Case Title: The Estate of Frank P. Rille v. Physicians Insurance Company

Citation: 2007 WI 36

Docket Number: 2005AP001407

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 36 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1407 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
The Estate of Frank P. Rille, by its Personal  
Representative, Susan Rille, and Susan Rille, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
Tommy Thompson, Secretary, Department of Health 
& Human Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Physicians Insurance Company, Medical College of 
Wisconsin Affiliated Hospitals, Inc., and Sheila 
Galbraith, M.D., 
          Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Albertson's, Inc., Osco Drug, Inc., and ABC 
Insurance Company, 
          Third-Party Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 23, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 12, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Mark Gempeler 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: WILCOX, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-third-party plaintiffs-appellants there 
were briefs by Michael B. Van Sicklen, Naikang Tsao, and Foley & 
Lardner LLP, Madison; Steven P. Sager, James Samuelsen, and 
Sager, Colwin, Samuelsen & Associates, S.C., Fond du Lac, and 
oral argument by Michael B. Van Sicklen. 
 
 
2 
 
For the third-party defendants-respondents there was a 
brief by William J. Katt, Mark D. Malloy, and Leib & Katt, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by William J. Katt. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief by Edward 
E. Robinson and Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., Brookfield, and oral 
argument by Brett A. Eckstein. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Linda V. Meagher and 
Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
2007 WI 36 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports. 
No.  2005AP1407  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV606) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
The Estate of Frank P. Rille, by its Personal  
Representative, Susan Rille, and Susan Rille, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
Tommy Thompson, Secretary, Department of Health 
& Human Services, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Physicians Insurance Company, Medical College 
of Wisconsin Affiliated Hospitals, Inc., and 
Sheila Galbraith, M.D., 
 
          Defendants-Third-Party 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Albertson's, Inc., Osco Drug, Inc., and ABC 
Insurance Company, 
 
          Third-Party Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 23, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Mark Gempeler, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
2 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This case is before the 
court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2003-04).1  The circuit court for Waukesha 
County, Mark S. Gempeler, Judge, granted the motion of the 
third-party defendants, Albertson's, Inc. and Osco Drug, Inc., 
(collectively referred to as Osco Drug),2 to dismiss the third-
party 
complaint 
brought 
by 
the 
third-party 
plaintiffs, 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., Medical College 
of Wisconsin Affiliated Hospitals, Inc., and Sheila Galbraith, 
M.D. (collectively referred to as Dr. Galbraith).   
¶2 
Dr. 
Galbraith's 
third 
party 
complaint 
sought 
contribution or indemnity from Osco Drug if Dr. Galbraith were 
found liable in the underlying medical malpractice lawsuit 
brought by the Estate of Frank P. Rille by Susan Rille, its 
Personal representative, and Susan Rille (collectively referred 
to as Rille) against Dr. Galbraith and Osco Drug.3 
¶3 
The circuit court granted Osco Drug's motion to 
dismiss Dr. Galbraith's third party complaint on the basis of a 
prior proceeding in the underlying medical malpractice lawsuit.  
Osco Drug had petitioned the circuit court in the underlying 
medical malpractice lawsuit for summary judgment when no party 
in response to the scheduling order submitted the names of 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
2004 version unless otherwise noted. 
2 Albertson's, Inc. is the parent company of Osco Drug.  
3 Dr. Galbraith's supervising physician, Thomas J. Russell, 
M.D., was also sued but was dismissed as a defendant.   
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
3 
 
expert witnesses or reports critical of the conduct of Osco 
Drug.   
¶4 
Rille did not oppose Osco Drug's motion for summary 
judgment.  Dr. Galbraith did not oppose the motion for summary 
judgment as it related to Rille's underlying medical malpractice 
lawsuit, but Dr. Galbraith filed a brief and affidavits and 
appeared at the hearing on the motion.  Dr. Galbraith attempted 
to preserve her contribution claim against Osco Drug, asking the 
circuit court to rule that the summary judgment was not on the 
merits and would not affect her rights to contribution or 
indemnity.   
¶5 
The circuit court granted Osco Drug's motion for 
summary judgment on the merits.  The parties vigorously debated 
the wording of the summary judgment order relating to Dr. 
Galbraith's rights against Osco Drug.  The circuit court adopted 
Dr. Galbraith's phrasing of the summary judgment order, which 
stated that "this order is no way intended to affect the rights 
of other parties to pursue claims under appropriate statutory 
and/or case law." 
¶6 
After summary judgment was granted (with the language 
quoted above) and after further discovery proceedings, Dr. 
Galbraith filed a third-party complaint against Osco Drug for 
contribution, 
which 
included 
allegations 
of 
Osco 
Drug's 
negligence that were substantially the same as those contained 
in Rille's complaint.  Osco Drug moved to dismiss the third-
party complaint against it on the ground of issue preclusion, 
arguing that Osco Drug's liability was preclusively determined 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
4 
 
in the earlier summary judgment order.  The circuit court 
granted Osco Drug's motion to dismiss, and Dr. Galbraith 
appealed.   
¶7  The issue presented is whether the circuit court erred 
in holding that issue preclusion barred the third-party claim of 
Dr. Galbraith for contribution against Osco Drug. 
¶8 
Addressing this issue requires the court to answer two 
questions: Was the issue of Osco Drug's negligence actually 
litigated and determined in the summary judgment motion so that 
the doctrine of issue preclusion applies?  If the doctrine of 
issue preclusion applies, did the circuit court erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it applied issue preclusion in the 
present case?   
¶9 
For the reasons set forth, we hold that the issue of 
Osco Drug's liability was actually litigated and determined by 
summary judgment and that the circuit court did not preserve Dr. 
Galbraith's claim for contribution in its order on summary 
judgment.  We further hold that the circuit court did not 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
when 
it 
ruled 
that 
application of issue preclusion was fundamentally fair.  To 
preserve her contribution claim against Osco Drug successfully 
against a challenge on the ground of issue preclusion, Dr. 
Galbraith should have appeared and objected on the merits to 
Osco Drug's motion for summary judgment, thereby ensuring that 
there would be no possibility of inconsistent fact-finding on 
any issue central to Rille's claim and her own claim.  Filing a 
brief and arguing that her claim for contribution should be 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
5 
 
preserved for a later date was not adequate, without any 
justification, 
to 
avoid 
issue 
preclusion 
under 
Precision 
Erecting, Inc. v. M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 224 Wis. 2d 288, 
592 N.W.2d 5 (1998).  
¶10 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court 
dismissing 
Dr. 
Galbraith's 
third-party 
complaint 
for 
contribution against Osco Drug. 
I 
¶11 Although the parties disagree about the proper legal 
inferences and legal conclusions to draw from the facts, the 
facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. 
¶12 This appeal stems from a medical malpractice action. 
On March 10, 2003, Frank Rille filed a medical malpractice 
action against Dr. Galbraith and Osco Drug.  An amended 
complaint was filed on August 1, 2003, following the death of 
Frank Rille, substituting as plaintiffs the Estate of Frank P. 
Rille, by its personal representative Susan Rille, and Susan 
Rille, in her personal capacity.   
¶13 The medical malpractice complaint alleges that while 
treating Frank Rille's psoriasis condition, Dr. Sheila Galbraith 
issued a prescription for the drug methotrexate in a dosage 
higher than Galbraith's supervising physician instructed.  The 
medication was supposed to be prescribed at the rate of 2.5 mg 
administered three times a week (total dosage of 7.5 mg per 
week).  Instead the prescription, as written, directed the 
patient to take 7.5 mg per day (total dosage of 52.5 mg per 
week).  An Osco Drug pharmacy filled the prescription as 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
6 
 
written, without questioning the dosage.  Frank Rille took the 
drug as prescribed for several days.  He became severely ill and 
required extended medical care. 
¶14 Dr. Galbraith did not initially file a claim in  
Rille's action against her co-defendant, Osco Drug, and need not 
have done so.  Contribution claims may, however, be brought in 
the original tort action.4  "To facilitate efficiency and 
eliminate the necessity of additional subsequent litigation, 
this 
court 
has 
approved 
the 
practice 
of 
allowing 
the 
contribution action to be considered in the same proceeding 
involving the underlying damage claim despite the contingent 
nature of this cross action."5 
 
¶15 Contribution claims are not mandatory in the initial 
tort action.6  "While claims for contribution are commonly pled 
in 
the 
underlying 
personal 
injury 
action, 
there 
is 
no 
requirement that they be pled at that time."7  A party instead 
                                                 
4 The basic elements of a contribution claim in negligence 
actions 
are: 
"1. 
Both 
parties 
must 
be 
joint 
negligent 
wrongdoers; 2. they must have common liability because of such 
negligence to the same person; 3. one such party must have borne 
an unequal proportion of the common burden."  Johnson v. Heintz, 
73 Wis. 2d 286, 295, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976) (quoting Farmers Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 512, 515, 
99 N.W.2d 746 (1959)). 
5 Johnson, 73 Wis. 2d at 295. 
6 Marten Transport, Ltd. v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 198 
Wis. 2d 738, 741, 543 N.W.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Weina 
v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Wis. 2d 341, 346, 501 N.W.2d 465 
(Ct. App. 1993)). 
7 Weina v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Wis. 2d 341, 346, 501 
N.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1993). 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
7 
 
may wait until after he or she is adjudged liable before filing 
a contribution claim.8    
 
¶16 Nevertheless, in her answer to both the initial 
complaint and the amended complaint, Dr. Galbraith references 
her contribution claim against Osco Drug.  Specifically, in the 
"wherefore" clause of her answer, Dr. Galbraith asserted the 
following: 
In the event this defendant is found jointly liable 
with any other defendant, then, and in that event, 
this defendant will be entitled to contribution and/or 
indemnity according to the law. 
 
¶17 Dr. Galbraith's contribution claim was thus well known 
to all parties and the circuit court. 
 
¶18 Under the circuit court's original scheduling order, 
Rille was required to disclose experts by August 1, 2003, and 
the defendants were required to disclose their experts by 
November 1, 2003. 
 
¶19 On December 1, 2003, Osco Drug filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  It alleged that no party has presented any 
expert witness or report establishing an inference of Osco 
Drug's negligence or a causal connection between any action or 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.92 establishes the statute of 
limitations 
for 
a 
contribution 
action: 
 
"An 
action 
for 
contribution based on tort, if the right of contribution does 
not arise out of a prior judgment allocating the comparative 
negligence between the parties, shall be commenced within one 
year after the cause of action accrues or be barred." 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
8 
 
inaction of Osco Drug and the damages sought.9  Wisconsin courts 
have consistently maintained that medical malpractice negligence 
claims such as Rille's must be supported by expert testimony. 
 
¶20 Rille did not oppose the motion for summary judgment.  
At the hearing, counsel for Rille explained: 
We do not oppose Osco's motion for summary judgment 
based, in part, on the testimony that has come out 
from Dr. Galbraith at her deposition, number one.  
Number two, as a matter of strategy obviously the 
Court is aware of the competency and capabilities and 
trial prowess of both counsel seated here.   
We have a clear claim in this case against Dr. 
Galbraith, the resident, who admitted that she wrote 
out an incorrect prescription; that the prescription 
was filled exactly as she wrote it out.  Our client 
took it as written out, as prescribed, and that led to 
why we are here today.  So we, for that reason, have 
decided not to pursue a claim against Osco.   
They have moved for summary judgment.  We do not 
oppose that motion at this time, not because we 
couldn't hypothetically go out and try to find some 
expert.  We have just decided not to do that. 
 
¶21 Dr. Galbraith received notice of the summary judgment 
motion.  She did not oppose the motion.  She did, however, file 
a brief and affidavits in response to Osco Drug's summary 
judgment motion.  Dr. Galbraith explained her intention not to 
oppose Osco Drug's motion for summary judgment.  She stated that 
the summary judgment hearing was not the right time for her to 
                                                 
9 Rille had alleged in his Amended Complaint that Osco Drug 
"was negligent in dispensing a dosage of Methotrexate . . . in a 
quantity that its agents, servants or employees, knew or should 
[have] known exceeded safe and recommended levels, or was 
otherwise negligent." 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
9 
 
pursue a contribution claim.  She concluded that she could wait 
to pursue her contribution claim:  "So I am able to kind of sit 
back, if you will, and see what [the plaintiff] decides to 
do. . . . It's really that simple, and I don't think there is 
anything more to it than that.  We have the right to pursue this 
if we choose to.  We may or may not take discovery in this case 
about Osco."10   
¶22 Dr. Galbraith's brief requested that, "in fairness to 
[the defendants]," the circuit court on the summary judgment 
motion should "specifically reference: 1. That such order is not 
determinative of any claims of those defendants, Physicians 
Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., Medical College of 
Wisconsin Affiliated Hospitals, Inc. and Sheila Galbraith, M.D., 
and 2. That such claims are preserved." 
 
¶23 The circuit court heard arguments on Osco Drug's 
motion for summary judgment on February 19, 2004.  The regularly 
assigned judge, Hon. Mark S. Gempeler, was unavailable that day, 
so Reserve Judge John Fiorenza presided over the hearing.   
 
¶24 Significant discussion ensued at the hearing about the 
impact of a summary judgment in favor of Osco Drug on Dr. 
Galbraith's contribution claim.  At the hearing, Dr. Galbraith 
reiterated that even though she was not opposing the motion, she 
                                                 
10 In her brief, Dr. Galbraith explained she had "a right to 
a potential cross-claim and/or a claim for contribution against 
Osco but did not want to mislead the court or counsel in 
indicating that any active claim was made at this time on behalf 
of Dr. Galbraith that Osco's actions or omissions were violative 
of some standard of care . . . ." 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
10 
 
wanted to reserve the right to pursue a claim for contribution  
against Osco Drug.  Dr. Galbraith requested that summary 
judgment be granted "without prejudice."   
¶25 Osco Drug's counsel predicted at the hearing that if 
summary judgment were granted and Dr. Galbraith brought a 
contribution claim against Osco Drug, the claim would be 
challenged under the doctrine of issue preclusion, citing 
Precision Erecting v. M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, G.A.P., 
Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 288, 592 N.W.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1998), and a court 
would bar the claim.   
 
¶26 The circuit court (Judge Fiorenza) granted summary 
judgment in favor of Osco Drug on the merits and dismissed 
Rille's claims against Osco Drug with prejudice.  During the 
hearing, the circuit court explained that its decision was not 
"foreclosing whatever arguments [the parties] make in the future 
and whatever potential claims that are out there against 
anyone . . . ."  The circuit court stated that the validity of 
any action for contribution was not before it and that the 
validity of any action for contribution would have to be 
determined according to the statutes and case law when a 
contribution action was filed.  The circuit court explained its 
position as follows:  
The case here, the summary judgment motion is very 
clear and its deals with an issue that is in the case, 
and that is the question of negligence claimed by the 
plaintiff against Osco.  There is [sic] no other 
claims against Osco in the case.  There are no 
formalized claims against Osco in this case and, 
therefore, 
if 
any 
party 
has 
another 
claim 
for 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
11 
 
contribution, or what have you, whatever claim they 
may have but has not been brought forth in this case 
the Court can't look into the future and say, well, 
there's possible claims out there and so I shouldn’t 
rule on the case that's before me . . . .  
If someone would bring an action for contribution 
against Osco, that would have to be determined if the 
statute in question would allow that, if the case law 
would allow that. . . .  I have not considered these. 
Absolutely have not considered these facts because 
they're not before me . . . .  I cannot restrict 
Osco's position of saying you should have brought it, 
and that certainly is their right to object at that 
time to any further contribution action; nor can I at 
this time tell [Dr. Galbraith] that you can't bring a 
contribution action.  That issue just isn't before me 
at this time and before the Court, and therefore I 
actually have no authority to rule on such a matter 
that is not before me in this decision.   
 
¶27 Osco Drug and Galbraith disagreed about the language 
that should be incorporated in the circuit court order granting 
Osco Drug summary judgment to reflect the decision of the 
circuit court.  Osco Drug submitted a proposed order to Judge 
Gempeler, 
who 
had 
resumed 
responsibility 
over 
the 
case, 
declaring only the dismissal with prejudice of Rille's claims 
against Osco Drug.   
¶28 Dr. Galbraith submitted an alternative proposed order, 
which added the following words: "this order is no way intended 
to affect the rights of other parties to pursue claims under 
appropriate statutory and/or case law."  Dr. Galbraith explained 
that, in her opinion, this language was more consistent with the 
decision of Judge Fiorenza.     
 
¶29 Osco Drug strenuously opposed Dr. Galbraith's version 
of the proposed order.  Osco Drug wrote the circuit court 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
12 
 
insisting that Judge Fiorenza did not carve out and preserve Dr. 
Galbraith's contribution claim but merely refused to rule on 
issue preclusion.  The letter stated: 
The only argument at the motion was whether the 
dismissal should be on the merits and with prejudice 
as it relates to Osco, Inc.  Judge Fiorenza gave a 
very clear decision, and in fact I have ordered a copy 
of that transcript, because I suspected that [Dr. 
Galbraith's counsel] would attempt to do something 
exactly like he has done [with the proposed order].  
He is still trying to preserve a claim that we do not 
believe that he has.  Judge Fiorenza made it very 
clear that he could not make an anticipatory ruling 
and that the only motion before him was Osco's motion 
for summary judgment.  Summary judgment on that motion 
was clearly granted to Osco and it was granted on the 
merits and with prejudice. . . . Please disregard [Dr. 
Galbraith's] order and sign the order that we have 
previously submitted. 
 
¶30 In reply, Dr. Galbraith wrote the circuit court 
challenging Osco Drug's assertions, stating in relevant part: 
[Osco, Inc.'s counsel's] comments and implications I 
believe are . . . inappropriate.   
I respectfully suggest that perhaps Judge Fiorenza, 
who heard the entire argument, might want to sign the 
order.  Regardless of who signs the order, I certainly 
concur with the review of the transcript prior to the 
order 
being signed, especially the last several 
minutes of the hearing when the Judge made his 
decision. 
¶31 The 
circuit 
court 
(Judge 
Gempeler) 
signed 
Dr. 
Galbraith's (not Osco Drug's) proposed order on March 8, 2004.   
 
¶32 The circuit court subsequently entered an order on 
September 30, 2004 that amended the original scheduling order.  
Rille was to name experts and file expert reports by November 6, 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
13 
 
2004.11  The parties were given until December 1, 2004, to make 
any amendments to the pleadings, including adding parties.  Dr. 
Galbraith was to name experts and file expert reports by 
February 1, 2005. 
 
¶33 Dr. Galbraith proceeded to conduct discovery against 
Osco Drug, including taking depositions of Osco Drug employees 
in Phoenix, AZ.  Dr. Galbraith also secured experts to testify 
about 
Osco 
Drug's 
negligence 
in 
filling 
Frank 
Rille's 
prescription as written. 
 
¶34 In November 2004, Dr. Galbraith filed a third-party 
complaint 
against 
Osco 
Drug 
seeking 
contribution 
and/or 
indemnity.  Dr. Galbraith also named experts and provided expert 
reports allegedly establishing the negligent conduct of Osco 
Drug pharmacists.  
 
¶35 In January 2005, Osco Drug filed a motion to dismiss 
Dr. Galbraith's third-party complaint against it on the ground 
of issue preclusion.  After a hearing on the matter, on April 
15, 2005, the circuit court (Judge Gempeler) granted Osco Drug's 
motion to dismiss, holding that issue preclusion barred Dr. 
Galbraith's re-litigating Osco Drug's negligence.  Dr. Galbraith 
sought reconsideration of the decision, which was denied.  Dr. 
Galbraith then appealed the order dismissing her third-party 
complaint to the court of appeals, and the court of appeals 
certified the case.12 
                                                 
11 By stipulation of Rille and Dr. Galbraith. 
12 Rille's claims against Dr. Galbraith have been stayed 
pending this appeal. 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
14 
 
II 
 
¶36 To determine whether the doctrine of issue preclusion 
bars Dr. Gallagher's third party complaint against Osco Drug, we 
apply a two-step analysis described in the case law: (1) whether 
issue preclusion can, as a matter of law, be applied, and if so, 
(2) whether the application of issue preclusion would be 
fundamentally fair.  
 
¶37 In the first step, a circuit court must determine 
whether the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined 
in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action 
and whether the determination was essential to the judgment.13  
The determination under the first step is a question of law, 
which this court decides on appeal independently of the circuit 
court but benefiting from its analysis.14  Issue preclusion can 
be applied only if this first step is satisfied.  
 
¶38 In the second step, a circuit court must determine 
whether applying issue preclusion comports with principles of 
fundamental fairness.15  A circuit court's ultimate decision on 
                                                 
13 Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2004 WI 17, ¶34, 269 
Wis. 2d 109, 675 N.W.2d 470.  See also Restatement (Second) 
Judgments, § 27 (1982) ("When an issue of fact or law is 
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, 
and the determination is essential to the judgment, the 
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the 
parties, whether on the same or a different claim."). 
14 Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 224, 594 
N.W.2d 370 (1999); Gloss v. Legend Lake Property Owners Ass'n, 
Inc., 2003 WI App 162, ¶13, 266 Wis. 2d 694, 667 N.W.2d 378. 
15 Paige K.B., 226 Wis. 2d at 225. 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
15 
 
fundamental fairness is an exercise of discretion and is 
reviewed as such.16  The case law has set forth five factors, 
which are not exclusive or dispositive, to aid a circuit court 
in determining whether application of issue preclusion is 
fundamentally fair.  Several of these factors present questions 
of law.17  Others are within the circuit court's discretion.18   
 
¶39 We 
will 
affirm 
a 
circuit 
court's 
exercise 
of 
discretion if the circuit court applies the proper standard of 
law and, using a demonstrated rational process, reaches a 
conclusion that a reasonable court could reach.19  If a circuit 
court exercises its discretion upon an error of law, the circuit 
court has erroneously exercised its discretion.20  In sum, we 
review the circuit court's final decision on whether to apply 
the 
doctrine 
of 
issue 
preclusion 
under 
the 
exercise 
of 
discretion standard, deciding the questions of law embedded in 
the exercise of discretion independently, benefiting from the 
analysis of the circuit court. 
III 
                                                 
16 Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶15, 281 
Wis. 2d 448, 
699 
N.W.2d 54 
("[W]hether 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly applied, or refused to apply, issue preclusion in an 
individual case is a discretionary decision.").   
17 Paige K.B., 226 Wis. 2d at 225. 
18 Paige K.B., 226 Wis. 2d at 225. 
19 Johnson v. Allis Chambers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 273, 
470 N.W.2d 859 (1991). 
20 State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 N.W.2d 733 
(1968). 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
16 
 
 
¶40 We address the first step in the analysis of issue 
preclusion, that is, whether the issue of Osco Drug's negligence 
was actually litigated and determined in the summary judgment 
proceeding by a valid judgment and whether the determination of 
the issue was essential to the prior judgment.  
¶41 Ordinarily issue preclusion arises in a subsequent 
lawsuit.  Dr. Galbraith's contribution claim is brought within 
the four corners of the same lawsuit.  The court of appeals has 
clearly held that the doctrine of issue preclusion applies when 
one party seeks to bar another from relitigating a prior 
adjudication in the same lawsuit.21  
¶42 The parties disagree whether the issue of Osco Drug's 
negligence was actually litigated and determined when the 
circuit court granted Osco Drug's motion for summary judgment. 
¶43 Dr. Galbraith insists that because Rille did not 
oppose Osco Drug's motion for summary judgment, the summary 
judgment was in effect a voluntary stipulated dismissal of Osco 
Drug from Rille's lawsuit.  Dr. Galbraith also argues that Osco 
Drug was dismissed from the case on a procedural technicality, 
that is, on the ground that Rille failed to secure the expert 
                                                 
21 Precision Erecting, Inc. v. M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 
224 Wis. 2d 288, 302, 592 N.W.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]here is 
nothing in the rationale behind the rule to prevent its 
application within the four corners of the same lawsuit."). 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
17 
 
testimony necessary to prove the negligence claim.22  Dr. 
Galbraith further argues that the summary judgment can be 
characterized as a default judgment, sanctioning Rille's failure 
to prosecute the case by failing to secure an expert witness to 
support the claim that Osco Drug was negligent.     
¶44 According 
to Dr. Galbraith, whether the circuit 
court's actions are viewed as a stipulated dismissal, as a 
summary judgment on a procedural technicality, or as a default 
judgment, the issue of Osco Drug's negligence was not actually 
litigated and determined. 
¶45 Osco Drug and Rille disagree with Dr. Galbraith's 
characterization of the circuit court's order.  They emphasize 
that the summary judgment motion was argued and granted as a 
summary judgment motion.  Osco Drug moved for summary judgment 
under Wis. Stat. § 802.08, arguing in its briefs and at the 
hearing that there was no triable issue of fact regarding Osco 
Drug's negligence.  Dr.  Galbraith responded, treating the 
relief Osco Drug requested as summary judgment.   
                                                 
22 Expert testimony is required on "those matters involving 
special knowledge or skill or experience on subjects which are 
not within the realm of the ordinary experience of mankind and 
which require special learning, study or experience."  Payne v. 
Milwaukee Sanitarium Found., Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 264, 276, 260 
N.W.2d 386 (1977). 
Not all cases alleging negligence of licensed professionals 
require expert testimony: "[T]he necessity for expert testimony 
depends upon the type of negligent acts involved."  Id. at 275-
76.   
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
18 
 
¶46 The circuit court also treated Osco Drug's motion as a 
motion for summary judgment and analyzed the arguments and law 
accordingly.  Summary judgment was granted on the ground that no 
party demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact 
remained in dispute.  Neither Rille nor Dr. Galbraith was able 
to demonstrate a triable issue of fact regarding Osco Drug's 
negligence, irrespective of the form that the proof must take.  
Thus, in granting Osco Drug's motion for summary judgment, the 
circuit court determined that there were no material facts in 
dispute on the issue of Osco Drug's negligence and that, as a 
matter of law, Osco Drug was not liable for Rille's injuries.  
The circuit court had no need to delineate any facts, because 
the only relevant fact was that there were no facts in dispute 
as to Osco Drug's liability.  It is the absence of facts that 
provides the basis for the summary judgment. 
¶47 The circuit court left no room for confusion as to 
what it was doing.  It emphasized at the hearing that "with 
respect to this case I am granting the motion for summary 
judgment, and it's on the merits for this case.  No question 
about that."  
¶48 We are not persuaded by Dr. Galbraith's arguments that 
the summary judgment was really a different decision in 
disguise.  The parties and the circuit court treated the motion 
as a motion for summary judgment.  We see no reason to analyze 
the circuit court's decision as anything other than a summary 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
19 
 
judgment.23  The court has previously recognized that "[a] 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant is sufficient to meet 
the requirement of a conclusive and final judgment."24  We see no 
reason to depart from this well-established precedent. 
¶49 Dr. Galbraith, however, raises another argument why 
issue preclusion cannot be applied to her contribution claim.  
Dr. Galbraith insists that the circuit court specifically 
                                                 
23 A similar argument was made in Precision Erecting, 224 
Wis. 2d at 310-11, namely that the summary judgment was not a 
summary judgment but rather was a request for approval of the 
stipulated agreement on payment of claims.  The court of appeals 
declined to adopt this position.  It concluded that the motion 
was noticed and served as a motion for summary judgment and 
would be treated as such.  
24 DePratt v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Wis. 2d 306, 310-
11, 334 N.W.2d 883 (1983).  
In Gies v. Nissen Corp., 57 Wis. 2d 371, 382-83, 204 
N.W.2d 519 
(1973), 
the court held that the issue of a 
defendant's liability was determined when the circuit court 
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
We also find guidance in the Restatement (Second) Judgments 
(1982):  An issue submitted on a motion for summary judgment is 
an issue actually litigated for purposes of issue preclusion.  
"A determination may be based on a failure of pleading or of 
proof as well as on the sustaining of the burden of proof."  
Restatement (Second) Judgments, § 27, comment d (1982).   
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
consistently 
relied 
on 
the 
Restatement (Second) Judgments for guidance when deciding 
questions related to issue preclusion.  See, e.g., Deminsky v. 
Arlington Plastics Mach., 2003 WI 15, ¶49, 259 Wis. 2d 587, 657 
N.W.2d 411 (2003); Robinson v. City of West Allis, 2000 WI 126, 
¶45, 239 Wis. 2d 595, 619 N.W.2d 692; Paige K.B., 226 Wis. 2d at 
228-29; Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 689, 495 N.W.2d 
327 (1993); Precision Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 302; Heggy, 156 
Wis. 2d at 193; Landess v. Schmidt, 115 Wis. 2d 186, 196-97, 340 
N.W.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1983).   
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
20 
 
"reserved" her right to bring a contribution claim and contends 
that an issue on which a claim is "reserved" is not actually 
litigated and determined. 
¶50 Dr. Galbraith does not cite to or rely on any 
Wisconsin authority to support her contention that the circuit 
court can "reserve" a party's claims when the reservation might 
result in inconsistent findings.  Indeed, the court of appeals 
in Precision Erecting implicitly foreclosed reserving a party's 
claim for contribution under the circumstances of that case, 
declaring: "A court cannot adjudge the facts to be one way with 
regard to some parties to a multiparty claim and adjudge the 
same factual dispute another way as to other parties in the same 
action.  That would be absurd.  There can be only one finding of 
each historical fact per case.  That the facts might be 
determined as a result of summary judgment is not material."25   
¶51 In any event, we are not persuaded that the circuit 
court "reserved" Dr. Galbraith's contribution claim against Osco 
Drug.  Indeed, Dr. Galbraith's brief concedes, as it must, that 
the very language of the summary judgment order that it drafted 
relating 
to 
future 
claims 
"is 
not 
a 
model 
of 
clarity 
in . . . regard" to preserving her contribution claim.26  Our 
review of the record on Osco Drug's summary judgment motion 
reveals 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
was 
not 
"reserving" 
Dr. 
                                                 
25 Precision Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 310. 
26 Brief 
and 
Appendix 
of 
Defendants 
and 
Third 
Party 
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 20. 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
21 
 
Galbraith's claim, despite Dr. Galbraith's request, but in fact 
was reserving judgment on the viability of any contribution 
claim Dr. Galbraith might file after summary judgment was 
granted until the claim for contribution was actually filed and 
challenged.   
¶52 Evident from the transcript is the circuit court's 
concern that it did not have the power to make an anticipatory 
ruling on a possible contribution claim.  For instance, the 
circuit court announced: "I am sure that counsel is well aware, 
that the Court can only rule upon matters that are before it and 
not on anticipatory matters maybe in the future, potential 
claims, cause of action." 
¶53 Later, the circuit court similarly stated: 
[T]he Court can't look into the future and say, well, 
there's possible claims out there and so I shouldn't 
rule on the case that's before me or the question 
that's before me.  I can't do that.  I can't judge 
potential claims that might be out there but not 
pleaded that may arise in the future, nor can I in 
this case prohibit any party from bringing any other 
action that they wish to bring against another party.   
¶54 The circuit court clearly avoided ruling on the effect 
of the summary judgment on Dr. Galbraith's contribution claim, 
stating 
that 
"[i]f 
someone 
would 
bring 
an 
action 
for 
contribution against Osco, that would have to be determined if 
the statute in question would allow that, if the case law would 
allow that."  The circuit court announced:  
I 
cannot 
preclude 
any 
party 
from 
starting 
a 
contribution action and I cannot bar a party from 
starting a contribution action because I don't have 
all the facts before me on that.  I cannot restrict 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
22 
 
Osco's position of saying you should have brought it, 
and that certainly is their right to object at that 
time to any further contribution action; nor can I at 
this time tell [Dr. Galbraith] that you can't bring a 
contribution action.  That issue just isn't before me 
at this time and before the Court, and therefore I 
actually have no authority to rule on such a matter 
that is not before me in this decision. 
¶55 The transcript shows that the circuit court did not 
intend to "preserve" or "reserve" or "carve out" Dr. Galbraith's 
right to bring a contribution claim free from a challenge on the 
ground of issue preclusion, although Dr. Galbraith requested 
such a carve-out.  Instead, the circuit court refrained from 
deciding the effect of the summary judgment on any contribution 
claim Dr. Galbraith might file until the contribution claim was 
actually before the circuit court.  The impact of summary 
judgment on Dr. Galbraith's contribution claim, the circuit 
court made clear, was to be litigated at a later point. 
 
¶56 The order granting Osco Drug's motion for summary 
judgment and dismissing Rille's claim against Osco Drug can be 
similarly understood as adopting the circuit court's "wait and 
see" position.  The order, memorializing the circuit court's 
discussion at the hearing, did not bar the parties from bringing 
their respective claims and raising their respective defenses.  
The order states that "this order is no way intended to affect 
the rights of other parties to pursue claims under appropriate 
statutory and/or case law."  This language allows the parties to 
pursue their claims, but does not mention——let alone guarantee——
that the doctrine of issue preclusion will not apply.  Under the 
order, if Dr. Galbraith filed her third-party complaint against 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
23 
 
Osco Drug seeking contribution, Osco Drug could raise the 
doctrine of issue preclusion.   
¶57 One might ask why the circuit court avoided ruling at 
the 
summary 
judgment 
hearing 
whether 
Dr. 
Galbraith's 
contribution 
claim 
was 
barred 
by 
the 
doctrine 
of 
issue 
preclusion.  Arguably, the circuit court could have, on argument 
of the parties, answered the first step of the inquiry, a 
question of law, at the summary judgment motion hearing, but 
without anything more in the record might not have been able to 
address the second step of the inquiry, an exercise of 
discretion, at that stage of the proceeding. 
¶58 For the reasons set forth, we conclude as a matter of 
law that the issue of Osco Drug's negligence was actually 
litigated and determined in the summary judgment proceeding by a 
valid judgment and that the determination was essential to the 
judgment. 
¶59 Having decided that issue preclusion applies as a 
matter of law to this third-party complaint for contribution, we 
next determine whether the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion when it applied issue preclusion to bar Dr. 
Galbraith from litigating Osco Drug's negligence in her claim 
for contribution. 
IV 
¶60 The circuit court, as we have explained, may permit or 
deny the application of the doctrine of issue preclusion on the 
basis of fundamental fairness.  This discretionary decision is 
"bottomed in guarantees of due process which require that a 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
24 
 
person 
must 
have 
had 
a 
fair 
opportunity 
procedurally, 
substantively and evidentially to pursue the claim before a 
second litigation will be precluded."27 
¶61 A circuit court generally examines five factors in 
determining 
whether 
the 
application 
of 
issue 
preclusion 
satisfies notions of fundamental fairness.  The factors to be 
considered in determining whether to apply issue preclusion are 
as follows: 
1) Could the party against whom preclusion is sought 
have obtained review of the judgment as a matter of 
law;  
2) Is the question one of law that involves two 
distinct claims or intervening contextual shifts in 
the law; 
3) Do significant differences in the quality or 
extensiveness of proceedings between the two courts 
warrant relitigation of the issue; 
4) Have the burdens of persuasion shifted such that 
the party seeking preclusion had a lower burden of 
persuasion in the first trial than in the second; 
and 
5) Are 
matters 
of 
public 
policy 
and 
individual 
circumstances 
involved 
that 
would 
render 
the 
application 
of 
collateral 
estoppel 
to 
be 
fundamentally 
unfair, 
including 
inadequate 
opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair 
adjudication in the initial action?28 
                                                 
27 Precision Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 305 (quoting Amber 
J.F. v. Richard B., 205 Wis. 2d 510, 520, 557 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. 
App. 1996)). 
28 Michelle T., 173 Wis. 2d at 689 (citing "Exceptions to 
the General Rule of Issue Preclusion" set forth in Restatement 
(Second) Judgments § 28 at 273-74 (1982))); Precision Erecting, 
224 Wis. 2d at 305. 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
25 
 
¶62 The weight to be given to each of these factors 
involves a circuit court's exercise of discretion.29  Factors 1, 
2, and 4 of the analysis present questions of law.  Factors 3 
and 5 generally fall within the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion. 
 
¶63 These enumerated factors are illustrative; they are 
not exclusive or dispositive.  The "most important factor to be 
considered is fairness to the party against whom preclusion is 
asserted, and this fairness determination should be made on a 
case-by-case basis."30  The final decision whether the doctrine 
of issue preclusion should be applied rests on the circuit 
court's sense of justice and equity. 
 
¶64 Before we apply the five factors to the instant case, 
we examine Precision Erecting v. M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 
G.A.P., Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 288, 592 N.W.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1998), a 
case substantially similar to the case at bar.  Applying the 
five factors, Precision Erecting upheld the circuit court's 
exercise of discretion in precluding a party-defendant from re-
litigating an issue decided on summary judgment against a co-
defendant.  Precision Erecting is a seminal case discussing a 
party-defendant's obligations on a motion for summary judgment 
to avoid issue preclusion and the circuit court's exercise of 
its discretion in applying issue preclusion.   
                                                 
29 Precision Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 305. 
30 Id. at 306 (citing Michelle T., 173 Wis. 2d at 692-93). 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
26 
 
 
¶65 The parties in the present case focused on Precision 
Erecting in the summary judgment proceedings and in the 
proceedings to dismiss the third-party complaint, and on appeal 
focus on the application of Precision Erecting to the present 
case. 
A 
 
¶66 Precision Erecting filed suit against AFW Foundry for 
payment of overdue bills.  AFW responded by filing a third-party 
complaint against Antonic & Associates, Nambe Mills, Inc., and 
twenty-one other third party defendants.31 
 
¶67 The facts in Precision Erecting were, for purposes of 
issue preclusion, undisputed.  AFW Foundry contracted with 
Antonic to coordinate an improvement project.  As part of this 
project, Antonic purchased a piece of equipment from Nambe, 
making only a $7,000 down payment on the $70,000 purchase price.  
Antonic 
was 
also 
derelict 
in 
paying 
subcontractors 
and 
suppliers, one of which was Precision Electric.   
¶68 In its third party complaint, AFW alleged that Antonic 
was not its agent, but rather was a general contractor, and that 
                                                 
31 In contrast, Dr. Galbraith did not file a third-party 
complaint against Osco Drug before Osco Drug moved for summary 
judgment.  This procedural difference between Precision Erecting 
and the present case is not significant because Dr. Galbraith's 
contemplation of a third-party complaint against Osco Drug for 
contribution was at all times well known to the parties and the 
circuit court.  The same concerns described in Precision 
Erecting about the obligations of a party-defendant on a motion 
for summary judgment and the problems arising when a party-
defendant does not object to the summary judgment motion are 
present in the case at bar. 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
27 
 
AFW's liability was limited to the amount it owed Antonic——an 
amount far less than the $365,000 the third-party defendants 
claimed was due. 
¶69 Both Antonic and Nambe filed answers to the third-
party complaint, alleging that Antonic was an agent, not a 
general contractor. 
¶70 AFW then moved for summary judgment against all of the 
third-party defendants, requesting a judgment affixing its 
liability as the amount it owed under the contract to Antonic.  
Antonic did not oppose AFW's motion for summary judgment and 
submitted a letter to that effect.  Nambe did not respond to the 
summary judgment motion at all.  The circuit court granted 
summary 
judgment, 
declaring 
that 
Antonic 
was 
a 
general 
contractor and directing that the third party defendants be paid 
pro rata from the amount AWF owed Antonic.  The circuit court 
ordered judgment in favor of Nambe for $11,340, an amount 
equivalent to 18% of Nambe's claim. 
¶71 Nambe 
appealed from this judgment, arguing that 
Antonic was an agent of AFW rather than a general contractor.  
Antonic contended that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred 
Nambe's appeal, that is, that Antonic's status as general 
contractor was established by the summary judgment.  The court 
of appeals agreed with Antonic. 
 
¶72 The Precision Erecting court declared that in the 
interests of fundamental fairness and finality, "[i]f a litigant 
who is not the subject of the motion for summary judgment 
nonetheless has reason to dispute the facts supporting the 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
28 
 
motion, it is that litigant's duty to appear and object to the 
motion."32  The litigant "should have asserted itself at the 
summary judgment stage if it felt material facts regarding [the 
other party's liability] were in dispute."33  The very fact that 
a party moves for a summary judgment alerts the other parties 
that someone is alleging that there are no facts in dispute.34  
 
¶73 In other words, under Precision Erecting, in the 
interest of fundamental fairness a circuit court may apply issue 
preclusion unless a litigant "appears and objects" on the merits 
to a motion for summary judgment, informing the circuit court of 
any disputed material facts.35  If a litigant does not appear and 
object and summary judgment of dismissal is granted, a circuit 
court may in the exercise of discretion conclude that the facts 
underlying the summary judgment are binding on all parties to 
the suit as a matter of issue preclusion.36  To allow a litigant 
to take a "wait and see" position detracts from finality of 
judgments and paves the way for inconsistent decisions on the 
same set of facts.37   
                                                 
32 Precision Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 292-93. 
33 Id. at 301. 
34 Id. at 309-10. 
35 Id. at 309. 
36 Id. at 310. 
37 Id. 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
29 
 
 
¶74 Dr. Galbraith argues that she did all that was 
required by Precision Erecting to avoid the doctrine of issue 
preclusion from applying to her.  We disagree with her position. 
¶75 True, 
Dr. 
Galbraith, 
unlike 
Nambe 
in 
Precision 
Erecting, did appear at the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment. 
 She asked the circuit court to reserve her 
contribution claim.  She could have, however, objected to or 
challenged Osco Drug's motion for summary judgment on the 
merits.  She did not.  Dr. Galbraith could have secured her own 
expert witnesses and filed expert reports establishing Osco 
Drug's negligence.  She did not.  Dr. Galbraith could have 
demonstrated a triable issue of material fact, proving to the 
circuit court that summary judgment in favor of Osco Drug was 
not appropriate as a matter of law.  She did not.  Dr. Galbraith 
could have moved for a continuance pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(4) to gain more time to conduct depositions or obtain 
affidavits necessary to challenge a motion for summary judgment 
on the merits.  She did not.  She took none of these steps and 
offers no explanation for her failure to do so other than that 
she is not required to file a third-party complaint for 
contribution in the original tort action.   
¶76 Instead Dr. Galbraith merely asked that any dismissal 
of Osco Drug be without prejudice to her claim against Osco 
Drug.  Although Dr. Galbraith thus opposed the summary judgment 
motion, it is not the legal opposition envisioned by Precision 
Erecting.  The litigation envisioned by Precision Erecting under 
the circumstances of the present case was litigation on the 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
30 
 
merits of the issue, litigation that would foster judicial 
efficiency and finality, ensure the stability of judgments, and 
guard against inconsistent decisions on the same set of facts.     
 
¶77 We therefore conclude that Precision Erecting teaches 
that the doctrine of issue preclusion may be applied against Dr. 
Galbraith's third-party complaint.  We must now determine 
whether in applying the five factors of fundamental fairness the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion in barring Dr. 
Galbraith from re-litigating the issue of Osco Drug's liability 
in her contribution claim against Osco Drug.   
B 
 
¶78 Neither the transcript of the hearing on Osco Drug's 
motion to dismiss Dr. Galbraith's third-party complaint on the 
ground of issue preclusion nor the order of dismissal includes a 
statement by the circuit court carefully analyzing each of the 
five factors of fundamental fairness.  Nevertheless, the 
transcript of the hearing demonstrates that the circuit court 
heard lengthy arguments from all the parties, including Rille, 
and had read the briefs explicating Precision Erecting and its 
application to the present case.  The transcript of the 
exchanges among the lawyers and the circuit court evidences that 
all the participants were very familiar with Precision Erecting 
and the issues raised and decided therein and the need for the 
circuit court to balance the competing interests.   
¶79 The 
circuit 
court 
carefully 
followed 
counsels' 
arguments, commenting on them as the hearing proceeded.  The 
circuit court concluded that Precision Erecting is on all fours 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
31 
 
with this case and that it would apply Precision Erecting in 
this case.  The circuit court concluded that "all five of the 
factors that are recited in Precision Erecting as borrowed 
from . . . Crozier . . . are applicable here."      
¶80 Dr. Galbraith urges this court to overrule the circuit 
court, insisting that application of issue preclusion in her 
case is fundamentally unfair.  She asserts that she did not sit 
back while Osco Drug moved for summary judgment and that the 
text of the summary judgment order for summary judgment protects 
her contribution claim.  
¶81 In contrast, Osco Drug and Rille argue that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion and 
that it was fundamentally fair for the circuit court to apply 
issue preclusion in the current case.  They claim that Dr. 
Galbraith was aware of and debated the impact of the Precision 
Erecting case on her contribution claim at the summary judgment 
hearing, that Osco Drug asserted issue preclusion at the summary 
judgment hearing, and that Dr. Galbraith strategically chose not 
to oppose Osco Drug's motion for summary judgment on the merits 
when she had the opportunity.  The only fair result under these 
circumstances, they say, is to make Dr. Galbraith shoulder the 
burden of her strategy. 
 
¶82 All the facts were known to the circuit court.  Our 
role in reviewing the circuit court's decision is limited.  When 
reviewing a circuit court's exercise of discretion, this court 
cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the circuit court 
and 
determine 
for 
itself 
whether 
issue 
preclusion 
was 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
32 
 
fundamentally fair under the circumstances.  Rather, this court 
limits its review to determining whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  The final decision on the 
application of issue preclusion rests on the circuit court’s 
sense of justice and equity.   
 
¶83 Keeping this standard of review in mind, we examine 
the five factors used to determine whether the application of 
issue preclusion is fundamentally fair.  
¶84 Under the first factor, the parties debate whether Dr. 
Galbraith could have obtained appellate review of the summary 
judgment.     
 
¶85 Dr. Galbraith argues that she could not have appealed 
the order granting Osco Drug's motion for summary judgment and 
dismissing Osco Drug from Rille's action because she got the 
relief she had requested, that is, the order she proposed was 
adopted, and it stated that the decision would not affect her 
contribution claim.  But Dr. Galbraith had requested that the 
motion for summary judgment be granted "without prejudice" and 
the circuit court entered the motion "with prejudice."  Although 
the circuit court adopted Dr. Galbraith's proposed order, the 
language in the order relating to future claims was broad and, 
as Dr. Galbraith concedes, was not a model of clarity.  The 
order could be understood as simply memorializing the circuit 
court's declaration at the hearing that the circuit court would 
not rule on the impact of its decision until a claim for 
contribution was actually filed and challenged. 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
33 
 
 
¶86 Osco Drug contends that Dr. Galbraith was aggrieved by 
the dismissal of Rille's negligence claim against Osco Drug and 
had the right to appeal.  A party can appeal the dismissal of a 
co-defendant from a lawsuit, even when no third-party complaint 
has been filed, since "[t]he dismissal of the co-defendants 
adversely affects a substantial interest."38 
 
¶87 The parties discussed this first factor at the hearing 
on the motion to dismiss, and the circuit court concluded that 
Dr. Galbraith had waived her right to appeal.  We need not 
decide this question of law to determine whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion in applying the 
doctrine of issue preclusion in the present case.      
 
¶88 The second factor examines whether the claims are 
distinct or whether there was an intervening contextual shift in 
the law.  Dr. Galbraith argues that her contribution claim is a 
distinct claim because it is a contingent claim and is not 
triggered until after she is adjudged liable.  Dr. Galbraith's 
argument 
is 
not 
persuasive. 
 
Although 
Dr. 
Galbraith's 
contribution claim is a "separate and distinct" claim, it is 
interwoven with a finding of Osco Drug's negligence in Rille's 
underlying tort suit.  The issue of Osco Drug's negligence was 
the same in both the summary judgment proceeding and the motion 
to dismiss proceeding.  A finding of Osco Drug's negligence is 
                                                 
38 Weina, 177 Wis. 2d at 345-47 (although no third party 
claim for contribution was filed, a defendant may appeal a 
summary 
judgment 
dismissing 
a 
co-defendant 
to 
preserve 
contribution rights). 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
34 
 
necessary for Dr. Galbraith to succeed on any contribution 
claim.  There was no shift in negligence law between the summary 
judgment 
decision 
and 
the 
dismissal 
of 
the 
third 
party 
complaint.  This factor weighs in Osco Drug's favor.   
 
¶89 The third factor examines the difference between the 
nature and extensiveness of the proceedings in the court that 
granted summary judgment and in the court that dismissed the 
third party complaint.  This factor is meant to protect parties 
from issue preclusion when the proceedings in the second action 
differ in quality and extensiveness from the first proceedings.   
 
¶90 Dr. Galbraith attempts to argue that issue preclusion 
should not apply because Rille failed to prosecute the claim and 
Osco Drug's motion for summary judgment went unchallenged.  She 
argues she should have an opportunity to litigate Osco Drug's 
negligence fully.  This argument misses the mark.   
 
¶91 This factor does not explore how well the parties 
litigated in the first proceeding or the extent of their 
efforts.  This factor examines the procedural aspects of the 
first proceeding, such as the ability to conduct discovery and 
introduce evidence, the availability of counsel, and the 
relative burdens of proof.39  Here, the two proceedings, the 
summary judgment and the dismissal of the third-party complaint, 
were substantially identical proceedings involving the same 
civil action before the same circuit court.  Dr. Galbraith had 
                                                 
39 Lindas v. Cady, 183 Wis. 2d 547, 557, 515 N.W.2d 458 
(1994). 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
35 
 
the opportunity to conduct discovery and introduce evidence in 
the summary judgment hearing.  This factor favors Osco Drug.     
 
¶92 We agree with the parties that the fourth factor has no 
bearing on this case.  The burden on the contribution claim 
remained with Dr. Galbraith at all times: "The party asserting 
the right of contribution has the burden of alleging and proving 
these necessary conditions."40 
 
¶93 The fifth factor requires the circuit court, in its 
discretion, to determine whether matters of public policy and 
individual 
circumstances 
render 
the 
application 
of 
issue 
preclusion fundamentally unfair.41     
¶94 The circuit court must weigh competing interests under 
this step of the fundamental fairness analysis.  The interests 
of the party facing issue preclusion are important, including 
                                                 
40 Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 295, 243 N.W.2d 815 
(1976). 
41 Precision Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 308, explains that the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982) lists three 
reasons why issue preclusion should not be applied under the 
fifth factor.  First, a re-determination of the issue might have 
an impact on persons not party to the initial action.  (Here Dr. 
Galbraith 
was 
a 
party 
in 
the 
initial 
summary 
judgment 
proceeding.)  Second, it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the 
time of the initial action that the issue would arise in the 
context of a subsequent action. (Here it was foreseeable that 
Dr. Galbraith would file a contribution claim against Osco Drug 
and that claim depended on Osco Drug being held causally 
negligent.)  Third, the party sought to be precluded did not 
have, as a result of the conduct of an adversary or other 
special circumstances, an adequate opportunity or incentive to 
obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action. (Dr. 
Galbraith had an adequate opportunity and incentive to obtain a 
full and fair adjudication of Osco Drug's negligence in the 
summary judgment proceeding.)  
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
36 
 
whether the party to be precluded was afforded full due process 
rights to litigate the issue in the previous proceeding.  The 
circuit court must also consider, however, the expense and 
inconvenience to the other parties who may have to relitigate an 
issue, the burden on judicial resources, and the interest in 
finality of judgments.  In short, in deciding whether to apply 
issue preclusion, a circuit court must "balance competing goals 
of 
judicial 
efficiency 
and 
finality, 
protection 
against 
repetitious or harassing litigation, and the right to litigate 
one's claims."42 
¶95 Some may consider this case a close one on the fifth 
factor, 
fundamental 
fairness. 
 
After 
all, 
Dr. 
Galbraith 
attempted to preserve her ability to bring a contribution claim 
against Osco Drug.  She did not completely "sit on [her] hands" 
and do absolutely nothing, inaction condemned by Precision 
Erecting.43  Furthermore, inasmuch as the circuit court's summary 
judgment order adopted Dr. Galbraith's language, over Osco 
Drug's strenuous objection, Dr. Galbraith could have thought she 
had "won," that is, that she could bring her contribution claim 
free from the preclusive effect of Osco Drug's summary judgment.  
Dr. Galbraith is, in effect, claiming that she was misled by the 
circuit court's actions in granting Osco Drug's motion for 
summary judgment incorporating her language in the order for 
summary judgment.  Dr. Galbraith also relies on an amended 
                                                 
42 Michelle T., 173 Wis. 2d at 688. 
43 Precision Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 309. 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
37 
 
scheduling order the circuit court entered (by stipulation of 
Rille and Dr. Galbraith), providing time in which Dr. Galbraith 
could pursue discovery, name experts, and add parties.  Dr. 
Galbraith contends that this scheduling order was a "green 
light" from the circuit court to pursue her contribution claim 
against Osco Drug.   
¶96 The circuit court did not find Dr. Galbraith's 
characterization 
of 
the 
events 
persuasive, 
although 
it 
considered the expectations of Dr. Galbraith and her argument 
that she attempted to reserve her rights in the summary judgment 
proceeding.  The circuit court stated that "in fairness, there 
was discussion [in the summary judgment motion proceedings] 
about reserving abilities, and even Judge Fiorenza acknowledged 
there may be a question at a later date."     
¶97 The circuit court knew that Dr. Galbraith was a party 
to the action and received notice of the pending motion for 
summary judgment; that Dr. Galbraith had the opportunity to 
challenge Osco Drug's motion for summary judgment on the merits; 
that Dr. Galbraith participated in the hearing, knowing that 
Osco Drug would claim issue preclusion in response to her 
contribution claim; that the circuit court was withholding 
decision on issue preclusion; and that the amended scheduling 
order could not have meant that if Dr. Galbraith filed a third-
party complaint the new party would have no right to object, 
including on issue preclusion grounds.  The circuit court 
concluded that Dr. Galbraith was afforded her due process 
rights, made a strategic decision not to pursue discovery and 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
38 
 
the contribution claim at the summary judgment stage, and took 
her chances on losing on the doctrine of issue preclusion.   
 
¶98 Moreover, it is not just Dr. Galbraith's interests the 
circuit court had to consider.  The circuit court had to 
consider the effect of issue preclusion on the other parties to 
the litigation.    
 
¶99 If the summary judgment does not have preclusive 
effect, then the summary judgment may prove to be but a "hollow 
victory" for Osco Drug. Osco Drug will have to defend itself 
against the third-party complaint, may be found negligent, and 
may be held liable for contribution.  Osco Drug will have to re-
litigate the same issues already decided in its favor in the 
summary judgment.   
 
¶100 Furthermore, if the summary judgment does not have 
preclusive effect, Rille's claim against Dr. Galbraith might be 
adversely affected.  Rille (and the Wisconsin Academy of Trial 
Lawyers in its nonparty brief) argue that Rille might be harmed 
if Dr. Galbraith is permitted to relitigate Osco Drug's 
negligence: a jury might find in a special verdict in Rille's 
lawsuit that Osco Drug was liable for Rille's injuries, but, 
because of the earlier summary judgment, Rille would not be able 
to recover from Osco Drug and might recover only partial damages 
from Dr. Galbraith.44   
                                                 
44 Rille also argues, however, that Dr. Galbraith would not 
be permitted to present evidence against Osco Drug in the Rille 
trial against Dr. Galbraith, citing Haase v. R & P Indus. 
Chimney Repair Co., Inc., 140 Wis. 2d 187, 409 N.W.2d 423 (Ct. 
App. 1987). 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
39 
 
 
¶101 Additionally, if Dr. Galbraith is not precluded from 
litigating her contribution claim, gamesmanship by the parties 
and abuse of the system might be encouraged.  The nonparty brief 
of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers details how defendants 
in multi-defendant cases may use a holding of no issue 
preclusion under the facts of the present case to engage in 
gamesmanship and work together to avoid liability in similar 
multiple party lawsuits.  As the Precision Erecting court 
explained, "[t]o not apply issue preclusion in this case would 
encourage parties . . . to sit on their hands and wait to see 
what happens instead of opposing summary judgment on an issue 
crucial to their claims.  Then, if other parties who put forth 
the effort to oppose fail, the waiting parties are allowed a 
second kick at the cat."45 
                                                                                                                                                             
The circuit court refrained from ruling on whether Dr. 
Galbraith could refer to Osco Drug during trial of Rille's 
medical malpractice claim.  The circuit court announced: "[M]y 
decision 
shouldn't 
be 
interpreted 
that 
I 
am 
foreclosing 
[Galbraith] from making any reference to Osco [during the course 
of trial].  I can't do that at this time, nor am I indicating 
that counsel for the plaintiff can't argue that point.  I think 
it's more appropriately brought to the trial court's attention 
either at the time that it's brought up at the time of trial, or 
by a motion in limine where both parties can fully address that 
issue . . . but in this summary judgment motion I really can't 
do that."  
We need not and do not address this question.   
45 Precision Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 309. 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
40 
 
¶102 Considering all the factors raised at the hearing, the 
circuit court concluded that the equities favor the application 
of issue preclusion.  This conclusion was a reasonable one. 
¶103 Some judges may have reached a different conclusion 
about fundamental fairness under the peculiar facts of the 
present case were they to have decided this issue in the first 
instance.  But what other judges may have done in the first 
instance is irrelevant.  What matters is that the circuit court 
reached a reasonable result.  We therefore uphold the circuit 
court's 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
in 
determining 
that 
the 
application of issue preclusion in the present case was 
fundamentally fair.  The circuit court's conclusion was one that 
a reasonable court could reach on this record.   
¶104 In sum, for the reasons set forth, we hold that the 
issue of Osco Drug's liability was actually litigated and 
determined by summary judgment and that the circuit court did 
not reserve Dr. Galbraith's claim for contribution in its order 
on summary judgment.  We further hold that the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion when it ruled that 
application of issue preclusion was fundamentally fair.  To 
preserve her contribution claim against Osco Drug successfully 
against a challenge on the ground of issue preclusion, Dr. 
Galbraith should have appeared and objected on the merits to 
Osco Drug's motion for summary judgment, thereby ensuring that 
there would be no possibility of inconsistent fact-finding on 
any issue central to Rille's claim and her own claim.  Filing a 
brief and arguing that her claim for contribution should be 
No. 
2005AP1407   
 
41 
 
preserved for a later date was not adequate, without any 
justification for her position, to avoid issue preclusion under 
Precision Erecting.  
¶105 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court 
dismissing 
Dr. 
Galbraith's 
third-party 
complaint 
seeking 
contribution from Osco Drug. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶106 JON P. WILCOX, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶107 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Dr. Sheila 
Galbraith (Dr. Galbraith) seeks reversal of the circuit court’s 
dismissal of her cross-complaint for contribution against Osco 
Drug, Inc. (Osco).  The majority refuses to reinstate her 
contribution claim.  In doing so, the court not only renders a 
decision that is fundamentally unfair to Dr. Galbraith but also 
alters and distorts the relationships among plaintiffs and 
defendants in future cases.  Because I disagree with the 
majority’s refusal to reinstate Dr. Galbraith’s contribution 
claim, I respectfully dissent. 
 
¶108 The majority decides that issue preclusion should 
apply as a matter of law to this case because the holding in 
Precision Erecting, Inc. v. M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, G.A.P., 
224 Wis. 2d 288, 592 N.W.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1998), does not allow a 
defendant to preserve a right to bring a contribution claim 
against a codefendant after the codefendant obtains summary 
judgment against plaintiffs.  The majority also decides that 
regardless of Precision Erecting, the circuit court did not in 
fact preserve Dr. Galbraith’s contribution claim against Osco.  
In justifying these decisions, the majority paints a picture in 
which the holding in Precision Erecting is so clear that Dr. 
Galbraith should have known that a court could not preserve her 
contribution claim, and that Dr. Galbraith could not have been 
misled into believing that anything she did in court preserved 
her contribution claim against Osco. 
¶109 In my view, the facts and law suggest otherwise.  Dr. 
Galbraith had good reason to believe that the circuit court had 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
2 
 
preserved her contribution claim and that she was doing all that 
she was required to do under Precision Erecting.  In response to 
Osco’s motion for summary judgment, Dr. Galbraith filed a 
response brief to notify the circuit court that she was not 
making any claim against Osco at that time but that she still 
had the right to file a cross-claim or a contribution claim in 
the future.  While Dr. Galbraith did not oppose Osco’s summary 
judgment motion, she noted factual issues that Rille could have 
raised to oppose the summary judgment motion if Rille had not 
failed to engage in discovery.1  Dr. Galbraith asked the circuit 
court to specify in its order granting Osco summary judgment 
that the order was not determinative of any of her claims, or 
that her claims were preserved. 
¶110 In its reply to Dr. Galbraith, Osco vigorously opposed 
Dr. Galbraith’s request.  It asserted that (1) she had no 
standing to object or to limit the dismissal sought by Osco 
because she had not filed any claim against Osco; and (2) she 
had raised no issue of material fact. 
¶111 At the hearing on Osco’s summary judgment motion, the 
parties disagreed whether Dr. Galbraith could preserve her 
contribution claim.  Osco argued that the court should grant its 
summary judgment motion on the merits so that Osco would be able 
to raise the doctrine of issue preclusion to preclude any later 
contribution claim filed by Dr. Galbraith.  In support of its 
                                                 
1 For instance, Dr. Galbraith specified that there had been 
no discovery of Osco personnel and no discovery about Osco’s 
policies and procedures, all of which might have revealed Osco’s 
negligence. 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
3 
 
position that any future contribution claim would be barred, 
Osco cited Precision Erecting.  Rille also cited that case to 
argue that if the circuit court were to grant Osco’s motion for 
summary judgment, Dr. Galbraith would not be able to raise the 
issue of Osco’s negligence at trial.  In its argument, Rille 
discussed the facts of Precision Erecting in detail. 
¶112 In 
response, 
Dr. 
Galbraith 
contended 
that, 
by 
"stand[ing] up and say[ing] something" about the summary 
judgment motion, she was doing all that Precision Erecting 
required to preserve her claim.  Dr. Galbraith acknowledged 
that,  
If it weren’t for the Precision case[,] I guess I 
wouldn’t be standing here saying we are objecting, 
Your Honor.  We aren’t standing quiet.  We are 
expressing our concern that the Court enter the 
appropriate order as it relates to the plaintiff and 
the defendant so it doesn’t damage the rest of this 
case. 
¶113 The circuit court, Reserve Circuit Judge John Fiorenza 
presiding, responded that it was granting Osco’s motion for 
summary judgment but that it was not ruling on the effect of 
summary judgment on Dr. Galbraith’s contribution claim.  The 
majority cites the circuit court’s discussion to demonstrate 
that the circuit court did not preserve Dr. Galbraith’s right to 
bring a contribution claim.  Majority op., ¶¶52-55.  If the 
circuit court's discussion were the only evidence in the record, 
it 
would 
be 
more 
difficult 
to 
dispute 
the 
majority’s 
characterizations.  However, the circuit court's discussion is 
not the only evidence.  The circuit court's actions after the 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
4 
 
hearing are what misled Dr. Galbraith into thinking that she had 
preserved her right to bring a contribution claim. 
¶114 After Judge Fiorenza granted Osco’s summary judgment 
motion, Osco and Dr. Galbraith each submitted a proposed order 
to Mark S. Gempeler, the regularly assigned circuit judge.  Osco 
submitted an order with the following language: "That the 
Defendant Osco[] Drugs, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is 
Granted and that Osco Drugs, Inc., is dismissed from this case 
upon the merits with prejudice." 
¶115 Dr. Galbraith submitted an alternative order with the 
following language: 
1. 
That 
the 
defendant, 
Osco 
Drugs, 
Inc.’s 
motion for summary judgment is granted, and the 
complaint of the plaintiff and all causes of action of 
the plaintiff against Osco Drugs, Inc. is dismissed 
upon its merits, with prejudice. 
2. 
That this order is no way intended to affect 
the rights of other parties to pursue claims under 
appropriate statutory and/or case law. 
¶116 In a letter to Judge Gempeler, Osco strongly opposed 
Dr. Galbraith’s proposed order, opining that Dr. Galbraith was 
still trying to preserve her contribution claim even though 
Judge Fiorenza had made clear that he was not making an 
anticipatory ruling on the viability of any future contribution 
claim.  Osco noted that it was ordering a transcript of Judge 
Fiorenza’s proceedings for Judge Gempeler to review.  Osco urged 
Judge Gempeler to ignore Dr. Galbraith’s order. 
¶117 In response, Dr. Galbraith also asked that Judge 
Gempeler review the transcript of Judge Fiorenza’s proceedings 
before deciding between the two proposed orders and suggested 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
5 
 
that Judge Fiorenza, who heard the entire argument, might want 
to sign the order. 
 
¶118 Judge 
Gempeler 
decided 
to 
sign 
Dr. 
Galbraith’s 
proposed 
order, 
not 
Osco's. 
 
The 
implications 
of 
Judge 
Gempeler's adoption of Dr. Galbraith’s proposed order are 
compelling and suggest that Judge Gempeler, after reviewing the 
transcript of the earlier proceedings and comparing the drafts, 
chose to adopt Dr. Galbraith’s proposed order to preserve her 
right to bring a future contribution claim.  The majority, 
however, claims that the adoption of Dr. Galbraith’s proposed 
order "can be similarly understood as adopting the circuit 
court’s 'wait and see' position."  Majority op., ¶56 (emphasis 
added).  The majority seizes upon Dr. Galbraith’s concession 
that her proposed order was not "a model of clarity" to support 
its conclusion that the proposed order "could be understood as 
simply memorializing the circuit court’s declaration at the 
hearing that the circuit court would not rule on the impact of 
its decision until a claim for contribution was actually filed 
and challenged."  Majority op., ¶85 (emphasis added). 
¶119 In 
relying 
on 
Galbraith’s 
concession 
and 
in 
emphasizing what the proposed order could mean, the majority 
fails to acknowledge what the proposed order did mean.  If Dr. 
Galbraith’s order was simply to memorialize a "wait and see 
position," it is difficult to comprehend why Osco so vigorously 
opposed it.  Osco acknowledged in its letter to Judge Gempeler 
that Dr. Galbraith was trying to preserve her contribution claim 
and therefore urged Judge Gempeler to sign its own proposed 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
6 
 
order.  It is hard to imagine why Dr. Galbraith, who drafted the 
language in the order that the court actually signed, would have 
been trying to preserve only the opportunity to file a claim, 
rather than the right to file a claim without fear of dismissal. 
¶120 Under the majority’s "wait and see" interpretation, it 
would have made no difference which order Judge Gempeler signed.  
Dr. Galbraith would have had the opportunity to file a claim 
under either order——but with no practical chance of success.  
What Dr. Galbraith was attempting to do with her proposed order 
was to ensure her right to bring a contribution claim without 
fear of dismissal.  When Judge Gempeler signed her markedly 
different order, Dr. Galbraith thought she had received the 
relief that she had requested. 
¶121 The majority asserts that Dr. Galbraith had the right 
to obtain appellate review at the time the order was signed 
because she was an aggrieved party.  Majority op., ¶86.  But Dr. 
Galbraith had no reason to think that she was an aggrieved 
party.  The court had approved her version of the order.  In 
addition, upon stipulation of Rille and Dr. Galbraith, the court 
amended its original scheduling order, giving Dr. Galbraith a 
new deadline to add any additional party (such as Osco) to the 
pleadings and to name experts and file expert reports.  In 
reliance on this amended scheduling order, Dr. Galbraith 
proceeded with discovery against Osco and deposed Osco employees 
in Phoenix, Arizona, and named experts and provided expert 
reports supporting Osco’s negligence. 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
7 
 
 
¶122 Based on these facts, the majority’s conclusion that 
the circuit court did not preserve Dr. Galbraith's contribution 
claim is fundamentally unfair and unjust.  If the law had been 
clear at the time of Osco’s summary judgment motion or if the 
court had informed Dr. Galbraith that her contribution claim 
would 
be 
precluded 
by 
summary 
judgment, 
the 
majority’s 
conclusion would not have worked an injustice.  But the circuit 
court was not clear in its decision, and Precision Erecting was 
not clear in its effect. 
¶123 The 
majority 
cites 
Precision 
Erecting 
for 
the 
proposition that a court is unable to preserve a party’s 
contribution claim in these circumstances.  Majority op., ¶50.  
The majority cites three sentences from Precision Erecting to 
support this proposition, but it fails to consider other 
relevant language and fails to recognize the facts that 
distinguish this case from the other.  See id. 
¶124 The Precision Erecting case involved two lawsuits and 
multiple parties.  AFW Foundry, Inc. (AFW) contracted with 
Antonic 
& 
Associates 
(Antonic) 
to 
oversee 
a 
substantial 
refurbishing of the foundry.  Antonic, in turn, engaged various 
subcontractors and suppliers to effect the refurbishing.  When 
these subcontractors and suppliers were not fully paid, some of 
them 
commenced 
litigation 
against 
both 
AFW 
and 
Antonic.  
Precision Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 293. 
¶125 Nambe Mills, Inc. (Nambe), a company in New Mexico, 
sold 
a $70,000 muller for AFW to Antonic, receiving a 
downpayment of $7000.  It filed suit against AFW and Antonic in 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
8 
 
New Mexico when the balance was not paid.  Another claimant, 
Precision Erecting, filed a separate suit against the two 
defendants in Wisconsin.  AFW then filed a third-party complaint 
in the latter suit against Nambe, Antonic, and 22 other third-
party defendants.  Id.  AFW alleged that Antonic was not its 
agent but rather the general contractor for the project, and 
thus AFW’s liability was limited to the amount it owed Antonic 
under the contract.  Id. at 293-94.  Antonic and Nambe each 
filed an answer alleging that Antonic was AFW’s agent.  Id. at 
294.  Nambe's suit in New Mexico had similarly relied on the 
theory that Antonic was AFW’s agent when it purchased the 
muller.  Id. at 293. 
¶126 AFW subsequently moved for summary judgment against 
Antonic and some but not all third-party defendants in the 
Precision Erecting case, and Antonic notified the court that it 
did not oppose the motion.  Id. at 294.  Although Nambe had 
notice of AFW's motion, it did not appear on the motion or 
participate in the proceedings.  Id.  The circuit court granted 
summary judgment, establishing that Antonic was a general 
contractor, not an agent, and ordered pro rata payments from the 
amount AFW owed Antonic to the third-party defendants.  Id. at 
294-95.  The circuit court ordered judgment in favor of Nambe 
for $11,340, which represented only 18 percent of Nambe’s 
$63,000 claim.  Id. 
¶127 Nambe appealed from that judgment, but the court of 
appeals held that Nambe was precluded from arguing that Antonic 
was AFW’s agent rather than a general contractor.  Id. at 300-
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
9 
 
301.  The court held that "[i]f a litigant who is not the 
subject of the motion for summary judgment nonetheless has 
reason to dispute the facts supporting the motion, it is that 
litigant’s duty to appear and object to the motion."  Id. at 
292-93 (emphasis added). 
¶128 The majority disregards this "appear and object" 
language when it holds that Precision Erecting forecloses the 
court’s ability to preserve Dr. Galbraith’s contribution claim.  
See majority op., ¶50.  The majority does not recognize that the 
"appear and object" language is capable of different meanings in 
different contexts.  To illustrate, "appear and object" could 
mean that Dr. Galbraith had the duty to file a cross-claim and 
oppose Osco’s summary judgment motion.  On the other hand, 
"appear and object" could mean that Dr. Galbraith simply had the 
duty to come to the summary judgment hearing and, in Dr. 
Galbraith’s own words, "stand up and say something" as an 
objection.  In fact, Dr. Galbraith did more than appear in the 
proceeding and make an objection.  She did her best to preserve 
her claim. 
¶129 The meaning of "appear and object" in the context of 
contribution claims must have been unclear even to some of the 
judges who decided Precision Erecting, for Judges Nettesheim and 
Snyder, who were both on the panel that decided Precision 
Erecting, were part of the panel that certified the present case 
to this court.  In the certification, the judges asked this 
court 
to 
determine 
"the 
extent 
of 
a 
tort 
litigant’s 
responsibility to appear and object to a motion for summary 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
10 
 
judgment filed against another party to the tort action, but not 
against the litigant, when the litigant seeks to preserve a 
potential claim for contribution against a party to the motion."  
Estate of Rille v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1009230 (Ct App. 
Apr. 19, 2006) (emphasis added). 
¶130 Because the majority disregards the ambiguity of the 
"appear 
and 
object" 
language 
and 
sidesteps 
the 
factual 
differences in this case from Precision Erecting, the majority 
fails to recognize the ramifications of applying Precision 
Erecting in the context of contribution claims. 
¶131 While Precision Erecting involved a multiparty suit 
and a summary judgment motion, it did not involve a contribution 
claim or a statute that expressly allows a party to file a 
contribution claim in a subsequent action.2 
¶132 Moreover, the effect of the summary judgment motion on 
the parties in Precision Erecting was not contingent on any 
later finding made by the court.  Unlike a contribution claim, 
Nambe’s claim for damages was choate at the time of the summary 
judgment motion.  See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Schara, 56 Wis. 2d 262, 201 N.W.2d 758 (1972) (describing the 
contingent and inchoate nature of a contribution claim).  
Therefore, Nambe knew that at some point during litigation it 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.92 
provides 
the 
following: 
"An 
action for contribution based on tort, if the right of 
contribution does not arise out of a prior judgment allocating 
the comparative negligence between the parties, shall be 
commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues or 
be barred."  Wis. Stat. § 893.92. 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
11 
 
would definitely be arguing the very issue on which summary 
judgment was granted. 
¶133 Finally, 
Precision 
Erecting 
involved 
a 
summary 
judgment motion against one defendant that was not challenged by 
a codefendant, even though the issue being decided clearly 
affected the codefendant.  In those circumstances, Nambe had 
every incentive to fight summary judgment.  Instead, it lay "in 
the 
weeds 
during 
the 
initial 
summary 
judgment 
motion."  
Precision Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 307.  By contrast, Dr. 
Galbraith did not have every incentive to fight the summary 
judgment motion because, if she did, she would invite a counter 
attack by Osco and thereby help plaintiff Rille make its case 
against both defendants.  The Precision Erecting decision did 
not 
appear 
to 
force 
an 
alteration 
of 
the 
adversarial 
relationships among parties.  It did not force one defendant to 
assume 
the 
plaintiff's 
burden 
of 
proof 
against 
another 
defendant. 
¶134 The failure to distinguish Precision Erecting from the 
facts of this case is not only unjust to Dr. Galbraith but also 
has 
serious 
implications 
for 
defendants 
with 
potential 
contribution claims in future multiparty lawsuits. 
¶135 First, as noted, the majority’s holding distorts the 
adversarial relationship among defendants and plaintiffs by 
forcing codefendants to fight each other instead of fighting the 
plaintiff. 
¶136 Second, in its attempt to prevent gamesmanship by 
defendants, the majority simply shifts the opportunity for 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
12 
 
gamesmanship from defendants to plaintiffs.  Courts have 
bemoaned defendants’ ability to "sit on their hands and wait to 
see what happens instead of opposing summary judgment on an 
issue crucial to their claims."  Precision Erecting, 224 
Wis. 2d at 309.  The majority writes that "if Dr. Galbraith is 
not 
precluded 
from 
litigating 
her 
contribution 
claim, 
gamesmanship by the parties and abuse of the system might be 
encouraged."  Majority op., ¶101.  The majority, however, 
ignores the fact that it is giving plaintiffs the opportunity to 
sit back and allow codefendants to bloody each other and make 
the case for them.  Plaintiffs can name as many defendants as 
they would like, and when any of the defendants file a summary 
judgment motion, the plaintiffs can sit back and let the 
codefendants fight to keep each other in the game. 
¶137 Third, applying issue preclusion to Dr. Galbraith’s 
contribution claim runs counter to the purpose of issue 
preclusion, which is to promote judicial efficiency and finality 
and protect against harassing litigation.  See Precision 
Erecting, 224 Wis. 2d at 304.  To apply issue preclusion in this 
context increases needless litigation by forcing defendants to 
keep other defendants in the litigation and to file cross-claims 
before they are found negligent. 
¶138 The dilemma posed by this holding that pits defendants 
against each other may be a result of the shifting jurisprudence 
concerning the doctrine of issue preclusion, which no longer 
requires an identity or mutuality of parties.  See Michelle T. 
v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 687-88, 495 N.W.2d 327 (1993); 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
13 
 
Amber J.F. v. Richard B., 205 Wis. 2d 510, 518, 557 N.W.2d 84 
(Ct. App. 1996).  Before courts shifted from formalistic 
requirements towards less rigid factors, the doctrine of issue 
preclusion envisioned that parties be formally adverse in order 
for issue preclusion to apply.  Consequently, the older 
contribution cases cited by the parties may not be applicable. 
¶139 For example, Rille cites Gies v. Nissen Corp., 57 
Wis. 2d 371, 204 N.W.2d 519 (1973), arguing that Gies is 
directly on point and involves the same set of facts.  However, 
Gies was decided when the doctrine of issue preclusion still 
required an identity of parties. 
¶140 Gies involved a summary judgment dismissal of a 
defendant in a negligence action.  The court determined that 
this dismissal barred the codefendants’ contribution claim 
against the dismissed defendant (Burghardt).  Id. at 377.  Gies, 
however, 
is 
distinguishable 
from 
this 
case 
because 
the 
codefendants were already in an adversarial relationship when 
the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Burghardt 
against the plaintiffs.  Hence, there was an identity of parties 
under the doctrine of issue preclusion. 
¶141 In Gies, the plaintiffs did not originally file a 
claim against Burghardt.  Rather, the original defendants 
impleaded Burghardt as a third-party defendant and then filed a 
cross-complaint against Burghardt.  Id. at 375, 375 n.1.  
Burghardt first filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue 
of its negligence against the plaintiffs, which the court 
granted.  Id. at 375-76.  When Burghardt later filed a motion 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
14 
 
for 
summary 
judgment 
against 
the 
cross-complaint 
of 
the 
codefendants on the same issue of negligence, the circuit court 
held that its summary judgment dismissal of Burghardt’s claim 
against the plaintiffs precluded relitigation of the issue of 
Burghardt’s negligence.  Id. at 376, 378.  In holding that the 
codefendants should have opposed Burghardt’s motion for summary 
judgment against the plaintiffs, the court emphasized the 
adversarial relationship between the codefendants and Burghardt: 
Although Burghardt filed no responsive pleading 
as to [the codefendants’] cross complaint, the issue 
of Burghardt’s liability to the plaintiffs was joined 
between them.  Burghardt and the [codefendants] were 
arrayed on opposite sides of the issue.  The issue was 
proffered by [the codefendants] and controverted by 
Burghardt.  Burghardt and [the codefendants] were 
adverse parties thereto. 
Id. at 383. 
¶142 The court in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. 
Goldblatt Brothers, Inc., 142 Wis. 2d 187, 417 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. 
App. 1987), recognized the importance of adversity of parties 
under the identity of parties requirement.  The court cited both 
Gies and Bakula v. Schwab, 167 Wis. 546, 168 N.W. 378 (1918), 
for the proposition that "the concept of identity of parties 
requires that the parties be formally adverse, that is, arrayed 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
15 
 
on opposite sides of the lawsuit."3  Goldblatt, 142 Wis. 2d at 
191. 
¶143 It is doubtful that the present case would have been 
decided the same as it is now if it had been brought at the same 
time as Gies.  In this case, Dr. Galbraith did not implead Osco 
as a third-party defendant and had not filed a cross-claim at 
the time of Osco’s summary judgment motion.  Dr. Galbraith and 
Osco were therefore not formally adverse parties. 
¶144 While the shift away from the identity of parties 
requirement may be justified in the context of other claims such 
as the one in Precision Erecting, we ought to consider whether 
this shift is justified in the context of contribution claims.  
Requiring an identity of parties based on a formal adverse 
relationship would allow for a more balanced solution for 
plaintiffs and defendants. 
¶145 If an identity of parties requirement were preserved 
in the present circumstances, it would allow a codefendant, like 
Dr. Galbraith, to have the choice in the underlying lawsuit to 
                                                 
3 While the court recognized that Bakula v. Schwab, 167 
Wis. 546, 168 N.W. 378 (1918), was modified eight years later in 
Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926), the court was 
"unpersuaded that the modification affected the standard for 
adversity . . . , especially since the supreme court in [Gies] 
closely tracked the language of the Bakula adversity test."  
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 142 
Wis. 2d 187, 191-92, 417 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1987).  The Bakula 
court defined the standard as the following: "What is meant by 
adverse parties scarcely needs definition.  Its significance is 
apparent from the expression itself.  They must be opposite 
parties to an issue between them.  The issue must be proffered 
by one and controverted by the other.  They must be arrayed on 
opposite sides of the issue."  Bakula, 167 Wis. at 555-56.   
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
16 
 
remain in a neutral or supportive relationship with her 
codefendant 
(Osco) 
or 
to 
establish 
a 
formal 
adversarial 
relationship by filing an immediate cross-complaint.  She would 
have to make that choice when the other defendant filed a 
summary judgment motion against the plaintiff.  She could choose 
to remain in a neutral or supportive relationship with the other 
defendant by appearing and objecting to the summary judgment 
motion, thus putting the other defendant on notice that she 
might pursue a cross-claim or contribution claim at a later 
time.  If she chose to remain in this neutral or supportive 
relationship, she would preserve a right to bring a future 
cross-claim or separate contribution claim but would waive the 
opportunity to include the issue of Osco’s negligence on a 
special verdict in the underlying lawsuit between Dr. Galbraith 
and Rille.  Cf. Haase v. R&P Indus. Chimney Repair Co., 140 
Wis. 2d 187, 409 N.W.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1987).4  In the case of a 
future cross-claim, the issue of Osco’s negligence could be 
litigated at a separate trial to avoid any prejudice to Rille.  
See Wis. Stat. § 802.07; Wis. Stat. § 805.05(2) (providing that 
"[t]he court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid 
                                                 
4 In Haase v. R&P Industrial Chimney Repair Co., 140 
Wis. 2d 187, 193, 409 N.W.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1987), the court held 
that where an alleged tortfeasor is adjudged to be free from 
negligence as a matter of law, the issue of the alleged 
tortfeasor’s negligence should not be included on a special 
verdict in the plaintiff’s action against another alleged joint 
tortfeasor.  The court found inapplicable Payne v. Bilco Co., 54 
Wis. 2d 424, 431, 195 N.W.2d 641 (1972), which held that it was 
necessary to include in the special verdict for comparison 
purposes all alleged tortfeasors, regardless of whether they 
were settling tortfeasors or never parties to the action. 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
17 
 
prejudice . . . may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim or 3rd-party claim").  This would make the 
subsequent cross-claim similar to a contribution claim that 
would 
be 
litigated 
in 
a 
subsequent 
action. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 893.92. 
¶146 If a defendant like Dr. Galbraith did not want to risk 
losing the opportunity to point the finger at a codefendant like 
Osco in the underlying lawsuit, she could file a cross-claim and 
adamantly oppose the codefendant's motion for summary judgment. 
 
¶147 This approach would help to preserve the traditional 
adversarial relationship among plaintiffs and defendants by 
minimizing the plaintiffs’ ability to pit codefendants against 
each other.  While this approach does not eliminate all 
potential for gamesmanship by the parties, it does maintain the 
burden on plaintiffs to prove their case before requiring 
codefendants to do it for them.  This approach also allows 
codefendants, who may have pre-existing relationships with each 
other, to remain in a supportive relationship as long as 
possible. 
¶148 Because I believe this approach is more equitable than 
the majority's view, I would allow Dr. Galbraith to pursue her 
contribution claim as a cross-claim in a separate trial or as a 
separate contribution claim in a subsequent action. 
¶149 Even if the majority opinion were deemed to set out 
clear and sound procedure for the future, I believe it is 
fundamentally unfair to apply this procedure retroactively.  Dr. 
Galbraith has had the rug pulled out from under her.  She would 
No.  2005AP1407.dtp 
 
18 
 
surely have asked for an extension of time to file an immediate 
cross-complaint against Osco if she had thought that summary 
judgment would preclude her contribution claim. 
¶150 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
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