Case Title: Spriggie Hensley v. Jeffrey P. Endicott

Citation: 2001 WI 105

Docket Number: 2000AP000076

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 105 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
00-0076 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Spriggie Hensley,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Jeffrey P. Endicott and Wisconsin  
Department of Corrections,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 189 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 649, 618 N.W.2d 245 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 11, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 30, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Steven D. Ebert 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners the 
cause was argued by Michael D. Oeser, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by 
Beth Ermatinger Hanan and Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & 
Rieselbach, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Beth E. Hanan. 
 
2 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Michael P. 
May and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field LLP, Madison, on behalf of 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation. 
 
2001 WI 105 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 00-0076 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Spriggie  
Hensley,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey P. Endicott, and Wisconsin  
Department of Corrections,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State ex rel. Hensley v. 
Endicott, 2000 WI App 189, 238 Wis. 2d 649, 618 N.W.2d 245, 
reversing an order of the Dane County Circuit Court, Steven D. 
Ebert, Judge.  There are two issues.  The first issue is whether 
there is a common law futility exception to the Prisoner 
Litigation 
Reform 
Act's 
(PLRA), 
codified 
at 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(b)(1997-98),1 statutory exhaustion requirement.  We 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 version unless otherwise indicated.  
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
2 
find that the statute is clear on its face in requiring 
prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to 
bringing an action in circuit court.  Accordingly, there is no 
common law futility exception to the PLRA.  The second issue is 
whether the court of appeals' holding that Wis. Stat. § 227.40, 
a declaratory judgment statute, trumps the PLRA was contrary to 
rules of statutory construction.  Because the PLRA is more 
specific and passed later in time than § 227.40, it should have 
been 
applied 
to 
require 
the 
prisoner 
to 
exhaust 
his 
administrative remedies. 
I 
¶2 
Spriggie 
Hensley 
(Hensley), 
incarcerated 
in 
the 
Columbia Correctional Institution in Portage County, filed a 
complaint for declaratory judgment against the Department of 
Corrections (DOC) in Dane County Circuit Court challenging the 
validity of two administrative regulations on First Amendment 
and Equal Protection grounds.  The first regulation prohibited 
prisoners from having pornographic materials while the second 
prohibited prisoners from having cassette tapes and tape 
players.  The DOC responded with a motion to dismiss because 
Hensley failed to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies 
per the PLRA.  Although the circuit court found that Hensley 
stated a claim, it concluded that he was required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies under the PLRA and therefore dismissed 
his complaint.  Hensley appealed. 
¶3 
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the 
circuit court.  In so doing, the court observed that Hensley 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
3 
claimed the rules "are unconstitutional; and that question is 
unsuited to resolution through an inmate complaint review 
process in a particular correctional institution."  Hensley, 
2000 WI App 189, ¶5.  The court then found two cases 
"persuasive" on the issue of exhaustion, Cravatt v. Thomas, 399 
F.Supp. 956 (W.D. Wis. 1975), and Green v. Nelson, 442 F. Supp. 
1047 (D. Conn. 1977).  Hensley, 2000 WI App 189, ¶¶6-7.  Sharing 
the "sentiments" expressed in those cases, the court of appeals 
asserted "that to require Hensley to advance his constitutional 
challenges to the rules in question before his institution's 
complaint 
review 
committees 
and 
appeal 
personnel 
as 
a 
precondition to raising them is unnecessary."  Id. at ¶¶7-8.  
Instead, the court found that Wis. Stat. § 806.04, which sets 
forth the general rules governing declaratory relief, and Wis. 
Stat. § 227.40(1), which deals with contesting the validity of 
administrative rules through declaratory judgment proceedings, 
trumped the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.  Id. at ¶3. 
¶4 
We subsequently 
accepted 
the DOC's 
petition for 
review. 
II 
¶5 
Before reaching the first substantive issue, we must 
address Hensley's threshold assertion, urged at oral argument, 
that we should decline to review whether there is a common law 
futility exception to the PLRA because the underlying dispute in 
this case has been rendered moot by the implementation of an 
emergency 
administrative 
rule, 
temporarily 
supplanting 
the 
particular prison rules challenged by Hensley.  Wis. Admin. Reg. 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
4 
No. 543 (Mar. 2001).  Even though an issue may be moot, this 
court will nevertheless address that issue if:  (1) the issue is 
of great public importance; (2) the situation occurs so 
frequently that a definitive decision is necessary to guide 
circuit courts; (3) the issue is likely to arise again and a 
decision from the court would alleviate uncertainty; or (4) the 
issue will likely be repeated but evades appellate review 
because the appellate process cannot be completed or even 
undertaken in time to have a practical effect on the parties.  
State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 66, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999).  Here, 
the first issue is whether the PLRA applies to a broad class of 
constitutional challenges raised by prisoners.  This issue is 
likely to arise again and a decision from this court will 
alleviate uncertainty circuit courts may have on whether they 
should find that a particular prisoner has exhausted his or her 
administrative remedies as a precondition for a challenge to a 
condition of the facility in which he or she is confined.  Thus, 
we will address this issue as presented and briefed by the 
parties.  Id.  For the sake of completeness, we will address the 
second related issue of whether Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1) trumps 
the PLRA on the requirement of exhaustion. 
¶6 
Hensley asserts that there is common law futility 
exception to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement.  He therefore 
presents an issue of statutory construction.  We review 
questions of statutory construction de novo.  State ex rel. 
Cramer v. Court of Appeals, 2000 WI 86, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 
613 N.W.2d 591.   
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
5 
¶7 
The analytical framework for Wisconsin courts when 
confronted with a dispute that necessarily entails resolution of 
a point of statutory construction is well-established law.  When 
we are confronted with a case that presents an unresolved point 
of statutory construction, we engage in statutory interpretation 
to discern the legislative intent.  State v. Sprosty, 227 
Wis. 2d 316, 323-24, 595 N.W.2d 692 (1999).  As we have 
previously commented, "[o]ur duty to fulfill legislative intent 
ensures that we uphold the separation of powers by not 
substituting judicial policy views for the views of the 
legislature."  Cramer, 2000 WI 86 at ¶17. 
¶8 
In adhering to our adjudicative role, we employ our 
established analytical framework on a point of statutory 
construction, 
which 
avoids 
invading 
the 
province 
of 
the 
legislature.  First, we look at the plain language of the 
statute.  Id. at ¶18.  Where the language of the statute is 
clear, we do not look beyond the language of the statute to 
discern legislative intent.  Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d at 324.  It is 
only upon a finding of ambiguity that a court turns to extrinsic 
materials in order to discern the legislative intent.  Cramer, 
2000 WI 86 at ¶18. 
¶9 
The PLRA, codified at Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(b), 
provides: 
 
