Case Title: Minchenko v. VT Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

Citation: 164 Vt 624, 672 A.2d 478

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Minchenko v. VT Comm. of Motor Vehicles (95-158); 164 Vt 624; 672 A.2d 478

[Filed 18-Dec-1995]


                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 95-158

                            NOVEMBER TERM, 1995


Daniel J. Minchenko                  }     APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
     v.                              }     Windsor Superior Court
                                     }
Vermont Commissioner of Motor        }
Vehicles                             }     DOCKET NO. S438-94Wrc


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant driver sued the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to vacate a
  license suspension for a third conviction of driving while under the
  influence (DUI) and to require that any suspension be based on a record of
  DUI, first offense.  The Windsor Superior Court granted the State's motion
  for summary judgment.  We affirm.

       In August 1994, defendant was cited for DUI, refusal.  Pursuant to 23
  V.S.A. § 1205 he was also given a notice of intent to suspend his driver's
  license.  Defendant pled not guilty to the criminal charge and requested a
  hearing with respect to the civil suspension.  At the final hearing on the
  suspension, defendant stipulated to a finding in favor of the State, and
  his license was suspended for six months.  He subsequently pled guilty to a
  charge of DUI, first offense, and was sentenced to serve three months to
  two years in jail, with all time to serve suspended, a fine, and probation.

       Following the criminal conviction, the State issued a second notice
  suspending defendant's driver's license for three years pursuant to 23
  V.S.A. § 1208(b).  The suspension was based on the Department's motor
  vehicle records, reflecting prior convictions for "DW1" in June 1981 and
  "DW2" in January 1983.

       Defendant brought the present action to vacate the State's second
  suspension notice and to require that any suspension be based upon a record
  of DUI, first offense.  The court granted the State's motion for summary
  judgment, and this appeal followed.

       At issue is action the commissioner took in accordance with 23 V.S.A.
  § 1208(b), which provides:

           Upon a third conviction of a person violating a provision
           of section 1201 of this title and upon final determination of any
           appeal, the court shall forward the conviction report forthwith to

 

           the commissioner of motor vehicles.  The commissioner shall
           immediately revoke the person's operating license, or nonresident
           operating privilege or the privilege of an unlicensed operator to
           operate a motor vehicle for three years and until the defendant
           complies with section 1209a.

       Defendant's sole argument is that the DUI court identified his
  conviction as a first offense and that the principle of separation of
  powers embodied in Chapter II, § 5 of the Vermont Constitution (FN1) bars
  administrative agencies like the Department of Motor Vehicles from
  exercising judicial power to change the nature of his criminal conviction
  and the consequences that flow from it.

       It is important to note that defendant does not challenge the
  constitutionality of the statutory license suspension scheme as a whole. 
  He rather limits his argument to the point that if the DUI court
  denominated his conviction as a first offense, the commissioner, who serves
  in the executive, not the judicial, branch of government, lacks the power
  to change the nature of the conviction in her suspension process.

       We disagree, because the commissioner did not effect any change in the
  nature or incidents of the criminal conviction.  It is true, but irrelevant
  to the present case, that the determination of whether a person is subject
  to liability as a subsequent offender is a criminal rather than a civil
  proceeding.  State v. Cameron, 126 Vt. 244, 249-50,