Case Title: Johnson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-2219

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC10-2219 
_____________ 
 
 
EMANUEL JOHNSON, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[November 8, 2012] 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Emanuel Johnson appeals the ruling of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court 
denying his motion to vacate his sentence of death, filed under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the circuit court’s order. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Between April and June 1991, Johnson was tried, convicted, and sentenced 
for several crimes committed between January and October 1988 against four 
separate victims.  Two of the victims—Iris White and Jackie McCahon—were 
 
 
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murdered, while two—Kate Cornell and Lawanda Giddens—were not.  Johnson’s 
convictions in the noncapital cases were used as aggravators in both capital cases, 
and each capital conviction was used as an aggravator in the other capital case.  
This appeal stems from Johnson’s first-degree murder conviction and 
accompanying death sentence for the killing of Jackie McCahon.  In addition to the 
murder conviction, Johnson was convicted of armed burglary of McCahon’s home. 
Reviewing Johnson’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal, this Court 
set forth the following facts: 
 
On September 22, 1988, Sarasota police found Jackie 
McCahon’s body on a sidewalk in front of her residence.  She had 
been stabbed nineteen times, and twelve of the wounds were fatal.  A 
broken-off piece of a knife blade was found in her body.  Blood 
spatter evidence suggested that McCahon had been attacked as she 
opened the door, or while inside a bathroom.  Police at first suspected 
several men, but later turned their attention to a tenant of McCahon’s 
named Emanuel Johnson.  When first questioned, Johnson said he had 
heard police cars arrive and had gone out to see what was happening, 
but that he did not know McCahon was the victim until someone told 
him so the next day. 
After a lengthy police interrogation, however, Johnson 
confessed.  He said he had gone to McCahon’s residence to say he 
needed to use her phone because his wife was about to give birth.  
McCahon knew that Johnson’s wife was pregnant.  When McCahon 
let Johnson in the door, he grabbed her and choked her to semi-
consciousness.  Then he found a knife, stabbed her several times, cut 
the phone cord, then took twenty dollars he found.  Later, Johnson 
stated that he then went across the street to his apartment, but saw 
McCahon stagger out of her residence on to the sidewalk.  At this 
point Johnson said he took a knife from his apartment, went out, and 
stabbed McCahon repeatedly.  Police later found a broken knife 
handle where Johnson said he had thrown the second knife.  It 
matched the broken blade found in the body. 
 
 
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Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648, 652 (Fla. 1995).  For McCahon’s murder, the 
jury recommended the death sentence by a vote of ten to two.  In sentencing 
Johnson to death, the trial court found three aggravating factors—Johnson had 
been convicted of a prior violent felony, the murder was committed for pecuniary 
gain, and the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC)—and fifteen 
mitigating factors, including that Johnson suffered mental pressure not reaching the 
level of statutory mitigation.  Johnson, 660 So. 2d at 652. 
 
Johnson raised thirteen claims on direct appeal:  (1) Johnson’s arrest warrant 
was defective on several grounds; (2) Johnson’s confessions should have been 
suppressed; (3) the jury that convicted Johnson was improperly qualified and 
sworn; (4) the grand jury that indicted Johnson was improperly qualified and 
sworn; (5) the extended period of time (twenty-four days) between voir dire and 
trial violated Johnson’s rights; (6) the trial court erred in denying a voir dire 
challenge for cause; (7) Johnson was deprived of a representative jury because—in 
the four cases against him—only two out of one hundred venire members were 
black; (8) the trial court manipulated the dates of Johnson’s four trials in order to 
use convictions in some cases as aggravators in others; (9) this Court’s page limits 
on appellate briefs deprived Johnson’s counsel of the ability to address all issues in 
Johnson’s case; (10) the trial court committed various errors in rulings affecting 
the presentation of mitigating factors; (11) the trial court applied the wrong 
 
 
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standard in evaluating mitigating evidence of emotional disturbance; (12) the 
felony-murder aggravator is an unconstitutional “automatic” aggravator; and (13) 
the HAC aggravating factor is unconstitutional and was submitted to the jury on 
improper instruction.  Id. at 653-64.  This Court denied each of Johnson’s claims, 
determined that the death penalty was proportional to Johnson’s crime, and 
affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences.  Id. at 664. 
II.  MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
A.  Procedural Background 
In March 1997, Johnson filed a shell motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.1  After multiple amended 
postconviction motions, as well as several rulings from both this Court and the 
court below tolling the time for Johnson to file an amended postconviction 
motion,2 Johnson’s postconviction claims proceeded on an amended motion filed 
in September 2003 and an addendum filed in December 2003. 
                                         
