Case Title: Sisson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 319, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SEAN M. SISSON, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 319, 2005 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. A. Nos. IN-04-03-2294 through 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  2296 and IN04-03-2301 through 2303 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
)  ID Nos. 0403019957A and 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
)  0403019957B 
 
Submitted:  April 12. 2006 
Decided:  June 19, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED 
 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell (argued) and Nicole M. Walker, Office of the Public 
Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas E. Brown (argued) and Donald R. Roberts, Department of Justice, 
Wilmington, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
2
 
The defendant appellant, Sean Sisson appeals his convictions for six counts 
of Sexual Exploitation of a Child. The Delaware State Police executed a search 
warrant at Sisson’s residence and seized Sisson’s business computer. On the 
computer they found several hundred images of child pornography, ten of which 
depicted Sisson’s daughter. Sisson was charged with ten counts of Sexual 
Exploitation of a Child and various other counts of possessing and dealing in child 
pornography. Before trial, Sisson moved to suppress the images contending that 
the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to support a finding of probable cause. 
Sisson also moved to dismiss nine of the ten counts of Sexual Exploitation of a 
Child on the ground that they were multiplicitous. The trial judge denied both of 
these motions. The trial judge did, however, grant Sisson’s motion to sever the 
Sexual Exploitation counts from the other dealing and possessing counts. After a 
bench trial on the Sexual Exploitation charges, the judge found Sisson guilty on six 
of the ten counts of Sexual Exploitation of a Child. Sisson ultimately pleaded 
guilty to two of the other severed counts and the State entered nolle prosequis on 
the remaining charges. Sisson now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and 
motion to dismiss. Because the affidavit established probable cause, because 
Sisson was properly charged with ten counts of Sexual Exploitation, and because 
the evidence supports his conviction of six counts, we affirm the trial judge’s 
rulings and Sisson’s convictions.  
 
3
FACTS 
 
On March 24, 2004 detectives of the Delaware State Police submitted an 
application for a search warrant supported by an affidavit of probable cause to a 
magistrate in J.P. Court. The affidavit included the following information: 
1. On March 17, 2004, Your Affiant(s) received information through 
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
(NCMEC)1 that America On Line (AOL), an Internet Service 
Provider, had discovered an email that depicted a pre-pubescent, 
possibly Asia [sic], female performing fellatio on an adult white 
male. The email involved an AOL subscriber with the screen name 
“letsrolearound” 
with 
the 
email 
address 
of  
letsrolearound@aol.com. The email was discovered, by AOL, on 
January 2, 2004. AOL provided the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s 
Office, located in the state of Florida, with the picture and screen 
name 
of 
the 
subscriber. 
The 
original 
file 
name 
was 
“6year_blowbb.jpg”. An attachment, to the sent email by 
“letsrolearound”, was identified by AOL employees as an image 
depicting child pornography. 
2. [A Florida Detective], of the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, 
sent 
a 
subpoena 
to 
AOL 
for 
information 
involving 
“letsrolearound”. It was discovered that the subscriber for 
“letsrolearound was [the defendant’s wife] with an address [in] … 
Lutz, Fl[orida]…. Sean Sisson [the defendant] (WM: DOB: 
02/23/63) was the second bill contact on the AOL account. [The 
Florida Detective] discovered that [the defendant’s wife] and … 
Sisson no longer resided in Florida and had a current address [in] 
… Hockessin, De. 
3. [The Florida Detective] also discovered that [the defendant’s wife] 
and Sean Sisson had two daughters and two sons. In May 2002, the 
Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office investigated an allegation of 
child abuse involving Sean Sisson, who was identified as the father 
of [youngest daughter], and [oldest daughter] … The allegation 
                                                 
1  
See State v. Sisson, 883 A.2d 868, 872-73, n.8 (Del. Super. 2005) (“Sisson I”) (explaining 
in detail the NCMEC). 
 
4
involved inappropriate behavior involving [youngest daughter] and 
her father Sean Sisson. The case was cleared unfounded [sic]. 
4. Since it was discovered that [defendant’s wife] and Sean Sisson 
now resided in Delaware, [the Florida Detective] forwarded all the 
information to NCMEC. NCMEC, in turn, forwarded the 
information to Your Affiant(s). 
5. Your Affiant(s) completed a local Delaware license check and 
found that [defendant’s wife and] Sean Sisson … obtained 
Delaware Drivers [sic] licenses in 2003. All the licenses have the 
address … [in] Hockessin, De. 
6. Your Affiant verified that [oldest daughter] and [youngest 
daughter] attend [a middle school] in Delaware. From [oldest 
daughter’s] school records, she is described as Asian-Caucasian. 
7. Your Affiant verified that Sean Sisson is employed by Netvantage 
Solutions Inc., located in Hockessin Delaware. Your Affiant 
completed a business check, through the Better Business Bureau, 
for Netvantage Solutions. The check revealed that the principle 
[sic] of the business is Sean Sisson. Netvantage Solutions offers 
intranet development, computer support, and software integration 
and Internet services and is located at 7454 Lancaster Pike, 
Hockessin, De. 
8. Your Affiant completed a search for 7454 Lancaster Pike … and 
found that this address is a Mailboxes Etc. Mailboxes Etc. offers 
mailboxes “drop boxes” that a person may rent. 
  
 
The affidavit included background information on email and the use of 
computers and the internet with child pornography. It also included statements that 
the DSP detectives made based on their “training and experience” that:  
The majority of individuals who collect child pornography rarely, if 
ever, dispose of their sexually explicit materials and may go to great 
lengths to conceal and protect from discovery, theft, and damage their 
collections of illicit materials…. [U]nder the relevant case law, 
information in support of probable cause in child pornography cases is 
less likely to be stale because collectors and traders are known to store 
and retain their collections for extended periods of time, usually in 
their home and/or computer [citing cases]. 
 
 
5
 
Based on this information, the DSP detectives requested a warrant to search 
the defendant’s residence for evidence of Unlawfully Dealing in Child 
Pornography and Possession of Child Pornography. A magistrate reviewed the 
application and authorized the search warrant. The detectives executed the warrant 
on March 24, 2004, seizing a number of items from the defendant’s home, 
including his business computer. As the trial judge elaborated: 
 
On 
this 
computer, 
detectives 
found 
several 
hundred 
pornographic images of prepubescent children engaged in various sex 
acts with adult males. After being Mirandized, … Sisson admitted that 
all of the child pornography on his business computer belonged to 
him. He also admitted that he transmitted pornographic images of 
children to other individuals who collect and view these images via 
the Internet. He further admitted that several of the images on his 
computer were of his thirteen year old daughter.2 
 
 
 
Sisson was arrested and charged with ten counts of Sexual Exploitation of a 
Child,3 numerous counts of Dealing in Child Pornography4 and numerous counts of 
Possession of Child Pornography.5 Before trial, Sisson moved to suppress the 
evidence seized pursuant to the warrant on the ground that the affidavit supporting 
the application for the warrant failed to establish probable cause. The trial judge 
                                                 
2  
Id. at 873.  
 
3  
11 Del. C. § 1108 
 
4  
11 Del. C. §1109 
 
5  
11 Del. C. § 1111.  
 
 
6
denied the motion.6 Sisson also moved to dismiss nine of the ten counts of Sexual 
Exploitation of a Child as multiplicitous. The trial judge denied this motion as 
well.7 The trial judge did, however, grant Sisson’s motion to sever the Sexual 
Exploitation of a Child counts from the other child pornography counts. After a 
bench trial, the trial judge found Sisson guilty of six of the ten counts of Sexual 
Exploitation of a Child.8 Sisson now appeals arguing that the trial judge erred by 
denying his motions.  
THE AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH 
 
Before the trial judge, and again before this Court, Sisson made three 
arguments for why the affidavit failed to establish probable cause. First, he argued 
that the affidavit only indicated when AOL “discovered” the email rather than 
when the email was “transmitted.” Thus, it was impossible to determine when the 
crime was actually committed and, therefore, impossible to conduct a staleness 
analysis. Consequently, the information in the affidavit was ipso facto stale. 
Second, Sisson argued that the police recklessly omitted information on email 
“spoofing” and that this information, if it had been included, would have vitiated 
                                                 
6  
Sisson I, 883 A.2d 868. 
 
7  
State v. Sisson, 883 A.2d 68 (Del. Super. 2005) (“Sisson II”) 
 
8  
Sisson later entered into a plea agreement with respect to the severed child pornography 
counts, and pleaded guilty to and was sentenced on two counts of Dealing in Child Pornography.  
 
 
 
7
the probable cause determination.9 Finally, Sisson argued that his AOL username 
insufficiently linked him and his residence to the digital picture discovered. The 
trial judge rejected these contentions, as do we. Our reasons follow.  
Probable Cause Generally 
 
Under the Delaware and the United States Constitutions, “a search warrant 
may be issued only upon a showing of probable cause.”10 An affidavit in support of 
a search warrant must, within the four-corners of the affidavit, set forth facts 
adequate for a judicial officer to form a reasonable belief that an offense has been 
committed and the property to be seized will be found in a particular place.11 In 
determining whether probable cause to obtain a search warrant exists, we apply a 
totality of the circumstances test.12 Thus, a magistrate may find probable cause 
when, considering the totality of the circumstances, “there is a fair probability that 
                                                 
9  
Before the trial judge, Sisson also argued that the detectives knowingly included false 
information in the affidavit. The trial judge found otherwise and Sisson did not appeal this 
ruling. 
 
10  
Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 786 (Del. 2003); U.S. Const. Amend. IV, Del. Const. art. 1, 
§ 6. 
 
11  
Fink, 817 A.2d at 787 (citing 11 Del. C. §2306; Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 811 (Del. 
2000)); Blount v. State, 511 A.2d 1030, 1033 (Del. 1986); Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571, 573 
(Del. 1975).  
 
12  
Fink, 817 A.2d at 787; See also Gardner v. State, 567 A.2d 404 (Del. 1989). 
 
 
8
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”13 Moreover, 
a neutral and detached magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from the factual 
allegations in the affidavit.14 
 
We review a magistrate’s probable cause determination with great 
deference, considering it as a whole in a practical, commonsense manner, and not 
on the basis of a hypertechnical analysis of its separate allegations.15 We do so 
because “[a] grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants is 
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant….”16 Therefore, our duty is simply to ensure that 
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable caused existed.17 
Giving great deference to the magistrate’s decision, however “does not mean that 
reviewing courts should simply rubber stamp a magistrate’s conclusions.”18 Where 
                                                 
13  
Stones v. State, 1996 Del. LEXIS 123, *5 (Del. 1996) (Order) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). See also United States v. Mortimer, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2208, *4 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
 
14  
James v. State, 1985 Del. LEXIS 583, *6 (Del. 1985) (Order) See also United States v. 
Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The issuing judge is entitled to go beyond the 
averred facts and draw upon common sense in making reasonable inferences from those facts.”).  
 
15  
Smith v. State, 887 A.2d 470, 473 (Del. 2005) (quoting Blount , 511 A.2d at 1034). 
 
16  
Smith 887 A.2d at 473 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)).  
 
17  
Scott v. State, 1992 Del. LEXIS 494, *8 (Del. 1992) (Order) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)); See also Mortimer, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2208, at *3.  
 
18  
United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 432 (3d. Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. 
Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1117 (3d. Cir. 1984)).  
 
9
the facts are not disputed and only a constitutional claim of probable cause is at 
issue, we will review the Superior Court’s application of the law of probable cause 
de novo.19  
 
With respect to staleness, it is clear that “[p]robable cause must be based on 
current information, not conjecture, for stale information will not support a finding 
of probable cause.”20 In other words, “probable cause must exist to believe that the 
specified items are presently on the premises….”21 While statements of dates and 
times are instructive, they are not dispositive to ascertaining the existence of 
probable cause.22 Instead, magistrates and courts must consider other factors 
including the kind of property for which authority to search is sought, and whether 
the evidence sought is highly incriminating or consumable and thus less or more 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
19  
Smith, 887 A.2d at 473. See e.g., Theis v. State, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 9683, *7-8 (Tex. 
App. 2005) (“We review de novo the trial court's application of the law of search and seizure and 
probable cause. [citation] Appellate review of the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a 
search warrant, however, is not de novo; rather, great deference is given to the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause.”) 
 
20  
Pierson, 338 A.2d at 573  
 
21  
Id. (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 1499, n2 
(U.S. 2006) (parenthetical) (quoting United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69, 75 (2nd Cir.1993)) 
(“[T]he facts in an affidavit supporting a search warrant must be sufficiently close in time to the 
issuance of the warrant and the subsequent search conducted so that probable cause can be said 
to exist as of the time of the search and not simply as of some time in the past."); United States v. 
Hython, 443 F.3d 480 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 
22  
Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d 105, 111 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). 
 
 
10
likely to remain in one location.23 The validity of probable cause cannot be 
quantified “by simply counting the number of days between the occurrence of the 
facts relied upon and the issuance of the affidavit.”24 Rather, in determining 
whether information has become stale due to an impermissible delay in securing a 
warrant, courts must examine all the relevant facts and circumstances in a 
“practical and flexible manner.”25  
A. The information in the affidavit was not stale 
 
Sisson focuses on one word in one sentence in the affidavit of probable 
cause to support his staleness argument: “The email was discovered, by AOL, on 
January 2, 2004.” According to Sisson, because the affidavit indicated only when 
AOL “discovered” the email, not “when it was transmitted and the alleged offense 
occurred…, [w]hen the offense … occurred is … conjectural.” Therefore, Sisson 
contends, there is no starting point to begin a staleness analysis; it is simply not 
possible to determine the duration of time between the alleged offense and the 
DSP’s effort to find incriminating evidence. Consequently, Sisson concludes, the 
affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause. We disagree.  
                                                 
23  
Id. at 112.  See United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 572-73 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 
24  
 Jensen, 482 A.2d at 112 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 
1972)).  
 
25  
Smith, 887 A.2d at 475 (quoting Jensen, 482 A.2d at 112). See also United States v. 
Washington, 139 Fed. Appx. 479, 482 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 
 
11
 
Sisson’s narrow focus on the word “discovered” and the argument that flows 
from it is misplaced because it involves a hypertechnical analysis of the affidavit’s 
separate allegations, rather than a commonsense approach to the affidavit in its 
entirety.  Viewing the affidavit as a whole and considering the totality of the 
circumstances, the issuing magistrate was free to draw upon his commonsense to 
infer reasonably from the facts alleged that there was a fair probability that AOL 
discovered the email within a short time – perhaps one or two days – after 
“letsrolearound” transmitted the email. While this may not have been the only 
inference the magistrate could have drawn from the “discovered” language in the 
affidavit, it certainly was not unreasonable.26  
 
The nature of the evidence in this case adds further support to the 
magistrate’s determination that probable cause existed. Sisson does not dispute 
that: 
child pornography is difficult to obtain; that it is more likely to be 
retained and secreted by its possessor for longer periods of time than 
other types of contraband such as weapons or controlled substances; 
                                                 
26  
See e.g., United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (split 
panel) (Search warrant was supported by probable cause where “the only inference the 
magistrate judge needed to make was that there was a “fair probability” [defendant] had, in fact, 
received or downloaded images.”); State v. Wright, 890 A.2d 703, 704 (Me. 2006). In Wright, 
the affidavit in support of the search warrant revealed that the defendant’s friend viewed child 
pornography on the defendant’s computer almost three months before the date of the affidavit. 
The defendant argued that there was no basis in the affidavit for the “three months” 
determination because the affidavit stated that the witness “viewed the images in late January or 
early February” but did not state the year. Id. at 704. The Court disagreed, noting that “[a]though 
the affidavit does not state the year, the court’s determination was based on a reasonable 
inference.” Id. at 704, n1 (emphasis added).  
 
 
12
and that special computer programs used by police may recover it 
long after it was acquired and any attempts to delete it from the 
computer.27 
 
The fact that child pornography is not highly consumable and that those who 
collect child pornography tend to keep it for long periods of time adds support to 
the magistrate’s analysis in this case.28 Based on their training and expertise, the 
detectives stated in the affidavit of probable cause: “The majority of individuals 
who collect child pornography rarely, if ever, dispose of their sexually explicit 
materials and may go to great lengths to conceal and protect from discovery, theft, 
and damage their collections of illicit materials….” Even if, for example, the 
magistrate had inferred that “letsrolearound” transmitted the email two months 
before AOL discovered it (which may have been less reasonable than inferring a 
transmission closer to the date of discovery), he still could have found probable 
cause to search, because he was aware that those who collect child pornography 
tend to retain it for long periods of time. Considering the nature of child 
pornography, the magistrate could have reasonably inferred that “letsrolearound” 
transmitted the email around January 2, 2004. Giving the requisite “great 
deference” to the magistrate’s finding, it is clear that the issuing magistrate had a 
                                                 
27  
Defendant’s Reply Br., pg 1; See Smith, 887 A.2d at 474 (citing cases).  
 
28  
See U.S. v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 434 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing United States v. 
Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318 (3d Cir. 1993) (“…pedophiles rarely, if ever, dispose of child 
pornography…. Presumably individuals will protect and retain child pornography for long 
periods of time because it is illegal and difficult to obtain.”)).  
 
 
13
substantial basis for finding probable cause that images of child pornography were 
presently on Sisson’s computer. With the reasonable inference in place, the 
magistrate could have concluded that less than three months had passed from the 
time “letsrolearound” sent the email and the time that the DSP executed the search 
warrant on March 24, 2004. Because of the nature of child pornography, the less-
than-three-month time period did not render the information in the warrant stale. 
 
Finally, Sisson’s reliance on Pierson v. State29 is misplaced. In Pierson it 
was “undisputed and manifest on the face of the warrant application/affidavit that 
it contain[ed] no statement as to times or dates, except the date of notarization.”30  
Because the warrant application contained no times or dates whatsoever we held 
that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause.31 Pierson is clearly 
distinguishable, because here the magistrate could reasonably infer from the facts 
on the face of the affidavit that there was a fair probability that AOL discovered 
the email around the time it was sent on January 2, 2004.  For these reasons, 
Sisson’s staleness argument must fail.  
 
 
 
                                                 
29  
338 A.2d 571.  
 
30  
Id. at 572.  
 
31  
Id. at 574.  
 
 
14
B. The detectives did not recklessly or intentionally omit material information 
from the affidavit 
 
 
Sisson next argues that the detectives recklessly omitted information on 
email spoofing in the affidavit of probable cause and that the magistrate would 
have been unable to make the probable cause determination had the information 
been included. As the trial judge noted, “E-mail spoofing occurs when a computer 
user receives email that appears to originate from one source when it was actually 
sent from another source.”32 According to Sisson, the affidavit of probable cause 
should have disclosed how spoofing could have caused the email in question to 
                                                 
32  
Sisson, 883 A.2d at 874, n19 (citing Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, 
CERT Coordination Center, Spoofed/Forged E-mail, at http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/ 
email_spoofing.html). Interestingly, in briefing before this Court, Sisson seems to suggest that a 
potential spoofer would need the username and the password associated with that username in 
order to spoof. As noted in his opening brief: “anyone familiar with the user name 
‘letsrolearound’ and the user’s password could have logged onto the AOL server from any 
computer on the internet and sent an email which appeared to originate from the username 
‘letsrolearound.’” (pg 8, emphasis added). As we understand it, the situation Sisson describes 
would not be spoofing at all because the email would in fact be sent from the legitimate 
“letsrolearound@aol.com” email account, even though it could have been sent from a nearby 
library or coffee shop by one of Sisson’s family members, friends, or anyone else with access to 
Sisson’s password. Sisson’s reference to the password seems to undercut his spoofing argument. 
If a password is required, there are fewer people who will be able to spoof any particular 
account. In any event, the expert testimony at the evidentiary hearing suggests to us that a 
spoofer can spoof without having access to the password associated with the spoofed AOL 
account. The expert testified that: 
 
Email spoofing is an activity that goes on, whereas, I can send an email to anyone 
in this room, assuming I know your email address, and I can make it look like it 
came from anybody I want to make it look like it came from. I can send you an 
email, and when you read that email, I can make it so that it appeared as though it 
was from georgewbush@whitehouse.gov... [even though I had no special access 
to the georgewbush@whitehouse.gov email account]. 
 
For purposes of this opinion, we will assume that it is this latter type of “password-not-required-
spoofing” that Sisson is attempting to describe.  
 
 
15
“appear… to [have] be[en] sent by the AOL user name ‘letsrolearound’ subscribed 
to by the defendant and his wife, [even though] it also could have been transmitted 
from a different computer location not associated with the defendant’s username.” 
Moreover, Sisson argues, the affidavit of probable cause also should have 
disclosed that AOL had purged the original email at issue pursuant to its email 
retention policy long before the DSP investigation, and that, therefore, it was 
impossible to review the electronic header of that original email in order to 
accurately determine that spoofing did not account for the email appearing to have 
been sent by the username “letsrolearound.” 33 
 
 
“If the police omit facts that are material to a finding of probable cause with 
reckless disregard for the truth, then the rationale of Franks v. Delaware applies.”34  
In Franks v. Delaware35 the United States Supreme Court held: 
                                                 
33  
Before the trial judge, Sisson also argued that the affidavit of probable cause also should 
have disclosed (1) that there were no past NCMEC CyberTipline reports involving the 
letsrolearound username; (2) that the NCMEC CyberTipline searched the internet to find other 
connections between letsrolearound and child pornography but found nothing; (3) that, at the 
request of the DSP, the FBI conducted an online search, that also returned negative results; and 
(4) that the affidavit should have included information on identity theft and “spamming.” Sisson 
also argued that portions actually included in the affidavit were recklessly misleading because 
they implied that the DSP actually had the email in their possession. As the trial judge found, 
looking at the totality of the circumstances in a practical, commonsense manner, these arguments 
have no merit. In any event, Sisson did not raise them on appeal. 
 
34  
Smith, 887 A.2d at 472; United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 574 (6th Cir. 2006)(“This 
Court has interpreted Franks to include omissions.”) 
 
35  
438 U.S.  154 (1978).  
 
 
16
Where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a 
false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant 
affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to a finding 
of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be 
held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the 
allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the 
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's 
false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is 
insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be 
voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if 
probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.36 
 
Thus, in the so-called reverse-Franks situation, if the defendant establishes by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the police knowingly and intentionally, or with 
reckless disregard for the truth, omitted information material to a finding of 
probable cause, the reviewing court will add the omitted information to the 
affidavit and examine the affidavit with the newly added information to determine 
whether the affidavit still gives rise to probable cause.37  
 
After hearing testimony from the two DSP detectives who prepared the 
affidavit of probable cause and from the defendant’s expert, the trial judge orally 
ruled that there was no evidence to suggest that there was “either an intentional or 
                                                 
36  
Blount, 511 A.2d at 1033 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56) 
 
37  
Smith, 887 A.2d at 472; See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (“To 
determine the materiality of the misstatements and omissions, we excise the offending 
inaccuracies and insert the facts recklessly omitted, and then determine whether or not the 
‘corrected’ warrant affidavit would establish probable cause.”) 
 
 
17
reckless withholding of …information.”38 Alternatively, the trial judge concluded 
that “none of the items identified by the defendant would have made a difference 
in the probable cause analysis.” In a following written opinion, the trial judge 
confirmed that Sisson “failed to carry his burden of proving that the detectives 
omitted information regarding ‘spoofing’ with reckless disregard for the truth.”39  
 
Sisson suggests that the trial judge erred by finding that the detectives did 
not omit the information with a reckless disregard for the truth. He cites Wilson v. 
Russo,40 Rivera v. United States41 and United States v. Perez42 for the proposition 
that the required reckless disregard under Franks may be inferred where clearly 
critical information to the probable cause determination has been omitted from the 
search warrant application regardless of the affiant’s subjective state of mind. 
Although the trial judge found that Sisson failed to carry his burden of proving that 
the detectives intentionally or recklessly withheld information, Sisson argues that 
                                                 
38  
The trial judge also concluded that there was no “information in the affidavit that would 
be grounds for a Franks challenge…[because he] found no information that was either 
intentionally …or recklessly misleading….”  
 
39  
Sisson I, 883 A.2d at 874 (citing Blount, 511 A.2d 1030). 
  
40  
212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000). Wilson was a civil rights lawsuit arising under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, in which the Court considered the plaintiff’s argument that his arrest violated his state and 
federal constitutional rights. The plaintiff argued that the arresting officer, one of the named 
defendants, lied and omitted material facts during his application for the plaintiff’s arrest 
warrant. Id. at 783.  
 
41  
928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991).  
 
42  
247 F.Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 
 
18
we should infer that the detectives were reckless based on the standard articulated 
in these cases.  
 
In Wilson, the Third Circuit considered what the Franks phrase “reckless 
disregard for the truth” means. The Court first noted that “unfortunately, the 
[United States] Supreme Court in Franks gave no guidance concerning what 
constitutes a reckless disregard for the truth in fourth amendment cases, except to 
state that ‘negligence or innocent mistake is insufficient.’”43  Left with little 
guidance from the United States Supreme Court, the Third Circuit concluded that 
reckless disregard for the truth means different things when dealing with omissions 
and assertions. For purposes of this opinion, we need only consider the standard 
that applies to omissions. According to the Third Circuit in Wilson, “omissions are 
made with reckless disregard if an officer withholds a fact in his ken that ‘any 
reasonable person would have known that this was the kind of thing the judge 
would wish to know.’”44 In Rivera, the Second Circuit also attempted to provide 
some guidance on what constitutes reckless disregard: “recklessness may be 
inferred where the omitted information was ‘clearly critical’ to the probable cause 
determination.”45 
                                                 
43  
Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787 (quoting United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171)) 
 
44  
Id. at 788 (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993)).  
 
45  
928 A.2d at 604. (citations omitted).  
 
19
 
The Court in Perez applied these standards to the facts of an affidavit of 
probable cause to search for child pornography.46 In Perez, the defendant 
subscribed to an egroup47 by entering his email address through the website 
associated with the group,48 but paid no fee.49 At some point an undercover FBI 
agent subscribed.50 During the time the FBI agent was a member he received 
numerous emails with pictures of child pornography attached.51 The FBI agent 
prepared an affidavit of probable cause describing the egroup, stating that all new 
members were automatically added to the egroup’s mailing list and that every 
member on the email list automatically received every email message transmitted 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
46 Perez was one of the many child pornography cases involving the FBI’s “Operation 
Candyman.” See also United States v. Strauser, 247 F.Supp. 2d 1135 (E.D. Mo. 2003); United 
States v. Bailey, 272 F.Supp. 2d 822 (D.Neb. 2003) (magistrate judge’s recommendation, later 
adopted by district court judge) (D.Neb. 2003); United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 
2005)(collecting cases) rehearing denied by 426 F.3d 83, rehearing, en banc, denied by 430 F.3d 
73 cert denied by 2006 WL 451674, 74 USLW 3487 (U.S. Jun 12, 2006) (NO. 05-1073); United 
States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2005)  rehearing denied by 426 F.3d 615, rehearing, en 
banc, denied by 430 F.3d 73, cert denied by 2006 WL 403674, 74 USLW 3487 (U.S. Jun 12, 
2006) (NO. 05-1062) 
 
47  
“An egroup is an internet forum through which persons with similar interests can interact 
by email and online ‘chat,’ and by posting messages, pictures, and videos to the group’s 
website.” Martin, 426 F.3d at 70, n1.  
 
48  
Perez, 247 F.Supp.2d at 471.  
 
49  
Id. at 462-64. 
 
50  
Id. at 465-66. 
 
51  
Id. at 462. 
 
 
20
by every other member to the group.52 Thus, the affidavit stated, when individual 
members transmitted child pornography the images automatically went to every 
member of the group.53 These statements were inaccurate because the egroup 
members, in fact, had three email delivery options: (1) receipt of all emails; (2) 
receipt of a daily digest of emails; and (3) receipt of no emails. 54 
 
After extensively reviewing the facts, the district court judge noted the 
reckless disregard standard of Wilson and Rivera and then applied the standard to 
the facts.55 He concluded that the FBI agent acted with reckless disregard for the 
truth by erroneously affirmatively representing that all members of the egroup 
received every email and therefore every member received images of child 
pornography transmitted to the group.56 The judge also concluded that the FBI 
recklessly omitted the fact that the egroup members had three email delivery 
options, including the option not to receive emails.57 Having concluded that the 
FBI recklessly disregarded the truth, he deleted the affirmative misstatements and 
                                                 
52  
Id.  
 
53  
Id.  
 
54  
Id. at 463. 
 
55  
Id. at 474. 
 
56  
Id. at 479 - 80.  
 
57  
Id.  
 
 
21
added the omitted information to form a “corrected” affidavit.58 Reviewing the 
“corrected” affidavit, the judge determined that there was no representation that the 
defendant “received any emails or that he received or downloaded or viewed any 
images or files or that he sent or uploaded any images or files.”59 All that was left 
was the fact that the defendant subscribed to a website where unlawful images of 
child pornography could be downloaded.60 This was not enough to permit a 
magistrate judge to determine that probable cause existed that child pornography 
would be found in the defendant’s home.61  
 
We are satisfied that Perez is distinguishable on its facts. Unlike Perez, 
where there was nothing in the affidavit to connect the defendant to any 
downloaded images of child pornography, here the image of child pornography 
was directly associated with a “sent email by letsrolearound.” Because Perez is 
distinguishable, we are left with the standards for reckless disregard articulated by 
the Third and Second Circuits. Even applying the “clearly critical” or the 
“reasonable-person-would-have-known-a-magistrate-would-have-wished-to-
                                                 
58  
Id. at 480. 
 
59  
Id. at 481.  
 
60  
Id.  
 
61  
Id.  
 
 
22
know” standards for reckless disregard to the record, we cannot conclude that the 
trial judge erred in this case. 
 
The trial judge apparently concluded that Sisson made a “substantial 
preliminary showing” that the detectives omitted the “spoofing information” from 
the affidavit with reckless disregard for the truth by attaching a computer print-out 
of a portion of the www.cert.org website on “spoofed/forged” email. He then held 
an evidentiary hearing at which both DSP detectives and the defendant’s computer 
expert testified. We have carefully examined the record of the evidentiary hearing 
and conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by finding that the 
DSP detectives did not omit information in reckless disregard of the truth. 62 Nor is 
there sufficient evidence in the record for us to independently infer that the DSP 
detectives acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Although Sisson may have 
presented some evidence tending to establish that the detectives acted with reckless 
disregard, that evidence, in our judgment, failed to meet the preponderance 
standard. The detectives may have been negligent, but negligence without more is 
not sufficient to require that that we add the omitted material and examine the 
“corrected” affidavit.63  
                                                 
62  
See Smith, 887 A.2d at 473.  
 
63  
See United States v. Rivera, 410 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 
23
 
In any event, assuming for the sake of argument that the detectives omitted 
the information in reckless disregard of the truth, we agree with the trial judge’s 
alternate holding that the omissions were simply not material. Had the omitted 
items been included, the magistrate still could have determined that there was a fair 
probability that a search of Sisson’s home would reveal contraband. The omitted 
items may have made it less likely that probable cause existed, but would not have 
entirely vitiated the magistrate’s determination had they been included. 
C. The AOL username was sufficient to establish a nexus between the 
defendant’s residence and computer and the intercepted image of child 
pornography 
 
 
In his third argument on appeal, Sisson suggests that the AOL username, 
“letsrolearound,” standing alone, provides an insufficient nexus between the image 
AOL discovered and the defendant’s residence and computer to support the 
magistrate’s probable cause determination. According to Sisson, to establish the 
required nexus between the defendant’s residence and computer and the image of 
child pornography, the affidavit should have informed the magistrate of the 
internet protocol (“IP”) address of the email sent from the letsrolearound@aol.com 
email address. Only with this IP address, Sisson suggests, could the magistrate 
“reliably determine…” the sender’s identity because, it appears from the expert 
testimony below, while an email address can be “spoofed,” an IP address cannot. 
 
24
Instead, an IP address obtained from the “header” information of an email message 
specifically links that email to a particular computer.   
 
At oral argument, Sisson’s counsel contended that this issue and the Franks 
issue were “mirror images,” apparently because the affidavit failed to include IP 
address information. It does not appear that Sisson is arguing that the DSP 
detectives acted with reckless disregard for the truth by failing to include the IP 
address (which they apparently did not have in their possession because they 
lacked the email that AOL had purged). Rather, Sisson’s argument appears to be 
that the IP address was required to establish the link between the email sent from 
“letsrolearound” because the specter of “spoofing” made it possible that Sisson did 
not send the email. Thus, Sisson concludes, only the IP address plus the username 
(or perhaps the IP address standing alone) would be sufficient to provide probable 
cause to search his home and computer.  
 
The parties cited a litany of cases to the trial judge64 and a slightly different 
litany of cases to us. The trial judge relied upon State v. Evers,65 which he 
determined was “most factually and legally on point,” to conclude that “an internet 
screen name alone can be sufficient to link the Internet subscriber associated with 
                                                 
64  
 See Sisson I, 883 A.2d at 877, n.38. 
 
65  
815 A.2d 432 (N.J. 2003).  
 
 
25
that screen name to criminal activity for purposes of establishing probable 
cause.”66  
 
In Evers, a detective from the San Bernardino (California) County Sheriff’s 
Office entered an AOL chat room devoted to sexual activity involving children.67 
He submitted his screen name and email address to a list-serve associated with the 
chat room that allowed other AOL subscribers interested in the subject matter to 
communicate with each other. Shortly thereafter, the detective checked his email 
and discovered responses from ninety-eight different screen names from the chat 
room. A response from the user with a screen name of “BTE324” contained 
images of child pornography.68 With this information, the detective obtained a 
warrant, which he served on AOL, seeking the identities of the ninety-eight users. 
AOL provided him with the name of the account holder and the billing address for 
“BTE324,” one of the ninety-eight.69 
 
BTE324 was registered to a New Jersey address, belonging to the 
defendant’s wife.70 The California detective, therefore, forwarded the information 
                                                 
66  
Sisson I, 883 A.2d at 878.  
 
67  
Evers, 815 A.2d at 437. 
 
68  
Id. 
 
69  
Id.  at 438. 
 
70  
Id.  
 
 
26
to New Jersey authorities. Based on the California detective’s investigation, a New 
Jersey detective applied for a warrant to search the defendant’s residence and 
computers. A magistrate reviewed the affidavit and found probable cause to issue 
the warrant. The police executed the warrant and seized the hard drive of the 
defendant’s computer, which contained images of child pornography. 71 
 
The defendant argued, among other things, that the AOL billing address for 
the BTE324 screen name did not resolve whether BTE324 “actually used the 
computer for illicit purposes at the same location, and therefore, that there was not 
a well-grounded suspicion that search of [the defendant’s] home would yield 
evidence of child pornography.”72 The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed, and 
upheld the magistrate’s finding of probable cause. The Court first noted that there 
was a fair probability that the computer would be at the defendant’s residence:  
The billing address of an account tied to a computer screen name may 
not be an absolute guarantee that the holder of the computer screen 
name used the computer at the billing address to commit criminal 
activity, but there is a fair and logical inference that the computer will 
probably be found at that address and, if not, at least evidence of the 
identity of the holder of the screen name will be found there. 73  
 
                                                 
71  
Id.  
 
72  
Id. at 446.  
 
73  
Id. at 448 (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1145 
(10th Cir. 2000), Hause v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 1, 4-5, 11-12 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)) 
(parentheticals omitted). 
 
 
27
Second, the court “conclude[d] that there was probable cause to believe that 
pornographic images of children would be retained on the computer of the person 
using the screen name ‘BTE324.’”74 In so doing, the Court relied upon the 
affidavit’s statement that child pornographers rarely destroy “the photographs and 
images of their prurient interest” and the “solid precedent” supporting the 
detective’s investigative reasoning.75 For these reasons, the Court held that the 
probable cause standard for the issuance of a search warrant was satisfied.76 
 
Before the trial judge, Sisson attempted to distinguish Evers. The trial judge 
properly concluded that Evers was not distinguishable on the ground Sisson 
proffered.77 Before this Court, Sisson appears to concede that Evers is factually 
analogous,78 but suggests that we should look to the analysis in Evers and not to 
                                                 
74  
Id. at 448. 
 
75  
Id. 447-448 (quoting United State v. Lamb, 945 F.Supp. 441, 460 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(“Since the materials are illegal to distribute and possess, initial collection is difficult. Having 
succeeding in obtaining images, collectors are unlikely to quickly destroy them.”) (additional 
citation omitted).  
 
76  
Id. at 450  
 
77  
Sisson I, 883 A.2d at 878.  
 
78  
Defendant’s Reply Br., pg 6 (While Evers permitted the issuance of a search warrant 
where the nexus to the suspected offender was established through the username of the person 
believed to have transmitted the email, it did not address and did not rule on whether the 
computer internet protocol … address of the suspected offender should also be identified in order 
to establish a reliable identification.”) (emphasis added).  
 
 
28
the result.79 In his reply brief, Sisson quotes a passage of Evers at length. For the 
sake of completeness, we quote Evers at greater length:  
There is nothing in the present record to indicate whether or not it 
was possible to determine the precise point of transmission of the 
email sent to [the California detective]. At oral argument, the State 
admitted that it did not know whether such information was 
obtainable. We note with approval that in several other cases, law 
enforcement officials took additional steps to verify that the 
computers from which offending images were sent were located in the 
defendants' residences. [citations] Although there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that such additional information was available in 
this case, law enforcement officers should, when possible, turn to 
available sources of information which may give greater accuracy to 
the probable cause determination. The Fourth Amendment … does 
not render ignorance bliss. 
 
We do not suggest that if it were possible to obtain the precise point of 
transmission in this case, the failure to do so would have invalidated 
the warrant. However, technological advances, if they do not already, 
may soon permit law enforcement officers to determine easily through 
Internet service providers the exact point of transmission of personal 
computer email. A single billing account for an Internet service 
provider, such as AOL, may cover the charges for a number of 
computers used by different members of a family. Given the mobility 
of our society, even that of the nuclear family, some computers may 
be at home and others in more distant locations. For example, parents 
may pay the account for computers used by their children in college. 
A laptop computer can be used at any number of locations other than 
                                                 
79  
The trial judge considered whether the fact that in Evers a law enforcement officer 
obtained the images and, here AOL obtained the image, impacted the probable cause analysis. 
Sisson argued that neither AOL nor NCMEC were “reliable sources and that any finding of 
probable cause based on information from these sources is flawed as a matter of law.” Sisson, 
883 A.2d at 879. The trial judge concluded that “AOL was a reliable informant and no 
independent corroboration of the information provided by AOL was required.”  Id at 880. Sisson 
did not advance any argument on appeal concerning AOL or NCMEC’s reliability as an 
informant. Thus, we need not consider the issue. See Murphy v State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 
1993) ("The failure to raise a legal issue in the text of the opening brief generally constitutes a 
waiver of that claim on appeal.") 
 
29
the billing address. For this reason, a judge reviewing an application 
for the search of a home should make certain that reliable information, 
which is accessible in a timely manner, is utilized in making the 
probable cause determination of the locale of a computer used for 
criminal purposes. In other words, our courts must consider the new 
realities of our ever-expanding technological world. Nonetheless, the 
proofs in support of a search warrant will continue to be examined in 
a common-sense and not a hypertechnical manner.80 
 
 
Sisson seizes on this language, particularly the italicized language, to argue 
for a reversal. In Evers, the record was incomplete because nothing indicated 
whether it was possible to determine the precise point of transmission of the email 
BTE324 sent. Here, in contrast, Sisson contends that the expert testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing established that the IP address information, “would have been 
available [to determine the precise point of the email sent] but its absence was not 
disclosed in this case.” Sisson argues that if the New Jersey Supreme Court had 
evidence before it like the expert testimony in this case, the outcome would have 
been different. We disagree because the very language the Court itself used belies 
this contention: “We do not suggest that if it were possible to obtain the precise 
point of transmission in this case, the failure to do so would have invalidated the 
warrant.”81 Had the New Jersey Supreme Court been as concerned with the 
possibility of determining the precise point of BTE324’s email transmission as 
                                                 
80  
Evers, 815 A.2d at 449-50. (emphasis added).  
 
81  
Id. at 449.  
 
 
30
Sisson suggests, that Court assuredly had the inherent power to remand the case to 
a trial judge with instructions to supplement the record by examining the methods 
of the “ever-expanding technological world” and whether these methods permitted 
the investigating officers to determine the point of transmission. In short, we do not 
read the dictum from Evers as Sisson does. The quoted language from Evers was 
not necessary or central to its holding, and we decline to adopt what Sisson calls 
the “analysis” of Evers as opposed to examining its “result.”  
 
Sisson also cites several other cases to support his argument that the 
username was insufficient to establish the required nexus between the image and 
his residence and computer. Of these cases, we will discuss only Taylor v. State82 
in any detail.83 Taylor appears to have arisen out of the same investigation as 
Evers. The same California detective entered an AOL chatroom, around the same 
time as in Evers, and “someone using the screen name ‘MENU441@aol.com’ 
purportedly ‘contacted detectives from the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s 
Department and transmitted child pornography and/or child erotica images via the 
                                                 
82  
54 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. App. 2001). 
 
83  
Sisson also cites United State v. Gourde, 382 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2004) different result 
reached after rehearing en banc 440 F.3d 1065 (March 9, 2006); United States v. Greathouse, 
297 F.Supp.2d 1264 (D. Ore. 2003); United States v. Perez, 247 F.Supp.2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
We are satisfied that Greathouse and Perez are not sufficiently analogous to control the outcome. 
Moreover, neither addressed the precise issue involved in this case. See Supra pgs. 19-21 for a 
discussion of Perez. Furthermore, while this appeal was pending, the Ninth Circuit issued an en 
banc opinion in Gourde that reached a different result than the panel decision upon which Sisson 
relies. To the extent that Gourde initially supported Sisson’s position, it now appears to support 
the State’s position.  
 
 
31
internet…’”84 After receiving subscriber information from AOL, the California 
detective forwarded the information to a Texas Ranger, and, consequently, the 
Texas Ranger applied for and was issued a warrant to search the defendant’s home. 
The search revealed evidence of possession of child pornography.85 After listing 17 
items not included in the affidavit, the Court concluded that the affidavit included 
three relevant pieces of information: (1) that there was one instance of one image 
being sent within a three month time frame from somewhere over the internet to 
someone in the California Sheriff’s Office by someone using the username 
MENU441; (2) a general description of the propensities  of someone “involved” in 
trading and collecting child pornography; and (3) the representation that the screen 
name MENU441 “comes back to [the defendant’s address].”86 The Court noted: 
Admittedly, a search of AOL records indicated that “MENU441” 
somehow “comes back to” [the defendant] who lived at a specified 
address. Yet, that [the defendant] utilized or had assigned to him the 
screen name when the transmission was sent, that he owned or 
otherwise maintained a computer or computer related equipment at 
the locale, that he had the capability of accessing AOL from the 
address, that the transmissions came from a particular computer or 
internet related equipment at [the defendant’s address], or that others 
could not use the screen name appeared nowhere in [the Texas 
Ranger’s] affidavit or its attachments. Furthermore, we do not think it 
                                                 
84  
Taylor, 54 S.W.3d at 22. Interestingly, the Evers Court did not mention or cite Taylor at 
all despite the fact that Taylor was decided (February 27, 2001) before Evers was submitted for 
decision (September 24, 2002).  
 
85  
Id. at 22-24. 
 
86  
Id. at 25. (emphasis added).  
 
 
32
reasonable to infer the presence of those indicia simply because a 
search of AOL records 1) attributed the screen name to [the 
defendant] at one time or another and 2) contained the address 
eventually searched.87 
 
The Court then held that the facts in the affidavit were insufficient to support the 
magistrate’s finding that a fair probability of finding child pornography at the 
defendant’s home existed.88  
 
It is possible to distinguish Taylor on its facts. Here, unlike Taylor, the 
affidavit included information that Sisson was the “principle [sic]” of Netvantage 
Solutions Inc., a company that offered “intranet development, computer support, 
and software integration and Internet services” – all computer-related services. 
Moreover, the police checked the address listed for Netvantage Solutions and 
determined that it was a Mailboxes, Etc. drop box. In other words, Netvantage 
Solutions did not appear to have an actual physical location. This information lends 
support to the reasonable inference of a fair probability that Sisson –  the principal 
of a business that provides computer services but might not have had a physical 
location – was likely to have computer equipment in his residence.89 Even if Taylor 
is not sufficiently factually distinguishable on this ground, we find Evers more 
                                                 
87  
Id. at 26. (emphasis in original) 
 
88  
Id. at 27.  
 
89  
See Id. at 25. 
 
 
33
persuasive.90 Accordingly, we hold, on the facts of this case, that: (i) the 
“letsrolearound” username, together with (ii) the Florida AOL billing address 
linking Sisson to that username, (iii) the fact that the DSP traced Sisson to his 
Hockessin address through driving records, and (iv) the fact that Sisson was the 
principal in a computer business with a drop box as the listed address, provided the 
magistrate with a substantial basis for concluding that a fair probability existed that 
there was a computer in Sisson’s residence upon which images of child 
pornography might be found.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90  
See also United States v. Chrobak, 289 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 2002) (The 
investigating officer “established a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the internet 
moniker by providing evidence that the name was registered to him.”); State v. Hinkel, 2000 
Ohio App. LEXIS 5961 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (split panel). At the evidentiary hearing in this 
case, the trial judge considered whether the return address on piece of “snail” or regular mail 
containing contraband was analogous to the username on an email with an attached image of 
child pornography. At oral arguments, we also considered that analogy. Hinkel seems to support 
the proposition that a return address might be sufficient, in some cases, to support a finding of 
probable cause to search the return address listed for contraband. We express no opinion on this 
issue or on whether Hinkel was correctly decided. Hinkel appears to lower the threshold required 
for a return address to give sufficient probable cause to a situation where the police have direct 
evidence that someone other than, and apparently completely unrelated to, the person residing at 
the return address sent “snail” mail spoofing that address. 
 
 
34
THE 10 COUNTS IN THE INDICTMENT FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
OF A CHILD DID NOT VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY, EQUAL 
PROTECTION, OR DUE PROCESS 
 
 
Sisson was indicted on ten counts of Sexual Exploitation of a Child under 11 
Del C. § 1108. He moved to dismiss nine of the ten counts as multiplicitous. In a 
well-reasoned opinion, the trial judge denied Sisson’s motion, concluding that 
under §1108 and 11 Del. C. §1103 “each separate photograph, motion picture or 
digitally created image is a single ‘visual depiction’” and that “the creation of each 
‘visual depiction’ … is a separate criminal offense.” 91  The case proceeded to a 
bench trial at which the trial judge found Sisson guilty of six of the ten counts. The 
trial judge then sentenced Sisson to the minimum mandatory of 12 years in 
prison.92 Sisson now appeals, claiming that the trial judge erred in his interpretation 
of § 1108, and, that if this interpretation is correct, the statute violates the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitutions. Sisson 
raises three constitutional claims that we will review de novo.93 
 
                                                 
91  
Sisson II, 883 A.2d at 71. 
 
92  
Sisson also received three years at Level 5 suspended for 1 year at level 2 for the two 
counts of Unlawfully Dealing in Child Pornography to which he pleaded guilty.  
 
93  
Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 535 (Del. 2006) (citing Grace v. State, 658 A.2d 1011, 
1015 (Del. 1995)). It is unclear whether Sisson actually raised his due process claim before the 
trial judge. The State does not suggest that we should review this issue for plain error. Instead, 
the State concedes that our standard of review for all of Sisson’s arguments on appeal is de novo.  
 
 
35
A. Multiplicity and Double Jeopardy 
 
On appeal, Sisson again argues that under the “multiplicity doctrine” the 
trial judge should have dismissed nine of the ten counts of Sexual Exploitation of a 
Child. The “multiplicity doctrine” is a subset of the protections afforded under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.94 The Double Jeopardy Clause, as a constitutional 
principle, protects a defendant (1) against successive prosecutions; (2) against 
multiple charges under separate statutes; and (3) against being charged multiple 
times under the same statute.95 Multiplicity is the “charging of a single offense in 
more than one count of an indictment.”96 Dividing “a single offense into multiple 
counts of an indictment violates the double jeopardy provisions” of both the 
Delaware and the United States Constitutions.97 Therefore, “prosecutors may not 
manufacture additional counts of a particular crime by the simple expedient of 
dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.”98 When 
determining whether the constitutional protection against double jeopardy permits 
                                                 
94  
U.S. Const. amend V; Del Const art. I, § 8. 
 
95  
Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Del. 2002) (citations omitted).  
 
96  
Feddiman v. State, 558 A.2d 278, 288 (Del. 1989) (quotation and citation omitted); 
Williams, 796 A2d at 1285. 
 
97  
Feddiman, 558 A.2d at 288; Williams, 796 A2d at 1285. 
 
98  
Handy v. State, 803 A.2d 937, 940 (Del. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted).  
 
 
36
multiple counts in any particular statutory setting, we look to legislative intent.99 In 
this case, therefore, we must determine the appropriate “unit of prosecution” under 
§1108.100 We thus turn to the text of the relevant statutes.  
 
11 Del C. §1108(1) provides:  
A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a child when: 
 
 (1) The person knowingly, photographs or films a child engaging in a 
prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act, or otherwise 
knowingly creates a visual depiction of a child engaging in a 
prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act; … 
 
“Visual depiction” is a defined term that means:  
 
(1) Any image which is recorded, stored or contained on or by 
developed or undeveloped photographic film, motion picture film or 
videotape; or 
 
   (2) Data which is stored or transmitted on or by any computer, or on 
or by any digital storage medium or by any other electronic means 
which is capable of conversion into a visual image; or 
 
   (3) Any picture, or computer-generated image or picture, or any 
other image whether made, stored or produced by electronic, digital, 
mechanical or other means.101 
 
                                                 
99  
Id. at 941. 
 
100  
Id. at 941, n.9 (quoting State v. Westling, 40 P.3d 669, 671 (Wash. 2002) (“Thus, when a 
defendant is convicted of multiple violations of the same statute, the double jeopardy question 
focuses on what ‘unit of prosecution’ the Legislature intends as the punishable act under the 
statute.”) 
 
101  
11 Del. C. § 1103(g).  
 
 
37
Before the trial judge, Sisson focused on the first clause of §1108(1) (particularly 
the phrase “knowingly, photographs or films”) to argue that the statute 
criminalized a course of conduct (the “photo session”) rather the act of creating 
each individual visual depiction. The trial judge correctly rejected this argument. 
He concluded that the second clause of §1108(1) (“or otherwise knowingly creates 
a visual depiction”),102 coupled with the definition of visual depiction in §1103 that 
was added at the same time, rendered the first clause of §1108 surplusage.103 As 
the trial judge noted:  
as a result of the 2000 amendments, the phrase “photographs or 
films,” as used in the first clause of Section 1108(1), was subsumed 
within the phrase “creates a visual depiction,” as it appears in the 
second clause, because a “visual depiction,” by statutory definition, 
includes a “photograph” or “film.”104 
 
 
We agree with the trial judge’s persuasive analysis and with his conclusion. 
Because under §1103 “each separate photograph, motion picture, or digitally 
created image is a single ‘visual depiction,’”105 the legislative intent in §1108 is 
very clear. The statute criminalizes each individual act of creating a single visual 
                                                 
102  
The legislature added that clause in July 2000 in an attempt to ensure that the criminal 
code could meet the challenges posed by new technology. 
 
103  
Sisson II, 883 A.2d at 72 (citing 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory 
Construction, §47.37, at 387-88.).  
 
104  
Id.  
 
105  
Id. at 71.  
 
 
38
depiction.106 Interpreting similar statutes, other courts have reached this same 
conclusion.107 That interpretation is consistent with our interpretation of the 
companion statutes 11 Del. C. §1109 and §1111 in Fink v. State.108  
 
Sisson’s “absurd result” argument does not convince us otherwise. Sisson 
argues that if we interpret the statute to criminalize each act of creating a visual 
depiction (the per-visual-depiction unit of prosecution) rather than each “photo 
session” (the per-photo-session unit of prosecution), resulting in numerous visual 
                                                 
106  
See Id. (“the creation of each ‘visual depiction’ … is a separate criminal offense.”). 
 
107  
See State v. Mather, 646 N.W.2d 605 (Neb. 2002) (split panel)(collecting cases); 
Williams v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 491 (Ky. 2005). But see State v. Root, 141 Wn.2d 701 
(Wash. 2000). Before the trial judge, Sisson argued that Root was analogous. On appeal, he cited 
Root, but appears to have abandoned the argument that Root is analogous. In any event, we are 
satisfied that the trial judge appropriately distinguished Root. See Sisson II, 883 A.2d at 73-74. 
But see also Wilson v. State, 114 P.3d 285 (Nev. 2005).  
 
108  
817 A.2d 781 (Del. 2003). In Fink we noted:  
 
Both 11 Del. C. § 1109(4) and § 1111(1) use the term “visual depiction” in the 
singular. The clearest reading of the statutes is that each individual “visual 
depiction” of child pornography that is knowingly “dealt” or possessed by a 
defendant constitutes the basis for a separate offense under the statutes. 
Accordingly, in this case, [the defendant’s] possession of multiple photographs 
depicting child pornography constituted multiple violations of both the dealing 
and the possession statute. Id. at 788. 
 
 §1108(1) also uses the term “visual depiction” in the singular. Like §1109(4) and § 1111(1), we 
are satisfied that the clearest reading of §1108 is that each individual “visual depiction” that the 
defendant knowingly creates constitutes the basis for a separate offense. Reading the statute and 
the statutory scheme as a whole, rather than nit-picking through individual sections, Sisson’s 
attempt to distinguish Fink by citing the word “any” in §1109(4) is unavailing.  In Fink we 
clearly focused on the fact that the statutes used the term “visual depiction” in the singular, not 
on the term modifying “visual depiction.”  
 
 
 
39
depictions, it will lead to absurd results. Sisson points to two of such potential 
“absurd” results. The first we can dismiss very readily.  
 
Sisson first posits that under the per-visual-depiction unit of prosecution: 
[T]wo defendants who share the same criminal intent and, at the same 
time, photograph [or film] the same victim engaged in prohibited 
sexual acts could be charged with widely varying numbers of crimes. 
For example, one defendant can take up to 24 still pictures in one 
second with a “motion picture,” [or video camera] amounting to 
14,400 images in ten minutes. [citation omitted] The other defendant, 
however, can only take a significantly fewer number of still pictures 
with a still camera in that same second [or ten minute time period]. 
[citation 
omitted]. 
Under 
the 
[per-visual-depiction 
unit 
of 
prosecution], the first defendant [who used a video camera] could be 
charged with up to 14,400 counts of Sexual Exploitation … while the 
other [who used a still camera] could be charged with a significantly 
fewer number of counts …. 
 
Under the statute as written, this hypothetical example simply can never occur in 
reality. The act of taking a ten-minute video or “motion picture” creates one visual 
depiction (the ten-minute video), not 14,400 still pictures. For purposes of a motion 
picture visual depiction, we look to the whole visual depiction, not to the sum of its 
parts. This is not to say that a defendant who took one ten-minute motion picture 
video and then, using digital editing software, created 20 still pictures from the 
motion picture could only be charged with one count under §1108. That defendant 
could be charged with 21 counts: 1 for the video and 20 for each still picture 
created from the video. Capturing single still frames from a video falls within 
 
40
§1108’s language of “otherwise knowingly creat[ing] a visual depiction.” For these 
reasons, we are satisfied that the first potential absurd result is not an issue.  
 
Sisson’s second potential “absurd” result is more troubling. Under the per-
visual-depiction unit of prosecution, Sisson contends, the Sexual Exploitation 
statute classifies offenders “based on the instrument of photography that is 
employed to obtain visual depictions.” This classification, Sisson argues, is 
arbitrary, capricious, irrational and absurd, and leads to one group of sexual 
exploitation offenders being punished more severely than another group. For 
example, assume an individual, during the course of one thirty-minute “photo 
session,” in the same location, and without interruption, takes thirty still pictures 
depicting a child engaged in a prohibited sexual act. Under §1108, that person will 
have created thirty visual depictions. Because §1108 is a class B felony and the 
sentence for a class B felony is “not less than 2 years up to 25 years” at level V, 
that person will be subject to a sixty-year mandatory minimum prison sentence.109 
A different person, under exactly similar circumstances, but who takes one thirty-
minute motion picture or video will be punished less severely. That latter person 
will have created one visual depiction and can receive from two to twenty-five 
years at Level V. Even if the second person receives the maximum, he would 
                                                 
109  
11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2) (“The term of incarceration which the court may impose for a 
felony is fixed as follows … For a class B felony not less than 2 years up to 25 years to be served 
at level V.”) (emphasis added).  
 
41
receive only twenty-five years, as opposed to the first person’s sixty years. 
According to Sisson, it is absurd to sentence the first person (the still 
photographer) more harshly than the second person (the “videographer”) because 
they shared similar criminal intents and engaged in similar acts, but merely used 
different instruments to create the respective visual depictions.  
 
The trial judge considered a variant of this argument below and ultimately 
rejected it. Before the trial judge, Sisson characterized the possibility that a person 
who took one still image could be sentenced the same as a person who took one 
video as a “practical loophole in the statute.” The trial judge noted: 
[W]hat may appear, at first glance, to be a statutory loophole can 
easily be remedied at sentencing. Among the factors in aggravation of 
the crime that the court may consider when determining an 
appropriate sentence are the circumstances surrounding the creation of 
the "visual depiction," including the length of a filming session, and 
the nature of the end-product itself.110 
 
With respect to a single visual depiction, the trial judge is assuredly correct. Trial 
judges have the discretion to sentence a person convicted of creating one still 
picture of a child engaged in a prohibited sexual act to the minimum mandatory of 
two years and, based on the surrounding circumstances, have the discretion to 
sentence a person convicted of creating one video of a child engaged in a 
prohibited sexual act to up to twenty-five years. Even so, this does not solve the 
problem of creating parity between the person convicted of taking thirty still 
                                                 
110  
Sisson II, 883 A.2d at 75.  
 
42
photographs in one photo session over a thirty-minute period (who receives a 
mandatory minimum of sixty years) and the person convicted of taking one thirty-
minute video in the same photo session (who can receive a minimum of two years 
up to a maximum of twenty-five years).  
 
At first blush, this potential disparity does seem absurd. Intuitively, a thirty-
minute video of a child engaged in a prohibited sexual act, presumably with audio 
and obviously with motion, seems more repugnant than thirty still photographs. 
Drawing from this seeming absurdity, Sisson suggests that we should adopt the 
analysis applied in Feddiman,111 considering the time, location, or intended 
purpose of the criminal conduct under the totality of the circumstances. Doing so 
would require interpreting the statute to create a per-photo-session unit of 
prosecution. But that, according to Sisson, would be a more rational approach, and 
would eliminate the disparate treatment of the still photographer who takes thirty 
pictures in thirty minutes and the videographer who takes one thirty minute video. 
 
We decline to adopt this totality of the circumstances approach and the 
corresponding per-photo-session unit of prosecution because, upon a closer 
examination of the purposes of the statute, this disparity makes perfect sense. The 
legislature was obviously concerned with curtailing the proliferation of child 
pornography. The per-visual-depiction unit of prosecution more effectively serves 
                                                 
111  
558 A.2d at 289.  
 
 
43
this purpose than does the per-photo-session unit of prosecution, and the legislature 
could have so rationally concluded. The legislature could have rationally 
concluded that to deter such proliferation it should focus on the number of visual 
depictions rather than their content or their method of creation. The more instances 
of visual depictions in existence, the higher the possibility for the proliferation of 
child pornography. It is easier to circulate thirty still pictures to other collectors of 
child pornography, whether the pictures are digital (and stored in a computer’s 
hard drive) or physical, than it is to circulate one thirty-minute physical or digital 
video. In other words, the legislature could have concluded that thirty individual 
pictures, each of which could be used for self-gratification or, worse, for a profit, 
would be more pernicious than one thirty-minute film, because the pictures can be 
copied and repeatedly posted more easily and widely than the film, and therefore 
might reach an overall larger audience than one film. §1108 looks not only to the 
act of creating a visual depiction of a prohibited act of child pornography, but also 
to the end product of that exploitation, the visual depiction itself. Using the per-
photo-session unit of prosecution rather than the per-visual-depiction unit of 
prosecution would undermine the legislature’s goal of curtailing the overall 
proliferation of visual depictions of child pornography by essentially giving the 
still photographer a volume discount on crime.   
 
44
 
As mentioned above, §1108 is broad enough to cover the situation of a 
person who takes a thirty-minute video and then uses the video as the raw material 
to create thirty still photographs depicting prohibited sexual acts by capturing 
single video frames. Such a person would be punished as severely as the still 
photographer who directly creates thirty still photographs using a camera. In short, 
what matters is not the method of creating the visual depictions, but the number of 
the visual depictions created, using whatever method, because “[e]ach picture is a 
crime against the child depicted as well as an offense to society.”112 Given the 
legislature’s concern with the proliferation of child pornography using new and old 
technology, we conclude that the legislature had a rational basis for looking to the 
end product of the exploitation to set forth the per-visual-depiction unit of 
prosecution under §1108. Because this interpretation of the statute does not lead to 
an absurd result, we reject Sisson’s statutory interpretation argument. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
112  
Fink, 817 A.2d at 788.  
 
 
45
B. Due Process and Equal Protection 
 
Sisson’s final argument on appeal is that §1108 and its per-visual-depiction 
unit of prosecution violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
United States Constitution.113 Sisson argues that §1108 punishes one group of 
sexual exploitation offenders (those who use a still camera) more severely than 
another group (those who use a video camera). According to Sisson, the statute 
classifies offenders into separate categories “based on the instrument of 
photography that is employed to obtain the visual depictions.” Imposing a harsher 
penalty on a person who uses a still camera than on a person who uses a video 
camera is allegedly irrational, arbitrary, and capricious. Moreover, Sisson 
contends, because the classifications are not rationally related to the purpose of the 
statute, which Sisson admits is to prevent the creation of child pornography, the 
statute violates the Due Process clause.  
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects against arbitrary and capricious classifications, and 
requires that similarly situated persons be treated equally.114  “Equal protection 
                                                 
113  
Sisson makes no reference to the Delaware Constitution. Thus we will consider only his 
federal constitutional claims. See Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 291, n4 (Del. 2005) (“Conclusory 
assertions that the Delaware Constitution has been violated will be considered to be waived on 
appeal”).  
 
114  
Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 247 (Del. 1994); Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 618 
(6th Cir. 2005). 
 
 
46
does not require identical treatment for all individuals within a class but, rather, 
when distinctive treatment for individual class members does occur, there must be 
a reasonable basis for the distinction.”115  For the distinction to be unconstitutional, 
“the distinction must be patently arbitrary and bear no rational relationship to a 
legitimate governmental interest.”116 Moreover, “due process … requires that a 
statutory provision be rationally related to its purpose.”117 
In determining whether a statutory classification, not involving a 
suspect class or fundamental right, violates the equal protection [or 
due process] clause, we presume that the distinctions so created are 
valid. A statutory discrimination or classification will not be set aside 
if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.118 
 
Sisson suggests that the statute creates two groups of persons who create visual 
depictions of children engaged in prohibited sexual acts: photographers and 
videographers. Photographers are allegedly punished more severely. As we read 
the statute, each class is punished the same. For each visual depiction created, 
whether it be a still photograph from a camera, a movie from a video camera, or 
even a still photograph created from a movie using editing software, the creator of 
                                                 
115  
Hughes, 543 A.2d at 248.  
 
116  
Id. (citing Gotleib v. State, 406 A.2d 270, 275 (Del 1979); Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 
1185 (Del. 1990)); See Virdin v. State, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 358 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999) 
(Ridgely, P.J.) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). 
 
117  
Hughes, 543 A.2d at 248 (citing State v. Hobson, 46 Del. 381 (Del. 1951). 
 
118  
Hughes, 543 A.2d at 247 (citation omitted).  
 
 
47
the visual depiction has committed one act violating §1108. If that is what Sisson is 
arguing, he is wrong because there is no unequal treatment in this instance, and 
therefore no equal protection or due process issue.  
 
What we think Sisson may be attempting to argue is that the statute creates a 
class of photographers who take several pictures during a defined time period, on 
the one hand, and a class of videographers who record one video during the same 
defined time period, on the other. The former are punished more severely than the 
latter, Sisson contends, based solely on the instrument used. Sisson does not 
suggest that those who create visual depictions of children engaged in prohibited 
sexual acts are members of a suspect class. Nor does he suggest or cite any case to 
support the proposition that the statute and its classification interferes with a 
fundamental right.119 Sisson argues only that the statute is not rationally related to 
its purpose, and that the legislature created the separate videographer/photographer 
classification arbitrarily and capriciously. Therefore we must determine only 
whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. As discussed 
at length above, the legislature could have rationally concluded that the unit of 
                                                 
119  
Virdin, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 358, at *6 (“Furthermore, a classification neither 
involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong 
presumption of validity. The statute presently under attack does not raise issues of race, alienage, 
or national origin and is therefore not subject to the strict scrutiny analysis which is required in 
such circumstances. Nor does the statute involve gender discrimination, and a heightened 
standard of review….”) (quotation omitted) (citing inter alia Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 
(1993); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.)  See Jackson, 411 F.3d at 618 (“[S]tatutes that do not 
interfere with fundamental rights or single out suspect classifications must bear only a rational 
relationship to a legitimate state interest.” 
 
48
prosecution should be per-visual-depiction in order to curb the proliferation of the 
number of visual depictions of child pornography in Delaware. Because the 
legislature had a rational basis for reaching this conclusion and because curbing the 
proliferation of child pornography is a legitimate state interest, Sisson’s equal 
protection argument must fail. Similarly, because §1108 is rationally related to its 
legitimate purpose of preventing the creation of child pornography, Sisson’s due 
process argument must fail as well.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, Sisson’s convictions and the judgments of the 
Superior Court are AFFIRMED.