Case Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Harris

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Harris1997 WY 21931 P.2d 255Case Number: 96-106, 96-107Decided: 02/06/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

STATE 
of Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS'

COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellant 
(Petitioner-Objector),

v.

Sherman HARRIS, Appellee 
(Respondent-Employee).

 

SINCLAIR TRUCKING, Appellant 
(Petitioner-Employer),

v.

Sherman HARRIS, Appellee 
(Respondent-Employee).

  

 

Appeal from District Court, 
Carbon County, Kenneth Stebner, J.

 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Jennifer A. Evans, Assistant Attorney General, 
for Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division.

 Catherine MacPherson, of MacPherson Law Offices, LLC, 
Rawlins, WY, for Sinclair Trucking.

 Susan Maher Guthrie, Casper, Wyoming, for 
Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, 
C.J., THOMAS and MACY, JJ., and KALOKATHIS and PRICE, District 
Judges.

 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 [¶1]      The debate in 
this case is over the sufficiency of the evidence to support an award of 
benefits for a fatal heart attack sustained by Sherman Harris (Harris).1 Upon our reversal of an order of 
the district court remanding the case to the hearing examiner for the taking of 
additional evidence, Matter of Harris, 900 P.2d 1163 (Wyo. 1995), the case was 
remanded for review of the original decision of the hearing examiner. The 
hearing examiner's decision had awarded benefits to Harris, and upon our remand, 
the decision was affirmed by the 
district court. This appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in light 
of the standards articulated in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-603(b) (1991), as construed 
by our decisions. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the 
statutory standards as interpreted in our prior decisions. The ruling of the 
district court articulated in its Decision Letter, in which it affirmed the 
Order Awarding Benefits, is affirmed.

 

[¶2]      The single issue 
pressed by the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division (Division) in its Brief of 
Appellant is:

 

Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings, award 
of workers' compensation benefits for the heart attack of a truck driver caused 
by changing a flat tire is arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.

 

In the Brief of Appellant, 
Sinclair Trucking, a series of issues are set forth:

 

A. Pursuant to W.S. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A), the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge was unlawful and should be set aside 
because the decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law as set forth in W.S. § 
27-14-603(b).

 

1. 
Under W.S. § 27-14-603(b)(ii), changing a tire as a matter of law is not a 
causative exertion clearly unusual to or abnormal for employees in the 
particular employment of an oilfield truck driver.

 

2. 
The Administrative Law Judge's determination that changing a tire on a loaded 
trailer, alone, in muddy conditions transformed an usual and normal exertion 
into an unusual and abnormal exertion amounted to a finding, in violation of 
W.S. § 27-14-603(b)(ii), that the exertion was unusual and abnormal for the 
individual employee, rather than for employees in the particular employment of 
an oilfield truck driver.

 

B. Pursuant to W.S. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E), the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge is unsupported by substantial evidence 
of the character and type specifically required by W.S. § 
27-14-603(b).

 

In the Brief of Appellee, 
Harris identifies only one issue:

 

1. Whether the Administrative Law Judge's decision 
rendered December 28, 1992 was correct as a matter of law and supported by 
substantial evidence?

 

[¶3]      In reviewing the 
decision of the hearing examiner, the district judge authored a complete and 
well considered decision letter. In addition to the factual background offered 
in Matter of Harris, we draw upon the factual summary articulated by the 
district judge. At the time of his death, Harris had worked for Sinclair 
Trucking for approximately seven years. During the last two or three years of 
that employment, Harris worked as a truck driver hauling loads of crude oil from 
the oil fields. In that employment, Harris was subject to Department of 
Transportation regulations that limited driving hours in a given time frame as 
demonstrated by a log of driving activities and required a periodic physical 
examination. At those examinations, the physician pronounced Mr. Harris to be 
generally in good health.

 

[¶4]      On August 21, 
1991, Harris hauled two loads of crude oil. On the second trip, after picking up 
his load, a tire went flat on the inner dual wheel of the "pup" trailer, a 
smaller tanker pulled behind the main tanker. Harris' log book for that trip 
disclosed that he spent an hour and fifteen minutes changing the tire. He was 
required to remove an outer wheel and then change the inner tire. Considerable 
work is required to change a tire, which is exacerbated if the work must be done 
in the mud. When Harris returned home that evening, he was covered with mud and 
grease, and he told his wife that it "like to have killed me having to change 
that tire." Harris indicated that he had hurt his back and arms and was 
suffering from nausea, fatigue and indigestion. He asked Mrs. Harris to arrange 
a doctor's appointment for him.

 

[¶5]      Although his 
symptoms continued the following day, Harris hauled three loads of oil, 
completing his work at approximately 8:25 p.m. on August 22, 1991. He had coffee 
with a friend after work, but left early because he did not feel well, and felt 
like he was coming down with the flu. On the second day after changing the tire, 
August 23, 1991, Harris did not feel well and was late arriving at work.  He hauled two loads of crude oil on that 
day, and he began to feel poorly as he was unloading the second load. A 
co-worker assisted him in unloading his truck, and the co-worker then fueled and 
weighed Harris' truck. When the coworker returned, he found Harris slumped over, 
and efforts to revive him were unsuccessful. He was pronounced dead at the 
hospital.

 

[¶6]      A claim for 
Worker's Compensation death benefits was filed on behalf of his wife. Both the 
Division and Sinclair Trucking filed timely objections, contending that Harris' 
death was not attributable to his employment. A contested case hearing was held 
July 14, 1992, and the hearing examiner awarded the statutory benefits. The 
Division and Sinclair Trucking sought judicial review of that administrative 
award, and the review lead to the return of the case by the district court to 
the hearing examiner to take additional evidence. After taking the additional 
evidence, the hearing examiner reversed the decision and denied benefits. Harris 
then appealed to the district court and to this court. We reversed the order of 
the district court that had remanded the case for taking additional evidence, 
and instructed the court to review the original administrative decision awarding 
benefits under the usual standards. Matter Of Harris. The district court, after 
accomplishing that review, affirmed the hearing examiner's decision awarding 
benefits, and the Division and Sinclair Trucking then appealed to this 
court.

 

[¶7]      Review of the 
action of an administrative agency is accomplished in accordance with WYO. STAT. 
§ 16-3-114(c) (1990), which provides:

 

The reviewing court shall:

 

* 
* * * * *

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

 

(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege or immunity;

 

(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

 

(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

 

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 

Review is limited to a 
determination of the issues specified in the statute, which is specifically 
adopted by reference in WYO. R. APP. P. 12.09(a). In addition, the review is 
confined to the record and to the issues set forth in the petition for review 
and raised before the agency.

 

[¶8]      In accomplishing 
this review, we accord no special deference to the decision of the district 
court, but review the case as if it came to us directly from the agency. Wyoming 
Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994). We do give to 
the findings of fact by the administrative agency the same deference normally 
accorded to findings of fact by a trial court, and the agency's factual 
determinations will not be set aside unless clearly contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence in the record. We examine the entire record to determine if substantial evidence is 
present to support the findings of fact by the hearing examiner. Romero v. Davy 
McKee Corp., 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993). "Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of 
an agency." Stuckey v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 
890 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wyo. 1995). There must be more than a mere scintilla of 
evidence or simply a suspicion for a fact to be established. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. v. Public Service Com'n of 
Wyoming, 662 P.2d 878, 882 (Wyo. 1983). The presence in the record of 
contradictory evidence or other material controverting a fact does not establish 
that a finding of that fact is not supported by substantial 
evidence.

 

[¶9]      There is no 
question that Harris died as a result of a heart attack. All parties point to 
the controlling statute in this matter, WYO. STAT. § 27-14-603(b) (1991) which 
provides:

 

(B) Benefits for employment-related coronary 
conditions except those directly and solely caused by an injury, are not payable 
unless the employee establishes by competent medical authority 
that:

 

(i) 
There is direct causal connection between the condition under which the work was 
performed and the cardiac condition; and

 

(ii) The causative exertion occurs during the actual 
period of employment stress clearly unusual to or abnormal for employees in that 
particular employment, irrespective of whether the employment stress is unusual 
to or abnormal for the individual employee; and

 

(iii) The acute symptoms of the cardiac condition are 
clearly manifested not later than four (4) hours after the alleged causative 
exertion.

 

In Matter of Desotell, 767 P.2d 998, 1002 (Wyo. 1989), we interpreted this statute2:

 

Given the way the statute is phrased, the claimant 
must first prove that the injured employee experienced an "actual period of 
employment stress clearly unusual to, or abnormal for, employees in that 
particular employment * * *." Next, and only after proof of the first 
requirement, the claimant must establish legal causation, by proving a 
"causative exertion" during the proven period of actual unusual or abnormal 
stress. Then, the claimant must establish medical causation, by introducing 
competent medical testimony evidencing a direct causal connection between the 
causative exertion and the coronary condition. Last, the claimant must introduce 
evidence showing that the acute symptoms of that coronary condition were 
manifested within four hours of the causative exertion.  State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division v. Van Buskirk, 721 P.2d 570, 572 (Wyo. 1986) first 
analyzed as a four-part test in Claim of 
McCarley, 590 P.2d 1333, 1335-336 (Wyo. 1979).

 

[¶10]   The hearing examiner found that 
each of the statutory elements as identified in Matter of Desotell were 
established by Harris. The Division and Sinclair Trucking contend that the Order 
Awarding Benefits and Decision Letter of the hearing examiner are not supported 
by substantial evidence, are arbitrary and capricious, or constitute an abuse of 
discretion or are otherwise not in accordance with law. They assert that the 
case should be reversed in accordance with WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c). If the 
award is supported by substantial evidence and is not contrary to law, however, 
it is to be affirmed. Robles.

 

[¶11]   The Division and Sinclair Trucking 
contest only whether the first element was established. That element requires 
that the record demonstrate the causative exertion occurred during employment 
stress that is "clearly unusual to or abnormal for employees in that particular 
employment." This is an objective test and invokes the usual employment 
activities; it does not focus on the activities or characteristics of an 
individual employee. Sinclair Trucking and the Division contend first, that the 
evidence did not demonstrate muddy conditions on August 21, 1991; and second, 
the normal usual employment duty of changing a flat tire does not become an 
unusual or abnormal duty if it must be performed in the mud. The record 
discloses that there was conflicting evidence on these two 
matters.

 

[¶12]   Mrs. Harris testified that when her 
husband came home late one night, covered with mud and grease, he said that 
changing that tire "like to have killed me." Her testimony manifested confusion 
as to which day this occurred, but she always maintained that the events were 
associated with one another. The Division and Sinclair Trucking rely upon this 
confusion, and claim there is insufficient evidence to establish that Harris 
changed the tire in the mud. There is nothing in the record by direct evidence, 
however, that would refute the testimony of Mrs. Harris. The determination of 
the facts in the case is the responsibility of the hearing examiner, and we 
hold, in this instance, that more than a mere scintilla of evidence supported 
the finding of the hearing examiner that Harris changed a tire in the 
mud.

 

[¶13]   The Division and Sinclair Trucking 
argue, however, that changing a tire in any sort of weather conditions is a 
normal, usual job duty of truck drivers hauling crude oil. They offered evidence 
to demonstrate that the task of changing a tire is a usual and normal part of an 
oil patch truck driver's job. Further, they produced evidence that the roads oil 
patch drivers travel can be muddy. The terminal manager at Sinclair Trucking and 
a working manager at another company testified that changing a tire requires the 
same exertion whether it is in the mud or on dry, flat 
ground.

 

[¶14]   Harris presented evidence that 
changing a tire in mud and under the conditions that he confronted on August 21, 
1991, is an unusual and abnormal activity for drivers in the crude oil patch. A 
Sinclair Trucking employee, who like Harris, worked at hauling crude oil, 
testified the roads over which they travel in Wyoming get very muddy, slick and 
sticky in rain. He testified it would be unusual in the profession for a driver 
to have to change a tire in the mud. A former driver who had worked in the crude 
oil patch, testified that changing a tire in the mud was to be avoided and that 
it was "very abnormal and unusual for a driver to have to change it by 
himself."

 

[¶15]   The evidence was in conflict, but 
we agree with the decision of the district court that the hearing examiner, as 
the finder of fact, was in the best position to determine the facts. As the 
district court pointed out, we have held that "the possibility of drawing two 
inconsistent conclusions from a body of evidence does not prevent a finding that 
the conclusion drawn by the administrative agency was supported by substantial 
evidence." Southwest Wyoming Rehabilitation Center v. Employment Sec. Com'n of 
Wyoming, 781 P.2d 918, 921 (Wyo. 1989). The hearing examiner correctly applied 
the objective test articulated in Matter of Desotell, and there is substantial 
evidence to justify the finding that the circumstances under which Harris 
changed the tire on August 21, 1991, were unusual and 
abnormal.

 

[¶16]   The parties do not offer 
significant argument with respect to the other requirements of the statute, 
namely causation, both proximate and medical, and the four hour window for 
manifestation. The record discloses that the administrative judge properly 
concluded that causation was present. A competent medical expert testified on 
behalf of Harris, and agreed that it was more probable than not that changing 
the tire contributed in a material degree to the precipitation, aggravation, or 
acceleration of the heart attack which resulted in Harris' death. A witness produced by the Division 
and Sinclair Trucking did not agree, but we cannot say that the agency acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding as it did. See Claim of Taffner, 821 P.2d 103, 105 (Wyo. 1991); Matter of Injury to Taylor, 718 P.2d 63, 65 (Wyo. 
1986) (both cases discussing the standard for establishing causation between a 
work activity and a heart condition). There is also sufficient evidence in the 
record to demonstrate that Harris experienced the onslaught of his symptoms 
within four hours after changing the truck tire.

 

[¶17]   Harris satisfied the burden of 
proof under the statute and established the case at the contested case hearing. 
The findings of fact by the hearing examiner are based on substantial evidence, 
and the law properly was applied to those facts. The decision of the district 
court, affirming the decision of the hearing examiner, is 
affirmed.

  

 

FOOTNOTES

1The parties faithfully have reflected 
Sherman Harris as the party in this appeal, although it is clear from our 
previous opinion that the claim for benefits was prosecuted by his widow, Bonnie 
Harris. Matter of Harris, 900 P.2d 1163 (Wyo. 1995). Our reference to Harris 
includes the true party to the proceedings, Bonnie 
Harris.

2In 
Matter of Desotell, 767 P.2d 998 (Wyo. 1989), the statute was identified as WYO. 
STAT. § 27-12-604(b) (1977) (June 1983 Repl.). The same statute is now found at 
WYO. STAT. § 27-14-603(b) (1991), and the Desotell reasoning clearly is 
applicable.