Case Title: People v. Lantz & Robles

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83527, 83641

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
People v. Lantz & Robles (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket Nos. 83527, 83641 cons.-Agenda 7-September 1998.
Filed April 20, 1999.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
The common question in these consolidated appeals involves the constitutionality of the guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) statute,
section 115-4(j) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-4(j) (West 1994)). In cause No. 83527, the
defendant, James Lantz, was charged in the circuit court of Lake County with first degree murder. After a jury trial, Lantz was
found guilty but mentally ill of that offense and was sentenced to a term of 38 years' imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed
Lantz's conviction and sentence in an unpublished order. No. 2-95-1569 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166
Ill. 2d R. 23)). We allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). In cause No. 83641, the defendant,
Eric J. Robles, was charged in the circuit court of Du Page County with the first degree murders of his parents and with the
solicitation of their murders. A jury found Robles guilty but mentally ill of those offenses, and the trial judge sentenced Robles to
a term of natural life imprisonment for the first degree murder convictions and to concurrent terms of 35 years' imprisonment for
the solicitation convictions. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed the defendant's convictions and granted the
defendant a new trial, finding the guilty but mentally ill statute unconstitutional. 288 Ill. App. 3d 935. Because the appellate court
found the statute unconstitutional, the State's appeal from that decision is before us as a matter of right. 134 Ill. 2d R. 317. We
consolidated the two cases for purposes of oral argument and disposition, and we now hold that the GBMI statute is
constitutional.
The issues before us are fairly narrow, centering on the constitutionality of the GBMI statute, and much of the evidence in these
cases is uncontested, so only an abbreviated recitation of the testimony is required; additional evidence will be provided as it
becomes necessary.
No. 83527
The defendant in No. 83527, James Lantz, stabbed his wife to death early in the morning on March 16, 1995, inflicting 68
separate wounds to her neck, chest, arms, and hands. The defendant next obtained a can of gasoline from the garage and poured
gasoline around the victim and in the living room. The defendant also severed natural gas lines connecting the stove and clothes
dryer. The defendant then woke up his daughter, telling her to wake her brother and to leave the house because he was going to
set it on fire. The defendant led the children from the house, saying repeatedly that "he was sorry but he had to do it," "she
deserved it," and "she drove me to it." The defendant then set the family's house on fire. While the house was in flames, the
defendant tried to reenter it several times, suffering burns to his feet, a leg, and face. When police arrived, defendant approached
the officers with out-stretched hands, as though he expected to be handcuffed. Police asked where the defendant's wife was, and
the defendant replied, "I killed her." When firefighters asked the defendant about his wife, he answered, "She's dead." Without
prompting, defendant told one officer who was guarding him that his wife spent the preceding night telling him he was going to
hell and that he could not take it anymore. The defendant did not complain about his injuries, appeared to be dazed, and was
nonresponsive to medical personnel.
At trial, the defense presented extensive evidence of the defendant's mental condition and history. In 1991, defendant went to a
hospital emergency room complaining of fatigue and headaches. At that time, defendant had just quit drinking coffee and
smoking. The treating physician, Dr. Antonio Lee, noted in the defendant's records that the defendant was nervous and had
trouble sleeping. The defendant visited Dr. Lee in August 1991, complaining then of increased anxiety. Dr. Lee found that
defendant was anxious about his employment situation but noted that defendant could not explain his concerns logically and
concluded that they were groundless. Dr. Lee prescribed tranquilizers at the time. Dr. Lee saw defendant again three months
later. On that occasion, Dr. Lee noted that defendant's condition had not improved; believing defendant to be delusional, Dr. Lee
advised him to see a psychiatrist.
The defendant saw different doctors at various times during the next several years. In general, they found defendant to be
depressed and agitated, and they prescribed different drugs for him to take. On March 15, 1995, the day before the offense
involved here, defendant interrupted a meeting at his workplace, believing that it was about him. Defendant's boss attempted to
reassure the defendant that the discussion did not concern him and sent him home for the rest of the day. The defendant instead
went to a nearby psychologist's office and made an appointment for that day. The defendant did not keep the appointment,
however. The defendant next went to an office of the Lake County sheriff's department, where he asked whether his wife had
served divorce papers on him. The defendant then went to his accountant's office, without an appointment, to discuss some
unreported income from baby-sitting. The defendant returned to the accountant's office later that afternoon, again without an
appointment. The accountant testified at trial that the defendant was anxious and "hyper." The defendant went home, where he
argued with his wife, accusing her of conspiring with the accountant to have him committed. Early the next morning, the
defendant committed the offense charged here.
While awaiting trial, the defendant was examined by two experts, Dr. Michael Gelbort, a clinical psychologist, and Dr. Donald
Chapman, a psychiatrist, who later testified on the defendant's behalf. In formulating their opinions the defense experts tested the
defendant and reviewed police reports, the defendant's medical records, and statements of various witnesses. Dr. Gelbort testified
that the defendant was insane at the time of the offense. He found the defendant to be suffering from a delusional syndrome and
experiencing persecutory ideas. Dr. Gelbort also said that the defendant was showing evidence of a bipolar disease characterized
by depression and hypermanic presentation. Dr. Chapman also believed that the defendant was insane at the time of the offense.
Dr. Chapman concluded that the defendant was suffering from a bipolar disorder and was experiencing a psychotic episode with
paranoid delusional features.
The defendant was also examined by the State's expert witness, Dr. Henry Lahmeyer, a psychiatrist. Relying on the same
materials as the defense experts, Dr. Lahmeyer concluded that the defendant was not insane at the time of the murder.
At the close of evidence, the jury found the defendant guilty but mentally ill of first degree murder. The trial judge sentenced the
defendant to 38 years' imprisonment for the offense. The appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence in an
unpublished order. No. 2-95-1569 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)). The court concluded
that the jury's finding of mental illness was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the defendant was not denied a
fair trial by several instances of alleged trial error, and that the defendant's 38-year sentence for the offense was not excessive. We
allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we later consolidated the cause with No. 83641,
People v. Robles.
No. 83641
In cause No. 83641, the defendant and a friend were arrested on April 17, 1993, after Elgin police officers found them near their
parked car covered with what appeared to be a red substance. While being taken by ambulance to the hospital, the defendant was
asked who should be notified of his injuries, and the defendant replied, "I just killed my mom." Investigating officers found Mrs.
Robles on the floor in the front room of the family's house; she had a deep cut in her throat. Mrs. Robles was taken to the
hospital, and she died there several hours later. Officers found the body of Mr. Robles in a downstairs bathroom; he also had slash
wounds in the neck.
At trial, the defendant did not challenge the evidence of his participation in the charged offenses, and contended instead that he
was insane at the time. The principal witness for the defense was Ruth Kuncel, a clinical psychologist, who provided expert
testimony on the defendant's mental condition. In formulating her opinion, Dr. Kuncel separately interviewed the defendant and
the defendant's brother, and she reviewed relevant records in the case, including the defendant's medical and school records,
reports prepared by the State's experts, police reports, and grand jury transcripts. Dr. Kuncel testified that the defendant had a
significant personality disorder, had significant deficits in his cognitive functioning, had been pathologically attached to his
mother, and had been depressed for years. She believed that the defendant was borderline, dependent, paranoid, histrionic, and
antisocial. She believed that the defendant was insane at the time of the offenses, lacking substantial capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law. She stated that the defendant was experiencing a brief psychotic disorder at the time of
the attack on his parents. The defense also presented extensive testimony from the defendant's friends, who described the
defendant's difficult home life and the troubled nature of his parents' relationship and of his relationship with his father.
Dr. Henry Lahmeyer, a psychiatrist, examined the defendant on behalf of the State. Dr. Lahmeyer concluded that the defendant
was not insane at the time of the offenses here. In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Lahmeyer relied on his interview with the
defendant, as well as on his review of police reports and grant jury transcripts, the defendant's school records, and other relevant
materials. Dr. Daniel Hardy, a psychiatrist, also examined the defendant on behalf of the State. Like Dr. Lahmeyer, Dr. Hardy
concluded that the defendant was sane at the time of the offenses.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts finding the defendant guilty but mentally ill of the murders of his parents,
and guilty but mentally ill of the solicitation of their murders. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to a mandatory term of
natural life imprisonment for the first degree murders. The judge also imposed concurrent terms of 35 years' imprisonment for the
solicitation convictions.
