Case Title: Dougherty v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-2365

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-2365 
____________ 
 
BERNARD J. DOUGHERTY,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 16, 2014] 
 
LABARGA, C.J. 
 
Bernard Joseph Dougherty seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Dougherty v. State, 96 So. 3d 984 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), on the 
ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Macaluso v. State, 12 So. 3d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), on a 
question of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the 
following reasons, we quash in part the Fifth District’s decision in Dougherty and 
approve Macaluso to the extent it is consistent with this opinion because a 
defendant’s stipulation to his own competency does not absolve the trial court from 
its duty to independently make a determination of a defendant’s competency to 
 
 
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proceed.  As discussed in more detail below, however, Dougherty’s claim is 
procedurally barred.      
FACTS 
 
Dougherty was charged with resisting an officer with violence; acquiring a 
controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge; 
and criminal use of personal identification information in March 2000.1  Shortly 
thereafter, the trial court entered an order appointing three experts for a 
competency determination.2  In August 2002, the court entered an order declaring 
Dougherty incompetent to proceed to trial, and Dougherty was committed to the 
Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF).  In the order, the trial court 
noted that Dougherty was diagnosed with psychotic disorder and could not 
presently understand the charges or allegations.     
 
On January 24, 2003, the trial court entered an order to transfer Dougherty to 
the Florida Department of Corrections because DCF determined that Dougherty no 
longer met the criteria for commitment.  On February 28, 2003, Dougherty 
                                          
 
 
1.  He failed to appear for the first scheduled trial on September 9, 2000, 
because he fled to Pennsylvania.  The State became aware of his whereabouts 
because he was arrested in Pennsylvania.     
 
2.  The trial court appointed the following three experts: William Riebsame, 
Ph.D., Howard Bernstein, Ph.D., and Burton Podnos, M.D.   
 
 
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appeared before the court for a status hearing regarding competency.  The 
following is the entire transcript of the status hearing:  
THE COURT: State of Florida versus Bernard Dougherty.   
 
MR. [JACK] GILMORE: Your Honor, this is Mr. Dougherty 
who just returned from the State Hospital.  This would be a comp 
review.   
Apparently, the hospital feels Mr. Dougherty is capable of 
going forward and we would request that since they feel he’s capable 
of going forward, I talked to Mr. Dougherty briefly this morning, and 
he feels he’s ready to go forward.  We would like to have this set for 
the next docket sounding. 
THE COURT: State? 
THE STATE: April 21st. 
THE COURT: Set for docket sounding then on April 21st as 
requested.  
 
Subsequently, on July 10, 2003, defense counsel filed a motion to determine 
Dougherty’s competency to stand trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.210(a).  The trial court granted the motion and appointed three experts 
for a competency determination.3  The experts were directed to submit written 
reports to the court, with copies to the attorneys, on September 3, 2003.  On 
September 10, 2003, the parties appeared before the Court for a competency 
hearing.  The following is the entire transcript of this proceeding:  
THE COURT: This is the matter of the State of Florida versus 
Bernard Dougherty.  Who’s got that case? 
MR. [JAMES] MCMASTER [STATE ATTORNEY]: Judge, 
Ms. Cobrand and I.  It should not be that complicated.   
                                          
 
 
3.  The three experts were: Dr. Riebsame, Dr. Bernstein, and David 
Greenblum, Ph.D.       
 
 
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MS. [SHEENA] COBRAND [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: We 
did get the evaluations back from the three doctors, so we will 
stipulate he is competent to proceed.  
THE COURT: Very good.  We’ll put it on just the regular 
docket sounding then.   
MR. MCMASTER: It’s already scheduled for October 8 docket 
sounding.   
MS. COBRAND: Judge, if we can do the 10/8 one, that way we 
can get everything together and we’ll be ready to go.  
THE COURT: What are his pending charges? 
MR. MCMASTER: Resisting an officer with violence, 
acquiring controlled substance from misrepresentation and fraudulent 
use of personal ID. 
THE COURT: So that might not be able to be resolved; does it? 
MR. MCMASTER: We’ll bring in the officer.  He is a [prison 
releasee reoffender] criminal.   
THE COURT: Okay.  All right.   
 
The court did not refer to Dougherty’s competency again and did not enter a 
written order determining that Dougherty was competent to proceed to trial.  
Nevertheless, the matter proceeded to a two-day jury trial on the charges of 
resisting arrest with violence, and acquiring a controlled substance by 
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge.  The jury found 
Dougherty guilty of both charges.4  Dougherty was sentenced to prison for 
consecutive ten-year sentences as a habitual felony offender.     
 
On April 19, 2009, Dougherty filed an amended motion to correct an illegal 
sentence.  The trial court summarily denied the amended motion and Dougherty 
appealed.  The Fifth District reversed in part, finding that the trial court erred in 
                                          
 
 
4.  The State dismissed the criminal use of personal identification charge.   
 
 
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sentencing Dougherty as a habitual felony offender for the charge of acquiring a 
controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge.  
On July 2, 2010, nearly seven years after the September 10, 2003, competency 
hearing, Dougherty appeared for resentencing.  At this resentencing hearing, 
defense counsel raised the issue of Dougherty’s competency, alleging that 
Dougherty had never been evaluated and did not have a hearing regarding 
competency.  On August 11, 2010, Dougherty again appeared at a hearing for 
resentencing, and again defense counsel raised the issue of Dougherty’s 
competency.  The trial court, however, did not consider the competency issue.  
Instead, the court resentenced Dougherty, finding that Dougherty was a habitual 
felony offender as to count one—resisting an officer with violence.  The trial court 
reduced the sentence for count two— acquiring a controlled substance by 
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge—to five years, to run 
consecutively with the sentence of count one.     
 
Dougherty raised the issue of his competency on appeal to the Fifth District.  
Dougherty, 96 So. 3d at 984.  Dougherty argued that the lack of a written order 
adjudicating him competent required reversal of his conviction and a new trial.  Id. 
at 985.  He also argued that he did not receive a proper and sufficient hearing.  Id.  
The Fifth District held that the lack of a written order could be cured without a new 
trial because it was apparent from the record that the trial court found Dougherty 
 
 
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competent based on the representation and stipulation of defense counsel.  Further, 
the Fifth District held that the hearing was sufficient because the trial court was 
authorized to base its competency finding on written evaluations stipulated to by 
Dougherty at a properly scheduled competency hearing.  Id.   
Dougherty filed a timely notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of 
this Court alleging conflict with Macaluso, in which the defendant was found 
incompetent and sent to a facility.  12 So. 3d at 915.  Five months later, the court 
held a hearing at which defense counsel informed the court that Macaluso had been 
found competent based on evaluations obtained by the Public Defender’s Office.  
Id.  Without additional evidence or a hearing, the court declared Macaluso 
competent to proceed to trial.  Macaluso’s attorney later informed the court before 
jury selection that facility doctors had also found him competent to be tried.  After 
he was found guilty of multiple offenses, he appealed the conviction on the 
grounds that the competency issue was improperly decided.  The Fourth District 
held that the conviction had to be set aside and Macaluso was entitled to a new trial 
if determined to be competent because Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.212(c)(7) did not contemplate lawyers stipulating to restored competency 
without an evidentiary hearing.5  Id.  The Fourth District reasoned that it had 
                                          
 
 
5.  In Jones v. State, 125 So. 3d 982, 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), the Fourth 
District explained that Macaluso “recognized that [r]ule 3.212 does not sanction 
stipulations to the ultimate issue of competency.”  However, the district court 
 
 
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previously determined that a court must hold a hearing and enter an order finding 
the defendant competent before proceeding to trial.  Id.  Accordingly, Dougherty 
and Macaluso conflict because the district courts reached different conclusions on 
whether a court can determine a defendant to be competent based on the stipulation 
of counsel, and whether a new trial is necessary under such circumstances.  We 
now turn to the merits.   
ANALYSIS 
 
Before discussing the proper procedures to be followed in competency 
determinations, we note that Dougherty raised this issue for the first time at a 
resentencing hearing on remand after the Fifth District reversed the trial court’s 
summary denial of his amended motion to correct an illegal sentence, which 
occurred nearly seven years after his original competency hearing before trial.  
Thus, Dougherty’s claim is procedurally barred because he did not raise this issue 
on direct appeal.  See Thompson v. State, 88 So. 3d 312, 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 
(“In Florida state courts, neither a procedural nor a substantive competency claim 
of trial court error may be raised in a postconviction motion.” (citing Nelson v. 
State, 43 So. 3d 20, 33 (Fla. 2010))); see also Wickham v. State, 124 So. 3d 841, 
861-62 (Fla. 2013); Bundy v. State, 538 So. 2d 445, 447 (Fla. 1989).  As a result, 
                                                                                                                                        
acknowledged that parties may stipulate to expert reports in lieu of testimony at a 
competency hearing to form the evidence upon which the trial court may rely to 
decide the ultimate issue of competency.     
 
 
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we do not address application of our holding to the specific circumstances of his 
case.  We resolve the conflict, however, to stress the importance of competency 
determinations to criminal proceedings and to ensure that courts follow the specific 
procedures outlined in Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.210-3.212.  Indeed, it 
is necessary for courts to observe the specific hearing requirements set forth in the 
rules in order to safeguard a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial and to 
provide the reviewing court with an adequate record on appeal.          
 
Competency Determination Requirements 
 
In Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975), the United States Supreme 
Court recognized that “the failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a 
defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial 
deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial.”  Procedural due process 
requires adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and 
in a meaningful manner.”  Jones v. State, 740 So. 2d 520, 523 (Fla. 1999) (quoting 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)).  Further, “ ‘[i]t is well-settled 
that a criminal prosecution may not move forward at any material stage of a 
criminal proceeding against a defendant who is incompetent to proceed.’ ”  
McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848, 862 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Caraballo v. State, 39 So. 
3d 1234, 1252 (Fla. 2010)); see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(a).  “An individual who has 
been adjudicated incompetent is presumed to remain incompetent until adjudicated 
 
 
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competent to proceed by a court.”  Jackson v. State, 880 So. 2d 1241, 1242 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2004) (citing Holland v. State, 634 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)); 
see also Corbin v. State, 176 So. 435 (Fla. 1937); Erickson v. State, 965 So. 2d 294 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2007); and Molina v. State, 946 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).  
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.210-3.212 were enacted to set forth 
the required competency hearing procedures for determining whether a defendant 
is competent to proceed or has been restored to competency.  See Mora v. State, 
814 So. 2d 322, 333 (Fla. 2002).  Pertinent to this case are rules 3.210(b) and 
3.212(a)-(b), (c)(3), (c)(5)-(7).    
 
Rule 3.210(b) provides: 
 If, at any material stage[6] of a criminal proceeding, the court of its 
own motion, or on motion of counsel for the defendant or for the state, 
has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally 
competent to proceed, the court shall immediately enter its order 
setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant’s mental 
condition, which shall be held no later than 20 days after the date of 
the filing of the motion, and may order the defendant to be examined 
by no more than 3 experts, as needed, prior to the date of the 
hearing. . . .    
 
                                          
 
 
6.  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(a) defines a “material stage” as 
“the trial of the case, pretrial hearings involving questions of fact on which the 
defendant might be expected to testify, entry of a plea, violation of probation or 
violation of community control proceedings, sentencing, hearings on issues 
regarding a defendant’s failure to comply with court orders or conditions, or other 
matters where the mental competence of the defendant is necessary for a just 
resolution of the issues being considered. . . .” 
 
 
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(Footnote added).  As we stated in Fowler when addressing the proper procedures 
to rule on the question of competency, albeit interpreting an earlier version of the 
rule referring to insanity, “[t]he framers of the rule . . . obviously did not regard 
lightly the necessity for a hearing” by their use of the terms “shall” and 
“immediately.”  Fowler v. State, 255 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1971).  Pursuant to rule 
3.212(a), the experts preparing the reports may be called by the court or either 
party and “shall be deemed court witnesses.”  Rule 3.212(b) then provides that the 
“court shall first consider the issue of the defendant’s competency to proceed.  If 
the court finds the defendant competent to proceed, the court shall enter its order so 
finding and shall proceed.”  The State concedes that entry of an order under the 
rule refers to entry of a written order as opposed to an oral pronouncement.  See 
also Molina, 946 So. 2d at 1105 n.1.   
 
If a defendant is found incompetent, the defendant may be committed for 
treatment to restore his competency to proceed.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(c)(3).  If 
the facility’s administrator determines that the defendant no longer meets the 
criteria for commitment or has become competent to proceed, rule 3.212(c)(5) 
provides that the treatment facility’s administrator must notify the court in a 
written report with copies furnished to all parties.  The trial court shall then hold a 
hearing within thirty days of the receipt of any such report from the administrator 
of the facility.  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(c)(6).  “If, at any time after such 
 
 
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commitment, the court decides, after hearing, that the defendant is competent to 
proceed, it shall enter its order so finding and shall proceed.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.212(c)(7).     
Generally, a proper hearing to determine whether competency has been 
restored after a period of incompetence requires “the calling of court-appointed 
expert witnesses designated under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.211, a 
determination of competence to proceed, and the entry of an order finding 
competence.”  Jones v. State, 125 So. 3d 982, 983-84 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) 
(quoting Samson v. State, 853 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).  The plain 
language of rule 3.212(a), however, does not require the calling of expert witnesses 
or any additional witnesses because the word “may” is used.  Further, “where the 
parties and the judge agree, the trial Court may decide the issue of competency on 
the basis of the written reports alone.”  Fowler, 255 So. 2d at 515; see Jones, 125 
So. 3d at 984.  Nevertheless, these written reports are advisory to the trial court, 
“which itself retains the responsibility of the decision.”  McCray, 71 So. 3d at 862 
(quoting Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 247 (Fla. 1995) (citing Brown v. State, 
245 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. 1971), vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 938, 
(1972) (noting that the purpose of the provisions of rule 1.210(a)—an older 
provision with very similar language—was “to aid and assist the Court, so as to 
enable the Court wisely to determine whether . . . proceedings . . . must be . . . 
 
 
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stayed during a period of necessary treatment.”))); see also Alexander v. State, 380 
So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (citing Butler v. State, 261 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1972) (noting that competence to stand trial is a legal question and not a 
medical question)).  Accepting a stipulation improperly absolves the trial court 
from making an independent determination regarding a defendant’s competency to 
stand trial.   
We note that our prior cases, in which we held that the trial court retains the 
responsibility to determine if the defendant is competent, generally involved 
conflicting testimony or evidence regarding a defendant’s competency.  However, 
nothing in our precedent or the State’s argument persuades us that a defendant can 
stipulate to the ultimate issue of competency, even where the written reports reach 
the same conclusion.7  Even in a situation where all the experts opine that a 
defendant is competent, the trial court could presumably disagree based on other 
evidence such as the defendant’s courtroom behavior or attorney representations.  
Further, the language of rule 3.212(c)(7) and rule 3.212(b) discussed above does 
not allow parties to stipulate to the issue of competency.  See Jones, 125 So. 3d at 
984 (citing Macaluso, 12 So. 3d at 915).  In particular, the rules do not contemplate 
                                          
 
 
7.  Although the State argues that the three experts concluded that Dougherty 
was feigning incompetence, this Court cannot independently verify the accuracy of 
that representation because the record is devoid of information on the content of 
the expert reports, the experts did not testify, and the trial court did not enter a 
written order determining Dougherty was competent to proceed.   
 
 
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such stipulations where the trial court has previously concluded that a particular 
defendant is incompetent and his competency has yet to be restored.8  Thus, based 
on our precedent and the procedural rules for competency determinations, a 
defendant cannot stipulate that he is competent, particularly where he has been 
previously adjudicated incompetent during the same criminal proceedings.  
Further, if a trial court finds that a defendant is competent to proceed, it must enter 
a written order so finding.  Having concluded that a defendant cannot stipulate to 
his own competency, and that a trial court must enter a written order if the 
defendant is found competent, we now turn to the remedy for a violation of these 
procedures.      
 
Remedy 
Generally, the remedy for a trial court’s failure to conduct a proper 
competency hearing is for the defendant to receive a new trial, if deemed 
competent to proceed on remand.  Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1966); 
Tingle v. State, 536 So. 2d 202, 204 (Fla. 1988) (noting that a due process 
violation regarding a defendant’s competency generally results in a new trial 
                                          
 
 
8.  Under those circumstances, a defendant previously adjudicated 
incompetent would be stipulating to the issue of his own competency, which is an 
issue essential to the integrity of the criminal proceedings.  See People v. Lesly T., 
930 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (citing Pouncey v. United States, 349 
F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and People v. Harris, 14 Cal.App.4th 984, 18 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)).  Thus, we do not find it appropriate to endorse such a 
procedure.   
 
 
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because “a hearing to determine whether a defendant was competent at the time he 
was tried generally cannot be held retroactively.”).  A new trial is not always 
necessary where the issue of competency was inadequately determined prior to 
trial; a retroactive determination of competency is possible.  See Fowler, 255 So. 
2d at 515 (“[O]ur finding in this regard does not require vacation of the judgment 
and sentence entered against defendant at this time.”).  However, as we have 
previously noted, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned that determining 
competency to stand trial retrospectively is inherently difficult, even under the 
most favorable circumstances.  Jones, 740 So. 2d at 523 (citing Drope, 420 U.S. at 
183).  “The chances of conducting a meaningful retrospective competency hearing 
decrease when experts must rely on a cold record.”  Jones, 740 So. 2d at 523 
(citing Mason v. State, 489 So. 2d 734, 737 (Fla. 1986)).  Nevertheless, in Mason, 
this Court held that a nunc pro tunc competency evaluation could be done where “ 
‘there are a sufficient number of expert and lay witnesses who have examined or 
observed the defendant contemporaneous with trial available to offer pertinent 
evidence at a retrospective hearing.’ ”  489 So. 2d at 737 (quoting Martin v. 
Estelle, 583 F.2d 1373, 1375 (5th Cir. 1979)).  In Mason, this Court noted that 
“[s]hould the trial court find, for whatever reason, that an evaluation of Mason’s 
competency at the time of the original trial cannot be conducted in such a manner 
as to assure Mason due process of law, the court must so rule and grant a new 
 
 
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trial.”  Id. at 737; see also Monte, 51 So. 3d at 1203.  Thus, the remedy for a trial 
court’s failure to follow the procedures discussed above depends on the 
circumstances of each case.        
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a trial court’s failure to observe 
the procedures outlined in Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.210-3.212—
procedures determined to be adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried 
or convicted while incompetent to stand trial—deprives a defendant of his due 
process right to a fair trial.  Although the trial court, when the parties agree, may 
decide the issue of competency on the basis of written reports alone, it cannot 
dispense with its duty to make an independent determination about a defendant’s 
competency, and must enter a written order if the defendant is found competent to 
proceed.  Further, we conclude that the remedy for such a violation, a new trial or a 
nunc pro tunc hearing to determine competency, depends on the circumstances of 
each case.  Accordingly, we quash in part the Fifth District’s decision in Dougherty 
v. State, 96 So. 3d 984 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), and approve the decision of the 
Fourth District in Macaluso v. State, 12 So. 3d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), to the 
extent it is consistent with this opinion.   
 
It is so ordered.   
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
Although I agree that the Court has express and direct conflict jurisdiction, I 
would nonetheless discharge this case.  The majority correctly recognizes that 
Dougherty’s incompetency claim is a claim of trial court error that is not 
cognizable in a postconviction proceeding.  The majority’s discussion of the 
incompetency issue—which is the basis for our conflict jurisdiction—thus 
constitutes an abstract legal discussion that has no application to the case on 
review.  The majority effectively acknowledges this when it observes that it does 
“not address application of our holding to the specific circumstances of his case.”  
Majority op. at 8.  “Judicial declaration, unaccompanied by judicial application, is 
of no authority.”  John W. Salmond, The Theory of Judicial Precedents, 16 L.Q. 
Rev. 376, 389 (1900).  Because what the Court says here on the conflict issue has 
no application in this case, the Court should refrain from saying it.  The subject of 
the conflict should be resolved in a future case when it is properly at issue. 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D10-2755 
 
 
 
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(Brevard County) 
 
Carlos Fernando Gonzalez and Paola M. Sanchez Torres of Diaz, Reus & Targ, 
LLP, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Wesley Harold 
Heidt, Bureau Chief, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan, Assistant Attorney General, 
Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent