Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Pfundstein

Citation: 2010-Ohio-6150

Docket Number: 20101243

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Pfundstein, 128 Ohio St.3d 61, 2010-Ohio-6150.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. PFUNDSTEIN. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Pfundstein,  
128 Ohio St.3d 61, 2010-Ohio-6150.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Multiple violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct — Deference to panel’s credibility determinations — Stayed one-
year license suspension. 
(No. 2010-1243 — Submitted October 12, 2010 — Decided December 21, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-076. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Joseph Anthony Pfundstein of Pepper Pike, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0056167, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1991.  The charges here stem from respondent’s representation of Phillip Einhorn 
in two separate matters: collection of a legal-malpractice judgment and litigation 
of an employment-discrimination claim against Einhorn’s former employer.  
Relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent with multiple violations of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, in each matter alleging that respondent had 
misrepresented the status of the litigation to his client, had failed to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his client, had failed to keep 
his client reasonably informed of the status of the case, had failed to respond 
promptly to his client’s reasonable requests for information, and had engaged in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and adversely reflecting on his 
fitness to practice law. 
{¶ 2} The parties stipulated that respondent’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable with 
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reasonable requests for information from the client), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from 
engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
that adversely reflects upon the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), but disputed 
whether that conduct also violated 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable 
diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of legal matters), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
{¶ 3} Based on the submitted stipulations and other evidence, a panel of 
board members found clear and convincing evidence that respondent had violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h), concluded that 
insufficient evidence supported the allegations that respondent had violated 
8.4(d), and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law 
for 12 months, all stayed on conditions. 
{¶ 4} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended 
sanction.  Relator agrees with the board’s recommendation of a 12-month 
suspension but urges that only six months of that suspension be stayed on 
conditions. 
{¶ 5} We overrule relator’s objections, adopt the board’s findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, and accept its recommendation that we suspend 
respondent from the practice of law for one year, with the entire suspension 
stayed on the conditions that respondent (1) comply with his Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program (“OLAP”) contract, (2) accept the treatment recommended by 
OLAP and his psychologist during the period of suspension, (3) remain on 
probation — monitored by relator — during the term of his three-year OLAP 
contract, and (4) pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings. 
Misconduct 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
Count I — Legal-malpractice judgment collection 
{¶ 6} In 1998, Phillip Einhorn hired respondent to represent him in a 
legal-malpractice claim.  In April 2001, respondent obtained a $3,906.52 
judgment against the attorney in favor of Einhorn. Respondent then agreed to 
pursue collection of the judgment, but by 2007 had done little to collect on it, and 
it had not been satisfied. 
{¶ 7} Einhorn made multiple telephone and e-mail requests to 
respondent for the status of the collection effort, but respondent failed to timely 
respond.  Further, he falsely advised Einhorn in July 2007 that he “was waiting to 
get [the attorney] into court” and that he had “been waiting on a court date to 
finish [his] update.”  In August 2007, he misrepresented that he had been “waiting 
[on the] Garfield [Heights Municipal] Court [for] a date for a show cause motion 
that should be coming in [about] a month,” and in January 2008, he falsely 
advised that he “was waiting for a Show Cause date for [the attorney’s] failure to 
appear at a recent hearing.”  In fact, respondent had not been involved in any 
litigation involving the attorney at the time of these statements. 
{¶ 8} In addition, although respondent had advised Einhorn that he 
“found out where [the attorney] works” and was “trying to garnish her wages,” in 
reality, respondent had done neither.  In fact, the attorney has been indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law since 2002.  Einhorn finally terminated the 
representation in August 2008. 
{¶ 9} We accept the board’s findings that respondent violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h).  We also agree with the 
board’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence does not support the 
allegations that respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) with regard to this 
conduct, and we therefore dismiss that part of the complaint. 
Count II — The employment-discrimination claim 
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{¶ 10} In late 1999 or early 2000, Einhorn also hired respondent to 
represent him in an employment-discrimination claim against his former 
employer.  Respondent filed a complaint in May 2000, but Einhorn subsequently 
failed to cooperate in discovery, and as a result, the trial court ordered him to 
respond to discovery or face sanctions, including dismissal with prejudice.  
Because Einhorn did not provide the requested documents, respondent voluntarily 
dismissed the case in February 2001 to preserve the claim.  After dismissing the 
lawsuit, however, respondent did not perform any other legal work on this matter. 
{¶ 11} Nonetheless, in 2007 and 2008, respondent misrepresented the 
status of the case, suggesting that the claim remained pending.  In an August 14, 
2007 e-mail, for example, respondent advised Einhorn that the litigation remained 
“kind of in a holding pattern[,] nothing reall[y] going on but should be picking up 
in a couple of weeks.  By any chance are you coming in to Cleveland in the event 
of depositions or anything like this[?]”  When Einhorn inquired, “[W]hat type of 
depositions are we talking about and for what,” respondent falsely represented 
that he was “trying to figure out what kind of depo[sition] they want” and 
suggested that a teleconference might be possible.  And when Einhorn sought to 
confirm that his deposition would be held in Cleveland on September 24, 2007, 
respondent lied, writing that he could not confirm the date because he and the 
attorney for the former employer both had other commitments that day.  Einhorn 
requested an update on the litigation on November 28, 2007, but respondent did 
not provide information until January 2, 2008, and only then to misrepresent that 
he had been “trying to figure out a way to get [the client’s] depo[sition] without 
[his] having to come to town.”  Respondent also sent an e-mail on May 25, 2008, 
falsely stating that he had already mailed the update requested by Einhorn and 
that he would send a second copy. 
{¶ 12} At the hearing before the panel, respondent admitted that no legal 
action had been pending and no depositions had been planned, and he testified 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
that he had sent the false e-mails to keep Einhorn from filing a grievance against 
him and to “buy [himself] time” to figure out how to deal with the situation.  
Nonetheless, Einhorn terminated respondent in August 2008. 
{¶ 13} We accept the board’s findings that respondent violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h).  We also agree with the 
board’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence does not support the 
allegations that respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) with regard to this 
conduct, and we therefore dismiss that part of the complaint. 
Sanction 
{¶ 14} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider a 
number of factors, including the duties the lawyer violated, the lawyer’s mental 
state, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In 
making our determination, we weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating 
factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  Because each disciplinary 
case is unique, we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule but may take 
into account “all relevant factors” in determining what sanction to impose.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). 
Aggravating Factors 
{¶ 15} In aggravation, the board found that respondent had engaged in a 
pattern of misconduct and had committed multiple offenses. 
Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 16} In mitigation, the board found that respondent had no prior 
disciplinary record, displayed a cooperative attitude and remorse during the 
disciplinary proceedings, and had submitted over 20 letters attesting to his good 
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character and reputation as well as to his community and legal service spanning 
his 18 years of practice.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (e).  The board noted 
that Bedford Municipal Court Judge Brian J. Melling, who employs respondent as 
a part-time magistrate, testified to respondent’s competence and good character 
and that Paul A. Caimi, the associate director of OLAP and respondent’s monitor, 
testified that respondent had been complying with his three-year OLAP contract 
and poses no threat to the public. 
{¶ 17} The board further found that relator did not show that respondent’s 
misconduct had harmed Einhorn, and it also found that respondent proved that he 
suffers from a mental disability within the meaning of BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g).  Relying on the testimony of respondent’s psychologist, Dr. Roger 
Neil Hess, the board concluded that respondent had been diagnosed with 
dysthymia, which is a form of depression, that this mental disability contributed to 
cause the misconduct, that respondent had undergone a sustained period of 
successful treatment, and that he could return to competent, ethical professional 
practice. 
{¶ 18} Relator objects to the board’s conclusions, contends that the 
evidence does not support the board’s decision to consider respondent’s mental 
disability mitigating, and attacks the credibility of Dr. Hess’s determination that 
respondent’s dysthymia contributed to his dishonesty.  In particular, relator notes 
that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder  (“DSMMD”) does 
not indicate that dysthymia causes dishonesty.  Relator further asserts that Dr. 
Hess’s testimony reveals a lack of knowledge of the facts of respondent’s 
misconduct, emphasizing that Dr. Hess testified that the misconduct had taken 
place in 2001 and initially stated on cross-examination that there were only two 
instances of dishonesty. 
{¶ 19} We explained in Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 
521, 2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 39, that “[w]e will defer to a panel’s 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
credibility determination in our independent review of discipline cases unless the 
record weighs heavily against those determinations.” 
{¶ 20} While Dr. Hess admitted that the DSMMD does not indicate that 
dysthymia causes dishonesty, he testified that other literature as well as his 
education, experience, and contact with respondent supported his professional 
opinion that dysthymia could cause a person to be dishonest when he or she has 
difficulty dealing with people, and he opined that respondent’s dysthymia 
contributed to cause the misconduct that occurred in this case.  In addition, the 
board noted that relator produced no evidence to rebut Dr. Hess’s opinion that 
respondent’s dysthymia contributed to respondent’s dishonesty. 
{¶ 21} Further, Dr. Hess testified that he understood that respondent had 
“informed Mr. Einhorn that [respondent] had taken certain actions * * * and that 
those were not true statements” and that there may have been “more than just two 
times that [respondent] was dishonest about those two different legal matters.”  
Dr. Hess’s confusion over the date of the misconduct does not show his ignorance 
of the history of the misconduct at issue.  He testified that respondent had been 
referred to him by OLAP and had been open and candid during their frequent 
therapy sessions. 
{¶ 22} Relator’s arguments that the board erred in relying on Caimi’s 
testimony that respondent’s mental disorder had contributed to his misconduct 
and its assertions that respondent’s “dishonesty is not consistent with what 
common sense tells us a person * * * acting in a cloud of depression would be 
able to do” and that the supposed depression is “inconsistent with his abilities to 
function normally and successfully in all other areas of his life at the same time” 
similarly attack the credibility of the evidence.  (Emphasis sic.)  However, relator 
failed to object to Caimi’s testimony and points to no evidence in the record 
contradicting Dr. Hess’s statement that respondent’s dysthymia could manifest 
itself in some contexts but not in others. 
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{¶ 23} Accordingly, relator has not shown that the record weighs heavily 
against the panel’s credibility determinations, and we accept the board’s findings 
regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. 
{¶ 24} The parties agree that a suspension from the practice of law for one 
year, stayed on conditions, is the appropriate sanction in this case, but relator 
urges in its objections that an actual suspension is necessary based on 
respondent’s pattern of misconduct involving dishonesty. 
{¶ 25} While relator is correct that “[d]ishonest conduct on the part of an 
attorney generally warrants an actual suspension from the practice of law,” 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Rooney, 110 Ohio St.3d 349, 2006-Ohio-4576, 853 
N.E.2d 663, ¶ 12, we have explained that the type of mitigating evidence 
introduced in this case can justify imposing a lesser sanction. 
{¶ 26} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Kimmins, 123 Ohio St.3d 207, 2009-
Ohio-4943, 915 N.E.2d 330, we determined that mitigating evidence that the 
attorney had no prior disciplinary record, had proven his good character and 
reputation, had acted without a selfish motive, and had fully cooperated with the 
disciplinary process warranted staying the one-year suspension imposed, 
notwithstanding the attorney’s dishonesty, misuse of the client’s confidential 
information, and failure to protect the client’s property.  Id. at ¶ 18, 22. 
{¶ 27} In Dayton Bar Assn. v. Ellison, 118 Ohio St.3d 128, 2008-Ohio-
1808, 886 N.E.2d 836, the attorney’s negligence resulted in the dismissal of the 
client’s employment-discrimination claim, and when the client contacted the 
attorney to check on the status of her claim, the attorney falsely stated that she did 
not know anything and failed to inform the client of the court’s action until more 
than six months after the claim had been dismissed.  Id. at ¶ 8-9.  Noting that “we 
have imposed a stayed suspension despite the dishonesty where sufficient 
mitigating circumstances are present,” id. at ¶ 13, we imposed a one-year 
suspension, stayed on conditions, because the attorney provided an important 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
service to the community, had practiced for 27 years with only a 20-year-old 
public reprimand on her disciplinary record, had earned the respect of her fellow 
practitioners, had cooperated fully in the disciplinary process, and had 
acknowledged her wrongdoing and shown remorse.  Id. at ¶ 14-16. 
{¶ 28} Similarly, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Fumich, 116 Ohio St.3d 257, 
2007-Ohio-6040, 878 N.E.2d 6, the attorney filed a medical-malpractice claim on 
behalf of the estate of the victim, but failed to comply with the trial court’s case-
management order or to oppose the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, 
resulting in the dismissal of the complaint.  Two years later, after a client inquired 
about the status of the case, the attorney claimed to be negotiating a settlement for 
the medical-malpractice claim without revealing that that claim had been 
dismissed.  The attorney then deposited his personal funds into his trust account 
and wrote the client a check for $16,000.  Notwithstanding this dishonesty, we 
determined that mitigating evidence that the attorney had no prior disciplinary 
record, cooperated fully in the disciplinary process, accepted responsibility for his 
wrongful conduct, submitted letters attesting to his reputation, professionalism, 
and competence, and made restitution to the client weighed in favor of a one-year 
suspension, conditionally stayed.  Id. at ¶ 11, 18. 
{¶ 29} We have explained that “ ‘in determining the appropriate length of 
the suspension and any attendant conditions, we must recognize that the primary 
purpose of disciplinary sanctions is not to punish the offender, but to protect the 
public.’ ”  Fumich at ¶ 17, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53.  That purpose is served by 
suspending respondent from the practice of law for one year, with the entire 
suspension stayed on conditions.  Relator did not show that Einhorn suffered any 
harm, while respondent has no prior disciplinary record, cooperated fully in the 
investigation of his misconduct, acknowledged his wrongdoing, and demonstrated 
his good character.  Further, the evidence establishes that respondent’s mental 
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disability contributed to cause his misconduct and that continued successful 
treatment and monitoring pursuant to his three-year OLAP contract will allow 
him to practice law without posing a threat to the public. 
{¶ 30} Accordingly, based on respondent’s conduct and our precedent, 
respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio for 
one year, with the entire suspension stayed on the conditions that respondent (1) 
comply with his OLAP contract, (2) accept the treatment recommended by OLAP 
and his psychologist, (3) serve a period of probation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(9) 
— monitored by relator — during the term of his three-year OLAP contract, and 
(4) pay the costs of disciplinary proceedings.  If respondent fails to comply with 
the conditions of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and respondent will serve the 
entire one-year suspension. 
{¶ 31} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, Senior 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Koblentz & Penvose, L.L.C., Richard S. Koblentz, and Bryan L. Penvose, 
for respondent. 
______________________