Case Title: Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Target Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 061737

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:   Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J.1 
 
COMMONWEALTH TRANSPORTATION  
COMMISSIONER OF VIRGINIA 
OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 061737 
 September 14, 2007 
 
TARGET CORPORATION, A/K/A 
TARGET STORES, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Robert W. Wooldridge, Jr., Judge 
 
I. 
 
In this appeal of a judgment in favor of a landowner in a 
condemnation proceeding, we consider issues related to the 
recovery of damages for the loss of visibility to the residue 
of the real property. 
II. 
 
The Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner of Virginia 
filed a petition for condemnation pursuant to Code § 25.1-205 
against Target Stores, Inc.  As authorized by Code §§ 33.1-89, 
et seq., the Transportation Commissioner recorded a 
certificate of deposit among the land records in Fairfax 
County, where the subject property is located.  Upon 
recordation, title to certain land that had been owned by 
Target’s predecessors in title vested in the Commonwealth.  
                     
 
1 Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 
August 16, 2007. 
 
2
The real property interests subject to the take included land 
in fee simple, permanent easements, and temporary easements.  
These real property interests were taken for the construction, 
reconstruction, alteration, maintenance, and repair of Roberts 
Parkway, which is a part of Route 6197 in Fairfax County. 
 
Target filed its answer to the petition, and a jury trial 
was conducted in the circuit court.  The jury returned a 
report that awarded Target $175,100 for the value of the real 
property interests and $3,324,900 for damages to the residue.  
The Transportation Commissioner filed exceptions to the 
report.  The circuit court rejected the exceptions and entered 
an order confirming the report.  The Transportation 
Commissioner appeals. 
III. 
 
In accordance with familiar principles, we will state the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Target, the prevailing 
party in the circuit court.  Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. City of 
Alexandria, 272 Va. 274, 278, 634 S.E.2d 722, 724 (2006); 
Stanley v. Webber, 260 Va. 90, 92, 531 S.E.2d 311, 312 (2000); 
Bayliner Marine Corp. v. Crow, 257 Va. 121, 126, 509 S.E.2d 
499, 502 (1999). 
 
Target owns and operates a “big box” retail store on a 
triangular-shaped parcel in Fairfax County.  Before February 
5, 1999, the date of the take, Target’s parcel consisted of 
 
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approximately 10.56 acres.  The front of the store was 
situated on New Guinea Road, a public street from which 
signage for the store was visible.  Old Guinea Road extended 
along the rear of the store, and this road also provided 
access to the store. 
 
In 1983, Target’s predecessor in title made a proffer to 
Fairfax County, and the proffer affected future development of 
the parcel that is the subject of this condemnation 
proceeding.  The proffer, which became a part of the zoning 
classification for the parcel, included a site plan.  The 
proffer required dense landscaping on certain portions of the 
property that reduced the visibility of the store.  The 1983 
site plan also showed the future construction of Roberts Road 
Bridge.  Additionally, information that had been submitted in 
conjunction with the 1983 proffer revealed that the majority 
of Old Guinea Road would be vacated in the future. 
 
Before February 1999, Target’s retail store was visible 
from Old Guinea Road and New Guinea Road.  Witnesses described 
the visibility of the store from New Guinea Road as excellent.  
According to one of Target’s expert witnesses, the highest and 
best use of Target’s parcel before the take was for the 
location of a “big box” retail store.  A “big box” retail 
store is a retail establishment that sells goods to the public 
 
4
at discount prices in a large building, similar to a 
warehouse, with few amenities. 
 
In August 1999, the Transportation Commissioner commenced 
construction of Roberts Parkway, which consists of four lanes 
and a bridge.  In March 2002, Roberts Parkway opened. 
 
The Transportation Commissioner closed most of Old Guinea 
Road to traffic, but a small portion of that public road 
remains open for vehicular access to Target’s store.  New 
Guinea Road extends beside the store.  Even though Roberts 
Parkway is adjacent to the store, visibility of the store from 
the Parkway is obscured because of privacy barriers that were 
erected. 
 
The Transportation Commissioner agreed at trial that 
after the take, the store was not visible from Roberts 
Parkway.  However, the Transportation Commissioner’s expert 
witness testified that Target did not incur any damage to the 
residue because of this loss of visibility to its store. 
 
Target presented numerous witnesses who testified that 
after the take, the residue to its property was damaged 
because the store lost visibility upon the partial closure of 
Old Guinea Road and upon the construction of privacy barriers 
along Roberts Parkway.  For example, Dexter Williams, who 
qualified as an expert witness, gave the following testimony: 
 
5
“Q:  Describe for me what [has] been lost from 
this site.  
“A:  [The store] was . . . at the corner of two 
roads with visibility from two sides; now it is 
. . . at the corner of two roads with visibility 
from one side.” 
 
 
Target’s expert witnesses rendered opinions on the damage 
to the residue caused by the lack of visibility.  Richard 
Marchitelli testified that the damages associated with the 
permanent taking were $115,000, and the damage to the residue 
caused by loss of visibility was $4.6 million.  Everett B. 
Wright, another expert witness, testified that the damages to 
the property that was taken were $173,000 and that the damage 
to the residue caused by the loss of visibility was 
approximately $3.3 million.  Additionally, the jury 
commissioners took a view of the property. 
IV. 
 
Code § 25.1-417(A)(3) states: 
 
“Before initiating negotiations for real 
property, the state agency shall establish an amount 
which it believes to be just compensation therefor 
and shall make a prompt offer to acquire the 
property for the full amount so established.  In no 
event shall such amount be less than the agency's 
approved appraisal of the fair market value of such 
property, if such an appraisal is required.  Any 
decrease or increase in the fair market value of 
real property prior to the date of valuation caused 
by the public improvement for which such property is 
acquired, or by the likelihood that the property 
would be acquired for such improvement, other than 
that due to physical deterioration within the 
reasonable control of the owner, shall be 
disregarded in determining the compensation for the 
 
6
property.  The agency concerned shall provide the 
owner of real property to be acquired with a written 
statement of, and summary of the basis for, the 
amount it established as just compensation, together 
with a copy of the agency's approved appraisal of 
the fair market value of such property upon which 
the agency has based the amount offered for the 
property, if such an appraisal is required.  Where 
appropriate, the just compensation for the real 
property acquired and for damages to remaining real 
property shall be separately stated.” 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Relying upon this Code section, Target filed a pretrial 
motion in limine asserting that Code § 25.1-417, “specifically 
makes it clear that a property owner cannot get enhancement as 
a result of the project, nor can a property owner be penalized 
[because of] a decrease in the value of the property as a 
result of the announcement of a project or the impending 
nature of a project.”  The circuit court ruled that during the 
trial, the litigants may not “seek admission or elicit 
evidence of any party’s knowledge of the design or 
construction of the Roberts Parkway Bridge prior to the 
taking, or any expectancy therefrom,” and that “either party 
may seek admission or elicit evidence of the 1983 Proffer 
Statement, the approved Target Site Plan and other zoning for 
the Target site as of the date of the taking.”  Subsequently, 
the judge who presided during the trial interpreted the 
pretrial ruling as requiring that all references to the future 
construction of Roberts Parkway or the closing of Old Guinea 
 
7
Road must be redacted from documents related to the zoning 
proffer and related site plans admitted in evidence at trial.2 
 
The Transportation Commissioner argues that even though 
Code § 25.1-417 prescribes the methodology that the Department 
of Transportation must utilize to establish fair market value, 
the circuit court’s ruling, prohibiting the Transportation 
Commissioner from presenting evidence that Target knew of the 
design and construction of the Roberts Parkway before Target 
acquired the real property, is contrary to Code § 25.1-
417(A)(3).  Continuing, the Transportation Commissioner states 
that the redacted references on exhibits in the landowner’s 
proffer would have shown the jury that Fairfax County’s zoning 
classification required that the Target store not be visible 
from Roberts Parkway, and that the closure of Old Guinea Road 
was required by the zoning ordinance. 
 
This Court cannot consider the Transportation 
Commissioner’s arguments.  The Transportation Commissioner 
failed to make all the documents that he claims should not 
have contained redactions a part of the record.3  This Court 
                     
2 A different judge presided during the hearing for the 
motion in limine. 
3 The Transportation Commissioner identified specific 
documents that contained references he maintains should not 
have been redacted.  Duplicate copies of some of the documents 
at issue were admitted in evidence and some, but not all, of 
the documents were inadvertently provided to the jury without 
redaction.  Receipt of these unredacted documents does not 
 
8
has consistently adhered to the following principles that are 
applicable here: 
“This Court will not consider testimony excluded by 
the trial court ‘without a proper showing of what 
that testimony might have been.’  O’Dell v. 
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 697, 364 S.E.2d 491, 505 
(1988).  ‘When testimony is rejected before it is 
delivered, an appellate court has no basis for 
adjudication unless the record reflects a proper 
proffer.’  Whittaker v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 966, 
968, 234 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1977).” 
 
Rose v. Jaques, 268 Va. 137, 154, 597 S.E.2d 64, 74 (2004); 
accord Holles, Inc. v. Sunrise Terrace, 257 Va. 131, 135, 509 
S.E.2d 494, 497 (1999) (“When testimony is excluded before it 
is presented, the record must reflect a proper proffer showing 
what the testimony would have been.”); Chappell v. Virginia 
Electric and Power Co., 250 Va. 169, 173, 458 S.E.2d 282, 285 
(1995); Wyche v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 839, 842, 241 S.E.2d 
772, 774 (1978); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 845, 846-47, 
36 S.E. 487, 488 (1900).  The Transportation Commissioner’s 
failure to make a proffer of all the documents without the 
redactions has deprived this Court of the ability to determine 
the admissibility of those documents and, if admissible, 
whether the circuit court’s exclusion of that evidence 
prejudiced the Transportation Commissioner.  Holles, 257 Va. 
                                                                
render the redaction ruling of the circuit court harmless 
error as Target argues, because not all the documents 
identified by the Transportation Commissioner were provided to 
the jury in unredacted form. 
 
9
at 135, 509 S.E.2d at 497.  A circuit court’s judgment is 
presumptively correct, and the appellant bears the burden of 
presenting a sufficient record to permit a determination 
whether the circuit court committed an alleged error.  
Commonwealth v. Williams, 262 Va. 661, 669, 553 S.E.2d 760, 
764 (2001); accord McDonald v. National Enterprises, Inc., 262 
Va. 184, 195, 547 S.E.2d 204, 211 (2001); White v. Morano, 249 
Va. 27, 30, 452 S.E.2d 856, 858 (1995). 
V. 
 
The Transportation Commissioner submitted the following 
proposed jury instructions, which were refused by the circuit 
court: 
“Jury Instruction 20 
“One who owns land abutting a public highway is 
entitled only to reasonable visibility of his 
property.  His right of visibility is limited by the 
state’s right to control traffic over its highways. 
“If you find that the landowner in this case 
will have reasonable visibility of his property 
after the construction of this project, then you may 
not award damages for the change of visibility.” 
 
“Jury Instruction 21 
“The highway constructed upon the land here 
being condemned is on a new location, no part of 
which was included in an existing public road which 
abutted upon the lands of the owner in this 
proceeding.  Therefore, in determining the damages, 
if any, to the remaining lands of the owner, you 
will not consider that said remaining land had any 
right or easement of access or visibility taken from 
it or the owner, for the reason that there was no 
such right of easement or access or visibility by 
the owner or appurtenant to the land described in 
 
10
the petition at the time of the taking by the 
Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner.” 
 
The Transportation Commissioner argues that the circuit court 
erred by denying proposed Jury Instructions 20 and 21 because 
a landowner’s loss of visibility is not a compensable damage 
in a condemnation proceeding. 
 
We will not consider the Transportation Commissioner’s 
arguments because the Transportation Commissioner has adopted 
inconsistent positions.  In the circuit court, as illustrated 
by the Transportation Commissioner’s proposed Jury Instruction 
20, the Transportation Commissioner asserted that a landowner 
who owns land abutting a public highway is entitled to damages 
if a governmental taking has deprived that landowner of 
reasonable visibility of his property.  In this Court, 
however, the Transportation Commissioner asserts that 
compensation for “loss of visibility would be directly at odds 
to the established principle in Virginia that the State has 
the right to control the flow of traffic under its police 
power.” 
 
We have consistently held that litigants may not take 
inconsistent positions at different stages of litigation.  
Cohn v. Knowledge Connections, Inc., 266 Va. 362, 367, 585 
S.E.2d 578, 581 (2003); Commonwealth v. Lotz Realty Co., 237 
Va. 1, 7, 376 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1989); Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 
 
11
157 Va. 867, 878, 161 S.E. 297, 300 (1931); Kelley v. 
Commonwealth, 140 Va. 522, 536, 125 S.E. 437, 441 (1924).  We 
have also stated that “[t]his is an appellate court, and [this 
Court] hears cases on the theory upon which they were tried in 
the [circuit] court, reviewing those points properly raised, 
decided, and preserved.”  Pearsall v. Richmond Redevelopment & 
Housing Authority, 218 Va. 892, 908, 242 S.E.2d 228, 237 
(1978) (quoting Strauss v. Princess Anne Marine and 
Bulkheading Co., 209 Va. 217, 221-22, 163 S.E.2d 198, 202 
(1968)).  The Transportation Commissioner will not be 
permitted to argue in this Court that Target may not recover 
any damages for loss of visibility when, in the circuit court, 
the Transportation Commissioner asserted that Target is 
entitled to recover damages if it does not have “reasonable 
visibility” of its property. 
 
Additionally, the circuit court implicitly held that 
proposed Jury Instruction 21 was confusing, and the court did 
not think that the jury would understand that instruction.  In 
his brief filed in this Court, the Transportation Commissioner 
does not challenge the circuit court’s ruling that the jury 
would not understand proposed Jury Instruction 21.  Therefore, 
the circuit court’s ruling is the law of this case, and we 
will not disturb that ruling.  Today Homes, Inc. v. Williams, 
272 Va. 462, 470, 634 S.E.2d 737, 742 (2006); Owens-Corning 
 
12
Fiberglas Corp. v. Watson, 243 Va. 128, 136, 413 S.E.2d 630, 
635 (1992). 
VI. 
 
The Transportation Commissioner argues that the circuit 
court erred by denying proposed Jury Instruction 18, which 
states: 
 
“Use of the subject property is already 
restricted by local zoning ordinances.  Your 
calculation of damages, if any, to the remaining 
property must be based solely on the negative 
effects on the fair market value to the remaining 
property resulting from the taking alone, beyond 
those restrictions already imposed on the property. 
“If the taking has caused no additional 
negative effects on fair market value to the 
remaining property beyond those created by the 
zoning ordinance restrictions, you may not award any 
damages.” 
 
The Transportation Commissioner argues in this Court that the 
circuit court’s denial of this instruction was prejudicial 
because the zoning classification of Target’s property was 
relevant to the value of the property, and the zoning 
classification required obstructions to visibility of the 
property upon the construction of Roberts Parkway. 
 
We do not consider the Transportation Commissioner’s 
arguments because the Transportation Commissioner did not 
raise these issues in the circuit court.  The Transportation 
Commissioner made the following argument in the circuit court 
regarding Jury Instruction 18: 
 
13
 
“[Counsel for the Transportation Commissioner]:  
All right, Your Honor.  The issue in this case that 
the Commonwealth has tried to present is that the 
flow of traffic around the property has not changed 
or damaged visibility. 
 
“All these instructions – specifically, 19, 20, 
and 21, deal specifically with our argument that, 
based on the traffic patterns on the roadway, they 
have not been damaged.  These are all correct 
statements of – well, let me –  
 
. . . . 
 
 
“[The Court]:  The question is whether or not 
[the proposed instructions] are appropriate to give 
as an instruction, as opposed to being correct 
statements of law. 
“[Counsel for the Transportation Commissioner]:  
Well, as I said, Your Honor, I mean, the basis of 
our case has been, based on the flow of traffic 
around the property – I mean, their argument is two 
sides, one side.  Our argument is that, based on the 
flow of traffic around the property, [Target has] 
not been damaged, based on the visibility, you know, 
the landscaping, how the traffic passes in front of 
the property. 
“All of that mitigates any damages [Target] may 
have stated, so, therefore, it is important that 
correct statements of the law regarding the flow of 
traffic around the property are given to the jury.” 
 
 
The Transportation Commissioner may not assert, for the 
first time on appeal, a new argument in support of Jury 
Instruction 18.  Rule 5:25. 
VII. 
 
The Transportation Commissioner contends that the circuit 
court erred by failing to grant its proposed Jury Instruction 
19 that states: 
 
“The right to regulate and control traffic in 
the interest of public safety is a proper exercise 
 
14
of the Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner’s 
police power.  The closure of public streets is a 
proper exercise of that police power.  The landowner 
can only recover damages if he has suffered some 
special damage to his land that is different than 
damages suffered by the public.  If the landowner 
has not suffered any special damages from the 
closure of that road, you may not award any damages 
to the landowner.” 
 
 
The Transportation Commissioner argues that the closure 
of roads is “a proper and non-compensable exercise of the 
[Transportation Commissioner’s] police power.”  Continuing, 
the Transportation Commissioner asserts that the circuit 
court’s refusal to grant this instruction prejudiced the 
Commonwealth because the jury did not understand that it could 
not compensate Target for damages to the residue caused by the 
closure of a public roadway. 
 
The Transportation Commissioner did not assert in the 
circuit court that Target could not recover damages for loss 
of visibility because the Commonwealth has the right to 
regulate and control traffic and that the closure of roads is 
a proper and non-compensable exercise of the Commonwealth’s 
police power.  We will not permit the Transportation 
Commissioner to assert these arguments for the first time on 
appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
VIII. 
 
The Transportation Commissioner asserts the following 
assignment of error:  “The trial court erred in failing to 
 
15
find that the jury commissioners’ report is contrary to the 
evidence at trial.”  Rule 5:17(c) states:  “An assignment of 
error which merely states that the judgment or award is 
contrary to the law and the evidence is not sufficient.”  
Thus, we do not consider this assignment of error. 
IX. 
 
The Transportation Commissioner argues that the circuit 
court erred in failing to set aside the jury’s report because 
the award of damages was excessive.  We disagree with the 
Transportation Commissioner. 
This Court has repeatedly held that in an eminent domain 
proceeding, 
“the report of the commissioners4 is entitled to 
great weight, is prima facie correct, and must be 
confirmed unless ‘good cause be shown against it.’  
Where there is a conflict of evidence before the 
commissioners neither the trial court nor this 
[C]ourt can set aside the award unless it be shown 
that the commissioners proceeded upon erroneous 
principles, or unless the amount allowed is so 
grossly inadequate or excessive as to show prejudice 
or corruption on their part.  This is so because the 
commissioners may base their finding largely upon 
facts obtained by their own view of the property 
which do not appear in the record.” 
 
Highway Commissioner v. Carter, 216 Va. 639, 641, 222 S.E.2d 
776, 777 (1976) (quoting Kornegay v. City of Richmond, 185 Va. 
1013, 1024, 41 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1947); accord Highway 
 
16
Commissioner v. Frazier, 214 Va. 556, 558, 203 S.E.2d 350, 351 
(1974); Massie v. Highway Commissioner, 209 Va. 365, 368, 164 
S.E.2d 696, 698 (1968); Highway Commissioner v. Skillman, 206 
Va. 39, 41-42, 141 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1965).  In the record 
before this Court, the Transportation Commissioner has failed 
to establish that the report of the jurors is so excessive as 
to show prejudice or corruption. 
X. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court.  We observe, however, that we do not decide 
whether a landowner, whose real property is the subject of a 
condemnation proceeding, may recover damages for loss of 
visibility to the residue of the real property.  This issue 
remains undecided in this Commonwealth. 
Affirmed. 
                                                                
4 Pursuant to Code §§ 25.1-100 and -220, the body that 
determines just compensation in condemnation proceedings is 
referred to as a jury.