Case Title: State ex rel. Dann v. Taft

Citation: 2006-Ohio-3677

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 110 Ohio St.3d 252, 2006-Ohio-3677.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DANN v. TAFT, GOVERNOR. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 110 Ohio St.3d 252, 2006-Ohio-3677.] 
Mandamus — Public records — R.C. 149.43 — Executive privilege — 
Gubernatorial communications — Requested materials already provided 
to relator — Writ denied. 
(No. 2005-1222 ─ Submitted July 18, 2006 ─ Decided July 21, 2006.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Relator, Marc Dann, filed this original action in mandamus seeking 
a writ ordering respondent Governor Bob Taft to disclose certain weekly reports 
that allegedly relate to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”) and that 
were prepared by various officials in the executive branch.  The parties filed 
competing discovery motions, presenting the issue whether the governor’s claim 
of executive privilege over those weekly reports is valid. 
{¶ 2} The governor urged this court to recognize an absolute privilege, a 
suggestion all members of this court rejected. State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472 (“Dann v. Taft I”).  By contrast, 
courts in several states recognized absolute gubernatorial executive privilege as 
early as the 19th Century as a matter of common law based on principles of 
separation of powers. See Annotation, Construction and Application, Under State 
Law, of Doctrine of “Executive Privilege” (1981), 10 A.L.R.4th 355, 357. 
Absolute privilege is based on the theory that “the coequal status of the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches would be disrupted if one branch, the 
judiciary, were empowered to compel another branch, the executive, to disclose 
information against its will.”  Id. 
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{¶ 3} Some form of executive privilege has long been accorded the 
executive branch by state courts as a matter of the common law of evidence, 
including courts in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Maryland, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See Annotation, 
supra, 10 A.L.R.4th 355, Sections 2(b) and 4.  See, also, Nero v. Hyland (1978), 
76 N.J. 213, 386 A.2d 846; Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm. (Del.Super.1995), 
659 A.2d 777; Wilson v. Los Angeles Cty. Super. Court (1996), 51 Cal.App.4th 
1136, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 537. 
{¶ 4} Consistent with this weight of authority, this court recognized not 
an absolute but a qualified gubernatorial-communications privilege in Dann v. 
Taft I, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472.  We drew upon the 
decisions of a number of federal and state courts in crafting a three-step analytical 
framework for Ohio courts to follow when required to resolve a conflict between 
a requester of gubernatorial communications and a governor who claims that 
those communications are privileged.  Id. at ¶ 62-72. 
{¶ 5} We initiated the process established in Dann v. Taft I by issuing an 
order 
allowing 
Governor 
Taft 
to 
formally 
assert 
the 
gubernatorial-
communications privilege and authorizing Dann to thereafter submit a statement 
describing his particularized need to review any weekly reports the governor 
might assert to be privileged.  Id. at ¶ 74. 
{¶ 6} Governor Taft timely submitted a sworn affidavit stating that he 
had provided Dann with all the communications Dann had sought regarding the 
BWC and asserting the qualified gubernatorial-communications privilege as to 
other documents.  See State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 110 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-
2947, 850 N.E.2d 27 (“Dann v. Taft II”).  Dann thereafter proffered his assertion 
of particularized need to obtain the documents withheld by the governor. 
{¶ 7} In his proffer, Dann stated that he, as an Ohio employer, had 
contributed to the Ohio Workers' Compensation Fund.  Id. at ¶ 11.  That assertion 
January Term, 2006 
3 
arguably could have met the test for particularized need if the governor possessed 
the records that Dann said the governor possessed.  But Dann also claimed that he 
was “a taxpayer who paid taxes into the general fund used to finance the 
operations of most of the state departments and agencies reporting to Governor 
Taft” and had “paid gasoline taxes used to finance the operations of the Ohio 
Department of Transportation and the State Highway Patrol.”  He stated that he 
believed that he had “every reason to be concerned” that a “climate of corruption” 
had affected state government agencies other than the BWC, and that he had made 
his public records request “[a]s a taxpayer” because he was considering pursuing 
a taxpayers’ action “to enjoin illegal contract or other unauthorized use of public 
funds and, where appropriate, to recoup the lost funds.” 
{¶ 8} That basis for asserting particularized need goes far afield of 
Dann’s complaint in mandamus and is not appropriately asserted in this case.1  
Even assuming that Dann’s status as an Ohio taxpayer could serve as a premise 
for particularized need, it would not be sufficient in this case. 
                                                 
1. 
{¶ a} The relator’s complaint clearly is focused  on the denial of public records 
concerning the BWC, as illustrated by the following statements, in that pleading:  
 
{¶ b} “(1)  This is an original action for a writ of mandamus *** compelling the 
respondent to *** make available to Relator periodic, routine reports from certain officials in the 
Bureau of Worker’s [sic] Compensation (‘BWC’), for the years 1998-2005. *** 
 
{¶ c} “(2)  *** Senator Dann, on behalf of himself and his constituents, sought to obtain 
more detailed information regarding the Governor’s awareness of  the investment practices of the 
Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (‘BWC’) and its related entities through public records 
requests under the Ohio Public Records Act. ***    
 
[¶ d} “(3) Relator believes access to public records involving communications between 
BWC officials and the Governor are of great importance ***.   
 
{¶ e} “*** 
 
{¶ f} “(14)  As a result of the Respondent’s unlawful and arbitrary refusal to provide 
many of the requested documents (especially most of the communications from BWC 
Administrator  and any of the communications from the BWC Media Relations official), Relator is 
unable to determine the full extent and timing of Respondent Taft’s knowledge of the BWC’s 
investment practices and related losses.” 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 9} In order to overcome an assertion of qualified gubernatorial-
communications privilege, a requester “must demonstrate particularized, rather 
than generalized, need and explain why that need outweighs the qualified 
privilege.”  Dann v. Taft I, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472, 
¶67.  Dann’s status as a taxpayer who paid taxes into the general fund and paid 
gasoline taxes is shared by nearly all adult Ohio citizens.  There is nothing 
particularized about a need asserted on that basis.  Nor would the fact that Dann 
may be contemplating the filing of a taxpayer suit alleging unspecified 
misconduct on the part of government officials demonstrate a particularized need, 
because, in the absence of statutory authority, a taxpayer in his position lacks 
standing to file a taxpayer suit. State ex rel. Masterson v. Ohio State Racing 
Comm. (1954), 162 Ohio St. 366, 55 O.O. 215, 123 N.E.2d 1.  Ohio law does not 
authorize a private Ohio citizen, acting individually and without official authority, 
to prosecute government officials suspected of misconduct based on the citizen’s 
status as a taxpayer of general taxes, including the gasoline tax. 
{¶ 10} In contrast, longstanding Ohio law does recognize that a taxpayer 
with a “special interest” in particular public funds has standing to seek equitable 
relief in a court of equity to remedy a wrong committed by public officers in the 
management of those funds.  Id.; Racing Guild of Ohio, Local 304, Serv. Emps. 
Internatl. Union, AFL-CIO v. Ohio State Racing Comm. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 
317, 28 OBR 386, 503 N.E.2d 1025.  Dann arguably has a “special interest” in the 
management of the Worker’s Compensation Fund because he had paid into that 
fund as an employer.  Dann v. Taft II, 110 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-2947, 850 
N.E.2d 27, ¶ 16.  It is the existence of that arguable special interest in the 
Workers’ Compensation Fund that differentiates Dann’s need to access 
gubernatorial communications concerning that fund from his generalized need to 
review communications regarding other Ohio executive departments.  Dann 
confined his complaint to seeking communications relating to the BWC, and he 
January Term, 2006 
5 
has failed to state a credible theory that he has standing to initiate a taxpayer 
action based on his speculations of misconduct on the part of departments and 
agencies other than the BWC. 
{¶ 11} In his assertion of the gubernatorial-communications privilege, the 
governor stated that he had “voluntarily waived executive privilege as to any 
Weekly Reports pertaining to the BWC” and had already provided Dann “all the 
information he sought related to the BWC.”  Dann has repeatedly claimed, 
without supporting affidavits or other evidence, that the governor possesses 
records relating to the BWC that would implicate the governor in some 
inappropriate conduct.  The governor by sworn affidavit responded that he had 
provided Dann with all communications regarding the BWC.  We ordered the 
governor to submit the communications under seal to the court for our in camera 
review in order to resolve the factual issue.  Dann v. Taft II, 110 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2006-Ohio-2947, 850 N.E.2d 27.  In this unusual case,2 resolution of the factual 
dispute between the parties relating to the contents of the records is potentially 
dispositive of the cause.  If the governor has, in fact, already provided Dann all 
weekly reports that related to Dann’s arguable need for information relative to the 
BWC, then Dann no longer has any need, either particularized or generalized, for 
disclosure of additional records. 
{¶ 12} The governor complied with the order issued in Dann v. Taft II by 
submitting documents in three categories: (1) unredacted versions of documents 
previously provided to Dann in redacted format, (2) documents previously 
withheld from Dann that contain no reference to the BWC, and (3) copies of 
                                                 
2.  In analogous cases in other jurisdictions, it is clear that the governor actually possessed the 
records sought by the moving party.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Los Angeles Cty. Super. Court (1996), 51 
Cal.App.4th 1136, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 (applications submitted to a governor by persons seeking 
appointed office); Doe v. Alaska Super. Court, Third Judicial Dist. (Alaska 1986), 721 P.2d 617 
(letters from private citizens opposing a particular candidate for appointment to a state board); 
Hamilton v. Verdow (1980), 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (investigative report compiled in 
confidence at the request of a governor). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
documents that had been previously provided to Dann in redacted form.  The 
justices of this court have reviewed all of these documents. 
{¶ 13} Despite Dann’s repeated assertions that the governor withheld 
from public scrutiny certain documents, our careful review of the voluminous 
documents submitted by the governor produces two factual conclusions: (1) none 
of the redactions made by the governor in the weekly reports already provided to 
Dann relate to the BWC or to any persons doing business with the BWC and (2) 
none of the other weekly reports withheld from Dann, but submitted to this court, 
include information relating to the BWC.  Our review verifies the governor’s 
statements that the documents submitted to the court for in camera review do not 
contain any materials concerning the BWC that have not previously been 
disclosed to Dann.  Accordingly we need not proceed beyond the second step of 
the procedural framework prescribed in Dann v. Taft I, because Dann has failed to 
meet his burden of demonstrating particularized need. However, in this seminal 
case, disposition of that issue does not fully resolve the matter. 
{¶ 14} The complaint in mandamus filed in this case required the court, 
for the first time, to consider whether Ohio should recognize a gubernatorial 
executive privilege.  Most cases raising issues concerning executive privilege are 
resolved pursuant to the common law, i.e., no statute or express constitutional 
provision is implicated. See, e.g., Herald Assn., Inc. v. Dean (2002), 174 Vt. 350, 
816 A.2d 469.  Rather they are decided pursuant to fundamental principles of 
American government—the distribution of equal power among the three branches 
of government.  See, e.g., Office of Governor v. Washington Post Co. (2000), 360 
Md. 520, 759 A.2d 249.  It is not uncommon for courts of last resort to be the 
final arbiters of the fair and appropriate distribution of these powers. 
{¶ 15} In Dann v. Taft II we did not prescribe the bounds of the qualified 
gubernatorial-communications privilege, preferring to do that in the context of the 
submission of communications for which the governor might assert the privilege.  
January Term, 2006 
7 
The full contents of the communications, including their possibly sensitive nature, 
were then unknown to us.  It is now in the best interest of this governor, and 
particularly, future governors and the public that we more precisely define the 
scope of that privilege. 
{¶ 16} The governor stated as follows in asserting qualified gubernatorial-
communications privilege: 
{¶ 17} “I want to make clear that I am not asserting the privilege with 
respect to any documents requested by Senator Dann that contain information 
pertaining to the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (‘BWC’).  In fact, I 
have waived any privilege related to the hundreds of documents that have already 
been provided to Senator Dann. * * *  
{¶ 18} “* * * 
{¶ 19} “* * * These reports and/or redacted material contain information 
pertaining to other cabinet agencies or other matters unrelated to the BWC. 
{¶ 20} “* * * 
{¶ 21} “* * * I personally reviewed these reports each week and relied on 
them to assist me in identifying issues that raised potential policy concerns, 
required my direct attention or input, or needed further review by my office.  In 
addition, I used these weekly reports (and those from the other Executive 
Assistants and cabinet directors) as a tool for structuring my internal staff 
meetings, which are an important part of the process I use to deliberate on issues, 
formulate policy and make decisions. 
{¶ 22} “* * * Based on my review of the Business and Industry Weekly 
Reports, I conclude that they all meet the criteria for the gubernatorial-
communications privilege because they are communications from the Executive 
Assistant for Business and Industry that were prepared for the purpose of 
fostering informed and sound gubernatorial deliberations, policymaking, and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
decisionmaking.  None of the Business and Industry Weekly Reports for which I 
am now asserting the privilege contain information related to the BWC.” 
