Case Title: Higgins v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-C-3113

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1994-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Higgins v. State1995 WY 12889 P.2d 964Case Number: 93-268Decided: 02/13/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Tammy 
HIGGINS, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court of Sheridan County, John Brackley, J.

Leonard D. Munker, State 
Public Defender, Deborah Cornia, Asst. Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, 
Director, Defender Aid Program, and Tom Sutherland, Student Intern, representing 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., 
Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Georgia L. Tibbetts, Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution 
Assistance Program, Rose Meacham and Bruce Horton, Student Interns, representing 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* 
MACY and TAYLOR, JJ.

* 
Retired July 6, 1994.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      A confession 
exacted from a criminal defendant in violation of applicable constitutional 
protections is not admissible at that defendant's trial. In this appeal, we are 
asked to determine if the district court erred in admitting such a confession 
or, if it was erroneously admitted, whether the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In addition, appellant contends the State deliberately delayed 
her appearance before a judge for the purpose of obtaining a 
confession.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant raises 
these issues:

I.          
Did the trial court err in concluding that Tammy Higgins' confession was 
the result of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of her rights under 
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under the Wyoming 
Constitution, Article I, Section Eleven, when there was no readvisement of her 
rights for the second, third, and fourth custodial 
interrogations?

II.          
Did the trial court err in concluding that Tammy Higgins' confession was 
voluntary within the meaning of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth 
Amendment due process clause and the Wyoming Constitution's Article I, Section 
Six, due process clause, when four different officers attempted to extract a 
confession from Ms. Higgins over the course of three months, with the last two 
officers attempting to get a confession from Ms. Higgins for seven to seven and 
a half hours within an eleven hour period?

(A) Did the timing and circumstances of Officer 
Hofmeier's arrest constitute an "unnecessary delay" in bringing Ms. Higgins 
before the judicial officer of the court from which the warrant was issued and 
as such, constitute a de facto denial of her rights to both an attorney and to 
due process under both the United States Constitution's Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as well as under both the Wyoming Constitution's Article I, Sections 
Six and Ten?

III.         Did 
the trial court err by misapplying the Wyoming Supreme Court's precedent, when 
it analyzed the necessity of subsequent Miranda warnings, for subsequent 
interrogation periods, under the following standard: "the trial court was to 
make a determination as to the sufficiency of the original warnings and the 
conduct of the second officer.", when totality of the circumstances is the 
appropriate standard?

[¶4]      Appellee 
rephrases the issues:

I.          
Did the district court correctly find that the statement made by 
appellant, following the giving of Miranda warnings which appellant acknowledged 
that she understood and subsequently waived, was voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently given, and thus admissible into evidence at 
trial?

II.          
Did the circumstances of appellant's arrest, pursuant to a warrant issued 
by the county court, and her transportation from the place of her arrest to the 
court which issued the warrant constitute an unreasonable delay which violated 
appellant's constitutional rights?

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      Facts are pivotal 
in the resolution of any issue of law. This is especially true in this case. A 
brief overview of the circumstances surrounding the crime will be 
helpful.

[¶6]      Shortly before 
midnight on December 6, 1992, Paul Minick (Minick) and his friend Mike Webb 
(Webb) were traveling along I-90 about twenty miles south of Sheridan, Wyoming. 
Meanwhile, Tammy Higgins (Higgins) and her friend Rachel Smith (Smith)1 were cruising I-90 south of 
Sheridan looking for someone to rob. Their strategy was to find a car with 
license plates from a distant state, shoot a tire out, and then rob the stranded 
motorist. Higgins spotted a car with Florida license plates. The car was driven 
by Minick and Webb. Higgins drove alongside the vehicle and Smith shot out the 
right rear tire with a rifle. Minick and Webb were only aware that they had 
experienced a blow-out and they pulled over to effect 
repairs.

[¶7]      Higgins turned 
around in the median and headed south and then, once again, turned around in the 
median and headed north, so as to pull up behind the victims. Higgins shouted 
from her pickup and asked if the victims needed help. At first, Minick indicated 
that no assistance was required, but Higgins stayed at the scene anyway. Minick 
quickly discovered that he had no jack and, indeed, did need help. Webb walked 
back and talked to the two women, looked in the back of the pickup for tools, 
and then returned to Minick's car to warm up. Higgins brought a hydraulic jack 
over to Minick and placed it by his feet. Minick asked Higgins if she had a lug 
wrench to use with the jack. Higgins returned to her pickup, supposedly to look 
for the proper tool.

[¶8]      Shortly, both 
Higgins and Smith returned, indicated that they had no lug wrench, and asked 
Minick to show them where his spare tire was. As Minick turned around to do 
that, he felt a tap on his head. When he looked up, Higgins was pointing a black 
.357 revolver at him. Higgins asked for Minick's money and, at Smith's 
suggestion, took both Minick's money and his wallet. After this experience, 
Minick was somewhat frantic, in addition to the fact that he was without the 
means to repair his tire. He drove to Sheridan on the rim of a wheel and, 
following road signs, ended up at "Perkins," a restaurant which is open 
twenty-four hours a day.

[¶9]      In the meantime, 
Higgins drove to a self-storage unit and dropped off the hydraulic jack, a tool 
box, and the guns used in the crime. She disposed of the wallet by tearing it up 
and flushing it down a toilet. Higgins continued to drive around for a time 
before she and Smith also went to "Perkins" to look for a friend. Minick and 
Webb were describing the robbery to two sheriff's deputies who happened to be at 
"Perkins" when they arrived. When Smith walked in the door, Webb immediately 
pointed her out as one of the women who had committed the robbery. Minick also 
identified her. Smith turned to leave, but was stopped by the deputies. The 
deputies brought Higgins into the restaurant and she too was identified by both 
victims. Some minimal questioning was accomplished at "Perkins," although no 
Miranda warnings were given at that time. The entire group left the restaurant 
and went to the Sheridan County Sheriff's office. Higgins was permitted to drive 
herself there. Minick filled out a statement, but also indicated that he did not 
want to press charges because he was afraid. Higgins was questioned again, she 
claims without Miranda warnings. The deputies claim those warnings were read to 
her at the sheriff's office.

[¶10]   Eventually, Minick did press 
charges and he brought the right rear wheel from his car to the sheriff as 
evidence. The wheel had a bullet hole in it. Items of evidence from the pickup, 
as well as the items which had been left at the storage unit, were eventually 
seized pursuant to search warrants. At trial, Minick identified Higgins, her 
vehicle, the hydraulic jack, the stocking cap she wore, and the revolver she 
used. Webb also identified Higgins, virtually all of the other physical evidence 
listed above, as well as some additional items which he saw in Higgins' 
pickup.

[¶11]   Since Higgins gave a full 
confession, we also know this story from her perspective. That confession is, of 
course, the centerpiece of this appeal. Higgins identifies a series of errors by 
the police which she claims necessitate suppression of her confession. First, 
she was not given Miranda warnings at "Perkins." Second, she was not given 
Miranda warnings at the sheriff's office on the night of December 6, 1992. We 
need not analyze those events in detail because no statements from those 
occurrences were admitted at her trial or otherwise used against her. To the 
extent she answered questions, it was to deny being involved in the 
robbery.

[¶12]   Higgins was arrested, pursuant to a 
warrant, in Casper, Wyoming, on March 10, 1993. She contends she was then 
subjected to a marathon interrogation session on March 11, 1993, which violated 
her constitutional rights and resulted in her giving an involuntary 
confession.

[¶13]   Higgins was questioned by Sheridan 
County Deputy Hofmeier for about one hour (2:00-3:00 p.m.) at the Casper Police 
Department. It is undisputed that she was given Miranda warnings in writing 
before that interrogation. She denied being involved in the robbery and asked to 
terminate the interrogation. Deputy Hofmeier drove Higgins to Sheridan in her 
pickup (4:30-6:30 p.m.). She claims Deputy Hofmeier questioned her during that 
trip. Deputy Hofmeier testified that he did not question her during the trip - 
that they just visited back and forth. Once in Sheridan, Higgins was questioned 
by an agent of the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) (8:30-10:30 
p.m.). Miranda warnings were not repeated verbatim at that time, but Higgins was 
asked if she remembered being given those warnings and if she understood that 
they still applied. She claims she responded by saying, "`Okay?' because I 
really didn't understand what he was saying." The DCI agent claims he verified 
with Higgins that Miranda warnings had been read to her and that she understood 
them. Higgins claims that the DCI agent obtained a confession from her by 
playing on her emotions, by telling her that Smith had already "jumped on the 
band wagon," and that she was looking at twenty-five years if she did not come 
clean, but likely a short sentence if she confessed. The DCI agent basically 
denied those allegations. Higgins repeated that confession to Deputy Hofmeier 
and the DCI agent and it was tape-recorded 
(10:45-Midnight).

[¶14]   The district court determined that 
the confession should not be suppressed. At trial, the district court heard all 
evidence, including the confession, and, ultimately, found Higgins guilty of 
aggravated robbery.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶15]   The prosecution bears the burden of 
proving that a confession is voluntary. In the face of conflicting evidence, the 
district court is the arbiter of those facts and must make the initial 
determination whether that confession is voluntary in the light of all 
surrounding circumstances. Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 387 (Wyo. 1992); Garcia 
v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 605-07 (Wyo. 1989); Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 308-10 
(Wyo. 1977).

[¶16]   Under the factual circumstances 
present in this case, which we have set out in detail above, the prosecution 
carried its burden of proof. The district court could readily infer from all the 
facts presented that the confession was voluntary and we so 
hold.

[¶17]   Higgins also contends there was 
unnecessary delay in her being brought before the court which issued her arrest 
warrant. The record simply does not demonstrate either excessive or deliberate 
delay in Higgins being brought before a judicial officer. There is no suggestion 
in the record that Higgins asked to consult with an attorney or that such a 
request was denied. In essence, Higgins asks this court to assume that 
deliberate delay was employed so as to infringe upon her right to counsel. We 
decline to make such an assumption, particularly where the facts point in the 
opposite direction.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶18]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Rachel Smith was the defendant in a 
separate criminal proceeding which was treated by this court in Smith v. State, 
880 P.2d 573 (Wyo. 1994).