Case Title: Compton v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1976-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Compton v. State1997 WY 1931 P.2d 936Case Number: 95-57Decided: 01/07/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

 

       Raymond A. COMPTON, 
Appellant (Defendant), 
    

v. 

   The STATE 
of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). 
     
               
Appeal from District Court, Crook County, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.
Michael N. "Nick" Deegan, Gillette, for appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Assistant Attorney General, for 
appellee.  
Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR* and LEHMAN, JJ.         

*Chief Justice effective July 1, 
1996.     

GOLDEN, Justice. 

[¶1] Appellant Raymond A. Compton 
appeals his conviction for attempted first-degree sexual assault following a 
jury trial on grounds the jury was improperly instructed and he contends his 
trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 
object to the jury instructions given.          
            
           
            

[¶2] We affirm.  
ISSUES

[¶3] Compton identifies the following 
issues:     

1. Whether or not the trial court 
committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on the law of attempt, the 
elements of the crime attempted and the elements of attempt as 
charged.             
               
     

2. Whether or not the trial court 
committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on "specific 
intent".             
     

3. Whether or not the trial court 
committed plain error in failing to define "substantial step" for the 
jury.              
    

4. Whether or not the trial court 
committed plain error in instructing the jury that it could find the defendant 
guilty if the presumption of innocence was "overcome by the evidence" rather 
than instructing the jury that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" on each element 
was required to overcome the presumption.             
              
             
          

5. Whether or not the trial court 
committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on attempted sexual 
assault in the fourth degree as a lesser included offense of attempted sexual 
assault in the first degree.             
              
         

6. Whether or not defense counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the 
instructional errors and omissions recited in # 1 through # 5 above.           
              
   

[¶4] The State rephrases the issues 
as:      

I. Whether the district court properly 
instructed the jury with respect to the charge of attempted first degree sexual 
assault?            
       

II. Whether the district court properly 
instructed the jury on the state's burden of proof and the standard of proof 
applicable to criminal cases?            
           

III. Whether the district court's 
failure to sua sponte offer a lesser included offense instruction on attempted 
fourth degree sexual assault amounted to plain error?            
          
  

IV. Whether appellant's trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to object to the instructional errors and omissions 
alleged in appellant's first five enumerated appellate arguments?            
          
  
FACTS

[¶5] Around 3:00 
a.m., Saturday, March 19, 1994, the victim was awakened by a partially undressed 
assailant attempting to penetrate her with his partially erect penis. 
Unsuccessful, the intruder left the house. The victim recognized him as Compton 
and reported the attack to sheriff's deputies, who arrested Compton at his 
house.  Compton was overheard telling his girlfriend that the arrest 
concerned the "[the victim's last name] lady" and, as he was transported to 
jail, he volunteered that the victim was "coming on to him." Compton stood trial 
for burglary and attempted first degree sexual assault. His defense was consent, 
contending that the victim had invited him to her home and initiated the sexual 
activity. The district court rejected the proposed jury instructions submitted 
by the State and Compton and proposed its own jury instructions. The defense did 
not object to the court's jury instructions. A jury acquitted him on the 
burglary charge but convicted him of attempted first degree sexual 
assault.  This appeal followed.  
             
     
DISCUSSION

Standard of Review  

[¶6] No objections were lodged against 
the jury instructions at trial and plain error analysis applies. Miller v. 
State,             
       904 P.2d 344  , 347 (Wyo. 1995). To demonstrate plain error, 
Compton must show that the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a substantial right. 
Id. at 348.     
            
            
      

                               
Jury Instructions on the Crime of Attempt 
      

[¶7] The jury convicted Compton of one 
count of attempted first degree sexual assault. The crime of first degree sexual 
assault is defined in the statute as:             
             

(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual 
intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree 
if:             
     

* * *  

          (iii) The 
victim is physically helpless, and the actor knows or reasonably should know 
that the victim is physically helpless and that the victim has not 
consented. . . .     
            
            

WYO. STAT. § 6-2-302(a)(iii) 
(1988).    

