Case Title: Steven Maurice Evans v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC05-161

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-161 
____________ 
 
STEVEN MAURICE EVANS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-1526 
____________ 
 
STEVEN MAURICE EVANS,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc., et al.,  
Respondents. 
 
[November 15, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Steven Maurice Evans appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Evans also petitions this Court 
for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. 
Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the denial of postconviction 
relief and deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Steven Maurice Evans was tried and convicted in 1999 for the first-degree 
murder and kidnapping of Kenneth Lewis in 1996.  Evans was sentenced to death 
for his participation in the crimes.  The trial was delayed when Evans was found 
not competent to proceed on two occasions and had to be hospitalized.  At the final  
competency hearing, two experts opined that Evans was competent to be tried.  A 
third expert concluded that he was not competent.  After hearing testimony from 
the three experts, the trial court found Evans competent to stand trial. 
 
Evans, Lewis, and two other individuals, Edward Francis and Gervalow 
Ward, traveled together from Orlando to Sanford to commit a home invasion 
robbery on a purported drug dealer.  The robbery was called off when Lewis 
abandoned his companions and drove off in the getaway car, which was owned by 
Evans’ girlfriend’s brother.  The other three men went to the nearby home of an 
acquaintance, Mark Quinn.  Evans called his girlfriend Shana Wright and warned 
 
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her that Lewis might be coming to her apartment.  Evans instructed Wright to call 
the police and report the car stolen, and to remove her money from the apartment. 
Evans, Francis, Ward, Quinn, and another man named Blaine Stafford went to 
Wright’s apartment and waited for Lewis.  When Lewis entered the apartment, the 
men jumped him, beat him, and bound and gagged him.  When the police arrived 
to investigate the stolen vehicle report, the men took Lewis to a back room of the 
apartment. 
 
After the police left, Evans fashioned a homemade silencer from a shampoo 
bottle stuffed with plastic bags and taped it to the barrel of a .22-caliber pistol.  
Evans instructed Ward to check the backyard for any witnesses.  Then Evans, 
Francis, and Ward walked Lewis to a culvert behind the apartment building.  Evans 
told Lewis that they were the last three people he would leave behind and that they 
were the last people he would see on earth.  Evans then placed the gun to Lewis’s 
head and fired six shots.  Five of the shots entered Lewis’s head. 
 
Francis was tried and convicted for the same crime and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.  Francis testified against Evans at the 1999 trial.  Ward pled guilty 
to the lesser charge of kidnapping and received a ten-year negotiated sentence.  
Ward also testified against Evans at trial.  The other individuals involved in the 
case were not charged with any crimes.  Stafford testified at Evans’ trial; Quinn did 
not.  Evans was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder.  At the penalty 
 
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phase, Evans presented evidence about his childhood and teenage years as a 
member of a Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation.  He also presented evidence of 
two childhood head injuries, a change in personality after the second injury at age 
nineteen, and several incidents of “out of control” behavior after he consumed 
alcohol.  At age twenty-two or twenty-three, Evans committed adultery and was 
disassociated from the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Evans was twenty-eight years old at 
the time of this crime. 
The jury recommended a sentence of death by an eleven-to-one vote.  At the 
Spencer1 hearing, Evans requested that no additional mitigating evidence be 
presented and asked the court to follow the jury’s recommendation and impose a 
death sentence.  The trial court followed the procedure mandated in Koon v. 
Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246, 250 (Fla. 1993), and considered all of the mitigating 
factors, including those proffered pursuant to Koon.  The trial court found five 
aggravating factors:  (1) the murder was committed by a person under sentence of 
imprisonment; (2) Evans had been previously convicted of a felony involving the 
use or threat of violence; (3) the murder was committed during a kidnapping; (4) 
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (5) the murder 
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any 
pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP).  The court gave substantial weight to 
                                          
 
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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the statutory mitigator of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and some 
weight to the statutory mitigator of impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct.  The court also found five nonstatutory mitigators related to 
substance abuse (given little weight by the court because there was no evidence 
that Evans had consumed a particular amount of alcohol or drugs on the night of 
the murder) and fifteen related to family, community, and character issues (given 
little weight because these occurred long before the crimes).  Evans asserted a 
number of other nonstatutory mitigating factors that the court gave no weight. 
 
On appeal, Evans raised three guilt phase issues and five penalty phase 
issues.  Evans claimed that the trial court had erred in finding him competent to 
stand trial and in denying his motion for a mistrial after a State witness referred to 
Evans’ prior criminal record.  He also claimed that the introduction of certain 
evidence denied him a fair trial.  As to the penalty phase, Evans claimed that the 
trial court erred in finding the CCP and HAC aggravating factors and had 
improperly balanced the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors.  He also 
claimed that his death sentence was disproportionate and the split jury vote of 
eleven to one rendered his death sentence unconstitutional.  This Court found no 
error regarding most of Evans’ claims.  To the extent that irrelevant evidence was 
improperly admitted during the guilt phase, this Court found any error harmless 
 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.  We affirmed Evans’ conviction for first-degree 
murder and his sentence of death.  Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2001). 
 
Since his conviction, Evans has been diagnosed with sarcoidosis, a 
progressive autoimmune disease.2  This disease has caused Evans to go blind in 
both eyes.  Evans has refused medicine and medical treatment for his disease, 
expressing a fear of being poisoned. 
 
In October 2002, Evans filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Evans’ collateral counsel 
also filed a motion under rule 3.851(g) to determine Evans’ competency to proceed 
with the postconviction proceedings.  A competency evaluation was held and 
Evans was found competent to proceed in October 2003.  Thereafter, he filed an 
amended 3.851 motion, and an evidentiary hearing was held on August 31 and 
September 1, 2004.  The circuit court issued an order denying all postconviction 
relief in November 2004. 
Evans appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief 
and has petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. 
                                          
 
 
2.  Ophthalmologist Dr. Vivian Allen testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
Evans has lost vision in both of his eyes from sarcoidosis, an autoimmune disease 
that can form nodules throughout the body.  Evans’ lungs, abdomen, and liver have 
also been affected by the disease.  Some patients respond to treatment with 
prednisone, but the disease cannot be cured.  Dr. Allen testified that Evans’ 
prognosis is poor and he is likely to die from the disease.  The significant onset of 
Evans’ disease occurred in 2000. 
 
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APPEAL OF RULE 3.851 POSTCONVICTION MOTION 
Evans appeals the denial of his postconviction motion to this Court, raising 
seven claims.  Evans asserts:  (1) it is cruel and unusual punishment to execute a 
physically handicapped and mentally impaired individual; (2) counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress all of the evidence 
seized after his arrest on a faulty arrest warrant; (3) counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to prepare Evans to testify at trial, by failing to investigate the 
circumstances of his escape case, and by failing to mitigate the escape offense by 
presenting this evidence at trial; (4) counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to investigate and challenge forensic evidence and inculpatory admissions 
made by Evans and others and by failing to impeach various witnesses at trial; (5) 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present the 
testimony of alibi witnesses; (6) counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to investigate mental state defenses and by failing to give vital information to the 
mental health experts; and (7) the cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial.  We 
address each claim in turn below. 
Execution of Physically Handicapped and Mentally Impaired Individual 
In the postconviction proceedings below, Evans’ counsel claimed that Evans 
was incompetent to proceed with his postconviction motion.  Evans also asserted 
that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because 
 
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the statute permits the execution of a defendant who has been found incompetent to 
stand trial.  On appeal to this Court, Evans seems to have transformed these two 
claims into a new claim, namely that it is arbitrary and capricious and cruel and 
unusual punishment to execute him because he is physically handicapped by the 
debilitating and possibly fatal disease of sarcoidoisis and he is mentally impaired. 
 
To the extent that Evans is arguing that the trial court erred in its finding that 
he was competent to proceed with the postconviction proceedings, we find no 
merit to the claim.  Evans’ competency to proceed with his postconviction motion 
was evaluated and litigated extensively in the proceedings below.  Evans’ 
postconviction counsel twice filed motions to determine his competency to proceed 
with the postconviction proceedings.  Each time the court ordered mental health 
experts to conduct competency evaluations.  However, with the exception of one 
court-appointed psychologist, Evans refused to talk to the mental health experts or 
to cooperate with their evaluations.  Evans also refused to cooperate with the 
routine psychological examinations conducted by the prison mental health staff.  
At one point, the court ordered Evans transferred to the transitional care unit at the 
prison for observation and evaluation.  He stayed in that unit for ten weeks.  The 
one psychologist who was able to meet with Evans and conduct an evaluation 
opined that he was competent to proceed.  Despite Evans’ refusal to talk to a court-
appointed psychiatrist, the psychiatrist offered his opinion that Evans was 
 
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competent to proceed based on observations of Evans in the prison care unit and a 
review of numerous records.  The mental health expert retained by Evans’ 
postconviction counsel offered a contradictory opinion that Evans is a paranoid 
schizophrenic who is able to appear competent to someone who only observes him 
for a short time. 
After hearing testimony from the mental health experts, the circuit court 
found Evans competent to proceed with the postconviction proceedings.  The court 
concluded that Evans met the criteria for mental competence to proceed in Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.211(a) in that he “has sufficient present ability to 
consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and . . . 
has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the pending proceedings.”  
There is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support this conclusion. 
To the extent that Evans is claiming that the death penalty statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to him because it permits the execution of a defendant 
who was twice adjudged incompetent to stand trial, we find no merit to his claim.  
On two separate occasions Evans was found not competent to be tried and had to 
be hospitalized.  Evans was tried only after two experts opined that he was 
competent to be tried and the court found him competent to stand trial.  There is no 
constitutional bar to the execution of an individual who has previously been judged 
not competent to stand trial, provided that the individual is not insane at the time of 
 
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execution.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.811(a) (“A person under sentence of death shall 
not be executed while insane to be executed.”).  
To the extent that Evans argues that it is unconstitutional to execute him 
because he is physically handicapped and mentally impaired, this claim is not 
properly before the Court because it was not raised in the postconviction motion 
below.3  “[T]he specific legal ground upon which a claim is based must be raised 
at trial and a claim different than that will not be heard on appeal.”  Spann v. State, 
857 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 499 
(Fla. 1992)); see also Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982).  
However, even if this claim were not procedurally barred, we would find it to be 
without merit. 
 
As the State points out in its brief to this Court, neither claim relates to 
Evans’ physical or mental status at the time of the offense or at the time of 
                                          
 
 
3.  At the evidentiary hearing, ophthalmologist Dr. Vivian Allen testified 
about the diagnosis of sarcoidosis and the progression of the disease in Evans.  
However, Dr. Allen’s testimony was directed to the issue of Evans’ competency 
and mental state.  Dr. Allen was questioned about Evans’ strange manner of 
communicating with the doctor, his failure to take the prescribed medication, and 
his representation that prison officials were not treating his disease.  There is no 
mention of Dr. Allen’s testimony or Evans’ disease in the trial court’s order 
denying postconviction relief.  In fact, in his motion for rehearing, Evans argued 
that the court failed to address his current medical condition.  In denying rehearing, 
the court noted that Evans’ current medical condition “has no relevance to the 
validity of his judgment and sentence, and provides no basis for postconviction 
relief.”  The court explained that “[i]f and when a death warrant is signed, [Evans’] 
physical and mental condition may become an issue for further consideration,” but 
is not at the current time. 
 
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sentencing.  Evans was found competent to stand trial and was found competent to 
proceed with his postconviction proceeding.  He chose not to pursue a mental 
status defense at trial and his mental mitigating evidence was considered in 
sentencing.  This claim regarding Evans’ physical illness can most properly be 
classified as “newly discovered evidence of a subsequently occurring mitigating 
circumstance.”  It is not a basis for overturning a properly imposed death sentence 
in a postconviction proceeding.  See, e.g., State v. Spencer, 859 P.2d 146, 155 
(Ariz. 1993) (holding that a defendant’s post-incarceration illnesses do not 
constitute mitigating circumstances).  We agree with the trial court that Evans’ 
physical and mental condition may become an issue for further consideration if a 
death warrant is signed.  At this stage of the proceedings, however, no 
postconviction relief is warranted.  Cf. Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1151 (Fla.) 
(stating that mental illness has not been recognized as a per se bar to execution), 
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 850 (2006). 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Evans raises five claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel during 
trial.  These include counsel’s failure to:  move to suppress evidence that Evans 
claims was seized pursuant to a faulty arrest warrant; prepare Evans to testify at 
trial; challenge forensic evidence and admissions by Evans; investigate and present 
 
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alibi witnesses; and investigate mental state defenses and give information to the 
mental health experts. 
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are subject to the test set forth in 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984).  Following Strickland, this Court has held that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).  Where this Court 
previously has rejected a substantive claim on the merits, counsel cannot be 
deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless argument.  Melendez v. State, 
612 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 1992). 
 
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made 
to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 
perspective at the time.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Rivera v. Dugger, 
629 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1993).  The defendant carries the burden to “overcome 
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 
considered sound trial strategy.’”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. 
 
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Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  In Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 
(Fla. 2000), this Court held that “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and 
counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.” 
As to the first prong, the defendant must establish that “counsel made errors 
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Cherry 
v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 1995).  For the prejudice prong, the reviewing 
court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the 
deficiency, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 695; see also Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. 1997).  A 
court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific 
ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice 
component is not satisfied.  Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.  “Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law 
and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit 
court’s factual findings if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, 
 
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but reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Sochor v. State, 
883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).  Where the trial court has conducted an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court affords deference to the trial court’s factual 
findings.  McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 948, 954 n.4 (Fla. 2002). “As long as the trial 
court’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, ‘this Court will 
not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise 
of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence 
by the trial court.’”  Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (quoting 
Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 1984)).  We review each of Evans’ 
claims of ineffective assistance guided by these principles of law. 
1. Suppression of Evidence 
 
Evans claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress evidence based on a faulty arrest warrant.4  In denying this claim, the 
lower court acknowledged that Evans presented arguments regarding the validity 
of the arrest warrant in his separate Brevard County escape case.5  However, the 
court ruled that Evans “did not establish an adequate connection to the instant case 
                                          
 
 
4.  Evans asserts that the warrant in the escape case was not valid because it 
was signed by a designee of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections 
(DOC), but the Secretary, and not the designee, was the person listed in the body 
of the warrant as certifying the validity of the facts stated in the warrant. 
 
5.  Evans had been convicted of a felony and sentenced to a term of five and 
a half years in DOC custody.  Evans was serving his sentence in a work release 
program in Brevard County.  Evans walked away from the work site before his 
sentence expired, which constituted an escape. 
 
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or present any evidence which established the absence of a valid warrant in the 
instant case.”  Evans asserts that this claim was sufficiently preserved and pled. 
 
Evans’ amended motion for postconviction relief to the trial court included 
only a single conclusory sentence about this claim:  “Counsel was ineffective in 
failing to file a motion to suppress based on a faulty arrest warrant.”  There was no 
further explanation of what arrest warrant was at issue, the alleged faults of the 
warrant, or what evidence allegedly would have been suppressed had trial counsel 
successfully challenged the warrant.6  At the evidentiary hearing, the public 
defender who represented Evans in the Brevard County escape case testified that 
he had never seen an arrest warrant in the escape case, the probable cause affidavit 
and other pertinent documents in the escape case were filed weeks after Evans was 
arrested on that charge in Orlando, and he was never contacted by Evans’ trial 
counsel prior to the murder trial.  Evans’ trial counsel testified that she had no 
recollection of whether she investigated the circumstances of Evans’ arrest on the 
escape charge and whether there was a basis for filing a motion to suppress. 
 
Although Evans presented testimony relating to the validity of the escape 
warrant during the evidentiary hearing, he did not fully explain the connection of 
this warrant to the instant case nor establish trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on this 
                                          
 
 
6.  In closing argument at the postconviction hearing, Evans argued that his 
shoes were seized upon his arrest on the escape charge and were used to place him 
at the murder scene. The treads on the shoes seized from Evans were consistent 
with shoe prints found at the crime scene. 
 
