Case Title: Gibb v. Spiker

Citation: 718 P.2d 1076

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 1986-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
718 P.2d 1076 (1986) Douglas GIBB, Chief of Police, Honolulu Police Department, City and County of Honolulu, Appellant-Appellee, v. John SPIKER, Appellee-Appellant, and Patricia Salsbury and the Civil Service Commission, City and County of Honolulu, Appellees-Appellees. No. 10792. Supreme Court of Hawaii. May 8, 1986. *1077 Lowell K.Y. Chun-Hoon, King, Nakamura & Chun-Hoon, Honolulu, for appellee-appellant. Charlotte J. Duarte, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Honolulu, for appellees. Before LUM, C.J., PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ., and HEEN, Intermediate Court of Appeals Associate Judge, in place of NAKAMURA, J., recused. LUM, Chief Justice. This is an appeal by Appellee-Appellant John Spiker ("Spiker") who appeals from a circuit court order reversing the decision of the Civil Service Commission ("Commission"). Spiker is a former Honolulu Police Department ("HPD") officer who resigned but sought reinstatement, and the Commission had ordered Appellant-Appellee HPD Chief Douglas Gibb ("Gibb") to rehire Spiker. Spiker contends the trial court erred by 1) not dismissing Gibb's appeal for lack of standing; and 2) ruling the Commission lacked the authority to order reinstatement. We disagree and affirm the trial court's order for the reasons stated below. The facts are not disputed. Spiker joined HPD on September 16, 1976. Spiker resigned on May 16, 1980 with the approval of then-HPD Chief Francis Keala. Spiker then worked full-time at his precious metals business. On February 7, 1983, Spiker applied for re-employment at HPD. He was twice rejected and appealed to the Commission. In an October 24, 1983 hearing, former Acting HPD Chief Harold Falk testified Spiker was rejected because Spiker and his company were under investigation for possible illegal activities though there was no hard evidence of any crimes, the reliability of information implicating Spiker was unknown, and Spiker had twice assisted HPD in arresting persons making illegal precious metals transactions. Spiker denied involvement in any crime. HPD Captain Ersel Kilburn, then-acting personnel officer, stated HPD had an unwritten policy that no person under criminal investigation would be hired. The Commission found the sole reason Spiker was not rehired was because of the continuing investigation into unproven allegations of criminal conduct and held this reason was an insufficient basis to deny reemployment. The Commission ordered Spiker rehired and ruled Hawaii Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 76-48 and Revised Charter of the City and County of Honolulu ("RCH") art. VI, Ch. 3 § 6-308 controlled: (Record before the Commission at 224-25). Gibb refused to rehire Spiker and appealed to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit. The Commission and Spiker then asserted Gibb had no standing under HRS § 91-14(a) to appeal the Commission's order.[1] The trial court reversed the Commission's order ruling, inter alia, 1) HRS § 76-48 applied to the State of Hawaii and not the City and County of Honolulu; 2) HRS § 76-48 and RCH § 6-308 apply to appeals for wrongly demoted, suspended, or fired employees and was thus inapplicable to Spiker, an ex-employee who had resigned but was seeking reinstatement; and 3) the Commission exceeded its authority by ordering reinstatement. Spiker then appealed to this court. To have standing to make an administrative appeal under HRS § 91-14(a), Gibb 1) must be an aggrieved person; and 2) must have participated in the contested case before the administrative agency.[2]Jordan v. Hamada, 64 Haw. 451, 643 P.2d 73 (1982). Spiker argues Gibb is not a "person" but an "agency" who cannot appeal from the Commission's ruling. We conclude otherwise. HRS § 91-1 (1976) reads in relevant part: (Emphasis added). Gibb is thus an agency if he engages in rulemaking that affects private rights of or procedures available to the public. Here, there is no contention Gibb has promulgated or enforced any such rules. The decision not to rehire Spiker based on an informal, unwritten policy against hiring anyone under investigation for possible criminal wrongdoing was a purely internal management function not within the scope *1079 of HRS § 91-1(4). See Waugh v. University of Hawaii, 63 Haw. 117, 621 P.2d 957 (1981); Holdman v. Olim, 59 Haw. 346, 581 P.2d 1164 (1978); Doe v. Chang, 58 Haw. 94, 564 P.2d 1271 (1977). Gibb, therefore, was not an agency based on the definitions provided in HRS § 91-1 and possessed standing under HRS § 91-14(a) to appeal the Commission's order. Spiker argues In re Eric G., 65 Haw. 219, 649 P.2d 1140 (1982), is dispositive. Eric G. held the Department of Education was an agency, not an aggrieved "person," and lacked standing to appeal an adverse administrative hearings ruling under HRS § 91-14(a) (though DOE was entitled to appeal under a separate controlling federal act). We noted there: "A plain English reading of 91-1 ... HRS discloses a clear and understandable legislative directive that agencies are not `persons' with standing to appeal administrative action." Id. at 224, 649 P.2d at 1143. Eric G. is clearly distinguishable from the present case. The Department of Education is undisputedly an agency within the meaning of HRS § 91-1(4). Unlike Gibb, the Department of Education promulgates rules subject to the requirements of the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act (HRS Chapter 91) that affect private rights of or procedures available to the public. Eric G. is not applicable to this case. This law reads: Spiker urges this court to accept the Commission's ruling that HRS § 76-48 applies to the City and County of Honolulu because the Commission's interpretation of the civil service laws it enforces should be accorded a presumption of validity. See e.g., Treloar v. Swinerton and Walberg Co., 65 Haw. 415, 653 P.2d 420 (1982); Waikiki Resort Hotel v. City and County of Honolulu, 63 Haw. 222, 624 P.2d 1353 (1981). An agency's statutory interpretation, though, cannot contradict the clear statutory language, State v. Dillingham Corp., 60 Haw. 393, 591 P.2d 1049 (1979), that is consistent with the legislative purpose. Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 685 P.2d 794 (1984); see Agsalud v. Blalack, 67 Haw. 588, 699 P.2d 17 (1985). Based on the plain and unambiguous statutory directive that Civil Service Laws Part II (which contains HRS § 76-48) pertains only to the State of Hawaii, the trial court correctly held the Commission's ruling that HRS § 76-48 controlled was erroneous. This provision reads: Because Spiker had not been suspended, demoted, or dismissed, a literal reading indicates *1080 RCH § 6-308 does not apply to his case. Unless the literal construction would produce an absurd and unjust result clearly inconsistent with the civil service provisions' purposes, this court must enforce RCH § 6-308 as read. See Sherman v. Sawyer, 63 Haw. 55, 621 P.2d 346 (1980); In re Tax Appeal of Palk, 56 Haw. 492, 542 P.2d 361 (1975). Notwithstanding the Commission's expertise in this area, see Treloar, Waikiki Resort Hotel, it is evident the drafters of RCH § 6-308 did not intend RCH § 6-308 to apply to the present case where a former employee who resigned seeks reinstatement. RCH § 6-308 does not apply to Spiker. The Commission, therefore, lacked the authority to order Spiker's reinstatement, and the trial court committed no error by reversing the Commission's decision. The Commission's decision was clearly ultra vires. Affirmed. [1] The Commission was a party to the appeal to the trial court but took a separate appeal from the trial court ruling. The Commission's appeal to this court was dismissed when no opening brief was filed. [2] HRS § 91-14 states: Judicial review of contested cases. (a) Any person aggrieved by a final decision and order in a contested case or by a preliminary ruling of the nature that deferral of review pending entry of a subsequent final decision would deprive appellant of adequate relief is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter; but nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent resort to other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo, including the right of trial by jury, provided by law.