Case Title: Rule v. Tobin

Citation: 168 Vt. 166, 719 A.2d 869

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rule v. Tobin  (97-316); 168 Vt. 166; 719 A.2d 869

[Opinion Filed 19-Jun-1998]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 27-Jul-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 97-316

William D. and Beverly G. Rule	                    Supreme Court
and Danielle Swain
                                                    On Appeal from
     v.		                                    Rutland Superior Court

Gary G. Tobin and	                            February Term, 1998
City of Rutland

Alden T. Bryan, J.

       Alicia L. Aiken and Herbert G. Ogden, Jr. of Liccardi, Crawford &
  Ogden, P.C., Rutland, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

       Shannon A. Bertrand of Reiber, Kenlan, Schwiebert, Hall & Facey, P.C.,
  Rutland, for Defendants-Appellees.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiffs, William and Beverly Rule and Danielle Swain,
  brought a civil  rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a Rutland
  police officer, Gary Tobin, and the City  of Rutland alleging that Tobin
  unlawfully entered plaintiffs' apartment and unlawfully arrested  Beverly
  Rule, using excessive force.  A Rutland Superior Court jury returned a
  verdict for  defendants, and plaintiffs appeal on a number of grounds,
  including that the trial court erred in  failing to enforce a settlement
  agreement.  We agree that the parties entered into a binding  settlement
  agreement and reverse for entry of judgment consistent with that agreement.

  This case was tried twice.  On April 10, 1997, between the first and second
  trials,  defendants' attorney sent plaintiffs an offer of judgment which
  read as follows: 

    Now comes defendants . . . and in accordance with the
    provisions  of V.R.C.P. 68, and without prejudice to the rights of the
    defendant  to proceed with the defense and its general denial of liability
    as  envisioned by the rules, makes the following offer of judgment:

 

    The defendant offers to allow the plaintiff to take judgment against 
    it in the amount and to the extent of Four Thousand and no/100 
    ($4,000.00), having thoroughly reviewed the liability and damages 
    aspect of this case.

       On April 15, 1997, plaintiffs' attorney answered, purporting to accept
  the offer of judgment, as  follows:

     Assuming the defendants' 10 April Offer of Judgment does not 
     include costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or 
     any other entitlement, the plaintiffs accept the defendants' $4,000 
     offer.
    
     The plaintiffs understand that attorney's fees and costs will be 
     determined in a later hearing pursuant to V.R.C.P. 54(d).

       Asserting that they intended to include attorney's fees and costs in
  the offer, defendants objected  to plaintiffs' answer and claimed that the
  offer had not been accepted.

       The court apparently agreed with defendants' position.  Over
  plaintiffs' objection, the  court ordered the parties to start over with a
  new offer and acceptance, if appropriate.  It directed  that the new offer
  explicitly cover "everything, including all attorney's fees."  Thereafter, 
  defendants submitted an offer of judgment of $7,000, including "all claims
  for damages, costs,  attorney's fees and every other potential claim." 
  Plaintiffs rejected this offer.

       On appeal, plaintiffs argue that (1) defendants' offer cannot be
  interpreted to include  attorney's fees, (2) plaintiffs accepted
  defendants' offer, and (3) the court had no discretion to set  aside the
  resulting agreement.  Defendants respond that its offer must be interpreted
  to include  costs and attorney's fees or, alternatively, it was ambiguous
  and the court had the discretion to  rescind it because there was no
  meeting of the minds.  We agree with plaintiffs' position.

       The offer of judgment procedure which defendants invoked by their
  offer is authorized and  governed by Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 68,
  which provides in pertinent part:

 

     At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins or within such 
     shorter time as the court may approve, a party defending against a 
     claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment 
     to be taken against the defending party for the money or property 
     or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued.  If 
     within 10 days after the service of the offer or within such shorter 
    time as the court may order the adverse party serves written notice 
    that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and 
    notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and 
    thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment.

  Refusal of an offer of judgment may have adverse consequences for the
  plaintiff depending upon  the ultimate result of the case.  "If the
  judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more  favorable than the
  offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the
  offer."  Id.  

       Except for an irrelevant variation, the rule is identical to Federal
  Rule of Civil Procedure  68.   We have applied this rule on only one
  occasion, and that precedent is not helpful to the  question before us. 
  Because our rule is identical to the federal rule, we look to the "Federal
  cases  interpreting the Federal Rules [as] . . . an authoritative source
  for the interpretation" of our rule.  Reporters Notes to V.R.C.P. 1.  It is
  particularly appropriate to look to federal law in this case  because we
  are defining the interrelationship between Rule 68 and the attorney's fee
  provision of  the federal Civil Rights Act.

       We take the component questions in the order plaintiffs have presented
  them, looking first  at defendants' offer.  Our starting point is Marek v.
  Chesny,