Case Title: State v. Oates

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC96650

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2018-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
  ) 
  ) 
Respondent, 
  ) 
  ) 
v. 
  ) 
No.  SC96650 
  ) 
THOMAS OATES, 
  ) 
  ) 
Appellant. 
  ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Kristine Kerr, Judge 
Thomas Oates was charged with two counts of second-degree murder (conventional 
murder) and two counts of armed criminal action.  A jury convicted Oates of two counts 
of second-degree murder (felony murder) and two counts of armed criminal action.  On 
appeal, Oates argues the circuit court erred in: (1) refusing to instruct the jury on self-
defense as to felony murder; and (2) submitting instructions on felony murder for the 
second-degree murder counts.  The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.  
I. Factual and Procedural History
Oates went to a gas station to sell marijuana to a prospective buyer, Darrah Lane, 
who had arranged the meeting.  Oates brought a gun with him.  When Oates arrived, he 
walked over to Lane’s vehicle.  She was seated in the driver’s seat and accompanied by 
Opinion issued February 13, 2018
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Leon Davis, who sat in the passenger’s seat.  With the driver’s side window down, Oates 
leaned into the vehicle to discuss the sale and presented a plastic storage container full of 
marijuana.  Lane took the lid off the container, smelled the marijuana, and passed the 
container to Davis.  As Davis examined the marijuana, the parties negotiated the sale.  
When the parties could not come to an agreement, Oates reached into the vehicle in an 
attempt to retrieve the marijuana from Davis.  At that point, Lane stepped on the vehicle’s 
gas pedal.  Oates, caught halfway in the moving vehicle, lunged into the vehicle through 
the window and fell into the backseat.  Oates then shot and killed both Lane and Davis. 
 
Oates was charged with two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of 
armed criminal action.  For the second-degree murder counts, the indictment charged Oates 
with “conventional murder” rather than “felony murder.”1   The State later filed a notice of 
intention to submit felony murder as an alternative to conventional murder for the second-
degree murder counts with attempted distribution of a controlled substance as the 
underlying felony.  Oates filed a motion to strike the notice.  The circuit court overruled 
                                              
1  The offense of second-degree murder has two different provisions and manners of 
committing the offense.  See § 565.021.1, RSMo 2000.  For ease and distinction, this Court 
will refer to the different provisions and manners as “conventional murder” and “felony 
murder.” A person commits second-degree murder under the conventional murder 
provision if he or she “[k]nowingly causes the death of another person or, with the purpose 
of causing serious physical injury to another person, causes the death of another person.”  
Section 565.021.1(1), RSMo 2000.  A person commits second-degree murder under the 
felony murder provision if he or she “[c]ommits or attempts to commit any felony, and, in 
the perpetration or the attempted perpetration of such felony or in the flight from the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of such felony, another person is killed as a result of 
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of such felony or immediate flight from the 
perpetration of such felony or attempted perpetration of such felony.” Section 
565.021.1(2), RSMo 2000. 
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the motion but allowed Oates’ objection to the submission of felony murder to stand 
throughout the trial.   
At trial, Oates testified that, after he fell into the backseat of Lane’s vehicle, Davis 
pulled out a gun.  Believing Davis was going to shoot him, Oates pulled out his own gun 
and shot Davis.  Oates further testified Lane then reached for Davis’ gun, and Oates shot 
her because he believed Lane was going to shoot him. 
 
For the second-degree murder counts, the circuit court instructed the jury on 
conventional murder, the lesser offenses of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary 
manslaughter, and, in the alternative, felony murder.  At Oates’ request, the circuit court 
instructed the jury on self-defense as to conventional murder, voluntary manslaughter, and 
involuntary manslaughter.  The circuit court, however, refused Oates’ request to instruct 
the jury on self-defense as to felony murder, reasoning self-defense was not a defense to 
felony murder as a matter of law. 
The jury convicted Oates of two alternative counts of felony murder and the 
accompanying two counts of armed criminal action.  Oates filed a motion for new trial, 
arguing the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense as to felony 
murder and in submitting instructions on felony murder for the second-degree murder 
counts.  The circuit court overruled Oates’ motion.  Oates appealed and, after opinion, the 
court of appeals transferred the case to this Court pursuant to article V, § 10 of the Missouri 
Constitution. 
 
 
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II.  Refusing to Instruct on Self-Defense as to Felony Murder 
 
In his first point on appeal, Oates argues the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury on self-defense as to felony murder.  This Court has previously held self-defense, 
as a matter of law, is not a defense to felony murder.  See, e.g., State v. Newman, 605 
S.W.2d 781, 786 (Mo. 1980); State v. Burnett, 293 S.W.2d 335, 343 (Mo. banc 1956).  
Oates acknowledges these prior holdings but contends they no longer control.  Relying on 
statutory changes to the law of self-defense enacted in 2007, and not previously addressed 
by this Court, Oates argues he is entitled to claim self-defense for felony murder as a result 
of the 2007 changes in the law.2  Oates’ argument, however, fails to appreciate that the 
2007 changes did not alter the statutory principle in Missouri that self-defense justifies only 
the use of force and is, therefore, a defense only to prosecution for the use of force.  
Consequently, where, as here, the prosecution for felony murder is not based on the 
defendant’s use of force but rather the underlying felony of attempting to distribute a 
controlled substance, self-defense continues, as a matter of law, not to be a defense to 
felony murder. 
 
Turning to Oates’ argument, he cites §§ 563.031.1 and 563.074.13 for support.  
Section 563.031.1, which codifies the justification of self-defense, provides a person may, 
subject to exceptions, “use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he 
or she reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself … from 
                                              
2  “Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo.”  State v. 
Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505, 510 (Mo. banc 2017) (internal quotations omitted).   
3  Statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2011 unless otherwise indicated.   
5 
 
what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by such 
person.”  In 2007, § 563.074.1 was adopted, providing “a person who uses force as 
described in section[] 563.031 … is justified in using such force and such fact shall be an 
absolute defense to criminal prosecution or civil liability.” (Emphasis added).  Also in 
2007, an exception to the justification of self-defense was added to § 563.031.1 providing 
a person may not use self-defense as a justification for the person’s use of physical force 
against another if the person “was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the 
commission of a forcible felony.”  Section 563.031.1(3) (emphasis added).  Because he 
was not committing a forcible felony when he attempted to distribute a controlled 
substance, Oates argues § 563.031.1(3) did not preclude self-defense as a justification for 
his use of force and, therefore, after 2007, self-defense provides “an absolute defense to 
criminal prosecution” pursuant to § 563.074.1, including prosecution for felony murder.   
While Oates is correct that § 563.031.1(3) did not preclude self-defense as a 
justification for his use of force because he was not committing a forcible felony,4 self-
defense justifies only that—the use of force.  This is evident in the plain language of 
§§ 563.031.1 and 563.074.1, which speak only in terms of the use of force.  See § 563.031.1 
(providing a person may “use physical force” in self-defense) (emphasis added); 
§ 563.074.1 (providing “a person who uses force [in self-defense] is justified in using such 
force and such fact shall be an absolute defense”) (emphasis added).  Because self-defense 
                                              
4  “Forcible felony” is defined as “any felony involving the use or threat of physical force 
or violence against any individual, including but not limited to murder, robbery, burglary, 
arson, kidnapping, assault, and any forcible sexual offense.”  Section 563.011(3). 
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justifies only the use of force, it is an absolute defense only to prosecution for the use of 
force, not prosecution for other acts not involving the use of force, such as those 
constituting a non-forcible felony.  See §§ 563.031.1, 563.074.1.   
Accordingly, the dispositive question is whether Oates was prosecuted for his use 
of force, which self-defense could justify, or for a different act not involving the use of 
force, which self-defense could not justify.  When a defendant’s use of force causes the 
death of a person and the State charges the defendant with conventional murder or 
manslaughter, the criminal act being prosecuted is the defendant’s use of force.  See 
§§ 565.021.1(1), 565.023.1(1), 565.024.1(1), RSMo 2000.  As such, self-defense is an 
available justification.  See §§ 563.031.1, 563.074.1.  Therefore, the circuit court in this 
case appropriately instructed the jury on self-defense as to conventional murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter.  But felony murder is different.  When a 
defendant’s use of force causes the death of a person and the defendant is charged with 
felony murder, the criminal act being prosecuted is not necessarily the defendant’s use of 
force.   
 
A person commits felony murder if he or she “commits any felony and, in the 
perpetration of that felony, another person dies as a result of the perpetration of that 
felony.”  State v. Burrell, 160 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Mo. banc 2005); see also § 565.021.1(2), 
RSMo 2000.  The underlying felony does not have to involve the use of force.  See 
§ 565.021.1(2), RSMo 2000.   It does not matter whether the person died as a result of the 
defendant’s or someone else’s use of lawful force, unlawful force, or no force at all.  It 
matters only that the person died as a result of the defendant’s commission of the 
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underlying felony, without regard to the defendant’s role in the fatal act.  See id.; Burrell, 
160 S.W.3d at 803 (“Under Missouri law, a defendant is responsible for any deaths that 
are the natural and proximate result of the commission of the felony.”) (emphasis added); 
State v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747, 752 (Mo. banc 1979) (“Whether the fatal act was done by 
the defendant, an accomplice, another victim, or a bystander is, under the facts here, not 
controlling.”); State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 110 (Mo. App. 2000) (“The purpose of 
the felony murder rule is to deter the commission of homicides during felonious activity 
by holding the felon liable for murder, even though the killing may have been committed 
only recklessly, negligently, or even entirely accidentally.”).  In other words, unless the 
underlying felony involves the defendant’s use of force, felony murder is not prosecuting 
the defendant’s use of force.  Instead, felony murder is prosecuting a different act—the 
commission of a felony that results in the death of a person.5  See § 565.021.1(2), RSMo 
2000. 
Such is the case here.  Because Oates’ underlying felony for felony murder did not 
involve the use of force, he was not prosecuted for his use of force.  Rather, he was 
prosecuted for committing a felony (attempting to distribute a controlled substance) that 
resulted in the death of the victims.  Consistent with the statutory definition of felony 
murder, Oates was not prosecuted for felony murder because it was his use of force that 
                                              
5  If the underlying felony involves the defendant’s use of force, then a prosecution for 
felony murder would be a prosecution for the defendant’s use of force.  However, 
§ 563.031.1(3) precludes self-defense from being an available justification if the defendant 
was committing a “forcible felony.”  
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caused the victims’ deaths; he was prosecuted for felony murder because he committed a 
drug felony that resulted in their deaths.   
The verdict directors confirm this.  For conventional murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter, the verdict directors each required the jury to 
find “the defendant caused the death of [the victim] by shooting [him or her].”  Requiring 
the jury to find Oates shot the victim necessarily required the jury to find Oates used force, 
evincing prosecution for his use of force.  In contrast, the verdict directors for felony 
murder required the jury to find Oates “committed attempted distribution of a controlled 
substance,” “[the victim] was killed by being shot,” and “[the victim] was killed as a result 
of the perpetration of that attempted distribution of a controlled substance.”  Most notably, 
the verdict directors for felony murder did not require the jury to find Oates shot the victim 
and, therefore, did not require the jury to find Oates used force.  Unlike the other verdict 
directors, the verdict directors for felony murder reflected prosecution for deaths that 
occurred as a result of a felony, not Oates’ use of force.   
In short, because self-defense justifies only the use of force, it is a defense only to 
prosecution for the defendant’s use of force.  See §§ 563.031.1, 563.074.1.  For felony 
murder, Oates was not prosecuted for his use of force.  Therefore, the circuit court did not 
err in refusing to instruct on self-defense as to felony murder.  Point I is denied. 
III.  Submitting Instructions on Felony Murder 
 
In his second point on appeal, Oates argues the circuit court erred in submitting 
instructions on felony murder for the second-degree murder counts.  Relying on several 
state and federal constitutional provisions, Oates argues submitting the felony-murder 
9 
 
instructions violated his constitutional rights to due process and to be tried for the offenses 
for which he was charged in that he was indicted only on conventional murder for the 
second-degree murder counts, and felony murder is not an included offense of conventional 
murder.  When the State filed a notice of intention to submit felony murder as an alternative 
to conventional murder, Oates filed a motion to strike the notice.  Oates’ motion to strike, 
however, did not invoke any of the constitutional provisions on which he now relies.  “To 
preserve a constitutional claim of error, the claim must be raised at the first opportunity 
with citation to specific constitutional sections.”  State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 426 
(Mo. banc 2015).  “If not raised at the first opportunity in the circuit court, a constitutional 
claim is waived and cannot be raised here.”  State v. Fassero, 256 S.W.3d 109, 117 (Mo. 
banc 2008).   
Oates’ unpreserved constitutional claim is subject to discretionary review only for 
plain error.  See Driskill, 459 S.W.3d at 426.  With plain-error review, “the defendant bears 
the burden of establishing manifest injustice.”  State v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. 
banc 2006).  As Oates does not even request plain-error review, he has made no attempt to 
carry this burden.  Furthermore, Oates was provided notice of the State’s intention to 
pursue felony murder before trial.  Therefore, Oates had the opportunity to prepare a proper 
defense and was not prejudiced.  See State v. Blankenship, 830 S.W.2d 1, 13 (Mo. banc 
1992); State v. Hendren, 524 S.W.3d 76, 82–83 (Mo. App. 2017).  Point II is denied. 
 
 
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IV.  Conclusion 
 
The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  W. Brent Powell, Judge 
 
 
 
All concur.