Case Title: People v. Guzman

Citation: 

Docket Number: S242244

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ALEJANDRO GUZMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S242244 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Three 
B265937 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA420611 
 
 
December 5, 2019 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger 
and Groban concurred. 
 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
S242244 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
 
 
A jury convicted defendant Alejandro Guzman of two 
counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child after 
it heard a recorded phone conversation between the mother of 
one of the victims and defendant’s niece.  The mother had 
secretly recorded the conversation without the niece’s consent, 
thereby violating Penal Code section 632.1  Subdivision (d) of 
that section prohibits the admission of “evidence obtained . . . in 
violation of this section . . . in any judicial, administrative, 
legislative, or other proceeding.”  (§ 632, subd. (d) (hereafter 
section 632(d)).)  The Court of Appeal, however, found that 
section 632(d) has been abrogated in the relevant part by “the 
‘Right to Truth in Evidence’ provision of the California 
Constitution.”  (People v. Guzman (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 184, 
186 (Guzman).)  The court thus concluded the recording was 
properly admitted and affirmed defendant’s convictions. 
 
We granted review to determine the continued viability of 
section 632(d) in light of the limits placed on the exclusion of 
evidence by the “Right to Truth-in-Evidence” provision of the 
Constitution.  Enacted as part of Proposition 8 in 1982, the 
                                        
1  
All further unspecified statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
provision instructs that “[e]xcept as provided by statute 
hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in 
each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be 
excluded in any criminal proceeding.”2  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, 
subd. (f)(2) (hereafter article I, section 28(f)(2)).)3  Within the 
context of defendant’s criminal trial, the recording in this case 
was relevant evidence.  By the express terms of the Right to 
Truth-in-Evidence provision, therefore, the recording could “not 
be excluded.”  (Ibid.) 
 
We conclude that to the extent section 632(d) demanded 
the suppression of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding, it 
was abrogated when the voters approved Proposition 8.  
Moreover, although the Legislature amended section 632 by a 
two-thirds vote several times after the enactment of Proposition 
8, none of these amendments revived the exclusionary remedy 
of section 632(d).  In each of these instances, the Legislature 
reenacted section 632(d) only as an incident to its enactment of 
other statutory provisions.  Nothing in the language, history, or 
context of the amendments evinces an intent on the part of the 
Legislature to render surreptitious recordings once again 
inadmissible in criminal proceedings.   
                                        
2  
As is evident from its language, the Truth-in-Evidence 
provision applies only in criminal cases, and nothing we say here 
affects the applicability of section 632(d) to other contexts. 
3  
The Truth-in-Evidence provision was originally codified at 
article I, section 28, subdivision (d).  It was subsequently 
redesignated as section 28, subdivision (f)(2).  (People v. Capers 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1002, fn. 6.) 
 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
 
Because the Court of Appeal reached the same 
conclusions, we affirm its judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A jury convicted defendant of two counts of committing a 
lewd and lascivious act upon a child for his inappropriate 
touching of 10-year-old E.F. and 12-year-old M.M.  Both E.F. 
and M.M. knew defendant’s niece, Lorena.4  E.F. was Lorena’s 
neighbor, and M.M., Lorena’s cousin.  Immediately after an 
incident in which defendant touched E.F., E.F. confided in 
Lorena and Lorena advised her to avoid defendant.  Sometime 
thereafter, M.M. told her mother that during a sleepover she 
had with defendant’s daughter, defendant had put his hand 
inside her pajamas, touched her vagina, and made her touch his 
penis.  M.M. also told her mother that Lorena had warned her 
about defendant.  M.M.’s mother, Esperanza, then talked to 
Lorena by telephone. 
 
Without Lorena’s knowledge, Esperanza recorded the 
conversation. 
 
Although 
Esperanza 
provided 
various 
explanations as to why she did so, she did not alert law 
enforcement of the existence of the recording until the day jury 
selection in defendant’s trial was to begin. 
 
Upon learning of the recording, the prosecution informed 
the court that it intended to use the recording to cross-examine 
Lorena, who was expected to testify for the defense.  Defense 
                                        
4  
The record discloses Lorena’s surname because Lorena, 
several years older than either E.F. or M.M., was an adult.  We 
nonetheless continue to identify Lorena by her given name since 
this was how other witnesses at trial referred to her.  We 
likewise identify M.M.’s mother by her given name as it appears 
that she and M.M. may share a surname. 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
counsel objected, arguing that the recording was categorically 
inadmissible under section 632(d).  The court disagreed, 
reasoning that insofar as section 632(d) operated to bar the 
admission of relevant evidence in criminal proceedings, it has 
been abrogated by the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision. 
 
A transcript of the recording was subsequently admitted 
into evidence.  The jury thus heard Lorena making various 
statements that were unfavorable to defendant.  For instance, 
Lorena said that she did not “feel good around [defendant], like 
when I’m wearing shorts or anything.”  Lorena further said that 
although defendant “hasn’t touched me anywhere else like . . . 
my vagina or my breasts,” she knew “he’s capable of doing that” 
and “that’s why [she] believe[s] what [M.M]’s saying.”  Moreover, 
although at trial Lorena denied that she had warned M.M. about 
defendant, in her phone conversation, she appeared to admit 
that she “told [M.M.] . . . to be careful.” 
 
After hearing from the various witnesses, the jury 
convicted defendant.  He appealed, arguing that the trial court 
prejudicially erred in admitting the recording because the 
admission “contravened the exclusionary rule stated in Penal 
Code section 632, subdivision (d).”  (Guzman, supra, 
11 Cal.App.5th at p. 186, fn. omitted.)  The Court of Appeal 
rejected the argument, finding that within the criminal context, 
section 632(d) has been rendered inoperative by Proposition 8.  
(Guzman, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 186.) 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
In determining whether the Right to Truth-in-Evidence 
provision abrogated the exclusionary remedy of section 632(d) 
as that remedy applies to criminal proceedings, we undertake 
two separate inquiries.  First, we ask whether the constitutional 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
provision repealed section 632(d) at the moment of its passage 
in 1982.  Second, if it did, we examine whether the Legislature 
revived section 632(d) by a two-thirds vote any time thereafter, 
thus restoring the section’s prohibition against admission of 
secret recordings. 
A.  Whether the Exclusionary Remedy of Section 
632(d) Survived the Passage of the Truth-in-
evidence Provision 
 
In 1967, the Legislature enacted section 632 as part of the 
Invasion of Privacy Act (§ 630 et seq.).  “The purpose of the act 
was to protect the right of privacy by, among other things,” 
“replacing prior laws that permitted the recording of telephone 
conversations with the consent of [only] one party to the 
conversation.”  (Flanagan v. Flanagan (2002) 27 Cal.4th 766, 
768-769.)  Section 632, a multipart provision, operates to 
prohibit such recordings. 
 
At issue in this case is subdivision (d), the exclusionary 
remedy of section 632.  The wording of subdivision (d) has been 
modified only slightly since its enactment in 1967.  In its current 
form, the subdivision states, “Except as proof in an action or 
prosecution for violation of this section, evidence obtained as a 
result of eavesdropping upon or recording a confidential 
communication in violation of this section is not admissible in 
any judicial, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding.”  
(§ 632(d).)  We focus here on the viability of the provision “to the 
extent it is invoked to suppress relevant evidence in a criminal 
proceeding.”  (Guzman, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 186.) 
 
Subsequent to the enactment of the section 632, California 
voters acted to limit the grounds for excluding evidence at 
criminal trials.  In 1982, the voters approved Proposition 8, 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
thereby amending the state Constitution.  Proposition 8 
contains a provision known as the Right to Truth-in-Evidence, 
now codified at article I, section 28(f)(2).  In relevant part, the 
provision states:  “Except as provided by statute hereafter 
enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of 
the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any 
criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction 
motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for 
a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court.  
Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of 
evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code 
Sections 352, 782 or 1103.”  (Art. I, § 28(f)(2).) 
 
To determine whether the constitutional right of article I, 
section 28(f)(2) abrogated the exclusionary remedy of section 
632(d), “[w]e begin, as we must, with the express, unambiguous 
language of section 28[(f)(2)].”  (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 
873, 886 (Lance W.).)  Section 28(f)(2) states that “[e]xcept as 
provided . . . , relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any 
criminal proceeding.”  As we noted in Lance W., “[t]his clearly 
stated command has only one apparent meaning” — to prohibit 
the exclusion of evidence at criminal proceedings except on those 
grounds expressly contemplated by the constitutional provision.  
(Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 886.) 
 
Section 632(d) does not fit within any of those grounds.  At 
the time of the passage of Proposition 8, the section was not an 
“existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or 
hearsay.”  (Art. I, § 28(f)(2).)  Nor, obviously, was it “Evidence 
Code Sections 352, 782 or 1103.”  (Art. I, § 28(f)(2).)  As such, 
section 632(d) was not exempt from the dictate of the Right to 
Truth-in-Evidence provision.  Hence, to the extent that section 
632(d) demanded the suppression of relevant evidence at 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
criminal proceedings, it was superseded when the voters 
approved the constitutional amendment in 1982.  (See People v. 
Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 291 (Wheeler) [“section 28[(f)(2)] 
supersedes all California restrictions on the admission of 
relevant evidence except those preserved or permitted by the 
express words of section 28[(f)(2)] itself”].) 
 
Not only does the language of the Right to Truth-in-
Evidence provision unambiguously abrogate part of section 
632(d), the history of the provision also “buttress[es] our reading 
of the statute.”  (Scher v. Burke (2017) 3 Cal.5th 136, 148.)  
Proposition 8 was a voter initiative measure, and the ballot 
materials relating to the proposition included this statement 
from the Legislative Analyst:  “Under current law, certain 
evidence is not permitted to be presented in a criminal trial or 
hearing.  For example, evidence obtained through unlawful 
eavesdropping or wiretapping, or through unlawful searches of 
persons or property, cannot be used in court.  This measure 
generally would allow most relevant evidence to be presented in 
criminal cases, subject to such exceptions as the Legislature 
may in the future enact by a two-thirds vote.”  (Ballot Pamp., 
Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982) analysis of Prop. 8 by Legis. 
Analyst, p. 32 (Ballot Pamp.); see also Lance W., supra, 
37 Cal.3d at p. 888, fn. 8 [“Ballot summaries and arguments are 
accepted sources from which to ascertain the voters’ intent and 
understanding of initiative measures”].)5  Because the ballot 
                                        
5  
The Legislative Analyst also advised the voters that 
Proposition 8 “could not affect federal restrictions on the use of 
evidence.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, at p. 32.)  We note that federal 
law imposes no restriction on the admission of the recording in 
this case.  Esperanza was not acting as a government agent in 
 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
material specifically singled out “evidence obtained through 
unlawful eavesdropping,” which was then “not permitted to be 
presented in a criminal trial or hearing,” and advised voters that 
Proposition 8 would change the law so as to “allow most relevant 
evidence to be presented in criminal cases,” the natural 
inference is that Proposition 8 would permit “evidence obtained 
through unlawful eavesdropping” to be admitted in criminal 
cases.  (Ballot Pamp., supra, at p. 32.)  In essence, voters were 
informed that Proposition 8 would abrogate section 632(d) — 
and they approved. 
 
In light of the clear language and history of the 
constitutional amendment, we conclude that the 1982 passage 
                                        
taping her conversation with Lorena.  As such, the Fourth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution poses no bar to the 
admission of the evidence she gathered.  (See, e.g., United States 
v. Jacobsen (1984) 466 U.S. 109, 113; Jones v. Kmart Corp. 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 332-333.)  Furthermore, because 
Esperanza consented to the recording, federal law does not 
prohibit the recording of the conversation between herself and 
Lorena.  (See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d); People v. Otto (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 1088, 1097.)  Finally, even if Esperanza violated 
federal constitutional or statutory law in recording Lorena, she 
did not violate defendant’s rights in doing so and defendant may 
not vicariously seek to suppress the recording.  (See Rakas v. 
Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 133-134 [“ ‘Fourth Amendment 
rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously 
asserted’ ”]; 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11); Alderman v. United States 
(1969) 394 U.S. 165, 175, fn. 9; People v. Otto, supra, 2 Cal.4th 
at p. 1098 [explaining that “a violation of the federal statute 
renders the illegally obtained evidence inadmissible in state 
court proceedings” but that only an “ ‘aggrieved person,’ ” or “one 
‘who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral or electronic 
communication or a person against whom the interception was 
directed,’ ” may move to suppress the content of any such 
communication].) 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
of the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision repealed section 
632(d) to the extent the section applies to criminal proceedings.  
Defendant resists this conclusion, but none of the arguments he 
makes is persuasive. 
 
Defendant first argues that the Right to Truth-in-
Evidence provision abrogated only those exclusionary rules that 
were judicially created and not those that have a statutory basis 
like section 632(d).  To be sure, some of our cases have found 
that the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision abrogated 
judicially-created exclusionary rules.  (See Lance W., supra, 
37 Cal.3d 873; People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 (May); accord 
People v. Markham, 49 Cal.3d 63 (Markham).)  But this is not 
all that the provision does.  Indeed, more than once, we have 
found that the constitutional amendment superseded statutory 
provisions.  (Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 893 [finding that 
the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision abrogated § 1538.5, 
subd. (a)]; Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 287-288 [holding that 
art. I, § 28(f)(2) abrogated the statutory rule of Evid. Code 
§ 787]; People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 168 [same]; People 
v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1081 (Harris) [“section 28[(f)(2)] 
effected a pro tanto repeal of Evidence Code section 790”]; People 
v. Ratekin (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1165, 1169 [holding that the 
exclusionary remedy of § 631, subd. (c) has no effect in light of 
art. I, § 28(f)(2)].) 
 
These cases find firm footing in the language of the Right 
to Truth-in-Evidence provision.  As they explained, if the 
provision was not intended to affect statutes, there would have 
been “no need” for its language “to preserve some, but not all, 
existing statutory limitations on the admission of relevant 
evidence.”  (Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 291; see Harris, 
supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1082 [similar].)  Likewise, “[t]he grant of 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
authority to the Legislature to enact new exclusionary rules, but 
only by a two-thirds vote of each house, would be meaningless.”  
(Harris, supra, 47 Cal. 3d at p. 1082; see Wheeler, supra, 
4 Cal.4th at p. 291 [similar].)  Because “[c]onstitutional 
provisions, like statutes, must be read in conformity with their 
plain language . . . and in such a manner as to give effect 
wherever possible to every word,” we rejected the argument that 
the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision left statutory rules of 
evidence undisturbed.  (Harris, supra, 47 Cal. 3d at p. 1082, 
citation omitted.) 
 
We do so again here.  Merely because an exclusionary 
remedy is codified does not mean that it is beyond the reach of 
the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision.  Nothing in our case 
law or the language of the constitutional amendment supports 
a contention to the contrary. 
 
Defendant’s second argument likewise falls short of the 
mark.  He contends there is no need for us to find that article I, 
section 28(f)(2) abrogated section 632(d) because both provisions 
may be given effect by excluding “the tape recording itself” but 
allowing Esperanza to testify to “her independent recollection of 
the telephone conversation to impeach Lorena.”  We fail to see 
how this proposal would give effect to the Right to Truth-in-
Evidence provision.  Regardless of whether Esperanza testified,6 
the tape recording is relevant evidence.  (See Evid. Code, § 210; 
accord Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 360-361 (Ribas) 
[stating that there is “a substantial distinction . . . between the 
secondhand repetition of the contents of a conversation and its 
simultaneous dissemination to an unannounced second auditor, 
                                        
6  
Esperanza testified both to her recollection of events and 
to authenticate the recording. 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
whether that auditor be a person or mechanical device”]; People 
v. Patton (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 211, 220 [holding that a “tape 
recording is not barred by the best evidence rule merely because 
a witness to the conversation is available”]; People v. Kulwin 
(1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 104, 109 [recognizing that “recordings 
might be more reliable and satisfactory evidence under 
circumstances than testimony from memory”].)  As such, our 
state Constitution requires that the recording “shall not be 
excluded” in defendant’s criminal trial.  (Art. I, § 28(f)(2).) 
 
Defendant relies heavily on Frio v. Superior Court (1988) 
203 Cal.App.3d 1480 in trying to persuade us otherwise.  The 
case sheds no insight into the matter at hand.  Frio is a civil 
matter, and it is undisputed that civil, “administrative,” 
“legislative,” and other noncriminal proceedings are unaffected 
by Proposition 8.  (§ 632(d).)  The analysis of the scope of section 
632(d) in Frio thus has little bearing on whether Proposition 8 
abrogated the exclusionary provision in the criminal context. 
 
For the first time on appeal, defendant contends that the 
Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision cannot abrogate section 
632(d) without running afoul of equal protection principles.  
According to defendant, “[i]f Proposition 8 abrogated section 
632, subdivision (d) in criminal cases, the defendant’s right to 
due process and equal protection would be abridged because the 
statute is still valid in civil cases.”7  Defendant acknowledges 
that we turned back such an argument in Lance W. but 
                                        
7  
Although defendant mentions due process in passing, he 
does not develop the argument, choosing instead to focus on his 
equal protection claim.  We adopt the same focus and hold that 
any due process claim has been forfeited.  (See Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 
764, 793.) 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
characterizes our rejection there as mere dicta.  It is true that 
in Lance W., we initially expressed some skepticism about “the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings.”  
(Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 892.)  We went on to say, 
however, that even if there were civil proceedings in which an 
exclusionary remedy applies although the same rule does not 
apply to criminal proceedings, “criminal defendants are not 
thereby denied equal protection.”  (Id. at p. 893.)  This is because 
criminal defendants and civil litigants are not similarly situated 
and it is “constitutionally permissible for the electorate” to treat 
them differently.  (Ibid. [“the public stake in criminal 
proceedings, and in assuring that all evidence relevant to the 
guilt of the accused be presented to the trier of fact, justifies the 
admission of evidence that would be excluded in other 
proceedings”].)  We do not think this basis for rejecting the equal 
protection claim in Lance W. was dictum, but even if it were, 
defendant has given us no reason to reconsider its merit. 
 
We further reject defendant’s argument that “the right to 
privacy outranks the right to truth-in-evidence” and hence 
section 632(d) must be given effect regardless of Proposition 8.  
We find no conflict between the different constitutional rights 
such that only one may be effectuated.  Although there is a 
conflict between the demands of Proposition 8 and section 
632(d), this conflict does not lead inexorably to friction between 
Proposition 8 and the constitutional right to privacy.  Defendant 
claims otherwise, but his argument rests on the faulty premise 
that the exclusionary rule of section 632(d) is one and the same 
as the right to privacy itself.  Although “[i]n enacting [the 
Invasion of Privacy Act], the Legislature declared in broad terms 
its intent ‘to protect the right of privacy of the people of this 
state,’ ” this does not mean that substantive right of privacy — 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
that enshrined in article I, section 1 of our state Constitution — 
is coextensive with the exclusionary remedy codified in section 
632(d).  (Ribas, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 359.) 
 
We find comparable aspects between the present context 
and the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  Article I, section 13 of our state Constitution protects 
the people’s right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches.” (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 13.)  In Lance W., we distinguished between the 
right protected by article I, section 13 and the associated 
exclusionary rule requiring suppression of evidence seized in 
violation of that right.  (Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 886-
887.)  As we explained, “the substantive scope of [article I, 
section 13] remains unaffected by Proposition 8” and “[w]hat 
would have been an unlawful search or seizure in this state 
before the passage of that initiative would be unlawful today.”  
(Id. at p. 886.)  The same cannot be said of the exclusionary rule, 
which was “eliminate[d]” by Proposition 8.  (Lance W., supra, 
37 Cal.3d at p. 886.)  But because the exclusionary rule is simply 
a “remedy for violations of the search and seizure provision[],” 
Proposition 8 can eliminate the exclusionary remedy without 
affecting the “substantive scope” of article I, section 13.  (Lance 
W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 886-887.)  In much the same way, 
Proposition 8 can eliminate the exclusionary remedy of section 
632(d) without affecting the substantive scope of privacy of 
article I, section 1, or even more narrowly, the privacy of 
telephone conversations.  (Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 886-
887.) 
 
This is demonstrated by the fact that even after the 
passage of Proposition 8, surreptitious recording of telephone 
conversations is still prohibited.  Presently, such recording is 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
punishable by a fine of as much as “two thousand five hundred 
dollars ($2,500) per violation,” imprisonment in state prison of 
up to a year, or “both that fine and imprisonment.”  (§ 632, subd. 
(a).)  For repeat offenders, the penalties increase to “ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000) per violation.”  (Ibid.)  Furthermore, 
individuals who are injured by secret recordings made in 
violation of section 632 can bring civil actions against the 
perpetrators to recover statutory or actual damages.  (§ 637.2, 
subd. (a).)  Given such protective measures, we cannot say that 
people like Lorena have been shorn of their right to private 
phone conversations simply because Proposition 8 repealed the 
exclusionary remedy of section 632 as it applied to criminal 
proceedings. 
 
Indeed, the facts of this case demonstrate why an 
exclusionary remedy may, at times, prove to be an ill-suited tool 
for protecting an individual’s privacy.  On the one hand, a rule 
like section 632(d) does little to deter a person who, like 
Esperanza, in recording a conversation may not have 
anticipated it being used in a criminal trial.  The exclusionary 
remedy thus may do little to protect the right to privacy of 
individuals like Lorena.  On the other hand, the remedy would 
benefit individuals like defendant, a person who was not 
recorded and whose privacy was in no way implicated.  Of 
course, the fact that defendant was not a party to the 
conversation is not dispositive to our holding.  But such a 
circumstance 
demonstrates 
the 
relatively 
attenuated 
relationship between the exclusionary provision of section 
632(d) and the right to private communication in this case.  Such 
a scenario provides further evidence that the exclusionary 
remedy and the right to privacy are not equivalent and that 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
section 632(d) should not afforded the status of an “inalienable 
right.” 
 
In sum, we find that section 632(d) did not survive the 
1982 passage of the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision.  This 
does not end our inquiry.  Because article I, section 28(f)(2) 
provides that exclusionary remedies may be created, or 
recreated, “by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house 
of the Legislature,” we next examine whether the Legislature 
revived section 632(d) after the passage of Proposition 8 by 
reenacting it with the requisite vote. 
B. Whether Subsequent Amendments of Section 
632 Revived the Exclusionary Remedy 
 
As the Court of Appeal noted, “the Legislature has 
amended section 632 numerous times since the voters passed 
Proposition 8 in 1982.”  (Guzman, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 194.)  Indeed, in 1985, 1990, 1992, and 1994, the Legislature 
— by at least a two-thirds vote of the membership of both the 
Assembly and Senate — amended one or more subdivisions of 
section 632 and reenacted the section in its entirety.8 
 
Yet, there is less to this fact than meets the eye.  Although 
section 632 has been reenacted more than once since 1982, each 
time, the exclusionary remedy was reenacted only as an incident 
                                        
8  
For a tally of the votes of the 1985, 1990, and 1992 
amendments, see Guzman, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at page 194, 
footnote 9.  The final votes for the 1994 amendment were 76 ayes 
and 1 no in the Assembly and 38 ayes and 0 noes in the Senate.  
(Sen. Bill No. 2053, 3d reading Aug. 24, 1994, 2 Sen. Final Hist. 
(1993-1994 Reg. Sess.), p. 1406.) 
 
Defendant also references a 2016 amendment to section 
632.  As we discuss below, however, that bill did not garner the 
requisite two-thirds vote of each house’s membership. 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
to other provisions of section 632 being amended.  (See Cal. 
Const., art. IV, § 9 [“A section of a statute may not be amended 
unless the section is re-enacted as amended”].)  More than 
technical reenactment is needed to overcome Proposition 8. 
 
Article IV, section 9 of our Constitution requires an 
amended statute to be reenacted.  But a reenacted statute may 
be amended in only some parts and not others.  Government 
Code section 9605 addresses such a situation and provides that 
“[i]f a section or part of a statute is amended, it is not to be 
considered as having been repealed and reenacted in the 
amended form.  The portions that are not altered are to be 
considered as having been the law from the time when those 
provisions were enacted.”  (Gov. Code, § 9605, subd. (a).)  As we 
explained in Lance W., “[n]either article IV, section 9, nor 
Government Code section 9605, contemplates reenactment of 
the unchanged portions of an amended statute in the form of its 
original enactment if there have been intervening amendments 
of those portions.”  (Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 895, fn. 18.)  
Rather, “[t]he clear intent of Government Code section 9605 is 
to codify the rule that the unchanged portions of the newly 
amended statute be ‘reenacted’ as they existed immediately prior 
to the amendment.”  (Id., at p. 895, fn. 18, italics added.) 
 
Accordingly, mere reenactment of section 632 does not 
necessarily revive the exclusionary rule of section 632(d).  To 
find that a subsequent amendment of section 632 had the effect 
of reviving its exclusionary provision, there must be something 
in the “language, history, or context of the amendment[]” to 
support the conclusion that the Legislature intended such a 
result.  (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771 (Christian 
S.) [articulating this rule in a different context]; see also Lance 
W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 893-896; People v. Ewoldt (1994) 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
7 Cal.4th 380, 391-392 (Ewoldt); People v. Sullivan (1991) 
234 Cal.App.3d 56, 64.)  Without evidence of such an intent, the 
reenactment of section 632 simply reinstates the statute as it 
existed at the time of reenactment — i.e., the statute, as limited 
by the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision to include no 
exclusionary remedy.  (See Gov. Code, § 9605, subd. (a); Lance 
W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 895, fn. 18.) 
 
Two cases illustrate when a statutory provision may be 
revived by a subsequent reenactment.  In Ewoldt, we considered 
an amendment to section 1101, subdivision (b).  We found that 
the amendment revived subdivision (a) of the same section.  
(Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 392.)  This is because changes the 
Legislature made to subdivision (b) “would have no effect” 
unless the Legislature revived subdivision (a) as well.  (Ibid.)  By 
contrast, in Lance W., we held that an amendment to section 
1538.5 did not revive subdivision (a) of that section, which had 
been abrogated previously by the Right to Truth-in-Evidence 
provision.  (Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 893-894.)  We 
reasoned that the amendment to section 1538.5 was simply a 
“ ‘clean-up’ ” amendment, and the Legislature cannot be 
presumed to have “understood or intended that such far-
reaching consequences — virtually a legislative repeal of the 
‘Truth-in-Evidence’ section of Proposition 8 — would follow an 
amendment so casually proposed and adopted without 
opposition.”  (Id. at p. 894.) 
 
With these principles in mind, we examine the 1985, 1990, 
1992, 1994 and 2016 amendments to determine whether, in 
light of the Constitution’s Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision, 
the Legislature intended to revive section 632(d) in any of these 
instances. 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
1.  1985 Amendment 
In 1985, the Legislature enacted the Cellular Radio 
Telephone Privacy Act, and as part of this act, amended section 
632, subdivision (a).  (Stats. 1985, ch. 909, §§ 1, 2.5, pp. 2900, 
2901).  The purpose of the act — as indicated by its name, a 
declaration of legislative intent accompanying the enactment, 
and various legislative history materials — was to protect the 
privacy of communications conducted via a new means of 
communication:  cellular radio telephones.  (See Stats. 1985, 
ch. 909, § 2, pp. 2900-2901; Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill 
No. 1431 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) 4 Stats. 1985, Summary Dig., 
p. 295; Assem., 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1431 (1985-
1986 Reg. Sess.), as amended Aug. 27, 1985, p. 1; Com. on 
Energy and Pub. Utilities, letter to Governor George 
Deukmejian, Sept. 10, 1985 (letter to Governor Deukmejian).)  
Specifically, the act worked to “prohibit and make the same 
criminal penalties applicable” to intrusions on cellular radio 
telephone conversations as existed for landline telephone 
communications.  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1431 
(1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) 4 Stats. 1985, Summary Dig., p. 295.) 
The Cellular Radio Telephone Privacy Act of 1985 
accomplished its purpose primarily through the enactment of 
section 632.5.  Section 632.5 imposes the same fine and term of 
imprisonment on “person[s] who, maliciously and without the 
consent of all parties to the communication, intercept[], 
receive[], 
or 
assist[] 
in 
intercepting 
or 
receiving 
a 
communication transmitted between cellular radio telephones 
or between any cellular radio telephone and a landline 
telephone” as section 632 does on violators of its prohibitions.  
(§ 632.5, subd. (a).)  In essence then, section 632.5 extends the 
protection available under section 632 (and other provisions) to 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
a new form of communication, cellular radio telephone 
conversations.  Notably, section 632.5 contains no exclusionary 
provision — just as section 632 effectively did not after the 
passage of Proposition 8. 
The Cellular Radio Telephone Privacy Act also worked a 
substantive change to subdivision (a) of section 632.  Subdivision 
(a) of section 632 provides, among other things, enhanced 
penalties for repeat violations of certain provisions of the 
Invasion of Privacy Act.  Before 1985, section 632, subdivision 
(a) read, “[i]f [a] person has previously been convicted of a 
violation of this section or Section 631 or 636,” the person would 
be punished as a repeat offender.  (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 258, 
p. 5134.)  With the enactment of section 632.5, the Legislature 
amended section 632, subdivision (a) to include the newly 
created section, stipulating that persons “previously convicted 
of a violation this section or Section 631, 632.5, or 636” would be 
subjected to the heightened penalties.  (Stats. 1985, ch. 909, 
§ 2.5, p. 2901.)  The Legislature made no change to section 
632(d).  Nonetheless, to effectuate the change to section 632, 
subdivision (a), the Legislature reenacted section 632 in its 
entirety.  (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 9; Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 
at p. 391.) 
Nothing 
in 
the 
language, 
legislative 
history, 
or 
surrounding context of the 1985 amendment indicates that the 
Legislature intended to overcome the Right to Truth-in-
Evidence provision and revive section 632(d).  Indeed, the 
Legislature did not once mention the exclusionary provision.  
This is understandable.  Prohibiting the admission of landline 
telephone conversations recorded in violation of section 632 
would have done little to protect cellular radio telephone 
communications.  As such, the exclusionary remedy of section 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
632(d) could play no role in advancing the Legislature’s stated 
purpose of “provid[ing] a legal recourse to those persons whose 
private cellular radio telephone communications have been 
maliciously invaded.”  (Stats. 1985, ch. 909, § 2, pp. 2900-2901.)  
In fact, to the extent that the Legislature intended to “grant[] 
the same protection against eavesdropping to those who speak 
over cellular radio (car) telephones, as is now guaranteed to all 
other telephone conversations,” a revival of section 632(d) would 
contravene that intent.  (Letter to Governor George 
Deukmejian, supra, italics added.)  Because section 632.5 
includes no exclusionary provision, cellular radio telephone 
conversations would be afforded less protection in criminal 
matters than landline telephone conversation were we to infer 
that the exclusionary remedy of section 632(d) — after a lapse 
of years — had become operational again.  We will not do so, 
given the lack of any indicia suggesting that this is what the 
Legislature intended. 
In resisting this conclusion, defendant makes two 
arguments — neither of which persuades.  He first contends that 
we do not require that “in order for an exclusionary provision to 
survive Proposition 8, there must be a substantive amendment 
to the exclusionary provision itself.”  The contention is true 
enough, but it does not help defendant.  In Ewoldt, supra, 
7 Cal.4th at page 391, for instance, we concluded that the 
Legislature revived subdivision (a) of section 1101 of the 
Evidence Code — whose language was unaltered — when it 
amended subdivision (b) of the same section and reenacted the 
section in its entirety.  Because subdivision (b) of section 1101 
clarifies the scope of subdivision (a), we reasoned that the 
amendment to subdivision (b) “would become a complete nullity” 
if subdivision (a) were not revived.  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
p. 392.)  Here, in contrast, nothing that the Legislature did 
would be nullified, or even affected, if section 632(d) remains 
inoperative in the face of the Right to Truth-in-Evidence 
provision.  In other words, it is not the lack of any change to 
section 632(d) that leads us to the conclusion that the 
Legislature did not revive it.  Rather, our conclusion is 
compelled by what the Legislature did do and by what it said it 
was doing — neither of which evidences any intent to revive 
section 632(d). 
Defendant next argues that because the Legislature made 
a substantive change to section 632, subdivision (a), it must 
have revived subdivision (d) in reenacting the section as a whole.  
We can make little sense of this argument.  We do not see how 
a change to one part of a statutory provision — whether 
technical or substantive — inexorably leads to the conclusion 
that another part of the provision has been revived. 
In short, we conclude that section 632(d) remains 
abrogated by Proposition 8, despite having been reenacted in 
1985.  We reach the same conclusion with respect to the 
subsequent reenactments. 
2.  1990 and 1992 Amendments 
The next two amendments to section 632 are similar to the 
1985 amendment.  In 1990, the Legislature became concerned 
about another new technology — cordless telephones — much as 
it had with regard to cellular radio telephones.  (Stats. 1990, 
ch. 96, §§ 2, 4, pp. 3268, 3269-3270.)  To provide “legal recourse 
to 
those 
persons 
whose 
private 
cordless 
telephone 
communications 
have 
been 
maliciously 
invaded,” 
the 
Legislature enacted section 632.6, which mirrors section 632.5 
as enacted by the Cellular Radio Telephone Privacy Act.  (Stats. 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
1990, ch. 696, §§ 2, 4, pp. 3268, 3269-3270.)  Like section 632.5, 
section 632.6 contains no exclusionary provision.  The 
Legislature also amended section 632, subdivision (a) to include 
section 632.6 in the list of provisions whose violations subject a 
person to heightened punishment as a repeat offender.  The 
Legislature then reenacted section 632 in its entirety, with 
section 632(d) unchanged and not otherwise mentioned. 
Although section 632(d) received no mention in the either 
statutory text or legislative history of the 1990 amendment, 
Proposition 8 was briefly mentioned in the legislative materials.  
In a section titled “No apparent impact on rules of evidence,” a 
Senate committee analysis states, “[section 631] subdivision (c) 
provides that no evidence obtained in violation of the section is 
admissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative or other 
proceeding.  [¶]  Given the broad language of Section 631, it 
appears that interception of cordless telephone communications 
may already be prohibited, and any evidence derived therefrom 
is presently inadmissible.  Thus, the fact that this bill would 
provide greater privacy protections to a cordless telephone user 
than is provided under federal law does not appear to raise 
Proposition 8 questions.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 3457 (1990-1991 Reg. Sess.) June 19, 1990, p. 4 
(Judiciary Committee Analysis).) 
We acknowledge that the significance of this legislative 
analysis is far from clear.  It is puzzling that the Senate 
Committee would recognize that a bill “provide[s] greater 
privacy protections . . . than is provided under federal law” 
(Judiciary Committee Analysis, supra, at p. 4) but assert, 
without any explanation other than a reference to section 631 
(which is similarly subject to the stricture of Proposition 8), that 
the proposition is not implicated.  (See, e.g., Markham, supra, 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
49 Cal.3d at p. 71 [“the intent of the electorate in passing 
Proposition 8 was to curtail the exclusion of relevant evidence 
based upon independent state grounds, except as required by the 
Constitution of the United States”]; May, supra, 44 Cal.3d at 
p. 318.)  On balance, however, the citation to Proposition 8 
within a part of the analysis titled “[n]o apparent impact on 
rules of evidence” is some indication that the Legislature wanted 
to maintain the effect of Proposition 8.  (Judiciary Committee 
Analysis, supra, at p. 4.)  The opposite conclusion — that the 
Legislature intended a sea change in the law, “virtually a 
legislative repeal of the ‘Truth-in-Evidence’ section of 
Proposition 8” while mentioning the proposition only once in a 
legislative analysis — appears far less tenable.  (Lance W., 
supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 894.) 
As for the 1992 amendment, the Legislature during that 
year enacted section 632.7 to reach conduct that was not 
criminalized under section 632.6.9  (Stats. 1992, ch. 298, § 6, 
p. 1216.)  Again, like sections 632.5 and 632.6, section 623.7 has 
                                        
9  
(Compare § 632.6, subd. (a) [“Every person who, 
maliciously and without the consent of all parties to the 
communication, intercepts, receives, or assists in intercepting or 
receiving a communication transmitted between cordless 
telephones as defined in subdivision (c), between any cordless 
telephone and a landline telephone, or between a cordless 
telephone and a cellular telephone shall be punished . . . .”] with 
§ 632.7, subd. (a) [“Every person who, without the consent of all 
parties to a communication, intercepts or receives and 
intentionally records, or assists in the interception or reception 
and intentional recordation of, a communication transmitted 
between two cellular radio telephones, a cellular radio telephone 
and a landline telephone, two cordless telephones, a cordless 
telephone and a landline telephone, or a cordless telephone and 
a cellular radio telephone, shall be punished . . . .”].) 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
no exclusionary provision.  And again, as it had done previously, 
the Legislature amended section 632, subdivision (a) to include 
section 632.7 in its list of offenses qualifying a person for 
enhanced penalties and reenacted the section.  (Stats. 1992, 
ch. 298, § 3, p. 1214.) 
For the same reasons discussed above, we find that 
neither the 1990 nor 1992 reenactment of section 632 revived 
the exclusionary remedy of section 632(d).  Nothing in the 
amendments suggests an intent by the Legislature to overrule 
the effect of Proposition 8 and render evidence obtained from 
surreptitious recordings once again inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings. 
3.  1994 and 2016 Amendments 
The 1994 and 2016 amendments differ from the previous 
amendments in that these amendments changed the text of 
section 632(d) itself.  As defendant concedes, however, “the 
wording change does not add anything to subdivision (d).”  The 
change does not indicate an intent to revive the substance of 
section 632(d), and neither does anything else in the 
amendments. 
In 1994, the Legislature revised the Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act.  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 2053 
(1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 1994, Summary Dig., p. 410.)  As 
part of this change, the Legislature amended subdivision (b) of 
section 632, modifying the definition of “person” subject to 
section 632’s prohibitions to include a “limited liability 
company.”  (Stats. 1994, ch. 1010, § 194, p. 6130.)  Nothing about 
this change suggests an intent to revive section 632(d). 
In addition to amending subdivision (b) of section 632, the 
Legislature also deleted the heading to each subpart of section 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
632.  (Sen. Bill No. 2053 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.), Legis. Serv., 
ch. 1010, p. 97.)  Thus, subdivision (d) “no longer had the 
heading ‘evidence.’ ”  The change was entirely stylistic, and we 
cannot read into it the intent to “continue [the] operation [of the 
exclusionary remedy] as it had been construed and applied prior 
to the adoption of Proposition 8.”  (Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at 
p. 895.) 
This is not to say that the Legislature may never revive a 
statutory provision while making only stylistic changes to the 
text of the provision.  Indeed, as discussed, the Legislature can 
reenact a provision while making no change to its language at 
all.  (See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 391.)  But just as a 
change to the text of a provision is not necessary to make its 
substance operative, neither is it sufficient to effect such a 
result.  Put differently, we do not simply look to see whether the 
language of a particular provision was altered, however 
minutely.  Instead, we examine the language, legislative 
history, and context surrounding a legislative reenactment to 
discern whether the Legislature intended to revive the 
substance of a lapsed provision.  Here, weighing against the 
minor textual change is the fact that “there [wa]s no discussion, 
not a single mention” of reviving the exclusionary remedy.  
(Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 782.)  In addition, the 
Legislature was plainly concerned with something else (the 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act) when it amended the heading 
to section 632(d).  To find that this change had the effect of 
reviving the substance of the exclusionary provision would 
amount to embracing legislation by inadvertence.  We will not 
do so.  (Christian S., supra, 7 Cal. 4th at p. 776.) 
The 2016 amendment likewise does not help defendant.  
The amendment garnered 52 ayes and 26 noes in the Assembly 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
and 26 ayes and 13 noes in the Senate.  (Assem. Bill No. 1671 
(2015-2016 Reg. Sess.), Bill Hist.).  “As the Assembly has 80 
members and the Senate has 40 members (Cal. Const., art. IV, 
§ 2, subd. (a)(1), (2)),” the affirmative votes for the 2016 
amendment fall (just) short of two-thirds of each house’s 
membership.  (Guzman, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 194, fn. 9.)  
Thus, the 2016 amendment could not have overridden the 
limitation on the exclusion of relevant evidence imposed by the 
Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision.  (See art. I, § 28(f)(2) 
[providing that a statute must “hereafter [be] enacted by a two-
thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature” 
to qualify as an exception to the mandate of Prop. 8].) 
Furthermore, even were we to consider the content of the 
2016 amendment, we would find that it falls short.  In 2016, the 
Legislature strengthened the penalties for violating the 
Invasion of Privacy Act.  In particular, the Legislature amended 
section 632, subdivision (a) to provide that the monetary fines 
specified there would be imposed “per violation” of the provision.  
(Stats. 2016, ch. 855, § 1; Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill 
No. 1671 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1671 Digest).)  
In addition, the Legislature changed the phrasing of section 
632(d), so that it reads “evidence obtained . . . in violation of this 
section is not admissible” instead of “no evidence obtained . . . in 
violation of this section shall be admissible.”  (Stats. 2016, 
ch. 855, § 1.)  The Legislature expressly declared that the 
alteration 
was 
a 
“technical, 
nonsubstantive 
change[].”  
(Assembly Bill 1671 Digest, supra, at p. 2.)  We glean no intent 
to revive the substance of section 632(d) from such a “technical, 
nonsubstantive” amendment.  (Assembly Bill 1671 Digest, 
supra, at p. 2.) 
PEOPLE v. GUZMAN 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
Having found that Proposition 8 abrogated section 632(d) 
and the Legislature has not acted since to overcome the effect of 
the proposition, we conclude that the exclusionary provision of 
section 632(d) posed no bar to the admission of the recording at 
defendant’s criminal trial. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeal. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Guzman  
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 11 Cal.App.5th 184  
Rehearing Granted 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S242244 
Date Filed:  December 5, 2019 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Shelly Torrealba 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Verna Wefald, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Louis W. Karlin, Victoria B. 
Wilson and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Verna Wefald 
65 North Raymond Avenue, #320 
Pasadena, California 91103 
(626) 577-2658 
 
J. Michael Lehmann 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6205