Case Title: People v. Duong

Citation: 

Docket Number: S114228

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ANH THE DUONG, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S114228 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA240170 
 
 
August 10, 2020 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred.   
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
S114228 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Defendant Anh The Duong shot and killed four nightclub 
patrons after an argument.  He was convicted of three counts of 
first degree and one count of second degree murder with a 
multiple murder special circumstance and various gun use 
enhancements.1  The jury returned a death verdict.2  We affirm.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
On the evening of May 5, 1999, Thi Van Le went to the 
International Club in El Monte to attend a birthday party for 
Khiet Diep.  The party of at least seven sat at a table near the 
restroom.  Diep belonged to the Wah Ching gang, and Anthony 
Tran, Hoa Truong, and defendant were Lao Family gang 
members.  The other three attendees were Le, Duc Nguyen, and 
a man named “Khuong.”  None of the latter three were identified 
as gang members.  At some point, Le went to the restroom and 
heard Tran arguing with three or four Asian men.  Minh Tram, 
 
1  
Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a), 189, 190.2, 
subdivision 
(a)(3), 
12022.5, 
subdivision 
(a), 
12022.53, 
subdivisions (b)–(d).   
2  
The trial court stayed sentence on the various 
enhancements.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
a member of the Black Dragon gang, eventually joined the 
argument.   
After this encounter, defendant went toward the bar area 
where Tram and others sat in a booth.  Ten to 15 minutes after 
the argument, Le saw defendant shoot into the booth with a 
handgun.  John Bui, a co-owner of the club, stood up from the 
booth and grabbed at defendant, who evaded Bui and continued 
firing between nine to 13 shots, which took 10 to 15 seconds.  Le 
did not see anyone shoot at defendant.  Tran testified that he 
did not see anyone threaten defendant or their group.   
Bui testified he saw an argument between two groups, 
which included defendant and Minh Tram.  He told the men to 
stop arguing and, in an effort to diffuse the situation, he brought 
Tram to his booth.  Defendant and his group returned to the 
table near the restroom.  Those in Bui’s booth included Thi Hoa 
Tang, Lan Thi Dang and her sister, Robert Norman, and others.  
Bui heard a loud sound and saw defendant shooting at the 
group.  Bui, who was sitting outermost in the booth, tried to grab 
defendant but fell to the ground as defendant continued 
shooting.  Bui did not see anyone threaten defendant or point a 
gun at him.  Bui reviewed a photospread and identified 
defendant as the shooter but was afraid to confirm his selection.  
Bui was later a reluctant grand jury witness.   
Tram, Tang, and Norman were pronounced dead at the 
scene.  Dang died at the hospital.  Tram had been shot once in 
the back of the head.  Three other shots struck his left side, arm, 
and chest.  Tram likely lost consciousness after the first shot.  
His wounds were consistent with the shooter firing downward 
from a position slightly behind the victim.  Tang was shot four 
times, including once in the temple.  Norman was shot once in 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
the back, which was consistent with him being struck as he 
attempted to crawl away from the booth.  Dang was also struck 
once by a bullet that pierced her arm, then hit her lung, heart, 
and liver.  None of the various wounds appeared to have been 
caused by rounds that ricocheted off of the booth table.  There 
was no evidence that a bullet had pierced one victim then 
entered another.   
Police recovered 10 expended shell casings, all fired from 
a .45-caliber semi-automatic handgun.  Nine bullets were also 
recovered, including two from Tang’s body and one from Dang’s.  
All bullets and casings came from the same gun.  A .40-caliber 
handgun fell out of Tram’s back waistband as his body was 
moved.  No evidence suggested the gun had been fired.  A 
firearms expert opined that the trajectory of the bullets was 
consistent with the shooter firing into the booth from the front 
at a downward angle.   
The day after the shooting, Diep went to Khuong’s house 
and retrieved a videotape of the events.  He eventually burned 
the tape in a backyard barbecue.   
Le had been working as a confidential informant after a 
drug arrest.  On the night of the shooting, he was looking for a 
murder suspect in an unrelated case.  He had previously been 
paid $300 for information but was not being paid at the time of 
the shooting.  He had no agreement for a disposition of his drug 
case.   
Cellular phone records showed numerous calls the 
morning after the shooting between Tran, Diep, Nguyen, and a 
phone registered to defendant’s girlfriend.   
Defendant was arrested in July 2001 after a lengthy 
investigation.  The search of a Ford Expedition revealed 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
identification in the name of Long Hoang but bearing 
defendant’s photo.  A loaded .45-caliber handgun, along with 
credit cards in the names of Hoang and Christine Chen, were 
also recovered.  The gun had not been used in the shooting.  At 
the time of the murders, defendant lived with his girlfriend 
Cindy Hoang.  A search of their residence revealed another .45-
caliber handgun belonging to defendant, who worked at a gun 
range and was proficient with firearms.   
2.  Defense Evidence 
Khiet Diep, a manager at the International Club, initially 
testified he did not see any fights or arguments on the night in 
question.  He ran from the club when he heard, but did not see, 
the shooting.  He denied telling police otherwise.  He did not 
view or burn a videotape.  He did not remember several calls 
made to his cell phone after the shooting.  On cross-examination, 
he identified defendant as the shooter and admitted hearing an 
argument in the restroom before the shooting.  He denied telling 
police that defendant and Tram were arguing over a woman.   
Hoa Truong testified he was at the club.  Before the 
shooting, he saw a man in a trench coat walk in and out.  
Someone told Truong the man was armed.  As Truong was 
preparing to leave, he heard gunshots and saw defendant and 
the man in the trench coat struggling over something.  He 
denied telling a defense investigator that defendant could not 
have been the shooter because defendant ran out of the club 
ahead of him.  Shortly after the shooting, Truong and defendant 
fled to Austin, Texas.  A defense investigator testified regarding 
his interview with Truong.   
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Detective Christine Carns 
related various interviews conducted during her investigation.  
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
Bui said he grabbed the shooter’s arm and the shooting 
continued as Bui fell to the ground.  Tram told Bui he and the 
shooter argued about a shooting at a different nightclub called 
Passions.  In his interview, Le said Tram “was walking around 
’cuz he packing,” which Carns interpreted to mean Le believed 
Tram had a gun.  Le also told police that Diep approached 
defendant’s table after the argument and defendant asked in 
Chinese, “Do you want me to do him now?” which Le interpreted 
to mean shoot the victim.3  Diep told police defendant and Tram 
argued “over a girl from another bar named Passions.”   
B.  Penalty Phase 
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s 
involvement in four uncharged robbery-related shootings, two 
before and two after the murders.  Thien Tang owned a 
supermarket in San Jose.  On May 3, 1997, while bringing 
$300,000 in cash from a bank to the market, two men accosted 
him and demanded the money.  Defendant shot Tang in the leg 
and took the bag of cash.  The assailants fled, but a market 
employee, Chau Quach, gave chase.  Defendant fatally shot 
Quach.  Defendant admitted the crime to his girlfriend Christine 
Chen, and Tang identified defendant in a lineup after the 
robbery.   
On August 28, 1998, three masked men with guns tried to 
enter the property of Wintec Industries in Fremont.  Security 
guard Ted Garcia was shot but survived.  Employee Hsu Pin 
Tsai was killed as he tried to drive away.  The men escaped in a 
white van.  The van was later stopped but defendant was not 
 
3  
Le testified during the prosecution’s case that he heard 
defendant say, “What do you want?” to which Diep replied, 
“[W]e’ll see.”   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
with the four men inside.  The van contained diagrams of the 
Wintec facility bearing defendant’s fingerprints.  The diagrams 
showed the location of various expensive computer parts.  A 
phone associated with defendant was in constant contact with 
the perpetrators around the time of the incident.  Defendant 
later confessed his involvement to Chen.   
Chen testified that she and defendant began “casing” the 
Traditional Jewelers store in Newport Beach where defendant 
and others planned to steal watches.  On January 16, 2001, 
defendant and three other men prepared for the robbery at the 
apartment defendant shared with Chen.  Defendant was armed 
with an “AK.”  That evening, three armed masked men ran 
toward the store.  Two men fired at security guard Rafael 
Gomez, while a third man stood near a planter.  Gomez returned 
fire but was shot in the chest and arm.  Glass fragments lodged 
in his eye and head.  Gomez survived but required four 
surgeries.  One of the men fired repeatedly into the front of the 
store, but they failed to gain entry.  The store contained 1,200 
watches worth between five and six million dollars.  Defendant 
and the others went to the apartment, where defendant told 
Chen they had “shot up” the store but “couldn’t get anything.”   
Chen suggested they should rob another jewelry store, so 
she, defendant, and others drove to Cupertino to case the shop.  
Chen was to watch the business until she saw the security guard 
go inside, and then alert the others.  Two weeks later, they 
executed the plan.  Defendant and three others entered wearing 
dark clothing.  Inside, they killed security guard Joseph 
Cambosa and took $53,000 worth of watches.   
Chen testified under a grant of use immunity.  Defendant 
told Chen he supported himself through gambling and armed 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
robberies.  He kept a cache of weapons at their apartment so he 
could supply guns for his crimes.  Defendant explained that he 
would wear a mask and dark clothes and only stay at the 
robbery site for 15 to 20 seconds.   
Robert Norman’s mother and Lan Dang’s father and sister 
gave victim impact testimony.   
The defense presented no evidence.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Venue Change 
Defendant challenges the denial of his venue change 
motion.4  There was no error.   
a.  Background 
The charged murders happened in May 1999.  Arrested 
more than two years later, defendant sought to change venue, 
arguing he could not receive a fair trial in Los Angeles County.5  
Defendant submitted printouts of eight news articles.  One Los 
Angeles Times report immediately after the shooting described 
the incident and identified the victims but did not mention 
defendant.  Another Times article in December 1999 said 
defendant was wanted for the shooting, described as “an 
apparent gang-related attack.”  Three articles were published 
 
4  
Defendant asserts a violation of his rights to due process, 
equal protection, a fair and impartial jury, and a reliable penalty 
determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution and analogous state 
constitutional provisions.   
5  
Defendant also moved for a protective gag order.  That 
motion is not at issue here.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
on July 18, 2001.  They described the shooting and defendant’s 
arrest, also reporting he was a suspect in two previous robbery 
shootings in San Jose and Fremont.  Those articles appeared in 
the Los Angeles Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, and were 
carried by the Associated Press.  A September 2001 Los Angeles 
Times article reported on defendant’s suicide attempt and 
repeated he was suspected of killing six people.  Two other 
articles reported on trial proceedings.  In July 2002, the San 
Gabriel Valley Tribune covered a defense motion to discover the 
names of two of the San Jose witnesses who were in a witness 
protection program.  The Inland Valley Daily Bulletin reported 
in September 2002 that defendant’s Faretta (Faretta v. 
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806) motion had been denied.  
Defense counsel also observed the shooting was featured in a 
single, May 2000 airing of an episode of America’s Most Wanted, 
which named defendant as a suspect.  The episode aired only 
once, to a national audience.   
The court deferred ruling on venue, noting that the jury 
questionnaire addressed pretrial publicity.  The court explained, 
“what I want to do is see if it really manifests itself in terms of 
the pool that we have at the moment.”  The court asked how 
many prospective jurors reported in questionnaires that they 
had learned something about the case.  Defense counsel 
responded four or five had done so.  The court denied the motion 
but said it would revisit the ruling “if the numbers are 
substantially different” upon further questionnaire review.   
The next day, the court individually questioned three 
prospective jurors who said that they had heard something 
about the case.  Prospective Juror No. 6274 had read an article 
in the San Gabriel Valley Tribune about the beginning of jury 
selection.  The court granted the defense challenge for cause 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
because “she read the entire article.”  Prospective Juror No. 
1291 recalled “hearing something about [the case] a couple years 
ago” on the television news but had no more specific recollection.  
Prospective Juror No. 5230 remembered reading about the case 
“right after it happened” because she used to live in El Monte 
and had a business there.  The article reported some people were 
killed and gave Asian names she did not recognize.  She did not 
recall any article “talking about the perpetrator.”  The court 
denied defendant’s challenge for cause of these two prospective 
jurors.  They were empaneled as alternates6 and accepted by the 
defense.   
b.  The Court Properly Denied the Venue Change 
Motion 
“ ‘On appeal from the denial of a change of venue, we 
accept the trial court’s factual findings where supported by 
substantial evidence, but we review independently the court’s 
ultimate determination whether it was reasonably likely the 
defendant could receive a fair trial in the county.  In deciding 
whether to change venue, the trial court, and this court in its 
independent review, considers several factors, including the 
nature and gravity of the offense, the nature and extent of the 
media coverage, the size of the community, the defendant’s 
status within the community, and the victim’s prominence.  On 
appeal, a defendant . . . must show both error and prejudice, 
that is, that it was not reasonably likely the defendant could 
receive a fair trial at the time of the motion, and that it is 
reasonably likely he did not in fact receive a fair trial.’ ”  (People 
v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 72 (Rices), quoting People v. 
 
6  
Neither alternate served on the jury.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 837; see Pen. Code, § 1033, 
subd. (a).)   
Defendant failed to show a reasonable likelihood he could 
not receive a fair trial in Los Angeles County.  A capital murder 
charge involving the killing of four people “weighs in favor of a 
change of venue but is not itself dispositive.”  (People v. 
Rountree, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 837.)  “Indeed, on numerous 
occasions we have upheld the denial of change of venue motions 
in cases involving multiple murders.”  (People v. Farley (2009) 
46 Cal.4th 1053, 1083.)   
The media coverage here was hardly “sensational and 
extensive.”  (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1395 
(Leonard).)  Defendant cited only eight print articles about the 
case published over a period of more than three years.  One of 
the articles appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle, an out-of-
market publication not relevant to local publicity.  Another was 
authored by the Associated Press, but there was no evidence any 
publication carried the story.  Of the six remaining articles, one 
appeared immediately after the shooting and did not name 
defendant; another reported seven months later he was named 
a suspect; a third covered his arrest more than two years after 
the shooting; and a fourth recounted his suicide attempt.  The 
remaining two articles concerned proceedings just before jury 
selection.   
We have affirmed venue change denials in cases with far 
more publicity.  For example, in People v. Coffman and Marlow 
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, “the defense presented more than 150 
articles from regional newspapers and various videos of 
television coverage of the case.”  (Id. at p. 44.)   The defendant 
in Leonard “cited 556 television segments on the killings that 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
appeared on local stations, as well as 130 newspaper articles, 
most of them in . . . the area’s largest newspaper.  Many of the 
television news segments and newspaper articles were the lead 
story.  As a result, public awareness of the case was very high.”  
(Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1395–1396.)  People v. Prince 
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179 (Prince), cited by defendant, involved “a 
series of six similar murders occur[ring] in a community over a 
period of approximately one year without a culprit being quickly 
identified.”  (Id. at p. 1210.)  There, “the defense proffered 
evidence of the more than 270 newspaper articles that had 
appeared concerning the crimes, the criminal investigation, 
defendant’s eventual arrest in Alabama and extradition, and the 
preliminary examination.”  (Ibid.)  “There was evidence 
suggesting that television coverage was similar in extent.”  
(Ibid.)  Despite the “intense” publicity (id. at p. 1212), Prince 
affirmed the denial of the defendant’s venue motion, noting in 
part that much of the publicity occurred over a two-year period 
and predated jury selection by a year.  “The passage of time 
ordinarily blunts the prejudicial impact of widespread 
publicity.”  (Id. at p. 1214; see Leonard, at p. 1396.)  This is even 
more true in a case like this one.   
Defendant argues that “a suspect at large for a long period 
of time can create a sense of fear in a community.”  While 
possible, the argument is speculative here.  Neither prearrest 
article mentioned any community fear.  Unlike in Prince, the 
killings were not “ ‘serial’ ” killings but part of a single incident.  
(Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1211.)  Defendant was identified 
as a suspect within a few months.  (Cf. Id. at pp. 1210–1211.)   
The record confirms the lack of significant publicity.  The 
jury questionnaire asked, “Do you know anything, or have you 
read or heard anything, about the case?”  Of the 142 prospective 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
jurors, only 10 reported any exposure to coverage of the case.7  
None of the 12 selected jurors responded affirmatively, and only 
two of five alternate jurors did so.  This contrasts with Prince, 
in which “a high percentage of the prospective jurors and 12 of 
the 13 jurors who actually served at trial . . . had been exposed 
to the publicity.”  (Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1215.)  We 
nevertheless affirmed the denial of a venue change because “the 
jurors’ responses to the juror questionnaire and voir dire did not 
disclose any prejudgment or emotional bias.”  (Ibid.)  Other 
cases have upheld a denial even when “a large percentage of the 
venire had heard of the case.”  (People v. Harris (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 804, 825; see People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1049; 
People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 505.)   
As to the nature of coverage, defendant argues some 
details prejudiced him, including a description of the shooting 
as gang-related, defendant’s involvement in unrelated killings 
and prosecutions, and certain details about the victims.  He 
complains that coverage of his suicide attempt suggested a 
consciousness of guilt, and reports that he sought to represent 
himself suggested a conflict with defense counsel.  He also 
claims coverage of his attempt to discover the identity of certain 
witnesses in an unrelated case suggested those witnesses had 
reason to fear him.  “But while the local coverage disclosed the 
 
7  
There were two other affirmative responses, but they were 
not attributable to pretrial publicity.  One person reported he 
heard about the incident because his wife had previously worked 
for the owner of the International Club.  The other prospective 
juror responded with the non sequitur, “You have to have 12 
people for the case.”  Six other responses indicated they did not 
know or were not sure whether they had heard something about 
the case.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
brutal details of the crimes, and elicited their effects on the 
victims and their families, the reporting was essentially factual, 
not sensationalized.”  (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
1082, 1126.)  These facts are different from Leonard, where “the 
media consistently described the perpetrator, both before and 
after defendant became a suspect, as the ‘Thrill Killer,’ a highly 
pejorative moniker that was potentially prejudicial to 
defendant.”  (Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1395.)  Further, 
the “vast bulk of the local coverage was clustered around the 
times of significant events in the case.”  (Zambrano, at p. 1126.)   
Finally, although the case was covered once on America’s 
Most Wanted, the episode aired more than two years before trial 
began.  “Moreover, as America’s Most Wanted was broadcast 
nationally, ‘a change of venue could not be expected to dilute its 
prejudicial effect.’ ”  (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 
1078.)  The nature and extent of media coverage weighed 
against a venue change.   
“The size of the community (Los Angeles County, the 
largest and most populous in California) was a factor weighing 
heavily against a change of venue.”  (People v. Williams (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 635, 655.)  “This is significant because the 
‘adversities of publicity are considerably offset if trial is 
conducted in a populous metropolitan area.’  [Citation.]  That 
the populous metropolitan character of the community 
dissipated the impact of pretrial publicity in this case was made 
clear on voir dire.”  (People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 949.)  
Defendant makes no argument regarding this factor.   
He does argue that, because he lived in Orange County, 
his status as a nonresident and “a reputed gang member who 
was captured only after a national manhunt” weighed in favor 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
of a venue change.  Similarly, defendant claims the sympathetic 
media coverage of the victims elevated their status in the 
community.  These claims lack merit.  As to status, “there is no 
indication that either defendant or his victims were prominent 
in the community.”  (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 
1167.)  “As a recreational visitor to the county, defendant was 
relatively anonymous in the community.”  (People v. Adcox 
(1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 234.)  Any notoriety he gained from his 
national television appearance would either have faded with 
time or followed him to any county.   
“ ‘When pretrial publicity is at issue, “primary reliance on 
the judgment of the trial court makes [especially] good sense” 
because the judge “sits in the locale where the publicity is said 
to have had its effect” and may base [the] evaluation on [the 
judge’s] “own perception of the depth and extent of news stories 
that might influence a juror.” ’ ”  (People v. Famalaro (2011) 52 
Cal.4th 1, 24, quoting Skilling v. United States (2010) 561 U.S. 
358, 386.)  Only a single factor, the nature and gravity of the 
offense, weighed in favor of a venue change.  But that factor 
would apply no matter where the case was tried.  Defendant fails 
to show the court improperly denied a venue change at the time 
of the motion.   
He also fails to show prejudice.  As noted, “[o]n appeal, a 
defendant challenging a trial court’s denial of a motion for 
change of venue must show both error and prejudice:  that is, 
that at the time of the motion it was reasonably likely that a fair 
trial could not be had in the county, and that it was reasonably 
likely that a fair trial was not had.”  (People v. Davis (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 539, 578.)  None appears on this record.  Although 
defendant suggests “extensive media coverage continued 
throughout [his] trial,” he cites only a single article from 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
January 8, 2003, in the San Gabriel Valley Tribune, published 
during jury selection.  The court itself alerted the parties to the 
story.  None of the sitting jurors indicated they had previously 
heard anything about the case.  “ ‘[W]e are confident the guilt 
and penalty verdicts were due to the evidence presented at trial 
and not to a biased jury or the failure to change venue.’ ”  (People 
v. Avila (2014) 59 Cal.4th 496, 513; see Rices, supra, 4 Cal.5th 
at pp. 74–75.)   
2.  Suppression Motion 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly denied his 
motion to suppress items discovered during a warrantless 
search of a Ford Expedition he drove before his arrest.8  Any 
possible error was not prejudicial.   
a.  Background 
Between 4:45 and 5:00 p.m. on July 16, 2001, defendant 
was arrested on a basketball court at a gym in Costa Mesa.  
Officers recovered several items at the court, including a 
membership card in Long Hoang’s name, a parking lot ticket 
with a time stamp of 4:23 p.m., a cell phone, and a Ford key.  An 
officer took the key and tried it on various vehicles in the 
parking lot, where it opened a Ford Expedition registered to 
 
8  
See Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (a)(1)(A).  
Defendant claims he was denied due process and his rights to be 
free from unreasonable searches and arbitrary imposition of the 
death penalty in violation of the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and their 
state counterparts.   
 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
Timothy Mukasa.9  The Expedition was towed to a police 
department lot and an inventory search was conducted six hours 
after defendant’s arrest.  A Colt .45-caliber handgun was found 
in the center console, as well as a check and the credit cards 
previously described.  (See ante, at p. 5.)  The detective who 
conducted the search testified it was performed pursuant to a 
standard policy for impound searches.  Three police agencies 
and 30 officers were involved that day, and officers worked 
“continually on this case” during the six-hour time span.  They 
also 
secured 
and 
searched 
defendant’s 
residence 
and 
coordinated 
with 
other 
agencies 
regarding 
defendant’s 
outstanding warrants.  Defendant’s girlfriend Chen and their 
roommate were also arrested.  The trial court denied the motion, 
concluding the Expedition was properly impounded and 
inventoried.   
b.  Any Possible Error Was Not Prejudicial 
A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable, and 
the prosecution must demonstrate a legal justification for the 
action.  The standard of appellate review is well established.  We 
defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by 
substantial evidence.  In determining whether the search or 
seizure was reasonable, we exercise our independent judgment.  
(See People v. Suff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1053.)   
 
9  
There was some confusion about when this occurred.  The 
officer who found the Expedition initially testified that he was 
given the Ford key at 11:00 p.m., but later clarified his 
testimony was based on a report he had written, and he 
currently had no independent recollection of the actual time.  It 
was later established that the inventory search occurred at 
11:00 p.m.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
“When vehicles are impounded, local police departments 
generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying 
the automobiles’ contents.  These procedures developed in 
response to three distinct needs:  the protection of the owner’s 
property while it remains in police custody [citation]; the 
protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or 
stolen property [citation]; and the protection of the police from 
potential danger [citation].  The practice has been viewed as 
essential to respond to incidents of theft or vandalism.”  (South 
Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 369; see Cady v. 
Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 442–443.)  The high court in 
Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367 upheld the inventory 
search of a van after the driver was arrested, citing the same 
concerns expressed in Opperman.  (Bertine, at pp. 372–374.)   
The question is “whether a decision to impound or remove 
a vehicle . . . was reasonable under all the circumstances.”  
(People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.)  We need 
not resolve this question because any possible error was 
harmless.  Defendant argues the recovered evidence allowed the 
prosecutor to paint him as “a bad, dangerous person whose 
weapon of choice was a Colt .45.”  However, other evidence 
already linked him to both gun ownership and use.  A warrant 
search of defendant’s residence revealed another .45-caliber 
handgun.  He worked at a gun range and testimony established 
his proficiency with firearms.  Further, defendant’s identity as 
the shooter here was undisputed.  With respect to the penalty 
phase, defendant suggests the evidence recovered from the 
Expedition improperly bolstered Christine Chen’s testimony.  
But such evidence was trivial compared to Chen’s extensive 
testimony 
regarding 
defendant’s 
involvement 
in 
other 
shootings, which was corroborated by testimony from the 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
victims of those crimes.  Under these circumstances, admission 
of evidence from the Expedition was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (See People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 
159; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1125.)   
3.  Defendant’s Decision Not To Testify 
Defendant contends his decision not to testify was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Defendant’s contention 
fails on this record.10   
a.  Background 
During a break in the prosecution’s guilt phase case, the 
prosecutor indicated that if defendant decided to testify, the 
prosecutor would “question him about other people he has shot” 
because “that would be critical as to intent on the issue of self-
defense.”  Defense counsel responded he was not prepared to 
argue the issue and defendant had not yet decided whether to 
testify.  The court declined “to compel the defense to indicate 
whether or not [defendant] intends to testify,” noting such 
decision is “frequently a question that is directed to a client once 
all the evidence is in.”  The court observed that whether 
impeachment would be proper would depend on the content of 
defendant’s testimony and encouraged the parties to further 
research the issue.  The prosecutor filed a written motion 
arguing that, if defendant testified regarding self-defense, the 
 
10  
Defendant claims violations of his rights to testify, present 
a defense, compulsory and due process, equal protection, a fair 
trial, an impartial jury, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, non-
arbitrary and reliable guilt and penalty determinations, and his 
right against self-incrimination under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
to 
the 
federal 
Constitution and their state counterparts.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
prosecution should be allowed to cross-examine him about, and 
present evidence of, four uncharged shootings.  The defense filed 
an opposition.   
The issue arose again during the defense case.  Defense 
counsel stated he planned to speak with defendant that 
afternoon about whether he would testify, and he would make a 
decision by the following morning.  The prosecutor repeated his 
position as to the scope of impeachment.  The court was 
reluctant to make a ruling “in a vacuum” that “could possibly 
have a chilling effect on the decision on the defendant of whether 
or not to testify.”  The court also commented that “if I make an 
erroneous ruling on the admissibility of this, I may create an 
issue on appeal that the defendant didn’t exercise his right to 
testify because of the erroneous ruling.”  The prosecutor 
“disagree[d] with the court on the law,” noting “for that to be 
preserved the defendant would have had to actually testify.”  
The court clarified that it would defer ruling until defendant 
testified on direct.   
The next day, defense counsel asked to make an offer of 
proof as to defendant’s testimony and secure a tentative ruling 
before defendant took the stand.  Defense counsel reported 
defendant would testify he shot Tram in defense of another, then 
accidentally shot the other three victims while he and Bui 
struggled over the gun.  The prosecutor argued he should be 
allowed to present evidence of defendant’s four other robbery 
shootings.  Defense counsel responded that this case was 
dissimilar because it was not a robbery and sought an 
evidentiary hearing regarding the uncharged incidents.  The 
court tentatively ruled that if defendant testified consistently 
with counsel’s offer of proof, it would allow evidence of two 
incidents:  the 1997 San Jose robbery where defendant shot two 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
people, killing one; and the 1998 Fremont robbery where 
defendant shot and killed one person.  It would exclude evidence 
of the two incidents where defendant’s involvement as the 
shooter was in question.   
Based on the extant state of the record, the court agreed 
to instruct on heat of passion and accident.  The following 
transpired: 
 
“[Defense counsel]:  I would indicate that based on the 
court’s ruling of the court [sic] allowing the voluntary 
manslaughter as to Mr. Tram and accidental homicide as 
to the other three victims, Mr. Duong would — is 
indicating that he will not take the witness stand in this 
case.   
 
“Again, just to reiterate briefly, it’s the defense position as 
stated previously that it’s in violation of Mr. Duong’s 4th, 
5th, 6th and 14th Amendment rights of the federal 
Constitution and state Constitution to testify in this 
matter, and he understands that.[11]  However, based on 
the court’s ruling of the two uncharged homicides which 
are still pending in other jurisdictions, he believes it is in 
his best interest not to testify.   
 
 
11  
Counsel was apparently suggesting, consistent with 
earlier arguments, that the court’s indication that it would allow 
the impeachment evidence improperly infringed on defendant’s 
right to testify and present a defense.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
“Mr. Duong, you understand that my advice in this case at 
this time is for you not to testify based on the status of the 
case at this time?   
 
“The defendant:  Yes, now I will not testify.   
 
“[Defense counsel]:  And you understand you have a right 
to testify no matter what I say, whether I think it’s good 
or not good for [you to] testify, you could still testify.  [¶] 
Do you understand that?   
 
“The defendant:  Yes.   
 
“[Defense counsel]:  And having that knowledge, what is 
your position?   
 
“The defendant:  Now I will not testify.”   
b.  Defendant’s Decision Not To Testify Was 
Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary 
A criminal defendant has the right to testify at trial, “a 
right that is the mirror image of the privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination and accordingly is of equal dignity.”  (People 
v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1223; see People v. Nakahara 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 717.)  “The defendant may exercise the 
right to testify over the objection of, and contrary to the advice 
of, defense counsel.  [Citations.]  ‘When the decision is whether 
to testify . . .  at the guilt phase of a capital trial [citation] it is 
only in case of an express conflict arising between the defendant 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
and counsel that the defendant’s desires must prevail.  In the 
latter situation, there is no duty to admonish and secure an on 
the record waiver unless the conflict comes to the court’s 
attention.’ ”  (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332; 
see People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 762.)  Absent an 
express conflict, “ ‘a trial judge may safely assume that a 
defendant, who is ably represented and who does not testify is 
merely exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination 
and 
is 
abiding 
by 
his 
counsel’s 
trial 
strategy . . . .’ ”  (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 
1053.)   
Defendant argues that his decision to forgo testifying was 
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he was misled 
to believe he could appeal the trial court’s tentative ruling 
regarding the admissibility of uncharged crimes evidence even 
if he did not testify.  (See discussion post.)  He asserts he was 
misled by the court’s comment, in expressing reluctance to issue 
a tentative ruling, that it may “create an issue on appeal.”  He 
also suggests that “defense counsel continued to make strenuous 
objections in an effort to preserve the issue for appeal,” and 
counsel “simultaneously objecting to the trial court’s ruling and 
advising [him] not to testify strongly suggested that he could 
challenge the issue in appellate proceedings.”  Defendant 
contends “neither the trial court nor defense counsel told him he 
was waiving his right to appeal the trial court’s ruling on the 
unadjudicated offenses nor did they endeavor to ensure that [he] 
was not misled by the trial court’s erroneous statements or trial 
counsel’s efforts to preserve the issue for appeal.  [His] waiver of 
a fundamental right made in the absence of any advice as to its 
consequences and the trial court’s uncorrected misleading 
statement of law is invalid.”   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
Initially, defendant acknowledges that a formal, in-court 
waiver of his right to testify was not required because there was 
no apparent conflict between defendant and his counsel as to 
whether he should take the stand.  “ ‘[A] trial judge may safely 
assume that a defendant, who is ably represented and who does 
not testify is merely exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination and is abiding by his counsel’s trial 
strategy . . . .’  [Citation.]  If that assumption is incorrect, 
defendant’s remedy is not a personal waiver in open court, but 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”  (People v. Bradford, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1053.)  Defendant does not urge his 
counsel was ineffective, nor does he allege there was a conflict 
with counsel.  Any claim of ineffective assistance based on 
evidence not in the trial record must be made in a habeas corpus 
petition.  (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 
266–267.)   
In any event, defendant’s argument does not withstand 
scrutiny.  Defendant’s argument is based on his implicit 
suggestion that, had he understood he could not appeal the trial 
court’s tentative ruling, he would have testified, presumably to 
preserve that issue for appeal.  The record here belies 
defendant’s suggestion that his decision not to testify turned on 
the appealability issue and thus was not knowing and 
voluntary.  Although the court tentatively ruled defendant could 
be impeached with two uncharged incidents if he testified, the 
court also agreed to instruct on heat of passion as to Tram and 
accident as to the others.  The latter ruling largely obviated the 
need for defendant to testify to establish the defense theory.  
Indeed, defense counsel cited the ruling as a circumstance 
supporting defendant’s decision not to testify.  At the same time, 
defense counsel did not mention the appealability of the court’s 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
tentative impeachment ruling, which might have been expected 
had appealability been a determinative factor in defendant’s 
decision as he now suggests.  Further, the court’s offhand 
comment explaining its reluctance to create an appellate issue 
was immediately corrected by the prosecutor without objection 
from defense counsel, with the prosecutor reminding everyone 
that defendant would have to testify to preserve any later claim.  
Defendant characterizes counsel’s statements during the later 
colloquy as a continuing objection to the court’s tentative ruling 
which served to further mislead him about the appealability of 
that ruling.  What counsel intended by his comments is 
somewhat unclear, but, as noted, he never mentioned any right 
to appeal from the court’s tentative ruling nor did he suggest he 
told his client that defendant could appeal the issue without 
testifying.  This record supports the conclusion that defendant’s 
decision not to testify was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  
(Cf. People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 164–169 [jury 
trial waiver].)   
4.  Impeachment Ruling 
Defendant challenges the trial court’s tentative ruling 
that, if he testified, he could be impeached with evidence of his 
participation in two uncharged robberies.  “It is well established 
that the denial of a motion to exclude impeachment evidence is 
not reviewable on appeal if the defendant subsequently declines 
to testify.”  (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 731; see 
Luce v. United States (1984) 469 U.S. 38, 41–43.)  Defendant 
acknowledges this rule but argues it should not apply here 
because he reasonably relied on the court’s misstatement that 
the issue was appealable even if he did not testify.  (See 
discussion ante.)  We reject the argument.  For the reasons 
already discussed, the record belies defendant’s suggestion that 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
his decision not to testify was induced by the court’s 
misstatement of law.  As noted, the court’s statement was 
immediately corrected by the prosecutor without defense 
objection, and the appealability of the court’s ruling was not 
mentioned during defense counsel’s colloquy announcing 
defendant’s decision not to testify.  These circumstances present 
no compelling reason to deviate from settled jurisprudence that 
defendant must testify to preserve a challenge to the court’s 
tentative ruling on impeachment.  (See Ledesma, at p. 731; 
People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 455–456; see also People v. 
Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 383–388 [adopting rule].)   
5.  Exclusion of Defense Evidence 
a.  Defense Expert 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly excluded a 
defense expert.12  No error appears.   
i.  Background 
The defense witness list included Dr. David M. Posey.  The 
prosecutor stated he had received Posey’s report but had 
concerns about the form of some of the doctor’s opinions.  Posey 
concluded he “believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
shooting of Minh [Tram] was purposeful and intentional,” while 
the shooting of the other three victims was “unintentional and 
accidental . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.”  The court expressed 
skepticism that “medicine has evolved to a scientific and medical 
 
12  
Defendant claims a violation of his rights to present a 
defense, confront witnesses, due process, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, effective assistance of counsel, and non-
arbitrary guilt and penalty determinations under the Sixth, 
Eighth, 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
to 
the 
federal 
Constitution and their state counterparts.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
certainty of whether a person’s discharge of the firearm was 
accidental or intentional” and suggested an evidentiary hearing 
would be required.  (See Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (b).)   
At the hearing, the prosecutor asked Posey about an 
“incident scenario” he described in his report that Tram was 
shot “with a volley of several shots” and “then while an 
individual was attempting to disarm the perpetrator, a second 
volley of shots accidentally and unintentionally injured and 
killed three other victims.”  The court asked Posey to clarify the 
bases of his opinion.  Posey explained that he considered his 
opinion “more of injury pattern analysis,” and “the question 
posed to me could I render an opinion based on the wound 
patterns as to whether I felt it was intentional — wounds were 
intentionally placed or unintentionally placed.”  The court 
questioned whether “a wound in and of itself . . . can tell you 
whether the shot was intentional or unintentional” and inquired 
what experience or field of medicine allowed him to draw such 
conclusions.  Posey stated he was a forensic pathologist and 
“[y]ou take a pattern of injuries or pattern of gunshot wounds 
and you work backwards through the scenario given the 
information I was provided.”  Posey explained that he could 
draw conclusions regarding intentionality “if you compare one 
victim to another victim to another victim to the fourth victim, 
that’s where I was able to make a decision based on that.  [¶] 
Seemingly the primary individual, Minh [Tram], had wounds 
that were very accurately, in my opinion, from a number of 
gunshot wound cases I have done, were purposefully placed.  
They were placed to kill.  [¶] And as I reviewed the cases the one 
that jumped out at me was the young lady, I think it was Ms. 
Dang, who had really one gunshot wound that was an entrance 
in the left arm, exited the inner portion of the left arm and 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
reentered the chest and ended up going through vital organs.  
[¶] In my opinion if I am basing it on the whole scenario that 
becomes one that was not a purposeful shot.  I don’t think that 
shot was meant to kill her, based on again what I have seen of 
the scene from diagrams, the videos and everything like that.”   
There was some confusion about what Posey meant by 
“purposeful.”  He ultimately clarified he meant an intent to fire 
the gun and hit the target, not simply an intent to pull the 
trigger.  The court observed that the jury had heard evidence 
about “the various wounds, the trajectory, the paths through 
organs that resulted in death” and asked Posey, “What is the 
difference in the evaluation and mental process of those jurors 
making that determination and you?”  The question was 
directed to whether the subject was sufficiently beyond common 
experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of 
fact.  (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).)  Posey gave a lengthy 
answer:  “Sir, it’s a forensic opinion. . . .  [W]hat the court has to 
understand there is a difference between a medical doctor’s 
opinion and a medical forensic opinion.  That’s what I opined 
earlier, that we take everything, not just this [an examination 
of the bodies].  If that’s all there was to it, I wouldn’t even be 
sitting here talking to you.  But because we are trained, and 
that’s the essence of a lot of the training of forensic 
medicine . . . .  It’s reconstruction of injury patterns to try to put 
together in the mind’s eye of the beholder, whoever that is, be it 
an attorney like yourself or an attorney, what exactly happened.  
People say what happened.  I don’t understand.  Based on my 
experience, training, and everything I have done the last 
quarter of a century is what brings us together as a forensic 
specialist, not just as an M.D. sitting here with training in 
pathology.”  Posey clarified that “[y]ou take multiple pieces” 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
including “the medical information” and “the investigative 
information.”  The transcript continues: 
 
“[Posey]:  Because Mr. Minh had three well-placed shots 
in his body, one the back of his head and two in the side.  
Again, I don’t know if it happened all the same time. . . .  
These are well-placed shots.  Anybody handling a firearm 
will know if you put a shot [in] the back of the head, the 
lights are out.  If you put them in the chest, the chances 
are the guy isn’t going to survive.   
 
“The Court:  Are you suggesting anybody who shoots 
somebody in the chest didn’t do so intentionally [in 
apparent reference to victim Dang’s injury]? 
 
“[Posey]:  I would think that one case by itself, if they shoot 
them in the chest, I would think they were thinking about 
ending the individual’s life or at least stopping them from 
going forward.  But when you relate this to the other three 
and you look at the wound pattern, that’s what gave me 
the opinion, based on the other information I had from the 
investigative reports, that, yes, that could be a possibility 
that . . . these three victims weren’t the intention of that 
crime that night, that this actually became more of a 
secondary accidental thing than it did as I did not, he did 
not, whoever the perpetrator, did start out to shoot these 
three people.  That’s how I came to my opinion, your 
honor.”   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
Posey confirmed that he had not conducted any experiments 
“where shootings took place and tried to verify [his] opinions,” 
nor was he aware of other pathologists who had done so.   
The court ruled admission of Posey’s opinion about 
defendant’s intent would violate Penal Code section 29 (see 
discussion post), and “[i]t sure sounds like the doctor is invading 
the province of the jury that Penal Code section 29 specifically 
reserves to the trier of fact.”  The court clarified that Posey could 
“testify to any medical pattern or what have you, but what I am 
saying is an opinion as to whether the shooting was intentional, 
accidental, with malice or without malice is a province that he 
is not entitled to go into under this section.”  The court later 
added that it had “very strong reservations as to whether the 
procedure and process that form the basis of his opinion are 
something based in science and whether it is a recognized body 
of science that includes other individuals or similar background.  
[¶] The court is also concerned about the lack of any studies or 
attempts to verify the issues that are the subject matters of this 
opinion.”  Posey was not called to testify.   
ii.  The Trial Court Properly Excluded Opinion 
Testimony Regarding Defendant’s Intent 
“While lay witnesses are allowed to testify only about 
matters within their personal knowledge (Evid. Code, § 702, 
subd. (a)), expert witnesses are given greater latitude.  ‘A person 
is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him 
as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.’  
(Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).)  An expert may express an opinion 
on ‘a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that 
the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.’  (Evid. 
Code, § 801, subd. (a).)”  (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
665, 675.)  “The trial court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to admit or exclude expert testimony [citation], and its 
decision as to whether expert testimony meets the standard for 
admissibility is subject to review for abuse of discretion.”  
(People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426.)   
Defendant argues Posey’s testimony was relevant to his 
defense that his shooting of the three victims other than Tram 
was accidental.  He correctly observes that “[t]estimony in the 
form of an opinion that is otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact.”  (Evid. Code, § 805.)  He further 
contends that Penal Code section 29, relied on by the trial court, 
did not apply to him.  That provision states:  “In the guilt phase 
of a criminal action, any expert testifying about a defendant’s 
mental illness, mental disorder, or mental defect shall not testify 
as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required 
mental states, which include, but are not limited to, purpose, 
intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, for the crimes 
charged.  The question as to whether the defendant had or did 
not have the required mental states shall be decided by the trier 
of fact.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  As defendant notes, Posey did not 
purport to testify regarding any mental illness or disorder of 
defendant.   
Nevertheless, the trial court properly concluded that 
Posey’s proposed opinion about defendant’s state of mind should 
be excluded.  “A consistent line of authority in California as well 
as other jurisdictions holds a witness cannot express an opinion 
concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendant. . . .  [T]he 
reason for employing this rule is not because guilt is the 
‘ultimate issue of fact’ to be decided by the jury.  Opinion 
testimony often goes to the ultimate issue in the case.  [Citation.]  
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
Rather, opinions on guilt or innocence are inadmissible because 
they are of no assistance to the trier of fact.  To put it another 
way, the trier of fact is as competent as the witness to weigh the 
evidence and draw a conclusion on the issue of guilt.”  (People v. 
Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 46–47.)  Here, Posey’s proposed 
testimony was “tantamount to expressing an opinion as to 
defendant’s guilt” (People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 210) 
because it proposed to dispose of an essential element of the 
crime.  In essence, Posey sought to testify that defendant was 
not guilty of three murders because defendant lacked the 
required intent.  Posey opined that the wounds to the three 
victims other than Tram reflected that they were not 
“purposeful” but accidental.  He acknowledged that his opinion 
was not based solely on any medical evaluation of the wounds 
but also on “investigative information,” including evidence 
suggesting that Tram was defendant’s primary target.  Indeed, 
Posey conceded that if his opinion was limited to the medical 
evidence, he “wouldn’t even be sitting here talking to you.”  As 
the trial court observed, the jury was equally equipped as Posey 
to evaluate whether the shooting of the other three victims was 
accidental or intentional.  Posey’s opinion “of the knowledge or 
intent of a defendant on trial” (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 
Cal.App.4th 1539, 1551) did not assist the trier of fact and the 
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony.  
(See Torres, at pp. 47–48.)   
Defendant suggests Posey’s testimony was necessary to 
rebut the testimony of prosecution firearms expert Patricia 
Fant.  He argues Fant “opined that, based on her trajectory rod 
analysis, the shooter was aiming for or shooting for the victims’ 
center mass or heads,” and “[t]hus, Fant, based on her analysis 
of forensic evidence, was testifying as to the shooter’s intent.”  
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
Defendant mischaracterizes Fant’s testimony.  Fant testified 
that the bullet trajectories were consistent with the shooter 
being positioned in front of the booth and firing at a slightly 
downward angle.  Although Fant agreed with the prosecutor’s 
statement that the shooter “was basically shooting center mass 
or head,” she contrasted the trajectories with what might be 
expected if the shooter were aiming “at their arms or their feet 
or their legs.”  Fant testified as to the direction and angle at 
which the shots were fired.  She did not purport to testify 
regarding the shooter’s mental processes.  She conceded on 
cross-examination that she did not know whether the bullets hit 
the table before entering the victims and acknowledged that an 
intervening object could have changed the bullet trajectory.  
Posey’s proposed testimony would not have constituted valid 
rebuttal to Fant’s testimony.   
b.  Evidence Regarding the International Club’s 
Business License 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly excluded 
evidence that the City of El Monte tried to rescind the 
International Club’s business license after the shooting.13  The 
court did not err.   
i.  Background 
Before trial, defense counsel proposed to present evidence 
from witnesses who “testified at a hearing and provided reports 
regarding International Club and efforts to close it down, prior 
incidents that had occurred there, why there was supposed to be 
increased security.”  Counsel argued the evidence was relevant 
to the credibility of John Bui, the club’s owner.  The court 
 
13  
See footnote 12, ante, at page 26, as to the errors asserted.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
conducted a hearing.  (Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (b).)  El Monte 
Police Officer Gary Haidet testified that, after the murders, he 
was asked to review police dispatches to the club to determine 
whether its business license should be renewed.  Between 
November 1996 and this incident, there were 51 radio calls for 
police assistance at the club.  Six calls involved guns or 
shootings.  Haidet recommended that the club’s license not be 
renewed based on several factors:  increased gang activity; 
concerns regarding security and underage patrons; and its 
remote location, which hampered police response.  Further, the 
club’s metal detector had not worked “for quite a while,” 
including the night of the shooting.  The club’s business license 
expressly required the use of security guards and metal 
detectors.  Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Sergeant William 
Howell testified that, although the club was known as an Asian 
gang hangout, he had no information that Bui was associated 
with any gang.   
Defense counsel argued this evidence was relevant to Bui’s 
credibility because it showed he failed to follow the 
requirements of the club’s license, particularly for adequate 
security.  The court sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay and 
relevance objections without prejudice to a renewed request at 
trial.  After Bui’s trial testimony, defense counsel asked “to bring 
in evidence of the fact that that location is a gang hangout and 
information having to do with Mr. Bui being involved as a 
security person.”  The court denied the request, noting that Bui 
expressly denied being in charge of security and questioning the 
relevance of the evidence on Bui’s credibility.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
ii.  The Trial Court Properly Excluded the 
Evidence 
Defendant here provides a laundry list of reasons why this 
evidence was relevant.  He argues the evidence impeached Bui’s 
credibility by refuting his claim that he was not responsible for 
security and suggesting he had a motive to lie because his 
business license was imperiled.  These claims lack merit.  On 
the first point, although Bui may have been “responsible” for 
security in the sense that he was a co-owner of the club, this fact 
was not inconsistent with Bui’s testimony that his partner 
handled the day-to-day security of the club.  As to credibility, 
defendant does not explain how Bui’s allegedly false testimony 
about the shooting would have aided renewal of his business 
license.  It was the fact of the shooting, not its particulars, that 
prompted the investigation.  No evidence was offered to suggest 
that Bui was told of the license review or that he was otherwise 
aware of it.   
Defendant’s remaining arguments conflate the business 
license investigation with general evidence that the club was 
patronized by gang members.  Defendant contends the evidence 
would have (1) impeached Bui’s testimony that he was not 
aware the club was a gang hangout, (2) shown Bui was 
“financially beholden” to gangs because of their patronage, (3) 
refuted the prosecutor’s suggestion that Bui was a victim who 
ran a “clean” business, and (4) bolstered the reasonableness of 
his own conduct by explaining the “gang dynamics” at the club.  
However, the court did not preclude evidence of gang conduct at 
the club generally.  Defense counsel made clear he sought 
evidence of the license investigation to impeach Bui.  He did not 
offer broader evidence as to gang attendance or activity there.  
Exclusion of this irrelevant evidence did not undermine 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
defendant’s right to present a defense.  (See People v. Thornton 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 445.)   
6.  Defendant’s Gang Affiliation 
Defendant contends the court erred by denying his pretrial 
motion to exclude evidence of his gang membership.14  The 
prosecutor argued before the trial court that the gang evidence 
“explains some of the interrelationships between the people and 
it also goes to motive.”  Defense counsel countered that evidence 
of his gang membership was irrelevant because “[t]here are no 
gang allegations filed,” though counsel conceded “[t]here can be 
reference to the location being a gang location and that type 
testimony.”  The prosecutor responded that “we can’t refer to 
this place as a gang hangout, refer to some of the victims as gang 
members, but then completely sanitize Mr. Duong.”  The 
prosecutor argued a gang enhancement allegation was not 
necessary to present evidence of defendant’s membership if it 
was otherwise relevant to explain the shooting.  The court ruled 
the evidence was relevant to motive and Bui’s reluctance to 
testify, and concluded the probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by the probability of undue prejudice.  (See Evid. 
Code, § 352.)  The court later gave a limiting instruction that 
defendant’s gang membership could only be considered as to 
identity or motive.   
Defendant argues here that his gang membership was 
irrelevant because no gang enhancement allegation was filed, 
and the identity of the shooter was not at issue.  Initially, it was 
 
