Case Title: Manuel Antonio Rodriguez v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC05-859

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-859 
____________ 
 
MANUEL ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1314 
____________ 
 
MANUEL ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. MCNEIL, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 6, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Manuel Antonio Rodriguez appeals the circuit court‘s order denying his 
motion to vacate his convictions of first-degree murder and sentences of death and 
also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. 
 
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V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  Rodriguez raised a significant number of claims in 
his postconviction motion, and the circuit court held two separate evidentiary 
hearings on the claims requiring evidentiary development.  This Court, having 
reviewed the record in the original trial and on postconviction and having held two 
separate oral arguments, has determined that none of the claims individually or 
collectively warrant relief.  As more fully explained in this opinion, we affirm the 
circuit court‘s denial of postconviction relief.  We also deny habeas relief. 
FACTS 
Direct Appeal 
The appellant, Manuel Antonio Rodriguez, was convicted of the first-degree 
murders of Bea Joseph, Sam Joseph, and Genevieve Abraham, which took place in 
Miami.  The facts of this case are more fully set forth in our opinion on direct 
appeal.  See Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 33-35 (Fla. 2000).  Briefly stated, 
in December 1984, Sam Joseph, Bea Joseph (Sam‘s wife), and Genevieve 
Abraham (the Josephs‘ friend) were found murdered in the Josephs‘ apartment.  
―When Abraham was found, her wedding band, diamond watch, and diamond 
earrings were missing.  There was no sign of forced entry into the apartment, but 
the apartment was in disarray.‖  Id. at 33.  Each victim ―died quickly from gunshot 
wounds to the head.‖  Id. at 33-34. 
 
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 Sam Joseph was Rodriguez‘s landlord.  Rodriguez lived with his girlfriend, 
Maria Malakoff, in the same apartment building as the Josephs and often did odd 
jobs for them in their apartment.  He was suspected of being involved because of 
several calls that he made to the police as a ―tipster‖ after the murders.  Id. at 34.  
However, the police did not have sufficient evidence to charge him at that time.   
In 1992, Rafael Lopez contacted police and told them that his brother-in-
law, Luis Rodriguez,1 had confided to him that Luis and his friend, Manuel 
Rodriguez, committed the murders.  Police contacted Luis, who eventually gave a 
formal confession in which he implicated both himself and Manuel Rodriguez.  
The police also arrested and questioned Rodriguez, who gave numerous conflicting 
accounts.  Rodriguez finally admitted he was present at the time of the crime and 
helped Luis gain access to the Josephs‘ apartment, but ―contended that the robbery 
and murders were committed by Luis and Luis‘s brother Isidoro, and that he had 
simply acted as a lookout.‖  Id.  
Although it was Rodriguez who had the prior relationship with the victims 
and lived in the same apartment building, no physical evidence linked him to the 
murders.  His codefendant Luis, who pled guilty to second-degree murder, testified 
against him at trial and was a key witness: 
                                          
 
 
1.  Luis Rodriguez and Manuel Rodriguez were not related.  Luis Rodriguez 
was the brother of Maria Malakoff, Manuel Rodriguez‘s girlfriend. 
 
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At trial, Luis testified that in 1984 he was living in Orlando.  He stated 
that Manuel called him and asked if he was interested in making 
money by assisting Manuel in committing a robbery.  Manuel told 
Luis that Luis would be the lookout and that Manuel would do all of 
the work.  Luis flew to Miami and met Manuel.  They went to the 
Josephs‘ apartment; Manuel knocked on the door and told Sam Joseph 
that Malakoff and the children were being held hostage and that they 
would be released only if the Josephs gave him money.  Manuel then 
forced himself into the apartment.  Luis followed and shut the door. 
Once inside the apartment, Manuel, who had brought two pairs 
of rubber gloves with him, put on one pair and told Luis to wear the 
other pair and not to touch anything in the apartment without the 
gloves.  Sam Joseph offered to get money from the bedroom, but 
Manuel instructed Luis to look there instead.  Luis found a gun in the 
Josephs‘ bedroom, and Manuel became angry with Sam Joseph 
because he thought the offer to get money from the bedroom was 
actually a ruse to get the gun.  Eventually, during the course of the 
crime, Manuel shot both Sam and Bea Joseph with a gun he had 
brought with him and then he ordered Luis to shoot Abraham with the 
gun Luis had found in the Josephs‘ bedroom.  Because Luis was 
scared, he did as he was told and then he fled.  He stated that he did 
not receive any of the proceeds from the crime and flew back to 
Orlando the next day. 
 
Id.2 
 
Luis‘s brother, Isidoro, also testified at trial and provided inculpatory 
evidence against Rodriguez:   
He . . . stated that, soon after the murders, his mother contacted him to 
tell him that she had found coins and jewelry in a bag under her trailer 
                                          
 
2.  Luis‘s trial testimony was ―somewhat different than his initial 
confession‖ regarding the exact circumstances of the murders.  Rodriguez, 753 
So. 2d at 34.  ―In his initial confession, Luis Rodriguez stated that he shot 
Abraham through a pillow; that he shot at two people; that he had ingested cocaine 
and marijuana before the homicides; and that Manuel Rodriguez shot the Josephs 
after he shot Abraham.‖  Id. at 34 n.1. 
 
 
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and that Manuel and Malakoff had shown up looking for it.  Isidoro 
stated that he was aware of the murders in the building and that he 
took the bag back to Orlando, where he threw it into a field.  Isidoro‘s 
mother also testified and confirmed Isidoro‘s story. 
Id. at 35.  Isidoro also provided documentation that he was working in another city 
at the time of the crime.  Rodriguez‘s girlfriend, Malakoff, testified, stating 
that she and Manuel had two children, one of whom died in 1984.  
She stated that members of her family did not like her or Manuel.  She 
also said that Manuel was not angry with Sam Joseph at the time of 
the murders and that she did not believe that Manuel was involved in 
the murders.  The State impeached her testimony through her sworn 
statement to the police in 1993, in which she said that Manuel had 
been angry with Sam Joseph and on the day of the murders had called 
him a son-of-a-bitch.  Additionally, in her pretrial statement, she said 
that Manuel told her he killed Sam Joseph when Joseph reached for a 
gun; that he had made sure that Luis killed Abraham; and that Manuel 
made sure they were all dead. 
 
Id.  The jury convicted Rodriguez of three counts of first-degree murder.   
 
In the penalty phase, the State presented evidence that Rodriguez had 
―seventy-one prior violent felony convictions (the contemporaneous murders in 
this case, twenty-three convictions of armed robbery, seventeen for armed 
kidnapping, eight for aggravated assault with a firearm, and numerous convictions 
for carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon).‖  Id.  The State also presented evidence that Rodriguez was on probation 
and parole at the time of the murders.  
Both the State and Rodriguez presented the testimony of numerous 
psychologists and psychiatrists who had evaluated Rodriguez over the previous 
 
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twenty years.  While the experts believed that Rodriguez had some sort of mental 
illness, many questioned whether he exaggerated his symptoms and was 
malingering: 
Apparently, whenever Rodriguez was charged with a crime, a 
question of competency was raised and he was evaluated.  Most of 
those who examined him agreed that he suffered from some sort of 
mental illness, but the testimony varied greatly in that some had 
previously found him to be incompetent and in need of 
hospitalization; others had found him to be malingering.  
Id. at 35.  The testimony did establish a long history of drug abuse.  The State also 
called Detective Jarrett Crawford, who testified as to hearsay statements from 
Alejandro Lago, an inmate who asserted that Rodriguez admitted he was 
exaggerating his symptoms.   
The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty for each of the 
murders.  The judge sentenced Rodriguez to death for each murder, finding six 
aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed while Rodriguez was 
under a sentence of imprisonment; (2) he had previously been convicted of violent 
felonies; (3) the murder was committed during the felony of armed burglary; (4) 
the murder was committed to avoid arrest; (5) the murder was committed for 
pecuniary gain; and (6) the murder was cold, calculated and premeditated (CCP).3 
                                          
 
 
3.  On appeal, this Court concluded that the trial court erroneously 
considered two aggravators separately (committed during a burglary and 
committed for pecuniary gain), but found the error to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d at 46. 
 
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The trial judge found no statutory mitigation, but found the following nonstatutory 
mitigation: ―Rodriguez was and is mentally ill, he has a history of drug abuse and 
drug psychosis, and he is a good brother, loving father, and caring son.‖  Id.   
On appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions and sentences of death.  As to 
the guilt phase, the Court reviewed a statement made by a detective during trial and 
an improper comment during closing argument—both which could have been 
interpreted as comments on Rodriguez‘s right to remain silent.  Nevertheless, we 
found that the comments constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. 
at 36-39.  As to the penalty phase, we held it was error to permit Detective 
Crawford to testify as to the statements from Alejandro Lago but held the error was 
harmless.  Id. at 45. 
Postconviction Proceedings 
Rodriguez filed his initial motion for postconviction relief under Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.8504 on September 14, 2001, and his amended 
postconviction motion on April 16, 2004, raising numerous claims.5  A Huff6 
                                          
 
4.  Rodriguez‘s amended motion will be governed by the requirements 
applicable to rule 3.850 because the original motion was filed before the effective 
date of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 on October 1, 2001.  
 
 
5.  Rodriguez raised the following claims: (1) his convictions are materially 
unreliable based on the cumulative effects of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
State withholding exculpatory or impeaching evidence, and the existence of newly 
discovered evidence; (2) his trial counsel had a conflict of interest; (3) Rodriguez 
was denied effective representation of trial counsel; (4) Rodriguez was denied the 
 
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hearing was held August 24, 2004, at which the State conceded that an evidentiary 
hearing was necessary on six of the subclaims raised by Rodriguez.  The trial court 
agreed to hold a hearing on the following claims: (1) trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance in failing to present evidence that Luis and Isidoro left 
Orlando together to commit the crimes; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective 
                                                                                                                                        
right to a fair trial based on prejudicial pretrial publicity and failing to change the 
venue; (5) Rodriguez is innocent of first-degree murder; (6) Rodriguez was denied 
effective assistance of counsel and the State withheld material impeachment 
evidence during the penalty phase and sentencing; (7) Rodriguez was denied his 
rights under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); (8) Rodriguez is innocent of 
the death penalty; (9) Rodriguez‘s right of confrontation was violated during the 
penalty and sentencing phases; (10) Rodriguez‘s constitutional rights were violated 
when he was absent from critical stages of the trial; (11) Rodriguez‘s convictions 
and sentences are unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); 
(12) Rodriguez was denied a fair trial and a fair, reliable, and individualized capital 
sentencing determination; (13) Rodriguez‘s death sentence is premised on 
fundamental error because the jury was provided with inadequate instructions 
concerning what constitutes certain aggravating circumstances; (14) Rodriguez is 
being denied his constitutional rights based on rules that prohibit his counsel from 
interviewing jurors; (15) Rodriguez was denied his constitutional right to a fair 
trial, his right to counsel, and his right to confront the witnesses because he was 
rendered incompetent due to medication and his mental condition; (16) the verdict 
of guilt and jury recommendation for death are unreliable because the trial court 
provided the jury with erroneous statements regarding the applicable standard by 
which to judge expert testimony; (17) Rodriguez‘s sentence of death is being 
exacted pursuant to a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of race; 
(18) Florida‘s capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and as 
applied; (19) execution by electrocution or lethal injection is cruel and unusual 
punishment; (20) Rodriguez is being denied his constitutional rights because 
access to certain records and files are being withheld in violation of chapter 119, 
Florida Statutes (2009); (21) Rodriguez is not competent to be executed; and (22) 
Rodriguez‘s trial was fraught with procedural and substantive errors that cannot be 
considered harmless when viewed as a whole. 
6.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).   
 
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assistance in failing to present testimony of Edgar Baez, an eyewitness, to describe 
the man he saw pull or take a woman into the apartment at the time of the crimes; 
(3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to present evidence that 
Luis, Raphael Lopez, and other members of Luis‘s family possessed jewelry taken 
from the victims; (4) the State knowingly presented false evidence and did not 
disclose details of family visits that were allowed to Luis while he was in jail and 
that police knew about, and possibly encouraged, Luis‘s engagement in sexual 
relations with his wife in the police station in order to obtain his favorable 
testimony; (5) the State knowingly presented false evidence that it had not 
promised to assist Luis in obtaining parole in exchange for his testimony; and (6) 
the State knowingly presented false evidence that it did not threaten Luis into 
confessing by showing him fake indictments against his family.  The trial court 
held an evidentiary hearing during which Rodriguez presented the testimony of 
Edgar Baez, trial prosecutor Abraham Laeser, Rodriguez‘s trial counsel Richard 
Houlihan and Eugene Zenobi, Luis‘s trial counsel Art Koch, and Luis.  The State 
presented the testimony of Officers Gregory Smith and Jarrett Crawford.  The trial 
court entered a detailed order denying the six claims on which the hearing was held 
and summarily denying the remaining claims.   
 
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Rodriguez raised six claims on appeal, most of which had a significant 
number of subclaims.7  On initial appeal of the order, this Court held oral 
argument.  By order, we affirmed the circuit court‘s ruling that denied Rodriguez‘s 
motions to disqualify the postconviction trial judge, but relinquished jurisdiction to 
the circuit court for further evidentiary proceedings on the following claims: (1) 
the State‘s failure to disclose two letters that Willy Sirvas wrote to the prosecutor 
before the trial, alleging that he knew Luis would lie; (2) the State‘s failure to 
disclose letters pertaining to potential impeachment of Alejandro Lago, a witness 
whose hearsay statements were heard by the jury in the penalty phase through 
Detective Crawford; and (3) various potential impeachment evidence relating to 
Isidoro.   
Another evidentiary hearing was held regarding these claims, at which 
Rodriguez presented the testimony of Willy Sirvas (concerning potential 
                                          
 
 
7.  Rodriguez raised the following claims: (1) he is entitled to a new trial due 
to the deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel and the violation of his due 
process rights under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the lack of a full and fair postconviction hearing 
before a neutral tribunal served to deny Rodriguez his constitutional right to due 
process; (3) Rodriguez was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and 
impartial jury and the effective assistance of counsel during voir dire; (4) 
Rodriguez is entitled to a hearing in order to establish that his trial counsel 
operated under multiple conflicts of interest; (5) Rodriguez was denied a reliable 
sentencing phase and is entitled to a hearing on each of his penalty phase claims; 
and (6) the lower court erred in summarily denying the remainder of Rodriguez‘s 
claims. 
 
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impeachment evidence regarding Luis), Sergeant Kenneth Alan Singleton 
(concerning potential impeachment evidence regarding Isidoro), Detective John 
LeClaire (concerning potential impeachment evidence regarding Isidoro), 
Lieutenant Daniel Villanueva (concerning potential impeachment evidence 
regarding Isidoro), Diane Pattavina (concerning whether there were secret dockets 
pertaining to Isidoro), Jose Arrojo (concerning whether there were secret dockets 
pertaining to Isidoro), and Detective Greg Smith (concerning Lago), as well as 
Abraham Laeser, Richard Houlihan, and Eugene Zenobi.  The circuit court 
subsequently denied relief on all of the additional issues.  This Court held a second 
oral argument to review all arguments raised on appeal in both the initial and 
subsequent brief. 
ANALYSIS 
Rodriguez has raised numerous claims and subclaims on appeal.8  We have 
reorganized the discussion of the claims presented by Rodriguez, focusing on those 
                                          
 
8.  After fully reviewing all of his claims and subclaims, we deny the 
following claims, which the trial court summarily denied, without further 
discussion because they are conclusively refuted by the record or are without 
merit: the circuit court erred in denying a hearing on the claims that counsel was 
ineffective in litigating the suppression of Rodriguez‘s statements and ineffective 
in failing to object to the prosecutor‘s comment on Rodriguez‘s right to remain 
silent (a subclaim of claim 1); the circuit court failed to consider the cumulative 
effects of the individual errors that occurred (a subclaim of claim 1); Rodriguez 
was denied his due process right to an accurate transcript of the evidentiary 
proceedings (a subclaim of claim 2); trial counsel failed to preserve the record 
regarding the refusal to allow Rodriguez to make a peremptory challenge (a 
 
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claims for which an evidentiary hearing was held.  In analyzing Rodriguez‘s 
claims, we first review the applicable law.  We then address the following claims: 
potential impeachment material concerning Luis; potential impeachment material 
regarding Isidoro; trial counsel‘s failure to present evidence implicating Isidoro in 
the crime; trial counsel‘s failure to present the testimony of Edgar Baez; and  
potential impeachment material concerning Alejandro Lago.  Finally, we review 
Rodriguez‘s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LAW 
The majority of Rodriguez‘s claims assert either ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a Brady9 violation, or a Giglio10 violation.  The law regarding these claims 
is well-established.  As to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, Rodriguez 
must meet both requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984): 
                                                                                                                                        
subclaim of claim 3); trial counsel was ineffective in failing to protect Rodriguez‘s 
right to a fair and impartial jury (a subclaim of claim 3); Rodriguez is entitled to a 
hearing to establish that his trial counsel operated under multiple conflicts of 
interest (Claim 4);  Rodriguez was denied a reliable sentencing phase and is 
entitled to a hearing on each of his penalty phase claims (Claim 5) (as addressed 
above, he did receive a hearing pertaining to a subclaim relating to Lago); and the 
circuit court erred in summarily denying the remainder of Rodriguez‘s claims 
(Claim 6). 
 
 
9.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
10.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
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First, the defendant must show that counsel‘s performance was 
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the ―counsel‖ guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This 
requires showing that counsel‘s errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  Unless a 
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction 
or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process 
that renders the result unreliable. 
Prejudice is met only if ―there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.‖  Id. at 694; see also Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 455-56 (2009) 
(emphasizing that courts ―do not require a defendant to show ‗that counsel‘s 
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome‘ of his penalty 
proceeding, but rather that he establish ‗a probability sufficient to undermine‘ 
confidence in [that] outcome‖ (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94)).   
To the extent that Rodriguez presents a Brady claim, he must show ―(1) that 
favorable evidence—either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or 
inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, 
the defendant was prejudiced.‖  Riechmann v. State, 966 So. 2d 298, 307 (Fla. 
2007).  To establish prejudice, the Court must ask whether ―the favorable evidence 
could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.‖  Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 
 
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2006) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999)).  Finally, to 
establish a Giglio violation, Rodriguez must show: ―(1) the testimony given was 
false; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the statement was 
material.‖  Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003).  In reviewing Brady 
and Giglio claims on appeal, this Court is ―bound by the trial court‘s credibility 
determinations and factual findings to the extent they are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.‖  Jones v. State, 998 So. 2d 573, 580 (Fla. 2008).  However, 
this Court decides de novo whether the facts are sufficient to establish each 
element.  See id.   
A.  Potential Impeachment Concerning Luis Rodriguez 
We begin with the claims that the State withheld favorable evidence that 
would have impeached Luis Rodriguez.  Any potential impeachment of Luis could 
have been significant because he was a main witness against Rodriguez and 
Rodriguez‘s defense has been that, although he was involved, Luis was the main 
actor in the murder.  
Rodriguez alleges a violation of Brady because the State failed to disclose 
certain letters that would have called Luis‘s testimony into question.  He further 
asserts the State violated either Brady or Giglio because his trial counsel was not 
given the potential impeachment material that the police threatened to arrest Luis‘s 
family, that Luis was provided with special accommodations as a benefit to ensure 
 
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his cooperation, and that Luis was promised assistance in obtaining parole if he 
testified against Rodriguez.  We discuss each of these claims and conclude that 
Rodriguez has not established a basis for relief.  
Failure to Disclose Letters to Prosecutor from Willy Sirvas 
We first address Rodriguez‘s allegations of a Brady violation when the State 
failed to disclose two letters that jail inmate Willy Sirvas wrote to the prosecutor, 
prior to trial, alleging that Luis Rodriguez would lie.  The first letter, dated August 
10, 1995, stated as follows: 
Dear Laeser-Hague: 
I‘m in the same dormitory as inmate Luis Rodriguez # 93-
65604.  You have to ask for continuance on August 14.  Rodriguez 
told me everything about the murders and he said that the state can‘t 
pruebe [sic] him anything without a witness or pruebes [sic] that lead 
him to this murders.  I will get in touch. 
 
The May 28, 1996, letter states: 
Dear Mr. Abe Laeser and Andrew Hague: 
A year ago I wrote a letter to the state attorney office.  And my 
letter ignore.  [sic]  Now, Mr. Richard Houlihan could use my 
testimony in court in reference to Luis Rodriguez lies to save his ass, 
is only one true. [sic] 
 
The postconviction court initially summarily denied this claim, but while the 
appeal was pending, defense counsel was finally able to locate Sirvas in Peru.  
Accordingly, this claim was part of the relinquishment proceedings, in which 
Sirvas testified via satellite.  The postconviction court found that Sirvas‘s 
 
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testimony was not consistent with the content of the Sirvas letters and denied this 
claim as follows: 
For there to be a violation of Brady, the state must have 
suppressed evidence that was exculpatory and the Defendant must 
have suffered some prejudice as a result. 
. . . . 
The 1995 letter was not signed it was unknown by the 
prosecution from whom it was sent.  It would not have been helpful to 
defense counsel.  Arguably, the 1996 letter should have been turned 
over.  However, Defendant was not prejudiced as a result of the 
failure to turn over the 1996 letter.  Counsel for Defendant testified at 
the hearing that they did not think that Luis was telling the truth.  Luis 
was extensively cross-examined.  Even if Sirvas was called to testify 
at trial, his oral testimony contradicted what he wrote in the letter.  He 
did not have any credibility in front of a jury.   
 
Luis testified at trial.  His plea agreement was known at that 
time and he was questioned at length about the agreement.  It was 
clear Luis entered into the plea agreement to avoid the death penalty.  
Luis testified to that at the trial.  The inconsistencies in his trial 
testimony from his initial confession were noted by the Florida 
Supreme Court on direct appeal.  Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 
34 (Fla. 2000). 
 
If any Brady violation occurred, it was not material and did not 
prejudice the Defendant‘s ability to investigate or present other 
aspects of the case. 
 
Although we disagree with the court‘s conclusions regarding whether this was 
favorable evidence that was not timely disclosed, we ultimately agree that 
Rodriguez has not shown prejudice.   
During the evidentiary hearing on relinquishment, Rodriguez clearly showed 
that the prosecutor failed to disclose these letters.  Laeser admitted that he received 
these letters before the trial but did not turn them over to the defense.  The first 
 
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letter was unsigned so Laeser testified that he did not turn this letter over because 
he did not know who wrote it.  As to the second, signed letter, Laeser testified that 
he did not turn the letter over to the defense because he knew that he would not call 
Sirvas, and the letter mentioned only Luis by name.  Laeser testified that he 
thought the letter was relevant only to Luis‘s trial, and Luis had already entered a 
plea. 
Rodriguez also called Willy Sirvas.  Sirvas knew Luis because he was in a 
cell next to Luis when they were both at the Metro West Jail.  According to Sirvas, 
Luis talked about his case and stated that the State offered him a deal to testify 
against his codefendant because he was facing the death penalty and the State 
could not prove the charges unless Luis testified.  Luis told Sirvas that even though 
he and his codefendant had a pact not to testify against each other, he would testify 
against his codefendant and blame it on him.  However, Sirvas acknowledged that 
Luis did not describe the crime or how it occurred.  On cross-examination, Sirvas 
acknowledged that he did not even know the codefendant‘s name and that Luis 
never told him anything specific about the case.   
We agree with Rodriguez that both letters should have been disclosed and 
strongly condemn such conduct.  As this Court emphasized in Mordenti v. State, 
894 So. 2d 161, 168-69 (Fla. 2004):  
Brady requires the State to disclose material information within 
the State‘s possession or control that tends to negate the guilt of the 
 
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defendant.  See Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 508 (Fla. 2003).  
Errors involving the suppression of evidence in violation of Brady 
present issues of constitutional magnitude.  See Cardona v. State, 826 
So. 2d 968, 973 (Fla. 2002).  As expressed in Brady, the rule is 
premised on the principle that reversal is warranted when the State 
fails to disclose to the defense exculpatory or impeaching evidence 
that prejudices the defendant, thereby undermining confidence that he 
received a fair trial: 
The principle . . . is not punishment of society for 
misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial 
to the accused.  Society wins not only when the guilty are 
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of 
the administration of justice suffers when any accused is 
treated unfairly . . . .  A prosecution that withholds 
evidence . . . which, if made available, would tend to 
exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial 
that bears heavily on the defendant.  That casts the 
prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that 
does not comport with standards of justice . . . . 
Cardona, 826 So. 2d at 972-73 (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88, 83 
S. Ct. 1194). 
In this case, the letters themselves strongly suggested that Sirvas possessed 
material impeachment evidence that defense counsel could have used in 
Rodriguez‘s defense.  The prosecutor explained that he did not turn over the first 
letter because he did not know who wrote it.  Such a rationale for failing to 
disclose this evidence is disingenuous; the question of how to contact the author 
does not excuse the prosecution from disclosing favorable evidence.  By its very 
nature, the letter was favorable to the defense.  The prosecutor further asserted that 
he did not disclose either letter because they were relevant only to Luis‘s trial.  
However, both letters involved the credibility of one of the State‘s most important 
 
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witnesses against Rodriguez.  In fact, the second letter was clearly written in 
reference to this case and even included Rodriguez‘s defense attorney‘s name, 
stating, ―Richard Houlihan could use my testimony in court in reference to Luis 
Rodriguez lies to save his ass.‖  Accordingly, the letters meet the first prong of 
Brady and should have been disclosed to defense counsel. 
While the record clearly establishes that the State wrongfully withheld 
favorable evidence, in order to be entitled to relief, Rodriguez must also 
demonstrate prejudice, which he has not done.  Sirvas admitted at the evidentiary 
hearing that Luis did not tell him any of the specifics about the case itself and that 
he did not even know the codefendant‘s name.  This testimony was directly 
contrary to some of the statements in his 1995 letter in which Sirvas alleged that 
Luis had told him ―everything.‖  Because his actual testimony contradicted his 
letters, Sirvas‘s credibility is questionable.   
More importantly, Sirvas‘s testimony at the evidentiary hearing shows that 
Sirvas did not know the underlying facts of the case and who participated in the 
crime.  Thus, Rodriguez would have been unable to show how Luis lied about 
Rodriguez‘s involvement.  When Sirvas was questioned during the evidentiary 
hearing, he was asked directly about why he stated in his letter that he believed 
Luis would lie.  Sirvas responded, ―You know, he was lying because, you know, he 
was testifying, the defendant because I don‘t even know his name or who he was.  
 
- 20 - 
But he told me that the State is helping me, you know, how do you call it?  A 
charge, you know, if I testify against my codefendant.  That‘s why he was lying, 
you know.‖  At no point did Sirvas provide any testimony that sufficiently 
explained why Sirvas thought that Luis would lie.  Both his letter and his testimony 
assumed that because Luis decided to plead guilty to a lesser charge in order to 
avoid the death penalty, Luis would lie.  The jury was aware that Luis had entered 
a plea in order to avoid the death penalty.  Accordingly, the defense cannot show 
how Rodriguez was prejudiced by the failure to turn over the letters. 
Potential Impeachment Regarding Threats and Favorable Treatment 
 
 In his next subclaim, Rodriguez asserts that the State violated Brady or 
Giglio because the State failed to disclose potential impeachment evidence that 
police threatened to arrest Luis‘s family, that Luis was given special favors while 
in jail, including being allowed family visits outside the jail without supervision, 
that Luis was permitted to have sex with his wife while in custody, and that Luis 
was promised help in obtaining parole.  The circuit court made credibility 
determinations based on testimony of the prosecutor and the detectives.  As 
addressed below, there is competent, substantial evidence that supports the trial 
court‘s factual findings.  Further, Rodriguez has failed to show that he is entitled to 
relief on his claims.  
 
- 21 - 
 
First, Rodriguez alleges that the State suppressed information that police 
threatened to arrest Luis‘s family or knowingly presented false testimony that this 
did not occur.  During the evidentiary hearing, Luis testified that when he was first 
questioned, the police informed him that they had picked up members of his family 
(his mother, his brother Isidoro, his sister Maria Malakoff, and his former 
girlfriend Cathy Sundin) and showed him some documents that he thought were 
either indictments or confessions.  According to Luis, the police further informed 
him that Rodriguez was blaming everything on Luis.  Officers Smith and Crawford 
testified that they did not threaten to arrest Luis‘s family.  The circuit court denied 
this claim, finding that even if this allegation was true, Rodriguez failed to show 
prejudice because Luis was vigorously cross-examined at trial as to his motives for 
testifying against Rodriguez.   
We conclude that Rodriguez has failed to show that the police threatened to 
arrest Luis‘s family if he did not cooperate.  Moreover, even if this Court accepted 
his allegations as true, Rodriguez has failed to show prejudice—i.e., that ―the 
favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.‖  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 
290 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).  The jury was presented 
with significant impeachment evidence against Luis, including his plea agreement 
and that he was given some preferential treatment.  
 
- 22 - 
Second, Rodriguez alleges that the State violated Giglio and Brady by 
suppressing information that in order to obtain Luis‘s cooperation in testifying 
against Rodriguez, Luis was provided with special accommodations, including 
unsupervised visits with his family and being permitted to have sexual relations 
with his wife while in jail.  At trial, the jury heard testimony from Luis himself that 
he was permitted to have visits with various members of his family, he had 
informed his attorneys about these visits, and his attorney asked him to take 
pictures of the visits because the attorney could not believe that the visits were 
being permitted.  Luis further testified at the trial that he had a meeting with his 
wife alone for about five or ten minutes and that during this time, he had sexual 
relations with her.  However, he testified that he did not know if the police were 
aware of this.  Trial defense counsel cross-examined Luis about these incidents at 
trial.  
At the evidentiary hearing, Luis testified that while he was unsure whether 
the police knew that he had sexual relations with his wife, the officers did suggest 
that, if he needed privacy with his wife, he should place a sticker over the peephole 
in the window of the door.  The two officers testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
they were not aware Luis had sex with his wife and denied that they granted him 
permission to have sexual relations by using stickers to cover the peephole.  The 
prosecutor testified that he did not knowingly present false testimony when the 
 
- 23 - 
detectives testified at trial that they did not permit Luis to have sexual relations 
with his wife.   
The circuit court denied this aspect of the claim, finding that Luis‘s 
statements lacked credibility and that the police officers provided credible 
testimony.  This Court is ―bound by the trial court‘s credibility determinations and 
factual findings to the extent they are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.‖  Jones, 998 So. 2d at 580.  Upon review, we find that competent, 
substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s factual findings.  Luis‘s recent 
testimony was contrary to his prior sworn statements at trial, and at times his 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing conflicted with other statements that he made 
during the hearing.  Because Luis‘s testimony was the primary support for this 
claim and his testimony was found to be not credible, Rodriguez is unable to 
establish the first prong of either a Brady violation or a Giglio violation.  Further, 
even assuming the change of testimony that the police may have known about the 
sexual relations, the jury was already aware that Luis was being provided with 
special treatment and that the police knowingly permitted him to have some private 
time with his wife.  Therefore, Rodriguez cannot establish either materiality or 
prejudice.  
Finally, Rodriguez claims that the prosecutor presented false testimony and 
failed to disclose that Luis was promised assistance in obtaining parole if he 
 
- 24 - 
testified against Rodriguez.  Although Luis was initially charged with first-degree 
murder and was facing the death penalty, he avoided this potential penalty by 
accepting a plea deal with the State in which he pled guilty to second-degree 
murder.  At trial, the jury was informed as to Luis‘s plea agreement, and Luis was 
vigorously cross-examined as to his motives for testifying against Rodriguez.  The 
circuit court denied this portion of the claim. 
Other than vague, conclusory statements, Rodriguez failed to present any 
evidence to support his claim.  During the evidentiary hearing, Luis testified that 
he thought he would be receiving assistance in obtaining parole based on some 
conversations he had ―behind closed doors.‖  No specifics of these conversations 
were provided.  Luis‘s lawyer also was unable to provide any details as to specific 
assistance that Luis was to be given if he testified against Rodriguez.  Luis agreed 
at the evidentiary hearing that the plea agreement expressly states that no promises 
were being made about his sentence.  Because Rodriguez has failed to sufficiently 
support his allegation as to an undisclosed agreement, he is not entitled to relief. 
For the reasons addressed above, we deny this subclaim.11 
B.  Potential Impeachment Concerning Isidoro Rodriguez 
                                          
 
 
11.  To the extent that Rodriguez asserts that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to properly impeach Luis, we conclude this claim 
is meritless and further deny the claim that Rodriguez was denied a full and fair 
hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.   
 
- 25 - 
We next address the claims regarding Isidoro, Luis‘s brother, in which 
Rodriguez alleges violations of Strickland, Brady, and Giglio.  Isidoro also gave 
inculpatory testimony against Rodriguez.  Rodriguez‘s defense at trial was that 
both Isidoro and Luis actively participated in the crime and Rodriguez was merely 
a lookout.  Isidoro, however, established at trial that he was in Orlando at the time 
of the murder.  Nevertheless, because Isidoro admitted some involvement in events 
after the crime (that he had disposed of jewelry discovered by his mother 
underneath her trailer) and because Luis was Isidoro‘s brother, any impeachment 
of Isidoro also could have been helpful to the defense‘s case.  
Rodriguez alleges ineffective assistance in his defense lawyer‘s failure to 
impeach Isidoro, violations of Brady by the State‘s failing to disclose potential 
impeachment evidence pertaining to Isidoro, and violations of Giglio by the State‘s 
knowing presentation of false testimony.  Rodriguez raises four distinct claims 
pertaining to Isidoro: (a) alleged secret dockets in Dade County involving Isidoro; 
(b) alleged involvement in drug activity and police investigations into such 
allegations; (c) alleged threats made by police to Isidoro; and (d) an alleged 
relationship between Isidoro and a member of the police department.  We discuss 
each claim in turn and conclude that Rodriguez has not established a basis for 
relief under any of the claims asserted.  
Allegations of Secret Dockets 
 
- 26 - 
Rodriguez first asserts that there may be secret dockets in Dade County 
involving Isidoro which should be disclosed.  After thoroughly reviewing the 
evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied 
relief on this claim as follows: 
  
There was absolutely no evidence presented that there is a 
secret docket that relates to Isidoro Rodriguez.  Since Isidoro was not 
arrested for anything but trespass in 1978, there can be no secret 
docket since there was no arrest.  In fact, it is clear to this court that 
the Defendant confuses sealed plea agreements, which were the topic 
of the Miami Herald article, with a sealed docket.  
We agree. 
Rodriguez has not presented any evidence that a secret docket exists 
concerning Isidoro.  Despite the fact that several witnesses testified that they were 
unable to find any hidden or secret dockets concerning Isidoro, Rodriguez alleges 
that secret dockets could still exist involving this witness.  Rodriguez‘s claim as to 
this issue is completely speculative and without any support.  Accordingly, we 
deny this subclaim.  See Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 951 (Fla. 2000) 
(―Postconviction relief cannot be based on speculation or possibility.‖).   
Allegations of Drug Activity 
Next, Rodriguez asserts that the State failed to disclose evidence that Isidoro 
was involved in significant drug-related offenses.  In support, he points to evidence 
that shows Isidoro was investigated by Seminole County law enforcement officials 
for possible narcotics offenses.  
 
- 27 - 
The postconviction court denied this claim as follows:  
The deposition of Pete Kelting was introduced into evidence.  Kelting 
stated that there was no indication that Isidoro ever worked as an 
informant or that he was ever arrested.  There was an anonymous tip 
that drugs were being sold out of a residence where Isidoro lived.  It 
was investigated and no arrests were made. 
 
The fact that Isidoro was investigated in Seminole County 
would not have been admissible as impeachment.  Under §90.610, 
Fla. Stat., only contact which results in a criminal conviction is 
admissible to prove bad character.  Since Isidoro was not arrested, he 
was not convicted.  It‘s possible Isidoro didn‘t know he was 
investigated.  
 
As the postconviction court pointed out, Rodriguez fails to establish how 
testimony and information concerning the Seminole County investigation could be 
admissible at trial on the murder charges against Rodriguez or have led to any 
favorable evidence.  Isidoro was never arrested or charged with any criminal drug 
activity; police received only a tip involving possible narcotics violations at a 
residence in which Isidoro lived.  Rodriguez presents no evidence that Isidoro was 
even aware that he was being investigated.  Even assuming that Rodriguez could 
show the evidence was exculpatory or proper impeachment evidence, he clearly 
cannot show any prejudice—i.e., that this evidence ―could reasonably be taken to 
put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the 
verdict.‖  Smith, 931 So. 2d at 796 (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290).   
Alleged Threats by Police 
 
- 28 - 
Rodriguez alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach 
Isidoro regarding available evidence that Isidoro cooperated as a witness only after 
he was threatened by police.  In denying this claim, the postconviction court 
observed that all witnesses called by Rodriguez stated the opposite—that Isidoro 
was never threatened or given special benefits.   
Rodriguez called numerous witnesses regarding this claim during the 
relinquishment evidentiary hearing.  All of them denied that Isidoro had been 
threatened.  Sergeant Singleton explicitly stated that he did not threaten Isidoro or 
tell him that he would be arrested and that he did not have any knowledge that 
Detective Nyberg or Detective LeClaire threatened him either.  Initially Isidoro 
was not being cooperative, so Sergeant Singleton brought Isidoro‘s wife to him, 
hoping that she would help convince her husband to cooperate.  He did not recall 
any arrangement he made with Isidoro in exchange for Isidoro‘s cooperation.  
Detective LeClaire also testified, but had no independent knowledge of Isidoro.   
Finally, the prosecutor, Abraham Laeser, testified that he also did not know 
of any threats or promises that Isidoro received in exchange for his cooperation.  
The only information he could recall on the subject was from either a deposition or 
trial testimony that Isidoro felt he needed to cooperate so the police would not 
arrest his mother.   
 
- 29 - 
 
There is competent, substantial evidence that supports the trial court‘s 
factual findings that no evidence was introduced to show that Isidoro was 
threatened or promised favors in exchange for his cooperation.  Accordingly, we 
deny this subclaim.  Defense counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to 
impeach Isidoro on evidence that did not exist.   
Allegations Regarding Relationship with Miami-Dade Police Department 
In his final subclaim, Rodriguez alleges that the State failed to disclose that a 
business partner and family member of Isidoro (Lieutenant Villanueva) was a 
detective with the Miami-Dade Police Department.  The postconviction court 
denied this claim, finding that no impeachment evidence existed because 
Lieutenant Villanueva did not know about Isidoro‘s involvement in the case until 
after the fact, he did not have contact with the officers who investigated the case, 
and he was not involved with the investigation.  
The record supports these findings.  Lieutenant Villanueva testified at the 
relinquishment hearing, acknowledging that he knew Isidoro because Isidoro had 
married his cousin and that he and Isidoro had previously bought two houses, 
which they sold for a profit.  Lieutenant Villanueva explicitly denied that the 
officers who were investigating the case talked to him about the investigation and 
further testified that he was not involved ―in any way, shape, or form in anything 
having to do with this investigation.‖  None of the witnesses testified about any 
 
- 30 - 
involvement that Lieutenant Villanueva had in the case.  Further, defense counsel 
acknowledged that he would not have brought this information before the jury if 
this was all the information he had uncovered because it would have diminished 
his credibility.   
The postconviction court‘s factual findings are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.  Moreover, the evidence is insufficient to support a Brady 
violation.  Rodriguez has not demonstrated that the relationship between Isidoro 
and Lieutenant Villanueva was favorable evidence, and thus he cannot meet the 
first prong of Brady.  Further, Rodriguez cannot establish prejudice because this 
type of attenuated impeachment evidence could not ―reasonably be taken to put the 
whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.‖  
Smith, 931 So. 2d at 796 (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290).   
In reviewing all of the subclaims regarding Isidoro, we find that Rodriguez 
has failed to show that the State suppressed any favorable evidence, that the State 
presented false testimony at trial, or that trial counsel was ineffective during the 
impeachment of Isidoro.  Accordingly, we deny relief.  
C.  Whether Counsel Was Ineffective in Failing to  
Present Evidence Implicating Isidoro in the Crime 
 
Rodriguez asserts his counsel was ineffective in failing to present testimony 
from Luis‘s girlfriend that would have implicated Isidoro and failing to present 
 
- 31 - 
evidence alleging that Isidoro or Luis‘s family had sold the jewelry belonging to 
the crime victims.  
As to the first aspect of this claim, Rodriguez alleged that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to present available evidence from Luis‘s girlfriend (Cathy 
Sundin) that Luis and Isidoro drove together from Orlando to Miami to commit the 
crimes.  Contrary to Rodriguez‘s allegations regarding this claim, he failed to 
present any testimony to establish that such available evidence existed.   
At the trial, Luis testified that he flew to Miami in order to participate in the 
crime.  Although Luis did testify at the evidentiary hearing, counsel did not inquire 
as to this matter.  The only evidence upon which Rodriguez relies to support this 
claim is the pretrial deposition of Cathy Sundin, who was Luis‘s girlfriend at the 
time of the crimes.  The postconviction court refused to consider this pretrial 
deposition, holding that the deposition constituted hearsay.  However, even if this 
deposition had been considered, it would not support a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Specifically, in her pretrial deposition, Sundin surmised that 
Isidoro drove Luis to Miami because Isidoro was ―the only one around with a car.‖  
She had no distinct memory of Isidoro picking up Luis.  Further, she had no 
knowledge that Isidoro helped in committing the crime.  However, Sundin 
mentioned on numerous occasions throughout her deposition that Rodriguez was 
the person who had planned the crime and that Luis believed he would obtain a 
 
- 32 - 
significant amount of money if he helped Rodriguez.  Because Rodriguez has 
failed to establish that favorable evidence existed as to this issue, we deny this 
subclaim. 
As to the second aspect of this subclaim, Rodriguez also asserts that his 
counsel should have presented available evidence that members of Isidoro‘s or 
Luis‘s family had and sold jewelry belonging to the victims.  Although Rodriguez 
was permitted an evidentiary hearing on this claim, no evidence was presented that 
any specific person kept or sold the jewelry.  Rodriguez has failed to demonstrate 
any available evidence that his trial counsel failed to present.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the trial court correctly denied this claim. 
D.  Whether Counsel Was Ineffective Relating to the Testimony of Edgar Baez 
In the next claim we address, Rodriguez asserts that his counsel was 
ineffective during the guilt phase because he failed to present the testimony of 
Edgar Baez, a witness who saw a man taking a woman into the Josephs‘ apartment 
around the time of the murders.  Rodriguez asserts that Baez‘s testimony could 
demonstrate that the person Baez saw at the time of the crime did not match Luis 
or Rodriguez but could have been Isidoro.  Specifically, Baez was across the street 
on the day of the murder and saw a man let an older woman (presumably 
Abraham) into the apartment.  Baez had described the man he saw very briefly in a 
1984 sworn statement, and a composite sketch was prepared.  Baez remembered 
 
- 33 - 
that a sketch was made but did not recall if he was shown the final picture.  Nor 
could Baez attest that the sketch he helped make, and which he was shown at the 
hearing, resembled the person he saw in 1984.  In reviewing the entire record as it 
relates to this claim, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of relief because, based on 
the evidence presented, Rodriguez is unable to establish either deficiency or 
prejudice in failing to present Baez as a witness. 
E.  Potential Impeachment Concerning Alejandro Lago 
We next address Rodriguez‘s allegations that the State violated Brady 
because trial counsel was never provided with letters that contained information 
that could have been used to attack the credibility of Alejandro Lago.12  According 
to Rodriguez, the State possessed letters showing that Lago received consideration 
in exchange for his assistance and that the results of a polygraph test that he took 
were considered suspect13 and that if the jury had been made aware of this 
                                          
 
 
12.  Although Lago never testified at the trial, his testimony was admitted 
through Detective Crawford during the penalty phase.  As addressed below, this 
Court held this constituted error, but was harmless.  Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d at 44-
45.   
 
13.  As this Court has recognized, although ―polygraph evidence is generally 
inadmissible, . . . the issue we focus on for purposes of determining a Brady 
violation is whether the evidence would lead to admissible substantive or 
impeachment evidence.‖  Duest v. State, 12 So. 3d 734, 746 (Fla. 2009) 
(discussing that in Rivera v. State, 995 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2008), this Court held that 
a trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant‘s Brady claim, which was 
based in part on the State‘s failure to disclose that a State witness had lied in 
polygraph examinations in other cases).   
 
- 34 - 
information, the jury might have rejected the statements of Lago that were 
presented through the testimony of a law enforcement officer. 
Specifically, Lago was an inmate who shared a cell with Rodriguez during 
their confinement.  Lago told Detective Crawford that Rodriguez admitted he was 
not crazy but knew that he had to act insane or the police would connect him to 
other crimes.  The prosecutor initially considered calling Lago to be a penalty 
phase witness, but instead called Detective Crawford to testify as to Lago‘s 
statements.  On direct appeal, this Court held that permitting Detective Crawford to 
testify to the double hearsay statements from Lago was error, but determined that 
the admission of the testimony was harmless.  Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d at 44-45. 
During postconviction proceedings, the circuit court rejected this claim, first 
questioning whether this information could have impeached Lago because he was 
never called to testify.  Moreover, even if impeachment was possible, the court 
found that the claim lacked merit because, on direct appeal, any error regarding 
Lago was found to be harmless.  Further, the circuit court thoroughly reviewed the 
original sentencing order, noting that the original trial judge provided an in-depth 
analysis as to whether Rodriguez was mentally ill and concluded that Rodriguez 
consciously exaggerated his symptoms and manipulated the doctors after he 
learned that he could avoid going to prison for his criminal behavior if he was 
mentally ill.  The postconviction court concluded that based on the testimony of 
 
- 35 - 
the mental health experts and Rodriguez‘s prior seventy-one felony convictions, 
the judge and jury could have easily concluded death was the appropriate sentence. 
 
We affirm the trial court‘s conclusion.  As addressed above, in order to 
prevail on a Brady claim, Rodriguez must show: ―(1) that favorable evidence—
either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by 
the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was 
prejudiced.‖  Riechmann, 966 So. 2d at 307.  Here, there are substantial questions 
as to whether Lago had been promised any benefits for his assistance before the 
trial and whether the polygraph would have led to any favorable evidence.  Even if 
Rodriguez could meet the first prong of Brady, however, he cannot show prejudice.  
On direct appeal, this Court held the trial court erred in permitting Lago‘s 
statements to be admitted through Detective Crawford.  However, the Court 
explicitly determined that ―the admission of the testimony was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt given the number of strong aggravators in this case and the 
conflicting testimony as to Manuel Rodriguez‘s mental health, including some 
testimony that he was a malingerer.‖  Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d at 45.  Turning to the 
Brady claim, the challenged documents would only have presented potential 
additional bases to impeach Lago‘s statements, assuming they were admissible at 
all.  This additional evidence would not change our harmless error analysis as set 
 
- 36 - 
forth on direct appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court‘s ruling on 
this claim. 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
 
Rodriguez raises nine claims in his petition for habeas corpus: (1) appellate 
counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal rulings relating to limits on the 
presentation of family history of mental illness as mitigation; (2) counsel was 
ineffective in failing to appeal the trial court‘s improper consideration of 
Rodriguez‘s mother‘s mental illness as mitigation; (3) counsel was ineffective in 
failing to appeal the denial of relief based on improper prosecutorial comments 
relating to mitigation; (4) counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal the denial of 
relief on prosecutorial argument regarding Rodriguez‘s prior convictions; (5) 
counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress 
Rodriguez‘s statements; (6) counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal pervasive 
prosecutorial misconduct and comment; (7) counsel was ineffective in failing to 
appeal numerous rulings limiting cross-examination; (8) counsel was ineffective in 
failing to appeal the ruling allowing the State to bring witness Maria Malakoff to 
the stand solely to impeach her with her prior inconsistent statement; and (9) this 
Court conducted an improper harmless error analysis in the direct appeal.   
Rodriguez‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus is ―the proper vehicle to 
advance claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel‖ and the criteria for 
 
- 37 - 
analyzing the claims ―parallel the Strickland standard for ineffective trial counsel.‖  
Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1985)).  Therefore, Rodriguez 
must first establish that his appellate counsel‘s performance was deficient because 
of errors that are of such magnitude and are so serious that they fall outside the 
range of professionally acceptable performance.  Id.  Second, Rodriguez must 
establish that he was prejudiced because of the deficiency.  In determining if 
prejudice is shown, it must appear that appellate counsel‘s deficient performance 
―compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence 
in the correctness of the result.‖  Id. (quoting Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 
660 (Fla. 2000)). 
None of the first eight claims warrant relief because the underlying claims of 
error would have been rejected on direct appeal, and therefore Rodriguez cannot 
establish either deficiency or prejudice.  As to the last claim, that this Court 
performed an improper harmless error analysis on direct appeal, this claim is an 
improper attempt to relitigate a claim we have already rejected.  See, e.g., Taylor v. 
State, 3 So. 3d 986, 1000 (Fla. 2009) (holding that a petitioner ―cannot relitigate 
the merits of an issue through a habeas petition or use an ineffective assistance 
claim to argue the merits of claims that either were or should have been raised 
below‖). 
 
- 38 - 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
We affirm the trial court‘s denial of relief on the motion for postconviction 
relief.  We deny Rodriguez‘s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J, and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Victoria S. Sigler, Judge – Case No. F93-25817B 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Roseanne Eckert, CCR 
Counsel and Alisha D. Hurwood, CCR Counsel Staff Attorney, Southern Region, 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Sandra S. Jaggard and 
Katherine Maria Diamandis, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent