Case Title: MARTIN LEYVA, SR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARTIN LEYVA, SR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 22106 P.3d 873Case Number: NO. 03-187Decided: 02/25/2005

October 
Term, A.D. 2004

MARTIN 
LEYVA, SR.,                                  

                        
                                    
        Appellant 
(Defendant),

            
                        

     
v.

                                                
                                                                        

THE STATE OFWYOMING,

                                                
        Appellee (Plaintiff).                   

Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, Judge (Retired)

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth M. 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Roden.

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. Morgan.

 
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, VOIGT, and BURKE*, JJ., and 
YOUNG, DJ.
*District Judge at time of argument.

YOUNG, 
District Judge .

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the judgment finding appellant Martin David Leyva, Sr. (Leyva) guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, with intent to deliver in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003). 1  Leyva argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him, the jury was improperly instructed, and his counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance.  
Upon our review, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Leyva phrases the 
issues on appeal as: 

I.  Whether 
the evidence was sufficient to convict [Leyva] of possession of marijuana with 
the intent to deliver, because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt an essential element of that crime. 

II.  Whether 
the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to adequately instruct 
the jury on the legal definition of an essential element of the crime for which 
[Leyva] was charged, violating [Leyva 's] due process rights to a fair trial. 

III.  Whether 
defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object 
to the district court's instruction to the jury defining marijuana and for 
failing to propose an instruction defining marijuana as statutorily defined in 
W.S. § 35-7-1002(a)(xiv).

FACTS

¶3]       On the 
evening of March 2, 2002, Rawlins police made a routine traffic stop.  After obtaining consent to search the 
vehicle, the police located a purse belonging to a minor passenger of the 
vehicle.  After obtaining consent to 
search the purse, the police found rolling papers, a scale, metal screens, two 
different rolling devices, two burnt roaches, two rolled marijuana joints, and 
some marijuana particles.  Upon 
questioning, the minor voluntarily produced a bud of marijuana, which she had 
concealed on her person.  The minor 
was then transported to the police department.  Ultimately, the minor was released to 
her grandmother, who acted as her guardian.

[¶4]      Upon transporting 
the minor to her grandmother's residence, where the minor also resided, the 
grandmother gave the police consent to search her home, with the exception of a 
room where her sick husband was sleeping.  
The minor granted the police permission to search her bedroom.  Upon searching the minor's bedroom, the 
police found two marijuana pipes and a screwdriver with black residue on the end 
of it.  They also found a box of 
sandwich bags and a baggy containing marijuana leaves, seeds, and stems 
underneath the trash bag located inside a trashcan.  The minor stated that these items were 
not hers; instead they belonged to Leyva, her uncle.

[¶5]      On two separate 
occasions, Leyva, who was present in the home, admitted that these items 
belonged to him .  Leyva also stated 
to the police that he had been trying, unsuccessfully, to sell the items so that 
he could travel to California.  Leyva was subsequently arrested.  The substance in the baggy found inside 
the trashcan was later tested and positively identified as 
marijuana.

[¶6]      Leyva was then 
charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, with 
the intent to deliver in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii).  After 
trial, a jury convicted Leyva.  
Sentence and judgment was entered, and this appeal 
followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7]      In Lopez v. 
State, 2004 WY 28, ¶16, 86 P.3d 851, ¶16, (Wyo. 2004), we recently 
reiterated:

The 
standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence issues is well 
established.   "We assess 
whether all the evidence presented is adequate to form the basis for an 
inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact 
when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State." 
Estrada-Sanchez v. State , 2003 WY 45, ¶6, 66 P.3d 703, ¶6 
(Wyo.2003).

We leave 
out of consideration the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party which 
conflicts with the successful party's evidence and afford every favorable 
inference to the successful party's evidence which may be reasonably and fairly 
drawn from that evidence.  Even 
though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence presented, the 
jury has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine 
whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, 
have come to the same result as the jury actually did.

[¶8]      We also have a 
well-established standard of review for jury instructions.

Jury 
instructions should inform the jurors concerning the applicable law so that they 
can apply that law to their findings with respect to the material facts, 
instructions should be written with the particular facts and legal theories of 
each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any one of several 
instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give an instruction 
on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a 
confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a jury has been 
properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the 
instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be 
found to have been committed.  

Mueller v. 
State, 2001 WY 
134, ¶9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 
73, ¶23, 29 P.3d 76, 83 (Wyo. 2001) and Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 908 
(Wyo. 2000)).  We analyze jury 
instructions as a whole and do not single out individual instructions or parts 
thereof. Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶8, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo. 
2001).  We give trial courts great 
latitude in instructing juries and "will not find reversible error in the jury 
instructions as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire 
set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were presented at the 
trial.'" Id. (quoting Harris v. 
State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 (Wyo. 1997)).

