Case Title: Howard A. Engle, M.D., Et Al. v. Liggett Group, Inc., Et Al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1856 
____________ 
 
HOWARD A. ENGLE, M.D., et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
LIGGETT GROUP, INC., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[December 21, 2006] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case arises from the Third District Court of Appeal’s reversal of a final 
judgment entered in a smokers’ class action lawsuit that sought damages against 
cigarette companies and industry organizations for alleged smoking-related 
injuries.  See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) 
(hereinafter “Engle II”).  The final judgment awarded $12.7 million in 
compensatory damages to three individual plaintiffs and $145 billion in punitive 
damages to the entire class.  See id. at 441.  We have jurisdiction because Engle II 
misapplies our decision in Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., 46 So. 2d 26 
(Fla. 1950).  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.   
For the reasons explained more fully in this opinion, although we approve 
the Third District’s reversal of the $145 billion class action punitive damages 
award, we quash the remainder of the Third District’s decision.  A majority of the 
Court (Anstead, Pariente, Lewis and Quince) holds that the compensatory 
damages award in favor of Mary Farnan in the amount of $2,850,000 and Angie 
Della Vecchia in the amount of $4,023,000 should be reinstated.  However, the 
court unanimously agrees that the compensatory damages award in favor of Frank 
Amodeo must be vacated based on the statute of limitations.      
 
Further, a majority of the Court (Anstead, Pariente, Lewis and Quince)  
concludes that Engle II misapplied our decision on the law of the case doctrine in 
Florida Department of Transportation v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 106 (Fla. 2001); 
that the certification of the class action and the Phase I trial process were not 
abuses of the trial court’s discretion; and that certain common liability findings can 
stand.  However, we also conclude that the remaining issues, including individual 
causation and apportionment of fault among the defendants, are highly 
individualized and do not lend themselves to class action treatment.  Thus, we 
remand with directions that the class should be decertified without prejudice to the 
class members filing individual claims within one year of the issuance of our 
mandate in this case with res judicata effect given to certain Phase I findings. 
 
More specifically, we hold as follows:  
 
 
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES: We unanimously hold that the Third District 
erred in concluding that under Young the class action punitive damages claims 
were barred by the settlement agreement between the State of Florida and many of 
the defendants involved in the present action (Florida Settlement Agreement or 
FSA).  However, we vacate the punitive damages award because we unanimously 
conclude that the punitive damages award is excessive as a matter of law.     
 
  A majority of the Court (Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, and Quince) also 
concludes that the Third District misapplied Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456 
(Fla. 1989), by holding that compensatory damages must be determined before a 
jury can consider entitlement to punitive damages.  Although Justices Lewis and 
Quince would allow the finding of entitlement to punitive damages to stand, a 
different majority of the Court (Wells, Anstead, Pariente, and Bell) concludes 
that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to make this finding during Phase I 
because, consistent with Ault, proof of liability, which includes both reliance and 
causation, is a predicate to the determination of entitlement to punitive damages.   
 
PHASE I FINDINGS:  A majority of the Court (Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, 
and Quince) concludes that the Third District erred as a matter of law in 
conducting a plenary review of the trial court’s decision to certify the Engle Class 
after completion of an extended Phase I trial and after a different panel of the Third 
 
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District upheld the certification.1  This same majority concludes that it was proper 
to allow the jury to make findings in Phase I on Questions 1 (general causation), 2 
(addiction of cigarettes), 3 (strict liability), 4(a) (fraud by concealment), 5(a) (civil-
conspiracy-concealment), 6 (breach of implied warranty), 7 (breach of express 
warranty), and 8 (negligence).  Therefore, these findings in favor of the Engle 
Class can stand.  The Court unanimously agrees that the nonspecific findings in 
favor of the plaintiffs on Questions 4 (fraud and misrepresentation) and 9 
(intentional infliction of emotional distress) are inadequate to allow a subsequent 
jury to consider individual questions of reliance and legal cause.  Therefore, these 
findings cannot stand.  Because the finding in favor of the plaintiffs on Question 5 
(civil conspiracy-misrepresentation) relies on the underlying tort of 
misrepresentation, this finding also cannot stand.    
ARGUMENTS OF ENGLE CLASS’S COUNSEL: A majority of the 
Court (Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, and Quince) disagrees with the Third District’s 
conclusion that the plaintiffs’ counsel’s improper arguments require reversal, but 
we condemn in no uncertain terms some of these arguments.  We do not address 
the Phase II arguments because we are reversing the punitive damages award from 
Phase II-B and the defendants do not raise any error with respect to arguments 
                                          
 
1.  Justices Wells and Bell would affirm the Third District as to its 
conclusions regarding the class action.  
 
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made during Phase II-A, in which the jury determined the individual compensatory 
damages of three class representatives.    
 
CLASS CERTIFICATION CUT-OFF DATE: While a majority 
(Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, and Quince) agrees that the class cannot be open-
ended, we disagree with the Third District’s ruling that the appropriate cut-off date 
for class membership is October 31, 1994, the date the class was initially certified.  
We conclude that the date of the trial court’s November 21, 1996, order that 
recertified a narrower class is the appropriate cut-off date.   
 
JUDGMENT FOR CLASS MEMBERS: Because Mary Farnan, who was 
diagnosed with lung cancer in April 1996, is clearly a proper member of the class, 
the Third District erred in reversing the compensatory verdict in favor of Farnan in 
the amount of $2,850,000, except as against Liggett Group Inc. and Brooke Group 
Holding Inc., whom the jury found to be zero percent at fault.  We thus approve the 
Third District’s conclusion that a directed verdict should be granted in favor of  
Liggett and Brooke.  
As for Angie Della Vecchia, she was diagnosed with lung cancer in early 
1997.  However, at that time, it was also noted by her doctors that she had a past 
medical history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”) and 
significant hypertension.  Because two of the diseases at issue in this case are 
coronary heart disease and COPD, Della Vecchia’s medical records indicate that 
 
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she had been suffering from a tobacco related disease prior to the time of 
certification and is therefore properly included as a class member.  The jury 
specifically found that her lung disease was caused by smoking.  Thus, a majority 
of the Court concludes that the compensatory judgment in favor of Della Vecchia 
in the amount of $4,023,000 should stand, except as against Liggett and Brooke, 
who were found to be zero percent at fault.2  The Court unanimously agrees with 
the Third District that the final judgment in favor of class representative Frank 
Amodeo must be reversed because all of Amodeo’s claims are barred by the statute 
of limitations.   
With the summary of this Court’s holdings set forth above, we now turn to a 
more in-depth discussion of the background of this case and the salient issues.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On October 31, 1994, the trial court certified as a nationwide class action a 
group of smokers and their survivors under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 
                                          
 
 
2.  We also note that the defendants never objected to Farnan or Della 
Vecchia as a proper members of the class.  Although the defendants opposed the 
Engle Class’s 1998 motion to add thirteen class representatives, which listed 
Farnan and Della Vecchia, their arguments focused on the timeliness of the motion 
and on the fact that adding thirteen new class representatives was unnecessary.  
The defendants did state that the brief descriptions of the proposed new class 
representatives that were provided by the plaintiffs did not indicate that “they 
would be adequate class representatives, whose claims are not time-barred.”  
However, the defendants did not argue that any of the proposed class 
representatives, including Farnan and Della Vecchia, were not proper members of 
the class because of the class cut-off date.   
 
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1.220(b)(3).   The class representatives on behalf of themselves, and all others 
similarly situated, filed an amended class action complaint seeking compensatory 
and punitive damages against major domestic cigarette companies and two 
industry organizations (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Tobacco”) for 
injuries allegedly caused by smoking.3   
The trial court defined the class as:  “All United States citizens and 
residents, and their survivors, who have suffered, presently suffer or who have died 
from diseases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes that 
contain nicotine.”  Tobacco filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order 
certifying the Engle Class pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 
9.130(a)(6).  See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1996) (hereinafter “Engle I”).  On January 31, 1996, the Third District 
affirmed the trial court’s order certifying the class but reduced the class to include 
only Florida smokers.  See id. at 42 (striking “[a]ll United States citizens and 
residents” provision and substituting in its place “[a]ll Florida citizens and 
                                          
 
 
3.  The cigarette companies are:  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; RJR 
Nabisco, Inc.; Philip Morris Incorporated (Philip Morris U.S.A.); Philip Morris 
Companies, Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Company; Lorillard, Inc.; Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corporation, individually and as successor by merger to The 
American Tobacco Company; Liggett Group Inc.; Brooke Group Holding Inc., and 
Dosal Tobacco Corp.  The industry organizations are The Council for Tobacco 
Research-U.S.A., Inc., and The Tobacco Institute, Inc.   
 
 
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residents”).  Tobacco’s petition for review by this Court was denied.  See R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 682 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1996). 
 
On February 4, 1998, the trial court issued a trial plan, dividing the trial 
proceedings into three phases.  Phase I consisted of a year-long trial to consider the 
issues of liability and entitlement to punitive damages for the class as a whole.  See 
Engle II, 853 So. 2d at 441.  The jury considered common issues relating 
exclusively to the defendants’ conduct and the general health effects of smoking.  
See id.  On July 7, 1999, at the conclusion of Phase I, the jury rendered a verdict 
for the Engle Class and against Tobacco on all counts.4   
                                          
 
 
4.  The Phase I findings were:  (1) that cigarettes cause some of the diseases 
at issue; (2) that nicotine is addictive; (3) that the defendants placed cigarettes on 
the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous; (4) that the defendants 
made a false or misleading statement of material fact with the intention of 
misleading smokers; (4)(a) that the defendants concealed or omitted material 
information not otherwise known or available knowing that the material was false 
or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or 
addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both; (5) that all of the defendants agreed 
to misrepresent information relating to the health effects of cigarettes or the 
addictive nature of cigarettes with the intention that smokers and the public would 
rely on this information to their detriment; (5)(a) that the defendants agreed to 
conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their 
addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this 
information to their detriment; (6) that all of the defendants sold or supplied 
cigarettes that were defective; (7) that all of the defendants sold or supplied 
cigarettes that at the time of the sale or supply did not conform to representations 
of fact made by the defendants; (8) that all of the defendants were negligent; (9) 
that all of the defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct or with 
reckless disregard relating to cigarettes sold or supplied to Florida smokers with 
the intent to inflict severe emotional distress; and (10) that all of the defendants’ 
conduct rose to a level that would permit an award of punitive damages.   
 
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Phase II was divided into two subparts––Phase II-A and Phase II-B.  Phase 
II-A was intended to resolve the issues of entitlement and amount of compensatory 
damages, if any, that the three individual class representatives––Frank Amodeo, 
Mary Farnan, and Angie Della Vecchia––should receive.  Phase II-B was designed 
to result in a jury determination of a total lump sum punitive damage award, if any, 
that should be assessed in favor of the class as a whole.  
At the conclusion of Phase II-A, the jury determined that the three individual 
class representatives were entitled to compensatory damages in varying amounts, 
which were offset by their comparative fault.  The total award was $12.7 million.  
The jury subsequently determined in Phase II-B the lump-sum amount of punitive 
damages for the entire class to be $145 billion, without allocation of that amount to 
any class member.  Tobacco filed several post-verdict motions, including a motion 
at the conclusion of phase II-B for a new trial or remittitur, a motion to set aside 
the verdict, and for entry of judgment, and another motion to decertify the class.  
See Engle v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 
6, 2000) (hereinafter “Engle F.J.”), rev’d, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).   
On November 6, 2000, the trial court entered a final judgment and amended 
omnibus order, in which it granted judgment in Tobacco’s favor in two respects.  
First, the trial court granted Tobacco’s motion for directed verdict on a statute of 
limitations basis with regard to named plaintiff Frank Amodeo on the counts based 
 
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on strict liability, implied warranty, express warranty, negligence, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  However, the trial court ruled that Amodeo’s fraud 
and conspiracy claims were not time-barred.  Second, the court granted Tobacco’s 
motion for directed verdict with regard to count seven of the complaint, in which 
the Engle Class sought equitable relief, upon the basis that the count had 
previously been dismissed by the court.  The court entered judgment in favor of the 
Engle Class on all other counts, ordered immediate payment to the individual 
plaintiffs, and directed Tobacco to pay the $145 billion in punitive damages into 
the registry of the Dade County Circuit Court for the benefit of the entire class.     
 
According to the trial plan, in Phase III, new juries are to decide the 
individual liability and compensatory damages claims for each class member 
(estimated to number approximately 700,000).  See Engle II, 853 So. 2d at 442.  
Thereafter, the plan contemplated that the trial court would divide the punitive 
damages previously determined equally among any successful class members.  
Pursuant to the omnibus order, interest on the punitive award began accruing 
immediately.  See id.   
Tobacco filed an appeal and the Third District reversed the final judgment 
with instructions that the class be decertified.  See id.   
ANALYSIS 
1. 
Res Judicata  
 
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A.  History of the Florida Settlement Agreement and  
the Master Settlement Agreement 
 
In 1995, the State of Florida and others (hereinafter “State”) filed a 
complaint against many of the defendants involved in the present action 
(hereinafter “FSA Defendants”). 5  This earlier action was initiated by the State 
under the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, section 409.910, Florida Statutes 
(1995).  In its complaint, the State alleged counts of negligence, strict liability in 
tort, injunctive relief, various statutory and criminal violations, and violations of 
the Florida RICO Act.  The State sought reimbursement of Medicaid monies 
expended in treating the victims of tobacco-related illnesses as well as other 
damages permitted by law, including punitive damages where available.  
Subsequent to the filing of the State’s complaint, the circuit court granted the FSA 
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims by the State 
for punitive damages with the exception of its claim for punitive damages 
                                          
 
5.  The named plaintiffs in the State’s suit were:  The State of Florida; 
Lawton Chiles, Jr., Individually and as Governor; the Department of Business and 
Professional Regulation; the Agency for Health Care Administration; and the 
Department of Legal Affairs. 
The named defendants in the State’s suit were:  The American Tobacco 
Company; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; RJR Nabisco, Inc.; B.A.T. Industries, 
PLC; Batus Holdings, Inc.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation; Philip 
Morris Companies, Inc.; Philip Morris Incorporated (Philip Morris U.S.A.); Loews 
Corporation; Lorillard Tobacco Company; United States Tobacco Company; UST 
Inc.; The Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A. Inc. (successor to Tobacco 
Institute Research Committee); The Tobacco Institute, Inc.; Hill & Knowlton, Inc.; 
British American Tobacco Co., Ltd.; and Dosal Tobacco Corp., Inc. 
 
 
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contained in count four of the complaint alleging only statutory and criminal 
violations.6   
In 1997, the State and the FSA Defendants entered into the Florida  
Settlement Agreement, which resolved “all present and future civil claims against 
all parties to [the] litigation relating to the subject matter of [the] litigation, which 
[were] or could have been asserted by any of the parties [thereto].”  (Emphasis 
supplied.)  Pursuant to the terms of the FSA, in exchange for agreeing to resolve 
these claims, the State received $550 million for unspecified purposes, $200 
million for a pilot program by the State of Florida aimed at the reduction of the use 
of tobacco products by minors, several billion dollars paid out over a period of 
time for the benefit of the State of Florida, and injunctive relief.  As stated by the 
FSA, the monies received “constitute[d] not only reimbursement for Medicaid 
expenses incurred by the State of Florida, but also settlement of all of Florida’s 
other claims, including those for punitive damages, RICO and other statutory 
theories.”  Also included in the FSA was a “Non-Admissibility” provision which 
provided: 
These settlement negotiations have been undertaken by the parties in 
good faith and for settlement purposes only, and neither this 
                                          
 
6.  Specifically, count four contained allegations that the defendants violated 
the Florida Drug and Cosmetic Act, statutory provisions prohibiting the wrongful 
targeting of minors, statutory provisions prohibiting fraudulent practices, statutory 
provisions prohibiting public nuisances, and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair 
Trade Practices Act. 
 
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Settlement Agreement nor any evidence of negotiations hereunder, 
shall be offered or received in evidence in this Action, or any other 
action or proceeding, for any purpose other than in an action or 
proceeding arising under this Settlement Agreement. 
 
During the time period in which Florida pursued an action against the FSA 
Defendants, several other states also initiated actions against the FSA Defendants 
for similar if not identical claims.  These states settled their claims against the FSA 
Defendants in November of 1998 when all parties to that action entered into a 
Master Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”).  The MSA released all claims of the 
participating states and also included a “Non-Admissibility” provision similar to 
that in the FSA.  Under the MSA, the FSA Defendants are required to pay certain 
participating states more than $200 billion over the first twenty-five years, with 
additional amounts to be paid in perpetuity after that. 
B.   Res Judicata Effect of the FSA 
The Third District in this case held that the punitive damages claims of the 
Engle Class were precluded by the FSA.  See Engle II, 853 So. 2d at 467.  The 
district court reasoned that Florida, in agreeing to relinquish its claims through the 
FSA, had effectively resolved a matter of general interest to all of its citizens and, 
therefore, the FSA was binding upon all citizens even though they were not parties 
to the original litigation.  See id. at 468.  The district court therefore concluded that 
the FSA’s “release, and the res judicata effect of the resulting final judgment, 
preclude[d] the [Engle Class’s] punitive-damage claims here.”  Id. 
 
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We agree with the Third District that whether the application of res judicata 
was proper is a question of law.  See id. at 468.  We therefore apply a de novo 
standard of review. See D’Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003) 
(stating that standard of review for pure questions of law is de novo). 
The doctrine of res judicata serves an important purpose in the judicial 
system of this state.  The foundation of res judicata is that a final judgment in a 
court of competent jurisdiction is absolute and settles all issues actually litigated in 
a proceeding as well as those issues that could have been litigated.  We have 
explained the doctrine of res judicata as follows: 
A judgment on the merits rendered in a former suit between the same 
parties or their privies, upon the same cause of action, by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, is conclusive not only as to every matter 
which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but as 
to every other matter which might with propriety have been litigated 
and determined in that action. 
Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 2001) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Kimbrell v. Paige, 448 So. 2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 1984)).   
 
In Young, this Court held that citizens of the City of Miami Beach were 
bound by a judgment against the city that enjoined the city from asserting any 
interest in a particular parcel of oceanfront property.  See 46 So. 2d at 30.  An 
association of citizens of the City of Miami Beach filed an action to determine the 
public’s interest in this parcel, which was owned by the defendant, a private 
corporation.  See id. at 26.  In holding that the claim was barred by the prior decree 
 
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enjoining the City, we noted that a “judgment against a municipal corporation in a 
matter of general interest to all its citizens is binding on the latter, although they 
are not parties to the suit.”  Id. at 30 (emphasis supplied) (quoting 38 Am. Jur. § 
728).   
 
Similarly, in Castro v. Sun Bank of Bal Harbour, 370 So. 2d 392, 393 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1979), the Third District held that private parties were precluded from 
relitigating public nuisance and zoning violation claims that had already been 
settled by the State.  The district court reasoned that the plaintiffs were bound by 
the final judgment of the prior action “irrespective of whether they were formal 
parties to the . . . action” because they were “citizens of the State of Florida and the 
City of Miami at the time of the [prior] litigation.”  Id.
 
The district court, as well as Tobacco, relied on Young and Castro to support 
the position that the FSA is binding on all citizens of the State of Florida.  
However, in both of these cases the governmental entity was asserting interests of  
concern common to all of its citizens: the public’s interest in oceanfront property 
and public nuisance and zoning violations.  Application of res judicata in these 
contexts is supported by precedent that has established that for a State to bind its 
citizens as a result of litigation advanced by the State, the government must be 
suing in its parens patriae capacity, litigating the rights or interests common to the 
public at large and thereby representing the citizenry of the State.  See Satsky v. 
 
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Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1470 (11th Cir. 1993).  The Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals appropriately described this form of action when it stated:  
“In order to maintain [a parens patriae] action, the State must 
articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private 
parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party. The State 
must express a quasi-sovereign interest.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. 
v. Puerto Rico, ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 
3268, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982). “Parens patriae standing has been 
explained on the ground that the plaintiff state is not merely 
advancing the rights of individual injured citizens, but has an 
additional sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest.” 17 Charles A. 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 4047 at 223 (1988). Although the 
Supreme Court has not expressly defined what is a “quasi-sovereign” 
interest, it is clear that a state may sue to protect its citizens against 
“the pollution of the air over its territory; or of interstate waters in 
which the state has rights.” 12 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 350.02[3] at 
3-20 (1993). It is equally clear, however, that a state may not sue to 
assert the rights of private individuals. See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. 
at 600, 102 S.Ct. at 3265; Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 
665, 96 S.Ct. 2333, 2335, 49 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976); New York by 
Abrams v. Seneci, 817 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2nd Cir.1987); Illinois v. 
Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir.1986), 13A 
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3531.11 at 19 (1984). 
Id. at 1469 (alteration in original). 
 
In Satsky, the court analyzed an action in which a group of property owners 
alleged a variety of private property claims arising from the defendant’s operation 
of a mine.  See id. at 1466.  The defendant claimed that a consent decree between 
itself and the State of Colorado precluded the plaintiffs’ claims.  See id. at 1467.  
In reversing a final summary judgment entered by the lower court for the 
 
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defendant, the court held that “[t]o the extent [the] claims involve injuries to purely 
private interests, which the State cannot raise, then the claims are not barred.”  Id. 
at 1470.  We agree with the reasoning of Satsky and with the principle that 
“litigation by a government agency will not preclude a private party from 
vindicating a wrong that arises from related facts but generates a distinct individual 
cause of action.”  Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Intern. Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 
84, 98 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 
In the litigation that resulted in the FSA, the State, in support of its claim for 
punitive damages, alleged knowing and intentional dissemination of false, 
fraudulent and misleading statements to the general public by the FSA Defendants 
in violation of section 817.41, Florida Statutes (1995).7  In the present case, the 
Engle Class relied on legal theories that were based on injuries personal to the 
class members to support the claim for punitive damages.  Since the State had no 
right to pursue these types of private interests on behalf of its citizens, the punitive 
damages claims settled by the State in the FSA, if any, were distinct from the 
punitive damages sought by the Engle Class in the present case.   
                                          
 
7.  The State’s only claim for punitive damages arose from the alleged 
violation of this Florida statutory provision prohibiting misleading advertising.   
None of the other statutory provisions alleged to be violated by the FSA 
Defendants in count four of the State’s complaint allowed the recovery of punitive 
damages.   
 
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The reasoning in In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001), is 
instructive.  In that case, the defendants appealed a punitive damages award for 
claims arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  See id. at 1221.  The plaintiffs 
consisted of separate classes of commercial fishermen, Alaskan natives, and 
landowners affected by the spill.  See id. at 1225.  These distinct classes sought 
compensatory and punitive damages for injuries resulting from the Exxon Valdez 
spill.  See id.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs which assessed 
$287 million in compensatory damages and $5 billion in punitive damages.  See id.  
Exxon appealed the resulting judgment, asserting that the punitive damages award 
was barred by the res judicata effect of a consent decree between Exxon and the 
United States and the State of Alaska that settled claims in a previous action filed 
under the Clean Water Act.  See id. at 1227.  In holding that the award was not 
barred by the previous settlement, the court concluded that the interests asserted by 
the plaintiffs were distinct from those asserted by the United States and Alaska in 
the prior action.  See id. at 1228.  The court, relying on Satsky, noted that the prior 
consent decree addressed harms caused to the environment and the general public 
whereas the claims in the class action were to vindicate wrongs that resulted in 
individual injuries.  See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1227-28.  Moreover, the 
court stressed that although the consent decree “released all government claims, 
[it] provides explicitly that ‘nothing in this agreement, however, is intended to 
 
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affect legally the claims, if any, of any person or entity not a Party to this 
Agreement.’”  Id. at 1227.  The FSA expressly provided that neither the agreement 
itself “nor any evidence of negotiations [t]hereunder, shall be offered or received in 
evidence in this Action, or any other action or proceeding, for any purpose other 
than in an action or proceeding arising under this Settlement Agreement.”  The 
facts of In re Exxon are similar to the circumstances presented in this case and 
support our conclusion that the Third District erred in holding that the FSA barred 
the Engle Class’s punitive damages claim. 
2. 
Punitive Damages Award  
Although we conclude that the Third District erred in applying the doctrine 
of res judicata to bar the Engle Class’s punitive damages claim, we must vacate the 
classwide punitive damages award because we unanimously agree with the Third 
District that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine a lump sum 
amount before it determined the amount of total compensatory damages for the 
class.  As a matter of law, the punitive damages award violates due process 
because there is no way to evaluate the reasonableness of the punitive damages 
award without the amount of compensatory damages having been fixed.  The 
amount awarded is also clearly excessive because it would bankrupt some of the 
defendants.  A majority of the Court further concludes that the trial court erred in 
 
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allowing the jury to consider entitlement to punitive damages during the Phase I 
trial.  We address these issues separately.       
 
 
A.  Phase I Finding on Entitlement to Punitive Damages 
The last question on the Phase I verdict form asked the jury to determine 
whether “[u]nder the circumstances of this case, . . . the conduct of any Defendant 
rose to a level that would permit a potential award or entitlement to punitive 
damages.”  The jury answered “yes” with respect to each of the defendants.  In 
Phase II-B, the jury awarded a total of $145 billion in punitive damages to the 
class.   
 
The Third District ruled that the trial erred in awarding classwide punitive 
damages “without the necessary findings of liability and compensatory damages.”  
Engle II, 853 So. 2d at 450.  A majority of the Court (Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, 
and Quince) concludes that an award of compensatory damages is not a 
prerequisite to a finding of entitlement to punitive damages.  Compensatory and 
punitive damages serve distinct purposes.   As the United States Supreme Court 
has explained:  
The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff 
has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.  The 
latter, which have been described as “quasi-criminal,” operate as 
“private fines” intended to punish the defendant and to deter future 
wrongdoing.  A jury’s assessment of the extent of a plaintiff’s injury 
is essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of 
punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation. 
 
