Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO SRJ and CDJ, minor children: MDW V. HOT SPRINGS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0011

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO SRJ and CDJ, minor children: MDW V. HOT SPRINGS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2009 WY 94212 P.3d 611Case Number: S-09-0011Decided: 07/28/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO SRJ and CDJ, minor children: 
MDW,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
HOT 
SPRINGS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Hot Springs County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Larry 
B. Jones, Burg, Simpson, Eldredge, Hersh & Jardine, PC, Cody, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; 
Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Christina McCabe, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
McCabe.

 
 
Guardian 
Ad Litem:

Bobbi 
Dean Overfield, Messenger & Jurovich, PC.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Mother, 
MDW, appeals the district court's decision terminating her parental rights.  We affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mother 
lists two issues:

 
 
1.         
The district court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence existed 
to terminate the parental rights of Appellant under Wyo. Stat. 
§ 14-2-309(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007).  
The evidence was not sufficient to establish "reasonable efforts" to 
rehabilitate the family by the Appellee.

 
 
2.         
The district court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence existed 
to terminate the parental rights of Appellant under Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-309(a)(v) 
(LexisNexis 2007).  The evidence was 
not sufficient to establish Appellant was an "unfit parent" at the time of the 
hearing.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
MDW 
is the biological Mother of SRJ, born in 1994, and CDJ, born in 1997.  In 2005, Mother lost her job and her 
apartment in Casper, Wyoming, and she and her daughters moved in with relatives 
in Thermopolis.  There, she began 
telephoning the local police chief about concerns for her daughters' safety and 
her own.  On October 13, 2005, 
Mother met with the police chief, and one of several fears she expressed was 
that someone was poisoning her food.  
Mother agreed to testing at the hospital.  She tested positive for 
methamphetamine.  Based on Mother's 
positive drug test, her unusual behavior that he perceived as paranoid, and her 
expressed concern about the daughters' safety in their current residence, the 
police chief took the children into protective custody.  

 
 

[¶4]        
In 
subsequent court proceedings, Mother conceded allegations of child neglect made 
by the Department of Family Services.  
The daughters were placed in foster care, and the Department began 
working with Mother on a case management plan with the stated goal of family 
reunification.  Plan objectives for 
Mother included maintaining a residence and stable employment, completing 
psychological and substance abuse evaluations and treatments, and engaging in 
appropriate visitation with the daughters.  
After nearly two years, the Department concluded that Mother had not made 
satisfactory progress under the plan.  
It petitioned to terminate her parental rights.  Following two days of testimony on July 
28 and 29, 2008, the district court granted the petition.  Mother appealed.1

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶5]        
Our 
standard of review in cases involving termination of parental rights has been 
stated as follows: 

 
 
Due 
to the tension between the fundamental liberty of familial association and the 
compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of children, application of 
statutes for termination of parental rights is a matter for strict 
scrutiny.  As part of this strict 
scrutiny standard, a case for termination of parental rights must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence.  Clear and convincing evidence is that 
kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the 
contention is highly probable.  
Rigorous though this standard may be, we apply our traditional principles 
of evidentiary review when a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting termination.  Thus, we 
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, 
assuming all favorable evidence to be true while discounting conflicting 
evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.

 
 

MN 
v. Department of Family Servs., 
2003 WY 135, ¶ 5, 78 P.3d 232, 234 (Wyo. 2003) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶6]        
The 
Department petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights under two separate 
statutory subsections.  The first of 
these subsections, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii), provides 
that:

 
 
The 
parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the 
following facts is established by clear and convincing evidence:  . . . (iii) The 
child has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable efforts by an 
authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, 
and it is shown that the child's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent.

 
 
On 
appeal, Mother does not challenge the conclusion that the daughters were 
neglected.  She had admitted neglect 
in the earlier proceeding that led to the children's placement in foster 
care.  She also does not dispute the 
conclusion that the daughters' health and safety would be seriously jeopardized 
if returned to her.  That was 
established by evidence at trial including the unchallenged testimony of several 
witnesses.

 
 

[¶7]        
She 
does assert that there was insufficient evidence that the Department made 
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family, the second requirement under this 
statutory subsection.  In its 
decision letter, the district court concluded that the Department's efforts were 
reasonable, basing its conclusion on these findings:

 
 
The 
Department of Family Services has provided assistance to [Mother].  The goals have been to maintain proper 
housing, to obtain employment, to cease substance abuse, to obtain counseling, 
to take drug tests, and to visit with the children.  The mother has not maintained a stable 
residence, living in various households and cities.  Her employment has been sporadic.  She has continued substance abuse, 
testing positive on several occasions.  
She has not completed counseling and has not taken prescribed 
medications.  She has made little or 
no progress in counseling.  She has 
refused to take some of the drug tests.  
At times, her visitations with the children have not been appropriate, as 
she has discussed legal topics with them and has been confrontational with the 
social workers.  She has missed some 
appointments and has been uncooperative with social workers at times.  She has not always paid the requested 
support.  She has not recognized her 
problems and taken responsibility for them.

 
 

[¶8]        
These 
findings are fully supported by evidence in the record.  The Department's efforts are illustrated 
by the circumstances surrounding Mother's psychological evaluation and 
treatment.  The required evaluation 
was not readily available in Thermopolis, so the Department made an appointment 
for Mother to meet with a psychologist in Billings, Montana.  She refused to travel to the 
appointment.  The Department then 
engaged a psychologist to come to Thermopolis to perform the evaluation.  Mother completed the evaluation, but 
largely declined or failed to cooperate in subsequent counseling.  At trial, several witnesses agreed that 
Mother had made little or no progress in the treatment of her psychological 
problems.

 
 

[¶9]        
The 
Department also sought to accommodate Mother's random drug testing by sending 
case workers to Mother's house rather than requiring her to come to the 
office.  Still, Mother often refused 
to take the tests.  One DFS worker 
said the refusals were "belligerent," and another described Mother "threatening" 
and "screaming" obscenities.  The 
Department also made efforts to facilitate Mother's visits with her 
daughters.  After Mother threatened 
one case worker who was supervising the visitation, the Department assigned 
another person to take over the task.  
When Mother moved to Worland, a case worker drove the daughters there for 
visitations.  After one visit, 
Mother asked for a ride back to Thermopolis.  During the trip, Mother's inappropriate 
behavior "kept escalating" until she was "screaming and yelling" and "out of 
control."  One daughter was "crying" 
and "upset," and the case worker called law enforcement for assistance.  After that incident, the Department 
arranged for Mother to visit with the daughters by telephone, and that practice 
continued after Mother moved to Casper.  
Overall, contrary to Mother's argument, the evidence at trial clearly and 
convincingly demonstrated the Department's reasonable but unsuccessful 
rehabilitation efforts.

 
 

[¶10]     
The 
district court also terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to a second 
statutory subsection, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v), which requires 
clear and convincing proof that the children have been in the State's care for 
fifteen of the past twenty-two months, and that the parent is unfit.  We have recognized that the several 
statutory bases for termination are separate and "independent."  DKM v. RJS, 924 P.2d 985, 987 (Wyo. 
1996).  "Proof of any one of those 
[bases] by clear and convincing evidence supports the termination of parental 
rights."  SLJ v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Servs., 
2005 WY 3, ¶ 32, 104 P.3d 74, 82 (Wyo. 2005).  We affirm the district court's decision 
under the first statutory subsection discussed above, so there is no reason to 
consider the second.  See JD and SE v. Wyoming Dept. of Family 
Servs., 2009 WY 78, ¶ 12, 208 P.3d 1323, 1327 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
Department also petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the daughters' 
biological fathers, but the record before us does not disclose the district 
court's disposition with respect to the fathers.  This opinion therefore 
concerns only Mother's parental rights.