse impact on the public that it presently has. A remand is necessary for the Chancery Division to determine the precise limits of the geographic area of the restriction, but in no event should it exceed thirteen miles or include Somerset. Our dissenting colleague points to the language of the restrictive covenant in which the parties agree that the terms are reasonable. Because Dr. More "voluntarily signed three separate covenants containing that language, the dissent concludes that the doctor s actions deserve our condemnation. Post at ___ (slip op. at 2) Although acknowledging that equitable considerations are paramount, (post at ___ (slip op. at 3)) when the validity of a restrictive covenant is at issue, the dissent disregards that principle, and instead, chastises Dr. More. We are satisfied that the interests of patients at Somerset who need emergent neurological care come first, and should not be put aside because Dr. More disregarded the terms of his agreement with JFK. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAY MORE, M.D. and SOMERSET MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants-Appellants, and DR. JAMES CHIMENTI and NEUROSURGICAL ASSOCIATES AT PARK AVENUE, Defendants. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Today we reaffirm Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 N.J. 408 (1978), and hold that a restrictive covenant in an employment contract between a hospital and a physician is not per se unreasonable and unenforceable. Ante, ___ N.J. ___. I join the Court in so holding. However, to the extent the Court also blue pencils the restrictive covenant at issue here in a manner that renders it meaningless, I must respectfully dissent. Circumscribing the geographic limits of the restrictive covenant so as to place the very conduct prohibited by the restrictive covenant tantalizingly outside the restrictive covenant s reach gives the party that successfully sought to enforce the restrictive covenant nothing more than a Pyrrhic victory. There can be no question that considerations of patient care are critically important in the judicial calculus of whether a restrictive covenant is injurious to the public. However, the conduct of the restricted physician here in singling out the one hospital most convenient to his personal preferences that also has a need for his medical specialty as his justification for violating a restrictive covenant he voluntarily signed three different times over a five-year period -- and ignoring all other alternatives that would not have violated the covenant he freely and voluntarily entered into with the hospital employer that allowed him to develop his expertise in the first instance -- is little more than rank bootstrapping. This is even more so because the employment agreement this physician voluntarily signed contained his representation that the terms of the restrictive covenant (i) . . . are necessary and appropriate for the reasonable protection of [plaintiff s] interests; (ii) each and every covenant and restriction is reasonable in respect to its subject matter, length of time and geographical area; and (iii) [plaintiff] has been induced to enter into this Agreement with [defendant] and is relying upon the representation and covenant by [defendant] that he will abide by and be bound by each of the covenants and agreements set forth [in the restrictive covenant section of the employment agreement]. [Emphasis added.] When, as here, equitable considerations are paramount, those actions constitute crass opportunistic behavior deserving of nothing more than our condemnation. Therefore, because I would affirm in all respects the thoughtful opinion of the Appellate Division, Community Hosp. Group v. More, 365 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div. 2003), I must respectfully dissent from that part of the Court s opinion that blue pencils the geographic limits of the restrictive covenant and remands the case to the Chancery Division. NO. A75/76 SEPTEMBER TERM 2003 ON REMAND FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court THE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL GROUP, INC., t/a JFK MEDICAL CENTER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAY MORE, M.D. and SOMERSET MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED April 5, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Wallace CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto DISSENTING OPINION BY