Case Title: TRUSKY v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
TRUSKY v. STATE2000 WY 1237 P.3d 5Case Number: 98-298Decided: 05/26/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
WENDY TRUSKY, Appellant 
(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Converse County The Honorable Barton R. Voigt, 
Judge.

Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Monique McBride, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel.Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Barbara L. Boyer, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J.; THOMAS, MACY, & HILL, JJ.; and JOHN D. TROUGHTON*, 
D.J.

* Judge 
Troughton concurred in the result of part A and concurred in parts B, C 
& D.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1] The primary 
issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered 
the defense to produce a licensed clinical social worker's notes for the 
prosecution. Appellant Wendy Trusky (Wendy) hired the social worker to perform a 
psycho-social evaluation for use in her defense. The social worker was expected 
to testify as an expert, if necessary, during Wendy's homicide trial. Wendy 
claims the notes were encompassed within the attorney-client privilege. The 
introduction of evidence of Wendy's consensual sexual conduct with a male friend 
after the death of her husband and improper information before the trial court 
at the time of sentencing are additional issues we must 
resolve.

[¶2] We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3] Wendy 
presents the following issues for our review:

ISSUE 
I

Did the trial 
court commit reversible error by requiring the defense to provide to the 
prosecution notes generated by a defense social worker in preparation for 
trial?

ISSUE 
II

Did the trial 
court err in permitting the prosecutor to introduce evidence of Wendy's 
consensual sexual conduct with a male friend which occurred after Martin 
Trusky's death?

ISSUE 
III

Did the trial 
court rely on improper premises when it sentenced Wendy?

FACTS

[¶4] Wendy 
married Martin Trusky on October 16, 1976. The couple had four children, and, in 
1993, the family moved from Pennsylvania to Wyoming where they purchased 
sixty-eight acres of land north of Glenrock. Wendy was a licensed practical 
nurse and began working at a nursing home in Casper. Because Martin was unable 
to read, he helped out with odd jobs, doing mostly mechanical work, but Wendy 
provided the family's main source of income.

[¶5] Prior to 
their marriage and continuing throughout it, the couple had a history of 
domestic violence. Wendy testified that, on several occasions, she ended up in 
the hospital as a result of that violence. When she would return home late from 
work and shopping, Martin would throw the sacks of groceries or purchases on the 
ground to demonstrate his anger. He would stay in a rage for hours, break 
household items, and punch anyone he thought had crossed him, which included 
Wendy and their children. He also mentally abused Wendy and their children by 
killing the family pets, going so far as cooking their pet goat for dinner and 
informing them, after they had finished eating, that they had just eaten the 
goat. On one occasion, one of the children called the sheriff to stop Martin 
from beating Wendy. This did not stop the cycle of abuse. At times, to temper 
these fits of rage, Wendy put over-the-counter sleeping aids into her husband's 
dinner so that he would leave her and the children alone.

[¶6] After 
leaving work on the afternoon of December 13, 1996, Wendy stopped at the grocery 
store and was late returning home. Martin threw the bags of groceries on the 
ground, and the couple "scuffled." Martin punched Wendy in the lip and grabbed 
her throat. On December 15, 1996, Wendy took one of the children to work with 
her, and, after she finished working, they stopped at Wal-Mart on the way out of 
town, arriving home in Glenrock about five o'clock in the afternoon. Wendy and 
Martin had another scuffle, and Martin struck Wendy. Wendy proceeded to make 
dinner, putting a sleeping aid in Martin's food. While Martin was in the 
bathroom, Wendy asked one of the children to bring her one bullet. She loaded 
the rifle and placed it beside the couch. After dinner, the family watched 
movies. The children went to bed when the movies were over, and Martin and Wendy 
discussed their failed marriage and his plans to return to 
Pennsylvania.

[¶7] Wendy shot 
Martin sometime during the morning of December 16, 1996, after the children had 
gone to school. Wendy and the prosecution presented differing versions of how 
the shooting took place. According to Wendy, she shot Martin during an 
altercation. The prosecution maintained that she shot him while he was sleeping. 
Regardless of this discrepancy, the parties do not dispute that Wendy shot a 
bullet straight into the back of Martin's head. Thereafter, Wendy wrapped the 
body in a quilt, dragged it outside, and buried it under a pile of tires and car 
parts.

[¶8] Wendy began 
to manufacture different stories regarding Martin's whereabouts. She told the 
children he had returned to Pennsylvania but told Martin's niece he had run off 
with another woman. Wendy told a law enforcement officer who was investigating a 
missing person's report for Martin that she did not know where he was but she 
suspected he had broken into her apartment. She even filed a police report 
regarding the alleged break-in. There were other versions regarding his absence 
that circulated, which included that she had taken Martin to the bus station so 
he could return to Pennsylvania and that he was working on a 
ranch.

[¶9] After 
receiving no contact from or information about Martin, his family hired a 
private investigator. Law enforcement officers entered the Glenrock property 
with a search warrant to search the premises for any sign of Martin. They 
ultimately found his body wrapped in a quilt and buried under a pile of tires 
behind the house.

[¶10] On October 
1, 1997, the county attorney filed an information charging Wendy with first- 
degree murder of Martin. Wendy was arrested on October 4, 1997. She pleaded not 
guilty, using battered woman syndrome as an element of her self-defense claim.1 The jury returned a guilty verdict 
on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. The trial court 
sentenced Wendy to a prison term of not less than twenty-five years nor more 
than forty years. Wendy received credit for the 321 days she served in jail 
prior to sentencing. The notice of appeal was timely 
filed.

DISCUSSION

A. Social 
Worker's Notes

[¶11] Wendy 
claims that the trial court improperly invaded the attorney-client privilege and 
violated her constitutional right to counsel when it required her to produce 
notes for the prosecution that had been taken by a licensed clinical social 
worker during a psycho-social evaluation of her. She also maintains that the 
trial court improperly expanded the discovery rules set out in W.R.Cr.P. 
16(b)(1)(B) and W.R.Cr.P. 26.2(a) when it required her to give the notes to the 
prosecution. We are not persuaded by Wendy's arguments.

[¶12] The 
defense hired the social worker to perform a psycho-social evaluation of Wendy. 
The prosecution filed a motion to compel discovery in March of 1998. Included in 
the motion was a request for "test questionnaires, notes of interviews, notes 
and reports of statements made, and other materials made or generated by [the 
social worker] or Psychotherapy Services" during Wendy's examination or 
evaluation for battered woman syndrome. Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 26.2, the 
prosecutor also requested "all notes and records to be referred to by any 
psychological, psychiatric, or other such person[s] who participated in the 
examination process of Wendy Trusky."

[¶13] Wendy 
claims that the social worker was acting as an agent for the defense and the 
social worker's communications with her were, therefore, protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. She also maintains that the Wyoming Rules of Evidence 
and Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law mandate that individuals 
retained by counsel must keep information, which the client discloses to them, 
confidential. Wendy claims that, by requiring the social worker to disclose the 
notes of their discussions, the trial court intruded so substantially into the 
province of the attorney-client privilege that it violated both the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 6 and 10 of 
the Wyoming Constitution.

[¶14] The 
essence of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is, 
indeed, privacy of communication with counsel. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62, 62 S. Ct. 457, 461, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). However, mere government 
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, although not condoned by the 
court, is not of itself violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Rather, the right is only violated when the intrusion substantially prejudices 
the defendant. Prejudice can manifest itself in several ways. It results when 
evidence gained through the interference is used against the defendant at trial. 
It also can result from the prosecution's use of confidential information 
pertaining to the defense plans and strategy, from government influence which 
destroys the defendant's confidence in his attorney, and from other actions 
designed to give the prosecution an unfair advantage at 
trial.

[¶15] United 
States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980).

We have not 
previously addressed whether the attorney-client privilege protects 
conversations between a defendant and a mental health professional hired by the 
defense when a defendant places her mental capacity at issue. We, therefore, 
turn to other jurisdictions for guidance on this issue. The Washington Supreme 
Court summarized the holdings of courts from several jurisdictions in State v. 
Pawlyk, 800 P.2d 338, 342 (Wash. 1990) (en banc). Some courts hold that, when a 
defendant asserts an insanity defense, the privilege applies. 800 P.2d  at 342. 
Others hold that the privilege is waived or does not apply. Id. We believe the 
cases which allow production of the information for the prosecution are better 
reasoned.

[¶16] In State 
v. Hamlet, 944 P.2d 1026, 1030 (Wash. 1997) (en banc), the Washington Supreme 
Court opined that, in cases involving claims of diminished capacity or insanity, 
the defense's evidence concerning the defendant's mental state may be more 
accurate than the prosecution's evidence. The court ruled, therefore, that, by 
asserting a defense of diminished capacity or insanity, the defendant waived the 
attorney-client privilege as to evidence concerning his mental state and the 
defense was obligated to disclose the evidence to the prosecution. 944 P.2d  at 
1030.

[¶17] In Gray v. 
District Court of Eleventh Judicial District, 884 P.2d 286 (Colo. 1994) (en 
banc), cert denied, 514 U.S. 1084 (1995), the Colorado Supreme Court considered 
a Colorado statute pertaining to discovery and ruled that, when the defendant 
tenders a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity or asserts the affirmative 
defense of impaired mental condition, the attorney- client privilege is waived 
between the defendant and agents, including psychiatrists or psychologists, of 
the attorney. In People v. Ullery, 964 P.2d 539, 541 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997), 
aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 984 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1999) (en banc), a 
Colorado court of appeals held that a defendant who asserts the defense of 
impaired mental condition must produce all communications for the prosecution 
which occurred between the defendant and any mental health professional employed 
on his behalf. 964 P.2d  at 541-42. The court specifically excluded disclosure of 
the defense attorney's work product, including his legal research, theories, 
opinions, or conclusions. 964 P.2d  at 542. The state appealed to the Colorado 
Supreme Court, contesting the court of appeals' decision that the attorney's 
work product was not subject to disclosure under the applicable statute. People 
v. Ullery, 984 P.2d 586, 589 (Colo. 1999) (en banc). That court determined that 
the privilege applicable to the attorney's work product was not waived and 
information which truly fell within the category of attorney work product was 
not subject to disclosure to the prosecution. Id.

[¶18] In 
Clifford v. United States, 532 A.2d 628, 636 (D.C. App. 1987), a District of 
Columbia court of appeals stated: "[U]nless the defendant has waived the fifth 
amendment right against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to 
counsel, the government cannot attempt to prove guilt or determine punishment 
with expert testimony based on statements of the accused made during a compelled 
psychiatric examination." The privileges against self-incrimination and right to 
counsel, however, apply to only interrogation by government agents. 532 A.2d  at 
636. The court of appeals ruled, therefore, that, when the defendant voluntarily 
undergoes a mental examination, the trial court may order the defendant to 
provide the information gathered during the examination to the government 
without violating the defendant's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. 
Id.

[¶19] Wendy may 
not argue a deficient mental condition and, at the same time, claim protection 
by privilege. She voluntarily hired the licensed social worker to evaluate her. 
The trial court's order requiring production of the social worker's notes did 
not intrude on Wendy's attorney-client privilege, and her constitutional right 
to assistance of counsel was not violated. Wendy argues that she was prejudiced 
by the prosecution's receipt of the social worker's notes because the 
prosecution used the information to prepare more thoroughly for its 
cross-examination of her. She overlooks the fact that, when she asserted an 
affirmative defense on the basis of diminished capacity and battered woman 
syndrome, the need for accurate evidence on her mental state became especially 
critical.

[¶20] The social 
worker was one of the first people to examine Wendy. The social worker's results 
may be considered more reliable than Wendy's own statements as to her mental 
state. Basic fairness and integrity demand that we allow the prosecution access 
to any reports bearing on Wendy's mental state in order to avoid giving her an 
unfair advantage. See Pawlyk, 800 P.2d  at 347-48.

B. W.R.Cr.P. 
16(b)(1)(B) and W.R.Cr.P. 26.2(a)

[¶21] Wendy 
contends that W.R.Cr.P. 16(b)(1)(B) and W.R.Cr.P. 26.2(a) did not mandate 
disclosure of the social worker's notes and interviews. The trial court has 
broad discretion in controlling discovery. Nowotny v. L & B Contract 
Industries, Inc., 933 P.2d 452, 461 (Wyo. 1997). In Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)), 
we said: "`Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.'"

[¶22] W.R.Cr.P. 
16(b)(1)(B) states:

(B) Reports of 
examinations and tests. - If the defendant demands disclosure under subdivision 
(a)(1)(C) or (a)(1)(D), upon compliance with such demand by the state, the 
defendant, on demand of the state, shall permit the state to inspect and copy or 
photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of 
scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or 
copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendant, which the 
defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at the trial or which were 
prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the 
results or reports relate to that witness's testimony.

[¶23] W.R.Cr.P. 
26.2(a) states:

(a) Order for 
production. - Upon order of the court, the attorney for the state or the 
defendant and the defendant's attorney shall produce for the examination and use 
of the other party, any written or recorded statement of a witness other than 
the defendant in their possession or which they may reasonably obtain and which 
relates to the subject matter about which the witness has testified or will 
testify and:

(1) Upon demand 
of the other party, the court shall order the statement to be produced after a 
witness has testified; and

(2) Upon motion 
of a party or upon its own motion, the court may require the statement to be 
produced at any time before trial.

[¶24] Wendy 
concedes that, once the social worker was designated as an expert, her results 
or reports were discoverable under W.R.Cr.P. 16(b)(1)(B) and W.R.Cr.P. 26.2(a). 
She argues, however, that the prosecution's right to discovery did not extend to 
the social worker's notes from interviews or conversations with her. The state 
maintains that the trial judge properly gave it access to the social worker's 
notes, especially in light of Wendy's failure to produce a report of any 
substance.

[¶25] We do not 
need to address whether the notes fall under the rubric of W.R.Cr.P. 16(b)(1)(B) 
and W.R.Cr.P. 26.2(a) because the record does not include a copy of the report 
or the notes. Without copies of the report or the notes in question, we are 
unable to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in Wendy's 
case. The appellant has the burden to prove abuse of discretion and the burden 
to provide an adequate record on appeal. Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 150 
(Wyo. 1998); Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996). Given 
Wendy's failure to provide us with a copy of the social worker's notes or the 
report, we have no choice but to affirm the trial court's decision to allow 
discovery of the notes pursuant to the relevant rules of criminal 
procedure.

C. Impeachment 
Testimony

[¶26] The next 
issue we must address is whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting Wendy's boyfriend's testimony concerning their sexual relationship. 
Decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and we give considerable deference to those 
determinations. Sturgis v. State, 932 P.2d 199, 201 (Wyo. 
1997).

[¶27] As long as 
there is a "consistent and legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling," we 
will not find an abuse of discretion. Id.

Wendy claims 
that the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence 
of her sexual relationship with a man whom she met several months after her 
husband's death. During direct examination, Wendy testified that her husband 
sexually abused her and frequently forced her to do things against her will such 
as watching pornographic movies and replicating acts seen in those movies, 
performing oral and anal sex, and engaging in sexual behavior with him and 
another man. According to Wendy's expert, such sexual abuse is one of the 
factors involved in battered woman syndrome. Her expert testified: "Sex pressure 
rape, for those of you who aren't aware of the term, when you have sex with 
someone probably willingly then they force you to do things during the sexual 
act you are ashamed of. You feel guilty or makes you feel dirty or against your 
morals or value system."

[¶28] The 
prosecutor cross-examined Wendy about her testimony that she would not have 
engaged in these sexual acts if her husband had not forced her to do so. Wendy 
objected to the line of questioning, but the trial court allowed it. Given the 
nature of Wendy's direct examination, the trial court allowed the prosecutor 
some latitude, limiting the nature of questions to those related specifically to 
Wendy's direct testimony.

[¶29] The 
prosecutor also questioned Wendy's boyfriend about their sexual relationship. In 
contrast to Wendy's testimony, he testified that she willingly and, at her own 
instigation, performed oral sex on him; that the two of them had briefly watched 
a pornographic movie together; and that Wendy owned that 
movie.

[¶30] Wendy 
maintains that the evidence of her sexual relationship with her new boyfriend 
was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible because it did not prove or disprove 
an element of the crime charged. W.R.E. 402. The trial court concluded that 
evidence contradicting Wendy's testimony that she abhorred these sexual 
practices and activities was relevant and, therefore, admissible. We agree. The 
evidence was relevant to the issue of Wendy's veracity. When a defendant "takes 
the witness stand in [her] own defense, [her] credibility becomes an issue and 
[she] may be cross-examined" regarding that testimony. Montez v. State, 670 P.2d 694, 696 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶31] Wendy 
further claims that the prosecutor used the evidence to convey to the jury that, 
by voluntarily engaging in such conduct with someone else, Wendy lied about her 
husband's sexual abuse of her. She contends, therefore, that the prosecution 
used the evidence to show that she could not have been afraid of her husband. 
She equates this evidence with other bad acts evidence and maintains it was 
inadmissible under W.R.E. 404(b). This evidence clearly does not fall within the 
rubric of W.R.E. 404(b). The prosecution used the evidence of Wendy's sexual 
activity with her boyfriend to demonstrate she lied about her distaste for such 
sexual activities, thus questioning her credibility and 
veracity.

[A] defendant 
who has voluntarily testified may be cross-examined the same as any other 
witness and the latitude of cross-examination is largely within the discretion 
of the court. . . .

. . . [T]he 
prosecution may impeach a witness' credibility by presenting competent evidence 
of an attempt to fabricate evidence.

[¶32] Roby v. 
State, 587 P.2d 641, 644 (Wyo. 1978). The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing the prosecutor to introduce this 
evidence.

Wendy also 
claims that the "rape shield" statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-312 (LEXIS 1999), 
prohibited admitting evidence of her sexual conduct. The rape shield statute 
applies to "prosecution[s] under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-305 [6-2-304] or for 
any lesser included offense, if evidence of the prior sexual conduct of the 
victim, reputation evidence or opinion evidence as to the character of the 
victim is to be offered." Section 6-2-312(a). In Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641 
(Wyo. 1981), we addressed the purpose of rape shield statutes. They "were 
designed to protect the victim from embarrassment and abuse at trial and also to 
encourage the reporting of sexual assaults to the authorities. They are not 
enacted for the protection of the accused." 638 P.2d  at 646. The rape shield 
statute is inapplicable to Wendy's situation because first-degree murder is not 
one of the crimes enumerated in § 6-2-312(a) and she was the perpetrator, rather 
than the victim, of the offense at issue.

D. 
Sentencing

[¶33] Wendy 
maintains that the trial court erred when it sentenced her. The state argues 
that the trial court's sentencing decisions were appropriate and any errors were 
harmless. We agree with the state.

Sentencing 
decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial court. Hamill v. 
State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Wyo. 1997). "A sentence will not be disturbed 
because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an abuse of 
discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and circumstances which 
manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public 
sense of fair play." Smith v. State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 (Wyo. 1997). "An error 
warrants reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's 
substantial rights. The party who is appealing bears the burden to establish 
that an error was prejudicial." Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Wyo. 
1995) (citations omitted); see also Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 155 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶34] The jury 
determined that Wendy was not guilty of first-degree murder but was guilty of 
second-degree murder. It did not, therefore, find that the state had proven the 
element of premeditation. Wendy argues that the trial court improperly 
considered premeditation in its sentencing decision and ultimately sentenced her 
as if she had been convicted of first-degree murder. She cites to these remarks 
to support her proposition:

[¶35] But I 
also, as I said, heard the evidence in this case at the trial, and there was 
considerable evidence of premeditation in this case. The jury maybe did not find 
that. There was considerable evidence, at least inferences to be made from that 
evidence, that the defendant was somewhat less than fully truthful in her 
account of the events. The bullets were purchased long before the event. The gun 
was loaded and hidden the night before. I - I've never been one to really 
believe much in coincidences. And I think it's an extreme coincidence that 
Martin Trusky's last abusive act happened to land you right next to the gun that 
you had hidden.

[¶36] This Court 
has not addressed whether, in its sentencing determination, the sentencing judge 
may consider elements that the jury did not find when it determined guilt. The 
North Carolina Supreme Court, however, addressed that very issue in State v. 
Marley, 364 S.E.2d 133 (N.C. 1988). Marley was tried for first-degree murder, 
but the jury found insufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Marley premeditated and deliberated the killing. 364 S.E.2d  at 138. The 
Marley court held: "To allow the trial court to use at sentencing an essential 
element of a greater offense as an aggravating factor, when the presumption of 
innocence was not, at trial, overcome as to this element, is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence itself." 364 S.E.2d  at 139. It 
concluded that, because premeditation and deliberation are the factors 
distinguishing first-degree murder from second-degree murder, due process and 
fundamental fairness precluded the trial court from using premeditation and 
deliberation as aggravating factors when sentencing Marley for second-degree 
murder. Id.

[¶37] We agree 
with the North Carolina Supreme Court and conclude that, in making their 
sentencing decisions, trial courts are precluded from considering evidence or 
elements that the jury did not find had been proven by the prosecution. Factors 
the trial court may consider in its sentencing decision include age, health, 
children, employment record, intelligence, family history, and education. Wright 
v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶38] The trial 
court's discussion of premeditation in this case was, therefore, inappropriate. 
Nevertheless, we do not believe that the evidence of premeditation and 
deliberation materially affected the trial court's decision. A person who is 
found guilty of second-degree murder may be sentenced to life in prison.2 Accordingly, if the evidence of 
premeditation had weighed heavily in its sentencing decision, the trial court 
presumably would have sentenced Wendy to a life sentence rather than to a 
twenty-five to forty-year sentence. Viewing the comments about premeditation in 
relation to the other factors the trial court considered in its decision, 
including Wendy's age, children, and education, we conclude that the court's 
comments were harmless error. Wendy's sentence fell within the statutorily 
prescribed range for second-degree murder and outside the range for first-degree 
murder. Therefore, her claim that she was sentenced as if she had been convicted 
of first-degree murder is without merit and must fail.

[¶39] Wendy also 
asserts that the trial court acted improperly when it considered "good time" in 
determining her sentence. She cites to these remarks:

Most 
significantly to me is the fact that there are two types of what is known as 
"good time" authorized by statute. They are called "statutory good time" and 
"social good time." Now, those may act to reduce both the minimum and the 
maximum sentence that is imposed. A lot of people don't know that. They think 
good time only goes against the maximum, but it also applies against the minimum 
sentence. As a generalization, it can be said that statutory good time applies 
against the maximum sentence and special good time applies against the minimum 
sentence. As an example only, I will tell you a defendant who is sentenced to 15 
to 20 years will serve 10 years and two months if all good time is applied to 
that sentence.

[¶40] See Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-420 (LEXIS 1999). We do not believe that the trial court 
considered good time as a factor in Wendy's sentencing. Instead, the judge 
referred to the possibility of a "good time" reduction to provide Wendy with an 
incentive to behave appropriately while she was 
incarcerated.

[¶41] Finally, 
we address the victim impact testimony. Wyoming law permits the trial court to 
consider victim impact statements prior to imposing a sentence. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-21-103 (LEXIS 1999). The purpose of "§ 7-21-103 is to permit the sentencing 
court to consider information about the harm caused by the defendant during the 
commission of the particular crime for which sentence is about to be imposed." 
Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1116 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶42] During 
Wendy's sentencing, Martin's sister read a letter into evidence from a next-door 
neighbor. Wendy contends that the neighbor did not fit the definition of victim 
and, therefore, Martin's sister should not have been allowed to read the 
neighbor's letter at the sentencing hearing. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-101(a)(iii) 
(LEXIS 1999) defines victim as "an individual who has suffered direct or 
threatened physical, emotional or financial harm as the result of the commission 
of a crime or a family member of a minor, incompetent person or a homicide 
victim."

[¶43] We 
conclude that the neighbor was a victim. In his letter to the court, the 
neighbor wrote that Martin frequently helped him fix things, cared for his 
animals, and checked on his property when he was away, all without being paid. 
The neighbor also explained his friendship with Martin and indicated that he 
socialized with both of the Truskys two or three times a week. Certainly, he 
suffered emotional, if not financial, harm as the result of Martin's death. The 
neighbor, therefore, qualified as a victim, and his statement was properly 
admitted to the trial court.

[¶44] In Wright, 
670 P.2d  at 1093, we addressed the pressures the sentencing judge is 
under:

The judge must 
isolate himself from (1) the "sob-sister" type who pressures for leniency on the 
basis of the convicted person's humanity without consideration of the injured 
victims and other pertinent factors, and (2) the vengeful "blood-at-any-cost" 
type who pressures for "hanging" without consideration of the human nature of 
the convicted one and the circumstances surrounding him and the crime 
itself.

[¶45] Similarly, 
the trial court stated in the situation before us:

People think 
they are helping by sending all of those letters and saying things on one side 
or the other. But when you get a certain number on each side, I have to conclude 
that Marty Trusky was either a demon or a saint, and Wendy Trusky is either a 
demon or a saint. And it depends on which side you're looking from. And that 
cannot be the totally controlling factor in this case. I had to discount much of 
this material as the extreme view of family members who see what they want to 
see and hear what they want to hear, although I have to say that I do not doubt 
that Wendy Trusky was the victim of domestic abuse.

[¶46] It is 
clear from this discussion that Wendy was not materially prejudiced by the 
reading of the neighbor's letter. The letter was merely one factor the trial 
court took into consideration when it sentenced her. As stated above, the law 
allows sentences for second-degree murder to range from twenty years to life 
imprisonment. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 (LEXIS 1999). The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in sentencing Wendy to a term of twenty-five to forty 
years.

[¶47] 
Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 In Witt v. 
State, 892 P.2d 132 (Wyo. 1995), we recognized that battered woman syndrome was 
not a separate defense but was an element of 
self-defense.

2 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-104 (LEXIS 1999) states:

Whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any 
human being is guilty of murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in 
the penitentiary for any term not less than twenty (20) years, or during 
life.