Case Title: In re Magar

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51060

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  November 4, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
MAGAR E. MAGAR
Accused.
(OSB 01-196, 02-128, 02-129; SC S51060)
En Banc
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted September 9, 2004.
Magar E. Magar, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief for himself.
Jane Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year, effective 60 days from the date of filing of
this decision. 
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) filed a complaint alleging that the accused, an
inactive member of the Bar, violated ORS 9.160 (holding self out
as lawyer without authorization to do so) (two counts); Code of
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(3)
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation) (three counts); DR 2-101(A)(1) (making or
causing to be made communication containing material
misrepresentation about self or omitting statement of fact
necessary to make communication considered as whole not
materially misleading) (two counts); DR 7-102(A)(5) (knowingly
making false statement of fact) (one count); and DR 7-106(C)(7)
(intentionally violating established rule of procedure) (one
count).  The accused failed to attend the disciplinary hearing
before the trial panel of the Disciplinary Board.  As a result,
the trial panel granted the Bar's motion for a default under Bar
Rule of Procedure (BR) 5.8(a) and deemed the allegations of the
Bar's complaint to be true.  Subsequently, the trial panel
concluded that those allegations established that the accused had
violated the rules as charged.
The trial panel's November 21, 2003, opinion states as
follows:  "The Trial Panel orders a suspension of one year."  At
the time, the accused was on inactive status with the Bar and,
consequently, had no authority to engage in the practice of law. 
Neither the Bar Rules of Procedure nor this court's past
decisions explain how a disciplinary suspension should operate in
that context.  We return to that subject later in this opinion.
When the trial panel issued its decision, ORS 9.536(2)
(2001), amended by Or Laws 2003, ch 192, § 4, provided for
automatic review by this court of a "decision of the disciplinary
board * * * to suspend the accused attorney from the practice of
law for a period of longer than six months * * *."  See also
former BR 10.1 (2001) (stating similar rule). (1)
  We apply the
automatic review provisions here, because those provisions were
in effect when the trial panel issued its decision.  We review
the decision of the trial panel de novo.  ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.6. 
The Bar has the burden of establishing the alleged conduct by
clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2; In re McKee, 316 Or 114,
116, 849 P2d 509 (1993).  "'Clear and convincing evidence' means
evidence establishing that the truth of the facts asserted is
highly probable."  In re Cohen, 316 Or 657, 659, 853 P2d 286
(1993).
BR 5.8(a) provides in part:
"If an accused lawyer fails to resign or file an answer
to a formal complaint within the time allowed by these
rules, or if an accused lawyer fails to appear at a
hearing set pursuant to BR 2.4(h), the trial panel    
* * * may file with the Disciplinary Board Clerk an
order finding the accused in default under this rule. 
* * *  The trial panel shall thereafter deem the
allegations in the formal complaint to be true.  The
trial panel shall thereafter proceed to render its
written opinion based on the formal complaint * * *."
(Emphasis added.)  A threshold issue in this proceeding is
whether the accused failed to "appear at a hearing" within the
meaning of BR 5.8(a).  
The Bar asserts that an accused lawyer must appear in
person at a disciplinary hearing to avoid default. (2)
  The
accused argues that an accused may "appear at a hearing" within
the meaning of BR 5.8(a) by filing a document with the trial
panel at or before the hearing.  He contends that he made an
appearance of that kind at his hearing when he delivered a
document entitled "Please consider this a motion" to the office
of the trial panel chairperson at approximately 5:00 p.m. on the
day before the scheduled trial panel hearing.  A stack of papers
accompanied the motion.  The motion stated that the accused
requested the admission into evidence of his "public file" with
the Bar and the complaints, and related correspondence, that the
accused had filed against other lawyers who had complained
against the accused in this proceeding.  The accused apparently
assumed that the trial panel chairperson would offer the document
into evidence on the accused's behalf at the hearing.  The
accused failed to serve a copy of that document on the Bar.  The
trial panel denied the accused's motion and granted the Bar's
motion for a default.  
The accused now makes inconsistent arguments.  On the
one hand, he contends that the trial panel's default order is not
valid because he made an appearance at the hearing by delivering
his motion and documents to the trial panel chairperson, as
described above.  On the other hand, the accused also concedes
that, "[b]ecause of the default[,] it appears that accused is
stuck with the truthfulness of the allegations of the amended
complaint BR 5.8(a)."  The accused also asserts that he now
wishes to supplement the record with the documents that the trial
panel chairperson refused to receive into evidence at the
hearing.
It is evident that the accused is aware of the
predicament in which he finds himself.  To that, we add that the
predicament is one of the accused's own making.  Because the
accused chose not to appear at his hearing, he was not available
to authenticate the documents on which he now attempts to rely. 
Moreover, the accused violated BR 1.10(d) (3)
 by failing to
serve a copy of his motion and documents on the Bar.  The trial
panel chairperson committed no error in denying the accused's
motion and refusing to receive those documents into evidence.  As
a consequence, nothing in the record before the court supports
the accused's claim that he appeared at the hearing. (4)
  
We decline to allow the accused to supplement the
record at this late date with those documents, because, from all
that appears, those documents are not in the record at the
present time only as a result of the accused's intentional choice
not to attend the disciplinary hearing and his failure to submit
his documentary evidence properly at the hearing.  The accused's
attempt to present argument in reliance on those documents is
unavailing, because the documents are not in the record before
the court.  
Like the trial panel, we "deem the allegations in the
formal complaint to be true[,]" BR 5.8(a), and conclude that the
Bar's alleged facts are sufficient to establish that the accused
violated ORS 9.160, DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 2-101(A)(1), DR 7-102(A)(5), and DR 7-106(C)(7).  We turn to the appropriate
sanction.
At the outset, we note that the accused does not
challenge the trial panel's sanction of a one-year suspension. 
Rather, he points out that he is 65 years old and "has no
intention of ever applying to become active again."
The accused has been an inactive lawyer for four years. 
In that status, the accused may not engage in the practice of
law, but may apply informally for reinstatement as an active
member of the Bar under BR 8.2(a)(ii). (5)
  A suspension of an
inactive lawyer for a period of one year, as the trial panel
determined, does not affect the lawyer's ongoing inability to
practice law.  However, a suspension of that length subjects the
accused to the formal reinstatement requirements set out in BR
8.1(a)(iv). (6)
  The relatively simple reinstatement procedures
in BR 8.2(a)(ii) do not apply to an inactive lawyer whom this
court has suspended for more than six months.
After considering the record as a whole, including the
decision of the trial panel, we agree with the trial panel that a
suspension of one year is the appropriate sanction for the
accused's misconduct.  A detailed discussion of the facts that
support that determination would not serve the public, bench, or
bar.  In the event that the accused decides to apply for
reinstatement to active status, the requirements of BR 8.1(a)(iv)
would apply in the ordinary course. 
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year, effective 60 days from the date of filing of
this decision.
1. The legislature amended ORS 9.536(1) and (2), effective
January 1, 2004, to eliminate automatic review by this court and
to provide, instead, for review in all discipline proceedings by
this court as "a matter of right upon the request of either
party."  Or Laws 2003, ch 192, § 4.  The Bar proposed, and this
court approved, a conforming amendment to BR 10.1 effective
January 1, 2004.
2. At oral argument, the Bar agreed that an accused lawyer
also may appear at a hearing by telephone.
3. BR 1.10(d) provides:
"A copy of any pleading or document filed under
these Rules must also be served by the party or
attorney delivering it on other parties to the case. 
All service copies must include a certificate showing
the date of filing.  'Parties' for the purposes of this
rule shall be the accused or applicant, or his or her
attorney if the accused or applicant is represented,
Disciplinary Counsel, and Bar Counsel."
4. Because we conclude that the accused did not "appear at
[his] hearing," BR 5.8(a), we have no occasion to decide whether
an accused lawyer may "appear" under that rule by filing a
pleading or other document, or, instead, whether an accused
lawyer must appear either telephonically or in person.
5. BR 8.2(a) provides, in part:
"Any person who has been a member of the Bar, but
who has
"* * * * *
"(ii) been enrolled voluntarily as an inactive
member for five years or less prior to the date of
application for reinstatement; * * *
"* * * * *
"may be reinstated by the Board at its next regularly
scheduled meeting following the filing of an informal
application for reinstatement with the Bar and
compliance with the Rules of Procedure in effect at the
time of such application."
6. BR 8.1(a) provides, in part:
"Any person who has been a member of the Bar, but
who has 
"* * * * *
"(iv) been suspended for misconduct for a period
of more than six months * * *
"and who desires to be reinstated as an active member 
* * * shall be reinstated as an active member of the
Bar only upon formal application and compliance with
the Rules of Procedure in effect at the time of such
application."