Case Title: In the Matter of Merrill "Scooter" Moores

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S00-0503-DI-119

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEYS FOR THE RESPONDENT ATTORNEY FORTHEINDIANA SUPREME COURT

Kevin. Moot? DisciPLNARY CoMnussion
Kelly Eskew Donald R. Lundberg, Executive Seretary
Indianapolis Indiana Dennis KX McKinney, Staff Atomey

Indianapolis Indiana

 

In the
Sndiana Supreme Court

 

No. 49800-0503-DI-119

INTHE MATTER OF

‘MERRILL “SCOOTER” MOORES' Respondent.
Disciplinary Action
September 29, 2006

Per Curiam,

‘This matter is before us on the report ofthe hearing officer appointed by this Court to hear
evidence on the Disciplinary Commission's Verified Complaint for Disciplinary Action, and the
post-hearing pleadings of the parties. We find thatthe respondent engaged in attoriey miscon-
duct by representing clients with conflicting interests, failing to explain matters to the extent rea-
sonably necessary to permit clients to make informed decisions about the representation, entering
into an unreasonable business transaction with them, and failing to expedite the litigation. For

" We include respondents nickname at his request to distinguish respondent rom his father wh i allo an attorney
and shares the seme name
this misconduct, we find that respondent should be suspended ffom the practice of law for thirty
(G0) days, with automatic reinstatement thereafter.

‘Where as here, the hearing officers report is challenged, we review the record presented de
novo. Matter of Wilder, 764 N.E.24 617 (Ind.2002). Final determination esto misconduct and
sanction rests with this Court. Matter of Lamb, 686 N.E.2d 113 (Ind.1997); Matter of Gerde, 634
N.E.24 494 (Ind.1994). We find the relevant facts as follows: In March 2002, JR, who owned
several parcels of land in Greenwood, Indiana, obtained a loan which was intended tobe secured
by a mortgage on a half-acre parcel. The mortgage however listed a two-acre parcel, also owned
by ER,, as securing the loan, J.R later sold an intrest in the two-acre parcel to M.D. JR. fell
behind in his mortgage payments onthe hal
foreclose on the two-acre parcel thet had been mistakenly listed in the mortgage. As a result,
M.D’s interest in the two-acre parcel was put at risk, Subsequently, LR, and M.D. hited re-
spondent to represent them in te foreclosure on the two-acre parcel. Respontient requested a
$4,000 retainer thatthe clients could not pay in fll. To protect himself from his clients, respon-
dent had the clients sign an eight-year exclusive listing agreement with respondent (who also
held areal estate broker's license) on terms unfavorable tothe clients. This agreement covered
the two-acre parcel and an adjoining piece of property also owned by 1.R. Respondent urged the
clients to raise the funds to bring the mortgage current while he delayed the foreclosure proceed
ing,

‘The mortgage company moved for summary judgment and respondent requested an exten-
sion of time to respond. Respondent di not file ¢ response and did not appear atthe summary
judgment hearing. He purposely failed to appear because he was concemed he would have to re-
veal that the foreclosure action was brought against the wrong property. Respondent planned to
allow the court to grant the summary judgment motion and then move to set aside the judgment
pparsuant to Ind‘Trial Rule 60(B). This tactic was intended to delay the foreclosure to allow the
clients to raise funds to bring the mortgage current on the half-ecre perce, and thereby protect
LR. "s residence, which was situeted on th half-acre parcel. Respondent didnot inform his ci-
cents of the filing ofthe summary judgment motion until after it was granted. Upon learning that
summary judgment had been entered against them, both clients obtained new counsel, M.D."s
counsel had the action agains his client dismissed and the foreclosure directed at the halfacre
parce!

 

cre parcel and the mortgage company sued to

 
 

 

‘We agree with the conclusions of the hearing officer and find that respondent commited the
misconduct charged by the Commission. LR. and M.D. had competing interests that prohibited

respondent from representing them simultaneously. .R. was interested in protecting his resi-
dence on the one-half acre plot that should have been, but was not, subject to foreclosure. M.D.’s
interest inthe two-sere plot was needlessly put atrsk in an attempt by respondent to protect
JR's home. By representing both clients in this situation respondent violated Ind. Professional
Conduct Rule 1.7(6) (2002), which prohibits lawyer from continuing to represent a client when
the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client.

Respondent also entered into an unreasonable business transaction with his clients. The
cight-year listing agreement, which the respondent himself described as extraordinarily ong, was
{intended to protect respondent from his clients. Without the clients having the benefit of inde-
pendent counsel, respondent convinced them to sign the listing agreement to protect respondent's
potential commission upon on sale ofthe property. To further guard himself from his clients, re-
spondent also included language giving him frst right of refusal on the sale of the property. Re-
spondent agreed thatthe sole reason for the option was to protect his potential commission from
‘a below market sham sale, Respondent's own testimony established that use of first right of re-
fusal language was unusual for such an agreement. By entering into « business transaction with
his client on terms that were not reasonable and fir, and without giving the cients a reasonable
‘opportunity to seek independent counsel, respondent violated Prof.Cond.R.1.8(a) (2002)

‘A major concer in this case isthe strategy that respondent adopted to represent his clients
He chose to stall and delay, and failed to appear ata hearing on a motion for summary judgment
He did not advise his clients of his strategy or when summary judgment was entered against
them. As result, MD., who should not have been involved in the litigation at all, had to endure
the scheme respondent devised in order to protect .R.'s home, Respondent “justified” his failure
to appear atthe summary judgment hearing because he would have to explain thatthe mortgage
was being foreclosed on the wrong property. Though such a disclosure would have benefited
MD, it would have been harmful to J.R. This course of conduct violated Prof:Cond.R. 1.2(a)
(2002), which requires a lawyer to consult with his client as to the means by which the objectives
‘of the representation are pursued; Prof. Cond, 1.4(b) (2002), which requires a lawyer to explain
‘a matter tothe extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions re-
 

sarding the representation; and Prof Cond.R. 3.2 (2002), which requires a lawyer to make rea-
sonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.

tis this lst issu, the failure to expedite litigation that comprises respondents substantive
challenge to the hearing offcer’s conclusions. He maintains that this violation was not estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence. Delaying court proceedings merely to obstruct the
‘course of legal proceeding is not an acceptable means of conducting litigation. In this case, stall-
ing was not consistent with the interests of M.D. Upon hiring new counsel, M.D. was dismissed
fom the litigation of which he should never have been apart. The evidence is clear and convine~
ing that respondent violated Prof Cond. 3.2

‘This brings us tothe issue ofthe discipline to impose, which the parties contest. The Hearing,
‘Officer recommends a sixty (60) day suspension from the practice of law. The Commission,
‘which originelly suguested to the Hearing Officer that public reprimand was appropriate, now
‘ges the Court to adopt the Hearing Officers recommendation. Respondent asks the Court to
follow the Commission's earlier suggestion and impose a public reprimand.

Respondent contends the Court should consider several mitigetors in determining what sanc-
tion to impose. He cites his lack of a prior disciplinary record, and that he cooperated with the
‘Commission, had no dishonest or selfish motive, and has shown remorse, We do not find signifi

 

‘cant mitigation.

Respondent does not have a record of prior disciplinary action, and as a mitigator, this is of
some value

His cooperation with the Commission consisted of doing nothing more than what is required
by Ind, Admission and Discipline Rule 23 § 10(¢). Further, the Commission asserts that Respon-
dent's cooperation was “illusory”. Apparently, respondent's answers to the Commission's initial
‘investigation and bis later answers inthe proceedings varied substantially. Such conduct does not
‘eam respondent any consideration in mitigation of his discipline.

‘That respondent's conduct was not motivated by dishonest or selfish motive is questionable.
‘Respondent convinced his clients to enter into a business transaction that was unfur to them and

 

benefited respondent. He obtained an unusvally long exclusive listing agreement and a right of
first refusal to protect himself, not serve his clients, He is not entitled to any mitigation on
point.

 
Finally, from a review of the Hearing Officer's findings, we are convinced that respondent's
remorse is limited to his regret for having been called to account for his conduct. Respondent's
assertions thet he did nothing wrong and that his delay strategy served his clients demonstrate
that respondent does not understand the nature of his violation.

We imposed a six-month suspension for a lawyer who purposely failed to appear on seven
‘ccasions for proceedings in a client's criminal case. Matter of Shull, 741 N.E.2d 723 (Ind.
2001) Like the respondent, the lawyer in Shull believed his delaying tactic was a commendable
strategy. We disagreed with Shull and we disagree with respondent. M.D. received no advantage
from respondent's delaying tactics. In another case, we imposed a two month suspension where @
lawyer failed to disclose information toa tribunel and engaged in deceit, Matter of Ouellette, 636
N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. 1994). On the other hand, respondent's delaying tactics were less pervasive
‘than in Shull and there is no finding of direct deceit in this case.

Giving consideration to the hearing officer's recommendation for a sixty (60) day suspen-
sion, the Commission's prior suggested penalty of # public reprimand, past disciplinary cases,
and the facts of this ease, we now suspend respondent from the practice of law for thirty (30)
days, effective November 13, 2006, with reinstatement thereafter as contemplated by Ind. Ad-
‘mission and Discipline Rule 23 § 4(¢)

Costs ofthis proceeding are assessed against the respondent,