Case Title: MAURICE CAROL NOLLER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0129

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAURICE CAROL NOLLER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 30226 P.3d 867Case Number: No. S-09-0129Decided: 03/18/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
MAURICE 
CAROL NOLLER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Maurice Carol Noller pleaded guilty to 
one count of aggravated vehicular homicide and two counts of driving under the 
influence (DUI) with serious bodily injury.  At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Noller 
moved to strike portions of the pre-sentencing investigation report (PSI) on the 
grounds that they were inflammatory and argumentative.  The district court denied the motion and 
sentenced Mr. Noller to terms encompassing the maximum period of incarceration 
on each count.  Mr. Noller appeals, 
claiming the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 
strike and considering improper comments contained in the PSI.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Mr. Noller presents the issue for this 
Court's consideration as follows:

 
 
            
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's 
motion to strike inflammatory and argumentative language from the PSI and 
considered such language during sentencing?

 
 
The 
State asserts the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  In January of 2008, Mr. Noller was 
driving his pickup truck on a two-lane highway outside of Gillette, 
Wyoming.  His two step-daughters 
were with him in the vehicle.  Mr. 
Noller attempted to pass in a no passing zone, causing a head-on collision 
between his truck and a Chevy Suburban.  
Chemical testing performed after the accident established that Mr. 
Noller's blood alcohol content was .22.

 
 
[¶4]  One of the passengers in the Suburban 
was killed instantly.  The driver 
sustained serious injuries, including a broken left femur, a compound fracture 
of her right tibia and fibula, a broken left forearm and humerus, multiple 
broken bones in her right arm, a broken tailbone, two broken vertebra, damage to 
her liver, spleen, lungs and kidneys and hemorrhaging in her brain and 
spine.  The driver's two year old 
son, who was a passenger in the back seat of the Suburban, was also seriously 
injured.  He and his mother were 
flown by flight-for-life to Colorado for treatment.

 
 
[¶5]  Mr. Noller was charged with one count of 
aggravated vehicular homicide under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i) (LexisNexis 
2007) and two counts of causing serious bodily injury while driving under the 
influence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(h)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).  Mr. Noller ultimately pleaded guilty to 
all three charges and the district court set the matter for 
sentencing.

 
 
[¶6]  At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Noller 
moved to strike portions of the PSI.  
As grounds for his motion, he asserted comments made by the probation and 
parole agent who prepared the report were argumentative, biased and showed that 
she improperly had assumed the role of an advocate for the prosecution rather 
than simply gathering factual information for the district court.  The district court denied the motion and 
sentenced Mr. Noller to a term of eighteen to twenty years on the aggravated 
vehicular homicide charge, and terms of nine to ten years for each count of 
causing serious bodily injury while driving under the influence, with the three 
terms to be served consecutively.  
Mr. Noller timely appealed. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]  We review a district court's sentencing 
decisions for abuse of discretion.  
Roeschlein v. State, 2007 WY 
156, ¶ 17, 168 P.3d 468, 473 (Wyo. 2007).  
A sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless 
the defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to 
him, circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct 
which offends the public sense of fair play.  Id.  An error warrants reversal only when it 
is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights.  Id.  The party who is appealing bears the 
burden to establish that an error was prejudicial.  Id.  This Court has declined to reverse a 
sentence where the party objecting to particular portions of a PSI failed to 
demonstrate that the district court based its decision upon those parts of the 
report and the challenged comments "merely summarized what was apparent 
elsewhere in the report and provided the rationale for the agent's sentencing 
recommendation."  Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 34, 131 P.3d 963, 974 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]  In moving to strike portions of the PSI 
during the sentencing hearing, defense counsel specifically objected to the 
following comments in the report: 

 
 
In 
gauging the Defendant's level of remorse during the interview, this Writer did 
believe he felt some responsibility for his actions.  However, he seemed to have about 20% 
remorse and 80% self-pity.   . 
. .  He seemed much more concerned 
that there was "no hope" for him and voiced passive defiance, even now, 
toward any future treatment participation.  In this Writer's opinion and observation, 
he still maintains selfish, cowardly and self-defeating thoughts and behaviors 
and appears either unwilling or unable to entertain true empathy for the 
victims, their families and their loved ones. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original).  Defense counsel 
asserted that these comments were not reflective of the dispassionate, 
non-argumentative information contemplated by the rules governing 
PSIs.

 

[¶9]      Defense counsel 
also objected specifically to the following comments, characterizing them as 
"the prose of a romance writer:"

 
 
This 
Writer noted profound sorrowfulness in the expressions of hopelessness, sadness 
and grief narrated by [the deceased victim's husband and daughter].  This Writer would refer the Court, once 
again, to those statements before passing sentence.  [Husband] was obviously still in love 
with his wife of 34 years and misses her at a level few can comprehend.  But his and his family's mourning does 
not begin or end with the death of the "love of his life" and "life partner," 
mother, sister, friend, etc.  He, 
his son, his son-in-law and other beloved family members have lived 
moment-to-moment since the crash wondering, hoping and praying that the same 
fate would not befall [daughter] and [grandson].  Unfortunately for all of them, the 
trade-off for survival has been extreme pain, multiple medical procedures and 
adjusting to life with physical limitations and only the memory of [the deceased 
victim].

 
 
Defense 
counsel reiterated that these comments, rather than relating facts, were 
"straight advocacy" and repetitive of statements the husband of the deceased 
victim had already provided.  

 
 
[¶10]  Defense counsel also objected 
specifically to the following comments at the close of the agent's 
evaluation:

 
 
The 
truth is, no matter what sentences are passed here, there is no real justice in 
these matters and there is no real expectation of financial restitution from the 
Defendant.  The only 
realistic option is one that removes the Defendant from society for maximum and 
consecutive terms in order to protect the rest of society from his cruel and 
injurious behaviors and choices.  It 
is already too late for [the victims in this case].

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original).  Referencing the 
agent's recommendation that the court impose the maximum sentences on all counts 
to be served consecutively, defense counsel argued that the recommendation was 
beyond the agent's role and improper.1  

 
 
[¶11]  The statute and rule governing PSIs 
provide in relevant part as follows: 

 
 
§ 
7-13-303.  Investigation preceding 
probation or suspension of sentence. 

 
 
   (a)  When directed by the court, . . . the 
state probation and parole officer . . . shall investigate and report to the 
court in writing:

            
(i)   The circumstances 
of the offense;

            
(ii)  The criminal record, 
social history and present conditions of the defendant;

            
(iii) If practicable, the findings of a physical and mental examination 
of the defendant;

            
(iv)  If practicable, 
statements from the victim; and

            
(v)   A summary of the 
impact of the offense on the victim. 

 
 
[W.R.Cr.P.] 
32.  Judgment and 
sentence.

 
 
(a)  Presentence investigation. 

            
. . . .

            
(2)  Report.  The report of 
the presentence investigation shall contain:

(A)  Information about the history and 
characteristics of the defendant, including prior criminal record, if any, 
financial condition, and any circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior 
that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in the correctional treatment of the 
defendant;

(B)  Verified information stated in a 
nonargumentative style containing an assessment of the financial, social, 
psychological, and medical impact upon, and cost to, any individual against whom 
the offense has been committed and attaching a victim impact statement as 
provided in W.S. 7-21-103 if the victim chooses to make one in writing. 

(C)  Unless the court orders otherwise, 
information concerning the nature and extent of non-prison programs and 
resources available for the defendant; and

(D)  Such other information as may be 
required by the court.

 
 
[¶12]  In denying Mr. Noller's motion to 
strike, the district court referenced Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-303 (LexisNexis 
2007) and Rule 32(a)(2) and stated:

 
 
            
The court believes and concludes that this statutory mandate and the rule 
mandate comprehend certain items in a presentence investigation report that may 
not necessarily be factual, that may be even arguably editorial in nature.  

 
 
            
I think it is incumbent upon the court, this court and any court, in 
sentencing to separate the wheat from the chaff, and I would certainly undertake 
to do that in this particular case.

 
 
And, 
of course, the court relies upon the arguments of counsel as to what represents 
wheat and what represents chaff in any presentence investigation report. 

 
 
[¶13]  In considering the statutory provision 
and the rule, we have said that trial courts have broad discretion when imposing 
sentence to consider a wide range of factors about the defendant and the 
crime.  Thomas v. State, 2009 WY 92, ¶ 10, 211 P.3d 509, 512 (Wyo. 2009).   
They are free, in the exercise of their sentencing discretion, to 
consider victim impact statements, PSIs and other factors relating to the 
defendant and his crimes in imposing an appropriate sentence within the 
statutory range.  Garcia v. State, 2007 WY 48, ¶ 10, 153 P.3d 941, 944 (Wyo. 2007), citing Smith 
v. State, 2005 WY 113, ¶ 37, 119 P.3d 411, 422 (Wyo. 2005).  Trial courts are permitted to consider a 
defendant's character when exercising their discretion to impose sentence.  Doherty, ¶ 35, 131 P.3d  at 974.  In evaluating character, the trial court 
may consider a broad range of reports and information.  Gorseth v. State, 2006 WY 109, ¶ 15, 141 P.3d 698, 703 (Wyo. 2006).  A 
defendant's cooperation with authorities and remorse for his actions are 
appropriate factors to be considered when imposing sentence.  Dodge v. State, 951 P.2d 383, 386 (Wyo. 
1997).  A sentencing recommendation 
contained in a PSI is one of the factors that a court may properly consider in 
determining the appropriate sentence to impose.  Duke v. State, 2009 WY 74, ¶ 15, 209 P.3d 563, 569 (Wyo. 2009).

 

[¶14]  We applied these principles in Janssen v. State, 2005 WY 123, 120 P.3d 1006 (Wyo. 2005), to uphold a district court's sentence that was based in part 
on a comment contained in the PSI that the defendant was "choosing to violate 
the law."  We 
said:

 
 
[The] 
comment merely summarized what was apparent elsewhere in the report and provided 
the rationale for the agent's sentencing recommendation.  The district court was not bound to 
accept the opinion or the recommendation of the agent.  The district court merely arrived at the 
same conclusiona conclusion which was more than adequately supported by Mr. 
Janssen's uncontested criminal history.  

 
 

Id., 
¶ 18, 120 P.3d  at 1011.  In Janssen, the defendant also asserted 
that the agent's comment was not authorized by Rule 32 because it was 
"evaluative."  We said that although 
Rule 32 does not require an evaluation or a recommendation, a sentencing 
recommendation is a common part of a PSI and is one of the factors the trial 
court may properly consider.  Id., citing Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 
(Wyo. 1993).              
  

 
 
[¶15]  Similarly, in Gorseth, ¶ 22, 141 P.3d  at 705, we 
upheld a sentence based in part on a PSI to which the defendant had objected on 
the grounds that the probation agent argued in favor of the State because she 
recommended a lengthy prison sentence, asserted he did not take responsibility 
for his crimes, speculated about what might have happened to the victims if a 
third party had not come to their rescue, and neglected to contact the 
defendant's family to obtain information about him.   We concluded the probation agent 
presented the information in a non-argumentative style as required by Rule 
32(a).  We stated:  

 
 
Although 
Rule 32 does not specifically charge a probation agent with giving an opinion 
about the defendant (making an evaluation and giving recommendations), it is 
apparent that the district courts deem such information to be of value in the 
sentencing process because the form used in that process calls for such 
evaluations and recommendations.  

 
 

Id.  We concluded it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the district court to consider such information in imposing 
sentence.

 
 
[¶16]  In Carothers v. State, 2008 WY 58, ¶ 24, 
185 P.3d 1, 15 (Wyo. 2008), the defendant moved to strike from the PSI remarks 
of a tone quite similar to those Mr. Noller challenges.  While cautioning PSI preparers to limit 
their reports to the factors outlined in Rule 32(a)(2), we upheld the district 
court's ruling denying the motion because:  
1) there was no showing the court relied on the challenged comments in 
imposing the sentence; 2) the comments basically repeated statements contained 
in the victim impact portion of the report and made in court during the 
sentencing hearing; and 3) the fact that the district court imposed a shorter 
sentence than the State requested suggested it was not inflamed by the 
comments.  Id.

 
 
[¶17]  From these cases, it is clear the 
district court was free to consider a variety of information and sources in 
imposing sentence upon Mr. Noller, including his character, his level of remorse 
for his action, the probation and parole agent's assessment of whether he 
accepted responsibility for his crime, victim statements, and the agent's 
sentencing recommendation.  The 
district court was also free to consider the agent's summary of information, 
such as victim statements, contained elsewhere in the report and factors upon 
which she based her sentencing recommendation.       

 
 
[¶18]  Mr. Noller takes issue with the tone of 
the agent's comments.  He cites Duke, ¶ 16, 209 P.3d  at 569, for the 
principle that a parole and probation agent is an agent of the sentencing court, 
and a neutral and independent participant in the sentencing process.  He asserts the agent here was not 
neutral or independent and acted as an advocate for the prosecution rather than 
an agent of the sentencing court.  
Mr. Noller also cites Carothers, ¶ 24, 185 P.3d  at 15, in 
which we characterized the agent's comments as "extreme to say the least" and 
cautioned PSI preparers to limit their reports to the information outlined in 
Rule 32(a)(2).  

 
 
[¶19]  We agree with Mr. Noller that the 
agent's comments went beyond the information the rule required her to 
provide.  Rather than acting as an 
agent of the sentencing court, as a neutral and independent participant in the 
sentencing process, the PSI preparer in this case took on the role of a legal 
advocate, with many of her comments being more appropriate for the prosecutor's 
argument to the sentencing court than for a PSI.  As we did in Carothers, we caution probation and 
parole agents that it is not their function to act as legal advocates but to be 
neutral participants and provide the information specified in Rule 32(a)(2) for 
consideration by the sentencing court.  
The tone of the comments in Mr. Noller's PSI is quite similar to that of 
the comments in Carothers and both 
cases came to this Court from Campbell County.  In the future we expect agents involved 
in preparing PSIs to conform their comments to the requirements of Rule 32(a)(2) 
and comply with this Court's directives in this case and Carothers.       

 
 
[¶20]  Returning to the issue raised, we have 
read the agent's comments in the context of the entire PSI and the district 
court's statements leading up to the imposition of sentence and conclude that no 
abuse of discretion occurred.  The 
PSI was lengthy and detailed.  It 
contained extensive information concerning Mr. Noller's criminal history, 
including several previous arrests and/or convictions for alcohol related 
driving offenses.  It also contained 
the complete affidavit of probable cause, which described in detail the 
circumstances of the collision and the victims' injuries.  The PSI also included the written 
statements of the deceased victim's husband and his daughter, who was driving 
the vehicle and was seriously injured in the crash.  The agent's comments concerning the 
impact on the victims basically repeated statements made by the victims.  

 
 
[¶21]  At the sentencing hearing, the district 
court pointedly questioned the prosecutor and the agent about some of the 
information contained in the PSI, which resulted in some clarifications and some 
information being stricken from the report.  The district court also heard directly 
from the two victims whose written reports were contained in the PSI.  Additionally, the district court 
considered defense counsel's comments on Mr. Noller's behalf.    

 
 
[¶22]  Prior to imposing sentence, the district 
court summarized the factors that influenced its decision.  The court stated that it was struck 
particularly by the circumstances of the collision, including that it occurred 
on a curve in the road at the crest of hill in a no passing zone; one victim was 
killed; and the surviving victims, including a two year old boy, were taken by 
life-flight to Colorado with numerous and extensive injuries and the likelihood 
of permanent disabilities.  The 
district court stated that it was struck further by the fact that Mr. Noller had 
his two step-daughters in the vehicle with him at the time and they said he had 
been drinking while he was driving, estimated his speed at 90 miles per hour, 
asked him to slow down, sustained injuries in the collision and were taken from 
him and placed in the custody of the department of family services as a result 
of the collision, making them victims of Mr. Noller's actions as well. The court 
noted that a six pack of beer with only one unopened bottle remaining and an 
empty shot glass were found in Mr. Noller's vehicle.  The district court also stated that it 
took into account Mr. Noller's extensive history of alcohol related arrests and 
convictions and failed alcohol treatment programs.   The court 
stated:

 
 
I 
cannot conjure up [any more] serious set of circumstances than those presented 
in this case, nor a set of circumstances that calls out more strongly for 
imposition of a stern sentence. 

. 
. . .

Not 
only the death of [one passenger], and the severe injury to [her daughter and 
grandson], but the ongoing disability that [they] are likely to suffer as time 
goes on, and all of the distress to which they have been subject[ed].  

 
 
[¶23]  Mr. Noller has not shown the district 
court relied on the agent's comments in imposing sentence.  From our review of the entirety of the 
record, it appears the district court relied primarily on the information 
contained in the affidavit of probable cause, Mr. Noller's criminal history and 
the victims' statements.  We hold 
the district court acted reasonably in denying the motion to strike. 

 
 
[¶24]  Affirmed.  

            
  

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 
[¶25]   The presentence investigation 
report submitted in this case clearly violated the dictates of W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a)(2)(B).  It is not a report; it 
is a diatribe based apparently upon the writer's personal animosity toward the 
appellant and sympathy for the victims.  
While the majority opinion touches upon this fact, I write separately to 
state more forcefully that, were it not for the excellent job done by the 
district court both in "distinguishing the wheat from the chaff," and in setting 
forth the specific record facts upon which the sentence was based, I would vote 
to reverse the sentence and remand to the district court for preparation of a 
new presentence investigation report, prepared by a different 
agent.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In his appellate brief, Mr. Noller takes exception to other comments made 
by the agent in the PSI.  Because he 
did not challenge them in the district court, we do not consider 
them.