Case Title: Basin Elec. Power Co-op. v. Bowen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Basin Elec. Power Co-op. v. Bowen1999 WY 51979 P.2d 503Case Number: 97-336Decided: 05/10/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

BASIN 
ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

 

LINDA BOWEN, Platte County Treasurer, in her official 
capacity;

and the BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR PLATTE 
COUNTY,

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court 
of Platte County, The Honorable

Barton R. Voigt, 
Judge.

    

 

W. Perry Dray and Brandin 
Hay of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, P. C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, for 
appellant.

 David F. Palmerlee of Palmerlee and Durrant, Buffalo, 
Wyoming; and Bruce A. Hellbaum of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, 
Wyoming, for appellees.

    

      Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR, * 
JJ.

     
* Chief Justice at time of oral argument; retired November 2, 
1998.

 

      TAYLOR, 
Justice, Retired.

    
[¶1]      At issue in this case is the 
construction of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-4-101(d) (Michie 1997) (the Escrow 
Statute),1 which directs the county treasurer 
to place taxes paid under protest in an interest-bearing escrow account. 
Specifically, the parties disagree as to who is to make the final determination 
of the amount placed in escrow when the 
county and the taxpayer dispute the amount that is "under appeal." The district 
court concluded the duties of the county treasurer as set forth in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-2-201(d) (Michie Repl. 1994) (the Estimate Statute) indicate the 
legislative intent that the county treasurer determine the amount designated for 
the escrow account. Finding no controlling relationship between the Estimate 
Statute and the Escrow Statute, and construing the Escrow Statute in favor of 
the taxpayer, we reverse and remand.

 

                                
I. ISSUES

 

    [¶2]  
  Appellant, Basin Electric 
Power Cooperative (Basin), presents three issues for 
review:

 

I.   
Whether Wyo. Stat. § 39-4-101(d) (repl. vol. 1997) requires the Platte 
County Treasurer to deposit "that protested amount under appeal" as designated 
by Basin Electric Power Cooperative into an interest-bearing escrow 
account?

 

II.  
Whether the Platte County Treasurer's duties pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
39-4-101(d) (repl. vol. 1997) are wholly ministerial, and not discretionary, 
such that a writ of mandamus should issue to require her to deposit "that 
protested amount under appeal" as designated by Basin Electric Power Cooperative 
into an interest-bearing escrow account?

 

III. Whether preliminary and permanent injunctive 
relief lies against the Platte County Treasurer to prevent her from depositing 
less than "that protested amount under appeal" as designated by Basin Electric 
Power Cooperative into an interest-bearing escrow account?

 

    [¶3]    
Appellees, Linda Bowen as Platte County Treasurer (County Treasurer) and 
the Board of County Commissioners for Platte County (Board of Commissioners), 
perceive the issues as follows:

 

I. Does Wyoming Statute 39-2-201(d) provide the 
mechanism for the County Treasurer to determine the "amount under appeal" to be 
deposited in escrow pursuant to Wyoming Statute 
39-4-101(d)?

 

II. Can Basin Electric Power Cooperative ("Basin") 
obtain a preliminary injunction when it cannot show irreparable injury or 
emergency, but can only show a speculative future delay in the recovery of 
money?

 

III. Can Basin obtain a Writ of Mandamus without 
showing that the alleged duty of the Platte County Treasurer was clear, 
undisputable, ministerial and when such act would not be in the public's best 
interest?

 

                   
             II. 
FACTS

 

    [¶4]    
In 1994 and 1995, Basin paid a portion of its assessed taxes under 
protest and requested the protested amounts be placed into an escrow account 
pursuant to the Escrow Statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-4-101(d). In November 1996, 
Basin again submitted a portion of its tax payment under protest, which amount 
was placed into an escrow account. After the amount was deposited, however, the 
Chairman of the Board of Commissioners wrote to Basin asking for a detailed 
explanation of why Basin's protested amount increased for 1996, when the 
assessed fair market value had decreased from the previous year. Basin responded 
by asserting that they were not required to give an explanation, but offered the 
following information:

 

[T]he calculation was made according to the same 
methodology Basin Electric has used in the 1994 case appealed to the State Board 
of Equalization * * *.  The reason 
the escrowed amount is higher is because Basin Electric's value has declined 
since 1994, using the same methodology. Two factors that have contributed to 
that decline have been higher costs of capital and lower net operating income 
since the 1994 assessment.

 

The Board of Commissioners 
subsequently notified Basin that due to Basin's failure to provide more detailed 
information, the Board of Commissioners had applied Basin's 1994 methodology to 
the current assessment and determined the amount protested by Basin exceeded any 
possible appellate recovery for Basin by $197,656.00. On that basis, the County 
Treasurer removed the excess sum from the escrow account and distributed it to 
the tax district.

 

    [¶5]    
When Basin's demand to return the disbursed escrow amounts went unheeded, 
Basin brought an action seeking declaratory judgment.  Basin claimed that the County 
Treasurer's removal of the funds from the escrow account was a clear violation 
of the Escrow Statute, and requested a writ of mandamus ordering the County 
Treasurer to replace the funds into the escrow account. Basin further sought an 
injunction prohibiting the County Treasurer from removing any protested amounts 
from the escrow account in the future.

 

    [¶6]    
The district court denied Basin's request for a preliminary injunction 
and a writ of mandamus, and the case proceeded to trial. After hearing the 
matter, the district court concluded that the County Treasurer's estimate of the 
amount under appeal pursuant to the Estimate Statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-2-201(d), governs the amount which must be deposited into an interest-bearing 
escrow account. The district court reasoned:

 

The key to the resolution of this issue is the 
precept that courts are to review statutes in the light of their object and 
purpose, and then to interpret them so as to achieve that purpose. * * *  It cannot seriously be controverted that 
the unambiguous purpose of W.S. § 39-4-101(d) is to preserve for a taxpayer that portion of its taxes 
that may be refunded in the event of a successful appeal. It is simply 
unreasonable to ascribe to the legislature an intent to require the escrow of 
amounts that are not, in fact, subject to the protest or appeal. This reading of 
the statute is not only consistent with 
reason, it is also consistent with the county treasurer's statutory duty upon 
receipt of a taxpayer's objection to a tax assessment[.]

 

This timely appeal followed.

 

                         
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

    [¶7]    
Statutory interpretation is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 983 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

"We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with 
the Legislature's intent. We begin by making `an inquiry respecting the ordinary 
and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection.' * * *"

 

* * 
* "When the court determines, as a matter of law, that a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, it must give effect to the plain language of the statute and should 
not resort to the rules of statutory construction." * * * If, on the other hand, the Court 
determines that a statute is ambiguous, it may use extrinsic aids of 
statutory interpretation to help it determine the legislature's 
intent.

 

State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 376 (Wyo. 1997) 
(quoting State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 
1166 (Wyo. 1994) and Lancto v. City of Rawlins, 892 P.2d 800, 802-03 (Wyo. 
1995)).

 

    [¶8]    
The question of whether an ambiguity exists is a matter of law to be 
determined by the court. Board of County Com'rs of County of Laramie v. Laramie 
County School Dist. Number One, 884 P.2d 946, 955 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219-20 
(Wyo. 1991)). A statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or 
uncertain and subject to varying interpretations; it is "`unambiguous if its 
wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree to its meaning with 
consistency and predictability.'" Board of County Com'rs of County of Laramie, 
884 P.2d  at 955 (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc., 813 P.2d at 
219-20).

 

                             
IV. DISCUSSION

 

      A. THE ESCROW 
STATUTE

 

    [¶9]    
Basin argues that the language of the Escrow Statute is plain and 
unambiguous, and, therefore, we need not look to other provisions, such as the 
Estimate Statute, to determine its meaning. State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 544 
(Wyo. 1982). In support of this argument, Basin relies on Thunder Basin Coal Co. 
v. Study, 866 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Wyo. 1994), where we held that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-4-101(d) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1993) unambiguously requires the submission of 
only the amount of disputed taxes. The county treasurer had no authority to 
demand interest and penalty payments as a precondition to placing the disputed 
taxes into an escrow account.

 

    [¶10]  Contrary to the assertions of Basin, 
however, Thunder Basin Coal Co. is not dispositive of the issue before us. Here, 
it is not interest and penalties, but the actual amount under appeal which is in 
dispute. Further, in 1994, the legislature modified the Escrow Statute,2 adding the following underlined 
language:

 

(d) If taxes are paid under protest to the extent of 
and due to an appeal pending before the state board of equalization or any court 
of competent jurisdiction, the county treasurer shall deposit that protested 
amount under appeal in an interest bearing escrow account and withhold 
distribution until a final decision on the appeal has been rendered. To the 
extent the taxpayer prevails in the appeal, the county treasurer shall refund 
that amount under appeal, plus interest earned thereon, to the taxpayer within thirty (30) days from the day the 
final decision is rendered. If the taxpayer pays to the county an amount in 
excess of the protested amount under appeal, the excess shall be distributed as 
provided by law.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-4-101(d).

 

    [¶11]  It is clear that the statute mandates 
the county treasurer to deposit "that protested amount under appeal" into an 
interest-bearing escrow account. It is equally clear that the "protested amount" 
is defined and limited by the phrase "to the extent of and due to an appeal * * 
*." This limitation is underscored by the legislature's use of the specific term 
"protested amount under appeal" throughout the provision, rather than 
merely "that protested amount." At the same time, the addition of the phrase "or 
any court of competent jurisdiction" 
extends the time during which the protested amount may remain in the escrow 
account to include the time for an appeal from the Board of Equalization's 
decision. Thus, the escrowed amount is not disbursed until all appeals are 
exhausted.

 

    [¶12]  The difficulty is that nothing in the 
statute directly addresses the procedure to be used if the taxpayer and the 
county treasurer disagree as to the amount "under appeal." It is not so much 
that the statute is ambiguous as to its terms, but that the statute does not 
expressly contemplate the current dispute. We are left to determine how, in 
light of the taxation statutes as a whole, the legislature would wish to resolve 
the question. In the words of Justice Brown:

 

Statutory construction is a fertile source of 
litigation for parties and a fertile source of frustration for courts. * * * 
Although courts resort to numerous rules of statutory construction to determine 
legislative intent, they are often reduced to drawing what they hope is a 
logical inference about the legislature's intent, knowing that if their 
inference is wrong, the legislature will eventually correct it. We are in that 
position here. We will discuss some of the accepted rules of statutory 
construction because they offer us 
help. They are, nevertheless, not 
determinative; we are left to make what we think is a logical inference of 
the legislative intent.

 

    
Stovall, 648 P.2d  at 545.

 

    [¶13]  The fundamental rule in statutory 
construction is to ascertain, if possible, what the legislature intended by the 
language used, viewed in light of the objects and purposes to be accomplished. 
Id. at 545. It cannot be questioned that the purpose of the Escrow Statute is to 
preserve for the taxpayer, in an interest-bearing escrow account, the entire 
portion of levied taxes to which the taxpayer objects. Basin argues that in the 
absence of language to the contrary, the taxpayer is the sole judge of that 
protested amount. Indeed, Basin goes so far as to say that it was free to pay 
the entire amount of the levied tax under protest because the issue on appeal is 
the methodology used by the Department of Revenue in its assessment. Therefore, 
if the appeal is successful, the entire assessment will be overturned and the 
levied tax will be void. Consequently, even though Basin does not dispute that 
it owes some tax, it reasons that the amount under appeal in this case is all of 
the taxes levied under the Department of Revenue's erroneous assessment 
methods.

 

    [¶14]  On the other hand, the Board of 
Commissioners contends that if Basin is allowed to designate any amount it 
chooses as the protested tax under appeal, without explanation, the Board of 
Commissioners has no way to predict its tax income for budgeting purposes. Given 
the extended amount of time the protested taxes may remain unavailable to the 
county, the unbridled opportunity to designate the entire amount of tax allows 
the taxpayer to hold the county hostage. The Board of Commissioners insists that 
the legislature could not have intended this result, and posits that the only 
reasonable solution is to find that the "amount under appeal" is governed by the 
Estimate Statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-201(d). That provision 
states:

 

(d) Following determination of the fair market value 
of property the department shall notify the taxpayer by mail of the assessed 
value. The person assessed may file written objections to the assessment with 
the [state] board within thirty (30) days of the date of postmark and appear 
before the board at a time specified by the board. The person assessed shall 
also file a copy of the written objections with the county treasurer of the 
county in which the property is located, who shall notify the county assessor 
and the board of county commissioners, with an estimate of the tax amount under 
appeal based upon the previous year's levy.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-2-201(d) (emphasis added). Because the Escrow Statute is silent regarding the 
computation of the "amount under appeal," the Board of Commissioners argues that 
the Estimate Statute, which provides instruction on how to do so,3 becomes the only viable means of 
fairly accounting for the needs of the county and the fiduciary duty of the 
County Treasurer in conjunction with the concerns of 
Basin.

 

    [¶15]  When we are confronted with two possible 
but conflicting conclusions, we will choose the one that is most logically 
designed to cure the mischief or inequity that the legislature was attempting to 
accomplish. Stovall, 648 P.2d  at 546. Here, the legislature designed a remedy by 
which the taxpayer could protect the 
entire amount that it believed to be wrongfully taxed, and have such amount 
returned within thirty days if the taxpayer is correct. The Board of 
Commissioners' method of estimating the amount under appeal does not take into 
account the possibility that the current appeal is not based on the same set of 
facts as the previous year's tax 
assessment or that other factors have affected value. Thus, even though the 
taxpayer may legitimately object to an amount which exceeds the calculations of 
the county treasurer under the Estimate Statute, the taxpayer's remedy is 
contricted.4

 

    [¶16]  This is not the intent of the Escrow 
Statute. A basic rule of statutory construction is that courts may try to 
determine legislative intent by considering the type of statute being 
interpreted. Id. Tax statutes are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer and 
are not to be extended absent clear intent of the legislature. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 918 P.2d  at 985. Reading Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-4-101(d) in the light most 
favorable to Basin, we cannot agree that the Estimate Statute defines the amount 
under appeal which must be placed into escrow.

 

Omission of words from a statute must be considered 
intentional on the part of the legislature. * * *             
Moreover, where the legislature has specifically used a word or term in 
certain places in a statute and excluded 
it in another place, the court should not read that term into the section from 
which it was excluded.

 

Carroll By and Through 
Miller v. Wyoming Production Credit Ass'n, 755 P.2d 869, 873 (Wyo. 1988). The 
Escrow and the Estimate statutes were both modified in 1994. It would have been 
a simple task for the legislature to have explicitly guaranteed the result urged 
by the Board of Commissioners by merely referring to the allegedly controlling 
Estimate Statute or adding the word "estimated" to the amount under appeal in 
the Escrow Statute.5  The legislature chose not to do so. "This 
court has no power to add to, or to substitute, words in the statute. * * * That 
authority is vested in the legislature, and we will not, nor should we, encroach 
upon its proper authority." Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Wyo. 
1991). Thus, we hold that the legislature intended the protested amount be 
designated by the taxpayer and is not controlled by the County Treasurer's 
estimate made five months earlier.

 

    [¶17]  This said, it is necessary to address 
Basin's interpretation of its duties under the statute and the "amount under 
appeal." The final sentence of the Escrow Statute, also added in 1994, instructs 
the County Treasurer that "[i]f the taxpayer pays to the county an amount in 
excess of the protested amount under appeal, the excess shall be distributed as provided 
by law."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-4-101(d). "[A]n omission, by itself, even though intentional, is not 
sufficient to instruct with respect to the new meaning. * * * Added language 
also must be considered." Longfellow, 803 P.2d  at 1388. Every word in 
legislation is presumed to have a meaning, and a statute should be construed so 
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous.  Stovall, 648 P.2d  at 547. Statutes must 
be interpreted in a fashion which permits an agency to carry out its legislative 
mandate. Wyoming State Tax Com'n v. BHP Petroleum Co., Inc., 856 P.2d 428, 436 
(Wyo. 1993).

 

    [¶18]  A county treasurer has the duty to 
collect taxes and other monies belonging to the county and pay over to the 
proper entity any monies received. Board of County Com'rs of County of Laramie, 
884 P.2d  at 957. This duty must be carried out with reasonable skill, diligence, 
good faith and honesty. Id. A county treasurer acts as a trustee in the 
management of funds held by that office on behalf of others. Id. In light of 
these duties, we cannot agree with Basin's position that the taxpayer has no 
responsibility to explain to the County Treasurer, in sufficient detail, the 
basis on which the taxpayer has designated a specific amount as a protested tax 
payment.6 Nor can we interpret the "amount 
under appeal" to be governed by the form of the objection to the assessment 
rather than the difference between the tax levied and the taxpayer's objective 
calculations of its tax obligation.

 

    [¶19]  While we construe the Escrow Statute to 
provide relief for Basin, it cannot be reasonably argued that the legislature 
intended the Board of Commissioners to forego its responsibility to the 
remainder of its citizens by accepting, without question, the designation of a 
"protested amount" which appears to be in excess of "the extent" of the appeal. 
Basin does not deny that it owes a significant amount of taxes for 1996. Indeed, 
Basin calculated that only a portion of its tax bill should be protested in 
1996.  Since the calculation must be 
made prior to its payment under protest, we see no reason why Basin cannot, or 
should not, share this information with the Board of Commissioners. We also find 
that an objection to the methodology of the state assessment does not excuse 
payment of those taxes which Basin believes would be owed if the correct 
methodology were used. Even if successful on appeal, the amount Basin believes 
owed for that period will not change if the case is remanded for reassessment. 
Consequently, the amount which is "to the extent of and due to an appeal" is the 
difference between Basin's objective calculation of its tax obligation and the 
tax which was levied.

 

    [¶20]  In summary, we hold that the County 
Treasurer must deposit the amount protested by Basin into an interest-bearing 
escrow account. However, Basin is required to give a detailed explanation, if 
requested, regarding the calculation of the protested amount. Upon receipt of 
Basin's calculations, the County Treasurer may agree that the escrowed amount is 
proper or, if not, may proceed with a declaratory judgment action requesting the 
district court determine whether the protested amount is in excess of the amount 
under appeal. The merits of Basin's appeal are not to be decided at this time, 
but merely whether the protested amount is the difference between Basin's 
objective calculation of its tax obligation and the tax which was 
levied.

 

    [¶21]  We are mindful that the resolution of 
this dispute places an extra burden on both Basin and the Board of 
Commissioners. We are confident, however, that if we have misconstrued the 
intention of the legislature in this matter, we will be 
corrected.

 

                   B. 
WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND INJUNCTION

 

    [¶22]  Mandamus is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-30-101 (Michie 1997) as "a writ issued in the name of the state to an inferior 
tribunal, a corporation, board or person commanding the performance of an act 
which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or 
station." "The writ must not be issued when there is an adequate remedy at law." 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-30-104 (Michie 1997). We have said: 

 

"[T]he writ of mandamus will issue only where the 
duty to be performed is ministerial and the obligation is peremptory and plainly 
defined. The law must not only authorize the demanded action but require it; and 
the duty must be clear and undisputable.

 

            * * 
*

 

[I]n order to warrant the issuance of mandamus, not 
only must there be a legal right in the relator, but owing to the extraordinary 
and drastic character of mandamus and the caution exercised by courts in 
awarding it, it is also important that the right sought to be enforced be clear 
and certain, so as not to admit of any reasonable controversy. The writ does not 
issue in cases where the right in question is doubtful."

 

State ex rel. Sweetwater 
County School Dist. No. One v. Ohman, 895 P.2d 49, 54 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting 
LeBeau v. State ex rel. White, 377 P.2d 302, 303 (Wyo. 
1963)).

 

    [¶23]  In light of our ruling above, the duty 
of the County Treasurer to deposit the amount protested by Basin is clear and 
certain. Until a court of competent jurisdiction absolves the County Treasurer 
of this duty by holding the amount placed in escrow is clearly in excess of the 
amount under appeal, the amount designated by Basin is presumed correct. The 
County Treasurer has no independent authority to disburse the funds in 
escrow.

 

    [¶24]  Moreover, the Escrow Statute clearly 
mandates the County Treasurer return the funds to Basin within thirty days of a 
successful final appeal. Were we to accept the Board of Commissioners' argument 
that Basin has an adequate remedy by allowing the Board of Commissioners to 
apply the equivalent of the disbursed funds to Basin's future tax payments, we 
would be negating the clear intention of the legislature that these funds be 
returned in a specific amount of time. This we cannot do.  Therefore, we find that a writ of 
mandamus ordering the County Treasurer to deposit the amounts paid under protest 
by Basin should issue. An injunction preventing future disbursement of taxes 
paid under protest is unnecessary in light of this ruling.

 

                              
V. CONCLUSION

 

    [¶25]  Under the Escrow Statute, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-4-101(d), the amount protested by Basin is presumed to be the amount 
under appeal. However, Basin has an obligation to provide the Board of 
Commissioners with an explanation of its designation if requested to do so. The 
County Treasurer does not have the authority to unilaterally determine that the 
escrowed funds are in excess of the amount under appeal, and, therefore, the 
duty of the County Treasurer to escrow the amount paid under protest is clear 
and certain. A writ of mandamus ordering the County Treasurer to deposit the 
taxes protested by Basin in an interest-bearing escrow account is appropriate. 
Reversed and remanded.

                   

           

FOOTNOTES

1 The 
1998 revisions to the taxation and revenue statutes repealed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-4-101(d) and recodified this provision at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-13-109(f); 
39-13-111(b); 39-14-109(f)(i); 39-14-209(f)(i); 39-14-309(f)(i); 
39-14-409(f)(i); 39-14-509(f)(i); 39-14-609(f)(i); and 
39-14-709(f)(i).

  

2 When 
considered in Thunder Basin Coal Co., 866 P.2d  at 1290, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-4-101(d) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1993) read as follows:

 

        
    "(d) If taxes 
are paid under protest due to an appeal pending before the state board of 
equalization, 
the county treasurer shall deposit the amount under appeal in an interest 
bearing escrow account and withhold distribution until a final decision on the 
appeal has been rendered.  If the 
taxpayer prevails in the appeal, plus interest earned, to the taxpayer within 
thirty (30) days from the day the final decision is 
rendered."

  

3 The 
formula espoused by the Board of Commissioners is as follows: If the tax levy 
from the preceding year has not been protested, the County Treasurer's estimate 
of the amount under appeal is merely a calculation of the difference between the 
last tax levy paid without protest and the amount which will be levied in the 
current year. If part of the last year's tax levy was paid under protest and the 
matter remains under appeal, then the amount to be escrowed will be the last 
year's escrow amount increased or decreased by the proportionate tax levy 
disparity from the previous year.

  

4 It is 
also noteworthy that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-201(d) does not require the county 
treasurer to notify the taxpayer of the estimate which will limit the amount 
which may be paid under protest. See Wyoming Bd. of Equalization v. State ex 
rel. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 637 P.2d 248, 251 (Wyo. 1981) (the hearing 
contemplated under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-201 includes a right to notice). It 
appears that the taxpayer would not be notified of this limit until there was an 
attempt to protest more than the amount estimated by the county 
treasurer.

  

5 
Further, there is a companion statute, utilizing the same language as Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-4-101(d), that allows the taxpayer to pay taxes under protest to the 
state, but the Board of Commissioners fails to point to any provision that gives 
the State Treasurer the authority to limit the amount which may be protested. 
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-311 (Michie 1997).

  

6 Basin's 
position is as follows: As the entire 1996 taxable assessed valuation notice to 
the taxpayer was appealed, the entire 1996 tax computed and levied by Platte 
County would have been the taxes to the extent of and due to the appeal. 
Although Basin was entitled to designate the entire amount, it decided to 
designate only a portion which it determined was the difference between the tax 
on the fair market value as computed by Basin, and the tax on the fair market 
value computed by the Department of Revenue. Basin was not obligated under the 
statute to do this, and therefore, was not obligated to tell the county how it 
determined the amount to be escrowed.