Case Title: Larson & Larson, P.A., Et Al. v. TSE Industries, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-428

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC08-428 
_____________ 
 
LARSON & LARSON, P.A., et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
TSE INDUSTRIES, INC., 
Respondent. 
 
[November 5, 2009] 
 
CANADY, J. 
 
We have for review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in 
TSE Industries, Inc. v. Larson & Larson, P.A., 987 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2008), in which the district court certified direct conflict with the decision of the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Integrated Broadcast Services, Inc. v. Mitchel, 
931 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), regarding when the two-year statute of 
limitations begins to run on a legal malpractice claim.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
The Second District held in Larson that where the judgment underlying a 
litigation-related legal malpractice claim is final, the statute of limitations does not 
 
 
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begin to run until the final disposition of motions for sanctions.  On similar facts, 
however, the Fourth District in Mitchel held that the limitations period on a legal 
malpractice claim began to run on the underlying judgment when that judgment 
was final but did not begin to run with respect to a subsequent sanctions judgment 
until the sanctions judgment became final.  As we explain below, we agree with 
the Fourth District‟s decision in Mitchel. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
In 1998, Larson & Larson, P.A., as counsel for TSE Industries, filed a patent 
infringement suit in United States district court to enforce one of TSE‟s patents 
against Franklynn Industries, Inc.  After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Franklynn, finding that TSE‟s patent was invalid.  The trial court entered judgment 
against TSE in the case on October 24, 2001.  TSE filed timely motions for 
judgment as a matter of law and for new trial, and Franklynn filed a post-judgment 
motion for declaration of an exceptional case and for recovery of attorney fees.  
See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable 
attorney fees to the prevailing party [in patent infringement actions].”)  
On August 16, 2002, the federal district court entered two orders.  One order 
disposed of TSE‟s motions and affirmed the jury verdict, thus entering judgment 
 
 
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against TSE.1  TSE did not appeal this order, and the judgment was final thirty 
days later, September 16, 2002.  In the other order of August 16, 2002, the federal 
judge granted Franklynn‟s sanctions motion.  The court found the case exceptional 
within the meaning of the statute, relying largely on its findings that a TSE 
employee engaged in inequitable conduct both before the Patent and Trademark 
Office and before the court and that TSE was aware of a possible problem with the 
patent and did not candidly disclose this fact.  The federal court determined that 
but for such conduct, the trial would not have been necessary and awarded 
Franklynn prevailing party attorney fees and expert witness fees.  Leaving the 
amount of the sanctions award for later determination, the trial court ordered 
Franklynn to file a revised statement of fees and costs.  The parties, however, 
settled the issue before the court issued a final determination, and on October 10, 
2002, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal. 
On October 5, 2004—more than two years after the judgment in the patent 
case was final but less than two years after the parties filed the stipulation of 
dismissal—TSE filed a legal malpractice suit against Larson in Florida circuit 
court.  TSE alleged negligence and breach of contract and sought monetary 
                                          
 
 
1.  The federal district court granted in part and denied in part TSE‟s 
motions, holding that competent, substantial evidence supported all but one of 
Franklynn‟s claims of patent invalidity.  The court denied all of TSE‟s other claims 
and denied a new trial.  
 
 
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damages for the attorney fees and expenses incurred by TSE to initiate and 
prosecute the patent infringement suit and for the sums it paid for Franklynn‟s 
attorney fees and expenses.2 
Larson moved for summary judgment based on the two-year statute of 
limitations for professional malpractice in section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes 
(2002).  After hearing argument, the trial court entered final summary judgment for 
Larson.  Applying this Court‟s decision in Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 1173 
(Fla. 1998), the trial court held the action was barred.  The court reasoned that 
judicial labor regarding the merits of the underlying action ended when the 
judgment was not appealed.  Further, the court concluded that the order granting 
attorney fees could not alter that final judgment and TSE‟s complaint did not allege 
any legal malpractice occurring after the August 2002 orders were entered. 
As explained more fully in the next section, the Second District reversed, 
concluding that this Court‟s Silvestrone opinion did not contemplate the factual 
scenario in this case.  Larson, 987 So. 2d at 691.  Accordingly, the district court 
                                          
 
 
2.  The complaint alleged the same seven bases for both the negligence and 
breach of contract counts.  TSE claimed that Larson (1) failed to adequately 
investigate the validity of TSE‟s patent; (2) failed to review relevant files before 
advising TSE to file suit; (3) advised TSE the patent infringement suit was 
“strong”; (4) failed to advise TSE of concerns about patent validity and the 
veracity of TSE‟s employee as a witness; (5) knowingly prepared and filed a false 
interrogatory response; (6) failed to advise TSE of issues regarding patent validity 
raised in correspondence; and (7) failed to adequately advise TSE‟s management 
regarding weaknesses in the action before and after filing suit. 
 
 
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held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the parties settled the 
sanctions claim and filed the stipulation dismissing the case with prejudice. 
II.  SILVESTRONE AND THE CONFLICT IN THE CASES 
 
Florida law provides that “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element 
constituting the cause of action occurs,” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2002), and that a 
legal malpractice action must be brought within two years “from the time the cause 
of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due 
diligence,” § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002).  “A legal malpractice action has three 
elements: 1) the attorney‟s employment; 2) the attorney‟s neglect of a reasonable 
duty; and 3) the attorney‟s negligence as the proximate cause of loss to the client.”  
Law Office of David J. Stern, P.A. v. Sec. Nat‟l Servicing Corp., 969 So. 2d 962, 
966 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Sec. Nat‟l Servicing Corp. v. Law Office of David J. 
Stern, P.A., 916 So. 2d 934, 936-37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). 
 
In Silvestrone, we specifically addressed the question of when the statute of 
limitations begins to run in a litigation-related legal malpractice claim.  The district 
courts in both Larson and Mitchel expressly relied on Silvestrone.  Accordingly, to 
provide context for these decisions and the conflict presented here, we begin by 
reviewing Silvestrone. 
 
Silvestrone, the plaintiff in a federal antitrust action, prevailed when the jury 
returned a verdict in his favor and awarded him money damages.  Silvestrone, 721 
 
 
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So. 2d at 1174.  The court entered final judgment two years later, when it resolved 
various post-trial motions, including Silvestrone‟s motion for attorney fees and 
costs and a coplaintiff‟s motion for new trial.  The final judgment became final on 
February 4, 1992, when it was not appealed.  Almost a year later, Silvestrone filed 
a legal malpractice action against his former trial attorney “for exceeding his 
authority to enter into a settlement agreement.”  Id.  His former attorney raised the 
statute of limitations as a bar to the suit, arguing that the statute began to run when 
the jury returned its verdict.  Although the district court agreed, we unanimously 
quashed its decision.  Id.  
Beginning from the premise that the law was unclear regarding when the 
statute of limitations period begins to run for a litigation-related legal malpractice 
claim, we sought to establish a clearly delineated rule.  Id. at 1175.   We 
recognized in this context that until final judgment is entered, a trial court may 
revisit any nonfinal ruling.  Accordingly we reasoned and held as follows: 
[W]hen a malpractice action is predicated on errors or omissions 
committed in the course of litigation, and that litigation proceeds to 
judgment, the statute of limitations does not commence to run until 
the litigation is concluded by final judgment.  To be specific, we hold 
that the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the final 
judgment becomes final. 
To be liable for malpractice arising out of litigation, the 
attorney must be the proximate cause of the adverse outcome of the 
underlying action which results in damage to the client.  Since 
redressable harm is not established until final judgment is rendered, a 
malpractice claim is hypothetical and damages are speculative until 
 
 
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the underlying action is concluded with an adverse outcome to the 
client. 
. . . . 
We therefore hold, in those cases that proceed to final 
judgment, the two-year statute of limitations for litigation-related 
malpractice under section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), begins 
to run when final judgment becomes final.  This bright-line rule will 
provide certainty and reduce litigation over when the statute starts to 
run.  Without such a rule, the courts would be required to make a 
factual determination on a case by case basis as to when all the 
information necessary to establish the enforceable right was 
discovered or should have been discovered. 
Id. at 1175-76 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted).  For Silvestrone, 
this meant that his malpractice claim was timely because the two-year statute did 
not begin to run until the “final judgment became final,” id. at 1175, some two 
years after the jury verdict was entered, see id. at 1174. 
 
