Case Title: Olmsted Township v. Ritchie

Citation: 2023-Ohio-2516

Docket Number: 2022-0262

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Olmsted Twp. v. Ritchie, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2516.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-2516 
OLMSTED TOWNSHIP, APPELLANT, v. RITCHIE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Olmsted Twp. v. Ritchie, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2516.] 
Criminal law—Sentencing—R.C. 2929.25(D)(4)—Under R.C. 2929.25(D)(4), total 
time spent in jail for both a misdemeanor offense and a violation of a 
condition of a community-control sanction imposed for that offense may not 
exceed the statutory maximum jail term provided for the offense in R.C. 
2929.24—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and trial-court order 
reinstated. 
(No. 2022-0262—Submitted February 28, 2023—Decided July 25, 2023.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
Nos. 110107 and 110108, 2022-Ohio-124. 
__________________ 
 
KENNEDY, C.J. 
{¶ 1} The Eighth District Court of Appeals certified this case to this court 
after it determined that its judgment conflicts with judgments of the Fourth, 
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Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh District Courts of Appeals.  We determined that a 
conflict exists and ordered the parties to brief the following question: 
 
“[Does] R.C. 2929.25(D)(4) authorize[ ] a trial court to impose a jail 
term for a violation of a condition of a community-control sanction 
when the original sentence was directly imposed under R.C. 
2929.25(A)(1)(a) and no suspended jail time was reserved as 
contemplated under R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(b), regardless of notice 
having been provided under R.C. 2929.25(A)(3)(c)[?]” 
 
166 Ohio St.3d 1483, 2022-Ohio-1284, 186 N.E.3d 814, quoting the court of 
appeals’ February 15, 2022 entry. 
{¶ 2} R.C. 2929.25(D)(4) provides that when a trial court imposes a jail 
term for a misdemeanant’s violation of a condition of a community-control 
sanction, “the total time spent in jail for the misdemeanor offense and the violation 
of a condition of the community control sanction shall not exceed the maximum 
jail term available for the offense for which the sanction that was violated was 
imposed.”  The Eighth District construed this language as prohibiting the trial court 
from ordering a jail term for a violation of a condition of community control that 
exceeds the maximum jail term imposed on the misdemeanant at sentencing. 
{¶ 3} We disagree with the court of appeals’ construction of R.C. 
2929.25(D)(4).  The limit on the total length of time that a misdemeanant may be 
incarcerated for both a misdemeanor offense and a violation of a condition of a 
community-control sanction that was imposed for that offense is the statutory 
maximum jail term for the offense set forth in R.C. 2929.24.  This limit does not 
change based on the length of the jail term imposed at sentencing. 
{¶ 4} Consequently, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and 
reverse the contrary judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
January Term, 2023 
 
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Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} In September 2018, in two separate cases, appellee, Chad Ritchie, 
pleaded no contest to several first-degree misdemeanors: two counts of operating a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”), two counts of endangering 
children, two counts of domestic violence, driving with a suspended license, failure 
to maintain control of a motor vehicle, and failure to reinstate a license.  After 
merging allied offenses and dismissing one OVI count, the trial court imposed 
sentences of 30 days in jail for each of four counts, suspended fines, and a five-year 
period of community-control sanctions.  It ordered the jail terms to be served 
consecutively for an aggregate term of 120 days.  For each count, the trial court 
informed Ritchie that if he violated a condition of a community-control sanction, 
the court could impose a sentence of 180 days in jail, which is the statutory 
maximum jail term provided by R.C. 2929.24(A)(1) for a first-degree 
misdemeanor. 
{¶ 6} In September 2020, the trial court granted Ritchie’s motion to modify 
his sentence to credit against the 120-day jail term time he had served for 
convictions in a separate case.  The trial court’s entry allowing his four 30-day jail 
sentences to run concurrently with the prison sentence he had already served 
included the final phrase, “Leaving a 150 day jail sentence on each count.”  Ritchie 
moved the trial court to correct the entry, asserting that the court could not impose 
an additional jail term for a community-control violation, because he had already 
served the 120-day jail term imposed on him.  The trial court corrected a clerical 
error in the entry and changed the disputed phrase to “leaving 150 days of jail 
available to sentence on each count,” but it otherwise denied the motion, stating: 
“The Court shall correct the record to amend the case numbers.  The request to 
delete 150 days of jail remaining on each case is denied.” 
{¶ 7} Ritchie appealed, but the Eighth District remanded the cases for the 
trial court to file an entry in each case that resolved all counts in a single document.  
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See State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 17 
(holding that “[o]nly one document [as opposed to multiple documents considered 
together] can constitute a final, appealable order”), modified in part on other 
grounds, State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  The trial court complied, and the case returned to 
the court of appeals. 
{¶ 8} The Eighth District noted that the trial court “did not suspend the 
additional 150 days that could have been imposed when it sentenced Ritchie on 
each of the misdemeanor counts.”  2022-Ohio-124, 181 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 10.  It 
therefore rejected the trial court’s conclusion that 150 days of jail time for each 
count remained available to sentence Ritchie for any violation of the terms of his 
community control.  Id. at ¶ 16.  Construing R.C. 2929.25(D), the court of appeals 
explained that the statute permits the trial court to impose a jail term for a violation 
of a condition of community control so long as the time in jail does not exceed the 
maximum jail term imposed at sentencing.  See id. at ¶ 19.  It concluded that 
“[b]ecause Ritchie has served the maximum jail term on the sentence that was 
imposed, Ritchie is not subject to any further jail time for the offenses involved.”  
Id. at ¶ 16.  The appellate court modified the trial court’s ruling and remanded the 
case “for correction of the trial court’s entry to reflect [that] no jail time remains.”  
Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 9} The Eighth District certified that its judgment conflicts with 
judgments of the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Districts on the following 
question of law: 
 
“[Does] R.C. 2929.25(D)(4) authorize[ ] a trial court to impose a jail 
term for a violation of a condition of a community-control sanction 
when the original sentence was directly imposed under R.C. 
2929.25(A)(1)(a) and no suspended jail time was reserved as 
January Term, 2023 
 
5 
contemplated under R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(b), regardless of notice 
having been provided under R.C. 2929.25(A)(3)(c)[?]” 
 
166 Ohio St.3d 1483, 2022-Ohio-1284, 186 N.E.3d 814, quoting the court of 
appeals’ February 15, 2022 entry. 
Law and Analysis 
Statutory Interpretation 
{¶ 10} This certified conflict presents an issue of statutory interpretation, 
which is a question of law that we review de novo, State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 
81, 2013-Ohio-4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 9.  As we explained long ago, “[t]he 
question is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the 
meaning of that which it did enact.”  Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 
574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus.  “When the statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what 
the General Assembly has said.”  Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio 
St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12.  “An unambiguous statute is 
to be applied, not interpreted.”  Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 
(1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. 
Community-Control Sanctions 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2929.25 authorizes the trial court to impose community-control 
sanctions on misdemeanants, and it provides the consequences for a violation of a 
condition of those sanctions.  Unless otherwise provided by law, a trial court 
sentencing an offender for a misdemeanor may impose a jail term on the offender 
in addition to any community-control sanction or combination of community-
control sanctions.  R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a).  It also may suspend all or part of any 
jail term imposed and place the offender on community control.  R.C. 
2929.25(A)(1)(b).  And in contrast to the general rule that a trial court lacks 
authority to modify a sentence, see State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-
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5636, 982 N.E.2d 684, ¶ 20, R.C. 2929.24(B)(1) provides that “[t]he court retains 
jurisdiction over every offender sentenced to jail to modify the jail sentence 
imposed at any time, but the court shall not reduce any mandatory jail term.” 
{¶ 12} If the trial court imposes a community-control sanction, it must 
inform the defendant at sentencing that a violation of a condition of community 
control could result in an extended or more restrictive community-control sanction 
as well as the imposition of “a definite jail term from the range of jail terms 
authorized for the offense under section 2929.24 of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 
2929.25(A)(3).  R.C. 2929.25(D)(2), in turn, permits the trial court to impose on a 
violator a longer time under the same community-control sanction, a more 
restrictive community-control sanction, and “[a] combination of community 
control sanctions, including a jail term.” 
{¶ 13} Lastly, R.C. 2929.25(D)(4) states, “If the court imposes a jail term 
upon a violator pursuant to division (D)(2) of this section, the total time spent in 
jail for the misdemeanor offense and the violation of a condition of the community 
control sanction shall not exceed the maximum jail term available for the offense 
for which the sanction that was violated was imposed.” 
{¶ 14} Reading these provisions together reveals that unless otherwise 
provided by law, a trial court handing down a sentence on a misdemeanant may 
impose a jail term within the statutory range provided in R.C. 2929.24.  If the trial 
court also imposes community-control sanctions, then it may punish the 
misdemeanant for a violation of a condition of those sanctions with incarceration 
not to exceed the statutory maximum jail term for the misdemeanor offense.  
However, the total amount of time that the offender may spend in jail for both the 
misdemeanor and any violation of a condition of community control is capped at 
the statutory maximum period for the misdemeanor offense as set forth in R.C. 
2929.24. 
January Term, 2023 
 
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{¶ 15} Here, the court of appeals concluded that a trial court may punish a 
violation of a condition of a community-control sanction with incarceration only if 
time remains on the jail term that the trial court initially imposed at sentencing.  
However, if R.C. 2929.25(D)(4) meant that, it would read: “[T]he total time spent 
in jail for the misdemeanor offense and the violation of a condition of the 
community control sanction shall not exceed the maximum jail term available that 
was imposed at sentencing for the offense for which the sanction that was violated 
was imposed.”  That is not how the General Assembly wrote the statute.  Rather, 
the phrase “was imposed” at the end of the sentence modifies the word “sanction,” 
not the phrase “maximum jail term available.”  The “maximum jail term available” 
is not the maximum jail term that the trial court imposed; it is the statutory 
maximum term provided in R.C. 2929.24 that the trial court could have imposed 
for the offense the defendant committed.  This is why the trial court must notify the 
defendant at sentencing that a violation of a condition of a community-control 
sanction may be punished with “a definite jail term from the range of jail terms 
authorized for the offense under [R.C.] 2929.24.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
2929.25(A)(3)(c). 
{¶ 16} Here, the statutory maximum jail term that the trial court could have 
imposed for each of Ritchie’s first-degree misdemeanor offenses is 180 days.  R.C. 
2929.24(A)(1).  For each offense, the trial court sentenced Ritchie to 30 days in jail, 
which he has served.  Therefore, if Ritchie violates a condition of community 
control, the trial court may order him to serve a jail term for the violation but his 
time in jail for the violation may not exceed 150 days, the jail time still available 
for the misdemeanor for which the community-control sanction was imposed.  
Consequently, the trial court in its entries modifying Ritchie’s sentences did not err 
in calculating the jail time that it could impose for a violation of a condition of the 
community-control sanction. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 17} Under R.C. 2929.25(D)(4), the total time spent in jail for both a 
misdemeanor offense and a violation of a condition of a community-control 
sanction imposed for that offense may not exceed the statutory maximum jail term 
provided for the offense in R.C. 2929.24.  Applying these statutes, the trial court in 
its entries modifying Ritchie’s sentences properly calculated the jail time that it 
could impose on him for a violation of a condition of community control.  We 
therefore reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment reversed 
and trial-court order reinstated. 
DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FISCHER, J. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 18} There is an elephant in the room.  We don’t have the authority to 
decide this case.  Chad Ritchie has not suffered any present injury.  He simply seeks 
an advisory opinion about something that might happen in the future.  Because 
Ritchie lacks standing and his claim is not ripe for review, I would dismiss the 
appeal and vacate the decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 19} Ritchie asked the court of appeals, and now asks this court, for a 
pronouncement as to the maximum sentence that he might receive for a future 
community-control violation.  The majority answers Ritchie’s question, opining 
that the trial court did not err “in calculating the jail time that it could impose for a 
violation of a condition of the community-control sanction.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Majority opinion, ¶ 16.  In doing so, the majority ignores the firmly enshrined 
principle that we lack the authority to decide cases that “rest[] on contingent events 
that may never occur at all,” State ex rel. Jones v. Husted, 149 Ohio St.3d 110, 
2016-Ohio-5752, 73 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 21 (lead opinion).  In the process, it seemingly 
January Term, 2023 
 
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reverses a long line of appellate cases from across the state that hold that claims 
like Ritchie’s—claims that attempt to challenge a potential future sentence for a 
community-control violation—are not ripe for review.  One wonders what will 
result. 
A lot of ifs 
{¶ 20} The question at the center of this appeal is a hypothetical one: If 
Ritchie violates the terms of his probation, and if a violation complaint is filed 
against him, and if he is found to have violated his probation, and if the trial court 
decides to sentence Ritchie to jail for that violation, how much jail time may the 
trial court impose?  The majority answers the question with an advisory opinion 
about the misdemeanor sentencing statute.  What it provides might ultimately end 
up being helpful advice to Ritchie’s judge, and it may be of assistance to other 
judges in Ohio.  But rendering advice about hypothetical cases is not the business 
of this court. 
{¶ 21} Recall the facts of Ritchie’s case.  Ritchie was sentenced for four 
misdemeanors and ordered to serve 30 days in jail on each charge, to be served 
consecutively, and five years of probation.  The court subsequently issued a 
judgment entry indicating that if Ritchie violated community control, he could be 
sentenced to “a 150 day jail sentence on each count.”  Ritchie later violated the 
terms of his community control, but the trial court did not impose a jail term and 
instead continued him on community control.  Ritchie then filed a motion to correct 
the earlier judgment and delete the “150 day jail sentence on each count” language.  
Instead of deleting the language, the court modified that language to read “leaving 
150 days of jail available to sentence on each count.” 
{¶ 22} Ritchie appealed, asking that the language be stricken altogether.  
The Eighth District acknowledged that there was a ripeness problem, stating: “We 
recognize that no jail time has actually been imposed for a violation of community-
control sanctions, which presents a ripeness concern.”  2022-Ohio-124, 181 N.E.3d 
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649, ¶ 10, fn. 2.  But then, without further discussion, the court proceeded to decide 
the case anyway.  The entirety of its analysis of the ripeness issue is this sentence: 
“Nonetheless, we find any error in the modification of Ritchie’s sentence is ripe for 
review.”  Id.  Having brushed by its stated concerns about ripeness, the court of 
appeals ordered “correction of the trial court’s entry to reflect [that] no jail time 
remains,” id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 23} So what we are left with is a question about the potential sentence 
available for a potential community-control violation.  Before we can answer that 
question, though, we need to address the elephant that the court of appeals closed 
its eyes to and that the majority ignores completely: our constitutional authority to 
decide this case. 
We decide only cases in which someone has suffered an actual injury 
{¶ 24} Our authority is limited.  The Ohio Constitution limits this court and 
inferior courts to the exercise of the “judicial power.”  Ohio Constitution, Article 
IV, Section 1.  While the Ohio Constitution does not contain the same “cases” and 
“controversies” language as the United States Constitution, we have long 
understood that its limitation of our authority to the judicial power imposes similar 
constraints.  See Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970).  
Thus, Ohio courts may decide only “actual controversies between parties 
legitimately affected by specific facts.”  Id.  And they must “refrain from giving 
opinions on abstract propositions” or issuing “premature declarations or advice 
upon potential controversies.”  Id.; see also Travis v. Pub. Util. Comm., 123 Ohio 
St. 355, 359, 175 N.E. 586 (1931). 
{¶ 25} This constitutional standing requirement precludes courts from 
deciding cases where there has been no “injury in fact.”  State ex rel. Walgate v. 
Kasich, 147 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-1176, 59 N.E.3d 1240, ¶ 23 (lead opinion); 
see also Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157-158, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 
189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014).  Ripeness is an aspect of the constitutional standing 
January Term, 2023 
 
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requirement.  Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Section 3532.1 (3d 
Ed.2017) (noting that ripeness and mootness may be viewed as “time dimensions 
of standing”); see also Trump v. New York, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 141 S.Ct. 530, 535, 
208 L.Ed.2d 365 (2020) (standing and ripeness are “[t]wo related doctrines of 
justiciability”).  For a claim to be ripe, a harm “must be ‘concrete and 
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ”  
Susan B. Anthony List at 158, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 
U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990).  Central to the doctrine is 
the idea that the “ ‘judicial machinery should be conserved for problems which are 
real or present and imminent, not squandered on problems which are abstract or 
hypothetical or remote.’ ”  State ex rel. Elyria Foundry Co. v. Indus. Comm., 82 
Ohio St.3d 88, 89, 694 N.E.2d 459 (1988), quoting Davis, Ripeness of 
Governmental Action for Judicial Review, 68 Harv.L.Rev. 1122, 1122 (1955). 
{¶ 26} A concern about a future injury will satisfy the ripeness requirement 
only when the injury is “certainly impending” or there is at least a “substantial risk” 
that the harm will occur.  Susan B. Anthony List at 158, quoting Clapper v. Amnesty 
Internatl. USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 185 L.Ed.2d 351 (2013), 
fn. 5.  But when a claim “rests on contingent events that may never occur at all,” 
the claim is not ripe for review.  Jones, 149 Ohio St.3d 110, 2016-Ohio-5752, 73 
N.E.3d 463, at ¶ 21 (lead opinion); see also Trump at 535, quoting Texas v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (to be 
justiciable, a claim must be “ ‘ripe’—not dependent on ‘contingent future events 
that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all’ ”). 
{¶ 27} This point is illustrated by our decision in State ex rel. Jones v. 
Husted, 146 Ohio St.3d 1412, 2016-Ohio-3390, 51 N.E.3d 658.  That case arose 
after several signatures submitted in support of a statewide ballot initiative had been 
invalidated.  See Jones, 2016-Ohio-5752, at ¶ 11.  The petitioners sought to restore 
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signatures that had been invalidated because they were concerned that a separate 
lawsuit filed by opponents of the ballot initiative might lead to additional signatures 
being disqualified and therefore cause the initiative to drop below the required 
signature threshold for placement on the ballot.  See id. at ¶ 11-12.  This court 
summarily dismissed the challenge “as premature.”  Jones, 2016-Ohio-3390.  We 
later explained that we had dismissed the case as unripe because the proponents’ 
“claims were contingent upon future events that might or might not occur.”  Jones, 
2016-Ohio-5752, at ¶ 21.1 
{¶ 28} Like the situation in Jones, Ritchie’s claim hinges on contingent 
events that may never occur.  Ritchie is not challenging a sentence that has been 
imposed on him.  What he is challenging is a notation in a judgment entry about 
the upper limit of the sentence he might receive if he violates his community control 
in the future.  But the upper limit of the potential sentence will become an issue 
only if Ritchie commits a future community-control violation and is found guilty 
of that violation.  If that happens, the trial court must “sentence[] the offender anew 
and must comply with the relevant sentencing statutes.”  State v. Fraley, 105 Ohio 
St.3d 13, 2004-Ohio-7110, 821 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 17 (construing analogous felony 
sentencing statutes).  And at that point, the trial court is free to impose a jail term 
that is less than the “150 days of jail available to sentence on each count” indicated 
in Ritchie’s judgment entry or not impose a jail term at all. 
{¶ 29} Thus, four contingent events must occur before Ritchie suffers any 
injury in fact.  First, Ritchie must engage in prohibited conduct.  Second, a violation 
complaint must be filed.  Third, the court must find Ritchie in violation.  And fourth, 
the judge must decide that jail time is appropriate for that violation.  Thus, it is 
purely speculative whether Ritchie will suffer any injury. 
 
1. Ultimately, the contingent events did come to pass—additional signatures were disqualified in 
litigation.  See Jones, 2016-Ohio-5752, at ¶ 13.  At that point, the lawsuit became ripe, and we 
proceeded to consider the merits of the challenge.  See id. at ¶ 22-23. 
January Term, 2023 
 
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The majority uproots an established body of lower-court caselaw 
{¶ 30} Ohio’s appellate courts have had little difficulty seeing what the 
majority misses.  These courts widely have held that claims similar to Ritchie’s—
claims that seek to challenge a notification about a sentence that may be imposed 
in the future for a community-control violation—are not ripe for review.  See, e.g., 
State v. Poppe, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-06-23, 2007-Ohio-688, ¶ 14 (“an appeal of 
a reserved sentence of imprisonment that is part of a sentence of community control 
is not ripe until an actual sentencing order imposes the prison term for community 
control violation”); State v. Daniel, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0044, 2015-
Ohio-3826, ¶ 9 (same); State v. Wilson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-061000, 2007-
Ohio-6339, ¶ 4-6 (same); State v. Wilson, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT 2005-0031, 
2006-Ohio-3541, ¶ 8 (“this Court has held that appeals challenging potential 
periods of incarceration for violation of community control sanctions are not ripe 
until an actual sentencing order imposes a prison term for such violation”); State v. 
Williams, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2012-CA-43, 2014-Ohio-725, ¶ 15 (“when a trial 
court imposes a sentence of community control with a reserve prison sentence, an 
appeal of the prison sentence does not become ripe until after a defendant actually 
violates community control”); State v. Ellis, 4th Dist. Washington No. 02CA48, 
2003-Ohio-2243, ¶ 12-15 (party lacks authority to appeal sentence that may be 
imposed for a future community-control violation “because the issues or claims she 
raises are not yet justiciable”); State v. Ogle, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-01-040, 2002 
WL 313386, *4 (Mar. 1, 2002) (challenge to reserved sentence “is not yet ripe for 
review, as [the] appellant has not yet been found to have violated his community 
control sanctions”).  As the Third District succinctly explained:  
 
If Poppe violates his community control sanctions, a 
subsequent sentencing hearing would need to be conducted.  Thus, 
we are constrained from giving advice concerning a potential 
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controversy that may never occur.  If, and when, Poppe is sentenced 
to a term of incarceration for violation of his community control 
sanctions, he can appeal that sentencing order * * *. 
 
(Citations omitted.)  Poppe at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 31} The apparent effect of the majority opinion is to overrule this line of 
precedent sub silentio.  The majority does so without the benefit of adversarial 
briefing on the standing issue and without providing any explanation of why the 
lower courts were wrong.  One has to wonder what future complications will result.  
What happens to all those defendants on community control across the state who in 
accordance with well-established precedent failed to pursue in a direct appeal a 
challenge to a sentence that was reserved in case of a future violation?  Have they 
now forfeited their opportunity to do so?  Is any challenge barred by res judicata?  
Stay tuned. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} I would not ignore the elephant.  There’s no hiding the obvious: this 
case involves contingent events that may never occur.  I would do what the court 
of appeals should have done.  I would dismiss this case on standing and ripeness 
grounds.  And I would vacate the decision of the court of appeals for the same 
reasons.  Because the majority does otherwise, I dissent. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Baker Dublikar, James F. Mathews, and Brittany A. Bowland, for appellant. 
 
Patituce & Associates, L.L.C., Joseph C. Patituce, and Megan M. Patituce, 
for appellee. 
_________________