Case Title: In re Brandt/Griffin

Citation: 

Docket Number: S45122

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  September 14, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
William D. Brandt,
Accused.
_____________________________________
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of 
Mark E. Griffin,
Accused.
(OSB 95-6; SC S45122, S45123)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted September 8, 1999.
	Peter R. Jarvis, Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, argued the cause
and filed the briefs for the accused, William D. Brandt.
	W. Eugene Hallman, Pendleton, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for the accused, Mark E. Griffin.
	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar. 
With her on the brief was Jeffrey Sapiro.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Kulongoski, Leeson, and Riggs Justices.*  
	PER CURIAM
	Griffin is suspended from the practice of law for 12 months,
and Brandt is suspended from the practice of law for 13 months. 
The suspensions shall commence sixty days from the filing of this
decision.
	Kulongoski, J., concurred in part, dissented in part, and
filed an opinion in which Riggs, J., joined in part.
Riggs, J.,
concurred in part, dissented in part, and filed an opinion in
which Kulongoski, J., joined in part. 
	*Durham, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case. 
	PER CURIAM
	In this consolidated lawyer discipline proceeding, the
Oregon State Bar (Bar) charged William D. Brandt and Mark E.
Griffin (collectively, "the accused") with violating four
disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: 
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-101(A)(1) (prohibiting accepting or
continuing employment when exercise of lawyer's judgment will be
or reasonably may be affected by lawyer's own interest, except
with consent of client after full disclosure); DR 1-102(A)(3) 
(prohibiting engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation); DR 1-103(C) (requiring full and
truthful responses to inquiries in disciplinary proceeding); and
DR 2-108(B) (prohibiting, in connection with settlement, entering
into an agreement that restricts lawyer's right to practice law). 
A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board found that the accused
had committed all the charged violations and recommended that
each lawyer be suspended from the practice of law for six months. 
One panel member dissented, concluding that the charges against
the accused should be dismissed.  
	The accused have sought review of the trial panel's
decision.  ORS 9.536(1); Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.1.  This
court reviews the record de novo.  ORS 9.536(3) and BR 10.6.  The
Bar has the burden of establishing alleged misconduct by clear
and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  The testimony of an accused
lawyer, if this court deems it credible, can be sufficient to
establish facts.  In re Gildea, 325 Or 281, 295-96, 936 P2d 975
(1997).  We hold that the accused violated DR 5-101(A)(1), DR 2-108(B), and DR 1-102(A)(3).  We suspend Griffin for a period of
12 months, and we suspend Brandt for a period of 13 months.
I.  FACTS

	We find the following facts by clear and convincing
evidence.  The accused are partners in different law firms. 
Brandt's firm is in Salem, and Griffin's is in Portland. For many
years, Brandt successfully represented hand tool distributors
against the manufacturers of those tools.  When the volume and
complexity of those cases grew, Brandt began to associate Griffin
as co-counsel.  Griffin's practice emphasizes plaintiffs' complex
business fraud litigation.  In 1992, the accused agreed to
represent Eric Bramel and his wife, former hand tool
distributors, in resolving claims against Mac Tools.  Bramel
signed a retainer agreement that included a contingent fee
provision of 45 percent of any recovery from settlement, trial,
or appeal.  
	Initially, Bramel had hoped to net $1.5 million after all
legal expenses.  Late in December 1992, Bramel filled out a
client questionnaire that Brandt had given him, and Brandt then
drafted, but did not file, a complaint seeking $150,000 in
compensatory damages and $4,445,000 in punitive damages from Mac
Tools.  
	On April 1, 1993, Brandt told Bramel that Bramel's hope to
net $1.5 million was not realistic, that Bramel should demand
$275,000, and that he should accept a net settlement of between
$130,000 and $150,000.  Later that month, Brandt told Mac Tools
that Bramel would settle his claims for $275,000.  In mid-September 1993, Mac Tools countered with a net settlement offer
of $19,700.  Griffin recommended that Bramel reject that offer,
and Bramel did so. 
	In late September, Bramel told Griffin that he needed
$100,000 "in his pocket," because his financial situation was
desperate and he might be forced to declare bankruptcy.  Griffin
responded that he would have more information about a settlement
within thirty days.
	By fall 1993, the accused had 49 clients, including Bramel,
who had claims against Mac Tools.  In October 1993, Brandt met in
Denver with three other lawyers -- Wagner, Miller, and Napper --
who represented clients with claims against Mac Tools and its
parent company, The Stanley Works (Stanley).  Among them, the
lawyers represented approximately 120 clients.  The lawyers
discussed the possibility of "global settlement negotiations"
with Mac Tools and Stanley. 
	On October 18, 1993, Bramel told Griffin that he would
settle his claim for $175,000.  Later that month, Griffin told
Bramel that Mac Tools and Stanley had agreed to try to settle the
cases on a "global" basis and that Griffin and Brandt would
continue "to press [Bramel's] individual settlement demand." 
Griffin also told Bramel that Mac Tools and Stanley had agreed to
toll the statute of limitations until after the global settlement
negotiations had terminated.  
	Mac Tools, Stanley, and the plaintiffs' (1) lawyers agreed to
meet in Chicago with a private mediator on November 5, 1993, to
discuss settlement.  On November 2, 1993, Bramel had reduced his
demand to $165,000, an amount he told the accused was "the bare
minimum acceptable."  
	On November 3, 1993, apparently in response to conversations
that Wagner, Napper, Miller, and Brandt had had during their
October meeting in Chicago, Wagner sent Griffin a copy of an
article from an ABA Journal and an ABA ethics opinion about
restricting the practice of law in connection with settlements. 
The article criticized Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule
5.6(b), and Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-108(B), both of which prohibit a lawyer from participating in
offering or making an agreement that restricts the lawyer's right
to practice law when settling a case.  The ethics opinion
expressed the view that "a lawyer may not offer, nor may opposing
counsel accept, a settlement agreement which would obligate the
latter to limit the representation of future claimants."  ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 371
(1993). 
	Griffin attended the meeting in Chicago on November 5, 1993. 
Four days later, on November 9, he told Brandt and Weiss, another
plaintiffs' lawyer, that Weddle, a Stanley vice-president, had
expressed concern during the November 5 meeting that there be "no
future litigation" against his company and had stated that the
only way that he could be assured of that would be to retain the
plaintiffs' lawyers to represent Mac Tools and Stanley in the
future. (2)  According to Griffin, Weddle had "insisted that there
be a linkage between settlement of present cases and a future
agreement that we [the plaintiffs' lawyers] be retained by Mac
[Tools] and Stanley."  The plaintiffs' lawyers who were present
at the meeting had responded that they would not discuss future
employment and walked out of the room.  Communicating through the
mediator, the plaintiffs' lawyers  subsequently offered to settle
all the cases for approximately $18,060,000.  Stanley countered
with an offer of $9.5 million, which the plaintiffs rejected. 
Griffin has no "independent recollection" whether he told Bramel
about Weddle's offer to hire the plaintiffs' lawyers.  Brandt
told some, but not all, of his clients about Stanley's retainer
offer.
	On December 20, 1993, both the accused attended another
settlement meeting in Chicago.  The lawyers present at that
meeting agreed to settle all the claims for $13.32 million,
subject to the approval of individual plaintiffs. (3)  The proposed
settlement made no mention of the plaintiffs' lawyers being
retained by Stanley in the future.  After December 20, the
accused began conferring with their clients to determine whether
the clients would agree to the settlement amounts contained in
the December 20 proposal. (4)  According to Brandt, Griffin had more
responsibility for contacting clients than Brandt did.  Brandt
did talk informally with some of the clients, but neither he nor
Griffin sent out letters about the December 20 proposed
settlement, and Brandt kept no notes about what he said to any of
the clients.  Brandt believed that, by January 4, 1994, he and
Griffin "had basically communicated with most of them * * * or I
think all of them * * * that we had reached the numbers [i.e.,
amount of the settlement]."  However, Brandt himself did not have
"any recollection of any discussion with the clients," and he
could not recall having any telephone conversations with Bramel
between November 1, 1993, and January 11, 1994.  On January 6,
1994, Brandt disagreed with Wagner that the agreement of December
20, 1993, was final regarding the amount of the settlement,
because "we had some clients to contact.  But we had expressed to
[Wagner] we were confident those clients would accept the Mac
final offer."
	Griffin testified that he did not believe that Bramel had
conversations with anyone else except Griffin about the
settlement.  Griffin also testified that, although he "may have
mentioned" the December 20 settlement to Bramel before January
13, he specifically remembers talking to Bramel on January 13.  
Griffin testified that Bramel agreed to the amount of the
settlement on that date and that Griffin wrote "1-13-94, okay[]"
next to $133.045.31 on the ledger that he had prepared reflecting
the amount that each of his and Brandt's clients would receive
under the terms of the proposed settlement.
	Bramel, by contrast, testified that he did not learn of the
amount of the settlement until he received a letter from the
accused dated January 17, 1994.  He also testified that the
letter concerned him because the "settlement amount was lower
than we had discussed" with the accused previously. (5)
	Whether Bramel had agreed orally by January 11, 1994, to
accept $133,045.31 to settle his claims against Mac Tools is
significant regarding the conflict-of-interest issues that are at
the heart of this case.  Based on the record before us, we find
that Bramel did not agree to the amount of the proposed
settlement until after January 11, 1994. (6)
	On January 4, 1994, Richards, a lawyer for Stanley, sent
Brandt drafts of three forms of settlement reflecting the three
kinds of claims that the parties were negotiating:  one "where
there is a filed action against Mac Tools; one where there is a
filed action against both Mac and [Stanley]; and one where action
is unfiled."  Those drafts made no mention of Stanley retaining
plaintiffs' counsel.  
	On January 5, 1994, Richards talked to Wagner, who was
acting as the spokesperson for the plaintiffs' lawyers, and she
again raised the issue of Stanley retaining the plaintiffs'
lawyers as part of the settlement.  On January 6, Wagner sent a
letter to Richards expressing "distress" over Richards's proposal
for a retainer provision in the settlement agreement.  Wagner
reminded Richards of earlier conversations they had had about
"ethical prohibitions" and the parties' agreement not to make
"the negotiation and settlement of existing claims and cases
contingent in any way upon any agreement regarding representation
of future claimants."  Wagner reiterated that "[t]he Chicago
settlement [of December 20] was not contingent upon any agreement
to represent or not represent Stanley or Mac [Tools], post
settlement."  Finally, Wagner also told Richards that the drafts
of the settlement agreement that Richards had sent on January 4
were acceptable to the plaintiffs' lawyers.  Wagner sent copies
of his letter to the other plaintiffs' lawyers, including the
accused, who agreed with Wagner about "the issue of retention."
	On January 6, 1994, after she had received Wagner's letter,
Richards sent all the plaintiffs' lawyers a new paragraph that
she proposed be inserted into the various settlement agreements. 
It provided:
"#.  Retention of Counsel.  Distributor
understands that, upon execution of this Agreement
resolving all matters and disputes between the
Distributor and Mac Tools, counsel for the Distributor
will be retained by Mac Tools at counsel's normal
hourly rates to advise Mac Tools, and the Distributor
approves this retention.  By his signature approving
this Agreement, counsel for Distributor agrees to,
acknowledges, approves and accepts this retention."  
Richards enclosed a copy of Kaplan v. Emerson Radio Corp., No.
90-CV-3166, 1991 WL 41846 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 14, 1991), which, in her
view, indicated that it was ethical and proper to have a retainer
provision as part of a settlement agreement.   
	On January 7, 1994, Wagner, on behalf of the
plaintiffs' lawyers, wrote to Richards: 
"The case you have provided to us does not discuss
whether it is ethical for a defendant to make the
retention of a plaintiff's attorney a component of the
settlement of a claim between the parties. * * * 
"Our firm has reached an agreement with Mac
[Tools]/Stanley to settle all the claims we presently
have.  Our agreement was not contingent upon our firm
agreeing to represent Mac [Tools]/Stanley in the
future.  We consider your proposal to include the
'Retention of Counsel' language in the settlement
agreements to be inconsistent with the settlement
agreement.  Again, we will not agree to be retained by
Mac [Tools]/Stanley nor will we even discuss such a
topic, nor the topic of possible procedures relating to
our representation of future clients until such time as
the releases are signed and the money distributed."
(Emphasis added.)  
	In Griffin's view, the retainer provision that Richards
proposed on January 7 meant that the parties "didn't have a
meeting of the minds and therefore we [didn't] have a settlement
agreement."  On January 10, Griffin wrote a memo to Brandt
stating that "'No meeting of the minds' comes through loud and
clear" and that "[i]t is interesting that [Richards] admits that
our future retention is a condition of settlement."  The
plaintiffs' lawyers discussed trying to enforce the settlement
agreement without the retainer provision, but they were concerned
that doing so would delay settlement and that rejecting the
retainer provision would unravel the proposed agreement that the
lawyers had reached on December 20.  The lawyers also were
concerned about the impact of a summary judgment ruling that
Stanley recently had obtained in a similar case. 
	On January 10, 1994, Griffin wrote to Brandt and two
other plaintiffs' lawyers that he had a pretrial statement due on
January 12 with a court in California regarding five of the
claims in the global settlement negotiations that were scheduled
for trial.  The statement that Griffin planned to file contained
the following paragraph: 
"After the settlement agreement was reached,
counsel for Mac Tools and [Stanley] has attempted to
enforce an additional condition of settlement, one
which is both unethical and illegal.  That provision is
as follows:  Mac Tools and [Stanley] have insisted that
counsel for the plaintiffs in each of these groups
agree to be retained by Mac Tools and [Stanley].  This
condition, of course, is both unacceptable and
unenforceable.  It is now the sole impediment to
payment of the settlement proceeds."
(Emphasis added.)  Griffin told the other plaintiffs' lawyers
that, in Griffin's view, "I think it is time to stop playing games with Ms.
Richards and her clients.  Perhaps if we sent this
[statement to the court] to Ms. Richards and told her
our dilemma she might get the hint that it is time to
take the money out of their pockets and put it in
ours." 
Griffin also stated that he could draft a complaint for breach of
the settlement agreement in a very short time.
	According to Brandt, Richards' proposal to insert a
retainer provision into the proposed settlement was "a complete
curve" that precipitated an emergency meeting in Chicago on
January 11, 1994.  Brandt attended that meeting; Griffin remained
in Portland.  At the beginning of the meeting, Weddle
congratulated the plaintiffs' lawyers on the agreement to settle
the claims and then stated that Stanley wanted to retain them. 
Richards explained that she had done a good deal of research and
was convinced that there was a way to include the retainer
provision in the settlement agreement without violating any
ethical prohibitions.  After the parties went to their respective
"break out" rooms, the mediator proposed to the plaintiffs' 
lawyers that they sign individual retainer agreements with
Stanley, and give them to the mediator to hold "in escrow" until
all the clients had executed settlement agreements, all
settlement amounts had been paid, and all pending actions had
been dismissed.  According to the mediator, if any of the clients
did not consent to the retainer provision, none of the retainer
agreements would go into effect.
	From Chicago, Brandt called Griffin in Portland to
explain the retainer and escrow proposals, and Griffin told him
that he wanted to talk to Riemer, the Bar's general counsel. 
Griffin took only sketchy notes of his conversation with Riemer. 
Riemer, who receives as many as ten telephone calls a day from
lawyers seeking ethical advice, took no notes.  According to
Griffin, he explained to Riemer that Stanley was attempting to
impose another condition of settlement, namely, that the
plaintiffs' lawyers sign retainer agreements as part of the
settlement, and that Griffin was worried about the "taking
yourself out of the market problem."  Griffin also wanted to know
whether, "if we got a retainer from Mac Tools, would we have to
share this retainer with our client."  Griffin's final concern
was how much information he and Brandt had to share with their
clients about their relationship with Stanley.  Griffin believes
that he told Riemer that the retainer agreement documents were to
be signed that day, before any of the lawyers had had an
opportunity to talk to their clients and obtain their consent. 
Riemer advised Griffin that the proposed course of action was
"hypothetically possible."  According to Griffin, Riemer told him
that Griffin and Brandt would have to give full disclosure under
DR 5-101(A)(1).  That rule defines full disclosure as an
explanation sufficient to apprise a client of the potentially
adverse impact to the client of a matter to which a client is
being asked to consent.  
	Although Riemer does not remember the details of his
conversation with Griffin, he believed that the retainer proposal
did not raise a problem under DR 2-108, because he did not
understand that the retainer agreement was a condition of
settling the plaintiffs' claims against Stanley.  Riemer is
certain that, if Griffin had mentioned an escrow arrangement as a
means of avoiding violating DR 2-108, Riemer would have
remembered it, because that approach would have been "very
unique."  
	Later on January 11, 1994, Brandt, along with the other
plaintiffs' lawyers who were at the Chicago meeting, signed a
document entitled "Escrow Instructions-Mac Tool Litigation." 
That document stated that the parties appointed the mediator to
serve as the escrow agent and that he was to hold "all conformed
copies of the settlement agreement and the retention agreements"
until such time as Weddle, on behalf of Stanley, and Napper, on
behalf of all the plaintiffs, instructed him to distribute the
documents.  The document that Brandt signed also stated that, if
the mediator did not receive written instructions to distribute
the documents "from both Parties by 5:00 p.m. EST on January 26,
1994, he shall destroy the documents."  Brandt also signed a
document entitled "Settlement Agreement."  It provided, in part:
"3.  The parties acknowledge that Counsel did not
solicit, request or otherwise seek to be retained by
Mac Tools as part of entering into this Settlement
Agreement or the Settlement Agreements on behalf of
each of the clients set forth on Attachment A.  The
parties further acknowledge that retention by Mac Tools
is not a term of the Settlement Agreement."
	Also on January 11, 1994, Griffin signed documents
agreeing to act as counsel and provide legal services to Stanley. 
Those documents provided that he would be paid $10,000 and $175
per hour during 1994.  At the request of the plaintiffs' lawyers,
the retainer agreement that Griffin signed included a provision
indemnifying him from any claim by current clients that might
arise from the retainer agreement. (7)  The plaintiffs' lawyers
placed all the retainer agreements in escrow with the mediator. 
	On January 13, 1994, Griffin called Bramel to discuss
the settlement and advised him about Stanley's retainer proposal. 
Four days later, on January 17, the accused sent a letter to
Bramel that stated, in part:
	"After we obtained Mac [Tools]/Stanley's agreement to
resolve our cases for a sum certain, Mac
[Tools]/Stanley made a separate offer to hire [Brandt's
and Griffin's law firms] to work for Mac
[Tools]/Stanley in the future.  Mac [Tools]/Stanley's
retaining of [Brandt's and Griffin's law firms] was not
solicited by us in any way.  However, after
consideration, [Brandt's and Griffin's law firms]
agreed to provide certain legal advice and counsel on
improving their distribution recruitment practices. 
Once we are retained by Mac [Tools], we will be unable
to pursue claims like yours against Mac [Tools]/Stanley
in the future.  We are disclosing this information to
you because we feel that we have an obligation to do
so[.]
	"Because this situation may appear to create a conflict
of interest, we recommend that you seek independent
legal advice to determine if consent should be given."
(Emphasis added.)  The accused enclosed a copy of the proposed
settlement agreement with their letter.  The retainer provision
that Richards had proposed on January 6, 1994, appeared as
paragraph number 7 of the settlement agreement.  Although the
escrow agreement that Brandt had signed contained a January 26
deadline, the letter to Bramel did not state that Bramel needed
to sign the agreement within a specified period of time. 
	Bramel talked to Griffin on January 22, 1994, about the
indemnification, confidentiality, and noncooperation provisions
in the settlement agreement.  Either on that date, or within a
few days thereafter, Griffin told Bramel that, if Bramel rejected
the settlement, Griffin would not represent him at trial.  On
January 24, Bramel consulted Kuhling, a Spokane, Washington,
lawyer, about the proposed settlement.  After that meeting,
Bramel told Griffin that he was "considering the settlement
proposal" and reminded Griffin that Bramel desired that all
information he had shared with Griffin and Brandt "remain
confidential."  
	On January 26, 1994, Griffin told Richards that four of
his clients, including Bramel, had not yet signed the settlement
agreement, but that Richards should receive signed copies of the
agreement from those clients by the next morning.  The next
morning, Bramel told Kuhling that he had received numerous
messages on his answering machine from Griffin "stressing the
urgency of settlement before 'Mac' changes their mind" and
suggesting that Bramel send the documents "back East" by
facsimile.  That afternoon, Kuhling told Griffin that Bramel was
unhappy with the settlement and that Kuhling believed that a
conflict of interest existed.  Kuhling also told Griffin that
Bramel would accept $133,045.31 to settle his claims if the
accused would waive their attorney fees.  Griffin responded that
he would reduce his fee by $5,000 if Bramel accepted his offer to
do so before 11:00 a.m. on January 28.  Griffin also told Kuhling
that Richards had told Griffin that, if she did not have an
executed copy of the agreement by noon on January 28, "she will
consider the offer to have been rejected."  
	In a letter dated January 28, 1994, Kuhling told Bramel
about his conversation with Griffin.  Kuhling's letter stated, in
part:
	"Mr. Griffin further advises that you have only until
noon today to accept the settlement.  He advises that
after noon today, Mac will deem the settlement
repudiated.  He advises he will not continue to
represent you and that you'll be on your own with a
speculative lawsuit against Mac.  
	"* * * * *
	"I want * * * you to understand that I can offer no
opinion about the fairness of the $133,000.00
settlement amount.  I do not possess the extensive
knowledge of the workings of the Mac Tool Company and
their distributorship program that is possessed by you
and your lawyer, Mark Griffin.  Nor do I possess the
knowledge of all the law affecting your case.  To gain
the requisite knowledge of the applicable facts and law
would require extensive research.  It is part of the
problem that Mr. Griffin has placed you under time
pressure to make this decision without adequate time
for independent counsel to review the matter.  You will
have to rely on your own judgment as to the adequacy of
the settlement amount."  
However, because Bramel's financial situation had become
"desperate," Kuhling suggested that Bramel's "best course of
action may be to accept the settlement which, after your
[attorneys'] fee, will net you approximately $73,000" and,
thereafter, "consider suing your counsel for refund of the fee
they extracted."  
	Bramel signed the settlement agreement, and Kuhling
sent it to Richards within minutes of the noon deadline.  By that
time, all the other plaintiffs also had agreed to the settlement,
and the retainer agreements were released from escrow.  On
January 31, 1994, Brandt sent Bramel a check for $73,174.92, the
net amount of Bramel's settlement after deduction of attorney
fees. (8)  Both the accused performed legal services for Mac Tools
during 1994. 
	In March 1994, Bramel sent a complaint to the Bar.  As
Bar counsel understood the complaint, Bramel raised several
issues.  On April 8, 1994, the Bar's assistant disciplinary
counsel, Cooper, sent Griffin a letter identifying ten
disciplinary rules, including DR 2-108(B), that she believed "may
be implicated" by Bramel's complaint.  Cooper enclosed a copy of
an article about DR 2-108(B) that had appeared in the Oregon
State Bar Bulletin. 
	On April 21, 1994, the accused sent Cooper a lengthy
letter that addressed each of the disciplinary rules that Cooper
had indicated might be implicated by Bramel's complaint.  The
letter stated, in part:
"Neither Bill Brandt and I, nor any other
attorneys involved in the global settlement
negotiations, agreed to work for Mac Tools while the
case was still pending.  After the settlement was
finalized, the attorneys agreed to discuss a retainer
with Mac Tools.  Representation of Mac Tools did not
commence until after the conclusion of the cases, i.e.,
until after [Bramel] signed the settlement agreement
and returned it to Mac Tools."
(Emphasis added.)  With respect to DR 2-108(B), the letter
stated:
"This rule was not violated.  This was one issue
which I addressed with George Reimer [sic] during our
conversation of January 11, 1994.  I was confident
after that conversation with Mr. Reimer [sic], my
independent research, and the input of other attorneys
(including those who participated in the global
settlement) that the settlement agreement was within
ethical bounds.
"I have reviewed the article written in the April,
1994, Bar Journal by Ms. Marilyn Cohen.  None of the
examples of inappropriate conduct are similar to the
situations here.  The settlement agreement:  (1) did
not prohibit counsel from disclosing names of people
who had contacted me, or whom I had represented; (2)
did not prohibit counsel from referring clients who
have claims against Mac Tools to other attorneys; (3)
did not require counsel to turn over files,
investigation, or discovery, to defendants; and (4) did
not bar me or Bill Brandt, the Bramels, or other
clients or prospective clients, from subpoenaing
records or using experts, and did not otherwise impede
prosecution of future cases.  Nor does the agreement
impose venue limits upon future claimants against Mac
Tools.  Although the agreement does contain a
confidentiality agreement with respect to the terms of
the settlement, such confidentiality agreements are not
uncommon and are not prohibited.  The fact that
claimants against Mac [Tools] and Stanley agreed not to
voluntarily cooperate with others in pressing claims
against Mac Tools does not prohibit them from
testifying in claims against Mac Tools if they are
subpoenaed to do so.  Such provisions also are not
prohibited and are common in complex litigation cases."
The letter did not mention the documents that the accused had
signed on January 11, 1994, and had placed in escrow. 
	The Bar subsequently referred Bramel's complaint to the
Multnomah County Local Professional Responsibility Committee
(LPRC), which assigned a Portland lawyer, Hankin, to investigate
the matter.  Hankin interviewed the accused in Griffin's Portland
office in March 1995.  At that time, Hankin believed that the two
most important issues were Bramel's claims of excessive attorney
fees and conflict of interest.  During the interview, Griffin
made available to Hankin his file on Bramel, including the
retainer agreements and escrow instructions.  Hankin did not look
through the file.  Instead, she relied on Griffin to produce
documents from the file relevant to topics that Hankin raised
during the interview.  Griffin drew Hankin's attention to
Griffin's notes of his conversation with Riemer, which contained
the words "retainer agreement," but Hankin did not ask to see the
agreement and did not ask what it meant.  
	Soon after that interview, Hankin asked to review
Brandt's files at his Salem office, and Brandt agreed.  Brandt
gave Hankin his files on Bramel and Stanley, which contained the
retainer agreement, and Hankin reviewed them in Brandt's
conference room.  Hankin did not contact Riemer or the mediator
who served as the escrow agent, although the accused urged her to
do so.  However, she did interview two of the lawyers for
Stanley.  Hankin filed a report on April 19, 1995, and, based on
her report, the Bar filed formal complaints against the accused. 
II.  ALLEGED VIOLATIONS

A.  DR 2-108(B)
	The accused first assign error to the trial panel's
finding that they violated DR 2-108(B), which provides:
"In connection with the settlement of a
controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an
agreement that restricts the lawyer's right to practice
law." 
A violation of DR 2-108(B) requires the Bar to prove both that a
lawyer entered into an agreement in connection with settlement
and that the agreement restricted the lawyer's right to practice
law.  In its complaint, the Bar alleged:
"Mac Tools' offer to retain the Accused was
intended to restrict the Accused's right to bring
lawsuits against Mac Tools in the future.  Mac Tools
conditioned settlement of the Bramels' case upon the
Accused's agreement to be retained by Mac Tools.
"The Accused knew that one of the reasons (if not
the principal reason) Mac Tools offered to retain
[them] was to prevent [them] from representing
similarly situated plaintiffs in the future. 
Nevertheless, the Accused agreed to a settlement which
was conditioned upon [their] agreement to restrict
[their] practice in the future." (9)
	The accused concede, and we agree, that they agreed to
the retention of counsel provision in the settlement agreement
"[i]n connection with the settlement" of the controversy between
Bramel and Mac Tools. (10)  However, the accused contend that DR 2-108(B) addresses only agreements that directly prohibit a lawyer
from representing certain clients or types of clients. (11)  The
accused argue that the retainer agreement that they signed with
Stanley only indirectly restricted their right to practice law. 
They contend that, if a retainer agreement merely requires the
lawyer to provide valuable legal services, with its concomitant
disqualification from representing adverse parties, the agreement
does not restrict the lawyer's right to practice law within the
meaning of DR 2-108(B).  Any ethical issue associated with such
agreements, they argue, is governed by different disciplinary
rules, such as DR 5-105, which regulates current and former
client conflicts of interest, and DR 5-101, which regulates
conflicts between clients' and a lawyer's own interest. 
	The Bar responds that the retainer of counsel provision
had the effect of preventing the accused from representing future
plaintiffs against Stanley and, consequently, that the agreement
violated DR 2-108(B).  The Bar relies on several ethics opinions
from other jurisdictions holding that both direct and indirect
restrictions on the right to practice law violate analogues of DR
2-108(B). (12)
	This court has not construed DR 2-108(B) previously. 
As framed by the parties, the issue is whether a retainer
agreement that is entered into in connection with the settlement
of a case and that indirectly limits a lawyer's right to practice
law, violates DR 2-108(B).  We hold that it does.  
	By its terms, DR 2-108(B) does not prohibit all
agreements that restrict the right to practice law.  Rather, the
rule prohibits agreements that are made "[i]n connection with the
settlement" of a case that restrict the lawyer's right to
practice law.  The rule does not distinguish between direct and
indirect restrictions.  
	An ABA Formal Opinion has explained the policy reasons
for DR 2-108(B):
	"First, permitting such agreements restricts the access
of the public to lawyers who, by virtue of their
background and experience, might be the very best
available talent to represent these individuals. 
Second, the use of such agreements may provide clients
with rewards that bear less relationship to the merits
of their claims than they do to the desire of the
defendant to 'buy off' plaintiffs' counsel.  Third, the
offering of such restrictive agreements places the
plaintiff's lawyer in a situation where there is
conflict between the interests of present clients and
those of potential future clients."
ABA Formal Opinion 371 (April 16, 1993).  We agree with that
analysis.  DR 2-108(B) is undermined equally by direct and
indirect agreements that restrict a lawyer's right to practice
law.  Accepting the accused's argument that indirect restrictions
on the right to practice do not violate DR 2-108(B) would put
this court's imprimatur on a method of drafting those agreements
that would evade the purpose of the rule.  We decline to do so. 
	It is true, as the accused assert, that every retainer
agreement restricts a lawyer's right to practice law. (13)  It also
is true that ethical issues associated with retainer agreements
generally are governed by other disciplinary rules, such as DR 5-105 and DR 5-101.  However, the fact that retainer agreements are
governed by other disciplinary rules does not mean that the
specific type of retainer agreement at issue in this proceeding,
one made in connection with the settlement of a case, is not
governed also by DR 2-108(B). 
	In this proceeding, no one disputes that one of the
reasons that Richards insisted that the retainer of counsel
provision be incorporated into the settlement agreement was to
prevent the accused from representing other plaintiffs against
Stanley in the future.  As noted, the accused concede that they
entered into the agreement to restrict their right to represent
such clients in the future in connection with the settlement of a
controversy between former Mac Tools distributors and Stanley.  
Accordingly, we find that the accused violated DR 2-108(B). 
	Nonetheless, the accused argue, the Bar should be
estopped from charging them with violating DR 2-108(B), because
Griffin had consulted Riemer on January 11, 1994, before either
he or Brandt had signed retainer agreements with Stanley, and
they relied on Riemer's advice that putting the retainer
agreements into escrow with the mediator was a way to avoid the
prohibition in DR 2-108(B).  Even assuming that Griffin fully and
accurately informed Riemer about the retainer and escrow
arrangement, and that Riemer opined that the arrangement would
not violate DR 2-108(B), the accused would not, as a matter of
law, be insulated from a determination that they violated DR 2-108(B).  Just as favorable advice by the Bar's general counsel
does not provide a defense to disciplinary violations, In re
Ainsworth, 289 Or 479, 490, 614 P2d 1127 (1980), such advice does
not estop the Bar from charging violations with respect to
conduct undertaken after obtaining the advice of the Bar's
general counsel. 
 B. DR 5-101(A)
	The accused next assign error to the trial panel's
finding that they violated DR 5-101(A), which provides, in part: 
"(A) Except with the consent of the lawyer's
client after full disclosure,
"(1) a lawyer shall not accept or continue
employment if the exercise of the lawyer's professional
judgment on behalf of the lawyer's client will be or
reasonably may be affected by the lawyer's own
financial, business, property, or personal interests." 
DR 10-101(B) addresses the issue of disclosure.  It provides:
"(1) 'Full disclosure' means an explanation
sufficient to apprise the recipient of the potential
adverse impact on the recipient, of the matter to which
the recipient is asked to consent.
"(2) As used in DR 5-101 * * * , 'full disclosure' 
shall also include a recommendation that the recipient
seek independent legal advice to determine if consent
should be given and shall be contemporaneously
confirmed in writing."  
In its complaint, the Bar alleged that "[b]y continuing to represent the Bramels despite the
offer of employment by the opposing party and the
Accused's eventual acceptance of that offer, the
Accused continued employment despite the fact that the
exercise of [their] professional judgment on the
Bramels' behalf would or would likely be affected by
[their] own financial, business, property or personal
interests.  The Accused's eventual disclosure to the
Bramels of Mac Tools' offer was not contemporaneous and
also omitted material facts concerning the nature and
extent of the Accused['s] adverse interest and/or the
potential adverse impact on the Bramels of the matter
to which they were asked to consent."
	The trial panel rejected the Bar's argument that the
retainer offer that Stanley had made in November 1993 created a
conflict of interest, and the Bar concedes before this court that
no conflict of interest existed in November 1993.  However, when
the accused signed the retainer and escrow agreements on January
11, 1994, they acquired an interest that did, or reasonably might
have, affected the exercise of their professional judgment on
behalf of Bramel.  
	As noted, Bramel had told the accused in November 1993
that $165,000 was "the bare minimum acceptable" to settle his
claims against Stanley.  On December 20, 1993, the accused agreed
to a settlement under which Bramel would receive a gross sum of
$133,045.13.  When the accused signed the settlement agreement,
retainer agreement, and escrow agreements on January 11, 1994 --
which was before Bramel had agreed to the proposed settlement of
December 20, 1993 -- their loyalty became divided, and a conflict
of interest existed.  DR 5-101(A) required the accused to
disclose their conflict of interest to Bramel, and DR 10-101(B)
required them to give Bramel an explanation that was sufficient
to apprise Bramel of the potential adverse impact of that
conflict and to recommend that Bramel seek independent legal
advice.  DR 10-101(B) also required the accused's "full
disclosure" to be confirmed contemporaneously in writing.
	There is no dispute that the accused complied with the
requirement that they advise Bramel to seek independent legal
advice.  However, the Bar contends that the disclosure of the
conflict that the accused made to Bramel was insufficient to
apprise him of the potential adverse impact that the retainer
agreement had on him and that the written confirmation did not
constitute either a full or a contemporaneous disclosure.  The
trial panel majority agreed.
	We begin with the Bar's contention that the accused did
not give Bramel timely written disclosure of their conflict of
interest.  DR 10-101(B)(2) requires the written disclosure to be
made "contemporaneously" with the oral disclosure.  The word
"contemporaneously" means "at or near the same time."  Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary, 491 (unabridged ed 1993).  The
question is whether, by their letter of January 17, 1994, the
accused "contemporaneously confirmed in writing" Griffin's oral
disclosure of the conflict in his telephone call to Bramel on
January 13.  
	After Griffin talked to Bramel on January 13, he and
Brandt had to compose a letter confirming in writing what Griffin
had said, and the letter had to contain both of their signatures. 
Brandt and Griffin's offices were in different cities.  Two of
the days between January 13 and January 17, 1994, were Saturday
and Sunday.  We reject the Bar's argument that the accused's
written disclosure was not made contemporaneously with their oral
disclosure.
	We turn to the Bar's contention that the disclosure
that the accused provided to Bramel was insufficient.  As noted,
DR 10-101(B)(1) requires "full disclosure," which is "an
explanation sufficient to apprise the recipient of the potential
adverse impact on the recipient, of the matter to which the
recipient is asked to consent."  
	This court has addressed the meaning of the "full
disclosure" requirement in several cases.  In In re Boivin, 271
Or 419, 424, 533 P2d 171 (1975), for example, this court
construed a previous iteration of the disciplinary rules that
also required full disclosure, explaining:
"To satisfy the requirement of full disclosure by
a lawyer before undertaking to represent two
conflicting interests, it is not sufficient that both
parties be informed of the fact that the lawyer is
undertaking to represent both of them, but he must
explain to them the nature of the conflict of interest
in such detail so that they can understand the reasons
why it may be desirable for each to have independent
counsel, with undivided loyalty to the interests of
each of them."  
Similarly, in In re O'Byrne, 298 Or 535, 548-49, 694 P2d 955
(1985), this court held that full disclosure includes "tell[ing]
* * * what effects the differing interest may have upon the
lawyer's ability to exercise his independent professional
judgment."  
	The current version of DR 10-101(B) was adopted in
1988.  Since then, this court has adhered to its prior standards
in construing the full disclosure requirement contained in that
rule.  See In re McKee, 316 Or 114, 128, 849 P2d 509 (1993) (full
disclosure under former DR 5-105(C) "requires a full disclosure
of the possible effect of multiple representation on the exercise
of the lawyer's independent professional judgment on behalf of
each client") (emphasis in original).  
	In this proceeding, the only record of what the accused
disclosed to Bramel is their letter of January 17, 1994.  DR 10-102(B)(2) requires that an oral disclosure be "confirmed in
writing."  The word "confirm" means to "give new assurance of the
truth or validity of: CORROBORATE."  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary at 476.  Accordingly, we find that the written
disclosure that the accused made to Bramel reflected the oral
disclosure that Griffin had made four days earlier.  As noted,
that letter stated that the accused had not entered into a
retainer agreement with Stanley until "[a]fter we obtained
Mac/Stanley's agreement to resolve our cases for a sum certain,"
and it stated that Stanley had "made a separate offer" to hire
them.  Rather than disclosing their conflict of interest, those
statements suggested that there was no conflict.  The only
statements in the letter that arguably could be viewed as
disclosing the accused's conflict of interest to Bramel are the
following:
	"Once we are retained by Mac, we will be unable to
pursue claims like yours against Mac/Stanley in the
future.  We are disclosing this information to you
because we feel that we have an obligation to do so[.]  
	"Because this situation may appear to create a conflict
of interest, we recommend that you seek independent
legal advice to determine if consent should be given." 
	Nothing in the accused's letter to Bramel informed him
that, on January 11, 1994, the accused had signed retainer
agreements with Stanley and placed them in escrow.  As explained
above, as of January 11 -- when the accused agreed to be retained
by Stanley before Bramel had agreed to the amount of the
settlement that the lawyers had reached on December 20 -- the
accused's interests were divided between at least one of their
current clients, Bramel, and Stanley when it came to recommending
whether Bramel should accept the settlement.  In other words,
beginning on January 11, 1994, it is possible that the accused's
relationship with Stanley motivated them to recommend to Bramel a
settlement that they would not have recommended -- and that was
not as favorable to Bramel as it could have been -- if their
loyalty had not been divided.  Nothing in the letter informed
Bramel that the accused's retainer agreements with Stanley
contained indemnity provisions insuring that the accused would be
protected fully by Stanley if Bramel decided to bring a claim
against them because of the conflict of interest that they had
acquired on January 11.  A potential adverse impact of the
indemnity provisions on Bramel was that, because of that
protection, the accused's interests might be aligned with
Stanley, not Bramel, their current client.  The letter of January
17, 1994, fell short of the full disclosure required by DR 10-101(B). 
	The accused contend that their disclosure satisfied the
requirements of DR 10-101(B), because it led Bramel to believe
that his lawyers had "switched sides" and had "betrayed" him
during settlement negotiations and that Kuhling then had advised
Bramel about the potential adverse effects of the accused's
conflict of interest.  That argument is without merit.  DR 10-101(B) requires the explanation that the lawyer gives to the
client to be sufficient to apprise the client of the adverse
consequences of the lawyer's conflict.  The rule does not direct
us to examine the client's subjective understanding of the
lawyer's explanation, whether or not enhanced by consultation
with an independent lawyer.  Additionally, under DR 10-101(B),
the issues of the sufficiency of the disclosure and consultation
with independent counsel are separate:  A lawyer must, when full
disclosure is required under DR 5-101(A)(1), provide disclosure
sufficient to apprise the client of adverse consequences and
advise the client to seek independent counsel.  DR 10-101(B) does
not provide that advice from independent counsel may serve as a
post hoc substitute for the lawyer's own disclosure.  Moreover,
the disclosure that the lawyer gives the client will affect the
ability of independent counsel to assess the conflict and to
advise the client.  We hold that the accused violated DR 5-101(A)
by continuing to represent Bramel after January 11, 1994, without
having provided full disclosure to obtain Bramel's consent.
C.  DR 1-102(A)(3)
	The accused also assign error to the trial panel's
finding that they violated DR 1-102(A)(3), which provides:
"(A) It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to:
"* * * * *
"(3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 
The Bar's complaint alleged that the accused's failure to make
full disclosure to Bramel also violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and that
their failure to respond fully to the Bar's inquiry violated that
rule.  The trial panel majority agreed: 
"The accused[] had a fiduciary relationship with
their clients that imposed on them a special duty of
candor.  The accused[] breached this duty when they
failed to tell the Bramels about all aspects of the
settlement.  The failure to disclose the information to
the Bramels constitutes misrepresentation by omission.
"* * * * * 
"The majority finds that the accused['s]
disclosure to their clients * * * were not ambiguous,
but misleading.  They would have been ambiguous if the
Bramels and the Bar had all the information that the
accused[] did.  They are misleading due to the
information omitted.  Further, the majority finds that
they [sic] accused made a misrepresentation to their
clients when they stated in their January 17, 1994
letter that the defendants had made to them a separate
offer to be retained.  The accused knew that the offer
was not separate from the settlement, but was in fact a
condition of the settlement."
At the outset, we note that DR 1-102(A)(3) sets out
different legal theories: dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation.  The Bar's third amended complaint does not
specify on which of those theories it intended to proceed. 
Although the better practice is to identify the theory or
theories on which the Bar is proceeding, the trial panel resolved
the DR 1-102(A)(3) charges on the theory of misrepresentation,
and the accused respond to that theory before this court. 
This court has held that "misrepresentation" is a broad
term that encompasses both affirmative misstatements and the
nondisclosure of a material fact.  In re Leonard, 308 Or 560,
569, 784 P2d 95 (1989).  A fact is "material" if it is
information that, if known, would be significant to the
recipient.  In re Gustafson, 327 Or 636, 649, 968 P2d 367 (1998). 
The misrepresentation need not be made with the intent to deceive
or to commit fraud.  In re Hiller, 298 Or 526, 533, 694 P2d 540
(1985). 
In this case, the accused's January 17, 1994, letter to
Bramel stated that Stanley had made a "separate" offer to retain
them.  The letter did not explain that, on January 11, the
accused had signed retainer and escrow agreements. 
When Richards proposed adding the retainer provision to
the settlement documents, Griffin believed that the parties no
longer had a meeting of the minds "and therefore we [didn't] have
a settlement agreement."  The accused were upset by the proposal
to include the retainer provision and understood that Stanley
considered that provision to be a condition of the settlement. 
Nonetheless, they later agreed to that proposal as a part of the
global settlement.  Their statement to Bramel that Stanley had
made a "separate" offer of retention was an affirmative
misstatement. 
We turn to the accused's omissions.  On January 10,
Griffin had written to the other plaintiffs' lawyers that he
planned to inform a trial court in California about the proposed
retainer agreement, which he described as "unethical and illegal"
as well as "unacceptable and unenforceable."  The accused knew
that the retainer proposal created a conflict of interest, and
Griffin specifically asked Riemer how much information he and
Brandt had to share with their clients about their relationship
with Stanley.  When the accused signed the retainer and escrow 
agreements on January 11, they apparently believed that they had
discovered a way to avoid the ethical issues associated with the
agreement to work for Stanley.  However, by failing to inform
Bramel that they had signed those documents, the accused gave
Bramel an incomplete understanding of the conflict of interest
that was created by the retainer provision.  Knowing when the
accused agreed to work for Stanley was a fact that was material
to Bramel's assessment of how he should respond to the conflict
of interest and whether he should accept the accused's
recommendation that he settle his claim against Stanley for
$133,045.31.  Knowing that the accused were indemnified fully by
Stanley for any claim that Bramel might bring against them was
material to Bramel's decision whether he should rely on the
accused's advice in recommending that he accept the settlement. 
The accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by not disclosing material
facts to Bramel.
We turn to the accused's argument that the trial panel
erred in finding that they violated DR 1-102(A)(3) in their
letter of April 21, 1994, to Bar counsel Cooper responding to
Bramel's complaint. (14)  In its complaint, the Bar alleged:
"The Accused * * * made the following affirmative
misrepresentations of fact to the Bar:
"a) That [they] had not agreed to work for Mac
Tools while the Bramels' case was still pending;
"b) That a retainer with Mac Tools had not been
discussed until the settlement of the Bramels' case was
finalized; and 
"c) That the Bramels had been fully advised of all
aspects of the settlement negotiations with Mac Tools."
The trial panel majority concluded that the accused violated DR
1-102(A)(3) in those respects. 
	The accused's April 21 letter to Cooper stated, in
part, that they had apprised Bramel of the status of his case
throughout the global settlement negotiations and that Stanley
did not offer to retain plaintiffs' counsel until "after the
settlement was finalized."  The letter also stated that, 
	"[p]rior to finalizing the settlement, all plaintiff's
[sic] counsel embarked on significant research into
potential ethical problems.  This research included a
call by me to bar counsel, George Reimer, [sic] on
January 11, 1994.  During that discussion, I
specifically spoke with Mr. Reimer [sic] about
Disciplinary Rules 5-107, 5-110(A) and 10-101(B).  All
plaintiffs' counsel were careful in structuring a
settlement which would maximize benefit to our clients
and avoid ethical violations.  It was only after much
discussion among counsel that the structure of the
agreement was reached.  All counsel was [sic]
confident, based upon independent research and input
from other attorneys, that the settlement structure met
ethical standards."
	According to the accused, the allegations in the second
cause of complaint are based on statements in their April 21
letter that have been taken out of context.  We have reviewed
their letter and disagree.  The accused's letter to Cooper stated
unequivocally that they did not agree to work for Stanley until
"after" the settlement was finalized and that Stanley did not
offer to retain the plaintiffs' counsel until after the
settlement had been finalized.  Those statements would have been
true if the plaintiffs' claims against Mac Tools had been settled
on December 20, 1993.  However, as noted, the December 20
agreement was subject to the approval of the individual
plaintiffs.  When Griffin received Richards' retainer proposal on
January 6, 1994, he believed that there no longer was a "meeting
of the minds" among the lawyers.  Griffin also believed that
Richards was proposing that the retainer provision was a
condition of settlement, and he believed that the provision was
both unethical and illegal.  Brandt attended an emergency meeting
in Chicago on January 11 to resolve whether and how to
incorporate the retainer provision into the settlement agreement. 
The accused did not send a copy of the proposed settlement to
Bramel until January 17, and Bramel did not sign it until January
28.  The accused's statements to Cooper that they did not agree
to work for Stanley while Bramel's case still was pending and
that Stanley did not offer to retain them until after the
settlement had been finalized simply were not true.  The
accused's assertion in their letter that they had kept Bramel
"fully advised of all aspects of the settlement negotiations" 
with Stanley also was not true.  The accused did not tell Bramel
that, on January 6, 1994, Stanley had proposed adding a retainer
provision to the settlement agreement and that that provision was
a condition of the settlement.  Neither did the accused tell
Bramel that, on January 11, before the settlement agreement had
been signed by all their clients, the accused had signed retainer
and escrow agreements.  All three statements that form the basis
of the Bar's complaint were factual misreprentations.  All three
statements were material to the Bar's inquiry into Bramel's
complaint and whether to proceed with a formal investigation. 
The accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by making affirmative
misrepresentations of material fact to the Bar in their letter of
April 21, 1994.
D.  DR 1-103(C)
	Finally, the accused assign error to the trial panel's
finding that they violated DR 1-103(C), which provides:
"A lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary
investigation shall respond fully and truthfully to
inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of a
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or
act upon the conduct of lawyers, subject only to the
exercise of any applicable right or privilege."
The Bar's complaint alleges that "the Accused failed to respond
truthfully to inquiries from authorities empowered to investigate
or act upon the conduct of lawyers."  Specifically, the Bar
charges that the accused did not respond fully and truthfully to
the inquiries of Hankin, the LPRC investigator.  The trial panel
reasoned that the accused had violated the rule, because the rule
"places the burden on the accused to provide information, not the
Bar to ferret it out." 
	The gravamen of the Bar's allegation is that the
accused failed to disclose to Hankin the January 11, 1994,
retainer agreement and escrow arrangements which, the Bar
contends, the accused knew "were, at best, questionable." 
According to the Bar, "it is questionable whether the Accused
ever actually made their documents physically available to
Hankin."  We conclude that the Bar has failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused failed to make the
retainer agreement and escrow instructions of January 11
available to Hankin.
	As noted, Griffin gave his file on Bramel to Hankin
when he and Brandt met with Hankin in Griffin's office in March
1995.  Hankin did not look through it.  Neither did she examine
Bramel's file that Brandt had made available to her when she met
with him in Salem.  When Hankin met with the accused, she had a
copy of the settlement document that contained paragraph 7
regarding retention of counsel.  However, she did not ask the
accused about the retainer provision.  Hankin testified that, at
that time, her investigation focused mostly on Bramel's complaint
about the amount of the accused's fee and their alleged conflict
of interest. 
	By its terms, DR 1-103(C) requires an accused to
"respond fully and truthfully to inquiries."  We disagree with
the trial panel's view that the rule "places the burden on the
accused to provide information, not the Bar to ferret it out."
Rather, the rule requires an accused to respond "fully and
truthfully" to inquiries.  Hankin never inquired about the
retainer agreements and the escrow arrangement.  The accused made
their files on Bramel, which contained copies of those documents,
available to Hankin.  In addition the accused suggested that
Hankin contact Riemer, the mediator who served as the escrow
agent, and counsel for Stanley.  Hankin did not look through the
files that the accused provided her.  Neither did she contact
Riemer or the mediator.  On this record, we conclude that the Bar
has not met its burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused violated DR 1-103(C). 
III.  SANCTION 

	Having determined that the accused violated DR 2-108(B), DR 5-101(A)(1), and DR 1-102(A)(3), we turn to the
question of the appropriate sanction.  The trial panel
recommended that each of the accused be suspended for six months. 
The Bar requests that this court suspend each of the accused for
at least one year.  The accused argue that no sanction or, at
most, a reprimand, is warranted in this case.
	This court refers to the American Bar Association's
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992)
(ABA Standards) for guidance in determining the appropriate
sanction for lawyer misconduct.  In re Schaffner, 323 Or 472, 918
P2d 803 (1996).  According to the ABA Standards,
"The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is
to protect the public and the administration of justice
from lawyers who have not discharged, will not
discharge, or are unlikely properly to discharge their
professional duties to clients, the public, the legal
system, and the legal profession."
ABA Standard 1.1; see In re Huffman, 328 Or 567, 587, 983 P2d 534
(1999) (noting agreement with statement).
	This court first considers three factors to determine
the appropriate sanction:  the duty violated; the accused
lawyer's mental state; and the actual or potential injury caused
by the accused lawyer's misconduct.  ABA Standard 3.0.  We then
examine any aggravating or mitigating circumstances to determine
if the sanction should be adjusted.  In re Devers, 328 Or 230,
241, 974 P2d 191 (1999); ABA Standard 3.0.  Finally, we look to
Oregon case law.  Devers, 328 Or at 241.  
	In this case, the accused violated their duty to their
client by failing to avoid conflicts of interest, ABA Standard
4.3, and by lacking candor in their dealings with their client,
ABA Standard 4.6.  The accused also failed to maintain their
personal integrity by making misrepresentations to their client
and to the Bar.  ABA Standard 5.1.
	As to the accused's mental state, the Bar contends that
all the accused's acts were intentional, that is, all were done
with a "conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  ABA Standards at 7 (defining "intent").  According to
the Bar, 
	"the Accused intentionally provided their clients with
untimely, incomplete and misleading information, hoping
to push the settlement through while at the same time
disguising their own unethical conduct.  When their
client[] complained to the Bar, the Accused
intentionally provided incomplete and misleading
information to Bar investigators in the hopes of
persuading the Bar to dismiss the Bramels' complaint." 
	We agree that the accused acted intentionally.  When
the accused signed the retainer and escrow agreements on January
11, they created a conflict of interest that they had a duty to
disclose fully to Bramel.  They also had a duty to apprise Bramel
of the potential adverse impact that the conflict could have on
him.  However, beginning on January 11, 1994, the accused's
loyalty was divided between Bramel and Stanley, they
intentionally misrepresented facts and withheld information from
Bramel to mask their conflict of interest.  When Bramel
complained to the Bar, the accused made intentional
misrepresentations in response to Cooper's letter of inquiry. 
The accused intended their misrepresentations to persuade the Bar
not to conduct an investigation of any alleged ethical
misconduct. 
	We turn to whether the accused's conduct caused injury. 
"Injury" includes actual or potential harm to a client, the
public, the legal system, or the legal profession.  ABA Standards
at 6-7.  The Bar has not demonstrated that the accused caused
actual harm to Bramel by securing for him a settlement amount
that was less than Bramel would have received if the accused had
not agreed to work for Stanley in connection with the global
settlement.  However, there is the potential for considerable
harm when a lawyer violates DR 2-108(B) by agreeing to work for
the opposing side in connection with the settlement of a case,
because such an agreement creates the possibility that the
lawyer's professional judgment will be affected and that the
lawyer's loyalty to the current client will be impaired.  Such an
agreement also creates the possibility that the settlement of the
current case does not reflect the value of the claims at issue in
that case.  That is, parties might be willing to pay more, or to
accept less, to settle a case if the settlement includes an
agreement that all lawyers involved will work for the same side
in the future.  
	The accused's letter to Cooper of April 21, 1994,
caused both actual and potential harm to the legal system.  The
effectiveness of the Bar's disciplinary system, and public
confidence in it, assume that lawyers do not make factual
misrepresentations in response to Bar inquiries.  Cooper was
entitled to rely on the accused's response to her inquiry in
deciding whether to dismiss Bramel's complaint or to have the
complaint investigated.  If the accused's misrepresentations had
persuaded Cooper to dismiss Bramel's complaint, the lawyer
discipline system would have been compromised.  The accused's
misrepresentations of material facts also made Hankin's task more
difficult, because she was unsure what she was looking for in her
investigation.  
	The accused's misconduct implicates several ABA
Standards.  ABA Standard 4.31 provides:
"Disbarment is generally appropriate when a
lawyer, without the informed consent of [a] client: 
"(a) engages in representation of a client knowing
that the lawyer's interests are adverse to the client's
with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and
causes serious or potentially serious injury to the
client."
ABA Standard 4.32 provides:
"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully
disclose to a client the possible effect of that
conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a
client[.]"
ABA Standard 4.61 provides:
"Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit
the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or
potential serious injury to a client."
ABA Standard 4.62 provides:
"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or
potential injury to the client."
ABA Standard 5.11 provides, in part:
"Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
"* * * * *
"(b)  a lawyer engages in * * * intentional
conduct involving * * * misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice."
ABA Standard 5.13 provides:
"Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in * * * conduct that involves * * *
misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the
lawyer's fitness to practice law."    
	Drawing together the factors of duty violated, mental
state of the accused, and injury caused, either a suspension or
disbarment could be appropriate in this case.  However, because
the Bar has failed to establish that the accused's misconduct
caused actual harm to Bramel, we make an initial determination
that a lengthy suspension is the appropriate sanction in this
case.  We turn to the fourth factor, aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
	Several aggravating factors are present.  In
misrepresenting facts to Bramel and to the Bar, the accused acted
with a dishonest or selfish motive, namely, not wanting to advise
Bramel of their conflict of interest and not wanting the Bar to
pursue an investigation in response to Bramel's complaint.  ABA
Standard 9.22(b).  The accused engaged in a pattern of misconduct
in their incomplete disclosures to both Bramel and to the Bar. 
ABA Standard 9.22(c).  The accused committed multiple offenses,
ABA Standard 9.22(d), and they refuse to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of their conduct, ABA Standard 9.22(g).  Both the accused
have substantial experience in the practice of law.  ABA Standard
9.22(i).  Finally, Brandt has a prior disciplinary offense
consisting of a letter of admonition in 1993 for a former client
conflict of interest and continuing to represent a party without
making full written disclosures to each client.  ABA Standard
9.22(a).  We discuss the significance of that letter later in
this opinion.
	The only mitigating factor in this case is that Griffin
has no prior disciplinary record.  ABA Standard 9.32(a).
	We next consider this court's case law.  All the
ethical violations in this case stem from the accused's violation
of DR 2-108(B).  As noted, whether DR 2-108(B) is violated when a
lawyer agrees, in connection with the settlement of a case, to
"indirect" restrictions on the future practice of law was a
question of first impression in this case.  If that were the sole
issue here, we might hold that, because this was the first time
that the issue has been litigated in a disciplinary case, the
appropriate sanction would be a public reprimand.  See In re
Banks, 283 Or 459, 482, 584 P2d 284 (1978) (because novel aspect
of case required court to "plow some new ground," public
reprimand was appropriate sanction).  However, having violated DR
2-108, the accused then attempted to disguise and to justify that
violation, resulting in violations of the full disclosure
requirement of DR 5-101(A) and misrepresentations of material
fact both to Bramel and to the Bar, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3). 
	This court has distinguished between cases in which the
lawyer is guilty only of a conflict of interest and cases in
which the conflict is aggravated by fraud, dishonesty, or
misappropriation of funds, or there are many aggravating factors. 
See In re Moore, 299 Or 496, 510, 703 P2d 961 (1985) (drawing
that distinction).  In the former category of cases, the
sanctions have ranged from a public reprimand to a suspension of
less than one year.  Id.  However, when the lawyer's conflict of
interest has been aggravated by fraud, dishonesty, or
misappropriation of funds, or there were many aggravating
factors, the sanction always has involved at least a suspension. 
Some suspensions have exceeded one year and, in one case, this
court disbarred the lawyer.  See In re O'Byrne, 298 Or 535, 551,
694 P2d 955 (1985) (so stating); see also In re Wittemyer, 328 Or
448, 462, 980 P2d 148 (1999) (providing additional examples of
sanctions imposed for violation of conflict-of-interest rules
aggravated by other circumstances).  However, this court has
rejected the argument that there is a "minimum period of
suspension" that always is appropriate in the latter category of
cases.  Wittemyer, 328 Or at 462.  Rather, the appropriate
sanction in each case depends on individual facts and
circumstances.  Id.
	As noted, in this case, the accused acted intentionally
when they violated DR 2-108(B) by entering into the retainer
agreement in connection with the settlement of Bramel's claim
against Stanley.  They compounded that violation by not
disclosing fully their conflict of interest to Bramel and by
making material misrepresentations of fact both to Bramel and to
the Bar, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3). 
	In addition, this case involves several aggravating
factors, and the sole mitigating factor affects only Griffin. 
The aggravating factors heavily outweigh Griffin's one mitigating
factor.  Cf. In re Morris, 326 Or 493, 505-6, 953 P2d 387 (1998) 
(four-month suspension for violation of conflict-of-interest rule
where mitigating factors outweighed aggravating factors).  Our
prior case law confirms that a lengthy suspension is warranted. 
We conclude that Griffin should be suspended for 12 months.
	With respect to Brandt, we conclude that a longer
period of suspension is warranted.  This court has held that, if
the misconduct that gave rise to an earlier letter of admonition
involved the same or similar type of misconduct at issue in the
present case, then it is appropriate to consider the letter in
determining an appropriate sanction.  In re Cohen, 330 Or 489,
500, __ P2d __ (2000).  As noted, in 1993, Brandt received a
letter of admonition for a former client conflict of interest and
continuing to represent a party without making full written
disclosures to each client.  This case involves a current client
conflict of interest and failure to make full disclosure, which
is sufficiently similar in nature that we consider it as an
aggravating factor in this case.  Id. at 501.  Brandt's 1993
letter of admonition is his sole past instance of misconduct.  
However, he became involved in the conflict of interest that is
at the core of this proceeding in January 1994, soon after having
been warned against engaging in behavior that creates a conflict
of interest.  See In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149
(1997) (relative recency of prior instance of misconduct and
timing of current offense in relation to prior offense important
in determining significance of prior misconduct).  The recent
admonition to avoid client conflicts and to make full disclosures
apparently did not deter Brandt from becoming involved in the
conflict of interest that is at the core of the other
disciplinary violations that are at issue in this case.  See In
re Bridges, 302 Or 250, 254-55, 728 P2d 863 (1986) (one purpose
of sanction is to deter misconduct).  Under those circumstances,
Brandt's prior letter of admonition is an aggravating factor that
warrants a longer period of suspension than the suspension that
we have imposed on Griffin.  We conclude that Brandt should be
suspended from the practice of law for 13 months.
	Griffin is suspended from the practice of law for 12
months, and Brandt is suspended from the practice of law for 13
months.  The suspensions shall commence sixty days from the
filing of this decision.
KULONGOSKI, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority's holding that the
accused did not violate Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-103(C).  I
respectfully dissent, however, from the majority's holding that
the accused violated DR 5-101(A)(1) and DR 1-102(A)(3). 
Additionally, although I concur in the majority's holding that
the accused violated DR 2-108(B), I disagree with the majority's
conclusions concerning the appropriate sanction for that
violation.  The issue whether a lawyer violates DR 2-108(B) when
a lawyer agrees in connection with settlement of a case to
"indirect" restrictions on the future practice of law never has
been litigated previously in a disciplinary case in Oregon. 
Accordingly, I would hold that the appropriate sanction for both
the accused is a reprimand.
The accused in this disciplinary proceeding are
entitled to a presumption that they are innocent of the charges. 
In re Jordan, 295 Or 142, 156, 665 P2d 341 (1983).  To overcome
that presumption, the Bar must prove the alleged misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence.  In re Allen, 326 Or 107, 109, 949
P2d 710 (1997); Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 5.2.  "Clear and
convincing evidence means that the truth of the facts asserted is
highly probable."  In re Whipple, 320 Or 476, 478, 886 P2d 7
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
FACTS
The facts in this proceeding are of the utmost
importance, and, because I disagree with most of the majority's
interpretation of those facts, I believe that it is necessary to
give my own explanation of them here.  Reviewing the record de
novo, I would find the following facts.
Both the accused have been lawyers in Oregon for
more than 20 years.  Brandt began representing former
distributors against hand-tool manufacturers in the late 1980s. 
Griffin, whose practice emphasizes plaintiffs' complex business
fraud litigation, first associated as co-counsel with Brandt in
the early 1990s when Brandt's practice began to grow in volume
and complexity, due, at least in part, to an $8.9 million jury
verdict that Brandt had obtained against a hand-tool manufacturer
called Snap-On Tools in 1989.  In 1992, Brandt and Griffin
litigated a case against another hand-tool manufacturer, Mac
Tools, that resulted in a $2.4 million verdict.  Due to the
publicity generated by both those multimillion dollar verdicts,
by fall 1993, the accused were handling 49 claims against Mac
Tools.  One of those claims belonged to Eric Bramel and his wife,
Audrey. (15)
Bramel operated a Mac Tools distributorship in
Spokane, Washington, from 1991 to 1992.  Mac Tools ultimately
terminated that distributorship, after which Bramel sought legal
counsel.  A former Snap-On Tools client referred Bramel to
Brandt, and, in 1992, both the accused agreed to represent him.  
As noted by the majority, Bramel initially had
hoped to net $1.5 million from his claim.  From the outset,
however, Bramel conceded that his total out-of-pocket loss was
approximately $142,000.  In his first letter to Bramel in 1992,
Brandt had cautioned Bramel that his prior $2.4 million verdict
against Mac Tools included a large punitive damages award and
that "Washington law does not recognize punitive damages." (16)  In
the letter, Brandt also stated that, because Mac Tools had
recruited Bramel in California, Brandt would "try to argue that
California law applie[d]" to Bramel's punitive damages claim.
Although the accused began drafting a complaint
for Bramel's claims, they did not file that complaint.  Instead,
Bramel's claims against Mac Tools were to be included in larger
settlement negotiations that began in March 1993 between Mac
Tools and plaintiffs' counsel throughout the country, including
the accused.  In April 1993, Brandt informed Bramel that a
realistic settlement demand would be $275,000, and Bramel
reluctantly agreed.  Brandt testified before the trial panel that
that demand was higher than what he considered to be the actual
value of Bramel's claim, but that making higher demands was part
of the negotiation strategy.
In August 1993, plaintiffs, including Bramel,
participated in "mediation interviews" as part of the settlement
process with Mac Tools.  The purpose of those interviews was to
allow Mac Tools's lawyers to interview individual plaintiffs off-the-record and evaluate their claims.  Following his interview,
Mac Tools offered Bramel $26,000, minus $6,300 that Mac Tools
claimed Bramel still owed for his tool inventory.  Counsel for
Mac Tools also informed Griffin that they were prepared to try
Bramel's case because they did not believe that his claim had
significant value.  Griffin recommended that Bramel reject the
"unrealistically low" settlement offer, which he did. 
Subsequently, however, Bramel's personal financial situation
began to worsen, and he began to lower his settlement demand.
By fall 1993, when a second round of settlement
negotiations began between Mac Tools, its parent company, The
Stanley Works (collectively "Stanley"), and plaintiffs' counsel,
Bramel had reduced his settlement demand to $165,000.  Of the
approximately 115 claims involved in those negotiations, Brandt
and Griffin were representing 49 clients, including Bramel.  At
the second "global settlement" meeting on November 5, 1993,
Stanley proposed an $8 million settlement offer, which the
plaintiffs rejected.  The plaintiffs' counsel countered with an
offer to settle all claims for approximately $18 million -- an
aggregate sum of their individual clients' demands.  Stanley then
increased its offer to $9.5 million, but plaintiffs rejected that
offer as well.
It was during the November 5, 1993, meeting that
Weddle, a vice-president for The Stanley Works, first raised the
subject of Stanley retaining the plaintiffs' lawyers to represent
Stanley in the future.  Weddle implied that, if the plaintiffs'
lawyers agreed to his proposal, their retainer fees would be
substantial, stating:  "We can make you very rich men."  Griffin,
who was present at that meeting, interpreted the proposal as
"bribery" and an attempt to buy them off.  The plaintiffs'
counsel rejected the proposal and walked out of the meeting. 
Afterward, they informed Stanley that they would not discuss the
employment issue while settlement negotiations were ongoing. 
Stanley agreed, and a third global settlement meeting was
scheduled for December 20, 1993.
No mention of a retainer agreement was made at the
December 20, 1993, meeting, and the plaintiffs' counsel believed
that it was no longer an issue.  At that meeting, the parties
agreed to settle all the claims for $13.32 million, subject to
approval by the individual plaintiffs.  As mentioned by the
majority, the individual settlement amounts offered to the
accused's clients reflected approximately 80 percent of their
latest demands.  Under the terms of the proposed settlement,
Bramel would receive $133,045.31 and Mac Tools would forgive the
sum of $6,300 that it claimed that Bramel owed.  In fact, in
Bramel's case, that offer represented more than 80 percent of his
latest demand ($165,000) and was almost seven times greater than
Mac Tools's original offer to Bramel ($26,000 minus $6,300).  
Immediately after the December 20, 1993, meeting,
Brandt and Griffin began contacting each of their clients to
inform them of the proposed settlement amounts.  Brandt testified
that he believed that all 49 clients had agreed to the settlement
figures by approximately January 4, 1994, although neither he nor
Griffin remember talking to Bramel in particular. 
On January 4, 1994, counsel for Stanley faxed
drafts of proposed settlement forms to Brandt.  The forms
contained   boilerplate confidentiality and noncompetition
provisions that essentially required the plaintiffs who agreed to
settle also to agree that the terms of the agreement would be
confidential and that they would not "voluntarily" cooperate with
other potential claimants.  None of the forms referred to Stanley
retaining the plaintiffs' counsel.  The next day, however, the
retainer issue resurfaced in a telephone conversation between
Richards, one of the lawyers for Stanley, and Wagner, another
plaintiffs' lawyer involved in the global settlement
negotiations.  Wagner, who was considered by the rest of the
plaintiffs' counsel as the designated "point man" because of his
proximity to Richards, (17) responded to Stanley's "resurrection" of
the retainer issue with a letter dated January 6, 1994.  When
Wagner wrote that letter, no specific retainer agreement had been
proposed since the November 5, 1993, meeting.  Consequently, in
his letter, Wagner expressed his concern over the telephone
conversation in which the retainer issue had resurfaced, and he
reiterated that the settlement reached on December 20, 1993, "was
not contingent upon any agreement to represent or not represent
Stanley or Mac [Tools], post settlement."  He also indicated that
the drafts of the proposed settlement forms faxed on January 4,
1994 -- that made no mention of being retained by Stanley -- were
acceptable to the plaintiffs' lawyers.  The accused agreed with
Wagner's assessment of the situation.
The same day, in response to Wagner's letter,
Richards faxed to plaintiffs' lawyers a new paragraph that she
proposed be inserted into the settlement agreements.  The
paragraph began:  
	"#.  Retention of Counsel.  Distributor
understands that, upon execution of this Agreement
resolving all matters and disputes between the
Distributor and Mac Tools, counsel for the Distributor
will be retained by Mac Tools * * *."   
(Emphasis added.)  Also attached to the proposed amendment was a
copy of a case that Richards asserted "indicates that it is
ethical and proper to have a retention agreement as part of a
settlement agreement."  
In reaction, the plaintiffs' counsel began
discussing whether and how it would be possible to enforce the
settlement agreement reached on December 20, 1993, without the
retainer provision.  One option that they discussed was to file a
lawsuit to enforce the December 20 settlement agreement.  That
option, however, would delay a conclusion to the suit and would
impose additional expense on their clients.  The plaintiffs'
counsel also were concerned about the settlement agreement
breaking down entirely.  That concern was heightened by their
belief that the value of their clients' claims was beginning to
decrease and the strength of their positions beginning to weaken
as a result of reports of similar cases in other parts of the
country in which plaintiffs' lawyers "were not getting good
results."  Additionally, Stanley recently had obtained a summary
judgment in a similar case, and Stanley's lawyers had developed
greater confidence about their ability to obtain similar
judgments in other jurisdictions.
On January 11, 1994, Brandt and other plaintiffs'
counsel met once more with Stanley in Chicago.  Weddle began the
meeting by congratulating the plaintiffs' counsel for reaching a
settlement for their clients -- reaffirming their belief that the
settlement amount "was a done deal."  Brandt remembers that
Weddle then stated, "Now that that's done and the case is
settled, we want to retain you."  The retainer agreement proposed
by Stanley on this occasion, however, was different from the
agreement previously rejected by the plaintiffs' counsel on
November 5, 1993.  Stanley's counsel explained that one of the
reasons that Stanley wanted to retain the plaintiffs' counsel was
to avoid similar deceptive practices suits being filed against
them in the future.  To accomplish that objective, Stanley
proposed that the plaintiffs' counsel sign agreements to be
retained by Stanley for the balance of 1994 and, in return,
Stanley would pay each of them a nonrefundable retainer fee of
$10,000.  Under Stanley's proposal, once signed, the agreements
would be placed in escrow and would not go into effect until
after all plaintiffs had executed their individual settlement
agreements, all settlement amounts had been paid, and all pending
actions had been dismissed.  The plaintiffs' counsel understood
that, under that proposed arrangement, if one of their clients
did not consent to future retainer by Stanley, none of the
retainer agreements would go into effect.  The plaintiffs'
counsel also understood that those clients who did agree still
would receive their agreed settlement amounts even if other
clients did not and the retainer agreements never took effect.
During the meeting, Brandt called Griffin, who was
then in Portland, to discuss the new retainer proposal.  Griffin,
on the same day, called George Riemer, the Bar's General Counsel,
to discuss the ethical implications of the arrangement.  Both
Griffin and Riemer remember discussing DR 2-108(B) and whether
retainer in connection with settlement of a case that was still
pending might be possible.  Griffin's notes taken during that
conversation -- Riemer took no notes -- reflect that he and
Riemer also discussed the potential applications of DR 5-107(A),
DR 5-101(A), DR 10-101(B), and, specifically, what "full
disclosure" meant in that context.  Riemer told Griffin that it
was "hypothetically possible" to proceed with the proposed
arrangement as long as he and Brandt complied with the disclosure
and consent provisions.  
Based on that advice, on their desire to reach a
prompt resolution of their clients' claims, and on their concern
that, "if they did not accept the offer * * *[,] the settlement
might be in jeopardy," the accused agreed to Stanley's retainer
proposal.  Both the accused testified that they would not have
done so if Riemer had told them that the proposal was improper. 
Once signed, the agreements were placed in escrow with the
mediator, pending execution of the settlement agreements by the
individual plaintiffs.
I believe that it is necessary to address here the
majority's finding that Bramel had not agreed orally to the
settlement offer "until after January 11, 1994."  ___ Or at ___
(slip op at 8).  As I read the record, it is at least equally
possible that Bramel had, in fact, agreed to the settlement offer
before January 6 or, at the very latest, before the January 11
meeting.  It is critical, I believe, to differentiate between
Bramel's knowledge and acceptance of the settlement amount, i.e.,
the offer made by Stanley on December 20, 1993, to settle his
case for $133,045.31, and his knowledge and acceptance of the
settlement agreement, i.e., the agreement contained in the
proposed settlement forms that included not only the settlement
amount but also a provision acknowledging the accused's retainer
by Stanley.  
The only evidence in the record concerning when
Bramel agreed to the $133,045.31 settlement amount is the
testimony of Bramel, and both the accused before the trial panel. 
Interestingly, the trial panel did not reach a finding on that
point.  Cf. In re Trukositz, 312 Or 621, 629, 825 P2d 1369 (1992)
(when credibility of witness is material issue, court
substantially relies on trial panel's findings of fact). 
Notably, Bramel's testimony conflicts with both the accused's. 
My own review of the record persuades me that Bramel's testimony
about when he agreed to the settlement amount is suspect for
three reasons.  First, Bramel noted that he is "not very good"
with dates and could not remember exactly when he talked with the
accused.  Second, Bramel testified that he first learned of the
December 20, 1993, settlement amount when he received a letter
from the accused on January 17, 1994.  The record, however, is
clear that Bramel had discussed the settlement amount with
Griffin sometime before January 11 or, at the very latest, on
January 13.  Third, Bramel testified that three things concerned
him about the settlement agreement.  In his initial complaint to
the Bar about the accused's conduct, however, Bramel noted only
two concerns with the settlement agreement.  The concern
conspicuously "missing" in Bramel's original complaint involved
his "concern" about the actual settlement amount.  Based on the
foregoing, I reject Bramel's testimony concerning the date on
which he agreed to the settlement amount.  See generally UCJI
10.04 (when person intentionally gives false testimony in part,
person's testimony may be distrusted in its entirety). 
Although Bramel testified that, prior to January
17, 1994, he had not told Griffin that he would accept the
settlement agreement, he never testified directly that he
previously had not agreed to the settlement amount.  Brandt, on
the other hand, testified that, by approximately January 4, he
believed that he and Griffin had contacted all their clients
regarding the acceptability of the settlement amounts negotiated
at the meeting on December 20, 1993.  Although Brandt also
testified that, on January 6 he was concerned that they might
have had some remaining clients to contact, he also testified
that, when he attended the meeting in Chicago on January 11 he
believed that Griffin had contacted Bramel and had obtained
authority to settle Bramel's case for the proposed settlement
amount.  That testimony is consistent with the plaintiffs'
counsel's perspective going into that meeting, viz., that a
settlement already had been reached.  It also is consistent with
Weddle's announcement to the plaintiffs' counsel at the start of
that meeting:  "Now that * * * the case is settled, we want to
retain you." 
Finally, Griffin's testimony does not conflict
with Brandt's regarding when Bramel agreed to the settlement
amount.  Griffin's statement that he "may have mentioned" the
settlement to Bramel prior to a conversation he had with Bramel
on January 13, 1994, but that he specifically remembers talking
about "it" to Bramel on January 13, was in response to the
following question by the Bar:
	"Is January 13, 1994, the first date that you
called Mr. Bramel in an attempt to tell him that there
had been a settlement and to make full disclosure to
him of the potential conflict of interest that you were
in?
(Emphasis added.)  In other words, Griffin was confident that he
had discussed both the settlement amount and the potential
conflict with Bramel on January 13, 1994.  That does not mean,
however, that he had not received Bramel's approval of the
settlement amount before January 11.  Griffin testified that he
had "numerous conversations" with Bramel concerning the
settlement amount prior to their conversation on January 13. 
Griffin also testified that, in general, his conversations with
his clients following the January 11 meeting had followed an
unwritten "script" in which he would discuss, among other things,
the amount and the potential conflict.
As detailed above, the record does not support a
finding that it was highly probable that Bramel had not agreed to
the settlement amount before January 11, 1994.  The absence of
direct evidence on that issue does not support the majority's
conclusion that, on January 11, when the accused agreed to be
retained by Stanley, Bramel had not agreed to the settlement
amount reached on December 20, 1993.  ___ Or ___ (slip op at 8). 
In fact, apart from Bramel's testimony, the accused's testimony
demonstrates that all of their clients, including Bramel, had
approved the settlement amounts offered by Stanley before January
11.  See In re Gildea, 325 Or 281, 296-97, 936 P2d 975 (1997)
(testimony of accused lawyer, if court deems it credible, is
sufficient to establish facts).  Accordingly, I find that Bramel
had agreed to the amount of the proposed settlement before
January 11.
Following the events of January 11, 1994, the
accused began contacting each of their 49 clients to discuss the
execution of the individual settlement agreements.  Griffin
specifically remembered talking to Bramel about the settlement
agreement and the potential conflict on the phone on January 13,
1994.  During that conversation, Griffin also recommended to
Bramel that he seek independent legal advice concerning consent
to the conflict.
Following their conversation on January 13, 1994,
Griffin and Bramel had several additional discussions about
Bramel's case and about the settlement agreement.  Bramel
testified before the trial panel that at that time (January 1994)
he was "in need of the settlement money" and was not in a
position financially to reject the settlement offer and take his
case to trial.  Griffin testified before the trial panel that,
because of the time and expense that would have been involved in
trying the case and, because he did not think that Bramel would
recover as much from a trial as he had in the settlement process,
he had encouraged Bramel to accept the $133,045.31 settlement
offer. (18) 
On January 17, 1994, the accused mailed a letter
to their clients, including Bramel, regarding the retainer
agreement and seeking their clients' signatures on documents
consenting to the potential conflict of interest and approving
the settlement agreements.  The letter also advised the clients
to consult independent counsel "to determine if consent should be
given."  See ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 15-16) (setting out text
of January 17 letter).
Bramel does not remember talking to Griffin on
January 13, 1994.  He claims that he first learned that his
lawyers were "switching sides" when he received the letter mailed
on January 17.  According to Bramel, it was at that time that he
decided to consult independent counsel for advice.  Bramel's
first telephone call was to his accountant in Idaho.  His
accountant referred him to a lawyer in Idaho who, because he was
not licensed to practice law in Washington, ultimately referred
Bramel to Kuhling, a lawyer in Spokane, Washington.  Kuhling's
records indicate that Bramel called him for the first time on
January 18, 1994.  During that conversation, Bramel informed
Kuhling that he had been advised to seek independent counsel to
review a proposed settlement agreement. (19)  The two met in person
for the first time on January 24.
At some point between January 13 and January 26,
1994, Griffin learned that Bramel had contacted another lawyer. 
As a result, the accused obtained an extension of the original
settlement deadline, January 26, 1994, to January 28, 1994,
giving Bramel and three other clients additional time to sign
their settlement agreements.  
Griffin first spoke with Kuhling on January 27,
1994.  During that conversation, Kuhling informed Griffin that he
believed that a conflict of interest existed and that what
"[Brandt and Griffin] were doing was unethical."  Kuhling told
Griffin that "the only fair thing to do" was to waive his
attorney fees and that, if he did so, Bramel would accept the
$133,045.31 settlement offer.  Griffin refused to waive his
entire fee.  Griffin also informed Kuhling that, if Bramel was
going to accuse him of ethical violations, he would not be able
to represent Bramel in his case against Mac Tools.  Griffin
offered to reduce his fee by $5,000, but, acting on Kuhling's
advice, Bramel rejected that offer.
Bramel ultimately signed the settlement agreement
with Stanley.  On January 31, 1994, Brandt sent Bramel a check
for $73,174.92, the net amount of Bramel's settlement after
deducting attorney fees.  Less than two months later, with
Kuhling's assistance, Bramel drafted and sent a complaint to the
Bar.
Most of the remaining facts discussed by the
majority  primarily pertain to the alleged violation of DR 1-103(C) (requiring full and truthful responses to inquiries in
disciplinary proceeding).  Because I concur in the majority's
holding that the Bar did not prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused violated DR 1-103(C), I shall refrain
from repeating the facts that relate to that allegation.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
The majority concludes that the accused violated
DR 5-101(A)(1) (prohibiting accepting or continuing employment
when exercise of lawyer's judgment will be or reasonably may be
affected by lawyer's own interest, except with client consent
after full disclosure), DR 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation), and DR 2-108(B) (prohibiting, in connection
with settlement, entering into agreement that restricts lawyer's
right to practice law).  I begin with the alleged violations of
DR 5-101(A)(1) and DR 1-102(A)(3). 
The majority concludes that a conflict existed in
violation of DR 5-101(A)(1) when the accused agreed to Stanley's
retainer proposal on January 11, 1994, reasoning that at that
time the accused "acquired an interest that did, or reasonably
might have, affected the exercise of their professional judgment
on behalf of Bramel."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 27-28).  To the
extent that the majority suggests that the accused's professional
judgment was affected by their own self-interest when the
settlement offers were negotiated, I disagree.  
The total settlement amount, $13.32 million, and
Bramel's individual settlement amount, $133,045.31, were
negotiated and agreed to at the global settlement meeting held on
December 20, 1993.  The record is very clear that retainer was
not an issue during the December 20 meeting.  The record also
indicates that the plaintiffs' counsel believed that the $13.32
million was a favorable settlement for their clients and that
Stanley would go no higher with their settlement offer.  I
emphasize that the final settlement amount offered by Stanley to
each of the plaintiffs was negotiated without the retainer issue
on the table.  Bramel's actual settlement amount serves as an
example of the favorableness of the settlement offers negotiated
by the accused on behalf of their clients.  Bramel conceded when
he retained the accused that his actual damages were
approximately $142,000.  That assessment presumably did not
include the $6,300 that Mac Tools claimed that Bramel still owed
for his tool inventory and that ultimately was forgiven.  The
record demonstrates that the ultimate settlement amount offered
for Bramel's claim was $133,045.31.  That amount approximately is
equal to Bramel's actual damages ($142,000) minus the $6,300 he
owed ($135,700).  Consequently, I cannot agree that the accused
were not striving to achieve the best possible settlement for
their clients on December 20, or that their judgment somehow was
clouded by a retainer offer that, in their minds, no longer
existed.  That is critical, because the amount agreed to on
December 20 did not change as a result of the plaintiffs'
lawyers' agreement to the retainer arrangement proposed by
Stanley on January 11, 1994.  
To the extent, however, that the majority asserts
that the accused's professional judgment was affected by their
own self-interest after they agreed to sign the retainer
agreements on January 11, 1994, I agree.  The majority and I part
company, however, in our analysis of the disclosure given by the
accused to Bramel concerning that conflict.  
The majority concludes that the accused's
disclosure of that conflict under DR 10-101(B)(1) was
insufficient. (20)  Focusing on the January 17, 1994, letter written
by the accused to their clients -- the purpose of which was to
confirm oral disclosures that already had occurred -- the
majority emphasizes that the letter:  (1) by its wording, led the
clients to believe that there was no conflict; and (2) was
insufficient because it did not inform the clients of the exact
terms of the retainer agreements or of the escrow arrangement. 
___ Or at ___ (slip op at 31-33).  
The primary flaw in the majority's analysis of the
accused's disclosure under DR 10-101(B) is its presumption that
the January 17, 1994, letter mirrored the oral disclosure that
Griffin had made to Bramel on January 13. (21)  Based on the actions
taken by Bramel after his conversation with Griffin on January
13, I conclude that Griffin fully had apprised Bramel orally
about the potential conflict and the adverse impact that that
conflict may have had on the settlement agreement negotiated on
his behalf.  Following that conversation, and before he could
have received the January 17 letter, Bramel sought the advice of
independent counsel to review the proposed settlement
agreement. (22)  Bramel also testified that, although he might not
have communicated it to Kuhling, he had been informed by Griffin
that there was a deadline to agree to the settlement.  Bramel's
impression that his lawyers had "switched sides" and had
"deserted" him also indicate to me that Bramel was aware of the
potential adverse impact that Stanley's future retainer of the
accused had on his case. (23) 
Finally, I also would point out that, even if the
January 17, 1994, letter had been the only disclosure made to
Bramel -- which it was not -- I do not believe that DR 10-101(B)(1) required the accused to disclose every provision of the
retainer arrangement that had been negotiated on January 11. 
That rule requires an adequate explanation of the nature of the
potential conflict, not disclosure of each and every detail
surrounding the potential conflict.  The required disclosure
occurred here.  The letter disclosed that an offer to be retained
at the close of the plaintiffs' cases had been made by Stanley
and accepted by the plaintiffs' counsel.  The letter disclosed
that the acceptance of that offer might have created a potential
conflict of interest.  The letter also advised clients to seek
independent legal advice to determine whether consent to the
settlement and to the conflict should be given.  And the letter
was sent contemporaneously with the accused's oral disclosures to
their clients.  Accordingly, I do not believe that DR 10-101(B)(1) required the accused to say more than was said in the
January 17 letter and, therefore, I conclude that the
requirements of "full disclosure" under that rule were satisfied. 
To that end, I also note that, generally, lawyers
are asked to do three things when they have a question regarding
the disciplinary rules:  (1) disclose to the client; (2) advise
the client to seek independent legal advice; and, (3) call the
Bar.  The issue is not whether the accused did what they were
advised to do, but whether what they did was sufficient.  Because
I believe that it was, I would hold that the Bar has not proved a
violation of DR 5-101(A)(1) by clear and convincing evidence.  I
dissent from the majority's holding that the Bar has done so, and
I would dismiss the 5-101(A)(1) charge against each of the
accused. 
Turning to DR 1-102(A)(3), the majority concludes
that the accused made "affirmative misrepresentations" to Bramel
and to the Bar.  ___ Or ___ (slip op at 35, 37-40).  That
conclusion primarily is based on the majority's interpretation of
the words "after," "separate," and "finalized" used by the
accused in their January 17, 1994, letter to Bramel describing
what had transpired at the meeting with Stanley on January 11,
and again in their letter dated April 21, 1994, to the Bar,
responding to Bramel's complaint.  The majority also concludes
that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3), because they failed to
inform Bramel that the retainer and escrow agreements had been
signed on January 11 and failed to tell him about the
indemnification terms included in the retainer agreement.
Again, my reading of the record indicates that the
Bar has failed to demonstrate that its interpretation of the
words "after," "separate," and "finalized" is more probable, let
alone highly probable, in comparison with the interpretation of
those words by the accused.  The accused's interpretation of
those words especially is reasonable when one considers the
sequence of events that took place between December 20, 1993, and
January 11, 1994.  The record indicates that the retainer
arrangement in fact was proposed on January 11, after the parties
had agreed to the settlement amount on December 20.  The retainer
arrangement also was separate from the settlement in that:  (1)
the offer was distinct from the settlement amount ("sum certain")
previously agreed to on December 20; (2) the retainer agreements
were separate documents being held in escrow; and (3) the
retainer agreements would not take effect unless all the
individual clients consented to the retainer and until after all
the individual settlement agreements were executed.  As discussed
above, the accused had disclosed to their clients the agreement
to be retained by Stanley in the future, i.e., once consent from
their clients had been given and the settlement was complete. 
Finally, the record indicates that all the plaintiffs' counsel
and Stanley believed that, as of December 20, the settlement "was
a done deal."  I agree with the dissent written by my colleague
Justice Riggs on this point:  Under the circumstances, even
though their clients had not yet signed the final settlement
agreements, it was reasonable for the accused to believe that the
settlement amount had been "finalized" before the retainer
arrangement was proposed.  
My view of the alleged misrepresentation by
omission simply is that no such misrepresentation occurred.  For
the reasons explained above in my analysis under DR 10-101(B), I
do not believe that the accused were required by the disciplinary
rules to disclose to Bramel the details surrounding the retainer
proposal or the terms of the retainer agreements themselves. 
Consequently, I conclude that the Bar has not proved clearly and
convincingly that the accused engaged in conduct involving
misrepresentation, either affirmatively or by omission, and I
would dismiss the DR 1-102(A)(3) charges against them.
Finally, I concur in the majority's holding that
the accused violated DR 2-108(B), which provides:
	"In connection with the settlement of a
controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an
agreement that restricts the lawyer's right to practice
law."
The agreement by the accused in this case to be retained in the
future by Stanley, in connection with the settlement that they
previously had negotiated for their clients, was a violation of
DR 2-108(B).  Although the signed retainer agreements would not
go into effect until after all the plaintiffs had consented to
the retainer and signed the settlement agreements, the effect of
the agreement to be retained by Stanley, made by the plaintiffs'
lawyers in connection with the settlement, was the same as an
agreement, made in connection with the settlement, never again to
sue Stanley in the future.  Although I agree with the accused's
assertion that all retainer agreements restrict a lawyer's right
to practice law in some way or another, not all agreements
restricting a lawyer's right to practice law are unethical under
DR 2-108(B).  Only those made in connection with settlement
violate that rule. 
DR 2-108(B) is a clear prohibition against
restrictive covenants. (24)  As noted by the majority, the rationale
behind DR 2-108(B) and Model Rule 5.6 (derived from DR 2-108(B))
is threefold:  (1) such agreements restrict the public's ability
to retain counsel of choice; (2) within the context of such an
agreement, the client's actual recovery might have more to do
with the desire to restrict an opponent's practice than the
merits of the client's claim; and, (3) such agreements create
potential conflicts of interest.  ABA Formal Opinion 371 (April
16, 1993).  Those public policy concerns were not eliminated by
the escrow arrangement entered into by the plaintiffs' counsel on
January 11, 1994.  Consequently, I find by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused entered into an agreement in connection
with settlement that restricted their practice of law.  In so
finding, I concur in the majority's holding that the accused
violated DR 2-108(B).
In summary, because I would find that the Bar did
not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
violated DR 5-101(A)(1), DR 1-102(A)(3), or DR 1-103(C), I would
dismiss those charges against the accused.  I concur, however, in
the majority's holding that the Bar proved that the accused
violated DR 2-108(B).  
SANCTION
Having determined that the conduct of the accused
violated DR 2-108(B), I turn to the question of the appropriate
sanction for that violation.  In doing so, I bear in mind that
the purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings, as provided by the
American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards), is to
"protect the public and the administration of justice
from lawyers who have not discharged, will not
discharge, or are unlikely to properly discharge their
professional duties to clients, the public, the legal
system, and the legal profession."  
ABA Standard 1.1.  This court similarly has noted: 
"The objects of [lawyer discipline] proceedings are to
uphold the dignity and respect of the profession,
protect the courts, preserve the administration of
justice and protect clients." 
In re Carstens, 297 Or 155, 166, 683 P2d 992 (1984).
Following the analytical framework for determining
the appropriate sanction in lawyer disciplinary cases set forth
in the ABA Standards, I first consider the following three
factors:  (1) the duty violated; (2) the accused's mental state;
and (3) the actual or potential injury caused by the accused's
misconduct.  ABA Standards at 6; ABA Standard 3.0. 
In this case, the only duty violated by the
accused when they agreed to be retained by Stanley was their duty
owed as professionals.  ABA Standard 7.0.  DR 2-108(B) is
included among those rules that provide "ethical standards that
are not fundamental to the professional relationship but which
define certain standards of conduct."  Id.  ABA Standard 7.0
provides, in part:
	"* * * While [standards that are not
fundamental to the professional relationship but which
define certain standards of conduct] have been
developed out of a desire to protect the public * * * a
violation of these standards generally is less likely
to cause injury to a client, the public, or the
administration of justice * * *.
	"In general, then, a sanction of disbarment
or suspension will rarely be required, and a sanction
of reprimand, admonition or probation will be
sufficient to ensure that the public is protected and
the bar is educated. * * *"
Turning to the accused's mental state, I cannot
agree with the majority's conclusion that the accused acted
intentionally when they violated DR 2-108(B).  As mentioned
above, this is the first disciplinary case in Oregon in which
this court has had the opportunity to apply DR 2-108(B) in this
context.  After consulting with the Bar's general counsel, the
accused disclosed the retainer agreement to their clients and
advised their clients to seek independent counsel.  Based on the
foregoing, and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
settlement negotiations with Stanley, I find that, at most, the
accused acted negligently when they entered into the retainer
agreement with Stanley, that is, they "fail[ed] to be aware of a
substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will
follow[.]"  ABA Standards at 6.
Moving on to the injury caused by the accused's
conduct, I agree with the majority that the Bar has failed to
demonstrate that the accused's violation of DR 2-108(B) caused
actual harm to Bramel, the public, or the legal system.  There is
nothing in the record that demonstrates that Bramel would have
received a larger settlement if the accused had not agreed to be
retained by Stanley.  Unlike the majority, however, I also find
that the conduct of the accused in this case caused little, if
any, potential harm to Bramel, the public, or the legal system. 
I agree that, in some instances, an agreement to be retained in
the future by an opponent could create the possibility that
settlement of the current case does not reflect the value of the
claims at issue in that case, because the professional judgment
of the lawyer violating DR 2-108(B) might have been affected.  In
this proceeding, however, the settlement amounts negotiated by
the accused for their clients were agreed to on December 20,
1993, at a time when, as far as the accused were concerned, being
retained by Stanley was not an issue.  Consequently, the
accused's professional judgment could not have been affected on
December 20, 1993, by the retainer arrangement proposed
subsequently on January 11, 1994.  Nor were their loyalties
divided at the time when the settlement amount was negotiated. 
Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that the settlement
between Stanley and the accused's clients did not reflect the
value of the clients' claims.  In fact, the record demonstrates
that the settlement amounts that the accused negotiated on behalf
of their clients reflected approximately 80 percent of their
clients' latest demands. 
Examining the duty violated, the accused's mental
state, and the lack of potential or actual injury caused by the
violation of DR 2-108(B) in this proceeding, the accused's
violation implicates ABA Standard 7.3, which provides:
	"Reprimand is generally appropriate when a
lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes
injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or
the legal system."
Having found that the accused's misconduct was negligent and
caused no actual injury and little, if any, potential injury to
Bramel, the public, or the legal system, I make an initial
determination that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction in
this case. (25)
With that in mind, I next consider the applicable
aggravating and mitigating factors.  See ABA Standards at 6
(after making initial determination about appropriate sanction,
court then considers relevant aggravating and mitigating
factors).  The only aggravating factor present in this case is
that both the accused have substantial experience in the practice
of law. (26)  ABA Standard 9.22(i).  On the other hand, in
mitigation, the accused provided full and free disclosure during
the disciplinary investigation and had cooperative attitudes
toward the proceedings.  ABA Standard 9.32(e).  Additionally,
neither of the accused have a prior disciplinary record.  ABA
Standard 9.32(a); see also In re Cohen, 330 Or 489, 500, ___ P2d
___ (2000) (inaccurate to characterize letter of admonition as
form of "sanction" or "prior record" of discipline imposed on
accused lawyer).
Finally, I turn to this court's case law.  When
addressing a violation of a disciplinary rule for the first time,
this court previously has held that a public reprimand is the
appropriate sanction.  In re Banks, 283 Or 459, 482, 584 P2d 284
(1978).  Similarly, I conclude that a reprimand is sufficient to
"ensure that the public is protected and the bar is educated"
regarding violations of DR 2-108(B) under the circumstances
presented by this case.  ABA Standard 7.0.
Accordingly, following my examination of the
applicable ABA Standards, keeping in mind that violation of DR 2-108(B) is the sole issue in this case, and taking into
consideration the fact that this is the first time that this
issue has been litigated in a disciplinary case in Oregon, I
would conclude that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction for
both the accused. 
RIGGS, J., joins in this opinion in part, as set forth in his
separate opinion.	RIGGS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
	I concur with the majority's findings that the accused did
not violate Disciplinary Rule (DR) l-103(C). (27)  I respectfully
dissent from the majority's findings that the accused violated DR
2-108(B), DR 5-101(A)(1), and DR 1-102(A)(3), and I would dismiss
entirely those allegations.  I join the separate concurring and
dissenting opinion of my colleague, Justice Kulongoski, except to
the extent that he finds that the accused violated DR 2-108(B). 
As to DR 5-101(A)(1) and DR 1-102(A)(3), I do not believe that
the nature of the accused's representations to Bramel or the Bar
suggests the mental state that the majority opinion imputes. 
Moreover, even if the majority is correct in its findings of fact
and the inferences that flow from them, I believe that the
sanctions imposed are excessive.
	It is impossible to overemphasize our role here.  We are
reviewing, de novo, whether the Bar has sustained its burden of
proving each allegation by clear and convincing evidence.  I note
at the outset that I agree with the majority as to the meaning of
most, but not all, of the relevant disciplinary rules.  Whether
the accused's conduct in this proceeding violated those rules,
however, is a very different matter.
	My review of the record indicates that this is a much closer
case than the majority opinion acknowledges.  Although this
proceeding does not have many disputed facts, the parties hotly
dispute the inferences that can be drawn from those facts.  It is
those inferences that are crucial to deciding this proceeding. 
As Justice Kulongoski's opinion aptly demonstrates, many, if not
most, of the facts and inferences can be viewed from a
perspective that supports the accused's theories.  Because that
is so, and for the reasons explained below, I believe that the
Bar has failed to meet its burden of proving the charges by clear
and convincing evidence.
	Turning first to the majority's analysis of the DR 5-101(A)
matters, the issue is whether, given what Bramel knew at the
relevant times, the accused told Bramel enough so that he was
aware of a potential adverse impact on him if he consented to the
accused's prospective employment relationship with Stanley.  It
is true that DR 10-101(B) (quoted in the majority opinion) speaks
of "full disclosure."  This court recently considered the meaning
of the term "full disclosure" in In re Hassenstab, 325 Or 166,
175, 934 P2d 1110 (1997).  There, this court held that full
disclosure of a conflict meant "an explanation sufficient to
apprise the client of the potential adverse impact upon that
client."  Id.  Here, the majority, at the Bar's urging, expands
that definition to require disclosure of virtually all details of
a potential adverse impact -- a much higher standard than the
rule and our case law require.  As I explain below, I do not
believe that DR 5-101(A) required the accused to say more to
Bramel than what was said in the January 17, 1994, letter. 
	First, I disagree with the majority's analysis of the
statements that the accused made in their January 17, 1994,
letter to Bramel.  In my view, the majority's temporal analysis -- which permeates its opinion, especially its analysis of DR 1-102(A)(3) -- is only one of two reasonable ways to view the
facts.  For example, the majority takes the accused to task for
their use of the wording "after" in their January 17, 1994,
letter to Bramel ("[a]fter we obtained Mac/Stanley's agreement to
resolve our cases for a sum certain"). (28)  Looking at the chain of
events, it is possible to view that statement as the accused's
reasonable interpretation of the facts:  the retainer agreement
was suggested by Richards on January 6, 1994, which was "after"
December 20, 1993, the day that the plaintiff's lawyers and the
lawyers for Stanley agreed on a settlement amount.  On January 4,
1994, Richards sent by facsimile the three versions of settlement
forms to Brandt.  On January 6, Wagner wrote a letter to Richards
that stated that those settlement forms were acceptable to the
plaintiffs' lawyers.  At that point, "after" the lawyers had
agreed not only on a settlement amount, but also on the written
form of the settlement agreements, Richards suggested the
retainer agreement.  It is true that, on January 6, 1994, all the
clients had not yet signed the settlement agreement and,
therefore, the cases technically were not "finally" settled.  On
that date, however, a reasonable lawyer, familiar with
representing individuals in a litigation or negotiation context,
as the accused were, could have considered the case as a "done
deal."  After all, the plaintiffs' lawyers had agreed on a
settlement amount and the terms of payment, which are usually the
most important components of a settlement agreement.  In the
circumstances of that litigation, in which the accused were
familiar with their clients' expectations for settlement, it is
not unreasonable for the accused to have believed that their
clients would consent to the settlement.  
	In their January 17, 1994, letter to Bramel, the accused
stated that Stanley had made a "separate offer to hire" the
accused.  In fact, the retainer agreement was a physically
"separate" agreement and purposefully was structured in a
separate way in the escrow arrangement suggested by the
mediator. (29)  Finally, in their April 21, 1994, letter to the Bar,
the accused's statement that they did not agree "to work for Mac 
Tools[/Stanley] while the case was still pending" also can be
interpreted reasonably not to state an intentional
misrepresentation.  Specifically, that statement could be
understood to mean that Stanley would not retain the accused
until after all the accused's clients' claims were settled.  In
sum, and with due respect to the majority, the majority's
temporal focus does not resolve clearly and convincingly the DR
5-101(A) allegations in the Bar's favor.
	The majority also faults the accused for failing to point
out certain details surrounding the accused's retainer agreement
with Stanley.  In the majority's view, the accused should have
disclosed in their January 17, 1994, letter to Bramel that they
had agreed to place the retainer agreement in escrow pending
completion of the settlement.  The majority also faults the
accused for failing to disclose in that letter that the retainer
agreement contained indemnity provisions from Stanley that would
be implicated in the event that Bramel sought recovery from the
accused.  The majority fails to explain why Bramel's interests
legally were compromised by the indemnity provisions -- a
seemingly necessary element in the analysis.  In fact, an
indemnity provision has the effect of providing an additional
"pocket" for any potential future recovery by Bramel.  Such a
provision neither insulated the accused from legal action by
Bramel, nor required Bramel to sue additional parties if he seeks
recovery from the accused.  Neither did the indemnity agreement
create or remove any causes of action or defenses on either side. 
It did not create or restrict jurisdiction or venue, or erect
other pleading barriers that otherwise would not have existed. 
In short, the Bar does not identify -- and the majority opinion
cannot point to -- any legally cognizable or strategic detriment
to Bramel that resulted from the indemnity provision.  There
simply is no obligation to disclose that which is not material to
the client's interests and which does no harm to the lawyer-client relationship.
Finally, the majority reasons that its reading of DR
10-101(B) requires that a detailed explanation of a conflict be
made by the lawyer (the accused) directly to the client (Bramel). 
The majority opinion suggests that it is not enough that a client
already knows of the conflict because of the client's discussions
with another lawyer or an informed third party, or because the
client knows and understands the complete parameters of the
conflict as a result of the client's own personal or professional
knowledge.  No case from this court supports such a reading of
the rule.  To the contrary, in In re Bishop, 297 Or 479, 686 P2d
350 (1984), the court stated:
"The duty of full disclosure is not satisfied by
just advising the client to obtain independent legal
advice.  If the client does not obtain such advice, the
lawyer must inform the client that their interests in
the transaction are adverse."
Id. at 488-89 (construing former DR 5-104(A) (1994)) (emphasis
added). (30)  It makes sense that the converse also must be true: 
when the client, at the lawyer's recommendation, does obtain
independent legal advice about the very matter at issue, the
amount of disclosure that will be "sufficient to apprise the
client" is less, or perhaps becomes non-existent, because the
client now has new representation and might be in an adversarial
relationship with the referring lawyer. 
Here, the accused timely advised Bramel to obtain
counsel, and Bramel did so.  Bramel obtained a lawyer who
professed particular and substantial knowledge of ethical matters
and who undertook active and vigorous representation of Bramel
against the accused regarding the very matters that are in
dispute under DR 5-101(A) and DR 10-101(B).  The accused's
disclosure of the nature of the conflict and their recommendation
of independent counsel adequately protected Bramel's interests. 
To say that even more disclosure was required by the accused
under those circumstances ignores what happened here.  The
majority fails to identify any interest of Bramel that was
affected, let alone prejudiced, by the accused's actions.
In sum, the Bar has not proven by clear and convincing
evidence that the accused's January 17, 1994, letter failed to
tell Bramel enough to apprise him of any potential adverse impact
on him, given the totality of the somewhat unique facts in this
proceeding.
For many of the same reasons discussed above, and
particularly because of my temporal analysis, I also dissent from
the majority's conclusion that the accused violated DR 2-108(B).
I turn to the majority's discussion of DR 1-102(A)(3). 
The allegations regarding that charge implicate many of the same
facts and inferences discussed above.  The Bar's complaint
alleges misrepresentation on the part of the accused by
commission and omission in what the accused told both Bramel and
the Bar.  I have discussed above my disagreement with the
majority's conclusion respecting the facts surrounding the
accused's representations to Bramel, and that analysis extends to
DR 1-102(A)(3).  The discussion regarding the majority's temporal
analysis, ante, is appropriate equally to the majority's analysis
of misrepresentation to the Bar, and I shall not repeat it here.
Finally, I turn to the sanctions imposed.  Because, for
the reasons discussed above, the Bar has not met its burden in
the "guilt" phase of the proceeding, a sanction is not warranted. 
Even if, as the majority believes, the Bar has met its burden of
proving violations of several disciplinary rules, the sanctions
imposed by the majority are inappropriate in light of the
accused's mental state.
I disagree with the majority's view that the accused
acted with intent when they represented certain facts to Bramel
and the Bar.  To me, the record does not demonstrate clearly and
convincingly that the accused acted with a "conscious objective
or purpose to accomplish a particular result."  American Bar
Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991)
(amended 1992) (ABA Standards) at 7.  Rather, I conclude that the
accused acted with "knowledge," that is, "the conscious awareness
of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but
without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a
particular result."  Id.  As they stated in their January 17,
1994, letter to Bramel, the accused were aware that the retainer
agreement might have created a conflict of interest.  Despite
that awareness, I do not believe that the accused's failure to
disclose the details of the escrow arrangement or the existence
of the indemnity agreement was because of any "conscious
objective or purpose." 
	As the majority notes, a lawyer's failure to disclose
fully a known possible conflict implicates ABA Standard 4.32,
which provides for suspension as a possible sanction where the
lawyer's failure to disclose "causes injury or potential injury
to a client."  The majority does not point to, nor does this
record reveal, any actual financial injury to Bramel.  The record
does not indicate, and no one suggests, that the settlement
amount to which Bramel last agreed was inadequate compensation
for the loss that Bramel suffered at the hands of Stanley.  Thus,
the Bar is left with only "potential" injury to Bramel.  With ABA
Standard 4.32 in mind, I conclude that the potential client
injury shown here is not sufficient to justify the length of the 
suspensions imposed by the majority.
	Turning to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, my
analysis again parts company with the majority's.  I do not find
that the accused engaged in a "pattern of misconduct" in their
dealings with either Bramel or the Bar.  ABA Standards 9.22(c). 
Rather, the conduct here constitutes a single transaction:  it
involves neither a series of unrelated acts nor multiple victims. 
The accused took a position that they believed was correct in a
novel and highly complex piece of litigation.  They made
representations to Bramel and to the Bar that were interrelated
and were consistent with their initial position.  On this record,
there simply is no pattern of misconduct.  Cf. In re Schaffner,
323 Or 472, 480, 918 P2d 803 (1996) (finding pattern of
misconduct where accused repeatedly failed to respond or to take
action to protect clients' interests and failed to answer Bar's
continuing inquiries over considerable period of time). 
Therefore, the Bar has not established that aggravating factor.
	I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that the
accused acted with a dishonest or selfish motive when they
communicated with the Bar. (31)  ABA Standard 9.22(b).  For the
reasons already discussed, I do not believe that the accused
communicated dishonestly with the Bar.
	Finally, in mitigation, I emphasize the accused's lack
of a disciplinary record.  ABA Standard 9.32(a).  Griffin has no
prior disciplinary record, and Brandt's 1993 letter of admonition
is of no moment here.  See In re Cohen, 330 Or 489, 500, ___ P2d
___ (2000) (holding that letter of admonition is evidence of
earlier misconduct only if misconduct that gave rise to letter
was similar to misconduct at issue).  Accordingly, each of the
accused has approximately 25 years of unblemished membership in
the Bar. (32)  See ABA Standards 9.3(g) (listing "character or
reputation" as mitigating circumstance).  In sum, the sanction
selected by the majority is unjustified.
	For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and dissent
in part from the majority opinion.  I also join in part the
separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Kulongoski,
as set out in this opinion.
	Kulongoski, J., joins in part in this opinion as set
out in his separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

1. 	The parties use the term "plaintiffs" even
though not all the clients had filed complaints against
Mac Tools or Stanley.  We follow that practice for
convenience in this opinion.

2. 	The parties refer to Mac Tools, Mac Tools, Inc., The Stanley
Works, and Stanley interchangeably to refer to The Stanley Works, which
is the parent company of Mac Tools, Inc.  Henceforth, we use the term
"Stanley." 

3. 	For the accused's clients, the settlement reflected
approximately 80 percent of their latest demand.  As noted, on November
2, 1993, Bramel had reduced his demand to $165,000.  Under the terms of
the proposed settlement, Bramel would receive $133,045.31, and Mac
Tools would forgive the sum of $6,300 that it claimed Bramel owed it.  After
deducting the accused's attorney fees of approximately $29,900 each,
Bramel would net approximately $73,000 from the settlement.  

4. 	Justice Riggs apparently believes that the settlement became
final on December 20 and that neither the accused nor any of the other
plaintiffs' lawyers had to obtain their clients' consent to the amount of the
settlement.  See ___ Or at ___ (Riggs, J., dissenting, slip op at 4.)

5. 	We agree with Justice Kulongoski that Bramel knew of the
amount of the proposed settlement before January 17, because Bramel
contacted another lawyer, Kuhling, on January 18, 1994, to discuss the
terms of the settlement agreement with him.  

6. 	Justice Kulongoski surmises that Bramel must have agreed
orally to accept $133,045.31 in settlement of his claims on or before
January 11, 1994.  That premise is central to Justice Kulongoski's
conclusion that the accused did not violate DR 5-101(A)(1) or DR 1-102(A)(3), because the retainer agreement was a matter separate from the
settlement of Bramel's claims.  We do not dispute that Griffin may have
received oral consent to the amount of the settlement from some other
clients before January 11, but that is not the issue in this proceeding.  The
issue here is whether Bramel agreed to the amount of the settlement
before the accused entered into an agreement with Mac Tools that created
a conflict of interest.  The record does not support Justice Kulongoski's
belief that Bramel had consented orally to the settlement by January 11.

7. 	On January 19 and 20, 1994, Brandt signed similar retainer
agreements, providing that he would be paid $5,000 and $125 per hour for
services in 1994.  The retainer agreements did not contain indemnification
clauses.  On January 24, 1994, he signed a retainer agreement that
contained an indemnification clause.

8. 	Because Bramel had not accepted Griffin's offer to reduce his
attorney fee in the amount of $5,000 by 11:00 a.m. on January 28, the full
45 percent contingent fee was deducted from Bramel's share of the
settlement.

9. 	The Bar filed identical complaints against the accused. 

10. 	The trial panel concluded, and the Bar argues on review, that
the agreement was a "condition" of settlement.  We need not determine
whether the retainer agreement was a condition of settlement to be able to
conclude that the accused violated DR 2-108(B).  A violation of that rule
occurs if an agreement is made in connection with settlement; it is not
necessary to establish that the agreement was a condition of settlement.

11. 	An example of a "direct restriction" is,
	"In exchange for the sum $25,000, I would agree not to pursue
any employment claim not currently filed; nor would I render
any assistance to other persons/attorneys making such
claims."  
In Re Vanagas, 8 DB Rptr 185 (1994).  

12. 	We have examined the opinions from other jurisdictions that
both sides rely on in this dispute.  Those decisions are distinguishable
factually and do not aid either side or our analysis.  

13. 	The accused argue that the following quotation from a leading
treatise on legal ethics regarding ABA Model Rule 5.6, which is similar to
DR 2-108(B), assists their position:
	"[T]he defendant could retain the plaintiff's lawyer, after the
settlement, as consulting counsel on any claims arising out of
the same transaction.  By operation of the conflict of interest
rules, that arrangement would preclude the lawyer from
representing any new plaintiffs in such cases." 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, 2 The Law of  Lawyering §
5.6:301 (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).  The emphasized phrase in that
treatise makes clear that the circumstances under which a retainer
agreement is entered into is a critical factor under DR 2-108(B).

14. 	Griffin wrote another letter to Cooper on June 15, 1994, which
Brandt "joined" by reference in a letter to Cooper on June 16.  Those
letters responded to a letter that Bramel had written to Cooper on May 30,
1994, in response to the accused's letter of April 21.  Griffin's June 15
letter reiterated matters he had discussed in his April 21 letter, and
emphasized that, in Griffin's view, he and Brandt had "met the disclosure
requirements of DR 10-101 and other ethical requirements."  For purposes
of our analysis whether the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by making
affirmative misrepresentations of fact, we focus only on the letter of April
21, 1994.  The letters of June 15 and 16 contain neither additional
misrepresentations of material fact nor retractions of any statement that
was made in the April 21 letter.

15. 	Unless otherwise noted, all references to "Bramel" are to Eric
Bramel.  All references to "the Bramels" are to both Eric Bramel and his
wife.

16. 	The Washington Supreme Court consistently has not allowed
punitive damages, determining that their award would be contrary to public
policy.  Dailey v. North Coast Life Ins., Co., 129 Wash2d 572, 574, 919
P2d 589 (1996) (citing Spokane Truck and Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash 45,
50-56, 25 P 1072 (1891)).  In Washington, punitive damages are allowed
only when expressly authorized by the Washington legislature.  Winchester
v. Stein, 135 Wash2d 835, 858, 959 P2d 1077 (1998).

17. 	Both Wagner and Richards practiced law in Ohio. 

18. 	Brandt also testified that his assessment of the value of the
Bramels' case had become less favorable as his understanding of the
details involved had developed.  Brandt speculated that, based on
Washington law and recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court,
the odds of Bramel recovering punitive damages were slim.  In addition, he
was concerned about whether his clients could recover their economic
damages due to Stanley's recent summary judgment victory in an Ohio
federal court.  

19. 	Bramel admitted that two or three days elapsed between the
time when he called his accountant and January 18, when he first spoke
with Kuhling.  Consequently, I conclude that he must have been informed
of the potential conflict and advised to seek independent counsel before he
received the letter dated and mailed January 17.  The absolute earliest that
Bramel could have received that letter was on January 18 -- the day that he
first spoke with Kuhling about representation and at least two days after he
had begun his search for independent legal advice.  

20. 	DR 10-101(B)(1) defines "[f]ull disclosure" as:
"[A]n explanation sufficient to apprise the recipient of the
potential adverse impact on the recipient, of the matter to which
the recipient is asked to consent."

21. 	DR 10-101(B)(2) states that "'full disclosure' * * * shall be
contemporaneously confirmed in writing."

22. 	Bramel began his search for independent counsel two or three
days before he actually spoke with Kuhling for the first time on January 18,
1994, that is, after his January 13 telephone conversation with Griffin and
before he received the January 17 letter.  See ___ Or at ___ n 5
(Kulongoski, J., dissenting, slip op at ___ n 5) (so discussing).

23. 	I agree with the majority's proposition that, under DR 10-101(B), a client's subjective understanding is not dispositive that the "full
disclosure" requirements of the rule have been met.  I do not agree,
however, that a client's subjective understanding is irrelevant to the inquiry. 
See DR 10-101(B)(1) (requiring "explanation sufficient to apprise the
recipient of the potential adverse impact on the recipient"); cf. Macy v.
Blatchford, 330 Or 444, 454, ___ P2d ___ (2000) ("An explanation clarifies
an issue or makes it understandable to the recipient * * *." (Emphasis added.)).

24. 	Oregon Formal Ethics Opinion No 1991-47, approved by the
Board of Governors, July 1991, provides that it would be unethical under
DR 2-108(B) either to propose or to accept a settlement agreement that
includes a provision in which a lawyer agrees that he never again will
represent a client who has a claim against the defendant in the matter
being settled. 

25. 	ABA Standard 7.4 suggests that an admonition generally is
appropriate when a lawyer 
"engages in an isolated instance of negligence that is a
violation of a duty owed as a professional, and causes little or
no actual or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal
system."
The accused's violation of DR 2-108(B) in this case was an isolated
instance of negligence that caused little or no actual or potential injury to
Bramel, the public, or the legal system. An admonition, however, is not an
available sanction in a "disciplinary proceeding" such as this, in which the
Bar charges a lawyer with misconduct "in a formal complaint."  See BR
1.1(m) ("disciplinary [p]roceeding" defined as proceeding in which Bar
charges lawyer with misconduct "in a formal complaint"); BR 6.1 (listing
"sanctions" available in "disciplinary proceedings" as public reprimand,
suspension, disbarment, restitution, and reimbursement to Client Security
Fund); BR 5.5(a) (defining "[p]rior record," for purpose of prohibiting
admission of same to prove character or to impeach as "any contested * * *
disciplinary * * * decision of the Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court
which has become final").

26. 	Brandt has received a letter of admonition, dated August 3,
1993.  In 1990, apparently in a hurry to meet a filing deadline, Brandt filed
a third-party complaint against one of his law firm's current clients without
running a "conflict-check."  The first allegation in the admonition arose from
that conduct, the second from Brandt allowing his staff to help prepare and
file that third-party complaint.
Because the conduct that resulted in that admonition (current-client conflict) is not similar in nature to the misconduct that occurred in this
case (restriction of the practice of law in connection with settlement), I do
not consider that letter in aggravation.  See In re Cohen, 330 Or 489, 500,
___ P2d ___ (2000) (letter of admonition considered as evidence of earlier
instance of misconduct only if earlier misconduct giving rise to letter of
admonition was same or similar in nature to later misconduct).

27. 	This is a consolidated lawyer disciplinary proceeding, and I
follow the majority's characterization of Brandt and Griffin collectively as
"the accused."

28. 	Similarly, in its analysis regarding DR 1-102(A)(3), the majority
faults the accused for a similar reference in the accused's April 21, 1994,
letter to the Bar ("[a]fter the settlement was finalized").

29. 	It is worth noting that it was the mediator, not the accused, who
initiated the idea of the escrow agreement as a vehicle for solving the
accused's concerns about treating the retainer agreement
contemporaneously with the settlement.

30. 	Former DR 5-104(A) (1994) provided that a lawyer must not
enter into a business transaction with a client if their interests differ unless
the client consents after full disclosure.  Although former DR 5-104(A)
(1994) is not a predecessor to any of the rules at issue in the present case,
the current disciplinary rules do not embody a substantially different
standard of "full disclosure" than did the former rules.  Thus, this court's 
construction of the concept of "full disclosure" in former DR 5-104(A)
(1994) informs the analysis of "full disclosure" under current DR 5-101(A)
and DR 10-101(B).

31. 	In my view, Bramel, however wronged, reasonably can be seen
as the kind of occasional and difficult client familiar to most members of the
litigation bar:  A person with unreasonable expectations that often are
impossible to meet.  Although I believe that the contingent fee that the
accused would receive upon settlement of Bramel's claim could have
motivated the accused to act the way they did, I also believe that the
accused might have been motivated equally by the understandable desire
to get Bramel out of their collective "hair" as quickly as possible.  My guess
is that the accused gladly would have settled for almost anything that
resulted in Bramel just "going away."  Based on my own occasional
experience with similarly minded clients, that is an understandable
sentiment, even though it never justifies unethical conduct by a lawyer.
I emphasize that I recognize that Bramel's desirability as a
client makes no difference with respect to whether the accused violated
these disciplinary rules.  In analyzing the appropriate sanction, however, I
do believe that Bramel's attributes as a client bear on the evaluation of the
accused's motives and state of mind.

32. 	Unfortunately, the record does not disclose whether, and to
what extent, either of the accused were active in Bar service activities, pro
bono work, or community activities.