{¶ 23} In his memorandum accompanying his affidavit, weekly reports to 
the governor were described as follows: 
{¶ 24} “[T]he Weekly Reports in question contain information relayed 
confidentially by businesses considering closing or opening an office, plant, or 
research facility in Ohio, and other confidential information about business 
expansion plans or state incentive offers. * * *  Weekly Reports also contain 
information about hiring/personnel action such as disciplining an employee or 
recruiting a potential new hire. * * *Weekly Reports also contain information 
with respect to the Governor’s legislative strategy.  * * * Such sensitive and 
timely information from the Governor’s advisors that relays significant events, 
areas of concern, and other issues warrants the Governor’s attention and may 
require action by the Governor in the form of advice, recommendation, or a 
decision. 
{¶ 25} “The confidentiality of the Weekly Reports allows the Governor to 
have open and honest communications from his cabinet directors and policy 
advisors.  Weekly Reports aid gubernatorial deliberations, policymaking, and 
decisionmaking by giving the Governor timely information coupled with the 
opportunity to reflect upon the information and discuss it with key advisors or 
obtain additional information or clarification before he has to formulate a 
response or make a decision.” 
{¶ 26} These statements imply that the governor deems the full contents 
of all written weekly reports from executive staff members to be within the scope 
of the qualified gubernatorial-communications privilege described in Dann v. Taft 
I.  That conclusion is not unreasonable in view of the general definition 
announced in Dann v. Taft I.  But that interpretation is too broad, and we now 
define qualified gubernatorial-communications privilege more precisely. 
January Term, 2006 
9 
{¶ 27} Initially we note that all the members of this court, including those 
who dissented in Dann v. Taft I, agreed that some form of common-law executive 
privilege should be accorded Ohio governors.  One justice writing separately 
observed that “[l]ying at the heart of the executive privilege for presidential or 
gubernatorial communications ‘is the necessity for protection of the public 
interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential [or 
gubernatorial] decisionmaking.  A President [or governor] and those who assist 
him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and 
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express 
except privately.’ ” (Emphasis added.)  Dann v. Taft I, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-
Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472, ¶ 76 (Resnick, J., dissenting), quoting United States 
v. Nixon (1974), 418 U.S. 683, 708, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039. 
{¶ 28} The second dissenting justice wrote: “Certainly, the governor is 
entitled to privacy in the making of decisions, and, to that end, the common law 
recognizes the ‘deliberative process’ privilege.  The deliberative-process privilege 
‘allows the government to withhold documents and other materials that would 
reveal “advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of 
a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” ’  In re 
Sealed Case (C.A.D.C.1997), 121 F.3d 729, 737, quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. 
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena (D.D.C.1966), 40 F.R.D. 318, 324.  The aim of the 
privilege is to encourage unrestrained debate in the formulation of policy, but to 
keep public purely factual information.”  109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 
848 N.E.2d 472, at ¶ 89 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 29} The differences reflected in the several opinions in Dann v. Taft I 
were not differences regarding the propriety of recognizing an executive privilege 
for a governor, a privilege widely recognized throughout the country.  Rather the 
opinions reflect different views as to the procedural burdens to be placed on the 
competing parties when a governor has been the subject of a public-records 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
request but refuses to comply. The majority accorded the governor a presumption 
that his invocation of gubernatorial-communications privilege was appropriate in 
the absence of a demonstration by a requester of particularized need to review the 
documents.  Those who dissented believed that an Ohio governor should not 
benefit from such a presumption. 
{¶ 30} Many courts have recognized that the scope of a governor’s 
executive privilege overlaps the more general deliberative-process privilege in 
significant ways.  The differences between the gubernatorial-communications 
privilege we recognized in Dann v. Taft I and the deliberative-process privilege 
primarily concern the underpinnings of the two privileges and the identity of 
individuals entitled to assert them.  As we observed in Dann v. Taft I, the 
gubernatorial-communications privilege is grounded on the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers, while the deliberative-process privilege is 
grounded in the common law of evidence.  Id. at ¶ 43.  The deliberative-process 
privilege is actually broader in one sense than the gubernatorial-communications 
privilege because it may be asserted by various executive officials, while only a 
governor may assert the gubernatorial-communications privilege.  Id. at ¶ 42. 
{¶ 31} It is clear from Dann v. Taft I that it is initially the governor’s 
decision to assert gubernatorial-communications privilege when gubernatorial 
documents are requested by a member of the public.  However, we also stated in 
Dann v. Taft I: “The gubernatorial-communications privilege protects the public 
by allowing the state’s chief executive the freedom that is required to make 
decisions.” (Emphasis added.) 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 
472, ¶ 56.  We recognized that the privilege advances the public’s interest in 
sound executive decisionmaking. Id., citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 
708, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039.  In addition we cautioned that executive 
privilege “should not be lightly invoked.”  Id. at ¶ 70. 
January Term, 2006 
11 
{¶ 32} Our recognition of a qualified gubernatorial-communications 
privilege did not equate to a judicial stamp of imprimatur on blanket secrecy of all 
written communications to or from the governor.  Nothing in Dann v. Taft I 
warrants the conclusion that a governor may invoke the privilege to exempt from 
the Public Records Act purely informational public records not associated with a 
specific issue requiring contemporaneous decisionmaking of the governor. 
{¶ 33} The fact that a public record possessed by a governor has some 
privileged content does not justify a governor in withholding the nonprivileged 
portions of the public record from a Public Records Act requester.  Our review of 
the weekly reports provided to us by the governor for in camera review prompts 
us to clarify that many written communications to and from the governor simply 
do not concern “sensitive decisional and consultative responsibilities of the 
Governor”3 and have little if anything to do with gubernatorial policymaking or 
decisionmaking except in the most general way.  To be considered “made for the 
purpose of fostering informed and sound gubernatorial deliberations, 
policymaking, and decisionmaking,” and thus subject to the exemption created by 
the General Assembly for “records the release of which is prohibited by state or 
federal law,” R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v), communications must rise above the merely 
informational and must possess some attribute of being “advisory, investigatory, 
decisional, consultative, deliberative, or sensitive” in nature.  Cf.  Dann v. Taft I, 
109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472,  at  ¶81 (Resnick, J., 
dissenting).  Purely informational communications that serve as status reports for 
the governor relating to the activities of a subordinate or an executive department 
do not fall within the scope of the gubernatorial-communications privilege and are 
thus not exempt from the Public Records Act. 
                                                 
3.  Nero v. Hyland (1978), 76 N.J. 213, 225-226, 386 A.2d 846.    
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 34} It follows that many written communications to the governor 
remain subject to disclosure pursuant to the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43.  
The governor is not generally exempt from the purview of the Public Records Act 
simply because he or she possesses a qualified privilege to withhold from the 
public communications integral to gubernatorial deliberations, policymaking, and 
decisionmaking.  When in doubt whether information requested falls within the 
scope of the privilege, the governor should disclose it. 
{¶ 35} In order to be protected by the qualified privilege, the 
communication must relate directly to a specific decision required of or sought 
from the governor.  It must be used by the governor in the process of arriving at a 
decision.  An example of such a circumstance would be the following: Two bills 
introduced in the General Assembly relate to the distribution of electricity by 
companies regulated by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio.  One bill would 
be economically attractive to individual consumers of electricity, and the other 
bill would offer incentives to industrial users of electricity.  The governor has 
been requested to state his or her support or opposition to each of the bills, which 
arguably benefit different groups of consumers.  Written communications are 
submitted to the governor arguing for and against his support of the legislation. 
{¶ 36} Those communications would be privileged because they would be 
used to assist the governor in making a decision with respect to a specific issue.  
A memo to the governor regarding only the status of the legislation, i.e., one that 
requires the governor to make no decision, would not be privileged. 
{¶ 37} We recognize that a governor could argue that every piece of 
information, every communication, virtually every conversation, collectively 
inform a governor, building the governor’s reservoir of useful knowledge 
available to every gubernatorial decision.  Such an application of gubernatorial 
privilege is overbroad.  Also outside the bounds of the privilege are observations 
January Term, 2006 
13 
in communications to the governor that merely reflect unfavorably upon an 
individual or an entity. 
{¶ 38} There is another category of topics that find their way into 
communications to a governor that, while not protected by a gubernatorial 
privilege, may be shielded from public access by legislation or other principles of 
law.  Such topics include communications regarding trade secrets or the security 
of an individual, a building, or a community.4 
{¶ 39} Our review of the weekly reports submitted to the governor in this 
case causes us to conclude that most of the communications are status reports, 
information regarding upcoming events, reports regarding plans of various 
companies relating to their business where a decision by the company is probably 
now public, and miscellaneous reports on topical current events.  Documents of 
that nature are not covered by the qualified executive privilege and are therefore 
subject to disclosure pursuant to R.C. 149.43. 
{¶ 40} Another category of the communications submitted by the 
governor for our review is composed of reports that, at the time the report was 
given to the governor, provided information regarding economic or business 
decisions of companies.  Such reports arguably should be confidential until a 
public announcement is made by the company.  It is not possible for us to 
determine from the records submitted by the governor whether such memoranda, 
most of which were prepared in 2003, should continue to be confidential.  In most 
instances, the time within which a company would have announced or 
implemented a decision has probably passed, but this court should not 
presumptively make that decision. 
{¶ 41} We conclude that most, if not all, of the communications submitted 
by the governor are not protected by the qualified executive privilege and are 
                                                 
4.  It would be appropriate for the General Assembly to consider adopting legislation that could 
define these and other topics. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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therefore subject to R.C. 149.43.  If an appropriate public record request is made, 
those communications would not be shielded. 
{¶ 42} We deny Dann’s request for a writ of mandamus, however, since 
all weekly reports relating to the BWC have previously been provided to him by 
the governor. 
Writ denied. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 43} For the past year, the governor has been claiming that the 
executive decisionmaking process would virtually collapse if the weekly reports 
at issue were to be released to the public.  He has requested and received from this 
court a protective privilege that is rarely afforded to presidents.  Yet in the final 
analysis, these records have proved to be so innocuous, mundane, and unrelated to 
the decisional process that the five members of the majority who originally graced 
the governor with a presumptive privilege have been compelled to find them 
unworthy of protection even though the relator has purportedly failed to meet the 
majority’s requirement of particularized need. 
{¶ 44} The governor has seriously misrepresented the nature and import 
of the information contained within the disputed weekly reports in his efforts to 
secure an executive privilege in this case, and he should bear the inevitable 
consequences.  The governor should not be saved by the majority’s mysterious 
decision to deny the writ while rejecting the governor’s attempt to invoke the 
privilege. 
{¶ 45} In rejecting the governor’s claim of privilege as to the records 
submitted under seal, the majority concludes that “most, if not all, of the 
January Term, 2006 
15 
communications submitted by the governor are not protected by the qualified 
executive privilege and are therefore subject to R.C. 149.43.”  See ¶ 41.  Quoting 
from my dissent in State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St.3d 364, 2006-Ohio-
1825, 848 N.E.2d 472, at ¶ 8 (“Dann v. Taft I”), the majority now clarifies that to 
fall 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
gubernatorial-communications 
privilege, 
“communications must rise above the merely informational, and must possess 
some attribute of being ‘advisory, investigatory, decisional, consultative, 
deliberative, or sensitive’ in nature.”  See ¶ 33.  I concur in this aspect of the 
majority’s decision. 
{¶ 46} In denying the writ, however, the majority places the proverbial 
cart before the horse by requiring the relator to show a particularized need for 
documents that are not covered by the privilege in the first place.  The governor 
has waived any privilege with respect to communications pertaining to the Bureau 
of Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”), and the majority has found that the 
withheld documents “are not covered by the qualified executive privilege and are 
therefore subject to disclosure pursuant to R.C. 149.43.”  See ¶ 39.  Why, then, 
should Dann be required to show a particularized need for any of the records?  It 
makes no sense to impose a requirement that arises only by virtue of a privilege 
that is not applicable. 
{¶ 47} According to the majority, “Dann confined his complaint to 
seeking communications relating to the BWC.”  See ¶ 10.  Thus, the majority 
denies Dann’s request for a writ of mandamus because “all weekly reports 
relating to the BWC have previously been provided to him by the governor.”  See  
¶ 42. 
{¶ 48} I cannot agree with the majority’s finding that Dann’s requests 
have been limited to information concerning the BWC.  While Dann’s original 
complaint was primarily directed at obtaining BWC-related records, it also 
alleged that “[o]n June 16, 2005, the Relator made three additional written 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
requests pursuant to the Ohio Public Records Act.  The first request sought 
weekly memoranda and other periodic reports from James Samuel (Governor’s 
liaison to the BWC) and/or his predecessors to the Office of the Governor for the 
years 1998-2005.”  In a related affidavit, which was filed with the court nine 
months before it decided Dann v. Taft I, Dann specifically stated, “Although the 
BWC scandals motivated my request, I wanted the weekly reports for all 
information they contained concerning state government operations whether or 
not they involved the BWC.” 
{¶ 49} Moreover, if Dann’s requests were actually limited to records 
pertaining to the BWC, there would have been no controversy for the court to 
decide in the first instance.  Long before the court decided the issue of privilege in 
Dann v. Taft I, the governor had waived the assertion of any privilege over 
weekly reports or portions thereof concerning the BWC.  There was simply no 
need to determine in Dann v. Taft I whether a privilege attaches to those records, 
since the governor was no longer asserting a privilege over them.  But the court 
did decide the issue of privilege with respect to something that was in dispute, and 
that something was the only weekly reports for which the governor continued to 
seek protection under the executive privilege, i.e., the weekly reports from 
Samuel that do not contain information relating to the BWC. 
{¶ 50} Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s decision to the extent that it 
finds the gubernatorial-communications privilege inapplicable to the withheld 
reports, but dissent from its decision to deny the writ of mandamus and require 
Dann to reassert his request for the Samuel reports.  It is pointless to insist that 
Dann must take still more action under R.C. 149.43 to obtain disclosure of these 
documents.  The governor should not be afforded any further opportunity to delay 
the release of these public records. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
January Term, 2006 
17 
{¶ 51} Our in camera review of the records the governor sought to 
withhold reveals a collection of information so inane, so inconsequential, and so 
insignificant that taken together it could not generate one interesting newspaper 
story.  But it has generated still another opinion by this court. 
{¶ 52} I do not choose to reargue or reinterpret Taft I.  As for the question 
arising today, we can all agree that the reports at issue are public records and that 
the governor may exert no privilege to prevent their disclosure.  I depart from the 
majority’s determination to deny a writ of mandamus.  Relator has asked for all 
the records that this court determines today to be public.  For instance, in his 
public records request of June 16, 2005, relator requested from the governor “[a]ll 
weekly memoranda, weekly reports, or other periodic reports required by statute 
or office procedure or practice from James Samuel and James Samuel’s 
predecessor(s) to the Governor from the years 1998-2005.”  That same request 
became the basis for part of relator’s complaint in mandamus.  At paragraph ten 
of his complaint, relator states: 
{¶ 53} “(10) On June 16, 2005, the Relator made three additional written 
requests pursuant to the Ohio Public Records Act. The first request sought weekly 
memoranda and other periodic reports from James Samuel (Governor’s liaison to 
the BWC) and/or his predecessors to the Office of the Governor for the years 
1998-2005.” 
{¶ 54} Relator asserted in his complaint for mandamus that the governor 
failed to provide the requested records and sought a writ of mandamus to force 
their disclosure.  Relator did not limit his public records request or his complaint 
in mandamus to Samuel’s memoranda specifically relating to the BWC.  He asked 
for all of the reports.  The governor released to relator only reports relating to the 
BWC.  But that was not an act of largesse by the governor; it was a failure to 
respond completely to the relator’s legitimate public records request.  No matter 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
what the relator’s particular area of interest was, he asked for all of the Samuel 
memoranda. 
{¶ 55} If the majority is right that relator sought only records specifically 
relating to the BWC, then much of this court's time and many trees have been 
needlessly sacrificed.  Could it be true that all of this litigation was over a bunch 
of records that no one ever asked for?  If so, this matter could have been solved 
well short of this court’s creation of a gubernatorial-communications privilege.  
The governor need merely have said, “I gave relator everything he asked for.”  
What the governor really did was to claim that everything was privileged, but 
released the records he deemed relevant to the relator’s interest.  The balance of 
what relator sought has been the focus of this matter.  Today we hold that all of 
those records are public. 
{¶ 56} Accordingly, since the relator had a right to see everything he 
sought, I would grant the writ of mandamus.  Further, I would award attorney fees 
to the relator, since he meets this court’s two-pronged test for such an award.  
First, the public has an unquestioned interest in the competent and ethical 
administration of the state’s workers’ compensation system, and so relator has 
established a public benefit.  Second, the respondent has failed to comply with 
this legitimate records request for invalid reasons.  State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. 
v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 106 Ohio St.3d 113, 2005-Ohio-6549, 832 
N.E.2d 711, ¶ 24. 
__________________ 
Gittes & Schulte, Frederick M. Gittes, and Kathaleen B. Schulte, for 
relator. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., 
Kathleen M. Trafford, and Bryan R. Faller, for respondent. 
______________________