Case Title: Derksen v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Derksen v. State1993 WY 18845 P.2d 1383Case Number: 91-126Decided: 02/05/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
Frank W. 
DERKSEN,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal from District 
Court, Platte County and 
Converse 
County, William A. Taylor, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, David Gosar, Appellate Counsel, and Erin A. 
McIntyre, Legal Intern, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired 1/1/93.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      An issue of first 
impression is presented in this appeal asking whether the offense of taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child is a lesser included 
offense of second-degree sexual assault. Appellant, Frank W. Derksen (Derksen), 
contends it was plain error to permit the lesser included offense instruction 
from which his conviction resulted. We agree.

I. ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant states 
multiple issues for this court's consideration:

ISSUE I

Was it plain error to 
allow jury instruction no. 12 which stated that taking immodest, immoral, or 
indecent liberties with a minor is a lesser-included offense of second degree 
sexual assault?

ISSUE II

Did the trial judge abuse 
his discretion by failing to afford the defendant his constitutionally protected 
right of allocution and by relying on improper information when sentencing the 
defendant?

ISSUE III

Was it plain error to 
allow a ten-year-old "borderline" mentally retarded child to testify absent a 
determination of her competency?

ISSUE IV

Did the prosecutor 
repeatedly overstep and ignore rules prohibiting him from asserting as fact his 
own personal beliefs relating to matters in issue so as to adversely affect the 
defendant's substantial right to a fair trial?

ISSUE V

Was [the grandmother's] 
testimony concerning the "yellow mess" in the child's underpants improperly 
admitted?

ISSUE VI

Was there sufficient 
evidence to convict appellant of taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties 
with a minor?

ISSUE VII

Was the Victims 
Compensation assessment made in violation of law?

ISSUE VIII

Should Appellant's 
conviction be reversed pursuant to the doctrine of cumulative error?

[¶3]      The State, in 
response, summarizes the issues as:

I. Was appellant properly 
convicted of taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a 
minor?

II. Was the prosecutor's 
argument proper comment upon the evidence admitted at trial?

III. Did the district 
court properly use the pre-sentence investigation report during sentencing and 
did it afford appellant all constitutional rights?

IV. Is the doctrine of 
cumulative error inapplicable to appellant's conviction since no error appears 
in the record?

II. FACTS

[¶4]      In the summer and 
early fall of 1988, the victim was ten years old. The victim lived with her 
paternal grandparents, but was allowed to visit her stepfather, Derksen, and her 
natural mother at their home near Wheatland, Wyoming under terms of a custody 
decree. During one of those visits, Derksen allegedly tied the victim's hands so 
he could remove her clothes and fondle her. Later, Derksen disrobed, according 
to the victim, and forced her to touch his penis and put it in her mouth. 
Derksen also reportedly displayed to the victim lewd pictures of himself and the 
victim's mother.

[¶5]      More than two 
years after this incident reportedly took place, by information, Derksen was 
charged with second-degree sexual assault. During the instruction conference at 
Derksen's jury trial, the defense initially objected to a state offered 
instruction for taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child as a 
lesser included offense. However, the objection was withdrawn after an 
unreported conference was held between the judge, prosecutor and defense 
lawyer.

[¶6]      The jury 
convicted Derksen of the "lesser" offense, taking immodest, immoral or indecent 
liberties, and he was sentenced to not less than nine years nor more than ten 
years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary and assessed $500 for the Wyoming 
Victim's Compensation Fund. Additional relevant facts will be included in the 
discussion as necessary.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶7]      Without a 
preserved objection, at trial, the disputed lesser included offense instruction 
requires analysis under the plain error doctrine.

[¶8]      Our standard of 
review under plain error is well established.

"`First, the record must 
be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party 
claiming that error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a 
substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially 
prejudiced.'"

Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132, 
1134 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Auclair 
v. State, 660 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Wyo. 1983) cert. denied 464 U.S. 909, 104 S. Ct. 265, 78 L. Ed. 2d 249 and Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 
(Wyo. 1981)). See [W.R.Cr.P. 
52(b)].

Craney v. State, 
798 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶9]      The record in 
this proceeding is sufficient to evaluate the contentions of error. Jury 
Instruction Nos. 12 through 15 permitted the jury to convict Derksen of taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties as a lesser included offense. Jury 
Instruction No. 12 specifically stated:

If you are not satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, 
he may, however, be found guilty of any lesser offense, the commission of which 
is necessarily included in the offense charged, if the evidence is sufficient to 
establish his guilt of such lesser offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

The offense of sexual 
assault in the second degree, with which the defendant is charged, includes the 
lesser offense of taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a 
child.

Derksen has 
fulfilled the first requirement of the plain error test.

[¶10]   Demonstrating that a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law has been violated, the second portion of the plain error 
test requires consideration of the lesser included offense doctrine as defined 
by W.R.Cr.P. 31(c).1

The defendant may be 
found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an 
attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included 
therein if the attempt is an offense.

The lesser 
included offense doctrine benefits the prosecution when it fails to establish 
each of the elements of the charged crime and the doctrine benefits the 
defendant because it provides the jury a "`less drastic alternative than the 
choice between conviction of the offense charged and acquittal.'" State v. 
Selig, 635 P.2d 786, 790 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting Beck v. 
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 
2387, 65 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1980)).

[¶11]   In 
Wyoming, an offense is 
"necessarily included" in the charged offense when "`the elements of the lesser 
offense are identical to part of the elements of the greater offense * * *.'" 
Selig, 635 P.2d  at 790 (quoting United 
States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294, 1299 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 446 U.S. 967, 100 S. Ct. 2947, 64 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1980)).2 Accord Pearson v. State, 818 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Wyo. 1991); Craney, 798 P.2d at 1205-06; Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379, 383-84 (Wyo. 1989); Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91, 95 (Wyo. 1988); Miller 
v. State, 755 P.2d 855, 865 (Wyo. 1988); Seeley v. State, 715 P.2d 232, 238 
(Wyo. 1986); Amin v. State, 694 P.2d 119, 122-24 (Wyo. 1985); and Balsley v. 
State, 668 P.2d 1324, 1327 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶12]   The elements of the crime of sexual 
assault in the second degree, Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-303 (1988), require:

(1) an actor

(2) who 
inflicts

(3) sexual 
intrusion

(4) on a 
victim

(5) less than twelve 
years of age

(6) while the actor is 
more than four years older.

[¶13]   The elements of the crime of taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties, Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105 (1986), 
punish:

(1) any 
person

(2) knowingly 

(3) taking immodest, 
immoral or indecent liberties

(4) with any 
child.

This court has 
held that the word "child" in this statute refers to any one under the age of 
nineteen years. Campbell v. State, 709 P.2d 425, 
427 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶14]   The elements of the claimed 
"lesser" offense, taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties, are not 
identical to part of the elements of the greater offense, sexual assault in the 
second degree under the applicable standard. Selig, 635 P.2d  at 790. Aside from 
the obvious discrepancies in the actor's age3 and the victim's age,4 the basic natures of the offenses 
differ. Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1992); McArtor v. State, 
699 P.2d 288, 293 (Wyo. 1985). The claimed 
"greater" offense punishes conduct involving sexual intrusion. The purported 
"lesser" offense punishes sexual intrusion as well as other forms of conduct. 
Each statute is intended "to suppress different evils * * *." Rivera, 840 P.2d  
at 942.

[¶15]   Sexual assault in the second degree 
requires proof of sexual intrusion. Sexual intrusion is defined as:

(A) Any intrusion, 
however slight, by any object or any part of a person's body, except the mouth, 
tongue or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another person's body if 
that sexual intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of 
sexual arousal, gratification or abuse; or

(B) Sexual intercourse, 
cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or anal intercourse with or without 
emission.

Wyo. Stat. § 
6-2-301(a)(vii) (1988). The provisions of the sexual assault in the second 
degree statute prohibit a form of rape, a common law crime of violence directed 
against a person.

[¶16]   The offense of taking immodest, 
immoral or indecent liberties covers a broader range of conduct than sexual 
intrusion. The jury in this case received Jury Instruction No. 14 stating: 
"Immodest, immoral or indecent liberties have a definite meaning because a 
person of ordinary intelligence can weigh his contemplated conduct against the 
prohibition of taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties and know whether 
or not such contemplated conduct is prohibited."5 Under this instruction, a broad 
range of conduct, including sexual contact6 as well as sexual intrusion, is 
prohibited by Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105.

[¶17]   The case of Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1032 (Wyo. 1979) is instructive on 
the breadth of Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105. Sorenson, while working at the home of the 
parents of his twelve-year-old victim, touched the breasts of the victim through 
her clothing. He also attempted to unbutton the victim's shirt. In affirming 
Sorenson's conviction for taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties, this 
court held that the purpose of the statute was "`to protect the morals of the 
child * * *.'" Id. at 1035 (quoting Dekelt 
v. People, 44 Colo. 525, 99 P. 330, 331-32 
(1909)). Accord Gallegos v. People, 176 Colo. 191, 489 P.2d 1301 
(1971).7 There were no allegations in 
Sorenson of conduct involving sexual intrusion.

[¶18]   In Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 
365 (Wyo. 1991), evidence of 
sexual intrusion was presented in expert testimony from a physician. The expert 
testified that, based upon the results of the medical examination, a molestation 
had occurred. This court affirmed a conviction for taking immodest, immoral or 
indecent liberties.

[¶19]   In McArtor, a conviction for taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties was affirmed based on evidence of 
consensual sexual intercourse. McArtor, 699 P.2d  at 294. As Sorenson, Montoya 
and McArtor illustrate, the offense of taking immodest, immoral or indecent 
liberties punishes conduct which includes not only sexual intrusion, but also 
sexual contact and consensual sexual intercourse. The elements of taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties are not identical to part of the 
elements of the claimed greater offense.

[¶20]   Under the terms of Jury Instruction 
No. 12, the jury was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Derksen 
committed sexual assault in the second degree. The sexual intrusion evidence, 
which was aggressively challenged in cross-examination and during expert 
testimony, was apparently not sufficient. The language of Jury Instruction No. 
14, erroneously, permitted the jury to convict for taking immodest, immoral or 
indecent liberties as a lesser included offense by finding creditability in 
either the evidence of sexual contact or the evidence of the display of lewd 
photographs or both.

[¶21]   As a matter of law, the crime of 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties, Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105, cannot be 
a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the second degree. Wyo. Stat. § 
6-2-303(a)(v). Derksen has met his burden of establishing the clear violation of 
a rule of law.

[¶22]   The final step in the plain error 
test requires establishing that a substantial right has been denied and material 
prejudice has resulted. A substantial right is implicated if an individual is 
convicted of a crime not charged or not "necessarily included" within the 
charged crime. Craney, 798 P.2d  at 1205; W.R.Cr.P. 31(c). Material prejudice 
results when there is no notice of the charges to be defended against. Craney, 
798 P.2d  at 1206; Selig, 635 P.2d  at 793.

[¶23]   A substantial right of Derksen's 
was violated when he was convicted of a crime not charged or not "necessarily 
included" within the charged crime. The State argues that despite the fact the 
elements of Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105 are not identical to part of the elements of 
Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-303(a)(v), the lesser included offense instruction was proper. 
The State claims, "[j]ust because evidence of the greater element on intrusion 
may not have been accepted by the jury does not mean that the elements of 
immoral or indecent acts were not proved."

[¶24]   The problem with the State's 
argument is that it ignores a basic constitutional right - a defendant's right 
to notice of the charges. When specific conduct violates more than one criminal 
statute, the state, at its option, may choose to prosecute for the violation of 
one statute or for the violation of multiple statutes under appropriate 
circumstances where multiple punishment is legislatively authorized. Cook v. 
State, 841 P.2d 1345 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting 
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69, 103 S. Ct. 673, 74 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1983)); Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132, 1141 
(Wyo. 1986), cert. denied 480 U.S. 907, 107 S. Ct. 1353, 94 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987). The nature of the charge or 
charges filed is a matter of prosecutorial discretion which is limited by 
constitutional guarantees of certain rights. Bueno-Hernandez, 724 P.2d  at 1141; 
Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 929 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶25]   The 
United 
States Constitution8 and the 
Wyoming Constitution9 both assure the right of a 
defendant to adequate notice of the accusations against him or her so that a 
defense may be prepared. McInturff v. State, 808 P.2d 190, 193 
(Wyo. 1991); Gonzales v. 
State, 551 P.2d 929, 930 (Wyo. 1976). Under the notice 
provision of Wyo. Const. art. 1 § 10, a basic rule that the proof must 
correspond with the allegation means that a prosecution is not sustained by 
evidence which tends to prove a different offense than the one charged. Brantley 
v. State, 9 Wyo. 102, 106, 61 P. 139 
(1900).

[¶26]   At the time of trial, former 
W.R.Cr.P. 9 provided that "the indictment or information shall be a plain, 
concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the 
offense charged and it shall be signed by the prosecuting attorney." W.R.Cr.P. 
9(c). See W.R.Cr.P. 3 (restating information provisions of former Rule 9); 
W.R.Cr.P. 7 (restating indictment provisions of former Rule 9). The legal 
sufficiency of the charging document is tested by determining whether it fairly 
indicates the crime charged, states the essential elements of the alleged crime 
and is sufficiently definite to enable the defendant to prepare a defense and 
grants double jeopardy protection from further prosecution for the same offense. 
Gonzales, 551 P.2d  at 933.

[¶27]   Derksen was charged, by 
information, with unlawfully

inflict[ing] sexual 
intrusion on [the victim], and at the time of the commission of the act, [the 
victim] was less than twelve (12) years of age, and Frank W. Derksen was a least 
four (4) years older than she, in violation of W.S. 6-2-303(a)(v) (second degree 
sexual assault).

At the time of 
arraignment, the trial court judge advised Derksen of the offense charged by 
reading the information and inquired:

[BY THE COURT] I must be 
sure that you understand with what you have been charged and the possible 
penalties. With what have you been charged, sir?

[BY DERKSEN] I've been 
charged with second degree sexual assault.

[BY THE COURT] What would 
be the possible penalties if you plead guilty or were found guilty of that 
charge?

[BY DERKSEN] Imprisonment 
for not more than 20 years and no less than $50 victims' compensation fund and 
restitution and cost of public defender.

[BY THE COURT] Do you 
understand that?

[BY DERKSEN] Yes, I 
do.

[BY THE COURT] I'm then 
going to ask you then, Mr. Derksen, how you plead to the charge of second degree 
sexual assault involving one [victim's name], guilty or not guilty?

[BY DERKSEN] Not 
guilty.[10]

[¶28]   The information provided notice to 
Derksen of the need to provide a defense to Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-303(a)(v), an 
offense involving sexual intrusion. No other offenses were charged. Before 
trial, Derksen filed a motion for a bill of particulars specifically requesting 
information to "enable him to adequately be apprised of the nature and scope of 
those accusations against him as guaranteed to him by Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wyoming Constitution * * *."11 The record, however, contains no 
indication that this motion was ever determined by the trial court. In any 
event, no bill of particulars was ever filed. As a result, the notice to Derksen 
was sufficient only to the extent that a defense for conduct involving sexual 
intrusion would be required.

[¶29]   If the offense of taking immodest, 
immoral or indecent liberties were a lesser included offense of sexual assault 
in the second degree, the notice burden would have been satisfied by the 
"necessarily included" language of W.R.Cr.P. 31(c). Selig, 635 P.2d  at 793; 
Brantley, 9 Wyo. at 106, 61 P.  at 139-40. 
In Brantley, this court held that because of the lesser included offense 
doctrine, "in charging an intent to commit murder in the first degree there is 
necessarily included a charge of intent to commit murder in the second degree 
and voluntary manslaughter." Brantley, 9 Wyo. at 106, 61 P.  at 139-40 
(emphasis added).

[¶30]   The Brantley decision illustrates 
an important point about the lesser included offense doctrine and the multiple 
punishment component of the double jeopardy clause which has been overlooked in 
the State's argument. Wyo. Const. art. 1 § 11. The 
Brantley court supported its decision by citing the traditional progression of a 
lesser included offense:

Under our statute murder 
in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and manslaughter each involves 
a felonious killing. To constitute the first, it must be done with premeditated 
malice; the second is a killing with malice, but with the element of 
premeditation omitted, while in voluntary manslaughter there is an intentional 
killing, but without any element of malice or premeditation. Brantley, 9 
Wyo. at 106-07, 61 P.  at 140. 
At the time Brantley was decided, Wyoming's homicide statutes 
fulfilled the requirement that, "`the elements of the lesser offense are 
identical to part of the elements of the greater offense * * *.'" Selig, 635 P.2d  at 790 (quoting Chapman, 615 F.2d at 1299). Therefore, a conviction for 
assault with intent to commit murder in the second degree was affirmed despite 
the fact that the charge filed was for assault with intent to commit murder in 
the first degree. Brantley, 9 Wyo. at 109, 61 P.  at 
140.

[¶31]   Brantley's punishment was a 
sentence for committing the offense of assault with intent to commit murder in 
the second degree, the lesser offense. If he had been found guilty of the 
greater offense, assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree, the 
sentence would have been for that offense. Brantley could not have been 
sentenced for both the greater and lesser offenses without violating the 
multiple punishment protection of the double jeopardy clause. Whalen v. 
United 
States, 445 U.S. 684, 694, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 1439, 63 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1980).

[¶32]   The Wyoming Supreme Court has 
previously ruled that a defendant convicted of sexual assault in the second 
degree and taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties may be sentenced for 
both offenses. Kallas v. State, 704 P.2d 693, 695 
(Wyo. 1985). In its ruling, 
the court specifically recognized that the elements of the offenses are not 
identical. Our recent decision in Rivera acknowledged, for purposes of 
sentencing, that a merger of a sexual assault offense and an offense for taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties may occur when the facts proven at trial 
establish that the defendant committed only a single criminal act. Rivera, 840 P.2d 933. However, Rivera also approved individual sentences for sexual assault 
in the first degree and taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties when 
individual offenses were committed. Id. If we were to agree with 
the State's argument, that the offense of taking immodest, immoral or indecent 
liberties is a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the second degree, 
we would have to overrule Kallas and Rivera. Whalen, 445 U.S.  at 694, 100 S. Ct.  at 
1439. The State cannot be urging such discordant results.

[¶33]   Derksen has met his burden of 
establishing that a substantial right was denied and that material prejudice 
resulted from a lack of notice. Instructing the jury members that they could 
convict Derksen of taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties as a lesser 
included offense amounted to plain error. It is not necessary to consider the 
remaining issues on appeal.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶34]   The demonstration of plain error at 
trial requires the conviction be reversed to be retried, if the county attorney 
elects, on a properly charged offense under Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105.

CARDINE, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion.

THOMAS, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

CARDINE, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶35]   The court has concluded that the 
indecent liberties statute is not a lesser-included offense to second degree 
sexual assault because:

a) Second degree sexual 
assault requires that the victim be less than the age of 12 years, whereas the 
indecent liberties statute requires less than 18 years;

b) Second degree sexual 
assault requires penetration. Indecent liberties requires immodest, immoral or 
indecent liberties.

[¶36]   A minor of the age of 12 is under 
the age of 18. We have held that penetration is an act that constitutes 
immodest, immoral and indecent liberties. The majority rule is that indecent 
liberties is a lesser-included offense based upon the cognate test which is as 
follows:

The lesser offense is 
related and, hence, `cognate' in the sense that it has several elements in 
common with the greater offense but may have one or two elements not essential 
to the greater crime.

State v. 
Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1988) (cited in Craney 
v. State, 798 P.2d 1202, 1205, n. 6 (Wyo. 1990)). Without more, it 
would seem clear that immodest, immoral and indecent liberties is a 
lesser-included offense to second degree sexual assault.

[¶37]   The Washington Supreme Court, 
however, has recently held that indecent liberties is not a lesser-included 
offense of either first degree statutory rape or second degree statutory rape. 
State v. Markle, 118 Wn.2d 424, 823 P.2d 1101, 1109 (1992). That court decided 
that it was not a lesser-included offense because the indecent liberties statute 
contains a knowledge requirement that the rape statute does not require. Markle, 
823 P.2d  at 1107. Our indecent liberties statute provides as 
follows:

Any person knowingly 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly 
causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit 
with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction 
shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten 
(10) years, or both.

W.S. 14-3-105 
(emphasis added). Our statute contains a knowledge requirement not found in our 
second degree sexual assault statute. The required mental state is a significant 
factor which, for this reason rather than that cited by the court, prevents a 
lesser-included status for the indecent liberties statute regardless of the age 
or specific facts. I would hold, therefore, that because the indecent liberties 
statute contains an element of the crime not found in the sexual assault statute 
that indecent liberties is not a lesser-included offense to second degree sexual 
assault.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶38]   While I have no disagreement with 
the discussion in the majority opinion concerning the law of lesser included 
offenses and the general rule relating to the defendant's right to notice, I 
would affirm Derksen's conviction. I think it is important that the judicial 
department of our State not lose sight of the fact that criminal trials are 
expensive, both to the State and the counties. The monetary costs do not 
account, in any way, for the emotional stress that is incurred by all the 
participants. Retrials should be avoided when that is possible without 
transgressing the rights of a defendant. Consequently, I write in 
dissent.

[¶39]   As the majority explains, these are 
the crucial facts regarding the conviction for the crime of taking immodest, 
immoral, or indecent liberties with a child:

More than two years after 
this incident reportedly took place, by information, Derksen was charged with 
second-degree sexual assault. During the instruction conference at Derksen's 
jury trial, the defense initially objected to a state offered instruction for 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child as a lesser included 
offense. However, the objection was withdrawn after an unreported conference was 
held between the judge, prosecutor and defense lawyer.

Op. at 
1385.

While the record 
does not explain the reason for this tactical decision to withdraw the 
objection, a comparison of the crimes and their penalties does demonstrate a 
rather clear motive. The offense of second degree sexual assault and the penalty 
is set forth in the statutes:

6-2-303. Sexual assault 
in the second degree.

(a) Any actor who 
inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second 
degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first 
degree:

* * * * * *

(v) At the time of the 
commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age and the 
actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim * * *.

6-2-306. Penalties for 
sexual assault.

(a) An actor convicted of 
sexual assault who does not qualify under the criteria of subsection (b) of this 
section shall be punished as follows:

* * * * * *

(ii) Sexual assault in 
the second degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
twenty (20) years * * *.

Wyo. Stat. §§ 
6-2-303, -306 (1988) (emphasis added).

The statute 
proscribing the taking of immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with a child 
reads:

Any person knowingly 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly 
causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit 
with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be fined not less 
than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) years, or 
both. (Emphasis added.)

Wyo. Stat. § 
14-3-105 (1986) (emphasis added.)

By agreeing to 
have the jury charge include the offense of indecent liberties with a child, 
counsel for Derksen injected an offense for which the potential sentence was 
one-half of the potential maximum sentence for the crime with which he was 
charged. It worked for him.

[¶40]   Under the circumstances, instead of 
rewarding Derksen with a reversal for an error he assisted in causing, if he did 
not cause it, I would hold he had consented to an informal amendment of the 
information or, in the alternative, the instruction became the law of the case 
once Derksen withdrew his objection. Both of these approaches are justified by 
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions.

[¶41]   Neither party objected to the 
giving of that instruction; consequently, it became the law of the case. Sanchez 
v. State, 751 P.2d 1300 (Wyo. 1988). In New Mexico, 
had Derksen actually requested the instruction on indecent liberties with a 
minor it would be perceived as law of the case, and his complaint of error would 
not be recognized on appeal. State v. Hamilton, 107 N.M. 186, 754 P.2d 857 
(N.M.App. 1988). In light of Derksen's original objection that later was 
withdrawn, there is no substantial basis to distinguish what occurred here from 
a request for the instruction on indecent liberties.

[¶42]   Similarly, in 
Washington, when a defendant fails 
to object to an instruction as to an offense that is not a lesser included 
offense, although perceived to be a lesser included offense in the trial court, 
the instruction becomes the law of the case, and the giving of the instruction 
will not be recognized as reversible error in the reviewing court. State v. Mak, 
105 Wn.2d 692, 718 P.2d 407 (Wash. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S. Ct. 599, 93 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1986). Mak was followed in State v. 
Bailey, 114 Wn.2d 340, 787 P.2d 1378 (Wash. 1990), in which an 
instruction on the offense of indecent liberties was given without exception 
although the charged offense was first degree statutory rape. The Supreme Court 
of Washington said:

In short, what we held in 
Mak was that a defendant cannot fail in his duty to except to lesser included 
offense instructions that potentially benefit him, and then on appeal claim 
reversible error based on those instructions. Yet that is precisely what the 
defendant is attempting here. The present case is even more egregious than Mak, 
because here the defendant profited from the trial court's giving of the lesser 
offense instructions to the extent that he was convicted of the lesser offense 
of indecent liberties rather than the more serious offense of first degree 
statutory rape with which he was charged. We hold in this case, as we did in 
Mak, that "the lesser included offense instruction that was given, not having 
been excepted to at trial, became the law of the case."

* * * * * *

The defendant claims that 
the lesser included offense instructions constituted an error of constitutional 
magnitude because they violated his constitutional right to notice of the 
charges filed against him. An accused has a constitutional right to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her so as to enable the 
accused to prepare a defense. "[T]his can only be made known by setting forth in 
the indictment or information every fact constituting an element of the offense 
charged."

Here, the charge of 
statutory rape in the first degree technically failed to notify the defendant of 
the nonmarriage requirement of indecent liberties. However, the defendant had 
ample notice of the possibility that he could be convicted of indecent liberties 
and ample opportunity to fully defend himself against that charge. While the 
charge of statutory rape in the first degree did fail to expressly notify the 
defendant of the nonmarriage element of indecent liberties, this omission was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Bailey, 787 P.2d  
at 1382-83 (footnotes omitted).

[¶43]   In 
California, the rule is that when a 
defendant fails to object to instructions on an offense, purportedly a lesser 
included offense but which is not, his failure to object constitutes "an implied 
consent to the jury's consideration of the lesser related offense and a waiver 
of any objection based on lack of notice." People v. Toro, 47 Cal. 3d 966, 766 P.2d 577, 584, 254 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1989) (footnote omitted). Other 
California cases encompass similar 
holdings. E.g., People v. Rasher, 3 Cal. App. 3d 798, 83 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1970); 
People v. Hensel, 233 Cal. App. 2d 834, 43 Cal. Rptr. 865, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 942, 86 S. Ct. 396, 15 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1965). Because of the development of this 
rule in California, it does not appear that 
the law-of-the-case proposition is in vogue there.

[¶44]   I am satisfied that either the 
law-of-the-case rule, coupled with waiver of the claim of error, or the rule of 
implied consent to amendment of the charge suffices to justify the affirmance of 
Derksen's conviction. Both rules are rational and have value in the 
administration of criminal law. I would adopt both rules for 
Wyoming and in future cases 
apply the one most appropriate to the circumstances of the particular case, 
unless both fit that case.

[¶45]   I would affirm Derksen's 
conviction.

 Footnotes

1 At the time of trial, 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(c) was in effect. The language of both the present and former rule 
is identical.

2 We acknowledge the 
unsettled nature of the lesser included offense doctrine in 
Wyoming. Craney, 798 P.2d  at 
1205 n. 6 (noting differences in various approaches). However, under any 
anticipated formulation, the result would be the same.

3 The actor in Wyo. Stat. 
§ 6-2-303(a)(v) must be four years older than the victim. The actor in Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-3-105 may be any age.

4 The victim in Wyo. Stat. 
§ 6-2-303(a)(v) must be less than twelve years of age. The victim in Wyo. Stat. 
§ 14-3-105 may be any age under nineteen years.

5 The language of the 
instruction is derived from Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 
(Wyo. 1979) which held Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-3-105 (1977) was not unconstitutionally vague.

6 Wyo. Stat. § 
6-2-301(a)(vi) defines sexual contact as "touching, with the intention of sexual 
arousal, gratification or abuse, of the victim's intimate parts by the actor, or 
of the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or of the clothing covering the 
immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts[.]"

7 
Colorado's former offense of 
taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child is now incorporated 
into a sexual assault on a child offense creating a cohesive structure of sexual 
assault crimes. Colo.Stat. § 18-3-405 (1986 & Cum.Supp. 1992).

8 
U.S. Const. amend. VI 
provides, in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation * 
* *."

9 
Wyo. Const. art. 1 § 10 
insures, in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right * * * to demand the nature and cause of the accusation, to have a copy 
thereof * * *."

10 Until the entry of the 
plea, former W.R.Cr.P. 9(c) provided that the state could have amended the 
information without leave of the court to charge a violation of Wyo. Stat. § 
14-3-105 for taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child. No 
amendments to the information were filed before the plea was entered. After the 
plea was entered, the former rule permitted, at the court's discretion, "an 
information to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if no additional 
or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant have 
not been prejudiced." W.R.Cr.P. 9(c) (emphasis added). See W.R.Cr.P. 3. The 
addition of a charge of taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties after the 
plea would have been counter to the rule of McInturff, 808 P.2d  at 193 since a 
different offense, involving sexual contact and other conduct, would have been 
charged.

11 
Wyo. Const. art. 1 § 11 
encompasses the right to protection against double jeopardy by providing: "No 
person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If a jury 
disagree, or if the judgement be arrested after a verdict, or if the judgement 
be reversed for error in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in 
jeopardy."