Case Title: Scott v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC09-1578

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1578 
____________ 
 
KEVIN JEROME SCOTT,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[June 30, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Kevin Jerome Scott, who was twenty-two years old at the time of the crime, 
was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted armed robbery, and aggravated 
battery due to his role in the June 30, 2007, coin laundry robbery, which resulted in 
the shooting death of Kristo Binjaku.  Scott appeals his first-degree murder 
conviction and sentence of death.  We have mandatory jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons more fully explained below, we affirm Scott‘s 
conviction but vacate his death sentence because we conclude that imposing a 
sentence of death would not be a proportionate punishment in this case.  
Accordingly, we remand for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without 
2 
 
the possibility of parole. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Guilt Phase 
 
The evidence presented at trial established that Scott, together with his 
friend and codefendant Desi Bolling, who was twenty-one at the time, planned a 
robbery of the Binjaku Crystal Coin Laundry, a coin laundry on the south side of 
Jacksonville.  On June 30, 2007, approximately two weeks after Scott and Bolling 
planned the robbery, Bolling contacted Scott by phone, and the two men met at a 
gas station near the coin laundry.  Scott and another man, previously unknown to 
Bolling and identified only as ―Miami,‖ entered Bolling‘s car.1 
While inside the vehicle, the three men discussed the coin laundry, during 
which Scott asked Bolling if he had a firearm.  At the time, Bolling had been 
attempting to sell a .40-caliber Glock handgun, had the gun in his trunk, and 
provided it to Scott.  Bolling expected to sell the gun to Scott in exchange for 
money gained from the robbery.  Miami brought his own firearm but mentioned 
that it was not loaded.  Scott did not indicate to Bolling whether it was Scott‘s plan 
to shoot anyone.  Following this discussion, Scott and Miami exited the vehicle 
and informed Bolling that they would call him in ten minutes.  Bolling drove to a 
                                         
 
1.  ―Miami‖ was the nickname of Scott‘s accomplice during the robbery.  
Law enforcement never located Miami. 
3 
 
nearby apartment complex to await the call and socialize with friends. 
After Scott and Miami exited Bolling‘s vehicle, they approached the coin 
laundry‘s side entrance.  Both men covered their faces with white t-shirts to mask 
their identities.  Scott then entered the coin laundry while Miami apparently 
remained at the side entranceway.  As Scott entered, he hit Gentian Koci, who was 
sitting in a chair next to the side door, on the back of the head with the butt of his 
gun.  Binjaku, who at the time was sitting on the floor next to Koci working on a 
broken machine, got up and told the intruders that he did not have any money and 
to go away.  Scott then pointed his gun at Binjaku and fired one fatal shot to 
Binjaku‘s face.  Scott and Miami fled the scene, and Xhulio Binjaku, the murder 
victim‘s son, called 911 to report the crime.  Eyewitnesses identified both intruders 
as black males.   
Following the attempted robbery, Scott and Miami ran to a nearby high 
school.  John Holsenbeck, who was at the pool of an apartment complex across the 
street, testified that after he heard the gunshot, he observed a black male wearing a 
white t-shirt run by the swimming pool from the direction of the coin laundry and 
toward the high school.  Holsenbeck could not identify the individual but thought 
the man resembled someone he had spoken to earlier that day at the intersection 
next to the coin laundry.  He relayed his observations to police at the scene.  
Approximately three weeks later, Holsenbeck identified from a photo lineup two 
4 
 
individuals, one of whom was Scott, who looked like the person he had talked to 
earlier in the day.   
Approximately ten to fifteen minutes after Scott and Miami had exited 
Bolling‘s vehicle, Bolling received a call from Scott.  At Scott‘s request, Bolling 
drove to the nearby high school and picked up Scott and Miami.  At trial, Bolling 
testified that Scott and Miami were sweating, hysterical, and tired.  Bolling 
recalled Scott saying that he had ―shot the guy‖ because the victim ―had jacked the 
buck.‖  Bolling understood that comment to mean that Binjaku had refused to give 
Scott any money.  At the time, Bolling did not realize that the gunshot was fatal to 
the victim. 
 
Bolling, Scott, and Miami then went back to the apartment complex where 
Bolling had previously been socializing.  One witness, Lawrence Wright, stated 
that Scott appeared nervous, shaky, sweaty, and paranoid.  Bolling testified that 
Scott explained to everyone that he was sweaty because he had been having sex.  
Bolling then left the apartment complex to drop off Scott and Miami at separate 
locations.  Scott gave the murder weapon back to Bolling, at which point Bolling 
observed that one bullet was missing.  The next day, Bolling discovered that the 
gunshot to Binjaku was fatal. 
In an effort to secure a $20,000 reward promised by local businessmen, 
Wright volunteered the information that Bolling, Scott, and another individual had 
5 
 
acted suspiciously on the night of the murder and that Bolling had been trying to 
sell a handgun prior to the date of the murder.  Wright agreed to wear a recording 
device and to purchase the handgun from Bolling.  When Bolling sold the murder 
weapon to Wright, Bolling told Wright to be careful because the gun had ―a body 
on it.‖  Law enforcement obtained the weapon from Wright and found that it 
matched a cartridge case recovered from the scene of the murder. 
Bolling was subsequently arrested and charged with murder and attempted 
armed robbery.  After initially denying any involvement, Bolling approached law 
enforcement, acknowledged his complicity, identified Scott as the killer, and 
agreed to cooperate.2  The next day, on October 1, 2007, Scott was arrested for an 
unrelated possession-of-cocaine offense at the intersection adjacent to the coin 
laundry.  At trial, testimony regarding Scott‘s arrest and subsequent jailing was 
excluded following a defense motion in limine.  However, testimony as to Scott‘s 
general ―contact‖ with law enforcement was presented at trial for the limited 
purpose of demonstrating that Scott was in the south side area where the crime was 
committed and not, as the defense would seek to show, always at his north side 
residence.  
Following Scott‘s arrest, law enforcement arranged for Scott and Bolling to 
                                         
 
2.  Bolling pled guilty to second-degree murder and attempted robbery in 
exchange for testifying in Scott‘s case.  For each offense, Bolling was sentenced to 
time served—678 days—to run concurrently and ten years‘ probation. 
6 
 
be housed in the same area at the jail.  Bolling agreed to wear a wire and to record 
a conversation with Scott.  Both Bolling and lead Detective Travis Oliver testified 
that they recognized the voice on the recording as belonging to Scott.  The 
conversation was played at trial, but because much of the recording was inaudible, 
a prepared transcript was provided to the jury as an aid. 
In the recording, Bolling asked Scott about the night of the shooting.  The 
ensuing conversation contained statements from Scott about the circumstances 
surrounding the attempted robbery and murder, including: (1) Scott‘s identification 
of three people in the coin laundry, one of whom was bending down by a machine; 
(2) Scott‘s explanation that an accomplice from Miami was behind him outside 
with an unloaded gun and was shaken by the events; (3) Scott‘s acknowledgement 
that he was masked; (4) Scott‘s claim to have hit one man in the head; and (5) 
Scott‘s claim that he shot another man after he told Scott to get out of the store 
and, in Scott‘s words, ―grabbed a chair like he was going to hit‖ Scott. 
At trial, Scott presented four alibi witnesses:  Scott‘s neighbors, Quartx 
Barney, Tony Paige, and Ray Washington, and the daughter of Scott‘s girlfriend, 
Regina Corley, all of whom testified that Scott was present at the birthday party of 
Barney‘s child at the time of the crime, that Scott was cooking and helping with 
the children, and that he never left the party.  The witnesses also testified that Scott 
lived with his girlfriend, Nicole Corley, on Jacksonville‘s north side, took care of 
7 
 
her children, and generally never left the house.  
Through cross-examination, the prosecutor suggested that the four had 
together agreed to provide a false alibi for Scott.  Specifically, the prosecutor asked 
each witness about the circumstances under which the four communicated the story 
to one another and why they waited nearly two years before coming forward.  The 
prosecutor also asked Barney, Paige, and Washington why Scott was on the south 
side when he came into contact with a police officer in October.   
The State called Scott‘s girlfriend, Nicole Corley, as a rebuttal witness and 
asked her if Scott had a friend identified as ―Miami.‖  She testified that she had 
heard Scott refer to someone by that name but did not know who he was, and she 
answered that ―there‘s a lot of Miamis in Jacksonville.‖  Corley also testified that 
she lived with Scott on the north side, that she had three children—one with 
Scott—and that Scott always stayed home and cared for the children.  The 
prosecutor asked her why Scott came into contact with a police officer at the 
intersection next to the coin laundry in October, and she responded that he briefly 
left the house around that date after the two had a disagreement.  
 
The jury found Scott guilty as to all counts.  As to his conviction for first-
degree murder, the jury found Scott guilty, by special verdict, under both 
premeditated and felony-murder theories. 
The Penalty Phase 
8 
 
At the penalty phase, the State presented two victim impact witnesses:  
Malvina Binjaku, the murder victim‘s daughter, and Sally Trammel, a family 
friend who taught Malvina, both of whom read from prepared statements.  
To establish the existence of mitigation, Scott presented testimony from his 
relatives, friends, and former employers before testifying himself.  Scott‘s mother 
testified that Scott had some trouble with the law, but that it was a result of Scott 
hanging around with the wrong crowd.  She testified that Scott‘s father had not 
been involved in his life and described Scott‘s interaction with his father as brief 
and disappointing to Scott.  She also testified that when Scott was three, she had a 
brief marriage in which she was physically abused.  However, she said that Scott 
only heard the abuse and was not around to see it.  Scott‘s mother also testified that 
Scott had never been violent.   
The prosecution cross-examined Scott‘s mother as to Scott‘s prior 
convictions and presented rebuttal testimony from six police officers or former 
police officers who indicated that Scott was accused of burglary and battery with 
assault as a minor in 1999 and was arrested for three burglaries in 2003; reckless 
driving, driving with no valid driver‘s license, and felony fleeing in 2005; 
possession of crack cocaine in 2005; and marijuana possession in 2006.  These 
arrests and others resulted in a conviction for dealing in stolen property in 2003; 
convictions for felony fleeing, reckless driving, driving with no valid driver‘s 
9 
 
license, and possession of cocaine in 2005; convictions for resisting an officer 
without violence and driving while license suspended or revoked in 2005; a 
conviction for no valid driver‘s license in 2006; and a final conviction for grand 
theft in 2006.  
Scott testified on his own behalf, during which he did not admit to guilt. 
Instead, Scott testified that he had learned a lot and that he could be a productive 
person and contributing family member from prison.  Following the presentation of 
penalty-phase testimony, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of nine 
to three.   
The Spencer3 Hearing 
The trial court subsequently conducted a brief Spencer hearing.  The State 
did not introduce any additional evidence.  Defense counsel discussed with the trial 
court Scott‘s presentence investigation report and then read into the record two 
letters from members of Scott‘s family.  The first letter was written by Scott‘s 
father, Kevin Robinson, who expressed regret that due to drug dependency, he was 
never able to be a part of Scott‘s life.  The second letter was written by Scott‘s 
aunt, Lavonda Armstrong, who recounted that Scott was still a sweet and mindful 
individual whose life should be spared.  Scott chose not to testify. 
The Sentencing Order 
                                         
 
3.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
10 
 
Subsequent to the Spencer hearing, the trial court followed the jury‘s 
recommendation and sentenced Scott to death.  In pronouncing Scott‘s sentence, 
the trial court determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the 
existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) Scott was previously 
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to some person; and 
(2) the murder was committed while Scott was engaged in an attempt to commit 
the crime of armed robbery.  The trial court found that the result of the jury‘s guilt-
phase verdict—finding Scott guilty of the aggravated battery committed on 
Gentian Koci and the attempted armed robbery of the coin laundry—supported the 
aggravators and assigned to each ―great weight.‖ 
The trial court rejected two statutory mitigators,4 but found that the evidence 
established nine nonstatutory mitigators, which are set forth in our proportionality 
discussion.  With respect to Scott‘s convictions for attempted armed robbery and 
aggravated battery, the trial court sentenced Scott to twenty-five years‘ and fifteen 
years‘ imprisonment, respectively. 
 
On direct appeal, Scott raises five claims.5  In addition to addressing each of 
                                         
 
4.  The trial court rejected the following statutory mitigating factors: (1) the 
defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; and (2) the age of 
the defendant at the time of the crime. 
 
5.  Scott makes the following five claims: (1) the trial court erred in denying 
his motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor‘s guilt-phase closing argument 
commentary; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based on a 
11 
 
these claims, we also conclude that based upon the testimony of codefendant 
Bolling, the testimony of eyewitnesses, and Scott‘s own inculpatory statements, 
there was sufficient evidence that ―a rational trier of fact could have found the 
existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  Simmons v. 
State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1111 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 
738 (Fla. 2001)). 
ANALYSIS 
The Prosecutor’s Guilt-Phase Closing Argument 
 
Scott first claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial 
when the State impermissibly suggested to the jury that the burden was on the 
defendant to prove the identity of the person whose voice was captured on the 
jailhouse recording.  Although Scott moved for a mistrial following the 
presentation of closing arguments, he did not contemporaneously object to this 
alleged error, and, in failing to do so, did not preserve this issue for appellate 
review.  See Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1340-41 (Fla. 1990) (holding that a 
                                                                                                                                   
defense witness‘s cross-examination testimony that Scott had been incarcerated for 
an uncharged crime; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
recording of Scott‘s jailhouse statements; (4) his death sentence is not 
proportionate; and (5) the death sentence imposed and Florida‘s capital sentencing 
scheme are unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).   
Because we determine that the death sentence is not proportionate, we do not 
reach the Ring claim.  Moreover, because Scott does not challenge his attempted 
robbery and aggravated battery convictions, we do not address either conviction in 
this appeal. 
12 
 
motion for mistrial raised after closing arguments, absent contemporaneous 
objection to the alleged error, is insufficient to preserve the issue of improper 
prosecutorial argument for appeal); see also Poole v. State, 997 So. 2d 382, 389-90 
(Fla. 2008) (concluding that the failure to raise contemporaneous objections to the 
prosecutor‘s comments waived any claim concerning the comments for appellate 
review notwithstanding a subsequent motion for mistrial).  ―Unobjected-to 
comments are grounds for reversal only if they rise to the level of fundamental 
error.‖  Merck v. State, 975 So. 2d 1054, 1061 (Fla. 2007).  Fundamental error is 
error that ―reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a 
verdict of guilty . . . could not have been obtained without the assistance of the 
alleged error.‖  Poole, 997 So. 2d at 390 (quoting Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 
622 (Fla. 2001)).    
With this claim, Scott argues that the State‘s commentary recognized that 
Scott had an obligation to present evidence to refute testimony from the State‘s 
witnesses stating that the voice captured on the recording matched Scott‘s.  We 
disagree.  In Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 1991), this Court 
explained that the State cannot comment on a defendant‘s failure to produce 
evidence to refute an element of the crime.  In Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197, 
1200 (Fla. 1998), we further explained impermissible burden shifting: 
The standard for a criminal conviction is not which side is more 
believable, but whether, taking all the evidence into consideration, the 
13 
 
State has proven every essential element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  For that reason, it is error for a prosecutor to make 
statements that shift the burden of proof and invite the jury to convict 
the defendant for some reason other than that the State has proved its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
However, ―[a] prosecutor‘s comments are not improper where they fall into the 
category of an ‗invited response‘ by the preceding argument of defense counsel 
concerning the same subject.‖  Walls v. State, 926 So. 2d 1156, 1166 (Fla. 2006).  
Accordingly, under the ―invited response‖ doctrine, the State is permitted ―to 
emphasize uncontradicted evidence for the narrow purpose of rebutting a defense 
argument since the defense has invited the response.‖  Caballero v. State, 851 So. 
2d 655, 660 (Fla. 2003). 
 
In this case, we conclude the prosecutor‘s remarks were an invited response 
to Scott‘s suggestion that Bolling could have scripted the recording in an effort to 
frame Scott for the murder.  During his closing argument, defense counsel 
insinuated that Bolling had scripted the jailhouse conversation with a third party in 
order ―to go home‖ because Bolling was the actual killer.  Although the prosecutor 
could have used a better choice of words to address Scott‘s alibi presentation, the 
prosecutor‘s comments, when considered in context, were made in direct response 
to Scott‘s closing argument.  In fact, the prosecutor specifically referenced the 
alternative theory Scott proposed—that Bolling had scripted this conversation with 
someone other than Scott.  Moreover, the prosecutor‘s comments did not explicitly 
14 
 
mention that Scott bore the burden of proving it was not his voice on the tape.  Cf. 
Gore, 719 So. 2d at 1200-01 (finding prosecutor‘s statement, that ―[i]f you believe 
[the defendant‘s] lying to you, he‘s guilty,‖ enunciated ―an erroneous and 
misleading statement of the State‘s burden of proof because it improperly asked 
the jury to determine whether Gore was lying as the sole test for determining the 
issue of his guilt‖).   
Instead, the prosecutor‘s commentary, which stated that Scott‘s alibi 
witnesses were never asked about whether the recorded voice was Scott‘s, went no 
further than to point out the lack of evidence to support Scott‘s alternative theory 
and that the State‘s evidence on this matter was uncontradicted.  See Poole, 997 
So. 2d at 390 (concluding that a prosecutor‘s remark regarding a lack of evidence 
that someone else could be responsible for causing injury to the victims was a 
proper, invited response to Poole‘s denial of guilt for only the crimes involving 
injury).  Thus, the State‘s comments did not constitute impermissible burden-
shifting, but were rather invited responses to Scott‘s own suggestion that Bolling 
could have scripted the recording in an effort to frame Scott for the murder.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the comments did not constitute reversible error, 
and Scott is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
Evidence of Scott’s Unrelated Drug Offense 
Next, Scott argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial 
15 
 
following the State‘s cross-examination of defense alibi witness Ray Washington, 
during which Washington stated that Scott had been incarcerated for an unrelated 
drug charge.  Specifically, Scott contends that Washington‘s testimony had a 
negative impact on the jury‘s view of his character and resulted in undue prejudice.  
While we agree with Scott that Washington‘s statements were improper, we 
disagree that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial under these 
circumstances.   
The facts underlying this claim are as follows.  Shortly after Bolling 
informed police that Scott was the shooter, Scott was arrested and jailed for an 
unrelated possession-of-cocaine offense.  Consequently, the State sought to 
introduce evidence that when Scott was arrested, he was in the south side area 
where the murder was committed and not, as the defense attempted to show, 
always at his north side residence.  Scott filed a motion in limine to exclude the 
evidence of the arrest.  Following a hearing on this motion, the trial court excluded 
the nature of Scott‘s arrest but allowed the State to present testimony that the 
officer came into ―contact‖ with Scott at that location.   
During the State‘s cross-examination of Washington, the prosecutor 
questioned her as to what year she had spoken to someone about Scott‘s presence 
at a party.  Washington responded, ―Yes.  It was after he got incarcerated.  He had 
went to jail on a drug charge.  Then [Scott‘s girlfriend] called down there and they 
16 
 
say he had a case pending and then that‘s when y‘all start coming out.‖   
Defense counsel did not contemporaneously object, but shortly thereafter, 
when witness Washington was dismissed, counsel moved for a mistrial, citing the 
prejudicial effect of Washington‘s testimony.  The trial court denied the motion, 
and defense counsel expressly declined the issuance of a curative instruction even 
though the trial court stated that it would have given such an instruction if so 
requested. 
We acknowledge that counsel failed to contemporaneously object and that, 
generally, a fundamental error analysis would apply.  Here, however, the trial court 
previously ruled upon this issue in a motion in limine and would have 
presumptively sustained an objection.  Rather than objecting, counsel moved for a 
mistrial shortly after Washington‘s improper testimony.  Therefore, under the facts 
of this case, we review the trial court‘s ruling on the motion for mistrial for an 
abuse of discretion.  See Smith v. State, 998 So. 2d 516, 526 (Fla. 2008).   
The granting of a motion for mistrial is not based on whether the error is 
―prejudicial.‖  Rather, the standard requires that a mistrial be granted only ―where 
an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial,‖ England v. State, 940 So. 2d 
389, 402 (Fla. 2006), such that a mistrial is ―necessary to ensure that the defendant 
receives a fair trial,‖ McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 790 (Fla. 2010).  ―It has been 
long established and continuously adhered to that the power to declare a mistrial 
17 
 
and discharge the jury should be exercised with great care and caution and [it] 
should be done only in cases of absolute necessity.‖  England, 940 So. 2d at 402 
(quoting Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 980 (Fla. 1999)).  Therefore, ―[i]n order 
for the prosecutor‘s comments to merit a new trial, the comments must either 
deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial, materially contribute to the 
conviction, be so harmful or fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or be 
so inflammatory that they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe 
verdict than that it would have otherwise.‖  Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 372 
(Fla. 2008) (quoting Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 383 (Fla. 1994)). 
In the present case, based on the trial court‘s prior ruling on the motion in 
limine, it was certainly improper for witness Washington to discuss the underlying 
nature of Scott‘s collateral drug arrest.  However, from the record, Washington‘s 
reference to the details of Scott‘s unrelated charge appeared to be spontaneous and 
fleeting, and it bore no connection to the charges for which Scott was being tried.  
Further, this witness was called by Scott himself, and there is no indication that the 
State intended to elicit this statement.  In fact, the State did not again mention to 
the jury Washington‘s solitary reference to the nature of this collateral charge.  
Moreover, the trial court implicitly recognized that this was error and asked 
defense counsel whether the court should issue a curative instruction, which 
defense counsel declined. 
18 
 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Washington‘s isolated reference 
to Scott‘s unrelated drug charge was not so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.  
See Jackson v. State, 25 So. 3d 518, 528-29 (Fla. 2009) (finding a witness‘s 
comment regarding fact that defendant always carried a gun, the mention of which 
was previously excluded by defense motion in limine, was improper but did not 
warrant a mistrial because defense counsel declined a curative instruction and 
witness‘s gun reference was brief), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3420 (2010).  
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Scott‘s motion. 
The Admission of Scott’s Recorded Jailhouse Statements 
 
Scott also asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the recorded jailhouse 
conversation between Bolling and himself that took place following his arrest on 
the unrelated drug charge.  Scott does not argue on appeal that under the Fifth 
Amendment, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings were necessary 
prior to the recorded conversation; instead, he argues that the statements were 
obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.6  We disagree. 
                                         
 
6.  To the extent that this argument can be construed as a Fifth Amendment 
challenge based on a custodial interrogation without the required Miranda 
warnings, as opposed to merely a conversation between Scott and Bolling, we find 
that this argument has not been sufficiently pled and is therefore waived.  See 
Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 742 n.2 (Fla. 1997) (stating that a failure to fully 
brief and argue points on appeal ―constitutes a waiver of these claims‖); see also 
Victorino v. State, 23 So. 3d 87, 103 (Fla. 2009) (―We have previously stated that 
‗[t]he purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support of the points 
on appeal.‘ ‖ (quoting Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1990))). 
19 
 
The record reflects that after codefendant Bolling identified Scott as the 
shooter, law enforcement issued an ―intelligence bulletin‖ identifying Scott as 
Bolling‘s accomplice in the murder and calling for his arrest.  The next day, Scott 
was arrested and jailed for an unrelated drug offense, and the intelligence bulletin 
was cancelled.  Scott‘s statements to Bolling discussing the circumstances 
surrounding the shooting and attempted robbery were recorded after he was jailed 
for the drug charge but before he knew that he was considered a suspect in the 
murder.   
Prior to trial, Scott filed a motion to suppress the statements obtained as a 
result of the recorded conversation between Scott and Bolling.  Scott argued that 
the statements were obtained while he was ―in-custody at the time of his 
questioning by‖ Bolling, and the recording violated his ―constitutional rights.‖  At 
trial, Scott argued for suppression based on the assertion that the tape was 
inaudible and the transcript was unreliable.  The trial court denied Scott‘s oral 
motion without addressing Scott‘s written argument that his constitutional rights 
had been violated.   
In resolving this claim, we initially note that the United States Supreme 
Court has drawn a distinction between the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination: 
The former arises from the fact that the suspect has been formally 
charged with a particular crime and thus is facing a state apparatus 
20 
 
that has been geared up to prosecute him.  The latter is protected by 
the prophylaxis of having an attorney present to counteract the 
inherent pressures of custodial interrogation, which arise from the fact 
of such interrogation and exist regardless of the number of crimes 
under investigation or whether those crimes have resulted in formal 
charges. 
 
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 685 (1988).  Along the same lines, this Court 
has explained that unlike the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, ―the Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is ‗offense specific‘ and applies only 
to the offense or offenses with which the defendant has actually been charged, and 
not to any other offense he may have committed but with which he has not been 
charged.‖  Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 470 (Fla. 2006).  The Sixth Amendment 
right is meant ―to protect unaided laymen at critical confrontations with the State‖ 
and therefore ―attaches at the earliest of the following points: formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.‖  Smith v. State, 699 
So. 2d 629, 638 (Fla. 1997).  
In this case, it is undisputed that the recorded conversation between Bolling 
and Scott was obtained prior to any of the points at which the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches.  Scott had not been formally accused of the murder, nor 
was he even aware that law enforcement considered him a suspect.  Scott 
nevertheless argues that the right attached earlier in his case because after Bolling 
communicated his intent to cooperate with law enforcement and an intelligence 
bulletin called for Scott‘s arrest, the process shifted from ―an investigatory process 
21 
 
to an accusatory one.‖  In support of his argument, Scott points to the following 
language from the United States Supreme Court: 
[W]hen the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory—when its 
focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession—our 
adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances 
here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer. 
 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964). 
 
Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court make clear that, ―[a]lthough 
Escobedo was originally decided as a Sixth Amendment case, ‗the Court in 
retrospect perceived that the prime purpose of Escobedo was not to vindicate the 
constitutional right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, to guarantee full 
effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination.‘ ‖  Moran v. Burbine, 475 
U.S. 412, 429-30 (1986) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).  
Therefore, Escobedo no longer supports the argument that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel applies prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings.  
See Moran, 475 U.S. at 429.7 
Here, although Bolling had provided a statement implicating Scott, law 
enforcement did not formally accuse Scott based solely on the potentially 
                                         
 
7.  To any extent that Scott relies on Escobedo to support his constitutional 
claim, we conclude the Supreme Court decision does not apply in this case.  The 
Supreme Court limited the holding of Escobedo to its own facts, and because those 
facts are not analogous to the facts in this case, Escobedo is inapplicable.  See 
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (―[T]he Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its 
own facts and those facts are not remotely akin to the facts of the case before us.‖). 
22 
 
unreliable confession of a codefendant seeking a lesser sentence, but sought to 
further investigate by obtaining independent, recorded evidence of guilt.  Only 
after obtaining the recording did the State formally accuse Scott.8  While Scott had 
been formally charged in the unrelated drug crime by the time of the recording, the 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific and therefore 
inapplicable to the investigation in this case.  See Ibar, 938 So. 2d at 470 
(determining that the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not been 
triggered at the time of a live lineup because the defendant had only been arrested 
on unrelated charges); Durocher v. State, 596 So. 2d 997, 999-1000 (Fla. 1992) 
(determining that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not implicated where 
the defendant was awaiting sentencing on an unrelated murder charge and had not 
yet been charged with the crime to which he confessed).  Accordingly, the trial 
court did not err in denying Scott‘s motion to suppress.  
Proportionality 
                                         
 
8.  We note that the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in United States 
v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), is distinguishable from the case at bar.  In Henry, 
the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel prohibited the 
post-indictment admission of incriminating statements the defendant made to his 
cellmate, an undisclosed and paid government informant, while the defendant was 
in custody on the indicted offense.  See id. at 269-71, 274.  In this case, although 
Scott was in custody on an unrelated drug arrest, he had not been formally charged 
for the crime at issue—first-degree murder—nor had an indictment been issued.  
Because no formal proceedings against Scott had begun on the crime of first-
degree murder, the holding in Henry does not apply to the facts we confront here. 
23 
 
 
We finally address Scott‘s claim that the death penalty is disproportionate.  
Specifically, Scott contends that the nature of the prior violent felony in his case 
does not elevate the murder of Kristo Binjaku to one permitting a sentence of 
death.  After considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, we agree 
with Scott that the imposition of the death penalty in this case would not be a 
proportionate punishment. 
―Due to the uniqueness and finality of death, this Court addresses the 
propriety of all death sentences in a proportionality review.‖  Hurst v. State, 819 
So. 2d 689, 700 (Fla. 2002).  In determining whether death is a proportionate 
penalty in a given case, we have explained our standard of review as follows: 
―[W]e make a comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether 
the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the 
least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the 
application of the sentence.‖  We consider the totality of the 
circumstances of the case and compare the case to other capital cases.  
This entails ―a qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis 
for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.‖  
In other words, proportionality review ―is not a comparison between 
the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.‖ 
 
Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 205 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Offord v. State, 959 
So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 2007)).  Thus, our proportionality review requires that we 
discretely analyze the nature and weight of the underlying facts; we do not engage 
in a ― ‗mere tabulation‘ of the aggravating and mitigating factors.‖  Terry v. State, 
668 So. 2d 954, 965 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Francis v. Dugger, 908 F.2d 696, 705 
24 
 
(11th Cir. 1990)).   
 
Here, the jury recommended death by a nine-to-three vote.  The trial court 
found two aggravators, assigning to them both great weight: (1) prior violent 
felony; and (2) commission during an attempted armed robbery.  Both aggravators 
resulted from Scott‘s convictions in this case and were weighed against nine 
nonstatutory mitigators: (1) Scott evidenced religious faith (slight weight); (2) 
Scott has love for his family and friends (slight weight); (3) Scott‘s father was 
absent from his life (slight weight); (4) Scott‘s family loves him (slight weight); (5) 
Scott was a good and respectful son to his family (little weight); (6) Scott is a good 
surrogate father (slight weight); (7) Scott can be a good father figure from prison 
(slight weight); (8) Scott overheard domestic abuse as a small child (slight weight); 
and (9) Scott once stopped a man from stealing from a grocery store (slight 
weight).   
The record certainly demonstrates that this is not a case with substantial 
mitigation.  Nevertheless, we conclude that because the aggravation is dissimilar to 
other robbery-murder cases where the imposition of the death penalty was upheld, 
this case is unlike those where the most aggravating circumstances exist.9  
We first focus on the prior violent felony aggravator, which is present in 
                                         
 
9.  At oral argument before this Court, the State did not contest that this case 
lacks strong aggravation and actually referred to the murder as ―poorly 
aggravated.‖   
25 
 
every case the State cites in support of its argument that Scott‘s death sentence is 
proportionate.  Here, the prior violent felony aggravator was predicated upon 
Scott‘s contemporaneous conviction for the aggravated battery inflicted upon 
Gentian Koci.  Regarding this aggravated battery, the record reflects that just 
before shooting Binjaku, Scott hit Koci on the head with the butt of his gun.  Koci, 
a friend of the victim‘s, was visiting the coin laundry at the time.  The record does 
not reflect whether Koci was ever treated for any type of injury as a result of this 
strike.  In fact, the original indictment charging Scott with first-degree murder did 
not include the aggravated battery charge.     
The State first learned of the battery when Koci was deposed prior to trial.  
Then, approximately four days before jury selection, the State charged Scott by 
information with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon for this offense; the trial 
court consolidated the two cases because both arose from the same series of acts.  
We set forth these factual circumstances not to minimize the aggravated battery 
charge, but to place this ―prior violent felony‖ aggravator in context of the 
proportionality of the death sentence and to evaluate the circumstances 
qualitatively. 
  In support of its proportionality argument, the State compares this case to 
Phillips v. State, 39 So. 3d 296 (Fla.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 520 (2010), Hayward 
v. State, 24 So. 3d 17 (Fla. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2385 (2010), Bryant v. 
26 
 
State, 785 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 2001), and Jackson v. State, 502 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1986).  
However, the Phillips and Bryant cases were more aggravated and involved prior 
violent felony aggravators established by qualitatively different offenses, which 
were committed at times separate from the murder.  See Phillips, 39 So. 3d at 301 
& n.7 (finding aggravators that crime was committed during robbery and prior 
violent felony established by two violent felonies occurring at times separate from 
murder (shot aunt in legs with sawed-off shotgun and armed robbery wherein 
defendant discharged gun thirteen times at someone attempting to thwart crime) 
along with additional aggravator that the murder was committed for purpose of 
avoiding lawful arrest or effecting escape from custody); Bryant, 785 So. 2d at 
436-37 & n.12 (finding same three aggravators as in Phillips and prior violent 
felony aggravator established by previous convictions for ―sexual battery, grand 
theft, robbery with a weapon, and aggravated assault with a mask‖).  Likewise, in 
both Hayward and Jackson, the Court considered similar aggravators to those 
found by the trial court in this case, but the prior violent felony aggravators were 
qualitatively more compelling.  See Hayward, 24 So. 3d at 27, 46-47 (prior violent 
felony aggravator established by three prior violent felonies for second-degree 
murder and two counts of armed robbery, to which trial court assigned ―extremely 
great weight‖); Jackson, 502 So. 2d at 410-11 (prior violent felony aggravator 
established by conviction for previous attempted armed robbery).  Therefore, the 
27 
 
State‘s reliance on the aforementioned cases is misplaced. 
The circumstances giving rise to the prior violent felony aggravator—in this 
case, a contemporaneous aggravated assault—although properly found, militate 
against the weight that a prior violent felony would normally carry.  Cf. Ocha v. 
State, 826 So. 2d 956, 966 (Fla. 2002) (finding prior violent felony aggravator 
―[p]articularly weighty‖ where defendant‘s prior convictions included robbery and 
one count of attempted murder); Hess v. State, 794 So. 2d 1249, 1266 (Fla. 2001) 
(―[T]he [prior violent felony] aggravator in this case, albeit established, is not as 
‗weighty‘ as it normally would be in cases where the defendant has a significant 
history of prior violent crimes, which includes prior murders.‖); Johnson v. State, 
720 So. 2d 232, 238 (Fla. 1998) (discounting one of Johnson‘s prior violent 
felonies because it was an aggravated assault against his codefendant and brother 
who testified that he was not injured). 
  While Scott‘s aggravated battery conviction unquestionably qualifies as a 
prior violent felony and a separate aggravator, see Francis v. State, 808 So. 2d 110, 
136 (Fla. 2001), we must consider that the facts supporting this aggravator 
demonstrate that the battery occurred at the same time as the murder and 
apparently involved a limited threat of violence and no permanent injury.  In fact, 
the circumstances of this case stand in stark contrast to other robbery-murder cases 
in which this Court has upheld the sentence of death as proportionate where the 
28 
 
prior violent felony aggravator was predicated upon crimes that did not occur 
contemporaneously with the murder.  See, e.g., Lebron v. State, 982 So. 2d 649, 
667 (Fla. 2008) (prior violent felony aggravator established by violent felonies 
committed shortly before and after the murder); Mendoza v. State, 700 So. 2d 670, 
679 (Fla. 1997) (prior violent felony aggravator established by armed robbery 
committed in connection with separate case and drawing a distinction between 
prior violent felony committed as a separate act as opposed to an act 
contemporaneous with the murder); Heath v. State, 648 So. 2d 660, 663 (Fla. 
1994) (prior violent felony aggravator established by previous conviction for 
second-degree murder); Melton v. State, 638 So. 2d 927, 929 & n.2 (Fla. 1994) 
(prior violent felony aggravator established by unrelated armed robbery and first-
degree murder); Freeman v. State, 563 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1990) (prior violent 
felony aggravator established by crimes of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and 
burglary of a dwelling with an assault, which were committed three weeks before 
murder).   
Furthermore, the prior violent felony aggravator, which was established by 
the aggravated battery committed during the course of the attempted robbery, is 
qualitatively different than in cases where this Court has affirmed the death penalty 
when similar aggravators were considered and the prior violent felony aggravator 
was based on a contemporaneous criminal act.  See, e.g., Frances v. State, 970 So. 
29 
 
2d 806, 820-21 (Fla. 2007) (finding death sentence proportionate as to victim Mills 
where aggravation was based on prior violent felony from a contemporaneous 
conviction for murder of another victim and that the murder was committed during 
the course of a robbery); Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41, 48 (Fla. 2003) (finding 
death sentence proportionate where two aggravating factors were present ((1) prior 
violent felony; and (2) the crime was committed while Kormondy was engaged or 
an accomplice in the commission of an attempt burglary), but prior violent felony 
aggravator was established by robbery of two victims and a sexual battery of one 
of the victims during the attempted burglary). 
If this Court were to consider the proportionality of the death penalty absent 
the prior violent felony aggravator found in this case, we would be left to evaluate 
only one aggravator (commission during attempted armed robbery) in relation to 
the mitigating factors presented, and the death penalty would unquestionably be 
disproportionate.10  In light of these observations, when the facts and 
                                         
10.  This Court has previously vacated the death sentence where the sole 
aggravating factor was that the murder was committed during the course of a 
robbery.  See, e.g., Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138, 1139-40 & n.1, 1142 (Fla. 
1995) (reversing death sentence for shooting death of cab driver where pecuniary 
gain and commission during a robbery were sole merged aggravator, which was 
weighed against three nonstatutory mitigators given little to no weight and this 
Court‘s finding of Sinclair‘s low intelligence and emotional disturbances); 
Thompson v. State, 647 So. 2d 824, 825-28 (Fla. 1994) (reversing death sentence 
for shooting death of fast-food worker where commission during robbery was the 
sole aggravating circumstance, which was weighed against several nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances); Lloyd  v. State, 524 So. 2d 396, 397, 403 (Fla. 1988) 
30 
 
circumstances in this case are compared to other capital cases involving a robbery-
murder, we conclude that death is not the appropriate penalty.   
Although not precisely like the ―robbery gone bad‖ cases where we have 
reduced the sentence of death to life, see, e.g., Jones v. State, 963 So. 2d 180, 188-
89 (Fla. 2007); Terry, 668 So. 2d at 965-66, there is no evidence in this case that 
Scott planned to shoot any of the individuals inside the coin laundry prior to doing 
so, and therefore this murder could be viewed as a reactive action in response to 
the victim‘s resistance to the robbery.  The fact that Scott left the coin laundry 
without attempting to shoot any of the remaining eyewitnesses further supports the 
inference that the defendant lacked a prearranged plan to murder. 
We note that the facts of this case are most similar to those presented in 
Johnson, 720 So. 2d at 235, 238, where defendant Johnson was convicted of first-
degree murder and other robbery-related offenses for the shooting death of Willie 
Gaines.  As in the instant case, during Johnson‘s trial, one witness testified that 
Johnson claimed to have shot the victim after the victim resisted the robbery.  Id. at 
235.  This Court upheld the defendant‘s conviction for first-degree murder under 
both premeditated and felony-murder theories, explaining that Johnson shot the 
victim multiple times during the course of the burglary and then finally, without 
                                                                                                                                   
(reversing death sentence for shooting death of woman at home where commission 
during a robbery was sole aggravator, which was weighed against one mitigating 
circumstance—that Lloyd had no significant history of prior criminal activity). 
31 
 
provocation, shot the victim in the jaw.  Id. at 236.  However, we vacated 
Johnson‘s sentence of death.  Id. at 239. 
In Johnson, the trial court found two aggravators (prior violent felony and 
burglary/pecuniary gain) and several mitigators, including the statutory mitigator 
that Johnson was twenty-two at the time of the crime, and several nonstatutory 
mitigators, including that (1) Johnson voluntarily surrendered to the police; (2) 
Johnson had a troubled childhood; (3) Johnson was previously employed; (4) 
Johnson was a good son and good neighbor; (5) Johnson had a young child; and (6) 
Johnson earned his GED and participated in high school athletics.  Id. at 235.  In 
reducing Johnston‘s penalty to a life sentence, we approved the trial court‘s finding 
that the murder was aggravated by the defendant‘s prior convictions of four violent 
felonies—aggravated assault, aggravated battery, robbery with a firearm, and 
attempted murder—and the fact that murder was committed during the course of a 
burglary.  Id. at 237-38.  Notwithstanding that fact, we found that the prior violent 
felony aggravator was not compelling when the circumstances surrounding the 
prior offenses were considered, reasoning as follows: 
The prior violent felony aggravating circumstance, although properly 
found to be present, is not strong when the facts are considered.  The 
aggravator is based in part on an aggravated assault committed by [the 
defendant] upon his brother, Anthony.  Anthony testified in the 
present case that he was not injured in the confrontation with his 
brother and that the entire incident occurred because of a 
misunderstanding.  The aggravator is also based in part on [the 
defendant‘s] two contemporaneous convictions as principal to crimes 
32 
 
against [the victim] simultaneously committed by codefendant 
Anthony. 
 
Id. at 238.  After considering these circumstances with the mitigating evidence 
presented and similar other capital cases, we concluded that the crime committed 
by Johnson was ―not among those for which the death penalty is specifically 
reserved.‖  Id. 
 
Like the defendant in Johnson, Scott was convicted under both premeditated 
and felony-murder theories and his penalty-phase proceeding produced comparable 
mitigation.  As in Johnson, the evidence here certainly supports a finding of two 
aggravating circumstances; however, those aggravators are simply not compelling 
when the circumstances surrounding Scott‘s contemporaneous felony are 
adequately considered: the prior violent felony was predicated upon an aggravated 
battery occurring at the same time as the murder, it involved a relatively limited 
use of violence, and was not charged until the eve of trial.  Moreover, the facts of 
the murder are less compelling than in Johnson, where the record reflected that 
Johnson shot the victim multiple times and then, without provocation, again shot 
the victim in the jaw.  Id. at 236.  Here, Scott shot Binjaku only once, and, by 
Scott‘s account, the shot was in response to Binjaku rushing at him with a chair.   
Based upon our review of the record and similar capital cases, we are 
compelled to conclude that this case does not fall into the narrow category of ―the 
most egregious of murders‖ in order to warrant the imposition of death.  Jones, 963 
33 
 
So. 2d at 189. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In accordance with our analysis above, we affirm Scott‘s conviction for first-
degree murder but vacate the sentence of death and remand for the imposition of a 
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority‘s decision to affirm Scott‘s conviction for first-
degree murder.  However, unlike the majority, I would also affirm Scott‘s death 
sentence because it is proportionate when compared to other death penalty cases.   
In this case, the trial court found two aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt 
and gave them both great weight:  (1) prior violent felony; and (2) commission 
during attempted armed robbery.  Both aggravators resulted from determinations of 
guilt in this case.  The trial court also found no statutory mitigators and nine 
nonstatutory mitigators of only slight and little weight:  (1) religious faith; (2) love 
for family and friends; (3) no father in his life; (4) respectful to family; (5) loved 
34 
 
by family; (6) good surrogate father; (7) ability to be a good father figure from 
prison; (8) overheard domestic abuse as a child; and (9) stopped a man from 
stealing.  There is no evidence of mental health issues or substance addiction. 
This Court has upheld death sentences in a number of robbery cases where 
the trial court found the prior violent felony aggravator, the commission during a 
robbery (or committed for pecuniary gain) aggravator, and similar or weightier 
mitigators.  See, e.g., Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17 (Fla. 2009) (death sentence 
proportionate with aggravators of prior violent felony and commission during a 
robbery merged with pecuniary gain and nonstatutory mitigators, including 
growing up without a father given some weight and academic and financial 
problems given little weight), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 2385 (2010); Lebron v. State, 
982 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2008) (death sentence proportionate with aggravators of prior 
violent felony and commission during a robbery merged with pecuniary gain and 
nonstatutory mitigators, including family, emotional, and mental health problems 
that were not compelling); Miller v. State, 770 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 2000) (death 
sentence proportionate with aggravators of prior violent felony and commission 
during an attempted robbery merged with pecuniary gain and nonstatutory 
mitigators, including remorsefulness and cooperation with law enforcement given 
some weight and frontal lobe deficiency given moderate weight); Mendoza v. 
State, 700 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1997) (death sentence proportionate with aggravators of 
35 
 
prior violent felony and commission during a robbery merged with pecuniary gain 
and nonstatutory mitigators, including drug use given little weight and mental 
health problems given minimal weight); Heath v. State, 648 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1994) 
(death sentence proportionate with aggravators of prior violent felony and murder 
committed during course of robbery, statutory mitigator of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, and nonstatutory mitigators, including good character in 
prison). 
Additionally, this Court has found the death penalty proportionate in robbery 
cases where the defendant had no apparent design to shoot someone.  See, e.g., 
Phillips v. State, 39 So. 3d 296 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 520 (2010); 
Bryant v. State, 785 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 2001); Jackson v. State, 502 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 
1986).   
Accordingly, I believe the death sentence is proportionate in this case, and I 
would affirm Scott‘s sentence as well as his conviction.  I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
CANADY, C.J., concurs. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Charles Warner Arnold, Jr., Judge – Case No. 2007-14830 CFA 
 
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and William Carl McLain, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
36 
 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Thomas David Winokur, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee