Case Title: State ex rel. VanCleave v. School Emps. Retirement Sys.

Citation: 2008-Ohio-5377

Docket Number: 20072442

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. VanCleave v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 120 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-
Ohio-5377.] 
 
THE STATE EX REL. VANCLEAVE, APPELLANT, v. 
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. VanCleave v. School Emps. Retirement Sys.,  
120 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-5377.] 
Mandamus — Writ sought to compel School Employees Retirement System to 
specify evidence it relied upon in denying disability-retirement benefits — 
Court of appeals’ denial of writ affirmed. 
(No. 2007-2442 ─ Submitted June 3, 2008 ─ Decided November 12, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 06AP-1233, 2007-Ohio-6544. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of mandamus to 
compel appellee, School Employees Retirement System (“SERS”), to vacate its 
decision denying the application of appellant, Susan E. VanCleave, for disability-
retirement benefits.  Because we hold that SERS did not abuse its discretion in 
denying VanCleave’s application, we affirm. 
SERS Membership and Employment 
{¶ 2} VanCleave has been a member of SERS since 1985.  She was 
originally employed by the Washington Local Schools near Toledo as a school 
bus driver.  She became a custodian at Monac Elementary School in February 
1996 and received good performance evaluations in that position. 
{¶ 3} In July 1996, while she was cleaning a bathroom wall at the 
school, VanCleave fell off a ladder, landing directly on her buttocks, lower back, 
and legs.  As a result of the pain she experienced due to the fall, VanCleave left 
work in April 1998. 
Application for Disability-Retirement Benefits 
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and Initial Denial of Benefits and Appeal 
{¶ 4} VanCleave filed an application for disability-retirement benefits1 
with SERS in June 2000.  Her treating physician, Richard A. Koepke, D.O., 
certified that VanCleave “is physically and/or mentally incapacitated for a period 
of at least 12 months and is unable to perform the duty for which [she was] 
formerly responsible as a school employee.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Dr. Koepke listed 
VanCleave’s primary disabling conditions as “[h]erniated disc L4-5, degenerative 
disc disease lumbar spine, [and] bilateral sciatic neuralgia,” and her underlying 
condition as “[f]ibromyalgia.” 
{¶ 5} SERS ordered a medical examination of VanCleave by Claire V. 
Wolfe, M.D.  Dr. Wolfe conducted a physical examination of VanCleave in 
October 2000.  Dr. Wolfe noted that VanCleave complained of constant pain to 
her lower back, right buttock, and leg.  Dr. Wolfe further found upon her 
examination of VanCleave that “[p]alpitation revealed profound tenderness in the 
anterior chest bilaterally, moderate tenderness in the right lateral epicondyle and 
mild on the left, marked tightness in the left upper trapezius, mild tightness in the 
levators and cervical paraspinals.  She was moderately tender in the lower back.  
She was severely tender with palpitation in the right buttock, moderately on the 
left.  Both greater trochanders were tender, as were the medial knees.” 
{¶ 6} Dr. Wolfe diagnosed VanCleave with “[f]ibromyalgia syndrome” 
and “[l]umbar degenerative disk disease without active radiculopathy” and 
included the following in her recommendations: 
{¶ 7} “Ms. Crooks [n.k.a. VanCleave] has MRI documentation of lumbar 
degenerative disk disease with a bulge at L4-5 primarily to the left.  Almost all of 
                                                 
1.  The original papers filed in the court of appeals refer to, but do not include, VanCleave’s 
application for disability-retirement benefits and the report of her treating physician, which she 
submitted to SERS with her application.  The clerk of the court of appeals was contacted, but these 
materials could not be located.  Nevertheless, the magistrate’s findings of fact concerning the 
contents of these documents were not objected to by either party and are relied upon in this 
opinion for facts concerning the missing papers. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
her symptoms are to the right.  After several years of symptoms, she has no 
objective neurologic deficits.  She has had normal electrodiagnostic studies in the 
past.  Her low back symptoms are most compatible with her fibromyalgia 
diagnosis.  I do not find anything on today’s examination that would preclude her 
from continuing work as a custodian.” 
