Case Title: Guidone's Food Palace v. Palace Pharmacy

Citation: 248 N.E.2d 354, 252 Ind. 400

Docket Number: 369 S 57

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1969-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
252 Ind. 400 (1969)
248 N.E.2d 354
JOS. GUIDONE'S FOOD PALACE, INC.
v.
PALACE PHARMACY, INC. ET AL.
No. 369 S 57.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed June 27, 1969.
*401 Alan H. Lobley, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Forrest D. Rau, of Indianapolis, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
ARTERBURN, J.
This action was brought by plaintiff-appellee,[1] who was a lessee in a small Indianapolis shopping center against the lessor, Gardner and Guidone, Inc., and another lessee, appellant, to enjoin alleged violations by the appellant of the covenants in restraint of trade contained in the leases. The trial court granted the appellee a temporary injunction pending the trial of this cause. From this order, the appellant appeals.
The evidence shows that on September 1, 1965, Palace Pharmacy entered into a ten year lease with Gardner and Guidone, Inc., which lease contained the following provision:
Jos. Guidone's Food Palace, Inc., (herein referred to as Appellant) was originally owned by the same Joseph Guidone who was connected with Gardner and Guidone, Inc. The grocery store entered into their lease on October 9, 1965, and commenced business in March, 1966. Guidone sold his stock in the grocery store to Scot Lad Foods, Inc., in October, 1967. A subsequent lease was entered into October 25, 1967, for a term of fifteen years. The lease contained the following provision:
The Appellant admitted in the trial court that it had knowledge of the lease between Palace Pharmacy, Inc., and Gardner and Guidone, Inc., at the time the lease was executed on October 26, 1967.
The Appellant uses the case of Mennen Co. v. Kelly, 137 F.2d 866 (3rd Cir.1942) to define cosmetics. An examination of that case, however, shows that it was concerned only with whether Mennen Antiseptic Oil was a cosmetic within the meaning of the Revenue Act taxing cosmetics. The definition given in that case was that a cosmetic was "a preparation intended to beautify or improve the complexion, skin `or hair'." The definition is tempered by a caveat: "Like many definitions given at large this one may prove both too wide or too narrow when applied in specific situations, although it was satisfactory enough in the case cited." Mennen Co. v. Kelly, supra, 867.
The reliance Appellant places on the language to the effect that a cosmetic is an article of decorative value and that cosmetics create "fictitious (artificial) appearances" is misleading and is too vague to be of use to us in the present case.
In a case with similar facts, it was held that dentifrices, hair tonics, denture powders, shampoos and shaving preparations were cosmetics. The court on appeal in that case said:
Viewing the items contained in the trial court's temporary injunction, we believe that the classification of the items as "drugs or cosmetics" was reasonable and was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
The Appellant would urge the court to classify the items as health and beauty aids and not as drugs or cosmetics. This Court knows of no definition or classification which would allow a separation of health and beauty aids from drugs or cosmetics. The lease itself contains a provision that the Food Palace can only sell the health and beauty aids "when not inconsistent with the leases in effect". The right to sell health and beauty aids was not an unequivocal right, but a conditional right based upon a showing that their sale did not violate any other lease. Such conditional right was lost by the lessor agreeing to prohibit the sale of drugs and cosmetics. This Court will not be swayed in its consideration by different labels which are placed on items with no valid distinction shown between the categories.
The Appellant further alleges that even if the lease was violated, the appellee is estopped from recovering. The Appellee admits selling Metrecal, Sego, ice cream, dog food, candy, soft drinks, Kool-aid, unpopped popcorn, paper towels and napkins, detergents, hand soaps, window polish and drain cleaners. The Appellant urges that this violates the clause in the lease which prohibits the sale by appellee of any food or related grocery or meat product. Therefore, it is appellant's position that appellee's "unclean hands" would estop him from recovering.
*406 It is apparent under the terms of the leases of the respective parties that there could be an overlapping of items that both could lawfully sell outside the field of merchandise specifically restricted. Whether or not the appellee has been guilty of the violations, we need not at this time determine, since the question was not put at issue by any pleading in the hearing on the temporary injunction or interlocutory order. It may be that such an issue can properly be presented in the hearing on the permanent injunction. The rules governing the granting of a temporary injunction or an interlocutory order are different from those which would prevail in the hearing on the permanent injunction. It is not necessary that the proof be as complete and convincing in the granting of a temporary injunction or interlocutory order as that required at the time of the determination of the permanent injunction. It has been said that the granting of an interlocutory order is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the petitioner need only make out a prima facie case.
*407 We therefore hold that all that is necessary in order to obtain a temporary injunction is the establishment of a prima facie case stating facts authorizing such relief, which the appellee-drug store did in this case.
Under the result we reach herein it is unnecessary for us to discuss the cross-error presented by the appellee.
It appears that there has been no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the granting of the interlocutory order appealed from in this case, and the judgment thereon is affirmed.
DeBruler, C.J., Hunter and Givan, JJ., concur. Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 248 N.E.2d 354.
[1]  The term appellee in this opinion refers only to Palace Pharmacy, Inc. Gardner and Guidone, Inc. are joined as appellees only because they failed to appeal the judgment rendered by the trial court.