Case Title: DONALD LEE ROLLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0086

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
DONALD LEE ROLLE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 100236 P.3d 259Case Number: S-09-0086Decided: 07/16/2010
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2010
DONALD LEE ROLLE,

Appellant(Defendant),

v.
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District Court of 
Natrona CountyThe Honorable W. 
Thomas Sullins, Jud

Representing Appellant:
Michael H. Reese, Contract Appellate Counsel, of 
Michael H. Reese, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee:
Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. 
Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Smith.
Before KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, 
and BURKE, JJ.
*Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.
VOIGT, Justice.
[¶1]      Donald Lee Rolle 
(the appellant) seeks to overturn his convictions for first-degree murder, 
felony murder, and kidnapping.  He asserts numerous claims of error. 
 Finding no abuse of discretion or prejudicial error, we affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2]      1.   Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted certain uncharged 
misconduct evidence?
            
2.   Did the district court commit plain error when it did not give a 
limiting instruction immediately after the introduction of the uncharged 
misconduct evidence, but rather waited until the close of evidence, when defense 
counsel requested the instruction?
            
3.   Did a question asked by the jury, and the judge's response 
thereto, result in a fatal variance, an improper instruction by the judge, or 
indicate that there was insufficient evidence to support a first-degree murder 
conviction?
4.   Was the appellant's defense counsel 
  ineffective?
5.   Did cumulative error 
  occur?
FACTS
[¶3]      On the evening of 
November 3, 2007, the appellant and Jennifer Randel went to Butch's Bar in 
Evansville, Wyoming.  The appellant and Ms. Randel were together despite 
the fact that the appellant had been ordered, as a condition of his probation, 
not to have contact with Ms. Randel.  Witnesses said that at one point the 
appellant attempted to initiate a physical altercation with another patron, but 
was restrained by bouncers.  Shortly thereafter, the appellant and Ms. 
Randel left the bar, with a witness hearing the appellant say to Ms. Randel "get 
the f[---] up let's go, we're getting the f[---] out of here."  Ms. 
Randel's response was "why, what did I do wrong."
[¶4]      At approximately 
9:34 p.m., that same night, a 911 call was received from Ms. Randel stating she 
was being held against her will in the appellant's vehicle.  At one point 
during the call, there were sounds of a struggle and then Ms. Randel stated "you 
are going to kill me."  Later, a male voice identified as that of the 
appellant stated, "I'm going to cut your f[------] eyes out."  The call 
lasted approximately nine minutes, then ended abruptly.  Local law 
enforcement attempted to find Ms. Randel throughout the evening with no 
success.
[¶5]      The next morning, 
a local rancher reported a vehicle stuck off an unimproved dirt road in a remote 
portion of Natrona County.  Law enforcement responded and discovered the 
appellant's truck, with the appellant outside the vehicle with blood on his 
clothing.  When the appellant saw the officers, he retreated to his vehicle 
and the officers observed the appellant begin to slash at his wrists.  The 
officers eventually removed the appellant from his vehicle and detained him. 
 Inside the vehicle they found the body of Ms. Randel, who was 
deceased.

[¶6]      An autopsy showed 
that Ms. Randel had suffered numerous abrasions, contusions, and lacerations. 
 Ms. Randel also suffered a stab wound in the back of her neck, multiple 
defensive wound1 cuts on her hands, 
two rib fractures, a broken nose, and bruises across her limbs.  However, 
the most serious trauma was to Ms. Randal's head.  There was swelling and 
extensive bruising and lacerations resulting from "many, many blows" to the head 
and neck.  Additionally, patches of hair had been pulled from Ms. Randel's 
scalp, and her body showed signs of manual strangulation.  The autopsy 
revealed that Ms. Randel died from swelling of the brain resulting from blunt 
force trauma to the head.

[¶7]      The appellant was 
tried and convicted by a jury of premeditated first-degree murder, felony 
murder, and kidnapping.  The appellant timely appealed from those 
convictions.  We will affirm.
DISCUSSION
Did the district court abuse 
its discretion when it admitted certain uncharged misconduct 
evidence?
[¶8]      The 
admissibility of evidence of uncharged misconduct must be determined within the 
confines of W.R.E. 404(b), which rule reads as follows:
(b)    Other crimes, wrongs, or 
  acts. ? Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
  prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
  therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
  motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
  absence of mistake or accident . . . .
The test that district courts must follow when 
determining the proper application of this rule and admissibility of uncharged 
misconduct evidence was adopted in Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 357 (Wyo. 1996), 
holding modified by Howard v. State, 42 P.3d 483, 484 (Wyo. 2002), and 
later articulated as follows:
Admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b) is not limited to 
  the purposes set forth in the rule, and we have adopted a liberal approach 
  toward admitting uncharged misconduct evidence.  The listed exceptions 
  are illustrative rather than exclusive.  Nevertheless, because uncharged 
  misconduct evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice, we have also 
  adopted a mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility: (1) the evidence 
  must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) 
  the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by 
  its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court must 
  instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for 
  the proper purpose for which it was admitted.  We do not apply this test 
  on appeal; rather, it is intended to be conducted by the trial 
  court.
. . . .
For proper appellate review of the admissibility of 
  evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the record must reflect that the trial court 
  required the State not only to identify the proper purpose for which uncharged 
  misconduct evidence is being offered, but also to explain how or why it is 
  probative, and why it is more probative than prejudicial. . . .  To make 
  sure there is no doubt in the future that this is a required process, we will 
  repeat it now, in the body of this opinion:
In determining the probative 
  value of prior bad acts evidence, the trial court should consider the 
  following factors:
1.    How clear is it that the 
  defendant committed the prior bad act?

2.    Does the 
  defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the prior bad 
  acts evidence?

3.    Is other evidence 
  available?
4.    Is the evidence unnecessarily 
  cumulative?
5.    How much time has elapsed 
  between the charged crime and the prior bad act?
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it tempts the 
  jury to decide the case on an improper basis.  In balancing against its 
  probative value the unfair prejudice created by the evidence, the trial court 
  should consider the extent to which the evidence distracts the jury from the 
  central question whether the defendant committed the charged crime.  The 
  trial court should weigh these additional factors against the probative value 
  of the evidence:
1.    The reprehensible nature of 
  the prior bad act. The more reprehensible the act, the more likely the jury 
  will be tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act.
2.    The sympathetic character of 
  the alleged victim of the prior bad act.  Again, the jury will be tempted 
  to punish the defendant for the prior act if the victim was especially 
  vulnerable.
3.    The similarity between the 
  charged crime and the prior bad act.  The more similar the acts, the 
  greater is the likelihood that the jury will draw the improper inference that 
  if the defendant did it once, he probably did it again.
4.    The comparative enormity of 
  the charged crime and the prior bad act.  When the prior act is a more 
  serious offense than the charged crime, the introduction of that act will tend 
  to place the defendant in a different and unfavorable light.
5.    The comparable relevance of 
  the prior bad act to the proper and forbidden inferences.  Evidence of 
  the prior bad act may be much more probative of bad character than it is of 
  any legitimate inference permitted by Rule 404(b).
6.    Whether the prior act resulted 
  in a conviction.  The jury may be tempted to punish the defendant if they 
  believe he escaped punishment for the prior bad act.

Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶¶ 18, 27, 57 P.3d 332, 340, 342-43 (Wyo. 
2002) (citations omitted).2  

[¶9]      Our standard of 
review when examining a district court's determination concerning the 
admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence is as follows:

We review claims of error concerning the improper 
  admission of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence for abuse of discretion and will not 
  reverse the trial court's decision absent a clear abuse.  Thomas v. 
  State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 10, 
  131 P.3d 348, 352 (Wyo. 2006). 
   A trial court abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably 
  concluded as it did.  Id.  In this context, 
  "reasonably" means sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
  the circumstances and without being arbitrary or capricious.  
  Id.

Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 1202, 1206-07 (Wyo. 
2007).  Even if we 
determine that a district court abused its discretion in improperly allowing 
admission of uncharged misconduct evidence, and thus the evidence was admitted 
in error, we must also determine whether the error was prejudicial.  
Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1999).  "Error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable 
possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if 
the error had not been made."  Vigil v. State, 2010 WY 15, ¶ 11, 224 P.3d 31, 36 (Wyo. 
2010).

[¶10]   Prior to trial, the appellant filed 
a demand for notice of the State's intent to use uncharged misconduct evidence, 
and the appropriate hearing was held.  Following the hearing, the district 
court issued a decision letter specifically addressing each item of uncharged 
misconduct evidence.  The district court excluded certain items proffered 
by the State; however, it also determined that much of the uncharged misconduct 
evidence noticed by the State would be admissible.
[¶11]   The appellant now argues that 
"[t]he introduction of 404(b) evidence is but a smokescreen to have evidence of 
Mr. Rolle's propensity to assault women and men and otherwise be a person with 
violent tendencies and consequently he should be convicted of first degree 
murder."  While the appellant makes broad assertions of error and discusses 
the general dangers associated with the admission of uncharged misconduct 
evidence, in his appellate argument he only specifically takes exception to the 
testimony of one individualD.G.  D.G. was one of the appellant's former 
girlfriends.  In his brief, the appellant claims:
In this case the prejudice is so clear that the 
  jury could generalize from the testimony of just [D.G.] that [the appellant] 
  is prone to violence and is highly and physically abusive, although her 
  testimony would suggest only when drinking.  Such testimony infers 
  violent predisposition because which [sic] effectively negates the presumption 
  of innocence.
[¶12]   The State responds that the 
district court took great care to analyze every piece of evidence individually 
under the Gleason/Vigil test, relying heavily on prior precedent that 
recognized similar evidence as admissible under 404(b).  The State then 
argues that if the authority relied upon by the district court is still good 
today, then surely the district court did not abuse its discretion by following 
that precedent.
[¶13]   In order to determine whether the 
district court abused its discretion in allowing D.G.'s testimony, we must 
examine the nature of the testimony as presented to the district court.  
The appellant did not object at trial to the admission of D.G.'s testimony, 
therefore we will examine the testimony as proffered in the State's Notice of 
Intent to Offer Evidence Pursuant to Rule 404(b).  Before examining the 
proffer, we note that with the exception of evidence the district court refused 
to allow, D.G.'s in-court testimony was consistent with the State's 
proffer.  The State described D.G.'s proposed testimony as follows: 

            
  [D.G.] was in an intimate relationship with [the appellant] from February, 
  1992 to February, 1994 and again from approximately December of 1994 to 
  December of 1995.  In interviews with police, [D.G.] described an 
  incident during the first time she was with [the appellant] when she and [the 
  appellant] had been at a local business when a man who had hung a door for her 
  said hello to her.  [The appellant] went into a jealous rage and 
  assaulted the man for no apparent reason.  In the summer of 1993, [the 
  appellant] became angry when he had been drinking because [D.G.] and her 
  children would not ride with him.  While at [D.G.]'s home he grabbed her 
  by the neck and began choking her then pushed her into the bathtub causing her 
  to strike her head.  On January 13, 1994, [D.G.] became involved in an 
  argument with [the appellant].  [The appellant] repeatedly told [D.G.] to 
  hit him.  She did eventually and then [the appellant] called the 
  police.  As [D.G.] left the room, [the appellant] punched her in the back 
  of the head.  [A police officer] responded to the call and arrested both 
  of the parties and found a knot on the back of [D.G.]'s head.  [The 
  appellant] was convicted of battery but the conviction was reversed due to 
  technical issues with the charging document.  Thereafter, [the appellant] 
  entered a plea of guilty to the charge and adopted the supporting documents in 
  the case as factual basis.  [The appellant] admitted during the trial 
  that he had pushed [D.G.] but could not explain how a push resulted in a goose 
  egg on the back of [D.G.]'s neck. Attachment 25.  [D.G.'s] . . . son, saw 
  [the appellant] punch her in the back of the head.  He also observed that 
  [the appellant] was often verbally abusive to both himself and [D.G.].  
  See Attachment 26.
            
