Case Title: MARK GEORGE WHITFIELD v. STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-59

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARK GEORGE WHITFIELD v. STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 190781 P.2d 913Case Number: 89-59Decided: 10/26/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARK GEORGE WHITFIELD, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, GoshenCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Wyoming Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Mike Cornia, Appellate Counsel, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Hugh Kenny, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Tandem claims of abuse 
of discretion in imposing sentencing encompass the only issues in this appeal. 
Mark George Whitfield (Whitfield) first asserts that the trial judge refused to 
consider probation when imposing sentence, thereby committing an abuse of 
discretion. Whitfield also contends that the sentence imposed of not less than 
three nor more than five years constituted an abuse of discretion. Our review of 
the record convinces us that the trial judge appropriately considered, and 
rejected, probation as a sentencing option and, further, there was no abuse of 
discretion with respect to the term imposed. The judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.

[¶2.]     Whitfield stated the 
issue in his Brief of Appellant in this way:

"Whether the trial 
court's refusal to consider probation and subsequent sentence to three to five 
years incarceration was an abuse of discretion."

The State of 
Wyoming 
submitted a counterstatement of the issue that is substantially identical to the 
articulation by Whitfield. Whitfield did not submit extensive argument in his 
brief with respect to the length of the sentence but, because he framed the 
issue in the way that he did and alluded to the length of the sentence in his 
argument, we do address the question of whether this sentence amounted to an 
abuse of discretion under the circumstances. Whitfield was charged with 
aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of §§ 31-5-233 and 6-2-106(b)(i), 
W.S. 1977. After waiving a preliminary examination, he initially entered a plea 
of not guilty in the district court. Whitfield filed a motion to suppress both 
the report of a blood alcohol test that was accomplished about an hour after the 
accident in question and some statements that he made to an investigating 
highway patrolman. After an adverse ruling on his motion to suppress, Whitfield 
changed his plea to guilty, and he was sentenced to a term of not less than 
three nor more than five years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

[¶3.]     Section 31-5-233, W.S. 
1977 (1988 Cum. Supp.), on April 2, 1988, the date of the offense, provided, in 
pertinent part:

"(a) It is unlawful for 
any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to a degree which 
renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, to drive or have actual 
physical control of any vehicle within this state.

"(b) Upon the trial of 
any criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been 
committed by any person while driving a vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in the person's blood at the time 
alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath or 
other bodily substance shall give rise to the following 
presumptions:

* * * * * 
*

"(iii) If there was at 
that time ten one-hundredths of one percent (0.10%) or more by weight of alcohol 
in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, to a degree which renders him incapable of 
safely driving a motor vehicle; * * *."

Section 6-2-106, 
W.S. 1977 (June 1988 Repl.), provided, in pertinent part:

"(b) A person is guilty 
of aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, if:

"(i) While operating or 
driving a vehicle in violation of W.S. * * * 31-5-233 * * *, he causes the death 
of another person and the violation is the proximate cause of the death; * * 
*."

[¶4.]     On April 2, 1988, 
Whitfield, then twenty-seven years old, began drinking at a bar in Torrington around 1:30 in 
the afternoon. He advised the probation officer that he had two beers and then 
left around 3:30. He said that he returned to the bar to drink two more beers 
and two mixed drinks and stayed until 5:00 P.M.; he then went to another bar 
where he had a few more drinks (two or three); and, about 7:00 P.M., he stopped 
at a bar in Lingle. He did not state that he had a drink at the last stop. He 
then began his return journey to Torrington, and 
not very far east of Lingle, on U.S. Highway 85-26, at about 9:15 P.M., 
Whitfield struck a vehicle driven by Kevin L. Zimmerman, age twenty-two, a 
student at EasternWyomingCollege, from behind. Both vehicles rolled 
over after the collision, and Zimmerman was found fifty-five feet from his car. 
Zimmerman died at the scene of the accident while Whitfield received only minor 
injuries, which apparently included a blow to his head. The investigating 
officer, when testifying at the suppression hearing, stated that both vehicles 
were traveling in the same direction at the time of impact, that the road was 
dry, and that the impact occurred on a straight stretch of the highway. The 
laboratory report on the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of the sample of 
blood taken from Whitfield approximately an hour later was 0.29%. A blood 
alcohol concentration evaluation of a sample of Zimmerman's blood showed no 
alcohol. At the time he changed his plea from not guilty to guilty, Whitfield 
acknowledged that he was too drunk to drive on that evening and that Zimmerman's 
death was a result of Whitfield's driving while 
intoxicated.

[¶5.]     Prior to imposing 
sentence upon Whitfield, the trial court directed that a presentence 
investigation and report be conducted and prepared by the Department of 
Probation and Parole. That report discloses that, between 1979 and 1987, 
Whitfield had accumulated numerous traffic violations which included eight 
speeding citations and one charge of driving under the influence in 1985. After 
that offense, Whitfield received "counseling," and the term "binge alcoholic" 
was used in describing his use of intoxicating liquors. The report also notes 
other instances of substance abuse.

[¶6.]     Prior to sentencing, 
counsel for Whitfield filed a motion for sentencing pursuant to § 7-13-301, W.S. 
1977 (June 1987 Repl.). This statute provides for the suspension of criminal 
proceedings and the placing of the person charged on probation. The sentencing 
judge acknowledged that this statute is a "great tool" and advised that he had 
used it before, but that Whitfield's motion was denied because the judge felt 
the statute did not "fit this particular situation." At the sentencing hearing, 
the trial judge recognized that Whitfield basically was a good person, but 
stated that he deserved to be punished for causing an alcohol-related death. In 
imposing sentence, the judge emphasized Whitfield's indifference to Zimmerman's 
safety as evidenced by the fact that Whitfield continued to drive his vehicle 
even though his blood alcohol concentration was nearly three times the legal 
limit. After weighing the statements of counsel and the policy and sentencing 
considerations, the judge ruled that probation would be an inappropriate 
disposition in this instance and, instead, the judge sentenced Whitfield to a 
term of not less than three nor more than five years in the state 
penitentiary.

[¶7.]     The well-settled rule 
in cases that challenge the imposition of sentence by a trial judge is that, in 
the absence of an abuse of discretion, the sentence stands. Kavanaugh v. State, 
769 P.2d 908 (Wyo. 1989). The propriety of a probationary 
sentence and the degree to which probation is to be considered as an alternative 
both are vested within the sound discretion of the trial court. Kavanaugh. In 
determining, on review, whether the trial court reasonably could impose the 
sentence appealed from, each case is viewed as factually unique. Kavanaugh, 769 P.2d  at 915. If the sentence imposed is the product of a reasonable conclusion 
under the circumstances, the sentencing court has acted within its discretion. 
Kavanaugh, 769 P.2d  at 916.

[¶8.]     In making a 
determination as to whether probation is appropriate, the sentencing judge has 
discretion to frame and consider, in a reasonable manner, the relevant inquiries 
with respect to the recognized purposes for imposing sentence. Robinson v. 
State, 678 P.2d 374 (Wyo. 1984). The societal need for retribution 
is a relevant consideration in the imposition of punishment. Kavanaugh, 769 P.2d  
at 915. Another appropriate consideration is whether the imposition of a 
penitentiary sentence would serve to deter others from committing similar 
crimes. Volz v. State, 707 P.2d 179 (Wyo. 1985). It is appropriate to impose a 
sentence of imprisonment if probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of 
the charged offense. Volz, 707 P.2d  at 183.

[¶9.]     Whitfield's claim of an 
abuse of discretion in denying him probation is premised essentially upon the 
fact that he was a nice person in serious trouble for the first time. He 
contends that should have led to a probationary sentence. He also has suggested 
that this court should consider certain newspaper articles in which the trial 
judge was severely criticized for granting probation to another criminal 
defendant. Obviously, we cannot consider matters which are not a part of the 
record in examining the issues on appeal. Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d 864 
(Wyo. 1984). 
Furthermore, we note that in Kavanaugh, 769 P.2d  at 914, the defendants relied 
on the proposition upon which Whitfield's claim is based that they were good 
people who were first offenders. The trial judge in that case nevertheless 
denied probation.

[¶10.]  The rationale found in Volz is 
dispositive of Whitfield's claim of abuse of discretion in denying probation. 
Volz, who was nineteen years old, struck a bicyclist, eighteen years old, from 
behind at a speed of about seventy miles per hour. Investigation disclosed that 
Volz' blood alcohol concentration was 0.13%. He entered a plea of guilty to a 
charge of aggravated vehicular homicide, and he was sentenced to a term of not 
less than two nor more than five years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. This 
court affirmed that sentence. Following an approach similar to Whitfield's 
arguments, Volz had asked that the trial court consider probation because he was 
a full-time college student and had been drafted by a major league baseball 
team. The issue essentially involved the degree to which the trial court should 
consider probation. This court recognized in Volz that the degree of 
consideration to be given to probation is within the discretion of the 
sentencing court. The record in that case indicated that the sentencing judge 
had, in the course of the proceedings, considered probation. That is all that 
the judge is required to do. Volz, 707 P.2d  at 183.

[¶11.]  Applying the Volz rationale to this 
situation, because probation is a matter of grace and clemency, Whitfield was 
only entitled to have the trial judge consider probation; he was not entitled to 
receive probation. Kavanaugh, 769 P.2d  at 915. The judge articulated for the 
record the reasons that probation was not appropriate. He recalled that 
Whitfield was basically a nice person who had an alcohol problem, but he also 
articulated his concern about Whitfield's "indifference" to the grave 
consequences of drinking and driving. See Volz. The judge was troubled by the 
fact that Whitfield continued to drive even though he had consumed three times 
the amount of alcohol that justifies a presumption of intoxication. It is clear 
that the judge was concerned that a sentence of probation would not properly 
reflect the fact that Whitfield had caused the death of another young person. In 
essence, the court concluded that because probation would unacceptably 
depreciate the seriousness of an alcohol-related traffic fatality, a prison 
sentence was appropriate. See Volz, 707 P.2d  at 183. The judge obviously 
concluded that deterrence and punishment were significant considerations in 
sentencing Whitfield, and we have said that both are permissible objectives. See 
Volz. The record discloses that the trial court gave careful consideration to 
probation as an alternative and concluded that Whitfield was not deserving of 
that disposition. That is all that Volz requires from a sentencing 
court.

[¶12.]  In Volz, the court's conclusion that 
there had been a proper consideration of the alternative of probation was, in 
part, grounded upon the fact that a written motion had been filed for sentencing 
pursuant to § 7-13-302, W.S. 1977. That provision has been amended and 
renumbered as § 7-13-301, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), and Whitfield, in this 
instance, filed a written motion relying upon the new version of the statute. We 
observed in Volz, 707 P.2d  at 183, that the effect of filing a motion pursuant 
to the statute necessarily placed probation in issue and that the judge was 
required to consider probation before imposing sentence. In responding to 
Whitfield's motion, the judge, in this case, discussed why the granting of 
probation in response to the motion was inappropriate. Counsel was not deterred, 
however, and continued to argue for probation. Furthermore, the sentencing judge 
had the benefit of the pre-sentence report which discussed probation as a 
sentencing alternative. The record demonstrates ample consideration by the trial 
judge of probation as a sentencing alternative for Whitfield and the reasoned 
rejection of that alternative. Application of Volz to these circumstances 
negates Whitfield's claim of an abuse of discretion in refusing to consider 
probation.

[¶13.]  Despite the controlling influence of 
Volz, Whitfield further argues that the sentencing judge erroneously believed 
that he could not grant Whitfield probation because a death was involved. In 
Volz, we noted that, in determining whether the trial judge considered 
probation, it is necessary to examine all of the facts and circumstances of the 
case in context, without isolating any of the judge's comments relating to 
sentencing. Volz, 707 P.2d  at 182-83. In this instance, an examination of the 
entire record, in context, makes it evident that the sentencing judge did not 
entertain any misconception about any lack of authority to grant Whitfield 
probation. Instead, the record demonstrates that the judge was exercising his 
discretion, in light of all the facts and circumstances, to punish Whitfield for 
his "indifference" to the public's welfare in driving while intoxicated and 
causing a death. This is an appropriate application of Volz where we noted that 
it is clearly within a sentencing judge's discretion to eschew probation in 
favor of a sentence to the penitentiary if probation would "unduly depreciate 
the seriousness of the offense." Volz, 707 P.2d  at 183. The fact that a 
sentencing judge may perceive individuals who drink to excess, then drive and 
take a life, in a harsh judicial light is not such an unreasonable approach as 
to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

[¶14.]  Turning to the length of the sentence, 
Volz also addresses the proposition that probation and the subsequent sentence 
to a term are "intertwined" in the sentencing process. Volz, 707 P.2d  at 182. 
Essentially, the same standard with respect to abuse of discretion is applied 
with respect to a review of a claim that the judge imposed an excessive 
sentence. Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1983), reh. denied, cert. granted 707 P.2d 153 (1985). The one additional inquiry is whether the imposed sentence may 
be unlawful because it does not fall within the legislative mandate setting the 
minimum and maximum terms. Roose v. State, 753 P.2d 574 (Wyo. 1988). Other than 
that, the sentencing court should consider the same pertinent factors that it 
may consider with respect to a determination as to whether probation should be 
granted.

[¶15.]  In this instance, the judge concluded 
that Whitfield's "indifference" to the safety of the public was sufficiently 
serious to justify a prison sentence. He also had a concern about the 
depreciation of the offense if a sentence were not imposed. In the process, the 
trial judge appropriately delineated his rationale for sentencing Whitfield to a 
term of not less than three nor more than five years. The sentence imposed 
clearly is within the legislatively mandated term, a maximum of twenty years. It 
is similar to the sentence of not less than two nor more than five imposed in 
Volz. Succinctly, the sentence that was imposed is founded upon a reasonable 
conclusion reached by the sentencing judge. There was no abuse of 
discretion.

[¶16.]  The judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.