Case Title: Evans v. Moyer

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0220

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
COURTNEY EVANS, AS BENEFICIARY OF THE FINLAY FAMILY TRUST AND CONTINGENT BENEFICIARY OF HTE JOAN HENRIETTE FINLAY TRUST v. PETER F. MOYER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE TRUSTEE OF THE FINLAY FAMILY TRUST AND THE JOAN HENRIETTE FINALY TRUST2012 WY 111Case Number: S-11-0220Decided: 08/15/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
COURTNEY 
EVANS, as beneficiary of the Finlay Family Trust and contingent beneficiary of 
the Joan Henriette Finlay 
Trust,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.PETER F. MOYER, 
individually and in his capacity as the Trustee of the Finlay Family Trust and 
the Joan Henriette Finlay Trust,Appellee(Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Lance 
J. Schuster and Carrie J. Gorgacz of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, Idaho Falls, 
Idaho.  Argument by Mr. 
Schuster.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Elizabeth 
N. Moore and Joseph F. Moore, Jr. of Moore & Myers, LLC, Jackson, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Moore.
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]      As a beneficiary 
of a trust created by her grandfather, Courtney Evans brought an action against 
the trustee, Peter F. Moyer, for an accounting and distribution of income.  The district court generally ruled in Mr. 
Moyer’s favor, and Ms. Evans appealed arguing that the district court’s 
interpretation of the trust was erroneous and Mr. Moyer’s accounting was 
insufficient.  We affirm.  
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Ms. Evans 
presents a lengthy statement of the issues on appeal:
 
A.           
Whether 
the district court erred in holding that the Plaintiff is not entitled to 
regular, quarterly distributions of income from the Finlay Family 
Trust.
 
B.           
Whether 
the Plaintiff is entitled to distributions of income that have not been made 
from the Finlay Family Trust.
 
C.           
Whether 
the Plaintiff is a beneficiary of the Finlay Family Trust and entitled to 
regular accountings from the Trustee.
 
D.           
Whether 
the district court erred in determining that Mr. Moyer’s final accounting was 
sufficient.
 
E.           
Whether 
the Trustee may make distributions of principal for the benefit of Courtney 
Evans during the lifetime of her father Bruce Evans so as to assure the support, 
maintenance, health and education of Courtney Evans.
 
F.            
Whether 
the district court erred in prohibiting the Plaintiff from conducting 
discovery.
 
G.           
Whether 
the district court erred in finding that the Sixth Amendment had application and 
that Pamela Evans properly received distributions from the Finlay Family 
Trust.
 
H.           
Whether 
the district court erred in failing to require the Trustee to segregate for 
accounting purposes the shares of Courtney and Dillon in the Finlay Family 
Trust.
 
I.              
Whether 
the district court erred in failing to grant Plaintiff’s motion to remove Peter 
Moyer as Trustee of the Finlay Family Trust.
 
J.            
Whether 
the Court erred in failing to award the Plaintiff her attorney fees and costs. 

 
Mr. 
Moyer’s statement of the issues is similar, although he presents an additional 
issue:
 
1.            
Does 
this court lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal because Ms. Evans failed to 
file a notice of appeal from the district court’s final order within the time 
allotted by Rule 2.02?
 
a.    
Did 
Ms. Evans’ improper post-judgment motion fail to toll the time for filing a 
notice of appeal?
 
b.    
Did 
Ms. Evans fail to appeal from the final order disposing of issues in this 
case?
FACTS
 
[¶3]      Ms. Evans and her 
brother Dylan are Robert Finlay’s grandchildren.  Prior to his death in 2003, Mr. Finlay 
executed a trust agreement and numerous amendments.   Upon his death, Mr. Finlay’s trust 
estate was divided into two trusts, the Joan Henriette Finlay Trust to benefit 
his wife and the Finlay Family Trust to benefit Ms. Evans and Dylan.  The Finlay Family Trust included 
provisions for distribution of income and principal.  It also included provisions designed to 
avoid the federal generation skipping transfer (GST) tax and to prevent 
distributions of principal to the beneficiaries while their father, Bruce Evans, 
was still living.  Mr. Moyer, who is 
Mr. Finlay’s nephew, was designated as trustee.   
 
[¶4]      Ms. Evans filed a 
petition against Mr. Moyer seeking an accounting of the Finlay Family Trust 
activities; distribution of income; a declaration of the meaning of the trust 
documents; and attorney fees.  After 
the trustee answered her petition, Ms. Evans filed several motions, including 
motions to compel discovery and a motion for temporary orders requiring the 
trustee to pay her educational costs.  
The district court denied Ms. Evans’ motion for temporary orders but 
ordered Mr. Moyer to provide an accounting.  It also stayed the discovery issues, 
pending a hearing on the meaning of the trust documents.    
 
[¶5]      Mr. Moyer 
prepared an accounting, but at the hearing held December 29, 2010, the district 
court ordered Mr. Moyer to supplement his accounting.  Mr. Moyer filed another accounting on 
January 18, 2011.  The district 
court issued a decision letter on April 5, 2011, generally ruling that the 
Trustee was not required to make distributions of principal for Ms. Evans’ 
education; the interest income had been properly distributed; Ms. Evans had 
received all income owed to her; Mr. Moyer properly allocated the principal and 
income of the trust; Mr. Moyer’s previous accountings were inadequate; and 
ordering Mr. Moyer to provide a complete accounting.  The district court directed the 
trustee’s attorney to prepare the order.  
The Order on Petition for Accounting and Distribution of Income entered 
April 22, 2011, contained, in addition to the rulings in the decision letter, a 
denial of attorney fees to Ms. Evans.  

 
[¶6]      Ms. Evans filed a 
motion to alter or amend judgment, asserting that the district court had 
committed a number of errors of law.  
She contested the denial of attorney fees in her motion to alter or amend 
judgment and filed a separate motion for attorney fees.  Mr. Moyer filed his supplemental 
accounting on May 16, 2011, and Ms. Evans again objected, posing seventeen 
questions about the trust account.    
 
[¶7]      The district 
court entered an order on June 28, 2011, denying Ms. Evans’ motion to alter or 
amend judgment and her motion for attorney fees.  It also ordered the parties to “provide 
a concise and cogent memorandum explaining whether [Ms. Evans] has a right to 
demand an accounting to be filed.  
In the alternative, [Mr. Moyer] can provide a written response to the 
seventeen questions raised in [Ms. Evans’] objection . . . .”   The parties filed memoranda 
addressing the legal issue of whether Ms. Evans was entitled to an accounting 
under the Uniform Trust Code and/or the trust document.  In addition, Mr. Moyer filed a response 
to the seventeen questions posed in Ms. Evans’ objection to his accounting.    
 
[¶8]      On July 18, 2011, 
Ms. Evans filed a notice of appeal, appealing from the district court’s April 
22, 2011 order and its June 28, 2011 order.  On October 7, 2011, the district court 
entered an order ruling the Uniform Trust Code in general and the specific 
accounting requirements contained in the code did not apply to the trust because 
it pre-dated the adoption of the code.  
The district court also stated that Ms. Evans was “not entitled to 
anything else by way of her Petition at this time.”        

 
DISCUSSION
 
1.    
Jurisdiction
 
[¶9]      A determination 
that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the appeal would be dispositive; 
consequently, we consider that issue first.  “The existence of jurisdiction is a 
question of law and our review is de 
novo.”  Mathewson v. Estate of Nielsen, 2011 WY 71, ¶ 11, 252 P.3d 958, 961 (Wyo. 2011).  
 
[¶10]   Mr. Moyer claims Ms. Evans did not 
file her notice of appeal in a timely manner and, therefore, did not properly 
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.  
Specifically, he argues that her motion to alter or amend the judgment 
filed after the district court issued its April 22, 2011 Order on Petition for Accounting and 
Distribution of Income was actually an improper motion for reconsideration and 
did not toll the time for filing the appeal. According to Mr. Moyer, Ms. Evans 
should have filed a notice of appeal within thirty days of the district court’s 
entry of its April 22, 2011 order.
 
[¶11]   Our jurisdiction is limited to 
appeals from final appealable orders.  
Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, ¶ 4, 125 P.3d 1022, 1023 (Wyo. 
2006).  In order to invoke this 
Court’s jurisdiction, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of 
entry of a final appealable order.  
W.R.A.P. 2.01. “A post-judgment 
motion which is otherwise titled but, in actuality, only requests 
reconsideration of the district court’s judgment will be considered an improper 
motion for reconsideration and will not toll the time for filing a notice of 
appeal.”  Mathewson, ¶ 12, 252 P.3d  at 961.  
 
[¶12]   Ms. Evans filed a motion to alter 
or amend judgment under W.R.C.P. 59(e). 
 
 
A 
Rule 
59(e) 
motion is only appropriate if one of three grounds exists: 1) the availability 
of new evidence not previously available; 2) an intervening change in 
controlling law, or 3) the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent 
manifest injustice. It is not a mechanism to relitigate issues that the court 
has already decided, nor should parties make additional arguments which should 
have been made before judgment.
 
Ragsdale 
v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 2007 
WY 163, ¶ 5, 169 P.3d 78, 80 
(Wyo. 2007) (citations omitted).   

 
[¶13]   In her motion to alter or amend 
judgment, Ms. Evans identified several errors of law with regard to the district 
court’s interpretation and application of the trust instrument.  She also asserted the district court 
erred by prohibiting her from conducting discovery.  Ms. Evans additionally challenged the 
district court’s ruling that she was not entitled to an attorney fees award and 
filed a separate motion for attorney fees.    
 
[¶14]   We agree with Mr. Moyer that the 
grounds set forth in Ms. Evans’ motion regarding the interpretation of the trust 
document and discovery were simply reiterations of issues the district court 
already considered or arguments which she should have made prior to entry of the 
order on her petition and, therefore, were actually requests for reconsideration 
and did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal.  Ragsdale, ¶¶ 6-7, 169 P.3d at 80-81; Mathewson, ¶ 17, 252 P.3d  at 
962-63.  The outstanding attorney 
fees issue also does not necessarily preclude a finding that the district 
court’s order was a final judgment.  
In Witowski v. Roosevelt, 2009 
WY 5, ¶ 10 n.1, 199 P.3d 1072, 
1076 n.1 (Wyo. 2009), we stated that “entry of a final judgment and the time for 
appeal is not necessarily delayed by an outstanding motion for attorney 
fees.”   
 
[¶15]   Nevertheless, another aspect of the 
district court’s April 22, 2011 order compels us to conclude it was not a final 
appealable judgment.  The order 
stated:  
 
The 
Court previously ordered Mr. Moyer to prepare an accounting.  The Court has reviewed the accounting 
and finds that it does not provide the detail needed to explain all income and 
distributions so that a third person could understand them.  The Court again orders Mr. Moyer to 
provide an accounting listing the principal, the income allocations, the 
expenses paid, and the distributions made to which beneficiary for every year he 
has been acting as Trustee.    

 
In 
response, Mr. Moyer submitted a revised accounting on May 16, 2011, and Ms. 
Evans again objected to it.  The 
district court then issued a decision letter and entered a corresponding order 
on June 28, 2011, in which it asked the parties to brief the issue of whether 
Ms. Evans was entitled to an accounting at all or, in the alternative, gave Mr. 
Moyer the opportunity to respond to seventeen questions raised by Ms. Evans in 
her objection to his May 16, 2011 accounting.  Mr. Moyer responded to the questions and 
both parties briefed the issue of whether Ms. Evans was entitled to an 
accounting.  On October 7, 2011, the 
district court ruled that Ms. Evans was not entitled to an accounting.    
 
[¶16]   As this procedural history makes 
clear, there were several issues regarding Ms. Evans’ petition for an accounting 
which were outstanding after the April 22, 2011 order.  In Woods v. Woods, 2001 WY 131, 36 P.3d 1142 (Wyo. 2001), the 
plaintiff sought an accounting of trust activities.  The defendant appealed the district 
court’s interim accounting and distribution order.  We held that the order was not a final 
appealable order under W.R.A.P. 1.05:
 
In 
the underlying case, both Roger and Marquietta Woods have asked for an 
accounting of the administration of the trust. While an interim accounting and 
an interim distribution of trust assets have been accomplished, there has not 
yet been a final accounting. The district court maintains jurisdiction to take 
such further action as is necessary to accomplish the final accounting. Thus, 
the order on appeal is clearly an interlocutory order and not appealable at this 
time.
 
Id., 
¶ 
9, 36 P.3d  at 1144-45.  Applying 
those principles here, the district court’s April 22, 2011 order which commanded 
Mr. Moyer to provide a more detailed accounting was not a final order.  As such, the failure to appeal that 
order within thirty days did not deprive this Court of jurisdiction.  
 
[¶17]   Ms. Evans filed her notice of 
appeal on July 18, 2011, appealing the district court’s April 22, 2011 order and 
the June 28, 2011 order denying her motion to alter or amend the judgment.  At that point, the accounting issue 
still was not resolved and her notice of appeal was premature.  However, a premature notice of appeal 
becomes effective upon entry of a final appealable order.  W.R.A.P. 2.04.  So, when the district court entered its 
final order in October 2011, the notice of appeal became effective as to those 
orders identified therein.  

 
[¶18]   One more matter requires our 
attention prior to turning to the merits of this case.  Ms. Evans did not amend her notice of 
appeal after the October 7, 2011 order and, consequently, that order was not 
identified as being appealed in the notice of appeal.  W.R.A.P. 2.07 sets forth the requirement for a notice of appeal, including “identifying the judgment or appealable order that is being appealed and 
attaching, as an appendix, the order or judgment that is being appealed.”  Painovich v. Painovich, 2009 WY 116, ¶ 11, 216 P.3d 501, 504 (Wyo. 2009).  Thus, the notice of appeal only perfects an appeal of the order(s) identified in the notice.  Nish 
v. Schaefer, 
2006 WY 85, ¶ 23, 138 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Wyo. 
2006).  
 
[¶19]   In the October 7, 2011 order, the 
district court ruled that the provisions of the Uniform Trust Code did not apply 
to this trust as it predated the adoption of the Code and Ms. Evans was not 
entitled to an accounting.  By 
ruling Ms. Evans was not entitled to an accounting at all, the district court 
essentially mooted the outstanding issues as to the adequacy of the accountings 
produced by Mr. Moyer.  To the 
extent Ms. Evans’ appeal challenges the district court’s rulings in the October 
2011 order or the sufficiency of the accountings, those claims and arguments are 
not properly before us because Ms. Evans did not identify that order in her 
notice of appeal.  Painovich, ¶ 11, 216 P.3d  at 504.    
 
2.    
Interpretation 
of Trust Documents
 
[¶20]   We turn now to the district court’s 
rulings on the meaning of the trust, which the court determined on summary 
judgment.  Summary judgments are 
governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c):
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  
 
We 
review a district court’s summary judgment rulings de novo, using the same 
materials and following the same standards as the district court.  The facts are reviewed from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  
 
Grynberg 
v. L & R Exploration Venture, 
2011 WY 134, ¶ 16, 261 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo. 2011) 
(citations omitted).   

 
[¶21]   Interpretation of an unambiguous 
trust agreement is a matter of law for the court.  Rock Springs Land and Timber, Inc. v. Lore, 
2003 WY 100, ¶ 12, 75 P.3d 614, 619 (Wyo. 2003).  The meaning of a trust is determined by 
the same rules that govern the interpretation of contracts.  In interpreting a trust, our primary 
purpose is to determine the intent of the settlor.  Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, N.A. v. 
Hodder, 2006 WY 128, ¶ 21, 
144 P.3d 401, 409 (Wyo. 2006); 
First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367, 1369 
(Wyo. 1973).  We construe the trust 
instrument as a whole, attempting to avoid a construction which renders a 
provision meaningless.  Id.  “We strive to reconcile by reasonable 
interpretation any provisions which apparently conflict before adopting a 
construction which would nullify any provision.”  Wells Fargo, ¶ 21, 144 P.3d  at 409.  See also, Purcella v. Purcella, 2011 WY 124, ¶ 14, 258 P.3d 730, 734-35 (Wyo. 
2011).   
 
[¶22]   The Fourth Amendment to the trust 
provided that, upon the death of the Settlor, the trustee would divide the trust 
estate into two trusts, the Joan Henriette Finlay Trust to benefit the Settlor’s 
wife and the Finlay Family Trust.  Upon the death of the Settlor’s wife, 
“the entire remaining principal of the Joan Henriette Finlay Trust shall be 
added to and become a part of the Finlay Family Trust . . . .”  The Trust included a one-time 
distribution to Settlor’s daughter, Pamela, and stated that the Settlor’s 
grandchildren, Ms. Evans and her brother Dylan, were to share the Finlay Family 
Trust       

 
[¶23]   In the Fifth Amendment to the 
Trust, the Settlor appointed Mr. Moyer as Trustee and revised the one-time 
distribution to Pamela.  It also 
stated in Article VII regarding the Finlay Family Trust:
 
            
(2)       
Division of Trust Assets.   Upon Settlor’s death, Trustee shall 
divide the assets of this Trust into as many equal shares as may be necessary in 
order to provide (i) one share for each grandchild of Settlor surviving at 
Settlor’s death . . . .  As of 
execution of this document, Settlor has two grandchildren, namely Courtney Evans 
and Dillon1 Evans. . . . 
 
            
(3)       
Beneficiaries Under Age Thirty-Five.  If any grandchild/beneficiary under 
paragraph (2) of this Article is under the age of thirty-five at the time the 
distribution of such beneficiary’s share is to be made to the beneficiary, 
Trustee shall retain such beneficiary’s share IN TRUST, to hold and manage the 
same for the benefit of the beneficiary.  
All of the net income shall be paid in convenient installments to or for 
the benefit of the beneficiary until complete distribution of the share as 
hereinafter provided.  In addition 
to income, the Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of the beneficiary 
such sums from the principal of the beneficiary’s share as may be deemed 
necessary in the sole discretion of Trustee, taking into account all other 
sources of income or support of the beneficiary of which Trustee has knowledge, 
to ensure the proper support, maintenance, health and education of the 
beneficiary.  When the beneficiary 
reaches age twenty-five (25), Trustee shall pay to the beneficiary one-third 
(1/3) of the value of the trust principal as then constituted.  When the beneficiary reaches age thirty 
(30), Trustee shall pay to the beneficiary one-half (1/2) of the value of the 
remaining trust principal.  When the 
beneficiary reaches age thirty-five (35), Trustee shall distribute all the 
remaining principal and undistributed income of the trust to the beneficiary, 
outright and free of trust.  In the 
event beneficiary has already attained age twenty-five (25), age thirty (30) or 
age thirty-five (35) at the time the trust is divided into shares pursuant to 
Section (2) above, Trustee shall, upon making the division, distribute to the 
beneficiary one-third (1/3), two-thirds (2/3) or all of the beneficiary’s share, 
respectively.  . . . 

 
            
Notwithstanding the distribution provisions of the preceding paragraph, 
no principal distribution shall be made to Courtney Evans or Dillon Evans during 
the lifetime of their father, Bruce Evans.  
In the event a distribution of principal to either beneficiary is 
otherwise directed hereunder and Bruce Evans shall be alive, the trustee shall 
retain said amount, in trust, for the benefit of the beneficiary under the terms 
hereof as if the beneficiary was then under the age of twenty-five years.  Any principal distribution retained in 
trust under this provision shall be released to the beneficiary upon the death 
of Bruce Evans.  

 
The 
Sixth Amendment stated:
 
Notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary set forth in the Trust Agreement, as previously 
amended, if any vesting or distribution to the issue of Settlor could result in 
Federal generation skipping tax, then said vesting and distribution shall 
instead accrue to Settlor’s daughter, Pamela . . . .  
 
[¶24]   Ms. Evans requested that the 
district court order Mr. Moyer to make distributions of net income from the 
Trust to her at least on a quarterly basis.  The district court 
ruled:
 
            
Mr. Moyer as Trustee determined that the distributions of the Trust 
resulted in generation skipping transfer taxes.  Therefore, the Sixth Amendment to the 
Trust was triggered.  The generation 
skipping transfer tax made Pamela Mitchell a contingent beneficiary for the 
Trust.  While Pamela Mitchell was 
the beneficiary during the time the Trust is subject to the tax, Ms. Evans was 
not a beneficiary eligible to receive income distributions from the 
Trust.
 
            
The Trust has decreased in size and is no longer subject to generation 
skipping tax and Courtney and Dylan Evans have once again become beneficiaries 
of the Trust eligible to receive distributions of income.  The Trust specifies that these 
distributions are to be in “convenient installments.”  The Trust does not contain the 
requirement found in the Joan Henriette Finlay Trust specifying that the 
disbursement must be quarterly.  Had 
the intent been to provide quarterly payments of income to Ms. Evans and Dylan, 
the Trust would have adopted the same language used in the Joan Henriette Finlay 
Trust.  The Court finds that the 
payments should be in convenient installments as the trust 
requires.
 
[¶25]   Ms. Evans argues on appeal that the 
district court erred by determining she was not a beneficiary.  Even a cursory reading of the district 
court’s ruling indicates that it did, in fact, rule that Ms. Evans and Dylan are 
beneficiaries.  She also argues that 
the district court erred in concluding that the Sixth Amendment was properly 
employed in earlier years to provide payments to her mother, Pamela, instead of 
her and her brother in order to avoid the GST tax.  
 
[¶26]   The GST tax is a federal tax on 
generation-skipping transfers of wealth.  
26 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.  There is, however, an exemption that 
protects a certain amount of the transfer from taxes.  26 U.S.C. § 2631.  Ms. Evans claims that when Mr. Finlay 
died in 2003, the value of the Finlay Family Trust was less than the exempt 
amount; therefore, no generation skipping transfer taxes were owed.  Mr. Moyer apparently took the position 
that the combined values of the Joan Henriette Finlay Trust and the Finlay 
Family Trust should be considered and that amount was in excess of the exemption 
for the years in question.  Ms. 
Evans does not cite any legal authority to support her method of determining 
whether GST tax could be due or to establish that Mr. Moyer’s method was 
erroneous.  We do not address issues 
which are not supported by cogent argument or citation to pertinent legal 
authority.  See Shaw Constr., LLC v. Rocky Mountain 
Hardware, Inc., 2012 WY 60, 
¶ 23, 275 P.3d 1238, 1244 (Wyo. 
2012).  
 
[¶27]   Moreover, the trustee is given 
broad discretion in administering the trust, and the trust provides that any 
income or principal may be distributed for the “benefit” of the 
beneficiary.  The amounts allocated 
to Pamela were actually distributed for the “benefit” of the beneficiaries, 
specifically to pay their educational expenses.  Ms. Evans has not established that Mr. 
Moyer did anything improper by distributing trust proceeds through Pamela.       
 
[¶28]   Ms. Evans’ next argument is that 
the district court erred by failing to define the term “convenient installments” 
as used in the Finlay Family Trust.  
The trust states:  “All of 
the net income shall be paid in convenient installments to or for the benefit of 
the beneficiary until complete distribution of the share as hereinafter 
provided.”  She claims that, 
although “convenient installments” is not defined in the Finlay Family Trust, it 
is defined in the Joan Henriette Finlay Trust:
 
Commencing 
with the date of the Settlor’s death, the Trustee shall pay to the Settlor’s 
wife during her lifetime all the income from the Joan Henriette Finlay Trust in 
convenient installments but no less frequently than quarter-annually. 

 
Ms. 
Evans argues that the district court should have, therefore, required the 
trustee to make payments to the beneficiaries of the Finlay Family Trust on at 
least a quarterly basis.  

 
[¶29]   The district court rejected this 
argument, stating  “[h]ad the intent 
been to provide quarterly payments of income to Ms. Evans and Dylan, the Trust 
would have adopted the same language used in the Joan Henriette Finlay 
Trust.”  This interpretation is 
supported by our contract interpretation rules, which hold that the use of 
specific words in one part of a contract and the omission of the language in 
another part is considered intentional.  
See Mathisen v. Thunder Basin Coal 
Co., 2007 WY 161, ¶ 16, 169 P.3d 61, 66 (Wyo. 2007).  Having determined that Ms. Evans was not 
entitled to quarterly income payments, the district court simply ruled that the 
installments must be convenient.  
The word “convenient” means “suitable or agreeable to the needs or the 
circumstances of a particular situation.”  
Webster’s New Third Int’l 
Dictionary 497 (2002).  The term 
obviously needs context for definition.  
Although Ms. Evans criticizes the district court for failing to define 
the term, she did not make any argument other than the payments should be made 
quarterly.  Under these 
circumstances, the district court did not err by failing to further define the 
term.    

 
[¶30]   The district court also ruled that 
the Trust prohibited Mr. Moyer from making any principal distributions to Ms. 
Evans while her father, Bruce Evans, is still alive.  As we noted above, the Fifth Amendment 
states that “no principal distribution shall be made to [Ms. Evans] during the 
lifetime of” her father, Bruce Evans.  
Ms. Evans argued that, while the provision prohibited direct principal 
distributions “to” her, principal could be distributed “for her benefit.”  The same contract interpretation 
principle which defeated Ms. Evans’ argument regarding quarterly income payments 
supports her argument here.  Unlike 
other provisions of the Finlay Family Trust which repeatedly use the term “to or 
for the benefit of” the beneficiary, the Fifth Amendment only prohibits direct 
distributions “to” Ms. Evans while her father is living.  Since the Settlor obviously knew how to 
use the term “to or for the benefit of” and chose in the latter amendment to 
limit the prohibition to distributions “to” the beneficiaries, we conclude Mr. 
Moyer is not prohibited from making principal distributions for the benefit of 
the beneficiaries while Mr. Evans is still alive.  
 
[¶31]   This interpretation is consistent 
with the allowable purposes for invading the principal to “ensure the proper 
support, maintenance, health and education of the beneficiary.”  If the trustee was prohibited from 
making principal distributions for the benefit of the beneficiaries any time 
before Bruce Evans dies, the purposes of the trust could be frustrated.  In addition, by prohibiting direct 
distributions “to” Ms. Evans the provision alleviates any concern that Mr. Evans 
will somehow influence or manipulate Ms. Evans into using the principal for 
reasons not approved by the Settlor.  

 
[¶32]   Nevertheless, even though we have 
ruled that Mr. Moyer has the authority to make principal distributions for the 
benefit of Ms. Evans while Mr. Evans is still living, he also had the authority 
to refuse to distribute any principal.  
Paragraph (3) states the trustee “may pay to or apply for the benefit of 
the beneficiary such sums from the principal of the beneficiary’s share as may 
be deemed necessary in the sole discretion of the Trustee, taking into account 
all other sources of income or support of the beneficiary of which Trustee has 
knowledge, to ensure the proper support, maintenance, health and education of 
the beneficiary.”  By using the verb 
“may” the Settlor made the provision non-mandatory and by giving the trustee 
sole discretion the Settlor placed that decision squarely with Mr. Moyer.  Therefore, while we disagree with the 
district court’s decision that the trustee is prohibited from making 
distributions for the benefit of Ms. Evans while Mr. Evans is alive, we agree 
that Mr. Moyer has the sole discretion to make such distributions or not.  
 
[¶33]   In a somewhat confusing argument, 
Ms. Evans claims that she has not been paid the full amount of income due her 
under the terms of the trust and that the trustee improperly allocated income as 
principal.  The district court ruled 
that all payments of income owed to Ms. Evans had been paid.  Ms. Evans asserts that she has only been 
directly paid $235 and for the years 2004 through 2007, she was entitled to 
$25,351 in income payments.  Mr. 
Moyer responds that all income plus a significant amount of principal has been 
paid to or for Ms. Evans’ benefit.  
The accounting indicates Mr. Moyer distributed over $54,000 to the 
University of Alabama to pay Ms. Evans’ educational expenses, and that amount 
exceeded Ms. Evans’ share of the trust income.  Given that funds in excess of the income 
owed to Ms. Evans have been applied to her benefit, we affirm the district 
court’s ruling.
 
[¶34]   Next, Ms. Evans argues Mr. Moyer 
did not properly segregate her interest from her brother Dylan’s interest.  The district court did not rule on this 
particular aspect of her argument.  
The trust states in the Fifth Amendment, Art. VII 
(2):
 
Upon 
Settlor’s death, Trustee shall divide the assets of this Trust into as many 
equal shares as may be necessary in order to provide (i) one share for each 
grandchild of Settlor surviving at Settlor’s death . . . .  
 
However, 
the trust also authorized the trustee:
 
            
To hold and retain the principal of the Trust Estate undivided until 
actual division shall become necessary in order to make distributions; to hold, 
manage, invest, and account for the several shares or parts thereof by 
appropriate entries on the Trustee’s books of account; and to allocate to each 
share or part of share its proportionate part of all receipts and expenses; 
provided, however, the carrying of several trusts as one shall not defer the 
vesting in title or in possession of any share or part of share thereof.  
 
The 
accounting demonstrates that Mr. Moyer has retained the trust principal 
undivided, but kept records of the distributions to and/or for the benefit of 
each beneficiary.  Ms. Evans has not 
demonstrated how this accounting method violates the terms of the trust.    
 
            
3.         
Removal of Trustee
 
 
[¶35]   Ms. Evans filed a motion to remove 
Mr. Moyer as trustee of the Finlay Family Trust.  Although the district court did not 
expressly rule on her request, it was obviously denied by implication.  She claims on appeal that Mr. Moyer 
should have been removed.
 
[¶36]   In Kerper v. Kerper, 780 P.2d 923, 938 (Wyo. 1989), this 
Court stated that the district court has equitable powers to remove a 
trustee.  See also, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-3-210 
(LexisNexis 2011).  We said: 

 
[T]he 
court has sound discretion to make a determination as to removal. We will not disturb an 
exercise of district court discretion unless its actions are shown to have been 
made arbitrarily and capriciously and in disregard of the use of sound judgment 
regarding what is right under the circumstances. 
 
Kerper, 
780 P.2d  at 938.  Ms. Evans claims that 
removal of Mr. Moyer as trustee is required because he made principal and income 
distributions to a non-beneficiary and failed to adequately account to the 
beneficiaries, segregate the shares of the trust for accounting purposes, and 
properly administer the trust under the GST tax provisions.  We have already determined each of these 
issues in favor of Mr. Moyer in one way or another.  As such, they do not form a basis for 
removal.  The district court did not 
abuse its discretion by refusing to remove Mr. Moyer as the trustee of the 
Finlay Family Trust. 
 
            
4.         
Attorney Fees
 
[¶37]   Ms. Evans claims the district court 
erred by refusing to award her attorney fees.  The question 
of whether there is legal authority to award attorney fees is 
one of law, which we review de novo.  
See, Thorkildsen v. Belden, 2011 WY 26, ¶ 8, 247 P.3d 60, 62 (Wyo. 2011); 
Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶ 149, 226 P.3d 889, 935 (Wyo. 2010); 
Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2006 WY 48, ¶ 12, 132 P.3d 189, 193 
(Wyo. 2006).  The final attorney fee award is, however, reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Mueller 
v. Zimmer, 
2007 WY 195, ¶ 11, 173 P.3d 361, 364 (Wyo. 
2007).  
 
[¶38]   Wyoming follows the “American rule” 
with regard to attorney fees, meaning that each party is generally responsible 
for its own attorney fees.  Magin v. Solitude Homeowner’s Inc., 2011 
WY 102, ¶ 41, 255 P.3d 920, 932 
(Wyo. 2011); Cline v. Rocky Mountain, 
Inc., 998 P.2d 946, 949 
(Wyo. 2000).  However, a party may 
be reimbursed for its attorney fees if a contractual or statutory provision 
allows.  Id.  
Ms. Evans claims that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-1004 (LexisNexis 2011) 
authorizes an award of attorney fees:  

 
In 
a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court, as 
justice and equity may require, may award costs and expenses, including 
reasonable attorney’s fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from 
the trust that is the subject of the controversy.
 
Section 
4-10-1004 is part of the Uniform Trust Code and since we have determined that 
the district court’s October 7, 2011 order that the Uniform Trust Code does not 
apply is final, that determination would apply to Ms. Evans’ attorney fees claim 
as well.  
 
[¶39]   However, prior to its final 
decision that the code did not apply in this case, the district court 
ruled:
 
With 
regard to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees the Court finds that under 
the justice and equity requirement of W.S. §4-10-1004 the Plaintiff has caused 
the Trustee to engage an attorney to defend Plaintiff’s efforts to require the 
Trustee to disburse funds to Plaintiff.  
The Court also finds that the expenses and fees incurred in obtaining the 
Accounting that has been requested by Plaintiff are insignificant compared to 
the defense of Plaintiff’s main claim.  
Therefore, the Plaintiff is not awarded her attorney fees and costs and 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is hereby denied. 
 
[¶40]   Even if the code did apply here, we 
would agree with the district court’s determination that justice and equity do 
not support an award of attorney fees to Ms. Evans given she has not 
demonstrated that Mr. Moyer improperly performed any part of his duties as 
trustee.    

 
            
5.         
Discovery 
 
[¶41]   Over the course of this action, Ms. 
Evans filed a number of motions to compel.  
The district court stayed the discovery issues pending its decision on 
the legal issues.  Ms. Evans claims 
the district court should not have granted summary judgment without first 
allowing discovery.  

 
[¶42]   The trial court has broad discretion in controlling discovery; consequently, we review 
decisions relating to discovery 
for abuse of discretion. Global 
Shipping & Trading v. Verkhnesaldincky Metallurgic Co., 
892 P.2d 143, 145 (Wyo. 
1995).  See also, Cramer v. Powder River Coal, LLC, 2009 
WY 45, ¶ 14, 204 P.3d 974, 979 
(Wyo. 2009).  However, we have also 
stated that “ordinarily, discovery on the issues which are the subject of the 
summary judgment motion should be allowed to be completed before a motion for 
summary judgment is scheduled, heard, and decided.”  Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 145, ¶ 19, 101 P.3d 446, 455 (Wyo. 2004).  
 
[¶43]   We conclude that, under the 
specific circumstances presented here, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing Ms. Evans the opportunity to conduct formal 
discovery.  There were two basic 
claims raised by Ms. Evans’ petition—a request for declaration of the meaning of 
the trust terms and a request for an accounting.  Interpretation of an unambiguous trust 
is done as a matter of law and no additional evidence is needed.  Hence, Ms. Evans did not need discovery 
to effectively litigate the legal question about the meaning of the trust.  
 
[¶44]   The matters on which Ms. Evans 
claims she needed discovery pertained to Mr. Moyer’s administration of the 
trust.  Mr. Moyer prepared an 
initial accounting, and the district court ordered Mr. Moyer to provide more 
complete accountings and records on two additional occasions.  Mr. Moyer submitted the accountings to 
the court and included numerous financial record attachments.  Pursuant to the accounting process, Ms. 
Evans was provided with the relevant information.  Moreover, in the end, the district court 
ruled that she was not entitled to an accounting and she did not appeal that 
order.  The district court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying her discovery requests.  
 
[¶45]   Affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES
1Settlor’s 
grandson’s name is alternatively spelled as Dylan and Dillon in various 
documents.