Case Title: ROBERT R. BRYANT v. PACIFIC POWER AND LIGHT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84-286

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT R. BRYANT v. PACIFIC POWER AND LIGHT1985 WY 89701 P.2d 1165Case Number: 84-286Decided: 07/11/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT R. BRYANT, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

PACIFIC POWER AND LIGHT, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, ConverseCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
Robert C. 
Wilson, Douglas, for appellant.

Patrick J. 
Murphy and Stuart R. Day, of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
summary judgment against appellant in an action premised on his unlawful 
discharge from employment by appellee. Appellant was a member of the Utility 
Worker's Union of America, Local No. 127, A.F.L.-C.I.O. (hereinafter referred to 
as "Union"), and the terms of his employment by appellee were contained in a 
working agreement between appellee and Union. The summary judgment was based on 
the failure of appellant to utilize the grievance-arbitration provisions of such 
agreement.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant entered the 
employment of appellee in May 1974. He had a work-related injury to his back in 
December 1976. Between that date and January 8, 1981, he was off work for back 
surgery on two occasions. On January 8, 1981, he again left work to obtain 
treatment for his back. On January 26, 1981, the company doctor would not allow 
him to return to his regular position and directed that he could work only in a 
position which did not require lifting. Appellant was then on long-term 
disability until November 17, 1983 when he was offered a tool-room attendant's 
position. When he refused, he was discharged. During the time he was not 
working, he received worker's compensation and long-term disability benefits 
which were supplemented by appellee to 90% of his regular pay - pursuant to the 
agreement between appellee and the Union.

[¶4.]     The agreement provides 
in pertinent part:

"6.4 Any Employee 
alleging that he has been unjustly discharged, suspended, or demoted shall file 
with the Company a written grievance, on the approved grievance forms within ten 
(10) working days after such discharge, suspension or 
demotion.

* * * * * 
*

"An Employee shall be 
deemed to have waived his right to settlement of such an alleged grievance if he 
fails to file a written grievance within the ten (10) days time limit stipulated 
herein."

[¶5.]     The fact that appellant 
did not file a grievance, or attempt to do so, is not contested. Appellant 
argued in the district court that the ten-day period was unreasonably short. He 
does not present that argument to us, but contends on appeal that the Union failed to properly represent him by not timely 
filing the grievance or by not instructing him to do so. Appellee urges us to 
dispose of the matter on the basis that this change of theory by appellant on 
appeal violates our precedent in refusing to consider issues not raised in the 
trial court. Bragg v. Marion, Wyo., 663 P.2d 505 (1983); North American Uranium v. 
Johnston, 77 Wyo. 332, 316 P.2d 325 
(1957).

[¶6.]     However, we note that 
although the memorandum submitted by appellant to the district court does not 
address the issue presented on appeal, appellant's affidavit in opposition to 
the motion for summary judgment does allege "[t]hat the union president or union 
representatives never advised the plaintiff of it's [sic] grievance procedures," 
and the trial court stated in its Order Granting Summary Judgment that the 
affidavit was considered:

"* * * the Court having 
considered the pleadings and materials in support of and in opposition to, the 
defendant's aforesaid motion, and the Court also considering counsels' memoranda 
and oral argument, * * *." (Emphasis added.)1

It cannot be 
said from the record that the trial court did not consider the issue now before 
us.

[¶7.]     Appellant does not 
contend that he was not bound by the working agreement between appellee and the 
Union. He does not deny that he failed to file 
a grievance and that he did not attempt to do so. He accepts the proposition 
that normally access to the courts is barred to one who fails to exhaust 
mandatory grievance procedures in a collective-bargaining agreement. Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212, 103 S. Ct. 588, 74 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1983); Vaca v. Sipes, 
386 U.S. 171, 87 S. Ct. 903, 
17 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1967); Republic Steel 
Corporation v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S. Ct. 614, 13 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1965). And he recognizes that arbitration is favored as a method of 
voluntary settlement of disputes. Matter 
of Town of Greybull, Wyo., 
560 P.2d 1172, 1175 (1977).

[¶8.]     Rather, he blames the 
Union for not filing the grievance or for not 
causing him to do so. He quotes extensively from Gilstrap v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 
270 Or. 599, 529 P.2d 370 (1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 1011, 95 S. Ct. 2415, 44 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1975), to contend that a breach of contract action by an employee 
is not barred on the basis that a grievance-arbitration procedure in a 
union-employer working agreement was not followed in those instances in which 
the union did not fairly represent the employee by not sincerely processing the 
grievance.

[¶9.]     Appellee, in return, 
does not take exception to the law referred to by appellant, but points out that 
the facts of this case do not fall within that to which such law applies. 
Appellee notes that the court recognized in Gilstrap v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 
supra, that the employee must attempt to exhaust the contractual remedies 
before resorting to court action and that the employee in that case had 
requested union help which was refused.

[¶10.]  There is nothing in the record to reflect 
that appellant asked the Union for assistance 
in processing the grievance. In fact, there is nothing in the record to reflect 
that appellant told the Union that he desired 
to file a grievance. The working agreement provided that the "Employee * * * 
shall file with the Company a written grievance." Appellant did not do so. Some 
collective-bargaining agreements require the union to file the grievance when an 
employee advises that he wishes to contest disciplinary action by the employer. 
Vaca v. Sipes, supra. In such case, a 
failure of the union to fairly act for the employee may make it unnecessary to 
exhaust the contract remedies before taking court action. Such is not the case 
here.

[¶11.]  There was nothing before the district 
court to indicate that the Union did not fairly 
represent appellant in connection with the grievance. The statement that "the 
union president or union representatives never advised the plaintiff of it's 
[sic] grievance procedures" falls far short of that necessary to reflect lack of 
fair representation. Appellant is taken to know the provisions of the working 
agreement. If he had questions concerning any of the provisions, he should have 
inquired. The agreement designates holidays, vacation times and amounts, 
transfer policy, working rules, etc. Employees are generally aware of the 
various items contained in a collective-bargaining agreement. If a special 
problem arises, inquiry is usually made concerning it. There is nothing in the 
record to reflect an inquiry, directed to either the appellee or the Union by appellant, concerning a grievance, let alone a 
failure to respond to such inquiry.

[¶12.]  The material before the district court 
was not contradicted. Appellant failed to pursue the grievance-arbitration 
remedies available to him at the time of termination; he did not attempt to do 
so; he did not request assistance from the Union; the Union did not have 
knowledge of his desire to process a grievance; and the Union did not fail to fairly represent him in any manner. 
The summary judgment was proper.

[¶13.]  Affirmed.

1 The oral arguments are 
not part of the record on appeal.