Case Title: Ebb v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 117d/94

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
NO. 117
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1994
___________________________________
JEFFREY D. EBB
V.
STATE OF MARYLAND 
___________________________________
Murphy, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
    
JJ.
___________________________________
 DISSENTING OPINION BY Bell, J., in
     which Eldridge, J. joins. 
___________________________________
      FILED:  February 14, 1996
This case requires resolution of a frequently occurring
conflict between a trial court's duty to control trial, including
the cross-examination of witnesses, and a jury's responsibility to
judge the credibility of witnesses. The Court of Special Appeals,
in an unreported opinion, resolved the conflict in favor of the
State. Relying on the court's right to control the cross-
examination of witnesses, the Court of Special Appeals held that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when, after conducting
hearings outside the presence of the jury, it excluded evidence of
the witnesses' pending charges and/or probationary status, based on
its having found that the witnesses had no expectation of favorable
treatment because of testifying. The majority affirms the judgment
of the Court of Special Appeals. Because I am of the opinion that
the province of the jury as the judge of witness credibility was
impermissibly invaded, I respectfully dissent. 
I.
Jeffrey Damon Ebb, the petitioner, was tried in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County for murder and related charges, in
connection with an attempted robbery of a barbershop, which
occurred on November 28, 1992. To prove the petitioner's criminal
agency, the State called, in addition to the petitioner's alleged
accomplice, Stephanie Stevenson, three witnesses: Todd Timmons,
Lawrence Allen, and Jerome House-Bowman. Timmons and Allen placed
the murder weapon in the petitioner's possession at about the time
the murders were committed.
2
     Timmons originally testified that he purchased a nine
1
millimeter handgun from the petitioner in either September or
October 1992, being unsure of the exact month.  Upon further
questioning, he amended his testimony to reflect that he
purchased the gun in November 1992. 
     The record does not reflect what substance Timmons
2
possessed with intent to distribute.
According to Timmons, he purchased a nine millimeter handgun
from the petitioner around the end of November 1992.  When Timmons
1
was arrested, inter alia, for possession of the handgun, it was
discovered that it was the weapon used to kill two persons in the
barbershop. Allen, in addition to testifying that the petitioner
had a gun that looked like the murder weapon in his possession
prior to the murders, testified that, on November 28, 1992, the
petitioner asked him for money with which to get out of town.
House-Bowman stated that, in December 1992, the petitioner admitted
his involvement in the "barbershop murder" to him, explaining that
he knew where the money was kept and that was why he attempted to
rob the barbershop.
Timmons, Allen and House-Bowman all had charges pending
against them and were incarcerated at the time they testified.
Timmons was serving a two-year, six-month sentence for possession
of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute,  
2
as to which there was a pending motion for reconsideration. He was
also awaiting trial on a violation of probation charge, for which
he was "backing up" a one year sentence. Along with serving a six-
month sentence for possession of narcotics, Allen had pending
3
handgun violation and handgun theft charges. House-Bowman was
awaiting trial on a violation of probation charge, the underlying
charges being two robberies with a deadly weapon.
Prior to trial, the petitioner inquired "whether or not any
statements or promises or inducements had been made to the State's
witness." In response, the prosecutor informed the court:
Judge, I can tell you that we have not made
any written promises of immunity or anything
like that to any witness. The only one that I
am aware of is the individual, Jerry Bowman-
House believes that at some point he was told
that somebody would speak on his behalf at a 
probation hearing that he has.
I have talked with him about that, and I
have explained to him that his testimony in
this case is only based on the fact that it is
the truth and it is the right thing to do. I
talked with him about it and made clear to him
that there is no express promise that that is  
going to happen.
* * *
But he believes that somebody told him that. 
So I am sure if he is asked, that is what he
is going to say. 
Despite the State's position that it had made no promises, the
petitioner, nevertheless, sought to cross-examine Timmons, Allen,
and House-Bowman about their pending charges. To support his
position, the petitioner contended that it was not what the State
had promised, but rather the witnesses' motive to testify that was
a proper subject of inquiry. The court agreed with the petitioner
stating, "it is not what the State has promised here. Sometimes the
act itself is sufficient. In others, even without any promises, it
4
is what is in the mind of the defendant." Consequently, the court
ruled that "[f]irst of all, you have to lay some threshold
foundation that he does expect something." Based on that ruling,
the court held hearings outside the presence of the jury, thus
allowing the petitioner the opportunity to "get [the] threshold
foundation that would suggest that [the witness] expects any kind
of lenience."  
When confronted at a hearing outside the presence of the jury,
House-Bowman stated that he had been told his testimony would not
assist him in obtaining a favorable outcome in his pending
probation matter. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that he still hoped
that testifying would help him to receive leniency. In contrast,
Timmons and Allen, when questioned outside the presence of the
jury,  confirmed that the prosecutor made no promise to them and
also denied expecting anything in return for their testimony. 
As to Timmons and Allen, the court ruled that, while their
convictions affecting credibility could be inquired into, the
petitioner could not cross-examine these witnesses concerning
pending charges. A different conclusion was reached as to House-
Bowman, 
however. 
Because 
he 
admitted 
expecting 
favorable
consideration, the court permitted the petitioner to cross-examine
him as to the pending violation of probation charge. During the
cross-examinations of Timmons and Allen, the petitioner did, in
fact, bring out their prior relevant criminal convictions.
  
Having been convicted of two counts of felony murder,
5
     In addition to the life sentences, the court sentenced the
3
petitioner to concurrent life sentences totaling 80 years
imprisonment. 
attempted second degree murder, attempted robbery with a deadly
weapon, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, use of a
handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and three counts
of assault, for which he received a total sentence of life
imprisonment without parole,  the petitioner noted an appeal to the
3
Court of Special Appeals. Among the challenges he raised was the
trial court's restriction of his cross-examination of Timmons and
Allen. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments, holding
that "[i]n the balanced handling of this issue, we see no abuse of
discretion on the part of [the trial court]."  This Court, at the
petitioner's request, granted certiorari to consider the important
issue involved.
  
II.
The petitioner contends that the trial court's preclusion of
his cross-examination of Timmons and Allen about their pending
charges in the presence of the jury was error. He argues that,
because it is the jury's responsibility to assess whether a witness
is being truthful, cross-examining the witnesses in the jury's
presence as to pending charges is permissible, without regard to
what the witnesses might say. The petitioner relies, therefore, on
the credibility judging function of the jury and the right of
confrontation guaranteed him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
6
to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. The confrontation right includes the right
to cross-examine witnesses on matters affecting bias, interest, or
motive to falsify. Brown v. State, 74 Md. App. 414, 418, 538 A.2d
317, 319 (1988); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94
S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). 
While recognizing a defendant's constitutional right of
confrontation, and more particularly to cross-examine witnesses,
the State characterizes the issue in this case in terms of the
trial court's discretion to control the cross-examination of
witnesses. In its view, the real question is whether, in this case,
the line the court drew in limiting the petitioner's cross-
examination was an abuse of discretion. The State thus relies on
the fact that our cases recognize that the right to cross-examine
is not limitless. Noting that this Court has held that trial courts
have "discretion to determine whether particular evidence is
relevant to the issue of bias or motive," Bruce v. State, 328 Md.
594, 624, 616 A.2d 392, 407 (1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113
S.Ct. 2936, 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993), and that the broad latitude
given a defendant to cross-examine as to bias or prejudice must be
balanced against the need to prevent cross-examination from
straying into collateral matters, obscuring trial issues and
confusing the fact finder, the majority, adopting the State's
argument, contends that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in this case. It relies on Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95,
7
     The State also relies on Johnson v. State, 332 Md. 456,
4
467, 632 A.2d 152, 157 (1993). That reliance is tied to Watkins
v. State, 328 Md. 95, 102-03, 613 A.2d 379, 382-83 (1992). It
cites Johnson for the proposition that:
[F]or purposes of cross-examination of a pro-
secution witness in order to show bias or motive,
`[T]he crux of the inquiry insofar as its rele-
vance is concerned, is the witness' state of mind.
What is essential to the preservation of the right
to cross-examine is that the interrogator be per-
mitted to probe into whether the witness is acting
under a hope or belief of leniency or reward,'
"or out of spite or vindictiveness. (Emphasis in original). 
Smallwood, 320 Md. at 309-10, 577 A.2d at 360, quoting with
approval, Brown v. State, 74 Md. App. 414, 420-21, 538 A.2d
317, 320 (1988), quoting Fletcher v. State, 50 Md. App. 349, 
359, 437 A.2d 901, 906 (1981)." 
  
 
613 A.2d 379 (1992), which acknowledges, if not explicitly then
implicitly, the tension that may exist between the judge's trial
control function and the jury's credibility judging function.  
4
___, Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (1996) [Slip op. at 8-12].  
In this State, in a jury trial, it is well settled that it is
the function of the jury, rather than the trial judge, to judge the
credibility of the witnesses, to weigh their testimony, and to
resolve contested facts. Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 278-79, 539
A.2d 657, 663 (1988); Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203, 210, 214, 522
A.2d 1338, 1341, 1343 (1987); Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 566,
276 A.2d 214, 221 (1971); Jacobs v. State, 238 Md. 648, 650, 210
A.2d 722, 723 (1965). See also Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224,
571 A.2d 1251, 1260 (1990). Moreover, this Court has long made
clear that a jury's resolution of credibility is entitled to great
8
deference. See e.g., Dykes, 319 Md. at 222, 224, 571 A.2d at 1259-
60; Bohnert, 312 Md. at 278-79, 539 A.2d at 663; Gore, 309 Md. at
210, 214, 522 A.2d at 1341, 1343; Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177,
184, 502 A.2d 496, 499 (1986); Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 150,
355 A.2d 455, 463 (1976).
Dykes is illustrative. There, the defendant offered a defense
of perfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense. The trial court
refused to instruct on either defense, finding the evidence
presented by the defendant unpersuasive. This Court reversed.
Although finding the defenses to be "difficult to accept," we held
that the trial court had erred in making a preliminary
determination on credibility. We explained:
In short, the judge resolved conflicts in the
evidence, choosing which parts of Dykes's 
statement and testimony to believe, weighed
the evidence and made findings of fact. On
this culling of the evidence, he found that
the elements necessary to establish perfect 
self-defense had not been established and 
that the incidents of imperfect self-defense
had not been met. This went far beyond his
authority.
    * * *
Of course, what evidence to believe, 
what weight to be given it, and what facts
flow from that evidence are for the jury,
not the judge, to determine. When the trial
judge resolves conflicts in the evidence in
the face of the "some" evidence requirement,
and refuses to instruct because he believes
that the evidence supporting the request is
incredible or too weak or overwhelmed by 
other evidence, he improperly assumes the 
jury's role as fact-finder.
9
Dykes, 319 Md. at 222, 224, 571 A.2d at 1259-60 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
The jury performs its credibility judging function more
effectively when all relevant, salient facts concerning witnesses
are placed before it. Accordingly, ensuring that the relevant,
salient facts are before the jury is the function of cross-
examination. See Cox v. State, 298 Md. 173, 183-84, 468 A.2d 319,
324 (1983) ("That a witness may be cross examined on such matters
and facts as are likely to affect his credibility, test his memory
or knowledge or the like, is a fundamental concept in our system of
jurisprudence.") (quoting DeLilly v. State, 11 Md. App. 676, 681,
276 A.2d 417, 419 (1971)). Whether a witness is biased, has an
interest in the outcome of the litigation, or has a motive to lie
are matters that properly inform the decision as to credibility.
See 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 940 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (stating
that whether a witness is biased is "always relevant as
discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his
testimony." Hence, it is always subject to exploration at trial).
Alford v. United States,  282 U.S. 687, 692, 51 S.Ct. 218, 219, 75
L.Ed. 624, 628 (1931) (stating that a defendant has a right to
"place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his
testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury
cannot fairly appraise them.").