No prisoner may commence a civil action or special 
proceeding, including a petition for a common law writ 
of certiorari, with respect to the prison or jail 
conditions in the facility in which he or she is or 
has been incarcerated, imprisoned or detained until 
the person has exhausted all available administrative 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
6 
remedies 
that 
the department 
of 
corrections has 
promulgated by rule or, in the case of prisoners not 
in the custody of the department of corrections, that 
the sheriff, superintendent or other keeper of a jail 
or house of correction has reduced to writing and 
provided reasonable notice of to the prisoners. 
The plain language of the PLRA here indicates the intent of the 
legislature.  It encompasses all prisoners who challenge 
"conditions in the facility in which he or she is or has been 
incarcerated, imprisoned, or detained" through civil actions or 
special proceedings, as well as common law writs of certiorari. 
 Id.  No such proceeding can be commenced unless the prisoner 
"exhausted all available administrative remedies."  Id.  The 
plain language contains no exception regarding futility.  It is 
not within our judicial function to insert the phrase "where 
they are not shown to be futile" after "administrative remedies" 
in the statute.  Therefore, we conclude that the plain language 
of 
the 
PLRA 
requires 
prisoners 
to 
exhaust 
all 
their 
administrative remedies prior to challenging a condition in 
their respective facilities through any civil actions or special 
proceedings, including common law writs of certiorari. 
 
¶10 In interpreting Wisconsin's PLRA on the issue of 
exhaustion, we can take guidance from the United States Supreme 
Court's recent interpretation of the federal PLRA, upon which 
the Wisconsin PLRA is based, in Booth v. Churner, 121 S. Ct. 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
7 
1819 (2001).2  See Cramer, 2000 WI 86 at ¶38.  In Booth, a state 
prisoner in Pennsylvania brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in 
federal court alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment right 
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by corrections 
officers.3  121 S. Ct. at 1821.  Booth, like Hensley, asserted 
that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies 
                     
2 The federal PLRA provides that "[n]o action shall be 
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of 
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."  42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(2000).  Thus, there is only a slight variation 
between the federal PLRA and the Wisconsin PLRA statutes.  
Hensley places great emphasis on the difference between the two 
statutes, arguing that it undercuts the persuasive force of 
Booth v. Churner, 121 S. Ct. 1819 (2001), as well as other 
federal decisions interpreting the federal PLRA.  We disagree.  
Our purpose in interpreting a statute is to discern the intent 
of the legislature. State v. Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 323, 595 
N.W.2d 692 (1999).  In a case decided just last year, we said 
that the federal PLRA was the model for the Wisconsin PLRA.  
State ex rel. Cramer v. Court of Appeals, 2000 WI 86, ¶38, 236 
Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 591.  Hensley has presented no special 
justification 
that 
compels 
us 
to 
rescind 
that 
recent 
determination.  Accordingly, we find the United State Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Booth persuasive on the issue before 
us:  whether a prisoner needs to exhaust administrative remedies 
when challenging a condition in the facility where he or she has 
been incarcerated or detained. 
3 Hensley attempts to distinguish Booth from the present 
case on the ground that he did not file a claim in federal court 
or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but rather filed under Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40(1), which allows a challenge to an administrative rule. 
 We find Hensley's distinction lacking because the holding in 
Booth was not confined to the procedural posture of the specific 
fact pattern before the court; instead the Booth court discussed 
the meaning of the word "exhaustion" in the federal PLRA and 
resolved a split among the federal circuits on that issue.  121 
S. Ct. 1819, 1824-25.  The meaning of the word "exhaustion" in 
the Wisconsin PLRA is similarly at issue in the present case. 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
8 
when the "prison's process simply cannot satisfy the inmate's 
sole demand, the odds of keeping the matter out of court are 
slim."  Id. at 1823.  Therefore, the Supreme Court focused on 
the phrase "administrative remedies . . . available" in the 
federal PLRA which is the same as "available administrative 
remedies" in Wisconsin's PLRA.  Id.  To resolve the issue raised 
by Booth, the Supreme Court looked to the context of this phrase 
and the statutory history of the federal PLRA.  Id. at 1824.  
Both points are instructive in the present case regarding 
Wisconsin's PLRA. 
 
