Case Title: Lenoci v. Leonard

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2010-163

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 VT 47













 
Lenoci v. Leonard (2010-163)
 
2011 VT 47
 
[Filed 21-Apr-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 47
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2010-163
 
NOVEMBER TERM, 2010
 
Pamela Lenoci, Administratrix of
  the 
Estate of Alexandra Brown
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APPEALED FROM:
     
    v.
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Rutland Superior Court
 
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Kayla Leonard
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DOCKET NO. 604-8-08
  Rdcv
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Harold E. Eaton, Jr.
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
This case asks the Court to decide if an eighteen-year-old has a duty to
control the behavior of a fifteen-year-old friend and, if the fifteen-year-old
later commits suicide, whether the eighteen-year-old is at fault.  We
affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendant and conclude she had no duty to intervene to prevent the tragedy
that occurred.   
¶ 2.            
Alexandra Brown was fifteen years old when she committed suicide in the
early morning of February 21, 2007.  Two nights before, on February 19,
she and eighteen-year-old Kayla Leonard, defendant, had decided to go to a
party at an acquaintance's apartment.  Each girl had lied to her parents,
telling them that she was sleeping over at the other's house.  Kayla
picked Alex up at her home and drove them both to the apartment.  There
the girls danced and drank alcohol Alex provided.  Kayla was concerned
some of the young men at the party might "take advantage" of Alex,
and at one point she stopped Alex from dancing inappropriately.  Ultimately,
the girls spent the night, sharing a room with a nineteen-year-old man who
lived in the apartment.  During the night Alex had sexual intercourse with
the nineteen-year-old.  Kayla was aware the two were intimate but did not
know they had intercourse.
¶ 3.            
Kayla drove Alex home the next morning.  Alex had made plans to
return to the nineteen-year-old man's apartment.  She got her stepfather's
permission to spend the night at another girl's house.  Her stepfather
became suspicious, however, when he saw Alex leave the house, walk down the
driveway to a car, and drive away.  He called Alex's mother, who was in
Florida at the time, and told her of his suspicions.  Alex's mother called
the girl's house and found out that there were no plans for Alex to spend the
night.  She then called Alex's cell phone and left a message confronting
Alex with her deceit.  The State Police were called.  One officer
called Alex's cell phone twice and asked her to simply get in touch with either
him or her mother to let them know she was all right.  Alex's mother
called several more times and left messages, including one that threatened
"massive, massive consequences" because of Alex's behavior.  
¶ 4.            
Throughout the night, while driving around Rutland with a friend and
later alone at her house, Alex sent numerous text messages to her friends
telling them she had been caught by her parents and describing the trouble she
was in.  She also sent numerous text messages to her boyfriend, who was
away at college, one of which said, "I got caught tonight.  I'm grounded
forever. Goodbye."  Alex also spoke with her boyfriend by phone and
admitted that she had gotten drunk the night before.  Later, she left her
boyfriend a voicemail on his cell phone in which she admitted to having sex
with the nineteen-year-old.  While she mentioned suicide in some of her
text messages, she never sent Kayla such a message. 
¶ 5.            
At some point in the evening, back at her house, Alex composed a suicide
note.  In it, she lamented having had sex with the nineteen-year-old and
said that she felt her boyfriend hated her and that she hated herself. 
She also expressed love for her boyfriend.  Approximately one week
beforehand, she and her boyfriend had a fight over the phone during which she
told him that she felt like committing suicide and that she had even decided
how she would take her life.  On this night, after writing the suicide
note, Alex carried out the plan she had discussed and hanged herself from a
tree in her yard.  Her body was discovered by a neighbor the next morning.
¶ 6.            
Plaintiff, Alex's mother acting as administrator of her estate, sued
Kayla alleging that Kayla was negligent for bringing Alex to the apartment
party, that Kayla should have intervened to prevent Alex from having sexual
intercourse with the nineteen-year-old, and that, because she failed to do so,
Kayla negligently caused Alex to suffer emotional harm.  Plaintiff further
claimed that Kayla's negligence caused a delirium or insanity in Alex and "as a
proximate result thereof, she committed suicide."  Kayla moved for summary
judgment arguing that she owed no duty to Alex and that her actions were not
the proximate cause of Alex's suicide.  The trial court granted Kayla's motion,
and from that decision plaintiff appeals. 
¶ 7.            
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in finding Kayla did not owe
Alex a duty.  She suggests such a duty arose when Kayla, an eighteen year
old, brought Alex, a minor, to a party with alcohol and adults present and
recognized, or should have recognized, the "unreasonable risk of sexual
assault" Alex faced.  Plaintiff further argues that there was ample
evidence supporting her theory that Kayla's negligence caused Alex's death and
emotional distress and summary judgment was therefore premature.  We
affirm the trial court, holding that Vermont law does not recognize the duty
sought under these circumstances.  We additionally address the trial
court's holding that Alex's suicide broke any causal connection to Kayla's
actions.
¶ 8.            
Our standard for reviewing a grant of summary judgment is well
rehearsed: we apply the same standard as the trial court, affording its
decision no deference.  Myers v. Langlois, 168
Vt. 432, 434, 721 A.2d 129, 130 (1998).  Accordingly, we will
affirm if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the prevailing party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3). 
¶ 9.            
Under our criminal code, a fifteen-year-old is incapable of having
consensual sex with a nineteen-year-old unless the two are married.  See
13 V.S.A. § 3252(c).  Similarly, a highly intoxicated person cannot
be said to consent to having sex.  See id. § 3254(2). 
However, this is a civil case, and the question for the Court is one of
duty.  To support a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant owed her a legal duty, that the defendant breached that duty, that
the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and that she
suffered actual loss or damage.  Endres v. Endres, 2008 VT 124, ¶
11, 185 Vt. 63, 968 A.2d 336.  Thus to maintain
either her wrongful death or negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress
claimboth of which sound in negligenceplaintiff must establish that Kayla
owed Alex a duty.  The existence of duty is a question of law.  Edson
v. Barre Supervisory Union No. 61, 2007 VT 62, ¶ 9, 182 Vt. 157, 933 A.2d 200.  Absent a duty of care, an action for
negligence fails.  Rubin v. Town of Poultney, 168
Vt. 624, 625, 721 A.2d 504, 506 (1998) (mem.).  
¶ 10.         Plaintiff
argues that Kayla owed a duty to Alex to prevent the sexual intercourse that
occurred.  She relies on several theories to support her claim. 
First, she argues that once Kayla observed the drinking and licentious behavior
at the apartment party, she should have realized she had exposed Alex to an
unreasonably risky situation by bringing her to the apartment.  Plaintiff
relies on the principle that "[i]f the actor does an act, and subsequently
realizes or should realize that it has created an unreasonable risk of causing
physical harm to another, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent the risk from taking effect," even if at the time of acting, "the actor
has no reason to believe that it will involve such a risk."  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 321 (1965).
¶ 11.         It
cannot be said that Kayla, by driving Alex to the apartment and witnessing her
conduct while there, created a risk that Alex would have sexual intercourse
that night.  Both girls had decided to go to the apartment, and Alex chose
to engage in certain behavior while there.  There was no suggestion that
Alex was not there voluntarily or that her behaviors were coerced or that Kayla
somehow accepted responsibility for Alex upon picking her up or watching out
for her while there.  Mere presence at the apartment, moreover, did not
result in Alex and the nineteen-year-old's interaction.  Alex made her own
choices that night, and Kayla did not create a potentially dangerous situation
such that she had a duty to prevent harm to Alex.
¶ 12.         Plaintiff
essentially advocates that we find a duty simply because one girl was eighteen
and the other was fifteen.  The law does not impose such a duty in this
situationa duty for an eighteen-year-old to protect a high school friend who
has not reached the age of majority from the consequences of the younger
person's independent behavior or to control such behavior.  See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 ("The fact that the actor realizes or
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or
protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such
action.").  The consequences to the community should such a duty be found would
be considerable, transforming every high school friendship at the moment one
friend turns eighteen into an in loco parentis relationship.  Plaintiff
has made no convincing argument that Kayla was somehow in a position to control
Alex's behavior that night by virtue of the less-than-three-year difference in
their ages.  
¶ 13.         Plaintiff
alternately contends that we should evaluate the factors set out in Langle
v. Kurkul as part of our analysis of whether any duty existed.  146 Vt. 513, 510 A.2d 1301 (1986).  In Langle,
through a discussion of decisions from other states, we identified a number of
factors to consider in determining whether a duty exists.  Id. at
519, 510 A.2d  at 1305.  We noted that
foreseeability of the risk is often a primary consideration.  Id.
 Other factors include: 
the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved.  
Id. (quotation omitted).  In this
case, none of these considerations supports a finding of duty on the part of
Kayla.  
¶ 14.         We
have recognized that "[a]ctionable negligence is made out only when it appears
that a prudent person, in like circumstances, would have thought that injury
would be likely to result" from the acts or omissions in question.  LaFaso v. LaFaso, 126 Vt. 90, 93, 223 A.2d 814, 817 (1966). 
The only suggestion that Alex suffered an injury as a result of her liaison
with the nineteen-year-old was the expression of regret found in her suicide
note.  To argue that Kayla could or should have anticipated Alex would
suffer emotional distress as a result of the intercourse requires too much
speculation and does not satisfy the need that the claimed injury be reasonably
foreseeable.  If it was only on subsequent reflection that Alex regretted
her choices, it cannot be reasonable to expect Kayla to have anticipated
same.  "Foresight of harm lies at the foundation of negligence."  Id. at 94, 223 A.2d  at 818 (quotation omitted).       

¶ 15.         In
passing, plaintiff suggests Kayla had a duty to protect Alex because the two
had a special relationship, but she presents no argument on this issue beyond
stating that she raised it below.  A special relationship may arise
between two people, such as between a parent and child or custodian and ward.
 Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) ("One who is required by law
to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances
such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection is
under a similar duty to the other.").  When such a relationship exists, it
may impose a duty on one party to take affirmative action or precautions for
the aid or protection of the other.  See Peck v. Counseling Serv. of
Addison Cnty., Inc., 146 Vt. 61, 65, 499 A.2d 422, 425 (1985) ("[T]he
relationship between a clinical therapist and his or her patient is sufficient
to create a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect a potential victim of
another's conduct." (quotation omitted)).  When a
special relationship is found, such as when a parent relinquishes the
supervision and care of a child to an adult who agrees to supervise and care
for that child, some courts have held that the supervising adult must discharge
that duty with reasonable care.  See Kellermann v. McDonough, 684 S.E.2d 786, 790 (Va. 2009).  But here, there is no
evidence that Kayla ever agreed to supervise and care for Alex or that the
parents of Alex ever relinquished or sought to relinquish supervision of Alex
to Kayla.  As the trial court noted, "This was a case of two high school
friends sneaking out together, unbeknown to either of their parents; not a
situation where an adult agrees to care for another's child.  Kayla did
not become Alex's keeper simply because Kayla was 18 years old and Alex was
not."  We affirm the trial court's decision on this issue.   
¶ 16.         Plaintiff's
remaining arguments are directly predicated on the existence of a duty binding
Kayla to Alex.  The trial court, however, noted that the wrongful death
claim required further analysis because "a separate duty exists as to
suicide."  We address this issue to provide guidance to the trial bench in
the future and to affirm the trial court's reasoning in this case.
¶ 17.         Plaintiff
argues that her daughter's death was the direct result of the sexual encounter
the night beforean encounter for which we decline to hold Kayla
responsible.  Generally speaking, voluntary suicide is viewed as an
independent intervening act that breaks the causal chain and severs potential
liability.  McKane v. Capital Hill Quarry Co., 100 Vt. 45, 47, 134 A. 640, 641 (1926) ("[W]hen the suicide is the result of a voluntary, willful
choice, with knowledge of the purpose and physical effect of the act, a new and
independent agency intervenes . . . [and] breaks the chain of
causation . . . ."); see Mikell v. Sch. Admin. Unit
#33, 972 A.2d 1050, 1054
(N.H. 2009) ("[T]he act of suicide breaks the causal connection between the
wrongful or negligent act and the death." (quotation
omitted)).  This is because the act of suicide is considered to be a
deliberate, intentional, and intervening act, which precludes a finding that a
given defendant is, in fact, responsible for the harm.  Maloney
v. Badman, 938 A.2d 883, 886 (N.H. 2007).  However, when an
injured person becomes insane, even temporarily, and that insanity prevents one
from realizing the nature of one's act or controlling one's conduct, a
resulting suicide is regarded either as a direct consequence of the injury and
not an intervening force or as a normal consequence of the injury
inflicted.  W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 44, at
310-11 (5th ed. 1984); accord McKane, 100 Vt. at 47, 134 A.  at 640; see
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 455 (discussing "acts done during insanity
caused by negligent conduct"). 
¶ 18.         Here,
there was no evidence of an uncontrollable impulse on Alex's part to commit
suicide.  It was uncontroverted that Alex threatened to commit suicide
numerous times in the weeks before her death.  On one occasion, Alex went
into detail with her boyfriend about how she planned to take her own
life.  She spoke about suicide with her mother.  On the night of her
suicide, she sent text messages to her friends in which she talked about being
in trouble with her parents and told her friends goodbye.  Then, while
sober, she carried out her suicide plan.  This is not evidence of an
"uncontrollable impulse," but rather of a voluntary, deliberate, and tragic
choice by a girl who knew the purpose and the physical effect of her actions.
¶ 19.         A
number of jurisdictions have recognized an additional exception to the general
rule limiting liability in the event of a suicide, holding that liability
exists because the defendant had a duty to prevent the suicide arising from the
defendant's special relationship with the suicidal individual.  See, e.g. English
v. Griffith, 99 P.3d 90, 94 (Colo. App. 2004) (listing cases and stating
that "[s]pecial relationships typically involve circumstances in which the
defendant either had a treating or supervisory relationship with the decedent
or maintained custodial control over the decedent's environment"). 
Typically, the defendant in these cases "is someone who has a duty of custodial
care, is in a position to know about suicide potential, and fails to take
measures to prevent suicide from occurring."  Mikell, 972 A.2d  at
1054 (quotation omitted); cf., e.g., Nally v. Grace Comty Church, 763 P.2d 948, 956-58 (Cal. 1988) (refusing to extend special relationship duty to
prevent suicide to nontherapeutic counselor in part because such relationship
occurred outside custodial environment).  This duty has been imposed on
institutions with control over the persons, such as jails, see Murdock v.
City of Keene, 623 A.2d 755, 756 (N.H. 1993), and mental hospitals, see Maloney,
938 A.2d  at 890-91 (listing cases), and in limited cases on psychiatrists and
other trained professionals who have the expertise or training to enable them
to detect mental illness and/or the potential for suicide and the power or
control necessary to prevent that suicide.  See Kockelman v. Segal,
71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552, 557 (Ct. App. 1998).  Plainly, this exception does
not apply here.  As we have found, the relationship between Alex and Kayla
did not give rise to any "special relationship" that would impose a duty of
care on Kayla.  Further, while there was substantial evidence that Alex
had been expressing suicidal ideation for some time, long before she had sex at
the apartment, there was no evidence Kayla knew Alex was suicidal.  Alex,
for her own reasons, chose to end her life.  Nothing Kayla did or did not
do played a part in that decision.  We affirm the grant of summary judgment.
Affirmed.
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
  
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
  
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Geoffrey W. Crawford,
  Superior Judge,
Specially Assigned