Case Title: Edbow, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision

Citation: 1999-Ohio-331

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Edbow, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 1999-Ohio-331.] 
 
 
 
 
 
EDBOW, INC., APPELLEE, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Edbow, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Taxation — Real property valuation of four-story office building — True value — 
Board of Tax Appeals’ valuation of property reasonable and lawful, when. 
(No. 98-1809 — Submitted March 17, 1999 — Decided June 23, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 96-T-476. 
 
Edbow, Inc., appellee, owns a four-story office building at 665 East Dublin-
Granville Road in Columbus, which was built in 1972.  For the tax year 1993, 
Edbow filed a complaint with the Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR”), 
appellant, seeking to reduce the true value of the property from $639,200, which 
the Franklin County Auditor had placed on it.  The Columbus Board of Education 
(“Columbus”), appellant, filed a complaint with the BOR countering Edbow’s 
complaint. 
 
The BOR conducted a hearing on these complaints.  At the hearing, Edbow 
presented Brent G. Davis, who holds an Ohio Real Estate Appraisal Certificate, to 
offer an appraisal report and expert testimony on the true value of the property.  He 
testified that the true value of the property was $400,000. 
 
Columbus cross-examined Davis.  Columbus questioned Davis about 
various aspects of his report, including his selection of vacancy rates and 
comparable sales.  Columbus, however, did not present any evidence attempting to 
value the property.  In any event, the BOR decided to retain the auditor’s true value 
determination. 
 
Edbow appealed the BOR’s decision to the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”).  
All parties waived an evidentiary hearing in the appeal, and the BTA decided the 
matter after considering the statutory transcript certified to it by the BOR and the 
 
 
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briefs filed by the parties.  The BTA found that the true value of the property was 
$399,600, essentially the value attested to by Davis. 
 
In its decision, the BTA recounted Davis’s report and testimony.  In 
analyzing this evidence, the BTA rejected Davis’s market-data approach because 
insufficient evidence rendered it incompetent and not probative of value.  The 
BTA, however, adopted Davis’s income approach as the true value of the property.  
The BTA found the market rents to be reasonable because the comparable rental 
properties were similar in age, condition, and amenities offered to Edbow’s 
tenants. 
 
The BTA also accepted Davis’s vacancy and credit loss rate of twenty 
percent because the market near the property saw vacancy rates of thirty percent to 
fifty percent, and because Davis’s testimony that these rates were declining 
credibly and competently supported the rate Davis selected.  According to Davis, 
this property experienced a forty-percent vacancy rate in 1993. 
 
The BTA, next, found that Davis’s expense rates were in line with actual 
expenses for the property, contrary to appellants’ claim.  The BTA concluded that 
the high vacancy rate in the area supported the reasonableness of the high “expense 
to effective gross income ratio.”  In the final analysis, the BTA decided that Edbow 
had proven, by competent and probative evidence, that the true value of the 
property was $399,600. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Todd W. Sleggs & Associates, Todd W. Sleggs and Susan K. French-Scaggs, 
for appellee. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Matthew H. 
Chafin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellants Franklin County Auditor 
and Franklin County Board of Revision. 
 
 
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Teaford, Rich & Wheeler, Jeffrey A. Rich and James R. Gorry, for appellant 
Columbus Board of Education. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellants argue that the BTA cannot accept the opinion of a 
witness who did not appear personally before the BTA and that Davis’s appraisal 
report is not competent evidence of the true value of the property.  Edbow contends 
that it met its burden to prove the value of the property and that the evidence was 
competent and probative. 
 
We hold that sufficient, probative evidence of record supports the BTA’s 
factual findings and the BTA exercised sound discretion in ruling on the credibility 
of witnesses and the weight attributed to the evidence.  Our analysis of the 
evidence and our reading of the statutes and case law confirm the BTA’s 
conclusion as to the true value of the property.  Consequently, we affirm the 
BTA’s decision. 
 
In Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 77 Ohio 
St.3d 402, 405, 674 N.E.2d 696, 699, we set forth our role in reviewing appeals 
from the BTA: 
 
“Consequently, we affirm the BTA’s basic factual findings if sufficient, 
probative evidence of record supports these findings.  We also affirm the BTA’s 
rulings on credibility of witnesses and weight attributed to evidence if the BTA has 
exercised sound discretion in rendering these rulings.  Finally, we affirm the 
BTA’s findings on ultimate facts, i.e., factual conclusions derived from given basic 
facts [citation omitted], if the evidence the BTA relies on meets these above 
conditions, and our analysis of the evidence and reading of the statutes and case 
law confirm its conclusion.  After meeting all these prerequisites, the BTA’s 
decision would, thus, be reasonable and lawful, pursuant to R.C. 5717.04.” 
 
 
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Appellants chiefly complain that the BTA could not grant credibility to 
Davis because he did not testify before the BTA.  Appellants argue that the BTA 
unreasonably granted credibility to Davis and weight to his report. 
 
However, “the BTA has wide discretion to accept all, part or none of the 
testimony of any appraiser presented to said board. * * *  Absent a showing of 
abuse of that discretion, the BTA’s determination as to the credibility of witnesses 
and weight to be given their testimony will not be reversed by this court.”  Witt Co. 
v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 573 N.E.2d 661, 
663.  Thus, appellants must show that the BTA abused its discretion in granting 
credibility to witnesses and weight to evidence, not that the BTA unreasonably 
believed the testimony.  Appellants, here, made no such showing. 
 
Moreover, we have ruled that the BTA must review the transcript certified to 
it by the BOR.  “Thus, if the only evidence before the BTA is the statutory 
transcript from the board of revision, the BTA must make its own independent 
judgment based on its weighing of the evidence contained in that transcript.”  
Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 13, 
15, 665 N.E.2d 1098, 1101; R.C. 5717.01.  “In fact, the evidence contained in the 
record to the BTA from the board of revision may be used as the sole basis for 
deciding the appeal.”  (Emphasis added.)  Dublin Senior Community L.P. v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 455, 461, 687 N.E.2d 426, 
431.  Accordingly, the BTA did not err in reviewing the evidence Davis presented 
to the BOR and contained in its transcript certified to the BTA, or in granting 
credibility to Davis and weight to his report. 
 
As to appellants’ claim that they had no meaningful opportunity to cross-
examine Davis, they could have subpoenaed him at the BTA.  Despite appellants’ 
contention that Edbow held an uncontestable right to waive a hearing, Ohio 
Adm.Code 5717-1-15(B) provides that a BTA hearing “may be waived, in writing, 
 
 
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with the consent of all parties and the board.  If waived, the board may proceed to 
decide the case upon the record.”  Appellants joined in waiving the hearing; after 
doing so, as the rule states, the BTA could decide the case on the record. 
 
Finally, appellants claim that Davis’s report is not competent evidence, and 
they focus on the operating expenses Davis included in his report.  We find that the 
BTA adequately explained why it accepted Davis’s expense amounts.  According 
to the BTA, the expenses were in line with actual expenses for the property and 
were, according to Davis, in line with expenses at comparable properties.  The 
BTA decides these kinds of factual matters.  Wolf v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision 
(1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 205, 207, 11 OBR 523, 524, 465 N.E.2d 50, 52.  Appellants 
did not present any competing evidence to rebut these factual findings. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the BTA’s decision is reasonable and lawful, and 
we affirm it. 
Decision affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.