Case Title: Lawrence Logan v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1155 
____________ 
 
 
 
LAWRENCE LOGAN,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 20, 2005] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
BELL, J. 
 
We have for review Logan v. State, 846 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), 
which expressly and directly conflicts with our decision in Smith v. State, 537 So. 
2d 982 (Fla. 1989).1  In December 1984, Logan was sentenced for offenses he 
committed on March 17, 1984.  That sentence was later set aside, and Logan was 
resentenced on May 8, 2001.  At this 2001 resentencing hearing, Logan elected to 
be sentenced “under the guidelines.”  The question before us is which sentencing 
provision applies to this election:  section 921.001(4)(b)(1), Florida Statutes 
                                          
 
 
1.    We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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(2001), also known as the 1983 guidelines, or section 921.002, Florida Statutes 
(2001), also known as the Criminal Punishment Code (“CPC”).   
 
The Second District Court of Appeal held that Logan’s election in 2001 was 
an election to be resentenced according to the CPC.  However, Logan argues that,  
like the appellant in Smith, his election was to be sentenced according to section 
921.001(4)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001), the 1983 guidelines.  Logan is correct. 2  
Consistent with our holding in Smith and a fair reading of both sections 
921.001(4)(b)(1) and 921.002, we hold that Logan elected and is entitled to be 
sentenced under section 921.001(4)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001), the 1983 
guidelines.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Logan was charged by information with six counts of armed robbery with a 
firearm.  The offenses occurred on March 17, 1984.  Logan was tried on November 
6-9, 1984, and was convicted on five counts.  A sentencing hearing was held on 
December 11, 1984.  The trial court applied but departed from the 1983 guidelines 
and sentenced Logan to five concurrent sentences of life in prison.  Written, 
supplemental grounds for departure were filed on December 19, 1984. 
                                          
 
 
2.  We decline to address other claims raised by Logan.  See Kelly v. 
Community Hosp. of Palm Beaches, 818 So. 2d 469, 470 n.1 (Fla. 2002) (declining 
to address issues raised that were beyond the scope of this Court’s conflict 
jurisdiction). 
 
 
 
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On October 18, 1999, Logan filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).  Relying on Smith, which 
was decided in January 1989, Logan argued that his sentence should be vacated 
and his case remanded for resentencing where he would have the express option to 
choose between a nonguidelines sentence or affirmatively elect to be sentenced in 
accordance with the guidelines in effect at the time of resentencing.  The State 
agreed.  On May 2, 2000, the trial court entered an order granting Logan’s motion. 
Logan’s resentencing occurred on May 8, 2001.  Logan elected to be 
sentenced “under the guidelines.”3  The trial court accepted this election and, as in 
1984, imposed a departure sentence.  Logan was sentenced to concurrent life 
sentences for each of the five counts of armed robbery with a firearm.  However,  
though the court orally stated its reasons for the departure sentence, it failed to file 
the requisite written reasons for departure. 
                                          
 
3.  The following colloquy occurred: 
Q.  Mr. Logan, we are here for your resentencing this morning.  And, 
of course, you have had an opportunity to talk to Mr. Rinella [defense 
counsel] and you have heard the arguments that were made.  But I do 
need to have you actually make the official decision on whether you 
want to elect to go under the guidelines or do you want a 
nonguidelines sentence. 
A.  I would like to go under the guidelines, Your Honor. 
 
 
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Logan appealed this new sentence to the Second District Court of Appeal.  
He argued that this new sentence was illegal because no written reasons for 
departure were filed as required by the 1983 guidelines.  For the first time, the 
State took the position that Logan’s election to be sentenced “under the guidelines” 
was an election to be resentenced under the CPC.   Under the CPC, life sentences 
on Logan’s offenses are not departure sentences; therefore, there is no need to file 
written reasons for departure.  In reply, Logan reiterated that his election was to be 
sentenced under the 1983 guidelines––not the CPC.  Alternatively, he argued that 
to apply the CPC to his offenses would violate the ex post facto clauses of the 
constitutions of the United States and the State of Florida. 
Agreeing with the State, the Second District affirmed Logan’s resentencing, 
stating: 
A defendant who elects to be sentenced under the guidelines, 
elects to be sentenced under the guidelines in effect at the time of the 
election.   Smith [v. State, 537 So. 2d 982, 987 (Fla. 1989)].  Because 
Logan made his election in 2001, he elected to be sentenced pursuant 
to the Criminal Punishment Code.  See Quevado v. State, 838 So. 2d 
1253, 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that defendant sentenced in 
1999 had right to choose "either a nonguidelines sentence or one 
under the 1998 Criminal Punishment Code"). 
Pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code, the five concurrent 
life sentences received here by Logan were not departure sentences.  
Accordingly, the trial court was not required to file written departure 
reasons.  See § 812.13 (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001).  Therefore, we affirm 
Logan's sentences. 
 
 
 
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Logan v. State, 846 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).  The Second District did 
not address the ex post facto claim. 
ANALYSIS 
The Second District’s reliance upon Smith to reach its conclusion that 
Logan’s election to be sentenced under the guidelines was an election to be 
sentenced under the CPC is incorrect.  According to Smith, Logan had the right to 
elect a sentence under the appropriate provision of section 921.001, Florida 
Statutes (2001).  The appropriate provision, in this case, is section 921.001(4)(b)(1) 
because Logan committed his crimes during the time period specified in this 
provision.  Therefore, Logan’s election entitled him to a sentence under section 
921.001(4)(b)(1). 
Logan is entitled to have his sentence determined by the provisions in 
section 921.001 because he is in the same “unique posture” as the defendant in 
Smith.  In Smith, this Court’s primary holding was that the 1983 sentencing 
guidelines (which had been promulgated by this Court as procedural rules on 
September 8, 1983) were invalid; however, the Court also held that the Legislature 
rectified this invalidity when it adopted the same rules by statute effective July 1, 
1984.  The Court then addressed the impact of its holding on Smith.  It held that 
section 921.001(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), gave Smith the right to elect to be 
sentenced under the 1983 guidelines when he was resentenced in 1988.  
 
 
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Smith’s position was remarkably similar to Logan’s.  Smith committed his 
offenses and received his departure sentence before July 1, 1984, the effective date 
of the 1983 guidelines.  The departure sentence was overturned on appeal.  Smith 
was resentenced on June 23, 1988, at which time the trial court held the sentencing 
guidelines statute unconstitutional and sentenced Smith to a  nonguidelines 
sentence.   
This Court recognized that Smith was in a “unique posture” because his 
crime was committed before the effective date of the guidelines, but his re-
sentencing occurred afterwards.  537 So. 2d at 987.  It also recognized that the 
right to elect a sentence was a right granted by the Legislature.  Specifically,  
section 921.001(4)(a) provided:  
The guidelines shall be applied to all felonies, except capital felonies, 
committed on or after October 1, 1983, and to all felonies, except 
capital and life felonies, committed prior to October 1, 1983, for 
which sentencing occurs after such date when the defendant 
affirmatively selects to be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of this 
act. 
§ 921.001(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983).  Relying upon this statutory right to 
affirmatively select a guidelines sentence, the Court then held: 
Under section 921.001(4)(a), a person whose crime was committed 
before the effective date of the guidelines but sentenced thereafter 
may affirmatively select to be sentenced under the guidelines.  When 
appellant appeared for resentencing in 1988, his effort to be sentenced 
under the guidelines constituted the affirmative selection 
contemplated by section 921.001(4)(a).  Therefore, appellant should 
 
 
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have been sentenced under the guidelines which were effective on that 
date.   
Smith, 537 So. 2d at 987.  Therefore, after Smith, defendants who are in this 
“unique posture” are authorized to elect a guidelines sentence.  This election 
requires the trial court to look to the express language of section 921.001, Florida 
Statutes, to determine which sentencing guidelines apply. 
In Logan’s case, we find that Logan was authorized to elect a guidelines 
sentence and that the 1983 guidelines apply to his case.  Similar to Smith, Logan’s 
crimes were committed prior to July 1, 1984.  His original sentence was vacated, 
and he appeared for resentencing after July 1, 1984.  At his May 8, 2001, 
resentencing, Logan affirmatively elected to be sentenced under the guidelines.  
The sentencing provisions which were effective on that date expressly provided 
that section 921.004(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001), the current codified version of 
the 1983 guidelines, applied to Logan’s offenses.  Specifically, section 
921.001(4)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001) (formerly section 921.001(4)(a)), 
provided: 
The guidelines enacted effective October 1, 1983, apply to all 
felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 
1983, and before January 1, 1994; and to all felonies, except capital 
felonies and life felonies, committed before October 1, 1983, when 
the defendant affirmatively selects to be sentenced pursuant to such 
provisions. 
 
 
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Pursuant to this express language of section 921.001(4)(b)(1) and consistent with  
Smith, this affirmative election entitled Logan to be sentenced under the 1983 
guidelines.4 
Moreover, the express language of the CPC, section 921.002, confirms this.   
The CPC expressly states that “[t]he Criminal Punishment Code shall apply to all 
felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998.”  § 
921.002, Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added).  Logan’s offenses were not committed 
on or after October 1, 1998.  His offenses were committed in 1984.  Therefore, by 
its express terms, the CPC does not apply to Logan’s offenses. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons expressed above, we hold that section 921.001(4)(b)(1) 
applies to Logan’s offenses, and his affirmative election at resentencing was an 
election to be resentenced under the 1983 guidelines.  We quash the decision of the 
                                          
 
4.  The only potentially significant factual distinction between Smith and 
Logan is that the right to elect in section 921.001(4)(b)(1) is expressly granted to 
defendants whose crimes were committed before October 1, 1983.  Smith’s offense 
was committed prior to this date; Logan’s crime was committed after this date.  
But, if section 921.001(4)(b)(1) applies to Logan’s offenses, he cannot be denied 
the right to elect to be sentenced under the 1983 guidelines.  As a consequence of 
the primary holding in Smith and consistent with a fair reading of the statute, the 
pertinent cut-off date for purposes of  the right to elect under section 
921.001(4)(b)(1) is July 1, 1984.  Logan’s offenses were committed prior to July 1, 
1984, so he is entitled to be resentenced under the 1983 guidelines if he so elects.  
See Kunkel v. State, 765 So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Gibbons v. State, 
543 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla.2d DCA 1989). 
 
 
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Second District Court of Appeal and remand to the district court for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D01-3151 
 
 
(Hendry County) 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Carol J.Y. Wilson, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss, 
Bureau Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals and Dale E. Tarpley, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent