Case Title: Brooks v. RA Clark's Garage, Inc.

Citation: 117 N.H. 770

Docket Number: 

State: new-hampshire

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Date: 1977-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
117 N.H. 770 (1977) WAYNE BROOKS v. R. A. CLARK'S GARAGE, INC. No. 7726. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. October 17, 1977. New Hampshire Legal Assistance, of Lebanon, Mark A. Larsen and Alan Krans (Mr. Larsen orally), for the plaintiff. Decato & Cirone, of Lebanon (Mr. R. Peter Decato orally), for the defendant. BOIS, J. This is an action in trover to recover damages arising out of the repair and sale of plaintiff's motor vehicle. Trial by the Court (Lovejoy, J.) resulted in a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals. The court found the facts to be generally as follows: On October 23, 1975, plaintiff had his Jeep vehicle towed to the defendant garage, where he requested an estimate on certain repairs and subsequently orally authorized that the work be done. No written estimate of said work was provided nor did the plaintiff waive in writing such an estimate. Parties agreed that the subsequent auction sale of the vehicle to satisfy defendant's mechanic's lien was lawfully conducted. *771 The only question before us is whether defendant's admitted failure to supply plaintiff with a written estimate as required by RSA 269:8 (Supp. 1975) precludes it from recovering on its oral contract. The pertinent sections of RSA 269:8 (Supp. 1975) provide: Plaintiff contends the statute should be construed as providing that a repairman is not entitled to recover for repairs absent a written estimate or written waiver of the right to said estimate. Defendant argues that the statute is penal in nature and was not intended to bar recovery for authorized repairs made. The defendant's argument overlooks the legislative history of the statute. Speaking before the senate in favor of passage of RSA 269:8 (Supp. 1975), Senator Fennelly explained: [1] It would be inconsistent with this intention to protect the consumer to deny private redress on the ground that the statute was intended to operate only via criminal sanctions. The States of Connecticut and California have so interpreted statutes similar to ours. See DeBiase v. Garnsey, 103 Conn. 21, 130 A. 81 (1925); Bennett v. Hayes, 53 Cal. App. 3d 700, 125 Cal. Rptr. 825 (Ct. App. 1975); Schreiber v. Kelsey, 62 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 45, 133 Cal. Rptr. 508, (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1976). *772 [2] The language of RSA 269:8 (Supp. 1975) itself supports our holding that a written estimate must be given if recovery is to be had and further that any waiver must be in writing. [3] This conclusion also disposes of the defendant's claim for restitution under a quantum meruit theory, since to permit recovery under this theory would be inconsistent with the denial of recovery under the contract. Generally the guilty party to an illegal contract cannot bring an action to enforce the contract or to recover on principles of quasi-contract the benefits he has conferred under it. See Colten & Co., Inc. v. Manchester Savings Bank, 105 N.H. 254, 197 A.2d 208 (1964); American Home Improvement Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964). Exceptions sustained. DOUGLAS, J., did not sit; GRIMES, J., dissented; the others concurred.