Case Title: Bernard v. Unemployment Comp. Review Comm'n

Citation: 2013-Ohio-3121

Docket Number: 2012-0717

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Bernard v. Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3121.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South 
Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal 
errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the 
opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-3121 
BERNARD, APPELLANT, v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION REVIEW 
COMMISSION; BARRY AND PATRICIA WAKEMAN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Bernard v. Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3121.] 
R.C. 4141.28(H)—Agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statute is lawful and 
reasonable—R.C. 4141.01—Earnings deposited into a flexible-spending 
account for reimbursement of medical costs under an employer’s cafeteria 
plan do not qualify as remuneration for purposes of determining an 
employee’s unemployment-compensation eligibility. 
(No. 2012-0717—Submitted April 9, 2013—Decided July 25, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Miami County, No. 2011-CA-16, 
2012-Ohio-958. 
_____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we consider whether earnings deposited into a 
flexible-spending account for reimbursement of medical costs under an 
employer’s cafeteria plan1 qualify as remuneration for purposes of determining an 
employee’s unemployment-compensation eligibility.  We hold that they do not. 
I.  Facts 
{¶ 2} Until December 2009, appellant, Claudia Bernard, was employed 
as a property caretaker by appellee Wakefield Educational Foundation 
(“Wakefield”).  Bernard acknowledges that in 2009, she authorized Wakefield to 
deposit $900 of her monthly earnings into a flexible-spending account so that she 
could use that money to obtain tax-free reimbursement of medical expenses.  
Accordingly, in 2009, Wakefield deposited $10,800 of Bernard’s $17,320 
earnings into a flexible-spending account.  After she was terminated from 
employment with Wakefield on December 31, 2009, Bernard applied for 
unemployment-compensation benefits with appellee Ohio Department of Jobs and 
Family Services (“ODJFS”). 
{¶ 3} The ODJFS ruled that Bernard was required to have earned an 
average weekly wage of at least $213 for the relevant 20 weeks to be eligible for 
unemployment compensation and that the amounts that went into the flexible-
spending account were not “remuneration” as that term is used in R.C. 
4141.01(R)(1).  With the exclusion of those amounts, Bernard’s average weekly 
wage was only $125, and so her claim was denied on the grounds of insufficient 
earnings to qualify for unemployment-compensation benefits. 
                                          
 
1 A cafeteria plan is a written benefit plan maintained by an employer for the benefit of its 
employees in which all participants are employees and each participant has the opportunity to 
select from among two or more benefits consisting of cash and qualified benefits.  26 U.S.C. 
125(d)(1). 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
{¶ 4} Bernard appealed the decision of the ODJFS to the Unemployment 
Compensation Review Commission, contending that the definition of 
“remuneration” under R.C. 4141.01(H)(1)(a) includes all annual earnings for 
purposes of determining unemployment-compensation eligibility. 
{¶ 5} The commission affirmed the ODFJS decision that pursuant to 
R.C. 4141.01(R), Bernard did not qualify for unemployment-compensation 
benefits, because she did not earn an average weekly wage of at least $213 for the 
required 20 qualifying weeks.  It found that Bernard’s total wages for the base 
period of January 2009 through December 31, 2009, were only $6,520, because 
the $900 per month that had been deposited in a flexible-spending account were 
not considered wages. 
{¶ 6} Bernard filed an appeal with the Court of Common Pleas of Miami 
County, asserting that the commission’s decision should be overturned because it 
was “unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.”  
She claimed that R.C. 4141.46 entitles her to the benefit of the doubt on which 
benefits are included as wages because the statutes defining “wages” are 
ambiguous.  The court of common pleas upheld the decision of the commission as 
reasonable and appropriate. 
{¶ 7} By a vote of two to one, a panel of the Second District Court of 
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, deferring to the agency’s 
interpretation of the state and federal statutes at issue.  2012-Ohio-958, ¶ 12.  The 
dissenting judge would have accepted Bernard’s definition of “wages” as 
controlling, applying R.C. 4141.46.  Id. at ¶ 19. 
II.  Argument 
{¶ 8} We accepted this discretionary appeal on a single proposition of 
law: “Courts must interpret statutes and regulations with deference to the affected 
party and against the state agency charged with enforcement of the 
statutory/regulatory scheme.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 9} Because the proposition of law involves a question of law, we 
review the court of appeals’ judgment de novo.  Univ. Hosp., Univ. of Cincinnati 
College of Medicine v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 63 Ohio St.3d 339, 587 N.E.2d 
835 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus.  Specifically, with respect to review of 
an administrative ruling, “[i]f the court finds that the decision of the commission 
was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, it 
shall reverse, vacate, or modify the decision, or remand the matter to the 
commission.  Otherwise, the court shall affirm the decision of the commission.”  
R.C. 4141.282(H).  This standard of review applies to all appellate courts.  Irvine 
v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18, 482 N.E.2d 587 (1985). 
{¶ 10} Basically, Bernard argues that deference is not owed to the agency 
in its interpretation of law.  She argues that there is ambiguity in R.C. 
4141.01(H)(1), which defines “remuneration,” a word that appears in R.C. 
4141.01(R)(1), which sets forth when an application for unemployment-
compensation benefits is valid.  She contends that the decision denying her 
benefits was “unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the 
evidence” because R.C. 4141.46 “requires that the Unemployment Compensation 
Act be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits.”  (Emphasis sic.)   
{¶ 11} Bernard misstates the statute by adding the words “in favor of 
awarding benefits.”  R.C. 4141.46 merely states that “Sections 4141.01 to 
4141.46, inclusive, of the Revised Code shall be liberally construed.”  In 
Bernard’s view, under a liberal construction of R.C. 4141.01(H)(1)(a), she earned 
remuneration in excess of the statutorily required average weekly wage for the 
qualifying period, even though a portion was placed into a medical flexible-
spending account.  She asks us to defer to her interpretation of the statutory 
language. 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
{¶ 12} But we have never read R.C. 4141.46 to say that courts must 
interpret statutes and regulations with deference to the interpretation of the 
affected party and against the interpretation of the state agency charged with 
enforcement of the statutory/regulatory scheme.  Instead, we have explained that 
“courts * * * must give due deference to an administrative interpretation 
formulated by an agency that has accumulated substantial expertise, and to which 
the General Assembly has delegated the responsibility of implementing the 
legislative command.”  Swallow v. Indus. Comm., 36 Ohio St.3d 55, 57, 521 
N.E.2d 778 (1988).  Accepting Bernard’s proposition would lead to an outcome-
determinative approach:  the agency’s position would be entitled to be upheld 
only in cases in which the ruling favored the employee.  Yet we have held that 
deference is owed no matter which way the agency rules.  We must accordingly 
defer to the commission’s interpretation, so long as the interpretation is 
reasonable.  See State ex rel. McLean v. Indus. Comm., 25 Ohio St.3d 90, 92-93, 
495 N.E.2d 370 (1986). 
Statutory Language in Dispute: 26 U.S.C. 3306(b)(5)(G) 
{¶ 13} Whether the amounts deposited into Bernard’s flexible-spending 
account should be included as remuneration in determining whether she is eligible 
for unemployment compensation is not a question with a simple, plain, or clear 
answer; the statutes do contain ambiguity.  A statute is ambiguous when its 
language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.  Clark v. Scarpelli, 
91 Ohio St.3d 271, 274, 744 N.E.2d 719 (2001). 
{¶ 14} Bernard’s application for unemployment-compensation benefits 
was valid if (1) she was unemployed, (2) she had been employed for at least 20 
qualifying weeks during her base period, and (3) she had earned or been paid 
remuneration at an average weekly remuneration of not less than 27.5 percent of 
the statewide average weekly wage for such weeks.  R.C. 4141.01(R)(1). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 15} “Remuneration” means “all compensation for personal services, 
including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all compensation in any 
medium other than cash.”  R.C. 4141.01(H)(1).  But the statutory definition of 
“remuneration” excludes 15 specified payments listed in R.C. 4141.01(H)(1)(a).  
These exclusions are defined further by the federal-unemployment-tax portion of 
the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. 3306(b)(2) through (b)(16).  R.C. 
4141.01(H)(1)(a).  One of those exclusions relates to cafeteria plans.  The relevant 
subsection of 26 U.S.C. 3306 provides: 
 
(b) Wages.—For purposes of this chapter, the term 
“wages” means all remuneration for employment, including the 
cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any 
medium other than cash; except that such term shall not include— 
* * * 
(5) any payment made to, or on behalf of, an employee or 
his beneficiary— 
* * * 
(G) under a cafeteria plan (within the meaning of section 
125) if such payment would not be treated as wages without regard 
to such plan and it is reasonable to believe that (if section 125 
applied for purposes of this section) section 125 would not treat 
any wages as constructively received * * *. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Thus, the term “wages” excludes payments made to an 
employee “under” a cafeteria plan (1) “if such payment would not be treated as 
wages without regard to such plan” and (2) “section 125 would not treat any 
wages as constructively received.” 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
{¶ 16} The portion of 26 U.S.C. 3306(b)(5)(G) emphasized above is 
subject to more than one interpretation, for even the ODJFS and the majority of 
the judges on the court of appeals’ panel in this case interpret the statutory 
language differently.  They do agree on one point—that both conditions 
mentioned in 26 U.S.C. 3306(b)(5)(G) are fulfilled and that the amount that was 
placed into the tax-free flexible-spending account was not “remuneration” as that 
term is used in R.C. 4141.01(R)(1). 
{¶ 17} The parties here agree that the amount that was placed in the 
flexible-spending account within the cafeteria plan was not included in Bernard’s 
gross income, and they do not dispute that the second criterion is fulfilled, i.e., 
there was no constructive receipt of wages.  But Bernard states that the first 
criterion, that “payment would not be treated as wages without regard to” the 
plan, is not satisfied.  In her view, the amount received from her employer that she 
voluntarily contributed to her medical flexible-spending account would be treated 
as wages but for the plan.  The problem thus becomes that the Ohio Revised Code 
relies on the Internal Revenue Code to flesh out its definition of remuneration. 
{¶ 18} But the court of appeals’ majority opinion observes that any 
payment made to Bernard under the cafeteria plan was made from the plan to the 
employee and would be in the nature of a reimbursement to her for her medical 
expenses rather than wages and so “ ‘such payment would not be treated as wages 
without regard to such plan.’ ”  2012-Ohio-958, ¶ 8, quoting 26 U.S.C. 
3306(b)(5)(G). 
{¶ 19} The ODJFS sets forth its own explanation of the disputed language 
and first notes that “a payment ‘under a cafeteria plan’ is not automatically 
excludable or includable [from wages] merely because it is in a cafeteria plan.”  A 
cafeteria plan is a fringe benefit that allows an employee to choose between cash 
(or equivalents) and “qualified” benefits (i.e., those excluded from taxation under 
another part of the code).  See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2010-38, 2010-20 Internal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
Revenue Bulletin 683, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb10-20.pdf 
(accessed May 30, 2013).  Because there is an option to receive cash, ordinarily 
the doctrine of constructive receipt would apply to make a cafeteria-plan payment 
taxable, and that is why the second condition is included in 26 U.S.C. 
3306(b)(5)(G). 
{¶ 20} With respect to the first condition, the ODJFS explains that a 
health flexible-spending arrangement is a type of insurance plan excluded from 
gross income under 26 U.S.C. 105(b) without regard to whether it is part of a 
cafeteria plan.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2004-50, 2004-33 Internal Revenue 
Bulletin 205, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb04-33.pdf (accessed 
May 30, 2013) (flexible-spending-arrangement regulations “are generally 
imposed so that health [flexible-spending arrangements] operate in a manner 
similar to ‘insurance-type’ accident or health plans under [26 U.S.C.] 105”; Adam 
Chodorow, Charitable FSAs: A Proposal to Combine Healthcare and Charitable 
Giving Tax Provisions, 2011 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1041, 1050 (2011) (“to the IRS, 
[health-care flexible-spending accounts] are a form of employer-provided health 
insurance”).  Thus, the language in 26 U.S.C. 3306(b)(5)(G) that payments “under 
a cafeteria plan” are not wages if the payment would not be treated as wages 
“without regard” to the plan simply reiterates that the taxable status of a benefit 
does not change merely because it is within a cafeteria plan. 
{¶ 21} Regardless of the varying interpretations, we are to consider 
whether the commission’s interpretation is reasonable.  R.C. 4141.282(H) sets 
forth a highly deferential standard, and this court will not reject a decision of the 
commission that is lawful and reasonable.  Lang v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family 
Servs., 134 Ohio St.3d 296, 2012-Ohio-5366, 982 N.E.2d 636, ¶ 16.  The trial 
judge in this matter succinctly stated the reasonableness of the commission’s 
interpretation of “remuneration” for unemployment-compensation-eligibility 
purposes: 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
 
As noted by the appellee, the entire Unemployment 
Compensation Act is funded by an excise tax on employers. This is 
based upon the gross wages paid to employees each quarter. To be 
a viable safety net for eligible workers, the Act needs to maintain a 
stream of income consistent with its obligations to pay. To that 
end, the legislature has defined wages to mean remuneration paid 
to an employee * * *. 
The legislature defined remuneration to mean all 
compensation for personal services * * * provided that 
remuneration does not include: (a) payments as provided in 
divisions (b)(2) to (b)16 of Section 3306 of the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act, 84 Stat. 703, 26 U.S.C.A. 3301 to 3311 
as amended. 
Section 3306 states that wages do not include payments 
under a cafeteria plan if the payments are not treated as wages. 
For purposes of the excise tax payable by the employer, 
Health [flexible-spending account] diversions are not considered 
wages. 
When one realizes the appellant wanted the money directed 
in this fashion, and both she and the employer benefitted from not 
having to report the money as a wage under box 1 of her W-2 
form, the appellee’s interpretation of not considering the 
$10,800.00 as wages for unemployment purposes seems quite 
reasonable. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
{¶ 22} We agree. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 23} The ODJFS determined that earnings that an employee elects to 
deposit into a tax-free flexible-spending account to obtain reimbursement of 
medical costs under an employer’s cafeteria plan do not qualify as remuneration 
for determining the employee’s unemployment-compensation eligibility.  Because 
the ODJFS’s interpretation of R.C. 4141.01(H)(1)(a) is both lawful and 
reasonable, we affirm the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, J., concur. 
O’DONNELL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in judgment and concur separately. 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring. 
{¶ 24} I concur in the majority’s judgment.  I write separately because I 
agree with appellee Ohio Department of Job and Family Services that R.C. 
4141.01(H)(1)(a) and the related statutes, which define and determine taxable 
remuneration, are not ambiguous.  Because deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute is not necessary when applying an unambiguous statute, 
I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court by applying the statutes as 
written, and I would not address R.C. 4141.46 or other laws that guide our 
interpretation of ambiguous statutes. 
Legal Analysis 
 
Our first duty in statutory interpretation is to determine 
whether the statute is clear and unambiguous.  Sherwin–Williams 
Co. v. Dayton Freight Lines, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 52, 2006-Ohio-
6498, 858 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 15.  “ ‘[W]here the language of a statute 
is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to enforce the 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
statute as written * * *.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Hubbard v. Canton 
City School Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451, 2002-Ohio-6718, 780 
N.E.2d 543, ¶ 14. 
 
Estate of Heintzelman v. Air Experts, Inc., 126 Ohio St.3d 138, 2010-Ohio-3264, 
931 N.E.2d 548, ¶ 15.  The legal analysis of the relevant statutes requires a 
multilayered approach, but it reveals no ambiguity in the statutes.  Therefore, the 
statutes should be enforced like any other statutes. 
{¶ 25} The analysis begins with the definitional section of the 
Unemployment Compensation Act, R.C. 4141.01, defining “benefit year” as 
follows: 
 
(R)(1) * * * Any application for determination of benefit 
rights made in accordance with section 4141.28 of the Revised 
Code is valid if the individual filing such application is 
unemployed, has been employed by an employer or employers 
subject to this chapter in at least twenty qualifying weeks within 
the individual’s base period, and has earned or been paid 
remuneration at an average weekly wage of not less than twenty-
seven and one-half per cent of the statewide average weekly wage 
for such weeks. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 26} “Remuneration” is defined in R.C. 4141.01(H)(1) and provides: 
 
“Remuneration” means all compensation for personal 
services, including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of 
all compensation * * *. * * * 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
* * * “[R]emuneration” does not include: 
(a) Payments as provided in divisions (b)(2) to (b)(16) of 
section 3306 of the “Federal Unemployment Tax Act,” 84 Stat. 
713, 26 U.S.C.A. 3301 to 3311, as amended. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 27} Under 
a 
plain 
reading 
of 
R.C. 
4141.01(H)(1), 
then, 
“remuneration,” for purposes of determining eligibility under the unemployment-
compensation statutes, includes all compensation for personal services, but 
excludes any compensation paid under 26 U.S.C. 3306(b)(2) to (b)(16). 
{¶ 28} Title 26 of the United States Code is the Internal Revenue Code.  
26 U.S.C. 3306, entitled “Definitions,” provides: 
   
(b) Wages.—For purposes of this chapter, the term 
“wages” means all remuneration for employment, including the 
cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any 
medium other than cash; except that such term shall not include— 
* * * 
(5) any payment made to, or on behalf of, an employee or 
his beneficiary— 
* * * 
(G) under a cafeteria plan (within the meaning of section 
125) if such payment would not be treated as wages without regard 
to such plan and it is reasonable to believe that (if section 125 
applied for purposes of this section) section 125 would not treat 
any wages as constructively received * * *. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
{¶ 29} Therefore, under a plain reading of 26 U.S.C. 3306(b)(5)(G), 
“wages,” for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, means all remuneration, but 
excludes any payment under a cafeteria plan if 26 U.S.C. 125 does not treat the 
payment as wages or as wages constructively received. 
{¶ 30} 26 U.S.C. 125 is entitled “Cafeteria plans” and provides: 
 
(a) In general.—Except as provided in subsection (b) 
[exception for highly compensated participants and key 
employees], no amount shall be included in the gross income of a 
participant in a cafeteria plan solely because, under the plan, the 
participant may choose among the benefits of the plan. 
* * * 
(d) Cafeteria plan defined.—For purposes of this 
section— 
(1) In general.  The term “cafeteria plan” means a written 
plan under which— 
(A) all participants are employees, and 
(B) the participants may choose among 2 or more benefits 
consisting of cash and qualified benefits. 
* * * 
(f) Qualified benefits defined.—For purposes of this 
section, the term “qualified benefit” means any benefit which, with 
the application of subsection (a), is not includible in the gross 
income of the employee by reason of an express provision of this 
chapter (other than section 106(b), 117, 127, or 132). 
 
{¶ 31} Therefore, under a plain reading of 26 U.S.C. 125, contributions to 
a qualified cafeteria plan may be excluded from gross income.  To qualify as a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
cafeteria plan, the plan must be in writing, cover only employees, and permit the 
employees to choose from two or more benefits consisting of cash and qualified 
benefits.  A “qualified benefit” is not included as income if there is an express 
provision in the Internal Revenue Code exempting it.  26 U.S.C. 105 specifically 
exempts the money placed in the flexible spending account (“FSA”) in this case. 
{¶ 32} 26 U.S.C. 105, entitled “Amounts received under accident and 
health plans,” provides:  
 
(a) Amounts attributable to employer contributions.—
Except as otherwise provided in this section, amounts received by 
an employee through accident or health insurance for personal 
injuries or sickness shall be included in gross income to the extent 
such amounts (1) are attributable to contributions by the employer 
which were not includible in the gross income of the employee, or 
(2) are paid by the employer. 
(b) Amounts expended for medical care.—Except in the 
case of amounts attributable to * * * deductions allowed under 
section 213 * * * gross income does not include amounts referred 
to in subsection (a) if such amounts are paid, directly or indirectly, 
to the taxpayer to reimburse the taxpayer for expenses incurred by 
him for the medical care (as defined in section 213(d)) of the 
taxpayer, his spouse, [and/or] his dependents * * *. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 33} Therefore, the Internal Revenue Code does not include in gross 
income amounts paid for qualifying 26 U.S.C. 213(d) medical expenses. 
{¶ 34} The administrative agencies, the courts, and the parties agree that 
the amounts paid on behalf of or reimbursements made to Bernard for medical 
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
expenses from the FSA are qualifying medical expenses pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 
213(d).  They also agree that Bernard’s FSA was a qualified cafeteria plan, which 
legally permitted her to direct her employer to divert earnings for future 
reimbursement for or direct payment of qualifying medical expenses, and that at 
all relevant times, a provision of the Internal Revenue Code declared that those 
amounts were not included in gross income. 
{¶ 35} The language of R.C. 4141.01(H)(1) is not ambiguous.  It defines 
“remuneration” as all compensation for personal service with the exclusion of all 
payments made in accordance with 26 U.S.C. 3306(b)(2) to (b)(16).  While the 
Internal Revenue Code is cumbersome, it plainly delineates that amounts diverted 
into a qualified cafeteria plan to pay qualified medical expenses and amounts paid 
“directly or indirectly” under a qualified cafeteria plan for qualified medical 
expenses are not includable as gross income for income-tax purposes. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 36} I concur with the majority to affirm the court of appeals.  But in 
my view, R.C. 4141.01(H)(1)(a) and the related state and federal statutes are not 
ambiguous.  Consequently, I would not address R.C. 4141.46 or other laws that 
guide our interpretation of ambiguous statutes. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 37} After reading the lead opinion’s interpretations of the statutes and 
cases involved in this case, I am left with one overpowering conclusion:  this 
issue is much more complicated than it should be.  To me, compensation is 
compensation.  Under this simple approach, Bernard’s request for unemployment 
benefits would be based on her total compensation, not just the portion of her 
compensation that was taxable. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
{¶ 38} We all understand that Bernard allocated some of her remuneration 
to the cafeteria plan in order to save money on taxes.  Many Ohioans make similar 
decisions every day; nobody wants to pay more taxes than necessary.  Bernard 
may have made a different decision if she had known that her decision would 
affect her ability to receive unemployment benefits.  But how was she to know?  
No ordinary resident can be expected to understand the interplay between the 
various state statutes, IRS notices and bulletins, cases, and definitions implicated 
in this case.  As the lead opinion points out, even the court of appeals and the 
Department of Job and Family Services interpreted the statutes differently. 
{¶ 39} This case raises two interesting questions.  First, do Ohioans know 
and approve of the fact that some people earn so little money that they are not 
covered by unemployment insurance even though their employer pays into the 
system?  Second, because Bernard’s entire compensation package isn’t 
remuneration, did her employer improperly pay her less than minimum wage? 
{¶ 40} I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  I would 
liberally construe “remuneration” to include Bernard’s entire compensation 
package.  See R.C. 4141.46.  I dissent. 
_______________________ 
Burton Law, L.L.C., Robert Guehl, Tony M. Alexander, and Brandon 
Cogswell, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, and Rebecca L. Thomas 
and Robin A. Jarvis, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee Ohio Department 
of Job and Family Services. 
Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis, L.L.P., W. Roger Fry, and William H. Fry, 
for appellee Wakeman Educational Foundation. 
________________________