Case Title: BARTEL v STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 83-54 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1985 DONNA L. B-gRTEL, Guardian and Conservator of BRUCE W. BARTEL, an i n c a p a c i t a t e d person, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs- STATE OF M O N T A N A , Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL F R O M : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lewis & Clark, The Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge presiding. COUNSEL O F RECORD: For Appellant: Michael J. McKeon argued, Anaconda, Montana Edward K. Duckworth argued, Ronan, Montana For Respondent: Roy Andes argued, Agency Legal S e r v i c e s Bureau, Helena, Montana Submitted: May 7 , 1985 Decided: August 2 7 , 1985 F i l e d : #iuc~ s : 198% e i!6zdL */- Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f Donna L. B a r t e l , a s guardian and c o n s e r v a t o r o f Bruce F 7 . B a r t e l , an i n c a p a c i t a t e d person, brought t h i s negligence a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e o f Montana. A f t e r a bench t r i a l on t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y , t h e Lewis and Clark County D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d judgment i n favor o f t h e defen- d a n t S t a t e o f Montana. P l a i n t i f f appealed. By opinion dated January 2, 1985, t h i s Court affirmed t h e judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Two o f t h e j u s t i c e s who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l c a s e r e t i r e d from t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f p e t i t i o n e d f o r rehearing. A r e h e a r i n g was granted. W e a f f i r m t h e judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court. W e withdraw t h e o r i g i n a l opinion dated January 2 , 1985, and s u b s t i t u t e t h i s opinion. The i s s u e s a r e : 1. Did t h e District Court err i n a d m i t t i n g i n t o evidence without adequate foundation t h e r e s u l t s o f a blood-alcohol t e s t ? 2. Are t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t 6 through 8 supported by s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence? Bruce B a r t e l was s e v e r e l y i n j u r e d i n a motorcycle a c c i d e n t which occurred about 1:00 a.m. on May 28, 1980 a t a highway junction on t h e north end o f S t . I g n a t i u s , Montana. On t h e d a t e o f t h e a c c i d e n t , B a r t e l was 2 4 y e a r s o l d , weighed 318 pounds, was 6 f e e t , 4 inches t a l l and was n o t p h y s i c a l l y o r mentally impaired. R a r t e l was a t r u c k d r i v e r l i v i n g i n Ronan, Montana, approximately 14 m i l e s north o f S t . I g n a t i u s . O n t h e d a t e o f t h e a c c i d e n t , B a r t e l had l i v e d i n Ronan f o r about 6 y e a r s and had done a t l e a s t a normal amount o f occupational and r e c r e a t i o n a l t r a v e l i n g i n t h e Ronan a r e a by motorcycle and four-wheel d r i v e v e h i c l e . Beginning i n J u l y 1979 and c o n t i n u i n g t o t h e d a t e o f t h e a c c i d e n t , B a r t e l had driven by S t . I g n a t i u s about once a day while d r i v i n g a logging t r u c k between Ronan and Thompson F a l l s . B a r t e l had a l s o v i s i t e d S t . I g n a t i u s a t l e a s t twice during t h i s period o f t i m e . On t h e day o f t h e a c c i d e n t , B a r t e l devoted much o f h i s t i m e p r e p a r i n g f o r a t r u c k i n g t r i p scheduled t o begin t h e next day. H e a t e b r e a k f a s t a t a Ronan r e s t a u r a n t and l a t e r a t e lunch a t a c a f e i n Pablo. Between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., B a r t e l and a f r i e n d stopped a t W i l l a r d ' s Bar i n Ronan where B a r t e l drank two b e e r s . Sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., B a r t e l a t e d i n n e r a t a l o c a l drive-in. S h o r t l y a f t e r 7:00 p.m., B a r t e l and two f r i e n d s purchased a six-pack o f b e e r and drove around town, d u r i n g which time B a r t e l drank one beer. Around 9:00 p.m., B a r t e l m e t two o t h e r f r i e n d s , George I M i t c h e l l and Gerald Cooper, a t a n o t h e r Ronan b a r , where B a r t e l drank a t l e a s t two d r i n k s c o n s i s t i n g of s c o t c h whiskey and water . S h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s meeting, B a r t e l t r a d e d h i s pickup t r u c k f o r M i t c h e l l ' s motorcycle. For t h e rest o f t h e evening, B a r t e l drove M i t c h e l l ' s motorcycle, a 750 c c Yamaha, and M i t c h e l l drove B a r t e l ' s pickup. Cooper was r i d i n g h i s own motorcycle. A f t e r t h i s meeting and exchange o f v e h i c l e s and throughout t h e rest o f t h e evening u n t i l 1:00 a.m., t h e t r i o v i s i t e d v a r i o u s b a r s between Ronan and S t . I g n a t i u s . Numerous w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l regarding how many d r i n k s B a r t e l had a t each b a r and whether and t o what degree h e became i n t o x i c a t e d . B a r t e l argues t h a t t h e testimony e s t a b l i s h e s he had no more than 9 d r i n k s o f s c o t c h and water between 9:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. The S t a t e contends t h e evidence e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t B a r t e l had about 15 d r i n k s between 9:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. and 18 d r i n k s t o t a l f o r t h e day. The group e v e n t u a l l y headed south t o S t . I g n a t i u s . They approached S t . I g n a t i u s from t h e n o r t h on U.S. Highway 93 (New Highway 93) b u t drove p a s t t h e n o r t h e n t r a n c e t o S t . I g n a t i u s (Old Highway 93) and continued south n New Highway 93 f o r approximately 3/4 m i l e t o t h e s o u t h e n t r a n c e t o S t . I g n a t i u s . A f t e r p l a y i n g pool and d r i n k i n g i n a S t . I g n a t i u s b a r , Cooper and B a r t e l decided t o r e t u r n t o Ronan because B a r t e l intended t o d e p a r t on h i s t r u c k i n g t r i p e a r l y t h e next morning. B a r t e l and Cooper l e f t S t . I g n a t i u s o t h e motorcycles, w i t h Cooper i n t h e lead and B a r t e l some d i s t a n c e behind. The two drove n o r t h on t h e main street o f S t . I g n a t i u s , which is known a s "Old Highway 93." Old Highway 93 proceeds n o r t h and i n t e r s e c t s a t an a c u t e angle with New Highway 93 on t h e n o r t h edge o f S t . I g n a t i u s . New Highway 93 approaches S t . I g n a t i u s from t h e w e s t and than s k i r t s S t . I g n a t i u s on t h e northwest i n a sweeping curve t o t h e north. B a r t e l ' s a c c i d e n t occurred a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n o f Old Highway 93 and New Highway 93. A diagram o f t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n i s a t t a c h e d t o t h i s opinion a s Appendix A. The i n t e r s e c t i o n i s designed t o channel northbound Old Highway 93 t r a f f i c t o t h e l e f t immediately a f t e r t h e f i r s t l a r g e t r a f f i c i s l a n d on t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e roadway. T r a f f i c t h e n s t o p s a t a s t o p s i g n immediately b e f o r e t u r n i n g r i g h t o r l e f t t o t r a v e l n o r t h toward Ronan or s o u t h toward Missoula. Rather t h a n following t h i s channel t o t h e l e f t and heeding t h e s t o p s i g n b e f o r e t u r n i n g o n t o New Highway 93, B a r t e l drove s t r a i g h t n o r t h along t h e e a s t s i d e o f t h e second t r a f f i c i s l a n d , a p p a r e n t l y attempting t o proceed s t r a i g h t onto New Highway 93. The northern t i p o f t h e second t r a f f i c i s l a n d p r o t r u d e s t o t h e e a s t i n t o what would otherwise be a s t r a i g h t l i n e o f pavement from Old Highway 93 o n t o New Highway 93. The p r o t r u s i o n a t t h e n o r t h e r n t i p o f t h e second t r a f f i c i s l a n d a p p a r e n t l y was designed t o channel northbound Old Highway 93 t r a f f i c i n t o a r i g h t t u r n onto A i r p o r t Road, which e n t e r s a t t h a t p o i n t from t h e e a s t , and t o prevent t r a f f i c from proceeding s t r a i g h t d i r e c t l y o n t o New Highway 93. A s B a r t e l drove through t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , he s t r u c k t h e n o r t h e r n t i p o f t h e t r a f f i c i s l a n d w i t h t h e motorcycle, l o s t c o n t r o l and came t o rest about 50 t o 60 feet north i n t h e barrow p i t on t h e r i g h t s i d e of t h e highway. B a r t e l was taken immediately t o t h e S t . I g n a t i u s h o s p i t a l , where personnel q u i c k l y determined t h a t t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of h i s i n j u r i e s r e q u i r e d t r e a t m e n t i n Missoula. The S t . I g n a t i u s Hospital nurse who admitted B a r t e l made t h e n o t a t i o n "intox." on t h e admission form, along w i t h n o t i n g o t h e r symptoms. B a r t e l was t r a n s f e r r e d by ambulance t o S t . P a t r i c k ' s H o s p i t a l i n Missoula and a r r i v e d a t t h e emergency room t h e r e a t approximately 3:30 a.m. Blood specimens w e r e drawn and an I V was s t a r t e d . The t r e a t i n g n e u r o l o g i s t examined B a r t e l and concluded, among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t B a r t e l was i n a s t a t e o f " a l c o h o l i c i n t o x i c a t i o n . " A blood-alcohol test, performed on B a r t e l s o l e l y f o r medical purposes, i n d i c a t e d a blood-alcohol l e v e l of . I 7 1 p e r c e n t . Rased upon t h e .I71 p e r c e n t test r e s u l t , e x p e r t w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t B a r t e l ' s blood-alcohol l e v e l was between . l o 3 and .213 p e r c e n t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . The complaint sought damages f o r personal i n j u r i e s r e s u l t i n g from t h e motorcycle a c c i d e n t a l l e g e d l y caused by t h e S t a t e ' s negligence i n design and maintenance o f t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and surrounding a r e a . A f t e r e x t e n s i v e discovery, t h e c a s e was t r i e d b e f o r e t h e L e w i s and Clark County D i s t r i c t Court, s i t t i n g without a jury. T r i a l was on t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y only. On January 9, 1983 t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions o f law. O n January 18, 1983 t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d judgement i n f a v o r o f t h e defendant. The c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t included t h e following: "6. A s a r e s u l t o f h i s c a s u a l t r a v e l i n g i n and g e n e r a l knowledge o f t h e a r e a , o f h i s r e g u l a r t r i p s by and i n c l o s e proximity t o t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n a t which t h e a c c i d e n t occurred and o f h i s v i s i t s t o S t . I g n a t i u s , he was thoroughly f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n i n q u e s t i o n and how t r a f f i c moved from S t . I g n a t i u s through t h a t i n t e r s e c t i o n t o Highway 9 3 e n r o u t e n o r t h t o Ronan. "7. On May 27, 1980, he p u t i n an o r d i n a r y d a y ' s work u n t i l f o u r p.m., a t which t i m e and b e f o r e f i v e p.m. he had two b e e r s . Between e i g h t and n i n e p.m., a f t e r e a t i n g h i s supper, he drank a n o t h e r can o f beer. Between n i n e p.m. on t h e 27th and t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t a t one a.m. on t h e 28th he drank n o t less t h a n nine and q u i t e probably twelve t o f i f t e e n d r i n k s c o n t a i n i n g undetermined amounts o f s c o t c h whiskey. "8. A t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t h i s blood stream was c a r r y i n g between . l o 3 and .213 percentage a l c o h o l , which s e r i o u s l y impaired h i s sensory and mental f u n c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g s i g h t , p e r c e p t i o n , r e f l e x i o n , r e a c t i o n and r a t i o c i n a t i o n . " B a r t e l c h a l l e n g e s t h e s e t h r e e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h a t t h e n i g h t of t h e a c c i d e n t was dark b u t c l e a r , t h e roadway was d r y and c l e a r , and no o t h e r t r a f f i c was involved i n t h e a c c i d e n t . The c o u r t found t h a t t h e h e a d l i g h t on t h e motorcycle was f u n c t i o n i n g normally and t h a t a l l t r a f f i c s i g n s could be d i s c e r n e d c l e a r l y w i t h t h e h e a d l i g h t . The c o u r t found t h a t B a r t e l , a t a speed o f 25 t o 30 m.p.h. and without braking o r d e c e l e r a t i n g , passed a c r o s s t h e r o a d ' s yellow d i v i d i n g l i n e and t h e l e f t l a n e , c o l l i d e d w i t h t h e t r a f f i c s e p a r a t i o n i s l a n d toward i t s n o r t h end, l o s t c o n t r o l o f h i s motorcycle and landed with it i n a d i t c h on t h e r i g h t s i d e o f t h e road. The c o u r t found t h a t under t h e l i g h t and weather c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t , an o r d i n a r i l y observant motor v e h i c l e o p e r a t o r t r a v e l i n g i n B a r t e l ' s d i r e c t i o n could have seen from a d i s t a n c e o f n o t less than 350 f e e t t h e end o f t h e t r a f f i c i s l a n d which B a r t e l h i t and could have seen o t h e r i n d i c a t i o n s o f t h e proper r o u t e through t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . The c o u r t found t h a t i f B a r t e l had been d r i v i n g i n a reasonably c a r e f u l and prudent manner and n o t under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l , he could have e a s i l y avoided t h e c o l l i s i o n w i t h t h e t r a f f i c i s l a n d and t h a t B a r t e l was n o t i n any way "trapped" by highway d e s i g n , s i g n i n g o r maintenance. Although t h e c o u r t found t h a t t h e d e s i g n , c o n s t r u c t i o n , s i g n i n g and maintenance o f t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n was "demonstrably d e f i c i e n t i n numerous r e s p e c t s and d i d n o t comport w i t h n a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s o r even t h e S t a t e ' s own s t a n d a r d s , " t h e s e d e f i c i e n c i e s were n o t found t o be a cause o f t h e a c c i d e n t . The c o u r t noted t h a t no o t h e r a c c i d e n t s a t t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n had been r e p o r t e d s i n c e 1969, when t h e t r a f f i c i s l a n d was i n s t a l l e d . The c o u r t concluded t h a t B a r t e l was n e g l i g e n t i n v i o l a t i n g s e v e r a l t r a f f i c s a f e t y s t a t u t e s , i n c l u d i n g d r i v i n g while under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l . The c o u r t a l s o concluded t h a t B a r t e l was n e g l i g e n t i n f a i l i n g t o see a hazard which a reasonably prudent person would see under t h e circumstances o r , having seen it, i g n o r i n g it o r f a i l i n g t o r e a c t t o it i n a reasonable and prudent manner. The c o u r t concluded t h a t B a r t e l ' s negligence was t h e s o l e proximate cause o f t h e a c c i d e n t . The c o u r t a l s o concluded t h a t any negligence of t h e S t a t e was n o t i n any degree a proximate cause o f t h e a c c i d e n t . B a r t e l appeals. I Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t err i n a d m i t t i n g i n t o evidence without adequate foundation t h e r e s u l t s o f a blood-alcohol t e s t ? B a r t e l contends t h a t evidence o f blood-alcohol test r e s u l t s was inadmissible because t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e required foundation f o r i t s admission, a s required by McAlpine v. Midland E l e c t r i c Company (Mont. 1981), 634 P.2d 1166, 38 St.Rep. 1577. B a r t e l argues t h a t although less s t r i n g e n t foundational safeguards a r e r e q u i r e d f o r admissibi-lity o f blood test r e s u l t s i n c i v i l c a s e s than i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s , McAlpine nonetheless r e q u i r e s t h a t test procedures accord w i t h "good p r a c t i c e i n t h e f i e l d " t o a s s u r e r e l i a b l e r e s u l t s . B a r t e l a l l e g e s numerous inadequacies i n t h e blood t e s t procedure which he contends a r e d e v i a t i o n s from good medical p r a c t i c e . H e a l l e g e s t h e s e d e v i a t i o n s render t h e test r e s u l t s i n t h i s c a s e u n r e l i a b l e . B a r t e l contends t h e r e i s no evidence o t h e r than t h e blood test r e s u l t s t h a t he was i n t o x i c a t e d o r impaired i n h i s a b i l i t y t o d r i v e . Because t h e S t a t e ' s defense depended upon showing t h a t B a r t e l was i n t o x i c a t e d , B a r t e l argues t h a t t h e erroneous admission o f E x h i b i t X I t h e l a b r e p o r t c o n t a i n i n g t h e blood test r e s u l t s , was extremely p r e j u d i c i a l and c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . A review o f t h e d e t a i l e d foundation testimony is a p p r o p r i a t e here. Three h o s p i t a l employees t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l regarding B a r t e l 1 s blood test and r o u t i n e blood test procedure. Barbara Westphal-Marcus, an R.N. who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n B a r t e l ' s emergency room t r e a t m e n t , c h a r t e d t h e t r e a t m e n t B a r t e l received. The c h a r t showed t h a t an I V was s t a r t e d a t 3:30 a.m. and t h a t t h e drug mannitol was administered a t 3:35 a.m., although t h e c h a r t d i d n o t show s p e c i f i c a l l y when blood was drawn. However, Westphal-Marcus t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s a m a t t e r o f r o u t i n e p r a c t i c e , blood i s drawn f o r t e s t i n g when an I V i s s t a r t e d . She described r o u t i n e procedure f o r s t a r t i n g an I V and drawing blood f o r a l c o h o l t e s t i n g : t h e p a t i e n t ' s arm i s prepped w i t h b e t a d i n e , a non-a l c o h o l i c s o l u t i o n ; t h e needle and c a t h e t e r a r e i n s e r t e d ; t h e needle is then removed from t h e c a t h e t e r ; b e f o r e t h e blood-drawing s y r i n g e i s i n s e r t e d i n t o t h e c a t h e t e r , blood i s s p i l l e d from t h e c a t h e t e r ; t h e s y r i n g e i s i n s e r t e d and 10 cc's o f blood a r e drawn; t h e blood i s p u t immediately i n t o two t u b e s , marked w i t h t h e p a t i e n t ' s name and ER c h a r t number, and handed t o t h e l a b t e c h n i c i a n . Westphal-Marcus t e s t i f i e d s h e was p r e s e n t when B a r t e l ' s blood was drawn. She s t a t e d t h a t based on r o u t i n e p r a c t i c e , B a r t e l ' s blood was drawn a t 3:30 a.m. when t h e I V was s t a r t e d . Responding t o q u e s t i o n s from t h e c o u r t , she i n d i c a t e d t h a t nothing unusual had been done i n B a r t e l ' s case. While b e t a d i n e is u s u a l l y used f o r prepping where a l c o h o l t e s t i n g i s a n t i c i p a t e d , Westphal-Marcus could n o t s t a t e with c e r t a i n t y t h a t isopropyl a l c o h o l was n o t used on t h i s occasion. However, she s t a t e d t h a t t h e blood s p i l l which occurs b e f o r e t h e s y r i n g e is i n s e r t e d and blood i s drawn would remove any t a i n t caused by use o f an isopropyl a l c o h o l prepping s o l u t i o n . She noted t h a t i n B a r t e l ' s c a s e a l a r g e c a t h e t e r was used and a l o t o f blood was s p i l l e d . She concluded t h a t good medical p r a c t i c e was used i n drawing B a r t e l ' s blood and t h a t t h e test r e s u l t s w e r e r e l i a b l e . L e i l a n i Heuer i s t h e l a b t e c h n i c i a n who t e s t e d B a r t e l ' s blood. She recognized and i d e n t i f i e d E x h i b i t X a s an a c c u r a t e copy o f t h e l a b r e p o r t s h e had prepared from t h e o r i g i n a l test p r i n t o u t and signed t h e n i g h t o f B a r t e l ' s a c c i d e n t . Heuer described f o r t h e c o u r t t h e r o u t i n e t e s t i n g procedure employed. she s t a t e d t h a t t h e t e s t i n g machine i s c a l i b r a t e d b e f o r e t h e f i r s t test o f every n i g h t a s a m a t t e r o f r o u t i n e p r a c t i c e . She produced a t t r i a l t h e record of c a l i b r a t i o n f o r t h e day o f B a r t e l ' s blood test. She s t a t e d t h a t q u a l i t y c o n t r o l t e s t i n g i s done every day, b u t r e c o r d s o f t h a t t e s t i n g a r e k e p t f o r only one year. Heuer t e s t i f i e d t h a t isopropyl a l c o h o l would i n t e r f e r e w i t h t e s t r e s u l t s only i f t h e p a t i e n t had i n g e s t e d it, and t h a t i n h e r experience n e g a t i v e test r e s u l t s had occurred even though i s o p r o p y l a l c o h o l had been used t o prepare t h e p a t i e n t ' s s k i n f o r t h e blood drawing. Heuer s t a t e d t h a t o r i g i n a l machine p r i n t o u t s f o r s p e c i f i c tests a r e n o t k e p t , b u t t h a t i f t h e machine p r i n t o u t had i n d i c a t e d any e r r o r , she would have repeated t h e test u n t i l r e c e i v i n g e r r o r - f r e e r e s u l t s . Chief Lab Technician Opal S p r a d l i n ' s d e p o s i t i o n was s t i p u l a t e d i n t o evidence i n l i e u of testimony. She s t a t e d t h a t t h e drawing o f blood f o r a l c o h o l t e s t i n g i s u s u a l l y done without use o f i s o p r o p y l a l c o h o l a s a c l e a n s i n g agent. She noted t h a t a l l h o s p i t a l personnel who could have drawn B a r t e l ' s blood w e r e p r o f e s s i o n a l l y competent. S p r a d l i n concluded t h a t test procedures accorded with good medical p r a c t i c e t o a s s u r e r e l i a b l e medical r e s u l t s . James D. Hutchinson, a c l i n i c a l t o x i c o l o g i s t experienced i n blood-alcohol t e s t i n g , l i s t e n e d t o Heuer's testimony and t e s t i f i e d t h e h o s p i t a l ' s t e s t i n g methods a r e a c c u r a t e . D r . Kenneth H. Mueller, a f o r e n s i c p a t h o l o g i s t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t use o f i s o p r o p y l a l c o h o l would a f f e c t test r e s u l t s o n l y i f something d i s t i n c t l y abnormal o r incompetent was done i n drawing t h e blood. I f normal prepping procedure was followed u s i n g i s o p r o p y l a l c o h o l , t h e i s o p r o p y l would r e s u l t i n no measurable d i f f e r e n c e . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t e s t on blood serum a s opposed t o whole blood would y i e l d a maximum d i f f e r e n c e o f o n l y 2-3 p e r c e n t . Mueller s t a t e d t h a t i f t h e r e had been any s i g n i f i c a n t p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r r o r i n B a r t e l ' s blood test, it would have been c a l l e d t o someone's a t t e n t i o n . I n McAlpine v. Midland Electric Company (Mont. 1981), 634 P.2d 1166, 38 St.Rep. 1577, t h e a p p e l l a n t r a i s e d s e v e r a l arguments regarding foundation f o r admission of blood-alcohol test r e s u l t s which a r e s i m i l a r t o t h o s e r a i s e d by B a r t e l . There, a p p e l l a n t argued t h a t t h e proponent o f t h e evidence had f a i l e d t o show t h a t post-mortem blood c l o t t i n g d i d n o t r e s u l t i n a higher blood-alcohol reading; f a i l e d t o show t h a t t h e procuring and t e s t i n g o f t h e samples followed t h e procedures set o u t i n t h e Administrative Rules o f Montana; failed to show the blood tested came from the victimsf bodies; and failed to produce the gas chromatograph records which recorded the test results. 634 P.2d at 1170, 38 St.Rep. at 1582. In McAlpine, this Court held that procedures required by administrative rule where results are to be used in a criminal prosecution are not required for admissibility of test results in a civil trial. In so holding, we quoted from Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Company (6th Cir. 1974) , 502 F.2d 1117, which stated that while test procedures for civil trial use need not comply with criminal case statutory procedures, l1 'they must accord with good practice in the field to assure reliable results.11' McAlpine, 634 P.2d at 1171, 38 St.Rep. at 1583, quoting Bach, 502 F.2d at 1121. We concluded that testimony in that case "established that the procedures employed followed good practice in the field. " 634 P.2d at 1171, 38 St.Rep. at 1583-84. We adhere to that test today. Rule 406(b), M.R.Evid. provides that "[elvidence of habit or of routine practice, whether corroborated or not, and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice." l1 Routine practice" is defined as "a regular course of conduct of a group of persons or an organization. " Rule 406 (a) , M.R.Evid. Hospital personnel and medical experts testified at length of the routine medical practices employed at the hospital in drawing and testing blood for alcohol content. These witnesses also testified at length as to whether those practices accord with good medical practice. With the single exception of Bartel1s expert witness, all witnesses testifying on this point agreed that the procedures employed were in accordance with good practice and yielded reliable and accurate results. During the extensive foundation testimony heard prior to admission of Exhibit I, the experienced trial judge questioned the witnesses in detail on various points. In response to a question from the court, Westphal-Marcus indicated she believed that the blood drawing procedure used in Bartel's case did not deviate from routine hospital procedure. Further, Heuer stated that she performed the Bartel blood test using good, reliable procedures. The above testimony, together with testimony specifically relating to Bartel's blood test, was relevant and provided adequate foundation to support admission of Exhibit X. We hold that the record contains substantial credible evidence to show that the test procedure employed in this case accorded with good medical practice to assure reliable results. Bartel vigorously emphasizes those portions of the testimony which he argues support his contention that the blood test results were inadmissible. He argues the necessary foundation was not established because the State failed to establish certain facts which he argues are essential to admissibility of the results. We will discuss each of these contentions in light of the record. 1. Bartel argues that the State's failure to identify positively the person who drew Bartel's blood precludes admissibility of the test results. The testimony of R.N. Westfall-Marcus established that she was present for the drawing of the blood specimens from Bruce Bartel as was Bill Kirk, R.N., Jackie Clausen, Night Supervisor, and the medical doctor. While she was present at the time of the blood drawing, she could not recall whether she or Nurse Kirk had drawn the blood sample. She did testify at length regarding the procedure customarily followed in the drawing of blood. Her testimony and that of other witnesses established that the two registered nurses were both qualified to draw blood and were both familiar with routine hospital practices. Nurse west fall-Marcus completed a portion of the emergency room records with regard to the treatment of Mr. Bartel, particularly the cross-matching of blood and the ordering of the blood test. The routine procedure used by Nurse Westfall-Marcus and other nurses in the hospital was established without contradiction. There is nothing in the written records to indicate any deviation from these proce- dures. Nurse Westfall-Marcus testified there was no deviation from routine procedures. Mere inability to recall which of two registered nurses completed this particular blood test after a lapse of two years is not a sufficient basis to challenge the admissibility of the blood test itself. While it would have been preferable that the name of the nurse withdrawing the blood be shown on the emergency room records, Nurse Westfall-Marcus indicated they were so busy taking care of the severely-injured patient, Bartel, that this had not been placed on the records. The testimony established the very large number of blood tests conducted by hospital personnel and by Nurse Westfall-Marcus in the course of emergency room operation. Under the circumstances of this case, the failure to establish which of two registered nurses withdrew the blood does not preclude admissibility of the test results. 2. Bartel contends that the State failed to establish the time when the blood was drawn. He argues this is critical because it must be shown that administration of mannitol did not interfere with test results, and also be- cause time of blood drawing is critical to the accuracy of calculations made by experts to determine the degree of intoxication at the time of the accident. The time of the blood drawing is certainly a significant fact. Nurse Westfall-Marcus t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e c o r d s d i d n o t d i s c l o s e s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e t i m e o f t h e blood drawing, b u t only e s t a b - l i s h e d t h a t t h e I.V. was commenced a t 3 : 3 0 and t h a t mannitol was given t o M r . B a r t e l a t 3 : 3 5 . She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r o u t i n e p r a c t i c e , which she followed and which was followed by o t h e r n u r s e s i n t h e h o s p i t a l , would have r e q u i r e d t h e withdrawal o f t h e blood promptly a f t e r t h e commencement o f t h e I.V. and p r i o r t o t h e g i v i n g o f mannitol. The testimony of L e i l a n i Heuer, t h e l a b t e c h n i c i a n who conducted t h e blood test, e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t she completed h e r test a t 4 : 3 0 and t h a t it would have taken h e r n o t less than one-half hour t o complete t h e test. While t h a t evidence does n o t i n d i c a t e a s p e c i f i c time, it does confirm t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e blood was withdrawn between 3 : 3 0 and 4 : 0 0 a.m. The f i n d i n g s on t h e p a r t o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n d i c a t e t h a t it concluded t h a t t h e blood was drawn a t c l o s e t o 3:30 a.m., when t h e I . V . was begun. There i s c e r t a i n l y s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h a t conclusion. There i s i n f a c t no evidence t o t h e c o n t r a r y , b u t only t h e s p e c u l a t i o n r a i s e d by M r . B a r t e l . W e conclude t h a t t h e argument of M r . B a r t e l t h a t t h e r e was mannitol i n t e r f e r e n c e must a l s o f a i l . 3 . B a r t e l argues t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o demonstrate t h a t a non-alcoholic s o l u t i o n was used f o r s k i n p r e p a r a t i o n i s f a t a l t o t h e test r e s u l t ' s a d m i s s i b i l i t y . Nurse Westfall-Marcus t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r o u t i n e p r a c t i c e i s t o use Betadine, a non-alcoholic s o l u t i o n , when a l c o h o l t e s t i n g i s a n t i c i p a t e d . However, s h e could n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y remember t h e n a t u r e of t h e s o l u t i o n used on M r . B a r t e l . She d i d e x p l a i n i n d e t a i l t h e n a t u r e o f t h e I . V . which was s t a r t e d , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t a f t e r making a veni-puncture, t h e needle i s withdrawn from t h e c a t h e t e r w i t h t h e t o u r n i q u e t s t i l l on t h e arm s o t h e r e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t s p i l l i n g o f blood on t h e f l o o r b e f o r e t h e s y r i n g e i s i n s e r t e d , a t which t i m e t h e 10 cc. I s o f blood a r e taken o u t f o r t e s t i n g purposes. She concluded t h a t even i f a l c o h o l had been used t o swab t h e arm p r i o r t o t h e commencement o f t h e I . V . , s o much blood was s p i l l e d t h a t she d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h e r e could have been any contamination. D r . Mueller, f o r e n s i c p a t h o l o g i s t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had done s t u d i e s on t h e e f f e c t o f t h e use o f isopropyl a l c o h o l swabs on t h e measurement of e t h e l a l c o h o l . D r . Mueller t e s t i f i e d he had found t h e only way it would a f f e c t t h e e t h e l a l c o h o l r e s u l t was i f t h e needle was withdrawn through t h e sponge w i t h t h e s u c t i o n s t i l l on o r , i n o t h e r words, t h e doing o f something d i s t i n c t l y abnormal o r incompetent i n withdrawing t h e blood. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n t h e o r d i n a r y way o f preparing an arm f o r example w i t h a l c o h o l , "isopropyl a l c o h o l simply d i d n o t g i v e measureable amounts of alcohol." I n a d d i t i o n , he t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e drug mannitol i s n o t an i n t e r f e r i n g substance w i t h t h e method o f alcohol t e s t i n g used i n t h e p r e s e n t case. W e , t h e r e f o r e , conclude t h a t a f a i l u r e t o demonstrate t h a t a non-alcoholic s o l u t i o n was used i s n o t f a t a l t o t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e blood test. 4. R a r t e l argues t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o show t h a t B a r t e l ' s abnormal body c h e m i s t r i e s d i d n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h test r e s u l t s . However, t h e record c o n t a i n s nothing, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t body c h e m i s t r i e s a c t u a l l y a f f e c t e d test r e s u l t s . 5. B a r t e l contends t h a t t h e test r e s u l t s a r e inadmissible because t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o produce t h e o r i g i n a l test machine p r i n t o u t and f a i l e d t o produce q u a l i t y c o n t r o l records. F a i l u r e t o produce t h e o r i g i n a l test p r i n t o u t does n o t preclude a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f test r e s u l t s . See McAlpine, 634 P.2d a t 7171-72, 38 St.Rep. a t 1584. Heuer t e s t i f i e d t h a t E x h i b i t X was t h e l a b r e p o r t she prepared by r e c o r d i n g test r e s u l t s . F u r t h e r , she s t a t e d she would have repeated t h e test if necessary t o g e t an e r r o r - f r e e r e s u l t . Heuer and Spradlin t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e h o s p i t a l r o u t i n e l y followed q u a l i t y c o n t r o l procedures, preventive maintenance procedures and d a i l y c a l i b r a t i o n procedures. W e f i n d no m e r i t i n t h e s e c o n t e n t i o n s . 6. F i n a l l y , B a r t e l argues t h a t t h e test r e s u l t s w e r e inadmissible because t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o show t h a t t e s t i n g serum r a t h e r t h a n whole blood d i d n o t a f f e c t test r e s u l t s and f a i l e d t o show t h a t more than one blood sample was t e s t e d . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , D r . Muel l e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t e s t i n g o f serum r a t h e r than whole blood was not s i g n i f i c a n t because it could account f o r e r r o r o f no more than 2-3 p e r c e n t i n test r e s u l t s . F u r t h e r , he s t a t e d t h a t m u l t i p l e t e s t samples w e r e unnecessary f o r a c c u r a t e r e s u l t s . W e reject t h e s e c o n t e n t i o n s . Despite B a r t e l ' s vigorous argument a s t o t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e a l l e g e d omissions i n foundation testimony, B a r t e l has f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h any a c t u a l inadequacy i n t h e blood test procedure which a f f e c t s a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f t h e blood test r e s u l t s . In McAlpine, we found it s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t had presented no evidence t o support h i s contention t h a t post-mortem blood c l o t t i n g s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d test r e s u l t s . W e s t a t e d t h a t a t most, t h e a p p e l l a n t had l a i d a b a s i s f o r a suggestion t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e v i c t i m s ' blood had changed between t h e t i m e o f d e a t h and t h e t i m e o f drawing t h e blood. W e concluded t h a t " [ s l u c h a suggestion goes t o weight, n o t a d m i s s i b i l i t y . " 634 P.2d a t 1171, 38 St.Rep. a t 1583. I n a s i m i l a r manner, B a r t e l has a t most l a i d t h e b a s i s f o r a v a r i e t y o f suggestions t h a t B a r t e l ' s blood test r e s u l t s w e r e i n some manner u n r e l i a b l e . B a r t e l has c i t e d numerous c a s e s from f o r e i g n j u r i s d i c t i o n s which he argues e s t a b l i s h t h e i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f E x h i b i t X. These c a s e s g e n e r a l l y follow the rule established in Lessenhop v . Norton (Iowa 1967), 153 N.W.2d 107, which requires that before blood test results may be admitted in evidence, each of 9 specific factual requirements must be satisfied. These requirements include a showing of the time at which the blood was drawn and the identity of the person who drew the blood. 153 We do not follow the rule which requires that each of a list of facts be established as foundation for admissibility of blood-alcohol test results. Rather, we follow the McAlpine rule which requires that procedures accord with good practice in the field to assure reliability. Whether procedures accord with good practice in the field is a question to be decided based upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case and the expert testimony received. Having concluded that the record supports a finding that good medical practice was followed in this case, the alleged omissions in foundation raised by Bartel go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility. We hold that the District Court did not err in admitting into evidence the results of Bartel's blood-alcohol test. Are the District Court's findings of fact number 6 through 8 supported by substantial credible evidence? Bartel's contention that findings of fact number 7 and 8 are unsupported by substantial credible evidence depends upon the inadmissibility of blood test results and upon Bartel's characterization of other evidence regarding his intoxication and impairment. We have concluded that the evidence of blood test results was properly admitted. We would also conclude there is additional evidence which supports these findings by the District Court. Gerald Cooper, one o f B a r t e l ' s d r i n k i n g companions, could n o t remember how many d r i n k s B a r t e l had a t any o f t h e b a r s they v i s i t e d . George M i t c h e l l t o l d i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r Schmauch t h a t t h e y had been d r i n k i n g , barhopping. M i t c h e l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t B a r t e l had 9 o r more d r i n k s . Randy Merryman, a Lake County Deputy S h e r i f f who was p r e s e n t a t t h e scene immediately a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e was a very d e f i n i t e s t r o n g odor o f a l c o h o l on B a r t e l ' s b r e a t h . Karla Court, t h e r e g i s t e r e d nurse a t S t . I g n a t i u s Hospital who f i l l e d o u t t h e i n i t i a l r e p o r t on B a r t e l , while she s t a t e d she d i d n o t know f o r s u r e t h a t B a r t e l was i n t o x i c a t e d , s a i d t h e s m e l l o f a l c o h o l on him was " p r e t t y strong." D r . Cooney, t r e a t i n g physician a t S t . P a t r i c k ' s H o s p i t a l i n Missoula, s t a t e d he has experience i n recognizing i n t o x i c a t i o n , t h a t he s m e l l of a l c o h o l is very c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i n t o x i c a t i o n , and t h a t t h e alcohol s m e l l on B a r t e l was t h e b a s i s f o r t h e n o t a t i o n on h i s r e p o r t t h a t B a r t e l was i n t o x i c a t e d . Although t h e r e was e x t e n s i v e testimony r e g a r d i n g t h e number o f d r i n k s Bartel had and how drunk he appeared t o be, t h e testimony was c o n t r a d i c t o r y and none of t h e w i t n e s s e s could s t a t e d e f i n i t e l y how many d r i n k s B a r t e l had o r how drunk he was. The c o l l e c t e d testimony s u p p o r t s a f i n d i n g t h a t B a r t e l had anywhere from 9 t o 15 d r i n k s between 9:00 p.m. and 1 : 0 0 a.m. on t h e n i g h t o f t h e a c c i d e n t . The D i s t r i c t Court concluded i n f i n d i n g o f f a c t number 7 t h a t B a r t e l had consumed " q u i t e probably 12 t o 15 d r i n k s c o n t a i n i n g undetermined amounts o f s c o t c h whiskey." W e hold t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h i s f i n d i n g . T h i s Court w i l l n o t re-weigh c o n f l i c t i n g evidence. Marriage o f Smith (Mont., Dec. 13, 1984), No. 83-502, s l i p op. a t 4 . Extensive testimony was presented regarding B a r t e l ' s blood-alcohol l e v e l a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t and t h e degree to which he was impaired. The testimony on these points, as on most other key points in this case, was in sharp conflict. We conclude, however, that substantial evidence supports finding of fact number 8 with respect to Bartel's blood-alcohol level and degree of intoxication. Mr. Hutchinson, a clinical toxicologist with extensive experience in blood-alcohol testing and forensic toxicology, stated that based upon certain known factors it is possible to calculate with reasonable scientific reliability the blood-alcohol level of a certain individual at a certain time. Hutchinson then testified at length regarding the details of such a calculation as to Bartel. Hutchinson concluded that Bartel's blood alcohol level at 1 a.m. would have been from .lo3 to .213, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. The blood-alcohol level was expressed as a range of values to take into account the unknown variables of individual elimination rate and individual absorption rate. This level would require that the individual drink around 18 to 21 ounces of 86 proof scotch. Hutchinson's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Mueller. Dr. Mueller further testified that at about .08 a person's visual acuity is significantly affected. The alcohol decreases peripheral vision, ability to recognize objects clearly, ability to focus, and ability to recover after being blinded by bright light. "Starting at about .08 the effect of alcohol in the system is to produce a kind of tunnel vision." At a .15 level, the vast majority of people are severely affected in driving a motor vehicle. Functions important in driving are impaired at .15 or less, even though there are no obvious signs of drunkenness apparent in those habituated to alcohol. Dr. Mueller stated that unless Bartel is very unusual, he would have suffered these effects. W e hold t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i v e c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e District C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g of f a c t number 8 , t h a t " [ a l t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t , B a r t e l ' s blood stream was c a r r y i n g between . l o 3 and .213 percentage a l c o h o l , which s e r i o u s l y impaired h i s sensory and mental f u n c t i o n s . . . ." B a r t e l a l s o contends t h a t f i n d i n g o f f a c t number 6 , t h a t B a r t e l was "thoroughly f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , " i s n o t supported by s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence. W e d i s a g r e e . The record i n d i c a t e s t h a t B a r t e l had driven p a s t t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n d a i l y f o r many months p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t . B a r t e l denied a t t r i a l t h a t he had ever d r i v e n through t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n o r t h a t he had a f r i e n d i n S t . I g n a t i u s . T h i s statement was impeached a t t r i a l through B a r t e l ' s d e p o s i t i o n i n which he admitted having v i s i t e d a f r i e n d i n S t . I g n a t i u s and having d r i v e n through t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . The t r i a l c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t B a r t e l had p r e v i o u s l y been i n S t . I g n a t i u s on s e v e r a l occasions and t h a t B a r t e l had done e x t e n s i v e t r a v e l i n g i n t h e area d u r i n g t h e 6 y e a r s he l i v e d i n Ronan. W e hold t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e District C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g o f f a c t number 6, a s w e l l a s f i n d i n g s number 7 and 8. F i n a l l y , we t u r n t o an i s s u e which was n o t r a i s e d by a p p e l l a n t s b u t which was discussed i n o r a l argument. The i s s u e was whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t erroneously concluded t h a t B a r t e l ' s negligence was t h e s o l e proximate cause o f t h e a c c i d e n t . The c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t under t h e 1.ight and weather c o n d i t i o n s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t an o r d i n a r i l y observant d r i v e r could observe: "A. From a d i s t a n c e of n o t less t h a n 450 f e e t s o u t h of t h e n o r t h end o f t h e t r a f f i c i s l a n d t h e roadway i t s e l f could be seen t o curve t o t h e r i g h t , o r e a s t . B. The end of t h e i s l a n d and i t s hook w e r e v i s i b l e from an approaching d i s t a n c e o f n o t less than 350 feet, t h e p o i n t o f t h e designated bypass t o Highway 93. C. From a p o i n t approximately 200 f e e t t o a p o i n t approximately 50 f e e t from t h e n o r t h end o f t h e i s l a n d t h e c e n t e r l i n e yellow s t r i p e was c l e a r l y d i s c e r n i b l e , a s w e r e t h e white border s t r i p e s and t h e curbing o f t h e i s l a n d . D. From a d i s t a n c e o f a t l e a s t 150 f e e t s o u t h o f t h e n o r t h end o f t h e i s l a n d an unobstructed passage t o Highway 93 was c l e a r l y d i s c e r n i b l e . E. The t r i a n g u l a r c a u t i o n a r y ' y i e l d ' s i g n could be observed a t l e a s t 400 f e e t s o u t h of t h e n o r t h end o f t h e i s l a n d . " I n v e s t i g a t i n g Highway P a t r o l O f f i c e r Richard G. Schmauch t e s t i f i e d a s follows: "Q O f f i c e r , based on your experience and your t r a i n i n g , your i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a c c i d e n t , your o b s e r v a t i o n s do you have an opinion a s t o t h e cause o f t h i s a c c i d e n t ? "A Y e s , sir, I do. "Q And what i s t h a t opinion? "A J u s t c a r e l e s s n e s s on t h e p a r t o f t h e o p e r a t o r . "Q And why do you s a y t h a t ? "A Because I know t h a t i f a person was paying a t t e n t i o n , obeying t h e laws and t h e s i g n s i n t h e a r e a , t h a t he would n o t have contacted t h a t d i v i d e r . " A s p r e v i o u s l y set f o r t h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t concluded t h a t i f B a r t e l had been d r i v i n g i n a reasonably c a r e f u l and prudent manner and n o t under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l , he could have e a s i l y avoided t h e c o l l i s i o n w i t h t h e t r a f f i c i s l a n d . H e a l s o concluded t h a t B a r t e l was n o t i n any way trapped by highway d e s i g n , signin.g o r maintenance. The f i n d i n g s and conclusions o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court regarding proximate cause a r e n o t challenged by B a r t e l on appeal. W e hold t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and conclusions t h a t B a r t e l ' s negligence was t h e s o l e proximate cause o f t h e a c c i d e n t . See McAlpine v. Dahl (1978), 179 Mont. 23, 585 P.2d 1307; Jimison v. Unisted S t a t e s (D. Mont. 1 9 6 7 ) , 267 F.Supp. 674, affirmed Jimison v. United States (9th Cir. We affirm the judgment of the District Court. We concur: --, The Honorable John M-. McCarvel, ~is&ict Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice John C. Harrison Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting: I dissent from the unqualified acceptance by this Court and by the District Court of the blood test results in light of the record here. In my original dissent to the original opinion which has now been withdrawn, I contended that no foundation had been laid for the supposedly scientific tests of the blood alcohol concentrations here. I continue here in that dissent to the new opinion because at a minimum, for scientific test results a foundation should include the following factors: (1) that the persons engaged in the test were qualified; ( 2 ) that the machine used and its components were in proper condition; and (3) that the test was properly conducted. In this case, factors (1) and !3) have not been shown. It is incredible that the hospital chart does not show the precise time in which the blood was withdrawn from Bartel, nor the person who withdrew the blood. Thus we have no direct evidence as to how part of the test was conducted, a most important part, the drawing of the blood sample itself. A record of the time the blood was withdrawn from Bartel was especially important, because if the blood was taken after mannitol had been administered, at 3 : 35 a.m. , then the test was subject to considerable doubt. Mannitol is a crystaline alcohol having a chemical makeup of C6HI4O6. If Bartel' s blood was withdrawn before the mannitol was administered, but isopropyl was used to swab the location where the blood was withdrawn, there is still a problem (not admitted by the State experts) because isopropyl has a chemical makeup of C3H80. The chemical symbol for ethyl alcohol, the intoxicating agent in liquor is C2H60. This Court, like many another, has fallen prey to the pseudo-science of alcohol concentrations in the blood, urine or breath to determine drunkenness. With the advent of statutes using alcohol concentrations to define drunk driving, a holy mystique of a sort has grown up around the levels defined in those statutes. Courts and lawyers untutored in chemistry and in spite of their own experience accept these levels without question. They adopt the statutes as establishing a sharp cleavage between drunkenness and nondrunkenness. The assumption is embraced that one having an alcohol concentration of less than 0.10 is not drunk, but one having an alcohol concentration greater than 0.10 is drunk, even though that assumption belies their own personal observation. It is our common observation that some people carry their booze better than others. What is forgotten is that 0.10 alcohol concentration is an arbitrary figure, so arbitrary that proof of such an alcohol concentration without more, is in itself a crime in operating a motor vehicle. Section 61.-8-406, MCA. Until the legislative amendment in 1971, the former arbitrary figure was 0.15 alcohol concentration which would be half again as much alcohol in the blood. Section 32-2142, R.C.M. 1-947, amended Ch. 32, Laws of Montana (1971) . Now courts give greater probity to blood test results than to witnesses' observations of drunken persons, when the reverse should be true. To paraphrase the remark about pornography, we cannot define drunkenness, but we know it when we see it. In this case, there was a wealth of evidence about the amount of liquor consumed, the appearance, the eyes, the breath, the gait, the slurred speech, the lack of coordination that, had the District Court relied principally on these and not so heavily on the blood test results, I would then support its judgment. But because the blood test results weighed so heavily in its opinion in determining the intoxication of Ba-rtel, I am forced to dissent. I have never worshipped at the shrine of blood test results because they are for the most part a false idol, with feet of clay and the heart of a gas chromatograph. It is evident that the majority and the District Court have not thoroughly thought out the implications of blood test results, because each blithely accepts that Bartel had "a blood alcohol level of .I71 percent" or that at the time of the accident, Bartel's blood alcohol was "between .I03 and .213 percent." Percent of what? Blood alcohol levels cannot he defined in terms of percentage unless they are expressed in terms of percentage of weight or percentage of volume. Neither volume nor weight is met under the evidence in this case. The statute defining "alcohol concentration," for the purpose of this case, requires grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. Section 61-8-407, MCA. Grams are a measure of weight. Milliliters are a measure of volume. One cannot be expressed in terms of the other by percentage unless the substances being compared weigh exactly the same. Alcohol is lighter than water, because it floats on water. In fact, absolute alcohol has a specific gravity of 0.789, compared to water which has a specific gravity of 1. Blood is thicker than water, both socially and physically. I do not know the specific gravity of human blood but I suspect that it is greater than the specific gravity of water because my personal observation is that blood sinks in water. A cubic centimeter of alcohol, therefore, would weigh much less than a cubic centimeter of human blood. If we had a 100 milliliter mixture of water and alcohol of which the alcohol consisted of 1 percent by volume, the alcohol in the mixture would weigh 0.789 grams. If the alcohol in the same mixture constituted 1 percent by weight, the mixture would contain nearly 1.267 cubic centimeters of alcohol. Chemical-ly that is a vast difference. It is for that reason that the statute defining alcohol concentration now avoids references to percent, and relates instead to weight of alcohol per volume of blood. There is nothing, however, in the record before us to tell us what the so-called experts were talking about when they were referring to "percent" in determining blood alcohol levels. Lost in the murnbo-jumbo of the pseudo-science of blood alcohol tests is the fact that the tests involve infinitesimally small amounts. This is because statutory blood alcohol terms are couched in terms of metric measures, perhaps purposely so. Most Americans do not comprehend the relationship between metric measures and their U.S. equivalents. It may have helped if section 61-8-407, MCA, had defined "alcohol concentration" as the number of 0.035 ounces of alcohol per 6.1 cubic inches of blood. (A gram is 0.035 ounce.) We might be able to grasp then that if Bartel's blood alcohol level was 0.171 (assuming that 0.171 refers to grams) that his actual alcohol level per ounce was 0.005985 (0.171 x 0.035). Put another way, if each ounce of his blood was broken into a thousand parts, at a blood alcohol level of 0.171, six parts of that blood would constitute alcohol. The minuteness of those figures is lost in the metric system in the pseudo-science of blood alcohol levels. Minute -amounts of alcohol in the blood can cause intoxication. Minute amounts of other alcohol-related substances, if present, can seriously distort blood test results. I fear the weight given to blood test results, especially in civil cases where other and more convincing evidence of drunkenness is available. I fear the testimony of experts who testify that the margin for error in these tests is "2 to 3 percent." Two percent of 0.005985 is 0.0001197. I truly doubt that any machines available here are capable of measuring down to the ten millionth part. If we accept these statements without question, we have been overtaken by a form of doublethink in the guise of metric measures. Please do not answer that the hospital and doctors used the blood test results for their medical purposes, and therefore the results must be accurate. The medical people here did not need blood tests to determine that this man had been drinking. The nurse wrote "intoxicated" upon the chart the first moment she saw him. That observation was not based on blood tests. For these reasons, I would set a rigid foundational requirement for the admission of blood test evidence. Routine would not be enough. No perfect routine and no perfect machine can escape the impact of the imperfect human being. The majority in this case have elevated routine into infallability. 1 would reverse this case on the grounds that the District Court found evidence of intoxication based on the blood tests for which no proper foundation was laid and for the further reason that the blood test results do not relate to the statutory scheme of weight per volume of blood. M r . J u s t i c e William E. Hunt, S r . , d i s s e n t i n g : /' I concur i n t h e d i s s e n t of M r . J u s t i c e Sheehy. Mr. J u s t i c e Frank 3. Pdorrison, Jr. , d i s s e n t i n g : I concur i n t h e d i s s e n t of M r . J u s t i c e Sheehy.