Case Title: In re Williams

Citation: 2004-Ohio-1500

Docket Number: 20031466

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Williams, 101 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500.] 
 
 
IN RE WILLIAMS. 
[Cite as In re Williams, 101 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500.] 
Juvenile court — Right to counsel — Pursuant to R.C. 2151.352, a child who is 
the subject of a juvenile court proceeding to terminate parental rights is 
a party to that proceeding and, therefore, is entitled to independent 
counsel in certain circumstances. 
(No. 2003-1466 — Submitted December 16, 2003 — Decided April 14, 2004.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Geauga County, Nos. 2003-G-2498 and 
2003-G-2499, 2003-Ohio-3550. 
_______________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Pursuant to R.C. 2151.352, as clarified by Juv.R. 4(A) and Juv.R. 2(Y), a child 
who is the subject of a juvenile court proceeding to terminate parental 
rights is a party to that proceeding and, therefore, is entitled to independent 
counsel in certain circumstances. 
_______________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶1} 
This appeal requires us to determine when a juvenile court must 
appoint counsel for a child who is the subject of a proceeding to terminate 
parental rights.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Geauga 
County Court of Appeals on the certified issue. 
I 
Facts and Procedural History 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶2} 
In June 2000, in response to a complaint filed by appellant, Geauga 
County Job and Family Services,1 a judge of the Juvenile Division of the Geauga 
County Court of Common Pleas determined that Malcolm Williams (born May 
22, 1996, to appellee, Dakota Williams, and Larry Williams) was a neglected and 
dependent child and placed Malcolm in the temporary custody of appellant for 
placement in foster care.  In July 2000, the juvenile court, acting on a complaint 
filed by appellant regarding Shaquille Williams (born May 8, 2000, to appellee 
and Larry Williams) granted appellant protective supervision over Shaquille on a 
predispositional interim basis. 
{¶3} 
The juvenile court returned Malcolm to appellee’s custody in 
September 2000, under appellant’s protective supervision.  That same month, the 
juvenile court found Shaquille to be a neglected and dependent child and ordered 
appellant to continue protective supervision over Shaquille.  In October 2001, the 
juvenile court determined, for a second time as to Malcolm and for the first time 
as to Shaquille, that appellant should exercise temporary custody and that the 
children should be placed in foster care. 
{¶4} 
Appellant moved for permanent custody of both Malcolm and 
Shaquille in March 2002.  The juvenile court held a four-day hearing, and on June 
5, 2002, the court granted the motion for permanent custody as to both children 
and terminated the parental rights of appellee and Larry Williams.2  Appellee 
appealed from the juvenile court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals for Geauga 
County.  Larry Williams did not appeal from the court’s judgment. 
{¶5} 
The court of appeals vacated the trial court’s order granting 
permanent custody to appellant and remanded the cause for further proceedings.  
                                                 
1.  At that time, appellant was known as the Geauga County Department of Human Services, and the 
complaint was filed under that name. 
2.  Appellee and Larry Williams had separated in March 2000 and did not live together after that time.  
They obtained a dissolution of their marriage prior to the juvenile court’s hearing. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
In re Williams, 11th Dist. Nos. 2002-G-2454 and 2002-G-2459, 2002-Ohio-6588, 
2002 WL 31716777.  The court of appeals noted that Malcolm had repeatedly 
expressed a desire to remain with his mother, that the guardian ad litem’s 
recommendation that appellant’s motion for permanent custody be granted 
conflicted with Malcolm’s wishes, that Malcolm’s interests were not represented 
by the guardian ad litem or by his parents, and that Malcolm, therefore, had been 
unrepresented in the proceedings.  Id. at ¶ 9, 20, 23, 27. 
{¶6} 
In light of the above facts, the court of appeals found that the 
juvenile court had erred in failing to consider whether Malcolm was entitled to 
counsel to represent his interests.  Id. at ¶ 27.  The court held, “[W]hen a child 
consistently expresses a desire to be with a parent, then a juvenile court should 
investigate, giving due regard to the child’s maturity and understanding of the 
proceedings, and make a ruling about whether an attorney should be appointed to 
represent the child’s interest and expressed wishes.”  Id. at ¶ 26.  This court 
declined discretionary review of that decision.  98 Ohio St.3d 1425, 2003-Ohio-
259, 782 N.E.2d 79. 
{¶7} 
The juvenile court, on remand, appointed an attorney to represent 
Malcolm and Shaquille but only for the limited purpose of “fil[ing] a response to 
the motion for permanent custody stating the position of the child[ren] with 
respect to permanent custody.”  Based in part on the attorney’s filings, which were 
little more than a statement indicating Malcolm’s desire to live with his mother 
and Malcolm’s reasons and a statement by the attorney that due to Shaquille’s age, 
the attorney was unable to determine Shaquille’s wishes, the court, without first 
holding a hearing, ruled that there was no need to appoint counsel to fully 
represent Malcolm’s or Shaquille’s interests.  The court reinstated its prior 
decision that both children should be placed in the permanent custody of 
appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶8} 
Appellee again appealed to the court of appeals, and that court 
again reversed the juvenile court’s decision and remanded the cause for further 
proceedings.  As to the issue relevant to this appeal, the court of appeals held that 
the juvenile court erred by failing to hold a hearing on whether Malcolm was 
entitled to representation by independent counsel, found that the limited scope of 
the representation ordered by the court for Malcolm was insufficient, and ordered 
that, on remand, the juvenile court again appoint counsel for Malcolm.  In 
addition, on an issue not within the scope of this appeal as it comes to this court, 
the court of appeals found that the juvenile court had erred in finding that all the 
requirements for granting a motion for permanent custody had been proven, and 
remanded the cause for a new permanent-custody hearing. 
{¶9} 
The court of appeals found that its holding regarding the 
appointment of counsel for the children was in conflict with the decision of the 
Second District Court of Appeals in In re Alfrey, Clark App. No. 01CA0083, 
2003-Ohio-608, 2003 WL 262587.  Upon appellant’s filing of a notice of certified 
conflict, this court determined that a conflict exists and ordered the parties to brief 
the following issue: 
{¶10} “Whether children who are the subject of a motion to terminate 
parental rights are ‘parties’ to that proceeding for the purposes of Juv.R. 4(A) and 
R.C. 2151.352, requiring the appointment of counsel.”  In re Williams, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 1540, 2003-Ohio-4671, 795 N.E.2d 680. 
II 
Resolution of the Certified Issue 
{¶11} The court of appeals remanded this cause to the juvenile court on 
two separate grounds — the first involving the appointment of counsel for the 
children and the second concerning whether adequate proof supported the juvenile 
court’s determination that the requirements for granting permanent custody to 
January Term, 2004 
5 
appellant were met.  The court of appeals’ holding that the trial court must hold a 
new permanent-custody hearing based on the second ground for reversal is not 
within the scope of our review.  Therefore, regardless of how we resolve the 
certified issue, a new permanent-custody hearing must be held.  This appeal 
focuses only on the certified issue concerning the appointment of counsel for 
children who are the subject of proceedings to terminate parental rights. 
{¶12} The approach taken by the court of appeals in this case followed 
the approach taken by most Ohio courts of appeals that have encountered similar 
situations regarding the appointment of counsel for juveniles in permanent-
custody proceedings.  As to the specific certified issue, the parties have cited only 
the Second District Court of Appeals’ decision in Alfrey, 2003-Ohio-608, as 
differing significantly from the approach of most Ohio courts of appeals, and our 
research has revealed no other cases that have resolved the issue in the same way 
it was resolved by the Alfrey court. 
{¶13} Our inquiry centers around R.C. 2151.352, which provides, “A 
child or the child’s parents, custodian, or other person in loco parentis of such 
child is entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings 
under this chapter or Chapter 2152. of the Revised Code and if, as an indigent 
person, any such person is unable to employ counsel, to have counsel provided for 
the person * * *.  Counsel must be provided for a child not represented by the 
child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.  If the interests of two or more such parties 
conflict, separate counsel shall be provided for each of them.” 
{¶14} Furthermore, Juv.R. 4(A) provides, “Every party shall have the 
right to be represented by counsel and every child, parent, custodian, or other 
person in loco parentis the right to appointed counsel if indigent.  These rights 
shall arise when a person becomes a party to a juvenile court proceeding.  When 
the complaint alleges that a child is an abused child, the court must appoint an 
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attorney to represent the interests of the child.  This rule shall not be construed to 
provide for a right to appointed counsel in cases in which that right is not 
otherwise provided for by constitution or statute.” 
{¶15} This court, in State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 
44, 46, 693 N.E.2d 794, stated that “Ohio, through R.C. 2151.352, provides a 
statutory right to appointed counsel that goes beyond constitutional requirements.”  
For discussions of the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution regarding the right to counsel in 
juvenile court proceedings, see Application of Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 
1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (juvenile delinquency proceedings), and Lassiter v. Durham 
Cty. Dept. of Social Serv. (1981), 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 
(proceedings to terminate parental rights). 
{¶16} This court, in Asberry, 82 Ohio St.3d at 48, 693 N.E.2d 794, 
further stated that “under the plain language of R.C. 2151.352, indigent children, 
parents, custodians, or other persons in loco parentis are entitled to appointed 
counsel in all juvenile proceedings” and that this right to appointed counsel 
“emanates from R.C. 2151.352” and not from Juv.R. 4(A).  See, also, 1994 Staff 
Notes to Juv.R. 4(A), 69 Ohio St.3d at CL. 
{¶17} The court of appeals in this case, along with most courts of appeals 
that have considered the issue, determined that a juvenile has a right to counsel in 
a proceeding to terminate parental rights, based on the juvenile’s status as a party 
to the proceeding.  See In re Janie M. (1999), 131 Ohio App.3d 637, 639, 723 
N.E.2d 191; In re Clark (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 55, 60-61, 749 N.E.2d 833.  
The court of appeals based its decision on R.C. 2151.352 and Juv.R. 4(A), and on 
Juv.R. 2(Y)’s definition of “party” as “a child who is the subject of a juvenile 
court proceeding.”  Like other courts that have reached this conclusion, the court 
of appeals recognized that courts should make a determination, on a case-by-case 
January Term, 2004 
7 
basis, whether the child actually needs independent counsel, taking into account 
the maturity of the child and the possibility of the child’s guardian ad litem being 
appointed to represent the child. 
{¶18} The court of appeals held that a guardian ad litem can, in some 
situations, serve a dual role as both the guardian ad litem and the juvenile’s 
attorney, see Juv.R. 4(C) and R.C. 2151.281(H), and thereby fulfill the juvenile’s 
right to counsel, provided there has been an express dual appointment by the 
juvenile court.  See In re Duncan/Walker Children (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 841, 
844-845, 673 N.E.2d 217; Clark, 141 Ohio App.3d at 60-61, 749 N.E.2d 833.  
Furthermore, the court of appeals followed the cases that have held that when a 
guardian ad litem who is also appointed as the juvenile’s attorney recommends a 
disposition that conflicts with the juvenile’s wishes, the juvenile court must 
appoint independent counsel to represent the child.  See In re Smith (1991), 77 
Ohio App.3d 1, 13-14, 601 N.E.2d 45; Janie M., 131 Ohio App.3d at 639, 723 
N.E.2d 191; See, also, In re Baby Girl Baxter (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 232, 17 
OBR 469, 479 N.E.2d 257 (the duty of a guardian ad litem to a ward [to 
recommend to the court what the guardian feels is in the best interest of the ward] 
and the duty of a lawyer to a client [to provide zealous representation] may be in 
fundamental conflict in a dual-representation situation). 
{¶19} In In re Alfrey, on the other hand, the Second District Court of 
Appeals found that a child whose fate is being determined at a permanent-custody 
proceeding is not a party to that proceeding for purposes of R.C. 2151.352 and 
Juv.R. 4(A) and that, therefore, a child involved in the proceeding has no right to 
independent counsel.  Id., 2003-Ohio-608, ¶ 21. 
{¶20} In its decision, the Alfrey court did not cite Juv.R. 2(Y) and did not 
consider the effect of that provision on its conclusion.  However, as the court of 
appeals in this case recognized, Juv.R. 2(Y) provides a significant indication that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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children who are the subject of permanent-custody proceedings are within R.C. 
2151.352’s reach regarding appointment of counsel.  The Fourth Appellate 
District has recently adopted the approach that the court of appeals took in this 
case and acknowledged that Juv.R. 2(Y) was an important factor in its decision.  
See In re Emery, 4th Dist. No. 02CA40, 2003-Ohio-2206, 2003 WL 2003811, ¶ 8-
9 (Juv.R. 2[Y] erases any doubt that both parents and children are parties to all 
juvenile court proceedings covered by the Juvenile Rules.  Citing the Editor’s 
Comment to Juv.R. 2[Y] in Banks-Baldwin’s Ohio Revised Code Annotated.). 
{¶21} In addition, other Juvenile Rules besides Juv.R. 2(Y) and 4(A) lend 
support to the view that a child who is the subject of a permanent-custody 
proceeding is a party to that proceeding.  See, e.g., Juv.R. 2(O), which defines 
“guardian ad litem” as “a person appointed to protect the interests of a party in a 
juvenile court proceeding.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶22} The Alfrey court, in concluding that children are not parties for 
purposes of R.C. 2151.352, specifically rejected the holdings of the Sixth District 
in In re Janie M., 131 Ohio App.3d 637, 723 N.E.2d 191, and the Eighth District 
in In re Clark, 141 Ohio App.3d 55, 749 N.E.2d 833.  Alfrey, 2003-Ohio-608, ¶ 
27-28.  The Alfrey court found that those decisions were based in part on an 
overly broad reading of this court’s statement in Asberry, 82 Ohio St.3d 44, 48, 
693 N.E.2d 794, and distinguished Asberry because that case involved the 
appointment of counsel for a grandmother who qualified as a party to the 
proceedings under R.C. 2151.352 because she was the custodian of the child.  
Alfrey at ¶ 27-28.  However, even though this court’s statement in Asberry 
regarding who is entitled to appointed counsel under R.C. 2151.352 may be 
susceptible of the argument that it was overly broad given the facts of that case, 
that does not mean that that statement was incorrect.  As indicated by the Juvenile 
January Term, 2004 
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Rules discussed above, the plain language of R.C. 2151.352 establishes that the 
subject child is a party to the proceeding to terminate parental rights. 
{¶23} The Alfrey court drew a distinction between the application of R.C. 
2151.352 in a delinquency proceeding, in which it found that the child is clearly a 
party and is thus entitled to appointed counsel, and in a termination-of-parental-
rights proceeding, in which it found that the child is not a party.  Id. at ¶ 6, 21, 30.  
However, as discussed above, the plain language of the statute belies this 
distinction and recognizes the child as a party in any juvenile court proceeding, 
not just in delinquency cases. 
{¶24} As further support for its position, the Alfrey court found that 
parents can adequately represent their child’s interests when those interests are 
aligned with those of the parents and, in that situation, appointment of 
independent counsel for the child is not necessary.  Id. at ¶ 21.  Appellant urges us 
to accept this view and points to the following language from R.C. 2151.352 to 
support its position:  “Counsel must be provided for a child not represented by the 
child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.  If the interests of two or more such parties 
conflict, separate counsel shall be provided for each of them.”  We agree that 
these two sentences create an ambiguity, in that it is not clear whether the “child” 
referred to in the first quoted sentence of R.C. 2151.352 is one of the “such 
parties” referred to in the second quoted sentence, and therefore can be interpreted 
favorably to appellant’s position. 
{¶25} In addition, we recognize that there is a dichotomy in finding, as 
many courts of appeals have, that when the interests of parent and child are 
aligned a parent has standing to raise the child’s deprivation of counsel as an issue 
on appeal and at the same time finding that the parent’s attorney is unable to 
adequately represent the interests of the child.  However, this inconsistency is not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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sufficient to overcome the plain language of the first sentence of R.C. 2151.352, 
as clarified by the Juvenile Rules discussed above. 
{¶26} The Alfrey court expressed what it called a “practical concern” 
about the burden that had been imposed on juvenile courts in those appellate 
districts that had held that a child in a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding is 
a party to the proceeding and entitled to counsel.  Id. at ¶ 29-30.  The court 
questioned the benefit of such a holding, particularly when many children may be 
involved in a single case, and questioned whether having more attorneys involved 
would bring anything additional to the proceedings, when the parents’ attorney 
already represents the interests of the parents, which are congruent with the 
interests of the child.  Id. 
{¶27} In a somewhat related argument, appellant implies that the 
procedures set forth in R.C. Chapter 2151, especially R.C. 2151.414, are invoked 
for the child’s protection and the furtherance of the child’s best interests, and so 
the child does not need an independent attorney.  Appellant cites several R.C. 
Chapter 2151 sections that indicate that children are generally not permitted to 
make important decisions and that others, including juvenile court judges, must 
make those decisions.  Appellant also points out that there are statutory 
requirements in place to guide those judges in reaching their decisions.  For 
example, R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) requires the juvenile court to consider the wishes 
of the child, whether expressed by the guardian ad litem or directly by the child, 
so the court cannot ignore the child’s wishes, even if they are not presented by 
counsel.  However, once again, appellant’s arguments and the Alfrey court’s 
“practical concerns” do not overcome the plain language of the first sentence of 
R.C. 2151.352, as clarified by the Juvenile Rules. 
{¶28} Juv.R. 1(B) provides that the Juvenile Rules “shall be liberally 
interpreted and construed so as to effectuate * * * the just determination of every 
January Term, 2004 
11 
juvenile court proceeding by ensuring the parties a fair hearing and the recognition 
and enforcement of their constitutional and other legal rights.”  Once we accept 
the premise that the subject child is a party whose due process rights are entitled 
to protection, peripheral practical considerations fade in importance.  See In re 
Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14 (recognizing 
importance of ensuring due process in cases involving the termination of parental 
rights). 
{¶29} For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that pursuant to R.C. 
2151.352, as clarified by Juv.R. 4(A) and Juv.R. 2(Y), a child who is the subject 
of a juvenile court proceeding to terminate parental rights is a party to that 
proceeding and, therefore, is entitled to independent counsel in certain 
circumstances.  We affirm the judgment of the Geauga County Court of Appeals 
on the issue certified for our review. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR 
and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
_______________ 
 
David P. Joyce, Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian M. 
Richter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant Geauga County Job and 
Family Services. 
 
Robey & Robey and Margaret Amer Robey, for appellee Dakota Williams. 
 
Katherine Hunt Federle; Paul Skendelas and David L. Strait, urging 
affirmance for amici curiae Justice For Children Project and Ohio Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
_______________