Case Title: RYEL v. ANDERIES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
RYEL v. ANDERIES2000 WY 814 P.3d 193Case Number: 99-52Decided: 04/07/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

LAURINDA 
MICHELLE RYEL, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

JENNIFER S. ANDERIES, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

                                 

Appeal from the District Court 
of Laramie County, The Honorable

Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
Judge.

  

   Ronald E. Triggs of the Law 
Offices of Ronald E. Triggs, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellant.

    
Michele K. McKellar of Boley & McKellar, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, 
Representing Appellee.

 

   
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

 

   
THOMAS, Justice.

 [¶1]         The only question to be resolved 
in this case is whether absence from the state serves to toll the statute of 
limitations when substituted service of process can be made within the state 
upon the absent party.  Laurinda 
Michelle Ryel (Ryel) relies upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-116  (Lexis 1999) as tolling the statute of 
limitations because of the absence from the state of Jennifer S. Anderies 
(Anderies).  Anderies contends that 
the tolling statute does not pertain in this instance because Ryel could have 
served Anderies pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301(a) (Lexis 1999) by serving 
the Secretary of State. Relying upon Tarter v. Insco, 550 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1976), 
the district court entered an Order Granting Summary Judgment to Anderies 
because Ryel had not commenced her action within the period prescribed by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (Lexis 1999). We hold that the Tarter precedent 
retains its vitality under the present form of the applicable statutes, and we 
affirm the Order Granting Summary Judgment.

 

[¶2]         This statement of the issues is 
found in the Brief of Appellant:

 

1. 
Did the court err in dismissing this action prior to the last date for service 
of process?

 

2. 
Did the court err in refusing to reinstate this matter during the time frame 
that service could be made under the provisions of W.S. § 1-6-301 and/or under 
its express requirement to locate the defendant?

 

3. 
Did the court err in requiring that Anderies be located prior to the 
reinstitution of this action?

 

4. 
Did the court err in finding that the non-resident motorist statute, W.S. § 
1-6-301 applied to defendant, who resided in the State of Wyoming at the time 
the cause of action arose?

 

5. 
Did the court err in failing to apply the tolling statute, W.S. § 1-3-116, in 
the instant action, from 20 January 1995 to 25 September 
1998?

 

 This Statement of the Issues is found in 
the Brief of Appellee:

 

I.  
Whether the district court properly dismissed the appellant's complaint 
with prejudice for failure to commence the action within four years as 
required by Wyoming Statute § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (1997), Wyoming's statute of 
limitations governing negligence actions.

 

II. Whether appellant has filed a brief containing 
cogent argument and citations of authority sufficient to support 
reversal.

 

[¶3]         On the afternoon of January 27, 
1994, Anderies' vehicle slid on ice and hit Ryel's vehicle on Del Range 
Boulevard in Cheyenne.  At the time 
of the accident, Anderies told the investigating officer that, although her 
driver's license was issued by the state of Ohio, she resided at F.E. Warren Air 
Force Base.  One year later, her 
husband was transferred from Cheyenne to Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland, and 
she moved there with him. Later, Anderies' husband was reassigned to a base in 
Oklahoma, and the couple moved there.

 

[¶4]         Ryel filed this action, naming 
Anderies as the defendant, on September 16, 1997. Ryel claimed that she had 
suffered severe and permanent injuries to her neck and back, chronic headaches 
and pain, and incapacitating emotional injuries as a result of the 
accident.  Three days later, Ryel 
learned from the detective agency hired to serve Anderies with a summons and 
complaint that Anderies no longer resided at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, her 
last known address in Cheyenne.  On 
January 14, 1998, the district court dismissed Ryel's action without prejudice 
for failure to serve Anderies.

 

[¶5]         Ryel petitioned the district court 
to reopen the case on January 23, 1998, and the district judge wrote on the 
proposed order, "I will sign the order when you have located the 
defendant."  Ryel renewed her motion 
on April 30, 1998, and, on May 5, 1998, the district court entered an Order 
Reopening Case File Nunc Pro Tunc.  
That order provided that the file was reopened as of September 16, 
1997.  Ultimately, Ryel filed an 
Affidavit in Support of Service by Certified Mail on August 4, 1998.  Service by certified mail was asserted 
to be final on August 27, 1998, four years and seven months after the cause of 
action accrued and more than eleven months after the Complaint was filed.  The district court entered an Order 
Granting Summary Judgment on December 8, 1998, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) and W.R.C.P. 3.  
Ryel appealed from the Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of 
Anderies.

 

[¶6]         Both of the parties attached 
affidavits in support of their relative positions to the pleadings on the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, and the district court 
correctly ruled that the motion became one for summary judgment pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 12(b). Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Dunkelberger, 918 P.2d 987, 990-91 
(Wyo. 1996).  The district court 
ruled that the facts in this case are undisputed.  Certainly, with respect to the facts 
relating to service of process, that ruling is correct.  Such cases are ripe for summary 
judgment.

 

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue 
of material fact is present and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  Hermreck v. United 
Parcel Service, Inc., 938 P.2d 863 (Wyo. 1997); Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, 
Inc., 927 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Wyo. 1996).  
See also, W.R.C.P. 56(c).

 

 Murphy 
v. Housel & Housel, 955 P.2d 880, 883 (Wyo. 1998).

 

Here, the material facts are undisputed.  This appeal, then, reviews only the 
district court's determination that the undisputed facts mandate a judgment in 
favor of State Farm.  No deference 
is given to the district court's conclusions of law. Martin v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, 894 P.2d 618, 620 (Wyo. 1995).

 

 Pribble 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 933 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

[¶7]         Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-105(a)(iv)(C), a personal injury action must be brought within four years 
after the cause of action accrues.  
For purposes of the statute of limitations, a civil action is commenced 
the day the complaint is filed, so long as a defendant is served with process 
within sixty days.  If service is 
not made within sixty days, W.R.C.P. 3 provides:

 

(b)  When 
commenced. - For purposes of statutes of limitations, an action shall be deemed 
commenced on the date of filing the complaint as to each defendant, if service 
is made on the defendant * * * within 60 days after the filing of the 
complaint.  If such service is not 
made within 60 days the action shall be deemed commenced on the date when 
service is made. * * *

 

 When Ryel's complaint was filed on 
September 16, 1997, the four-year period specified in the statute of limitations 
had not expired, but Ryel did not obtain service of process on Anderies until 
August 27, 1998, seven months after the statute of limitations expired.  The district court held, in accordance 
with W.R.C.P. 3, that the action was not commenced until service of process was 
accomplished and therefore was not brought within the period of the applicable 
statute of limitations.

 

[¶8]         Ryel suggests that her injuries 
did not become apparent until November of 1996 when she was released by her 
physician to return to work.  The 
police report dated January 27, 1994, the date of the accident, reflects that 
Ryel complained of injuries to her knee and numbness in her foot.  In this instance, the language of James 
v. Montoya, 963 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Wyo. 1998) is prophetic:

 

A 
tort cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that 
she has suffered damage due to another's wrongful act.  Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 337 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Wyo. 
1984)).  The statute of limitations 
begins to run at that time, even when 
the consequences of the wrongful act are not fully known until later.  Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 343-44 
(Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979).  James' affidavit makes it clear she knew 
of the wrongful act, and knew she had suffered injury as a result, on June 30, 
1992, the day she was exposed to the chemicals.  Even though she was not fully aware of 
the extent of her injury until the following spring, her cause of action accrued 
and the statute of limitations began to run on that date.

 

Statutes of limitation do not discriminate between 
the just and unjust claim.  They 
operate regardless of the merits, and courts have no right to deny their 
operation.  Duke, 589 P.2d  at 
340.  James' injury occurred on June 
30, 1992, and the statute of limitations began to run on this negligence action 
on that date. Appellants' action was commenced on October 9, 1996, more than 
four years later.  There is no 
dispute of material fact, and the law is clear that this claim is time barred. 
The district court was correct in dismissing this case.

 

[¶9]         Ryel seeks to avoid the clear 
application of the foregoing rules by contending that after the cause of action 
accrued, Anderies departed from the state, and the statute of limitations was 
tolled in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-116:

 

If a cause of action accrues against a person when he 
is out of the state, or has absconded or concealed himself, the period limited 
for the commencement of the action does not begin to run until he comes into the 
state or while he is absconded or concealed.  If after the cause of action accrues he 
departs from the state or absconds or conceals himself, the time of his absence 
or concealment is not computed as a part of the period within which the action 
shall be brought.

 

 The district court relied upon Tarter, 
550 P.2d  at 910 when Ryel made the same argument in response to the motion for 
summary judgment.  In Tarter, we 
held the tolling statute does not apply where there is another method of service 
available to the plaintiff.  
Anderies asserts there was a substitute method of service available 
through Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301(a), which provides in pertinent 
part:

 

(a)  The 
use and operation of a motor vehicle on any street or highway within Wyoming by 
any person upon whom service of process cannot be made within Wyoming either 
personally or by service upon a duly appointed resident agent is deemed an 
appointment of the secretary of state of Wyoming as the operator's lawful 
attorney upon whom may be served all legal processes in any proceeding against 
him, or his personal representative if he be deceased, due to damage or injury 
to person or property resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle on the 
streets or highways within this state.  
Such operation constitutes the operator's agreement that any process 
served in any action against him or his personal representative has the same 
legal force and validity as if served upon him or his personal representative 
within this state.

 

[¶10]      Ryel argues that the statutory 
language has changed since Tarter was decided and the rule announced in that 
case is no longer applicable because of those changes.1 Although the statute enacted at the 
time of Tarter specified "resident" or "non-resident" instead of "any person" as 
the current version does, "any person" is a term that would include both 
"resident" or "non-resident," and the change in statutory language does not 
serve to distinguish Tarter.

 

 [¶11]    
After the amendment to the statute, this Court decided Colley v. Dyer, 
821 P.2d 565 (Wyo. 1991).  In that 
case, this Court assumed that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-6-301(a) could be invoked in 
an instance in which a defendant was a resident at the time of the accident. 
While no problem of the statute of limitations was addressed, it is clear that 
the teaching of Tarter would remain viable to the extent that this statute would 
serve as a vehicle for effecting service upon the absent defendant.  The only possible reconciliation of 
these two cases is that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Anderies' 
absence from Wyoming. We hold that the decision of the district court set forth 
in its Order Granting Summary Judgment is correct.

 

 [¶12]    
Anderies has argued as a second premise for affirmance that Ryel filed a 
brief containing no cogent argument or citations of authority sufficient to 
support reversal.  Our determination 
that the district court correctly applied the pertinent law in ruling that the 
action was not brought within the time specified by the pertinent statute of 
limitations makes it unnecessary and unavailing to address the second argument 
asserted by Anderies. Suffice it to say that we do not agree, even though we 
ruled against Ryel, that Ryel did not support her appeal by cogent argument or citations of 
relevant authority.

 

 [¶13]  The Order Granting Summary Judgment 
entered in the district court in which the court ruled that the case should be 
dismissed with prejudice because it was not commenced within the time limit of 
the statute of limitations is affirmed.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. § 
1-52 (1957, 1975 Cum. Supp.) read:

 

The use 
and operation by a non-resident of the State of Wyoming or a resident of this 
state upon whom service of summons cannot be made within this state, or the 
agent of such non-resident or resident, of a motor vehicle over or upon any 
street or highway within the State of Wyoming, shall be deemed an appointment by 
such non-resident or resident of the secretary of state of the State of Wyoming 
as his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal processes in 
any action or proceeding against him * * *.