Case Title: Taylor v. First Resolution Inv. Corp.

Citation: 2016-Ohio-3444

Docket Number: 2013-0118

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Taylor v. First Resolution Invest. Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-3444.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-3444 
TAYLOR, EXR., APPELLEE, v. FIRST RESOLUTION INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Taylor v. First Resolution Invest. Corp., Slip Opinion No. 
2016-Ohio-3444.] 
Consumer-debt collection—Fair Debt Collection Practices Act—Ohio Consumer 
Sales Practices Act—Statutes of limitations—Accrual of cause of action—
R.C. 2305.03(B), Ohio’s borrowing statute—Time-barred collection action 
as basis for asserting violations of consumer-protection statutes—R.C. 
1343.03(A)—Statutory interest—Debt collector’s claim for interest that is 
unavailable by law as basis for asserting violations of consumer-protection 
statutes—Debt buyers collecting on credit-card debt and their attorneys are 
subject to the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. 
(No. 2013-0118—Submitted November 20, 2013—Decided June 16, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 26042, 2012-Ohio-5653. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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_____________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} This case began with a default on credit-card debt by an Ohio 
consumer.  It reaches this court because that consumer alleged violations of the 
federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and 
the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”), R.C. 1345.01 et seq., by the 
entities that purchased her debt and were involved in suing her to collect on it.  
Today, we determine several issues relevant to the application of the FDCPA and 
the OCSPA to the collection of purchased credit-card debt in Ohio.  We hold that 
the underlying cause of action for default on the credit card in this case accrued in 
Delaware, the home state of the bank that issued the credit card and where the 
consumer’s payments were made, and that Delaware’s statute of limitations—
through operation of Ohio’s borrowing statute—determines whether the collection 
action was timely filed.  We further hold that the filing of a time-barred collection 
action may form the basis of a violation under both the FDCPA and the OCSPA.  
We also hold that that a consumer can bring actionable claims under the FDCPA 
and the OCSPA based upon debt collectors’ representations made to courts in legal 
filings, specifically on a debt collector’s claim for interest that is unavailable to the 
debt collector by law.  Finally, we hold that debt buyers collecting on credit-card 
debt and their attorneys are subject to the OCSPA. 
BACKGROUND 
Using Courts to Collect Purchased Debt 
{¶ 2} The questions presented to us arise from the now common 
phenomenon of debt sales, in which a creditor sells an individual’s debt to a private 
entity that then attempts to collect the debt.  The sale of debt can provide grease for 
the wheels of commerce.  “Debt buying can reduce the losses that creditors incur 
in providing credit, thereby allowing creditors to provide more credit at lower 
prices.”  Federal Trade Commission, The Structure and Practices of the Debt 
January Term, 2016 
 
3
Buying 
Industry 
(Jan. 
2013) 
i, 
available 
at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structure-and-practices-
debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf (accessed Mar. 14, 2016) (“Structure 
and Practices”).  Private debt collectors often employ the court process to collect 
the debt that they have purchased, and thus, courts have become vital cogs in the 
machinery of debt collection.  The threat of a lawsuit, an executed lawsuit, or a 
judgment can be a powerful, intimidating force against a consumer. 
A Problematic Process 
{¶ 3} First-party debts are debts owed by a consumer to an entity that 
initially extended credit to the consumer.  Note, Improving Relief from Abusive 
Debt Collection Practices, 127 Harv.L.Rev. 1447 (2014), fn. 1.  When a consumer 
falls in arrears on paying a debt, “first-party creditors frequently charge off the debt 
(that is, account for the debt as being unrecoverable) and sell the rights to the 
delinquent debt to debt buyers and collection agencies who specialize in the 
collection of delinquent debts.”  Id., citing Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB Annual Report 2013, at 8-9 (2013).  
Those debts are then “bundled” into portfolios, which are purchased by debt buyers 
through a bidding process, usually at a steep discount from the face value of the 
debts.  Improving Relief at 1448. 
{¶ 4} During the debt-sale process, documentation of information about the 
debt is often lost.  Debt buyers receive some information about the debt, but “[f]or 
most portfolios, buyers did not receive any documents at the time of purchase” and 
“[o]nly a small percentage of portfolios included documents, such as account 
statements or the terms and conditions of credit.”  Structure and Practices at iii.  
“Even when [account documents] are available and debt buyers request them, banks 
often require additional payments to supply them.  Such demands can prove 
prohibitively expensive or encourage debt collectors to gather detailed evidence 
only in sporadic cases.”  Horwitz, Banks Face Official Backlash Against Card Debt 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
Collection Practices, American Banker (Jan. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_12/banks-face-official-backlash-
against-card-debt-collection-practices-1055929-1.html?pg=2 (accessed Mar. 14, 
2016). 
{¶ 5} Debt collectors go to court with the information they have.  As an 
industry that buys debt for an average of four cents per dollar of face value, 
Structure and Practices at ii, consumer-debt collection, by its very nature, is a high-
volume enterprise.  It is dependent in large part on the acquiescence, ambivalence, 
or ignorance of consumers: 
 
 
The consumer debt collection industry is premised on a high-
volume business model.  Debt buyers holding portfolios of debts 
with a low ratio of book value to face value seek to collect on a 
sufficient number of debts to generate a profit, through direct 
collection efforts as well as lawsuits.  Empirical evidence shows that 
many debt buyers using a high volume of lawsuits as a component 
of their recovery strategy rely heavily on the assumption that 
consumers often fail to show up to contest the case; this assumption 
is largely valid.  There may be several reasons for such a failure to 
respond.  Some of these reasons may themselves be related to 
FDCPA violations, including defective notice, or may stem from a 
(mistaken) consumer belief that no response is required if the debt 
being sued upon is not actually hers.  Most simply, many consumers 
may not respond due to a misunderstanding of the legal procedures 
required to avoid default.  In addition, some debt collectors rely on 
the assumption of default to pursue what has been called a 
“scattershot” approach, whereby they file many lawsuits with the 
January Term, 2016 
 
5
hope of securing default judgments, but without the intent to 
actually litigate them should the opposing parties respond. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.)  Improving Relief, 127 Harv.L.Rev. at 1449. 
{¶ 6} A predictable result of debt buyers filing a high volume of lawsuits 
based on imperfect information is that lawsuits are regularly filed after the right to 
collect debts has expired or that seek a debt that is not owed; “each year, buyers 
sought to collect about one million debts that consumers asserted they did not owe.”  
Structure and Practices at iv. 
Statutory Protections 
The FDCPA 
{¶ 7} Federal and state statutes in play in this case provide protections 
against such debt-collection abuses.  “Congress passed the FDCPA to address ‘what 
it considered to be a widespread problem’ of consumer abuse at the hands of debt 
collectors.”  Wise v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 780 F.3d 710, 712-713 (6th 
Cir.2015), quoting Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516, 1521 (6th Cir.1992).  The 
intent of the FDCPA is to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices” that have 
contributed to personal bankruptcies, job loss, and invasions of individual privacy.  
15 U.S.C. 1692(a) and (e); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, 
L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573, 577, 130 S.Ct. 1605, 176 L.Ed.2d 519 (2010).  “In reaction 
to the size of the problem, [Congress] crafted ‘an extraordinarily broad’ remedial 
statute.”  Wise at 713, quoting Frey at 1521.  The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors 
from employing “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 
connection with the collection of any debt,” including misrepresenting “the 
character, amount, or legal status of any debt.”  15 U.S.C. 1692e(2)(A).  A debt 
collector may not employ any “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt 
to collect any debt,” 15 U.S.C. 1692f, and cannot collect “any amount (including 
any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted 
by law,” 15 U.S.C. 1692f(1). 
{¶ 8} When analyzing whether conduct giving rise to the claim fits within 
the broad scope of the FDCPA, “the conduct is viewed through the eyes of the ‘least 
sophisticated consumer.’ ”  Currier v. First Resolution Invest. Corp., 762 F.3d 529, 
533 (6th Cir.2014).  That standard, while protecting “the gullible and the shrewd 
alike,” also presumes “a basic level of reasonableness and understanding on the part 
of the debtor.”  Id. 
{¶ 9} A plaintiff must prove four essential elements to establish a prima 
facie case for a violation of the FDCPA: 
 
1. [T]he plaintiff is a natural person who is harmed by 
violations of the FDCPA, or is a “consumer” within the meaning of 
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692a(3), 1692(d) for purposes of a cause of action, 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1692c or 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e(11); 
2. [T]he “debt” arises out of a transaction entered primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes, 15 U.S.C.A.  
§ 1692a(5); 
3. [T]he defendant collecting the debt is a “debt collector” 
within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6); and 
4. [T]he defendant has violated, by act or omission, a 
provision of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C.A § 1692a–1692o; 15 U.S.C.A 
§ 1692a; 15 U.S.C.A § 1692k. 
 
Whittiker v. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., 605 F.Supp.2d 914, 938-939 (N.D.Ohio 
2009).  “The absence of any one of the four essential elements is fatal to a FDCPA 
lawsuit.”  Id. at 939. 
January Term, 2016 
 
7
{¶ 10} A plaintiff does not need to demonstrate that he or she suffered actual 
damages in order to prevail on an FDCPA claim; the FDCPA “places the risk of 
penalties on the debt collector that engages in activities which are not entirely 
lawful, rather than exposing consumers to unlawful debt-collector behavior without 
a possibility for relief.”  Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., L.L.C., 770 F.3d 
443, 449 (6th Cir.2014).  Further, courts have characterized the FDCPA as a strict-
liability statute, Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Lamar, 503 F.3d 504, 513 (6th 
Cir. 2007); to establish liability, a plaintiff does not have to prove knowledge or 
intent of the debt collector, Wise, 780 F.3d at 713. 
{¶ 11} Who is potentially liable under the FDCPA?  The FDCPA excludes 
first-party creditors engaged in debt collection, but the statute broadly reaches the 
actions of “debt collectors,” an inclusive statutory term that covers third-party debt 
collectors as well as attorneys who regularly engage in debt-collection activities, 
including litigation to collect debts owed by consumers.  See 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6); 
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 293-294, 297-299, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 
395 (1995).  In fact, in response “to the explosion of law firms conducting debt 
collection businesses,” Congress in 1986 specifically repealed a prior version of the 
FDCPA that had afforded attorneys an exemption from the statute’s reach.  
Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., 674 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir.2012); see 
McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, L.L.C., 637 F.3d 939, 951 (9th 
Cir.2011). 
The OCSPA 
{¶ 12} As we hold later in this opinion, the OCSPA also provides 
protections for consumer debtors against debt collectors and their attorneys.  The 
act states that “[n]o supplier shall commit an unfair or deceptive act or practice in 
connection with a consumer transaction.”  R.C. 1345.02(A).  R.C. 1345.03(A) 
provides that “[n]o supplier shall commit an unconscionable act or practice in 
connection with a consumer transaction.”  State and federal courts in Ohio have 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
held that the OCSPA applies to debt collectors and to litigation activities.  See, e.g., 
Hartman v. Asset Acceptance Corp., 467 F.Supp.2d 769, 780 (S.D.Ohio 2004), and 
cases cited therein.  We confirm the validity of those precedents today. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 13} Sandra J. Taylor Jarvis1 obtained a credit card, used it to make 
purchases over several years, but she was eventually unable to make scheduled 
minimum payments on the account, and the account was declared delinquent.  
Taylor Jarvis’s debt was purchased and resold and eventually became owned by 
appellant First Resolution Investment Corporation (“FRIC”), a subsidiary of a 
Canadian corporation, appellant First Resolution Management Corporation 
(“FRMC”).  FRIC had incomplete documentation of the terms of the credit-card 
agreement.  Despite the centrality of the credit-card agreement to the parties’ 
positions in this litigation, no party has been able to produce it, and it is not in the 
record before us. 
{¶ 14} The case before us proceeded like many others.  FRIC hired 
appellants, Cheek Law Offices, L.L.C., and Parri Hockenberry, Esq. (collectively 
“Cheek”), to file a lawsuit to collect on the debt.  Cheek filed a complaint on March 
9, 2010, and filed a motion for default judgment less than two months later.  Within 
a week of that motion, FRIC had a signed entry from the trial judge granting it a 
default judgment, awarding it everything that it had asked for.  Like clockwork, this 
case started out as a typical case in the world of debt buying. 
{¶ 15} But Taylor Jarvis was different from most defendants who are sued 
in this way.  She found out about the judgment against her and decided to fight it.  
Six weeks after the entry of the default judgment, she successfully moved to vacate 
it, and she later raised counterclaims against FRIC and Cheek.  By doing so, she 
has given this court the opportunity to address issues in her case that happen to be 
                                                 
1 Taylor Jarvis was the original appellee in the appeal to this court, but she died during its pendency.  
Brian Taylor, the executor of her estate, has been substituted for her as the appellee. 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
endemic to the whole debt-collection world and that impact Ohio courts.  Those 
issues include how to determine the proper statute of limitations in debt-collection 
cases and whether the filing of lawsuits containing unsubstantiated claims can 
constitute violations of the FDCPA and the OCSPA. 
The Credit-Card Account and the Collection Action Against Taylor Jarvis 
Offer and Acceptance 
{¶ 16} Taylor Jarvis was a resident and domiciliary of Summit County.  In 
2001, Taylor Jarvis was solicited with a credit-card application in Ohio, completed 
that application in Ohio, and mailed it from Ohio to the issuing bank in Delaware, 
where it was approved.  After her application was approved, Taylor Jarvis began 
using the credit card.  The issuing bank eventually became, through acquisitions, 
Chase Bank USA, N.A.  Although Taylor Jarvis’s credit-card account was with 
banks with three different names over the years, it was always the same account, 
and we collectively refer to the banks as “Chase.”  There is no evidence that she 
used the card for anything other than making purchases for personal, household, 
and family use. 
Account History 
{¶ 17} Taylor Jarvis made payments on the account through at least part of 
2004 and mailed those payments to an address in the state of Delaware; one invoice 
in the record with a payment-due date of February 3, 2004, requested that payment 
be made to an address in Illinois, but Taylor Jarvis stated in an affidavit that she 
mailed all payments to Delaware, and there is no evidence in the record that 
contradicts that statement.  She last used the card for a purchase on May 5, 2004.  
She then fell into arrears. 
{¶ 18} Taylor Jarvis did not make the scheduled minimum payment on the 
account that was due on January 1, 2005, and made no scheduled minimum monthly 
payments thereafter.  Her account was declared delinquent by Chase in February 
2005.  Subsequent credit-card billing statements during 2005 informed Taylor 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Jarvis that her account was past due and warned her that she could lose charging 
privileges on the account unless payment was made.  Chase’s billing statement to 
Taylor Jarvis for the payment due on May 2, 2005, which covered the billing period 
from March 8 through April 7, stated, “Your charge privileges are now revoked.”  
By January 31, 2006, Chase had “written off” Taylor Jarvis’s account. 
{¶ 19} After suspending her charging privileges, Chase continued to send 
Taylor Jarvis bills, including one requesting payment by February 1, 2006.  That 
bill showed a past-due amount of $1,481, a minimum payment due of $1,707, and 
a balance of $9,065.37.  That bill also showed that Taylor Jarvis was making 
payments on the account, albeit in amounts less than the minimum due.  Taylor 
Jarvis made her last payment to Chase on the account, for $50, on June 28, 2006.  
She had made a total of $1,150 in payments after the suspension of her charging 
privileges. 
{¶ 20} In February 2008, Chase sold its rights to Taylor Jarvis’s account to 
Unifund Portfolio A, L.L.C. (“Unifund”).  In June 2008, Unifund sold those rights 
to FRIC. 
{¶ 21} On September 16, 2009, FRIC, through FRMC, sent a “final notice” 
to Taylor Jarvis.  That notice advised Taylor Jarvis that her account had been 
forwarded to a “pre-litigation department” and that unless the account was resolved 
within 21 days, FRIC would forward the claim to a collection attorney. 
Litigation 
{¶ 22} On November 3, 2009, Cheek Law Offices sent Taylor Jarvis a letter 
informing her that FRIC had advised Cheek that Taylor Jarvis owed $15,818.50 on 
the account.  Four months later, on March 9, 2010, Cheek filed suit against Taylor 
Jarvis in Summit County Common Pleas Court seeking $8,765.37 on the account, 
accrued interest of $7,738.99, and future interest of 24 percent.  FRIC attached to 
its complaint copies of the bills of sale of the rights to the account from Chase to 
Unifund and from Unifund to FRIC, as well as a copy of one of the monthly billing 
January Term, 2016 
 
11 
statements that Chase had sent to Taylor Jarvis in 2006.  The attached statement 
showed that Taylor Jarvis was being charged interest on the unpaid balance on the 
account at the rate of 24.99 percent.  FRIC did not attach to the complaint a copy 
of the credit-card agreement between Taylor Jarvis and Chase. 
{¶ 23} Cheek filed a motion for default judgment on May 5, 2010, with an 
accompanying affidavit from a FRIC employee, claiming that Taylor Jarvis owed 
$8,765.37, accrued interest in the amount of $8,067.51, and continuing further 
interest at the rate of 24 percent.  By May 12, 2010, FRIC had a signed entry from 
the trial judge granting it a default judgment, awarding it everything that it had 
asked for. 
Taylor Jarvis’s Counterclaims 
{¶ 24} On June 28, 2010, Taylor Jarvis filed a motion to vacate the 
judgment, and on July 26, 2010, the court granted the motion.  On August 6, 2010, 
Taylor Jarvis answered the original complaint, raising several affirmative defenses, 
including a statute-of-limitations defense, and filed a number of class-action 
counterclaims; her amended version of the counterclaims, filed on August 26, 2010, 
included claims against FRIC, FRMC, and Cheek.  Those claims were based on 
alleged violations of the FDCPA and the OCSPA, along with a common-law claim 
for abuse of process. 
{¶ 25} Taylor Jarvis’s statutory claims flow from two theories—first, that 
FRIC’s claim against Taylor Jarvis was time-barred by the statute of limitations 
and second, that FRIC sought interest on Taylor Jarvis’s debt that was unavailable 
to FRIC by law.  Taylor Jarvis alleged that threatening to file a time-barred claim 
and actually filing a time-barred claim against her constituted misleading and 
deceptive collection practices under 15 U.S.C. 1692e and the OCSPA and unfair 
and unconscionable collection practices under 15 U.S.C. 1692f and the OCSPA.  
Central to Taylor Jarvis’s statute-of-limitations-based claims is the position that 
FRIC’s claims against her accrued in Delaware and are thus governed by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Delaware’s statute of limitations through operation of Ohio’s borrowing statute, 
R.C. 2305.03(B).  According to Taylor Jarvis, because Delaware law affords only 
a three-year statute of limitations for actions to collect on debts, Del.Code Ann., 
Title 10, 8106(a), FRIC and Cheek knowingly brought an action that was barred by 
the statute of limitations, thereby violating state consumer-protection and federal 
fair-collection-practice laws. 
{¶ 26} Taylor Jarvis also asserts that FRIC and Cheek improperly sought 
24 percent interest on her debt in the complaint against her, purportedly under the 
terms of the cardholder agreement.  Taylor Jarvis asserted that since FRIC could 
produce no written contract that set forth a rate of interest higher than the statutory 
rate, it was limited to the statutory interest rate—4 percent at the time of the filing 
of the complaint—pursuant to R.C. 1343.03.  She further asserted that the actions 
of FRIC and Cheek in seeking in the complaint more interest than was recoverable 
constituted violations of U.S.C. 1692e and 1692f as well as the OCSPA. 
The Trial Court’s Rulings 
{¶ 27} After FRIC dismissed without prejudice its complaint against Taylor 
Jarvis pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A), the trial court realigned the parties so that Taylor 
Jarvis was the plaintiff.  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court 
then entered judgment for Cheek and FRIC on Taylor Jarvis’s claims. 
{¶ 28} As the trial court noted, Taylor Jarvis’s case turned, “in large part, 
on whether Ohio’s borrowing statute applies to the facts of this case.”  It stated: 
 
If the Court determines that Ohio’s borrowing statute applies to this 
case, the next question is whether [FRIC’s] claims accrued in Ohio 
or Delaware.  If the Court determines that the claims accrued in 
Delaware, then they may be barred by Delaware’s three-year statute 
of limitations. 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 29} The trial court held that the borrowing statute did not apply, that 
Ohio law governed the determination of the statute of limitations, that Ohio law 
imposed either a 6- or 15-year statute of limitations, and that under either limitation 
period FRIC’s suit against Taylor Jarvis was commenced timely because it was 
brought within six years of Taylor Jarvis’s breach. 
{¶ 30} The court also ruled that Taylor Jarvis failed to show that FRIC and 
Cheek violated the FDCPA or the OCSPA by requesting in a complaint 
postjudgment interest in excess of the statutory rate.  The court reasoned that a 
prayer for relief in a complaint is not a demand to the debtor but is rather a request 
for consideration to a court.  Finally, the trial court also granted summary judgment 
to FRIC and Cheek on Taylor Jarvis’s common-law abuse-of-process claim. 
The Court of Appeals Reverses and Remands 
{¶ 31} On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
Delaware’s statute of limitations applied to FRIC’s claims.  2012-Ohio-5653, 983 
N.E.2d 380, ¶ 29, 35-36 (9th Dist.).  The appellate court further held that FRIC’s 
suit to collect on the debt was time-barred and remanded the matter to the trial court 
for consideration of Taylor Jarvis’s claims.  Id. at ¶ 36, 42. 
{¶ 32} The court also reversed the trial court’s ruling on Taylor Jarvis’s 
claims based upon the interest rate sought by FRIC.  The court held that FRIC in 
its complaint was “enunciating its absolute entitlement to interest at a rate of 24 
percent and * * * was demanding such from Ms. Jarvis, not from the trial court,” 
and that Taylor Jarvis had established prima facie claims against FRIC and Cheek 
under the FDCPA and the OCSPA.  Id. at ¶ 41.  The court remanded the issue 
regarding the rate of interest sought to the trial court to consider whether the bona 
fide error defense of 15 U.S.C. 1692k(c) applied: 
 
Because the trial court found that a prayer in a complaint for interest 
was not a demand to the debtor, it did not consider whether genuine 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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issues of material fact existed regarding the existence of a bona fide 
error defense.  This Court declines to address that issue in the first 
instance. 
 
Id. at ¶ 42.  Under 15 U.S.C. 1692k(c), a debt collector can escape liability by 
showing “by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and 
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures 
reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 
{¶ 33} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a discretionary 
appeal.  135 Ohio St.3d 1412, 2013-Ohio-1622, 986 N.E.2d 29. 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
The Statute of Limitations 
{¶ 34} Statutes of limitations are designed to protect defendants from stale 
claims, but for many consumers, they do not.  In most states, the expiration of the 
statute of limitations does not automatically extinguish a debt and is instead 
 
an affirmative defense that consumers themselves must raise and 
prove before courts will dismiss actions to collect on their debts.  As 
the [Federal Trade] Commission has noted, because 90% or more of 
consumers sued in these actions do not appear in court to defend, 
filing these actions creates a risk that consumers will be subject to a 
default judgment on a time-barred debt. 
 
Structure and Practices at 45. 
{¶ 35} The filing of a time-barred lawsuit by a debt collector has been held 
to constitute a violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692e and 1692f for falsely representing the 
legal status of a debt and employing an unfair means to attempt to collect a debt.  
Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir.2013); Dudek v. 
January Term, 2016 
 
15 
Thomas & Thomas Attorneys & Counselors at Law, L.L.C., 702 F.Supp.2d 826, 
833 (N.D.Ohio 2010).  The court in Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, L.L.C., 757 F.3d 636, 
639 (7th Cir.2014) (en banc) described the too-common scenario: “[T]he debt 
collector hopes that the debtor will be unaware that he has a complete defense to 
the suit and so will default, which will enable the debt collector to garnish the 
debtor’s wages.” 
{¶ 36} Thus, determining the correct statute of limitations on the underlying 
collection action is essential to this case and others like it.  The appellate court 
below held that this court’s decision in Gries Sports Ents., Inc. v. Modell, 15 Ohio 
St.3d 284, 473 N.E.2d 807 (1984), and 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of 
Laws, Section 188 (1971), apply to the conflict-of-laws question in this case.  See 
2012-Ohio-5653, 983 N.E.2d 380, at ¶ 24.  That conclusion was correct insofar as 
this case may implicate questions as to the applicable substantive law regarding the 
credit-card agreement.  But the salient question is whether the statute of limitations, 
which is governed by procedural law, had run.  “[L]imitation provisions are 
remedial in nature, and are therefore controlled by the law of the forum.”  Howard 
v. Allen, 30 Ohio St.2d 130, 133, 283 N.E.2d 167 (1972).  As this court stated in 
Kerper v. Wood, 48 Ohio St. 613, 622, 29 N.E. 501 (1891): “Statutes of limitations 
relate to the remedy, and are, and must be, governed by the law of the forum; for it 
is conceded that a court which has power to say when its doors shall be opened has 
also power to say when they shall be closed.” 
{¶ 37} Since Ohio is the forum state of this case, Ohio law determines the 
statute of limitations.  But Ohio has a borrowing statute, which is a legislative 
exception to the general rule that a forum state always applies its own statute-of-
limitations law.  Combs v. Internatl. Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir.2004).  In 
essence, a borrowing statute directs a forum court to “borrow” the limitation period 
of another state if the cause of action accrued in that foreign state and that state’s 
limitation period is shorter than the forum state’s limitation period.  Dudek at 835, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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citing Combs at 578, and CMACO Automotive Sys., Inc. v. Wanxiang Am. Corp., 
589 F.3d 235, 244 (6th Cir.2009).  Pursuant to its borrowing statute, R.C. 
2305.03(B), Ohio applies the statute of limitations of the state where the cause of 
action accrued in instances when that state’s statute of limitations is shorter.  R.C. 
2305.03(B) provides: 
 
No civil action that is based upon a cause of action that 
accrued in any other state, territory, district, or foreign jurisdiction 
may be commenced and maintained in this state if the period of 
limitation that applies to that action under the laws of that other state, 
territory, district, or foreign jurisdiction has expired or the period of 
limitation that applies to that action under the laws of this state has 
expired. 
 
{¶ 38} As the trial court held, the key issue in determining the applicable 
statute of limitations in this case is the effect of R.C. 2305.03(B).  That statute 
determines whether the statute of limitations of Ohio—Taylor Jarvis’s home—or 
Delaware—where Chase is headquartered and where Taylor Jarvis stated in her 
affidavit that she mailed her signed credit-card agreement and sent all of her 
payments—is applicable in this case. 
{¶ 39} The borrowing statute prevents a litigant from gaining the benefit of 
an Ohio statute of limitations when the state where the cause accrued has a shorter 
statute of limitations.  As the United State Supreme Court wrote about Ohio’s 
earlier, similar version of the borrowing statute that was later repealed, “The 
purpose of the state’s borrowing statute as those of other states, was apparently to 
require its courts to bar suits against an Ohio resident if the right to sue him had 
already expired in another state where the combination of circumstances giving rise 
January Term, 2016 
 
17 
to the right to sue had taken place.”  (Footnotes omitted.)  Cope v. Anderson, 331 
U.S. 461, 466, 67 S.Ct. 1340, 91 L.Ed. 1602 (1947). 
{¶ 40} There is no dispute that as applicable to this case, Ohio law provided 
that the statute of limitations for suit on a written contract was 15 years.  Former 
R.C. 2305.06.  The statute of limitations for suit on a contract not reduced to writing 
is six years.  R.C. 2305.07.  In this case, the parties failed to enter the written credit-
card agreement into evidence.  Accordingly, absent the borrowing statute, the 
applicable limitation period for FRIC’s suit would be supplied by R.C. 2305.07, 
which limits the viability of any action to six years after the cause of action accrued. 
{¶ 41} But if the borrowing statute is applicable to this case, Delaware’s 
shorter, three-year statute of limitations on contract actions applied to the collection 
action, rather than Ohio’s six-year statute of limitations. 
The Jurisdiction of Accrual 
{¶ 42} Where the cause of action accrued is the key element of the 
borrowing statute.  Thus, we must determine where the underlying collection claims 
accrued in this case.  The most relevant precedent favors the conclusion that the 
cause of action accrued in Delaware, which is where the debt was to be paid and 
where Chase suffered its loss. 
{¶ 43} In Meekison v. Groschner, 153 Ohio St. 301, 306-307, 91 N.E.2d 
680 (1950), this court addressed the question of where a cause of action accrued on 
a promissory note that had been executed in Michigan, but that required the 
promisor to pay off the note in Napoleon, Ohio.  This court considered whether 
Ohio’s borrowing statute in place at that time (which was very similar to current 
R.C. 2305.03(B)) required that the cause of action on the unpaid note should be 
subject to Michigan’s statute of limitations or Ohio’s.  This court concluded that 
the claim arose not where the contract was executed—Michigan—but where the 
contract was made payable—Ohio: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
Where was that default?  The Heaths were obligated to pay 
the note at Napoleon, Ohio.  If it was not paid at Napoleon on its due 
date, a default would occur at Napoleon and a cause of action would 
arise for the first time because of the default at Napoleon.  It seems 
to us unassailable that the cause of action arose where the default 
occurred, and therefore the Ohio statute * * * governs the instant 
case and an action on the note must be brought within 15 years after 
the cause thereof accrued. 
 
Id at 307.  The Heaths were residing in Michigan when they made the decision to 
not pay the note.  Thus, where they were when they made the decision to not pay 
the note played no role in this court’s determination of where the cause of action 
accrued. 
{¶ 44} In a case directly on point, involving a suit based on a New York 
resident’s default on a credit card issued by a Delaware bank, New York’s highest 
court held that New York’s borrowing statute required an application of Delaware’s 
statute of limitations, because the cause of action for nonpayment accrued in 
Delaware.  The court held that “[i]f the claimed injury is an economic one, the cause 
of action typically accrues ‘where the plaintiff resides and sustains the economic 
impact of the loss.’ ”  Portfolio Recovery Assocs., L.L.C. v. King, 14 N.Y.3d 410, 
416, 901 N.Y.S.2d 575, 927 N.E.2d 1059 (2010), quoting Global Fin. Corp. v 
Triarc Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 525, 529, 693 N.Y.S.2d 479, 715 N.E.2d 482 (1999).  
Since the bank was located in Delaware, that state’s statute of limitations applied. 
{¶ 45} In Hamid v. Stock & Grimes, L.L.P., E.D.Pa. No. 11-2349, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 96245 (Aug. 26, 2011), the court determined that Pennsylvania’s 
borrowing statute required an application of Delaware’s statute of limitations 
because the cause of action for nonpayment on a credit card accrued in Delaware, 
where the bank failed to receive payment: 
January Term, 2016 
 
19 
 
Here, the damage to Discover Bank occurred when it did not 
receive the payment due on August 12, 2006 at its post office box in 
Dover, Delaware.  While Hamid’s failure to mail her payment may 
have set events in motion, it was in Delaware where the final 
significant event took place, that is, where Discover Bank sustained 
injury from non-payment of Hamid’s debt.  It was not until Discover 
Bank failed to receive Hamid’s check on August 12, 2006 that it was 
able to sue her for breach of contract.  We conclude that the place 
where the claim in the underlying action accrued was in Delaware. 
 
Id. at *5-6. 
{¶ 46} In another case directly on point, Conway v. Portfolio Recovery 
Assocs., L.L.C., 13 F.Supp.3d 711 (E.D.Ky.2014), the court, in applying 
Kentucky’s borrowing statute, held that the credit card issuer’s breach-of-contract 
claim against a Kentucky-resident cardholder accrued in Virginia, the location 
where the bank, Capital One, should have received payment.  The court sought to 
identify where “ ‘the injurious consequences of the alleged wrongful conduct 
occurred.’ ”  Id. at 718, quoting Abel v. Austin, 411 S.W.3d 728, 737 (Ky.2013). 
{¶ 47} The court pointed out the impracticality of using the location where 
the cardholder made the decision to not make his payment as the place of the accrual 
of the action: 
 
Presumably, Capital One has similar agreements with multiple 
customers in multiple locations, but receives payments from those 
customers at one central location.  It would be impossible for Capital 
One to know where any of those customers happen to be when they 
decide not to pay.  Rather, as a practical matter, the only way Capital 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
One can determine a customer is in default is when payment is not 
received at the central location in Virginia by a certain date. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 720-721.  The court concluded that “[b]ecause the due date 
passing without payment being received was the final event that allowed Capital 
One’s cause of action to accrue, and was also the event that actually resulted in 
damages to Capital One, the breach must have occurred when and where payment 
was not received, which in this case was Virginia.”  Id. at 719. 
{¶ 48} We follow our own precedent and that of New York’s highest court 
and the cited federal courts and hold that the cause of action against Taylor Jarvis 
for her failure to pay the debt accrued in the jurisdiction where the debt was to be 
paid, Delaware. 
The Time of Accrual 
{¶ 49} The time of accrual of the cause of action on Taylor Jarvis’s debt is 
an important consideration in this case not only to determine from what point the 
statute of limitations begins to run:  FRIC and Cheek argue that the cause of action 
on the debt accrued before the effective date of R.C. 2305.03(B), so that even if 
Chase’s cause of action accrued in Delaware, Ohio’s borrowing statute is 
inapplicable.  The effective date of R.C. 2305.03(B) was April 7, 2005.  
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7915, 7930-7931, 8037.  The trial 
court apparently accepted the arguments of FRIC and Cheek that Chase’s claims 
accrued when Taylor Jarvis failed to make the minimum monthly payment in 
January 2005, and it found that since Chase’s claims accrued prior to the effective 
date of the statute, the borrowing statute could not apply.  We agree that the cause 
of action accrued when Taylor Jarvis failed to make her minimum payment in 
January 2005, but we determine that R.C. 2305.03(B) nonetheless applies to the 
cause of action against her. 
January Term, 2016 
 
21 
{¶ 50} Although there is no credit-card agreement in evidence in this case, 
Taylor Jarvis has not disputed that a contract existed between her and Chase.  
“Credit card agreements are contracts whereby the issuance and use of a credit card 
creates a legally binding agreement.”  Bank One, Columbus, N.A. v. Palmer, 63 
Ohio App.3d 491, 493, 579 N.E.2d 284 (10th Dist.1989).  There is no dispute that 
a precursor of Chase issued a credit card to Taylor Jarvis and that she used the card 
to make purchases.  A cause of action for breach of a credit-card agreement based 
on nonpayment accrues when the obligation to pay under the agreement becomes 
due and owing and the cardholder does not make an agreed-to monthly payment.  
Dudek, 702 F.Supp.2d at 839; Citibank, N.A. v. Hyslop, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 
12AP-885, 2014-Ohio-844, ¶ 16-17; Discover Bank v. Heinz, 10th Dist. Franklin 
No. 08AP-1001, 2009-Ohio-2850, ¶ 17; Discover Bank v. Poling, 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 04AP-1117, 2005-Ohio-1543, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 51} Taylor Jarvis also has not disputed that under her contract she was 
bound to make a minimum monthly payment.  Nor has she disputed that she failed 
to make the minimum payment due on January 1, 2005, and failed to make a 
minimum payment thereafter.  We have already held that the cause of action 
accrued in Delaware, where Chase Bank did not receive payment from Taylor 
Jarvis.  The location of accrual informs the time of the accrual: 
 
[T]he elements of time and place of accrual are inextricably 
intertwined: “The time when a cause of action arises and the place 
where it arises are necessarily connected, since the same act is the 
critical event in each instance.  The final act which transforms the 
liability into a cause of action necessarily has both aspects of time 
and place.” 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
CMACO Automotive Sys., 589 F.3d at 243, fn. 7, quoting Helmers v. Anderson, 156 
F.2d 47, 51 (6th Cir.1946). 
{¶ 52} We determine that the cause of action accrued when Taylor Jarvis 
failed to make the minimum payment due in January 2005. 
{¶ 53} But this finding does not make Ohio’s borrowing statute inapplicable 
in this case.  It is true that Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution prohibits 
the General Assembly from enacting retroactive laws.  But there is no indication 
that the General Assembly intended R.C. 2305.03(B) to be retroactive—it is written 
to apply prospectively to all cases commenced after its effective date.  The statute 
reads: 
 
No civil action that is based upon a cause of action that 
accrued in any other state * * * may be commenced and maintained 
in this state if the period of limitation that applies to that action under 
the laws of that other state * * * has expired or the period of 
limitation that applies to that action under the laws of this state has 
expired. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 54} R.C. 2305.03(B) applies to civil actions “commenced and 
maintained” in Ohio after the effective date of the statute.  “Statutes of limitations 
are remedial in nature.”  Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. Airline Union’s Mtge. Co., 128 
Ohio St.3d 529, 2011-Ohio-1961, 947 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 7.  And this court has held that 
“ ‘[l]aws of a remedial nature providing rules of practice, courses of procedure, or 
methods of review are applicable to any proceedings conducted after the adoption 
of such laws.’ ”  Estate of Johnson v. Randall Smith, Inc., 135 Ohio St.3d 440, 
2013-Ohio-1507, 989 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 20, quoting Kilbreath v. Rudy, 16 Ohio St.2d 
January Term, 2016 
 
23 
70, 242 N.E.2d 658 (1968), paragraph two of the syllabus.  Thus, as a remedial 
statute, the borrowing statute applies to proceedings conducted after its adoption. 
{¶ 55} But what of the concern that R.C. 2305.03(B) potentially applies to 
causes of action that accrued but were not commenced before the effective date of 
the statute?  This court has recognized that a statute that applies prospectively may, 
through its operation, violate the Retroactivity Clause if it destroys vested rights: 
 
We have also stated that the “retroactivity clause nullifies those new 
laws that ‘reach back and create new burdens, new duties, new 
obligations, or new liabilities not existing at the time [the statute 
becomes effective].’  Miller v. Hixson (1901), 64 Ohio St. 39, 51, 59 
N.E. 749, 752.”  Bielat [v. Bielat], 87 Ohio St.3d [350,] 352-353, 
721 N.E.2d 28 [2000].  In Van Fossen [v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 
36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489 (1988)], this court stated that the 
constitutional limitation against retroactive laws “ ‘include[s] a 
prohibition against laws which commenced on the date of enactment 
and which operated in futuro, but which, in doing so, divested rights, 
particularly property rights, which had been vested anterior to the 
time of enactment of the laws.’ ”  [Id. at 105], quoting Smead, The 
Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of 
Jurisprudence (1936), 20 Minn.L.Rev. 775, 781-782. 
 
Tobacco Use Prevention & Control Found. Bd. of Trustees v. Boyce, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 511, 2010-Ohio-6207, 941 N.E.2d 745, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 56} The shortening of a statute of limitations, however, does not 
necessarily extinguish a vested right.  This court has held that the shortening of a 
statute of limitations is constitutionally permissible when it does not destroy an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
existing cause of action.  The continued vitality of the cause of action after the 
amendment of the statute is the crucial factor in the inquiry.  This court has 
 
delineated between the operation of an amended statute of 
limitations which totally obliterates an existing substantive right and 
one which merely shortens the period of time in which the remedy 
can be realized.  The latter application of an amended statute is not 
unlawful as long as a prospective claimant or litigant * * * is still 
afforded “ ‘a reasonable time [within] which to enforce’ his right.”  
[Gregory v.] Flowers [, 32 Ohio St.2d 48,] 54 [,290 N.E.2d 181 
(1972), quoting Smith v. New York Cent. RR. Co., 122 Ohio St. 45, 
49, 170 N.E. 637 (1930)]. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Cook v. Matvejs, 56 Ohio St.2d 234, 237, 383 N.E.2d 601 (1978). 
{¶ 57} In sum, “ ‘[a] period of limitations already running may also be 
shortened by the legislature’ as long as ‘a period sufficiently long to allow a 
reasonable time to begin suit’ is allowed.”  State ex rel. Nickoli v. Erie MetroParks, 
124 Ohio St.3d 449, 2010-Ohio-606, 923 N.E.2d 588, ¶ 29, quoting 1A Sackman, 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 4.102[3], at 4-74 (3d Ed.2006). 
{¶ 58} Here, the date of the accrual of the cause of action was only a little 
over three months before the effective date of the borrowing statute.  Granted, the 
application of the borrowing statute to FRIC’s claims in this case reduces the 
applicable statute of limitations from six years to three.  But even with that 
shortening, there existed a reasonably long period of time for FRIC to file suit.  
Thus, an application of R.C. 2305.03(B) in this case is not unconstitutionally 
retroactive. 
{¶ 59} With Delaware’s statute of limitations controlling this case, FRIC’s 
complaint was filed well outside the applicable statute of limitations.  We affirm 
January Term, 2016 
 
25 
the judgment of the court of appeals that FRIC and Cheek are potentially liable 
under the FDCPA and the OCSPA for threatening to file suit and for filing suit on 
a time-barred debt, and we remand the case to the trial court for further 
determinations, including a determination of the effect of our holding on this issue 
on Taylor Jarvis’s claim for abuse of process. 
The Interest Claim 
{¶ 60} Taylor Jarvis asserted claims against FRIC and Cheek pursuant to 
the FDCPA and the OCSPA based on the claim in FRIC’s complaint that it was 
entitled to postjudgment interest in excess of the applicable statutory rate.  The trial 
court granted summary judgment to FRIC and Cheek on the issue, relying primarily 
on the decision in Argentieri v. Fisher Landscapes, Inc., 15 F.Supp.2d 55 
(D.Mass.1998), for the proposition that setting forth a claim in a prayer for relief 
filed with a court is distinguishable from other conduct in which a debt collector 
may engage. 
{¶ 61} In Argentieri, the plaintiff in a federal-court action alleged an 
FDCPA violation based upon a request for attorney’s fees that had been made in a 
state-court complaint in a breach-of-contract action; the plaintiff asserted that the 
FDCPA was violated because there was no statutory or contractual basis for such 
an award.  Id. at 58-59.  According to Argentieri, a prayer for relief is just a request 
to the court: 
 
A prayer for relief in a complaint, even where it specifies the 
quantity of attorney’s fees, is just that: a request to a third party—
the court—for consideration, not a demand to the debtor himself.  A 
request for attorney’s fees ultimately rests upon the discretion of the 
court and a determination of applicability at a later stage of the 
litigation.  The whole purpose of regulating debt collection was to 
“supervise” a range of unsupervised contacts, such as demand letters 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
and late-night telephone calls.  In contrast, a statement in a pleading 
is supervised by the court and monitored by counsel.  The two 
situations are drastically different. 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  Argentieri at 61-62. 
{¶ 62} We disagree with that statement.  A prayer for 24 percent interest is 
an intimidating statement to a debtor.  According to Argentieri, such a prayer is 
“supervised by the court and monitored by counsel.”  But in a case that is filed with 
the anticipation of obtaining a default judgment, how much “supervision” of 
statements in a pleading is actually conducted?  In this case, as in many others, 
there was none.  “Unsupervised contacts” by debt collectors are annoyances; 
demands to a court, on the other hand, have the force of the legal system behind 
them.  Debt collectors borrow the legitimacy of the justice system to back up their 
claims.  “[A] civil filing serves as a credible threat to inflict harm on the defendant” 
by damaging the defendant’s credit rating and thus “may induce the defendant to 
pay.”  Hynes, Broke But Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 
60 Fla.L.Rev. 1, 20 (2008).  As one court put it, 
 
an unsophisticated consumer reading the State Court Complaint 
could be left with the false impression that [the law firm that filed 
the complaint] was legally entitled to recover an award of attorneys’ 
fees in addition to the amount of the debt allegedly owed.  This false 
impression, in turn, could subtly coerce the consumer to pay the debt 
out of the fear of incurring even greater liability. 
 
Samms v. Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara & Wolf, 
L.L.P., 112 F.Supp.3d 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y.2015). 
January Term, 2016 
 
27 
{¶ 63} Federal courts have held that a court filing is not a safe harbor for 
debt collectors under the FDCPA.  In Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 
L.Ed.2d 395, the United States Supreme Court held that the FDCPA “applies to the 
litigating activities of lawyers.”  Relying on that holding, federal “circuit courts 
have widely recognized that litigation-related conduct, including the filing of 
formal complaints, can give rise to claims under the Act.”  Lipscomb v. The Raddatz 
Law Firm, P.L.L.C., 109 F.Supp.3d 251, 260 (D.D.C.2015). 
{¶ 64} In Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 177 (3d Cir.2015), 
the court held that “a communication cannot be uniquely exempted from the 
FDCPA because it is a formal pleading or, in particular, a complaint.”  In that case, 
the consumer, Kaymark, had defaulted on a mortgage held by Bank of America 
(“BOA”).  A law firm representing BOA initiated foreclosure proceedings against 
the consumer in state court.  The foreclosure complaint included an itemized list of 
total debt, which included $1,650 in attorney’s fees that had not yet been incurred 
at the time of the filing and other allegedly improper fees.  Id. at 173.  Kaymark’s 
subsequent action against BOA and the law firm included a claim that by attempting 
to collect fees for legal services not yet performed in the mortgage foreclosure, the 
law firm had violated the FDCPA.  Id at 174.  The court held that “the Foreclosure 
Complaint conceivably misrepresented the amount of the debt owed, forming a 
basis for violations of [15 U.S.C.] 1692e(2)(A) and (10)” and that Kaymark had 
also “sufficiently alleged that [the law firm’s] attempt to collect those 
misrepresented fees was not ‘expressly authorized’ by the mortgage contract or 
permitted by law,” forming the basis for a violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692f(1).  
Kaymark at 175, quoting 15 U.S.C. 1692f(1).  In response to the law firm’s 
argument that pleadings cannot be the basis of FDCPA claims, the court concluded 
that “the statutory text, as well as the case law interpreting that text, renders this 
argument meritless.”  Id. at 176. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
{¶ 65} In Miljkovic v. Shafritz & Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291 (11th 
Cir.2015), the court stated that “because debts are often collected through the 
judicial process, * * * we think it would ‘compel absurd results’ indeed if abusive, 
misleading, or unconscionable documents submitted to a court (and served on the 
consumer or his counsel) in an attempt to collect on any debt were excluded from 
the [FDCPA]’s proscriptions.”  Id. at 1303, fn. 8, quoting Jerman, 559 U.S. at 600, 
130 S.Ct. 1605, 176 L. Ed. 2d 519.  The court in Miljkovic ultimately determined 
that the court filing at issue—a reply to the consumer’s claim of an exemption from 
a garnishment action—did not rise to the level of an FDCPA violation.  Id. at 1306.  
But as to the broader question, the court stated, 
 
The statutory text is entirely clear: the FDCPA applies to lawyers 
and law firms who regularly engage in debt-collection activity, even 
when that activity involves litigation, and categorically prohibits 
abusive conduct in the name of debt collection, even when the 
audience for such conduct is someone other than the consumer. 
 
Id. at 1297. 
{¶ 66} A recent decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals involved a 
scenario akin to the present case—the consumer’s FDCPA cause of action was 
based on a debt collector’s improper claim for interest on a credit-card debt.  In 
Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 770 F.3d at 445, the court held that a debt 
collector’s improper claim for statutory interest made in a complaint filed in a state 
trial court could form the basis for a claim by the consumer under the FDCPA.  In 
Stratton, the credit-card user, Stratton, had stopped making payments on her credit 
card; her contract with GE Money Bank (“GE”) established an interest rate of 21.99 
percent.  Id. at 446.  Once GE determined that the debt was uncollectible, it stopped 
charging Stratton interest on the debt, for reasons that, according to the federal 
January Term, 2016 
 
29 
circuit court, were “neither irrational or altruistic: By charging off the debt and 
ceasing to charge interest on it, GE could take a bad-debt tax deduction * * * and 
could avoid the cost of sending Stratton periodic statements on her account.”  Id. at 
445.  GE then sold the debt to Portfolio Recovery Associates, L.L.C. (“PRA”).  Id. 
{¶ 67} Two years after buying the debt, PRA filed suit against Stratton, 
alleging that she “ ‘owes [PRA] $2,630.95 with interest thereon at the rate of 8% 
per annum from December 19, 2008[,] until the date of judgment with 12% per 
annum thereafter until paid, plus court costs.’ ”  Id. at 446, quoting PRA’s 
complaint.  Kentucky’s usury statute sets the legal rate of interest for all loans made 
in that state at 8 percent unless the parties agree in writing to a higher rate.  
Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. 360.010(1).  Stratton at 445. 
{¶ 68} Stratton filed a putative class action against PRA in federal court, 
 
alleging that PRA’s attempt to collect 8% interest for the period 
between the date GE charged off Stratton’s debt and the date it sold 
that debt to PRA violated the FDCPA.  In particular, Stratton alleged 
that the 8% interest was not “expressly authorized by the agreement 
creating the debt or permitted by law,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1), that 
PRA had falsely represented the “character” of Stratton’s debt and 
the “amount” she owed, § 1692e(2)(A), and that PRA’s suit to 
recover interest it was not owed was a “threat” to take an “action 
that cannot legally be taken,” § 1692e(5). 
 
Id. at 446. 
{¶ 69} The district court dismissed Stratton’s case, concluding that “even 
an unsophisticated consumer would have understood that the request for interest 
was just a request, and would not have been misled by it.”  Stratton v. Portfolio 
Recovery Assocs., L.L.C., E.D.Ky. No. 5:13-147-DCR, 2013 WL 6191804, *5 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
(Nov. 26, 2013).  Further, the district court held that the state-court collection action 
did not constitute a threat, but was instead a “lawful vehicle” to recover Stratton’s 
debt.  Id. at *7. 
{¶ 70} The Sixth Circuit reversed, first establishing that the interest sought 
by PRA in its complaint was not authorized by law.  The court found that the 8 
percent statutory interest rate was unavailable to PRA because it was unavailable 
to GE due to the contract GE had negotiated with Stratton: 
 
GE waived its right to collect contractual interest, a right it had 
acquired in part by forgoing its right to collect statutory interest.  GE 
gave up the right to collect 8% statutory interest when it had Stratton 
agree to a 21.99% contractual rate of interest.  GE cannot recover 
the right it bargained away simply because it later chose to waive 
the right for which it bargained. 
 
Stratton, 770 F.3d at 448. 
{¶ 71} In Stratton, the Sixth Circuit recognized that pursuing the 
unavailable 8 percent interest rate against the consumer could constitute an FDCPA 
violation.  The court rejected the district court’s holding, which had relied on 
Argentieri: 
 
The district court distinguished “claims made in court from the type 
of abusive tactics most often invoked under the FDCPA” and saw 
“no need to invoke the protections” of the Act “when a claim is made 
to the court,” (quoting Argentieri v. Fisher Landscapes, Inc., 15 
F.Supp.2d 55, 62 (D.Mass.1998)).  Both Supreme Court precedent 
and the other traditional tools of statutory construction make clear 
that the district court’s understanding of the FDCPA is untenable. 
January Term, 2016 
 
31 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  Stratton at 449. 
{¶ 72} First, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court 
recognized in Heintz that the FDCPA applies to the litigating activities of lawyers.  
Stratton at 449.  Second, the court pointed out that the FDCPA from its inception 
“reflected Congressional concern with abusive litigation tactics” through the 
enactment of 15 U.S.C. 1692i, the FDCPA’s “fair venue” provision, which was 
designed to combat the problem of forum abuse—an unfair practice in which debt 
collectors seek to obtain default judgments by filing suit in courts so distant or 
inconvenient that consumers cannot make an appearance.  Id. at 449-450.  Third, 
the Stratton court recognized that post-Heintz amendments to 15 U.S.C. 1692e 
specifically exempt formal pleadings only “ ‘from a sole particularized requirement 
of the FDCPA: the requirement [in 15 U.S.C. 1692e(11)] that all communications 
state that they come from a debt collector.’ ”  Stratton at 450, quoting Sayyed v. 
Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 231 (4th Cir.2007).  Relying on the Fourth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Sayyed, the Stratton court determined that formal pleadings 
are subject to the other provisions of 15 U.S.C. 1692e: 
 
As the Fourth Circuit explained, “[t]he amendment by its terms in 
fact suggests that all litigation activities, including formal pleadings 
are subject to the FDCPA, except to the limited extent that Congress 
exempted formal pleadings from the particular requirements of § 
1692e(11).” 
 
Stratton, 770 F.3d at 450, quoting Sayyed at 231.  The Stratton court concluded, 
“In sum, absent strong evidence of an exemption, the FDCPA’s protections are 
available wherever unscrupulous debt collection practices might be found—and 
most certainly in litigation.”  Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
{¶ 73} Having determined that the filing of a complaint can constitute an 
FDCPA violation, the Stratton court employed the “least sophisticated consumer” 
test—“ ‘the usual objective legal standard in consumer protection cases’ ”—in 
considering PRA’s complaint.  Id., quoting Gionis v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 
L.L.P., 238 Fed.Appx. 24, 28 (6th Cir.2007).  The Stratton court held that “[a]s the 
drafter of the complaint, PRA ‘is responsible for its content and for what the least 
sophisticated [consumer] would have understood from it.’ ”  Id. at 451, quoting 
McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, L.L.P., 756 F.3d 240, 246 (3d 
Cir.2014). 
{¶ 74} Pursuant to that standard, the court found that Stratton had alleged 
numerous plausible FDCPA violations: 
 
Because PRA does not have the right to collect interest on Stratton’s 
debt, PRA’s allegation to the contrary is a “false representation” of 
the “character” and “amount” of Stratton’s debt.  § 1692e(2); see 
also Gearing v. Check Brokerage Corp., 233 F.3d 469, 472 (7th 
Cir.2000).  PRA’s state court suit is an “attempt” to collect an 
“amount”—$2,630.95 plus 8% interest—that is neither “expressly 
authorized” by any agreement in the record nor “permitted by law.”  
§ 1692f(1).  And from the perspective of the least sophisticated 
consumer it is also a “threat” by PRA “to take action that cannot 
legally be taken”—namely, to recover 8% interest. 
 
Id. 
{¶ 75} The court in Stratton rejected the argument put forth by PRA that its 
request for statutory interest was merely an aspirational request to the state court, 
rather than a representation of the legal status of the debt.  The court found it 
significant that PRA had not sought a nonspecific, open-ended amount that the state 
January Term, 2016 
 
33 
court might have deemed appropriate, but rather, in the numbered allegations in the 
complaint had stated, “ ‘The Defendant(s) owes the plaintiff $2,630.95, with 
interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum.’ ”  (Emphasis added by the court.)  Id., 
770 F.3d at 451, quoting the complaint.  The court found that “even a sophisticated 
consumer would read that numbered paragraph from the complaint to be a factual 
allegation rather than an ‘aspirational request.’ ”  Id.  The court held: 
 
Thus, PRA’s argument fails for two reasons:  PRA’s allegation was 
not a “simple request” and there is no protection for a representation 
that is inaccurate.  Saying that Stratton owed $2630.95 plus 
whatever interest the court chooses to award is simply not the same 
as saying that Stratton owed $2630.95 plus 8% interest from the date 
GE charged off her account.  PRA averred the latter.  It is therefore 
plausible that PRA’s complaint falsely represents both the 
“character” and “amount” of Stratton’s debt.  An unsophisticated 
consumer would most certainly have been misled. 
 
Id. 
{¶ 76} We agree with the overarching conclusion reached by the court in 
Stratton that both the text and purpose of the FDCPA as well as the reality of the 
debt-collection industry’s pursuit of default judgments as part of its typical 
collection strategy require the application of the FDCPA to abusive and unfair 
tactics employed in litigation: 
 
The FDCPA governs debt collection in or out of court; it does not 
allow debt collectors to use litigation as a vehicle for abusive and 
unfair practices that the Act forbids.  The district court’s [statement 
that there is “ ‘no need to invoke the protections’ ” of the FDCPA 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
“ ‘when a claim is made to the court,’ ” (quoting Argentieri, 15 
F.Supp.2d at 62)] conflicts with the text and purpose of the FDCPA 
and ignores the reality of the debt collection business, where “some 
debt collectors have foregone all meaningful attempts to 
communicate with debtors and have instead opted to file lawsuits 
against debtors en masse in an effort to collect enforceable default 
judgments.”  Matthew R. Bremner, The Need for Reform in the Age 
of Financial Chaos, 76 Brook. L.Rev. 1553, 1587 (2011); see also 
Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th 
Cir.2014).  * * *  By alleging in a complaint that a consumer owes 
interest that had in fact been waived, a debt collector may be able to 
secure a default judgment for an amount the consumer does not 
actually owe.  See Suesz, 757 F.3d at 639. The FDCPA proscribes 
such practices. 
 
Stratton at 451-452. 
{¶ 77} Like the debt collector in Stratton, FRIC in its complaint sought an 
interest rate to which it was not entitled.  A creditor is limited to interest at the 
statutory rate unless a written contract provides a different rate of interest, pursuant 
to R.C. 1343.03(A).  Minster Farmers Coop. Exchange Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 117 
Ohio St.3d 459, 2008-Ohio-1259, 884 N.E.2d 1056, ¶ 25-27.  “ ‘An invoice or 
monthly statement does not constitute such a writing.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 27, quoting WC 
Milling, L.L.C. v. Grooms, 164 Ohio App.3d 45, 2005-Ohio-5420, 841 N.E.2d 324, 
¶ 20 (4th Dist.), citing Yager Materials, Inc. v. Marietta Indus. Ents., Inc., 116 Ohio 
App.3d 233, 235-236, 687 N.E.2d 505 (4th Dist.1996).  FRIC filed its complaint 
and motion for default judgment seeking an interest rate above the maximum 
statutory rate, but it attached only a billing statement to its complaint to support that 
rate of interest and did not attach a copy of the credit-card agreement that Taylor 
January Term, 2016 
 
35 
Jarvis had signed.  Pursuant to R.C. 1343.03(A), when there is not a written contract 
the statutory rate is determined by a formula set forth in R.C. 5703.47; in 2010, 
when 
the 
complaint 
was 
filed, 
that 
rate 
was 
4 
percent. 
 
See 
http://www.tax.ohio.gov/ohio_individual/individual/interest_rates.aspx. 
{¶ 78} As in Stratton, the complaint against Taylor Jarvis here alleged that 
she was required to pay a specific rate of interest; FRIC did not simply request 
interest at a rate the trial court might deem appropriate.  The request is set forth in 
paragraph three of the complaint: 
 
 
Upon information and belief, Plaintiff is owed the charged 
off sum of $8,765.37, plus accrued interest of $7,738.99, for a total 
amount owed of $16,504.36, plus future interest at 24.00 % and 
Defendant(s) is/are in default of his/her/their obligation to pay said 
balance. 
 
The specificity of the complaint belies the idea that FRIC’s claim of entitlement to 
24 percent interest was merely an aspirational request to the court rather than a 
representation of the legal status of the debt. 
{¶ 79} FRIC and Cheek rely on Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 
F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir.2006), in which the court held that filing a lawsuit to collect 
a purported debt without the immediate means of proving the existence of the debt 
does not constitute a violation of the FDCPA.  In Harvey, the consumer had filed a 
responsive pleading to a state-court collection complaint and had sought discovery 
from the debt collector and its attorneys—culminating in the consumer filing a 
motion to compel—concerning the ownership and amount of the debt.  The debt 
collector did not respond to discovery and dismissed its complaint.  The consumer 
then filed suit in federal court, alleging that the debt collector and its law firm knew 
that they lacked documentation to prove the existence of the debt for which they 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
filed a state-court collection action and that the filing of a complaint under those 
circumstances constituted a deceptive debt-collection practice.  Id. at 326. 
{¶ 80} In affirming the district court’s dismissal of the consumer’s 
complaint, the Sixth Circuit held that “a debt may be properly pursued in court, 
even if the debt collector does not yet possess adequate proof of its claim.”  Id. at 
333.  The court in Harvey quoted the reasoning of a federal district court in a similar 
case: 
 
“[F]iling a lawsuit supported by the client’s affidavit attesting to the 
existence and amount of a debt * * * is not a false representation 
about the character or legal status of a debt, nor is it unfair or 
unconscionable.  A defendant in any lawsuit is entitled to request 
more information or details about a plaintiff’s claim, either through 
formal pleadings challenging a complaint, or through discovery.  
[The consumer] does not allege that anything in the state court 
complaint was false, or that the complaint was baseless.  She 
essentially alleges that more of a paper trail should have been in the 
lawyers’ hands or attached to the complaint.  The FDCPA imposes 
no such obligation.” 
 
Harvey at 331, quoting Deere v. Javitch, Block, & Rathbone, L.L.P., 413 F.Supp.2d 
886, 891 (S.D.Ohio 2006). 
{¶ 81} The court in Harvey pointed out that Harvey did not allege in her 
complaint that the debt collector and its law firm had failed to undertake a 
reasonable investigation into whether or not Harvey’s debt existed; rather, “she 
essentially focused on the contention” that the debt collector and law firm “did not 
presently possess the means of proving that debt” when the state-court complaint 
was filed.  Harvey, 453 F.3d at 333. 
January Term, 2016 
 
37 
{¶ 82} Harvey is distinguishable for several reasons.  First, the consumer in 
this case alleges more than the consumer alleged in Harvey.  Taylor Jarvis’s 
pleading in this case alleged not only that FRIC and Cheek filed a lawsuit against 
her without possessing at that time of filing the means of proving the debt, but she 
also alleged that they regularly maintain lawsuits such as the one against her 
“without the intention or ability to ever obtain evidence” that would establish 
FRIC’s entitlement to interest in excess of the statutory rate.  We agree with courts 
that have found that allegations of this type—regarding the lack of intent to 
investigate or prove claims on behalf of debt collectors—distinguish cases such as 
this one from Harvey.  See, e.g., Rollins v. Midland Funding, L.L.C., E.D.Mo. No. 
4:14CV01976 ERW, 2015 WL 3506556, *8 (June 3, 2015), citing Hinten v. 
Midland Funding, L.L.C., E.D.Mo. No. 2:13CV54 DDN, 2013 WL 5739035, *7 
(Oct. 22, 2013), and Brewer v. LVNV Funding, L.L.C., E.D.Mo. No. 4:14CV00942 
AGF, 2014 WL 5420274, *2 (Oct. 22, 2014). 
{¶ 83} Further, FRIC here went far beyond simply filing a complaint 
without yet having “adequate proof of its claim.”  Harvey at 333.  FRIC filed its 
complaint in March 2010, without including a copy of the credit-card agreement.  
It quickly sought a default judgment.  It did not retreat from the claim for 24 percent 
interest for which it lacked adequate documentation when it moved for default 
judgment; instead, it attached an affidavit from a FRIC employee to the motion for 
default judgment asserting that FRIC was owed “interest at the rate of at least” 24 
percent.  About two months after filing the complaint, it had a judgment entry 
awarding it 24 percent postjudgment interest.  But it never had the necessary 
documentation to back up its claim.  This was not a mere lack of proof at the first 
instance of filing.  It was a demand for 24 percent interest—unavailable under the 
law—from a debtor whom it thought would never fight back. 
{¶ 84} Finally, FRIC lacked more than just a paper trail.  FRIC in this case 
attempted to collect an interest rate that it could not legally collect; only a written 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
contract could except FRIC from the statutory rate of interest under R.C. 
1343.03(A).  The existence of a written contract setting forth the interest rate is an 
essential element of its claim. 
{¶ 85} There is a clear difference between asserting claims that are 
recoverable under the law and those that are not.  In Foster v. D.B.S. Collection 
Agency, 463 F.Supp.2d 783, 802 (S.D.Ohio 2006), the court found a violation of 
the FDCPA when a creditor prayed for attorney’s fees that were unobtainable 
pursuant to an Ohio statute.  The Foster court reasoned that “from the perspective 
of the ‘least sophisticated consumer,’ ” the prayer for such relief “constitute[d] an 
absolute entitlement to attorney fees, even though such fees are not recoverable 
under Ohio law.”  Id. 
{¶ 86} In this case, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, 
the prayer for relief claimed entitlement to a rate of interest that was unavailable 
under the law to FRIC.  We affirm the appellate court’s decision that Taylor Jarvis 
established a prima facie case against FRIC and Cheek under the FDCPA and the 
OCSPA on this issue. 
Liability Under the OCSPA 
{¶ 87} The court below did not address head-on the question of the 
applicability of the OCSPA to debt collectors and their attorneys, but instead simply 
held that Taylor Jarvis had presented viable claims under both the FDCPA and the 
OCSPA.  FRIC and Cheek rely on definitions in R.C. 1345.01(C) and 1345.01(A) 
to assert that the OCSPA “does not apply to bank assignees and their collection 
attorneys because there is no ‘consumer transaction’ or ‘supplier.’ ”  We reject their 
arguments in this regard and agree with Taylor Jarvis’s position that debt collectors, 
including attorneys engaged in debt collections, can be held liable under the 
OCSPA. 
{¶ 88} Both the FDCPA and the OCSPA are remedial statutes, intended to 
reach a broad range of conduct.  To state a claim under the FDCPA, a debtor must 
January Term, 2016 
 
39 
establish that a party violated one of the substantive provisions of the act while 
engaging in debt-collection activity.  Glazer v. Chase Home Fin., L.L.C., 704 F.3d 
453, 459-460 (6th Cir.2013).  15 U.S.C. 1692e forbids “false, deceptive, or 
misleading representation[s] or means in connection with the collection of any 
debt.”  15 U.S.C. 1692e(2)(A) prohibits a party from making a “false 
representation” of the “amount” of any debt.  And 15 U.S.C. 1692e(10) prohibits a 
party from using “false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to 
collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.”  For a statement 
to be actionable, however, it must be “more than just misleading—it ‘must be 
materially false or misleading to violate Section 1692e.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  Clark 
v. Lender Processing Servs., 562 Fed.Appx. 460, 466 (6th Cir.2014), quoting 
Wallace v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir.2012).  “The 
materiality standard * * * means that in addition to being technically false, a 
statement would tend to mislead or confuse the reasonable unsophisticated 
consumer.”  Id., citing Wallace at 326-327. 
{¶ 89} The OCSPA is similar: 
 
[R.C.] Section 1345.02(A) provides that “[n]o supplier shall 
commit an unfair or deceptive act or practice in connection with a 
consumer transaction.  Such an unfair or deceptive act or practice by 
a supplier violates this section whether it occurs before, during, or 
after the transaction.”  Section 1345.03(A) provides that “[n]o 
supplier shall commit an unconscionable act or practice in 
connection with a consumer transaction.  Such an unconscionable 
act or practice by a supplier violates this section whether it occurs 
before, during, or after the transaction.”  Although the OCSPA does 
not expressly address debt collection practices, Ohio courts have 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40 
applied the OCSPA to such practices.  See Liggins v. May Co., 44 
Ohio Misc. 81, 337 N.E.2d 816 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County 1975). 
 
Lewis v. ACB Business Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 403 (6th Cir.1998), fn. 11. 
{¶ 90} The interrelationship between the FDCPA and the OCSPA is 
established: 
 
“[V]arious violations of the FDCPA constitute a violation of the 
CSPA.  * * *  [T]he purpose of both acts is to prohibit both unfair 
and deceptive acts and this court holds that any violation of any one 
of the enumerated sections of the FDCPA is necessarily an unfair 
and deceptive act or practice in violation of R.C. § 1345.02 and/or  
§ 1345.03.” 
 
Kelly v. Montgomery Lynch & Assocs., Inc., N.D.Ohio No. 1:07-CV-919, 2008 WL 
1775251, *11 (Apr. 15, 2008), quoting Becker v. Montgomery, Lynch, N.D.Ohio 
No. Civ.A. 1:02CV 874, 2003 WL 23335929, *2 (Feb. 26, 2003).  But see Slorp v. 
Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, 587 Fed.Appx. 249, 260-261 (6th Cir.2014) 
(cautioning that some conduct that violates the FDCPA may not necessarily 
constitute a violation of the OCSPA).  Thus, it is helpful to further examine the 
FDCPA as we consider the application of the OCSPA in the context of debt 
collection by debt buyers and attorneys. 
{¶ 91} Under the FDCPA, a debt collector is “any person who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal 
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts 
to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due 
another.”  15 U.S.C. 1692a(6).  And in Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. at 299, 115 S.Ct. 
1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395, the United States Supreme Court made clear that the 
January Term, 2016 
 
41 
FDCPA applies to “attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage in consumer-debt-collection 
activity, even when that activity consists of litigation.”  See also Beler v. Blatt, 
Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, L.L.C., 480 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir.2007). 
{¶ 92} Typically, to determine the applicability of the FDCPA to a 
particular attorney or law firm, the salient question is whether the attorney or law 
firm regularly engages in consumer-debt-collection activity within the meaning of 
the act.  In answering that question, the focus is on the “regularity” of the collection 
activities by the attorney and his or her firm. 
{¶ 93} As the Sixth Circuit recognizes, “[o]rdinary interpretations of the 
words ‘regular’ and ‘regularly’ fail to delineate the amount of debt collection 
activity required * * * to find an attorney a ‘debt collector’ under the FDCPA.”  
Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170, 1174 (6th Cir.1999).  The Sixth Circuit holds 
that “for a court to find that an attorney or law firm ‘regularly’ collects debts for 
purposes of the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show that the attorney or law firm collects 
debts as a matter of course for its clients or for some clients, or collects debts as a 
substantial, but not principal, part of his or its general law practice.”  Id. at 1176. 
{¶ 94} Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Heintz and other reported 
precedent that makes clear that the FDCPA applies to lawyers and law firms who 
regularly engage in debt collection as well as to other debt collectors, Cheek and 
FRIC assert that they are not subject to liability under the OCSPA because they are 
not “suppliers” within the meaning of R.C. 1345.01(C) and because no “consumer 
transaction” within the meaning of R.C. 1345.01(A) occurred. 
{¶ 95} We have little trouble concluding that Cheek and FRIC are 
“suppliers.”  As we explained in Anderson v. Barclay’s Capital Real Estate, Inc., 
136 Ohio St.3d 31, 2013-Ohio-1933, 989 N.E.2d 997: 
 
“ ‘Supplier’ means a seller, lessor, assignor, franchisor, or 
other person engaged in the business of effecting or soliciting 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
42 
consumer transactions, whether or not the person deals directly with 
the consumer.”  R.C. 1345.01(C).  The terms “effecting” and 
“soliciting” are not defined by the statute, so we give the terms their 
plain and ordinary meanings. 
“Effect” is defined as “[t]o bring about; to make happen.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary at 592 [9th Ed.2009].  “Solicitation” is 
defined as “[t]he act or an instance of requesting or seeking to obtain 
something; a request or petition.”  Black’s at 1520. 
 
Id. at ¶ 29-30. 
{¶ 96} Both FRIC and Cheek solicited Taylor Jarvis in an effort to effect 
the recovery of her debt or the resolution of it.  They are suppliers within the 
meaning of the OCSPA.  We now turn to the question of whether a “consumer 
transaction” occurred. 
{¶ 97} For purposes of the OCSPA, the term “consumer transaction” is 
defined to mean 
 
a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other transfer of an 
item of goods, a service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an 
individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or 
household, or solicitation to supply any of these things.  “Consumer 
transaction” does not include transactions between persons, defined 
in sections 4905.03 and 5725.01 [financial institution defined] of the 
Revised Code, and their customers, except for transactions 
involving a loan made pursuant to sections 1321.35 to 1321.48 of 
the Revised Code and transactions in connection with residential 
mortgages between loan officers, mortgage brokers, or nonbank 
mortgage lenders and their customers; transactions involving a 
January Term, 2016 
 
43 
home construction service contract as defined in section 4722.01 of 
the Revised Code; transactions between certified public accountants 
or public accountants and their clients; transactions between 
attorneys, physicians, or dentists and their clients or patients; and 
transactions between veterinarians and their patients that pertain to 
medical treatment but not ancillary services. 
 
R.C. 1345.01(A). 
{¶ 98} Relying on this court’s decision in Reagans v. MountainHigh 
Coachworks, Inc., 117 Ohio St.3d 22, 2008-Ohio-271, 881 N.E.2d 245, Cheek 
asserts that “the definition of ‘consumer transaction’ explicitly and specifically 
excludes transactions between financial institutions and their customers,” and that 
the exemption extends to “bank assignees,” which Cheek contends includes both 
FRIC and Cheek.  We disagree. 
{¶ 99} Reagans is wholly distinguishable from this case.  That case 
involved litigation brought by plaintiffs against the seller and the manufacturer of 
their motor home, which the plaintiffs claimed was defective.  The plaintiffs sought 
recovery under various causes of action, including alleging a violation of the 
OCSPA.  Id. at ¶ 1.  The plaintiffs also alleged that the bank that loaned them the 
money for the purchase was derivatively liable for their claims against the seller.  
Id. 
{¶ 100} In addressing that claim, we held that a bank cannot be held 
derivatively liable pursuant to a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regulation or 
rule for an award of treble damages and attorney’s fees against a seller of goods 
under the OCSPA.  Id. at ¶ 2-3.  Our analysis was driven, in part, by the recognition 
that transactions between financial institutions and their customers are exempted 
from the definition of a “consumer transaction” within the meaning of R.C. 
1345.01(A) of the OCSPA.  Id. at ¶ 33.  See also Jackson v. Sunnyside Toyota, Inc., 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
44 
175 Ohio App.3d 370, 2008-Ohio-687, 887 N.E.2d 370, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.)  
(“ ‘Consumer transactions’ do not include transactions between ‘financial 
institutions’ and their customers.  See R.C. 1345.01(A) and 5725.01(A)”).  That 
exemption shielded the bank from direct liability and permitted derivative liability 
only to the extent that the FTC required derivative liability.  Reagans at ¶ 33. 
{¶ 101} Here, Cheek asserts that because Chase (which we will presume for 
purposes of this case to be an exempt “financial institution” within the meaning of 
the OCSPA) would be shielded from OCSPA liability for its own attempts to collect 
the debt from Taylor Jarvis, Cheek is similarly exempt because it was attempting 
to collect the debt on behalf of FRIC, which purchased the debt that had been owed 
to Chase.  We do not agree. 
{¶ 102} Neither FRIC nor Cheek is a financial institution within the 
meaning of the OCSPA.  As amicus curiae the state of Ohio correctly argues, the 
exemption for banks and financial institutions applies only to transactions with 
certain specific entities, namely, banks and financial institutions as defined by R.C. 
1345.01(A) and 5725.01.  Cheek fails to establish that those statutes, or any other 
statutes in the Revised Code, confer an exemption on FRIC, a debt buyer that 
purchased a debt that originated in a transaction involving an exempt financial 
institution, or on Cheek merely because it contracted with and represented a debt 
buyer.  And we reject any notion that a debt collector and its attorneys can be 
permitted “derivative use” of the financial-institution exemption in the OCSPA 
based solely on the fact that the debt at issue originated between a financial 
institution and a consumer.  See Foster, 463 F.Supp.2d at 783, fn. 42 (rejecting a 
nonphysician debt collector and its attorney’s invocation of the exemption in the 
OCSPA that applies to physicians regarding their attempts to collect debts arising 
from patient-physician health-care transactions); Kline v. Mtge. Electronic 
Registration Sys., Inc., S.D.Ohio No. 3:08cv408, 2010 WL 1267809, *5 (Mar. 30, 
January Term, 2016 
 
45 
2010) (holding that the financial-institution exemption in the OCSPA applies to 
national banks and not to subsidiaries of those banks). 
{¶ 103} Cheek additionally asserts that our decision in Anderson, 136 Ohio 
St.3d 31, 2013-Ohio-1933, 989 N.E.2d 997, supports that no “consumer 
transaction” on which to base an OCSPA action occurred in this case.  FRIC 
presents arguments on this point that also rely heavily on Anderson.  But Anderson 
is inapposite here. 
{¶ 104} Anderson arose from interactions between mortgage-service 
providers and homeowners.  We held that the OCSPA did not apply to the 
mortgage-service providers for three key reasons not presented here. 
{¶ 105} First, in Anderson we held that because “[m]ortgage servicing is a 
contractual agreement between the mortgage servicer and the financial institution 
that owns both the note and mortgage,” there was no “consumer” transaction within 
the meaning of the OCSPA.  Id. at ¶ 12-13.  Second, we recognized that land 
transactions are frequently regulated by specialized legislation and thus are 
excluded from the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, on which the OCSPA is 
modeled.  Id. at ¶ 18.  And third, we found that that the legislative history of the 
OCSPA amply demonstrated that the General Assembly did not intend for the 
OCSPA to apply to mortgage-service providers.  Id. at ¶ 20-25. 
{¶ 106} None of the factors that were critical to our analysis in Anderson is 
present here.  We therefore reject Cheek’s and FRIC’s arguments that debt 
collectors and their attorneys are exempt from the OCSPA. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 107} We hold that Ohio’s borrowing statute applies in this case and that 
therefore, Delaware’s statute of limitations applied to FRIC’s debt-collection action 
against Taylor Jarvis.  We further hold that FRIC’s complaint against Taylor Jarvis 
was time-barred and that the filing of a time-barred collection action may form the 
basis of violations under the FDCPA and the OCSPA.  We also hold that FRIC’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
46 
claim in its complaint for interest that is unavailable by law was a demand made 
upon Taylor Jarvis rather than an aspirational request to the trial court and thus can 
be the basis of an actionable claim under the FDCPA and the OCSPA.  We remand 
the case to the trial court for a determination of those causes of action, including a 
consideration of whether the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense is applicable, and 
for a determination of the cause of action for abuse of process.  Finally, we hold 
that debt buyers collecting on credit-card debt and their attorneys are subject to the 
OCSPA. 
{¶ 108} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that 
reversed the trial court’s granting of FRIC’s and Cheek’s motions for summary 
judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed 
and cause remanded. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and concurs in the judgment in an opinion that 
O’DONNELL, J., joins. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents in an opinion that FRENCH, J., joins. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring. 
{¶ 109} I agree with most of the opinion of the court.  While I agree with 
the ultimate conclusion that the action brought against Sandra Taylor Jarvis was 
untimely, I disagree with the analysis regarding when the cause of action against 
her accrued.  Because a credit-card account is an account founded upon contract, 
with a single and indivisible liability arising from individual transactions that are 
connected as a series, the issue of when the cause of action accrued is resolved by 
case law regarding an action on an account.  The statute of limitations for an action 
January Term, 2016 
 
47 
on an account begins to run on the date of the last item appearing on the account.  
Applying these principles to the facts before us, I would hold that the cause of action 
accrued on June 28, 2006, the date Taylor Jarvis made her last payment on the 
credit-card account. 
{¶ 110} The lead opinion reasons that when a credit-card debtor fails to 
make an agreed-to monthly minimum payment when it becomes due and owing, a 
cause of action accrues for statute-of-limitations purposes.  Lead opinion at ¶ 50, 
citing Dudek v. Thomas & Thomas Attorneys & Counselors at Law, L.L.C., 702 
F.Supp.2d 826, 839 (N.D.Ohio 2010); Citibank, N.A. v. Hyslop, 10th Dist. Franklin 
No. 12AP-885, 2014-Ohio-844, ¶ 16-17; Discover Bank v. Heinz, 10th Dist. 
Franklin No. 08AP-1001, 2009-Ohio-2850, ¶ 17; Discover Bank v. Poling, 10th 
Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-1117, 2005-Ohio-1543, ¶ 18.  However, none of the cases 
relied upon by the lead opinion engaged in any analysis on the issue of accrual, and 
none of them concluded that the due date of the first missed monthly minimum 
payment is the date on which a cause of action accrues. 
{¶ 111} In Dudek, there was no dispute as to the date that the creditor’s 
breach-of-contract claim accrued against the debtor.  Dudek at 839.  The court 
accepted the undisputed date and did not engage in any independent analysis to 
resolve the issue of when the cause of action accrued.  Id. 
{¶ 112} Hyslop is also devoid of any discussion of when the cause of action 
accrued.  Instead, the Hyslop court noted that the credit-card-account billing 
statements in evidence reflected activity beginning September 30, 2009, and 
continuing through September 5, 2011.  Hyslop at ¶ 12.  An employee of the bank 
had stated in an affidavit that the debtor was in default for his failure to make 
“proper payments” on the account.  Id. at ¶ 13.  The appellate court did not address 
any issue regarding the statute of limitations and agreed with the trial court that the 
bank had established that the debtor had failed to make required payments and that 
the account was in default.  Id. at ¶ 16-20. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
48 
{¶ 113} The analysis in Poling focused on whether the bank had proved a 
breach-of-contract claim for the debtor’s alleged failure to make payments on a 
credit-card account.  Poling, 2005-Ohio-1543, at ¶ 17.  The court concluded that 
the bank had established a breach of contract, and the court stated that the 
“defendant repeatedly failed to make the minimum monthly payment due on the 
account, and, therefore, was in default.”  Id. at ¶ 18.  The court never discussed the 
accrual date for the cause of action. 
{¶ 114} In Heinz, no issue was raised regarding the date that the cause of 
action accrued.  The court noted that after applying for and receiving the credit card, 
the debtor made a balance transfer, purchased some goods and services with the 
card, and “made payments on the account until November 2007, when she sent a 
letter to [the creditor] contending she was not required to pay any amounts due on 
the account.”  Heinz, 2009-Ohio-2850, at ¶ 4.  In concluding that the debtor had 
failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense to the creditor’s breach-of-contract 
claim, the Heinz court noted that after November 2007, the debtor “failed to make 
any required minimum monthly payments due on her * * * card account and 
therefore was in ‘default.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 115} The facts currently before this court are also different from the 
underlying facts in Dudek, Hyslop, Heinz, and Poling.  While Taylor Jarvis failed 
to make the scheduled minimum monthly payment due in January 2005, Chase did 
not inform her that it had suspended her charging privileges until it sent her the 
billing statement for the payment due on May 2, 2005.  Taylor Jarvis also continued 
to make a number of less-than-minimum monthly payments until June 28, 2006.  
There are no indications in any of the aforementioned cases that the creditors had 
continued to extend credit after the debtors had failed to make less-than-minimum 
monthly payments or that the debtors made less-than-minimum payments on the 
accounts that were accepted by the creditors after the debtors had failed to make a 
minimum payment due.  Based upon these factual differences and the lack of a 
January Term, 2016 
 
49 
discussion of the date the cause of action accrued in any of the cases the lead 
opinion cites, the cases relied upon by the lead opinion are unavailing. 
{¶ 116} Rather, case law pertaining to an action on an account guides the 
determination of when the cause of action accrues for statute-of-limitations 
purposes.  An action on an account is founded upon contract, Arthur v. Parenteau, 
102 Ohio App.3d 302, 304, 657 N.E.2d 284 (3d Dist.1995), and “is appropriate 
where the parties have conducted a series of transactions for which a balance 
remains to be paid,” Blanchester Lumber & Supply, Inc. v. Coleman, 69 Ohio 
App.3d 263, 265, 590 N.E.2d 770 (12th Dist.1990).  Courts in Ohio recognize a 
creditor’s ability to pursue an action on an account for a cardholder’s default on a 
credit-card account.  See Ohio Receivables, L.L.C. v. Dallariva, 10th Dist. Franklin 
No. 11AP-951, 2012-Ohio-3165, ¶ 30-34; Citibank, N.A. v. Eckmeyer, 11th Dist. 
Portage No. 2008-P-0069, 2009-Ohio-2435, ¶ 15.  Further, the General Assembly 
has defined “account” to include “a right to payment of a monetary obligation, 
whether or not earned by performance, * * * arising out of the use of a credit or 
charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.”  R.C. 
1309.102(A)(2)(a)(vii). 
{¶ 117} An Indiana court of appeals engaged in a thorough analysis of a 
credit-card account that is instructive here.  Smither v. Asset Acceptance, L.L.C., 
919 N.E.2d 1153, 1160 (Ind.App.2010).  The Smither court distinguished credit-
card accounts from promissory notes and installment loans, which have a “total 
amount of indebtedness and a defined schedule of repayment, including precise 
dates for payment and the amount of each payment until the debt is fully repaid, 
typically * * * included in the loan document from the outset.”  Id. at 1159.  In 
contrast, 
 
the precise amount of debt that a consumer may undertake [on a 
credit-card account] is unknown at the outset and fluctuates, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
50 
depending on how the card is used.  * * *  [T]he creditor sends 
monthly statements to the debtor indicating the amount of that 
month’s required minimum payment, which may vary depending 
upon how much the card has been used, whether the creditor has 
imposed fees of different kinds, whether the interest rate for the card 
is variable, and how previous payments have been made. 
 
Id. 
{¶ 118} The Smither court concluded that a credit-card account is analogous 
to an “open account,” which 
 
“results where the parties intend that the individual transactions in 
the account be considered as a connected series, rather than as 
independent of each other, subject to a shifting balance as additional 
debits and credits are made, until one of the parties wishes to settle 
and close the account, and where there is but one single and 
indivisible liability arising from such series of related and reciprocal 
debits and credits.” 
 
Id., quoting 1 American Jurisprudence 2d, Accounts and Accounting, Section 4, at 
263-264 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
{¶ 119} The Smither court held that a credit-card debt is “an open account 
debt for statute of limitations purposes.”  919 N.E.2d at 1160.  It determined that 
the statute of limitations for such an account begins to run on the date of the last 
activity on the account.  Id. (“Whether we consider the statute of limitations to have 
begun running on the date of Smither’s last payment or the next payment due date 
thereafter, Asset’s lawsuit filed on May 30, 2006, was more than six years after 
both dates”). 
January Term, 2016 
 
51 
{¶ 120} Turning to the current case, the last activity on the account was a 
$50 payment by Taylor Jarvis on June 28, 2006, which qualifies as the last item on 
the account.  Taylor Jarvis tendered the payment, and Chase accepted it, with the 
understanding that Chase would apply the payment to adjust the balance due on the 
account.  Therefore, I would find that the cause of action against Taylor Jarvis 
accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, on June 28, 2006.  As such, the 
cause of action accrued after April 7, 2005, the effective date of the borrowing 
statute, R.C. 2305.03(B), and that statute applies in the circumstances here, 
meaning that Delaware’s statute of limitations controls and that the suit against 
Taylor Jarvis was untimely.  It is therefore not necessary to determine, as the lead 
opinion does, whether R.C. 2305.03(B) applies to causes of action that accrued but 
were not commenced before its effective date. 
{¶ 121} Even if the analysis focusing on Taylor Jarvis’s last payment on the 
account is rejected, the lead opinion’s conclusion that the cause of action accrued 
when Taylor Jarvis failed to make a minimum monthly payment is problematic.  
Chase obviously did not conclude that this failure rendered the parties’ credit 
relationship irreparable.  Instead, Chase continued to extend charging privileges to 
Taylor Jarvis.  It was not until Chase terminated Taylor Jarvis’s charging privileges 
that the credit relationship between the parties came to end.  The First District Court 
of Appeal of California has concluded that the relevant date for determining when 
a cause of action accrues for statute-of-limitations purposes on an open account is 
“the date the debt becomes settled; i.e., the date the relationship between the parties 
has come to an end other than for purposes of paying amounts due or past due.”  
R.N.C., Inc. v. Tsegeletos, 231 Cal.App.3d 967, 975, 283 Cal.Rptr. 48 (1991).  
Applying this alternative analysis, the cause of action against Taylor Jarvis accrued, 
and the statute of limitations began to run, at the very earliest on April 8, 2005, the 
day after the last day of the billing cycle that closed before Chase terminated Taylor 
Jarvis’s charging privileges.  As such, the borrowing statute applies under this 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
52 
analysis as well, Delaware’s statute of limitations controls, and the suit against 
Taylor Jarvis was untimely.  And, again, it is therefore not necessary to determine, 
as the lead opinion does, whether R.C. 2305.03(B) applies to causes of action that 
accrued but were not commenced before its effective date. 
{¶ 122} Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 123} This appeal illustrates the nexus of complex financial, social, and 
legal phenomena that have arisen in the wake of what is commonly called the Great 
Recession (generally considered to have been most severe in this country from 
December 2007 through June 2009), which left many Americans with decreased 
net worth and engendered the longest periods of unemployment since the World 
War II era.  See generally Warner, What the Great Recession Has Done to Family 
Life, 
New 
York 
Times 
Magazine 
(Aug. 
6, 
2010), 
available 
at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/magazine/08FOB-wwln-
t.html?_r=2&ref=magazine& (accessed May 12, 2016); see also Jobless Debt Is 
Heavy, 
Columbus 
Dispatch 
(Aug. 
13, 
2014), 
available 
at 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/editorials/2014/08/13/jobless-debt-is-
heavy.html (accessed May 12, 2016).  Not surprisingly, many Americans incurred 
debts that they were unable—or perhaps unwilling—to pay.  The decedent in this 
case appears to be one such American, but the record before us does not establish 
why her debts were not paid.2 
                                                 
2 “[A]lthough ‘de mortuis nil nisi bonum,’ be a maxim of our profession, the memory of the deceased 
has not been spared.”  Pierson v. Post, 3 Caines 175, 180, 2 Am.Dec. 264, 1805 WL 781 (N.Y.1805) 
(Livingston, J., dissenting) (using a Latin phrase that has been translated as “(say) nothing but good 
of the dead,” Webster’s New World Dictionary 367 (3d College Ed.1988)).  As the majority notes, 
the decedent, Sandra Taylor Jarvis, died during the pendency of this appeal.  She may have been the 
victim of poor health, but we cannot assume that her ill health was the reason she failed to make 
payments on the credit-card account at issue in this case or that she was the gullible victim of debt 
January Term, 2016 
 
53 
{¶ 124} The amounts of unpaid debt in the United States are staggering.  In 
2008, credit card lenders “wrote off” about $45 billion in bad debt.  Dash and 
Martin, Banks Brace for Credit Card Write-Offs, New York Times, May 10, 2009, 
available 
at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/11/business/11credit.html?_r=0 
(accessed May 19, 2016).  As troubling as that number is, financial institutions 
charged off about $20 billion each quarter from early 2009 through early 2010.  
Hauser, Bank Losses Lead to Drop in Credit Card Debt, New York Times, Sept. 
24, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/business/25credit.html 
(accessed May 19, 2016). 
{¶ 125} Terms such as “write-off” and “charge-off” are based on 
accounting principles and are used to describe the situation in which a creditor has 
determined that a debt is unlikely to be paid, usually after 180 days without 
payment, and “charges off” the account receivable as uncollectable.  Fox, Do We 
Have A Debt Collection Crisis?  Some Cautionary Tales of Debt Collection in 
Indiana, 24 Loy.Consumer L.Rev. 355, 358 (2012), fn. 16; Haneman, The Ethical 
Exploitation of the Unrepresented Consumer, 73 Mo.L.Rev. 707, 713 (2008).  The 
real debt, however, does not magically disappear.  The companies owed the debt 
suffer the loss of that money, and ultimately they shift the burden of paying the debt 
to other credit-card holders through higher interest rates and fees.  Fox at 362.  And 
there are plenty of credit-card holders bearing that burden.  In 2015, the average 
American household carried about $5,700 in credit-card debt; about 38 percent of 
households carried an average debt that was more than $15,000.  Gabler, The Secret 
                                                 
collectors.  The decedent stated in an affidavit that appears in the record of this case that she worked 
in a supervisory capacity in a bankruptcy trustee’s office for more than a decade and affirmatively 
stated that she had a considerable degree of familiarity with the law and legal processes.  And 
although she alleged that she became disabled after suffering a serious stroke on February 5, 2010, 
that date was well after the cause of action accrued in this case, as well as in others in which she 
apparently defaulted on credit-card debt accumulated on other credit cards.  See, e.g., Capital One 
Bank v. Jarvis, Cuyahoga Falls M.C. No. 2004CVF03902 (Feb. 8, 2005) (entering judgment of 
$12,495.27 plus interest). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
54 
Shame of Middle-Class Americans, The Atlantic (May 2016), available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/05/my-secret-shame/476415/ 
(accessed May 19, 2016).  Although the number of people holding credit-card debt 
has been decreasing over the last few years, notably, the average debt for those 
households that do carry a balance has been on the rise.  Id.  In a sense then, credit-
card companies are charging those people for both the costs they incur as they 
attempt to pay off their debts and the costs that others incurred but were unable to 
pay. 
{¶ 126} Companies also engage in the sometimes unsavory, but now 
common, phenomenon of “debt sales” in which a creditor sells an individual’s debt, 
for pennies on the dollar, to a private entity that then attempts to collect the debt, 
often through the court process.  And the collection efforts include efforts to collect 
“charged-off” debts: 
 
To recoup a portion of its lost investment, an originating 
lender may sell a charged-off consumer loan to a Debt Buyer, 
usually as part of a portfolio of delinquent consumer loans, for a 
fraction of the total amount owed to the originating lender.  * * *  
Once a Debt Buyer has purchased a portfolio of defaulted consumer 
loans, it may engage in collection efforts (or hire a third-party to do 
so), which may include locating borrowers, determining whether 
borrowers are in bankruptcy, commencing legal proceedings, or 
“otherwise encouraging” payment of all or a portion of the 
delinquency. 
 
Debt Buyers’ Assn. v. Snow, 481 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2006), quoting a 
memorandum filed in the case. 
January Term, 2016 
 
55 
{¶ 127} It is undisputable that some debt collectors, whether first party or 
third party, act unlawfully and unconscionably in the process of attempting to 
collect the debt.  The majority raises valid criticisms of those debt purchasers who 
“reap staggering profits by methodically cleaning financial carcasses left 
abandoned” years ago.  Haneman, 73 Mo.L.Rev. at 713. 
{¶ 128} But the majority’s characterization of the debt market ignores the 
reality that there would be no debt to purchase if there had not been so many 
defaults on debts.  In fact, there is plenty of blame to go around. 
{¶ 129} The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) recent report of the 
results of a landmark study of the debt-purchasing industry, upon which the 
majority relies heavily, analyzed more than 5,000 debt portfolios purchased by 
large debt buyers in a three-year study period ending in June 2009.  The Structure 
and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry ii, A-1 (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structure-and-practices-
debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf (accessed May 19, 2016) (“Structure 
and Practices”).  Those portfolios contained nearly 90 million consumer accounts 
that had a face value of $143 billion.  Id. at ii.  Sixty-two percent of that debt was 
credit-card debt.  Id. 
{¶ 130} The study makes clear that information received by debt 
purchasers, including information about whether the consumer had ever disputed 
the debt, is deficient in many ways.  Id. at ii-iii.  Yet only 3.2 percent of the 
consumers whose debt was purchased disputed the debts, and the debts in more 
than half of those cases were verified by the debt buyer.  Id. at iv.  Debt-purchasing 
companies resold only 2.9 percent of their disputed debts and only 0.8 percent of 
their unverified disputed debts.  Id.  Thus, although some debt buyers undoubtedly 
bought disputed debts, the vast majority of them did not. 
{¶ 131} Similarly, although some debt buyers involved in the study 
purchased and attempted to collect debts that were more than six years old, the FTC 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
56 
also found that “most of the debt that [debt buyers] purchased did not appear to be 
either old or beyond the statute of limitations.”  Id. at v. 
{¶ 132} And, for better or worse, the FTC acknowledged that debt buying 
can reduce creditors’ losses and thereby allow for more credit to be provided to 
consumers at better rates.  Id. at i. 
{¶ 133} Much more could be said about the business of debt buying, but for 
now, it suffices for two things to be made clear.  First, the debt market involves 
both the bad behaviors of irresponsible consumers and the tragedies of responsible 
ones.  Second, despite the majority’s recitation of the misdeeds of debt collectors 
and its broad-brush imputation of those misdeeds to the industry as a whole, nothing 
in the record before us establishes that these appellants—Cheek Law Offices, 
L.L.C., and attorney Parri Hockenberry (collectively “Cheek”), First Resolution 
Investment 
Corporation 
(“FRIC”), 
and 
First 
Resolution 
Management 
Corporation—necessarily acted wrongly in seeking to collect an established debt. 
{¶ 134} I understand the majority’s indignation with perceived injustices, 
but I cannot join its analysis, which is driven by the result it seeks to achieve rather 
than thoughtful considerations of precedent and public policy.  And therein lies the 
rub:  the majority’s grandiose statements and holdings, though intended to protect 
Ohio’s consumers, portend great harm to them and to the vitally important 
plaintiffs’ bar—the holdings will inevitably be applied as precedent in future cases 
in ways that will not be consumer friendly. 
{¶ 135} I dissent. 
{¶ 136} The proper analysis of the claims in this case should lead to the 
conclusion that Ohio law controls both the substantive and procedural aspects 
involved.  I would hold that under Ohio law, the complaint was timely filed and 
therefore that appellants did not violate the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act 
(“OCSPA”), R.C. 1345.01 et seq., or the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., by bringing a time-barred suit against the 
January Term, 2016 
 
57 
decedent.  I would also hold that appellants did not violate the OCSPA or the 
FDCPA by requesting the rate of interest in the prayer for relief in the complaint 
against the decedent that they sought.  I would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and enter judgment in favor of appellants, as the trial court did. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 137} As the trial court recognized early in these proceedings, the 
outcome in this case turns on whether the procedural and substantive law of Ohio 
or another state controls. 
Ohio Procedural Law Controls 
Ohio’s procedural law on statutes of limitations 
{¶ 138} The key to the majority’s holding in favor of the decedent’s estate 
is that Ohio’s borrowing statute, R.C. 2305.05, applies in this case.  It does not. 
{¶ 139} It is well settled in Ohio that the forum state’s statutes of limitations 
are to be applied in the forum, which, here, is Ohio.  “The matter of the statute of 
limitations being a question of remedy, it is universally considered to be governed 
by the law of the forum.”  McCormick v. Taft, 61 Ohio App. 200, 201, 22 N.E.2d 
510 (1st Dist.1938).  Because the forum for the underlying suit is a court in Ohio, 
Ohio law controls the statute-of-limitations question.3  See, e.g., Kerper v. Wood, 
                                                 
3 Because substantive law is not at issue, neither Gries Sports Ents., Inc. v. Modell, 15 Ohio St.3d 
284, 473 N.E.2d 807 (1984), nor 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws, Section 188 (1971), 
applies to the statute-of-limitations question in this case, Resner v. Owners Ins. Co., 3d Dist. Allen 
No. CA 2001 0091, 2002 WL 236970, *1 (Feb. 14, 2002), and the appellate court’s analysis of the 
issue was incorrect.  Instead, 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws, Section 142(2) (1971), 
governs the resolution of conflicts over which state’s statute of limitations applies.  Unifund CCR 
Partners Assignee of Palisades Collection, L.L.C. v. Childs, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23161, 2010-
Ohio-746, ¶ 15; see also Lewis v. Steinreich, 73 Ohio St.3d 299, 303, 652 N.E.2d 981 (1995), citing 
Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286, 288-289 (1984).  As the Sixth 
Circuit has explained: 
 
When a conflict arises between two states’ statutes of limitations, the Restatement 
provides:  [“]An action will be maintained if it is not barred by the statute of 
limitations of the forum, even though it would be barred by the statute of 
limitations of another state.[”]  Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 
142(2).  Section 142(2) thus requires Ohio courts to apply Ohio’s statute of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
58 
48 Ohio St. 613, 622, 29 N.E. 501 (1891) (“Statutes of limitation relate to the 
remedy, and are, and must be, governed by the law of the forum; for it is conceded 
that a court which has power to say when its doors shall be opened has also power 
to say when they shall be closed”).  See also Alropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm, 138 Ohio 
St. 30, 33 N.E.2d 655 (1941), paragraph one of the syllabus (“The validity and 
interpretation of a contract are governed by the laws of the state where such contract 
is made or is to be performed; but the remedies are governed by the laws of the 
state where the suit is brought.  The limitation of actions relates to the remedy”); 
Unifund CCR Partners Assignee of Palisades Collection, L.L.C. v. Childs, 2d Dist. 
Montgomery No. 23161, 2010-Ohio-746, ¶ 14 (“ ‘In choice-of-law situations, the 
procedural laws of the forum state, including applicable statutes of limitations, are 
generally applied’ ”), quoting Lawson v. Valve-Trol Co., 81 Ohio App.3d 1, 4, 610 
N.E.2d 425 (9th Dist.1991), citing Howard v. Allen, 30 Ohio St.2d 130, 283 N.E.2d 
167 (1972); D.A.N. Joint Venture III, L.P. v. Armstrong, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2006-
L-089, 2007-Ohio-898, ¶ 28 (Ohio courts have consistently and uniformly held that 
limitations of actions are fixed by the laws of the state in which suit is filed); Combs 
v. Internatl. Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir.2004) (a federal court sitting in 
                                                 
limitations to breach of contract actions brought in Ohio, even if the action would 
be time-barred in another state.  See Males v. W.E. Gates & Associates, 29 Ohio 
Misc.2d 13, 504 N.E.2d 494, 494-95 (Ohio Com.Pl.1985) (applying Ohio’s 
fifteen-year statute of limitations to a breach of contract action that would have 
been barred by Virginia’s five-year statute); cf. Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 
F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir.1972) (holding this rule does not deny full faith and credit); 
Mackey v. Judy’s Foods, Inc., 867 F.2d 325, 328-29 (6th Cir.1989) (affirming the 
district court’s application of a similar rule in Tennessee). 
 
Cole v. Mileti, 133 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir.1998), citing Charash v. Oberlin College, 14 F.3d 291, 
299 (6th Cir.1994).  In so concluding, I recognize that Section 142 of the Restatement was revised 
in 1988, see 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws, Section 142 (1988), but the courts of 
our state have declined to adopt the revised version.  See Dudek v. Thomas & Thomas Attorneys & 
Counselors at Law, L.L.C., 702 F.Supp.2d 826, 834 (N.D.Ohio 2010), fn. 8 (stating that Ohio courts 
have continued to apply the original version of Section 142).  I agree that the 1971 version of Section 
142 is applicable here. 
January Term, 2016 
 
59 
diversity must apply the procedural law of the forum state, including the forum 
state’s statute of limitations). 
{¶ 140} The majority pays lip service to these principles, but it meanders 
through a muddied analysis that obfuscates the law for debtor and creditor alike so 
that it can hold that Delaware’s statute of limitations applies.  The majority 
accordingly reaches the outcome desired by both it and the decedent’s estate:  that 
FRIC’s claims were time-barred when it filed its complaint against the decedent. 
Application of the borrowing statute 
{¶ 141} For R.C. 2305.03(B) to apply here, there necessarily must first be 
a finding that the cause of action accrued in a different jurisdiction than Ohio.  See 
Combs v. Internatl. Ins. Co., 163 F.Supp.2d 686, 691 (E.D.Ky.2001) (“borrowing 
statute is triggered only when the cause of action accrued in another jurisdiction” 
[emphasis sic]), aff’d, 354 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.2004).  The trial court in this case was 
presented with conflicting arguments on that point and found little controlling case 
law.  Ultimately, it found the holdings by the federal trial and appellate courts in 
Combs to be “most persuasive in assisting this Court in its determination of where 
the present case ‘accrued.’ ” 
{¶ 142} In Combs, a federal trial court applying Kentucky law in a diversity 
case was confronted with a choice-of-law accrual question in a dispute involving 
the alleged breach of an insurance contract.  In a thorough analysis, that court 
concluded that a cause of action for payment of money allegedly due accrues where 
the decision to deny payment was made.  163 F.Supp.2d at 692-695. 
{¶ 143} Applying Combs, the trial court in this case held that the breach 
occurred in Ohio because the decedent made the decision not to make her payments 
while she was in Ohio: 
 
The Court finds that Ohio, where [the decedent] resides, primarily 
used the credit card, and decided to stop making the minimum 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
60 
required payments on her credit card, was where the breach of the 
agreement occurred.  The fact that [the decedent] was required to 
mail payments to Delaware does not determine where the breach 
occurred—or where the action accrued.  There is evidence that, for 
some period of time, [the decedent] was mailing payments to 
Illinois, rather than Delaware.  She could have also chosen to make 
her payments on the Internet, by telephone, or to a Chase bank 
branch.  The location where she sent her payments seems less 
significant in this case than the place where [the decedent] decided 
to stop making payments.  In summary, the Court finds that 
[FRIC’s] actions accrued in Ohio.  For this reason, the Court finds 
that Ohio’s statute of limitations applies to the present case. 
 
(Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 144} I agree with the trial court’s approach—which is grounded in law 
and common sense—that the location where the debtor lives, primarily uses the 
card, and decides not to make the payments is more significant to the breach than 
the place where payments would have been sent if there had been no breach.  See, 
e.g., Combs, 163 F.Supp.2d at 692-695.  Because I would find the cause of action 
accrued in Ohio, I would hold that the borrowing statute is inapplicable here. 
{¶ 145} Conversely, the majority’s view, in essence, is that Ohio consumers 
who are solicited with credit-card applications in Ohio, complete the applications 
in Ohio and mail the applications from Ohio, then receive the credit cards in Ohio 
and use the credit cards in Ohio, nevertheless would be better served by having the 
law of Delaware—or whichever state they mailed their payments to—apply to any 
claims arising from the credit-card agreements. 
{¶ 146} Notably, however, the place where a creditor is incorporated or 
requests to receive its payments should not be controlling, given that “Congress’ 
January Term, 2016 
 
61 
purpose in passing the FDCPA was ‘to prevent debt collectors from bringing 
collection suits in forums located at great distances from debtors’ residences.’ ”  
Harrington v. CACV of Colorado, L.L.C., 508 F.Supp.2d 128, 134 (D.Mass.2007), 
quoting Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F.Supp. 1130, 1139 (D.Del.1992), citing S.Rep. No. 
95-382, at 5, reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News 1695, 1699.  And the 
borrowing statute was designed to prevent a plaintiff from forum shopping when 
the plaintiff’s claims have expired, Miami Valley Mobile Health Servs., Inc. v. 
ExamOne Worldwide, Inc., 852 F.Supp.2d 925, 932 (S.D.Ohio 2012). 
{¶ 147} As the majority acknowledges, Ohio’s borrowing statute, in 
essence, “directs a forum court to ‘borrow’ the limitation period of another state if 
the cause of action accrued in that foreign state and that state’s limitation period is 
shorter than the forum state’s limitation period.”  Majority opinion at 37, citing 
Dudek v. Thomas & Thomas Attorneys & Counselors at Law, L.L.C., 702 F.Supp.2d 
826, 835 (N.D.Ohio 2010), citing Combs, 354 F.3d at 578, and CMACO Automotive 
Sys., Inc. v. Wanxiang Am. Corp., 589 F.3d 235, 244 (6th Cir.2009). 
{¶ 148} The 
better-reasoned 
analysis 
of 
precedent 
mandates 
a 
determination that the cause of action in this case accrued in Ohio, because an Ohio 
consumer executed a contract for a credit card in Ohio, made purchases with that 
card in Ohio, and defaulted on the debt in Ohio.  As one court explained in 
considering a choice-of-law dispute involving a Chase credit card issued to an 
employee of an Ohio corporation, because the credit-card agreement “was applied 
for and signed in Ohio and, as the card was used by an Ohio corporation, its primary 
effect was in Ohio.”  Heiges v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 521 F.Supp.2d 641, 
646 (N.D.Ohio 2007).  The trial court in this case properly found that public-policy 
considerations also support the conclusion that Ohio is where the cause of action 
accrued, because the primary effect of the credit-card agreement was in Ohio. 
{¶ 149} The majority looks to only one aspect of the history of the case and 
elevates that fact—the place where payments were sent—to be dispositive.  In 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
62 
doing so, it ignores the many compelling facts that indicate strongly that Ohio 
interests predominate in this case:  at all times relevant here, the decedent was an 
Ohio resident, she applied for the card from her residence in Ohio, and her decision 
not to make the payments due on her account was a decision made in Ohio.  Thus, 
the proper result is to hold that the cause of action accrued in Ohio, Combs, 163 
F.Supp.2d at 692-695; Heiges at 646, and because it accrued in Ohio, R.C. 
2305.03(B) is inapplicable and Ohio law controls the determination of the statute 
of limitations, Combs at 691. 
{¶ 150} The majority clings to Meekison v. Groschner, 153 Ohio St. 301, 
91 N.E.2d 680 (1950), even though Meekison itself recognized that there is 
abundant authority for the view that a cause of action accrues where the contract is 
to be performed or where the breach occurs.  Id. at 306.  And Meekison is 
fundamentally distinguishable from this case because it involved a simple note, 
executed in Michigan by Michigan residents, that was required to be paid six 
months later “at Napoleon, Ohio” pursuant to the explicit terms of the note.  Id. at 
302-303. 
{¶ 151} In litigation involving simple, short-term contracts like basic 
promissory notes, the rule stated in Meekison works well.  But it retains little vitality 
in the context of contemporary credit-card-collection cases, which arise from 
monthly accountings of credit advanced by lenders to consumers for purchases and 
the interest or other charges that accrue with that credit, routine defaults on the 
required payments, and the frequent inability of consumers and creditors to 
maintain adequate records of the underlying contracts establishing credit-card 
accounts.  It is no wonder that until today, no court in America has ever applied 
Meekison in a reported decision involving a credit-card debt; and it has been 35 
years since an Ohio appellate court last cited Meekison in any context.  Its holding 
should not be imported to the credit-card context presented by this case. 
 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
63 
Improper Application of Substantive Law 
{¶ 152} Despite the majority’s haste to conclude that the cause of action 
accrued in Delaware and therefore that Delaware law controls the statute of 
limitations, the majority then ignores Delaware law in its analysis of the substantive 
issues before us.  I am left to wonder why, if the cause of action accrued in 
Delaware, the majority’s analysis is absolutely devoid of any discussion of 
Delaware substantive law.  This is particularly of concern given that the decedent’s 
attorneys provided the trial court with a Chase “cardmember agreement” as an 
exhibit to a filing in that court, and that agreement clearly states that the terms and 
enforcement of the cardholder agreement and the decedent’s account were 
governed by federal law, “AND, TO THE EXTENT STATE LAW APPLIES, THE 
LAW OF DELAWARE, * * * WHERE WE AND YOUR ACCOUNT ARE 
LOCATED, WILL APPLY NO MATTER WHERE YOU LIVE OR USE THE 
ACCOUNT.”  (Capitalization sic.)  I suspect that the majority wholly ignores 
Delaware law in its analysis because it cannot use Delaware law to reach the result 
it wants.  Whatever its reasoning may be, it is clear that the majority applies Ohio 
law to the substantive issues without any explanation of why Ohio law controls. 
{¶ 153} Even assuming that Ohio law controls the resolution of the 
substantive issues, the majority’s analysis is unsatisfying. 
{¶ 154} The majority erroneously concludes that any cause of action against 
the decedent accrued in Delaware because the decedent failed to make payments to 
Chase in Delaware.  In doing so, it ignores the record before us—premised on its 
belief that all of the decedent’s payments were sent to Delaware—when, in fact, the 
decedent’s attorneys submitted a document obtained during discovery to the trial 
court establishing that she mailed payments to Delaware and Illinois, and the trial 
court relied on that evidence in considering where the cause of action accrued.  If, 
as the majority concludes, the place of payment is dispositive, then the majority 
should address why Illinois law is irrelevant to the analysis. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
64 
{¶ 155} But that aside, the lead opinion’s analysis of the date the cause of 
action accrued in this case is not sufficient. 
{¶ 156} FRIC contended during discovery that the cause of action accrued 
on January 1, 2005, the date that the decedent “first failed to make her minimum 
[monthly] payment and defaulted on her obligation.”  The decedent did not clearly 
dispute that date, but in her amended counterclaim against FRIC and Cheek, she 
alleged that the cause of action accrued “at the latest” on August 10, 2006, a date 
one month after her last payment on the delinquent account.  But the decedent never 
established that the 2006 date was the date the cause of action accrued, and she 
never established that FRIC’s assertion that the cause of action accrued in 2005 was 
erroneous.  The trial court found that the cause of action accrued in January 2005, 
and the lead opinion adopts that as the time of accrual. 
{¶ 157} The author of the concurring opinion agrees with the majority’s 
analysis and disposition of this appeal, except that the author of that opinion asserts 
that the cause of action did not accrue until June 28, 2006, the date on which the 
decedent made her last payment.  The report produced by the FTC mentioned 
earlier suggests that the view expressed in the concurring opinion is consistent with 
the law of most states, i.e., that “a partial payment on a time-barred debt revives the 
entire balance of the debt for a new statute of limitations period.”  Structure and 
Practices at 47.  And at least one Ohio appellate court has adopted a similar view.  
Midland Funding, L.L.C. v. Hottenroth, 2014-Ohio-5680, 26 N.E.3d 269, ¶ 24 (8th 
Dist.) (“Typically, the making of a partial payment on an open account before the 
statute of limitations expires extends the implied promise to pay the balance owed 
amount, acting to renew the statute of limitations period”), appeal accepted and 
held for decision in this case, 142 Ohio St.3d 1464, 2015-Ohio-1896, 30 N.E.3d 
973; see also Himelfarb v. Am. Express Co., 301 Md. 698, 705, 484 A.2d 1013 
(1984).  And one federal court, applying Delaware law, has noted that 
“[d]etermining whether a debt is time-barred is not always a simple task,” because 
January Term, 2016 
 
65 
courts have to “consider many factors, such as the charge-off date, tolling issues, 
revival issues, and any actions between the debtor and creditor that may have 
modified their original agreement.”  Riffle v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 311 
F.R.D. 677, 684 (M.D.Fla.2015), citing Hart v. Deshong, 40 Del. 218, 8 A.2d 85 
(Super.1939) (Delaware law recognizes that an unconditional acknowledgement of 
a debt or a payment on an account can extend the statute of limitations to collect 
the debt). 
{¶ 158} Given the majority’s ultimate holding that Delaware’s statute of 
limitations applies, I need not opine on whether the lead opinion or concurring 
opinion, if either, is correct.  I expressly use the time of accrual adopted by the lead 
opinion solely for purposes of evaluating the propriety of other aspects of the lead 
opinion. 
{¶ 159} If the lead opinion is correct in its determination of the time of 
accrual, the lead opinion’s summary analysis permitting the retroactive application 
of Ohio’s borrowing statute is not proper.4 
{¶ 160} Ohio’s current borrowing statute, R.C. 2305.03(B), became 
effective on April 7, 2005.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7915, 
7930-7931, 8037; see Dudek, 702 F.Supp.2d at 836.  The borrowing statute cannot 
be applied retroactively to deprive a party of the right to sue on an accrued 
substantive right, including for breach of contract.  See Ohio Constitution, Article 
II, Section 28 (“The General Assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive 
laws”); Gregory v. Flowers, 32 Ohio St.2d 48, 290 N.E.2d 181 (1972), paragraph 
three of the syllabus (“When the retroactive application of a statute of limitation 
operates to destroy an accrued substantive right, such application conflicts with 
Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution”).  As Judge O’Malley wrote in 
                                                 
4 The concurring opinion’s analysis of the date the cause of action accrued places the accrual date 
after the effective date of the borrowing statute. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
66 
Dudek, a case on which the lead opinion relies, there is not an iota of authority 
supporting retroactive application of the borrowing statute: 
 
It is well-established that, in the absence of a “clear pronouncement 
by the General Assembly that a statute is to be applied 
retrospectively, a statute may be applied prospectively only.”  State 
v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, [2002-Ohio-4009,] 772 N.E.2d 1172, 
1175 (2002) [¶ 14]; see also State v. Brooks, 163 Ohio App.3d 241, 
[2005-Ohio-4728,] 837 N.E.2d 796, 800] ([4th Dist.] 2005) [¶ 13] 
(“In determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally retroactive, 
a court must first determine whether the General Assembly intended 
it to apply retroactively.  In the absence of such an express finding 
by the General Assembly, the presumption of prospective 
application may not be overcome, and the court’s inquiry into 
whether the statute may be constitutionally applied retrospectively 
ends” [citations and footnote omitted]). 
Nothing in the language of O.R.C. § 2305.03(B) 
demonstrates that the Ohio General Assembly intended the statute 
to apply retroactively.  The Court has not located any case law 
suggesting that the legislature intended O.R.C. § 2305.03(B) to 
apply retroactively, and the parties have cited none.  And, the few 
courts that have considered this issue have held that the borrowing 
statute cannot be applied retrospectively.  Curl [v. Greenlee Textron, 
Inc.], 404 F.Supp.2d [1001,] at 1008 [(S.D.Ohio 2005)] (“[T]here 
[is] no precedent showing that Ohio courts would apply § 2305.03 
retroactively”); D.A.N. Joint Venture III, L.P. v. Armstrong, [11th 
Dist. Lake] No. 2006-L-089, 2007-Ohio-898, ¶ 29, 2007 WL 
634457 (Ohio Ct.App.2007) (“Amended R.C. 2305.03(B) cannot be 
January Term, 2016 
 
67 
applied retroactively * * *”); Ormond v. Anthem, Inc., No. 05-cv-
1908, 2008 WL 906157, *19, n. 12, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30230, 
*59, n. 12 (S.D.Ind. Mar. 31, 2008) (“There is no evidence that the 
Ohio General Assembly intended its borrowing statute to be applied 
retrospectively”). 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  Dudek, 702 F.Supp.2d at 836-837. 
{¶ 161} The lead opinion concedes that the effective date of the borrowing 
statute—the linchpin of its analysis designed to invoke Delaware’s statute of 
limitations—was more than three months after the date the lead opinion determines 
the cause of action accrued.  But it nevertheless retroactively applies the borrowing 
statute to appellants, blithely asserting that “ ‘ “[a] period of limitations already 
running may also be shortened by the legislature” as long as “a period sufficiently 
long to allow a reasonable time to begin suit” is allowed.’ ”  Lead opinion at ¶ 57, 
quoting State ex rel. Nickoli v. Erie MetroParks, 124 Ohio St.3d 449, 2010-Ohio-
606, 923 N.E.2d 588, ¶ 29, quoting 1A Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
Section 4.102[3], at 4-74 (3d Ed.2006).  The lead opinion suggests that the statute 
of limitations can be reduced from six years to three years, because “even with that 
shortening, there existed a reasonably long period of time for FRIC to file suit,” 
and therefore the lead opinion concludes that applying the borrowing statute to this 
case is not unconstitutional despite its retroactive application.  Lead opinion at  
¶ 58. 
{¶ 162} But the lead opinion does not tell us why or how three years is 
“reasonably long,” particularly when three years not only halves Ohio’s six-year 
statute of limitations, but also obliterates FRIC’s claim while breathing life into the 
decedent’s counterclaims.  The borrowing statute cannot be employed retroactively 
to create such a result.  See Cook v. Matvejs, 56 Ohio St.2d 234, 237, 383 N.E.2d 
601 (1978).  Indeed, the lead opinion itself quotes our prior holding that the  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
68 
“ ‘ “retroactivity clause nullifies those new laws that ‘reach back and create new 
burdens, new duties, new obligations, or new liabilities not existing at the time [the 
statute becomes effective].’ ” ’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Lead opinion at ¶ 55, quoting 
Tobacco Use Prevention & Control Found. Bd. of Trustees v. Boyce, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 511, 2010-Ohio-6207, 941 N.E.2d 745, ¶ 14, quoting Bielat v. Bielat, 87 Ohio 
St.3d 350, 352-353, 721 N.E.2d 28 (2000), quoting Miller v. Hixson, 64 Ohio St. 
39, 51, 59 N.E. 749, 752 (1901).  It then wholly ignores the teaching of that 
precedent, despite the fact that applying the borrowing statute in this case clearly 
imposes new duties and liabilities on appellants who, prior to today, were not 
forbidden from attempting to collect the decedent’s debt and now are even being 
subjected to liability for doing so. 
No Violation of the Consumer-Protection Statutes Occurred in this Case 
{¶ 163} I agree, as a general matter, that debt collectors, including attorneys 
engaged in debt collections, can be held liable under both the OCSPA and the 
FDCPA.  Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 
(1995).  But I dissent strongly from the majority’s conclusions that because 
appellants brought a claim that the court today declares was time-barred under 
Delaware law and because appellants requested interest in an amount in excess of 
Ohio’s statutory interest rate, they are potentially liable under both statutory 
schemes.  The majority’s flawed analyses of these two issues not only improperly 
subject appellants to liability in this case, those analyses portend great risk for all 
plaintiffs and their attorneys in future cases. 
{¶ 164} As already explained, I would hold that the complaint was timely 
filed, and therefore I reject the notion that the mere filing of the complaint can be a 
statutory violation or can give rise to a potential abuse-of-process claim.  More 
importantly to the appellants before us is the fact that prior to this court’s holding 
today, there was ample precedent to support a debt collector bringing suit in an 
Ohio court against an Ohio debtor for a debt that was less than six years old.  
January Term, 2016 
 
69 
Appellants’ suit was not frivolous—nor was it sanctionable under the civil rules—
when the complaint was filed.5  Liability should not be imposed on these appellants 
for not being sufficiently prescient to predict an outcome to this appeal that even 
most justices of this court likely did not expect. 
{¶ 165} Turning my focus to the issue regarding the amount of interest set 
forth in the prayer in the complaint, the notion that FRIC’s demand for 24 percent 
interest in the complaint giving rise to this suit violated the FDCPA and the OCSPA 
requires more analysis.  Although I agree with the decedent’s estate that FRIC 
ultimately did not establish that it was entitled to interest at the rate claimed in the 
complaint,6 I disagree with the estate’s contention—and the majority’s 
determination—that demanding that rate in a complaint potentially violated the 
FDCPA and the OCSPA. 
{¶ 166} FRIC contends that it cannot be held liable under the FDCPA and 
the OCSPA for asserting in its complaint that it was entitled to an interest rate of 
24 percent.  Having carefully evaluated precedent for both positions, I would adopt 
the view of most jurisdictions, which supports FRIC’s position and is better 
                                                 
5 If a falsehood is alleged without good cause, the court may sanction the plaintiff pursuant to the 
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.  See Argentieri v. Fisher Landscapes, Inc., 15 F.Supp.2d 55, 63 
(D.Mass.1988) (declining to impose sanctions under the FDCPA because they were imposed under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11).  But the fact that a plaintiff “demands” a particular legal conclusion, judgment, 
and relief, whether in compensatory or punitive damages, interest, costs, or attorney’s fees, does not 
make the requested relief the basis for sanctions unless there is a clear showing that the attorney 
making the demand knew, or should have known, that the demand was not supported by the law.  
See Civ.R. 11. 
6 R.C. 1343.03(A) provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that a creditor is entitled to interest 
on an account in either the statutory rate as determined pursuant to R.C. 5703.47 or the interest rate 
set forth in a written contract entered between the parties.  See, e.g., United Collections, L.L.C. v. 
Tucholski, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-04-1314, 2005-Ohio-2495, ¶ 4, 7.  “R.C. 1343.03(A) requires a 
written contract, not simply an additional term added to an invoice and met without resistance by 
another party, to establish an interest rate greater than that set forth in R.C. 5703.47.”  Minster 
Farmers Coop. Exchange Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 117 Ohio St.3d 459, 2008-Ohio-1259, 884 N.E.2d 
1056, ¶ 25.  This court, Ohio’s courts of appeals, and the Sixth Circuit all hold that an invoice or 
billing statement is not sufficient to establish a written agreement for purposes of R.C. 1343.03(A).  
See Minster Farmers at ¶ 27-28, and cases cited therein. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
70 
reasoned and consistent with both common law and the intent and goals of the 
FDCPA.  Several rationales are central to my conclusion. 
{¶ 167} First, seeking damages, costs, and attorney’s fees in a complaint is 
distinguishable from other conduct a debt collector may engage in.  As one federal 
district court in Ohio has explained in dismissing a FDCPA claim that was based 
on the debt collector’s prayer for relief: 
 
[A] prayer for relief does not constitute a representation that the 
defendant must pay the amount listed, nor that the creditor is entitled 
to these additional amounts.  The prayer for relief is not a demand 
to the debtor himself.  Rather, the prayer for relief is what it purports 
to be—a prayer or request directed to the court.  The FDCPA does 
not extend protection to communications to courts.  See, e.g. 
O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, L.L.C., 635 F.3d 938, 940-
41, 944 (7th Cir.2011) (“the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does 
not extend to communications that would confuse or mislead a state 
court judge”). 
 
Hrivnak v. NCO Portfolio Mgt., 994 F.Supp.2d 889, 898 (N.D.Ohio 2014). 
{¶ 168} Another federal district court has explained the rationale for 
rejecting the argument that a debt collector violates the FDCPA by making a claim 
for attorney’s fees in a complaint to recover the debt from the creditor: 
 
A prayer for relief in a complaint, even where it specifies the 
quantity of attorney’s fees, is just that:  a request to a third party—
the court—for consideration, not a demand to the debtor himself.  A 
request for attorney’s fees ultimately rests upon the discretion of the 
court and a determination of applicability at a later stage of the 
January Term, 2016 
 
71 
litigation.  The whole purpose of regulating debt collection was to 
“supervise” a range of unsupervised contacts, such as demand letters 
and late-night telephone calls.  In contrast, a statement in a pleading 
is supervised by the court and monitored by counsel.  The two 
situations are drastically different. 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  Argentieri v. Fisher Landscapes, Inc., 15 F.Supp.2d 55, 61-62 
(D.Mass.1998.) 
{¶ 169} Other federal courts around the country have adopted rationales 
similar to Hrivnak and Argentieri.  See, e.g., Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 
733 F.Supp.2d 635, 649 (D.Md.2010) (holding that a prayer for attorney’s fees was 
“a request directed to the court, not a communication directed to the debtor, and 
certainly not a misrepresentation”); Winn v. Unifund CCR Partners, D.Ariz. No. 
CV 06-447-TUC-FRZ, 2007 WL 974099, *3 (Mar. 30, 2007) (a prayer for relief 
“is what it purports to be—a ‘prayer’ or request for a certain amount of attorney’s 
fees”); Rael v. Davis, S.D.Ind. No. 1:06-cv-0081-JDT-TAB, 2006 WL 2346396, *5 
(Aug. 11, 2006) (holding that a request for attorney’s fees in a complaint was a 
request to the court, not a demand on the debtor, and noting that “resolution of the 
request ultimately would depend on future events and the judgment of the state 
court judge”).  As the Seventh Circuit has noted, 
 
Whatever shorthand appeared in the complaint * * * was harmless 
rather than an effort to lead anyone astray.  It was the judge, not [the 
debtor], who had to be able to determine to whom the debt was 
owed, for it is the judge (or clerk of court) rather than the defendant 
who prepares the judgment specifying the relief to which the 
prevailing party is entitled. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
72 
Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, L.L.C., 480 F.3d 470, 473 (7th 
Cir.2007). 
{¶ 170} Only a few cases have addressed the specific context of a prayer 
for interest in a complaint that seeks to collect a debt.  I agree with those that have 
adopted and applied the rationale in Argentieri to cases in which interest is sought 
in a complaint.  See, e.g., Hart v. Pacific Rehab of Maryland, P.A., D.Md. No. ELH-
12-2608, 2013 WL 5212309, *23 (Sept. 13, 2013) (holding that a request for 
prejudgment interest in a complaint is akin to a request to a court for attorney’s fees 
and is not actionable as an improper FDCPA representation); Bird v. Pressler & 
Pressler, L.L.P., E.D.N.Y. No. 12-CV-3007(JS)(ETB), 2013 WL 2316601, *2 
(May 28, 2013) (applying Argentieri and finding no FDCPA violation because a 
complaint’s “prayer for relief of pre-judgment interest is a request upon the Court”). 
{¶ 171} Put another way, demands made in a complaint are “aspirational” 
requests, not absolute statements of entitlement.  Cisneros v. Neuheisel Law Firm, 
P.C., D.Ariz. No. CV06-1467-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 65608, *3 (Jan. 3, 2008) 
(noting that the “fact that the prayer alleges a special amount is no more binding on 
Plaintiff than any other factual allegation in the complaint” and that “the prayer for 
relief is aspirational—it describes what the collection agency seeks if it prevails, 
including ‘such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper’ ”). 
{¶ 172} Indeed, Ohio law has long held that the prayer is not a dispositive 
portion of the complaint.  “The prayer of a petition is no part of the cause of action, 
but merely indicates the object thereof, the remedy sought or the legal consequences 
of the facts set forth in the petition.  It is a mere incident to the petition.”  Harbage 
v. Ferguson, 27 Ohio Law Abs. 227, 229, 1938 WL 3192 (C.P.1938).  See also 
Martini v. Cicatiello, 74 Ohio Law Abs. 289, 292, 140 N.E.2d 336 (7th Dist.1955), 
quoting 19 American Jurisprudence, Equity, Section 226, at 181 (1939) (“ ‘Prayers 
for relief are special or general, and the cautious pleader includes both in his bill.  
In the special prayer, the complainant indicates the particular relief which he 
January Term, 2016 
 
73 
deems suited to his case and asks the court to grant that relief; in the prayer for 
general relief, he merely asks that he may have “such other, further, and general 
relief as he may be entitled to” ’ ” [footnote deleted and emphasis added]).  In other 
words, the prayer merely reflects what the plaintiff seeks from the court, but the 
complaint sets forth the theory of the case, and the evidence on damages adduced 
in discovery and/or presented at trial controls the relief that the court ultimately 
orders.  See James H. Herron Co. v. Jones, 28 Ohio App. 190, 197, 162 N.E. 624 
(8th Dist.1927); McGurrer v. Halliday, 15 Ohio Dec. 753, 754, 1905 WL 1273 
(C.P.1905).  Until today, the prayer alone has not been regarded as dispositive in 
determining the nature of the cause of action.  Goldstein v. Rousey, 8 Ohio Law 
Abs. 439, 440, 1930 WL 2164 (1st Dist.1930); accord Roller v. Patrick, 145 Ohio 
St. 572, 579, 62 N.E.2d 367 (1945).  “[T]he prayer of a pleading is no part of the 
cause of action, and the relief which may be given may be different than that asked 
for in the prayer, but the prayer may be examined to determine what the pleader 
intends by his pleading and the relief he is seeking and supposes he is entitled to 
receive.”  Parker v. Cent. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Ohio App. 169, 176, 128 N.E.2d 
440 (3d Dist.1953).  The character of a claim should continue to be determined by 
the contents of the entire complaint, and not, as the majority does here, by focusing 
solely on the prayer.  See Martini at 292. 
{¶ 173} The court of appeals in this case distinguished this matter from 
Argentieri and instead relied upon Foster v. D.B.S. Collection Agency, 463 
F.Supp.2d 783 (S.D.Ohio 2006).  The majority embraces Foster as well.  But Foster 
is wholly inapposite here. 
{¶ 174} The court in Foster found that a violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2)(b) 
occurred because a request for attorney’s fees—not for interest—was made upon 
the debtors despite the fact that such fees were categorically barred by an Ohio 
statute, former R.C. 1301.21 (proscribing creditors from recovering attorney’s fees 
incurred during litigation to collect “personal, family or household” debt).  Id. at 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
74 
802.  Foster turned on the court’s determination that the demand in the complaint 
“constituted an absolute entitlement to attorney fees, even though such fees are not 
recoverable under Ohio law.”  Id. 
{¶ 175} Similarly, the other courts that have found parties potentially liable 
under the FDCPA based on prayers in complaints have focused on the fact that the 
relief sought in the prayers was impossible or improper as a matter of law.  See, 
e.g., LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1193, 1195-1198 (11th 
Cir.2010) (liability could arise from a debt collector’s threat to file a lawsuit when 
the debt collector had failed to comply with a statutory requirement to register as a 
debt collector and therefore could not legally bring suit); Bradshaw v. Hilco 
Receivables, L.L.C., 765 F.Supp.2d 719, 729-730 (D.Md.2011) (viewing the filing 
of a debt-collection lawsuit without the required statutory license as “a threat to 
take * * * action that cannot legally be taken” under 15 U.S.C. 1692e(5)); Russey 
v. Rankin, 911 F.Supp. 1449, 1454 (D.N.M.1995) (a debt collector’s letter 
threatening to file a collection lawsuit when the debt collector could not file a 
lawsuit in its own name was an action that could not legally be taken).  See also 
Harrington, 508 F.Supp.2d at 136 (a fraudulent motion for default judgment is a 
“threat to take action that cannot legally be taken” in violation of 15 U.S.C. 
1692e(5)). 
{¶ 176} The majority relies heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., L.L.C., 770 F.3d 443 (6th Cir.2014) to hold 
that a mere request in a complaint for interest that is not available violates the 
FDCPA.  But as Judge Batchelder explained in her dissent in Stratton, that opinion 
is built on shaky foundations: 
 
Particularly pernicious is the majority’s holding that Stratton 
has stated a claim under § 1692e(5).  Section 1692e(5) prohibits 
“[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is 
January Term, 2016 
 
75 
not intended to be taken.”  In this case, however, PRA actually filed 
a state court complaint; it did not threaten to do so. 
We instructed in Hartman v. Great Seneca Financial Corp., 
569 F.3d 606, 611 (6th Cir.2009), that “[w]hen interpreting the 
FDCPA, we begin with the language of the statute itself.”  (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Although § 1692e broadly prohibits a 
debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading 
representation or means in connection with the collection of any 
debt,” Stratton pleaded a violation of § 1692e(5), which specifically 
requires a “threat.”  The majority is right that we may “proscribe 
other improper conduct which is not specifically addressed” under 
§ 1692e, but Stratton has not alleged a violation of § 1692e and  
§ 1692e(5) does not authorize the majority to ignore the specific 
textual requirement. 
To hold that PRA threatened to take illegal action the 
majority must mean either (1) filing a complaint can be a “threat” 
within the meaning of § 1692e(5), or (2) § 1692e(5) penalizes even 
actions that have already been taken.  Neither proposition is true. 
* * * 
We have never held that filing a complaint is itself a “threat” 
within the meaning of § 1692e(5).  The source of authority for the 
majority’s contrary conclusion is our unpublished opinion in Gionis 
v. Javitch, Block, Rathbone, LLP, 238 Fed.Appx. 24 (6th Cir.2007).  
But in Gionis the actual “threat” to recover unauthorized attorney 
fees appeared in an affidavit appended to the complaint, not in the 
complaint itself.  We said explicitly that the “unlawful ‘threat’ to 
collect attorney fees was made in the Affidavit,” id. at 29, which was 
intended to communicate directly with the debtor; the complaint was 
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not itself the “threat.”  Both Foster v. D.B.S. Collection Agency, 463 
F.Supp.2d 783 (S.D.Ohio 2006), and Poirier v. Alco Collections, 
Inc., 107 F.3d 347 (5th Cir.1997), are similarly distinguishable. 
The reason for excluding complaints from “threat” liability 
should be clear.  If filing a court complaint is per se a “threat,” then 
every time a debt collector loses in court it has threatened to take 
action it may not legally take—it has thus violated the FDCPA.  The 
“least sophisticated consumer” standard does not mean that every 
time a debt collector makes a reasonable mistake of fact or law it 
has thus violated federal law.  To hold that Congress contemplated 
such a scheme defies belief. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Stratton, 770 F.3d at 454 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 177} FRIC’s request for interest at the 24 percent rate was not 
necessarily barred by Ohio law.  Had FRIC produced the actual agreement at issue 
in this case and had the agreement provided that an interest rate in excess of the 
statutory limitation was agreed to by both of the originally contracting parties, FRIC 
might have been entitled to an award of interest at that rate.  I cannot conclude that 
interest at the 24 percent rate is recoverable here, because no party in this case 
produced the original agreement during discovery.  My conclusion, however, is 
quite different from a determination that FRIC was barred, as a matter of law, from 
seeking interest at that rate in its complaint against the decedent.  FRIC’s claim for 
24 percent interest fails because of an evidentiary shortcoming that was not clarified 
in the discovery process, not because FRIC is barred, as a matter of law, from 
seeking that interest. 
{¶ 178} As many courts have recognized in similar situations, the fact that 
FRIC did not establish its entitlement to 24 percent interest at the initial pleading 
stage is not the same as FRIC making a false representation that it was entitled to 
January Term, 2016 
 
77 
24 percent interest.  See Matrix Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Swope, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 
No. 94943, 2011-Ohio-111, 2011 WL 208063, ¶ 18 (“Even if a 25% interest rate is 
‘impermissible,’ as Swope claims, the [trial] court’s ruling does not conflict with 
its finding that Matrix did not violate the FDCPA or the OCSPA because the court 
was to determine the proper interest rate at trial”).  This is particularly true given 
that both the decedent and appellants attempted to use billing statements as 
evidence during the litigation, and the billing statements in the record consistently 
reflect that the applicable interest rate was understood to be 24.99 percent. 
{¶ 179} Everything in a complaint and counterclaim filed in a court is an 
allegation, subject to being admitted or denied by the opposing party and then 
clarified through the discovery process and in subsequent litigation.  See Hillin v. 
Beightler, 32 Ohio Law Abs. 251, 1939 WL 8086 (2d Dist., Franklin Cty., 1939).  
Indeed, the decedent employed this same understanding throughout her class-action 
counterclaims, asserting allegations based on purported facts (e.g., the decedent’s 
averment of how a debt buyer paid for her debt) or legal conclusions (e.g., the 
decedent’s assertions that FRIC and Cheek had engaged in deceptive acts and 
should be subject to punitive damages).  Nothing more was required of the decedent 
and quite properly so.  But equity requires that nothing more should be required of 
FRIC. 
{¶ 180} Lastly, the majority ignores that Ohio is a notice-pleading state, 
State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall, 141 Ohio St.3d 234, 2014-Ohio-4724, 23 N.E.3d 1077, 
¶ 41 (O’Neill, J., dissenting), citing Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio 
St.3d, 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 768 N.E.2d 1136, ¶ 29, and, therefore, FRIC was not 
required to plead operative facts beyond its general allegations and needed only to 
give adequate notice of its claims to allow the decedent to fairly defend against 
them.  See Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St.2d 88, 92, 326 N.E.2d 
267 (1975).  Moreover, FRIC was required to include that request for relief in its 
prayer in order to pursue the opportunity to recover interest.  See, e.g., Civ.R. 8(A).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
78 
FRIC properly attached to its complaint copies of the bills of sale of the rights to 
the decedent’s account and a billing statement that Chase had sent to the decedent, 
thereby giving the decedent more definitive notice of its claim for interest and the 
basis of that claim.  Rather than being used to abuse or harass a debtor, that 
information was used to clarify and contextualize the claim for interest. 
{¶ 181} Having considered the complaint as a whole, I would hold that 
liability under the FDCPA and OCSPA does not attach when the prayer in the 
complaint simply sets forth the relief that the plaintiff seeks if it proves its case. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 182} Debt collection can be a hardhearted business.  When debt 
collectors violate consumer-protection laws, they should be held accountable.  
However, no violations occurred in this particular case. 
{¶ 183} In its efforts to solve a very large and very complex problem, the 
lead opinion makes analytical leaps over mountains of precedent without providing 
satisfying explanations:  Delaware’s statute of limitations controls causes of action 
based on credit-card debt simply because Ohio consumers have mailed (or should 
have mailed) payments to Wilmington in that state; Ohio’s borrowing statute can 
be retroactively applied to not only deprive plaintiffs of their causes of action but 
also to subject them to liability where liability was not clear before; and requests 
for relief made by a plaintiff’s attorney in a complaint—whether for attorney fees, 
or interest, or punitive damages—can be used to establish liability against the 
attorney as well as the attorney’s client. 
{¶ 184} If nothing else, it seems ironic that if the precedent established 
today by the court is faithfully applied in future cases, consumers and plaintiffs will 
lose many benefits provided to them by Ohio law through the same opinion that the 
majority evidently believes will save them. 
FRENCH, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2016 
 
79 
Burke & Horrigan, James F. Burke Jr., and John J. Horrigan, for appellee. 
 
Surdyk, Dowd & Turner Co., L.P.A., Jeffrey C. Turner, John Langenderfer, 
and Kevin A. Lantz, for appellants First Resolution Investment Corporation and 
First Resolution Management Corporation. 
Law Office of Boyd W. Gentry, L.L.C., and Boyd W. Gentry, for appellants 
Cheek Law Offices, L.L.C., and Parri Hockenberry. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy 
Solicitor, and Tracy M. Dickens, Teresa A. Heffernan, Jeffrey Loeser, Brittany M. 
Steele, and Melissa G. Wright, Assistant Attorneys General, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
 
Burdge Law Office Co., L.P.A., and Ronald L. Burdge, urging affirmance 
for amicus curiae AARP. 
Sessions, Fishman, Nathan & Israel, L.L.C., and Michael D. Slodov, urging 
reversal for amici curiae Ohio Creditors Attorneys Association and DBA 
International. 
_____________________