Case Title: Board of Higher Education v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12621

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12621 
 
BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION  vs.  COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONS BOARD1 & another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 7, 2019. - October 7, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Commonwealth Employment Relations Board.  Education, Public 
colleges and universities.  Public Employment, Collective 
bargaining.  Labor, Public Employment, Collective 
bargaining. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from a decision of the Commonwealth Employment 
Relations Board. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
James B. Cox, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the 
employer. 
 
T. Jane Gabriel for Commonwealth Employment Relations 
Board. 
 
Laurie R. Houle for the intervener. 
 
 
                     
 
1 The Commonwealth Employment Relations Board (board) is the 
successor to the Labor Relations Commission.  See St. 2007, 
c. 145, §§ 5, 7, and 8. 
 
 
2 Massachusetts State College Association, intervener. 
2 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  We have long recognized the tension between the 
statutory right of public employees to bargain collectively the 
terms and conditions of their employment with public employers 
and the Legislature's intent to bestow upon those employers 
nondelegable managerial responsibilities.  The relationship 
between the faculties and the boards of trustees at our State 
colleges3 is no exception.  See, e.g., Higher Educ. Coordinating 
Council/Roxbury Community College v. Massachusetts Teachers' 
Ass'n/Mass. Community College Council, 423 Mass. 23, 28 (1996) 
(Roxbury Community College).  Here, the Board of Higher 
Education (BHE) has appealed from a decision of the Commonwealth 
Employment Relations Board (board), upholding a provision in a 
collective bargaining agreement between the BHE and the 
Massachusetts State College Association4 (union) that placed a 
cap on the percentage of courses taught by part-time faculty at 
the Commonwealth's State colleges.  The BHE argues that, 
although it bargained for this provision, it is not enforceable 
because it impermissibly intrudes on the nondelegable managerial 
prerogatives of the State college boards of trustees and, as 
                     
 
3 By St. 2010, c. 189, § 12, the Legislature conferred 
university status on the State colleges, and some of the 
colleges changed their names accordingly.  However, as the 
parties refer to the institutions as colleges, we do likewise. 
 
 
4 The Massachusetts State College Association is affiliated 
with the Massachusetts Teachers Association and the National 
Education Association. 
3 
 
 
such, is not a proper subject of collective bargaining.  We 
disagree and therefore affirm the board's decision. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Public sector collective bargaining.  
Enacted in 1973, G. L. c. 150E provides a comprehensive 
framework for the regulation of public sector collective 
bargaining.  Labor Relations Comm'n v. Boston Teachers Union, 
Local 66, 374 Mass. 79, 93 (1977).  See Greenbaum, The Scope of 
Mandatory Bargaining under Massachusetts Public Sector Labor 
Law, 72 Mass. L. Rev. 102, 102 (1987).  The statute recognizes 
important collective bargaining rights for public employees and 
imposes significant obligations on public employers with respect 
to those rights.  In particular, G. L. c. 150E, § 2, provides:  
"Employees shall have the right of self-organization and the 
right to form, join, or assist any employee organization for the 
purpose of bargaining collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing on questions of wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment, and to engage in lawful, concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection, free from interference, restraint, or 
coercion."  Public employers are obligated to "negotiate in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, standards of productivity 
and performance, and any other terms and conditions of 
employment."  G. L. c. 150E, § 6.  The statute also sets forth 
4 
 
 
practices in which public employers and employees may not 
engage.5  See G. L. c. 150E, § 10. 
Finally, the statute provides for the resolution of 
disputes that may arise during the collective bargaining 
process, or after the agreement has been finalized, during the 
pendency of the agreement.  Should the parties fail to come to 
terms as to any mandatory subject of bargaining, G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 9, prescribes procedures to determine whether an impasse 
exists and how to resolve it.  And G. L. c. 150E, § 11, sets 
forth a comprehensive process by which either side may bring a 
complaint regarding a practice prohibited by G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 10. 
 
b.  State college system.  Each of the Commonwealth's State 
colleges6 is governed by its own board of trustees which 
"appoint[s], transfer[s], dismiss[es], promote[s] and award[s] 
                     
5 Prohibited practices by employers under G. L. c. 150E, § 
10, include, inter alia, the refusal of the employer to bargain 
in good faith with the exclusive representative of the employee 
organization over mandatory subjects of bargaining, G. L. c. 
150E, § 10 (a) (5); interference with any employee's exercise of 
his or her collective bargaining rights, G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) 
(1); and discrimination against an employee due to union 
membership, G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (3). 
 
6 The Commonwealth's State colleges are Bridgewater State 
College, Fitchburg State College, Framingham State College, the 
Massachusetts College of Art and Design (Mass. Art), the 
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, the Massachusetts College of 
Liberal Arts, Salem State College, Westfield State College, and 
Worcester State College.  See note 3, supra. 
5 
 
 
tenure to all personnel of [its respective] institution."  G. L. 
c. 15A, § 22.  The BHE, which is "responsible for defining the 
mission of and coordinating the [S]tate's system of higher 
education," "work[s] with [the State college] boards of trustees 
to identify and define institutional missions . . . as well as 
to define each institution's role within the greater system."  
G. L. c. 15A, § 1.  Although each board of trustees is 
responsible for appointing faculty at its respective college, it 
is the BHE that is the statutory employer of State college 
faculty members under G. L. c. 150E, and the party to the 
collective bargaining agreement.7  Correspondingly, the union is 
the exclusive bargaining representative for certain faculty 
members employed by the BHE, as identified in the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement. 
 
Students at State colleges are taught by both full-time and 
part-time faculty.  Full-time faculty members may be tenured, 
tenure-track, or temporary.8  Full-time faculty members generally 
                     
 
7 The parties' collective bargaining agreement provides that 
"[a]ctions to be taken by any [board of trustees] . . . are 
rights and obligations created or imposed by the terms of this 
[a]greement and as such are binding upon the [Board of Higher 
Education (BHE)] as the employer under G. L. c.] 150E." 
 
 
8 Full-time temporary faculty members teach from one to four 
consecutive semesters, advise students who are assigned to them, 
and have the same workload as tenured or tenure-track faculty 
members. 
6 
 
 
teach a full course load each semester9 and receive an annual 
salary with benefits.  Tenured and tenure-track faculty members 
also participate in governance at their respective colleges, 
including structuring academic programs, designing curricula, 
and serving on departmental committees.  In addition, some full-
time faculty serve as department chairs, who are responsible for 
supervising and evaluating other full-time and part-time faculty 
members in their respective departments. 
 
Part-time or adjunct faculty generally do not receive 
employee benefits.10  Part-time faculty are also not eligible to 
become members of the bargaining unit until they complete three 
consecutive semesters, and they cannot be hired for more than 
four consecutive semesters.  The colleges hire part-time faculty 
when the number of courses needed exceeds the ability of full-
                     
 
9 By the terms of the agreement, a full-time faculty member 
may fulfill his or her professional responsibilities by 
alternative means or may have his or her workload reduced in 
some circumstances.  Full-time faculty who have served at the 
State colleges for a sufficient length of time may also take 
sabbatical leave. 
 
 
10 Mass. Art alone employs some faculty members on a 
"benefited" part-time basis.  Unlike regular part-time 
positions, benefited part-time faculty possess the same rights, 
benefits, and responsibilities as full-time faculty members.  
Moreover, benefited part-time faculty at Mass. Art are included 
in the bargaining unit defined in the parties' agreement.  For 
ease of reference, we include these benefited part-time faculty 
members in the term "full-time faculty." 
7 
 
 
time faculty to deliver those courses,11 or when teachers with 
specialization in a particular area are needed.12  It costs the 
colleges less to hire a part-time adjunct than a full-time 
faculty member because part-time adjuncts are paid per course 
rather than per semester or on a yearly salary.  Because the 
decision to grant tenure involves a major financial commitment 
on the part of the college, the fact that adjuncts are not 
eligible for tenure also makes them less expensive to hire. 
 
The decision to hire adjunct faculty is made by individual 
colleges each academic year based on the number of students 
enrolled in particular programs and related courses.  The 
colleges balance the need to offer lower level core courses 
against the availability of full-time instructors to teach those 
courses.  The colleges must also respond to changing conditions 
such as increases in student enrollment.  For example, as the 
board found, enrollment numbers for first-year students at some 
State colleges in academic year 2007-2008 were higher than 
expected, and the colleges did not have enough full-time faculty 
                     
 
11 The State colleges require all students to enroll in 
designated core curriculum courses as a prerequisite to earning 
their degrees.  The preference is to have part-time faculty 
teach the core curriculum courses. 
 
 
12 The BHE states that State colleges employ part-time 
faculty to teach subjects such as art, music, theater, and 
certain foreign languages and to bring practical expertise in 
particular disciplines into the classroom. 
8 
 
 
members to teach all the core courses.  The colleges addressed 
this by hiring additional part-time instructors to teach those 
courses. 
 
c.  Article XX, § C(10) of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  The BHE and the union were parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement for the period between July 1, 2004, and 
June 30, 2007 (agreement).  Pursuant to a further memorandum of 
agreement dated August 27, 2007, the agreement was in effect in 
late 2007, when the dispute arose over the enforceability of a 
provision therein.  That provision, Article XX, § C(10) 
(§ C[10]), provides: 
"Part-Time Appointments:  Limitations 
 
"This subsection shall be of application only to 
departments with six (6) or more full-time members. 
 
"Except at [Massachusetts College of Art and Design (Mass. 
Art)], not more than fifteen percent (15%) of an academic 
department's total number of three (3) credit courses and 
sections shall be taught by part-time employees during an 
academic year. 
 
"At [Mass. Art], not more than twenty percent (20%) of the 
total number of three (3) credit courses taught in a 
department with six (6) or more full-time faculty shall be 
taught by part-time employees during an academic year. 
 
"Not included in the foregoing are courses or sections 
taught by part-time employees hired to replace unit members 
on sabbatical leave of absence, on unpaid leave of absence, 
on reduced teaching loads for the purpose of alternative 
professional responsibilities or [union] release time, or 
any other contractual released time, or any unforeseen 
emergency." 
 
9 
 
 
The language in § C(10) first appeared in the parties' 1986-1989 
contract and remained in effect through the 2004-2007 agreement. 
As the board found, the purpose of capping the hiring of 
part-time faculty traditionally has been to help ensure a 
manageable workload for full-time faculty members.  An increase 
in the number of part-time faculty members results in an 
increased workload for department chairs who must hire, 
supervise, and evaluate the part–time faculty.  It also 
increases the workload for full-time faculty members generally 
because it reduces the pool of full-time faculty available to 
staff committees.  An increased workload for full-time faculty 
members reduces their ability to pursue scholarship (e.g., 
research, publishing, and presentation at conferences) in their 
chosen fields of study.  It also reduces their ability to meet 
and work one-on-one outside the classroom with their students. 
The caps on the percentage of part-time faculty contained 
in § C(10) do not leave the colleges without flexibility in 
hiring.  As the board found, before the start of an academic 
year, the parties know the core courses offered; the number of 
full-time tenured, tenure-track, and temporary faculty; and the 
number of students enrolled for the fall semester.  This 
information makes it possible for the colleges to avoid 
violating § C(10) in a number of ways.  The colleges can 
(1) hire more full-time faculty members; (2) where permissible 
10 
 
 
under the agreement, direct full-time faculty to teach more 
courses, including lower-level core courses; (3) cancel courses; 
(4) reduce course offerings; (5) combine low-enrollment courses; 
(6) increase student enrollment caps for courses; (7) use 
historic data to plan courses more carefully; and (8) control 
matriculation. 
Moreover, when there is a shortage of faculty due to 
exigent circumstances such as retirement, medical leave of 
absence, sabbatical, death, or increase in student enrollment, 
§ C(10) does not limit the colleges' ability to hire faculty 
members on a full-time temporary (semester-by-semester) or part-
time temporary (course-by-course) basis.  The colleges also may 
respond by arranging tenured and tenure-track faculty to assume 
more courses than required by the agreement or by shifting full-
time faculty members from compliant to noncompliant 
departments.13 
 
d.  Violations of part-time faculty hiring caps.  For seven 
years, from academic year 2001-2002 through academic year 2007-
2008, nearly all of the State colleges reported having academic 
                     
 
13 The parties explain that this does not mean transferring 
a professor from one department to another, but rather 
increasing the number of full-time faculty positions in some 
departments and decreasing the number of such positions in 
others. 
11 
 
 
departments in violation of the part-time faculty hiring caps.14  
The total number of departments that violated the caps rose from 
fourteen in academic year 2001-2002 to thirty-one in academic 
year 2007-2008.  The total number of course sections that 
violated those caps rose from 416 in academic year 2004-2005 to 
664 in academic year 2007-2008.  Specifically, in academic year 
2005-2006, five colleges had twenty departments and 346 course 
sections taught by part-time faculty members that exceeded the 
fifteen percent cap.15  In academic year 2006-2007, seven 
colleges reported having twenty-seven departments and 551 course 
sections in violation of the caps.  In academic year 2007-2008, 
eight colleges had thirty-one departments and 663 course 
sections in excess of the caps. 
 
e.  Prior proceedings.  By a memorandum dated March 7, 
2002, the union filed a consolidated grievance with the chair of 
the Council of State College Presidents (council),16 alleging 
that the BHE had violated the part-time hiring cap by exceeding 
                     
 
14 The one college in compliance was Fitchburg State 
College. 
 
15 Mass. Art reported zero violations for academic year 
2005-2006. 
 
 
16 The Council of State College Presidents (council) is the 
body by which the presidents of the nine State colleges act upon 
matters of mutual concern, notably collective bargaining.  Under 
the terms of the agreement, the BHE acts through the council or 
its chair in matters arising thereunder, including grievances. 
12 
 
 
the maximum number of part-time faculty in each academic 
department.17  By letter dated February 23, 2006, the chair of 
the council notified the union president of her decision on the 
grievance, finding that the BHE violated § C(10) by excessive 
reliance on part-time faculty.  Her decision stated in part: 
"I find no reason to question the sufficiency of the 
factual basis for the [union]'s claim.  I conclude from it 
that seven of the Colleges -- Fitchburg [State College] and 
[Massachusetts] Maritime Academy are . . . exceptions -- 
have at different points (though not at every point in 
every case) violated the Agreement by employing, in various 
departments at various times, more part-time faculty to 
teach three-credit courses than the Agreement permits." 
 
The chair went on to direct the colleges to reduce their 
reliance on part-time faculty starting in academic year 2006-
2007 and to be in compliance with § C(10) no later than the end 
of academic year 2008-2009. 
 
The parties commenced successor contract negotiations in 
2007.  During that summer, the BHE proposed to delete § C(10).  
The union rejected that proposal, and the BHE withdrew it.  Also 
in the summer of 2007, the union discovered that some colleges 
had failed to reduce their reliance on part-time faculty for 
academic year 2006-2007 and had, in fact, increased the number 
of part-time faculty members who were hired in excess of the 
                     
 
17 At least one State college, Salem State College, 
acknowledged that several of its departments were in violation 
of the fifteen percent cap. 
13 
 
 
fifteen and twenty percent caps and in contravention of the 2006 
grievance decision. 
 
Although the parties finalized the successor agreement on 
August 27, 2007, which also included a part-time faculty hiring 
cap, the BHE, through its counsel, took the position that this 
provision "intrudes upon and impairs an authority that the laws 
of this Commonwealth vest exclusively in the persons charged 
with managing the State Colleges . . . in other words, [it is a 
matter] of managerial prerogative" and that the provision is 
"unlawful," "unenforceable as a matter of law," and "a legal and 
contractual nullity."  However, the president of Fitchburg State 
College assured the union on behalf of the council: 
"Speaking for all of the Colleges, we wish you to know that 
we intend, in fact, to adhere to the provisions of the new 
collective bargaining agreement now at issue.  With respect 
to the use of part-time faculty, therefore, the Colleges 
will continue to implement the grievance decision . . . 
rendered on February 23, 2006." 
 
Despite this assurance, certain departments at Bridgewater State 
College, Framingham State College, Salem State College, and 
Westfield State College, as well as Mass. Art, still violated 
the fifteen and twenty percent caps for academic year 2007-2008 
by excessive reliance on part-time faculty members. 
 
On May 30, 2008, pursuant to G. L. c. 150E, § 11, the union 
filed a charge of prohibited practice with the Division of Labor 
Relations (division), alleging that the BHE violated its duty to 
14 
 
 
bargain in good faith under G. L. c. 150E, § 6, by repudiating 
§ C(10) of the agreement as well as the 2006 grievance decision.  
The division investigated the charge and, on May 6, 2009, issued 
a complaint of prohibited practice.  Over several days in 2010 
and 2011, a hearing proceeded before a hearing officer, who 
issued a decision on January 16, 2014, finding that the BHE had 
repudiated both § C(10) and the 2006 grievance decision.  The 
BHE appealed to the board, which affirmed the hearing officer's 
decision in its entirety.18  The BHE appealed to the Appeals 
Court, see G. L. c. 150E, § 11 (i), and we transferred the case 
to this court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We review the board's decision pursuant to 
G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), under which a final administrative 
agency decision will be upheld unless, "among other grounds, it 
is '[u]nsupported by substantial evidence,' G. L. c. 30A, § 14 
(7) (e), or '[a]rbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion 
or otherwise not in accordance with law, G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) 
(g)."19  Commissioner of Admin. & Fin. v. Commonwealth Employment 
                     
 
18 In doing so, the board accepted the hearing officer's 
findings of fact, with minor modifications. 
 
 
19 Although the BHE claims that the board disregarded 
certain evidence and disputes particular inferences drawn by the 
board from the evidence, the BHE has not shown that any of the 
findings were unsupported by substantial evidence.  See Duggan 
v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 456 Mass. 666, 674 (2010), 
citing School Comm. of Brookline v. Bureau of Special Educ. 
Appeals, 389 Mass. 705, 716 (1983) ("the reviewing court must 
15 
 
 
Relations Bd., 477 Mass. 92, 95 (2017), citing G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 11 (i).  We "give due weight to the experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as 
the discretionary authority conferred upon it."  G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14.  Here, the BHE grounds its argument in the nondelegability 
doctrine, insisting that § C(10) is unenforceable because the 
provision impermissibly intrudes on the BHE's managerial 
authority, see, e.g., Billerica v. International Ass'n of 
Firefighters, Local 1495, 415 Mass. 692, 694 (1993), and that 
the board erred in failing so to conclude.20 
The BHE contends that § C(10) infringes on the nondelegable 
power that the statute at issue here, G. L. c. 15A, § 22, 
confers upon the State college boards of trustees to "appoint, 
transfer, dismiss, promote and award tenure to all personnel," 
and, more generally, the "unfettered authority to make decisions 
bearing on core issues of educational policy," in an effort to 
provide the most effective education for students" (quotations 
omitted).  Massachusetts Community College Council v. 
Massachusetts Bd. of Higher Educ./Roxbury Community College, 81 
                     
defer to the agency's right to draw inferences from the 
testimony and evidence before it"). 
 
 
20 As noted supra, the hearing officer found that the BHE 
deliberately repudiated § C(10), and the board upheld this 
finding over the BHE's challenge.  The BHE has not pressed that 
issue before us. 
16 
 
 
Mass. App. Ct. 554, 560 (2012), S.C., 465 Mass. 791 (2013), 
quoting Board of Higher Educ. v. Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 
NEA, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 49 (2004).  See G. L. c. 15A, 
§ 22 (c). 
However, there is a "strong public policy favoring 
collective bargaining between public employers and employees 
over the conditions and terms of employment."  Somerville v. 
Somerville Mun. Employees Ass'n, 451 Mass. 493, 496 (2008).  
Thus, "the principle of nondelegability is to be applied only so 
far as is necessary to preserve the college's discretion to 
carry out its statutory mandates."  Massachusetts Bd. of Higher 
Educ./Holyoke Community College v. Massachusetts Teachers 
Ass'n/Mass. Community College Council/National Educ. Ass'n, 79 
Mass. App. Ct. 27, 32 (2011). 
 
The scope of a governmental employer's nondelegable 
authority depends on "the explicitness of the statutory 
authorization under which [that] employer acts."  Lynn v. Labor 
Relations Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 182 (1997).  "Where the 
public sector employer is operating under the authority of 
statutes that define in broad, general terms the employer's 
management powers, the scope of exclusive management powers has 
been worked out 'on a case by case basis.'"  Id. at 177, quoting 
Burlington v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 390 Mass. 157, 164 (1983). 
17 
 
 
In such a case, we ask "whether the ingredient of public 
policy in the issue subject to dispute is so comparatively heavy 
that collective bargaining, and even voluntary arbitration, on 
the subject is, as a matter of law, to be denied effect."  Lynn, 
43 Mass. App. Ct. at 178, quoting School Comm. of Boston v. 
Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 378 Mass. 65, 71 (1979).21  For 
example, in School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 
388 Mass. 557, 565-566 (1983), we ruled that statutes conferring 
"general authority [on a school committee] over the operation 
and maintenance of public schools," as well as "general grants 
of authority to discharge employees," must yield to the 
obligation to engage in collective bargaining over the decision 
to achieve a reduction in force by means of layoffs and the 
impact of that decision on employees. 
Where, in contrast, the employer acts "under the authority 
of a statute or law authorizing the employer to perform a 
specific, narrow function or, alternatively, acts with reference 
to a statute specific in purpose that would be undermined if the 
employer's freedom of action were compromised by the collective 
                     
21 Even if a management decision itself is a matter of 
nondelegable authority, the employer may nonetheless be required 
to bargain over ancillary matters such as the means of 
implementing that decision and the impact of the decision on the 
terms and conditions of employment.  School Comm. of Newton v. 
Labor Relations Comm'n, 388 Mass. 557, 563-564 & n.5 (1983), and 
cases cited.  Lynn v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 
172, 179-180 (1997). 
18 
 
 
bargaining process," we will not enforce a conflicting provision 
in a collective bargaining agreement.  Lynn, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 180.  Instead, the narrowly drawn statute would take 
precedence.22  For example, in Local 589, Amalgamated Transit 
Union v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 392 Mass. 407 (1984), 
the enabling statute of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA) was amended so that the MBTA was prohibited 
from "enter[ing] into collective bargaining agreements with 
respect to matters of inherent management right," which 
expressly included the right "to hire part-time employees."  Id. 
at 413 n.2, quoting G. L. c. 161A, § 19, as amended by St. 1980, 
c. 581, § 8.  When certain provisions in an arbitrator's 
decision dealt with the percentage of part-time employees that 
the MBTA could hire, and dictated certain terms of their 
employment, this court determined that the challenged provisions 
were unenforceable as they improperly intruded on the MBTA's 
inherent management rights.  Id. at 415-416. 
                     
22 The exception to this rule is found in G. L. c. 150E, 
§ 7 (d), which enumerates several statutes that would yield to 
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement if there were a 
conflict between one of the statutes and the agreement.  See 
Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. v. Office & Professional 
Employees Int'l Union, Local 6, AFL-CIO, 441 Mass. 620, 629 
(2004).  Although the statute at issue here, G. L. c. 15A, § 22, 
is not among the statutes enumerated in G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d), 
we note that, unlike G. L. c. 15A, § 22, "the statutes . . . in 
§ 7 (d) . . . are specific mandates to do or not to do something 
in connection with the terms and conditions of employment of 
public employees."  School Comm. of Newton, 388 Mass. at 566. 
19 
 
 
Similarly, in School Comm. of Natick v. Education Ass'n of 
Natick, 423 Mass. 34, 37-38 (1996), this court concluded that a 
provision in a collective bargaining agreement prohibiting the 
nonrenewal of a teacher's employment without just cause could 
not be used to require the reappointment of a school athletic 
coach, because G. L. c. 71, § 47A, specifically limited the 
tenure of public school athletic coaches to three years.  We 
reasoned that "[a] collective bargaining agreement which 
conferred just cause protection, and de facto tenure, on a 
public high school coach would conflict with the durational 
limitation of § 47A."  Id. at 39. 
 
In our view, c. 15A, § 22, is a grant of management 
authority in broad, general terms.  Unlike the statute at issue 
in Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union, 392 Mass. at 413 n.2, 
nothing in the language of § 22 explicitly prohibits the BHE 
from bargaining over the hiring of part-time faculty.  The 
statutory authority to "appoint, transfer, dismiss, promote and 
award tenure" set forth in § 22 places in the realm of 
nondelegable management authority only the "authority to make 
'specific appointment determinations, and decisions to abolish 
positions.'"  Massachusetts Community College Council, 81 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 560, quoting Board of Higher Educ. v. Massachusetts 
Teachers Ass'n, NEA, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 49 (2004).  See 
Roxbury Community College, 423 Mass. at 32 (decision to abolish 
20 
 
 
full-time position within exclusive managerial prerogative of 
college administrators; arbitrator improperly directed college 
to create full-time position and assign it to specific 
grievant).  See also School Comm. of Natick, 423 Mass. at 39, 
quoting School Comm. of Holbrook v. Holbrook Educ. Ass'n, 395 
Mass. 651, 655 (1985) ("it is by now well-settled that 'specific 
appointment determinations . . . are within the exclusive 
managerial prerogative of [employers], and thus beyond the scope 
of collective bargaining").  Section C(10) of the agreement, 
which limits only the percentage of courses that may be taught 
by part-time faculty in certain departments, does not interfere 
with this authority; that is, it does not in any way dictate, 
for example, whom to hire or to whom to award tenure. 
 
Nor does § C(10) materially conflict with the BHE's more 
general authority to set educational policy.  In arguing that 
§ C(10) intrudes on this authority, the BHE contends that 
limiting the number of courses taught by part-time faculty, who 
are less expensive to employ than full-time faculty, requires 
the colleges to sacrifice other objectives and inhibits the 
ability to provide students with a high-quality education in a 
cost-effective manner.  But if we were to hold that these 
financial considerations rendered § C(10) an intrusion on 
nondelegable authority, we would be hard-pressed to discern any 
limiting principle.  Any provision or any given collective 
21 
 
 
bargaining agreement could potentially affect the way an 
employer allocates funds by, for example, requiring the employer 
to pay higher wages than it otherwise would have, thus diverting 
resources away from the employer's other objectives.  The 
collective bargaining agreement at issue does not usurp 
managerial authority merely by requiring the colleges to balance 
competing obligations within certain parameters. 
 
To the extent § C(10) touches on nondelegable decisions of 
educational policy, it is the result of proper collective 
bargaining over the means to implement that policy.  As 
mentioned in note 21, supra, "the means of implementing . . . a 
nondelegable decision may properly be the subject of an 
enforceable collective bargaining agreement."  School Comm. of 
Newton, 388 Mass. at 564.  Indeed, as the board observed, 
§ C(10) "only comes into play once the [BHE] determines the 
number of students it will admit and the number of classes that 
must be taught in any given college and/or department and after 
the [BHE] makes a decision whether to hire additional faculty to 
meet those needs."  Only then can it be decided how many full- 
or part-time faculty must be hired in order to teach the 
classes, thus implementing the core policy decisions concerning 
the colleges' curricula. 
 
We conclude that § C(10) of the agreement is valid and 
enforceable.  The parties bargained for it pursuant to the 
22 
 
 
collective bargaining process, and the BHE is bound to abide by 
it as long as the agreement remains in force.23 
 
5.  Conclusion.  The decision of the Commonwealth 
Employment Relations Board is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
23 We note, as did the board, that the State college 
presidents reaffirmed their commitment to comply with § C(10).  
The BHE, of course, remains free to raise its objections to the 
caps at the bargaining table and to offer the union other 
concessions, if need be, to raise the limits or remove them 
altogether.  And if the parties should reach an impasse despite 
good faith bargaining, there are procedures available to resolve 
it.  See G. L. c. 150E, § 9.