Case Title: Lewis v. City of Alexandria

Citation: 

Docket Number: 131308

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2014-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
HENRY LEWIS 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 131308 
JUSTICE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 
 
 
 
       APRIL 17, 2014 
CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
James C. Clark, Judge 
 
 
Henry Lewis (Lewis) claims the circuit court erred in 
declining to award reinstatement, front pay and/or compensation 
for lost pension benefits in his wrongful termination action 
against the City of Alexandria (the City) under Code § 8.01-
216.8 of the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act (VFATA), Code 
§§ 8.01-216.1 through -216.19.  We disagree and will affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
I.  Background 
 
The City hired Lewis in January 2008 as a senior project 
manager in its Capital Projects Division of the Department of 
General Services (the Department).  Lewis was assigned to manage 
the construction of a new police and emergency communications 
facility (hereinafter, the police facility project), and worked 
in that capacity until August 2011, when the City terminated his 
employment. 
 
Lewis sued the City alleging "unlawful retaliation and 
discrimination" in violation of Code § 8.01-216.8, based on his 
alleged wrongful termination.  Specifically, Lewis claimed the 
 
2 
City retaliated and discriminated against him by terminating his 
employment in response to complaints he made about Jeremy McPike 
(McPike), a Deputy Director, and then Director, of the 
Department (when McPike became Lewis' direct supervisor).  Lewis 
complained to various individuals in the Department that McPike 
approved payments of certain false invoices submitted to the 
City by the construction company serving as the "construction 
manager" for the police facility project.  These complaints 
caused acrimony between Lewis and McPike, as well as between 
Lewis and the construction manager, which, Lewis claimed, 
eventually led to his wrongful termination. 
 
Lewis sought an award of two times the amount of back pay 
(as liquidated damages), reinstatement, special damages, 
including lost pension benefits, and "any other relief provided 
for in Code § 8.01-216.8."  To the extent the circuit court 
determined that reinstatement was "impractical and unworkable," 
Lewis requested in the alternative that he be awarded front pay 
(i.e., lost future earnings). 1 
                      
 
1 See Johnson v. Spencer Press of Maine, Inc., 364 F.3d 368, 
379 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that "[a]n award of back pay 
compensates plaintiffs for lost wages and benefits between the 
time of discharge and the trial court judgment," whereas 
"[f]ront pay . . . compensates plaintiffs for lost wages that 
may accrue after the conclusion of the trial"). 
 
3 
 
On Lewis' pretrial motion, the circuit court ruled that a 
jury would decide whether the City violated Code § 8.01-216.8 in 
terminating his employment and, if so, decide his claim for back 
pay.  If the jury found in favor of Lewis, his other remedial 
requests would then be treated as requests for equitable relief 
and thus decided by the circuit court. 
 
Unlike the issue of liability, evidence regarding the 
amount of back pay that would be owed to Lewis upon a finding of 
wrongful termination was undisputed.  Approximately nine months 
after his termination, Lewis secured new employment with the 
Prince George's County, Maryland, Public Schools in June 2012, 
earning approximately ten thousand dollars a year less than he 
earned with the City.  Accordingly, Lewis' expert witness in the 
field of economic damages, Joel Morse, Ph.D. (Morse), testified 
that Lewis' back pay would equal the rate of his salary with the 
City as applied to the period extending from the time of his 
termination (August 2011) to the time of trial (March 2013), 
less the earnings he received from his new employment during 
that same period. 
 
Morse then testified outside the presence of the jury 
regarding his analysis in support of Lewis' claims for front pay 
and compensation for lost pension benefits.  Although it is 
somewhat unclear from the record, Lewis has asserted below and 
maintains on appeal that Morse's testimony established that his 
 
4 
lost front pay through age 65 (Lewis was 58 at the time of 
trial) was $57,178.2  As to the pension-related claim, Morse 
explained that Lewis' pension with the City had not vested at 
the time of his termination.  Lewis would have been required to 
work for the City for another year and a half for his pension to 
vest.  Nevertheless, according to Morse, Lewis was "denied the 
value [of that pension] between age 65 and 80 [Lewis' life 
expectancy]," the present value of which was $175,130.  Morse 
further explained, however, that if Lewis worked to age 68 in 
his current position, he would receive a pension from the State 
of Maryland. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Lewis and awarded 
damages of $104,096 in back pay.  Lewis accordingly moved the 
court to include liquidated damages to this award pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-216.8, which would double the back pay award 
resulting in a total of $208,192.  The circuit court granted the 
motion. 
                      
 
2 During his testimony, Morse relied on a chart that was 
only used as demonstrative evidence, which may have shown this 
front pay figure.  Morse did testify, however, that based on his 
calculations Lewis' back pay and front pay combined would total 
$161,228.  We will simply assume, for purposes of this opinion, 
that $57,178 was Morse's front pay figure, but hold that the 
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award 
this sum to Lewis as front pay. 
 
5 
 
Lewis then moved the circuit court "to use its equitable 
powers" to award additional relief against the City, including 
"reinstatement . . . or if reinstatement is not feasible, in the 
alternative . . . an award of front-pay in the amount of 
$57,178.00"; and an award "for his loss of pension benefits in 
the amount of $175,130."3  The circuit court declined to award 
reinstatement, front pay or pension compensation.  On a motion 
for reconsideration, Lewis again asked the circuit court to 
award front pay and pension compensation, but abandoned his 
claim for reinstatement.  The circuit court again denied this 
requested relief in its final order.  In reaching this decision, 
the circuit court reasoned that Lewis had been "made whole" by 
the jury's verdict and the circuit court's other awards in his 
favor.  The circuit court otherwise found that the claims for 
front pay and pension compensation were "subject to too much 
speculation." 
II.  Analysis 
 
On appeal, Lewis asserts in his sole assignment of error 
that the circuit court erred in declining to award 
                      
 
3 In addition, Lewis requested (i) an award of attorneys' 
fees, as expressly provided for in Code § 8.01-216.8, (ii) 
payment for his unused vacation leave, and (iii) expungement of 
all disciplinary actions entered on his employment file with the 
City.  The circuit court ruled in Lewis' favor on these three 
requests, which included awards of $243,684.12 in attorneys' 
fees and costs, and $8,181 for loss of vacation pay.  None of 
these awards are at issue in this appeal. 
 
6 
"reinstatement, front pay and/or compensation for his lost 
pension" under Code § 8.01-216.8.  In requiring that we review 
the circuit court's construction and application of the 
statute's remedial provisions, this appeal presents a case of 
first impression in this Court. 
A. Code § 8.01-216.8 
 
Code § 8.01-216.8, the VFATA's anti-retaliation provision, 
creates a cause of action for wrongful termination resulting 
from the reporting of potential false claims against the 
Commonwealth and its subsidiaries.4  Thus, upon establishing that 
the City terminated his employment in violation of the statute, 
Lewis was entitled to seek the relief expressly provided 
therein.  The statute states that such an employee "shall be 
entitled to all relief necessary to make that employee . . . 
whole."  Code § 8.01-216.8.  The statute further states that 
"[r]elief shall include reinstatement[,] two times the amount of 
back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any 
                      
 
4 The VFATA is based on the federal civil False Claims Act 
(FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.  The relief provided in Code § 
8.01-216.8 of the VFATA is, in fact, identical to the relief 
provided in the FCA under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2).  The FCA cases 
thus provide guidance for our review in this appeal.  We also 
find guidance in cases addressing other federal statutory 
schemes containing anti-retaliatory relief for wrongful 
termination, specifically the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) (29 U.S.C. § 626(b)), the Family Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) (29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B)), and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)). 
 
7 
special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, 
including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys fees."  Id. 
B. Reinstatement 
 
As to the circuit court's denial of his claim for 
reinstatement, Lewis cannot make the argument on appeal that the 
circuit court erred in not awarding such relief.  Lewis 
abandoned that claim at the hearing on his motion asking the 
circuit court to reconsider its earlier denial of reinstatement, 
front pay and pension compensation. 
 
Lewis' counsel began his argument in support of the motion 
by stating that Code § 8.01-216.8 "says the [c]ourt shall award 
all relief necessary, including reinstatement," but then 
asserted that "quite frankly, reinstatement is almost never 
practical."  At that point, the circuit court judge interjected 
by asking, "Can we agree that reinstatement is just not an 
option here[?]"  Lewis' counsel responded, "Fair enough, Judge," 
after the circuit court judge went on to explain that his 
question was based on the evidence at trial of "obvious 
acrimony," which led him to believe that reinstatement was "not 
an option." 
 
Moreover, even after assigning error to the circuit court's 
decision not to award reinstatement, Lewis states on brief in 
this appeal that "the circuit court likely enjoyed the 
discretion to determine that reinstatement was impractical, 
 
8 
particularly given the parties' animosity and the fact that 
Lewis had secured new employment."  A party "'may not approbate 
and reprobate by taking successive positions in the course of 
litigation that are either inconsistent with each other or 
mutually contradictory.'"  Rowe v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 495, 
502, 675 S.E.2d 161, 164 (2009) (quoting Cangiano v. LSH Bldg. 
Co., 271 Va. 171, 181, 623 S.E.2d 889, 895 (2006)).  Therefore, 
we leave for another day our consideration of the parameters of 
the statute's reinstatement provision. 
C. Front Pay 
 
We agree with the parties that the circuit court's 
treatment of Lewis' claim for front pay as a request for 
equitable relief under Code § 8.01-216.8 was correct.  See Board 
of Supervisors of James Cnty. v. Windmill Meadows, LLC, 287 Va. 
170, 175, 752 S.E.2d 837, 839 (2014) (on appeal, circuit court's 
statutory construction is subject to de novo review (citing 
Newberry Station Homeowners Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 285 
Va. 604, 611, 740 S.E.2d 548, 552 (2013))).  That ruling, which 
was consistent with the treatment of front pay claims in FCA, 
FMLA, Title VII and ADEA cases, meant that the circuit court's 
subsequent decision regarding whether to award front pay was 
committed to its discretion.  See, e.g., Nichols v. Ashland 
Hosp. Corp., 251 F.3d 496, 503-04 (4th Cir. 2001) (FMLA); Selgas 
v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9, 12-13 & n.2 (1st Cir. 
 
9 
1997) (Title VII); Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 
(4th Cir. 1991) (ADEA); Wiehua Huang v. Rector and Visitors of 
the Univ. of Va., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34186, at *39-40 (W.D. 
Va. March 7, 2013) (FCA) Wilkins v. St. Louis Housing Auth., 198 
F.Supp.2d 1080, 1091-92 (E.D. Mo. 2001) (FCA).  We therefore 
also agree with the parties that this Court's review of the 
circuit court's denial of front pay is subject to an abuse of 
discretion standard.  See Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-
Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 
(2011) (analyzing abuse of discretion standard); Bentley Funding 
Group, L.L.C. v. SK&R Group, L.L.C., 269 Va. 315, 323-24, 609 
S.E.2d 49, 53 (2005) (circuit court's exercise of discretionary 
authority in equity reviewed under abuse of discretion 
standard). 
 
Lewis argues the circuit court abused its discretion in not 
awarding front pay under Code § 8.01-216.8 in the amount of 
$57,178, based on testimony of his economic damages expert.  The 
circuit court had to award at least "some amount of front pay in 
lieu of reinstatement," Lewis contends, or "explain why front 
pay was somehow unnecessary to make Lewis whole."  (Emphasis 
omitted.)  With this, we disagree. 
 
10 
Code § 8.01-216.8 nowhere mentions the words "front pay."5  
Thus, to the extent front pay is an available remedy under the 
statute in an appropriate case, it would necessarily be awarded 
under the statute's provision for recovery of "any special 
damages sustained as a result of the discrimination," which are 
not defined in the statute.  Id.  Furthermore, the overriding 
consideration under the express terms of the statute is not that 
the plaintiff be awarded any particular kind of relief, or 
combination of remedies, as "special damages."  Id.  Rather, it 
is ultimately a matter of compensating the plaintiff with 
"relief necessary to make [him] whole."  Id.  See Hammond v. 
Northland Counseling Ctr., Inc., 218 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 
2000) (the FCA's anti-retaliation statute has same "overarching 
purpose"). 
It is true that front pay is commonly given consideration 
as an equitable remedy in the alternative to reinstatement in 
cases decided under anti-retaliation statutes for wrongful 
termination, including the FCA.  See Wilkins, 198 F.Supp.2d at 
1091 ("While the FCA does not specifically include front pay as 
a remedy available to the court to effect full compensation, the 
court concludes that Congress intended that front pay be awarded 
                      
 
5 Nor is front pay expressly provided as a remedy in the 
anti-retaliation provisions of the FCA, ADEA, FMLA or Title VII.  
See supra note 4. 
 
11 
in the appropriate case to effect the express Congressional 
intention that a claimant under § 3730(h) be made whole." 
(internal citation omitted)).  But front pay is not awarded as a 
matter of course when reinstatement is denied.  As the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has counseled, 
"front pay may serve as a substitute or a complement [to 
reinstatement].  Because of the potential for windfall, however, 
its use must be tempered."  Duke, 928 F.2d at 1424.   Hence, 
"[i]ts award, as an adjunct or an alternative to reinstatement, 
must rest in the discretion of the court in shaping the 
appropriate remedy."  Id.  Similarly mindful that the plaintiff 
should not receive "a windfall, rather than compensation" in an 
FCA case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit held in Hammond that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
either reinstatement or front pay, even though there was factual 
support for an award of other FCA damages and attorneys' fees.  
218 F.3d at 892-95.  See Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 
829 (8th Cir. 2002) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to award front pay because, "in light of the current 
employment [of plaintiff] and back pay and compensatory awards, 
an award of front pay would be an unnecessary windfall to 
[plaintiff]").6 
                      
 
6 Code § 8.01-216.8 makes no express provision for front 
 
12 
Here, the circuit court found that Lewis was "made whole" 
under Code § 8.01-216.8 without an award of front pay, based 
upon (i) the jury's award of $104,096 in back pay and the 
circuit court's doubling of that award as liquidated damages, 
for a total award of $208,192; (ii) the circuit court's award of 
$8,181 for lost vacation pay; and (iii) the circuit court's 
award of $243,684.12 in attorneys' fees.  In light of these 
awards, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its 
discretion in declining to award front pay to Lewis in the 
amount of $57,178, as requested, particularly given that his 
liquidated damages award was nearly twice the amount of his 
claim for front pay. 
We find support for this conclusion in Dotson v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 558 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2009), a FMLA wrongful termination 
case in which the plaintiff was awarded liquidated damages, but 
not front pay.  Like Lewis, the plaintiff in Dotson argued that 
the trial court erred by considering "the role played by the 
                                                                  
pay.  As explained above, absent an award of reinstatement, 
front pay is an equitable remedy that may be awarded, in the 
circuit court's discretion, as an alternative to reinstatement.  
The overarching requirement under the statute is that the 
plaintiff be made "whole."  Id.  Consequently, absent 
reinstatement, an award of front pay is not required as a matter 
of law in any case apart from consideration of the other relief, 
if any, awarded under the statute in making the plaintiff whole, 
as decided by the circuit court in its sound discretion. 
  
 
13 
liquidated damages [award] in making him whole" when the trial 
court declined to award front pay.  Id. at 300-01.  The Fourth 
Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in making this ruling, explaining that "it is difficult to 
understand why a lower court cannot consider the role of 
liquidated damages in reaching [the FMLA anti-retaliation 
provision's] overarching goal" of making the plaintiff whole.  
Id. at 301.  Other courts have similarly recognized that an 
award of liquidated damages may justify the denial of front pay.  
See, e.g., McNeil v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 
118 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that "front pay may be less 
appropriate when liquidated damages are awarded"); Wildman v. 
Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Because 
future damages are often speculative, the district court, in 
exercising its discretion, should consider the circumstances of 
the case, including the availability of liquidated damages."); 
Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) 
("We agree with the Seventh and First Circuits that a 
substantial liquidated damage award may indicate that an 
additional award of front pay is inappropriate or excessive."); 
Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th 
Cir. 1982) ("[A]vailability of a substantial liquidated damages 
award may be a proper consideration in denying additional 
damages in lieu of reinstatement."); see also Bergerson v. New 
 
14 
York Office of Mental Health, 652 F.3d 277, 288 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(explaining, in an ADEA wrongful termination case, that "[a]n 
award of front pay is discretionary, and if a district court 
makes a nonerroneous 'specific finding' that a plaintiff has 
already been made whole, no abuse of discretion can be found in 
denying front pay").7 
D. Compensation for Lost Pension Benefits 
Finally, Lewis argues that the circuit court abused its 
discretion in denying his claim against the City for lost 
pension benefits in the amount of $175,130.  As with front pay, 
Code § 8.01-216.8 does not expressly provide for relief 
pertaining to lost pension benefits.  Thus, to the extent such 
relief may be awarded, it too would necessarily be awarded as an 
equitable remedy for "special damages."  Code § 8.01-216.8.  See 
                      
7 Because of the quantitative comparison of Lewis' front pay 
claim to his liquidated damages award, justifying the circuit 
court's denial of an award of front pay, we need not address the 
circuit court's determination that his front pay claim was 
otherwise too speculative.  We nevertheless note that it is, of 
course, well established under applicable case law that the 
longer the period over which front pay is requested, the more 
speculative a front pay award becomes.  Downey v. Strain, 510 
F.3d 534, 545 (5th Cir. 2007)  Here, Lewis sought an award of 
front pay through age 65, a period of nine years from the date 
of his termination and seven years from the date of trial.  
Compare, id. at 544-45 (affirming trial court's two year front 
pay award); Dollar v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 710 F.3d 798, 
808-811 (8th Cir. 2013) (reversing trial court's ten year front 
pay award). 
  
 
15 
Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 373-74 (3rd Cir. 1987) 
(treating claim for lost pension compensation under the ADEA as 
claim for equitable relief).  Accordingly, as noted in regard to 
Lewis' claim for front pay, we conclude that the decision 
whether to award lost pension compensation to Lewis was 
committed to the circuit court's discretion, and that his appeal 
of the circuit court's denial of this claim is likewise subject 
to an abuse of discretion standard of review. 
The salient facts before the circuit court relevant to its 
denial of Lewis' claim for pension compensation are as follows.  
Lewis was a licensed architect with more that thirty-five years 
of experience in architecture and construction project 
management, and no evidence was presented indicating that he 
could no longer market his professional skills.  His contract 
with the City contained no specific period of employment, and 
the police facility project, which was his only assignment 
during his three and a half years of employment with the City, 
was completed two months after his termination.  Lewis' pension 
with the City had not vested at the time of his termination, and 
would not have vested for another eighteen months.  Finally, 
Lewis obtained employment after his termination that paid a 
comparable salary and would provide pension benefits upon his 
retirement at age 68. 
 
16 
Based on these facts, we hold that the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion in determining that Lewis was made 
whole through his other awards against the City, absent an award 
of pension compensation; and that his claim for pension 
compensation in the amount of $175,130 was otherwise "subject to 
too much speculation."8 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding relief to Lewis under Code § 
8.01-216.8, absent an award of reinstatement, front pay or 
pension compensation.  We will thus affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE MIMS, concurring. 
I concur with the majority’s conclusions that Lewis abandoned 
his claim for reinstatement and that the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying his claim for pension 
compensation because it was too speculative.  However, I write 
                      
8 Lewis cites no persuasive authority compelling a different 
conclusion.  In the two cases that he does cite in support of 
this claim, Blum, 829 F.2d at 371-76, and Buckley v. Reynolds 
Metals Co., 690 F.Supp. 211, 213-220 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the 
plaintiffs had been long term employees with tenures of between 
9 and 25 years, and were entitled to pension benefits at the 
time their employment was terminated. 
  
 
 
separately because I believe that the interpretation of Code § 
8.01-216.8 in Part II(C) is both unnecessary and incorrect. 
As the majority opinion recites, front pay is awarded as 
prospective compensation, for pay lost from the date of judgment 
into the future.  Johnson v. Spencer Press of Maine, Inc., 364 
F.3d 368, 379 (1st Cir. 2004). 
The evidence in this case is that the project for which 
Lewis was principally responsible ended in October 2011, at 
least five months before he filed his complaint and 18 months 
before entry of judgment.  Although Lewis argues that he is 
entitled to an award of front pay for the difference between his 
compensation from the City and from his new employer through age 
65, he failed to prove at trial that his at-will employment by 
the City would not have lawfully terminated upon the conclusion 
of the project.  Cf. Wilkins v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 198 
F.Supp.2d 1080, 1092 (E.D. Mo. 2001).  He therefore failed to 
prove that he was entitled to ongoing employment by the City at 
his previous level of compensation from the date of judgment 
forward. 
Consequently, Lewis’ claim for front pay was, as the 
circuit court ruled, simply too speculative.  The court did not 
abuse its discretion when it declined to enter such an award.  
This basis is sufficient to affirm its judgment and the Court 
need not reach the interpretation of Code § 8.01-216.8.  Yet the 
 
 
18 
majority opinion does so, relying on its analysis of that issue 
to decide this assignment of error.  In addition to being 
unnecessary, that analysis is incorrect. 
Code § 8.01-216.8 provides that when an employee proves a 
claim of unlawful retaliation under the Virginia Fraud Against 
Taxpayers Act (the “VFATA”), he or she “shall be entitled to all 
relief necessary to make [him or her] whole.”  (Emphasis added.)  
The statute further specifies that “[r]elief shall include 
reinstatement with the same seniority status that [he or she] 
would have had but for the discrimination, two times the amount 
of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any 
special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, 
including litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
“It is elementary that the primary object in the 
interpretation of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to 
the intention of the legislature.”  Andrews v. Shepherd, 201 Va. 
412, 414, 111 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1959).  “In interpreting [a] 
statute, ‘courts apply the plain meaning . . . unless the terms 
are ambiguous or applying the plain language would lead to an 
absurd result.’”  Baker v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 572, 576, 733 
S.E.2d 642, 644 (2012) (quoting Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 
227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 926 (2006)). 
 
 
19 
“When the word ‘shall’ appears in a statute it is generally 
used in an imperative or mandatory sense.”  Schmidt v. City of 
Richmond, 206 Va. 211, 218, 142 S.E.2d 573, 578 (1965); accord 
City of Waynesboro Sheriff's Dep't v. Harter, 222 Va. 564, 566, 
281 S.E.2d 911, 912-13 (1981).  “In this sense ‘shall’ is 
inconsistent with, and excludes, the idea of discretion, and 
operates to impose a duty which may be enforced . . . unless an 
intent to the contrary appears.”  Andrews, 201 Va. at 414, 111 
S.E.2d at 281-82. 
Nevertheless, “the courts, in endeavoring to arrive at the 
meaning of written language, whether used in a will, a contract, 
or a statute, will construe ‘may’ and ‘shall’ as permissive or 
mandatory in accordance with the subject matter and context.”  
Pettus v. Hendricks, 113 Va. 326, 330, 74 S.E. 191, 193 (1912).  
Code § 8.01-216.8 therefore is ambiguous because we must 
determine whether the General Assembly intended the relief 
provision to be mandatory or permissive.  Brown v. Lukhard, 229 
Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (“Language is ambiguous 
if it admits of being understood in more than one way or refers 
to two or more things simultaneously . . . . is difficult to 
comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and 
definiteness.”). 
When interpreting an ambiguous statute, courts may consult 
its legislative history.  See id. (excluding use of legislative 
 
 
20 
history when statute is unambiguous).  The General Assembly 
enacted the VFATA in 2002.  2002 Acts ch. 842.  As noted in the 
majority opinion, the substantive words it used in the relief 
provision were identical to those found in the corresponding 
provision in the federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et 
seq. (the “FCA”)--specifically, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).  Moreover, 
the General Assembly enacted an amendment to conform the relief 
provision in Code § 8.01-216.8 to the changes to 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(h) after Congress amended the federal statute in the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 
4(d), 123 Stat. 1617, 1624-25 (2009) and the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1079A(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2079 (2010).  2011 Acts ch. 676. 
The fact that the General Assembly adopted the same 
substantive language as the relief provision in the FCA when it 
originally enacted the corresponding provision in the VFATA, and 
amended the VFATA provision in 2011 after Congress amended the 
FCA provision in 2009 and 2010, indicates that the General 
Assembly intended state courts to construe the state statute as 
the federal courts had then construed the federal statute.  
Powers v. County School Board, 148 Va. 661, 669, 139 S.E. 262, 
264 (1927) (“When the legislature comes to pass a new law or to 
amend an old one, it is presumed to act with full knowledge of 
the law as it stands bearing upon the subject with which it 
 
 
21 
proposes to deal.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Two 
federal cases construing the FCA relief provision are especially 
instructive here. 
In Hammond v. Northland Counseling Center, Inc., 218 F.3d 
886 (8th Cir. 2000), the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit held that reinstatement may be an impractical, 
inappropriate remedy in light of continuing acrimony between the 
parties.  It declined to reach the question of awarding front 
pay in lieu of reinstatement because the plaintiff terminated in 
that case “started work [for a new employer] the very next day 
with an equal (if not better) salary and benefits package.”  Id. 
at 892. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Missouri addressed the question squarely in Wilkins.  There 
the court reiterated that reinstatement may not be appropriate 
in every case due to the relationship between the parties.  198 
F.Supp.2d at 1091.  It further found that the animosity between 
the plaintiff and his employer made reinstatement inappropriate 
in that case.  It held that “Congress intended that front pay be 
awarded in the appropriate case to effect the express 
Congressional intention that a claimant under [31 U.S.C.] § 
3730(h) be made whole.”  Id.  It continued by holding that 
“[w]hether to order reinstatement or front pay is committed to 
the discretion of [the trial] court” and that where 
 
 
22 
reinstatement was inappropriate “the court will award . . . 
front pay.”  Id. 
The trial court in Wilkins clearly considered front pay to 
be an equitable substitute for reinstatement.1  The only factor 
it considered when deciding that an award of front pay was 
appropriate was its conclusion that reinstatement was 
inappropriate based on the facts of the case.  198 F.Supp.2d at 
1091.  This is a logical conclusion based on the plain language 
of the FCA, which, like the VFATA, commands that the plaintiff 
“shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make [him or her] 
whole.”  31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1); accord Code § 8.01-216.8. 
As the majority opinion recites, “[a]n award of back pay 
compensates plaintiffs for lost wages and benefits between the 
time of the discharge and the trial court judgment.”  Johnson, 
364 F.3d at 379.  Thus, an award of back pay is an award of 
retrospective relief, intended to restore to the plaintiff 
compensation he or she would have received between termination 
and judgment if the unlawful retaliation had not occurred.2  
Reinstatement is the corresponding award of prospective relief, 
                      
1 The district court’s judgment was affirmed “in all respects,” 
without commentary on its front pay reasoning.  Wilkins v. St. 
Louis Hous. Auth., 314 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2002). 
2 The interest on the back pay, litigation costs, and attorneys’ 
fees provided by the statutes are also retrospective relief 
because they too restore to the plaintiff losses he or she 
incurred prior to or in the course of obtaining the judgment. 
 
 
23 
ensuring that the plaintiff receives, after judgment, the 
compensation he or she would have earned from his or her 
employment if the unlawful retaliation had not occurred. 
However, as noted in Hammond and Wilkins, reinstatement may 
be inappropriate due to the current relationship between the 
parties.  In such circumstances, front pay is an equitable 
substitute for reinstatement, as reflected in part of the 
definition of front pay included in Johnson but omitted from the 
majority opinion:  “Front pay, by contrast, is money awarded for 
lost compensation during the period between judgment and 
reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement.  Front pay thus 
compensates plaintiffs for lost wages that may accrue after the 
conclusion of the trial.”  Id. (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Both retrospective relief and 
prospective relief are necessary to make the plaintiff whole 
unless, as in Hammond, the plaintiff suffers no prospective 
injury.3  218 F.3d at 892. 
To hold, as the majority opinion effectively does, that no 
prospective relief is necessary simply because reinstatement is 
                      
3 The VFATA does not relieve the plaintiff of the general duty to 
mitigate his or her damages.  See, e.g., Forbes v. Rapp, 269 Va. 
374, 380, 611 S.E.2d 592, 595 (2005).  A plaintiff terminated in 
an unlawful retaliatory act therefore must make reasonable 
efforts to obtain alternative employment.  See Wilkins, 198 
F.Supp.2d at 1091-92. 
 
 
24 
impractical or inappropriate due to the relationship of the 
parties unfairly penalizes the plaintiff alone for the 
deterioration in the bilateral employment relationship.  More 
importantly, such an interpretation contravenes the spirit of 
the statutes. 
The majority opinion cites several federal cases 
interpreting the relief provisions of other federal statutes and 
concludes that, coupled with the statutory award of double back 
pay, an award of front pay may result in a windfall to the 
plaintiff.  According to the majority opinion, this would exceed 
the amount of damages Congress and the General Assembly intended 
when they contemplated making the plaintiff whole.  I disagree 
for two reasons. 
First, federal cases interpreting the relief afforded by 
other federal statutes are not instructive here.  The General 
Assembly took the language of the VFATA from the FCA, not the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Family Medical Leave 
Act, or the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Moreover, Hammond and 
Wilkins were decided in 2000 and 2001, respectively, and thus 
were contemporaneous with the General Assembly’s original 
enactment of the VFATA in 2002. 
Second, the windfall concern was adequately addressed in 
Wilkins.  There the court reduced the amount of back pay by the 
 
 
25 
amount of compensation the plaintiff received from his new 
employment.  198 F.Supp.2d at 1090. 
For the reasons stated, I would hold that “shall” is 
mandatory in Code § 8.01-216.8 and that it requires a court to 
award both retrospective and prospective relief when the 
plaintiff proves both retrospective and prospective injury.  It 
may exercise its sound discretion to determine which form of 
prospective relief (reinstatement or front pay) may be 
appropriate considering the facts of the case.  I therefore 
would affirm the circuit court’s judgment because, as noted 
above, Lewis failed to prove prospective injury.  There was no 
evidence that he was entitled to ongoing employment by the City 
at his previous level of compensation from the date of judgment 
forward.