Case Title: In Interest of MFB

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-93-1

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
In Interest of MFB1993 WY 128860 P.2d 1140Case Number: C-93-1Decided: 10/04/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN 
THE INTEREST OF MFB, A Minor: DB,

Appellant 
(Respondent),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,

Appellee 
(Petitioner).

 Appeal from the District Court 
of Natrona County. The Honorable Harry E. Leimback, 
JudgeRepresenting Appellant: H. Steven Brown and James A. 
Raymond of Brown & Raymond, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming. Representing Appellee: Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Richard E. 
Dixon, Assistant Attorney General.Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, 
CARDINE, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR, JJ.TAYLOR, 
Justice.[¶1]            
In this appeal of a juvenile court neglect proceeding, the father of a 
minor child challenges the juvenile court's jurisdiction to conduct proceedings 
after failing to hold an adjudicatory hearing within the time period stated in 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-6-209(c) and 14-6-226(b) (1986 & Cum. Supp. 1993). The 
father also contends the juvenile court erred during the adjudicatory hearing by 
permitting presentation of improper evidence and by failing to make necessary 
findings of fact. The juvenile court determined, in the best interests of the 
child, that custody should be granted to the Department of Family 
Services.[¶2]            
We hold that the juvenile court maintained proper subject matter 
jurisdiction because the failure to set an adjudicatory hearing within the time 
suggested by the applicable statutes does not result in a loss of jurisdiction. 
We affirm that admissible evidence supported the determination made by the 
juvenile court that the child was neglected. We also affirm that the grant of 
custody included a sufficient finding of neglect; however, in accord with 
statutory requirements, we modify the custody determination to specify that 
custody is temporary.I. ISSUES[¶3]            
Appellant, the father, presents the following issues on 
appeal:I.

Was 
the district court in error for refusing to grant a parent's motion to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction when the petition for juvenile abuse/neglect was not 
adjudicated within sixty (60) days as required by Wyoming Statutes 14-6-226 and 
14-6-209?

II. 

Was 
the district court in error in allowing into evidence at an adjudicatory 
hearing, under Wyoming Statute § 14-6-226 evidence that occurred after 
the state's taking of the child?

III. 

Was 
the district court in error in allowing a taking of the child when its final 
order and findings failed to show abuse or neglect by the parent before the 
state's taking of the child?

 (Emphasis 
in original.)[¶4]            
On behalf of appellee, the Wyoming Department of Family Services, 
the Attorney General chose to frame a single, different issue: 

Did 
the lower court fulfill the mandate of this court as expressed in the Order 
Denying Motion To Reconsider Peremptory Writ of Mandamus and Staying Dismissal 
for Twenty Days To Permit A Hearing To Be Held Within That 
Time?

[¶5]            
The guardian ad litem did not file a brief in this appeal on behalf of 
the minor child.II. FACTS[¶6]            
Within a month after the sudden, unexplained disappearance of her mother, 
police took MFB, then age two and one-half, into protective custody and removed 
her from the home she shared with the father and his girlfriend. A petition 
alleging neglect of a minor child was filed by the State on January 2, 1991. In 
a supporting affidavit, filed with the petition, a local police investigator 
detailed various concerns of family members and authorities for the welfare of 
MFB, including the father's failure to permit professional counseling for MFB to 
help her deal with the disappearance of her mother. The affidavit included 
information that MFB's welfare was threatened because she had some knowledge of 
possible criminal activity involved in her mother's 
disappearance.[¶7]            
Following the appointment  of a guardian ad litem for MFB, a shelter 
care hearing was conducted on January 3, 1991 by a court commissioner. The 
father waived his right to an attorney and informed the juvenile court that he 
was leaving the county for an eighteen week military training school in another 
state. He stipulated to a custody arrangement. The Department of Family Services 
assumed temporary legal custody of MFB with temporary placement at MFB's 
maternal grandparents. The commissioner ordered psychological evaluations of MFB 
and the father.[¶8]            
The father presented himself for psychological evaluation on January 4, 
1991. The evaluation was scheduled to include a personal interview and some 
standardized testing. However, when the psychologist left the room, the father 
failed to complete most of the tests and departed. As a result, the psychologist 
reported to the juvenile court that no diagnosis was possible from this 
evaluation.[¶9]            
Meanwhile, counseling had begun for MFB. MFB experienced high levels of 
anxiety and recurring memories of a traumatic incident related to her mother's 
disappearance. The counselor concluded that MFB suffered from Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder.[¶10]          
When the father returned from his military training, he filed an 
Affidavit In Forma Pauperis requesting court-appointed representation. An 
attorney was appointed on May 20, 1991.[¶11]          
The father requested a "Review Hearing" for October 16, 1991 to consider 
a change in visitation. A report from MFB's counselor revealed that of five 
scheduled supervised visits, the father had appeared for only four visits. His 
interaction with MFB at the visits was characterized as displaying a lack of 
sensitivity. As an example, the counselor pointed out that during the second 
visit, the father brought a picture of MFB's mother and displayed it without 
seeking guidance in how to help MFB deal with her mother's disappearance. At 
another session, the counselor reported that the father brought inappropriate 
reading material to show MFB, a book titled The Principles of Anatomy and 
Physiology. The counselor told the court that MFB showed regression in her 
behavior, including nightmares, loss of appetite and tantrums, following each 
supervised visit. The counselor reported that MFB feared for her safety, telling 
the counselor, "My Daddy said he would kill me." The juvenile court permitted 
supervised visitation to continue, but ordered a second psychological  
evaluation of the father and that he be required to successfully complete 
parenting classes as part of a reunification plan. The father presented himself 
for the second psychological evaluation on November 25, 1991.[¶12]          
On January 22, 1992, the father apparently requested an "Adjudicatory 
Hearing." The form used as the Request For Setting misidentified the father's 
attorney as the "Attorney/Guardian ad Litem for Minor." However, the juvenile 
court evidently presumed the attorney was acting on behalf of the father. The 
hearing was promptly set for February 10, 1992. However, no hearing was held on 
that date because only thirty minutes had been reserved. In a later hearing, the 
father's attorney admitted rescheduling was necessary because he had not 
requested sufficient time for the proceeding. On March 3, 1992, the State 
requested a one-day "Contested Hearing" which was set for May 11, 1992. All 
parties agreed that this was an adjudicatory hearing.[¶13]          
During the adjudicatory hearing, the State presented testimony from MFB's 
counselor that she suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder which was severe 
in nature. The counselor described the traumatic event which triggered the 
disorder as occurring at the time that MFB's mother disappeared. In the 
counselor's opinion, the father's failure to seek professional help for such a 
young child suffering the stress of such a traumatic event constituted serious 
neglect.[¶14]          
The paternal grandparents testified that they saw the father strike MFB 
with a hard slap across the face when she did not want to leave her grandparents 
following her mother's disappearance. As a result, the paternal grandfather said 
he feared for MFB's safety if she remained in the father's home. The paternal 
grandmother testified that the father used obscene language and made 
inappropriate references to the disappearance of the mother while MFB was 
present.[¶15]          
The maternal grandmother testified about behavioral problems MFB 
experienced following her mother's disappearance, including claiming her mother 
was dead. The maternal grandmother testified she expressed her concern for MFB's 
well-being to local police following a visit in which the child acted withdrawn 
and had trouble sleeping.[¶16]          
The adjudicatory hearing was not completed in one day as originally 
scheduled. The juvenile court recessed before completion of the State's case. 
During the interim period, the juvenile court ordered another evaluation of 
MFB, this time by a child psychiatrist.[¶17]          
When the adjudicatory hearing resumed on July 30, 1992, a board certified 
child psychiatrist testified that she diagnosed MFB as suffering from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder. The disorder was caused by the emotional abuse or 
trauma which the child suffered as a result of MFB's  belief that she saw 
the father hurt her mother. The psychiatrist indicated that MFB would suffer 
tremendous anxiety if she were returned to the father's custody because MFB 
feared the father would harm her.[¶18]          
The psychologist who conducted both evaluations of the father diagnosed 
him as suffering from an adjustment disorder. The father also displayed some 
long term characterological features such as passive aggressive behavior and a 
narcissistic personality. Testing revealed he suffered from depression and 
significant amounts of anger. The psychologist recommended further counseling 
for the father and demonstrated success before any attempt to increase 
visitation or reunify the family.[¶19]          
The father admitted in his testimony that following his wife's 
disappearance, he had reacted to the suspicions of his family with some 
unusual  behavior. However, he denied that behavior ever included slapping 
MFB in the face. The father said he completed the juvenile court-ordered 
parenting classes and psychological evaluations as part of his commitment to do 
whatever was necessary to get MFB back.[¶20]          
The juvenile court found, in denying a motion to dismiss after completion 
of the State's presentation of evidence, that there had been physical abuse and 
neglect. Furthermore, at the conclusion of all evidence, the juvenile court 
found that MFB suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder caused by the 
disappearance of her mother and the fear that the father would harm her. In an 
integrated disposition proceeding, the juvenile court ordered that in the best 
interests of the child, legal custody would remain with the Department of Family 
Services and MFB would be placed with the maternal grandparents. The juvenile 
court permitted supervised visitations bi-monthly for three hours per visit and 
ordered the father to attend counseling.III. DISCUSSIONA. 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction[¶21]          
The central argument presented by the father is that the juvenile court 
lacked jurisdiction to proceed with this case. At the May 11, 1992 hearing, 
 the father made a motion to dismiss based upon the failure of the juvenile 
court to hold the adjudicatory hearing within sixty days of the time the father 
denied the allegations of neglect and abuse contained in the petition. 
See Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-6-209(c) and 14-6-226(b). The father declared that 
the allegations should be deemed denied at the time of the shelter care hearing 
in January of 1991. The State argued the allegations should be deemed denied at 
the time the request for the adjudicatory hearing was made in February of 
1992.[¶22]          
Without deciding when, or if, the allegations of the petition were 
denied, the juvenile court ruled that it had jurisdiction based upon this 
court's decision in In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369, 1374 (Wyo. 1990), 
where we said:

