Case Title: State v. Tony M. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP003367-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-3364-CR, 94-3365-CR, 94-3366-CR and 94-3367-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Tony M. Smith, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  198 Wis. 2d 820, 543 N.W.2d 836 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
February 6, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
October 31, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
 
MAXINE A. WHITE 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by John Allan Pray and Legal Assistance Program, University 
of Wisconsin Law School, Madison and oral argument by John Allan 
Pray. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by William 
L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
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1
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-3364-CR 
 
94-3365-CR 
 
94-3366-CR 
 
94-3367-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
TONY M. SMITH, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 6, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 
 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals
1 affirming an order of the 
circuit court for Milwaukee County, Maxine A. White, judge, 
denying Smith's postconviction motion.  Smith seeks resentencing 
on the grounds that his counsel provided ineffective assistance 
by failing to object at Smith’s sentencing hearing when the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement.  We conclude that defense 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient, 
and 
that 
Smith 
was 
prejudiced by the State's material and substantial breach of the 
                     
1  State v. Smith, 198 Wis. 2d 820, 543 N.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
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plea agreement.  We therefore reverse the decisions of the lower 
courts and remand for a new sentencing hearing. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
Prior to his conviction, defendant Smith and the 
Milwaukee County Assistant District Attorney negotiated a plea 
agreement whereby Smith agreed to plead no contest to one count 
of burglary  and guilty to four misdemeanors.
2  Under the terms 
of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss three 
additional misdemeanor charges against Smith.  Those charges were 
to be read in at sentencing.  The prosecutor also agreed to make 
no sentencing recommendation.  Judge Leander J. Foley presided 
over the plea hearing.  In accepting Smith's plea, the circuit 
court informed him that he could be sentenced to the maximum 
prison term for each offense.  The court then ordered a pre-
sentence investigation. 
¶3 
Judge John J. DiMotto presided over the sentencing 
hearing.  At that hearing, and contrary to the plea agreement, 
the prosecutor recommended that Smith be sentenced to 58 months 
in prison.  Smith’s counsel did not object to the prosecutor's 
recommendation.  Defense counsel then recommended a prison 
sentence of 36 months.  The circuit court sentenced Smith to six 
years in prison on the burglary count and nine months in jail on 
each misdemeanor to run concurrently with the burglary sentence. 
 The court analyzed a number of factors appropriate for 
                     
2  Smith pled guilty or no contest to charges under the following 
statutes: Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1)(a), 943.01(1), 943.11, 
943.21(1)(a) and 939.05. (1993-94).  All future references are 
to the 1993-94 volume unless otherwise indicated. 
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sentencing and never mentioned the State's recommendation of 58 
months.
3 
¶4 
Smith filed several motions after his sentencing.  
First, he filed two motions that were heard by Judge DiMotto.
4  
Later, Smith filed a postconviction motion, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.30, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  He 
alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object during sentencing when the plea agreement was breached.  
The ineffective assistance motion was filed after the court of 
appeals granted Smith’s motion to extend time for filing a notice 
of appeal. 
¶5 
Judge Maxine A. White was assigned to handle the latter 
postconviction motion.  Without a hearing, and without a response 
from the State, the circuit court denied Smith’s motion alleging 
ineffective assistance.  The court first concluded that defense 
counsel's failure to object at the sentencing constituted 
deficient performance.  The court also found that the sentencing 
court did not rely on the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation. 
 Therefore, the circuit court held that defense counsel's 
deficient performance did not prejudice the outcome of the 
sentencing.  Smith appealed. 
                     
3  The sentencing court also considered the pertinent sentencing 
guidelines and, according to the State, the sentence Smith 
received was at the upper end of the sentencing guidelines for 
his offense. 
4  The motions after sentencing heard by Judge DiMotto included a 
motion to modify the sentence and a motion for credit for time 
served.  Neither motion was explicitly raised, or granted, under 
Wis. Stat. § 809.30, the statute governing postconviction 
motions.  The court granted Smith’s first two motions by giving 
Smith credit for time served and modifying the misdemeanor 
sentences from nine month terms each to four month terms each.  
Neither of these motions is relevant to our consideration of the 
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¶6 
On appeal Smith asserted that by recommending a 
sentence the prosecutor had committed a material and substantial 
breach of the plea agreement.  By doing so, Smith contended, the 
prosecutor denied Smith what he bargained for.  Smith agreed with 
the 
circuit 
court's 
conclusion 
that 
under 
Strickland 
v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
5 the deficient performance 
component of the ineffective assistance of counsel test was met 
when his attorney failed to object to the prosecutor's breach. 
¶7 
Smith next contended that the Strickland decision 
rejected an outcome-determinative test for proving the prejudice 
component of an ineffective assistance claim.  Smith maintained 
that the outcome was affected because if the State had not 
breached the plea agreement, or if his counsel had objected to 
the 
breach, 
Smith 
would 
have 
received 
the 
State's 
"no 
recommendation" statement for which he negotiated.  Smith also 
contended at the court of appeals, as he does here, that 
prejudice 
can 
be 
presumed 
from 
his 
counsel's 
deficient 
performance in this case. 
¶8 
In response, the State conceded at the court of appeals 
that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement.
6  The State also 
agreed that defense counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 
Smith because a term of his agreement with the State was not met. 
                                                                  
ineffective assistance of counsel claim here. 
5  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), sets out the 
two-part test for assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 
6  The State argued, however, that Smith failed to timely raise 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his series of 
postconviction motions.  By order of July 15, 1995, the court of 
appeals denied the State's motion seeking summary affirmance on 
the waiver grounds.  State v. Smith, 198 Wis. 2d 820, 823 n.3, 
543 N.W.2d 836 (Ct. App. 1995).  The court of appeals proceeded 
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 The State conceded that together, the breach of the plea 
agreement and the failure to object to that breach rendered the 
proceedings flawed and unfair.  According to the State, the 
proper focus then was not whether Judge DiMotto would have 
imposed a different sentence if Smith's counsel had objected, but 
whether the sentencing proceeding itself would have been altered. 
 Before the court of appeals, the State agreed with Smith that he 
was entitled to relief in the form of resentencing.   
¶9 
The 
appellate 
court 
upheld 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination of deficient performance by Smith's trial attorney. 
 198 Wis. 2d at 824.  The court of appeals likewise upheld the 
lower court's conclusion that Smith was not prejudiced by his 
counsel's performance, for two reasons.  First, the court of 
appeals underscored the fact that Judge Foley, in accepting 
Smith's plea, informed Smith that the court was not bound by the 
prosecutor's recommendations, and that the court could sentence 
Smith up to the maximum prison term for each offense.  198 Wis. 
2d at 825.  Smith acknowledged at the plea hearing that he 
understood this possibility. 
¶10 Second, the court of appeals held that Judge DiMotto 
relied on the sentencing guidelines, Smith's prior record, his 
character, and the number of crimes involved, and did not rely on 
the prosecutor's recommendation when deciding Smith's sentence.  
198 Wis. 2d at 827.  In fact, the court of appeals surmised that 
Judge 
DiMotto 
"apparently 
ignored 
the 
prosecutor's 
recommendation."  Id.  Because the sentencing judge did not rely 
on the prosecutor's recommendation, the court held that Smith did 
                                                                  
to review the merits of the ineffective assistance claim. 
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not show a reasonable probability that, in the absence of his 
counsel's failure to object, the "result of the proceeding would 
have been different," 198 Wis. 2d at 827 (citing Strickland, 466 
U.S at 694).  According to the court of appeals, Smith failed to 
show 
that 
if 
the 
prosecutor had 
not 
made 
a 
sentencing 
recommendation, or if Smith's counsel had objected to such a 
recommendation, there was a reasonable probability that Smith 
would have received a lesser sentence.  Id.     
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 When the facts are undisputed, the question of whether 
the prosecutor’s conduct breached the terms of the plea agreement 
is a question of law that we review de novo.  State v. Wills, 193 
Wis. 2d 273, 277, 533 N.W.2d 165 (1995).  The question of whether 
counsel's actions constitute ineffective assistance is a mixed 
question of law and fact.  State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 
Wis. 2d 587, 609, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994)(citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 698).  The circuit court's findings of fact will not be 
reversed unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Pitsch, 124 
Wis. 2d 628, 633-34, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985); Wis. Stat. §  
805.17(2).  Finally, the ultimate conclusion of whether counsel's 
conduct violated Smith's right to effective assistance of counsel 
is a question of law that this court decides without deference to 
the lower courts.
7  State v. [Oliver Ross] Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 
                     
7  The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
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207, 216, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986); State v. Ludwig, 124 Wis. 2d 
600, 607, 369 N.W.2d 722 (1985).   
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
¶12 Both parties come to us concerned with the integrity of 
the plea process.  Smith argues that he was prejudiced because he 
did not receive a material and substantial benefit of the 
agreement he made with the State, a sentencing without any 
recommendation by the prosecutor.  The State is likewise 
concerned that the integrity of the plea process be preserved, 
but argues here that Smith has not been prejudiced.
8 
¶13 Smith contends that he was denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel by his attorney's failure to 
object when the prosecutor recommended a sentence in violation of 
their plea agreement.  First, he asserts that the prosecutor's 
recommendation was a material and substantial breach of the 
negotiated plea agreement.  Second, Smith asserts that his 
counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's recommendation 
constituted deficient performance.  Third, Smith contends that he 
                                                                  
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Art. I, sec. 7 of the Wisconsin constitution provides: 
Rights of accused.  In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and 
counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; and in prosecutions by indictment, or 
information, to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the county or district wherein the offense shall have 
been committed; which county or district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law. 
8  The parties agreed at oral argument that here we are concerned 
with only one breach of the plea agreement, a breach by the 
prosecutor.  Thus, we do not address the procedural implications 
of a case where both parties to the plea agreement have breached 
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was prejudiced both because he did not receive what the State 
promised him in the plea agreement and because his defense 
counsel failed to object to the broken promise.  Smith seeks a 
remand for resentencing under the terms of the original plea 
agreement. 
¶14 The State agrees that the circuit court order summarily 
denying Smith's motion for postconviction relief should be 
reversed.  First, the State has conceded throughout these 
proceedings that by recommending a sentence of 58 months, the 
prosecutor breached the terms of the plea agreement with Smith.9 
 Second, the State has likewise conceded throughout these 
proceedings that the adversary process did not properly function 
here, and that defense counsel's failure to object at the 
sentencing hearings constituted deficient performance.  Before 
the court of appeals, the State also conceded that Smith was 
prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance following the 
breach.  The State initially argued that the proper focus, under 
Strickland, and under State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d 359, 389 N.W.2d 
40 (Ct. App. 1986), was whether the prosecutor complied with the 
plea agreement.  According to the State's brief to the court of 
appeals, the actual prejudice sustained by Smith was the State's 
failure to perform one of the terms to which Smith agreed.  A 
breach of the plea agreement rendered the sentencing proceeding 
fundamentally unfair.  Had the prosecution's breach been objected 
                                                                  
its terms. 
9  The State asserts that the breach was “inadvertent.”  However, 
as the United States Supreme Court said in a similar breach of a 
plea agreement case, the fact that "the breach was inadvertent 
does not lessen its impact." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257, 262 (1971). 
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to at the sentencing, the proceeding would have been different.  
The breach, according to the State, would have been noted and 
corrected. 
¶15 The State now withdraws its earlier concession of 
prejudice.  The State asserts that its argument before the court 
of appeals was "doctrinally incorrect" under Strickland.  Below, 
the State focused on whether the sentencing proceeding itself 
would have been different if defense counsel had objected to the 
prosecutor's 
recommendation. 
 
The 
State 
argued 
that 
the 
proceeding would have been different, presumably because either 
the prosecutor would have withdrawn the recommendation, or 
because Judge DiMotto would have granted a new sentencing hearing 
before a different judge.  Before this court, however, the State 
contends that the proper inquiry is whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, had defense counsel performed properly, the 
sentencing proceeding would have produced a different outcome, 
i.e., a different sentence. 
¶16 The State now reads Strickland to require a full 
hearing in this case to apply the test for ineffectiveness of 
counsel.  The State submits that both the circuit court and the 
court of appeals erred in summarily determining, without a fully 
developed record, that Smith was not prejudiced by his counsel's 
performance subsequent to the breach.  In particular, the State 
points out that the judge accepting the plea was not the 
sentencing judge.  The latter judge, Judge DiMotto, was never 
made aware of the State's promise not to recommend a specific 
sentence.  The State contends that it would have been quite 
reasonable for Judge DiMotto to conclude that the defense had 
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agreed 
as 
part 
of 
the 
plea 
agreement 
to 
the 
State's 
recommendation of 58 months' imprisonment. 
¶17 In addition, the State points out that the sentencing 
court may well have relied on the prosecutor's recommendation, 
but failed to mention it.  The State offers certain statistical 
information to assert that because the overwhelming majority of 
criminal cases are terminated by guilty or no-contest pleas, and 
because sentence recommendations by prosecutors are often a part 
of the negotiated disposition, such sentencing concessions by the 
State are "important, significant, and influential in the courts' 
ultimate sentencing decisions."10  Respondent's brief at 20-21.  
Under such circumstances, the State contends that the circuit 
court should not have summarily rejected Smith's ineffectiveness 
claim.  Rather, the State urges us to remand for a plenary 
examination of Smith's ineffectiveness claim.  By giving both 
parties the opportunity to present evidence and offer argument, 
the State asserts that the circuit court can specifically 
determine whether there is a reasonable probability that proper 
performance by Smith's counsel, after the prosecutor's breach, 
would have produced a different result.  
                     
10   As the United States Supreme Court said in Santobello 
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971), "The disposition of 
criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the 
accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an 
essential component of the administration of justice.  Properly 
administered, it is to be encouraged.  If every criminal charge 
were subjected to a full-scale trial, the [state] would need to 
multiply 
by many 
times 
the 
number 
of judges 
and 
court 
facilities."  For a survey of Wisconsin case law on the purpose 
and validity of plea agreements, and the consequences of a breach 
of a plea agreement, see Christine M. Wiseman et al., Criminal 
Practice and Procedure §§ 23.11 - 23.42 at 740-758 (West 
Wisconsin Practice Series, Vol. 9, 1996). 
 
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BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
¶18 A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the 
enforcement of a negotiated plea agreement.  State v. Wills, 187 
Wis. 2d 529, 536, 523 N.W.2d 569 (Ct. App. 1994) aff'd, 193 Wis. 
2d 273, 533 N.W.2d 165 (1995)(citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 
504 (1984)).  Due process concerns arise in the process of 
enforcing a plea agreement.  Wills, 187 Wis. 2d at 537 (citing 
Daniel Frome Kaplan, Comment, Where Promises End: Prosecutorial 
Adherence 
to 
Sentence 
Recommendation 
Commitments 
in 
Plea 
Bargains, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751, 755 (1985)).  "Although a 
defendant has no right to call upon the prosecution to perform 
while the agreement is wholly executory, once the defendant has 
given up his bargaining chip by pleading guilty, due process 
requires that the defendant's expectations be fulfilled."  187 
Wis. 2d at 537 (quoting Kaplan, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 755). 
¶19 The Wills court concluded that a contract law analysis 
of a plea agreement leads to the same result as a due process 
analysis.  187 Wis. 2d at 537.  An agreement by the State to make 
a particular sentence recommendation may induce the defendant to 
waive his fundamental right to a trial.  "Government sentence 
recommendation 
commitments 
fundamentally 
influence 
the 
defendant's calculus by altering the expected outcome of a 
sentencing proceeding."  Id. (quoting Kaplan, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
at 769).  When a prosecutor does not make the negotiated 
sentencing recommendation, that conduct constitutes a breach of 
the plea agreement.  State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d at 364. 
¶20 In a case where the defendant sought to withdraw his 
guilty plea because the prosecutor may have technically breached 
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the agreement, we said that a plea agreement may be vacated where 
a "material and substantial breach of the agreement" is proven.  
State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 289, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  
Such a breach must deprive the defendant of a material and 
substantial benefit for which he or she bargained.  Id. at 290.  
Further, we said that a material and substantial breach amounts 
to a "manifest injustice."  Id. at 289. 
¶21 Here, the terms of the plea agreement were clear.  
Following their negotiations, Smith agreed to plead no contest to 
one charge of burglary and guilty to four misdemeanors.  The 
State 
agreed 
to 
dismiss, 
although 
read 
in, 
three 
other 
misdemeanor charges and to refrain from recommending any specific 
sentence term.  The State's agreement to make no sentencing 
recommendation 
was 
unambiguous, 
and 
was 
a 
material 
and 
substantial term of the plea agreement.  At the sentencing 
hearing, however, the prosecutor recommended a sentence of 58 
months, a sentence at the high end of the sentencing guidelines 
for the burglary offense.  This recommendation was contrary to 
the State’s agreement and was more than a technical breach of the 
agreement.  Smith's expectation that the prosecution refrain from 
making any sentencing recommendation was not fulfilled.  Thus, 
the State's recommendation deprived Smith of the benefit for 
which he negotiated, and constituted a material and substantial 
breach of the plea agreement.  Further, the breach was not 
remedied, because Smith's counsel failed to object to the breach. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE 
¶22 The failure of Smith's counsel to timely object to the 
prosecutor's breach is the basis for the ineffective assistance 
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claim here.  The right to effective assistance of counsel derives 
from the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Art. I, sec. 7 of the Wisconsin constitution.  Both provisions 
grant the right to a fair trial, including the assistance of 
counsel in criminal cases. Strickland, 466 U.S at 684-86.  There 
are two components to a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel: 
a 
demonstration 
that 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient, and a demonstration that such deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant.  Id. at 687.  The defendant has the 
burden of proof on both components.  Id. at 688. 
¶23 To prove deficient performance, the defendant must 
establish that his or her counsel "made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment."  State v. [Edward] Johnson, 
153 Wis. 2d 121, 127, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990)(citing Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687).  The defendant must overcome a strong 
presumption that his or her counsel acted reasonably within 
professional norms.  Id.   The Strickland Court outlined certain 
basic duties that an attorney owes the criminal defense client.  
Among those is the duty to "bring to bear such skill and 
knowledge as will render the trial [or proceeding] a reliable 
adversarial testing process." 466 U.S. at 688 (citations 
omitted).   
¶24 Normally, 
judicial 
scrutiny 
of 
an 
attorney's 
performance will be highly deferential.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689.  The court must determine whether, under all the 
circumstances, counsel's conduct was outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance.  Id. at 690.  In Strickland, 
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the ineffectiveness claim was based on a failure to investigate. 
 The inquiry then involved information supplied to counsel by the 
defendant client.  The Court noted that counsel's actions are 
often 
based 
on 
"informed 
strategic 
choices 
made 
by 
the 
defendant."  Id. at 691. 
¶25 Here, however, Smith's claim is based on a failure to 
object to adversary counsel's breach of a negotiated agreement.  
No further information or investigation was required to enable 
defense counsel to offer an objection at the sentencing hearing. 
 Moreover, the failure to object flew in the face of the 
"informed strategic choice" made by Smith earlier when he entered 
into the plea agreement.  The failure to object constituted a 
breakdown in the adversarial system. 
¶26 The State concedes that defense counsel's failure to 
object 
to 
the 
prosecutor's 
sentencing 
recommendation 
was 
deficient performance.  The trial court so held.  The court of 
appeals agreed with that conclusion.  The court of appeals held 
defense 
counsel's 
failure 
to 
immediately 
object 
to 
the 
prosecutor's clear and absolute breach of the plea agreement to 
be deficient performance.  We therefore conclude that defense 
counsel's failure to immediately object to the prosecutor's 
sentence recommendation, a recommendation that clearly breached 
Smith's plea agreement, was not reasonable conduct within 
professional norms and constitutes deficient performance. 11 
                     
11  In light of the State's concession of deficient performance 
as well as our own conclusion on deficient performance, no 
Machner hearing is necessary given the facts of this case.  
However, see State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 
905 (Ct. App. 1979).  In Machner, the court ruled that in order 
to determine on appeal whether the attorney's action was the 
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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE: PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT 
 ¶27  Whether or not Smith was prejudiced by his counsel's 
deficient performance is the crux of the matter now before us.  
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that "when a plea rests 
in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor . . . such promise must be fulfilled."  Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).  The guilty plea process must 
be attended by certain assurances that the defendant will receive 
what is reasonably due, under the circumstances.  Id.  According 
to the Strickland Court, proof of prejudice requires a showing 
that the defendant was deprived of a fair proceeding whose result 
is reliable.  466 U.S. at 687.  The defendant need only 
demonstrate to the court that the outcome is suspect, but need 
not establish that the final result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  As the Strickland Court said,  
An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one 
of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding 
is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and 
the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat 
lower.  The result of a proceeding can be rendered 
unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if 
the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of 
the evidence to have determined the outcome . . . The 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable 
probability is a 
probability sufficient 
to 
undermine 
confidence in the outcome. 
 
Id. at 694. 
 
¶28 The Strickland test is not an outcome-determinative 
test.  Id. at 693-94.  In decisions following Strickland, the 
Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the touchstone of the prejudice 
                                                                  
result of deliberate trial strategy or incompetence, trial 
counsel's testimony as to his or her reasoning must be preserved 
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component is "whether counsel's deficient performance renders the 
result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally 
unfair."  Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).  In Nix 
v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175-76 (1986), the Court said that 
the “benchmark” of the right to counsel is the “fairness of the 
adversary proceeding;” see also, United States v. Morrison, 449 
U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (the right to counsel “is meant to assure 
fairness in the adversary criminal process”).  
¶29 The 
Santobello 
decision 
was 
rendered 
prior 
to 
Strickland but likewise relied on principles of fairness to 
establish that the breach of a prosecutor's agreement required a 
remand either for specific performance under the agreement, or to 
permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.  404 U.S. at 262-63.  
In that case, the defendant had negotiated with the prosecutor 
and agreed to plead guilty to a lesser included offense that 
carried a maximum sentence of one year in prison.  As part of 
that agreement, the prosecutor agreed to make no sentence 
recommendation.  404 U.S. at 258.  There were a number of 
procedural delays after the defendant entered his guilty plea and 
before his sentencing.  In that interval, the defendant acquired 
new defense counsel, the original presiding judge retired, and by 
the time of the sentencing, a different prosecutor had taken on 
the case.  Id. at 258-59.  That prosecutor recommended the 
maximum sentence.  Id. at 259.  Unlike the facts before us, 
however, 
Santobello's counsel 
immediately objected to the 
prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement condition and requested 
an adjournment.  Id. 
                                                                  
at a hearing.  
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¶30 The trial court declined to adjourn the hearing or to 
take testimony.  The judge then told the parties that he was not 
at all influenced by the prosecutor's recommendation, but instead 
relied upon the presentence report in rendering the maximum 
sentence.  Id. at 259-60.  After unsuccessful appeals to New York 
courts, Santobello sought certiorari in the United States Supreme 
Court. 
¶31 The Court observed that plea negotiations between the 
State and the defendant offer a number of advantages to 
efficiently ensure the public's protection and the prompt 
disposition of criminal cases.  Id. at 261.  But, the Court 
cautioned, all of those advantages are premised on a plea 
negotiation rooted in fairness.  "[A]ll of these considerations 
presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and 
a prosecutor."  Id.  To ensure a fair result to the process, 
certain safeguards must be present.  "[A] constant factor is that 
when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of 
the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." 
 Id. at 262.  The Court held that the interests of justice and a 
recognition of the duties of the prosecution would best be served 
by a remand to the state courts.  Id. at 262-63. 
¶32 Discussing the prejudice component sometime after 
Santobello, the Supreme Court said that “[u]nreliability or 
unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does 
not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right 
to which the law entitles him.”  Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 372.  
Santobello remains consistent with the later rulings of the 
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Supreme Court in that it recognizes the defendant’s substantive 
right to fulfillment of the fundamental terms of a plea 
agreement, and also by its conclusion that a breach of the plea 
agreement, unobjected to by defense counsel, constitutes a 
deprivation of that substantive right. 
¶33 In certain instances, prejudice is presumed once 
deficient performance has been proven.  The Supreme Court 
highlighted several of these situations: 
In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. 
 Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel 
altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice.  So 
are various kinds of state interference with counsel's 
assistance.  Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely 
that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the 
cost.  Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of 
the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for 
that reason and because the prosecution is directly 
responsible, easy for the government to prevent. 
 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citations omitted). 
¶34 Instances 
where 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
presumed 
prejudice include United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 
(1984)(presuming that trial is unfair if the accused is denied 
counsel at a critical stage of the trial); Hamilton v. Alabama, 
368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961)(presumption of prejudice when defendant is 
denied counsel at arraignment); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 
60 (1963) (prejudice presumed when defendant denied counsel at 
preliminary hearing); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 864 
(1975)(presumption of prejudice where defendant denied right to 
give closing argument); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 (1988) 
(ruling that where there is a complete denial of appeal, 
prejudice is presumed); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 
(1980) (presumption of prejudice to defendant where his attorney 
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19
labored under an actual conflict of interest that negatively 
affected his performance). 
¶35 Our court too, has presumed prejudice to a criminal 
defendant in some instances.  In one ineffective assistance of 
counsel case we ruled that had certain letters creating doubt as 
to the defendant's competency to stand trial been introduced, 
"the trial court would have been required to hold a competency 
hearing." State v. [Oliver Ross] Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 224.  
Thus, the defendant in Johnson established that his counsel's 
failure to bring those letters to the circuit court's attention 
"was so serious as to deprive [the defendant] of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable."  133 Wis. 2d at 224.   Later, in 
State v. Behnke, 155 Wis. 2d 796, 456 N.W.2d 610 (1990), we 
declined to consider whether the outcome would have been 
different but for counsel's error.  In particular, we declined to 
assess whether the jury poll would have yielded a different 
result had Behnke's attorney been present at the reading of the 
verdict.  Instead, we assumed prejudice because the defense 
counsel's absence cost the defendant a "very important right."  
155 Wis. 2d at 802, 806. 
¶36 Part of the rationale behind presuming prejudice is the 
difficulty in measuring the harm caused by the error or the 
ineffective assistance.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; Behnke, 
155 Wis. 2d at 806.  In Behnke, for instance, we declined to 
indulge in calculation or speculation about the prejudice arising 
from the absence of counsel and the failure to poll the jury.  
155 Wis. 2d at 807.   
¶37 In this case, both parties recognize the difficulty in 
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measuring the degree to which Smith was prejudiced when his 
counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's breach.  To 
ascertain what would have happened in the absence of error, the 
State suggests that we remand to the circuit court for a new 
hearing to determine whether Mr. Smith would have received a 
different sentence if the prosecutor had made no recommendation. 
 But such a hearing would necessarily involve speculation and 
calculation.  Retrospective testimony by the judge who sentenced 
Smith would be inappropriate, and irrelevant.12  Poole, 131 Wis. 
2d at 364. 
¶38 Instead, we conclude that when a prosecutor agrees to 
make no sentence recommendation but instead recommends a 
significant prison term, such conduct is a material and 
substantial breach of the plea agreement.  Such a breach of the 
State's agreement on sentencing is a “manifest injustice” and 
always results in prejudice to the defendant.13  See State v. 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 289.  The breach of a material and 
substantial term of a plea agreement by the prosecutor deprives 
                     
