Case Title: Commonwealth v. Dotson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 071162

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.       Record No. 071162                 OPINION BY 
JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
NINA CARMAN DOTSON 
      June 6, 2008 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF BRISTOL 
Larry B. Kirksey, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a criminal charge that 
was dismissed pursuant to a first offender statute, Code 
§ 18.2-251, can be expunged from a defendant’s record. 
 
Nina Dotson (“Dotson”), charged with possession of 
marijuana under Code § 18.2-250.1, tendered a plea of nolo 
contendere in the Circuit Court of the City of Bristol.  The 
court accepted the plea, deferred proceedings pursuant to a 
first offender statute, Code § 18.2-251, and, upon Dotson’s 
successful completion of the obligations imposed upon her by 
the court, dismissed the charge.  Approximately three years 
later, Dotson made a motion for expungement of her records 
regarding the possession of marijuana charge.  The trial court 
granted the motion.  The Commonwealth appeals. 
 
On August 2, 2001, Dotson pled not guilty to the 
misdemeanor charge of possession of marijuana and was convicted 
in the General District Court of the City of Bristol.  Dotson 
appealed the conviction to the Circuit Court of the City of 
Bristol, where she tendered a plea of nolo contendere as part 
of an agreement that the Commonwealth would recommend that she 
be treated as a first offender pursuant to Code § 18.2-251.  
The court accepted the plea and deferred proceedings pursuant 
to the first offender statute.  The trial court’s order did not 
state that there was a finding of guilt or that there was 
evidence sufficient for a finding of guilt. 
 
Pursuant to the disposition of her claim under the first 
offender statute, the court ordered Dotson to serve one year of 
active probation and suspended her driver’s license for six 
months.  The court also ordered Dotson to pay the cost of the 
proceedings within six months, enter into and successfully 
complete any substance abuse programs as directed by her 
probation officer, complete twenty-four hours of community 
service, and remain free from using drugs and alcohol.  On 
October 23, 2002, the circuit court ruled that Dotson had 
satisfied her court-ordered obligations and, based upon 
Dotson’s successful completion of those court-ordered 
obligations, the court dismissed the possession of marijuana 
charge. 
 
On December 27, 2005, Dotson served the Commonwealth with 
a motion for expungement of her police and court records 
regarding the possession of marijuana charge.  Dotson stated in 
her motion that the charge had been dismissed upon her 
successful completion of her court-ordered obligations.  Dotson 
 
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did not allege that she had been acquitted or that a nolle 
prosequi had been taken in her case.  Her motivation for 
seeking expungement, as stated in her motion, was a job 
rejection and the potential for subsequent rejections due to 
her criminal record.  
 
After a hearing, the trial court found that “[u]nwarranted 
damage [] occurred to [Dotson] and may occur in the future if 
her arrest record is not expunged.”  The trial court also found 
that, even though the court had treated Dotson as a first 
offender, the court’s order doing so failed to “reflect a 
finding of guilt or that the evidence would have been 
sufficient for a finding of guilt.”  Based on these findings, 
the trial court ordered that Dotson’s arrest and court records 
regarding the possession of marijuana charge be expunged.  
 
Code § 19.2-392.1 contains the following statement of 
policy: 
The General Assembly finds that arrest records can be 
a hindrance to an innocent citizen's ability to 
obtain employment, an education and to obtain credit. 
It further finds that the police and court records of 
those of its citizens who have been absolutely 
pardoned for crimes for which they have been unjustly 
convicted can also be a hindrance. This chapter is 
intended to protect such persons from the unwarranted 
damage which may occur as a result of being arrested 
and convicted. 
 
Code § 19.2-392.1 (emphasis added). 
 
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Code § 19.2-392.2(A) lists the pertinent occasions when an 
expungement may be sought; it states, in relevant part: 
If a person is charged with the commission of a 
crime and (1) [i]s acquitted, or (2) [a] nolle 
prosequi is taken or the charge is otherwise 
dismissed, including dismissal by accord and 
satisfaction pursuant to § 19.2-151 . . . he may 
file a petition setting forth the relevant facts and 
requesting expungement . . . . 
 
Code § 19.2-392.2(A).∗  There is no dispute regarding the fact 
that Dotson was neither acquitted nor was a nolle prosequi 
taken dismissing her charge.  Thus, under the statute, in order 
for Dotson’s charge to be expunged, it must have been 
“otherwise dismissed.” 
The Commonwealth notes that Dotson pled nolo contendere 
and that the relevant first offender statute, Code § 18.2-251, 
requires a court to find evidence sufficient for a finding of 
guilt prior to placing a defendant on first offender status.  
The Commonwealth argues that expungement is designed for 
“innocent” citizens, and a charge dismissed pursuant to a first 
offender statute is not “otherwise dismissed” as required by 
Code § 19.2-392.2(A); thus, it may not be expunged.  
 
Dotson argues that she is entitled to expungement despite 
her plea of nolo contendere because the trial court’s order, 
deferring disposition of her charge and placing her on terms 
 
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pursuant to Code § 18.2-251, did not expressly state that the 
court found evidence sufficient for a finding of guilt.  
Analogizing her dismissal to an accord and satisfaction, Dotson 
claims that her charge qualifies for expungement because it was 
“otherwise dismissed” within the meaning of Code § 19.2-
392.2(A).  We disagree with Dotson. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 255 Va. 552, 499 S.E.2d 276 
(1998), this Court offered the following explanation regarding 
a plea of nolo contendere: 
We recognize that a plea of nolo contendere is not a 
confession of guilt and has no effect beyond 
permitting the court to impose sentence in a 
particular case. Nonetheless, by entering a plea of 
nolo contendere, the defendant "implies a confession 
. . . of the truth of the charge . . . [and] agrees 
that the court may consider him guilty" for the 
purpose of imposing judgment and sentence.  Thus, 
while not an admission of guilt, neither is a plea of 
nolo contendere a declaration of innocence equivalent 
to a plea of not guilty. 
 
 
Id. at 555, 499 S.E.2d at 278 (citations omitted). 
Dotson, by pleading nolo contendere to the possession of 
marijuana charge, agreed that the court could consider her 
guilty for the purpose of imposing judgment and sentence. 
Accepting Dotson’s plea of nolo contendere, the trial 
court placed her on first offender status.  The first offender 
                                                                 
∗ Code § 19.2-392.2 was amended effective July 1, 2007.  
See 2007 Acts chs. 465, 824, 883, and 905.  However, these 
amendments are not relevant to this case. 
 
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statute, Code § 18.2-251, states that if a person pleads guilty 
or enters a plea of not guilty, “the court, upon such plea if 
the facts found by the court would justify a finding of guilt, 
without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of 
the accused, may defer further proceedings and place him on 
probation upon terms and conditions.”  Code § 18.2-251 
(emphasis added).  By statute, inherent in a trial court 
placing a defendant on first offender status is a finding by 
the trial court that there is evidence sufficient to find the 
defendant guilty.  Under the first offender statute, probation 
and ultimate dismissal is conditioned upon a finding of guilt.  
Gregg v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 504, 507, 316 S.E.2d 741, 743 
(1984). 
This Court presumes that the trial court followed the 
statutory mandate of Code § 18.2-251.  See Napert v. Napert, 
261 Va. 45, 47, 540 S.E.2d 882, 884 (2001); Beck v. Semones, 
145 Va. 429, 442, 134 S.E. 677, 681 (1926).  As a matter of 
law, the trial court had to find there was sufficient evidence 
to find Dotson guilty before disposing of her case pursuant to 
the first offender statute by deferring further proceedings and 
placing Dotson on probation with terms and conditions that had 
to be satisfied prior to the dismissal of her charge. 
 
A defendant cannot be considered “innocent” as 
contemplated by the expungement statute when he or she 
 
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enters a plea of nolo contendere and the trial court finds 
that the evidence was sufficient to prove his or her 
guilt.  Jackson, 255 Va. at 555-56, 499 S.E.2d at 278.  
Dotson, nevertheless, claims that her situation may be 
analogized to one in which a charge is dismissed by accord 
and satisfaction.  However, in Jackson, we held that an 
accord and satisfaction “dismissal occurs without any 
determination of guilt or imposition of penalty by 
judicial authority.”  Jackson, 255 Va. at 556, 499 S.E.2d 
at 279.  We further held that: 
A person deferred from judgment following a 
determination that the evidence is sufficient to 
support a conviction is not "innocent" of the 
offense regardless of the plea originally entered. 
Nor does a dismissal following satisfaction of the 
terms of that deferral render the case "otherwise 
dismissed" for purposes of expungement. 
 
Id. at 557, 499 S.E.2d at 279. 
 
Dotson pled nolo contendere and was placed on first 
offender status.  The trial court was required to find evidence 
sufficient for a finding of guilt in order to defer the 
proceedings pursuant to the first offender statute, Code 
§ 18.2-251.  Her charge was not dismissed until after she 
completed court-ordered obligations including the suspension of 
her operator’s license, probation, and payment of court costs.  
By statute, such obligations could not be imposed absent a 
finding of evidence sufficient to find her guilty.  Thus, 
 
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Dotson’s charge was not “otherwise dismissed” within the 
meaning of the expungement statute, and Dotson was not entitled 
to have the charge expunged from her record. 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the trial court granting 
expungement and enter final judgment for the Commonwealth. 
Reversed and final judgment.