Case Title: State of New Jersey v. Manuel Perez

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-131-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). On a rainy February day in 1999, Perez drove up to D.D. in his car while she was walking to school. Perez offered to give her a ride to school, which she declined. Perez then drove away. D.D told her father about the incident. He did not report it, thinking it was an isolated event. About three months later, Perez saw D.D. playing on a public street with her two younger brothers. He stopped his car, singled D.D. out, and motioned for her to come over to his car. D.D. ignored Perez and he drove away. D.D. told her father about this incident and, in response, he called the police. The municipal police interviewed D.D. and then picked up Perez and brought him to the police station. Perez was given his Miranda rights, which he waived. He gave a formal statement wherein he revealed that he often watched D.D., that he thought she was about sixteen, that he liked her looks, that he is obsessed with her, that he would like to make use of how he looks now, and that he fantasizes about her and about asking her on a date. A grand jury charged Perez with fourth-degree stalking (count one); third-degree child luring, (count two); and third-degree attempting to endanger the welfare of a child (count three). At trial, the State sought to prove that Perez had attempted to lure D.D. into his car to engage in some form of prohibited sexual contact. The prosecution presented testimony from D.D., her brothers, her father, and from the police officer who had taken Perez s statement at the police station. After the State rested, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. The trial court granted Perez s motion with respect to count one, the stalking charge, but allowed the remaining two charges to proceed to the jury. Perez was thereafter found guilty of both child luring and attempted endangering the welfare of a child. Perez was sentenced to an aggregate three-year probationary term conditioned on lifetime community supervision, and assesses the usual monetary fines and penalties. The Appellate Division reversed on appeal, concluding that there was no reasonable basis on which the jury could have convicted Perez for child luring and attempted child endangerment. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: The State submitted sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Perez was guilty of child luring and attempted child endangerment. 1. The Legislature enacted the child-luring statute to close the gap between criminal charges of attempted kidnapping and the lesser offense of harassment for those times when a person unsuccessfully tries to lure a child into a car with a criminal purpose. The statute is intended to criminalize the early stages of an act that may develop into kidnapping or a sex offense with a child less than eighteen years old, which previously was nearly impossible to prosecute. In addition, the Legislature intended the child-endangerment statute to criminalize a broad array of sexual activity involving children below sixteen years of age. (Pp. 8-10) 2. When evaluating motions to acquit based on insufficient evidence, courts must view the totality of evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the State. The applicable standard is whether such evidence would enable a reasonable jury to find the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime or crimes charged. (Pp. 10-11) 3. When prosecuting an accused for child luring, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements: 1) that the accused attempted to lure or entice into a motor vehicle, structure, or isolated area, 2) a child under the age of eighteen, 3) with a purpose to commit a criminal offense with or against the child. A defendant s simple attempt to lure or entice a child into the prohibited space is the only act required under the statute. Like eluding or witness tampering, child luring does not involve an attempt to commit another substantive offense. Rather, the criminal act of child luring is complete when a person tries to lure a child into a motor vehicle with criminal purpose. (Pp. 11-13) 4. The record contains sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that the State satisfied all three elements of the child-luring statute beyond a reasonable doubt. Perez directly invited D.D. into his car to give her a ride to school. Three months later he singled her out, motioning her to come over to his car. A reasonable jury could have construed the totality of those facts as Perez s trying to get D.D into his car in satisfaction of the first element of the crime. Element two is satisfied as D.D. was under eighteen at the time of the encounters with Perez. It is the third element, with criminal purpose, that is hardest to discern. The jury was entitled to apply its common sense to the statements made by Perez to police: that he was obsessed with D.D.; that he fantasized about her and dating her; and that he was physically attracted to her. These facts would allow a jury to draw a reasonable inference that Perez s purpose in trying to lure D.D. into his car was to engage in sexual conduct. While this is a close case, the trial court did not err in allowing this child-luring charge to go to the jury. (Pp. 13-16) 5. Attempted child endangerment must be evaluated in accordance with the Criminal Code s criminal attempt statute. That statute requires proof of a defendant s criminal purpose, as well as evidence that the defendant had taken a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. A substantial step is conduct that strongly corroborates the defendant s alleged criminal purpose. Informed by the its analysis of the child-luring conviction, the Court is satisfied that a reasonable jury could have discerned Perez s criminal purpose within the meaning of attempted child endangerment based on the totality of his admissions. Similarly, the jury could have concluded that his actions constituted a substantial step toward realizing those intentions. Thus, the State presented sufficient proof of Perez s actions and purpose to withstand an acquittal motion in respect of those two elements of the crime. (Pp. 16-18) 6. With regard to the age element, the Court concludes that the Legislature intended that Chapter 14 of the Code, dealing with sexual offenses, be the standard for the victim s age, requiring that the State prove that the victim was under the age of sixteen regardless of whether the defendant knew or should have known that fact. Under that standard, the State met its burden of proof. Based on the conclusion that Perez was not entitled to an acquittal at the close of the State s case, there was no manifest denial of justice in the trial court s refusal to set aside the jury s verdict. (Pp. 18-21) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the trial court s judgment of conviction is REINSTATED. JUSTICE ZAZZALI, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agrees with the majority s conclusion that the evidence presented by the State supports Perez s conviction for child luring. However, he disagrees that the same evidence supports the conviction for attempted child endangering because the evidence presented does not support a finding that Perez took a substantial step towards commission of the object crime of child endangering. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE VERVIERO S opinion. JUSTICE ZAZZALI filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 131 September Term 2001 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANUEL PEREZ, Defendant-Respondent. Argued April 28, 2003 Decided July 22, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 349 N.J Super. 145 (2002). Steven E. Braun, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (James F. Avigliano, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney; Gary H. Schlyen, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). James H. Maynard argued the cause for respondent (Maynard & Truland, attorneys; Mr. Maynard and Joseph S. Szary on the briefs). Kristen M. Harberg, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General, attorney). Michael J. Sullivan argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (McElroy, Deutsch & Mulvaney, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. We are called on to evaluate the sufficiency of the State s evidence in respect of defendant s convictions for child luring and attempted child endangerment. Both offenses stemmed from two encounters with the same thirteen-year-old victim. The Appellate Division set aside the jury s guilty verdict, concluding that the evidence presented against defendant was insufficient as a matter of law. We disagree and reverse. . . . . I don t want to give up anything like my marriage, but what impressed me about her is her looks, she s attractive and her height. I don t know much about her. . . . . [On a prior occasion] [s]he was sitting on her front porch and I saw her talking to two young guys. I just drove by and we made eye contact and I just smiled at her. I was surprised that she lived there, I didn t know. I wasn t jealous of them, they were in her age bracket, I guess I m trying to take advantage of how I look now while I can. I am obsessed with her, but not like anything out of the ordinary. I find her attractive and there are plenty of young ladies that go by that way and sometimes I get to talk to them. Sometimes girls going to school or joggers. I don t usually fantasize about her, but sometimes if it come[s] to me mentally. Mentally I ve thought of asking her for a date, but actually no, it s hard to come on to a lady straight. You have to play the game. I wish I could ask her out, but physically it is hard. . . . . Yes, I said come over here [at the second encounter]. She didn t come over, she made a U-turn with the two boys and went up [the] Avenue. I just smiled and continued on my way. I wanted to talk to her because she was across the street, and I wanted to tell her that if she remembers me and that I was the guy that lives over on the corner of [the street]. I just wanted to see her up close and hear her voice and what she s like. Defendant also admitted that the first incident had occurred as D.D. described it to the police. A grand jury charged defendant with fourth-degree stalking in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10b (count one); third-degree child luring, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6 (count two); and third-degree attempting to endanger the welfare of a child, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:24-4a (count three). At trial, the State sought to prove that defendant had attempted to lure D.D. into his car to engage in some form of prohibited sexual conduct. The prosecution presented testimony from D.D., her two brothers, her father, and from the police officer who had taken defendant s statement at police headquarters. The officer read much of that statement to the jury. After the State had rested, defendant moved under Rule 3:18-1 for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. The court granted defendant s motion in respect of the stalking charge (a determination that the State does not contest). The court, however, allowed the other two charges to proceed to the jury, reasoning: The evidence does not indicate that either in February of 1999 or in May of 1999, that the conversation dealt with sex. In fact D.D. herself testified that there was nothing sexual. The defendant did not do anything that, under the circumstances - did not follow her, did not offer to take her anywhere, did not show her anything; did not ask her any other questions and did not mention he liked her or thought she was pretty or attractive and this would be [applicable] to both February of 1999 and May of 1999. What moves it in the direction of sex is the statement of the defendant. . . . . It s very close in my judgment as to whether or not both Counts 2 and 3 should be dismissed. It s a close question I believe, but as I indicated the standard is that the State does not have to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt, and I think when you consider the totality of the circumstances in giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, I think . . . a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that is to say, I think the jury can conclude that it was the defendant s conscious object both as to Count 2 and as to Count 3 to engage in a sexual act with this person which would be a prohibited offense or a criminal offense or sexual contact given her age being 13. . . . . Now it might be that he just wanted to ask her for a date, but, on the other hand, it might have been that he wanted to get her into the car to commit some type of sexual act with her. Now, you don t get it from what he said to her, but arguably you get it from the fascination that he had with her in terms of his statement to the police, and I realize it s somewhat of a stretch, but I really think it s a question that the jury should decide. The jury found defendant guilty of both remaining charges. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate three-year probationary term conditioned on lifetime community supervision, and assessed the usual monetary penalties and fines. The Appellate Division reversed in a reported decision. State v. Perez, 349 N.J. Super. 145 (2002). The panel concluded that there was no reasonable basis upon which the jury might have convicted defendant for child luring and attempted child endangerment. Id. at 151. We granted the State s petition for certification, 174 N.J. 40 (2002), and granted amicus curiae status to the Attorney General and to the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Association). [N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6.] As originally drafted, the statute provided that attempting to lure or entice a child into an automobile created a rebuttable presumption that the person has acted with a criminal purpose. Senate, No. 1524 (3rd reprint) (Feb. 1, 1993); Assembly Judiciary, Law and Public Safety Committee, Statement to Senate, No. 1524 (June 3, 1993). The Legislature, however, deleted that language as recommended by Governor Florio in his conditional veto of the bill. See Governor s Veto Message to Senate, No. 1524 (Aug. 16, 1993) (recommending deletion of language that created rebuttable presumption of criminal purpose when accused lacked legal responsibility for child). In that same conditional veto, the Governor requested that the Legislature increase the offense s classification from a fourth-degree crime to a third-degree crime. Ibid. Aside from his proposed changes, Governor Florio expressed his agreement with the bill. He stated: I want to commend the sponsors of this bill for proposing legislation that will fill a significant gap in our current law. Under current law, it is nearly impossible to prosecute individuals who attempt to abduct children into their cars until after it is too late - that is, until the criminal has succeeded in taking control of the child, and thereby inflicting serious psychological, and sometimes even physical harm on the victim. [Ibid.] After the Legislature had accepted his conditions, the Governor signed the measure into law in December 1993. b. (1) As used in this subsection: Child means any child under 16 years of age. [N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.] Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANUEL PEREZ, Defendant-Respondent. ZAZZALI, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the conclusion set forth in the majority s persuasive opinion that the evidence presented by the State supports defendant s conviction for child luring. N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6. I respectfully disagree, however, that the same evidence supports his conviction for attempted child endangering. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1; N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a. To convict defendant of that offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he took a substantial step towards commission of the object crime of child endangering. Ante, at __ (slip op. at 16) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1a(3)). Because I believe that the evidence presented in this case does not support such a finding, I dissent from that portion of the majority s opinion. A substantial step is conduct strongly corroborative of the actor s criminal purpose. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1b. Attempt crimes require that the actor take a substantial step towards the commission of an object offense to ensure that very remote prepatory acts remain excluded from the ambit of criminal liability. New Jersey Penal Code, Volume II: Commentary, Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission at 117-18. The substantial step requirement reflects the Legislature s policy judgment that an individual should not be subject to criminal prosecution and punishment for a criminal attempt unless he or she firmly has advanced toward some criminal objective. Ibid. It balances a fundamental concern for the liberty of our citizens with the State s general interest in criminal deterrence. Ibid. In this case, the State alleges that defendant attempted to commit the underlying crime of child endangering. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a (requiring defendant to engage in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of [a] child ). Although a jury reasonably might have inferred from defendant s statements to police that he desired sexual conduct with D.D., the State failed to offer sufficient evidence that defendant took a substantial step toward that end. The record establishes that defendant offered D.D. a ride to school on a rainy February day. D.D. declined defendant s offer and defendant drove away. On a second occasion, three months later, defendant saw D.D. playing on a public street with her younger brothers, stopped, and motioned for D.D. to come over to his car. When D.D. ignored defendant, he again drove away. Those two incidents comprised defendant s entire course of conduct toward D.D. As noted, to support a conviction for attempted child endangerment, defendant s actions must be strongly corroborative of a desire to engage in sexual conduct with D.D. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1b. If defendant s conviction for child luring, which does not require that a defendant take a substantial step, presents a close case, ante at ___ (slip op. at 15), his conviction for attempted child endangering, which does require a substantial step, should fall. On the thin facts of this appeal, a jury reasonably could not have concluded that defendant s actions were strongly corroborative of an underlying criminal intent. I therefore would vacate defendant s attempted child endangering conviction for failure to present sufficient evidence of a substantial step in accordance with the reasons expressed by Judge Parrillo on that issue. State v. Perez, 349 N.J. Super. 145, 155-57 (App. Div. 2002). NO. A-131 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANUEL PEREZ, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED July 22, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Verniero CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali DISSENTING OPINION BY