¶11 On 
the 
first 
point, 
the 
context 
of 
the 
word 
"exhausted," the Supreme Court noted that "[w]hile the modifier 
'available' requires the possibility of some relief for the 
action 
complained 
of . . . , 
the 
word 
'exhausted' 
has 
a 
decidedly procedural emphasis.  It makes sense only in referring 
to the procedural means, not the particular relief ordered."  
Id.  We adopt the Supreme Court's interpretation of "exhausted" 
for the Wisconsin PLRA.  The word "exhausted" in Wisconsin's 
PLRA refers to the procedural means, not the specific relief 
Hensley requested. 
¶12 On the second point, the statutory history of the 
federal PLRA, the Supreme Court observed an earlier version gave 
a court discretion "to require a state inmate to exhaust 
'such . . . remedies as are available,' but only if those 
remedies were 'plain, speedy, and effective.'  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a)(1994 ed.)."  Id.  However, Congress eliminated the 
phrase referring to "plain, speedy, and effective" remedies.  
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
9 
Id. at 1825.  In light of this deletion by Congress, the Supreme 
Court asserted that "we think that Congress has mandated 
exhaustion clearly enough, regardless of the relief offered 
through administrative procedures."4  Id. at 1825.  In contrast, 
the Wisconsin PLRA never had any such contingent phrase.  
Because Wisconsin's PLRA does not contain any contingent 
language 
regarding 
exhaustion, 
it 
follows 
that 
the 
PLRA 
eliminated any common law futility exception in the context of 
prisoner litigation that may have existed prior to its passage 
and mandated exhaustion regardless of the relief sought by the 
prisoner.  
 
¶13 But the court of appeals found a futility exception to 
the exhaustion requirement in Wisconsin's PLRA as asserted by 
Hensley.  Although neither the court of appeals nor Hensley 
highlight any ambiguity within the statute that enables them to 
reach beyond its plain language for extrinsic evidence, both 
cite State ex. rel. Smith v. McCaughtry, 222 Wis. 2d 68, 72, 586 
N.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1998), as authority for a futility exception 
to the exhaustion requirement in the PLRA.  In Smith, the court 
of appeals stated that "[f]ailure to plead exhaustion of 
remedies, where they are not shown to be futile, is fatal to a 
complaint."  Id.  In support, the Smith court cited State ex. 
                     
4 As noted previously, the Supreme Court also explained that 
it had granted certiorari to address conflict among the federal 
circuits on the issue of exhaustion, and in the process, 
overruled Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 1998) and 
Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 1997), which are 
relied on by Hensley.  Booth v. Churner, 121 S.Ct. at 1822. 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
10
rel. Braun v. Krenke, 146 Wis. 2d 31, 39, 429 N.W.2d 114 (Ct. 
App. 1988).  Braun, however, was decided prior to the passage of 
both Wisconsin's PLRA and the federal PLRA.  See Cramer, 2000 WI 
86, ¶38 (recounting the history and passage of the PLRA).  It 
did not confront the plain unambiguous language present in the 
PLRA.  It follows, then, that this sentence in Smith regarding 
exhaustion of remedies does not create a futility exception to 
the exhaustion requirement because it relied on Braun, which was 
superseded by the legislature's subsequent passage of the PLRA. 
 To the same vein, the court of appeals' reliance on Cravatt, 
399 F. Supp. 956, and Green, 442 F. Supp. 1047, is misplaced——
both cases were decided prior to the passage of Wisconsin's PLRA 
and therefore did not confront the plain unambiguous language at 
bar in the PLRA.   
 
¶14 Hensley, however, argues that the PLRA is inapplicable 
here because it applies to the conditions of confinement in a 
particular institution.  In contrast, he contends, his challenge 
is statewide and constitutionally based.  And "[n]othing in the 
language of the statute or the pertinent administrative code 
provisions expressly requires exhaustion when the scope of the 
challenge is state-wide, and constitutionally based."  To be 
sure, the DOC administrative rules Hensley challenged applied to 
all correctional facilities under the ambit of the DOC, not just 
the Columbia Correctional Institution.  Nevertheless, Hensley's 
argument makes a distinction without a difference.  The PLRA 
refers to challenges made "with respect to the prison or jail 
conditions in the facility in which he or she has been 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
11
incarcerated, 
imprisoned 
or 
detained." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(b).  The plain language of the PLRA, then, does not 
make the distinction that Hensley presses.5  That is, so long as 
the conditions at issue relate to the institution in which the 
prisoner is incarcerated, the PLRA applies.  It is irrelevant 
whether those conditions relate to other institutions as well. 
 
¶15 Finally, Hensley contends that only the courts, not 
the DOC administrative staff, have the power to declare the 
rules and procedures unconstitutional.  According to Hensley, 
the alleged inability of the DOC to declare its own rules and 
procedures unconstitutional renders the exhaustion requirement 
superfluous.  As previously discussed, we reject this argument 
in light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of "exhausted" in 
the substantially similar federal PLRA statute. 
                     
5 Hensley attempts to buttress his argument on this point by 
comparing the PLRA with Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7) (1995-96).  
Hensley notes that in creating the PLRA in 1997, the legislature 
changed the exhaustion requirement from applying to actions 
involving DOC personnel to actions involving "the prison or jail 
conditions in the facility in which he or she is or has been 
incarcerated." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(b)(1997-98).  
Nevertheless, 
Hensley's 
argument 
is 
unpersuasive 
for 
two 
reasons.  First, as we observed in Cramer, the PLRA as passed in 
1997 was directed at curtailing "frivolous prisoner lawsuits 
related to prison or jail conditions."  2000 WI 86, ¶38 (citing 
the fiscal estimate LRB 4463/1, 1997 AB 688).  Thus, the PLRA is 
substantively different than Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7) (1995-96), 
not just a later variation of that statute.  Second, the fact 
that the legislature intended to ground challenges to a specific 
institution does not imply that the regulation being challenged 
has to be unique to that institution.  As noted above, there is 
no evidence in the plain language of the statute of such 
legislative intent. 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
12
 
¶16 Moreover, we find that Hensley's argument falls short 
because the exhaustion requirement does not prohibit prisoners 
from 
pursuing 
constitutional 
challenges 
against 
the 
DOC; 
instead, it creates a preliminary procedure that must be 
completed before a prisoner can mount such a challenge in 
circuit court.  As the seventh circuit observed in interpreting 
the analogous federal PLRA, "[s]ection 1997e [the federal PLRA] 
would not be worth much if prisoners could evade it simply by 
asking for relief that the administrative process is unable to 
provide.  An administrative claim may help to narrow a dispute 
or avoid the need for litigation."  Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 1999).  Hensley would disrupt 
the sweeping simplicity of the PLRA in order to get into circuit 
court sooner.  By introducing this exception to the exhaustion 
requirement into Wisconsin's PLRA, Hensley would subvert the 
legislature's intent and dramatically increase the number of 
prospective litigants as well as associated costs——which we have 
previously noted the PLRA was intended to reduce——in order to 
have his first go before a circuit court rather than a DOC 
administrator.  See Cramer, 2000 WI 86, ¶39 (noting that the 
PLRA "illustrates that the legislature intended to address the 
costly problems caused by prisoner litigation more expansively 
than the federal law).  As Judge Easterbrook queried in Perez:  
"What's the harm in waiting to see how the administrative 
process turns out?"  182 F.3d at 537.  On that same thread, at 
oral argument, Justice Bablitch asked Hensley's counsel, "as a 
practical matter, why does Mr. Hensley want to avoid the 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
13
administrative process?"  Hensley's response was essentially 
that he wanted "to stop this deprivation before it got started." 
 Thus, the crux of Hensley's argument, repeated throughout his 
brief and again at oral argument, is that the administrative 
process cannot grant him the relief he requested.  But see 
Booth, 121 S.Ct. at 1823 (federal PLRA "requires a prisoner to 
exhaust the grievance procedures offered, whether or not the 
possible responses cover the specific relief the prisoner 
demands").  He believes that an administrative law judge, in 
contrast to a circuit court judge, would not have stopped the 
implementation of the regulations at issue.  In short, he rests 
on his unsupported assumption that the administrative process 
would be futile.  But Hensley cannot know, anymore than we can 
know, how the administrative process will turn out.  His 
argument against the exhaustion requirement, then, is one 
sounding in policy rather than law.  However, the legislature 
has already made that policy decision in passing the PLRA and it 
is the adjudicative role of the courts to apply the plain 
unambiguous language of the PLRA to the case at hand. 
III 
¶17 Turning to the second issue, which is whether the 
court of appeals' holding that Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1), a 
declaratory judgment statute, trumps the PLRA in this context 
was contrary to rules of statutory construction, we begin with 
the arguments of Hensley and the State.  Hensley maintains that 
§ 227.40(1) is more specific than the PLRA in "terms of the form 
of relief requested."  Hensley further contends that the 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
14
legislature was aware of this declaratory judgment statute when 
it passed the PLRA in 1997 and would have made it expressly 
subject to the PLRA if that was its intention.  Finally, Hensley 
argues that the canon requiring harmonization of conflicting 
statutes mandates that facial constitutional challenges to 
statewide rules are exempt from the exhaustion requirement.   
¶18 The State counters that Wisconsin PLRA is more 
specific than the declaratory judgment statute and, therefore, 
under the rule of statutory construction that the more specific 
statute 
controls 
over 
the 
more 
general, 
is 
controlling.  
Furthermore, the State asserts that because the PLRA was enacted 
later than § 227.40(1), it should control.  Finally, the State 
maintains that the PLRA and the declaratory judgment statute 
could be harmonized because the PLRA only adds an additional 
pleading requirement. 
¶19 It 
is 
well-settled 
"that 
where 
two 
conflicting 
statutes apply to the same subject, the more specific controls." 
 Jones v. State, 226 Wis. 2d 565, 576, 594 N.W.2d 738 (1999).  
Importantly, 
"conflicts 
between 
different 
statutes, 
by 
implication or otherwise, are not favored and will not be held 
to exist if they may otherwise be reasonably construed."  Moran 
v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 553, 150 N.W.2d 
137 (1967).  It therefore follows that the statutes in question 
"must be construed in a manner that serves each statute's 
purpose."  Jones, 226 Wis. 2d at 576. 
¶20 Hensley sought declaratory judgment on the validity of 
administrative rules; such actions are typically governed by 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
15
Wis. Stat. § 806.04, which provides the general rules for 
declaratory relief, and Wis. Stat. § 227.40, which provides the 
procedures for contesting the validity of administrative rules. 
 In particular, Hensley relies on § 227.40(1), which states that 
a declaratory judgment may be rendered "whether or not the 
plaintiff has first requested the agency to pass upon the 
validity of the rule."  According to Hensley, a conflict exists 
between this language in § 227.40(1) and the PLRA, which 
mandates that a prisoner exhaust his or her administrative 
remedies prior to seeking relief in circuit court.  Hensley 
argues that this language in § 227.40(1) trumps the exhaustion 
requirement in the PLRA.  He asserts that the PLRA is not a more 
specific statute in terms of the form of the relief requested, 
and therefore, it should not control over § 227.40(1). 
¶21 We reject Hensley's argument.  The rule of statutory 
construction that a more specific statute controls over a more 
general statute is not measured by the relief requested, but by 
the subject matter in question.  See Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity 
House v. City of Menomonie, 93 Wis. 2d 392, 402, 288 N.W.2d 85 
(1980).  To be sure, there is a slight overlap between the PLRA 
and § 227.40(1) in that both relate to bringing causes of 
actions.  However, the PLRA is more specific than § 227.40(1) in 
that it is targeted at challenges to "conditions in the 
facility" while § 227.40(1) broadly allows judicial review of 
any administrative "rule."  The PLRA, then, is confined to 
prison conditions 
while 
§ 227.40(1) 
encompasses 
all 
rules 
promulgated 
by 
all 
administrative 
agencies 
in 
Wisconsin.  
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
16
Therefore, the breadth of § 227.40(1) is much greater than the 
PLRA.  That the PLRA trumps § 227.40(1) where challenges are 
made to a condition in the facility where a prisoner is 
incarcerated is bolstered by the fact that the PLRA was passed 
later in time than § 227.40(1).6  See Martineau v. State 
Conservation Comm'n, 46 Wis. 2d 443, 449, 175 N.W.2d 206 (1970) 
(ruling that a specific statute controls over a general statute 
is especially true when the specific statute is enacted after 
the general statute).  Accordingly, where a prisoner challenges 
a condition in the facility in which he or she has been 
incarcerated, the PLRA controls.  
IV 
¶22 In sum, we rule that pursuant to the plain text of the 
statute, 
there 
is 
no 
common 
law 
futility 
exception 
to 
Wisconsin's PLRA.  Moreover, we find that the recently passed 
PLRA, which is specifically targeted at requiring prisoners to 
exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing an action 
to challenge a condition at the institutions where they are 
incarcerated or detained, controls over the much broader 
§ 227.40(1), which in some cases allows an individual to obtain 
declaratory judgment on administrative rules regardless of 
whether he or she has exhausted all administrative remedies.  
Accordingly, we find that the PLRA requires Hensley to exhaust 
                     
6 The PLRA was first passed in 1997, while Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40(1) was passed in 1955.  See Cramer, 2000 WI 86, ¶38; 
§ 13, ch. 221, Laws of 1955; Wis. Stat. § 227.05 (1955). 
No. 
00-0076 
 
 
17
his administrative remedies before bringing an action in ciruit 
court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
00-0076.awb 
 
1 
¶23 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting).  Spriggie Hensley 
sought to constitutionally challenge the facial validity of 
administrative rules.  Apparently, his First Amendment challenge 
had 
merit. 
 
As 
the 
majority 
opinion 
explains, 
that 
constitutional 
challenge 
has 
been 
rendered 
moot 
by 
the 
implementation of an emergency administrative rule suspending 
the very rule challenged by Hensley.7  This emergency suspension 
was the result of a class action lawsuit filed in federal court, 
challenging the same administrative rule on First Amendment 
grounds.8 
¶24 Having 
asserted 
a 
meritorious 
constitutional 
challenge, this case now only involves the question of what 
procedural route a prisoner must take in a limited circumstance—
when a prisoner raises a constitutional challenge to the facial 
validity of an administrative rule. I conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40(1) is controlling because it more specifically applies 
to a facial challenge to an administrative rule.  Because of the 
interplay between the PLRA's exhaustion requirements and the 
Department 
of 
Corrections' 
(DOC) 
complaint 
procedure, 
a 
conclusion to the contrary would lead to an absurd result.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
¶25 This case involves the collision of two statutory 
provisions.  On the one hand, the PLRA requires exhaustion of 
                     
7 See Wis. Admin. Reg. No. 543, 4 (Mar. 2001).   
8 See Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (W.D. Wis. 
2000).   
00-0076.awb 
 
2 
administrative remedies prior to bringing an action in circuit 
court regarding "prison or jail conditions."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.02(7)(b).  On the other hand, Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1) 
states that "the exclusive means of judicial review of the 
validity of a rule shall be an action for declaratory judgment 
as to the validity of such rule brought in the circuit court for 
Dane County."  Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1) (emphasis added).  Under 
that statute, exhaustion of administrative remedies is expressly 
not required.  Id.   
¶26 There is an inevitable overlap between these two 
statutes where a prisoner seeks to challenge the facial validity 
of a rule relating to prison or jail conditions, as in the case 
at hand.  I agree with the majority that we are to determine 
which statute is more specific.  However, I disagree with the 
majority as to which aspect of the statutes we are to examine to 
determine that specificity:  the specificity in a prisoner's 
challenge to a condition of confinement under the PLRA or the 
specificity in a challenge to the facial validity of a rule 
under § 227.40(1).  
¶27 The majority concludes that Wisconsin's PLRA trumps 
Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1) on the grounds that the PLRA is more 
specific because it is confined to challenges to prison 
conditions, 
whereas 
§ 227.40(1) 
encompasses 
all 
rules 
promulgated by a Wisconsin administrative agency.  While the 
majority correctly notes that Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1) broadly 
applies to any administrative agency's rules, it also fails to 
note that it quite specifically applies to a challenge to the 
00-0076.awb 
 
3 
facial validity of a rule.  Likewise, while the majority 
accurately explains that the PLRA applies to any action by a 
prisoner relating to the conditions of confinement, it ignores 
that the PLRA quite generally applies to a broad array of 
challenges: 
facial 
challenges 
to 
administrative 
rules, 
challenges to the application of administrative rules, and 
challenges relating to conduct or action of DOC personnel, 
unrelated to administrative rules.   
¶28 I believe that we should focus on the application of 
Wis. Stat. § 227.40(1) to facial challenges addressing the 
validity of a rule.  Ultimately, in resolving the conflict 
between the PLRA and § 227.40(1) in this case, we are asked to 
determine which procedure is to be employed in a specific type 
of challenge.  As a result, I believe the nature of that 
challenge, rather than the substance of the challenge, should be 
determinative.   
¶29 I am compelled in this conclusion because a conclusion 
to the contrary would lead to an absurd result.  In interpreting 
and harmonizing statutes, we are to avoid an interpretation 
which would lead to an absurd result.  Peters v. Menard, Inc., 
224 Wis. 2d 174, 189, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999).   
¶30  Wisconsin Admin. Code ch. DOC 310, which sets forth 
the inmate complaint procedure that the majority would have an 
inmate exhaust, requires the filing of a complaint within 14 
days of "the occurrence giving rise to the complaint." Wis. 
00-0076.awb 
 
4 
Admin. Code § DOC 310.09(3) (Apr. 1998). 9  Presumably, where an 
inmate seeks to challenge an administrative rule on its face, 
rather than as applied, "the occurrence giving rise to the 
complaint" is the promulgation of the challenged rule.  Thus, 
there is no administrative remedy——as a matter of right——to 
address a facial challenge to a DOC rule after the initial two 
weeks of the rule's existence.  Such a limitation to a 
constitutional facial challenge is absurd. 
¶31 As a result of the majority's decision, a prisoner has 
only two weeks from the date that the rule is enacted to file a 
complaint facially challenging the constitutionality of the 
rule.  Such a time limit would require that notice of the 
enactment be given with relative lightning speed to the 
prisoners.  Such speed is often inconsistent with the realities 
of prison administration.   
¶32 Likewise, inconsistent with reality is the requirement 
that a prisoner challenge the facial validity of a rule within 
two weeks of its enactment even if a prisoner is not placed in 
the prison system until years after the enactment.  As a result 
of the majority's decision, absent the good graces of the prison 
administration to allow for a late filing, there is no avenue, 
whatsoever, for a person imprisoned more than two weeks after 
the enactment of the rule to raise a constitutional challenge 
addressing the facial validity of a rule.  This means that 
                     
9 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 310.09(3) also provides that 
an institution examiner "may accept a late complaint for good 
cause."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.09(3) (Apr. 1998).   
00-0076.awb 
 
5 
meritorious challenges to unconstitutional rules can be forever 
foreclosed if raised outside the two-week window of opportunity. 
 I do not believe the legislature intended such an absurd 
result. 
¶33 While the inmate complaint system is capable of 
addressing an "as applied" challenge to an administrative rule, 
to the extent that the DOC complaint procedure forecloses all 
facial challenges that a prisoner seeks to bring after the 
initial 14 days of the rule's existence, the system is wholly 
inadequate to address such a challenge.  Because Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.40(1) specifically applies to facial challenges to the 
validity of an administrative rule and because it does not 
require exhaustion and therefore does not suffer from the same 
infirmities as the procedure under the PLRA, I conclude that it 
should be controlling. 
¶34 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.