  [D.G.] would also testify that during times they were apart [the appellant] 
  would destroy her property.  There was insufficient evidence at the time 
  to prosecute but [the appellant] later admitted to [D.G.] that he was 
  responsible for the damage.  Jennifer Randel experienced similar problems 
  with [the appellant] throughout their relationship.  On February 25, 
  1994, and on other occasions, [the appellant] contacted [D.G.] in violation of 
  court orders.  She reported further damage to her vehicles on February 
  18, 1996, and reported that [the appellant] had admitted past acts of 
  vandalism.  See Attachment 27.  The second incident occurred just 
  after she had applied for an order of protection similar to Randel's.  He 
  left notes in a mailbox calling her a slut.  He harassed her when she was 
  out in public.  Finally, in December of 1995, he began cursing her and 
  finally kicked her out of the car on the interstate.  He then proceeded 
  to drive the vehicle at her and the children. . . .  Even his dog wasn't 
  exempt from [the appellant]'s abuse.  He would beat the dog until it 
  bled.  [D.G.] report[ed] instances of verbal and physical abuse, as well 
  as property destruction in the 1996 affidavit.  To this day, [D.G.] is 
  terrified by [the appellant].
The State argued for the admissibility of D.G.'s 
testimony as follows:
The [appellant] is fond of portraying Jennifer 
  Randel as a crazy woman who he was victimized by on multiple occasions. . . . 
   However, the [appellant]'s claims of being the victim of Randel as the 
  first aggressor and his claim of accident make his relationships with other 
  women particularly relevant to intent, motive and lack of mistake.  In 
  fact, this is how [the appellant] has presented himself since 1989 in his 
  relationships. . . . 
. . . .
More specifically regarding D.G.'s testimony, the 
State contended:
The similarities between the situations and 
  Jennifer Randel and [D.G.] are persuasive evidence of [the appellant]'s motive 
  and intent as well as a clear repudiation of his ridiculous story that he is 
  somehow a victim and that his murder of Jennifer Randel was an accident. . . . 
   [D.G.] described how [the appellant] would provoke an attack so he could 
  strike back. 
[¶14]   The district court addressed the 
admissibility of D.G.'s proposed testimony in its decision letter:
The State of Wyoming's notices and supplemental 
  notices of uncharged misconduct evidence also includes a listing of evidence 
  concerning relationships of [the appellant] with women other than Jennifer 
  Randel, and instances of threats, assaults, and destruction of property 
  allegedly perpetrated by [the appellant] against those women.  The other 
  crimes, wrongs, or acts listed in this category are reported to have occurred 
  from 1989 to 1996.  The listed evidence includes a variety of conduct 
  attributable to [the appellant], with several of the incidents lacking facts 
  comparable to the alleged kidnapping and homicide in this case, but a number 
  of incidents being factually comparable to the alleged events of November 2007 
  involving Jennifer Randel.
Evidence of specific acts of violence may generally 
  be admissible in a homicide case.  Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Wyo. 1981). 
   In the case of Johnson v. State, 936 P.2d 458, 465 (Wyo. 1997), 
  evidence of a defendant's prior assault of a live-in girlfriend was held to be 
  probative of the charged assault on a current girlfriend because it suggested 
  that he was violent toward the women with whom he lived.  Perhaps even 
  more applicable to the situation hereunder review, is the case of Moore v. 
  State, [2003 WY 153, ¶¶ 
  18-23,] 80 P.3d [191,] 196-197 [(Wyo. 2003)], wherein the Wyoming Supreme 
  Court held that evidence of a defendant's prior abuse of a kidnapping victim 
  was admissible to show that the defendant intended to control the actions of 
  the victims and that he was capable of carrying out the threats he made to his 
  victims.  Finally, it is noted that case law indicates that uncharged 
  misconduct directed toward a previous wife may be admitted for a proper 
  purpose when the assaultive conduct is comparable to the situation for which 
  the defendant is standing trial.  Sandy v. State, 870 P.2d 352, 357 (Wyo. 
  1994).
Although the above-cited legal authorities 
  generally support the allowance of uncharged misconduct evidence similar to 
  that noticed in the third category hereunder review, it is still necessary 
  that the proper analysis be undertaken pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming 
  Rules of Evidence.  In making the required analysis, the court is mindful 
  of dangers of admitting such evidence and skeptical of its necessity, but 
  should be willing to admit it when it is offered for a proper purpose that is 
  material and not unduly prejudicial.  Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 28, 37 (Wyo. 
  1999).
The prosecution asserts that the noticed evidence 
  of other wrongs, crimes or acts in the designated third category is offered to 
  show motive, intent, course of conduct, and to rebut any claim of mistake or 
  accident.  The court would agree that the identified acts, as summarized 
  in the State of Wyoming's notices concerning evidence of [the appellant]'s 
  assaults on other women are proposed for introduction for proper purposes. The 
  use of such evidence concerning a defendant's relationship with other women 
  has been introduced in Wyoming cases for such purposes.  Kenyon v. 
  State, [2004 WY 100, ¶ 
  24,] 96 P.3d 1016, 1026 (Wyo. 
  2004); and Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 918 (Wyo. 
  2000).  More specifically, as noted in the case of Johnston v. 
  State, 936 P.2d 458 (Wyo. 
  1997), evidence of domestic conflict may be proper to show motive regarding 
  the charged crimes. In any event, the noted instances of [the appellant]'s 
  threats, assaults, and destruction of property directed towards other women 
  are offered for proper purposes in this case.
As with the testing of the other categories of 
  noticed uncharged misconduct evidence in this case, it is necessary for the 
  court to determine whether that evidence is more probative than prejudicial 
  considering the Gleason factors.  The following is this court's 
  analysis in evaluating the probative value of the noticed other acts evidenced 
  in this category and the weighing of the additional facts against the 
  probative value of such evidence:
a.   Factors re: 
Probative Value of Prior Acts Evidence.
1.    How clear is it that the 
  defendant committed the prior acts? It is clear that there is proposed direct 
  testimony to indicate that [the appellant] committed the uncharged misconduct 
  in this category.  The submittals of the prosecution assert that 
  testimony will be presented by eye witnesses to the listed incidents.  
  Additionally, there are corroborative statements and documentation of several 
  of the prior acts listed by the State of Wyoming in this category.
2.    Does the defendant dispute the 
  issue on which the State is offering the prior acts evidence?  It does 
  appear that the defense disputes the issues of intent, motive, and absence of 
  mistake or accident upon which the State of Wyoming is offering the noticed 
  other acts evidenced in this category.
3.    Is other evidence 
  available?  As previously noted, there is some other proposed evidence 
  relating to the issues of intent, motive, and absence of mistake or accident, 
  but it is difficult to quantify such other evidence based upon the information 
  provided.
4.    Is the evidence unnecessarily 
  cumulative?  Some of the proposed evidence in this category may be 
  cumulative to some degree, but it would not appear that the evidence as 
  outlined in the State of Wyoming's listing would be unnecessarily 
  cumulative.
5.    How much time has elapsed 
  between the charged crime and the prior acts?  The prior acts in this 
  category occurred between 1989 to 1999. . . .  The alleged assaultive 
  behavior of [the appellant] directed at [D.G.] is alleged to have occurred in 
  the time frame from 1993 to 1995. . . .  With the exception of the 
  alleged assaultive behavior of 1989, it does not appear that the subject acts 
  in this category are overly remote to the charged crime in this 
  case.
b.   Additional Facts 
to Weigh Against theProbative Value of the Prior Acts 
Evidence.
1.    The reprehensible nature of 
  the prior acts.  The noticed uncharged misconduct evidence in this 
  category would be classified as reprehensible in nature.  Several of the 
  noticed factual matters, however, would not be of such seriousness to conclude 
  that a jury would be tempted to punish the defendant for such other 
  acts.  An exception to this finding would be the reprehensible nature of 
  the allegations relating to [the appellant]'s conviction for possession of a 
  sawed-off rifle in the State of Montana given the alarming nature of such 
  offense.
2.    The sympathetic character of 
  the alleged victim of the prior acts.  There would be some component of 
  sympathy relative to the alleged victims of the noticed 404(b) evidence in 
  this category.
3.    The similarity between the 
  charged crimes and the prior acts.  There are several similarities 
  between the alleged other acts and the identified evidence in the events 
  surrounding the kidnapping and homicide charged in this case.  Such 
  similarities include the allegations of [the appellant]'s assaultive behavior, 
  threatening statements, and violation of protective orders.  Several of 
  the asserted prior acts in this category, however, including [the appellant]'s 
  description of [his ex-wife], the alleged assault of [the appellant] on a door 
  repairman that said hello to [D.G.], and the alleged abuse by [the appellant] 
  of his dog, would not have any substantial similarity to the charged crimes in 
  this case.
4.    The comparative enormity of 
  the charged crimes and the prior acts.  The alleged prior acts in this 
  category are substantially less serious than the charged crimes in this 
  case.
5.    The comparative relevance of 
  the prior acts to the proper and forbidden inferences.  Generally, the 
  proposed uncharged misconduct evidence in this category is comparably relevant 
  to the proper and legitimate purposes of proving motive, intent, and absence 
  of mistake or accident.  Exceptions to this finding would be the noticed 
  evidentiary items concerning [the appellant]'s description of [his ex-wife], 
  the alleged assault of [the appellant] on a door repairman that said hello to 
  [D.G.], and the alleged abuse by [the appellant] of his dog, which matters 
  would appear to have little comparative relevance.
6.    Whether the prior acts 
  resulted in a conviction.  The identified January 13, 1994 assault upon 
  [D.G.], and the 1999 possession of a sawed-off rifle in violation of an order 
  of protection issued to [another ex-girlfriend] are identified to have 
  resulted in convictions.  None of the other noticed crimes, wrongs, or 
  acts in this category resulted in any identified conviction.  
Giving consideration to the above-listed factors, 
  the court concludes that with the exceptions hereinafter noted, the evidence 
  of [the appellant]'s relationships with [two other individuals], and [D.G.], 
  including instances of threats, assaults, and destruction of property, as set 
  forth in the State of Wyoming's Rule 404(b) notices meets the admissibility 
  requirements under 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence.  

[¶15]   As can be seen, the district court 
earnestly endeavored to apply the Gleason/Vigil test.  It appears 
that the district court carefully examined and considered the proffered 
evidence, and then clearly and specifically stated that the evidence was 
properly admissible to show motive, intent, course of conduct, and to rebut any 
claim of mistake or accident.3  Additionally, in making that determination, the district court 
relied upon a number of cases wherein this Court determined that similar 
evidence was properly admissible.  Finally, the district court addressed 
the relevance and probative value of the evidence by examining those concepts 
within the framework established in our prior precedent.

[¶16]   The appellant does not claim that a 
procedural error occurred in the admission of the uncharged misconduct 
evidence.  Also, the appellant does not refute (or even discuss) any of the 
cases cited by the district court or otherwise assert that the evidence was not 
admitted for a proper purpose.  In fact, other than the general allegation 
quoted above regarding the prejudicial effect of the admission of D.G.'s 
testimony, the appellant undertakes no specific relevancy or prejudicial effect 
analysis.  See supra ¶ 11.
[¶17]   Our task in reviewing a district 
court's decision on the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence is to 
determine whether the district court abused its discretion, not to apply the 
Gleason/Vigil test anew.  Gleason, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d  at 340 
("We do not apply this test on appeal; rather, it is intended to be conducted by 
the trial court.").  When reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we are 
bound by the principle that "as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the 
trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on appeal."  
Leyva v. State, 2007 
WY 136, ¶ 17, 165 P.3d 446, 
452 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Wyo. 
2006)).  "It is well established that deference is given to a trial judge's 
rulings as to the admissibility of evidence; as long as there is some reasonable 
basis for his conclusions, this court will not second-guess him on 
appeal."  Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 101 (Wyo. 1981). 

[¶18]   Our review of the analysis 
undertaken and authority relied upon by the district court, as set forth in its 
decision letter, convinces us that the district court had a legitimate and 
reasonable basis for its ruling on the admissibility of [D.G.]'s testimony, as 
well as the other proposed evidence of uncharged misconduct.  Thus, we 
conclude that the uncharged misconduct evidence admitted in this case was 
admitted for one or more proper purpose under W.R.E. 404(b), that the district 
court adequately performed the pretrial analysis required by Gleason and 
Vigil to determine the relevance of the evidence, and that the district 
court properly balanced the probative nature of the evidence against its 
potential for unfair prejudice.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the evidence. 
Did the district court commit 
plain error when itdid not give a limiting instruction immediately 
afterthe introduction of the uncharged misconduct evidence,but rather 
waited until the close of evidence, whendefense counsel requested the 
instruction?
[¶19]   The appellant next argues that the 
district court committed plain error when it failed to give a limiting 
instruction both at the time the uncharged misconduct evidence was admitted and 
at the end of trial when instructing the jury.  We have previously reviewed 
a similar case under the plain error standard of review.  Connolly v. 
State, 610 P.2d 1008, 1011 
(Wyo. 1980) (district court failed to give a limiting instruction 
contemporaneous to the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence).  In 
Connolly, the focus of our analysis was on the second element of the plain 
error test; that is, whether the alleged error resulted in the transgression of 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  That will likewise be our focus 
here.
[¶20]   At the end of the district court's 
decision letter, quoted in part and discussed in the previous section of this 
opinion (see supra ¶ 14), the court made the following comment:
Upon request, the court will instruct the jury that 
  as to all uncharged misconduct evidence found to have met the criteria of Rule 
  404(b), it be considered only for the proper purpose or purposes for which it 
  is admitted.  Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 357 (Wyo. 
  1996).  It is requested that the parties, in advance of trial, submit for 
  the court's consideration all proposed limiting instructions concerning the 
  admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
At trial, no objection was made or limiting 
instruction requested or given regarding admissibility of the uncharged 
misconduct evidence.  At the end of trial, and at the beginning of the jury 
instruction conference, the court stated:
The Court notes for the record that in its decision 
  letter as to the 404(b) evidence proposed by the State, the Court did include 
  an advisement that it would give a limiting instruction at any time requested 
  by the Defense; and during the trial proceedings, I think I reiterated that 
  offer.  And it wasn't until the end of the case and the submittal of the 
  jury instructions that the Defense has requested the 404(b) instruction, and 
  that will be given as requested by the Defense.
[¶21]   The appellant now takes exception 
to the fact that no limiting instruction was given contemporaneously with the 
admission of the uncharged misconduct evidence, suggesting that a rule currently 
exists requiring dual instructions when admitting such evidence.  As 
support for this argument, the appellant points to a number of cases wherein 
federal courts required such a procedure.  For example, in United States 
v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 1988), the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated:
If evidence is admitted solely under the authority of 
Rule 404(b), the court must give a limiting instruction both at the time the 
evidence is admitted and in the general charge to minimize the danger that the 
jury might use the evidence as proof that the defendant acted in conformity with 
his past acts on the occasion for which he is being tried.

[¶22]   While this statement appears 
compelling at first blush, the appellant's use of the authority and accompanying 
argument is flawed.  All of the federal authority cited by the appellant 
predates the case of Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988).4  In Huddleston, the United States Supreme Court determined 
the protection afforded by F.R.E. 105, which rule only requires a limiting 
instruction to be given "upon request," was sufficient to guard against the 
possibility of undue prejudice created by the admission of uncharged misconduct 
evidence.  485 U.S.  at 691-92, 108 S. Ct.  at 1502.   Following 
Huddleston, the Tenth Circuit backed away from its mandatory 
requirement of both a contemporaneous limiting instruction and one at the close 
of the case.  In United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 
1989), the Tenth Circuit reviewed an appeal in which the appellant did not 
receive an additional limiting instruction at the close of evidence, only a 
contemporaneous instruction.  Id. at 1373.  On appeal, he 
claimed this was a violation of the rule articulated in the above-quoted 
Rivera case.  Id. at 1373-74.  The Tenth Circuit 
proceeded to review this rule in light of the Huddleston decision. 
 Id. at 1374.  The court determined that, as United States 
Supreme Court precedent, Huddleston was controlling and that "in the wake 
of Huddleston it is not error for a trial court to fail to instruct the 
jury . . . in the absence of a proper request by counsel."  Id. at 
1376.  As a result, the Tenth Circuit has stated that although the 
dual-limiting instruction method is the preferred method in the circuit, it is 
not mandatory.  United States v. Harrison, 942 F.2d 751, 760 (10th 
Cir. 1991).

[¶23]   Likewise, this Court rejected the 
dual-instruction requirement.  In Connolly v. State, 610 P.2d 1008 (Wyo. 1980), we found 
that the district court did not err in failing to give a limiting instruction 
following the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence where none was 
requested, stating:
To charge the trial court with the duty of 
  protecting defendant's right to receive a limiting instruction, thereby 
  relieving the attorney of that obligation, would be an exercise in 
  role-switching which we are not ready to condone, and which would, in any 
  case, be contrary to the procedural responsibilities contemplated by Rule 105, 
  W.R.E., . . . .
Id. at 1011.
¶24]   Given this federal and state 
precedent, we cannot say that it was error for the district court not to give a 
contemporaneous limiting instruction upon admission of uncharged misconduct 
evidence where none was requested.
Did a question asked by the 
jury, and the judge's response thereto, result in a fatal variance, an improper 
instruction by the judge, or indicate that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a first degree murder conviction?
[¶25]   The appellant raises three issues 
that he claims arise out of, or in relation to, a question submitted by the 
jury.  During deliberations, the jury sent the following question to the 
judge:

We, the jury, would appreciate any and all 
  information you could provide us with in assisting us in determining the 
  differences between 1st and 2nd degree 
  murder.  More specifically, a definition of "maliciously" and examples of 
  "pre-meditated malice."  Thank you for your consideration.  The 
  Jury.

In response to this question, the judge 
stated
I believe we're all in agreement that the jury 
  should be referred back to Instruction 10 with respect to the elements of 
  premeditated murder in the first degree and Instruction 15, the elements of 
  murder in the second degree.  And the jury will need to be governed by 
  those instructions in determining the differences.
1.         Did the 
instruction result in a fatal variance?
[¶26]
Two major precepts govern the law of 
  variances.  First, a variance occurs when the evidence presented at trial 
  proves facts different from those alleged in the information or 
  indictment.  Second, a variance is not fatal?that is, it does not require 
  reversal of a conviction?unless the appellant could not have anticipated from 
  the indictment or information what evidence would be admitted at trial, or the 
  conviction would not bar subsequent prosecution.
Spagner v. State, 2009 WY 12, ¶ 15, 200 P.3d 793, 800 (Wyo. 
2009).  The concept of a variance arises out of the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, as well as Article 1, Section 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution and W.R.Cr.P. 3, which provisions guarantee an accused the right to 
notice of the charges against him and a right for that notice sufficiently to 
inform him of the specific charges against which he must defend.  
Spagner, 2009 WY 12, ¶ 
10, 200 P.3d 793, 798-99.  
To ensure this right,
[t]hese constitutional provisions and the 
  procedural rule require that an information (1) contain the elements of the 
  offense charged; (2) fairly inform a defendant of the charges against which he 
  must defend; and (3) enable a defendant to plead an acquittal or conviction in 
  bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.
Id. at ¶ 10, at 799.  In interpreting these 
requirements, this Court has held "that an information is sufficient if it is 
in the words of the statute.'"  Id. at ¶ 11, at 799.
[¶27]   "Because the right to notice of 
criminal charges is of constitutional magnitude and the determination on the 
adequacy of the notice is a question of law, we review the issue de 
novo."  Id. at ¶ 10, at 799.

[¶28]   Without citing any supporting 
authority, the appellant points to the jury's question and states: 
 "Confusion is certainly one of those considerations this Court considers 
when discussing whether a variance is applicable because the jury did not 
understand the jury instructions which interfered with its ability to properly' 
understand the separate elements of each crime" and "this discrepancy between 
the evidence and jury instruction is a proper reflection of what a variance 
means."  The appellant is attempting to argue the existence of a variance 
where the facts clearly do not support such.5  The Information here was drafted in the words of the statute. 
 Additionally, the Information identified the approximate location, 
approximate time frame, and the specific victim of this crime. 
 Consequently, the appellant was fully and fairly informed of the charges 
and, if acquitted, was subject to a bar of future prosecutions for the death of 
Jennifer Randel.  At trial, the State continued on this course and 
presented evidence showing that the appellant purposely and with premeditated 
malice killed Jennifer Randel sometime between November 3, 2007, and November 4, 
2007, in Natrona County, Wyoming.  The jury's question and possible 
confusion had no bearing on the adequacy of the notice provided to the appellant 
of the charges against him, nor did it indicate that the evidence at trial 
demonstrated facts different from those alleged in the information.  No 
variance occurred here.

2.         Did the 
district court fail properly to instruct the 
jury?
[¶29]   As described above, the jury sent 
the judge a question asking for clarification on the difference between 
first-degree and second-degree murder.  See supra ¶ 25. 
 Specifically, the jury asked the judge to define "maliciously" and to give 
examples of pre-mediated malice.  In response, the judge directed the jury 
to the instructions setting forth the elements of those crimes and stated that 
the jury would need to be governed by those instructions in determining the 
difference.  The appellant now asserts that the judge improperly answered 
the jury's question and that this error interfered with the jury's ability to 
understand or examine the separate elements of each crime.  He summarizes 
his argument as follows:
The jury requested a definition of "maliciously" 
  and was not provided such a definition other than to refer to the definition 
  of "malice."  The jury reasonably confused the two terms.  By 
  directing the jury to a definition embodied in the statute of First Degree 
  Murder the Court has in fact left the jury with no room to maneuver and so the 
  guilty verdict in the first degree was logical inference in the chain of first 
  degree inferences.
[¶30]   Our standard of review when 
examining jury instructions is as follows:
[W]hen an appellant does not object at trial to the 
  jury instructions . . . our review of this issue follows our plain error 
  standard:
First, the record must clearly present the 
    incident alleged to be error.  Second, appellant must demonstrate that 
    a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not 
    merely arguable, way.  Last, appellant must prove that he was denied a 
    substantial right resulting in material prejudice against 
  him.
Six v. State, 2008 WY 42, ¶ 12, 180 P.3d 912, 917 (Wyo. 
2008).  We review and analyze jury instructions as a whole and do not 
single out individual instructions or parts thereof. Id.  We give 
trial courts great latitude in instructing juries and "will not find reversible 
error in the jury instructions as long as the instructions correctly state the 
law and the entire set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were 
presented at the trial.'" Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 2001) 
(quoting Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 (Wyo. 1997)).  More specifically with regard to a 
judge's duty to respond to a jury question, we have said that "jury questions 
revealing confusion or a lack of understanding should be answered."  
Heywood v. State, 2007 WY 
149, ¶ 29, 170 P.3d 1227, 
1235 (Wyo. 2007).
[¶31]   We begin our discussion of this 
issue by noting that the jury's written question and the judge's response 
thereto are both clearly reflected in the record, thus satisfying the first 
prong of plain error analysis.  Next, we turn to whether a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated.  The error alleged by the appellant 
is that the judge failed to provide the jury with a definition of "maliciously." 
 Although made many years ago, the following statement by this Court is 
particularly pertinent to the issue presented here.  
We are cited to numerous cases where it has been 
  held that a failure of the court to state a pertinent legal principle, when it 
  has not been requested, is not error; as for instance, a failure to define the 
  terms, "malice," "reasonable doubt," or the like. But the distinction is 
  plain.  If counsel desire to have the jury instructed more in detail than 
  the court may deem necessary, they must ask for such instructions; otherwise 
  it is reasonable to presume they concurred with the court in the opinion that 
  the jury was sufficiently informed as to such matters.
Palmer v. State, 9 Wyo. 40, 49, 59 P. 793, 796 (1900).  After 
the judge responded to the jury's question by directing them to the instruction 
setting forth the elements of first-degree and second-degree murder, the 
appellant neither objected to the judge's response nor requested additional 
instruction.  Likewise, the jury did not present further questions.  
Thus, we can reasonably assume that the judge's response adequately addressed 
any confusion the jury may have had.
[¶32]   Although our analysis of this issue 
might well end here, because the jury's question expressed some level of 
confusion, we will briefly examine the issue further to ensure that the 
instructions sufficiently covered the issues presented at trial.  
Specifically, we will review whether the judge's failure to define "maliciously" 
was error under these circumstances.  We have said that "a trial court is 
under no obligation to define a statutory term unless the term carries a 
technical connotation different from its everyday meaning."  Ewing v. 
State, 2007 WY 78, ¶ 9, 157 P.3d 943, 946 (Wyo. 
2007).  "A term must only be defined if the correct legal definition is 
such a departure from ordinary meaning that the jury would misunderstand its 
application to the circumstances before it."  Id.  As used in 
this statute, the term "maliciously" does not appear to have any technical 
meaning beyond the definition of "malice" given in Instruction No. 13, or 
outside of its ordinary connotation:
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that "Malice" means 
    that the act(s) constituting the offense charged was/were done 
    intentionally, without legal justification or excuse or that the act(s) 
    was/were done in such a manner as to indicate hatred, ill-will, or hostility 
    towards another.
The common definition of "maliciously" is "given to, 
marked by, or arising from malice."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1367 (3d ed 1993).  Therefore, we conclude that the 
instructions accurately stated the law and sufficiently covered the issues 
presented at the trial.
3.         Was there 
sufficient evidence to support the first-degree murder 
conviction?
[¶33]   At the end of the previous two 
arguments, the appellant adds the following statement:  "In the alternative 
if this Court were to decide that no variance exists, we would submit that there 
is a lack of evidence to find [the appellant] guilty of murder in the first 
degree."  This comment is the extent of his argument on the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  We have "consistently refused to consider 
claims not supported by cogent argument or citation to pertinent legal 
authority."  Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41, ¶ 10, 203 P.3d 421, 424 (Wyo. 
2009).  We will follow that principle here.
Was the appellant's 
defense counsel ineffective?
[¶34]   "The issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel involves mixed questions of fact and law, and is reviewed 
de novo."  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 33, 193 P.3d 228, 241 (Wyo. 
2008).  The rules governing our review of trial counsel's 
effectiveness, which rules originate from the United States Supreme Court case 
of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), are as follows:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
  performance was deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made 
  errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed 
  the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show 
  that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires 
  showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 
  fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a defendant makes 
  both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
  resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
  unreliable.
Proffit, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 33, 193 P.3d  at 241. 
 When reviewing such claims "[w]e invoke a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all decisions within the 
bounds of reasonable professional judgment."  Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 (Wyo. 1987).  "The burden is upon the defendant to overcome 
this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the challenged action or 
failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial strategy." 
 Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo. 1992).  
[¶35]   Appellant contends his trial 
counsel was ineffective for:  (1) failing to request a limiting instruction 
regarding the State's uncharged misconduct evidence at the time that evidence 
was introduced; (2) failing to object to the content of the uncharged misconduct 
limiting instruction; and (3) failing to object to the qualifications of certain 
witnesses who were, or allegedly could have been, considered experts.  We 
will address each of the claims in turn.  
1.         Failure to request 
contemporaneous uncharged misconduct limiting 
instruction.
[¶36]   The appellant asserts that defense 
counsel was ineffective in failing to request a limiting instruction 
contemporaneously with the admission of the uncharged misconduct evidence.  
We have said "[c]ounsel may, as a matter of trial strategy, choose not to 
request a limiting instruction in order to avoid emphasizing the unfavorable 
evidence." Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1228 (Wyo. 
1997).  Furthermore, where the district court had no duty, absent a 
request, to fashion a limiting instruction we have held that "the decision to 
request, or refrain from requesting, a limiting instruction is a tactical 
decision that this court will not second guess."  Chapman v. State, 
2001 WY 25, ¶ 22, 18 P.3d 1164, 1174 (Wyo. 
2001).  
[¶37]   As discussed above, the district 
court was not required to give a contemporaneous limiting instruction.  
Before trial, defense counsel was informed by the district court that it would 
give a limiting instruction if requested.  Defense counsel was fully aware 
of which witnesses would be testifying to uncharged misconduct.  Although 
defense counsel never requested a contemporaneous limiting instruction, the 
instruction addressing the uncharged misconduct evidence given during the 
instructions phase was drafted and submitted by the appellant.  The 
appellant offers no evidence that the failure to request, or decision not to 
request, a contemporaneous limiting instruction was anything other than trial 
strategy to mitigate the effect of the uncharged misconduct evidence.  As 
such, we find that the appellant fails to overcome the strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance in this regard.
2.         Failure to 
object to content of limiting instruction. 
[¶38]   The appellant's next claim relates 
to defense counsel's failure to object to the adequacy of the limiting 
instruction regarding the uncharged misconduct evidence given to the jury at the 
end of the trial.  The instruction, drafted and submitted by the appellant, 
read as follows:
You have heard evidence about prior acts committed 
  by [the appellant] against Jennifer Randel, [and two other girlfriends]. 
   The Court permitted the State of Wyoming to introduce this evidence for 
  the purpose of showing the [appellant]'s motive, intent, the relationship of 
  the parties, lack of mistake or accident, and to show a course of conduct 
  between [the appellant] and Jennifer Randel.  You are hereby instructed 
  that you may not consider this as evidence of the [appellant]'s bad character 
  and that he acted in conformity therewith on the night of November 3rd and 
  4th, 2007.  You may only consider this evidence to bear on the issues of 
  the [appellant]'s motive, intent, the relationship of the parties, lack of 
  mistake or accident and to show a course of conduct between [the appellant] 
  and Jennifer Randel.

[¶39]   The appellant asserts that the 
instruction only applied to prior acts committed against Jennifer Randel and two 
other of the appellant's prior girlfriends.  The appellant then argues that 
other individuals testified to uncharged misconduct, and failure of the 
instruction specifically to include each of those individuals was prejudicial to 
the appellant because the jury could have reasonably assumed that other 
testimony was beyond the scope of the limiting instruction.  Although the 
appellant claims that defense counsel's failure to provide a more comprehensive 
jury instruction was prejudicial, he does not point to a single instance of 
uncharged misconduct evidence that was admitted, yet not covered by the limiting 
instruction.6  Therefore, 
the appellant fails in his burden to demonstrate how he was, or even could have 
been, prejudiced by his defense counsel's failure to object to the jury 
instruction.  Because we are unable to discern any prejudice arising from 
the instruction, it is unnecessary to address the matter further.  Floyd v. 
State, 2006 WY 135, ¶ 13, 144 P.3d 1233, 1238 (Wyo. 2006) 
("If we conclude that a defendant fails to satisfy the prejudice prong, we need 
not address the performance of counsel prong.").

3.         Failure to 
voir dire "expert" witnesses.
[¶40]   Finally, the appellant argues that 
defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the 
qualifications of certain witnesses who were, or allegedly could have been, 
considered experts.  The appellant argues that trial counsel should have 
challenged the credentials of the Crisis Intervention Services director (CIS 
director), who testified about patterns of behavior in domestic violence. 
 The appellant also argues that the person who transcribed the 911 call was 
not qualified to give expert opinion about certain sounds heard in the 911 
call.

[¶41]   An attorney's failure or refusal to 
voir dire an expert witness is not per se ineffective 
performance.  Saenz v. State, 103 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) 
("[N]either the rule nor the case law creates a presumption of error if counsel 
fails to request voir dire [of an expert witness]."); see also 
Kimbrough v. State, 886 So. 2d 965, 982 (Fla. 2004).  In order for the 
failure to voir dire an expert witness to constitute reversible 
ineffective assistance, the appellant bears the burden of showing the testimony 
would likely have been inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).  See 
Montez v. State, 2009 WY 17, 
¶¶ 23-26, 201 P.3d 434, 441-42 
(Wyo. 2009)7; see also Wright v. 
State, 765 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Minn. 2009).  Therefore, in addressing this 
claim, we must first determine if the expert testimony is "sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which 
it belongs," and only if the evidence fails that test should we determine 
"whether there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.'"  Williamson v. State, 994 So. 2d 1000, 1010-11 (Fla. 
2008) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 
2069).

[¶42]   When testifying, the CIS director 
explained her qualifications and experience, and then stated: 
Q.    Have you had occasion also to 
  testify about that in the courts of the State of Wyoming?
A.    Yes, I have.
Q.    Is that both civil and 
  criminal cases?
A.    Yes, sir.
Q.    Have you testified for both 
  the defense and the prosecution?
A.    Yes, sir.
Q.    In fact, have you been 
  qualified as an expert witness in this area in this court?
A.    In Natrona County District 
  Court with Judge Park, yes, sir.
On appeal, the appellant undertakes no effort to 
demonstrate that the CIS director would not have qualified as an expert under 
Daubert, or to demonstrate how defense counsel's failure to object to the 
expert testimony resulted in prejudice.  After our own review of the 
record, including the testimony as to the qualifications of the CIS director and 
the relevance of her testimony, we find that she was adequately qualified as an 
expert and that her testimony was such that it assisted the jury. 
 Furthermore, we have previously recognized that the type of testimony 
offered by the CIS director is proper expert testimony under similar 
circumstances.  See Kenyon v. State, 2004 WY 100, ¶¶ 21-23, 96 P.3d 1016, 1025 (Wyo. 
2004).  In short, the appellant has not shown that any effort by defense 
counsel to exclude the testimony of the CIS director would have been successful, 
and thus has not shown that defense counsel's failure to voir dire 
her constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
[¶43]   The appellant's final claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel involves the testimony of the individual who 
transcribed Ms. Randel's 911 call.  In her testimony, the transcriptionist 
described what she surmised to be a "hitting noise" and speculated that the 
reason the victim's voice was muffled at one point in the recording was due to 
"the phone [being] very close to the caller's face."  The appellant claims 
that such subjective descriptions either approximated an expert opinion?which 
the transcriptionist was allegedly unqualified to give?or invaded the province 
of the jury.  Accordingly, the appellant now claims it was ineffective 
assistance when counsel failed either to move to have the witness disqualified 
as an expert or otherwise to move to exclude her testimony.  This argument, 
however, ignores the actions that counsel did take. 
[¶44]   The record reflects that trial 
counsel objected to the subjective statements in the transcript and the 
qualifications of the transcriptionist.  Such actions by trial counsel 
demonstrate that he was trying, as best he could, to exclude the subjective 
statements in the transcript.  As a compromise, the judge ruled that the 
transcript would be given to the jury only when the audio recording played and 
would be collected immediately after, so the jurors would not have access to it 
during their deliberations.  The record shows the transcripts were 
collected when the witness was excused.  Also, the judge specifically 
cautioned the jury that although the transcript was going to be provided while 
the jury listened to the recording, "It is only to be an aid to you in your 
consideration of the evidence, and you need to rely upon your own hearing and 
your own perception of the 911 call in connection with your actual evaluation of 
your use of that evidence."  Finally, trial counsel requested permission 
and was allowed to conduct a voir dire examination of the witness 
about what expertise "enable[d] [her] to accurately say what's on a recording 
above that of anybody else" and, later, extensively cross-examined her about the 
fact that her subjective statements merely reflected her interpretation of what 
certain recorded sounds conveyed, which was not the only possible 
interpretation.  In such a circumstance, it is unclear what other actions 
the appellant wishes his trial counsel would have taken.  He states that 
"[c]ounsel failed to object to such testimony based upon a failure to vet expert 
witnesses through the Daubert process."  On the contrary, trial 
counsel did question the transcriptionist about whether she had an ability to 
recognize the sounds on an audiotape beyond that possessed by anyone else and 
then renewed his objection to the admissibility of her transcription.
[¶45]   Considering all of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the admission of the 911 call transcription, and in 
light of trial counsel's efforts to exclude admission of that evidence, we 
cannot say that trial counsel's performance was deficient; that is "counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel' guaranteed 
[appellant] by the Sixth Amendment."  Montez, 2009 WY 17, ¶ 3, 201 P.3d  at 436 
(quoting Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 
1986)).  
Did cumulative error 
occur?
[¶46]   In his final issue, the appellant 
argues that this Court should reverse his conviction as a result of the 
cumulative effect of all the errors made during his trial.
The purpose of evaluating for cumulative error is 
  "to address whether the cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless 
  errors has the potential to prejudice the defendant to the same extent as a 
  single reversible error."  McClelland v. State, 2007 WY 57, ¶ 27, 155 P.3d 1013, 1022 (Wyo. 2007). 
   In conducting a cumulative error evaluation, we consider only matters 
  that we have determined to be errors.  Id. We will reverse a 
  conviction only when "the accumulated effect [of the errors] constitutes 
  prejudice and the conduct of the trial is other than fair and impartial.'" 
   Id. (quoting Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 462 (Wyo. 
  1971)).
Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶ 45, 184 P.3d 687, 701 (Wyo. 2008). 
 Because we have found that no individual errors occurred, a claim for 
cumulative error cannot lie.
CONCLUSION
[¶47]   After careful consideration of the 
appellant's claims, we conclude that:  (1) the district court properly 
followed the Gleason/Vigil test for determining the admissibility of the 
uncharged misconduct evidence and we cannot say that the court abused its 
discretion in admitting testimony concerning the appellant's prior uncharged 
misconduct; (2) the appellant's claim that a court is required, without request, 
to give a limiting instruction contemporaneously with the introduction of 
uncharged misconduct evidence is not supported by law; (3) the appellant's claim 
that there was a variance between the facts alleged in the Information and those 
presented at trial is unsupported by the record; (4) the jury was adequately 
instructed on the difference between first-degree and second-degree murder, and 
on the meaning of the term "maliciously"; (5) the appellant failed to provide 
cogent argument or citation to pertinent authority regarding his claim that 
there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree 
murder; (6) the appellant failed to show that defense counsel's failure to 
request, or decision not to request, a limiting instruction contemporaneously 
with the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence resulted in ineffective 
assistance; (7) the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice arising out of 
defense counsel's failure to object, or decision not to object, to the limiting 
instruction regarding the uncharged misconduct evidence; (8) the appellant's 
claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to voir dire 
certain "expert" witnesses is not supported by the record;  and 
finally,  (9) because we find no individual error or abuse of discretion, 
we conclude that cumulative error did not occur.
[¶48]   Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES

1The physician describing 
Ms. Randel's injuries to the jury described "defensive wound" as a "[a] defense 
wound, this would indicate a sharp knife, which the subject probably was trying 
to evade or walk away from the stab wound."

2It is perhaps appropriate to note that there is some "tension" 
between our prior statements that we have adopted a liberal approach toward 
admitting uncharged misconduct evidence, and our required application of 
specific procedures prior to such admission.  We reiterate here that those 
procedures are mandatory.

3We have held that 404(b) analysis does not require pinpointing 
only one purpose for the admission of such evidence.  Sturgis v. 
State, 932 P.2d 199, 203 
(Wyo. 1997).

4The Rivera 
decision was issued on January 20, 1988.  Huddleston was issued 
on May 2, 1988. 

5A close reading of the 
appellant's brief suggests that his actual argument is that the evidence was 
only sufficient to convict him of the lesser included offense of manslaughter, 
which argument would be more appropriate in the context of a sufficiency of the 
evidence argument.

6The appellant does make 
reference to one individual not listed in the instruction who testified that he 
received 200 stitches in his face after the appellant hit him with a beer glass 
in a 1993 barroom altercation.  However, that individual only testified 
during the sentencing phase of the trial, and therefore the district court's 
ruling did not apply to his testimony.

7One of the issues stated in 
Montez read as follows:  "Did trial counsel provide ineffective 
assistance by failing to object to portions of law enforcement officers' 
testimony on the ground that such was expert testimony that was inadmissible 
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993)?"  2009 WY 17, ¶ 23, 201 P.3d  at 
441.  However, we did not reach the issue of whether an ineffective 
assistance claim arises where a trial counsel fails to challenge an expert on 
Daubert grounds because we concluded that no prejudice could have 
resulted from one witness's testimony and that the other witness's opinion was a 
lay opinion, not subject to Daubert-type analysis.  Id. at ¶¶ 
24, 26, at 441-42.