Case Title: Pearl Gennette y v. State of Arkansas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pearl Gennette ANTHONY v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-655                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 16, 1998


1.   Evidence -- defendant's testimony at previous trial --
     admissibility of. -- A defendant's testimony at a former trial
     is admissible in evidence against him in later proceedings; a
     defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against
     compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he
     gives; that waiver is no less effective or complete because
     the defendant may have been motivated to take the witness
     stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the
     lawful evidence adduced against him.

2.   Evidence -- appellant voluntarily testified at first trial --
     privilege against self-incrimination waived at second trial. -
     - By voluntarily testifying at her first trial, appellant
     waived her privilege against self-incrimination with respect
     to the testimony that she gave; the fact that appellant
     exercised her right to remain silent at the second trial did
     not preclude the use of her testimony given at the first
     trial, if it was otherwise admissible. 

3.   Evidence -- party's attempt to fabricate evidence -- how
     admissible. -- A party's attempt to fabricate evidence is
     admissible, not merely as an admission under Uniform Evidence
     Rule 801(d)(2), but as proof relevant to show his own belief
     that his case is weak; fabrication of evidence of innocence is
     cogent evidence of guilt. 

4.   Evidence -- trial court has discretion to decide propriety of
     evidence offered in rebuttal -- what constitutes genuine
     rebuttal. -- The trial court has discretion to decide the
     propriety of evidence offered in rebuttal; however, genuine
     rebuttal is evidence offered in reply to new matters; the
     supreme court has disallowed evidence presented as rebuttal
     where the evidence was not responsive to the defense evidence.
     
5.   Evidence -- neither appellant's prior testimony nor testimony
     of witness was proper rebuttal evidence -- trial court abused
     discretion in admitting. -- Neither appellant's prior
     testimony nor the testimony of the witness was proper rebuttal
     evidence where the testimony presented by the prosecution
     during rebuttal did not contradict the witness's testimony or
     any other evidence presented by appellant; by introducing
     appellant's prior testimony, the prosecution created an
     opportunity to present the witness's testimony, which was not
     otherwise appropriate as rebuttal, in an effort to discredit
     appellant's alibi; the introduction of this testimony during
     rebuttal constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion
     and prejudiced appellant; the case was reversed and remanded.

6.   Appeal & error -- preservation of argument for appeal -- party
     bound by scope and nature of arguments at trial. -- In order
     to preserve an argument for appeal, the objection below must
     be specific enough to apprise the trial court of the
     particular error about which appellant complains; a party is
     bound on appeal by the scope and nature of the objections and
     arguments presented at trial.

7.   Appeal & error -- issue not presented at trial -- not reached
     on appeal. -- Appellant's contention that the trial court
     commented on the evidence while instructing the jury that a
     witness had violated Rule 615 of the Arkansas Rules of
     Evidence was not presented to the trial court and so was not
     preserved for appeal; at trial the appellant made a general
     objection, she did not apprise the trial court of the argument
     made on appeal; therefore, the supreme court would not address
     it.


     Appeal from Hempstead Circuit Court; Jim Gunter, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Kiel & Goodson, by:  John C. Goodson, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     Appellant Pearl Gennette Anthony was convicted of two counts
of delivery of a controlled substance, cocaine, and sentenced to
two consecutive thirty-year terms of imprisonment in the Arkansas
Department of Correction.  She does not challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence to support her convictions.  Instead, she argues
that the trial court erred by (1) allowing the State to introduce
certain rebuttal testimony, (2) admitting a bus manifest as a
business record, and (3) improperly commenting on the evidence.  We
agree with the first point and reverse and remand for a new trial.
     In her first point of appeal, appellant contends that the
trial court erred during the rebuttal phase by permitting the State
to introduce portions of her testimony from her first trial, which
ended in a mistrial, and the testimony of Holly Scott.  Appellant
elected not to testify at her second trial, and she alleges the
introduction of this testimony was improper in two respects:  (1)
the introduction of her testimony from the first trial was, in
effect, a direct comment on her failure to testify in the second
trial, in violation of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination; and (2) both her testimony and that of Ms. Scott
were improper rebuttal.  
     During its case in chief, the State presented the testimony of
Johnny Alexander, a detective with the Pine Bluff Police
Department, who testified that he bought cocaine from appellant on
two separate occasions on the evening of October 19, 1995. 
Detective Alexander testified that he and a confidential informant
purchased crack cocaine from appellant at her home around 7:48 p.m. 
He further testified that around 11:30 p.m., he returned to
appellant's home to make a second buy.
     After the State rested, appellant presented the testimony of
Faye Walker.  Ms. Walker testified that, on the evening of October
19, 1995, she saw appellant in Idabel, Oklahoma, at Choctaw Bingo,
a bingo parlor.  On cross-examination, Ms. Walker testified that
she did not know whether appellant won any money that night or how
appellant traveled to the bingo parlor.      
     Appellant also presented the testimony of her son, Edmund
Colbert, who testified that she left their residence at
approximately two or three o'clock on the afternoon of October 19,
1995.  Mr. Colbert testified that appellant told him she was "going
up town," and then she would "probably go to bingo."  He also
testified that he was home that evening and that appellant returned
home "a little after one."
     Before the defense rested, the court advised appellant of her
Fifth Amendment rights, and she choose not to testify.  During the
rebuttal phase, the trial court allowed the State to introduce
testimony from appellant's first trial where she had testified that
she was playing bingo in Idabel, Oklahoma, on the night she
allegedly sold cocaine to Detective Alexander, that she won two
mini pots that night, and that she rode a Sue Long Corporation bus
to the bingo parlor.  Appellant objected to the use of her prior
testimony by asserting that it was improper rebuttal, that it
violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and
that it was misleading and confusing.  The trial court ruled that
appellant's prior testimony was admissible for the purpose of
rebutting the defense of alibi.    
     After the State read portions of appellant's testimony from
her first trial, the trial court then permitted the State to
introduce the testimony of Holly Scott, co-manager of Choctaw
Bingo.  Ms. Scott testified that their records showed that
appellant neither won two mini pots nor rode the Sue Long bus to
the bingo parlor that night.
     We begin our review by addressing appellant's contention that
the admission of her prior testimony amounted to a direct comment
on her election not to testify in violation of her Fifth Amendment
rights.  This argument is without merit.
     In Harrison v. United States,