Case Title: Commonwealth v. Rosa

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13277

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13277 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERTO ROSA & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 7, 2022. - February 24, 2023. 
 
Present (Sitting at Plymouth):  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, 
Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Complaint, Dismissal, Delay in commencement 
of prosecution, Interlocutory appeal, District attorney, 
Judicial discretion.  Constitutional Law, Separation of 
powers. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on November 22, 2021. 
 
The case was reported by Wendlandt, J. 
 
 
Darcy Jordan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Esther J. Horwich for Roberta Rosa. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The defendant's trial for operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and other related 
charges was continued three times because the prosecutor was not 
 
1 Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court 
Department. 
2 
 
ready for trial.2  Two of these continuances were due to the 
unavailability of the Commonwealth's key witness, the State 
police trooper who had arrested the defendant.  When the witness 
was unavailable for a third time, the defendant moved to dismiss 
for lack of prosecution and requested that the Commonwealth be 
required to file a motion to vacate the dismissal if it chose to 
refile the case.  The judge granted the defendant's motion and 
dismissed the case without prejudice.  The order of dismissal 
also required the Commonwealth to file a motion to vacate if it 
decided to proceed with the prosecution of the case.  The 
Commonwealth then sought extraordinary relief in the county 
court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, on the ground that the 
judge's order violated the district attorney's constitutional 
authority to choose which cases to prosecute.  A single justice 
reserved and reported the case to the full court. 
 
We conclude that the judge's decision to require the 
Commonwealth to seek court approval before refiling charges was 
an abuse of discretion.  Article 30 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights protects a prosecutor's right to decide 
whether to prosecute a defendant and for which offenses; a court 
may not impede the exercise of that right by imposing an 
 
2 Although the Commonwealth commenced this action by filing 
a petition in the county court, for convenience we refer to the 
respondent as the "defendant." 
3 
 
additional requirement on the prosecution before it can refile 
the charges. 
 
1.  Background.  On January 2, 2020, a complaint issued in 
the Boston Municipal Court charging the defendant with operating 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); negligent operation of a motor vehicle, 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a); possession of an open container of 
alcohol in a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24I; and a marked 
lanes violation, G. L. c. 89, § 4A.  A jury trial was scheduled 
for February 27, 2020. 
 
On what would have been the first day of trial, the 
Commonwealth's request for a continuance was allowed because its 
key witness, the State police trooper who had stopped and 
arrested the defendant, was unavailable, as she had been 
summonsed to appear in a different court.  The case then was 
rescheduled two more times due to the state of emergency arising 
from the COVID-19 pandemic.  Thereafter, on August 4, 2020, 
trial again was continued because the Commonwealth was not ready 
for trial, and the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied.  A 
jury-waived trial was scheduled for September 4, 2020.  On that 
date, the Commonwealth answered not ready for trial because the 
State police trooper was on vacation.  Again, the defendant's 
motion to dismiss was denied.  A jury-waived trial was 
rescheduled for November 9, 2020, and, on the scheduled day, 
4 
 
trial again was continued.  A jury trial subsequently was 
scheduled for March 8, 2021, but was rescheduled because there 
were no jurors.  For reasons not indicated in the record, on 
May 13, 2021, the jury trial was continued to July 7, 2021, and, 
on that date, trial again was continued, this time to 
October 12, 2021.  By that point, four Boston Municipal Court 
judges had allowed continuances of the trial. 
 
On the morning of October 12, 2021, the Boston Municipal 
Court judge who had allowed the continuance on November 9, 2020, 
presided.  When the judge asked whether the Commonwealth was 
ready for trial, the prosecutor responded that it was not.  The 
prosecutor explained that, although the State police trooper had 
sent an electronic mail message to the prosecutor one week 
previously to confirm the date of trial, the trooper had called 
earlier that morning to say that she had had a family emergency 
and was unable to appear.  The prosecutor requested that the 
trial again be rescheduled, asserting, "I understand today is 
the trial date and this has been on for trial several times, but 
there was a family emergency on her end, and I did expect her to 
come today." 
 
Defense counsel objected to any further continuances.  She 
said, "[T]his is at least three separate occasions when the 
[t]rooper has not been available, and I'd ask you to dismiss the 
matter."  The judge inquired of the prosecutor whether she had 
5 
 
the same memory of the trooper having been unavailable on 
previous dates, and the prosecutor affirmed that she did. 
 
The judge then asked the prosecutor whether, on the prior 
dates when the trooper had not appeared, she had received 
advance notice of the trooper's unavailability.  The prosecutor 
responded, "On [August 4, 2020], . . . I knew why [the trooper] 
wasn't here, but I don't believe she gave me [any more] advanced 
notice than like the morning of."  The judge said, "I appreciate 
that she has a family emergency today, and I'm happy that she 
reached out to you[.]  [T]he Commonwealth, however, seems to 
[have] an issue of her not appearing notwithstanding today's 
emergency.  Does the Commonwealth wish to say anything else?"  
The prosecutor answered, "[T]his is a very provable case with 
the [t]rooper.  I do understand that the [t]rooper has not been 
here for multiple dates, and I do understand that, but . . . we 
possibly would take out additional charges if this case was 
dismissed." 
 
The judge asked defense counsel whether she still intended 
to move for dismissal.  Counsel responded, "I am, Judge.  And 
I'd ask that the Commonwealth be ordered to go through proper 
channels of a [m]otion to [v]acate the [d]ismissal, giving 
notice to myself and my client if they try to reopen it." 
 
The judge then allowed the motion to dismiss for want of 
prosecution and noted that the dismissal was over the 
6 
 
Commonwealth's objection.  After dismissing the case, the judge 
added, "Should the Commonwealth wish to pursue this case, the 
Commonwealth is ordered to file a [m]otion to [v]acate the 
[d]ismissal, [and to] notify [the defendant and his attorney] so 
that we can set this up for a hearing where everybody can be 
heard."  The judge also told the defendant, "[S]tay in contact 
with [your attorney].  I anticipate there will likely be a 
motion for you to come back into court, sir; okay?"  A notation 
of dismissal without prejudice was entered on the docket.  The 
Commonwealth then filed a petition for extraordinary relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court, and a single 
justice reserved and reported the case, without decision, to the 
full court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The Commonwealth argues that the judge 
lacked the authority to require it to file a motion to vacate 
the dismissal before it could seek a new criminal complaint 
against the defendant.  Accordingly, the Commonwealth asserts, 
the judge's ruling effectively was an improper dismissal with 
prejudice.  The defendant maintains that, in allowing the 
prosecutor to file a motion to vacate the dismissal, the judge 
provided the Commonwealth with an adequate opportunity to argue, 
at a hearing, that the prosecutor should be allowed to refile 
the case.  The defendant also argues that the order was 
7 
 
permissible, given the court's inherent authority to manage its 
docket. 
 
Article 30 prohibits one branch of the government from 
interfering with the functions of another.  See K.J. v. 
Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 488 Mass. 362, 368 
(2021).  Among the functions exclusively within the domain of 
the executive branch is "the decision to proceed with [a] 
prosecution."  Commonwealth v. Newton N., 478 Mass. 747, 755 
(2018).  Judicial review of such a decision "would constitute an 
intolerable interference by the judiciary in the executive 
department of the government and would be in violation of art. 
30."  Id. at 755-756.  For this reason, "[i]n the absence of a 
legal basis to do so, it is well established that a judge may 
not dismiss a valid complaint over the Commonwealth's 
objection."  Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 780 (2017).  
"[W]hen a judge, without any legal basis[,] preempts the 
Commonwealth's presentation of its case[,] that action 
effectively usurps the decision-making authority 
constitutionally allocated to the executive branch" (quotations, 
citation, and alterations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Cheney, 440 
Mass. 568, 574 (2003). 
 
A prosecutor nonetheless does not have the authority to 
delay prosecution indefinitely once charges have been filed.  
See Commonwealth v. Super, 431 Mass. 492, 499 (2000); Mass. R. 
8 
 
Crim. P. 36 (b), as amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996) (requiring 
that defendant be brought to trial within specified period of 
time).  "[T]he prosecutor's broad discretion over whether a case 
is prosecuted must be considered in conjunction with the 
judiciary's wide discretion as to when a case goes to trial."  
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 428 Mass. 623, 629 (1999).  If the 
Commonwealth fails to prosecute a case, a judge has "the 
inherent authority to dismiss [the] indictment for failure to 
prosecute."  Commonwealth v. Graham, 480 Mass. 516, 536 (2018).  
This authority extends to situations where the Commonwealth is 
not ready for trial because one of its witnesses is absent.  Id. 
 
When a judge dismisses a case for failure to prosecute, the 
dismissal ordinarily is without prejudice, thus allowing the 
prosecutor to refile the charges and to proceed with the 
prosecution.  See Graham, 480 Mass. at 537.  Because a dismissal 
without prejudice does not preempt further prosecution of a 
defendant, it is "upheld in the absence of an abuse of 
discretion."  Id. at 536, quoting Commonwealth v. Connelly, 418 
Mass. 37, 38 (1994). 
 
Alternatively, a judge may dismiss a case with prejudice, 
so that the Commonwealth is precluded from refiling the same 
charges against the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Mason, 453 
Mass. 873, 877 (2009).  Because dismissal with prejudice 
"precludes a public trial and terminates criminal proceedings" 
9 
 
(citation omitted), id., such a dismissal raises concerns as to 
whether the court is infringing on the power of the executive 
branch, see Cheney, 440 Mass. at 574.  For this reason, a 
court's inherent authority to dismiss an indictment with 
prejudice may be exercised only where there is either a "showing 
of irremediable harm to the defendant's opportunity to obtain a 
fair trial" or "prosecutorial misconduct that is egregious, 
deliberate, and intentional, or that results in a violation of 
constitutional rights" (citations omitted).  Bridgeman v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 298, 316 
(2017).  "Absent egregious misconduct or at least a serious 
threat of prejudice, the remedy of dismissal infringes too 
severely on the public interest in bringing guilty persons to 
justice" (citation omitted).  Brangan v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 
361, 366 (2017).  "To conclude otherwise would be to permit 
judges to substitute their judgment as to whom and what crimes 
to prosecute, for the judgment of those who are constitutionally 
charged with that duty, and who are accountable to the people 
for doing so responsibly."  Cheney, supra at 575. 
 
Here, in response to the Commonwealth's repeated failures 
to prosecute the defendant, the judge dismissed the case without 
prejudice.  As the Commonwealth concedes, the dismissal was not 
an abuse of the judge's discretion.  See Graham, 480 Mass. 
at 536, quoting Commonwealth v. Lucero, 450 Mass. 1032, 1033 
10 
 
(2008) ("where a prosecutor is unprepared to present her case 
due to the unexpected absence of a witness, a judge has 
discretion to dismiss the case without prejudice").  The judge, 
however, did not limit her order to a simple dismissal.  Rather, 
she added a condition that, in order to pursue new charges 
against the defendant for those offenses, the Commonwealth was 
required to file a motion to vacate the dismissal.  This 
requirement constituted a hurdle for the Commonwealth to 
overcome in order to reprosecute the case.  As a result, the 
Commonwealth could have continued to prosecute the defendant 
only with the court's approval. 
The judge's ruling thus interfered with the prosecutor's 
exclusive "discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a 
particular defendant."  Cheney, 440 Mass. at 574.  This 
interference took place prior to a "verdict, finding, or plea," 
id. at 568, and was not based on a finding that the 
Commonwealth's delays constituted egregious misconduct, or that 
they prejudiced the defendant's ability to receive a fair trial, 
see Mason, 453 Mass. at 877.  While the ruling was not a 
dismissal with prejudice, it nonetheless improperly constrained 
"a power reserved for the executive branch" (quotations and 
citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Powell, 453 Mass. 320, 323 
(2009).  The ruling therefore was in violation of art. 30. 
11 
 
 
The defendant argues that the Commonwealth retained the 
right to pursue the prosecution because the judge's action did 
not permanently preempt the Commonwealth from prosecuting the 
case.  Rather, the prosecutor could have moved to vacate the 
dismissal; this, according to the trial judge, would have 
resulted in a "hearing where everybody [could] be heard."  The 
defendant contends that at such a hearing, the prosecutor could 
have argued that a dismissal with prejudice was not warranted; 
if the judge had been persuaded, she then could have placed the 
case back on the trial list. 
This argument is unconvincing.  Nothing in the record 
suggests that, had the prosecutor moved to vacate the dismissal, 
the hearing on the motion to vacate would have addressed whether 
a dismissal with prejudice was warranted.  Rather, the judge 
could have upheld the dismissal without prejudice in the absence 
of a finding of egregious misconduct or prejudice to the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Gardner, 467 Mass. 363, 368 
(2014) (dismissal without prejudice is upheld absent abuse of 
discretion).  A hearing on a motion to vacate the dismissal thus 
would have been insufficient to protect the "exclusive power of 
the executive branch to prosecute criminal cases."  Commonwealth 
v. Gonsalves, 432 Mass. 613, 620 (2000). 
 
The defendant also argues that the judge did not abuse her 
discretion because the ruling was issued pursuant to her 
12 
 
inherent authority to manage the flow of the court's docket.  In 
the defendant's view, the court has the authority to take the 
measures necessary to maintain the efficiency of its docket in 
the face of the prosecutor's delays. 
 
The courts' inherent powers are those that, while not 
statutorily provided, see Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 475 Mass. 
482, 490 (2016), are "essential to the performance of their 
functions, to the maintenance of their authority, and to their 
capacity to determine the rights of parties according to law," 
Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 72-73 (2013), quoting 
Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 260 Mass. 369, 373 (1927).  "The 
boundaries of inherent judicial authority have been established 
on a case-by-case basis as challenges to the exercise of a 
particular power have arisen."  Charles, supra at 73.  Among the 
courts' inherent powers, we have recognized the authority to 
dismiss an indictment for failure to prosecute, Graham, 480 
Mass. at 536; to order prehearing discovery, Teixeira, supra 
at 491; to stay execution of a defendant's sentence in 
exceptional circumstances, Charles, supra at 79; and to make 
scheduling decisions with regard to trial, Super, 431 Mass. 
at 499; we have also recognized the authority "to control and 
supervise personnel within the judicial system" (citation 
omitted), Carrasquillo v. Hampden County Dist. Courts, 484 Mass. 
367, 384 (2020). 
13 
 
 
"[T]he very conception of inherent power carries with it 
the implication that its use is for occasions not provided for 
by established methods.  Only when established methods 
fail, . . . or when an emergency arises which the established 
methods cannot or do not instantly meet, then and not till then 
does occasion arise for the exercise of the inherent power" 
(citation and alterations omitted).  Brach v. Chief Justice of 
the Dist. Court Dep't, 386 Mass. 528, 536 (1982). 
 
Here, the court had an interest in discouraging further 
delays by the Commonwealth in order to "keep the judicial system 
in efficient operation," State Realty Co. of Boston v. MacNeil 
Bros. Co., 358 Mass. 374, 379 (1970), and to protect the 
"defendant's ability to receive a fair trial," Connelly, 418 
Mass. at 39.  Established methods, however, would have sufficed 
to serve this interest.  In particular, prior to issuing her 
ruling, the judge could have made a finding on the record 
concerning the existence of either egregious misconduct or 
prejudice to the defendant, which would have enabled appellate 
review of the "propriety of such a finding."  See Commonwealth 
v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301, 314 (1984).  If more information 
were needed, the judge could have scheduled a hearing to 
determine whether a dismissal with prejudice was warranted.  
This would have provided the Commonwealth an opportunity to 
prepare an argument that its conduct did not surpass the "high 
14 
 
threshold that must be crossed before dismissal [with prejudice] 
is appropriate."  Commonwealth v. Viverito, 422 Mass. 228, 230 
(1996).  We therefore conclude that the judge's ruling was not 
essential for the "judicial department to function" (citation 
omitted).  See Charles, 466 Mass. at 73.  Rather, the ruling 
constituted an unwarranted intrusion upon the powers granted 
exclusively to the executive branch under art. 30. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  So much of the order granting the 
defendant's motion to dismiss as required the Commonwealth to 
file a motion to vacate the dismissal is vacated. 
So ordered.