Case Title: Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Fox

Citation: 623 So. 2d 1180

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1993-08-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
623 So. 2d 1180 (1993)
ALLIED-SIGNAL, INC., etc., Appellant,
v.
Kevin FOX, Appellee.
No. 80181.

Supreme Court of Florida.
August 26, 1993.
*1181 Kathleen M. O'Connor of Thornton, David, Murray, Richard & Davis, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
G. William Bissett of Hardy & Bissett, P.A., Miami, for appellee.
Marguerite H. Davis of Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Davis & Marks, P.A., Tallahassee, amicus curiae for American Ins. Ass'n.
Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A., Miami, amicus curiae for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.
Sharon Lee Stedman of De Ciccio & Associates, P.A., Orlando, amicus curiae for the Florida Defense Lawyers Ass'n.
GRIMES, Justice.
Pursuant to section 25.031, Florida Statutes (1987), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.150, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has certified to this Court a question concerning the interpretation of section 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1989). Fox v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 966 F.2d 626 (11th Cir.1992). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(6) of the Florida Constitution.
The federal appeals court outlined the circumstances giving rise to certification as follows:
Fox, 966 F.2d  at 626-27.
The court phrased the question for certification as follows:
Id. at 628. As a reason for the certification, the court noted the conflicting opinions on the subject in Messmer v. Teacher's Insurance Co., 588 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), review denied, 598 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1992), and Fabre v. Marin, 597 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
On the authority of our decision in Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993), we answer the certified question in the affirmative. In Fabre we adopted the rationale of Messmer, holding that section 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1989), requires that liability be apportioned to all participants in an accident in order to determine a defendant's percentage of fault. In support of our decision we cited several cases with facts similar to those in the instant case in which it was necessary to consider the percentage of fault of the plaintiff's employer even though the employer was immune from tort liability under workers' compensation laws. Nance v. Gulf Oil Corp., 817 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir.1987); Johnson v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 666 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir.1981); DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 2 Cal. 4th 593, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 238, 828 P.2d 140 (1992); Connar v. West Shore Equip., 68 Wis.2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660 (1975).
Having answered the certified question, we return the record to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW and HARDING, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs.
BARKETT, Chief Justice, dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons I stated in Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993) (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
KOGAN, J., concurs.