Case Title: State v. Philogene

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 126

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 126 
Docket: 
And-18-17 
 
Submitted  
    On Briefs: July 24, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
August 23, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
JERRY PHILOGENE, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Party-in-Interest 
 
$16,545 U.S. Currency, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant in rem 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
 
[¶1]  Jerry Philogene appeals from a judgment entered by the Superior 
Court (Androscoggin County, Horton, J.) denying his motion to set aside a 
default and for relief from a judgment.  See M.R. Civ. P. 55(c), 60(b).  The default 
judgment extinguished Philogene’s property rights, as a party-in-interest, to 
$16,545 in cash seized as part of a civil asset forfeiture proceeding, see 15 M.R.S. 
§§ 5821-5822 (2017),1 initiated following a motor vehicle stop and the filing of 
criminal charges related to Philogene’s operation of a motor vehicle. 
                                         
1  These statutes were recently amended.  See P.L. 2017, ch. 409, § B-1 (effective May 2, 2018) (to 
be codified at 15 M.R.S. §§ 5821, 5821-B). 
 
 
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[¶2]  Philogene contends, among other arguments, that the court abused 
its discretion when it denied his motion for relief from judgment, arguing that 
he demonstrated excusable neglect because (1) he believed that the attorney 
representing him with regard to the seized money in a parallel criminal matter 
also represented him in the civil forfeiture proceeding; (2) he was unable, while 
in jail, to file the necessary documents or respond to the State’s filings, resulting 
in his default; and (3) the State lacked probable cause to seize the cash.  We 
vacate the judgment. 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
[¶3]  The facts of this case are drawn from the records of the overlapping 
criminal and civil matters that began with the arrest of Jerry Philogene and the 
seizure of his property.2  On March 7, 2017, an Androscoggin County Sherriff’s 
Deputy stopped a vehicle Philogene was operating for erratic driving.  The 
officer determined that Philogene was not the owner of the vehicle, did not have 
permission to use the vehicle, and had a suspended Massachusetts driver’s 
                                         
2  Although the record relating to Philogene’s criminal case was not included in the appendix on 
appeal, the appendix does include police reports, search warrant affidavits, and the transcript from 
the December 14, 2017, motion hearing, all of which provide facts relating to Philogene’s arrest and 
the resolution of his criminal matter.  Additionally, a copy of the criminal docket, of which the motion 
court took judicial notice, was obtained and used for further clarity regarding the criminal 
proceedings against Philogene.  See M.R. Evid. 201; Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 80, ¶ 24, 
2 A.3d 301 (stating that this Court can take judicial notice of docket entries in other cases.).  
 
 
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license.  The officer arrested Philogene and, after conducting a search incident 
to the arrest, seized $16,545 in cash found in Philogene’s pockets.3   
[¶4]  On March 8, 2017, the State filed a criminal complaint against 
Philogene for theft by unauthorized use of property (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 360(1)(A) (2017), and operating after license suspension (Class E), 29-A 
M.R.S. § 2415 (2017).  Philogene was provided a court-appointed attorney and 
released on bail.  On April 7, 2017, Philogene, through counsel, filed a motion 
for return of the seized property, contending that no connection existed 
between the money seized and the charges filed against him.  See M.R.U. 
Crim. P. 41(j).   
[¶5]  On April 28, 2017, Philogene was arrested a second time after law 
enforcement authorities executed a search warrant at a home in Mexico where 
Philogene was visiting.  Authorities discovered scales, drug packaging 
materials, and 86 grams of cocaine in the home.  At the time of the April search, 
Philogene was found to be in possession of 8.4 grams of heroin and 17.4 grams 
of cocaine.   
                                         
3  In addition to the money found on Philogene, the officer also later found a knife in Philogene’s 
possession.  Following the execution of a search warrant for the vehicle on March 8, 2017, officers 
discovered 1.91 ounces of marijuana, a pill bottle belonging to an acquaintance of Philogene, and a 
cell phone.   
 
 
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[¶6]  On June 8, 2017, the State amended its criminal complaint against 
Philogene to include two counts of conspiracy to commit trafficking of 
scheduled drugs (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(D), (H) (2017), and one 
count of criminal forfeiture relating to the cash seized on March 7, 15 M.R.S. 
§ 5826 (2017).   
[¶7]  Also on June 8, the State filed, in the Superior Court (Androscoggin 
County), a separate civil asset forfeiture action against the $16,545, as 
defendant in rem, and Philogene, as a party-in-interest.  See 15 M.R.S 
§§ 5821-5822.  The State served Philogene with a summons for the civil 
forfeiture at the courthouse on June 8 while he was in court for the criminal 
matter.4  No notice of the civil matter was given to his criminal attorney.   
[¶8]  On June 19, 2017, the State filed an ex parte motion to impound the 
$16,545 during the pendency of the civil action.  See 15 M.R.S. § 5822(6).  The 
court (MG Kennedy, J.) granted that motion on June 27, 2017.   
[¶9]  The following day, on June 28, 2017, Philogene, accompanied by his 
court-appointed attorney, made his initial appearance on the three additional 
                                         
4  The record indicates that Philogene was in court on June 8 for a hearing on his motion for return 
of seized property, but that the court continued the motion hearing until June 28, 2017, to be 
considered along with the State’s motions to revoke Philogene’s bail.  The summons for the civil 
forfeiture action stated that Philogene had twenty days to answer the State’s complaint and warned 
that judgment by default would result if he failed to do so.  See M.R. Civ. P. 4(a), 12(a).   
 
 
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criminal charges alleged in the State’s amended complaint.  At the hearing, the 
court discussed Philogene’s motion for return of seized property, see M.R.U. 
Crim. P. 41(j), and ruled that the criminal motion was “moot pending the 
outcome of the civil forfeiture action.”  During this proceeding, the State 
provided Philogene’s attorney with a copy of the court’s ex parte order to 
impound.   
[¶10]  On July 10, 2017, the State, without notice to the attorney 
representing Philogene in his criminal matters, filed an affidavit and request for 
default judgment after Philogene failed to appear or defend in the civil 
forfeiture action.5  See M.R. Civ. P. 55.  On July 13, 2017, the clerk entered a 
default and, on the same day, the court (MG Kennedy, J.) entered a judgment by 
default against Philogene, as a party-in-interest, and the $16,545, as defendant 
in rem.  See M.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); 15 M.R.S. § 5822(5).  Although Philogene’s 
motion for return of seized property remained pending, on July 28, 2017, the 
court issued a final order dispersing the forfeited $16,545 to two local law 
enforcement agencies.  See 15 M.R.S. § 5822(4)(A).   
                                         
5  The record indicates that a court clerk asked the State on or before July 12, 2017, to provide 
notice of the State’s request for default judgment to Philogene’s criminal attorney.  The State replied 
that, pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 5822(5) (2017) and M.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), it was not required to provide 
notice to an attorney who had not appeared in a civil forfeiture proceeding.   
 
 
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[¶11]  On October 13, 2017, three months after entry of the default 
judgment, the attorney representing Philogene in his criminal matters entered 
an appearance in the civil forfeiture proceeding, filed an answer to the State’s 
petition for asset forfeiture, and filed a motion to set aside the default and for 
relief from the judgment, see M.R. Civ. P. 55(c), 60(b).  The court scheduled a 
hearing on the motion, with notice provided to both parties.6   
[¶12]  On December 14, 2017, after the hearing, the court (Horton, J.)7 
denied Philogene’s motion to set aside default and for relief from judgment.  
The court issued oral findings, concluding that Philogene’s assumption that his 
criminal attorney was representing him in the civil forfeiture matter did not 
constitute excusable neglect and that Philogene’s claim that he possessed the 
$16,545 in order to purchase a car for his sister did not “rise to the level” of a 
meritorious defense.  The court’s opinion did not address the still pending 
motion for return of seized property in the criminal matter.8   
                                         
6  On November 3, 2017, the State objected to Philogene’s motion and requested that the court 
decline to hold a hearing.   
7  It is not clear from the docket why the motion to set aside the default and for relief from the 
judgment was not heard by the judge who entered the default judgment. 
8  Philogene filed a motion, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52, asking the court to find that Philogene 
“understandably believed” that his counsel represented him on both the civil and criminal actions 
involving his $16,545, but the court declined to make that finding.  See M.R. Civ. P. 52(a).   
 
 
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[¶13]  Philogene filed a timely notice of appeal.9  See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).    
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
[¶14]  Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)10 provides in relevant part 
that “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 
or the party’s legal representative from a final judgment . . . for . . . (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”  When a party seeks relief from a 
judgment for excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), the party must file a 
motion “not more than one year after the judgment,” M.R. Civ. P. 60(b), and 
“bears the burden of proving that the judgment should be set aside,” 
Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, 2008 ME 11, ¶ 6, 940 A.2d 1082.  To satisfy that 
burden and obtain relief from a default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) for 
excusable neglect, “a party must show (1) a reasonable excuse for [the party’s] 
                                         
9  We suspended the provisions of M.R. App. P. 7A and 8 and permitted Philogene to file a letter 
explaining his position that the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief from the default 
judgment.   
10  Philogene sought relief pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a) and 60(b).  Because a “default judgment 
can only be set aside if the conditions of M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) are met,” Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, 
¶¶ 16-17, 955 A.2d 202; see M.R. Civ. P. 55(c), and because the parties and the court dealt with the 
motion at the hearing as a motion under Rule 60(b)(1), we evaluate Philogene’s argument pursuant 
to the Rule 60(b) standard. 
 
 
8 
inattention to the court proceedings, and (2) a meritorious defense to the 
underlying action.”  Haskell v. Haskell, 2017 ME 91, ¶ 13, 160 A.3d 1176.  
[¶15]  When a court’s decision is supported by competent evidence, we 
review the denial of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion for an abuse of discretion.  
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. White, 2015 ME 145, ¶ 8, 127 A.3d 538.  Our review 
“involves resolution of three questions: (1) are factual findings, if any, 
supported by the record according to the clear error standard; (2) did the court 
understand the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given all the 
facts and applying the appropriate law, was the court’s weighing of the 
applicable facts and choices within the bounds of reasonableness."  Haskell, 
2017 ME 91, ¶ 12, 160 A.3d 1176.  We will set aside the court’s decision “only 
if the failure to grant the relief works a plain and unmistakable injustice against 
the moving party.”  Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, ¶ 19, 955 A.2d 202. 
A. 
Reasonable Excuse 
[¶16]  Philogene contends that his inattention to the civil forfeiture 
proceeding was caused by both his incarceration at the time when the 
proceeding was initiated and his belief that his attorney was representing him 
on all issues involving the seized $16,545.  He argues that he can “barely read 
 
 
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and write” and that it was his attorney’s responsibility to file documents to 
transport him from jail in order to contest the forfeiture proceedings.   
[¶17]  A party seeking relief from a default judgment “must adduce the 
facts showing a reasonable excuse for the default.”  A. Dean Corp. v. White, 
429 A.2d 1010, 1011 (Me. 1981).  We have affirmed a trial court’s 
determination that a reasonable excuse had been demonstrated where a 
default was due in part to a defendant’s reliance on assertions made by the 
opposing party, see Mariello v. Giguere, 667 A.2d 588, 589-90 (Me. 1995); see 
also Schmid Bros., Inc. v. Roberts, 538 A.2d 291, 293 (Me. 1988) (affirming the 
finding of a reasonable excuse where the defaulted party relied on statements 
made by an employee of opposing party).  Similarly, we have held that a trial 
court committed obvious error when it failed to grant relief from judgment 
where the opposing party failed to follow a procedural rule.  See Scott v. Lipman 
& Katz, P.A., 648 A.2d 969, 972-976 (Me. 1994). 
[¶18]  In contrast, we have held that the trial court properly denied a 
Rule 60(b) motion when a party was properly served and failed to appear at a 
court proceeding, see e.g., Haskell, 2017 ME 91, ¶¶ 14-15, 160 A.3d 1176; Butler 
v. D/Wave Seafood, 2002 ME 41, ¶ 18, 791 A.2d 928; where a party failed to 
offer any evidence to support his assertion that he had a reasonable excuse, see 
 
 
10 
Maroon Flooring, Inc. v. Austin, 2007 ME 75, ¶ 9, 927 A.2d 1182; and where a 
party failed to retain Maine counsel in a timely manner, see Interstate Food 
Processing Corp. v. Pellerito Foods, Inc., 622 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Me. 1993).   
[¶19]  The unusual factual circumstances of this case steer us in a 
different direction.  Although Philogene was served by the State in the civil 
forfeiture matter, the record as a whole compelled the conclusion that 
Philogene believed his attorney was representing him in proceedings related to 
his $16,545.  Because of the unusual actions of the prosecutor’s office, there 
were two separate actions brought by the State concerning the same $16,545.  
In docket number ANDCD-CR-2017-624, a criminal case against Philogene, 
count 5 asserted that the State was entitled to a “criminal” forfeiture, 15 M.R.S. 
§ 5826, of that money from Philogene.  In docket number AUBSC-CV-2017-79, 
the State asserted that, pursuant to 15 M.R.S. §§ 5821-5822, it was entitled to a 
“decree of forfeiture” against the money and named Philogene as a party in 
interest.  In the criminal case, Philogene’s counsel appropriately was seeking 
the return of his client’s property, but, inexplicably, the trial court deemed his 
motion “moot pending the outcome of the civil forfeiture proceeding” even 
though the criminal action was still pending.   
 
 
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[¶20]  Here, because Philogene had filed a motion in his criminal case to 
obtain the return of the seized funds and the State should have notified 
Philogene’s counsel of the civil action, there is a “showing of injustice in the 
original judgment.”  Moulton v. Brown, 627 A.2d 521, 523 (Me. 1993).  
 
[¶21]  Philogene timely filed a Rule 60(b) motion and has continued to 
seek to have the merits of his argument heard.  His attempt to right the wrong 
effected by the default judgment was not “a new litigation strategy 
after-the-fact.”  In re David H., 2009 ME 131, ¶ 40, 985 A.2d 490. 
[¶22]  The dilemma in which Philogene finds himself is not the result of 
an intentional failure to appear or a willful disregard of the court proceedings.  
See Keane v. HSBC Bank USA, 874 F.3d 763, 765-66 (1st Cir. 2017).  Rather, 
Philogene’s dilemma arose out of a reasonable confusion concerning the 
overlap between the charges filed against him and his own legal responsibilities 
at the time when the civil forfeiture was initiated.  Philogene continued to “take 
legal steps to protect [his] own interests” in the criminal proceedings, Town of 
Wiscasset v. Mason Station, LLC, 2015 ME 59, ¶ 10, 116 A.3d 458, and, as 
supported by the record before the trial court, demonstrated a reasonable 
excuse for his inattention to the civil forfeiture proceedings.  
 
 
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B. 
Meritorious Defense 
[¶23]  Philogene contends that the State lacked probable cause to seize 
his money following his March 7, 2017, traffic stop and arrest.  Philogene bears 
the burden of providing “a meritorious defense to the underlying action.”  Ezell, 
2008 ME 139, ¶ 22, 955 A.2d 202. 
[¶24]  A meritorious defense is one that is colorable and not frivolous.  
Estate of Gordan, 2004 ME 23, ¶ 23, 842 A.2d 1270.  “The mere assertion that a 
meritorious defense exists is insufficient to support a motion to set aside a 
default judgment.”  A. Dean Corp., 429 A.2d at 1011.  Instead, in asserting a 
defense, a party’s argument must be presented with “enough elaboration of 
facts to permit the court to determine whether . . . the defense would be 
meritorious.”  Hart v. Terry L. Hopkins, Inc., 588 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Me. 1991).  
Because the truth of a purported defense is not litigated at the motion hearing, 
“the moving party’s version of the facts and circumstances supporting his 
defense are deemed to be true.”  Id. 
[¶25]  Here, the “underlying action” to which Philogene must provide a 
defense involves the State’s allegation that the cash was connected to illegal 
 
 
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drug activity. 11   Ezell, 2008 ME 139, ¶ 22, 955 A.2d 202; see 15 M.R.S. 
§§ 5821-5822.  
[¶26]  The trial court erred as a matter of law because it focused only on 
what the money was to be used for and not whether there was probable cause 
to trace the money to any drug offense, and because it failed to give the requisite 
deference to Philogene’s proffered defense that, in effect, the cash had a 
legitimate source.12  We therefore vacate the judgment denying Philogene’s 
motion to set aside the default and for relief from the default judgment, and we 
remand with instructions for the court to grant that motion and, after hearing 
or other appropriate process, adjudicate the merits of the M.R.U. Crim. P. 41(j) 
motion and the civil forfeiture action.13 
                                         
11  Section 5821 provides that the State may subject to forfeiture “all money . . . furnished or 
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a scheduled drug in violation of Title 17-A, 
chapter 45; all proceeds traceable to such an exchange; and all money . . . used or intended to be used 
to facilitate any violation of Title 17-A, chapter 45.”  15 M.R.S. § 5821(6) (2017).  Section 5822 
provides that in an in rem civil forfeiture action, the State must prove all material facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See 15 M.R.S. § 5822(3) (2017). 
12  In analyzing the federal civil forfeiture statute, the First Circuit has held that the government 
must, by a preponderance of the evidence, establish “a ‘substantial connection’ between the currency 
and a narcotics offense.”  United States v. $62,552.00 in United States Currency, No. 03-10153-RBC, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6280, at *24 (D. Mass. Jan. 20, 2015) (quoting 18 U.S.C.S. § 983(c)(3)). 
13  When criminal and civil proceedings regarding the same subject matter are pending, courts 
generally defer civil proceedings pending the completion of parallel criminal proceedings.  See United 
States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27 (1970) (“Federal courts have deferred civil proceedings pending 
the completion of parallel criminal prosecutions when the interests of justice seemed to require such 
action, sometimes at the request of the prosecution, sometimes at the request of the defense.”); see 
also SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375-76 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Eastwood v. United States, 
 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶27]  In sum, in the unique circumstances of this case, the record 
indicates that Philogene showed a reasonable excuse for his inattention to the 
forfeiture proceedings and demonstrated a meritorious defense to the 
underlying charges.  Accordingly, the trial court, in denying Philogene’s motion 
for relief from judgment, “work[ed] a plain and unmistakable injustice” against 
Philogene, as a party-in-interest, and his $16,545, as defendant in rem.  Ezell, 
2008 ME 139, ¶ 19, 955 A.2d 202. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jerry Philogene, appellant pro se 
 
Andrew S. Robinson, District Attorney, and Michael B. Dumas, Asst. Dist. Atty., 
Prosecutorial District III, Lewiston, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number CV-2017-79 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
No. 2:06-cv-164, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106777, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2008) (citing Campbell v. 
Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 488 (5th Cir. 1962)).