Brown v. 
State, 2002 WY 
61, ¶9, 44 P.3d 97, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002).

[¶9]      Finally, we have 
indicated that when an appellant does not object at trial to the jury 
instructions, or request that a certain instruction be included, our review of 
this issue follows our plain error standard:

First, the 
record must clearly present the incident alleged to be error.  Second, appellant must demonstrate that 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not 
merely arguable, way.  Last, 
appellant must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in 
material prejudice against him.

Ogden v. 
State, 2001 WY 
109, ¶9, 34 P.3d 271 ¶9 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting In Interest of CB, 749 P.2d 267, 268-69 (Wyo. 1988)); see also Brown, 
¶10.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency 
of Evidence

[¶10]   Leyva contends that the State 
failed to present sufficient evidence that the substance in the baggy found 
inside the trashcan was marijuana as it is defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1002(a)(xiv).  Leyva argues 
that § 35-7-1002(a)(xiv) specifically states that the mature stalks of the plant 
and the sterilized seed or plant which is incapable of germination are not 
included in the definition of marijuana.  
He then asserts that all parties and witnesses agreed that the purported 
marijuana contained in the baggy found inside the trashcan was solely in the 
form of "stems and seeds" with no leaves.  
Therefore, Leyva claims the State did not satisfy its burden of proof 
that the substance in the baggy was marijuana because the State did not show 
that the stems and seeds were not mature stalks, sterilized seeds, and parts of 
the marijuana plant incapable of germination.  He thus maintains that it was impossible 
for him to have been convicted of possession of a controlled substance, 
marijuana, with intent to deliver in violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii).  We do not agree.

[¶11]   The basis of our disagreement is 
that Leyva simply mischaracterizes the testimony and actual evidence presented 
at trial.  Officer Richard Hooper 
testified that the substance in the baggy was "a green, leafy 
substance with the stem and seed."  
Thereafter, when Officer Hooper was asked at trial to view the baggy and 
its contents, he indicated that the baggy contained "[l]ittle bits of 
leaves" with mostly stems and seeds.  Similarly, Officer Michael Rose 
described the contents of the baggy as "green and leafy marijuana" 
with stems and seeds.  Likewise, 
Officer Jason Green stated that the baggy contained a "green leafy 
substance I believed to be marijuana" and that the baggy "contained 
stems and seeds and particles of marijuana."  Furthermore, on cross-examination 
Officer Green positively stated that he saw "a green leafy 
substance" inside the baggy, and upon review of the actual contents of 
the baggy presented to him at trial, identified it as containing "leaf 
particles, stems and seeds."

[¶12]   Therefore, notwithstanding the fact 
that the baggy did contain "stems and seeds," the evidence clearly established 
that the baggy also contained marijuana leaf, which falls directly within the 
definition of "marijuana." Accordingly, affording the State every favorable 
inference which may be fairly and reasonably drawn from the evidence, the 
evidence presented was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the substance in the baggy was 
"marijuana."

Jury 
Instructions

[¶13]   Leyva also argues that the jury 
instruction defining the term "marijuana" was insufficient because it did not 
include the statutory language of that term as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1002(a)(xiv).  Leyva 
therefore contends that he was denied due process because the jury was not 
informed that mature stalks, sterilized seeds, and parts of the plant incapable 
of germination are excluded from the definition of marijuana.  Because defense counsel did not offer 
any such instruction or object to the proposed instruction, we review Leyva's 
claims under the plain error standard.

[¶14]   The instruction provided to the 
jury provided that marijuana is a controlled substance as defined by Wyoming law.  Nonetheless, as indicated above, the 
evidence presented at trial showed that the baggy contained marijuana leaf and 
thus clearly falls within the statutory definition.  Therefore, we hold that the instruction 
given the jury correctly stated the law, and the entire set of instructions 
given the jury sufficiently covered the issues that were presented at 
trial.  We also cannot characterize 
the instruction given the jury defining "marijuana" as confusing or 
misleading.  As such, the district 
court did not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law by not instructing the 
jury in such a manner, nor is Leyva able to show that he was prejudiced.  Leyva, accordingly, has not established 
plain error. 2 

[¶15]   Leyva admits in his argument that 
in a general, run-of-the-mill marijuana case, not involving any seeds or stems, 
but the actual leaves and buds of marijuana plants, the statutory definition of 
"marijuana" would not have to be given to the jury.  We substantially agree.  However, we believe that it is more 
accurate to state that when it is shown through the evidence that actual leaves 
and buds of marijuana plants are present, even when seeds and stems are 
involved, it is not mandatory that the statutory definition of "marijuana" be 
given to the jury.  Common sense 
dictates this result.  Indeed, once 
it is shown that the marijuana leaf or the bud of the plant is present, 
"marijuana," as statutorily defined, has been established leaving any exception 
as delineated within the statute an impossibility.

[¶16]   In addition, counsel for Leyva 
inferred and presented evidence that the baggy contained "seeds and stems" and 
later argued to the jury that it was illogical for a person to attempt to sell a 
"bag of seeds and stems."  It is, 
therefore, unlikely that the jury was misled.  Rather, the most probable explanation is 
that the jury, upon consideration of the actual evidence, merely rejected the 
argument presented by Leyva.

[¶17]   Finally, the jury was instructed on 
the charge of possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, with the intent 
to deliver.  In particular, the jury 
was instructed that in order to convict Leyva of the charge, it had to find 
that:

1.  On 
or about the 2nd day of March, 2002

2.  In 
Carbon County, Wyoming

3.  The 
Defendant, Martin David Leyva, Sr.

4.  Possessed 
a controlled substance, marijuana, with intent to deliver it to another 
person.

Sufficient 
evidence was presented at trial on each of these elements. 

[¶18]   According to police testifying at 
trial, Leyva admitted that on March 2, 2002, at the Carbon County, Wyoming, 
residence of the grandmother and minor child, the baggy containing "green and 
leafy marijuana with stems and seeds" found in the minor's bedroom was his, and 
that he had attempted to sell it on previous occasions.  Indeed, at trial Leyva specifically 
testified that he told the police that the baggy and its contents belonged to 
him.  Furthermore, Officer Michael 
Morris testified that Leyva told him after being arrested at the police station 
that he "had screwed up," and that "he was trying to make some money, he was 
trying to bounce to California."  Thus, through Leyva's own admissions 
each of the required elements was established.  Accordingly, we hold that no plain error 
occurred when the district court instructed the jury as it did in this 
case.

Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel

[¶19]   In CLC v. State, 2004 WY 2, 
¶11, 82 P.3d 1235, ¶11 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 
115, ¶¶34-35, 76 P.3d 323, ¶¶34-35 (Wyo. 2003)), we set 
forth:

In 
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, our paramount 
consideration is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsels' 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.   Gleason v. 
State, 2002 WY 161, ¶44, 57 P.3d 332, ¶44 (Wyo. 2002).  An appellant claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance 
was deficient. Id. (citing Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).  Ordinarily, he must 
also demonstrate that prejudice resulted.  
Under this test, the inquiry is whether or not counsel rendered the 
assistance a reasonably competent attorney would have offered and, if not, 
whether his failure to do so prejudiced the defense of the case.  Id. This two-part test, the Strickland 
test, is the test we normally apply in reviewing ineffectiveness claims, and it 
is this test that applies to Mr. Sincock's first claim of 
ineffectiveness.

We examine 
the conduct of defense counsel in light of all the circumstances in determining 
whether the identified acts or omissions fall outside the ambit of 
professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the function of counsel is 
to make the adversarial testing process work in every case. Dickeson v. 
State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo. 1992).  The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as 
having produced a just result.  
Gleason, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332.   We do not evaluate the efforts of 
counsel from a perspective of hindsight but endeavor to reconstruct the 
circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct and evaluate the professional 
efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time.  Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 609.  We invoke a strong presumption that 
counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all decisions within 
the bounds of reasonable professional judgment.  Id. The burden is on the defendant to 
overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the challenged 
action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial strategy.  Id.

[¶20]   Leyva contends his defense counsel 
was ineffective for failing to request that the district court instruct the jury 
concerning the definition of "marijuana" contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1002(a)(xiv).  For those 
reasons noted above, Leyva's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
unpersuasive.

CONCLUSION

[¶21]   For the foregoing reasons, Leyva's 
conviction is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1  .Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) 
provides:

            
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to 
manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a 
controlled substance.  Any person 
who violates this subsection with respect to:

            
. . . .

(ii) 
Any other controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of 
a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, 
fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both;

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1002(a)(xiv) (LexisNexis 2003) defines marijuana 
as

all 
parts of the plant of the genus Cannabis, whether growing or not;  the seed thereof; the resin extracted 
from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 
mixture or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin.  It does not include the mature stalks of 
the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of 
the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture or 
preparation of the mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, 
oil or cake, or the sterilized seed or the plant which is incapable of 
germination[.]

2  .The instruction, "marijuana is a 
controlled substance as defined by Wyoming law," does not comprise a technical 
definition of marijuana.  Rather, it 
simply provides that marijuana is one of the items designated as an illegal 
"controlled substance" in Wyoming.  
Nevertheless, the instruction addressing the elements of the involved 
charge advised the jury that it was illegal to possess marijuana, a controlled 
substance, thereby rendering the entire set of instructions given the jury 
sufficient in covering the issues that were presented at trial.  In any event, it may be advisable to 
provide the jury with the statutory definition of "marijuana" so as to leave no 
doubt that the jury was absolutely properly instructed.