Case Title: McGowan v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 062482

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
KYNA CHANELLE McGOWAN 
 
    OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 062482          JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
     November 2, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, the sole issue we consider is whether the 
trial court erred in admitting evidence of a subsequent crime 
committed by the criminal defendant for the purpose of 
impeaching the credibility of the defendant’s testimony during 
cross-examination. 
BACKGROUND 
Kyna Chanelle McGowan (McGowan) was indicted, as a 
principal in the second degree, for unlawfully and feloniously 
distributing cocaine on March 4, 2004 in the City of Hampton.  
Thereafter, she was tried and found guilty of that offense in 
a jury trial conducted in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Hampton, and sentenced to five years imprisonment with a 
$5,000 fine. 
We state the evidence taken at trial in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.  
Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 467, 643 S.E.2d 708, 714 
(2007).  On March 4, 2004, James McCoy (McCoy), a confidential 
informant working for the Hampton Police Department’s Special 
 
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Investigations Unit, conducted a controlled buy of crack 
cocaine as part of a local drug interdiction program.  After 
driving to a particular shopping center known to be in a 
“high-drug area,” McCoy was approached by Saroyal Booker 
(Booker), who asked McCoy whether “he was looking.”  McCoy 
responded that he wanted a “20 rock.”  Booker then instructed 
McCoy to follow her because her “girl [was] across the street 
at McDonald’s.” 
Upon arriving at the McDonald’s parking lot, McCoy 
watched as Booker approached and spoke with McGowan.  McCoy 
continued his observation as McGowan reached under her shirt 
and handed something to Booker.  Booker then returned to McCoy 
and handed him two rocks of crack cocaine in exchange for 
twenty dollars.  Booker then walked over to McGowan, and 
again, a transaction occurred. 
On July 13, 2004, McGowan was arrested pursuant to the 
indictment charging her for distribution of cocaine on March 
4, 2004.  At that time, Hampton Police Detective Christine 
Saunders conducted a search incident to arrest, during which 
McGowan “turned her back, reached down into her bra and handed 
[the Detective] two items . . . wrapped in small pieces of 
plastic.”  Detective Saunders believed these items to be crack 
cocaine. 
 
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Prior to trial, the Commonwealth moved the trial court in 
limine to allow it to introduce evidence of the suspected 
crack cocaine found in McGowan’s possession on the day of her 
arrest.  The court denied the motion with respect to the 
introduction of the evidence in the Commonwealth’s case-in-
chief.  However, the court expressly reserved ruling as to 
whether the Commonwealth could introduce that evidence in 
rebuttal. 
McGowan chose to take the stand during the ensuing jury 
trial, denying any knowledge of, and participation in, the 
March 4, 2004 drug sale.  McGowan maintained that she had 
removed money from her bra and given it to Booker, her friend, 
to buy a meal at the McDonald’s restaurant.  During cross-
examination, McGowan testified that she “wouldn’t know crack 
cocaine if [she] saw it.”  In an attempt to impeach McGowan’s 
statement, the Commonwealth then asked “[s]o when you were 
arrested on July 13, 2004, did you have any crack cocaine on 
your person?”  Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial 
court allowed similar questioning to proceed, to which McGowan 
denied possessing crack cocaine on July 13, 2004.  The court 
reasoned that, because McGowan had not objected to initial 
questions concerning her lack of knowledge of crack cocaine, 
she had thus “opened the door” to the evidence of her later 
possession of the drug on July 13, 2004.  The Commonwealth 
 
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then elicited the testimony of Detective Saunders regarding 
the arrest and search of McGowan on July 13, 2004, for the 
purpose of rebutting McGowan’s testimony. 
At the conclusion of the introduction of the evidence, 
the trial court gave a limiting instruction directing the jury 
to consider the July 13, 2004 incident “only as evidence of 
the defendant’s intent, opportunity or as evidence of the 
absence of mistake or accident on the part of the defendant in 
connection with the offense for which she is on trial.”  When 
the proceedings in the trial court were concluded, McGowan 
pursued an appeal of her conviction in the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed McGowan’s conviction in a 
divided en banc decision, holding that “[t]he trial court 
properly admitted the evidence of McGowan’s subsequent 
possession of cocaine in order to prove her knowledge of 
cocaine, as well as to impeach her credibility.”  McGowan v. 
Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 333, 344, 630 S.E.2d 758, 764 
(2006).  This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
The thrust of the Commonwealth’s position is that McGowan 
“opened the door” to evidence of other crimes when she 
testified during cross-examination that she had no knowledge 
of cocaine.  See Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 251-52, 
421 S.E.2d 821, 840 (1992) (denial of complicity in crime by 
 
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witness opens the door for questions on cross-examination 
relevant to issue of guilt or innocence).  The Commonwealth 
does not contend that the evidence of McGowan’s possession of 
crack cocaine when she was arrested on July 13, 2004 was 
admissible in its case-in-chief to prove that McGowan had the 
requisite knowledge of cocaine on March 4, 2004 as charged in 
the indictment. 
Indeed, in accord with this Court’s well-established 
precedent addressing the inadmissibility of evidence of other 
crimes to prove the crime presently charged, there is no 
challenge to the trial court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s 
motion in limine with regard to that issue.  See generally, 
Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 176 S.E.2d 802 
(1970).  Likewise, there is no dispute that in order to 
convict McGowan of the charged offense, the Commonwealth had 
the burden of proving that McGowan had knowledge of the nature 
and character of the substance involved in the alleged 
distribution on March 4, 2004.  See Burton v. Commonwealth, 
215 Va. 711, 713, 213 S.E.2d 757, 759 (1975) (Commonwealth 
must prove that defendant possessed drug with knowledge of its 
nature and character).  Thus, the sole focus of our analysis 
here is whether, under the particular circumstances of this 
case, the Commonwealth was properly permitted to introduce 
evidence of another crime during its cross-examination of 
 
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McGowan and during rebuttal testimony in order to establish an 
essential element of the crime charged. 
In Guill v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 495 S.E.2d 489 
(1998), we held that: 
Evidence that shows or tends to show a defendant has 
committed a prior crime generally is inadmissible to 
prove the crime charged.  Such evidence implicating 
an accused in other crimes unrelated to the charged 
offense is inadmissible because it may confuse the 
issues being tried and cause undue prejudice to the 
defendant. 
 
Id. at 138, 495 S.E.2d at 491 (internal citations omitted).  
There are several exceptions to this rule.  “Evidence of 
‘other crimes’ is relevant and admissible if it tends to prove 
any element of the offense charged.  Thus, evidence of other 
crimes is allowed when it tends to prove motive, intent, or 
knowledge of the defendant.”  Id. (citing Kirkpatrick, 211 Va. 
at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805) (emphasis omitted). 
However, in order for evidence of the defendant’s other 
crimes to be admissible under the “knowledge of the defendant” 
exception, its tendency to produce prejudice must not outweigh 
its probative value.  See Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 
340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986).  We have held in this regard that 
“[e]vidence of collateral facts or those incapable of 
affording any reasonable presumption or inference on matters 
in issue, because [they are] too remote or irrelevant, cannot 
be accepted in evidence.”  Bunting v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 
 
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309, 314, 157 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1967).  Accordingly, “ ‘[t]he 
test as to whether a matter is material or collateral, in the 
matter of impeachment of a witness, is whether . . . the 
cross-examining party would be entitled to prove it in support 
of his case.’ ”  Stottlemyer v. Ghramm, 268 Va. 7, 12, 597 
S.E.2d 191, 193 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 
834, 842, 94 S.E. 783, 786 (1918)).  Therefore, when “ ‘the 
circumstances [of the other event] have no intimate connection 
with the main fact; if they constitute no link in the chain of 
evidence . . . they ought to be excluded.’ ”  Guill, 255 Va. 
at 139, 495 S.E.2d at 492 (quoting Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 
Va. (1 Leigh) 574, 577 (1829)).  Evidence that relates to a 
separate offense for which the defendant is not currently 
standing trial, and which cannot be used for any purpose other 
than for impeachment of the defendant, is certainly collateral 
to the main issue.  Cf. Seilheimer v. Melville, 224 Va. 323, 
327, 295 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1982). 
Notwithstanding these principles, it is well settled 
that, “[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify 
in his own defense, or to refuse to do so.  But that 
privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit 
perjury.”  Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).  
Clearly, a criminal defendant such as McGowan cannot expect 
to make a misleading statement to the jury without also 
 
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“open[ing] the door to cross-examination for the purpose of 
attacking [her] credibility.”  Santmier v. Commonwealth, 217 
Va. 318, 319-20, 228 S.E.2d 681, 682 (1976).  Under our 
jurisprudence however, the cross-examiner is bound by the 
answer given, and cannot introduce any extrinsic evidence to 
otherwise contradict the witness.  Allen, 122 Va. at 841, 94 
S.E. at 785.  Thus, “the answer of the witness will be 
conclusive; [she] cannot be asked as to any collateral 
independent fact merely with a view to contradict [her] 
afterwards by calling another witness.”  Id. at 842, 94 S.E. 
at 786. 
Applying these principles to the facts in this case, we 
are of opinion that the trial court erred in permitting the 
Commonwealth to introduce evidence of McGowan’s alleged 
possession of crack cocaine on July 13, 2004, during the 
trial for the March 4, 2004 distribution of cocaine.  
Assuming, as we must from the record, that the substance 
recovered during the search of McGowan on July 13, 2004 was 
in fact crack cocaine, evidence of McGowan’s possession of 
that substance was evidence of another crime.  The July 13, 
2004 crime was committed subsequent to the crime charged, 
and had little, if any, tendency to prove that McGowan had 
knowledge of cocaine on March 4, 2004.  This evidence was 
 
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therefore unduly prejudicial and inadmissible in the 
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. 
Moreover, while the Commonwealth had the right to 
cross-examine McGowan with regard to her knowledge of crack 
cocaine after she chose to testify on her own behalf, the 
Commonwealth was not permitted through the testimony of 
Detective Saunders to offer clearly prejudicial evidence of 
another crime to rebut McGowan’s testimony.  The 
Commonwealth cannot be allowed to essentially smuggle into 
evidence during its cross-examination of a defendant proof 
of another crime not admissible in its case-in-chief, which 
is not only highly inflammatory and misleading to a jury, 
but lacking in serious probative value as well.  To hold 
otherwise would, as the dissent in the Court of Appeals 
aptly noted, allow the exception to swallow the rule 
prohibiting evidence of other crimes in drug-related cases.  
McGowan, 48 Va. App. at 347, 630 S.E.2d at 765 (Frank, J., 
dissenting). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we conclude that the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that the trial court properly admitted the 
evidence of McGowan’s subsequent possession of cocaine in 
order to prove her knowledge of cocaine on March 4, 2004, as 
well as to impeach her credibility.  Accordingly, we will 
 
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reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this 
case to that Court with instructions that the case be remanded 
to the trial court for a new trial, if the Commonwealth be so 
advised. 
Reversed and remanded.