Case Title: Fuston, Petway & French, LLP v. Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1180875

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: June 30, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1180875
____________________
Fuston, Petway & French, LLP
v.
The Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-17-900765)
PER CURIAM.
Fuston, Petway & French, LLP ("the Firm"), appeals from a
summary judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial
1180875
court") in favor of The Water Works Board of the City of  Birmingham
("the Board") regarding the Board's termination of a contract between the
parties. 
Facts and Procedural History
In September 2015, the Firm and the Board entered into a one-year
contract in which the Firm agreed to provide legal representation for the
Board.   In 2016, the Firm and the Board entered into negotiations for a
new contract.    Robert Mims, then the chairman of the Board, approached
the Firm regarding the Board's need to have independent oversight and
review of a program designed to attract "historically underutilized
business entities," such as minority-owned businesses, which the parties
refer to as  "the HUB program."    Several members of the Board were
concerned that the HUB program, which was being administered by
employees of the Board, was underperforming.       One of the members of
the Board drafted a memorandum expressing his desire to create a
"contract-compliance program" to oversee the HUB program by (1)
reviewing and monitoring all Board contracts and non-bid procurements,
(2) developing an outreach program to minority-owned businesses to
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solicit contracting and subcontracting opportunities, (3) developing a
verifiable method of tracking minority-owned-business data for project
utilization and timely payment for services from general contractors, (4)
developing written guidelines for contract administration, (5) using
bidders conferences to discuss utilization of minority-owned businesses,
(6) developing a non-bid process that ensures fair administration and
rotation of non-bid work. (7) monitoring and ensuring the legitimacy of
contractor quotes submitted with bids in terms of the solicitation effect on
minority-owned businesses, (8) engaging the banks that the Board does
business with to better assist minority-owned businesses, (9) developing
classifications that reflect the types of minorities owning businesses
involved in the HUB program, and (10) reaching out to community
colleges concerning programs that would aid minority-owned businesses. 
The Board member requested that $2 million from an economic-
development fund be used to finance the contract-compliance program. 
At its meeting held on November 10, 2016, the Board  agreed to
transfer "$2,000,000.00 from its Reserve Fund allotted for Economic
Development to its Operational Fund relative to a Contract Compliance
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Program."  The  adoption of  a contract-compliance program was not
presented to the Board or voted on at that time.   
On November 22, 2016, the Board met and discussed the contract-
compliance program and the proposed new contract with the Firm.  The
minutes of that meeting reflect the following:
"[T]he Board was asked to approve an agreement with Fuston,
Petway & French, LLP, as set forth in agenda item 6, to
provide general legal services for a three-year period effective
November 22, 2016, and to authorize the Chairman to accept
said agreement.  After the motions were made,  Director Lewis
indicated she was surprised to see the referenced item on
today's agenda because she was not involved in any
discussions concerning said agreement.  She asked who wrote
said agreement and Board Attorney French stated he drafted
the agreement, pointing out said Firm's previous agreement
that was executed in September 2015 for one (1) year has
expired. Director Lewis stated her concern is the stipulations
that are in the agreement because they do not protect the
Board and they take away its control. Following, Director
Lewis inquired as to why the referenced agreement was not
discussed with her as a Board member. Attorney French
replied he emailed said agreement to all Board members
yesterday wherein Director Lewis pointed out said attorney's
timeline allowed her less than 24 hours to review the
agreement and she added it took more than said hours to
prepare the referenced agreement wherein some prior
discussion had to have taken place. Subsequently, Director
Lewis asked the General Manager when he received said
agreement, if he had read it, and if due process had been
followed. The General Manager indicated he saw the
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agreement yesterday afternoon. Following, Director Lewis 
inquired of the whereabouts of  'Exhibit A' that was referenced
in the new agreement and Attorney French stated said Exhibit
A was not included and indicated it was included in the
previous agreement.  After reading a portion of the new
agreement that mentioned the exhibit as being a part of the
new agreement, Director Lewis  asked if someone could
provide her with a copy.   Following,  the General Manager
said the referenced exhibit in the previous agreement was a
rate schedule that listed hourly rates from $125.00 to $250.00. 
He said the new hourly rate of $275.00 is listed in item six (6)
on page three (3) of Attorney French's proposed new
agreement.  Following, Director Lewis  expressed great
concern with the Board relative to increasing the attorneys'
fees at this point. She said the Board's  previous attorneys
were paid an hourly rate of $175.00 to $250.00.   She  also said
under the previous agreement, the Board's current attorneys
charged hourly rates based on the following: years of
experience:  0 - two (2) years $125.00; two (2) - five (5) years
$150.00;  five (5) - ten (10) years $200,00; ten (10) - 15 years
$225.00; and over 15 years $250.00 per hour wherein each
lawyer would now be paid $275.00 under the current
agreement.   Following, Director Lewis asked how long it took
the Board's previous attorneys to get a raise and the General
Manager stated hourly rates for said attorneys remained the
same from 2001 through 2015.
"Following, Director Lewis said the new agreement
indicates  the Board's current attorneys want to administer
the Contract Compliance Program based on stipulations in
said agreement. When she questioned whether the Board had
voted to initiate said program, Director Muhammad said the
Board had agreed. Director Lewis said she believes the Board
voted to move $2,000,000.00 and indicated she does not recall
the Board voting to start said program.  Following, Director
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Muhammad said the Board voted to move the money and to
initiate the referenced program. Director McKie said there
would be nothing to administer if the Board does not start said
program. Director Lewis commented that it is strange such
language would be included in the agreement and she again
expressed her concern about the verbiage, pointing out
according to item 4 on page two (2) of the new agreement, the
Board would hand over its power to the attorneys, if it is
approved.  She then asked why it is not a part of the Board's
duties to decide on said program.  Director Lewis pointed out
that a 'supermajority' of votes would be needed to terminate
the new agreement with the Fuston Petway and French law
firm and she questioned why the Board would accept an
agreement that would be difficult to modify.  Director Lewis
said the wording is the same as language that was in Russell
Management Group, LLC's (RMG) agreement, which the
Board later rescinded.  Following, Director McKie stated the
new agreement would not make it difficult for the Board to
make changes or affect how the Board could hire other
attorneys to do whatever  it could give to its current attorneys. 
Director Lewis pointed out the previous agreement specified
things would be done with the Board's approval wherein such
wording is not included in the new agreement.  Director Lewis
said she had not spoken with Attorney French and noted he
does not respond to her emails.
"Subsequently, Director Lewis asked Attorney French
why the new agreement indicates his law firm would manage
the Contract Compliance Program and Attorney French said
he had a conversation with Director Muhammad after the
Board voted to approve the budget for said program at the
November 10, 2016 Regular Board of Directors' Meeting,
relative to his firm administering and helping to oversee the
referenced program. Director Lewis asked Attorney French did
he not think it would be wise to discuss a $2,000,000.00 project
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with all of the Board members wherein Attorney French stated
Director Muhammad indicated he had a two-hour telephone
conversation with Director Lewis.  Following, Director Lewis
stated said discussion did not occur wherein Director
Muhammad stated Director Lewis called him and Director
Lewis indicated she returned Director Muhammad's call. 
Director Lewis then asked Attorney French if Director
Muhammad had indicated she agreed with him and Attorney
French said he believes this would be up to the Board to decide
on 
today. 
Following, 
Director 
Muhammad 
said 
the
aforementioned telephone conversation lasted two (2) hours,
but it was not about the Contract Compliance Program. 
Director Lewis then asked how said program was included in
the new agreement. Director Muhammad said he sent an
email to all of the directors prior to the Board voting to move
the referenced  funds for said program and pointed out that he
had also talked with the General Manager.   He said in his
email he requested that  the Board consider   the attorneys
and independent engineer to administer said program because
said entities report to the Board. Director Muhammad added
he could easily see how this would be included in the new
agreement. Following, Director Lewis said she believes the
General Manager and the Assistant General Managers would
be more knowledgeable about said program wherein Director
Muhammad disagreed. Director McKie reminded Director
Lewis of the Board's discussion concerning said program at the
November 10th  Board Meeting and he pointed out none of the
$2,000,000.00 would be spent on any programs until the Board
votes on it and designates some direction. He also pointed out
that Attorney French would not spend said amount wherein
Director Lewis stated said attorneys would have the right to
say who would be hired.  Following, Director McKie said the
Board would have to set up the Contract Compliance Program.
He said the Board would be made aware of some of the things
that take place but it would not know everything that
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happens,  pointing out this is why said attorneys'  firm would
administer the above-mentioned program.  Following, 
Director Muhammad said  the  Board's attorneys would ensure
the general contractor is not just including a certain
percentage on the form relative to the sub-contractor. 
Following, Director Lewis said she received an email  from the
General  Manager last night that was also sent to the other
directors.  She asked the General Manager what said
attorneys would do differently  handling the Contract
Compliance Program  since it appears the Board is presently
doing  everything that the attorneys would do.  Director Lewis
said she believes the Board would be wasting $2,000,000.00 of
ratepayers'  money.  Further, Director Lewis commented that
Director Muhammad was just recently elected to the Board
and indicated he places everything on the agenda without
taking it through the proper channels. Director Muhammad
stated he does this because he has three (3) votes wherein
Director Lewis remarked that Director Muhammad discusses
Board business outside of regular Board meetings and gets the
required votes prior to said meetings. Following, Director
Lewis  said it is apparent that she is the only  Board  member
who does not  know the details  relative to such matter and she
pointed out Director Munchus is absent from today's meeting
and could not voice his opinion. Subsequently, she said the
manner in which Director Muhammad got the three (3) votes
is questionable.
"Following,  a copy of the guidelines for the Historically
Underutilized Business (HUB) program was distributed to the
directors. Subsequently, the General Manager  stated for the 
record the Historically Underutilized Business (HUB) program
was approved and updated in 2015.  He said since then  senior 
executive 
management, 
the 
Engineering, 
System
Development, and Purchasing Departments have complied
with guidelines established by said program.  Following, the
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General Manager said the memo that he sent to the directors
yesterday indicated  staff  is complying with all rules in the
referenced program with  the  exception of verifying  and 
certifying the amount contractors are paying to sub-
contractors and minority vendors. He stated said program does
not require staff to certify the HUB contractors wherein staff 
relies on  about  10 or 12 organizations to verify the minority
vendors. Following, the General Manager said staff could
easily verify amounts paid to HUB contractors, pointing out he
had 
talked 
with 
managers 
in 
the 
above-mentioned
departments. He said the general contractors must complete
a form certifying they correctly paid the minority  vendors 
after  projects are completed. Subsequently, the General
Manager said the verification process is simple and involves
sending a letter to the minority  contractors wherein said
contractors would send staff confirmation that they were paid
accurately.
"....
"Following, Director Muhammad commented on House
Bill 647 which expanded the Board, stating he was firmly
opposed to such an expansion.  He stated that he is determined
to protect assets of the citizens of Birmingham who purchased
the Water Works from a private company for $20 million in
1950 and also  purchased  Inland Lake in 1939. Director
Muhammad said in 1950 the people of Birmingham had a $20
million bond to purchase the Water Works from a private
company which was not set up by the legislature.  Director
Muhammad said when the Mayor Council Act was passed, it
gave some of the  appointing powers of the council to the
mayor, pointing out politically, it appears there is an attempt
to take over the majority of the Board from the city council and
the citizens of Birmingham. Following, Director Muhammad
said the Water Works assets must be protected wherein the
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Board has to make some moves in case said rumor of an
attempt to refigure the current Board is realized.  Following,
Director Lewis asked Director Muhammad what does he
believe giving the new agreement to Attorney French and his
firm would protect the Board from.  Following, Director
Muhammad said he believes the Board has extenuating 
political circumstances such as legal  cases that are happening
wherein Director Lewis asked him if the Board is relinquishing
power to its attorneys for this reason.   Director Muhammad
said he thinks handing over power to the attorneys would
stabilize the Board's situation  wherein  Director Lewis asked
him how this would be possible since the directors are the
Board. Director Muhammad explained he believes this would
steady the Board's position because if the overthrow takes
place,  politically the mayor would have two (2) appointees and
there would be three (3) outside appointees. Following, 
Director Lewis said she thinks the directors are intelligent
[sic] to make the right decisions, she asked what would cause
the Board to set a precedent to give its power to an attorney
out of some fear it has instead of working  through a process. 
Director Lewis said during her years on the Board, she has
never witnessed the manner in which decisions are being made
lately, pointing  out she realizes changes happen and indicated
she never thought she would see board members turning their
power over to an attorney.   Subsequently, Director Lewis
pointed out the previous attorneys did not control the Board.
"Following,  a  discussion ensued relative to the process
in  reviewing consultants agreements and the former 
attorneys’  agreement with the Board. Director Muhammad
asked the General Manager if the Board's legal fees for the
previous  attorneys were overbudgeted and  if  the Board is
spending more in said fees for its current attorneys. The
General Manager replied legal lees for 2015 totaled 
$1,250,000.00  and  pointed out approximately $1.6 million
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would be spent in 2016. Director Muhammad asked if the
Board is paying Fuston Petway & French more than it was
paying Waldrep Stewart & Kendrick and the General Manager
responded no.   He added that the cost for the four (4) or five
(5) additional attorneys the Board hired this year would put
the total in excess of the amount that was paid to the Board's
former attorneys.  The General Manager stated legal fees are 
overspent for 2016,  pointing out the budget for said fees was
increased to $1.6 million because of the expected excess.
Following, Director Muhammad said the Board hired
additional  attorneys to work on two (2) separate cases
wherein the Board is paying the current attorneys less than it
paid the previous attorneys. Subsequently, the General
Manager said the Board's legal fees for 2016 are over budget.
In response to Director Lewis's inquiry as to whether they
anticipate hiring another attorney,  Director Muhammad said
he is not aware of such. Director McKie asked if the issues the
Board spent the extra legal fees on in 2016 were not present in
2015 such as the bond circumstances and the hearing last
week. The General Manager replied no because legal fees for
bond issues are taken  from  bond issuance monies, pointing
out said issues were not charged to the budget."
Subsequently, the issue whether to approve the proposed new
contract with the Firm was called for a vote.  The minutes reflect that the
contract was approved, with three Board members voting in favor of the
contract and one Board member  opposing the contract.   The contract
between the Firm and the Board provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
"1. Subject to the terms and conditions contained herein,
[the Firm] shall provide the Board with professional legal
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services and administer the [Board's] Contract Compliance
Program from time to time upon request by the Board.
"2. With approval of the Board, [the Firm] shall be
authorized to engage the services of agents, associates,
independent contractors, or assistants that [the Firm] deems
proper as well as  employ, engage, or retain the services of
such persons or  corporations to aid or assist [the Firm] in the
proper performance of its duties and obligations under this
agreement.
"3. [The Firm] shall perform the professional legal
services under this Agreement at the level customary for
competent and prudent attorneys performing such services at
the time and place where the services are provided and in
accordance with the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct.
Said legal services will be provided by licensed attorneys and
other professionals and individuals skilled in other technical
disciplines, as appropriate.
"4. [The Firm] shall administer the Contract Compliance
Program. The Contract Compliance Program services will be
performed by such persons, corporations, or other entity as
designated by [the Firm].
"5. This Agreement is not a contract of employment. No
relationship of employer and employee exists between [the
Firm] and the Board, or between the Board and any agent or
employee of [the Firm]. [The Firm] shall at all times be
deemed an independent contractor. The Board shall not be
liable for any acts of [the Firm or] its agents or employees.
"6. Unless otherwise agreed to by the Parties,  [the Firm]
shall be compensated for services performed pursuant to this
Agreement on the basis of time spent and expenses incurred.
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The hourly rate charged by [the Firm] shall be $275.00, in
addition to all reasonable expenses.
"7. Terms of the Agreement:
"(a) The term of this Agreement shall be for a
period of three (3) years, commencing on the date
first written above and shall continue thereafter for
additional periods of one (1) year;
"(b) [The Firm] shall have the right at any
time to terminate this Agreement by giving at least
a ninety (90) day advance written notice to the
Board that it does not desire to continue with this
Agreement;
"(c) The Board shall have the right at any
time to terminate this Agreement:
"(i) by vote of more than a
supermajority of the total members of
the board of directors (i.e., if a five (5)
member board, by at least four (4)
board members and if a nine (9)
member board, by at least seven (7)
board members;[1] and
1According to the Firm, at the time the Board approved the contract,
the Board was composed of five members; however, the Board, through
state legislation, was increased by the appointment of four additional
members -- making the Board  a nine-member board as of January 2017.
Because the Board was engaged in litigation fighting against the
appointment of  four additional Board members at the time the contract
was approved, this specific provision of the contract was written to reflect
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"(ii) by giving at least ninety (90)
days prior written notice to [the Firm]
that more than a supermajority of the
Board does not desire to continue with
the Agreement. In the event that this
Agreement is terminated, the Board
agrees to pay [the Firm] for all services
rendered 
and 
expenses 
incurred
through and including the date of
termination."
In January 2017, the membership of the Board was increased to nine
members.  See note 1, supra.
On January 27, 2017, the Firm sent the Alabama State Bar a letter
asking (1) whether the provision in the  termination clause of the contract
requiring that a supermajority of the Board must vote to terminate the
contract violated the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct and (2)
whether the provision in the terminate clause of the contract requiring the
Board to provide the Firm with 90-days' prior written notice of intent to
terminate the contract violated the Alabama Rules of Professional
what would constitute a supermajority of both a five-member board or a
nine-member board.
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Conduct.   The Firm noted that the Board's contract with its  general
manager also contained a supermajority provision.
On February 3, 2017, the Alabama State Bar responded:
"I am writing in response to your letter of January 27,
2017, in which you requested an ethics opinion from this office.
A copy of your letter is attached hereto for reference purposes.
I am providing you the following which is an informal opinion
of the Office of General Counsel and is not binding on the
Disciplinary Commission of the  Alabama State Bar.
"As I understand, your law firm currently represents the
Birmingham Water  Works Board ('BWWB').  Under the terms
of the firm's contract with the BWWB, prior to terminating the
firm's services, the BWWB must give your firm  ninety (90)
days  written notice that more than a  supermajority of the
Board wish to cancel the firm's representation of the Board.
According to your letter, the ninety (90) day provision was 
added at the request of the Chairman of the Board to ensure
a smooth transition should your firm be terminated and new
counsel retained by BWWB.  In addition, the supermajority
provision necessary to terminate your  firm's representation is
consistent with prior contracts entered into  by the BWWB. 
You seek an ethics opinion from this office that these
provisions are permissible under the Alabama Rules of
Professional Conduct.
"In  providing you an opinion, please note the Comment
to Rule 1.16, Ala. R. Prof. C., notes that a client has the right
to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause. 
Similarly, the Comment to § 32 of the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers, Third Edition, provides '[a] client may
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always discharge a lawyer regardless of the cause and
regardless of any agreement between them.'
"With this principal in mind, it is the opinion of this
office that the ninety (90) day termination provision is likely
unenforceable under Rule 1.16, Ala. R. Prof. C. In other words,
if the BWWB elected to terminate your firm's representation,
without providing the contracted for ninety (90) day notice,
your firm would be required to immediately move to withdraw
from representation of the BWWB in all pending matters. This
opinion is not meant to suggest that the BWWB could not
voluntarily abide by the ninety (90) day notice.  However, if
the BWWB chose to ignore the provision and requested the
immediate termination of the representation, your firm would
need to comply.
"The other provision requires a super majority of the
BWWB to terminate your firm's representation. This provision
is permissible assuming that the Board ratified the contract
and the provision. By ratifying the contract, the BWWB has
presumably agreed to place the super majority restriction on
its own ability to terminate counsel. I cannot speculate as to
the reason for the decision, but the decision was their own to
make. As such, the provision would not violate the Alabama
Rules of Professional Conduct."
On February 9, 2017, at a Board meeting at which seven of the nine
Board members were present, the Board voted to terminate the contract
between the Firm and the Board.  According to the minutes from that
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meeting, the Board members voted five to two in favor of terminating the
contract.2
On February 24, 2017, the Firm sued the Board, asserting claims of
breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.   On April 10, 2017, the Board filed a motion to dismiss the claims
against it, arguing that a client has the right to terminate an attorney-
client relationship at any time.   The Board  argued that the Firm's efforts
to be paid for services that it had not yet performed violated Alabama
caselaw holding that attorneys can be compensated only for work they
have actually performed before discharge.  The Board further argued that,
as a matter of public policy, in cases involving attorney contracts with
2In its brief to this Court, the Firm asserts that Board member
Brenda Dickerson voted against the termination of the contract.  In
support, it argues that Dickerson sent  an e-mail to the Board's general
manager on February 10, 2017, stating that the record incorrectly
reflected her vote as a "yes" when she voted "no" to terminating the
contract.  Dickerson included a link to an article on al.com, a news web
site, that the Firm contends was written by an attendee of the meeting
and shows that she voted "no."  The Board asserts that Dickerson was
silent during the vote and that, according to Section 13 of the Board's
bylaws, her vote was, thus, recorded as a "yes."  
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governmental entities  such as a water-works board, a board cannot bind
a successor board to an attorney contract. 
On June 19, 2017, the trial court granted the Board's motion in part,
dismissing the Firm's  claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing because, the court noted, that claim is recognized only with
respect to the breach of insurance contracts.  The trial court specifically
found that the contract between the Firm and the Board was for
professional legal services and for the administration of the contract-
compliance program and that, as a result, the Firm "may possibly prevail"
on its breach-of-contract claim insofar as it applied to the administration
of the contract-compliance program or insofar as the Firm was not paid for
any services rendered before the contract was terminated.   Accordingly,
the trial court denied the motion insofar as it sought the dismissal of the
breach-of-contract claim. 
On  June 29, 2018, the Board filed a summary-judgment motion.   In
its motion, the Board argued that it had never approved or adopted a
contract-compliance  program.  Therefore, the  Board asserted, the Firm
could not maintain a breach-of-contract claim relating to a nonexistent
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contract-compliance program.  The Board also argued that the Firm could
not maintain a breach-of-contract claim for unpaid services because, the
Board asserted, the Firm had submitted all of its invoices to the Board for
payment and those invoices had been paid.   The Board further argued
that any services provided by the Firm with regard to the contract-
compliance program were part of the general legal services provided by
the Firm, which could be terminated at any time, and that  the firm could
not prove any damages  because it had been paid in full for all services
rendered.   The Board also argued that the contract was void on public-
policy grounds public policy because it bound successor boards to the 
agreement with an attorney that they did not choose and because it
required a vote of a supermajority of the Board to terminate the contract. 
The Board attached numerous evidentiary exhibits to its motion, including
minutes from Board meetings, internal e-mails, and invoices submitted by
the Firm. 
On August 24, 2018, the Firm filed a response in opposition to the
Board's summary-judgment motion in which it argued that there were
genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether the administration of the
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contract-compliance program was a nonlegal service, (2) whether the
Board had formally approved or adopted the contract-compliance program,
(3) whether  public policy invalidated the supermajority provision in the
contract, and (4) whether the firm had demonstrated its damages.3  The
Firm supported its response with evidentiary exhibits.  
The Board filed a reply to the Firm's response in opposition to its
summary-judgment motion, in which it reiterated the arguments in its
summary-judgment motion. 
On June 25, 2019, the trial court entered a summary judgment in
favor of the Board.  In its judgment, the trial court found, among other
things, that the entirety of the Firm's obligations in the contract entailed
legal services and that, as a result, the contract was terminable by the
Board at any time.   The trial court stated:
"The Court has reviewed the contract and finds that it is
not ambiguous. A review of the contract as a whole, shows that
the entirety of the contract was for legal services. There is no
3The Firm initially responded to the Board's summary-judgment
motion by invoking to Rule 56(f), Ala. R. Civ. P., and stating that it needed
to conduct additional discovery.  The Board responded that the Firm had
failed to show what would be learned from further discovery.
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indication 
in 
the 
contract 
that 
contract 
compliance
administration is not one of the legal services to be performed
by the [Firm].  The contract does not say one word about 'non-
legal' services.  There is no distinction made between legal or
non-legal services in the contract and there is no statement
that the contract compliance services are not meant to be legal
services nor does the contract set out what contract compliance
administration would entail. Also, the contract only contains
one hourly rate of $275.00. Because the contract was for legal
services, the [Board] had the right to terminate it at any time
for any reason. Gaines, Gaines & Gaines, P.C. v. Hare, Wynn,
Newell & Newton, 554 So. 2d 445 (Ala. 1989).
"Even assuming the contract was not one for legal
services and therefore terminable at will by the [Board], based
on the terms of the contract, the [Firm] cannot establish the
fourth element for a breach of contract claim, i.e., damages,
and therefore cannot prevail as a matter of law. By the plain
terms of the contract, the [Firm] could not be compensated
other than for services it actually performed and on the basis
of time it spent on such services and expenses incurred.  The
[Firm] was paid for all services rendered at its hourly rate for
the services set out in the contract. The contract stated that
the services would be provided 'from time to time upon
request' by the [Board].  The [Firm] had no guarantee that it
would ever be requested to perform work under the contract,
if the [Firm] was not requested to perform services then it
would not be entitled to any compensation. The [Firm] has not
presented any evidence that it was requested to or performed
any services of any type beyond the work set out in its invoices
and for which it has been paid.
"Notwithstanding the provisions of the plain terms of the
contract, the [Firm] argues that it is entitled to recover lost
profits. However, profits that are speculative, conjectural or
21
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remote are not recoverable damages. Deng v. Scroggins, 169
So. 3d 1015 (Ala. 2014); Taylor v. Shoemaker, 38 So. 2d 895
(Ala. Civ. 1948).  Given that the [Firm] was not guaranteed
any future work and given that the [Firm] was only entitled to
compensation for work actually performed, then any claim for
lost profit would be mere speculation and therefore not due to
be recovered."
On July 29, 2019, the Firm timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
Standard of Review
The standard of review applicable to a summary judgment is the
same as the standard the trial court applied when granting the
summary-judgment motion.  McClendon v. Mountain Top Indoor Flea
Mkt., Inc., 601 So. 2d 957, 958 (Ala. 1992). That is, we must determine
whether there was a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Id. at 958.
"When the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is
no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an
issue.  Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d
794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). Evidence is 'substantial' if it is of 'such
weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the
fact sought to be proved.'  West v. Founders Life Assurance Co.
of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989)." 
Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 906 (Ala. 1999).
22
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Discussion
The Firm argues that there is a genuine dispute as to whether a
supermajority provision, like the one in the contract at issue in this case,
violates public policy and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether the Board violated the supermajority provision by terminating
the contract with the Firm without a  supermajority of the Board voting
in favor of the termination.   Second, the Firm says, there is a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the administration of the contract-
compliance program was a legal or nonlegal service.  Last, the Firm
argues that there is conflicting evidence, i.e., a genuine issue of material
fact, regarding the appropriate measure of damages it is entitled to on the
breach-of-contract claim insofar as that claim relates to the
administration of the contract-compliance program.
  At the outset, we note that " '[t]he attorney-client relationship is
similar to the doctor-patient relationship in that it is a "close, personal
relationship built upon trust and confidence." ' " Ex parte Dunaway, 198
So. 3d 567, 586 (Ala. 2014)(quoting Boykin v. Keebler, 648 So. 2d 550, 552
(Ala. 1994)).  
23
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In Gaines, Gaines & Gaines, P.C. v. Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton,
554 So. 2d 445 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989), the Court of Civil Appeals held that
a client may discharge an attorney with or without cause and that, in
certain  circumstances, the discharged attorney  may recover
compensation for services performed before the discharge.  554 So. 2d 447-
48. 
In Garmon v. Robertson, 601 So. 2d 987, 989 (Ala. 1992), this Court
quoted Gaines with approval, explaining:
"The Court of Civil Appeals has correctly stated:
" 'It is well recognized that the
employment of an attorney by a client is
revocable by the client with or without
cause, 
and 
that 
such 
discharge
ordinarily does not constitute a breach
of contract even with a contract of
employment which provides for the
payment of a contingent fee. There are,
of course, well recognized procedures
where a discharged attorney may
recover compensation for the services
rendered to that client before the
discharge.'
"Gaines, Gaines & Gaines, P.C. v. Hare, Wynn, Newell &
Newton, 554 So. 2d 445, 447 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989)."
24
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In Cheriogotis v. White (In re Cheriogotis), 188 B.R. 996, 1000 n.4 (Bankr.
M.D. Ala. 1994), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Alabama observed:
"The existence of an attorney-client relationship gives
rise to special duties and responsibilities. 'A lawyer is a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice.'  Ala. Rules of Prof. Conduct (1994), preamble. A
lawyer serves as a legal advisor, but his role is not merely
limited to the law.  There is a fiduciary duty with regards to
the client's financial and other interests.  A lawyer acts as an
advocate, a negotiator, an intermediary, and an evaluator. 
These disparate duties have been codified in the code of
professional conduct in each of several states. Eg. Ala. Rules
of Prof. Conduct (1994). ...
"Moreover, the attorney-client relationship is a very
personal relationship.  It must be based on some established
and known arrangement between the counselor and the
counseled.  Attorneys are not fungible goods that may be
traded one for another like pre-adolescent boys trading
baseball cards of their sports heroes.  A lawyer, absent consent
of the client, has no right to assign the representation of a
client to another member of the bar.  See Ala. Rules of Prof.
Conduct (1994), Rule 1.5(e)(2).
"We need hardly add that an attorney's power to
represent a client may be limited and a lawyer is
dischargeable by the client as a matter of right and without
cause or justification.  Doggett v. Deauville Corp., 148 F.2d 881
(5th Cir. (Ala.) 1945); Gaines, Gaines, & Gaines, P.C. v. Hare,
25
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Wynn, Newell, & Newton, 554 So. 2d 445 (Ala. Civ. App.
1989)."
See also Alabama State Bar Ethics Opinion RO-93-21 (discussing fee
agreements and noting that "non-refundable fee language is objectionable
because it may chill a client from exercising his or her right to discharge
his or her lawyer and, thus, force the client to proceed with a lawyer that
the client no longer has confidence in"); Alabama State Bar Ethics Opinion
RO-92-17 (discussing Gaines and stating: "[T]he client has the absolute
right to terminate the services of his or her lawyer, with or without cause,
and to retain another lawyer of their choice. This right would be
substantially limited if the client was required to pay the full amount of
the agreed on fee without the services being performed."); and 7A  C.J.S.
Attorney & Client § 326 (2015) ("The right of a client to terminate his or
her  relationship with a lawyer is necessarily implied in the
attorney-client relationship, and the right is absolute.").
Rule 1.16(a), Ala. R. Prof. Cond., provides, in part: 
"(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not
represent a client or,  where representation has commenced,
shall withdraw from the representation of a client, if:
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"....
"(3) The lawyer is discharged."
The Comment to Rule 1.16 provides, in part: "A client has a right to
discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability
for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the
withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written
statement reciting the circumstances."   That is, a client has the
unqualified right to hire and fire attorneys at will with no obligation at all
except to pay for completed services.
In this case, the question is whether requiring a supermajority of the
Board to vote in favor of terminating the contract conflicts with a client's
right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause.   The
minutes from the Board's November 22, 2016, meeting indicate that the
supermajority provision in the contract with the Firm was based on a
similar provision in a contract that the Board had with an engineering
firm.   The Firm's letter to the Alabama State Bar indicates that the
Board's contract with its general manager also contained a supermajority
27
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provision.  An attorney-client relationship is different from a client's
relationship with other professions or a client's employees.   
"This Court has the inherent authority to admit lawyers
to the practice of law, to approve or disapprove any rule
governing lawyers' conduct, to inquire into  matters of any
disciplinary proceeding, and to take any action it sees fit in
disciplinary matters. Board of Comm'rs of the Alabama State
Bar v. State ex rel. Baxley, 295 Ala. 100, 324 So. 2d 256 (1975);
Simpson v. Alabama State Bar, 294 Ala. 52, 311 So. 2d 307
(1975)."
Ex parte Case, 925 So. 2d 956, 962-63 (Ala. 2005).
"The relationship of attorney and client is one of the most
sacred relationships known to the law and places upon the
attorney a position likened to a fiduciary calling for the highest
trust and confidence, so that in all his relations and dealings
with his client, it is his duty to exercise the utmost honesty,
good faith, fairness, integrity and fidelity, and he may not at
any time use against his former client knowledge or
information acquired by virtue of the previous relationship.
This rule is universal and hoary with age."
Hannon v. State, 48 Ala. App. 613, 618, 266 So. 2d 825, 829 (Crim. App.
1972).
The Supreme Court of Colorado addressed a city's  termination of a
law firm's services. In Olsen & Brown v. City of Englewood, 889 P.2d 673
(Colo. 1995),  the city retained a law firm to represent it in tort litigation
28
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on a noncontingent-fee basis.4   The litigation required the law firm to
devote substantially all of its time to the case and to forgo other
employment.  The city terminated the attorney-client relationship without
cause.  The law firm sued the city for damages, alleging breach of contract. 
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the law firm was entitled to
recover the reasonable value of the services it had rendered before
discharge, stating:
"The relationship between an attorney and client is a
distinct fiduciary affiliation which arises as a matter of law.
Bailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Colo. App.
1992). The foundation of this relationship is grounded upon a
special trust and confidence, Enyart v. Orr, 78 Colo. 6, 15, 238
P. 29, 34 (Colo. 1925), and requires that a client have the
utmost faith in chosen counsel.
"To this end, attorneys are governed by and must adhere
to specific rules of conduct which this court has the exclusive
jurisdiction to oversee. Colorado Supreme Court Grievance
Committee v. District Court, 850 P.2d 150, 152 (Colo. 1993). 
Thus, the attorney-client  relationship may initially be
distinguished from other business relationships by virtue of
these specific rules and the uniqueness of the governing body
4The Colorado Supreme Court noted that its opinion addressed only
the issue of terminating the services of attorneys in private practice and
that it did not express any views on the applicability of its holding in that
case to attorneys who are employees, including in-house counsel.
29
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under which attorney conduct is regulated. See Rhode,
Titchenal, Baumann & Scripter v. Shattuck, 44 Colo. App. 449,
619 P.2d 507, 508 (1980) (distinguishing attorney-client
relationship from accountant-client relationship on this basis).
"These rules are not designed to alter civil liability nor do
they serve as a basis for such liability. Code of Professional
Responsibility, Preliminary Statement; Colorado Rules of
Professional Conduct, Preamble, Scope and Terminology. See
also Bryant v. Hand, 158 Colo. 56, 404 P.2d 521 (Colo. 1965).
"Rather, such rules are in place to provide guidance in
the attorney-client relationship and to serve as a mechanism
of internal professional discipline. Code of Professional
Responsibility, Preliminary Statement; Colorado Rules of
Professional Conduct, Preamble, Scope and Terminology.
"Although not controlling of the issue before us, we must
be mindful of these rules and the influence they necessarily
have in situations involving the attorney-client relationship.
"....
"[Rule of Professional Conduct] 1.16 requires an
attorney's withdrawal from representation upon discharge by
the client. The Comment to this rule states, in pertinent part:
'[a] client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with
or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the
lawyer's services.'
"In order to assure no compulsion to retain an attorney
where trust between attorney and client has been broken, and
to further guarantee a client may always be confident with
such representation, a client must, and does, have the right to
discharge the attorney at any time and for whatever reason.
30
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See Thompson v. McCormick, 138 Colo. 434, 440, 335 P.2d 265,
269 (Colo. 1959). An attorney may not rely upon an indefinite
continuation 
of 
employment 
but instead, 
enters 
an
attorney-client relationship with knowledge that the
relationship may be terminated at any time and for any
reason.
"The unique relationship between attorney and client
prevents the agreement between them from being considered
as an ordinary contract because doing so would ignore the
special fiduciary relationship. AFLAC [Inc. v. Williams, [264
Ga. 351, 353], 444 S.E.2d [314] at 316 [(1994)](citing Fox &
Associates Co., L.P.A. v. Purdon, 44 Ohio St. 3d 69, 541 N.E.2d
448, 450 (1989)).
"The right to terminate the attorney-client relationship
'is a term of the contract implied by public policy because of
the peculiar relationship between attorney and client.' 
AFLAC, [264 Ga at 353,] 444 S.E.2d at 316 (citing Martin v.
Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916)). A client's
discharge of chosen counsel is not a breach of contract but
merely an exercise of this inherent right. AFLAC, [264 Ga at
353,] 444 S.E.2d at 316 (citing Dorsey v. Edge, 75 Ga. App.
388, 43 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1947))."
Olsen & Brown, 889 P.2d at 675-676 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
In AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 264 Ga. 351, 444 S.E.2d 314 (1994), the
Georgia Supreme Court determined that to afford all attorney-client
agreements the conventional status of commercial contracts ignores the
special fiduciary relationship created when an attorney represents a
31
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client.  In Williams, an insurance company entered in to a seven-year
contract with an attorney to provide legal advice to company officers on
an " 'as needed' basis."   264 Ga. at 352, 444 S.E.2d at 316.  The attorney
was paid a monthly retainer plus additional compensation for special
projects.  The contract provided for an automatic renewal for an additional
five years unless terminated.   If the company terminated the contract,
even for good cause, it agreed to pay " 'as damages an amount equal to 50
percent of the sums due under the remaining terms, plus renewal of the
agreement.' "  264 Ga. at 352, 444 S.E.2d at 316.
 The chief executive officer of the company died, and the new chief
executive officer stopped paying the attorney's monthly retainer.  The
company also commenced a declaratory-judgment action to determine the
validity of the contract.  The attorney filed a counterclaim, seeking more
than $1 million in damages for breach of contract.  The trial court declared
the contract unenforceable and entered a summary judgment for the
company on its declaratory-judgment claim and on the attorney's
counterclaim.  The lower appellate court reversed in part, holding that the
provision providing for a monthly retainer was valid and, thus, that the
32
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attorney had a valid claim for damages based on the company's breach of
that provision but determining that summary judgment was appropriate
as to the attorney's claim based on the renewal provision.  
The Georgia Supreme Court held that a client's discharge of chosen
counsel is not a breach of contract, but merely an exercise of the client's
inherent right to terminate the attorney-client relationship.5   The court
stated:
"This court has the duty to regulate the practice of law. Sams
v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 501, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 914, 90 S.Ct. 916, 25 L.Ed.2d 94 (1970). In exercising
this duty, we have sought to assure the public that the practice
of law 'will be a professional service and not simply a
commercial enterprise. The primary distinction is that a
profession is a calling which demands adherence to the public
interest as the foremost obligation of the practitioner.' First
Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 845, 302 S.E.2d 674
(1983).  As an officer of the court, the lawyer's obligation to the
courts and the public is as significant as the obligation to
clients. Sams, 225 Ga. at 504, 169 S.E.2d 790.
"The relationship between a lawyer and client is a special
one of trust that entitles the client to the attorney's fidelity.
5The Georgia Supreme Court noted that its opinion dealt only with
contracts involving attorneys in private practice and did not address the
employment relationship between employers and in-house counsel or
other full-time employees.  
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See Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 662, 409 S.E.2d 507 (1991);
Freeman v. Bigham, 65 Ga. 580, 589 (1880). This 'unique'
relationship is 'founded in principle upon the elements of trust
and confidence on the part of the client and of undivided
loyalty and devotion on the part of the attorney.'  Demov,
Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 53 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 428
N.E.2d 387, 389, 444 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (1981). To force all
attorney-client agreements into the conventional status of
commercial contracts ignores the special fiduciary relationship
created when an attorney represents a client. Fox & Associates
Co., L.P.A. v. Purdon, 44 Ohio St. 3d 69, 541 N.E.2d 448, 450
(1989).
"Because of this fiduciary relationship, 'a client has the
absolute right to discharge the attorney and terminate the
relation at any time, even without cause.'  White v. Aiken, 197
Ga. 29, 32, 28 S.E.2d 263 (1943). A client's discharge of his
attorney 'is not a breach of the contract of employment but the
exercise of his right.'  Dorsey v. Edge, 75 Ga. App. 388, 392, 43
S.E.2d 425 (1947).  This right to terminate is a term of the
contract implied by public policy because of the peculiar
relationship between attorney and client. See Martin v. Camp,
219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916). A client must be free to
end the relationship whenever ' "he ceases to have absolute
confidence in either the integrity or the judgment or the
capacity of the attorney." ' Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784,
494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972) (quoting Gage v.
Atwater, 136 Cal. 170, 172, 68 P. 581 (1902)).
"Our obligation to regulate the legal profession in the
public's interest causes us to favor AFLAC's freedom in ending
the attorney-client relationship without financial penalty over
Williams' right to enforce the damages provision in his
retainer contract. Requiring a client to pay damages for
terminating its attorney's employment contract eviscerates the
34
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client's absolute right to terminate. A client should not be
deterred from exercising his or her legal right because of
economic coercion. Since the contract improperly imposes a
penalty by requiring AFLAC to pay damages equal to half
Williams' retainer,  we conclude that the provision is
unenforceable.
"....
"Contrary to the Court of Appeals, we conclude that the
contract's damages provision improperly imposes a penalty by
forcing AFLAC to pay damages for exercising its legal right to
end the attorney-client relationship. The peculiar language of
the provision demonstrates that the parties intended to deter
AFLAC from discharging Williams and to punish the company
if it did. The contract specifies AFLAC must pay 50 percent of
the remaining sums due Williams under both the original
seven-year term and the five-year renewal period.  This
provision requires AFLAC to pay an unreasonably high sum as
damages, requires payment without considering Williams'
duty to mitigate his damages, and obligates AFLAC to pay
even if Williams is discharged for cause.  Because the damages
provision is not a reasonable estimate of Williams' damages
and instead is a penalty imposed to punish AFLAC, we find it
is unenforceable as a liquidated damages clause."
Williams, 264 Ga. at 352-54, 444 S.E.2d at 316-17 (emphasis added;
footnotes omitted).
Similar to the restrictions on the attorney-client relationship in
Olsen & Brown and Williams, the supermajority provision in this case
impedes  a client's right to discharge an attorney with or without cause. 
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 The relationship between the attorney and his or her client must be based
on the utmost trust and confidence, and such trust and confidence is
undermined by restrictions penalizing or impeding the client's right to
terminate the relationship.   As the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Middle District of Alabama recognized in Cheriogotis, supra,  the
attorney-client relationship is very personal and not "fungible goods that
may be traded one for another."  188 B.R. at 1000 n.4.  Applying general
contract law to contracts governing the attorney-client relationship,
especially with regard to the termination of the attorney-client
relationship, ignores the unique relationship between an attorney and
client.   We recognize that the Board is an entity composed of members
who act on behalf of the public by voting in order to conduct the business
of the Board.   However, the supermajority provision circumvents
established Alabama public policy allowing a client to terminate the
attorney-client relationship at any time, with or without cause.   We also
note that the minutes from the November 10, 2016, Board meeting
indicate that the supermajority provision was added to protect the
preference of a majority of the existing five-member Board with regard to
36
1180875
the attorney-client relationship, knowing that the Board might soon be
increased to nine members, which it was.6        
In addition to conflicting with the Board's right to terminate its
attorney-client relationship with the Firm, the supermajority provision
also conflicts with caselaw preventing a board from binding a successor
board.  The question presented in Willett & Willett v. Calhoun County,
217 Ala. 687, 117 So. 311 (1928),  was whether a county board of revenue
had authority to make a contract with the attorney for the board to extend
they attorney's term of employment beyond the term of the board as it
existed at the time of the execution of the contract. The Court answered
that question in the negative, holding that doing so was contrary to public
policy and injurious to the interest of the public because the effect would
be "tying the hands of the succeeding board and depriving the latter of
their proper powers." 217 Ala. 688, 117 So. at 311.  The succeeding board,
as constituted, the Court held, should at all times be free to select its own
confidential legal adviser.
6No such supermajority provision was in place when a majority of
the Board terminated its previous legal counsel and hired the Firm. 
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In Galbreath v. Hale County Commission, 754 F. App'x  820 (11th
Cir. 2018)(not selected for publication in Federal Reporter), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed an
employment contract between a county and the county administrator that
prevented the majority of the county commission from discharging the
county administrator.  The court distinguished Willett, supra, concluding
that because the role of county administrator  is largely administrative in
nature, the reasoning of Willett -- that a succeeding board should at all
times be free to select its own confidential legal advisor -- was not
implicated.  
The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed a similar question in
Parent v. Woonsocket Housing Authority, 87 R.I. 444, 143 A.2d 146
(1958), in which a housing authority entered into a five-year contract with
the plaintiff to be the legal advisor for the housing authority.   The
housing authority agreed to pay the plaintiff for his services according to
the fees allowable for legal expenses as set out and approved in its budget. 
The  plaintiff  performed legal services as required of him by the housing
authority.  However, after the membership of the housing authority had
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partially changed, the housing authority terminated the plaintiff's
employment before the expiration of the five-year period.  It was conceded
that plaintiff had received as compensation for services rendered to that
date the amount of $2,041.67.   The plaintiff sued the housing authority
alleging breach of contract.   The trial court determined that the contract
was valid and enforceable.   On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that legislative bodies and municipal agencies having legislative
powers may not by contract impair or prevent a succeeding body or agency
from exercising a legislative or governmental function and that engaging
a lawyer to act on behalf of the housing authority was related to the
governmental functions of the housing authority.  
In the present case, the supermajority provision is invalid.
Therefore, there is no need to address whether there is a fact question as
to whether  the  Board violated the supermajority provision by discharging
the Firm.  We recognize that the Firm requested an opinion from the
Alabama State Bar as to whether the supermajority provision violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct.  The informal and nonbinding opinion
letter provided by the Alabama State Bar addressed the Rules of
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Professional Conduct, but the Alabama State Bar's conclusion that the
supermajority provision was a valid attorney-client contractual provision
was simply wrong.   We note that, in its opinion letter,  the Alabama State
Bar even appears to question why the Board would agree to such a
supermajority provision.
Next, the Firm argues that the contract was for legal and nonlegal
services.  Specifically, the Firm contends that the administration of the
contract-compliance program was a nonlegal service and, thus, that it can
maintain its breach-of-contract claim against the Board insofar as it
relates to that nonlegal service.  
The trial court found that the contract was for legal services.  We
agree. The record reflects that the contract contains no separate
provisions identifying the administration of the contract-compliance
program as a nonlegal service.   The contract provides for one rate for all
of  the Firm's services, and the contract provides that the Firm would
administer the contract-compliance program from time to time as
requested by the Board.     There is no definition of the services to be
provided for administration of the contract-compliance program in the
40
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contract, and those services were to be provided on an "as requested"
basis.    Even if we assume that the contract provided for both legal and
nonlegal services and that administering a contract-compliance program
was a nonlegal service, that program was never approved or adopted.  
The record shows that one of the members of the Board wrote a
memorandum setting out the goals that he would like to see accomplished
under such a program, and the Board approved transferring money from
a reserve fund to an operational fund for such a program.   However, as
one of the Board members recognized, no money would be spent until a
contract-compliance program was created.  There is nothing in the record
to indicate that such a program was created, approved, or adopted by the
Board.   Moreover, the record reflects that any contract-compliance
program would have included oversight of the HUB  program, which was
already being administered by employees of the Board.    The minutes of
a governmental body are the best evidence of the official acts of the
governmental body.   Kimbrell v. City of Bessemer, 380 So. 2d 838 (Ala.
1980);    Penton v. Brown Crumner Inv. Co., 222 Ala. 155, 131 So. 14
41
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(1930).  In this case, the minutes of the Board reflect that the contract-
compliance program was never created, approved, or adopted.
Last, the Firm argues that there is conflicting evidence regarding
the appropriate measure of damages it would be entitled to on a breach-of-
contract claim relating to the administration of the contract-compliance
program.  However, because such a program was never created, approved,
or adopted, we pretermit discussion of this argument.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.  
Bolin, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Shaw and Bryan, JJ., and McCool, Special Justice,* dissent.
Mitchell, J., recuses himself.
*Judge Chris McCool of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was
appointed to serve as a Special Justice in regard to this appeal.
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PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree that the supermajority provision was unenforceable as an
unconscionable restriction of the right of The Water Works Board of the
City of Birmingham ("the Board") to terminate the portion of its contract
with Fuston, Petway & French, LLP ("the Firm"), that called for legal
services. I dissent from the main opinion with regard to the contract-
compliance-program portion of the contract. There was a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether that portion called for nonlegal services,
for the reasons stated by Justice Shaw, see ___ So. 3d at ___ (Shaw, J.,
dissenting). Cf. Ellenstein v. Herman Body Co., 23 N.J. 348, 129 A.2d 268
(1957) (holding that contract with lawyer for labor-relations consulting
was for nonlegal services). And, contrary to the main opinion, there was
an issue of fact regarding whether the contract-compliance program was
created. The Firm's invoices reflect that, in the weeks after the contract
was signed, the Firm spent about 20 hours performing services related to
the program. It is undisputed that the Board paid the Firm for those
services, implying that they were requested by the Board. Further, there
was an issue of fact regarding whether, if the Board had not terminated
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the contract, the Board would have asked the Firm to perform further
services related to the program. Finally, if the Board breached the
contract-compliance-program portion of the contract, the Firm would have
been entitled to at least nominal damages. See Knox Kershaw, Inc. v.
Kershaw, 552 So. 2d 126, 128 (Ala. 1989). A nominal-damages award may
be important for collateral reasons, such as seeking prevailing-party
attorney fees. Accordingly, I would reverse the summary judgment with
regard to the contract-compliance-program portion of the contract.
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SHAW, Justice (dissenting).
This case involves the purported termination of a contract between
the law firm of Fuston, Petway & French, LLP ("the Firm"), and The
Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham ("the Board").  The Firm
sued the Board alleging that the contract was not properly terminated and
sought damages.  The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of
the Board, and the main opinion affirms that judgment.  I respectfully
dissent.   
The Board, as an entity, makes decisions through the collective
agreement, by vote, of its governing board members.  Although the
organizational rules that determine how the board members make
decisions by vote on behalf of the entity are not entirely disclosed, and
although any law governing that voting process is not extensively
addressed, it is clear from the facts that some actions of the Board are
decided by a majority of the board members and some by a supermajority
of the board members.
In this case, it is alleged that the contract between the Board and
the Firm required a vote by a supermajority of the board members to
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terminate the contract.  As recounted in the main opinion, the minutes
from the meeting by the governing board members on whether to agree to
the contract show that the potential ramifications of the inclusion of the
supermajority-vote requirement was fully discussed.  It is undisputed that
the board members later purported to terminate the contract by a simple
majority vote.     
"It is well recognized that the employment of an attorney by a client
is revocable by the client with or without cause, and that such discharge
ordinarily does not constitute a breach of contract ...."  Gaines, Gaines &
Gaines, P.C. v. Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, 554 So. 2d 445, 447 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1989) (emphasis added; quoted with approval in Garmon v.
Robertson, 601 So. 2d 987, 989 (Ala. 1992)).  Rule 1.16(a)(3), Ala. R. Prof.
Cond., states that "a lawyer ... shall withdraw from the representation of
a client, if ... the lawyer is discharged."  The Comment to that rule states:
"A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without
cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services."
The language of the contract and the description of the services to
be provided make clear that the Board, as an entity, and not the
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individual members of its governing board, is the "client" in this case.7 
Further, the issue in this case is not whether the Board could terminate
the contract, but whether the board members actually did so. 
The parties -- both sophisticated -- had a specific agreement as to the
means required to terminate the contract: a supermajority vote.  The Firm
received an informal advisory opinion from the Alabama State Bar
indicating that such an arrangement was permissible and did not violate
Rule 1.16, Ala. R. Prof. Cond.  There are numerous reasons given on
appeal for the supermajority-vote requirement, including regular changes
in membership/leadership of the governing board, which occurred in this
case, and that such a requirement is a provision "routinely include[d]" in
contracts negotiated and executed by the Board.
Our prior decisions recognize that we "highly value the freedom to
contract" and that, as a result, "we will not alter the expressed intentions
of the parties to a contract unless the contract offends some rule of law or
7It is clear from the contract that the Firm was to provide the Board,
as an entity, certain services; no legal representation for the individual
members of the governing board is at issue. 
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contravenes public policy."  Grimes v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 227 So. 3d 475,
487 (Ala. 2017).  As the Firm notes, in the absence of an ambiguity, courts
are obligated to enforce lawful, freely negotiated contracts as written. 
See, e.g., Ex parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales, Inc., 718 So. 2d 33, 35 (Ala.
1998).
Contracts for legal services may be revocable by a client without
cause, but this general public policy governs the reason for the
termination.  The agreement of the Board to require a supermajority vote
in this case provides how a corporate body -- not an individual client -- will
decide to effect any termination.  Given the unique facts in this case, the
sophistication of the parties, and the corporate nature of the Board and
the way it conducts business, I do not believe that the general public
policy of allowing a client to terminate legal representation on any basis
is implicated in this case.   
Further, it appears disputed that some of the services provided in
the contract related to the contract-compliance program were nonlegal in
nature.  Specifically, numerous responsibilities regarding engagement,
monitoring, and outreach outlined as necessary to the administration of
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the contract-compliance program appear to be distinctly nonlegal in
nature.  In fact, the minutes of the meeting preceding the adoption of the
contract reflect that, before its adoption, "the Board [was] presently doing
everything that the [Firm was required to] do" under the contract.  
Finally, the trial court concluded that the Firm was unable to
demonstrate damages because it was not guaranteed any minimum
amount of work under the contract and, instead, was obligated only to
provide legal services when or if requested.  However, the Firm produced
substantial evidence indicating that the Board breached the termination
provision of the contract; therefore, the Firm argues, it could be entitled
to nominal damages.  Knox Kershaw, Inc. v. Kershaw, 552 So. 2d 126, 128
(Ala. 1989) (quoting James S. Kemper & Co. Se., Inc. v. Cox & Assocs.,
Inc., 434 So. 2d 1380, 1385 (Ala. 1993)) (" '[W]hen the evidence establishes
a breach, even if only technical, there is nothing discretionary about the
award of nominal damages.' ").   
Given the above, I respectfully dissent. 
Bryan, J., concurs.   
 
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McCOOL, Special Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the main opinion's
conclusion that public-policy considerations override the express and
unequivocal intent of the employment contract between The Water Works
Board of the City of Birmingham ("the Board") and Fuston, Petway, &
French, LLP ("the Firm"), at issue in this case.
I agree with the main opinion's conclusion that public policy
generally prohibits a breach-of-contract action for a client's termination
of a lawyer's representation.  This is so because, as the main opinion
notes, a client has a right to terminate a lawyer's representation at any
time and for any reason, and this right " ' "is a term of the contract implied
by public policy because of the peculiar relationship between attorney and
client." ' "  ___ So. 3d at ___ (emphasis omitted) (quoting Olsen & Brown
v. City of Englewood, 889 P.2d 673, 676 (Colo. 1995), quoting in turn
AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 264 Ga. 351, 353, 444 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1994)).
However, like Justice Shaw, I believe the main opinion ignores the
fact that this public-policy consideration is not implicated in this case. 
Simply put, nothing in the employment contract prohibits the Board from
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terminating the Firm's representation at any time or for any reason. 
Rather, as Justice Shaw points out, the employment contract merely
contains a supermajority provision that defines how that termination
must occur, and I fail to see how it violates public policy to hold the Board
to the manner in which it chose to bind itself with respect to the
termination of the Firm's representation.  
Furthermore, I am concerned that, by applying a public-policy
principle that I do not believe is applicable in this case, the main opinion
intrudes upon another public-policy consideration -- namely, the parties'
freedom to contract with each other as they see fit.  That is to say,
although a client may, as a matter of public policy, terminate a lawyer's
representation at any time and for any reason, is it not also a matter of
public policy to allow a client to freely and voluntarily choose to enter into
an agreement that restricts the manner in which that termination must
occur?  I believe it is, and, in fact, the Alabama Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the freedom to contract is the " 'paramount public
policy.' "  Milton Constr. Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 568 So. 2d 784, 789
(Ala. 1990) (quoting 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts, § 178 (1964)), rev'd on other
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grounds, Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978 So. 2d 17, 23 (Ala. 2007). 
As both the main opinion and Justice Shaw note, the Alabama State Bar
Association has apparently reached the same conclusion by opining that
the supermajority provision is permissible and that the Board was free to
" 'place the super majority restriction on its own ability to terminate
counsel.' "  ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting February 3, 2017, opinion letter of
the Bar).  Of course, that opinion is not binding upon the Alabama
Supreme Court.  However, I do believe that that opinion letter provides
support for the conclusion that the supermajority provision does not
intrude upon the public-policy principle that allows a client to terminate
a lawyer's representation at any time or for any reason.
In Poole v. Prince, 61 So. 3d 258, 281 (Ala. 2010), this Court stated:
"The power to declare a contract void based on a violation of
public policy ' "is a very delicate and undefined power and, like
the power to declare a statute unconstitutional, should be
exercised only in cases free from doubt." '  Milton Constr. Co.
v. State Highway Dep't, 568 So. 2d 784, 788 (Ala. 1990)
(quoting 17 Am Jur. 2d Contracts § 178 (1964)).  ' "The courts
are averse to holding contracts unenforceable on the ground of
public policy unless their illegality is clear and certain .... 
[T]he courts will not declare an agreement void on the ground
of public policy unless it clearly appears to be in violation of
the public policy of the state." '  Id."
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I do not believe that the supermajority provision of the employment
contract actually violates the public policy of allowing a client to terminate
a lawyer's representation at any time or for any reason.  By concluding
otherwise, the main opinion does infringe upon the parties' right to
contract as they see fit.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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