Case Title: State v. Brown

Citation: 179 Vt. 22, 2005 VT 104, 890 A.2d 79

Docket Number: 2003-384

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Brown (2003-384); 179 Vt. 22; 890 A.2d 79

2005 VT 104

[Filed 26-Aug-2005]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2005 VT 104

                                No. 2003-384


  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

  Theodore L. Brown	                         February Term, 2005


  Theresa S. DiMauro, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney
    General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender
    General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

  Richard Verrochi, Pro Se, Amherst, New Hampshire, for Amicus Curiae Amherst
    Bail Bonds, Inc.
  	

  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.),  Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.  Defendant appeals jury convictions of attempting
  to elude, reckless endangerment, and grossly negligent operation.  He also
  appeals an order forfeiting his $5000 bail.  On appeal, defendant argues
  that (1) bail forfeiture was erroneous because his appearance was not
  required and his absence was excusable because he was in federal custody;
  (2) he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to
  counsel; (3) the trial court erred in preventing him from reasserting a
  defense of insanity; and (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury
  that aiming was not an essential element of the reckless endangerment
  offense.  We vacate the trial court's order forfeiting bail.  We affirm
  defendant's waiver of counsel; however, we find that the trial court erred
  in denying defendant an opportunity to reinstate his insanity defense and
  in instructing the jury on the reckless endangerment charge.  Therefore, we
  reverse defendant's convictions and remand for a new trial.

       ¶  2.  The basic facts surrounding defendant's arrest and conviction
  are set out below.  Additional facts are included in the analysis of the
  relevant issues.  On November 4, 2002, Vermont State Police Officer Paul
  Gauthier, while watching traffic on Interstate-91, observed defendant's car
  traveling in excess of ninety miles per hour and directed the vehicle to
  stop.  Defendant did not pull over; instead he sped up, eventually exiting
  the highway and leading police on a chase through Windsor County.  Officer
  Gauthier followed defendant off the highway and onto smaller, eventually
  dirt, roads with his lights and siren activated.  During the chase, Officer
  Gauthier lost sight of the vehicle.  Over the radio Officer Gauthier heard
  that defendant had been sighted and then saw defendant's car approaching
  his stopped cruiser.  Defendant's car swerved towards the cruiser, but no
  collision occurred.  Eventually, police blockaded defendant's car and
  forced him to stop.  Defendant was initially charged with attempting to
  elude and grossly negligent operation.  Later, the prosecution amended the
  information and added a count of reckless endangerment for "aiming his car
  at a Vermont State Police cruiser."  After arraignment, the court released
  defendant on $5000 cash bail. 
   
       ¶  3.  Defendant's situation became more complicated when, in February
  2003, he was charged with possession of marijuana and another offense of
  attempting to elude.  Although these charges are not currently on appeal,
  they are indirectly involved in the first issue-the claim that the bail
  forfeiture was improper.  The conditions of release on these charges were
  made concurrent with those on the earlier charges so that the $5000 cash
  bail also secured defendant's appearance on the later charges.

       ¶  4.  Defendant has a history of paranoia, beginning with a diagnosis
  of paranoid schizophrenia in 1979.  In March 2003, a psychiatrist, Dr.
  Jonathan Weker, examined defendant and determined that he was competent to
  stand trial, but that his "mental illness deprived him of the capacity to
  conform his conduct to requirements of law."  Dr. Weker's report chronicled
  defendant's belief that he was being targeted by law enforcement agencies,
  specifically that he "seemed quite fixed in the delusional belief that the
  Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney in Burlington have conspired
  against him, and that the police want to put him in jail or, ideally, to
  kill him."  He found that defendant had "disordered thought at the time of
  the alleged offenses" and that these thoughts "would have overridden Mr.
  Brown's . . . ability to conceptualize alternative courses of action."  
  Specifically, he concluded that defendant believed that responding to the
  police command to stop would "put his life in jeopardy."  On March 28,
  2003, defendant filed a notice of intent to offer an insanity defense,
  indicating that Dr. Weker would testify on his behalf.

       ¶  5.  In April 2003, defendant's situation became even more
  complicated when federal authorities arrested him on a separate drug charge
  and placed him in the custody of U.S. Marshals.  As a result of this arrest
  and incarceration, defendant was absent at an April 9, 2003 calendar call
  on the offenses charged in February and a status conference on all charges
  on April 29.  Defendant's attorney attempted to excuse the absence,
  explaining that defendant was in federal custody.  Nonetheless, the State
  filed for bail forfeiture and, after a hearing, the court granted
  forfeiture of defendant's bail on August 7, 2003.
   
       ¶  6.  Another outcome of his federal arrest was that defendant
  sought to cooperate with federal authorities.  To be free to do so,
  defendant signed a stipulation with the State whereby the State agreed to
  strike pending warrants against defendant and modify his conditions of
  release and defendant agreed to permanently waive his right to assert an
  insanity or diminished capacity defense "or any other mental health
  defense."  Soon after his release, defendant was arrested again for DUI and
  was thus unable to cooperate with federal authorities.  He then filed a
  renewed notice to assert an insanity defense.  The trial court denieddefendant an opportunity to do so, based on the stipulation.


       ¶  7.  After the jury was empaneled, defendant moved to dismiss
  counsel and represent himself.  The court questioned defendant and
  ultimately granted the motion.  At trial, defendant's primary defense to
  the charge of reckless endangerment was that he did not aim at the police
  cruiser.  During deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the court
  inquiring as to whether aiming was an essential element of the reckless
  endangerment charge.  The court answered that aiming was not an element of
  the charge, but was instead part of the language used by the State in its
  charging information to describe the defendant's conduct.   

       ¶  8.  The jury convicted defendant on all counts.  Defendant filed a
  motion for a new trial, which the court denied.  Defendant then filed this
  appeal.                                   I.
   
       ¶  9.  Defendant argues that the court erred in forfeiting his bail
  for failure to appear.  Defendant claims that the forfeiture is erroneous
  because his presence was not required at the calendar call and status
  conference and because federal incarceration within the State is not
  grounds for forfeiture where the defendant is available for trial. 
  Defendant first contends that because the Windsor District Court does not
  order that incarcerated defendants be transported to attend status
  conferences, the court may not punish defendant for his failure to appear
  at such a proceeding.  The State responds that absolving defendant of his
  responsibility to attend court proceedings would negate the deterrent
  effect of bail because defendant chose to engage in the illegal conduct
  that precipitated his arrest by federal authorities which in turn made him
  unable to attend the hearing. (FN1)
        
       ¶  10.  Under 13 V.S.A. § 7560a, a court is authorized to forfeit bail
  if it finds that the person failed to appear at a hearing where appearance
  was required.  We review the court's decision for an abuse of discretion. 
  See State v. Hutchins, 134 Vt. 441, 443, 365 A.2d 507,