Case Title: State v. Perez

Citation: 976 P.2d 379

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
976 P.2d 379 (1999) 90 Hawai`i 65 STATE of Hawai`i, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Roman PEREZ, also known as Raymond Perez, Respondent-Appellant. No. 20880. Supreme Court of Hawai`i. February 8, 1999. Reconsideration Denied March 4, 1999. *380 Deborah L. Kim, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, for the respondent-appellant, Roman Perez. James M. Anderson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, for the petitioner-appellee, State of Hawai`i. MOON, C.J., KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ. LEVINSON, J. We issued a writ of certiorari to review the published decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in State v. Perez, 90 Hawai`i 113, 976 P.2d 427 (App.1998) (hereinafter the "ICA's decision"). In its application for certiorari, the prosecution asserts that the ICA erroneously vacated Perez's convictions of attempted second degree murder, in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 705-500 (1993),[1] 707-701.5 (1993),[2] and 706-656 (1993)[3] (Count I), attempted assault in the first degree, in violation of HRS §§ 705-500 and 707-710 (1993)[4] (Count II), and two counts of reckless endangering in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 707-713 (1993)[5] (Counts III and V). Specifically, the prosecution contends that the ICA erred in holding that two of the circuit court's jury instructionsNo. 3, pertaining to the defense of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED), and No. 2A, pertaining to reasonable doubtwere prejudicially harmful. We disagree with the ICA's analysis regarding Jury Instruction No. 3, as set forth in section III.C of the ICA's decision, inasmuch as the ICA mischaracterized the significance of the presence or absence of "self-control" in the determination as to whether a criminal defendant was under the influence of EMED in such a manner as to mitigate the culpability of his or her conduct from murder to manslaughter, pursuant to HRS § 707-702(2) (1993).[6] Accordingly, we hold *381 that the circuit court did not err in giving Jury Instruction No. 3. However, we agree with the ICA's analysis regarding Jury Instruction No. 2A, as set forth in section IV of the ICA's decision, and, therefore, affirm the ICA's decision vacating Perez's convictions and remanding for a new trial. We further affirm the ICA's decision in all other respects. The charges against Perez arose from an incident in which he fired shots at his wife, Nova. The Perezes' relationship had evidently become strained when, in mid-1996, Nova became romantically involved with "Nani," a security guard at the Hawai`i Newspaper Agency (the HNA), where Nova was also employed. Perez was aware that Nova had been involved in lesbian relationships in the past, but did not discover until sometime between late 1995 and early 1996 that Nova had become reinvolved. Perez did not object to Nova's lifestyle as long as she "c[a]me home." However, as the ICA's decision recites, ICA's decision at 116-18, 976 P.2d at 430-32 (some brackets added and some in original). At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the circuit court instructed the jury regarding the mitigating defense of attempted EMED manslaughter as follows: (Citing State v. Matias, 74 Haw. 197, 204, 840 P.2d 374, 378 (1992).) The prosecution subsequently argued in closing argument as follows: After his conviction, Perez was sentenced to imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole in connection with his conviction of Count I, imprisonment for ten years in connection with his conviction of Count II, and prison terms of five years each in connection with his convictions of Counts III and V, together with mandatory minimum terms of twenty years, ten years, and five years, respectively. Each of the foregoing terms was ordered to be served concurrently. On appeal, Perez argued that the circuit court had committed reversible error in (1) giving certain jury instructions and (2) failing to admonish the prosecution or to issue a curative instruction when the prosecution allegedly raised the issue of Perez's punishment in its closing argument. The ICA agreed that the circuit court had incorrectly instructed the jury pertaining to (1) the definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the significance of self-control in determining whether Perez had acted under the influence of EMED so as to mitigate the charge of attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. ICA's decision at 125, 128-29, 976 P.2d at 439, 442-43. Accordingly, the ICA vacated Perez's convictions and remanded the matter to the circuit court for a new trial. Id. at 129, 976 P.2d at 444. *385 Subsequently, the prosecution applied to this court for a writ of certiorari, contesting the ICA's holdings that the aforementioned jury instructions were prejudicially erroneous. State v. Maumalanga, 90 Hawai`i 58, 62-63, 976 P.2d 372, 376-77 (1998) (quoting State v. Cullen, 86 Hawai`i 1, 8, 946 P.2d 955, 962 (1997)) (some brackets added and some in original). In holding that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that the presence or absence of self-control "is a significant factor in deciding whether [a defendant] was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance," the ICA first traced the historical development of the principles embodied in HRS § 707-702(2), see supra note 6, and Hawai`i case law interpreting that statute. ICA's decision at 121-23, 976 P.2d at 435-37. While it acknowledged that the concept of "EMED manslaughter" found its roots in the English common law, which defined voluntary manslaughter "as springing from `passion... tending to disturb the judgment and mental faculties, and weaken the possession of self-control,'" Id. at 122, 976 P.2d at 436 (quoting State v. Russo, 69 Haw. 72, 77, 734 P.2d 156, 159 (1987) (quoting King v. Greenwell, 1 Haw. 146, 149 (1853))) (ellipsis points in original), the ICA expressed the views that "the concept of lack of self-control as derived from common-law manslaughter is already subsumed in the penal code defense of emotional disturbance" and that "the `criterion of a general weakening of self-control' ... was not the same as but rather `something approximating the Code's [already] more general approach to mental and emotional extenuation'" ICA's decision at 122-23, 976 P.2d at 436-37 (quoting Commentary on HRS § 707-702) (emphasis deleted) (brackets in original).[7] The ICA further reasoned: ICA's decision at 123-24, 976 P.2d at 437-38 (some brackets added and some in original) (emphasis and ellipsis points in original) (footnote omitted). The prosecution, in its application for certiorari, urges that the ICA's analysis was flawed because, The prosecution's argument demonstrates the better understanding of the mitigating EMED defense. It is insufficient for a criminal defendant merely to allege that he or she was experiencing emotional distress at the time of the charged offense. As this court noted in Seguritan, the mitigating EMED defense "focuses ... on the defendant's reaction to the stress," i.e., on whether the defendant's reason was "overborne." 70 Haw. at 174, 766 P.2d at 129 (emphasis added). The key distinction, therefore, is between the "intentional" or "knowing" character of conduct, on the one hand, and its "controllability," on the other. Knight, in which the defendant appealed his second degree murder conviction, provides an apt illustration. Knight, 80 Hawai`i at 319, 909 P.2d at 1134. In that case, the defendant was accused of killing a gay man after an alleged homosexual encounter in the victim's apartment: Id. at 322-24, 909 P.2d at 1137-39, 1141 (some brackets added and some in original) (some emphases added, some omitted, and some in original) (footnotes omitted). Evidence of a criminal defendant's state of mind may take a variety of forms. There may be expert testimony regarding the matter, as in Matias. State of mind may be established by way of the defendant's own testimony, as in Knight. Or it may, as in the present case, be inferred via evidence of the defendant's conduct and demeanor at the time of the charged offense. See State v. Mitsuda, 86 Hawai`i 37, 44, 947 P.2d 349, 356 (1997) (quoting State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 254, 831 P.2d 924, 934, reconsideration denied, 73 Haw. 625, 834 P.2d 1315 (1992)) ("[G]iven the difficulty of proving the requisite state of mind by direct evidence in criminal cases, `[w]e have consistently held that... proof by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from circumstances surrounding the [defendant's conduct] is sufficient.... Thus, the mind of an alleged offender may be read from his acts, conduct and inference fairly drawn from all of the circumstances.'" (Some brackets added and some in original.)) Perez contends that "[t]he prosecutor... exploited the fact that the instructions failed to adequately define `self-control' by arguing that since there was no evidence that Mr. Perez exhibited any hysteria or stereo-typical loss of control, Mr. Perez was not under the influence of EMED." On the record before it, however, the jury could legitimately have inferred that Perez's conduct was inconsistent with his claim of being "under the influence" of EMED. That being the case, the prosecution was justified in urging it to do so. It is undoubtedly true, as Perez asserts, that, under some circumstances, persons experiencing a loss of self-control, resulting from being under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, may behave in an outwardly calm or even semi-catatonic state. That being the case, a defendant is free to adduce expert testimony or other evidence pertaining to his or her state of mind offense in order to rebut the prosecution's contention that outward calm was evidence of self-control. Such testimony was, in fact, adduced in Matias, 74 Haw. at 200, 840 P.2d at 376. Perez, however, apparently opted not to do so here. Irrespective of the wisdom of Perez's decision in retrospect, it does not constitute reversible error. See State v. Richie, 88 Hawai`i 19, 39, 960 P.2d 1227, 1247 (1998) (quoting State v. Aplaca, 74 Haw. 54, 70, 837 P.2d 1298, 1307 (1992)) ("`[T]he decision whether to call witnesses in a criminal case is normally a matter of judgment of counsel, and, accordingly, will rarely be second-guessed by judicial hindsight.'") This court noted in Russo that to hold that evidence that an individual "would coolly seek out and intentionally kill the owner and *390 a patron of a bar he once frequented and justify the acts on grounds that habitués of the establishment were `leaving me out' of their activities ... furnishes a basis for mitigating the offense of murder to manslaughter `would [be to] undermine the normative message of the criminal law' communicated via HRS §§ 707-701 and 707-702." 69 Haw. at 79-80, 734 P.2d at 160 (citing Model Penal Code § 210.3 comment 5). Similarly, we believe that to hold that evidence that an individual who "obtained a loaded gun, went to [his wife's] work place, waited for her to show up, shot methodically, put the gun away and walked away," in and of itself, furnished a basis for mitigating the offense of attempted murder to attempted manslaughter, as Perez presently argues, "`would [likewise] undermine the normative message of the criminal law' communicated via HRS §§ 707-701 and 707-702." The appellate courts of this jurisdiction have observed on many occasions that "EMED manslaughter ... is [ ] the intentional killing of another `while under the influence of a reasonably induced emotional disturbance causing a temporary loss of normal self-control.'" Knight, 80 Hawai`i at 326, 909 P.2d at 1141 (quoting Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 27, 904 P.2d at 927); see also Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 45, 904 P.2d at 930 ("[I]t is in HRS § 707-702(2) ... that the legislature has codified the common law of "voluntary manslaughter."); Matias, 74 Haw. at 204, 840 P.2d at 378 ("[A] killer's self-control, or lack of it, at the time of the killing is a significant, even determining, factor in deciding whether the killer was under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance such that his conduct would fall under HRS § 707-702(2)."); Dumlao, 6 Haw.App. at 181-82, 715 P.2d at 829 ("[An] extreme [mental] or emotional disturbance is the emotional state of an individual, who ... has an extreme emotional reaction to [an unusual and overwhelming stress] as a result of which there is a loss of self-control and reason is overborne by intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation or other similar emotions.") We therefore hold that the circuit court did not err in the present matter by instructing the jury consistently therewith. Because we agree with the ICA that Jury Instruction No. 2A, defining reasonable doubt, was prejudicially misleading, we affirm the ICA's decision vacating Perez's convictions and remanding the present matter to the circuit court for a new trial. However, we hold that the circuit court did not err in giving Jury Instruction No. 3, pertaining to the role of self-control in determining whether a defendant is acting under the influence of EMED in such a manner as to reduce attempted murder to attempted EMED manslaughter. In all other respects, we affirm the ICA's decision. [1] HRS § 705-500 provides: Criminal attempt. (1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if the person: (a) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as the person believes them to be; or (b) Intentionally engages in conduct which, under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the person's commission of the crime. (2) When causing a particular result is an element of the crime, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime if, acting with the state of mind required to establish liability with respect to the attendant circumstances specified in the definition of the crime, the person intentionally engages in conduct which is a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause such a result. (3) Conduct shall not be considered a substantial step under this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the defendant's criminal intent. [2] HRS § 707-701.5 provides in relevant part that "a person commits the offense of murder in the second degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another person.... Murder in the second degree is a felony for which the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment as provided in section 706-656." [3] HRS § 706-656(2) provides in relevant part that "[p]ersons convicted of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment with possibility of parole." [4] HRS § 707-710 provides in relevant part that "[a] person commits the offense of assault in the first degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes serious bodily injury to another person." [5] HRS § 707-713 provides in relevant part: Reckless endangering in the first degree. (1) A person commits the offense of reckless endangering in the first degree if the person employs widely dangerous means in a manner which recklessly places another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury or intentionally fires a firearm in a manner which recklessly places another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury. [6] HRS § 707-702(2) provides: In a prosecution for murder in the first and second degrees it is a defense, which reduces the offense to manslaughter, that the defendant was, at the time he caused the death of the other person, under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation. The reasonableness of the explanation shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as he believed them to be. [7] But see State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i 27, 34, 904 P.2d 912, 919 ("We thus inherit, with minimal modifications, several enduring principles regarding manslaughter from the English common law: (1) manslaughter may be either `voluntary' or `involuntary,' but not both; (2) voluntary manslaughter arises out of a purposeful but `hasty' act that would constitute murder but for the absence of `malice' and the presence of `provocation,' `passion,' or `heat of blood,' which is unsubsided by `sufficient cooling-time'; [and] (3) involuntary manslaughter arises out of an unjustified and unintentional act of homicide[.]"), reconsideration denied, 80 Hawai`i 187, 907 P.2d 773 (1995).