Case Title: Vermont v. Boglioli

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2009-410

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 VT 60











State v. Boglioli (2009-410)
 
2011 VT 60
 
[Filed 16-Jun-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 60
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2009-410
 
JANUARY TERM, 2011
 
State of Vermont
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APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
 
}
 
     v.
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District Court of Vermont, 
 
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Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit 
 
}
 
David Boglioli
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DOCKET NO. 1070-8-08
  Wmcr
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Karen R. Carroll
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Defendant, David Boglioli, appeals his conviction for voluntary
manslaughter posing multiple grounds for reversal.  He claims that he was
denied a fair trial when he was precluded from presenting evidence of the
victim's threats against others.  He claims reversible error on various
theories regarding the jury instructions.  He also argues that the
evidence presented was insufficient to support the verdict of guilty for
voluntary manslaughter and that this verdict was against the great weight of
the evidence.  We affirm the trial court's decision in its entirety.
¶ 2.            
Prior to the killing, defendant and the victim had a history.  The
two were neighbors and the victim made a habit of tormenting defendant. 
According to the evidence presented at trial, the victim physically assaulted
defendant on numerous occasions and shot projectiles at defendant's home
including BBs, darts, pellets, rocks, and bullets.  He also threatened to
kill and hurt defendant and verbally harassed him.  There was testimony
that the victim grew marijuana in his home and that his menacing tactics were
aimed at getting defendant to move so that the victim could use the house to
grow marijuana.  Testifying at trial in his own defense, defendant
claimed that he was afraid of the victim, that the victim bragged about
shooting his own brother with an arrow and that he had threatened to do the
same to defendant.  Defendant and other witnesses also testified about
physical assaults by the victim on people other than defendant.  
¶ 3.            
Defendant explained that his fear of his neighbor was such that he would
go to great lengths to avoid being outside when the victim was present. 
He testified that when he saw the victim nearby he would double and triple bag
his garbage to "keep it from smelling" while he waited for an opportunity to
dispose of it in the common dumpster.  The day of the killing, defendant
needed to take out his garbage.  He looked outside and seeing no signs of
the victim, decided it was safe to do so.  Carrying a pistol, he headed
for the dumpster, when the victim appeared behind him, emerging from between
two houses swinging an axe handle and blocking defendant's way back to his
home.  Defendant claims that the victim stated "let's get this over,"
while holding the axe handle cocked like a batter at the plate.  Defendant
drew his gun and pulled the trigger.  The victim was mortally wounded and
stopped breathing within three minutes.  Defendant went inside and called
a friend to tell him that the victim had attacked him, that he had killed the
victim, and to ask his friend to care for his pets. 
¶ 4.            
Defendant was charged with second degree murder in violation of
13 V.S.A. § 2301.  He raised the affirmative defense of
self-defense.  The State requested a jury instruction on the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter, which the trial court granted over
defendant's objection.  The jury convicted defendant of voluntary manslaughter,
and defendant now appeals. 
¶ 5.            
Post trial, defendant moved for acquittal pursuant to Vermont Rules of
Criminal Procedure 29(c) and alternatively for a new trial pursuant to
V.R.Cr.P. 33.  He argued that the State's evidence was insufficient to
prove him guilty of voluntary manslaughter and that the jury's conclusion must
therefore have been the product of a compromised verdict.  Defendant
reasoned that "[b]ased upon the juror's note to the [c]ourt suggesting it
rejected self defense due to excessive force, they apparently felt there was
some wrongdoing.  But since there was no evidence of sudden passion and
great provocation, the jury could not convict of voluntary manslaughter without
a compromise."  
¶ 6.            
The trial court denied these motions concluding that "[t]here was
substantial, admissible evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
[d]efendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt."
 The court noted that "evidence was presented to the jury that . . . [o]n
the evening prior to the shooting, the victim had placed marijuana plants on
[d]efendant's porch which clearly angered [d]efendant" and that "[o]n the day
of the shooting, the victim followed [d]efendant to the dumpster, verbally
abusing him, and possibly physically threatening him."  The court
explained that "[f]rom this evidence a reasonable jury could conclude that
[d]efendant was provoked and did not have adequate time to cool off."  The
court reasoned that this finding was "not inconsistent with the jury rejecting
the self-defense claim because [d]efendant's use of force went well beyond that
which the defense authorizes, while also recognizing [d]efendant was provoked
and did not have adequate time to cool off while standing at the dumpster,
being confronted by the victim, and having been followed there by the victim
the morning after an event which made [d]efendant extremely angry."  On
appeal defendant argues the trial court's conclusions were in error and that
defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal or in the alternative a new
trial.
¶ 7.            
The inquiry on review of a motion for judgment of acquittal is whether
"the evidence, when viewed in light most favorable to the State and excluding
any modifying evidence, fairly and reasonably tends to convince a reasonable
trier of fact that defendant" is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  State
v. Delisle, 162 Vt. 293, 307, 648 A.2d 632, 641 (1994) (quotation
omitted).  "[A] judgment of acquittal is proper only if the prosecution
has failed to put forth any evidence to substantiate a jury
verdict."  State v. Couture, 169 Vt. 222, 226, 734 A.2d 524, 527
(1999) (emphasis added).  
¶ 8.            
The elements that must be proven to support a conviction of voluntary
manslaughter are: "(1) adequate provocation; (2) inadequate time to regain
self-control or cool off'; (3) actual provocation; and (4) actual failure to
cool off.' "  State v. Kulzer, 2009 VT 79, ¶ 25, 186 Vt. 264, 979 A.2d 1031 (quotation omitted).  Defendant argues that the evidence presented
by the State was too remote in time or inadequate to sufficiently prove the
provocation element of voluntary manslaughter.  Defendant acknowledges
that the State presented evidence of the victim verbally threatening defendant
immediately prior to the shooting, but argues that words alone do not
constitute adequate provocation.  While defendant is correct that "mere
words will not justify a physical attack," id. ¶ 26 (quotation omitted),
it was defendant who presented evidence that the victim threatened defendant
with more than mere words in this instance.  Defendant testified that on
the day of the shooting, the victim appeared out of nowhere, came within two or
three feet of him, brandishing an axe handle and stated "[c]ome on mother
fucker, let's get this over."*  Defendant also testified that in
shooting the victim, he "was protecting [his] life and "had no recourse but to
shoot."  This evidence, along with the victim's history of violent
behavior toward defendant, taken in the light most favorable to the State, is
sufficient to fairly and reasonably convince a trier of fact that defendant was
provoked, that the provocation was adequate, that he had insufficient time to
cool offthere was testimony that indicated the axe handle was in mid swing
when defendant firedand that he had in fact, not cooled off between the time
of the provocation and when the shot was fired.  
¶ 9.            
As for defendant's Rule 33 claim, "a new trial based upon the weight of
the evidence should be granted only where the evidence preponderates heavily
against the verdict and a serious miscarriage of justice would otherwise
result."  State v. Ladabouche, 146 Vt. 279, 285, 502 A.2d 852, 856
(1985).  The evidence presented herethat the victim had repeatedly
threatened defendant, that he had repeatedly attacked defendant, that on the
occasion in question the victim yelled threats, physically blocked defendant
from returning to his home, and came at defendant with an axe handlein no way
preponderated heavily against a verdict of voluntary manslaughter.  "The
court's decision on a new trial motion is a matter committed to the sole
discretion of the court and will stand on appeal unless defendant can show that
the court's discretion was either totally withheld or exercised on grounds
clearly untenable or unreasonable."  State v. Elkins, 155 Vt. 9,
18, 580 A.2d 1200, 1205 (1990) (quotation omitted).  Defendant has not
made this showing here.  As such, defendant's weight of the evidence claim
cannot prevail.
¶ 10.        
Defendant next claims that the trial court committed prejudicial
reversible error when instructing the jury and poses three grounds for this
argument.
¶ 11.        
The first ground on which defendant claims jury instruction error was
the trial court's decision not to require the jury to choose and unanimously
agree upon one of the three possible mental states that can be used as a basis
to support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter or second degree murder:
intent to kill, intent to do great bodily harm, and wanton disregard of the
likelihood of death or great bodily harm.  Defendant argues that by
failing to require this unanimity, the jury charge violated defendant's
constitutional rights under Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution.
 It does not appear that defendant raised the constitutional argument at
trial, and thus it is waived.  See State v. Hinchliffe, 2009 VT
111, ¶ 31, 186 Vt. 487, 987 A.2d 988 (holding failure to preserve issues
below results in waiver, even of constitutional issues).  Even had proper
objection been made, there was no error, and defendant's argument cannot
prevail.  Defendant's contention is essentially that if twelve jurors
conclude a defendant possessed "intent to kill," a guilty verdict for voluntary
manslaughter or second degree murder could stand; likewise if all twelve jurors
conclude a defendant possessed intent to inflict "great bodily harm," a guilty
verdict could stand, but if eleven jurors agree a defendant had intent to kill
while one concludes instead that he acted with intent to inflict great bodily
harm or with wanton disregard, then the constitutionally required outcome would
be a hung jury and a retrial.  
¶ 12.        
We addressed the question of ascending mental states in State v.
Bolio, 159 Vt. 250, 253-54, 617 A.2d 885, 887 (1992), where we held that
"[w]hen the State establishe[s] the higher culpable mental state of specific
intent, it necessarily establishe[s] the lower state of recklessness or
negligence."  We explained that a person who acts purposely or knowingly
"acts in a more egregious manner than one who acts recklessly . . . the
person's level of intent has exceeded simply acting recklessly," and
thus the higher culpable mental state of specific intent necessarily
establishes the lower state of recklessness.  Id.  The same
holds true here: while a finding of wanton disregard is enough to satisfy the
intent prong of voluntary manslaughter, a finding of either of the two higher
mental states would also be adequate, as they each subsume wanton
disregard.  The element required to sustain a conviction of voluntary
manslaughter is that a defendant have "intent," and the three mental
states described above are merely other ways to demonstrate defendant had the
requisite intent.  As long as all jurors were unanimous on the ultimate
issue of intent, which of the three alternative methods used to inform each
decision as to intent is immaterial.  The trial court's instruction was
therefore proper.
¶ 13.        
Defendant next contends that the jury instructions were prejudicial
because the self defense-instruction was erroneous as it unduly emphasized the
State's theory of the case.  The instructions were as follows, with the
specific portion objected to underlined:
 
