Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. West

Citation: 378 Md. 395

Docket Number: 38ag/02

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-02-004004
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 38
September Term, 2002
______________________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND
v.
PATTI DIANE GILMAN WEST
_______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
_______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
Bell, C.J., Cathell  and Harrell, JJ., dissent.
______________________________________________
Filed: November 20, 2003 
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference
of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
1Rule 1.1 provides as follows:
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”
2Rule 1.2 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the
objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and,
when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued.  A lawyer shall abide by a client’s
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.”
3Rule 1.3 provides as follows:
“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.”
4Rule 1.4 provides as follows:
“(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status
of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.”
5Rule 1.16 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a
client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from
the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law;
(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs
The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition
with this Court for disciplinary action against Patti Diane Gilman West, alleging violations
of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.  The Commission charged respondent with
violating Rules 1.1 (Competence),1 1.2 (Scope of representation),2 1.3 (Diligence),3 1.4
(Communication),4 1.16 (Declining or terminating representation),5 3.2 (Expediting
the lawyer’s ability to represent the client
***
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as
giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment
of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client
is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been
earned.  The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the
extent permitted by other law.”
6Rule 3.2 provides as follows:
“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client.”
7Rule 3.3 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law
to a tribunal”
8Rule 3.4 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“A lawyer shall not:
***
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion
that no valid obligation exists;
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery
request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to
comply with a legally proper discovery request by an
opposing party”
9Rule 8.1 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
***
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
-2-
litigation),6 3.3 (Candor toward the tribunal),7 3.4(c) and (d) (Fairness to opposing party and
counsel),8 8.1(b) (Bar admission and disciplinary matters),9 and 8.4(a), (c), and (d)
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in
the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful
demand for information from an admissions or
disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not
require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.”
10Rule 8.4 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
***
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice”
11The record reflects that malpractice claims were filed by respondent’s client,
Maryland General Hospital, and the cases were settled by respondent’s malpractice carrier.
Accordingly, the names of respondent’s clients who were injured as a result of her
misconduct have been deleted from this opinion.
-3-
(Misconduct).10  Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), we referred the matter to Judge Kaye
Allison of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to make findings of fact and proposed
conclusions of law.  Judge Allison held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that
respondent had violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c) and (d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(a),
(c), and (d).  She found that Bar Counsel failed to establish that respondent had violated
Rule 1.2 or Rule 1.16.
I.
Judge Allison made the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:11
-4-
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“Patti Diane Gilman West was admitted to the Bar of the Court of
Appeals on May 25, 1982.  The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland
has filed a Petition for Disciplinary Action against Patti Diane Gilman West
and, by Order dated July 23, 2002, the matter was assigned to this Court to be
heard and determined in accordance with Maryland Rule 16-757.  The
Respondent was served with the Writ of Summons, transmittal Order dated
July 23, 2002, the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, and various
discovery material on October 28, 2002.  The matter came before this Court
and a hearing was conducted on February 20, 2003.  From that hearing the
Court makes the following Conclusions of Law and Findings of Fact, each of
which, the Court finds to have been established by clear and convincing
evidence.
Carter
“On or about September 29, 1999, Maryland General Hospital and
[name deleted], LWS, a social worker employee of the Hospital, were served
with a copy of a Complaint filed against them by James Carter and others,
Carter, et al.v. Maryland General Hospital, Case No. 24-C-99-00521, Circuit
Court for Baltimore City.  At the time of service, the Hospital and [social
worker] were served with interrogatories, request for production of documents
-5-
and notices to take depositions.  In October 1999 Respondent was retained to
represent both the Hospital and [social worker] in the negligence action filed
on behalf of Carter and others.  
“Respondent did not timely respond to interrogatories and request for
production of documents in the Carter matter.  On or about July 27, 2000
Carter’s counsel filed a Motion to Compel Discovery to which Respondent
failed to timely respond.  By Order dated August 18, 2000, the Court in the
Carter matter ordered that the employees of the Hospital named in the order
appear for deposition and that the Hospital and [social worker] provide
responses to Carter’s discovery requests within thirty days of the date of that
Order.
“Respondent did not take measures to effectuate her clients’
compliance with that Order.  On or about September 29, 2000, Carter filed a
motion for judgment based on the noncompliance.
“The Court denied Carter’s motion for judgment by Order dated
November 6, 2000, and again ordered that the named employees of the
Hospital appear for deposition, and that the Hospital and [social worker]
provide responses to Carter’s interrogatories and request for production of
documents.  The Court further ordered that failure to comply with discovery
requests by the thirty-day deadline, without good cause, would result in a
-6-
default judgment against the Hospital and [social worker]. 
“Respondent failed to provide the discovery on behalf of the Hospital
and [social worker] within thirty days of the Court’s Order dated November
6, 2000.  Carter filed a second motion for judgment on or about December 7,
2000.  Respondent failed to respond and on January 19, 2001, the Court
granted that Motion. 
“Respondent also failed to effectuate her clients’ compliance with the
provision of the Scheduling Order requiring the designation of an expert
witness on damages.  Respondent’s failure to effectuate compliance with the
Court’s Scheduling Order and two Orders responding to discovery requests
left the Hospital with a judgment against it as to liability and no expert witness
to defend against Carter’s experts on damages.  Respondent misrepresented
the status of the case to the Hospital representatives.  She also failed to advise
them that she had not responded to discovery and that motions to compel and
for judgment had also been filed.  She failed to advise that default judgment
had been granted and that she had not designated any damage expert.  
“Respondent failed to provide competent representation to her clients
in violation of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1.  Respondent
failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in violation of
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3.  Respondent failed to keep her
-7-
clients reasonably informed of the status of their case and to explain the status
of the legal matter as reasonably necessary for the clients to make informed
decisions in violation of Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4.
Respondent knowingly misrepresented the status of the Carter matter to the
hospital in violation of Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c).
Respondent failed to expedite litigation in violation of Maryland Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.2.  Respondent violated Maryland Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.4(c)(d) by neglecting her obligation to take reasonably
diligent efforts to comply with proper discovery requests under the scheduling
order, the Maryland Rules of Procedure and Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct.  These actions are also violations of Maryland Rule of Professional
Conduct 8.4(a), and (d). 
Davis
“On or about June 8, 1998, Bridgette Davis, mother and next friend of
Desmond Davis, filed a complaint against [name deleted], M.D., [name
deleted], M.D., P.A. and the Maryland General Hospital, Davis, et al. v.
Maryland General Hospital, Case No. 24-C-98-159105/CC4926, Circuit Court
for Baltimore City.  Respondent was retained to represent the Hospital and
filed an Answer to the Davis complaint on or about August 24, 1998.  
“Respondent failed to timely identify a damage expert pursuant to the
-8-
Scheduling Order.  This failure caused significant prejudice to the Hospital’s
defense of the case.  Respondent failed timely to communicate to the Hospital
or its excess insurance carrier, OHIC (Ohio Hospital Insurance Company), a
settlement offer from Davis’ counsel dated July 5, 2000.  Respondent
conveyed the offer in December 2000.  Respondent’s failure necessitated that
the Hospital and OHIC agree to an unfavorable settlement.  
“Respondent represented to the Court that she needed continuances in
the Davis matter based on an incapacity which prevented her from defending
the case.  However, Respondent was practicing law in other matters during
this time period.  
“In the course of her representation in Davis, Respondent (1) violated
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 by her failure to competently
pursue the legal matter entrusted to her; (2) Maryland Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.3 by failing to diligently and promptly pursue the legal matter; (3)
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 by failing to reasonably
communicate with her client about the status of the legal matter; (4) Maryland
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2 by failing to reasonably expedite the
litigation consistent with her client’s best interest; (5) Maryland Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) by her knowing misrepresentation of the need
for a continuance; (6) Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(c)(d) by
-9-
knowingly disobeying the obligation to provide discovery and identify expert
witnesses; and (7) Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a), (c) and (d).
Lewis
“ On or about November 16, 1998, Mary Lewis filed a Complaint on
her own behalf and on behalf of Lakriasha M. Lewis-Dixon, Case No. 98-
320105/CC10009, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City naming one of
Maryland General Hospital’s physicians, [name deleted], as the defendant.
“Respondent was retained by the Hospital to represent [physician] and
she filed an Answer on his behalf on December 21, 1998.  On or about
January 28, 1999, Respondent identified Dr. Robert Keehn as an expert who
could certify that a meritorious defense existed.  In August 2000, Lewis’
counsel requested Respondent provide dates when Dr. Keehn could be
deposed.  Respondent failed to respond to that request.  Lewis’ counsel served
a notice of deposition of Dr. Keehn on Respondent for October 3, 2000.
Neither Respondent nor Dr. Keehn appeared for the October 3, 2000
deposition.  On or about October 10, 2000, Lewis’ counsel filed a motion to
compel discovery and for sanctions.
“By Order dated November 14, 2000, the Court granted Lewis’ motion
to compel discovery and for sanctions and ordered that Dr. Keehn be
produced for deposition on or before November 30, 2000.  The Order
-10-
specified that noncompliance would result in Dr. Keehn being excluded as an
expert.  Respondent failed to produce Dr. Keehn for deposition and failed to
request an extension of time.  Dr. Keehn was precluded from testifying on
behalf of [physician].  With no expert on the standard of care, the Hospital
was forced to enter into a settlement.  
“Respondent violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1,
1.3, 3.2, 3.4(c)(d) and 8.4(a).  
Strong
“On or about January 5, 2000, Paul Strong filed a complaint in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City naming Maryland General Health Systems,
Incorporated; Maryland General Hospital; [physician] and several of the
Hospital’s staff physicians as defendants, Strong v. Maryland General
Hospital, Case. No. 24-C-00-000055.  Respondent was retained to represent
the Hospital and [physician] and she filed an Answer to the Strong complaint
on March 9, 2000.  
“On or about January 25, 2000, Strong’s counsel served a first request
for production of documents on the Hospital and [physician].  Respondent
failed to effectuate a timely response.  On May 16, 2000 Strong’s counsel
served the Hospital and [physician] with Interrogatories and a Second Request
for Production of Documents, to which Respondent failed to effectuate a
-11-
timely response.  Approximately ten months later, on January 24, 2001, a
motion to compel and for sanctions was filed.  Respondent failed to file an
opposition.
“By Order dated February 25, 2001, the Hospital and [physician] were
ordered to ‘fully respond to [Strong’s Interrogatories] and produce all
documents responsive to [Strong’s] document requests within fifteen days of
[that] Order’ and it was further ordered that if the Hospital and [physician]
failed to respond to Strong’s discovery requests within fifteen days of that
Order, the Court would enter a default judgment upon subsequent pleadings.
Respondent did not provide answers to interrogatories nor produce documents
on behalf of the Hospital and [physician].  With its ability to defend the
Strong matter substantially impaired, the Hospital was forced to settle.  
“Respondent’s actions violated Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 3.4(c)(d) and 8.4(a)(d).  
Neal
“On or about March 9, 2000, Samuel J. Neal, III filed a complaint in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City naming Maryland General Hospital as the
defendant, Neal v. Maryland General Hospital, Case No. 24-C-00-001240.
Respondent was retained to represent the Hospital in the Neal matter and filed
an answer on or about May 12, 2000.  On or about May 12, 2000, Neal’s
-12-
counsel served interrogatories and requests for production of documents on
the Respondent as counsel for the Hospital.  Respondent failed to effectuate
her client’s response.
“On or about October 12, 2000, Neal’s counsel filed a motion to
compel and for sanctions to which Respondent did not respond.  By Order
dated November 14, 2000, the Court ordered that responses to Neal’s
discovery requests be produced within fifteen days of the date of that Order.
On or about December 19, 2000, Neal’s counsel filed a motion for default
judgment because Respondent did not respond to the Order compelling
answers to discovery.  Respondent did not file an opposition to Neal’s motion
for default judgment.  An Order of Default was signed on January 18, 2001.
“Respondent violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1,
1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 3.4(c)(d), and 8.4(a)(d).  
Stewart
“On or about August 8, 1994, Kenneth Stewart and others filed an
action, Stewart v. Frimpong, Case No. 94220028/CL184410, in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City naming as defendant [name deleted], an employee
nurse-anesthetist of the Maryland General Hospital.  The Hospital retained
Respondent to represent [nurse-anesthetist].  Respondent obtained summary
judgment in favor of [nurse-anesthetist] in 1995.  Thereafter Stewart appealed
-13-
to the Court of Special Appeals.  That Court remanded the matter and
eventually Stewart appealed to the Court of Special Appeals a second time.
During the second appeal, Respondent failed to file a brief and failed to
appear at oral argument.  The Court of Special Appeals reversed the summary
judgment and remanded for trial before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
The Hospital settled.
“Respondent violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1,
1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 8.4(a)(d). 
Koehler
“On or about October 25, 1999, Mark M. Koehler, Sr. and his wife
filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City naming Maryland
General Hospital as Defendant, Koehler v. Maryland General Hospital, Case
No. 24-C-99-005053.  On or about November 15, 1999, the Hospital was
served with a writ of summons, complaint, interrogatories, request for
production of documents and a case civil information sheet.  Respondent was
retained to represent the Hospital and filed an answer on its behalf on
December 7, 1999.
“Respondent failed to effectuate the Hospital’s response to Koehler’s
interrogatories and request for production of document for over three months.
Further, Respondent failed to respond to Koehler’s counsel’s numerous
-14-
written and telephonic attempts to obtain the outstanding discovery.  On or
about February 29, 2000, Koehler’s counsel filed a motion for sanctions to
which Respondent did not respond.  On March 24, 2000, the Court entered an
Order compelling the Hospital to respond to the outstanding discovery within
fifteen days from the date of that Order.  On or about April 18, 2000,
Koehler’s counsel moved for default judgment based on noncompliance with
the Court’s order.  Respondent did not oppose Koehler’s motion for default
judgment and it was granted on May 15, 2000.  A Revised Order granting
default judgment was entered on June 7, 2000.  Respondent moved to vacate
that judgment.  The motion to vacate was denied on July 14, 2000.  
“With no ability to defend the action, the Hospital was forced to settle.
Koehler’s counsel demanded $150,000.00.  Respondent had failed to convey
to the Hospital a prejudgment settlement demand from Koehler’s counsel in
the amount of $75,000.00.
“Respondent violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1,
1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c)(d), 8.4(a) and (d).  
Matthews
“On or about September 30, 1999, Paul Matthews filed a complaint in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City naming Maryland General Hospital and
several physicians including [name deleted] as Defendants, Matthews v.
-15-
Maryland General Hospital, et al., Case No. 24-C-99-004642.  Respondent
was retained to represent the Hospital and [physician] and filed an answer to
Matthews’ complaint on October 26, 1999.  Matthews’ counsel served
interrogatories and a request for production of documents on the Hospital and
[physician].  Respondent failed to have the defendants provide complete
responses to those discovery requests and failed to produce witnesses for
depositions.  Matthews’ counsel filed a motion to compel discovery on April
14, 2000.  Respondent failed to respond.  On or about June 12, 2000, the
Court granted Matthews’ motion to compel and ordered the Hospital to
provide the requested discovery within forty-five days.
“On or about August 28, 2000, Matthews’ counsel filed a motion for
judgment by default based on the failure to comply with the Court’s Order
dated June 12, 2000 compelling discovery.  The Court granted Matthews’
motion for judgment by default, but granted the defendants fifteen days to
provide the discovery before entry of judgment.  Respondent failed to comply
with the Court’s Order and Matthews’ counsel again filed for default
judgment on December 7, 2000.  Respondent filed an untimely opposition on
February 23, 2001.  The Court struck Respondent’s untimely opposition on
March 23, 2001, and subsequently entered a default judgment against the
Hospital.  
-16-
“The effect of the default was to preclude the Hospital from defending
against Matthews’ proof of liability or damages and from calling any expert
witnesses in its defense.  Respondent misrepresented to the Hospital the status
of the Matthews matter.  
“Respondent violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1,
1.3, 1.4, 3.2, 3.4 (c)(d), and 8.4(a)(d).  
Carter, Davis, Lewis, Strong, Neal, Stewart, Koehler and Matthews
“Throughout Respondent’s representation in the Carter, Davis, Lewis,
Strong, Neal, Stewart, Koehler, and Matthews matters, representatives of
Maryland General Hospital asked Respondent to provide written reports for
the purpose of updating and advising the Hospital about litigation brought
against it.  Notwithstanding repeated requests, Respondent failed to provide
written reports for the purpose of updating and advising the Hospital about
litigation brought against it.  Notwithstanding repeated requests, Respondent
failed to provide the status reports for many months.  Summaries of pending
litigation were provided on or about December 15, 2000 and March 15, 2001.
Those reports were misleading in that they did not reveal the pendency of
motions for judgment and outstanding default orders.  Further, Respondent
failed to advise the Hospital in those cases that motions to compel and/or for
sanctions were filed against it and its defendant representatives or doctors.  
