Case Title: Hasan v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 080030

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
QAADIR TARIQ HASAN  
 
v.  Record No. 080030 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
OCTOBER 31, 2008 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether evidence of a 
defendant’s response to a police officer’s question regarding 
the presence of a weapon in a vehicle should have been 
suppressed in the absence of Miranda warnings.  For the 
reasons stated below, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On May 30, 2004, Newport News Police officers received a 
radio transmission for a “be-on-the-lookout” (“BOL”) 
concerning an armed robbery that had occurred in the city.  
Officers Sutton and Grace of the Newport News Police 
Department received this BOL, which notified officers to look 
for “a black, square body, older model Chevy Impala [with] a 
window shattered but . . . still intact on the passenger side 
of the vehicle.”  The vehicle was described as having a 
“[p]artial tag . . . of JHM or JMH [and] was being operated by 
a black male driver with another black male passenger.” 
 
Not long after receiving the BOL, Officer Sutton observed 
a black, older model Chevy Impala with the front passenger 
window shattered but still intact, with the first letters on 
the license plate, “JMH.”  Officers Sutton and Grace followed 
the vehicle and called for assistance with the ensuing traffic 
stop.  After stopping the suspected vehicle, the officers used 
a public announcement system from one of the police cars to 
initially communicate with the driver and passenger. 
At the beginning of this encounter, there were three or 
four police officers present and as many as two to four 
additional officers arrived during the traffic stop, for a 
total of six to eight officers.  There was also a K-9 unit at 
the scene, and the various officers present had both handguns 
and shotguns drawn. 
 
The defendant, Qaadir Tariq Hasan (“Hasan”), was the 
driver and the first occupant removed from the vehicle.  
Officer Sutton “patted him down” for weapons and then placed 
him in handcuffs.  At least five other officers were standing 
around Officer Sutton and Hasan in a “cone” formation.  None 
of the officers informed Hasan of his rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), at any time prior to the 
question and answer that are the major focus of this appeal. 
 
Officer Sutton asked Hasan if there were any weapons in 
the vehicle, and Hasan responded that there was a handgun 
 
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under the driver’s seat.  The other occupant of the vehicle 
was still in the vehicle, and Officer Sutton testified that he 
asked whether there were any weapons in the car for “officer 
safety” because “[i]f there’s another occupant in that vehicle 
and we are stopping that vehicle for a violent felony, I’m 
going to ask that question regardless.” 
 
Officer Sutton notified other police officers present 
that there was a weapon in the vehicle and, once the passenger 
was removed from the vehicle, Officer Grace found the weapon 
under the driver’s seat where Hasan indicated it would be 
located.  Subsequent investigation revealed that Hasan and the 
passenger were not involved in the robbery. 
 
Hasan was indicted for carrying a concealed weapon, 
second or subsequent offense, and possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  He filed a motion to suppress “any and all 
evidence as well as the fruits derived therefrom, resulting 
from the statements taken from the defendant at the time of 
the defendant’s arrest,” arguing that the officers should have 
read him his rights under Miranda before posing the question 
about weapons.  The trial court denied the motion to suppress. 
 
Hasan entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the 
right to challenge on appeal the trial court’s denial of his 
motion to suppress and to withdraw his plea if successful.  
The Commonwealth consented to this conditional plea and the 
 
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trial court approved it, as required by Code § 19.2-254.  Upon 
entering this conditional plea, Hasan was found guilty of both 
offenses.  He was sentenced to two years’ incarceration with 
both years suspended for carrying a concealed weapon, and five 
years with three years suspended for possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon. 
 
Hasan appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia which 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court in an unpublished 
opinion.  The Court of Appeals held that  
[t]he only issue on appeal is whether appellant 
was “in custody” for practical purposes at the 
time he was asked about “weapons in the 
vehicle.” . . .  Although appellant was told to 
exit his car under conditions of a “high-risk” 
traffic stop with between three and eight police 
officers present, and although he was patted 
down and handcuffed, appellant was not taken to 
a patrol car prior to questioning. . . .  [W]e 
cannot say that a reasonable person in 
appellant’s position would understand that he 
was “in custody” at the moment he was 
questioned.  The trial court therefore did not 
err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. 
 
Hasan v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2435-06-1, slip op. at 2-4 
(Dec. 27, 2007).  Hasan appeals to this Court upon one 
assignment of error: “The Court of Appeals erred in affirming 
the trial court’s denial of Hasan’s motion to suppress the 
statements he made to police in the absence of a Miranda 
warning.” 
II.  Analysis 
 
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A. 
Standard of Review 
 
 
When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s 
motion to suppress evidence,  
we consider the evidence “in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth,” McCain v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490, 545 S.E.2d 541, 
545 (2001), and “accord the Commonwealth the 
benefit of all inferences fairly deducible from 
the evidence.”  Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 
296, 303, 601 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2004). . . .  The 
defendant bears the burden of establishing that 
the denial of his suppression motion was 
reversible error. 
 
Glenn v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 123, 130, 654 S.E.2d 910, 913 
(2008). 
B. 
The Court of Appeals Erred in Affirming 
 the Trial Court’s Holding that Hasan Was Not In Custody 
 
 
Hasan argues that his statement to police about the 
presence of a handgun in the vehicle should have been 
suppressed in the absence of Miranda warnings.  The United 
States Supreme Court held in Miranda that “the prosecution may 
not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless 
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination” guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment.  384 U.S. at 444.  “The safeguards 
required by Miranda must be afforded to a suspect as soon as 
the police have restricted his freedom of action to a ‘degree 
associated with formal arrest.’ ”  Dixon v. Commonwealth, 270 
 
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Va. 34, 39, 613 S.E.2d 398, 400 (2005) (quoting Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). 
 
The relevant inquiry to determine if a suspect is in 
custody is “how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation 
would have understood his circumstances.”  Id. at 40, 613 
S.E.2d at 401.  As the United States Supreme Court has noted, 
“the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a 
determination of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ for 
purposes of receiving Miranda protection.”  California v. 
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983).  Among the circumstances 
courts consider in determining whether a suspect is in custody 
are whether police were able to physically seize the suspect, 
whether the suspect was physically restrained, whether 
firearms were drawn, whether there was physical contact 
between police and the suspect, whether the suspect was 
confined in a police car, whether police told the suspect he 
or she was free to leave, whether police engaged in other 
incidents of formal arrest such as booking, whether friends or 
relatives of the suspect were present, and whether more than 
one officer was present.  2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal 
Procedure § 6.6(f) (3d ed. 2007).  Of equal importance are the 
officers’ demeanor during the encounter, the length of the 
questioning, and the nature of the questions asked, id., the 
location of the encounter, id. at § 6.6(d), and whether the 
 
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subject was uniquely susceptible to intimidation, id. at 
§ 6.6(c).  However, this list is not exhaustive, and other 
circumstances might bear on the question whether police have 
curtailed a particular suspect's freedom to a “degree 
associated with a formal arrest.”  Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125. 
 
The Court of Appeals held that Hasan was not “in custody” 
and therefore Miranda warnings were not necessary.  We 
disagree.  Prior to the questioning at issue here, the 
officers had stopped Hasan, and using a public announcement 
system, ordered him to drop the car keys and get out of the 
car.  He was immediately surrounded by officers with drawn 
handguns and shotguns trained upon him.  The nature of the 
detention was not similar to an ordinary traffic stop.  Hasan 
was directed to a location between two police cars, frisked 
for weapons, and handcuffed.  The circumstances under which 
Hasan was questioned, particularly the number of officers 
present, the coercive character of the encounter, and the 
degree to which Hasan was restrained suggest that a reasonable 
person in Hasan’s place would have considered himself to be in 
police custody.  Dixon, 270 Va. at 39-40, 613 S.E.2d at 400-
01. 
 
The Court of Appeals’ determination that Hasan was not in 
custody relied heavily on the fact that Hasan was not placed 
in a patrol car before being questioned by police.  In Dixon, 
 
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we noted that “the presence of either [handcuffing the 
defendant or placing him in a locked police car], in the 
absence of the other, may not result in a curtailment of 
freedom ordinarily associated with a formal arrest.”  270 Va. 
at 41, 613 S.E.2d at 401. 
 
However, several factors not present in Dixon distinguish 
this case.  For example, the defendant in Dixon did not face 
drawn weapons or a readily available K-9 unit, and at the time 
of the custodial interrogation, only one trooper was 
interacting with the defendant.  See id. at 37-38, 613 S.E.2d 
at 399-400.  In contrast, Hasan was confronted during 
questioning with both drawn guns and a K-9 unit close by, and 
was surrounded by a “cone” consisting of multiple officers. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that a reasonable person in Hasan’s 
position “would have understood that his freedom was being 
restricted to a degree associated with a formal arrest.”  
Dixon, 270 Va. at 40, 613 S.E.2d at 401.  Because Hasan was in 
custody when he was questioned but had not been given Miranda 
warnings, the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the trial 
court’s denial of Hasan’s motion to suppress was erroneous. 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth argues that a reversal of 
Hasan’s conviction would be improper because evidence of the 
weapon in the car would have been admissible under the 
doctrine of “inevitable discovery,” or because Officer 
 
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Sutton’s question was justified by the “public safety” 
exception to the requirements of Miranda.  These arguments, 
which are in the nature of a harmless error analysis, are 
inapplicable to this case.  Even if the Commonwealth is 
correct about the inevitable discovery of the weapon or the 
application of the public safety exception, Hasan entered a 
conditional guilty plea pursuant to Code § 19.2-254, which 
provides in part that “[i]f the defendant prevails on appeal, 
he shall be allowed to withdraw his plea.”  Hasan has 
prevailed on appeal regarding suppression of the statement at 
issue in this case.  He is entitled by statute to withdraw his 
plea.  Hasan must be given the opportunity to reassess the 
admissible evidence that may be used against him and, if the 
Commonwealth wishes to continue its prosecution, demand a 
trial if he so desires. 
III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming Hasan’s convictions.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with 
instructions that this matter be remanded to the trial court 
for a new trial, if the Commonwealth so elects, in accordance 
with the principles expressed in this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded.