Case Title: State v. Ralph D. Armstrong

Citation: 2005 WI 119

Docket Number: 2001AP002789

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 119 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Ralph D. Armstrong,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 275, 683 N.W.2d 93 
(Ct. App. 2004 –Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2005 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 31, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Fiedler   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and PROSSER, J.J., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Jerome Buting and Buting & Williams, S.C., Brookfield, and Barry 
C. Scheck, Colin Starger, and The Innocence Project, New York, 
NY and oral argument by Jerome Buting and Barry C. Scheck. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Keith A. Findley, Byron 
C. Lichstein, John A. Pray, and University of Wisconsin Law 
School, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Innocence Project. 
 
2005 WI 119
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979  
(L.C. No. 
1980CF495) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ralph D. Armstrong, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Ralph Armstrong seeks 
review of an unpublished court of appeals' decision that 
affirmed the circuit court's orders denying Armstrong's motions 
to vacate his judgment of conviction and for reconsideration.  
State v. Armstrong, Nos. 2001AP2789 and 2002AP2979, unpublished 
slip. op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27, 2004).  The court of 
appeals 
determined 
that 
newly 
obtained 
DNA 
tests 
that 
established Armstrong was not the donor of certain biological 
evidence found at a 1980 murder scene did not create a 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
2 
 
reasonable probability that the outcome would be different on 
retrial. 
¶2 
We reverse the court of appeals' decision.  Because 
(1) the DNA evidence excluding Armstrong as the donor of the 
physical evidence was relevant to the critical issue of 
identification; (2) the jury did not hear this evidence; and (3) 
instead, the State used the physical evidence assertively and 
repetitively as affirmative proof of Armstrong's guilt, we 
conclude that the real controversy was not fully tried.  
Therefore, we reverse the circuit court's order and remand this 
matter to the circuit court with directions to grant Armstrong's 
motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and to order a new 
trial.1  
I 
¶3 
On March 24, 1981, Ralph Armstrong was convicted of 
first-degree sexual assault and first-degree murder of Charise 
Kamps, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§  940.225(1)(a) 
and 
940.01 
(1979).  Armstrong was later sentenced to life plus 16 years' 
imprisonment.   
¶4 
On 
the 
afternoon 
of 
June 
24, 
1980, 
Jane 
May, 
Armstrong's fiancée, discovered Kamps' body in Kamps' apartment 
at 134 W. Gorham Street in Madison, Wisconsin.  Kamps was found 
                                                 
1 According to 
representations 
made by 
the 
State at 
Armstrong's latest postconviction motion hearing, Armstrong has 
to serve the remainder of a 30- to 150-year sentence in New 
Mexico. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
3 
 
face down in her bed smeared with blood, naked with a bathrobe 
belt draped across her back. 
¶5 
Pathologist Robert Huntington concluded that Kamps 
most likely died from strangulation.  He found substantial 
injury to Kamps' anus, vagina, and throat consistent with the 
insertion of a blunt, unyielding object.2  He also found six 
bruises in tissue below the scalp consistent with being struck 
by a blunt object.  Huntington estimated that the time of death 
was between midnight and 3:00 a.m. on June 24. 
¶6 
Although 
the bed 
and pillows 
were 
blood-soaked, 
investigators found no traces of blood elsewhere in the 
apartment, including the bathroom.  The police also found no 
indication the killer attempted to clean the scene or himself or 
herself in the apartment.3  Police gathered forensic evidence, 
                                                 
2 Brian Dillman, Kamps' boyfriend, testified that a nine to 
ten inch tall glass flower vase with a wide base and tapering to 
the top was missing from Kamps' nightstand when he viewed the 
apartment after Kamps' murder.  There is no indication in the 
record that this glass vase was ever recovered or tested.   
3 On this point, we note that Officer Dean Fischer, a 
uniformed special investigator who works crime scenes, testified 
that he searched Kamps' apartment to identify anything which 
potentially was evidence; that he did not observe blood or 
stains anywhere else in the apartment aside from the bed; that 
he specifically checked the bathroom; that the bathroom in 
Kamps' apartment was "orderly and clean"; that he did not 
observe any stains in the bathroom; and that he found no blood 
in the bathroom.   
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
4 
 
including fingerprints, head and pubic hairs found on and around 
the body and elsewhere in the apartment, purported blood 
evidence, and a bathrobe found on the floor next to Kamps that 
later revealed semen stains. 
¶7 
Armstrong and Kamps knew each other and were friends 
through Armstrong's fiancée.  Armstrong admitted to being in 
Kamps' apartment for a brief period beginning around 9:15 and 
9:25 p.m. the evening of June 23, just hours before Kamps was 
murdered.  However, Armstrong claimed that he was not there at 
the times when Kamps was murdered.   
¶8 
The State built its case against Armstrong on the 
following:  (1) that Armstrong could not have been at Kamps' 
apartment before her murder; (2) two witnesses made observations 
that placed Armstrong at Kamps' apartment around the time she 
was murdered; (3) physical evidence conclusively and irrefutably 
established Armstrong's guilt, including (a) a fingerprint 
identified as Armstrong's found on a water bong in Kamps' 
apartment; (b) semen stains on the victim's bathrobe that came 
                                                                                                                                                             
When specifically asked, "Was there any evidence, anything 
which you would have noticed which would have indicated that 
something had been cleaned up?", Fischer answered, "Nothing that 
I know of."  When specifically asked if any information 
regarding whether someone had cleaned up in the bathroom had 
come to his attention, Fischer answered, "No."  When asked if 
Fischer was "specifically looking for anything which would be a 
clue," Fischer answered "Yes."   
Thus, the jury heard testimony about whether the murderer 
cleaned up in Kamps' bathroom before leaving the scene.  Compare 
Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶172 n.4.  That evidence was that 
the murderer did not.  Compare id.   
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
5 
 
from a similar secretor type as Armstrong; (c) four head hairs 
found in the apartment characterized by the State's expert as 
"consistent" and "similar" to Armstrong's; (d) traces of blood 
underneath Armstrong's fingernails and toenails detected the 
evening following the murder; (4) Armstrong had a romantic 
interest in Kamps that she did not return; and (5) Armstrong 
paid Kamps $400 in repayment of a debt and following her murder, 
the $400 could not be found in her apartment, while Armstrong 
made a $315 cash deposit the next day.   
¶9 
The following factual background combines the State's 
points and splits them into two main subheadings:  (A) 
chronology of events on June 23 through June 24, 1980; and (B) 
evidence that placed Armstrong at the scene.  Subsumed under the 
first subheading includes Armstrong's explanation, and the 
State's refutation, of his whereabouts.  Subsumed under the 
second subheading includes the witnesses who placed Armstrong at 
Kamps' apartment around the time of her death, the missing money 
from Kamps' apartment that implicates Armstrong as the murderer, 
and, finally, the physical evidence the State claimed that 
"conclusively" and "irrefutably" established Armstrong was the 
murderer. 
A. Chronology of Events on June 23 through June 24, 1980 
1.  Early Evening 
¶10 Charise Kamps spent the evening of June 23, 1980, in 
the company of her friends, including Ralph Armstrong, and his 
fiancée, Jane May.  May was Kamps' close friend and coworker at 
the Pipefitter on State Street, Madison, Wisconsin.  Kamps was 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
6 
 
friends with Armstrong through May.  In the early evening of 
June 23, May invited her coworkers to a small party in her 
apartment, located above the Pipefitter store at 519 State 
Street.  May, Armstrong, Armstrong's brother (Steve), Kamps, and 
Armstrong's 
friend 
(Greg 
Kohlhardt) 
were 
there. 
 
May's 
coworkers, Judy Marty and Betsy Cornelius, joined the party 
after the store closed around 5:30 p.m.   
¶11 Kamps, Armstrong, and May all consumed alcohol and 
used cocaine at the party.  In addition, Cornelius testified 
that Kamps, Steve, and Armstrong also smoked marijuana.   
¶12 Both Cornelius and Marty testified they observed 
Armstrong flirting with Kamps, specifically that he sat on her 
lap and attempted to kiss her.  Marty also testified that she 
overheard Armstrong tell Kamps that they would talk later.  
Kohlhardt testified that it was Kamps who sat in Armstrong's 
lap, and that "They were just being——it seems friendly toward 
each other, laughing and stuff." 
¶13 At about 6:00 p.m., Kamps' boyfriend, Brian Dillman, 
telephoned May's apartment from McGregor, Iowa, and spoke with 
Kamps.  Dillman testified that he loaned Armstrong $500 for the 
purchase of a car, and that while speaking with Kamps at the 
party, he overheard Armstrong giving Kamps money and indicating 
that it was $400 in partial repayment for the loan.  May 
testified that both Kamps and Armstrong had told her about the 
$400 repayment.  Kohlhardt testified that he also witnessed 
Armstrong giving money to Kamps, but said that he only saw two 
$20 bills pass between them. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
7 
 
2. 6:30 – 9:00 p.m. 
¶14 Following the party at May's apartment, May, Kamps, 
Kohlhardt, Steve, and Armstrong went to a local restaurant for 
dinner from about 6:30 to 8:00 p.m., and then bought beer on the 
way to Kohlhardt's house to watch the television program MASH.  
A member of the Madison Police verified a newspaper television 
schedule showing MASH played from 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. that 
evening.  Immediately following the conclusion of MASH, the 
group left Kohlhardt at Kohlhardt's house.  
¶15 There is some confusion as to when the group drove to 
Armstrong's apartment, located at 5572 Guilford in Fitchburg, 
Wisconsin, to drop off Steve for the evening.  May testified 
that the group went to Armstrong's apartment after dinner and 
before watching MASH at Kohlhardt's house.   
¶16 However, Kohlhardt testified that Steve joined them 
watching MASH at Kohlhardt's house following dinner.  Further 
supporting 
Kohlhardt's 
testimony 
was 
the 
testimony 
of 
Armstrong's 
neighbor, 
Patricia 
Emmerich, 
who 
stopped 
by 
Armstrong's apartment to meet Steve a few minutes after 9 p.m. 
and said that Steve, Armstrong, and Kamps were present.    
Armstrong testified that May was also with them when Emmerich 
stopped by at 9:00 p.m. but that May was in the bedroom at the 
time, packing up her things from the previous night's visit.   
3.  9:00 p.m. onward 
¶17 It is disputed what occurred between 9:00 p.m. and 
10:00 p.m. on the evening of June 23, but trial testimony 
clearly shows that around 10:00 p.m., Armstrong, May, and Kamps 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
8 
 
ended up in May's apartment and watched part of the 10:00 p.m. 
news together while using cocaine.  Both May and Armstrong 
testified that Kamps left May's apartment at about a quarter to 
11:00 p.m. and that Armstrong left about 15 minutes later. 
¶18 A friend of Kamps, Michael Erdenberger, testified at 
trial that Kamps called him at his apartment at 10:52 p.m. on 
June 23.  Erdenberger said that Kamps was looking for Dillman.  
He also said that during their two-minute conversation, Kamps 
did not seem excited.   
¶19 May spoke with Kamps by telephone at some point 
between 11:00 p.m. and 11:15 p.m. to discuss plans to go water-
skiing the next day.  May's phone call was the last time any 
witness admitted to having contact with Kamps.    
¶20 Dillman testified that he tried to reach Kamps several 
times between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m. on June 24 but received a busy 
signal.  Dillman called again between 9:30 and 10:00 a.m. with 
the same result, and finally called May at about 12:15 p.m. to 
ask her to stop by Kamps' apartment. 
¶21 May testified that at about 12:40 p.m., she discovered 
Kamps' body, noticing that the telephone receiver was off the 
hook, as if it had been intentionally placed aside.  May then 
ran back to the Pipefitter and had one of her coworkers call the 
police. 
a.  Armstrong's Account of His Whereabouts 
¶22 Armstrong testified that at about 9:00 p.m., while he, 
Kamps, and May visited his apartment to drop off his brother, 
Steve, he telephoned Brent Goodman at 153 Harding Street, 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
9 
 
Madison, Wisconsin, to inquire about buying more cocaine.  
Goodman testified that he had sold cocaine to Armstrong earlier 
that 
afternoon 
and 
corroborated 
the 
9:00 
p.m. 
telephone 
conversation with Armstrong, in which Armstrong said that he 
would stop by Goodman's house in a half-hour. 
¶23 Armstrong testified that he, Kamps, and May left 
Armstrong's apartment and dropped May off at her apartment.  In 
the parking lot behind May's apartment building, Armstrong said 
that he and Kamps switched from his to Kamps' vehicle, which was 
parked in the same lot.  
¶24 On the way to Goodman's house, Armstrong testified 
that Kamps invited Armstrong up to her apartment for a beer 
sometime between 9:15 and 9:25 p.m.  Armstrong accepted, and he 
said he had a half-glass of orange juice and a can of beer.  He 
also testified that he had to move a glass bong off a table so 
that he could put his drink down, explaining why his fingerprint 
was found on the bong in Kamps' apartment.  Armstrong said he 
played some music on the stereo and talked with Kamps for a 
short while before the two continued on to Goodman's.  
¶25 At Goodman's, Armstrong testified that he and Kamps 
purchased about 0.4 grams of cocaine and then returned to May's 
apartment between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m., where Armstrong, May, 
and Kamps used the cocaine and watched television. 
¶26 Armstrong testified that Kamps left at about 10:45 
p.m., and Armstrong said that he left about 15 minutes later to 
return to his apartment to visit with his brother.  Armstrong 
stated that after he arrived at his apartment, he made several 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
10 
 
phone calls, attempting to find a different source for more 
cocaine, but was unsuccessful.  Armstrong said he then tried to 
phone Kamps to let her know that he was unable to find more 
cocaine but received a busy signal. 
¶27 Armstrong said he then drove back to May's apartment 
and estimated that he arrived at about 1:00 a.m., judging from 
the bar traffic around State Street.  Armstrong testified that 
when he returned to May's apartment, he entered through the fire 
escape at the back of the building, not the front staircase.  
Armstrong explained that he would generally enter the building 
using the fire escape, because he did not have a key to get 
through the front door.4 
¶28 May testified that she estimated the time Armstrong 
returned to her apartment for the evening was around 1:00 a.m., 
judging from the noise outside resembling bar time.  However, 
May admitted stating at the John Doe hearing that Armstrong's 
return could have been as late as 3:00 or 3:30 a.m.  Also, May 
acknowledged that she told two coworkers the next morning that 
                                                 
4 Charles Lulling, an investigator for the defense testified 
that the doors to the fire escape were unlocked.   
Terry Fink, a resident in May's apartment building and who 
lives below May's apartment, testified that she had once used 
the fire escape when she lost her keys and could not get into 
the building through the front.  However, Fink also testified 
that shrubs and bushes blocked the path from the alley behind 
the apartment building to the fire escape and that it is not a 
path that one would normally choose.  Additionally, Fink stated 
that while she was awake in her apartment between 3:30 a.m. and 
5:00 a.m., she heard somebody come up the front stairwell. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
11 
 
Armstrong was not with her that night, later explaining that it 
was a false comment, a "flip remark." 
b. 
The 
State's 
Refutation 
of 
Armstrong's 
Whereabouts 
¶29 The State presented testimony that the distances 
between May's, Kamps' and Goodman's apartments were too great 
for Armstrong's version of events to be plausible.  Madison 
Police Detective Theodore Mell testified that he drove the 
routes between the various apartments at five to ten miles per 
hour faster than the speed limit and stated that the time 
between Armstrong's apartment at 5572 Guilford and May's 
apartment at 519 State Street was ten minutes and 27 seconds.  
He further testified that the driving time between May's 
apartment and Goodman's, located at 153 Harding Street, was ten 
minutes and 22 seconds.  
¶30 As noted above, Emmerich testified that she visited 
Armstrong in his apartment a few minutes after 9:00 p.m.  
Goodman testified that Kamps and Armstrong stopped by at about 
9:30 p.m.  Goodman did not note the precise time but estimated 
that Armstrong and Kamps left his home between 9:35 p.m. and 
9:45 p.m.  Armstrong and Kamps returned to May's apartment at 
about 10:00 p.m.  The State argued that given the driving times, 
Armstrong could not have visited Kamps' apartment at the time 
Armstrong 
stated——around 
9:30 
p.m.——because 
Goodman 
placed 
No. 
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Armstrong and Kamps at his house ten minutes away, at the same 
moment.5 
¶31 To refute Armstrong's story that he returned to May's 
apartment at about 1:00 a.m., the State presented two residents 
of May's building who the State argued would have seen or heard 
Armstrong if he had entered at that hour.  Terry Fink testified 
that the musician Jackson Browne was making a promotional film 
on State Street, including filming outside the Pipefitter.  Fink 
stated that from five or ten minutes before 1:00 a.m. until 1:45 
a.m., she was on the sidewalk within ten feet of the front 
apartment door, observing the film crew and chatting with 
friends.  Fink testified that she never saw Armstrong in the 
area or enter the apartments during that time. 
¶32 Jeff Zuba was the resident manager for the apartments 
directly above the Pipefitter.  Zuba testified he was in his 
apartment at 9:00 p.m., waiting for the film crew to contact him 
about turning on the store's lights, and remained in his 
apartment with the door open throughout the evening.  The front 
door of the apartment building had a security lock but was 
propped open with a brick that night for the benefit of the film 
                                                 
5 Armstrong argued that the driving times presented by the 
State were unreasonable, creating an average driving speed of 
slightly more than 26 miles per hour.  If Armstrong had been 
driving an average of 40 miles per hour, the difference in speed 
would create enough time for Armstrong's explanation of his 
visit to Kamps' apartment to become reasonable.  Additionally, 
Goodman was not precise about the time he provided and gave 
rough estimates of the time Armstrong and Kamps arrived and the 
duration of their stay.   
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
13 
 
crew.  Zuba testified that his apartment door was opposite the 
door at the top of the front staircase and that he could hear 
anyone entering or leaving the building.   
¶33 Zuba stated that between 10:00 and 10:15 p.m., Kamps 
poked her head in to say hello.  Zuba also heard Armstrong's 
voice in the stairway but did not see him.   
¶34 Zuba said he went downstairs to the sidewalk in front 
of the Pipefitter three times that evening to check on the 
crew's progress, but he claimed he did not wander far from the 
apartment's entrance.  Zuba returned to his apartment for the 
last time about 12:45 a.m. and kept his apartment door open 
until he went to bed at about 1:15 a.m.  He did not see or hear 
Armstrong leave or return to the building. 
¶35 With regard to Armstrong's testimony that he returned 
to May's apartment at about 1:00 a.m. through the fire escape at 
the back of the building, Zuba admitted that he would not have 
heard someone entering or leaving by the back stairway.     
¶36 A Madison Police Officer, Vivian Beckwith, testified 
on behalf of the State during rebuttal.  She issued a ticket for 
Armstrong's vehicle shortly before 11:00 a.m. on June 24 for 
parking in the private lot adjacent to the Pipefitter.  The 
State argued that the ticket was concrete evidence that 
contradicted Armstrong's testimony that he parked in the lot 
behind the building that made his entry through the back door 
much less likely. 
B.  Evidence Placing Armstrong at the Murder Scene 
 
1.  Witnesses 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
14 
 
¶37 The State presented two witnesses to support its 
theory that Armstrong went to Kamps' apartment after midnight, 
instead of before 10:00 p.m., as Armstrong asserted.   
a.  Laura Chafee 
¶38 The first witness was Laura Chafee.6  She lived at 134 
West Gorham in the apartment directly below Kamps' and heard 
some music, which seemed to be coming from upstairs, starting at 
about 12:05 a.m.  Chafee testified that she had not heard music 
from Kamps' apartment earlier in the evening.  Detectives from 
the Madison Police Department had Chafee sit in her apartment 
and listen to music played in Kamps' apartment.  Chafee 
testified that the sound was similar.  Josef Rut, a Madison 
Police Officer, testified that he removed a Grand Funk album 
from Kamps' stereo.  Dillman, Kamps' boyfriend, testified that 
Armstrong had once played Grand Funk Survival for him.  Dillman 
said that a copy of the album was on Kamps' turntable when he 
accompanied investigators on a walk-through of her apartment 
several days after her murder.  Judy Marty, who worked at the 
Pipefitter and was at May's party on June 23, also testified 
                                                 
6 Laura Chafee's recollections were apparently refreshed 
through hypnosis.  However, this was not explored at trial by 
either the State or by Armstrong.   
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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that Armstrong had once told her that Grand Funk Survival was 
among his favorites and that he played the album for her.7   
b.  Riccie Orebia 
¶39 Riccie Orebia was the second witness the State 
presented to place Armstrong at Kamps' apartment at the time of 
the murder.8  Orebia lived at 120 W. Gorham and sat on his porch 
from shortly after 10:30 p.m. until almost 4 a.m. on the night 
of June 23 and during the early morning of June 24.  Orebia did 
not have a watch or clock available, but asked a passer-by for 
the time and was told it was about 11:45 p.m.   
¶40 Based on that time, Orebia estimated that at about 
12:30 p.m., he saw a white car with a black top pass on West 
Gorham and described the driver as having dark, shoulder-length 
hair.9  Orebia saw the car pass a second time and park out of 
view across the street.   
¶41 About five or ten minutes later, Orebia saw a person 
walk from the direction of the parking lot, cross the street, 
                                                 
7 At trial, Armstrong argued that Grand Funk Survival was a 
popular album liked and owned by many, including Armstrong, May, 
and Kamps.  As previously noted, Armstrong testified that he 
visited Kamps' apartment between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. Armstrong 
could not remember, however, whether he put a record on her 
stereo or just turned on her receiver. 
8 Riccie Orebia was living as a transvestite at the time of 
trial and was referred to in the feminine.  In the record from 
the postconviction motion hearing and in the court of appeals 
opinion, Orebia is identified in the masculine.  We will do the 
same.   
9 Armstrong testified that he bought a black-over-white 
Plymouth Satellite with the money he borrowed from Dillman.   
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
16 
 
and enter Kamps' apartment building.  Orebia described the 
person he observed as lean and very muscular.10  About five to 
ten minutes after that, the same man left the building and 
headed back the direction he had come.  Orebia testified that 
another five minutes passed, and the same person crossed the 
street, entered the building a second time, and then, after 
staying inside another five minutes, left again this time 
without wearing a shirt.  Orebia stated that five more minutes 
passed, and the same person ran across the street to the 
building a third time, stayed for about 20 minutes, and then 
left running very fast, "shining" as if he were oily.  Orebia 
then observed the black-over-white car speeding away from the 
parking lot. 
¶42 Thomas 
Anderson, 
another 
resident 
in 
Orebia's 
building, testified that on the afternoon of June 24, Orebia 
shared the following description of what he observed the night 
before: a muscular man with large arms and a flat stomach ran in 
and out of Kamps' building without a shirt on and that a black-
over-white vehicle sped away from the scene. 
i. Orebia's Hypnotically Enhanced Memory 
¶43 Several days after the murder and prior to any police 
identification procedure, Orebia underwent hypnosis to enhance 
his memory.11  Dr. Roger A. McKinley performed the hypnosis, and 
                                                 
10 Greg Kohlhardt, Armstrong's friend, testified that 
Armstrong was particularly strong and that he had once witnessed 
Armstrong rip a full deck of cards in half. 
11 In response to Armstrong's attack on Orebia's credibility 
with regard to his recantations and the effect of hypnosis, the 
No. 
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Detective Robert Lombardo of the Madison Police Department was 
present during the process to provide McKinley with information 
about important areas to cover.  McKinley testified that prior 
to hypnosis, Orebia gave him a description of the man Orebia 
observed, indicating that he had shoulder-length hair, a 
muscular build, and that he was running and sweating when he 
left the scene. 
¶44 McKinley testified that during the hypnotic session, 
Orebia described particular features of the suspect's face, 
including that the suspect had a long nose and bushy eyebrows.  
McKinley admitted that if Orebia would not have been able to 
make out the detail of Armstrong's face because of lighting 
conditions, then any description he gave of Armstrong's nose, 
eyebrows, and other features would have to be "confabulation."12 
¶45 Photographs of Armstrong and the vehicle were passed 
between Lombardo and McKinley during the hypnotic session, in 
front of Orebia.  McKinley testified that in his presence Orebia 
was never shown photographs of Armstrong.  However, Lombardo 
stated that Orebia saw photographs of Armstrong's vehicle when 
he handed them to McKinley during the session and that Orebia 
                                                                                                                                                             
State emphasized that Orebia's early description matched his 
trial testimony. 
 
12 Dr. 
Kihlstrom, Armstrong's 
hypnosis expert, defined 
"confabulation" as the creation or alteration of memories 
through such suggestion that the subject could wake from the 
hypnotic state and remember something that actually never 
occurred.   
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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had also seen photos of the car prior to hypnosis.  McKinley 
defended his hypnosis procedure with Orebia as non-suggestive.  
¶46 At trial, Armstrong was critical of the decision to 
subject Orebia to hypnosis. Lombardo argued that prior to 
hypnosis Orebia stated he would have been able to identify the 
person he had seen.13  
¶47 Armstrong presented the testimony of Dr. John F. 
Kihlstrom, a psychology professor who testified to the effects 
of hypnosis on memory.  Kihlstrom stated that hypnosis can be 
used to access memories that are not ordinarily memorable in the 
wakened state, but the hypnotist also runs an equal risk of 
confabulation.14  Kihlstrom stated that precautions to limit the 
introduction of inadvertent suggestion include keeping the 
hypnotist blind to the facts of the case, and to conduct the 
session out of the presence of an investigator who could suggest 
particular views. 
¶48 During his testimony, Kihlstrom presented excerpts 
from the videotaped session between McKinley and Orebia.  
Kihlstrom noted that Lombardo was in the room during the 
session, and that Orebia initially described the suspect as 
being five-feet, three inches to five-feet five-inches tall, but 
McKinley suggestively inquired about a height of six feet tall 
                                                 
13 Orebia also testified that he would have been able to 
make a positive identification without hypnosis and that the 
suggestion to undergo hypnosis was Lombardo's. 
14 See footnote 11 for Armstrong's expert's definition of 
confabulation. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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until Orebia agreed with that height.  Armstrong's attorney 
stated that Armstrong is six-feet, two inches tall.   
ii.  Orebia's Line-up Identification of Armstrong 
¶49 In the early morning hours of July 1, 1980, after 
Orebia had undergone hypnosis, the Madison Police Department 
arranged a line-up procedure at 134 West Gorham.  Armstrong's 
attorney at the time, Dennis Burke, instructed Armstrong not to 
cooperate and Armstrong complied with Burke's direction.  The 
police then returned Armstrong to jail.15  The line-up was 
rescheduled and held in the early morning hours of July 3, 1980.  
Again, 
Burke 
had 
instructed 
Armstrong 
not 
to 
cooperate.  
Detective Francis McCoy testified that at about 4:00 a.m. on 
July 3, he requested that Armstrong put on a shirt, a pair of 
jeans and a pair of cowboy boots to match the other line-up 
participants, but Armstrong refused.  
¶50 At the line up, two police officers walked with each 
of the five line-up participants across West Gorham, up to the 
porch of Kamps' apartment at 134 West Gorham, and then back the 
opposite direction.  Armstrong was the second person to go and 
he went limp as soon as he and the two officers accompanying him 
came into view of the observers standing on the porch of 120 
West Gorham.  Detective Roger Attoe and a patrolman accompanied 
Armstrong and dragged him up to the porch of Kamps' apartment 
and back again.  Detective Attoe testified that Armstrong lost 
                                                 
15 Armstrong was previously arrested in connection with 
Kamps' murder.   
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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his shoes along the way and made the statement, "better a little 
pain now than life imprisonment later."  The police took the 
three remaining participants along the same route.  
¶51 The five line-up participants were then each held by 
two police officers in front of a police van and Orebia was 
brought down to the parking lot to observe.  Orebia walked down 
to view the participants at a distance of about 25 feet.  The 
testimony of the State's witness, Detective McCoy, and the 
defense's 
witness, 
Attorney 
Burke, 
differ 
as 
to 
whether 
Armstrong was slumping or standing at full height at the time 
Orebia viewed the line-up in front of the van.  
¶52 At 
trial, 
Orebia 
testified 
that 
upon 
seeing 
Armstrong's head come into view during the first portion of the 
line-up, he gasped and mentioned to police officers standing 
with him that Armstrong was the person he saw leaving the murder 
scene. 
¶53 Orebia also stated that he recognized that the other 
line-up participants, including the first participant, were 
wearing shoulder-length wigs and mentioned that observation to 
the officers standing with him.  Orebia testified that the 
police told him that they had a man in custody who would be in 
the line-up, however, the police also instructed Orebia not to 
pick anyone unless he was sure.  Orebia admitted to telling 
Attorney Burke that as far as he was concerned, the line-up was 
fixed.  
 
 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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iii.  Orebia's Ability to Make Observations. 
¶54 Armstrong 
presented 
Dr. 
John 
Fournier, 
an 
ophthalmologist, to refute the ability of Orebia to make certain 
observations.  Fournier measured the distances and lighting 
conditions from Orebia's vantage point on the porch of 120 West 
Gorham to the route of the person he observed.  Fournier 
testified that night vision acuity is about 1/10 that of daytime 
vision, and that given the conditions under which Orebia made 
his observations——a distance of 100 to 134 feet and low 
illumination from the street lamps with glare in the foreground—
—it was not physically possible for a person in Orebia's 
position to make out facial features. 
iv.  Orebia's Recantation 
¶55 On November 5, 1980, Orebia gave a statement under 
oath at Armstrong's attorney's office (Attorney Edward Krueger), 
in the presence of a court reporter and Armstrong's attorney's 
investigator, 
Charles 
Lulling, 
in 
which 
Orebia 
directly 
contradicted his identification of Armstrong to the police.  In 
that statement, Orebia said that Armstrong absolutely could not 
have been the person he saw running in and out of 134 West 
Gorham.   
¶56 Orebia gave a second statement in Attorney Krueger's 
office on November 10, 1980, indicating that he had read through 
the statement he had given five days prior and that it was true 
and correct. 
¶57 However, at trial Orebia recanted his recantation and 
stated that he was positive that Armstrong was the person he saw 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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enter and leave Kamps' apartment building three times on the 
night of June 24, 1980.  Orebia testified that the statements he 
gave on November 5 and 10, 1980, were purposely untruthful, told 
as deliberate lies to undermine his credibility as a witness and 
to hopefully result in his withdrawal as a witness. 
2. Missing Money from Kamps' Apartment 
¶58 The State also theorized that after Armstrong murdered 
Kamps, he stole the $400 from Kamps that he had given her 
earlier in the evening.  In the early afternoon of June 24, 
1980, the State established that Armstrong deposited $315 in 
cash into his bank account.  In both the opening and closing 
statements, the State emphasized the $400 missing from Kamps' 
apartment and Armstrong's $315 cash deposit the following 
afternoon, asserting that both instances together were an 
indication of Armstrong's guilt. 
¶59 Karen Renzaglia, a bank teller at First Wisconsin West 
Towne Bank, was familiar with Armstrong and testified on behalf 
of the State.  She said that Armstrong did not usually deposit 
large bills or large amounts, but on June 24, 1980, he gave her 
at least one $100 bill and at least two $50 bills, along with 
five 20s, a ten and a five, and then a check.  While Armstrong 
was typically talkative, he was quiet that afternoon.16  
                                                 
16 Armstrong explained that if he was any less talkative in 
the drive-through, it was because he was chatting with his 
brother sitting in the passenger seat.  Renzaglia testified that 
she could not be sure if Armstrong was alone in the vehicle.  
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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¶60 The State presented testimony from several detectives 
that investigators were unable to find the $400 in cash that 
Armstrong gave to Kamps to partially satisfy his debt to Kamps' 
boyfriend, 
Dillman. 
 
Dean 
Fisher, 
a 
uniformed 
special 
investigator with the Madison Police Department testified that 
he and another officer looked in "just about any conceivable 
place we figured there would be money hidden.  Drawers, 
dressers, cabinets, anything," including clothing, in Kamps' 
apartment without finding the $400.  
¶61 James Meicher, a member of the Dane County Sheriff's 
Department, assisted Fisher with the scene.  Meicher testified 
that he found $136 in a pair of blue jeans that was located 
halfway from the top of a fairly large pile of clothing in 
Kamps' apartment, stating that the denominations were six $20 
bills, three five dollar bills, and a single one dollar bill.  
Dillman testified that on the morning of June 23, 1980, when 
Kamps left his home in McGregor, Iowa, he gave her $133 in cash—
—six 20's, a ten, and three ones.  The State attributed the $136 
found in Kamps' apartment to Dillman and argued that the $400 
investigators could not locate could be found in Armstrong's 
bank account and in the $61 on his person when he was taken into 
custody. 
¶62 Armstrong testified that his brother, Steve, gave him 
$300, in repayment for clothes Armstrong bought him and for 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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Steve's summer rent.17  At trial, Armstrong also explained that 
he was involved in a car accident in the middle of May and 
received an insurance check on June 20 for $600 from his 
insurance company.  He also sold the salvaged car to his 
roommate for another $250.  May testified at the John Doe 
hearing that she was with Armstrong when he cashed the insurance 
check and that she witnessed Armstrong receive large bills. 
3.  Physical Evidence at the Crime Scene 
¶63 The police collected hair specimens and semen samples 
from Kamps' apartment, as well as two fingerprints that were 
found on a bong.  The police also gathered what purported to be 
blood evidence from underneath Armstrong's fingernails and 
toenails.  The State argued to the jury that the physical 
evidence "conclusively" and "irrevocably" established Armstrong 
as the killer. 
a.  Fingerprints 
¶64 Josef Rut, a Madison Police Officer, testified that 
one of the two fingerprints on the bong matched Armstrong and 
that the source of the other print was unknown. 
                                                 
17 The State presented evidence to refute whether Steve had 
$300 to give to Armstrong.  On June 23, Armstrong spent $140 on 
clothes for Steve, who had lost his luggage on the bus ride to 
Madison.  Armstrong also admitted that several weeks before 
Steve arrived, Steve had asked Armstrong to send money to cover 
his travel costs. 
 
Additionally, with regard to Armstrong's other sources of 
money, Brent Goodman testified that Armstrong had to borrow cash 
from Kamps to purchase cocaine from Goodman on the night of June 
23, as Goodman heard Armstrong tell Kamps he was a little short.  
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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b.  Semen Stains on the Robe 
¶65 Coila J. Wegner, a microanalyst at the State Crime 
Laboratory Bureau, tested semen samples found on the bathrobe 
recovered from the floor next to Kamps' body.  Wegner testified 
that she found nine areas on the robe that tested positive for 
the presence of seminal material.  She tested the stain nearest 
the hem of the robe and determined that it was indicative of a 
type A secretor.  Wegner testified that both Armstrong and 
Dillman are type A secretors, as are 80 percent of the world's 
population. 
¶66 On 
cross-examination, 
Wegner 
testified 
that 
the 
location of at least seven of the nine seminal stains on the 
robe were consistent with a person having sexual intercourse and 
then sitting down while wearing the robe.  Wegner stated that 
these stains would remain on the robe until the garment was 
washed.  Dillman testified that Kamps' wore the robe often, 
usually in the morning before she got dressed and when she 
retired in the evening. 
¶67 The State argued the following about the semen 
evidence in closing argument:  
This 
picture 
shows 
Charise 
Kamps' 
robe.  
(Indicating.)  It's right next to the bed.  You heard 
testimony about that robe.  Jill Wegner performed 
tests on it and she looked for seminal material and 
she found it.  Found spots of it.  She did an analysis 
on that.  She was trying to determine the blood type 
of the person who put seminal fluids on the robe.  So, 
she analyzed it and found that it came from a person 
with type A blood who secreted his blood type in his 
body fluid, in his semen, in his saliva, in his tears.  
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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And she analyzed Ralph Armstrong's blood and his 
saliva.  Ralph Armstrong's a type A secreter. 
c.  Blood Evidence - Hemosticks 
¶68 Armstrong drove to the police station at about 2:15 
p.m. on the afternoon of June 24 to wait for May, who was asked 
to give a statement to police.  After arriving at the station, 
Armstrong was asked by Officer Hathoway to give a statement.  
After three interviews, at about 8:30 p.m., Armstrong signed 
consent forms for searches of his person, car, and apartment.  
Wegner took samples from Armstrong, including a standard head 
hair, pubic hair, a saliva sample, and tested Armstrong's hands 
and feet for traces of blood. 
¶69 Wegner 
testified 
that 
after 
running 
hemosticks——
plastic strips with treated absorbent pads that react to the 
presence of certain proteins found in blood——under the nails of 
Armstrong's fingers and toes and around the cuticles, she found 
a presumptive positive reaction on every finger and on several 
toes.18   
¶70 Wegner 
then 
scraped 
material 
from 
underneath 
Armstrong's thumbs and large toes, tested the samples, and 
determined that the material indicated blood of human origin.  
However, Wegner testified that she did not have sufficient 
material to run additional tests and could not identify from 
whom the blood came or how old it was.  In fact, Wegner agreed 
                                                 
18 Wegner also used hemosticks on Armstrong's watch, finding 
a presumptive positive for blood, but did not have sufficient 
amounts to determine the blood's origin. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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that in her experience, she had blood over one-year old produce 
positive hemostick results.   
¶71 Wegner agreed that the sensitivity of the hemosticks 
is one in 300,000 to trigger a presumptive positive.  She also 
agreed that the hemosticks simply react to particular chemicals 
within blood——iron, and plant peroxide——which are also found in 
other substances besides blood. 
¶72 Armstrong presented evidence supporting alternative 
explanations 
for 
the 
presence 
of 
human 
blood 
under 
his 
thumbnails and large toenails.  During the tests in the evening 
of June 24, 1980, in the presence of Detectives Roger Attoe and 
Rudolf Jergovic, and at trial, Armstrong stated that he had 
fallen and scraped his elbow and his knee the previous day in a 
footrace with his brother in the Arboretum.  Armstrong also 
explained that in the days preceding the tests he had sex and 
had taken showers with his fiancée, May, while she was 
experiencing her menstrual period and that she tended to bleed 
profusely. 
¶73 Indeed, Wegner testified that Armstrong showed her the 
scab on his knee when she conducted the tests, and Armstrong 
presented photographs of his scrapes in a trial exhibit.  
Wegner's testing also found blood on the inside of Armstrong's 
pants that was consistent with his scraped knee.  No other 
traces of blood were found on Armstrong's clothing or inside or 
outside of his boots. 
¶74 May's testimony corroborated Armstrong's explanation 
about his fall during the footrace and about Armstrong's and 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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May's physical intimacy during her menstrual period.  May 
specifically stated that she sought medical attention regarding 
her particularly heavy bleeding in the days prior to Kamps' 
murder.  May testified that she was bleeding heavily during a 
shower with Armstrong and that she later had surgery to correct 
her condition. 
¶75 Wegner also testified that she spent two full working 
days examining the interior of Armstrong's car for traces of 
blood.  Wegner tested for blood in the car's interior, including 
the trunk compartment, and focused on the steering wheel, 
gearshift lever, lock button on the driver's door, the floor, 
ceiling, and the front and rear seats.  Wegner found no traces 
of blood anywhere within the vehicle and testified that it did 
not appear as if there had been an attempt to clean the car. 
¶76 The State characterized Wegner's findings of trace 
amounts of blood underneath Armstrong's fingers and toenails in 
closing with the following: 
The defendant's fingers were tested down at the 
police station.  Jill Wegner ran the hemosticks around 
the cuticles and under the thumb and under the nails 
and around the cuticles of every finger and lo and 
behold there was blood under every fingernail, every 
single one.  That was Charise Kamps' blood.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
d.  Hair Evidence 
¶77 Wegner assisted Dr. Huntington with his postmortem 
examination of Kamps' body.  Wegner recovered pubic hair 
combings and head and pubic hair standards from Kamps for 
comparison.  
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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¶78 A 
number 
of 
hairs 
were 
recovered 
from 
Kamps' 
apartment, which Wegner compared to the standard head and pubic 
hairs from Armstrong, Kamps, and Dillman.  At trial, Wegner 
explained her process of comparison to the jury, elaborating on 
the characteristics of importance——the scales on the hair's 
surface, or cuticle; the form, color, and distribution of 
pigmentation; the consistency of the center, or medulla, of the 
hair; whether the hair has been shed, broken, or forcibly 
removed; any unusual characteristics, such as double medulla or 
cracked cuticles; and physical condition of the hair.   
¶79 Wegner 
testified 
that 
there 
are 
60 
to 
70 
characteristics she compares between hairs to determine whether 
two are "similar" or "consistent."  Only a majority is needed to 
determine two hairs are "consistent."  Wegner stated that in 
almost all instances——99.9 percent——one could not say through 
microscopic analysis that a specific hair came from a specific 
individual.  Wegner testified that hair analysis can include or 
exclude a person but could not identify them. 
¶80 Wegner testified that two head hairs and one pubic 
hair were removed from the bathrobe belt that was draped across 
Kamps' body.  One head hair was consistent and one was similar 
with Armstrong's hair.  The pubic hair removed from the belt was 
consistent with Kamps.  
¶81 From Kamps' bathroom sink, investigators recovered two 
head hairs and two head hair fragments.  Wegner testified that 
one head hair was similar with Kamps, two were consistent with 
Armstrong, and one could not be attributed to either Kamps or 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
30 
 
Armstrong.  Armstrong's counsel elicited testimony from May that 
May, Kamps, and Armstrong routinely shared the same hairbrushes, 
and May identified a hairbrush in the photograph of Kamps' 
bathroom counter as one of May's own. 
¶82 Wegner analyzed 13 hairs from blood and fecal-like 
matter collected at the scene, including five head hairs, four 
pubic hairs, three body hairs, and one animal hair.  Of those, 
Wegner found one head hair that was consistent with Armstrong's.  
All four of the pubic hairs were consistent with Kamps. 
¶83 From 
the 
fan 
in 
Kamps' 
apartment, 
investigators 
recovered four head hairs, one of which was similar to 
Armstrong's, and three were consistent with Kamps.  Wegner 
attributed one head hair recovered from Kamps' apartment to 
Dillman. 
¶84 From the robe itself, Wegner collected one head hair, 
which was consistent with Kamps, and three pubic hairs.  Two of 
the pubic hairs removed from the robe were consistent with 
Kamps, and one was not consistent with either Kamps or 
Armstrong. 
¶85 On the bedspread from Kamps apartment, Wegner found 
one head hair and nine pubic hairs.  Five pubic hairs were 
consistent with Kamps, and four pubic hairs, which had been 
"forcibly removed,"19 were inconsistent with both Kamps and 
Armstrong.  
                                                 
19 Wegner testified that one could determine whether a hair 
had been cut, shed, broken, or forcibly removed, based on the 
condition of the hair and presence or lack of a follicle. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
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¶86 Of the hairs collected in the vacuum sweeping around 
the bed,20 none were found to be consistent with Armstrong.  Ten 
pubic hairs, five of which were forcibly removed, in the vacuum 
sweepings were not attributable to either Kamps or Armstrong. 
¶87 Wegner agreed that in about half of all sexual assault 
cases pubic hair is transferred from the assailant to the victim 
or from the victim to the assailant.  Wegner stated that no 
pubic hairs collected from Kamps' apartment were determined to 
be consistent with Armstrong, and no hairs were found on 
Armstrong, or on articles seized in the search of Armstrong's 
apartment, that were consistent with Kamps. 
¶88 In closing arguments, the State argued that the two 
head hairs found on the bathrobe belt draped across Kamps' body 
(one of which Wegner determined to be consistent with and the 
other to be similar to Armstrong's hair), the two head hairs 
found in the sink (which were consistent with Armstrong's hair), 
the head hair found in the fan (which was similar to Armstrong's 
hair), and the head hair found in the fecal matter near Kamps' 
body (which was consistent with Armstrong's hair) proved that 
Armstrong murdered Kamps.  The State made the following 
statements characterizing the hair evidence: 
Now, you have an opportunity to see what that 
scene 
looked 
like 
right 
after 
Ralph 
Armstrong 
                                                 
20 Wegner testified that seven head hairs, six head hair 
fragments, 20 pubic hairs, two pubic hair fragments, seven 
animal hairs, and three body hairs were recovered from the 
vacuum sweeper. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
32 
 
committed the murder (indicating).21  That's what they 
saw on the bed (indicating).  Charise Kamps.  That was 
Charise Kamps.  I want you to look at the smear marks 
on the legs.  You can't see it real well from this 
angle (indicating).  You have heard Officer Fisher 
describe it.  You heard Jane May describe it.  It says 
it was like finger paints (indicating).22  So, Charise 
Kamps was found lying in blood and feces and on her 
bed with that robe on.  This is it (indicating) lying 
on top of Charise Kamps' body.  Two of the defendant's 
hairs were on this robe.  One of Charise Kamps' hairs 
right there across the body (indicating).  
 . . . . 
They looked for hairs.  Where did they find the 
hair in that apartment?  Found it in the bathroom 
sink.  Found it in, on the robe tie.  Found it in the 
fan, and they found it in a pile of feces on the floor 
underneath the body.  The defendant's hair in every 
place in that apartment was consistent with his 
killing Charise Kamps. 
The cabinet in the bathroom was open.  Right 
where the towels were kept were open.  The defendant 
had gone in there to clean up after he murdered 
Charise and his hair was in that sink.23  
                                                 
21 The indications the State made were to crime scene 
photographs depicting Kamps' body "nude, lying on her face, with 
blood smeared on her back, buttocks and thighs."  State v. 
Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 579, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983).  These 
are the same photographs this court concluded in Armstrong's 
direct appeal were properly sent back to the jury room to aid 
the jury in its assessment of the physical evidence produced at 
trial.  Id.  This court stated, "We conclude that the trial 
judge could reasonably decide that the photograph in question 
could assist the jury in their assessment of the physical 
evidence connecting the defendant to the crime and that the 
purpose was not merely to inflame or prejudice the jury."  Id. 
22 As noted, there was no indication the killer cleaned 
himself or herself at Kamps' apartment.  Further, Wegner found 
no traces of blood in Armstrong's car.  
23 As noted above, the police found no indication, and there 
was no evidence to establish, that the killer cleaned himself or 
herself at Kamps' apartment following the murder. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
33 
 
The defendant would want you to believe that hair 
kind of floats around and lands where it was and has a 
mind of its own.  There is no explanation for why that 
hair was found in every place that the defendant was 
except that he murdered Charise Kamps.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶89 In 
closing, 
Armstrong 
disputed 
the 
State's 
characterization of hair evidence at length.  Specifically, 
Armstrong argued that the sharing of hairbrushes among Kamps, 
May, and Armstrong provided an innocent explanation for why 
Armstrong's hair was found in Kamps' bathroom sink.  Armstrong 
noted that many forcibly removed pubic hairs were found at the 
scene, all of which were inconsistent with Armstrong's hair, and 
asserted that the hairs belong to the person who killed Kamps.  
¶90 The jury convicted Armstrong on all counts. 
C.  Procedural History and Newly Discovered Evidence. 
¶91 After 
the 
convictions, 
Armstrong 
filed 
a 
postconviction motion that requested a new trial, arguing:  (1) 
Orebia's 
identification 
of 
Armstrong 
should 
have 
been 
inadmissible because of the State's use of hypnosis to enhance 
his memory; (2) the line-up identification of Armstrong was 
unreliable and was therefore inadmissible; (3) the trial court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by allowing two color 
murder scene photographs of Kamps' to be sent to the jury room; 
and (4) the State breached its duty to disclose exculpatory 
evidence by failing to provide an accurate copy of a parking 
ticket received by the defendant.  See State v. Armstrong, 110 
Wis. 2d 555, 559-60, 329 N.W.2d 386 (1983).  This court 
affirmed.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals later denied 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
34 
 
