Case Title: Caneda v. Okuyama

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW LIDRARY

'* NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
No. 25070

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

JOHN CANEDA, R., Plainesef-appetiont Bf BF
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uv LOU OKUYAMA, Defendant-Appelice ele -
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APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(crv. No. 01-1-0027)

(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.)
Plaintif£-Appellant John Caneda, Sr. (*Caneda”) appeals
from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and
Judgment of the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit! (“circuit
court”) filed on April 1, 2002, following the granting of summary
judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Amy Lou Okuyama
(okuyama”). On summary judgment, the circuit court found that
caneda’s motor vehicle tort claim was time-barred as a matter of
law under the applicable statute of limitations, Hawai'i Revised
(Supp. 1998), because (1) the

Statutes ("HRS") § 431:10C~315(b)

 

‘The Honorable Riki May Anano presided

RS § 431:10C~315 (b) reads
No suit arising out of @ motor vehicle accident shall be brought
ver of

 

tor vehicle accident

 

of the

 

(2) Two years afcer the dal
upon waigh the claim is based;
(2) Two years after the date of the last payment of motor
vehicle ineurance or optional additional benefits; or
: he Jost

(cone ine

 

G3) me
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alleged claim arose on July 5, 1996, (2) Caneda’s complaint was
not filed until January 23, 2001, (3) Caneda did not have no-
fault motor vehicle insurance at the time of the accident, (4)
there was a gap of more than two years between Caneda’s public
assistance benefit payments (from May 16, 1997, the last payment
by the Department of Human Services (“DHS”), to approximately
August 7, 2000, the first known payment by Medicare), and (5)
medical payments from Caneda’s private health insurance (HMSA)
for medical services rendered from 1996 to 1999 did not toll the
statute of limitations.

On appeal, Caneda essentially argues that his claim

should not have been time-barred under HRS § 431:10C-315(b) (3),

 

inasmuch as (1) the trial court erred by failing to consider the
HMSA private health insurance benefits (which Caneda received for
his alleged July 5, 1996 car accident injuries) as “public
oc-103",

 

assistance benefits” within the meaning of HRS § 43
such that the statute of Limitations was tolled, and (2) when

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, the

 

scontinued)
‘Morkers' compensation of public assistance benefits arising
item the motor vehicle accident

(Emphasis added.) Only HRS § 431:10C~315(b) (3) Le at issue in
this appeal.

» Rg _§ 431:100-103 provides in pertinent part:
“Person receiving public assistance benefits” means:

(2) Any person receiving benefits consisting of direct cash
payments through the department of human services; oF

 

(2) Any person receiving benefits from the Supplemental Security
Ingone Progran Under the Social Security Administration
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circuit court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact
as to whether there was a 2-year-or-greater gap between the last
DHS public asaistance benefit payment (made on May 16, 1997) and
the firet Medicare public assistance benefit payment (which was
made on August 7, 2000 on the face of the record).

Upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the argunents advanced and the issues raised, we hold as follows:

(2) As per the plain and unambiguous language of HRS §
431:10C-103, private health insurance benefit payments do not
qualify as “public assistance benefits.” The statute clearly
states that there are only two specifically enumerated sources of
such benefits: DHS and the Social Security Administration. And
“where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, our
only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.”
Allstate Ins, Co, v. Schmidt, 104 Hawai'i 261, 265, 88 P.3d 196,
198 (2004) (citations omitted). Even assuming arquendo that
431:10C~103 is ambiguous, interpreting “public assistance

benef!

 

8" to mean “private health insurance” such as Caneda’s
HNSA coverage is a nonsensical statutory construction that this
court must reject, HRS § 1-15(3) (1955) ("Where the words of a
law are ambiguous . . . . [e]very construction which leads to an
absurdity shall be rejected.”); see also Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter
Dodge, Inc., 98 Hawai'i 309, 316, 47 P.3d 1222, 1229 (stating
that “the legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result”
(citation omitted)). In any event, confining “public assistance

benefits” to those received from DHS and the Social Security
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Administration furthers the legislature's express intent to
create a no-fault insurance compensation system which is intended
to limit the imposition of tort liability with respect to motor
vehicle accidents. HRS § 431:10C-102(a).' Therefore, the
circuit court did not err in concluding that Caneda’s HMSA
benefits were not “public assistance benefits” under HRS §
431:10C-103.

(2) Even when viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to Caneda, we must conclude that his claim is time-
barred by HRS § 431:10C-315(b) (3). On her motion for summary
Judgment, Okuyama had shown that given the known facts at the

time of her motion, there had by

 

n no public assistance benefit
payments between May 16, 1997 and January 23, 2001, when Caneda’s
complaint was initially filed. No evidence of the Medicare
payments was on the record at the time. The burden of production
thus shifted from Okuyama to Caneda, and Caneda was required to
respond with specific facts showing that @ genuine issue for
trial still remained. Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (“HRCP”)
Rule 56(e) (2000); see Lge v. Puamana Community Ass'n, 109
Hawai'i 961, 567, 126 P.3d 874, 880 (2006) (quoting Erench vy

 

«was § 431:100-102(a) provides:
The purpose of this article is to:

(2) create 9 system of reparations for accidental harm and
loss arising from motor vehicle accident:

 

 

(2) Conpensate these damages without regard to faulty and

(3) Lime tort Wabibity for these scoidents.

(Emphasis added.)
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Hawaii Pizze Hut, Inc.,

Caneda responded by attaching the declaration of his treating

105 Hawai'i 462, 99 P.3d 1046 (2004).

 

physician, Kevin Kurchara, M.0., as well as an exhibit in the
form of Dr. Kurohara’s payment ledger for Caneda, in an apparent
attempt to show that Medicare had made qualifying public
assistance benefit payments before the statute of limitations had
run. This purported evidence, which Caneda candidly admits is
ambiguous, cannot defeat sunnary judgment for two reasons.

First, the declaration and Dr. Kurohara’s payment
ledger are inadmissible evidence under the best evidence rule,
insofar as no reason was given as to why the original payment
atatenents from Medicare itself (or copies thereof) could not be
produced. Hawai'l Rules of Evidence ("HRE") Rule 1004 (1993);
see also HRE Rules 1001-1003 (1993). Second, even assuming Dr.
Kurohara’s declaration and attached exhibit do not run afoul of
HRE Rule 1004, they do not constitute “specific facts” needed to
defeat summary judgment. Caneda’s counsel admits that more tine
could have been requested to obtain some form of clarification
from Dr. Kurohara, but now argues that the alleged ambiguity
created by Dr. Kurohara’s declaration “should have been enough to
ae:

 

© summary judgment on the issue.” On its face, such an
ambiguity does not constitute the “specific facts” required for
Caneda to overcome summary judgment. In any event, this court
cannot rationally infer that a patient ledger indicating payment
activity on and after August 4, 2000 means that Medicare had made
payments prior to May 16, 1999, when the two-year statute of
Limitations under HRS § 431:10C~315(b) (3) had run. Thus, the
 

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circuit court properly granted summary judgment in Okuyama’ s
favor. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment from which the
appeal is taken is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 16, 2006.

on the briefs:

Phillip L. carey, p
for Plaintiff-Appel lant

John Caneda, Sr :

‘Thomas Tsuchiyana, .

(of Matsui Chung Sumide &

Tsuchiyama) for eeweese C1 dete f-rics

Defendant-Appeliee

Any Lou Okuyama Boon
Gone Dustigs