Case Title: WCI Steel, Inc. v. Testa

Citation: 2011-Ohio-3280

Docket Number: 20101027

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
WCI Steel, Inc. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3280.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-3280 
WCI STEEL, INC., APPELLANT, v. TESTA, TAX COMMR., APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as WCI Steel, Inc. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-3280.] 
Board of Tax Appeals — Specificity of notice of appeal. 
(No. 2010-1027 — Submitted March 23, 2011 — Decided July 7, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2005-V-1565. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
The jurisdiction of the Board of Tax Appeals is invoked to review an 
assessment in which the tax commissioner has determined the value of 
personal property if the notice of appeal from that determination (1) states 
the appellant’s objection to the commissioner’s actions in valuing the 
property and (2) identifies the treatment that the commissioner should 
have applied.  (Abex Corp. v. Kosydar (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 13, 17, 64 
O.O.2d 8, 298 N.E.2d 584, followed.) 
2. 
In an appeal from an assessment in which the tax commissioner has 
determined the value of personal property, the Board of Tax Appeals is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
statutorily authorized to receive evidence in addition to that considered by 
the tax commissioner, and that evidence may include different valuation 
approaches from those presented to the tax commissioner.  (Key Servs. 
Corp. v. Zaino (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 11, 16, 764 N.E.2d 1015, applied.) 
3. 
The different approaches to the valuation of personal property set forth in 
Ohio Adm.Code 5703-3-10(B) are not “alternate valuation methods” as 
that term is used in Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Levin, 124 Ohio St.3d 211, 2009-
Ohio-6189, 921 N.E.2d 212, and accordingly the notice of appeal need not 
specify that the appellant will present a different valuation approach to the 
Board of Tax Appeals than it presented in the proceedings before the tax 
commissioner. 
__________________ 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} In this personal-property-tax case, WCI Steel, Inc. (“WCI”) 
appeals from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), which dismissed 
WCI’s appeal on the authority of Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Levin, 124 Ohio St.3d 211, 
2009-Ohio-6189, 921 N.E.2d 212.  The BTA held that when judged under the 
standards articulated in Ohio Bell, WCI’s notice of appeal to the BTA failed to 
specify any error and thereby failed to vest jurisdiction in the BTA to consider the 
appeal. 
{¶ 2} On appeal, WCI argues that the BTA misconstrued Ohio Bell.  
WCI argues that it sufficiently specified error and that it was entitled to present, 
for the first time at the BTA hearing, an appraisal prepared by AccuVal 
Associates, Inc. as part of its claim for reduced valuation of its manufacturing 
machinery and equipment.  We agree. 
{¶ 3} First, we follow our precedents holding that a notice of appeal 
from an assessment in which the tax commissioner has determined the value of 
personal property invokes the jurisdiction of the BTA to review that 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
determination if the notice (1) states the appellant’s objection to the 
commissioner’s actions in valuing the property and (2) identifies the treatment 
that the commissioner should have applied. 
{¶ 4} Moreover, the BTA’s jurisdiction in the appeal permitted it to 
consider the appraisal report and testimony that WCI presented for the first time 
at the BTA hearing.  Our precedents establish that the BTA is statutorily 
authorized to receive evidence in addition to that considered by the tax 
commissioner, and we hold that such evidence may include different valuation 
approaches from those presented to the tax commissioner. 
{¶ 5} In this regard, we hold that our decision in Ohio Bell is inapposite.  
The different approaches to the valuation of personal property set forth in Ohio 
Adm.Code 5703-3-10(B) are not “alternate valuation methods” as that term is 
used in Ohio Bell, and accordingly the notice of appeal need not specify that the 
appellant will present a different valuation approach to the Board of Tax Appeals 
than it presented in the proceedings before the tax commissioner. 
{¶ 6} Because the BTA applied Ohio Bell to a situation in which it 
should not have been applied, we reverse and remand with the instruction that the 
BTA decide this case on the merits. 
Factual Background 
{¶ 7} WCI Steel, Inc. is a steelmaker in northeast Ohio.  For tax year 
2001, WCI reported that its manufacturing machinery and equipment (“M&E”) 
had a value (in accordance with the tax commissioner’s prescribed valuation 
method) of $84 million.  For tax year 2002, the reported value of the M&E was 
just under $90 million. 
{¶ 8} Testimony at the BTA hearing indicated that 2001 was a terrible 
year financially for the steel industry generally and was WCI’s worst financial 
year:  WCI lost $100 million.  In 2002, WCI lost $37 million.  In September 2003, 
WCI filed for bankruptcy reorganization. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 9} In connection with its business troubles, WCI decided to seek a 
lower valuation of its business property—in particular, the M&E used in steel 
manufacturing.  In May 2003, a WCI representative made a presentation to tax 
department representatives.  WCI presented a study apparently predicated 
primarily on comparable sales, although the study did discuss obsolescence.  
According to the commissioner’s agent, the study compared the valuation of 
WCI’s assets per ton of production capacity with that of five other steel 
producers, and recommended—based on the comparison—that a lower value be 
assigned to WCI’s own M&E.  The report recommended a total value of all 
WCI’s property at $35 million for 2003, with retrospective valuation adjustments 
for 2002 and 2001. 
{¶ 10} In accordance with the study, WCI valued its M&E for tax year 
2003 at just under $30 million.  WCI filed applications for final assessment 
pursuant to R.C. 5711.26 to obtain similar lower valuation for 2001 and 2002.  
The tax commissioner ultimately rejected the study based primarily on the 
conclusion of the tax commissioner’s agent that the sales were not comparable, 
because WCI was more of a special-job steelmaker than a general steelmaker. 
{¶ 11} During the proceedings before the commissioner, WCI’s claim for 
reduction of the value of M&E was reviewed and analyzed as a claim for an 
impairment of asset value—indeed, the audit remarks characterized WCI’s claim 
as a claim for asset impairment.  Correspondence filed on behalf of WCI during 
the proceedings before the commissioner acknowledged the commissioner’s 
interest in whether WCI ought to recognize an impairment on its books for its 
M&E, given the reduced valuation it sought from the commissioner.  An earlier 
audit by the accounting firm KPMG had indicated that accounting standards did 
not require WCI to record an impairment for fiscal year 2002. 
{¶ 12} After WCI’s bankruptcy filing, WCI commissioned an appraisal of 
its assets from Nationwide Consulting Company, Inc.  As a result of that 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
appraisal, WCI did record an impairment.  The tax commissioner’s agent 
reviewed a portion of that appraisal, and the tax commissioner’s witness at the 
BTA hearing stated, “[W]e saw parts of it and then did not agree with the 
method.”  The tax agent apparently asked for, but was denied, access to a portion 
of the analysis supporting the claim of impairment.  On the other hand, the 
commissioner’s agent did note in an addendum to the audit that the Nationwide 
Consulting appraisal of “fair market value in continued use” did consider a 
combination of cost approach, market-comparison approach, and income 
approach—with emphasis on the market comparison approach “when sufficient 
data was available”—to arrive at a value of $83,316,000. 
{¶ 13} Although the commissioner suggests that the Nationwide 
Consulting appraisal relied exclusively on a sales-comparison approach and that 
the appraisal found income and cost approaches inapplicable, the page that the 
commissioner cites appears to address the value of the realty, not the M&E. 
Procedural History 
{¶ 14} The present case involves not one but three tax years:  2001, 2002, 
and 2003.  WCI was a fiscal-year taxpayer:  it listed its personal property value as 
of the last day of its preceding fiscal year, which is October 31, rather than as of 
December 31 of the preceding calendar year.  See R.C. 5711.03 and 5711.101; 
Ohio Adm.Code 5703-3-04.  Thus, WCI’s personal property was valued as of 
October 31, 2000, for tax year 2001; as of October 31, 2001, for tax year 2002; 
and as of October 31, 2002, for tax year 2003.  Procedurally, the 2001 and 2002 
tax years were placed at issue when WCI filed an application for final assessment.  
For tax year 2003, WCI filed its return using a lower valuation. 
{¶ 15} The commissioner denied the relief WCI sought for 2001, 2002, 
and 2003.  In doing so, the commissioner issued final-assessment certificates 
pursuant to R.C. 5711.26 but did not formally articulate the grounds for his 
decision in a final determination.  WCI appealed the final assessment to the BTA.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
In the second assignment of error in its notice of appeal to the BTA, WCI did the 
following: 
{¶ 16} (1) identified the categories of personal property at issue, 
{¶ 17} (2) reiterated that the value previously asserted by the taxpayer was 
correct,  
{¶ 18} (3) stated that the commissioner’s determination “reflects property 
being valued as a percentage of its original cost using the Tax Commissioner’s 
composite annual allowance procedure,” and contended that the true value of its 
property did not exceed the values requested by WCI, and 
{¶ 19} (4) cited the pertinent statutes and administrative rules. 
{¶ 20} WCI presented testimony and exhibits at an evidentiary hearing 
before the BTA.  Most prominently, WCI presented the appraisal prepared by 
AccuVal Associates, Inc., which the commissioner has characterized as primarily 
a “replacement cost new” study. 
{¶ 21} The AccuVal appraisal expressed an opinion of the value of WCI’s 
M&E for 2003, 2002, and 2001 by determining its replacement cost and then 
making adjustments to that figure.  First, AccuVal computed and subtracted 
depreciation by both physical deterioration and functional obsolescence.  Second, 
AccuVal subtracted a large amount for economic obsolescence based on a 
computation of business-enterprise value.  Third, AccuVal made an adjustment 
derived from a sales-comparison approach, and thereby arrived at its estimate of 
true value.  The primary focus was the 2003 tax year (value as of October 31, 
2002), and the study then trended backward to determine values for the previous 
two years. 
{¶ 22} After this court issued its decision in Ohio Bell, the BTA solicited 
briefs from the parties on the issue whether the decision affected the BTA’s 
jurisdiction in the present case.  Ultimately, the BTA determined that WCI’s 
appeal must be dismissed on the authority of Ohio Bell because its notice of 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
appeal failed to specify error.  WCI timely appealed to this court.  We now 
reverse. 
Analysis 
{¶ 23} Because the “law of Ohio requires that personal property used in 
business be taxed at its true value,” and because “it is impractical for the 
Department of Taxation to personally value all such personal property in the 
state,” we have held that it is reasonable and lawful for the commissioner to 
develop a method of “depreciating the cost of the personal property in accordance 
with its useful life.”  W.L. Harper Co. v. Peck (1954), 161 Ohio St. 300, 303, 53 
O.O. 178, 118 N.E.2d 643.  The commissioner’s method, known as the “302 
computation,” consists of industry-specific composite annual allowances by 
which categories of business assets are depreciated from cost, and this court has 
approved the 302 computation “as a practical, reasonable and lawful method and 
device to achieve uniform valuation of plant equipment in Ohio by prescribing 
annual depreciation rates in lieu of book depreciation for Ohio personal property 
tax purposes.”  PPG Industries, Inc. v Kosydar (1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 80, 83, 19 
O.O.3d 268, 417 N.E.2d 1385; see Ohio Adm.Code 5703-3-11 (prescribing use of 
the 302 computation in valuing personal property used in business). 
{¶ 24} WCI sought a drastic reduction in the value of its M&E for tax 
years 2001, 2002, and 2003 from the value determined under the 302 
computation.  Before the tax commissioner, WCI placed primary reliance on a 
study of sales of comparable plants.  Before the BTA, WCI presented the 
AccuVal appraisal.  But the BTA dismissed WCI’s appeal on the authority of 
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Levin, 124 Ohio St.3d 211, 2009-Ohio-6189, 921 N.E.2d 
212. 
The BTA misread the holding of Ohio Bell 
{¶ 25} When a notice of appeal fails to set forth any error with the 
required specificity, an appeal may properly be dismissed—the action that the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
BTA took in the present case.1  Brown v. Levin, 119 Ohio St.3d 335, 2008-Ohio-
4081, 894 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 17.  Alternatively, if the notice does specify one or more 
errors, the BTA may be called upon to rule that a particular claim was not among 
those errors specified and therefore lies outside the BTA’s jurisdiction.  Id.  Ohio 
Bell, 124 Ohio St.3d 211, 2009-Ohio-6189, 921 N.E.2d 212, exemplifies the latter 
principle:  the court held that the notice of appeal did not permit the introduction 
of a newly commissioned “unit appraisal” at the BTA.2  But in the present case, 
the BTA relied on Ohio Bell to hold that the notice of appeal in this case failed to 
specify any error at all.  That is mistaken. 
{¶ 26} In Ohio Bell, the notice of appeal contained two claims of error 
that were pertinent to the court’s analysis.  First, the notice stated that the 
commissioner’s determination “overstates both costs and service lives” of Ohio 
Bell’s property; second, the notice stated that the assessment “utilizes a method 
that does not reasonably reflect true value.”  Id. at ¶ 20.  The court considered 
whether either of these assertions conferred jurisdiction on the BTA to grant Ohio 
Bell relief based on a unit appraisal, given that Ohio Bell had not presented such 
an appraisal below but had presented only a valuation study that called for 
different cost figures and depreciation rates.  Id. at ¶ 6. 
{¶ 27} As for the statement that the commissioner “overstates costs and 
service lives,” that phrase referred to the type of valuation study Ohio Bell had 
previously presented to the commissioner, and it did not relate to a unit appraisal.  
                                                 
1 The BTA’s decision noted that two assignments of error in the notice of appeal had been 
abandoned, and it therefore did not consider the sufficiency of those assignments.  WCI Steel, Inc. 
v. Wilkins (May 18, 2010), BTA No. 2005-V-1565, at 5.  The BTA then proceeded to dismiss the 
appeal on the grounds that the remaining assignments of error were “so broad and vague as to be 
insufficient to invoke [the] board’s jurisdiction.”  Id. at 6. 
 
2 Because the taxpayer in Ohio Bell had abandoned the use of its study of costs and service lives in 
favor of exclusive reliance on a unit appraisal, the court did not remand but instead ordered that 
the commissioner’s determination be reinstated.  Ohio Bell, 124 Ohio St.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-6189, 
921 N.E.2d 212, at ¶ 34.  Significantly, there was no dismissal of the BTA appeal in Ohio Bell, 
because there was no holding that the notice of appeal completely failed to specify any error at all. 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
We next considered whether the assertion that the assessment “utilizes a method 
that does not reasonably reflect true value” extended jurisdiction to encompass a 
unit appraisal.  We decided that it did not, because, while it purported to open the 
door to an alternative method, it “did not narrow the issues in this case in any 
way.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 27.  In this context, the court observed that “[s]uch 
a ‘specification’ is so broad that it specifies nothing at all.”  Id.  But because we 
did not address whether the notice of appeal failed to specify any error, that 
statement is obiter dictum. 
{¶ 28} Moreover, reading Ohio Bell as foreclosing the jurisdiction of the 
BTA in this case contravenes the principles we have applied in other cases.  We 
have held that a notice of appeal is sufficient to give notice of a particular error 
when it has “specified the commissioner’s action that it questioned, cited the 
statute under which it objected, and asserted the treatment that it believed the 
commissioner should have applied.”  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Wilkins, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 33, 2004-Ohio-1869, 806 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 75, citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Limbach (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 575 N.E.2d 146, citing Abex 
Corp. v. Kosydar (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 13, 64 O.O.2d 8, 298 N.E.2d 584.  Abex 
Corp. is particularly significant in this regard because it involved a decision by 
the BTA to dismiss a challenge to the valuation of personal property.  Like the 
notice of appeal in Abex Corp., WCI’s second assignment of error meets the 
criteria by identifying the property, identifying the commissioner’s action that it 
did not agree with, and identifying the treatment that the commissioner should 
have accorded. 
{¶ 29} Therefore, consistent with Abex Corp., 35 Ohio St.2d 13, 17, 64 
O.O.2d 8, 298 N.E.2d 584, we hold that the jurisdiction of the BTA is invoked to 
review an assessment in which the tax commissioner has determined the value of 
personal property if the notice of appeal from that determination (1) states the 
appellant’s objection to the commissioner’s actions in valuing the property and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
(2) identifies the treatment that the commissioner should have applied.  Because 
WCI’s notice of appeal complied with these criteria, it invoked the BTA’s 
jurisdiction. 
{¶ 30} For all these reasons, the BTA erred by reading Ohio Bell as 
establishing that the notice of appeal in the present case fails to invoke any 
jurisdiction in the BTA.  Indeed, we left no doubt of the narrow compass of our 
holding when we stated that the “jurisdictional issue * * * stems from Ohio Bell’s 
failure to present a case based on a unit appraisal to the commissioner, not from 
an unfortunate choice of words [in the notice of appeal].”  124 Ohio St.3d 211, 
2009-Ohio-6189, 921 N.E.2d 212, at ¶ 32.  The holding of Ohio Bell does not, 
therefore, dictate that a notice of appeal must set forth valuation theories with 
particularity.  Instead, the case merely prevents the presentation of an “alternate 
valuation method” that has not previously been presented to the tax 
commissioner. 
By explicitly challenging the commissioner’s valuation, a notice of appeal 
preserves the claim for reduced value and allows new evidence at the BTA 
{¶ 31} Determining that Ohio Bell does not support the BTA’s dismissal 
of this case does not end our inquiry.  That is so because the BTA’s error is 
jurisdictional in nature, and we must determine whether the BTA will have 
jurisdiction to entertain WCI’s claim for reduced value on remand.3 
{¶ 32} Even if a notice of appeal does specify one or more errors, the 
BTA may be called upon to rule that a particular claim was not among those 
errors specified and therefore lies outside the BTA’s jurisdiction.  Brown, 119 
                                                 
3 Ordinarily, our jurisdiction to consider a claim that the BTA has erred is confined to 
specifications of error advanced either in a notice of appeal or in a cross-appeal.  See Polaris 
Amphitheater Concerts, Inc. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 118 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-
2454, 889 N.E.2d 103, ¶ 13-15; Northeast Ohio Psych. Inst. v. Levin, 121 Ohio St.3d 292, 2009-
Ohio-583, 903 N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 23.  But when, as in the present case, an issue concerns the 
jurisdiction of the BTA and thereby, derivatively, our own jurisdiction on appeal, we may consider 
the issue without regard to the specification requirement of R.C. 5717.04.  See Brown, 119 Ohio 
St.3d 335, 2008-Ohio-4081, 894 N.E.2d 35, at ¶ 23, fn. 4. 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
Ohio St.3d 335, 2008-Ohio-4081, 894 N.E.2d 35, at ¶ 17.  As noted, our decision 
in Ohio Bell exemplifies that principle:  the court held that the notice of appeal 
did not permit the introduction of a newly commissioned “unit appraisal” at the 
BTA.  Ohio Bell, 124 Ohio St.3d 211, 2009-Ohio-6189, 921 N.E.2d 212, at ¶ 32-
33. 
{¶ 33} In the present case, the tax commissioner does not confine himself 
to defending the BTA’s determination that WCI’s notice failed to specify any 
error at all; the commissioner also contends that in this case, “just like in Ohio 
Bell, the language used by WCI in its notice of appeal to the BTA provides no 
notice to the Commissioner or the BTA of the particular valuation 
methodology(ies), analysis, assumptions, and evidence that WCI would present at 
the BTA.”  We therefore consider whether WCI’s notice of appeal encompassed 
the AccuVal appraisal that WCI presented for the first time at the BTA. 
{¶ 34} For two reasons, we hold that the BTA did possess jurisdiction to 
consider the AccuVal appraisal.  First, the commissioner’s argument cannot be 
reconciled with the statutes and the case law concerning the BTA’s authority to 
hear evidence.  R.C. 5717.02 specifically provides that “upon the application of 
any interested party the board shall order the hearing of additional evidence, and it 
may make such investigation concerning the appeal as it considers proper.”  The 
proposition that the notice of appeal must specify the nature of the evidence that 
the appellant will present at the BTA hearing cannot be reconciled with the 
specific mandate that “additional evidence” be taken on application of a party. 
{¶ 35} Moreover, we have held that the “BTA hearing is de novo” and 
that the board is “statutorily authorized to conduct full administrative appeals in 
which the parties are entitled to produce evidence in addition to that considered 
by the Tax Commissioner.”  Key Servs. Corp. v. Zaino (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 11, 
16, 764 N.E.2d 1015, citing Higbee Co. v. Evatt (1942), 140 Ohio St. 325, 332, 23 
O.O. 543, 43 N.E.2d 273; Bloch v. Glander (1949), 151 Ohio St. 381, 387, 39 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
O.O. 216, 86 N.E.2d 318.  Imposing the jurisdictional prerequisite of specifying 
evidence would severely limit if not overrule our precedent concerning the scope 
of the BTA’s authority in this regard—indeed, in Ohio Bell itself we expressly 
acknowledged that a party “need not specify the evidence on which it intends to 
rely [at the BTA].”  Ohio Bell, 124 Ohio St.3d 211, 2009-Ohio-6189, 921 N.E.2d 
212, at ¶ 30. 
{¶ 36} Second, our decisions have not judged the sufficiency of 
assignments of error in a notice of appeal merely by their form of words.  Instead, 
the words of the notice of appeal must be read in the context of the particular case 
in which those words are used.  An assertion in a notice of appeal should therefore 
be read in light of the objections and evidence that were presented to the 
commissioner, with the result that a taxpayer’s explicit objection to the 
commissioner’s valuation of personal property will usually suffice to permit the 
taxpayer to preserve its valuation challenge and present new evidence to the BTA. 
{¶ 37} One of the most dramatic illustrations of the importance of context 
is Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 335, 2008-Ohio-4081, 894 N.E.2d 35.  In Brown, the 
notice of appeal stated that the appeal was “being taken because the assessment is 
not supported by a proper application of Ohio Revised Code § 5747.02 and other 
applicable laws.”  Id. at ¶ 5.  The “claim of error might indeed have been raised in 
any income tax case in Ohio.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 22. (R.C. 5747.02 imposes 
the income tax.)  Thus, the statement “arguably specifies no error at all.”  Id. 
{¶ 38} But we did not hold that the BTA should have dismissed the 
appeal.  Instead, we looked at the context as infusing the notice of appeal with a 
particular meaning:  because the commissioner’s determination relied on the 
BTA’s decision in Knust v. Wilkins (Oct. 14, 2005), BTA No. 2004-M-533, 
affirmed, 111 Ohio St.3d 331, 2006-Ohio-5791, 856 N.E.2d 243, and because the 
Knust appeal was pending before this court at the time the tax commissioner 
issued his final determination, we held:  “[T]he BTA could have construed the 
January Term, 2011 
13 
 
Browns’ notice of appeal as a request that if this court reversed the BTA’s 
decision in Knust, the Browns should enjoy the benefit of that legal ruling.  
Indeed, to construe the notice of appeal in that way would comport with the fact 
that this case is one of a large number of cases that were pending before the BTA 
in anticipation of our decision in the Knust appeal.”  Brown at ¶ 14.  Our ultimate 
disposition in Brown reflects the reading of the notice of appeal in context:  we 
did not find that the BTA lacked jurisdiction, but instead affirmed the BTA’s 
summary affirmance of the commissioner’s determination based on the court’s 
decision in Knust. 
{¶ 39} Additionally, reading the notice of appeal in context comports with 
the basic purpose of the specification requirement:  notice.  See Gen. Mills, Inc. v. 
Limbach (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 273, 275, 586 N.E.2d 1074 (“R.C. 5717.02 merely 
requires that the error be presented with sufficient specificity to apprise the BTA 
of the nature and extent of the alleged error”), citing Abex Corp., 35 Ohio St.2d 
13, 64 O.O.2d 8, 298 N.E.2d 584; Castle Aviation, Inc. v. Wilkins, 109 Ohio St.3d 
290, 2006-Ohio-2420, 847 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 39 (“The purpose of specifying error at 
the BTA, be the error constitutional or nonconstitutional, is to put the Tax 
Commissioner on notice as to the issues that will be contested”).  Simply put, 
reiterating a claim raised before the commissioner, even without exposition, gives 
adequate notice that the taxpayer will reassert that claim to the BTA. 
{¶ 40} In the present case, WCI’s notice invokes the BTA’s jurisdiction to 
consider a claim for reduced value, at least to the extent of the evidence, 
arguments, and considerations that formed a part of the tax commissioner’s 
review of that claim. 
The AccuVal appraisal presented at the BTA did not exceed the scope of  
the claim for reduced value specified in the notice of appeal 
{¶ 41} The commissioner emphasizes that WCI presented a comparable-
sales study to the commissioner and placed primary reliance on that study, and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
distinguishes between a comparable-sales approach and a replacement-cost 
approach, which predominated in the AccuVal appraisal that WCI presented at the 
BTA.  Citing Ohio Bell, the commissioner analogizes this distinction to the 
“alternate valuation methods” at issue in Ohio Bell.  Under this theory, the 
AccuVal appraisal, like the unit appraisal in Ohio Bell, lay outside the jurisdiction 
created by the notice of appeal. 
{¶ 42} The commissioner’s theory is mistaken for two reasons.  First, 
unlike the utility tax at issue in Ohio Bell, the general personal property tax is 
subject to administrative rules that address the valuation of personal property.  
Ohio Adm.Code 5703-3-11 generally calls for the use of the commissioner’s 302 
computation and establishes the prima facie validity of that method. 
{¶ 43} When a taxpayer challenges the valuation in accordance with the 
302 computation, Ohio Adm.Code 5703-3-10(B) provides that the 302 valuation 
may be “rebutted by probative evidence of higher or lower valuation” and then 
enumerates several types of evidence:  an arm’s-length sale of the assets, a 
comparable-sales study, or more accurate annual allowances for depreciation and 
obsolescence.  Contrary to the commissioner’s argument, this language makes 
clear that a comparable-sales study and a cost-less-depreciation study do not 
constitute different claims for relief, but merely different types of “probative 
evidence of higher or lower valuation” by which the prima facie validity of the 
302 computation may be rebutted.  Ohio Adm.Code 5703-3-10(B).  Because an 
appellant at the BTA “need not specify the evidence on which it intends to rely,” 
Ohio Bell, 124 Ohio St.3d 211, 2009-Ohio-6189, 921 N.E.2d 212, at ¶ 30, it 
follows that WCI did not need to specify the approaches to valuing property that it 
intended to rely on before the BTA. 
{¶ 44} Second, the concept of an “alternate valuation method” found in 
Ohio Bell is specific to the utility tax and usually does not apply to the general 
personal property tax.  Ohio Bell was itself a utility-tax case in which the tax 
January Term, 2011 
15 
 
commissioner valued Ohio Bell’s property by applying “composite annual 
allowances” for depreciation and obsolescence to the historical cost of the utility’s 
operating assets.  See R.C. 5727.11.  Before the commissioner, Ohio Bell began 
by offering a valuation to reduce costs and accelerate depreciation, but for the first 
time at the BTA, Ohio Bell resorted to a “unit appraisal.”  The term “alternate 
valuation method” is derived from a previous utility-tax case and refers to the 
distinction between these two approaches to valuing the operating assets of a 
utility.  Ohio Bell, at ¶ 23, citing Texas E. Transm. Corp. v. Tracy (1997), 78 Ohio 
St.3d 83, 86-87, 676 N.E.2d 523. 
{¶ 45} Unit-appraisal valuation is different—in Ohio Bell we referred to 
its “fundamental dissimilarity” to the cost-less-depreciation approach—because a 
unit appraisal is an “ ‘appraisal of an integrated property as a whole, without 
reference to the value of its component parts.’ ”  Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Wilkins 
(Aug. 31, 2007), BTA No. 2005-K-202, at 12, quoting the unit appraisal presented 
to the BTA, reversed on other grounds, Ohio Bell, 124 Ohio St.3d 211, 2009-
Ohio-6189, 921 N.E.2d 212; accord Stone v. Limbach (June 30, 1988), BTA No. 
85-C-931, at 23 (Ohio formerly taxed utility property under “unit” valuation, 
meaning that “[a]ll taxable property of a public utility is valued as one ‘piece’ or 
‘unit’ of property,” with the result that the property is “valued as a ‘whole’ instead 
of on an ‘item by item’ basis”). And unit-appraisal valuation plays a role in the 
history of utility taxation that is different from the general personal property tax. 
{¶ 46} Namely, the unit appraisal became an alternate valuation method in 
the utility tax after the enactment of R.C. 5727.11 in 1989.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 156, 
143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 891, 909-911.  Under the public utility personal property 
tax as amended, the statute requires the commissioner to determine the value of 
personal property by “using cost as capitalized on the public utility’s books less 
composite annual allowances as prescribed by the commissioner.”  R.C. 
5727.11(A), formerly (B).  Before that amendment, the valuation of utility 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
property by means of a “unit appraisal” was a widely acknowledged and accepted 
approach.  See Texas E. Transm. Corp., 78 Ohio St.3d at 83, 676 N.E.2d 523  
(“Prior to 1990, TET’s property was assessed by ‘unit appraisal,’ ” pursuant to 
which “the value of the entire operating system is determined and then an amount 
is allocated to those components located within the various states”).4  Because of 
this background, we characterized the unit appraisal offered in Texas Eastern as 
an “alternate valuation method” from the statutory method and held that such an 
appraisal could be offered as a basis for departing from the cost-less-deprecation 
approach without any showing of special and unusual circumstances.  Id. at 86.  
Next, in Ohio Bell we echoed the discussion in Texas E. Transm. Corp. of the unit 
appraisal as an “alternate valuation method” and emphasized the “fundamental 
dissimilarity between the valuation theory presented to the commissioner (which 
was focused on revising the cost and depreciation variables) and the [unit 
appraisal] presented to the BTA (which was focused on an expert appraiser’s 
professional opinion of the market value of Ohio Bell’s operating properties).”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Ohio Bell, 124 Ohio St.3d 211, 2009-Ohio-6189, 921 N.E.2d 
212, at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 47} By contrast with Ohio Bell, the present case presents no such 
“fundamental dissimilarity” because the AccuVal appraisal that WCI presented at 
the BTA integrates a mix of approaches into a replacement-cost study, and such 
an appraisal does not qualify as an “alternate valuation method” from what was 
considered by the tax commissioner.  Moreover, the concept of alternate valuation 
method simply does not apply outside the utility-tax context.  For these reasons 
                                                 
4 See Condee v. Lindley (Nov. 30, 1983), BTA No. 81-F-652, at 13-14, affirmed, 12 Ohio St.3d 
90, 12 OBR 79, 465 N.E.2d 450; Stone v. Limbach (June 30, 1988), BTA No. 85-C-931, at 23; 
McCormack v. Limbach (Feb. 3, 1988), BTA Nos. 85-A-969, -984, -1016, and -1023, at 10, 1988 
WL 161837, *4-5, affirmed sub nom. Snider v. Limbach (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 200, 542 N.E.2d 
647. 
January Term, 2011 
17 
 
Ohio Bell is not apposite, and the BTA had jurisdiction to consider the AccuVal 
appraisal. 
WCI was not obligated to present the AccuVal appraisal to the commissioner  
in order to be permitted to present it to the BTA 
{¶ 48} The commissioner also argues that the BTA lacked jurisdiction 
because WCI did not present the AccuVal appraisal to the commissioner first.  
This argument relies on the asserted rule that “a failure to present an issue to the 
commissioner precludes the BTA from taking jurisdiction over that issue—even if 
the issue is specified in the notice of appeal.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Ohio Bell, 124 
Ohio St.3d 211, 2009-Ohio-6189, 921 N.E.2d 212, at ¶ 33, citing CNG Dev. Co. 
v. Limbach (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 28, 32, 584 N.E.2d 1180, and DeWeese v. 
Zaino, 100 Ohio St.3d 324, 2003-Ohio-6502, 800 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 19–22. 
{¶ 49} The commissioner cites no specific statutory authority to support 
his second and third propositions of law.  That is odd because the language of the 
statutes is almost certainly relevant to whether a taxpayer is or is not obligated to 
set forth its objections and arguments before the commissioner.  See CNG, 63 
Ohio St.3d at 31, 584 N.E.2d 1180, quoting R.C. 5739.13 (sales-tax provision 
authorizing a challenge to the tax commissioner’s assessment expressly required 
that the petition for reassessment “ ‘set[ ] forth with particularity the items of the 
assessment objected to, together with the reasons for such objections’ ”); 
DeWeese, 100 Ohio St.3d 324, 2003-Ohio-6502, 800 N.E.2d 1, at ¶ 10 (because 
R.C. 5711.31 requires a petition for reassessment in a property-tax case to 
“indicate the objections of the party assessed, but additional objections may be 
raised in writing if received prior to the date shown on the final determination by 
the commissioner,” the “issues that the taxpayer wants reviewed must be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
presented to the Tax Commissioner in writing,” and “the only issues before him 
for determination are those that have been presented in writing by the taxpayer”).5 
{¶ 50} Despite the commissioner’s lack of reference to a specific statute, 
for purposes of our analysis we will assume without deciding that the requirement 
that objections be raised before the commissioner applies to all three tax years at 
issue in this case.  By asserting that requirement as he does in the present case, 
however, the commissioner pits it squarely against the settled principle 
(previously discussed) that new evidence may be presented at the BTA in support 
of a claim for reduced value. 
{¶ 51} The preceding discussion establishes that the commissioner’s 
argument must fail.  Under Ohio Adm.Code 5703-3-10(B), the comparable-sales 
approach and the cost-less-depreciation approach are two evidentiary approaches, 
not different claims for relief.6   Because the “BTA hearing is de novo” and the 
“parties are entitled to produce evidence [at the BTA] in addition to that 
considered by the Tax Commissioner,” Key Servs. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d at 16, 764 
N.E.2d 1015, the presentation of evidence using one approach to value before the 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that the present case involves the issuance of final-assessment certificates by 
the tax commissioner pursuant to R.C. 5711.26 and does not involve a final determination of a 
petition for reassessment pursuant to R.C. 5711.31.  That is potentially significant to the 
commissioner’s argument because R.C. 5711.31 explicitly requires the taxpayer to “indicate the 
objections” to the assessment, while R.C. 5711.26 does not expressly create a duty to state 
objections. 
 
6 In this regard, the distinctions between various evidentiary approaches to valuation differ 
markedly from the distinctions between discrete legal claims at issue in the cases that the 
commissioner relies upon.  See Am. Fiber Sys., Inc. v. Levin, 125 Ohio St.3d 374, 2010-Ohio-
1468, 928 N.E.2d 695, ¶ 17-22 (collateral-estoppel theory constituted a claim or argument that had 
to be affirmatively specified in the objections to the commissioner’s assessment); CNG, 63 Ohio 
St.3d at 32, 584 N.E.2d 1180 (where petition for reassessment stated two grounds for relief from 
assessment but made no reference to the exemption from sales and use tax for items used directly 
in the rendition of a utility service, the taxpayer could not assert the latter claim at the BTA); 
DeWeese, 100 Ohio St.3d 324, 2003-Ohio-6502, 800 N.E.2d 1 (where county auditors appealed to 
the BTA from the tax commissioner’s final determination of a property-tax assessment and raised 
exemption issues in that appeal that were not the subject of the taxpayer’s petition for 
reassessment, the court held that those issues were therefore jurisdictionally barred). 
January Term, 2011 
19 
 
commissioner does not bar the presentation of evidence to the BTA using another 
approach. 
{¶ 52} Consistent with the reasoning of Key Servs. Corp., we hold that in 
an appeal from an assessment in which the tax commissioner has determined the 
value of personal property, the BTA is statutorily authorized to receive evidence 
in addition to that considered by the tax commissioner and that evidence may 
include different valuation approaches from those presented to the tax 
commissioner. 
{¶ 53} As for the commissioner’s citation of Hatchadorian v. Lindley 
(1986), 21 Ohio St.3d 66, 21 OBR 365, 488 N.E.2d 145, that case does state that 
the commissioner’s findings are “presumptively valid, absent a demonstration that 
those findings are clearly unreasonable or unlawful.”  Id. at paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  But the BTA’s standard of review in an appeal from a determination of 
the tax commissioner is not before us, and we do not think it is relevant to the 
jurisdictional issue we do confront. 
{¶ 54} The commissioner additionally claims that he possesses the 
exclusive power to value and assess property and argues on that basis that the 
BTA cannot consider an appraisal that was not first presented to the 
commissioner.  Although our case law at one point acknowledged the 
commissioner’s “exclusive power” concerning property valuation, it did so only 
in the context of the public utility property tax, see Toledo Edison Co. v. Galvin 
(1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 210, 212, 67 O.O.2d 230, 311 N.E.2d 897 (former public 
utility property-tax statutes reserved “exclusive power to value and assess public 
utility property to the Tax Commissioner”), cited by Hatchadorian, at 71.  
Hatchadorian was a utility-tax case as well, and whatever continuing force that 
pronouncement may have is confined to the utility context. 
Conclusion 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
{¶ 55} For all the foregoing reasons, we distinguish our decision in Ohio 
Bell and hold that the different approaches to valuing personal property set forth 
in Ohio Adm.Code 5703-3-10(B) are not “alternate valuation methods” and 
accordingly that the notice of appeal need not specify that the appellant will 
present a different valuation approach to the BTA than it presented in the 
proceedings before the tax commissioner. 
{¶ 56} The analysis of Ohio Bell is inapplicable to the situation of this 
case.  The BTA acted unlawfully when it dismissed WCI’s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.  We therefore reverse and remand for a determination of WCI’s 
appeal on the merits. 
Decision reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., David W. Hilkert, and 
Steven A. Dimengo, for appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Barton A. Hubbard, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
 
Eugene P. Whetzel, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio State Bar 
Association. 
 
Linda S. Woggon, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of 
Commerce. 
______________________