Case Title: ROGER ROLLINS V. WYOMING TRIBUNE-EAGLE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROGER ROLLINS V. WYOMING TRIBUNE-EAGLE2007 WY 28152 P.3d 367Case Number: 06-48Decided: 02/16/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
ROGER 
ROLLINS,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 

WYOMING 
TRIBUNE-EAGLE,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mitchell 
E. Osborn, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Corinne 
E. Rutledge and James C. Kaste of LATHROP & RUTLEDGE, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Kaste.          

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Roger Rollins 
filed a charge of discrimination with the Department of Employment, Fair 
Employment Program, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming the 
Wyoming Tribune-Eagle (WTE) discriminated against him on the basis of his age, 
in violation of Wyoming's Fair Employment Practices Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
27-9-101, et seq. (LexisNexis 2005), when it terminated his employment as 
circulation district manager.  The 
matter was referred to a hearing officer for a contested case hearing, and WTE 
filed a motion for summary judgment.  
Applying the burden-shifting analysis outlined in federal age discrimination decisions, 
the hearing officer determined, as a matter of law, Mr. Rollins had not 
established WTE discriminated against him on the basis of his age and granted 
WTE's summary judgment motion.  The 
district court affirmed the agency decision, and Mr. Rollins appealed to this 
Court.  We agree no genuine issues 
of material fact existed on Mr. Rollins' claim and WTE was entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.  We 
affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Rollins 
articulates two related issues on appeal:

 
 

1.                  
Did 
genuine issues of material facts exist sufficient for the administrative agency 
to deny the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment?

 
 

2.                  
Did 
the District Court err in failing to remand the matter back to the 
administrative agency for an evidentiary hearing, in light of the fact that 
genuine issues of material facts existed and summary judgment in favor of the 
Respondent was inappropriate?

 
 
WTE 
presents a single issue:

 
 
            
Did the Compliance Officer, the Hearing Officer, and the District Court 
properly determine that Mr. Rollins failed to present any evidence establishing 
that age actually played a role in the Wyoming Tribune-Eagle's decision to 
terminate him?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      WTE hired Mr. 
Rollins as a circulation district manager in October 1999.  Jack Oleson became WTE's circulation 
director at the end of 2002.  
According to Mr. Rollins, Mr. Oleson made statements indicating he 
preferred younger workers.  Mr. 
Oleson also made a number of changes to the circulation department, including 
changing the work hours for the circulation district managers.  Mr. Oleson and various other managers 
expressed concerns about Mr. Rollins' work habits and behaviors, including 
failing to be at work when he was scheduled, and causing morale problems in the 
circulation department by complaining to co-workers.  The situation came to a head in August 
2003, when Doug Merideth was promoted to circulation delivery manager.  Mr. Merideth met with Mr. Rollins to 
discuss concerns about his behavior and attitude, but was not satisfied with Mr. 
Rollins' response to their discussions.    

 
 
[¶4]      After Mr. 
Merideth advised Mr. Oleson about the problems with Mr. Rollins and his failure 
to change his behavior, Mr. Oleson terminated Mr. Rollins' employment with WTE 
on August 21, 2003.  Mr. Rollins was 
fifty-nine years old when he was discharged, and he filed a charge of age 
discrimination against WTE.  A 
compliance officer for the Department of Employment investigated Mr. Rollins' 
claim and concluded "there was no reasonable cause to conclude [WTE] engaged in 
discriminatory acts detrimental to [Mr. Rollins]."  Therefore, the Labor Standards Program 
Manager issued a notice of dismissal.  

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Rollins 
requested a contested case hearing on his claim and the matter was referred to a 
hearing officer.  WTE filed a motion 
for summary judgment supported by Mr. Oleson's affidavit.  Mr. Oleson averred that Mr. Rollins was 
discharged because he had a bad attitude, at times could not be found at work 
when he was scheduled to be there, and complained to co-workers, leading to 
morale problems in the circulation department.  Mr. Oleson referred to a number of 
business letters and memoranda composed by WTE employees documenting Mr. 
Rollins' behavior, which were included with WTE's summary judgment 
submittals.  Mr. Rollins opposed 
WTE's summary judgment motion with his affidavit, a former co-worker's 
affidavit, and several exhibits.  In 
general, Mr. Rollins' submissions indicated his work performance was 
satisfactory and Mr. Oleson wanted to replace older workers, including Mr. 
Rollins, with younger persons.  The 
hearing officer considered the parties' submissions and arguments before 
granting WTE's summary judgment motion.  
The district court affirmed the hearing officer's decision, and Mr. 
Rollins appealed.     

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶6]      The Wyoming Fair 
Employment Practices Act specifies hearings on discrimination claims shall be 
conducted in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act. 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-9-106(k) (LexisNexis 2005).  
Summary judgment procedures set out in Rule 56 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure apply to administrative cases.  Chavez v. Mem'l Hosp. Of SweetwaterCounty, 2006 WY 82, ¶ 6, 138 P.3d 185, 188 (Wyo. 
2006); Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc., 
899 P.2d 56, 58 (Wyo. 1995).  W.R.C.P. 56(c) states:  

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  

 
 
In Markstein v. Countryside I, L.L.C., 2003 
WY 122, ¶ 11, 77 P.3d 389, 393 (Wyo. 2003), we described the role of summary 
judgments in litigation:

 
 
            
The purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of suits before trial that 
present no genuine issue of material fact.  
Moore v. Kiljander, 604 P.2d 204, 207 
(Wyo.1979).  . . .  A fact is material if proof of that fact 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements 
of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties.  Schuler v. Community First Nat. Bank, 
999 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Wyo.2000).  
The summary judgment movant has the initial burden of establishing by 
admissible evidence a prima facie case; once this is accomplished, the burden 
shifts and the opposing party must present specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue of material fact.  
Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo.1987);  Gennings v. First Nat. Bank of 
Thermopolis, 654 P.2d 154, 156 (Wyo.1982).  

 
 

See 
also, Cathcart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2005 WY 154, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 579, 586 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
[¶7]      Because summary 
judgment may be granted only when there are no issues of material fact and the 
decision can be made as a matter of law, our plenary standard for reviewing 
summary judgments is consistent with our standard for judicial review of 
administrative actions in which we hold unlawful and set aside agency action 
which is not in accordance with law.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005).  Thus, we review an agency's order 
granting a summary judgment in the same manner as in the civil context by 
employing our de novo standard of 
review and utilizing the same standards and reviewing the same materials as the 
agency.  Chavez, ¶ 6, 138 P.3d  at 188.   See also, Knapp v. Landex Corp., 2006 WY 36, ¶ 7, 
130 P.3d 924, 926 (Wyo. 2006).  We 
consider the record "from the vantage point most favorable to the party who 
opposed the motion, and this Court will give that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record."  Markstein, ¶ 11, 77 P.3d  at 393.  

 
 
[¶8]      Section 27-9-105 
articulates the substantive law prohibiting 
discrimination:

 
 
            
(a) It is a discriminatory or unfair employment 
practice:

 
 
                        
(i) For an employer to refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or 
demote, or to discriminate in matters of compensation or the terms, conditions 
or privileges of employment against, a qualified disabled person or any person 
otherwise qualified, because of age, sex, race, creed, color, national origin or 
ancestry;

 
 
            
* * * 

 
 
            
(b) The prohibitions against discrimination based on age in this section 
apply only to persons at least forty (40) years of age.

 
 

Wyoming's law 
prohibiting discrimination in employment matters on the basis of age is similar 
to the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).  See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).  Thus, we will refer to federal case law 
for guidance in analyzing claims of ageism.  See, e.g., Kruzich v. Martin-Harris Gallery, LLC, 
2006 WY 7, ¶¶ 13-14, 126 P.3d 867, 872 (Wyo. 2006) and World Mart, Inc. v. Ditsch, 855 P.2d 1228 (Wyo. 1993) (applying federal analysis to claims of handicap discrimination 
brought under Wyoming law).    

 
 
[¶9]      In Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526, 529 (10th Cir. 1994), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
coherently described the analysis applicable to age discrimination claims when 
no direct evidence1 of discrimination exists:  

 
 
The 
Tenth Circuit uses the three-stage analysis outlined in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 
(1973), and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
252-56, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-95, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981), to prove discrimination 
when no direct evidence of age discrimination exists.  Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert 
Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir.1988).   At the first stage, the plaintiff 
must prove a prima facie case of discrimination.   [The plaintiff] must show that (1) 
[she] is "within the protected age group"; (2) [she] "was doing satisfactory 
work"; (3) [she] "was discharged"; and (4) [her] position was filled by a 
younger person.  Denison v. Swaco 
Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting Lucas v. 
Dover Corp., 857 F.2d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir.1988)

 
 
If 
the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie requirements under the ADEA, then the 
case enters the next stage.  In this 
second stage, the burden of production moves to the defendant.  The defendant has to present a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action.   If the defendant articulates a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, then the burden of 
persuasion moves back to the plaintiff.  
In this third stage of the discrimination analysis, the plaintiff must 
show that age was a determinative factor in the defendant's employment decision, 
or show that the defendant's explanation for its action was merely pretext.   See Faulkner v. Super Valu 
Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1424-25 (10th Cir.1993).   Failure to come forward with 
evidence of pretext will entitle the defendant to judgment.   See Burdine, 450 U.S.  at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 
1095;  Denison, 941 F.2d  at 1421 (evidence of pretext "is crucial in an ADEA 
case").

 
 
[¶10]   The Tenth Circuit further explained 
the third stage of the analysis in the context of a summary judgment in Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624, 632 
(10th 
Cir. 1995):

 
 
Because 
plaintiffs failed to produce direct evidence of intent to discriminate, we have 
carefully reviewed the record for rebuttal evidence on which a finder of fact 
could conclude that Unisys' explanations for the challenged decisions were 
actually a pretext for age discrimination.  
"A plaintiff demonstrates pretext by showing either that a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or ... that the 
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.' "  Rea, 
29 F.3d 1450, 1455 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S.  at 256, 101 
S.Ct. at 1095).  Plaintiffs need not 
disprove defendant's reasons or demonstrate that age was the only factor 
motivating the decision, but they "must show that age actually played a role in 
the [employer's] decision making process and had a determinative influence" on 
the decision.  Rea, 29 F.3d  
at 1455.  In opposing summary 
judgment a plaintiff must be given an opportunity to show by competent evidence 
that the presumably valid reasons for the [discharge] were really a pretext for 
a discriminatory decision.  
Id. at 1455.   
In evaluating plaintiffs' evidence, we must determine whether the 
evidence interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs "could 
persuade a reasonable jury that the employer had discriminated against the 
plaintiff[s]."  Hooks v. Diamond 
Crystal Specialty Foods, Inc., 997 F.2d 793, 798 (10th Cir.1993).   If no material facts are in dispute 
concerning the pretextuality of defendants' actions, summary judgment is 
appropriate.  Id.

 
 

See 
also, Cone, 14 F.3d  at 528.  

 
 

[¶11]   In this case, the hearing officer 
applied the three stage burden-shifting analysis and concluded WTE was entitled 
to a summary judgment on Mr. Rollins' claim of age discrimination.  In particular, she found:  1) Mr. Rollins had established a prima 
facie case of 
discrimination; 2) WTE articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for 
termination; and 3) Mr. Rollins failed to present sufficient evidence to create 
a genuine issue of material fact that age was a determinative factor in WTE's 
employment decision or that WTE's explanation for his discharge was 
pretextual.    

 
 
[¶12]   In its summary judgment motion, WTE 
claimed Mr. Rollins failed to fulfill the first step of the analysis because he 
had not established he was performing satisfactory work or was replaced with a 
younger person.  On appeal, WTE 
seems to accept the hearing officer's conclusion that Mr. Rollins established a 
prima facie case of discrimination and focuses its argument on the second and 
third steps of the test.  Given this state of the argument, we 
need not determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist as to Mr. 
Rollins' work performance or if he was actually replaced by a younger 
person.  Instead, we will assume for 
the purposes of this appeal, that Mr. Rollins established a prima facie case of 
age discrimination.2  See Cone, 14 F.3d  at 530 (assuming a 
prima facie case of discrimination had been established even though the 
discharge element of the employee's case was problematic).  

 
 
[¶13]   In the second step of the analysis, 
the employer is charged with showing a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action.  
The order granting summary judgment stated, "The evidence presented by 
[WTE] demonstrates [Mr. Rollins'] supervisors were having problems with [his] 
attitude, his work attendance and his complaining to co-workers which [WTE] 
determined to be disruptive."  The 
hearing officer concluded WTE's explanation for the discharge was a "legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to discharge."  Mr. Rollins claims there were genuine 
issues of material fact as to whether WTE's satisfied its burden of presenting a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge.   

 
 
[¶14]   WTE's summary judgment motion was 
supported by Circulation Director Jack Oleson's affidavit.  Mr. Oleson's affidavit included the 
following statements relevant to our analysis:   

 
 

2.         
Roger 
Rollins was hired by the Wyoming Tribune-Eagle as a circulation district manager 
on October 12, 1999.  He was 
promoted to circulation home delivery manager on February 5, 2001.  On August 19, 2002, he was returned to 
the position of circulation district manager.  Rollins was demoted because of concerns 
the circulation director before me had with Rollins' attitude and because 
Rollins made minimal efforts in the position beyond maintaining the delivery 
area he was directly responsible for.  
As a circulation district manager, Rollins was no longer responsible for 
overall supervision of other circulation district 
managers.

 
 

3.         
In 
September, 2002, a meeting was held between Wyoming Tribune-Eagle Circulation 
Customer Service Manager Debbie Phillips (then interim circulation director), 
Wyoming Tribune-Eagle Controller Larry Catalano, and Rollins[] to discuss 
Rollins' attitude at work.  Rollins 
was advised during this meeting that his continued negative attitude on the job 
was disruptive and counterproductive.  
Debbie Phillips' written recollection of this meeting is attached as 
Exhibit 1.

 
 

4.         
I 
was hired as circulation director on December 31, 2002, and became Rollins' 
department head.  From that date 
until Rollins' termination on August 21, 2003, Rollins met change in the 
circulation department with resistance and discontent.  By not readily accepting new ideas, his 
work performance fell below par.  He 
exhibited a defiant attitude towards me and other circulation department 
supervisors responsible for implementing and tracking the changes.  He complained often to other employees, 
causing department morale problems.

 
 

5.         
In 
March, 2003, I modified the work hours required of the four full time 
circulation district managers. . . . Rollins resisted the change in hours, and 
was at times nowhere to be found at work, despite the new job 
requirement.

 
 

6.         
On 
March 10, 2003, I hired Dan Candelaria to be circulation home delivery 
manager.  According to Candelaria, 
Rollins had a poor attitude in the department and resisted change.  Candelaria worked with Rollins until 
July 25, 2003, at which time Candelaria left the Wyoming Tribune-Eagle.  Candelaria drafted a memorandum of his 
experiences with Rollins while employed at the Wyoming Tribune-Eagle.  The memorandum is attached as Exhibit 
2.  

 
 

7.         
On 
April 15, 2003, I met with Rollins to discuss my concerns about his ongoing 
attitude, and his resistance towards change in the circulation department.  I told Rollins that his attitude and 
cooperativeness needed to improve immediately, and that failure to do so would 
result in termination from the Wyoming Tribune-Eagle. A memorandum I wrote of 
this meeting is attached as Exhibit 3.  

 
 
8.  When I promoted Doug Merideth from the 
position of circulation district sales manager to circulation delivery manager 
on August 7, 2003, Rollins said he had hoped he would have been considered for 
the position.  (Although the title 
of the position changed, the responsibilities of the circulation delivery 
manager position are similar to the responsibilities of the home delivery 
manager position.)  Because of 
Rollins' attitude and resistance toward changes in the circulation department, 
he was not given the promotion.  
Rollins referred to Merideth's getting the position over him as a lie, 
but I do not understand why Rollins thought this was a lie, as I had not offered 
and had not promised him the position.  

 
 
9.   On August 7, 2003, Merideth met 
with Rollins to discuss expectations Merideth had of Rollins.  Merideth told Rollins that Rollins 
needed to be more agreeable, that his constant griping had to stop, and that if 
he did not change, he would be let go.  
Merideth's memorandum of this meeting is attached as Exhibit 
4.

 
 

10.             
On 
August 14, 2003, Merideth had another meeting with Rollins to discuss his 
attitude and his continuing griping with fellow employees.  Merideth told Rollins that Rollins' 
complaining and instigation had to stop.  
Rollins told Merideth he disliked and had no respect for me, as he felt I 
had lied to him, but that he would go along with changes in the department even 
if he disagreed with them.  
Merideth's letter to me describing this meeting is attached as Exhibit 
5.  

 
 

11.             
  Merideth continued to experience 
problems with Rollins, and on August 20, 2003, he sent another letter to me 
detailing the problems he continued to have with Rollins.  Merideth reported that Rollins was bound 
and determined to interfere with the progress of the circulation 
department.  Merideth's letter is 
attached as Exhibit 6.

 
 

12.             
 On August 20, 2003, Sandy Cary, then 
circulation sales coordinator, sent a memorandum to me describing a conversation 
she had with a friend concerning Rollins.  
Cary wrote that she was having problems 
with Rollins' attitude (Cary's memorandum is attached as Exhibit 
7).  Cary continued to experience problems with 
Rollins' attitude throughout the month of August.  She drafted a memorandum of her 
experiences with Rollins, which is attached as Exhibit 8.

 
 

13.             
 I asked Rollins to resign from his 
employment at the Wyoming Tribune-Eagle on August 21, 2003, because of his 
negative attitude and his disruptive effect on the circulation department.  Rollins declined to resign.  It is important to note that at the time 
I terminated Rollins from his position at the Wyoming Tribune-Eagle, Rollins 
asked Meredith and me if he could keep his job if his attitude were to 
improve.  As Rollins had already 
been asked repeatedly to change his attitude, yet had not, I let him go (the 
memorandum of Rollins' termination is attached as Exhibit 9).  In no way was Rollins' age a factor in 
my ending his employment.  

 
 
* 
* * 

 
 

18.             
 Roger Rollins was passed over for 
promotion to circulation home delivery manager because of problems with his 
attitude, performance of his job duties, and difficulties he created in the 
office with co-workers, and not because of his age.  Likewise, Rollins was terminated from 
his employment because of problems with his attitude, performance of his job 
duties, and difficulties he created in the office with co-workers, and not 
because of his age.

 
 
[¶15]   To counter WTE's summary judgment 
motion, Mr. Rollins submitted his affidavit, Sandy Cary's affidavit, and several 
exhibits.  The exhibits included an 
unsigned, undated performance appraisal reflecting a positive evaluation of Mr. 
Rollins' work performance; reports of bonuses and commissions he earned for 
accomplishing certain goals; and unsworn statements written by former WTE 
employees indicating dissatisfaction with Mr. Oleson's management skills; Mr. 
Oleson preferred younger workers, particularly blond females; and Mr. Rollins 
was a good co-worker.  These 
documents were not sworn, and Mr. Rollins provided no foundation for their 
admissibility.  We only consider 
admissible evidence in summary judgment proceedings.  Knapp, ¶ 8, 130 P.3d at 926-27; W.R.C.P. 
56.  Consequently, we will limit our 
review of Mr. Rollins' submissions to the affidavits he submitted in opposition 
to WTE's summary judgment motion.  

 
 
[¶16]  In his affidavit, Mr. Rollins agreed 
with Mr. Oleson's statements that he was hired in October 1999 and promoted to 
home delivery manager in September 2001.  
Contrary to Mr. Oleson's statement, however, Mr. Rollins denied that he 
had been demoted in 2002 when his duties were changed.  Mr. Rollins' affidavit continued, as 
follows:

 
 

4.                  
I 
am aware that the documents concerning my "bad attitude" were generated only 
after I was terminated.  When I 
reviewed my personnel file upon being terminate[d], there were no documents 
supporting a demotion and the documents attached to [WTE's] Motion for Sum[m]ary 
Judgment were not in my file.  The 
only documents in my file were my promotion and pay raises I received every year 
while employed with [WTE]. . . . I have reason to believe that the documents 
regarding the supposed demotion and "bad attitude" were manufactured or 
solicited only after my termination and my contest of the termination (See 
Affidavit of Sandy Cary).

  

5.                  
My 
work was not substandard.  
Otherwise, I would not have received the merit pay increases every year 
of my employment.  My co-workers 
have vouched for my abilities and the fact that I was not disruptive.  See attached statements from Deb Worley, 
Tammy Robinson, Ken Rudman, Barb Bunch and Jenny Lane.  

 
 

6.                  
Early 
on in his tenure at the Wyoming Tribune-Eagle, Jack Oleson said he wanted to get 
rid of the older workers.  I heard 
him say this and other people in the office heard him say this.  In fact, Jack Oleson was heard to have 
said "Roger Rollins is too old[."] (See Affidavit of Sandy 
Car[y]).

 
 

7.                  
I 
truly believe that Jack Oleson discriminated against me because of my age.  He always showed a preference toward 
younger workers (Cary, Lane, Worley, Rudman).  There was no valid basis to terminate my 
employment.  

 
 
[¶17]   Ms. Cary, who was formerly employed 
as circulation sales coordinator for WTE, stated in her affidavit that, prior to 
Mr. Rollins' termination, she had never been told he had been demoted.  She also stated the letters she wrote 
which were attached to Mr. Oleson's affidavit were written at his request, after 
Mr. Rollins had already been terminated and not contemporaneously with the dates 
on the letters.  Ms. Cary further 
stated:  "Mr. Oleson made it clear 
to me that he preferred the younger employees, especially the younger female 
employees." She averred that Mr. Oleson stated that Mr. Rollins was "too old" 
and he "always emphasized that [Mr. Rollins] was the oldest' and probably 
wasn't able to do certain work."    

 
 
[¶18]   Challenging the hearing officer's 
conclusion that WTE satisfied the second stage of the discrimination analysis, 
Mr. Rollins argues the business memoranda referred to in Mr. Oleson's affidavit 
were not in his personnel file when he was terminated.  Relying on Ms. Cary's averment that she 
drafted the documents referred to in Mr. Oleson's affidavit at his request and 
after Mr. Rollins' termination, Mr. Rollins asserts the documents were created 
after-the-fact in response to his discrimination charge.  He claims the fact the documents were 
created after his termination reflects adversely upon Mr. Oleson's credibility 
and should, therefore, discredit WTE's stated reasons for his discharge.  

 
 

[¶19]   Taking Mr. Rollins' assertions as 
true, we, nevertheless, cannot conclude there are genuine issues of material 
fact about WTE's stated reasons for Mr. Rollins' termination because neither Mr. 
Rollins nor Ms. Cary averred the substantive statements in the business 
documents attached to Mr. Oleson's affidavit were inaccurate.  Ms. Cary did not state the information 
about Mr. Rollins contained in her memorandum to Mr. Oleson was untrue, and Mr. 
Rollins did not deny the problems referred to by his supervisors or the fact 
that he had been repeatedly instructed to change his behavior.  Although Mr. Rollins stated he did not 
believe there was a valid reason to discharge him, his summary judgment 
evidence 
did not counter Mr. Oleson's assertions that at times Mr. Rollins could not be 
found at work when he was scheduled to be there and did not change his behavior 
after being specifically instructed to do so by various supervisors.  The hearing officer stated:  "[Mr. Rollins'] erratic work attendance, 
negative attitude and failure to follow instructions are, individually and 
collectively, legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for [WTE's] decision to 
discharge [Mr. Rollins] from his employment.  There are no genuine issues of material 
fact in this regard."  We agree. WTE 
satisfied the second step of the analysis by showing a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Mr. Rollins.  

 
 
[¶20]   Under the third step of the 
analysis, Mr. Rollins had the burden of showing age was a determinative factor 
in WTE's decision to discharge him or that its explanation for the discharge was 
merely pretext for age discrimination.  
To show pretext, Mr. Rollins provides two admissible3 statements indicating Mr. Oleson 
made ageist comments:

1.                  
Mr. Rollins averred:  "Early on in his tenure at the Wyoming 
Tribune-Eagle, Jack Oleson said he wanted to get rid of the older workers.  I heard him say this and other people 
heard him say this.  In fact, Jack 
Oleson was heard to have said Roger Rollins is too old.'"  (See affidavit of Sandy Carey (sic)). 

 
 

2.                  
Sandy 
Cary averred:  "I recall on at least 
one occasion Mr. Oleson stating with regard to Roger Rollins He is too old.' 
Further, Mr. Oleson always emphasized that Roger was the oldest' and probably 
wasn't able to do certain work."    

 
 
Since 
we are reviewing a summary judgment, we assume Mr. Oleson made these comments. 

 
 
[¶21]   The relevance of arguably 
discriminatory comments has been addressed by the Tenth Circuit.  
In order to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
pretext on the basis of ageist remarks, the employee must show a nexus between 
the discriminatory statements and the termination decision.  Cone, 14 F.3d  at 531.  See also, Stone, 210 F.3d  at 1140.  In other words, the employee must show 
that age played an actual role in the termination decision and had a 
"determinative influence on the outcome."  
Stone, 210 F.3d  at 1140, 
quoting Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 
29 F.3d 1450, 1455 (10th Cir. 1994).  

 
 
[¶22]   Age-related comments referring 
directly to the employee who is discharged may support an inference of 
discrimination; however, isolated comments are typically too abstract to support 
a finding of age discrimination.  Cone, 14 F.3d  at 531, citing Phelps v. Yale Sec., 
Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir.).  
Stray discriminatory remarks are insufficient to create a jury question 
because they do not establish the requisite nexus between the comment and the 
termination decision.  See, e.g., Cone, 14 F.3d  at 531; Stone, 210 F.3d  at 1140-41.  When the comments are isolated and there 
is no showing they are related to the challenged employment action they "are 
insufficient to show discriminatory animus in termination decisions.'"  Stone, 210 F.3d  at 1140, quoting Cone, 14 F.3d  at 531.  

 
 
[¶23]   In an apparent attempt to show the 
requisite nexus between his discharge and Mr. Oleson's ageist comments, he 
pointed to Ms. Cary's affidavit.  
Ms. Cary stated Mr. Oleson referred directly to Mr. Rollins when 
describing his preference for younger workers; however, she did not provide the 
time or context for Mr. Oleson's comments.  
Other than Mr. Rollins' assertion that Mr. Oleson made the discriminatory 
statement he overheard "early on" in Mr. Oleson's tenure with WTE, Mr. Rollins 
provides no details about the context or the timing of any of Mr. Oleson's 
ageist comments, and, significantly, none of Mr. Rollins' submissions indicate 
Mr. Oleson's remarks were made in connection with his discharge.  To the contrary, Mr. Oleson stated, 
without contravention, it was Mr. Rollins' encounters with Mr. Meredith, the new 
circulation delivery manager, in August 2003 which ultimately led to his 
discharge later that month.  In the 
absence of more detail as to the time and context of Mr. Oleson's comments or 
evidence showing that the comments were actually related to his discharge, Mr. 
Rollins simply has not raised a material issue of fact that age played a role 
in, or had a determinative influence on, WTE's decision to terminate his 
employment.  

 
 
[¶24]   As is obvious from the federal case 
law and our discussion here, the second and third steps of the burden-shifting 
analysis are interrelated.  Although 
Mr. Rollins was not required to disprove WTE's reasons for his discharge, in 
order to satisfy the third stage and avoid summary judgment, he was required to 
show "that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or . . . 
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.' "  Rea, 29 F.3d 1450, 1455 (quoting 
Burdine, 450 U.S.  at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095).  See also, Jones, 54 F.3d  at 632.  The undisputed facts presented here do 
not demonstrate that WTE's explanation for terminating Mr. Rollins' employment 
-- absenteeism, bad attitude, and refusal to follow instruction-- was not 
credible.  In addition, even when we 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Rollins, we cannot conclude 
that it "could persuade a reasonable jury that the employer had discriminated 
against the [employee].'" Jones, 54 F.3d  at 632, quoting Hooks, 997 F.2d  
at 798.   

 
 
[¶25]   A party may not overcome a motion 
for summary judgment by merely demonstrating some factual dispute exists.  Instead, he must convince the court there 
is a genuine issue of material fact relating to a component of his claim that 
must be determined by the trier of fact. In this case, Mr. Rollins failed to 
identify any issues of fact material to whether age was a determinative factor 
in his termination. Consequently, the hearing examiner properly granted WTE's 
summary judgment motion.    

 
 
[¶26]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"A plaintiff 
proves discrimination through direct evidence by establishing proof of an 
existing policy which itself constitutes discrimination.'" Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2000), quoting Ramsey v. City & County of Denver, 
907 F.2d 1004, 1008 (10th Cir. 1990).  Mr. Rollins does not argue there was 
direct evidence of discrimination but, instead, discusses his case in accordance 
with the burden-shifting analysis for cases involving indirect evidence of 
discrimination.

    

2Although it 
is not completely clear from his brief, Mr. Rollins seems to argue that once a 
claimant has established a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e. satisfied 
the first step of the analysis, summary judgment is not appropriate.  That argument is incorrect.  In order to survive a motion for summary 
judgment, the claimant must fulfill all of his duties under the burden-shifting 
analysis, which include the third stage if the employer successfully meets its 
obligation in the second step.  See Cone, 14 F.3d  at 
530-31.

  

3Mr. Rollins 
also presented other statements from other co-employees describing ageist 
comments purportedly made by Mr. Oleson.  
As we explained above, those statements were not sworn and Mr. Rollins 
did not provide any foundation for their admissibility; consequently, they are 
not appropriate for consideration in a summary judgment proceeding.  See W.R.C.P. 56; Knapp, ¶¶ 7-8, 130 P.3d  at 
926-27.