Case Title: State v. Weston

Citation: 159 S.E.2d 883, 273 N.C. 275

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1968-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
159 S.E.2d 883 (1968) 273 N.C. 275 STATE of North Carolina v. Ebenezer Cola WESTON (Nos. 33 and 34). No. 1. Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 20, 1968. *886 Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton and Staff Attorney Andrew A. Vanore, for the State. Aydlett & White and Frank B. Aycock, Jr., Elizabeth City, for defendant. BRANCH, Justice. Defendant assigns as error the trial court's denial of his motions for judgment as of nonsuit. The often-quoted landmark case of State v. Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 167 S.E. 456, defines culpable negligence and distinguishes culpable negligence and the resulting criminal responsibility from ordinary actionable negligence which imports only civil liability. We quote portions of this opinion: The rule as to the intentional or unintentional violations of a speed statute as related to culpable negligence is concisely *887 stated by Denny, J. (later C.J.), in the case of State v. Hancock, 248 N.C. 432, 103 S.E.2d 491, as follows: See 1 N.C. Index, 2d, Automobiles, § 110, footnotes 71, 72 and 73, beginning on page 597, for an exhaustive citation of applicable case law. The evidence, in the light most favorable to the State, tends to show that defendant was operating his automobile in an easterly direction on Highway 158 at a speed of 58 to 60 miles per hour, on a clear, sunny day, at about 8:00 o'clock a.m. There was nothing to obstruct his view of the highway, and from the point where the school bus stopped the highway was straight in a westerly direction for one to one and a half miles and in an easterly direction for two miles. The school bus came to a stop when defendant was approaching at a distance of about 500 feet. The arm stop signal and the blinking light on the bus were put into operation 300 feet east of the place where the bus stopped. Defendant passed the stopped school bus at a speed of about 25 miles per hour. At least two of the three children had been standing within one foot of the southern edge of the pavement across from where the bus stopped. Defendant did not see any of the children. Michael Dean Heath died as a result of the injuries received when he was struck by defendant's automobile. It is a violation of the law to pass a school bus while such bus is stopped and engaged in receiving or discharging passengers therefrom upon the roads or highways of the state. G.S. § 20-217. It is also a violation of the law to drive upon the highways of the state carelessly and heedlessly, in wilful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or to operate a motor vehicle without caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property. G.S. § 20-140. These statutes are safety statutes, designed for the protection of life, limb and property. Applying these recognized rules of law, we hold that the trial judge correctly overruled defendant's motions for nonsuit. Defendant assigns as error, inter alia, the following portion of the trial judge's charge: Here, the trial judge instructed the jury as to several alternatives under which they could find defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter. One of the alternatives was that the jury should find defendant guilty if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time his automobile struck and killed Michael Dean Heath defendant was operating his car while failing to keep a reasonable lookout. This instruction was erroneous in that it applied the test of civil liability rather than the test of criminal liability. State v. Cope, supra; State v. Spencer, 209 N.C. 827, 184 S.E. 835. It is apparent from the exemplary manner in which the learned trial judge charged the jury in other respects and the able manner in which he presided at this trial that this erroneous portion of the charge was a lapsus linguae. However, this Court has held many times that when there are conflicting instructions upon a material point, one correct and one incorrect, a new trial must be granted. Since the jury is not supposed to know which is the correct instruction, we must assume that the jury's verdict was influenced by that portion of the charge which is incorrect. State v. Starnes, 220 N.C. 384, 17 S.E.2d 346. It is obvious that this portion of the charge is a material point and, even though apparently inadvertent, is error. Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his motions for nonsuit as to the charge of passing a school bus while it was stopped on a road or highway and engaged in receiving or discharging passengers therefrom. We do not deem it necessary to again review the evidence upon consideration of defendant's motions for nonsuit as to this charge. Suffice it to say that, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and resolving the conflicts therein in favor of the State, as we must do, there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged. State v. Thompson, 256 N.C. 593, 124 S.E.2d 728; State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 120 S.E.2d 580, 86 A.L.R.2d 259. The trial court correctly denied defendant's motions for nonsuit. Nor is there merit in defendant's contention that the judgment entered was excessive. The sentences were within the statutory limit for the offense of which defendant was convicted, and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment as forbidden by Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of North Carolina. State v. LePard, 270 N.C. 157, 153 S.E.2d 875. We have carefully examined defendant's remaining assignments of error and find no prejudicial error affecting the charge of passing a school bus while it was stopped on the road or highway and engaged in receiving or discharging persons therefrom. As to the charge of involuntary manslaughter: New trial. As to the charge of passing a school bus while it was stopped: No error.