Case Title: Commonwealth v. Letkowski

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11556

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11556 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MIKOLAJ K. LETKOWSKI. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     April 10, 2014. - September 9, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Kidnapping.  Rape.  Robbery.  Assault and Battery by Means of a 
Dangerous Weapon.  Intimidation of Witness.  Witness, 
Intimidation.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  
Practice, Criminal, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of confession, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 8, 2006. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Peter 
A. Velis, J., and the cases were tried before Daniel A. Ford, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Charles W. Rankin (Kerry A. Haberlin with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
                     
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  After a jury trial, the defendant, Mikolaj 
Letkowski, was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated 
rape, armed robbery, assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon, and intimidation of a witness.  The defendant appealed, 
and the Appeals Court affirmed the convictions.  Commonwealth v. 
Letkowski, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 847 (2013).  We granted the 
defendant's application for further appellate review, limited to 
issues concerning the prosecutor's references to the defendant's 
invocation of his rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966), at trial.  We conclude that the 
prosecutor's references to the defendant's invocation of his 
Miranda rights were improper.  We conclude also, however, that 
in the particular circumstances of this case, the improper 
references, which were not objected to at trial, did not raise a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  We affirm the 
defendant's convictions. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  The jury could have found the 
following.  At approximately 11:30 P.M. on April 17, 2006, the 
victim, a student at a college in Springfield, drove from her 
off-campus job and entered the parking lot of her campus 
dormitory.  When she pulled into the parking lot, she noticed 
the defendant walking on the sidewalk near one of the 
dormitories.  The victim parked her car.  While she was 
3 
 
collecting her belongings from it, the defendant approached her 
and asked whether she knew where a set of nearby dormitories was 
located.  After answering him, the victim returned to gathering 
her belongings; when she turned around again, the defendant had 
a knife in his hand and ordered the victim back into her car.   
He then ordered the victim to give him one hundred dollars, but 
she told him that she did not have that much money on her.  The 
defendant drove the victim's motor vehicle (with the victim in 
the front passenger seat) to an automated teller machine (ATM) 
in West Springfield, declining to go to the ATM across from the 
college because, as he later told the police, it was too well 
lit and was close to a coffee shop which was frequented by the 
police.2 
 
Once they arrived at the ATM, the defendant ordered the 
victim to switch places with him; she complied and moved into 
the driver's seat.  He placed a black winter hat over his face 
as the victim drove through the ATM and aimed his face toward 
the passenger's side door to avoid being detected by video 
cameras.  The victim removed sixty dollars from her bank 
account; the defendant removed the hat from his face only after 
they left the ATM. 
                     
2 The facts we set out here include some explanations of the 
defendant's reasons for taking certain actions.  The source of 
this evidence is either the defendant's statement to the police 
that was admitted at trial or the victim's testimony as to what 
the defendant said to her. 
4 
 
 
The defendant then directed the victim to an apartment 
complex in Agawam where his former girl friend used to live.  He 
took the victim to the woods behind the complex and twice forced 
her to perform oral sex; he also digitally penetrated her.  
During the second instance of oral sex, a car pulled into the 
apartment complex, which prompted the defendant to have the 
victim stop and to tell her that, if anyone came into the woods, 
she should tell them that they were just "making out."  The 
defendant then hit the victim with a belt, directed her to get 
dressed, brought her to the bottom of a hill, and told her that 
he did not believe that she would not go to the police and that 
he could just stab her then and throw her in some nearby water. 
They returned to the car, and the victim drove back toward 
campus.  The defendant made her enter campus from a particular 
direction that had fewer lights and video cameras.  Once the 
victim parked her car near her dormitory, the defendant escorted 
her to her door.  Before leaving, he insisted that, should the 
victim go to the police, he knew her home address and where she 
lived on campus so he could find her.3 
 
The next day, Longmeadow police officers seized both a knit 
hat and a knife from the defendant's car during a valid traffic 
                     
3 Before the defendant and the victim arrived at the 
automated teller machine (ATM) in West Springfield, the 
defendant asked her for her driver's license.  He wrote down her 
name and her address on a piece of paper he found in the 
victim's vehicle. 
5 
 
stop of the defendant, but did not arrest him at that point.  
The defendant later admitted to police that the knit hat 
recovered was the one used during the robbery.4  In addition, a 
piece of paper containing the victim's name and information was 
recovered from a trash barrel outside the defendant's home 
during the execution of a search warrant.  Analysis of 
fingerprints lifted from the victim's car revealed that the 
fingerprints located on the driver's front door window and 
passenger's front door window matched the defendant's prints.   
The defendant's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was also a match 
with a vaginal swab taken from the victim.5 
 
b.  The defendant's statement to police.6  On April 19, 
2006, the defendant was arrested in his parents' home.  The 
defendant's mother provided the arresting officers with the 
                     
4 The defendant indicated in his interview with police that 
a knife the police recovered during the search of his car was 
the knife that he had carried with him in a gym bag when he 
committed the robbery, although he initially denied using the 
knife against the victim. 
 
5 Amylase, an enzyme found in human saliva, was detected on 
the victim's vaginal swab and served as the basis for the 
positive match of the defendant's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). 
 
6 The facts relied on here are principally taken from the 
motion judge's findings of fact on the defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
 
6 
 
defendant's prescription pain medication,7 and he was thereafter 
taken to the Springfield police department.  On arrival, the 
defendant was read the Miranda warnings, as well as his right to 
a prompt arraignment.  He told the officers that he understood 
those rights but stated that he did not wish to speak with them.8  
After this invocation, the officers took the defendant to be 
booked; in conjunction with the booking process, he was 
photographed and fingerprinted, and submitted to a DNA test.  
While he was in the booking area, the defendant received some of 
his prescription pain medication. 
 
After his fingerprints had been taken and the DNA swab 
obtained, the defendant told the officers that he wanted to give 
a statement.  Accordingly, two hours after he had initially 
invoked his Miranda rights, the defendant was escorted back to 
the police interview room where he again was advised of his 
Miranda rights and his right to prompt arraignment.  He 
indicated that he understood the rights and that he wanted to 
talk with the officers.  The defendant's resulting statement 
                     
7 On April 18, 2006, the defendant was assaulted and 
sustained facial injuries.  He was prescribed medication to 
alleviate the pain. 
 
8 Before he was read the Miranda warnings, the defendant 
informed the officers that he was receiving methadone 
maintenance treatment but had missed receiving his dose the 
morning of the arrest. 
7 
 
contained portions that implicated him in the robbery of the 
victim but denied sexually assaulting and beating her. 
 
c.  The references to the defendant's invocation of his 
Miranda rights.  Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress 
his statements to the police, asserting, in part, that his 
statements were not voluntary because the officers withheld the 
defendant's prescription pain medication and told him they would 
provide the defendant with his medication if he reconsidered 
talking to them.  After an evidentiary hearing, the motion 
judge, who was not the trial judge, did not accept the 
defendant's allegation about withheld medication, concluded that 
the defendant's statements were voluntary based on the totality 
of the circumstances, and ultimately denied the motion to 
suppress in its entirety.  The defendant based his defense at 
trial on his claim that he lacked criminal responsibility, and 
informed the prosecutor and the trial judge at the outset of the 
trial that voluntariness of the defendant's statements to the 
police remained a live issue. 
 
In three different portions of the trial, the prosecutor 
referred to the defendant's initial invocation of his Miranda 
right to remain silent and not to speak with police:  during her 
direct examination of Detective Eugene Dean of the Springfield 
police department; in her cross-examination of the defendant's 
expert witness, Dr. Melvin Lurie; and in her closing argument. 
8 
 
 
(i)  Detective Dean.  On the first day of Dean's testimony, 
the prosecutor elicited in her direct examination the following:  
The prosecutor:  "[C]an you explain to the ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury how you went over the Miranda 
warnings with him?" 
 
The witness:  "Line by line.  Read question number one, and 
he would read before we ask him any questions. . . .  
Number eight is, 'Having these rights in mind, do you wish 
to talk to me now?'  Stated he understood it, put his 
initials, but then wrote the word 'no', meaning he did not 
wish to talk with us any further." 
 
. . .  
 
The prosecutor:  "Showing you this document, can you 
explain to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what that 
document is." 
 
The witness:  "Yes.  That document is your right to a 
prompt arraignment . . . ." 
 
The prosecutor:  "Did you go over that document with [the 
defendant]?" 
 
The witness:  "Yes, in the same manner as I did in the 
first document. . . .  'Having these rights in mind, do you 
wish to talk to me now?'  He again wrote, 'No.'" 
 
The prosecutor thereafter introduced into evidence the "Miranda 
Warning" and "Arraignment Warning" forms, both of which 
evidenced the defendant's initial invocation of his right to 
remain silent in his own handwriting.  This testimony of Dean 
and these forms provided the first references to the defendant's 
invocation of his Miranda rights at trial.9 
                     
9 The defendant did not object to either the testimony or 
the admission of the forms from the first interview on the 
9 
 
 
On the second day of Dean's testimony, the prosecutor again 
referred to the defendant's invocation through her questioning: 
The prosecutor:  "I think you told us on Friday, initially, 
the defendant indicated that he did not wish to speak to 
you; is that correct?"  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The witness:  "That's correct." 
 
The judge:  "Which is --" 
 
The prosecutor:  "Which is his right?" 
 
The witness:  "It is, indeed, his right." 
 
. . .  
 
The prosecutor:  "At that time, you brought him back down 
to the booking area . . . so that he could continue with 
the booking process; is that correct?" 
 
The witness:  "That's correct." 
 
The prosecutor:  "It was at that point that he was booked 
and fingerprinted?" 
 
The witness:  "Correct." 
 
The prosecutor:  "And then he came back upstairs and 
decided to change his mind.  He did want to talk to you?"  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The witness:  "He had told us that while we were downstairs 
that he requested to go back upstairs." 
 
The prosecutor:  "After he was fingerprinted?" 
 
The witness:  "After he was fingerprinted and after he gave 
a DNA sample."10 
 
                                                                  
grounds that his invocation of his Miranda rights was being used 
against him. 
10 The defendant did not raise an objection to the questions 
posed or testimony elicited on this second day of testimony. 
 
10 
 
 
(ii)  Dr. Lurie.  During her cross-examination of the 
defendant's expert, the following exchange occurred: 
The prosecutor:  "Now, would it be fair to say that you 
know that, initially, the defendant did not want to speak 
to the police.  He went through his rights and said, [']no, 
I don't want to.[']" 
 
The witness:  "Right." 
 
. . . 
 
The prosecutor:  "[A]re you aware it was after he got 
fingerprinted that he indicated he was willing to speak to 
the police?" 
 
The witness:  "That might be the case; that might not be.  
If you tell me it is, then I don't have reason to doubt 
it." 
 
. . . 
 
The prosecutor:  "Now, is -- could it be -- hypothetically, 
if a person realizes that they are getting fingerprinted, 
and they realize that they touched something that was used 
in the course of a crime, hypothetically, is it not 
reasonable to assume that a person thinks they might have 
my fingerprints, I'm going to tell them my side of the 
story."11 
 
 
(iii)  Closing argument.  In her closing, the prosecutor 
rehearsed the various actions taken by the defendant during the 
criminal events that, the prosecutor argued, showed that the 
defendant was criminally responsible and described them as 
"calculated" actions.  The prosecutor then stated: 
 
"What I suggest [is] he calculated the scenario -- at 
first, he said he didn't want to talk to the police which 
is his right.  He has every right to say he did not want to 
                     
11 The defendant only objected to the final hypothetical 
question in this exchange; the objection was overruled. 
11 
 
talk to the police and that should not be taken against 
him. 
 
 
"But, then he finishes the booking process.  What does 
that involve?  They are rolling his fingerprints, and he's 
thinking to himself as they are rolling finger by finger by 
finger by finger, damn, damn.  I drove that girl's car.  I 
touched the steering wheel.  Okay.  I want to talk to the 
cops.  I want to tell my side of the story." 
 
. . . 
 
 
"It wasn't impulsive behavior.  It was cold.  It was 
calculated.  And he should be punished for it."12 
    
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Prosecutor's use of defendant's 
invocation of right to silence.  At trial, the defendant 
conceded that he committed the acts of aggravated kidnapping, 
aggravated rape, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, 
and intimidation of the victim that were at issue in the case; 
his defense, and the question in dispute, was whether he was 
criminally responsible for those acts.  Relying principally on 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-619 (1976), and Commonwealth v. 
Madhi, 388 Mass. 679, 694-697 (1983), he argues that the 
prosecutor's several references to his initial invocation of his 
right to remain silent violated his constitutional due process 
rights in that the prosecutor was using the defendant's 
invocation to argue, impermissibly, that he was indeed 
                     
12 The defendant did not raise an objection to the 
prosecutor's closing argument at trial. 
12 
 
criminally responsible.13  We agree with the defendant.  We begin 
with the governing constitutional principles. 
"There is no question that, under the fundamental 
principles of jurisprudence, evidence of a criminal defendant's 
postarrest, post-Miranda silence cannot be used for the 
substantive purpose of permitting an inference of guilt . . . ."  
Mahdi, 388 Mass. at 694, citing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 
171, 175, 181 (1975).  This prohibition exists because 
"[s]ilence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing 
more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights.  
Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous 
because of what the State is required to advise the person 
being arrested. . . .  Moreover, while it is true that the 
Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence 
will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any 
person who receives the warnings." 
 
                     
13 The defendant advanced this same argument before the 
Appeals Court.  That court viewed the prosecutor's references to 
the defendant's initial invocation during her direct examination 
of Detective Eugene Dean as being intended to respond to the 
defendant's claim that his statement to the police was not 
voluntary.  Commonwealth v. Letkowski, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 847, 
853-854 (2013).  The court concluded, however, that the 
references came before the defendant had raised the 
voluntariness issue at trial and therefore were improper as a 
matter of timing.  See id. at 855-856.  Nevertheless, because 
the defendant later did raise the voluntariness of his statement 
as a trial issue, in the Appeals Court's view, the prosecutor's 
questioning of the detective about the defendant's initial 
invocation ultimately would have been admissible, and the timing 
error did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Id. at 856-857.  As for the prosecutor's references to 
the defendant's initial invocation during her cross-examination 
of the defendant's expert and in her closing argument, the 
Appeals Court opined that the references "came dangerously close 
to using the defendant's initial silence against him and should 
not have been said[,]" id. at 856. 
13 
 
Commonwealth v. Cobb, 374 Mass. 514, 520-521 (1978), quoting 
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-618.  See Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 
Mass. 61, 73 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Peixoto, 430 Mass. 
654, 658-659 (2000).  See also Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 
792, 797 (1996).  Moreover, "[f]undamental unfairness results 
from the use of evidence of such silence regardless whether the 
person exercising his or her constitutional right to remain 
silent claims insanity as a defense."  Mahdi, supra at 695.14 
There are, however, "rare instances where evidence of a   
defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda silence . . . may be 
admissible."  Commonwealth v. DePace, 433 Mass. 379, 383 (2001), 
overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 Mass. 
71, 80 (2007).  Such instances include explaining why a police 
                     
14 See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986), 
where the United States Supreme Court rejected a State's 
argument that Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-619 (1976), did 
not preclude the State from contending that a defendant's post-
Miranda invocation of his right to remain silent and not to 
speak with the police was evidence that he did not lack criminal 
responsibility: 
 
"The point of the Doyle holding is that it is 
fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his 
silence will not be used against him and thereafter to 
breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his 
trial testimony.  It is equally unfair to breach that 
promise by using silence to overcome a defendant's plea of 
insanity.  In both situations, the State gives warnings to 
protect constitutional rights and implicitly promises that 
any exercise of those rights will not be penalized.  In 
both situations, the State then seeks to make use of the 
defendant's exercise of those rights in obtaining his 
conviction.  The implicit promise, the breach, and the 
consequent penalty are identical in both situations." 
14 
 
interview of the defendant abruptly ended and the jury would be 
confused without the explanation, see Commonwealth v. Habarek, 
402 Mass. 105, 110 (1988), S.C., 421 Mass. 1005 (1995); 
rebutting the defendant's suggestion at trial that some 
impropriety on the part of the police prevented him from 
completing his statement to them, see id.; and rebutting a claim 
by the defendant that he had given the police at the time of his 
arrest the same exculpatory explanation as he was presenting to 
the jury at trial.  See DePace, supra at 383-384.  None of these 
exceptions applies in this case. 
 
(i)  Direct examination of Detective Dean.  The 
Commonwealth contends that the prosecutor was justified in 
eliciting that the defendant initially invoked his right to 
remain silent during her direct examination of Dean to (1) 
"provide a complete picture of the defendant's interaction with 
the police," and in particular to explain why the first 
interview ended in very short order; and (2) rebut the 
defendant's theory that the statements elicited during his 
second police interview were not voluntary.  We disagree. 
 
When a defendant gives a statement to the police, it is 
permissible for the Commonwealth to present a fair and 
reasonably complete picture of the interaction between police 
and the defendant, including the administration of Miranda 
warnings and the defendant's responses to questions posed to him 
15 
 
during that process.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 
Mass. 452, 472 (2011); Habarek, 402 Mass. at 110.  In this case, 
the defendant gave a statement to the police when they brought 
him back to the interview room in response to his request near 
the end of the booking process.  The Commonwealth was entitled 
to, and did, present a full account of that interrogation 
through the prosecutor's direct examination of Dean.  The 
defendant's earlier invocation of his right to remain silent was 
a distinct event, separated by time and circumstances; clearly, 
there was no need, in the name of fairness or completeness, to 
include a description of that event in presenting evidence about 
the defendant's postbooking waiver of Miranda rights and police 
interview. 
 
In addition, the Commonwealth's reliance on Habarek, 402 
Mass. at 109-110, is misplaced.15  Unlike that case, where the 
                     
15 In Commonwealth v. Habarek, 402 Mass. 105 (1988), S.C., 
421 Mass. 1005 (1995), the defendant, after waiving his Miranda 
rights, spoke to a police officer, provided some information, 
and then stated that he did not want to say any more, at which 
point the interview ended.  Id. at 109 & n.1.  At trial, the 
interrogating officer recounted the entire interview on direct 
examination, including the defendant's statement about not 
wanting to say more.  Id. at 109.  Then, following a question by 
defense counsel during cross-examination about the fact that the 
interview had not been taped, id., the officer stated on 
redirect that no tape had been made because the defendant 
"exercised his right to remain silent so I terminated the 
conversation."  Id. at 110.  We concluded that although "[t]here 
should be no comments on the defendant's claim of his rights 
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution[,]" 
the officer's direct examination testimony about the defendant's 
16 
 
defendant waived his Miranda rights and spoke to the police 
about the alleged crime in question for at least a short while 
(see note 15, supra), in this case, Dean did not conduct any 
interview of the defendant the first time he and the defendant 
spoke, precisely because upon receiving the Miranda warnings, 
the defendant stated he did not want to speak with the police.  
See DePace, 433 Mass. at 384 ("The rule in Habarek does not 
apply to the present case [. . . .]  Here, there was no evidence 
of any interview, much less one that ended abruptly").  See also 
Commonwealth v. King, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 469 (1993).16  The 
                                                                  
request to end the interview was necessary to not leave the jury 
"wondering why the interview ended abruptly," id.; and that the 
officer's reference to exercise of rights on redirect was 
permissible "in response to the inferences left by defense 
counsel on cross-examination."  Id. 
 
16 The Commonwealth also contends that it needed to present 
the defendant's invocation to the jury to explain why a second 
set of Miranda warnings were given; not to do so would leave the 
jury "without any explanation as to the unnecessary repetition."  
We are not persuaded.  First of all, there was no need to 
mention the initial invocation at all, which would render 
"unnecessary repetition" a nonissue.  In any event, it is not 
unusual for the police to give a suspect multiple sets of 
Miranda warnings.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 
61, 68 (2010) (Miranda warnings given twice); Commonwealth v. 
Tolan, 453 Mass. 634, 644 (2009) (police read defendant Miranda 
warnings multiple times during interview).  And, here there was 
an intervening event -- the defendant's booking -- that provided 
the jury with a sufficient explanation for why the initial 
interaction with Dean was cut short and would need to be resumed 
later in time.  More to the point, we expect prosecutors, 
defense counsel, and trial judges to work together in order to 
find ways to provide juries with a reasonably complete picture 
of an interrogation without trenching on or even implicating the 
defendant's exercise of constitutional rights.  See Commonwealth 
17 
 
prosecutor's references to the defendant's desire to remain 
silent were not justified under Habarek. 
 
That the voluntariness of the defendant's statement to 
police remained a live issue at trial likewise did not justify 
the prosecutor's use of the defendant's exercise of his right to 
silence during her direct examination of Dean.  It is true that 
"under the Commonwealth's 'humane practice' rule, where the 
voluntariness of a statement is a live issue at trial, the jury 
may hear evidence that a defendant was informed of and 
understood his Miranda rights."  Toolan, 460 Mass. at 471.  But 
evidence that Miranda warnings were provided and that the 
defendant understood them does not itself require reference to 
the fact that the defendant earlier exercised the rights 
included in those warnings.  See id. at 472-473.17  This is 
particularly the case where, as here, the prosecutor introduced 
the evidence of the defendant's exercise of his Miranda rights 
                                                                  
v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 799 n.5 (1996).  See also Commonwealth 
v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 452, 472-473 (2011). 
 
17 We recognize that a defendant's initial exercise of his 
right to silence and then a change of mind and request to speak 
to the police could be deemed probative of the voluntariness of 
the defendant's statement.  But the fact that evidence might be 
relevant or probative does not mean that it can always properly 
be introduced.  As suggested in note 16, supra, when 
introduction of such arguably relevant evidence directly 
implicates the defendant's protected exercise of his 
constitutional rights, an inquiry as to whether alternatives are 
available should be undertaken -- before trial, if possible, and 
at sidebar during trial, if not. 
18 
 
at a time when the defendant had yet to raise the issue of 
voluntariness before the jury.  The references to the fact that 
the defendant initially declined to speak to police during the 
prosecutor's direct examination of Dean constituted error. 
 
(ii)  Cross-examination of the defendant's expert.  In 
cross-examining Dr. Lurie, the prosecutor again mentioned the 
defendant's initial assertion of his right to remain silent.18  
The Commonwealth argues that in doing so, the prosecutor was 
clearly addressing the voluntariness of the defendant's 
statement, and that she was careful to distinguish the 
"voluntariness" line of questioning from her questions that 
dealt with the defendant's criminal responsibility.  The 
defendant disputes this characterization.  He contends that the 
                     
18 The pertinent portions of the cross-examination are set 
out in the fact section of this opinion.  To summarize, the 
prosecutor asked Dr. Lurie if he knew the defendant had 
initially invoked his right not to speak with the police, and, 
following some intervening questions, asked if Lurie knew that, 
after the defendant was fingerprinted, he wanted to speak to the 
police.  The prosecutor then asked this question: 
 
"Now, is -- could it be  -- hypothetically, if a 
person realizes that they are getting fingerprinted, and 
they realize that they touched something that was used in 
the course of a crime, hypothetically, is it not reasonable 
to assume that a person thinks they might have my 
fingerprints, I'm going to tell them my side of the story." 
 
After defense counsel's objection was overruled, Lurie 
answered that he thought the fingerprints issue was irrelevant -
- what mattered was that the defendant was desperate for pain 
medication, and, Lurie stated, the defendant agreed to give a 
statement in exchange for receiving medicine. 
19 
 
true focus of the prosecutor's references to the defendant's 
assertion of his right to silence and then waiver was on his 
capacity to appreciate the wrongful nature of his conduct and to 
take steps post hoc to exculpate himself -- that is, the focus 
was on the defendant's criminal responsibility.19 
 
It is true Dr. Lurie testified that, in his opinion, the 
defendant's statement to the police was not voluntary.  But just 
as it was not necessary for the prosecutor to refer to the 
defendant's initial invocation of his rights in order to address 
the voluntariness issue with Detective Dean, it was equally 
unnecessary in cross-examining Lurie.  The prosecutor could have 
asked questions to challenge Lurie's view on voluntariness 
without the reference, and certainly could have posed the same 
hypothetical question whether a person in the defendant's 
position who had been fingerprinted would want to tell his story 
to the police without any mention of the defendant's earlier 
exercise of his right not to speak.  See Wainwright v. 
                     
19 In particular, the defendant points out that the 
prosecutor immediately preceded her references to the 
defendant's initial decision to decline to speak to police with 
questions highlighting a series of decisions by the defendant 
during the criminal event that evidenced he was not "oblivious" 
to the consequences of his criminal behavior.  The defendant 
argues that the prosecutor left the jury with the same 
impression about the defendant's invocation of his right to 
silence, i.e., that the defendant's ability first to invoke his 
Miranda rights and then waive them when he realized that "they 
might have my fingerprints" also proved that he was not 
oblivious to such consequences. 
20 
 
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 (1986) (carefully framed questions 
can accomplish same task as comment on silence). 
 
Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that it would 
have been permissible to introduce evidence of the defendant's 
initial invocation in order to respond to his claim of 
involuntariness, cf. Habarek, 402 Mass. at 110, contrary to the 
Commonwealth's claim, the prosecutor's questions were not so 
focused.  As the defendant points out (see note 19, supra), 
right before the prosecutor referred to the defendant's initial 
decision not to speak to police, she listed a series of the 
defendant's actions on the night the crimes were committed to 
show that he understood the consequences of his actions.  The 
Commonwealth argues that the prosecutor paused following these 
questions before turning to the voluntariness issue.  The 
transcript does reflect a pause, but we question whether that 
pause, by itself, was sufficient to signal to the jury that the 
prosecutor was no longer addressing the defendant's lack of 
criminal responsibility defense.  Moreover, the prosecutor 
followed her reference to the defendant's invocation of his 
right to silence with more questions about particular aspects of 
the criminal episode that arguably showed appreciation and 
control (i.e., criminal responsibility).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Acevedo, 427 Mass. 714, 716-717 (1998) (prejudice created by 
21 
 
correct jury instruction sandwiched between two incorrect 
instructions on same issue). 
 
In sum, the prosecutor's references to the defendant's 
invocation of the right to silence in the cross-examination of 
Lurie were improper. 
 
(iii)  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The portion of the 
prosecutor's closing argument challenged by the defendant 
followed the same pattern as her cross-examination of Lurie, and 
indeed built on it.  As earlier described, the prosecutor in her 
closing listed actions by the defendant that reflected his 
capacity for appreciation and control in relation to his 
conduct, characterizing them for the jury as "calculated" 
actions; she then moved to the defendant's initial exercise of 
his right to silence and subsequent decision to speak to the 
police after being fingerprinted, describing the defendant's 
thought pattern in essentially the same words as she had in her 
hypothetical question earlier posed to Lurie, and then labeling 
the entire invocation-waiver sequence as a "calculated . . . 
scenario." 
 
The Commonwealth asserts that the prosecutor's challenged 
remarks were addressing the voluntariness of the defendant's 
statement, not his criminal responsibility, and that she was 
entitled to do so to reply to the defendant's contrary position.  
Again, assuming the propriety of raising the defendant's initial 
22 
 
invocation of Miranda rights as a response to a defense 
challenge to voluntariness, the Commonwealth's argument ignores 
the close proximity and significant degree of parallelism 
between the portion of the prosecutor's closing argument 
countering the defendant's contention that he lacked criminal 
responsibility, and the portion purporting to address the 
voluntariness of the defendant's statement.  We agree with the 
defendant that the prosecutor's closing left the impression that 
the defendant's invocation in significant part demonstrated that 
he was criminally responsible.20  This is precisely what Madhi 
prohibits.  See Mahdi, 388 Mass. at 694-695. 
 
b.  Effect of errors.  With one partial exception, the 
defendant did not object at trial to the prosecutor's references 
to his invocation.21  Both the defendant and the Commonwealth 
agree, as do we, that the proper standard of review is whether 
                     
20 Cf. Toolan, 460 Mass. at 472 (conviction reversed on 
other grounds; prosecutor's opening statement and police 
testimony focused on defendant's actions and statements about 
whether to exercise Miranda rights came "dangerously close to an 
improper suggestion that the defendant was manipulating his 
constitutional rights to his own advantage"; "[o]n remand, the 
Commonwealth should exercise care to avoid using the defendant's 
exercise of his Miranda rights against him by suggesting that 
his invocations of or deliberations on those rights demonstrated 
his criminal responsibility"). 
 
21 The defendant objected to the hypothetical question the 
prosecutor asked Dr. Lurie about what a person in the 
defendant's circumstances would think about speaking to the 
police once fingerprinted, and the trial judge overruled the 
objection. 
23 
 
the errors created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999).  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 431 Mass. 30, 42 & n.20 (2000) 
(unpreserved error concerning admission of evidence of 
defendant's invocation of right to remain silent in first degree 
murder appeal was properly reviewed under substantial likelihood 
of miscarriage of justice standard). 
 
In Alphas, 430 Mass. at 13, this court stated: 
"An error creates a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice unless we are persuaded that it did not materially 
influence[] the guilty verdict. . . .  In making that 
determination, we consider the strength of the 
Commonwealth's case against the defendant (without 
consideration of any evidence erroneously admitted), the 
nature of the error, . . . whether the error is 
sufficiently significant in the context of the trial to 
make plausible an inference that the [jury's] result might 
have been otherwise but for the error, and whether it can 
be inferred from the record that counsel's failure to 
object was not simply a reasonable tactical decision" 
(quotations, citations, and footnotes omitted). 
 
See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 297-298 (2002) 
(review of denial of motion for new trial; articulation of 
factors for reviewing substantial risk of miscarriage of 
justice).22 
                     
22 The factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Madhi, 388 Mass. 
679, 696-697 (1983), are ones that the court originally set out 
for determining whether the Commonwealth's impermissible use of 
the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent at 
trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt -- a standard which 
does not apply to unpreserved errors.  See Commonwealth v. 
LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 n.6 (1999).  A number, but not all, 
of this court's decisions reviewing convictions of murder in the 
24 
 
 
We first review the considerations set forth in Alphas.  As 
to the strength of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant 
admitted to committing the acts constituting the crimes charged, 
and even without the evidence of the defendant's invocation of 
                                                                  
first degree have applied the Mahdi factors when determining 
whether such error, unpreserved at trial, raised a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Adams, 434 Mass. 805, 811-815 (2001) (applying Madhi factors 
to introduction of defendant's postarrest silence as evidence of 
criminal responsibility to determine whether errors created 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice).  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 690-691 (2014) (using 
Madhi factors to determine whether admission of defendant's 
requests to confer with counsel created substantial likelihood 
of miscarriage of justice).  But see Commonwealth v. Fowler, 431 
Mass. 30, 42-43 & n.20 (2000) (unpreserved error concerning 
invocation of right to silence; court concluded there was no 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice based solely on 
strength of Commonwealth's case).  Decisions also have varied in 
using the Madhi factors to assess whether an unpreserved Doyle 
error raises a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
Compare Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 829 (2009) 
(stating that court uses five Madhi factors to determine whether 
unpreserved Doyle error created substantial risk of miscarriage 
of justice), and Commonwealth v. Ewing, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 
544-545 (2006), S.C., 449 Mass. 1035 (2007) (looking at Madhi 
factors to determine whether prosecutor's impermissible but 
unobjected-to questions and comments infringing on defendant's 
right to remain silent after arrest created substantial risk of 
miscarriage of justice), with Commonwealth v. Brown, 451 Mass. 
200, 209 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 
(1999) (analyzing whether unpreserved possible Doyle issue 
created substantial risk of miscarriage of justice; no mention 
of Mahdi factors).  The Commonwealth and the defendant have 
applied the Mahdi factors in their arguments before this court, 
and in assessing whether the defendant was prejudiced by the 
errors, we consider in the text first the substantial risk 
factors set forth in Alphas, supra at 13, and then the Madhi 
factors.  The difference between the two sets of factors is not 
great.  We leave for decision in another case the question which 
set properly should apply to determine whether an unpreserved 
Doyle error creates a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice and requires reversal. 
25 
 
his Miranda rights, the Commonwealth's case that the defendant 
was criminally responsible was very strong.  The testimony of 
the victim, as well as the defendant's own statement to the 
police, provided detailed, compelling evidence that the 
defendant understood and appreciated that what he was doing was 
criminal and that he had the capacity to direct and control his 
behavior.23  Turning to the nature of the error and the failure 
of defense counsel to object, for all the reasons we have 
discussed previously, the prosecutor's various references to the 
defendant's initial invocation constituted a constitutional 
error that at least in part related to the premise of the 
defense.  Nevertheless, in the context of the other evidence 
presented at trial, the error does not create a plausible 
                     
23 The defendant through his statement, and the victim 
through her testimony, provided the jury with information that 
during the criminal episode:  (1) the defendant drove the 
victim's car as part of the abduction rather than his own; (2) 
the defendant drove with the victim to an ATM in West 
Springfield rather than the ATM near the college because that 
ATM was well-lit and near a coffee shop frequented by police; 
(3) once they arrived at the West Springfield ATM, the defendant 
switched places with the victim and moved from the driver's seat 
to the passenger's seat, pulled a hat over his face, and looked 
toward the passenger's window, all to avoid being detected on 
the drive-through ATM's video camera; (4) the defendant 
thereafter took the victim to an apartment complex that he knew 
had a wooded area where he and the victim would be shaded from 
view; (5) during the criminal episode, the defendant wrote the 
victim's name and information down on a piece of paper, and 
threatened to harm the victim should she go to the police; and 
(6) he also directed her to use a particular entrance of the 
college when they returned to the campus because there were 
fewer lights and video cameras. 
26 
 
inference that if it had not occurred, the jury would have 
decided the case differently.  See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 22 
Mass. App. Ct. 10, 21 (1986).  In these circumstances, we 
conclude that no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
occurred in this case. 
 
Finally, we turn to the factors that the court set out in 
Mahdi, 388 Mass. at 696-697, for assessing the degree of harm 
caused by constitutional evidentiary errors.  See note 22, 
supra.  The Mahdi factors are:  "(1) the relationship between 
the evidence and the premise of the defense; (2) who introduced 
the issue at trial; (3) the weight or quantum of evidence of 
guilt; (4) the frequency of the reference; and (5) the 
availability or effect of curative instructions."  Id. 
(footnotes omitted).  Many of the factors weigh against the 
Commonwealth here.  The prosecutor's references to the 
defendant's invocation of Miranda rights, when used to suggest 
criminal responsibility, directly connected to the premise of 
the defendant's defense (factor 1); the Commonwealth introduced 
the evidence at trial (factor 2); the prosecutor referred to the 
invocation in three contexts (factor 4); and there were no 
targeted curative instructions by the judge (factor 5) -- 
although the absence of such instructions is consistent with the 
evidence being admitted without objection.  See Commonwealth v. 
27 
 
Adams, 434 Mass. 805, 812 (2001).24  But as discussed, the 
victim's testimony and, significantly, the defendant's own 
statement described the series of intentional actions he took 
during the criminal episode and offered explanations for those 
actions (see note 23, supra), and these explanations provided 
very powerful evidence of the defendant's ability to appreciate 
both the wrongfulness of his actions and his ability to conform 
his actions to the requirements of law -- i.e., that he 
possessed criminal responsibility while committing the crimes 
(factor 3).  See id. at 814 ("lengthy laundry list of rational, 
calculating, nondelusional conduct . . . admittedly engaged in 
by [the defendant] before, during, and just after the crime" 
supported "[the Commonwealth's] expert's testimony that [the 
defendant] was fully capable of complex thought and action when 
he committed the murders, and was able to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct and form it to the requirements of 
the law" [footnote omitted]).  See also Fowler, 431 Mass. at 42-
43.25  In light of the strength of the evidence of the 
                     
24 Moreover, the fact that the defendant ultimately spoke 
with the police serves to mitigate the potential for 
impermissible inferences being drawn by the jury from the 
defendant's initial refusal to speak with them.  See 
Commonwealth v. Peixoto, 430 Mass. 654, 658 n.4, 661 (2000). 
 
25 In cases of murder in the first degree where the 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard 
applies, Mahdi indicates that where a clear Doyle error occurs 
28 
 
defendant's criminal responsibility, even considering the Mahdi 
factors, we conclude that there was no substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice, and reversal of the defendant's 
convictions is not warranted. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The prosecutor's references to the 
defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent constituted 
error but they did not create a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  For the reasons stated by the Appeals 
Court, Letkowski, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 858-859, the case is 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                                  
"reversal is the norm, not the exception."  Mahdi, 388 Mass. at 
698.