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issue.  While Evans attempted to fill in the missing connections and clarify the 
nexus through closing argument and a motion for rehearing, neither was an 
adequate substitute for evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in support of 
the claim.  Thus, we affirm the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief on this 
claim. 
2. Preparation to Testify 
 
Evans claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to prepare him for 
testifying and in failing to investigate the circumstances of his escape and thereby 
present evidence to mitigate the escape offense.  This claim is based on the 
following events at trial.  The day after the defense had rested its case counsel 
informed the court that Evans had changed his mind and, against counsel’s advice, 
wanted to testify at trial.  When asked on cross-examination how many prior 
convictions he had, Evans answered one, which was not accurate.  He also stated 
that he had a “conviction coming up,” alluding to the escape offense.  When 
counsel objected to this answer as unresponsive, there was a sidebar discussion 
about Evans’ convictions.  Counsel was then permitted to discuss this matter with 
Evans in a private conversation.  Upon continuation of cross-examination, Evans 
volunteered that he had a “deviation from work release.”  The court interjected that 
Evans need only respond with the number of convictions.  After another sidebar 
conference in which the prosecutor stated that Evans was misleading the jury by  
 
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using the term “deviation,” the prosecutor elicited from Evans that he had been 
convicted of escape from the work release center where he was serving a sentence.  
Defense counsel did not pose any questions on redirect. 
 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Evans’ trial counsel testified that 
she did discuss the right to testify with Evans and explained to him that when 
asked about his convictions he should answer with a specific number.  She also 
testified that she warned Evans of the risks of testifying and advised him not to do 
so.  Counsel had no recollection of ordering files from the public defender relating 
to the escape offense. 
The public defender who represented Evans on the escape charge explained 
the circumstances of the escape during testimony at the evidentiary hearing.  Evans 
walked away from his work release site in Brevard County, which technically 
constituted an escape.  When the manager of the work site arrived at the site, Evans 
was not there and could not be located on the grounds.  The public defender further 
explained that this was not a “prison break” escape and Evans did not engage in 
violence to escape. 
In denying postconviction relief on this claim, the lower court noted trial 
counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing and that it was Evans who revealed 
the nature of his second conviction.  The court concluded that there was no 
 
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reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different had counsel asked additional questions of Evans on this issue. 
Counsel cannot be faulted for Evans’ own blunder in revealing that he had a 
conviction for escape.  Counsel had advised Evans not to testify, precisely to avoid 
such revelations.  Evans ignored this advice, chose to testify after the defense had 
already rested its case, and informed counsel of his decision just minutes before 
court convened.  While counsel might have been able to ameliorate any damage 
done by Evans’ revelation had she elicited the details of his escape, we agree with 
the trial court that Evans has not met the Strickland prejudice prong.  Even if the 
jury heard the details of the escape, there is no reasonable probability that this 
would have changed the sentence recommendation by the jury.  Thus, Evans is not 
entitled to postconviction relief on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
3. Forensic Evidence, Inculpatory Admissions, and Impeachment of Witnesses 
This claim actually incorporates a number of claims regarding counsel’s 
handling of testimony and evidence, including the testimony of Shana Wright 
about admissions made by Evans, information about the ownership of the murder 
weapon, and alleged admissions by other participants in the crime. 
At trial Shana Wright testified about encountering Evans on a bus the day 
after the victim was killed.  Evans told Wright “that he had to get a new suit 
because he got [the victim’s] brains all over it.”  This admission was reinforced by 
 
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the medical examiner’s testimony that it was possible for the triggerman to get 
blood and brain matter on his clothing.  Codefendants Gervalow Ward and Edward 
Francis also testified at trial that all three men had been splattered with blood on 
their pants and shoes when Lewis was shot in the head. 
Evans argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to dispute this 
testimony with forensic evidence.  At the evidentiary hearing, Evans’ defense 
counsel admitted that she did not consult a blood spatter expert or ballistics expert 
to counter the “brain spatter” admission by Evans.  Forensic expert Kenneth Zercie 
also testified at the evidentiary hearing that the evidence of the crime scene and the 
victim was not consistent with blood and brains splattering back on the shooter.  
Zercie based his opinion on the following facts:  the wounds to the victim were not 
contact wounds because there was no gunshot residue on the victim; the .22 caliber 
ammunition would not necessarily cause an explosion on contact; the concise 
nature of the victim’s wounds and the lack of seepage from the wounds; and the 
victim’s tight “nappy” hair that would have retained matter close to the wound.  
However, on cross-examination Zercie admitted that the use of a homemade 
silencer on the gun would have inhibited the discharge of gunshot residue on the 
victim even if the shooting was from close range.  Zercie also admitted that 
research shows that back spatter can occur with .22-caliber weapons. 
 
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In denying relief on this claim, the lower court noted that even had a crime 
scene reconstruction expert such as Zercie testified at trial, it “would not have 
eliminated the possibility that Mr. Evans did get blood on his clothes during the 
commission of the crime [when the victim was beaten in the apartment], blood that 
he mistakenly characterized as brain matter.”  Further, the court concluded, “the 
testimony of an expert such as Mr. Zercie would not have discounted the impact of 
Shana Wright’s testimony that Mr. Evans admitted getting rid of his suit because 
he got brains all over it.”  Thus, we agree with the trial court that even if counsel’s 
performance was deficient in this regard, no prejudice can be shown from the 
failure. 
Evans also presented testimony from his mother on this claim at the 
evidentiary hearing.  Evans’ mother testified that he has a tendency to brag about 
things, but that she had never discussed this with trial counsel because she was 
never asked about it.  Evans claims that had his mother testified about his bragging 
at trial, it would have cast doubt on his admission to Wright.  We conclude that 
even if counsel were deficient in not presenting the mother’s testimony, there is no 
reasonable probability that based on her testimony the result of the trial would have 
been different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
Evans further claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach 
Wright’s testimony that she initially did not tell the police about her conversation 
 
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with Evans because she was scared.  Evans claims that counsel’s failure left the 
jury with the erroneous impression that Wright was afraid of Evans.  We agree 
with the lower court that this claim is refuted by the record.  Wright made this 
statement in her direct examination by the State.  However, during cross-
examination and redirect questioning Wright clarified that she was afraid of being 
“charged with something.”  Defense counsel also elicited that Wright voluntarily 
visited Evans just days after the murder in response to a phone call from him and 
that she had not sought protection from anyone.  During closing argument, defense 
counsel specifically argued that Wright was motivated to testify as she did because 
she was afraid of being charged in the crime.  Thus, the jury was not misled about 
Wright’s motivation in initially concealing this conversation from the police. 
Evans also claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to present 
information about the murder weapon, namely that the gun “belonged to” 
codefendant Edward Francis and that Francis had used this weapon to shoot 
another victim just weeks before Lewis’s murder.  Evans contends that had this 
evidence been introduced at trial, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt that 
he was involved in Lewis’s murder and would have acquitted him.  In denying 
relief on this claim, the lower court concluded that there was no reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had 
 
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counsel introduced additional evidence regarding the technical ownership of the 
weapon.  We agree. 
At trial, codefendant Gervalow Ward testified that Francis normally carried 
the .22-caliber gun.  However, Ward also testified that Evans took the .22-caliber 
gun from the victim Lewis when Lewis arrived at the apartment, fashioned a 
silencer for the gun from an empty shampoo bottle stuffed with plastic bags, and 
shot Lewis in the head with the gun.  Francis gave similar testimony about Evans’ 
use of the gun in the murder.  During closing argument, defense counsel reminded 
the jury that most of the witnesses testified that the .22-caliber gun belonged to 
Francis. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Francis testified that the .22-
caliber murder weapon was among a number of weapons stolen from Mark 
Quinn’s employer.  Francis also testified that while he considered the .22-caliber to 
be his gun, he was not allowed to actually keep the gun and Evans kept control of 
the gun.  Francis admitted that he used the .22-caliber gun to shoot another 
individual several weeks before Lewis’s murder.  Francis also testified that Evans 
kept the .22-caliber gun after Lewis’s shooting, but ordered Francis to get rid of the 
shampoo bottle that had been used as a silencer.  When asked about the failure to 
introduce this evidence at trial, counsel explained that she was aware of Francis’s 
 
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possession and use of the murder weapon, but felt it would harm Evans because it 
would open the door to his participation in another violent crime. 
Based on the evidence actually presented at trial about the “ownership” of 
the gun and the possible damage of introducing evidence about Evans’ 
participation in another crime, we conclude that counsel made a strategic decision 
and was not deficient in her representation of Evans on this issue. 
Finally, Evans claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Mark 
Quinn, an uncharged participant in the crime, to testify at trial about inculpatory 
statements he heard Ward and Francis make after the shooting.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, Quinn testified that he did not accompany the other men to the back of the 
apartment complex where Lewis was shot and that he did not hear a gunshot.  
When the men returned to the front of the apartments, Quinn saw Ward and 
Francis with the .22-caliber gun and saw Ward put it inside his jacket.  Quinn 
testified that Ward and Francis bragged about shooting Lewis when the group went 
to a convenience store shortly after the shooting.  He heard them make similar 
statements later at a downtown bus stop.7  However, Quinn’s postconviction 
testimony also placed Evans at the scene of the murder, which Evans had denied 
                                          
 
 
7.  Prior to trial, Francis and Ward made statements to the police implicating 
each other as Lewis’s shooter.  At trial, each admitted that his original statement 
was a lie and testified that Evans had shot Lewis. 
 
- 23 -
throughout trial.  Further, Quinn testified that Evans thought the victim was going 
to rob Wright, which gave Evans a motive for the killing. 
On cross-examination at the evidentiary hearing, the State impeached Quinn 
with two earlier depositions.  In a 1998 deposition, Quinn stated that Evans 
dominated the younger members of the gang and used his martial arts skills to 
inflict pain and control them.  In a deposition two weeks before the evidentiary 
hearing, Quinn stated that Evans had admitted that he was the first to shoot the 
victim; that Quinn never saw the .22-caliber gun when the group returned from the 
back of the apartment complex, that he never saw Ward or Francis with a gun, and 
that Evans was also bragging about the shooting at the convenience store. 
If Quinn had testified at trial, as Evans contends he should have, the jury 
would have heard that Quinn did not see the murder weapon in Evans’ hands.  
However, they would also have heard that Evans was at the scene, had a motive for 
killing the victim, and had bragged about his participation.  Further, Quinn’s 
testimony was impeached by the damaging statements in his previous depositions.  
Thus, we agree with the trial court that there was no prejudice demonstrated by 
counsel’s failure to use Quinn as a witness at trial. 
Thus, Evans is not entitled to postconviction relief on the claim of 
ineffective assistance relating to the forensic evidence, inculpatory admissions, and 
the impeachment of witnesses. 
 
- 24 -
4. Alibi Witness 
Evans claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the 
appearance of his girlfriend Nichole Taylor as an alibi witness.  Evans alleges that 
Taylor could have testified that he was with her in her apartment on the night of 
the shooting. 
Near the end of the State’s case-in-chief at trial, defense counsel informed 
the judge that Taylor would not appear in court even though she had been served 
with a subpoena.  Counsel also stated that she had discussed this matter with 
Evans, but could not personally ask the court for a writ of attachment to compel 
Taylor’s appearance.  Counsel gave only a vague response when the judge asked 
directly what the problem was.  The prosecutor volunteered that, based on his 
deposition of Taylor, he believed that Taylor was not telling the truth and defense 
counsel was ethically constrained in presenting her testimony.  The judge refused 
defense counsel’s request for the court to issue its own writ of attachment to 
compel Taylor’s appearance.  The judge explained he did not want to compel 
Taylor to appear when her testimony might hurt Evans’ case. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Taylor testified that she was 
Evans’ girlfriend at the time of the crime, that Evans was home with her every 
night in April 1996 when the murder occurred, that Evans was not involved in any 
gang activity, that she did not testify on Evans’ behalf at trial because her 
 
- 25 -
boyfriend at the time threatened to beat her up if she testified, and that she had 
informed the defense investigator about this dilemma but the defense did nothing 
to assist her appearance in court. 
Defense counsel related a strikingly different story in her postconviction 
hearing testimony.  Counsel testified that Taylor called her during trial, stating that 
she had perjured herself at the deposition and was not going to do it again at trial.  
Taylor also told counsel that Evans had asked her to lie for him and had threatened 
to kill her and her child if she did not comply.  Taylor told counsel that she was 
afraid of Evans.  Counsel testified that she spoke to Evans and relayed the contents 
of her conversation with Taylor.  Evans agreed that Taylor should not be called to 
testify at trial if she was going to make these accusations against him. 
In denying relief on this claim, the lower court concluded that “counsel’s 
decision not to seek a writ of attachment to secure this witness’s testimony was 
more than reasonable under the circumstances, given the risk that [the witness] 
would have suddenly denied the alibi set forth in her deposition.”  We agree.  
Additionally, the court found Taylor’s evidentiary hearing testimony was not 
credible and thus there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
proceedings would have been different had Taylor been summoned to testify.  We 
give deference to a trial court’s assessment of witness credibility.  See Stephens v. 
State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 1999) (“We recognize and honor the trial court's 
 
- 26 -
superior vantage point in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in making 
findings of fact. . . . In many instances, the trial court is in a superior position ‘to 
evaluate and weigh the testimony and evidence based upon its observation of the 
bearing, demeanor, and credibility of the witnesses.’”) (quoting Shaw v. Shaw, 334 
So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976)).  Thus, we find no merit to Evans’ claim that counsel 
was ineffective in failing to present this alibi witness at trial. 
5. Mental Health Defenses 
Evans claims that trial counsel was ineffective in investigating the mental 
state defenses of insanity and voluntary intoxication and for failing to give vital 
information to the mental health experts.  The mental health information that Evans 
claims was withheld includes the pretrial depositions of Quinn and Francis, in 
which they describe Evans’ behavior and consumption of alcohol and drugs on the 
night of the crime, and some letters and correspondence from Evans, in which he 
exhibits strange communication. 
In denying relief on this claim, the trial court noted that numerous mental 
health evaluations had been conducted in this case.  The court also outlined 
defense counsel’s investigation of the mental health issues and the presentation of 
this evidence at the penalty phase.  The court concluded that Evans “waived his 
right to proceed with a guilt-phase mental status defense when he instructed 
counsel not to prepare one, and it is not reasonable for him to . . . complain now 
 
- 27 -
that counsel’s performance was deficient for complying with his instruction.”  We 
agree. 
 
Evans’ competency to stand trial was litigated extensively prior to trial.  On 
two occasions, the trial court concluded that Evans was not competent to proceed 
with trial and had him hospitalized.  Evans, 800 So. 2d at 188.  During the final 
competency determination, three experts offered conflicting evaluations, with two 
opining that Evans was competent to stand trial and one concluding that he was not 
competent.  Id.  On appeal, this Court found no error in the trial court’s conclusion 
that Evans was competent to stand trial.  Id. at 187-88. 
 
While counsel did not present either an insanity or voluntary intoxication 
defense during the guilt phase of trial, there is record evidence that counsel 
investigated and pursued these defenses.  This investigation is memorialized in 
counsel’s correspondence with Evans, in which counsel explained that both 
insanity and voluntary intoxication were viable defenses.  However, Evans refused 
to pursue these defenses, maintained that he was not present at the crime, and 
instructed counsel to pursue an alibi defense.  In fact, despite counsel’s advice that 
Evans not testify at trial and the fact that numerous witnesses testified about 
Evans’ participation in the crime, Evans testified at trial that he was not present at 
the crime scene, had never been in Wright’s apartment, was only an acquaintance 
of Wright and Francis, and did not know Ward at all. 
 
- 28 -
 
At the penalty phase, the three mental health experts who had evaluated 
Evans testified about his mental state.  Two of the experts opined that Evans 
suffers from bipolar disorder.  Both of these experts examined Evans on numerous 
occasions and reviewed a number of documents, including the depositions of the 
codefendants and the witnesses who described strange behavior by Evans and his 
use of alcohol and drugs on the night of the crime.  The third expert concluded that 
Evans suffers from a rare form of paranoid schizophrenia.  He classified Evans as a 
“dissembler,” a person who is psychotic and insane, yet tries hard to appear sane 
and has delusions about being sane.  This third expert had also opined that Evans 
was not competent to stand trial. 
At the Spencer hearing, Evans waived the presentation of any additional 
mitigating evidence and asked the court to follow the jury’s recommendation and 
impose a death sentence.  In accordance with the procedures in Koon v. Dugger, 
619 So. 2d 246, 250 (Fla. 1993), defense counsel profferred additional mental 
health evidence, including the mental health reports from the appointed experts, 
depositions from codefendants, and letters to the court from family and friends. 
Based on the evidence presented at trial and proffered at the Spencer 
hearing, the trial court found the statutory mental mitigators of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, which was given substantial weight, and substantially 
impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his 
 
- 29 -
conduct to the requirements of law, which was given some weight.  On appeal, this 
Court found that the trial court gave proper weight to the impaired capacity 
mitigating factor based on the extensive record evidence that Evans’ mental 
impairment did not impede his ability to appreciate the criminality of his actions.  
Evans, 800 So. 2d at 196. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, the third mental health expert 
testified that trial counsel only provided him with the depositions of codefendants 
Quinn and Francis one week before trial and never gave him copies of the strange 
correspondence from Evans.  The expert admitted, however, that this information 
did not change his pretrial diagnosis that Evans was not competent to stand trial. 
Francis offered essentially the same testimony at the evidentiary hearing as 
he did at trial, i.e., Evans was drinking, smoking pot, and “acting weird” on the 
night of the murder.  Quinn’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was similar and 
was cumulative to that presented through the testimony of Francis and Ward at 
trial.  Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that Evans was adamant that 
she not pursue an insanity or mental state defense.  Counsel nonetheless consulted 
with the appointed mental health experts and other mental experts to investigate 
possible defenses and mitigating circumstances. 
We agree with the trial court that counsel’s performance was not deficient 
on this issue.  With respect to the investigation and presentation of mitigation 
 
- 30 -
evidence, the Supreme Court observed in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 
(2003), that “Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable 
line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the 
defendant at sentencing.  Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present 
mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case.”  Rather, in deciding whether trial 
counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment with regard to the 
investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, a reviewing court must focus 
on whether the investigation resulting in counsel’s decision not to introduce certain 
mitigation evidence was itself reasonable.  Id. at 523; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690-91. 
This is not a case where counsel conducted no investigation or presented no 
mitigating evidence.  See Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 572 (Fla. 1996) 
(concluding that defendant was entitled to relief in case where trial court found no 
mitigating circumstances and counsel made practically no investigation of 
mitigation and presented little mitigation evidence in the sentencing proceedings 
despite the existence of substantial evidence that would have been revealed by 
reasonable investigation); Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1326 (Fla. 
1994) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase where 
counsel made no attempt to investigate family history and background and 
admitted that he had no strategic reason for failing to present mitigating evidence 
 
- 31 -
during the penalty phase).  In fact, the record in this case shows extensive 
investigation and evaluation of Evans’ mental health status.  The record also shows 
a very uncooperative client who absolutely refused to let counsel present a mental 
status defense.  The mental health experts opined that Evans was competent to 
proceed to trial; the judge made a finding of competency to stand trial; and this 
Court affirmed that ruling on appeal.  Thus, Evans had the right to control his 
defense after being informed by counsel about his options and the risks.  Evans 
chose not to pursue a mental status defense.  He is not entitled to postconviction 
relief because his choice was not an effective one. 
Cumulative Error 
Evans’ final claim is that the cumulative effect of his alleged errors requires 
that he receive a new trial.  However, because all of Evans’ individual claims of 
error are without merit, his cumulative error claim must fail.  See Griffin v. State, 
866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003) (“[W]here individual claims of error alleged are either 
procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error must fail.”); 
Vining v. State, 827 So. 2d 201, 219 (Fla. 2002) (“Because the alleged individual 
errors are without merit, the contention of cumulative error is similarly without 
merit.”); Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 509 (Fla. 1999) (concluding that where 
allegations of individual error do not warrant relief, a cumulative error argument 
based thereon is without merit). 
 
- 32 -
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Evans has also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising five claims.  
He claims:  (1) it is unconstitutional to execute a physically handicapped and 
mentally ill individual; (2) Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional under 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002); (3) the judge’s finding of the “under a sentence of imprisonment” 
aggravating circumstance violates the requirements of Ring; (4) he is incompetent 
to be executed; and (5) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing 
to raise an issue relating to the testimony of the medical examiner.  We address 
each claim in turn below. 
Execution of Physically Handicapped and Mentally Impaired Individual 
This is the same issue raised in Evans’ postconviction appeal, namely that it 
is unconstitutional to execute an individual who is physically handicapped by a 
debilitating disease and who is mentally ill.  However, as we noted above, Evans 
was found competent to stand trial and was found competent to proceed with his 
postconviction proceeding.  He chose not to pursue a mental status defense at trial 
and his mental mitigating evidence was considered in his sentencing.  Evans’ 
subsequently occurring physical illness is not a basis for overturning a properly 
imposed death sentence in a postconviction proceeding.  See, e.g., State v. Spencer, 
859 P.2d 146, 155 (Ariz. 1993) (holding that a defendant’s post-incarceration 
 
- 33 -
illnesses do not constitute mitigating circumstances).  While Evans’ physical and 
mental condition may become an issue for further consideration if a death warrant 
is signed, at this stage of the proceedings no habeas relief is warranted.  Cf. Diaz v. 
State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1151 (Fla.) (stating that mental illness has not been 
recognized as a per se bar to execution), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 850 (2006). 
Ring Claims 
Evans raises several claims relating to the United States Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Apprendi and Ring.  Evans contends that Florida’s capital sentencing 
statute, as applied in his case, is unconstitutional because:  the jury was not 
required to make a specific finding that each aggravating circumstance was proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt; the jury was not required to reach a unanimous jury 
verdict as to a death sentence recommendation; and the judge made the finding of 
the “under sentence of imprisonment” aggravating circumstance based on evidence 
not presented to the jury.  Evans also claims that in light of Ring the jury 
instructions violated the principles of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 
(1985), because they diminished the jury’s true role in his death sentence.  He 
further claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising these claims on 
direct appeal. 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 
U.S. 348 (2004), held that the decision in Ring is not retroactive.  A majority of 
 
- 34 -
this Court has also concluded that Ring does not apply retroactively in Florida to 
cases that are final, under the test of Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980).  See 
Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 412 (Fla. 2005).  Accordingly, Evans’ Ring 
claims are procedurally barred in these postconviction proceedings. 
However, even if the claims were not barred, they would be without merit.  
This Court has recognized that a defendant is not entitled to relief under the “prior-
conviction exception” to Apprendi8 where the aggravating circumstances include a 
prior violent felony conviction.  See, e.g., Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 49 (Fla. 
2003) (noting rejection of Ring claims in a number of cases involving a prior-
conviction aggravator); Grim v. State, 841 So. 2d 455, 465 (Fla. 2003) (explaining 
that defendant was not entitled to relief under Ring where aggravating 
circumstances of multiple convictions for prior violent felonies and 
contemporaneous felony of sexual battery were unanimously found by jury).  In 
Evans’ case, the trial court found the aggravating circumstance of a prior violent 
felony conviction based on Evans’ previous conviction as a principal to robbery 
with a firearm.  A unanimous jury found Evans guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
of this offense, thereby satisfying the mandates of the United States and Florida 
                                          
 
8.  In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). 
 
- 35 -
Constitutions.  See Kimbrough v. State, 886 So. 2d 965, 984 (Fla. 2004); Doorbal 
v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla. 2003). 
Additionally, this Court has rejected claims that Ring requires the 
aggravating circumstances to be individually found by a unanimous jury verdict.  
See Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 359 nn.9 & 10 (Fla. 2004); Blackwelder v. 
State, 851 So. 2d 650, 654 (Fla. 2003); Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 986 (Fla. 
2003).  The Court has also repeatedly rejected objections to Florida’s standard jury 
instructions based on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).  See Mansfield 
v. State, 911 So. 2d 1160, 1180 (Fla. 2005); Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 291 
(Fla. 1993); Turner v. Dugger, 614 So. 2d 1075, 1079 (Fla. 1992).  Nor can 
appellate counsel be deemed ineffective for failing to raise Ring claims in Evans’ 
2000 direct appeal when the Supreme Court did not issue its opinion in Ring until 
2002.  Thus, Evans is not entitled to habeas relief on any of these Ring-based 
claims. 
Incompetent to Be Executed 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811(a) provides that “[a] person under 
sentence of death shall not be executed while insane to be executed.”  The rule also 
provides that “[n]o motion for a stay of execution pending hearing, based on 
grounds of the prisoner’s insanity to be executed, shall be entertained by any court 
until such time as the Governor of Florida shall have held appropriate proceedings 
 
- 36 -
for determining the issue pursuant to the appropriate Florida Statutes.”  Fla. R. 
Crim. P. 3.811(c). 
Evans concedes that this claim is not ripe for review as he has not yet been 
found incompetent and a death warrant has not been signed.  He contends that he is 
only raising this issue for preservation purposes.  This Court has repeatedly found 
that no relief is warranted on similar claims.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 
137 n.19 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting Coney’s claim that he was insane to be executed 
where he acknowledged that claim was not yet ripe and was being raised only for 
preservation purposes); Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 2003) (finding claim 
that defendant may be insane to be executed “not ripe for review” where defendant 
had not been found incompetent and death warrant had not been signed yet; noting 
that defendant made claim “simply to preserve it for review in the federal court 
system”); Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla. 2001) (stating that it is 
premature for a death-sentenced individual to present a claim of incompetency or 
insanity, with regard to his execution, if a death warrant has not been signed). 
Thus, Evans is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately 
presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  To prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in a 
 
- 37 -
habeas corpus proceeding, a claimant must show that appellate counsel performed 
deficiently and that the deficiency compromised the appellate process to such 
degree as to undermine confidence in the fairness and correctness of the appellate 
result.  See Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1027 (Fla. 1999); Wilson v. 
Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1985).  Appellate counsel is not 
ineffective for failing to raise issues not preserved for appeal.  See Medina v. 
Dugger, 586 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 1991).  Moreover, “[i]f a legal issue ‘would in 
all probability have been found to be without merit’ had counsel raised the issue on 
direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not 
render appellate counsel’s performance ineffective.”  Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 
2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 
1994)).   
Evans claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise as 
error the medical examiner’s testimony regarding possible blood and brain spatter 
on the person who shot the victim.  This claim is interconnected with issue four in 
the postconviction appeal above, in which Evans claims that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to utilize a crime scene reconstruction expert to challenge the 
validity of Evans’ statement to Wright about spatter on his clothing.  The State 
correctly notes that appellate counsel could not have raised any issue related to 
 
- 38 -
what a “crime scene expert” could have testified to had one been called by the 
defense as no such witness was called at trial. 
The second aspect of this claim relates to the testimony of the medical 
examiner regarding possible blood spatter from the victim.  Evans now complains 
that the medical examiner was not qualified to provide an opinion regarding blood 
spatter because he is neither a crime scene reconstruction expert nor a ballistics 
expert and that appellate counsel should have raised this as error on appeal.  
However, the record shows that defense counsel’s objection was not based on the 
medical examiner’s qualifications to answer a question involving ballistics and 
blood spatter.  When the State asked the medical examiner if it was possible for 
blood and brain matter to spatter on the clothing of a shooter standing next to the 
victim, as Evans had stated to Wright, defense counsel objected that the question 
was speculative and hypothetical.  Thus, the claim asserted in this habeas petition 
was not preserved at trial and appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to raise it.  See Medina, 586 So. 2d at 318.  Evans is not entitled to habeas 
relief on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief and we deny Evans’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
- 39 -
 
- 40 -
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ, concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,  
Jay Paul Cohen, Judge - Case No. CR96-5639 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and David Dixon Hendry, 
Assistant CCRC, Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent