Case Title: A.B. and S.B.W. v. S.E.W.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-155-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff A.B. and defendant S.E.W. were domestic partners from November 1988 to November 1996. At some point during the relationship, they decided that they both should become pregnant through artificial insemination. Defendant become pregnant first and gave birth to K.W. in April 1993. Plaintiff participated both in defendant s Lamaze classes and in K.W. s birth and delivery. Following the birth, plaintiff participated in K.W. s day-to-day care. K.W. was given plaintiff s surname as a middle name and K.W. referred to both plaintiff and defendant as Mama G and Mama Li l. In October 1994, plaintiff gave birth to S.B.W. After S.B.W. s birth, the relationship between plaintiff and defendant soured. The couple s friends observed plaintiff s anger and resentment toward defendant. K.W. s child care provider testified that just before the couple s eventual separation, K.W. was violent, irritable, and withdrawn, but that afterward, she was well behaved. Other witnesses also observed that during the time when the couple was experiencing problems, K.W. s behavior and demeanor changed, noting that she had become rude and agitated toward the plaintiff. They further testified that K.W. had become calm, more affectionate, and happy following the couple s separation. The couple ended their cohabitation in November 1996. Defendant denied plaintiff s repeated requests for visitation with K.W., prompting plaintiff to file suit for visitation in March 1997. After hearing testimony from both fact and expert witnesses, the trial court found that although plaintiff had established that she had stood in loco parentis to K.W., she had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation would be in K.W. s best interests. In reaching that determination, the trial court noted specifically the improvement in K.W. s behavior since the separation and the fact that she had not asked about S.B.W. during the year prior to the hearing and only rarely had asked for plaintiff. The trial court therefore denied visitation to plaintiff in a decree entitled final order, dated September 9, 1998. Plaintiff did not appeal that determination. In August 2000, several months after the Supreme Court s decision in V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000), plaintiff moved to reopen the trial court s September 9, 1998, order and to obtain visitation with K.W. Inasmuch as the time to appeal that order had expired, plaintiff cited Rule 4:50-1(f), claiming that the new standard announced in V.C. constituted a reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order. In that case, the Court stated that once a third party is determined to be a psychological parent, he or she stands in parity with the legal parent. The Court in V.C. further concluded that when a plaintiff stands as a psychological parent to a minor, visitation will be the presumptive rule. The trial judge denied plaintiff s application to reopen the September 1998 order, which the Appellate Division upheld in an unreported opinion. The Supreme Court granted plaintiff s petition for certification. HELD : Plaintiff s motion to reopen a prior order denying her visitation with her former domestic partner s child was not erroneously denied by the trial court when the time for direct appeal had expired and the sole basis for plaintiff s motion was the Supreme Court s issuance of a potentially relevant decision more than a year and a half after the entry of the original visitation order. 1. To prevent endless re-litigation of settled cases, new developments in case law generally do not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance as to justify relief from a final judgment. In keeping with the traditional manner in which new case law is treated, V.C. is not an exceptional circumstance, absent which the trial court s original visitation decree must be upheld. (pp. 5-6) 2. Courts must consider the prejudice and foreseeable harm to a child when a legal challenge jeopardizes that child s well-settled home environment. Although special concerns are implicated whenever an application submitted under Rule 4:50 relates to child custody or visitation, in view of the facts of this case, K.W. s paramount interest in stability and permanency appears to outweigh significantly the asserted benefits of plaintiff s requested relief. (pp. 6-8) 3. Although visitation orders, by their nature, often are subject to future revision depending on changed factual circumstances in a given case, to allow the jurisdiction of the court to be invoked merely because a party wishes to argue new or developing case law would deprive all parents and children of repose from visitation complaints. (pp. 8-9) 4. Given the terms of the trial court s original order completely denying all visits, the parties could not reasonably have expected any revisions to that disposition, absent changed circumstances. Without more, the issuance of V.C. is insufficient to warrant reopening of the prior decree and the trial court on the present motion did not err in disposing of this matter in the manner that it did. (p. 9) 5. Assuming that V.C. reflects a new rule of law, the Court declines to apply it retroactively to this or any similar case in which the time for direct appeal so clearly has expired. Such retroactivity would expose children and their caregivers to a serious disruption of their family life. (pp. 9-10) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI, and JUDGES PETRELLA and SKILLMAN, temporarily assigned, join in JUSTICE VERNIERO s opinion. JUSTICES LONG and ALBIN did not participate. A.B. and S.B.W., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. S.E.W., Defendant-Respondent. Argued February 4, 2003 Decided April 1, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. William S. Singer argued the cause for appellants (Singer & Fedun, attorneys; Mr. Singer and Mary Ann Bauer, on the brief). Barbara A. Ulrichsen argued the cause for respondent (Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, attorneys; Ms. Ulrichsen and Derek M. Freed, of counsel and on the briefs). J.C. Salyer argued the cause for amicus curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey. The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. In V.C. v. M.J.B., this Court articulated the standard to be applied when determining whether a party, on the basis of his or her claimed status as a psychological parent, should be awarded custody of, and visitation with, a former domestic partner's biological children. 163 N.J. 200, 205, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926, 121 S. Ct. 302, 148 L. Ed 2d 243 (2000). Nearly two years before we decided V.C., the trial court in this case entered a final order denying plaintiff visitation with her former partner s daughter. Plaintiff did not appeal that determination. In her present application, plaintiff argues that V.C. should be applied to her case, requiring the trial court to reopen and reconsider the prior order. We hold that the trial court did not err in denying that application. [Alderiso v. Medical Center, 167 N.J. 191, 203 (2001).] Assuming that V.C. reflects a new rule of law, we decline to apply it retroactively to this or any similar case in which the time for direct appeal so clearly has expired. Such retroactivity would expose children and their caregivers to a serious disruption of their family life. As this matter well demonstrates, courts should avoid interfering with well-settled home environments unless the equities of a given case clearly compel that result. Informed by our analysis under Rule 4:50, we conclude that this is not such a case. NO. A-155 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court A.B. and S.B.W., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. S.E.W., Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED April 1, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Verniero CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY