Case Title: People v. Kinney

Citation: 2012 IL 113197

Docket Number: 113197

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 IL 113197
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 113197)
THE PEOPLE ex rel. JAMES W. GLASGOW, Petitioner, v.
GERALD R. KINNEY, Judge, Respondent.
Opinion filed May 24, 2012.
CHIEF JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1
Petitioner, James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney of Will County,
seeks mandamus against respondent, the Honorable Gerald R.
Kinney, judge of the circuit court of Will County. See Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, § 4(a). The petitioner requests mandamus compelling
respondent to: (1) vacate his order granting the motion of defendant,
Michael W. Drew, to strike his Bureau County driving while under
the influence (DUI) conviction; (2) vacate his sentencing order; (3)
deny defendant’s motion to “strike”; and (4) sentence defendant in
accordance with section 11-501(d)(2)(C) of the Illinois Vehicle Code
(625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(C) (West 2008)), and section 5-4.5-35 of
the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35 (West 2008)).
For the following reasons, we award mandamus. 
¶ 2
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3
In August 2009, defendant, Michael W. Drew, was charged by
indictment with aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(C) (West
2008)), a nonprobationable Class 2 felony. The indictment alleged
that on August 7, 2009, defendant committed DUI and that he had
three prior DUI violations: (1) a 1985 Will County DUI; (2) a 1990
Cook County DUI; and (3) a 2000 Bureau County DUI. Defendant
pleaded guilty to aggravated DUI as charged in the indictment.
¶ 4
At the plea hearing, defendant was permitted to file a motion in
limine seeking to “strike” his 2000 Bureau County conviction. Citing
People v. Finley, 209 Ill. App. 3d 968 (1991), defendant argued that
his 2000 Bureau County DUI guilty plea was made without legal
counsel and, therefore, could not be used to enhance his sentence to
a nonprobationable Class 2 felony. In Finley, the court held that a
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used to
enhance a current offense. Finley, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 973. In
response, the State argued that Finley was no longer valid because it
was based on Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), and Baldasar
was overruled in Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
¶ 5
Respondent concluded that he was bound to follow Finley,
granted defendant’s motion in limine, and sentenced him to 48
months of probation. Respondent denied the State’s subsequent
motion to vacate the sentencing order. The State filed a motion with
this court for leave to file a complaint seeking mandamus. Ill. S. Ct.
R. 381(a) (eff. Dec. 29, 2009). We allowed the State’s motion for
leave to file the complaint.
¶ 6
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 7
Before this court, the State contends that respondent erred, as a
matter of law, in barring the use of defendant’s Bureau County
misdemeanor DUI conviction, and it seeks mandamus relief from this
court. Article VI, section 4(a), of the Illinois Constitution confers
discretionary original jurisdiction upon this court to hear mandamus
cases. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(a). “Mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy used to compel a public official to perform a purely
ministerial duty where no exercise of discretion is involved.” People
ex rel. Alvarez v. Skryd, 241 Ill. 2d 34, 38 (2011). This court will
award mandamus only when “the petitioner establishes a clear right
to the relief requested, a clear duty of the public official to act, and
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clear authority in the public official to comply.” Alvarez, 241 Ill. 2d
at 39.
¶ 8
Section 11-501(d)(2)(C) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS
5/11-501(d)(2)(C) (West 2008)) prohibits a court from imposing a
probationary sentence for an offender who has three prior DUI
violations. Section 11-501(d)(2)(C) provides, in relevant part:
“A fourth violation of this Section or a similar provision is a
Class 2 felony, for which a sentence of probation or
conditional discharge may not be imposed.” 625 ILCS 5/11-
501(d)(2)(C) (West 2008).
¶ 9
In this case, respondent believed that, under Finley, defendant’s
uncounseled Bureau County misdemeanor DUI conviction could not
be used to enhance his current offense to a nonprobationable Class 2
felony. In Finley, the appellate court held that the use of a defendant’s
prior uncounseled DUI conviction to enhance his current DUI offense
is prohibited by Baldasar. Although Baldasar was overruled in
Nichols, the respondent concluded he was bound to follow Finley.
The respondent believed he was bound to follow Finley because
Finley was never expressly overruled.
¶ 10
Our decision is instructed by the law surrounding this issue. In
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the United States Supreme
Court held that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor has no
constitutional right to counsel when no sentence of imprisonment is
imposed. A year after the Scott decision, a majority of the Court held
in Baldasar that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, while
constitutional under Scott, could not be collaterally used to convert a
subsequent misdemeanor conviction into a felony under the
applicable Illinois sentencing enhancement statute. Baldasar, 446
U.S. at 224, 227-28. Baldasar was a per curiam opinion that provided
no single rationale for its result, instead referring to three different
concurring opinions to support its judgment. Subsequently, in
Nichols, the Supreme Court continued its adherence to Scott, but
overruled Baldasar and, instead, adopted the Baldasar dissent,
holding that an uncounseled conviction that is valid under Scott may
be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense.
Nichols, 511 U.S. at 746-48. The Nichols court reasoned:
“Enhancement statutes, whether in the nature of criminal
history provisions *** or recidivist statutes that are
commonplace in state criminal laws, do not change the
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penalty imposed for the earlier conviction.” Nichols, 511 U.S.
at 747.
¶ 11
Defendant contends that Nichols is inapplicable here because it
only addressed enhanced sentences and did not address whether a
prior uncounseled conviction could be used to support a sentence of
mandatory imprisonment. We disagree.
¶ 12
Nichols drew no distinction between enhancements that lengthen
a term of imprisonment and enhancements that result in a mandatory
term of imprisonment. To the contrary, Nichols held that “an
uncounseled conviction valid under Scott may be relied upon to
enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, even though that
sentence entails imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.) Nichols, 511 U.S.
at 746-47. Nichols recognized that enhancement statutes, or
“recidivist statutes that are commonplace in state criminal laws, do
not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction.” Nichols,
511 U.S. at 747. In fact, the Supreme Court “consistently has
sustained repeat-offender laws as penalizing only the last offense
committed by the defendant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Nichols, 511 U.S. at 747.
¶ 13
Nichols plainly held that “an uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term was imposed, is
also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent
conviction.” Nichols, 511 U.S. at 749. Section 11-501(d)(2)(C) is
precisely the type of recidivist statute contemplated by the Nichols
decision, providing enhanced sentences for repeat offenders. We
therefore reject defendant’s argument that Nichols did not address
whether a prior uncounseled conviction could be used to support a
sentence of mandatory imprisonment.
¶ 14
In accordance with Nichols, we conclude that a valid uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction is also valid when used to enhance
punishment in a subsequent conviction. Finley’s holding was based
entirely on Baldasar, and Baldasar was expressly overruled by
Nichols. Thus, we overrule Finley.
¶ 15
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 16
For the foregoing reasons, we award mandamus and order
respondent to: (1) vacate his order granting the motion of defendant,
Michael W. Drew, to “strike” his Bureau County DUI conviction; (2)
vacate his sentencing order; (3) deny defendant’s motion to strike;
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and (4) sentence defendant in accordance with section 11-
501(d)(2)(C) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-
501(d)(2)(C) (West 2008)) and section 5-4.5-35 of the Unified Code
of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35 (West 2008)).
¶ 17
Judgment of mandamus awarded.
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