Case Title: First Nat. Bank, Cortez, Colorado v. First Interstate Bank, Riverton, Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
First Nat. Bank, Cortez, Colorado v. First Interstate Bank, Riverton, Wyoming1989 WY 120774 P.2d 645Case Number: 86-283Decided: 05/26/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
FIRST NATIONAL 
BANK, CORTEZ, COLORADO, a 
United 
States banking corporation, Appellant 
(Plaintiff)

 
 
v.

 
 
FIRST 
INTERSTATE BANK, RIVERTON, WYOMING, A United States banking corporation, 
Appellee (Defendant)

 
 
Lawrence J. Wolfe, Julie E. 
Trenerry, and Timothy Kingston, Holland & Hart, for 
Appellant.

 
 
Joel M. Vincent, Hettinger, Leedy 
& Vincent, for Appellee.

 
 

Before 
Cardine, C.J., Thomas, 
Urbigkit, Macy, and Golden, JJ. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; 
Urbigkit, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Macy, J., 
joined.

 
 
Thomas, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Upon the rehearing 
which the court granted in this case, the majority became convinced that the 
original opinion of the court was in error.1 The issue now to be resolved is 
whether a secured party must set forth in a security agreement or financing 
statement with specificity the amount of any antecedent indebtedness that the 
instrument secures or yield priority to a subsequent creditor if it fails to do 
so. The court has concluded that, so long as a security interest is properly 
perfected, priority is not lost under such circumstances because the subsequent 
creditor has the notice required by law which permits it to ascertain the facts 
relative to the antecedent indebtedness. In the original opinion of the court, 
the conclusion was reached that the subsequent creditor could prevail, with the 
court primarily relying upon precedent which requires that, in situations 
involving the mortgage of real estate, the intent of the parties is controlling. 
The prior opinion of the court in this case now is vacated, and the judgment of 
the district court is affirmed.

 
 

[¶2.]     In the initial briefs 
filed in this case, the respective parties articulated certain issues to be 
addressed. The appellant, First National Bank, Cortez, Colorado (Cortez Bank), stated the issues to 
be reviewed as:

 
 
"A. Will aircraft collateral used to 
secure a promissory note which is recorded with the FAA in the form of a 
security agreement also serve to secure a separate antecedent debt which has not 
been recorded with the FAA to the detriment of a third party who also claims 
pursuant to a properly perfected security agreement?

 
 
"B. Should a properly recorded 
security agreement have priority over an antecedent debt which has not been 
properly recorded where the antecedent debt is not specifically set forth in a 
security agreement?

 
 
"C. Did the Lower Court err in 
holding in favor of an antecedent debt without considering the intent of the 
parties?"

 
 
As appellee, the First Interstate 
Bank of Riverton, N.A. (Riverton Bank), offered this statement of 
issues:

 
 
"1.1 Whether federal law or state 
law determines the effect of filing.

 
 
"1.2 Whether First Interstate held a 
prior perfected and superior security interest in the aircraft with regard to 
that security interest held by Cortez.

 
 
"1.3 Whether Cortez can raise the 
issues set forth in its brief or in the alternative, has standing with regard to 
those issues."

 
 
In its Brief in Support of 
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing, the Riverton Bank then articulated the 
following issues:

 
 
"3.1 The District Court in and for 
Fremont County, Wyoming, Ninth Judicial District will not be able upon remand to 
conduct proceedings in accord with the majority opinion of this Court in that 
the aircraft in question was sold with other collateral by First Interstate, in 
bulk, for a price of $ 70,000.00, and therefore, there is no method by which to 
determine what portion of the $ 70,000.00 received by First Interstate is 
attributable to the aircraft.

 
 
"3.2 The decision of the majority 
opinion is contrary to the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, settled opinion of learned authorities, and to the intent of the 
legislature of the State of Wyoming in adopting the Uniform Commercial 
Code.

 
 
"3.3 Whether the opinion of the 
majority violates Section 6 of the Wyoming Constitution, that being the 
protection of due process of law in that the same is an unreasonable restraint 
upon the freedom of contract.

 
 
"3.4 Whether the majority opinion 
usurps the authority of the legislature with a consequent and adverse impact 
upon banking and commerce in the State of Wyoming to the detriment of its 
citizens."

 
 
The Cortez Bank does not articulate 
issues on rehearing but, instead, summarizes its position with these 
statements:

"I. Appellee's security agreement 
was inaccurate and therefore misleading. It was ineffective to perfect 
appellee's interest in the airplane and FNBC is entitled to the sale 
proceeds.

 
 
"II. The other arguments raised in 
the petition for rehearing are without merit."

 
 

[¶3.]     There is no need to 
consider constitutional arguments in this case. The other issues are resolved 
adequately by the disposition of the case in accordance with a standard 
application of the Uniform Commercial Code. In summary, that application leads 
to the conclusion that the security agreement was adequate to secure antecedent 
indebtedness as between the parties to it and, therefore, was binding upon them 
and their successors in interest with notice. The security agreement was 
perfected in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Cortez Bank is 
presumed to have had notice of it. The notice was sufficient to put the Cortez 
Bank upon inquiry, and nothing in the record suggests that it could not have 
discovered that antecedent indebtedness was secured, and the amount thereof, had 
it made an appropriate inquiry as the Uniform Commercial Code 
contemplates.

 
 

[¶4.]     The material facts, 
which are not disputed by the parties, can be readily summarized. On August 7, 
1981, Richard and Verlene Walker (Walkers) borrowed about $ 93,000 from the 
Riverton Bank. They gave the Riverton Bank a promissory note on that occasion 
which was secured by property identified as "Rigs." That note was renewed on 
July 27, 1982, at which time the Walkers owed the Riverton Bank about $ 77,000, 
and was secured by "2 Drilling Rigs." The next transaction is the critical one. 
On April 6, 1984, the Walkers asked to borrow an additional sum which was loaned 
by the bank upon a security agreement which encumbered the Walkers' 1979 Cessna 
airplane. The security agreement showed the principal amount as $ 7,328.35, but 
it also included the following statement:

 
 
"(Check and initial if applicable X 
/s RW VW.) In addition to the Note, this security agreement secures all amounts 
I owe to the Bank, whether now or later. This means that every loan I have now 
or get later is secured by this security agreement, as well as any other amount 
I may owe to the Bank (such as an overdraft on my checking 
account)."

 
 
This statement was checked in the 
appropriate place and initialed by each of the Walkers. At that time, the 
Walkers owed the Riverton Bank $ 77,605.63, which was the balance due on the 
previous promissory note.

 
 

[¶5.]     The Riverton Bank filed 
its security agreement with the CountyClerk and Ex-Officio Register of Deeds 
in and for Fremont County, 
Wyoming on April 12, 1984. On May 
9, 1984, the security agreement was also filed with the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA).

 
 

[¶6.]     On August 7, 1984, 
Richard Walker, d/b/a R & R Drilling, obtained a loan from the Cortez Bank. 
That loan, in the amount of $ 58,836.73, was secured by the same Cessna 
airplane. The record is silent as to any investigation made by the Cortez Bank 
prior to making the loan even though the district court found that the Cortez 
Bank relied upon a title search of the airplane before making the loan to 
Walker. In 
November, an examination was made of the FAA title record by Federal Aviation 
Title Company which reflected the situation as of November 23, 1984. It 
indicated that the original amount secured by the Riverton Bank's security 
agreement was $ 7,328.35, but made no reference to the clause that secured all 
amounts owed. The title examination also reflected the fact that the Cortez Bank 
recorded its security agreement with the FAA on September 14, 
1984.

 
 

[¶7.]     Subsequently, having 
obtained peaceful possession, the Riverton Bank sold the Cessna airplane. The 
sale was made in bulk with other collateral in the possession of the Riverton 
Bank for $ 70,000. The Riverton Bank retained the entire proceeds of the 
sale.

 
 

[¶8.]     This action then was 
instituted by the Cortez Bank seeking a declaratory judgment that it was 
entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the aircraft in excess of the sum of $ 
7,328.35 specified in the security agreement recorded with the FAA on May 9, 
1984 by the Riverton Bank. The district court ruled that the substantive effect 
of the recordings which perfected the respective security interests was 
controlled by state law. It held that the security agreement should be given 
effect according to its terms between the parties to it and any subsequent 
purchasers, if it had been properly perfected. It applied a presumption of 
notice to subsequent purchasers resulting from the proper filing of a security 
agreement and ruled that, having notice, the Cortez Bank could have obtained the 
appropriate information necessary for making its loan to the Walkers. The court 
then ordered that the declaratory judgment be granted to the Riverton Bank 
against the Cortez Bank, and this appeal was taken from that 
judgment.

 
 

[¶9.]     The essence of the 
dispute, as presented in this court, is found in the claim of the Cortez Bank 
that it was misled by the amount recited in the security agreement and that, 
consequently, the security agreement is not effective with respect to any 
indebtedness other than that amount. The Riverton Bank argues that this is not a 
proper construction of the Uniform Commercial Code and the applicable 
authorities; that it gave value for the security interest it acquired in the 
Cessna airplane; that it properly perfected its security interest; and that it 
was properly entitled to priority with respect to its security 
interest.

 
 

[¶10.]  If collateral is not in the possession of 
the secured party, it is necessary that the debtor sign a written security 
agreement containing a description of the collateral and manifesting the 
intention of the parties to create a security interest in that collateral. 
WYHY Federal Credit Union v. Burchell, 643 P.2d 471 (Wyo. 1982); 8 R. 
Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 9-203:17 at 669-70 (3d ed. 1985). If value 
has been given, and the debtor has rights in the collateral, the security 
interest attaches and becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the 
collateral as soon as all of the minimal requirements have been met. Section 
34-21-922, W.S.1977; Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 9-203, Comment 1, 1972 
Official Comment (rev. 1981). As defined by § 34-21-120(a)(xliv), (B), W.S.1977, 
value includes total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing 
claim.

 
 

[¶11.]  The security agreement between the 
Riverton Bank and the Walkers met the requirement for value, and we understand 
that there is no dispute about that. The security agreement specifically 
provided, as between the Walkers and the Riverton Bank, that all amounts owed to 
the bank, whether then existing or later advanced, were covered by the security 
agreement. The Cessna aircraft was described specifically as the collateral. 
Section 34-21-120(a)(iii), W.S.1977, sets forth a definition of agreement, which 
provides that the bargain of the parties may be found either in the language 
used or by implication from other circumstances. At the time the security 
agreement was made, the Walkers owed the Riverton Bank money on a previous 
promissory note made August 7, 1981. The agreement clearly manifests the 
intention of the parties that the aircraft served as collateral to secure the 
pre-existing debt. Clovis National Bank v. Harmon, 102 N.M. 166, 692 P.2d 1315 (1984). The Walkers had the rights of ownership in the Cessna airplane, and 
the security interest of the Riverton Bank attached when the security agreement 
was signed on April 6, 1984.

 
 

[¶12.]  The security interest was perfected, 
according to law, on April 23, 1984 when the Riverton Bank filed the security 
agreement with the FAA. Title 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1981) establishes a recording 
system with respect to conveyances of aircraft. This filing system was adopted 
in order to provide a central source of information from which notice of 
transactions could be obtained through an indexing system. See Philko 
Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 76 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1983). The function of this system is 
very similar to the notice provided through local filing systems for secured 
transactions. See In re Gelking, 754 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied sub nom. Armstrong v. State Bank of Towner, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S. Ct. 3529, 87 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1985); Bank of Oklahoma, 
CityPlaza v. Martin, 744 P.2d 218 (Okla.App. 1987); Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 9-302, Comment 8, 
1972 Official Comment.

 
 

[¶13.]  While, in this instance, the Riverton 
Bank recorded the security agreement, it was filed as a financing statement, as 
defined in § 34-21-951, W.S.1977. In a number of instances, this court has 
recognized the difference between a financing statement and a security agreement 
and has articulated the requirements and functions of a financing statement. 
See, e.g., Landen v. Production Credit Association of Midlands, 737 P.2d 1325 (Wyo. 
1987); Sannerud v. First National Bank of Sheridan, 708 P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 1985); Daly v. Shrimplin, 610 P.2d 397 
(Wyo. 1980); 
American National Bank of Riverton v. First National Bank of Lander, 446 P.2d 968 (Wyo. 
1968). In Shrimplin, we emphasized the proposition that a financing 
statement is filed to give constructive notice of a security interest in 
property. We there noted that the formal requisites for financing statements are 
articulated in § 34-21-951, W.S.1977, and we quoted the following language with 
approval:

 
 
"'* * * * The purpose of the filed 
statement or agreement is to give the minimum information necessary to put a 
searcher on inquiry. The section contemplates that the complete state of affairs 
will be learned only after such inquiry. * * * *' Bank of America v. Bank of Nutley, 94 N.J.Super. 220, 227 A.2d 535, 539 (1967)." Shrimplin, 610 P.2d  at 404.

 
 
There is no question that the filed 
document in this section satisfied the requirements of § 
34-21-951.

 
 

[¶14.]  We again emphasize the notice theory with 
respect to financing statements. Prior decisions of this court are entirely 
consistent with the application of the Uniform Commercial Code as understood by 
its drafters and respected authorities in this area of the law. Uniform 
Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 9-402, Comment 2, 1972 Official Comments, says in 
pertinent part:

 
 
"This section adopts the system of 
'notice filing' which proved successful under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. 
What is required to be filed is not, as under chattel mortgage and conditional 
sales acts, the security agreement itself, but only a simple notice which may be 
filed before the security interest attaches or thereafter. The notice itself 
indicates merely that the secured party who has filed may have a security 
interest in the collateral described. Further inquiry from the parties concerned 
will be necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs. Section 9-208 
provides a statutory procedure under which the secured party, at the debtor's 
request, may be required to make disclosure. Notice filing has proved to be of 
great use in financing transactions involving inventory, accounts and chattel 
paper, since it obviates the necessity of refiling on each of a series of 
transactions in a continuing arrangement where the collateral changes from day 
to day. Where other types of collateral are involved, the alternative procedure 
of filing a signed copy of the security agreement may prove to be the simplest 
solution. Sometimes more than one copy of a financing statement or of a security 
agreement used as a financing statement is needed for filing. In such a case the 
section permits use of a carbon copy or photographic copy of the paper, 
including signatures.

 
 
"However, even in the case of 
filings that do not necessarily involve a series of transactions the financing 
statement is effective to encompass transactions under a security agreement not 
in existence and not contemplated at the time the notice was filed, if the 
description of collateral in the financing statement is broad enough to 
encompass them. Similarly, the financing statement is valid to cover 
after-acquired property and future advances under security agreements whether or 
not mentioned in the financing statement."

 
 
In his work on the U.C.C., Anderson 
says:

 
 
"When a proper filing is made, third 
persons are presumed to have notice of and are subject to the provisions of the 
security agreement. A person is charged with possessing the information that 
could have been discovered had he made the inquiry suggested by the 
filing.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
"The financing statement only gives 
notice that a security interest is claimed in certain described collateral. 
There is no requirement that the financing statement identify the obligation 
that is secured by the secured transaction nor to state the terms of such 
obligation. As there is no requirement that the financing statement identify the 
debt, there is no requirement that the financing statement set forth the amount 
of the debt, that future advances may be made, or the maximum amount of the 
debt.

 
 
"Because the financing statement 
does not identify any particular debt as underlying the secured transaction, the 
one financing statement may cover many successive obligations of the debtor with 
respect to the described collateral, without regard to the fact that different 
obligations are involved, or that there has been a refinancing of the obligation 
underlying the original secured transaction. Thus one filing of a financing 
statement may cover all secured transactions between the debtor and creditor and 
there is no requirement that a new financing statement be filed every time that 
a later secured transaction is entered into." 9 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial 
Code, §§ 9-402:6, 9-402:22 at 448 and 462 (3d ed. 1985) (footnotes 
omitted).

 
 

[¶15.]  Section 34-21-951, setting forth the 
requisites of a financing statement, does not require any statement of the 
amount secured. The same thing is true with respect to a security agreement. The 
law does not require that a security agreement recite the amount of the debt 
secured. Section 34-21-922, W.S.1977 (U.C.C. § 9-203); Clovis, 102 N.M. 
166, 692 P.2d 1315; 8 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, § 9-203:27 at 676. 
These statutes contain minimal requirements with respect to the enforceability 
of and the attachment of the security interest and, if those requirements are 
met, nothing more need be done.

 
 

[¶16.]  We find, in this instance, no question 
that the Walkers and the Riverton Bank intended that the Cessna aircraft serve 
as security for previously existing indebtedness. The intent of the parties 
controls, and that is true whatever the form or designation of the instrument 
might be. Frantz v. First National Bank & Trust Company of Wyoming, 687 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1984). In this 
latter case, we said:

 
 
"* * * * A security agreement is 
effective according to its terms between the parties and subsequent purchasers 
if properly perfected by filing. The subsequent purchasers are presumed to have 
notice and are, therefore, subject to the provisions of the agreement." 
Frantz at 1162.

 
 
As the trial court perceptively 
noted, that is exactly the situation in this instance. The Cortez Bank was 
chargeable with this notice. The record does not disclose that it had actual 
notice of the prior security agreement in favor of the Riverton Bank. In its 
trial brief, the Cortez Bank argued that it had relied upon an FAA title search, 
but the stipulated facts do not include the fact of reliance. So far as the 
record evidence demonstrates, which is the only information this court has, the 
Cortez Bank had no information about the principal amount of $ 7,328.35 prior to 
making its loan to Walker. If the Cortez Bank had actual knowledge 
of the security agreement, then its duty to inquire is even more 
clear.

 
 

[¶17.]  Under these circumstances, the Riverton 
Bank did everything that the law requires to perfect its security interest in 
the aircraft. The Cortez Bank had constructive, and perhaps actual, knowledge of 
the existence of a security interest in that aircraft. The theory of the Uniform 
Commercial Code is that, given that information, further inquiry is required in 
order to disclose the other facts that may be material to a subsequent purchaser 
or lender. Proper analysis and application of the Uniform Commercial Code leads 
to a conclusion that the judgment of the district court in this declaratory 
judgment suit be affirmed.

 
 

[¶18.]  The judgment of the district court in 
this case is affirmed, and the opinion of this court filed in First National 
Bank, Cortez v. First Interstate Bank, Riverton, 758 P.2d 1026 (Wyo. 1988), is 
vacated.

 
 
Urbigkit, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which Macy, J., joined.

 
 
URBIGKIT, Justice, dissenting, with 
whom MACY, Justice, joins.

 
 

[¶19.]  This reversal after rehearing, following 
a change in court membership, ignores a singular volume of cases and gives 
little credit to either stare decisis or stability. The majority in present 
opinion creates what they want the law to be, not what it generally by precedent 
has been or, as a general rule for efficiency and clarity in commercial 
enterprises, what it should be.

 
 

[¶20.]  One lone New Mexico case, clearly 
distinguishable both in fact and logic which also has been superceded by a more 
recent New Mexico decision, provides the only support for this present majority 
decision which creates a posture of the law to ignore specificity in filed loan 
documents which would protect subsequent interest claimants. It is in the 
concept of adequate notice and identified debt that these anaconda-dragnet 
clauses have been for at least half a century viewed with suspicion and 
impressed with strictly confined application. This status is recognized in 
preparation and final drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code where a validation 
of a future claim to security coverage was included within carefully defined 
limits in operational status and no similar statutory provision was included for 
a pre-existing debt which most easily can be detailed to provide notice within 
the security document.

 
 

[¶21.]  It is an interesting facet of 
communicative draftsmanship that the appellation of dragnet or anaconda clauses 
are not included in the majority opinion, although in text and annotation these 
defining words lead to the voluminous case law now ignored. The most recent 
case, authored by Chief Justice Rabinowitz of the Alaska Supreme Court, 
addresses directly this dragnet application of a security document. Within that 
evidentiary review and exhaustive case citation, the Alaska court repeats the 
determinative principle which was the basis of the prior majority opinion of 
this court, with both writers citing identical cases for authoritative 
support.

 
 
Many courts, however, have refused 
to rely solely on the language of the dragnet clause and instead have sought to 
determine the "true intent" of the parties. Decisions adopting this approach 
have pointed out that such clauses are usually "boiler-plate" in a document 
drafted by the lender, seldom the subject of negotiation, and often the debtor 
is unaware of its presence or implications. See, e.g., Wong v. Beneficial 
Sav. and Loan Ass'n., 56 Cal. App. 3d 286, 128 Cal. Rptr. 338, 342 (1976); 
First Sec. Bank v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952, 957 (Utah 1980). These courts 
often opine that although dragnet clauses are not invalid, they will be 
carefully scrutinized and strictly construed; the courts express concern that 
the debtor may be caught unaware of the indebtedness that the agreement secures 
and consequently become the "economic serf" of the creditors. See, e.g., 
Akamine & Sons, Ltd. v. American Sec. Bank, 50 Hawaii 304, 440 P.2d 262, 
267 (1968); Emporia State Bank and Trust Co. v. Mounkes, 214 Kan. 178, 
519 P.2d 618 (1974) (quoting with approval Akamine, 440 P.2d at 267); 
Shiew, 609 P.2d  at 955.

 
 
Courts have adopted various 
approaches to determine whether the nature of the "other debt" should bring it 
within the dragnet clause. Some have held that debts incurred prior to the 
security agreement ("antecedent debts") will not come within the dragnet clause 
unless such debts were specifically identified in the security agreement. 
See, e.g., National Bank v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667, 673-74 (E.D. 
Ark.1959), aff'd sub nom. National Bank v. General Mills, 283 F.2d 574 
(8th Cir.1960) (applying Arkansas law); Underwood v. Jarvis, 358 So. 2d 731, 735 (Ala.1978); First v. Byrne, 238 Iowa 712, 28 N.W.2d 509, 512 
(1947); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lygrisse, 231 Kan. 595, 647 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1982). A key rationale underlying these holdings is that since 
the antecedent debt is already owed by the borrower to the lender, the parties 
would have had no good reason not to identify it in the subsequent security 
instrument if they had truly intended the deed of trust or mortgage to cover it. 
Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. at 673-74; Underwood, 358 So. 2d  at 735; 
Byrne, 28 N.W.2d  at 512. Several decisions have modified this rule by 
holding that if the parties expressly agree in a subsequent instrument that a 
security agreement containing the dragnet clause extends to an antecedent debt 
specifically referred to in the subsequent instrument then the dragnet clause 
will apply to the antecedent debt. Kamaole Resort Twenty-One v. Ficke 
Hawaiian Investments, 60 Hawaii 413, 591 P.2d 104, 112 (1979); 
Lygrisse, 647 P.2d  at 1273.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
Our study of the foregoing 
authorities leads us to reject an approach which enforces dragnet clauses 
uncritically. Here we conclude that the dragnet clause contained in NBA's second 
deed of trust on Seven Mile North Yard does not encompass any of JMI and LPCC's 
approximately $ 2.7 million of antecedent debt to NBA.

 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we are 
persuaded by those authorities which hold that antecedent debts will not be 
included within the scope of a dragnet clause unless such debts are specifically 
identified in the security agreement. Identification and incorporation of such 
debts in the security agreement will provide accurate and accessible notice as 
to the extent of indebtedness secured by the subject property not only to the 
parties to the agreement, but also to all those who subsequently deal with the 
parties and the property. Of controlling significance is the fact that this 
approach will thus furnish protection for junior 
lienholders.

 
 

Lundgren v. National Bank of 
Alaska, 756 P.2d 270, 277-78 (Alaska 
1987).

 
 

[¶22.]  This principle of reliable notice is a 
basic justification for recording and filing statutes where an efficient lending 
industry can examine and determine limits of utilization of security coverage by 
reading the filed documents and security instruments. These general principles 
have developed both for real estate and chattel financing and many of the cases 
are produced by security conflicts as a question of lien priority. 1 See differentiation of classes of 
cases in prior opinion, First Nat. Bank, Cortez, Colo. 
v. First Interstate Bank, Riverton, 758 P.2d 1026, 1030 (Wyo. 1988). One major 
class is established by the U.C.C. chattel financing future advance provision, 
U.C.C. § 9-204 (W.S. 34-21-923(c)), which states that "obligations covered by a 
security agreement may include future advances or other value whether or not the 
advances or value are given pursuant to commitment." Generally, this clause is 
considered to have confirmed prior case law that a discernible difference in 
application between the statutory provision for chattel financing and real 
estate applications does not exist. It is noteworthy that the one dragnet case 
actually cited by the majority, Clovis Nat. Bank v. Harmon, 102 N.M. 166, 
692 P.2d 1315 (1984), did involve a real estate 
transaction.

 
 
1 Dragnet clause controversies 
between claimant lenders are equally included within the total number of 
lawsuits which attack these clauses. Examples include: United States v. 
Fahrenkamp, 312 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1963); Feldman v. Philadelphia Nat. 
Bank, 408 F. Supp. 24 (E.D.Pa. 1976); Marine Nat. Bank v. Airco, 
Inc., 389 F. Supp. 231 (W.D.Pa. 1975); National Bank of Eastern Ark. v. 
Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.Ark. 1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 574 
(8th Cir. 1960); Lundgren, 756 P.2d 270; Security Bank v. First Nat. 
Bank, 263 Ark. 525, 565 S.W.2d 623 (1978); First Nat. Bank of Corning v. 
Corning Bank & Trust Co., 168 Ark. 17, 268 S.W. 606 (1925); Kamaole 
Resort Twenty-One v. Ficke Hawaiian Investments, Inc., 60 Haw. 413, 591 P.2d 104 (1979); Akamine and Sons, Limited v. American Sec. Bank, 50 Haw. 304, 
440 P.2d 262 (1968); Ruidoso State Bank v. Castle, 105 N.M. 158, 730 P.2d 461 (1986); Clovis Nat. Bank v. Harmon, 102 N.M. 166, 692 P.2d 1315 
(1984); New Mexico Bank & Trust Co. v. Lucas Bros., 92 N.M. 2, 582 P.2d 379 (1978); Farmers Nat. Bank of Cherokee v. De Fever, 177 Okl. 561, 
61 P.2d 245 (1936); First Nat. Bank of Ardmore v. Gillam, 134 Okl. 237, 273 P. 261 
(1927); and In re Grizaffi, 23 B.R. 137 (Colo. 1982).

 
 

[¶23.]  Not only was Clovis National Bank 
a real estate transaction, it was also a trial concluded case with the principal 
appellate issue of the substantial evidence rule which was sufficient to support 
a trial court factual finding. Annotations reveal that except for a succeeding 
case where Clovis National Bank was put in its proper perspective in New 
Mexico law, the case has since been cited only in support of that substantial 
evidence rule and was never used as authority on dragnet financing in any case, 
whether in New Mexico or any other jurisdiction until this 
case.

 
 

[¶24.]  The reason for its limitation in 
precedential value is easily perceived in examining the more recent case of 
Ruidoso State Bank v. Castle, 105 N.M. 158, 730 P.2d 461 (1986), where 
the New Mexico court was called to more specifically consider the dragnet 
provision in lending documentation. The question in Ruidoso State Bank 
was

 
 
whether a mortgage containing a 
"dragnet clause" covers preexisting debts to the lender in all cases, whether or 
not those debts are related to the purpose of the loan for which the mortgage is 
obtained, to give the lender in a foreclosure proceeding a priority position as 
to those debts over judgments obtained by other creditors before foreclosure. In 
the circumstances of this case, we hold it does not and we affirm the trial 
court.

 
 

Id. at 461. See likewise, In re 
Bass, 44 B.R. 113 (N.M. 1984), which applied New Mexico law and denied application to the 
earlier existent but non-referenced differentiated purpose 
loan.

 
 

[¶25.]  In Ruidoso State Bank, 105 N.M. 
158, 730 P.2d 461, the factual situation is remarkably similar to the present 
case with the exception that the succeeding liens were obtained by judgment 
rather than by new loans to the debtor. In March 1982, debtor gave Ruidoso State 
Bank note one in the amount of $ 10,100 secured by chattel security on a 20-ton 
crane. In June, he gave a second promissory note for $ 4,334.64 secured by a 
mortgage on a vehicle. A third note was executed in July as a real estate 
mortgage and a fourth mortgage in September, which contained a dragnet clause 
for both future advances and antecedent debts in each real estate mortgage. The 
note covered an additional $ 12,000. In December, a second creditor obtained a 
money judgment against the debtor. Following thereafter in 1983, the debtor 
executed a further note in favor of the bank of $ 6,000 as a renewal note of 
note three, and in November of the same year, the bank obtained a deficiency 
judgment on the chattel financing transactions, notes one and two, in the amount 
of $ 6,032.12. The factual issue then presented was whether the second 
creditor's judgment lien of December 1982 provided a higher priority than the 
dragnet application of the defaulted payments on notes one and two as each was 
to be impressed upon equity value beyond the real estate mortgage stated 
amounts. In trial court, and as affirmed on appeal, Ruidoso State Bank lost and 
its dragnet clause was not accorded function sufficiency to provide a priority 
superior to the intervening judgment liens. There, as in this case, the debtor 
disappeared from the litigative proceedings by default.

 
 

[¶26.]  The New Mexico court then directly 
related the Ruidoso State Bank, 105 N.M. 158, 730 P.2d 461 decision to 
the prior case, Clovis National Bank, 102 N.M. 166, 692 P.2d 
1315:

 
 
We think the trial court was 
correct, however, in declining to read Harmon [102 N.M. 166, 692 P.2d 1315] as establishing as a matter of law that any holder of a mortgage having a 
dragnet provision has, automatically, with respect to all preexisting and future 
obligations, a priority date as of the date of the 
mortgage.

 
 
* * * * In Harmon, then, this 
Court, in its appellate role, simply concluded that based on the record before 
it the trial judge had not erred in deciding that the dragnet clause contained 
in the real estate mortgage secured other notes involved in that particular 
case. Having said here, however, that dragnet clauses do not, as a matter of 
law, secure all debts between parties, we must then determine if substantial 
evidence supports the trial court's decision.

 
 
Dragnet clauses which purport to 
secure all debts, past, present, and future, between parties to a security 
agreement generally are disfavored and thus strictly construed. Uransky v. 
First Federal Savings & Loan Association [684 F.2d 750 (11th Cir. 
1982)]. Aside from the actual language of the provision, construction should 
focus on the intent of the parties as evidenced by the circumstances surrounding 
the mortgage and the nexus between the mortgage and the notes 
involved.

 
 

Ruidoso State Bank, 730 P.2d  at 463. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court thus affirmed the trial court decision that the dragnet clause was 
ineffective to affix priority on the real estate mortgage for the earlier 
chattel loans. By judgment which gave priority to the intervening lien 
claimants, the bank was given third priority as to its remaining balances on the 
first two notes as superior only to other non-participating creditors. A 
comprehensive examination as similar precedent is found in Farmers & 
Mechanics Bank v. Davies, 97 Ill.App.3d 195, 52 Ill.Dec. 655, 422 N.E.2d 864 
(1981).

 
 

[¶27.]  It is in this examination now made by the 
current majority which is directly contrary to the general rule stated by the 
most recent New 
Mexico case as a fact and circumstance test to establish 
nexus, where my critical disagreement is derived. This Wyoming summary judgment 
cannot be justified on that precedent, Ruidoso State Bank, 105 N.M. 158, 
730 P.2d 461, nor any other directly related authority. See Lundgren, 756 P.2d 270; Freese Leasing, Inc. v. Union Trust & Sav. Bank Stanwood, 
253 N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1977); and Canal Nat. 
Bank v. Becker, 431 A.2d 71 (Me. 1981).

 
 

[¶28.]  In present appeal, this debtor had a 
large oil drilling operation loan in the initial amount of approximately $ 
93,000 as subsequently renewed for approximately $ 77,605.63 which was secured 
by the equipment of the business enterprise described as "rigs." The second loan 
of $ 7,328.35 as made with the security of the airplane, had no discernible 
relationship with the earlier business operating loan. It was with purpose 
unstated, secured by totally different property, namely the airplane which, 
unless recently purchased by the debtor, had apparently not been previously 
burdened by chattel financing. It was out of this relatively small mortgage that 
the security document form language of a dragnet clause provision was 
incorporated.

 
 

[¶29.]  There is no evidence in the record that 
the borrowers realized the effect of the dragnet clause so that they were 
thereafter at best to commit a criminal fraud when they gave another lien on the 
same airplane to the First National Bank of Cortez contrary to the apparent 
assumption of both that lender and the same borrowers that the airplane was only 
indebted for the $ 7,328.35 loan and not the underlying pre-existing earlier 
operating loan of a singularly greater amount of $ 77,605.63. We are then here, 
as was the case in Ruidoso State Bank, 105 N.M. 158, 730 P.2d 461, 
provided no evidence sufficient to meet the strict scrutiny test required 
generally by the cases and specifically by the New Mexico court. See 
likewise, New Mexico Bank and Trust Co. v. Lucas Bros., 92 N.M. 2, 582 P.2d 379 (1978), where it was determined that actual notice was the determinative 
factor. Future advances were involved with the statutory future advance maximum 
coverage provision then controlling.

 
 

[¶30.]  For comparable authority to Ruidoso 
State Bank, 105 N.M. 158, 730 P.2d 461, see Dixie Ag Supply, Inc. v. 
Nelson, 500 So. 2d 1036 (Ala. 1986), which defines, as a test for dragnet 
clause effectiveness, that the loan document itemize the existing indebtedness 
by clear and unequivocal terms and references that include a specific and 
identifiable antecedent debt in order to extend the coverage of the security 
agreement to that antecedent debt. In Dixie Ag Supply, Inc., the 
antecedent debt was specifically identified and the clause was consequently 
given validation to effectuate debt coverage against the designated security. 
See identification in mortgage test as applied in Badger State Agri-Credit 
& Realty, Inc. v. Lubahn, 122 Wis.2d 718, 365 N.W.2d 616 (1985). The 
burden of proof for specificity of identification of the debt to be covered 
intended within the loan documents rests upon the lender claimant. Wong v. 
Beneficial Sav. and Loan Ass'n., 56 Cal. App. 3d 286, 128 Cal. Rptr. 338 
(1976); Kamaole Resort Twenty-One v. Ficke Hawaiian Investments, Inc., 60 
Haw. 413, 591 P.2d 104 (1979); Capocasa v. First Nat. Bank of Stevens Point, 36 
Wis.2d 714, 154 N.W.2d 271 (1967).

 
 

[¶31.]  Lacking that specificity of the amount 
intended to be dragged forward by the dragnet to be thrust under the security 
umbrella, I dissent from this reversal upon rehearing to put Wyoming in a class 
of the only jurisdiction which adopts a totality rule of validation for 
dragnet-anaconda clause application. More serious problems from this clutch and 
thrust aptitude will develop causing controversy among lenders, all of whom in 
initial relationships probably act in good faith in a particular 
transaction.

 
 

[¶32.]  There is nothing cited as authority by 
the majority which lends strength as precedent to what is basically an 
undirected deviation of dragnet legal application. Surprisingly, the majority 
does not cite the extensive literature or distinguish the cases enumerated in 
detail in prior writings or specifically the two most recent cases of Ruidoso 
State Bank, 105 N.M. 158, 730 P.2d 461 and Lundgren, 756 P.2d 270. 
Those two can be joined by a third of interest, which is also not cited, 
Decorah State Bank v. Zidlicky, 426 N.W.2d 388, 390 (Iowa 1988) which, 
although discussing a future advance application, relates:

 
 
II. Future advances clauses are 
valid but courts look upon them with a definite lack of enthusiasm. We have 
adopted the following standard for ascertaining whether a future advances clause 
(also known as a dragnet clause) includes a particular 
debt:

 
 
In the absence of clear, supportive 
evidence of a contrary intention a mortgage containing a dragnet type clause 
will not be extended to cover future advances unless the advances are of the 
same kind and quality or relate to the same transaction or series of 
transactions as the principal obligation secured or unless the document 
evidencing the subsequent advance refers to the mortgage as providing security 
therefor.

 
 

Freese Leasing, 253 N.W.2d  at 927 (quoting 
Emporia Bank and Trust Co. v. Mounkes, 214 Kan. 178, 184, 519 P.2d 618, 623 (1974)). The Freese Leasing tests are alternative tests. 
Hawkeye Bank & Trust Co. v. Michel, 373 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Iowa 
1985).

 
 
Dragnet clauses are valid but are 
not favored by the law. Farmers Trust & Sav. Bank v. Manning, 311 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa 1981). They are thus strictly construed 
against the mortgagee.

 
 

Cf. Union Nat. Bank of Little Rock v. First State 
Bank & Trust Co. of Conway, 16 Ark.App. 116, 697 S.W.2d 940, 
941-42 (1985), which notes the

 
 
well-settled rule that a mortgage 
given to secure a specific debt will not be extended to cover debts subsequently 
incurred unless they are of the same class or are so related to the primary debt 
secured that the assent of the mortgagor will be inferred. The purpose for such 
a requirement is to prevent the extension of a lien by the use of general terms 
to debts which the debtor did not contemplate.

 
 

[¶33.]  There is a further thesis as argued by 
First National Bank of Cortez in this case justifying retention of our first 
decision. If the document which provides the notice of indebtedness contains a 
secured amount total, that document should accurately reflect the totality of 
indebtedness and not exclude prior amounts which would later be claimed to be 
brought within its coverage. This is the seriously misleading prohibition of the 
security documents. See In re South Atlantic Packers Ass'n, Inc., 30 B.R. 836, 838 (S.C. 1983) and 9 Hawkland, Lord & Lewis, UCC Series § 9-402:14 at 
410 (1986). The financing statement or document of notice is misleading if the 
effect is that a potential creditor could have been misled. In re Pacific 
Trencher & Equipment, Inc., 735 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir. 1984); In re 
HGS Technical Associates, Inc., 14 UCC Rep.Serv. 237, 245 (1972), 
aff'd, 14 UCC Rep.Serv. 247 (E.D.Tenn. 1973). This argument also has 
logic in context that if stated as a debt coverage, it should include the total 
amount intended to be consequently secured.

 
 

[¶34.]  The seriously misleading thesis as 
addressed by a singular number of cases by First National Bank of Cortez in 
their rehearing brief is related to the conjecture of the majority that where a 
self-standing financing statement is used, then no amount is stated. In first 
analysis, it is true that if no amount is stated, it is not misleading, but that 
is not the case because the documents here clearly reflect a filed combination 
form which included a stated amount of only $ 7,328.35. See First Agri 
Services, Inc. v. Kahl, 129 Wis.2d 464, 385 N.W.2d 191, 194 
(1986).

 
 

[¶35.]  There is another disability in the logic 
of the majority in application of the financing statement requirements to the 
aircraft filing standard with the Federal Aviation Authority. Nothing is found 
to reveal that financing statements can be filed with the FAA and, 
certainly in this case, a self-standing simple financing statement was not 
filed. The federal statute, 49 U.S.C.A. 1403(a)(1) (West 1976), provides: "Any 
conveyance which affects the title to, or any interest in, any civil aircraft of 
the United 
States." Recording of Aircraft Title and 
Security Documents, 14 C.F.R. § 49.17(a) (1988) defines:

 
 
"Conveyance" means a bill of sale, 
contract of conditional sale, mortgage, assignment of mortgage, or other 
instrument affecting title to, or interest in, property.

 
 

[¶36.]  Lacking citation of authority by 
litigants or a recitation of case law by the majority, there is only one case 
found on the subject which accurately recognizes that a financing statement is 
not a conveyance and apparently is not a fileable document within the FAA 
registration system at Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma. In 
Feldman v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 408 F. Supp. 24, 35 (E.D.Pa. 1976), 
the court recognized that Article 9 of the U.C.C.

 
 
adopts a system of "notice filing" 
whereby the only document filed is a financing statement which is no more than a 
"simple notice" indicating "merely that the secured party who has filed may have 
a security interest in the collateral described." UCC § 9-402, Comment 2, 12A 
P.S. § 9-402. * * * *.* * * * The Federal Aviation Act does not adopt a notice 
filing system with respect to conveyances, but instead requires that the 
instrument of conveyance through which the party claims the interest must itself 
be filed with the Administrator for recording. The Act explicitly states that an 
instrument is invalid as to third parties without actual notice unless that 
instrument is on file with the Administrator. [Emphasis in 
original.]

 
 
Cf. Landen v. Production Credit 
Ass'n of Midlands, 737 P.2d 1325 (Wyo. 1987) and Sannerud v. First Nat. Bank 
of Sheridan, 708 P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 

[¶37.]  Whatever kind of document may be fileable 
with the county clerk does not provide a substitute for proper filing of a 
recordable instrument with the FAA pursuant to the federal statute. State 
Securities Co. v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc., 355 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1966); 
In re Pegasus Intern. Travel Club, 15 B.R. 842 (Bankr.M.D.Pa. 
1981).

 
 

[¶38.]  I do not have any significant 
disagreement with the force and effect of the authorities cited by the majority 
except Clovis National Bank. However, these authorities really do not 
have anything to do with dragnet clause finance case law and consequently 
provide no authority for the arbitrary posture adopted in opinion which 
disregards a rather consistent national development in the law for more than 
fifty years. Annotation, Debts Included in Provision of Mortgage Purporting 
to Cover All Future and Existing Debts (Dragnet Clause)--Modern Status, 3 
A.L.R.4th 690 (1981). See National Bank of Eastern Ark. v. Blankenship, 
177 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.Ark. 1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960); 
Hendrickson v. Farmers' Bank & Trust Co., 189 Ark. 423, 73 S.W.2d 725 
(1934); First Nat. Bank of Corning v. Corning Bank & Trust Co., 168 
Ark. 17, 268 S.W. 606 (1925); Skinner v. Elliot, 17 Ga.App. 511, 87 S.E. 759 (1916); Freese Leasing, Inc., 253 N.W.2d 921; Sowder v. 
Lawrence, 129 Kan. 135, 281 P. 921 (1929); Farmers Nat. 
Bank of Cherokee v. De Fever, 177 Okl. 561, 61 P.2d 245 (1936); First 
Nat. Bank of Ardmore v. Gillam, 134 Okl. 237, 273 P. 261 
(1927); and McCollum v. Braddock Trust Co., 330 Pa. 293, 198 A. 803 
(1938). More recent cases include Lundgren, 756 P.2d 270; Farmers 
& Mechanics Bank, 97 Ill. App. 3d 195, 422 N.E.2d 864, 52 Ill. Dec. 655; 
Ruidoso State Bank, 105 N.M. 158, 730 P.2d 461, First Sec. Bank of 
Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952 (Utah 1980); and Badger State Agri-Credit 
& Realty Inc., 122 Wis. 2d 718, 365 N.W.2d 616. See also G. 
Nelson and D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law § 12.8 (2d ed. 
1985).

 
 

[¶39.]  Any hypothetical discussion that a 
financing statement, if separately used, need not include an amount secured has 
no relevance to the facts of this case where the filed document designated as a 
consumer's security and pledge agreement stated a principle amount of $ 
7,328.35. This is precisely the amount shown from the record which was revealed 
in the title search with the Federal Aviation Authority. The argument provides 
no support for contention about what would be the case if the lender were to use 
a nondesignated amount financing statement which might be possible if the 
property, as different from this case, was not an airplane. The defined amount 
as secured was $ 7,328.35 and not plus $ 77,605.63 as arrived from earlier 
separately placed loan transaction. Consequently, WYHY Federal Credit Union 
v. Burchell, 643 P.2d 471 (Wyo. 1982) is unrelated as involving an 
unsecured security agreement form. The accounts receivable financing as also 
involving an unfiled subsequent creditor claim in Daly v. Shrimplin, 610 P.2d 397 (Wyo. 1980) is likewise uninformative in this factual situation for a 
prior indebtedness dragnet clause. The application of a lien to chattel proceeds 
is likewise dissimilar in Frantz v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of 
Wyoming, 687 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 
1984).

 
 

[¶40.]  The issue raised in In re Gelking, 
754 F.2d 778 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S. Ct. 3529, 87 L. Ed. 2d 653 
(1985) and Bank of Oklahoma, CityPlaza v. Martin, 744 P.2d 218 
(Okl.App. 1987) presented priority of filing with the FAA which is a question of 
federal law. Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 103 S. Ct. 2476, 76 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1983) and not the effect of the 
particular document which, by 49 U.S.C.App. § 1406, is controlled by state law. 
Matter of Gary Aircraft Corp., 681 F.2d 365, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131, 103 S. Ct. 3110, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1366 
(1983). Consequently, the majority's citation and argument reaches no issue 
properly presented here.

 
 

[¶41.]  In considerable detail in rehearing 
brief, First Interstate Bank questions what can be done since it conducted the 
foreclosure "at private sale, in bulk, for the total sum of $ 70,000." Within 
the uninformative record, there is nothing to suggest that the sale was 
conducted legally in accord with the U.C.C. after proper notice but, in any 
event, the risk of an in bulk private sale sets its own responsibilities. This 
is particularly true since unquestionably, First National Bank of Cortez had a 
lien interest in the airplane with notice given and the only question was 
priority. See W.S. 34-21-963(c). See Stephens v. Sheridan Public Emp. Federal Credit Union, 594 P.2d 473 
(Wyo. 1979) and Whirlybirds Leasing 
Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 749 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.App. 1988). Cf. Durdahl v. Bank of Casper, 718 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1986) and Annotation, Sufficiency of Secured 
Party's Notification of Sale or Other Intended Disposition of 
Collateral Under UCC § 9-504(3), 11 A.L.R.4th 241 (1982). Actually, no 
particular problem would have been created since upon remand the litigants would 
have determined by proper evidence what the value of the chattel property was so 
that First Interstate Bank would have been chargeable for the value of the 
property after deduction of its priority claim of $ 7,328.35 or balance thereof 
remaining at sale date with accrued interest and prorated costs of foreclosure 
sale. If the lender selling at private sale did not get proper value, it only 
constitutes the risk elected by conducting the private sale in bulk. This 
abridged record for an issue not briefed until rehearing does not justify (or 
permit) adequate review of the validity of initial sale and its effect before or 
now after reversal of initial decision on rehearing. ABC Builders, Inc. v. 
Phillips, 632 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1981). See Villella Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Young, 108 N.M. 33, 766 P.2d 293 (1988).

 
 

[¶42.]  Realistically, little benefit would be 
derived in a repetition in further writing in this opinion as to the authorities 
and principles generally followed in the extensive case law as previously 
recited in detail in the prior opinion of First Nat. Bank, Cortez, Colo., 
758 P.2d 1026 or to be found in Ruidoso State Bank, 105 N.M. 158, 730 P.2d 461 and Lundgren, 756 P.2d 270. The practical result of this 
majority's decision is to freeze out any additional security value of a 
borrower's assets after his first loan where partial utilization has occurred. 
Consequently, this majority, in an unjustified decision which makes new law, 
further limits credit to the Wyoming borrower.

 
 

[¶43.]  In re-examination, I remain even more 
firmly convinced that the first decision was both legally persuasive and 
formally implanted by near unanimous precedent. Consequently, I dissent from 
reversal on rehearing.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1First National Bank, 
Cortez v. First Interstate Bank, Riverton, 758 P.2d 1026 
(Wyo. 
1988).