Case Title: Devoney v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91468

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 91468-Agenda 21-January 2002.
WILLIAM DEVONEY, Appellant, v. THE RETIREMENT 
BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY & BENEFIT
FUND FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee.
Opinion filed April 18, 2002.


	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	William Devoney, a former Chicago police lieutenant, was
convicted of federal mail fraud charges arising from his
participation in a scheme to defraud Allstate Insurance. The issue
before us is whether Devoney's conviction, a felony, "relat[ed] to
or [arose] out of or in connection with his service as a policeman"
so as to render him ineligible for his police pension benefits under
section 5-227 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/5-227
(West 1998)). The Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity
and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (the Retirement Board)
answered this question in the affirmative and denied Devoney his
pension. On administrative review, the circuit court of Cook
County affirmed the Retirement Board's decision. The appellate
court subsequently affirmed the circuit court's judgment, with one
justice dissenting. 321 Ill. App. 3d 1. We granted Devoney leave
to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow, we now
affirm.
	Devoney served on the Chicago police force for more than 34
years, eventually attaining the rank of lieutenant. In October of
1994, a federal grand jury indicted him along with 23 other
persons on charges of conspiracy to commit insurance fraud.
Devoney resigned from the police department the following
month. He then entered into a written plea agreement with the
United States Attorney's office under which he pleaded guilty to
one count of mail fraud, a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341
(1994). The federal court accepted Devoney's plea and ultimately
sentenced him to 16 months' incarceration and 3 years of
supervised release and ordered him to pay restitution in the
amount of $42,000 plus a $50 special assessment.
	The circumstances which gave rise to Devoney's conviction
originated from his friendship with David Ballog, Jr., one of his
codefendants in the federal prosecution. Ballog is a career criminal
who made his living by filing fraudulent insurance claims.
Devoney first met Ballog in the early 1980s when Ballog hired
him to install a concrete patio. Ballog was aware that Devoney was
a police officer. He cultivated his friendship with Devoney
because he believed such a friendship would aid him in dealing
with the legal problems he frequently faced.
	In 1992, Devoney's wife slipped and fell at home and broke
her ankle. Following the injury, Ballog and Devoney conspired
with Matt Raimondi, one of Ballog's associates, to defraud
Raimondi's homeowner's insurance carrier by claiming that
Devoney's wife had actually injured herself at Raimondi's home
as a result of Raimondi's negligence. The scheme ultimately netted
a $70,000 cash settlement from Raimondi's insurer, which
Devoney split with Raimondi and Ballog. Negotiations leading to
the settlement were conducted by Ballog, who represented himself
to the insurer as the brother of Devoney's wife. They also involved
the assistance of Devoney, who personally spoke with adjusters
regarding the claim.
	At the time Devoney resigned from the force, he was entitled
to receive a pension. After he pleaded guilty, the Retirement Board
began to withhold his pension benefits. Devoney subsequently
applied to have the benefits restored. The Retirement Board
conducted a series of administrative hearings on his application,
the last of which took place in June of 1998. The following month,
the Retirement Board issued a final decision denying reinstatement
of Devoney's benefits pursuant to section 5-227 of the Pension
Code (40 ILCS 5/5-227 (West 1998)), which provides:
			"None of the benefits provided for in this Article shall
be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony
relating to or arising out of or in connection with his
service as a policeman."
	Devoney sought administrative review of the Retirement
Board's decision in the circuit court. He was not successful. The
circuit court affirmed the Board's denial of Devoney's application
for restoration of pension benefits. The appellate court affirmed
the circuit court's judgment, and we granted Devoney leave to
appeal from the judgment of the appellate court.
	Here, as throughout this litigation, the dispositive question is
whether reinstatement of Devoney's pension benefits was properly
denied under section 5-227 of the Pension Code based on his
felony conviction. Any felony conviction will disqualify a police
officer from receiving benefits under the Pension Code when the
conviction takes places while the officer is receiving disability
benefits. Devoney, however, was not on disability at the time of
his conviction. Accordingly, an additional requirement applied.
Under the Pension Code, he could only be disqualified from
receiving benefits if the felony was one "relating to or arising out
of or in connection with" his service as a policeman. 40 ILCS
5/5-227 (West 1998).
	The requirement that the conviction relate to or arise out of or
in connection with a person's service as a policeman is not unique
to law enforcement. Identical provisions govern members of the
General Assembly (40 ILCS 5/2-156 (West 1998)), participants
in the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (40 ILCS 5/7-219 (West
1998)), those in the Municipal Employees', Officers', and
Officials' Annuity and Benefit Fund (40 ILCS 5/8-251 (West
1998)), county employees (40 ILCS 5/9-235 (West 1998)),
employees under the Laborers' and Retirement Board Employees'
Annuity and Benefit Fund (40 ILCS 5/11-230 (West 1998)),
sanitary district employees (40 ILCS 5/13-807 (West 1998)), state
employees (40 ILCS 5/14-149 (West 1998)), judges (40 ILCS
5/18-163 (West 1998)), and others (see, e.g., 40 ILCS 5/16-199
(West 1998)).
	These provisions have been enacted pursuant to the
legislature's power "to deter felonious conduct in public
employment by affecting the pension rights of public employees
convicted of a work-related felony." See Stillo v. State Retirement
Systems, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1007 (1999). Their purpose is to
"discourage official malfeasance by denying the public servant
convicted of unfaithfulness to his trust the retirement benefits to
which he otherwise would have been entitled." Kerner v. State
Employees' Retirement System, 72 Ill. 2d 507, 513 (1978).
	The statutes are general in describing how the felony
conviction must pertain to an employee's public service before the
pension benefit disqualification will be triggered, but they could
not be otherwise. The ways in which governmental offices can be
exploited for illicit purposes are so diverse and varied that greater
specificity would be impossible.
	When applying the pension disqualification statutes, including
section 5-227, the pivotal inquiry is whether a nexus exists
between the employee's criminal wrongdoing and the performance
of his official duties. See DiFiore v. Retirement Board of the
Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 313 Ill. App. 3d 546, 551
(2000). The appellate court opined that the nexus requirement was
satisfied in this case because Devoney's participation in the
unlawful activity violated his sworn duty to report crime and arrest
persons engaged in criminal conduct. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 10. The
dissenting appellate court justice argued, however, that this
rationale cannot be squared with the provisions of the Pension
Code. We believe that the dissenting justice's concerns are well
founded.
	Although a duty to report crime and arrest criminals does arise
from an officer's service as a policeman, breach of that duty is not
what triggers disqualification for a pension. Under the plain and
unambiguous language of the statute, what triggers
disqualification is the existence of a connection between the actual
felony conviction and the officer's service as a policeman.
	The distinction is important because the two sets of events,
breach of the duty to report and arrest and conviction of a felony,
are not equivalent. Whether an officer may be deemed to have
breached his duty to arrest and report is not dependent on his
having committed a felony associated with his service as a
policeman. The duty may be breached where the underlying
offense was not a felony, the officer was not personally involved
in its commission, or the offense had nothing whatever to do with
the fact that he was a policeman.
	Correspondingly, an officer's commission of a felony will not
automatically constitute a breach of his duty to report and arrest.
If an officer who has committed a felony immediately surrenders
to authorities and confesses to the crime, for example, no breach
of the duty to arrest and report can be said to have occurred.
	Admittedly, felonious police officers are not apt to voluntarily
surrender and confess their crimes. As a practical matter, their
criminal activity will be accompanied by a breach of their duty to
arrest and report. The fact that a breach of the duty to arrest and
report will normally follow an officer's commission of a felony
does not mean, however, that the felony itself "relat[ed] to or
[arose] out of or in connection with his service as a policeman"
within the meaning of section 5-227 of the Pension Code.
Whether a nexus exists between the officer's service as a
policeman and the crime he is convicted of committing is a
separate inquiry.
	If the requisite statutory nexus could be established based
solely on the felonious officer's breach of his duty to arrest and
report, as the appellate court majority suggests, every felony
committed by a police officer would render him ineligible for a
pension, regardless of the nature of the offense or the
circumstances under which it was committed. Such an
interpretation of the law would yield a standard indistinguishable
from the one applicable where the officer committed a felony
while receiving disability benefits. The requirement that the felony
be one which is "relat[ed] to or [arose] out of or in connection
with his service as a policeman" would have no independent
effect. For all practical purposes, it would be read out of the
statute.
	A different panel of the appellate court addressed a similar
issue in Cullen v. Retirement Board of the Policeman's Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1105 (1995). In that case a police
officer was convicted for first degree murder after he fatally shot
a young man between the eyes following a traffic altercation. At
the time of the murder the officer was off duty, was not in
uniform, and was not driving a police car. He never identified
himself as a policeman, did not attempt to make an arrest, and did
not use his service revolver.
	Following the officer's conviction, the Retirement Board
terminated his retirement benefits. The Board reasoned that
because police officers are sworn to always uphold the law, any
action policemen take is, by definition, within the performance of
their official duties. That being so, this murder here must be
deemed to have been committed within the officer's performance
of his official duty.
	The appellate court rejected this analysis. Based on the
language of the statute, the court held that section 5-227 "clearly
contemplates the existence of situations where a police officer
could commit a felony unrelated to his law enforcement duties."
Cullen, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 1109. Had the General Assembly not
intended to make this distinction, the court reasoned, it would not
have employed different language in the first two paragraphs of
the statute. Instead, it would have simply written "one paragraph
denying all benefits for any felony conviction." Cullen, 271 Ill.
App. 3d at 1109.
	Having reached this conclusion, the court went on to hold that
the statutory standard for nondisability cases was not met. In the
court's view, there was "no evidence demonstrating that [the
officer's] criminal actions were in any way related to or arose out
of or in connection with his service as a Chicago police officer."
Cullen, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 1109. It therefore reversed the judgment
of the circuit court and remanded the cause with instructions to
reinstate the officer's pension benefits.
	The approach taken in Cullen was subsequently followed by
the appellate court in Siwek v. Retirement Board of the
Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 324 Ill. App. 3d 820 (2001).
In Siwek, as in Cullen, the court rejected the notion that violation
of the officer's oath or statutory duty provides the requisite nexus
between his conviction and his service as a police officer under the
Pension Code. Echoing the analysis in Cullen, the court wrote:
		"Every time a police officer is convicted of a felony he
has violated his oath of office. When a police officer is
convicted of a crime, he has violated the law he has sworn
to obey. The fact of a felony conviction, standing alone,
cannot, within the plain meaning of paragraph one of
section 5-227, be enough to deprive a police officer of his
pension. To so hold would be to rewrite the statute,
something we are not authorized to do." Siwek, 324 Ill.
App. 3d at 828-29.
	We agree with these cases and therefore likewise reject the
notion that violation of the officer's oath or statutory duty provides
the requisite nexus between his conviction and his service as a
police officer under the Pension Code. That conclusion, however,
does not end our inquiry.
	Our function as a reviewing court is to determine whether the
lower courts reached the correct result. The reasons given by a
lower court for its decision or the findings on which a decision is
based are not material if the judgment is correct. See Board of
Managers of Dominion Plaza One Condominium Ass'n No. 1-A v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 116 Ill. App. 3d 690, 694 (1983). A
judgment may be sustained upon any ground warranted by the
record. Bell v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 106 Ill. 2d 135,
148 (1985).
	The federal indictment under which Devoney was charged
does not identify him as a police officer, proof of his employment
as a police officer was not a necessary to establish his guilt, and
his association with Chicago's police department is not mentioned
in his written plea agreement with the United States Attorney. For
purposes of criminal liability under the governing federal statute,
what mattered is the action he took, not his official status when he
acted. Although Devoney's status as a police officer was germane
to a prior incident involving obstruction of justice that was
considered by the federal court at sentencing, that incident was
wholly unrelated to his culpability in this case and did not, itself,
result in a felony conviction. Accordingly, as the appellate court
correctly recognized, the incident was irrelevant to Devoney's
pension rights under section 5-227. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 6.
	That being said, we nevertheless believe that the
circumstances surrounding the crime establish that the offense was
related to Devoney's work as a police officer. As indicated earlier
in this disposition, the conditions which gave rise to Devoney's
conviction originated from his friendship with codefendant David
Ballog, Jr. Ballog cultivated his relationship with Devoney
because Ballog was a criminal who considered it advantageous to
have police connections.
	Devoney was not naive or unsuspecting about Ballog. In the
words of the Retirement Board's attorney, their relationship was
"long and unsavory." At Ballog's behest, Devoney had used his
position on the police force for Ballog's benefit in a variety of
ways over a protracted period of time. Based upon these
circumstances, there was ample ground for the Retirement Board's
finding that "but for the fact that Devoney was a Police Officer of
high rank," he "would not have been in a position or selected to
participate in the scheme to defraud [which led to his conviction]."
	Because Devoney's participation in the scheme to defraud
was the product of his status as a law enforcement official, we
believe that the nexus required by section 5-227 of the Pension
Code (40 ILCS 5/5-227 (West 1998)) was present. Devoney's
felony conviction in federal court was "relat[ed] to or [arose] out
of or in connection with his service as a policeman" so as to render
him ineligible for his police pension benefits. 40 ILCS 5/5-227
(West 1998). The appellate court was therefore correct in
affirming the judgment of the circuit court which confirmed the
Retirement Board's decision denying Devoney's claim for pension
benefits.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.


	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:


	The issue in this case is whether Devoney has forfeited his
pension benefits, pursuant to section 5-227 of the Illinois Pension
Code (40 ILCS 5/5-227 (West 1998)), because of his conviction
for mail fraud. The majority answers in the affirmative, finding a
connection between Devoney's status as a police officer and his
conviction for mail fraud. Because I believe the majority has
misconstrued the nexus requirement of section 5-227, I
respectfully dissent.

DISCUSSION
	Section 5-227 provides in part:
			"None of the benefits provided for in this Article shall
be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony
relating to or arising out of or in connection with his
service as a policeman." 40 ILCS 5/5-227 (West 1998).
Devoney stands convicted of mail fraud, a felony. See 18 U.S.C.
§1341 (1994). The question here is whether the mail fraud related
to or arose out of or in connection with Devoney's service as a
police officer.
	In interpreting the language of a statute, the primary goal of
this court is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388
(1996). This court must seek the legislative intent primarily from
the language used in the statute. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001); Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 388. Where the language
of the statute is unambiguous, the only legitimate function of this
court is to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature. Henrich
v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 391 (1998); Certain
Taxpayers v. Sheahen, 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84, 256 N.E.2d 758 (1970).
There is no rule of statutory construction which authorizes this
court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain
language of the statute says. Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d  at 391; Illinois
Power Co. v. Mahin, 72 Ill. 2d  at 189, 194 (1978). Further, this
court must evaluate the statute as a whole, and construe each
provision in connection with every other section. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d  at 388-89, citing Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of
Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 91 (1992).
	In the case at bar, the majority finds a connection between
Devoney's mail fraud conviction and Devoney's service as a
police officer. The majority states:
		"As indicated earlier in this disposition, the conditions
which gave rise to Devoney's conviction originated from
his friendship with codefendant David Ballog, Jr. Ballog
cultivated his relationship with Devoney because Ballog
was a criminal who considered it advantageous to have
police connections.
			Devoney was not naive or unsuspecting about Ballog.
In the words of the Retirement Board's attorney, their
relationship was 'long and unsavory.' At Ballog's behest,
Devoney had used his position on the police force for
Ballog's benefit in a variety of ways over a protracted
period of time. Based upon these circumstances, there was
ample ground for the Retirement Board's finding that 'but
for the fact that Devoney was a Police Officer of high
rank,' he 'would not have been in a position or selected to
participate in the scheme to defraud [which led to his
conviction].'
			Because Devoney's participation in the scheme to
defraud was the product of his status as a law enforcement
official, we believe that the nexus required by section
5-227 of the Pension Code [citation] was present." Slip
op. at 7-8.
I disagree.
	First, I note that the majority does not provide support for the
assertion that "Devoney had used his position on the police force
for Ballog's benefit in a variety of ways over a protracted period
of time." Perhaps the majority is referring to the district court's
finding that Devoney had interfered with the investigation of a
sexual assault allegedly perpetrated by one of Ballog's relatives.
However, Devoney was not charged with any wrongdoing in
connection with the investigation of the sexual assault. As the
appellate court observed:
		"[Devoney] had not been charged with or convicted of
any felony related to obstructing justice regarding the
sexual assault case, and thus the language of section
5-227 precludes us from considering this conduct in
determining whether [Devoney] has forfeited his pension
benefits. Therefore, [Devoney's] conduct in obstructing
justice in the sexual assault case is irrelevant to our
analysis of whether [Devoney] has forfeited his benefits
under section 5-227." 321 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6.
Perhaps the majority is referring to some other conduct. Without
more information regarding the nature of the conduct involved, I,
for one, find it difficult to conclude that the requisite nexus exists.
	Second, and more importantly, the majority adopts a "but for"
standard for the forfeiture of pension benefits. The assumption is
that "but for" Devoney's status as a police officer, Ballog would
not have selected him to participate in the scheme. The problem
with such an assumption is the generality of its application to any
crime involving the participation of the police officer and another
individual. The participation of the police officer in a crime that is
unconnected to his work on the police force can always be
connected to his status as a police officer. For example, it can
always be said that an individual who gets to know a police officer
and later obtains the officer's participation in a crime would not
have approached the officer but for his status as a police officer.
	Moreover, the majority's "but for" standard cannot be
reconciled to the plain language of the statute. The first paragraph
of section 5-227 provides:
			"None of the benefits provided for in this Article shall
be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony
relating to or arising out of or in connection with his
service as a policeman." 40 ILCS 5/5-227 (West 1998).
As the appellate court observed in Cullen v. Retirement Board of
the Policeman's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1105,
1109 (1995):
		"the statute clearly contemplates the existence of
situations where a police officer could commit a felony
unrelated to his law enforcement duties."
	In contrast, the second paragraph of section 5-227 provides:
			"None of the benefits provided for in this Article shall
be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony
while in receipt of disability benefits." 40 ILCS 5/5-227
(West 1998).
Thus, in the case of a recipient of disability benefits, the
conviction need not relate to, or arise out of, the recipient's service
to the state. The conviction of any felony is sufficient ground for
disqualification.
	 If a police officer's employment status can provide the
requisite nexus between the crime and the officer's service to the
state, there will never be a situation where a police officer can
commit a felony unrelated to his law enforcement duties. Perforce,
the nexus requirement is rendered superfluous. The legislature
could simply have used language similar to that found in the
second paragraph of section 5-227, making the commission of
"any felony" ground for disqualification.
	As the appellate court stated in Cullen:
		"Surely, if the legislature had wanted the first paragraph
of section 5-227 to read in the way the Board wishes us
to interpret it, it could have used the same language or
similar language to that which it used in the second
paragraph. Moreover, if the General Assembly did not
wish to employ a different standard for denying disability
benefits from that of pension benefits, why did it not
simply write one paragraph denying all benefits for any
felony conviction instead of writing two separate
paragraphs that draw distinctions?" Cullen, 271 Ill. App.
3d at 1109.
This court is not at liberty to construe the statute in such a way as
to render any part of it superfluous. Sylvester v. Industrial
Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001).
	The difficulty with the majority's "but for" standard is
magnified when it is applied to other participants in the state's
pension plan. As the majority notes:
			"The requirement that the conviction relate to or arise
out of or in connection with a person's service as a
policeman is not unique to law enforcement. Identical
provisions govern members of the General Assembly
[citation], participants in the Illinois Municipal
Retirement Fund [citation], those in the Municipal
Employees', Officers', and Officials' Annuity and Benefit
Fund [citation], *** state employees [citation], judges
[citation], and others [citation]." Slip op. at 3.
If, for example, a member of the General Assembly is approached
about a crime, say a scheme to defraud a homeowner's insurance
carrier, could it ever be said there was no connection between the
scheme to defraud the insurance carrier and the status of the
member of the General Assembly? I believe the conclusion would
follow that but for the individual's status as a member of the
General Assembly " 'he would not have been in a position or
selected to participate in the scheme to defraud.' " Employment
status would always provide the nexus between the crime and the
person's service to the state.

CONCLUSION
	The majority adopts a "but for" standard that equates an
individual's employment status to his service to the state, and
requires only a nexus between the individual's conviction and the
employment status. However, the nexus requirement of section
5-227 entails more than a connection between the individual's
employment status and the conviction. Were it not so, the
legislature could simply have provided that benefits would not be
paid to any individual convicted of a felony. The majority's
interpretation of section 5-227 renders superfluous the additional
provision that the felony relate to or arise out of or in connection
with the individual's service to the state. It also does not reflect the
intent of the legislature.
	It is the province of the legislature to enact laws; it is the
province of this court to construe the laws as enacted. This court
has no legislative powers; it may not enact or amend statutes. This
court cannot restrict or enlarge the meaning of an unambiguous
statute. The responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation
rests upon the legislature. Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d  at 394; People ex
rel. Roan v. Wilson, 405 Ill. 122, 128, 90 N.E.2d 224 (1950). 
	I understand the desire of the majority to punish Devoney by
depriving him of his pension benefits. I sympathize with the
majority. However, this court must interpret and apply the statute
in the manner in which it is written. This court must not rewrite
the statute to make it consistent with the court's idea of orderliness
and public policy. Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's
Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1983). Because the
"but for" standard adopted by the majority cannot be reconciled to
the plain language of the statute, I respectfully dissent.