Case Title: Morales v. Rust

Citation: 

Docket Number: 23S-PL-00371

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 23S-PL-371 
Diego Morales, in his official capacity as Indiana 
Secretary of State, the Indiana Election Commission, 
and Amanda Lowery, in her official capacity as 
Jackson County Republican Chair, 
Appellants, 
–v– 
John Rust, 
Appellee. 
Argued: February 12, 2024 | Decided: March 6, 2024 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court 
No. 49D12-2309-PL-36487 
The Honorable Patrick J. Dietrick, Judge 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Justices Slaughter and Molter concur. 
Justice Molter concurs with separate opinion in which Justice Slaughter joins. 
Justice Goff dissents with separate opinion in which Chief Justice Rush joins. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Mar 06 2024, 2:47 pm
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Massa, Justice. 
John Rust seeks the Republican nomination for United States Senator 
from Indiana in 2024. Concerned he would be denied access to the May 
primary ballot for failure to comply with state law, he sought preemptive 
relief in the Marion Superior Court. The law in question, commonly called 
“the Affiliation Statute,” contains objective criteria for determining 
eligibility to appear on the primary ballot of a major political party1 and 
discretion for a party to allow the candidacy regardless of compliance. A 
judge blocked enforcement of the law, finding it unconstitutional for a 
variety of reasons, triggering direct appeal to this Court. Focusing 
primarily on the weighing of First Amendment “rights of association” of 
both Appellants and Appellee, we first stayed the trial court’s ruling on 
February 15, 2024,2 and reversed it entirely on February 27, 2024, 
remanding with an order to enter judgment for Appellants on all claims.3 
Today, we explain why. 
Neither the Constitution of the United States nor the Constitution of the 
State of Indiana mentions political parties, but the Founders were keenly 
 
1 Indiana law defines a “major political party” as follows:   
(1) With respect to the state, either of the two (2) parties whose nominees received the 
highest and second highest number of votes statewide for secretary of state in the last 
election; or  
(2) With respect to a political subdivision, either of the two (2) parties whose nominees 
received the highest and second highest of number of votes in that political 
subdivision for secretary of state in that last election. 
Ind. Code § 3-5-2-30. 
2 We point out that, while the State originally requested a stay with our Court, it bypassed 
Appellate Rule 39, which provides that “a motion for stay pending appeal may not be filed . . . 
unless a motion for stay was filed and denied by the trial court . . . .” Ind. Appellate Rule 
39(B) (emphasis added). That condition was not satisfied. While we nonetheless stayed the 
trial court’s order, we admonish the State to follow the proper procedures in the future. See 
Hardiman v. Cozmanoff, 4 N.E.3d 1148, 1151 (Ind. 2014) (explaining that appellate courts place 
special “trust in the trial court to exercise sound discretion” in deciding motions for stay). To 
be clear, we did not grant the State’s motion, but instead ordered a stay on our own accord. 
3 The bipartisan State Election Board unanimously upheld challenges to Rust’s candidacy on 
February 27, formally denying him access to the primary ballot. 
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aware “that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do 
significant damage to the fabric of government.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 
724, 736 (1974) (citing FEDERALIST, NO. 10 (Madison)). The United States 
Supreme Court fifty years ago accordingly found “the State’s interest in 
the stability of its political system” to be “compelling,” id. at 736, and later 
recognized that “[a] political party has a First Amendment right to limit its 
membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection process that 
will in its view produce the nominee who best represents its political 
platform,” N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 202 (2008) 
(citing Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisc. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 
(1981)). The political party seeking the law’s enforcement and the State 
Appellants defending its legitimacy thus wield the First Amendment as a 
“shield,” López Torres, 552 U.S. at 203, to deny Rust entry to the ballot.  
Appellee Rust, conversely, claims First Amendment associational rights 
of his own, to wield as a “sword,” id., to force his way on the ballot. And 
in that clash today, the shield checks the sword, as we find the minor 
requirements of the Affiliation Statute reflect an elegant balancing of First 
Amendment interests and are thus constitutionally sound.    
 
Facts and Procedural History 
A. Indiana’s Affiliation Statute 
The Framers of the United States Constitution “conceived of a Federal 
Government directly responsible to the people, possessed of direct power 
over the people, and chosen directly, not by the States, but by the people.” 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995) (citation 
omitted). This ideal, which was “extant from the beginning of the 
Republic,” id., was constitutionalized in Article I, Section 2, which 
authorized Members of the House of Representatives to be “chosen every 
second Year by the People of the several states,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 
1. By direct contrast, Article I, Section 3, provided that the “Senate of the 
United States shall be . . . chosen by the [state] Legislature[s].” Id. § 3.  
In 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment adjusted that arrangement by 
amending Article I, Section 3 to allow voters to directly vote for senators. 
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U.S. CONST. amend XVII. Because of its ratification, states established their 
own primary systems. López Torres, 552 U.S. at 206. Indiana enacted the 
Primary Election Law in 1915, giving Hoosiers the chance to hold 
primaries for state and federal candidates, including United States 
senators. Charles Kettleborough, The Direct Primary in Indiana, 10 Nat’l 
Mun. Rev. 166 (1921); Kelso v. Cook, 110 N.E. 987, 989 (Ind. 1916). 
After a series of modifications, the General Assembly eventually 
expanded its election laws to provide Hoosiers broad access to become a 
party-affiliated candidate in a primary election. Before appearing on the 
party primary ballot, that would-be candidate must satisfy Indiana Code 
section 3-8-2-7 (“the Affiliation Statute”). The Affiliation Statute requires a 
would-be candidate to file a declaration of candidacy, Ind. Code § 3-8-2-7, 
between January 10 and 12:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on February 9, 
2024, see id. § 3-8-2-4 (a declaration must be filed not later than noon 88 
days and not earlier than 118 days before the primary election).  
Additionally, a would-be party-affiliated candidate must establish their 
party affiliation by one of two ways: (A) having voted for the party with 
which they claim affiliation in the two most recent primary elections in 
which they voted (“Option A”); or (B) filing a certification from their 
county party chair affirming their membership in the party (“Option B”). 
Id. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4).  
A previous iteration of the Affiliation Statute, by contrast, allowed a 
candidate seeking certification under (a)(4)(A) to qualify so long as he 
voted for the party with which he claimed affiliation in the last primary 
election in which he voted. Id. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4)(A) (2021). The original 
version of the statute, effective from 1986 through June 30, 2013, allowed a 
candidate to establish party affiliation in three ways: (A) voting in the 
most recent primary held by the party in which the candidate claimed 
affiliation; (B) the candidate claimed a party affiliation despite never 
having voted in a primary election; or (C) filing certification from their 
county party chair affirming their membership in the party. Id. § 3-8-2-
7(4), as amended by Pub. L. No. 194-2013, § 12 (eff. July 1, 2013). 
 
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B. Procedural History 
John Rust of Seymour seeks to be a candidate on the May 7, 2024, 
Republican Party primary ballot for United States Senate. Rust last voted 
in the Republican primary in 2016. He did not vote in the 2014, 2018, 2020, 
or 2022 primaries and voted as a Democrat in the 2006, 2008, 2010, and 
2012 primaries. Because he last voted in the 2016 Republican primary, 
Rust could not qualify under Option A of the Affiliation Statute and had 
to seek party certification under Option B. 
In July 2023, Rust met with Jackson County Republican Party Chair 
Amanda Lowery requesting certification to fulfill Option B. Lowery told 
Rust she would not certify his party membership because of his voting 
record. Despite not satisfying either option of the Affiliation Statute, Rust 
announced his candidacy.  
Rust then filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief 
naming Lowery, the Election Commission, and Secretary of State Morales 
as Defendants (collectively, “the State”). He also sought a preliminary 
injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Affiliation Statute, arguing it 
violated the federal and state constitutions. The State moved to dismiss 
the complaint under Trial Rule 12(B)(1) and moved to consolidate the 
hearing on the preliminary injunction motion with a trial on the merits.  
The trial court consolidated the motions and after a hearing found the 
Affiliation Statute unconstitutional. The trial court explained that if the 
State “imperils a sacred and cherished right of [its] citizens,” then it must 
act “for an articulated compelling and pressing reason, and it[s action] 
must be exercised in the most transparent and least restrictive and least 
intrusive ways possible.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 10. The trial court 
concluded that the 2021 amendment to Indiana Code section 3-8-2-7(a)(4) 
“fails in this regard.” Id. Specifically, the trial court found that the 
Affiliation Statute: (1) violated Rust’s First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights; (2) raised vagueness and overbreadth concerns; (3) violated the 
Seventeenth Amendment by improperly taking away rights from voters 
and giving them to the state legislature and party chairs; (4) violated 
Rust’s Article 1, Section 23 right to equal privileges and immunities; (5) 
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improperly amended the Indiana Constitution without going through the 
proper process; and (6) violated the canons of statutory interpretation.  
Because the trial court’s final judgment declared the Affiliation Statute 
unconstitutional, we have mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction. Ind. 
Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(b). And since this appeal was filed, this Court has 
received amicus briefs from the Indiana Republican State Committee, and 
Common Cause Indiana and League of Woman Voters of Indiana.4 
 
Standard of Review 
We review statutory and constitutional questions de novo. City of 
Hammond v. Herman & Kittle Properties, Inc., 119 N.E.3d 70, 78 (Ind. 2019). 
Here, the Affiliation Statute is cloaked with “the presumption of 
constitutionality until clearly overcome by a contrary showing.” Horner v. 
Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 588 (Ind. 2019).  
 
Discussion and Decision 
To begin, we address the threshold issue of whether this matter is 
justiciable for resolution. The State alleged ripeness and standing as 
procedural concerns, but conceded during oral argument they were now 
satisfied. Oral Argument at 3:17–4:10. We agree.  
Rust sued the State under our Declaratory Judgment Act, which 
provides in part: “any person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question 
of construction or validity arising” under such law. I.C. § 34-14-1-2. While 
the General Assembly has been silent on what “affected by a statute” 
entails, this Court in Holcomb v. Bray ascribed concrete meaning to that 
phrase by suggesting it “requires a plaintiff must have standing and that 
their claims be ripe.” 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1285 (Ind. 2022) (citation omitted). 
 
4 We thank Amici for submitting briefs in this case.  
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Standing asks “whether a litigant is entitled to have a court decide the 
substantive issues of the claims presented,” id. at 1285 (citing Solarize 
Indiana, Inc. v. Southern Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 216 (Ind. 2022)), 
while ripeness questions “whether the claim is sufficiently developed to 
merit judicial review,” id. at 1285 (citing Ind. Dep’t of Env’t Mgmt. v. Chem. 
Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Ind. 1994)).  
Standing is a key component of Indiana’s tripartite system, which 
dispels aggregations of power. Horner, 125 N.E.3d at 589. Our standing 
jurisprudence requires plaintiffs to show “their rights are implicated in 
such a way that they could suffer an injury.” Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1287. 
“An injury is personal, direct, and one the plaintiff has suffered or is in the 
imminent danger of suffering.” Id. at 1287; Solarize Indiana, 182 N.E.3d at 
217 (explaining that standing requires “a party showing that they have 
suffered or were in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as result 
of the complained of conduct”) (cleaned up). Without a cognizable injury, 
a court cannot review the merits. Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1286.  
Claims must also be ripe for adjudication. See, e.g., Zoercher v. Agler, 
202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186, 189 (1930). As such, claims must not be merely 
academic or “theoretical,” but must reflect a “real or actual controversy, or 
at least the ripening seeds of such a controversy.” Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 
1287 (quoting Zoercher, 172 N.E. at 189). The issues, thus, must originate 
from “actual facts,” not “abstract possibilities.” Id.  
Any lingering doubts about standing or ripeness have been quelled 
because Rust alleges the Affiliation Statute infringes on his constitutional 
rights. Rust filed his declaration of candidacy on February 5, well before 
the February 9, 2024, at 12:00 p.m., deadline. See I.C. § 3-8-2-4(a). He also 
filed a petition signed by at least 4,500 Hoosier voters, including at least 
500 voters from each of Indiana’s congressional districts. Id. § 3-8-2-8. We 
therefore conclude that Rust is in “imminent danger of suffering” a real—
not theoretical—injury to his rights. Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1286. He has 
standing and his claims are ripe for review.  
 
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I. 
Rust’s First and Fourteenth Amendment 
challenges fail because the Affiliation Statute 
imposes a minor, reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory restriction that advances a 
litany of important state regulatory interests.  
With justiciability established, we turn to the merits. Rust successfully 
challenged the Affiliation Statute on First and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds, arguing it violated his rights of association. Today, we reach the 
opposite conclusion, and hold the Affiliation Statute survives this 
constitutional attack.  
A. First Principles of Free Association  
We start with first principles of free association. The First Amendment, 
“applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,” Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015), prohibits the government from 
“abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances,” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The United States Supreme 
Court has long embraced the axiom that “implicit in the right to engage in 
activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding right to 
associate with others.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). 
At its core, the First Amendment safeguards “the freedom to join 
together in furtherance of common political beliefs.” Tashjian v. Republican 
Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986). This freedom, which implicitly 
flows from the constitutional text, “presupposes the freedom to identify 
the people who constitute the association, and to limit the association to 
those people only.” La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122. If liberty exists, differences 
exist; and where differences exist, factions and groups emerge. See 
FEDERALIST, NO. 10 (Madison) (“As long as the reason of man continues to 
be infallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be 
formed.”). Individuals have diverse views, preferences, and commitments. 
See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983) (explaining that free 
association involves “an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the 
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). Protected 
association, therefore, plays an instrumental role in carving out space for 
the advancement of “a wide variety of political, social, economic, 
educational, religious, and cultural ends.” Am. for Prosperity Found. v. 
Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021) (quoting Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622).  
But the implication of the right to associate is the “corollary” right not 
to associate. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000). Without 
this feature, the purpose of free association would be undermined. Both 
rights—to associate and not associate—are two sides of the same coin. 
Otherwise, free association “would prove an empty guarantee if 
associations could not limit control over their decisions to those who share 
the interests and persuasions that underlie the association’s being.” La 
Follette, 450 U.S. at 122 n.22 (cleaned up). Our First Amendment 
jurisprudence consecrates a “special place” for “the processes by which a 
political party ‘selects a standard bearer who best represents the party’s 
ideologies and preferences.’” Jones, 530 U.S. at 575 (quoting Eu v. San 
Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)). Why? 
Because the party’s nominee serves as its “ambassador to the general 
electorate,” tasked with winning votes. Jones, 530 U.S. at 575. “In no area is 
the political association’s right to exclude more important than in the 
process of selecting its nominee,” as a party sets forth the criteria and 
vision for its agenda. Id. Indeed, the “moment of choosing the party’s 
nominee” for office, Jones, 530 U.S. at 575, represents a pivotal stage when 
principle becomes practice—“the crucial juncture at which the appeal to 
common principles may be translated into concerted action, and hence to 
political power in the community,” Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216. 
Against this backdrop, the core First Amendment question before us 
today is: Who decides? That is, who decides whether Rust can run as a 
Republican on the 2024 primary ballot for United States Senate in Indiana? 
Himself? Or the Republican Party? The Affiliation Statute says both: Rust 
decides if he votes in two primaries; the party decides if he does not.  
We find solid footing in the broad principle pronounced in López 
Torres: “A political party has a First Amendment right to limit its 
membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection that will in 
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its view produce the nominee who best represents its political platform.” 
552 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added). Two ideas merit brief explanation. First, 
limitation of membership suggests that some individuals will not 
represent the party and its platform. Thus, the party has a right to restrict 
association. This point hardly needs dissertation: a northern Democrat 
who opposed Lyndon Johnson’s landmark civil rights law would likely 
have been unwelcomed in his party in 1968; a Republican opposing 
Ronald Reagan’s tax reforms could likewise be shunned decades later, as 
parties would have the right to limit association with critics.  
Second, a party’s choice over the candidate-selection process allows it 
to work within the real-world constraint that differences exist among 
candidates. The Founders rightfully embraced in the Declaration of 
Independence the notion that “all men are created equal.” But that 
premise of equality does not ensure that each candidate will be equal in 
every respect. Some are better equipped for a party nomination than 
others. This could stem from a variation in a candidate’s views, charisma, 
experience, or timing.  
And that brings us to the fundamental purpose of candidate-selection: 
it allows parties to decide who would be the best “ambassador,” Jones, 530 
U.S. at 575, of its “ideologies and preferences.” Id. (cleaned up). History 
shows that party primaries were not the only valid method of selection. 
Instead, selection by “smoke-filled rooms” dictated by party bosses was 
constitutionally permissible. López Torres, 552 U.S. at 206. Such a method 
was not constitutionally infirm, but part-and-parcel of free association. Id. 
And to be sure, this method “has never been thought unconstitutional,” 
even though delegates were selected by party caucuses. Id.  
Indiana’s history confirms its own vacillation in candidate-selection. In 
response to the Seventeenth Amendment, Indiana enacted the Primary 
Election Law in 1915, establishing candidate nominations by party 
primary election for both state and federal candidates. Charles 
Kettleborough, Direct Primary in Indiana at 166. This statewide 
requirement applied to all parties casting over ten percent of the total vote 
in the preceding general election. J.F. Connell, Indiana Primary Laws, 18 
Ind. Mag. Hist. 224, 230 (1922). In 1929, however, Indiana abandoned 
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primaries and returned to nominating candidates for United States Senate 
and Governor at state political party conventions. Id. Finally, in 1975, 
Indiana law was amended to return once again to primary selection for 
these candidates. I.C. § 3-1-10-3 (1975). In short, these alterations in 
candidate selection over sixty years reflect different value-laden policy 
choices by the political branches about how much choice the State was 
willing extend to parties, consistent with the First Amendment’s broad 
guarantee of associational rights.  
To be sure, a party’s associational rights are not infinite and without 
limitation. For example, if states give a party a seat at the table in “the 
election process,” the party’s rights are constitutionally “circumscribed.” 
López Torres, 552 U.S. at 203. In such an event, if a party committed a 
racially discriminatory act, it could come within state action and thus 
result in a Fifteenth Amendment violation. Id. at 798. On the flip side, the 
State, having given a party a seat at the table, would also have “a 
legitimate . . . interest in ensuring the fairness of the party’s nominating 
process,” and thus could define “what the process must be.” Id. Of course, 
it is “too plain for argument,” Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 
(1974), that states may enact procedures and decide the “party use of 
primaries or conventions to select nominees who appear on the general-
election ballot,” López Torres, 552 U.S. at 203 (citing White, 415 U.S. at 781).  
This principle of free association was explained in López Torres. In that 
case, the United States Supreme Court confronted a 1921 New York 
election law that “required parties to select their candidates for the 
Supreme Court [the trial court of general jurisdiction in New York] by a 
convention composed of delegates elected by party members.” Id. at 200 
(citation omitted). Under that law, the nominees chosen at the party 
conventions “appear[ed] automatically on the general-election ballot.” Id. 
at 201. López Torres had been elected to “a court of more limited 
jurisdiction” in 1992 with the support of the Democratic Party, but fell out 
of favor with party leaders over her resistance to their patronage hiring 
demands. Id. at 201 According to López Torres, her continued resistance 
led to the local party opposing her unsuccessful candidacy at the Supreme 
Court nominating conventions in 1997, 2002, and 2003, respectively. Id. 
She later brought suit—along with other candidates who failed to secure 
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party nominations—against the New York Board of Elections, arguing 
that this law “burdened the rights of challengers seeking to run against 
candidates favored by the party leadership,” and as a result “deprived 
voters and candidates of their rights to gain access to the ballot and to 
associate in choosing their party’s candidates.” Id.  
The Supreme Court rejected this novel argument on arrival. Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court, reasoned these challengers were “in no 
position to rely on the right that the First Amendment confers on political 
parties to structure their internal party processes and to select the 
candidate of the party’s choosing.” Id. at 203. And this is where the 
“shield” and “sword” imagery came to life: Democratic and Republican 
parties in New York both intervened to defend the election law and thus 
use the First Amendment as a “shield” of associational protection. Id. 
López Torres, by contrast, employed the First Amendment as a “sword” 
as an attempt to gain entry into the party to obtain “a certain degree of 
influence” within it. Id. She argued that use of the sword was needed to 
ensure that she and others would have a “fair chance” in prevailing in 
their primary candidate-selection process. Id. at 203–04. But this 
implausible and strained reading of the First Amendment was unmoored 
from federal precedent authorizing states to impose reasonable limitations 
on voting. Id. at 204; see, e.g., Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) 
(recognizing that states may require a person to show “a significant 
modicum of support” before giving them access to the general-election 
ballot); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 295 (1992) (approving rule of 25,000 
signatures, or two percent of the electorate); White, 415 U.S. at 783 
(approving condition of one percent of the vote cast for Governor in 
preceding general election, which was around 22,000 signatures).  
The Court rejected this request to ensure candidates have a “fair shot,” 
because opening the doors to an “unpredictable theater of election 
jurisprudence” would require constitutionalizing a policy preference 
about candidate selection. López Torres, 552 U.S. at 206–07. While New 
York could make a policy decision about whether its candidate-selection 
regime that dated to 1921 was still “desirable,” the First Amendment did 
not compel that outcome. Id. Properly understood, the Constitution vests 
authority in the political branches to ratify those policy decisions.  
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B. Application of Anderson-Burdick Framework  
With the First Amendment principles established, we turn to the 
Anderson-Burdick framework to evaluate whether the Affiliation Statute 
survives Rust’s First Amendment challenges. Under this standard, we 
assess the competing rights of both parties and candidates. Based on our 
application of this standard, the Affiliation Statute passes constitutional 
muster, despite Rust’s insistence to the contrary. 
To start, we acknowledge a key distinction between the rights of voters 
and the rights of candidates. “[T]he political franchise of voting . . . is 
regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all 
rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). By contrast, the rights 
of candidates is less defined and has not been awarded a fundamental 
status. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142–43 (1972) (“the Court has not 
heretofore attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a 
rigorous standard of review” but “laws that affect candidates always have 
at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters”); see also Clements v. 
Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982) (explaining there is no fundamental right 
for a candidate to run for office). In this arena, precedent affording 
protection for candidacy “can be best described as a legal morass.” Randall 
v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010). We can thus confidently say that 
Rust does not have a fundamental right to run for United States Senate in 
Indiana, let alone as “the Republican Party’s nominee” for that place on 
the ballot. Ind. Republican State Comm. Amicus Br. at 9. 
But just because he lacks a fundamental right to run for United States 
Senate as the Republican nominee does not mean he lacks a right to run as 
a candidate for United States Senate. Id. The First Amendment generally 
protects the rights of political parties and the rights of citizens to 
participate in the electoral system. See Norman, 502 U.S. at 288 (identifying 
the “constitutional interest of like-minded voters to gather in pursuit of 
common political ends”). Thus, we must still determine whether the 
Affiliation Statute infringes Rust’s First Amendment rights.  
We look to Anderson-Burdick for instruction. See Tully v. Okeson, 977 
F.3d 608, 615 (7th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the Anderson-Burdick “test 
applies to all First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state election 
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laws.”) (emphasis in original). This framework descends from two 
Supreme Court cases, Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, and Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428. The balancing test from Anderson requires three 
inquiries: First, the Court must “consider the character and magnitude of 
the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.” 460 U.S. at 789. Second, the Court “must identify and 
evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for 
the burden imposed [by the law].” Id. Third, in weighing the rights 
burdened and the state’s interests, the Court “also must consider the 
extent to which those [state] interests make it necessary to burden the 
plaintiff’s rights.” Id. Burdick later recognized two applicable standards: 
when the burden on ballot access is severe, the restriction triggers strict 
scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state 
interest. 504 U.S. at 434. But if the burden is “reasonable” and 
“nondiscriminatory,” the restriction will survive constitutional attack if 
the state can identify and put forth “important regulatory interests” to 
justify it. Id. (emphasis added). Under the more deferential Anderson-
Burdick standard, the regulation still “must be justified by relevant 
legitimate state interests sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.” 
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (cleaned up).  
The trial court, in reviewing this challenge, concluded there was (1) 
“no compelling or even rational government interest being served here,” 
and (2) the statute was not “tailored” to meet the State’s purported 
interests. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 20. We disagree. Because the 
Affiliation Statute imposes a minor, reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
restriction on Rust’s rights, justified by the State’s catalogue of legitimate 
interests, it survives this attack under the Anderson-Burdick standard.5 
 
 
5 Because we resolve this challenge under the Anderson-Burdick standard, we need not analyze 
this challenge under strict scrutiny. Rust did not directly assert that the Affiliation Statute was 
not reasonable and instead assumes the more exacting strict scrutiny applies. We disagree.  
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1. The Affiliation Statute imposes a minor, reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory limitation on Rust’s associational rights. 
First, the Affiliation Statute imposes a reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory restriction on Rust’s right to be on the primary election 
ballot. At most, this restriction is a minor impediment, satisfied by simply 
voting in the last two primaries (or less, actually, so long as in the last two 
primaries in which Rust voted—whenever they were held—he requested 
a Republican Party ballot). We do not find this modest objective criterion 
for demonstrating party bona fides to be a significant burden.  
Moreover, to reiterate, Rust does not have a fundamental right to run 
for United States Senate as the Republican nominee. See Clements, 457 U.S. 
at 963. But the Affiliation Statute does not foreclose his opportunity to run 
as a candidate for United States Senate anyway. He still enjoys a statutory 
right to appear on the general-election ballot as an independent, 
Libertarian, or write-in candidate, where Hoosiers can still vote for him. 
I.C. §§ 3-8-4-10(b); 3-8-6-3; 3-8-2-2.5(a). True, Rust cannot run on the 
Republican primary ballot—admittedly, his “first choice”—but he can still 
run as an independent, for example, and “tout his Republican virtues, tell 
voters he supports Republicans, put up yard signs to that effect, and run 
on a platform identical to any political party.” Hero v. Lake County Election 
Board, 42 F.4th 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2022). Still, Rust argued that even if he 
could “run as an independent or write-in candidate, a severe restriction of 
his right to freely associate would [still] exist.” Appellee’s Br. at 32. We 
disagree. Even though independents or write-in candidates may not have 
the greatest likelihood of electoral success, see Anderson, 460 U.S. at 799 
n.26 (explaining the limitations of a write-in candidacy), the Supreme 
Court has rejected similar fairness arguments requesting that the First 
Amendment’s free association jurisprudence be calibrated to maximize 
the electoral chances of candidates for office, see López Torres, 552 U.S. at 
205 (pointing out that “none of our cases” recognize a “constitutional right 
to have a ‘fair shot’ at winning the party’s nomination”).  
Though ballot access laws can impose burdens on the “right of 
individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs,” even 
restrictions on general elections do not automatically trigger strict 
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scrutiny. Navarro v. Neal, 716 F.3d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting William 
v. Rhoades, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)). The Seventh Circuit in Navarro, for 
example, upheld an Illinois law requiring candidates for state legislature 
to secure 500 to 1,000 signatures to appear on the general-election ballot, 
reasoning that this restriction was not severe and therefore qualified as 
minor. 716 F.3d at 428–30; see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (applying a more 
lenient standard to Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting in primary 
and general elections); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 593 (2005) 
(applying a more lenient standard to Oklahoma’s semi-closed primary 
system that allowed independent voters but blocked other parties’ 
members from voting in the Libertarian Party’s primary election).  
At most, the Affiliation Statute is a minor restriction. It simply governs 
the procedures to access the party’s primary ballot by requiring Rust to 
establish sufficient party affiliation by showing (1) he has an adequate 
primary voting record with the party, or (2) he has attached a written 
certification of party membership from the county party chair to his 
declaration of candidacy. I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4). Unlike Navarro, 716 F.3d at 
428–30, none of these conditions impact Rust’s access to the general-
election ballot. At bottom, he can still run his campaign, express his views, 
put forth his agenda, and appear on the general-election ballot in 
November. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (“[A]n election campaign is an 
effective platform for the expression of views on the issues of the day, and 
a candidate serves as a rallying-point for like-minded citizens.”). And 
Hoosiers can still vote for him. Thus, we are satisfied this restriction is 
indeed minor, as that term has been defined in election law challenges.  
Our conclusion finds refuge and support in the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Hero. In that case, Joseph Hero “voted in Republican primaries 
for decades, and even ran for office as a Republican with occasional 
success.” 42 F.4th at 770. After a local policy disagreement about his 
town’s use of eminent domain to seize property from low-income 
residents, Hero supported a group of independent candidates running for 
town council. Id. In response, the local Republican Party deprived Hero of 
his ability to run for reelection as precinct committeeman and delegate to 
the Republican State Convention. Further, the State Republican Party took 
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a bolder step in that direction and banned him for ten years from “seeking 
elected office in Indiana as a Republican.” Id. at 770–71.  
Unmoved, Hero attempted to appear as the Republican candidate for 
town council in the 2019 election. Id. at 771. He satisfied all requirements 
under Indiana law,6 but the local party objected and challenged his 
candidacy. Id. The Lake County Election Board sustained the challenge 
and removed Hero from the Republican primary ballot. Id. On appeal, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the Election Board “did not violate Hero’s First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights” because its decision to strike his 
name from the primary ballot was simply a “minor restriction” on his 
rights, as Hero could still access the general-election ballot. Id. at 776. 
In short, Hero reinforces our conclusion that the Affiliation Statute 
imposes a minor, reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction on Rust’s 
rights as a candidate. Applying the Anderson-Burdick framework, Hero 
determined that enforcement of a ten-year ban on affiliation—“a patently 
more severe restriction” than the one here, Ind. Republican State Comm. 
Amicus Br. at 16, was minor given Hero’s alternative access to the 
general-election ballot. Like Hero, Rust, too, has other routes to the 
general-election ballot, I.C. §§ 3-8-4-10(b); 3-8-6-3; 3-8-2-2.5(a), even if they 
are not his “first option,” Hero, 42 F.4th at 776. We are thus satisfied Hero 
supports our conclusion today that the Affiliation Statute imposes a minor 
restriction triggering Anderson-Burdick, applying less than strict scrutiny.  
Rust successfully argued below that Hero could be distinguished for 
two reasons. First, Hero did not “involve a challenge to, or the 
interpretation of,” the Affiliation Statute. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 32. 
Second, Hero involved internal banishment by the Republican Party, 
whereas Rust has not been banned by the GOP. Both are unpersuasive.  
 
6 At the time of Hero, the previous iteration of the Affiliation Statute provided that a candidate 
of a major political party could file “a declaration of candidacy” for a party if either he voted 
in the last primary election, or the county chairman certified that the candidate is a member of 
the political party. 42 F.4th at 771 (citation omitted). As explained, the law has since been 
amended to require voting in two primary elections. I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4). 
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True, Hero did not challenge the constitutionality of the Affiliation 
Statute. But Hero pressed the same First and Fourteenth Amendment 
associational rights to access the Republican primary ballot, see 42 F.4th at 
771, which also undergird Rust’s challenge. And equally true: the ten-year 
ban in Hero originated with the party, id., whereas Rust feared rejection 
because he failed to satisfy statutory requirements. But the final decision 
to remove Hero from the ballot was from a state actor—the Lake County 
Election Board, which enforced the party’s First Amendment rights. Id.  
While Rust urges we focus narrowly on the thin distinction between 
party and state action, Hero explained more broadly that a political party 
has a First Amendment right to exclude those “with whom the party does 
not wish to affiliate” and that a state, in turn, can “protect the First 
Amendment rights of a political party” by allowing it to “restrict its 
standard bearers to members in good standing.” 42 F.4th at 776–77. Hero 
thus stands for a larger First Amendment principle: a political party may 
exclude candidates from their ballot, even if they satisfy the Affiliation 
Statute. Id. at 771; see also Ind. Republican State Comm. Amicus Br. at 17. 
2. The State has important interests supporting this minor 
restriction on Rust’s access to the primary-election ballot.   
And this brings us to our second point: The State has a list of 
important regulatory interests in protecting a party’s associational rights 
that justify this minor, reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction.  
But before we survey the range of state interests, we again 
acknowledge a first principle: political parties have legitimate First 
Amendment interests in choosing—and excluding—their members and 
leaders. “Political parties enjoy these associational rights like any other 
organization.” Hero, 42 F.4th at 776. Its “determination . . . of the structure 
which best allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by the 
Constitution.” Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224. The Supreme Court has 
“vigorously affirmed,” and specifically recognized, this “special place” 
reserved by the First Amendment. Jones, 530 U.S. at 575. A party’s 
associational rights “presuppose[] the freedom to identify those who 
constitute the association, and to limit the association to those people.” 
Jones, 530 U.S. at 567–68 (citing La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122). Free association 
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also generally “encompasses a political party’s decision about the . . . 
process for electing its leaders.” Eu, 489 U.S. at 229. The Supreme Court 
has also embraced—“with increasing firmness”—the view that “the First 
Amendment guarantees a political party great leeway in governing its 
own affairs.” Maslow v. Bd. of Election in N.Y.C., 658 F.3d at 291, 296 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). A party thus has an indispensable interest in 
protecting itself against “unaffiliated” people who “may seriously distort 
[its] collective decisions,” and thus encroach its “essential functions.” 
Hero, 42 F.4th at 776 (quoting La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122). Rightfully so.  
Of course, these rights belong to the party, but states also have a 
legitimate interest in safeguarding parties from forced inclusion of 
unwanted members and candidates. See Hero, 42 F.4th at 776 (“The state 
has an interest in protecting a party’s right to determine its own 
membership and limit its candidates to those party members.”). Allowing 
an unwanted individual to wield a “sword” to gain access into a party, 
López Torres, 552 U.S. at 203, would invade “the group’s freedom of 
expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant 
way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints,” Hero, 42 
F.4th at 776 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (1984)). 
While a party may use the First Amendment as a “shield,” López Torres, 
552 U.S. at 203, to protect itself from “intrusion by those with adverse 
political principles,” La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122, states may also further 
“protect the First Amendment rights of a political party,” as the Election 
Board did in Hero, “by allowing the Republican Party to determine its 
membership and restrict its standard bearers,” 42 F.4th at 777–78.  
This principle—that the Constitution allows states to guard a political 
party’s preferences—finds support elsewhere. Two federal circuit 
opinions from the Eleventh Circuit, which both concerned a party’s effort 
to exclude an odious candidate from its primary ballot, provide 
illustration. In Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992), the Eleventh 
Circuit applied a “reasonable restriction standard” to find that, while 
David Duke, a former Klansman, had satisfied the statutory requirements 
for ballot access, the Republican committee had the First Amendment 
right to keep him off, and Georgia “has an interest in maintaining the 
autonomy of political parties,” because the Republican Party enjoys “a 
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constitutionally protected right of freedom of association.” Id. at 1531–32. 
Four years later in Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996), the 
Eleventh Circuit again denied Duke relief, but this time it applied strict 
scrutiny. Id. at 1234. The court concluded that the “state has a compelling 
interest in protecting political parties’ right to define their membership.” 
Id. Hero thus does not find itself on an island of its own jurisprudence.  
States also have an important interest in sustaining the identifiability 
of political parties. The integrity and legitimacy of a political party 
“depend[] upon its ability to place before voters, under the party insignia, 
a list of candidates for office who stand for those tenets concerning 
government that the organization is supposed to represent.” State ex rel. 
Garn v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Marshall Cnty., 78 N.E. 1016, 1018 (Ind. 
1906). Thus, party identifiability embodies “the highest importance to the 
electors, to the end that they might not be misled into indorsing principles 
in form to which they were opposed in fact.” Id.  
States also have a “strong interest” in fostering the health and 
“stability of their political systems.” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New 
Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366 (1997) (emphasis added). As such, states may 
“enact reasonable election regulations that may, in practice, favor the 
traditional two-party system and that temper the destabilizing effects of 
party-splintering and excessive factionalism.” Id. at 367 (citation omitted). 
The strength and vitality of “established parties,” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
347, 383 (Powell, J., dissenting), present voters “with understandable 
choices and the winner in the general election with sufficient support to 
govern effectively,” Storer, 415 U.S. at 735. By contrast, “splintered parties 
and unrestrained factionalism” could impose “significant damage to the 
fabric of government.” Id. “[T]he importance of political parties [is] self-
evident,” serving “a variety of substantial government interests,” 
including effective implementation of programs and policies, 
accountability, and identifiability for voters in down ballot, lower profile 
races. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 528 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 
531 (explaining that “[v]oters with little information about individuals 
seeking office traditionally have relied upon party affiliation as a guide to 
choosing among candidates,” but a “decline in party stability” has left 
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them “less able to blame or credit a party for the performance of” its 
officials).7 
On a more general level, states have other essential interests in 
cabining ballot access rights to protect the integrity of the election 
process. The Supreme Court has affirmed that states have important 
regulatory interests in imposing ballot access requirements to prevent 
ballot overcrowding, voter confusion, and election fraud. Storer, 415 U.S. 
at 732–33. In short, states have a robust “interest in having orderly, fair, 
and honest elections,” rather than allowing circus-level “chaos” and 
confusion. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730. Because the state has an interest in 
preserving the integrity of its election process, it may pass laws that 
“promote the integrity of primary elections.” Eu, 489 U.S. at 231; see also 
Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973) (states may impose waiting 
periods before voters change party registration and participate in another 
party primary; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145 (states may also prevent “frivolous 
or fraudulent candidacies”); Norman, 502 U.S. at 290 (states have an 
interest in thwarting “misrepresentation” and electoral confusion). 
Here, the State put forth several “precise interests” to justify the 
Affiliation Statute’s restriction on primary ballot access. Anderson, 460 U.S. 
at 789. These interests included “protecting a political party’s right to 
determine its own membership,” Tr. at 154, and preventing “voter 
confusion by preserving party identifiability, avoiding ballot 
overcrowding and frivolous candidacies, and maintaining order, rather 
than chaos, in Indiana’s primary and general elections,” Appellants’ Br. at 
27. With these interests in mind, we conclude the State has several 
important interests supporting the Affiliation Statute, which imposes a 
minor, reasonable and nondiscriminatory limitation on Rust’s rights.  
 
7 While these sentiments appeared in dissents from opinions holding wholesale patronage 
firings unconstitutional, that context makes them no less relevant and persuasive today. 
Indeed, the Elrod and Branti dissents were prescient in predicting today’s political 
environment where celebrity can trump organization. It is simply historical fact that “smoke-
filled” convention halls when parties were stronger gave us Lincoln, the Roosevelts, Truman, 
and Eisenhower, to name several, though causation and correlation can always be debated.  
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The Affiliation Statute provides a reasonable balancing to access the 
primary ballot: Option A provides that a candidate, like Rust, may 
establish sufficient association with a major political party if his two most 
recent primary votes in Indiana were in the party’s primary. I.C. § 3-8-2-
7(a)(4)(A). This option affords candidates control over affiliation through 
primary election voting. Here, Rust had that choice, but did not exercise it. 
He voted in the Republican primary in 2016, and yet he did not vote in the 
2014, 2018, 2020, or 2022 primaries. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 57–59. 
Thus, he failed to exercise his rights to affiliate with the Republican Party 
under the Affiliation Statute. By contrast, Option B provides Rust a 
potential safe harbor by allowing him to request certification by his 
county party chair. I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4)(B). But his request for affiliation 
with the Republican Party is cabined by the county party’s discretion, 
which reflects the party’s right to decide whether to use its rights as a 
“shield,” López Torres, 552 U.S. at 203, against Rust if it desires not to be 
affiliated with him. See infra Section II.E. In short, Option B advances the 
party’s associational right to “limit” candidates, Hero, 42 F.4th at 776, 
which in turn protects its identifiability, Garn, 78 N.E. at 1018, and ensures 
the enduring “stability” of the political system, Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366.  
Both options reasonably balance the rights of candidates and parties 
consistent with the Constitution. As a matter of first principles, the First 
Amendment does not give Rust a license to “fight freestyle” to access the 
Republican primary ballot, while requiring the Party to “follow Marquis 
of Queensberry rules.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992). 
This statute embraces that principle and further ensures an equal fight. 
The dissent rejects this equal fight by implicitly appealing to policy 
arguments about fairness.8 At first glance, our disagreement may seem to 
turn on whether the Affiliation Statute imposes a minor or severe burden 
under Anderson-Burdick, which triggers the level of scrutiny. But upon 
closer reflection, this conflict is really a clash about the judicial role. 
 
8 We assign the election policy choices of Illinois and New Jersey, for example, zero weight in 
our constitutional analysis. Post, at 7 n.6. (opinion of Goff, J.).  
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The fundamental question today is who decides whether Rust should 
be on the Republican primary ballot for United States Senate. The plain 
text of the Affiliation Statute is clear: Rust decides to be on the primary 
ballot if he votes in two Republican primaries; the party decides if he does 
not. I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4). The facts are equally clear: Rust did not vote in the 
required primaries, nor did Chairperson Lowery certify him. Thus, based 
on the terms of the statute, Rust should not be on the ballot—full stop.   
So, why are we here? Because Rust believes the Affiliation Statute is 
unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (though it 
is unclear if he brings a “facial” or “as-applied” challenge). The dissent 
sympathizes, and raps Indiana for imposing “some of the highest hurdles 
for primary-ballot access in the nation,” while observing that “the General 
Assembly recently amended [the] election code to make it even harder for 
potential candidates to add their names to the primary ballot.” Post, at 6 
(opinion of Goff, J.). The dissent also judges the State for offering “no 
meaningful opportunity for Rust to exercise his associational rights as a 
candidate or a voter.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added).9 If we are talking about 
Rust as a candidate, the State could abolish its primary system altogether 
and provide no opportunity for Rust to exercise his associational rights if 
it so desired.10 Since the selection of candidates through “smoke-filled 
rooms” has never been viewed as unconstitutional, López Torres, 552 U.S. 
at 206, the argument is unpersuasive, especially since Rust can exercise his 
rights on the general-election ballot this fall. But even if we are talking 
 
9 Rust brings this claim as both a candidate and as a voter. App. Vol. 2, p. 37. But precedent 
confirms the rights of voters and rights of candidates are distinct and thus do not share the 
same status. Compare Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370 (describing voting as “a fundamental political 
right”), with Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142–43 (explaining that a “fundamental status to candidacy” 
has not been “attached” to such a right). Rust presents no meaningful line of distinction 
here—he baldly asserts his rights as a candidate and voter without demarcation. 
10 Rust’s counsel acknowledged during oral argument that abolishing the primary selection of 
candidates in Indiana would be constitutionally permissible. Oral Argument at 19:26–19:40.  
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about Rust’s rights as a voter,11 the Supreme Court has typically reviewed 
these restrictions “and their reasonably foreseeable impact on voters 
generally,” not on the individual burden. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 206 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original). Burdick, for 
example, concluded that the Hawaii laws at issue “impose[d] only a 
limited burden on voters’ rights to make free choices and to associate 
politically through the vote.” 504 U.S. at 439. But Burdick did not review 
whether the restrictions had a severe effect on Burdick’s right to vote 
under his personal circumstances. See id. at 436–37. In fact, that view was 
embraced by the Burdick dissenters who would have applied strict 
scrutiny to the laws because of their impact on “some voters.” Id. at 446 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also id. at 448 (“The 
majority’s analysis ignores the inevitable and significant write-in ban 
imposes on some individual voters . . . .”). But properly understood, 
precedent “refute[s] the view that individual impacts are relevant to 
determining the severity of the burden it imposes.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 
206 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Clingman, 544 U.S. at 
590–91 (examining voting burdens generally rather than individually). 
We are acutely aware of our limited constitutional role as judges and 
thus avoid any “pretense of knowledge” about what is best for Hoosiers 
as a matter of policy when it comes to primary elections.12 Out of this 
posture of judicial humility, we presume the constitutionality of statutes 
“until clearly overcome by a contrary showing.” Horner, 125 N.E.3d at 588. 
At the same time, we also recognize our power of judicial review—that it 
is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
 
11 Rust brought this claim as an individual voter because he “seeks to cast his vote 
effectively.” App. Vol. 2, p. 37 (emphasis added). But the dissent extrapolates from this 
complaint that the burden is not simply about Rust’s rights as an individual voter, but also 
about “his prospective supporters’ rights.” Post, at 10 (opinion of Goff, J.) (emphasis added).   
12 F.A. Hayek expressed this sentiment in his famous “The Pretence of Knowledge” 1974 
Nobel Lecture: “To act on the belief that we possess the knowledge and the power which 
enable us to shape the processes of society entirely to our liking, knowledge which in fact we 
do not possess, is likely to make us do much harm.” Friedrich August von Hayek, The Pretence 
of Knowledge, Nobel Memorial Lecture (Dec. 11, 1974), in 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 3, 7 (1989).  
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what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis 
added); see also FEDERALIST, NO. 78 (Hamilton) (“The interpretation of the 
laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.”). As such, civics 
teaches that the legislature makes the law and courts interpret law as 
written. But the dissent would collapse the judicial and legislative 
functions and flout the separation of powers by announcing its own 
policy preference: “Primaries are not meant to be opportunities for party 
leaders to crown their favored candidates—and certainly not in 
uncontested ballots.” Post, at 2 (opinion of Goff, J.). But the First 
Amendment says nothing of the sort, and the Supreme Court has never 
embraced this policy and transformed it into a formal rule or standard for 
constitutional law. See López Torres, 552 U.S. at 205–06 (explaining that 
determining a candidate’s “fair shot” is “hardly a manageable 
constitutional question for judges—especially for judges in our legal 
system, where traditional electoral practices give no hint or even the 
existence, much less the content, of [such] a constitutional requirement”). 
Thus, the dissent’s position is untethered from the First Amendment.  
Elsewhere, the dissent points to the “lack of competition” in elections, 
which “has resulted in extremely low voter turnout in recent years.” Post, 
at 5–6 (opinion of Goff, J.). In highlighting this concern, the dissent shares 
data about the “average turnout rate for eligible voters at primary 
elections” in Indiana. Id. at 6. Admittedly, low voter turnout presents a 
legitimate concern for Hoosiers—a concern that all members of this Court 
share. At any rate, this problem is best addressed in the legislature, where 
elected officials can debate and discuss the efficacy and desirability of 
policies affecting voter turnout. Courts should not be drawn into the 
vortex of hotly-contested social and political disputes, which they are ill-
equipped to handle, due to limited institutional competence in evaluating 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
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such information and rendering judgments.13 Simply put, the legislature is 
in the best position to “weigh the costs and benefits” of a given ballot 
restriction and voter turnout. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). Courts, in contrast, should stay in their lane 
and not make broad, values-based pronouncements about election policy. 
The Constitution did not assign us that job. As always, the legislature can 
amend its primary-selection method. Post, at 2–6 (opinion of Goff, J.). “But 
to say that the State can require this is a far cry from saying that the 
Constitution demands it.” López Torres, 552 U.S. at 206. It does not.  
The dissent also expresses policy preferences when it generally 
concludes that the Affiliation Statute fails to serve the State’s interests 
because “[t]here’s no potential for ballot overcrowding,” post, at 13 
(opinion of Goff, J.), and “likewise no potential for party raiding or a 
frivolous candidacy,” id. at 14. In acknowledging the State has “a 
legitimate interest in seeing that ballots are not encumbered by the names 
of candidates with no substantial support,” id. at 13, the dissent contends 
that the Petition Statute, Indiana Code § 3-8-2-8, “adequately serves” the 
State’s interests in preventing ballot overcrowding, id. (emphasis added). 
Two points stand out. First, is the dissent implying the Affiliation Statute 
can never serve the State’s interest in preventing ballot overcrowding? Or 
is it concluding that the Petition Statute is simply better at serving the 
State’s interests? Either way, both explanations involve a policy 
assessment of the Affiliation Statute. Cf. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 
479 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1986) (stating the legislature may “respond to 
potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than 
reactively, provided that the response is reasonable and does not 
 
13 We believe that courts are not well suited to resolve policy debates based on legislative 
facts, i.e., empirical studies, statistics, or social scientific theories. Charles Reich captured this 
point about the limitations of courts well: “Courts have no sources of information other than 
the record before them, and judges have no special knowledge to assist them in evaluating 
information of a social or political nature if they were able to obtain it.” Charles A. Reich, Mr. 
Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 740 (1963) (emphasis added). 
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significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights”). But such 
value-laced judgments are properly left to the legislature.14  
The dissent accuses the Court of giving “the legislature unrestricted 
authority to regulate the primary ballot.” Post, at 23 (opinion of Goff, J.). 
Not so. Two points merit attention from this sweeping conclusion.  
First, the Constitution—not five appointed lawyers on the Indiana 
Supreme Court—grants the General Assembly broad authority to shape 
election policy. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4. True, this power is not unrestricted, 
but we have recognized that unremarkable principle of constitutional law. 
Supra at 11. Of course, the First and Fourteenth Amendments impose 
independent limitations on the exercise of government power against 
individuals. And indeed, courts have a first principles duty to enforce 
those limits as “the bulwarks of a limited Constitution.” FEDERALIST, NO. 
78 (Hamilton); see also Horner, 125 N.E.3d at 610 (Rush, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (explaining that courts are “responsible for 
safeguarding against legislative overreach”). But we must enforce limits 
when the Constitution requires us to do so. In this case, it does not.  
Second, not all ballot restrictions demand strict scrutiny under 
Anderson-Burdick. The dissent implies otherwise. It contends the Court 
contains “no analysis” of how the State’s interests “are necessary to 
burden Rust’s constitutional rights.” Post, at 23 (opinion of Goff, J.) 
(emphasis in original). But this broad assertion overlooks the “primacy” of 
the Supreme Court’s “two-track approach” in applying Anderson-Burdick. 
 
14 The dissent also points out that, since Indiana’s “semi-closed” primary system does not 
require “formal membership, enrollment, or registration with the party” in order to vote in a 
party primary, Herr v. State, 212 N.E.3d 1261, 1264 n. 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), the State “created” 
any attendant risk of “party raiding” because there is “no way of determining what a voter 
intends to do [because] voting is not necessarily indicative of party membership or loyalty.” 
Post, at 14–15 (opinion of Goff, J.). Indeed, primary voting may not be dispositive of party 
membership or loyalty, but that type of normative assessment is reserved for the legislature—
which, in this instance, has deemed primary voting to be probative evidence of party 
affiliation. Cf. Munro, 479 U.S. at 195 (“To require States to prove actual voter confusion, ballot 
overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies as a predicate to the imposition of 
reasonable ballot access restrictions would invariably lead to endless court battles over the 
sufficiency of the ‘evidence’ marshaled by the State to prove the predicate.”). 
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Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Before we 
balance rights and interests, courts must first “identify” the burden 
imposed. Id. If the burden is “severe,” strict scrutiny applies, “and we 
uphold them only if they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 
451 (2008) (quotations omitted). But if it is minor, “then the State’s 
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify 
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions on elections procedures.” Id. at 
452 (quotations omitted); see also Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Ordinary and widespread burdens [that 
require] nominal effort of everyone, are not severe.”) (quotations omitted). 
That is precisely what the Court did here. We first concluded the 
Affiliation Statute imposes a minor, reasonable and nondiscriminatory 
restriction on Rust’s access to the primary ballot. Supra at 15–18. We 
therefore rejected the dissent’s novel premise—one that derives from 
policy notions of fairness—that the burden imposed is somehow “severe.” 
Id. at 16. It is not. The Affiliation Statute has “eminently reasonable” 
requirements. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 209 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Make no mistake: Rust could have appeared on the 
Republican primary ballot this May had he voted in the required 
primaries, but he elected not to do so. That was his choice. No one 
stopped him. He stopped himself, a dispositive point the concurrence 
properly emphasizes. Post, at 17 (opinion of Molter, J.). The First 
Amendment does not “shield” Rust from his choices. Id. We next 
pinpointed several legitimate regulatory interests that support this 
restriction, supra at 18–22, which “are generally sufficient” on their own 
terms, Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. 452, but that also directly balance 
the rights of Rust and the Republican Party under Option A and B, supra 
at 22. Option B, specifically, advances the party’s right to limit its 
candidates, which in turns protects its identifiability and ensures stability 
in the political system. Each of these is a sufficiently weighty interest. Id.  
The dissent’s ambitious quest to convert these minor restrictions into 
“severe” burdens requires the “sort of detailed judicial supervision of the 
election process” that defies the judicial role and constitutional structure. 
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In so 
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doing, the dissent takes Indiana’s established presumption of 
constitutionality of statutes and flips it on its head. Cf. Horner, 125 N.E.3d 
at 588. Indeed, our Court must apply strict scrutiny when severe burdens 
are at play. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 592 (“strict scrutiny is appropriate only if 
the burden is severe”). But the flip side is also true: we must lower our 
standard and defer to the legislature when it imposes a minor, reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory restriction that is justified by several legitimate 
state regulatory interests in elections. To hold otherwise would be a sheer 
act of political will, not legal judgment. Cf. FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Hamilton) 
(courts may exercise “neither force nor will but merely judgment”).  
On a fundamental level, the dissent today takes a policy dispute, about 
which reasonable minds may disagree, and constitutionalizes it “into the 
language of competing rights,” thus recasting this debate into “something 
ripe for judicial decree rather than resolution by democratic processes.” 
Randall T. Shepard, A Bill of Rights for the Whole Nation, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 
27, 32 (1991). Yet a judge who protests that “the [C]onstitution made me 
do it,” often simply means that “things will be better if I do it.” Id. Maybe 
so. But today we render our decision within a more limited authority by 
confining our analysis to the text of the Constitution and corresponding 
precedent interpreting the First Amendment, which neither prescribes nor 
endorses a one-size-fits-all policy regime for primary elections. The 
dissent suggests that the Court today “forsakes its role as a check and 
balance to the legislature” by deferring to its judgment. Post, at 24 
(opinion of Goff, J.). Wrong. This Court will check government power 
when an act of the legislature runs into conflict with the Constitution. See 
Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1273–74 (declaring unconstitutional a law that 
allowed the legislature to call itself into emergency session). But we will 
not reinvent the constitutional wheel and invalidate a statute based on our 
preferences about the fairness of primary elections in Indiana.  
We therefore need not second-guess the wisdom of the Affiliation 
Statute—the expression of a majority of Hoosiers who are represented by 
legislators they elected who passed this law, and by a Governor who 
signed it. See Columbus, Chi. & Ind. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Grant 
Cnty., 65 Ind. 427, 438 (1878). These citizens—and their wishes as 
expressed in the Affiliation Statute—would have their will undermined if 
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the dissent’s policy preference won out today. But that assertion of raw 
judicial power, ironically, made in the people’s name, would in the end 
diminish their power by enlarging ours. While the legislature may change 
the law, the First Amendment does not compel us to invalidate it.  
Because the Affiliation Statute imposes a minor, reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory restriction on Rust’s First Amendment rights, which is 
justified by the State’s interests, it satisfies Anderson-Burdick standard. 
 
II. 
Rust’s other arguments fail on the merits.  
We address Rust’s remaining arguments in turn and conclude that 
none of them are successful on the merits.  
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth  
Rust’s void-for-vagueness challenge turns on the theory that “it is not 
clear what a party chair must certify” under Option B of the Affiliation 
Statute. Appellee’s Br. at 35. He points to Ray v. State Election Board, 422 
N.E.2d 714 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), to conclude that this doctrine applies in 
the ballot access election context. He also argues that it provides “no 
guidelines for determining party membership,” Appellee’s Br. at 36, and 
thus suffers from constitutional infirmities. Today, we question the 
premise that the doctrine applies and reject the conclusion even if it does.  
To begin with, we are reluctant to find the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
applies in the civil ballot election context. Traditionally, this doctrine has 
been generally applied to statutes that prohibit certain conduct. See Karlin 
v. Faust, 188 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that “a statute is void 
for vagueness if it fails to provide ‘fair warning’ as to what conduct will 
subject a person to liability”); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983) (describing this doctrine “requires that a penal statute define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited”). It “requires only that the law 
give sufficient warning so that individuals may conduct themselves in a 
manner which avoids the forbidden conduct.” Chandley Enterprises, Inc. v. 
City of Evansville, 563 N.E.2d 672, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).  
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The Affiliation Statute does not fit within this traditional 
understanding of void-for-vagueness because it does not prohibit certain 
conduct, nor is it enforced by civil or criminal penalties. See I.C. § 3-8-2-
7(a)(4). We are thus averse to applying this doctrine outside the criminal 
context. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 596 
(Ind. 1980) (declining to rely on a case from another jurisdiction where the 
statute had a “clear penal nature” to “establish the proposition of law that 
the void for vagueness doctrine is applicable to testing non-penal 
statutes”), overruled on other grounds by In re Stephens, 867 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. 
2007); Brunton v. Porter Mem. Hosp. Ambulance Serv., 647 N.E.2d 636, 640 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Johnson for the view that void-for-vagueness 
applies “only to penal statutes, not to non-penal civil statutes”).  
But even if this doctrine applied in this context, we would be 
unpersuaded that it would invalidate the Affiliation Statute. 
Void-for-vagueness is about ensuring that an “ordinary person 
exercising ordinary common sense” has the chance to “sufficiently comply 
with the statute.” Neudecker v. Neudecker, 566 N.E.2d 557, 562 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1991), aff’d, 577 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 1991). Simply put, it helps ensure 
fair notice. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“Vague 
laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.”). But the 
Affiliation Statute gives Hoosiers fair notice about the conditions required 
to appear on a primary ballot: either the candidate (1) has a recent 
primary voting record with the party, or (2) the candidate attaches a 
written certification of party membership from the county party chair to 
their declaration of candidacy. I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4). These two options are 
“explicit” enough to avoid a void-for-vagueness violation. Grayned, 408 
U.S. at 108. Either the conditions are satisfied or they are not; there is no 
vagueness about it.  
Rust relies on Ray to argue the Affiliation Statute is vague and 
overbroad. But Ray is distinguishable. First, in Ray, the court found a 
statute prohibiting individuals from seeking placement on both 
Republican and Democratic Party ballots unconstitutional. 422 N.E.2d at 
715. The court found the phrase prohibiting persons who “belong[] to any 
other party” from participating in a primary election to be vague because 
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it contained no standard on which to judge that determination. Id. But 
here, the Affiliation Statute provides an objective metric to determine 
whether a candidate has established sufficient affiliation with a party to 
appear on the primary ballot: Rust has two options—(a) primary voting or 
(b) party certification. Thus, they are either met or not. Both options yield 
clear, not vague, standards. Second, Ray involved a situation where the 
State Election Board—not the party—applied the language of the 
applicable statute to determine who belonged to which party. Id. Here, the 
party—acting through its county chair—has the power to determine party 
membership. The Affiliation Statute properly lodges party determinations 
with the right actor—the party, not the state. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 224 (“a 
political party has a right to identify the people who constitute the 
association,” subject to constitutional limits) (cleaned up). 
Nor is the Affiliation Statute overbroad. The overbreadth doctrine 
safeguards constitutional freedoms from freefalling into “the ambit of a 
statute written more broadly than needed to proscribe illegitimate and 
unprotected conduct.” Matheney v. State, 688 N.E.2d 883, 905 (Ind. 1997). 
Recently, this Court rejected an overbreadth challenge and underscored 
that “invalidation for overbreadth is strong medicine that has been 
employed sparingly and only as a last resort.” State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 
431, 460 (Ind. 2022) (cleaned up). And “the mere fact that one can conceive 
of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it 
susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” Id. (quoting Members of City of 
Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)). Against 
this risk avoidance posture, see Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 460, we find the 
Affiliation Statute is not overbroad. It provides two reasonably crafted 
ways to establish party affiliation for a primary: a candidate may choose 
to affiliate with the Republican by voting in the two Republican Party 
primaries. I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4). If he elects not to do so, he can still become a 
candidate in that primary, provided his county party’s chair permits it. Id.   
At its core, the Affiliation Statute strikes a reasonable balance of 
associational rights for both Rust and the Republican Party. It thus does 
not require “strong medicine” as a dose of “last resort.” Katz, 179 N.E.2d 
at 460; see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (explaining 
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the Supreme Court has “vigorously enforced the requirement that a 
statute’s overbreadth be substantial”) (emphasis in original).  
Because the Affiliation Statute is neither vague nor overbroad, it 
survives Rust’s void-for-vagueness and overbreadth challenges.  
B. Seventeenth Amendment 
Rust also argues that the Affiliation Statute violates the Seventeenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution because it “improperly 
takes rights away from voters and gives them to the state legislature and 
party chairs.” Appellee’s Br. at 38. He concludes this “indirectly” limits 
candidate choices, id. at 39, and thus “leads to voter disenfranchisement 
and an inability to cast votes effectively,” id. at 38. We disagree.  
The Seventeenth Amendment provides in part:  
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators 
from each state, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and 
each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each state shall 
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous 
branch of the state legislatures.  
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. Indeed, this amendment superseded the original 
rule in the Constitution that senators be “chosen by the [state] 
Legislature[s].” Id. at art. 1, § 3. In 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment 
became law. 2 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 10.10(b)(iv). But the Seventeenth 
Amendment did not amend the entire Constitution: it did not strip states 
of their power to regulate the “Times, Places, and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives.” Id. at art. 1, § 4. Indeed, 
Article 1, Section 14 (“Elections Clause”) equips states with broad 
“authority to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and 
safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the 
fundamental right involved.” Thornton, 514 U.S. at 834 (cleaned up).   
Rust argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, is “instructive” given the lack of Seventeenth 
Amendment precedent. Appellee’s Br. at 39. True, Thornton is instructive, 
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but not for the reasons cited by Rust. To be clear, this is not a Thornton 
case, or else Rust could not run at all, including in the general election. 
In Thornton, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Arkansas 
constitutional amendment that limited the number of times an otherwise-
eligible candidate could run for Congress. 514 U.S. at 783. This state 
constitutional amendment collided with the Seventeenth Amendment’s 
Qualification Clauses. Id. at 831. In reviewing the Arkansas amendment, 
the Thornton majority underscored that the Constitution established 
“fixed” qualifications that could not be amended by states, id. at 790, 
without the proper Article V amendment process, id. at 837. Thornton 
concluded that the text of the Constitution was enduring and thus it 
required constitutional amendment for it to be changed. Id. at 783.  
But Thornton also drew a key distinction between substantive changes 
to minimum congressional qualifications and state regulations of election 
procedures. Under the Election Clause, art. 1, § 4, states are “entitled to 
adopt ‘generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the 
integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.’” Thornton, 514 U.S. 
at 834 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n. 9). The Supreme Court has 
ratified other state regulations of elections procedures, without finding 
them to contain “any substantive qualification rendering a class of 
potential candidates ineligible for ballot position.” Id. at 835; see, e.g., 
Storer, 415 U.S. at 724 (upholding California law forbidding ballot access 
to independent candidates who registered with a qualified political party 
within one year before the preceding primary election); Munro, U.S. at 
194–95 (upholding Washington law requiring a minor-party candidate 
receive at least one percent of votes cast in the primary election before 
their name would be placed on the general-election ballot); Burdick, 504 
U.S. at 433 (upholding Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting). At base, 
these procedural regulations were calibrated to ensure that elections are 
“fair and honest . . . and [that] some sort of order, rather than chaos, . . . 
accompan[ies] the democratic processes.” Id.  (cleaned up). And, in each of 
these cases, the Supreme Court recognized the central “state interest in 
protecting the integrity and regularity of the election process,” 
independent of “any attempt to evade the constitutional prohibition 
against the imposition” of other qualifications. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 835.  
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The State argues that the constitutional amendment in Thornton is “far 
removed” from the Affiliation Statute, which merely creates a procedural 
condition for access to a party’s primary ballot. Appellants’ Br. at 40. We 
agree this is the proper characterization. Simply put, the Affiliation Statute 
exists within a broader election code ecosystem, where procedures are 
designed to regulate “the time, place, and manner of holding primary and 
general elections, the registration and qualifications of voters, and the 
selection and qualification of candidates.” Storer, 415 U.S. at 730. Rust 
overlooks this critical distinction identified in Thornton, and argues the 
Affiliation Statute “indirectly violates” the Seventeenth Amendment. 
Appellee’s Br. at 39. But the Affiliation Statute does not substantively add 
minimum qualifications for the general election or to hold the office of 
United States Senator. And it does not block Hoosiers from voting for a 
Senator in the primary or general elections. It simply erects a minor 
procedural bar for primary ballot access consistent with the Constitution.  
Because the Affiliation Statute is a mere procedural regulation that 
does not substantively change the minimum qualifications for United 
States Senate, it survives Rust’s Seventeenth Amendment challenge.  
C. Equal Protection under the Indiana Constitution  
Rust presses a state constitutional claim that the Affiliation Statute 
violates his equal protection rights under Article 1, Section 23 of the 
Indiana Constitution. Appellee’s Br. at 41. He argues that he suffered from 
(1) “disparate treatment” and that (2) this treatment was “not related to 
inherent characteristics.” Id. at 44. Id. at 44. We disagree.  
Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution states: “The General 
Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or 
immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all 
citizens.” IND. CONST. art. 1, § 23. In Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 
1994), this Court adopted a two-part test for determining whether a 
statute is valid under this constitutional provision:  
First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be 
reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the 
unequally treated classes. Second, preferential treatment must be 
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uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly 
situated. 
Id. at 80 (emphasis added). 
Indiana courts presume the statute in question is constitutional. Id. The 
burden is then placed “on the challenger to negate every conceivable basis 
which might have supported the classification.” Whistle Stop Inn, Inc. v. 
City of Indianapolis, 51 N.E.3d 195, 199 (Ind. 2016) (cleaned up). In an 
Article 1, Section 23 challenge, “it is the disparate classification alleged by 
the challenger, not other classifications, that warrants review.” Myers v. 
Crouse-Hinds Div. of Cooper Indus., Inc., 53 N.E.3d 1160, 1165 (Ind. 2016).  
Rust raises an as-applied challenge that “he is being treated 
differently than candidates who were able to be on the ballot prior to the 
July 2021 Amendments and differently than those candidates who have a 
more reasonable party chair that certifies based on party membership 
alone.” Appellee’s Br. at 41. The State counters that the statute is not 
unconstitutional “because it imposes the same requirements on anyone 
seeking to declare candidacy in a party’s primary.” Appellants’ Br. at 41.  
We agree with the State there is no equal protection violation as 
applied to Rust. The Affiliation Statute applies the same requirements on 
everyone who desires to run in a party’s primary election, including Rust. 
I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4). Two reasons reinforce our conclusion today.  
First, Rust lacks an inherent characteristic to qualify for the ballot 
because he elected not to vote in the last three primary elections. But these 
choices do not reflect an “inherent” characteristic cognizable under our 
Privileges and Immunities Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Whistle Stop Inn, 
51 N.E.3d at 200 (citing Collins for the proposition that “the prevalence of 
sole proprietorships and small employment units” and “the distinctive 
nature of farm work” were “inherent characteristics of Indiana 
agricultural employers”); Gambill v. State, 675 N.E.2d 668, 677 (Ind. 1996) 
(acknowledging “mental illness” as an inherent characteristic); Horseman 
v. Keller, 841 N.E.2d 164, 172 (Ind. 2006) (confirming that not being present 
at the polling site on Election Day was inherent of an absentee voter).  
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Second, Rust did not allege a valid classification. Here, he alleges two 
disparate classifications. But both fail. At first, he claims that he is being 
treated differently than candidates who ran before July 2021 under the 
previous iteration of the Affiliation Statute. Yet this is not a valid 
classification because it compares candidates under different statutes. See 
Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 78. Any candidate seeking placement on the 2024 
primary ballot—Republican or Democrat—must comply with the current 
version of the Affiliation Statute. See I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4). Candidates before 
the July 2021 amendments are thus not similarly situated to Rust. 
Next, Rust alleges that he is being treated differently than candidates 
who have “more reasonable [county] party chairs.” Appellee’s Br. at 41. 
This is also not a valid classification because the Affiliation Statute treats 
all candidates the same: without satisfying the primary voting condition, 
all potential candidates must be certified by their county party chair. I.C. § 
3-8-2-7(a)(4). And supposed differences based on the proclivities or 
idiosyncrasies of county chairs—including amorphous, indeterminate 
notions of “reasonableness”—are based on the party chair’s discretion, 
not on the operation of the Affiliation Statute. Appellants’ Reply Br. at 29. 
Thus, we are hard pressed to find this alleged class valid.  
Because the Affiliation Statute does not treat Rust unequally, it 
survives his equal protection challenge under Article 1, Section 23.  
D. Improper Amendment to the Indiana Constitution  
Rust advances another state constitutional claim, arguing that the 
Affiliation Statute “improperly” amends Article 4, Section 7 of the Indiana 
Constitution, which establishes eligibility requirements to run for the 
State Senate and House of Representatives. Appellee’s Br. at 45. His 
argument is that the Affiliation Statute modifies this provision without 
following the amendment process. Unusually, this claim is about Rust’s 
status as a voter—not as a candidate for federal office—as “he seeks to 
have all willing and constitutionally eligible candidates on the ballot so 
that he may have meaningful choices and cast his vote effectively.” Id. at 
46. He argues that the Affiliation Statute “adds extra requirements” to our 
Constitution. Id. at 45. The State objected, in part, because Rust lacks 
standing. We share the State’s concern. 
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We thus decline to reach the merits of this claim because Rust lacked 
standing as a voter in Indiana. He has not asserted a direct injury that he 
has “suffered” or is “in immediate danger of suffering . . . as a result of the 
complained-of conduct.” Solarize Indiana, 182 N.E.3d at 217 (cleaned up); 
see also Holcomb, 187 N.E.2d at 1286 (explaining that, without an injury, a 
court cannot review the merits of a claim). To be precise, Rust is not 
running for State office and “he has not identified a new resident or . . . a 
Hoosier that is . . . adversely affected by” the Affiliation Statute that Rust 
would vote for. Appellants’ Br. at 44. He lacks standing to press this issue.  
Because Rust lacks standing to bring this claim as a voter under Article 
4, Section 7, his claim will not be reviewed on the merits.  
E. Invalid Use of Discretion under Affiliation Statute  
Finally, Rust argued that Chairperson Lowery’s discretion in applying 
the Affiliation Statute was invalid and illegal because it “violates multiple 
canons of statutory construction.” Appellee’s Br. at 48. Rust argues that 
her discretion: (1) conflicts with the purpose and spirit of the law; (2) 
engrafts words onto the statute; (3) renders a portion of the statute 
meaningless; and (4) conflicts with Indiana Code Section 3-10-1-2.  
Rust is mistaken: the canons of interpretation support—not 
undermine—Lowery’s discretion. When interpreting words in a statute, 
this Court’s “first task” is to assign words their “plain meaning,” ESPN, 
Inc. v. University of Notre Dame Police Dept., 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 
2016), to unlock the legislature’s intent. Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 
663 (Ind. 2010). If we neglected this elemental task, “we would be 
rewriting” unambiguous language, and therefore disrupting our 
“separation-of-powers because it is the legislature that writes and revises 
statutes while [courts] merely interpret and apply them.” Indiana Right to 
Life Victory Fund v. Morales, 217 N.E.3d 517, 524 (Ind. 2023); see also Ind. 
Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co. v. State ex rel. Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 
695 N.E.2d 99, 108 n.21 (Ind. 1998) (“On the other hand, separation of 
powers prevents a court from effectively rewriting a statute to save it from 
constitutionality infirmity.”). And, of course, statutory language itself is 
the best indication of legislative intent. Nicoson, 938 N.E.2d at 663.  
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The Affiliation Statute’s plain language compels our conclusion that 
Lowery’s discretion was not invalid or illegal. Option B states: “a 
candidate is considered to be affiliated with a political party only if . . . 
[t]he county chairman of: the political party with which the candidate 
claims affiliation; and the county in which the candidate resides; certifies 
that the candidate is a member of the political party.” I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4) 
(emphasis added). By its terms, Lowery has broad discretion to certify that 
Rust is a member of the Republican Party. Her broad discretion is a 
feature—not a bug—of the Affiliation Statute, for it again recognizes a 
party’s First Amendment rights in the exercise of associational discretion.  
There were concerns raised in oral argument that the Affiliation 
Statute lacked any criteria to guide or cabin the county chair’s discretion, 
but such an attempt to restrict that exercise of discretion may raise First 
Amendment concerns, as well. Moreover, the power to reject obviously 
assumes the power to welcome. In modern times, we have seen 
candidates with fame, fortune, or a following nominated by state and 
national parties with little or no prior affiliation, in an exercise of 
legitimate party self-interest and discretion. In 2016, the Indiana 
Republican Party welcomed Trey Hollingsworth on the primary ballot for 
Indiana’s 9th District congressional seat—although he never voted in an 
Indiana primary—because he secured certification from the Clark County 
party chair.15 Other historical examples illustrate the broad sweep of party 
discretion. After defeating Hitler, General Eisenhower was courted by 
both national parties in 1948 and 1952 for the presidential nomination16; in 
1964, Massachusetts native Robert Kennedy became a Senator from New 
 
15 See Tim Evans and Mark Alesia, Trey Hollingsworth for Congress—rich carpetbagger or breath of 
fresh air?, Trey Hollingsworth for Congress — rich carpetbagger or breath of fresh air? 
(indystar.com) [https://perma.cc/Y4PM-U2LG].  
16 Before the 1948 election, President Truman proposed in a private meeting with Eisenhower 
that they both run on the Democratic ticket, with Eisenhower as the presidential candidate 
and Truman as his running mate. After Truman won in 1948, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., 
of Massachusetts began a campaign in the Republican Party to draft Eisenhower as the GOP 
presidential nominee in 1952, which proved successful. See Chester J. Pach, Jr., Dwight D. 
Eisenhower: Campaigns and Elections, https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/campaigns-
and-elections [https://perma.cc/VS4E-9MD3].  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 40 of 41 
York, without having lived in the state. Just under four decades later, 
Hillary Clinton of Washington, D.C., by way of Arkansas and Illinois, did 
the same. If, for instance, the Obamas were to return to their native 
Chicagoland and move across the street to Hammond, the Affiliation 
Statute would not bar Democratic Party officials from allowing either to 
run in a Senate primary, despite a lack of primary voting history in this 
state, so long as they satisfied modest residency requirements.17 The 
Affiliation Statute—by its terms—unassailably allows for this outcome.  
Political parties do not exist to lose elections. The blunt lesson of these 
examples is that if you fail to comply with voting history requirements but 
they think you can win, they will let you in; if they think you hurt their 
chances or do not represent their values, they will keep you out. The 
Affiliation Statute reasonably recognizes and respects that reality without 
offending the Constitution or any canon of construction. 
 
Conclusion 
Because the Affiliation Statute is not unconstitutional, and 
because Rust’s remaining arguments lack merit, we reverse the trial 
court and remand with instructions to enter judgment for the State.  
 
17 The United States Constitution fixes the substantive qualification requirements to run for 
United States Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“No person shall be a senator who shall not 
have attained to the age of thirty years and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and 
who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state for which he shall be chosen.”). 
States, in turn, cannot add substantive congressional candidacy qualifications not specified in 
the Constitution. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 783. But they can impose “evenhanded” restrictions 
to protect the integrity of the electoral process. Id. at 834. Thus, to be declared a candidate for 
United States Senate in Indiana, state election law provides that a petition must contain, 
relevant here, “the residence address of each petitioner as set forth on the petitioner’s voter 
registration record.” I.C. § 3-8-2-8(b)(3) (emphasis added). Further, Indiana law provides 
further modest protection that “[t]he county voter registration office in the county where a 
petitioner is registered must certify whether each petitioner is a voter at the residence 
addressed listed in the petition at the time the petition is being processed, and whether that 
address is located within the election district for office.” I.C.  § 3-8-2-9 (emphasis added). Put 
simply, the bar for establishing candidate residency for United States Senate in Indiana is low. 
Certainly, you could establish residency without having to vote in two party primaries.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 41 of 41 
Slaughter and Molter, JJ., concur. 
Molter, J., concurs with separate opinion in which Slaughter, J., joins. 
Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Rush, C.J., joins. 
A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L A N T S , D I E G O M O RA L E S A N D I ND I A NA 
E L E C T I O N C OMM I S S I O N 
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana  
Angela N. Sanchez, Chief Counsel of Appeals 
Benjamin M.L. Jones, Section Chief, Civil Appeals 
Kyle Hunter, Assistant Section Chief, Civil Appeals 
Office of the Indiana Attorney General  
Indianapolis, Indiana  
A T T O R N E Y F O R A P P E L L A N T , AMA N DA L O WE R Y 
E. Ryan Shouse
Lewis and Wilkins LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A T T O R N E Y F O R A P P E L L E E , J O HN RU S T 
Michelle C. Harter 
Lekse Harter, LLC 
Greenwood, Indiana  
A T T O R N E Y S F O R AM I C U S CU R I A E , T HE I N D I A NA R E P U B L I CA N 
S T A T E C OM M I T T E E , I NC . 
Jackie M. Bennett, Jr. 
Vivek R. Hadley 
Hayley A. Sears 
Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
A T T O R N E Y S F O R AM I C I CU R I A E , C OMM O N CA U S E I N D I AN A 
A N D L E A GU E O F WO M E N V O T E R S O F I N D I AN A 
William R. Groth 
Daniel Bowman 
Bowman & Vlink, LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 1 of 18 
Molter, J., concurring.  
I agree that all of John Rust’s claims fail for the reasons the Court’s 
opinion explains. For Rust’s First Amendment claim, the volleys between 
the Court’s opinion and the dissenting opinion continue great debates our 
country has been having since its founding about how democracy 
functions best and the role of judges in our divided government. I take no 
position on the best way to run elections, and between the competing 
views of the judicial role, I align more closely with the Court’s opinion. 
But I write separately to demonstrate that when we walk through the 
First Amendment analysis with smaller steps, we can resolve this case 
without having to resolve those bigger debates. The bottom line boils 
down to this: the Affiliation Statute limits primary candidates to those 
who are either party members or who vote in the party’s primary 
elections, and the United States Supreme Court interprets the First 
Amendment as compelling that sort of limitation rather than prohibiting it. 
The Affiliation Statute does not impermissibly burden Rust’s First 
Amendment rights because its requirement to either become a party 
member or vote in the party’s primaries was not too onerous for Rust to 
satisfy. Instead, Rust did not satisfy the requirement because the party 
exercised its own First Amendment right to deny his membership, and he 
chose not to vote in the party’s primaries. 
I. The Affiliation Statute’s Operation  
Evaluating the Affiliation Statute’s constitutionality becomes easier 
after recognizing three key aspects of the statute’s operation.  
First, the statute provides two paths to appear on a party’s primary 
ballot: a party‐controlled membership path, and a candidate‐controlled 
voting history path. Those are alternative paths reflecting legislative 
balancing; neither option is an exception to or a relief valve from the other. 
Second, for the party‐controlled membership path, the local party chair 
certifies only party membership. The chair does not have broader 
discretion to decide whether the party gives one of its members 
permission to run for a particular office.  
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Third, if the aspiring candidate disagrees with the local party chair’s 
membership decision, the candidate can, at a minimum, appeal that 
decision through the party’s internal appeal process.  
A. The Affiliation Statute provides alternative routes to the 
primary ballot that reflect legislative balancing. 
As the Court’s opinion explains, the Affiliation Statute provides two 
paths onto a primary ballot—one over which the party has complete 
control, and the other over which the aspiring candidate has complete 
control. The option the party controls is for the county chair where the 
candidate resides to certify that the candidate “is a member of the political 
party.” Ind. Code § 3‐8‐2‐7(a)(4)(B). The option the candidate controls is to 
cast their two most recent primary ballots in the primary election for the 
party with which they claim affiliation. Id. § 3‐8‐2‐7(a)(4)(A). Those ballots 
can be in recent elections or elections long ago; elections that were close 
together, or far apart. All that matters is that both ballots were for the 
party with which the candidate claims affiliation. 
There seems to be confusion over how these two options relate to each 
other. Sometimes they are discussed as though one is an exception to or a 
relief valve from the other. But that isn’t how the statute is written.  
Instead, the two options are alternatives that reflect a legislative 
balance. The party‐controlled membership option reflects the State’s 
legitimate interest in protecting political parties’ First Amendment rights 
to determine their own membership, representatives, and leadership. N.Y. 
State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 202 (2008) (“A political 
party has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes, 
and to choose a candidate‐selection process that will in its view produce 
the nominee who best represents its political platform.”).  
But a political party’s First Amendment rights over control of its 
candidate‐selection process “are circumscribed” when “the State gives the 
party a role in the election process” by administering a state‐run primary 
election. Id. at 203. Then “the State acquires a legitimate governmental 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 3 of 18 
interest in ensuring the fairness of the party’s nominating process, 
enabling it to prescribe what that process must be.” Id.  
The candidate‐controlled voting history option reflects the State’s 
interest in fair elections. To advance that interest, the State made the 
policy choice to broaden the candidate pool so that it includes those who 
are affiliated with a political party through their primary voting history, 
even if the party does not count them as members. The State didn’t have 
to broaden the candidate pool, but having done so, requiring some 
measure of party affiliation was appropriate. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 
530 U.S. 567, 567 (2000) (holding that California’s blanket primary for 
determining a political party’s nominee for the general election violated 
the political parties’ First Amendment rights).  
So the candidate‐controlled voting history option is not “a restriction 
on an individual’s ability to choose and to change his or her party 
affiliation.” Post, at 15 (emphasis omitted). The parties and individuals 
remain free to associate to whatever extent they agree. The voting history 
option merely limits which candidates who claim party affiliation will be 
listed on a primary ballot, even though the party does not necessarily 
acknowledge the candidates as party members.  
Rust complains that one reason Lowery gave for refusing to certify his 
party membership is that his two most recent primary votes were not in a 
Republican primary. (Four out of his last five votes were in the 
Democratic primary.) He says Lowery, in effect, adopted the candidate‐
controlled voting history criteria as the criteria for party membership. And 
that is improper, he argues, because it renders the party‐controlled option 
“meaningless/useless.” Appellee’s Br. at 50.  
But the political parties have the First Amendment right to limit their 
membership however they wish, including by adopting a statutory 
standard as their own. López Torres, 552 U.S. at 202. Here, that means the 
parties remain free to adopt the voting history criteria as their own 
membership criteria, even if that makes the party‐controlled option 
redundant of the candidate‐controlled option.   
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐371 | March 6, 2024 
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While the party‐membership option leaves it to the parties to define 
their membership however they wish, that leads to another source of 
confusion, which is determining exactly what local party chairs are 
supposed to certify. 
B. For the party‐controlled option, county chairs certify 
only party membership, not permission to run for a 
particular office.   
Rust contends some county chairs are not following the statutory 
provision for the party‐controlled membership option because they read 
words into the statute. More than just certifying whether an aspiring 
candidate is a party member, Rust says those chairs mistakenly believe 
they have broader power to decide whether to give candidates the party’s 
permission to run for a particular office.  
At oral argument, Rust’s attorney fleshed this out with some good 
examples. She said she represented another client who had a Republican 
Party membership card, who was listed on the party website as a sponsor, 
and who wanted to run for state representative. The county chair would 
certify the candidate as a party member if the candidate ran for a county 
office, but not if the candidate ran for a state office. Another client 
reported a similar experience. He could run on a Republican primary 
ballot as a candidate for delegate to the Republican Party State 
Convention, but the county chair would not certify his party membership 
if he ran for Congress.  
Those cases aren’t before us now, so we don’t know whether that is the 
fairest representation of the facts or not. But even just considering them to 
be hypothetical examples, they are illustrative. The plain meaning of the 
Affiliation Statute’s text does not delegate that sort of discretion to county 
chairs. The statute says the county chair certifies whether the candidate is 
“a member of the political party.” I.C. § 3‐8‐2‐7(a)(4)(B). That’s it. Nothing 
in the statute authorizes the county chair to withhold that certification 
because the chair doesn’t want the candidate to seek the party’s 
nomination for a particular office.  
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Consistent with the political parties’ First Amendment rights, the 
statute lets the parties determine who their members are, and the statute 
delegates to county chairs the responsibility to certify that a candidate is a 
party member. But as Rust bluntly puts it: “The statute does not provide 
for either the [Indiana Election] Commission or a county party chairman 
to make decisions about who should run.” Appellee’s Br. at 49. He is right 
about that much.  
Once a party includes someone as a member, the statute requires the 
party to let them run for any office if they satisfy the remaining statutory 
and constitutional requirements.  
C. A candidate can challenge a local party chair’s 
membership decision through the party’s internal 
appeal process. 
Even when local party chairs properly limit their decisions to whether 
aspiring candidates are party members, disputes can arise about whether 
the chairs made the right decisions. Here, Lowery says she consulted with 
other Jackson County Republican Central Committee members, and her 
reasons for concluding Rust was not a party member included that he had 
voted in Democratic primaries twice as often as Republican primaries. Her 
decision to deny Rust’s party membership also aligned with the party’s 
definition of a “Qualified Primary Republican,” which is “a voter who cast 
[a] Republican Party ballot at the two (2) most recent primary elections in 
Indiana which the voter voted, and who is a Republican in Good‐
Standing.” Rules of the Ind. Republican State Comm. Rule 1‐24.1  
But Rust argues that Lowery and her colleagues should have instead 
evaluated his party membership against the party’s definition of a 
“Republican in Good Standing,” which is “a Republican who supports 
 
1 See Rules of the Ind. Republican State Comm. (2023), available at 
https://www.indiana.gop/sites/default/files/10%2012%2023%20Rules%20of%20the%20Indiana
%20Republican%20Party.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA3E‐4N39]. 
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Page 6 of 18 
Republican nominees and who does not actively or openly support 
another candidate against a Republican nominee.” Id. R. 1‐25. Rust 
believes he satisfies that definition. 
We can’t know whether Lowery or Rust is correct about which 
definition the party would apply for its membership and whether the 
party would agree with Lowery’s application of that definition because 
Rust didn’t appeal Lowery’s decision to higher levels of the party. Of 
course, the fact that the Republican Party filed an amicus brief in our 
Court supporting Lowery’s decision is a strong indication that it agrees 
with her membership determination. Regardless, the same party rules 
Rust cites to establish his party membership also provide an internal party 
appeal process. And for candidates like Rust who disagree with the 
county chair’s decision whether to certify their membership, the party 
provides a hearing and appeal process. The appeal goes first to the party’s 
District Committee, and then to its State Committee. Id. R. 1‐30 to ‐35.  
The Indiana Democratic Party defines its membership differently, but it 
has a similar internal appeal process. That party has decided: “Any legally 
qualified Indiana voter who supports the purposes of the Party may be a 
member.” Rules of the Ind. Democratic Party Rule 8(a).2 And as with the 
Republican Party, someone who disagrees with a lower‐level decision 
about their membership can appeal the decision all the way to the Indiana 
Democratic Party’s State Committee. Id. at R. 20. 
Rust suggested at oral argument that he wasn’t aware of an internal 
party appeal process. But that process is spelled out in the very same 
party rules that the Republican Party publishes on its website and which 
Rust has been citing throughout the litigation to show that he is a member 
of the Republican Party.  
Perhaps Rust instead thought an internal party appeal would be futile 
because the party already endorsed Representative Banks and would 
 
2 See Rules of the Ind. Democratic Party (2023), available at https://indems.org/wp‐
content/uploads/2023/10/IDP‐Rules‐April‐2023.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GU8‐BE7A]. 
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Page 7 of 18 
therefore exclude Rust as a member so he couldn’t run for the party’s 
nomination to the Senate. But whether an appeal over Lowery’s 
membership decision would be futile, the party still gets to decide for 
itself who its members are. López Torres, 552 U.S. at 202 (“A political party 
has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes . . . .”). 
And the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hero v. Lake County Election Board 
demonstrates there are mechanisms for political parties (not just the 
party’s county chair) to determine who its members are for purposes of 
the Affiliation Statute and to communicate those membership decisions to 
election officials. 42 F.4th 768, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2022).  
II. The Affiliation Statute’s Constitutionality  
After establishing how the Affiliation Statute operates, the 
constitutional analysis rests on stronger footing. Rust’s argument that 
some county chairs are not complying with the Affiliation Statute is a 
reason to enforce the statute, not to invalidate it as unconstitutional. While 
Rust disagrees with Lowery’s decision that he is not a party member, he 
opted not to pursue the party’s internal appeal process or to seek relief in 
the courts to compel Lowery’s certification. And he cannot skip to the 
nuclear option of invalidating the statute before exhausting all other 
options for compelling statutory compliance consistent with the 
Constitution.   
As for the merits of Rust’s First Amendment challenge, both the Court’s 
opinion and the dissenting opinion appropriately decline Rust’s invitation 
to declare the statute unconstitutional on its face. Rust’s as‐applied 
challenge fails because his own concessions foreclose any claim that the 
statute unduly burdens his First Amendment rights. He acknowledges the 
State can limit primary candidates to party members, so the party‐
controlled membership option does not impose an unconstitutional 
burden. That concession alone defeats his First Amendment claim because 
adding a second path to an independently sufficient path to the primary 
ballot cannot impose an undue burden. But even if we evaluate the voting 
history option too, Rust’s claim fails because he does not identify any 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 8 of 18 
burden keeping him from voting in primary elections. He simply chose 
not to.   
A. Rust’s claim that some party chairs don’t follow the 
statute is a reason to enforce it, not to invalidate it. 
Rust argues that Lowery, acting in an official capacity as a state actor, 
did not comply with the Affiliation Statute, and if she had, Rust would be 
on the ballot. Specifically, Rust contends he qualifies as a party member 
under the party’s rules, and the statute therefore required Lowery to 
certify his party membership. Lowery has strong counterarguments that 
she did follow the statute, but even if Rust is right that she didn’t, that is a 
reason to enforce the statute, not to invalidate it.  
Rust responds that simply enforcing the statute in his case doesn’t go 
far enough because the statute is hopelessly vague, and that vagueness 
will lead other county chairs to violate the statute in other elections. But as 
explained above, the statute isn’t vague, and it operates just as Rust claims 
it should. The party‐controlled membership option requires the local party 
chair to certify only party membership, not permission to run for a 
particular office. And if the aspiring candidate disagrees with the chair’s 
membership determination, the candidate can appeal that decision 
through the party’s internal appeal process.   
We reach constitutional issues only as a last resort. WTHR‐TV v. Milam, 
690 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ind. 1998) (declining the parties’ invitation to 
“reach a constitutional issue as [a] matter of first not last resort”). And 
here, Rust had other options available to him to compel Lowery’s 
compliance with the statute short of asking the courts to invalidate it. At a 
minimum, he could have exhausted the party’s internal appeal process to 
challenge Lowery’s membership decision.   
Rust also sued Lowery in her “official capacity” because the Affiliation 
Statute “empowers her to certify candidates who are members of the 
party.” App. Vol. 2 at 37, 39–40. That is, Rust alleges Lowery was a state 
actor in an official capacity when she refused to certify Rust’s party 
membership. It is unsurprising that, having sued Lowery, Rust alleged 
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she was a state actor because the First Amendment restricts only state 
action, not private conduct. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 
777 (1986) (recognizing that the First Amendment “by its terms applies 
only to governmental action”); see also Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. 
Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928–29 (2019) (explaining that “a private entity 
may qualify as a state actor when it exercises powers traditionally 
exclusively reserved to the State,” that “very few functions fall into that 
category,” and one function falling into this narrow category is “running 
elections” (quotations omitted)); Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. 
2003) (“A private entity is deemed a state actor when the state delegates to 
it a traditionally public function.”).  
If Rust is right that Lowery was a state actor with a ministerial duty to 
certify party membership, then the mandate statute may have authorized 
him to sue Lowery to compel her to certify his party membership. I.C. § 
34‐27‐3‐1 (“An action for mandate may be prosecuted against any inferior 
tribunal, corporation, public or corporate officer, or person to compel the 
performance of any: (1) act that the law specifically requires; or (2) duty 
resulting from any office, trust, or station.”). Or if that statute didn’t 
apply, he may have been able to sue for a mandatory injunction 
compelling certification. Warriner Invs., LLC v. Dynasty Homeowners Ass’n, 
Inc., 189 N.E.3d 1119, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“An injunction which 
orders a party to take a specific action is referred to as a mandatory 
injunction.”). 
Those remedies may have ultimately proved unavailable for any 
number of reasons, including that Rust may not be right that Lowery was 
a state actor with a duty to certify his membership. See Price v. Ind. Dep’t of 
Child Servs., 80 N.E.3d 170, 175 (Ind. 2017) (“Judicial mandate is 
appropriate only when two elements are present: (1) the defendant bears 
an imperative legal duty to perform the ministerial act or function 
demanded and (2) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to compel the 
performance of that specific duty.” (cleaned up)); Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson 
Cnty. v. State, 46 N.E. 908, 913 (Ind. 1897) (“A duty to be performed is none 
the less ministerial because the person who is required to perform it may 
have to satisfy himself of the existence of a state of facts under which he is 
given his right or warrant to perform the required duty.”). But Rust was 
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the master of his complaint, and after alleging that Lowery was a state 
actor refusing to fulfill a statutory duty, he abandoned his pursuit for 
relief to compel her statutory compliance. We can’t invalidate the statute 
before Rust demonstrates that invalidating the statute on constitutional 
grounds is his last resort rather than his first. WTHR‐TV, 690 N.E.2d at 
1176. 
B. Rust’s First Amendment claim fails as both a facial 
challenge and as an as‐applied challenge.  
For ballot access cases like this one, courts evaluate First Amendment 
challenges through Anderson‐Burdick balancing. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). “Election 
regulations that impose a severe burden on associational rights are subject 
to strict scrutiny, and we uphold them only if they are narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling state interest.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451 (2008) (quotations omitted). “If a statute 
imposes only modest burdens, however, then the State’s important 
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions on election procedures.” Id. at 452 
(quotations omitted). 
Critical here, reviewing the constitutionality of an election law requires 
attention to whether the plaintiff asserts a facial challenge or an as‐applied 
challenge. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, The Significance of the Shift 
Toward As‐Applied Challenges in Election Law, 37 Hofstra L. Rev. 635 (2009). 
A facial challenge alleges there are no circumstances in which the State 
could enforce a statute without violating someone’s constitutional rights, 
requiring the court to stop the State from enforcing the statute against 
anyone (or at least against a group of people beyond just the plaintiff in a 
set of circumstances where applying the statute would never be 
constitutional). John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194 (2010). An as‐
applied challenge alleges only that enforcing the statute against the 
plaintiff would violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, requiring the 
court to stop the State from enforcing the statute against only the plaintiff, 
but not anyone else. Id.  
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While the trial court invalidated the Affiliation Statute on its face, 
Rust’s attorney clarified at oral argument in our Court that Rust asserts 
both a facial and an as‐applied challenge. The dissenting opinion adheres 
to the guidance from the United States Supreme Court that facial 
challenges to election laws are disfavored, and the dissent reaches the 
more limited conclusion that the Affiliation Statute is unconstitutional 
only as applied to Rust. But I agree with the Court’s opinion that Rust’s 
First Amendment challenge fails as both a facial challenge and as an as‐
applied challenge.  
1. Rust cannot prevail on a facial challenge. 
Prevailing on a facial challenge requires the plaintiff to prove that “no 
set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid, i.e., that 
the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Wash. State Grange, 
552 U.S. at 449 (quotations omitted). Rust isn’t challenging the State’s 
primary election scheme or the broader statutory scheme for accessing the 
general election ballot on the whole. He is just challenging the two options 
the General Assembly offers candidates through the Affiliation Statute for 
establishing party affiliation so that they can appear on a political party’s 
primary ballot: (1) become a member of the party (which the county chair 
certifies); or (2) cast the two most recent primary votes for the same party.   
Those two options—party membership or voting history—do not, on 
their face, violate the First Amendment because they do not severely 
restrict aspiring candidates’ access to the ballot, and they are justified by 
the sufficiently weighty State interests that the Court’s opinion explains. 
Rust disagrees, arguing that the Affiliation Statute is unconstitutionally 
burdensome in three ways, but each argument fails.  
a. Excluding candidates from the ballot 
Rust argues that by providing only these two routes for appearing on a 
primary ballot, the Affiliation Statute “severely burdens” candidates’ 
rights to associate with the Republican Party because the statute excludes 
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some candidates from appearing on primary ballots. Appellee’s Br. at 19. 
But that argument confuses the consequence with the burden.  
All ballot access cases involve the consequence of excluding a candidate 
from a ballot, and courts don’t treat the exclusion as such as the burden. 
Instead, the burden is the contested ballot access requirement. See, e.g., 
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782 (“The question presented by this case is whether 
Ohio’s early filing deadline placed an unconstitutional burden on the 
voting and associational rights of Anderson’s supporters.”). Here, that 
requirement is to be either a party member or someone who votes in the 
party’s primaries. And for a facial challenge, we evaluate how onerous 
that requirement is generally, without regard to any specific candidates or 
specific elections. 
Rust stresses that this year’s Republican primary election for the party’s 
Senate nomination will be uncontested if he is excluded from the ballot, 
but a facial challenge must consider all the other elections too. That 
includes all the congressional races this year that include many primary 
candidates, and the Republican primary election for governor, which has 
five candidates. For the full scope, we should also consider that the 
Secretary of State’s 2022 Candidate List for the primary election was 303 
pages long.3 Rust doesn’t claim that the Affiliation Statute couldn’t be 
enforced consistent with the First Amendment in any of those races, or 
even that on balance, the Affiliation Statute’s two options for ballot access 
have generally proved too burdensome.  
Rust also doesn’t cite any case that stands for or supports the 
proposition that a state violates the First Amendment by limiting primary 
candidates to those who are members of a party or vote in the party’s 
primaries. Just the opposite, the United States Supreme Court has 
concluded that political parties’ First Amendment rights compel states to 
impose party affiliation requirements for primary elections to select the 
 
3 2022 Primary Election Candidate List, Ind. Sec’y of State (May 3, 2022), 
https://www.in.gov/sos/elections/files/2022_Primary_Candidate_List.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZU78‐PP72]. 
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parties’ nominees for the general election. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 
567 (holding that California’s blanket primary for determining a political 
party’s nominee for the general election violated the political parties’ First 
Amendment rights). That is why Rust concedes that the First Amendment 
permits the State to limit ballot access to party members and to defer to 
the parties to certify their membership, Oral Argument at 21:00–23:05, 
27:55–30:50, which is precisely how the party‐controlled membership 
option currently operates. 
Bolstering the statute’s constitutionality on its face is the fact that 
certification of party membership or primary voting history is a well‐worn 
tool for establishing party affiliation. For example, the Affiliation Statute’s 
two options are the same two options to establish party affiliation for 
appointments to state entities with party‐affiliation requirements. 
I.C. § 36‐1‐8‐10(b). And as the Republican Party’s amicus brief 
demonstrates, more than three dozen state entities depend on these 
methods for establishing party affiliation. See Ind. Republican State 
Comm. Amicus Br. at 19–20 n.3 (collecting statutory cites). Some entities—
like police and fire merit commissions—depend on an even longer voting 
history, requiring that an individual’s three most recent primary votes be 
cast for the affiliated party. I.C. § 36‐8‐3.5‐6(c). Service to those important 
public entities is just as important a First Amendment exercise as running 
for elected office, and there is no suggestion here that those statutes 
violate the First Amendment.   
b. Ineligibility for the candidate‐controlled voting 
history option 
Rust also argues the statute is unconstitutional on its face because he 
estimates that 81% of Hoosiers do not qualify for the candidate‐controlled 
voting history option. That argument fails for a couple of reasons.  
For starters, the percentage of Hoosiers eligible under the voting 
history option tells us nothing about the percentage eligible under the 
party membership option. Rust seeks to invalidate both provisions on 
their face, so he has the burden to prove the Affiliation Statute as a 
whole—not just the voting history option—imposes an undue burden. 
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But even for the candidate‐controlled voting history option, Rust’s 
numbers are incomplete. He reaches the 81% figure by citing surveys 
stating that 79% of Hoosiers identify as Republican or Democrat, and 24% 
of Hoosiers voted in the 2020 primary. Multiplying 79% by 24% yields 
19%, which Rust says leaves the remaining 81% of Hoosiers ineligible to 
run as a Republican or a Democrat. Looking at how many Hoosiers voted 
in one year’s primary tells us nothing about how many Hoosiers’ most 
recent two primary votes—in any years—were for the same political 
party.  
In short, Rust’s statistical extrapolations are incomplete and do not 
demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional on its face.  
c. Access to voting history records 
Rust also argues that the candidate‐controlled voting history option is 
severely burdensome because some people might not have access to 
voting history that they need to establish their eligibility, such as voters 
who last voted before records were digitized in 2003. That is not a facial 
challenge because it is not an argument that the Affiliation Statute is 
unconstitutional in all circumstances. It is an argument that the statute is 
unconstitutional in limited circumstances where a candidate doesn’t have 
access to that voting history. Or, if Rust intends this as a facial challenge in 
the sense that the Affiliation Statute is overly burdensome in all 
circumstances where the potential candidate is neither a party member 
nor has access to their voting history, Rust lacks standing to make that 
claim because he is neither such a candidate nor a voter seeking to cast a 
vote for such a candidate. Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995).   
2. Rust cannot prevail on an as‐applied challenge 
either. 
The dissenting opinion expressly declines Rust’s request to invalidate 
the Affiliation Statute on its face, concluding instead that the statute 
should be enjoined only as to Rust. And significantly, the dissent 
acknowledges that “the legislature is best suited to weigh the costs and 
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benefits of a given ballot restriction.” Post, at 1. So while our written 
opinions engage in larger debates about the role of elections in democracy 
and the role of judges in a divided government, the disagreement among 
us that matters for resolving this case is much narrower: three of us 
conclude that requiring Rust to comply with the Affiliation Statute does 
not violate his First Amendment rights, and two of us conclude that it 
does.  
We all also agree that the State’s interests in the Affiliation Statute “are 
certainly legitimate in the abstract.” Id. at 13. So for Rust’s as‐applied 
challenge, we must weigh those legitimate interests against the statute’s 
burden on Rust’s individual First Amendment rights. As with his facial 
challenge, Rust claims the burden on his First Amendment rights is that 
he is excluded from the primary ballot. But again, he confuses the 
consequence of statutory noncompliance with the burden of compliance. All 
ballot access challenges involve exclusion from the ballot. A plaintiff 
cannot prevail on an as‐applied challenge just by saying that a 
requirement for a filing fee, petition signatures, party membership, party 
affiliation, or any other ballot access requirement violates their First 
Amendment right to party affiliation because failing to satisfy the 
requirement excludes them from the ballot.  
Here, the burden on Rust is to either become a member of the 
Republican Party or vote in its primary elections. We must therefore 
evaluate whether the impediments to Rust either obtaining party member 
certification or voting in the party’s primaries are substantial enough that 
he has demonstrated the statute’s burdens on him so clearly outweigh its 
benefits that the statute violates his First Amendment rights. Rust has not 
demonstrated that.  
a. Party membership 
Rust’s own concessions foreclose any claim that the party‐controlled 
membership option is unconstitutionally burdensome. He concedes, as he 
must, that Indiana can limit primary candidates to party members, and 
that the State can rely on the parties to determine and certify their own 
membership. The dissenting opinion likewise acknowledges that the 
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“Republican Party certainly has the right to exclude non‐members and to 
bar people it disfavors from officially representing it.” Id. at 17; see also id. 
at 20 (acknowledging that “the parties always retain a First Amendment 
right to disassociate from any person and thereby block them from the 
ballot”); id. at 23 (“To be sure, a party may justifiably seek to prevent 
unsavory individuals . . . from becoming a candidate.”).  
That should end the analysis of Rust’s as‐applied First Amendment 
claim because that is all the party‐controlled membership requirement 
does. The statute simply lets the parties determine their own membership 
and relies on local party chairs to certify that membership. And that is all 
that happened here. Lowery decided Rust wasn’t a member of the 
Republican Party, and the Republican Party has backed her up by filing an 
amicus brief in our Court supporting her decision. Rust could have 
challenged Lowery’s decision through the party’s internal appeal process, 
but he chose not to. 
Critically, Rust is not claiming it is too burdensome to obtain party 
membership certification. He is not, for example, saying he couldn’t 
satisfy the party membership requirement because it is just too hard to 
track down the local party chair and obtain the certification. He is instead 
complaining that the party refuses to acknowledge his membership. That 
isn’t a dispute about a burden. That is a dispute about how to resolve a 
conflict between Rust’s First Amendment right to seek membership in the 
Republican Party and the Republican Party’s First Amendment right to 
exclude Rust from the party. And the law is clear and undisputed on that 
point. The party has the right to determine its membership for itself. López 
Torres, 552 U.S. at 202 (“A political party has a First Amendment right to 
limit its membership as it wishes . . . .”). 
All agree the First Amendment permits States to limit primary 
candidates to party members. Applying the party‐controlled membership 
option to Rust does only that, so it does not violate the First Amendment.  
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b. Voting history 
There is no need to go any further. If the party‐controlled membership 
option is not unconstitutionally burdensome by itself, then it can’t be 
unconstitutionally burdensome to offer candidates a second path to the 
ballot that the candidates control. But even if we evaluate the candidate‐
controlled voting history option in isolation, Rust also failed to carry his 
burden to prove that the voting history requirement is too onerous for him 
to satisfy.  
Rust voted in the 2016 Republican primary and four Democratic 
primaries before that, so obviously voting in primaries is not unduly 
burdensome for him. He simply chose not to vote in the 2020 or 2022 
Republican primaries. Had he voted in either of those elections, he would 
have satisfied the requirements of the voting history option, would have 
established his affiliation with the Republican Party, and would have been 
entitled to appear on a 2024 Republican primary ballot.  
Rust claims he did not vote in the 2020 primary because “that election 
was moved due to Covid‐19.” Appellee’s Br. at 10. But in his deposition, 
the State asked Rust why changing the primary’s date prevented Rust 
from participating. Rust responded that he “believe[d] [he] had to work 
. . . and couldn’t vote the day they moved it to.” App. Vol. 2 at 187. And 
when reminded that he could have voted absentee without excuse in that 
election, Rust merely stated “I don’t know.” Id.  
Nothing prevented Rust from participating in the 2022 Republican 
primary either, or at least he didn’t prove there was any unconstitutional 
burden on his ability to vote. Again, when asked why he didn’t vote in 
that election, Rust said, “I was probably working and could not vote. I 
don’t know.” Id. at 240.  
Rust’s choice not to vote in the 2020 or 2022 Republican primary 
elections was his prerogative, and I agree with the dissenting opinion that 
Rust had no obligation to vote in any primary. Post, at 15. But the First 
Amendment doesn’t shield Rust from the consequences of his own 
choices. His as‐applied challenge requires him to identify a severe 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S‐PL‐371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 18 of 18 
restriction on his ability to access the ballot. And because he can’t, his as‐
applied challenge fails.  
III. Conclusion 
The First Amendment permits States to limit primary election 
candidates to those who are party members or vote in the party’s primary 
elections. That is all the Affiliation Statute does, and Rust has failed to 
carry his burden to prove that requiring him to comply with the statute 
violates his First Amendment rights. I therefore agree with the Court’s 
conclusion that we must vacate the injunction and that judgment must be 
entered for the defendants.  
Slaughter, J., joins. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
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Goff, J., dissenting. 
Because I believe the application of the Affiliation Statute to John Rust 
violates his First Amendment right of association, I respectfully dissent 
from the decision of the Court.1 
The Republican Party’s 2024 primary election to select their nominee 
for United States Senate will feature one candidate. That person’s 
nomination will therefore be uncontested. Meanwhile, Rust—who’s 
donated thousands of dollars to national Republicans, who adheres to the 
Republican Party platform’s core beliefs, and whose participation has 
been welcomed by his local Republican party—is barred by the Statute 
because he failed to vote in two consecutive Republican Party primaries 
and the party’s county chairperson has refused to certify him as a party 
member. The burden imposed on Rust by these restrictions, in my view, is 
unjustified by the interests advanced by the State. And while the 
legislature is best suited to weigh the costs and benefits of a given ballot 
restriction, this Court is still responsible for safeguarding against 
legislative overreach. 
I. Primary elections emerged to divest party leaders 
of control over the nominating process, but today’s 
system can impose onerous barriers on candidates.  
Disputes over the regulation of party primaries “are inherently 
intraparty squabbles pitting one component of the party (voters and 
candidates) against another (usually the party organization).” Nathaniel 
Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot 
Access Laws, 89 Geo. L.J. 2181, 2185 (2001). In finding no violation of Rust’s 
associational rights, the Court focuses on the State’s “legitimate interest in 
 
1 Because I would resolve Rust’s challenge narrowly on as-applied First Amendment grounds, 
I refrain from addressing his other claims under principles of constitutional avoidance. See 
Indiana Land Tr. Co. v. XL Inv. Properties, LLC, 155 N.E.3d 1177, 1182–83 (Ind. 2020). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
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safeguarding parties from forced inclusion of unwanted members and 
candidates.” Ante, at 19. But this position, it’s worth emphasizing, stands 
in stark contrast to the reason primaries in Indiana emerged to begin with: 
to limit the power of party leaders to dictate nominations. Primaries are 
not meant to be opportunities for party leaders to crown their favored 
candidates—and certainly not in uncontested ballots. 
A. Primaries are a chance for the voters (i.e., the party-in-
the-electorate), not just party leaders, to select 
nominees. 
For much of the nineteenth century, the selection of candidates for 
public office took place in caucuses—small, closed-party meetings led by 
local party leaders. Trevor Potter & Marianne H. Viray, Barriers to 
Participation, 36 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 547, 549 (2003). While excluding the 
participation of rank-and-file party members, caucuses allowed the party 
itself to control the nominating process with virtually no legal restrictions. 
Id.; see also Adam Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs: Early Political 
Party Regulation in the State Courts, 1886-1915, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 876 
(2000). The lack of state oversight, however, lent itself to widespread 
abuses—from vote buying to intimidation at the polls. In Indiana (as in 
other states), the parties furnished their own ballots, often printed on a 
distinctive color of paper, to ensure that “voters voted as they were paid 
to do.” Emma Lou Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War Era, 1850-1880, 
at 40 (1965). 
As caucuses fell under increasing criticism for the level of control they 
gave to party bosses, some states, including Indiana, introduced a more 
representative method of nomination—the convention system. Lauren 
Hancock, Note, The Life of the Party: Analyzing Political Parties’ First 
Amendment Associational Rights When the Primary Election Process is 
Construed Along a Continuum, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 159, 164–65 (2003); see 
generally J.F. Connell, Indiana Primary Laws, 18 Ind. Mag. Hist. 224 (1922). 
Under this system, delegates chosen by local party leaders attended state 
or national party meetings, charged with “transmitting, from local 
assemblies, the wishes and impulses of the mass of party membership to a 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
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central point, where the selection of nominees was made.” V.O. Key, 
Politics, Parties, & Pressure Groups 373 (5th ed. 1964). While the 
convention model quickly took root, it too drew criticism for the degree of 
control exercised by party leaders over the ballot. Hancock, supra, at 164–
65. In Indiana, endorsement from the county chairperson remained crucial 
for those seeking elected office. “Without such backing candidates had 
little hope of winning.” Justin A. Walsh, The Centennial History of the 
Indiana General Assembly, 1816-1978, at 359 (1987).  
By the 1880s, the intensity of party politics in Indiana generated 
“popular questioning about how nominees were endorsed and elected.” 
Id. Persistent charges of corrupt practices at the polls “cast doubt over the 
entire electoral process,” generating a sense of urgency among lawmakers 
to reform the state’s balloting methods. Id.; Clifton J. Phillips, Indiana in 
Transition: The Emergence of an Industrial Commonwealth, 1880-1920, at 
29 (1968). Indeed, “public faith” in elections had “become shaken,” 
Democratic Governor Isaac Gray lamented, leading to a widespread belief 
“that the decision at the ballot box no longer reflect[ed] the honest 
judgment of a majority of the voters.” S. Journal, 56th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. 45 (Ind. 1889). Gray’s successor, Republican Governor Alvin Hovey, 
expressed similar concerns, warning that, if the “contending parties” 
remained free to perpetuate “fraud and corruption” upon the ballot box, a 
“moneyed aristocracy” would “control the destinies of our Nation.” Id. at 
103. To remedy this evil, he opined, “every means should be taken to 
accurately and honestly ascertain the evidence of [the people’s] will.” Id. 
The General Assembly’s response was twofold: regulating voting 
procedures and expanding voter participation in the nomination process. 
The legislature took its first step toward reform in 1889 with the adoption 
of the Australian-ballot system. This system created the official state ballot 
form and prohibited all persons, except election officials and voters, from 
approaching within fifty feet of a polling place, enabling Hoosiers to cast 
their votes in secret. Phillips, supra, at 30; Ray Boomhower, “To Secure 
Honest Elections”: Jacob Piatt Dunn, Jr., and the Reform of Indiana’s Ballot, 90 
Ind. Mag. Hist. 311, 324 (1994). While the parties lost control over the 
ballot, they secured equal representation on the election boards. Phillips, 
supra, at 30. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
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These reforms prompted a “growing recognition that the individual’s 
right to vote included participation in party nominating procedures.” 
Winkler, supra, at 881; see also Charles C. Binney, American Secret Ballot 
Decisions, 41 Amer. L. Reg. & Rev. 101, 105–06 (1893) (arguing that the 
right to vote extended beyond general elections to include “the right to 
designate the candidate of one’s choice”). What resulted was a series of 
measures, in the first decade of the twentieth century, to gradually replace 
party control over the selection of candidates with the popular vote.2 In 
1915, primary-election advocates in Indiana won their greatest victory 
with the passage of a mandatory, statewide law.3 Walsh, supra, at 360; 
Connell, supra, at 228–29. The act required primary elections for all 
township, city, county, state, and congressional nominees, and it obligated 
delegates to state and national conventions to support any candidate for 
president, United States senator, or governor who received a majority 
vote. Walsh, supra, at 360–61. So sweeping was its scope, one historian 
wrote, that the measure “deprived party machines all over the state of 
exclusive power over nominations for public office.” Id. at 517. Indeed, 
while subject to its own imperfections, the primary system in Indiana 
stood on the idea that “members of the party should have the privilege of 
nominating their party’s candidates directly and without unreasonable 
dictation from party leaders” who could “not be held legally or morally 
responsible for that dictation.” Connell, supra, at 227. 
To be sure, as the Court points out, the state has, since 1915, vacillated 
in its method of candidate selection—reverting to the convention system 
 
2 A 1901 law, which applied only to Marion and Vanderburgh Counties, changed little in the 
electoral landscape, as it left primaries optional, with discretion vested in local parties. Walsh, 
supra, at 360; Connell, supra, at 228. A 1907 law, applicable only to counties with the largest 
populations, made primaries mandatory for the nomination of all county, township, and city 
officers, as well as for precinct committeemen and delegates to the congressional and state 
conventions. Walsh, supra, at 360; Connell, supra, at 229. 
3 To further bolster public confidence in the state’s electoral system, the General Assembly 
had enacted a corrupt-practices act in 1911, imposing criminal penalties on those found 
tampering with voting machines at general and primary elections alike. Connell, supra, at 230. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 5 of 25 
in 1929 before returning to primaries in 1975.4 Ante, at 10–11. But such 
changes in the state’s approach to the nomination process did not 
diminish the role of the voter. As this Court emphasized in 1935, the 
purpose of “all election laws” in Indiana—including those “controlling 
the activities of political parties, party conventions, and primaries, and 
providing for the manner in which the names of candidates may be put 
upon the ballots”—is ultimately “to secure to the elector an opportunity to 
freely and fairly cast his ballot, and to uphold the will of the electorate 
and prevent disfranchisement.” Lumm v. Simpson, 207 Ind. 680, 683–84, 194 
N.E. 341, 342 (1935) (emphases added). 
B. Indiana’s current primary system features a high barrier 
to candidate entry. 
While the advent of primaries advanced public participation in the 
selection of representatives, “it has long been accepted that states must 
necessarily regulate elections, even through restricting candidate access to 
the ballot.” Potter & Viray, supra, at 547. After all, a “procedure inviting or 
permitting every citizen to present himself to the voters on the ballot 
without some means of measuring the seriousness of the candidate’s 
desire and motivation would make rational voter choices more difficult 
because of the size of the ballot.” Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974). 
Still, the type and severity of ballot restrictions administered by the 
state—e.g., filing fees or petition-signature requirements—may impose 
significant barriers to participation for genuine candidates. The most 
onerous burdens tend to “undermine the competitive character of an 
electoral system,” depriving the voters of “a meaningful range of choices 
on the ballot.” Persily, supra, at 2189, 2190. This lack of competition, in 
 
4 The General Assembly repealed the statewide law in 1929, marking a “reversion to the 
system of the 1890s when party conventions had exclusive control” over most nominations for 
public office. Walsh, supra, at 362–63. But given the “wide popular support for direct 
primaries” in Indiana, lawmakers restored direct elections for legislative candidates just two 
years later. Id. at 517. State conventions, however, retained the power for several years to 
endorse presidential candidates and to select nominees for the U.S. Senate. Id. at 517 & n.1. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 6 of 25 
turn, has resulted in extremely low voter turnout in recent years. See 
generally Bipartisan Policy Ctr., 2022 Primary Turnout: Trends and Lessons 
for Boosting Participation (2023). In Indiana, the average turnout rate for 
eligible voters at primary elections between 2010 and 2022 hovered at just 
above fifteen percent. Id. at 29–32. 
Despite these figures, Indiana imposes some of the highest hurdles for 
primary-ballot access in the nation. For example, whereas New Jersey and 
Ohio require a candidate for U.S. Senator to collect 1,000 signatures,5 
Indiana’s election code requires a candidate seeking the same office to 
collect at least 4,500 signatures from registered voters statewide—500 
signatures from each of Indiana’s nine Congressional districts. Ind. Code § 
3-8-2-8(a).  
Adding to this burden, the General Assembly recently amended 
Indiana’s election code to make it even harder for potential candidates to 
add their names to the primary ballot. Before 2021, a person could run as a 
primary candidate if the “most recent primary election in Indiana in 
which the candidate voted was a primary election held by the party with 
which the candidate claims affiliation” or if the county chair of the 
political party with which the candidate claimed affiliation certified the 
candidate as a member of the political party. I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4) (2017) 
(repealed). Effective January 1, 2022, a person is eligible only if the “two 
(2) most recent primary elections in Indiana in which the candidate voted 
were primary elections held by the party with which the candidate claims 
affiliation.” Pub. L. No. 193-2021, § 17, 2021 Ind. Acts 2719, 2731–32 
(codified at I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4)(A)) (emphasis added)). If the prospective 
candidate fails to meet this two-primary requirement, then the only way 
onto the primary ballot is through the county chair certifying the 
candidate’s membership. Id. (codified at I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4)(B)). From my 
research, it appears that no other state that uses a primary system like 
 
5 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:23-8 (West); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3513.05 (West). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
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Indiana’s imposes such an onerous affiliation requirement to run for U.S. 
Senate.6 
Needless to say, these added hurdles have generated challenges from 
prospective candidates in recent years. See, e.g., Bookwalter v. Indiana 
Election Comm’n, 209 N.E.3d 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023); Rainey v. Indiana 
Election Comm’n, 208 N.E.3d 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Adding to this list of 
disaffected Hoosiers, John Rust, a prospective Republican candidate for 
the U.S. Senate, sued state election officials and his local Republican Party 
chairperson, arguing that the Affiliation Statute violates his 
constitutionally protected rights to freely associate with the party and to 
cast his vote effectively. App. Vol. 2, p. 45.  
II. The Affiliation Statute violates Rust’s right to 
associate with the Republican Party as its nominee 
for U.S. Senate. 
The Court insists that “the State could abolish its primary system 
altogether and provide no opportunity for Rust to exercise his 
associational rights if it so desired.” Ante, at 23. Though certainly true, this 
proposition misses the point. While “states enjoy near absolute authority 
in their decisions whether to create democracy, once they do so, they 
invite constitutional scrutiny over every aspect of the system they enact.” 
Persily, supra, at 2209 (emphasis added). So, “primary elections, while not 
constitutionally required, must abide by certain constitutional rules once 
the state (or party as state actor) makes them part of the selection process 
for representatives.” Id. 
 
6 Most states simply require a candidate to file a declaration of candidacy affirming party 
membership or affiliation. See, e.g., 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/7-10 (West); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
19:23-7 (West); Iowa Code Ann. § 43.18 (West). An Ohio statute renders a candidate ineligible 
if they “voted as a member of a different political party at any primary election within the 
current year and the immediately preceding two calendar years.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
3513.191(A) (West). But this restriction applies only to persons holding an elective office for 
which candidates are not nominated at a primary election. Id. § 3513.191(B) (West). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
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When reviewing First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state 
election laws, courts apply the balancing test established in Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
Under the Anderson/Burdick test, courts weigh “the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury” to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights 
against “the precise interests” offered by the state to justify the restriction 
and the “extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the 
plaintiff’s rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted). Courts will apply a heightened, strict-scrutiny standard—
requiring a narrowly tailored regulation that advances a compelling state 
interest—whenever the regulation subjects First Amendment rights to 
“severe restrictions.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
If, on the other hand, the regulation “imposes only reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon those rights, “the State’s important 
regulatory interests” generally suffice “to justify the restrictions.” Id. 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Still, no matter how 
“slight [the] burden may appear,” that burden “must be justified by 
relevant and legitimate state interests sufficiently weighty to justify the 
limitation.” Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). And if there’s “a less 
drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests,” the state “may not 
choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of 
fundamental personal liberties.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806 (internal citation 
and quotation marks omitted). 
Here, the Affiliation Statute (or just Statute) bars Rust’s candidacy 
because, although the last primary he voted in was the 2016 Republican 
Party primary, he voted before that in the 2012 Democratic Party primary. 
See I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4)(A). And despite welcoming Rust’s participation in 
the party, his Republican county chairwoman decided not to certify him 
as “a member of the political party.” See I.C. 3-8-2-7(a)(4)(B). 
The State Defendants argue (A) that any limitation on Rust’s ballot 
access is minor because, regardless of the Statute’s effect on a party’s 
primary election, Rust can still access the general election ballot through 
other means; and (B) the State itself has a compelling interest in regulating 
elections and preserving parties’ associational rights to govern their own 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 9 of 25 
membership. Appellants’ Br. at 15. Even if strict scrutiny applies, the State 
Defendants insist, the Statute is still constitutional because it’s narrowly 
tailored to balance the rights of all involved and furthers the State’s 
allegedly compelling interests. Id. at 16–17. 
In my view, the Affiliation Statute substantially burdens Rust’s 
associational rights and the State fails to offer precise interests sufficient to 
justify this burden under the Anderson/Burdick test. 
A. The Affiliation Statute substantially burdens Rust’s 
associational rights. 
I agree with the Court that Rust does not have “a fundamental right to 
run for United States Senate as the Republican nominee.” Ante, at 13. But 
Rust is relying on rights that rank among the “most precious freedoms” in 
our system of representative democracy: “the right of individuals to 
associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified 
voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes 
effectively.”7 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 
23, 30–31 (1968)). And while a state may restrict ballot access in the public 
interest, it can do so only by means that do not “unfairly or unnecessarily 
burden” the electorate’s right to vote and a candidate’s “equally important 
interest in the continued availability of political opportunity.” Lubin, 415 
U.S. at 716 (emphasis added). 
Still, the State Defendants argue that the restriction imposed on Rust is 
“minor” because the Affiliation Statute only limits his access to the 
primary ballot. Appellants’ Br. at 22. And his right to access the primary 
ballot, they insist, is “less compelling” than his right to access the general-
election ballot. Id. at 20. After all, Defendants emphasize, “Rust can still 
run for the U.S. Senate as a Libertarian, a minor party candidate, an 
 
7 Rust brought this claim as both a candidate and as a voter. App. Vol. 2, p. 37. 
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independent, or write-in candidate under Indiana law.” Id. at 25 (citing 
I.C. § 3-8-4-10(b); I.C. § 3-8-6-3; I.C. § 3-8-2-2.5(a)).8 
In my view, these arguments misconstrue Rust’s claim and miss the 
point. Rust is not seeking to “vindicate a right to get on the general ballot 
any way possible.” Appellee’s Br. at 20. Rather, he seeks the opportunity 
to associate with “like-minded” Republican Party supporters by standing 
as a U.S. Senate nominee for the Indiana Republican Party. Id. The 
alternative paths relied on by the State Defendants offer no meaningful 
opportunity for Rust to exercise his associational rights as a candidate or a 
voter. Furthermore, Rust’s exclusion from the primary impinges on his 
prospective supporters’ rights “to associate for political purposes” and to 
“cast their votes effectively.” See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 
189, 193 (1986). 
In any case, the purported write-in and independent candidacy options 
are not equivalent to standing in a party primary. 
As a write-in candidate, Rust would need to file the proper forms and a 
statement of economic interests, among other things. See generally I.C. § 3-
8-2-2.5. And while he must still “file a declaration of intent to be a write-in 
candidate,” I.C. § 3-8-2-2.5(a); see also I.C. § 3-12-1-1.7(a)(1) (specifying that 
“only votes cast for declared write-in candidates shall be counted and 
certified”), his name would never actually appear on the ballot. This path 
to the general election, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, is simply 
 
8 State Defendants argue further that Rust “could also seek to fill any ballot vacancy for the 
Democratic, Libertarian, or Republican parties because the Affiliation Statute does not apply 
to the statutory ballot vacancy procedures.” Appellants’ Br. at 25 (citing I.C. § 3-13-1-20). That 
may be true, but vacancies open only sporadically, and, in any case, there is no current 
vacancy in either of Indiana’s U.S. Senate seats.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 11 of 25 
“not an adequate substitute for having the candidate’s name appear on 
the printed ballot.”9 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 799 n.26.  
To run as an independent candidate, Rust would have to secure the 
valid signatures of two percent of the total number of voters who voted in 
the most recent election for Indiana Secretary of State. See I.C. § 3-8-6-3(a). 
The total number of statewide voters who voted in the most recent 
election was 1,847,179, two percent of which equals 36,944. See Amicus Br. 
of Common Cause at 26. That latter figure is more than eight times the 
number of signatures—4,500—needed to run for U.S. Senate as a major 
party candidate. See I.C. § 3-8-2-8(a).  
Aside from this hurdle, a person may run as an independent candidate 
only if the individual “states” that he or she is “not affiliated with any 
political party.” I.C. § 3-5-2-26.6. Rust, however, has repeatedly asserted 
his Republican bona fides and has consistently declared his intent to run 
as a Republican. App. Vol. 2, pp. 178–80, 184. What’s more, he testified 
under oath that he would be lying if he were to run as an independent 
candidate.10 App. Vol. 3, p. 29. These statements notwithstanding, Rust 
would risk falling out of good standing with the Republican party if he 
were to run as an independent (or Libertarian), potentially barring him for 
an extended period from seeking elected office in Indiana as a Republican. 
See Rules of the Ind. Republican State Comm. 1-6 (stating that a person is 
“not in good standing in the Party and may be removed for cause” if he 
“openly supports a candidate” who “oppos[es] a Republican Candidate”); 
Hero v. Lake Cnty. Election Bd., 42 F.4th 768, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting a 
 
9 Even assuming he could mount an effective write-in campaign, there are several provisions 
of the election code that would disqualify a vote for such candidates. For example, “the name 
or office of a candidate written in a place on the ballot other than the place reserved for write-
in voting may not be counted for that office.” I.C. § 3-12-1-1.7(a)(2). A write-in vote is likewise 
void “if the voter attempts to cast the vote by a means other than printing the name of the 
candidate in ink or lead pencil.” I.C. § 3-12-1-1.7(a)(3). 
10 Rust’s failure to declare party affiliation under the Affiliation Statute would not free him to 
run as an unaffiliated independent. The Affiliation Statute’s criteria for party affiliation apply 
to that provision only. See I.C. § 3-8-2-7(a)(4) (laying down the two-primary rule and 
certification option “[f]or purposes of this subdivision”). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 12 of 25 
long-time Republican’s ten-year bar from the party for his support of 
independent candidates). The State Defendants appear to have 
acknowledged as much in the trial court. See Tr. Vol. 2, p. 25 (discussing 
the circumstances of the Hero case).  
Still, the Court suggests that Rust may, as an independent candidate, 
“‘tout his Republican virtues, tell voters he supports Republicans, put up 
yard signs to that effect, and run on a platform identical to any political 
party.’” Ante, at 15 (quoting Hero, 42 F.4th at 776). But campaigning in 
such a manner presents further risks to the candidate. Claiming affiliation 
with a major political party is expressly prohibited by Indiana’s election 
code, for both independent candidates and write-in candidates alike. I.C. § 
3-8-6-5.5; I.C. § 3-8-2-2.5(b)(4). And these candidates may face legal 
challenges if their statements could lead a voter to confuse them with a 
candidate from a major political party. See, e.g., I.C. § 3-8-1-2. 
In short, there is no realistic way for Rust to hold himself out to others 
as a Republican in the general election, other than standing in the 
Republican Party’s primary. The Affiliation Statute therefore imposes a 
heavy burden on his associational rights. 
B. The State’s alleged interests are insufficiently weighty 
to justify the ballot restrictions as applied to Rust. 
For this Court to sustain the Affiliation Statute, the constitutional injury 
to Rust must be justified and counterbalanced by the “precise interests” 
offered by the State that “make it necessary to burden” his rights. Burdick, 
504 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the 
State Defendants invoke the need to prevent “voter confusion by 
preserving party identifiability, avoiding ballot overcrowding and 
frivolous candidacies, and maintaining order, rather than chaos, in 
Indiana’s primary and general elections.” Appellants’ Br. at 27; see also id. 
at 15–16 (citing the need to maintain fair and honest elections, preserve 
party identities, enhance party-building efforts, guard against party 
raiding, and avoid voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, and frivolous 
candidacies). 
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While these interests are certainly legitimate in the abstract, they fall far 
short, in my view, of justifying the Statute’s ballot-access restrictions as 
applied to Rust. 
1. There’s no potential for ballot overcrowding. 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized a state’s “interest 
in keeping its ballots within manageable, understandable limits.” Lubin, 
415 U.S. at 715. That overcrowded ballots “discourage voter participation 
and confuse and frustrate those who do participate is too obvious to call 
for extended discussion.” Id. Here, however, the potential for ballot 
overcrowding isn’t even an issue. Rust’s exclusion from the primary ballot 
means that the remaining Republican contender will run unopposed. To 
be sure, a state need not prove actual voter confusion or ballot 
overcrowding. Munro, 479 U.S. at 195. To impose such a requirement 
would require a state’s “political system [to] sustain some level of damage 
before the legislature could take corrective action.” Id. But with nothing 
here to suggest that the “election ballot was becoming cluttered with 
candidates” in recent years, the idea of the Affiliation Statute as a response 
to “potential deficiencies in the electoral process” simply lacks merit. Cf. 
id. at 195–96. 
I also recognize that the state has a legitimate interest in seeing that 
ballots are not encumbered by the names of candidates with no 
substantial support. Lumm, 207 Ind. at 683, 194 N.E. at 342; see also Munro, 
479 U.S. at 197–98 (candidates must show that “they enjoy a modicum of 
community support in order to advance to the general election”). But the 
petition statute, in my view, adequately serves this interest. See I.C. § 3-8-
2-8 (requiring a potential candidate for U.S. Senator to collect at least 500 
signatures from registered voters in each of Indiana’s nine Congressional 
districts). 
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2. There’s likewise no potential for party raiding or a 
frivolous candidacy.  
The state’s interest in guarding against party raiding and frivolous 
candidates likewise fails to carry the day. For one thing, this concern 
carries little weight at the primary stage, given the other ballot-access 
requirements and the fact that the voters—i.e., the party-in-the-
electorate—can simply vote against a candidate who does not represent 
their values. In any case, as noted above, Rust repeatedly asserted his 
Republican bona fides and testified under oath that he would be lying if 
he were to run as an independent candidate. App. Vol. 2, pp. 178–80, 184. 
What’s more, when presented with certain “core beliefs” listed in the 
Republican Party platform, Rust explicitly stated that he adhered to each 
of them. App. Vol. 3, pp. 19–20. To be sure, Rust may have voted years 
ago in Democratic primaries for people he knew personally through his 
church or for those who were pro agriculture. But he testified to having 
never contributed to a Democratic candidate financially (while donating 
over $10,000 to Republican candidates), and he’s always voted for 
Republican candidates in the general elections. App. Vol. 2, pp. 40, 42. 
Beyond these points, the State Defendants’ purported interest in 
protecting against the risk of party raiding is highly suspect because the 
State itself created that risk in the first place through the primary voting 
method it adopted. While often deemed a “closed primary” system, 
Indiana’s system is more akin to a “semi-closed” primary, “in which a 
political party’s primary is open not only to members but also to 
independent voters,” given that “no formal membership, enrollment, or 
registration with the party is required.”11 Herr v. State, 212 N.E.3d 1261, 
1264 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Moreover, there’s no way to determine 
whether a voter intends “to vote at the next general election for a majority 
 
11 To vote in a party’s primary in Indiana, a person must be registered to vote and must have 
“at the last general election, voted for a majority of the regular nominees of the political party 
holding the primary election.” I.C. § 3-10-1-6(1). Alternatively, the registered voter must 
intend “to vote at the next general election for a majority of the regular nominees of the 
political party holding the primary election.” I.C. § 3-10-1-6(2).  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 15 of 25 
of the regular nominees of the political party holding the primary 
election.” See I.C. § 3-10-1-6(2). And with no way of determining what a 
voter intends to do, voting is not necessarily indicative of party 
membership or loyalty. 
Still, the Court and the concurrence conclude that the Affiliation Statute 
imposes no burden on Rust because he simply could have voted at either 
the 2020 or 2022 Republican primaries to supplement the vote he cast at 
the 2016 Republican Primary. Ante at 22; id. at 17 (opinion of Molter, J.).  
This conclusion, in my view, misses the point.   
For one thing, Rust had no obligation to vote at these previous primary 
elections. Unlike some jurisdictions in other parts of the world, “[w]e have 
no compulsory voting laws in Indiana.” Spickermon v. Goddard, 182 Ind. 
523, 532, 107 N.E. 2, 5 (1914); see Eric Lund, Compulsory Voting: A Possible 
Cure for Partisanship and Apathy in U.S. Politics, 31 Wis. Int’l L.J. 90, 94–101 
(2013) (discussing compulsory voting laws in Belgium and Australia). 
Second, and more importantly, the idea that Rust could simply have 
voted in the 2020 or 2022 Republican Primaries fails to appreciate the 
Statute for what it actually is—a restriction on an individual’s ability to 
choose and to change his or her party affiliation, which unmistakably 
implicates the associational freedoms guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 731 (1974); Kusper v. 
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973). The Affiliation Statute, in effect, locks 
voters into their party affiliation for at least two years after voting in a 
primary, if not longer (depending on when they last voted in a primary). 
See Kusper, 414 U.S. at 57, 61 (invalidating a statute which locked voters 
into their party affiliation for twenty-three months after they voted in their 
party’s primary). 
To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a state’s interest in 
imposing a durational party-affiliation requirement, but only to protect 
against “candidacies prompted by short-range political goals.” Storer, 415 
U.S. at 735 (emphasis added). The idea of party raiding, “its potential 
disruptive impact, and its advantages to one side” over another, the Court 
has explained, “are not likely to be as apparent to the majority of enrolled 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 16 of 25 
voters” or even the “professional politician just prior to a November 
general election when concerns are elsewhere as would be true during the 
‘primary season.’” Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973) (quoting 
the appellate court). What’s more, “[f]ew persons have the effrontery or 
the foresight to enroll as say, ‘Republicans’ so that they can vote in a 
primary some seven months hence, when they full well intend to vote 
‘Democratic’ in only a few weeks.” Id. (quoting the appellate court). And 
only the “rare politician” could effectively “urge his constituents to vote 
for him or his party in the upcoming general election, while at the same 
time urging a cross-over enrollment for the purpose of upsetting the 
opposite party’s primary.” Id. (quoting the appellate court). 
Based on this reasoning, courts have struck down long-term party-
affiliation requirements while upholding those that are relatively short in 
duration and that focus on preventing the political opportunism that 
arises just before an election campaign. Compare Kay v. Brown, 424 F. Supp. 
588, 591, 593, 595 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (holding unconstitutional a state statute 
barring primary-ballot access if the candidate voted for a “different 
political party at any primary election within the next preceding four 
calendar years”), with State ex rel. Billings v. City of Point Pleasant, 460 
S.E.2d 436, 437, 443–44 (W. Va. 1995) (upholding a requirement for a 
candidate to file a verified statement that he or she “has not been 
registered as a voter affiliated with any other political party for a period of 
sixty days” before announcing his or her candidacy for public office). As 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio aptly 
observed, the “state’s interest in promoting party loyalty and party 
attachment is not in preserving the status quo within a party, but is in 
assuring the integrity of a party’s candidate selection process.” Kay, 424 F. 
Supp. at 593 (emphasis added). 
By effectively penalizing him for having voted in the Democratic 
Primary twelve years ago—despite his vote in the Republican Primary in 
2016, despite the thousands of dollars he’s contributed to the national 
Republican Party over the years, and despite his adherence to the core 
beliefs of the party’s platform—the Affiliation Statute’s durational 
requirement works an especially significant hardship on Rust. Sure, he 
could have voted in the 2020 or 2022 Republican Primaries. But 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
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“[r]equiring a voter to decide before casting his ballot in a party primary 
whether he might not [several] years in the future want to run for office as 
the candidate of another party,” in my view, clearly constitutes a “drastic 
means of accomplishing the state’s goals.” See Kay, 424 F. Supp. at 593. 
3. The State’s purported interest in protecting the 
parties’ associational rights is limited. 
Beyond the interests cited above, the State Defendants invoke the need 
to preserve the “parties’ associational rights to govern their own 
membership.” Appellants’ Br. at 15. The Republican State Committee 
agrees, arguing that Rust has no “right to force his inclusion on a 
particular party’s primary ballot.” Amicus Br. at 9–10. 
The Republican Party certainly has the right to exclude non-members 
and to bar people it disfavors from officially representing it. But this 
important right does not necessarily align with the State’s interest. The 
State’s interest in regulating the primary ballot is to “protect it as a means 
of democratic choice” (e.g., by seeking to avoid voter confusion), not to 
“produce any particular outcome.” Persily, supra, at 2222. A political 
party’s interests in regulating the ballot, on the other hand, “are explicitly 
factional and anti-state.” Id. Indeed, for the party, the “primary exists to 
further the interests of a subset of the electorate—not the electorate itself.” 
Id. Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that “care must 
be taken not to confuse the interest of partisan organizations with 
governmental interests.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976). More to 
the point, the Court has explicitly recognized that “preserving party unity 
during a primary is not a compelling state interest.” Eu v. San Francisco 
County Democratic Cent. Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 228 (1989) (emphasis 
added). 
Still, the Court here assumes that state and party interests go hand in 
hand. See ante, at 19 (explaining that the state has “a legitimate interest in 
safeguarding parties from forced inclusion of unwanted members and 
candidates”). In doing so, the Court—improperly, in my view—
transforms a claim of rights versus state interests into a claim of rights 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 18 of 25 
versus rights, with the party leaders’ rights coming out on top. See Persily, 
supra, at 2184.  
Even if the state’s interest did align with the party’s right to exclude, 
that right, I conclude, does not justify the Affiliation Statute’s burden on 
Rust. 
a. Giving Rust primary-ballot access doesn’t impose 
his nomination on the Republican Party. 
To begin with, the State Defendants’ purported interest overlooks the 
fact that a political party’s associational rights and interests do not begin 
and end with party leadership. See Tashjian v. Republican Party, 478 U.S. 
208, 215 (1986) (noting that a “major state political party necessarily 
includes individuals playing a broad spectrum of roles in the 
organization’s activities”). “At the stage of preprimary litigation,” one 
commentator notes, “no one knows whether the bulk of the membership 
of the party wants the names of additional candidates to appear on the 
primary ballot.” Persily, supra, at 2186. Indeed, the “precise question in the 
litigation is whether party members will even have the opportunity to 
express their candidate preferences.” Id.  
Simply put, giving Rust primary-ballot access doesn’t impose his 
nomination on the Republican Party. That’s for the voters (i.e., the party-
in-the-electorate) to decide at the primary election itself. See Anderson, 460 
U.S. at 803 (citing the “conclusive effect” of “the winnowing process 
performed by party members in the primary election”); Eu, 489 U.S. at 227 
(citing the primary election as the proper means for “contending forces 
within the party” to ultimately “settle their differences”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). To conclude otherwise allows the 
party leadership to “invoke the powers of the State to assure monolithic 
control over its own members and supporters.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 803.  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
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b. The Republican Party has never excluded Rust 
from membership. 
The Court relies on Hero for the proposition that “a political party may 
exclude candidates from their ballot, even if they satisfy the Affiliation 
Statute.” Ante, at 18. But that precedent weighs against the need for the 
Statute’s two-primary requirement.  
In Hero, a longtime member of the Republican Party, Joseph Hero, 
“openly campaigned for the defeat of a Republican candidate.” 42 F.4th at 
770. The State Republican Party “caught wind of Hero’s efforts” and 
informed him that he was “not a Republican in good standing,” thus 
“barring him from seeking elected office in Indiana as a Republican” for 
ten years. Id. at 770–71. Despite this bar, Hero declared his Republican 
candidacy for a seat on the town council. Id. at 771. The chairman of the 
county Republican party challenged Hero’s candidacy. While conceding 
that “Hero met the qualifications for affiliation” under the statute, the 
chairman “maintained that Hero could not run based on ‘an actual order 
from the party chairman in Indiana.’”12 Id. The county election board 
agreed, as did the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, concluding that the 
restriction was reasonable and nondiscriminatory because the “State has 
an interest in protecting a party’s right to determine its own membership 
and limit its candidates to those party members.” Id. at 776. 
Unlike in Hero, Rust has not been banned from the Republican party. 
To the contrary, the State Defendants have repeatedly emphasized that 
Rust could still run as a Republican (before the candidate-filing deadline) 
if the current chair of his county’s Republic Party were to “change her 
mind” or if she were to “resign, die, or otherwise vacate the county party 
chair position” and leave certification discretion to her replacement. App. 
Vol. 2, p. 143; see also id. at 149–50; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 10. What’s more, while 
arguing that Rust is disqualified under the Affiliation Statute, the State 
 
12 The statute in Hero was the pre-2022 version, requiring the candidate to have either voted 
for their party in the last primary election or to have secured certification from the county 
chairperson. 42 F.4th at 771. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
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Defendants expressly rejected the idea that “Rust is an unwanted person 
in the Republican Party.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 66. In fact, they acknowledged that 
the county Republican party would “welcome [Rust’s] participation.” 
App. Vol. 3, p. 2; see also App. Vol. 2, p. 146. 
This distinction aside, the Court, in its analysis of Hero, makes much of 
the fact that “the final decision to remove Hero from the ballot was from a 
state actor—the Lake County Election Board, which enforced the party’s 
First Amendment rights.” Ante, at 18. But the election board was 
enforcing, not a statutory restriction on a person’s candidacy but, rather, 
the party’s right to exclude a person no longer affiliated with that party 
by its own rules.13 See 42 F.4th at 776–77. And “disaffiliation,” whether by 
internal party rules or laws defining which voters may participate in a 
primary, “is an absolute bar to candidacy.” Storer, 415 U.S. at 737. This 
absolute bar, moreover, precludes the need to assess the totality of the 
election laws as they affect the candidate’s constitutional rights. Id. Thus, 
the Hero court’s discussion of alternative means to accessing the ballot was 
entirely irrelevant to that case’s resolution. See id. 
Because the parties always retain a First Amendment right to 
disassociate from any person and thereby block them from the ballot, 
enforcing the Affiliation Statute’s two-primary barrier against Rust does 
not serve an essential function in protecting the parties’ rights to limit 
their candidacies to members in good standing. 
c. Given its potential for arbitrary application, the 
certification option fails to mitigate the burden of 
the two-primary barrier. 
Having failed to vote Republican at two consecutive primary elections, 
Rust’s other option to access the primary ballot was to obtain membership 
 
13 In fact, the Lake County Election Board made this very point in its briefing before the 
Seventh Circuit, arguing that Hero sought “to create a Constitutional question by conflating 
the issue of party membership with the issue of access to the ballot.” Br. of Defendant-
Appellee, at *2, Hero, 42 F.4th 768, 2022 WL 510919. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 21 of 25 
certification from the county chairperson of the Republican party. See I.C. 
§ 3-8-2-7(a)(4)(B). But because this option is entirely discretionary and 
potentially arbitrary, it provides no means to mitigate the burden on Rust. 
The certification option permits the local “county chairman” of the 
party with which a candidate “claims affiliation” to certify “that the 
candidate is a member of the political party.” Id. As the Court explains, 
this provision allows a party discretion to welcome a candidate who does 
not satisfy the two-primary requirement. Ante, at 22. Precisely because of 
the party’s discretion, however, the provision does nothing to lessen the 
burden of the two-primary requirement on Rust. The provision calls for 
certification of party membership but leaves the term “member” 
undefined. It is unclear how Rust could ascertain whether he is a 
Republican Party member or not. Such a “‘standardless’” statute does not 
protect Rust’s First Amendment rights because it “‘authorizes or 
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’” See F.C.C. v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (quoting United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). Lacking any “explicit standards,” the 
provision is “vague” and leaves Rust’s rights subject to “resolution on an 
ad hoc and subjective basis.” See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108–09 (1972). Indeed, any candidate who fails to curry the favor of party 
leadership has little chance of accessing the primary by way of 
membership certification. 
I find support for this conclusion in Duke v. Connell, 790 F. Supp. 50 
(D.R.I. 1992). In that case, a presidential hopeful—David Duke—sought to 
place his name on the Republican Party’s primary-election ballot in Rhode 
Island. Id. at 51. By statute, the state allowed three methods for admitting 
a presidential candidate to the primary ballot: (1) an announcement by the 
secretary of state of any known “bona fide national candidates for 
presidential nominee,” (2) a written request signed by the chairman of the 
state committee, and (3) a petition signed by at least 1,000 qualified party 
voters. Id. at 51–52. A “bona fide national candidate” was defined as a 
person who was “generally recognized nationally as a presidential 
contender within his [or her] respective party.” Id. at 52 (quoting statute).  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
Page 22 of 25 
Following the recommendation of the State Republican Party Chair, the 
secretary of state announced President George H.W. Bush as “the only 
person who met the requirements of a bona fide national candidate.” Id. 
Duke, for his part, had announced his candidacy via national television. 
But while the secretary of state knew of this announcement, she ultimately 
decided that he was not a bona fide national candidate. Id. While Duke 
could still have secured access to the ballot by submitting a petition of 
1,000 qualified signatures, the limited timeframe in which to pursue that 
option (eight days) rendered it impractical. Id.  
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island 
concluded that the statutory procedure was “not reasonably necessary to 
achieve the legitimate state interest of regulating ballot access.” Id. at 53–
54. In reaching this conclusion, the court identified three potentially fatal 
infirmities. First, the procedure lacked meaningful criteria in failing to 
specify by whom a candidate must be “generally recognized nationally.” 
Id. at 54. Second, the procedure failed to identify “what a candidate must 
do in order to comply” with the requirement, leaving a candidate to 
“necessarily guess at its meaning.” Id. Finally, the procedure improperly 
vested in the secretary of state the authority to “exercise unreviewable 
discretion” in determining a person’s candidacy. Id. By basing this 
determination on the “disapproval of party leaders,” the court reasoned, 
the secretary of state “failed to consider Duke’s support among the 
populace, for whom the party leaders [did] not necessarily speak.” Id. 
What’s more, the court explained, the procedure set forth “no standards” 
for the state party chair to follow in making a recommendation, effectively 
permitting the chair to “discriminate against any candidate whose views 
he does not approve, even those of an incumbent, while acting under the 
guise of statutory mandate.” Id. at 54–55. 
Here, just as in Connell, the Affiliation Statute’s certification option 
permits a county chair, unelected by Hoosier voters, “to discriminate 
against any candidate whose views [they do] not approve, even those of 
an incumbent, while acting under the guise of statutory mandate.” See id. 
at 55. And given this potential for arbitrary application, it provides no 
means to mitigate the burden on Rust. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-371 | March 6, 2024 
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To be sure, a party may justifiably seek to prevent unsavory individuals 
like Duke (a former Klansman with extreme right-wing views) from 
becoming a candidate. But the Republican Party has taken no such steps 
with respect to Rust—a candidate who, unlike Duke, closely adheres to 
the “core beliefs” in the Republican Party platform. See App. Vol. 3, pp. 
19–20.  
III. The Court’s decision gives the legislature 
unrestricted authority to regulate the primary 
ballot.  
The Court characterizes the foregoing analysis as expressing a policy 
preference. Ante, at 26. But it carries out exactly what the Anderson/Burdick 
test calls for: weighing “the character and magnitude” of the plaintiff’s 
asserted constitutional injury against “the precise interests” offered by the 
state to justify the restriction and the “extent to which those interests 
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. 
The Court, for its part, simply recites the State’s asserted interests—
avoiding voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, frivolous candidacies, and 
general “chaos” in Indiana’s elections—with no analysis of how those 
purported interests are necessary to burden Rust’s constitutional rights. 
See ante, at 21.  
Today’s opinion, in fact, would seem to discard the Anderson/Burdick 
test altogether, giving the legislature unrestricted authority to regulate the 
primary ballot any way it sees fit. See id. at 29 (declining to “second-guess 
the wisdom of the Affiliation Statute,” which reflects “the expression of a 
majority of Hoosiers who are represented by legislators they elected who 
passed this law”). The concurrence goes a step further, suggesting that the 
General Assembly need not consider a potential candidate’s voting 
history, allowing party leadership alone to establish party affiliation for 
ballot access. Id. at 17 (opinion of Molter, J.) (stating that, if “the party-
controlled membership option is not unconstitutionally burdensome by 
itself,” then there’s “no need to go any further”).  
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Page 24 of 25 
To be sure, I agree with the Court that “the legislature is in the best 
position to ‘weigh the costs and benefits’ of a given ballot restriction.” See 
id. at 26 (opinion of the Court) (quoting Crawford, 553 U.S. at 181 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). But we are still “responsible for 
safeguarding against legislative overreach.” Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 
584, 610 (Ind. 2019) (Rush, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
See, e.g., Holcomb v. Bray, 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1273–74 (Ind. 2022) (holding 
unconstitutional a law that allowed the legislature to call itself into 
emergency session); City of Hammond v. Herman & Kittle Properties, Inc., 119 
N.E.3d 70, 73–74 (Ind. 2019) (declaring a statute that allowed certain cities 
to charge local landlords any amount to register rental properties to be 
unconstitutional special legislation). This is hardly a controversial 
proposition, even in the context of analyzing the constitutionality of the 
state’s election scheme. As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
recognized, “the Legislature, as well as the judiciary, has a role to play in 
ensuring the process retains its integrity and functions as an accurate 
reflection of the people’s will.” Billings, 460 S.E.2d at 442 (footnote 
omitted, emphasis added). Indeed, the Court forsakes its role as a check 
and balance to the legislature if it “simply defer[s] to the General 
Assembly’s decision on how to weigh the people’s liberty.” Members of 
Medical Licensing Bd. of Indiana v. Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Haw., Ala., 
Ind., Ky., Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957, 990–91 (Ind. 2023) (Goff., J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  
Conclusion 
“A fundamental principle of our representative democracy,” the U.S. 
Supreme Court once observed, quoting the words of Alexander Hamilton, 
“‘is that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.’” 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (quoting 2 Elliot’s Debates 
257) (emphasis added). And “this principle is undermined as much by 
limiting whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself.” Id. 
I couldn’t agree more. And while the State has a legitimate interest in 
regulating the ballot—to avoid voter confusion or party raiding and to 
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Page 25 of 25 
preserve the parties’ associational rights—those interests, in my view, fail 
to justify the onerous burden imposed on Rust.  
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the Court 
to uphold the Affiliation Statute as applied to Rust.  
Rush, C.J., joins.