Case Title: Commonwealth v. Martin, B. (Concurring Opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[J-80-2005] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. BRADLEY MARTIN, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 441 CAP Appeal from the Order entered on March 4, 2004 denying portions of PCRA petition in the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division of Lebanon County at Nos. 1993- 10899 & 1993-11079. SUBMITTED: June 2, 2005 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. BRADLEY MARTIN, Appellee : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 442 CAP Appeal from the Order entered on March 4, 2004 granting new sentencing hearing in the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division of Lebanon County at Nos. 1993- 10899 & 1993-11079. SUBMITTED: June 2, 2005 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. BRADLEY MARTIN, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 443 CAP Appeal from the Order entered on March 4, 2004 denying portions of PCRA petition in the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division of Lebanon County at Nos. 1993- 10899 & 1993-11079. SUBMITTED: June 2, 2005 [J-80-2005] - 2 CONCURRING OPINION MR. CHIEF JUSTICE CASTILLE DECIDED: August 17, 2010 I join the Majority Opinion, with the exception of the two points addressed below. First, with respect to the Commonwealth’s cross-appeal, I write to address the Majority’s characterization of this Court’s “divided opinions” from the recent past concerning mitigation claims, which seem to be raised in every capital PCRA appeal. Majority Slip Op. at 29. The Majority suggests that these divisions may arise from the fact that each case “must be analyzed considering the unique facts presented. No two capital defendants will have the same life histories and no two counsel will proceed in the identical manner. Thus, what is considered reasonable in one case will not necessarily be considered reasonable in another.” Id. at 29 (quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 583 n.25 (Pa. 2005)). The cases cited by the Majority do convey the difficult nature of the inquiry in question. I write merely to note that the U.S. Supreme Court recently has issued a series of decisions in this area. See Wood v. Allen, ___ U.S. ____, 130 S.Ct. 841 (2010) (counsel’s decision not to pursue or present mitigating evidence of defendant’s mental deficiencies was reasonable result of strategic decision to focus on other defenses); Smith v. Spisak, ___ U.S. ____, 130 S.Ct. 676 (2010) (deficiencies in defense counsel’s closing argument did not raise reasonable probability that, but for deficient closing, sentencing phase result would have been different); Porter v. McCollum, ___ U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009) (per curiam) (counsel’s insufficient investigation into defendant’s background and failure to discover and present significant available mitigation evidence did not reflect reasonable professional judgment); Wong v. Belmontes, ___ U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct. 383 (2009) (per curiam) (counsel’s cautious mitigation strategy reasonable in light of potential for evidence of prior murder to come in via open door); Bobby v. Van Hook, ___ U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009) (per curiam) (counsel’s decision not to seek more mitigation evidence than that [J-80-2005] - 3 already in hand did not fall below range of professionally reasonable judgments). I discussed the importance of Van Hook and Porter in my concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Miller, 987 A.2d 638, 673-75 (Pa. 2009) (Castille, C.J., joined by Eakin, J., concurring), which I need not repeat here. The High Court’s rather unusual determination to issue multiple summary opinions on this very issue no doubt reflects its recognition that concrete guidance in this area, involving application of the settled standard under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to the most common of penalty phase claims, is useful. I believe that our approach in these cases should reflect a familiarity with recent governing federal law, particularly in an instance where our own cases reflect division. The second point involves the Majority’s discussion of the standard of review. The Majority states that a claim of counsel ineffectiveness with respect to mitigation poses a mixed question of law and fact, citing Commonwealth v. Rios, 920 A.2d 790, 810 (Pa. 2007) and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, which held that the ineffectiveness inquiry is generally comprised of mixed questions of fact and law. Majority Slip Op. at 31. The Majority adds that when reviewing a mixed question of law and fact, the level of deference to a PCRA court’s determinations varies because some mixed questions “are more heavily weighted toward fact, while others are more heavily weighted towards law.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Crawley, 924 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. 2007)). As such, according to the Majority, factual findings of the PCRA court, especially when the hearing judge also served as the trial judge, should be given “great deference” and will “not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the record, even where the record could support a contrary holding.” Id. at 32 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 293 (Pa. 2006)). Some clarification may be beneficial. Strickland indeed classifies the overall ineffectiveness inquiry as a mixed question of law and fact, within which lower court [J-80-2005] - 4 findings of fact will be afforded deference. 466 U.S. at 698. Along these lines, as Mr. Justice Saylor has recently explained: In Commonwealth v. Rios, 591 Pa. 583, 920 A.2d 790 (2007), a majority of the Court adopted a de novo review standard for the mixed question of law and fact concerning whether capital counsel's performance fell beneath the constitutionally [sic] floor. This position derived from former Chief Justice Cappy's concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364, 909 A.2d 775 (2006), in which he elaborated that “this [in] no way alters the principle that ‘the trial court is in the best position to review claims related to trial counsel's error in the first instance as that is the court that observed firsthand counsel's allegedly deficient performance.’ ” Indeed, the former Chief Justice stressed that he “would continue to accept the factual findings and credibility determinations of the PCRA court that are supported by the record.” Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 952 A.2d 640, 657 n.10 (Pa. 2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Small, 980 A.2d 549, 583 (Pa. 2009) (Saylor, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court has clarified that the appellate review of ineffectiveness matters is ultimately de novo. See [Rios].”). In addition to Justice Saylor’s comments, I would suggest that our consideration of PCRA court assessments involving Strickland prejudice should be confined to matters where the trial court is better positioned to make an assessment, such as where demeanor, credibility, or the overall effect of evidence (where the PCRA judge was also the trial judge) is involved. Cf. Jefferson v. Upton, U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 2217 (2010) (per curiam) (remanding for determination of whether state court’s factual findings warranted presumption of correctness; refusing to decide defendant’s legal issue). Here, however, the PCRA court’s finding that appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s penalty phase ineffectiveness was not based upon questions particular to the court’s superior perspective, but rather on its comparison, from a remove, of the mitigation evidence actually presented at appellant’s penalty hearing with the mitigation evidence that counsel did not investigate or present at the penalty phase, which the court deemed [J-80-2005] - 5 “significant” in terms of volume and quality. PCRA Ct. Op., 3/4/04, at 73. The court’s perception of the great differential between the two mitigation “packages” convinced it that appellant had been prejudiced. I do not read the opinion below as being premised upon a perspective that is any different from that which this Court may glean from this record. Thus, although I agree with the Majority’s affirmation on this point, I would hold that the court made no error of law in concluding that appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate and present more extensive mitigation evidence at the penalty phase. Mr. Justice McCaffery joins this opinion.