Case Title: State v. Robert S. Robinson

Citation: 2002 WI 9

Docket Number: 2000AP002435-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 9 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2435-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Robert S. Robinson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 29, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 3, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce Schmidt   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Leonard D. 
Kachinsky and Kachinsky & Petit Law Offices, Neenah, and oral 
argument by Leonard D. Kachinsky. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Michael R. Klos, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 9 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-2435-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 310) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert S. Robinson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 29, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Winnebago County, Bruce K. Schmidt, Judge.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This appeal 
from a judgment of conviction and an order of the circuit court 
comes to this court upon certification by the court of appeals 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (1999-2000).1  The Circuit 
Court for Winnebago County, Bruce K. Schmidt, Judge, entered a 
judgment of conviction on two counts of recklessly endangering 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
2 
 
safety and an order denying a post-conviction motion by the 
defendant Robert S. Robinson.  The defendant had sought to set 
aside one of the two counts to which he had pled no contest 
pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement.  The defendant's post-
conviction 
motion 
claimed 
that 
the 
two 
counts 
were 
multiplicitous, violating his state and federal constitutional 
guarantees against double jeopardy.2  The defendant appealed the 
judgment of conviction and the order denying his post-conviction 
motion.   
¶2 
The question of law raised on appeal is what is the 
appropriate remedy when an accused is convicted on the basis of 
a negotiated plea agreement and the counts later are determined 
to be multiplicitous, violating the accused's state and federal 
constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy?  This court 
determines this question of law independently of the circuit 
court but benefiting from its analysis.   
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
when 
an 
accused 
successfully 
challenges a plea to and conviction on one count of a two-count 
information on grounds of double jeopardy and the information 
has been amended pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement by 
which the State made charging concessions, ordinarily the remedy 
is to reverse the convictions and sentences, vacate the plea 
agreement, and reinstate the original information so that the 
                                                 
2 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that 
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  Article I, Section 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution states that "no person for the same 
offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment." 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
3 
 
parties are restored to their positions prior to the negotiated 
plea agreement.  We further conclude, however, that under some 
circumstances this remedy might not be appropriate.  A court 
should, therefore, examine the remedies available and adopt one 
that fits the circumstances of the case after considering both 
the 
defendant's 
and 
the 
State's 
interests. 
 
Under 
the 
circumstances of the present case, we reverse the judgment of 
conviction and the order of the circuit court and remand the 
cause to the circuit court with directions to reinstate the 
original information against the defendant and to conduct 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. 
 
I 
 
¶4 
The facts of this case are undisputed for purposes of 
this appeal.  On May 19, 1999, the defendant struck Norman 
Elsinger, who was attempting to break up a barroom fight.3  The 
victim 
suffered 
a 
severe 
brain 
injury 
and 
required 
hospitalization.   
¶5 
A complaint was filed on June 25, 1999, charging the 
defendant with one count of aggravated battery as a party to the 
crime in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.19(5) (a class C felony) 
and one count of recklessly endangering safety as a party to the 
crime in violation of § 941.30(1) (a class D felony).  The 
                                                 
3 The parties dispute whether the defendant struck the 
victim with his fist or stomped on the victim's head with his 
feet. 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
4 
 
complaint alleged that the defendant was a repeat offender under 
§ 939.62(1)(b).  The State subsequently filed an information 
containing the same charges as those in the complaint.   
¶6 
The State and the defendant entered into a negotiated 
plea agreement.  Under the agreement, the State amended the 
information to reduce the original count of aggravated battery 
to one count of recklessly endangering safety, to retain the 
original 
count 
of 
recklessly 
endangering 
safety, 
and 
to 
eliminate 
the 
repeat 
offender 
allegations. 
 
The 
amended 
information reduced the defendant's exposure from 27 years in 
state prison to ten years.  In addition, the State agreed to 
recommend an imposed and stayed two-year prison sentence, 
probation, eight months in jail as a condition of probation, and 
restitution. 
¶7 
In exchange for the State's concessions, the defendant 
agreed to enter pleas of no contest to the two counts of 
recklessly endangering safety as a party to the crime.4   
¶8 
The defendant filed a signed Plea Questionnaire/Waiver 
of Rights form with the circuit court.  The circuit court 
engaged 
the 
defendant 
in 
a 
colloquy 
regarding 
the 
plea 
agreement, accepted the defendant's pleas, and ordered a 
                                                 
4 When a no-contest plea in a criminal matter is accepted by 
the circuit court, the plea "constitutes an implied confession 
of guilt for the purposes of the case to support a judgment of 
conviction and in that respect is equivalent to a plea of 
guilty."  Lee v. Wisconsin State Board of Dental Examiners, 29 
Wis. 2d 330, 334, 139 N.W.2d 61 (1966).  See also State v. 
Suick, 195 Wis. 175, 217 N.W. 743 (1928). 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
5 
 
presentence investigation.  On March 16, 2000, the circuit court 
sentenced the defendant to five years in prison on each count of 
recklessly endangering safety, the sentences to be served 
consecutively.   
¶9 
On July 19, 2000, the defendant filed a post-
conviction motion for relief, alleging that the two counts of 
recklessly endangering safety were identical in both fact and 
law and that the defendant's convictions on the two counts 
violated the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal 
constitutions.  The defendant requested that the circuit court  
vacate his conviction and sentence on one of the two counts of 
recklessly endangering safety and leave standing the conviction 
and sentence on the other count.  The effect of granting the 
defendant's motion would be to subject the defendant to a single 
five-year sentence in prison for one count of recklessly 
endangering safety. 
¶10 The circuit court denied the defendant's motion, 
ruling that the defendant had waived his right to challenge his 
convictions and the plea agreement, even on constitutional 
grounds, because he entered a knowing and voluntary plea to both 
counts of recklessly endangering safety, had been represented by 
counsel throughout the proceedings, had engaged in a colloquy 
with 
the 
circuit 
court, 
and 
had 
signed 
the 
Plea 
Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form.  The defendant appealed the 
judgment of conviction and the order denying the post-conviction 
motion, and this court accepted certification of the appeal.  
 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
6 
 
II 
 
¶11 The parties agree on two propositions of law that are 
not briefed or argued before this court on this appeal.  
Therefore, we do not address these issues, but set them forth to 
put this appeal in context.  
¶12 First, the parties agree that on the facts of the 
present case the amended information to which the defendant pled 
no contest pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement was 
multiplicitous and violated the double jeopardy provisions of 
both the state and federal constitutions.  The double jeopardy 
violation 
did 
not 
arise 
from 
the 
original 
complaint 
or 
information, but rather from the negotiated plea agreement that 
contained two identical counts of recklessly endangering safety 
for the same criminal conduct. 
¶13 Second, the parties agree that the defendant's plea of 
no contest did not waive the defendant's right to bring a post-
conviction motion to challenge his conviction on double jeopardy 
grounds.  The parties agree that a simple entry of a guilty plea 
does not waive the constitutional defect of double jeopardy.5  An 
express waiver of a double jeopardy claim in a plea agreement is 
needed for a waiver of a double jeopardy claim.6   
                                                 
5 The State cites United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575 
(1989); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975); State v. 
Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, 284 n.2, 322 N.W.2d 264 (1982); and 
State v. Hubbard, 206 Wis. 2d 651, 656, 558 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 
1996). 
6 State v. Hubbard, 206 Wis. 2d at 657. 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
7 
 
¶14 The parties agree that the defendant did not expressly 
waive his double jeopardy claim and, therefore, his no-contest 
plea and conviction on the two counts of recklessly endangering 
safety did not waive his double jeopardy claim in the present 
case. 
 
III 
 
¶15 The parties disagree about one issue of law——the 
remedy in the present case.  They correctly point out that there 
is no direct precedent in Wisconsin regarding the appropriate 
remedy when an accused is convicted on the basis of a negotiated 
plea agreement and the counts in the agreement and conviction 
are later determined to be multiplicitous, violating the 
accused's state and federal constitutional guarantees against 
double jeopardy. 
¶16 The parties' disagreement about the appropriate remedy 
in the present case stems from their disagreement about the 
proper characterization of the present case.  
¶17 The defendant focuses on the constitutional infirmity 
of the judgment of conviction.  He characterizes the present 
case as one in which the amended information and resulting 
judgment of conviction include a constitutionally invalid count, 
rendering void the conviction and sentence on that count.  
According to the defendant, the other count is valid, and the 
conviction on that count should stand, leaving intact a five-
year sentence.   
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
8 
 
¶18 In contrast, the State focuses on the defendant's 
repudiation of the negotiated plea agreement.  The State 
compares the present case to those in which a plea agreement has 
been breached. 
¶19 Numerous cases have stated that when the breach of a 
plea agreement is material and substantial,7 a plea agreement may 
be vacated or an accused may be entitled to resentencing.8  These 
cases demonstrate that the remedy for a breach of a plea 
agreement depends on the nature of the breach and the totality 
of the circumstances.   
¶20 The defendant's repudiation of the plea agreement is a 
substantial and material breach of the plea agreement because it 
deprives the State of the benefit for which it bargained, 
namely, the defendant's conviction on two counts of recklessly 
endangering safety that exposes the defendant to a maximum 
sentence of ten years in prison.  The State argues that because 
the defendant is reneging on the plea agreement, the plea 
agreement should be vacated.  The State urges that the remedy in 
the present case is to reverse the conviction, vacate the plea 
                                                 
7 See, 
e.g., 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Warren 
v. 
Schwarz, 
219 
Wis. 2d 615, 643, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998); State v. Smith, 207 
Wis. 2d 258, 272, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997); State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 289-90, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  A material and 
substantial breach is a violation of the terms of the agreement 
that defeats the benefit for which a party bargained.  State v. 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 289-90. 
8 State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 272, 281-82; State v. 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 
289-90; 
State 
v. 
Rivest, 
106 
Wis. 2d 406, 414, 216 N.W.2d 395 (1982); State v. Jorgensen, 137 
Wis. 2d 163, 168, 404 N.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1987).   
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
9 
 
agreement, reinstate the original information, and restore the 
parties to their positions before the execution of the invalid 
plea agreement.  According to the State, resentencing would not 
be a meaningful remedy in the present case because the circuit 
court has already imposed the maximum five-year penalty on the 
remaining "valid" felony count of recklessly endangering safety.  
The State contends that allowing one of the five-year sentences 
to stand negates the essence of the State's and defendant's 
negotiated plea agreement that the defendant would be exposed to 
a maximum sentence under the plea agreement of ten years. 
¶21 The defendant and the State rely on different cases to 
support their respective positions about the appropriate remedy 
in the present case.   
¶22 The 
defendant 
relies 
on 
State 
v. 
Benzel, 
220 
Wis. 2d 588, 583 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1998), in which the 
accused pled no contest to one count of possession of marijuana 
with intent to deliver and one count of possession of drugs 
without a tax stamp.  No plea agreement was involved in Benzel.   
¶23 After Benzel's conviction, the supreme court declared 
the tax stamp statute unconstitutional,9 and Benzel challenged 
his conviction on the tax stamp count.  The issue before the 
court 
of 
appeals 
was 
whether 
the 
declaration 
of 
unconstitutionality 
of 
the 
tax 
stamp 
statute 
applied 
retroactively.  The court of appeals ruled that it did apply 
retroactively, that the circuit court had no subject matter 
                                                 
9 See State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997). 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
10 
 
jurisdiction over the tax stamp count, and that the count in the 
information was void from the beginning because it charged the 
accused with an offense that was not recognized in law.  The 
Benzel court remanded the cause to the circuit court with 
instructions to vacate the conviction on the tax stamp count; 
the conviction on the other count remained intact. 
¶24 We disagree with the defendant that Benzel supports 
the remedy of vacating one of the counts of recklessly 
endangering safety in the present case.  In Benzel, the tax 
stamp count was unconstitutional.  Reinstituting the original 
information against the accused in Benzel would not have changed 
the fact that one of the counts in the original information was 
unconstitutional.  Under no circumstances could the State try 
Benzel under the void count.  The only remedy available in 
Benzel was to vacate the tax stamp conviction and leave intact 
the remaining conviction for possession of marijuana with intent 
to deliver.10 
¶25 We agree with the State that Benzel is not analogous 
to the present case.  Benzel involved an unconstitutional count 
in both the original information and in the judgment of 
conviction.  Benzel was not a breach of plea agreement case.  
The original information in Benzel could not be reinstated.  No 
one asserts that the original information in the present case 
                                                 
10 The Benzel court apparently did not consider remanding 
the case for resentencing on the marijuana charge.  State v. 
Benzel, 220 Wis. 2d 588, 583 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1998). 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
11 
 
contains an unconstitutional or otherwise invalid count or that 
it cannot be lawfully reinstated.   
¶26 The 
defendant 
also 
relies 
on 
cases 
from 
other 
jurisdictions to support his position that the proper remedy for 
a conviction based on multiplicitous counts in a plea agreement 
is to set aside the conviction and sentence on the invalid 
count. 
¶27 The defendant argues that Jordan v. State, 676 N.E.2d 
352 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), is persuasive authority for his 
position.  In Jordan the Indiana court of appeals vacated one of 
two multiplicitous counts that resulted from a plea agreement 
and allowed the conviction and sentence on the other count to 
stand.   
¶28 Jordan pled guilty to both a felony murder count and a 
robbery count.  Because the robbery count was the underlying 
felony to support the felony murder count, the Indiana court of 
appeals held that the conviction and sentence for both counts 
violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.  
The Jordan court acknowledged that a variety of remedies had 
been imposed in analogous cases.  One remedy was to vacate the 
plea agreement and allow the State to reprosecute the accused on 
the original charges.  Another remedy was to vacate only certain 
convictions and sentences and resentence the accused on the 
remaining valid convictions.   
¶29 Because Jordan had neither alleged nor proved that he 
would not have entered the plea agreement had he been properly 
advised of the principles of double jeopardy, and because he 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
12 
 
neither asserted nor proved that his guilty plea was involuntary 
or unintelligent, the Indiana court of appeals concluded that it 
did not have to vacate the plea agreement and did not have to 
reinstate the original charges.   
¶30 Instead, the Indiana court of appeals vacated the 
robbery conviction and sentence and allowed the felony murder 
conviction and sentence to stand.  Although the effect of the 
court of appeals' decision was to reduce a 110-year sentence to 
a 60-year sentence so that the State did not get the full 
benefit of its plea agreement, the Indiana court of appeals 
believed that it had taken the wisest path.  The court of 
appeals wrote that its remedy was "the wisest in that it 
forecloses the possibility that Jordan will be set free in the 
event the State does not have sufficient evidence to reprosecute 
a ten year old murder case."11  The remedy was the best one under 
the circumstances to avoid a violation of the accused's 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy and at the same 
time protect the public interest in incarcerating a murderer. 
¶31 The Jordan decision does not persuade us that vacating 
one of the multiplicitous counts in the present case is the 
proper remedy.  Rather, we view the Jordan case as persuasive 
authority for our conclusion in the present case about the 
appropriate 
remedy. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
when 
an 
accused 
successfully challenges a plea to and conviction on one count of 
                                                 
11 Jordan v. State, 676 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1997). 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
13 
 
a two-count information on grounds of double jeopardy and the 
information has been amended pursuant to a negotiated plea 
agreement 
by 
which 
the 
State 
made 
charging 
concessions, 
ordinarily the remedy is to reverse the convictions and 
sentences, vacate the plea agreement, and reinstate the original 
information so that the parties are restored to their positions 
before the negotiated plea agreement.  Jordan supports our 
conclusion that under some circumstances the latter remedy might 
not be appropriate.  We agree with the Jordan decision that a 
court should examine the available remedies and adopt the one 
that fits the circumstances of the case, considering both the 
defendant's and the State's interests.  
¶32 Although the present case and Jordan similarly involve 
multiplicitous counts and negotiated plea agreements, the record 
in the present case does not point to any circumstances that are 
likely to prevent the State from trying the defendant under the 
original information or to prevent the defendant from defending 
himself.  Therefore, we view the Jordan decision as persuasive 
authority for our conclusion about the remedy, not for the 
defendant's position about the remedy.   
¶33 The defendant also relies on Burke v. State12 to 
support his position that the appropriate remedy in the present 
case is to vacate one of the multiplicitous counts of recklessly 
                                                 
12 The Burke case has been before the Texas appellate courts 
a number of times.  See Burke v. State, 6 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1999); Burke v. State, 28 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1997); Burke v. State, No. 2-98-185-CR, 2001 WL 1340583, at *11, 
___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2001). 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
14 
 
endangering safety.  In Burke, the accused was charged with both 
reckless aggravated assault and intoxication assault and pled 
guilty to both counts.  A jury found the accused guilty of both 
offenses and assessed his punishment at 15 years' and ten years' 
confinement, 
respectively. 
 
The 
trial 
court 
ordered 
the 
sentences to run concurrently.  The accused appealed, arguing 
that the convictions violated the accused's constitutional 
guarantee against double jeopardy.   
¶34 The Texas court of appeals ultimately held that the 
proper remedy for the double jeopardy violation in that case was 
to apply the "most serious punishment" test, which requires 
retaining the offense with the most serious punishment and 
vacating any remaining offenses that are the "same" for double 
jeopardy purposes.13  Thus, the Texas court of appeals vacated 
the conviction for the lesser charge of intoxication assault on 
double jeopardy grounds and retained the conviction for the more 
serious charge of reckless aggravated assault. 
¶35 The Burke court of appeals also determined, however, 
that the accused's guilty plea to reckless aggravated assault 
was involuntary, as the accused had claimed.  Therefore, the 
court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction on that 
count, set aside the guilty plea to that count, and remanded the 
cause for a new trial.14 
                                                 
13 Burke, No. 2-98-185-CR, 2001 WL 1340583, at *3. 
14 Id., at *11, *13.   
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
15 
 
¶36 The Burke case is not convincing support for the 
defendant's position that the proper remedy in the present case 
is to vacate one of the multiplicitous convictions.  Although a 
guilty plea case, Burke did not involve either a negotiated plea 
agreement or an amended information.  Thus Burke is not 
sufficiently analogous to the present case to convince us that 
vacating one of the multiplicitous counts is the proper remedy 
in the present case. 
¶37 The defendant ultimately bases his remedy on concepts 
of fairness.  The defendant argues that the remedy he proposes 
for his multiplicitous convictions is fair because it enables 
the defendant to bring constitutional violations to the court's 
attention.  The defendant argues that an accused should not be 
placed in risk of increased punishment by the reinstatement of 
the original information after he has successfully challenged 
the unconstitutionality of a conviction.  
¶38 The defendant makes a good point.  Our cases recognize 
that "the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights to 
challenge a conviction or sentence should not be 'chilled' by 
the threat of increased punishment."15  Nevertheless, the cases 
also recognize that when one conviction and sentence is vacated 
on double jeopardy grounds, the validity of the sentence on the 
other conviction is implicated, resentencing on the valid 
conviction is permissible, and the circuit court may increase 
                                                 
15 State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 682, 360 N.W.2d 43 
(1985). 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
16 
 
the sentence on the valid conviction.16  Thus, although the 
defendant correctly reminds us that he ought not to be punished 
for exercising his constitutional rights, the cases do not 
proscribe every increase in a sentence when a defendant 
challenges his conviction on constitutional grounds.17 
¶39 Relying on different cases from those cited by the 
defendant, the State argues that the convictions in the present 
case should be reversed, the negotiated plea agreement vacated, 
and the original information reinstated.  According to the 
State, the defendant is now reneging on a negotiated plea 
agreement by challenging the constitutionality of his plea and 
conviction on one of the two counts.  The defendant should not 
                                                 
16 Id., 121 Wis. 2d at 681. 
17 For example, when a trial court sentences on two 
convictions, one sentence being invalid, resentencing may be 
appropriate on the valid conviction when the maximum sentence 
was not imposed because the trial court's sentence on the valid 
conviction may have taken into account the sentence on the 
invalid conviction.  Ronzani v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 512, 520, 129 
N.W.2d 143 (1964).   
In the present case, resentencing on the valid count is not 
a viable option because the circuit court in the present case 
has already imposed the maximum sentence on the valid count.  
Neither the defendant nor the State suggests resentencing.   
Indeed the defendant argues that the State still gets more 
than it expected under the plea agreement because the five-year 
sentence on the one valid count is well in excess of the imposed 
and stayed probationary disposition recommended by the State at 
the sentencing hearing.  This argument ignores the law that the 
circuit court, not the State, determines the sentence.  The 
circuit court is not bound by the State's recommendation in 
determining the sentence.  Young v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 361, 367, 
182 N.W.2d 262 (1971).   
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
17 
 
benefit, urges the State, from the State's concessions in the 
negotiated plea agreement when the defendant is reneging on his 
promise in the negotiated plea agreement to be convicted on two 
offenses with a maximum penalty of ten years in prison.  
According to the State, reversing a conviction on one of the 
multiplicitous counts gives the defendant the benefit of 
reducing his maximum sentence from ten years in prison to five 
years, contrary to the plea agreement. 
¶40 The 
State 
relies 
on 
State 
v. 
Pohlhammer, 
78 
Wis. 2d 516, 519, 254 N.W.2d 478 (1977), on rehearing 82 
Wis. 2d 1, 260 N.W.2d 678 (1978), in which the accused was 
charged with three counts of arson with intent to defraud the 
insurer.  Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the State 
filed an amended information of one count of theft by fraud to 
which the accused pled guilty.  After sentencing, the accused 
sought to withdraw his plea of guilty on the ground that the 
statute of limitations had expired on the theft by fraud charge 
and that the amended information was defective.   
¶41 The Pohlhammer court concluded that the filing of the 
amended information was barred by the statute of limitations and 
that neither the amended information nor the plea thereto should 
have been accepted.  The court permitted the accused to withdraw 
his plea and set aside the judgment of conviction, permitted the 
State to withdraw the amended information, and remanded the 
cause to the trial court for further proceedings on the original 
information.  The court reasoned that the amended information 
was "conditioned" on the accused's "agreement to plead guilty" 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
18 
 
and 
that 
"[i]nvalidating 
the 
plea 
invalidates 
the 
plea 
bargain."18 
¶42 The State also relies on State v. Briggs, 218 
Wis. 2d 61, 64, 579 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1998), in which the 
accused entered a negotiated plea agreement with the State, 
resulting in an amended information that charged the accused 
with attempted felony murder and armed burglary.19  The circuit 
court sentenced the accused to 30 years in prison on the 
attempted felony murder charge and 40 years in prison on the 
armed burglary charge, the sentences to be served consecutively.   
¶43 The 
accused 
then 
challenged 
his 
conviction 
for 
attempted felony murder because this offense was not a crime 
under Wisconsin's statutory or common law.  The Briggs court 
agreed with the accused that he had been convicted of a crime 
that did not exist under Wisconsin law.   
¶44 The accused argued in Briggs that the appropriate 
relief was to vacate the conviction for attempted felony murder 
and leave the conviction and sentence for armed burglary intact.  
The State argued in Briggs that the convictions based on the 
                                                 
18 State v. Pohlhammer, 78 Wis. 2d 516, 524, 254 N.W.2d 478 
(1977).  The disposition in Pohlhammer was reaffirmed on 
rehearing 
in 
State 
v. 
Pohlhammer, 
82 
Wis. 2d 1, 
4, 
260 
N.W.2d 678 (1978). 
19 The 
original 
information 
in 
State 
v. 
Briggs, 
218 
Wis. 2d 61, 64, 579 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1998), charged the 
accused with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, armed 
car theft, armed robbery, armed burglary, and criminal damage to 
property.   
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
19 
 
plea agreement should be vacated and the original information 
reinstated.  
¶45 Relying on the reasoning in the Pohlhammer case, the 
Briggs court set aside both convictions and the plea agreement 
because "all are connected and all were the result of an 
erroneous view of the law."20  The Briggs court then vacated the 
amended information and reinstated the original information in 
order to restore the parties to their positions prior to the 
negotiated plea agreement that was based on an inaccurate view 
of the law.  The cause was remanded for proceedings on the 
counts contained in the original information.   
¶46 We agree with the State that Briggs and Pohlhammer are 
analogous to the present case and that they suggest the proper 
remedy in the present case.  The Jordan case also gives us 
insight about remedies.  
¶47 We agree with the State that the defendant's motion to 
vacate a conviction on one count and withdraw his plea of no 
contest to one of the two counts of the amended information 
constitutes a repudiation of the plea agreement.  The agreement 
was that the defendant would plead no contest to two counts of 
recklessly endangering safety with a maximum possible sentence 
of ten years in prison in return for the State reducing one 
charge, 
dropping 
the 
repeat 
offender 
allegations, 
and 
recommending a sentence that was less than the possible maximum 
sentence.  When the defendant was successful in withdrawing his 
                                                 
20 Id., 218 Wis. 2d at 73. 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
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no-contest plea to one of the counts of recklessly endangering 
safety, the basis on which the State had entered the plea 
agreement was substantially changed.   
¶48 We conclude that the appropriate remedy in such 
circumstances ordinarily is to reverse the conviction, vacate 
the negotiated plea agreement upon which the conviction was 
based, set aside the amended information, and reinstate the 
original charges against the accused.  But the appropriate 
remedy depends on the totality of the circumstances.  A court 
must examine all of the circumstances of a case to determine an 
appropriate 
remedy 
for 
that 
case, 
considering 
both 
the 
defendant's and State's interests. 
¶49 In the present case, examining all the circumstances, 
the 
available 
remedies, 
and 
the 
State's 
and 
defendant's 
interests, we conclude that the parties should be restored to 
the same positions they respectively held before the defective 
plea agreement was entered.  No claim is made by the parties and 
nothing appears in the record that this remedy adversely affects 
the State's ability to prosecute or the defendant's ability to 
defend against the counts set forth in the original information.  
Furthermore, the defendant has not made a persuasive argument 
that this remedy is fundamentally unfair because it exposes him 
to the risk of a greater sentence. 
¶50 Our conclusion about the remedy based on Pohlhammer,21 
Briggs,22 and Jordan23 is also supported by principles of contract 
                                                 
21 State v. Pohlhammer, 78 Wis. 2d 516. 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
21 
 
law.  Plea agreements have been compared to contracts, although 
the analogy is not precise.24   
¶51 Our conclusion about the appropriate remedy in the 
present case is congruent with the principle of contract law 
that recognizes several remedies are available for breaches of 
contracts to protect the various interests of the contracting 
parties under the circumstances of a case.25  One contract remedy 
is to place the parties back in the positions they would have 
held if the contract had not been made.  This remedy is used 
when a party to a contract changes its position in reliance on 
                                                                                                                                                             
22 State v. Briggs, 218 Wis. 2d 61. 
23 Jordan v. State, 676 N.E.2d 352. 
24 "[W]e also look to contract law principles to determine a 
criminal defendant's rights [under plea agreements] . . . .  
[T]he analogy of plea agreements to private contracts is not 
precise.  The constitutional concerns undergirding a defendant's 
'contract rights' in a plea agreement demand broader and more 
vigorous protection than those accorded private contractual 
commitments."  State v. Scott, 230 Wis. 2d 643, 654-55, 602 
N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1999). 
25 "Availability of particular remedies depends much on the 
facts of the case."  Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 1.1 
at 3 (2d ed. 1993).   
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
22 
 
the promise of another party to the contract.  The remedy 
protects a party's reliance interest in the contract.26   
¶52 In the present case the State changed its position by 
filing an amended information in reliance on the defendant's 
promise to plead no contest.  When the defendant repudiated his 
plea to one of the counts upon which he was convicted, the State 
sought to be placed in the position it would have held if the 
plea agreement had not been made.  This remedy would serve to 
protect the State's reliance interest in the plea agreement and 
consequently comports with the relevant principles of contract 
law. 
¶53 An alternative principle of contract law also supports 
our conclusion about the appropriate remedy in the present case.  
Both parties in the present case apparently believed that the 
terms of the plea agreement were constitutional, even though 
they were not.  Both the State and defendant were thus acting 
under a mistake of law in negotiating the plea agreement, and 
this mistake had a material effect on the agreement by relieving 
                                                 
26 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344(b) (1981).  The 
other interests protected are the expectation interest of the 
promisee in having the benefit of the bargain by being put in as 
good a position as he or she would have been in had the contract 
been performed and the restitution interest of the promisee in 
having restored to him or her any benefit that was conferred on 
the other party.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344(a) and 
(c) (1981).  See Harris v. Metropolitan Mall, 112 Wis. 2d 487, 
496-97, 334 N.W.2d 519 (1983) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 344 (1981)); Thorpe Sales Corp. v. Gyuro Grading 
Co., Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 431, 438, 331 N.W.2d 342 (1983) (same); 
Reimer v. Badger Wholesale Co., Inc., 147 Wis. 2d 389, 395, 433 
N.W.2d 592 (1988) (same). 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
23 
 
the defendant of a substantial part of his performance and 
adversely affecting the State's prosecution of the case.   
¶54 The general rule is that when both parties are 
mistaken about a basic assumption on which a contract was made 
and the mistake has a material effect on the agreed exchange of 
performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected 
party.27 
¶55 If we adhere to contract law doctrines about remedies 
for breach of contract and mistakes, the plea agreement in the 
present case should be voided at the request of the State, which 
is the adversely affected party, and the parties restored to 
their respective positions before the plea agreement was 
entered. 
 
IV 
 
¶56 Because we agree with the State's proposed remedy, we 
need not and do not address the State's claim that the doctrine 
of judicial estoppel bars the defendant in the present case from 
claiming a benefit from the double jeopardy violation created by 
the plea agreement.    
¶57 In summary, we conclude that when the defendant 
repudiated the negotiated plea agreement on the ground that it 
contained multiplicitous counts, the defendant materially and 
substantially breached the plea agreement.  We further conclude 
                                                 
27 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152(1) (1981). 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
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that when an accused successfully challenges a plea to and a 
conviction on one count of a two-count information on grounds of 
double jeopardy and the information has been amended pursuant to 
a negotiated plea agreement by which the State made charging 
concessions, ordinarily the remedy is to reverse the convictions 
and sentences, to vacate the plea agreement, and to reinstate 
the original information so that the parties are restored to 
their positions prior to the negotiated plea agreement.  We also 
conclude, however, that under some circumstances this remedy 
might not be appropriate.   
¶58 In the present case, we reverse the judgment of 
conviction, vacate the plea agreement, and remand the cause to 
the circuit court with directions to reinstate the original 
information against the defendant and to conduct such other 
proceedings that are not inconsistent with this opinion.   
By the Court.—The judgment of conviction and the order of 
the circuit court are reversed and the cause is remanded.  
 
 
No. 
00-2435-CR   
 
 
 
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