Cross-examination then is "the principal means by which the
believability of a witness and the truth of his [or her] testimony
10
are tested." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105,
1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974). Its goal is not only "to delve
into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and
memory, but ... to impeach, i.e., discredit the witness." Id.
In addition to inquiring into a witness's prior convictions, "[a]
more particular attack on the witness' credibility is effected by
means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible
biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may
relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand." 
Id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d at 354. A criminal
defendant thus states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by
showing that he was prevented from pursuing otherwise appropriate
cross-examination in an effort to show a prototypical form of bias
on the part of the witness, and thereby "to expose to the jury the
facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences
relating to the reliability of the witness." Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674,
684 (1986) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111, 39
L.Ed.2d at 355).    
When a defendant's confrontation rights are abridged, the
jury, concomitantly, is denied the benefit of information on the
basis of which to perform its credibility judging function. See
Davis, 415 U.S. at 317, 94 S.Ct. at 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d at 354
(quoting Douglass v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419, 85 S.Ct. 1074,
1077, 13 L.Ed.2d 934, 937 (1965)) ("Jurors [are] entitled to have
11
the benefit of the defense theory before them so that they [can]
make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on [the
witnesses'] testimony which provide[s] `a crucial link in the proof
... of the petitioner's act.'").       
To be sure, cross-examination for bias is not without
restriction, as the majority recognizes.  ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d
at ___ [Slip op. at 8].  Indeed, this Court has considered as well
settled the proposition that "`trial judges retain wide latitude
insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose
reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns
about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or
only marginally relevant.'" Smallwood v. State, 320 Md. 300, 307,
577 A.2d 356, 359 (1990) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106
S.Ct. at 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d at 683). This restriction is aimed at
avoiding "collateral matters which will obscure the [trial]
issue[s] and lead to the fact finder's confusion." Cox, 298 Md. at
178, 468 A.2d at 321. It does not apply, however, unless and until,
the cross-examiner has reached the "`constitutionally required
threshold level of inquiry.'" Smallwood, 320 Md. at 307, 577 A.2d
at 359 (quoting Brown v. State, 74 Md. App. 414, 419, 538 A.2d 317,
319 (1988)). 
The majority holds that cross-examination was properly
restricted in this case. It reads Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 613
A.2d 379 (1992), as standing for the proposition that "where the
12
     The issue this case presents, however, was never directly
5
raised or argued in Watkins. In fact, there the majority held
that "[d]efense counsel clearly accepted the prosecutor's
statement that no `deal' had been made with the witness, and
acquiesced in the court's ruling." 328 Md. at 100, 613 A.2d at
381. 
subject of the proposed inquiry is of limited probative value and
could brand the witness with prior bad acts not otherwise
admissible as bearing on credibility, a trial court's decision not
to permit cross-examination on the subject matter will not be
deemed an abuse of discretion."  ___ Md.at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
5
[Slip op. at 12].      
In Watkins, two of the State's witnesses were on probation.
Both witnesses denied the defendant's contention that the
indictment out of which the defendant's charges arose was drug
related. The defendant sought to cross-examine those witnesses as
to their probationary status, arguing that it gave them a second
reason for denying drug involvement, the first being the
understandable desire to avoid the risk of prosecution which such
an admission would entail. Although the majority noted that the
petitioner's argument had "some merit," 328 Md. at 102, 613 A.2d at
382, it held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it disallowed the inquiry. The majority added, however, that "had
the trial judge exercised his discretion to allow the evidence,
that would not have constituted error." Id. at 102-03, 613 A.2d at
382.
Even if one were to accept the majority's reading of Watkins,
13
which I do not, as my dissent in that case confirms, it does not
alter what the result in this case should be. Timmons and Allen
were serving sentences in addition to awaiting trial on other
charges. In the case of Timmons, a motion for reconsideration of
his sentence was also pending. Moreover, Timmons and Allen were
important State's witnesses in a murder case, not, as in Watkins,
essentially complaining witnesses against the party who assaulted
them.
As I stated in my Watkins dissent, the crux of the relevant
inquiry as to bias, motivation, interest and the like, is the
witness' state of mind. Id. at 118, 613 A.2d at 390 (Bell, J.,
dissenting); see also Smallwood, 320 Md. at 309, 577 A.2d at 360.
Therefore, just as the Watkins "jurors would understand that any
witness would be reluctant to admit to illegal drug involvement
because of the danger of being prosecuted for such involvement,"
328 Md. at 103, 613 A.2d at 382, the jurors in the instant case
would understand that witnesses currently serving a sentence and
saddled with pending charges would be willing to testify to clear
a murder case without an explicit agreement for leniency, in hopes
of later favorable treatment. The relevant inquiry, and the one
sought to be made in this case, relates to what the jury clearly
would understand, and so it is equivalent to the refusal to
acknowledge drug involvement in Watkins. Without question, then,
such evidence must be placed before the jury to allow it to make
accurate credibility assessments as to the witnesses' testimony,
14
     Because the state of mind of a witness is often a matter of
6
inference, quite logically then, it need not be, and indeed may
be unable to be established by direct proof. But that is
precisely what the trial court erroneously required. 
and consequently, the weight it should be accorded.6
Not surprisingly, I find myself in fundamental disagreement
with the majority in this case, as I was with the Watkins majority,
as to the probative value of evidence concerning the witnesses'
pending charges and/or probationary status and the importance of
placing that information before the trier of fact. In the instant
case, the probative value of the petitioner's inquiries of the
witnesses is considerably more substantial than its potential
misuse to brand "the witnesses with prior bad acts not otherwise
admissible as bearing on credibility ...." Watkins, 328 Md. at 103,
613 A.2d at 382. Furthermore, there is "no indication that defense
counsel was harassing the witness by asking an unfounded question
or seeking primarily to embarrass the witness." Smallwood, 320 Md.
at 310, 577 A.2d at 360-61 (quoting Cox, 298 Md. at 184, 468 A.2d
at 324). In addition, the subject of the inquiry here is a matter
that goes to the "`very heart'" of the witnesses' bias. Id. There
simply was no danger of the jury's attention being diverted,
confounded or confused in this case.
Besides Watkins, the other cases the majority relies upon as
support for its position are, State v. Grace, 643 So.2d 1306 (La.
Ct. App. 1994) and Gutierrez v. State, 681 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984). Gutierrez, however, does not suggest that the cases
15
      A similar rationalization was offered in State v. Lindh,
7
468 N.W.2d 168, 178 (Wis. 1991), a case upon which the State
relied. While such circumstances constitute a distinction, they
do not form a sufficient basis for limiting the jury's trial
role.   
from Texas on which the petitioner relies are no longer good law;
rather, it sought to distinguish them on the basis that, in those
cases, the testifying witness was an indictee or suspect in the
principal crime for which the defendant was on trial. This fact,
the court suggested, gave rise to an obvious incentive for the
witness to testify against the defendant to protect his own self-
interest.  In short, while Gutierrez and Grace resolve the conflict
7
between the trial role of the jury and judge in favor of the trial
judge's discretion to limit cross-examination, they are not
persuasive authority for resolution of the case at bar. 
   
The petitioner does not claim that the State promised Timmons
and Allen anything. For this reason, the petitioner has never
challenged the accuracy of the State's representation that it made
no promises. The petitioner's position, rather, is that whether or
not Timmons and Allen subjectively expected to obtain some benefit
for their testimony, the jury conceivably could have so found. The
jury was not, therefore, obliged to accept the witnesses'
disclaimer. Accordingly, cognizant that the jury, as the trier of
fact, is charged with responsibility for resolving credibility
issues, the petitioner sought to cross-examine the witnesses as to
their bias, interest, motivation, or the like, all of which are
16
proper subjects of cross-examination. As discussed supra, the focus
of the petitioner's inquiry was for the purpose of putting before
the jury information on the basis of which it could infer that the
witnesses' testimony lacked credibility and, thus, should be
discounted.  
In this case, the trial court's ruling prevented the jury from
ever considering whether the witnesses were biased or otherwise
interested in the case. The court did so by determining that the
petitioner did not lay a proper foundation to entitle him to cross-
examine the witnesses. This result, in turn, was reached in two
ways. First, the court made a credibility determination, assessing
whether witnesses testified truthfully when they denied expecting
a reward or favorable treatment in connection with their pending
charges for their testimony. Second, the court placed on the
petitioner the impossible burden of proving by direct evidence from
the witnesses themselves, the witnesses' state of mind. On both
counts, the trial court erred. Certainly, there is no legal
requirement that a witness' state of mind be proven by direct
evidence. And, as discussed supra, credibility issues in a jury
trial are matters reserved for resolution by the jury. Moreover,
the trial court's right to limit cross-examination does not extend
to the point of preventing cross-examination altogether in an area
that is a traditional focus of cross-examination.     
Resolving the conflict between the trial court and the jury in
favor of permitting cross-examination so that the jury has an
17
opportunity to pass on the credibility of witnesses is consistent
with the result reached by the courts that have considered this
issue. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435, 89
L.Ed.2d at 676; People v. Richmond, 406 N.E.2d 135, 136-37 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1980); Williams v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 139, 144-45
(Ky. 1978); Spears v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 396 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Mass. 1979)
("where [criminal] charges are pending, there is possibility of
bias in favor of the government, and normally it is for the jury,
and not the judge, to determine the effect, if any, of those
pending charges on the witness's testimony."); State v. Baker, 336
A.2d 762, 764 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); People v. Leonard,
396 N.Y.S.2d 956, 957 (1977) (even though trial court found that
there was no "deal," it was error to preclude defense from cross-
examining State's witness about the same); State v. Spicer, 204
S.E.2d 641, 647 (N.C. 1974); State v. Roberson, 3 S.E.2d 277, 280
(N.C. 1939); Commonwealth v. Evans, 512 A.2d 626, 631-32 (Pa.
1986); Koehler v. State, 679 S.W.2d 6, 9-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
(en banc); Parker v. State, 657 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. Crim. App.
1983) (en banc); Spain v. State, 585 S.W.2d 705, 710 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979). 
The State quite properly points out that the petitioner was
able to attack the witness's credibility generally, with evidence
of prior convictions affecting credibility. It argues, therefore,
that the error was harmless. I do not agree. Evidence of a more
18
     I believe that the majority's reliance on Smallwood as
8
support for the position it has adopted in this case is
misplaced. See ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (1996) [Slip
op at 8, 13]. In this case, there is no harassment, prejudice, or
particular reason for challenging the credibility of a witness is
more effective than a general attack on credibility. Indeed, a
particularized attack on credibility permits a more effective
argument to be made as to "why [the witness] might have been biased
or otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality expected of a
witness at trial." Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S. Ct. at 1111, 39
L.Ed.2d at 355 (emphasis in original). In order to find an error
harmless, a reviewing court, "upon its own independent review of
the record [must be able] to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict...." Dorsey
v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976). Therefore,
being precluded from pursuing the bias inquiry certainly could have
influenced the verdict and, consequently, is not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.   
IV.
In sum, because this petitioner, like the petitioner in
Watkins, was not permitted to cross-examine witnesses concerning
their pending charges and/or probationary status, he has been
denied his constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry.
More importantly, until that threshold is satisfied, the trial
court abuses its discretion by engaging in the kind of balancing
process advanced by Watkins, and reaffirmed by the majority today.8
19
confusion of the issues. Moreover, there is nothing "repetitive"
or "marginally relevant" about the bias inquiry the petitioner
attempted to make. Smallwood, 320 Md. at 307, 577 A.2d at 359
(quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S. Ct. at 1435, 89
L.Ed.2d at 683).   
See ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [Slip op. at 13].  Because the
majority fails to grasp this fundamental concept, I must dissent.
Eldridge, J. joins in the views herein expressed.