The defendant appealed, and the appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed the defendant's convictions and remanded
the cause for a new trial. The court found the GBMI provisions unconstitutional on two grounds. First, the court believed that the
statutory scheme is confusing and can only encourage juries to reach compromise verdicts. Second, the court believed that the
statute places conflicting burdens on the defense, by requiring the defense to prove both insanity and mental illness. 288 Ill. App.
3d 935. The State appeals, as a matter of right, from the appellate court's determination that the statute is unconstitutional. 134
Ill. 2d R. 317. We consolidated the appeal with No. 83527, People v. Lantz.
I
We will first address the issue common to the cases consolidated here, whether the GBMI statute is constitutional. The
defendants raise two principal objections to the GBMI provisions. First, they argue that the statutory scheme violates due process
because it places conflicting burdens on the defense. Second, they argue that the provisions violate due process because they
improperly encourage juries to render compromise verdicts.
Section 115-4(j) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides, in pertinent part:
Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, which contains the definitions referred to in the preceding quotation, provides:
A defendant who has been found guilty but mentally ill of an offense may receive any sentence that the same defendant could have
received if he had been found guilty of the offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(a) (West 1994); see also People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266,
277 (1988). Section 5-2-6(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections further provides that a GBMI offender who is sentenced to a
term of imprisonment, like the defendants in the present cases, "shall be committed to the Department of Corrections, which shall
cause periodic inquiry and examination to be made concerning the nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the defendant's
mental illness. The Department of Corrections shall provide such psychiatric, psychological, or other counseling and treatment for
the defendant as it determines necessary." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(b) (West 1994). A GBMI offender who receives a sentence of
probation, periodic imprisonment, or conditional discharge "shall be required to submit to a course of mental treatment prescribed
by the sentencing court." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(e)(1) (West 1994).
It is a familiar doctrine that legislation enjoys a presumption of constitutionality, and that the party challenging a statute has the
burden of establishing its invalidity. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 147 Ill. 2d 57, 67 (1992); Bilyk v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230, 235 (1988); Pre-School Owners Ass'n of Illinois, Inc. v. Department of Children & Family Services,
119 Ill. 2d 268, 275 (1988). Our role in evaluating the provisions at issue here is necessarily limited, for we are not called upon to
determine whether the legislature has chosen the best or most effective means of resolving the problems addressed in this
legislation. People v. Adams, 149 Ill. 2d 331, 338 (1992); People v. Kohrig, 113 Ill. 2d 384, 392-93 (1986). As a preliminary
matter, we note that a constitutional challenge to an earlier version of the GBMI statute was raised in People v. Fierer, 124 Ill. 2d 176 (1988), but this court did not resolve the issue, reversing the defendant's convictions on other grounds. Various panels of the
appellate court have upheld the statutory scheme against a number of constitutional attacks, including arguments similar to the
present defendants' contentions that the statutory scheme encourages compromise verdicts and violates equal protection. People
v. Kneller, 219 Ill. App. 3d 834 (1991); People v. Seaman, 203 Ill. App. 3d 871 (1990); People v. Smith, 124 Ill. App. 3d 805
(1984); People v. DeWit, 123 Ill. App. 3d 723 (1984).
A
The defendants first argue that the statutory scheme denies a GBMI offender a fair trial and violates due process by placing
conflicting burdens of proof on the defense. According to the defendants, the insanity statute imposes one burden, which requires
the defense to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 1994). The GBMI statute imposes a
different burden, requiring the defense to establish mental illness by a preponderance of the evidence. 725 ILCS 5/115-4(j) (West
1994). As the defendants observe, insanity and mental illness are defined in mutually exclusive terms, and a person cannot be both
one and the other simultaneously. Section 6-2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that an offender is insane if "as a result of
mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law." 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 1994). Section 6-2(d) defines the term "mental illness" as "a
substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of the commission of the offense and
which impaired that person's judgment, but not to the extent that he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior or is
unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." 720 ILCS 5/6-2(d) (West 1994). The defendants thus argue that the
statutory scheme imposes conflicting burdens on the defense, for it requires a defendant to prove the inconsistent and
contradictory conditions of insanity on one hand and mental illness on the other.
We do not agree with the defendants that the preceding provisions improperly require the defense to prove inconsistent
propositions at the same time. That the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of mental illness does not mean that
the defense must forgo presenting evidence of insanity in favor of presenting evidence of mental illness. As the terms are defined,
mental illness is a less serious form of psychological functioning than insanity. The assignment of a burden of persuasion to the
defendant on the question of mental illness simply recognizes that the defense, rather than the prosecution, is the party who will
generally introduce evidence on the issue of the defendant's mental condition. In the course of attempting to establish insanity, the
defense might fail to prove that proposition and might prove instead mental illness.
In upholding the constitutionality of an earlier version of these provisions, the court of appeals in United States ex rel. Weismiller
v. Lane, 815 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1987), noted:
Moreover, jurors' consideration of these issues during their deliberations is carefully channeled. Under the GBMI statutory
scheme, the jury does not consider mental illness until it has first decided the defendant's claim of insanity. Thus, the jury does not
determine insanity and mental illness simultaneously. The jury must consider first whether the defendant committed the acts
forming the basis for the charged offense, next whether the defendant was insane, and finally whether the defendant was mentally
ill. We believe that the sequence in which these issues are resolved by the jury further demonstrates that the defense in a GBMI
case does not have the burden of establishing conflicting propositions at the same time.
For these reasons, we do not believe that the present case is like People v. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d 184 (1988), cited by the
defendants, in which this court found error in the jury instructions used to distinguish voluntary manslaughter from murder. At
issue in that case were jury instructions requiring the prosecution to establish a mental state that would sustain a conviction for
voluntary manslaughter. Yet often proof of the mitigating mental state would come not from the prosecution but from the
defense. Thus, a conscientious jury, following its instructions to the letter, would be unable to return a verdict of voluntary
manslaughter, when the mitigating evidence came from the defense. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d  at 194-95. Contrary to the defendants'
arguments, in the GBMI context the defense is not required to shoulder conflicting burdens and establish contradictory
propositions in an effort to obtain a more lenient or mitigating result. As we have explained, the jury does not consider the
insanity and GBMI options at the same time. Furthermore, evidence regarding a defendant's mental or psychological functioning
will likely come from the defense. In Reddick, in contrast, mitigating evidence would have in all likelihood come from the defense,
yet the instructions placed the burden of producing the evidence on the State.
B
The defendants also argue that the GBMI provisions improperly encourage juries to return compromise verdicts. The defendants
maintain that the GBMI verdict presents jurors with a meaningless choice, and that it improperly invites jurors to consider the
dispositional effect of their decision. As we explain below, we do not believe that the statutory scheme possesses either fault
attributed to it by the defendants.
The defendants first contend that the GBMI provisions provide jurors with a misleading and meaningless choice. The defendants
maintain that jurors will reasonably believe that a GBMI verdict denotes a lower level of culpability, falling somewhere between a
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, on one hand, and a finding of guilty, on the other hand. The defendants assert that the
conjunction "but" in the phrase "guilty but mentally ill" connotes a reduced state of guilt and implies that a finding of GBMI
represents a mitigating mental state. The defendants additionally argue that the GBMI instructions, by placing the burden of proof
for this issue on the defense, will lead juries to believe that the verdict is something the defense wants. According to the
defendants, the GBMI finding thus seems to provide jurors with a compromise between insanity and outright guilt. The
defendants note, however, that this court has previously explained that a person found guilty but mentally ill "is no less guilty than
one who is found guilty and not mentally ill." People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266, 278 (1988). The defendants thus argue that the
GBMI verdict misleads jurors about the real significance and meaning of that choice.
Contrary to the defendants' argument, we do not believe that the GBMI verdict represents a meaningless option. The separate
verdict helps clarify for the jury the differences between insanity and mental illness that falls short of insanity. The court of appeals
in United States ex rel. Weismiller v. Lane, 815 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1987), rejected a similar contention that the GBMI verdict
encourages juries to render false compromise verdicts. The court explained:
As the Weismiller court explains, the GBMI option helps clarify the distinction between insanity and mental disorders that do not
meet the definition of insanity.
The defendants note, however, that the GBMI statute applicable in these cases differs from the statute involved in Weismiller.
The defendant now bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of mental illness, while under former law the State bore that
burden. Although the GBMI statute applicable in this case is somewhat different from the statute at issue in Weismiller, we do
not believe that the differences between the two versions of the statute affect the relevance of the analysis used by the Weismiller
court in rejecting the contention that the statutory scheme encourages juries to return false compromise verdicts.
As an additional reason by which the GBMI option may encourage the return of false compromise verdicts, the defendants argue
that the GBMI verdict option improperly leads jurors to consider the possible dispositional effect of their decisions, distracting
them from a consideration of the defendant's guilt.
We do not agree with the defendants that it is improper for the State to ask jurors to determine whether a person raising an
insanity defense is instead mentally ill. Providing the jury with the GBMI option enables the jury to identify offenders who are in
need of treatment while they are incarcerated. Section 5-2-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections provides various treatment
options for defendants who have been found guilty but mentally ill. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6 (West 1994). That the jury is not informed
of the consequences of its determination does not render this purpose invalid. As the court of appeals explained in rejecting a
similar challenge to New Mexico's GBMI statute:
The defendants also briefly raise an equal protection challenge to the GBMI statute. Having found that the GBMI statute violates
due process, the appellate court in No. 83641 (Robles, 288 Ill. App. 3d 935), did not address this additional argument. It is
readily apparent that the statute bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. We have already identified
several legislature purposes in enacting the GBMI statute. As we have noted, the verdict helps the jury in determining whether
someone is insane, in identifying offenders who are mentally ill, and in sentencing of mentally ill offenders. We believe that these
aspects of the statutory scheme are legitimate purposes, and that the legislation bears a rational relationship to these goals. See
United States ex rel. Weismiller v. Lane, 815 F.2d 1106, 1110-12 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting equal protection challenge to former
version of Illinois GBMI statute); State v. Neely, 112 N.M. 702, 708-09, 819 P.2d 249, 254-55 (1991) (rejecting equal protection
challenge to New Mexico's GBMI statute).
II
As a final matter, we consider several issues peculiar to the individual appeals. The defendant in No. 83527, Lantz, raises several
additional challenges to his conviction and sentence. Lantz first argues that the trial judge should not have submitted the GBMI
instructions to the jury because they were not supported by the evidence. The defendant notes that his own experts testified that
he was insane, while the State's expert believed that he was not mentally ill. The defendant thus asserts that the GBMI option
given to the jury in his case finds no support in the record. We do not agree. The trial judge appropriately gave the jury the option
of considering whether the defense evidence fell short of establishing insanity yet did show that the defendant was mentally ill, as
that term is defined under the GBMI provisions. Moreover, we believe that the evidence in this case was sufficient to sustain the
jury's determination that the defendant was not insane at the time of the offense.
Lantz also contends that his 38-year sentence of imprisonment for first degree murder is excessive. A sentence will be affirmed on
appeal unless it represents an abuse of discretion. People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 18-19 (1991); People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268,
273-76 (1980); People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977). The same judge presided at the defendant's trial and sentencing
hearing, and he was therefore familiar with the extensive evidence of the defendant's mental condition. In mitigation, the judge
considered the defendant's lack of a criminal record, his history of alcoholism, and his mental history. In aggravation, the judge
noted the circumstances of the murder and the effect of the crime on the defendant's daughter. Declining to sentence the
defendant to an extended term, the judge imposed a term of 38 years.
We cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in sentencing the defendant to 38 years' imprisonment. The judge carefully
considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case. We do not believe that the sentence is excessive, even when
measured considered in relation to the defendant's age, 55.
Lantz summarily raises several allegations of trial error in his petition for leave to appeal. He does not support these additional
contentions with argument or citation to authority, however, and therefore we conclude that they have been waived. 166 Ill. 2d
R. 341(e)(7) (argument portion of brief  "shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefore, with citation of
the authorities and the pages of the record relied on"; "[p]oints not argued are waived").