In the present case, the Second District addressed a somewhat different 
factual scenario.  Unlike Silvestrone—where the damages based on the jury‟s 
verdict and the award of attorney fees were included in the same final judgment—
in this case, when the final judgment against TSE Industries in the federal action 
was final, the sanctions order against TSE was not.  The district court applied our 
Silvestrone decision as follows: 
The Silvestrone court‟s “bright-line rule” was that that the statute of 
limitations begins to run when “the litigation is concluded by final 
judgment.”  Under the particular facts in Silvestrone, the litigation 
was concluded when the final judgment became final.  In this case, 
however, the litigation was not concluded until the parties filed the 
stipulation to dismiss the underlying action with prejudice.  When the 
final judgment in the patent infringement action became final for 
 
 
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purposes of appeal, a second final judgment remained to be rendered 
in order to conclude the patent infringement action. 
Larson, 987 So. 2d at 690-91 (emphasis added).  The Second District thus reasoned 
that until the order imposing sanctions was final, the legal malpractice cause of 
action did not accrue. 
The operative facts of Mitchel, the conflict case, are similar.  Mitchel 
represented Integrated Broadcast Services, the plaintiff in a federal lawsuit.  The 
final summary judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed on appeal, but 
while the appeal was pending, the defendants moved for sanctions—on grounds 
that Mitchel does not identify—against Integrated and its attorney, Mitchel.3  Two 
months after the final judgment was final, the trial court awarded the defendants 
sanctions, and Integrated appealed.  The parties subsequently settled and filed a 
dismissal of the sanctions appeal in January 2003.  Integrated filed its legal 
malpractice action against Mitchel more than two years after the final summary 
judgment was final on appeal but within two years of the sanctions judgment 
becoming final.  Mitchel, 931 So. 2d at 1074.  Integrated‟s malpractice complaint 
alleged that counsel‟s negligence caused the adverse judgment in the underlying 
action and the subsequent sanctions award.  The trial court held that the statute of 
limitations barred the suit. 
                                          
 
 
3.  Mitchel immediately withdrew from representation and settled with the 
defendants. 
 
 
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The district court in Mitchel held that the statute of limitations barred the 
malpractice claim as to the underlying action but determined that the malpractice 
claim regarding the sanctions judgment was not barred.  Id.  The Fourth District 
cited Silvestrone and reasoned that “[b]ecause the damages caused by the sanctions 
did not exist at the time the judgment became final in the underlying litigation, the 
trial court erred in concluding that the cause of action for legal malpractice for the 
sanctions accrued before the judgment for sanctions became final.”  Mitchel, 931 
So. 2d at 1074. 
In Larson, the Second District certified conflict with Mitchel “to the extent 
that it holds that the statute of limitations on the underlying judgment runs when 
the underlying judgment becomes final even when a motion for attorneys‟ fees or 
sanctions remains pending.”  Larson, 987 So. 2d at 692-93. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
Both Larson and TSE contend that there is only one accrual date for the 
malpractice claims brought by TSE against Larson, but they disagree about what 
that date is.  Larson now argues, as it did below, that the cause of action accrued 
when the judgment entered in the underlying action became final.  TSE contends 
that the cause of action accrued when TSE and Franklynn filed a dismissal after 
entering into a settlement agreement with respect to the claim for attorney fees.  
Below, we address these arguments and explain why we adopt the reasoning of 
 
 
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Mitchel, which identifies two different accrual dates—one for the claims based on 
the underlying litigation and one for the claims based on the post-trial sanctions. 
 
The statute of limitations requires that a legal malpractice action on a 
litigation-related claim be brought within two years after the cause of action is or 
should have been discovered, § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002), and in Silvestrone 
we drew the line of accrual at the time final judgment was final to “provide 
certainty and reduce litigation over when the statute starts to run.”  Silvestrone, 721 
So. 2d at 1176.4  Until a final judgment is final, the outcome of the case and the 
occurrence of harm to the client remains uncertain, and it cannot be said that the 
cause of action was discovered or should have been discovered.  See id. at 1175.  
Before that point is reached, the “malpractice claim is hypothetical and damages 
are speculative.”  Id.  But once a judgment adverse to the client has reached the 
point of finality, “the last element constituting the [malpractice] cause of action 
occurs,” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2002)—that is, the element of “loss to the client,” 
                                          
 
 
4.  Similarly, we have striven to establish that same clarity in transactional 
legal malpractice actions.  See Perez-Abreu, Zamora & De La Fe, P.A. v. Taracido, 
790 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Fla. 2001) (holding that statute of limitations for a 
transactional legal malpractice action begins to run “when the client incurs 
damages at the conclusion of the related or underlying judicial proceedings or, if 
there are no related or underlying judicial proceedings, when the client‟s right to 
sue in the related or underlying proceeding expires” (quoting Blumberg v. USAA 
Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 2001))). 
 
 
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Law Office of David J. Stern, P.A., 969 So. 2d at 966—and the cause of action is 
or should be “discovered,” § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). 
 
The crux of Silvestrone‟s reasoning is that it cannot be known with 
sufficient certainty that the client has suffered any loss caused by the lawyer‟s 
negligence until the finality of a judgment adverse to the client.  A favorable result 
for the client in the lawsuit—which could be the result of appellate proceedings—
would, of course, mean that the client had suffered no loss.  Silvestrone‟s rule thus 
merely establishes a bright line for establishing when the client has suffered some 
loss as a consequence of the attorney‟s negligence.  It does not require that there be 
a determination of the full extent of all losses suffered by the client due to the 
lawyer‟s negligence. 
 
This is in line with the long-standing rule generally applicable to personal 
injury claims under which “the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run 
from the time when the injury was first inflicted, and not from the time when the 
full extent of the damages sustained have been ascertained.”  Seaboard Air Line 
R.R. Co. v. Ford, 92 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. 1956) (on rehearing); see also Highland 
Indus. Park, Inc. v. BEI Defense Sys. Co., 357 F.3d 794, 797 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(“[W]e know of no state whatever in which an injured party must know the full 
extent of the damages that it may recover before the statute of limitations begins to 
run on its claim.  Indeed, the cases on this issue are legion.”); Goodhand v. United 
 
 
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States, 40 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that it “is a general principle of 
limitations law” that “[t]he statute of limitations begins to run upon the discovery 
of the injury, even if the full extent of the injury is not discovered until much 
later”). 
 
We reaffirmed Silvestrone‟s bright-line rule in Fremont Indemnity Co. v. 
Carey, Dwyer, Eckhart, Mason & Spring, P.A., 796 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 2001), a case 
involving a legal malpractice claim arising from a lawyer‟s failure to inform the 
client—the defendant in an architectural malpractice action—of settlement offers.  
We concluded that the case presented “a classic example of why redressable harm 
cannot be determined until the conclusion of the litigation.”  Id. at 506.  We 
specifically relied on the Silvestrone rule that the limitations period for a litigation-
related legal malpractice claim does not commence “until the final judgment 
becomes final” with a result adverse to the client.  We reasoned that until the 
judgment adverse to the client reached the point of finality, the “possibility existed 
that [the client] would not suffer any redressable harm” as a consequence of the 
lawyer‟s negligence.  As in Silvestrone, our analysis in Fremont turned on the need 
for sufficient certainty that the client had sustained some loss.  Fremont does not 
hold that the full extent of a client‟s loss must be established in order for the 
limitations period to commence. 
 
 
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TSE argues for our approval of the Second District‟s alteration of the 
Silvestrone rule in the decision under review.  The Second District determined that 
the Silvestrone rule of finality applied in this case only when the sanctions claim 
was resolved by the stipulation of dismissal.  According to the Second District, it 
was only at that point that all matters related to the underlying litigation were 
concluded and the limitations clock started ticking.  Larson, 987 So. 2d at 692.  
“Until the case is fully resolved,” the court reasoned, “there is a chance that the 
appeals process could result in a reversal of the original decision that established 
an injury.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The Second District‟s reasoning on this point, 
however, is not correct. 
Under the Silvestrone bright-line rule, redressable harm was established 
when the final judgment against TSE in the patent infringement action became 
final in September 2002.  At that point, “the information necessary to establish the 
enforceable right [of TSE against Larson for malpractice] was discovered or should 
have been discovered.”  Silvestrone, 721 So. 2d at 1176.  The dismissal filed after 
the sanctions claim was settled had no effect on the finality of the final judgment in 
the underlying action.  Even if the federal court had issued a final judgment on 
sanctions and it was reversed on appeal, the finality of the judgment in the patent 
case and the attendant establishment of damages would have been unaffected.  The 
Second District‟s statement to the contrary is plainly erroneous. 
 
 
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Under the Second District‟s approach, the determination of redressable 
harm, which was essential to our Silvestrone holding, is effectively removed from 
the analysis and the accrual of the cause of action occurs only when there is no 
further ongoing litigation related to the underlying action.  This is inconsistent with 
the provision in section 95.11(4)(a) that “the period of limitations shall run from 
the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the 
exercise of due diligence.”  When the underlying action was finally determined 
adversely to TSE, TSE had knowledge of the harm it suffered as a result and the 
malpractice cause of action accrued with respect to the damages entailed by that 
adverse determination.  There is no basis for concluding that TSE‟s cause of action 
for these damages was not discovered or discoverable at that point.5 
In concluding that no cause of action accrued in this case until the settlement 
of the sanctions claim, the Second District expressed concern that otherwise parties 
“would be forced to argue inconsistent positions if they were required to file the 
malpractice action before resolution of attorneys‟ fees in the underlying action.”  
                                          
 
 
5.  In his concurrence, Judge Altenbernd acknowledges as much.  He states: 
 
In this case, . . . it would seem that a claim of professional 
malpractice accrued prior to October 2002 because a final judgment . . 
. against the client existed prior to that time.  It would appear that the 
plaintiff in this case had discovered the act of alleged malpractice 
more than two years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. 
987 So. 2d at 693. 
 
 
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Larson, 987 So. 2d at 692.  The Second District based its decision in part on what 
it characterized as “[t]he policy concerns articulated” in Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & 
Co. v. Lane, 565 So. 2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 1990).  Larson, 987 So. 2d at 692.  We 
conclude, however, that the Second District‟s reliance on Peat, Marwick is 
unwarranted.  
In Peat, Marwick we addressed the question of when the limitations period 
began for an accounting malpractice action related to tax advice and the 
preparation of a tax return—with receipt of a notice of tax deficiency or when the 
tax court action was final.  In rejecting the date of the receipt of the deficiency 
notice as the date of accrual, we referred to the decisions of the district courts 
concerning “attorney malpractice actions,” which had “expressly held that a cause 
of action for legal malpractice does not accrue until the underlying legal 
proceeding has been completed on appellate review because, until that time, one 
cannot determine if there was any actionable error by the attorney.”  Peat, 
Marwick, 565 So. 2d at 1325.  Our conclusion that “the limitations period for 
accounting malpractice commenced when the United States Tax Court entered its 
judgment” flowed from the same reasoning.  Id. at 1327.  We thus “reject[ed] Peat 
Marwick‟s contention that an IRS deficiency determination conclusively 
establishes an injury upon which to base a professional malpractice action.”  Id. at 
1326. 
 
 
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In Peat, Marwick we also observed that accepting Peat, Marwick‟s argument 
would mean that the clients “would have had to have filed their accounting 
malpractice action during the same time that they were challenging the IRS‟s 
deficiency notice in their tax court appeal.”  Id. at 1326.  We concluded that 
“[s]uch a course would have placed them in the wholly untenable position of 
having to take directly contrary positions in these two actions.”  Id.  That is, in the 
tax court the clients would be arguing that the return prepared by the accountant 
was proper, while in the malpractice action the client would be arguing that the 
return was prepared negligently.  
The rule we rely on here does not set up the same prospect regarding the 
assertion of inconsistent positions as did the rule urged by Peat, Marwick.  
Ordinarily, there will not be a substantial gap in time between ultimate resolution 
of the litigation regarding the underlying judgment and the resolution of the 
litigation regarding sanctions.  In any event, Peat, Marwick does not articulate a 
rule that the running of the statute of limitations for professional malpractice is 
held in abeyance until the conclusion of any collateral litigation in which the client 
might assert a position inconsistent with the malpractice claim.  Such a rule could 
not be reconciled with the commencement point—“the time the cause of action is 
discovered or should have been discovered”—established in section 95.11(4)(a).  
In Peat, Marwick, 565 So. 2d at 1325, we acknowledged that a legal malpractice 
 
 
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cause of action accrues as soon as the client can “determine if there was any 
actionable error by the attorney”—that is, when “the underlying legal proceeding 
has been completed on appellate review” and the client can know of damages 
arising from the final judgment suffered as a consequence of the attorney‟s 
malpractice. 
TSE also argues that the Second District‟s conclusion that none of TSE‟s 
claims were barred is justified by the application of the continuing or continuous 
representation doctrine, “a doctrine of law which tolls the legal negligence statute 
of limitations so long as the attorney continues to represent the client in the 
matter.”  Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v. Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Ky. 
1994).  Although the Second District concluded that its interpretation of 
Silvestrone “render[ed] TSE‟s argument regarding the continuing representation 
doctrine moot,” the result reached by the Second District is certainly consistent 
with that doctrine.  Larson, 987 So. 2d at 692; see also id. at 693 (Altenbernd, J., 
concurring) (“Our holding today probably is a modified version of the continuing 
representation doctrine.”). 
We have not previously adopted the continuing representation doctrine in 
legal malpractice actions, see Perez-Abreu, 790 So. 2d at 1056 (Pariente, J., 
concurring in result only) (discussing rationale for the continuous representation 
 
 
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rule), and for the reasons presented below, we conclude that the doctrine is 
inconsistent with the pertinent statutory provisions.  
The continuous representation doctrine is predicated on the view that 
because of “the attorney‟s superior knowledge of the law and the dependence of 
the client,” “there can be no effective discovery of the [the attorney‟s] negligence 
so long as the relationship prevails.”  Alagia, 882 S.W.2d at 125.  Under this view, 
although the attorney‟s negligence and the resulting harm may be manifest, the 
nature of the ongoing attorney-client relationship requires that the running of the 
statute of limitations be tolled until that relationship is terminated with respect to 
the matter at issue.  Certain “practical advantages” are cited in support of the 
doctrine.  Id.  TSE argues in accordance with the Kentucky court‟s reasoning in 
Alagia that the doctrine allows “a negligent attorney . . . to correct or mitigate the 
harm if there is time and opportunity and if the parties choose such a course.”  Id.  
Further, it is urged that without the doctrine, “the client may be forced, on pain of 
having his malpractice claim become time-barred, to automatically accept the 
advice of a subsequent attorney.”  Id. 
As a practical matter, by holding that redressable harm is not established for 
purposes of a legal malpractice claim “until the final judgment becomes final,” 
Silvestrone, 721 So. 2d at 1175, we substantially addressed the basic concern 
regarding undue disruption of the attorney-client relationship underlying the 
 
 
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continuing representation doctrine.  Because finality requires the conclusion of 
appellate review, if any, there is no requirement that an ongoing attorney-client 
relationship be disrupted until two years after the appellate process has run its 
course.  In the usual case, collateral matters will be resolved by then.  However, 
even if they are not, once a judgment adverse to the client has reached the point of 
finality, there is no justification for tolling the statute of limitations. 
In Kelley v. School Board of Seminole County, 435 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1983), 
which we decided long before Silvestrone, we rejected the continuing 
representation doctrine in an architectural malpractice action.  We disapproved the 
district court majority‟s conclusion that “the „continuous treatment‟ doctrine [is] 
embodied in Florida‟s statute of limitations when a client-professional relationship 
is involved.”  Kelley, 435 So. 2d 805 (footnote omitted); see Almand Constr. Co. 
v. Evans, 547 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. 1989) (noting that in Kelley the Court “rejected 
the „continuous treatment‟ doctrine”).  And we stated that the dissenting opinion of 
“Judge Cowart reached the proper conclusion.”  Kelley, 435 So. 2d at 805.  Judge 
Cowart squarely rejected the notion that an ongoing client-professional relationship 
justifies tolling the statute of limitations: 
Existing law does not require a client to sue his professional 
“immediately” after discovering negligently caused injury or damage.  
Applicable statutes of limitation give either two or . . . four years 
within which time the client should either give up on his amiable but 
bungling professional, get competent help and sue, or be forever 
barred from asserting his stale claim. 
 
 
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Sch. Bd. of Seminole County v. GAF Corp., 413 So. 2d 1208, 1213 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1982) (Cowart, J., dissenting), quashed sub nom. Kelley v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole 
County, 435 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1983); see Kelley, 435 So. 2d at 805 (citing this text 
with approval). 
 
TSE‟s argument that we should employ the continuous representation 
doctrine to toll the statute of limitations founders not only on our decision in 
Kelley but also on the text of section 95.051, Florida Statutes (2002), which 
restricts the circumstances under which statutes of limitations may be tolled.  
Section 95.051(1) contains a list of specific circumstances in which the running of 
the time under statutes of limitations (subject to the exception of certain statutes) is 
tolled.  The existence of an ongoing attorney-client relationship is not on that list.  
(Nor is the existence of any other ongoing professional-client relationship.)  
Section 95.051(2) provides that “[n]o disability or other reason shall toll the 
running of any statute of limitations” except as specifically authorized by statute.  
See Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179, 1185 (Fla. 2000) (“[T]he tolling statute 
specifically precludes application of any tolling provision not specifically provided 
therein.”).  Accordingly, in the absence of a specific statutory authorization for 
doing so, we are precluded from tolling the statute of limitations based on the 
continuous representation doctrine. 
 
 
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In sum, the position urged by TSE and the analysis employed by the Second 
District are wholly detached from the governing statute, which ties the running of 
the limitations period for lawyer malpractice claims to “the time the cause of action 
is discovered or should have been discovered.”  § 95.11(4)(a).6  The policy 
considerations advanced by TSE and the Second District—whatever their merits 
may be—cannot be allowed to defeat the policy choice which is embodied in the 
statutory text enacted by the Legislature. 
 
Under the Second District‟s reasoning, if collateral post-trial issues remain 
pending, a cause of action for malpractice does not accrue even when after the 
conclusion of any appellate review, the client is subject to an enforceable final 
judgment which resulted from a lawyer‟s malpractice.  It requires a willing 
suspension of disbelief to conclude that there is no “redressable harm” in such 
circumstances.  At the point a judgment adverse to the client becomes irreversibly 
final, it can no longer be said that the “malpractice claim is hypothetical and 
damages are speculative.”  Silvestrone, 721 So. 2d at 1175.  It cannot plausibly be 
argued that a client who is subject to such an enforceable judgment and thus faces 
the immediate prospect of execution of the judgment has not “discovered” the 
harm caused by the lawyer‟s negligence.  The conclusion that the statute of 
                                          
 
 
6.  It is noteworthy that the majority opinion of the Second District does not 
discuss the text of the statute or make any reference to the question of when the 
cause of action was “discovered.” 
 
 
- 22 - 
limitations does not begin to run in such circumstances has not the slightest 
connection with the discovery rule laid down in the statute.  And it is inconsistent 
with the reasoning of Silvestrone, which is predicated on the discovery rule. 
 
Finally, we turn to Larson‟s argument that TSE‟s sanctions-based claim is 
barred because it accrued when the underlying judgment became final.  We 
conclude that this argument is no more consistent with the statute of limitations 
and Silvestrone than is the view adopted by the Second District. 
 
In Mitchel, the Fourth District determined that two statute of limitations 
periods applied; thus there were two legal malpractice claims.  Mitchel, 931 So. 2d 
at 1074; see Larson, 987 So. 2d at 692 (referring to the Fourth District‟s finding of 
a “bifurcated statute of limitations for the two judgments”).   Although the client‟s 
legal malpractice claim regarding the adverse judgment was barred by the statute 
of limitations, the claim that Mitchel negligently caused the judgment for sanctions 
was not.  The district court explained as follows:  
 
In order to be liable for malpractice resulting from litigation, 
the lawyer “must be the proximate cause of the adverse outcome of 
the underlying action which results in damage to the client.”  
Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1998).  Because the 
damages caused by the sanctions did not exist at the time the 
judgment became final in the underlying litigation, the trial court 
erred in concluding that the cause of action for legal malpractice for 
the sanctions accrued before the judgment for sanctions became final.
 
. . . . 
The summary judgment is affirmed as it relates to plaintiff‟s 
claims other than the damages resulting from the sanctions, but is 
 
 
- 23 - 
reversed in order for plaintiff to file an amended complaint limited to 
damages caused by the sanctions. 
 
Mitchel, 931 So. 2d at 1074 (emphasis added). 
 
Sanctions such as attorney fees are collateral to the underlying judgment and 
do not prevent judgment in the underlying action from becoming final.  However, 
being “collateral” does not mean they are subsumed by the underlying judgment.  
A judgment imposing such sanctions is appealable independently of the final 
judgment in the underlying action.  See Janelli v. Pagano, 492 So. 2d 796, 796-97 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (“A subsequent attorney‟s fee order judgment is a final order 
appealable as such apart from the final judgment.”); see also Oregon Natural 
Desert Ass‟n v. Locke, 572 F.3d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 2009) (“An award of attorney 
fees raises legal issues collateral to and separately appealable from the decision on 
the merits.” (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988))).  
Thus, as the Fourth District concluded, the finality of a determination regarding a 
claim for sanctions may occur independently of the finality of the underlying 
judgment.  And a determination adverse to the client in the sanctions litigation 
does not ineluctably flow from an adverse determination in the underlying 
litigation. 
 
The damage suffered by the client arising from the underlying judgment is 
discrete from any damage that might be suffered by the client arising from a 
sanctions claim that is not finally adjudicated in the underlying judgment.  The 
 
 
- 24 - 
discrete occurrence of damage—marked by a separate final judgment or the 
equivalent—gives rise to the discrete discovery of loss and the discrete accrual of 
separate causes of action for malpractice.7  Here, the point of finality with respect 
to the sanctions claim was not reached until the settlement was entered while the 
sanctions litigation was pending.  Until then, it was possible that an appeal in the 
sanctions litigation would produce an outcome favorable to TSE.  Only with the 
entry of the settlement agreement was the existence of any harm to TSE arising 
from the sanctions claim determined with sufficient certainty to justify 
commencement of the limitations period. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Fourth District‟s bifurcated approach is 
most consistent with section 95.11(4)(a) and our reasoning in Silvestrone.  Given 
that the underlying litigation between TSE and Franklynn was concluded before 
the sanctions litigation was resolved, redressable harm was established regarding 
                                          
 
 
7.  Our analysis does not entail the impermissible “splitting” of causes of 
action.  The question of whether a cause of action has accrued is logically prior to 
the question of whether there is an impermissible splitting of causes of action.  
“The rule against splitting causes of action makes it incumbent upon plaintiffs to 
raise all available claims involving the same circumstances in one action.”  Dep‟t 
of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 570 So. 2d 892, 901 
(Fla. 1990) (emphasis added).  The rule does not require the joinder of a cause of 
action that is not “available” because it has not accrued with a cause of action that 
has accrued.  See Gilbert v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 981 So. 2d 609, 614 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2008) (“[U]nder the rule against splitting a cause of action, a new claim for 
damages is not barred if the underlying cause of action had not accrued at the time 
of filing the previous lawsuit.”). 
 
 
- 25 - 
the underlying litigation before there was redressable harm with respect to the 
sanctions.  The sanctions-based malpractice claim was “hypothetical and [the 
related] damages [were] speculative until . . . an adverse outcome to the client” 
occurred in the litigation concerning the sanctions.  Silvestrone, 721 So. 2d at 
1175. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Under our decision, TSE‟s malpractice claim regarding the final judgment in 
the underlying patent action is barred, but the malpractice action regarding the 
sanctions claim is not barred.  Accordingly, we quash that portion of the Second 
District‟s decision that reversed the summary judgment as to the malpractice claim 
regarding the underlying patent infringement action, and we approve the Second 
District‟s reversal of the summary judgment as to the malpractice claim regarding 
sanctions.8 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
PERRY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE, C.J. and PARIENTE, J., 
concur. 
 
                                          
 
 
8.  This Court‟s judgment with respect to the malpractice claim regarding the 
underlying action is concurred in by Justices Canady, Polston, Labarga, and Perry.  
The judgment with respect to the sanctions-based malpractice claim is concurred in 
by Chief Justice Quince and Justices Pariente, Lewis, Canady, Polston, and 
Labarga. 
 
 
- 26 - 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PERRY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  
 
 
I agree with the present majority opinion to the extent it holds that the 
portion of TSE‟s malpractice claim involving TSE‟s attorney fees and expenses is 
barred, but I disagree to the extent it holds that the portion involving Franklynn‟s 
fees and expenses is not barred.  I would remand for reinstatement of the trial 
court‟s order of summary judgment barring TSE‟s malpractice claim in its entirety.   
A.  The Malpractice Claim 
 
The trial court entered judgment for Franklynn in the patent case on October 
24, 2001.  TSE filed timely motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new 
trial, and Franklynn filed a motion for attorney fees and expenses as the prevailing 
party under the applicable statue.  See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party [in 
patent infringement cases].”).  On August 16, 2002, the court entered two orders.  
One order disposed of TSE‟s motions, denying all but one of TSE‟s claims.  TSE 
did not appeal this order, and the judgment became final for purposes of appeal 
thirty days later, on September 16, 2002.  The other order awarded attorney fees 
and expenses to Franklynn, and directed Franklynn to file a revised statement of 
fees and expenses so the amount could be calculated.  The court reasoned that 
 
 
- 27 - 
Franklynn, as the prevailing party, was entitled to attorney fees and expenses 
because TSE‟s vice president had engaged in deceptive conduct both prior to and 
during trial, and that absent this conduct a costly jury trial probably would have 
been avoided. 
 
The parties on October 10, 2002, entered into a confidential settlement 
agreement and filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to the 
underlying patent case, and although this stipulation had no effect on the patent 
decision, which was final at that point, the private agreement fixed the amount of 
Franklynn‟s fees and expenses.  On October 5, 2004, TSE filed a malpractice claim 
against Larson seeking (a) reimbursement for its own attorney fees and expenses in 
the patent case, and (b) reimbursement for Franklynn‟s attorney fees and expenses 
in the same case, for which TSE was liable.  Larson moved for summary judgment 
based on the two-year statute of limitations, and the court granted the motion, 
ruling that the statute of limitations began to run on September 16, 2002, when 
TSE‟s post-trial motions were resolved and no appeal was taken.  The district court 
reversed, holding that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until entry of 
the parties‟ joint stipulation on October 10, 2002.   
B.  The Applicable Law 
 
Statute of limitations issues in litigation-related legal malpractice claims in 
Florida are governed by two main authorities.  First, section 95.11, Florida Statues 
 
 
- 28 - 
(2002), sets forth a two-year limitations period for the filing of such claims.  See § 
95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002).  The commencement of this period, however, is 
contingent on the discovery of the claim: 
Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced 
as follows: 
 
. . . . 
 
(4) Within two years.-- 
 
(a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical 
malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the 
period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is 
discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due 
diligence. However, the limitation of actions herein for professional 
malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional. 
 
§ 95.11, Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added). 
 
And second, the Court in Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1998), 
addressed the above discovery requirement and established a bright-line rule: 
 
We therefore hold, in those cases that proceed to final 
judgment, the two-year statute of limitations for litigation-related 
malpractice … begins to run when final judgment becomes final.  This 
bright-line rule will provide certainty and reduce litigation over when 
the statute starts to run.  Without such a rule, the courts would be 
required to make a factual determination on a case by case basis as to 
when all the information necessary to establish the enforceable right 
was discovered or should have been discovered. 
 
Silvestrone, 721 So. 2d at 1175-76.  The Court was clear in its meaning of the term 
“final”: 
[A] judgment becomes final either upon the expiration of the time for 
filing an appeal or postjudgment motions, or, if an appeal is taken, 
upon the appeal being affirmed and either the expiration of the time 
 
 
- 29 - 
for filing motions for rehearing or a denial of the motions for 
rehearing. 
 
Id. at 1175 n.2. 
C.  The Present Case 
 
Applying the above law to the present case, I would remand for 
reinstatement of the trial court‟s order of summary judgment.  Under the bright-
line rule of Silvestrone, the statute of limitations for TSE‟s malpractice claim 
began to run on September 16, 2002, when the trial court‟s judgment in the patent 
case became final for purposes of appeal.  At that point, all the alleged acts of 
malpractice had occurred,9 the malpractice cause of action had accrued,10 and the  
                                          
 
 
9.  TSE alleged that Larson committed the following acts of malpractice: (1) 
failed to adequately investigate the validity of the patent; (2) failed to conduct an 
adequate review before advising TSE to file suit; (3) advised TSE the patent 
infringement suit was “strong”; (4) failed to advise TSE of concerns about patent 
validity and the veracity of TSE‟s employee as a witness; (5) knowingly prepared 
and filed a false interrogatory response; (6) failed to advise TSE of issues 
regarding patent validity raised in correspondence; and (7) failed to adequately 
advise TSE‟s management staff regarding weaknesses in the action before and 
after filing suit.  
 
10.  Florida law provides that “[a] cause of action accrues when the last 
element constituting the cause of action occurs.” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).  As 
for legal malpractice claims, the Court has held that “[a] legal malpractice action 
has three elements: 1) the attorney‟s employment; 2) the attorney‟s neglect of a 
reasonable duty; and 3) the attorney‟s negligence as the proximate cause of loss to 
the client.”  Law Office of David J. Stern, P.A. v. Sec. Nat‟l Servicing Corp., 969 
So. 2d 962, 966 (Fla. 2007) (quoting  Sec. Nat‟l Servicing Corp. v. Law Office of 
David J. Stern, P.A.,  916 So. 2d 934, 936 -37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).  And finally, 
the Court has held that, under the discovery rule, a cause of action cannot accrue 
 
 
- 30 - 
malpractice cause of action had been “discovered” for section 95.11(4)(a) 
purposes, as explained below. 
 
Under Silvestrone, the section 95.11(4)(a) discovery requirement is satisfied 
when a court issues its final judgment on the merits in the underlying case and that 
judgment (a) is adverse to the client, and (b) results in damage to the client, and (c) 
is final for purposes of appeal.  Silvestrone, 721 So. 2d at 1175-76.  At that point, 
the client suffers redressable harm in the form of the final judgment and, based on 
that harm, the client is imputed with “discovery” of the malpractice cause of action 
under section 95.11(4)(a).  In the present case, the court‟s final judgment on the 
merits in the patent case was adverse to TSE, resulted in damage to TSE, and 
became final for purposes of appeal on September 16, 2002.  At that point, TSE 
suffered redressable harm in the form of the final judgment and, based on that 
harm, TSE was imputed with discovery of the malpractice cause of action under 
section 95.11(4)(a).  The statute of limitations began to run at that point. 
 
I disagree with the present majority opinion in two respects.  First, the 
majority opinion holds that the limitations period for the portion of TSE‟s 
malpractice claim involving Franklynn‟s attorney fees and expenses did not begin 
to run until October 10, 2002, when the parties entered their settlement agreement 
                                                                                                                                        
until the plaintiff reasonably discovers the right of action.  Hearndon v. Graham, 
767 So. 2d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 2000). 
 
 
- 31 - 
and TSE suffered redressable harm with respect to those fees and expenses.  I 
respectfully disagree.  As a result of the adverse judgment in the patent case, TSE 
had suffered redressable harm with respect to its own attorney fees and expenses 
nearly a month earlier, on September 16, 2002, when the case became final.  The 
fact that TSE later suffered additional damages from the same alleged acts of 
malpractice is irrelevant to the running of the statute of limitations.  The Court in 
City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954), stated the general rule in this 
area: 
The general rule, of course, is that where an injury, although slight, is 
sustained in consequence of the wrongful act of another, and the law 
affords a remedy therefor, the statute of limitations attaches at once.  
It is not material that all the damages resulting from the act shall have 
been sustained at that time and the running of the statute is not 
postponed by the fact that the actual or substantial damages do not 
occur until a later date. 
 
Id. at 308 (emphasis added).  Or, more succinctly: “[T]he statute [of limitations] 
must be held to attach when the plaintiff was first put upon notice or had reason to 
believe that [the] right of action had accrued.”  Id. at 309 (emphasis added). 
 
This general rule, which is termed the discovery rule, was adopted by the 
Court in Brooks and has been operative in Florida ever since, for over half a 
century.  See Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2000).  In 1974, the 
Legislature codified the rule specifically for professional malpractice claims in 
section 95.11(4)(a), see ch. 74-382, § 7, at 1211, Laws of Fla., and the language of 
 
 
- 32 - 
this statute could not be clearer in this respect: “[T]he period of limitations shall 
run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered 
with the exercise of due diligence.”  § 95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis 
added).  Neither the statute itself nor Silvestrone, wherein the Court interpreted the 
statute, says anything about the limitations period being further delayed by the 
subsequent discovery of additional damages.  This statutory discovery rule falls 
squarely within the legislative prerogative, and the intent of the Legislature is clear 
in the plain language of the statute.  I conclude that, under the discovery rule, the 
statute of limitations for TSE‟s entire malpractice claim began to run on September 
16, 2002, when TSE was imputed with discovery of the cause of action under the 
bright-line rule of Silvestrone. 
 
And second, the present majority opinion holds that the portion of TSE‟s 
malpractice claim involving Franklynn‟s attorney fees and expenses is an 
independent cause of action—and thus subject to its own limitations period—
because the damages arising from that portion of the claim are “discrete” from the 
damages arising from the judgment portion of the claim.  Again, I respectfully 
disagree.  In my opinion, the Franklynn damages are not separate.  Rather, they are 
ancillary damages that are dependent on the final judgment for their very existence.  
As noted above, attorney fees and expenses were awarded to Franklynn pursuant to 
the federal prevailing party statute, and absent the favorable judgment for 
 
 
- 33 - 
Franklynn in the patent case, the award never could have been made.  See 35 
U.S.C. § 285 (2006).  Thus, rather than constituting an independent cause of 
action, the portion of TSE‟s malpractice claim involving Franklynn‟s fees and 
expenses was an ancillary matter that was irrevocably tied to the final judgment 
and to the judgment-based portion of TSE‟s malpractice claim.  See generally 
McGurn v. Scott, 596 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 1992) (“[A]n award of attorneys‟ 
fees or costs is ancillary to, and . . . is incidental to the main adjudication.”). 
 
Further, the fact that the attorney fees award was not final and was subject to 
reversal on appeal is immaterial for purposes of the “discovery” of the malpractice 
cause of action under section 95.11(4)(a), for the bright-line rule of Silvestrone is 
based not on the finality of a post-judgment ruling on an ancillary matter, but on 
the finality of the final judgment on the merits.  See Silvestrone, 721 So. 2d at 
1175 (“To be specific, we hold that the statute of limitations does not commence to 
run until the final judgment becomes final.”) (emphasis added).  The Court in 
Silvestrone was unequivocal on this point.  In the present case, as noted above, 
because the final judgment on the merits in the patent case became final for 
purposes of appeal on September 16, 2002, the statute of limitations for the entire 
malpractice claim began to run at that point.  The Franklynn attorney fees and 
expenses are just what they appear to be—additional damages arising from the 
malpractice cause of action.  
 
 
- 34 - 
 
This does not mean, however, that TSE was without legal recourse with 
respect to Franklynn‟s attorney fees and expenses.  Franklynn already had been 
awarded attorney fees and expenses at the time the judgment in the patent case 
became final, and the amount of those fees and expenses had not yet been 
calculated.  But as noted above, TSE‟s own attorney fees and expenses were fully 
known to TSE at that point, and TSE reasonably could have filed its malpractice 
claim within two years of that date and then, if necessary, amended it to include the 
amount of Franklynn‟s fees and expenses.  To the extent TSE complains that this 
would have cast TSE and Larson in adversarial roles, or would have forced TSE to 
discharge Larson and hire new counsel, or would have forced TSE to pursue 
conflicting legal positions, I disagree.  As it turned out, the amount of Franklynn‟s 
attorney fees and expenses was ultimately settled on October 10, 2002, less than a 
month after the decision in the patent case became final.  TSE simply could have 
waited until that date and then ended its professional relationship with Larson and 
proceeded with the malpractice claim—TSE still would have had nearly the entire 
two-year period to file its malpractice claim.   
D.  Conclusion 
 
This case is hardly unique or complicated—it involves a straightforward 
final judgment and post-trial orders in which everything was decided except for the 
amount of the prevailing party‟s attorney fees and expenses.  The Court in 
 
 
- 35 - 
Silvestrone, in fashioning its bright-line rule, surely contemplated such a 
commonplace scenario.  Instead of disturbing the bright-line rule of Silvestrone, I 
would simply apply it and remand for reinstatement of the trial court‟s order of 
summary judgment barring TSE‟s malpractice claim in its entirety.  To the extent 
both the present majority opinion and the dissenting opinion conclude that the 
limitations period began to run not when TSE first discovered its malpractice 
damages (i.e., when the judgment in the patent case became final), but when TSE 
later discovered its additional malpractice damages (i.e., when Franklynn‟s 
attorney fees and expenses were agreed upon), those two opinions, to my mind, 
abrogate the discovery rule and violate legislative intent as evidenced in the plain 
language of section 95.11(4)(a). 
 
I would quash the decision of the district court in TSE Industries, Inc. v. 
Larson & Larson, Inc., 987 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), and approve in part 
and disapprove in part the decision of the district court in Integrated Broadcast 
Services, Inc. v. Mitchel, 931 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), as reflected 
herein. 
 
LEWIS, J., dissenting. 
 
 
I dissent because I am in substantial agreement with the logical, reasonable 
analysis provided by the Second District Court of Appeal below, which provided 
an intellectually sound holding: 
 
 
- 36 - 
On the merits, this case is controlled by Silvestrone because it 
involves legal malpractice that arises out of the handling of litigation.  
See Fremont Indem. Co. v. Carey, Dwyer, Eckhart, Mason & Spring, 
P.A., 796 So. 2d 504, 505-06 (Fla. 2001).  In Silvestrone, the Florida 
Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the district courts 
regarding whether the statute of limitations for legal malpractice 
begins to run when [1] the jury renders the verdict or [2] when the 
court enters the final judgment.  See Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 
1173, 1174 (Fla. 1998).  The court adopted a “bright-line rule” that 
the statute of limitations would begin to run when “the litigation is 
concluded by final judgment.”  Id. at 1175-76.  The court explained 
that this happens when the final judgment becomes final after the time 
for filing an appeal expires or the appeals process is concluded.  Id. at 
1175 n. 2. 
The court reasoned that liability for malpractice requires that 
the attorney be the proximate cause of the adverse outcome of the 
underlying litigation.  Id. at 1175.  The court explained that because 
“redressable harm is not established until final judgment is rendered, a 
malpractice claim is hypothetical and damages are speculative until 
the underlying action is concluded with an adverse outcome to the 
client.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Because posttrial motions could affect 
the plaintiff‟s rights or liabilities, the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until those rights or liabilities are finally determined.  Id. 
at 1175. 
Applying Silvestrone to the facts of this case, we conclude that 
the trial court erred in determining that the statute of limitations began 
to run before the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss the underlying 
[patent-infringement] action with prejudice.  The Silvestrone court‟s 
“bright-line rule” was that that the statute of limitations begins to run 
when “the litigation is concluded by final judgment.”  Under the 
particular facts in Silvestrone, the litigation was concluded when the 
final judgment became final.  In this case, however, the litigation was 
not concluded until the parties filed the stipulation to dismiss the 
underlying action with prejudice. . . .  
. . . [A] narrow reading of Silvestrone would defeat the very 
policy concerns the supreme court sought to address in not only that 
case, but also in [related] jurisprudence . . . . 
. . . . 
The policy concerns articulated by the supreme court in Peat, 
Marwick and Blumberg are equally applicable to litigation 
 
 
- 37 - 
malpractice actions in which a final judgment has become final for 
purposes of appeal but postjudgment motions for attorneys‟ fees are 
pending.[11]  In such actions, the client does not incur damages until 
the conclusion of the [underlying or] related judicial proceedings 
when the amount of attorneys‟ fees has been finally established.  Until 
the case is fully resolved, there is a chance that the appeals process 
could result in a reversal of the original decision that established an 
injury. 
Furthermore, parties in such actions would be forced to argue 
inconsistent positions if they were required to file the malpractice 
action before resolution of attorneys‟ fees in the underlying action.  In 
the malpractice action in this case, TSE would have argued that they 
did not have a proper basis for filing the patent infringement action.  
In the ongoing patent infringement action, TSE would have argued 
that they did have a proper basis for the action. 
In the same vein, forcing an aggrieved party to file a legal 
malpractice action before the underlying litigation is resolved would 
also create a conflict of interest that would undoubtedly require 
counsel to withdraw from representation in the underlying action.  
This would place the aggrieved party in the untenable position of 
having to hire new counsel who was unfamiliar with the case to 
continue the litigation or pursue negotiations at the last hour.  This 
would also take away the opportunity for counsel to correct his or her 
mistakes in the underlying action. 
 
TSE Indus., Inc. v. Larson & Larson, P.A., 987 So. 2d 687, 690-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2008) (emphasis supplied).   
In contrast, today, a majority of this Court has severely undermined the 
principles of effective jurisprudence and conflict-avoidance that underlie our 
controlling precedent in Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Carey, Dwyer, Eckhart, Mason 
                                          
 
 
11.  See, e.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So. 2d 1323, 1325 
(Fla. 1990) (“We find that the basic principles for all professional malpractice 
actions should be the same . . . .”).     
 
 
- 38 - 
& Spring, P.A., 796 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 2001), Blumberg v. USAA Casualty 
Insurance Co., 790 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 2001), Silvestrone v. Edell, 721 So. 2d 1173 
(Fla. 1998), and Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 
1990).  The majority adopts an artificial, simplistic approach to an issue that is 
more complex and demands a far more searching analysis.  A cause of action for 
litigation-related malpractice simply does not accrue under Florida law until 
redressable harm is definitively established.  See, e.g., Coble v. Aronson, 647 So. 
2d 968, 970 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (citing Peat, Marwick, 565 So. 2d at 1323).  In 
this context, it has long been recognized that such harm is not established until the 
conclusion of the underlying litigation.  See, e.g., Fremont, 796 So. 2d at 506.  The 
essential flaw in the majority‟s reasoning and holding is that it fails to recognize 
the full extent of the relevant “underlying litigation.”  The “twist” that this case 
presents with regard to the “sanctions” issue entirely undermines the logic and 
reasoning of the majority.   
Larson‟s alleged malpractice permeated the entirety of the federal patent-
infringement proceedings below.  Reduced to its essence, TSE has contended, and 
continues to contend, that Larson‟s alleged malpractice consisted of improper, 
incorrect legal advice and shoddy (potentially unethical) legal representation with 
regard to the validity vel non of TSE‟s mold-release patent.  This legal advice, and 
Larson‟s conduct during the federal patent-infringement action, not only (1) 
 
 
- 39 - 
“resulted in . . . a jury trial . . . that in all probability would have been avoided had 
the improper conduct not occurred,”12 but also, (2) prompted the federal 
defendant‟s request for—and the federal district court‟s later grant of—attorneys‟-
fee sanctions against TSE pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.13  Having parsed Larson‟s 
pedantic, rigid contentions (which supply the principle basis of the majority 
opinion), it is clear to me that even this law firm recognizes that the patent-
infringement litigation did not truly conclude until October 10, 2002, when the 
“sanctions” dispute ended with the parties entering into a settlement and filing a 
stipulation to dismiss the underlying patent-infringement action with prejudice.  
Rather than quibble with this established fact, Larson and the majority seek to 
artificially cordon off this later, exceedingly important and significant “sanctions” 
portion of the underlying litigation from the federal district court‟s judgment on the 
merits, which was entered on August 16, 2002,14 and became final for purposes of 
appeal on September 16, 2002.  This peculiar dissection is an act of sophistry.   
                                          
 
 
12.  TSE, 987 So. 2d at 689.   
 
13.  This statute provides:  “The court in exceptional cases may award 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”  The statute applies in patent-
infringement actions and is intended “to provide discretion where it would be 
grossly unjust that the winner be left to bear the burden of his own counsel which 
prevailing litigants normally bear.”  J.P. Stevens Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 822 F.2d 
1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (emphasis omitted).  
 
14.  The federal district court also entered a “sanctions” order on this same 
date.  Thus, the parties were well aware that the entire litigation would not be 
 
 
- 40 - 
Larson‟s alleged malpractice was the focus of both the merits judgment and 
the “sanctions” proceeding, each of which was a component of the same 
underlying federal patent-infringement litigation.  This federal litigation was the 
single transaction or occurrence resulting in Larson‟s alleged malpractice, and the 
entire matter was not concluded until a stipulation of the parties on October 10, 
2002.  Instead of forcing a square peg into a round hole, as the majority has done 
by failing to properly identify when the relevant litigation ended, I would 
recognize the broader, controlling rule and logic that undergird Silvestrone and 
related precedent:  Redressable harm is not definitively established—and a cause 
of action for litigation-related malpractice does not accrue—until the underlying 
litigation is concluded.  See, e.g., Fremont, 796 So. 2d at 506-07 (holding that a 
cause of action for litigation-related malpractice did not accrue until the pertinent 
litigation concluded even though the client was aware that some level of deficient 
representation occurred approximately one decade earlier when it dismissed and 
replaced its negligent counsel).  Tellingly, the majority‟s approach in this case is 
substantially similar to that which we definitively rejected in Fremont.  See 
Fremont, 796 So. 2d at 507 (Wells, J., dissenting) (“There is . . . a material 
difference between [1] damages which are totally contingent upon a determination 
                                                                                                                                        
resolved and concluded until the court determined with finality the character and 
amount of sanctions. 
 
 
- 41 - 
in the underlying litigation and [2] a situation in which some damages are incurred 
and thereby fixed, and what is to be determined in the underlying litigation is the 
full extent of the damages.  In the latter situation, the cause of action accrues and 
the statute of limitations begins to run from the moment some damages are 
definitively incurred, regardless of the effect the underlying litigation may have on 
the extent of these damages.” (emphasis supplied)).  This dissenting view was 
totally rejected there, but apparently has been revived by the majority today.   
Here, the underlying litigation did not conclude until October 10, 2002, 
when the “sanctions” issue was finally determined and the entire matter was 
dismissed with prejudice.  Similar to Fremont, even if TSE had incurred some 
indeterminate level of damages at an earlier point in the litigation, the true 
parameters of its damages were not, and could not be, fully realized and 
determined until the “sanctions” proceeding concluded the underlying litigation.  
Cf., e.g., Glucksman v. Persol N. Am., Inc., 813 So. 2d 122, 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2002) (“A legal malpractice cause of action accrues not necessarily when the client 
first suspects that the attorney might have committed malpractice, but rather, when 
the client incurs damages at the conclusion of the related or underlying judicial 
proceeding . . . .” (emphasis supplied)); Hold v. Manzini, 736 So. 2d 138, 142 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1999) (“[M]ere knowledge of possible malpractice is not dispositive of 
when a malpractice action accrues.”).  The decision of the present majority to 
 
 
- 42 - 
resurrect the approach abandoned in Fremont is an unwise departure from 
precedent, and it is my hope that this doctrinal misstep will be corrected in time. 
The majority‟s literalistic, mechanical reading of Silvestrone simply does 
not reflect the reality of when the “underlying litigation” at issue in this case 
concluded and, further, is totally out of step with our underlying logic and rationale 
in Peat, Marwick and related decisions.  See, e.g., Perez-Abreu, Zamora & De La 
Fe, P.A. v. Taracido, 790 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2001) (stating that Peat, Marwick and 
related decisions were intended, inter alia, to prevent clients from having to take 
directly contrary positions in two contemporaneous actions).  Merely because the 
majority asserts in an unelaborated fashion that “[o]rdinarily, there will not be a 
substantial gap in time between” resolution of the merits and the later resolution of 
an inextricably intertwined “sanctions” proceeding, does not make it so.  See 
majority op. at 16.  Instead, under the majority‟s holding today, unless and until an 
inextricably intertwined “sanctions” proceeding is resolved and definitively 
concludes the underlying litigation, there remains an unremitting risk that the client 
will be forced to seek new counsel and to prematurely initiate malpractice 
litigation for fear of triggering the two-year statute of limitations under section 
95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes.  Cf. Taracido v. Perez-Abreu, Zamora & De La Fe, 
P.A., 705 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“The existence of legal malpractice is 
often difficult to ascertain.  A client should not be placed in the position of having 
 
 
- 43 - 
to file a potentially baseless claim prematurely fearing that otherwise an action will 
be precluded by the statute of limitations.”), approved, 790 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 
2001).  As the Second District Court of Appeal correctly recognized below, this 
unnecessary risk triggers all of the undesirable, unreasonable attendant concerns 
that we identified in Peat, Marwick:  
[P]arties in such actions would be forced to argue inconsistent 
positions if they were required to file the malpractice action before 
resolution of attorneys‟ fees in the underlying action.  In the 
malpractice action in this case, TSE would have argued that they did 
not have a proper basis for filing the patent infringement action.  In 
the ongoing patent infringement action, TSE would have argued that 
they did have a proper basis for the action. 
In the same vein, forcing an aggrieved party to file a legal malpractice 
action before the underlying litigation is resolved would also create a 
conflict of interest that would undoubtedly require counsel to 
withdraw from representation in the underlying action.  This would 
place the aggrieved party in the untenable position of having to hire 
new counsel who was unfamiliar with the case to continue the 
litigation or pursue negotiations at the last hour.  This would also take 
away the opportunity for counsel to correct his or her mistakes in the 
underlying action. 
TSE, 987 So. 2d at 692 (emphasis supplied). 
 
Fortunately, this undesirable outcome is entirely avoidable by recognizing 
that Silvestrone simply did not involve, address, or contemplate litigation that 
continued past the time when a merits judgment became final, such as the present 
case in which an inextricably intertwined “sanctions” issue was later resolved to 
conclude the underlying litigation.  Under circumstances such as these, the narrow 
 
 
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articulation of the rule announced by the majority is inapposite, but the broader 
supporting rule continues unabated:  In litigation that proceeds past the point 
contemplated in Silvestrone, including cases that involve intertwined “sanctions” 
proceedings, “redressable harm cannot be determined until the conclusion of the 
[underlying] litigation.”  Fremont, 796 So. 2d at 506; see also Fremont Indem. Co. 
v. Carey, Dwyer, Eckhart, Mason & Spring, P.A., 271 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 
2001) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Florida held that the statute of limitations began 
to run at the conclusion of the underlying litigation.” (emphasis supplied)).  In my 
view, the only reasonable and logical analysis is that the underlying litigation 
continued here until October 10, 2002, and TSE filed its malpractice complaint 
against Larson in Florida circuit court on October 5, 2004, less than two years after 
Larson filed the stipulation to dismiss the federal patent-infringement action.  
Given the material facts, this is the only proper conclusion under Florida law.   
In addition to the above-expressed concerns, the majority‟s analysis and 
holding squarely conflict with, and contradict, the traditional rule against splitting 
causes of action:  
We recognize the rule against the splitting of causes of action and that 
as a general rule the law mandatorily requires that all damages 
sustained or accruing to one as a result of a single wrongful act must 
be claimed and recovered in one action or not at all.  As is stated in 1 
Am. Jur. 481, “the rule is founded upon the plainest and most 
substantial justice—namely, that litigation should have an end and 
that no person should be unnecessarily harassed with a multiplicity of 
suits.” 
 
 
- 45 - 
 
Gaynon v. Statum, 10 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 1942) (emphasis supplied); see also 
Dep‟t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Fla. Growers, Inc., 570 So. 2d 892, 901 
(Fla. 1990) (“The rule against splitting causes of action makes it incumbent upon 
plaintiffs to raise all available claims involving the same circumstances in one 
action.” (emphasis supplied)).  This rule is founded on the following policy 
concerns: 
 
(1)  finality in court cases promotes stability in the law; 
 
(2)  multiple lawsuits arising out of a single incident are costly 
to litigants and an inefficient use of judicial resources; and  
 
(3)  multiple lawsuits cause substantial delay in the final 
resolution of disputes. 
Mid-Fla. Growers, 570 So. 2d at 901 (formatting altered).   
In the present case, without relying upon any authority other than the 
incorrectly decided conflict case, the majority has concluded that two separate 
causes of action for litigation-related malpractice accrued (one associated with the 
merits judgment and another with the inextricably intertwined “sanctions” 
proceeding).  See majority op. at 10.  Again the majority fails to see the forest for 
the trees.  There was a single ongoing episode that TSE alleges constituted 
malpractice.  Specifically, TSE contends that Larson‟s alleged malpractice 
consisted of improper, incorrect legal advice and shoddy (potentially unethical) 
legal representation with regard to the validity vel non of TSE‟s mold-release 
 
 
- 46 - 
patent.  According to TSE and the record in this case, this single alleged episode 
led to both (a) the adverse merits judgment, and (b) the “sanctions” proceeding and 
associated attorneys‟-fee award, each of which was a component of the same 
undifferentiated, inextricably intertwined underlying patent-infringement litigation, 
which was dismissed with prejudice on October 10, 2002.   
Therefore, the majority has not at all identified separate malpractice actions 
that accrued at different points in time, but instead, has merely described the 
combined damages that flowed from an episode of alleged malpractice, which 
accrued when the underlying litigation concluded.  Where, as here, mutuality of 
parties and issues exists, the general rule applies, and a litigant may not split its 
cause of action to seek separate damages that arise from the same allegedly 
wrongful conduct.  See, e.g., Mid-Fla. Growers, 570 So. 2d at 901.  To my 
knowledge this has always been the fundamental and elemental common-law rule 
in Florida, and Larson has not consented to separate actions arising from the same 
transaction or occurrence.  The majority is simply incorrect as a matter of law that 
two separate causes of action for legal malpractice existed in this case. 
For these reasons, I would approve the decision of the Second District below 
in TSE Industries, Inc. v. Larson & Larson, P.A., 987 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2008), and disapprove the sparsely reasoned conflict decision in Integrated 
Broadcast Services, Inc. v. Mitchel, 931 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).  The 
 
 
- 47 - 
decision of the majority is neither compelled nor supported by Florida law.  I 
respectfully dissent.         
QUINCE, C.J. and PARIENTE, J., concur. 
 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D07-1872 
 
 
(Pinellas County) 
 
Brandon S. Vesely and Michael J. Keane of Keane, Reese, Vesely, and Gerdes, 
P.A., St. Petersburg, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Marie Tomassi, Stanley H. Eleff, and Edward B. Carlstedt of Trenam, Kemker, 
Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O‟Neill, and Mullis, P.A., St. Petersburg, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent