Case Title: Jobes v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 529, 2018

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EDWARD A. JOBES, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§     No. 529, 2018 
§ 
§     Court Below—Superior Court 
§     of the State of Delaware 
§   
§     Cr. ID No. 1510004414  
§  
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: January 11, 2019 
Decided: 
February 25, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Edward Jobes, appeals from the Superior Court’s denial 
of his first motion for postconviction relief.  The State has filed a motion to affirm 
the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Jobes’s 
opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that on December 7, 2015, a grand jury indicted 
Jobes for Rape Third Degree, following his arrest for engaging in sexual intercourse 
with a fourteen-year-old girl.  On February 24, 2016, Jobes pleaded guilty to the 
lesser-included offense of Rape Fourth Degree.  The parties agreed on an open 
 
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sentencing and a presentence investigation was conducted.  On May 24, 2016, the 
Superior Court sentenced Jobes to fifteen years’ incarceration, suspended after four 
years for decreasing levels of supervision.  Jobes did not file a direct appeal. 
(3) 
In July 2016, Jobes filed a motion for modification of sentence.  That 
motion was denied.  On July 18, 2016, Jobes filed a motion for postconviction relief 
under Superior Court Rule 61.  Jobes argued, among other things, that (i) the 
prosecution committed misconduct by withholding favorable evidence and not 
offering him a plea to unlawful sexual contact; (ii) there was insufficient evidence 
to indict or convict him; (iii) his counsel was ineffective because she did not fully 
review discovery materials with Jobes, did not sufficiently investigate and present 
mitigating evidence at sentencing, and provided him insufficient advice in 
connection with his guilty plea; (iv) the State violated the Fourth Amendment by 
seizing his cell phone and computer and extracting data from them, and his counsel 
should have sought suppression of that evidence; and (v) the police coerced his 
confession.  A Superior Court Commissioner recommended that Jobes’s motion for 
postconviction relief should be denied, reasoning that his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel did not provide a basis for relief because Jobes voluntarily 
pleaded guilty; his counsel’s representation was well within the range of 
reasonableness required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); during 
his plea colloquy Jobes stated he was satisfied with defense counsel’s representation; 
 
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and Jobes failed to make concrete allegations that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s 
alleged ineffectiveness.  The Commissioner determined that Jobes’s other claims 
were procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3) because they were not asserted before his 
conviction.1  The Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s report and denied the 
motion.  Jobes now appeals to this Court. 
(4) 
On appeal, Jobes argues that (i) the prosecution committed misconduct 
by withholding favorable evidence and not offering him a plea to unlawful sexual 
contact; (ii) there was insufficient evidence to indict or convict him; (iii) his counsel 
was ineffective because she did not fully review discovery materials with Jobes; and 
(iv) the State violated the Fourth Amendment by seizing his cell phone and computer 
and extracting data from them, and his counsel should have sought suppression of 
that evidence.2  We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.3   
(5) 
As an initial matter, the Superior Court correctly recognized that Rule 
61(i)(3) barred Jobes’s claims that did not implicate the effectiveness of his counsel 
because he did not raise those claims during the guilty plea proceeding and did not 
                                                 
1 SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(3) (barring “any ground for relief that was not asserted in the 
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court,” unless 
the defendant shows “[c]ause for relief from the procedural default” and “[p]rejudice from 
violation of the movant’s rights”). 
2 To the extent Jobes raises other issues on appeal, they were not raised in the Superior Court, and 
we therefore decline to address them.  See SUPR. CT. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the 
trial court may be presented for review . . . .”). 
3 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
 
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demonstrate cause for the procedural default.4  A successful claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel can constitute “cause” under Rule 61(i)(3).5  But to prevail on 
such a claim within the context of a guilty plea, a movant must show that (i) his 
counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged errors of counsel, the movant 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.6  A 
defendant must make concrete allegations of cause and actual prejudice to 
substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.7  Although not 
insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was 
professionally reasonable.8 
(6) 
In this case, Jobes’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not 
supported by the record.  The evidence against Jobes included his confession to the 
police that he engaged in sexual conduct with a fourteen-year-old girl.  If Jobes had 
gone to trial on the charge of Rape Third Degree, which is a Class B felony, he risked 
the imposition of a prison sentence of at least two years and up to twenty-five years.9  
By pleading guilty to Rape Fourth Degree, which is a Class C felony, he ensured a 
                                                 
4 SUPER. CT. R. 61(i)(3); see also Fields v. State, 2017 WL 4607424 (Del. Oct. 12, 2017). 
5 Cook v. State, 2000 WL 1177695 (Del. Aug. 14, 2000). 
6 Duffy v. State, 2019 WL 459982 (Del. Feb. 5, 2019); Fields, 2017 WL 4607424. 
7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
8 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
9 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2) (providing for a term of Level V incarceration for a Class B felony of 
“not less than 2 years up to 25 years”); 11 Del. C. § 771 (establishing rape in the third degree as a 
Class B felony). 
 
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much lower maximum term of incarceration and eliminated the minimum term of 
incarceration.10  Under these circumstances, Jobes cannot demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of his case would have been better for him if he had 
gone to trial rather than enter into a plea agreement.  We therefore conclude, as did 
the Superior Court, that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without 
merit. 
(7) 
To the extent that Jobes contends that his other claims of error warrant 
reversal separate from his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel, those claims 
are waived by his guilty plea.  Jobes could have raised the claims at trial if he had 
gone to trial, but he did not.  Instead, he chose to enter into the plea agreement.  A 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea waives a defendant’s right to 
challenge any errors occurring before the entry of the plea.11 
(8) 
In this case, having reviewed the transcript of the guilty plea 
proceeding, the Court has no doubt that Jobes entered his plea knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  During the colloquy with Jobes, the Superior Court 
made sure that Jobes understood the charges against him and what the guilty plea 
would mean for him.  Jobes expressed no reservation whatsoever when entering his 
plea.  He indicated he understood that he was waiving certain trial rights by pleading 
                                                 
10 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(3) (providing for a term of Level V incarceration for a Class C felony of 
“up to 15 years”); 11 Del. C. § 770 (establishing rape in the fourth degree as a Class C felony). 
11 Fields, 2017 WL 4607424; Smith v. State, 2004 WL 120530 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004). 
 
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guilty, including his right to require the State to prove each element of the charges 
against him beyond a reasonable doubt.  He also indicated that no one had coerced 
him into entering the plea, and he expressed satisfaction with his counsel’s 
representation.  Jobes acknowledged that he was pleading guilty to Rape Fourth 
Degree because he was in fact guilty of Rape Fourth Degree.  Absent clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary, Jobes is bound by his sworn representations 
during the guilty plea colloquy.12 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice  
 
                                                 
12 Palmer v. State, 2002 WL 31546531 (Del. Nov. 13, 2002).