Case Title: Murray v. Luzenac Corp.

Citation: 175 Vt. 529, 2003 VT 37, 830 A.2d 1

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Murray v. Luzenac Corp. (2002-140); 175 Vt. 529; 830 A.2d 1

2003 VT 37

[Filed 27-Mar-2003]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2003 VT 37

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-140

                             JANUARY TERM, 2003

  John Murray	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Commissioner of Labor and 
                                       }        Industry	
  Luzenac Corporation	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO.  R-02095

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendant  Luzenac Corporation appeals the decision of the
  Commissioner of Labor and Industry granting plaintiff's summary judgment
  motion.  Defendant claims that the Commissioner erred by: (1) holding that
  plaintiff's claim was not time-barred pursuant to the Occupational Disease
  Act (ODA), 21 V.S.A. § 1006(a)(1987) (repealed by 1999, No. 41, § 8(a)(1));
  (2) applying the "discovery rule" from 21 V.S.A.  § 660(b); and (3) relying
  upon the Commissioner's earlier decision in Sheltra v. Vt. Asbestos Group. 
  Although the Commissioner's analysis and reliance on Sheltra was erroneous,
  see Sheltra v. Vt. Asbestos Group, 2003 VT 22, No. 02-116 (Vt. February 18,
  2003) (mem.) (reversing Commissioner's decision), we affirm because
  plaintiff's claim in this case was not time-barred, and 21 V.S.A. § 660(b)
  was properly applied.

       ¶  2.  The following facts are undisputed.  Plaintiff, John Murray,
  was an employee, as defined in the Vermont Workers' Compensation Act, 21
  V.S.A. § 601(14), of Luzenac Corporation until his last day of work on
  September 15, 1994.  Plaintiff was diagnosed with silicosis on June 1,
  2000, which the parties stipulate is an occupational disease caused by
  plaintiff's exposure to talc.  On October 9, 2000, plaintiff filed a
  workers' compensation claim with the Department of Labor and Industry. 
  Both parties moved for summary judgment to determine whether 21 V.S.A. §
  660(b) applied to plaintiff's claim or if it was barred by a statute of
  repose contained in the repealed ODA, 21 V.S.A. § 1006(a).  The
  Commissioner ruled that § 1006(a) did not bar plaintiff's claim, and the
  "discovery rule" of 21 V.S.A. § 660(b) applied in its place.  The
  Commissioner wrote:

    By providing that a claimant now has "two years from the date the
    occupational disease is reasonably discoverable and apparent" to
    bring the claim, 21 V.S.A. § 660(b), the Legislature determined
    that it would not bar a claim before the claimant could have known
    of its existence.  Because discovery and accrual of this claim,
    like the claim in Sheltra, came since the enactment [of 21 V.S.A.
    § 660(b)], it is viable and not barred by the statute of
    limitations.

       ¶  3.  Although we find error in the Commissioner's analysis, the
  outcome is correct in this case, and we affirm.  See Vt. State Colls.
  Faculty Fed'n v. Vt. State Colls., 151 Vt. 457, 463, 561 A.2d 417, 421
  (1989) ("[W]e will affirm a judgment which is correct even if the grounds
  stated in its support are erroneous.").  We base our decision here not on
  the time of discovery or accrual, but rather on whether plaintiff's claim
  was already barred by the five year limitation when the statute of repose
  was repealed in 1999.

       ¶  4.  Section 1006(a) of the repealed ODA contained a statute of
  repose which read: "Compensation shall not be payable for disablement by
  reason of occupational disease unless such disablement results within five
  years after the last injurious exposure to such disease in the employment .
  . . ."  21 V.S.A. § 1006(a) (1987) (repealed by 1999, No. 41, § 8(a)(1)). 
  Before the five-year limitation period had lapsed on plaintiff's claim,
  however, the Legislature created 21 V.S.A. § 660(b), effective July 1,
  1999, and repealed § 1006(a).  Section 660(b) provides that: "[A] claim for
  occupational disease shall be made within two years of the date the
  occupational disease is reasonably discoverable and apparent." 
  Importantly, our workers' compensation statute is "remedial in nature and
  must be liberally construed to provide injured employees with benefits
  unless the law is clear to the contrary."  St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
  v. Surdam, 156 Vt. 585, 590, 595 A.2d 264, 266 (1991). 

       ¶  5.  The paramount issue in this case then is whether 21 V.S.A. §
  660(b) applies to claims where the last injurious exposure to an
  occupational disease occurred prior to July 1, 1999 but the time limitation
  for such a claim had not yet lapsed under § 1006(a).  We hold that it does. 
  Our decision today is in accord with the decisions of other courts.  For
  example, many jurisdictions allow parties to take advantage of new or
  amended statutes which extend time limitations for the filing of a workers'
  compensation claim as long as the claim was not time-barred prior to the
  effective date of the new statute or amendment.  See, e.g., Gaines v.
  Orange County Pub. Utils., 710 So. 2d 139, 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
  (citing Corbett v. General Eng'g & Mach. Co., 37 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla.
  1948)); Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 756 P.2d 401, 407 (Idaho 1988);
  Danforth v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,