Case Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Ranke

Citation: 2010-Ohio-5036

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Ranke, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5036.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-5036 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. RANKE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Ranke,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5036.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Failure to obtain clients’ consent to forgo responding 
to motion for summary judgment — DR 6-101(A)(3) — Neglect of 
entrusted legal matter — Public reprimand. 
(No. 2010-0345 — Submitted April 20, 2010 — Decided October 21, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-085. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Carolyn Kaye Ranke of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0043735, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989.  
On December 8, 2008, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, filed a 
two-count complaint against her.  The complaint alleged that while representing a 
husband and wife following the husband’s catastrophic injury in an automobile 
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accident, respondent had committed multiple violations of DR 6-101(A)(3) 
(prohibiting neglect of an entrusted legal matter) and 7-101(A) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from (1) intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of his client, (2) 
intentionally failing to carry out a contract of employment, or (3) intentionally 
damaging his client). 
{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
rejected all but one of the alleged violations, finding that they were not supported 
by clear and convincing evidence.  However, based upon findings that she 
neglected her clients by failing to obtain their consent to allow a motion for 
summary judgment to go unopposed, the board recommends that we publicly 
reprimand respondent.  Neither party has objected to the board’s report.  For the 
reasons that follow, we accept the board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} Respondent agreed to represent a husband and wife for claims 
arising from injuries the husband had suffered in an April 1999 automobile 
accident while on a business trip in California.  The husband, a passenger in a 
vehicle driven by a coworker, suffered catastrophic injuries that left him 
permanently disabled, and his coworker died. 
{¶ 4} The wife’s brother-in-law, an attorney in Cleveland, Ohio, had 
filed an initial application for workers’ compensation benefits in May 1999.  But 
when he failed to take steps to secure the vehicle involved in the accident, the 
wife terminated her brother-in-law’s services and hired respondent to prosecute 
all 
claims 
arising 
out 
of 
the 
accident, 
including 
claims 
for 
uninsured/underinsured-motorist insurance. 
{¶ 5} Respondent referred her clients to another attorney for the 
workers’ compensation portion of their claims.  Although the employer contested 
the claim on the ground that the husband and his coworker were acting outside of 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
the scope of their employment at the time of the accident, the wife testified that 
the men were pursuing their employer’s business when the accident occurred.  
After several appeals, the clients prevailed on their claim and secured present and 
future workers’ compensation benefits in excess of $1.5 million. 
{¶ 6} Much of relator’s complaint involves allegations that respondent 
violated her ethical duties to her clients by failing to prosecute tort claims against 
the coworker’s estate and the employer to (1) establish liability and damages and 
(2) recover insurance proceeds, including uninsured/underinsured-motorist 
coverage, from applicable insurance policies in accordance with this court’s 
decision in Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 
710 N.E.2d 1116 – a strategy that might have resulted in a greater recovery than 
the clients received through the workers’ compensation system. 
{¶ 7} R.C. 4123.741, however, provides:   
{¶ 8} “No employee of any employer as defined in division (B) of 
section 4123.10 of the Revised Code, shall be liable to respond in damages at 
common law or by statute for any injury or occupational disease, received or 
contracted by any other employee of such employer in the course of and arising 
out of the latter employee’s employment, or for any death resulting from such 
injury or occupational disease, on the condition that such injury, occupational 
disease, or death is found to be compensable under sections 4123.01 to 4123.94, 
inclusive, of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 9} Thus, before pursuing a tort recovery against the coworker, 
respondent’s clients would have had to withdraw their workers’ compensation 
claim, which they had initiated before hiring her, and forgo the benefits arising 
from that claim, at a time when their financial position was extremely grim.  The 
same would be true of any attempt to pursue a tort recovery against the employer.  
See R.C. 4123.74 (complying employers are immune from suit for employee 
injury received in course of and arising from employment). 
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{¶ 10} The attorney who had handled the workers’ compensation claim 
testified that it would have been malpractice for her to counsel the clients to 
withdraw that claim to pursue an uncertain tort recovery.  She also stated that if 
the client had instructed her to do so, she would have withdrawn as counsel. 
{¶ 11} The parties stipulated and the board found that in the first action 
that respondent  filed on her clients’ behalf,  she had (1) named as a defendant the 
coworker’s widow in her capacity as personal representative of the coworker’s 
estate, when no estate had been opened, (2) never conducted any formal 
discovery, (3) never responded to any formal discovery requests, although she 
provided relevant medical records and bills to the defendants, (4) failed to 
respond to motions to dismiss filed by the coworker’s widow and insurance 
company, and then voluntarily dismissed the claims against them and the 
employer’s insurer without prejudice, (5) failed to appear at a pretrial conference, 
and (6) did not oppose the employer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
which the court later granted. 
{¶ 12} The board concluded that none of these acts constituted neglect of 
an entrusted legal matter.  Although the board recognized that respondent did not 
formally respond to discovery requests, it noted that she did provide relevant 
medical bills and records to the defendants.  The board noted that it is not neglect 
for an attorney to voluntarily dismiss a defendant instead of responding to a 
motion to dismiss, nor is it neglect to miss a single pretrial appearance when that 
failure does not prejudice the client.  Moreover, the board rejected allegations that 
respondent neglected her clients by taking or not taking these actions without her 
clients’ permission, observing that respondent’s uncontroverted testimony 
revealed that she had discussed every decision with her clients and had done her 
best to keep them apprised of the case status. 
{¶ 13} In October 2004, respondent refiled the clients’ tort action against 
the coworker’s surviving spouse as the personal representative of the coworker’s 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
still nonexistent estate.  Respondent did not conduct any formal discovery and 
failed to respond to interrogatories and to requests for production of documents 
and admissions propounded by the defendant.  The board concluded that relator 
had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that these actions constituted 
neglect, because once respondent became aware that she had sued the wrong 
party, “there was nothing she could do to salvage the case.” 
{¶ 14} Although the parties had stipulated that respondent did not return 
phone calls to her clients for extended periods of time, they also stipulated that 
this conduct occurred when she was in trial on other matters.  The parties further 
acknowledged that at other times, respondent spoke frequently with the clients 
and provided uncompensated assistance regarding consumer debt, the husband’s 
driving privileges, student aid for the clients’ children, and the wife’s charitable 
activities.  Thus, the board found that relator had not shown that respondent’s 
failure to communicate with her clients rose to the level of neglect at any time 
during their professional relationship. 
{¶ 15} The board further rejected allegations that respondent had violated 
DR 7-101(A) by intentionally (1) failing to seek the lawful objectives of her 
clients, (2) failing to carry out her contract of employment, or (3) prejudicing or 
damaging her clients.  The board stated:  “Relator advanced no set of facts which 
tended to show that respondent intentionally hurt or damaged her clients in any 
way.  On the contrary, the [board] was impressed with the degree of selflessness 
which respondent exhibited in doing everything she could to help these 
unfortunate people.  While she may or may not have been guilty of negligence in 
her handling of their case, the [board] finds that she did not act to intentionally 
damage her clients in any way.” 
{¶ 16} Furthermore, the board observed that “by the time respondent was 
hired by her clients, [the brother-in-law] had already, at [the wife’s] request, filed 
an application for Workers’ Compensation benefits on behalf of [the husband].  
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Under the circumstances, the panel was convinced that this may very well have 
been the better way to address this family’s immediate financial needs.”  While 
the board agreed that the clients should have been advised of the benefits and 
drawbacks of pursuing a workers’ compensation recovery versus pursuing a tort 
recovery, it observed that the time for that discussion was before filing the 
workers’ compensation claim – when they were represented by other counsel. 
{¶ 17} In contrast, the board accepted the parties’ stipulation that 
respondent had failed to obtain her clients’ permission to forgo responding to a 
summary judgment motion filed by the coworker’s widow in the second tort 
action.  And because respondent had a duty to obtain her clients’ consent to allow 
the motion to go unopposed and admitted that she had not done so, the board 
concluded that respondent had violated DR 6-101(A)(3).  But in light of the fact 
that no estate had been opened for the deceased coworker, the board concluded 
that the dismissal of the action against his widow, as the purported representative 
of his nonexistent estate, did not prejudice the clients. 
{¶ 18} Upon review, we adopt the findings of the board and its 
conclusions (1) that respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(3) by failing to obtain her 
clients’ consent before deciding not to respond to a motion for summary judgment 
and (2) that relator failed to prove the remaining alleged violations DR 6-
101(A)(3) and 7-101(A) by clear and convincing evidence. 
Sanction 
{¶ 19} In recommending a sanction, the board considered the ethical 
duties that respondent had violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed 
in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints 
and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  See, e.g., Stark 
Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
818, ¶ 16; Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 
875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 20} The board found that respondent had committed a single violation 
of DR 6-101(A)(3) by failing to obtain her clients’ consent before allowing the 
summary judgment motion in the second tort action to go unopposed.  The only 
aggravating factor found by the board was respondent’s failure to acknowledge 
that she had either engaged in wrongful conduct or committed any ethical 
violation in not seeking her clients’ permission to allow that motion to go 
unopposed.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(g). 
{¶ 21} In mitigation, the board acknowledged that respondent has no prior 
disciplinary violations, had no dishonest or selfish motive, fully and freely 
disclosed information to relator, and displayed a cooperative attitude toward the 
disciplinary proceedings.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), and (d).  
Respondent also submitted letters from two judges and two lawyers attesting to 
her good character and reputation in the legal community.  She also agreed to 
settle a related malpractice action for $419,235.45.  These facts also may be 
considered in mitigation.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e) and (f). 
{¶ 22} Relator argued that a one-year suspension with six months stayed 
was the appropriate sanction for respondent’s alleged misconduct, while 
respondent urged the panel and board to dismiss the case.  Noting “the relatively 
minor nature of the single violation * * * and the mitigating fact that her clients 
were not prejudiced by it,” the board recommended that respondent be publicly 
reprimanded. 
{¶ 23} We have previously found that an attorney’s repeated failures to 
respond to discovery requests, motions to exclude and to dismiss, and the 
dismissal of a case without the client’s consent demonstrate a pattern of neglect in 
violation of DR 6-101(A)(3).  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Watterson, 103 Ohio St.3d 
322, 2004-Ohio-4776, 815 N.E.2d 386, ¶ 25, 46.  And in Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
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Kerek, 102 Ohio St.3d 228, 2004-Ohio-2286, 809 N.E.2d 1, we have publicly 
reprimanded an attorney who violated DR 6-101(A)(3), as well as 5-103(B) 
(barring attorneys from giving impermissible financial assistance to a client) and 
Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring an attorney’s cooperation in disciplinary 
proceedings). 
{¶ 24} Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the board’s 
recommended sanction is appropriate in this case.  Accordingly, respondent is 
hereby publicly reprimanded for having violated DR 6-101(A)(3).  Costs are 
taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Jones Day, Robert S. Faxon, and Seth J. Linnick, for relator. 
Reminger Co., L.P.A., and George S. Coakley, for respondent. 
______________________