Case Title: State v. Joseph J. Guerard

Citation: 2004 WI 85

Docket Number: 2002AP002404-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 85 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2404-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph J. Guerard,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  268 Wis. 2d 293, 671 N.W.2d 864 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 26, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Wolfgram   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there was a brief by 
Joseph L. Sommers, Madison, and oral argument by Joseph L. 
Sommers. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2004 WI 85 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2404-CR  
(L.C. No. 
96 CF 37) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Joseph J. Guerard,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.    
 
¶1 
DIANE 
S. 
SYKES, 
J. 
 
This 
case 
concerns 
the 
corroboration requirement for the admission of a hearsay 
statement 
against 
penal 
interest 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4)(2001-02).1  The issue arises in the 
context of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
¶2  The defendant was convicted of numerous serious 
felonies in connection with a home-invasion assault, robbery, 
and theft of guns.  The defendant was identified in photo arrays 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
2 
 
and a line-up by the victim and an eyewitness who was present in 
the home at the time of the crimes.  However, the defendant's 
brother told his sister and an investigator for the State Public 
Defender's ("SPD") office that he, not the defendant, committed 
the crimes, providing a detailed factual description of the 
events before, during, and after the crimes. 
¶3 
 On the day of trial, the defendant's brother invoked 
his right against self-incrimination and refused to testify.  
The defense attorney initiated an effort to gain admission of 
the brother's out—of-court confession to his sister, but 
inexplicably did not follow through.  The attorney, who was the 
defendant's second counsel, did not seek admission of the 
brother's additional confession to the SPD investigator or alert 
the circuit court to the existence of that separate statement as 
corroboration for the brother's confession to his sister.  The 
defendant was convicted and sentenced to 52 years in prison. 
¶4  The circuit court rejected the defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that there was no 
prejudice because the hearsay statements would have been 
excluded 
as 
insufficiently 
corroborated 
by 
"independent" 
evidence.  The court of appeals affirmed.  We reverse. 
 ¶5 We conclude that the brother's statements against 
penal 
interest 
were 
sufficiently 
corroborated 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4).  The standard for corroboration of 
hearsay statements against penal interest is "corroboration 
sufficient to permit a reasonable person to conclude, in light 
of all the facts and circumstances, that the statement could be 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
3 
 
true."  State v. Anderson, 141 Wis. 2d 653, 660, 416 N.W.2d 276 
(1987).  This standard can be met in appropriate circumstances 
by a repetition of the self-inculpatory statement to another 
witness, 
and 
in 
this 
sense 
can 
be 
sufficiently 
"self-
corroborating" to be admissible under the statute.  The lower 
courts erred to the extent that they purported to require the 
proponent of the hearsay statement against penal interest to 
produce 
"independent" 
evidence 
in 
order 
to 
satisfy 
the 
corroboration requirement for admission. 
¶6  We further conclude that the defendant has carried his 
burden of demonstrating his trial counsel's ineffectiveness in 
connection 
with 
the 
failure 
to 
gain 
admission 
of 
these 
admissible hearsay statements exculpating the defendant.  Trial 
counsel's failure to put before the circuit court judge and jury 
the 
brother's 
self-inculpatory 
statements 
exculpating 
the 
defendant 
was 
not 
objectively 
reasonable, 
and 
therefore 
constituted deficient performance.  We also conclude that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's error, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different, and 
therefore the error was prejudicial. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
Joseph Guerard ("Guerard") was convicted in 1996 in 
Ozaukee County Circuit Court of one count of armed burglary, one 
count of armed robbery, one count of aggravated battery, and 
five counts of theft.  The convictions stemmed from a violent 
break-in of a home in Cedarburg during which one of the 
residents was physically assaulted and five guns stolen.   
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
4 
 
¶8 
The State built its case around the testimony of the 
victim, Elizabeth Borchelt.  She testified that on the morning 
of February 23, 1996, a man came to her front door and asked to 
speak with a person named "Dana."  Borchelt told him there was 
no "Dana" who lived there, and the man departed.  Borchelt went 
upstairs and the man returned a few minutes later, rang the 
bell, and burst into the home after Borchelt's six-year-old 
daughter answered the door. 
¶9 
Once inside, the intruder went upstairs where he 
confronted Borchelt in her bedroom.  Borchelt testified that the 
man was wearing a turtleneck shirt pulled up over his nose and a 
sweatshirt hood pulled over the top of his head.  He demanded 
that Borchelt get on her bed, which she refused to do.  He then 
made a move that Borchelt interpreted as an attempt to draw a 
weapon from inside his waistband, so Borchelt grabbed him and 
pushed him down the stairs.  The two struggled at the bottom of 
the stairs, with Borchelt trying unsuccessfully to force the man 
through the front doorway.  At that point, Borchelt testified, 
the man started hitting her, breaking her nose and bruising her 
face, ear, and head.  He then demanded that she give him the key 
to the gun cabinet.  Borchelt did not have the key, so the man 
removed a knife from his pants and broke the glass door of the 
gun cabinet with either the butt or the point of the blade.   
¶10 The intruder then removed several guns from the 
cabinet and used one to intimidate Borchelt and her mother, who 
emerged 
from 
her 
basement 
bedroom 
at 
just 
this 
moment.  
Borchelt's mother placed herself between the intruder and her 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
5 
 
daughter and told him he could take some money that was lying on 
the kitchen table.  The man grabbed about $8, apologized to 
Borchelt for hitting her, and fled from the house. 
¶11 Several days later, Borchelt and her mother identified 
the defendant, Joseph Guerard, in photo arrays and a line-up.  
They also identified him in court during the trial as the 
perpetrator of these crimes. 
¶12 The strategy of the defense was to argue that Guerard 
was misidentified; that he was not present when the break-in 
occurred, and that evidence pointed to his brother, Daniel 
Guerard ("Daniel"), as the perpetrator.  Just before the trial 
began, Guerard's attorney, 
Thomas 
Kurzynski, 
informed the 
circuit court judge, the Honorable Tom R. Wolfgram, that Daniel 
had made a statement to him inculpating himself and exculpating 
Guerard.  The prosecutor reminded the court that Kurzynski could 
not testify to that statement and also remain as Guerard's 
counsel.  Daniel, in custody on other charges, was brought into 
court and sworn.  Kurzynski began to question him about the 
inculpatory statement he had made to Kurzynski, and Daniel 
invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  
The judge held that Daniel was unavailable to testify under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.04.       
¶13 Kurzynski then informed the court that Daniel had also 
confessed to his sister, Judy Cole, and that Cole was prepared 
to testify.  The parties discussed whether Daniel's admission to 
Cole was corroborated under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4), but the 
discussion was inconclusive.  The subject turned to whether 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
6 
 
Kurzynski would be permitted to conduct a "courtroom lineup" 
involving Guerard and Daniel (he was not), and the admissibility 
of Cole's testimony about Daniel's statement was never discussed 
again for the remainder of the trial.   
¶14  Kurzynski did not inform the court that there was 
additional evidence that could corroborate Daniel's statement to 
Cole that he, not Guerard, was the person who committed these 
crimes.  Kurzynski had in his possession several written reports 
prepared by Christian York, an investigator in the State Public 
Defender's office who had worked with Guerard's first lawyer.  
About four months before Guerard's trial, York took Cole's 
statement, in which she reported that Daniel had, on the day of 
the break-in, confessed to her that he had committed the crimes.  
She related his confession in some detail, and also said that 
she had possession of the clothes he was wearing at the time.  
York also interviewed Blanca Guerard, Joseph and Daniel's 
mother, who told him that Daniel did not specifically tell her 
whether or not he had committed the crimes, but did tell her 
that Joseph did not do so.  Finally, York interviewed Daniel 
himself, who provided a detailed statement incriminating himself 
and exculpating Guerard.  All three of these interviews were 
memorialized in written reports signed by Investigator York.  
York also had a signed handwritten statement from Cole.   
¶15 Kurzynski did not bring any of these statements to the 
circuit court's attention, nor did he subpoena York to testify.  
Indeed, Kurzynski later admitted that he never spoke to York 
before Guerard's trial.     
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
7 
 
¶16 Guerard testified in his own defense and said he was 
not involved in the crimes.2  He told the jury that on the 
morning of the incident, his brother Daniel picked him up and 
drove him around town, describing a plan to break into the 
Borchelt residence and steal several guns.  Guerard testified 
that he refused to participate in Daniel's plan and tried to 
dissuade Daniel from going through with it.  According to 
Guerard, Daniel dropped him off at a gas station next to the 
Northridge shopping mall and drove away.  Guerard waited there 
for over an hour until Daniel returned.  Guerard testified that 
when he got into the car he noticed a bag containing guns on the 
floor, and that Daniel's hand was bleeding.  Guerard said that 
Daniel told him he cut his hand when smashing through the glass 
door of the Borchelt's gun cabinet.   
¶17 Guerard was convicted and sentenced to a total of 52 
years imprisonment.  Guerard's initial appellate counsel did not 
complete his appeal.  In 2001, Guerard filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeals pursuant to State 
v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992), alleging that 
he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  The 
court of appeals sua sponte construed the petition as a request 
to extend time to file a notice of appeal or a motion for 
                                                 
2 The prosecutor argued that Guerard should not be permitted 
to testify that he was somewhere else when the crimes were 
committed, as that would constitute an alibi defense of which 
proper 
notice 
had 
not 
been 
given 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(8)(a). 
 
The circuit 
court 
allowed the 
testimony.   
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
8 
 
postconviction relief, and reinstated Guerard's appellate rights 
without addressing the claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.3  After new appellate counsel was appointed, 
Guerard filed a motion for postconviction relief in the circuit 
court, asserting that he had received ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.  After a Machner hearing,4 the court denied the 
motion, concluding that although Kurzynski's failure to follow 
through on the effort to admit Daniel's inculpatory statements 
may have constituted deficient performance, Guerard suffered no 
prejudice because the statements were inadmissible due to lack 
of corroboration.  The court viewed the fact that Daniel had 
confessed to more than one person, and on separate occasions, as 
insufficiently corroborative as a matter of law. 
¶18 Guerard appealed and the court of appeals affirmed, 
holding that regardless of whether Kurzynski's performance was 
deficient (the court did not decide that question), Guerard 
suffered 
no 
prejudice 
because 
Daniel's 
self-inculpatory 
statements exculpating Guerard were insufficiently corroborated 
and therefore inadmissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4).  The 
                                                 
 
3 We hold in State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d 
___, 
that 
the 
enlargement 
of 
time 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2), may not be used to "short-cut" 
the ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel 
procedure 
established in State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 
(1992).  Here, however, the State did not object, either in the 
court of appeals or in this court, and therefore any challenge 
to the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
sua sponte 
invocation of the 
enlargement of time statute is deemed waived.     
  
4 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
9 
 
court of appeals reached this conclusion by applying the 
corroboration standard set forth in State v. Johnson, 181 
Wis. 2d 470, 510 N.W.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1993).  Citing Johnson, 
id. at 483, the court of appeals held that a statement against 
penal interest by a declarant who is unavailable to testify is 
not admissible if the corroboration is "merely debatable."  The 
court of appeals also agreed with the circuit court that a 
repetition of a hearsay confession to more than one person does 
not corroborate the confession.  Concluding that there was no 
"independent evidence" to corroborate Daniel's self-inculpatory 
statements, and that his statements were inconsistent with the 
victim's testimony, the court of appeals held that they were 
inadmissible.  Accordingly, the court concluded that Guerard 
suffered 
no 
prejudice 
because 
of 
Kurzynski's 
failure 
to 
introduce Daniel's hearsay statements against penal interest.   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 Whether 
a 
defendant's 
trial 
counsel 
provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and 
fact.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984); State 
v. Franklin, 2001 WI 104, ¶12, 245 Wis. 2d 582, 629 N.W.2d 289.  
We will not disturb the circuit court's factual findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Franklin, 245 Wis. 2d 582, ¶12.  
Whether trial counsel's performance was deficient, and whether 
any such deficiency was prejudicial to the defendant, are 
questions of law that we review independently.  Id.   
¶20 This court will sustain an evidentiary ruling if it 
finds "that the circuit court examined the relevant facts; 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
10 
 
applied a proper standard of law; and using a demonstrative 
rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge 
could reach."  State v. Tucker, 2003 WI 12, ¶28, 259 
Wis. 2d 484, 
657 
N.W.2d 374 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Gray, 
225 
Wis. 2d 39, 48, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999)).  We accept the facts as 
found by the circuit court unless they are clearly erroneous, 
but whether the circuit court applied a correct standard of law 
is itself a question of law that we review de novo.         
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Corroboration of Statements Against Penal Interest 
¶21  Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 908.045 
prescribes 
the 
circumstances under which hearsay statements by an unavailable 
declarant may be admissible.  The rule provides, in pertinent 
part: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
 . . .  
(4)  Statement against interest.  A statement which 
was at the time of its making so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so 
far tended to subject the declarant to civil or 
criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by the 
declarant against another or to make the declarant an 
object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a 
reasonable person in the declarant's position would 
not have made the statement unless the person believed 
it to be true.  A statement tending to expose the 
declarant 
to 
criminal 
liability 
and 
offered 
to 
exculpate 
the 
accused 
is 
not 
admissible 
unless 
corroborated. 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045 (emphasis added). 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
11 
 
