Case Title: State v. Rothe

Citation: 249 P.2d 946, 74 Ariz. 382

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1952-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
74 Ariz. 382 (1952) 249 P.2d 946 STATE v. ROTHE. No. 1025. Supreme Court of Arizona. November 12, 1952. Fred O. Wilson, Atty. Gen., and Alfred C. Marquez, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Allen & David, of Tucson, for appellant. STANFORD, Justice. Harry Ronald Rothe, appellant, was found guilty by a jury of the charge of aggravated assault, a felony, and he appeals from the judgment of conviction and claims excessive sentence imposed thereon. The facts show that while appellant was at his sister's house in Tucson, Arizona, he took his child, the daughter of the prosecutrix, Mrs. Lydia Rothe and together with his own mother started to drive away, asserting that he was tired of the prosecutrix' tantrums and was going to take the child and leave. Before driving away, the appellant twice attempted to remove the prosecutrix from the running board of the car on which she had placed herself in an effort to remove the child from the car. Finally the appellant drove away with the prosecutrix clinging to the right hand side of the car, and she remained there during the drive to the house of Prucnal's some three or four miles distant. Appellant testified that at the home of Prucnal's he removed the prosecutrix from the running board of the car and placed her over the fence and into the yard of said residence, while other witnesses, including the prosecutrix, testified that he slapped her several times on the face and then threw her over the fence with great force and violence. *383 The treating of the "Legal Propositions Relied Upon", submitted by the appellant, will we think, sufficiently dispose of the numerous assignments of error. We will first consider the appellant's contention that the trial court erred in excluding Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 for Identification, which is a letter written by the prosecutrix to a girl friend on the date of and prior to the alleged aggravated assault. In this letter the prosecutrix called her husband, the defendant, an animal, and admitted that she intended to return to Guatemala and obtain a divorce as soon as her baby was stronger. She said her husband knew nothing of her plans to get a divorce. She told her friend that after the divorce she planned to take a trip to "North Africa `Casablanca' where my dearest Phil is now!" In another part of the letter she referred to Phil, saying: Prior to offering this letter in evidence, the counsel for appellant cross-examined the prosecutrix as follows: The letter was offered in evidence for the purpose of impeaching the prosecutrix as to the matters referred to above which were brought out on cross-examination and further to show her animosity toward defendant. In allowing the appellant to cross-examine the prosecutrix on the matters mentioned above, the trial court overruled the objections of the State's attorney that these matters were immaterial and collateral. We quote from the record rulings of the trial court on these objections: We find no error in these pronouncements as they are correct statements of the law of evidence. The trouble is the court erred in their application. At the time the letter mentioned herein was offered by the appellant in evidence, the trial court excluded it on the grounds that it was "immaterial and irrelevant." The question presented for our determination is whether this letter was properly excluded by the trial court, and if not, did such ruling constitute reversible error? It is a well-known rule of law that a cross-examiner should be given great latitude in his questions which seek to impeach an adverse witness being examined. It is always proper to inquire as to the motive of the adverse witness in testifying, and to show any matter which bears on the credibility of that witness. Nowhere is this better established than in the case of Arnold v. State, 100 Tex. Cr. R. 387, 272 S.W. 798, in which the Texas court said: The Texas court held that it was reversible error for the trial court to not allow the defense to go into the matter of motive on cross-examination. In accord with this decision is the case of Cryer v. State, 101 Tex. Cr. R. 637, 276 S.W. 925. If the defendant is to be allowed to inquire on cross-examination into possible motives of the adverse witness in testifying then it seems to logically follow that the defendant be allowed to put contrary statements of said witness in evidence for the purpose of impeaching such adverse witness. This court, in Fuller v. State, 23 Ariz. 489, 205 P. 324, 325, said: We feel the jury should have been allowed to consider the contents of the letter in determining what weight they would give to the testimony of the prosecutrix. We hold that the trial court erred in excluding this letter, and that its ruling was highly prejudicial to the rights of appellant. In view of this holding, we see no occasion to consider the other assignments of error advanced by the appellant at this time. The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. UDALL, C.J., and PHELPS, DE CONCINI and LA PRADE, JJ., concur.