Case Title: RICHARD JOHN WINSTED v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0011

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD JOHN WINSTED v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 139241 P.3d 497Case Number: No. S-10-0011Decided: 10/26/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
RICHARD JOHN 
WINSTED,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:

H. Michael Bennett, 
H. Michael Bennett, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Senior Assistant Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Craig C. Cook, Student 
Intern; Anna C. Swain, Student Intern.

 
 
 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
*Chief Justice at 
time of expedited conference.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, Richard 
John Winsted, pleaded no contest to one count of knowingly possessing a deadly 
weapon with intent to unlawfully threaten the life or physical well-being of 
another, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103 (LexisNexis 2007).  Prior to sentencing, he filed a motion 
to withdraw his no contest plea.  
The district court denied the motion and he challenges that decision in 
this appeal.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]      
Mr. Winsted presents 
one issue:  Whether the district 
court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion to withdraw no contest 
plea prior to 
sentencing.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On November 12, 2008, 
at 12:20 a.m., officers from the Casper Police Department responded to a report 
of possible gunfire at an apartment complex.  An initial investigation revealed no 
signs of shots fired and the officers left the scene.  At 7:15 a.m., the management of the 
apartment complex contacted the police with information that they had located a 
bullet hole and spent bullet.  The 
officers attempted to contact the resident of the apartment from which the 
bullet had been fired, but were unsuccessful.  The officers then entered the apartment, 
using a key provided by management, to determine whether anyone in the residence 
had been injured.  Once inside, 
officers observed Mr. Winsted crouched behind a bed.  He held a shotgun which was positioned 
on top of the bed and pointed directly at the officers.  

 
 

[¶4]        
The officers 
retreated and called for backup.  
Eventually, the officers convinced Mr. Winsted to surrender.  He admitted to the officers that a shot 
was fired in his apartment but claimed that it occurred accidentally while he 
was cleaning a pistol.  He was 
charged with two felony counts, one stemming from the pistol shot in the 
apartment, and the other from the threat to the officers from the shotgun.1  Mr. Winsted entered a plea of not guilty 
to both charges.

 
 

[¶5]        
Mr. Winsted 
subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the State.  As part of the agreement, Mr. Winsted 
agreed to plead no contest to Count II.  
In return the State agreed to dismiss Count I and a DWUI charge pending 
in circuit court.  He entered the 
plea on June 30, 2009 and was released from jail pending sentencing.  On August 6, 2009, prior to sentencing, 
Mr. Winsted filed a motion seeking to withdraw his plea pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
32(d).  After a hearing, the 
district court issued an order denying the motion.  At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the 
district court placed Mr. Winsted on probation in accordance with the plea 
agreement.  He timely filed this 
appeal.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶6]        
We review a district 
court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of 
discretion.   Frame v. State, 2001 WY 72, ¶¶ 7, 9, 29 P.3d 86, 89, 90 (Wyo. 2001).  In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we focus on the 
"reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).  If the trial court could 
reasonably conclude as it did and the ruling is one based on sound judgment with 
regard to what is right under the circumstances, it will not be disturbed absent 
a showing that some facet of the ruling is arbitrary or capricious.  Rolle v. State, 2010 WY 100, ¶ 9, 236 P.3d 259, 264 (Wyo. 2010).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶7]        
Mr. Winsted sought to 
withdraw his plea prior to sentencing.  
In such circumstances, "the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon 
a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason." W.R.Cr.P. 32(d).  A 
defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is 
imposed.  McCard v. 
State, 2003 WY 142, ¶ 6, 
78 P.3d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 2003).  "[W]here 
the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 
11 have been met, and the defendant intelligently, 
knowingly, and voluntarily entered into his plea of guilty, the district court's 
decision to deny such a motion is within its sound discretion."   Frame, ¶ 7, 29 P.3d  at 89. 

 
 

Seven 
factors have been suggested as pertinent to the exercise of the court's 
discretion: (1) Whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether 
the government would suffer prejudice; (3) whether the defendant has delayed in 
filing his motion; (4) whether withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the 
court; (5) whether close assistance of counsel was present; (6) whether the 
original plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would 
waste judicial resources.  3 
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 
(Supp.2001); United 
States v. Black, 
201 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 2000).

 
 

Id.  The defendant has the burden of 
establishing a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a plea before sentence is 
imposed.  Major v. State, 2004 WY 4, ¶ 14, 83 P.3d 468, 473 (Wyo. 2004).  For the 
purposes of an appeal, a plea of no contest is functionally equivalent to a 
guilty plea.  Id., ¶ 
11, 83 P.3d  at 472.  

 
 

[¶8]        
In his motion to 
withdraw, Mr. Winsted asserted that, after his release, he was able "to procure 
funds to hire private counsel and would now like to exercise his right to a 
trial by jury."  He based his motion 
on his contention that "allowing him to proceed to trial with the counsel of his 
choice after making arrangements to hire private counsel is a fair and just 
reason contemplated under the rule."

 
 

[¶9]        
The State resisted 
the motion contending that the "fact [that] Defendant has been able to obtain a 
Monday morning quarterback as a lawyer does not meet the standard as espoused 
under Rule 32."  The State urged the 
court to apply the seven factors identified in Frame, and contended that proper 
application of those factors mandated denial of the motion.  The State pointed out that as a result 
of the plea agreement, it had dismissed Count I in the instant case and had also 
dismissed the DWUI charges against Mr. Winsted in Natrona County Circuit Court 
Docket No. CR-2008-3252. 

 

[¶10]     
A hearing on the 
motion was held on September 8, 2009.  
Mr. Winsted was represented by his appointed counsel.  Mr. Winsted's "private counsel" was also 
present and, although he never entered a formal appearance, was allowed to 
comment at the hearing.  No evidence 
was presented.  The arguments of 
counsel focused primarily on the application of the seven factors identified in 
Frame.  

 
 

[¶11]     
The district court 
issued an Order Denying Motion to Withdraw No Contest Plea on September 17, 
2009.  In its order, the court 
addressed each of the Frame 
factors.  The court stated: 

 
 
8. With respect to 
the first of the factors set forth in Frame v. State  whether the Defendant 
has asserted his innocence, the facts presented in this case include that the 
Defendant initially pled not guilty to the two charges brought against him in 
this case, but that he freely and voluntarily entered a nolo contendere plea to 
the charge in Count Two of the Amended Information (possession of a deadly 
weapon with unlawful intent), and that he did not contest that the State of 
Wyoming would be able to produce evidence to support that 
charge.

 
 
9. With respect to 
the second of the factors set forth in Frame v. State  whether the government 
would suffer prejudice, the circumstances presented in this case indicate that 
there would be substantial prejudice to the State of Wyoming because of (a) the 
dismissal of the charge in Count One of the Amended Information (aggravated 
assault and battery), (b) the dismissal of the charges against Defendant in 
Seventh Judicial Circuit Court, CR 2008-3252 [the DWUI charge], and (c) the need 
of the prosecution to again pursue trial preparation after a delay in the 
proceedings.

 
 
10. With respect to 
the third of the factors set forth in Frame v. State  whether the Defendant 
has delayed in filing his motion, there was a delay from June 30, 2009 to August 
6, 2009 in bringing the motion to withdraw the nolo contendere 
plea.

 
 
11. With respect to 
the fourth of the factors set forth in Frame v. State  whether withdrawal 
would substantially inconvenience the court, the situation presented in this 
case would result in an inconvenience in scheduling a hearing to address the 
status of the initial charges against the Defendant and rescheduling the case 
for trial, but it cannot be concluded that such would result in a substantial 
inconvenience.

 
 
12. With respect to 
the fifth of the factors set forth in Frame v. State  whether close 
assistance of counsel was present, the facts presented in this case indicate 
that the Defendant was diligently represented by counsel during all stages of 
the proceeding, including the negotiation of a plea agreement and the change of 
plea proceeding hereunder review, and there is nothing to suggest that appointed 
counsel's assistance was inadequate or unavailable.  (Footnote 
omitted.)

 
 
13. With respect to 
the sixth of the factors set forth in Frame v. State  whether the original 
plea was knowing and voluntary, the undisputed facts are that the Defendant was 
fully advised of the charges against him, that the Defendant was fully advised 
of his rights under Rule 11 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that 
his plea of nolo contendere to the charge in Count Two of the Amended 
Information was knowingly and voluntarily made, without any improper inducement 
or condition, free of coercion, and with an understanding of the charge and its 
consequences.

 
 
14. With respect to 
the seventh of the factors set forth in Frame v. State  whether the withdrawal 
would waste judicial resources, the situation is one in which the withdrawal of 
the plea would squander judicial resources and the time and efforts of the 
prosecutor and defense attorney. 

 
 

[¶12]     
In 
this appeal, Mr. Winsted attempts to satisfy the abuse of discretion standard by 
raising several issues that were not presented to the district court.  He also fails to provide factual support 
for his position.  By way of 
illustration, we first address Mr. Winsted's contention on appeal that he should 
be allowed to withdraw his plea because he did not understand that he would not 
be able to own firearms if convicted of the felony charge.  There are two fundamental flaws with this 
argument.  First, Mr. Winsted never 
raised this issue in his motion to withdraw or in his argument to the district 
court on his motion.  Second, Mr. 
Winsted was clearly and unequivocally advised of the risk at the change of plea 
hearing.  He told the court that he 
understood that risk:

 
 
THE COURT: Also, [the 
offense] would be a felony-level offense, so it would result in a loss of civil 
rights including the rights to vote; to serve on a jury; to own and possess firearms; and to hold 
public office.  

 
 
Do you understand the 
other possible consequences of a conviction of the charge that I 
read?

 
 
[Mr. Winsted]: Yes, I 
do, Your Honor. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  

 
 

[¶13]     
On appeal, Mr. 
Winsted also suggests that he was pressured into entering the plea because of 
his lengthy confinement and that he may have received inadequate assistance of 
counsel.  These issues also were not 
raised in his motion to withdraw his plea.  
At the change of plea hearing, Mr. Winsted clearly and unequivocally 
advised the district court that his plea was voluntary and that he was satisfied 
with the performance of his counsel:

 
 
THE COURT: You're 
making your plea voluntarily then?

 
 
[Mr. Winsted]: 
Yes.

 
 
THE COURT: Are you 
making your plea after consultation with your attorney, [Defense Counsel]; and 
are you satisfied with his representation? 

 
 
[Mr. Winsted]: Yes, 
sir.

 
 
THE COURT: [Defense 
Counsel], have you had an opportunity to fully consult with Mr. Winsted 
concerning his proposed plea here today and any proposed plea agreement in the 
case?

 
 
[Defense Counsel]: 
Yes, I have, sir.  Thank 
you.

 
 

[¶14]     
Mr. Winsted does not 
identify any factual or legal error made by the district court in applying the 
Frame factors.  He merely contends that the court abused 
its discretion in applying the factors.  
He asserts that a no contest plea is not the same as a guilty plea.  He maintains that any imposition on 
judicial resources is outweighed by the right of a jury trial and that any 
inconvenience to the State is minimal. The district court considered these 
arguments and, after weighing all of the factors, concluded that the motion 
should be denied.  We can find no 
abuse of discretion in that decision.

 
 

[¶15]     
Mr. Winsted concedes 
that the district court complied with the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11.  He was adequately advised of his rights 
and the consequences of his plea.  
He told the district court that he understood his rights, that he was 
satisfied with his counsel, and that he was voluntarily entering his plea.  He did not contend otherwise at the 
hearing or in his motion to withdraw his plea.  Mr. Winsted sought to withdraw his plea 
on the basis that he had hired "private counsel."  Essentially, he changed his mind and 
wanted to go to trial.  The district 
court found that was not a "fair and just" reason and denied the 
motion.

 
 

[¶16]     
A 
fair and just reason includes inadequate plea colloquies, newly discovered 
evidence, intervening circumstances, or other reasons that did not exist when 
the defendant entered the plea.  See United States v. Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2004).  The 
reason must be something more than the wish to have a trial, or belated 
misgivings about the plea.  See State v. Jenkins, 736 N.W.2d 24, 34 (Wis. 
2007).  If 
an appropriately conducted Rule 
11 proceeding 
is to serve a meaningful function, on which the criminal justice system can 
rely, it must be recognized to raise a strong presumption that the plea is final 
and binding.  United States v. Battle, 499 F.3d 315, 
321 (4th Cir. 2007).  
Withdrawal of the plea 
would needlessly waste judicial resources and the time and efforts of the 
parties involved.  It is also 
undisputed that the State would suffer some degree of prejudice.  The State, relying on the plea agreement 
and entry of the plea, dismissed Count I and the pending DWUI charge in circuit 
court.  In order to pursue those 
charges, the State would be required to initiate new criminal proceedings.  Trial on all charges would be 
delayed.  Witness' loss of memory 
during this time period, or their unavailability, could unfairly prejudice the 
State.

 
 

[¶17]     
Mr. 
Winsted had the burden of establishing a fair and just reason for withdrawal of 
his plea. 
 The district court 
thoroughly considered each of the 
Frame factors and determined that Mr. Winsted had failed to meet that 
burden.  The district court's 
decision was reasonable given the facts and circumstances presented at the 
hearing on the motion to withdraw.  

 
 

[¶18]     
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Count 
I was charged under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii):

 
 

(a)   A 
person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he:

 
 


 
 
(iii) 
Threatens to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably necessary in 
defense of his person, property or abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to 
another[.]  

 
 
Count 
II was charged under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103:

 
 
A 
person who knowingly possesses, manufactures, transports, repairs or sells a 
deadly weapon with intent to unlawfully threaten the life or physical well-being 
of another or to commit assault or inflict bodily injury on another is guilty of 
a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both.