{¶ 8} Based upon this examination, Dr. Wolfe certified that VanCleave 
“is not physically * * * incapacitated for a period of at least 12 months and is able 
to perform the duty for which [she was] responsible * * * as a school employee.”  
(Emphasis sic.)   
{¶ 9} An SERS medical advisory committee reviewed VanCleave’s 
application and the evidence and concluded that VanCleave was not permanently 
disabled from performing her duties as a school custodian.  The committee 
recommended that VanCleave’s application be denied, and SERS adopted the 
committee’s recommendation and denied the application. 
{¶ 10} VanCleave appealed the decision, requested a personal appearance 
before the SERS retirement board, and submitted additional documentation in 
support of her appeal.  Included in her additional submission was a letter from Dr. 
Koepke in which he noted that he had examined VanCleave in February 2001 and 
diagnosed her as having (1) degenerative disc disease L4-5, (2) chronic spinal 
sprain, (3) fibromyalgia, which was confirmed by multiple evaluations by 
specialists and was created or significantly aggravated by her July 1996 work 
injury, and (4) sciatic neuralgia.  Dr. Koepke concluded that VanCleave could not 
return to her previous work as a janitor.  Dr. Koepke noted that although 
VanCleave had undergone various treatments, including physical therapy, she 
remained unable to perform her previous duties. 
{¶ 11} The medical advisory committee found that the additional 
submissions did not constitute additional objective medical evidence as defined in 
former Ohio Adm.Code 3309-1-41.  The committee recommended that 
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VanCleave’s appeal be denied.  In March 2001, SERS notified VanCleave that its 
retirement board had upheld its original decision to deny her request for 
disability-retirement benefits. SERS also denied her request for a personal 
appearance before the board. 
First Mandamus Case and Remand for Appeal Hearing 
{¶ 12} In September 2002, VanCleave filed a mandamus action in the 
Court of Appeals for Franklin County challenging the denial by the SERS board 
of her application for disability-retirement benefits.  By agreement of the parties, 
the mandamus action was dismissed and the matter was remanded for an appeal 
hearing before the board. 
{¶ 13} Before the hearing, VanCleave submitted updated records and 
reports in support of her application.  This additional information included a May 
2003 letter by Dr. Koepke, in which he diagnosed VanCleave as having (1) 
chronic spine sprain, (2) degenerative disc disease with previous herniation, (3) 
bilateral sciatic neuralgia, (4) fibromyalgia, (5) myospasm and myositis, and (6) 
chronic neuropathic pain syndrome.  Dr. Koepke concluded that VanCleave’s 
pain was “too disabling [for her] to perform her duties” as either a janitor or bus 
driver. 
{¶ 14} The documentation also included several reports of Allan G. 
Clague, a neurologist, who had diagnosed VanCleave with neuropathic pain 
syndrome and was treating her for that condition.  Dr. Clague determined that 
VanCleave could not return to her former position and that because she could 
perform the required duties for only short periods of time, she was totally and 
permanently medically disabled. 
{¶ 15} VanCleave also submitted an April 2003 psychiatric evaluation of 
her by Melanie Thombre, M.D, diagnosing her as suffering from secondary 
mental disability, i.e., cognitive disorder, sleep disorder due to pain, and mood 
disorder due to chronic pain.  Dr. Thombre concluded that VanCleave is totally 
January Term, 2008 
5 
and permanently disabled for her previous work as a school custodian and bus 
driver. 
{¶ 16} At the hearing, VanCleave and her husband testified that she could 
not perform her previous position of school custodian.  The medical advisory 
committee thereafter ordered that VanCleave be reexamined by Dr. Wolfe.  Dr. 
Wolfe reexamined her in September 2003 and diagnosed VanCleave as suffering 
from (1) fibromyalgia syndrome, (2) depression and chronic anxiety, and (3) 
lumbar degenerative disease without acute radiculopathy. 
{¶ 17} Dr. Wolfe again concluded that VanCleave “is not physically * * * 
incapacitated for a period of at least 12 months from the date of application and is 
able to perform the duty for which [she was] responsible * * * as a school 
employee.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Dr. Wolfe based her conclusion that VanCleave was 
not physically incapacitated on her opinion that although VanCleave had 
fibromyalgia, she was not precluded from working: 
{¶ 18} “People with fibromyalgia are, in fact, generally distressed.  The 
question of disability is more difficult to assess because it is a subjective one.  I 
do not believe the fibromyalgia is functionally disabling, even for Mrs. 
