Case Title: Doe v. Ronan

Citation: 2010-Ohio-5072

Docket Number: 20092104

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Doe v. Ronan, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5072.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-5072 
DOE v. RONAN, SUPERINTENDENT, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Doe v. Ronan, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5072.] 
As applied to employment contracts entered into by school districts governed by 
R.C. Chapter 124, R.C. 3319.391 and Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 do not 
violate the provision in Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution that 
prohibits the General Assembly from passing laws that impair the 
obligation of contracts — R.C. 3319.391 does not violate the provision in 
Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution that prohibits the General 
Assembly from passing retroactive laws. 
(No. 2009-2104 — Submitted June 8, 2010 — Decided October 26, 2010.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, 
Western Division, Certifying Questions of State Law, No. 1:09cv243. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  As applied to administrative-employment contracts entered into by school 
districts governed by R.C. Chapter 124, R.C. 3319.391 and Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
Adm.Code 3301-20-01 do not violate the provision in Section 28, Article 
II of the Ohio Constitution that prohibits the General Assembly from 
passing laws that impair the obligation of contracts. 
2.  R.C. 3319.391 does not violate the provision in Section 28, Article II of the 
Ohio Constitution that prohibits the General Assembly from passing 
retroactive laws. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} This case comes to us as two certified questions of state law from 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western 
Division.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that contractual obligations in 
administrative-employment contracts entered into by school districts governed by 
R.C. Chapter 124 are not impaired by R.C. 3319.391 and Ohio Adm.Code 3301-
20-01 and R.C. 3319.391 is not a retroactive law. 
I.  Facts 
{¶ 2} According to the order certifying the questions to this court and the 
facts agreed upon by the parties in their briefs, John Doe,1 petitioner, was 
convicted in 1976 of drug trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03 and spent three 
years in a correctional facility.  After he was released, Doe obtained a college 
degree, became a licensed social worker, and was certified as a chemical-
dependency counselor.  In 1997, Doe’s conviction was expunged pursuant to R.C. 
2953.32.  Doe has had no other criminal convictions. 
{¶ 3} In 1997, Doe began his employment with respondent Cincinnati 
Public School (“CPS”) as a drug-free-school specialist.  In 2002, Doe began to 
work in an administrative capacity as a hearing officer.  In this position, Doe’s 
                                                 
1.  The District Court granted plaintiff’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym because it 
determined that to pursue the lawsuit, the plaintiff would be compelled to disclose intimate 
information and that a pseudonym would prevent the public from tying that information to the 
plaintiff.   
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
only direct contact with students was at administrative hearings, and the students’ 
guardians were also present at those hearings. 
{¶ 4} Doe entered into a two-year administrative-employment contract 
with CPS in July 2008, with the two-year term beginning on August 1. The 
employment contract was made “subject to confirmation of appropriate state 
certification.”  Beginning in 2008, this confirmation process required Doe to 
submit to a background check.  This background-check requirement previously 
applied only to licensed2 positions, but legislation enacted in 2007 extended it to 
include administrative employees within the school district.  R.C. 3319.39 and 
3319.391, 2007 Sub.H.B. No. 190, eff. Nov.14, 2007 (“H.B. 190”).  H.B. 190 also 
authorized respondent Ohio Department of Education (“ODE”) to promulgate 
administrative rules related to the background-check process, including rules 
specifying circumstances under which persons with certain convictions could still 
be hired.  R.C. 3319.39(E). 
{¶ 5} In November 2008, CPS notified Doe that his 32-year-old drug-
trafficking conviction was discovered during the background check.3  CPS further 
advised Doe that the same recently enacted legislation that now required CPS to 
conduct background checks on administrative employees also required CPS to 
terminate its employment relationship with Doe because of the prior conviction. 
{¶ 6} Doe filed suit on April 3, 2009, in the Hamilton County Court of 
Common Pleas.  Doe alleged that CPS breached the July 2008 employment 
contract and that the recently enacted legislation expressed in H.B. 190 violated, 
among other things, the Contracts Clauses of the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, and the 
                                                 
2.  The term “license” is used herein consistent with the definition in R.C. 3319.31.   
 
3.  When an offense is expunged, the record is sealed.  R.C. 2953.32(C).  However, inspection of 
sealed records is permitted when a school board is conducting a background check.  R.C. 
2953.32(D)(8). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution.  CPS removed the case to the 
federal district court pursuant to Section 1441, Title 28, U.S.Code, and on April 
24, 2009, Doe filed an amended complaint in federal court.  Respondent Mary 
Ronan was the interim superintendent at the time the amended complaint was 
filed. 
{¶ 7} Thereafter, Doe filed a motion to certify his state-based 
retroactivity and contract-impairment claims as state-law questions.  The federal 
district court granted the motion, and this court accepted the certified questions.4  
124 Ohio St.3d 1440, 2010-Ohio-188, 920 N.E.2d 371. 
II.  Legislation and Regulations 
{¶ 8} For many years, this state has required criminal background checks 
for licensed and certificated school-district employees who have responsibility for 
the care, custody, and control of a child.  See former R.C. 3319.39(A)(1), 
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 38, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 367, 383, eff. Oct. 29, 1993 (“S.B. 
38”).  If the background check uncovered a conviction of an offense listed in 
former R.C. 3319.39(B)(1)(a), the school district was required to release that 
employee from employment, unless the “standards in regard to rehabilitation” 
were met.  Former R.C. 3319.39(B)(1) and (E), S.B. 38.  In keeping with the 
ODE’s concern that persons who have drug-trafficking convictions on their record 
                                                 
4.  {¶ a} The certified questions of law are as follows: 
     {¶ b} “I. [Do] Ohio Revised Code § 3319.391 and Ohio Administrative Code § 3301-20-01 
violate the Retroactivity Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution?”  
     {¶ c} “II. [Do] Ohio Revised Code § 3319.391 and Ohio Administrative Code § 3301-20-01 
violate the Contract Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution?”   
     {¶ d} The district court’s certified question pertaining to the retroactivity question, however, 
does not match the allegations in the amended complaint.  In the amended complaint, Doe alleged 
that both R.C. 3319.391 and R.C. 3319.39 were unconstitutionally retroactive.  Further, Doe did 
not assert that now-former Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 was unconstitutionally retroactive.   
     {¶ e} We are unclear as to the rationale behind the district court’s phrasing of the question 
regarding unconstitutional retroactivity and why the certified question does not comport with the 
allegations in Doe’s amended complaint.  In order to avoid rendering an advisory opinion on the 
question whether Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 is unconstitutionally retroactive, we limit our 
discussion to the issues presented in the amended complaint, but we decline to address whether 
R.C. 3319.39 is unconstitutionally retroactive, because this issue was not briefed by the parties.   
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
may jeopardize the health, safety, or welfare of students, no rehabilitation was 
available under the administrative regulation for a licensed employee who 
committed a drug-trafficking offense under R.C. 2925.03.  Former Ohio 
Adm.Code 3301-20-01(B)(1), 1993-1994 Ohio Monthly Record 1257, eff. Mar. 4, 
1994, and 3301-20-01(E)(1)(c) and (E)(2)(e), 2005-2006 Ohio Monthly Record 
1261, eff. Sept. 23, 2005. 
{¶ 9} In 2007, H.B. 190 expanded the background-check statutes to 
require, among other things, criminal-background checks for administrative, or 
nonlicensed, school-district employees.  Former R.C. 3319.391(A), H.B. No. 190.  
The list of enumerated offenses in R.C. 3319.39(B)(1) and the effect that a 
conviction of one of the enumerated offenses had on an employee’s employment 
within a district were not revised.  Former R.C. 3319.391(C), H.B. 190 (stating 
that a person convicted of an offense listed in R.C. 3319.39(B)(1) “shall not be 
hired or shall be released from employment” unless the person meets the 
rehabilitation standards promulgated by the ODE pursuant to R.C. 3319.39(E)); 
and former R.C. 3319.39(B)(1)(a), H.B. 190 (enumerated offenses not revised in 
H.B. 190).  Thus, an R.C. 2925.03 drug-trafficking offense remained an 
enumerated offense, and an employee who had been convicted of such an offense 
could not be employed by the school district unless the rehabilitation standards 
were met. 
{¶ 10} Prior to August 27, 2009, the ODE had promulgated only one 
regulation to address how a person with a prior conviction of an enumerated 
offense could be rehabilitated, allowing that person to be employed with the 
school district.  However, the regulation provided that for a conviction of an R.C. 
2925.03 drug-trafficking offense no rehabilitation was available to relieve a 
person from employment disqualification.  Former Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-
01(E)(1)(c) and (A)(11), 2005-2006 Ohio Monthly Record 1261, eff. Sept. 23, 
2005. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 11} Effective August 27, 2009, the ODE revised its background-check 
regulations to respond to the 2007 revisions to the statutes.  Rather than have one 
regulation apply to all persons subject to a background check, the ODE 
promulgated two regulations: one applicable to employees who hold positions that 
require licenses, and one applicable to employees who hold nonlicensed positions.  
Both of the regulations detail how a person with a conviction of an enumerated 
offense may demonstrate the person’s rehabilitation to relieve the person from 
employment disqualification with a school district.  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-
01(E) and 3301-20-03(D). 
{¶ 12} The regulation that applies to licensed positions is essentially a 
continuation of the original, pre-August 2009 ODE regulation.  Ohio Adm.Code 
3301-20-01.  In this regulation, the prior rule with respect to a R.C. 2925.03 drug-
trafficking offense is maintained: no rehabilitation is permitted.  Ohio Adm.Code 
3301-20-01(E)(1) and (A)(10)(c). 
{¶ 13} The second regulation created by the ODE was new and applied to 
nonlicensed positions within a school district.  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03.  For 
these positions, the rehabilitation rule for R.C. 2925.03 drug-trafficking offenses 
is different.  If the drug-trafficking offense occurred within ten years of the 
criminal-record check, no rehabilitation is permitted.  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-
03(D)(1) and (A)(6)(e).  But if the person committed the drug offense more than 
ten years before the criminal-record check, a district may employ that person if 
the rehabilitation conditions contained in Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03(D) are 
met.  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03(A)(6)(e).  But even if a person meets the 
rehabilitation conditions such that the school district may deem that person 
rehabilitated, a “district maintains the discretion whether to employ or retain in 
employment [that] individual.”  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03(D). 
III.  Analysis 
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7 
 
{¶ 14} Doe argues that R.C. 3319.391 and Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 
unconstitutionally impaired his employment contract with CPS.  Doe also argues 
that R.C. 3319.391 is unconstitutionally retroactive.  After consideration of the 
arguments presented in this case, we cannot agree with Doe. 
A. Contract Impairment 
{¶ 15} The Ohio Constitution provides that the “general assembly shall 
have no power to pass * * * laws impairing the obligation of contracts.”  Section 
28, Article II, Ohio Constitution.  This provision applies to contracts that “existed 
prior to the effective date of the statute [at issue in the litigation].”  Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. v. Schilling (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 164, 168, 616 N.E.2d 893.  In contrast, 
“contracts entered into on or after the effective date of [a statute] are subject to 
the provisions of the statute.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. 
{¶ 16} A two-part test has been established to determine whether a statute 
unconstitutionally impairs a contract.  The first question is whether the legislation 
at issue operates as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.  
Middletown v. Ferguson (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 71, 77, 495 N.E.2d 380.  If the 
answer is yes, the next question is whether the legislation is reasonable and 
necessary to serve an important public purpose.  Id. at 79. 
{¶ 17} When CPS advised Doe that it was terminating his 2008 
employment contract for the sole reason of Doe’s 1976 expunged drug-trafficking 
conviction, it did so in accordance with the requirements of the 2007 revisions to 
the background-check legislation.  Doe not only claims that R.C. 3319.391 
unconstitutionally impaired his 2008 employment contract with CPS, but he 
further asserts that applying the administrative regulation in effect at the time of 
his termination notice compounds the constitutional infirmity.  Ohio Adm.Code 
3301-20-01, 2005-2006 Ohio Monthly Record 1261, eff. Sept. 23, 2005.  Doe 
maintains that application of this administrative regulation to his circumstance is 
inappropriate because it was promulgated when only licensed school-district 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
employees were subject to criminal-record checks.  According to Doe, if the 
revised August 2009 regulation applicable to nonlicensed school-district 
employees had been promulgated sooner than it was following R.C. 3319.391’s 
effective date, he would have met the new rehabilitation standard for nonlicensed 
employees and could have remained employed by CPS.  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-
20-03(A)(6)(e) and (D). 
{¶ 18} The General Assembly has enacted detailed statutes regulating the 
employment of school employees.  See R.C. Chapter 3319.  When an employment 
contract between a school district and its employee is made pursuant to these 
statutes, that contract must be construed as though the statutes are incorporated 
into the contract and become implied terms and conditions of any contract or 
contractual right.  See, e.g., Jacot v. Secrest (1950), 153 Ohio St. 553, 558, 42 
O.O. 31, 93 N.E.2d 1, quoting Banks v. De Witt (1884), 42 Ohio St. 263, 
paragraph two of the syllabus (“ ‘A contract made in pursuance of a statute or 
resolution, must be construed as though such statute or resolution had been 
incorporated into such contract’ ”).5  In this case, the 2008 employment contract 
between Doe and CPS was made “subject to confirmation of appropriate state 
certification.”  Passing a statutorily mandated background check is necessary 
                                                 
5.  The dissent claims that the incorporation of present statutory law into a contract is legal 
artifice.  To the contrary, “[i]t is an elementary principle that any law relating to a contract which 
is in existence at the time of the execution of the contract becomes a part of such contract.”  
Eastern Mach. Co. v. Peck (1954), 161 Ohio St. 1, 6-7, 52 O.O. 463, 117 N.E.2d 593; Bricker v. 
Preble Shawnee Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 12th Dist. No. CA2007-10-020, 2008-Ohio-4964, 
¶ 15; Eastwood Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Eastwood Edn. Assn., 172 Ohio App.3d 423, 
2007-Ohio-3563, 875 N.E.2d 139, ¶ 27; Labate v. Natl. City Corp. (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 182, 
185, 680 N.E.2d 693.  It is also “ ‘elementary that no valid contract may be made contrary to 
statute, and that valid, applicable statutory provisions are parts of every contract.’ ”  Holdeman v. 
Epperson, 111 Ohio St.3d 551, 2006-Ohio-6209, 857 N.E.2d 583, ¶ 18, quoting Bell v. N. Ohio 
Tel. Co. (1948), 149 Ohio St. 157, 158, 36 O.O. 501, 78 N.E.2d 42,; Darwin Limes, L.L.C. v. 
Limes, 6th App. No. WD-06-049, 2007-Ohio-2261, ¶ 25.  Finally, this court has held in the 
context of subrogation rights that the statutory “provisions must control, regardless of the terms 
and conditions written into the policy by the contracting parties.”  Verducci v. Cas. Co. of Am. 
(1917), 96 Ohio St. 260, 265, 117 N.E. 235.  Thus, applying the principle that existing statutory 
provisions are incorporated into a contract is recognition of a basic legal concept of longstanding 
and accepted use.  
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
“state certification” and is therefore a condition that must be met before 
obligations in the contract become effective.  In recognition of this condition 
precedent, all prior and current versions of the background-check legislation 
permit an employee to be conditionally employed until the results of the 
background check are obtained.  See, e.g., former R.C. 3319.39(B)(2), S.B. 38, 
eff. Oct. 29, 1993, and former R.C. 3319.39(B)(2), H.B. 190, eff. Nov. 14, 2007. 
{¶ 19} Doe was conditionally employed pending the results of his 
background check.  When these results indicated that Doe failed to meet the state-
certification requirement, Doe was unable to meet the condition precedent that 
would have triggered CPS’s obligation to perform the contract.  Consequently, the 
contract between CPS and Doe failed to become binding. 
{¶ 20} We further note that Doe and CPS executed the July 2008 
employment contract eight months after the effective date of the provisions of 
H.B. 190, which imposed the new background-check requirements.  Because 
Doe’s 2008 employment contract with CPS was executed after the date the 
statutory change became effective, the new background-check requirements and 
the employment-disqualification standards of Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 
became incorporated as implied terms and conditions of Doe’s contract.  Thus, 
Doe cannot demonstrate that R.C. 3319.391 impaired his employment contract 
with CPS, because there was no contract between Doe and CPS to substantially 
impair. 
{¶ 21} Doe’s reliance on R.C. 3319.081 to establish that his employment 
contract was a continuing contract is misplaced.  R.C. 3319.081 applies to school 
districts that are not governed by R.C. Chapter 124.  CPS, however, is governed 
by R.C. Chapter 124.  R.C. 124.01(A) and 3319.081.  Thus, there is no continuing 
contract under R.C. 3319.081.  Moreover, a public employee who meets the 
classified-service parameters of R.C. 124.11(B) does have protection from 
termination without specific cause, as defined in R.C. 124.34(A).  One of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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specific causes for which an employee can be terminated, however, is the 
conviction of a felony drug-abuse offense under R.C. 2925.03.  R.C. 
124.34(A)(2).  Because the conviction was under R.C. 2925.03, it falls within the 
purview of R.C. 124.34(A), and Doe has no statutory right to continued 
employment. 
{¶ 22} Doe also claims that application of the pre-August 2009 
administrative rule to his circumstance impaired his 2008 employment contract 
with CPS.  Had Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03 been promulgated more quickly 
upon the enactment of H.B. 190, Doe’s R.C. 2925.03 drug-trafficking conviction 
would not have constituted a nonrehabilitative offense and he could likely have 
met the conditions to show rehabilitation such that CPS could have maintained its 
employment relationship with him.  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03(A)(6)(e) and 
(D). 
{¶ 23} Nonetheless, these laws reflect the General Assembly’s conclusion 
that the health, safety, and welfare of students required an expansion of the 
background-check laws to include nonteaching employees, e.g., administrators, 
cafeteria workers, custodians, and maintenance personnel.  Unfortunately, delay is 
often an inherent characteristic of the rulemaking process.  The effect that the 
delay in the administrative rulemaking process had on Doe’s career is regrettable.  
Doe’s past experiences and rehabilitation appear to have made him especially 
qualified for the duties of the position for which he was hired, and Doe claims in 
his amended complaint that he has received either an “acceptable” or 
“accomplished” job evaluation every year since he became employed at CPS.  
When his conviction was expunged in 1997, Doe was found to be rehabilitated.  
The district court found that Doe has been “a model citizen since being released 
from jail.”  Regardless, the ODE acted pursuant to its statutory grant of 
discretionary rulemaking authority and was under no obligation to amend the 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
Administrative Code to make different rehabilitation provisions for nonlicensed 
positions.  R.C. 3319.39(E) and 3319.391(C). 
{¶ 24} Based on the foregoing, the revisions to the background-check 
statutes and corresponding administrative regulations did not substantially impair 
the contractual relationship between Doe and CPS; they merely prevented Doe 
from being able to meet the condition precedent of the contract. 
B. Retroactivity 
{¶ 25} The Ohio Constitution also provides that the “general assembly 
shall have no power to pass retroactive laws.”  Section 28, Article II, Ohio 
Constitution.  A determination that a law is unconstitutionally retroactive involves 
a two-step inquiry.  If the statute is expressly retroactive and is substantive, as 
opposed to merely remedial, the statute violates the proscription against 
retroactive laws.  State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, 772 
N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 26} Doe 
asserts 
that 
the 
background-check 
legislation 
is 
unconstitutionally retroactive.  In Doe’s view, his vested right in continued 
employment was impaired when the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3319.391 
and caused nonlicensed school-district employees to be terminated from current 
employment if a background check disclosed a criminal conviction that predated 
the employment relationship. 
{¶ 27} Doe’s 
contention 
notwithstanding, 
the 
background-check 
legislation in R.C. 3319.391 is prospective in application.  This legislation simply 
imposed a new restriction on the school district regarding the qualifications of 
persons it could employ after a specific date, with a focus on those persons who 
have had felony convictions.  This legislation does not go back to the date of the 
employee’s initial hire, terminate that person effective as of the hire date and 
eliminate any of that person’s accrued benefits.  Doe has not been deprived of any 
pay, retirement credit, or other benefits he accrued during his tenure with CPS.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Instead, the conduct that the background-check legislation prohibits, i.e., 
continued employment after a disqualifying criminal-background check, occurs 
only after the effective date of the statute, November 14, 2007. 
{¶ 28} Even if we did consider the statute to be expressly retroactive, we 
have already concluded in our contract-impairment analysis that R.C. 3319.391 
does not impair, in Doe’s circumstances, any vested right to continued 
employment.  In view of the foregoing, we conclude that R.C. 3319.391, as 
expressed in H.B. 190, is not expressly retroactive, did not affect a vested right, 
and thus does not violate the retroactive-law proscription in Section 28, Article II 
of the Ohio Constitution. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 29} Based on the above discussion, we conclude that as applied to 
administrative-employment contracts entered into by school districts governed by 
R.C. Chapter 124, R.C. 3319.391 and Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 do not violate 
the provision in Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution that prohibits the 
General Assembly from passing laws that impair the obligation of contracts.  
Further, we conclude that R.C. 3319.391 does not violate the provision in Section 
28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution that prohibits the General Assembly from 
passing retroactive laws. 
So answered. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., concur in part and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
{¶ 30} While I sympathize with Doe’s plight, the law is clear, and I 
concur in the majority’s disposition of the two narrow legal questions certified to 
us by the district court. 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
{¶ 31} Although we have resolved the federal court’s legal questions 
under the Ohio Constitution, I believe that on remand the court may resolve this 
case by resorting to the doctrine of relation back.  Under this doctrine, “an act 
done at a later time is, under certain circumstances, treated as though it occurred 
at an earlier time.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.1999) 1314.  This doctrine 
applies to the amendments of pleadings, see Civ.R. 15(C), but I believe that it 
should apply here in the interest of equity. 
{¶ 32} The Ohio Department of Education had statutory authority to 
formulate the rules to carry out the legislative intent of 2007 Sub.H.B. No. 190, 
eff. Nov. 14, 2007 (“H.B. 190”).  R.C. 3319.39(E).  The department promulgated 
Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03 to carry out the legislative intent of H.B. 190.  
Unfortunately, Doe fell into the gap between enactment of the new law and the 
department’s regulations in response to the 2007 statutory revisions.  The parties 
agree that had the 2009 regulation been in effect, Doe would have remained in his 
position, because he had been rehabilitated.  Thus, I believe that the regulation 
should “relate back” to the statute’s enactment. 
{¶ 33} Courts must give due deference to an agency’s interpretation and 
implementation of the law.  State ex rel. Saunders v. Indus. Comm., 101 Ohio 
St.3d 125, 2004-Ohio-339, 802 N.E.2d 650, ¶ 41;  Northwestern Ohio Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council v. Conrad (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 282, 289, 750 N.E.2d 
130.  Under such circumstances, the court should apply the subsequent regulation 
to Doe’s contract in this case, which would allow him to continue his employment 
but would also fulfill the overall intent of the law. 
__________________ 
 
BROWN, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 34} I agree with the majority that R.C. Chapter 124, R.C. 3319.391, 
and Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01 do not violate the “Contract Clause,” Section 28, 
Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  However, I would hold that R.C. 3319.391 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
violates the prohibition against retroactive laws in Section 28, Article II of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 35} Today the majority holds that a long-term school-district 
employee—a person who has successfully turned his life around and has not been 
in trouble for over 30 years—can be summarily fired based upon a new law that 
looks back to conduct that occurred prior to his employment.  Contrary to the 
majority’s assertions, Doe’s vested right to continued public employment 
provided him with constitutional rights, which should not be summarily denied. 
{¶ 36} Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that 
R.C. 3319.391 does not violate the prohibition against retroactive laws. 
Facts 
{¶ 37} According to the order certifying the questions to this court, Doe 
was convicted 34 years ago for drug trafficking and spent three years in jail.  That 
conviction was expunged in 1997. 
{¶ 38} Doe obtained a bachelor’s degree in 1983 and became a licensed 
social worker and certified chemical-dependency counselor.  The federal court 
that is hearing this case found that Doe “has been a model citizen since being 
released from jail.” 
{¶ 39} Beginning in 1997, Doe spent five years working for the school 
district as a drug-free-school specialist.  Doe has since worked in an 
administrative capacity as a hearing officer. 
{¶ 40} R.C. 3319.391 was enacted, effective November 14, 2007, to 
expand the categories of school-district employees who were required to undergo 
criminal background checks.  2007 Sub.H.B. No. 190.  Doe was among the 
employees who were newly subject to background checks. 
{¶ 41} However, the statute provided that any employee whose 
background check revealed crimes requiring termination could avoid termination 
if that person met rehabilitation standards adopted by the Department of 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
Education.  R.C. 3319.391(C).  Doe’s 1976 conviction made him subject to 
termination, and under the then-existing regulations, the drug offense was a 
nonrehabilitative offense.  Former Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-01(E)(1)(c) and 
(A)(11), 2005-2006 Ohio Monthly Record 1261, eff. Sept. 23, 2005. 
{¶ 42} In July 2008, Doe signed a new employment contract with the 
school district; the contract stated that Doe’s employment was “subject to 
confirmation of appropriate state certification.”  In November 2008, the school 
district informed Doe that a background check had revealed his former felony and 
that his employment was terminated. 
{¶ 43} Subsequently, the Department of Education passed regulations that 
would have permitted Doe to retain employment by demonstrating rehabilitation.  
Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03 (eff. Aug. 27, 2009).  Had this regulation been in 
effect in November 2008, it is unlikely that Doe would have been fired. 
{¶ 44} Doe’s termination was incongruous in that had the General 
Assembly not passed R.C. 3319.391, Doe would not have been fired, and had the 
Department of Education more quickly promulgated its rule regarding 
rehabilitation (Ohio Adm.Code 3301-20-03), Doe would not have been fired.  As 
noted by the federal court, Doe is a model citizen, a person who turned his life 
around in a remarkable and exemplary way.  His life and experiences made him 
uniquely qualified for his service to the school district.  Yet because his 
background check occurred during the gap between November 2007 (when R.C. 
3319.391 was enacted) and August 2009 (when the Department of Education 
finally promulgated the rule that would allow rehabilitation for Doe’s offense), 
Doe was terminated. 
{¶ 45} Doe filed suit in state court, alleging breach of contract and 
violation of constitutional rights.  The school district removed the case to federal 
court.  The federal court certified questions of state law to this court concerning 
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16 
 
the constitutionality of certain state laws in effect at the time of Doe’s 
termination.  We accepted the questions. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 46} For the majority, the analysis of whether R.C. 3319.391 violates 
the prohibition against retroactive laws begins and ends with Doe’s 2008 
employment contract.  According to the majority, Doe did not have a vested right 
to employment, because his 2008 contract was contingent on “ ‘confirmation of 
appropriate state certification.’ ”  Majority opinion at ¶ 18, quoting the 
employment contract. 
{¶ 47} In order to reach this result, the majority equates passing the 
criminal background check required by R.C. 3319.391 with “confirmation of 
appropriate state certification” under Doe’s employment contract.  The majority 
springboards from this proposition to the holding that Doe did not meet the 
“condition precedent” in his employment contract and therefore had no “vested 
right” to continued employment.  Without such a right, the majority concludes, 
the law is not unconstitutionally retroactive. 
{¶ 48} I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the contract makes 
Doe’s employment conditional on a background check.  The contract does not 
clearly and unambiguously say that Doe would be subject to a background check 
and that he could be fired based on the result.  It says instead that his employment 
is “subject to confirmation of appropriate state certification.”  The phrase “state 
certification” is ambiguous.  In the context of a school-district employment 
contract, “certification” could as easily mean “licensed,” since certain school-
district jobs require licenses.  See R.C. 3319.22, describing “educator licenses.” 
{¶ 49} Thus, the contract is ambiguous, at best, with regard to whether 
passing a criminal background check equates to “confirmation of appropriate state 
certification.”  In contracts, we construe ambiguities against the proponent of the 
instrument.  Monnett v. Monnett (1888), 46 Ohio St. 30, 34-35.  “Any ambiguities 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
in the document setting forth the rights and responsibilities of each party must be 
construed against the drafter of the document. Otherwise the nondrafter of the 
document may ultimately forfeit far more than he or she reasonably contemplated 
at the time the agreement was signed.”  Fletcher v. Fletcher (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 
464, 471, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Resnick, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 50} In light of the ambiguity, the court should not deprive Doe of his 
vested right to continued employment.  Instead, the court should hold the 
ambiguity against the contract’s proponent—the school district—and hold that the 
clause does not mean that the employee must pass a criminal background check. 
{¶ 51} The majority next asserts that Doe’s satisfying R.C. 3319.391 was 
an implied term of the employment contract because the statute was in effect 
before the contract was executed.  In other words, the majority holds that Doe 
loses the ability to raise his otherwise-viable constitutional right based upon terms 
of the contract that were added to the contract by this court by implication. 
{¶ 52} I cannot agree to so casually dispose of Doe’s constitutional claims 
through the use of a legal artifice (contract terms implied in law). 
{¶ 53} This is not a proper use of the court’s ability to supply implied 
contractual terms.  The court should imply terms to prevent injustice and to 
conform the contract to the parties’ actual intent, but not to deprive a person of his 
ability to enforce his constitutional rights.  This is particularly true when, as here, 
the terms being implied are from a newly passed law and would significantly alter 
the contractual relationship between the parties.  Accordingly, I would not find 
that Doe’s satisfying R.C. 3319.391 was an implied term of his contract. 
{¶ 54} The majority also states that R.C. 3319.391 is not retroactive 
because it does not go back in time and terminate Doe from the date of his initial 
hire or deprive him of pay and benefits that he previously acquired.  But these 
facts are irrelevant. 
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18 
 
{¶ 55} What is relevant is that the new law required Doe’s termination 
from employment based on his past conduct.  We have held that laws are 
unconstitutionally retroactive when they impair a vested right based upon prior 
conduct.  Smith v. Smith, 109 Ohio St.3d 285, 2006-Ohio-2419, 847 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 
6.  The principle is that a law cannot add new burdens to rights that are presently 
lawfully enjoyed, based upon events that occurred in the past.  R.C. 3319.391 is 
such a statute. 
{¶ 56} R.C. 3319.391 applies retroactively by its own terms.  The statute 
applies to new and current employees alike and instructs that an employee whose 
background check discloses a proscribed felony “shall be released from 
employment.”  R.C. 3319.391(C). 
{¶ 57} Our caselaw establishes that public employees, like Doe, have a 
vested right to continued employment. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emps., 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Lakewood City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 175, 176, 624 N.E.2d 1043.  And where, as here, that vested right is 
impaired by a new law requiring the employee’s termination based on the 
employee’s prior conduct, the law is unconstitutionally retroactive. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 58} For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that R.C. 3319.391 
violated the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws.  Accordingly, I 
dissent from the majority’s holding that R.C. 3319.391 does not violate the 
prohibition against retroactive laws. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Christopher R. McDowell, Kimberly Beck, 
and Sarah Sparks Herron, for petitioner. 
 
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Mark J. Stepaniak, and Daniel J. 
Hoying, for respondents Mary Ronan and Cincinnati Public Schools. 
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, Mia T. Meucci, Assistant Solicitor, and 
Amy Nash Golian and Todd R. Marti, Assistant Attorneys General, for 
respondent Ohio Department of Education. 
 
Carrie L. Davis, in support of petitioner for amicus curiae American Civil 
Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. 
 
Christina M. Royer, Ltd., and Christina M. Royer; and Cynthia McGrae, 
in support of petitioner for amici curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers Association, 
The Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, and Towards Employment, Inc. 
______________________