Case Title: Sanders v. Martin

Citation: 662 So. 2d 241

Docket Number: 1930254

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1995-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
662 So. 2d 241 (1995)
Terrill W. SANDERS, as administrator of the Estate of Kenneth Wayne Elkins, deceased
v.
Harvey Franklin MARTIN, Jr., et al.
1930254.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 19, 1995.
*242 Robert E. Cooper and Deborah Alley Smith of Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, for Appellant.
William R. Myers of Yearout, Myers & Traylor, P.C., Birmingham, for Appellees.
COOK, Justice.
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order (see Rule 5, Ala.R.App.P.) holding that Harvey Franklin Martin's action against Terrill W. Sanders, as administrator of the estate of Kenneth Wayne Elkins, is not barred by the statute of limitations.
On April 21, 1989, Harvey Franklin Martin was injured when the vehicle he was driving was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle driven by Kenneth Wayne Elkins. On April 19, 1991, Martin sued, naming Kenneth Wayne Elkins as a defendant and alleging that Martin's injuries were caused by wantonness or negligence on the part of Elkins. Martin also named as a defendant Elkins's father, Frank Elkins, alleging negligent and wanton entrustment of a motor vehicle. Frank Elkins filed a motion for summary judgment in June 1991, and his motion was granted in August 1991. That summary judgment is not involved in this appeal. Kenneth Wayne Elkins had died on March 5, 1991, more than a month before Martin filed his complaint, from injuries not related to the accident that is the subject of this appeal.
Although a motion to quash service of process and to dismiss the complaint was filed with the trial court in May 1991, stating that Elkins had died in March, Martin made no attempt to amend his complaint to name Elkins's estate as a defendant until February 28, 1992, two years and 10 months after the accident and 9 months after Martin had learned of Elkins's death. Terrill Sanders, *243 the county administrator of Jefferson County, was appointed administrator of Elkins's estate on February 12, 1992. In April 1992, Sanders filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint; the trial court treated that motion as a motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order denying the motion and allowing the amendment. We permitted this appeal from that interlocutory order. We reverse and remand.
The administrator contends that the complaint filed against Kenneth Elkins was void because Elkins had died before it was filed. The administrator further argues that, because the complaint did not commence an action against Elkins, any amendment to the complaint, filed after the running of the period permitted by the statute of limitations, would not relate back to the original filing of the complaint. Martin, on the other hand, argues that, because a complaint was filed against both Elkins and his father, there was a case pending and the amendment should relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint, under Rule 15(c), Ala. R.Civ.P.Rule 15(c) states:
Under the facts of this case, there can be no relation back, because the administrator of Elkins's estate, Terrill Sanders, was not appointed until after the statutory limitations period had run and, therefore, could not have had knowledge of Martin's complaint until after the limitations period had run.
In Golatte v. Mathews, 394 F. Supp. 1203 (M.D.Ala.1975), the following fact situation was before the Federal district court:
394 F. Supp.  at 1203, 1205-07. We agree with the Federal district court's interpretation of Alabama law. Rule 25 states: "If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties." Clearly this rule is applicable only where an action is pending, i.e., where a complaint has been filed. Frank Elkins was dead when the complaint was filed against him. Therefore, the procedure for substitution of parties under Rule 25 is not applicable.
*245 The administrator also contends that this case falls within the purview of § 6-2-14, Ala.Code 1975, for purposes of determining whether the statutory limitations period was tolled to allow a cause of action to be filed against Elkins's estate.
Section 6-2-14 states:
By this Code section, the running of the limitations period is tolled for a period of up to, but not exceeding six months, in order to allow a plaintiff to sue the estate of a deceased defendant.
Martin made no attempt to sue Elkins's estate until 2 years and 10 months after the accident. Given the wording of § 6-2-14, we must conclude that Martin failed to file his claim against the estate within the period permitted by the statute of limitations. Martin claims that two things kept him from filing his amendment within the time allowed. He first claims that there was no ruling on the motion to quash service on Kenneth Elkins. We note that Martin did not have to wait on a ruling on that motion to file an amendment to the complaint. Martin next claims that no administrator had yet been appointed. We note that Martin could have requested the court to appoint an administrator of the estate. Although apparently this was eventually done, it was not done within the time allowed by the statute.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions for the trial court to enter a judgment in favor of Terrill Sanders, as administrator of the estate of Kenneth Elkins.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MADDOX, SHORES, HOUSTON, KENNEDY, and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
BUTTS, J., dissents.