Case Title: State v. Jordan

Citation: 2010-Ohio-281

Docket Number: 20082119 and 20082172

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Jordan, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-281.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-281 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. JORDAN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Jordan, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-281.] 
To obtain a conviction for escape under R.C. 2921.34(A)(1), the state may prove 
that the defendant was subject to postrelease control without proving that 
during a sentencing hearing the trial court orally notified the defendant 
that he would be subject to postrelease control. 
(Nos. 2008-2119 and 2008-2172 — Submitted October 21, 2009 — Decided 
February 4, 2010.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Marion County,  
No. 9-08-11, 2008-Ohio-4647. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
To obtain a conviction for escape under R.C. 2921.34(A)(1), the state may prove 
that the defendant was subject to postrelease control without proving that 
during a sentencing hearing the trial court orally notified the defendant 
that he would be subject to postrelease control. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
I 
{¶ 1} The Third District Court of Appeals certified the following issue 
pursuant to Section 3(B)(4), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and App.R. 25: 
“If a defendant is under actual detention, can the defendant be convicted of 
escape under R.C. 2921.34(A)(1) when the record demonstrates that the defendant 
knew he was under detention or was reckless in that regard, irrespective of 
whether the defendant was properly under said detention?”  (Emphasis sic.)  We 
recognized the certified conflict and also accepted the case on discretionary 
appeal. 
{¶ 2} The determinative issue in this case is more narrow than the 
question certified by the court of appeals.  We have previously held that the 
version of  R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)1 that is relevant in this case required a trial court to 
advise a defendant at the sentencing hearing of the possibility of postrelease 
control and that the failure to do so would result in a void sentence.  State v. 
Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 12.  Here, the 
narrow issue before us is whether in order to prove the element of detention in a 
prosecution for escape, the state must show that the offender was notified of 
postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2929.19 during the underlying sentencing 
                                                 
1.  {¶ a} Former R.C. 2929.19(B)(3) provided: 
     {¶ b}“Subject to division (B)(4) of this section, if the sentencing court determines at the 
sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary or required, the court shall do all of the 
following: 
     {¶ c} “* * * 
     {¶ d} “(c) Notify the offender that the offender will be supervised under section 2967.28 of the 
Revised Code after the offender leaves prison if the offender is being sentenced for a felony of the 
first degree or second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree in the 
commission of which the offender caused or threatened to cause physical harm to a person; 
     {¶ e} “(d) Notify the offender that the offender may be supervised under section 2967.28 of the 
Revised Code after the offender leaves prison if the offender is being sentenced for a felony of the 
third, fourth or fifth degree that is not subject to division (B)(3)(e) of this section.”  Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 473, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5707, 5743-5744.   
January Term, 2010 
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hearing.  We hold that the state may prove that an accused was under detention 
for purposes of a prosecution for escape under R.C. 2921.34(A)(1) without 
offering affirmative evidence that the sentencing court orally advised the offender 
of the possibility of the imposition of postrelease control.2  Thus, we answer the 
narrowed issue in the affirmative and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, 
albeit for reasons different than those stated by the court of appeals. 
II 
{¶ 3} Rusty Jordan, appellant, pleaded guilty to several felonies in 2006.  
In its entry, the sentencing court imposed a three-year term of postrelease control.  
Jordan complied with the terms of his postrelease control for several months, 
reporting regularly to his parole officer.  Jordan eventually failed to report for 
scheduled meetings with his parole officer, and it was determined that he had 
abandoned his approved residence.  Eventually, Jordan was located, arrested, and 
charged with escape under R.C. 2921.34.  A jury found him guilty of that offense. 
{¶ 4} On appeal, Jordan argued that the state had not proven that he was 
“under detention” for purposes of R.C. 2921.34, because there was no proof that 
the sentencing court had orally advised him that he would be subject to 
postrelease control.  The court of appeals affirmed, holding that (1) the state was 
not required to prove that the imposition of Jordan’s postrelease control had been 
proper, but merely that Jordan knew he was under detention or was reckless in 
that regard and (2) the state had met that burden. 
{¶ 5} The court of appeals certified that its judgment conflicted with the 
judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals in State v. North (Oct. 9, 2007), 
Lorain App. No. 06CA009063, 2007-Ohio-5383.  We recognized the conflict, 
                                                 