 
1.  Johnson’s amended rule 3.850 motion is governed by the requirements 
applicable to rule 3.850, rather than Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, 
because his amended motion relates back to his original motion, which was filed 
before October 1, 2001, the effective date of rule 3.851.  See Franqui v. State, 59 
So. 3d 82, 95 n. 13 (Fla. 2011). 
 
2.  See, e.g., Johnson v. State, No. SC78,336 (Fla. order filed Jun. 4, 1997) 
(unpublished order tolling time for filing of Johnson’s amended motion due to the 
financial condition of the Office of the Capital Collateral Representative); In re 
Amendments to Fla. Rule Crim. Pro. 3.852, 700 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla. 1997) 
(tolling time for filing Johnson’s postconviction motion for ninety days to allow 
 
 
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Johnson raised the following postconviction claims challenging his capital 
conviction and accompanying death sentence for McCahon’s murder:  (1) defense 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by mishandling mental health experts; (2) 
the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by manipulating the trial schedule of 
Johnson’s four trials and failing to make timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), rendering defense counsel 
ineffective in conducting Johnson’s defense; (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial 
misconduct by offering evidence of sperm after a Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) report stated that none had been found, and defense counsel was ineffective 
in failing to object to the State’s misconduct; (4) defense counsel was ineffective in 
failing to call a competent mental health expert at Johnson’s penalty phase trial; (5) 
the prior violent felony aggravator was based on invalid convictions; (6) Rule 
Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) unconstitutionally prevented Johnson, 
through his counsel, from interviewing jurors, thereby rendering counsel 
ineffective; (7) as applied, the Florida death sentencing statute is unconstitutional; 
(8) the trial court denied Johnson due process of law by preventing him from 
                                                                                                                                   
collateral counsel to transition from a single office to three regional offices); 
Amendments to Fla. Rules Crim. Pro. 3.851 and 3.850, 719 So. 2d 869, 871-72 
(Fla. 1998) (tolling time for Johnson to file motion under rule 3.850 or 3.851 until 
October 1, 1998, based on insufficient funding of collateral counsel); State v. 
Johnson, Nos. 88 CF 3200, et al. (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. order filed Feb. 13, 2002) 
(extending date for filing of Johnson’s amended motion to March 4, 2002). 
 
 
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informing the jury about his ineligibility for parole and the possible sentences he 
would likely receive in other pending criminal cases; (9) Johnson’s death sentence 
is unconstitutional because the penalty phase jury instructions improperly shifted 
the burden of proof to Johnson, and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to 
object to the improper jury instructions; (10) Florida’s method of execution by 
lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (11) Johnson’s 
convictions are materially unreliable based on the cumulative effect of the errors 
during his guilt and penalty phase trials; (12) Johnson’s death sentence constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment because Johnson may be incompetent at the time of 
execution; (13) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by presenting false 
evidence at the suppression hearing, and defense counsel was ineffective in failing 
to challenge the State’s misconduct; (14) the State violated due process by 
destroying potentially useful evidence in bad faith; (15) Johnson’s arrest, search, 
and seizure were all based on a defective affidavit that contained false statements, 
and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present these facts at the 
suppression hearing; and (16) the search warrants were not issued by a neutral 
magistrate, and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to discover and present 
this claim. 
Each of Johnson’s postconviction claims correlated with a substantially 
similar claim raised in his postconviction motion challenging his convictions and 
 
 
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sentences for the White murder.  See Johnson v. State, No. SC10-2008, slip op. at 
4-7 (Fla. Nov. 8, 2012) (noting the same postconviction claims listed above were 
raised by Johnson in his postconviction motion regarding the White murder, in 
addition to four claims raised exclusively in that case).  Because of the significant 
interrelation between Johnson’s postconviction motion in this case and the 
postconviction motion in the case regarding the White murder, the postconviction 
court held a consolidated hearing on the motions pursuant to Huff v. State, 495 So. 
2d 145 (Fla. 1986), on September 21, 2005.  Following the Huff hearing, the 
postconviction court entered a single order granting an evidentiary hearing on the 
first four of Johnson’s postconviction claims in this case—which were 
substantially indistinguishable from Johnson’s first four postconviction claims in 
the postconviction motion regarding the White murder—and summarily denying 
the remainder of Johnson’s postconviction claims.  State v. Johnson, Nos. CF 88-
3198, et al. (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. order filed Mar. 1, 2007). 
 
