Case Title: Parker v. I&F Insulation Co.

Citation: 2000-Ohio-151

Docket Number: 19991473

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Parker v. I&F Insulation Co., 89 Ohio St.3d 261, 2000-Ohio-151.] 
 
 
 
PARKER ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. I&F INSULATION COMPANY, INC. ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Parker v. I&F Insulation Co. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 261.] 
Consumer sales practices — Determining who is a “prevailing party” for 
purposes of an award of appellate attorney fees under R.C. 1349.09(F) 
— Party awarded attorney fees in accordance with R.C. 1345.09(F) is 
entitled to postjudgment interest on those fees in accordance with R.C. 
1343.03(A). 
1. 
A party “prevails” on appeal within the meaning of R.C. 1345.09(F) if it 
obtains a substantial modification of the trial court’s judgment. 
2. 
A party awarded attorney fees under R.C. 1345.09(F) is entitled to 
postjudgment interest on those fees in accordance with R.C. 1343.03(A). 
(No. 99-1473 — Submitted April 11, 2000 — Decided July 12, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-980502. 
 
Appellants, Jeffrey and Miriam Parker, hired appellee I&F Insulation 
Company, Inc., to remove lead paint from their home and to install insulation in 
the home.  Disputes between the parties arose, and I&F Insulation left the 
worksite having completed only part of the paint-removal project and none of the 
insulation project.  According to the Parkers, I&F Insulation left debris containing 
high levels of lead on the Parkers’ property, abandoned a barrel of hazardous 
waste in the Parkers’ yard, and removed sixty custom shutters from the home and 
refused to return them. 
 
The Parkers sued I&F Insulation Company, Inc., its parent company, its 
successor, and two of the company’s principals (hereinafter referred to 
collectively as “I&F”) on claims of breach of the two contracts, fraudulent 
inducement, conversion, intentional exposure to hazardous waste, intentional 
 
 
2 
infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act, 
invasion of privacy, and fraudulent transfer of assets, along with claims that the 
owner of I&F Insulation was the alter ego of that entity.  A jury trial resulted in a 
verdict for the Parkers on their claims of breach of insulation contract in the 
amount of $0 in compensatory damages, breach of paint-removal contract in the 
amount of $76,604.13 in compensatory damages, fraudulent inducement in the 
amount of $13,595 in compensatory and $20,000 in punitive damages, conversion 
in the amount of $1,392.60 in compensatory and $1,000 in punitive damages, 
intentional exposure to hazardous waste in the amount of $15,000 in 
compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages, and violation of the CSPA in the 
amount of $13,595.  The jury also found for the Parkers on their claims of 
fraudulent transfer and alter ego, but against them on their claims of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. 
 
The Parkers filed a motion to conform the damages award to the evidence 
on the breach-of-insulation-contract and CSPA claims, for treble damages on the 
CSPA claim, and for prejudgment interest.  In addition, they filed a motion for 
attorney fees.  I&F moved for a new trial based on evidentiary issues.  The trial 
court granted the Parkers’ motions and denied the motion by I&F.  It then entered 
judgment according to the jury’s verdict, but modified it to award damages of 
$3,542 on the insulation-contract claim;  $76,604.13 on the CSPA claim, which it 
then trebled (pursuant to R.C. 1345.09) for a total of $229,812.39;  $71,230.66 in 
prejudgment interest, with ten percent annual interest; $176,154 in attorney fees;  
and $12,533.43 in costs.  The total amount of money awarded to the Parkers, 
excluding prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs, was thus $410,946.12. 
 
I&F appealed the judgment to the court of appeals, asserting eight 
assignments of error.  The court of appeals held that the trial court had lacked the 
power to modify the jury’s verdict because the Parkers’ motion had not provided 
a legal basis on which to do so, and remanded the action to the trial court.  The 
 
 
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amount of the judgment that the court of appeals affirmed, therefore, was 
$153,376.13, leaving the Parkers with approximately thirty-seven percent of their 
original award. 
 
On remand, the Parkers filed a motion in the trial court for, inter alia, 
postjudgment interest of $32,286.12 on the attorney fees awarded after trial.  They 
also claimed to have been the prevailing party on appeal pursuant to R.C. 
1345.09(F), and requested attorney fees for that appeal in the amount of 
$16,318.50, with a multiplier of 1.5, for a total of $24,477.75.  The trial court 
granted the Parkers’ motion for attorney fees for the appeal and for postjudgment 
interest on the attorney fees awarded after trial.  I&F appealed these awards. 
 
The court of appeals reversed both the appellate attorney fees and 
postjudgment interest awarded, holding that (1) the Parkers were not the 
“prevailing party” on the first appeal within the meaning of R.C. 1345.09(F), 
because I&F had achieved a “substantial modification of the judgment” on appeal, 
and (2) postjudgment interest could not be awarded on the attorney fees awarded 
after trial because those fees were “costs” as opposed to “damages” and were, 
therefore, not subject to the accrual of interest. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Mark Vander Laan, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., 
and Bryan E. Pacheco, for appellants. 
 
Benjamin, Yocum & Heather, Anthony J. Iaciofano and Christopher J. 
Mulvaney, for appellees. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  This case presents the following questions: 
 
(1) Under the Consumer Sales Practices Act, how is a court to determine 
who a “prevailing party” is for purposes of an award of appellate attorney fees? 
 
 
4 
 
(2) Is a party entitled to postjudgment interest on an award of attorney fees 
under the Consumer Sales Practices Act? 
I.  PREVAILING PARTY ON APPEAL 
 
R.C. 1345.09(F) provides that, in an action alleging a violation of the 
Consumer Sales Practices Act (R.C. Chapter 1345), a “prevailing party” may 
recover reasonable attorney fees if the consumer’s action was groundless and 
brought (or maintained) in bad faith or if the supplier knowingly violated the Act.  
The parties, citing Tanner v. Tom Harrigan Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. (1991), 82 
Ohio App.3d 764, 613 N.E.2d 649, do not dispute that appellate attorney fees are 
properly awarded to a “prevailing party” on appeal as well as at the trial level.  
Nor does this court find any reason to disagree with the Tanner court’s holding 
that a prevailing party may recover appellate attorney fees in an action under R.C. 
Chapter 1345.1 Rather, the parties are divided on the issue of whether the Parkers 
were the “prevailing party” in their appeal.  The Parkers assert that a party 
prevails on appeal if it preserves at least part of an original judgment in its favor, 
while I&F argues that a party prevails if it achieves a substantial modification of a 
judgment against it.  The text of the statute neither defines “prevailing party” nor 
provides criteria by which a party may be deemed to have “prevailed” on appeal. 
 
I&F relies on Korn v. State Med. Bd. (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 483, 594 
N.E.2d 720, as support for its position that it was the prevailing party on appeal 
and that the court of appeals, therefore, properly reversed the trial court’s award 
of appellate attorney fees to the Parkers.  In Korn, the plaintiff sued the State 
Medical Board of Ohio for appellate attorney fees in connection with his appeal 
of the revocation of his medical license.  In that appeal, Korn had obtained a 
reversal of three of the four original charges against him and a remand to the trial 
court of the fourth.  Claiming to be the prevailing party on appeal, Korn applied to 
the trial court for appellate attorney fees, relying on R.C. 119.12 and 2335.39.  
Subject to exceptions not pertinent in Korn, R.C. 119.12 mandates that the state 
 
 
5 
pay the attorney fees of an opposing prevailing party in an appeal of an 
administrative action initiated by the state.  Under R.C. 2335.39, a prevailing 
party is one “that prevails in an action or appeal involving the state.” 
 
The trial court denied Korn’s application, and he appealed.  The Tenth 
District Court of Appeals, noting that “a substantial portion of [the Board’s] 
findings were reversed and its order vacated,” held that the plaintiff had prevailed 
on appeal:  “A party who appeals an order or judgment and prevails to the extent 
that he obtains a new trial, or a modification of the judgment, is a ‘prevailing 
party’ within the contemplation of R.C. 2335.39.”  Korn, 71 Ohio App.3d at 487, 
594 N.E.2d at 723.  The court of appeals below, relying on Korn, held that a party 
could be awarded appellate attorney fees under R.C. 1345.09(F) if it was “the 
prevailing party with respect to the overall appeal.”  To be such, a party “must 
achieve only substantial, not complete, victory.” 
 
We agree with the court of appeals below because the “substantial-
victory” test accords with the intent and purpose of the statutory allowance of 
attorney fees. As the court of appeals stated, deeming the consumer the prevailing 
party on appeal “simply because some measure of the damage award under the 
Act survived the appeal * * * would essentially penalize an appellant achieving 
anything less than a complete victory even though, as is the case here, the appeal 
was meritorious and achieved a substantial reduction of the judgment.”  See, also, 
Payless Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Draayer (1986), 43 Wash.App. 240, 246, 716 
P.2d 929, 933, and  Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash. v. Romas (1997), 88 Wash.App. 
801, 811-812, 947 P.2d 754, 759-760 (substantial-victory test applied to appeals 
in actions under state consumer protection law).  Moreover, as the court of 
appeals below stated, “the procedural error that gave rise to the modification of 
the judgment was at the urging of the Parkers and in no way the fault of I&F.” We 
hold that a party “prevails” on appeal within the meaning of R.C. 1345.09(F) if it 
obtains a substantial modification of the trial court’s judgment. 
 
 
6 
 
The Parkers cite Brenner Marine, Inc. v. George Goudreau, Jr. Trust (Jan. 
13, 1995), Lucas App. No. L-93-077, unreported, 1995 WL 12118, appeal not 
allowed (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 1530, 649 N.E.2d 839, in support of their position.  
Brenner is instructive, assert the Parkers, because it provides the only definition to 
be found in Ohio case law of “prevailing party” within the meaning of the CSPA.  
In Brenner, the court held that a consumer is the “prevailing party” in a CSPA 
action if it is awarded either rescission or damages by the trial court.  As I&F 
points out, however, Brenner was concerned with the definition of  “prevailing 
party” only at the trial court level.  It did not address the issue of who would be 
deemed the prevailing party on appeal if, as here, the consumer was awarded 
damages at trial and then the defendant obtained a substantial reduction of that 
award on appeal.  On the other hand, Korn, even though it involved a different 
statute, did address this very issue: 
 
“A party who appeals an order or judgment and prevails to the extent that 
he obtains a new trial, or a modification of the judgment, is a ‘prevailing party’ 
within the contemplation of R.C. 2335.39.  There is nothing in that section that 
requires a finding that a prevailing party on an appeal is limited to one who 
succeeds in having a ‘complete victory,’ which presumably means having the 
entire matter determined in his favor without a remand to the tribunal from which 
the appeal is taken for further proceedings.”  Korn at 487, 594 N.E.2d at 723. 
 
This reasoning applies here with equal force, regardless of the fact that the 
two cases involve different statutes.  Having already concluded that R.C. 
1345.09(F) allows for the award of appellate attorney fees to a party who prevails 
on appeal, we have effectively deemed the two statutes identical in that respect.  
We, therefore, affirm the court of appeals’ holding that the Parkers were not the 
prevailing party on appeal and were thus not entitled to appellate attorney fees. 
II.  POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST ON ATTORNEY FEES 
 
 
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The parties also ask us to decide whether postjudgment interest may be 
awarded for the Parkers’ trial-level attorney fees.  R.C. 1343.03(A) provides that 
judgment interest may be awarded on all “judgments, decrees, and orders of any 
judicial tribunal for the payment of money.”  Whether this applies to attorney fees 
in an action under R.C. Chapter 1345 is not explicitly addressed in the Code.  
According to the Parkers, the court of appeals’ holding that such fees are “costs” 
and, therefore, do not permit interest to accrue, is erroneous because it encourages 
a losing party to withhold payment without consequences and penalizes the 
winning party by depriving it of the value of the fees prior to payment.  I&F takes 
the position that there is statutory authority for the accrual of interest on damages 
(e.g., judgments arising out of tortious conduct), but not on costs;  therefore, 
attorney fees, being costs, do not accrue interest. 
 
R.C. 1343.03(A) provides that, with certain exceptions not important here, 
“when money becomes due and payable * * * upon all judgments, decrees, and 
orders of any judicial tribunal for the payment of money arising out of tortious 
conduct * * *, the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate of ten percent per 
annum * * *.”  The Parkers point out that this statute makes no exception for 
attorney fees, and argue that the failure to award interest on the fees allows a 
losing party to withhold payment without consequence.  I&F asserts that 
postjudgment interest on attorney fees is not authorized by statute and would 
penalize it for exercising its right to appeal.  The court of appeals below stated: 
 
“We hold the award of post-judgment interest on the attorney fees to be 
improper, however, for a reason neither party has discussed.  That reason is that 
the attorney-fee award should have been taxed as court costs, upon which post-
judgment interest may not be assessed.” 
 
But a conclusion that attorney fees in this case are “costs” does not answer 
the question of whether postjudgment interest may accrue on them.  The court of 
appeals cited a case from Ohio’s Sixth Appellate District, Chaney v. Breton 
 
 
8 
Builder Co., Ltd. (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 602, 720 N.E.2d 941.  In Chaney, the 
appellant argued that the trial court had erroneously awarded the appellee attorney 
fees as part of the judgment and then ordered the appellant to pay postjudgment 
interest on the entire amount.  The Chaney court, finding the trial court’s order to 
be unclear, held that attorney fees are “to be taxed as costs, not as damages,” id. at 
607, 720 N.E.2d at 945, and entered “the judgment the trial court should have 
rendered, i.e., that the $340 in attorney fees awarded * * * is hereby ordered taxed 
as court costs, and interest shall accrue at the rate of ten per cent per annum on 
only the $50 judgment awarded to appellee * * *.”  Id. at 609, 720 N.E.2d at 946. 
 
Chaney clashes with the modern trend that favors the awarding of 
postjudgment interest on attorney fees as a general rule.  The Supreme Court of 
Florida, for example, held that “the burden of nonpayment is fairly placed on the 
party whose obligation to pay attorney fees has been fixed,” and approved the 
reasoning of a lower court in another case that failure to award such interest 
“would be to penalize the prevailing party * * * for [the opposing party’s] delay 
in paying the attorney’s fees found due after their concession of liability upon 
settlement of the underlying claims;  it would reward [the losing party] for 
continuing to contest [the prevailing party’s] reimbursement of attorney’s fees by 
allowing [the losing party] interest-free use of the money for more than a year.  
Such a result would be inconsistent with the intent and purpose of statutory 
provisions allowing attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.”  Quality Engineered 
Installation, Inc. v. Higley South, Inc. (Fla.1996), 670 So.2d 929, 930, 931 (citing 
Inacio v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. [Fla.App.1990], 550 So.2d 92. 97-98).  See, 
also, Bailey v. Leatherman (Fla.App.1996), 668 So.2d 232, 233. 
 
Similarly, courts in other states have determined that interest is 
appropriately awarded on attorney fees.  See, e.g., Isaacson Structural Steel Co. v. 
Armco Steel Corp. (Alaska 1982), 640 P.2d 812, 818 (“post-judgment interest is 
‘a form of compensating for the period that the [prevailing party] remains “less 
 
 
9 
than whole” ’ ”);  Gaulin v. Commr. of Pub. Welfare (1986), 23 Mass.App.Ct. 
744, 748-749, 505 N.E.2d 898, 901-902 (attorney fees should be awarded to 
successful civil rights plaintiffs because it would facilitate the “strong system of 
private enforcement of Federal civil rights” created by Congress) (affirmed, 
Gaulin v. Commr. of Pub. Welfare [1987], 401 Mass. 1001, 515 N.E.2d 583, 584).  
Accord Nardone v. Patrick Motor Sales, Inc. (1999), 46 Mass.App.Ct. 452, 453, 
706 N.E.2d 1151, 1152.  See, also, In re Tucknall (Bankr.D.Conn.1989), 94 B.R. 
277, 279 (interpreting Connecticut’s postjudgment interest statute). 
 
Likewise, federal courts interpreting Section 1961, Title 28, U.S.Code, the 
analogous federal statute governing the payment of interest on civil judgments, 
are instructive.  For example, the Ninth Circuit held in 1982: 
 
“Title 28 U.S.C. section 1961 provides that ‘[i]nterest shall be allowed on 
any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court’ and that interest 
should run from the date of the entry of judgment.  Although this court has never 
addressed the issue whether section 1961 applies to attorney’s fees awards under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988, it has concluded that section 1961 permits interest on attorney’s 
fees awards in antitrust actions made pursuant to a similar attorney’s fees statute.  
* * * 
 
“We see no reason to distinguish between the two statutes in allowing 
interest on attorney’s fees.  Indeed, given the acknowledged purpose of section 
1988 to encourage private actions to enforce civil rights statutes where a monetary 
judgment in such actions is often nominal or, as in this case, not available at all, * 
* * the justification for awarding interest on attorney’s fees under section 1988 is 
stronger than in awards in antitrust actions where a prevailing plaintiff will 
usually recover damages.”  Spain v. Mountanos (C.A.9, 1982), 690 F.2d 742, 747-
748. 
 
In 1990, a federal district court even called the rule that interest is to be 
awarded on attorney fees “well-settled.”  Jenkins v. Missouri (W.D.Mo.1990), 
 
 
10 
731 F.Supp. 1437, 1438.  See, also, Foley v. Lowell (C.A.1, 1991), 948 F.2d 10, 
22 (“considering the time value of the dollar, the only way in which a fee award 
will retain its stated worth is by adding interest in order to compensate for delay 
in payment from that point forward”).  Accord Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc. 
(D.Mass.1995), 903 F.Supp. 234, 239. 
 
We are convinced that the modern trend represents the better-reasoned 
view.  Not only does an award of postjudgment interest on attorney fees properly 
recognize the time value of money by making the prevailing party truly whole and 
preventing the nonprevailing party from enjoying the use of money that no longer 
rightfully belongs to it, but it also promotes the purposes of the CSPA.  These 
purposes include making private enforcement of the CSPA attractive to 
consumers who otherwise might not be able to afford or justify the cost of 
prosecuting an alleged CSPA violation, which, in turn, works to discourage CSPA 
violations in the first place via the threat of liability for damages and attorney 
fees.  See Tanner, 82 Ohio App.3d at 765-766, 613 N.E.2d at 650. 
 
We hold, therefore, that a party awarded attorney fees under R.C. 
1345.09(F) is entitled to an award of postjudgment interest on those fees in 
accordance with R.C. 1343.03(A).  We reverse the court of appeals’ decision on 
this issue, and reinstate the trial court’s award to the Parkers of postjudgment 
interest on their original attorney fees award. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1. 
As the Tanner court observed at 765-766, 613 N.E.2d at 650: 
 
 
11 
 
“Under [R.C. 1345.09(F)] a trial court, in its discretion, may award a 
consumer reasonable attorney fees when the supplier in a consumer transaction 
intentionally commits an act or practice which is deceptive, unfair or 
unconscionable.  Einhorn v. Ford Motor Co. (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 27, 548 
N.E.2d 933.  The Consumer Sales Practices Act, R.C. Chapter 1345, is a remedial 
law designed to compensate for traditional consumer remedies and must be 
liberally construed pursuant to R.C. 1.11.  Id. at 29, 548 N.E.2d at 935.  Since 
recoveries under this Act are often small and generally insufficient to cover 
attorney fees, without an award of attorney fees many consumers would be 
persuaded not to sue.  Id. at 30, 548 N.E.2d at 935-936.  The legislative purpose 
of the section allowing an award of attorney fees was ‘to prevent unfair, 
deceptive, and unconscionable acts and practices, to provide strong and effective 
remedies, both public and private, to assure that consumers will recover any 
damages caused by such acts and practices, and to eliminate any monetary 
incentives for suppliers to engage in such acts and practices.’  (137 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, 3219.)  Awarding attorney fees under the Act allows private redress of 
individual wrongs, but also may benefit the community generally because a 
judgment for the consumer may discourage violations of the Act by others.  
Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 569 N.E.2d 464.  
‘Prohibiting private attorneys from recovering for the time they expend on a 
consumer protection case undermines both the purpose and deterrent effect of the 
Act.’  Id. at 144, 569 N.E.2d at 465.  “ * * * The work of the attorney on appeal is 
part of the legal process of achieving and maintaining the judgment for the 
consumer.  Disallowing attorney fees for appellate work undermines the purpose 
of the Act.” 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I 
dissent from Part I of the majority opinion, but concur as to Part II. 
 
 
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__________________ 
APPENDIX 
 
R.C. 1345.09 provides: 
 
“For a violation of Chapter 1345. of the Revised Code, a consumer has a 
cause of action and is entitled to relief as follows: 
 
“(A) Where the violation was an act prohibited by section 1345.02 or 
1345.03 of the Revised Code, the consumer may, in an individual  action, rescind 
the transaction or recover his damages. 
 
“(B) Where the violation was an act or practice declared to be deceptive or 
unconscionable by rule adopted under division (B)(2) of section 1345.05 of the 
Revised Code before the consumer transaction on which the action is based, or an 
act or practice determined by a court of this state to violate section 1345.02 or 
1345.03 of the Revised Code and committed after the decision containing the 
determination has been made available for public inspection under division (A)(3) 
of section 1345.05 of the Revised Code, the consumer may rescind the transaction 
or recover, but not in a class action, three times the amount of his actual damages 
or two hundred dollars, whichever is greater, or recover damages or other 
appropriate relief in a class action under Civil Rule 23, as amended. 
 
“(C) In any action for rescission, revocation of the consumer transaction 
must occur within a reasonable time after the consumer discovers or should have 
discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the 
subject of the consumer transaction. 
 
“(D) Any consumer may seek a declaratory judgment, an injunction, or 
other appropriate relief against an act or practice that violates this chapter. 
 
“(E) When a consumer commences an individual action for a declaratory 
judgment or an injunction or a class action under this section, the clerk of court 
shall immediately mail a copy of the complaint to the attorney general.  Upon 
timely application, the attorney general may be permitted to intervene in any 
 
 
13 
private action or appeal pending under this section.  When a judgment under this 
section becomes final, the clerk of court shall mail a copy of the judgment 
including supporting opinions to the attorney general for inclusion in the public 
file maintained under division (A)(3) of section 1345.05 of the Revised Code. 
 
“(F) The court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s 
fee limited to the work reasonably performed, if either of the following apply: 
 
“(1) The consumer complaining of the act or practice that violated this 
chapter has brought an action that is groundless, and the consumer filed or 
maintained the action in bad faith; 
 
“(2) The supplier has knowingly committed an act or practice that violates 
this chapter.”