2.  In view of this holding, the conflict between the courts of appeals on the certified issue has 
been eliminated.  Therefore, we do not address the question whether a person can be proved to be 
under detention for purposes of R.C. 2921.34(A)(1) if the evidence shows affirmatively that the 
trial court failed to meet its duties with regard to the imposition of postrelease control.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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accepted Jordan’s appeal, and consolidated the cases.  State v. Jordan, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 1484 and 1486, 2009-Ohio-278, 900 N.E.2d 196. 
III 
{¶ 6} Jordan’s argument can be divided into the following components.  
The criminal escape statute, R.C. 2921.34(A)(1), requires the state to prove as an 
element of the offense that the defendant was “under detention”; “detention” is 
defined in R.C. 2921.01(E); in this case, the relevant portion of R.C. 2921.01(E) 
defines “detention” as “supervision by an employee of the department of 
rehabilitation and correction of a person on any type of release from a state 
correctional institution”; and the “supervision” required by R.C. 2921.01(E) could 
arise in this case only as an element of the postrelease control imposed upon 
Jordan.  Thus, Jordan argues that in order to prove such supervision, the state 
must offer evidence to show that when his sentence was imposed, the court 
properly advised him of postrelease control. 
{¶ 7} In Jordan’s view, the evidence of supervision was legally 
insufficient because the state did not prove that the sentencing court advised him 
of postrelease control as required by R.C. 2929.19 and, therefore, the state did not 
prove that the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections was authorized to 
supervise him.  We are not persuaded by Jordan’s argument.  Supervision can be 
proven without evidence that the sentencing court advised an offender that he 
would be subject to postrelease control as required by R.C. 2929.19.  When the 
parties do not submit evidence to show whether the sentencing court performed 
each of its duties for imposition of postrelease control, the question is simply 
whether the state provided sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant was 
under detention. 
{¶ 8} The state provided ample evidence that Jordan was under the 
supervision of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.  The relevant 
sentencing entry states that Jordan “may be subject to a period of three (3) years 
January Term, 2010 
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of postrelease control.”  Jordan was also advised of his postrelease control two 
weeks before his release from prison. 
{¶ 9} Jordan signed a document detailing the conditions of his monitored 
time (one type of postrelease control) on the day after his release from prison.  
This document stated: “I understand if I am a releasee and abscond supervision, I 
may be prosecuted for the crime of escape, under section 2921.34 of the revised 
code.”  A few weeks later, when Jordan was arrested for an unrelated charge, his 
postrelease control was increased from monitored time to basic supervision. 
{¶ 10} When he was placed on basic supervision, his parole officer met 
with him, explained the terms of basic supervision, and provided him with a 
document entitled “Conditions of Supervision.”  This document also included the 
statement, “I understand that if I am a releasee and abscond supervision, I may be 
prosecuted for the crime of escape, under section 2921.34 of the Revised Code.”  
Jordan signed a receipt indicating that he was to follow all of the conditions of 
supervision listed on the document.  Jordan initially complied with his reporting 
requirements.  For many months, he contacted his parole officer and appeared for 
meetings when required.  Jordan testified that before his release from prison he 
was aware that he would be subject to postrelease control. 
{¶ 11} Based on this evidence, we hold that the state proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Jordan was subject to supervision by the Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction.  The evidence shows that Jordan was “under 
detention” as “detention” is defined in R.C. 2921.01(E), and therefore the state 
proved that element of R.C. 2921.34(A)(1). 
{¶ 12} Jordan directs us to the lack of proof in the record that the court 
orally advised him during sentencing that he would be subject to postrelease 
control.  He directs us to cases in which we held that oral notification of 
postrelease control is a necessity for a validly imposed sentence.  Bezak, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, at ¶ 12, citing State v. Jordan, 104 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864.  However, this case differs from 
Bezak and Jordan because in those cases, the defendants directly challenged the 
validity of the imposition of their respective postrelease control as an aspect of 
their sentence.  Bezak, 2007-Ohio-3250, ¶ 3-4; Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 2-3.  If 
this case had arisen as a direct challenge to Jordan’s postrelease control via an 
appeal of his sentence, Bezak and Jordan would control.  Instead, Jordan 
challenges the sufficiency of evidence on an element of the criminal offense of 
escape, and therefore ordinary standards regarding the sufficiency of evidence 
will apply. 
{¶ 13} A reviewing court need not dwell on the question whether the 
sentencing court advised the defendant of postrelease control at the sentencing 
hearing when the record is silent in that regard and there is uncontroverted 
evidence that the accused was indeed subject to supervision by the Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction.  Of course, it would be better practice for trial 
courts to note in the written sentencing entry that the defendant was orally advised 
of postrelease control on the record, and it may be advisable for the state to 
introduce transcripts or testimony, when available, to that effect.  But when, as 
here, the evidence sufficiently proves that the defendant was under detention, 
such silence in the record is not fatal to the state’s case.  To obtain a conviction 
for escape under R.C. 2921.34(A)(1), the state may prove that the defendant was 
subject to postrelease control without proving that during a sentencing hearing the 
trial court orally notified the defendant that he would be subject to postrelease 
control. 
{¶ 14} Our holding today does not reach the question whether a defendant 
can be convicted of escape when the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that the 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction lacked the authority to supervise the 
accused. In North—the case that was cited by the court of appeals as being in 
conflict with this case—the evidence established that the sentencing court failed 
January Term, 2010 
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or declined to impose postrelease control upon the defendant.  North, 2007-Ohio-
5383, at ¶ 7-8.  The provision of North’s sentencing entry that imposed 
postrelease control had been struck-through by the sentencing court.  Id. at ¶ 7.  
Citing Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, 
the court of appeals held that the Adult Parole Authority lacked authority to 
impose postrelease control on North.  Id.  Consequently, the court held, North 
could not be convicted of escape, because he was never legally under supervision.  
Id. 
{¶ 15} In this case there was no evidence that postrelease control was 
improperly imposed or that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
lacked the authority to supervise Jordan.  Instead, the evidence supports the 
conclusion that Jordan was subject to supervision. 
IV 
{¶ 16} For the foregoing reasons, we answer the narrowed issue in the 
affirmative and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 17} I respectfully dissent because the majority opinion relieves the 
state from its obligation to prove detention as an element of escape under R.C. 
2921.34(A)(1). 
{¶ 18} Jordan argues that to prove that he was under detention for 
purposes of escape, the state must show that the court properly advised him of 
postrelease control when he was sentenced.  This argument is persuasive, 
considering a line of decisions of this court.  We have ruled that unless the 
defendant is advised of postrelease control both at the sentencing hearing and in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the judgment entry, the Adult Parole Authority is without authority to impose it. 
Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, at ¶ 20, 
quoting State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, at 
¶ 19.  Although in this case there is a sentencing entry that includes three years of 
postrelease control, the state has not provided evidence that the defendant was 
orally notified of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 19} The majority holds that “the state may prove that an accused was 
under detention for purposes of a prosecution for escape under R.C. 
2921.34(A)(1) without offering affirmative evidence that the sentencing court 
orally advised the offender of the possibility of the imposition of postrelease 
control.”  (Emphasis added.)  Majority opinion at ¶ 2.  In other words, the state 
need not show that there was a valid sentence that placed the defendant under 
detention. 
{¶ 20} In failing to require the state to show proper oral notification to the 
defendant, the majority retreats from the idea that unless a defendant is notified of 
postrelease control at sentencing, the sentence is void.  See State v. Bezak, 114 
Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961; Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 
2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864.  "The effect of determining that a judgment is 
void is well established.  It is as though such proceedings had never occurred; the 
judgment is a mere nullity and the parties are in the same position as if there had 
been no judgment."  (Citations omitted.)  Romito v. Maxwell (1967), 10 Ohio 
St.2d 266, 267-268, 39 O.O.2d 414, 227 N.E. 2d 223.  In my view, this means that 
either a sentence is void and has no effect, or it is not void and does have effect. 
{¶ 21} The majority opinion distinguishes Bezak and Jordan because in 
those cases the defendants directly appealed the validity of postrelease control as 
part of their sentence.  Bezak, 2007-Ohio-3250, ¶ 3-4; Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 
2-3.  It states that Bezak and Jordan would control if this case had arisen “as a 
direct challenge to Jordan’s postrelease control via an appeal of his sentence.”  
January Term, 2010 
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Majority opinion at ¶ 12.  However, cases such as State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio 
St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, show that a void sentence need not 
be challenged on direct appeal. 
{¶ 22} From now on, apparently, the following will be sufficient proof of 
“detention:” postrelease control in the sentencing entry, the defendant’s 
knowledge of postrelease control before release from prison, the defendant’s 
signature on a form detailing monitored-time conditions, or the defendant’s 
contact with his or her parole officer. However, permitting these forms of proof 
contradicts precedent by allowing a defendant serving a void sentence, one that 
has “no effect,” to be convicted of a new crime of escape, even though the 
underlying sentence that allegedly imposed the detention is void. The majority 
concludes, “Our holding today does not reach the question whether a defendant 
can be convicted of escape when the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that the 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction lacked the authority to supervise the 
accused.”  (Emphasis added.)  Majority opinion at ¶ 14.  Nevertheless, the state 
need not provide affirmative evidence of a valid detention as an element of escape 
by  showing that there is a valid sentence allowing postrelease control of the 
accused.  Thus, the state receives the benefit of the doubt on an element of the 
offense, even though a missing notification renders void a sentence for which 
postrelease control was imposed in the sentencing entry. 
{¶ 23} I would require the state to prove that a defendant was notified of 
postrelease control at sentencing to show that the defendant was under valid 
detention for purposes of escape.  I respectfully dissent and would reverse the 
defendant’s conviction. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Brent W. Yager, Marion County Prosecuting Attorney, and Denise M. 
Martin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
______________________