Case Title: WAINMAN v BOWLER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 13923

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13923 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 JOHN F7AINMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, LARRY C. BOWLER, d/b/a TEE DANIELS COUNTY LEADER, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District, Honorable M. James Sorte, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robert A. Meldahl araued, Fairview, Montana For Respondent: Traynor and Hoversland, Scobey, Montana Ken W. Hoversland argued, Scobey, Montana Submitted: Jan. 26, 1978 Decided: MAR 2 8 1 9 7 8 Filed: MPR 2 5 " 1 6 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is an appeal by p l a i n t i f f from a judgment on t h e pleadings. P l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n f o r l i b e l w a s commenced following p u b l i c a t i o n of a r t i c l e s by defendant i n The - Daniels County Leader. The complaint a l l e g e d t h a t defendant published t h r e e a r t i c l e s containing l i b e l o u s statements which were f a l s e , unprivileged, and c a l c u l a t e d t o d r i v e p l a i n t i f f from h i s o f f i c e . Those statements, segregated by p l a i n t i f f from t h e e n t i r e a r t i c l e s , a r e a s follows: September 16, 1976: "There has been a d e r e l i c t i o n of duty, bullying of people, concealment o r d e l i b e r a t e non-recording of p u b l i c records, p l u s abysmal l a c k of normal and reasonable access t o t h e records which a r e recorded." October 21, 1976: "Increasing d i s c o u r t e s y and negligence by County and Scobey law enforcement o f f i c i a l s i n dealing with c i t i - zens of t h e a r e a and ~ ~ s i t o r s . " November 11, 1976: " * * * b u l l y boy chief of p o l i c e i n Scobey." P l a i n t i f f ' s f i r s t a c t i o n f o r l i b e l was commenced on December 2 , 1976. This a c t i o n w a s dismissed. A second a c t i o n was f i l e d a f t e r proper r e t r a c t i o n t i m e had passed pursuant t o s e c t i o n 64-207.1, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant answered p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint and f i l e d a motion f o r judgment on t h e pleadings. The motion was based on two grounds. F i r s t , t h e complaint s t a t e s no cause of a c t i o n upon which r e l i e f can be granted. Second, i f t h e statements a r e viewed i n t h e l i g h t most favorable t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , defendant's s t a t u t o r y defenses of t r u t h and p r i v i l e g e negate p l a i n t i f f ' s claims. The D i s t r i c t Court granted defendant's motion f o r judgment on t h e pleadings and dismissed p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint with prejudice. The Memorandum Opinion accompanying t h a t order reads: "The important pleading i n t h i s case is t h e Complaint and a reading of t h e Complaint r e v e a l s t h a t a l l of t h e references i n t h e Daniels County Leader t h a t w e r e published had reference t o a general c l a s s of people, and although t h e Plain- t i f f was within t h a t c l a s s , t h e language was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e l i b e l per se. One exception w a s made and t h a t w a s t h e p u b l i c a t i o n on November 11, 1976, when t h e Editor of t h e Daniels County Leader r e f e r r e d t o t h e P l a i n t i f f a s a ' b u l l y boy chief of p o l i c e i n Scobey'. This language i s n o t l i b e l per s e , and t h e f a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e innuendo a r e n o t s e t f o r t h i n a s a t i s f a c t o r y manner. I n a d d i t i o n , i f l i b e l i s n o t p e r se it must appear by innuendo and s p e c i a l damages must be a l l e g e d . This was n o t done i n t h i s case." Two i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d f o r review: 1. Whether t h e statements a r e l i b e l o u s per se? 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n granting a judgment on t h e pleadings? I s s u e 1. P l a i n t i f f ' s f i r s t i s s u e r e q u i r e s a review of t h e pleadings. On t h e f a c e of t h e pleadings, it i s obvious t h a t t h e theory of p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint is l i b e l p e r se. N o s p e c i a l damages w e r e a l l e g e d i n t h e complaint. Montana law i s c l e a r on t h i s s u b j e c t . To s t a t e a cause of a c t i o n f o r l i b e l , t h e complaint must s t a t e a l i b e l per se a c t i o n o r plead s p e c i a l damages t o uphold a l i b e l per quod a c t i o n . S t e f f e s v. Crawford, (1963), 143 Mont. 4 3 , 47, 386 P.2d 842. Accordingly, on t h e f a c e of t h e pleadings and i n l i g h t of s e t t l e d law, t h e D i s t r i c t Court was faced with t h e ques- t i o n : Were t h e statements l i b e l o u s per se? These s t a t e - ments must be examined with t h e a i d of t h e r u l e s of i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n a s set f o r t h by t h i s Court i n numerous cases. I n K e l l e r v. Safeway S t o r e s , Inc., (1940), 1 1 1 Mont. 28, 31-32, 108 P.2d 605, t h i s Court summarized t h e r u l e s of i n t e r - p r e t a t i o n f o r l i b e l and slander cases: " I n determining whether f a l s e defamatory words s a i d t o have been spoken of and concerninq t h e party complaining a;e o r are not slanderois se, t h e opprobrious words a r e t o be construed according t o t h e i r usual, popular and n a t u r a l meaning and - common acceptation, t h a t i s , i n t h e sense i n which persons o u t of c o u r t and of ordinary i n t e l l i g e n c e would understand them, f o r t h e presumption is t o be indulged t h a t t h e t h i r d p a r t y o r p a r t i e s present so understood them. * * * "The statement made must be viewed by t h e c o u r t as a stranger might look a t it, without the a i d of s p e c i a l knowledge possessed by t h e p a r t i e s concerned. * * * "The language used must be s u s c e p t i b l e of but one meaning and t h a t an opprobrious one. * * * "The alleged defamatory matter i s t o be construed a s an e n t i r e t y and with reference t o t h e remain- ing portions of t h e conversation. * * * " I f t h e language i s n o t slanderous per -- se, it cannot be made s o by innuendo * * * because t h e term "per se" means by i t s e l f ; simply a s such; i n i t s own nature without reference t o i t s r e l a t i o n s . * * * A s otherwise s t a t e d i n Manley v. Harer, supra: 'Words are defamatory -- per s e which upon t h e i r f a c e and without t h e a i d of e x t r i n s i c proof a r e i n j u r i o u s t o t h e person concerning whom they a r e spoken. I f t h e i n j u r i o u s character of t h e words does n o t appear from t h e i r f a c e when taken i n t h e i r p l a i n and n a t u r a l meaning and according t o t h e sense i n which they appear t o have been used, they a r e n o t defamatory per - se b u t a r e s a i d t o r e q u i r e innuendo.'" - Applying t h e s e r u l e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o t h e a r t i c l e s of September 16, 1976, and October 2 1 , 1976, reveals s e v e r a l v i o l a t i o n s of t h e r u l e s by t h e p l a i n t i f f . F i r s t , p l a i n t i f f segregated t h e statements from t h e e n t i r e a r t i c l e s and imported a l i b e l o u s per se meaning t o them. The words used may not be segregated and construed alone. The e n t i r e p r i n t e d statement must be viewed by t h e c o u r t a s a stranger might look a t it. S t e f f e s , supra. A review of t h e e n t i r e a r t i c l e s of September 16 and October 21, taking t h e s t a t e - ments with r e l a t i o n t o t h e whole and construing them with reference t o t h e remaining portions, negates any opprobrious meaning. Second, p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s t h e statements r e f e r t o him personally. The D i s t r i c t Court noted, and we agree, t h e statements r e f e r t o a general c l a s s of people. While t h e Scobey P o l i c e Department and t h e Daniels County S h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e a r e small, t h e a r t i c l e s , when read i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y , r e f e r t o t h e departments over a period of years. There have been many men employed by t h e s e departments t o whom t h e a r t i c l e s and statements could r e f e r . A t no p o i n t i n e i t h e r a r t i c l e i s t h e defendant personally r e f e r r e d t o o r is he s p e c i f i c a l l y set o u t . To be l i b e l o u s p e r se, t h e publica- t i o n must contain defamatory words s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d a t t h e person claiming i n j u r y . I n t e r - S t a t e Detective Bureau, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., (1971), 29 Colo.App. 313, 484 P.2d 131, 133. Granger v. Time, Inc., (1977), Mont. , 568 P.2d 535, 34 St.Rep. 983, 989. Third, p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s t h e statements have an oppro- brious meaning. The r u l e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e q u i r e t h a t t h e language must be s u s c e p t i b l e of b u t one meaning t o c o n s t i t u t e l i b e l per se. S t e f f e s , supra. Such unequivocal statement i s n o t p r e s e n t i n t h i s case. A reader of t h e e n t i r e a r t i c l e s could reach more than one meaning. The a r t i c l e of November 11, 1976, r e f e r r i n g t o t h e p l a i n t i f f as " b u l l y boy chief of police" r e q u i r e s t h i s Court t o review t h e n a t u r e of t h e words. The District Court r u l e d t h a t t h i s statement does n o t import such a meaning t h a t l i b e l per s e can be imputed. W e agree. The d e f i n i t i o n of l i b e l per se i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d and long standing i n Montana. Lemmer v. The "Tribune" e t a l . , (1915), 50 Mont. 559, 564, 148 P. 338; Manley v. Harer, (1925), 73 Mont. 253, 235 P. 757; G r i f f i n v. Opinion publishing Co., (1943), 1 1 4 Mont. 502, 508, 138 P.2d 580; ~ e w i s v. Reader's ~ i g e s t , (1973), 162 Mont. 4 0 1 , 406, 512 P.2d 702. Where t h e i n j u r i o u s c h a r a c t e r of t h e words does n o t appear from t h e i r f a c e when taken i n t h e i r p l a i n and n a t u r a l meaning and according t o t h e sense i n which they appear t o have been used, they a r e n o t l i b e l per se. Manley, supra. Additionally, t h e i n j u r i o u s c h a r a c t e r must be a f a c t of such common n o t o r i e t y a s t o be e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e general consent of men s o t h a t t h e c o u r t takes j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of it. G r i f f i n , supra. The words "bully boy" a r e of doubtful s i g n i f i c a n c e and t h e i r i n j u r i o u s c h a r a c t e r does n o t appear on t h e i r face. Defamatory words t o be a c t i o n a b l e , a s ex- posing a person t o hatred contempt, r i d i c u l e o r obloquy o r which have a tendency t o i n j u r e him i n h i s occupation must be of such a n a t u r e t h a t t h e c o u r t can presume a s a matter of law t h a t they w i l l tend t o d i s g r a c e and degrade him o r cause him t o be shunned and avoided. I t i s not s u f f i c i e n t , standing alone, t h a t t h e language i s unpleasant and annoys o r i r k s him, and s u b j e c t s him t o j e s t s o r banter, s o a s t o a f f e c t h i s f e e l i n g s . Gang v. Hughes, (1953) I 1 1 1 F-Supp. 27, 29. This Court notes t h a t " p o l i c e o f f i c e r s i n t h i s day perhaps must be thick-skinned and prepared f o r abuse". Conchito v. City of Tulsa, (1974), 0kl.Cr. 521 P.2d 1384, 1392. J u s t i c e Powell i n Lewis v. City of New Orleans, (1972), 408 U.S. 913, 92 S.Ct. 2499, 33 L Ed 2d 321, remarked on t h e s u b j e c t of e p i t h e t s spoken t o p o l i c e o f f i c e r s saying t h a t those e p i t h e t s , had they been addressed by one c i t i z e n t o another, f a c e t o f a c e and i n a h o s t i l e manner, would c l e a r l y have been f i g h t i n g words, i n h e r e n t l y l i k e l y t o provoke a v i o l e n t r e a c t i o n . This remark w a s taken one s t e p f u r t h e r by J u s t i c e Powell where i n h i s concurring opinion t o L e w i s v. C i t y of New Orleans, (1974), 415 U.S. 130, 94 S.Ct. 970, 39 L Ed 2d 2 1 4 , 220, he r e i t e r a t e d : "* * * a properly t r a i n e d [police] o f f i c e r may reasonably be expected t o ' e x e r c i s e a higher degree of r e s t r a i n t ' than t h e average c i t i z e n , and thus be less l i k e l y t o respond b e l l i g e r e n t l y t o ' f i g h t i n g words.'* * *" P l a i n t i f f was a p o l i c e o f f i c e r and a public o f f i c i a l . Due t o t h e nature of h i s employment and s t a t u s , he w a s s u b j e c t t o t h e vociferous comment by t h e public. To t h i s f a c t , we must quote t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Cohen v . C a l i f o r n i a , (1971), 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L Ed "* * * Indeed, a s M r . J u s t i c e Frankfurter has s a i d , ' [o] ne of t h e prerogatives of American c i t i z e n s h i p i s t h e r i g h t t o criti- c i z e public men and measures--and t h a t means n o t only informed and responsible c r i t i c i s m b u t t h e freedom t o speak f o o l i s h l y and without moderation.' Baumgartner v. United S t a t e s , 322 U.S. 665, 673-674, 88 L.Ed. 1525, 1531, 64 S.Ct. 1 2 4 0 (1944)." I s s u e 2. The statements of September 16, October 2 1 , and November 11, 1976, were not l i b e l o u s per se. N o s p e c i a l damages were plead. N o l i b e l per quod a c t i o n was plead. The D i s t r i c t Court was c o r r e c t i n g r a n t i n g a judgment on t h e pleadings i n t h a t no m a t e r i a l i s s u e s remained once a d e t e r - mination was made t h a t l i b e l per s e was n o t involved. S t e f f es, supra. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is affirmed. W e Concur: Chief Justgce