Armstrong's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Armstrong v. 
Young, 34 F.3d 421  (7th Cir. 1994). 
¶92 On February 26, 1991, Armstrong moved for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence, specifically DNA evidence 
that excluded him as the source of semen on Kamps' robe.  The 
circuit court for Dane County, Honorable Michael B. Torphy, Jr., 
denied the motion, concluding that this evidence would not 
probably produce a different result on retrial.  See State v. 
Armstrong, No. 1992AP232-CR, unpublished slip op. at 2 (Wis. Ct. 
App. June 17, 1993).  The court of appeals affirmed.  Id. at 1.  
¶93 The court of appeals determined that the semen 
evidence was "an insignificant piece of circumstantial evidence 
linking Armstrong to Kamps and to her apartment."  Id. at 2.  
Further, the court of appeals stated: 
Of much greater importance to the state's case 
was the unshaken testimony of Kamps' neighbor who saw 
Armstrong acting strangely while going in and out of 
Kamps' apartment building during the hours when the 
crime occurred.  Armstrong attempted to present an 
alibi for that time that the state effectively 
demolished.  Other physical evidence, such as blood 
and hair samples found on his body and at the crime 
scene, also inculpated Armstrong.  Additionally, the 
day after the murder Armstrong made an unusually large 
deposit of $315 in cash in his bank account.  Kamps 
was known to have had $400 in her apartment the 
previous day that was never found.  Armstrong was 
aware of the cash because it was he who had paid it to 
her to satisfy a debt.  This evidence would likely 
produce 
a 
guilty 
verdict 
on 
retrial 
even 
with 
Armstrong's conclusive proof that he did not leave his 
semen in Kamps' apartment. 
Id. at 3.  
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
35 
 
¶94 On May 17, 2001, Armstrong filed another motion for a 
new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  This motion was 
based on three findings, which the State did not dispute.   
¶95 First, DNA testing conducted by Dr. Edward Blake 
excluded Armstrong, as well as Kamps' boyfriend, Dillman, as the 
source of the two hairs found on the robe belt.  As noted above, 
at trial, the State's forensic expert testified that using 
microscopic analysis, she concluded that one hair was "similar" 
and one "consistent" with Armstrong's hair.  Second, Blake found 
no traces of blood when examining a piece of cloth accompanying 
slides allegedly prepared from the hemostick swabs and scrapings 
from Armstrong's thumbs and large toes.  Third, Armstrong 
reasserted that the DNA analysis conducted in 1990 excluded 
Armstrong as the source of the semen on the Kamps' bathrobe. 
¶96 The only issue was whether this new evidence created a 
reasonable probability that the result would be different at a 
trial.  Armstrong claimed that it did, while the State 
contended: 
[O]ne of the things you do, when you analyze that is, 
what was the strength of the scientific evidence that 
we presented? 
Frankly——and 
you 
alluded 
to 
this 
earlier——
[Armstrong's counsel] did a superb job of cross-
examining Miss Wegner in deflating the significance of 
this evidence. 
He brought out the fact that 80 percent of the 
population is secretors.  It was clear, by the time 
she was done testifying, that the boyfriend or the 
defendant could have been contributors of the semen, 
but we didn't know——we couldn't say precisely who. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
36 
 
He cross-examined her and elicited that there 
were, I think, 54 pubic hairs on the bed spread 
forcibly extracted of unknown origin.   
I believe that there were 50 not consistent with 
either the victim or the defendant.  Five in the 
vacuum 
sweepings 
around 
the 
bed 
with 
the 
same 
characteristics.  One on the bathrobe itself. 
There was a bevy of hair that was testified to 
that would not have included either the defendant or 
the victim, but was attributable to no one that we 
knew of at that point.  
And [Armstrong's counsel] argued very effectively 
that the hair evidence was not that significant. 
. . . .  
 . . .  He talked about hair goes everywhere.  He 
introduced 
evidence 
concerning 
the 
sharing 
of 
hairbrushes between Charise Kamps, Jane May, who was 
the defendant's girlfriend, and the defendant.  I 
think two of those hairbrushes were at the scene.   
And, 
beyond, which 
we have 
the 
defendant's 
admission, that he was in the apartment on the night 
of the murder. 
So the fact that there's hair there, that is seen 
as consistent with the defendant, is no surprise.  
Now I think the Court correctly pointed out that 
the defendant's contention that these hairs are now——
that Miss Wegner's testimony, that the hairs were 
"consistent with" or "similar to" the defendant's, 
does not fall——it's clear that to the extent somebody 
wants you to draw the inference that those hairs are 
the defendant's, that you can't draw that inference 
anymore, but she stated what was known to her at the 
time, and there's no indication, that in fact, in the 
kind of characteristics she was looking at, that these 
hairs 
aren't 
"consistent" 
or 
"similar 
to" 
the 
defendant's.  They simply aren't the defendant's. 
¶97 In response, Armstrong argued the following: 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
37 
 
[Y]ou don't even need a crime scene expert to see, as 
the Court has already indicated, from your preface 
here, the critical importance of this; because it is 
the 
belt, 
that 
there's 
a 
good 
chance 
was 
the 
instrument of death, but beyond that, it's right over 
the body where the killer had to have been during the 
course of the murder, and the hairs are on top of it, 
and I can't think of a forensic expert, a crime scene 
expert, who would be the appropriate expert in this 
case, who wouldn't say that that was extremely 
probative, highly probative.  That it was deposited at 
or around the time of the murder. 
It's common sense.  It's what they would say, 
because it's in accord with the usual transfer of 
principles and, indeed, you know, who said that to the 
jury?  [The prosecuting attorney.]  He didn't just say 
indicative of guilt, as he said in his argument; he 
said 
conclusive, 
irrevocable, 
and 
he 
said 
it 
persuasively, 
notwithstanding 
our 
praise 
of 
our 
colleague, [Armstrong's trial counsel,] for pointing 
out there's an 80 percent chance the serology could 
have meant somebody else.  That wasn't it.   
What's important here?  The fact, very fact that 
you're isolating on, and that is these are very, very 
probative pieces of evidence.  The hairs right on top 
of the belt, right over the crime scene, with the 
semen below.  
A juror looking at this evidence, reasonably 
listening to what [the prosecuting attorney] said, 
what the rebuttal was, about timing and explanations 
for all these different kind of things, and Orebia's 
opportunity to observe, and everything else, what do 
people ordinarily do in a common sense way? 
They say show me the physical evidence that's 
most highly probative, that we can use one way or 
another to corroborate, and what the State said here, 
in 
very 
forceful 
terms, 
it's 
conclusive, 
it's 
irrevocable, the hair is there, obviously that's hair, 
and that there's a high likelihood, extraordinarily 
high likelihood left by the killer, because of where 
it's found, and the semen below, that obviously could 
not be demonstrated at the trial conclusively didn't 
come from Armstrong.  
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
38 
 
Both the hair and the semen, it's not going to be 
a question of opinion; it's a question of fact.  They 
are not from Ralph Armstrong. 
That was something that this jury, I'm sure, 
would rely on when they considered everything, as the 
tipping point, because it is so highly probative.  It 
is so critical to who committed this crime. 
¶98 The circuit court for Dane County, Honorable Patrick 
J. Fiedler, denied Armstrong's motion.  Regarding the hemostick 
tests and how they did not show the presence of any blood, the 
circuit court found that Wegner's analysis expended all of the 
blood found.  The court further concluded that Wegner's 
testimony regarding finding blood underneath Armstrong's nails 
was proper.   
¶99 Regarding the semen, the circuit court determined that 
this evidence was minor.  Moreover, the court observed that 
Armstrong established that 80 percent of the population are Type 
A secretors and that there was no way of knowing when the semen 
stains were placed on the robe.  Thus, the circuit court 
concluded, the jury was well-apprised of the weight to be given 
to the evidence.   
¶100 With 
regard 
to 
the 
hair 
evidence, 
the 
court 
acknowledged that the bulk of the scientific evidence concerned 
the hair analysis.  However, the new hair DNA tests did not 
sufficiently tip the scale in Armstrong's favor, the circuit 
court concluded.  The court was persuaded by the fact that the 
evidence was properly admitted given the science of the times 
and that the State made a fair presentation of the evidence in 
its opening and closing arguments.  Also, viewing the entirety 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
39 
 
of the State's presentation of its closing argument, the court 
concluded the hair evidence played but a small role in the 
State's case.  If the case were to be retried, the circuit court 
posited: 
I am satisfied the jury would also hear that it is 
impossible to ascertain with any precision when the 
hairs found their way on the belt.  That this would be 
consistent with other hairs, to which we cannot give 
ownership to, that are found in the apartment, 
including that of an animal, and that with the 
advancement in science over the course of the last 20 
years, while it may be that the hair analysis would 
certainly be different, I am satisfied, given the way 
that it would be dealt with in its entirety, that the 
result would remain the same. 
¶101 The court said that the most critical evidence was the 
time-distance 
testimony 
as 
it 
related 
to 
Armstrong's 
whereabouts.  Thus, the court concluded that Armstrong did not 
meet his burden of clear and convincing evidence that the newly 
discovered evidence created a reasonable probability that the 
outcome would be different on retrial. 
¶102 Armstrong appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
The court of appeals first determined that judicial estoppel did 
not lie against the State.  Armstrong, Nos. 2001AP2789-CR and 
2002AP2979-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶31.  Armstrong noted that 
at his trial in 1981, the State argued that the semen and hairs 
found on the victim's bathrobe unmistakably implicated Armstrong 
as the murderer.  Id., ¶30.  In light of the new DNA tests, the 
State now argued that neither the semen nor hair was connected 
to the murder and that innocuous reasons explain why that 
physical evidence was present.  Id.  Armstrong claimed the State 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
40 
 
should be judicially estopped from making this turnabout.  Id.  
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
disagreed, 
concluding 
that 
because 
Armstrong was asserting newly discovered evidence, the facts 
could not be the same.  Id., ¶31.  Therefore, the court of 
appeals reasoned, judicial estoppel did not lie against the 
State.  Id. 
¶103 The court of appeals next turned to Armstrong's newly 
discovered DNA tests.  Id., ¶¶32-34.  Initially, the court of 
appeals had to decide whether the newly discovered evidence test 
applied.  Id., ¶32.  Armstrong proposed that it did not and that 
a harmless error test did.  Id., ¶33.  Rather than seeking to 
add new and relevant evidence to the fold, Armstrong sought to 
remove a powerful inference of guilt from the hair and semen 
that is now known to be utterly irrelevant to establishing his 
guilt.  See id.  As it was now known that the evidence was 
erroneously introduced and used, Armstrong argued the State bore 
the burden of proving the error was harmless.  Id. 
¶104 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
the 
newly 
discovered evidence test was proper, but wrestled with this 
conclusion, writing: 
Which test we use is of potential significance.  
This is an extremely close case.  It is not possible 
to tell from this record whether Armstrong is innocent 
or guilty.  While we affirm the trial court's decision 
to use the newly discovered evidence test, the use of 
a harmless-error test would probably result in our 
reversing the trial court's order.  We agree with 
Armstrong's argument that innovations in science cast 
doubt 
on 
evidence 
admitted 
at 
trial. 
 
These 
advancements in technology, however, do not render the 
trial court's evidentiary rulings erroneous at the 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
41 
 
time they were made.  "A motion for a new trial based 
on newly-discovered evidence does not claim that there 
were errors in the conduct of the trial or deficiency 
in trial counsel's performance."  [State v. Brunton, 
203 Wis. 2d 195, 206-07, 552 N.W.2d 452 (Ct. App. 
1996).]  The distinction Armstrong makes between newly 
discovered evidence not presented to the jury and 
evidence later shown to be false is a rational 
distinction.  Additional evidence is conceptually 
different from evidence from which the State argued 
false conclusions.  But this distinction has not been 
recognized and we cannot escape the undisputed fact 
that Armstrong's DNA evidence is newly discovered.  It 
may be anomalous that we use a more strict test where 
the State benefits from false factual conclusions than 
where the State benefits from an erroneous evidentiary 
ruling.  But the test for newly discovered evidence is 
the test the supreme court and this court continue to 
use. 
Id., ¶34.   
¶105 The State disputed only whether Armstrong had "clearly 
and convincingly" proven that the new "'evidence create[s] a 
reasonable probability that the outcome would be different on 
retrial.'"  Id., ¶36 (quoting State v. Avery, 213 Wis. 2d 228, 
234, 570 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1997)).  The court of appeals 
observed that Avery determined that "'[i]f there is a reasonable 
probability that a jury would harbor a reasonable doubt as to 
guilt, it follows that there exists a reasonable probability of 
a different result.'"  Id. (quoting Avery, 213 Wis. 2d at 241).  
The court of appeals determined that "[its] job is not to 
determine how, if at all, the false evidence influenced the jury 
in the first trial."  Id., ¶37.  Instead, the proper inquiry, 
the court of appeals stated, "is whether a hypothetical, future 
jury at retrial would find Armstrong not guilty based on the 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
42 
 
totality of the evidence, including the new evidence obtained 
from advances in DNA testing."  Id.   
¶106 After reviewing the record, the court concluded that 
"[d]espite the closeness of this case, Armstrong has not 
persuaded us that the newly discovered evidence would reasonably 
cause a new jury to discredit the incriminating circumstantial 
evidence."  Id., ¶44.  Although "it is easily possible that a 
new jury could reach a different verdict," id., the court of 
appeals held that "Armstrong has not shown that the newly 
discovered 
evidence 
clearly 
and 
convincingly 
creates 
a 
reasonable probability that the outcome would be different on 
retrial."  Id., ¶44. 
¶107 Finally, the court of appeals questioned whether it 
had the authority to grant a new trial in the interests of 
justice because the case was not on direct appeal, but it 
decided that even if it had the power, it would decline to 
exercise it.  Id., ¶¶4, 46-47.  The court of appeals 
distinguished State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 153, 549 N.W.2d 
435 (1996), where this court concluded that the real controversy 
of identification was not fully tried when "the State used the 
hair evidence assertively and repetitively as affirmative proof 
of Hicks' guilt" and when later DNA tests excluded Hicks as the 
donor of the hair.  Id. at 48. The court of appeals stated: 
Here, the sole issue of the case was whether 
Armstrong murdered Kamps.  The jury considered eye 
witness testimony, along with other circumstantial 
evidence, and found that Armstrong murdered Kamps.  
The misleading hair and semen evidence did not "so 
cloud" or distract the jury from deliberating this 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
43 
 
issue.  Likewise, the DNA evidence excluding Dillman 
[the victim's boyfriend] as the source of the hair and 
semen is not important enough testimony bearing on the 
controversy to warrant a new trial.  We conclude that 
the real controversy was tried fully. 
Id., ¶50.   
¶108 Armstrong seeks review.   
II 
¶109 Armstrong raises multiple arguments as to why this 
court should reverse, one of which is that we should use our 
discretionary reversal power.  Armstrong requests that this 
court order a new trial in the interest of justice because the 
real controversy has not been fully tried.  We agree with 
Armstrong that the physical evidence now known to exclude 
Armstrong as the donor was used in a manner such that we cannot 
say with any degree of certainty that the real controversy has 
been fully tried.  
A 
 
¶110 At the outset, the State, citing State v. Allen, 159 
Wis. 2d 53, 464 N.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1990), disputes whether 
this court can order a new trial in the interests of justice, as 
Armstrong's current appeal is not a direct appeal, but rather is 
premised 
on 
an 
order 
denying 
him 
relief 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2001-02).  We conclude that even if Allen 
is correct, we have the inherent authority to order a new trial, 
even where a defendant's appeal is not direct. 
 
¶111 In Allen, 159 Wis. 2d at 55-56, the court of appeals 
concluded that it did not have statutory authority under 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35 (1989-90) to discretionarily reverse Allen's 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
44 
 
judgment of conviction because Allen's appeal was from an order 
denying him relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (1989-90).24  There, 
in a § 974.06 motion, Allen contended that he was denied due 
process because the jury instructions improperly shifted the 
burden of proof to him.  Id.  He conceded that he had not raised 
a contemporaneous objection at the jury instruction conference 
and thus lost the right to appellate review.  Id.  However, he 
asked the court of appeals to exercise its discretionary 
reversal 
power 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35 
and 
reverse 
his 
judgment of conviction.  Id. at 55-56. 
¶112 The court of appeals rejected Allen's request.  The 
court of appeals cited to its statutory power of discretionary 
                                                 
24 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
noted 
that 
its 
statutory 
discretionary reversal power stated: 
In an appeal to the court of appeals, if it 
appears from the record that the real controversy has 
not been fully tried, or that it is probable that 
justice has for any reason miscarried, the court may 
reverse 
the 
judgment 
or 
order 
appealed 
from, 
regardless of whether the proper motion or objection 
appears in the record and may direct the entry of the 
proper judgment or remit the case to the trial court 
for entry of the proper judgment or for a new trial, 
and direct the making of such amendments in the 
pleadings and the adoption of such procedure in that 
court, not inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are 
necessary to accomplish the ends of justice. 
 
State v. Allen, 159 Wis. 2d 53, 55 n.2, 464 N.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 
1990) (quoting Wis. Stat. § 752.35 (1979)) (emphasis added by 
court of appeals). 
 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
45 
 
reversal, which provided it "may reverse the judgment or order 
appealed from, . . . and may direct the entry of the proper 
judgment or remit the case to the trial court for entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial . . . ."  Id. at 55 n.2 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 752.35 (1989-90)).  However, the court of 
appeals stated that "[w]hen an appeal is taken from an 
unsuccessful collateral attack under [§ 974.06, Stats. (1989-
90)] against a judgment or order, that judgment or order is not 
before us."  Id. at 55.  Instead, "[a]ll that is before us is an 
order which refuses to vacate and set the judgment of conviction 
aside or to grant a new trial or to correct a sentence."  Id. at 
55-56.  Thus, the court of appeals concluded that its statutory 
discretionary reversal power did not permit it "to go behind a 
[§ 974.06] order to reach the judgment of conviction." Id. at 
56.   
 
¶113 While 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
and 
this 
court's 
discretionary reversal powers are coterminous, Vollmer v. Luety, 
156 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990), we need not decide 
whether our statutory power is constrained according to Allen 
because 
this 
court 
has 
"both 
inherent 
power and 
express 
statutory authority to reverse a judgment of conviction and 
remit a case for a new trial in the interest of justice, even 
where the circuit court has exercised its power to order or to 
deny a new trial."25  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 159; State v. 
                                                 
25 Allen's exceedingly narrow view of the broad grant of 
power of discretionary reversal is strange.  This court's 
statutory discretionary reversal power states: 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
46 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In an appeal in the supreme court, if it appears from 
the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record, 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for the entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice. 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06 (2003-04) (emphasis added). 
 
From the statute's face, this court can "reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from . . . and may direct the entry 
of the proper judgment or remit the case to the trial court for 
the entry of the proper judgment or for a new trial."  Id.  The 
first part of the sentence clearly says that this court can 
reverse an "order appealed from."  The court order appealed from 
here is the order that refused to vacate and set aside the 
original judgment of conviction and order a new trial.   
However, if an appeal is here from that order, it does not 
follow that this court is powerless to reverse the underlying 
judgment.  Note that the second part of the sentence provides 
the power "to remit the case to the trial court for entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial."  The fact that the word 
"order" is not in this language may not affect this court's 
power to reverse the underlying judgment.  That is, if an appeal 
is taken from an order, we may still retain the power to order a 
new trial or reach the underlying judgment via our discretionary 
reversal power.  
Nonetheless, even if our power to directly reach the 
underlying judgment is restricted because the word "order" is 
not contained in that sentence, then by the statute's language, 
this court may still properly reverse the order that denied 
Armstrong's motion for a new trial and remit the case for a new 
trial.  We can vacate the trial court's order denying the motion 
for new trial with directions for the circuit court to grant the 
motion.  In any event, we leave resolution of this issue for 
another day. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
47 
 
Penigar, 139 Wis. 2d 569, 577, 408 N.W.2d 28 (1987); Stivarius 
v. DiVall, 121 Wis. 2d 145, 153, 358 N.W.2d 530 (1984); State v. 
McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 369-70, 334 N.W.2d 903 (1983).   
¶114 Under both our inherent powers and our statutory 
authority, "This court approaches a request for a new trial with 
great caution.  We are reluctant to grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice, and thus we exercise our discretion only in 
exceptional cases."  Morden v. Continental AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶87, 
235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659 (citations omitted).   We 
conclude this is an exceptional case, and invoke our inherent 
powers and reverse the circuit court's order denying Armstrong's 
request for a new trial and remand this case with directions to 
grant Armstrong a new trial.26 
B 
¶115 As noted in Vollmer, this court has concluded that the 
real controversy was not fully tried where important evidence 
was erroneously excluded or where the evidence was admitted that 
should have been excluded.  Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 19-20.  As 
was the case in Hicks, this case implicates both of these 
                                                 
26 We will assume, but not decide, that our inherent 
authority 
applies 
the 
same 
criteria 
as 
our 
statutory 
discretionary reversal power.  Under the statutory discretionary 
reversal power, when the real controversy has not been fully 
tried, the court is not required to find a substantial 
probability of a different result on retrial.  Vollmer v. Luety, 
156 Wis. 2d 1, 19, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990). 
We also add that our discretionary reversal power, although 
to be invoked in exceptional circumstances, is plenary and not 
necessarily restrained by any other possible means of relief.  
Compare Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶¶164, 188. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
48 
 
situations.  See Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 161.  First, the jury did 
not hear important DNA evidence that bore on an important issue 
of the case.  Second, the State presented physical evidence as 
affirmative proof of guilt, an assertion that was inconsistent 
with what the later DNA analysis revealed.  See id.  Thus, the 
crucial issue of identification was clouded.  See id. 
¶116 Because of the striking similarities between the 
present case and Hicks, we set forth a detailed discussion of 
the Hicks case. 
C 
¶117 In Hicks, the defendant was convicted of burglary, 
robbery, and two counts of sexual assault.  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 
at 152.  The convictions stemmed from allegations that the 
defendant, who was a black man, entered the apartment of the 
victim, who was a white female, with intent to commit a felony, 
forced the victim into two separate acts of sexual intercourse, 
and then stole $10.  Id. at 153.   
¶118 At trial, the victim testified that while she was 
getting ready for work one morning, she heard a knock at her 
apartment door around 7:25 a.m.  Id. at 153-54.  She looked 
through the door's peephole and saw a black man.  Id. at 153.  
The victim said the man identified himself as her upstairs 
neighbor and asked to use her phone, as he said his phone was 
broken.  Id.  It was stipulated to that the defendant lived in 
the same apartment complex as the victim and that their 
apartments were within 90 seconds walking distance of each 
other.  Id. at 154. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
49 
 
¶119 The victim let the man into her apartment, showed him 
where the phone was, and then went to the bathroom to finish 
getting ready for work.  Id. at 153.  She then saw the man's 
face behind her in the mirror.  Id.  The man threw a scarf 
around her head and neck to blind her and then sexually 
assaulted her twice over the next 30 minutes.  Id. at 153-54.  
During the assault, the victim caught glimpses of the man's face 
and heard the man speak to her intermittently.  Id. at 154.  The 
victim stated the assailant left the apartment around 7:55 a.m.  
Id. 
¶120 Two days later, the victim identified the defendant as 
the assailant from an eight-man line-up.  Id.  After the 
defendant was arrested, the police seized a "Caucasian" head-
hair they found on the inside of the pants the defendant was 
wearing.  Id.  The pants were apparently not the same pants the 
victim said the defendant was wearing at the time of the 
assault.  Id. 
¶121 A "Negro" head hair was found on the victim's 
comforter.  In addition, 15 days after the assault, the police 
conducted a vacuum sweep of the victim's apartment for physical 
evidence and found four "Negro" pubic hairs.  Id.  The victim 
said only one other black person had been in her apartment 
before the assaults, a woman two years earlier who asked to 
borrow a blanket.  Id. at 155.   
¶122 Also recovered from the apartment were specimens of 
semen, blood, and saliva.  Id. at 155.  However, DNA analyses of 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
50 
 
the specimens were inconclusive due to insufficient sampling 
sizes.  Id. at 155.   
¶123 To 
bolster 
the 
victim's 
identification 
of 
the 
defendant as the assailant, the State presented testimony from a 
State Crime Lab analyst who conducted analyses of the various 
hairs that had been recovered.  Id. at 154.  The analyst opined 
that the physical characteristics of four of the five hairs 
found in the apartment were "consistent," while the other hair 
was "similar," with hairs obtained from the defendant.  Id. at 
154, 
166. 
 
The 
analyst 
also 
opined 
that 
the 
physical 
characteristics of the hair recovered from the defendant's pants 
was "consistent" with the victim's hair.  Id. at 154. The 
analyst agreed that unlike 
fingerprints, microscopic 
hair 
comparisons can never yield a definitive identification.  Id.  
Thus, she stated to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, 
that the hairs recovered "could have" come from the defendant 
and the victim.  Id. at 154-55.  The State claimed that all of 
the hairs came from the same person, the defendant.  Id. at 166.  
However, the State did not have DNA tests conducted on the 
hairs.  Id. at 155. 
¶124 The defendant's theory at trial was that he had never 
been in the victim's apartment.  Id. at 163.  The defendant's 
girlfriend, who was living with the defendant at the time, 
testified that on the day of the assaults, the defendant left 
the apartment around 6:40 a.m. to go to work.  Id. at 155.  
However, she stated he returned about 20 minutes later because 
he was not feeling well.  She stated she left the apartment at 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
51 
 
7:00 a.m. to go to Rockford, Illinois.  Id.  She also presented 
a telephone bill that showed a call made from their apartment at 
8:12 a.m. to her mother's house in Rockford.  The girlfriend 
testified that the defendant made this call.  Id.  The 
defendant's employer also testified that the defendant called in 
sick sometime between 7:00 a.m. and 7:30 a.m.  Id. 
¶125 In other words, the defendant could not otherwise 
account for his whereabouts during the time of the assault from 
7:25 a.m. until 7:55 a.m. 
¶126 The State used the hair evidence to show that it was 
"more likely that [the defendant] committed the crime."  Id. at 
167.  Indeed, at trial, the State characterized the evidence as 
"powerful" and "strong" evidence of guilt.  Id.  During the 
State's closing argument, in addition to relying on the victim's 
identification, the State relied heavily on the expert's opinion 
that the hairs found at the scene were consistent with or 
"matched" those provided by the defendant.  Id. at 167-69.  The 
State argued: 
Not only do we have a positive——as positive as it 
gets——identification by the victim of this crime of 
[the defendant]; but  . . . [i]n addition to that, 
there are the hair standards, the hair standards and 
unknowns, that were compared and found consistent. 
. . . .  
[Defense counsel] complains about 15 days!  The 
mighty and powerful Madison Police Department waits 15 
days to vacuum up the foot of [the victim's] bed!  
Well, let me remind you that one of those hair 
samples came from the comforter.  One of the hair 
samples, that matched his, that was consistent with 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
52 
 
his, came from the comforter that was seized that very 
morning. 
The other hair samples came from the vacuumings. 
And did it matter that they were 15 days later? 
There were still hairs there that were consistent 
with his!  They were still laying there.  . . .  Those 
hairs were still there, where they had been, where 
they had fallen when he was in that apartment.  They 
were still there, to be matched up with his. 
Id. 167-69 (emphasis added.) 
¶127 Regarding the consistency with the hair recovered from 
the defendant's leg, the State claimed: 
The other hairs.  Remember, the one that came out of 
his pants, that matched her head, was taken diligently 
when [the victim] was taken for an exam and her hair 
standards were pulled. 
And when he's taken into custody, those pants are 
taken into custody.  And, lo and behold, that's where 
her comparison, her hair comparison comes from! 
Id. at 169. 
 
¶128 The State best summarized its case with the following 
argument in closing: 
"Here's a guy that matches the description.  
Let's put him in a line-up." 
And, lo and behold, [the victim] says, "That's 
him.  I'm certain that's him." 
And, lo and behold, he lives right——a minute and 
a half away from her! 
And, lo and behold, his hair matches up. 
And her hair is in his clothes!  Her hair is in 
his clothes. 
Id. at 169-70 (emphasis added.) 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
53 
 
 
¶129 The jury convicted the defendant on all charges. 
 
¶130 Postconviction 
DNA 
testing, 
however, 
revealed 
inconclusive results as to the source of the hair found on the 
defendant's pants, the head hair obtained from the victim's 
comforter, and two of the pubic hairs obtained from the vacuum 
sweep.  Id. at 156.  Of the other two pubic hairs, one of them 
actually revealed the presence of two different DNA sources, 
with the other DNA source possibly stemming from blood or semen 
on the hair.  Id.  The defendant was excluded as the main source 
of DNA, but the DNA testing expert could not form a conclusion 
as to his connection with the other DNA source.  Id.  From DNA 
testing of the other pubic hair, which the expert agreed may 
also have contained two different DNA sources, the expert 
testified that the defendant was not the source of that pubic 
hair.  Id.  
 
¶131 The circuit court denied the defendant's motion for a 
new trial.  Id. at 157.  In an ineffective assistance of counsel 
analysis, the trial court concluded that it was not reasonably 
probable that the DNA testimony would result in a different 
verdict at a new trial.  Id. at 157.  The court of appeals 
reversed, 
concluding 
that 
the 
defendant's 
counsel 
was 
ineffective for failing to have the pubic hair subjected to DNA 
analysis.  Id. at 152.  This court affirmed, but on different 
grounds.  This court used its discretionary reversal powers 
because the real controversy was not fully tried.  Id. at 152-
53. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
54 
 
¶132 This court determined that the sole issue in the case 
was identification:  "whether [the defendant] was the man that 
entered [the victim's] apartment and assaulted her."  Id. at 
163.  However, the jury "did not have an opportunity to hear and 
evaluate evidence of DNA testing which excluded [the defendant] 
as the source of one of the four pubic hairs found at the 
scene."  Id.  Quite to the contrary, the State presented the 
hair consistency evidence as "affirmative proof of guilt," an 
assertion later discredited by the DNA tests.  Id. at 161, 163.  
Because the defendant's theory was that he had never been in the 
victim's apartment, and because of the inconclusiveness of the 
other DNA results, this court concluded the conclusive DNA test 
that excluded the defendant as the source of the hair "could 
have been a crucial, material piece of evidence."27  Id. at 164.   
¶133 That DNA tests were later done, however, did not of 
itself warrant discretionary 
reversal, 
this 
court stated.  
Instead, 
the 
determinative 
factor 
was 
"that 
the 
State 
assertively and repetitively used hair evidence throughout the 
course of the trial as affirmative proof of [the defendant's] 
guilt."  Id.  This court observed: 
The State went to great lengths to establish that the 
hairs found at the scene came from the assailant.  In 
opening and closing 
arguments, the State 
relied 
heavily upon its expert's opinion that the hairs found 
at the scene were consistent with known standards 
                                                 
27 This court recognized that the jury did not hear of the 
DNA evidence not because the trial court erroneously excluded 
it, but because the results did not yet exist.  State v. Hicks, 
202 Wis. 2d 150, 164, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).   
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
55 
 
provided by [the defendant].  At various times, the 
State referred to a "match" between the hairs, thus 
elevating and highlighting the importance of the hair 
evidence to the jury. 
Id. at 164. 
 
¶134 On appeal, the State attempted to downplay its use of 
the hair evidence at trial and went so far as to discount the 
value of the evidence.  Id. at 165, 166.  This court was not 
persuaded, stating "a review of the record leads us to the 
opposite conclusion.  The State used this hair evidence 
throughout the trial as affirmative proof of [the defendant's] 
guilt."  Id.  Indeed, this court noted that the State 
characterized the evidence as "strong" and "powerful" in the 
trial court.  Id. 166-67.   
¶135 After detailing the State's use of the evidence in its 
closing argument, this court concluded that "[b]ased on a review 
of the record, we simply cannot say with any degree of certainty 
that this hair evidence did not influence the verdict."  Id. at 
171.  In this court's view, the new DNA results did much more 
than merely "chip away" at the State's case, as the State's case 
leaned on the victim's identification and assertion that no 
black person had been in her apartment in two years.  Id.  This 
court concluded that "[t]o the extent that the jury may have had 
questions about the accuracy of [the victim's] identification, 
these questions were likely answered by the State's affirmative 
use of the hair evidence."  Id.  Therefore, this court held: 
[T]he real controversy was not fully tried inasmuch 
as: (1) the DNA evidence excluding [the defendant] as 
the donor of one of the hair specimens was relevant to 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
56 
 
the critical issue of identification; (2) the jury did 
not hear this evidence; and (3) instead, the State 
used the hair evidence assertively and repetitively as 
affirmative proof of [the defendant's] guilt. 
Id. at 172.28 
D 
¶136 The State attempts to distinguish the present case 
from Hicks on the following grounds:  (1) in Hicks, the 
defendant's appeal was on direct appeal shortly after the 
conviction, 
whereas 
Armstrong's 
appeal 
is 
premised 
on 
a 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2001-02) motion filed 20 years after his 
trial; (2) in Hicks, there was no reasonable explanation for the 
defendant's hair to be in the victim's apartment unless he was 
there, where here Armstrong admitted to being in Kamps' 
apartment; (3) in Hicks, the prosecutor focused repeatedly on 
the hair evidence as proof of guilt, whereas here the prosecutor 
argued the physical evidence only provided an inference of guilt 
while focusing on all the other evidence; and (4) in Hicks, the 
State did not  have an abundance of strong, circumstantial 
evidence of guilt, whereas here the State claims it does.  We 
are not persuaded. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Even a casual reading of Hicks reveals how the dissent's 
distilled discussion of that case does violence to its holding.  
Compare Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 172 (focusing on State's use of 
evidence assertively and repetitively as affirmative proof of 
the defendant's guilt), with Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶¶182-
86 (construing Hicks as focusing on the defendant's theory of 
the case and whether new evidence undermines his or her 
defense). 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
57 
 
1 
¶137 First, we have already concluded that we have inherent 
power to reverse a conviction and order a new trial in the 
interests of justice.  Further, the timing of Armstrong's appeal 
20 years after his conviction is not a meaningful distinction.  
It is true that Armstrong's trial occurred long before the 
advent of DNA testing.  However, we agree with Armstrong that it 
was only through technological happenstance that DNA testing was 
available to the defendant in Hicks on his direct appeal.  
2 
¶138 The State's second distinction escapes us.  It is true 
that the defendant in Hicks claimed he was never in the victim's 
apartment.  However, here, Armstrong claims he was not in Kamps' 
apartment at the time of her murder.  The State used the hair 
evidence to prove that Armstrong must have been in the apartment 
when Kamps was murdered.  That is, the State used the evidence 
in exactly the same manner as in Hicks, and, based on our 
discussion below, the evidence was just as damaging against 
Armstrong.29 
 
 
                                                 
29 The dissent argues that "finding hair consistent with 
Armstrong's did not undermine his defense."  Roggensack, J., 
dissenting, ¶186.  This point is absurd.  If Armstrong's defense 
was that he was not there when Kamps was murdered, the State's 
affirmative 
and 
repetitive 
use 
of 
the 
hair 
evidence 
as 
"conclusive" proof that Armstrong was the murderer absolutely 
undermined his defense. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
58 
 
3 
¶139 The State's third distinction is disingenuous.  At 
trial, the State did more than simply use the physical evidence 
to establish an inference of guilt; it used the physical 
evidence assertively and repetitively as affirmative proof of 
Armstrong's guilt.   
¶140 In closing argument, the State presented its case as 
boiling down to five points: 
All 
the 
evidence 
that 
we 
have 
presented 
demonstrates beyond any doubt that Ralph Armstrong was 
at Charise Kamps' apartment in the early morning hours 
of June 24, 1980, murdering and sexually assaulting 
her.  
. . . . 
 . . . We divided the evidence that has been presented 
at this trial into five areas.  The first area is 
times.  The defendant could not have been at Charise 
Kamps' at a time he said he was.  And the evidence 
exclusively shows that it was impossible.  
The second area of evidence deals with the 
testimony of Riccie Orebia and Laura Chafee at 134 
West Gorham and 120 West Gorham and who made certain 
observations to put Ralph Armstrong at Charise Kamps' 
apartment after midnight of June 24, 1980. 
There 
was 
physical 
evidence 
at 
the 
scene.  
Physical evidence to demonstrate conclusively that 
Ralph Armstrong is the person who murdered Charise 
Kamps. 
There 
is 
also 
physical 
evidence 
on 
Ralph 
Armstrong that ties him precisely with the scene of 
the crime.  That's the third area. 
The fourth is the defendant's interest in Charise 
Kamps testified to by a number of witnesses and 
grudgingly admitted by the defendant.  And evidence 
very clearly on the evening of June 23, 1980, he was 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
59 
 
with Jane May later in the evening when he went out 
with her and, finally, when he went over to her 
apartment and he conveniently murdered her. 
Finally, there is the issue of the defendant's 
credibility.  The defendant got up here and lied 
through his teeth.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
¶141 After arguing why Armstrong could not have been where 
he claimed he was at the time of Kamps' murder, the State 
focused on the physical evidence:   
You have heard a lot of description about the physical 
evidence that was found at the scene, of people 
describing the body, about items of evidence that were 
collected at the scene, hairs, blood samples, analyses 
conducted subsequent to that.  The police were called 
to the scene at about one o'clock on June 24, 1980.  
They go there.  The first thing they did was they took 
pictures because they wanted to preserve the scene and 
check the evidence afterwards. 
¶142 Regarding the hairs found on Kamps' robe, the State 
claimed: 
Now, you have an opportunity to see what that 
scene 
looked 
like 
right 
after 
Ralph 
Armstrong 
committed the murder (indicating).30  That's what they 
saw on the bed (indicating).  Charise Kamps.  That was 
Charise Kamps.  I want you to look at the smear marks 
on the legs.  You can't see it real well from this 
angle (indicating).  You have heard Officer Fisher 
describe it.  You heard Jane May describe it.  It says 
it was like finger paints (indicating).  So, Charise 
Kamps was found in blood and feces and on her bed with 
that robe on.  This is it (indicating) lying on top of 
Charise Kamps' body.  Two of the defendant's hairs 
were on this robe.  One of Charise Kamps' hairs right 
there across the body (indicating).  
                                                 
30 As noted above, the indications the State made were to 
crime scene photographs depicting Kamps' body "nude, lying on 
her face, with blood smeared on her back, buttocks and thighs."  
Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 579.   
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
60 
 
¶143 Regarding the findings of trace amounts of blood 
underneath Armstrong's thumbnails, the State maintained: 
The defendant's fingers were tested down at the 
police station.  Jill Wegner ran the hemosticks around 
the cuticles and under the thumb and under the nails 
and around the cuticles of every finger and lo and 
behold there was blood under every fingernail, every 
single one.  That was Charise Kamps' blood.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶144 Finally, regarding the semen on Kamps' robe, the State 
argued: 
This picture shows Charise Kamps' robe.  (Indicating.)  
It's right next to the bed.  You heard testimony about 
that robe.  Jill Wegner performed tests on it and she 
looked for seminal material and she found it.  Found 
spots of it.  She did an analysis on that.  She was 
trying to determine the blood type of the person who 
put seminal fluids on the robe.  So, she analyzed it 
and found that it came from a person with type A blood 
who secreted this blood type in his body fluid, in his 
semen, in his saliva, in his tears.  And she analyzed 
Ralph Armstrong's blood and saliva.  Ralph Armstrong's 
a type A secretor.  
¶145 In rebuttal, the State summed up the physical evidence 
as follows: 
The physical evidence on Ralph Armstrong at the scene 
ties him irrevocably to the murder of Charise Kamps.  
That Ralph Armstrong was in the apartment of Charise 
Kamps.  And that's that certainty that's not less 
important that the defendant is a liar.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶146 As in Hicks, the State now attempts to downplay the 
significance of its use of the physical evidence.31  See Hicks, 
                                                 
31 The State goes so far as to now argue: 
The new DNA evidence is, at most, proof that the two 
head hairs came from an unidentified, unknown person 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
61 
 
202 Wis. 2d at 165.  An examination of the State's closing 
argument, however, belies the State's assertion that it merely 
used the evidence to establish an "inference of guilt."  Indeed, 
in stark contrast to Hicks, where the State argued the hairs 
"matched" the defendants, the State in this case went further, 
much further.  The State argued that the physical evidence 
"conclusively" demonstrated that Armstrong was the murderer.  
The State argued that there was no explanation for the hair in 
Kamps' apartment except for the fact that he was the murderer.  
And the State argued that the blood found underneath Armstrong's 
nails was Kamps' blood.32   
4 
¶147 
Finally, 
the 
State 
argues 
it 
had 
a 
stronger 
circumstantial evidence case against Armstrong than it did 
against the defendant in Hicks, including eyewitness testimony 
that identified Armstrong as the man who entered and exited 
                                                                                                                                                             
at an unknown time and in an unknown manner.  Given 
the mobility of hair, the source of the two hairs may 
be a person who was never even in Kamps' apartment, or 
who 
was 
never 
there 
until 
after 
the 
body 
was 
discovered.  The new DNA evidence makes it probable 
that the hairs are simply not connected to the crimes 
at all. 
 
 
The State has put on the defense's hat, as this "mobility 
of hair" is precisely the argument that Armstrong presented to 
the jury in 1981.  The jury did not buy it.   
32 The only evidence the State presented that arguably 
established nothing more than an inference of guilt was the 
semen evidence, as the State noted it came from a type A 
secretor and then noted only that Armstrong was such a secretor. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
62 
 
Kamps' apartment at the crucial time, that Armstrong's alibi was 
demolished, that Armstrong made a deposit of money the day after 
Kamps' murder that was similar to an amount that was missing 
from Kamps' apartment, and that the jury evaluated Armstrong's 
credibility in light of the fact that he had six prior 
convictions.  In light of Hicks, we are not persuaded that this 
circumstantial evidence weighs heavily, if at all, in the 
State's favor. 
¶148 Regarding identifications, Orebia saw the perpetrator 
from some distance.  While Orebia vacillated on multiple 
occasions about what he saw (and although it appears that his 
recollection was later refreshed by hypnosis),33 he ultimately 
remained firm that Armstrong was the person he saw. 
¶149 By contrast, in Hicks, the victim saw the perpetrator 
up-close and in person.  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 154.  From our 
reading of Hicks, there is no indication that the victim wavered 
on her identification.  Nevertheless, this court still reversed 
because of the State's use of the hair evidence as affirmative 
proof of guilt.  This court wrote:  "To the extent that the jury 
may have had questions about the accuracy of [the victim's] 
identification, these questions were likely answered by the 
                                                 
33 In Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d at 565-76, which was 
Armstrong's direct appeal, this court established the framework 
for determining the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed 
recollection 
and 
concluded 
that 
the 
procedures 
used 
to 
hypnotically refresh Orebia's testimony were not impermissibly 
suggestive.  
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
63 
 
State's affirmative use of the hair evidence."  Id. at 171.  The 
same is true here. 
¶150 Regarding alibi evidence, Armstrong has crafted an 
intricate argument to show why the State's assertion that his 
alibi was impossible is wrong.  The State, of course, refutes 
this by noting the jury did not accept Armstrong's explanation 
of his whereabouts.  However, this does not militate against 
Armstrong. 
¶151 In Hicks, the defendant, who lived in the same 
apartment complex as the victim and within 90-seconds walking-
distance, could not prove he was somewhere else at the time of 
the assaults.  Id. at 154.  He had evidence to show that he was 
not in the victim's apartment both before and after the 
assaults, but he could not confirm where he was during the time 
of the assaults from 7:25 a.m. to 7:55 a.m.  See id. at 154-55, 
163.  Nevertheless, this court reversed because of the manner in 
which the State used the hair evidence as affirmative proof of 
guilt.  Id. at 172.  The State has done the same thing here. 
¶152 Last, with respect to the deposit of money Armstrong 
made the morning after the murder and how such a deposit was out 
of character for him, and with respect to the jury's assessment 
of 
Armstrong's 
credibility 
in 
light 
of 
his 
six 
prior 
convictions, we cannot place great weight on this propensity and 
character evidence.  Surely it adds to the State's case, but the 
evidence can hardly be categorized as strong circumstantial 
proof that removes this case from the realm of Hicks, in light 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
64 
 
of what we now know about how the hair, semen and blood evidence 
and how it was used by the State.   
¶153 
Therefore, 
we 
are 
not 
persuaded 
that 
the 
circumstantial evidence presented by the State distinguishes 
this case from Hicks.  
E 
¶154 Based on a review of the record, we simply cannot say 
with any degree of certainty that the physical evidence did not 
influence the jury's verdict.  See Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 171.  
The sole issue in the case was one of identification:  whether 
Orebia saw Armstrong enter Kamps' apartment at the time of 
Kamps' murder.  Compare id. at 163.  To bolster Orebia's 
identification, the State flaunted powerful conclusions before 
the jury that the physical evidence conclusively and irrevocably 
established Armstrong as the murderer.  However, the jury was 
presented conclusions based on evidence that are now found to be 
inconsistent with the facts.  The key hairs on the bathrobe belt 
that was draped over Kamps' body are not Armstrong's and the 
semen found on Kamps' robe is not Armstrong's.  In addition, 
there is no indication that any blood that may have been on the 
hemosticks was that of Kamps.34 
                                                 
34 By making this observation, we do not disregard any of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
findings. 
 
Contra 
Roggensack, 
J., 
dissenting, ¶173.  Instead, we simply recognize the limitation 
of this physical evidence:  Wegner herself testified that she 
could not determine the source of the human blood found 
underneath Armstrong's fingernails and big toenails, yet the 
State argued that it was in fact Kamps' blood. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
65 
 
¶155 The jury did not have an opportunity to hear and 
evaluate the DNA evidence that excludes Armstrong as the source 
of the hairs and the semen.  This is not evidence that tends to 
"chip away" at the accumulation of the State's evidence.  
Compare id. at 171.  The DNA evidence discredits one of the 
pivotal pieces of proof forming the very foundation of the 
State's case.  If the State's theory is correct, that the semen 
is from the murderer and that the murderer's hairs fell on the 
bathrobe belt that was draped across Kamps' body, then that 
person is not Armstrong.  To the extent the jury had doubts 
about 
Orebia's 
testimony 
or 
the 
inference 
to 
draw 
from 
Armstrong's deposit of money the day after Kamps' murder, those 
questions were likely answered by the State's use of the 
physical evidence.  See Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 171 ("To the 
extent that the jury may have had questions about the accuracy 
of [the victim's] identification, these questions were likely 
answered by the State's affirmative use of the hair evidence.").  
¶156 The DNA evidence now excludes Armstrong as the donor 
of certain physical evidence that was relevant to the critical 
issue of identity; the jury did not hear this evidence, and the 
State used the physical evidence assertively and repetitively as 
affirmative proof of Armstrong's guilt.  Because of the affinity 
between this case and Hicks, we reverse Armstrong's judgment of 
conviction in the interests of justice because the real 
controversy was not fully tried.  Therefore, we remand this 
matter for a new trial.   
 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
66 
 
III 
¶157   Both 
parties 
have 
briefed 
arguments 
concerning 
whether Armstrong is entitled to a new trial because the DNA 
results constitute newly discovered evidence.  Because our 
decision rests on the interests of justice, we decline to decide 
whether a new trial should be ordered based on newly discovered 
evidence.35  Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to clarify 
the proper test for analyzing newly discovered evidence.   
                                                 
35 We note that there are problems with the dissent's 
"mountain of other evidence incriminating Armstrong that is not 
affected in any way by the DNA test results at issue here."  
Roggensack, J., dissenting, ¶174.  Here are some of those 
problems. 
First, the dissent contends that the eyewitness testimony 
placed Armstrong and Armstrong's vehicle "at Kamps' apartment at 
the time of the murder."  Id.  Actually, the best the State 
could determine was that Kamps was murdered anywhere from 
midnight to 3:00 a.m.  Thus, the evidence placed Armstrong and 
his vehicle at Kamps' apartment building around, not at, the 
time of the murder. 
Second, the dissent contends that there was "human blood 
around all 10 of Armstrong's fingers and on his toes . . . ."  
Id.  Actually, Wegner's hemostick test results were presumptive 
positives for the presence of blood.  From this alone, Wegner 
could not determine whether the blood was human or whether it 
was even blood in the first instance.  See I.B.3.c. infra.  
Wegner did take scrapings from underneath Armstrong's thumbs and 
big toes and did determine that there was human blood underneath 
both thumbnails and big toes.  She did not conduct scrapings 
under the rest of Armstrong's fingers or toes.   
Third, the dissent contends that Armstrong's failure to 
call his brother at trial as a material witness to corroborate 
Armstrong's testimony weighs against Armstrong.  Id.  This is 
little more than burden shifting, and the dissent has not 
explained how this is in anyway proper. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
67 
 
¶158 Quoting State v. Avery, 213 Wis. 2d 228, 234, 570 
N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals below set forth 
the standard as follows: 
Under [a newly discovered evidence] test, Armstrong 
would have to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, 
all of the following: 
(1) The evidence must have come to the moving party's 
knowledge after a trial; (2) the moving party must not 
have been negligent in seeking to discover it; (3) the 
evidence must be material to the issue; (4) the 
testimony must not be merely cumulative to the 
testimony which was introduced at trial; and (5) it 
must be reasonably probable that a different result 
would be reached on a new trial. 
Armstrong, Nos. 2001AP2789-CR and 2002AP2979-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶32.   
 
¶159 An issue in Avery was whether the clear and convincing 
standard applies to the reasonable probability factor.  The 
defendant agreed that the standard of proof in a newly 
discovered evidence claim was "clear and convincing evidence," 
but argued that the standard of proof was irrelevant because the 
facts were undisputed in his case.  Avery, 213 Wis. 2d at 235.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Fourth, the dissent states that Armstrong's brother did not 
file an affidavit with Armstrong's current motion for a new 
trial.  Id.  However, the dissent does not explain how this 
affects whether a different result would occur at a new trial.  
While such an affidavit, if filed, would be relevant to support 
his motion, the converse is not true.  The statement is 
irrelevant.   
Properly viewing the evidence, the dissent's "mountain of 
evidence" may be little more than a molehill.  See id.  However, 
we do not reach the issue of whether there is a reasonable 
probability that a different result would be reached at a new 
trial. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
68 
 
The court of appeals rejected this argument, stating that "[a] 
fact finder does not operate in a vacuum.  Rather, the fact 
finder necessarily needs a standard by which to measure whether 
certain facts warrant the relief sought."  Id. at 236.  Thus, 
the court of appeals concluded that a defendant must establish 
by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable 
probability that a different result would be reached on a new 
trial.   
¶160 Amicus for the Innocence Project contends the Avery 
court erred by imposing a double burden on defendants, first 
that there is a reasonable probability of a different result and 
then second, that that there is clear and convincing evidence of 
that reasonable probability.  The Innocence Project argues that 
the "reasonable probability" factor is itself a burden of 
proof.36  We agree. 
¶161 In State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 473, 561 N.W.2d 
707 (1997), this court specifically attached the burden of proof 
of clear and convincing evidence only on the first four criteria 
in the newly discovered evidence.  This court stated: 
First, 
the 
defendant 
must 
prove, 
by 
clear 
and 
convincing evidence, that:  (1) the evidence was 
discovered after conviction; (2) the defendant was not 
negligent in seeking evidence; (3) the evidence is 
material to an issue in the case; and (4) the evidence 
is not merely cumulative.  If the defendant proves 
these four criteria by clear and convincing evidence, 
the circuit court must determine whether a reasonable 
                                                 
36 Alternatively, Armstrong argues that we should at least 
lower the burden to a preponderance of the evidence. 
No. 
2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979   
 
69 
 
probability exists that a different result would be 
reached in a trial. 
¶162 In other words, there need only be a reasonable 
probability that a different result would be reached in a trial.  
There are no gradations of a reasonable probability; either 
there is one, or there is not.  Therefore, we withdraw language 
from 
Avery 
that 
concludes 
the 
reasonable 
probability 
determination must be made by clear and convincing evidence. 
IV 
¶163 In sum, we conclude that Armstrong is entitled to a 
new trial 
in 
the 
interest 
of justice because 
the 
real 
controversy was not fully tried..37  Therefore, we reverse the 
court of appeals' decision and remand this case to the circuit 
court with directions to grant his motion to vacate the judgment 
of conviction and to order  a new trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
                                                 
37 In Hicks, this court observed that "[t]here is no 
question 
that 
the 
State 
very 
capably 
and 
professionally 
presented its case to the jury."  Id. at 172.  We agree with 
that sentiment here.  Nevertheless, the interests of justice now 
require a new trial. 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶164 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   The 
majority 
opinion 
reverses 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision 
affirming the circuit court's order denying Ralph Armstrong's 
motion to vacate his judgment of conviction, and it then 
concludes that Armstrong is entitled to a new trial.  Majority 
op., ¶2.  The majority opinion does so based on its conclusion 
that the results of DNA tests that have been recently completed 
prove the real controversy was not fully tried.  Majority op., 
¶2.  However, the actual issue in this case is whether the DNA 
evidence, which is newly discovered, creates a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome at a new trial.  See State v. 
McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 474, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997).  The 
majority opinion is able to side-step our well-established 
jurisprudence for newly discovered evidence and conclude that 
Armstrong is entitled to a new trial only by avoiding the 
crucial analysis of whether this DNA evidence creates a 
reasonable probability that a different result would be reached 
at a new trial.  Because I conclude that this evidence does not 
create a reasonable probability that a different result would be 
reached at a new trial and because I conclude that the real 
controversy, whether Armstrong raped and murdered Charise Kamps, 
was fully tried in 1981, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority opinion.  Accordingly, I would affirm the court of 
appeals. 
 
 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  DISCUSSION 
¶165 Armstrong's 
claim 
of 
newly 
discovered 
evidence 
sufficient to vacate his conviction is based on recent DNA 
testing of two hairs found in Kamps' apartment and semen stains 
found on Kamps' bathrobe showing neither the hair nor the semen 
is his.  DNA testing was not available in 1981 when Armstrong 
was tried.  
A. 
Newly Discovered Evidence 
¶166 In order to set aside a judgment of conviction, newly 
discovered evidence must be sufficient to establish that a 
defendant's conviction was a manifest injustice.  State v. 
Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 241, 255, 471 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1991).  
The test for determining whether the proffered evidence is 
"newly discovered" and whether it meets the test of "manifest 
injustice" has been explained many times.  The court of appeals 
clearly set out the criteria a defendant must meet in order to 
overturn a conviction based on an allegation of newly discovered 
evidence as follows: 
(1) The evidence must have come to the moving party's 
knowledge after a trial; (2) the moving party must not 
have been negligent in seeking to discover it; (3) the 
evidence must be material to the issue; (4) the 
testimony must not be merely cumulative to the 
testimony which was introduced at trial; and (5) it 
must be reasonably probable that a different result 
would be reached on a new trial. 
State v. Avery, 213 Wis. 2d 228, 234, 570 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 
1997) (quotation omitted).  If a defendant proves the first four 
criteria set out above by clear and convincing evidence, then 
"the 
circuit 
court 
must 
determine 
whether 
a 
reasonable 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
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probability exists that a different result would be reached" at 
a new trial.  McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 473.  The first four 
criteria are questions of fact that are not contested here.  See 
id. at 473. 
¶167 The fifth criterion sets up a question of law, i.e., 
whether the facts of the case meet the legal standard of a 
reasonable probability of a different outcome at a new trial.38  
Id.  In assessing this legal standard, we must determine whether 
there is a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at all 
the relevant evidence in regard to whether the defendant did or 
did not commit the crime, would have reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt.  See id. at 474.  This examination requires 
an assessment of all the evidence to determine what effect, if 
any, the newly discovered evidence would be reasonably probable 
to have on a jury's verdict at a new trial.  See id. 
¶168 Part of the new evidence proffered by Armstrong is DNA 
testing that shows that two head hairs found on the belt of 
Kamps' bathrobe did not come from him.  One of these hairs had 
previously been characterized as "consistent" with Armstrong's 
hair and the other had been characterized as "similar" to 
Armstrong's hair.  At trial, Coila J. Wegner, the State's 
                                                 
38 I would apply the newly discovered evidence test as it 
repeatedly has been stated, rather than change it to omit the 
requirement that the fifth criterion be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence, as the majority opinion does.  Majority 
op., ¶162.  However, I do not address it further, and I do not 
require the fifth criterion to be met by clear and convincing 
evidence in this dissent, because it appears that this change in 
the law was inserted, albeit without any explanation, into State 
v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 474, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997). 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
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expert, testified about her examination of eight exhibits that 
contained hair samples taken from Kamps' apartment.  She 
explained that the tests she ran could exclude donors of the 
hair, but not identify them.  When she described the hair from 
eight exhibits, she explained that for 36 of the hairs she could 
not exclude Kamps as the donor, but she could exclude Armstrong 
as the donor.  For six of the hairs,39 she could not exclude 
Armstrong as the donor, but she could exclude Kamps.  Only two 
of the six hairs for which Armstrong could not be excluded as 
the donor were subjected to DNA testing.  For thirteen hairs, 
both Kamps and Armstrong were excluded as donors, and nine of 
the hairs she examined were animal hairs.  A review of Wegner's 
testimony about what she said she could determine relative to 
the donors of the hair samples is helpful to a consideration of 
how important this newly discovered evidence is in the context 
of all the evidence presented at trial.  Wegner testified as 
follows:   
Q: And what was the result of that comparison? 
A: The 
head 
hair 
was 
consistent 
in 
microscopic 
characteristics with the standard head hair from 
Miss Kamps.  It was not consistent in microscopic 
characteristics with the hair from Mr. Armstrong. 
Q: Now let me understand something.  With hair 
analysis when you say it was consistent, you can 
say that testimony or she cannot be eliminated as 
the source of the hair? 
                                                 
39 Hairs for which Armstrong could not be excluded as the 
donor were found in Exhibit 27 (hair taken from the belt of 
Kamps' bathrobe), Exhibit 29 (hair taken from the bathroom sink) 
and Exhibit 43 (hair taken from blood and fecal-like material 
near Kamps' body). 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
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A: That is correct. 
Q: And when you say it is not consistent, you are 
saying that that person or that standard is 
eliminated as a source of the hair? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: So this is a hair or examination which only 
excludes a person, it never includes a person? 
A: It could include them, but not identify them. 
Q: It can't identify them? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Is there any——any method whatsoever similar to 
fingerprints for identifying a given hair with a 
given person where you can say with a certainty or 
to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that 
this hair came from this person? 
A: In ninety-nine point nine (99.9%) percent of the 
time you could not say that a specific hair came 
from a specific individual. 
Wegner was very clear about the probative value of the hair 
analyses she completed.   
¶169 In closing argument, the district attorney argued that 
the hairs for which Armstrong could not be excluded as a donor 
were his and tied him to Kamps' murder.  Armstrong's attorney 
argued that the hair analyses did not identify Armstrong as the 
donor of the hairs, only that he could not be excluded as the 
donor.  He also argued that Armstrong admitted to being in 
Kamps' apartment earlier in the evening of her murder and 
because hairs move freely from place to place, the presence of 
those hairs did not show Armstrong committed the crimes.  He 
said that the movement of hair was demonstrated by the presence 
of animal hairs in Kamps' apartment when she never had a pet.  
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶170 Armstrong also proffered DNA testing of semen samples 
from Kamps' bathrobe that showed they came from Brian Dillman, 
Kamps' fiancé, as newly discovered evidence.  At trial, Wegner 
testified that a semen stain that was found on Kamps' bathrobe 
was made by a Type-A secretor.  She testified that both 
Armstrong and Dillman are Type-A secretors.  Wegner also 
testified that 80% of the population are Type-A secretors.  In 
closing argument, the district attorney said that the semen 
stains were made by a Type-A secretor and that Armstrong was a 
Type-A secretor.  Armstrong's attorney carefully explained that 
Dillman and Kamps were lovers, and because Dillman was a Type-A 
secretor, the semen was his.  He also repeated Wegner's 
testimony that 80% of the population are Type-A secretors.  
Therefore, the jury could not have given this evidence much 
weight in reaching its verdict that Armstrong raped and murdered 
Kamps.   
¶171 There is another fact that bears on the testimony 
about semen.  Kamps was raped anally and vaginally with a hard 
object.  Her injuries were not caused by being raped with a body 
part.  Therefore, it is understandable that semen from the 
perpetrator of this crime was not left at the crime scene. 
¶172 It is important to keep in mind that the DNA evidence 
Armstrong proffers is not exonerating evidence as DNA evidence 
can sometimes be.  Instead, this evidence affects only one part 
of one of the five categories of evidence the State presented to 
the jury.  And, it does not affect Armstrong's defense:  that he 
was at Kamps' apartment, but not at the time of her murder.  
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
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Physical evidence that was presented to the jury included 
Armstrong's fingerprint on a bong in Kamps' apartment;40 six 
hairs; possible connection to the semen stains on Kamps' 
bathrobe; human blood around all 10 of Armstrong's fingers and 
around his toes, except for his two little toes, and blood on 
his watch; blood smearing on Kamps' body and face, as though she 
had been "finger-painted" with her own blood;41 Armstrong's 
deposit of $315 later on the morning of the murder, when the 
$400 Armstrong had paid to Kamps was missing from her apartment 
after the murder; and the lack of a forced entry into Kamps' 
apartment the night of the murder.  The DNA test results do not 
affect most of this physical evidence.   
¶173 The majority opinion implies that the testimony of Dr. 
Edward Blake that he could not detect blood when he examined a 
piece of cloth and accompanying slides prepared from the 
scrapings from Armstrong's thumbs and great toes undermines 
Wegner's testimony that she detected human blood around all 
Armstrong's fingers and around most of his toes.  Majority op., 
¶95.  However, the circuit court found that Blake's testimony in 
this regard was not credible.  This is a finding that we are not 
free to disregard.  Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 147 Wis. 2d 
                                                 
40 This is the only fingerprint of Armstrong's found in the 
apartment, which is curious given that Armstrong testified that 
he drank a half glass of orange juice, a bottle of beer and 
played music on Kamps' turntable when he was there. 
41 Ms. Wegner testified that she did not check the bathroom 
for blood because she was not asked to do so.  Therefore, the 
jury heard no testimony about whether the murderer cleaned up in 
Kamps' bathroom before leaving the scene. 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
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500, 512, 434 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1988) (the determination of a 
witness's credibility is for the circuit court).  Therefore, the 
blood evidence potentially linking Armstrong to the murder has 
not been refuted by the defense, and remains part of the State's 
case.   
¶174 In refusing to apply the newly discovered evidence 
test, the majority opinion improperly ignores the mountain of 
other evidence incriminating Armstrong that is not affected in 
any way by the DNA test results at issue here:  (1) the time 
evidence presented by the State, showing that Armstrong could 
not have been at Kamps' apartment between 9:10 and 9:30 p.m. as 
he testified at trial that he was; (2) Armstrong's fingerprint 
in Kamps' apartment; (3) the eyewitness testimony that placed 
Armstrong's car at Kamps' apartment at the time of the murder; 
(4) the eyewitness testimony placing Armstrong at Kamps' 
apartment at the time of the murder; (5) the missing $400 from 
Kamps' apartment and Armstrong's deposit of $315 the next day;42 
(6) the lack of a forced entry into Kamps' apartment, suggesting 
she voluntarily let in her murderer; (7) the romantic interest 
Armstrong had in Kamps and her rebuff of that interest; (8) the 
human blood around all 10 of Armstrong's fingers and on his toes 
                                                 
42 Armstrong did not mention his trip to the bank, but 
instead said that after leaving May's apartment, he drove around 
in Brittingham and James Madison parks looking for a source of 
cocaine before going to Kamps' apartment.  He told police that 
he got some cocaine from a "well-dressed" African-American male 
who was about "five-seven, five nine" with a medium "afro" and 
"a mustache that turns into sideburns."  Armstrong changed this 
detailed story after he learned that law enforcement knew that 
he had deposited $315 the morning Kamps' body was discovered. 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
9 
 
and the blood on his watch; (9) the parking ticket showing 
Armstrong's car was not parked near the back door of May's 
apartment where he said he entered; (10) the testimony that 
someone was heard entering May's apartment building between 3:30 
and 5:00 the morning Kamps was killed; (11) the repetitive lies 
Armstrong told to law enforcement and to the jury; (12) the lack 
of trial testimony by Armstrong's brother, who could have 
corroborated Armstrong's testimony that his brother was the 
source of the $315 Armstrong deposited and who could have 
verified part of Armstrong's alibi; and (13) the lack of an 
affidavit from Armstrong's brother for these motions.  The 
majority opinion errs in its utter disregard of this mountain of 
evidence.  
¶175 In regard to the issue of time, the majority opinion 
repeats Armstrong's mantra that he left his apartment in 
Fitchburg at 9:10 p.m., drove to May's apartment in Madison and 
dropped her off, drove to Kamps' apartment, spent about 15 
minutes at Kamps' apartment drinking a beer, drinking some 
orange juice and playing music and then drove to Brent Goodman's 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
10 
 
house to buy cocaine, arriving there by 9:30 p.m.43  Majority 
op., ¶¶22-24.  Armstrong had to place himself at Kamps' between 
9:10 and his arrival at Goodman's at 9:30, if he was to cover 
for any evidence he may have left at Kamps' apartment at the 
time of the murder.  However, it is not possible to do all 
Armstrong says he did in the 20 minutes between when he left his 
apartment and arrived at Goodman's.  I agree with the circuit 
court that if the jury had believed Armstrong's time evidence, 
he would not have been convicted.  
¶176 The majority opinion also ignores how the immediate 
and unwavering description of a car that matched Armstrong's car 
as the vehicle seen at Kamps' apartment at the time of the 
murder, strengthens the eyewitness's identification of Armstrong 
                                                 
43 In his brief to this court, Armstrong includes "Mapquest" 
printouts showing driving times, which he implies, show that he 
could have done all that he alleges before going to Brent 
Goodman's at 9:30 p.m.  The State properly objected to this 
presentation as evidence never presented at trial.  However, 
even using the times from Mapquest, it is not possible to do 
what Armstrong said he did because from his apartment to Kamps' 
address, Mapquest lists 12 minutes; from Kamps' to May's one 
minute and from Kamps' to Goodman's 10 minutes, a total of 23 
minutes.  This is not the route that Armstrong testified he 
drove, in regard to his stop at Kamps' before he went to 
Goodman's, because he said he first dropped May off at her 
apartment and changed from his car to Kamps' car.  However, even 
adding the numbers from Mapquest shows a lapse of 23 minutes 
after he left his apartment in Fitchburg, when he had only 20 
minutes available before Goodman testified he was at his house.  
The 23 minutes from Mapquest also includes no time for getting 
people in and out of the car, changing cars and going into 
Kamps' apartment for 15 minutes as Armstrong said he did, coming 
out, starting up the car and driving to Goodman's.  The 23 
minutes also allocates nothing for all the traffic lights along 
the routes shown on the Mapquest printouts.  However you slice 
it, Armstrong could not have done all that he said he did in 20 
minutes.   
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
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as the man who drove that car and went in and out of Kamps' 
apartment three times after midnight on the night Kamps was 
murdered.  The majority opinion diminishes Riccie Orebia's 
identification of Armstrong as the man Orebia saw because Orebia 
was a reluctant witness and had been hypnotized.  However, 
Orebia gave an accurate description of Armstrong's car long 
before being hypnotized.  That description never changed. 
¶177 The jury's decision reflects its consideration of all 
five categories44 of evidence the State presented.  It cannot be 
ignored that if the jury had believed Armstrong's trial 
testimony about his being at Kamps' earlier in the evening, 
while also believing the two strands of hair were his, the jury 
would have acquitted him.  This is so because the jury was 
offered an explanation of how Armstrong's hairs could have 
attached to the bathrobe belt.  As the crime scene photo shows, 
the bathrobe belt was placed over Kamps after she was murdered 
and smeared with her own blood.  Therefore, that belt must have 
been elsewhere in the apartment, where it could easily have 
picked up the hairs that were found on it, prior to its being 
placed on Kamps' body.  If the jury had believed Armstrong, they 
would 
have 
believed 
the 
explanation 
Armstrong's 
attorney 
provided.  However, the jury saw Armstrong testify.  The jury 
did not believe him.  By refusing to apply the newly discovered 
                                                 
44 In order to summarize the evidence the State presented, 
the district attorney suggested it represented five categories:  
time evidence, testimonial evidence of Riccie Orebia and Laura 
Chafee, physical evidence, testimonial evidence of Armstrong's 
interest in Kamps which she rebuffed and Armstrong's lies to 
police and on the witness stand.  
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
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evidence test, the majority opinion ignores that crucial 
credibility determination.  
¶178 The 
State 
presented 
an 
extraordinary 
amount 
of 
evidence, from a fingerprint to eyewitness identification of 
both Armstrong and his car, to prove that Armstrong was Kamps' 
murderer.  The question the evidence presented at trial was, 
"Given the evidence before you, did Armstrong murder Kamps?"  
Taking away a piece of evidence from all that was presented in 
this case does not change the ultimate question.  Armstrong 
testified that he was in Kamps' apartment.  His defense was that 
he was not there when she was killed.  He said he was with his 
brother for part of the time and with May for part of it.  His 
brother did not testify and May could not say when he returned 
to her apartment.  Evidence that would show he could not have 
been at Kamps' apartment when the eyewitness said he was would 
be significant in regard to the results at a new trial.  The DNA 
evidence presented here does not affect the time testimony and 
the eyewitness testimony of both Armstrong's car and of him, 
which were critical to his conviction. 
¶179 The newly discovered evidence offered here is much 
different in its impact from the evidence that was presented in 
State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).45  In 
Hicks, the question was whether Hicks had ever been in the 
                                                 
45 State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996), 
was not argued as a newly discovered evidence case.  Nor could 
it have been, because DNA tests were available and known to 
Hicks' attorney, who chose not to do them for what he believed 
were tactical reasons. 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
13 
 
victim's apartment.  There were only two pieces of evidence 
tying him to that apartment at trial, one of which was later 
disproved.  The impact of the evidence in Hicks is a far cry 
from the impact of the DNA evidence Armstrong proffers because 
of the overwhelming amount of evidence that was presented to the 
jury in Armstrong's case.  Accordingly, I conclude that the 
newly discovered DNA evidence does not make it reasonably 
probable that a different result would be reached. 
B. 
Real Controversy Not Fully Tried 
¶180 Instead of applying the newly discovered evidence test 
as I have above, a test that Armstrong fails to pass, the 
majority reverses Armstrong's judgment of conviction on the 
theory that the real controversy was not fully tried.  Majority 
op., ¶156.  In doing so, the majority opinion misapplies our 
precedent and equates the idea of the "matter not being fully 
tried" with new scientific identification procedures in a way 
that threatens to reopen convictions statewide every time a 
scientific improvement occurs, regardless of the lack of a 
probable effect on the issues underlying the jury's verdict.  
Because the facts of this case do not meet the criteria 
necessary to reversing a conviction under our long-standing 
jurisprudence regarding the real controversy being fully tried, 
I would not reverse the court of appeals on this basis. 
¶181 The ability of this court to set aside a conviction 
through the use of our discretionary-reversal powers has often 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
14 
 
been discussed.46  In State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 424 
N.W.2d 672 (1988), we identified two avenues for its use:  when 
the real controversy has not been fully tried and when there has 
been a miscarriage of justice.  Id. at 400.  The proper analysis 
of 
a 
motion 
to 
set 
aside 
a 
conviction 
based 
on 
our 
discretionary-reversal 
powers 
was 
carefully 
laid 
out 
in 
Schumacher and many cases since then. 
[U]nder 
the 
"real 
controversy 
not 
fully 
tried" 
category, two different situations were included:  (1) 
Either the jury was not given an opportunity to hear 
important testimony that bore on an important issue in 
the case, or (2) the jury had before it testimony or 
evidence which had been improperly admitted, and this 
material obscured a crucial issue and prevented the 
real controversy from being fully tried. 
Under the second prong of the discretionary-
reversal statute, the "miscarriage of justice" prong, 
the case law made clear that, in order to grant a 
discretionary reversal under this prong, the court 
would 
have 
to 
conclude 
that 
there 
would 
be 
a 
substantial probability that a different result would 
be likely on retrial.   
Id. at 400-01 (citing State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 741, 370 
N.W.2d 745 (1985)).  As we explained in Schumacher and have 
repeated many times since, "this broad discretionary-review 
power . . . is . . . to be used sparingly, and only in 
exceptional circumstances."  Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d at 407 
(citing State v. Cuyler, 110 Wis. 2d 133, 141, 327 N.W.2d 662 
(1983)). 
                                                 
46 Our discretionary power to reverse judgments arises from 
both statute and common law.  Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 
13, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
15 
 
¶182 The majority opinion seems to rely on a belief that 
the 
hair 
testimony 
"obscured 
a 
crucial 
issue," 
thereby 
preventing 
the 
real 
controversy 
from 
being 
fully 
tried.  
Majority op., ¶115.  Its discussion focuses mainly on Hicks.  
Majority op., ¶¶117-35.  The majority opinion bases its decision 
on what it characterizes as the "striking similarities" between 
Hicks and the present case.  Majority op., ¶116.   
¶183 I do not agree that Hicks and the present case are 
similar.  Instead, as I explain below, the two cases are 
dissimilar in all respects that are material to whether the real 
controversy was fully tried.  In Hicks, the issue the majority 
opinion turned upon was whether Hicks' claim that he had never 
been in the victim's apartment was fully tried due to Hicks' 
attorney choosing not to pursue DNA testing of hairs recovered 
there.  Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 163-64.   
¶184 Hicks' presence in the victim's apartment, or the lack 
of his presence, was pivotal to the case because Hicks is an 
African-American and the victim said that no other African-
American male had been in her apartment except the perpetrator 
of the crime.  Id. at 155.  Five African-American hairs were 
found in the victim's apartment.  It was the State's theory at 
trial that all five hairs came from the same person:  the 
perpetrator.  Id. at 165.  It was Hicks' defense "that he had 
never been in [the victim's] apartment and could not have been 
the source of hairs that were found there."  Id. at 163.  
Although DNA testing was available at the time of Hicks' trial, 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
16 
 
his trial counsel chose not to have the hair evidence DNA 
tested.  Id. at 155.   
¶185 After Hicks' conviction, DNA analysis was performed on 
the hair specimens.  The results obtained from some of the 
specimens were inconclusive, but on two specimens, Hicks was 
ruled out as the source of the DNA.  Id. at 156.  Therefore, the 
following syllogism was set up:  if all the hair came from the 
same person, the hairs were from an African-American, and the 
only African-American who had been in the victim's apartment was 
the perpetrator of the crime, then Hicks could not have been the 
perpetrator.  Accordingly, we concluded that the issue of 
whether Hicks had been in the victim's apartment was not fully 
tried and Hicks was entitled to a new trial.  Id. at 171-72. 
¶186 In the present case, as in Hicks, hair recovered from 
the crime scene was inculpatory of the defendant at the time of 
trial, and some of it was later proved not to be the 
defendant's.  However, there the similarity to Hicks ends.  
Armstrong said he had been in Kamps' apartment.  Therefore, 
finding hair consistent with Armstrong's did not undermine his 
defense.  The time evidence and the eyewitness identifications 
of his car and of him at Kamps' apartment during the time when 
she was murdered undermined his defense extensively.   
¶187 There is another point that bears mentioning with 
regard to the DNA evidence at issue here.  What was presented at 
trial 
was 
not 
"false 
evidence," 
a 
characterization 
of 
Armstrong's that the court of appeals picked up.  State v. 
Armstrong, Nos. 2001AP2789 and 2002AP2979, unpublished slip op., 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
17 
 
¶37 (Wis. Ct. App. May 27, 2004).  Wegner's testimony about her 
analyses of the hair samples explained that Armstrong could not 
be excluded as the donor of six hairs by the tests that she ran.  
She also explained that those tests could not identify a hair's 
donor.  There was nothing "false" about this testimony.  It 
accurately described the capability of the tests she conducted 
relative to the hairs analyzed.  That there are more accurate 
DNA tests now available does not change the capability of 
Wegner's tests or cause her testimony about them to become 
"false." 
¶188 In the present case, the majority opinion states, 
"First the jury did not hear important DNA evidence that bore on 
an important issue of the case."  Majority op., ¶115.  Of course 
the jury did not hear the DNA evidence.  It did not exist at the 
time of the trial.  Likewise, the expert testimony regarding the 
hairs found in Kamps' apartment was properly admitted at the 
time of the trial.  It strains the meaning of "fully tried" to 
suggest that Armstrong's case was not fully tried because the 
scientific bases for physical evidence set forth in the trial 
were only state-of-the-art at the time of the trial, but not 
state-of-the-art at present.  Using the majority's standard, the 
real controversy can never be fully tried because scientific 
advances in evidence gathering and analysis will continue to 
improve.  The majority opinion's explanation of how the DNA 
evidence fits into the theory that the real controversy was not 
fully tried shows the fallacy in using that test and is an 
additional reason why the proper avenue to handle cases where 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
18 
 
new evidence is obtained is, as I have explained above, the 
newly discovered evidence test.  The newly discovered evidence 
test is best suited to analyzing the new evidence in the context 
of its impact on all the other evidence presented at trial.  
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, I reject the use of 
discretionary reversal under the rubric of the real controversy 
not fully tried. 
II.  CONCLUSION 
¶189 Accordingly, because I conclude that the DNA evidence 
does not create a reasonable probability that a different result 
would be reached at a new trial, and because I conclude that the 
real controversy, whether Armstrong raped and murdered Charise 
Kamps, was fully tried in 1981, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority opinion. 
¶190 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2001AP2789 & 2002AP2979.pdr 
 
 
 
1