Case Title: State v. Beam

Citation: 175 Kan. 814, 267 P.2d 509

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1954-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
175 Kan. 814 (1954)
267 P.2d 509
THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
C.R. BEAM, Appellant.
No. 39,209

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 6, 1954.
Kenneth H. Foust, of Iola, argued the cause, and O.E. Enfield, of Arnett, Okla., was with him on the briefs for the appellant.
William S. Bowers, county attorney, argued the cause, and John B. Pierson, of Ottawa, was with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.:
Defendant, C.R. Beam, was arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced on a charge of having drawn and delivered a worthless check in an amount of more than $20.00, in violation of G.S. 1949, 21-554, and appeals.
The facts on which the conviction depends are so much in conflict it is impossible to outline a factual picture on the basis of admissions by the respective parties or their counsel. However, it may be stated, the record discloses ample evidence to sustain the factual conclusion, inherent in the jury's verdict, that on April 8, 1951, defendant, who had been involved in the purchase of seventeen head of cattle from Bob Lantis, the prosecuting witness, at Ottawa in Franklin County, Kansas, executed a check at or near Wellington in Sumner County, Kansas, payable to Lantis, for the agreed purchase price of such cattle and thereafter delivered such check, or caused it to be delivered, to the payee therein named, at Ottawa, through the medium of the United States mail, where it was placed in the payee's bank for collection; thereafter sent through regular business channels, and payment thereof ultimately refused by the Farmers & Merchants Bank of Arnett, Oklahoma, the bank on which it was drawn, because of insufficient funds on deposit in that institution.
In view of what has been heretofore related, as well as the issues raised on appeal, nothing would be gained by a detailed recital of the evidence adduced at the trial. For that reason, we turn directly to the errors assigned as grounds for reversal of the judgment and will refer to portions of the testimony essential to their disposition as they are given consideration.
Two of such assignments are to the effect the trial court should have sustained motions to discharge the defendant because the opening statement of the state's attorney and the evidence adduced by the state in its case in chief disclosed that the district court of Franklin county did not have jurisdiction to try the cause. Both are based upon the premise the district court lacked jurisdiction *816 because such opening statement, as well as the state's evidence, disclosed that the check in question was written or signed in Sumner County. Neither has merit. This court, in conformity with the provisions of G.S. 1949, 62-404, is committed to the rule that where a worthless check is executed by the maker in one county and transmitted by the United States mail to the payee in another county the jurisdiction of the offense is in either county. (In re Myers, 119 Kan. 270, 237 Pac. 1026.)
The record discloses two other specifications of error which can be considered together. One relates to the admission of incompetent testimony and the other to improper admission of testimony on rebuttal. The state made a prima facie case by producing the check in question and testimony on the part of one witness who stated that all writing appearing thereon, including the name of the payee, the signature of the maker and the amount payable, was placed there by the defendant. After the state had closed its case the defendant took the stand and, while he admitted the signature, stated in substance that he had signed and delivered the check in blank for another purpose to one Hugh Gillespie, with whom he had been connected in some sort of a joint adventure involving the sale and purchase of cattle, and specifically denied that the other handwriting appearing thereon was his own. After defendant had so testified the court permitted the state to offer testimony in rebuttal on the part of witnesses respecting the handwriting of the defendant. Two of these witnesses produced instruments, known to have been defendant's handwriting, which were admitted. The third witness was a handwriting expert, who testified that after an examination of the check and the instruments to which reference has just been made, he was of the opinion that the check had been written by the defendant in its entirety. All of this evidence was objected to by defendant on the ground it was not competent because it was a part of the state's case in chief and he now argues, without producing any authorities to support his position, that such evidence was no part of the state's rebuttal; that its admission was prejudicial to his rights; and therefore constitutes grounds for reversal of the judgment. There are two short answers to these contentions. The first is that under the confronting circumstances this evidence was properly admitted on rebuttal for the purpose of refuting defendant's claim to the effect that nothing appearing on the check, except the signature, was in his handwriting. The second is, that under our decisions (see The State v. Gibbs, 105 *817 Kan. 52, 181 Pac. 569; The State v. Abrams, 115 Kan. 520, 223 Pac. 301; The State v. McReynolds, 118 Kan. 356, 360, 234 Pac. 975; State v. Haines, 128 Kan. 475, 477, 278 Pac. 767), the admission of such evidence, even though it be assumed it pertained to the state's case in chief, did not prevent the defendant from having a fair trial and affords no sound ground for reversal of the judgment. Indeed, after the defendant while testifying as a witness in his own behalf conceded the signature but denied the balance of the check was in his handwriting, sound reason and the furtherance of justice, which we pause to note are the bases on which evidence is held to be properly admissible under the foregoing decisions even where it is to be regarded as a part of the original case, required admission of the evidence which defendant now argues was erroneously received.
During the course of the trial and while the defendant was on the stand he was asked on cross-examination whether he did not know that the sheriff of Franklin county had a warrant for him for an insufficient fund check out in Western Kansas and promptly answered no. Immediately his attorney objected to the question and in effect asked that the answer be stricken. Thereupon the trial court promptly instructed the jury that it was admonished to disregard the testimony regarding the question and the answer given in response thereto. In connection with this same matter it may be added that 10a of the court's instructions to the jury reads as follows:
Notwithstanding what has just been related the defendant contends the question was prejudicial to his rights and requires a reversal of the judgment. We do not agree. Conceding for purposes of argument that the question was improper, the error, if any, with respect to both the question and the answer was cured by the trial court's action in orally instructing the jury to disregard the question as well as the answer and by its subsequent instruction when the cause was finally submitted.
See The State v. Bell, 109 Kan. 767, 201 Pac. 1110, which holds:
*818 See, also, City of Wichita v. Hibbs, 158 Kan. 185, 146 P.2d 397, where it is said:
Other grounds of error relied on relate to the instructions. At the close of the trial the court instructed the jury at length as to the applicable law. In view of arguments advanced respecting them certain of the instructions submitted are of importance and should be noted. They read:
Defendant makes no complaint of instruction 6 either in the brief *819 or on oral argument. Therefore, under the rule of universal application, it must be regarded as stating the law of the case.
In connection with the direct examination of defendant, while testifying in his own behalf, he was asked by his own counsel whether or not Hugh Gillespie bought seventeen head of cattle from Mr. Lantis in March, 1951, and gave Lantis his check in the sum of $5,710. On objection defendant was not permitted to answer this question. Specifically, the complaint lodged against instruction 6a is that the giving thereof was prejudicial to defendant because his answer to the foregoing question was excluded. No argument is advanced on this point and we are somewhat at a loss to understand just what defendant's position is with respect thereto. Any objection based on the premise there was nothing in the record to warrant the giving of the instruction lacks merit and he cannot now be heard to complain thereof because he himself brought the question into the case and made it necessary for the court to advise the jury as to whether the giving of a prior check would constitute a defense to the action. On the other hand, assuming that his objection is predicated upon the proposition that such instruction is erroneous as a matter of law it still lacks merit, under our decisions, and cannot be upheld.
See, e.g., the comparatively recent case of State v. Marshall, 152 Kan. 607, 106 P.2d 688, later cited with approval and adhered to in State v. Doyle, 166 Kan. 5, 199 P.2d 164, where, after approving an instruction somewhat similar to instruction 6a here involved and after giving consideration to the defenses available in a prosecution under the provisions of G.S. 1935, 21-554, now G.S. 1949, 21-554, we said:
For other decisions involving prosecutions under the worthless-check act, where the rule announced in the foregoing decisions has been recognized, approved and applied, see State v. Crane, 136 Kan. 181, 183, 14 P.2d 634; State v. Goodrich, 136 Kan. 277, 279, 15 P.2d 434; State v. Gillen, 151 Kan. 359, 363, 99 P.2d 832; State v. Bechtelheimer, 151 Kan. 582, 586, 100 P.2d 657.
See, also, State v. Brown, 173 Kan. 166, 244 P.2d 1190, recognizing and applying the rule under other statutes where  as here  commission of an act is made a crime by their terms, which holds:
Defendant contends there was no evidence to show that there had been a previous trial and that therefore instruction No. 10b was erroneous and prejudicial. No one denies there had been a prior trial of this case in the district court of Franklin County. Doubtless the trial court was aware, and for that matter this court takes judicial notice, that in a community the size of Franklin County it would be extremely difficult, if not almost impossible to obtain twelve jurors who had no knowledge of the fact there had been a prior trial. Under such circumstances we have little difficulty in concluding that this instruction was proper. Of a certainty the giving thereof did not prejudice or affect the substantial rights of the defendant, hence under our statute, G.S. 1949, 62-1718, error therein, if any, would not warrant the granting of a new trial.
Finally defendant contends that the trial court erred in rejecting and excluding competent evidence offered by the defendant on direct examination of his witnesses and on cross-examination of the state's witnesses. The state challenges the right of the defendant to be heard on this specification of error because the oral evidence offered and excluded was not brought to the attention of the trial court by affidavit or otherwise at the hearing of the motion for a *821 new trial. Our examination of the record discloses that the state's contention on this point is factually correct. The result, under our decisions, is that this claim of error is not open to appellate review.
See, e.g., The State v. Ball, 110 Kan. 428, 204 Pac. 701, where it is held:
For other decisions of like import wherein the rule announced in the foregoing decision is recognized and applied see State v. Vandruff, 125 Kan. 496, 264 Pac. 1060; State v. Crane, supra; State v. Riner, 143 Kan. 520, 54 P.2d 990; State v. Bechtelheimer, supra; State v. Berry, 170 Kan. 174, 223 P.2d 726; State v. Osburn, 171 Kan. 330, 335, 232 P.2d 451.
The rule, it may be added, is the same where the evidence in question has been excluded on cross-examination (see State v. Thomas, 157 Kan. 526, 142 P.2d 692; State v. Thomas, 173 Kan. 460, 462, 249 P.2d 645).
In reaching the conclusion just announced we have not overlooked the defendant's contention that the rule requiring evidence excluded at the trial to be produced upon the hearing of the motion for new trial does not apply to depositions, to documentary evidence or to testimony received and thereafter stricken out. That may be conceded. The trouble from defendant's standpoint is that the exception to the rule has no application where  as here  the propriety of the rulings complained of on appellate review depends upon, and cannot be determined without, an examination of both oral and documentary evidence.
We find nothing in the record which requires or permits a disturbance of the judgment. Therefore it must be and it is hereby affirmed.
It is so ordered.