[¶8] The crime of attempt is described 
in the statutes as:          

(a) A person is guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime if:            

                    
(i) With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial 
step towards commission of the crime. A "substantial step" is conduct which 
is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to 
complete the commission of the crime. . . . 
                
           
          
        

WYO. STAT. § 6-1-301(a)(i) 
(1988).    

[¶9] The jury instructions given by the 
court on the charge of attempted first degree sexual assault in this case 
were:             
       

                                         
Instruction No. 5 
  

The necessary elements of the crime of 
attempted sexual assault in the first degree are:             
 

1. The acts occurred within the County 
of Crook in the State of Wyoming on or about March 19, 1994; and                
    

2. Raymond Compton attempted to inflict 
sexual intrusion on [the victim]; and           

3. With the intent to commit sexual 
intrusion on [the victim], Raymond Compton, did an act which was a substantial 
step towards the infliction of sexual intrusion on her; and            
             
    

4. At the time [the victim] was 
physically helpless and Raymond Compton knew, or should reasonably have known, 
that she was physically helpless and had not consented. . . .             
             
   

* * * *   

                                         
Instruction No. 6 
  

"Sexual penetration" means sexual 
intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or anal intercourse with or 
without emission.       
       

                                         
Instruction No. 7 
  

"Physically helpless" means unconscious, 
asleep or otherwise physically unable to communicate unwillingness to 
act.        
     

                                         
Instruction No. 8 
  

The defendant contends that [the victim] 
consented to sexual contact. The defense of consent involves two separate 
elements:           
      

1. [The victim] voluntarily consented to 
sexual contact by word or conduct; and            

2. [The victim] had the present ability 
to consent or the defendant could not reasonably have known that she lacked the 
present ability to consent.              
          

The State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that [the victim] did not consent to intercourse with the 
defendant.             
     

[¶10] Compton contends that it was error 
to combine the elements of the first degree sexual assault and attempt into one 
jury instruction instead of separately setting out the elements of the two 
crimes in two different instructions and he contends that it was error for part 
three of Instruction No. 5 to state "with the intent to inflict sexual 
intrusion," claiming it should have stated "with the specific intent to commit 
first degree sexual assault."              
           
            
              
             
           

[¶11] Jury instructions should inform 
the jury about the applicable law so that the jury may apply that law to its own 
findings with respect to the material facts. Miller, 904 P.2d  at 348. Jury 
instructions are to be written with the particular facts and theories of each 
case in mind and may differ from case to case since any one of several 
instructions may be legally correct. Id. A failure to give any instruction on an 
essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing 
or misleading instruction, requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction. 
Id.  The test whether the jury has been instructed on the necessary 
elements of the crime charged is whether the instruction leaves no doubt as to 
under what circumstances the crime can be found to have been committed. 
Id.            
               
             
               
               
              
          
            
             
             
     

[¶12] In this case, Instruction No. 5 
was based upon evidence that Compton partially undressed, climbed into bed with 
a sleeping victim, and attempted to force penetration. The essential elements of 
first degree sexual assault for these facts are an intent to inflict sexual 
intrusion with a physically helpless victim. Instruction No. 5 stated those 
elements. Wyoming does not require particular words be used to properly instruct 
on the specific intent element of the crime of attempt. The crime of attempt 
consists of:             
            
           
             
           
             
         

          (1) an intent 
to do an act or to bring about certain consequences which would in law amount to 
a crime; and       
              

          (2) an act in 
furtherance of that intent which, as it is most commonly put, goes beyond mere 
preparation.  . . . The primary purpose in punishing attempts is not 
to deter the commission of completed crimes, but rather to subject to 
corrective action those individuals who have sufficiently manifested 
their dangerousness.     
              
           
           
        

People v. Frysig,    628 P.2d 1004  , 1007 (Colo. 1981) (citing W. La Fave and A. Scott, Jr., 
Handbook on Criminal Law, § 59 at 423 (1972)). The Colorado Supreme Court 
recognized that when the court stated that an "intent to commit the underlying 
offense is an essential element of criminal attempt," it used that language as 
convenient shorthand for "the intent to perform acts which, if completed, would 
constitute the underlying offense." Id. at 1007 n. 4. Noting that "it is the 
intent to do certain proscribed acts or to bring about a certain proscribed 
result, rather than an intent to engage in criminality, which is required," the 
court explained this intent is required because it is this purpose to cause 
harmful consequences by performing those acts necessary to accomplish a 
completed crime which forms an important 
part of the rationale for making attempt criminally punishable. Id. at 
1007-08.     
       

[¶13] The facts and the charges of this 
case did not require the court to identify this intent as "specific" or restate 
the name of the crime, but required the court to adequately instruct the jury 
that it should determine whether Compton was guilty of attempt because his 
purpose was to cause harmful consequences. The instruction adequately 
accomplished this requirement. Frysig, 628 P.2d  at 1008; see Dorador v. State, 
               
             
            
             
        
        573 P.2d 839  , 843 (Wyo. 1978).  Combining the elements 
of these two crimes was not error in this case because the instruction left no 
doubt as to under what circumstances the crime could be found to have been 
committed in this case. Miller, 904 P.2d  at 348.    
              
              
            

[¶14] Compton next claims it is 
constitutional error not to have separately instructed the jury that intent and 
a substantial step are elements of an attempt to commit a crime. The principles 
of law articulated above apply to this contention as well. Instruction No. 5 set 
out these two elements of the crime of attempt in an accurate, understandable 
manner, and was not confusing or misleading. A separate instruction does not add 
information, clarify, or serve any purpose left unserved for the facts of this 
case and we find no error.            
             
              
               
           
           
              

                                
Instructions on Specific Intent Definition 
    

[¶15] At Compton's 
trial, the court instructed the jury on the definition of intent by using the 
instruction for general intent in the Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions - 
Criminal (1978) (WJICR) but did not entitle it as general intent.  The 
WJICR also contain an instruction defining specific intent and, despite the fact 
that burglary and attempt to commit a crime are both specific intent crimes, 
this instruction was not given. In a separate argument, Compton claims it was 
plain error not to instruct the jury on the definition of specific intent. In 
his view, the failure to separately instruct the jury on the precise mental 
state that is an element of the offense fails to uphold the rule of law that a 
jury must be instructed on all elements of a crime. Seeley v. State,              
              
               
                 
 715 P.2d 232   (Wyo. 1986), held that specific intent is an 
element of the crime of attempted sexual assault whereas first degree sexual 
assault is a general intent crime. Seeley, 715 P.2d  at 239. Compton asserts 
Dorador v. State,             
            
             
573 P.2d 839   (Wyo. 1978), held that a specific intent instruction was required. 
Dorador, 573 P.2d  at 843. Dorador requires an "element" instruction, i.e., that 
the court instruct a jury that the jury must determine whether the accused 
intended to do some further act or attain some additional consequence. Dorador, 
573 P.2d  at 843. Dorador does not hold that a "definitioninstruction" on specific intent 
is required. Id.  
    

[¶16] Compton's brief provides a helpful 
discussion on the trend in the law to dispense with instructions explaining the 
difficult concepts of specific and general intent because of their vagueness and 
general failure to enlighten juries. See United States v. Dougherty,              
           
           
      763 F.2d 970  , 974 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing 
United States v. Bailey,      
     444 U.S. 394  , 400-409, 100 S. Ct. 624, 629-36, 62 L. Ed. 2d 575 (1980)). 
It is his point, however, that whatever form an instruction takes, it is imperative that the trial 
court separately instruct the jury on the proper mental state the accused must 
have had in order to have committed the crime because the mens rea element has a 
technical meaning which must be defined for the jury by way of instruction. In 
our view, it is more important that the jury understand what exactly they had to 
determine.          
               
              
                
           

[¶17] Determining 
the specific intent element of attempt serves the purpose of separating 
criminality from otherwise innocuous behavior. Bailey, 444 U.S.  at 405, 100 S. Ct.  at 632. The crime of attempt in this case required the court to instruct 
the jury to determine if Compton had the intent to perform acts and attain a 
result which, if accomplished, would constitute the crime of first degree sexual 
assault and that he acted on that intent but was unsuccessful 
in completing the crime. Instruction No. 5 specifically and precisely and in an 
understandable manner properly instructs on the specific intent element of 
attempt. Compton's point that instructing on the difficult concept of intent is 
a challenging necessity requiring care and thought by a trial court is well 
taken; however, in this case, webelieve the trial court 
exercised care and thought. That court's use of the general intent instruction 
was not error as the crime of attempt requires it. "Except for the intentional 
conduct constituting the substantial step, the requisite culpability is that 
provided for in the definition of the offense." Frysig, 628 P.2d  at 1008. Seeley 
held that first degree sexual assault is a general intent crime. Seeley, 715 P.2d  at 239.       
              
           
            
             
            

                          
Failure To Instruct on Definition of "Substantial Step" 
       

[¶18] Compton next contends it was plain 
error not to provide the jury with the statutory definition of substantial step. 
Failure to instruct properly on an element of a crime can be plain error. 
Miller, 904 P.2d  at 349; Vigil v. State,               
            
                
859 P.2d 659  , 662 (Wyo. 1993). A court need not give an 
instruction defining a term unless it has a technical legal meaning so different 
from its ordinary meaning that the jury, without further explanation, would 
misunderstand its import in relation to the factual circumstances. Cardenas v. 
State,              
             
          
          811 P.2d 989  
, 996 (Wyo. 1991). Prejudicial error must be 
demonstrated by appellant and prejudice will not be demonstrated unless the 
instruction confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of 
law. Collins v. State,             
            
            854 P.2d 688  
, 700 (Wyo. 1993); Lowseth v. State,  875 P.2d 725  , 729 (Wyo. 1994). Failure to instruct properly 
on an element of a crime does not constitute plain error where that element is 
not contested at trial or where evidence of the defendant's guilt is 
overwhelming. Miller, 904 P.2d  at 349.    
              
              
        

[¶19] The failure 
to provide the statutory definition of substantial step was error, but Compton 
does not demonstrate that the lack of the definition was plain error. The 
State's proof showed that Compton attempted to force penetration on his sleeping 
victim. That the jury was not told that a substantial step is "conduct which is 
strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the 
commission of the crime" is not prejudicial in light of 
the facts.       

                                     
Burden of Proof Instruction 
   

[¶20] In its 
instruction on presumption of innocence, the court instructed the jury that 
"[o]nly if the presumption has been overcome by the evidence may a defendant be 
found guilty." Compton claims the failure to further instruct that the 
presumption can be overcome only by "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" confused 
and misled the jury and is plain error. The instructions setting out the 
elements of burglary and attempted sexual assault both instructed that each element must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt before finding the defendant guilty. As the 
proper standard of proof was set out for the jury and no other conflicting 
standard was articulated, we find no evidence to support the contention that the 
instruction was confusing or misleading. 
            
               
            
        

       
Failure to Offer A Lesser Included Offense Instruction on Attempted Fourth 
Degree Sexual Assault       
       

[¶21] Compton contends it was plain 
error not to instruct the jury on attempted fourth degree sexual assault as a 
lesser included offense to attempted first degree sexual assault. We have 
previously held that the sexual contact offense described in fourth degree 
sexual assault is not a lesser included offense of the sexual intrusion offense 
described in first degree sexual assault. Driskill v. State,              
            
            
            
           
    761 P.2d 980  , 981-82 (Wyo. 1988); see Jackson v. State,891 P.2d 70  , 73-74 (Wyo. 1995). There was 
no error.       

                                  
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
   

[¶22] Compton's claim that his defense 
counsel at trial was ineffective is based upon the issues of error he presented 
in this appeal. To establish the prejudice necessary to a claim that counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective, a defendant must show that, but for counsel's 
deficiency, the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable. Arner v. 
State,             
              
           
             
        872 P.2d 100  , 106 (Wyo. 1994). Compton was not prejudiced by the one 
error we found to have been made regarding jury 
instructions. Having found no other error, Compton has not demonstrated a 
likelihood that the verdict would have been more favorable to him had his trial 
counsel challenged the jury instructions.   
           
             
       

[¶23] Affirmed.