Case Title: Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary and Chapel, Inc.

Citation: 378 P.2d 741, 93 Ariz. 60

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1963-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
93 Ariz. 60 (1963) 378 P.2d 741 Henry O. MUEHLEBACH, Appellant, v. MERCER MORTUARY AND CHAPEL, INC., a corporation, and Lewis R. Tresler, Appellees. No. 6863. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. February 7, 1963. *61 Moore & Romley, Phoenix, for appellant. Struckmeyer, Whitney & Perry, Phoenix, for appellees. KENNETH C. CHATWIN, Superior Court Judge. Appellant was plaintiff in a suit for injuries received in an automobile accident. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. The trial judge granted defendants' motion for a new trial and plaintiff appeals. The sole ground on which the trial judge granted the motion for a new trial was: The reference to insurance was made by the individual defendant, an employee of the corporate defendant. The circumstances leading up to the reference were as follows: The individual defendant was an ambulance driver. While going through a stop light, he hit one car and caromed off into the car driven by the plaintiff. One of the issues at the trial was whether the plaintiff should have pulled over to the curb. Another issue was whether he had lost consciousness. Plaintiff claimed that he could not pull over to the curb because the lane next to the curb was occupied by other cars. The individual defendant testified on the stand that there were no cars in the lane next to the curb that would have prevented the plaintiff from pulling over. He also testified that he observed nothing that would have led him to believe that the plaintiff had been injured. Counsel for plaintiff attempted to impeach the individual defendant by reference *62 to a deposition in which he had testified and had indicated on a diagram that there were cars so placed as to keep the plaintiff from pulling over to the curb. The individual defendant attempted to escape the consequences of his conflicting statements by stating that counsel for plaintiff had tried to put words in his mouth at the deposition and that it was plaintiff's counsel who had placed the cars on the diagram and then did not let the individual defendant see the diagram too well. Counsel had "kind of hid it" from him. The court recessed for the weekend, and on Saturday counsel for plaintiff subpoenaed the claims manager of the defendants' insurance carrier and obtained from him a signed statement made by the individual defendant at or about the time of the accident. In the statement, the individual defendant had stated that there were cars so placed that plaintiff could not pull over to the curb and that plaintiff had passed out a couple of times. The reference to insurance came as counsel for plaintiff was having the individual defendant identify the statement, as follows: A motion for mistrial was made, ruling was reserved (and later denied). The statement was then used for purposes of impeachment. This was the only reference to insurance during the trial. The general rule in this state has been that, with certain exceptions, any evidence, implication or suggestion that the defendant has liability insurance requires a mistrial or a new trial. See, e.g., Blue Bar Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Hudspeth, 25 Ariz. 287, 216 P. 246. This has been held to be so even though the disclosure that the defendant has liability insurance is inadvertent. Counsel for plaintiff has been put under the affirmative duty of preventing such disclosure. Consolidated Motors, Inc. v. Ketcham, 49 Ariz. 295, 66 P.2d 246. The reason for the rule has been the assumption that if the jury knows that the defendant has insurance, they will assume that the defendant will not have to pay the judgment personally, and that the jury will award a larger verdict. Consequently, they will ignore the issues of liability and merely decide how much the insurance company should pay. In former days, this reasoning may have been valid. But more recently, courts have questioned whether the mere mentioning of insurance still has this prejudicial effect. In Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 275-277, 330 P.2d 468, 472, the court said: The California Supreme Court refused to apply the rule in a later case, Little v. Superior Court of Orange County, 55 Cal. 2d 642, 645, 12 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483, 361 P.2d 13, 15 where plaintiff's counsel, on redirect examination asked his own witness, a doctor, if there were any changes between the time that a report had been written and a later time. In his answer, the doctor referred to the "initial insurance report." The court said: At the very least, this case stands for the proposition that the mere mention of defendants' liability insurance is not prejudicial. The New Jersey courts have also expressed a rational view of the problem of the effect of mentioning insurance, Runnacles v. Doddrell, 59 N.J. Super. 363, 367-368, 157 A.2d 836, 838. In this case, a denial of a motion for mistrial was affirmed where one of the witnesses stated that he had made a report to the insurance company. And in Pinkerton v. Oak Park Nat'l. Bank, 16 Ill. App.2d 91, 98-99, 147 N.E.2d 390, 394, the court commented that the existence and impact of liability insurance is one of the facts of life and went on to say: And see Granger v. Turley, 20 Ill. App.2d 488, 491, 156 N.E.2d 610, 612, in which a verdict and judgment were affirmed where plaintiff's counsel had referred to "your insurance adjuster." *65 If the suggestion of insurance is not prejudicial, why do defense counsel ask for a mistrial when insurance is mentioned? The California District Court of Appeals in Causey v. Cornelius, supra, said: Now, these judicial reminders to lawyers and trial judges about what really goes on in the world do not, of course, make the issue of liability insurance any more relevant in the run-of-the-mine automobile accident case. Such a case must not be tried on the basis of whether and how much liability insurance the defendant has. Usually an objection to a question as to the existence of liability insurance should be sustained. But it should be sustained on the basis of relevancy, not prejudice. Most of the time the existence of insurance just has nothing to do with the case. What we are reminded of is that the prejudicial content of a reference to liability insurance is largely a thing of the past. And it has, in part, been made a thing of the past by the expenditure of vast sums of money by insurance companies to educate prospective jurors of the claimed relation between large verdicts and insurance rates. There will be, of course, situations where the issue of insurance is injected into a case for a prejudicial purpose or where its discussion is of such a nature as to be prejudicial. In such a situation, a trial judge must grant a mistrial or a new trial. But he must not allow the bare mention of the word "insurance" to call forth the conditioned response "mistrial." He must truly use his discretion. In any event the instant case must be reversed. Defense counsel knew that plaintiff's counsel had in his possession a statement given by the defendant to an insurance adjuster. He knew the statement was to be used to impeach defendant's testimony. He knew that it would have to be identified by the defendant. He even knew when the document was going to be used. Defense counsel says that: *66 Without wishing to quibble, we note that counsel does not state that defendant was told, "Do not mention the word insurance." The question of plaintiff's counsel did not call for an answer that would have mentioned insurance, and under the circumstances defense counsel should and could have controlled his own witness well enough so that the word would not have been mentioned. In Northern Arizona Supply Co. v. Stinson, 73 Ariz. 109, 113, 238 P.2d 937, 939, this court said: In the same case this court also quoted with approval from Finck Cigar Co. v. Campbell, 134 Tex. 250, 254, 133 S.W.2d 759, 761 as follows: The rule applies where the defendant or his witness makes the reference to insurance on cross examination by counsel for plaintiff. Holbrook Light & Power Co. v. Gordon, 61 Ariz. 256, 148 P.2d 360. For the many other jurisdictions holding that an irresponsive or inadvertent answer referring to insurance is not grounds for a mistrial see 4 A.L.R.2d 771, 776. Reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment on the verdict. BERNSTEIN, C.J., and UDALL, JENNINGS, and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concurring. NOTE: Justice STRUCKMEYER, having disqualified himself, the Honorable KENNETH C. CHATWIN, Judge of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, was called to sit in his stead and participate in the determination of this appeal. [1] The Arizona equivalent is A.R.S. § 28-1101 et seq. [2] The Arizona equivalent is A.R.S. § 28-1141 through 1148.