Case Title: State v. Winkler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 440PA14

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA13-1059 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 21 October 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Chatham County 
Nos. 10CRS052754-55 
RONALD MICHAEL McCRARY, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered on or about 21 
March 2013 by Judge W. Osmond Smith in Chatham County Superior 
Court.  Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 February 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney 
General Catherine F. Jordan, for the State. 
 
Wait Law, P.L.L.C., by John L. Wait for defendant-
appellant. 
 
 
STROUD, Judge. 
 
 
Ronald 
Michael 
McCrary 
(“defendant”) 
appeals 
from 
a 
judgment entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of 
driving while impaired (“DWI”) and communicating threats. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his 
motion to suppress the evidence that resulted from a warrantless 
blood test; and (2) denying his motion to dismiss. We affirm the 
trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, but, 
-2- 
 
 
as to defendant’s motion to suppress, we remand for additional 
findings of fact. 
I. 
Background 
 
We will summarize the relevant facts based upon the trial 
court’s findings of fact, which are not challenged by defendant. 
At 6:34 p.m. on 28 December 2010, Deputy Justin Fyle of the 
Chatham County Sheriff’s Office responded to a report of 
suspicious activity at the home of Marshall Lindsey.  Upon his 
arrival at 7:01 p.m., Deputy Fyle observed a red Isuzu Trooper 
parked in a driveway near Lindsey’s garage. 
 
Deputy Fyle approached the vehicle and discovered defendant 
seated in the driver’s seat.  The vehicle’s engine was not 
operating, and defendant appeared to be asleep.  Deputy Fyle 
attempted to get defendant’s attention, but defendant did not 
respond.  Shortly thereafter, defendant began looking at his 
cell phone, which was upside down, but he continued to ignore 
Deputy Fyle. 
Deputy Fyle then opened the vehicle’s door to investigate 
further.  When he opened the door, Deputy Fyle detected a strong 
odor of alcohol and noticed that defendant’s eyes were red and 
glassy.  There was a nearly empty vodka bottle in the vehicle.  
Deputy Fyle administered an Alcosensor test, and the results 
-3- 
 
 
were “so high that Deputy Fyle determined that there may be a 
need for medical attention for the defendant.” 
Deputy Fyle also spoke to Lindsey, who stated that he had 
witnessed defendant make multiple attempts to turn into his 
driveway from the road.  When defendant finally was able to 
enter the driveway, he ran over one of Lindsey’s potted plants 
and a landscape light.  Deputy Fyle observed tracks in the snow 
at the end of Lindsey’s driveway that were consistent with 
Lindsey’s statement. 
Deputy 
Fyle 
returned 
to 
defendant 
and 
attempted 
to 
administer several field sobriety tests, but defendant was 
unable to stand up to perform them.  Deputy Fyle arrested 
defendant for DWI at 7:34 p.m.  Upon his arrest, defendant began 
complaining of chest pains and requested to be taken to the 
hospital.  Deputy Fyle contacted emergency medical services 
(EMS) personnel, who arrived at 7:39 p.m.  While EMS personnel 
examined defendant, Deputy Fyle determined that he would bring 
defendant to the Sheriff’s Office for processing after he was 
released by EMS personnel.  However, Deputy Fyle also decided 
that if defendant needed to be taken to the hospital, he would 
obtain a blood sample without a warrant. 
-4- 
 
 
While the EMS personnel tried to evaluate defendant’s 
medical condition, defendant was “continually yelling 
and 
uncooperative” and would not permit them to properly examine 
him.  Instead, defendant requested transport to the hospital.  
At the direction of his sergeant, Deputy Fyle directed EMS 
personnel to comply with defendant’s request.  Deputy Barry 
Ryser, a police officer assisting Deputy Fyle, accompanied 
defendant inside the EMS vehicle, and Deputy Fyle followed them 
in his patrol car. 
 
Defendant arrived at the hospital emergency room at 8:39 
p.m.  Deputy Fyle removed defendant’s handcuffs so that he could 
be examined, but defendant refused to cooperate with the medical 
staff and did not consent to any medical treatment.  He was 
“extremely 
belligerent, 
yelling 
at 
officers 
and 
medical 
personnel” and he insulted the officers as well as others.  “The 
defendant’s continued uncooperative conduct . . . led Deputy 
Fyle to conclude that the defendant was intentionally delaying 
the investigation.”  Prior to defendant’s discharge from medical 
care, Deputy Fyle asked defendant to submit to a blood test and 
informed defendant of his rights regarding a blood test at 8:51 
p.m.  Defendant refused to consent to a blood test, and his 
“belligerent conduct accelerated.”  “He issued vile insults and 
-5- 
 
 
threats to Deputy Fyle and others, including threatening to spit 
on Deputy Fyle and others.”  After emergency room personnel 
concluded their examination of defendant, he was discharged at 
9:13 p.m.  Therefore, Deputy Fyle decided to have defendant’s 
blood drawn without a warrant. 
Deputy Fyle requested that hospital personnel assist him 
with obtaining defendant’s blood sample.  Deputy Fyle required 
the assistance of the other officers and used restraints to 
protect both the officers and hospital staff from defendant 
while his blood was drawn at 9:16 p.m., almost 3 hours after 
Lindsey’s call.  Deputy Fyle and defendant subsequently left the 
hospital at 9:29 p.m. and arrived at the magistrate’s office for 
further processing at 9:43 p.m. 
Defendant was charged with DWI, possession of an open 
container, assault on a government official, communicating 
threats, resisting a public officer, and injury to personal 
property.  After a bench trial in Chatham County District Court, 
defendant was found not guilty of possession of an open 
container and injury to personal property and guilty of all 
other charges.  Defendant appealed to the Chatham County 
Superior Court for a trial de novo. 
-6- 
 
 
 
On 12 September 2012, defendant filed a motion to dismiss 
the charges against him, contending that the warrantless blood 
draw was flagrantly unconstitutional.  At a hearing in which the 
trial court treated defendant’s motion as both a motion to 
dismiss and a motion to suppress, Deputy Fyle testified that he 
called Magistrate Tyson at 7:15 p.m., before he arrested 
defendant, to seek his opinion about the situation.  Deputy Fyle 
also testified that he called the magistrate after defendant’s 
blood draw.  Deputy Fyle further testified that he waited at the 
magistrate’s office less than thirty minutes before meeting with 
the magistrate.  Deputy Fyle finally testified that, at the 
time, he determined that it would be unreasonable to seek a 
warrant before conducting a blood draw given the circumstances.  
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss.  Beginning 
18 March 2013, defendant was tried by a jury in superior court. 
On 21 March 2013, the jury returned verdicts finding 
defendant guilty of DWI and communicating threats and not guilty 
of all other charges.  For the DWI offense, the trial court 
sentenced defendant to an active term of six months.  For the 
communicating 
threats 
offense, 
the 
trial 
court 
sentenced 
defendant to an active term of 120 days.  The sentences were to 
-7- 
 
 
be served consecutively in the North Carolina Division of Adult 
Correction.  Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court. 
II. 
Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Blood Test 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his 
motion 
to 
suppress 
the 
evidence 
that 
resulted 
from 
the 
warrantless blood test because, under Missouri v. McNeely, 
Deputy Fyle “had ample time and ability to secure a search 
warrant” while defendant was in custody.  See ___ U.S. ___, 185 
L.Ed. 2d 696, 702 (2013). We remand for additional findings of 
fact on this issue. 
 
In ruling upon a motion to suppress evidence, “the [trial 
court] must set forth in the record [its] findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–977(f) (2013). “[T]he 
general rule is that [the trial court] should make findings of 
fact to show the bases of [its] ruling.” State v. Phillips, 300 
N.C. 678, 685, 268 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1980); see also State v. 
Salinas, 366 N.C. 119, 123, 729 S.E.2d 63, 66 (2012). “The 
standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to 
suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial 
court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact 
support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 
-8- 
 
 
167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011). Conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo. Id. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878. 
Findings and conclusions are required in 
order 
that 
there 
may 
be 
a 
meaningful 
appellate review of the decision on a motion 
to suppress. . . .  [W]hen the trial court 
fails to make findings of fact sufficient to 
allow the reviewing court to apply the 
correct legal standard, it is necessary to 
remand the case to the trial court. Remand 
is necessary because it is the trial court 
that is entrusted with the duty to hear 
testimony, weigh and resolve any conflicts 
in the evidence, find the facts, and, then 
based upon those findings, render a legal 
decision, in the first instance, as to 
whether or not a constitutional violation of 
some kind has occurred. 
 
Salinas, 366 N.C. at 124, 729 S.E.2d at 66-67 (citations and 
quotation marks omitted). Deputy Fyle performed a warrantless 
blood draw on defendant under the provisions of North Carolina 
General Statutes, section 20–139.1(d1), which provides that 
[i]f a person refuses to submit to any test 
or tests pursuant to this section, any law 
enforcement officer with probable cause may, 
without a court order, compel the person to 
provide blood or urine samples for analysis 
if the officer reasonably believes that the 
delay necessary to obtain a court order, 
under the circumstances, would result in the 
dissipation of the percentage of alcohol in 
the person’s blood or urine.  
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1(d1) (2009). This statutory procedure 
is also subject to limitations on searches imposed by the state 
-9- 
 
 
and federal constitutions. “Our courts have held that the taking 
of blood from a person constitutes a search under both” the 
United States and North Carolina Constitutions. State v. 
Barkley, 144 N.C. App. 514, 518, 551 S.E.2d 131, 134 (2001). 
Accordingly, “a search warrant must be issued before a blood 
sample can be obtained, unless probable cause and exigent 
circumstances exist that would justify a warrantless search.” 
State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 714, 370 S.E.2d 553, 556 (1988). 
The issue in cases of this sort normally depends upon the 
findings and conclusions as to the existence of “exigent 
circumstances” 
as 
our 
case 
law 
has 
defined 
that 
term, 
considering the “totality of the circumstances” in each case. 
State v. Dahlquist, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 752 S.E.2d 665, 667 
(2013), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, ___ N.C. ___, 
755 S.E.2d 614 (2014).  
In State v. Fletcher, this Court held that the trial court 
properly found that exigent circumstances existed for the 
arresting officer to obtain a blood sample from the defendant 
without a warrant, where the evidence showed that the defendant 
had “failed multiple field sobriety tests” and was unsuccessful 
in “producing a valid breath sample using the Intoximeter at the 
police station.” 202 N.C. App. 107, 111, 688 S.E.2d 94, 97 
-10- 
 
 
(2010). The officer testified about “the distance between the 
police station and the magistrate’s office, her belief that the 
magistrate’s office would be busy late on a Saturday night, and 
her previous experience with both the magistrate’s office and 
hospital on weekend nights[,]” all of which supported a 
“probability of significant delay” to obtain a warrant. Id. at 
111, 688 S.E.2d at 97. This Court held in Fletcher that these 
circumstances supported a finding of exigent circumstances and 
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to 
suppress.  Id. at 113, 688 S.E.2d at 98. 
More 
recently, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
addressed the issue of obtaining warrantless blood tests from 
defendants suspected of impaired driving. In Missouri v. 
McNeely, the United States Supreme Court held that “the natural 
metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream” does not create a 
“a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing 
in all drunk-driving cases.” ___ U.S. at ___, 185 L.Ed. 2d at 
702. In McNeely, the Supreme Court noted, however, that “some 
circumstances will make obtaining a warrant impractical such 
that the dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream will 
support an exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless 
-11- 
 
 
blood test.” Id. at ___, 185 L.Ed. 2d at 707. Such circumstances 
“may arise in the regular course of law enforcement due to 
delays from the warrant application process.” Id. at ___, 185 
L.Ed. 2d at 709. The Supreme Court noted that 
while the natural dissipation of alcohol in 
the blood may support a finding of exigency 
in a specific case, as it did in Schmerber 
[v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 16 L.Ed. 2d 
908 
(1966)], 
it 
does 
not 
do 
so 
categorically. Whether a warrantless blood 
test 
of 
a 
drunk-driving 
suspect 
is 
reasonable must be determined case by case 
based on the totality of the circumstances. 
 
Id. at ___, 185 L.Ed. 2d at 709. Thus, the circumstances that 
may make obtaining a warrant impractical may in some cases 
support the trial court’s finding of an exigent situation in 
which a warrantless blood draw is proper. Id. at ___, 185 L.Ed. 
2d at 709. “Therefore, after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
McNeely, 
the 
question 
for 
this 
Court 
remains 
whether, 
considering the totality of the circumstances, the facts of this 
case gave rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a 
warrantless search.” Dahlquist, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 752 S.E.2d 
at 667. 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s findings of 
fact but argues only that his case is similar to the situation 
presented in Missouri v. McNeely, which was decided by the 
-12- 
 
 
United States Supreme Court just over a month after the trial 
court ruled upon his motion to suppress. Defendant focuses on 
the lack of findings of fact as to the time that it would have 
taken Deputy Fyle to obtain a search warrant for the blood test. 
Defendant argues that “Officer Fyle’s testimony is strikingly 
similar to the testimony found insufficient in McNeely.”  The 
Supreme Court noted that 
[i]n his testimony before the trial court, 
the arresting officer did not identify any 
other factors that would suggest he faced an 
emergency or unusual delay in securing a 
warrant. He testified that he made no effort 
to obtain a search warrant before conducting 
the blood draw even though he was “sure” a 
prosecuting attorney was on call and even 
though he had no reason to believe that a 
magistrate 
judge 
would 
have 
been 
unavailable. The officer also acknowledged 
that he had obtained search warrants before 
taking blood samples in the past without 
difficulty. He explained that he elected to 
forgo a warrant application in this case 
only because he believed it was not legally 
necessary to obtain a warrant. 
 
___ U.S. at ___, 185 L.Ed. 2d at 714 (citations omitted). 
But the factual circumstances presented by this case and 
McNeely are quite different. McNeely involved a DWI stop 
described as “unquestionably a routine DWI case” involving a 
cooperative defendant with no need for medical treatment and no 
need for “police to attend to a car accident.”  Id. at ___, 185 
-13- 
 
 
L.Ed. 2d at 714. As the unchallenged findings of fact in this 
case as noted above demonstrate, this case was not “a routine 
DWI case.”  From the moment that Deputy Fyle placed defendant 
into custody, at 7:34 p.m., defendant claimed to have chest pain 
and to require medical assistance, which he then refused and 
actively fought.  He became increasingly belligerent and 
threatened Deputy Fyle and others.1  Ultimately Deputy Fyle 
determined 
that 
defendant 
was 
intentionally 
delaying 
his 
investigation.  Also unlike the officer in McNeely, Deputy Fyle 
testified at the suppression hearing as to the time it would 
have taken to obtain a warrant, as follows: 
Considering that this is Chatham County and 
we don’t have as many magistrates as other 
places on duty and all the time, a lot of 
times when you need a search warrant and 
somebody 
is 
placed 
in 
custody 
during 
nighttime hours, we have to actually call 
out the magistrate and at times wait for 
them to arrive and sometimes wait for other 
people to process prisoners before we can 
see them. So I was not aware of there being 
a magistrate in Siler City, which is where 
we were, because, like I said, during 
nighttime hours, they are not there. And I 
was unaware if in Pittsboro there was a 
magistrate on duty at the time. I felt that 
it was unreasonable for me to load him up, 
go back to Pittsboro, possibly wait for the 
magistrate to get there, draw up the search 
warrant, get the magistrate to sign it, load 
                     
1 Defendant did not challenge on appeal his conviction of 
communicating threats. 
-14- 
 
 
him back up, go back to Siler City, and then 
do the blood draw when we were losing 
evidence. 
 
Defendant asks us to second-guess the officer’s determinations 
about how long it might have taken to obtain a warrant and 
whether it would have been reasonable for him to take the 
increasingly belligerent defendant, “load him up, go back to 
Pittsboro, possibly wait for the magistrate to get there, draw 
up the search warrant, get the magistrate to sign it, load him 
back up, go back to Siler City, and then do the blood draw when 
[he 
was] 
losing 
evidence.” 
 
Defendant 
claims 
that 
the 
dispositive question, under McNeely and Schmerber, is “Did 
Officer Fyle have the time and ability to seek out a warrant?”  
Defendant argues that he did, and that the trial court failed to 
address the availability of a magistrate or “whether Officer 
Fyle should have sought a warrant since Officer Ryser was 
accompanying [defendant] in the EMS vehicle.”  Yet all of these 
questions are squarely within the authority of the trial court 
to make the factual findings as to these issues and to make the 
appropriate legal conclusions upon those facts. It is the trial 
court that “is entrusted with the duty to hear testimony, weigh 
and resolve any conflicts in the evidence, find the facts, and, 
then based upon those findings, render a legal decision, in the 
-15- 
 
 
first instance, as to whether or not a constitutional violation 
of some kind has occurred.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 
291 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1982). 
We find this case to be more similar to State v. Granger 
than to McNeely. See ___ N.C. App. ___, 761 S.E.2d 923 (2014). 
In Granger, this Court found that the trial court properly 
concluded that the totality of the circumstances showed exigent 
circumstances that justified the warrantless blood draw. Id. at 
___, 761 S.E.2d at 928. There, the defendant was injured in a 
wreck and required medical care. Id. at ___, 761 S.E.2d at 924. 
The officer was investigating the case alone and would have had 
to wait for another officer to come to the hospital so that he 
could travel to the magistrate to obtain a warrant. Id. at ___, 
761 S.E.2d at 928. The trial court also noted the officer’s 
“knowledge of the approximate probable wait time” and travel 
time to the magistrate. Id. at ___, 761 S.E.2d at 928. In 
addition, the officer was concerned that medications could have 
been administered to the defendant as part of his treatment that 
could contaminate the blood sample. Id. at ___, 761 S.E.2d at 
928. 
Although the situation here is different from Granger in 
that the defendant here only feigned a need for medical care and 
-16- 
 
 
in fact needed none, they are otherwise similar. Obtaining a 
warrant may have required an officer to either leave the 
defendant, which in this case may not have been a reasonable 
option even with more than one officer present, considering 
defendant’s threats to Deputy Fyle and others, or take the 
defendant with him to Pittsboro and then back to Siler City. The 
evidence and uncontested findings of fact show that several 
officers were needed to control the defendant and ensure the 
safety of the hospital personnel.2 In Conclusion of Law No. 6, 
the trial court concluded that 
[b]ased upon the time elapsed to that point 
and the additional time and uncertainties in 
how much additional time would be needed to 
obtain a search warrant or other court order 
for 
defendant’s 
blood 
and 
all 
other 
attendant circumstances, the same gave rise 
to the existence of exigent circumstances 
and 
supported 
the 
officer’s 
reasonable 
belief that the additional delay necessary 
                     
2 The dissent would find that even taking into account 
defendant’s belligerent behavior, the presence of so many 
officers would lead to the conclusion that there was no 
plausible 
justification 
for 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement under the totality of the circumstances. See 
McNeely, ___ U.S. at ___, 185 L.Ed. 2d at 708. We believe that 
this sort of determination is a factual determination that can 
be made only by the trial court that heard the evidence and 
observed all of the witnesses. An appellate court, far removed 
from the real physical dangers presented by a combative, highly 
intoxicated defendant, is in a poor position to make a finding 
of fact about how many officers are reasonably needed to protect 
themselves and others in that moment. That is the job of the 
trial judge. 
-17- 
 
 
to obtain a search warrant or court order 
under the circumstances would result in the 
dissipation of the percentage of alcohol in 
the defendant’s blood. 
 
Defendant is correct that the trial court did not make any 
specific findings addressing the availability of a magistrate at 
the time of the incident and the probable delay in seeking a 
warrant, although Deputy Fyle did testify about this matter, but 
it seems from the above conclusion of law that the trial court 
considered the time factor in mentioning the “additional time 
and uncertainties in how much additional time would be needed to 
obtain a search warrant.” Without findings of fact on these 
details, however, we cannot properly review this conclusion. We 
must therefore remand this matter to the trial court for 
additional findings of fact as to the availability of a 
magistrate and the “additional time and uncertainties” in 
obtaining 
a 
warrant, 
as 
well 
as 
the 
“other 
attendant 
circumstances” that may support the conclusion of law that 
exigent circumstances existed. 
III. Motion to Dismiss 
 
Defendant’s motion before the trial court was styled as a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-954(a)(4), 
which requires dismissal of criminal charges if “defendant’s 
constitutional rights have been flagrantly violated and there is 
-18- 
 
 
such irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s preparation of his 
case that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution.” 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-954(a)(4) (2013). However, at the hearing 
on defendant’s motion, both parties agreed to treat the motion 
as both a motion to dismiss and a motion to suppress.  Both of 
these motions were subsequently denied by the trial court.  On 
appeal, defendant requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court’s order as to both motions. 
 
In State v. Wilson, the trial court found that a 
warrantless 
blood 
draw 
had 
violated 
the 
defendant’s 
constitutional rights and dismissed the charges against him. ___ 
N.C. App. ___, ___, 736 S.E.2d 614, 616 (2013). On appeal, this 
Court held that dismissal was an inappropriate remedy: 
In his motion to dismiss, defendant argued 
the officer’s conduct flagrantly violated 
his constitutional rights “and there is such 
irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s 
preparation of his case that there is no 
remedy but to dismiss the prosecution.” 
While 
defendant’s 
motion 
addresses 
the 
alleged 
flagrant 
violation 
of 
his 
constitutional rights, his motion in no way 
details how there was irreparable damage to 
the preparation of his case as a result. 
Indeed, the trial court made no such finding 
or conclusion, and defendant has made no 
such argument on appeal. Thus, we fail to 
see how the alleged constitutional violation 
at issue here irreparably prejudiced the 
preparation of defendant’s case, and section 
-19- 
 
 
four of the dismissal statute likewise does 
not apply to the present case. 
 
Id. at ____, 736 S.E.2d at 617-18. Instead, “the appropriate 
argument by defendant was for suppression of the evidence, and 
the only appropriate action by the trial court under the 
circumstances of the present case was to consider suppression of 
the evidence as the proper remedy if a constitutional violation 
was found.”  Id. at ___, 736 S.E.2d at 618. 
 
Likewise, in the instant case, while defendant’s motion to 
dismiss asserts that the warrantless blood draw was a flagrant 
violation of his constitutional rights, “his motion in no way 
details how there was irreparable damage to the preparation of 
his case as a result” and “defendant has made no such argument 
on appeal.”  See id.  Thus, pursuant to Wilson, “the only 
appropriate action by the trial court under the circumstances of 
the present case was to consider suppression of the evidence as 
the proper remedy if a constitutional violation was found.” See 
id. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying 
defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s 
motion to dismiss. However, we remand to the trial court to make 
additional findings of fact addressing the availability of a 
-20- 
 
 
magistrate and the “additional time and uncertainties” in 
obtaining 
a 
warrant, 
as 
well 
as 
the 
“other 
attendant 
circumstances” that bear upon the conclusion of law that exigent 
circumstances existed that justified the warrantless blood draw. 
AFFIRMED, in part, and REMANDED. 
 
Judge DAVIS concurs. 
 
Judge CALABRIA dissents in a separate opinion. 
 NO. COA13-1059 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  21 October 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Chatham County 
Nos. 10 CRS 52754-55 
RONALD MICHAEL McCRARY 
 
 
 
 
 
CALABRIA, Judge, dissenting. 
 
 
Because I believe that, based upon the testimony presented 
below, remanding this case for further findings would be futile, 
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.  I 
would reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to 
suppress and remand for a new trial. 
 
As an initial matter, I agree with the majority that 
defendant’s self-styled “Motion to Dismiss” based upon the 
warrantless blood draw is most properly treated as a motion to 
suppress.  See State v. Wilson, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 736 
S.E.2d 614, 618 (2013).  “The standard of review in evaluating 
the denial of a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence 
supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the 
findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. 
Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011). 
-2- 
 
 
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 168, 712 S.E.2d 
at 878.  For a properly filed motion to suppress, “the burden is 
upon the [S]tate to demonstrate the admissibility of the 
challenged evidence[.]” State v. Cheek, 307 N.C. 552, 557, 299 
S.E.2d 633, 636 (1983). 
 
“Our courts have held that the taking of blood from a 
person constitutes a search under both” the United States and 
North Carolina Constitutions. State v. Barkley, 144 N.C. App. 
514, 518, 551 S.E.2d 131, 134 (2001).  This is because the 
drawing of blood “involve[s] a compelled physical intrusion 
beneath [a suspect]’s skin and into his veins to obtain a sample 
of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation. 
Such an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual’s 
‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’”  
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, ___, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696, 704 
(2013) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 84 L. Ed. 2d 
662, 
668 
(1985)). 
 
Accordingly, 
our 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
specifically held that “a search warrant must be issued before a 
blood sample can be obtained, unless probable cause and exigent 
circumstances exist that would justify a warrantless search.” 
State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 714, 370 S.E.2d 553, 556 (1988) 
(emphasis added). 
-3- 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court recently held that “the 
natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream” does not 
create “a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood 
testing in all drunk-driving cases[.]”  McNeely, 569 U.S. at 
___, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 702.  “Therefore, after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in McNeely, the question for this Court remains 
whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the 
facts of this case gave rise to an exigency sufficient to 
justify a warrantless search.” State v. Dahlquist, ___ N.C. App. 
___, ___, 752 S.E.2d 665, 667 (2013), appeal dismissed and disc. 
rev. denied, ___ N.C. ___, 755 S.E.2d 614 (2014). 
In McNeely, a Missouri law enforcement officer initiated a 
traffic stop of the defendant for speeding and crossing the 
centerline. 569 U.S. at ___, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 702. The defendant 
displayed obvious signs of impairment and failed various field-
sobriety tests.  Id.  As a result, the officer arrested the 
defendant and began to transport him to the station house. Id.  
While in transit, the defendant informed the officer he would 
not submit to a breath test. Id.  Consequently, the officer took 
the defendant directly to a nearby hospital for a blood test. 
Id. The officer never attempted to obtain a warrant, but sought 
-4- 
 
 
defendant’s consent for the blood test, which defendant refused. 
Id. at ___, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 702-03.  The United States Supreme 
Court concluded that the results of this blood test were 
required to be suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment 
because 
“in 
drunk-driving 
investigations, 
the 
natural 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an 
exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood 
test without a warrant.” Id. at ___, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 715.  In 
support of this conclusion, the Court provided the following 
example: 
Consider, for example, a situation in which 
the warrant process will not significantly 
increase the delay before the blood test is 
conducted because an officer can take steps 
to secure a warrant while the suspect is 
being transported to a medical facility by 
another officer. In such a circumstance, 
there would be no plausible justification 
for an exception to the warrant requirement. 
 
Id. at ___, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 708. 
 
In the instant case, the trial court’s unchallenged 
findings demonstrate that Deputy Fyle’s actions fall squarely 
within the ambit of the example articulated by McNeely.  The 
trial court found that Deputy Fyle had determined that he would 
seek to obtain a blood sample from defendant at 7:39 p.m.  
However, Deputy Fyle made no attempt to secure a warrant for 
-5- 
 
 
this blood draw.  Instead, Deputy Fyle followed defendant to the 
hospital, despite the fact that Deputy Ryser was already 
traveling with the handcuffed defendant in the ambulance.  There 
is nothing in the court’s order or in the transcript which 
provides any explanation for the reason Deputy Fyle followed 
defendant rather than using the time to seek a warrant.  
Pursuant to McNeely, “[i]n such a circumstance, there [is] no 
plausible 
justification 
for 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement.”  Id.; cf. State v. Granger, ___ N.C. App. ___, 
___, 761 S.E.2d 923, 928 (2014) (upholding a warrantless blood 
draw in part because “unlike the example in McNeely, [569] U.S. 
at ___, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 708, Officer Lippert was investigating 
the matter by himself and would have had to call and wait for 
another officer to arrive before he could travel to the 
magistrate to obtain a search warrant.”). 
Nonetheless, the majority contends that Deputy Fyle’s 
actions were appropriate under this Court’s decision in Granger.  
In that case, a law enforcement officer responded to the report 
of an accident in which the defendant had rear-ended another 
vehicle.  Granger, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 761 S.E.2d at 924.  
When the officer arrived at the scene, he observed that the 
defendant was in pain and emanated a moderate odor of alcohol.  
-6- 
 
 
Id.  The defendant was transported to the hospital before the 
officer could perform any sobriety tests.  Id.  Upon arrival, 
the defendant admitted to the officer that he had consumed 
alcohol and displayed clear signs of impairment.  Id.  The 
officer administered two portable breath tests, and both tests 
indicated the presence of alcohol on defendant’s breath.  Id.  
As a result, the officer obtained a warrantless blood sample 
from the defendant. Id. at ___, 761 S.E.2d at 925.  This Court 
held that, under the totality of the circumstances, there was a 
sufficient exigency to support a warrantless blood draw.  Id. at 
___, 761 S.E.2d at 928.  Specifically, the Court noted that (1) 
the officer was concerned about the dissipation of alcohol from 
the defendant’s blood, because over an hour had elapsed since 
the accident occurred before the officer established sufficient 
probable cause to seek the blood draw; (2) the officer estimated 
that the time it would take to travel to the magistrate’s 
office, obtain a warrant, and return to the hospital would be at 
least forty minutes; (3) the officer was investigating the 
matter alone, which would have required him to wait for another 
officer to arrive before he could travel to the magistrate’s 
office to obtain a warrant; and (4) the officer was concerned 
that if he left the defendant unattended or waited any longer 
-7- 
 
 
for a blood draw, the hospital might have administered pain 
medication to the defendant that could contaminate his blood 
sample. Id.    
Granger is distinguishable from the instant case.  First 
and foremost, unlike the officer in Granger,  Deputy Fyle was 
not the sole officer who accompanied defendant to the hospital.  
Instead, Deputy Ryser accompanied defendant in the ambulance, 
while Deputy Fyle followed behind the ambulance in his patrol 
car, despite the fact that he had already determined that he 
would seek to draw defendant’s blood.  Moreover, unlike the 
officer in Granger, Deputy Fyle had already completed his 
investigation and placed defendant under arrest on suspicion of 
DWI prior to defendant’s transportation to and arrival at the 
hospital.  The circumstances which this Court found justified 
the warrantless blood draw in Granger are simply not present in 
this case. 
The majority contends that the appropriate disposition for 
this case is to remand for additional findings of fact regarding 
the availability of a magistrate and the additional time and 
uncertainties in obtaining a warrant.  However, the trial 
court’s conclusion of law reflects that the court considered 
-8- 
 
 
these factors and applied the appropriate totality of the 
circumstances test required by McNeely: 
Based upon the time elapsed to that point 
and the additional time and uncertainties in 
how much additional time would be needed to 
obtain a search warrant or other court order 
for the defendant's blood and all other 
attendant circumstances, the same gave rise 
to the existence of exigent circumstances 
and 
supported 
the 
officer's 
reasonable 
belief that the additional delay necessary 
to obtain a search warrant or court order 
under the circumstances would result in the 
dissipation of the percentage of alcohol in 
the defendant's blood. 
 
While the majority is correct that the trial court could have 
made more explicit findings from Deputy Fyle’s testimony 
regarding the availability of a magistrate and the ease of 
obtaining a warrant, there is a fundamental flaw in the premise 
that these additional findings could support the trial court’s 
denial of the motion to suppress.  The trial court’s findings 
clearly indicate that Deputy Fyle determined he would obtain a 
sample 
of 
defendant’s 
blood 
at 
approximately 
7:39 
p.m.  
Accordingly, any determination of exigent circumstances must be 
based upon whether, under the facts that existed at that time, 
Deputy Fyle could have reasonably taken the appropriate steps to 
secure a warrant while defendant was transported to the hospital 
by Deputy Ryser.    
-9- 
 
 
However, there is no evidence on this question in the 
record, because Deputy Fyle’s testimony unequivocally indicates 
that he only considered whether exigent circumstances existed 
after defendant was discharged from the hospital and refused to 
consent to the blood draw.  At that time, approximately ninety 
minutes had already elapsed since Deputy Fyle had arrested 
defendant on suspicion of DWI and determined that he would seek 
to obtain a sample of defendant’s blood.   Despite the fact that 
Deputy Ryser was with defendant, who was restrained in handcuffs 
in the back of the ambulance, and the additional fact that at 
least two other deputies were dispatched to the hospital to 
assist with defendant when he arrived, there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that Deputy Fyle ever attempted, or even 
considered attempting, taking steps to obtain a warrant in the 
time between defendant’s arrest and his discharge from the 
hospital. 
The majority speculates that it may still have not been 
reasonable for Deputy Fyle to seek a warrant while Deputy Ryser 
transported him to the hospital because “several officers were 
needed to control defendant and ensure the safety of the 
hospital personnel.”  This speculation into Deputy Fyle’s 
motives at the time he followed defendant to the hospital is not 
-10- 
 
 
supported by any evidence that was presented during the hearing.  
Deputy Fyle restrained defendant in handcuffs without any 
physical altercation, deemed it unnecessary to travel together 
in the ambulance with Deputy Ryser and defendant, and never 
indicated at any point during his testimony that he went 
directly to the hospital due to safety concerns.  Moreover, it 
was not until Deputy Fyle ordered the warrantless “invasion of 
[defendant’s] bodily integrity,” McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 185 
L. Ed. 2d at 704, that defendant resisted sufficiently to 
require several officers to help control him.3 
Ultimately, I conclude that the trial court’s findings 
demonstrate that Deputy Fyle never considered whether a warrant 
was necessary during the ninety minutes after placing defendant 
in custody and determining that he would seek to draw 
defendant’s blood.  Therefore, “there [was] no plausible 
justification for an exception to the warrant requirement” under 
the totality of the circumstances. McNeely, 569 U.S. at ___, 185 
L. Ed. 2d at 708.  Deputy Fyle simply ignored our Supreme 
Court’s long-established directive that “a search warrant must 
be issued before a blood sample can be obtained[.]” Carter, 322 
N.C. at 714, 370 S.E.2d at 556.  He then sought to impermissibly 
                     
3 Defendant’s conviction for communicating threats was based upon 
his belligerent behavior during the blood draw. 
-11- 
 
 
benefit from his failure to seek a warrant by asserting that an 
exigency existed at the moment the blood draw was to occur.  At 
this point, it was far too late for Deputy Fyle to consider, for 
the first time, whether a warrant could reasonably be obtained.  
Since neither the trial court’s findings of fact nor any 
other evidence presented at the hearing support its conclusion 
of law that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, 
exigent circumstances existed to support defendant’s warrantless 
blood draw, the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion 
to suppress the results of the blood test.  The trial court’s 
order should be reversed and remanded for the entry of an order 
suppressing this evidence.  I respectfully dissent.