- 20 -
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) 
(citations omitted).   
Because a finding of entitlement to punitive damages is not dependent on a 
finding that a plaintiff suffered a specific injury, an award of compensatory 
damages need not precede a determination of entitlement to punitive damages.  
Therefore, we conclude that the order of these determinations is not critical.  See 
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1986).         
A different majority of the Court (Wells, Anstead, Pariente, and Bell) 
concludes that under our decision in Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1989), 
a finding of liability is required before entitlement to punitive damages can be 
determined, and that liability is more than a breach of duty.  A finding of liability 
necessarily precedes a determination of damages, but does not compel a 
compensatory award.  For example, in Ault, the jury found that the defendant had 
committed an assault and battery but awarded $0 in compensatory damages and 
$5000 in punitive damages.  See id. at 455.  Thus, unlike the Phase I jury in this 
case, the jury in Ault found that the plaintiff had proved the underlying cause of 
action but did not suffer any compensable damage.   
Although we appeared to use “breach of duty” and “liability” 
interchangeably in Ault, the Court expressly adopted the principles set forth in 
 
- 21 -
dicta in Lassiter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So. 2d 622 
(Fla. 1976).  Specifically, we stated that   
[n]ominal damages are awarded to vindicate an invasion of one’s legal 
rights where, although no physical or financial injury has been 
inflicted, the underlying cause of action has been proved to the 
satisfaction of a jury.  Accordingly, the establishment of liability for a 
breach of duty will support an otherwise valid punitive damage award 
even in the absence of financial loss for which compensatory damages 
would be appropriate. 
Ault, 538 So. 2d at 455 (some emphasis supplied) (quoting Lassiter, 349 So. 2d at 
625-26).   
In this case, the Phase I verdict did not constitute a “finding of liability” 
under Ault.  This is evidenced by the fact that had the jury found for Tobacco on 
the legal cause and reliance issues during Phase II, there would have been no 
opportunity for the jury to award the named plaintiffs damages of any type.  In 
other words, Phase II findings for Tobacco on legal causation and reliance would 
have precluded the jury from awarding compensatory or punitive damages.  It was 
error for the trial court to allow the jury to consider entitlement to punitive 
damages before the jury found that the plaintiffs had established causation and 
reliance.   
In Phase I, the jury decided issues related to Tobacco’s conduct but did not 
consider whether any class members relied on Tobacco’s misrepresentations or 
were injured by Tobacco’s conduct.  As the Third District noted, the Phase I jury 
 
- 22 -
“did not determine whether the defendants were liable to anyone.”  Engle II, 853 
So. 2d at 450.  It was therefore error for the Phase I jury to consider whether 
Tobacco was liable for punitive damages.             
B.  Excessiveness 
 
Even if it were not error to determine entitlement to punitive damages in 
Phase I, it was clear error to allow the jury to go beyond mere entitlement and 
award classwide punitive damages when total compensatory damages had not been 
determined.  Under Florida law, a trial court’s determination of whether a damage 
award is excessive, requiring a remittitur or a new trial, is reviewed by an appellate 
court under an abuse of discretion standard.  See St. John v. Coisman, 799 So. 2d 
1110, 1114 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).  However, a trial court’s determination as to 
whether a punitive damage award exceeds the boundaries of due process as 
guaranteed by the Unites States Constitution is reviewed by a court under a de 
novo standard.  See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436. 
Florida law requires that an appellate court review a punitive damages award 
to make certain that the manifest weight of the evidence does not render the 
amount of punitive damages assessed out of all reasonable proportion to the 
malice, outrage, or wantonness of the tortious conduct.  See Arab Termite & Pest 
Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1043 (Fla. 1982).  Additionally, 
an award must be reviewed to ensure that it bears some relationship to the 
 
- 23 -
defendant’s ability to pay and does not result in economic castigation or 
bankruptcy of the defendant.  See Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181, 1186 (Fla. 
1977).   
In the past, we have not discussed whether punitive damages awards must  
bear some reasonable relation to compensatory damages.  See Lassiter v. Int’l 
Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1977); see also Ault, 538 So. 
2d at 456; Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 
1985); Arab Termite, 409 So. 2d at 1043.  For example in Arab Termite, we stated 
that punitive damages “are to be measured by the enormity of the offense, entirely 
aside from the measure of compensation for the injured plaintiff.”  409 So. 2d at 
1043.  However, we now hold, consistent with United States Supreme Court 
decisions after Ault that recognize due process limits on punitive damages, that a 
review of the punitive damages award includes an evaluation of the punitive and 
compensatory amounts awarded to ensure a reasonable relationship between the 
two.         
 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a review of a punitive 
damages award must include consideration of three guideposts to determine 
whether the award is unconstitutionally excessive: 
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) 
the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the 
plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference 
 
- 24 -
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil 
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (citing 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). 
 
The second guidepost is determinative in this case.  As the United States 
Supreme Court has explained regarding this second factor:  
[W]e have been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on 
the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the 
punitive damages award.  Gore, 517 U.S., at 582 (“[W]e have 
consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked 
by a simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and 
potential damages to the punitive award”); TXO [Production Corp. v. 
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.] at 458.  We decline again to 
impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot 
exceed.  Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established 
demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a 
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due process.  In [Pacific Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v.] Haslip, in upholding a punitive damages award, we 
concluded that an award of more than four times the amount of 
compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional 
impropriety.  499 U.S., at 23-24.  We cited that 4-to-1 ratio again in 
Gore. 517 U.S., at 581.  The Court further referenced a long 
legislative history, dating back over 700 years and going forward to 
today, providing for sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages 
to deter and punish.  Id., at 581, and n. 33.  While these ratios are not 
binding, they are instructive.  They demonstrate what should be 
obvious:  Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due 
process, while still achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and 
retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1, id., at 582, or, 
in this case, of 145 to 1. 
Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a 
punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we 
have previously upheld may comport with due process where “a 
particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of 
 
- 25 -
economic damages.”  Ibid.; see also ibid. (positing that a higher ratio 
might be necessary where “the injury is hard to detect or the monetary 
value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine”).  
The converse is also true, however.  When compensatory damages are 
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory 
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.  
The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts 
and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the 
plaintiff. 
In sum, courts must ensure that the measure of punishment is 
both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the 
plaintiff and to the general damages recovered. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424-26.  Thus, the amount of compensatory damages must 
be determined in advance of a determination of the amount of punitive damages 
awardable, if any, so that the relationship between the two may be reviewed for 
reasonableness.   
In this case, the district court stated that without having total compensatory 
damages determined it would be “impossible to determine whether punitive 
damages bear a ‘reasonable’ relationship to the actual harm inflicted on the 
plaintiff.”  Engle II, 853 So. 2d at 451.  We agree.  The trial plan allowed a lump 
sum determination of punitive damages for the entire class when compensatory 
damages had been determined only for the three individual class representatives.  
This approach does not provide a reviewing court with an adequate starting point 
to compare the lump sum punitive damages amount to compensatory damages to 
ensure there is some reasonable relationship.  Accordingly, even if there was no 
 
- 26 -
error in allowing the Phase I jury to find entitlement to punitive damages, the 
classwide punitive damages award must be reversed.8    
3. 
Law of the Case—Class Certification    
In concluding that the Engle Class must be decertified, the Third District in 
Engle II ruled that the “‘predominance’ or ‘commonality’ requirement is not 
satisfied, where claims involve factual determinations unique to each plaintiff.”  
853 So. 2d at 445.  The district court explained that “common questions” did not 
predominate over individual issues because the choice of law analysis would 
require examination of numerous different state laws governing different 
individual claims.  See id. at 449.  The court also concluded that class 
representation would not be “superior” to individual suits because:  (1) 
individualized issues of liability, affirmative defenses, and damages outweighed 
any common issues in the case; (2) each class member had unique and different 
experiences, which would necessitate litigation of substantially separate issues, 
including legal causation, specific medical causation, reliance, and awareness of 
                                          
 
 
8.  We also conclude that the punitive damages award was clearly excessive 
under the limitation based on ability to pay established by our precedent because it 
is “so inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable 
range within which the jury may properly operate.”  Lassiter, 349 So. 2d at 627.  A 
comparison of the amounts awarded and the financial worth assigned to each 
company by the Engle Class’s expert clearly demonstrates that the award would 
result in an unlawful crippling of the defendant companies.      
 
- 27 -
risks; and (3) individualized choice of law issues would cause class proceedings to 
be unmanageable.  See id. at 445-47.   
We conclude that the Third District erred in nullifying its previous 
affirmance of the trial court’s certification order.  Contrary to the Third District’s 
conclusion, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(d)(1) did not authorize the  
subsequent (and different) panel of appellate judges to simply substitute its 
judgment for that of the prior panel and reverse the trial court’s certification order 
after the trial court entered its final judgment after Phase II.  See Engle II, 853 So. 
2d at 443 n.4.   
A class is normally certified at an early stage of the proceedings, certainly 
before trial, and typically before discovery is completed.  Rule 1.220(d)(1) 
provides an avenue for reexamining certification if subsequent discovery shows 
that circumstances have changed.  See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Deep Sea 
Local 1408 v. Fisher, 860 So. 2d 1078, 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (affirming the 
trial court’s nonfinal order certifying a class but noting that “because the order is 
interlocutory, it may be revisited by the trial court should circumstances change”).  
Rule 1.220(d)(1) was not designed to allow a district court to decertify a class, 
contrary to its previous affirmance of class certification and after notice to 
thousands of Floridians, a two-year trial, and an entry of final judgment.   
 
- 28 -
Moreover, under the doctrine of law of the case, the Third District would 
have been justified in reversing its previous ruling in Engle I only if it concluded 
that the prior ruling would have resulted in a clear manifest injustice.  See Juliano, 
801 So. 2d at 106 (“[A]n appellate court has the power to reconsider and correct an 
erroneous ruling that has become the law of the case where a prior ruling would 
result in a ‘manifest injustice.’”) (quoting Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 
(Fla. 1965)).   
Law of the case “requires that questions of law actually decided on appeal 
must govern the case in the same court and the trial court, through all subsequent 
stages of the proceedings.”  Juliano, 801 So. 2d at 105.  The Third District recently 
reiterated the purpose of the law of the case doctrine in a decision holding that the 
doctrine precluded relitigation of the propriety of class action treatment: “[P]oints 
of law adjudicated in a prior appeal are binding in order to promote stability of 
judicial decisions and to avoid piecemeal litigation.”  State, Dep’t of Revenue v. 
Bridger, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D1573, D1574 (Fla. 3d DCA June 7, 2006) (quoting 
Bueno v. Bueno de Khawly, 677 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)). 
The law of the case applies in subsequent proceedings as long as there has 
been no change in the facts on which the mandate was based.  Specifically, we 
have recognized that 
an appellate court should reconsider a point of law previously decided 
on a former appeal only as a matter of grace, and not as a matter of 
 
- 29 -
right; and that an exception to the general rule binding the parties to 
“the law of the case” at the retrial and at all subsequent proceedings 
should not be made except in unusual circumstances and for the most 
cogent reasons—and always, of course, only where “manifest 
injustice” will result from a strict and rigid adherence to the rule. 
Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965).  We have also cautioned that 
“the exception to the rule should never be allowed when it would amount to 
nothing more than a second appeal on a question determined on the first appeal.”  
Id. (emphasis supplied).   
We conclude that no circumstances existed that justified the subsequent 
panel’s reconsideration of the prior Third District decision approving class 
certification, which all parties and the trial court relied on to govern the 
continuation of the class action.  On this issue, the analysis of the Engle II court 
was flawed in several respects.  First, the Engle II court ignored the trial court’s 
pretrial ruling that only Florida law would apply when it stated that the “choice-of-
law analysis in the present case will require examination of numerous significantly 
different state laws governing the different plaintiffs’ claims.”  Engle II, 853 So. 2d 
at 449.  Second, none of the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the Third 
District in Engle II to justify decertification was in the procedural posture of the 
present case. 9     
                                          
 
9.  See, e.g., Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(affirming district court’s decertification); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 
F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing class certification on interlocutory appeal); 
 
- 30 -
This case came before the Third District in Engle II after it had affirmed the 
class certification and after the conclusion of a trial on all common issues.  Thus, 
there is no need to engage in an abstract analysis of the propriety of separate 
proceedings on common limited liability issues.  Invalidating the completed class 
action proceedings on manageability and superiority grounds after a trial has 
occurred does not accord with common sense or logic.   
Of course, this Court is not bound by the Third District’s law of the case.  
See Juliano, 801 So. 2d at 105 (“The doctrine of the law of the case requires that 
questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court 
and the trial court, through all subsequent stages of the proceedings.”).   
Nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
certifying the class.  See Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of 
                                                                                                                                        
Estate of Mahoney v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 204 F.R.D. 150 (S.D. Iowa 
2001) (denying motion to certify class action); Badillo v. American Tobacco Co., 
202 F.R.D. 261 (D. Nev. 2001) (denying motions to certify class action); Guillory 
v. American Tobacco Co., No. 97 C 8641, 2001 WL 290603 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 
2001) (denying motion to certify class action); Aksamit v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., No. C.A. 6:97-3636-24, 2001 WL 1809378 at *9 (D.S.C. Dec. 29, 
2000) (denying a motion to certify class action); Thompson v. American Tobacco 
Co., Inc., 189 F.R.D. 544 (D. Minn. 1999) (denying motion to certify class action); 
Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 535, 546 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (denying 
motion to certify class action); Emig v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 
389 (D. Kan. 1998) (denying motion to certify class action); Barreras Ruiz v. 
American Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194, 197 (D.P.R. 1998) (denying motion to 
certify class action); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 
94 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (denying motion to certify class action); Philip Morris, Inc. v. 
Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200 (Md. 2000) (reversing trial court’s class certification after 
trial plan had been established but before trial commenced). 
 
- 31 -
Pompano Beach, 829 So. 2d 928, 929 (Fla 4th DCA 2002) (“The trial court’s order 
certifying the class is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard.”); 
Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Updegraff, 807 So. 2d 768, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) 
(“[T]he determination that a case meets the requirements of a class action is a 
factual finding that is within the trial court’s discretion and will be reversed on 
appeal only if an abuse of discretion is shown.”). 
4.  
Three-Phase Trial Plan—Decertification   
We agree with the Third District that problems with the three-phase trial 
plan negate the continued viability of this class action.  We conclude that 
continued class action treatment for Phase III of the trial plan is not feasible 
because individualized issues such as legal causation, comparative fault, and 
damages predominate.  See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(3) (“A claim or defense may 
be maintained on behalf of a class if the court concludes that the prerequisites of 
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and that . . . the claim or defense is not maintainable 
under either subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), but the questions of law or fact common 
to the claim or defense of the representative party and the claim or defense of each 
member of the class predominate over any question of law or fact affecting only 
individual members of the class . . . .”).  
 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(d)(4)(A) provides that “[w]hen 
appropriate . . . a claim or defense may be brought or maintained on behalf of a 
 
- 32 -
class concerning particular issues.”  Although no Florida cases address whether it 
is appropriate under rule 1.220(d)(4)(A) to certify class treatment for only limited 
liability issues, several decisions by federal appellate courts applying a similar 
provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide persuasive authority for 
this approach.   
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4)(A) provides that “[w]hen 
appropriate . . . an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with 
respect to particular issues.”  In determining whether the predominance 
requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)10 has been met, several 
United States Courts of Appeals have concluded that under federal rule  
23(c)(4)(A) a trial court can properly separate liability and damages issues, 
certifying class treatment of liability while leaving damages to be determined on an 
individual basis.  See Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(stating that the district court can properly “bifurcate the issue of liability from the 
issue of damages, and if liability is found, the issue of damages can de decided by 
a special master or by another method”); Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 
F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that “Rule 23 allows district courts to devise 
                                          
 
 
10.  Federal rule 23(b)(3) is similar to Florida rule 1.220(b)(3) and provides 
in pertinent part that “[a]n action may be maintained as a class action if the 
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition . . . the court finds that 
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members.” 
 
- 33 -
imaginative solutions to problems created by the presence in a class action 
litigation of individual damages issues”); In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust 
Litigation, 280 F.3d 124, 139-41 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “[c]ommon issues may 
predominate when liability can be determined on a class-wide basis, even when 
there are some individualized damage issues” and that “[t]here are a number of 
management tools available to a district court to address any individualized 
damages issues that might arise in a class action”); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, 
Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Even if the common questions do not 
predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of the entire 
action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to 
isolate the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment 
of these particular issues.”); see also Slaven v. BP America, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 649, 
658 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (maintaining class status “solely for the determination of 
liability” and stating that “[i]f plaintiffs prevail on the liability portion of their case, 
the Court will determine the appropriate method of adjudicating causation and 
damages issues at that juncture”).11            
                                          
 
 
11.  But see Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (concluding that the interaction of (b)(3) and (c)(4) requires that “a 
cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3) 
and that (c)(4) is a housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever the common 
issues for a class trial”).  Both the Second and Fourth Circuits have noted the 
conflict on this issue.  See Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 444 
(4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is a circuit conflict as to whether predominance must be 
 
- 34 -
The Second and Seventh Circuits have also stated that the determination that 
class treatment of damages issues is inappropriate can be made after a finding on 
liability.  See Carnegie, 376 F.3d at 661 (explaining that one option available to the 
district courts for solving problems created by the presence in a class action 
litigation of individual damages issues is to decertify the class after the liability 
trial); Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d at 141 (same).  In 
Carnegie, the Seventh Circuit discussed the manageability of a class action 
alleging RICO violations and explained:   
Often . . . there is a big difference from the standpoint of 
manageability between the liability and remedy phases of a class 
action.  The number of class members need have no bearing on the 
burdensomeness of litigating a violation of RICO.  Whether particular 
members of the class were defrauded and if so what their damages 
were are another matter, and it may be that if and when the defendants 
are determined to have violated the law separate proceedings of some 
character will be required to determine the entitlements of the 
individual class members to relief.  That prospect need not defeat 
class treatment of the question whether the defendants violated RICO.  
Once that question is answered, if it is answered in favor of the class, 
a global settlement . . . will be a natural and appropriate sequel. And if 
there is no settlement, that won’t be the end of the world.  Rule 23 
allows district courts to devise imaginative solutions to problems 
created by the presence in a class action litigation of individual 
damages issues.  
                                                                                                                                        
shown with respect to an entire cause of action, or merely with respect to a specific 
issue, in order to invoke (c)(4).”); Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 
267 F.3d 147, 167 n.12 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “an alternate understanding of 
the interaction of (b)(3) and (c)(4) to that set forth in Castano has been advanced 
elsewhere”).     
 
- 35 -
 376 F.3d at 661 (citations omitted).  In Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust 
Litigation, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court adequately 
addressed individual issues that might arise from certifying the class by 
specifically recognizing “its ability to modify its class certification order, sever 
liability and damages, or even decertify the class if such an action ultimately 
became necessary.”  280 F.3d at 141.  
In this case, the Phase I trial has been completed.  The pragmatic solution is 
to now decertify the class, retaining the jury’s Phase I findings other than those on 
the fraud and intentional infliction of emotion distress claims, which involved 
highly individualized determinations, and the finding on entitlement to punitive 
damages questions, which was premature.  Class members can choose to initiate 
individual damages actions and the Phase I common core findings we approved 
above will have res judicata effect in those trials.  See Daenzer v. Wayland Ford, 
Inc., 210 F.R.D. 202, 205 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (entering summary judgment on the 
issue of liability, decertifying the class on the issue of damages and stating that 
“[t]he Court’s decision as to liability is res judicata in any damages action 
individual class members decide to bring”); McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. 
Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985) (concluding that plaintiff’s strict liability claim was 
 
- 36 -
barred by judgment for the defendants entered in a prior class action, which the 
plaintiff  joined, before that class action was decertified).12
We disagree with Justice Wells’ conclusion that bifurcating the trial in this 
manner violates article I, section 22 of the Florida Constitution.  See concurring in 
part and dissenting in part op. at 10-12.   We recognize the concerns expressed by 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 
734, 750 (5th Cir. 1996), in which that court held that bifurcation of issues in a 
nationwide smoking class action violated the Seventh Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 13  However, subsequent to its decision in Castano, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the risk of infringing on the parties’ Seventh Amendment rights is 
not significant and is in fact avoided where the liability issues common to all class 
members are tried together by a single initial jury, and issues affecting individual 
                                          
 
 
12.  Justice Wells asserts that allowing limited Phase I findings to stand sets 
“harmful and confusing precedent.”  Concurring in part and dissenting in part op. 
at 6-7.  However, the procedural posture of this case is unique and unlikely to be 
repeated.  Further, many of the questions posed by Justice Wells are answered in 
this opinion.  As we state in both the opening and closing of the opinion, class 
members (i.e. those individuals who fit the class description as of the November 
21, 1996, cut-off date) must file individual actions against the defendants within 
one year of the issuance of this Court’s mandate to benefit from the Phase I finding 
we uphold herein.   
 
 
13.  When this Court has interpreted article I, section 22 of the Florida 
Constitution, it found guidance in the Seventh Amendment of the United States 
Constitution while recognizing that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to 
actions brought in state court.  See Dep’t of Revenue v. The Printing House, 644 
So. 2d 498, 500 (Fla. 1994). 
 
- 37 -
class members such as causation, damages, and comparative negligence are tried 
by different juries.  See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC,  186 F.3d 620, 
628-29 (5th Cir. 1999).  Recognizing that it had previously reached a different 
conclusion in Castano, the Fifth Circuit explained that the circumstances of 
Castano were distinct from those present in Mullen: 
In Castano, we were concerned that allowing a second jury to consider 
the plaintiffs’ comparative negligence would invite that jury to 
reconsider the first jury’s findings concerning the defendants’ 
conduct.  We believe that such a risk has been avoided here by leaving 
all issues of causation for the phase-two jury.  When a jury considers 
the comparative negligence of a plaintiff, “the focus is upon causation.  
It is inevitable that a comparison of the conduct of plaintiffs and 
defendants ultimately be in terms of causation.”  Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 
716 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc); see id. (permitting the 
use of comparative negligence in strict liability claims).  Thus, in 
considering comparative negligence, the phase two jury would not be 
reconsidering the first jury’s findings of whether Treasure Chest’s 
conduct was negligent or the [vessel] unseaworthy, but only the 
degree to which those conditions were the sole or contributing cause 
of the class member’s injury.  Because the first jury will not be 
considering any issues of causation, no Seventh Amendment 
implications affect our review of the district court’s superiority 
finding.
Mullen, 186 F.3d at 628-29 (emphasis supplied). 
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Mullen is persuasive.  In this case, although 
the jury decided issues common to all class members, none involved whether, or 
the degree to which, the defendants’ conduct was the sole or contributing cause of 
the class members’ injuries, which is the pertinent question in applying the 
doctrine of comparative negligence.  We thus follow the reasoning of Mullen and 
 
- 38 -
conclude that the trial plan in this case did not violate Tobacco’s rights under 
article I, section 22 of the Florida Constitution.     
5.   
Arguments of Engle Class’s Counsel 
We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, reversal is not 
warranted based on the remarks made by the Engle Class’s counsel, Stanley 
Rosenblatt.  Nevertheless, we must again remind counsel that we will not condone 
improper arguments.  Inappropriate jury arguments in this type of case risk  
wasting significant judicial resources.  Here, trial counsel ventured very close to 
the line of reversible error on a number of occasions in his attempt to counteract 
opposing counsel’s contentions that Tobacco acted lawfully and to communicate 
his message to the jury that “legal doesn’t make it right.”  However, we conclude 
that under the totality of the circumstances these comments did not rise to the level 
of reversible error.   
If the issue of an opponent’s improper argument has been properly preserved 
by objection and motion for mistrial, the trial court should grant a new trial if the 
argument was “so highly prejudicial and inflammatory that it denied the opposing 
party its right to a fair trial.”  Tanner v. Beck, 907 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2005); see also Murphy v. Int’l Robotic Sys., Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010, 1013 n.2 (Fla. 
2000) (stating the Court’s decision addressing unobjected-to argument “does not 
impact the legal standards applicable to consideration of the issue that has been 
 
- 39 -
properly preserved by objection and motion for mistrial, which remains whether 
the comment was highly prejudicial and inflammatory”).  To justify granting a 
motion for a new trial based on unobjected-to improper argument, the trial court 
must find that the improper argument is of such a nature as to reach into the 
validity of the trial itself to the extent that the verdict could not have been obtained 
but for such comments.  See Murphy, 766 So. 2d at 1029-30.  A trial court’s order 
granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on either objected-to or 
unobjected-to improper argument is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See id. at 
1030-31 (“[T]he appellate court must . . . apply an abuse of discretion standard in 
reviewing either the trial court’s grant or denial of a new trial based on the 
unobjected-to closing argument.”); Bocher v. Glass, 874 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2004) (reviewing a trial court’s order denying a motion for rehearing based 
on objected-to improper argument for an abuse of discretion).       
 
In denying Tobacco’s motions for mistrial, the trial court stated: 
The Court has carefully considered the Motions for Mistrial in this 
cause and has determined that curative instructions to the jury and/or 
motions to strike have been granted as requested by the movant, for 
most of the motions, and in any event the cumulative effect of the 
alleged error, was not in the opinion of the Court, sufficient to have so 
influenced the jury as to affect the outcome of the case considering the 
length of the trial, the number of witnesses presented, the quality and 
quantity of the testimony, the huge amount of documentary evidence, 
and specifically the substance of the alleged remarks.  The jury in this 
case rendered three verdicts, each based upon a mountain of evidence 
over a period of two years in three separate trials.  The court feels 
confident, that although some remarks of counsel may have been 
 
- 40 -
uncalled for, or subject to objection, they were not so egregious as to 
require a new trial. 
Engle F.J., No. 94-08273 CA-22 order at 17.  However, the Third District held that 
the comments “caused irreparable prejudice and require reversal.”  Engle II, 853 
So. 2d at 458.  Specifically, the district court determined that this was 
accomplished in two stages: 
First, by inflaming the jury with racial pandering and pleas for 
nullification of the law to secure entitlement to punitive damages.  
And second, by removing responsibility from the jury for the size of 
the award, through arguing the award would be subject to appellate 
review and that it would not be paid out in a lump sum, but rather 
through a payout scheme. 
Id. at 459.  The district court then proceeded to list all of counsel’s arguments it 
determined were improper.   
 
Significantly, the manner in which the district court has set forth and 
presented the offending argument, stringing the comments together, would 
certainly cause a reader to assume that the comments are prejudicial.  However, 
this is not proper analysis for review under the totality of the circumstances.  
Context is crucial.  To determine whether the challenged statements and arguments 
were in fact prejudicial, the statements cannot be evaluated in isolation but must be 
placed and evaluated in context.  See State v. Jones, 867 So. 2d 398, 400 (Fla. 
2004) (“[T]his Court has evaluated the prosecutor’s action in context rather than 
focusing on the challenged statement in isolation.”).   
 
- 41 -
 
We emphasize that the duration of this trial does not mean that a comment or 
several comments standing alone would not warrant reversal.  Nonetheless, the 
length of the trial is relevant to the analysis because the alleged improper 
statements were not made on the same day or contained within a two- or three-hour 
closing argument.  These statements spanned a two-year period.  Some comments 
were made during opening statements in Phase I (liability phase) in October of 
1998, some during Phase I closing argument in June of 1999, and others during the 
closing statements in Phase II-B (punitive damages phase) in July of 2000.  Many 
of the alleged improper comments did not even prompt an objection by Tobacco. 14     
 
We begin with the Third District’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ counsel 
engaged in “racial pandering” and that the jury’s “runaway” verdict was evidently 
one inflamed by passion and prejudice.  A single reference to “race” in the Phase I 
opening statement was in the context of the consumer studies that the defendants 
conducted that divide American consumers into groups.  Mr. Rosenblatt’s 
                                          
 
 
14.  This Court has recognized: 
 
Harmfulness in this context also carries a requirement that the 
comments be so highly prejudicial and of such collective impact as to 
gravely impair a fair consideration and determination of the case by 
the jury.  Passing remarks of little consequence in the scope of a 
lengthy trial should find little sympathy if no contemporaneous 
objection is voiced.  The extensiveness of the objectionable material is 
a factor to be considered in the harmfulness analysis.  
Murphy, 766 So. 2d at 1029-30. 
 
 
- 42 -
comment that “they study races” was part of a statement about the study of the 
American consumer: “They study kids; they study races; they divide the American 
consumer into groups to sell their product.”  In fact, when the defense objected on 
the basis that those comments were “only designed to prejudice the jury,” the trial 
court rejected this argument because that was “not the context of which it’s being 
used.”  Mr. Rosenblatt then followed up with the statement that this is an industry 
that “divides the American consumer into groups: white, black, Jewish, Christian, 
young, old.”  The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that these 
statements were made in an attempt to show how Tobacco sells its products and 
advertises to different groups, not to impermissibly prejudice the jury.   
 
As to the Phase I closing argument, we agree that a series of improper 
remarks occurred when counsel injected race into his argument: 
Are there two sides to every question? And the immediate gut reaction 
is: Yeah, yeah. You want to be fair and you say: Right, there’s two 
sides to every question.  What’s the other side to the Holocaust? What 
is the other side to slavery? 
An objection was made and sustained.  While one could posit that this was merely 
an attempt to explain to the jury that there are not always two sides, several 
minutes later Mr. Rosenblatt returned to a race-based theme by referring to Rosa 
Parks: 
Let’s discuss the concept of legal in the context of America.  I noticed 
in last week’s newspaper, Rosa Parks, who is 86 years old, got the 
Congressional Gold Medal because in 1955 . . . . 
 
- 43 -
Mr. Rosenblatt got no further because an objection was made and sustained.  
Undaunted by the trial court’s ruling, Mr. Rosenblatt continued: 
We look back in history.  We look back in history.  The whole civil 
rights movement of the ’60s was fighting against unjust laws.  Dr. 
King was arrested in the ’60s  . . . .  
An objection was made and overruled and Mr. Rosenblatt continued: 
 
In this building, in this building, a temple to the law, they were—there 
were drinking fountains which said Whites Only.   
Once again, an objection was made and overruled.   
There is absolutely no justification for this series of remarks, which appears 
to compare the tobacco industry with slavery and, by invoking civil rights leaders 
Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, appealed to the jury’s sense of outrage for the 
injustices visited upon African-Americans in this country.  We condemn these 
tactics of Mr. Rosenblatt.  His attempt to incite racial passions was conduct 
unbecoming an attorney practicing in our state courts.   
 
Nevertheless, we note that the trial court sustained objections to several of 
these remarks and no motion for mistrial was made or curative instruction 
requested.  In addition, there was no further race-based argument during the 
remainder of the closing, and, significantly, no such references were made in any 
of Mr. Rosenblatt’s Phase I rebuttal argument.  
 
We next discuss the Third District’s conclusion that Mr. Rosenblatt’s Phase 
I closing argument was also replete with impermissible references to jury 
 
- 44 -
nullification.  The relevant comments were made in response to Tobacco’s 
preemption defense: that the warnings on the cigarettes were as provided by law.  
Although compliance with the federal warnings preempted any claim based on 
failure to warn, it did not eliminate the other causes of action that the jury had to 
consider in Phase I.  As for the comment “legal don’t make it right,” Mr. 
Rosenblatt was referring to the answers given by the CEO for Brown & 
Williamson, Nick Brookes.  Mr. Brookes was asked what he would do with his 
product if he became convinced that cigarettes caused cancer and heart disease.  
His reply was it would not affect his business because “it’s a legal product.”  Mr. 
Rosenblatt’s response was that “legal don’t make it right.”  No objection was 
made.  In fact, this theme continued in rebuttal when Mr. Rosenblatt explained 
without objection: 
It’s a legal product. There is no question about it.  But a legal product 
does not mean that the cigarette companies are not responsible when 
their product causes harm and death to their customers. And being 
legal is a very relative term.   
These arguments were not an attempt to tell the jury to ignore the law.   
 
 We conclude, under the totality of the circumstances, including that several 
objections were sustained and a number of the arguments were unobjected-to, that 
the defendants did not sustain their burden of proving reversible error under 
Murphy or that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new 
trial as to Phase I.   
As to Phase II, we note that no arguments have been raised as 
 
- 45 -
to impermissible comments during Phase II-A, in which the jury determined 
compensatory damages as to the three class representatives.  Moreover, a review of 
the verdicts reveals that each verdict reflected a careful and differentiated analysis 
as to comparative fault and individual damages and in no way justifies the Third 
District’s overall conclusion that this was a runaway jury inflamed by race because  
of the arguments directed to the four of the six members of the jury who were 
African-American.  As to Phase II-B, because we are reversing the punitive 
damages award we do not separately review each of these arguments except to 
again note that no race-based arguments were made.    
6. 
Reversal of Final Judgments in Favor of the Three Class 
Representatives  
 
The issue of whether two of the three Engle Class representatives are 
properly included within the class as certified by the trial court and approved on 
appeal involves the application of the law to a set of undisputed facts.  “[W]here 
the facts are essentially undisputed, the legal effect of the evidence will be a 
question of law.”  Town of Palm Beach County v. Palm Beach County, 460 So. 2d 
879, 882 (Fla. 1984).  Questions of law are reviewed de novo.  
 
The trial court originally certified this class on October 31, 1994.  This order 
provided for notice to the members of the class by way of publication and 
indicated that the trial court was to hold an additional hearing “to discuss the 
 
- 46 -
content, timing and manner of providing notice.”  At that time, the class was 
described as:  
All United States citizens and residents, and their survivors, who have 
suffered, presently suffer or who have died from diseases and medical 
conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine.  
The class shall specifically exclude officers, directors and agents of 
the [d]efendants. 
Engle I, 672 So. 2d at 40.  The class certification was affirmed by the Third 
District on January 31, 1996, but the class membership was altered by the district 
court to include only Florida citizens and residents.  See id. at 42.  Subsequent to 
the district court’s modification limiting the class to Florida citizens, the trial court 
issued an amended order on November 21, 1996, recertifying the more limited 
class.   
The final class description could lead one to believe that the class is open-
ended because there is no stated cut-off date for membership.  However, an open-
ended class would not allow for notice and an opportunity to opt out as required by 
rule 1.220(d)(2) and may implicate potential class members’ right of access to the 
courts under article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution.   
Further, without the ability to opt out, potential plaintiffs could argue that 
they should be allowed to intervene after a judgment in favor of the class or, 
alternatively, that they are not bound by an adverse judgment.  Cf. Katz v. Carte 
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir. 1974) (explaining that prior to the 
 
- 47 -
adoption of Federal Rule of Civil procedure 23(c)(2) some courts suggested that “it 
would be proper to make the class action determination and permit class members 
to intervene after the defendant’s liability had been determined in the single 
lawsuit,” that this “one-way intervention had the effect of giving collateral estoppel 
effect to the judgment of liability in a case where the estoppel was not mutual,” 
and that the notice and opt-out provisions were adopted to give mutual estoppel 
effect to the judgment on liability).  A finite class is necessary to avoid multiple 
similar lawsuits and to make legal process more effective and expeditious, 
important goals of a class action suit.  See Tenney v. City of Miami Beach, 11 So. 
2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1942) (“The very purpose of a class suit is to save a multiplicity 
of suits, to reduce the expense of litigation, to make legal processes more effective 
and expeditious, and to make available a remedy that would not otherwise exist.”).   
The plain language of the class certification indicates that the trial court 
anticipated that the class would be cut off or limited to the date of final 
certification.  The phrase “who have suffered, presently suffer or have died” 
supports the view that the class should include only those people who were 
affected in the past or who were presently suffering at the time the class was 
recertified by the trial court.  Moreover, although not controlling, federal case law 
supports the interpretation that the date of final class certification should be 
presumed the proper cut-off date for class membership.  See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 
 
- 48 -
U.S. 393, 403 (1975) (“A litigant must be a member of the class which he or she 
seeks to represent at the time the class action is certified by the district court.”) 
(citing Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962)); Davis v. Ball Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 
753 F.2d 1410, 1420 (7th Cir. 1985) (“To be a proper class representative, the 
named plaintiff must be a member of the class at the time the class action is 
certified.”).   
In our view, it is reasonable to conclude that the cut-off date for class 
membership is November, 21, 1996, the date the trial court recertified the class and 
issued an amended order conforming the class description to the Third District’s 
decision.  It was with this November 21, 1996, order that the circuit court first 
ordered that notice to potential class members be published in newspapers and 
magazines circulated in Florida.  The language employed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Sosna, although not addressing a scenario such as we face today, 
is not contrary to our conclusion. 
 
Relying upon Davis v. Ball Memorial Hospital Association, the district court 
held that “[s]ince Farnan was diagnosed in April 1996, and Della Vecchia was 
diagnosed in February 1997, they are clearly excluded from the class and the 
judgment in their favor must be reversed.”  Engle II, 853 So. 2d at 454 n.23 
(emphasis supplied).  However, “diagnosis” as a qualifying factor does not appear 
anywhere in the description of the class certified.  Rather, the class is described as 
 
- 49 -
those “who have suffered, presently suffer or have died from diseases and medical 
conditions.”  Engle I, 672 So. 2d at 40 (emphasis supplied).  The critical event is 
not when an illness was actually diagnosed by a physician, but when the disease or 
condition first manifested itself.   
 
Our review of the medical records demonstrates that class representative 
Farnan was formally diagnosed with lung cancer in March of 1996, clearly 
demonstrating her disease had manifested by that time.  Therefore, she was a 
proper member of the class at the time of the circuit court’s November 21, 1996, 
order.  As for class representative Della Vecchia, it was noted by her doctors in 
early 1997 that she had a past medical history of “COPD” and significant 
hypertension.  Thus, Della Vecchia’s medical records indicate that she had been 
suffering from a tobacco-related disease prior to the time of certification and is also 
properly included as a class member. We therefore quash the district court’s 
reversal of judgment entered in favor of class representatives Farnan and Della 
Vecchia and hereby order that the judgments be reinstated. 
In addition to reversing the judgments in favor of Farnan and Della Vecchia, 
the district court also held that the judgment in favor of Tobacco should have been 
entered as to all of class representative Amodeo’s claims.  See Engle II, 853 So. 2d 
at 455 n.23.  We agree that the district court properly held that all judgments in 
 
- 50 -
favor of class representative Amodeo were barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
6.   
Final Judgments Entered in Favor of the Three Class Representatives in 
Favor of Liggett and Brooke    
 
As noted above, the final judgments entered in favor of class representative 
Amodeo, including those against Liggett and Brooke, must be reversed because 
Amodeo’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.  We also agree with the 
Third District that the judgments against defendants Liggett and Brooke in favor of 
Farnan and Del Vecchia must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence 
to support these judgments.  As the Third District explained, “it is undisputed that 
the Liggett defendants did not manufacture or sell any of the products that 
allegedly caused injury to the individual plaintiff representatives.  It is also 
undisputed that the jury found the Liggett defendants zero percent at fault with 
respect to each of the named plaintiffs.”  Engle II, 853 So. 2d at 466 n.46.  A 
defendant who is found to be zero percent at fault for a plaintiff’s damages cannot 
be held jointly and severally liable for those damages.  We agree with the Third 
District that this inconsistency in the verdict requires reversal of the judgments 
entered against Liggett and Brooke.   See id.  
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, we approve the Third District’s holding that the $145 billion 
award of punitive damages must be vacated.  However, we disapprove the Third 
 
- 51 -
District’s conclusion that the class action punitive damages claims were barred by 
the FSA.  
 
We also disapprove the Third District’s holding that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying Tobacco’s motion for a mistrial due to improper argument by 
the Engle Class’s counsel.  We uphold the award of compensatory damages as to 
plaintiffs Farnan and Della Vecchia, and approve the reversal of the entry of 
judgment in favor of Amodeo.  However, the judgments against defendants Liggett 
and Brooke must reversed.   
We approve the Phase I findings for the class as to Questions 1 (that 
smoking cigarettes causes aortic aneurysm, bladder cancer, cerebrovascular 
disease, cervical cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, coronary heart 
disease, esophageal cancer, kidney cancer, laryngeal cancer, lung cancer 
(specifically, adenocarinoma, large cell carcinoma, small cell carcinoma, and 
squamous cell carcinoma), complications of pregnancy, oral cavity/tongue cancer, 
pancreatic cancer, peripheral vascular disease, pharyngeal cancer, and stomach 
cancer), 2 (that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive), 3 (that the defendants placed 
cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous), 4(a) 
(that the defendants concealed or omitted material information not otherwise 
known or available knowing that the material was false or misleading or failed to 
disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of 
 
- 52 -
smoking cigarettes or both), 5(a) (that the defendants agreed to conceal or omit 
information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with 
the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their 
detriment), 6 (that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were 
defective), (7) (that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that, at the time 
of sale or supply, did not conform to representations of fact made by said 
defendants), and 8 (that all of the defendants were negligent).  Therefore, these 
findings in favor of the Engle Class can stand.   
The class consists of all Florida residents fitting the class description as of 
the trial court’s order dated November 21, 1996.   However, we conclude for the 
reasons explained in this opinion that continued class action treatment is not 
feasible and that upon remand the class must be decertified.  Individual plaintiffs 
within the class will be permitted to proceed individually with the findings set forth 
above given res judicata effect in any subsequent trial between individual class 
members and the defendants, provided such action is filed within one year of the 
mandate in this case.  We remand this case to the Third District for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
It is so ordered. 
 
ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which  
 
- 53 -
BELL, J., concurs. 
CANTERO, J., recused. 
 
 
 
LEWIS, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in the majority’s opinion and most of the reasoning employed 
therein.  However, I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion with 
regard to entitlement to punitive damages.  For the reasons that follow, in my view 
Florida law clearly requires that the jury’s determination of entitlement to punitive 
damages which resulted in Phase I must stand. 
PHASE I FINDINGS ON ENTITLEMENT TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
 
Although I do agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Third District 
misapplied our decision in Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1989), in 
holding that compensatory damages must be determined before a jury can consider 
entitlement to punitive damages, I cannot agree with the majority’s view that the 
trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the entitlement of the class to 
punitive damages during Phase I of the trial based on the majority’s conclusion that 
proof of liability, which includes both reliance and causation, is a missing 
predicate here to the determination of entitlement to punitive damages.  For the 
reasons that follow, I would allow the jury’s determination of punitive conduct and 
of entitlement to punitive damages to stand for the class to be later applied as the 
case proceeds. 
 
- 54 -
This Court has previously addressed “whether a plaintiff can recover 
punitive damages where the factfinder has found a breach of duty but no 
compensatory or actual damages have been proven.”  Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 
456 (Fla. 1989).  In Ault, we clearly recognized that “an express finding of a 
breach of duty should be the critical factor in an award of punitive damages.”  Id.  
Further, this Court has held that “a finding of liability alone will support an award 
of punitive damages ‘even in the absence of financial loss for which compensatory 
damages would be appropriate.’ ”  Id. (quoting Lassiter v. Int’l Union of Operating 
Eng’rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1977)); see also Mortellite v. Am. Tower, L.P., 
819 So. 2d 928, 935 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (concluding that, based on the trial 
court’s finding of breach of duty, the appellant was ultimately entitled to a punitive 
damage award even if, after remand, it was again determined that he was not 
entitled to compensatory damages); Horizon Leasing v. Leefmans, 568 So. 2d 73, 
75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“[A] plaintiff can recover punitive damages where the 
fact finder has found a breach of duty but no compensatory or actual damages have 
been proven.”).   
In this matter, Tobacco asserts, and the majority agrees, that the jury in 
Phase I only determined that Tobacco breached its duty and that a breach of duty 
does not constitute “a finding of liability” under Ault.  Contrary to this assertion, 
the Phase I jury in the present case found Tobacco responsible with regard to the 
 
- 55 -
common core issues pertaining to liability and general causation.  This is supported 
by the fact that the trial plan only allowed the jury to proceed to the next stage of 
Phase I––a determination of entitlement to punitive damages––if liability was 
found.  The final judgment awarding compensatory damages to the three class 
representatives and punitive damages to the entire class was only possible after 
liability was determined because a judgment for damages could not be entered if 
there had been no finding of liability.  See Oliveira v. Ilion Taxi Aero LTDA, 830 
So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (recognizing “as does Ault, that as a matter 
of law a judgment for damages cannot be entered where there is no finding of 
liability”); Cont’l Assurance Co. v. Davis, 538 So. 2d 542, 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1989) (concluding that “absent the jury's finding of liability on the underlying 
fraud issue, there can be no valid award of punitive damages,” citing Ault); 
Cloutier v. Cent. Contracting, Inc., 418 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) 
(concluding that a verdict finding damages without finding liability cannot support 
the damage award).  Pursuant to Ault, the jury’s finding of liability and 
responsibility with regard to the common core issues alone in Phase I could 
support the jury’s determination that the class was entitled to punitive damages, 
notwithstanding that compensatory damages have not yet been awarded to all class 
members.  In fact, a final judgment awarding punitive damages has been affirmed 
notwithstanding that the judgment awarded no compensatory damages.  See Russin 
 
- 56 -
v. Richard F. Greminger, P.A., 563 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (citing Ault).  
A finding of liability, not compensatory damages, is the sine qua non of 
entitlement to a punitive damage award.     
In support of its argument that compensatory damages are a prerequisite for 
awarding punitive damages, Tobacco relies, as did the subsequent panel in Engle 
II, on only a concurring opinion in Ault, in which it was stated: 
The crucial element in determining whether punitive damages 
may be awarded absent an award of compensatory damages is proof 
of the underlying cause of action.  Where actual damage is an 
essential element of the underlying cause of action, an award of 
compensatory damages must be a prerequisite to an award of punitive 
damages. This case involved the torts of assault and battery, which do 
not require proof of actual damage. 
538 So. 2d at 457 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially).  However, a majority of this 
Court did not agree with that statement and did not join with that concurring 
opinion and, therefore, it is of no precedential value whatsoever. See Greene v. 
Massey, 384 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 1980) (“A concurring opinion does not constitute 
the law of the case nor the basis of the ultimate decision unless concurred in by a 
majority of the Court. . . . The special concurring opinion has no precedential value 
and it cannot serve to condition or limit the concurrence in the [majority] opinion . 
. . .”); Lindsay v. Cotton, 123 So. 2d 745, 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960) (“A concurring 
opinion has no binding effect as precedent; such an opinion represents only the 
personal view of the concurring judge and does not constitute the law of the 
 
- 57 -
case.”).  Moreover, neither the Ault court nor any other Florida court has ever 
addressed Ault in the class action context.  Due to the uniqueness and purpose of 
the class action device, which allows a jury to determine liability with regard to 
common issues first before determining individual damages, in my view, the jury’s 
verdict in Phase I finding Tobacco liable with regard to the common issues is a 
sufficient predicate to constitute a “finding of liability” under Ault.  This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that had the jury in Phase I found Tobacco not 
liable with regard to the common issues of liability and general causation each 
class member’s claim at that point would have been rendered moot, thereby 
precluding Phase II. 
In addition, a key factor in considering whether compensatory damages 
should be awarded prior to a determination of entitlement to punitive damages in a 
class action is whether the awarding of one is critical to awarding the other.  In 
other words, is the relative timing of the awards the determinative factor?  I 
conclude that the timing of the awards should not be the absolute controlling 
factor.   
Compensatory and punitive damages serve distinct purposes.  See Arab 
Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1042-43 (Fla. 
1982).  In Arab Termite we recognized the distinction between compensatory and 
punitive damages, specifically: 
 
- 58 -
[T]he amount of compensation for loss is an entirely separate matter 
from the amount of punitive damages.  Punitive damages apply to 
wrongdoing not covered by the criminal law, where the private 
injuries inflicted partake of public wrongs.  They are to be measured 
by the enormity of the offense, entirely aside from the measure of 
compensation for the injured plaintiff. 
Jenkins, 409 So. 2d at 1042-43.  In awarding punitive damages, the focus is on the 
defendant’s conduct, not on the conduct of the plaintiff or the extent of the injury 
to be compensated.  See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th 
Cir. 1986).  While the purpose of compensatory damages is “to restore the injured 
party to the position it would have been [in] had the wrong not been committed,” 
Laney v. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1354 (M.D. Fla. 
2003), the purpose of punitive damages “is not to further compensate the plaintiff, 
but to punish the defendant for its wrongful conduct and to deter similar 
misconduct by it and other actors in the future.”  Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. 
v. Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1999).  “Punitive damages are appropriate 
when a defendant engages in conduct which is fraudulent, malicious, deliberately 
violent or oppressive, or committed with such gross negligence as to indicate a 
wanton disregard for the rights of others.”  W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Waters, 
638 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. 1994).  The punitive damage inquiry, unlike that for 
compensatory damages, “focuses primarily on the egregiousness of the defendant’s 
conduct.”  Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1019 (5th Cir. 1992).  
 
- 59 -
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has also recognized the distinct 
purposes of compensatory and punitive damages:   
The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff 
has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.  The 
latter, which have been described as “quasi-criminal,” operate as 
“private fines” intended to punish the defendant and to deter future 
wrongdoing.  A jury’s assessment of the extent of a plaintiff’s injury 
is essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of 
punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation. 
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) 
(citations omitted).   Punitive damages “are not compensation for injury.  Instead, 
they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to 
deter its future occurrence.”  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 
(1974).  Punitive damages “serve a broader function; they are aimed at deterrence 
and retribution.”  State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 
(2003). 
Entitlement to punitive damages, therefore, aimed at deterrence and 
retribution for a public wrong, is distinct and not dependent on the specific injury 
suffered by the class member.  While no plaintiff in the Engle Class may ultimately 
receive an award of punitive damages without proving that he or she suffered 
actual damages in Phase III, the determination with regard to entitlement to 
punitive damages on a class basis need not be made concurrently with an 
evaluation of a particular claimant.  See Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 
 
- 60 -
F.2d 1188, 1217 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he district court need not defer its award of 
punitive damages prior to determining compensatory damages for the entire class 
of 128 individuals.  So long as the court determines the defendant's liability and 
awards representative class members compensatory damages, the district court 
may in its discretion award punitive damages to the class as a whole at that time.”)  
Moreover, although the Unites States Supreme Court has recognized that 
“compensatory damages and punitive damages are typically awarded at the same 
time by the same decisionmaker,” it has never held that entitlement to these 
damages must absolutely be assessed at the same time.  Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 
U.S. at 432 (emphasis supplied).  Therefore, in my view, the relative timing of the 
assessment of entitlement to punitive damages and a compensatory damage award 
is not critical.  See Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 474.  But see Allison v. Citgo Petroleum 
Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1998).   
 
It is important to highlight the distinction between a jury determination that 
a class is entitled to punitive damages before compensatory damages have been 
actually awarded versus an actual jury award of a specific amount to a class as a 
lump sum punitive damage award before compensatory damages have been 
determined.  In my view, the former comports with the requirements of due 
process while the latter, as the majority correctly concludes, does not.  However, 
contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, in my view, the trial court did 
 
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not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury in Phase I of the trial plan to determine 
whether the class was entitled to punitive damages after liability regarding the 
common issues had been determined.  Notwithstanding the above, I concur in the 
majority’s holding which disapproves the trial court’s trial plan in Phase II-B in 
which it allowed a lump sum punitive damage award to be determined prior to a 
determination of individual class members’ compensatory damage awards, which 
will occur in Phase III, based on due process concerns.  A simple determination of 
entitlement to punitive damages on a class basis does not violate Tobacco’s due 
process rights because no class member will be awarded punitive damages until the 
class member has been awarded compensatory damages in Phase III.  See In re 
New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 795 So. 2d 364, 379 (La. Ct. App. 
2001) (determining that there was no due process violation where the quantum of 
punitive damages was determined when the quantum of compensatory damages 
had been determined as to only 20 of 8,047 plaintiff class members).  Ultimately, 
Tobacco will not be required to pay a class member punitive damages until that 
class member demonstrates his or her entitlement to compensatory damages in 
Phase III.  Tobacco will have the opportunity to be heard at each Phase III trial 
with regard to why that individual plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory 
damages.  To date, Tobacco has not been required to pay any class member a 
punitive damage award.  Therefore, because Tobacco in Phase III will be heard 
 
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with regard to each class member’s compensatory damage claim before they are 
required to pay that class member any punitive damages, I conclude that Phases I 
and II-A of the trial court’s trial plan did not violate Tobacco’s due process rights, 
and that the jury’s finding with regard to entitlement to punitive damages should 
stand.  The majority today has inflicted serious harm to class actions which involve 
egregious behavior and has done so contrary to the clear law of Florida.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority 
opinion that reasons and holds that it was error for the trial court to allow the jury 
to make a determination of the entitlement of the class to punitive damages during 
Phase I of the trial.  If the majority had properly analyzed and discussed the 
availability of the class action status here the contrary result on the punitive issue 
would have been obvious.  I concur in the majority’s decision in all other respects. 
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
WELLS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the following in the majority decision and opinion: 
 
1.  Approving the Third District Court of Appeal’s reversal of the $145 
billion class action punitive damages award. 
 
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2.  Approving the Third District’s reversal of the judgment on behalf of 
plaintiff Amodeo. 
 
3.  Holding that the Third District misapplied Young v. Miami Beach 
Improvement Co., 46 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1950), to the extent that the Third District’s 
decision would bar individual smokers’ claims.  I do not, though, join in the 
majority’s opinion to the extent that it implies that there could be a proper class 
action for smokers’ claims. 
 
4.  Holding that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to find entitlement 
to punitive damages in Phase I of the trial. 
 
5.  Holding that the class be decertified. 
 
I dissent as to all other parts of the majority decision and opinion for the 
reasons that I will write about in this opinion.  In sum, I would affirm the 
remainder of the Third District’s extensive opinion, except that I would provide 
that any individual who can show that he or she relied on being a member of the 
class certified by the trial court in this case and based on that reliance did not bring 
an individual action would be allowed to file suit within one year of our decision 
becoming final.15
                                          
 
 
15.  There is no record of how many, if any, unnamed individuals relied 
upon being members of the class and thus did not file an independent action.  I 
conclude that the latest date that this class could have closed was November 21, 
1996, so that individuals would have to have claims which were not barred on that 
date.  To avoid barring any of those individuals who did in good faith rely upon 
 
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ANALYSIS 
Overview
 
The bottom line is that this was not properly a class action.  The Third 
District’s decision that this was not a proper class action is in accord with the 
overwhelming majority of courts from numerous jurisdictions.  The Third Circuit 
in Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.2d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1998), explains 
why: 
 
In decertifying the class, the District Court decided that “too 
many individual issues exist which prevent this case from proceeding 
as a class action.”  Barnes [v. American Tobacco Co.], 176 F.R.D. 
[479,] at 500.  As noted, the District Court found that addiction, 
causation, and affirmative defenses all presented individual issues not 
properly decided in a class action.  We believe that addiction, 
causation, the defenses of comparative and contributory negligence, 
the need for medical monitoring and the statute of limitations present 
too many individual issues to permit certification.  As in Amchem 
[Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)], plaintiffs were 
“exposed to different . . . products, for different amounts of time, in 
different ways, and over different periods.”  See Amchem, [521 U.S. 
at 624] (citation omitted).  These disparate issues make class 
treatment inappropriate.  [n. 19] 
 
[n. 19.]  We note that the individual issues raised 
by cigarette litigation often preclude class certification.  
See, e.g., Castano v. The American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 
                                                                                                                                        
being members of the class, I would order that the statute of limitations can be 
avoided for those individuals or claims filed for one year from the date of our 
decision becoming final.  An individual would have to plead and prove the 
avoidance as a reply to a statute of limitation affirmative defense pursuant to 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.100(a).  I believe that this procedure would 
conform to what this Court allowed in Lance v. Wade, 457 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 
1984). 
 
- 65 -
734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying 23(b)(3) class because 
individual issues predominated); Smith v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90 (W.D. Mo. 
1997) (denying certification under 23(b)(1), (2) & (3) 
because of the presence of individual issues); Ruiz v. The 
American Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194 (D. Puerto Rico 
1998) (denying certification under 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) 
because “cigarette addiction” claims raised too many 
individual issues).  Significantly, no federal appeals court 
has upheld the certification [of] a class of cigarette 
smokers or reversed a District Court’s refusal to certify 
such a class.  In some state cases, however, plaintiff 
smokers have succeeded in certification.  See Richardson 
v. Phillip Morris, No. 96145050/CE212596 (Baltimore 
Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 1998) (certifying class of Maryland 
smokers seeking compensatory and punitive damages); 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 
App. 3 Dist 1996), rev. denied, 682 So. 2d 1100 (1996) 
(certification of state-wide class of tobacco smokers 
suing for damages caused by smoking).[
]
16
 
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), was the 
initial case which comprehensively examined whether a class action could be 
pursued in tobacco litigation.  While Castano was a class action claiming a 
nationwide class and the present case was limited to a Florida class, much of the 
analysis is applicable to the present case.17  The Castano court stated: 
                                          
 
 
16.  Barnes was decided, and thus this footnote was written, before the 
Maryland Court of Appeals (Maryland’s court of last resort) held that the class 
action in the Maryland case cited was not proper and decertified the class in Phillip 
Morris v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200 (Md. 2000). 
 
 
17.  See Susan E. Kearns, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class 
Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1336 (1999). 
 
- 66 -
 
The Castano class suffers from many of the difficulties that the 
Georgine [v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996),] court 
found dispositive.  The class members were exposed to nicotine 
through different products, for different amounts of time, and over 
different time periods.  Each class member’s knowledge about the 
effects of smoking differs, and each plaintiff began smoking for 
different reasons.  Each of these factual differences impacts the 
application of legal rules such as causation, reliance, comparative 
fault, and other affirmative defenses. 
Id. at 742-43 n.15.  The United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624-25 (1997), instructs on the point in 
rejecting a settlement of an asbestos litigation class action.  Other cases with 
similar holdings are:  Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Hines, 883 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2003); Estate of Mahoney v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 204 F.R.D. 150, 
156 (S.D. Iowa 2001); Badillo v. American Tobacco Co., 202 F.R.D. 261, 264 (D. 
Nev. 2001); Guillory v. American Tobacco Co., No. 97 C 8641, 2001 WL 290603 
at *20, *24, *27 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2001); Aksamit v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., No. C.A. 6:97-3636-24, 2001 WL 1809378 at *24 (D.S.C. Dec. 29, 
2000); Thompson v. American Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544, 551 (D. Minn. 
1999); Hansen v. American Tobacco Co., No. LR-C-96-881, 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11277 at *7 (E.D. Ark. July 21, 1999); Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 
F.R.D. 535, 546 (W.D. Wis. 1998); Emig v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 
379, 389 (D. Kan. 1998); Barreras Ruiz v. American Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194, 
197 (D.P.R. 1998); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 
 
- 67 -
94 (W.D. Mo. 1997); In re Simon II, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005); Arch v. 
American Tobacco Co., Inc., 175 F.R.D. 469 (ED Pa. 1997). 
 
I recognize that a problem exists in this case because of the interlocutory 
appeal to the Third District in which a different panel of the Third District 
approved a class action for a class composed of Florida smokers.  But I also 
recognize that the 1996 decision by the Third District was made at a time when this 
case was only in the pleading stage.  At the time of the 1996 decision, there was no 
trial plan with Phases I, II, and III.  In fact, the three individuals who became the 
class representatives and who presented claims for compensatory damages, Farnan, 
Della Vecchia, and Amodeo, were added as class representatives after the Third 
District’s 1996 decision.  Though the trial court proceeded on the basis of the 1996 
Third District decision, for the reasons stated by the Second District in Toledo v. 
Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, 747 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), the 
1996 decision in the interlocutory appeal should not be given law-of-the-case 
effect:  “Due to the trial court’s broad authority to alter or amend orders 
determining class certification, the doctrine of law of the case ‘applies only 
sparingly in class certification proceedings.’  Fair Housing for Children Coalition, 
Inc. v. Pornchai Int’l, 890 F.2d 420, at 421 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished 
disposition).”  Toledo, 747 So. 2d at 960.  The present majority apparently agrees 
because the majority ultimately decertifies the class. 
 
- 68 -
 
In what I conclude will be harmful and confusing precedent, the majority 
saves some of the jury findings in Phase I of the class action before decertifying 
the class.  I do not join in doing that; rather, I would follow the overwhelming 
majority of courts and hold that this was not a proper class action.  The result of 
the majority “retaining the jury’s Phase I findings” is not, as the majority asserts, 
“pragmatic,” majority op. at 35-36; rather, it is problematic.  Under the majority’s 
holding, the class closed a decade ago.  Who are the individuals that are to get the 
use of these “findings”?  How will a trial court make that determination?  Does the 
individual only have to have an injury manifest prior to November 21, 1996, or 
does the individual have to have notice of the class action?  Does the majority’s 
holding mean that the statute of limitation has not run on any Florida resident’s 
claim whose injury manifested prior to November 21, 1996?  How long do 
individuals have to file such individual actions?  How are these findings to be used 
in cases in which the findings are used?  I assume that any individual cases filed on 
claims in which injuries manifested on November 22, 1996, or later do not get the 
benefit of these findings, so that there will be two classes of claimants.  These are 
only a few of the issues which arise in application of the majority’s holding. 
Punitive Damages 
 
As previously stated, I concur in the majority’s holding that agrees with the 
Third District that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider entitlement 
 
- 69 -
to punitive damages during the Phase I trial.  I do not concur, however, with the 
majority’s opinion that an award of compensatory damages is not a prerequisite to 
a finding of entitlement to punitive damages and that an award of compensatory 
damages need not precede a determination of entitlement to punitive damages.  I 
do not concur because the majority’s opinion is in conflict with the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), 
and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 
(2003). 
 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that punitive damages must be in ratio 
to compensatory damages.  In fact, the majority quotes a passage from the 
Campbell decision which makes this clear.  It necessarily follows, then, that there 
must be compensatory damages in order for punitive damages to be in ratio to 
compensatory damages.  Thus, I conclude that the majority decision here is in 
conflict with the Supreme Court decisions and is thereby erroneous. 
Law-of-the-Case Class Certification
 
I have previously stated why the law-of-the-case doctrine should not apply 
to the Third District’s 2003 review of this case, which followed the Phase I and 
Phase II jury trials and judgments.  Florida Department of Transportation v. 
Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 2001), should not be applied in this class action.  
 
- 70 -
Moreover, since the majority ends up decertifying the class, I fail to understand the 
point of the majority’s discussion of this issue.  Majority op. at 27-31. 
 
The Third District in its 2003 opinion correctly explains why the law-of-the-
case doctrine does not apply.  Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 443 
n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).  Furthermore, as the majority states, “Of course, this 
Court is not bound by the Third District’s law of the case.”  Majority op. at 31. 
 
In the present case, the trial plan was not decided by the trial court until after 
the 1996 interlocutory appeal.  The defendants objected to the trial plan and moved 
to decertify the class.  The trial court denied the motion, although it expressed 
reservations about the manageability of the case and predicted that the necessary 
individual hearings will place a serious demand upon Florida’s judicial resources.  
The denial of the defendant’s motion to decertify was then appealed to the Third 
District.  The Third District dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but 
expressly stated that the defendants had a right to obtain review of the propriety of 
the order by plenary appeal from any adverse judgment.  Engle, 853 So. 2d at 443.  
But now the majority in this Court makes the trial plan unreviewable in the district 
court by applying the law of the case to the earlier certification.  Certainly, the trial 
plan should have been reviewable by the district court as part of a review of the 
 
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motion to decertify after the trial plan was ordered.18  It was the trial plan which 
demonstrated just how unworkable this class action was and why the class should 
have been decertified.  It was the trial plan which resulted in the errors upon which 
the majority in this Court reverses the trial court’s final judgment. 
 
It was the trial plan which resulted in the Phase I jury deciding whether the 
defendants were negligent, breached warranties, were strictly liable, or were guilty 
of fraud and misrepresentation, but Phase II decided the claimant’s comparative 
fault.  Such a bifurcation of issues violates article I, section 22 of the Florida 
Constitution, just as the Fifth Circuit in Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 
734 (5th Cir. 1996), found that such a bifurcation of issues violated the Seventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
                                          
 
 
18.  See William Dodds, Trial Plans Come to Class Action Arena, 226 N.Y. 
Law J. (Aug. 13, 2001) at 2: 
 
 
Faced with actions that seek to aggregate claims of increasingly 
broad and disparate groups of plaintiffs, many courts across the 
country now require that plaintiffs, and sometimes both parties, 
prepare detailed trial plans at the time of or in advance of class 
certification.  For example, in In re Ford Motor Company Vehicle 
Paint Litigation, 182 F.R.D. 182, 224 (E.D. La. 1998), the district 
court required the plaintiff to submit a trial plan, saying it was 
constrained from “certifying a class now and worrying about how to 
try it later.”  Similarly, in Southwestern Refining Co., Inc. v. Bernal, 
22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000), the Texas Supreme Court declared 
that “it is improper to certify a class without knowing how the claims 
can and will likely be tried,” requiring plaintiffs to submit trial plans 
prior to certification. 
 
- 72 -
 
The Castano court explained why a bifurcation of the comparative 
negligence issue from the defendant’s negligence issue with a trial by separate 
juries is a violation of the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
 
Another factor weighing heavily in favor of individual trials is 
the risk that in order to make this class action manageable, the court 
will be forced to bifurcate issues in violation of the Seventh 
Amendment.  This class action is permeated with individual issues, 
such as proximate causation, comparative negligence, reliance, and 
compensatory damages.  In order to manage so many individual 
issues, the district court proposed to empanel a class jury to adjudicate 
common issues.  A second jury, or a number of “second” juries, will 
pass on the individual issues, either on a case-by-case basis or through 
group trials of individual plaintiffs. 
 
The Seventh Amendment entitles parties to have fact issues 
decided by one jury, and prohibits a second jury from reexamining 
those facts and issues.  [n. 30]  Thus, Constitution allows bifurcation 
of issues that are so separable that the second jury will not be called 
upon to reconsider findings of fact by the first: 
[T]his Court has cautioned that separation of issues is not 
the usual course that should be followed, and that the 
issue to be tried must be so distinct and separable from 
the others that a trial of it alone may be had without 
injustice.  This limitation on the use of bifurcation is a 
recognition of the fact that inherent in the Seventh 
Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury is the general 
right of a litigant to have only one jury pass on a 
common issue of fact.  The Supreme Court recognized 
this principle in Gasoline Products [Co., Inc. v. Champlin 
Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931)]. . . .  The Court 
explained . . . that a partial new trial may not be 
“properly resorted to unless it clearly appears that the 
issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the 
others that a trial of it alone may be had without 
injustice.”  Such a rule is dictated for the very practical 
reason that if separate juries are allowed to pass on issues 
 
- 73 -
involving overlapping legal and factual questions the 
verdicts rendered by each jury could be inconsistent. 
Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(citations and footnotes omitted). 
[n. 30]  “[N]o fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States . . .”  U.S. 
Const. amend VII. 
 
The Seventh Circuit recently addressed Seventh Amendment 
limitations to bifurcation.  In [In re] Rhone-Poulenc [Rorer, Inc.], 51 
F.3d [1293] at 1302-03, Chief Judge Posner described the 
constitutional limitation as one requiring a court to “carve at the joint” 
in such a way so that the same issue is not reexamined by different 
juries.  “The right to a jury trial . . . is a right have juriable issues 
determined by the first jury impaneled to hear them (provided there 
are no errors warranting a new trial), and not reexamined by another 
finder of fact.”  Id. at 1303. 
 
Severing a defendant’s conduct from comparative negligence 
results in the type of risk that our court forbade in Blue Bird.  
Comparative negligence, by definition, requires a comparison 
between the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s conduct.  Rhone-Poulenc, 
51 F.2d at 1303 (“Comparative negligence entails, as the name 
implies, a comparison of the degree of negligence of plaintiff and 
defendant.”)  At a bare minimum, a second jury will rehear evidence 
of the defendant’s conduct.  There is a risk that in apportioning fault, 
the second jury could reevaluate the defendant’s fault, determine that 
the defendant was not at fault, and apportion 100% of the fault to the 
plaintiff.  In such a situation, the second jury would be impermissibly 
reconsidering the findings of a first jury.  The risk of such 
reevaluation is so great that class treatment can hardly be said to be 
superior to individual adjudication. 
84 F.3d at 750-51.  Every smoker’s case has a substantial comparative fault 
defense. 
 
The majority’s opinion approves one jury making the decision on the 
defendant’s negligence and a different jury making a decision on the plaintiff’s 
 
- 74 -
negligence and comparing the two.  The second jury will be required to accept the 
first jury’s findings as to the defendant’s negligence and then in some way 
compare the defendant’s negligence with the second jury’s finding as to the 
plaintiff’s negligence.  It is only logical that comparative negligence, which the 
second jury will be finding, is an evaluation of how the negligence of the two 
parties relate.  That can only be accomplished by weighing the evidence of each 
party’s negligence as a cause of the defendant’s negligence, which the majority’s 
bifurcation of negligence and comparative negligence prevents from occurring on 
the basis of one jury’s findings.  Similarly, there is no logical way to decide the 
issues of misrepresentation and the element within misrepresentation of reliance by 
separate juries without having the second jury required to accept the findings of the 
first jury.  Both constitutionally and practically, these are issues which should be 
decided by one fact-finder so that there is consistency in the resolution of the facts. 
 
The majority states that it will follow the Fifth Circuit’s two-to-one majority 
opinion in Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 628-29 (5th Cir. 
1999), rather than the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Castano.  I cannot agree.  Mullen 
was not a smoker’s case.  Mullen was a case brought under the federal Jones Act,19 
in which the claims by the individuals were from the same defective ventilation 
system in a floating casino that occurred over the same general period of time.  The 
                                          
 
 
19.  46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988). 
 
- 75 -
Mullen majority pointed out that these were important distinguishing facts from 
Castano and from the asbestos case decided by the Supreme Court in Amchem 
Products, Inc.  Moreover—and very significantly—the Mullen majority 
specifically pointed out that as in Treasure Chest, the defendant in the Mullen case 
did not raise in the trial court the Seventh Amendment issue of having one jury 
consider the defendant’s conduct and another consider the plaintiffs’ comparative 
negligence.  I find the dissent in Mullen, which adheres to Castano and In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302-03 (7th Cir. 1995), to be the view 
which is correct for smokers’ cases in Florida. 
 
Finally, the majority opinion decides that the cut-off date for class 
membership should be November 21, 1996.  Majority op. at 46.  This was, of 
course, after the Third District decision in the interlocutory appeal, which was 
issued on January 31, 1996.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1996).  It is wholly inconsistent for the majority to apply the law of 
the 1996 case to prevent the Third District’s 2003 review of the certification and to 
also hold that the cut-off date for the class was after the 1996 review.  This results 
in the actual order of certification being unreviewable in the district court. 
Closing Arguments and Individual Judgments
 
I dissent from the majority’s decision that the blatantly improper closing 
arguments do not require reversal.  The Third District’s decision concerning this 
 
- 76 -
offensive argument was precisely correct.  There is no way to read the argument of 
plaintiff’s counsel other than to conclude that it dwelled upon issues which are and 
should be per se reversible error because the arguments were intended to have 
jurors make their decisions on issues which had no relevancy or materiality in the 
case.  These arguments were extreme in my view.  I will not join in a decision 
which affirms judgments which in part are a result of such arguments. 
 
It is because of the closing arguments that the judgments for compensatory 
damages on behalf of Farnan and Della Vecchia against the defendants other than 
Liggett and Brooke20 must be reversed.  Additionally, the individual verdicts 
cannot stand because the closing argument in Phase I was not only materially 
tainted by racial pandering and pleas for nullification but was also materially 
tainted by arguments which would have only been appropriate in seeking punitive 
damages.  Since, as the majority has held, it was improper for the trial court to 
allow the Phase I jury to consider punitive damages, the arguments in support of 
punitive damages were improper and wrongfully prejudiced the defendants from 
receiving a fair trial in Phase I.  This is still another reason why it is error for the 
majority to allow some of the Phase I jury findings to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
                                          
 
 
20.  The majority held that the Third District was correct that the judgments 
against Liggett and Brooke should be reversed on other grounds.  I agree. 
 
- 77 -
 
For the foregoing reasons, I concur with the majority’s reversal of the $145 
billion judgment; reversal of the judgment in behalf of Amodeo; holding that the 
Third District misapplied Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., 46 So. 2d 26 
(Fla. 1950); and holding that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to find 
entitlement to punitive damages in Phase I of the trial.  I dissent to all other parts of 
the majority decision and opinion. 
BELL, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case Nos. 3D00-3206, 3D00-3207, 3D00-3208, 3D00-3210,  
3D00-3212, 3D00-3215, and 3D00-3400 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Stanley M. Rosenblatt and Susan Rosenblatt of Stanley M. Rosenblatt, P.A., 
Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Alvin Bruce Davis of Steel, Hector and Davis, P.A., Miami, Florida, Mercer K. 
Clarke and Kelly A. Luther of Clarke, Silverglate, Campbell, Williams and 
Montgomery, Miami, Florida, Marc E. Kasowitz, Daniel R. Benson and Aaron H. 
Marks of Kasowitz, Benson, Torres and Friedman, LLP, New York, New York, 
Elliott H. Scherker, Arthur J. England, Jr., and David L. Ross of Greenberg 
Traugrig, P.A., Miami, Florida, Norman A. Coll and Kenneth J. Reilly of Shook, 
Hardy and Bacon, LLP, Miami, Florida, Stephen N. Zack of Zack, Sparber, 
Kosnitzky, Spratt and Brooks, P.A., Miami, Florida, Benjamine Reid and Wendy 
F. Lumish of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami, Florida, Anthony N. Upshaw of Adorno 
and Yoss, P.A., Miami, Florida, Renaldy J. Gutierrez and Kathleen M. Sales of 
Gutierrez and Associates, Miami, Florida, Dan K. Webb and Stuart Altschuler of 
 
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Winston and Strawn, LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Robert H. Klonoff of Jones Day, 
Washington, D.C., Robert C. Heim and Joseph Patrick Archie of Dechert, LLP, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, James R. Johnson and Diane P. Flannery of Jones Day, 
Atlanta, Georgia, and Richard A. Schneider of King and Spalding, LLP, Atlanta, 
Georgia, Joseph P. Moodhe of Debevoise and Plimpton, New York, New York, 
James T. Newsom of Shook, Hardy and Bacon, LLP, Kansas City, Missouri, 
 
 
for Respondents 
 
Norwood S. Wilner of Spohrer, Wilner, Maxwell and Matthews, P.A., 
Jacksonville, Florida on behalf of Tobacco Trial Lawyers Association; Theodore 
Jon Leopold of Ricci – Leopold, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, Richard 
Frankel, Matthew L. Myers, and Michael Stroud, Washington, D.C. on behalf of 
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice and Public Citizen, the Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Kids, and the American Cancer Society; Stephen P. Teret and Jon S. Vernick, 
Center for Law and the Public’s Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of 
Public Health, Baltimore, Maryland, and John B. Ostrow, Miami, Florida on behalf 
of American Public Health Association, American Medical Association, American 
Academy of Pediatrics, American Heart Association, American Lung Association, 
American Legacy Foundation and Roswell Park Cancer Institute, Sylvester 
Comprehensive Cancer Center/University of Miami Hospiital and Clinics and the 
Women’s Cancer League of Greater Miami; Phillip Timothy Howard of Howard 
and Associates, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, Douglas Blanke, Executive Director, 
William Mitchell College of Law, Saint Paul, Minnesota, Richard A. Daynard, 
Ph.D., Robert L. Kline and Christopher Banthin, Northeastern University School of 
Law, Boston, Massachusetts on behalf of Tobacco Control Legal Consortium and 
Tobacco Control Resource Center; Roy C.Young of Young Van Assenderp, 
Tallahassee, Florida, John H. Beisner, John F. Niblock and Jessica Davidson 
Miller of O’Melveny and Myers, LLP, Washington, D.C., and Robin S. Conrad, 
National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc., Washington, D.C., on behalf of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States; Rebecca O’Dell Townsend of Haas, 
Dutton, Blackburn, Lewis and Longley, P.L., Tampa, Florida, Daniel J. Popeo and 
David Price, Washington, D.C., on behalf of Washington Legal Foundation and 
National Association of Manufacturers, 
 
 
for Amici Curiae  
 
 
 
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