We 
cannot think of a result more absurd than to cause a vulnerable child to become 
unprotected while under the protective wing of our court system. Under W.S. 
14-6-226(b) (July 1986 Replacement), a juvenile court may either proceed 
immediately or hold a hearing within sixty days, but the statutes also preserve 
the discretion of the court to do neither if the best interests of the child are 
served at least until objection to the delayed hearing is asserted by a 
litigant.

The 
father characterizes this language as dicta and distinguishes the holding 
because of the concurrent jurisdiction the court in In Interest of MKM 
had with pending proceedings in the district court and in the juvenile court. We 
disagree and reaffirm the applicability of the holding of In Interest of 
MKM to proceedings in the juvenile court.[¶23]          
Our primary examination requires the use of rules for statutory 
interpretation which were carefully scrutinized in Parker Land and Cattle Co. 
v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-45 (Wyo. 1993). The 
vital concern of this court's inquiry is the intent of the legislature as 
expressed in the statute. Id. at 1042. Using the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the statute's words, we construe all sections of a statute in pari 
materia. Id.[¶24]          
Before we proceed, it is essential to understand how a court acquires 
jurisdiction. "'Jurisdiction' is the power to hear and determine the matter in 
controversy between the parties." McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1290 
(Wyo. 1980) (citing Begley v. Nall, 62 Wyo. 254, 166 P.2d 466 
(1946)). Jurisdiction is conferred when a court has general power over matters 
of the type involved in the particular case; the proceeding is initiated in the 
particular manner required; and there is notice to the parties. McGuire, 
608 P.2d  at 1290.[¶25]          
Under our civil rules, a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, as 
distinguished from personal jurisdiction, is a defense in law under W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(1). A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is never waived. 
Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Wyo. 1988). A challenge to 
subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted at any time by any interested party 
before final judgment, or in a motion for relief from judgment under W.R.C.P. 
60(b), or on appeal after being overruled below. 5A Charles A. Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure : Civil, § 1350 at 
200-05 (1990). The court, at trial or appellate level, may also assert a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d  at 1339; 5A 
Wright & Miller,  supra, § 1350 at 202.[¶26]          
Subject matter jurisdiction for juvenile courts originates in 
constitutional and statutory law. The Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
authorizes the legislature to create such juvenile courts as may be needed and 
provides that "such courts shall have such jurisdiction as the legislature may 
by law provide." Wyo. Const. art. 5 § 29. The Wyoming Juvenile Court Act of 
1971, Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-6-201 to 14-6-243 (1986 & Cum. Supp. 1993) 
(hereinafter Juvenile Court Act), provides the original jurisdiction and 
customary procedure for the juvenile courts of this state. General jurisdiction 
is granted by Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-203(a)(i) and (iii) concerning any minor alleged 
to be neglected and the parents, guardians or custodians of any minor alleged to 
be neglected. In many situations, the juvenile court's jurisdiction is 
concurrent with other court's jurisdiction over similar matters. See Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-6-203(c), (f), and (h). "Once the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
is invoked, then the matter proceeds as a continuing and dynamic situation." 
In Interest of N.M., 794 P.2d 564, 566 (Wyo. 1990), Thomas, J., 
concurring, joined by  Urbigkit, J.[¶27]          
The proceeding involving MFB was properly commenced by filing a petition 
in juvenile court alleging neglect by the lather. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-212(a). A 
neglected child is defined in Wyo. Stat. § 14-6201(a)(xvi) as a child: 

(A) 
Whose custodian has failed or refused to provide adequate care, maintenance, 
supervision, education or medical, surgical or any other care necessary for the 
child's well being. * * *(B) Who has been abused by the inflicting or 
causing of physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the physical or 
mental health or welfare of the child, other than by accidental means, including 
abandonment, excessive or unreasonable corporal punishment, malnutrition or 
substantial risk thereof by reason of intentional or unintentional neglect, and 
the commission or allowing the commission of a sexual offense against a child as 
defined by law: 

(I) 
"Mental injury" means an injury to the psychological capacity or emotional 
stability of a child as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in 
his ability to function within a normal range of performance and behavior with 
due regard to his culture;(II) "Physical injury" means death or any harm 
to a child including but not limited to disfigurement, impairment of any 
bodily organ, skin bruising, bleeding, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural 
hematoma or substantial malnutrition;(III) "Substantial risk" means a 
strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or insignificant 
possibility;(IV) "Imminent danger" includes threatened harm and means a 
statement, overt act, condition or status which represents an immediate and 
substantial risk of sexual abuse or physical or mental 
injury.

The 
petition alleged the father had neglected and physically abused MFB while she 
was in his care and the supporting affidavit alleged that without State 
intervention, a serious risk of further injury to the child 
remained.[¶28]          
The juvenile court had jurisdiction over the subject matter identified in 
the petition under the statutory definition of neglect. Therefore, the juvenile 
court had the power to hear and determine the general class of cases in which 
this proceeding belonged. In Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Wyo. 
1989). There is no challenge to the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over 
either the father or MFB. The remaining inquiry is whether, after being 
acquired, continuing subject matter jurisdiction required adherence to relevant 
procedural requirements.[¶29]          
The procedure for declaring a child neglected is statutory and contained 
in the Juvenile Court Act. Once the child is in state custody, a three-phased 
process commences with a shelter care hearing followed by an adjudicatory 
hearing which may result in a disposition hearing. See Kennard F. Nelson, 
Comment: The Wyoming Juvenile Court Act of 1971, VIII Land & Water L. 
Rev. 237 (1973). At each phase, the juvenile court makes a decision whether 
continued state intervention is appropriate and what form of intervention is in 
the best interests of the child.[¶30]          
Each hearing fulfills a statutory purpose. The informal shelter care 
hearing provides the juvenile court with the opportunity to determine if further 
shelter care is required pending later court action. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-209(a) 
and (d). The adjudicatory hearing provides the juvenile court with sufficient 
evidence to determine if the allegations of the neglect petition are 
sustainable, Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-6-209(c) and 14-6-226(b), by the requisite 
preponderance of the evidence standard. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-225(a). The 
disposition hearing for a child found to be neglected determines what 
custody and placement would be in the best interests of the child. Wyo. Stat. § 
14-6-229(b). If the neglected child is to be placed outside the home, the 
juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that a return to the 
home is not in the best interests of the child. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229(a). The 
disposition hearing may be incorporated in the adjudicatory proceeding or be 
conducted as a separate proceeding. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-226(e). Underlying each of 
these individual proceedings is the central purpose of the Juvenile Court Act, 
which is "to protect the best interest of the children who come under its 
jurisdiction." In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d  at 1374.[¶31]          
As previously noted, the adjudicatory hearing is discussed in two 
sections of the Juvenile Court Act. Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-6-209(c) and 14-6-226(b). 
The differences in the language of these two sections are related to the 
different nature of the actions and the rights involved in juvenile court 
proceedings. There are three basic actions heard in juvenile court: the action 
for a neglected child, such as the issue in this case; the action involving 
a child in need of supervision; and the action for a child alleged to be 
delinquent. See Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229.[¶32]          
While there are general similarities in the procedures used by the 
juvenile court for these three basic actions, there are differences in the 
individual rights and the person to whom they attach which are relevant. See, 
e.g., CH v. Campbell County D-Pass, 699 P.2d 830 (Wyo. 1985) (noting that in 
a neglect proceeding, the parents have a fundamental right to care and custody 
of a child); Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) (holding certain constitutional rights associated with criminal 
proceedings apply to juveniles charged as delinquents); Prince v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 
(1944) (holding when acting to guard the general interest in a child's well 
being, as parens patriae, the state may restrict the parent's control); 
and Nelson, supra, VIII Land & Water L. Rev. at 238-39. Therefore, 
statutory provisions and case authority pertaining to delinquency 
proceedings may not be applicable to neglect proceedings. State In Interest 
of C, 638 P.2d 165, 171 (Wyo. 1981). It is essential to observe the proper 
procedural requirements to determine which provision is applicable to a given 
situation.[¶33]          
When a child is placed in shelter care without a court order, as with 
MFB, the provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-209(c) govern: 

The 
child or in cases of neglect the parents, guardian or custodian shall be given 
an opportunity to admit or deny the allegations in the petition. If the 
allegations are admitted, the court shall make the appropriate adjudication and 
may proceed immediately to a disposition of the case in accordance with the 
provisions of W.S. 14-6-229. If denied, the court shall set a time not to exceed 
sixty (60) days for an adjudicatory hearing or a transfer 
hearing.

 See 
In Interest of AB, 839 P.2d 386, 389 (Wyo. 1992). The provisions of Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-6-226(b), which the father originally relied upon, are substantially 
similar: 

If 
the allegations of the petition are denied, the court may, with consent of the 
parties, proceed immediately to hear evidence on the petition or it may set 
a later time not to exceed sixty (60) days for an adjudicatory or a transfer 
hearing. Only competent, relevant and material evidence shall be admissible at 
an adjudicatory hearing to determine the truth of the allegations in the 
petition. If after an adjudicatory hearing the court finds that the allegations 
in the petition are not established as required by this act, it shall dismiss 
the petition and order the child released from any detention or shelter 
care.

The 
purpose of both provisions is to insure that prolonged pre-hearing detention of 
the child does not occur. See In re Kerr, 333 Pa.Super. 67, 481 A.2d 1225, 1227 (1984) (holding the purpose of a similar Pennsylvania Juvenile Code 
provision calling for adjudicatory hearing within ten days is to prevent lengthy 
pre-hearing confinement).[¶34]          
The father contends that the juvenile court must hold a 
final adjudication within sixty days of the time the allegations of the petition 
are denied. From the failure to hold a timely hearing, the father determines 
that the juvenile court loses subject matter jurisdiction. This argument is not 
persuasive.[¶35]          
The father reads a command to hold an adjudicatory hearing into 
the provisions of Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-6-209(c) and 14-6-226(b) that is simply not 
present. Both provisions, once the allegations of a petition are denied, permit 
the juvenile court to proceed immediately or to "set" a time "not 
to exceed sixty (60) days" for an adjudicatory hearing or a transfer hearing to 
district court. Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-6-209(c) and 14-6-226(b) (emphasis added). The 
operative verb is "set." The legislature has called upon the juvenile court to 
"set down" a cause for hearing which requires entering the title of the action 
in the court's calendar. Black's Law Dictionary 1372 (6th ed. 1990). The plain 
language used by the legislature does not require the juvenile court to hold an 
adjudicatory hearing within the sixty-day period as the father 
suggests.[¶36]          
The juvenile court has the authority to act with discretion in its 
calendaring process. Under the Juvenile Court Act, "'adjudication' means a 
finding by the court or the jury, incorporated in a decree, as to the truth of 
the facts alleged in the petition[.]" Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-201(a)(i). In permitting 
jury trials when demanded, the legislature also made a definite statement 
about the juvenile court's ability to schedule proceedings. "The court may, on 
motion of any party or on its own motion, continue or defer any 
hearing as the work of the court or justice requires." Wyo. Stat. § 
14-6-224(d) (emphasis added). The discretion granted juvenile courts in 
scheduling is essential in light of the fact Wyoming does not have an exclusive 
system of juvenile courts. The district court judges also serve as the juvenile 
court judges. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-202(a). The provisions of Wyo. Stat. § 
14-6-224(d), therefore, must be read together with the provisions of Wyo. Stat. 
§§ 14-6-209(c) and 14-6-226(b) to produce a harmonious result. Parker Land 
and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d  at 1042.[¶37]          
There is no finding or evidence in the record of when the father denied 
the allegations contained in the petition. No transcript is of record from the 
shelter care hearing and no documents from that proceeding indicate a denial was 
made by the father. The fact the father stipulated to the custody arrangement is 
not a sufficient basis to presume that the father either admitted or denied the 
allegations of the petition. The request for the review hearing in October 
of 1991 and the argument presented during that hearing cannot constitute a 
denial, since the allegations of the petition were never specifically 
addressed.[¶38]          
One point in the record in which we may presume a denial of the 
allegations occurred is in January of 1992 when the father made a motion to the 
juvenile court to set an adjudicatory hearing. The juvenile court set the 
hearing for February 10, 1992, within the sixty-day period mandated by Wyo. 
Stat. § 14-6-209(c). That hearing had to be continued in the interests of 
justice because of the failure of the father to request sufficient time for the 
proceeding. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-224(d). The granting of a continuance is a matter 
for the discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed on 
appeal without a clear abuse of that discretion. In Interest of AB, 839 P.2d  at 390. We find no abuse of discretion in this 
continuance.[¶39]          
Furthermore, even if the father denied the allegations of the petition at 
the time of the shelter care hearing in January of 1991, or we presume a denial 
at that time, the failure to set an adjudicatory hearing within sixty days would 
  not result in a loss of jurisdiction by the juvenile court. The language 
used by the legislature in Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-6-209(c) and 14-6-226(b) does not 
inhibit the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction. The legislature 
imposed no sanction for the failure of the juvenile court to set a time for a 
hearing within sixty days. We hold that it would require an unequivocal 
expression from the legislature for a violation of the statute's language to 
result in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In re Kerr, 481 A.2d  at 
1227. We do not find such unequivocal language in Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-6-209(c) and 
14-6-226(b). Therefore, as a matter of law, the failure to set an adjudicatory 
hearing within sixty days of the denial of allegations contained in a petition 
invoking juvenile court jurisdiction does not result in a loss of that court's 
subject matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the father's absence from the 
jurisdiction for eighteen weeks following the shelter care hearing and his 
failure to complete the first psychological evaluation made it impossible to set 
a hearing within sixty days.[¶40]          
Other states that have addressed jurisdictional questions resulting 
from delayed adjudicatory hearings in juvenile court have drawn similar 
conclusions. In an application for extraordinary relief, following a neglect 
proceeding, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the juvenile court did not lose 
jurisdiction by falling to conduct an adjudicatory hearing within that state's 
ten-day requirement. Linger v. Weiss, 57 Ohio St.2d 97, 386 N.E.2d 1354, 
1355-56, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862, 62 L. Ed. 2d 83, 100 S. Ct. 128 
(1979). Accord In re Kerr, 481 A.2d  at 1227 (holding under Pennsylvania 
law that failure to schedule an adjudicatory hearing within the ten-day 
statutory limit does not result in loss of jurisdiction). In Linger, a 
two-month old child was placed in foster care for almost three years before an 
adjudicatory hearing was finally held despite the ten-day adjudicatory hearing 
requirement. Linger, 386 N.E.2d  at 1355 n.2.[¶41]          
In considering the requirement for an adjudicatory hearing in a New 
Jersey delinquency action where the alleged delinquent's speedy trial rights 
were implicated, the court determined that a requirement to schedule a 
hearing within thirty days was a "calendaring device to constantly remind 
juvenile court judges that detention cases must move expeditiously and with 
priority." State In Interest of C.B., 173 N.J.Super. 424, 414 A.2d 572, 
574, cert denied, 84 N.J. 482, 420 A.2d 1303 (1980). The court noted that 
the applicable provision in New Jersey law failed to mandate a dismissal of 
delinquency charges or even a release from detention for failure to commence a 
timely hearing. Id.[¶42]          
In holding that the failure to set an adjudicatory hearing within sixty 
days does not result in a loss of subject matter jurisdiction, we are cognizant 
of the need for a proper remedy for the failure to set a timely hearing under 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-6-209(c) and 14-6-226(b). In this proceeding, after the 
juvenile court denied the father's motion to dismiss, a Petition For Writ of 
Certiorari was filed with this court. This court treated the matter as a 
Petition for a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus, which was granted. After a motion by 
the State to stay the preemptory writ of mandamus was granted, this court 
denied a rehearing. As a result, an order was issued which stayed the effective 
date of the preemptory writ of mandamus for twenty days to permit the juvenile 
court to hold an adjudicatory hearing.[¶43]          
The proper remedy for a failure to set an adjudicatory hearing within the 
time constraints of Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-6-209(c) and 14-6-226(b) is a motion to the 
juvenile court for a prompt hearing brought by the minor through the guardian ad 
litem, Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-216, or brought by the parents, guardians or custodian 
named in the petition as parties to the proceeding, Wyo. Stat. § 
14-6-201(a)(xvii). See W.R.C.P. 7(b). If such motion is not acted upon in 
a timely fashion, then a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be filed in 
this court seeking release of the minor. Wyo. Const. art. 5 § 3. See 
Linger, 386 N.E.2d  at 1356 and In re Kerr, 481 A.2d  at 
1227-28.B. Admission of Evidence[¶44]          
Next, the father asserts that the juvenile court erred in permitting 
evidence to be introduced at the adjudicatory hearing of events which occurred 
after MFB was placed in State custody. Specifically, the father objects to 
the relevancy of the diagnostic testimony of the counselor and the child 
psychiatrist that MFB suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. We do not 
find error in the admission of this testimony.[¶45]          
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are subject to the discretion of 
the court in which the proceeding is being heard and without an abuse of such 
discretion, the ruling will not be disturbed on appeal. L.U. Sheep Co. v. 
Board of County Com'rs of County of Hot Springs, 790 P.2d 663, 673 (Wyo. 
1990). Rulings on relevancy are included within the discretionary sphere of the 
trial court and will be upheld unless that discretion has been abused. 
Id.[¶46]          
We reject the thesis that only evidence that existed at the time the 
child was removed from the father's custody should be presented at the 
adjudicatory hearing. See, e.g., In re A.M., 365 Pa.Super. 516, 530 A.2d 430, 435 (1987) (permitting hearsay testimony from foster mother regarding 
statements children made while in custodial care) and 1 Homer H. Clark, Jr., 
The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, § 10.4 at 612 (2nd 
ed. 1987)   (discussing typical abuse case requiring evidence from an 
examining physician or other medical expert that injury did not result from 
accident which is countered by parental testimony that injury was accidental). 
The Juvenile Court Act specifically recognizes that after jurisdiction is 
acquired, the court may order examination of a child by medical personnel "to 
aid in determining the physical and mental condition of the child." Wyo. Stat. § 
14-6-219(a).[¶47]          
During the questioning of the counselor and the child psychiatrist, 
adequate foundation was laid that the diagnosis of the Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder resulted from trauma suffered while MFB was in the custody of the 
father. The testimony provided the juvenile court with relevant evidence on 
MFB's condition and its origin which supported a finding of neglect. W.R.E. 401. 
See In re Stephen W., 221 Cal. App. 3d 629, 271 Cal. Rptr. 319, 324 (1990) 
(holding prima facie showing of parental inability to provide for minor's care 
   is made by competent professional evidence that injury has been 
sustained which would ordinarily not be sustained without unreasonable or 
neglectful action). The juvenile court, therefore, did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting this testimony.[¶48]          
In addition, evidence introduced at the adjudicatory hearing from the 
period when MFB was m the father's custody supported a finding of neglect. The 
testimony of the paternal grandparents provided evidence of physical abuse. The 
testimony of the maternal grandmother detailed the fact that MFB was suffering 
from sleeplessness and other mental disorders which the father refused to permit 
to be treated. While the father is correct that at the time of the filing of the 
petition no diagnosis of these symptoms had been made by competent 
professionals, the State is not required to wait until catastrophic injury 
occurs to act. In re Interest of J.S., 2 NCA 500, 499 N.W.2d 89, 92 
(Neb.App. 1993). Apart from the physical abuse, the failure or refusal to 
provide necessary medical care is itself evidence of neglect which is sufficient 
to support the allegations of the petition and a finding of neglect. Wyo. Stat. 
§ 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(A). See 1 Clark, supra, § 10.3 at 591 (stating 
that parent has both a right and a duty to provide psychiatric care for a child 
in the same manner that a right and duty exists to provide medical or 
surgical care).C. Findings of Neglect[¶49]          
Finally, the father asserts that the juvenile court's order failed to 
make a necessary finding that abuse or neglect had occurred. We hold that the 
juvenile court's order is sufficient.[¶50]          
In Wyoming, a court is not required to state its findings, except in 
general terms, unless one of the parties requests special findings before the 
presentation of evidence. W.R.C.P. 52. See Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, 
Inc.,    P.2d    (Wyo. 1993) (Nos. 92-254 
& 92-255, decided 10/1/93). No request for specific findings is of record in 
this proceeding. Without a request for findings under W.R.C.P. 52, this court 
considers that the general finding by the juvenile court carries with it every 
finding of fact which is supported by the record. In Interest of N.M., 
794 P.2d  at 565; Deroche v. R.L. Manning Co., 737 P.2d 332, 335 (Wyo. 
1987); Brug v. Case, 600 P.2d 710, 715 (Wyo. 1979). See Matter of 
Welfare of C. Children, 348 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Minn.App. 1984) (holding that in 
neglect proceedings,  although findings were not specific, they were 
sufficient for review when supplemented by the record).[¶51]          
The failure to make a specific finding of parental neglect was considered 
when this court decided State In Interest of C, 638 P.2d  at 172. The 
parent contesting the finding of neglect in that case said the language of the 
predecessor to Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-226(c) required a specific finding of neglect. 
In determining that the statutory command had been fulfilled, this court 
referred to comments made from the bench and language from the juvenile court's 
order which was "tantamount to a finding of neglect." State In Interest of 
C, 638 P.2d  at 172.[¶52]          
We are satisfied that the juvenile court's order and determinations made 
from the bench during the adjudicatory hearing reflect a sufficient finding of 
neglect as defined by Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-201(a)(xvi). The order states a general 
finding: 

FURTHER, 
THE COURT SPECIFICALLY FINDS the allegations of the petition after hearing and 
takes jurisdiction over this matter[.]

In 
comments from the bench during the ruling against the father's motion to 
dismiss, the juvenile court determined that physical abuse and neglect had 
occurred when the father slapped MFB in the presence of the paternal 
grandparents. At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing and disposition 
proceeding, the juvenile court found that MFB suffered from Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder which had been untreated until State intervention occurred. 
Furthermore, the juvenile court found that the father suffered from clinical 
disorders which required successful counseling prior to any attempt at 
reunification of the family. These findings meet the requisite standard of 
State In Interest of C, 638 P.2d  at 172 to adjudge MFB to be neglected by 
a preponderance of the evidence. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-225(a).[¶53]          
Once it is determined that a child is neglected, the juvenile court makes 
a disposition as provided in Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229. We are satisfied that clear 
and convincing evidence, including MFB's cognizable fear of harm from the 
father, supports the finding that a return of MFB to the father's custody would 
not be in the best interests of the child. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229(a). Among the 
permissible alternatives for placement of a neglected child is a transfer of 
temporary legal custody to a state agency. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229(b)(v). The 
order in this proceeding transferred custody without a clear declaration that it 
is temporary. Using our power to modify a judgment, In Interest of MKM, 
792 P.2d  at 1376, we remand to the juvenile court to issue an order conforming 
with Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-229(b)(v), stating that the Department of Family Services 
is granted temporary legal custody of MFB.D. The Role of the Guardian Ad 
Litem[¶54]          
While not placed at issue by the parties, this court must direct some 
attention to the role of the guardian ad litem in this proceeding. See In 
Interest of AB, 839 P.2d  at 390 (addressing issue not argued on appeal but 
injected through correspondence contained in the record). Letters from both the 
maternal and paternal grandparents of MFB are contained in the record which 
object to the representation of the guardian ad litem and request the 
appointment of a new guardian ad litem. Both letters were forwarded by the 
juvenile court to the guardian ad litem "for appropriate action." However, no 
record exists of any subsequent action by the guardian ad litem regarding these 
objections.   [¶55]          
The challenged guardian ad litem appeared at the adjudicatory hearing and 
made some recommendations. However, she asked no questions of any witnesses and 
offered no briefing on behalf of MFB. In addition, the guardian ad litem did not 
participate in this appeal on behalf of MFB's interests. Of particular interest, 
given the jurisdictional and procedural questions in this appeal, is that at no 
time did the guardian ad litem make a motion to the juvenile court to move these 
proceedings forward.[¶56]          
Despite these concerns, we cannot say that MFB's interests were unfairly 
prejudiced by the continued representation or diligence of the guardian ad 
litem. However, we would remind all members of the bar serving in this capacity 
that the guardian ad litem fulfills an essential duty. In appointing a guardian 
ad litem, the juvenile court has determined that either the child has no parent, 
guardian or custodian appearing in its behalf or that the interests of the 
parent, guardian or custodian are adverse to the best interests of the child. 
Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-216. Therefore, the guardian ad litem must act with reasonable 
diligence in the role of an advocate for the child, Wyo. R. Prof. Cond. 1.3, 
and participate as necessary in all phases of the process, including 
subsequent appeals, to insure the rights of the client are protected. See 
Wyo. R. Prof. Cond. 1.14.IV. CONCLUSION[¶57]          
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed as modified and the 
proceeding is remanded for additional action consistent with the juvenile 
court's continuing jurisdiction in the best interests of the child.