Case Title: PARSONS v. PARSONS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
PARSONS v. PARSONS2001 WY 6227 P.3d 270Case Number: 00-247Decided: 07/18/2001

 

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

RAY LYNN 
PARSONS,

 Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

DIXIE 
LEE PARSONS,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Corinne A. Miller, Casper, Wyoming  

 Representing 
Appellee:

            
Nena R. James, Rock Springs, Wyoming 

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 
            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      In a divorce 
action, the district court ordered the sale of the marital real property to an 
identified, willing third party by an established deadline unless the husband 
arranged for the purchase before the deadline expired.  The husband appealed claiming the 
district court acted arbitrarily.  
We affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant Ray 
Parsons (the husband) presents the following issue for our 
review:

 

I.  Whether 
the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it ordered the sale 
of the marital property in the divorce action.

 

Appellee 
Dixie Parsons (the wife) phrases the issues as:

 

1.  Whether 
this appeal should be dismissed because Appellant has failed to comply with Rule 
3.03, Wyo.R.App.P., and has thereby failed to provide an adequate record for 
review.

 

2.  Whether 
this appeal should be dismissed because Appellant is raising new issues after 
failing to present testimony or other relevant evidence during the 
trial.

 

3.  Whether 
the District Court abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
in ordering the sale of real property in the First Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce Regarding Sale of Real Property and Improvements dated March 30, 
2000.

 

4.  Whether reasonable 
attorney's fees and damages to the Appellee should be assessed against Appellant 
under Rule 10.05, Wyo.R.App.P.

 
FACTS

 

[¶3]      After eleven 
years of marriage, the wife filed her complaint for a divorce on August 24, 
1998.  The couple owned a small 
ranch and associated personal property.  
Limited discovery occurred, and the matter was set for trial one year 
later, on September 10, 1999. The husband requested a continuance to 
allow his new attorney to enter the case.  
The trial was rescheduled for December 1, 1999.

 

[¶4]      At trial, the 
wife presented four witnesses and introduced several exhibits relating to the 
value of their joint property including an appraisal of the real estate, which 
was valued at $311,705.  One of the 
witnesses was Cynthia K. Smith who lived and worked on the couple's ranch and 
was willing to purchase the property for the appraised value.  The wife concluded her case on December 
1, 1999, and the trial was continued until December 13, 1999, at which time the 
husband informed the court that he would produce no testimony or other 
evidence.  The parties used the 
scheduled trial time to discuss settlement and ultimately reached an agreement 
with regard to the distribution of the personal property but were unsuccessful 
concerning the real estate.

 

[¶5]      The court 
informed the parties of its intent to order the sale of the real property to Ms. 
Smith at the appraised value unless, by December 27, 1999, the husband provided 
the court with: (1)  his written 
bona fide purchase offer for the property at the appraised value together with 
verification of the necessary financing or (2) an offer from a third party at a 
price exceeding Ms. Smith's offer.  
Ms. Smith filed a written offer to purchase at the appraised value on 
December 21, 1999.  The husband 
filed no objection to this procedure, and the court received no offer from him 
by the deadline.  The court entered 
the Decree of Divorce on December 29, 1999, which included a provision that a 
supplemental decree of divorce would be entered to effectuate the division of 
the marital property and debts of the parties.

 

[¶6]      On February 24, 
2000, the husband filed an objection to the First Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
Regarding Sale of Real Property and Improvements in which he objected to Ms. 
Smith's offer "due to disagreement with several of the sales contract 
stipulations" although he confirmed the parties had agreed at the time of trial 
to sell the property.  The court 
entered the supplemental decree on March 30, 2000, which set forth the order to 
sell the property to Ms. Smith as had been outlined at 
trial.

 

[¶7]      The husband 
refused to accept Ms. Smith's written offer, and, on April 18, 2000, the wife 
filed a Petition for Order to Show Cause why the husband should not be held in 
contempt for refusing to comply with the court's order and sought attorney's 
fees incurred in the effort to enforce the order.  After a hearing, the district court 
found the husband in contempt of its order.  The clerk of court was also appointed, 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 70, to act on behalf of the husband in accepting Ms. 
Smith's offer to purchase, and the husband was ordered to pay $641 to the wife's 
attorney for attorney's fees.  The 
husband filed this appeal from the supplemental decree.

 

[¶8]      The trial was not 
reported or recorded.  The husband 
filed a Statement of the Case ostensibly pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.08.  However, since he apparently intended to 
provide a factual record, a statement of evidence pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03 
would have been the appropriate method.  
In any event, the record was certified to this court before the wife was 
able to respond to the Statement of the Case, and, therefore, it cannot properly 
be considered as part of this record.  
The facts set out in this opinion have been drawn from court documents 
and other pleadings in the record.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]      The standard of 
review applicable to decisions involving the division of marital property is 
abuse of discretion.  This standard 
was most recently stated in Belless v. Belless, 2001 WY 41, ¶6, 21 P.3d 749, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001): 

 

There 
are few rules more firmly established in our jurisprudence than the proposition 
that disposition of marital property, calculation of income for child support 
purposes, and the granting of alimony are committed to the sound discretion of 
the district court.  Johnson v. 
Johnson, 11 P.3d 948, 950 (Wyo. 2000).  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  
Id.; Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  We must ask ourselves whether the trial 
court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling 
was arbitrary or capricious.  
Johnson, 11 P.3d  at 950.  
In accomplishing our review, we consider only the evidence in favor of 
the successful party, ignore the evidence of the unsuccessful party, and grant 
to the successful party every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the 
record.  
Id.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   On appeal, the husband claims the 
district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it ordered the real 
property be sold and the proceeds equally divided between the parties.  His objection is focused upon the 
deadline within which the court required him to respond if he desired to 
purchase the property himself.  He 
claims the thirteen days between the announcement of the court's decision and 
the December 27, 1999, deadline was unreasonably short and he was denied due 
process by a lack of notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard.  He also claims this process was 
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.

 

[¶11]   As the appellant, the husband has 
the burden of providing this court with a complete record on which to base a 
decision.  G.C.I., 
Inc. v. Haught, 7 P.3d 906, 911 (Wyo. 2000).  The 
record before this court consists of the complaint, answer and administrative 
pleadings, five exhibits introduced by the wife including the appraisal, two 
exhibits introduced by the husband which were irrelevant to the property value 
and distribution methods, and Ms. Smith's offer to purchase.  In the absence of any evidence from the 
husband concerning alternative methods of disposing of the property and of any 
alleged adverse impacts of the schedule for the sale on him, this court must 
conclude the evidence supports the district court's findings and order.  Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 
721 (Wyo. 1999).  Certainly, the 
husband had the right to request special findings pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(a) and 
did not.  Consequently, this court 
will "consider that the trial court's judgment carries with it every finding of 
fact supported by the evidence."  
Skinner v. Skinner, 601 P.2d 543, 545 (Wyo. 1979); see also 
Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1091 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶12]   Upon a review of this record, 
several problems with the husband's position become obvious.  The divorce had been pending for more 
than fifteen months before the trial was held.  The wife commissioned an appraisal of 
the real property in July 1999, five months before trial.  The husband was apparently familiar with 
the property and can be presumed to have had a general knowledge of its value 
and the need for division of the property in the course of the divorce.  Yet he did not testify himself or 
present any witnesses or evidence concerning his plans to purchase the property 
or the impact of a sale on his livelihood.  
He cannot sit back for more than fifteen months, do nothing to prepare 
his case or to present alternative methods for a distribution of the property to 
the court, and then be heard to complain subsequent to the trial that the court 
gave him inadequate time to arrange to purchase his wife's interest in the 
property.  A similar argument was 
equally unsuccessful in Barbour v. Barbour, 518 P.2d 12 (Wyo. 1974), 
where the husband complained that the sale of the couple's ranch would deprive 
him of a livelihood yet offered no alternative.  See also McLoughlin v. 
McLoughlin, 996 P.2d 5, 8 (Wyo. 2000).  
It should also be noted the wife's evidence was presented on December 1, 
1999, after which the husband had full knowledge of her position on the value of 
the property and the existence of a potential buyer.  In reality, due to the continuance of 
the trial, he had approximately one month to arrange financing or find another 
buyer.

 

[¶13]   Further, the husband's objections 
in this appeal are inconsistent with his position immediately after trial.  When he filed his objection to the 
court's supplemental decree which set forth the sale schedule, he did not 
complain that he had insufficient time to arrange to purchase the property 
himself as he does here.  Instead, 
he objected to unspecified terms of Ms. Smith's offer as the reason for his 
refusal to accept the offer.  Issues 
raised for the first time on appeal generally will not be considered by the 
appellate court.  Pace v. 
Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶22, 22 P.3d 861, ¶22 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶14]   The district court provided the 
parties an opportunity for a full hearing.  
All the evidence presented concerning the dissolution of their marriage 
and the fair and equitable distribution of the property was considered.  A rational decision was made which 
required the property be sold to the only willing buyer available with the 
proceeds distributed equally.  
Although we do not find fault with the district court's actions, we 
decline to award attorney's fees and damages to the wife pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
10.05.

 

[¶15]   
Affirmed.