Case Title: Troy Merck, Jr. v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC16-899

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-899 
____________ 
 
 
TROY MERCK, JR., 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[May 4, 2017] 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Troy Merck, Jr., a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit 
court’s order striking his motion to substitute Linda McDermott for the Capital 
Collateral Regional Counsel for the Middle Region (CCRC-MR) as his counsel, as 
well as the successive postconviction motion that Ms. McDermott simultaneously 
filed on his behalf pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
Ms. McDermott previously substituted for CCRC-MR as Merck’s counsel in 
federal court following the federal court’s determination that a conflict of interest 
 
 
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precludes CCRC-MR’s continued representation.  Merck v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152243, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2014).  CCRC-MR 
conceded below that the same conflict of interest precludes its continued 
representation of Merck in state court.  However, the circuit court struck the 
motions at issue as unauthorized after construing our decision in Suggs v. State, 
152 So. 3d 471 (Fla. 2014), to condition the termination of an attorney’s 
representation upon the filing of a motion to withdraw, which CCRC-MR has not 
filed.  In so ruling, the circuit court erred.  As we explained in Suggs, Florida Rule 
of Judicial Administration 2.505(f)(1)-(3) “outlin[es] modes by which an 
attorney’s appearance for a party terminates.”  Suggs, 152 So. 3d at 472.  Rule 
2.505(f)(2) authorizes the termination of an attorney’s appearance through 
substitution of counsel, which is the method that Ms. McDermott sought in this 
case after we specifically directed her to do so in Merck v. State, No. SC15-1439, 
2016 WL 104164, at *1 (Fla. Jan. 8, 2016) (dismissing a prior notice of appeal that 
Ms. McDermott filed on Merck’s behalf “without prejudice for [her] to seek 
substitution of counsel in the circuit court pursuant to Suggs”). 
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand with 
instructions for the circuit court to enter an order substituting Ms. McDermott as 
Merck’s counsel upon the filing of Merck’s written consent to the substitution with 
the circuit court.  Once Ms. McDermott has been substituted as counsel, we further 
 
 
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direct the circuit court to address the successive rule 3.851 motion that she filed on 
Merck’s behalf. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
Cynthia Joan Newton, Judge - Case No. 521991CF016659XXXXNO 
 
Linda McDermott of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Estero, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Stephen D. Ake, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee