Case Title: State v. Bryant

Citation: 361 Md. 420

Docket Number: 16/00

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Criminal No. 94-4554 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 16
September Term, 2000
______________________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
WILLIAM DUNLOCK BRYANT
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky*
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
JJ.
______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
______________________________________________
Filed:    November 14, 2000
*Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member
of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Sec. 3A, he also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.
We granted the State’s petition for certiorari in this case primarily to determine the requirements
under Maryland Rule 5-902(a)(11) for the admissibility of hospital records as certified records of regularly
conducted business activity without the in-court testimony of the hospital records custodian.   We agree
with the Court of Special Appeals that the toxicology report was not properly authenticated, and
accordingly we shall affirm.
Respondent was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of homicide by motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol, driving under the influence of alcohol, negligent driving, driving at
unreasonable speed, and failure to control speed.  The Circuit Court sentenced Bryant to a term of
imprisonment of one year and a fine of $1000 for homicide by motor vehicle and driving while under the
influence of alcohol.  The trial court merged the remaining convictions for sentencing purposes.
Bryant noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate court reversed
Respondent’s convictions for homicide by motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and driving
under the influence of alcohol, see Bryant v. State, 129 Md. App. 690, 743 A.2d 814 (2000), holding
that a toxicology report had been improperly admitted in evidence under the business records exception
to the hearsay rule, Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6).  The Court of Special Appeals held that the toxicology
report was inadmissible on two grounds: first, that it did not meet the requirements of Maryland Code
(1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 10-306 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article regarding
the admissibility of test results without the testimony of the technician; and, second, because it was not
authenticated in the manner required by the self-authentication rule, Rule 5-902(a)(11).  See Bryant, 129
Md. App. at 699, 743 A.2d at 819. 
We granted certiorari to clarify the requirements of Rule 5-902(a)(11) allowing hospital records
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While we affirm the Court of Special Appeals’ decision reversing Respondent’s convictions for
1
homicide by motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and driving under the influence of alcohol
on other grounds, we note that Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 10-306 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is not applicable to this case.  Sections 10-302 — 10-309 pertain
to compulsory chemical tests administered by law enforcement personnel for the purpose of determining
a suspect’s blood alcohol concentration.  These sections do not apply in a case, such as this, where the
blood sample is taken by hospital personnel for the apparent purpose of medical treatment.  See State v.
Moon, 291 Md. 463, 436 A.2d 420 (1981).
to be admitted as certified records of regularly conducted business activity without the in-court testimony
of the hospital records custodian and to reiterate that § 10-306 is not applicable to hospital records like
those in this case.1
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 12, 1994, Respondent, William Dunlock Bryant, was driving
northbound on Interstate 95 near White Marsh, along with one passenger, Gertrude O’Boyle.  The speed
limit on that particular stretch of highway was fifty-five miles per hour and there were four lanes of traffic
in each direction.  Respondent passed another vehicle traveling in his lane, containing Mark Williams, the
driver, and Brian Shillman, a passenger.  Shillman estimated that Respondent was driving between seventy
and seventy-five miles per hour.  Williams estimated that Respondent was driving between seventy-five and
eighty miles per hour.  According to Shillman, approximately one-half to three-quarters of a mile later, the
tail lights of Respondent’s car veered toward the center wall, and the car crashed in a spray of debris.
Police Sergeant Denard Allen arrived at the scene and found Respondent in his car attempting to
awaken O’Boyle.  Sergeant Allen testified that there was a strong odor of alcohol coming from the interior
of the vehicle, although he could not tell whether it was coming from Respondent or O’Boyle.  Sergeant
Allen asked Respondent if he had been drinking, and Respondent responded that he had had a beer during
the day.  Because Respondent was complaining of chest injuries, Sergeant Allen did not ask him to perform
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any field sobriety tests.
A paramedic, Jennifer Jordan, arrived at the scene of the accident and began to care for
Respondent, who was still seated in the driver’s seat of the car.  Paramedics from another ambulance were
attending to O’Boyle.  Jordan testified that Respondent had difficultly remembering the events of the
accident, that his speech seemed as if he had been drinking, and that he seemed a little bit slow to respond.
She noticed that his breath smelled like alcohol and asked him if he had been drinking.  Respondent
responded that he had had two “California iced teas” that evening.
Respondent and O’Boyle were transported to the University of Maryland Shock Trauma Unit.
A sample of Respondent’s blood was taken at 3:10 a.m. for a toxicology screen.  Respondent was treated
and released on the morning of the accident.  O’Boyle died as a result of her injuries.
On December 11, 1998, Respondent was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County of homicide by motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, driving under the influence of
alcohol, negligent driving, driving at unreasonable speed, and failure to control speed.  The jury found
Respondent not guilty of automobile manslaughter, homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated, driving
while intoxicated, reckless driving, and unsafe lane change.
At trial, the State introduced a toxicology report from the University of Maryland Medical System.
The report had Respondent’s name on it, and it indicated that the blood specimen had been received on
August 12, 1994 at 3:10 a.m. and that testing had been completed on August 16, 1994 at 2:45 a.m.  The
toxicology report showed a blood alcohol concentration of 216 milligrams per deciliter.  Attached to the
front of the toxicology report was a cover letter signed by the Director of Medical Record Services and
the Custodian of Records for the University of Maryland Medical System, which read as follows:
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This is to certify that the enclosed medical records are an accurate
reproduction of the medical records pertaining to patient WILLIAM
BRYANT, which are created and kept during the normal course of
business.  These records are housed in the Medical Record Services
Department of the University of Maryland Medical System from the time
of patient discharge or release.  Both inpatient and outpatient records are
housed in one medical record.
To the best of my knowledge, these are the complete medical records of
this patient.
Defense counsel argued that the custodian’s statement was insufficient to form a proper foundation for
authentication as a business record under Rule 5-902 and that the document did not contain sufficient
identifying information to establish Respondent as the patient to whom the report referred.  
Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court admitted the toxicology report as a business
record.  The court found that the cover letter from the University of Maryland Medical System was
sufficient authentication of the toxicology report and that the testimony of Dr. Barry Levine, Chief
Toxicologist for the Maryland Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, was sufficient to establish that the
report was kept in the regular course of business, that the toxicology screen of Respondent’s blood was
pathologically germane to treatment, and, thus, that the requirements of admissibility were established.
Petitioner argues that the custodian’s certification of the toxicology report in this case, along with
its contents, constituted a sufficient evidentiary foundation to authenticate it properly as a business record.
Petitioner maintains that the custodian was qualified to authenticate the contents of the report -- that she
could attest to the time that the report was made and had sufficient personal knowledge of the matters that
it contained.  Petitioner also maintains that the report itself contains evidence that it was timely, made by
a person with knowledge of its matters, and kept consistent with the hospital’s regular course of business.
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Respondent counters that the report was not adequately authenticated with respect to the time that
it was made, the person who made it, and the form of the certification provided by the hospital records
custodian.  He also argues that the trial judge’s admission of the toxicology report in evidence without
proper foundation or indicia of reliability denied him his right of confrontation.
Resolution of the issues presented in this case requires us to consider two related rules of evidence
— Rule 5-803(b)(6) and Rule 5-902(a)(11).  Rule 5-803 sets forth several exceptions to the rule excluding
hearsay that do not require the unavailability of the declarant in order for the declaration to be admissible.
Rule 5-803(b)(6) addresses the business records exception to the hearsay rule.  That rule states as follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness . . . .  A memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses if
(A) it was made at or near the time of the act, event, or condition, or the
rendition of the diagnosis, (B) it was made by a person with knowledge
or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, (C) it was
made and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,
and (D) the regular practice of that business was to make and keep the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation.  A record of this kind
may be excluded if the source of information or the method or
circumstances of the preparation of the record indicate that the information
in the record lacks trustworthiness.
Rule 5-803(b)(6). The authenticity requirements for the admissibility of a business record  are set forth
within the rule as (A) through (D).  There are two ways that the necessary evidentiary foundation for
admitting business records may be established: by extrinsic evidence (usually live witness testimony)
regarding the four requirements of Rule 5-803(b)(6) or by “self-authentication” pursuant to Rule 5-
902(a)(11).  
Rule 5-902, which was adopted by the Court of Appeals in 1994, sets out the class of records for
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which extrinsic evidence of authenticity is not a condition precedent to admissibility.  Rule 5-902 was
modeled on a 1986 amendment to the Uniform Rules of Evidence, see UNIF. R. EVID. 902(11), which
added a provision for the self-authentication of certified copies of business records.  Uniform Rule 902(11)
was based on the federal statute providing for the self-authentication in criminal proceedings of certified
copies of foreign records of regularly conducted activity.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3505 (1988); Lynn McLain,
Self-Authentication of Certified Copies of Business Records, 24 BALTIMORE L. REV. 27, 27-
28, 36-37 (1994).  It extended the applicability of the certification by affidavit to domestic business records
in both criminal and civil proceedings.  See McLain, supra, at 28.  Rule 5-902 was designed in the interest
of judicial economy to eliminate the need to call foundation witnesses for evidence that is so likely to be
authentic that extrinsic evidence is unnecessary.  See id. at 32.
 Rule 5-902(a)(11) creates an alternative method for authenticating business records without
requiring the live testimony of the records custodian.  It allows proof, by certification, of the same facts to
which a witness would have been required to testify in court to lay the foundation for the hearsay exception
at trial.  See id. at 51.  That rule provides as follows:
The original or duplicate of a record of regularly conducted business
activity, within the scope of Rule 5-803 (b)(6), which the custodian or
another qualified individual certifies (A) was made, at or near the time of
the occurrence of the matters set forth, by (or from information transmitted
by) a person with knowledge of those matters, (B) is made and kept in the
course of the regularly conducted business activity, and (C) was made and
kept by the regularly conducted business activity as a regular practice,
unless the sources of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness . . . .
Rule 5-902(a)(11).  “Certification,” as that term is employed in Rule 5-902 with respect to domestic
records, requires “a written declaration under oath subject to the penalty of perjury.”  Rule 5-902(b).
-7-
We point out that the custodian’s “certification” in this case conforms exactly to the requirements
2
of the custodian’s certificate in Maryland Rule 3-510(h), the rule governing the admission of hospital
records in civil actions in the District Court.  That rule allows a hospital that has been served with a
subpoena duces tecum for patient records to deliver copies of the records to the Clerk of the District
Court with “a certificate of the custodian that they are the complete records for the patient for the period
designated in the subpoena and that the records are maintained in the regular course of business of the
hospital.”  Rule 3-510(h).  It would seem that, in this case, the hospital records custodian simply followed
the wrong rule.  Cf. Maryland Code (1996, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 10-104 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article (providing an alternative method of authenticating medical records without the
testimony of a health care provider or custodian in certain civil actions for personal injuries and insurance
benefits).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence
3
803(6), the federal business records exception to the hearsay rule, has also held that, even though a
noncustodial witness or documentary evidence may lay the foundation for admission of records, the witness
or document still must attest to each of the foundational elements of the rule.  The court noted:
While a noncustodial witness such as a government agent, or even
documentary evidence, may be used to lay the foundation required by
Rule 803(6), that witness or those documents must still demonstrate that
the records were made contemporaneously with the act the documents
Proper certification, under Rule 5-902(a)(11), establishes a prima facie foundation for the business records
exception.  See McLain, supra, at 34.
In this case, the trial judge erred in admitting the toxicology report without an adequate evidentiary
foundation to authenticate it.  The “certification” attached to the toxicology report does not, on its face,
meet the requirements of Rule 5-902(a)(11).   First, it is not under oath subject to the penalty of perjury.
2
Second, the custodian never certified that the report was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the
matters that it sets forth by a person with knowledge of those matters or that it was made and kept by the
regularly conducted business activity as a regular practice.  Even if Petitioner is correct that the custodian
of records had sufficient personal knowledge to certify the authenticity of the toxicology report, the
custodian failed to do so in the cover letter presented.   Since the foundational requirements of Rule 5-
3
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purport to record by someone with knowledge of the subject matter, that
they were made in the regular course of business, and that such records
were regularly kept by the business. . . . Here, Agent Wolverton did not
purport to have familiarity with the record-keeping system of the banks,
nor did he attest to any of the other requirements of Rule 803(6).
Therefore, as proponent of the evidence, the Government has failed to lay
a proper foundation as required by the business records exception.
United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 201-02 (3  Cir. 1992).
rd
While the usual method of extrinsic authentication under Rule 803(b)(6) is by in-court testimony
4
by the records custodian, business records can also sometimes be authenticated by circumstantial evidence
of the manner of creation and nature of the document involved.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Keister, 327 Md. 56, 74-75, 607 A.2d 909, 918 (1992); Pine St. Trading Corp. v. Farrell Lines,
Inc., 278 Md. 363, 373, 364 A.2d 1103, 1110 (1976).
902(a)(11) apply to the certification by the custodian, not to evidence contained in the document
seeking to be admitted, this deficiency is fatal to any self-authentication under Rule 5-902.
Furthermore, the toxicology report is ambiguous, at best, with regard to its timeliness and to the
personal knowledge of the person who made the report.  The report indicates the date that Respondent’s
blood samples were received and the date that the tests were completed, i.e., four days later, but there is
no indication on its face of when the report was actually made.  In addition, the fact that there appear to
be initials in the two spaces marked “IDENTIFIED BY” and “ANALYST” is insufficient evidence to prove
that the report was made by a person with knowledge of the matters that it contains.   
Our inquiry, however, does not end with the inapplicability of Rule 5-902.  The failure of the cover
letter to establish a sufficient foundation for self-authentication pursuant to Rule 5-902 does not exclude
authentication of the report by extrinsic evidence.  See Rule 803(b)(6).   At trial, the State called Dr. Barry
4
Levine, Chief Toxicologist for the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Maryland, who
is also on the faculty of the University of Maryland, to testify regarding the results of the toxicology screen.
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As we reach this conclusion on the basis of the plain meaning of the Maryland Rules and the
5
Maryland common law of evidence, we shall not address Respondent’s right of confrontation claim under
U.S. CONST. amend. VI and MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XXI.  See, e.g., Hillard v. State, 286 Md.
145, 150 n.1, 406 A.2d 415, 418 n.1 (1979); State v. Raithel, 285 Md. 478, 484, 404 A.2d 264, 267
(1979) (upholding well-settled judicial principle of not deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily).
Generally, hospital records may be admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay
rule, Rule 5-803(b)(6).  See State v. Garlick, 313 Md. 209, 216, 220, 545 A.2d 27, 30, 32 (1988)
(applying Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 10-101 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, the statutory business records exception to the hearsay rule enacted prior to the
adoption of Rule 5-803(b)(6) by the Court of Appeals).  In order for hospital records to be considered
records of regularly conducted business activity, however, and therefore presumptively reliable and
trustworthy, the records must be generated as part of the hospital’s regular course of treatment — i.e.,
pathologically germane to the patient’s care and not developed for the purposes of litigation.  See id. at
221-23, 545 A.2d at 33; Jones v. State, 205 Md. 528, 532, 109 A.2d 732, 734 (1954).
We also do not reach Respondent’s argument that the toxicology report was not pathologically
germane to his treatment because it was not completed until several days after he was discharged from the
hospital and only after a request for records from the State’s Attorney’s Office.  Compare Moon v.
State, 300 Md. 354, 370-72, 478 A.2d 695, 703-04(1982) (holding that, since reliability of blood test
results was questionable  because they lacked the Petitioner’s name and there was a three-day delay
between collection of the sample and testing, and since the technician was available to testify, it was error
not to require live testimony for admission) with Garlick, 313 Md. at 226, 545 A.2d at 35 (holding that,
since laboratory test results had facial indicia of reliability and were kept in the regular course of treatment,
While conceding that he could not testify regarding pathological germaneness, Dr. Levine  testified that it
was routine to collect specimens for alcohol and drug screening in all shock trauma cases in order to
determine possible intoxication and probable treatment.  He also testified that he was familiar with the
clinical laboratory procedures of the hospital and that the report was made in the regular course of business
of the hospital.  Nonetheless, Dr. Levine never testified that the report was made at or near the time of
the tests or that it was made by a person with knowledge, as Rule 5-803(b)(6) requires.  Therefore, his
testimony also was inadequate to establish the necessary evidentiary foundation to admit the toxicology
report.  As a result, the Court of Special Appeals was correct in concluding that the toxicology report was
not properly authenticated as a business record and that the trial court erred in admitting it.  
5
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the technician’s testimony was not required to admit them).  The record in this case is insufficient for us to
determine whether the toxicology report was pathologically germane to Respondent’s treatment and,
therefore, reliable.  More importantly, we do not reach the issue of whether the report is admissible as a
business record, since we have found that it was error to admit it in evidence as it had not been properly
authenticated either by the cover letter or the testimony of Dr. Levine.
The State contends that, even if the admission of the toxicology report was error, it was harmless
error.  Once error has been established in a criminal case, the State bears the burden of proving, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the guilty verdict in any way.  See Dorsey v.
State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976).
The toxicology report indicated that Respondent had a blood alcohol concentration of 216
milligrams per deciliter.  Dr. Levine testified that a .216 blood alcohol concentration would correspond to
consumption of a minimum of nine standard drinks for an individual of Respondent’s size.  He also testified
that, with a .216 blood alcohol concentration, “all individuals” would have a “severe impairment due to
alcohol.”  He testified specifically that “all individuals are severely intoxicated at .216" and that such a blood
alcohol level would negatively effect judgment and decision-making ability and that vision and multitasking
ability would be impaired.
While there was other evidence that tended to prove that the defendant was intoxicated and/or
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error in admitting the toxicology report did not in any way contribute to the verdicts.  See Krauss
v. State, 322 Md. 376, 587 A.2d 1102 (1991) (holding that error in admitting the defendant’s refusal to
take a breathalyzer test was not harmless).
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.