Case Title: People v. Tapia

Citation: 515 P.2d 453

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1973-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
515 P.2d 453 (1973) The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard E. TAPIA, Defendant-Appellant. No. 25534. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. October 29, 1973. John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., Aurel M. Kelly, Sara Duncan, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee. Rollie R. Rogers, Colo. State Public Defender, J. D. MacFarlane, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Lee Belstock, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant. GROVES, Justice. On the night of May 23, 1970, two rival groups of young people were in Estes Park and had been drinking. According to some testimony, the two groups were in a fight. The defendant, being in one of the groups, shot the victim, a member of the other group, and several months later the victim died as a result. The jury brought in a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. We reverse. The defendant has presented two assignments of error, the first of which is that the question of second-degree murder should not have been submitted to the jury. So far as is material here, second-degree murder under the statute then in effect may be defined as the unlawful killing of a human with implied malice. C.R.S.1963, 40-2-3(1). The statute provided that malice should be implied when no considerable provocation appeared. The defendant contends that there was provocation for the shooting. This is true under the testimony of some witnesses, but is not true under the testimony of others. The issue of second-degree murder was therefore properly submitted to the jury. The defendant tendered an instruction undoubtedly drawn in part under the ruling in Young v. People, 47 Colo. 352, 107 P. 274 (1910). Young required in an appropriate case an instruction to the effect that a defendant may safely act upon appearances to avoid apprehended danger even though it develops later that the appearances *454 were false and that there was in effect no danger to do him serious injury. There is such a striking parallel between Young, supra, and the present case that we feel compelled to follow Young. The testimony of those near the scene of the shooting falls into three categories. In the first, the witnesses did not actually see the shooting. In the second, the victim approached the defendant and others in his group and asked "What's the problem?" or "What is the trouble?", whereupon the defendant drew his revolver and shot the victim. Under the third category, the defendant was cornered in a recessed doorway with no way in which to escape, and the victim and others were beating him. His glasses were knocked to the ground and broken and a dental retainer was dislodged from his teeth. The defendant then drew his revolver from his pocket and fired the shot. Incidentally but not material here, the defendant testified that, while he produced the revolver, he did not intend to fire it and the shot was accidental. We here are concerned with his other defense of self-defense. The court, as was the case in Young, supra, instructed the jury as follows: The court refused the following instruction tendered by the defendant: The first paragraph of the tendered instruction was undoubtedly fashioned from Young. The statements contained in the second paragraph of the tendered instruction were sufficiently embraced within the instruction given. Under the version of the facts here which would give rise to the defense of self-defense, retreat was impossible. The third paragraph of the tendered instruction need not therefore have been given. As to the first paragraph of the tendered instruction, the question for our consideration is whether the instruction given substantially informed the jury as to the law stated in the first paragraph. We might be inclined to answer that question in the affirmative except for the close parallel with Young. The ruling in Young was approved in People v. LaVoie, 155 Colo. 551, 395 P.2d 1001 (1964). In Young it was stated: The Attorney General in response to the argument of the defendant on this point merely states: This, of course, does not respond to the Young argument. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to grant a new trial. LEE, J., does not participate.