Case Title: STATE v BROWN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-375

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1984-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. 83-375 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1984 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, VS . L A R R Y G. BROWN, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Cascade Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robert M. Kampfer araued, Great F a l l s Montana For Respondent : Honorable Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Joe R. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, arqued, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Filed: ~ f i ~ - 8 1984 Submitted. A p r i l 1 6 , 1984 Decided: May 8 , 1984 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr. d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant Larry G. Brown appeals t h e judgment of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court (Cascade County) entered upon a jury v e r d i c t finding him g u i l t y of criminal mischief. Defendant and P a t r i c i a Brown divorced i n February 1981, but t h e c o n f l i c t s causing t h e divorce continued. O n October 2 1 , 1982 around 1 0 p.m., P a t r i c i a Brown went t o t h e Shamrock Bar t o v i s i t Allen Bapp, whom she had been dating. Sometime a f t e r 11 p.m., eyewitness Eleanor Schwartz came i n t o t h e b a r and t o l d Allen Bapp t h a t h i s t i r e s had been slashed. Both Ba-pp and P a t r i c i a Brown went o u t and found t h a t a l l f o u r t i r e s on both c a r s were slashed. Eleanor Schwartz t e s t i f i e d t h a t a s she drove up t o t h e f r o n t of t h e b a r , she saw someone moving from t i r e t o t i r e on Bapp's c a r . She d i d not recognize t h e person, b u t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was c l e a n shaven with s h o r t h a i r , and wearing a jacket, cap, jeans and sneakers. Several days l a t e r , a d e t e c t i v e of Cascade County S h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e presented a photogra.phic lineup t o Eleanor Schwartz. A f t e r narrowing down t o two photographs, she picked a photograph of defendant a s t h e person she had seen s l a s h i n g t h e t i r e s of Bapp's c a r a t t h e Shamrock Bar on October 21. A t t h e t r i a l , P a t r i c i a Brown t e s t i f i e d t h a t from t h e t i m e of her divorce from defendant t o t h e n i g h t of t h e offense, a t o t a l of 36 t i r e s were slashed on her c a r . While defendant was i n c a r c e r a t e d , no tires were slashed. She a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t on one occasion, she a c t u a l l y saw defendant s l a s h h e r t i r e s . Additionally, Bapp and another man whom P a t r i c i a Brown dated t e s t i f i e d they each had t i r e s slashed during t h e time they dated P a t r i c i a Brown. Defendant's son t e s t i f i e d t h a t he witnessed h i s f a t h e r s l a s h P a t r i c i a Brown's tires on a t l e a s t one occasion. O n t h e evening o f t h e a l l e g e d o f f e n s e , October 21, t h e son t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s f a t h e r displayed a Buck k n i f e and s a i d he might c u t P a t r i c i a Brown's tires again. Defendant's stepdaughter Theresa Brown t e s t i f i e d t h a t when defendant came t o h e r apartment on October 2 1 , he was drunk and angry, and claimed he would s l a s h t h e tires a g a i n i f he wanted. Defendant presented an a l i b i defense. Defendant claimed he was a t h i s s t e p d a u g h t e r ' s apartment u n t i l 11 o ' c l o c k . This was corroborated by Theresa Brown and h e r boyfriend. Other w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d t h e y were a t a p a r t y w i t h defendant l a t e r t h a t n i g h t . A complaint was f i l e d on October 2 7 , 1982. Defendant was a r r e s t e d t h e next day and remained i n custody u n t i l t h e d a t e of h i s t r i a l , 182 days l a t e r . O n March 1, 1983 defendant made a motion i n limine t o prevent t h e S t a t e from i n t r o d u c i n g evidence of any suspected p r i o r course o f conduct. The t r i a l c o u r t a p p a r e n t l y never r u l e d on t h e motion i n limine. However, an omnibus h e a r i n g was h e l d March 2 2 , 1983, a t which t i m e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ordered a ten-day n o t i c e t o defendant i f t h e S t a t e planned on p r e s e n t i n g evidence o f o t h e r o f f e n s e s o r a c t s . Defendant was n o t given such n o t i c e . The following i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d on appeal: 1. Whether it was p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r t o a l l o w testimony of o t h e r wrongful o r c r i m i n a l conduct without s u f f i c i e n t n o t i c e t o t h e defense o r e x p l a n a t i o n t o t h e jury where defendant made no o b j e c t i o n a t t r i a l . 2. Whether it was prejudicial error to refuse to instruct the jury on eyewitness identification where alibi is the raised defense. 3. Whether the defendant was denied a fair trial by an impartial jury because of an unrelated social conversation between a witness a-nd a juror. 4. Whether defendant was denied a speedy trial. 5. Whether it was prejudicial error not to allow the testimony of a witness. We will first address the speedy trial issue. A delay of 182 days is sufficient to trigger an inquiry into the right to a speedy trial. State v. Fife (Mont. 1981), 632 P.2d 712, 38 St.Rep. 1334. Defendant a.rgues that the 56 days consumed by motions to set trial date and for continuance, made by stand-by counsel while defendant wa.s proceeding pro se, are not chargeable to the defendant. We disagree. Defendant will not be allowed to gain advantage by jockeying between use and non-use of defense counsel. We find counsel's actions were part of, if not essential to the defense. The motions of counsel for the defense, whether lead counsel or stand-by, are properly attributable to the defendant. Although the remaining 126-day delay is troublesome, we find the prosecution was reasonably diligent in pursuing this matter. Nor was preparation of the defense hindered. We hold this delay to be within the permissible limits set by this Court pursuant to Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514; Cf. State v. Nelson (1978), 178 Mont. 280, 583 P.2d 435; State v. Kelly (Mont. 1983), 661 P.2d 26, 40 St.Rep. 364. Defendant challenges the admission of evidence of prior conduct without notice to the defense. This Court has clearly stated the procedural requirements for introducing evidence of other criminal or wrongful conduct in State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957: "(a) Evidence of other crimes may not be received unless there has been notice to the defendant that such evidence is to be introduced. The procedures set forth in section 46-18-503, MCA should serve as guidelines for the form and content of such notice. Additionally, the notice to the defendant shall include a statement as to the purposes for which such evidence is to be admitted. 'I (b) At the time of the introduction of such evidence, the trial court shall explain to the jury the purpose of such evidence and shall admonish it to weigh the evidence only for such purposes. " ( c ) In its final charge, the court should instruct the jury in unequivocal terms that such evidence was received. only for the limited purposes earlier stated and that the defendant is not being tried and may not be convicted for any offense except that charged, warning them that to convict for other offenses may result in unjust double punishment." Id. at 274. - The defendant never received the required notice. Nor did the trial court explain to the jury the limited purpose of the prior testimony when it was introduced. The State concedes these procedural errors but argues that defendant is precluded from raising this issue on appeal because no objection was made at trial. We disagree. A district court will not be put in error where it was not given an opportunity to correct itself. State v . Patton (1979), 183 Mont. 417, 600 P.2d 194; State v. Walker (1966), 148 Mont. 216, 223, 419 P.2d 300, 304. However, in this ca-se the admissibility of the prior conduct testimony was objected to prior to trial. On March 1, 1983, defendant filed with the court a Motion In Limine to exclude such evidence. Though the court did not rule directly on that motion, on March 22, 1983 the court ordered: I1V. The State will offer evidence of other offenses - - or acts under Rule 404(b), M.R.E. If notice has not been qiven, it will be qiven in writing 10 days before trial. " We hold defendant's allegations of procedural error are preserved by virtue of his Motion In Limine and the trial court's order. The State also argues that the error is not prejudicial because defendant was in fact aware that the state intended to offer testimony of prior conduct. The prejudice is found in the fact that defendant did not know exactly what acts or crimes he would have to be prepared to defend against at trial, nor did he know the form of such testimony. Had defendant received proper notice, he would have had the opportunity, prior to trial, to evaluate and to move to exclude that portion of such evidence that should not have been admitted. By his Motion In Limine, defendant took sufficient a.ction to settle these issues prior to trial. He was entitled to rely on the court's order that notice must be given. Since this case is remanded for retrial, it is not necessary to address the remaining issues. The case is reversed and remanded to the District Court. We concur: "a,.edlpe4, Chief Justi e Justices L