Case Title: Wyoming Recreation Com'n v. Hagar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wyoming Recreation Com'n v. Hagar1985 WY 204711 P.2d 402Case Number: 85-131Decided: 12/18/1985WYOMING RECREATION COMMISSION, STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

JOHN G. HAGAR AND GERALDINE HAGAR, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).
Supreme Court of Wyoming

WYOMING RECREATION COMMISSION, 
STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

JOHN G. HAGAR AND 
GERALDINE HAGAR, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

 
 
A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Roger C. Fransen, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., and Cheryl Solon, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellant 
(defendant).

F.M. Andrews, 
Jr., of Andrews and Anderson, P.C., Riverton, for appellees 
(plaintiffs).

Before THOMAS, C.J., 
BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., and ROONEY and GUTHRIE, JJ., 
Retired.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal results 
from an action on a lease. Appellees John G. Hagar and Geraldine Hagar (the 
Hagars) brought action against appellant Wyoming Recreation Commission (the 
state) after the state refused to renew its lease with the Hagars for the full 
remainder of the option under the lease. Trial was had to a jury resulting in a 
verdict for the Hagars. The state appeals the judgment and raises a number of 
issues. Since we find that appellant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
(appellant's second issue), we need not address the other 
issues.

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

I

[¶3.]     In 1956, the Wyoming 
State Parks Commission (predecessor of the Wyoming Recreation Commission) 
entered into an agreement with the federal government to administer federal 
lands adjacent to the Boysen Reservoir in Fremont County, Wyoming.1 This agreement was for an initial 
term of thirty years with an option to renew for another twenty years. In 1966, 
the primary term of the agreement was extended approximately ten years to the 
year 1996, and the renewal option was reduced to ten years. The maximum length 
of the agreement including the renewal option extended to the year 
2006.

[¶4.]     In 1960 the Wyoming 
State Parks Commission leased a portion of the lands to the S.J. Stanbury 
Company, Inc., for a term of twenty-three years with an option to renew the 
lease for another thirty years. Therefore, the maximum length of the Stanbury 
lease, including the option, extended to the year 2013, seven years beyond the 
maximum length of the state's lease with the federal 
government.

[¶5.]     The Stanbury lease was 
subsequently assigned to the Hagars. In 1983, the primary term of the Stanbury 
lease expired. The Hagars sought to renew the lease for an additional thirty 
years. The state offered a thirteen year lease in its stead, which time 
represented the remainder of the primary term of the state's lease with the 
federal government.

[¶6.]     The Hagars then 
instituted the present action alleging the state had breached its obligation 
under the Stanbury lease by failing to renew that lease for an additional term 
of thirty years.

II

[¶7.]     Before trial, the state 
moved for summary judgment alleging there were no genuine issues of material 
fact. Such motion was denied by the trial court. At trial the state moved for a 
directed verdict which was also denied.2

[¶8.]     When reviewing a 
summary judgment on appeal, this court has the same duty as the district court, 
using the same material and information. Colorado National Bank v. Miles, 711 P.2d 390 (Wyo., 1985); and Randolph v. Gilpatrick Construction Company, 
Inc., Wyo., 702 P.2d 142 (1985). A party moving for 
a summary judgment has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of 
material fact. Dudley v. East Ridge 
Development Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 113 (1985). A material fact is 
one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of 
the essential elements of the cause of action or defense asserted by the 
parties. Samuel Mares Post No. 8, 
American Legion, Department of Wyoming v. Board of County Commissioners of the 
County of Converse, Wyo., 697 P.2d 1040 (1985). We look at the record from 
the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving him 
every favorable inference which may be drawn from facts in the affidavits, 
depositions, and other material properly submitted in the record. Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil 
Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147 (1981); and Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 
611 P.2d 819 (1980).

[¶9.]     Applying those 
standards to the present case, we think the state was entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. Both parties agree that the terms of the leases are 
plain and unambiguous. The material facts are not in 
dispute.

[¶10.]  The Stanbury lease, executed on June 21, 
1960, specifically provided it was subject to the agreement between the state 
and the federal government:

"8. It is mutually 
understood, by and between the parties hereto, that this lease is subject to the 
lease by and between the WYOMING STATE PARK COMMISSION and the 
United States of America, and 
that this lease is subject to all the terms of said lease between the PARKS 
COMMISSION and the United 
States of America."

The lease 
between the state and the federal government specifically provided that the 
state could not grant a lease to a third party for a term which exceeded the 
term of the state's lease with the federal government:

"* * * The term of all 
licenses, permits and contracts granted to third parties by the Commissions 
[State] shall not extend beyond the termination date of the agreement between 
the United States and the Commissions [State] for Boysen 
Reservoir."

[¶11.]  Such language is clear and unambiguous. 
The state had no authority to renew the Stanbury lease beyond the term of its 
lease with the federal government. In 1983, the state had thirteen years 
remaining in the primary term of its lease with the federal government until the 
year 1996. The provisions of the federal government lease are clear: the state 
cannot offer a lease beyond the term of its lease with the federal government. 
The state offered to renew the Stanbury lease for thirteen years, which was all 
it could offer.

[¶12.]  When construing a written agreement, we 
must derive the meaning of the instrument from its language if the terms are 
clear and unambiguous. Bowen v. 
Korell, Wyo., 
587 P.2d 653 (1978). If the terms are clear, then it falls within the province 
of the court to construe the instrument as a matter of law. Madison v. Marlatt, Wyo., 619 P.2d 708 (1980). Reference in an agreement to 
extraneous writings renders them part of the agreement for the indicated 
purposes. Busch Development, Inc. v. City of 
Cheyenne, Wyo., 645 P.2d 65 
(1982); and Kilbourne-Park Corporation v. 
Buckingham, Wyo., 404 P.2d 244 (1965). The Hagars had notice of the 
state's agreement with the federal government because their lease expressly 
referred to the state's agreement. Appellees, as assignees of the Stanbury 
lease, have no greater rights under the lease than did 
Stanbury.

[¶13.]  Although presented with different issues, 
this court stated in Hagar v. Mobley, 
Wyo., 638 P.2d 127, 129 (1981), that the Stanbury lease "was expressly subject 
to the lease between the Parks Commission and the United States Government." For 
purposes of this appeal, it makes no difference whether the agreement is or is 
not a lease. In the Mobley case, we 
upheld the district court's rescission of the Hagars' agreement to sell its 
interest in the leased premises to a third party, finding the Hagars made 
material misrepresentations of the profits received from the property to the 
buyers which induced the buyers to purchase the property. The issues raised in 
this appeal are different, but we affirm our position that the Stanbury lease 
was made expressly subject to the instrument between the state and the federal 
government.

[¶14.]  The instruments are clear and 
unambiguous, and we find the state entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We 
have held summary judgment proper in contract cases where the language of a 
contract is clear. Dudley v. East Ridge 
Development Company, supra.

"* * * Summary judgment 
may be utilized and is appropriate in contract cases; and if the language of a 
contract is plain and unequivocal, that language is controlling and the 
construction of its provisions is for the court as a matter of law. 
[Citations.]" Kuehne v. Samedan Oil 
Corporation, Wyo., 626 P.2d 1035, 1039 
(1981).

See also Samuel Mares Post No. 8, American Legion, 
Department of Wyoming v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of 
Converse, supra; Madison v. 
Marlatt, supra; Amoco Production 
Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 (1980). 
Our decision makes it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by 
appellant.

[¶15.]  Reversed.

1 Appellees contend that 
this instrument was neither a lease nor an agreement. We are not concerned with 
how this instrument is designated. For our purposes, it is not important whether 
it is a contract, lease or memorandum of understanding. The State of Wyoming derives its 
authority to manage these federal lands from this instrument. The state's 
authority to contract is limited by the terms of this 
instrument.

2 The trial court could 
have ruled that the state was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on 
the state's motion for summary judgment or on the state's motion for a directed 
verdict. Our applicable rules of review of either theory are substantially the 
same.