-17-
“Respondent violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 and
8.4(c) and (d).
Hunter
“On or about June 17, 1998, Kimberly Hunter and Arnold Lee filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County naming [physician],
Maryland General Hospital, Dr. [name deleted] and Dr. [name deleted] as
Defendants, Hunter, et al. v. Maryland General Hospital, et al., Case No. 03-
C-98-006096.  Respondent represented the Hospital, [physician] and
[physician].  
“Respondent failed to reply to an Order in June 2000, requiring the
Hospital to pay $4,500 in deposition costs.  That failure resulted in a default
motion being filed against the Hospital.  Respondent violated Maryland Rules
of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 3.4(c) and 8.4(a)(d).  
Disciplinary Proceedings
“Petitioner was notified of Respondent’s alleged misconduct by
complaint dated April 5, 2001, with numerous attachments.  Respondent was
notified of that complaint and directed to respond by letters dated May 8,
2001, May 29, 2001 and June 11, 2001.  The complaint was updated by letter
dated May 25, 2001.  The updated complaint was forwarded to Respondent.
Again, Petitioner sought her explanation and response to the complaint.
-18-
Respondent failed to respond to the Office of Bar Counsel.  
“Respondent violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.1(b)
and 8.4(d).
Mitigation
“Respondent has been a member of the Bar of Maryland for twenty-one
years.  During that time she practiced law without disciplinary incident and
enjoyed good health.  During this time she also taught at the University of
Baltimore School of Law, the University of Maryland and MICPEL.
“In approximately the Spring of 2000, Respondent was diagnosed with
osteomyelitis.  She also was faced with the serious prospect of loss of her leg.
In June 2000, she traveled to Boston for treatment.  She suffered
complications from her treatment and was again hospitalized in September in
Baltimore.  During a trip to New York over Thanksgiving, Respondent was
again hospitalized, this time on an emergency basis.
“Throughout her trying medical ordeal, the Respondent practiced law.
Perhaps bravely, but, as is now apparent, misguidedly, Respondent continued
her practice without adjusting for her medical condition.  She refused help
from her colleague and denied an inability to handle her legal practice.  While
not admitting to the violations of professional conduct with which she was
charged, Respondent expressed remorse that ‘things had slipped through the
-19-
cracks’ and opined that when she was ill, she should have done things
differently.
Conclusion
“Respondent has violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1; 1.3;
1.4; 3.2; 3.3(a)(1); 3.4(c)(d); 8.4(a), (c), (d).”
Neither party excepts to any findings of fact or conclusions of law.  After a review
of the record, we hold that the findings of fact of the hearing judge are not clearly erroneous
and the hearing judge’s conclusions of law are supported by the facts.
II.
This Court has original jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 539, 810 A.2d 457, 474 (2002).  In
the exercise of our obligation, we conduct an independent review of the record, accepting
the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.  See Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 763-64 (2002).  The factual findings
of the hearing judge will not be disturbed if they are based on clear and convincing
evidence.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 388, 794 A.2d 92,
100 (2002).  We consider the hearing judge’s proposed conclusions of law de novo.  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 1145, 1160
(2002).
12Although petitioner contends that respondent’s claim of suffering from an illness
was “unsupported and unsubstantiated,” the hearing judge found by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent was diagnosed with osteomyelitis in the spring of 2000, “was faced
with the serious prospect of loss of her leg,” suffered complications from her medical
treatment, and was hospitalized at least twice in the fall of 2000.  Petitioner filed no
exceptions to these findings and thus, not having been shown to be clearly erroneous, the
hearing judge’s findings are prima facie correct.
-20-
III.
We turn now to the appropriate sanction to be imposed.  Bar Counsel recommends
disbarment.  Bar Counsel highlights “deceit on the part of the respondent that misled her
clients into a false sense of security that ultimately resulted in their inability to defend
themselves against liability, against damages, and ultimately resulted in serious financial
losses as well as a taint upon individual professional reputations.”  Bar Counsel contends
that, despite respondent’s lack of prior misconduct, disbarment is appropriate because of the
substantial number of complaints, the egregious nature of respondent’s violations, and the
harm resulting from those violations.  Although petitioner concedes that the hearing judge
determined that respondent’s osteomyelitis and several hospitalizations were mitigating
factors, petitioner argues that such diagnosis was unsubstantiated hearsay and witnesses
testified that respondent never expressed to others that she suffered from any conditions that
limited her ability to represent her clients.12 
Before this Court, Respondent recommends that she be permitted to continue to
practice.  
-21-
Bar Counsel has the burden of establishing the allegations by clear and convincing
evidence.  Md. Rule 16-757(b).  Respondent has the burden of proving the existence of
mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  On review, we keep in
mind that the findings of the trial judge are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed
unless clearly erroneous.  Garfield, 369 Md. at 97, 797 A.2d at 764.
The purpose of sanctioning an attorney is to protect the public rather than to punish
the errant attorney.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474, 800 A.2d
782, 789 (2002).  Attorney disciplinary proceedings also are aimed at deterring other
attorneys from committing violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Id. at 474-75,
800 A.2d at 789.  The severity of the sanction depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case, including consideration of any mitigating factors or aggravating
factors.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Angst, 369 Md. 404, 416-18, 800 A.2d 747, 755
(2002).  On occasion, in considering the appropriate sanction to be imposed, we have
referred to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Santos, 370 Md. 77, 88, 803 A.2d 505, 511 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 28, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 484, 671 A.2d 463, 480 (1996).  The Standards set out a framework
for consideration of discipline matters, providing as follows:
(1) What ethical duty did the lawyer violate?
(2) What was the lawyer’s mental state? 
(3) What was the extent of the actual or potential injury caused
by the lawyer’s misconduct?
13ABA Standard 9.21 defines “Aggravation” as “any considerations or factors that
may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.”  ABA Standard 9.31
defines “Mitigation” as “any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the
degree of discipline to be imposed.”  ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
reprinted in ABA Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards, 352-53
(1999).
-22-
(4) Are there any aggravating or mitigating circumstances?13
See ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, reprinted in ABA Compendium of
Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards, 338-39, 344 (1999).
We first address the duty violated by respondent and respondent’s mental state at the
time of the misconduct.  Respondent does not deny the misconduct in this case.  In addition
to her lack of competency, lack of diligence, and failure to communicate with clients, she
lacked candor toward the Circuit Court and initially failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel.
Respondent’s conduct was not an isolated incident, but was a pattern of misconduct.  In
considering respondent’s mental state, we note that all of the conduct which is the subject
of these proceedings occurred while respondent was ill and was under treatment for
osteomyelitis.  The hearing judge found that throughout respondent’s illness, she practiced
law, “[p]erhaps bravely, but, as is now apparent, misguidedly . . . without adjusting for her
medical condition.”  Respondent did not have a dishonest motive.  Nonetheless, her client,
the Hospital, and the individual physicians were injured by her conduct.
Next, we consider whether there are any aggravating or mitigating factors.  The main
aggravating factor in this case is respondent’s misrepresentations to her client that led the
14These mitigating factors are included in ABA Standard 9.32.  ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, reprinted in ABA Compendium of Professional Responsibility
Rules and Standards, 353-54 (1999).
-23-
client into a false sense of security, ultimately resulting in the client’s inability to present a
proper defense against liability.
We have found that mitigation includes the following: 
“absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest
or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good
faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the
practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental
disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings;
interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 330, 786 A.2d 763, 772-73 (2001)
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jaseb, 364 Md. 464, 481-82, 773 A.2d 516, 526
(2001) (quoting Glenn, 341 Md. at 488-89, 671 A.2d at 483 (citations omitted))).14
 In mitigation, respondent was admitted to the Bar of this Court on May 25, 1982.
She has had no prior offenses.  She has been a respected adjunct faculty member at the
University of Baltimore Law School, a lecturer for MICPEL, a faculty member at the
University of Maryland Medical School, and has served on many committees of the
Maryland State Bar Association.  All of her misconduct occurred during the period of her
illness.  She had no dishonest motive.  Respondent has expressed remorse and, as she has
her illness under control, is unlikely to reoffend.  “As to the repetition of violative conduct,
-24-
we have held that an attorney’s voluntary termination of the charged misconduct, when
accompanied by an appreciation of the serious impropriety of that past conduct and remorse
for it, may be evidence that the attorney will no longer engage in such misconduct.”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Seiden, 373 Md. 409, 422-23, 818 A.2d 1108, 1116 (2003).
In addition to the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors, we consider our
prior cases.  We have noted that “a less severe sanction than that ordinarily dictated may be
appropriate when an attorney is able to establish the existence of compelling extenuating
circumstances.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kenney, 339 Md. 578, 588, 664 A.2d 854,
858 (1995).  At the same time, in attorney grievance cases involving “intentional dishonesty,
misappropriation . . . , fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like,” we have held
that disbarment is warranted absent “anything less than the most serious and utterly
debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the ‘root
cause’ of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney’s utter inability to conform his
or her conduct in accordance with the law and with the MRPC.”  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001) (citing Kenney,
339 Md. at 594, 664 A.2d at 862).
Client neglect is a very serious violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and of
the duty owed to the client.  Persistent neglect may be grounds for disbarment.  See, e.g.,
Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 347 A.2d 556 (1975).  We noted there,
however, that:
-25-
“Where an attorney has been shown to have been negligent, or
inattentive to his client’s interests, or to have exhibited a lack of
professional competency in the handling of a client’s affairs, in
violation of the canons or of a statute, the imposition of some
disciplinary sanction against him may be warranted; the extent
of the discipline to be applied, however, is generally dependent
upon the severity of the conduct and the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding it. In determining the degree of
discipline to be imposed for such conduct, it has been held
proper not only to consider such circumstances as might
mitigate or extenuate the offense, but also proper to consider the
attorney’s prior history of misconduct and any antecedent
sanctions which may have been imposed. See Annot. 96
A.L.R.2d 823, 828-29, 853, supra. Cf. Bar Assoc. of Balto. City
v. Dearing, 274 Md. 66, 332 A.2d 649 (1975) (where neglect,
without any prior history of misconduct, was found to be
grounds for a one-year suspension.)”
Id. at 362, 347 A.2d at 561.  In cases involving client neglect, we have considered the
presence of aggravating and mitigating factors and imposed sanctions in accordance with
the circumstances.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Manning, 318 Md. 697, 704-05, 569
A.2d 1250, 1253-54 (1990) (disbarring an attorney for “willful and flagrant neglect” of his
clients’ affairs over a more than two-year period, where the attorney had a prior record and
there were no mitigating circumstances); Garfield, 369 Md. at 107, 797 A.2d at 769-70
(imposing an indefinite suspension with a right to reapply after thirty days on an attorney
with a drug addiction whose “professional lapses” resulted in the dismissal or barring of
seven cases); and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tolar, 357 Md. 569, 585, 745 A.2d 1045,
1053-54 (2000) (noting the attorney’s remorse for her misconduct and holding that a public
reprimand would “serve the purpose of protecting the public just as well as a short
15The hearing panel in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Finnesey, 283 Md. 541, 391
A.2d 434 (1978), found that the attorney had violated DR 1-102(a)(4), the precursor to
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c).  Both provisions state that a lawyer shall not
engage in “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”
-26-
suspension”).
It is helpful to consider Attorney Grievance Commission v. Finnesey, 283 Md. 541,
391 A.2d 434 (1978), a case involving an attorney’s neglect and misrepresentations to his
client.  In Finnesey, the attorney falsely advised his client that a petition had been filed and
misrepresented to the client that at least three different dates had been set for a hearing on
the petition.  Ultimately, the client retained new counsel and suffered no monetary loss.
After a disciplinary hearing, the panel found that the attorney “was dilatory in performing
his duties and sought to cover up his neglect by assuring the client that everything possible
had been done to perfect her claim.”  Id. at 546, 391 A.2d at 436.  The panel determined that
“[s]uch conduct falls somewhat short of dishonesty, fraud, and deceit which three require
a debased morality coupled with an intention to injure another person.”  Id. at 545, 391 A.2d
at 436.  We adopted the opinion that the attorney in that case should not be disbarred.  Id.
at 547, 391 A.2d at 437.
 In the case at bar, respondent’s violation of Rule 8.4(c) (conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) closely resembles the attorney’s conduct in
Finnesey.15  Respondent misrepresented to one client, the Hospital, the status of her cases
in order to cover up her neglect.  In one of her cases, respondent misrepresented to the court
-27-
her need for continuances.  Respondent’s conduct is a most serious transgression.  See Lane,
367 Md. 633, 647-48, 790 A.2d 621, 629 (2002) (finding the gravamen of the case to be the
attorney’s pattern of “continued deceitful misrepresentations of the most egregious nature,”
finding no mitigation for this pattern, and ordering disbarment); see also Vanderlinde, 364
Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488 (ordering disbarment where an attorney stole money from an
employer and stating that “[d]isbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional
dishonest conduct”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 51, 785 A.2d
1260, 1268-69 (2001) (notwithstanding absence of mitigating factors, indefinite suspension
imposed, where attorney misrepresented case status to client and failed to cooperate with the
Attorney Grievance Commission).
Petitioner relies on Attorney Grievance Commission v. Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 793
A.2d 535 (2002), as support for its contention that respondent’s behavior merits the ultimate
sanction of disbarment.  In Wallace, the hearing judge found by clear and convincing
evidence that the attorney had violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (b),
1.16(a)(2) and (d), 3.2, 8.1(b), and 8.4(c) and (d).  Six complaints formed the basis for the
Petition for Disciplinary Action filed in that case.  In addition to neglecting client matters,
failing to communicate with his clients, and making misrepresentations to his
clients—transgressions of which respondent in the case sub judice is also culpable, the
attorney charged unreasonable fees, failed to account for and return monies, and failed to
respond to Bar Counsel’s numerous inquiries and a subpoena.  The attorney appeared for
-28-
neither the evidentiary hearing nor oral argument before this Court.  Most significant is that
the hearing judge and this Court found no mitigating circumstances.
The primary distinction between Wallace and the instant case is the lack of mitigating
factors in the former case.  In addition, the attorney in Wallace committed violations over
a more than two-year period, whereas respondent’s actions in this case roughly corresponded
with the onset and duration of her physical illness and medical treatments over
approximately a one-year period.  Finally, respondent has expressed remorse for her
behavior, in contrast to the attorney in Wallace whose failure to appear before either the
hearing judge or this Court evidenced a blatant disregard toward the proceedings.
In cases where the attorney suffered from a serious physical or mental illness, we
rarely impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment absent misappropriation of funds.  The
weight we accord to a physical or mental illness depends in part on whether the condition
was causally related to the attorney’s misconduct and the seriousness of the charges. 
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Murray, 301 Md. 506, 483 A.2d 772 (1984),
the attorney, who was suffering from a physical illness, unaccompanied by any mental
illness, neglected client affairs and made misrepresentations to one of his clients.  His illness
consisted of arterial sclerosis in his legs which prevented him from walking and required
hospitalization and an operation.  Id. at 509, 483 A.2d at 773.  Considering the severity of
the attorney’s health problems, which spanned more than a one-year period, we imposed a
public reprimand, even though the attorney had previously received two private reprimands
-29-
for neglect of client affairs and related misconduct.  Id. at 513-14, 483 A.2d at 775-76.
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Willcher, 287 Md. 74, 411 A.2d 83 (1980), the
attorney, who suffered from manic depression and hypothyroidism, acted incompetently,
neglected a legal matter, and handled a legal matter without adequate preparation.  The
attorney did not engage in dishonest behavior, although at the time of the hearing he was
suspended from the practice of law for sixty days for misrepresentation to a client and
unjustified retention of a retainer.  Id. at 79, 411 A.2d at 86.  We ordered an indefinite
suspension after accepting the hearing judge’s finding that the attorney’s behavior was not
entirely due to illness.  Id. at 79-80, 411 A.2d at 86.
We also ordered an indefinite suspension in Santos, 370 Md. 77, 803 A.2d 505,
where the attorney neglected legal matters and misappropriated client funds.  The hearing
judge found that the attorney’s neglect “was exacerbated by undiagnosed physical and
mental health problems,” id. at 84, 803 A.2d at 509, and failed to affirmatively find a
violation of Rule 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation),
id. at 81, 803 A.2d at 507.  In rejecting a sanction of disbarment, we placed significance on
the hearing judge’s characterization of the attorney’s conduct in failing to return unearned
fees as “neglect,” id. at 87-88, 803 A.2d at 511, and also noted that the attorney cooperated
with the investigation, accepted responsibility for his actions, and had no disciplinary record,
id. at 84-87, 803 A.2d at 509-510.
Considering all of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that the appropriate
-30-
sanction to be imposed is an indefinite suspension.  Although respondent’s misconduct was
serious and the client suffered harm, respondent’s conduct occurred when she was suffering
from a serious physical illness which appears to be causally connected to her misconduct.
Moreover, there was no misappropriation of funds involved in the present case.  As we have
indicated, the purposes of discipline are to protect the public and to deter similar conduct by
other lawyers.  Having considered respondent’s misconduct, the ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and our prior
cases, the appropriate sanction is an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
THE 
CLERK 
OF 
THIS 
COURT,
I N C L U D I N G 
C O S T S  
O F  
A L L
TRANSCRIP TS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-761(B), FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST
PATTI DIANE GILMAN WEST.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-02-004004
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 38
September Term, 2002
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
   OF MARYLAND
v.
PATTI DIANE GILMAN WEST
Bell, C.J.
         *Eldridge
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J., in
which Bell, C.J., and Cathell, J., join.
      Filed: November 20, 2003
*Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member of
this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
-1-
Harrell, J. dissenting.
The majority generously finds that “respondent’s conduct occurred when she was
suffering from a serious physical illness which appears to be causally connected to her
misconduct.”  (Majority (Maj.) slip op. at 29).  In this regard, the majority oversteps the
boundaries of the Court’s role in this case.  “The hearing court's findings of fact are prima
facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.”
Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 288, 793 A.2d 535, 542 (2002).  Judge
Allison, the hearing judge, in her findings of fact, did not find that Respondent’s actions were
caused by her illness.  Rather, Judge Allison quite clearly rejected Respondent’s battle with
osteomyelitis as a legal cause or mitigating factor with regard to the many and serious
professional lapses proven in this case:
Throughout her trying medical ordeal, the Respondent practiced law.  Perhaps
bravely, but, as is now apparent, misguidedly, Respondent continued her
practice without adjusting for her medical condition.  She refused help from
her colleague and denied an inability to handle her legal practice.  While not
admitting to the violations of professional conduct with which she was
charged, Respondent expressed remorse that ‘things had slipped through the
cracks’ and opined that when she was ill, she should have done things
differently.
16 Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A), governing disposition of an attorney disciplinary
case on review by this Court, provides: “If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat
the findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if
any.”
-2-
Id. (Maj. slip op. at 18).  West filed no exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings.16  
We recently held that exculpatory factors “cause” misconduct only when they alter the
mental state of an attorney to a degree that excuses the conduct.  Attorney Griev. Comm’n
v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001).  Nothing in the record
indicates that Respondent’s illness affected her mental condition or her judgment beyond that
of the predictable stress any human being facing a serious medical condition experiences.
While naturally one must sympathize with the difficult medical situation West confronted,
stress alone does not mitigate the exceedingly poor judgment demonstrated by her consistent
pattern, over several months, of neglect of her duties to the court and to her clients,
exacerbated by her lying to cover up her failures.  Disbarment is the appropriate sanction for
this type of misconduct.
West engaged in a consistent pattern of conduct that included “conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”  MRPC 8.4(c).  It is well settled that
“[d]isbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.”  Attorney
Griev. Comm’n v. Cafferty, __ Md. __ (2003) (AG No. 82, September Term, 2002) (filed 8
September 2003) (slip op. at 21).  The majority in the present case concedes that,
“[r]espondent’s conduct is a most serious transgression,” yet fails to note that that conduct
constituted a pattern of serious deceitful conduct over an extensive period of time. (Maj. slip
-3-
op. at 27). The hearing judge found that West, for more than six months, violated Rule 8.4(c)
in the course of her representation of her clients in eight separate matters.  West produced
misleading reports for her clients and concealed the status of cases from her clients.  In
addition, she concealed her medical condition from her partners, opposing parties, and the
various courts before which she practiced.
Even beyond her dishonesty, West’s pattern of extreme neglect caused her clients
serious harm.  “[W]illful and flagrant neglect of a client's affairs is, in and of itself, the kind
of misconduct by an attorney which can lead to disbarment.”   Attorney Griev. Comm’n v.
Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 291, 793 A.2d 535, 544 (2002) (quoting Attorney Griev. Comm’n v.
Manning, 318 Md. 697, 704, 569 A.2d 1250, 1253 (1990)).   West essentially abandoned
clients in nine matters for several months and consistently lied about her actions, thus
preventing her clients from learning the scope of her neglect or from taking timely remedial
measures.  As a result of her failure to perform even her most basic professional duties and
her concealment of that failure, orders of default were entered in at least four cases, leading
to at least three default judgments against her clients.  Further, West’s clients were barred
from presenting certain expert witnesses at trial on at least two occasions and were forced
into settlements in at least five cases.  Two of those settlements, in the Davis matter and in
the Koehler matter, were particularly unfavorable insofar as they were more expensive for
her clients than settlement offers that she previously failed to forward to them for
-4-
consideration.  When all of the misconduct is itemized, the hearing judge found that West
committed seventy-four separate violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Perhaps the most serious damage caused by West’s deceit and inexcusable 
neglect was
to the reputations of her clients.  West represented Maryland General Hospital and several
individual health care professionals, including doctors, who worked at the Hospital.  As a
result of West’s actions, her clients either effectively were prevented from presenting a
defense or had their defenses substantially undercut in at least nine professional malpractice
actions.  The settlements and default judgments against the medical personnel and the
Hospital will stain their records and reputations for years to come.  West quite likely could
have prevented these losses had she disclosed her condition and asked for assistance from
her law firm colleagues.
As noted above, the normal sanction for client neglect of this scale is disbarment.  In
Wallace we disbarred an attorney who, in six separate cases, committed similar acts of
neglect and misrepresentation as West in the nine matters described in the hearing judge’s
findings of fact in this case.  Wallace failed to file required documents with the courts
hearing five of his cases.  368 Md. at 282-88, 793 A.2d at 538-42.  Three complaints Wallace
filed were dismissed for failure to prosecute.  Id.  Wallace failed to inform his clients that
those three cases were dismissed.  Id.  The Court also found that Wallace made
misrepresentations regarding the status of his cases and that he failed to return in a timely
manner fees owed to his clients.  Id.  We concluded in Wallace that:
-5-
The record in the case at bar does not indicate that respondent has received any
previous reprimands or sanctions from this Court; nevertheless, the volume
and severity of the complaints against respondent lead us to conclude that the
appropriate sanction against respondent is disbarment. Respondent has
engaged in a pattern of conduct that only the most severe sanction of
disbarment will provide the protection to the public that this procedure is
supposed to provide.
368 Md. at 293, 793 A.2d at 545.  
Given the lack of exceptions by West to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the only issue before us is the appropriate sanction to impose.  The
majority claims that:
In cases where the attorney suffered from a serious physical or mental illness,
we rarely impose the ultimate sanction of disbarment absent misappropriation
of funds.  The weight we accord to a physical or mental illness depends in part
on whether the condition was causally related to the attorney’s misconduct and
the seriousness of the charges.
(Maj. slip op. at 28).  This is an inaccurate representation of our cases generally and, most
certainly, of our recent cases.  As the majority points out, the purpose of sanctioning
attorneys is to protect the public and establish standards of acceptable versus unacceptable
conduct for the legal profession, rather than to punish the particular errant attorney in a given
case.  Id. at 20.  The mere fact that an attorney “suffered from a serious physical or mental
illness” is not dispositive; we only have found illness to be a mitigating factor where it
caused the misconduct. 
As admitted in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 773 A.2d 463
(2001), our prior responses to potentially mitigating factors involving a respondent’s mental
-6-
and physical health at the time of misconduct were somewhat inconsistent.  364 Md. at 405-
07, 773 A.2d at 480-81.  In Vanderlinde, however, we attempted to set a single standard for
future consideration of such mitigation arguments in “cases of intentional dishonesty,
misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like[.]”  364 Md.
at 413, 773 A.2d at 485.  In such cases, as Judge Cathell wrote for us,
we will not accept, as “compelling extenuating circumstances,” anything less
than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health
conditions, arising from any source that is the “root cause” of the misconduct
and that also result in an attorney's utter inability to conform his or her
conduct in accordance with the law and with the MRPC. Only if the
circumstances are that compelling, will we even consider imposing less than
the most severe sanction of disbarment
364 Md. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 485 (emphasis added).  It was our intention in Vanderlinde
to sweep behind us inconsistent prior cases related to consideration of such mitigating
factors, at least insofar as the misconduct in the particular case involved “dishonesty,
stealing, intentional misappropriation, fraud, serious criminal offenses, and the like.”  364
Md. at 414, 773 A.2d at 485-86.  West violated rule 8.4(c) and engaged in other dishonest
acts.  Therefore, we should adhere to the Vanderlinde standard in the present case.
In this case, the osteomyelitis that West claims as a mitigating factor is a painful bone
infection that normally does not affect the mind directly.  THE MERCK MANUAL 1343-46 (16th
ed. 1992).  As such, osteomyelitis is not the kind of physical health condition that would
cause West’s utter inability to conform her conduct in accordance with the law and with the
17 She may have cost her clients $75,000 in just the Koehler matter.  West failed to
forward an early $75,000  settlement offer to her clients for consideration.  After a
default judgment as to liability was taken, the client settled the matter for $150,000.
-7-
MRPC, and it should not be treated as a mitigating factor to reduce the ordinary sanction for
the scale and type of misconduct demonstrated by this case.  
Our purpose in Vanderlinde was to terminate a perpetuation of the sometimes
conflicting applications in our prior cases.  Yet, a scant two years later, the majority here
regresses to 1978 and invigorates Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Finnesey, 283 Md. 541, 391
A.2d 434 (1978), which it claims “closely resembles the attorney’s conduct” in this case.
(Maj. slip op. at 26).  Finnesey involved an attorney’s misconduct in a single case where the
client “suffered no monetary loss.”  283 Md. at 546, 391 A.2d at 436.  By comparison, West
appears to have cost her clients many thousands of dollars.17  Of the pre-Vanderlinde cases,
a closer match is Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Short, 303 Md. 317, 493 A.2d 362 (1985),
where we found that an attorney’s heart attack and financial difficulties did not excuse
misappropriation of funds.  Where the attorney in Finnesey “attributed his neglect of Mrs.
Bentley's case on mental depression brought about by personal financial reverses,” 
Finnesey,
283 Md. at 545, 391 A.2d at 436, the attorney in Short attributed his misconduct to a physical
ailment similar to the one West suffered.  Short, 303 Md. at 319, 493 A.2d at 362-63.  The
more important point, however, is that our pre-Vanderlinde cases were so inconsistent that
a case can be found to bootstrap just about any desired result.  That is the haven resorted to
by the majority here.
-8-
The argument that osteomyelitis “caused” West to engage in her pattern of neglect and
deceit is a strained one at best.  I suspect other members of the Maryland Bar, whether in
solo, small firm, medium size firm, or large firm practice, deal constructively and positively,
day-in and day-out, with serious illness as it impacts on their pursuit of their law practices.
Osteomyelitis very well may have caused West to be unable physically to perform her duties
to the court and to her clients.  If that was the case, she should have informed the courts,
clients, and attorneys with whom she worked that she could no longer, or for a time, manage
her caseload.  The record reflects that West unilaterally rejected the notion of seeking help
from her colleagues and that she hid her condition from those with which she came into
contact.  The misconduct in this case was caused by exceedingly poor judgment, not
osteomyelitis.  I would find that West’s misconduct neither was caused by osteomyelitis nor
mitigated sufficiently by her illness.  Therefore, I would mete out the usual sanction of
disbarment for misconduct of the scale and type in which she engaged.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Cathell have authorized me to state that they join in this
dissent.