Case Title: State v. Dye

Citation: 2010-Ohio-5728

Docket Number: 20091149

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Dye, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5728.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-5728 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DYE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Dye, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5728.] 
Criminal law — Effect of negotiated guilty pleas on future charges — When the 
state accepts a negotiated guilty plea and the victim later dies of the 
injuries sustained in the crime, the defendant cannot be indicted for 
murder unless the state reserved the right to file additional charges — 
Plea here had been negotiated — Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2009-1149 ⎯ Submitted March 31, 2010 ⎯ Decided December 1, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, 
No. 2008-L-106, 2009-Ohio-2949. 
__________________ 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} When may a defendant who has pleaded guilty to an offense less 
than homicide prior to the victim’s death be prosecuted for homicide when the 
victim subsequently dies?  In State v. Carpenter (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 59, 623 
N.E.2d 66, syllabus, we held, “The state cannot indict a defendant for murder 
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after the court has accepted a negotiated guilty plea to a lesser offense and the 
victim later dies of injuries sustained in the crime, unless the state expressly 
reserves the right to file additional charges on the record at the time of the 
defendant’s plea.” The answer depends upon the meaning of “negotiated guilty 
plea” and whether the facts show such a plea in Dye’s case. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we hold that Dye’s original guilty plea 
was a “negotiated guilty plea” within the meaning of Carpenter, and accordingly, 
his conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide under R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a) is 
barred. 
I. 
{¶ 3} On August 10, 1999, appellee, James Dye, drove his truck while 
Dye was under the influence of alcohol and while his driver’s license was 
suspended.  Dye’s vehicle struck Robbie Arnold, a 13-year-old boy, in front of 
Arnold’s home in Concord Township, Ohio. The boy suffered severe injuries, 
which left him a quadriplegic. Police who came to scene of the accident observed 
that Dye had smelled of alcohol, had slurred his speech, and had eventually 
admitted having drunk seven beers before driving. 
{¶ 4} In September 1999, the grand jury indicted Dye on one count of 
aggravated vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08, a fourth-degree felony, 
and one count of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 
4511.19, a first-degree misdemeanor. The aggravated-vehicular-assault count also 
added three specifications: (1) that Dye was under the influence of alcohol during 
the offense; (2) that he was driving with a suspended license when he committed 
the offense; and (3) that he had a previous conviction for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Dye initially pleaded not guilty to these charges, but in 
November 1999, he changed his plea to guilty of aggravated vehicular assault and 
the first specification, driving under the influence of alcohol, as well as to the 
second count. Based on Dye’s guilty plea, the trial court, on the state’s motion, 
January Term, 2010 
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dismissed the other two specifications in the first count of the indictment. Despite 
the gravity of Arnold’s injuries, apparent at the time of the plea, the state did not 
reserve the right to file additional criminal charges should Arnold die from those 
injuries. 
{¶ 5} In addition to recommending that the second and third 
specifications be dismissed, the state represented that an agreement had been 
reached with Dye regarding bond pending sentencing: 
{¶ 6} “THE COURT:   * * * You want to continue his bond?  I was 
considering cancelling his bond today.  Had you made an agreement? 
{¶ 7} “[THE STATE]:  I had assumed that bond was continued.  We had 
represented to the Defendant that that would happen. 
{¶ 8} “THE COURT:  You would recommend that? 
{¶ 9} “[THE STATE]:  Yes. 
{¶ 10} “THE COURT: You were involved with the case? 
{¶ 11} “[THE STATE]:  Yes.  That’s what we had agreed to with the 
same conditions, one, no driving, and two, no drug and alcohol use pending the 
presentence report.  We are also asking that a victim impact statement be ordered. 
{¶ 12} “THE COURT:  I will order the victim impact statement as well.  
And with your recommendation I will allow him to continue on bond.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 13} In December 1999, the trial court sentenced Dye to the maximum 
prison term for each count: 18 months for aggravated vehicular assault and six 
months for driving under the influence, to be served concurrently. Dye was 
released from prison in June 2001 after serving his full prison term. 
{¶ 14} On December 26, 2006, more than seven years after the date of the 
original incident, Robbie Arnold died from complications of his injuries, 
prompting the state to pursue new charges of aggravated vehicular homicide 
against Dye.  In July 2007, the grand jury indicted Dye on three counts of 
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aggravated vehicular homicide: (1) as a proximate result of driving under the 
influence of alcohol, in violation of the current R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a), a first-
degree felony; (2) recklessly, in violation of the current R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a), a 
second-degree felony; and (3) recklessly, in violation of the 1999 version of R.C. 
2903.06(A), a third-degree felony. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 238, 146 Ohio Laws, Part 
VI, 10416, 10427. 
{¶ 15} Dye moved to dismiss the indictment on the authority of 
Carpenter, 68 Ohio St.3d 59, 623 N.E.2d 66, contending that his 1999 guilty plea 
to the aggravated-vehicular-assault and driving-under-the-influence charges was a 
“negotiated guilty plea” within the meaning of Carpenter, and therefore, further 
prosecution of him for the 1999 incident was barred..1 The trial court denied the 
motion to dismiss, concluding that Dye had not pleaded guilty to a lesser offense 
in 1999 and that there was insufficient evidence that the guilty plea was 
“negotiated” within the meaning of Carpenter.  Dye then changed his plea to “no 
contest” to Count One of the indictment, which charged aggravated vehicular 
homicide under the current R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a). The trial court found Dye 
guilty on that count and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment, less the time 
served on the prior aggravated-vehicular-assault conviction, for a total of seven-
and-a-half years’ imprisonment, and ordered Dye to pay restitution to the victim’s 
family. 
{¶ 16} On appeal, the court of appeals sustained Dye’s claim that 
Carpenter barred the prosecution for aggravated vehicular homicide. The court of 
appeals concluded that Dye’s 1999 plea was “negotiated” under Carpenter 
because the state had obtained the benefit of a conviction without a trial and that 
the defendant, by pleading guilty, had given up the trial rights enumerated in 
                                                 
1.  Dye also filed another motion, urging the court to apply the aggravated-vehicular-homicide 
statute that existed in 1999, which provided a lesser penalty than the law as it existed at the time of 
the victim’s death in 2006. The trial court denied that motion. The court of appeals did not reach 
that issue, and it is not before us here. 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
Crim.R. 11(C).  State v. Dye, Lake App. No. 2008-L-10, 2009-Ohio-2949, at ¶ 
29-30. The court of appeals did not find consequential that the state had not given 
a favorable recommendation concerning sentencing or that Dye had been 
sentenced to the maximum at the state’s request. Id. at ¶ 28. Nor did the court of 
appeals find it significant that the two specifications that were dismissed on the 
state’s motion did not provide for a greater penalty than the specification to which 
Dye had pleaded guilty. Id. 
{¶ 17} The state sought review in this court. We accepted the state’s 
discretionary appeal on its first proposition of law. State v. Dye, 123 Ohio St.3d 
1492, 2009-Ohio-6015, 916 N.E.2d 1073. It asserts, “State v. Carpenter does not 
stand for the proposition that every plea of guilty is a negotiated plea.” 
II. 
A. 
{¶ 18} In Carpenter, the defendant had stabbed a victim and was indicted 
for one count of felonious assault. Id. at 60, 623 N.E.2d 66.  Four months later, 
Carpenter engaged in plea negotiations with the state and entered a guilty plea to 
the lesser included offense of attempted felonious assault. Id. The opinion does 
not describe the substance of the plea agreement in that case, but stated that 
Carpenter pleaded guilty to attempted felonious assault, a lesser included offense 
than the felonious assault charged in the indictment, and the state agreed to and 
did recommend the minimum allowable sentence.  Id.  Carpenter was sentenced to 
the minimum prison term of two to ten years. Id.  The plea agreement did not 
reserve the state’s right to prosecute for any death of the victim resulting from the 
defendant’s crime.  Id.  One year and two months later, in March 1986, the victim 
of Carpenter’s assault died.  Id. Carpenter was released from prison in 1987, after 
almost three years in prison on the attempted-assault charge.  In 1988, he was 
indicted for the murder of the victim. Id. The trial court eventually dismissed the 
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indictment based on the terms of the 1985 plea agreement, but the court of 
appeals reversed. Id. 
{¶ 19} This court reversed and dismissed the murder indictment against 
Carpenter.  Id. at 61.  We concluded that when the state accepts a negotiated 
guilty plea and the victim later dies of injuries sustained in the crime, the 
defendant cannot be indicted for murder when the state does not expressly reserve 
the right to file additional charges in the event of the victim’s death.  Id. at 60-61, 
623 N.E.2d 66.  We decided that Carpenter’s expectation that his initial guilty 
plea would terminate prosecutions was reasonable under the circumstances.  Id. at 
62. 
B. 
{¶ 20} The basis for the rule announced in Carpenter was the application 
of contract law to the construction of the plea agreement:  “The holding in 
Carpenter is essentially a synthesis of contract and criminal law in a particular 
factual setting.  Its supporting analysis is ultimately derived from the proposition 
that plea agreements are a necessary and desirable part of the administration of 
criminal justice, and, therefore, ‘ “must be attended by safeguards to insure the 
defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances.” ’ Id., 68 Ohio St.3d at 61, 
623 N.E.2d 66, quoting Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 
S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427.”  State v. Zima, 102 Ohio St.3d 61, 2004-Ohio-1807, 
806 N.E.2d 542, ¶ 11.2 
                                                 
2.  The rule in Carpenter was based on contract-law principles, not the Double Jeopardy Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. When the victim dies after the defendant has pleaded guilty to an offense 
less serious than homicide, that plea does not of itself bar the state from prosecuting the defendant 
for the homicide under double jeopardy principles. See generally State v. Thomas (1980), 61 Ohio 
St.2d 254, 262, 15 O.O.3d 262, 400 N.E.2d 897, overruled on other grounds by State v. Crago 
(1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 243, 559 N.E.2d 1353 (“The courts have long held that where a fact 
necessary to the commission of one offense occurs after the defendant has been convicted of 
another offense, multiple prosecutions are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause”). The 
principal element of a homicide offense is the death of the victim, and that element is not part of 
an assault charge.  The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: “[N]o person * * * shall be subject for 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 21} “ ‘[A] plea bargain itself is contractual in nature and “subject to 
contract-law standards.” ’ ”  Baker v. United States (C.A.6, 1986), 781 F.2d 85, 
90, quoting United States v. Krasn (C.A.9, 1980), 614 F.2d 1229, 1233, quoting 
United States v. Arnett (C.A.9, 1979), 628 F.2d 1162, 1164.  “In the process of 
determining whether disputed plea agreements have been formed or performed, 
courts have necessarily drawn on the most relevant body of developed rules and 
principles of private law, those pertaining to the formation and interpretation of 
commercial contracts.”  United States v. Harvey (C.A.4, 1986), 791 F.2d 294, 
300.”  Id.  Because the defendant’s constitutional rights are at stake in the plea 
process, the concerns underlying a plea agreement differ from and go beyond 
those of commercial contract law.  Carpenter, 68 Ohio St.3d at 61, 623 N.E.2d 
66. 
{¶ 22} Our concern in Carpenter was to avoid the breaking of promises 
made by the prosecutor in the original plea agreement.  Carpenter’s citation of 
cases from other states underscores the court’s concern with enforcing the 
promises in a valid plea agreement. See id. at 61, 623 N.E.2d 623, citing State v. 
Thomas (1972), 61 N.J. 314, 294 A.2d 57, and State v. Nelson (1990), 23 
Conn.App. 215, 579 A.2d 1104.  Thomas relied on Santobello, which involved a 
concession by the state that a particular plea agreement had been made following 
plea bargaining with the defendant.  Santobello, 404 U.S. at 258, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 
L.Ed.2d 427. The question in Santobello was whether that plea agreement could 
be enforced when a new assistant prosecutor sought a different sentence at the 
sentencing hearing, unaware of the earlier plea agreement. Id. at 259. The United 
States Supreme Court upheld the validity of the plea agreement. Id. at 262. 
                                                                                                                                     
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” (Emphasis added.)  If at the time of 
the guilty plea to the assault charge, the victim has not died, the final element of the homicide has 
not occurred, so the offenses are not “the same.” See Diaz v. United States (1912), 223 U.S. 442, 
449, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (only at the time of the victim’s death, “and not before, [is] it 
possible to put the accused in jeopardy for that [homicide] offense”). Accord Brown v. Ohio 
(1977), 432 U.S. 161, 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187, fn. 7. 
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Thomas quotes Santobello for this proposition: “ ‘[W]hen a plea rests in any 
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be 
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled.’ ” 61 N.J. at 323, 294 A.2d 57, quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 
S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427. See also Nelson, 23 Conn.App. at 221, 579 A.2d 1104 
( “specific performance of the [plea] agreement is the only appropriate remedy * * 
*”). These cases underscore the basis of the rule in Carpenter—effect must be 
given to the intention of the state and the defendant in their plea bargain, and 
courts should enforce what they perceive to be the terms of the original plea 
agreement. 
C. 
{¶ 23} In order for a guilty plea to be a “negotiated guilty plea” within the 
meaning of State v. Carpenter, the record must show the existence of the elements 
of a contract (the plea agreement). The state maintains that there was no plea 
agreement and that Dye effectively pleaded guilty to the indictment in the first 
case.  Dye pleaded guilty to both counts of the first indictment, but only to the 
first of the three specifications attached to the aggravated vehicular assault charge. 
(To be sure, that specification not only imposed a mandatory prison term, as did 
the other specifications that were dismissed, but it included a mandatory 
permanent revocation of Dye’s driver’s license.) The state sought the maximum 
sentence, which was imposed.  The state contends that Dye did not gain a reduced 
charge, a more favorable sentencing recommendation, or anything else, as one 
would expect from a negotiated plea agreement. 
{¶ 24} This matter is not without some difficulty.  However, a close 
examination of the record supports the conclusion that a negotiated plea existed 
within the meaning of Carpenter.  Although the record is limited regarding the 
plea negotiations in Dye’s first case, the transcript of the plea hearing reflects that 
some form of communication occurred before that hearing during which Dye 
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notified the state that he would plead guilty to Counts One and Two and the first 
specification.  Because Dye agreed to plead to this portion of the charges, the state 
recommended dismissal of the two remaining specifications.  In addition, the state 
indicated that it had made an agreement with Dye to recommend the continuation 
of bond on the condition that Dye refrain from driving and using drugs or alcohol. 
The state contends that this latter part of the agreement at most related to the 
continuation of the bond and not the overall plea, but, although it is a close 
question, we view the agreement for continuation of the bond as corroborating the 
defendant’s claim that his guilty plea was negotiated with the state.  Dye’s change 
of plea from not guilty to guilty and the state’s later recommendation that the 
second and third specifications be dismissed, in conjunction with the agreement 
on continuation of bond, support the conclusion that Dye’s guilty plea was a 
negotiated plea within the meaning of Carpenter. The state obtained a definite 
prison term and avoided the uncertainties of trial. Dye gave up rights that may 
have resulted in acquittal. 
{¶ 25} As the court of appeals concluded, any time a defendant enters a 
guilty plea, he or she will have relinquished the right to a trial at which the 
defendant could be acquitted, and the state gains the benefit of obtaining a 
conviction without having to go to trial. State v. Dye, 2009-Ohio-2949, at ¶ 28.  
We caution that our holding that a negotiated plea existed in Dye’s case does not 
mean that every plea of guilty necessarily is the result of a negotiated plea 
agreement within the meaning of Carpenter.  On this record, the evidence of plea 
negotiations and the parties’ awareness of the gravity of the victim’s injuries, 
together with the state’s failure to reserve the right to prosecute for any later 
homicide charge, justify the conclusion that the state agreed to forgo further 
prosecution of Dye. 
{¶ 26} Holding that Dye’s plea was a negotiated plea is consistent with 
the rule in Carpenter and upholds important rights afforded to defendants 
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generally.  Both the state and Dye were aware of the grave nature of Arnold’s 
injuries, and the record contains testimony that Arnold’s death from those injuries 
was foreseeable.  As in Carpenter, without an expressed reservation by the state 
of the right to prosecute for any later homicide charge, Dye had a reasonable 
expectation that his plea of guilty would end criminal prosecution based on this 
incident.  Given the extreme nature of Arnold’s injuries and the defendant’s 
reasonable expectation that pleading guilty would end the criminal proceedings 
arising out of the incident, we conclude that if the state had wished to reserve the 
right to bring further charges in the event of Arnold’s death, it would have so 
reserved on the record.  Requiring the state to make this reservation under these 
circumstances places no unreasonable burden on prosecutors and ensures that 
defendants are fully aware of the consequences of their guilty pleas. 
{¶ 27} Because Dye’s 1999 plea was a “negotiated guilty plea” within the 
meaning of Carpenter, the state had a duty to “expressly reserve[] the right to file 
additional charges” if the victim dies of his injuries. Id., 68 Ohio St.3d 59, 623 
N.E.2d 66, syllabus. Thus, Carpenter precluded the aggravated-vehicular-
homicide charge in this case. 
III. 
{¶ 28} We hold that Dye’s 1999 guilty plea to aggravated vehicular 
assault was a “negotiated plea” to a lesser offense within the meaning of 
Carpenter. Carpenter thus required the state to expressly reserve its right to bring 
a later homicide charge against Dye in the event that the victim died from injuries 
sustained in the aggravated vehicular assault to which Dye had pleaded guilty. 
Accordingly, the state was precluded from bringing the aggravated-vehicular-
homicide charge against Dye after the victim died.  We affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} I respectfully dissent.  For the reasons that follow, I would hold 
that Dye’s original guilty plea was not a “negotiated guilty plea” within the 
meaning of State v. Carpenter (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 59, 623 N.E.2d 66, syllabus, 
and accordingly, his conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide under R.C. 
2903.06(A)(1)(a) is not barred. 
{¶ 30} At the outset, the holding in Carpenter is not compelled by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.  The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: “[N]o person * * * 
shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb” 
and generally bars a successive prosecution for the “same” offense. See 
Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 
306; Gavieres v. United States (1911), 220 U.S. 338, 342, 31 S.Ct. 421, 55 L.Ed. 
489.3  The principal element of a homicide offense is the death of the victim, and 
that element is not part of an assault charge.  If at the time of the guilty plea to the 
assault charge, the victim has not died, the final element of the homicide charge 
has not occurred.  See Diaz v. United States (1912), 223 U.S. 442, 449, 32 S.Ct. 
250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (only at the time of the victim’s death, “and not before, [is] it 
possible to put the accused in jeopardy for that [homicide] offense”).  Accord 
Brown v. Ohio (1977), 432 U.S. 161, 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187, fn. 7. 
                                                 
3. In determining whether an offense is the “same” for double-jeopardy purposes, courts employ 
the “same-elements” test of Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306. The same-
elements test inquires as to whether each offense contains an element not included in the other: if 
not, they are the “same offence,” and the Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecution.  
United States v. Dixon (1993), 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 31} Thus, when the victim dies after the defendant has pleaded guilty 
to an offense other than homicide, that plea does not of itself bar the state under 
double jeopardy principles from prosecuting the defendant for the homicide.  See 
generally State v. Thomas (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 254, 262, 15 O.O.3d 262, 400 
N.E.2d 897, overruled on other grounds by State v. Crago (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 
243, 559 N.E.2d 1353 (“The courts have long held that where a fact necessary to 
the commission of one offense occurs after the defendant has been convicted of 
another offense, multiple prosecutions are not barred by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause”). 
{¶ 32} Instead, the basis for our concern for the defendant’s expectation 
that he would not face additional prosecution was the “negotiated guilty plea.” 
Carpenter, 68 Ohio St.3d 59, 623 N.E.2d 66, syllabus.  Carpenter noted that the 
guilty plea had followed “plea negotiations with the state.”  Id. at 60. The opinion 
does not describe the substance of the plea agreement, but the court observed that 
Carpenter did not plead guilty to felonious assault, the crime charged in the 
indictment, but instead to attempted felonious assault, a lesser included offense of 
felonious assault.  Id.  Additionally, Carpenter was sentenced to the minimum 
prison term for attempted assault, and the court noted that the “state had agreed to 
recommend” that minimum sentence.  Id.  The lesser charge, combined with the 
state’s favorable sentencing recommendation, indicated that a negotiated plea 
agreement had been reached in that case. 
{¶ 33} I agree with the cases cited by the majority.  However, I believe 
that their application to this case merits a different result.  In this case, the state 
maintains that there was no plea agreement and that Dye effectively pleaded 
guilty to the indictment in the first case.  Dye pleaded guilty to both counts of the 
first indictment.  While he pleaded guilty only to the first of the three 
specifications attached to the aggravated vehicular assault charge, that 
specification carried the most serious consequences for the defendant.  It not only 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
imposed a mandatory prison term (as did the other specifications that were 
dismissed), but it included a mandatory permanent revocation of Dye’s driver’s 
license.  Further, the dismissal of the other two specifications did not affect Dye’s 
sentence. 
{¶ 34} The state sought the maximum sentence, which was imposed. The 
state contends that Dye did not gain a reduced charge, a more favorable 
sentencing recommendation, or anything else that one would expect from a 
negotiated plea agreement.  Dye, on the other hand, contends that the dismissal of 
two of the three specifications shows that there was a negotiated plea agreement.  
He also argues that the state’s comments to the effect that the prosecutor had 
assumed that Dye’s bond would be continued pending sentencing (and that he had 
so represented to Dye and his counsel) show that a negotiated plea existed, 
because the trial judge had been prepared to revoke Dye’s bond. 
{¶ 35} The record does not contain the details of a plea agreement. 
However, Dye essentially pleaded guilty to the crimes charged.  The state 
requested a maximum sentence, which was imposed.  There was no negotiated 
reduced plea or plea bargain.  The dismissal of the two specifications to the 
aggravated vehicular assault charge did not result in a reduced sentence.  Dye 
received no more lenient a sentence than he would have if he had been found 
guilty at trial. 
{¶ 36} The fact that there is a written entry memorializing defendant’s 
guilty plea is not dispositive of the characterization of the plea as a “negotiated 
guilty plea.”  The guilty plea form’s recitation that “No promises other than those 
which are part of this plea agreement have been made” does not prove a 
“negotiated guilty plea” within the meaning of Carpenter.  The written entry is on 
a form used for guilty pleas.  Thus, the typed words “plea agreement” that 
appeared as part of the form do not suffice of themselves to satisfy Carpenter’s 
requirement of a negotiated guilty plea. 
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{¶ 37} The record regarding the continuation of bond does not 
unequivocally support appellee’s position.  The judge inquired of the assistant 
prosecutor about continuation of the bond: “Had you made an agreement?” The 
prosecutor responded: “I had assumed that bond was continued.  We had 
represented to the Defendant that that would happen.”  The judge then asked the 
prosecutor: “You would recommend that?” and the prosecutor replied 
affirmatively.  Upon being asked by the judge whether he had been involved with 
this case previously, the prosecutor responded: “Yes. That’s what we had agreed 
to with the same conditions, one, no driving, and two, no drug and alcohol use 
pending the presentence report.  We are also asking that a victim impact statement 
be ordered.”  The court then continued the bond for Dye. At most, this brief 
discussion shows an agreement with regard to the continuation of bond pending 
sentencing on the terms earlier provided.  And a bond is not part of a sentence.  A 
bond only provides assurance that the defendant will appear for trial.  When 
considered with the substance of the plea—essentially pleading guilty to the 
offense charged—and the state’s sentencing recommendation of the maximum 
sentence, the trial court’s conclusion that Dye’s plea was not a “negotiated guilty 
plea” within the meaning of Carpenter is not error. 
{¶ 38} I agree with the court of appeals that any time a defendant enters a 
guilty plea, he or she will have relinquished the right to a trial at which the 
defendant could be acquitted, and the state gains the benefit of obtaining a 
conviction without having to go to trial. State v. Dye, Lake App. No. 2008-L-106, 
2009-Ohio-2949, at ¶ 28.  But to hold that this detriment to the defendant and 
benefit to the state—which will be true of every guilty plea—amounts to a 
negotiated plea agreement under Carpenter is to read that case’s holding too 
broadly. Under that reading, any guilty plea would be considered “negotiated.”  
That is not what Carpenter held.  Instead, Carpenter addresses those guilty pleas 
in which both the state and the defendant understand at the time of the agreement 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
that the state does not intend to seek further prosecution of the defendant for the 
incident, even if the victim later dies from injuries suffered from the incident.  Not 
every guilty plea will satisfy that condition. 
{¶ 39} Because Dye’s 1999 plea was not a “negotiated guilty plea” within 
the meaning of Carpenter, I believe that the state had no duty to expressly reserve 
the right to file additional charges in the event of the death of the victim.  
Accordingly, I would hold that the state was not precluded from bringing the 
aggravated-vehicular-homicide charge against Dye after the victim died.  I 
respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Teri R. 
Daniel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Blakemore, Meeker & Bowler Co., L.P.A. and Michael B. Bowler, for 
appellee. 
______________________