Case Title: People v. Shum

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84933

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 84933-Agenda 2-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								KEITH SHUM, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 22, 2003.

	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	After a jury trial, defendant, Keith Shum,(1) was convicted of
murder, feticide, attempted murder, and two counts of rape.
Defendant waived a jury for the sentencing phase of trial, and he
was sentenced to death for murder and to concurrent sentences of
60 years for feticide, 60 years for attempted murder, and 30 years
for each rape. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on
direct appeal. People v. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d 317 (1987). Defendant
filed a pro se postconviction petition in 1988; he filed an amended
petition through counsel on September 24, 1997. After oral
argument, the circuit court granted the State's motion to dismiss
the postconviction petition. While that judgment was pending on
appeal, we remanded the matter to the circuit court, while
retaining jurisdiction, for a fitness hearing pursuant to People v.
Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351 (1990). The circuit court found defendant
fit to participate in postconviction proceedings.
	At the time defendant filed his appeal of the dismissal of his
postconviction petition, his death sentence triggered our exclusive
jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6) and Supreme Court
Rule 651(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)). Subsequently, the Governor
commuted his death sentence. Although the constitutional basis
for our direct appeal is no longer present, we choose in our
discretion to retain jurisdiction over this case. See McGill v.
Illinois Power Co., 18 Ill. 2d 242, 244 (1959); People ex rel.
Farwell v. Kelly, 367 Ill. 616, 618 (1937).
	An appellate issue is moot when it is abstract or presents no
controversy. People v. Blaylock, 202 Ill. 2d 319, 325 (2002). An
issue can become moot if circumstances change during the
pendency of an appeal that prevent the reviewing court from being
able to render effectual relief. People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286,
294 (2002). In this appeal, defendant raises two issues challenging
his sentence, including ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing and improper denial of request to depose trial counsel
about the sentencing hearing. Subsequent to the filing of his
appeal, the Governor commuted his death sentence to natural life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole or mandatory
supervised release. Commutation removes the judicially imposed
sentence and replaces it with a lesser, executively imposed
sentence. People ex rel. Johnson v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 566
(1913); Black's Law Dictionary 274 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, the
commutation rendered these sentencing issues moot. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38, 235 S.E.2d 320, 325
(1977); State v. Mitchell, 239 Or. 87, 88, 396 P.2d 572, 573
(1964). We, therefore, address only the viable, nonsentencing
issues.
	Defendant now appeals the denial of postconviction relief,
raising three viable issues: (1) whether the circuit court erred in
finding defendant fit for trial; (2) whether the circuit court erred in
finding defendant fit for postconviction proceedings; and (3)
whether the circuit court improperly refused to order DNA testing,
where such testing was not available at the time of trial and may
provide new evidence of defendant's innocence. In the wake of the
governor's commutation of his sentence, defendant filed a motion
for DNA testing before this court. We ordered that this motion be
taken with the case.

BACKGROUND
	Gwendolyn Whipple was living with Theresa Conway and
Conway's three children in an apartment in Chicago. Conway and
Whipple previously had met defendant through Conway's
boyfriend, Mark Aytchan; Conway knew defendant only as
"Keith." Whipple was nine months pregnant at the time of the
crimes. Between 11:15 and 11:30 p.m. on July 6, 1982, the two
women heard a knock at their door. The visitor told them it was
"Keith." Conway later identified defendant as the person they let
into the apartment.
	Defendant offered the women some marijuana, and the three
of them shared a marijuana cigarette. He told them that Aytchan
had asked him to watch over them while Aytchan was in Cook
County jail awaiting trial for burglary. Conway accused defendant
of lying because she had recently talked to Aytchan, and he did not
mention telling this to defendant. Defendant became angry and
pushed the sharp tip of his umbrella at Conway's left jaw. Conway
pushed the umbrella away and ran across the room to grab a knife.
Defendant pulled out a gun. Conway said she thought the gun was
only a toy. Defendant showed them the bullets in the gun, so she
dropped the knife.
	Defendant demanded that the two women lie side by side, face
down on a bed. One of Conway's children came to check out the
source of the noise that had awakened him. Defendant pointed the
gun at the boy's forehead. Conway approached defendant and
urged him to shoot her instead of her son. Defendant ordered
Conway to tell her son to go back to bed and told her to lie down
next to Whipple.
	Defendant walked behind Conway and undressed her from the
waist down. He had sexual intercourse with her while he pointed
the gun at Whipple's head. Defendant undressed Whipple from the
waist down and had sexual intercourse with her. Next, defendant
threatened to kill them if they both did not perform oral sex on
him, so first Conway and then Whipple complied. Afterward,
defendant sat on the window ledge next to the bed. He pointed the
gun at each of them while saying, "I'm going to kill you." He fired
several shots.
	Conway received gunshot injuries to her right mandible, the
right side of her neck, and her right arm. Whipple received five
gunshot wounds, including two to her left shoulder, two to the left
side of her forehead, and one to her head. When Conway looked
up, defendant had fled. She noticed Whipple's injuries, so she ran
to get help. She went to the nearby apartment of Gus and Marquita
Wilson. Gus Wilson testified that there was an urgent knock at the
door around 1 a.m. Wilson opened the door, and a bloody Conway
told him that she and Whipple had been shot. Wilson asked who
had shot them, and she answered, "Keith."
	Wilson went to Conway's apartment. He discovered that
Conway's three children were uninjured. He then checked
Whipple, but he was unable to find a pulse. He called for help. The
paramedic who arrived at the scene also was unable to find any
vital signs for Whipple or for her unborn baby. He testified that in
his opinion both Whipple and her fetus were dead when he
arrived. Conway was taken to St. Bernard's Hospital.
	About an hour later, two detectives from the Chicago police
department interviewed Conway. Conway described the
perpetrator and told them his name was Keith. She said that her
boyfriend, Mark Aytchan, knew more about Keith, and Aytchan
was currently in Cook County jail. An hour later, the police
questioned Aytchan, and he told them that Conway must be
referring to Keith Shum, the defendant. He gave them Shum's
address.
	The police went to this address, and defendant's aunt, Bernice
Shum, answered the door. The detectives found defendant
undressed and asleep on a couch. After he was awakened, they
identified themselves as policemen, told him why they were there,
and gave him Miranda warnings. Defendant denied involvement
in the incident. The detectives took defendant to Conway's
hospital room, and she immediately identified him as the person
who had raped and shot her and Gwendolyn Whipple. Police
reports disclosed that a "rape kit" or "Vitullo kit" was obtained
from Conway. Throughout questioning by police officers and an
assistant State's Attorney, defendant denied his involvement in the
crimes.
	Defendant was charged by indictment on July 7, 1982, with
murder, attempted murder, two counts of rape, two counts of
deviate sexual assault, two counts of unlawful restraint, aggravated
battery, armed violence, and feticide. The charges of deviate
sexual assault, unlawful restraint, aggravated battery, and armed
violence were dismissed just before the trial. On July 29, 1982, the
public defender requested a fitness and sanity evaluation. On
August 17, 1982, psychiatrist Dr. Albert Stipes sent a report to the
court stating his opinion that defendant was fit to stand trial and
was legally sane. Again upon request of defense counsel,
defendant was examined on September 14, 1984, by psychiatrist
Dr. Gilbert Bogen, who also concluded he was fit to stand trial.
Following a jury trial on September 12 through 18, 1984, the jury,
after 20 minutes of deliberation, found defendant guilty of two
counts of rape, feticide, attempted murder, and murder.
	Defendant waived a jury for the sentencing phase. Defense
counsel requested that defendant's fitness for sentencing be
evaluated. The judge ordered a psychiatric examination. On
October 9, 1984, Dr. R.A. Reifman concluded that defendant was
fit for sentencing. The trial court found defendant eligible for the
death penalty. The court found insufficient mitigating evidence to
allow him to sentence defendant to life in prison rather than death.
	On direct appeal, this court addressed 21 arguments raised by
defendant challenging his convictions. We affirmed his
convictions and sentences on April 2, 1987. People v. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d 317, 375 (1987).
	Defendant filed a postconviction petition on August 16, 1988.
In a pro se motion for appointment of counsel, defendant alleged
that during the pendency of his postconviction proceedings, he had
disagreements over discovery issues with the several different
attorneys from the Illinois Capital Litigation Division of the State
Appellate Defender. Defendant said he would rather proceed pro
se than have an attorney from that division represent him. These
disagreements delayed the filing of an amended postconviction
petition until September 24, 1997. On October 23, 1997, appointed
counsel filed a motion to determine fitness to proceed in
postconviction proceedings because defendant resisted assisting
his attorneys in defending him.
	The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's postconviction
petition. On December 24, 1997, the trial court granted the State's
motion. Regarding the DNA testing requested in the amended
petition, the court declined to order the testing under section
116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725
ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998)) because the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act is not a vehicle for enforcing criminal procedural rules but
instead is a means to evaluate whether constitutional deprivations
occurred during the proceeding leading to defendant's conviction.
In addition, the court found the defendant's claim that DNA
testing would exonerate him was speculative. According to the
court, identity was not an issue in the case because the victim who
positively identified defendant had met him on prior occasions.
Defendant appealed the trial court's dismissal of his amended
postconviction petition to this court.
	On July 1, 1998, while retaining jurisdiction, we remanded the
matter to the trial court for an evaluation of whether defendant was
fit for postconviction proceedings under People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351 (1990). The fitness hearing began on July 17, 2000. The
State's first witness was Dr. Matthew Markos, director of Forensic
Clinical Services of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Markos
testified that he found no evidence of schizophrenia, psychosis, or
organic mental disorder. Markos concluded that defendant's
uncooperative actions towards his attorneys were a product of
volitional choice rather than actions compelled by mental illness,
so defendant was fit for postconviction proceedings.
	On August 28, 2000, the hearing continued with psychiatrist
Dr. Carl Wahlstrom's testimony for the State. Wahlstrom testified
that he found no signs of schizophrenia, psychosis, or organic
brain injury. While defendant was somewhat stubborn and
adamant about his desire to obtain discovery materials, he
concluded that defendant met the standard of fitness for
postconviction proceedings.
	The defense called psychiatrist Dr. Henry Conroe as its sole
witness at the hearing. Conroe testified that defendant's adamant
belief that discovery materials would exonerate him was
delusional, and his fixation on this issue prevented him from
helping his attorneys with any other issue. Conroe concluded that
defendant was unfit for postconviction proceedings.
	Closing arguments in the fitness hearing were conducted on
August 29; the trial court found defendant fit for postconviction
proceedings on August 30, 2000.

ANALYSIS
	This case comes to this court for review of the circuit court's
dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition. Proceedings
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2000)) are a collateral attack on the judgment rather than a
direct appeal. People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 370 (1996).
During postconviction proceedings, the burden is on defendant to
make a substantial showing of a deprivation of a constitutional
right. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 370. Defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing only if the defendant meets this burden; the
circuit court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the petition
and supporting affidavits. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378,
380-81 (1998). We review de novo the circuit court's dismissal of
a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d  at 389.
	Defendant raises three viable claims in this court: (1)
unfitness to stand trial; (2) unfitness for postconviction
proceedings; and (3) actual innocence, requesting DNA testing of
the Vitullo rape kit under section 116-3 of the Code (725 ILCS
5/116-3 (West 1998)).

I. Defendant's Fitness to Stand Trial
	The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment bars
prosecuting a defendant who is not fit to stand trial. People v.
Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 226 (1996). A defendant is presumed to
be fit to stand trial. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 104-10, now
codified at 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 2000); People v. Johnson,
191 Ill. 2d 257, 269 (2000). A defendant is unfit to stand trial if his
mental or physical condition prevents him from understanding the
nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in
his defense. 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 2000); People v. Jamison,
197 Ill. 2d 135, 152 (2001). If there is a bona fide doubt that the
defendant is fit to stand trial, the court shall order a fitness hearing.
725 ILCS 5/104-11(a) (West 2000); People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 512 (1991). During postconviction proceedings
challenging a finding of fitness, defendant must show in his
petition sufficient facts to raise a bona fide doubt of his fitness to
stand trial. People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 319 (2000). We
review de novo the trial court's dismissal of this postconviction
claim without an evidentiary hearing. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 389.
	During postconviction review, the circuit court rejected the
claim of unfitness to stand trial as waived because it had not been
raised on direct appeal. Issues that could have been presented on
direct appeal are waived. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 371. The
doctrine of waiver can be relaxed when fundamental fairness
requires or when the facts supporting the claim are not in the
original appellate record. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 371-72.
	In People v. Harris, No. 89796 (June 20, 2002), the
postconviction attorney gathered evidence that defendant showed
signs of depression, a personality disorder, and organic brain
damage. Defendant raised the postconviction claim that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a fitness hearing, but
this claim had not been raised on direct appeal. We considered the
claim on the merits under the exception to waiver that information
was outside the appellate record because of this psychiatric
information gathered during postconviction. Harris, slip op. at 4-5.
Similarly, we considered a postconviction claim not raised on
direct appeal because of information from psychiatric
examinations conducted six years after defendant's conviction in
Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 322. Therefore, we will consider defendant's
claim that he was unfit to stand trial rather than apply the doctrine
of waiver. In order to succeed, defendant must show in his petition
sufficient facts to raise a bona fide doubt of his fitness to stand
trial. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 318-19.
	Attached to defendant's amended petition was the report of
neuropsychologist Dr. Jonathan Hess, who found evidence that
defendant experienced auditory verbal memory retrieval problems.
Hess concluded that these problems were caused by brain injury,
specifically frontal lobe impairment, in his report of November 29,
1997. The petition also included the report of forensic social
worker Alice Washington, who outlined the generations of
schizophrenia and other mental illness in the Shum family,
including the illnesses of his mother and brother. Defendant filed
the report of psychiatrist Dr. Bernard Block as an exhibit to
defendant's motion to reconsider the court's dismissal of the
amended postconviction petition. Block interviewed defendant on
November 20, 1997, and December 7, 1997. Block concluded that
defendant understood the issues involved during the trial, but his
insistence that he control his own case and his refusal to cooperate
with his attorneys rendered him unfit to stand trial. The
information from the reports of Hess, Washington, and Block were
not in the record on appeal.
	Evidence that a defendant is mentally unsound does not
necessarily establish that he or she is unfit to stand trial because
the fitness standard only concerns defendant's ability to
understand the proceedings and assist counsel, not mental fitness
in other areas of life. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d  at 322; Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d  at 519. Defendant showed the required ability in several ways.
Defendant participated in his own defense by filing several
motions pro se. The trial court and counsel explained to defendant
his right to testify and his ability to waive his right to a jury at
sentencing. Defendant demonstrated that he understood these
rights in his deliberate decisions to testify and to waive the jury.
Defendant spoke clearly in allocution during the mitigation phase
of sentencing. Although defendant sometimes disagreed with his
attorneys, it was because of differences of opinion about legal
strategy rather than a lack of understanding of the proceedings.
	Even taking as true the information from the reports of Hess,
Washington, and Block (see Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 378), we find
that defendant failed to raise a bona fide doubt of defendant's
fitness to stand trial. While these reports provide some evidence
of mental illness, they are insufficient to counter these several
indications that defendant understood and participated in the
proceedings at trial. We also note that there is psychiatric evidence
in the record to support the finding of fitness to stand trial. Upon
the request of defense counsel, defendant was evaluated by Dr.
Stipes, who concluded defendant was fit to stand trial and legally
sane on August 17, 1982. Again upon the request of defense
counsel, defendant was declared fit to stand trial by Dr. Bogen on
September 14, 1984, contemporaneously with his trial. Therefore,
defendant's claim that he was unfit to stand trial fails on the
merits.

II. Defendant's Fitness in Postconviction Proceedings
	On July 1, 1998, this court ordered the trial court to conduct
a fitness hearing while defendant's postconviction petition was
pending. The circuit court heard three witnesses at the hearing to
determine fitness for postconviction proceedings. Dr. Matthew
Markos, director of Forensic Clinical Services of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, testified for the State. Dr. Markos reviewed:
police reports; trial transcripts; pro se motions and motions filed
by attorneys for both parties; information from the Illinois
Department of Corrections master file; and reports of prior
evaluations by Dr. Stipes (fit for trial and legally sane, August
1982), Dr. Bogen (fit for trial, September 1984), Dr. Reifman (fit
for sentencing, October 1984), Dr. Hess (signs of frontal lobe
impairment, November 1997), Dr. Block (unfit for trial and
postconviction proceedings, December 1997), and Dr. Conroe
(unfit for postconviction proceedings, January 2000). Markos
acknowledged that he used the Owens standard to evaluate
defendant. After defendant refused to participate upon Markos's
first visit, he was able to conduct an interview with defendant on
October 27, 1999. He testified that he found no evidence of
organic brain damage or mental disorder. He stated that defendant
is capable of cooperating with his attorneys and explaining his
constitutional complaints. Any decision by defendant not to
cooperate with his attorneys has been volitional rather than
compelled by mental illness. Therefore, Markos concluded that
defendant was fit for postconviction proceedings, as he described
in his opinion letter dated November 22, 1999.
	The State's second witness, psychiatrist Dr. Carl Wahlstrom,
also inspected: police reports; motions; reports from the Illinois
Department of Corrections; and reports by Hess, Block, Conroe,
Stipes, Bogen, and Reifman under the Owens standard. Wahlstrom
similarly found no evidence of organic brain injury, schizophrenia,
or other mental illness. While defendant is stubborn and insistent
about obtaining certain discovery materials, this does not amount
to delusional paranoia. Wahlstrom concluded that defendant met
the standard of fitness to participate in postconviction proceedings,
which he confirmed in his opinion letter dated July 28, 2000.
	Finally, psychiatrist Dr. Henry Conroe testified for the
defense. Conroe examined: motions; police reports; the
presentence investigation report; reports by Hess, Block and
Markos; and the report of forensic social worker Alice
Washington. Cross-examination revealed that Conroe did not
review the trial transcripts or the reports of Stipes, Bogen, and
Reifman, who all found defendant fit for trial or sentencing. He
was notified of the Owens standard for fitness for postconviction
proceedings only after his interview with defendant. Conroe
characterized as delusional defendant's belief that he would be
exonerated upon receipt of missing discovery materials.
Defendant's fixation on discovery prevents him from assisting his
attorneys with any other claim, and his failure to cooperate with
his attorneys is not volitional. He had the opportunity to observe
defendant's interaction with one of his attorneys, John Greenlees,
who was present during the interview. Conroe determined that
defendant was unfit for postconviction proceedings, and he
detailed his findings in an opinion letter dated January 8, 2000.
	Defendant also has a history of refusing to cooperate with his
attorneys. Defendant's disagreements with appointed counsel led
to the participation of several different appointed defense attorneys
and contributed to the delay of almost 10 years between the filing
of the original pro se postconviction petition in August 1988 and
the filing of the amended petition through counsel in September
1997.
	In Owens, we explained that "a petitioner who is competent
to communicate his allegations of constitutional deprivations to
counsel is competent to participate in post-conviction
proceedings." Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 365. This fitness standard in
postconviction proceedings is less demanding than the standard for
fitness to stand trial. People v. Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d 257, 269
(2000). These standards vary because of the disparate nature of the
proceedings. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 363-64. In addition, a defendant
is presumed to be fit for postconviction proceedings. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 362. We will reverse the trial court's finding that
defendant was fit for postconviction proceedings only if the trial
court abused its discretion. People v. Simpson, Nos. 85084, 86926
cons., slip op. at 6 (September 27, 2001). We will find an abuse of
discretion where the trial court's decision is " 'arbitrary, fanciful
or unreasonable' " or " 'where no reasonable man would take the
view adopted by the court.' " People v. M.D., 101 Ill. 2d 73, 90
(1984), quoting Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 942 (9th Cir.
1963).
	There is ample evidence supporting the circuit court's
conclusion that defendant satisfied the low standard of fitness
required for postconviction proceedings. Two expert witnesses
explained their opinions that defendant met the Owens standard.
Defendant has participated in his case through pro se filings
during postconviction review. We are unwilling to conclude that
a defendant's lack of cooperation with his or her attorneys, if
volitional, supports a finding of unfitness for postconviction
proceedings. Markos and Wahlstrom both concluded that
defendant made a volitional choice to fight his attorneys. True,
Conroe opined that defendant's resistance was delusional rather
than volitional. However, the circuit court considered the
testimony of all three expert witnesses and found defendant fit
under the Owens standard. We cannot say that this finding of
fitness was " 'arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable' " (see M.D., 101 Ill. 2d  at 90, quoting Peek, 321 F.2d at 942) warranting reversal
under the abuse of discretion standard. We affirm the circuit
court's determination that defendant was fit for postconviction
proceedings.

III. Actual Innocence: DNA Testing Under Section 116-3
	Forensic DNA testing was not available at the time of
defendant's trial in September 1984. Section 116-3 was not in
force when defendant filed his amended postconviction petition in
September 1997. Effective January 1, 1998, the General Assembly
enacted section 116-3, which explains the process defendants
must follow to obtain fingerprint or forensic testing not available
at trial regarding actual innocence. 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West
2000). Section 116-3 provides:
			"(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial
court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her
case for the performance of fingerprint or forensic DNA
testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial
which resulted in his or her conviction, but which was not
subject to the testing which is now requested because the
technology for the testing was not available at the time of
trial. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served
upon the State.
			(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that:
				(1) identity was the issue in the trial which resulted
in his or her conviction; and
				(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a
chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not
been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in
any material aspect.
			(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under
reasonable conditions designed to protect the State's
interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing
process upon a determination that:
				(1) the result of the testing has the scientific
potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence
materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual
innocence;
				(2) the testing requested employs a scientific method
generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community." 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2000).
	On December 24, 1997, the judge granted the State's motion
to dismiss defendant's amended postconviction petition. This
included a dismissal of defendant's claim of actual innocence and
a specific denial of defendant's request for DNA testing of the
Vitullo rape kit that cited section 116-3 (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West
1998)). The trial court found that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
was an improper means to pursue enforcement of this criminal
procedure provision because the Act addresses allegations of
constitutional violations during the original trial. See Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d  at 380. A claim of actual innocence supported by newly
discovered evidence is properly raised in postconviction
proceedings. People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996).
However, the circuit court noted that defendant's argument that
DNA testing of the Vitullo rape kit could provide evidence of
actual innocence was only speculative because identity was not an
issue in the case. The court stated that identity was not disputed
because of the positive identification by the victim, who had been
acquainted with defendant prior to the crime. We review de novo
the dismissal of a postconviction claim without an evidentiary
hearing. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 389. We also review de novo the
ruling denying a section 116-3 motion. People v. Franks, 323 Ill.
App. 3d 660, 662 (2001).
	In People v. Johnson, No. 85134 (April 18, 2002), defendant
argued in his postconviction petition, citing section 116-3, that
testing the Vitullo rape kit would cast doubt on his convictions for
rape and murder because the surviving victim, Patricia Payne, told
police that the crimes had been committed by a single assailant.
Defendant noted that the only direct evidence of his guilt was
Payne's identification testimony, and defendant never admitted to
being at the crime scene. As a result, identity was a central issue
to the case. Defendant also alleged in his petition that the hospital
had taken a Vitullo rape kit that had been delivered to the State
Police Crime Lab, which would store and preserve the sample in
an uncontaminated manner. Defendant also attached to the petition
documents about the gathering and transport of the Vitullo rape
kit. The record was unclear about the current condition of the
Vitullo kit or whether there was a testable sample, but defendant
would not have access to this information. Johnson, slip op. at 7.
	We concluded that defendant made a prima facie case for
DNA testing under section 116-3 because he established that
identity was a central issue at trial and that there had been a secure
chain of custody for the Vitullo rape kit. Because the Vitullo kit
was entered into evidence, it would remain in the possession of the
circuit court clerk after defendant's conviction. Under section
116-3, the trial court evaluates whether DNA testing has the
potential to produce new evidence "materially relevant" to
defendant's actual-innocence claim. This phrase has been
interpreted to include evidence that will "significantly advance"
defendant's claim; the evidence need not exonerate defendant by
itself. Under the facts of this case, we held that the trial court erred
in denying DNA testing pursuant to section 116-3. Johnson, slip
op. at 11.
	The circumstances of the present case are nearly identical to
those of Johnson. The only direct evidence in this case is the
identification of defendant by Theresa Conway for murder and
rape in which there was a single assailant, and defendant has
consistently denied involvement in the crimes. Defendant alleges
in his petition that the hospital took a Vitullo rape kit sample from
Conway. The parties stipulated at trial that this sample was
delivered to and retained by the State Police Crime Lab in a sealed
container. The parties also stipulated that the sample tested
positive for the presence of seminal material. The Vitullo kit was
entered into evidence, so it would have remained in the possession
of the circuit court clerk after defendant's conviction. In sum,
defendant has established a prima facie case for DNA testing
under section 116-3 because he established that identity was a
central issue and that the evidence was subject to a secure chain of
custody. If the DNA testing produces results favorable to
defendant, this evidence will significantly advance defendant's
claim of actual innocence. Therefore, the trial court erred in
denying DNA testing.
	Generally, section 116-3 permits a defendant to seek DNA
testing by filing a motion before the trial court that entered the
judgment of conviction. 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2000); see
People v. Dunn, 306 Ill. App. 3d 75, 80 (1999). In this case,
defendant filed his postconviction petition and the trial court
dismissed it after section 116-3 had been enacted but before its
effective date. Under the unique temporal circumstances of this
case, defendant was able to refer to the language of section 116-3
when drafting his petition, but he was unable to invoke it in an
independent motion because the provision was not yet effective.
A postconviction petition was the only means available for his
request for relief at that time. Given the unusual facts of this 20-year-old case, little would be served by requiring defendant to
replead the contents of this portion of his postconviction petition
in a section 116-3 motion before the trial court when the petition
otherwise clearly meets the requirements of section 116-3. In
addition, the State has indicated that it does not oppose allowing
DNA testing in this case. As discussed above, we find on the
merits that defendant has made a prima facie case for DNA testing
under the now-effective section 116-3. We reverse the trial court's
denial of defendant's request for DNA testing.
	In addition to denying defendant's request for DNA testing,
the trial court dismissed defendant's claim of actual innocence. In
order to support a claim of actual innocence, the defendant must
submit new, noncumulative evidence material to the claim that
could not have been obtained through due diligence at the time of
trial. Harris, slip op. at 3. This evidence of actual innocence has
to be " ' "of such conclusive character" ' " as would " ' "probably
change the result on retrial." ' " Washington, 171 Ill. 2d  at 489,
quoting People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 368 (1987), quoting
People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 134 (1984). The only
"evidence" defendant provides in support of his claim of actual
innocence is speculation that the DNA tests could show he was not
the single perpetrator who attacked Gwendolyn Whipple and
Theresa Conway. Until the test results can be considered, it is
premature for us to evaluate the actual-innocence claim. We
remand the matter to the circuit court to consider the actual-innocence claim on the merits after the DNA test results are
completed.

CONCLUSION
	The trial court properly dismissed defendant's claims of
unfitness to stand trial and unfitness for postconviction
proceedings. We reverse the trial court's denial of defendant's
request for DNA testing under section 116-3. As a result, we
decline presently to consider the actual-innocence claim from
defendant's petition. We remand the matter to the circuit court
with instructions to order the Illinois State Police Crime Lab to
conduct DNA testing and to evaluate the actual-innocence claim
in light of the test results. In light of this conclusion, defendant's
motion for DNA testing taken with this case is denied as moot. For
these reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the
cause to the circuit court.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
remanded with directions.
 



 



1.      1Defendant's name is Keith Shurn, but for several years this court
and prison records have referred to him as Keith Shum. We will refer
to him and his relatives as the Shums throughout the opinion for
consistency and to avoid confusion with earlier documentation.