Case Title: Human Rights Commission v. Labrie, Inc.

Citation: 164 Vt 237, 668 A.2d 659

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-10-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
HUMAN_RIGHTS_COMM_V_LABRIE_INC.94-230; 164 Vt 237; 668 A.2d 659

[Filed:  06-Oct-1995]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 94-230


Human Rights Commission                           Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Washington Superior Court

LaBrie, Inc., Ernest LaBrie &                     May Term, 1995
Linda LaBrie

Alan W. Cheever, J.

Susan M. Sussman and Barbara Lelli, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

Oliver L. Twombly, Barre, for defendants-appellants


PRESENT:       Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and
               Davenport, Supr. J., Specially Assigned


       ALLEN, C.J.    Defendants LaBrie Inc., Linda LaBrie and Ernest LaBrie
  appeal from superior court orders, which held that defendants committed
  unfair housing practices by discriminating against persons with minor
  children in violation of 9 V.S.A. § 4503(a). Defendants claim that (1) the
  court's findings on disparate-treatment discrimination are clearly
  erroneous because the evidence did not show any intent to discriminate, (2)
  the court's findings based on plaintiff's experts' testimony should be
  vacated because the court did not qualify the witnesses as experts, (3) the
  court erred in awarding damages to a complainant for emotional distress in
  the absence of expert medical testimony, (4) the court awarded excessive
  attorney's fees to plaintiff, (5) the court committed plain error by
  holding Ernest Labrie personally liable for unfair housing practices, and
  (6) the court erred in ruling inadmissible certain testimony of defendants'
  witness, Reine Jenkins.(FN1)  We affirm.

 

       On May 1, 1981, Linda and Ernest LaBrie purchased Limehurst Mobile
  Home Park. The Park consists of thirty-three mobile home lots.  Most of the
  residents own their own mobile homes and rent only the lot.  LaBrie, Inc.
  purchased the Park from Ernest and Linda LaBrie on October 30, 1987. 
  Ernest and Linda LaBrie are the sole corporate officers and shareholders of
  LaBrie, Inc.  Ernest LaBrie is the president, and Linda LaBrie is the
  vice-president and treasurer.  The office of LaBrie, Inc. is in their home. 
  The Park is managed primarily by Linda, who is responsible for renting
  units, collecting rent, and making all general management decisions.  She
  also sets policies, rules, and lease terms, and approves residents for
  tenancy. Ernest is primarily responsible for maintenance under the
  direction of Linda but is aware of the decisions made by Linda.

       When the LaBries purchased the Park, the lease term on occupancy
  stated "that only one family shall occupy a mobile home on a permanent
  basis."  In 1982, the LaBries changed the occupancy provision to,

        Lessees, who have entered into a lease agreement after April 1,
        1982, shall not be permitted to have children under the age of 18
        years reside in their mobile home unit.  Lessee hereby agrees that
        lessee shall terminate this lease and vacate the premises prior to
        having said children reside in their mobile home.  (Emphasis
        added.)

  In July 1988, the occupancy provision was essentially the same but
  stated in addition, "This age restriction applies to all lots at Limehurst
  Mobile Home Park based on VSA 9-4508(b)."

       In April 1989, the occupancy provision was revised to state,

         [L]essees who have entered into a lease agreement after July 1,
         1988 shall not be permitted to have more than two permanent
         occupants per lease premises. . . .  Lessees prior to July 1, 1988,
         who have more than two permanent occupants shall be
         grandfathered, but the number of occupants cannot expand beyond
         what existed as of July 1, 1988.  (Emphasis added.)

       Currently, only one mobile home in the Park houses a family with a
  minor child.  This family moved into the Park prior to 1982.  No persons
  with minor children moved into the Park after the LaBries purchased it,
  even after the occupancy provision was changed from adults-only

 

  to a two-occupant maximum.  The population of the Park declined from
  May 1981 to May 1990, from ninety-five residents to sixty residents.  The
  LaBries also own two other mobile home parks, four homes leased as
  residential units, and twelve mobile homes throughout Vermont. There are
  minor children living in many of these homes.

       Scott and Luanne McCarthy purchased a mobile home in the Park for
  $7,000 in August 1986.  Linda LaBrie sent them a letter on August 1, 1986,
  accepting their application, and stating: "We remind you that Limehurst
  Mobile Home Park is an adult park and if you should have children in the
  future you will be required to vacate Limehurst Mobile Home Park prior to
  the arrival of said child."  In July 1989, the McCarthys contacted a broker
  to sell their mobile home because Luanne was pregnant.  The broker
  determined that the McCarthys should ask $18,000 for their home.

       The McCarthys' son was born September 18, 1989.  When they returned
  home from the hospital, they found a letter from Linda LaBrie informing
  them that they must vacate the premises "upon arrival of your third
  occupant."  Following the letter, the McCarthys received telephone calls,
  visits, and additional letters from Linda LaBrie telling them to vacate the
  Park. On December 28, 1989, the McCarthys were served with a summons and
  complaint for eviction brought by the LaBries in the name of LaBrie, Inc.
  d/b/a Limehurst Mobile Home Park.

       When the McCarthys informed the LaBries that they had accepted a
  deposit for the sale of their home, the LaBries delayed the sale,
  indicating that they would not act on the purchasers' application until the
  eviction action was resolved.  The purchasers' application was approved
  February 25, 1990, and the McCarthys sold their mobile home on March 2,
  1990, for $13,000. At trial, the broker testified that one-half of
  potential purchasers were ineligible because a minor child in the family
  put them over the occupancy limit.  There was conflicting evidence
  regarding the value of the home but the court determined that the fair
  market value of the home at the time of the sale was $13,000.

       From September 1989 through March 1990, while living at the Park,
  Luanne McCarthy

 

  felt humiliated by Linda LaBrie's demands to vacate the premises. 
  Consequently, she did not leave her home often.  She was unable to sleep
  and had chest pains.  The McCarthys moved from the Park to the home of
  Scott McCarthy's parents, where they had to share a family room in the
  basement with their newborn child.  Luanne McCarthy worried about their
  inability to find their own housing; her chest pains increased and she was
  given two medications to relieve stress.

       The McCarthys filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission,
  which commenced this action in Washington Superior Court in October 1990,
  alleging that defendants LaBrie, Inc., Linda LaBrie, and Ernest LaBrie
  violated the Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act, 9 V.S.A. §
  4503(a)(1)-(3), by discriminating against persons intending to occupy a
  dwelling with one or more minor children.  The Commission contended that
  the restrictive occupancy limit for the Park (1) was adopted for the
  purpose of discriminating against persons with minor children by either
  limiting or eliminating them from occupancy in the Park, and (2) although
  facially neutral, has an unlawful discriminatory impact because it excluded
  persons with minor children in significant numbers.  Defendants maintained
  that the occupancy limit was necessary due to limited water and septic
  capacity.

       At trial, both parties presented expert testimony on the capacity of
  the septic system and water supply at the Park.  Defendants' expert
  testified that the septic system at the Park was adequate to serve a
  maximum of sixty-six people.  The court found that the expert had not
  performed the tests necessary to properly assess the potential capacity of
  the septic system, and concluded that there was no credible evidence that
  the system could not support an increase in population in the Park. 
  Similarly, the court found that there was no credible evidence that water
  supply or water pressure was inadequate to serve more than sixty-six
  people.  Although the court acknowledged the LaBries' fear that problems --
  which had existed prior to installation of a new well and replacement of
  their leachfields -- would reoccur, it concluded that the LaBries have less
  restrictive alternatives available to them than the two-person occupancy
  limit.

       The court concluded that plaintiff had established that the McCarthys
  were evicted due

 

  to the presence of a minor child, and that persons with minor children
  were constructively denied access to housing in the Park by the two-person
  occupancy limit.  Further, the court concluded that defendants had not
  established the occupancy limit as a legitimate business necessity arising
  from septic and water capacities of the Park.  Accordingly, the court held
  that defendants had violated 9 V.S.A. § 4503(a) and awarded the McCarthys
  $2,700 in attorney's fees for the eviction proceeding, $1,500 for the
  emotional distress and humiliation suffered as a result of defendants'
  actions, $3,000 for loss of civil rights caused by the eviction and by
  restricting potential purchasers, and $3,000 in punitive damages.  The
  court also awarded the Human Rights Commission civil penalties of $6,000. 
  In subsequent orders, the court permanently enjoined defendants from
  adopting or enforcing a two-person-per-lot occupancy limit at the Limehurst
  Mobile Home Park, and awarded plaintiff $51,072 in attorney's fees,
  $2,194.39 for expenses and $240 for discovery costs.  Defendants appeal.

                                I.

       The Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (FHPA), 9
  V.S.A. §§ 4500-4507, prohibits discrimination in renting "a dwelling or
  other real estate to any person because of the race, sex, sexual
  orientation, age, marital status, religious creed, color, national origin
  or handicap of a person, or because a person intends to occupy a dwelling
  with one or more minor children, or because a person is a recipient of
  public assistance."  9 V.S.A. § 4503(a)(2). Discrimination on the basis of
  age, or because a person intends to occupy a dwelling with one or more
  minor children, has been prohibited in the rental of dwelling units in
  Vermont since 1986.  See 1985, No. 175 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 (prohibiting
  discrimination in rental of dwelling unit) (codified at 9 V.S.A. § 4466),
  repealed by 1987, No. 74, § 2(b); 1987, No. 74, § 1 (codified at 9 V.S.A. §
  4504); amended by 1987, No. 253 (Adj. Sess.), §§ 2-3 (codified at 9 V.S.A.
  §§ 4503-04).  FHPA defines "dwelling" as " any building, structure, or
  portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy
  as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is
  offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any

 

  such building, structure, or portion thereof."  9 V.S.A. § 4501(5)
  (emphasis added).

       Mobile home lot rentals were, however, covered by a separate provision
  enacted in 1988, which did not strictly prohibit discrimination on the
  basis of age or because a person intended to occupy a dwelling with one or
  more minor children.  See 1987, No. 252 (Adj. Sess.), § 4 (allowing
  discrimination based on age in rental of mobile home lots if park is
  occupied or planned for occupancy based on age restrictions as of June 1,
  1988).  The mobile-home-lot-rental provision was repealed in 1989, when
  the Legislature revised Vermont's housing discrimination laws to comply
  with the federal Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988.  See 1989, No. 89, §
  9 (stating purpose of statutory revision) & § 10 (repealing 9 V.S.A. §
  4508). Thus, Vermont's general housing-discrimination provision has been
  applicable to the rental of mobile home lots since 1989.

       FHPA is patterned on Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair
  Housing Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, compare 9 V.S.A. § 4503 (unfair
  housing practices) with 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (discrimination in sale or rental
  of housing), and therefore, in construing FHPA, we consider cases
  construing the federal statute.  Cf. Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 160 Vt.
  150, 161,