Case Title: Ex parte N.B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1150708

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2016-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
rel: 09/30/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2016
____________________
1150708
____________________
Ex parte N.B.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: N.B.
v.
J.C.R.)
(Shelby Juvenile Court, JU-15-000457.01)
PARKER, Justice.
PETITION DENIED; NO OPINION.
Stuart, Bolin, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
1150708
Shaw, J., concurs specially.
Murdock, J., dissents.
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SHAW, Justice (concurring specially).  
This petition for a writ of mandamus challenges whether
the Shelby Juvenile Court could transfer an 
action--over 
which
it had no jurisdiction--to the Shelby Circuit Court.  The
petitioner, N.B., initially filed a petition seeking mandamus
relief in the Court of Civil Appeals, which denied the
petition.  Ex parte N.B., [Ms. 2150281, March 18, 2016] ___
So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (opinion of Donaldson, J.,
joined by Pittman, J.).  N.B. has now filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus in this Court raising the same challenge.
The background facts in this case are explained in the
Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, and, for purposes of this
writing, there is no need to repeat them.  It is sufficient to
note that the juvenile court determined that it had no
jurisdiction over the action and purported to transfer it to
the circuit court.  
In the Court of Civil Appeals, N.B. argued that, because
the juvenile court had no jurisdiction, its only option was to
dismiss the case.  The Court of Civil Appeals held, however,
under the authority of this Court's decision in Ex parte E.S.,
[Ms. 1140889, October 30, 2015] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2015),
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that the juvenile court was empowered under Ala. Code 1975, §
12-11-11, to transfer the action.
I dissented in Ex parte E.S. because I believed that the
issue presented in that case--whether a circuit court was
required by § 12-11-11 to transfer an action over which it had
no jurisdiction--was not properly presented for appellate
review.   In the instant case, the issue of the correct
1
meaning of § 12-11-11 is properly before us.  For the reason
discussed below, I do not believe that the Code section has
application in this case.
The "intent" of the legislature is expressed in the
language of a statute.  When the language is plain and
unambiguous, then that language must be enforced as written in
order to put into effect that "intent."  
"I do not believe that E.S.'s application
1
for 
rehearing 
contained 
sufficient 
argument
or authorities to explain and support the
contention 
that 
a 
transfer 
under 
§
12–11–11, and not a dismissal--the usual
result 
when 
a 
trial 
court 
lacks
jurisdiction--was required. ... Therefore,
the issue whether the Court of Civil
Appeals' decision was, in light of §
12–11–11, inconsistent with this Court's
mandate was waived."
Ex parte E.S., ___ So. 3d at ___ (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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"The fundamental rule of statutory construction
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
legislature in enacting the statute. Words used in
a statute must be given their natural, plain,
ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where
plain language is used a court is bound to interpret
that language to mean exactly what it says. If the
language of the statute is unambiguous, then there
is no room for judicial construction and the clearly
expressed intent of the legislature must be given
effect."
IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346
(Ala. 1992).  See also Ex parte T.B., 698 So. 2d 127, 130
(Ala. 1997), and Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 431 (Ala.
2013) (Shaw, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
result) (stating that when "[t]he language of [a] Code section
is clear[,] there is nothing to construe [and] no need to
attempt to divine the 'intent' of the legislature").  However,
if the language of a statute is not "plain" or is ambiguous,
then we must construe it in order to determine the
legislature's intent.  City of Pike Road v. City of
Montgomery, [Ms. 1140487, December 11, 2015] ___ So. 3d ___
(Ala. 2015) ("Because the plain language of § 11–40–10 does
not give explicit guidance on this issue, we must ascertain
the legislature's intent through other means."); Dennis v.
Pendley, 518 So. 2d 688, 690 (Ala. 1987) ("It is the court's
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function to make clear the intent of the legislature when some
degree of ambiguity is found in a statute."); and Johnson
Controls, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 160 So. 3d 249, 270
(Ala. 2014) (Shaw, J., dissenting) ("We 'construe' a statute
only when it is ambiguous ....").2
Section 12-11-11 states, in pertinent part:
"Whenever it shall appear to the court that any
case filed therein should have been brought in
another court in the same county, the court shall
make an order transferring the case to the proper
court ...."
In my dissent in Ex parte E.S., I noted an ambiguity in
§ 12-11-11: "It is not immediately clear what court is 'the
The purpose of the plain-meaning rule--to give effect to
2
the 
legislature's 
words 
when 
determining 
its 
intent--is 
rooted
in the doctrine of separation of powers: "To apply a different
policy would turn this Court into a legislative body, and
doing that, of course, would be utterly inconsistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers."  DeKalb Cty. LP Gas Co.,
Inc. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 276 (Ala. 1998). 
See also City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1082
(Ala. 2006) (Harwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("This deference to the ordinary and plain meaning of
the language of a statute is not merely a matter of an
accommodating judicial philosophy; it is a response to the
constitutional mandate of the doctrine of the separation of
powers set out in Art. III, § 43, Alabama Constitution of 1901
...."). To deviate from the legislature's plain and
unambiguous language is to rewrite the statute and to exercise 
legislative powers.  Ala. Const. 1901, Art. III, § 43
(providing that the judicial department "shall never exercise
the legislative and executive powers"). 
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court' designated in the first clause." ___ So. 3d at ___
(Shaw, J., dissenting).  Specifically, the use of the definite
article "the" before the word "court" indicates specificity. 
"The word 'the' is a definite article, and unlike 'a' or 'an,'
that definite article suggests specificity."  1A Norman J.
Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 21:16, at 36 (7th ed. 2009) (Supp. 2015-2016). 
As another court has explained: "'[T]he' is '[a]n article
which particularizes the subject spoken of. In construing [a]
statute, [the] definite article "the" particularizes the
subject which it precedes and is [a] word of limitation as
opposed to [the] indefinite or generalizing force [of] "a" or
"an."'"  Yellowbird v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 833
N.W.2d 536, 539, (N.D. 2013) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary
1477 (6th ed. 1990)).
The use of the definite article "the" preceding the word
"court" is a limitation; the Code section does not use the
indefinite article "a" and state that "a court" without
jurisdiction shall transfer the case, which language could be
interpreted to mean that the Code section applied to any
court.  See Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501
7
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U.S. 868, 902 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring 
in 
the 
judgment) 
("[The 
Appointments 
Clause] 
refers
to 'the Courts of Law.' Certainly this does not mean any
'Cour[t] of Law'.... The definite article 'the' obviously
narrows the class of eligible 'Courts of Law'....").  Section
12-11-11 thus refers to a specific or particular court, but
that court is not designated in the Code section.  We do not,
from the plain language of the Code section, know which
particular court may transfer a case when it has no
jurisdiction.  To determine what "court" is "the court"
referred to in the Code section, we must look beyond the text
to determine the legislature's intent.
In my dissent in Ex parte E.S., I discussed the prior
history and use of § 12-11-11:
"What is now Ala. Code 1975, § 12-11-11, was
originally enacted as § 4 of Act No. 725, Ala. Acts
1915.  That entire act dealt with the transfer of a
case erroneously filed in the law or equity 'side'
of the circuit court to the proper 'side' of that
court.  When codified as part of the Code of Alabama
1940, what is now § 12-11-11 stated: 
"'Whenever it shall appear to any court of
law or equity that any cause filed therein
should have been brought in another court
of like jurisdiction in the same county,
the court shall make an order transferring
the cause to the proper court ....'
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"Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 13, § 156.  
"Although ostensibly dealing with transfers
between the law and equity 'sides' of the circuit
courts, the section was also used as a mechanism to
transfer cases, in counties in which the court sat
in divisions, from one division of the circuit court
to another division of that circuit court in that
county.  See, e.g., Ex parte Central of Georgia Ry.,
243 Ala. 508, 513, 10 So. 2d 746, 750 (1942).  This
prior version of § 12-11-11 clearly applied only to
the transfer of a circuit court case to another
court of equal–-'like'--jurisdiction."
Ex parte E.S., ___ So. 3d at ___ (Shaw, J., dissenting). 
Thus, the Code section was used for "horizontal" transfers of
cases between the law and equity sides of circuit courts or
between "divisions" of those circuit courts.  
Upon the adoption of the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure, the language of Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 13, § 156, was
modified 
to 
that 
currently 
found 
in 
§ 
12-11-11.  
3
Specifically, the Code section was altered to remove the
language referring to "law or equity" and requiring a transfer
In my dissent in Ex parte E.S., I suggested that the Code
3
section was altered in the 1975 codification of the Code. 
Further research reveals that alteration was undertaken upon
the adoption of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, and
first published in the 1975 Code.  The entry for § 12-11-11 in
Alabama Code of 1975, volume 11, fails to indicate that an
alteration took place.
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to a court of "like jurisdiction."  See Appendix III, Statutes
Modified, Ala. R. Civ. P.  The Committee Comments state:
"The substance of this statute will still have
some utility in courts coming under the rules
because, in some instances, statutes require that
certain cases be brought in a particular division
when the circuit court or court of like jurisdiction
is so divided.
"The clause deletes the phrase 'of law or
equity' which would be an inappropriate description
of courts coming under the new rules, since law and
equity are amalgamated in such courts."
Appendix III, Statutes Modified, Ala. R. Civ. P., Committee
Comments to Ala. Code 1940, Tit. 13, § 156 (emphasis added).4
It is clear that the alterations made to the Code
section--the difference between the language of Ala. Code
1940, Tit. 13, § 156, and § 12-11-11--were not intended to
allow an expansion of the ability to transfer cases to courts
other than circuit courts, or to allow a "vertical" as opposed
to "horizontal" transfer of cases.  Instead, the alterations
were simply to remove the language referring to the
distinction between law and equity, which language was
The current text of § 12-11-11 was modified by this
4
Court's adoption of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Whether 
the 
separation-of-powers 
concerns 
that 
require 
the 
use
of the plain-meaning rule apply in this context I leave to
another day.
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superseded by the Rules of Civil Procedure, because there was
no longer a need for a statute to allow the transfer of cases
between the law and equity "sides" of the circuit court.  The
Code section was retained, however, because it still had a use
in transferring cases between the divisions of the circuit
court.   That understanding of the Code section continued.  As
5
I stated in Ex parte E.S.:
"[Section] 12-11-11 has not, as far as my research
reveals, ever been held to require a 'vertical'
transfer from a circuit court to a lower court. 
Given the history of the Code section, as recounted
above, there is reason to suspect that it was never
'intended' to do so."
Ex parte E.S., ___ So. 3d at ___ (Shaw, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
Given the use of the limiting term "the court," it
appears that § 12-11-11 was "intended" to apply to a
"It would appear that, following the merger
5
of law and equity, the original purpose of
Act No. 725, including the prior version of
§ 12–11–11, no longer existed. Because
transfers to lower courts were covered by
other Code sections, § 12–11–11 was
probably retained and amended to preserve
its other historical use as a means to
transfer cases between divisions in the
circuit courts."
Ex parte E.S., ___ So. 3d at ___ n.4 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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particular court.  Given the original act from which § 12-11-
11 derives and the prior interpretation and use of that act 
for "horizontal" transfers between circuit courts, it appears
that § 12-11-11 was "intended" to allow a transfer by one
circuit court lacking jurisdiction to another circuit court. 
The Committee Comments explaining the modifications to the
Code section effected by the adoption of the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure confirm this interpretation.
Further, I do not believe that the Code section can be
said to have "intended" to allow a district court to transfer
a case to a circuit court, which expands the holding of Ex
parte E.S.  First, the history provides that the Code section 
allowed a transfer of cases only to a "court of like
jurisdiction," and it was not modified with the intent to
change that history.  Additionally, Ala. Code 1975, § 12-11-9,
which was adopted in 1975, provides that circuit courts, when
they lack jurisdiction, have the power to transfer a case to
district court, and vice versa.  That Code section is
superfluous and redundant if § 12-11-11 allows the same.  In
other words, if § 12-11-11 allows any court to transfer a case
to any other court in that county, then why would the
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legislature have enacted § 12-11-9 to allow circuit courts and
district courts--and only those courts--to transfer cases to
each other?  If that would already be permissible under the
purportedly much broader transfer powers of § 12-11-11, then 
§ 12-11-9, covering the more limited transfers, would be
unnecessary.  There was no need to enact § 12-11-9 if § 12-11-
11 allowed the same transfers.  It is presumed, however, that
the legislature does not enact redundant or superfluous
statutes.  Ex parte Uniroyal Tire Co., 779 So. 2d 227, 236
(Ala. 2000).  Thus, I cannot conclude that § 12-11-11 allows
the type of "vertical" transfers discussed in Ex parte E.S. or
the Court of Civil Appeals' decision below.
I do not believe that § 12-11-11 would allow the juvenile
court in the instant case to transfer the action to the
circuit court.  However, the mandamus petition before this
Court, while attempting to distinguish Ex parte E.S. and
citing my dissent in that case, does not present an analysis
sufficient to allow us to hold § 12-11-11 ambiguous and thus
depart from its plain meaning.  For that reason, I cannot hold
that the petition demonstrated a "clear legal right to the
order sought"; therefore, I must concur to deny the petition. 
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Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001). 
I note that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision is an 
opinion of two judges and that, in the future, another party
may seek to have this Court reconsider it and Ex parte E.S. 
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MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
In Ex parte E.S., [Ms. 1140889, Oct. 30, 2015] ___ So. 3d
___ (Ala. 2015), I joined Justice Shaw's dissent rejecting the
use of Ala. Code 1975, § 12-11-11, as a basis for the juvenile
court to transfer to a circuit court, rather than to dismiss,
a petition deemed to present a "mere custody dispute" rather
than a dependency case.  In the present case, this Court
denies certiorari review of a decision by the Court of Civil
Appeals affirming such a transfer by the trial court. 
Consistent with my vote in Ex parte E.S., I respectfully
dissent.
The statute upon which Ex parte E.S. was based,
§ 12-11-11, has not changed since 1975.  Yet, until recently
(including during my tenure as a judge on the Court of Civil
Appeals from 2000 to 2006) both the Court of Civil Appeals and
this Court understood that a dismissal, rather than a
transfer, was the proper outcome in a case such as this.  As
recently as 2012, the Court of Civil Appeals explained that
"'[i]f a juvenile court determines that the child is not
dependent, the court must dismiss the dependency petition.'" 
J.A. v. C.M., 93 So. 3d 953, 954-55 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012)
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(quoting K.C.G. v. S.J.R., 46 So. 3d 499, 501-02 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2010), and also quoting with approval Ala. Code 1975, §
12–15–310(b), to the effect that "'[i]f the juvenile court
finds that the allegations in the [dependency] petition have
not been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the juvenile
court shall dismiss the petition'").  Furthermore, as this
Court reiterated in 2013:
"[I]t is well established that '"'[u]nless expressly
authorized so to do, a court has no authority to
transfer a cause from itself to another court, and
thereby give the other court possession of the case
to hear and determine it, although the other court
would have had jurisdiction of the cause if it had
come to it by due process.'• 21 C.J.S. Courts § 502,
p. 769...."'  Ex parte Boykin, 611 So. 2d 322, 326
(Ala. 1992) (quoting Allen v. Zickos, 37 Ala. App.
361, 364, 68 So. 2d 841, 843 (1953))."
Hughes v. Branton, 141 So. 3d 1021, 1027 (Ala. 2013).
In accordance with the foregoing, I respectfully dissent.
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