Finally, the State need disprove only one of the above circumstances justifying
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  The State need not disprove all
of the above circumstances justifying self-defense. For example, the State
may disprove any of the following circumstances: A belief by the defendant of
immediate-imminent risk of serious bodily injury or death; a reasonable belief
of imminent risk of serious bodily injury or death; or the force used was
necessary and proportionate and defendant was not at fault for bringing about
the situation surrounding the death.  If the State disproves any of the
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, you find that the Defendant did not
act in self-defense.  If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
State has not disproven self defense, you must find the Defendant not guilty of
the charge under consideration.  
 
Defendant objected that this instruction
overly emphasized the State's position.  In reviewing jury instructions,
we consider them in their entirety.  See State v. Viens, 2009 VT
64, ¶ 10, 186 Vt. 138, 978 A.2d 37.  "A party appealing a jury charge has
the burden of establishing that the charge was both clearly erroneous and
prejudicial. . . . Although the trial court has the responsibility to instruct
the jury fully and correctly on every point raised by the material evidence,
the degree of elaboration lies within its sound discretion."  Id.
(emphasis added).  The trial court's instruction, on its face, does not
emphasize any one party's case.  It is an iteration of the law by way of
examples.  The judge chose a specific list of what must be disproven, but
stated all of the prongs in the affirmative, giving no hint of which way the
court expected the jury should vote.  The instructions are not an erroneous
statement of law nor are they inherently prejudicial. 
¶ 14.        
Defendant argues that the supplemental instructions given upon request
of the jury were prejudicial as well because they overemphasized the State's
theory of the case.  During jury deliberations, the jury sent a note out
asking the following with regard to the jury instructions:
With
a self-defense claim, does the State only need to disprove (1) immediate
danger; and (2) use of force; OR (3) unreasonable force to acquit him on
grounds of self-defense?  Meaning if we believe the first two, but not
(3), do we still need to find him not guilty?
 
Defendant asked the court to read the entire
self-defense instruction back to the jury in response.   The
trial court denied this request noting that the jury's question was "pretty
clear" and that the jury already had printed copies of the entire charge in the
jury room.  The court then answered the jury's question regarding the
burden of proof by rereading the portion of the jury instructions quoted and
underlined, supra, ¶ 13.  Defendant argues that this action unduly
emphasized the State's position.  However, "[t]he necessity, extent and
character of supplementary instructions requested by a jury are matters that
are within the sound discretion of the trial court.  We will reverse only
upon a showing that the court abused its discretion and that prejudice
flowed from that abuse."  State v. West, 151 Vt. 140, 142-43, 557 A.2d 873, 875 (1988) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  That is,
defendant must show that the court not only abused its discretion but also that
the outcome of the jury's decision would have been different absent this
abuse.  Defendant has not shown that here.  There was substantial
evidence of guilt such that it is doubtful that this instruction had any effect
on the ultimate outcome.
¶ 15.        
Finally, defendant claims that the portion of the jury instructions
enumerating the elements of self-defense was erroneous because the court
required the purely subjective element of self-defenserelating to the honesty
of belief of imminent perilbe reasonable.  The jury instructions
defendant objects to are as follows:
Self
defense means that every person has the right to use a reasonable amount of
force to defend himself if he actually reasonably believes two things: (1) that
he is in immediate danger of bodily harm; and (2) that the use of such force
was necessary to avoid the danger.
 
According to defendant, by placing a
reasonableness requirement on the honesty prong, that is, the "purely
subjective inquiry," the court turned this into an objective test. 
However, requiring that a belief be subjectively reasonable is possible
and in fact, required in these instances.  Defendant actually quotes the
relevant portion of the seminal case for this point in his brief: "A defendant
must have an honest belief of imminent peril, but that honest belief by itself
is insufficient to invoke the defense.  The belief must be grounded in
reason." (quoting State v. Wheelock, 158 Vt. 302, 308, 609 A.2d 972, 976
(1992)).  No part of placing a reasonableness requirement on a subjective
inquiry makes it inherently objective.  Further, our case law requires
that the honestly held belief be reasonable.  Thus we find no error in
these instructions.
¶ 16.        
Defendant next contends that it was reversible error for the trial court
not to allow defendant to present evidence of specific incidents of threats by
the victim against others to support his claim of self-defense.  The court
did allow some evidence of specific prior incidents of threats against
defendant, specific incidents of violence against others, as well as evidence
of the victim's reputation for violence and intimidating behavior. 
Nonetheless, defendant points to five specific instances where he believes the
trial court erred in failing to allow testimony. 
¶ 17.        
Defendant first claims it was error for the trial court to disallow a
witness from testifying that she heard the victim threatening defendant.  However,
that witness did testify about this matter.  Thus, this contention is
baseless.
¶ 18.        
Defendant next claims that it was error for the trial court to disallow
testimony about the instances in which the victim put marijuana plants on
defendant's porch.  But there was repeated testimony on this topic. 
One witness testified to three separate instances when she returned from
shopping with defendant to find marijuana plants on his porch.  Defendant
testified that the night before the shooting he found marijuana plants on his
porch, threw them into the road, and called defendant's landlord to complain at
which point the victim appeared at his house screaming "I am going to kill
you."  Defendant's landlord also testified about the marijuana plants on
the porch.  Hence this contention is also baseless.  
¶ 19.        
Defendant claims it was error for the court to exclude testimony about
two specific instances of threatening behavior against persons other than
defendant.  In one instance, the victim shot a blue heron and then looked
menacingly at his neighbor when she wanted to help the bird.  In another,
the victim acted in a threatening manner, holding a cross bow, while a landlord
and a tenant argued about the tenant. moving out because she was not paying her
rent.
¶ 20.        
The trial court excluded this testimony about these matters on relevance
grounds.  The court found that as the incidents were only threats of
violence, rather than violent acts, they should be excluded pursuant to Vermont
Rule of Evidence 403.  The court found these threats had no great
probative value and their admission would create significant confusion. 
"We review trial courts' evidentiary rulings deferentially and reverse only
when there is an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice."  State v.
Spooner, 2010 VT 75, ¶ 15, __ Vt. __, 8 A.3d 469.  We find exclusion
of these incidents was a proper exercise of discretion.  Threats, as
opposed to actual violence, have limited relation to a self-defense claim,
i.e., that defendant reasonably and actually believed he was in immediate
danger of bodily harm and that he used reasonable force to avoid this danger.
 See Wheelock, 158 Vt. at 307, 609 A.2d  at 975-76.  While
evidence of previous violent acts could support an inference that defendant's
fear of imminent harm was actual and reasonable and the amount of force
he used in response was proportionate, evidence of mere threats against others
does not support an inference that defendant's fear of imminent harm was actual
and reasonable without more.  Further, given the volume of evidence in the
record of the victim's actual physical assaults against defendant and others,
his threats against defendant, and his reputation for violence, we find no
prejudice as a result of exclusion of this evidence.  The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in making this ruling.
¶ 21.        
Defendant next contends that the trial court should have allowed him to
testify that his landlord told him that if he did not stop calling the police,
the landlord was not going to be able to control the victim's response.
 Defendant claims this evidence is relevant to show that the victim was
the first aggressor on the day of the shooting, that the victim threatened
defendant with an axe handle, and that defendant actually and reasonably believed
that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury when he shot
the victim.  But this evidence was merely the opinion of a third person
about possible future events and thus was not relevant to the theory that the
victim was the first aggressor or that he threatened defendant with an axe
handle.  What defendant's landlord thought the victim might do is not
relevant to defendant's state of mind at the time of the killing. 
Additionally, the jury was allowed to hear evidence several times over about
instances in which defendant's landlord had to restrain the victim from
attacking defendant and heard testimony that the victim had told defendant's
landlord that defendant deserved a beating.  Thus even had the evidence
been relevant, its prejudice outweighed its probative value, and no harm
results from its exclusion.  The trial court's exclusion of this evidence
was proper.
¶ 22.        
Finally, defendant argues that the court should have admitted testimony
about the victim's alleged threat to burn down a neighbor's barn.  Again
defendant claims that this evidence was relevant to his claim that the victim
was the first aggressor, that he threatened defendant with an axe handle, and
that defendant believed he was in imminent danger.  However, defendant
never offered any evidence showing that defendant knew of this threat at the
time of the shooting, and thus it cannot be relevant to his then present state
of mind.  Defendant counters that it is probative of the victim's state of
mind, but the victim's state of mind is immaterial to the question of self
defense.  Further, the woman who had originally told police about this
alleged threat had changed her story by the time of trial.  Thus in order
to introduce the testimony, defendant would have had to put the reneging
witness on the stand and then after her denial of the incident, call the
officer to whom she reported it originally to refute her denial.  The
court excluded the evidence as nonprobative and tending to create confusion and
mislead the jury.  We agree.
¶ 23.        
Defendant's last argument concerns certain comments made by the State
during trial which he claims denied him a right to a fair trial.  The
statements concerned recordings of conversations between defendant and his
sister while he was in jail.  The recordings had been offered into
evidence, and the State twice referred to them as the "jailhouse
recordings."  In neither of these instances did defendant request a
mistrial.  Defendant did request a limiting instruction in the second
instance, which the court granted.  Post trial defendant sought a new
trial pursuant to Rule 33, but this was denied.  
¶ 24.        
"The trial court is in the best position to assess whether any comment,
in the context of the trial before it, is prejudicial enough to warrant a new
trial."  State v. Desautels, 2006 VT 84, ¶ 11, 180 Vt. 189, 908 A.2d 463.  While statements which "characterize[] the accused as a
hardened criminal and put his bad character and past criminal record squarely
before the jury," State v. Garceau, 122 Vt. 303, 306, 170 A.2d 623, 625
(1961), may require a new trial, the risk of prejudice is not the same when the
statements show that defendant was "merely in the correctional center pending
trial."  State v. Lawrence, 137 Vt. 597, 602, 409 A.2d 997, 1000
(1979) (overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Shea, 148 Vt. 307,
532 A.2d 571 (1987)).  In light of these standards, the comments made by
the State were harmless.  Preliminarily, the phrase "jailhouse recordings"
was used only twice in a brief manner and was likely of little significance to
the jury's ultimate decision in light of the other evidence presented. 
See Desautels, 2006 VT 84, ¶ 11 (police officer's testimony that she
arrested defendant at the office of his parole officer did not warrant a
mistrial where it appeared to be "insignificant in the context of the
evidence").  Further, the "jailhouse recordings" were dated August 28,
2008 and December 24, 2008after defendant had killed the victim.  The
logical inference to be drawn is that these recordings were made when defendant
was in jail awaiting trial for this crime.  No evidence was presented that
would lead the jury to conclude defendant had been incarcerated for other
crimes.  Thus, we find these statements harmless.
           
Affirmed.
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
  
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 

*  According to defendant, we cannot
consider the evidence that the victim attacked defendant with an axe handle
because it was offered by defendant and it is the prosecution's burden to prove
guilt.  While proving the elements of a crime is the prosecution's burden,
when a defendant offers evidence that proves a matter for the prosecution, the
jury and this Court may take cognizance of that evidence.  To follow
defendant's argument to its logical conclusion, a defendant who offers
testimony which conclusively proves his guilt, even a total admission, should
nevertheless go free if the prosecution does not elicit the same
testimony.  The absurdity of this argument is self evident.