Case Title: State v. Fly

Citation: 348 N.C. 556

Docket Number: 472A97

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 472A97
FILED: 9 JULY 1998
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
MARK EDWARD FLY
On appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 127 N.C. App. 286, 488
S.E.2d 614 (1997), reversing a judgment entered by Helms, J., on
20 December 1995, in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.  Heard
in the Supreme Court on 10 February 1998.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Amy R.
Gillespie, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-
appellant.
Isabel Scott Day, Public Defender, by Julie Ramseur
Lewis, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant-
appellee.
MITCHELL, Chief Justice.
The evidence at trial tended to show that at about 7:30
a.m. on 26 July 1995, Barbara Glover was walking up the steps of
her condominium in Charlotte.  She rounded a turn on the stairs
and looked up to see defendant Mark Edward Fly, a twenty-eight-
year-old male, “mooning” her.  He was bent over at the waist,
with his short pants pulled down to his ankles.  He wore no other
clothing, except a baseball cap, which was backwards on his head. 
He was otherwise naked from his head to his feet.  Ms. Glover saw
what she described as defendant’s “fanny” or “his buttocks, the
crack of his buttocks.”  When she yelled at defendant, he pulled
his pants up and ran.  Ms. Glover ran after defendant to get a
-2-
description of his getaway vehicle -- a bicycle, which she
testified was “a real funky neon kind of color.”  The next
morning, she saw him outside on the bicycle looking up at her
condominium.  She called the police, who later detained defendant
for identification by Ms. Glover.  After she identified him, he
was arrested by the police, without a warrant, for indecent
exposure, in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9.  A magistrate’s
order was issued pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-511, finding probable
cause to detain defendant without a warrant for his arrest on a
charge of indecent exposure.  Defendant was found guilty of that
charge by the District Court, Mecklenburg County, and was
sentenced to sixty days’ imprisonment.  He appealed to the
Superior Court.
Defendant was tried de novo on 20 December 1995 in
Superior Court, Mecklenburg County.  At trial, defendant moved
for dismissal of the charge against him on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to show that he had exposed his private
parts.  In particular, defendant argued that buttocks are not
private parts within the meaning of the statute.  The motion was
denied, and the jury subsequently found defendant guilty.  The
trial court entered judgment sentencing defendant to sixty days’
imprisonment.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.  By a
divided panel, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. 
The majority in the Court of Appeals concluded that under
N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9, the term “private parts” includes only
genital organs and, therefore, that the exposure of buttocks is
-3-
not prohibited by the statute.  State v. Fly, 127 N.C. App. 286,
288, 488 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1997) (citing N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9
(1993) (effective 1 January 1995)).  Judge Walker stated in his
dissent that he would give a broader interpretation to the
statute to include buttocks within the definition of the phrase
“private parts.”  Id. at 289, 488 S.E.2d at 616.
On 27 September 1997, the State gave notice of appeal
as a matter of right to this Court based on Judge Walker’s
dissent in the Court of Appeals.  Additionally, on 15 January
1998, the State filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking
to have this Court consider an additional argument, that
defendant’s private parts were exposed because the evidence
tended to show that at the time defendant’s buttocks were
exposed, his genitals were also exposed.  This reasoning was not
advanced by the dissent in the Court of Appeals.
Initially, we address whether the State can present an
argument before this Court that was not the basis of the dissent
below.  In State v. Kaley, 343 N.C. 107, 468 S.E.2d 44 (1996), we
said the “State can argue in this Court any evidence that
supports [the dissent’s] premise.  It is not limited to arguing
the reasons in the dissent as to why there was evidence to
support the charge.”  Id. at 110, 468 S.E.2d at 46.  Thus,
because the dissent in this case was based on the premise that
there was sufficient evidence to support the charge of indecent
exposure, the State should not be limited to arguing solely that
buttocks are private parts.  Accordingly, the State is free here
to argue any reasoning it wishes in support of the proposition
-4-
that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s
conviction, as that is the issue on appeal before this Court. 
Since no writ of certiorari is necessary to permit the State to
make such arguments, its petition for writ of certiorari is
hereby denied.
The question presented by the State’s appeal is whether
the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of indecent
exposure for insufficiency of the evidence.  The elements of the
offense are (1) the willful exposure, (2) of private parts of
one’s person, (3) in a public place, (4) in the presence of one
or more persons of the opposite sex.  N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9.  The
majority in the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the
basis that the evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s
conviction because buttocks are not private parts within the
meaning of the statute.
The State’s witness, Ms. Glover, testified that
defendant was bent over and was naked from head to foot, although
he was wearing a baseball cap and shorts that were around his
ankles.  During direct examination, the following colloquy took
place:
THE COURT:  Now, exactly what parts of
his anatomy did you see or experience?
[MS. GLOVER:]  His buttocks, the crack of his
buttocks.  He’s real pasty white.  He doesn’t
have a tan line at all.
-5-
Ms. Glover testified that defendant was about four feet in front
of her and that “if I would have reached out, I probably could
have touched him.”
The State argues that the evidence was sufficient to
survive defendant’s motion to dismiss because it is undisputed
that defendant was naked from head to foot and that by definition
defendant’s private parts were exposed, regardless of whether
Ms. Glover actually saw them.  We agree.
It appears that in the present case, the Court of
Appeals based its holding upon a misreading of State v. Jones,
7 N.C. App. 166, 171 S.E.2d 468 (1970).  In Jones, the Court of
Appeals discussed the meaning of the phrase “private parts” as
used in another statute, N.C.G.S. § 14-190 (1969) (repealed
1971).  It concluded that the phrase as used in that statute,
since repealed, included only the genital organs.  Jones, 7 N.C.
App. at 169, 171 S.E.2d at 469.  As a result, the court held in
Jones that “the exposure by a female of her breasts to the public
view in a public place is not an offense under [former] G.S.
14-190.”  Id. at 169-70, 171 S.E.2d at 469.  The definition
applied by the court in Jones is too narrow to be historically
correct and complete.  For example, The American Heritage
Dictionary defines “private parts” as “[t]he external organs of
sex and excretion.”  The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 1442 (3d ed. 1992).  We agree and conclude that
in common law and as used in former N.C.G.S. § 14-190, the phrase
“private parts” included both the external organs of sex and of
excretion.
-6-
In the present case, the Court of Appeals erroneously
concluded that the legislature’s use of the term “private parts”
when it enacted “section 14-190.9 is particularly significant in
the face of . . . [the Court of Appeals’ prior] decision in Jones
because it reflects a satisfaction with that Court’s definition
of ‘private parts’ as a person’s ‘genital organs.’”  Fly, 127
N.C. App. at 288 n.1, 488 S.E.2d at 615 n.1.  The majority in the
Court of Appeals, however, failed to note that the legislature
quickly reacted to the decision in Jones in the very act which
repealed former N.C.G.S. § 14-190 and which first enacted
N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9.  There, the legislature expressly and
unequivocally stated its intent that “[e]very word, clause,
sentence, paragraph, section, or other part of this act shall be
interpreted in such manner as to be as expansive as the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of North
Carolina permit.”  Act of June 17, 1971, ch. 591, sec. 2, 1971
N.C. Sess. Laws 519 (adding new section 14-190.9 prohibiting
indecent exposure and repealing N.C.G.S. § 14-190).  However, the
legislature later amended N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9 by adding
subsection (b) providing that:  “Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a woman may breast feed in any public or
private location where she is otherwise authorized to be,
irrespective of whether the nipple of the mother’s breast is
uncovered during or incidental to the breast feeding.”  Act of 7
July 1993, ch. 301, sec. 1, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 586, 587.  In
footnote 1 of its opinion in the present case, the majority of
the Court of Appeals simply misread the legislative history and
-7-
the specifically expressed intent of the legislature which
repealed the former statute and adopted N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9.
We have already concluded that the phrase “private
parts” includes the external organs of sex and excretion.  On the
facts of this case, it is unnecessary for us to determine what,
if any, other parts of the female or male anatomy may be included
within the phrase “private parts,” as used in N.C.G.S. §
14-190.9, in light of the legislature’s expressed preference for
an “expansive” interpretation.  However, given the posture of
this case, we think it wise to note our agreement with the
conclusion of the majority below that buttocks are not private
parts within the meaning of the statute.  To hold that buttocks
are private parts would make criminals of all North Carolinians
who appear in public wearing “thong” or “g-string” bikinis or
other such skimpy attire during our torrid summer months.  Our
beaches, lakes, and resort areas are often teeming with such
scantily clad vacationers.  We simply do not believe that our
legislature sought to discourage a practice so commonly engaged
in by so many of our people when it enacted N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9. 
To make such attire criminal by an overly expansive reading of
the term “private parts” was not, we are convinced, the intent of
our legislature.  The difference, however, between defendant’s
conduct and someone wearing a bikini is that the former is a
clear-cut violation of recognized boundaries of decency, which
the statute was intended to address, whereas the latter is a 
-8-
matter of taste, which we do not believe our legislators intended
to make criminal.
In the present case, the jury could reasonably find
from the evidence that defendant had exposed private parts,
either his anus, his genitals, or both.  We held under former
N.C.G.S. § 14-190 that “‘[i]t is not essential to the crime of
indecent exposure that someone shall have seen the exposure
provided it was intentionally made in a public place and persons
were present who could have seen if they had looked.’”  State v.
King, 268 N.C. 711, 712, 151 S.E.2d 566, 567 (1966) (quoting 33
Am. Jur. Lewdness, Indecency and Obscenity § 7, at 19 (1941)). 
Likewise, the current statute does not require that private parts
be exposed to a member of the opposite sex before the crime is
committed, but rather that they be exposed “in the presence of” a
member of the opposite sex.  N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9 (emphasis
added).  The statute does not go to what the victim saw but to
what defendant exposed in her presence without her consent. 
Thus, the fact that Ms. Glover did not crane her neck or
otherwise change her position in an attempt to see more of
defendant’s anatomy than he had already thrust before her face
does not defeat the charge of indecent exposure.  Defendant’s
exposure was indecent within the meaning of the statute and is
among the acts the legislature intended to proscribe.
Furthermore, the willfulness of defendant’s act
distinguishes the exposure of his private parts from situations
in which such exposure is unintended and incidental to a
necessary activity.  Here, defendant willfully exposed his
-9-
private parts in the presence of a member of the opposite sex,
apparently for the shock value of the act and its hoped-for
effect on Ms. Glover.  He succeeded in that endeavor.  Even in a
society where all boundaries of common decency seem frequently
under assault, it is simply unacceptable for a person to harass
others by willfully exposing in their presence “those private
parts of the person which instinctive modesty, human decency, or
common propriety require shall be customarily kept covered in the
presence of others.”  State v. Galbreath, 69 Wash. 2d 664, 668,
419 P.2d 800, 803 (1966).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for
indecent exposure and that the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court.  The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed, and this case is remanded to that court for its
further remand to the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, for
reinstatement of its judgment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.