Case Title: Betzle v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Betzle v. State1993 WY 26847 P.2d 1010Case Number: 91-74Decided: 03/01/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming

 

Gary T. 
BETZLE,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Campbell 
County, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

Wyoming Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, and Lee E. Christian, Jostad 
Associates, Fort Collins, CO, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard E. Dixon, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired 1/1/93.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The primary issue 
presented by this case is whether inadmissible hearsay testimony was received at 
the trial of Gary T. Betzle (Betzle) on charges of second degree sexual assault; 
third degree sexual assault; and indecent liberties. The accused denounced 
testimony consisted of reports by a professional counselor, trained in 
psychology, and a pediatrician of what the intellectually-handicapped minor 
victim had told them about Betzle's criminal acts. The question is of special 
importance in this case because, apart from Betzle's own admissions, this 
testimony is the essential evidence that any crimes occurred. Betzle attacks the 
voluntariness of his admissions, and he also argues that, even if his confession 
was voluntary, there was not sufficient evidence presented at the trial to 
furnish independent corroboration of any crime. Other issues are raised 
concerning the invasion of the province of the jury by the counselor and the 
pediatrician because they stated opinions as to Betzle's guilt and vouched for 
the credibility of the victim; abuse of discretion by the district court in 
imposing particularly severe sentences; and ineffective assistance of counsel. 
We hold the testimony attacked as hearsay properly was received in evidence at 
the trial; Betzle's confession was voluntary; there was sufficient evidence of a 
corpus delicti to justify introducing his confession into evidence, even apart 
from the hearsay testimony; the testimony of the counselor and the pediatrician 
did not invade the province of the jury; the sentences imposed did not 
constitute an abuse of the discretion of the trial court; and the record does 
not justify Betzle's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The 
judgment and sentence are affirmed.

[¶2]      In his Brief of the 
Appellant, Betzle presented these issues:

I. 
Did the admission of the victim's hearsay statements violate the Appellant's 
constitutional right to confront his accuser?

A. 
Was it error to admit the child's hearsay statements to her school counselor 
because the hearsay lacked a proper foundation under Rule 803(4), W.R.E., and 
because the hearsay did not overcome the presumption against uncrossexamined 
evidence?

B. 
Were the hearsay statements made by the child to [the pediatrician] made for the 
purpose of obtaining medical treatment or diagnosis?

II. 
Were [the professional counselor] and [the pediatrician]'s opinions as to the 
fact that the child had been sexually abused inadmissible as an invasion of the 
province of the trier of fact?

III. 
Was the corpus delicti established by sufficient evidence independent of the 
Appellant's extrajudicial confession?

IV. 
Was the sentence given Appellant by the trial court an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion?

V. 
Was the Appellant denied effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's 
inadequate preparation, investigation and other errors?

VI. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, was Appellant's confession 
involuntarily given?

The 
State, in its brief as appellee, responded with its restated version of those 
issues, as follows:

I. 
Should Wyoming retain the corpus delecti aliunde rule, and if so, what form 
should the modern articulation of that rule take?

II. 
Does the record corroborate the truthfulness of appellant's confessions, 
independent of the admissible hearsay statements attributed to the 
victim?

III. 
Did the trial court properly admit statements made by the victim to her 
counselor, in light of established exceptions to the rule prohibiting hearsay, 
as well as necessity and trustworthiness?

IV. 
Did inherently trustworthy hearsay admitted under a "firmly rooted exception" 
violate the appellant's right to confront witnesses giving testimony against 
him?

V. 
Was appellant's confession given knowingly and voluntarily, under circumstances 
which betray no hint of duress or undue influence?

VI. 
Were the sentences imposed by the trial court lawful and 
appropriate?

VII. 
Did appellant enjoy vigorous and effective representation of counsel throughout 
his trial?

[¶3]      The victim in this 
case is a handicapped child. She suffered from a malignant brain tumor for which 
she had been subjected to radiation therapy, chemotherapy, and surgery. Although 
nine years old at the time of the alleged offenses, the victim's mental ability 
was that of a four-year old or a four-year, eight-month old child. She had been 
subjected to five surgeries which compounded her slowness, lack of coordination, 
speech problems, right-sided weakness and impaired long-term memory.

[¶4]      The victim's parents 
were divorced in 1982 and, subsequent to the divorce, the father was awarded 
primary custody although the mother was afforded liberal visitation rights 
including alternate weekends. Betzle was a baby sitter for the victim, and he 
was the only male baby sitter used by either of the parents prior to May of 
1990. Betzle was the victim's baby sitter on approximately four to six 
occasions, and he would watch over her at his house. The victim stayed overnight 
at Betzle's home on April 14, 1990 and 
also spent several hours with him at his home on April 
29, 1990.

[¶5]      Early in May of 1990, 
the victim complained to her father about soreness in her crotch area. At about 
the same time, her mother noticed the victim's appetite had decreased; there was 
difficulty in getting her to go to bed; she began wetting her pants; and she 
also began to complain of vaginal pain. Not long after these events, a licensed 
professional counselor, who had been working with the victim for about two and 
one-half years, was notified by the school counselor of the possibility that the 
victim may have been sexually abused. Upon request, the professional counselor 
interviewed the victim to determine whether sexual abuse had 
occurred.

[¶6]      At about the same 
time, the victim's grandfather called the Gillette police department from 
Tallahassee, 
Florida and 
reported a suspected sexual molestation of his granddaughter. A detective at the 
Gillette police department telephoned DPASS to advise that office of the 
telephone conversation with the grandfather, and then the detective later 
interviewed the victim's father and a female friend of the victim's father 
concerning the grandfather's allegations. The female friend also baby sat with 
the victim, and she told the officer that, on one occasion about the end of 
April or the first of May, the victim told her the child had a "secret." The 
police detective asked the father to take the victim to the doctor and, when he 
neglected to do that, the detective made an appointment with a physician, who 
specialized in pediatrics (pediatrician), to examine the victim.

[¶7]      The product of the 
interview by the professional counselor was an opinion that the victim had been 
sexually abused. After performing her examination, the pediatrician also formed 
an opinion that the victim had been sexually abused.

[¶8]      On May 
9, 1990, the 
police detective met Betzle at Betzle's home after work and asked Betzle to 
accompany him to the police station to answer some questions about an 
investigation he was conducting. Betzle agreed and drove himself to the police 
station. He was advised of his rights under the Miranda decision, and he was 
interviewed independently by the detective and later by another officer. Within 
an hour's time, Betzle provided the second investigating officer with several 
specific incidents of improper sexual contact with the victim. Betzle denied 
these events at trial.

[¶9]      In a criminal 
complaint filed on May 11, 1990, 
Betzle was charged with five counts of sexual assault and indecent liberties 
with a minor. Subsequently, an information was filed in the district court in 
which Betzle was charged with two counts of sexual assault in the second degree 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 6-2-303(a)(v) and 6-2-306(a)(ii), (b), (c)(i) 
(1988);1 two counts of sexual assault in the third degree 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 6-2-304(a)(ii) and 6-2-306(a)(iii), (b), (c)(ii) 
(1988);2 and one count of taking immodest, immoral and 
indecent liberties with a child in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-105 (1986).3 The handicapped girl was the victim in all of 
these alleged crimes.

[¶10]   Betzle opted for a trial by the court, 
and the judge found him guilty of two counts of sexual assault in the second 
degree, two counts of sexual assault in the third degree, and one count of 
indecent liberties with a child. Betzle then was sentenced to a term of not less 
than thirty years nor more than life for the two counts of sexual assault in the 
second degree, not less than four years nor more than five years for each count 
of sexual assault in the third degree, and not less than seven nor more than ten 
years for the count of indecent liberties with a child. The several sentences 
were specified to run consecutively. Betzle has taken this appeal from that 
judgment and sentence.

[¶11]   We address first the question of whether 
inadmissible hearsay testimony was received by the court at Betzle's trial. 
Hearsay is defined in Wyo.R.Evid. 801(c) as follows:

"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted.

The 
statements made by the victim to the professional counselor and to the 
pediatrician constitute hearsay within this definition when those statements are 
repeated in court. Hearsay evidence, ordinarily inadmissible, however, can be 
received in evidence under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule found in 
the Wyoming Rules of Evidence if the requirements of the rule exception are met. 
Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶12]   The trial court, after receiving 
extensive argument from counsel, admitted the statements made by the 
professional counselor and the pediatrician pursuant to a well-established 
hearsay exception found in Wyo.R.Evid. 803(4), which specifies:

The 
following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness:

* * * 
* * *

(4) 
Statements for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. - Statements made for purposes 
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or 
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of 
the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to 
diagnosis or treatment * * *.

[¶13]   At the time the trial court admitted the 
professional counselor's testimony as to the victim's statements, the court 
said:

This 
is a very perplexing, and in many respects, a difficult problem.

I am 
looking at Louisell and Mueller's book at article 444, , in volume four, when 
he's talking about the pertinency standard with respect to statements made to 
treating physicians. And he says: "The pertinency standard should be construed 
broadly enough to reach facts which would naturally be recited in a good-faith 
effort to provide needed information. If a patient, for example, tells a 
treating physician that he first felt pain while pulling some heavy pipes at 
work, the fact that diagnosis and treatment would have been the same if the 
patient had simply told the doctor that he stooped down and pulled on a heavy 
object should make no difference. Nothing is gained in terms of protecting the 
jury from untrustworthy evidence by applying Rule 803(4) so stringently as to 
require exclusion of details naturally included in an honest to-the-point effort 
to describe what happened."

And 
then he goes on to talk about the ascribing of fault.

Well, 
when we're talking about a child of this age, and particularly of this age and 
particular mental abilities, it doesn't appear to me that anything that she 
relates is something which attempts to attribute fault. It's merely a 
description of things happening.

The 
need for candor is, of course, underlies the exception for diagnosis and 
treatment. And if we accept the premise, which is generally espoused by experts 
in the field, that children are naturally candid about these things, in any 
event, and with some certain limited exceptions, don't make up stories about 
what happened to them sexually. And if you couple that with most of the 
information that pervade that when they are describing things which would 
ordinarily be beyond their sophistication, beyond their ken, that you can 
ascribe some reliability just to the mere fact that they're reciting things 
which they just would not have the ability or the inclination to make up, that 
makes their statements reliable in themselves.

So if 
you're just looking at the underlying test on the diagnosis and treatment as a 
candor rule, it would seem to me that probably statements made to a child - by a 
child to a reasonably skilled professional who is not leading the child or 
attempting to suggest to the child what the answer should be, that the same 
sorts of concerns about candor and reliability are met. There, of course, is no 
opportunity for cross examination, and that's something that generally is - is 
required under our understanding of due process. But I think the courts have 
said that if there are these other indicia of reliability, that the due process 
is met without the opportunity for cross-examination.

In a 
criminal case, I think we have the additional problem of not only due process 
but also of confrontation. And I recognize that that is a right that's pretty 
zealously guarded. And I would refer to that most recent decision by the United 
States Supreme Court which throughout the case, where I believe there was a 
screen placed between a testifying juvenile and a defendant, and Scalia, writing 
for the court, concluded that that was not - did not meet the requirements of 
confrontation.

So we 
have here a problem of a child who you now tell me is not going to testify at 
all, who is going to be permitted, if the State has its way, of coming into 
court and relating, through another, without any opportunity for cross 
examination, without any opportunity for confrontation, what - what 
happened.

And I 
- I'm looking at - I think that was the area of Louisell and Mueller that - that 
you were referring to, [Betzle's counsel] on where he talks about the difference 
between psychiatrists and medical people and that there may not be the same kind 
of pressure to be candid with a psychiatrist as there is with a - a physician - 
another kind of physician. I'm not sure when we're talking about a child and 
relating these things that they're not, how important that is.

And I 
recognize that the Rules of Evidence in Wyoming, for 
instance, do not permit the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements of 
a witness in a trial, nor do the federal rules. However, the California 
rules permit prior inconsistent statements of a witness to be used substantively 
in a trial and in a criminal trial. And that would include not only an 
inconsistent statement in the sense that the witness testifies differently in 
the courtroom than they did before, but also in a circumstance where the witness 
refuses, or is unable to testify in the courtroom. I guess if we got the little 
girl on the stand, she was unable to testify, that that might meet that rule; 
that's been upheld as constitutional. It involves the same denial, it seems to 
me, of the right of confrontation as does the circumstance presented 
here.

A 
further dilemma, I think, arises from the posture of the case. Number one, since 
there's not a jury and I'm the finder of fact as well as the ruler on - the 
person who rules on evidence, I don't have the luxury of being able to take 
testimony outside of the presence of the jury, evaluate it, and then decide 
whether or not it's going to be admissible.

And I 
would have to say that it doesn't take a genius to understand the issues in the 
case. It seems quite probable to me, given what everybody's been saying and 
doing here, that if this witness is allowed to testify, that she's going to 
testify that Sleepy - or Sleeper [Betzle's nickname], I'm sorry - Sleeper was 
the person who did this. Also, I kind of gather from the way things have been 
going that there's a confession that Sleeper admitted to some or all of these 
acts.

So we 
have the problem not only of whether or not this evidence should be admitted for 
all purposes, but also, whether it should be admitted for limited purposes, for 
instance, providing corroboration for a confession, or for perhaps even 
providing a predicate for admissibility of a confession, which I believe, Mr. 
Johnson, you're arguing under the Konopisos case, presents a real 
dilemma.

I'm 
going to allow the witness to testify. I will tell you now that if that's all 
there is, if the only evidence in this case about this defendant comes from the 
girl through the lips of a - of a psychologist, a judgment of acquittal is going 
to be in order. So you may proceed.

While 
this quotation is lengthy, it does manifest the careful concern of the trial 
judge with respect to the legal issues involved.

[¶14]   Wyoming 
precedent supports the ruling made by the court. In Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253, 104 S. Ct. 3539, 82 L. Ed. 2d 844 
(1984), and later in Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1989), we held that an 
expert witness may give testimony about what was said to the witness by an 
abused child under the exception articulated in Wyo. R.Evid. 803(4) provided: 
(1) the expert's testimony shows the victim's statements were consistent with 
the purposes for which the witness became involved with the victim, and (2) the 
witness relied on the statements in connection with diagnosis and treatment of 
the victim. In Stephens, the court adopted this two-part test from United States 
v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying Fed.R.Evid. 803(4), which is 
identical to Wyo.R.Evid. 803(4)) to assure such hearsay testimony conforms with 
the policy of the rule before the testimony is admitted. Stephens. See also 
State v. Dever, 64 Ohio 
St.3d 401, 596 N.E.2d 436, reh'g denied, 65 Ohio 
St.3d 1422, 598 N.E.2d 1172 (1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
113 S. Ct. 1279, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (U.S.Ohio 1993) (adopting the Renville 
reasoning); State v. Tracy, 482 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 
1992) (affirming the Renville analysis). These elements were satisfied in this 
case. Other federal courts have promulgated similar rulings. E.g., Dana v. 
Department of Corrections, 958 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 112 S. Ct. 3043, 120 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1992); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 
(4th Cir. 1988); United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1987); United 
States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001, 
101 S. Ct. 1709, 68 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1981); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th 
Cir. 1979).

[¶15]   The professional counselor's testimony 
must be tested against these requirements. The victim was examined by the 
counselor at the request of a school counselor at the victim's school. The 
professional counselor had been working with the victim for almost two and 
one-half years, with most of that work done in the area of behavioral management 
and support along with some work on a previous, but unrelated, alleged abuse 
situation. The professional counselor conducted the interview with the victim in 
an effort to determine if there had been any abuse of the victim. The testimony 
of the professional counselor at trial was consistent with an interview for the 
purpose of diagnosing any need for specific counseling with respect to a new 
abuse situation and with the purpose of promoting that treatment if it were 
indicated. The professional counselor relied upon the victim's statements in 
connection with the diagnosis and potential treatment of the young girl. In this 
regard, the counselor explained:

Q. 
[Professional Counselor], how important is the reliability of the children's 
statements to you in these kinds of cases in the diagnosis that you 
make?

A. 
It's very important.

Q. Do 
you have practices and procedures you follow or rules of thumb that you follow 
in determining reliability of the reports you receive?

A. 
Yes.

Q. 
What are those?

A. 
They are a lot of times consistency, whether the child repeats the same thing 
more than once, whether or not when they tell me something, if it's repeated 
again identically to another person; that is looked at as consistency. Knowledge 
that is above and beyond their age level; that's another thing we look at. The 
accuracy of their knowledge, and according to their age appropriateness, the 
general demeanor of the client, the child, how they act, if it's within their 
normal range. Many times there's a lot of subtle differences in the way a client 
will act. And if you've worked with them long enough, you begin to see those. So 
you take into account everything: What they say, how they say it, how much they 
say it, just everything is in there.

[¶16]   Examination of the pediatrician's 
testimony according to the same requirements also leads to the conclusion no 
error occurred. The victim was presented to the pediatrician at a regular office 
appointment by a police officer after the complaint of sexual assault. In her 
testimony, the pediatrician explained her physical findings and mental 
impressions with respect to the victim. The pediatrician also relied on 
statements by the victim in connection with her diagnosis and treatment. 
Specifically, she testified:

Q. 
And what is the purpose of speaking with the child in these 
examinations?

A. 
Well, based on the child's age, I try to decide whether they know things that a 
child that age should not know. And I also try to - if a child says that there's 
been vaginal penetration, then I know I have to look more closely at the vagina 
to see if there are any tears or any evidence of any problem. But it also - some 
children will say that there has been anal penetration, in which case I want to 
examine that more closely.

The 
testimony of both the professional counselor and the pediatrician fit within the 
requirements of the Renville test, and the hearsay statements from the victim 
were properly admitted into evidence under Wyo. R.Evid. 803(4).

[¶17]   Betzle, in support of his effort to 
exclude the statements of the victim, argues the statements the victim made to 
the professional counselor lacked a proper foundation under Wyo.R.Evid. 803(4), 
as interpreted in our ruling in Stephens. This argument is not persuasive. In 
Stephens we said:

If a 
foundation is presented which establishes that the identity of the perpetrator 
was necessary for diagnosis or treatment, however, such a statement may be 
admitted under the rule.

Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 72 (citations omitted).

[¶18]   Later, we said:

The 
exception articulated in Goldade is based on the assumption that disclosure of 
the identity of the perpetrator satisfies the requirements of Rule 803(4), 
W.R.E., and thus encompasses the inherent reliability which justifies 
admission.

Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 72.

[¶19]   We also stated:

A 
statement need not be made to a physician, and statements made to hospital 
attendants, or even family members, may be admitted under Rule 803(4) if the 
foundation conditions are satisfied. Such statements are not required to refer 
to the declarant's physical condition. Statements made to close relatives, which 
then are reported to the doctor, may be admitted under the rule, although double 
or multiple hearsay may be presented.

Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 73 (citations omitted).

[¶20]   The professional counselor testified 
about the relationship she had developed with the victim; her ability to 
communicate with the victim; the girl's ability to communicate with her; and to 
various indicia of reliability she and other professionals invoked in making a 
diagnosis and developing follow-up treatment plans. The professional counselor 
specifically testified:

Q. 
Okay. And I believe - will you go on from there? What did - what did [the 
victim] respond to you when you asked her about whether it was a good 
baby-sitter or a bad baby-sitter?

A. 
She indicated it was a baby-sitter.

Q. 
Did she say anything else?

A. 
She went on to - I had asked her who it was.

Q. 
What did she say?

A. 
She told me that it was Sleeper [Betzle].

[¶21]   The information that was furnished 
satisfies the foundation requirements articulated in Wyo.R.Evid. 803(4), as 
interpreted by this court in Stephens. See also Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42 
(holding testimony of victim's school counselor, who had been working with 
victim on his learning disability and behavior problems for a year, was 
admissible under Wyo.R.Evid. 804(b)(6), the catchall exception requiring the 
declarant be unavailable.) Betzle contends that bootstrapping statements of 
identification are inappropriate under Wyo.R.Evid. 803(4), since such statements 
extend the rationale beyond the "firmly rooted" hearsay exception.4 We also reject this contention. Those courts 
that have recently examined the question of whether statements of the victim 
concerning the identity of the perpetrator are admissible or not have concluded 
statements of identification are admissible because of the special character of 
diagnosis and treatment in child sexual abuse cases. Robert P. Mosteller, Child 
Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 
67 N.C.L.REV. 257 (1989).

[¶22]   The State laid its foundation prior to 
the questions directed to the professional counselor, and we do not perceive any 
bootstrapping here. The identification of the perpetrator by the victim was 
properly admitted. It should be noted further that no objection by Betzle can be 
found in the record with respect to this particular testimony by the 
professional counselor.

[¶23]   Betzle further argues he was deprived of 
his constitutional right of confrontation by his accuser as guaranteed by U.S. 
Const. amend. VI and Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 10. Betzle argues the general approach used by the United 
States Supreme Court to test hearsay admissions against confrontation rights 
requires: (1) either the production of the out-of-court declarant or 
demonstration of unavailability; and (2) assurances of reliability of the 
statement. Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 
100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980). 

[¶24]   In a recent decision, the United States 
Supreme Court held the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment does not 
require the prosecution to either produce the declarant or, alternatively, a 
finding by the court that the declarant is unavailable before a trial court can 
admit testimony under the spontaneous declaration and medical examination 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. White v. Illinois, ___ 
U.S. ___, 
112 S. Ct. 736, 116 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1992). Cf. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1990) (holding child victim's hearsay statements 
violated perpetrator's confrontation clause rights, citing the Roberts standard 
requiring the prosecution to produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the 
declarant whose statement it wishes to use and to demonstrate the statement 
bears adequate indicia of reliability); McIntosh v. State, 810 P.2d 373 (Okla. 
Cr. 1991) (holding admission of child's hearsay statements as to identity of his 
abuser, although in violation of defendant's confrontation rights using the 
Roberts and Wright standard, was harmless error).

[¶25]   In White, the conviction was for a 
sexual assault upon a four-year-old girl. The state trial court permitted the 
child's baby sitter, her mother, an investigating officer, an emergency room 
nurse, and a doctor to testify, each recounting statements by the child 
describing the crime. White. The testimony was admissible pursuant to the 
Illinois 
hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and for statements made for the 
purpose of securing medical treatment. The Illinois rule 
reads, according to White, ___ U.S. at 
___ n. 2, 112 S. Ct.  at 740 n. 2:

[¶26]   Illinois Rev.Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 115-13 
(1989), provides:

"In a 
prosecution for violation of Section 12-13, 12-14, 12-15 or 12-16 of the 
`Criminal Code of 1961', statements made by the victim to medical personnel for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment including descriptions of the cause 
of symptom, pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the 
cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule."

In 
rejecting White's claim under the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause, the 
Supreme Court concluded that its decision in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 89 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1986), on remand, 790 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 
1986), "foreclosed any rule requiring that, as a necessary antecedent to the 
introduction of hear-say testimony, the prosecution must either produce the 
declarant at trial or show that the declarant is unavailable." White, ___ 
U.S. at 
___, 112 S. Ct.  at 740. The Inadi decision had rejected the proposition that 
Roberts established a rule that no out-of-court statements would be admissible 
without a showing of unavailability. White. In White, as is true in this case, 
the victim did not testify at trial.

[¶27]   In addressing this issue, the Supreme 
Court noted the evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony regarding 
spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of receiving medical 
care is that such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that inherently 
provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness. White. A statement made 
in the course of procuring medical services, when the declarant presumably knows 
that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special 
guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not think can be replicated 
by testimony in the context of the courtroom. White. Where the proffered hearsay 
has those sufficient guarantees of reliability to bring it within a 
firmly-rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the confrontation clause of the 
Constitution is satisfied. White. The policy justification for admissibility is 
that the confrontation clause of the Constitution has as its basic purpose the 
promotion of the integrity of the fact-finding process. Consequently, the 
exclusion of probative statements such as these under the strictures of the 
confrontation clause would be antithetical to this fundamental purpose of the 
Constitution.

[¶28]   White affords a liberal application of 
the medical examination exceptions to the hearsay rule, and this is exactly what 
the trial court did in this case. Public policy justifies a more liberal 
approach that should prevail in cases such as this because, although the child 
may be too young to know what is actually germane to his or her treatment, still 
the child has no reason to fabricate and, presumably, furnishes the physician a 
full account of the occurrence, simply as a part of the story of the injury. 
Lloyd Leva Plaine, Comment, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse 
Prosecutions, 63 GEO.L.J. 257 (1974). The use of the victim's statements as 
substantive evidence at trial did not violate Betzle's constitutional right 
guaranteed by either version of the confrontation clause. We hold that, in light 
of our prior cases and the Supreme Court decision in White, the testimony of the 
professional counselor and the pediatrician, attacked as hearsay, properly was 
received in evidence at the trial.

[¶29]   Our research also discloses that such 
testimony often is admitted into evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) which 
reads:

Other 
exceptions. A 
statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines 
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the 
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served 
by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be 
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the 
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's 
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name 
and address of the declarant.

The 
language of Wyo.R.Evid. 803(24) is very similar to the federal counterpart. At 
trial, the prosecuting attorney brought up this catchall exception and its twin, 
Wyo. R.Evid. 804(b)(6), which applies when the declarant is unavailable. See 
Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(5); Wyo.R.Evid. 804(b)(6). The trial court acknowledged the 
unavailability of the witness in this instance, but it pointed out that, since 
notice was not given to the adverse party, the catchall exceptions could not be 
invoked. The ruling of the trial court was correct. In Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 
1990), we held notice was not given as required by either Wyo. R.Evid. 803(24) 
or Wyo.R.Evid. 804(b)(6), but only after making an in-depth analysis of the 
rules, their elements, the rationale behind the rules, and a reminder to 
practitioners of the notice required. In instances in which the potential of 
offering hearsay for substantive purposes is apparent, practitioners should be 
cognizant of the catchall exception and its potential use so that appropriate 
notice can be given to the adverse party. If the trial court chooses to rely on 
this exception to allow the admission of hearsay evidence at trial, it must make 
a record by appropriate statements of rationale, or findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to support its discretionary decision. State v. Smith, 315 
N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985). Trial courts have held testimony similar to the 
testimony in the case at bar admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(24) or 804(b)(6). 
United States v. St. John, 851 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Shaw, 
824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S. Ct. 1033, 98 L. Ed. 2d 997 (1988); United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1985); Huff v. 
White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1979).

[¶30]   Betzle's next major contention is that 
there was not sufficient evidence introduced at trial to corroborate his 
confession even if it were voluntary. The State urges the court to adopt a rule 
that would permit a conviction to be sustained upon the uncorroborated statement 
of the accused. In Konopisos v. State, 26 Wyo. 350, 185 P. 355 (Wyo. 1919), and 
more recently in Leach v. State, 836 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1992), and Osborne v. State, 
806 P.2d 272 (Wyo. 1991), we articulated our rule requiring there be proof of 
the corpus delicti apart from an extra-judicial confession of the accused in 
order to prove the commission of a crime. We do not accept the invitation of the 
State to change that rule. We hold it is necessary, under Wyoming law, 
to require the introduction of evidence that is independent of the confession by 
the accused in order to prove a criminal offense.

[¶31]   In this case, the record discloses 
testimony by the victim's mother that, when the victim returned from Betzle's 
house, she would come home wearing different clothing, including one of Betzle's 
shirts on one occasion. Both the victim's mother and Betzle testified the victim 
stayed at his house all night on April 14-15, 1990. The 
father of the victim testified that, around the first of May, the victim 
complained to him she had soreness in her crotch area. At the same time, the 
victim's mother noticed a decrease in the victim's appetite, she began to wet 
her pants and to complain of vaginal pain. The pediatrician who examined the 
victim testified she observed irritation and redness in the genital area. The 
counselor of the victim noted that, when she took the victim to their interview 
room, the victim moved very close to the counselor, took her hand and walked 
with her without lagging behind which was unusual conduct for the victim. These 
items of evidence in the record establish sufficiently for purposes of 
corroboration, the commission of the offense charged, and we hold there was, in 
this case, sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to justify the introduction 
into evidence of Betzle's confession.

[¶32]   With respect to Betzle's attack upon the 
voluntariness of his confession, the test for admissibility is whether, under 
the totality of the circumstances, the waiver of constitutional rights and 
subsequent statements given by an accused were voluntary, knowing, and made 
intelligently. Mayer v. State, 618 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 
1980) (citing Jarrett v. State, 500 P.2d 1027 (Wyo. 
1972)). Betzle initially was contacted by police officers about 4:30 
P.M. on 
May 
9, 1990. On 
that occasion, a detective stopped by his house and asked Betzle to come down to 
the police station and answer some questions. Betzle went to the police station 
in his own car, answered questions, returned to his apartment, and consented to 
a search of his residence by two detectives. After the search, Betzle returned 
to the police station and made a tape recording of his confession. Betzle knew 
his statements were being taped, but he later recanted his confession, 
testifying the tape was a fabrication. From the totality of the circumstances 
revealed by the record, we hold Betzle's confession was furnished voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently.

[¶33]   In another issue, Betzle questions 
whether the testimony of the counselor and the pediatrician invaded the province 
of the jury because, he argues, each gave an opinion as to his guilt and vouched 
for the credibility of the victim. The decision of the trial court to admit or 
reject expert testimony is a decision solely within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and will not be reversed without a showing of clear and prejudicial 
abuse. Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061 (Wyo. 
1987). Wyo.R.Evid. 702 first demands inquiry as to whether the witness is 
qualified as an expert. The qualification of a witness as an expert is vested 
within the discretion of the trial court and, similarly, that determination will 
be overturned only when a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Montoya v. State, 
822 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 
1991) (citing Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579 (Wyo. 
1986)). See MMOE v. MJE, 841 P.2d 820 (Wyo. 
1992). The pediatrician in this case had been practicing pediatric medicine for 
six and a half years, examining, in the course of that practice, approximately 
fifty children like the victim for the purpose of determining the existence of 
sexual molestation. Had an objection been posed to the expertise of this witness 
on the ground that she lacked the qualification or training essential to an 
expression of an opinion as an expert in her field or if voir dire had been 
requested with respect to her qualifications, as a party must do to assign as 
error the lack of expertise, we would have a more adequate record to consider. 
This statement from John E.B. Meyers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual 
Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L.REV. 1, 11 (1989) (footnote omitted), is peculiarly 
apt:

A 
party opposing expert testimony may voir dire a witness in an effort to show 
that the witness is not qualified as an expert. Unless a witness is clearly 
unqualified, however, deficiencies in qualifications normally go to the weight 
accorded the witness's testimony rather than its admissibility. A witness need 
not be the foremost authority on child sexual abuse, nor must the expert 
understand every nuance of the subject.

Counsel for Betzle had an opportunity to cross-examine his 
witness, but no questions were raised regarding qualifications or training. The 
first attack on the pediatrician's qualification as an expert is found in 
Betzle's appellate brief. The trial judge found the pediatrician was possessed 
of sufficient experience to qualify her as an expert, and there is no abuse of 
discretion to be found in that decision.

[¶34]   Betzle also attacks the credentials of 
the professional counselor in his brief. Betzle admits no objection was made 
during the trial, but urges upon us the plain error doctrine. We refuse to apply 
the plain error doctrine in this instance. This witness had a bachelor's degree 
in psychology, a master's degree in counseling psychology and human development, 
and is nationally certified by the American Association of Counseling and 
Development. She is a licensed professional counselor in the state of 
Wyoming. She 
had been practicing as a licensed counselor for approximately three years, 
working mostly with children and adolescents with an emphasis on medical 
counseling. In addition, this witness attended a week-long workshop on sexual 
abuse - the victim and the offender, workshops on rationale and motive therapy, 
play therapy, and other workshops oriented toward children. The trial judge also 
found the professional counselor's experience was sufficient to qualify her as 
an expert, and there is no abuse of discretion with respect to that 
decision.

[¶35]   Turning then to the substance of the 
expert testimony, we have ruled, consistently with Wyo.R.Evid. 702, that expert 
testimony is admissible if it is helpful to the trier of fact. Montoya; Lessard 
v. State, 719 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 
1986). In Montoya, we held the testimony of a pediatrician that the victim had 
been molested was admissible under Wyo.R.Evid. 702, justifying that decision 
because the doctor was an expert, and her opinion did assist the trier of fact. 
Montoya. Montoya was convicted of taking immodest, immoral, or indecent 
liberties with a five-year-old victim. The victim testified, and that testimony 
was followed by corroboration by the victim's foster mother, a social worker, an 
under-sheriff, and the examining physician. This court also has said that expert 
testimony meeting the following two criteria does not invade the province of the 
jury: (1) the challenged testimony assists the jury in understanding some 
peculiar aspect of the victim's behavior and (2) the challenged testimony does 
not involve a comment on the credibility or truthfulness of the victim. Zabel v. 
State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 
1988). See also Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶36]   In light of these rulings, the 
particular testimony of the two witnesses is scrutinized. At trial, and over a 
continuing objection, the professional counselor testified:

Q. 
Would you be more specific, please. What is your opinion as to whether or not 
[the victim] was sexually abused when you saw her in May of 1990?

* * * 
* * *

A. It 
is my opinion that [the victim] was sexually abused.

The 
pediatrician offered this testimony:

Q. 
And do you have an opinion whether [the victim] had been sexually abused at the 
time that you examined her based upon your interview and - physical 
exam?

A. It 
was my opinion that there was sexual molestation based mostly on things she had 
said. It's very unusual for a child to invent things that don't make any sense 
to children.

The 
pediatrician's testimony was admitted without any objection from the defense. 

[¶37]   Neither the professional counselor nor 
the pediatrician, in trial testimony, directly expressed an opinion as to the 
truthfulness of the victim. Neither stated an opinion as to Betzle's guilt like 
the opinions expressed in Stephens. Their opinions were respective conclusions 
that there had been sexual abuse and sexual molestation, respectively. We 
recognize that in many, if not most, instances the testimony of an expert will 
bolster the truthfulness of another witness. This incidental effect, however, 
does not serve, by itself, to render the expert testimony inadmissible. Montoya. 
In this instance, we hold that since both the professional counselor and the 
pediatrician were qualified as experts, and their opinion was of assistance to 
the trier of fact, the testimony was properly admitted pursuant to Wyo.R.Evid. 
702.

[¶38]   In his fourth issue, Betzle contends the 
sentence imposed upon him by the trial court was an abuse of that trial court's 
discretion. Our established rule is that, on appeal, we do not set aside a 
sentence if it is within the legislatively mandated minimum and maximum terms in 
the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244 
(Wyo. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S. Ct. 270, 93 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1986). 
Betzle's contention is that the sentencing court, in effect, invoked a form of 
an habitual criminal act in order to illegally enhance the sentence imposed upon 
him, without giving notice and in the absence of conclusive evidence as to a 
past conviction. Betzle's specific complaint is that the lack of notice 
prevented him from preparing a defense with respect to the prior conviction, 
from collaterally attacking the prior conviction, and from deciding whether to 
remain silent as to any prior conviction. The trial court convicted Betzle of 
two counts of sexual assault in the second degree; two counts of sexual assault 
in the third degree; and one count of taking immoral, immodest, or indecent 
liberties with a child. When Betzle was arraigned, the court explained the 
charges against him, the possible penalties, and his constitutional rights. At 
the sentencing hearing after trial, the court did discuss the prior conviction 
of Betzle in Wisconsin and 
the similarities between that case and this case.

[¶39]   Betzle's complaint is that the trial 
court elevated the penalty under the extended terms of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-306(c) 
because the criteria of § 6-2-306(b) were met. However, in imposing a sentence 
of not less than thirty years nor more than life on the two convictions of 
sexual assault in the second degree, the court enforced the sentence that was 
explained to Betzle at his arraignment. The trial court properly relied on § 
6-2-306(b)(i) and -306(c)(i). The sentence that was imposed is within the 
legislatively mandated minimum and maximum terms for the crimes of which Betzle 
was found guilty, without any reference to any prior conviction. We hold the 
sentences imposed did not reach the level of an abuse of discretion in this 
instance.

[¶40]   In a final claim of error, Betzle urges 
he did not receive effective assistance of counsel and, therefore, his 
conviction was not constitutionally obtained. As articulated in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984), and followed in Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 
1986), two elements must be established by the appellant to prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Barron v. State, 819 P.2d 412 
(Wyo. 
1991); Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 
1991). The first is that the appellant must show his counsel's performance was 
deficient, and the second is that the appellant must show the deficient 
performance prejudiced him in presenting his defense. Strickland; Dickeson v. 
State, 843 P.2d 606 (Wyo. 
1992); Keene v. 
State, 835 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶41]   Betzle argues the representation by 
trial counsel was inadequate in preparation and investigation. Specifically, 
Betzle contends trial counsel failed to: interview the professional counselor 
prior to trial; make an effective cross-examination of the professional 
counselor; contest the voluntariness of Betzle's confession prior to trial; call 
or subpoena certain witnesses; file a motion in limine as to the hearsay 
statements; receive a determination on the record as to the competency and 
unavailability of the victim as a witness; and collaterally attack the prior 
conviction.

[¶42]   The fact is, of course, that the 
professional counselor had no obligation to talk with counsel for Betzle prior 
to the trial even though he made a reasonable effort to interview her. We must 
concede that cross-examination is very important in any trial, but the 
particular questions asked by counsel are a part of trial tactics and strategy 
and, even though, in hindsight, we can conceive of a better cross-examination, 
the record does not demonstrate the cross-examination of a professional 
counselor was so deficient as to prejudice Betzle. Arguably, the voluntariness 
of the confession should have been contested prior to trial; other witnesses 
should, or perhaps should not, have been subpoenaed; it may have been prudent to 
file a motion in limine as to the hearsay statements; but, even if 
representation in these particular areas should be determined to be deficient in 
some respects, the second prong of the Strickland test was not satisfied. Betzle 
has failed to carry his burden of proving the alleged deficient performance by 
counsel prejudiced his defense. As the State argued in its brief, Betzle's trial 
counsel preserved an excellent record for appeal with respect to the Konopisos 
case, hearsay, and the confrontation clause. After having weighed Betzle's 
contentions against the test articulated in Strickland, we conclude the record 
does not justify any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and there 
is no showing of substance that would call for a remand for an evidentiary 
hearing.

[¶43]   The judgment and the sentence are 
affirmed in every respect.

 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice, Retired, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[¶44]   This appeal presents the question of 
whether the Wyoming Supreme Court will assume its constitutional responsibility 
to rationally consider the proportionality and severity of a multi-layered 
sentence. In this case, that consideration is derived from successive sentences 
which are undoubtedly the most severe, for this character of transactional 
occurrence, that has ever been entered by a court of this state. This appeal 
demonstrates that trial to a court, rather than before a jury, is not 
necessarily providential when severity of sentence issues develop.

[¶45]   Sexual abuse of a child for whom 
appellant was babysitting during the period of April 14, 1990 to April 29, 1990 
resulted in a combined sentence, to be served consecutively, of thirty years to 
life; seven years to ten years; four years to five years; and four years to five 
years. The total sentence creates a minimum confinement of forty-five years to a 
maximum confinement of life plus twenty years.

[¶46]   By all criteria, this was intended to be 
a life sentence, consecutively created. It is not disputed that the offenses 
charged were serious and a severe sentence was justified, but the result went 
beyond any rational degree of equivalent uniformity when considering 
Wyoming 
sentencing severity. See, e.g., Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1992) 
(holding merger of a sexual assault offense and an offense of taking immodest, 
immoral or indecent liberties may occur when facts established at trial prove 
that defendant committed only a single criminal act). Proportionality in 
sentencing, making punishment fit the crime, remains a relevant subject for 
state appellate courts' independent scrutiny. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 
103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983) and People v. Bullock, 440 
Mich. 15, 
485 N.W.2d 866 (1992) with Harmelin v. Michigan, ___ 
U.S. ___, 
111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991). See Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 
(Wyo. 
1993), Urbigkit, J., dissenting.

[¶47]   I am also uncomfortable with the level 
of hearsay and ex parte opinion testimony utilized for conviction. It was simply 
cumulative when considered in light of the totality of the properly admitted 
evidence which was strongly inculpatory. The fact that strong evidence of guilt 
existed is not, in my opinion, an excuse to add questionable evidence to augment 
the pile. See W.R.E. 403 (stating rule that although relevant, cumulative 
evidence may be excluded). 

[¶48]   Evidence of guilt was great and the 
decision to convict justified without the barrage of secondhand testimony 
paraded before the trial court as primary evidence of guilt. Some day, courts, 
even the courts of this state, are going to have to step back and re-establish 
the tradition of conviction determined by validated and real evidence instead of 
hearsay repeated and disguised with forensic opinions of trial-directed 
experts.

[¶49]   I concur in affirming the conviction. 
The trial proceedings and quantity of evidence sufficiently demonstrated guilt; 
however, I dissent to the severity of sentence which is beyond fairness and 
uniformity, even when considering the seriousness of the criminal acts committed 
by appellant on the defenseless victim. If trial witness perjury, including 
specifically those witnesses who by occupation have been previously sworn to 
support, obey and defend the constitution, not deny it, as public officials, was 
accommodated with the same life sentence severity, where the very integrity of 
the adjudicative system is at stake, the relative severity in this case would 
make somewhat more sense. Under the dual criteria of due process and equal 
protection, authenticated by the Wyoming Constitution in its first article, we 
should expect this court to recognize a responsibility to the entire system and 
require severity in punishment for such things as perjury, a crime which 
decimates the intrinsic structure of the justice delivery system while, at the 
same time, providing a rationality of reasonable equality for the many cases of 
recognized guilt but non-uniform sentencing application.

[¶50]   Consequently, I would affirm the 
conviction and submit the case for re-sentencing on some proportionality basis 
equivalent to a general standard. It is recognized that the trial court has a 
continuing opportunity to accord further consideration, but this court has an 
initial responsibility in application of its oath of office under the Wyoming 
Constitution to the appeal presently presented.

 Footnotes

1 
Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-303(a)(v) (1988) provides:

(a) 
Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in 
the second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the 
first degree:

* * * 
* * *

(v) 
At the time of the commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) 
years of age and the actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim * * 
*.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-306(a)(ii), (b), and (c)(i) (1988) provides:

(a) 
An actor convicted of sexual assault who does not qualify under the criteria of 
subsection (b) of this section shall be punished as follows:

* * * 
* * *

(ii) 
Sexual assault in the second degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than twenty (20) years * * *.

* * * 
* * *

(b) 
An actor who is convicted of sexual assault shall be punished by the extended 
terms of subsection (c) of this section if:

(i) 
He is being sentenced for two (2) or more separate acts of sexual assault in the 
first or second degree;

(ii) 
He previously has been convicted of any crime containing the same or similar 
elements as the crimes defined in W.S. 6-2-302 or 6-2-303.

(c) 
An actor convicted of sexual assault who qualifies under the criteria of 
subsection (b) of this section shall be punished as follows:

(i) 
Sexual assault in the first or second degree is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not less than five (5) years or for life * * *.

Sexual intrusion is defined in Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-301(a)(vii) 
(1988), as follows:

(vii) 
"Sexual intrusion" means:

(A) 
Any intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part of a person's body, 
except the mouth, tongue or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another 
person's body if that sexual intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for 
the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse; or

(B) 
Sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or anal intercourse with or 
without emission.

2 
Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (1988) provides:

(a) 
Except under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 14-3-105, an actor 
commits sexual assault in the third degree if:

* * * 
* * *

(ii) 
The actor is an adult and subjects a victim under the age of twelve (12) years 
to sexual contact without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without 
causing serious bodily injury to the victim.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-306(a)(iii), (b), (c)(ii) (1988) provides:

(a) 
An actor convicted of sexual assault who does not qualify under the criteria of 
subsection (b) of this section shall be punished as follows:

* * * 
* * *

(iii) 
Sexual assault in the third degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than five (5) years * * *.

(b) 
An actor who is convicted of sexual assault shall be punished by the extended 
terms of subsection (c) of this section if:

(i) 
He is being sentenced for two (2) or more separate acts of sexual assault in the 
first or second degree;

(ii) 
He previously has been convicted of any crime containing the same or similar 
elements as the crimes defined in W.S. 6-2-302 or 6-2-303.

(c) 
An actor convicted of sexual assault who qualifies under the criteria of 
subsection (b) of this section shall be punished as follows:

(ii) 
Sexual assault in the third degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than ten (10) years * * *.

 3 
Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-3-105 (1986) provides:

Any 
person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child 
or knowingly causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another 
child to commit with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, and 
upon conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor 
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not 
more than ten (10) years, or both.

4 An 
in-depth analysis of the "firmly rooted" concept, together with reasons why it 
is neither helpful nor workable, can be found in Stanley A. Goldman, Not So 
"Firmly Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L.REV. 1 
(1987).