Case Title: RW v. State ex rel. Laramie County Dept. of Public Assistance and Social Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-88-11

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
RW v. State ex rel. Laramie County Dept. of Public Assistance and Social Services1989 WY 1766 P.2d 555Case Number: C-88-11Decided: 01/03/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
RW AND LW, 
NATURAL PARENTS OF KW, APPELLANTS (RESPONDENTS),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, EX REL. LARAMIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, APPELLEE (PETITIONER). No. 
C-88-11

 
 
Petition 
for review from the District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 
 
Marvin J. 
Johnson of Edwards & Johnson, Cheyenne, for appellants.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Richard E. Dixon, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY, 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellants, RW and LW 
seek review of the district court's order terminating their parental rights to 
their natural daughter KW.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellants were 
convicted in federal district court of second degree murder and aiding and 
abetting second degree murder. On appeal, their convictions were affirmed by the 
circuit court of appeals. The termination of their parental rights to KW was 
premised on their incarceration for these convictions in accordance with W.S. 
14-2-309(a)(iv).1

 
 

[¶4.]     The family of RW and 
LW, in addition to KW, included three other children from a previous marriage of 
LW. One of these three children was a female child who we identify as JM. In 
July of 1986, JM became ill, complaining of a stomachache, vomiting and 
diarrhea. LW took JM to doctors on two occasions in late July and early August. 
She was diagnosed as having acute gastroenteritis. One of these doctors 
telephoned LW during the second week of August to inquire about JM's health, and 
LW reported her to be "fine." At this time, a friend of LW's was repeatedly 
urging her to seek additional medical attention because of the child's 
continuing illness. Although LW and her family had free access to emergency 
medical care at a federal facility seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day, 
LW told the friend that she was waiting to receive money from the child's 
natural father before taking her for medical treatment.

 
 

[¶5.]     A friend of the 
appellants testified that both LW and RW hit JM in the face and pulled her hair 
after dinner in the appellants' home during the weekend of August 30, 1986. This 
punishment was administered because JM was so ill that she was unable to eat or 
ask to be excused from the table. This friend related that RW then put JM in the 
backyard with the dog and later immersed her in a bathtub of cold water. On 
September 1, 1986, RW reported to a friend that JM was dead. This friend 
notified emergency medical personnel; and when they arrived, they found LW 
clutching JM whose abdomen was unusually distended.

 
 

[¶6.]     An autopsy revealed 
that the cause of death was sepsis, a blood poisoning condition caused by 
peritonitis from a perforated bowel. Testimony at trial established that JM had 
been struck in the stomach by RW with sufficient force to have caused the 
perforation. A forensic pathologist testified that the perforated bowel caused 
JM's death; that JM had suffered a severe neck injury within two days prior to 
her death; and that fifty-nine bruises and abrasions were found on JM's 
body.

 
 

[¶7.]     KW was born on June 5, 
1986, and was just over two months of age at the time JM was killed. KW was 
placed in foster care by order entered October 4, 1986, and neither parent has 
had any contact with the child since. LW voluntarily relinquished her parental 
rights to the other two children, who were returned to their natural 
father.

 
 

[¶8.]     On January 29, 1987, 
verdicts of guilty were returned against RW and LW for the crimes noted above. 
RW was sentenced to confinement for eighty years, with a minimum of twenty-five 
years to be served. LW was sentenced to confinement for eighty years with a 
minimum of twenty years to be served. This action to terminate the appellants' 
parental rights to KW was initiated on May 29, 1987. The convictions of RW and 
LW were affirmed by the federal circuit court of appeals on February 17, 1988. 
At the time this action was initiated, both parents were incarcerated on their 
convictions. The matter came before the court for trial April 14, 1988. On April 
21, 1988, an order was entered by the district court terminating the appellants' 
parental rights to KW.

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellants present the 
following issues:

 
 
1. That the 
State had a burden to prove termination was the least intrusive means to 
accomplish the State's interest in protecting KW and that the district court 
erred in finding that, (a) the State had no burden of proof in that regard; and 
(b) that even though the State had no such   
burden, the evidence presented established that termination was the least 
intrusive means to accomplish protection of KW.

 
 
2. The 
district court erred in terminating parental rights based on convictions which 
were not final because appellants are in the process of seeking review of their 
convictions by means of a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court.

 
 

[¶10.]  As to the first issue, we note that 
appellants' argument relies on language found in opinions of this court which 
decided cases involving application of W.S. 14-2-309(a)(iii). That particular 
subsection requires proof of three elements before parental rights can be 
terminated: (1) that the child has been abused or neglected by the parents; (2) 
that efforts to rehabilitate the family have been unsuccessful or refused by the 
family; and (3) that the child's health would be seriously jeopardized by 
remaining with or returning to the parents. In discussing the second of these 
two elements, the language "less intrusive means" has been used by this court in 
discussing application of this particular element of W.S. 14-2-309(a)(iii). 
Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 515 (Wyo. 1982); DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 922 (n.6) (Wyo. 1980). It is readily evident that this 
second element of W.S. 14-2-309(a)(iii) has no application to a termination of 
parental rights accomplished under W.S. 14-2-309(a)(iv). Subsection (a)(iv) of 
W.S. 14-2-309 requires the presence of two elements: (1) that the parent is 
incarcerated due to conviction of a felony; and (2) that the parent is unfit to 
have custody and control of the child. That statute is clear on its face. We 
need not employ rules of statutory construction, for it is clear that the State 
has no burden to demonstrate the unavailability of means less intrusive than 
termination.

 
 

[¶11.]  As their second issue, appellants contend 
the evidence does not establish that they are incarcerated due to the conviction 
of a felony because the convictions are subject to review by the United States 
Supreme Court and, hence, do not fulfill the "conviction" requirement of the 
statute. We note at the outset that the word "conviction" may have different 
meanings within different contexts. State v. Ege, 274 N.W.2d 350, 355 
(Iowa 1979); 
9A Words and Phrases, "Convicted; Conviction" (and associated words) (1960); 
Annotation, "What constitutes former `conviction' within statute enhancing 
penalty for second or subsequent offense," 5 A.L.R.2d 1080 (1949) (and Later 
Case Service). Appellants rely in part on a line of California cases, deriving 
from In re Sonia G., 158 Cal. App. 3d 18, 204 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501-02 (1984), for 
the proposition that a conviction is not final for purposes of terminating 
parental rights where an appeal is pending. The cases cited by appellants are 
clearly pertinent. We need not, however, resolve any and all issues which might 
arise concerning the meaning of the word "conviction," as employed in W.S. 
14-2-309(a)(iv), in order to dispose of this case. In this case, the appellants 
were convicted by the jury that returned a verdict of guilty, judgment was 
entered on that verdict, and the judgment was affirmed in an appeal of right to 
the federal circuit court of appeals. We hold that these circumstances are 
sufficient to establish the conviction contemplated by W.S. 14-2-309(a)(iv), and 
that the pendency of an application for a discretionary writ of certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court does not affect the status of those convictions 
for purposes of the statute.

 
 

[¶12.]  AFFIRMED.

 
 

THOMAS, J., filed 
a specially concurring opinion in which GOLDEN, J., 
joined.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., filed 
a specially concurring opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"(a) The 
parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the 
following facts is established by clear and convincing 
evidence:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(iv) The 
parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the 
parent is unfit to have the custody and control of the 
child."

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
specially concurring, with whom GOLDEN, J., 
joins.

 
 

[¶13.]  I agree with the result reached by the 
majority opinion in this case. I am satisfied that the convictions of the 
appellants were final and, consequently, no relief is indicated because of the 
potential petition for certiorari.

 
 

[¶14.]  I am concerned about the apparent 
limitation of a requirement which has been adopted as an aspect of the strict 
scrutiny standard. The strict scrutiny standard itself is designed to protect 
the right of familial association which we have concluded is a fundamental 
liberty. DS & RS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 
1980). We have held that it arises from the conflict between the fundamental 
liberty of familial association and the compelling interest of the State in 
protecting the welfare of children. Matter of MLM, 682 P.2d 982 (Wyo. 1984); Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984); Matter of SKJ, 673 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1983). 

 
 

[¶15.]  The second aspect of the fourth ground 
for termination of parent/child legal relationships found in § 14-2-309, W.S. 
1977:

 
 
"(iv) The 
parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the parent is unfit to have 
the custody and control of the child." (emphasis 
added)

 
 
is very 
similar to the second element found in subsection (iii) of that statute. I am 
not persuaded that our prior cases have limited the less intrusive means 
standard to the second element of the third ground for termination of 
parent/child relationships, and I believe that it is an appropriate standard to 
apply whenever the parent/child legal relationship is to be dissolved. In TR v. 
Washakie County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 736 P.2d 712 (Wyo. 
1987), we actually described that standard in the alternative, i.e., "a less 
intrusive or restrictive method of protecting the child has been attempted or is 
impractical." Washakie CountyDPASS, 736 P.2d  at 718. The trial court 
did not address either of these alternatives, but I am satisfied that this is an 
instance in which a less intrusive or restrictive method of protecting the child 
is impractical and, for that reason, I do join in the disposition of this 
case.

 
 

[¶16.]  I would prefer that there be found in a 
record an articulation of those reasons which persuade a trial court that a less 
intrusive or restrictive method of protecting the child has been attempted and 
been unsuccessful, or is impractical under the circumstances. That approach 
would be of significant assistance to this court in considering claims that 
appropriate alternatives have not been pursued in the context of the standard of 
strict scrutiny. I also add that, given the circumstances of this case, the 
resolution is obvious.

 
 

[¶17.]  Considering the potential for alternative 
custodial techniques which are becoming more present in our society because of 
the inability of governments to maintain penal institutions adequate to house 
all those who deserve commitment, institutional incarceration due to conviction 
of a felony might not automatically be imposed in every instance in the future. 
A parent could be convicted of a crime which did not involve the child and then 
be incarcerated but, instead of jail, be placed under electronically monitored 
custody confining the parent to the home, the block, or the neighborhood. In 
such a circumstance, it indeed would be appropriate to require a finding that 
less intrusive or restrictive methods of protecting the child have been 
attempted and found unsuccessful or, for some reason, were impractical. In many 
such instances, the child might well successfully live at home just as he or she 
had prior to the conviction of the parent.

 
 

[¶18.]  I would affirm this case because of the 
obvious impracticality of less intrusive alternatives, but I would require that, 
in those instances in which the termination of parental rights is sought relying 
upon the fourth ground set forth in § 14-2-309, W.S. 1977, there be a showing in 
connection with the element of unfitness that a less intrusive or restrictive 
method of protecting the child has been considered and abandoned as unsuccessful 
or found, for articulable reasons, to be impractical.1

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 I note the 
effort to nominate the paternal grandparents as surrogate parents here, but that 
arrangement is not a less intrusive means designed to preserve the familial 
relationship that the standard protects. It is really no different than 
permitting a parent whose rights are in jeopardy to nominate a foster parent, 
and that is not what the phrase "less intrusive or restrictive methods" 
connotes.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶19.]  I concur in the result, but write 
additionally to perceive that something separate from incarceration is required 
to justify parental rights termination. That protected right of parental 
association as "fundamental and substantial" cannot be extinguished by 
incarceration alone. Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984); Note, Family Law - Termination of Parental 
Rights: Establishing Standards for the Wyoming Law. In the Matter of Parental Rights 
to X, Y and Z, DS v. Dept. of Public Assistance & Social Services, 607 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1980), XVI Land & Water L.Rev. 217 (1981).

 
 

[¶20.]  The syllogism of W.S. 14-2-309(a)(iv) is 
not constitutionally complete if criterion one, incarceration for conviction of 
a felony, will then suffice to prove criterion two, unfitness, which in this 
case might be adduced from the extended terms given appellants in the federal 
penitentiary. Cf. In Interest of J.G., 742 P.2d 770 (Wyo. 1987). The 
availability of a means, which is less intrusive than termination, is a 
constitutional search which may also be applicable to the incarceration 
termination cases. These rules, such as least intrusive and child's best 
interest, are introduced in termination cases to quantify kinds of evidence 
sufficient to justify termination of the constitutional right of filiation 
between parent and child. Those societal interests exist no less today in these 
singularly multiplying types of cases of magnified human tragedy - penal 
confinement.

 
 

[¶21.]  I concur, however, in approval under the 
particularized circumstances of this case with the trial court's determination 
of a generalized category of unfitness as a separate factor for allocation of 
blame to the incarcerated parents. Matter of Parental Rights to ARW, 716 P.2d 353 (Wyo. 
1986). For a general test, see DS & RS v. Department of Public Assistance 
and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1980). My approval is also justified by 
the absence in appellate issue of any vagueness attack on the unfitness test as 
a constitutional perspective. In Interest of J.G., 742 P.2d 770. See Comment, 
Family Law - Wyoming's New Termination of 
Parental Rights Statute, XVIILand & Water L.Rev. 621, 635 (1982). 
Compare generally, Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.Iowa 1975), aff'd 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976) with People v. D.A.K., 
198 Colo. 11, 596 P.2d 747 (1979); Matter of Five Minor Children, 407 A.2d 198 
(Del. Supr. 1979), appeal dismissed for want of a properly presented federal 
issue, Doe v. Delaware, 450 U.S. 382, 101 S. Ct. 1495, 67 L. Ed. 2d 312 (Brennan 
and White, JJ., dissenting), reh'g denied 451 U.S. 964, 101 S. Ct. 2036, 68 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1981), reh'g denied 458 U.S. 1117, 102 S. Ct. 3502, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1379 
(1982); and In the Interest of Brooks, 228 Kan. 541, 618 P.2d 814 
(1980).

 
 

[¶22.]  I specially concur as justified by the 
facts of this case even though parental unfitness appears to be a somewhat 
ephemeral test for deprivation of the constitutional rights of a family, unless 
that "unfitness" is more closely defined within objective factual standards or 
legal principles. Whatever the test may be, it is not separately nor solely 
incarceration. Comment, supra, XVII Land & Water L.Rev. 
621.