VanCleave’s job as a custodian.  However, every physician that she has seen has 
told her that she cannot return to that, that her pain complaints will only be worse 
with that type of activity and it would be therefore very difficult, I think, for her to 
believe that she could return to such activity even if she went through a work 
hardening program.  It is difficult when you are the treating physician to be 
‘objective’ and not take the subjective pain into consideration.  However, based 
on my review of all the data and the examinations, I do not believe there are 
objective abnormalities that would preclude Mrs. VanCleave’s work.”  (Emphasis 
sic.)   
{¶ 19} The medical advisory committee relied on Dr. Wolfe’s new 
medical evaluation and recommended that its original decision to deny 
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VanCleave’s application for disability-retirement benefits be upheld and that the 
appeal be denied.  In November 2003, the SERS retirement board upheld its 
decision to deny the application. 
Second Mandamus Action 
{¶ 20} In December 2006, more than three years after the retirement 
board’s decision, VanCleave filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County for a writ of mandamus to compel SERS to pay disability-
retirement benefits to her.  In the alternative, VanCleave requested a writ of 
mandamus ordering the SERS board to vacate its denial of benefits and state its 
specific bases for its denial, including an explanation of how VanCleave’s mental 
condition was determined without evaluation by a board-appointed psychologist 
or psychiatrist.  VanCleave further requested, in the alternative, a writ of 
mandamus ordering the SERS board to revoke its denial of her application and to 
have her evaluated by a board-appointed psychologist or psychiatrist, and 
ordering that any board decision thereafter specify the evidence relied upon and 
the bases for its decision.  After SERS submitted an answer and the parties filed 
evidence and briefs, the court of appeals denied the writ. 
{¶ 21} This cause is now before the court upon VanCleave’s appeal as of 
right. 
Mandamus - General Standard 
{¶ 22} VanCleave requests extraordinary relief in mandamus, challenging 
the SERS action denying her application for disability-retirement benefits.  “The 
Public School Employees Retirement System was established for the purpose of 
providing retirement allowances and other benefits to public school employees 
other than teachers.”  State ex rel. McMaster v. School Emps. Retirement Sys. 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 630 N.E.2d 701, citing 1 Baker & Carey, Ohio 
School Law (1993) 399, Section 8.25.  Under R.C. 3309.39(C), to be entitled to 
disability-retirement benefits, an SERS member must be “mentally or physically 
January Term, 2008 
7 
incapacitated for the performance of the member’s last assigned primary duty as 
an employee by a disabling condition either permanent or presumed to be 
permanent for twelve continuous months following the filing of an application.”  
“Because there is no provision for appealing a final SERS decision, mandamus is 
available to correct any abuse of discretion by SERS.”  State ex rel. Stiles v. 
School Emps. Retirement Sys., 102 Ohio St.3d 156, 2004-Ohio-2140, 807 N.E.2d 
353, ¶ 13.  “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable.”  Id. 
Duty to Explain Decision on Disability-Retirement Benefits: 
Lack of Statutory Basis for Duty – State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers 
Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719 
{¶ 23} VanCleave asserts that she is entitled to the requested writ of 
mandamus because SERS did not identify the evidence it relied upon and explain 
its reasons for denying her application for disability-retirement benefits.  She 
contends that we should extend our decision in State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. 
(1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245, to orders of public employee 
retirement systems, like SERS, that concern applications for disability-retirement 
benefits.  In Noll, we held, “In any order of the Industrial Commission granting or 
denying benefits to a claimant, the commission must specifically state what 
evidence has been relied upon, and briefly explain the reasoning for its decision.”  
Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 24} We previously rejected a comparable request to extend Noll to 
public-employee-retirement-system disability determinations in State ex rel. 
Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 
767 N.E.2d 719, because (1) the Noll holding was expressly limited to workers’ 
compensation claims, (2) the creation of the legal duty that a relator seeks to 
enforce in mandamus proceedings is the distinct function of the General 
Assembly, and courts are not authorized to create the legal duty enforceable in 
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mandamus, (3) there had not been a flood of cases involving disability 
determinations by public employee retirement systems comparable to that 
experienced in workers’ compensation cases so that court review of the 
administrative proceedings would be overly burdensome, and (4) Noll relied 
heavily on a decision in which we emphasized that the statutory duty existed on 
the part of the Industrial Commission to specify the basis for its decisions.  Id. at ¶ 
16-21. 
{¶ 25} We concluded that the retirement system in Pipoly had no duty to 
specify the evidence it relied upon and its reasoning for its decision denying 
disability-retirement benefits: 
{¶ 26} “Therefore, while extending Noll to [State Teachers Retirement 
System] and [State Teachers Retirement Board] determinations may be tempting 
based on policy considerations, see [State ex rel.] Ochs [v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 
85 Ohio St.3d 674,] 675-676, 710 N.E.2d 1126, we will not impose the Noll 
requirements in the absence of a statutory duty or a comparable need for these 
requirements in cases other than workers’ compensation cases.  See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Schwaben v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 280, 285, 
667 N.E.2d 398 (‘However, while it may be tempting to decide this case on 
subjective principles of equity and fundamental fairness, this court has a greater 
obligation to follow the law’).  Accordingly, [the State Teachers Retirement 
System] had no clear legal duty cognizable in mandamus to specify what evidence 
it relied upon and explain the reasoning for its retirement board’s decision 
denying Pipoly’s application for disability retirement benefits.”  Id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 27} Insofar as VanCleave’s claim represents a reargument of the 
matters we previously considered and rejected in Pipoly, we deny it for the 
reasons previously specified in that case.  As we observed in Pipoly, 95 Ohio 
St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, at ¶ 21, “our review in a mandamus 
proceeding challenging an administrative determination on an application for 
January Term, 2008 
9 
disability retirement benefits is not any more burdensome than reviewing a 
summary judgment entered by a trial court without a detailed opinion.  See Civ.R. 
52.”  Although it may be preferable from a policy standpoint that a retirement 
board explain its reasoning for its decision, the General Assembly is the final 
arbiter of public policy.  Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 
873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 22. 
Duty to Explain Decision on Disability-Retirement Benefits: 
Procedural Due Process 
{¶ 28} VanCleave also claims that SERS’s duty to identify the evidence it 
relied upon and to briefly explain its reasons for denying her application for 
disability-retirement benefits is constitutionally required by procedural due 
process and the right to open courts and to a remedy.  See Section 1, Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (“nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); Section 16, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution (“All courts shall be open, and every person, for 
an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay”).  
We did not consider these issues in Pipoly, 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 
767 N.E.2d 719, because they were not raised in that case. 
{¶ 29} VanCleave has waived her claim that the rights under the Ohio 
Constitution to open courts and to a remedy impose a duty on SERS to identify 
the evidence it relied upon and to explain its reason for its decision because she 
failed to raise this claim in the court of appeals in her pleading, briefs, or 
objections to the decision of the court magistrate.  See State ex rel. Brady v. 
Pianka, 106 Ohio St.3d 147, 2005-Ohio-4105, 832 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 14 (appellant 
waived constitutional claim that she did not raise in the court of appeals); State ex 
rel. Van Dyke v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-Ohio-4123, 
793 N.E.2d 438, ¶ 42 (court need not address merits of constitutional claims on 
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appeal when relator did not raise them in her complaint or amended complaint 
and other parties did not consent to the litigation of these claims); State ex rel. 
Schmidt v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 100 Ohio St.3d 317, 2003-Ohio-6086, 
798 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 6 (appellant waived issue that she could have raised in 
objections to magistrate’s decision in lower court). 
{¶ 30} To trigger the benefit of the right to procedural due process found 
in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution, VanCleave must show that she has a protected 
property or liberty interest in the disability-retirement benefits for which she 
applied.  See State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 
502, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 31} Even if it were assumed that VanCleave has a property interest in a 
disability-retirement benefit, she has not demonstrated in this case that she did not 
receive due process regarding her claim for that benefit.  After VanCleave’s 
application for disability benefits was denied, she sought reconsideration of that 
decision and obtained a personal appearance before the board to present her 
position.  After that hearing, the SERS medical advisory committee requested and 
obtained another medical evaluation of Van Cleave for consideration.  Cf. R.C. 
