Case Title: Michael J. Hager v. Gary Marten

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1997AP003841-W

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3841-W 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Michael J. Hager,  
 
Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Gary Marten, Sheriff, Marathon County Jail,  
 
Respondent.  
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
(No Cite) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 16, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 12, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon  
 
JUDGE: 
Dorothy L. Bain 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J. (Opinion Filed) 
 
 
Bradley, J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Gerhardt F. Getzin, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the respondent the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
97-3841-W 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3841-W 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Michael J.  
Hager,  
 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary Marten, Sheriff, Marathon County  
Jail,  
 
          Respondent.  
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of an order of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.  The petitioner, Michael J. Hager, 
seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals’ order denying 
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Hager was held in 
custody from July 1997 to December 1997, awaiting an examination 
to determine whether he was competent to stand trial for 
numerous criminal charges against him.  He now seeks dismissal 
of all of the pending criminal charges and release from custody 
due to violations of the time limit for a competency examination 
under Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(c)(1997-98).1 
¶2 
This case presents two issues for review:  (1) Can a 
petitioner raise an issue of statutory interpretation on a writ 
of habeas corpus; and (2) If so, does the failure to conduct a 
                     
1 All statutory references are to the 1997-98 version of the 
statutes unless otherwise noted. 
No. 97-3841-W 
 
2 
competency examination within the time frame of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(2)(c) constitute a jurisdictional defect.  We answer 
the first question in the affirmative; a question of statutory 
interpretation may be considered on a writ of habeas corpus only 
if noncompliance with the statute at issue resulted in the 
restraint of the petitioner’s liberty in violation of the 
constitution or the court’s jurisdiction.  As to the second 
issue, we conclude that no jurisdictional defect is present 
because there was no time limit violation under the statutory 
section applicable in this case.  We further conclude that under 
the facts of this case, Hager was not denied due process based 
on the length of his pre-examination confinement.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals’ order denying the writ of habeas 
corpus. 
¶3 
The facts are not in dispute.  This action stems from 
four criminal complaints filed against Hager.  The first 
complaint, dated June 10, 1994, involved a charge of operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, second 
offense. 
 
Hager 
was 
present 
at 
the 
initial 
appearance 
on August 2, 1994, but failed to appear on October 26, 1994.  A 
bench warrant was issued on October 31, 1994.   
¶4 
The second complaint was filed in June 1996.  The 
complaint charged Hager with five counts of felony failure to 
pay child support from February 1, 1994, to June 7, 1996.  The 
next proceeding in this action was in December 1996. 
¶5 
On December 18, 1996, Hager was charged in yet another 
complaint, the third, with two counts of intentionally causing 
No. 97-3841-W 
 
3 
bodily harm to another over the age of 62 and one count of 
disorderly conduct for an incident involving his parents.  The 
initial appearance for this matter was held on the same day.  At 
the hearing, the Marathon County Circuit Court, Michael J. 
Hoover, Judge, found reason to doubt Hager’s competency to 
proceed and ordered a competency examination by the Department 
of Health and Family Services (DHFS).   
¶6 
The competency examination was completed on January 9, 
1997, and forwarded to the circuit court.  The report concluded 
that Hager was incompetent to stand trial.  However, after being 
returned from the Winnebago Mental Health Facility (Winnebago), 
where the examination was conducted, Hager was released from 
custody on a $1,000 recognizance bond.  In both April and May 
1997, Hager appeared in court claiming to be competent.  Yet, 
his counsel questioned Hager’s ability to participate in 
formulating a defense.  A second competency hearing was 
scheduled for July 10, 1997; however, Hager failed to show for 
the hearing, and the circuit court issued a bench warrant for 
his arrest.   
¶7 
On July 16, 1997, Hager was taken into custody and 
additional criminal charges (the fourth complaint) were filed 
for battery to a law enforcement officer, felony bail jumping, 
resisting an officer, and disorderly conduct.  Hager’s counsel 
informed the court that Hager had been found incompetent in the 
prior pending matters, and raised the question of competency to 
proceed with the new charges as well.  Based on the passage of 
time from the January 9th report to the new charges, the 
No. 97-3841-W 
 
4 
Marathon County Circuit Court, Vincent K. Howard, Judge, ordered 
a new competency examination to be conducted at Winnebago.  The 
court acknowledged that this examination was to be conducted 
within the statutory time limits.  The court also ordered $500 
cash bond. 
¶8 
Hager was never taken to Winnebago for the competency 
examination; unable to post bond, he remained in jail.  At a 
November 5, 1997, hearing, Hager’s counsel asked that Hager be 
released until another competency hearing could be rescheduled. 
 The circuit court authorized a $1,500 signature bond which had 
to be cosigned by a relative pending the hearing.  None of 
Hager’s relatives signed for his release, and he remained in 
jail. 
¶9 
The competency hearing was originally scheduled for 
December 12, 1997, but Hager, who was represented by new 
counsel, requested an outpatient examination to bring his report 
current.  The State stipulated to the outpatient examination and 
the competency hearing was rescheduled for December 17, 1997.  
At the hearing, Hager moved to dismiss all of the criminal 
charges for violation of the time limits imposed under Wis. 
Stat. § 971.14(2)(c).  The Marathon County Circuit Court, 
Dorothy L. Bain, Judge, denied Hager’s motion concluding that 
dismissal was unsupported in the law and that it would be an 
extreme measure in light of the previous finding that he was not 
competent.   
¶10 The court then proceeded with the competency hearing 
as scheduled.  Based on review of the two medical reports, the 
No. 97-3841-W 
 
5 
testimony from a clinical psychologist who conducted the second 
competency examination of Hager, and conversations with Hager at 
the hearing, the circuit court found that Hager was not 
competent to proceed but would likely become competent within a 
12-month period or less.  Accordingly, the court ordered 
medication and treatment be administered, regardless of consent, 
and that Hager be committed to the custody of DHFS for placement 
in an appropriate institution, with periodic examinations.  
¶11 Consequently, Hager filed petitions for leave to 
appeal the circuit court’s non-final order and for a writ of 
habeas corpus with the court of appeals.  The court of appeals 
concluded that dismissal of the criminal complaints was not an 
appropriate remedy and denied all petitions.  This court granted 
Hager’s petition for review from the court of appeals’ denial of 
the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
¶12 The first question we must address is whether habeas 
corpus 
is 
available 
to 
address 
a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding guaranteed 
by the Wisconsin and United States constitutions “to test the 
right of a person to his personal liberty.”  State ex rel. Dowe 
v. Waukesha County Circuit Court, 184 Wis. 2d 724, 728, 516 
N.W.2d 714 (1994).  The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is 
to protect and vindicate the petitioner’s right of personal 
liberty by releasing the petitioner from illegal restraint.  
State ex rel. Zdanczewicz v. Snyder, 131 Wis. 2d 147, 151, 388 
N.W.2d 612 (1986).  
No. 97-3841-W 
 
6 
¶13 The State challenges Hager’s ability to raise an issue 
of statutory construction on a writ of habeas corpus.  However, 
the court of appeals, in State ex rel. Lockman v. Gerhardstein, 
107 Wis. 2d 325, 320 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1982), addressed this 
very question.2   
¶14 The petitioner in Lockman submitted a writ of habeas 
corpus and discharge of the complaint alleging the final hearing 
on her involuntary civil commitment was not held within 14 days 
of her detention as required by Wis. Stat. § 51.20(7)(c)(1979-
80).  Lockman, 107 Wis. 2d at 326-27.  The issue before the 
court of 
appeals 
was 
whether the 
14-day 
time 
limit in 
§ 51.20(7)(c) (1979-80) refers to calendar days or business 
days—a question of statutory construction.  Lockman, 107 Wis. 2d 
at 327.  The court concluded that the statute meant 14 calendar 
days; therefore, the “trial court lost jurisdiction over Lockman 
as a consequence of its failure to hold a final commitment 
hearing within fourteen calendar days of Lockman’s detention and 
[it] should have dismissed the proceedings against her.”  Id. at 
328-29. 
                     
2 Other courts have addressed questions of statutory 
construction on a writ of habeas corpus.  See e.g., State ex 
rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 545-47, 541 
N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1995), rev’d by 209 Wis. 2d 112, 121, 561 
N.W.2d 729 (1997)(issue presented in habeas corpus petition was 
whether a viable fetus is included in the definition of “child” 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2)(1995-96)); and State ex rel. 
Jacobus v. State, 208 Wis. 2d 39, 47, 559 N.W.2d 900 
(1997)(habeas corpus petition raised question whether bail 
jumping convictions based solely upon consumption of alcohol 
violated state policy set forth in Wis. Stat. § 51.45(1)(1991-
92)).    
No. 97-3841-W 
 
7 
¶15 When considering whether or not to grant habeas corpus 
review, the habeas court determines only whether the order 
resulting in the restraint of liberty was made in violation of 
the constitution, or whether the court which issued the order 
lacked 
the 
jurisdiction 
or 
legal 
authority 
to 
do 
so.  
Zdanczewicz, 131 Wis. 2d at 151.  It follows then that statutory 
construction may only be considered on habeas corpus review in 
the 
context 
of 
these 
constitutional 
or 
jurisdictional 
violations.  See State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 
133, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968).   
¶16 To determine whether to grant Hager’s writ of habeas 
corpus for an alleged violation of the statutory time frame in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(c), this court must determine whether 
noncompliance with the statutory time frame resulted in Hager’s 
restraint of liberty in violation of the constitution, or 
whether noncompliance with the time frame resulted in a 
jurisdictional defect.  In a habeas corpus action, we apply a de 
novo standard to issues of law, State ex rel. McMillian v. 
Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 276-77, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986), 
and the burden is on the petitioner, here Hager, to demonstrate 
by a preponderance of the evidence that his detention is 
illegal, State ex rel. Alvarez v. Lotter, 91 Wis. 2d 329, 334, 
283 N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1979).   
¶17 Thus, we must address whether Hager’s five-month stay 
in the Marathon County jail without the ordered competency 
examination can be viewed as “illegal.”  Hager contends that the 
court ordered an inpatient competency examination under Wis. 
No. 97-3841-W 
 
8 
Stat. § 971.14(2)(a), which immediately triggered the time 
limits under § 971.14(2)(c).  The State, on the other hand, 
argues that the court ordered the competency examination at 
Winnebago under § 971.14(2)(am), and that the time limits under 
subs. 
(c) 
were 
never 
triggered 
because 
Hager 
was 
never 
transported to Winnebago.3 
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.14(2) provides in relevant part: 
(2) EXAMINATION. 
 
    (a) If an inpatient examination is determined by 
the court to be necessary, the defendant may be 
committed to a suitable mental health facility for the 
examination period specified in par. (c), which shall 
be deemed days spent in custody under s. 973.155.  If 
the examination is to be conducted by the department 
of health and family services, the court shall order 
the individual to the facility designated by the 
department of health and family services. 
 
    (am) Notwithstanding par. (a), if the court orders 
the defendant to be examined by the department or a 
department facility, the department shall determine 
where the examination will be conducted, who will 
conduct the examination and whether the examination 
will be conducted on an inpatient or outpatient basis. 
 Any such outpatient examination shall be conducted in 
a jail or a locked unit of a facility.  In any case 
under 
this 
paragraph 
in 
which 
the 
department 
determines that an inpatient examination is necessary, 
the 15-day period under par. (c) begins upon the 
                     
3 The State has argued in the alternative throughout this 
appeal.  The State contends the record is inadequate to review 
the issues petitioner raises in this case; the time limits under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(c) never started running; even if they 
did, the time limits are directory, not mandatory; and even if 
the time limits are mandatory, Hager is not entitled to the 
relief requested.  We agree with the State’s position that the 
time limits were never triggered in this case. 
No. 97-3841-W 
 
9 
arrival 
of 
the 
defendant 
at 
the 
inpatient 
facility. . . .  
 
(c) Inpatient examinations shall be completed and 
the report of examination filed within 15 days after 
the examination is ordered or as specified in par. 
(am), whichever is applicable, unless, for good cause, 
the facility or examiner appointed by the court cannot 
complete 
the 
examination 
within 
this 
period and 
requests an extension.  In that case, the court may 
allow one 15-day extension of the examination period. 
Outpatient examinations shall be completed and the 
report of examination filed within 30 days after the 
examination is ordered. [Emphasis added.] 
¶19 Whether Hager was ordered to be examined pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(a) or (am) depends on the nature of the 
order for a competency examination.  Clearly if the court 
ordered an inpatient examination under § 971.14(2)(a) as Hager 
claims it did, § 971.14(2)(c) would have been immediately 
triggered, and the 15-day time limit would have started to run. 
 Id.  However, the record reveals that the circuit court only 
ordered 
that 
the 
competency 
examination 
be 
conducted 
at 
Winnebago.  Contrary to Hager’s claim, the court did not specify 
whether Hager was to be examined on an inpatient or outpatient 
basis.4 
                     
4 The confusion generated by the court order in Hager’s case 
is due, in part, to the fact that Judge Howard’s order was not 
reduced to writing.  Hager had previously been given a 
competency hearing at Winnebago on an inpatient basis pursuant 
to a written order.  While that first order is not at issue in 
this appeal, Hager seems to have interpreted Judge Howard’s 
response to the assistant district attorney’s question of 
whether the second evaluation “would again be at Winnebago” 
(“[i]f the last one was there, yes”), as ordering an inpatient 
examination and thus triggering the time limits of Wis. Stat. § 
971.14(2)(c).  We do not agree that the facts support such a 
conclusion.  It is clear that a written order may have prevented 
the unfortunate circumstances of this case. 
No. 97-3841-W 
 
10
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.14(2)(am) states that once an 
examination is ordered to be conducted by a department facility, 
it is within the department’s discretion to determine where the 
examination will be conducted, by whom, and whether it should be 
conducted on an inpatient or outpatient basis.  Id.  If an 
inpatient examination is required, the 15-day time limit begins 
upon arrival of the defendant at the facility.  Id.   
¶21 In this case, the only cognizable order from the 
circuit court was that Winnebago conduct Hager’s competency 
examination; the court did not specify whether it should be an 
inpatient or outpatient examination.  Winnebago is one of two 
department facilities within the state.  Wis. Stat. § 51.05.  
Because 
the 
court’s 
order 
required 
Hager’s 
competency 
examination to be conducted at Winnebago—a department facility, 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(am) governs.   
¶22 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(am), the 15-day 
time limit begins to run upon arrival of the defendant at the 
facility.  Id.  However, Hager was never transported to the 
Winnebago facility.  We conclude that the time limits under 
§ 971.14(2)(am) did not start to run.5  Because Hager’s five-
month incarceration without the ordered competency examination 
                     
5 Both parties addressed in their briefs and at oral 
argument, the question of whether the time limits in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(2)(c) are mandatory or directory.  Because Hager’s 
order fell under subs. (2)(am), and because he never reached the 
department facility, we conclude that the time limits were not 
triggered.  The question of whether the time limits are 
mandatory or directory need only be considered if and when the 
time limits are triggered and violated.   
No. 97-3841-W 
 
11
did 
not 
constitute 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
time 
limits 
of 
§ 971.14(2)(c), 
the 
circuit 
court 
had 
jurisdiction, 
i.e., 
authority, to issue its order denying Hager’s motion to dismiss. 
¶23 We believe Hager’s reliance on Lockman for the 
proposition that a jurisdictional defect resulted from his 
delayed competency examination is misplaced.  In Lockman, the 
petitioner was taken into custody pending an involuntary 
commitment, and she did not receive a final commitment hearing 
within 
the 
statutory 
time 
limit 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(7)(1979-80), 
Wisconsin’s 
civil 
commitment 
statute.  
Lockman, 107 Wis. 2d at 326.  Lockman was not charged with any 
crimes.  The Lockman court held that the circuit court lost 
jurisdiction over Lockman as a consequence of its failure to 
hold the final commitment hearing within 14 days of her 
detention and the proceedings against her were dismissed.  Id. 
at 328-29.    
¶24 This case is distinguishable.  Because Lockman was not 
charged with any crimes, the state had no reason other than the 
involuntary commitment to keep her in custody beyond the time 
limits set forth in Wis. Stat. § 51.20.  In contrast, Hager was 
in custody for reasons other than to determine his mental 
competency to stand trial.  Hager remained in custody because he 
was charged with a series of misdemeanors and felonies for which 
No. 97-3841-W 
 
12
he could not post bond.6  The availability of bond distinguishes 
the competency commitment from civil commitments.7  Legislative 
Council Note, 1978, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.13 (West 1998).  
Hager’s continued incarceration is simply unlike that of the 
petitioner in Lockman.  
¶25 We are also unpersuaded by Hager’s argument that his 
due process rights were violated based on the length of time he 
was held in custody awaiting a determination of competency to 
stand trial.  Due process requires that the time of commitment  
bear a reasonable relationship to the underlying purpose of the 
commitment.  Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).  
“State courts, in the absence of a statute with a maximum 
sentence provision, have . . . recognized that the term of 
commitment should be related to the severity of the crime.”  
State ex rel. Deisinger v. Treffert, 85 Wis. 2d 257, 265, 270 
N.W.2d 402 (1978).  Thus, due process requires that one found 
                     
6 The remedy for a defendant’s financial inability to post 
bond is that he be given credit for the time spent in custody 
prior to conviction.  Byrd v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 415, 424-25, 222 
N.W.2d 696 (1974).  One subject to a civil commitment has no 
such remedy. 
7 Although temporary deprivation of a defendant’s liberty 
can be justified upon a finding of probable cause that an 
offense was committed, “the state’s interest in depriving the 
defendant of liberty prior to conviction is arguably exhausted 
by the time he or she is admitted to bail.”  Legislative Council 
Note, 1978, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.13 (West 1998). Once a 
defendant is admitted to bail, “the basis for distinguishing 
between competency and civil commitments, either in the basis 
upon which the defendant is deprived of liberty or in the length 
or severity of such deprivation, is questionable.”  Id. 
No. 97-3841-W 
 
13
incompetent 
to 
stand 
trial 
is 
entitled 
to 
release 
when 
observatory confinement reaches the length of the potential 
maximum sentence for the underlying criminal offense.  Id.  
Although Hager had not yet been found incompetent, the crimes he 
has been charged with carry a maximum sentence which greatly 
exceeds the 153 days he was in custody prior to his examination. 
 Hager would be given credit for the time he spent in custody.  
State v. Byrd, 65 Wis. 2d 415, 424-25, 222 N.W.2d 696 (1974).   
Under these facts, we conclude there was no due process 
violation. 
¶26 The State insists that the only due process claim 
Hager may have is a right to a speedy trial.  The right to a 
speedy 
trial 
has 
both 
statutory 
and 
constitutional 
manifestations and is incorporated in both the Federal and the 
Wisconsin constitutions.  U.S. Const. Amend. VI, Wis. Const. 
Art. I § 7.  In order to claim the statutory right, a defendant 
must affirmatively assert it.  Wis. Stat. § 971.10.  See also 
State v. Kwitek, 53 Wis. 2d 563, 570, 193 N.W.2d 682 (1972), 
Kopacka v. State, 22 Wis. 2d 457, 460, 126 N.W.2d 78 (1964).  
Hager did not assert his statutory right to a speedy trial; 
therefore, the right was not violated.8 
                     
8 Hager incorrectly claims that he could not assert his 
right to a speedy trial due to the fact that no arraignment had 
occurred.   The speedy trial statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.10(2)(a), 
states that the time starts to run from the “date trial is 
demanded by any party in writing or on the record.” The right 
may also attach when a complaint and warrant are issued, State 
v. Lemay, 155 Wis. 2d 202, 455 N.W.2d 233 (1990), or at the time 
of arrest or criminal charging and continues through sentencing. 
 State v. Allen, 179 Wis. 2d 67, 505 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1993).  
No. 97-3841-W 
 
14
¶27 The parameters of the constitutional right to a speedy 
trial were outlined in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) and 
recognized by this court in Day v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 236, 212 
N.W.2d 489 (1973).  These cases dictate that whether a 
defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated is to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.  The determination is to be 
made upon a consideration of a number of factors, “including the 
length of delay, the reason for the delay, whether a demand for 
a speedy trial was made and whether the delay resulted in 
prejudice to the defendant.”  State ex rel. Rabe v. Ferris, 97 
Wis. 2d 63, 67, 293 N.W.2d 151 (1980).  Because Hager does not 
claim his constitutional right to a speedy trial was denied, we 
need 
not 
determine 
whether 
the 
delay 
in 
the 
competency 
examination was constitutionally impermissible.  Id. at 68.  
¶28 To summarize, we conclude that the circuit court’s 
order denying Hager’s motion to dismiss was not made in 
violation of the constitution, nor was the court without 
jurisdiction to issue the order.  We further conclude that 
Hager’s due process rights were not violated.  Accordingly, 
Hager’s writ of habeas corpus must be denied. 
¶29 Both parties filed miscellaneous motions which were 
held in abeyance pending the decision by this court.  The State 
filed a motion to strike the petitioner’s brief and appendix, 
and the petitioner filed a motion to supplement the record; we 
now deny both motions.  The petitioner also filed a “motion 
regarding caption.”  The parties agree that despite the caption 
in this case, the real parties in interest are Petitioner-
No. 97-3841-W 
 
15
petitioner and the State of Wisconsin as represented by the 
Wisconsin Attorney General’s office.  We so order. 
By the Court.—The order of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.
No. 97-3841.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶30 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).   I 
agree with the State that a mistake was made in this case.  No 
onenot the court, not the prosecutor, not defense counsel, not 
jail officials, not the Department of Health and Family 
Services, not any mental health facility and not Michael 
Hagercould have intended Michael Hager to remain in jail for 
five months without having his competency evaluation completed 
and without any action of any kind taken on his case.  Yet for 
reasons unexplained on the record, no one realized that Michael 
Hager was sitting in the county jail for five months without any 
activity on his case.   
¶31 Although the circuit court ordered Hager's evaluation 
from the bench, no written court order was ever issued.  Whoever 
was supposed to prepare the order so that Hager could be 
transported to the 
appropriate institution 
for 
evaluation 
apparently failed to do so.  The only written record we have is 
a transcript of the circuit court's statements from the bench, 
and those statements are brief.  I agree with the State that on 
this record, it is impossible to determine whether the circuit 
court 
intended 
to 
order 
an 
evaluation 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.14(2)(a) or under Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(am).  
¶32 The State is also correct, I think, in concluding that 
regardless of whether the circuit court was acting under Wis. 
Stat. § 971.14(2)(a) or Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(am), no time 
limits ever began to run in this case.  The 15-day period under 
No. 97-3841.ssa 
 
2 
§ 971.14(2)(am) begins upon the arrival of a defendant at the 
inpatient facility.  Everyone agrees that Hager never arrived at 
an inpatient facility.  
¶33 The 15-day and 30-day periods under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14(2)(c) begin after the examination is ordered by the 
circuit court.  These time periods do not apply in this case, in 
my 
opinion, 
because 
no 
written 
order 
for 
a 
competency 
examination was ever actually issued by the circuit court.  
Although the statutes do not expressly require the circuit court 
order to be in writing, unless the order is in writing and 
issued the participants in the justice system have no notice of 
the circuit court's decision and have no notice of what action 
must be taken.  I conclude that under the circumstances of this 
case, a circuit court order pursuant to § 971.14(2)(a) must be 
in 
writing 
to 
trigger 
the 
time 
periods 
set 
forth 
in 
§ 971.14(2)(c).  Because no such written order was issued, I 
conclude that the 15-day and 30-day periods prescribed in 
§ 971.14(2)(c) were not triggered in the present case. 
¶34 If there is anyone in jail who cannot fend for 
himself, it is the incompetent individual.  Michael Hager fell 
through the cracks.  The legal system failed him.  Yet the 
system offers Hager no remedy for his five months in jail and 
the delay of his case.  I am compelled to concur in the mandate 
because I have not been persuaded that Hager's due process 
rights have been violated.   
¶35 For the reasons stated, I concur.  
No. 97-3841.ssa 
 
3 
¶36 I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence.