Case Title: LaGrave v. Jones

Citation: 336 So. 2d 1330

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1976-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
336 So. 2d 1330 (1976)
Carlos LaGRAVE and Catherine W. LaGrave
v.
George JONES and Richard Grogan.
SC 1667.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 20, 1976.
*1331 Vincent F. Kilborn, Mobile, for appellants.
Tonsmeire, McFadden & Riley and J. H. Fernandez, Mobile, for appellees.
SHORES, Justice.
In May, 1975, the LaGraves (hereinafter sellers) executed an instrument and delivered the same to Jones and Grogan (hereinafter buyers), which provided:
On May 5, 1975, the buyers applied to the Board of Adjustment of the City of Mobile for a use variance "To erect a one story office building of approx 1000 to 1200 sq ft to be used as an insurance office." At the time of the option, the lots were zoned R-1, Residential.
On June 2, 1975, the Board of Adjustment denied the application for a use variance and notified the buyers of that fact on June 3rd. The buyers appealed the denial of the use variance and notified the sellers on June 9th that they were thereby exercising the option to purchase the lots. By letter of July 10th, the buyers again notified the sellers that the option was being exercised and that the buyers were willing to accept the property under the existing zoning classification, "since they have taken a formal appeal from the adverse decision rendered by the Board of Adjustment."
The sellers refused to convey the property and returned the $1,000 down payment to the buyers on July 10th, the last day for exercising the option. The buyers refused the refund and brought this suit for specific performance.
The buyers filed motion for summary judgment based on the pleading. The sellers filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit, which was countered by the buyers by affidavit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the buyers and the sellers appealed.
The sellers concede that if the condition for securing a zoning variance was for the exclusive benefit of the buyers, then they have the right to waive such a condition, and, of course, that is true.
But, the sellers contend that the condition was for the benefit of both the buyers and the sellers, which assertion they make in their affidavit. This, they say, presents a genuine issue of a material fact, making the ruling of the trial court in granting the buyers' motion for summary judgment erroneous.
Whether such conditions are for the benefit of the buyer, or the seller, or both, must be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case and, of course, by the language of the agreement entered into between them.
We think it is clear from the language of the agreement and the undisputed facts presented by the respective affidavits that this provision was inserted in the contract for the benefit of the buyers. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, presented with an argument similar to that advanced by the sellers here, i.e., that the provision was intended for the mutual benefit of the parties, said in Funke v. Paist, 356 Pa. 594, 52 A.2d 655, 656 (1947):
The sellers here contend that their nearby property, other lots in the same subdivision, would be benefited because, as Mr. LaGrave said in his affidavit ". . . it would have changed the character of the area from residential to commercial and would have made it easier for me to commercially develop my nearby property."
The fallacy with this argument is found in the undisputed facts adduced by the affidavits of both parties. The agreement charged the buyers with attempting to get the Board of Adjustment to issue a use variance as to Lots 5 and 6 of Pinehurst Subdivision. Such a use variance would not have affected the zoning classification of other lots in this subdivision which the sellers owned and which were "nearby" Lots 5 and 6. Had the variance been granted, Mr. LaGrave would not have been able to commercially develop his property. We can find nothing to indicate that the parties intended this condition in the option agreement for the benefit of the sellers. By this, we do not mean that such provisions are always for the benefit of the buyer. Under proper circumstances, such a provision could benefit both parties. Indeed, it is conceivable that only the seller would gain a benefit by such a provision.
In Godfrey Co. v. Crawford, 23 Wis.2d 44, 126 N.W.2d 495, 496 (1964), the instrument had the following proviso:
Prior to March 1, 1963, the buyer notified the sellers that it waived the rezoning condition and stood ready to complete the purchase, and tendered the balance of the purchase price, which the sellers refused. There, the Wisconsin Court found that the provision as to time was for the benefit of the sellers, because the failure to get the property rezoned within the option period terminated the sellers' liability on the contract, and left the sellers free to sell the property to someone else at the end of the option period. However, in that case the buyer waived the condition prior to the end of the option period. The court said:
Cases from other jurisdictions are collated in 76 A.L.R.2d 1195. Some courts hold that such provisions are for the benefit of the buyer; and some hold that they are for the benefit of both parties; but, in every case which we have found, the determination was made by looking to the contract between the parties and considering the circumstances of each case. Such, we think, is a sound approach.
Looking to the written instrument in this case and the affidavits offered by both sides in support of their respective motions for summary judgment, we think the trial court correctly held that the provision in this case was inserted for the benefit of the buyers and, hence, enabled them to waive that condition before the option expired. There is nothing to support the sellers' contention that their nearby property would benefit from the use variance, if granted as to the lots subject to the option agreement.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.
HEFLIN, C.J., not sitting.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was based only "on the pleadings." Defendants' affidavit, which was filed in opposition to plaintiffs' motion, states:
The majority concludes as a matter of law that the contract terms show the condition here was for the benefit of the buyers. I fail to see how the majority can so conclude, when the sellers dispute that, and the sellers' affidavit is the only evidence on this issue which could be legally considered by the trial court.
Since buyers and sellers claim that the "zoning change" condition was for their benefit, there was a disputed issue of fact which should not be resolved except by a trial on the merits. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.