14  
Defendant claims a violation of his federal and state 
constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, an impartial 
jury, reliable guilt and penalty determinations, freedom of 
association, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
not clear before trial that the defense would concede identity.  
One witness, Hoa Truong, told a defense investigator defendant 
could not have been the shooter because defendant ran from the 
club during the incident.  Truong later renounced that 
statement at trial.   
In any event, as the court below reasoned, there was little 
question that evidence of defendant’s gang membership was 
relevant to motive.  Indeed, without such evidence, the shooting 
would have been difficult to explain.  There was conflicting 
evidence about whether defendant was involved in the 
preceding argument, and there was no evidence he had any prior 
relationship to Tram.   
The gang affiliation evidence gave context to the shooting, 
as well as the destruction of evidence afterwards.  Defendant, a 
member of Lao Family, was at the club with other Lao Family 
members, including Anthony Tran.  He sat at a table with 
members of other friendly gangs, including the Wah Ching and 
Pomona Boys.  Khiet Diep, a Wah Ching member who sat at 
defendant’s table, was later seen destroying surveillance video.  
Thi Van Le identified Tran as being involved in the argument in 
the restroom and that victim Minh Tram joined the argument.  
Bui told police he saw Tram having a “heated discussion” with 
someone as he left the restroom, then saw defendant and Tram 
leave the restroom together.  Bui confirmed that defendant’s 
group and Tram’s group were both involved in the restroom 
altercation.  Diep also told police that defendant was involved in 
the argument.  Defendant was subsequently heard to ask Diep 
whether he wanted defendant to “do him now.”  Tram and a 
companion were members of the Black Dragon gang.  Neither 
defendant nor others with him were associated with that gang.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
37 
“In general, ‘[t]he People are entitled to “introduce 
evidence of gang affiliation and activity where such evidence is 
relevant to an issue of motive or intent.”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]  
‘[E]ven where gang membership is relevant,’ however, ‘because 
it may have a highly inflammatory impact on the jury trial 
courts should carefully scrutinize such evidence before 
admitting it.’  [Citations.]  On the other hand, ‘ “[b]ecause a 
motive is ordinarily the incentive for criminal behavior, its 
probative value generally exceeds its prejudicial effect, and wide 
latitude is permitted in admitting evidence of its existence.”  
[Citations.]’  [Citation.]  On appeal, we review for abuse of 
discretion a trial court’s ruling on whether evidence is relevant, 
not unduly prejudicial, and thus admissible.”  (People v. 
McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 655.)  No abuse of discretion 
appears on this record.  The gang evidence explained 
defendant’s willingness to shoot a complete stranger minutes 
after a verbal spat, along with the apparent coordination among 
defendant’s associates to destroy the surveillance tape.  Of 
course, other motivations could have been at play.  Defendant 
may have acted in the heat of passion, as the defense argued at 
trial.  But the possibility of other motivations did not preclude 
the prosecution from presenting evidence that gang affiliation 
was the precipitating factor.  (See ibid.; see also People v. Montes 
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 859–860; People v. Carter (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 1166, 1194–1196.)   
The probative value was not substantially outweighed by 
the probability of undue prejudice.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  The 
gang evidence was largely limited to testimony regarding 
various people’s affiliations.  Two witnesses testified defendant 
had an “LF” tattoo.  No gang expert testified, and there was no 
evidence of any other gang-related activity other than this 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
38 
shooting.  The court properly admonished the jury that gang 
evidence was only relevant as to identity or motive and did not 
reflect on defendant’s character.  (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 82, 134.)   
7.  Instructional Error Claims 
a.  CALJIC No. 2.83 
Defendant contends15 the trial court should have granted 
his request to give CALJIC No. 2.83:  “In resolving any conflict 
that may exist in the testimony of expert witnesses, you should 
weigh the opinion of one expert against that of another.  In doing 
this, you should consider the qualifications and believability of 
each witness, the reasons for each opinion and the matter upon 
which it is based.”  (See also CALCRIM No. 332.)  Although 
acknowledging that the defense called no experts, counsel 
argued the instruction was necessary for the jury to distinguish 
among the prosecution experts, claiming “they may have had 
testimony which was not entirely consistent with one another.”  
The court declined to give the instruction, concluding “[t]here 
doesn’t appear to be competing opinions on similar subject 
matters.”   
Contrary to defendant’s contention, there was no 
“materially conflicting testimony on similar subject matters” 
among the prosecution experts.  He alleges two instances.  First, 
he claims, “Fant testified that the angle of some of the shots may 
have been altered because they passed through something.  
[Citation.]  In contrast, pathologist Lisa Scheinin was skeptical 
 
15  
Defendant claims he was deprived of his right to due 
process “and other rights” protected by the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and their 
state counterparts.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
39 
that any of the bullets passed through another person or object 
before hitting the victims.”  (Italics added.)  As the People 
observe, defendant mischaracterizes the testimony.  In 
reference to some of the trajectory rods in the booth where the 
shooting occurred, the prosecutor inquired whether “some of the 
shots appear to have been fired almost straight on into the booth 
where some appear to have been fired from an angle into the 
booth.”  Fant responded that “[s]ometimes the angle, because we 
don’t have everything exactly the way it was, once the bullet 
goes through something it could change trajectory,” but that “all 
I can say is the person was standing in front and firing from the 
seating area back towards where . . . [t]he walkway is.”  Fant 
did not testify the bullets did pass through something before 
striking a victim.  Her testimony was not inconsistent with Dr. 
Scheinin’s during cross-examination refuting defense counsel’s 
suggestion that the bullets could have ricocheted off of the table 
into the victims.  Fant was discussing a bullet changing 
trajectory after entering a victim’s body, whereas Scheinin was 
addressing whether a bullet could have ricocheted before hitting 
the victims.   
The second alleged conflict involved testimony about the 
ease of firing a weapon under certain circumstances:  “Firearms 
examiner Mike Oto testified that generally, once the slide or 
safety is off on a gun, it is easier to pull the trigger.  [Citation.]  
On the other hand, firearms expert Manuel Munoz testified that 
it becomes no easier to pull the trigger after the safety is off and 
an initial shot is fired.  [Citation.]  Patricia Fant testified that 
to her knowledge, it was possible for a semi-automatic weapon 
to discharge at least two bullets accidentally.”  These experts 
were discussing different aspects of the process.  Oto agreed 
with defense counsel on cross-examination that pulling back the 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
40 
slide and taking the safety off would make a gun “easier to 
shoot” by placing it in a “shooting position.”  By contrast, Munoz 
was testifying about the pounds of force required to pull the 
trigger itself, and that each successive shot did not become 
easier in that sense.  It is unclear how either Oto’s or Munoz’s 
testimony conflicted with Fant’s testimony that two bullets were 
“[t]he most” she had heard of having been expelled during an 
accidental discharge.   
On this record, the defense request “was properly refused 
on the ground that no conflicting expert testimony was 
presented.”  (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1161.)  
It should be noted that the court gave CALJIC No. 2.80, which 
told jurors they should “consider the qualifications and 
believability of the witness, the facts or materials upon which 
each opinion is based, and the reasons for each opinion,” as well 
as whether any fact relied upon “has not been proved, or has 
been disproved,” and “the strengths and weaknesses of the 
reasons” upon which their opinions are based.  The court also 
gave CALJIC No. 2.82 addressing hypothetical questions.  The 
jury was adequately instructed.   
b.  Lying in Wait 
Defendant contends no substantial evidence warranted 
instructing the jury as to murder by lying in wait.16  
Alternatively, he argues the instruction regarding the theory17 
 
16  
Defendant claims a violation of his rights to a fair trial and 
due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution and their state counterparts.   
17  
We address only lying in wait as a theory of first degree 
murder as the jury was not instructed on the lying in wait 
special circumstance.  (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(15).)   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
41 
was defective.  We reject these claims.  “To prove lying in wait, 
the prosecution must prove there was a concealment of purpose, 
a substantial period of watching and waiting for a favorable or 
opportune time to act, and that immediately thereafter the 
defendant launched a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim 
from a position of advantage.”  (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 557, 630; see People v. Russell (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1228, 
1244 (Russell).)   
We reject defendant’s argument that no evidence showed 
concealment of purpose.  “With regard to the element of 
concealment, we have explained that physical concealment 
before the attack on the victim is not required.  Rather, ‘ “[i]t is 
sufficient that a defendant’s true intent and purpose were 
concealed by his actions or conduct.” ’  [Citation.]  The 
concealment, in that sense, ‘ “is that which puts the defendant 
in a position of advantage, from which the factfinder can infer 
that lying-in-wait was part of the defendant’s plan to take the 
victim by surprise.” ’ ”  (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 
631–632.)  Defendant did not shoot Tram immediately after the 
verbal altercation.  Following the argument, defendant sat with 
Diep and asked if Diep wanted him to “do him now.”  About 10 
to 15 minutes after the argument, defendant approached the 
booth from behind and started shooting as he neared the front 
of it.  Tram did not draw his own gun before being hit, 
suggesting he was surprised by the attack.  Defendant waited to 
attack until Tram was seated in the booth, a position of 
disadvantage.  There was sufficient evidence of concealed 
purpose.  (See ibid.; Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1245.)   
Defendant acknowledges that he did not shoot Tram 
immediately after the argument but suggests there was no 
evidence of a substantial period of watching and waiting because 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
42 
Tram provoked him during their verbal altercation and “the 
provocation continued and escalated until the first shots were 
fired.”  This contention misses the mark.  The jury was fully 
instructed on provocation and could have returned a voluntary 
manslaughter verdict as to Tram under a heat of passion theory.  
Of course, the jury was not obligated to accept the defense 
theory, and the existence of some evidence warranting an 
instruction on that theory did not preclude an instruction on 
lying in wait where, as here, there existed substantial evidence 
of a concealed purpose.   
Defendant alternatively contends CALJIC No. 8.25, given 
here, was inadequate in two respects.  First, it failed to inform 
jurors that lying in wait did not apply if defendant “acted in 
anger, in response to provocation.”  Second, the instruction did 
not tell the jury the period of watching and waiting must be “for 
a substantial period of time.”   
These claims lack merit.  “We have repeatedly held that 
CALJIC No. 8.25 adequately conveys to a jury the elements of 
lying-in-wait murder.”  (Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1244; 
People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139.)  On the first point, 
the court gave CALJIC No. 8.42 dealing with heat of passion 
voluntary manslaughter.  Heat of passion requires that “the 
reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to 
such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person 
of average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and 
reflection, and from passion rather than from judgment.”  (Ibid.)  
The court also gave CALJIC No. 8.50, which explained that 
“[w]hen the act causing the death, though unlawful, is done in 
the heat of passion or is excited by a sudden quarrel that 
amounts to adequate provocation, the offense is manslaughter.  
In that case, even if an intent to kill exists, the law is that 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
43 
malice, which is an essential element of murder, is absent.”  By 
contrast, the court instructed jurors that murder required 
malice aforethought (see CALJIC Nos. 8.10, 8.11), and lying-in-
wait first degree murder required a period of waiting “such as to 
show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or 
deliberation” (CALJIC No. 8.25).  Considered as a whole, these 
instructions adequately told the jury that, if it found defendant 
killed the victims under legally adequate provocation, he could 
not be found guilty of first degree murder.  If defendant wanted 
a more direct statement to that effect based on the particular 
facts here, it was incumbent upon him to request such an 
instruction.  (Cf. People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 878–
880 [instruction on provocation reducing degree of murder is a 
pinpoint instruction].)   
We have previously rejected defendant’s second argument.  
“Defendant next contends the instructions do not require a 
‘substantial’ period of waiting and watching.  Again, the specific 
word ‘substantial’ was not used.  However, the jury was told that 
the lying in wait must be of sufficient duration to establish the 
elements of waiting, watching and concealment or other secret 
design to take the victim unawares and by surprise, and that a 
murder done suddenly without such waiting, watching and 
concealment is not murder by lying in wait.  These requirements 
necessarily include a substantial temporal element.  We have 
never required a certain minimum period of time, only a period 
not insubstantial.  The instructions sufficiently convey this 
meaning.”  (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 823; see 
Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1244–1245.)   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
44 
B.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct 
during penalty phase argument.18  “Prosecutorial misbehavior 
‘violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of 
conduct “so egregious that it infects the trial with such 
unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” ’ ”  
(People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 418.)  Under state law, 
a prosecutor’s action that does not cause fundamental 
unfairness is prosecutorial misconduct only if it involves “ ‘ “ ‘the 
use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to 
persuade either the court or the jury.’ ” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  We reject 
defendant’s assertions of misconduct.   
Defendant asserts the prosecutor improperly suggested 
that choosing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole 
would be the “easy way out” and “if you take an easy way out, I 
suggest that at some point in time, some day when you look 
yourself in the mirror, you will know in your heart you did the 
wrong thing.”  Defendant mischaracterizes the prosecutor’s 
argument.  He was not suggesting that any verdict of life 
without parole would constitute the “easy way out.”  Rather, he 
was urging that jurors who came to the conclusion that death 
was the appropriate judgment should not vote for life without 
parole simply because a death verdict was more difficult.  The 
prosecutor said after the statement quoted above:  “In life there’s 
tough decisions that sometimes have to be made.  And if we 
 
18  
Defendant claims he was denied his rights to a fair trial, 
due process, and a reliable penalty determination in violation of 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Amendments to the 
federal Constitution and their state counterparts.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
45 
make those decisions honestly, we make the tough decisions, we 
don’t take the easy way out.  I dare say, ladies and gentlemen, 
if you follow the evidence in this case, if you follow the evidence, 
there’s but one conclusion to come to.  And that’s not an easy 
conclusion.  But if you come to it, you will always be able to look 
yourself in the mirror and say, you know what, I got summoned 
into court, it’s something I would have rather not have done, it 
was a very difficult decision, one I may think about daily for the 
rest of my life.  But I know this, I know that I made the decision 
that was the right decision to make.”  We have previously noted 
that it is “proper for the prosecutor to argue that determining 
the appropriate punishment in a capital case is a difficult 
decision that requires courage.”  (People v. Jones (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 119, 185, overruled on another ground in People v. Hill 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.)  The prosecutor’s comments 
here were in the same vein.   
Defendant next argues the prosecutor improperly 
suggested defendant would be a “shark” in prison if the jury 
spared his life.  Defendant contends future dangerousness in 
prison is not an aggravating factor and should not have been 
argued.  Initially, “the prosecutor may not present expert 
evidence of future dangerousness as an aggravating factor, but 
he may argue from the defendant’s past conduct, as indicated in 
the record, that the defendant will be a danger in prison.”  
(People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1179, italics added; 
see People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1054.)  The 
prosecutor’s arguments were based, not on expert opinion, but 
on the circumstances of the present case and defendant’s 
conduct during the other uncharged robberies and murders.  
The prosecutor first argued that, even if jurors could “feel safe 
knowing you took Mr. Duong out of society,” “that’s not the 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
46 
question we’re here to address.  We’re here to address what is 
the appropriate punishment for Mr. Duong’s conduct in this 
case.”  In this context, the prosecutor stated:  “Sometimes jurors 
are told that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
is like being on a boat alone in the middle of an ocean 
surrounded by sharks.  The analogy being that a defendant 
serving life in prison without the possibility of parole is basically 
in a jail cell and the prison is the ocean and the other inmates 
are the sharks.  Again, that is not what you’re here to decide.  
You’re here to decide what is the appropriate punishment.  [¶] 
And also you might well say that based on the evidence 
presented Mr. Duong is the shark.  And I don’t say that to arouse 
hatred or malice towards Mr. Duong.  That’s not the point, but 
I’m going to be very candid in my remarks concerning his 
conduct.”  This comment dovetailed into a discussion about 
defendant’s conduct during the other robbery incidents and how 
he manipulated his girlfriend to do his bidding.  The prosecutor 
argued:  “Is that the conduct of a man that in any way will ever, 
ever be anything but a threat to other people?  Do you think just 
because he has LWOP that his conduct will ever change, that he 
will not be a danger?”  As this argument was “based on the 
evidence presented” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 
446), there was no misconduct.  (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8 
Cal.4th 450, 521.)   
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly argued 
defendant lacked remorse for the killings.  He further suggests 
the prosecutor misrepresented the facts on this point by not 
presenting evidence of defendant’s suicide attempt while 
incarcerated or his comments before the penalty phase that he 
wanted to “accept the D. P. instead of going through this.”  
Defendant points to two comments by the prosecutor that 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
47 
defendant “has not shown one tear drop of remorse” and he “took 
the life of each of those individuals without one shred of remorse 
or mercy.”  “[L]ack of remorse, because it suggests the absence 
of a mitigating factor, is deemed a relevant factor in the jury’s 
determination as to whether the factors in aggravation 
outweigh those in mitigation, and is thus an appropriate subject 
of comment by the prosecutor, so long as he or she does not argue 
that lack of remorse constitutes a factor in aggravation.”  (People 
v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 150; see People v. Spencer 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 687.)  The prosecutor could reasonably 
argue, based on defendant’s conduct, the absence of remorse as 
a mitigating circumstance.  If defendant believed other evidence 
tended to rebut such an argument, he was free to present it.  
That he chose not to do so did not render the prosecutor’s 
comments misleading.   
Finally, defendant complains that the prosecutor should 
not have been allowed to read a passage from the book The 
Killing of Bonnie Garland.19  Defendant acknowledges that we 
 
19  
As read to the jury here, the passage stated:  “When one 
person kills another there is an immediate revulsion in the 
nature of the crime.  But in time so short as to seem indecent to 
the members of the personal family, the dead person ceases to 
exist as an identifiable figure.  To those individuals in the 
community of good will and sympathy and empathy, warmth 
and compassion, only one of the key actors in the drama remains 
with whom to commiserate, and that is always the criminal.  The 
dead person ceases to be a part of everyday reality, ceases to 
exist.  The victim is only a figure in a historic event.  And we 
inevitably turn away from the past toward the ongoing reality 
of everyday life.  And the ongoing reality is that the criminal, 
trapped, anxious, now helpless, isolated, perhaps badgered, 
perhaps bewildered, is all that’s left.  He takes away compassion 
 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
48 
have repeatedly rejected that argument, explaining, “in 
determining penalty, [the jury] was required to consider not only 
the criminal but also his crime.”  (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 238, 277–278; see People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 
612–613; People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 659; People v. 
Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1063.)  Contrary to defendant’s 
assertion, nothing in the prosecutor’s argument suggested 
jurors should “compare the victims in this case to Bonnie 
Garland.”  The prosecutor argued defendant was not deserving 
of mercy or leniency, and “arguing to the jury the mere idea or 
belief that criminals sometimes get undeserved sympathy at the 
expense of their victims was proper.”  (Gurule, at p. 659.)   
2.  Victim Impact Evidence 
Defendant challenges several aspects of the victim impact 
testimony.20  “The Eighth Amendment does not categorically bar 
victim impact evidence.  [Citation.]  To the contrary, witnesses 
are permitted to share with jurors the harm that a capital crime 
caused in their lives.”  (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 461–
462.)  “That is because ‘the effects of a capital crime are relevant 
. . . as a circumstance of the crime.’  [Citations.]  And so long as 
victim impact evidence does not invite the jury to respond in a 
 
that is justly the victim’s.  And he will steal away his victim’s 
moral constituency along with the victim’s life.”   
20  
Defendant claims a violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and their 
state counterparts, depriving him of his rights to due process, a 
fair trial, a reliable penalty determination, and other 
unspecified rights.   
 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
49 
purely irrational way, it is admissible.”  (People v. Mendez (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 680, 712.)   
Defendant first argues one of the victim impact witnesses 
gave improper opinion testimony.  Mach Dang testified about 
the impact of his daughter’s murder.  He said he and his wife 
had been “suffering” and unable to sleep, his wife was sick, and 
he was “having a chest pain all the time.”  His daughter had 
wanted to be a teacher.  After the prosecutor thanked him for 
his brief testimony,21 he stated:  “Sir, I first of all I thank you 
God for getting this defendant here because he is not able to kill 
another person.”  Defense counsel objected, the witness left the 
stand, and the parties moved on to the next witness.   
Although “[i]t is improper for the victim’s family to express 
their opinion regarding the proper verdict” (People v. Collins 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 229), that is hardly what occurred here.  
The witness was not asked what verdict he believed the jury 
should render.  To the extent the witness was expressing that 
defendant’s conviction gave him some closure, the testimony 
was not improper.  (See People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 
212–213.)  Defendant could have asked that the comment be 
stricken and the jury admonished.  He did not do so.  (See 
Collins, at p. 229.)   
Defendant complains the court should not have allowed 
“victim impact” testimony regarding two of the uncharged 
robberies.  Michael Jeng testified that he worked at Wintec 
Industries when defendant killed his coworker Hsu Pin Tsai 
during a robbery attempt.  Jeng described how, at the time of the 
 
21  
Mach Dang’s testimony spanned two reporter’s transcript 
pages.   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
50 
shooting, Tsai was disabled and wore a leg brace.  He also 
testified that Tsai’s wife worked at the company but was not 
present during the incident.  Rafael Gomez testified he was 
working as a security guard at Traditional Jewelers when 
defendant shot him during a robbery attempt.  Gomez had four 
surgeries as a result of the shooting, been unable to return to 
work, and required two more surgeries.   
Initially, it seems questionable that this testimony 
constituted victim impact evidence at all, which is traditionally 
defined as “evidence about the victim and about the impact of 
the murder on the victim’s family.”  (Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 
501 U.S. 808, 827; People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 138.)  
The testimony in question only described the circumstances of 
the shootings and their direct aftermath.  They did not 
encompass biographical information about Tsai or Gomez or any 
impacts the crimes had on their families.  Even if this testimony 
did constitute victim impact evidence, “[t]he circumstances of 
uncharged violent criminal conduct, including its impact on the 
victims of that conduct, are admissible under [Penal Code] 
section 190.3, factor (b).”  (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 
581–582.)  The evidence was “relevant to the jury’s penalty 
determination and its admission did not render defendant’s trial 
constitutionally unfair.”  (People v. Adams (2014) 60 Cal.4th 
541, 573.)   
We also reject defendant’s assertion that this testimony’s 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the probability 
of undue prejudice.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  The testimony was both 
highly probative and tended to rebut the defense suggestion that 
the present shooting resulted from a combination of provocation 
and accident.  The witnesses did not recount any psychological 
impacts of defendant’s crimes, and their descriptions of the 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
51 
physical injuries were not inflammatory.  (See People v. Brady, 
supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 582.)   
Defendant claims he was given inadequate notice that the 
prosecution would present victim impact evidence regarding the 
uncharged offenses.  He asserts the prosecutor “misinform[ed]” 
him that victim impact evidence would be limited to victims 
Dang and Norman.  Defendant’s claim rests entirely on the use 
of the label “victim impact evidence.”  Before trial, the 
prosecution filed a notice of intent to introduce aggravating 
evidence at the penalty phase, listing eight uncharged incidents 
and victim impact testimony as to all four victims here.  After 
the jury’s guilt phase verdict, the court inquired whether 
defense counsel had conferred with the prosecutor regarding 
“the specific evidence in aggravation” and if there was “any more 
need to address what the People’s intention is.”  Defense counsel 
responded that he believed “this issue was addressed back in 
September of last year” and he understood the prosecution 
would present evidence of “[t]he four aggravating incidents, plus 
two victim statements.”  Counsel was fully aware of the 
prosecution’s intent to present evidence as to the uncharged 
offenses.   
3.  Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute 
Defendant raises numerous familiar challenges to the 
constitutionality 
of 
California’s 
death 
penalty 
scheme.  
Although recognizing we have previously rejected all of these 
arguments, he renews them to urge reconsideration and 
preserve the issues for federal review.  We decline to reconsider 
our settled precedent and continue to hold the following: 
The category of death-eligible defendants under Penal 
Code section 190.2 is not unconstitutionally overbroad.  (People 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
52 
v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 488 (Winbush); see People v. 
Reed (2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 1018.)  Penal Code section 190.3, 
factor (a), allowing aggravation based on the circumstances of 
the crime, does not result in arbitrary and capricious 
sentencing.  (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1129; 
see People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 255 (Salazar).)  The 
death penalty scheme is not unconstitutional for failing to 
require written findings (Winbush, at p. 490), unanimous 
findings (People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1072 (Wall)), or 
findings beyond a reasonable doubt as to the existence of 
aggravating 
factors, 
that 
aggravating 
factors 
outweigh 
mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate penalty.  
(Winbush, at p. 489; People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 
1235.)  These conclusions are not altered by Apprendi v. New 
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 
or Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 616].  (People 
v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 45 (Henriquez).)  The 
prosecution is not constitutionally obligated to bear a burden of 
proof or persuasion in sentencing, which is “an inherently moral 
and normative function, and not a factual one amenable to 
burden of proof calculations.”  (Winbush, at p. 489.)  For similar 
reasons, we have held the jury need not be instructed on a 
standard of proof for mitigating evidence.  (People v. Capers 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1016; People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 
269, 373.)  The federal Constitution also does not require an 
instruction that life is the presumptive penalty.  (Wall, at 
p. 1072; Salazar, at p. 256.) 
CALJIC No. 8.88 is not defective for failing to require a 
determination that death is the “appropriate” penalty (see 
Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 256; People v. Boyce (2014) 59 
Cal.4th 672, 724) or failing to require a life sentence if the jury 
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
53 
finds that mitigating factors outweigh aggravating ones (People 
v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 594; People v. Moon (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 1, 42).  This instruction’s use of the phrase “so 
substantial” was not overbroad or unconstitutionally vague.  
(Wall, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1073; Salazar, at p. 256.)  CALJIC 
No. 8.85’s use of the words “extreme” and “substantial” to 
describe mitigating circumstances does not impermissibly limit 
the jury’s consideration of mitigating factors.  (Rices, supra, 4 
Cal.5th at p. 94; Wall, at p. 1073.)  The court was not 
constitutionally obligated to delete inapplicable sentencing 
factors, designate which factors are aggravating or mitigating, 
or instruct that certain factors are relevant only in mitigation.  
(Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490; People v. Cook, supra, 39 
Cal.4th at p. 618.)  “The trial court is not required to instruct 
the jury that the absence of a mitigating factor cannot be 
considered as an aggravating factor.”  (People v. McKinnon, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 692; see Salazar, at p. 256.)   
The federal Constitution does not require intercase 
proportionality review.  (People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
p. 594; Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490.)  Nor does the death 
penalty statute violate equal protection by providing different 
procedural safeguards to capital and noncapital defendants.  
(Johnson, at p. 594; Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 46.)  
Finally, we have repeatedly held that California’s capital 
sentencing scheme does not violate international norms or 
evolving standards of decency in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  (Henriquez, at p. 47; Winbush, at 
p. 490; People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 725.)   
PEOPLE v. DUONG 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
54 
C.  Cumulative Error Claim 
Defendant contends cumulative error deprived him of a 
fair trial.  “We have found no error, and where we assumed 
error, we have found no prejudice.  Nor do we discern cumulative 
prejudice.”  (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 767; see 
People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 132; People v. Westerfield 
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 728.)   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed.   
 
CORRIGAN, J.   
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Duong   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted     
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S114228 
Date Filed:  August 10, 2020  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Los Angeles    
Judge:  Robert M. Martinez    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Debra S. Sabah Press and Charles J. Press, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Kamala Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, 
Joseph P. Lee and Jonathan M. Krauss, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Debra S. Sabah Press 
Attorney at Law 
3571 Far West Boulevard, PMB 140 
Austin, TX 78731 
(512) 215-8964 
 
Jonathan M. Krauss 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, Ca 90013 
(213) 269-6123