¶22 The 
admissibility 
of 
evidence 
falling 
within 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4) 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
conditional 
relevance under Wis. Stat. § 901.04(2), which provides: 
When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the 
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the judge shall 
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of 
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the 
fulfillment of the condition. 
¶23 The central issue in this case is the extent of 
corroboration 
required 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4) 
for 
statements tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability 
and offered to exculpate the accused.  We addressed this issue 
at 
length 
in 
Anderson, 
holding 
that 
the 
standard 
for 
corroboration under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4) is "corroboration 
sufficient to permit a reasonable person to conclude, in light 
of all the facts and circumstances, that the statement could be 
true."  Anderson, 141 Wis. 2d at 662.   
¶24 Thus, under Anderson, Wis. Stat. §§ 908.045(4) and 
901.04(2) together permit the admission of an out-of-court 
statement 
against 
penal 
interest 
by 
a 
declarant 
who 
is 
unavailable if: 1) the statement when made tended to expose the 
declarant to criminal liability; and 2) the statement is 
corroborated by evidence that is sufficient to enable a 
reasonable person to conclude, in light of all the facts and 
circumstances, that the statement could be true.  Id.  If a 
statement satisfies these specific conditions, a court may still 
exclude it on the general grounds that its probative value "is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
12 
 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.03; 
Anderson, 141 Wis. 2d at 664. 
¶25 We explained in 
Anderson 
that the 
corroboration 
required under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4) is different from the 
more stringent corroboration standard in Federal Rule of 
Evidence 
804(b)(3), 
which 
requires 
"corroboration 
clearly 
indicating the trustworthiness of the statement."  Anderson, 141 
Wis. 2d at 660-61.  We noted that Wisconsin never embraced the 
language 
or 
approach 
of 
the 
federal 
rule, 
and 
that 
a 
comparatively 
less 
restrictive 
standard 
was 
therefore 
appropriate.  Id.  We concluded that a less demanding standard 
would better balance the respective roles of the judge and jury 
and protect the defendant's constitutional right to present 
evidence under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).  
Anderson, 141 Wis. 2d at 662-65.          
¶26 The lower courts in this case applied the Anderson 
corroboration standard as amplified by the court of appeals in 
State v. Johnson.5  In Johnson, the defendant sought to introduce 
a statement by his brother in which the brother maintained that 
he, not the defendant, committed the charged offenses.  Johnson, 
181 Wis. 2d at 480.  The brother made his statement to a defense 
                                                 
5 The court of appeals has stated that its opinion in State 
v. Johnson, 181 Wis. 2d 470, 510 N.W.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1993), 
"clarified" the corroboration standard established in State v. 
Anderson, 141 Wis. 2d 653, 416 N.W.2d 276 (1987).  See State v. 
Malcom, 2001 WI App 291, ¶16, 249 Wis. 2d 403, 638 N.W.2d 918.    
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
13 
 
investigator, who memorialized it in a written report.  While 
recognizing that Anderson had rejected the "clearly trustworthy" 
standard of the federal rule, the court of appeals in Johnson 
held that Anderson does not authorize admission of a statement 
against 
penal 
interest 
if 
the 
corroboration 
is 
"merely 
debatable."  Id. at 483.        
¶27 The defendant in Johnson had argued in the circuit 
court that his brother's statement against penal interest was 
sufficiently corroborated because it recited facts that only 
someone present during the commission of the offense would know, 
and that the offense itself was consistent with the brother's 
criminal history.  Id. at 484.  The State responded that there 
was "no independent corroboration" of the brother's statement, 
and noted that the defendant and his brother had been in the 
county jail at the same time, suggesting the potential for 
collusion.  Id. 
¶28  In holding that the brother's statement was not 
sufficiently corroborated, the court of appeals in Johnson did 
not explicitly adopt the State's criterion of "independent" 
corroboration evidence.  Id. at 484-85.  However, the facts of 
the case suggest that the absence of corroboration separate and 
apart from the contents of the brother's statement was an 
apparent basis for both the circuit court's decision to exclude 
the evidence and the court of appeals' decision to affirm.  Id. 
at 485.  The court of appeals emphasized "the total lack of 
corroborating information that was independent of what [the 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
14 
 
brother] could have learned from [the defendant] while they were 
both in the county jail."  Id. at 486. 
¶29  Dissenting from the Johnson court's resolution of the 
corroboration issue, Judge Schudson objected to what he viewed 
as 
the 
majority's 
injection 
of 
an 
"independent 
source" 
requirement for corroboration under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4).  
Id. at 498 (Schudson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  In response, the majority cautioned that its use of the 
term "independent" should not be broadly construed to eliminate 
the possibility that a statement against penal interest could be 
sufficiently "self-corroborating" to be admissible: 
The Dissent mischaracterizes our use of the word 
"independent."  Of course a statement offered under 
Rule 908.045(4), Stats., can be sufficiently self-
corroborated to be admissible.  That is not the issue 
here, however.  The facts recited in [the declarant's] 
statement that are alleged to be corroborating were 
not independent of what [the declarant] could have 
easily learned from his brother.  This was a factor 
that the trial court could appropriately consider in 
the exercise of its discretion. 
Johnson, 181 Wis. 2d at 486-87 n.7.        
 
¶30 Here, the court of appeals took note of the Anderson 
corroboration test but cited and applied Johnson's "merely 
debatable" sub-standard for determining the sufficiency of 
corroboration under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4).  The court of 
appeals also appears to have applied the "independent source" 
requirement that the Johnson dissent cautioned against and the 
Johnson majority disavowed.  The court emphasized the lack of 
"independent evidence to corroborate Daniel's statements," as 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
15 
 
well as the "inconsistencies between the statements made by 
Daniel and the victim's testimony." 
¶31  The State has now conceded that there is no 
"independent 
source" 
requirement 
for 
corroboration 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4) and that the lower courts erred in 
concluding 
that 
Daniel's 
statements 
were 
inadmissible 
as 
insufficiently corroborated.  We agree, and conclude that the 
Johnson 
court's 
refinement 
of 
the 
Anderson 
standard 
for 
determining 
the 
sufficiency 
of 
corroboration 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4) is unclear and open to misinterpretation 
so as to be inconsistent with Anderson.  The "merely debatable" 
language in Johnson confuses rather than clarifies the Anderson 
standard.  The Johnson court's limited use of the term 
"independent" evidently has been improperly elevated to a 
mandatory corroboration requirement. 
¶32  The test for corroboration established in Anderson is 
intermediate and flexible, striking a balance between the need 
for exculpatory evidence and the "countervailing concern for the 
exclusion of untrustworthy statements."  Anderson, 141 Wis. 2d 
at 663.  It neither prescribes nor limits the type or source of 
acceptable 
corroboration 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
908.045(4).  
Application of the Anderson standard specifically does not 
involve an evaluation of the credibility or weight of the 
statement against penal interest itself; this is to "maintain[] 
the jury's role of assessing credibility and determining weight 
while properly limiting the judge's role to a threshold 
admissibility determination."  Id. at 665.  The Anderson 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
16 
 
standard 
tests 
the 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
corroboration 
by 
evaluating its tendency to lead a reasonable person to conclude 
that the hearsay statement against penal interest could be true.    
¶33 Thus, corroboration sufficient to meet the Anderson 
test will usually be "debatable," at least to the extent that 
the term "debatable" suggests a conflict between two distinct 
points of view, or, in this context, evidence that points in 
different 
directions. 
 
Nothing 
in 
Anderson 
or 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4) requires the exclusion of a hearsay 
statement against penal interest merely because there is 
conflicting 
evidence 
in 
the 
record——that 
is, 
where 
the 
corroboration is "debatable."  If this were true, then no 
corroboration would ever be sufficient, because the declarant's 
self-inculpatory statement is being offered to exculpate the 
accused and is therefore by definition inconsistent with at 
least some of the state's evidence, and hence any corroboration 
of the statement will necessarily be "debatable." 
¶34  To the extent that Johnson is interpreted as always 
requiring corroboration "independent" of the statement against 
penal interest itself, it is inconsistent with Anderson, which 
placed no such limitation on the nature of the corroboration 
required under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4).  Although corroboration 
will usually be contained in evidence that is external to the 
statement itself, a requirement that corroboration must always 
be "independent" would be arbitrary.  That a declarant's 
confession is repeated to more than one witness may well be 
sufficient, in light of all the facts and circumstances, to 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
17 
 
permit a reasonable person to conclude that it could be true, 
even in the absence of corroboration that is "independent" of 
the confession itself.  In this sense, the statement against 
penal interest may be sufficiently "self-corroborating," under 
the circumstances, by virtue of having been repeated in 
substantially the same form to a second or third witness.  There 
may well be other circumstances in which a statement against 
penal interest is sufficiently self-corroborating as to meet the 
Anderson 
standard 
for 
admissibility 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4), a possibility specifically recognized 
in Johnson. 
¶35  The Johnson majority cautioned against too broad an 
interpretation of its use of the term "independent."  We 
conclude that neither Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4) nor Anderson 
imposes a fixed requirement of corroboration that is independent 
of the declarant's self-inculpatory statement.  The "merely 
debatable" sub-standard for corroboration articulated in Johnson 
conflicts with Anderson.  We reaffirm the Anderson standard of 
"corroboration sufficient to permit a reasonable person to 
conclude, in light of all the facts and circumstances, that the 
statement could be true."                 
B.  Guerard's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 
 
¶36   Applying Anderson to the facts of this case, we 
conclude 
that 
Daniel's 
out-of-court 
statements 
inculpating 
himself and exculpating Guerard in the commission of the charged 
offenses are corroborated and therefore admissible.  The record 
contains two statements by Daniel in which he admitted that he, 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
18 
 
not Guerard, committed these crimes.  Judy Cole reported to 
Investigator York that Daniel confessed his commission of the 
crimes to her in considerable detail.  Cole reported that she 
saw both Joseph and Daniel in the late morning on the day the 
crimes were committed.  She said Daniel was wearing green baggy 
pants.  According to Cole's statement, Daniel told her that he 
and another person (not Joseph Guerard) went to the Borchelt 
residence, and that Daniel entered the house alone.  Daniel told 
Cole that the woman in the house started screaming and punching 
him, at which point he "lost it" and "beat her up."  He dragged 
the woman downstairs and demanded that she open the gun cabinet, 
but when it took a long time for her to find the key, he grew 
impatient and punched the cabinet, breaking the glass.  He then 
removed several handguns, including a .357 with a long barrel.  
Cole reported that she saw several of the guns, all handguns.  
¶37 Cole said Daniel told her that the woman did not see 
his face because he had a mask on and his hood pulled up.  
Daniel told Cole that Joseph Guerard was not with him at the 
Borchelt residence because he had dropped him off at a gas 
station before the break-in.  Cole also told Investigator York 
that she was in possession of the clothing that Daniel was 
wearing on the day the crimes were committed, and that there was 
blood on them.     
¶38 Daniel's 
statement, 
as 
reported 
by 
Cole, 
is 
corroborated by a confession Daniel gave to Investigator York, 
who interviewed Daniel about four months prior to Guerard's 
trial and prepared a three and one-half page written report of 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
19 
 
their 
conversation. 
 
Daniel's 
confession 
to 
York 
is 
substantially similar to his confession to Cole.6  As noted 
earlier, Attorney Kurzynski did not inform the circuit court of 
the existence of this statement, either as a separate statement 
inculpating Daniel and exculpating Guerard, or as corroboration 
for Daniel's statement to Cole.  York reports that Daniel told 
him that Joseph Guerard had nothing to do with the crimes at the 
Borchelt residence.  Daniel told York that on the morning of the 
crimes, he dropped Guerard off at a gas station next to the 
Northridge shopping mall, telling him only that he would come 
pick him up later.  He then picked up another person, with whom 
he drove to the Borchelt residence.  Daniel told York that on 
the day of the crimes he was wearing green pants and a blue and 
white flannel shirt.  Daniel told York that he was the only 
person to enter the Borchelt residence.  Just before entering, 
he put an orange handkerchief on as a mask.   
¶39 Daniel told York that the woman in the residence 
punched him in the jaw and split his lip.  He retaliated, 
hitting her several times.  He said that he used his fist to 
break the glass on the Borchelt's gun cabinet.  Daniel showed 
York his right hand, which York reported as having scars on it.  
Daniel said he was not carrying any weapons during the 
commission of the crimes.  After leaving the house with the guns 
and some stolen money, Daniel dropped off the other person and 
                                                 
 
6    Each statement is corroborative of the other, although 
chronologically Daniel's confession to Cole came before his 
confession to York. 
  
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
20 
 
picked up Guerard where he had left him.  He said he did not 
tell Guerard what had just transpired, that Guerard did not see 
the guns because they were under the seat in a bag, but that 
Guerard was very agitated by the sight of the blood on Daniel's 
clothes.  Daniel refused to write a statement for York and 
indicated he would not turn himself in until at least after 
Guerard's trial started.   
¶40   Although Daniel's statement to York is not precisely 
identical to his confession to Cole, a reasonable person could 
conclude on the basis of Daniel's confession to York that, in 
light of all the facts and circumstances, his earlier confession 
to Cole was true.  The general description of the break-in, 
assault, 
and 
robbery, 
though 
not 
all 
the 
details, 
is 
substantially similar in both statements.  In both statements, 
Joseph Guerard is described as a non-participant, having been 
dropped off at a gas station prior to the commission of the 
crimes.  In both statements, Daniel wears green pants.  The 
description and sequence of events is basically the same.  In 
both statements, Daniel's hand is injured and there is blood on 
his clothing.     
¶41 It is true that the details in Daniel's statements are 
not entirely consistent with Borchelt's and Guerard's trial 
testimony.  Borchelt testified that the perpetrator broke open 
the glass gun cabinet with a knife, rather than his bare hand, 
as Daniel claimed in his statements.  Guerard testified, 
contrary to Daniel's statements, that Daniel told him about the 
plan to rob the Borchelt residence during their car ride 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
21 
 
together.  Daniel said he wore a handkerchief over his face 
during 
the 
robbery, 
whereas 
Borchelt 
reported 
that 
the 
perpetrator pulled a turtleneck shirt up over his face.   
¶42 These 
inconsistencies 
do 
not mean 
that Daniel's 
statement to Cole is uncorroborated.  That there are some 
discrepancies goes to the jury's evaluation of the weight and 
credibility of Daniel's admissions.  The fact that Daniel 
repeated his confession to Cole in substantially the same form 
in a later interview with Investigator York, and that the 
confession 
is 
similar 
in 
certain 
important 
respects 
to 
Borchelt's and Guerard's trial testimony, is enough to satisfy 
the Anderson corroboration standard.  There is sufficient 
evidence here to permit a reasonable person to conclude, in 
light of all the circumstances, that Daniel's self-inculpatory 
statement could be true, and that is all the corroboration 
standard requires.7  We see no basis to exclude Daniel's 
confessions under Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 
¶43  To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant must establish that his attorney's 
performance was deficient in the constitutional sense, that is, 
that 
his 
attorney's 
representation 
fell 
below 
objective 
                                                 
 
7   As we have noted, the State now concedes that the self-
inculpatory portions of Daniel's out-of-court statements are 
admissible.  The State argues, however, that certain discrete 
parts of Daniel's statements are not in fact self-inculpatory, 
and therefore should be excluded.  As we are reversing and 
remanding for a new trial, we will not undertake a dissection of 
Daniel's statements here.  
  
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
22 
 
standards of reasonableness.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  
Counsel 
is 
"strongly 
presumed 
to 
have 
rendered 
adequate 
assistance."  Id.  The court must "determine whether, in light 
of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of 
counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance."  Id.  The defendant must also establish prejudice, 
defined as a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
Id. at 694.  "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id.  When 
the challenge is directed at the conviction, "the question is 
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the 
errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt."  Id. at 695.   
¶44  Attorney Kurzynski did not subpoena York——indeed, did 
not talk to him——nor did he alert the circuit court to the 
existence of York's reports.  All the court was told was that 
Cole was available to testify that Daniel confessed to her.  The 
colloquy 
concerning 
Daniel's 
confession 
to 
Cole 
ended 
inconclusively, and Attorney Kurzynski did not raise the subject 
again. 
¶45  At the Machner hearing, Attorney Kurzynski remembered 
very little about the trial——understandable given the passage of 
time and the fact that he had turned over his file to successor 
counsel.  He testified that he did not interview or subpoena 
York or otherwise follow through on the effort to admit Daniel's 
confessions because he thought the confessions were hearsay and 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
23 
 
that York's reports were the work product of the State Public 
Defender's office, and because Daniel had not signed any 
statement. 
 
The 
State 
concedes 
that 
these 
reasons 
are 
objectively unreasonable, but argues that a decision to forego 
admission of Daniel's confessions was otherwise objectively 
reasonable because of the inconsistencies between the statements 
and the victim's testimony, and because Daniel separately denied 
any involvement in the crimes when interviewed by a police 
investigator, which would have been admissible in rebuttal. 
¶46  Just as the inconsistencies between Daniel's hearsay 
statements 
and 
the 
victim's 
testimony 
do 
not 
defeat 
corroboration under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4), they do not provide 
an objectively reasonable basis for counsel to have declined to 
use Daniel's admissible self-inculpatory statements in defense 
of Guerard.  The inconsistencies may diminish the relative 
weight and credibility of Daniel's hearsay confessions but do 
not provide an objectively reasonable strategic rationale for 
foregoing their use altogether.  Similarly, Daniel's denial of 
involvement when interviewed by the police would have been a 
factor for the jury to consider in evaluating the believability 
of Daniel's confessions to his sister and the SPD investigator; 
it 
does 
not, 
however, 
provide 
an 
objectively 
reasonable 
justification for failing to use the statements at all.  
Guerard's trial strategy was to suggest that there was evidence 
pointing to his brother Daniel as the perpetrator of these 
crimes.  We see no objectively reasonable basis to forego the 
use of Daniel's admissible hearsay confessions, which support 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
24 
 
this theory of defense.  Guerard has demonstrated that his 
counsel's performance in this regard was deficient.  
¶47 We also conclude that Guerard has established that he 
was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance.  There is 
a reasonable probability of a different result if the jury had 
received the evidence of Daniel's confessions to Cole and York.  
We acknowledge that the victim's testimony was compelling; Judge 
Wolfgram was able to recall it at the Machner hearing even six 
years after the trial.  Also, Daniel's hearsay statements are 
admittedly not completely consistent with the victim's testimony 
about the break-in, and his denial of involvement to police 
would likely have been admitted in rebuttal.  The State argues 
that these factors preclude a conclusion that Guerard was 
prejudiced.  However, citing ethical obligations (see SCR 
20:3.8, Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor), the State 
invites this court to consider exercising its discretionary 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 to reverse in the interest 
of justice on the ground that the real controversy has not been 
tried. 
¶48  The State's position in this regard is based in part 
upon statements York took from Guerard's girlfriend and her 
sister which tend to suggest that Guerard might have been 
involved in the crimes as an aider and abettor, accompanying his 
brother in the car but not entering the Borchelt home.  This 
position posits a scenario that results in a guilty verdict 
against Guerard on retrial, but as an aider and abettor under 
the party to the crime statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.05.  Because 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
25 
 
Judge Wolfgram imposed a 52-year sentence on the basis of 
Guerard's conviction as the sole direct perpetrator of these 
violent crimes, the State suggests that a conviction on this 
alternative theory would probably draw a shorter sentence.  
¶49  Whether the prejudice is viewed as a different result 
at trial or a lesser sentence, we conclude that prejudice under 
Strickland has been established.  Despite the strength of the 
victim's testimony and the existence of some inconsistency 
between her testimony and Daniel's confessions, the failure to 
put before the jury Daniel's hearsay statements inculpating 
himself and exculpating Guerard creates a reasonable probability 
of a different result at trial.  The jury would have had to 
determine the weight and credibility to assign to Daniel's 
confessions, and might have convicted Guerard anyway.  But the 
failure to introduce Daniel's admissible confessions exculpating 
Guerard undermines our confidence in this verdict.  There is a 
reasonable probability that the jury would have viewed Daniel's 
hearsay confessions as creating a reasonable doubt about 
Guerard's involvement as the perpetrator of these crimes. 
¶50  We will not comment here on the merits of the State's 
alternate theory that Guerard was along for the ride but did not 
enter the Borchelt home, and therefore likely would be convicted 
on retrial as an aider and abettor but not as a direct 
perpetrator.  We note only that the State concedes that under 
this theory, Guerard probably would receive a shorter sentence 
due to the reduced degree of culpability; in that sense, there 
is prejudice.  See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 
No. 
02-2404-CR   
 
26 
 
(2001)("[O]ur jurisprudence suggests that any amount of actual 
jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.")  Guerard has 
established both the deficient performance and prejudice aspects 
of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  We therefore 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
  By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.          
 
 
No.  02-2404-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶51 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the opinion except for note 3, which attempts to distinguish 
State v. Evans.  See my dissent in State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
¶52 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  02-2404-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1