Case Title: Industry to Industry, Inc. v. Hillsman Modular Molding, Inc.

Citation: 2002 WI 51

Docket Number: 2000AP002180

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 51 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2180 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Industry to Industry, Inc.,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Hillsman Modular Molding, Inc.,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 177 
Reported at:  247 Wis. 2d 136, 633 N.W.2d 245 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 17, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 5, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Kieffer   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by David H. Hutchinson, New Berlin, and oral argument by David 
H. Hutchinson. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Stephen L. 
Fox and Schmidt & Rupke, S.C., Brookfield, and oral argument by 
Stephen L. Fox. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by David J. Edquist, 
Thomas J. Kammerait and von Briesen, Purtell & Roper, S.C., 
Milwaukee, 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Association 
of 
Manufacturers' Agents, Inc., with oral argument by David J. 
Edquist. 
 
 
2002 WI 51 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-2180  
(L.C. No. 
99-CV-1600) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Industry to Industry, Inc.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Hillsman Modular Molding, Inc.,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 17, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Hillsman Modular Molding, Inc. 
seeks review of a published court of appeals' decision, Industry 
to Industry, Inc. v. Hillsman Modular Molding, Inc., 2001 WI App 
177, 247 Wis. 2d 136, 633 N.W.2d 245, reversing the circuit 
court's partial summary judgment order.  The sole issue here 
involves interpretation of Wisconsin's Sales Representatives 
Act, Wis. Stat. § 134.93 (1999-2000).1  Specifically, we decide 
whether the term "person" in the definition of "independent 
sales representative" in § 134.93(1)(b), includes a corporation.  
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to the 1999-2000 version 
unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
00-2180   
 
2 
 
Based on the unambiguous language of the statute, the common and 
ordinary meaning of the term "person," and the relevant language 
of the entire statute, we agree with the court of appeals, and 
conclude that it does include a corporation. 
I 
¶2 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  This case 
arises out of a contract between Industry to Industry, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Industry") and Hillsman Modular Molding, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Hillsman").  Hillsman is a Florida-based business 
that manufactures custom injection plastic parts.  Industry is a 
Wisconsin corporation that operates as an independent sales 
representative, otherwise 
referred 
to 
as a 
manufacturer's 
representative. 
 
Industry 
has 
been 
Hillsman's 
Wisconsin 
representative since 1971.  On May 6, 1999, Hillsman terminated 
its relationship with Industry.2 
¶3 
The termination was effective on August 6, 1999, and 
on that date, Industry filed suit against Hillsman in Waukesha 
County Circuit Court.  Industry alleged that Hillsman refused to 
pay commissions on orders prior to August 6, 1999, and that this 
refusal to pay constituted a breach of contract and violated the 
Wisconsin Sales Representative Act, Wis. Stat. § 134.93. 
                                                 
2 The parties discuss several facts in their briefs, 
including the alleged reasons for terminating the relationship, 
that we conclude are irrelevant to our resolution of the issue 
before us.  We, therefore, limit our discussion to the relevant 
facts necessary to decide only the statutory interpretation 
question. 
No. 
00-2180   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Hillsman subsequently filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment, asking the court to conclude that Industry, a 
corporation, 
cannot 
bring 
a 
statutory 
claim 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 134.93(1)(b) 
because 
a 
corporation 
is 
not 
a 
"person" 
within 
the 
definition 
of 
"independent 
sales 
representative."  The Honorable James R. Kieffer, circuit judge, 
granted Hillsman's motion.  The circuit court concluded that 
§ 134.93 was ambiguous, and therefore turned to the legislative 
history of the statute, particularly 1997 Senate Bill 226 and 
Chapter 109, to determine the meaning of "independent sales 
representative."  The court ultimately analogized to the 
definition 
of 
"employee" 
in 
Chapter 109 
and 
held 
that 
"independent sales representative" was intended to apply only to 
natural persons, not corporations.  The court also concluded 
that 
this 
interpretation 
did 
not 
render 
the 
statute 
unconstitutional under the theory of equal protection. 
¶5 
Industry sought leave to appeal the circuit court's 
nonfinal 
order, 
and 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
handled 
the 
interlocutory appeal.  In a published decision, the court of 
appeals reversed the circuit court's order, concluding that the 
definition of "independent sales representative" unambiguously 
includes corporations.  Industry, 2001 WI App 177, ¶13.  The 
court primarily relied on the definition of "person" in 
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26), which explicitly includes corporations.  
Id. at ¶11.  The court reasoned, "the legislature must have 
enacted § 134.93 using the word 'person' with full knowledge of 
the definition of 'person' provided in § 990.01(26)," and that 
No. 
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4 
 
the legislature, therefore, intended for "person" in § 134.93 to 
included corporations.  Id. at ¶13.  Hillsman subsequently 
petitioned this court for review, which we granted. 
II 
¶6 
The sole issue in this case requires interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 134.93.  Statutory interpretation is a question of 
law that we review independently, benefiting from the decisions 
of the court of appeals and the circuit court.  Landis v. 
Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶13, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 
N.W.2d 893.   The purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine the intent of the legislature.  McEvoy v. Group Health 
Coop., 213 Wis. 2d 507, 528, 570 N.W.2d 397 (1997).  We must 
determine first whether or not the statute's language clearly 
and unambiguously sets forth the intent of the legislature.  
Landis, 2001 WI 86, ¶14.  If the statute is unambiguous and 
clearly sets forth the legislative intent, we do not look beyond 
the statutory language itself and simply apply the statute to 
the case at hand.  Id.  
¶7 
In contrast, if the language of the statute is 
ambiguous, the court must resort to judicial construction.  Id. 
at ¶15 (citing Kelley Co. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 247-48, 
493 N.W.2d 68 (1992)).  A statute is ambiguous if it is capable 
of being understood by a reasonable person in either of two 
senses.  Reyes v. Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 2d 357, 365, 597 
N.W.2d 687 (1999).  A statute is not rendered ambiguous, 
however, merely because two parties disagree as to its meaning.  
Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 663, 579 N.W.2d 715 
No. 
00-2180   
 
5 
 
(1998).  If the statute is ambiguous, we then look to extrinsic 
factors, including legislative history, and the statute's scope, 
context and subject matter, to determine the intent of the 
legislature.  Landis, 2001 WI 86, ¶15. 
¶8 
We 
additionally 
recognize 
two 
other 
tenets 
of 
statutory interpretation.  First, "it is [] well established 
that courts must not look at a single, isolated sentence or 
portion of a sentence, but at the role of the relevant language 
in the entire statute."  Alberte v. Anew Health Care Serv., 2000 
WI 7, ¶10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515 (citing Pilot Life 
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)).  Second, when 
interpreting a statute, we must "attempt to give effect to every 
word of a statute, so as not to render any portion of the 
statute superfluous."  County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 
Wis. 2d 293, 305, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999). 
¶9 
We now look to the language of Wis. Stat. § 134.93 to 
determine 
if 
the 
statute 
is 
clear 
and 
unambiguous.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 134.93(1) states in relevant part: 
(b) "Independent 
sales 
representative" 
means 
a 
person, other than an insurance agent or broker, 
who 
contracts 
with 
a 
principal 
to 
solicit 
wholesale orders and who is compensated, in whole 
or in part, by commission.  "Independent sales 
representative" does not include any of the 
following: 
1. 
A person who places orders or purchases products 
for the person's own account for resale. 
2. 
A person who is an employee of the principal and 
whose wages must be paid as required under s. 
109.03. 
No. 
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6 
 
(c) "Principal" 
means 
a 
sole 
proprietorship, 
partnership, joint venture, corporation or other 
business 
entity, 
whether 
or 
not 
having 
a 
permanent or fixed place of business in this 
state, that does all of the following: . . . . 
The issue here focuses on the word "person," as the parties 
dispute whether "person" in the definition of "independent sales 
representative" includes a corporation.  Before addressing the 
parties' 
arguments, 
however, 
we 
look 
to 
Wisconsin 
Statutes Chapter 990, relating to construction of statutes.  
Specifically, we turn to § 990.01, which states in relevant 
part: 
In the construction of Wisconsin laws the words and 
phrases which follow shall be construed as indicated 
unless such construction 
would 
produce 
a 
result 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
manifest 
intent 
of 
the 
legislature: 
 . . . . 
(26) 
PERSON.  "Person" includes all partnerships, 
associations and bodies politic or corporate. 
¶10 Hillsman 
argues 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 134.93 
is 
unambiguous, and that the stark contrast between the definitions 
of "principal" and "independent sales representative" shows that 
Industry, a corporation, is not entitled to a statutory claim or 
cause of action.  According to Hillsman, if the legislature 
wanted 
to 
include 
corporations 
as 
"independent 
sales 
representatives," it would have done so by explicitly including 
corporations in the definition.  Hillsman contends that the 
definition of person provided in § 990.01(26) adds nothing to 
No. 
00-2180   
 
7 
 
this case, because it simply dictates the fundamental rules of 
statutory construction.3 
¶11 To support its position, Hillsman relies on J.S. 
DeWeese Co. v. Hughes-Treitler Mfg. Corp., 881 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1994), where the Missouri Court of Appeals faced the 
same issue, interpretation of the term "person" under a statute 
relating to sales commissions.  The court held that the "stark" 
contrast in the statutory definitions of "principal" and "sales 
representative," which both included the word "person," required 
the court to hold that the remedy for a "sales representative" 
was intended only for natural persons, and not corporations.  
DeWeese, 881 S.W.2d at 643.  The statute at issue in that case 
included these definitions: 
(2) "Principal," 
a 
person, 
firm, 
corporation, 
partnership or other business entity, whether or 
                                                 
3 Hillsman and Industry make several arguments that we do 
not discuss here.  Specifically, the parties present arguments 
regarding the purpose of the statute and legislative history.  
In asking this court to consider the legislative history of 
Wis. Stat. § 134.93, 
Hillsman 
argues 
that 
there 
is 
a 
relationship 
between 
§ 134.93 
and 
Chapter 
109, 
as 
the 
legislature intended to extend the extraordinary remedies for 
employees in Chapter 109 to independent sales representatives in 
§ 134.93.  Furthermore, Industry argues that unless § 134.93 
includes corporations, the statute violates the equal protection 
clauses of the United States and Wisconsin constitutions.  In 
response, Hillsman contends that interpreting the statute to 
exclude corporations is not a constitutional violation.  We do 
not address these arguments, however, because we conclude that 
the statute is unambiguous, and that the unambiguous language 
includes corporations.  Consequently, we do not address the 
statute's legislative history nor do we find it necessary to 
discuss the parties' equal protection arguments. 
No. 
00-2180   
 
8 
 
not it has a permanent or fixed place of business 
in this state . . .  
(3) "Sales Representative," a person who contracts 
with a principal to solicit wholesale orders and 
who is compensated, in whole or in part, by 
commission . . . . 
Id. (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.911 (1986) (emphasis added)).  
The court reasoned that in order to follow the rules of 
statutory construction, and give meaning to each word in the 
statute, 
it 
necessarily 
concluded 
that 
"person" 
in 
the 
definition 
of 
"sales 
representative" 
does 
not 
include 
corporations.  Id.  To find otherwise, "the inclusion of 'firms, 
corporations, partnerships, or other business entities' in 
addition to 'person', within the definition of 'principal' would 
be repetitious and of no significance."  Id.  The court 
consequently determined that the legislature was presumed not to 
enact meaningless 
provisions, 
therefore, "person," in the 
definition of "sales representative" applied only to natural 
persons. 
¶12 Industry too argues that the statutory language is 
unambiguous; however, in 
contrast 
to 
Hillsman's 
position, 
Industry contends that reading Wis. Stat. § 134.93, under the 
rules of construction and applying the definition of "person" in 
§ 990.01(26), 
the term "person" in 
§ 134.93 
unambiguously 
includes corporations.  Industry alleges that Hillsman cannot 
show 
the 
legislature's 
"manifest 
intent" 
not 
to 
include 
corporations under the statute, so the definition of person in 
§ 990.01(26) controls. 
No. 
00-2180   
 
9 
 
¶13 Industry distinguishes DeWeese because the Missouri 
statute's use of the word "person" in the definitions of 
"principal" 
and 
"sales 
representative" 
is 
significantly 
different than § 134.93.  According to Industry, the crucial 
distinction is that the word "person" is used in both Missouri 
definitions, and in the definition of "principal," the term 
"person" is juxtaposed with the terms "firm, corporation, 
partnership or other business entity."  The Missouri court, 
therefore, reasonably concluded that the term "person" was 
intended only to mean natural person.  Industry argues that the 
Missouri court's interpretation is not helpful here, because in 
§ 134.93, the term "person" is not included in the definition of 
"principal." 
¶14 Instead of DeWeese, Industry asks the court to follow 
M.S. Kind Associates, Inc. v. Mark Evan Products, Inc., 584 
N.E.2d 180 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).  In M.S. Kind, the Illinois 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
faced 
the 
same 
question——statutory 
interpretation of the term "person" in the Sales Representative 
Act.  Id. at 180-81.  The statute included the following 
definitions: 
(3) "Principal" 
means 
a 
sole 
proprietorship, 
partnership, corporation or other business entity 
whether or not it has a permanent or fixed place 
of business in this State . . . . 
(4) "Sales 
representative" 
means 
a 
person 
who 
contracts with a principal to solicit wholesale 
orders within this state and who is compensated, 
in whole or in part by commission, but shall not 
include one who places orders or purchases for 
his own account for resale, one who qualifies as 
No. 
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10 
 
an employee of the principal . . . or one who 
sells products to the ultimate consumer. 
Id. at 180 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 2251 
(emphasis added)).  The court first discussed the rules of 
statutory construction, and then relied on the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. 
Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 875 (1985), holding that a corporation is a 
person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  M.S. 
Kind, 584 N.E.2d at 181.  The Illinois court ultimately 
concluded that the term "person" included corporations.  Id.  
The court stated: 
It would be an absurd result, indeed, if our courts 
were to hold that a sales representative could recover 
commissions wrongfully withheld from him if he engages 
in 
trade 
as 
an 
individual, 
but 
deny 
him 
that 
compensation and allow the manufacturer a windfall in 
cases where, fortuitously, the representative chooses 
the corporate form under which to do business, an 
election 
the 
legislature 
unconditionally 
makes 
available to him.  Surely, the General Assembly never 
intended such a result. 
Id. 
¶15 Industry argues that we should follow M.S. Kind, 
rather 
than 
DeWeese, 
because 
Wis. Stat. § 134.93 
is 
more 
analogous to the Illinois statute than the Missouri statute.  
Specifically, Industry points to the fact that neither the 
Wisconsin nor the Illinois statutes include the term "person" in 
the definition of "principal."  Consequently, the "stark 
contrast" 
between 
the 
definitions 
of 
"principal" 
and 
"independent sales representative" that the Missouri court 
No. 
00-2180   
 
11 
 
relied on, and that Hillsman argues before this court, is not 
present in the Wisconsin Statute. 
¶16 We agree with Industry and the court of appeals' 
decision in this case.  We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 134.93 
clearly and unambiguously includes corporations. 
¶17 We first examine the popular and ordinary meaning of 
the term "person" as it is used in Wisconsin.  Historically, we 
have interpreted the term "person" to include corporations.  See  
Country Motors v. Friendly Finance Corp., 13 Wis. 2d 475, 477, 
109 N.W.2d  137 (1961) ("The word 'person' in our statutes 
includes a corporation . . . ."); State ex. rel. Torres v. 
Krawczak, 217 Wis. 593, 599, 259 N.W. 607 (1935) ("A corporation 
is generally considered as a person within the meaning of the 
word 'person' in the statutes."); Milwaukee County v. W.S. 
Seaman Co., 181 Wis. 323, 326, 193 N.W. 513 (1923) ("The word 
'person' 
in 
our 
statutes 
includes 
corporations . . . .").  
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court, in Ward, held that 
a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Ward, 470 U.S. at 875. 
¶18 In addition to case law interpretations, the popular 
and ordinary meaning of the term "person" is evidenced by the 
statutory definition in Wis. Stat. § 990.01(26).  Significantly, 
§ 990.01(26) 
defines 
"person" 
explicitly 
to 
include 
corporations.  According to the statutory rules of construction, 
when 
construing 
statutes, 
we 
follow 
the 
given 
statutory 
definition "unless such construction would produce a result 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature."  
No. 
00-2180   
 
12 
 
Wis. Stat. § 990.01.  Therefore, we will apply the definition of 
person in § 990.01(26) here, unless we conclude that it is 
contrary to the manifest intent of the legislature.   
¶19 We are convinced that including corporations in the 
term "person," within the definition of "independent sales 
representative," is consistent with the manifest intent of the 
legislature.  As Industry notes in its brief, applying the 
statutory definition must produce an interpretation that is more 
than simply inconsistent with the legislative intent; it must be 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.4  
"Manifest" is defined as "[c]learly apparent to the sight or 
understanding; obvious."  The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 763 (2d ed. 1985); see also State v. 
Faucher, 220 Wis. 2d 689, 697-98, 584 N.W.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(in the context of a juror's manifest bias, using dictionary 
definition of manifest, meaning "readily perceived by the 
senses; evident").  It is neither "clearly apparent" nor 
"obvious" that the legislature intended corporations not to be 
included 
within 
the 
definition 
of 
"independent 
sales 
representative."  If the legislature wanted to ensure that 
corporations would not be included, it could have used the term 
                                                 
4 The 
non-party 
brief 
of 
Wisconsin 
Association 
of 
Manufacturers' Agents, Inc. makes the same argument. 
No. 
00-2180   
 
13 
 
"natural person" rather than "person."5  If the legislature 
intended 
to 
use 
the 
term 
"natural 
person" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 134.93(1)(b), we believe that it would have done 
so.  We, therefore, agree with the court of appeals' conclusion:  
"Thus, 
with 
knowledge 
of 
the 
definition 
of 
'person' 
in 
§ 990.01(26), we presume that in utilizing 'person,' the 
legislature intended for a 'person' in § 134.93 to include 
corporations."  Industry, 2001 WI App 177, ¶13.  Accordingly, we 
decline to abandon the common and ordinary meaning, and the 
statutory definition in § 990.01(26), because we conclude that 
applying this definition of "person" is not contrary to the 
manifest intent of the legislature. 
¶20 Although we base our decision here on the clear and 
unambiguous language of the statute itself, we find further 
support 
for 
our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
term 
"person" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 134.93 unambiguously includes corporations when we 
consider the use of the term "person" in the entire statute.  
See Alberte, 2000 WI 7, ¶10 (courts must look at the role of the 
relevant language in the entire statute rather than looking at a 
                                                 
5 We presume that the legislature "carefully and precisely" 
chooses statutory language to express a desired meaning.  Ball 
v. Dist. No. 4, Area Bd. of Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., 
117 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984).  In doing so, the 
legislature explicitly chooses between the terms "person" and 
"natural person."  In fact, we note that the legislature has 
chosen to use the term "natural person," rather than the term 
"person," at least one hundred and twenty-five times in the 
Wisconsin Statutes.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 19.42, 29.024, 
29.537, 29.614, 30.40, 30.47, 40.02, 44.47, 48.62, 66.1103, 
71.01, 77.61, 88.42, 93.17, 94.67, 125.65, 180.0103, 215.512. 
No. 
00-2180   
 
14 
 
single, isolated sentence); Renz, 231 Wis. 2d at 305.  First, we 
reject Hillsman's argument, asking us to rely on DeWeese and 
find a "stark contrast" between the definitions of "principal" 
and "independent sales representative."  We decline to follow 
the reasoning of DeWeese because the Wisconsin statute and the 
Missouri 
statute 
contain 
different 
language; 
specifically, 
§ 134.93 does not use the term "person" in both definitions.  
Instead, 
we 
look 
to 
M.S. 
Kind, 
the 
Illinois 
court's 
interpretation of a statute with nearly identical language.6  If 
we were to exclude corporations from the term "person" in the 
definition 
of 
"independent 
sales 
representative," such an 
interpretation would lead us to the same conclusion as the 
Illinois court reached in M.S. Kind.  Excluding corporations 
would lead to an absurd result and "it would make little if any 
sense to enact legislation benefitting the sales representative 
as an individual, but deny him coverage if he chooses to do 
business in accordance with an exceedingly common form of 
enterprise:  the corporation."  M.S. Kind, 584 N.E.2d at 181.  
We, therefore, affirm the court of appeals' decision, and 
conclude that the plain language of the statute unambiguously 
                                                 
6 In following M.S. Kind Associates, Inc. v. Mark Evan 
Products, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), we follow 
the judicial construction of the Illinois statute from that 
case, as well as subsequent cases, because Wis. Stat. § 134.93 
was enacted in 1997, six years after M.S. Kind.  See In re Adams 
Machinery, Inc., 20 Wis. 2d 607, 621, 123 N.W.2d  558 (1963) 
(stating as a rule of statutory construction that, "where a 
statute has received a judicial construction in another state 
and is then adopted by Wisconsin, it is taken with the 
construction which has been so given it"). 
No. 
00-2180   
 
15 
 
includes a corporation in the definition of "independent sales 
representative." 
III 
¶21 Based on the clear and unambiguous language of the 
statute, the common and ordinary meaning of the term "person," 
and the relevant language in the entire statute, we conclude 
that the term "person" in the definition of "independent sales 
representative" in Wis. Stat. § 134.93, includes a corporation. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
00-2180   
 
 
 
1