Case Title: Ezell v. Southland Corp.

Citation: 541 So. 2d 490

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1989-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
541 So. 2d 490 (1989)
Pattie Ann EZELL
v.
The SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, d/b/a Seven-Eleven.
87-1231.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 24, 1989.
Edward Massey, Mobile, for appellant.
Carroll H. Sullivan and Edward G. Bowron of Clark, Scott & Sullivan, Mobile, for appellee.
STEAGALL, Justice.
Plaintiff Pattie Ann Ezell appeals from the summary judgment in favor of defendant Southland Corporation, d/b/a Seven-Eleven, on her counts alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and outrage. Because Ezell concedes on appeal that the summary judgment was proper as to the false arrest and outrage claims, we confine *491 our discussion to the issue of malicious prosecution.
An employee of the Seven-Eleven store, Dorothy Sutterfield, claimed that Ezell, while in the store, picked up two cans of beer and left the store without replacing them or paying for them. Her affidavit in support of Seven-Eleven's motion for summary judgment states:
Ezell was charged with theft of property in the third degree. She was found not guilty at trial, and subsequently she filed the action which is the subject of this appeal.
The elements necessary to maintain an action for malicious prosecution are: 1) institution of a judicial proceeding; 2) by the defendant; 3) without probable cause; 4) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff's favor; 5) malice on the defendant's part; and 6) injury or damage to the plaintiff as a result of the action. Davidson v. Davidson, 510 So. 2d 199 (Ala.1987). The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of these elements. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Ruby, 348 So. 2d 484 (Ala.1977). It is clear that Seven-Eleven initiated an action against Ezell that was terminated in her favor; Ezell argues on appeal that Seven-Eleven lacked probable cause in prosecuting her and that malice can be inferred from that lack of probable cause.
"The question in an action for malicious prosecution arising from a criminal charge is whether the defendant, at the time he or she instituted the prosecution, had probable cause to believe that the accused was guilty." S.S. Kresge Co., supra, at 488 (citations omitted). Probable cause is defined as "`such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty.' Hanson v. Couch, 360 So. 2d 942, 947 (Ala. 1978)." Kitchens v. Winn-Dixie of Montgomery, Inc., 456 So. 2d 45, 47 (Ala.1984).
Sutterfield stated in her deposition that she signed the warrant based upon what she observed Ezell do in the store. Ezell's counter-affidavit contradicts Sutterfield's account:
Other than general denials, Ezell provided no proof or evidence to support her claim of lack of probable cause. "As with any issue on summary judgment, if the facts are not in dispute, a question of law is presented to be decided by the trial *492 court...." Kitchens, supra, at 47. In Gulf States Paper Corp. v. Hawkins, 444 So. 2d 381 (Ala.1983), we reversed a $200,000 judgment in favor of an employee, Hawkins, who had been accused of theft of the employer corporation's money. Hawkins was bound over to the grand jury twice, both occasions resulting in a no bill. It was after this that Hawkins sued Gulf States. In reversing the jury's verdict, we noted:
Gulf States Paper Corp. v. Hawkins, supra, at 390 (emphasis added).
Likewise, Ezell's denials, standing alone, are insufficient to create an issue of fact for a jury and thereby withstand summary judgment. Although Ezell is correct in arguing that malice may be inferred from a lack of probable cause, S.S. Kresge Co., supra, she has failed to prove that lack of probable cause. Accordingly, the summary judgment for Southland Corporation, d/b/a Seven-Eleven, is affirmed as to all counts.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON and ADAMS, JJ., concur.