Case Title: Cornish Town v. Koller

Citation: 758 P.2d 919

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1988-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
758 P.2d 919 (1988) CORNISH TOWN, a Utah municipal corporation, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant, v. Evan O. KOLLER and Marlene B. Koller, husband and wife, Defendants, Appellants, and Cross-Appellees. No. 19981. Supreme Court of Utah. July 20, 1988. George W. Preston, Logan, for defendants, appellants, and cross-appellees. Reed L. Martineau, Jody K. Burnett, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff, appellee and cross-appellant. HALL, Chief Justice: Cornish Town ("Cornish") initiated this action after a dispute arose over certain water rights and rights of way. Kollers counterclaimed for expenses associated with installing a waterline between Pearson Spring and their home. The case was tried to the court, without a jury. Thereafter, the court, ruling from the bench, entered findings of fact and conclusions of law providing in pertinent part: *921 Judgment was entered in accordance with these findings, and the parties brought their respective appeals. Kollers first argue on appeal that the trial court erred by finding that Cornish had the right to determine the point of connection of Kollers' culinary waterline with the Cornish water system. They claim their right to receive culinary water arises from a reservation in a deed given by Kollers' predecessors in interest (Pearsons) to Cornish wherein water rights in and to "one certain unnamed spring," now known as the Pearson Spring, were conveyed. Accordingly, Kollers contend that they are entitled to receive their water from the Pearson Spring and not Cornish's general culinary water supply. Cornish responds that the deed is silent concerning the location of the tap with the point of connection to Cornish's water system. The deed, wherein several members of the Pearson family granted "[a]ll the right, title and interest ... in all water and water rights in and to one certain unnamed spring," which is now known as Pearson Spring, contains the following provision: Resolution of this first issue requires construction of the grant. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1980) provides that water rights shall be transferred by deed in substantially the same manner as real estate, with an exception which is not relevant here. Accordingly, the rules governing the construction of deeds generally apply when construing an instrument conveying water rights.[1] The primary rule regarding construction of deeds is to give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the deed as a whole.[2] In this regard, we have stated that in the absence of ambiguity, the construction of a deed is a question of law for the court.[3] In such a case, we are not bound by the trial court's determination of the meaning of the writing.[4] In the instant case, the trial court concluded that Kollers' water right under the deed was not restricted "solely to the source of water of Pearson Spring." However, the plain language of the deed indicates that the grantors "reserved" in themselves the water rights indicated. By its very nature, a "reservation" is a clause in a deed or other instrument of conveyance by which the grantor creates and reserves to himself some right, interest, or profit relative to the estate granted. Ownership is one of the conditions which must exist as the basis of a valid reservation.[5] Since Kollers' predecessors in interest, the Pearsons, did not own the Cornish water system, the Pearsons could not have "reserved" to themselves rights to water from that system. Indeed, Cornish's brief appears to indicate that its water system was not even built at the time of the conveyance. Instead, the Pearsons must have "reserved" in themselves rights in the water which was the subject of the conveyance, namely, the water flowing from Pearson Spring. In view of this analysis, the arguments advanced by Cornish are unavailing. If Cornish did not desire to supply water under the deed from a specific source of water, it should not have accepted a deed containing this reservation. Accordingly, we find Kollers' first point to have merit, requiring a partial reversal of the judgment in this case. Kollers' next point is that the trial court erred by finding that the "Pearson *922 Spring water supply is not one single spring, but may be composed of several springs." Kollers' argument fails for several reasons. First, review of findings of fact is controlled by rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. To mount a successful challenge to trial court findings under that rule, an appellant must marshall the evidence supporting the trial court's findings. Only then can we determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous. Because Kollers have failed to make such a showing in this case, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed.[6] Second, Kollers have failed to provide the Court with the entire transcript of the proceedings below. This Court has repeatedly held that an appellant may not succeed on a claim of error when relevant portions of the record are not before us; in such a case, the proceedings before the trial court are presumed to support the trial court's findings.[7] For the above reasons, we find Kollers' second point to be without merit. Kollers' third point is that the trial court erred by dismissing their counterclaim. The trial court determined that Kollers were not entitled to recover on their counterclaim, which was brought to capture the cost of installing a new pipeline. Kollers installed the pipeline after Cornish advised them that it had no responsibility to replace the line. In ruling on the counterclaim from the bench, the trial court stated: *923 Kollers have not drawn the Court's attention to any evidence on this issue contradicting the trial court's perception thereon. Therefore, we find this point of Kollers' appeal to be without merit. Finally, Cornish in its cross-appeal contends that the trial court erred in failing to clarify the respective seasonal water rights of the parties and in concluding that Kollers held a one-fifth interest in the Pearson Spring. As support for these claims, Cornish argues that Kollers and their predecessors forfeited the disputed water right by the absence of any beneficial use thereof. Also, Cornish contends that Kollers should be equitably estopped from claiming the one-fifth interest by virtue of acquiescence to Cornish's use of all the Pearson Spring water in the town's construction and ongoing maintenance of its municipal waterworks. We disagree. Again, the designated record on appeal contains only a partial transcript of the proceedings involved.[8] Therefore, we are unable to review the evidence as a whole and must presume that the trial court's ruling was founded upon admissible, competent, and substantial evidence.[9] Furthermore, Cornish's claims appear predicated on our acceptance of its version of the testimony which was given and how the trial court should have perceived the circumstances as they existed. However, the facts Cornish advances in support of its arguments are chosen to the exclusion of other evidence in the partial record we have before us supporting the lower court's decision. Due to the trial court's advantaged position, the presumptions favor its judgment.[10] Where there is dispute and disagreement in the evidence, we assume that the trial court believed those aspects and fairly drew the inferences to be derived therefrom which gave its decision support.[11] To this end, the trial court did not find credible the evidence and testimony Cornish presented. Instead, the court viewed the evidence as supporting the determination that Kollers maintained a one-fifth interest in the water from Pearson Spring and that the watering period runs as specified. Given the record before us and the facts of this case, these determinations do not merit reversal herein. Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party to bear its own costs. HOWE, Associate C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. [1] See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1980); see also 93 C.J.S. Waters § 190, at 986 (1956). [2] Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1982); Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979). [3] Hartman, 596 P.2d at 656. [4] See id. [5] See id. at 656-57. [6] See Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah 1987). [7] Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498, 498 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1984); see In re Cluff's Estate, 587 P.2d 128, 128 n. 1 (Utah 1978); see also Union Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Kakaako, 5 Haw. App. 146, 149-153, 682 P.2d 82, 86-88 (1984), reconsideration granted, 5 Haw. App. 683, 753 P.2d 253. [8] See R. Utah S.Ct. 11(e)(2). [9] Id; see also Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 764-65 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). [10] Redevelopment Agency, 740 P.2d at 1301-02. [11] Id.