Case Title: Schlimmer v. Poverty Hunt Club

Citation: 

Docket Number: 031773

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
KARL SCHLIMMER 
v.  Record No. 031773  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 10, 2004 
POVERTY HUNT CLUB, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BRUNSWICK COUNTY 
Honorable James A. Luke, Judge 
 
 
Karl R. Schlimmer (“Schlimmer”), and his parents, 
Herman and Doreen Schlimmer, filed a second amended motion 
for judgment against Nolen L. Cofield (“Cofield”), Poverty 
Hunt Club (“Hunt Club”), and 12 other defendants for 
personal injuries Schlimmer sustained in a hunting accident 
when Cofield shot him.  A jury returned a verdict in favor 
of Cofield and the Hunt Club (collectively, “the 
Defendants”).1  After considering Schlimmer’s motion to set 
aside the jury verdict, the circuit court affirmed the 
verdict and entered judgment in favor of Cofield and the 
Hunt Club. 
Schlimmer appealed to this Court claiming that the 
circuit court erred by refusing to find Cofield negligent 
as a matter of law; by not granting a negligence per se 
instruction; by refusing to set aside the verdict on the 
                     
1 On brief, the appellees contend that the parents, as 
well as all the defendants except Cofield and the Hunt 
Club, were nonsuited from the case.  That fact is not clear 
in the record.  Nevertheless, Cofield and the Hunt Club 
were the only defendants before the jury. 
 
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basis that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a 
defense of contributory negligence or to find that 
Schlimmer’s alleged contributory negligence was a proximate 
cause of the accident; and by refusing to strike the 
defense of contributory negligence.  Because we conclude 
that Schlimmer was entitled to a negligence per se 
instruction, we will reverse the circuit court’s judgment. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
 
Schlimmer’s father had been a member of the Hunt Club 
for several years.  Schlimmer, who was 14 years old at the 
time of the accident, had been accompanying his father 
since he was 11 years old as a guest on hunting expeditions 
on property leased to the Hunt Club.  In approximately 1995 
or 1996, Schlimmer and his father attended a hunter safety 
education class together. 
On the morning of November 23, 1996, Schlimmer, his 
father, Cofield, and other members of the Hunt Club 
gathered for the second hunt of the day.  The members 
decided in which area of the property to conduct the hunt 
and assigned hunting stands to the hunters.  Schlimmer and 
his father were assigned a stand known as “Fletcher’s Old 
Stand.”  They were told that someone would meet them at the 
“loading dock” and show them where their assigned stand was 
located.  However, no one ever met them there.  After 
 
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waiting about 10 to 15 minutes, Schlimmer’s father decided 
that he and his son could find the stand by themselves, and 
they proceeded to walk into the “brush.”  They soon found a 
stand familiar to Schlimmer’s father and stopped there 
instead of proceeding to their assigned stand.  Schlimmer 
sat down on a bucket and his father sat on a log. 
After a few minutes, the two saw Cofield walk by 
within 25 to 30 yards of where Schlimmer and his father 
were sitting.  Neither of them said anything to Cofield so 
as to make him aware of their presence.  Schlimmer’s father 
admitted that Cofield probably did not see either him or 
his son as Cofield walked past them.  Schlimmer then 
questioned his father about whether they were in “a good 
place” and asked if they should move to a different 
location.  Schlimmer testified, “In my mind I was in a safe 
place but not the right place.”  They discussed the 
situation and had decided they should move to another 
location when Schlimmer was shot by Cofield. 
Up until that moment, Schlimmer had sat with his back 
against a tree that had a trunk of six to eight inches in 
diameter.  He had not stood up or moved except to look 
around nor had his father.  Schlimmer was wearing a blaze 
orange hat and a camouflage jacket. 
 
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A game warden who investigated the accident testified 
that it would have been “virtually impossible” to see 
Schlimmer from the tree stand in which Cofield was 
situated.  Pictures taken by the game warden showed that 
the area in which Schlimmer and his father had stopped 
contained numerous trees and brush.  The game warden 
measured a distance of 67 yards between Cofield’s tree 
stand and the spot where Schlimmer was sitting. 
In both an oral and written statement given to the 
game warden just after the shooting accident occurred, 
Cofield stated that he had seen one deer; and then about 20 
minutes later, he saw something moving, thought it was a 
deer, and shot.  Cofield’s testimony at trial, however, was 
different.  He stated that, after he climbed up a ladder to 
his tree stand and loaded his gun, he saw two deer pass but 
was not able to get off a shot at them.  Cofield then saw 
“a buck coming to [his] far left.”  He shot at the buck but 
hit Schlimmer.  Cofield testified that, at the time he 
fired his shotgun, he did not know that Schlimmer and his 
father “were where they were.”  “No one was supposed to be 
there,” Cofield stated. 
The game warden charged Cofield with the reckless 
handling of a firearm in violation of Code § 18.2-56.1(A).  
That statute makes it “unlawful for any person to handle 
 
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recklessly any firearm so as to endanger the life, limb or 
property of any person.”  Code § 18.2-56.1(A).  Cofield 
pled guilty to the charge. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal concerns the 
circuit court’s refusal to instruct the jury on negligence 
per se.  The circuit court stated the following reasons for 
its refusal to do so: “[Cofield] could have been convicted 
of reckless handling of a firearm if nobody had been hit.  
If he hadn’t touched the plaintiff, the handling of the 
firearm was reckless.  And I think we’ve got to rely on the 
negligence to get to the verdict on this.” 
Schlimmer argues he was entitled to an instruction on 
negligence per se because Cofield recklessly handled a 
firearm in violation of Code § 18.2-56.1(A).  The 
Defendants, however, contend that Cofield’s conviction for 
violating that statute was not “conclusive evidence of 
negligence in a subsequent civil action.”  They also argue 
that the inconsistencies in the evidence about how Cofield 
came to fire his shotgun did not justify a negligence per 
se instruction. 
A litigant is entitled to jury instructions supporting 
his or her theory of the case if sufficient evidence is 
introduced to support that theory and if the instructions 
 
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correctly state the law.  Price v. Taylor, 251 Va. 82, 85, 
466 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1996); Bowers v. May, 233 Va. 411, 413-
14, 357 S.E.2d 29, 30 (1987); Hodnett v. Friend, 232 Va. 
447, 452, 352 S.E.2d 338, 341 (1987); H. W. Miller Trucking 
Co. v. Flood, 203 Va. 934, 937, 128 S.E.2d 437, 439-40 
(1962).  The evidence presented in support of a particular 
instruction “must amount to more than a scintilla.”  Justus 
v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 678, 283 S.E.2d 905, 911 
(1981); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412, 417, 219 
S.E.2d 845, 849 (1975).  “It is immaterial that the jury 
could have reached contrary conclusions.  If a proffered 
instruction finds any support in credible evidence, its 
refusal is reversible error.”  McClung v. Commonwealth, 215 
Va. 654, 657, 212 S.E.2d 290, 293 (1975).  These principles 
are likewise true with regard to instructions pertaining to 
primary negligence.  See Gravitt v. Ward, 258 Va. 330, 335, 
518 S.E.2d 631, 634 (1999); Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 
287-88, 198 S.E.2d 441, 451 (1938). 
The doctrine of negligence per se represents the 
adoption of “the requirements of a legislative enactment as 
the standard of conduct of a reasonable [person].”  Butler 
v. Frieden, 208 Va. 352, 353, 158 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1967).  
When applicable, the violation of a statute or municipal 
ordinance adopted for public safety constitutes negligence 
 
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because the violation is the failure to abide by a 
particular standard of care prescribed by a legislative 
body.  Moore v. Virginia Transit Co., 188 Va. 493, 497-98, 
50 S.E.2d 268, 271 (1948).  A party relying on negligence 
per se does not need to establish common law negligence 
provided the proponent of the doctrine produces evidence 
supporting a determination that the opposing party violated 
a statute enacted for public safety, that the proponent 
belongs to the class of persons for whose benefit the 
statute was enacted and the harm suffered was of the type 
against which the statute was designed to protect, and that 
the statutory violation was a proximate cause of the 
injury.  Halterman v. Radisson Hotel Corp., 259 Va. 171, 
176-77, 523 S.E.2d 823, 825 (2000); Virginia Elec. & Power 
Co. v. Savoy Constr. Co., 224 Va. 36, 45, 294 S.E.2d 811, 
817 (1982). 
The first two elements of negligence per se, whether 
the statute was enacted for public safety and whether the 
injured party was a member of the class of people for whose 
benefit the statute was enacted and suffered an injury of 
the type against which the statute protects, are issues of 
law to be decided by a trial court.  See Virginia Elec., 
224 Va. at 45, 294 S.E.2d at 817.  The third element, 
whether the statutory violation was a proximate cause of 
 
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the injury, is generally a factual issue to be decided by 
the trier of fact.  Thomas v. Settle, 247 Va. 15, 20, 439 
S.E.2d 360, 363 (1994); Smith v. New Dixie Lines, Inc., 201 
Va. 466, 470, 111 S.E.2d 434, 437 (1959).  Similarly, if 
the violation of the statute is in dispute, that issue is 
also for the trier of fact.  Kimberlin v. PM Transp., Inc., 
264 Va. 261, 268, 563 S.E.2d 665, 668 (2002). 
In this case, Schlimmer established that Cofield 
violated a statute that was enacted for public safety and 
that protects a class of people including hunters such as 
Schlimmer.  Cf. Bailey v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 331, 
334, 362 S.E.2d 750, 751 (1987) (the provisions of Code 
§ 18.2-56.1(A) are not limited to hunters).  He further 
produced sufficient evidence to show that the harm suffered 
“was of the type against which the statute was designed to 
protect,” Halterman, 259 Va. at 176, 523 S.E.2d at 825, and 
that his injury was caused by the violation.  When an 
injured person is a member of the class for whose benefit a 
particular statute was enacted, violation of that statute 
constitutes negligence per se and, “if such negligence is a 
proximate or efficiently contributing cause of an injury, 
it will support a recovery for damages for such injury.”  
White v. Gore, 201 Va. 239, 242, 110 S.E.2d 228, 231 
(1959).  Accordingly, the circuit court erred in refusing 
 
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to instruct the jury on the doctrine of negligence per se.  
See McClung, 215 Va. at 657, 212 S.E.2d at 293. 
Contrary to the Defendants’ argument, the failure to 
instruct on negligence per se was not harmless error.  
Based on the record before us, we cannot determine whether 
the jury found for the Defendants due to lack of primary 
negligence or due to Schlimmer’s contributory negligence.  
Thus, we cannot say that the error in refusing to instruct 
on negligence per se was harmless.  See Caplan v. Bogard, 
264 Va. 219, 229, 563 S.E.2d 719, 724 (2002); Ring v. 
Poelman, 240 Va. 323, 328, 397 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1990). 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand this case for a new trial.2 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
2 In light of our decision, it is not necessary to 
address Schlimmer’s remaining assignments of error. 
We also express no view on whether the two 
instructions on negligence per se proffered by Schlimmer 
were correct statements of law.  The Defendants did not 
argue otherwise to the circuit court or on appeal.