12  Similarly, the Santobello Court declined to reach the 
question of whether the sentencing judge would have been 
influenced had he known all the details of the plea 
negotiations.  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 
 And although the trial judge testified at the subsequent habeas 
corpus evidentiary hearing in Strickland, on review the Supreme 
Court declared that the actual process of decision, if not 
already part of the record of the proceeding under review, 
should not be considered in the prejudice determination, and in 
fact was irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695, 700 (1984).  See also State v. 
Poole, 131 Wis. 2d 359, 364, 389 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1986). 
13  There may be some circumstances in which the State argues 
that defense counsel's failure to object to a recommendation 
that causes a material and substantial breach of the plea 
agreement was a strategic decision by the defense counsel.  In 
such cases, postconviction counsel would have to meet his or her 
burden at a Machner hearing. 
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the defendant of a sentencing proceeding whose result is fair and 
reliable.  Our conclusion precludes any need to consider what the 
sentencing judge would have done if the defense counsel had 
objected to the breach by the district attorney.  Rather, our 
conclusion is premised on the rule of Santobello, that when a 
negotiated plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement of the prosecutor, such promise must be fulfilled.  404 
U.S. at 262.   
 
¶39 We are mindful that the sentencing court is not bound 
by the parties' negotiations.  State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 
128, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990); Melby v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 368, 385-
86, 234 N.W.2d 634 (1975).  The sentencing court always has an 
independent duty to look beyond the recommendations and to 
consider all relevant sentencing factors.14  There is no question 
that Judge DiMotto had the authority to sentence Smith to any 
appropriate sentence up to the statutory maximum.  But the 
prejudice in this case arose when the prosecutor recommended a 
significant 
prison 
term 
after 
an 
agreement 
to 
make 
no 
recommendation, and Smith's defense counsel failed to object to 
                     
14  Sentencing is left to the discretion of the circuit court.  
State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 622, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984).  
The primary factors that the circuit court must consider in 
imposing a sentence are: (1) the gravity of the offense, (2) the 
character and rehabilitation needs of the defendant, and (3) the 
need for protection of the public.  State v. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 
2d 655, 673, 348 N.W.2d 527 (1984).  The sentencing court may 
consider other factors including the aggravated nature of the 
crime, the past record of criminal offenses, any history of 
undesirable behavior patterns, defendant's personality, 
character and social traits, results of presentence 
investigation, degree of defendant's culpability, defendant's 
demeanor at trial, defendant's age, educational background and 
work history, defendant's remorse, repentance and cooperation, 
and the length of pretrial detention.  State v. Borrell, 167 
Wis. 2d 749, 773-74, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992). 
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that recommendation. 
 
¶40 We conclude that Smith was automatically prejudiced 
when the prosecutor materially and substantially breached the 
plea agreement.  Thus, there is no need to remand for a 
determination of the ineffectiveness of counsel.  Instead, we 
grant Smith's request for a new sentencing hearing conducted in 
accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. 
 
By the Court.—Reversed and remanded for a new 
sentencing hearing.