Case Title: State v. Lawonn

Citation: 113 Ariz. 113, 547 P.2d 467

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1976-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
113 Ariz. 113 (1976) 547 P.2d 467 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Leah Lorraine LAWONN, Appellant. No. 3231. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. March 26, 1976. Bruce E. Babbitt, Atty. Gen., by William J. Schafer, III, and Robert S. Golden, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by H. Allen Gerhardt, Jr., Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. HAYS, Justice. This matter was previously before us and was remanded to the trial court by a memorandum decision filed October 22, 1975. On appeal the defendant contended that prior to her plea of guilty, she was not informed of her privilege against self-incrimination as required by Rule 17.2, Rules of Criminal Procedure; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), and State v. Darling, 109 Ariz. 148, 506 P.2d 1042 (1973). In the remand order we sent the case to the trial court for a determination as to whether the defendant knew that her privilege against self-incrimination would be waived by a plea of guilty. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to our order of remand, and returned findings and a reporter's transcript of the hearing. The defendant filed objections to the findings of the court. The basic issue presented at this time is whether a defendant who attacks the validity of a guilty plea because she was not aware that the entry of the plea waived her privilege against self-incrimination, can thereafter assert the attorney-client privilege to keep her attorney from testifying as to information he gave her in this regard. At the remand hearing, the deputy public defender who had represented the defendant at the guilty-plea proceeding was subpoenaed by the county attorney. He declined to testify, asserting the attorney-client *114 privilege and referring the court to a recent Michigan Supreme Court case, People v. Nicholson, 395 Mich. 96, 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975). Pursuant to stipulation, he filed an affidavit in a sealed envelope which contained the substance of the testimony he might have given at the hearing to be forwarded to this court. The defendant attacks the finding of the trial court which finds the defendant knew that a plea of guilty waived her privilege against self-incrimination. The court, in making this finding, referred to specific pages in the transcript in support thereof, among which is the following testimony of the defendant who took the stand: In view of our position on the assertion of the attorney-client privilege, we need not address the issues raised by defendant's objections. In State v. Darling, supra, we said: In People v. Nicholson, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court flatly says: With this position we do not agree. By raising on appeal the issue of lack of knowledge of a right waived by a guilty plea, we hold that defendant has waived the attorney-client privilege as to this issue. Although differing in mode of presentation and stage of proceedings, this is within the spirit of Rule 32.8, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which permits the state to call the defendant to the stand. Nor do we find a due process problem here. As the United States Supreme Court indicated in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1970), the adversary system is not a poker game. We are still involved in a search for truth. The following quote from United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317 (5 Cir., 1970), expresses our position: Having decided that the testimony of the defendant's attorney at the guilty proceeding *115 is not privileged, we look to his affidavit. The pertinent part reads as follows: With the affidavit testimony and the testimony taken at the remand hearing, there can be no doubt that the defendant, by pleading guilty, knew that she waived her privilege against self-incrimination. Judgment of conviction affirmed. CAMERON, C.J., and HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concur. STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice (specially concurring). I concur in the opinion of the Court in this matter, feeling that it is not in the interest of justice to extend the attorney-client privilege to instances where the client's position is an attack on the adequacy of the representation of the attorney. While I concurred in the first opinion of this Court remanding the case for a determination as to whether the defendant knew that her privilege against self-incrimination was waived by her plea of guilty, I now have had some second thoughts as to the correctness of our action then. It should be clearly understood that defendant Lawonn first pled not guilty to the charge of possession of a stolen check. At the hearing in which she changed her plea to guilty, the following occurred: The court then inquired of her as to whether there had been any threats made in an effort to get her to change her plea, any promises of leniency, whether she knew that if she did not go to trial she would waive her right to trial by jury, her right to take the witness stand and testify in her own behalf, her right to subpoena witnesses and to cross-examine the witnesses. Then this occurred: *116 The defendant was never told specifically that she was waiving her constitutional right against self-incrimination. But it is apparent from the fact she knew she did not have to plead guilty, having previously pled not guilty, and from the fact that a plea of guilty, can only be understood as an acknowledgment of wrongdoing that she knowingly and voluntarily gave up by such acknowledgment any right which she might have against self-incrimination as to the particular offense charged. In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), the Court said: I do not understand that the United States Supreme Court is saying a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be made by a plea of guilty if the plea is with the full knowledge by the defendant of his other rights and is voluntary. The plea of guilty by defendant in the instant case was an acknowledgment of her participation in the criminal offense charged. Such an acknowledgment of guilt is plainly a voluntary waiver of any right against self-incrimination which she might have had and which she exercised in her original plea of not guilty. The Supreme Court of the United States used the words "compulsory self-incrimination." When the defendant stood up in open court, was fully advised of all the other legal rights she was waiving by her plea of guilty, then acknowledged her guilty, admitting the essential elements of the offense charged, she made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of her right against self-incrimination. All the technicalities of the law have been complied with, down to the dotting of the last "i" and the crossing of the last "t". I do not now believe there was a need to remand this case to the Superior Court for a determination of whether defendant, Leah L. Lawonn, knew that she waived a privilege against self-incrimination by changing her plea. I think as a matter of law it can be said that there was no compulsory self-incrimination. For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the affirmance of the judgment of conviction.