Case Title: Kilian v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C.

Citation: 2011 WI 65

Docket Number: 2009AP000538

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP538 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Steven T. Kilian, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Daimler Chrysler 
Financial Services Americas, LLC d/b/a Mercedes-
Benz Financial, 
 
 Defendants-Respondents-Cross-Appellants. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at: 324 Wis. 2d 583, 785 N.W. 2d 687 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Unpublished)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 5, 2011   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Ralph Ramirez   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J. concurs (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER, J. did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner 
there were briefs and oral argument by Vincent P. Megna and 
Timothy J. Aiken, Aiken & Scoptur, S.C. 
For the defendants-respondents-cross-appellants there was a 
brief by Patrick L. Wells and Owen Armstrong, Von Briesen & 
Roper, S.C. and oral argument by Patrick L. Wells. 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 65
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP538 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV1869) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Steven T. Kilian, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Daimler Chrysler 
Financial Services Americas, LLC d/b/a 
Mercedes-Benz Financial, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.  Steven Kilian seeks review of 
an unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed 
the order of the circuit court for Waukesha County, the 
Honorable Ralph M. Ramirez presiding, granting summary judgment 
                                                 
1 Kilian 
v. 
Mercedes-Benz 
USA, 
LLC, 
No. 
2009AP538, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2010). 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
2 
 
to defendants Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, and Daimler Chrysler 
Financial Services Americas, LLC, d/b/a Mercedes-Benz Financial. 
¶2 
Kilian 
leased 
a 
Mercedes-Benz 
vehicle 
in 
2006.  
Mercedes-Benz USA manufactured the vehicle and Mercedes-Benz 
Financial provided the lease financing.  In the first year of 
the lease, the car required repairs on seven occasions and was 
out of service for an aggregate of approximately forty days.  
Kilian returned the car to Mercedes-Benz USA and sought a refund 
under Wisconsin's Lemon Law.2  Mercedes-Benz USA accepted the 
returned vehicle and refunded $20,847.87 to Kilian.  However, 
Mercedes-Benz USA did not immediately pay off the lease with 
Mercedes-Benz Financial and, as a result of this failure, 
Mercedes-Benz Financial commenced efforts to obtain payment on 
the lease from Kilian even though he had returned the car to 
Mercedes-Benz USA and had received a refund from them. 
¶3 
Kilian 
retained 
counsel 
to 
assist 
in 
stopping 
Mercedes-Benz Financial's collection efforts.  Kilian's counsel 
informed Mercedes-Benz Financial that the car had been returned 
to, and Kilian had received a refund from, Mercedes-Benz USA.  
Mercedes-Benz Financial does not dispute that it received actual 
                                                 
2 See Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 (2007-08).  "Wisconsin's Lemon 
Law is a remedial statute enacted to protect buyers [and 
lessees] of new [motor] vehicles if they experience certain 
types of problems with their purchases.  Vehicles with problems 
covered under the statute are known as 'lemons.'"  Tammi v. 
Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 2009 WI 83, ¶1 n.2, 320 Wis. 2d 45, 
768 N.W.2d 783 (internal citations omitted).  All subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version 
unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
3 
 
notice of these facts.  Kilian's counsel also informed Mercedes-
Benz Financial that no person may enforce a lease after a 
consumer has received a refund from the manufacturer under Lemon 
Law § 218.0171(2)(cm)3.  Despite the assurances it gave to 
Kilian's 
counsel, 
Mercedes-Benz 
Financial 
continued 
its 
enforcement actions.  Kilian filed suit under Lemon Law 
subsection (7) in order to stop enforcement of the lease. 
¶4 
We conclude that Kilian may maintain an action for 
equitable relief under Lemon Law subsection (7).  Further, we 
hold that Mercedes-Benz Financial's enforcement of the lease 
after it was informed by Kilian's attorney that Kilian had 
received a refund, and after it assured Kilian that collections 
efforts would cease, violated the Lemon Law.  We also conclude 
that Kilian prevailed in his action when Mercedes-Benz Financial 
voluntarily ceased enforcement of the lease after Kilian filed 
suit.  We conclude that Kilian, as the prevailing party, is 
entitled to his costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney 
fees, but that Kilian is not entitled to an award for pecuniary 
loss.  As a result, we reverse the court of appeals and remand 
the cause to the circuit court for a determination of the 
appropriate 
amount 
of 
Kilian's 
costs, 
disbursements, 
and 
reasonable attorney fees. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
¶5 
On March 21, 2006, Steven Kilian signed a thirty-nine 
month motor vehicle lease agreement with Concours Motors, Inc.  
Concours Motors is an authorized dealer for Mercedes-Benz USA, 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
4 
 
the vehicle's manufacturer, and Mercedes-Benz Financial, the 
lease financing company.3 
¶6 
During the first year of the lease, Kilian's vehicle 
required repairs on seven occasions and was out of service for 
an aggregate of approximately forty days.  Because of the number 
of problems with his new car, Kilian decided to assert his 
rights under Wisconsin's Lemon Law.4  On April 11, 2007, Kilian 
offered to return the car to the manufacturer, Mercedes-Benz 
USA, and concurrently demanded a refund in accordance with Lemon 
Law § 218.0171(2)(b). 
¶7 
On May 10, 2007, Kilian returned the car to Concours 
Motors, Inc.  On the same day, Kilian received a $20,847.87 
refund.5  Kilian then stopped making payments to Mercedes-Benz 
Financial.  He did so because he believed that returning the 
vehicle to Mercedes-Benz USA had satisfied his remaining 
obligations under the lease. 
                                                 
3  Mercedes-Benz Financial was described in the record as 
the "financing arm" of Mercedes-Benz USA.  The record does not 
provide a description of the precise corporate relationship 
between the companies. 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 218.0171. 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b)3.  This amount equaled the 
sum of Kilian's lease payments and other collateral costs from 
March 2006 through April 2007, less an allowance for reasonable 
use.  Kilian made fourteen payments of $1,826.12, totaling 
$25,565.68.  After adjusting the refund pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(b)3, 
including 
a 
($4,050.99) 
adjustment 
for 
Kilian's reasonable use of the vehicle, the final refund totaled 
$20,847.87. 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
5 
 
¶8 
The dispute leading to this case began when Mercedes-
Benz USA (1) failed to pay off Kilian's lease with Mercedes-Benz 
Financial and (2) failed to notify Mercedes-Benz Financial that 
the vehicle had been returned under the Lemon Law.  Mercedes-
Benz Financial, left unaware, began contacting Kilian to collect 
on what it viewed as unpaid lease installments, beginning with 
the installment due May 20.  These contacts included numerous 
phone calls and letters demanding payment.  Kilian repeatedly 
informed Mercedes-Benz Financial that the car had been returned 
under the Lemon Law.  Nonetheless, Mercedes-Benz Financial 
continued 
contacting 
Kilian 
about 
the 
payments 
that 
it 
considered Kilian had "missed."  By June, Kilian retained 
counsel in order to stop Mercedes-Benz Financial's collection 
efforts. 
¶9 
On June 15, 2007, Attorney Megna wrote a letter on 
Kilian's behalf informing Mercedes-Benz Financial that the 
vehicle had been returned to Mercedes-Benz USA, that Kilian had 
received a refund under the Lemon Law, and that therefore Lemon 
Law § 218.0171(2)(cm)3. precluded enforcement of the lease.  On 
June 20, Mercedes-Benz Financial responded with a letter from 
its Executive Referral Manager, Glen Bieler.  In the letter, 
Bieler acknowledged receipt of Attorney Megna's June 15 letter 
and assured Attorney Megna that Mercedes-Benz Financial would 
refrain from further contact with Kilian regarding the lease. 
¶10 After 
receiving 
Bieler's 
letter, 
Attorney 
Megna 
contacted the collections department of Mercedes-Benz Financial 
and was advised that the lease account remained open and active.  
No. 
2009AP538   
 
6 
 
On June 26, Attorney Megna sent a second letter to Mercedes-Benz 
Financial.  In the second letter, Attorney Megna inquired as to 
whether the lease had in fact been cancelled by Mercedes-Benz 
Financial. 
¶11 On July 1, 2007, Kilian received a "Federal Legal 
Notice" from Mercedes-Benz Financial.  This document warned 
Kilian of consequences he could face after his payments became 
thirty or more days past due.  Specifically, the notice 
cautioned: "We may report information about your account to 
credit bureaus.  Late payments, missed payments, or other 
defaults on your account may be reflected in your credit 
report." 
¶12 The following day, July 2, Kilian received an account 
statement reflecting a total amount due on the lease of 
$5,478.36.  This amount reflected the aggregate of three months 
of lease payments, presumably for the months of May, June, and 
July.  The statement listed July 21 as the payment due date. 
¶13 On July 10, 2007, Kilian filed a complaint in the 
circuit court for Waukesha County naming both Mercedes-Benz USA 
and Mercedes-Benz Financial as defendants.  Kilian alleged that 
Mercedes-Benz 
Financial 
violated 
Wisconsin's 
Lemon 
Law, 
specifically Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(cm)3., by continuing to 
enforce the lease after the vehicle was returned and he had 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
7 
 
received a refund from the manufacturer.6  Kilian's claim for 
relief included a demand for twice the amount of all pecuniary 
losses, rescission of the lease, prejudgment interest, attorney 
fees, costs, and disbursements. 
¶14 On August 29, 2007, while Kilian's action was pending 
in the circuit court, Mercedes-Benz USA sent a check for 
$95,252.37 to Mercedes-Benz Financial in order to pay off the 
lease.  After this point, Mercedes-Benz Financial considered the 
account closed and the lease cancelled because the lease had no 
remaining balance due. 
¶15 In an order dated January 28, 2009, the circuit court 
addressed Mercedes-Benz Financial's motion for summary judgment.  
The circuit court found no genuine issue of material fact 
related to Kilian's Lemon Law claim.  Further, the circuit court 
found that Kilian did not suffer a pecuniary loss when Mercedes-
Benz Financial continued to enforce the lease after the vehicle 
was returned.  The circuit court found no pecuniary loss existed 
because it found that Kilian did not make any lease payments to 
Mercedes-Benz Financial after returning the car.  As a result, 
                                                 
6 Kilian also alleged that Mercedes-Benz USA violated Lemon 
Law § 218.0171(2)(b)3.a. by failing to pay off the lease with 
Mercedes-Benz Financial.  On December 15, 2008, the circuit 
court granted Mercedes-Benz USA's motion to dismiss this cause 
of action, thus dismissing Mercedes-Benz USA as a defendant.  
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.  Kilian did not 
petition this court for review on this issue.  We therefore 
express 
no 
opinion 
concerning 
Kilian's 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(b)3.a. cause of action. 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
8 
 
the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Mercedes-
Benz Financial. 
¶16 The court of appeals, in an unpublished decision, 
affirmed the circuit court.7  The court of appeals first held 
that claims for attorney fees, defamation, and inconvenience did 
not qualify as pecuniary loss, and that a claim for pecuniary 
loss was required in order to recover under Lemon Law subsection 
(7). 
 
Kilian 
v. 
Mercedes-Benz 
USA, 
LLC, 
No. 
2009AP538, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶10-13 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2010).  
Second, the court of appeals held that Kilian did not seek any 
type 
of 
equitable 
relief in his complaint.  Id., ¶14.  
Consequently, the court of appeals concluded that the complaint 
against Mercedes-Benz USA was properly dismissed.  Id. 
¶17 We granted review and now reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶18 This case comes before us on a motion for summary 
judgment.  "We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment 
de novo, and apply the methodology specified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08."  Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson County, 2010 
WI 95, ¶11, 328 Wis. 2d 613, 785 N.W.2d 615.  "That is, we 
determine whether there is any genuine issue as to any material 
fact, and if not, which party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law."  Id. 
                                                 
7 Kilian, No. 2009AP538, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Mar. 24, 2010). 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
9 
 
 
¶19 This 
case 
also 
involves 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Wisconsin's Lemon Law, found in Wis. Stat. § 218.0171.  "The 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review 
de novo."  Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2010 WI 59, ¶17, 326 
Wis. 2d 155, 785 N.W.2d 398. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶20 In 1983, the legislature enacted Wisconsin's Lemon 
Law, codified in Wis. Stat. § 218.0171.8  It has since become 
"one of Wisconsin's preeminent consumer protection statutes."  
Tammi v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 2009 WI 83, ¶28, 320 
Wis. 2d 45, 768 N.W.2d 783.  The Lemon Law serves the goal of 
consumer protection by creating "standards of conduct for 
manufacturers of new motor vehicles . . . as well as potent 
consequences for violations of those standards."  Id.  In 
addition, it broadly prohibits any person from enforcing a lease 
after a refund is received by the consumer——regardless of 
whether that person is a manufacturer, lease financing company, 
or a dealer.  § 218.0171(2)(cm)3. 
 
¶21 A consumer who leases a vehicle may request a refund 
under the Lemon Law if warranty nonconformities cause the 
vehicle to be out of service for an aggregate of thirty or more 
days during the first year of the lease.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(1)(b)4., (1)(h)2., (2)(b)3.  Assuming the statutory 
criteria are met, the manufacturer must provide the consumer a 
refund within thirty days of the consumer's offer to return the 
                                                 
8 See 1983 Wis. Act 48, § 1. 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
10 
 
vehicle.  § 218.0171(2)(c).  The refund is equal to "the amount 
the consumer paid under the written lease plus any sales tax and 
collateral 
costs, 
less 
a 
reasonable 
allowance 
for 
use."  
§ 218.0171(2)(b)3.a.  Once the consumer has received his or her 
refund, 
"[n]o 
person 
may 
enforce 
the 
lease 
against 
the 
consumer."  § 218.0171(2)(cm)3.  
 
¶22 Consumers aggrieved by a violation of the Lemon Law 
may 
maintain 
an 
action 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 218.0171(7).  
Subsection (7) states: 
In addition to pursuing any other remedy, a consumer 
may bring an action to recover for any damages caused 
by a violation of this section.  The court shall award 
a consumer who prevails in such an action twice the 
amount of any pecuniary loss, together with costs, 
disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, and any 
equitable relief the court determines appropriate. 
Id.9   
¶23 Applying subsection (7) to the instant case requires 
us to consider four issues: (1) whether Kilian may maintain a 
cause of action; (2) whether Mercedes-Benz Financial violated 
                                                 
9 The Lemon Law is clear as to its intent to hold automobile 
manufacturers accountable, and to provide remedies to those 
consumers who have incurred damages as a result of conduct which 
the statute proscribes.  While the Lemon Law's general purpose 
is clear, the particular terms and provisions contained in the 
statute are sometimes opaque.  In subsection (7), for example, 
no definition is provided for the term "damages."  And while 
§ 218.0171(2)(cm)1. prescribes specific actions a manufacturer 
must 
take 
when 
issuing 
the 
consumer 
a 
refund, 
§ 218.0171(2)(cm)3., 
by 
contrast, 
makes 
only 
the 
blanket 
statement that "no person" may enforce a lease after a refund 
has been issued.  This case centers on these ambiguities, which 
we intend to clarify today in a fashion consistent with the 
legislature's intent. 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
11 
 
the Lemon Law; (3) whether Kilian prevailed in his action; and 
(4) whether recovery of pecuniary loss, costs, disbursements, 
reasonable 
attorney 
fees, 
and 
other 
equitable 
relief 
is 
appropriate in this case.  See Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).  We 
consider these four issues in turn. 
A.  Kilian May Maintain a Cause of Action Under Lemon Law 
Subsection (7) 
 
¶24 We first must determine whether Kilian may maintain an 
action under Lemon Law subsection (7).  The first sentence of 
subsection (7) provides that "[i]n addition to pursuing any 
other remedy, a consumer may maintain an action to recover for 
any damages caused by a violation of this section."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(7). 
¶25 Both parties argue that this case turns on our 
interpretation of the word "damages."  Mercedes-Benz Financial 
argues that Kilian could maintain an action only if his damages 
included pecuniary loss.  According to Mercedes-Benz Financial's 
theory, since Kilian suffered no pecuniary loss, he could not 
maintain an action under Lemon Law subsection (7).  Kilian, by 
contrast, argues that the word "damages" encompasses more than 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
12 
 
just pecuniary loss.10  According to Kilian's theory, because he 
sought equitable relief, he could properly maintain an action 
under Lemon Law subsection (7). 
¶26 These two theories on the proper interpretation of the 
word "damages" address one underlying issue: whether it is 
proper for Kilian to maintain an action under the Lemon Law.  We 
therefore now consider whether Kilian may maintain his action 
under Lemon Law subsection (7)'s first sentence. 
¶27 The court of appeals held that a consumer must suffer 
a pecuniary loss in order to maintain an action under Lemon Law 
subsection (7).  Kilian, No. 2009AP538, ¶¶9-10, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2010).  Because Kilian suffered no 
pecuniary loss,11 the court of appeals rejected his claim.  We 
conclude that the holding of the court of appeals is not 
                                                 
10 Kilian argued that he suffered defamation damages as a 
result of Mercedes-Benz Financial's negative reports to credit 
agencies, and that those damages were sufficient to bring an 
action under Lemon Law subsection (7).  We do not agree.  Lemon 
Law subsection (7) claims do not include personal injury 
damages.  Gosse v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 2000 WI App 8, 
¶14, 232 Wis. 2d 163, 605 N.W.2d 896 (holding that a consumer 
was not entitled to recover personal injury damages under the 
Lemon Law).    Nothing precluded Kilian from alleging defamation 
as an independent cause of action in his complaint.  No evidence 
indicates the legislature intended to include such claims under 
the Lemon Law.  Therefore, we conclude that Kilian may not 
bootstrap a defamation claim to his Lemon Law subsection (7) 
claim.  For the purposes of this decision, we also assume, 
without deciding, that pre-suit attorney fees and unspecified 
"inconvenience" damages do not qualify as pecuniary loss under 
subsection (7). 
11 In Part III.D.1. of this opinion, we explain that Kilian 
suffered no pecuniary loss because he had already received a 
properly calculated refund from Mercedes-Benz Financial. 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
13 
 
consistent with the plain language of subsection (7), prior case 
law, and accepted principles of statutory interpretation. 
¶28 First, the court of appeals decision overlooks the 
plain language of subsection (7)'s introductory clause.  The 
broad language of the introductory clause allows Kilian, as a 
consumer, "to pursu[e] any . . . remedy."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(7) (emphasis added).  A remedy is defined as "[t]he 
means of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a wrong; 
legal or equitable relief."  Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. 
Sokolowski, 2006 WI 103, ¶23, 294 Wis. 2d 274, 717 N.W.2d 781 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).  Further, subsection (7)'s 
second sentence explicitly permits a court to award a prevailing 
party "any equitable relief the court determines appropriate."  
§ 218.0171(7).  Therefore, the plain language of subsection (7) 
supports our conclusion that Kilian may maintain an action for 
equitable relief under subsection (7). 
 
¶29 Second, 
the 
only 
appellate 
decision 
interpreting 
identical statutory language permits consumers to seek equitable 
relief. See Cuellar v. Ford Motor Co., 2006 WI App 210, ¶22, 296 
Wis. 2d 545, 723 N.W.2d 747.  In Cuellar, a consumer brought an 
action under the Motor Vehicle Adjustment Programs Act (MVAPA) 
against the Ford Motor Company.  Id., ¶1.  Specifically, the 
consumer (Cuellar) brought his action under MVAPA subsection 
(4), Wis. Stat. § 218.0172(4), a statute which contains language 
identical to Lemon Law subsection (7).  Compare § 218.0172(4), 
with § 218.0171(7).  The court of appeals held that Cuellar did 
not have to show pecuniary loss in order to maintain an action 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
14 
 
under MVAPA subsection (4), noting that "the plain language of 
the statute provides that the court 'shall award . . . any 
equitable relief the court determines appropriate.'"  Cuellar, 
296 Wis. 2d 545, ¶22.  Thus, Cuellar, the only appellate 
decision interpreting statutory language identical to Lemon Law 
subsection (7), supports our conclusion that pecuniary loss is 
not required for a consumer to maintain an action under the 
Lemon Law. 
 
¶30 Third, the absence of any legislative amendment to 
MVAPA supports the conclusion that Cuellar's interpretation of 
MVAPA subsection (4), Wis. Stat. § 218.0172(4), is consistent 
with the legislature's intent.  See Zimmerman v. Wisconsin 
Electric Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 633-34, 157 N.W.2d 648 
(1968) ("The legislature is presumed to know that in absence of 
its changing the law, the construction put upon it by the courts 
will remain unchanged . . . .  Thus, when the legislature 
acquiesces or refuses to change the law, it has acknowledged 
that the court's interpretation of legislative intent is 
correct.").  In the five years since Cuellar, the legislature 
has made no modifications to MVAPA subsection (4) or any other 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
15 
 
identical 
statute, 
such 
as 
Lemon 
Law 
subsection 
(7).12  
Therefore, we presume that the legislature has accepted the 
court of appeals' interpretation of this language as permitting 
consumers to maintain an action seeking equitable relief.   
¶31 In light 
of subsection (7)'s broad introductory 
clause, the court of appeals decision in Cuellar, and the 
legislature's tacit acceptance of Cuellar's holding, we conclude 
that Kilian may maintain an action under the Lemon Law for 
equitable relief without alleging any pecuniary loss.13 
                                                 
12  "Legislative failure to act is ordinarily weak evidence 
of legislative intention to acquiesce in or countenance a 
judicial or executive branch interpretation. . . . Under proper 
circumstances, however, inaction by the legislature may be 
evidence of legislative intent."  Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids 
School Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶124, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177.  
In the instant case, we conclude the "presumption of tacit 
adoption and ratification" is relevant insofar as it is 
consistent with the plain language contained in subsection (7)'s 
broad introductory clause.  See Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. 
Dep't of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 26, 35, 
240 N.W.2d 422 (1976). 
13 While we do not rely on legislative history when a 
statute is unambiguous on its face, this court, on occasion, 
will "consult legislative history to show how that history 
supports our interpretation of a statute otherwise clear on its 
face."  Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶52, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
612 N.W.2d 659.   
No. 
2009AP538   
 
16 
 
B. Mercedes-Benz Financial Violated the Lemon Law 
 
¶32 We have concluded that Kilian may bring suit under the 
Lemon Law for equitable relief.  In order to obtain relief under 
Lemon Law subsection (7), however, Kilian must prove that 
Mercedes-Benz Financial violated some part of the Lemon Law.  
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).   
¶33 Kilian argues that Mercedes-Benz Financial violated 
Lemon Law § 218.0171(2)(cm)3.  This claim highlights an inherent 
tension in the statute because Mercedes-Benz Financial is the 
lease financing company, and not the manufacturer.  The Lemon 
Law is primarily focused on imposing duties on manufacturers.  
However, it just as clearly precludes "[any] person" from 
enforcing a lease once the manufacturer has issued a refund.  
§ 218.0171(2)(cm)3. ("No person may enforce the lease against 
the consumer . . . .").   
¶34 We agree with Kilian that a lender who continues to 
enforce a lease after the consumer returns the vehicle and 
receives a refund from the manufacturer may be held to violate 
the plain language of the statute prohibiting "[any] person" 
                                                                                                                                                             
In the instant case, the legislative history of the Lemon 
Law supports our interpretation of the term "damages." The 
legislative drafting notes from 1983 show that the term 
"pecuniary loss" was originally used in place of the term 
"damages."  Subsection (7) initially provided that "any person 
suffering a pecuniary loss because of a violation of this 
section may bring a civil action . . . ."  However, the final 
bill was amended to state that "a consumer damaged by a 
violation of this section may bring an action . . . ."  See 
LRBs0091/1; WLCS:92/1 (March 4, 1983).  This amendment suggests 
the legislature intended to provide a broader range of remedies 
under this provision than merely pecuniary loss.   
No. 
2009AP538   
 
17 
 
from doing so.14  We now turn to an examination of the specific 
conduct undertaken by Mercedes-Benz Financial after Kilian 
received his refund.   
¶35 On May 10, 2007, Kilian returned the leased vehicle 
pursuant to the Lemon Law and that same day received from the 
manufacturer a $20,847.87 refund.  It is undisputed that the 
collections department of Mercedes-Benz Financial contacted 
Kilian and attempted to obtain payment on the lease after May 
10.15 
¶36 Moreover, in his June 15 letter to Mercedes-Benz 
Financial, Kilian's attorney informed Mercedes-Benz Financial 
that Kilian had returned the vehicle to the manufacturer and had 
                                                 
14 The Lemon Law imposes no duty on the manufacturer to 
inform the lease financing company of a vehicle's return under 
the Lemon Law.  This absence is disconcerting as Justice 
Roggensack discusses in her thoughtful concurrence.  Without 
such a duty, a consumer may incur damages as a result of a 
manufacturer's failure to provide such notice.  We leave open 
the question of whether the Lemon Law imposes a duty of good 
faith on a manufacturer which would require it to give notice of 
the refund to a lease financing company.  We do not reach this 
question because Kilian has not alleged that Mercedes-Benz USA 
acted in bad faith when it failed to inform Mercedes-Benz 
Financial of the refund. 
15 Kilian asserts that he received daily phone calls from 
Mercedes-Benz 
Financial 
collections 
employees. 
 
Bieler 
(Mercedes-Benz Financial's agent) stated in his deposition "I 
don't know for sure if it's daily.  I really couldn't answer 
that."  The precise extent of Mercedes-Benz Financial's early 
enforcement efforts is not discernible from the record.  It is, 
however, undisputed that Kilian received at least two documents 
attempting to enforce the lease after Mercedes-Benz Financial 
(1) had been explicitly informed by Attorney Megna that Kilian 
had received a refund under the Lemon Law and (2) had assured 
Kilian that its collection efforts would cease.   
No. 
2009AP538   
 
18 
 
obtained a refund.  In his June 20 reply, Bieler acknowledged 
receipt of the June 15 letter and assured Kilian's attorney that 
Mercedes-Benz Financial would stop contacting Kilian.  However, 
on July 1, Kilian received a document entitled "Federal Legal 
Notice" from Mercedes-Benz Financial and, on July 2, Kilian 
received a bill for three months of payments from Mercedes-Benz 
Financial.  The notice threatened that Mercedes-Benz Financial 
"may report information about your account to credit bureaus.  
Late payments, missed payments, or other defaults on your 
account may be reflected in your credit report."  The bill was 
obviously a demand for payment. 
¶37 Mercedes-Benz 
Financial 
attempts 
to 
defend 
its 
enforcement of the lease by arguing that there was "no way" for 
it to stop these notices from being mailed by its automated 
collections system.  In essence, Mercedes-Benz Financial alleges 
that it made an innocent mistake and therefore cannot be 
penalized under the Lemon Law.  This argument ignores the fact 
that the Lemon Law unambiguously prohibits enforcement of the 
lease following the issuance of a refund to the consumer, and 
nothing in its plain language provides an exception for 
accidental enforcement of a lease.  This argument for a 
"mistaken enforcement" exception is unpersuasive in light of the 
letter from Kilian's attorney informing Mercedes-Benz Financial 
of Kilian's receipt of a Lemon Law refund, the assurances by 
Bieler that further contacts with Kilian would cease, and 
Kilian's representations for over a month to Mercedes-Benz 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
19 
 
Financial collections employees that he had received a refund 
under the Lemon Law. 
¶38 Therefore, in light of (1) Mercedes-Benz Financial's 
repeated efforts to enforce the lease for two months after 
Kilian received his refund, (2) the notice of the refund that 
Mercedes-Benz Financial received from both Kilian and his 
attorney, 
and 
(3) 
Bieler's 
assurances 
that 
Mercedes-Benz 
Financial's collection efforts would cease, we hold that 
Mercedes-Benz Financial violated Lemon Law § 218.0171(2)(cm)3. 
C. Kilian Prevailed in His Lemon Law Action  
 
¶39 We have 
concluded that Kilian may appropriately 
maintain a cause of action under Lemon Law subsection (7) 
seeking equitable relief for Mercedes-Benz Financial's violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(cm)3.  If Kilian prevails in "such 
an action", then Kilian is entitled to certain enumerated 
relief.  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7)  Specifically, Kilian would be 
entitled to "twice the amount of any pecuniary loss, together 
with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, and any 
equitable relief the court determines appropriate."  Id. 
 
¶40 We determine the precise nature of Kilian's claim for 
relief by examining its substance and not merely the label he 
affixed to it.  We do so in order to determine whether Kilian 
received the relief he actually sought.  We consider two issues 
in this regard: (1) whether we are limited by the fact that 
Kilian sought only one type of equitable relief, and (2) whether 
Kilian prevailed in his action seeking equitable relief. 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
20 
 
 
¶41 First, we consider whether we are limited by the fact 
that the only equitable remedy Kilian sought in his complaint 
was rescission of his lease with Mercedes-Benz Financial.  
Rescission is an equitable remedy, the effect of which is to 
"restore the parties to the position they would have occupied if 
no contract had ever been made between them."  Seidling v. 
Unichem, Inc., 52 Wis. 2d 552, 557-58, 191 N.W.2d 205 (1971).  
We are aware of the label Kilian assigned to his requested 
relief, i.e. "rescission."  However, upon review of the 
substance of his request, we determine that, in actuality, 
Kilian sought to prevent Mercedes-Benz Financial from further 
enforcement 
of 
the 
lease 
in 
violation 
of 
Lemon 
Law 
§ 218.0171(2)(cm)(3).  The equitable remedy Kilian actually 
sought could be more appropriately labeled an action seeking an 
injunction.  An injunction is an order commanding or preventing 
an action.  Black's Law Dictionary 788 (7th ed. 1999). 
¶42 Regardless of the precise label Kilian affixed to his 
request, it is well settled that a court sitting in equity has 
the "power to enlarge the scope of the ordinary forms of relief, 
and even to contrive new ones adapted to new circumstances."  
Mulder v. Mittelstadt, 120 Wis. 2d 103, 115, 352 N.W.2d 223 (Ct. 
App. 1984) (internal quotation omitted).  Therefore, we are not 
limited by the fact that Kilian labeled his action one for 
rescission, nor are we required to determine whether he sought 
an injunction.  Rather, we construe Kilian's action as one 
seeking cessation 
of Mercedes-Benz Financial's efforts to 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
21 
 
enforce the lease after Kilian received a refund from Mereceds-
Benz USA. 
 
¶43 We now turn to consideration of the second issue, 
whether Kilian prevailed in receiving the equitable remedy he 
actually sought.  In a typical case, it is clear which party 
prevails because that party will have a final judgment granted 
in its favor.  Obtaining final judgment is not, however, the 
only way a party may be considered a prevailing party.  While 
Mercedes-Benz Financial had provided assurances to Kilian prior 
to the filing of his lawsuit that its enforcement efforts would 
stop, it was only after Kilian commenced his lawsuit that 
Mercedes-Benz Financial ceased its efforts to enforce the lease. 
¶44 In order to prevail in a consumer protection action, 
it is sufficient that a consumer satisfy one of two tests.  We 
address each of these two tests in turn.  The first test 
requires that the consumer show (1) a causal link between his or 
her 
lawsuit and the relief obtained, and (2) that the 
defendant's conduct in response to the lawsuit was required by 
law.  Cmty. Credit Plan, Inc. v. Johnson, 228 Wis. 2d 30, 35, 
596 N.W.2d 799 (1999) (referring to this test as the "catalyst 
test"). 
¶45  A direct causal link exists between Kilian's lawsuit 
and the equitable relief he obtained——that is, cessation of the 
enforcement of the lease by Mercedes-Benz Financial after he 
received a refund from Mercedes-Benz USA.  It was, after all, 
Kilian's lawsuit which compelled Mercedes-Benz Financial to 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
22 
 
recognize its error and stop its efforts to enforce the lease.16  
Second, Mercedes-Benz Financial's enforcement of the lease was 
prohibited by the Lemon Law, and so, cessation of these 
enforcement efforts was required by law.  As previously 
discussed, "no person" may enforce a lease after a refund is 
received by a consumer pursuant to the Lemon Law.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(cm)3. 
 
Mercedes-Benz 
Financial 
was 
therefore 
required by law to grant Kilian the relief he sought in his 
lawsuit.  We conclude that Kilian has satisfied both prongs of 
the first test that the Community Credit Plan court applied. 
¶46 The second test the Community Credit Plan court 
applied was also a two-prong test: (1) whether the consumer 
received a significant benefit sought in litigation, and (2) 
whether there was a violation of a consumer protection statute 
by the defendant.  228 Wis. 2d at 35.  We find this test to be 
met as well.  First, Kilian received the exact benefit he sought 
in his litigation——the cessation of Mercedes-Benz Financial's 
efforts to enforce the lease after Kilian received a refund from 
Mercedes-Benz USA.  Based upon the record before us, it is clear 
that this was a significant benefit to Kilian as it served as 
the primary basis for his complaint.  Second, as we have 
discussed, 
Mercedes-Benz 
Financial 
violated 
Lemon 
Law 
§ 218.0171(2)(cm)3. when it enforced the lease against Kilian 
after receiving notice of Kilian's refund.  See id.  We conclude 
                                                 
16 Nothing in the record indicates that either Mercedes-Benz 
USA or Mercedes-Benz Financial intentionally violated the Lemon 
Law. 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
23 
 
that, under either test articulated by the Community Credit Plan 
court, Kilian is the prevailing party under subsection (7). 
D. Recovery of Pecuniary Loss, Costs, Disbursements, Reasonable 
Attorney Fees, and Other Equitable Relief 
 
¶47 We have determined that Kilian may maintain an action 
against Mercedes-Benz Financial for its violation of the Lemon 
Law and that Kilian qualifies as a prevailing party under 
subsection (7).  Because of his status as a prevailing party, 
Kilian is entitled to "twice the amount of any pecuniary loss, 
together with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, 
and any equitable relief the court determines appropriate."  
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).  We now discuss each remedy enumerated 
in subsection (7) and whether it is available to Kilian. 
1.  Twice Kilian's Pecuniary Loss 
 
¶48 Under the Lemon Law, a consumer may seek relief for 
his or her purchase or lease of a "lemon" vehicle by requesting 
a refund from the manufacturer.  See Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2).  
This refund typically equals the sum of the consumer's lease 
payments and other collateral costs, less an allowance for 
reasonable use.  See § 218.0171(2)(b)3.a.  The refund must be 
provided to the consumer within thirty days after the consumer 
makes 
a 
proper 
offer 
to 
return 
the 
vehicle. 
 
See 
§ 218.0171(2)(cm)1. 
 
¶49 If the consumer's refund is delayed, miscalculated, or 
withheld, the consumer may commence litigation under Lemon Law 
subsection (7).  See Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).  The consumer may 
sue for twice his or her pecuniary loss, in addition to other 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
24 
 
relief.  Id.  Pecuniary loss includes the purchase price of the 
car.  Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 983, 542 
N.W.2d 148 (1996).17  The legislature's purpose in doubling the 
pecuniary 
loss 
was 
to 
"persuade 
manufacturers 
to 
settle 
legitimate warranty disputes so that consumers are not forced to 
litigate."  Id. at 984 (internal citations omitted).  This 
purpose——encouraging 
legitimate 
refunds 
and 
discouraging 
litigation——is instructive to our interpretation of the term 
"pecuniary loss." 
¶50 On May 10, 2007, Kilian received a timely refund from 
Mercedes-Benz USA in the amount of $20,847.87.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(2)(b)3.b.  This amount equaled the sum of Kilian's 
lease payments and other collateral costs paid by him between 
March 2006 and April 2007, less an allowance for his reasonable 
use.  See id.  After receiving this refund, Kilian filed suit 
because Mercedes-Benz Financial continued to enforce the lease 
against him.  Kilian’s motivation for filing suit against 
Mercedes-Benz 
Financial 
was 
not 
related 
to 
any 
delay, 
miscalculation, or withholding of his refund.   
¶51 The legislature did not intend that consumers who have 
already received a proper refund should also recover twice the 
amount they paid under the lease as pecuniary loss.  This would 
not serve subsection (7)'s purpose——to encourage manufacturers 
to provide consumers proper Lemon Law refunds without resorting 
                                                 
17 Pecuniary loss incorporates "a reasonable allowance for 
use" before being doubled.  Tammi, 320 Wis. 2d 45, ¶61. 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
25 
 
to litigation——because Kilian had already received a $20,847.87 
refund.  Such a result would amount to a windfall to Kilian but 
would not advance a central purpose of subsection (7)——
discouraging manufacturers from withholding legitimate refunds. 
 
¶52 We conclude that, because Kilian has already received 
a properly calculated and timely refund, he did not suffer any 
pecuniary loss within the meaning of subsection (7).  Therefore, 
we turn to a discussion of other relief available to Kilian 
under subsection (7). 
2.  Costs and Disbursements 
 
¶53 Kilian is entitled to an award for his costs and 
disbursements caused by a violation of the Lemon Law.  Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0171(7).  Wisconsin Stat. § 814.04 sets forth the 
particular items which may be included in an award for costs and 
disbursements.  These costs and disbursements are then taxed by 
the circuit court clerk against the losing party pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 814.10.18  The costs and disbursements which may be 
awarded on appeal are set forth in Wis. Stat. § 809.25.  Costs 
and disbursements on appeal are then taxed according to 
§ 809.25(1)(d).19 
                                                 
18 "This action may be reviewed by the court on motion of 
the party aggrieved made and served within 10 days after 
taxation."  Wis. Stat. § 814.10(4). 
19 Wis. Stat. § 809.25(1)(d) states: 
Costs allowed by the court are taxed by the clerk of 
the court of appeals, irrespective of the filing by a 
party of a petition for review in the supreme court.  
In the event of review by the supreme court, costs are 
taxed by the clerk of the supreme court  . . . .  The 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
26 
 
¶54 Wisconsin's Lemon Law is a fee shifting statute.20  
"Fee shifting statutes contemplate that those recovering under 
them will be made whole."  Chmill v. Friendly Ford-Mercury of 
Janesville, Inc., 154 Wis. 2d 407, 413 n.2, 453 N.W.2d 197 (Ct. 
App. 1990).  In order to fulfill the Lemon Law fee-shifting 
statute's purpose that those recovering be made whole, we have 
held that under subsection (7), costs and disbursements also 
include "reasonable expenses incurred in litigation above and 
beyond . . . those taxed as costs by a court clerk . . . ."  Id.  
Therefore, in addition to the normal costs and disbursements 
awarded to Kilian under § 814.04 and § 809.25, the holding in 
Chmill also allows Kilian to recover any other "reasonable 
expenses incurred in litigation."21  Id. 
¶55 The circuit court did not determine the amount of 
Kilian's costs and disbursements.  We therefore remand the cause 
to the circuit court to determine the appropriate amount. 
3.  Reasonable Attorney Fees 
                                                                                                                                                             
clerk of the supreme court shall include in the 
remittitur the costs allowed in the court.  The clerk 
of circuit court shall enter the judgment for costs in 
accordance with s. 806.16. 
20 A "fee-shifting statute" is a statute that provides for 
an award of attorney fees for a prevailing plaintiff.  See 11 
Wisc. Prac., Trial Handbook for Wis. Lawyers § 37:04 (3rd ed.). 
21 These 
"reasonable 
expenses" 
exclude 
costs 
and 
disbursements already allowed to Kilian under § 814.04 so that 
Kilian receives no double recovery for overlapping items.  
Chmill v. Friendly Ford-Mercury of Janesville, Inc., 154 
Wis. 2d 407, 413 n.2, 453 N.W.2d 197 (Ct. App. 1990). 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
27 
 
 
¶56 Kilian is also entitled to an award of reasonable 
attorney fees caused by Mercedes-Benz Financial's violation of 
the Lemon Law.  Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7).  As a general rule, 
Wisconsin follows the "American Rule," pursuant to which 
litigants are required to pay their own attorney fees.  DeChant 
v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 200 Wis. 2d 559, 571, 547 N.W.2d 592 
(1996).  This general rule does not apply when the legislature 
has chosen to award attorney fees to a prevailing party through 
a fee-shifting statute.  Id.   
¶57 We have held that "an important purpose of fee-
shifting statutes is to encourage injured parties to enforce 
their statutory rights when the cost of litigation, absent the 
fee-shifting provision, would discourage them from doing so."  
Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2007 WI 98, ¶55, 303 
Wis. 2d 258, 735 N.W.2d 93.  Such fee-shifting statutes ensure 
"that individuals will enforce the rights provided to them under 
the statute by the legislature, even when the costs of 
litigation exceed the value of the action."  Id.  Lemon Law 
subsection (7) is such a fee-shifting statute, and thus, an 
exception to the American Rule.  See Chmill v. Friendly Ford-
Mercury 
of 
Janesville, 
Inc., 
144 
Wis. 2d 
796, 
809, 
424 
N.W.2d 747 (Ct. App. 1988). 
¶58 As a result, Kilian may recover reasonable attorney 
fees caused by Mercedes-Benz Financial's violation of Lemon Law 
§ 218.0171(2)(cm)3.22  The circuit court did not determine the 
                                                 
22 This includes "attorney fees for appellate work essential 
to the consumer's success."  Chmill, 144 Wis. 2d 796, at 809. 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
28 
 
amount of Kilian's reasonable attorney fees in the first 
instance.  Therefore, we remand the cause to the circuit court 
to determine the appropriate amount. 
4.  Other Appropriate Equitable Relief 
¶59 The final remedy allowed under subsection (7) permits 
the court to award Kilian "appropriate" equitable relief.  Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0171(7).  Because we held in Part III.C. that Kilian 
has already obtained the equitable relief he sought, cessation 
of the enforcement of the lease by Mercedes-Benz Financial, it 
is not appropriate to grant Kilian any other equitable relief in 
this case. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶60  We conclude that Kilian may maintain an action for 
equitable relief under Lemon Law subsection (7) and that 
Mercedes-Benz Financial's enforcement of the lease after it was 
informed by Kilian's attorney that Kilian had received a refund, 
and after it assured Kilian that collections efforts would 
cease, violated the Lemon Law.  We also conclude that Kilian 
prevailed in his action when Mercedes-Benz Financial voluntarily 
ceased enforcement of the lease after Kilian filed suit.  As the 
prevailing party, we conclude that Kilian is entitled to his 
costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees, but that 
Kilian is not entitled to an award for pecuniary loss.  As a 
result, we reverse the court of appeals and remand the cause to 
the circuit court for a determination of the appropriate amount 
of Kilian's costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees. 
No. 
2009AP538   
 
29 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
¶61 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2009AP538.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶62 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I join 
the majority opinion, but I write in concurrence in order to 
point out a gap in Wisconsin's Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 
(2009-10),1 and to urge the Wisconsin Legislature to close this 
gap.2  Namely, the Lemon Law does not require the manufacturer to 
notify a financing institution that finances a lease or a 
purchase when the owner has returned the car to the manufacturer 
under the law.  This gap has caused concerns in the present 
case.  I foresee that the lack of such a notice requirement has 
the potential to cause adverse effects both to the consumer and 
to financing institutions. 
¶63 First, 
as 
the 
majority 
underscores, 
without 
a 
requirement that the manufacturer notify financing institutions 
that a vehicle has been returned pursuant to the Lemon Law, a 
consumer may be adversely affected.3  Without notice of the 
return, the financing institution will likely continue in its 
efforts to collect payments that it believes the consumer owes 
under the financing agreement.  For example, the financing 
institution could harm a consumer's credit rating by reporting 
the missed payments or, in an attempt to prevent harm to his 
credit rating, a consumer may be forced to incur litigation 
expenses in order to stop enforcement efforts. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 A referral to the legislature's law review committee of 
the Legislative Council may be of assistance in this matter. 
3 Majority op., ¶35 n.14. 
No.  2009AP538.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶64 Second, without a requirement that the manufacturer 
notify financing institutions that the vehicle has been returned 
pursuant to the Lemon Law, financing institutions may be 
adversely affected.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(cm)3., 
"[n]o person may enforce the lease against the consumer after 
the consumer receives a refund."  The majority holds today that 
under this subdivision, a financing institution can be held 
liable for enforcing a lease after the consumer returns the 
vehicle to the manufacturer and receives a refund.4  Moreover, 
the majority holds that, if the consumer prevails in an action 
against the financing institution for enforcing a lease after 
the vehicle has been returned, the consumer may receive costs, 
disbursements, and reasonable attorney's fees.5  This is in 
addition to any other damages incurred. 
¶65 In the case at hand, these conclusions are not 
troublesome because Kilian informed Mercedes-Benz Financial that 
he had returned his car under the Lemon Law, and therefore, 
Mercedes-Benz Financial was on notice that it was improper to 
continue collection efforts against Kilian.  However, the 
conclusions 
we 
reach 
today 
become 
troublesome 
where 
the 
financing institution has not had notice that the consumer has 
returned the vehicle to the manufacturer.   
¶66 In order to avoid unwarranted adverse consequences to 
consumers and to financing institutions, it would be helpful if 
the Wisconsin Legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 to add 
                                                 
4 Id., ¶34. 
5 Id., ¶¶53-58. 
No.  2009AP538.pdr 
 
3 
 
two notice requirements to Wisconsin's Lemon Law upon the return 
of the vehicle:  (1) that the consumer notify the manufacturer 
of the current financing information for the vehicle6 and (2) 
that the manufacturer notify the financing institution of the 
vehicle's return.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Not surprisingly, the standard Lemon Law notice form 
provided by the Department of Transportation already asks the 
consumer to provide the manufacturer with this information and 
to 
authorize 
the 
manufacturer 
to 
contact 
the 
financing 
institution.  See Motor Vehicle Lemon Law Notice, available at 
http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/safety/consumer/rights/lemonlaw.htm 
(scroll down to "What should a lemon owner do?" and click on 
"Motor Vehicle Lemon Law Notice" pdf link).  However, the 
statutes do not so require. 
No.  2009AP538.pdr 
 
 
 
1