Case Title: Harris v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 990270

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
DAVID J. HARRIS 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 990270 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
November 5, 1999 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider a defendant’s claims that he 
was denied his right to a speedy trial under Code § 19.2-243 and 
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution where he 
was reindicted for the same offenses following the granting of 
the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi on the original 
indictment.  The dispositive issues are whether the Commonwealth 
had good cause for the nolle prosequi motion, and whether its 
motivation therefor constituted a bad faith or oppressive tactic 
amounting to prosecutorial misconduct. 
BACKGROUND 
In 1995, David J. Harris falsely represented to his 
employee-union, the International Association of Firefighters 
(IAFF), that he was in financial need as a result of unpaid 
medical expenses arising from the medical care of Harris’ unborn 
son.  Harris provided IAFF with an invoice for expenses, which 
Harris falsely represented as not having been paid by his 
insurer.  In response to Harris’ false representation, IAFF 
issued a check to Harris in the amount of $6,744.11.  
Subsequently, in an attempt to procure additional money, Harris 
made a second false representation to IAFF in the form of a 
fabricated invoice showing additional unpaid expenses. 
On January 23, 1996, the Loudoun County General District 
Court held a preliminary hearing and found probable cause to 
believe that Harris had committed the felony offense of 
obtaining money by false pretenses from IAFF.  Code § 18.2-178.  
The charge was certified to the grand jury.  Subsequently, on 
February 12, 1996, Harris was indicted in a two-count indictment 
for obtaining money by false pretenses from IAFF and for 
attempting to obtain money by false pretenses from IAFF.  Code 
§ 18.2-26.  At the Commonwealth’s request, a jury trial was set 
for September 3, 1996.  Harris was not held in custody pending 
his trial. 
On August 15, 1996, the Commonwealth filed a motion for a 
continuance on the grounds that it had been unable to obtain 
documents essential to the prosecution from both a local 
financial institution and an out-of-state financial institution.1  
On August 22, 1996, a hearing was held on the Commonwealth’s 
motion.  During argument, the Commonwealth conceded that 
“there’s a speedy trial issue,” but asserted that the case could 
                     
1The record reflects that the Commonwealth obtained 
subpoenas duces tecum for these documents in May and July, 1996. 
 
 
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be reset, subject to an available date on the trial court’s 
docket, within the statutory nine-month period. 
Harris opposed the granting of a continuance.  He contended 
that witnesses for his case would be inconvenienced by the delay 
and that the Commonwealth had failed to act with appropriate 
diligence to obtain the documents.  The trial court denied the 
motion and admonished the Commonwealth for not timely requesting 
the subpoenas duces tecum to obtain the documents.2  The 
Commonwealth then moved to nolle prosequi the indictment.  Over 
Harris’ objection, the trial court granted this motion and 
stated, “Mr. Harris, you are free to go.” 
On October 15, 1996, the grand jury directly indicted 
Harris for the same offenses.  By agreement with the 
Commonwealth, Harris appeared, accepted service, and was 
arraigned on the indictment on November 1, 1996.  The 
Commonwealth had previously agreed to Harris’ release on 
personal recognizance and, accordingly, Harris was not held in 
custody. 
                     
2Harris contends that the trial court offered the 
Commonwealth the option of withdrawing its request for a jury 
trial in order to obtain the continuance.  The record reflects, 
however, only that the trial court noted that the request for a 
jury trial was a factor in its consideration of the motion for a 
continuance. 
 
 
3
On March 31, 1997, Harris moved to dismiss the indictment.  
In a supporting memorandum, Harris contended that the 
Commonwealth lacked good cause for seeking the nolle prosequi of 
the original indictment as required by Code § 19.2-265.3.  
Relying on Battle v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 624, 406 S.E.2d 
195 (1991), Harris contended that the Commonwealth had 
effectively continued the first prosecution in the form of the 
second, thus denying him his statutory rights of speedy trial. 
Harris further contended that, even if his statutory speedy 
trial right had not been violated, his right to a speedy trial 
under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution had 
been prejudiced by the delay occasioned by the Commonwealth’s 
nolle prosequi of the original indictment.  Harris conceded that 
he could not “determine . . . whether any evidence will be lost 
due to witness unavailability, or whether there will be an 
inability of any witness . . . to now accurately recall events.”  
However, he asserted that he had been prejudiced by a change in 
counsel necessitated when his original counsel ended his 
employment with the firm retained by Harris and discontinued his 
practice of law. 
In a responding brief, the Commonwealth, relying on Arnold 
v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 218, 443 S.E.2d 183, aff’d, 19 Va. 
App. 143, 450 S.E.2d 151 (1994)(en banc), contended that the 
motion for nolle prosequi of the original indictment had been 
 
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properly taken and, thus, Harris’ statutory period in which to 
be afforded a speedy trial ran from the date of his arraignment 
on the second indictment.  The Commonwealth further contended 
that Harris had failed to show that the delay was prejudicial, 
precluding a review of his claim for a violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right. 
In a letter opinion, the trial court indicated that it 
would deny the motion to dismiss.  Citing Arnold, 18 Va. App. at 
222, 443 S.E.2d at 185, the trial court held that the nolle 
prosequi of the original indictment “laid to rest that 
indictment, . . . . as though it never had existed.”  
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Harris’ statutory 
speedy trial right was to be calculated from the date of his 
arraignment on the charges in the second indictment.3
The trial court continued in its opinion letter to consider 
Harris’ claim that the delay in prosecuting him constituted a 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.  The 
trial court concluded that “[t]he evidence before the Court 
. . . does not justify the conclusion that any such deprivation 
                     
3Although Harris had not expressly asserted a violation of 
his due process rights at this time, the trial court further 
stated that it found no improper motive or prosecutorial 
vindictiveness in the Commonwealth’s decision to nolle prosequi 
the original indictment or in its electing to seek the later 
indictment of Harris for the same offenses and, thus, no basis 
for finding a due process violation. 
 
5
has occurred.”  An order incorporating by reference the trial 
court’s opinion letter was entered May 29, 1997. 
On July 29, 1997, Harris entered into a conditional plea 
agreement whereby he agreed to plead guilty to attempting to 
obtain money by false pretenses from IAFF while reserving his 
right to appeal the denial of his speedy trial claims.  By order 
entered August 18, 1997, the trial court found Harris guilty of 
that offense, sentenced him to a suspended six months term of 
confinement, and ordered him to make restitution. 
Harris noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals.  With 
respect to the speedy trial right under Code § 19.2-243, Harris 
contended that the trial court erred in finding that the nolle 
prosequi of the original indictment had been taken for good 
cause.  He asserted that because the trial court had denied the 
Commonwealth’s motion for a continuance, there was no good cause 
for sustaining the motion for nolle prosequi as well.  Harris 
further asserted that the trial court erred in finding that 
there had been no improper motive in seeking the nolle prosequi 
and that this “bad faith” infringed upon his constitutionally 
protected right to a speedy trial.  Harris also contended that 
the delays occasioned by the nolle prosequi of the original 
indictment had violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
trial. 
 
6
In an unpublished opinion, Harris v. Commonwealth, Record 
No. 2087-97-4 (October 20, 1998), the Court of Appeals rejected 
Harris’ assertion that the motion for nolle prosequi had been 
granted without good cause.  Noting that the result of a motion 
for nolle prosequi being granted was more favorable to the 
defendant than where a case is merely continued, the Court of 
Appeals found that it was “uncontroverted that the Commonwealth 
had not obtained documents indispensable to prosecution of 
[Harris] on the scheduled trial date.”  In this context, the 
Court held that the Commonwealth had made a sufficient showing 
of good cause for the trial court to sustain a motion for nolle 
prosequi. 
Having thus found that Harris lacked grounds to assert a 
violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that there was no presumption of prejudice in 
the delay occasioned by his release from the original charges.  
The Court further concluded that Harris had failed to 
demonstrate actual prejudice as a result of this delay, thus he 
was precluded from asserting a violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right. 
The Court of Appeals further held that the Commonwealth’s 
motivation in making the motion for nolle prosequi was that it 
was “unable to properly prosecute the original indictment, 
without suggestion of unfair or oppressive tactics.”  
 
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Accordingly, the Court rejected Harris’ assertion of 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
On January 4, 1999, the Court denied Harris’ petition for a 
rehearing en banc.  We awarded Harris this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Harris first contends that the trial court’s granting of 
the motion for nolle prosequi of the first indictment without 
any showing of good cause by the Commonwealth was error and, 
thus, the second indictment was effectively a continuation of 
the original prosecution and subject to the speedy trial time 
limits of the original prosecution, which would have commenced 
from the date probable cause was found in the general district 
court.4  Specifically, he contends the record is devoid of any 
                     
4The Commonwealth contends that Harris failed to preserve 
his objection to the trial court’s “good cause” determination at 
the time that the motion for nolle prosequi was granted.  During 
oral argument, the Commonwealth further contended that Harris is 
barred from collaterally challenging the granting of the motion 
for nolle prosequi, asserting that his remedy was to have 
challenged the trial court’s action on direct appeal.  We 
disagree.  At the time the motion for nolle prosequi was 
granted, Harris was not an “aggrieved party . . . [petitioning] 
from [a] final conviction in a circuit court of a traffic 
infraction or a crime.”  Code § 17.1-406 (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, Harris had no right to petition the Court of 
Appeals for a review of the trial court’s action at that time.  
Harris’ right of appeal accrued only when he was convicted under 
the second indictment.  The issues before us arise from his 
assertion of his speedy trial rights, including the claim that 
the original indictment was improperly terminated, during that 
prosecution. 
 
 
8
basis upon which the trial court could have granted the motion 
for nolle prosequi for “good cause.”  This is so, Harris 
asserts, because the Commonwealth could not rely on its argument 
in favor of the motion for a continuance as supporting its 
motion for nolle prosequi and offered no additional reason to 
support the motion before the trial court made its ruling.  
Harris further asserts that the trial court’s denial of the 
continuance motion establishes that there was no good cause to 
support that motion and, thus, none to support the motion for 
nolle prosequi.  We disagree. 
We review the granting of a motion for nolle prosequi under 
well-settled principles of law.  Code § 19.2-265.3 provides that 
“[n]olle prosequi shall be entered only in the discretion of the 
court, upon motion of the Commonwealth with good cause therefor 
shown.”  The express language of the statute commits a finding 
of good cause to the discretion of the trial court.  “In 
reviewing an exercise of discretion, we do not substitute our 
judgment for that of the trial court.  Rather, we consider only 
whether the record fairly supports the trial court’s action.”  
Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 385, 484 S.E.2d 898, 906 
(1997).  Accordingly, the granting of a motion for nolle 
prosequi will only be overturned if there is clear evidence that 
the decision to grant the motion was not judicially sound. 
 
9
Harris’ contention that the Commonwealth could not rely on 
its argument in favor of a continuance to support its subsequent 
motion for nolle prosequi is without merit.  It is clear from 
the record that the Commonwealth sought the nolle prosequi as an 
alternative to the continuance and on the same grounds.  That 
argument and its underlying factual assertions were before the 
trial court, and it was not necessary for the Commonwealth to 
reiterate its position under those circumstances. 
Harris’ contention that the trial court’s refusal to grant 
the continuance is tantamount to a finding that there was no 
good cause to support the subsequent motion for nolle prosequi 
is equally without merit.  In denying the Commonwealth’s motion 
for a continuance, the trial court noted that Harris’ concern 
for rescheduling his witnesses and the trial court’s concern 
over the difficulty in setting a new date for a jury trial 
weighed against granting the motion.  These concerns were not 
applicable to the subsequent motion for nolle prosequi.  
Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted, whereas a continuance 
granted over the defendant’s objection is not favorable to him 
in certain respects, a nolle prosequi provides him with the 
benefit of being released from the terms of his bond or from 
being held in custody.  Thus, the trial court’s determination of 
whether to grant the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi 
involved a different calculus from the one it had applied to the 
 
10
continuance motion.  The record fairly supports the trial 
court’s action in granting the nolle prosequi and, accordingly, 
there is no basis for finding that decision was not founded upon 
good cause shown by the Commonwealth. 
Harris next contends that even if there was sufficient good 
cause to support the granting of the motion for nolle prosequi, 
the Commonwealth’s motive therefor was improper.  Harris asserts 
that the Commonwealth acted in bad faith and used “oppressive 
and unfair trial tactics” in order to avoid the operation of the 
speedy trial statute.  We disagree. 
Addressing the issue of prosecutorial misconduct in 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978), the United 
States Supreme Court stated, “for an agent of the State to 
pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a 
person’s reliance on his legal rights is ‘patently 
unconstitutional.’”  Id., 434 U.S. at 363.  In the instant case, 
the record does not support a conclusion that the decision to 
nolle prosequi the indictment was made to penalize Harris for 
his reliance on his legal rights.  Rather, the Commonwealth’s 
motion for nolle prosequi resulted from the Commonwealth’s 
inability to go forward with the prosecution without a 
continuance in order to obtain essential documentary evidence.  
We recognize that the trial court found that the Commonwealth’s 
failure to obtain the necessary documents in a timely manner 
 
11
was, at least in part, due to a lack of adequate foresight and 
preparation on the part of the Commonwealth’s Attorney.5  While 
such behavior is not to be encouraged, on this record it does 
not demonstrate bad faith on the Commonwealth’s part.  Nor does 
the decision of the Commonwealth to seek a nolle prosequi of the 
indictment rise to the level of oppressive tactics amounting to 
prosecutorial misconduct in this instance.  Cf. Battle v. 
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. at 630, 406 S.E.2d at 198 (prohibiting 
the use of the threat of nolle prosequi in order to increase the 
prosecutorial risk to a defendant to force a defendant to 
relinquish an advantage gained by the exercise of the 
defendant’s legal rights). 
Harris further contends that having failed to prepare 
adequately for trial, the Commonwealth’s action in seeking a 
nolle prosequi constituted a violation of his due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment by providing the Commonwealth 
with an “‘unlimited continuance’ that circumvented [Harris’] 
right to a speedy trial.”  In essence, Harris is asserting that, 
even in the absence of an improper or vindictive motive, where 
the Commonwealth elects not to proceed with a prosecution 
because of a weakness in its ability to present its case, any 
                     
5The record also reflects that the delay in obtaining the 
documents was caused in part by factors beyond the 
Commonwealth’s direct ability to control. 
 
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subsequent attempt to prosecute the same charge should be 
treated as a continuation of the original prosecution.  This 
contention is contrary to the well-established law of this 
Commonwealth concerning the effect of a nolle prosequi. 
“Under Virginia procedure a nolle prosequi is a 
discontinuance which discharges the accused from liability on 
the indictment to which the nolle prosequi is entered."  Miller 
v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 929, 935, 234 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1977).  
A new indictment is a new charge, distinct from the original 
charge or indictment.  “When an original indictment is 
supplanted by a second indictment, the terms contemplated by 
[Code § 19.2-243] are to be counted from the time of the second 
indictment.”  Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 322, 171 S.E.2d 
243, 246 (1969); see also Miller, 217 Va. at 934, 234 S.E.2d at 
273; Arnold, 18 Va. App. at 221-22, 443 S.E.2d at 185; Presley 
v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 348, 350, 344 S.E.2d 195, 196 
(1986). 
The fact that a motion for nolle prosequi comes close in 
time to the running of a defendant’s speedy trial period does 
not obviate the ultimate effect of that motion.  Once the motion 
is granted, the defendant is released from custody or the terms 
of his bond and is at liberty.  While this may provide the 
Commonwealth with an opportunity to gather more evidence, it 
does not amount to an “unlimited continuance” because the 
 
13
defendant no longer suffers the consequences of being under 
indictment. 
For these reasons, we find no merit to any of Harris’ 
contentions in support of his claim that he was denied his 
statutory right to a speedy trial or that his due process rights 
were violated when the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s 
motion for nolle prosequi. 
We now consider Harris’ contention that, even if the trial 
court did not err in granting the motion for nolle prosequi, he 
was nonetheless denied his right to a speedy trial as provided 
under the Sixth Amendment.  In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972), the United States Supreme Court listed four factors that 
are to be weighed in determining whether an accused has been 
deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.  These 
factors are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, 
whether the defendant has asserted his right, and the prejudice 
to the accused from the delay.  Id. at 530.  The Court noted 
that prejudice to the defendant must be considered in the light 
of the interests the speedy trial right was designed to protect: 
"(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to 
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit 
the possibility that the defense will be impaired.  Of these, 
the most serious is the last, because the inability of a 
 
14
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of 
the entire system."  Id. at 532 (footnote omitted). 
Addressing each of the factors identified in Barker,6 Harris 
asserts that the delay caused by the nolle prosequi of the 
original indictment creates a presumption of prejudice since he 
was not brought to trial for the offenses charged in that 
indictment until approximately nineteen months after the 
original probable cause hearing in the general district court.  
This delay, he asserts, “was deliberate in that the Commonwealth 
had not prepared for the original trial.”  Thus, while conceding 
that he was on a personal recognizance bond following his arrest 
in each instance, Harris contends that he “was kept in anxiety 
for more than nineteen (19) months.”  Harris further contends 
that he was prejudiced by the delay because he was required to 
substitute new counsel and was otherwise subjected to the 
inherent prejudice of being kept under suspicion of having 
committed a crime. 
The difficulty with all these contentions is that they fail 
to account for the effect of the nolle prosequi of the original 
indictment.  We have already determined that the trial court did 
not err in granting the motion for nolle prosequi.  As a result, 
                     
6It is not disputed that Harris asserted the right as 
required by the third factor. 
 
 
15
Harris’ claim for a violation of his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial relates only to the prosecution of the second 
indictment.7  The record fails to disclose that the time it took 
to bring Harris to trial on the second indictment was occasioned 
by any factor other than the normal proceedings of the trial 
court, including Harris’ own requests for discovery and pre-
trial motions. 
Nor does Harris point to any evidence in the record showing 
actual prejudice to his defense.  Although Harris’ original 
counsel left the employ of the firm Harris had retained for his 
defense, other members of that firm represented him throughout 
the proceedings.  The aggressive nature of the defense they 
provided discloses no indication of any deficiency resulting 
from the change in lead counsel.  Similarly, we find no support 
in the record of Harris’ claim of generalized prejudice 
resulting from his being under indictment.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the period between Harris’ appearance to accept service of 
the second indictment and his subsequent conviction thereon did 
not constitute a violation of his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. 
                     
7Harris concedes on brief that, taking into account his 
delay in accepting service of the indictment, his conviction on 
the second indictment occurred within the limits of Code § 19.2-
243. 
 
 
16
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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