Case Title: Martin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Martin v. State1986 WY 135720 P.2d 894Case Number: 86-29Decided: 06/18/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Robert 
Paul MARTIN, Jr., Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE ofWyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, ParkCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

Wyoming Public 
Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Julie D. Naylor, 
Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, and Leslie K. Delk, Public Defender, Laramie, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division; John 
Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen.; Nancy S. Tabor, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Robert Paul 
Martin, Jr., was convicted in ParkCounty of first degree sexual assault and 
sentenced to imprisonment for not less than eight years nor more than fifteen 
years. He urges a single issue on appeal:

"Whether the district 
court committed reversible error and abused its discretion in sentencing Paul 
Robert Martin, Jr., to a term of eight to fifteen years in the Wyoming 
Penitentiary for a violation of § 6-2-302(a)(i), W.S. 
1977."

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     In the early morning of 
May 2, 1985, appellant invited Rita Smith, the victim, to come out of Cassie's 
Supper Club in Cody, 
Wyoming, and look at his dog. After 
exhibiting the dog, appellant grabbed the victim, dragged her to the southeast 
corner of Cassie's and forcibly threw her to the ground. Appellant thereupon 
partially removed the victim's pants and rearranged her other garments whilst 
she struggled to get free and otherwise resisted. Appellant then and there 
perpetrated a sexual assault on the victim, which untoward behavior is 
proscribed by § 6-2-302(a)(i), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement). The victim 
suffered injuries to her head, nose, eye and scratches on her 
back.

[¶4.]     Appellant eventually 
entered a plea of nolo contendere. A presentence investigation was accomplished, 
together with a mental and physical examination. After these reports were 
reviewed and a hearing held, appellant was sentenced to not less than eight 
years nor more than fifteen years at the Wyoming Penitentiary. 

[¶5.]     The standards under 
which a sentence is examined on appeal may not be as clear as we had supposed. 
In Wright v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090, 1091-1092 (1983), we 
said:

"* * * We do not follow 
the commonlaw rule that a sentence is not subject to appellate review if it is 
within the limits set by the legislature.

"* * * * 
*

"As long ago as 1927, we 
indicated that we would modify a legal sentence if the trial court abused its 
discretion in imposing it. State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 111, 253 P. 14, 16 
(1927). Since then, we have repeatedly set forth the fact that a sentence will 
be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Cavanagh v. State, Wyo., 505 P.2d 311 
(1973); Peterson v. State, Wyo., 586 P.2d 144 (1978); Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 
592 P.2d 1130 (1979); Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378 (1979); Buck v. State, 
Wyo., 603 P.2d 878 (1979); Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031 (1979); Kenney 
v. State, Wyo., 605 P.2d 811 (1980); Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 
(1981); Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172 (1982); Taylor v. State, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1297 (1983); and Eaton v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 803 
(1983)."

[¶6.]     In Scheikofsky v. 
State, Wyo., 
636 P.2d 1107, 1112-1113 (1981), we said:

"This court has stated 
its approach to sentence review many times. If a trial court's determination of 
the terms of imprisonment is within the statutory limits, it will not be 
disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Hanson v. State, Wyo, 590 P.2d 832, 835 (1979); Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378, 380 (1979); Smith v. State, Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194, 1202 (1977); Daellenbach v. State, 
supra at 683 [Wyo., 562 P.2d 679 (1977)]. A sentence will 
not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show 
an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and circumstances 
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the 
public sense of fair play. Hicklin v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 743, 751, 79 A.L.R.3d 1050 
(1975). That is a nebulous standard, but it is as precise as we care to make it. 
We have an abiding reluctance to review a trial judge's determination of 
sentence. The determination is a burdensome decision which no trial judge could 
lightly make and which we will not lightly overturn."

[¶7.]     In defining an abuse of 
discretion, we have said that:

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *" Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

[¶8.]     However, in a recent 
case involving standards under which a sentence is reviewed we employed language 
that could be construed to modify the standards set out in Wright and 
Scheikofsky, supra. In Holmes v. State, Wyo., 715 P.2d 196, 197 (1986), we 
said:

"The rule is clear in 
this jurisdiction that there is no error in the imposition of a sentence by a 
trial court so long as the sentence is within the statutory limit authorized by 
the legislature. * * *"

[¶9.]     We will continue to 
follow the rule stated in Wright, Scheikofsky and cases cited therein, that 
sentences within the statutory limit authorized by the legislature are 
reviewable for an abuse of discretion. We wish to clarify, however, past 
statements we have made which might be construed to say that such sentences are 
not subject to review.

[¶10.]  Ambiguity springs from the definition of 
abuse of discretion stated in Martinez v. State, supra, which indicates that 
an "error of law" is the equivalent of abuse of discretion. Equivocation again 
surfaced in Holmes, supra, when we said, "* * * [T]here is no error in the 
imposition of a sentence by a trial court so long as the sentence is within the 
statutory limit authorized by the legislature. * * *" See, Comment, Reforming 
Criminal Sentencing in Wyoming, XX Land and Water L.Rev. p. 575 
(1985).

[¶11.]  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).

[¶12.]  Where a trial court imposes a sentence in 
excess of the statutory limit it has not exercised its discretion since it has 
no authority to so act. In that circumstance there is an error of law and an 
illegal sentence, which would require this court to remand for resentencing, but 
abuse of discretion is not involved. Where a trial court imposes a sentence 
authorized by the legislature it has exercised its discretion. In that situation 
the sentence is subject to review for an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion.

[¶13.]  We have usually alluded to abuse of 
discretion in general terms and have not made an exhaustive list of 
circumstances constituting abuse of discretion, nor do we care to. Each case 
must be determined on its peculiar facts. Other jurisdictions have described 
circumstances requiring remand for further sentencing procedures. See 
United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S. Ct. 589, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948); McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1970).

[¶14.]  In United 
States v. 
Malcolm, supra, the sentencing court failed to consider mitigating 
circumstances. In United 
States v. Tucker, supra, the record contained 
unconstitutional convictions. In McGee v. United 
States, 
supra, there was a simultaneous sentence and conviction upon a more serious 
count of the indictment, which was later invalidated. In Townsend v. Burke, 
supra, a sentence was imposed based on misinformation of constitutional 
magnitude.

[¶15.]  The United States Supreme Court has held 
that a sentence must be proportionate to the cause in order to be proper under 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). See, Oakley v. State, Wyo., 715 P.2d 1374 (1986), in which we dealt 
with the defendant's claim that his sentence violated both the Eighth Amendment 
under the Supreme Court's proportionality analysis adopted in Solem v. Helm, 
supra, and Art. 1, § 15 of the Wyoming Constitution.

[¶16.]  The sentence imposed by the court in this 
case was not disproportionate to the magnitude of the crime, nor did the court 
abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of not less than eight years nor 
more than fifteen years. Section 6-2-306(a)(i), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement), specifies imprisonment of not less than five years nor more than 
fifty years for first degree sexual assault. The actual sentence imposed in this 
case by the trial court was in the nature of a minimum 
sentence.

[¶17.]  According to the presentence 
investigation report appellant is no stranger to running afoul of the law. In 
the ten and one-half years before the present sexual assault appellant was 
convicted of sundry crimes ranging from speeding to sexual assault, statutory 
rape and robbery, together with a dozen other relatively minor 
crimes.

[¶18.]  The district court had the benefit of a 
comprehensive presentence report, an evaluation from the state hospital and the 
testimony of three witnesses at the sentencing hearing. The record reflects that 
the negative aspects of appellant's background far outweighed the positive. In 
this case the district court had an abundance of information before him. It is 
clear that the court reviewed and considered all the evidence, including the 
presentence reports and oral testimony. He also stated his reasons for imposing 
the sentence. 

[¶19.]  In his brief on appeal appellant makes a 
perfunctory alternative request that we "grant a writ of certiorari and remand 
appellant's case for resentencing, to prevent a failure of justice." Appellant 
seeks to invoke the concepts of Wright v. State, Wyo., 707 P.2d 153 (1985). That approach falls 
far short of demonstrating a rare and unusual case in accordance with the Wright 
case. See also, Holmes v. State, supra.

[¶20.]  Affirmed.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

[¶21.]  I concur in the disposition of this case 
in accordance with the opinion of the majority. As of this time, however, I have 
discovered no reason to recede from the comments set forth in my concurring 
opinion in the case of Wright v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090 (1983), reh'g 
denied, cert. granted, 707 P.2d 153 (1985). I still am persuaded that this is an 
instance in which what we do speaks more definitively than what we say, and we 
have not found an abuse of discretion yet.

[¶22.]  It now appears that we have two tests to 
consider in connection with appeals addressed only to the sentence imposed. In 
addition to abuse of discretion we also have espoused the proportionality test 
which some believe was articulated in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). One should undertake impossible tasks very 
carefully. Viewed in this light the majority position in Solem v. Helm, supra, 
certainly would have been an intriguing addition to Cervantes novel, Don 
Quixote. I believe there is a good deal of soundness in the dissenting opinion 
in Solem v. Helm, supra, but perhaps the most significant language is found in 
footnote 16 of the majority opinion which reads:

"Contrary to the 
dissent's suggestions, post, [103 S.Ct.] at 3017, 3022, we do not adopt or imply 
approval of a general rule of appellate review on sentences. Absent specific 
authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment 
for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular 
sentence; rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate court decides 
only whether the sentence under review is within constitutional limits. In view 
of the substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing 
courts, a reviewing court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis 
to determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate." Solem v. 
Helm, supra, at 3009-3010 n. 16.

[¶23.]  I do not perceive the majority opinion in 
this case as honoring that style of limitation. I fear that the majority has 
adopted the parroting of the proportionality test which appears in every brief 
in which the question of a proper sentence is raised by a convicted criminal. I 
return to my point that caution should be exercised. In Solem v. Helm, supra, at 
3011, the majority said:

"In sum, a court's 
proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided by 
objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness 
of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime 
in other jurisdictions."

[¶24.]  An application of these factors depends 
upon the utilization of empirical data which is not, so far as I can tell, 
available in Wyoming. Furthermore, the task of making that 
data available in my judgment is insurmountable in view of the steadfast 
position of the Wyoming state legislature that computer 
technology should not be available to the judicial branch of government for 
managing information. Any attempt by this court to utilize the objective 
criteria in the second and third factors identified by the Supreme Court is 
doomed to be an exercise in futility and frustration, not only on the part of 
this court, but for the appellants.

[¶25.]  I am satisfied that the development of 
the critical information is much more likely to occur in the context of a 
petition for a writ of certiorari as approved in Wright v. State, Wyo., 707 P.2d 153 (1985). I still believe that wisdom on the part of this court would lie in 
insisting that such issues be presented in that way, rather than committing 
relatively scarce resources to a plethora of appellate review of sentences 
imposed by our trial judges even in those cases in which the defendant entered a 
plea of guilty. It does not seem to me to be appropriate to entertain appeals in 
every instance in which a dissatisfied convict chooses to appeal his sentence 
either for his own amusement, or perhaps with the relatively slim hope that, 
like Jerry Buckley Helm, he will manage "to be in the outhouse when the 
lightning strikes."