Case Title: Lee v. University of Vermont

Citation: 173 Vt. 626, 800 A.2d 444

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lee v. University of Vermont (2001-300); 173 Vt. 626; 800 A.2d 444

[Filed 10-April-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-300

                              MARCH TERM, 2002

John W. Lee, Jr.	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Chittenden Superior Court
                                       }	
University of Vermont	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. S1630-98 CnC

                                                Trial Judge:  Ben W. Joseph

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff John Lee, Jr. appeals the Chittenden Superior Court's award
  of summary judgment to  defendant University of Vermont (UVM) on the
  grounds that Lee's claims are barred by the statute  of limitations.  The
  court made several factual findings and determined that there is no
  "continuing  violation" of anti-discrimination laws in this case, and
  therefore, Lee's claims do not fall under the  purview of the "continuing
  violation" exception to the statute of limitations.  Mr. Lee claims there 
  are genuine issues of material fact which, if resolved in his favor, exempt
  his claims from the  controlling statute of limitations.  We agree and
  reverse the trial court's award of summary  judgment. 

       When reviewing an award of summary judgment, we use the same standard
  as the trial court.   Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ouellette, 159
  Vt. 187, 189, 617 A.2d 132, 133 (1992).   Summary judgment  is appropriate
  if, after giving the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable  doubts
  and inferences, there are no genuine issues of material fact.  Id.  

       Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Lee, there exist
  numerous genuine issues  of material fact regarding events occurring within
  the six-year statute of limitations for civil actions,  see 12 V.S.A. §
  511, and may constitute part of a "continuous practice and policy of
  discrimination,"  tolling the statute of limitations from the time the last
  discriminatory act, performed in furtherance of  the discriminatory
  practice, took place.  See Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir.
  1994).  For example, factual disputes have risen out of what Lee claims was
  UVM's discriminatory  classification of his medical leave of absence as a
  dismissal for poor academic performance.  Lee  claims he was on a medical
  leave of absence from UVM when he received notice in January 1991  that he
  had been dismissed from UVM for poor academic performance.  Lee claims he
  immediately  began making repeated, unsuccessful attempts to remedy UVM's
  error and was ultimately forced to  reapply for admission.  On April 12,
  1991, his application for readmission was rejected.  UVM 

 

  asserts that Mr. Lee never again applied for readmission after the April
  12, 1991 rejection.  Mr. Lee  asserts, however, that he complied with UVM's
  requirements to be considered for readmission in  1992, 1996, and again, in
  1998.  Eventually, he was granted a retroactive medical withdrawal.  He 
  claims that in 1994, 1995, and 1996, UVM refused to issue a corrected
  transcript.  Allegedly, as a  result of the erroneous assertion included in
  his UVM transcripts that he had been dismissed for poor  academic
  performance, Lee's applications to other colleges were denied, and his
  status as a financial  aid recipient was adversely affected.  Mr. Lee
  claims that the above mentioned instances, and many  others, were part of
  UVM's "continuous practice and policy of discrimination." 

       Because there exist several triable issues of material fact, which, if
  resolved in Lee's favor,  could constitute a continuing violation not
  precluded by the statute of limitations, we reverse the  lower court's
  award of summary judgment in this matter. 

       Reversed.  

                                       BY THE COURT:

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice