Case Title: State v. Henderson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 76315-1

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 16–0575 
 
Filed March 9, 2018 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
K’VON JAMES HENDERSON, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
On review from Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, 
George Stigler, Judge. 
 
 
A defendant appeals his conviction for first-degree robbery.  
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. 
 
 
John Audlehelm of Audlehelm Law Office, Des Moines, for 
appellant. 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Trout, Assistant 
Attorney General, Brian Williams, County Attorney, and Bradley Walz, 
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
2 
MANSFIELD, Justice. 
Can a getaway driver be convicted of first-degree robbery under the 
dangerous weapon alternative without knowing or intending that the 
robbery does involve a dangerous weapon?  In our view, the answer to 
this question is no. 
Here the defendant agreed to be the getaway driver for two others 
who were going to rob a pharmacy.  The robbery took place, but the 
defendant never gave a ride to his compatriots because they were 
apprehended by the police before any rendezvous occurred. 
Since a gun had been used, all three individuals were charged with 
first-degree robbery.  Iowa Code § 711.2 (2015).  After a joint trial, all 
three were convicted of that charge.  The defendant appealed, arguing 
among other things that the record did not contain substantial evidence 
he knew a gun would be used in the robbery.  The court of appeals 
affirmed. 
 
On further review, we reverse the defendant’s conviction for 
robbery in the first degree under Iowa Code section 711.2 and remand 
for entry of judgment and sentencing for robbery in the second degree 
under section 711.3.  We hold that the defendant’s conviction under an 
aiding and abetting theory required the State to prove the defendant not 
only participated in or encouraged the crime, but also knew of it, 
including the dangerous weapon element.  Because the State failed to 
prove defendant had knowledge or intent of the use of a gun, a motion 
for judgment of acquittal on this basis would have been meritorious, and 
the defendant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to 
move for acquittal on this basis. 
 
 
 
3 
I.  Facts and Procedural Background. 
On February 9, 2015, the defendant K’von Henderson and his 
friends, Riley Mallett, Cody Plummer, Myles Anderson, and Dayton 
Nelson, were hanging out at Plummer’s home.  At some point, Mallett 
suggested robbing the Greenwood Pharmacy in Waterloo.  The group 
agreed and spent the rest of the evening hashing out the details, 
including each participant’s respective role in the robbery.  The initial 
plan was for Anderson and Mallett to enter the pharmacy, and 
Henderson and Nelson to be drivers.  Henderson would take Anderson 
and Mallett away from the scene in a white Oldsmobile, and Nelson 
would drive the drugs and money away in a separate vehicle—a black 
BMW. 
The parties also discussed how they would perpetrate the robbery 
itself.  According to Nelson,1 they decided not to use a gun.  Instead, they 
intended to use a threatening note. 
Q.  Now, when you made this plan to rob this 
pharmacy, you know very well that there was supposed to be 
no guns at all involved in this robbery, correct?  A.  Yes, sir. 
Q.  That was made certain at this house, Cody 
Plummer’s house?  A.  Yes, sir. 
Q.  And it’s fair to say that nobody was supposed to 
even get hurt in this robbery, correct?  A.  Yes, sir. 
. . . . 
Q.  In doing so, during that planning, how were you—
how were the people that entered the pharmacy going to 
attempt to get the employees at Greenwood Pharmacy to give 
them anything without showing a weapon or without using 
any kind of force.  A.  A note. 
Q.  And what was the nature of the note going to 
be?  A.  Just so you didn’t have to use anything else. 
                                                 
1Nelson testified for the prosecution at trial. 
 
 
 
4 
The following day, February 10, was a flurry of activity and 
communication for the group.  Cellphone records revealed that the 
parties called each other frequently that day, and the timing of the calls 
coincided with later trial testimony as to when the men were together 
and when they were apart.  Mallett texted Anderson in the early hours of 
the morning to confirm that both had obtained masks for the robbery.  
Approximately an hour and a half before the robbery, Anderson backed 
out of his role as one of the two entrants into the pharmacy.  Plummer 
took his place. 
The group brought two vehicles to the pharmacy parking lot: the 
BMW and the Oldsmobile.  Mallett drove Anderson and Plummer in the 
BMW, while Nelson and Henderson went separately in the Oldsmobile.  
After everyone arrived in the pharmacy parking lot, Nelson exited the 
Oldsmobile and got into the driver’s seat of the BMW.  Henderson split 
off from the group and drove the Oldsmobile by himself to the meeting 
point where he was supposed to pick up Plummer and Mallett after the 
robbery. 
According to Nelson, after Henderson had left, and immediately 
before Plummer and Mallett were to enter the pharmacy, Anderson 
produced a firearm similar to a police-issued firearm.  Anderson referred 
to this gun as “Billy” and had evidently acquired it in a previous robbery. 
Nelson testified at trial that all of the group members were aware 
Anderson possessed this gun, although he did not regularly carry it.  
Nelson further testified that he did not know that a gun was going to be 
used until Anderson pulled out “Billy.”  Nelson observed Anderson 
handing the gun out the car window of the BMW.  Nelson could not see 
who Anderson passed the gun to, although only Mallett and Plummer 
were outside the vehicle at that time. 
 
 
 
5 
Shortly before 9:00 p.m., Mallett and Plummer entered Greenwood 
Pharmacy.  Both men wore masks, and Mallett wore distinctive “clown 
pants,” which were black with large white stars on them.  Pharmacy 
employees testified that both men also appeared to be carrying guns, 
although one appeared to be a toy.  Once inside, Mallett moved to the 
back of the pharmacy and provided a handwritten note to the pharmacist 
that read, “Give all the pain pill[s], all the Xanax and all the 
Promethazine [and] Codeine before I shoot this bitch up.”  Mallett pointed 
his gun—i.e., “Billy”—at the pharmacist’s head to direct him around the 
store.  The pharmacist testified that the gun “definitely looked metal.  It 
looked like a weapon that a police would have.”  Mallett ordered the 
pharmacist to hand over supplies of various drugs. 
Meanwhile, Plummer took $70 from the cash register at the front, 
although the employee there believed Plummer’s gun wasn’t real: “It had 
a little orange around it.”  Plummer then joined Mallett at the rear of the 
pharmacy.  When the robbers ordered a technician to empty the 
remaining register, she triggered the silent alarm. 
Once Mallett and Plummer had obtained their loot, they fled 
through the back exit of the pharmacy.  Nelson was there to meet them, 
and they deposited the items they had stolen into the trunk of the BMW.  
Nelson and Anderson then headed in the BMW to Plummer’s house. 
In accordance with the plan, Mallett and Plummer went on foot to 
meet Henderson at the chosen rendezvous spot.  However, by this time, 
law enforcement officers were swarming the area, and no rendezvous 
occurred.  Mallett was eventually caught in a treehouse in a nearby 
neighborhood.  He had discarded his distinctive “clown pants”—later 
found by the police nearby—and wore only shorts and a hooded 
 
 
 
6 
sweatshirt. 
 
Plummer 
was 
apprehended 
running 
through 
the 
neighborhood with only one shoe, having lost the other while fleeing. 
Meanwhile, Henderson drove to Plummer’s house where he met 
Nelson and Anderson, and the three of them proceeded to Nelson’s 
house.  There, they divided some of the proceeds of the robbery and hid a 
purse filled with the remaining stolen drugs under Nelson’s mother’s bed.  
Anderson then went to his own home, where he was later taken into 
custody by police. 
At Nelson’s home, Henderson ran into Nelson’s younger brother.  
Henderson told the brother that if anyone asked, he should say 
Henderson and the others had been hanging out with him all evening.  
Soon, the police arrived at Nelson’s house and knocked on the door.  As 
Nelson answered the door, his dogs bolted out.  Henderson and Nelson 
ran after the dogs but were quickly apprehended by the police. 
The officer who detained Henderson found approximately $70 and 
a wad of tinfoil containing Xanax in his pocket.  Although Henderson had 
a valid prescription for Xanax, Henderson accused the officer of planting 
the packet in his pocket.  Henderson’s sister later testified at trial that 
the pills Henderson normally took were of a different color than those 
recovered from his pocket on the night of the robbery. 
 
When questioned by police, Henderson initially claimed he had 
been with a friend getting his taxes done during the day and ended up at 
the Nelson residence in the evening where he had stayed.  He ultimately 
admitted to leaving the Nelson house, but claimed that he had spent the 
time just driving around. 
 
On February 20, a trial information was filed in the Iowa District 
Court for Black Hawk County charging Henderson, Anderson, Plummer, 
and Mallett with first-degree robbery, a class “B” felony.  See Iowa Code 
 
 
 
7 
§ 711.2.  Anderson pled guilty to first-degree robbery.  Nelson entered 
into an agreement to plead guilty to first-degree theft and conspiracy to 
commit first-degree robbery, both class “C” felonies, and to testify against 
the remaining defendants.  See id. § 706.3(1); id. §  714.2(1).  Henderson 
went to trial jointly with Plummer and Mallett. 
A first trial commenced on November 24 but resulted in a mistrial.  
Subsequently, a second jury was impaneled on February 9, 2016, and 
the presentation of evidence began on February 10. 
The State’s main witness was Nelson, who testified to the entire 
series of events leading up to and past the robbery.  Other prosecution 
witnesses included employees of the pharmacy, police officers who 
responded to and investigated the robbery, Plummer’s girlfriend who 
overheard some of the planning for the robbery on February 9, 2015, 
Nelson’s mother, and Nelson’s younger brother.  Surveillance video from 
the pharmacy depicting the robbery was also played for the jury. 
 
After the State rested, all three defendants moved for judgment of 
acquittal.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(8).  Henderson’s motion urged that 
Nelson’s testimony lacked corroboration.  Specifically, his counsel 
argued,  
[T]here is simply no corroboration of Mr. Nelson’s testimony.  
Therefore, there is no jury question presented and we’d ask 
the Court to dismiss the charge of Robbery in the First 
Degree against Mr. Henderson as a matter of law. 
The court denied all three motions. 
In addition to first-degree robbery, the jury was instructed on the 
lesser included offenses of second-degree robbery and assault.  
Instruction No. 23 stated, 
The State must prove all of the following elements of 
Robbery in the First Degree: 
 
 
 
8 
1.  On or about the 10th day of February, the 
defendant K[’]von Henderson, or a person the defendant 
aided and abetted or engaged in joint criminal conduct, had 
the specific intent to commit a theft.   
2.  To carry out his intention or to assist in escaping 
from the scene, with or without the stolen property, the 
defendant, or a person the defendant aided and abetted or 
engaged in joint criminal conduct, committed an assault on 
Marcie Mangin or Diane Petersen or Stephen Burk or Wesley 
Pilkington. 
3.  The defendant, or a person the defendant aided and 
abetted, was armed with a dangerous weapon. 
If the State has proved all of the elements, the 
defendant is guilty of Robbery in the First Degree.  If the 
State has proved elements numbers 1 and 2, but not 
element 3, the defendant is guilty of Robbery in the Second 
Degree.  If the State has proved only element no. 2, the 
defendant is guilty of Assault.  If the State has proved only 
element no. 1 or none of the elements, the defendant is not 
guilty.   
The jury also received a general instruction regarding aiding and 
abetting.  Thus, Instruction No. 18 stated, 
“Aid and abet” means to knowingly approve and agree 
to the commission of a crime, either by active participation 
in it or by knowingly advising or encouraging the act in some 
way before or when it is committed.  Conduct following the 
crime may be considered only as it may tend to prove the 
defendant’s earlier participation. 
. . . . 
The 
crimes 
charged 
require 
a 
specific 
intent.  
Therefore, before you can find the defendant “aided and 
abetted” the commission of the crime, the state must prove 
the defendant(s) either has such specific intent or “aided and 
abetted” with the knowledge the others who directly 
committed the crime had such specific intent.  If the 
defendant(s) did not have the specific intent, or knowledge 
the other had such specific intent, he is not guilty. 
On February 17, 2016, the jury returned verdicts finding all three 
defendants guilty of first-degree robbery. 
 
 
 
9 
On February 25, Henderson filed from jail a pro se handwritten 
motion for a new trial, alleging several deficiencies in his trial and 
representation, including the lack of corroboration of Nelson’s testimony.  
On February 29, Henderson supplemented this motion with another 
handwritten jail note which said in part, 
In trial the state and it’s witness’ never mentioned I had any 
knowledge what-so-ever that there was going to be a weapon 
used in the robbery at Greenwood Pharmacy nor did the 
state or it’s witness’ ever mention I seen the robbery the 
night of the incident.  I feel I was wrongfully charged and 
convicted because to be charged with 1st degree robbery I 
would’ve have had to known that there was going to be a real 
weapon or even a weapon at all, and that was not brought 
up at trial at all. 
 
On March 24, the district court heard and overruled Henderson’s 
motion for new trial.  As to Henderson’s knowledge of a gun, the court 
indicated there had been trial testimony that “there was a weapon 
produced, handed out of the car by Myles Anderson to either Mr. Mallett 
or Mr. Plummer and that [Henderson] had full knowledge of that.” 
Henderson spoke up in the courtroom and disagreed.  He asked, 
“And when—where did they say that in the trial?”  The court replied that 
it didn’t want to argue the point, but that was what the record reflected.  
Henderson disagreed again and reiterated, “[T]hey have no proof that I 
knew knowledge of the weapon being involved . . . .  But I am still getting 
First Degree Robbery though.” 
As required by Iowa law, the district court sentenced Henderson 
for first-degree robbery to twenty-five years in prison, subject to a 
seventy percent mandatory minimum period of incarceration.  See Iowa 
Code §§ 902.9(1)(b), .12(5). 
 
Henderson appealed.  The appellate brief filed by his counsel 
raised a single issue—insufficient evidence or alternatively ineffective 
 
 
 
10 
assistance of counsel based on failure to move for judgment of acquittal 
due to absence of proof that Henderson was aware a dangerous weapon 
would be used in the robbery. 
Henderson also filed a pro se brief.  In addition to the dangerous 
weapon issue, Henderson’s pro se brief raised additional ineffective-
assistance claims relating to the waiving of reporting of voir dire, failure 
to obtain the admission of exculpatory out-of-court statements made by 
Henderson’s codefendants, failure to take the deposition of Nelson’s 
younger brother, and failure to object to trial evidence that Anderson had 
previously stolen firearms, including handguns. 
We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed 
Henderson’s conviction.  In rejecting Henderson’s claim that he could not 
be found guilty of first-degree robbery because the State had not proved 
he had knowledge or intent a dangerous weapon would be used, that 
court said,  
Henderson was involved in the planning and execution 
of the robbery.  He was there when the note threatening to 
“shoot this bitch up” was written.  “All persons concerned in 
the commission of a public offense, whether they directly 
commit the act constituting the offense or aid or abet its 
commission, shall be charged, tried, and punished as 
principles.”  Iowa Code § 703.1 (2015).  Nelson testified they 
all knew a gun would be used.  Whether Henderson knew or 
did not know a gun would be involved makes no difference. 
The court also denied relief on the remaining issues raised in 
Henderson’s pro se brief. 
 
We granted Henderson’s application for further review. 
II.  Standard of Review. 
We review de novo claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  State 
v. Harris, 891 N.W.2d 182, 185 (2017).  However, when the claim is that 
counsel was ineffective in failing to move for judgment of acquittal, this 
 
 
 
11 
implicates the question whether such a motion would have been 
meritorious, which turns on the sufficiency of evidence.  Id. at 186.  We 
have said that “no reasonable trial strategy could permit a jury to 
consider a crime not supported by substantial evidence.”  State v. 
Schlitter, 881 N.W.2d 380, 390 (Iowa 2016); see also State v. Schories, 
827 N.W.2d 659, 664–65 (Iowa 2013).  In making determinations on the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State and will consider whether there is substantial 
evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction.  See State v. Huser, 894 
N.W.2d 472, 490 (Iowa 2017).  Evidence is substantial if it would 
convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  State v. Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Iowa 2017); State 
v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 704–05 (Iowa 2016). 
III.  Analysis. 
Henderson’s application for further review raised only whether 
there was sufficient evidence to conclude Henderson knew or intended a 
dangerous weapon would be used in the robbery.  We will exercise our 
discretion to let the court of appeals decision stand as the final decision 
on the remaining issues raised on appeal.  See State v. Martin, 877 
N.W.2d 859, 865 (Iowa 2016).  Henderson asks that the sufficiency of 
this evidence be addressed either directly or, if necessary, through the 
pathway of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
At the close of the State’s case, Henderson’s counsel moved for a 
judgment of acquittal based on a claimed lack of corroboration of 
Nelson’s accomplice testimony.  He made no argument that the State had 
failed to prove Henderson’s knowledge of a dangerous weapon.  We have 
held a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal only serves to 
preserve error on a claim of insufficient evidence for appellate review in a 
 
 
 
12 
criminal case if it “identifies the specific grounds raised on appeal.”  See 
State v. Brubaker, 805 N.W.2d 164, 170 (Iowa 2011) (quoting State v. 
Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2004)); see also State v. Ross, 845 
N.W.2d 692, 700 (Iowa 2014) (“Trial counsel is required to make a 
specific objection in his or her motion for judgment of acquittal in order 
to preserve error.”).  Because the motion did not mention the deficiency 
in proof now raised on appeal, we find that error was not preserved.  See 
Brubaker, 805 N.W.2d at 170.  However, as already discussed, 
Henderson argues in the alternative that his trial counsel was ineffective 
and we can reach the sufficiency-of-evidence issue that way. 
 
Contrary to the district court’s observations at the sentencing 
hearing, we do not believe the record contains evidence that Henderson 
saw or knew about Anderson handing the gun through the window of the 
BMW to either Plummer or Mallett.  Nelson stated that Henderson was 
not with them at that point.  In fact, in its appellate brief the State 
concedes that “Henderson had already driven to his spot.” 
 
Likewise, we do not believe the record supports the court of 
appeals’ statements that Henderson was present when the note 
threatening to “shoot this bitch up” was written or that Nelson testified 
everyone knew a gun would be used.  To the contrary, Nelson testified 
(1) the plan on February 9 was not to use a gun, (2) the note was written 
later, and (3) Nelson himself learned for the first time a gun would be 
used when Anderson handed the firearm to Plummer or Mallett just 
before they entered the pharmacy. 
 
The State, however, insists the test is foreseeability rather than 
knowledge: “Contrary to Henderson’s claim, the issue is not whether he 
knew a gun would be used in the robbery to establish his guilt but 
whether it was foreseeable that a gun would be used.”  The State also 
 
 
 
13 
points to Nelson’s testimony that the group already knew Anderson 
possessed a gun and maintains the jury didn’t have to accept Nelson’s 
testimony that the plan was not to use a gun.  The State adds, “It makes 
little sense that the young men would plan a robbery at a pharmacy with 
four employees present and not have a weapon when one was readily 
available.” 
We do not agree that foreseeability, as opposed to knowledge or 
intent, is enough to sustain an aiding-and-abetting conviction.  This 
conflates aiding and abetting with joint criminal conduct.  We have held 
that “[j]oint criminal conduct ‘contemplates two acts—the crime the joint 
actor has knowingly participated in, and a second or resulting crime that 
is unplanned but could reasonably be expected to occur in furtherance of 
the first one.’ ”  State v. Tyler, 873 N.W.2d 741, 752 (Iowa 2016) (quoting 
State v. Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d 844, 852 (Iowa 2011)).  Here, however, 
only one crime occurred—the robbery itself. 
Aiding and abetting requires only a single crime, but the State 
must prove the defendant “knew of the crime at the time of or before its 
commission.”  State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 574 (Iowa 2000).  As we 
have held, 
To sustain a conviction on the theory of aiding and 
abetting, the record must contain substantial evidence the 
accused assented to or lent countenance and approval to the 
criminal act either by active participation or by some manner 
encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission.  The 
State must prove the accused knew of the crime at the time 
of or before its commission.  However, such proof need not 
be established by direct proof, it may be either direct or 
circumstantial. 
Id. (citation omitted).  “Knowledge is essential; however, neither 
knowledge nor presence at the scene of the crime is sufficient to prove 
aiding and abetting.”  State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180, 211 (Iowa 
 
 
 
14 
2013) (quoting State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Iowa 2011)).  “The 
guilt of a person who aids and abets the commission of a crime must be 
determined upon the facts which show the part the person had in it 
. . . .”  Iowa Code § 703.1. 
To restate the matter, under a joint criminal conduct theory, the 
question is whether the charged, later crime was foreseeable, regardless 
of whether the defendant had the specific intent to commit that crime or 
knowledge that his or her compatriot was committing the crime.  See 
State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 562 (Iowa 1997) (finding that 
“[f]rom the joint conduct in committing the first crime it follows that [the 
defendant] can be found vicariously responsible for other foreseeable 
crimes of a confederate” and rejecting the notion that “she should not be 
convicted without proving she had a mens rea to commit murder”).  The 
same is not true under the theory of aiding and abetting.  There the 
defendant must have “knowingly aided the principal” in committing the 
crime.  State v. Satern, 516 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Iowa 1994). 
 
Therefore, in the context of a first-degree robbery prosecution 
under the dangerous weapon alternative, the State must prove the 
alleged aider and abettor had knowledge that a dangerous weapon would 
be or was being used.  See Iowa Code § 711.2 (“A person commits 
robbery in the first degree when, while perpetrating a robbery, the person 
. . . is armed with a dangerous weapon.”).  Otherwise, the aider and 
abettor may have knowledge or intent to commit a robbery, but not first-
degree robbery. 
Federal law follows this approach: “We have previously found that 
intent requirement [for aiding and abetting] satisfied when a person 
actively participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the 
circumstances constituting the charged offense.”  Rosemond v. United 
 
 
 
15 
States, 572 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248–49, 1251 (2014) (holding 
that to be convicted of aiding and abetting the crime of using a firearm 
during drug trafficking, the defendant “needed advance knowledge of a 
firearm’s presence”).  “[A]n aiding and abetting conviction requires not 
just an act facilitating one or another element, but also a state of mind 
extending to the entire crime.”  Id. at 572 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1248.  
Hence, to sustain an armed robbery conviction based on aiding and 
abetting under federal law, the defendant must have known a 
confederate would be armed.  See United States v. Akiti, 701 F.3d 883, 
887 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding the conviction of a getaway driver for 
aiding and abetting armed robbery because “a reasonable jury could 
have concluded Akiti knew Tang would be armed during the robbery”); 
United States v. Easter, 66 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A rational 
jury could infer, based upon the conversation the night before the 
robbery, and Lea’s opportunity on the way to the bank to overhear a 
discussion about who was going to carry the guns, and to see at least 
one of the guns, that Lea knew the robbery was going to be an armed 
one.”); United States v. Grubczak, 793 F.2d 458, 462 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(noting “that in a prosecution for aiding and abetting armed bank 
robbery, the government must establish not only that the defendant 
knew that a bank was to be robbed and became associated and 
participated in that crime, but also that the defendant ‘knew that [the 
principal] was armed and intended to use the weapon, and intended to 
aid him in that respect’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1978))). 
Most state jurisdictions appear to follow the same approach.  See 
Robinson v. United States, 100 A.3d 95, 106–08 (D.C. 2014) (“Actual 
knowledge of the weapon is required . . . .  We perforce hold that the trial 
 
 
 
16 
court in the present case erred by instructing the jury, in response to its 
inquiries, that a defendant could be convicted of second-degree burglary 
while armed as an aider and abettor if she had reason to know the 
principal perpetrator of that crime was armed.”); Hemphill v. State, 531 
S.E.2d 150, 151–52 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (approving a pattern jury 
instruction requiring “that the defendant had knowledge that the crime 
of armed robbery was being committed” and noting that the defendant—
who 
was 
the 
driver—“knew 
that 
his 
accomplices 
had 
guns”); 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 81 N.E.3d 1173, 1182 (Mass. 2017) (“In this 
case, where the predicate felonies were attempted armed robbery and 
armed home invasion, the Commonwealth also was required to prove 
that the defendant knew that one of his accomplices possessed a 
firearm.”); Brooks v. State, 180 P.3d 657, 662 (Nev. 2008) (“Here, the 
State presented evidence that Brooks drove the vehicle to and from 
Davis’s home and knew the location of Davis’s discarded purse.  
However, it is unclear whether Brooks had knowledge of the other 
offender’s use of the gun. . . . [T]he State must also prove that Brooks 
had knowledge of the use of the deadly weapon.”); State v. Bohannan, 
503 A.2d 396, 399 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (“[A]n accomplice will 
be guilty of armed robbery, regardless of whether he actually possessed 
or used a weapon, only where he had the purpose to promote or facilitate 
an armed robbery.”); Wyatt v. State, 367 S.W.3d 337, 341 (Tex. App. 
2012) (“We agree with appellant that even if the jury believed that 
appellant participated in the robbery by serving as Tolbert’s getaway 
driver and sharing in the proceeds of the robbery, the record contains no 
evidence that appellant ever was aware that the firearm ‘would be, was 
being, or had been used or exhibited during the offense.’ ”); State v. 
Wimpie, No. 01-1634-CR, 2002 WL 234238, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 
2002) (per curiam) (affirming Wimpie’s conviction for armed robbery 
 
 
 
17 
because “a jury could conclude that Wimpie knew that Martin claimed to 
have a gun”).  But see State v. McCalpine, 463 A.2d 545, 551 (Conn. 
1983) (finding the state did not have to prove intent to use a deadly 
weapon in order to establish accessory liability); People v. Young, 318 
N.W.2d 606, 607 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (determining it was not necessary 
that “the defendant knew that Bennett was armed” but only that 
“carrying or using a weapon to commit the robbery was fairly within the 
scope of the common unlawful enterprise”); State v. Ward, 473 S.W.3d 
686, 692–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that under Missouri law, a 
defendant may be convicted under a theory of accomplice liability for 
first-degree robbery if the use of a firearm could be “reasonably 
anticipated”). 
 
Of course, knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence.  
See State v. McDowell, 622 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Iowa 2001).  The State 
notes the following: (1) Henderson knew Anderson possessed a weapon 
(although he didn’t regularly carry it with him), (2) it would make little 
sense for two people to try to rob a store staffed by four people without a 
gun if one was available, and (3) the jury didn’t have to believe Nelson’s 
testimony that the plan was not to use a gun and the plan only changed 
shortly before the robbery after Henderson had left the group. 
 
On our review of this record, we hold a reasonable jury could not 
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Henderson knew a gun 
would be used.  Notably, the prosecutor argued to the jury only that the 
use of a gun was “foreseeable.”  While the jury did not have to believe 
everything Nelson said, there was no contrary evidence as to how the 
robbery plan developed.  It isn’t implausible that a group of young men 
would think that two of them without using a gun could successfully rob 
a pharmacy staffed by two men and two women.  See, e.g., State v. 
Copenhaver, 844 N.W.2d 442, 445–46 (Iowa 2014) (describing unarmed 
 
 
 
18 
bank robbery committed by a lone individual while two tellers and two 
bank officers were in the bank).  One good reason not to use a firearm is 
Iowa’s 17.5 year mandatory minimum prison term for first-degree 
robbery, one of the most severe in the country.  See Iowa Code 
§ 902.12(5); Ed Mansfield & Julia Steggerda-Corey, Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing: A Closer Look at Iowa 17–20 tbl.4 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with authors). 
Because there was insufficient evidence to convict Henderson of 
first-degree robbery as an aider and abettor due to a failure of proof on 
the dangerous weapon element, that conviction must be set aside.  The 
question remains what to do next.  The jury necessarily found sufficient 
evidence to establish the other elements of first-degree robbery, namely, 
intent to commit a theft and assault.  The jury was instructed in 
Instruction No. 23 that if they found only those two elements, and not 
the dangerous weapon element, they should find the defendant guilty of 
the lesser included offense of second-degree robbery.2  Accordingly, the 
appropriate remedy is to remand the case for the district court to enter 
judgment and sentence on the lesser included offense of robbery in the 
second degree.  See Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d at 183; State v. Morris, 677 N.W.2d 
787, 788–89 (Iowa 2004); State v. Pace, 602 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 
1999). 
IV.  Conclusion. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Henderson’s conviction and 
sentence on first-degree robbery and remand for entry of conviction and 
sentence on second-degree robbery. 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH 
DIRECTIONS. 
                                                 
2This case predates the legislation that established third-degree robbery.  See 
2016 Iowa Acts ch. 1104, § 4 (codified at Iowa Code § 711.3A (2017)); Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 
at 180.