The defendant in No. 83641, Robles, renews two additional arguments in support of the judgment of the appellate court. Robles
presented these questions to the appellate court, which did not reach the issues, given its holding that the GBMI provisions are
unconstitutional. The State, appellant in this court, moved to strike these portions of the defendant-appellee's brief, arguing that
the appropriate procedure generally is to remand the matter to the appellate court so that previously unaddressed issues may be
considered there first. We ordered the State's motion taken with the case. Shortly before the matter was argued orally in this
court, the State submitted a brief on these additional issues. The defendant has not submitted a reply brief. For these reasons, we
believe that it is appropriate to remand the matter to the appellate court so that the appellate court may address these additional
questions. The State does concede, however, that the defendant's two convictions and sentences for the inchoate offense of
solicitation of first degree murder must be vacated (see People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 356-57 (1970)), and therefore we
vacate them here.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court in cause No. 83527 is affirmed. The judgment of the appellate court in
cause No. 83641 is reversed in part and vacated in part, and the cause is remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings.
No. 83527-Judgment affirmed.
No. 83641-Judgment reversed in part
and vacated in part;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
In these two consolidated but unrelated criminal cases, juries found defendants guilty but mentally ill (hereinafter GBMI) of first
degree murder. On appeal, defendants argued that the GBMI verdict violates the due process clause of the United States and
Illinois Constitutions because it imposes conflicting burdens of proof on defendants in insanity defense cases and encourages
compromise verdicts. The majority rejects both of these arguments and holds that the GBMI verdict is constitutional. While I
agree with the majority that the GBMI verdict does not impose conflicting burdens of proof, I cannot join the majority's holding
that the GBMI verdict does not encourage compromise verdicts. GBMI is a meaningless verdict which dupes the jury into
believing that there is a middle ground between guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. In reality, the GBMI verdict is no
different from a guilty verdict. Presenting this option to the jury encourages compromise verdicts and injects irrelevant sentencing
considerations into the jury's determination of defendant's criminal culpability. Such results are incompatible with due process of
law. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
This court concluded in People v. Fierer, 124 Ill. 2d 176 (1988), that "the interrelationship between the insanity and GBMI
statutes is rife with potential confusion and other difficulties." Fierer, 124 Ill. 2d  at 189. The pattern jury instructions for a GBMI
verdict are so woefully inadequate that the jury is left simply to guess at its meaning. As a result of this confusion, juries inevitably
will conclude that GBMI is a middle ground between a guilty verdict and a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. Few juries will
realize that this middle ground is illusory and, in reality, "there is no difference between being found guilty and being found guilty
but mentally ill that is likely to benefit a defendant." Report of the Governor's Commission to Revise the Mental Health Code of
Illinois 61 (1989). A GBMI verdict does not result in a reduced sentence. A defendant found GBMI may be sentenced to the full
range of punishments, including the death penalty, that may be imposed when a defendant is found guilty. People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266, 277 (1988). Nor does a GBMI verdict guarantee that a defendant will receive treatment for his mental illness while
incarcerated. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(b) (West 1996).(1) A GBMI verdict rendered by a jury operating under these inevitable
misconceptions is a false compromise verdict and renders defendant's trial so fundamentally unfair that it violates due process. See
People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 269 (1992), quoting Donnelly v. De Christoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431, 438, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 1872 (1974).
The majority advances two justifications for the GBMI verdict. First, the majority asserts that the GBMI verdict helps "clarify"
for the jury the differences between insanity and mental illness that falls short of insanity. Slip op. at 11. The majority concludes
that " '[t]he legislature could well have believed that many defendants were being found not guilty by reason of insanity even
though they did not satisfy the legal standard for the defense.' " Slip op. at 11-12, quoting Weismiller v. Lane, 815 F.2d 1106,
1112 (7th Cir. 1987). This is a remarkably cynical view of juries' ability to follow the law in insanity defense cases. One of the
most basic assumptions underlying the right to a jury trial is that juries are able to follow instructions. People v. Cole, 131 Ill.
App. 3d 36, 42 (1985). The majority does not cite any empirical evidence to support its assertion to the contrary. Reducing the
number of purportedly "erroneous" verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity may be a legitimate state interest, but the GBMI
verdict is an illegitimate means for advancing this interest. The State cannot attempt to reduce the number of not guilty by reason
of insanity verdicts by presenting the jury with a misleading verdict which is devoid of any consequence and entices the jury to
reach a false compromise verdict. Subterfuge is incompatible with the principle of fundamental fairness which animates the due
process clause. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d  at 269.
The majority also asserts that the GBMI verdict enables the jury to identify offenders who need psychiatric treatment while they
are incarcerated.(2) Slip op. at 13. This argument is specious. There is absolutely no need for the jury to signal to the court or the
Department of Corrections that a defendant is mentally ill and needs psychiatric treatment. The Department of Corrections is
required to evaluate every convict's medical and psychological history (as well as the circumstances of the offense) and
recommend appropriate medical and psychiatric treatment when the convict is first incarcerated. 730 ILCS 5/3-8-2 (West 1996).
Such an evaluation is far superior to a GBMI verdict because it is made by qualified experts rather than by jurors with little or no
expertise in this area.
On a more fundamental level, juries have no business deciding whether criminal defendants need psychiatric treatment. The jury's
function is to determine defendant's guilt. People v. McDonald, 62 Ill. 2d 448, 456 (1975). Juries are not empaneled to act as
psychiatrists, social workers or priests. Whether a criminal defendant is mentally ill and needs psychiatric treatment is an
"extraneous and irrelevant matter[ ]" which has no bearing on the defendant's criminal culpability and responsibility for his
actions. See People v. Meeker, 86 Ill. App. 3d 162, 170 (1980); see also ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards,
Standard 7-6.10, Commentary at 393 (1989) (stating GBMI is "not a proper verdict at all" but instead is "a dispositional
mechanism transferred to the guilt determination phase of the criminal process"). Allowing the jury to consider the consequences
of its verdict invites the jury to reach a compromise verdict. Meeker, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 170; People v. Stack, 244 Ill. App. 3d 166,
178 (1993); People v. Glenn, 233 Ill. App. 3d 666, 680 (1992).
The majority attempts to evade the problem of compromise verdicts by stating that the jury simply need not be informed that the
only effect of a GBMI verdict is to signal to the court or the Department of Corrections that defendant needs psychiatric
treatment. Slip op. at 13. This argument compounds rather than resolves the problem with the GBMI verdict. It does not change
the fact that the jury is performing an illegitimate function. Not informing the jury what function it is performing when it finds a
defendant GBMI is self-defeating because it guarantees that the signal the jury sends to the court or the Department of
Corrections will be an ill-informed one. The majority's willingness to endorse the manipulation of juries corrupts both the jury
system and the rule of law.
Ultimately, the GBMI verdict presents a choice between a fundamentally fair criminal justice system and one which merely
appears to be fair. The GBMI verdict is incompatible with due process of law and should be declared unconstitutional.
For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Footnotes:
1.  Section 5-2-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections leaves treatment of a GBMI offender completely within the discretion of the
Department of Corrections. That section provides that "[t]he Department of Corrections shall provide such psychiatric,
psychological, or other counseling and treatment for the [GBMI] defendant as it determines necessary." (Emphasis added.) 730
ILCS 5/5-2-6(b) (West 1996). Nothing prevents the Department of Corrections from simply ignoring the jury's determination that
a defendant is mentally ill and providing no treatment once the defendant is incarcerated. See People v. Marshall, 114 Ill. App. 3d
217 (1983) (GBMI verdict does not create a right to treatment beyond the constitutional right to minimally adequate health care
available to all prisoners). In fact, even when defendants found GBMI do receive psychiatric treatment, it is identical to the
treatment provided to defendants who are simply found guilty. Report of the Governor's Commission to Revise the Mental Health
Code of Illinois 61 (1989).
2.  Of course this "signaling" justification does not apply in cases where the GBMI offender receives the death penalty. See
People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266 (1988) (holding GBMI verdict does not preclude imposition of the death penalty).