Case Title: Skousen, Adm. v. Roelfs

Citation: 209 Or. 521, 307 P.2d 324

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1957-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed February 21, 1957.
*522 B.G. Skulason and Leroy B. Skousen, Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
S.J. Graham, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Ben F. Forbes, Portland.
Before TOOZE[*], Acting Chief Justice, and LUSK, BRAND and McALLISTER, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
McALLISTER, J.
We are called upon to construe a paragraph of the will of Bert E. Boice, deceased, reading as follows:
The real property on the Rockwood road referred to above consisted of two contiguous tracts, designated in the record as tract No. 1 containing 15.54 acres, and tract No. 2 containing 8.9308 acres.
On April 4, 1926, Benjamin F. Dahlhammer was the owner of tract No. 1 and he and his wife, Pearlettie A. Dahlhammer, were the owners of tract No. 2 as tenants by the entirety. Benjamin F. Dahlhammer died intestate in Multnomah County on April 4, 1926, leaving surviving him as his only heirs at law his widow, Pearlettie A. Dahlhammer, his son George and his daughter Edith.
On June 15, 1927, the widow, Pearlettie A. Dahlhammer, married Bert E. Boice. After this marriage, the title to both tract No. 1 and tract No. 2 was transferred by various conveyances to Bert E. Boice and Pearlettie A. Boice as tenants by the entirety. Pearlettie A. Boice died on October 4, 1943, and thereafter Bert E. Boice claimed to be the owner of both tracts of the Rockwood road property as the surviving tenant by the entirety.
On August 12, 1949, when Bert E. Boice made his last will containing the paragraph quoted above, he apparently believed that he was the sole owner of the said real property and according to appellant's brief, in making the bequests of $2,000.00 each to George and Edith, he "was giving to the stepchildren what he believed to be an amount fairly covering whatever interest they might have in the property, because formerly owned by their mother."
On February 16, 1950, George Dahlhammer and *524 his sister Edith Dahlhammer Roelfs filed a suit in the circuit court for Multnomah county against their stepfather, Bert E. Boice, to impress a trust in their favor upon both tracts of the Rockwood road property. The circuit court entered a decree on November 6, 1951, holding that George and Edith were the owners in fee of tract No. 1 but had no interest in tract No. 2. The case was appealed to this court which held that George had no interest in either tract but that Edith was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in tract No. 1. A more detailed narrative of the transactions concerning this property and the background of this litigation is contained in our opinion in Dahlhammer and Roelfs v. Schneider, Exec., 197 Or 478, 252 P2d 807.
Bert E. Boice died on November 13, 1952, while the above case was pending on appeal in this court and C.G. Schneider was appointed executor of his estate. Schneider died before the probate was completed and the appellant Leroy B. Skousen was appointed in his stead as administrator with the will annexed.
The executor paid the bequest of $2,000 to George Dahlhammer but filed his final account without paying the like bequest to Edith. Edith objected to the final account because her legacy had not been paid and after a hearing, the circuit court held the legacy valid and ordered that it be paid. From that order this appeal has been taken.
The appellant contends that the legacy to Edith "is specific and payable only out of a sale of the real property and since the testator did not own the property at the time of his death, the legacy lapsed."
1, 2. Legacies are usually classified as general, specific or demonstrative. In re Preston's Estate, 157 Or 631, 73 P2d 369, includes an informative discussion *525 of the elements of specific and demonstrative legacies and a definition of each, as follows:
The intention of the testator is the controlling factor in determining the nature of the legacy to Edith. The rule is thus clearly stated in 57 Am Jur 939, Wills § 1405:
3, 4. We also take note of the tendency of the courts to favor general or demonstrative legacies, as pointed out in 57 Am Jur 940, Wills § 1406 in the following language,
Viewing the language of the will in the light of the above principles, we are satisfied that the bequest to Edith was not a specific legacy but a demonstrative or general one which neither lapsed nor was adeemed because Bert E. Boice owned a lesser interest in the Rockwood road property at the time of his death than he thought he owned when he made his will.
The first sentence of the third paragraph of the will, taken alone, bequeaths a general legacy: "* * * and to * * * EDITH * * * I give, devise and bequeath the sum of Two Thousand Dollars * * *." And we find no language indicating an intention of the testator to make this bequest payable only out of a specific fund and not otherwise. The direction that the legacy is to be paid "out of" the sale of the Rockwood road property only indicates the primary source of payment and at most makes the legacy demonstrative rather than general.
If the legacy had been specific and payable only out of the proceeds of a sale of the Rockwood road property and not otherwise, the legacy ordinarily *527 would have been adeemed by the disposition of the property by the testator during his lifetime. In this case, however, the testator made certain that the legacy would not lapse by a sale of the property during his lifetime by specifically providing that the legacy would only lapse if (1) the property was sold and (2) if the sum of $2,000 was paid to Edith prior to his demise. The testator clearly intended that payment of the legacy was the controlling factor in determining whether the legacy should lapse, rather than a sale or other disposition of the property.
At the time of his death, Bert E. Boice still owned an undivided one-half interest in tract No. 1 and all of tract No. 2 which was more than sufficient to pay the legacies which he had directed his executor to pay from that primary source. Under these circumstances the bequest to Edith even if it had been a specific legacy would not have lapsed. In 4 Page on Wills 374, § 1522, it is said: "If a pecuniary legacy is charged upon realty which is devised, and testator conveys a part thereof during his lifetime, the legacy remains a charge upon the part of such realty which testator did not convey. * * *", citing Watson v. McLench, 57 Or 446, 110 P 482. See also 57 Am Jur 1081, Wills § 1581.
The appellant argues that Boice did not intend that Edith should receive $2,000 plus the amount received by her from the sale of her one-half interest in tract No. 1 and intimates that if Boice had anticipated the final outcome of the prior litigation, he would have changed his will. Although it is not controlling, we note that during the interval of nearly two years and nine months from the filing of the suit by George and Edith to recover the Rockwood road property until his death, Bert E. Boice made no change in his *528 will. The decree of the lower court awarding George and Edith the entire fee in tract No. 1 was entered approximately a year before Boice died. If Mr. Boice had wanted to restrict the legacy granted to Edith, he had ample opportunity so to do. We obviously have no authority to change his will.
The decree is affirmed.
[*]  Walter L. Tooze, A.C.J., died December 21, 1956.