Case Title: Strader v. Kansas Public Employees Retirement System

Citation: 206 Kan. 392, 479 P.2d 860

Docket Number: 45,843

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1971-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
206 Kan. 392 (1971)
479 P.2d 860
HAROLD STRADER, Appellant,
v.
KANSAS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Appellee.
No. 45,843

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 23, 1971.
Arthur E. Hodgson, of Hodgson and Kahler, of Lyons, and John E. Wilkinson, of Colmery, Davis, Bennett, Leonard and McClure, of Topeka, argued the cause and were on the brief for the appellant.
Edward G. Collister, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause, and Kent Frizzell, Attorney General, Sherman A. Parks, Assistant Attorney General, and Marshall Crowther, Insurance and Benefits Counsel, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
*393 The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This appeal stems from a judgment of the district court to which an appeal had been taken from an order of the Board of Trustees of the Kansas Employees Retirement System denying appellant's claim for permanent total disability benefits.
The basic facts are not in dispute.
The city of Lyons, Kansas, was a participating employer in the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System on September 9, 1965. On that date Harold J. Strader, appellant, was employed by the city of Lyons, Kansas, as a garbage collector at a salary of $350 per month. He was a member of the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System. He had no record or history of physical disability prior to September 9, 1965. His usual duties included driving a truck, collecting the refuse and emptying the refuse into the truck. He had performed these same tasks since his employment by the city on August 11, 1961.
On September 9, 1965, appellant reported for work as usual, worked through the morning, went home for lunch and returned to work. Shortly thereafter, and while the temperature was about 103 degrees, he drove a city truck to a home located about a mile from where he had commenced operations for the afternoon. Upon arriving at the home he set out to empty a 30-gallon container with the intent of emptying some of the trash from the container into two five gallon buckets in order to throw the trash onto the city truck. When he attempted to lift the container it began to slip and he tried to catch it by gripping it with his leg. He immediately began to feel dizzy but managed to get the container emptied.
Appellant drove about half a block at which time he felt so dizzy he stopped the truck. He opened the window of his truck in order to get some air. He remembers a beginning weakness in the left leg which rapidly progressed to weakness of the left arm and to the left half of his face and pain in the right eye. He became semi-conscious. Later he was discovered by some of the employees of the city of Lyons and taken to Rice County Hospital in Lyons, Kansas. He was hospitalized until October 23, 1965.
Appellant is totally disabled. There is no controversy regarding the timeliness of the application for accidental total and permanent disability retirement, or the member's report of total disability.
*394 On July 21, 1967, the Board of Trustees of the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System denied the claim of appellant, and on July 25, notified him in writing of its findings, and also notified him of his right, if he felt aggrieved, to make application for a "hearing" before the Board in compliance with K.S.A. 74-4904 (2). On October 26, 1967, the hearing in question was held before the Board of Trustees and at that time the appellant appeared in person and by his counsel. Testimony was given by appellant in connection with his claim. After listening to the oral testimony of appellant, and his counsel's argument, the Board of Trustees considered the three medical reports and reaffirmed the findings that it made at its meeting of July 21, 1967.
The specific finding of the Board of Trustees stated:
Appellant filed notice of appeal to the district court of Shawnee County, Kansas, and also filed in the district court an instrument designated a petition. It read in part:
The appellee answered admitting the formal allegations of the petition, and stated:
Appellant then filed a reply which for the first time raises the question of the constitutionality of the act:
Appellant later filed a motion for summary judgment, which reads:
The appellee also filed a motion for summary judgment, which reads:
The district court considered jointly the motions for summary judgment and filed a comprehensive memorandum opinion which we quote in part:
The statute (K.S.A. 1965 Supp. 74-4916; L. 1965 Ch. 446 § 4) governing the right to permanent total disability at the time of the injury reads:
The underscored language was materially amended by the 1967 legislature (K.S.A. 1970 Supp. 74-4916 [3] [a]) but it has no application here as the injury occurred in September of 1965.
The provision for review is to be found in K.S.A. 74-4909 (10). It reads:
The controlling issue before the Board of Trustees of the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System was, did the appellant's injury arise "out of and in the course of the member's [appellant's] actual performance of his duties?"
The appellant first contends that 
Perhaps we should first, as did the trial court, consider the scope of judicial review on appeal from a finding of an administrative agency.
*397 The statute covering this question (K.S.A. 74-4909 [10]) makes conclusive the Board of Trustees' finding of fact except for the right of review (1) as provided by law; (2) fraud, or (3) gross mistake of fact as to have an effect equivalent to fraud.
We do not see that the scope of review as provided by the statute materially changes the rule long established by this court for review of findings made by administrative agencies. We have limited such review to arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or unfair conduct. It may be said that any such conduct is a species of fraud  at least constructive fraud.
The rule for determining the scope of judicial review in cases such as we now have before us was announced in Pickman v. Weltmer, 191 Kan. 543, 382 P.2d 298, at page 547, where we stated:
The above statement was followed in Chadwick v. Employment Security Board of Review, 192 Kan. 769, 390 P.2d 1017 and Boeing Co. v. Kansas Employment Security Board of Review, 193 Kan. 287, 392 P.2d 904.
It may also be noted that whether there is any evidence to support the Board of Trustees' finding, or whether the findings are contrary to the evidence, presents a question of law which is always open to review by the courts. A finding without evidence, or contrary to the evidence, would also be such a gross mistake of fact as to have an effect equivalent to fraud as that phrase is used in the statute now under consideration.
We, therefore, examine the record for the purpose of determining whether there is substantial competent evidence to support *398 the finding of the Board of Trustees that appellant's disability did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.
The appellant contends that because he sustained his disability just after attempting to lift a 30 gallon container the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment as a matter of law under this court's decisions in workmen's compensation and accident insurance cases.
Without deciding whether or not the rule announced in workmen's compensation cases, as to what constitutes injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, applies to claims arising under the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System but only so assuming for the purpose of our consideration here, we must conclude that the facts here presented would not compel a finding that the disability arose out of and in the course of employment, as a matter of law, under the rules announced in such cases.
The appellant relies chiefly on Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 303 P.2d 197; McIver v. State Highway Commission, 198 Kan. 678, 426 P.2d 118, and Williams v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 200 Kan. 51, 434 P.2d 765.
The Pinkston case had the question of an injury arising out of employment under the Workmen's Compensation Act where the employee had a fatal heart seizure while performing his duties. We stated:
In the Pinkston case the medical testimony was that the additional physical exertion aggravated and participated his fatal seizure. The trial court's finding of injury arising out of and in the course of employment was sustained.
In the McIver case we also had the question of whether a heart condition arose out of and in the course of employment under the Workmen's Compensation Act. We held in paragraph 2 of the syllabus:
*399 In the McIver case the medical testimony was that the labor being performed was an aggravation of a pre-existing condition. The judgment in favor of the employee was affirmed.
The Williams case involved the question of what constituted an accidental injury under the terms of a policy insuring against accident. It was held in the first paragraph of the syllabus:
Axiomatic in all of the cases is the requirement that before there can be an accident or injury arising out of and in the course of employment, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the employment or the employment must aggravate or accelerate a pre-existing condition.
We must look to the medical testimony for the nature of appellant's injury and the effect of his labors upon his cerebral vascular disorder.
The force and sincerity of the argument made by able counsel for appellant leads us to set out the medical testimony at some length.
Appellant was examined by Dr. Foster May 17, 1966. He made his report from information obtained directly from appellant, from his wife who accompanied him and from a photostatic copy of his hospitalization. His written report reads in part:
*400 Dr. McCarter reported as follows:
Dr. Grimes, appellant's physician, made a second report at appellant's request. He stated:
It is clear from the medical testimony in this case, and the medical testimony in the cases cited, that while physical exertion may increase the burden placed on the heart, it has little, if any, effect on the blood vessels of the brain.
We are forced to conclude that there was ample evidence to support the finding of the Board of Trustees that the disability did not arise out of and in the course of appellant's actual performance of his duties.
The appellant complains that he did not have a complete hearing because the procedure afforded a claimant coming before the Kansas Public Employees Retirement Board does not provide for the opportunity of cross-examination nor for the subpoenaing of witnesses.
The record does not bear out the contention that appellant did not have a complete and satisfactory hearing.
On August 23, 1967, he wrote to the Board of Trustees stating:
*401 The hearing was held on October 26, 1967, at which time appellant took the witness stand and was examined by his attorney. Appellant's attorney made his argument. The chairman of the Board of Trustees then asked if there was any other evidence to be offered in appellant's behalf. Appellant's attorney asked the Board of Trustees to consider the latest report of October 6, 1967, from Dr. Grimes of Lyons, Kansas, and requested that this be considered in addition to the oral testimony in the case. Dr. Grimes' report of October 6, 1967, is quoted herein. The reports of the other doctors mentioned and other records had been previously filed with the Board of Trustees.
There is no indication that the appellant intended to present evidence in any form other than oral testimony on his own behalf, written medical reports from his physician and oral argument by his counsel. The record indicates that at the time of the hearing there was no objection to the hearing procedure and that at the close of the hearing counsel for the appellant conceded that everything which he felt should be presented was before the Board of Trustees.
In the two points which the appellant has raised regarding the fairness of the hearing  lack of power to subpoena witnesses and the fact that no cross-examination took place  appellant would appear to be contending that without a trial de novo in the district court he is denied due process of law.
The appellant got everything before the Board of Trustees that he requested. He did not suggest cross-examination of the doctors who filed the reports. Two of them were in the city of Topeka where the hearing was being held and subject to call. The other, Dr. Grimes, was appellant's own doctor. He was not hurt by the absence of statutory procedure for subpoenaing witnesses.
It will be time enough for this court to pass upon the due process of law question when it is raised by someone who is hurt.
Constitutionality of legislation or due process before an administrative body will be considered by the courts only where necessarily involved and such constitutionality may not be questioned by one not affected by its operation. (Stone v. City of Wichita, 145 Kan. 377, 380, 65 P.2d 595; Marks v. Frantz, 179 Kan. 638, 643, 298 P.2d 316; State v. Consumers Warehouse Market, 183 Kan. 502, 511, 329 P.2d 638.)
*402 We have not overlooked the statement in appellant's petition 
We would suggest that a party appearing before an administrative body cannot produce his evidence piecemeal. He cannot produce part of his evidence before an administrative agency and then produce the balance on judicial review. He must produce all of his evidence on the merits before the administrative body or show a good faith effort to do so.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.