3309.39(C). After the SERS board upheld its original decision to deny disability-
retirement benefits, VanCleave had the opportunity to obtain the medical 
evaluations and the opinions of the medical advisory committee members and to 
argue, in this mandamus action, that the board abused its discretion in denying her 
benefits.  See, e.g., Stiles, 102 Ohio St.3d 156, 2004-Ohio-2140, 807 N.E.2d 353, 
¶ 13 (abuse-of-discretion standard applies in mandamus action challenging 
SERS’s denial of disability retirement). 
{¶ 32} Included in the record of this mandamus case are Dr. Wolfe’s 
medical evaluations of VanCleave and the medical advisory committee’s 
correspondence outlining why the doctors on that committee believed that 
January Term, 2008 
11 
VanCleave was not entitled to a disability-retirement benefit.  Among the 
arguments VanCleave presented to the court of appeals was her contention that 
the SERS board abused its discretion by relying upon the medical report of Dr. 
Wolfe because the doctor had used the wrong standard in determining whether 
VanCleave’s fibromyalgia was disabling.  Under these circumstances, it is not 
clear how VanCleave’s mandamus claim has been prejudiced by the summary 
nature of the board’s decision. Cf. State ex rel. Haylett v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ 
Comp. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 325, 332-333, 720 N.E.2d 901, citing Mathews v. 
Eldridge (1976), 424 U.S. 319, 334-335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (in 
determining what process is due, factors include the value, if any, of additional 
procedural safeguards). 
{¶ 33} Therefore, we reject VanCleave’s claim that due process required 
that SERS support its denial of her application for disability-retirement benefits 
by specifically identifying the evidence it relied upon and explaining the reasons 
for its decision. 
{¶ 34} In so holding, we note that disability-retirement claimants, like 
VanCleave in this case, appear to already have, through administrative regulation, 
some right to obtain important information upon which to determine, generally, 
the basis of the board’s decision. One of the pertinent regulations governing 
SERS disability determinations, Ohio Adm.Code 3309-1-41(A)(1), provides that 
a notice of the denial of disability benefits must be issued to the applicant and 
must “inform the member of * * * [t]he medical evaluation and the board’s denial 
* * * of disability benefits [and] [t]he procedures for appeal of a denial * * * of 
disability benefits.” Although the regulation does not specify that a notice of 
denial of disability benefits must explain the evidence relied upon to deny 
benefits, Ohio Adm.Code 3309-1-41(A)(1)(a) does require that the applicant be 
informed of “the medical evaluation” upon which, presumably, the benefit denial 
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was based.2  Indeed, the “medical evaluation” of the SERS board’s consulting 
physician, or the SERS medical advisory committee’s review of and concurrence 
in that evaluation, may in some cases provide the board’s rationale for denying 
benefits.  See, e.g., McMaster, 69 Ohio St.3d 130, 630 N.E.2d 701 (upholding 
SERS’s denial of disability benefits based in part on recommendation of the 
board’s consulting physicians); State ex rel. Lecklider v. School Emps. Retirement 
Sys., 104 Ohio St.3d 271, 2004-Ohio-6586, 819 N.E.2d 289, ¶ 21 (SERS board 
did not abuse its discretion where the board’s consulting physician and all the 
doctors of the medical advisory committee concluded that relator was not 
physically incapacitated from doing her job). 
{¶ 35} In the present case, the letter that SERS sent to VanCleave advises 
that the board upheld its original decision to deny her disability-retirement 
benefits and that VanCleave had no further appeal rights.3  That letter does not 
“inform [VanCleave] of the medical evaluation,” regardless of the precise 
meaning of that term.  The term “medical evaluation” in the regulation may mean 
nothing more than providing the applicant with a copy of the examining 
physician’s evaluation—here, that of Dr. Wolfe—a matter we do not decide 
today.  Failure to provide this information with the board’s decision to deny 
benefits may require reversal of the board’s order because a letter denying 
benefits without also providing the medical evaluation it was based upon does not 
appear to be in compliance with the SERS rule. 
                                                 
2. The regulation does not specify what constitutes the “medical evaluation” of which the 
applicant must be informed. 
 
3.  {¶ a}  The letter sent to Van Cleave states: 
     {¶b} “This letter is in reference to the appeal for reconsideration of your disability retirement. 
All of the information submitted on appeal has been reviewed, including all evidence and 
testimony in relation to your personal appearance and reexamination.  
    {¶ c} “On November 19, 2003, the Retirement Board upheld their [sic] original decision to deny 
your disability retirement application. All appeal rights in regard to this application have ceased.”  
    {¶ d} The letter does not indicate that it included any attachments, i.e., Dr. Wolfe’s medical 
evaluation report. 
January Term, 2008 
13 
{¶ 36} However, this case provides no occasion to decide what the term 
“medical evaluation” in Ohio Adm.Code 3309-1-41(A)(1)(a) means, as Van 
Cleave has not based her claim on an allegation that she was not “informed of the 
medical evaluation.” 
Mental Evaluation 
{¶ 37} VanCleave next asserts that the court of appeals erred in not 
granting a writ of mandamus to compel SERS to obtain a psychological 
evaluation of her when new evidence submitted with her appeal ─ the psychiatric 
report of Dr. Thombre based on an April 2003 psychiatric examination ─ 
indicated that she suffered from a mental disability in addition to her claimed 
physical disabilities. 
{¶ 38} Under the version of Ohio Adm.Code 3309-1-41(A) in effect at the 
time of VanCleave’s application, an applicant for disability-retirement benefits 
could appeal the initial SERS decision to deny benefits by filing a notice of intent 
to appeal and by providing “additional objective medical evidence” in support of 
the appeal, which evidence was required to be “current” and documented by a 
physician specially trained in the field of medicine “pertinent to the illness or 
injury for which the disability was claimed.”  2000-2001 Ohio Monthly Record 
1678, 1679, effective May 2, 2001.  The present version of Ohio Adm.Code 3309-
1-41(A) similarly requires that an applicant submit “additional evidence” with an 
appeal of an initial SERS decision to deny disability-retirement benefits, with that 
evidence defined to be “current and pertinent to the illness or injury for which the 
disability was claimed.”  Ohio Adm.Code 3309-1-41(A)(2)(a) and (d). 
{¶ 39} VanCleave’s application did not claim a disability based on a 
mental condition.  Yet her mental condition is pertinent to the injuries for which 
she claimed disability:  it arose from her physical injuries and symptoms, e.g., the 
chronic pain associated with her fibromyalgia. 
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{¶ 40} Nevertheless, VanCleave did not submit any evidence regarding a 
mental condition with her application.  When she did submit evidence concerning 
this condition with her appeal, the evidence failed to disclose any disabling 
mental condition during the pertinent period of time for purposes of her 
application ─ 12 continuous months following VanCleave’s June 2000 
application for disability-retirement benefits.  See R.C. 3309.39(C) (“Medical 
examination of a member who has applied for a disability benefit shall be 
conducted by a competent disinterested physician or physicians selected by the 
retirement board to determine whether the member is mentally or physically 
incapacitated for the performance of the member’s last assigned primary duty as 
an employee by a disabling condition either permanent or presumed to be 
permanent for twelve continuous months following the filing of an application”).  
Instead, Dr. Thombre’s report included a diagnosis based on an April 2003 
examination and did not reveal whether VanCleave was disabled as a result of 
mental disability during the pertinent time period of June 2000 to June 2001. 
{¶ 41} Moreover, VanCleave could have requested that SERS conduct a 
mental-health evaluation of her during the proceedings before it, but she did not. 
{¶ 42} Under these circumstances and in the absence of any specific duty 
to do so under the pertinent statutes and regulations, SERS did not abuse its broad 
discretion in failing to order, sua sponte, a mental-health evaluation of VanCleave 
by a physician selected by it. 
Claimed Abuse of Discretion in Denial of Benefits and 
Reliance on Dr. Wolfe’s September 2003 Report 
{¶ 43} VanCleave next contends that SERS abused its discretion in 
denying her application for disability-retirement benefits. 
{¶ 44} VanCleave’s contention lacks merit.  The court below correctly 
determined that the SERS board did not abuse its discretion in denying 
VanCleave disability benefits. Specifically, the medical reevaluation by Dr. Wolfe 
January Term, 2008 
15 
of VanCleave’s condition concluded that Van Cleave suffered from fibromyalgia 
syndrome, depression and chronic anxiety, and lumbar degenerative disc disease 
without active radiculopathy, but did not exhibit complex regional pain syndrome.  
Based upon her review of the data, the treating physicians’ reports, and her 2003 
examination of Van Cleave, Dr. Wolfe concluded that Van Cleave did not suffer 
from a disability that would preclude her return to her last assigned duties as a 
custodian.  The doctors of the SERS board’s medical advisory committee 
reviewed Dr. Wolfe’s report and the extensive medical documentation submitted 
by Van Cleave, and concurred with Dr. Wolfe’s opinion that Van Cleave was not 
permanently incapacitated for the performance of her former duties as a 
custodian. 
{¶ 45} VanCleave argues that SERS could not have relied on Dr. Wolfe’s 
September 2003 report to deny her application for disability-retirement benefits 
because of the lack of objective medical evidence associated with her diagnosed 
condition of fibromyalgia. 
{¶ 46} It has been recognized that “fibromyalgia is an unusual impairment 
in that its symptoms are often not supportable by objective medical evidence.”  
Vance v. Commr. of Social Sec. (C.A.6, 2008), 260 Fed.Appx. 801, 806, 2008 WL 
162942.  It is thus difficult to determine the severity of a claimant’s fibromyalgia 
because of the unavailability of objective clinical tests.  See Sarchet v. Chater 
(C.A.7, 1996), 78 F.3d 305, 307 (“Some people may have such a severe case of 
fibromyalgia as to be totally disabled from working * * * but most do not * * *”). 
{¶ 47} But even in fibromyalgia cases, and notwithstanding VanCleave’s 
argument to the contrary, subjective complaints are not conclusive of disability, 
and objective medical evidence is still relevant to a determination of the severity 
of the condition.  See Vance, 260 Fed.Appx. at 806, 2008 WL 162942, quoting 
Arnett v. Commr. of Social Sec. (C.A.6, 2003), 76 Fed.Appx. 713, 716 (“ ‘If there 
is [objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition], the 
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examination focuses on 1) whether objective medical evidence confirms the 
severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition, or 2) whether the 
objectively established medical condition is of such severity that it can reasonably 
be expected to produce the disabling pain’ ”). 
{¶ 48} Therefore, the SERS did not abuse its discretion in relying on Dr. 
Wolfe’s report even though she had concluded that she did not believe that there 
were “objective abnormalities” that would preclude VanCleave from performing 
her previous custodial duties.  Nor did Dr. Wolfe completely discount 
VanCleave’s subjective complaints as VanCleave suggests; instead, Dr. Wolfe 
recognized that the question of disability for people diagnosed with fibromyalgia 
“is more difficult to assess because it is a subjective one.” 
{¶ 49} To be sure, some of VanCleave’s treating physicians expressed 
opinions regarding the severity of VanCleave’s condition that differed from those 
of Dr. Wolfe and the SERS medical advisory board.  But given the difficulties of 
determining the severity of fibromyalgia and its impact upon whether a claimant 
is permanently incapacitated from returning to her former job duties, the SERS 
board did not abuse its discretion in relying on the opinions of its consulting 
physician and the views of the board’s medical advisory committee in upholding 
its denial of VanCleave’s application for disability-retirement benefits. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 50} Therefore, because VanCleave failed to establish any abuse of 
discretion by SERS in its determination denying her application for disability-
retirement benefits, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER and O’CONNOR, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2008 
17 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 51} VanCleave has a protected property interest in the disability-
retirement benefits for which she applied.  See Kapps v. Wing (C.A.2, 2005), 404 
F.3d 105, 115, and cases cited therein (“Every [federal] circuit [court of appeals] 
to address the question * * * has concluded that applicants for benefits * * * may 
possess a property interest in the receipt of public welfare entitlements”).  See 
also Flatford v. Chater (C.A.6, 1996), 93 F.3d 1296, 1304 (“all appellate courts to 
date, including this one, have not questioned whether a social security claimant 
has a property interest in benefits for which he or she hopes to qualify”).  To 
determine what process is due with respect to VanCleave’s property interest, it is 
necessary to consider (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action,” (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
requirement would entail.”  State ex rel. Haylett v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. 
(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 325, 332-333, 720 N.E.2d 901. 
{¶ 52} The private interest involved here ─ the right to disability-
retirement benefits ─ is significant.  The risk of an erroneous deprivation of that 
right due to the lack of a statement by the School Employees Retirement System 
(“SERS”) identifying the evidence it relied upon and its reasons for denying the 
application may be less than claimed by VanCleave.  But the value in requiring an 
explanation is manifest ─ it will enable both parties and the court to better discern 
the reasons for the SERS determination and thereby also enable a more accurate 
resolution of a mandamus action challenging that determination.  Finally, there is 
no evidence or indication that requiring SERS and its retirement board to specify 
what evidence it relied upon and to briefly explain its reasons for denying a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
disability-retirement 
benefits 
application 
would 
be 
either 
fiscally 
or 
administratively burdensome. 
{¶ 53} Procedural due process requires SERS to specifically state what 
evidence it relies upon and briefly explain the reasoning for its denial of 
VanCleave’s application for disability-retirement benefits.  Kapps, 404 F.3d at 
124 (“Claimants cannot know whether a challenge to an agency’s action is 
warranted, much less formulate an effective challenge, if they are not provided 
with sufficient information to understand the basis for the agency’s action” 
[emphasis sic]).  See Barron v. Bd. of Trustees of Policemen’s Pension & Relief 
Fund (1985), 176 W.Va. 480, 485, 345 S.E.2d 779, paragraph four of the syllabus 
(the “procedural due process rights that should be accorded a member of the 
Policemen’s Pension and Relief Fund * * * are that such member is entitled * * * 
to have the Board of Trustees give a written statement outlining its reasons for 
denying [an application for disability] benefits).”  I am convinced that VanCleave 
has established that she is entitled to a limited writ of mandamus to compel SERS 
to vacate its decision denying her application for disability-retirement benefits and 
to issue a new decision specifically stating what evidence it relies upon and 
briefly explaining its reasoning.  An explanation would be particularly beneficial 
here, where Dr. Wolfe emphasized her suspect reliance on the lack of objective 
symptoms to support her conclusion that VanCleave was able to perform her job 
duties.  See Rogers v. Commr. of Social Sec. (C.A.6, 2007), 486 F.3d 234, 245 
(“in light of the unique evidentiary difficulties associated with the diagnosis and 
treatment of fibromyalgia, opinions that focus solely upon objective evidence are 
not particularly relevant”).  The majority opinion’s reliance on Vance v. Commr. 
of Social Sec. (C.A.6, 2008), 260 Fed.Appx. 801, 807, 2008 WL 162942, is 
misplaced because in that case, the court of appeals emphasized that there was 
evidence that the claimant’s symptoms “have either improved or remained 
stable.”  In Vance, “other evidence also supported the * * * finding that [the 
January Term, 2008 
19 
claimant] was not entirely credible with respect to the severity of her pain and 
limitations, including her activities of daily living.”  Id.  The record here is bereft 
of comparable evidence. 
{¶ 54} I also disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusory statement 
that “it is not clear how VanCleave’s mandamus claim has been prejudiced by the 
summary nature of the board’s decision.”  At a minimum, due process requires 
SERS to explain why it denied VanCleave’s claim for disability-retirement 
benefits.  Furthermore, SERS has introduced no evidence that it would suffer a 
fiscal or administrative burden that outweighs the risk that disability-retirement 
applicants would be wrongly denied benefits to which they are entitled when 
courts reviewing SERS determinations are uncertain of the reasons underlying 
those decisions.  Therefore, fundamental due process requires that the judgment 
of the court of appeals be reversed and that a limited writ of mandamus be granted 
to compel SERS to issue a new decision on VanCleave’s disability-retirement 
application that identifies the evidence it relies upon and briefly explains the 
reasons for the new decision.  Because the court fails to do so, I dissent. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Fell & Marcus Co., L.P.A., and George N. Fell II, for appellant. 
 
Nancy Hardin Rogers, Attorney General, and Todd A. Nist, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
______________________