Case Title: Trujillo v. Pacific Safety Supply

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49592

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  January 29, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Consuelo Trujillo, Claimant.
CONSUELO TRUJILLO,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
PACIFIC SAFETY SUPPLY
and SAIF CORPORATION,
Respondents on Review.
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Terry G. Logsdon, Claimant.
TERRY G. LOGSDON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
SAIF CORPORATION,
Respondent on Review.
In the Matter of the Compensation of
Cindy M. Mount, Claimant.
CINDY M. MOUNT,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND BUSINESS SERVICES
and SAIF CORPORATION,
Respondents on Review.
(WCB 96-10056, 99-00431, 97-08823;
CA A99410, A109321, A103636;
SC S49592, S49594, S49645)
(Consolidated for Argument and Opinion)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 8, 2003.
Max Rae, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
petitioners on review Trujillo and Logsdon.
Christopher D. Moore, of Malagon, Moore & Jensen, Eugene,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review
Mount.
David L. Runner, Appellate Counsel and Special Assistant
Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs
for respondents on review.  With him on the briefs for
respondents on review Department of Consumer and Business
Services and SAIF Corporation (S49645) were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
G. Duff Bloom, Eugene, filed a brief for amici curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association, Legal Aid Services of Oregon, Oregon Advocacy Center, and Oregon Law Center.

Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
GILLETTE, J.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.  The
case of Trujillo v. Pacific Safety Supply is remanded to the
Workers' Compensation Board for further proceedings.
*Judicial Review from the Workers' Compensation Board.
181 Or App 302, 45 P3d 1017 (2002),
181 Or App 317, 45 P3d 990 (2002),
181 Or App 458, 46 P3d 210 (2002).
**Kistler,, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
In these three workers' compensation cases, which this
court has consolidated for review, claimants assert a
constitutional right to present new evidence at a hearing before
an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Workers' Compensation
Board (board), on review of a Department of Consumer and Business
Services (department) order on reconsideration, notwithstanding a
statutory prohibition on the admission of such evidence.  In each
case, a divided, en banc Court of Appeals ruled, based on this
court's decision in Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331
Or 362, 15 P3d 548 (2000), that claimants have no such
constitutional right.  Trujillo v. Pacific Safety Supply, 181 Or
App 302, 45 P3d 1017 (2002); Logsdon v. SAIF, 181 Or App 317, 45
P3d 990 (2002); Mount v. DCBS, 181 Or App 458, 46 P3d 210 (2002). 
We allowed review in these cases primarily to address claimants'
constitutional arguments.  However, for the reasons that follow,
we conclude that we are unable to reach those arguments in any of
the cases because, in each case, the claimant failed to exhaust
his or her administrative remedies.  Accordingly, we affirm each
of the decisions of the Court of Appeals, albeit for different
reasons.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
The facts relevant to each of the claimants' challenges
are undisputed.  
A.  Trujillo v. Pacific Safety Supply
Claimant Trujillo compensably injured his neck,
shoulders, and chest in October 1995.  Trujillo's employer
accepted his claim in December 1995.  In June 1996, after
Trujillo became medically stationary, the insurer issued a notice
of closure, awarding Trujillo 16 percent unscheduled disability. 
A worksheet attached to the notice indicated that claimant's pre-injury capability, or "base functional capacity" (BFC), was light
and that his post-injury capability, or "residual functional
capacity" (RFC), also was light. (1)  That was important,
because the characterization of Trujillo's BFC and RFC would
affect the amount of compensation that Trujillo could receive for
his permanent injury. (2)  
Trujillo requested reconsideration.  During the
reconsideration process, Trujillo sought to prove that his BFC 
was heavier than the notice of closure designation of "light." 
Under the department's rules, BFC is determined by "[t]he highest
strength category of the job(s) successfully performed by the
worker in the five (5) years prior to the date of injury."  OAR
436-035-0310(4)(a). (3)  The strength categories, in turn, are
found in the department's "Dictionary of Occupational Titles"
(DOT).  Id.
Trujillo filled out and submitted to the department a
several-page form entitled "Work History."  That form asked the
claimant to "list all jobs for the last 10 years."  Among other
things, the form specifically requested job titles, job duties,
and dates of employment for all jobs.  On that form, Trujillo
described his job at the time of the injury, along with the
duties of that job.  In addition, under a heading "Previous Job,"
Trujillo stated that he had been a seasonal "canning line worker"
from July 1994 until January 1995 and described his duties there
as "help with canning line." 
Elsewhere on the form, under the heading "Additional
Work History Prior to Injury," Trujillo stated, "Other jobs
include picking fruits and berries, tending and trimming berries,
nursery work including grafting, and harvesting Christmas trees." 
Trujillo did not provide relevant dates or a specific list of
duties for any of those other jobs.  In addition to the
foregoing, Trujillo submitted an affidavit in which he provided a
list of the tasks that he performed in the course of the job that
he held when he was injured.  Although he specified the types of
objects that he was required to lift on the job, along with the
weights of those objects, he did not specify the frequency with
which he was called upon to perform those tasks, other than to
state, "[A]ll work repetitive."  
The other evidence before the department on
reconsideration was a job analysis of Trujillo's regular position
that the employer submitted to Trujillo's doctor for his review
and approval for purposes of releasing Trujillo to work.  That
analysis listed the weights that the job required Trujillo to
lift, along with the frequency with which it required Trujillo to
perform those tasks.  
On reconsideration, the department upheld the notice of
closure. 
Trujillo requested a hearing.  At the hearing, Trujillo
requested the opportunity to testify personally to supplement the
reconsideration record, claiming that he had a constitutional
right to do so.  The ALJ denied that request, concluding that ORS
656.283(7) precluded the admission of evidence that was not in
the reconsideration record (4) and rejecting Trujillo's
constitutional arguments.  Trujillo then made an offer of proof
to the effect that he would have testified concerning, among
other things, the frequency with which he performed the various
lifting requirements of his job at the time of his injury and the
duties and time frames for the jobs that he had performed in the
five years before the injury.  
Based on the written reconsideration record, including
Trujillo's affidavit and work history forms, the ALJ increased
Trujillo's award to 21 percent permanent partial disability.  
Trujillo then petitioned for board review of the ALJ's
order.  The board affirmed the ALJ's decision to exclude the oral
testimony.  In addition, as pertinent here, the board reviewed
the written reconsideration record and purported to conclude that
Trujillo's BFC was "light." (5)  In reaching that conclusion,
the board considered only the job that Trujillo held at the time
of his injury and the cannery worker job.  The cannery worker
job, according to the DOT, has a strength rating of "light."  The
board declined to consider Trujillo's jobs as fruit picker, vine
pruner, or Christmas tree farmer, because Trujillo had failed to
offer evidence to the department during reconsideration that he
had performed any of those jobs within the relevant time frame. 
Turning to the job that Trujillo held at the time of
his injury, the board began by rejecting Trujillo's contention
that that job fell in the DOT category of "Lumber Handler," with
a strength rating of "heavy."  The basis for the board's decision
in that regard was that the DOT description of the duties of the
job of "lumber handler" did not match the description of the job
duties that Trujillo actually performed, as described in his own
affidavit.  In the board's view, Trujillo's description of his
duties more closely resembled the DOT description of "Production
Assembler," which has a strength rating of "light."  In that
connection, the board observed that Trujillo had presented some
evidence that the job required more lifting than is covered by
the strength rating "light," but the board discounted that
evidence because Trujillo failed to specify during
reconsideration the frequency with which the job required him to
lift the heavier weights. (6)  In the end, the board concluded
that the appropriate "adaptability factor" was identical to that
found by the ALJ and agreed that claimant was entitled to 21
percent unscheduled permanent partial disability. 
B.  Logsdon v. SAIF Corporation
Claimant Logsdon has had ongoing problems with his
right knee since 1979.  As pertinent to this case, he suffered a
compensable injury to his right knee in January 1994, and the
insurer accepted his claim.  After about 18 months of treatment,
the insurer closed the claim by notice of closure in August 1995
and Logsdon ultimately was awarded four percent scheduled
permanent disability for loss of function in the right leg. 
Logsdon continued to seek medical treatment for problems with his
right knee and, on May 30, 1996, saw an orthopedist, Dr.
Greenleaf, who recommended reopening Logsdon's workers'
compensation claim based on aggravation of the January 1994
injury and recommended that Logsdon have total knee replacement
surgery.  Greenleaf performed that surgery in October 1996.  
Meanwhile, the insurer denied the aggravation claim and
denied that Logsdon's right knee condition was related to the
January 1994 injury.  In October 1997, an ALJ found the insurer
to be responsible for the claim for aggravation and ordered the
insurer to accept it, which it did.  
In December 1997, Logsdon saw another physician, Dr.
Schieber, for ongoing right knee pain.  Logsdon requested
referral to a pain center, and Schieber agreed to make the
referral.  In May 1998, Schieber evaluated Logsdon for pain
center treatment.  Logsdon was an admitted heroin user, although
he denied recent usage.  Accordingly, Logsdon was required to
undergo drug screening before admission to the pain center.  He
ultimately was tested three times.  The test results were
inconclusive, but suggested that Logsdon had attempted to affect
the test results by drinking large quantities of liquid so as to
dilute his urine.  On July 1, 1998, Dr. Ploss at the pain center
reported to Logsdon's managed care organization that, because
Logsdon's continued heroin use could not be ruled out, pain
center treatment was not appropriate.  Ploss also opined that
Logsdon was, therefore, medically stationary as of that date.  A
few days later, Schieber concurred with that assessment. 
Thereafter, Logsdon continued to see Scheiber for pain medication
and monitoring. 
On August 19, 1998, the insurer closed Logsdon's
aggravation claim by a notice of closure and awarded Logsdon
temporary disability compensation beginning May 30, 1996, when
Logsdon first saw the orthopedist, and continuing until May 11,
1998, the date that the insurer found Logsdon to have become
medically stationary.  The notice of closure also awarded Logsdon
35 percent scheduled permanent disability for loss of the right
leg. 
Logsdon requested reconsideration of that notice of
closure.  A panel of medical arbiters examined Logsdon on
November 21, 1998, and, on January 7, 1999, the department issued
its order on reconsideration increasing Logsdon's scheduled
permanent disability award to 37 percent.  
Thereafter, Logsdon timely sought a hearing before an
ALJ respecting the order on reconsideration.  About two weeks
before the hearing, Logsdon attempted to depose Schieber and
Ploss, the authors of the two exhibits submitted during
reconsideration that established Logsdon's medically stationary
status.  Logsdon's position was that he was not medically
stationary as of July 1, 1998, because he would have benefitted
from further pain management treatment and, therefore, he was
entitled to additional temporary partial disability benefits. 
Logsdon believed that the doctors' opinions to the contrary were
unduly influenced by a desire to please the insurer, which had a
financial interest in capping his temporary benefits.  As he
later explained to the board, "[t]he primary reason depositions
are needed is to attempt more fully to expose the extent of the
efforts by [insurers] to interfere with the independent
professional judgment of the doctors, and more fully to expose
the impact of those efforts."    
The insurer refused to schedule the doctors'
depositions.  Logsdon then moved to compel them, claiming both a
statutory and regulatory right to such depositions, as well as a
right under the state and federal constitutions.  The insurers
responded that Logsdon's motion was inappropriate at that stage
of the proceeding because ORS 656.283(7) precluded him from
raising a new issue at hearing.  That is, because Logsdon failed
to submit statements or depositions of the doctors during
reconsideration, notwithstanding that the underlying documents on
which Logsdon wished to cross-examine them were then available,
ORS 656.283(7) barred their submission at hearing.  Moreover, the
insurers contended, Logsdon waived the right to argue a
constitutional entitlement to present new evidence at hearing,
because during the reconsideration period, he made no effort to
depose or cross-examine the doctors, or otherwise to avail
himself of procedures available during that time frame to produce
evidence.  In that connection, they argued that Logsdon's failure
to take full advantage of the process at the appropriate time did
not make the process unconstitutional.  
The ALJ issued an interim order denying Logsdon's
motion.  The ALJ ruled that, under ORS 656.283(7), a claimant has
no right to cross-examine witnesses at a hearing arising out of
an order on reconsideration, and that the procedures for
determining permanent partial disability awards set out in ORS
656.268 and ORS 656.283 satisfy due process.  The case then went
to hearing on the documentary evidence developed through
reconsideration.  The ALJ concluded that Logsdon had failed to
prove that his claim was prematurely closed, but agreed that
Logsdon was not medically stationary until July 1, 1998, rather
than May 11, 1998, which the notice of closure had
provided. (7)  Ultimately, the ALJ also reduced Logsdon's
scheduled permanent disability to 34 percent.  On January 20,
2000, in a brief order on review, the board affirmed. (8)
C.  Mount v. Department of Consumer and Business Services
Claimant Mount suffered a compensable injury to her
left wrist in January 1996, while working as an occupational
safety specialist for OR-OSHA.  The insurer accepted the claim in
March 1996, and Mount's doctor released her to her regular work
in November 1996.  In February 1997, Mount's doctor wrote a
letter to the insurer explaining that Mount was doing very well,
that her grip strength was within one standard deviation from the
mean, and that any remaining weakness in grip strength was due to
"deconditioning," rather than from the injury.  Three weeks
later, the same doctor advised the insurer that Mount had
decreased strength to the left wrist due to nerve damage,
although he did not specifically attribute that loss to Mount's
on-the-job injury. (9)
The department closed Mount's claim by determination
order (10) in July 1997, with an award of 21 percent for the
left arm.  That award was based on findings that Mount suffered
loss of range of left wrist motion, loss of left wrist strength,
and loss of left arm pronation.  
On July 24, 1997, the insurer requested reconsideration
of the determination order, seeking a reduction in Mount's award. 
The insurer also requested the appointment of a medical arbiter. 
See ORS 656.268(7) (either party may request appointment of
medical arbiter).  Under the applicable statute, the insurer's
timely request for the appointment of a medical arbiter had the
effect of postponing the department's usual 18-working-day
deadline for issuing its order on reconsideration for an
additional 60 calendar days, or until October 20, 1997.  ORS
656.268(6)(d). (11)
A medical arbiter examined Mount on Thursday, October
9, 1997, and made his report the same day.  In it he found that,
although Mount's grip strength was 64 pounds on the right and
only 39 pounds on the left, she had full muscle strength in both
upper extremities.  He concluded: 
"I am of the opinion that this worker does not have a
significant limitation in the ability to repetitively
use the left hand, wrist or forearm, due to a diagnosed
chronic and permanent medical condition arising out of
the accepted injury, as based on objective findings
today."  
Under OAR 436-030-0165(3)(c), the medical arbiter was
required to submit his report to the worker, the insurer, and the
director, within five working days of its completion.  In
accordance with that rule, the department timely received the
report on Thursday, October 16, 1997, and Mount has not contended
that she did not also receive a copy of the report on that date. 
Mount did not immediately notify the department of any objection
either to the arbiter's conduct of the examination or to the
contents of the report, nor did she immediately take any other
action to challenge the medical arbiter's report.  
The department issued its order on reconsideration the
following Monday, October 20, 1997, as it was required to do
under ORS 656.268(6)(d).  Based on the medical arbiter's report,
it reduced Mount's scheduled award from 21 percent to one
percent, which resulted in a determination that the insurer had
overpaid Mount by more than $3,600.  
Mount immediately hired counsel and, on October 29,
1997, she requested a hearing.  The following week, the board
issued a notice of hearing scheduled for January 30, 1998.  On
January 8, 1998, Mount sent a letter to the ALJ informing him
that she intended to testify at the hearing on her own behalf and
asserting that the "current statutory scheme regarding
admissibility of testimony is unconstitutional."  Also on January
8, Mount sought to cross-examine the medical arbiter, (12) but
was not given the opportunity to do so.  
At the hearing before the ALJ, Mount objected to the
inclusion of the medical arbiter's report in the reconsideration
record on the ground that she had not had an opportunity to
cross-examine the doctor who prepared the report.  She claimed
that she had a constitutional due process right to cross-examine
witnesses against her and that she also was entitled to do so
under ORS 656.310(2), which provides that a medical report
presented by an insurer or employer is prima facie evidence as to
the matter contained therein, so long as the examining doctor
consents to submit to cross-examination. (13)  
Mount conceded at the hearing that, under board
precedent, she was not entitled to testify at the hearing. 
However, she made an offer of proof to the effect that she would
have testified concerning, among other things, the procedures
that the medical arbiter used during the examination, the tests
that he had conducted, and the problems that she continued to
experience with her injured hand, including pain and strength
loss.  
Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an opinion and
order affirming the order on reconsideration in all material
respects.  Among other things, the ALJ rejected Mount's argument
that the medical arbiter's report should have been excluded
because she was unable to cross-examine the medical arbiter,
holding that ORS 656.310(2) does not grant claimants a statutory
right to cross-examine a medical arbiter.  The ALJ did not,
however, address Mount's constitutional argument on that point. 
The ALJ also rejected Mount's argument that she should have been
permitted to testify at the hearing, on the ground that the board
previously had rejected similar statutory and constitutional
arguments on that point and the ALJ was bound by board precedent. Ultimately, the ALJ held that the department was
correct to give weight to the medical arbiter's findings because
his examination was "conducted closer in time to the
reconsideration process."  He also ruled that, in any event, the
medical arbiter's report was not actually inconsistent with the
report of Mount's own treating physician.  It was true, the ALJ
acknowledged, that the medical arbiter had found no loss of grip
strength, but the treating doctor had not attributed the loss of
grip strength that he had diagnosed to Mount's compensable
injury.  The ALJ affirmed the order on reconsideration.  
Mount requested board review of the ALJ's opinion and
order.  There, she repeated her argument that it was necessary to
cross-examine the medical arbiter because of the discrepancy
between her treating doctor's conclusions that Mount had suffered
nerve damage and the medical arbiter's conclusion that she showed
no loss of strength.  She also pointed to an apparent
contradiction within the four corners of the medical arbiter's
report:  The report contained a test result showing a difference
in strength between Mount's right and left arm, but it concluded
with a zero loss of strength in Mount's left arm for purposes of
the disability percentages.  The insurer countered that the board
should partially discount the treating physician's earlier report
because he initially had concluded that the loss of strength was
due to "deconditioning" and never explained his later conclusion
that there was nerve damage.  The insurer also contended that
there was a legitimate explanation for alleged discrepancies in
the arbiter's report.  The board refused to alter its conclusion
on review and affirmed the ALJ's opinion and order in all
pertinent respects. 
D.  Additional Procedural Background 
All three claimants -- Trujillo, Logsdon, and Mount --
sought judicial review of the board's orders in the Court of
Appeals.  There, each argued that, under this court's opinion in
Koskela, the board erred in not allowing him or her to present
additional evidence at hearing.  In each case, a majority of the
Court of Appeals ultimately held that ORS 656.283(7) precluded
the admission at hearing of the type of evidence that the
claimants attempted to introduce, that this court's opinion in
Koskela, which dealt with a claimant's right to permanent total
disability benefits, was distinguishable, and that the statutory
procedure that renders that evidence inadmissible at hearing in a
case dealing with a claimant's right to either permanent partial
disability benefits or temporary partial disability benefits is
not constitutionally defective in any way that claimants had
contended.  As noted, we allowed all three claimants' petitions
for review of the Court of Appeals decisions.
II.  DISCUSSION
Before this court, claimants continue to press their
argument that the board erred in not allowing the presentation of
additional evidence at hearing.  They rely on this court's
decision in Koskela, 331 Or at 382, in which this court held that
"the post-1995 statutory scheme for assessing whether a worker
should receive an award of [permanent total disability benefits]
fails to satisfy procedural due process requirements" because
"the worker does not have the opportunity to make a meaningful
record on elements of proof that are necessary for the worker to
meet the burden of proof and persuasion."  Based on that holding,
claimants contend that due process entitled them to supplement
the reconsideration record with their own testimony and/or
depositions of the authors of reports submitted at the
reconsideration level.  
In response, insurers argue that the ALJs correctly
refused to allow claimants to present additional evidence in
these cases.  Insurers also contend that, among other things,
claimants cannot complain about any lack of due process before
the ALJs, because they failed to take advantage of the
reconsideration process by failing even to try to submit the
evidence in question to the department on reconsideration.  In
short, according to insurers, each of the claimants has failed to
exhaust his or her administrative remedies.
Because it provides the centerpiece of the Court of
Appeals' opinions and the parties' arguments in each of these
cases, we begin with a brief description of this court's decision
in Koskela.  In 1986 and 1989, Koskela suffered compensable
injuries to his jaw.  331 Or at 365.  In June 1994, after Koskela
had undergone multiple surgeries, his treating physician declared
him to be medically stationary, and his claim was closed by
determination order in October 1994.  Id. at 366.  He was awarded
14 percent permanent partial disability benefits.  Id.  Koskela
sought reconsideration and, specifically, sought to prove that he
was permanently and totally disabled.  Id. at 366-67.  To do so,
he was required to prove that his disability permanently
prevented him from regularly performing work at gainful and
suitable employment, that he was willing to seek regular gainful
employment, and that he had made reasonable efforts to obtain
such employment.  Id. at 367.  
In July 1995, the department issued an order on
reconsideration rejecting Koskela's contention that he was
permanently totally disabled.  Id.  Koskela then requested a
hearing on the matter.  Id.  At the beginning of the hearing,
Koskela stated that he intended to introduce oral testimony from
himself, his doctor, a vocational expert, and lay witnesses
concerning the extent of his disability, whether suitable
employment was available, and his efforts and willingness to find
suitable employment.  Id.
At the time that Koskela first sought reconsideration,
ORS 656.283(7) (1993) provided, in part, 
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent
or limit the right of a worker, insurer or self-insured
employer to present evidence at hearing and to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
standards * * * for evaluation of the worker's
permanent disability were incorrectly applied in the
reconsideration order pursuant to ORS 656.268."  
As this court observed, that statute previously had been
interpreted to permit a party "to introduce evidence at hearing
[before the ALJ] that it had not previously introduced at
reconsideration [before the department]."  331 Or at 366. 
Accordingly, when Koskela appeared before the department, the
then-applicable statutes did not require him to present evidence
at that stage in order to preserve his claim that he was later
entitled to present oral testimony before the ALJ.  
In July 1995, however, while Koskela's case was pending
before the department, a 1995 amendment to ORS 656.283(7) took
effect.  The amendment precluded the introduction of new evidence
at a post-reconsideration hearing and limited the issues that the
ALJ may consider at hearing to those that a party had raised on
reconsideration.  331 Or at 367.  Relying on the new statutory
restrictions, the ALJ refused to admit any additional testimony
at the hearing in support of Koskela's contention that he should
have received permanent total disability benefits.  Id. 
In response to the ALJ's ruling, Koskela argued that
the 1995 amendments to the claim closure process violated his
federal due process rights because they deprived him of the right
to appear, to present live testimony, and to cross-examine
adverse witnesses in meeting his burden of proof.  The ALJ
rejected Koskela's constitutional arguments and held, based on
the written record that the parties had compiled during the
reconsideration process, that Koskela had failed to meet his
evidentiary burden.  Accordingly, the ALJ affirmed the
department's order on reconsideration.  Id. at 368.  The board
later affirmed, and a divided Court of Appeals also affirmed.  
As noted, this court reversed.  The court briefly
reviewed the statutory scheme that existed before the 1995
amendments, as well as the changes made to that scheme by those
amendments.  In that connection, the court observed that, after
the 1995 amendments, the "record on which a decision is made
regarding an award of [permanent total disability] benefits –- or
any permanent disability benefits –- consists solely of the
parties' written submissions."  Id. at 377.  The court then
turned to evaluate whether that statutory scheme comported with
federal due process requirements.  The court focused its analysis
on whether the process afforded by the relevant statutes provided
claimants with a meaningful opportunity to be heard, using the
three-factor test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319,
335, 96 S Ct 893, 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976).  That is, the court
weighed the claimant's private interest in disability benefits;
the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the
procedures provided; the value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedures; and the government's interest, including
the fiscal or administrative burden of additional or substitute
procedures.  331 Or at 378-82. 
Applying those factors, the court concluded, first,
that Koskela's private interest was great.  Id. at 379. 
Moreover, in light of the fact that Koskela had the burden of
proof on a matter for which the decision-maker had to employ a
subjective assessment of his credibility and veracity, the court
concluded that there would be substantial value in additional or
substitute procedures that would allow at least some opportunity
for the presentation of evidence at an oral hearing.  Id. at 381. 
Finally, the court concluded that the cost of additional or
substitute procedures to the government was minimal, given the
magnitude of the private interest at stake.  Id. at 382.  In
light of the foregoing, the court held that due process required
that Koskela be given the opportunity, at some meaningful stage
in the process, to introduce oral testimony.  Id.  Accordingly,
the court held, "the post-1995 statutory scheme for assessing
whether a worker should receive an award of [permanent total
disability] benefits fails to satisfy procedural due process
requirements."  Id. 
In the present cases, each claimant argues that, as in
Koskela, a witness's credibility and veracity was at issue with
respect to a point on which the claimant bore the burden of
proof.  Therefore, they argue that, as in Koskela, due process
requires that there be some opportunity for an oral evidentiary
hearing.  In addition, Logsdon and Mount argue that that right to
present oral testimony at hearing includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.  According to the claimants, because
it provides no such opportunity, the statutory scheme is
unconstitutional with respect to each of their claims.  
We note at the outset that, in Koskela, this court did
consider the issue of the admissibility of oral testimony at
hearing notwithstanding the claimant's failure to present the
desired evidence during reconsideration.  However, as discussed
above, in Koskela, the rules and procedures governing the
admissibility of oral evidence changed after the reconsideration
process had begun.  When Koskela sought reconsideration, the 1995
amendments to ORS 656.283(7) had not taken effect.  At that time,
the statutes did not require him to submit his entire case during
reconsideration or forfeit the right to supplement the record.  
In the present cases, by contrast, all the claims were
closed after the effective date of the 1995 amendments. 
Claimants in these cases therefore were on notice that the
statutes preclude the admission of new evidence at hearing and,
therefore, that all evidence that they wished to be part of the
record had to be submitted to the department during
reconsideration.  Thus, we now face a different question than
that presented in Koskela, viz., whether, notwithstanding the
terms of ORS 656.283(7), a claimant has a right to introduce
evidence to support his or her claims at the hearing before the
ALJ when the claimant failed to submit that evidence to the
department during reconsideration.  Put another way, the question
is, can a claimant bypass the opportunity to present written
evidence at reconsideration and then press a constitutional due
process argument when the ALJ refuses to permit him or her to
present new evidence, including oral testimony, at hearing?  For
the following reasons, we hold that the answer to that question
is no.  
It is beyond dispute that exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a prerequisite to a constitutional or other challenge
to an administrative scheme.  See Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc.
v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 661, 20 P3d 180 (2001); Mullenaux
v. Dept. of Revenue, 293 Or 536, 539, 651 P2d 724 (1982) (so
holding).  As this court stated in Outdoor Media, "[t]he doctrine
of exhaustion applies when a party, without conforming to the
applicable statutes or rules, seeks judicial determination of a
matter that was or should have been submitted to the
administrative agency for decision."  331 Or at 661.  The
doctrine requires that a party properly raise issues before the
administrative agency and that the party timely and adequately
address the merits of the dispute before the agency.  Mullenaux,
293 Or at 540-41.  A party does not exhaust his or her
administrative remedies "simply by stepping through the motions
of the administrative process without affording the agency an
opportunity to rule on the substance of the dispute."  Id. at
541.  
The reconsideration process before the department for
determining a disability award is part of an administrative
remedy for work-related injuries provided by the Workers'
Compensation Law.  The reconsideration process begins with a
request for reconsideration.  ORS 656.268(6)(e).  As noted,
Trujillo requested reconsideration in August 1996.  Logsdon
requested reconsideration in October 1998.  Mount requested
reconsideration in July 1997.  
The statutes governing the reconsideration process that
were in effect on the foregoing dates were substantially the same
in all pertinent respects as those in effect today.  Under those
statutes, the reconsideration process is mandatory.  See ORS
656.268(5)(c) ("If a worker objects to the notice of closure, the
worker first must request reconsideration by the director [of the
department] under this section.") (14)  The worker must request
reconsideration within 60 days of the date of the notice of
closure.  Id.  Once the reconsideration process is complete, a
dissatisfied worker must request a hearing on the reconsideration
order within 30 days of the order to obtain further review.  ORS
656.268(6)(g).  If, after the hearing before an ALJ, a claimant
still is dissatisfied, then he or she can appeal from the ALJ's
order to the board.  ORS 656.289(3).  Finally, a claimant may
seek review of a board order in the Court of Appeals.  ORS
656.298(1).  Under the foregoing statutory scheme, then, a worker
must complete the process at each level or forfeit the right to
proceed to the next level.  
In addition, the statutes require claimants to raise
and preserve all issues during the reconsideration process.  ORS
656.268(8) provides that "[n]o hearing shall be held on any issue
that was not raised and preserved before the director at
reconsideration.  However, issues arising out of the
reconsideration order may be addressed and resolved at hearing." 
Similarly, as noted, ORS 656.283(7) provides, in part, that
"issues that were not raised by a party to the reconsideration
may not be raised at hearing unless the issue arises out of the
reconsideration order itself."  As this court made clear in
Koskela, after the 1995 amendments to the workers' compensation
law took effect, "a worker must submit all evidence of the extent
of disability in writing at reconsideration."  331 Or at 375
(emphasis in original). 
We also observe that, at the time that each of the
claimants in these cases sought reconsideration, pertinent
statutes and rules provided (and still provide) multiple avenues
for requesting and submitting additional evidence, including the
cross-examination of witnesses.  For example, ORS 656.268(6)(a)
provides a statutory basis for a claimant to correct erroneous
information and to submit additional information to the
department on reconsideration. (15)  Moreover, if necessary,
the director of the department has authority to issue subpoenas
to witnesses, to obtain documents, and to take testimony.  ORS
656.726(4)(d) and (e). (16)  
In addition to the foregoing, OAR 436-030-0115(3)
permits a claimant to submit any document or factual information
into the record during reconsideration. (17)  Other rules
specifically contemplate that a claimant is entitled to raise
issues for the director's consideration during reconsideration. 
For example, OAR 436-030-0135(6) provides that the
"reconsideration order shall address issues raised by the
parties," as well as addressing compensation.  (Emphasis added.) 
OAR 436-030-0145(3) provides that the department shall consider
issues raised by the parties. (18)  And the department may
request additional information necessary to complete the
reconsideration.  Id.  That additional information apparently can
include, in an appropriate case, a personal appearance by a
party.  See OAR 436-030-0115(2). (19)
As we show below, in each of the three cases now before
this court, claimants failed to avail themselves of the
opportunity afforded by the foregoing statutes and rules to make
a complete record at reconsideration and, therefore, failed to
exhaust his or her administrative remedies. 
III.  CLAIMANTS' FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
As discussed above, claimant Trujillo presented
documentation to the department during reconsideration in an
effort to establish that his BFC was "heavy," rather than
"light," as the notice of closure had stated.  He offered an
affidavit in which he provided some details concerning the duties
of the job he held at injury, and he offered a form on which he
listed the titles of the jobs he had held earlier.  However, he
did not offer to the department the specific evidence that he now
claims is crucial to establish his BFC, viz., evidence respecting
the frequency with which he lifted certain weights at his job at
the time of injury and evidence respecting the precise dates or
specific duties of the other jobs that he had performed earlier.  
Instead, Trujillo bypassed the opportunity that the
rules and statutes provide to present that information in written
form during reconsideration and, instead, sought to introduce
that evidence, for the first time, through his own oral testimony
at the hearing.  If Trujillo had offered the substance of that
oral tesimony to the department during reconsideration, and if
the department had rejected that evidence on credibility grounds,
then Trujillo logically might have claimed a need for a hearing
to prove his case to the ALJ.  However, he did not take the
requisite preliminary step.  And, having failed to take full
advantage of the procedures that were available to him under the
existing rules and statutes during reconsideration, Trujillo
cannot now be heard to complain that the constitution requires
additional procedures at a later hearing.  
Claimant Logsdon desired to depose the two doctors who
had concluded that he became medically stationary on July 1,
1998, and then to introduce transcripts of those depositions at
hearing to prove that the insurer had coerced the doctors'
opinion regarding his medically stationary status.  
The documents upon which Logsdon wanted to question the
doctors –- Ploss's letter stating her opinion concerning
Logsdon's medically stationary date and Scheiber's letter
concurring –- were part of the reconsideration record before the
department and earlier had been provided to Logsdon.  Logsdon
claimed before the ALJ that he suspected that the insurer unduly
had influenced the doctors to base their opinion of his medically
stationary date on other than medical considerations.  However,
Logsdon did not make any effort to investigate those suspicions
during the reconsideration period.  As noted above, ORS
656.268(6)(a)(B) would have permitted Logsdon to correct
erroneous information during reconsideration and to submit
additional information to the department at that time.  In
addition, he could have asked the director of the department to
exercise its authority under ORS 656.726(4)(d) and (e) to issue
subpoenas to the doctors or to permit him to take their
testimony.  He did not seek to depose the doctors at that time,
nor did he ask the department to investigate the matter. 
Instead, Logsdon also bypassed the procedures available
to him during reconsideration and sought to obtain (and
introduce) that evidence for the first time at the hearing before
the ALJ. As we already have discussed, the doctrine of
exhaustion required Logsdon to employ available discovery devices
at the reconsideration level before invoking a constitutional
right to obtain the same discovery at the next level of review. 
Logsdon failed to do so. (20)  It follows that, by failing even
to attempt to obtain the depositions during the reconsideration
process, Logsdon failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
It further follows that, like Trujillo, Logsdon cannot now be
heard to complain that ORS 656.283(7) is unconstitutional because
it bars the admission of new evidence at the later hearing.  
Claimant Mount's desire to present additional evidence
at hearing arose out of the fact that the department, in its
order on reconsideration, substantially reduced her entitlement
to disability benefits based on the medical arbiter's conclusion
that any lingering problems that she experienced with her wrist
were not due to her work-related injury.  Like Trujillo, Mount
wished to testify orally at the hearing to explain, among other
things, the deficiencies in the medical arbiter's examination and
the present condition of her wrist.  And, like Logsdon, Mount
wished to depose the medical arbiter with respect to his
conclusions and then to introduce a transcript of the deposition
at the hearing.  
As noted above, the medical arbiter examined Mount on
Thursday, October 9, 1997.  He submitted his report to the
department and to the parties five working days later, on  Thursday, October 16, 1997, as he was required to do by OAR 436-030-0165(3)(c).  Moreover, ORS 656.268(6)(d), the statute
governing the timing of the issuance of orders on reconsideration
when there has been a medical arbiter examination, required that
such orders issue within 60 days after the eighteenth working day
following the worker's request for reconsideration.  Thus, the
department was required to, and in fact did, issue its order on
reconsideration on Monday, October 20, 1997.  
To the extent that Mount believed that the medical
arbiter's report erroneously understated her continuing pain or
otherwise misstated her condition, she was aware of that fact at
the time that the report was submitted.  She also was aware at
that time that she was dissatisfied with the way in which the
medical arbiter had conducted her examination.  Thus, she was in
a position at that point to connect the two different
circumstances and to argue that the outcome was not the result of
an adequate record.  The deadline for the issuance of the order
on reconsideration was statutory and, therefore, Mount was on
notice that the order would be released very soon after her
receipt of the medical arbiter's report. 
We acknowledge that the time frame here was very short
-- three days, by our count.  However, that fact does not relieve
Mount of the necessity of following the procedures under ORS
656.268(6)(a), ORS 656.726(4)(d) and (e), and under OAR 436-030-0115(3) and 436-030-0145(3), to challenge the medical arbiter's
report and to provide further information respecting her own
condition, including offering her own affidavit to the
department. (21)  She did not attempt to correct the record
herself, nor did she request the department to exercise its
authority either to subpoena the medical arbiter or to ask the
medical arbiter to clarify his report.  She cannot now
successfully complain that due process somehow requires that she
be allowed to do at hearing what she did not attempt to do during
reconsideration. (22)
One final point merits discussion.  None of the
claimants has seriously argued in the briefs that he or she was
not required to exhaust administrative remedies because
exhaustion would have been futile.  See Nutbrown v. Munn, 311 Or
328, 347-48, 811 P2d 131 (1991) (recognizing notion of futility
of exhaustion in case of "implacable hostility" of administrative
forum).  Neither are we aware of anything in the record of any of
these cases that would justify consideration of that exception to
the doctrine of exhaustion.
It follows from the foregoing that the claimants in
these cases were not without remedies at the reconsideration
level; they simply failed to pursue them.  Judicial intervention
in the process on the basis of some later-asserted constitutional
theory thus is inappropriate in any of the three cases.  The
claimants in these cases failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies.  That failure now bars them from pursuing their
constitutional challenges to the limitations on evidence used in
the review process set out in ORS 656.283(7).  For that reason,
we affirm the board's orders in Logsdon v. SAIF and Mount v.
DCBS, and we affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals in
those cases.   We also affirm the Court of Appeals decision in
Trujillo v. Pacific Safety Supply and remand that case for
reconsideration on the issue of the correct adaptability factor
applicable to Trujillo's claim.  
The decisions of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. 
The case of Trujillo v. Pacific Safety Supply is remanded to the
Workers' Compensation Board for further proceedings.  
1. OAR 436-035-0310(3)(a) defines BFC as "an individual's
demonstrated physical capacity before the injury or disease."  
OAR 436-035-0310(3)(b) defines RFC as "an individual's remaining
ability to perform work-related activities despite medically
determinable impairment resulting from the accepted compensable
condition." 
2. The amount of compensation that an injured worker receives
for a permanent injury depends on the extent of the disability
caused by the injury.  ORS 656.214(5).  The extent of disability,
expressed as a percentage, depends in turn on the seriousness of
the injury, "as modified by factors of age, education and
adaptability to perform a given job."  ORS 656.726(4)(f)(A). 
Adaptability, under the department's rules, is determined by
comparing the worker's ability to perform work before and after
the injury or, in the wording of the rules, by comparing the
worker's BFC with his or her RFC.  OAR 436-035-0310(2).  The
department provides formulas for expressing the modifying factors
as numbers.  A high number adds to the extent of disability,
which, in turn, adds to the injured worker's compensation.  
3. The ALJ and board orders in the Trujillo case refer to the
version of the Oregon Administrative Rules that was in effect at
the time of claim closure in 1996.  Likewise, the ALJ and board
orders in the Logsdon and Mount cases refer to the versions of
the Oregon Administrative Rules that were in effect when the
claims in each of those cases were closed.  The rules have been
amended in the interim, in some instances multiple times, but not
in ways that are pertinent to our disposition of these cases. 
Therefore, unless otherwise noted, all references to the Oregon
Administrative Rules in this opinion are to those rules currently
in effect.  
4. ORS 656.283(7) provides, in part:
"Evidence on an issue regarding a notice of closure
that was not submitted at the reconsideration required
by ORS 656.268 is not admissible at hearing, and issues
that were not raised by a party to the reconsideration
may not be raised at hearing unless the issue arises
out of the reconsideration order itself."
At the time that the claims of claimants in these consolidated
cases were closed, ORS 656.283(7) referred to "[e]vidence on an
issue regarding a notice of closure or determination order * * *."  The 1999 Legislative Assembly deleted the reference to
determination orders in ORS 656.283(7) at the same time that it
amended the statutes to provide for claim closure exclusively by
notice of closure.  See, post, 336 Or at ___ n 10 (slip op at 13 n 10).
5. Although the board stated in the body of its order that
Trujillo's BFC was "medium," the board stated that Trujillo's BFC
was "light" when it later summarized its conclusions for the
purpose of determining Trujillo's award.  The insurer has argued
that it is clear from the context that the reference to the
strength rating of "medium" was an error.  The matter is not
clear to us, however, and we do not think that we are at liberty
to ignore it.  Therefore, in light of the discrepancy, the case
must be remanded to the board for a final determination of the
proper strength rating for Trujillo's BFC, notwithstanding our
ultimate holding that Trujillo was not entitled to present
testimony at hearing to add to the record concerning his BFC. 
6. Trujillo asserts that the evidence that the board had
before it affirmatively established that his job required him to
do more heavy lifting than the board found.  Trujillo is
mistaken; the evidence was equivocal and therefore did not
require a finding in Trujillo's favor.
7. Notwithstanding that change in Logsdon's medically
stationary date, the ALJ declined to order an additional award of
temporary disability compensation, because the ALJ found no
evidence that Logsdon's attending physician, Schieber, authorized
time loss between May 30 and July 1, 1998.  The board adopted
that finding in its order on review.
8. Logsdon sought reconsideration of that board order on
review.  On February 11, 2000, the board issued an order on
reconsideration supplementing, adhering to, and republishing the
earlier order on review.  
9. The doctor handwrote his comment concerning nerve damage on
a letter from the insurer requesting attribution of the condition
to an involved nerve.  The letter asked the following:
"I realize that Ms. Mount did not suffer a direct
nerve injury, however, according to the Oregon
Standards for rating disability, valid loss of
strength, substantiated by clinical findings, shall be
valued as if the nerve supplying (innervating) the
weakened muscle(s) was impaired.  It is unclear from
the information contained in this file what nerve was
damaged or what muscle was weakened at the time of this
injury.  Please clarify the reason for the loss of left
hand strength."
(Emphasis is original.)
10. Before 1999, the workers' compensation statutes provided
that claims could be closed by the department through the
mechanism of a determination order, or by insurers or self-insured employers through the mechanism of a notice of closure. 
ORS 656.268 (1997).  In 1999, the legislature amended ORS
656.268(1) to give insurers or self-insured employers sole
responsibility for claim closure.  Or Laws 1999, ch 313, § 16. 
See Koskela, 331 Or at 371 n 6 (discussing that amendment).    
11. ORS 656.268(6)(d) provides:  
"The reconsideration proceeding shall be completed within 18
working days from the date the reconsideration proceeding
begins, and shall be performed by a special evaluation
appellate unit within the department.  The deadline of 18
working days may be postponed by an additional 60 calendar
days if within the 18 working days the department mails
notice of review by a medical arbiter. * * *"
Under ORS 656.268(6)(e), the period for completing the
reconsideration process begins when the department receives the
worker's request for reconsideration.  See also ORS 656.268(6)(e)
(1997) (providing same time frame for either party's request for
reconsideration of a determination order issued by the
department).  
12. That date, which is more than two months after the
reconsideration order issued, is based on counsel's own statement
to the ALJ.  Various opinions issued throughout the course of the
proceeding suggest that Mount made the request to cross-examine
the medical arbiter earlier, see, e.g., Mount, 181 Or App at 461-62 (Wollheim, J., dissenting), but the record does not support
any earlier date. 
13. ORS 656.310(2) provides:
"The contents of medical, surgical and hospital
reports presented by claimants for compensation shall
constitute prima facie evidence as to the matter
contained therein; so, also, shall such reports
presented by the insurer or self-insured employer,
provided that the doctor rendering medical and surgical
reports consents to submit to cross-examination. * * *"
14. Similarly, ORS 656.268(5)(b) (1997) made the process
mandatory for claims closed by determination order.  That section
provided:
"If the worker, the insurer or self-insured
employer objects to a determination order issued by the
department, the objecting party must first request
reconsideration of the order.  The request for
reconsideration must be made within 60 days of the date
of the determination order."
15. ORS 656.268(6)(a)(B) provides that, at the reconsideration
proceeding,
"the worker or the insurer or self-insured employer may
correct information in the record that is erroneous and
may submit any medical evidence that should have been
but was not submitted by the attending physician at the
time of claim closure."
16. ORS 656.726 provides generally for the duties and powers
of the director of the Department of Consumer and Business
Services to administer the workers' compensation laws.  ORS
656.726(4) provides, in part, that, to that end, the director
may:
"(d) Issue and serve by representatives of the
director, or by any sheriff, subpoenas for the
attendance of witnesses and the production of papers,
contracts, books, accounts, documents and testimony in
any inquiry, investigation, proceeding or rulemaking
hearing conducted by the director or the director's
representatives.  The director may require the
attendance and testimony of employers, their officers
and representatives in any inquiry under this chapter,
and the production by employers of books, records,
papers and documents without the payment or tender of
witness fees on account of such attendance.
"(e) Generally provide for the taking of testimony
and for the recording of such proceedings."
17. OAR 436-030-0115(3) provides:  
"All parties have an opportunity to submit
documents to the record regarding the worker's status
at the time of claim closure.  Other factual
information may be submitted for incorporation into the
record pursuant to ORS 656.268(6) within the time
frames outlined in OAR 436-030-0145.  Such information
may include, but is not limited to, responses to the
documentation and written arguments, written statements
and sworn affidavits from the parties."  
18. OAR 436-030-0145(3) provides:  
"Ten working days after the date the
reconsideration proceeding begins, the reconsideration
request and all other appropriate information submitted
by the parties shall become part of the record used in
the reconsideration proceeding. * * *
"(a) Evidence received or issues raised subsequent
to the tenth working day deadline will be considered in
the reconsideration proceeding to the extent
practicable.
"(b) Upon review of the record the director may
request, in accordance with ORS 656.268(6), any
additional information deemed necessary for the
reconsideration and set appropriate time frames for
response."  
19. OAR 436-030-0115(2) provides, in part:
"For purposes of these rules, 'reconsideration
proceeding' means the procedure established to
reconsider a Notice of Closure and does not require
personal appearances by any of the parties to the claim
or their representatives, unless requested by the
department."  
(Emphasis added.)  The version of that rule that was in effect at
the time of the claim closures in the instant cases was
substantially similar to the foregoing, except that it contained
a reference to determination orders.  
20. In that connection, we observe that the basis for the
ALJ's (and, later, the board's) rejection of Logsdon's request
for depositions was not that such information would not have been
admissible on reconsideration, but that Logsdon did not have a
right to cross-examine witnesses at hearing.  
21. We are aware that Mount was not represented by counsel
during reconsideration.  However, that fact does not affect our
analysis in light of the fact that Mount has not contended that
she was prevented from being represented for some reason
attributable to the insurer or the department. 
22. We observe that ORS 656.268(6)(f) provides that a "medical
arbiter report may be received as evidence at a hearing even if
the report is not prepared in time for use in the reconsideration
proceeding."  The question of a claimant's right to present
additional evidence at hearing to address a medical arbiter
report that was not available during reconsideration is not now
before this court, and we do not address it.