Before the evidentiary hearing was held, Johnson filed several pro se 
pleadings in both this case and the case relating to White’s murder, seeking to 
discharge collateral counsel and raising additional claims that he believed were not 
adequately addressed by collateral counsel.  Ultimately, Johnson withdrew his 
attempts to discharge counsel, and collateral counsel adopted six of Johnson’s pro 
se claims.  The additional claims alleged that the search warrant in the White 
 
 
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murder case, the affidavit in support of the warrant, and the inventory list of items 
obtained pursuant to the warrant were false in that each document was backdated 
and signed after the search of his premises had been completed.  Although the 
warrant was issued based on Johnson’s suspected involvement in White’s murder, 
law enforcement officials recovered items from Johnson’s residence that linked 
him to the unsolved murder of McCahon.  Accordingly, Johnson challenged the 
allegedly “false” documents in postconviction proceedings related to the White and 
McCahon murders.  Specifically, Johnson argued:  (17) the State had the duty to 
disclose the false documents because they constituted impeachment evidence; (18) 
the State had a duty to disclose that the false documents had been filed; (19) the 
State committed a fundamentally unfair act by fabricating, filing, and relying on 
the false documents; (20) the judge who backdated and signed the false documents 
was not neutral and detached; (21) the State committed per se reversible error by 
using and failing to advise the defense about the false documents; and (22) 
Johnson’s claims regarding the false documents are not procedurally barred 
because he was deprived of substantive due process.  The postconviction court 
issued a single order summarily denying each of the additional claims as they 
related to both postconviction cases.  The court held that the conclusory allegations 
contained in the claims were insufficient to require an evidentiary hearing, that the 
claims should have been raised on direct appeal, and that Johnson had previously 
 
 
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argued the issues during the Huff hearing.  State v. Johnson, Nos. 88 CF 3198, et 
al. (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. order filed Apr. 28, 2009). 
B.  Evidentiary Hearing Testimony 
On August 3 and 4, 2009, the postconviction court held a consolidated 
evidentiary hearing on the four remaining postconviction claims in this case and in 
the case related to the White murder.  We summarized the testimony presented at 
the evidentiary hearing in our decision affirming the denial of Johnson’s 
postconviction motion arising from his conviction and sentence for the White 
murder. 
[T]he the postconviction court heard testimony from Johnson’s three 
trial attorneys—Adam Tebrugge, Tobey Hockett, and Eliot 
Metcalfe—regarding the defense’s pretrial management of four 
experts—Dr. Walter Afield, Dr. Michael Maher, Dr. Richard Ofshe, 
and Dr. John Brigham.  Attorney Tebrugge, who was Johnson’s 
primary attorney for the penalty phase of the trials regarding both the 
White and McCahon murders, testified regarding Dr. Afield, who was 
appointed by the trial court pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.216 in order to determine whether Johnson was 
competent to stand trial and whether Johnson may have been insane at 
the time he committed the murders.  Tebrugge testified that 
throughout the preparation for Johnson’s trials, he had developed 
concerns with Dr. Afield’s potential testimony and ultimately was 
convinced that Dr. Afield would not be a helpful witness to the 
defense.  Tebrugge further testified that the decision not to use Dr. 
Afield as a witness during either Johnson’s guilt or penalty phase 
trials was based on the defense’s feeling that Dr. Afield would not be 
a helpful witness.  Tebrugge testified that the decision was not based 
on any threat by the State to present contradicting expert testimony if 
the defense called Dr. Afield as a witness. 
Attorney Metcalfe, who at the time of Johnson’s trials was the 
Public Defender for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, testified to similar 
 
 
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effect.  Metcalfe testified that the defense could not get a straight 
answer from Dr. Afield regarding whether a valid basis existed on 
which to rest an insanity defense and that, as a result, he believed that 
Dr. Afield’s testimony would undermine any attempted insanity 
defense.  Metcalfe testified that for this reason, he was nervous about 
calling Dr. Afield as a witness and that he ultimately became 
uncomfortable with using Dr. Afield for any purpose whatsoever.  
Metcalfe testified that Johnson’s trial team had conducted strategy 
sessions regarding whether to use Dr. Afield as a witness and that the 
attorneys had ultimately decided against using Dr. Afield at trial. 
Regarding the decision to make Dr. Afield available for a 
deposition, Attorney Hockett, who worked primarily on the pretrial 
aspects of Johnson’s trials, testified that the defense had originally 
listed Dr. Afield as a potential witness, which allowed the State to 
depose him.  Hockett testified that when, during the deposition, the 
State asked Dr. Afield to disclose confidential information regarding 
his conversations with Johnson, Hockett objected to the State’s 
question but did not feel that he could do anything else to prevent Dr. 
Afield from answering the question. 
Dr. Afield also testified at the evidentiary hearing.  Dr. Afield 
testified that he had evaluated Johnson on October 27, 1988, while 
Johnson was incarcerated.  Dr. Afield recalled his impression that 
Johnson was chronically retarded and schizophrenic and that Johnson 
had been attempting to control his psychosis with prescription 
medication and cocaine, both of which made the psychosis worse.  Dr. 
Afield testified that he had discussed the possibility of an insanity 
defense with Johnson’s trial counsel and had informed them that such 
a defense might be possible but that he would need more information 
to be certain.  However, Dr. Afield testified that after he was deposed 
in September 1990, he did not hear from counsel again regarding the 
possibility of pursuing an insanity defense.  Thus, in April 1991, he 
submitted a report advising trial counsel that he did not believe there 
was a basis for an insanity defense.  On cross-examination, Dr. Afield 
testified that he did not believe that Johnson could have been faking 
insanity by pretending to be delusional.  In Dr. Afield’s opinion, 
Johnson was too mentally retarded to pretend to be insane.  On 
redirect, Dr. Afield admitted that Johnson’s IQ was roughly 100, 
which is normal, although Dr. Afield stated that other tests were 
indicative of brain dysfunction.  Dr. Afield also recalled that, during 
 
 
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his evaluation, Johnson made admissions regarding the crimes with 
which he was charged. 
Regarding Dr. Maher, attorney Tebrugge testified that based on 
his dissatisfaction with Dr. Afield, he decided to employ Dr. Maher, a 
psychiatrist who specialized in the areas of substance abuse and 
cocaine psychosis.  Tebrugge testified that after the defense listed Dr. 
Maher as a potential witness, Dr. Maher was deposed by the State, 
during which he made several statements regarding admissions made 
by Johnson.  Tebrugge testified that based on Dr. Maher’s deposition, 
he decided not to call Dr. Maher as a witness after discussing the issue 
with Johnson.  Tebrugge also testified that the State had threatened to 
call Dr. Maher as a State’s witness based on the information he 
revealed during his deposition.  Tebrugge objected to the State’s 
threat on the grounds that any admissions made by Johnson to Dr. 
Maher were privileged and could not be introduced at trial.  Tebrugge 
testified that it was his belief that although listing Dr. Maher as a 
potential witness allowed the State to depose him and waived any 
attorney-client privilege attached to Dr. Maher, such waiver could be 
revoked by removing Dr. Maher as a potential witness. 
 
Regarding Dr. Ofshe, an expert in coerced confessions, attorney 
Hockett testified that the defense saw Dr. Ofshe as its best chance to 
suppress Johnson’s confession because Dr. Ofshe believed that the 
confession had been coerced and because Dr. Ofshe had intentionally 
avoided asking Johnson any questions that could lead to admissions 
regarding the crimes.  Hockett testified that the defense had presented 
Dr. Ofshe’s testimony at the motion to suppress hearing but that, after 
the court denied the defense’s motion, the defense never considered 
using Dr. Ofshe as a guilt phase witness.  Hockett testified that the 
defense decided it would not be helpful to present Dr. Ofshe as a 
witness at trial because it had already preserved the issue at the 
suppression hearing and because repeating a week’s worth of 
testimony would not have aided the defense. 
 
Regarding Johnson’s claim that the State’s manipulation of 
Johnson’s four trial dates had rendered Johnson’s counsel ineffective, 
attorney Hockett recalled that the defense had worked on securing Dr. 
Brigham, an expert in eyewitness identification, as an expert in the 
case regarding victim Cornell.  Hockett testified that the defense had 
made multiple attempts to continue Johnson’s trial schedule in order 
that Dr. Brigham could have time to adequately prepare for the trial 
regarding victim Cornell but that the trial court had denied the 
 
 
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defense’s motions for continuance.  Attorney Metcalfe similarly 
testified that the defense had discussed using Dr. Brigham as an expert 
in eyewitness identification in the trial regarding victim Cornell and 
possibly also the trial regarding victim Giddens. 
Dr. Brigham also testified at the evidentiary hearing.  Dr. 
Brigham testified that he had been contacted in the late spring of 1991 
by attorney Hockett about the possibility of testifying as an expert 
witness in the trial regarding victim Cornell.  After reviewing some 
materials from the case, Dr. Brigham replied that he would not have 
the chance to fully review the necessary materials before trial but that, 
if the trial were to be postponed, he would be interested in 
participating.  Dr. Brigham acknowledged that he had sent Hockett a 
letter on April 18, 1991, stating that his testimony would be most 
useful regarding the effect that exposure to several prior photo lineups 
would have had on a witness’s ability to correctly identify a 
perpetrator from a subsequent lineup.  Dr. Brigham claimed that—had 
he been able to testify at trial—he would have assisted Johnson’s trial 
attorneys in cross-examining any eyewitness.  On cross-examination, 
Dr. Brigham admitted that he would have testified at trial only 
regarding general principles of eyewitness identification.  Dr. 
Brigham also admitted that he had not performed an actual study on 
Cornell’s identification.  On redirect, Dr. Brigham clarified that had 
he been employed as an expert by the defense, he would have 
conducted a thorough study of all relevant records and reached an 
expert opinion regarding Cornell’s eyewitness identification of 
Johnson. 
 
The postconviction court also heard the testimony of Marjorie 
Hammock, a professor of social work who was tendered by collateral 
counsel as a mitigation specialist based on her expertise in 
biopsychosocial assessments—a tool for explaining how individuals 
came to be in a particular situation in their lives.  Ms. Hammock 
performed a biopsychosocial assessment of Johnson, reviewed the 
Department of Corrections’ records for Johnson, examined his health, 
mental health, and school records (grades one through six), and read 
interviews with several of Johnson’s family members and other 
individuals involved in the case.  Ms. Hammock also personally 
interviewed several of Johnson’s family members and interviewed 
Johnson himself three times.  Based on these sources, Ms. Hammock 
testified that poverty and abandonment were key patterns in Johnson’s 
life.  Ms. Hammock also testified that Johnson felt oppressed by the 
 
 
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white community and that Johnson had been ridiculed by the teachers 
and children at his school.  Ms. Hammock stated that Johnson had 
attempted to commit suicide twice—once as a young teenager by 
taking his mother’s antidepressant pills and later by attempting to slit 
his wrists while incarcerated—and that Johnson used crack cocaine 
extensively by the time of the murders.  Ms. Hammock then testified 
regarding the miscarriage of Johnson’s first child and the effect it had 
on him, including that he carried a picture of the dead child with him 
and showed it to everyone.  Ms. Hammock concluded that Johnson 
had been in psychological distress for most of his life and that he was 
unable to deal with the issues that confronted him. 
 
On cross-examination, Ms. Hammock testified regarding 
Beverly Ackerman, an investigator employed by Johnson’s trial 
counsel for the purpose of gathering mitigation evidence.  Ms. 
Hammock agreed that she and Ms. Ackerman had interviewed many 
of the same people and read many of the same records.  Ms. 
Hammock admitted that Ms. Ackerman had interviewed some people 
and reviewed some records that Ms. Hammock had not.  Ms. 
Hammock claimed, however, that although much of her investigation 
overlapped with Ms. Ackerman’s investigation, the information that 
she gathered from the records and interviews was not necessarily the 
same as that gathered by Ms. Ackerman.  Attorney Metcalfe also 
testified regarding Ms. Ackerman, recalling that his strategy was to 
gather as much information about Johnson as possible.  To this effect, 
Metcalfe had sent Ms. Ackerman to Johnson’s hometown in 
Mississippi because he felt that as a black female, Ms. Ackerman 
would have the best chance of connecting with and getting 
information from Johnson’s family and community. 
 
Johnson, No. SC11-2008, slip op. at 9-16. 
 
C.  Postconviction Court’s Ruling 
 
After the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied the remainder 
of Johnson’s claims in the case for the McMahon murder.  Because these claims 
were identical to those raised in the case related to the White murder, the 
postconviction court denied the claims in both cases in the same order.  We 
 
 
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summarized the postconviction court’s ruling in our opinion affirming the denial of 
Johnson’s postconviction motion in the case for the murder of White. 
Regarding Johnson’s first claim that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by mishandling the defense’s mental health 
expert witnesses, the postconviction court held that counsel was not 
ineffective in failing to call Dr. Afield as a witness because (1) it was 
clear that the decision was a tactical one based on the fact that Dr. 
Afield’s testimony would have been more harmful than helpful to the 
defense; and (2) Johnson had not established prejudice in light of this 
Court’s ruling on direct appeal that the evidence of Johnson’s mental 
disturbance—as presented in full at the suppression hearing at which 
Dr. Afield testified—did not rise to the level of a statutory mitigator.  
Johnson, 660 So. 2d at 646-47.  Similarly, regarding counsel’s 
decision not to call either Dr. Maher or Dr. Ofshe at trial, the 
postconviction court concluded that counsel’s performance was not 
deficient, but was strategic based on the content of both doctors’ 
potential testimony and that Johnson was not prejudiced by the lack of 
testimony.  Furthermore, the court ruled that Johnson was not 
prejudiced by his counsel’s decision to allow each of the doctors to be 
deposed because none of counsel’s decisions regarding the doctors 
were influenced by the State’s threat to call Dr. Maher at trial. 
 
The postconviction court also denied the portion of Johnson’s 
second claim alleging that defense counsel mishandled Dr. Brigham 
during the trial relating to victim Cornell and that Johnson was 
prejudiced by counsel’s deficiency because his conviction in that case 
was used as an aggravator in the capital cases.  The court found that 
counsel was not deficient because the requests for continuance in 
order to accommodate Dr. Brigham’s schedule were denied and that 
Johnson had suffered no prejudice because Dr. Brigham’s testimony 
was by no means certain to be admitted at trial.  The court also found 
that even in Dr. Brigham’s absence, Johnson’s trial counsel intensely 
challenged Ms. Cornell’s identification of Johnson. 
 
Finally, the postconviction court denied Johnson’s claim that 
his counsel was ineffective in failing to hire a mitigation expert to 
investigate and testify at Johnson’s penalty phase trial.  The court 
determined that counsel was not deficient because mitigation had been 
a central focus of the defense, as evidenced by Ms. Ackerman’s 
investigation.  The court found that Ms. Hammock would have 
 
 
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performed substantially the same in investigating and reporting 
mitigating evidence as did Ms. Ackerman.  The court concluded that 
Johnson’s argument that an expert such as Ms. Hammock would have 
presented the evidence more articulately or credibly was nothing more 
than second-guessing his trial counsel’s strategic decisions.  The court 
further concluded that Johnson had failed to establish prejudice 
because much of the information testified to by Ms. Hammock was 
expressed clearly, articulately, and credibly by Johnson’s family 
members during his penalty phase trial. 
 
The postconviction court made no ruling regarding Johnson’s 
allegations in his second claim that the State had failed to timely 
disclose exculpatory evidence.  The postconviction court also failed to 
address Johnson’s third claim alleging prosecutorial misconduct 
relating to evidence of sperm found at the crime scene.  However, 
shortly after its order following the evidentiary hearing, the 
postconviction court sua sponte issued another order clarifying that it 
also denied the remainder of Johnson’s second claim as well as 
Johnson’s third claim regarding the sperm evidence. 
 
Johnson, No. SC11-2008, slip op. at 16-18.  Accordingly, the postconviction court 
denied each of Johnson’s postconviction claims challenging his conviction for 
McCahon’s murder and the accompanying death sentence.  Johnson now appeals 
the postconviction court’s ruling. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Johnson raises exactly the same issues that he raised when 
appealing the postconviction court’s denial of his postconviction claims in the case 
regarding the murder of White.  Moreover, Johnson presents the same arguments 
in support of each issue because Johnson filed identical briefs on appeal in both 
capital cases.  Specifically, Johnson raises the following claims on appeal:  (1) the 
postconviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
 
 
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based on his trial counsel’s mishandling of expert witnesses Dr. Walter Afield, Dr. 
Michael Maher, and Dr. Richard Ofshe; (2) the postconviction court erred in 
denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the mishandling of witness 
Dr. Brigham in the case related to victim Cornell because Johnson’s conviction in 
that case was used as an aggravating factor in this case; (3) the postconviction 
court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his trial 
counsel’s failure to employ a mitigation specialist; (4) the postconviction court 
erred in summarily denying his claim that the trial court’s finding of the prior 
violent felony aggravator is based on an invalid conviction; (5) the postconviction 
court erred in summarily denying his claim that Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-
3.5(d)(4) unconstitutionally prevented Johnson from interviewing the jurors in this 
case; (6) the postconviction court erred in summarily denying his claim that 
Florida’s death sentencing statute, as applied, is unconstitutional; (7) the 
postconviction court erred in summarily denying his claim that the trial court erred 
in preventing Johnson from informing the jury about his ineligibility for parole and 
the possible sentences he would receive in his other three trials; (8) the 
postconviction court erred in summarily denying his claim that the penalty phase 
jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted the burden to Johnson to prove that 
death was an inappropriate sentence; (9) the postconviction court erred in 
summarily denying his claim that Florida’s method of execution constitutes cruel 
 
 
- 17 - 
and unusual punishment; (10) the postconviction court erred in summarily denying 
his claim that his convictions and sentences are materially unreliable due to the 
cumulative effect of the errors alleged in Johnson’s postconviction motion; and 
(11) the postconviction court erred in summarily denying his claim that his right 
against cruel and unusual punishment may be violated because, at the time of his 
execution, Johnson might be incompetent.  Finally, Johnson argues (12) that the 
postconviction court erred in summarily denying various pro se claims relating to 
the White case:  (a) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing facts not in 
evidence, and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to that 
misconduct; (b) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by presenting false evidence 
at the suppression hearing, and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object 
to that misconduct; (c) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by presenting 
inconsistent theories, and defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 
that misconduct; (d) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 
introduce evidence of Johnson’s actual innocence; (e) the State used illegally 
obtained rolled fingerprints; and (f) Johnson’s arrest, search, and seizure were 
based on an affidavit that contained false information, and defense counsel was 
ineffective in failing to present this fact at the suppression hearing. 
We have identified two issues raised in both this case and the case related to 
the White murder that require additional analysis here:  Johnson’s argument that 
 
 
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the postconviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim based on his counsel’s failure to properly authenticate medical records at 
both of his capital trials; and Johnson’s argument that the postconviction court 
erred in summarily denying various pro se claims challenging Johnson’s 
conviction and sentence for the murder of White.  For the reasons expressed below, 
we conclude that the postconviction court did not err in denying these claims as 
they relate to Johnson’s murder conviction and accompanying death sentence for 
the murder of McCahon. 
First, we address the portion of Johnson’s third claim on appeal challenging 
his trial counsel’s failure to properly authenticate medical records containing 
evidence regarding two suicide attempts by Johnson.  Johnson alleges that 
counsel’s error was more egregious in this case because the trial court had 
sustained the State’s objection to the medical records as unauthenticated in the 
earlier trial for the murder of White.  Thus, Johnson argues, counsel had additional 
time and notice to properly authenticate the records before attempting to introduce 
them at the trial for the murder of McCahon but failed to do so.  The 
postconviction court denied Johnson’s claim after an evidentiary hearing.  
Accordingly, we review de novo that court’s ruling on Johnson’s ineffective 
assistance claim but defer to its findings of fact if they are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence in the record.  Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001).  
 
 
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Similar to our holding denying this claim as it related to Johnson’s 
postconviction appeal in the case related to White’s murder, we conclude that 
regardless of any alleged deficiency by Johnson’s trial counsel due to counsel’s 
failure to properly authenticate the medical records, Johnson suffered no prejudice 
as a result of such error.  As in the case regarding White’s murder, the record 
shows that the jury and sentencing judge at the penalty phase trial for the McCahon 
murder heard evidence regarding one of Johnson’s suicide attempts through the 
testimony of Johnson’s mother.  Also, as in Johnson’s capital case for the White 
murder, the record establishes that any evidence regarding Johnson’s second 
attempt on his life would have opened the door to harmful testimony.  Dr. Ofshe 
testified at the suppression hearing that Johnson admitted that his second suicide 
attempt was a half-hearted effort designed to convince doctors that he was 
mentally ill.  Because Johnson has not shown any plausible reason why the State 
could not have called Dr. Ofshe to testify to the same effect at trial in response to 
the medical records, Johnson has not established a reasonable probability that 
absent the alleged error, the penalty phase jury would have reached a different 
conclusion.  Moreover, this Court held on direct appeal of the conviction and 
sentence for the White murder that the evidence of Johnson’s mental disturbance 
presented during the suppression hearing—which was consolidated for Johnson’s 
two capital cases—“did not rise to the level of a statutory mitigator.”  Johnson, 660 
 
 
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So. 3d at 647.  Because evidence of both suicide attempts was presented at the 
suppression hearing, counsel’s alleged deficiency does not undermine our 
confidence in the sentencing judge’s conclusion that the statutory mental mitigator 
did not exist in this case.  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial 
of Johnson’s claim as it relates to the McCahon murder. 
Second, we address Johnson’s final issue on appeal, which challenges the 
postconviction court’s denial of several pro se claims in the case relating to 
White’s murder.  Specifically, Johnson alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to object when the State argued based on improper evidence that 
Johnson had sexually battered White, when the State argued at the suppression 
hearing that two of the hairs recovered from White’s body were identified as 
Johnson’s and when the State subsequently presented theories at trial inconsistent 
with theories it had previously argued at the suppression hearing.  Johnson also 
argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce evidence that 
Johnson was a chronic nail biter—because such evidence would conclusively have 
established Johnson’s “actual innocence” in the case relating to White—and in 
failing to discover and present evidence that a key piece of evidence supporting the 
search warrant in that case was false. 
Johnson’s challenges to counsel’s performance in the case for White’s 
murder are only relevant to this case because Johnson’s conviction in that case was 
 
 
- 21 - 
used to support the prior violent felony aggravator in this case.  As it relates to 
Johnson’s conviction and sentence for the McCahon murder, this issue is therefore 
analogous to the claim addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Johnson 
v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 583-90 (1988), which granted postconviction relief 
on a defendant’s claim that the sentencing court’s finding of the prior violent 
felony aggravator based on a reversed conviction was unconstitutional.  We have 
previously held that a Johnson claim is not cognizable as long as the conviction 
underlying the aggravating factor is still a valid conviction.  See Lukehart v. State, 
70 So. 3d 503, 513 (Fla. 2011).  Moreover, we have affirmed the denial of 
Johnson’s postconviction challenge to his conviction and death sentence for the 
case relating to White.  See Johnson, No. SC10-2008, slip op. at 43.  The 
conviction for the murder of White therefore remains a proper basis for the prior 
violent felony aggravator in this case.  See Lukehart, 70 So. 3d at 513.  
Accordingly, we deny Johnson’s final appellate issue as it related to his 
convictions and sentences for the murder of McCahon. 
Having considered the remainder of Johnson’s claims presented in this 
postconviction appeal, we deny each of the claims for the reasons expressed in our 
opinion denying the identical claims as presented in Johnson’s postconviction 
appeal in the case related to the murder of White.  See Johnson, No. SC10-2008, 
slip op. at 18-43. 
 
 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Johnson is not entitled to 
postconviction relief from his conviction and sentence for the first-degree murder 
of Jackie McCahon.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Johnson’s 
motion for postconviction relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Sarasota County,  
Andrew Douglas Owens, Judge 
Case Nos. 1988-CF-003200-NC and 1988-CF-003438-NC 
 
John W. Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Mark S. Gruber and Maria 
Perinetti, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, 
Florida,  
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Katherine Vickers 
Blanco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee