Case Title: Devous v. Wyoming State Bd. of Medical Examiners

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Devous v. Wyoming State Bd. of Medical Examiners1993 WY 11845 P.2d 408Case Number: 91-212, 91-213Decided: 01/22/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming

 

A. Scott 
DEVOUS,

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

WYOMING STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL 
EXAMINERS,

Appellee 
(Respondent).

WYOMING STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL 
EXAMINERS,

Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

A. Scott 
DEVOUS,

Appellee 
(Petitioner).

 
 

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie 
County, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Richard Barrett, 
Hathaway, Speight, Kunz, Trautwein & Barrett, 
Cheyenne, for petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Don W. Riske, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for respondent.

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT,* and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired 1/1/93

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The primary issue 
to be resolved in this case is whether A. Scott Devous (Dr. Devous) was deprived 
of his constitutional right to due process in a proceeding to suspend his 
license to practice medicine. Dr. Devous' claims of deprivation of due process 
encompass inadequate notice; the impropriety of drawing an adverse inference 
based upon his exercise of his constitutional right not to incriminate himself; 
and the bias of a member of the board. The Wyoming State Board of Medical 
Examiners (Board) also has appealed from the decision of the district court 
contending the court erred in refusing to: sustain portions of the order of the 
Board that required Dr. Devous to show good conduct as a requisite to license 
reinstatement; restrict Dr. Devous' license upon reinstatement by requiring 
co-signature of another physician on prescriptions for Schedule II drugs; and 
issue a public reprimand of Dr. Devous. The Board also contends that the court 
erred in failing to sustain the imposition of costs in the order of the Board 
relating to the licensure proceedings. We hold that Dr. Devous' due process 
rights were infringed in the suspension proceeding, and the order of the 
district court sustaining the ninety-day suspension of Dr. Devous' license 
should be reversed. We affirm the refusal of the district court to order the 
imposition of costs against Dr. Devous in connection with the licensure 
proceeding.

[¶2]      The appeal of Dr. 
Devous and the appeal of the Board were consolidated for purposes of this 
appeal. The cases, however, were briefed separately by the parties. In his brief 
as appellant, Dr. Devous sets forth these issues:

[¶3]      Was the 90-day 
suspension of Dr. A. Scott Devous' license unlawful?

A. Did the board violate 
Dr. Devous' constitutional right to notice of the charges against 
him?

B. Does license 
suspension based solely on the exercise of a physician's privilege against 
self-incrimination violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution?

C. Was Dr. Devous denied 
a fair and impartial hearing by reason of [another physician]'s 
bias?

As appellee, the 
Board restates the issues in this way:

I. Whether the Appellee 
violated the Appellant's Constitutional rights to notice of charges against him 
at the informal interview stage of the disciplinary proceedings.

II. Whether the Board 
could properly find a violation of W.S. § 33-26-402(a)(xxiii) based upon 
Appellant's exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination.

In its Brief of 
Appellant, in its separate appeal, the Board presents this statement of the 
issues:

I. Whether the Board's 
April 22, 
1991, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order should be set aside. 

(a) Whether the Order 
should be set aside due to the hearing officer's failure to disqualify [another 
physician] from the hearing panel.

(b) Whether the Order 
should be set aside due to a lack of substantial evidence in the record to 
support the Board's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and 
Order.

II. Whether the Board is 
entitled to impose costs as shown by its verified Bill of Costs upon 
Respondent.

In answering the 
Board's appeal, Dr. Devous quotes and accepts that statement of the issues 
without submitting any additional statement.

[¶4]      Some background 
information is essential to an understanding of the dispute between Dr. Devous 
and the Board. In 1983, Dr. Devous was convicted, in the United States District 
Court for the District of Wyoming, of felony charges that related to his misuse 
of Demerol, a schedule II controlled substance. Dr. Devous served less than four 
months of his one-year sentence, and he was released from his five-year 
probation in December of 1985. Following his parole, Dr. Devous completed a 
family practice residency in Tennessee and, in 1989, he earned 
an M.A. degree in Public Health Administration.

[¶5]      Dr. Devous had 
voluntarily relinquished his license to practice medicine in the State of 
Wyoming around July 15, 
1983. On January 13, 
1987, he wrote to the Board 
requesting that it re-issue his license to practice medicine so he could sit for 
the American Board of Family Practice certifying examination. About 
April 6, 
1987, Dr. Devous also 
submitted an application to the Board to be licensed to practice medicine and 
surgery in the state of Wyoming. On June 1, 
1987, the Board issued 
license 3990-A to Dr. Devous, in accordance with his application and after he 
had appeared before the Board.

[¶6]      In February, 
1990, Dr. Devous began treating patients at the Wright Medical Clinic. 
Campbell 
County 
Memorial 
Hospital, which owned the clinic, 
employed him under a locum tenens (temporary) contract. Within days after Dr. 
Devous began seeing patients at the clinic, he received a letter from the Board 
asserting that his license was subject to certain conditions or restrictions 
that he allegedly had violated since his return to 
Wyoming. On June 4, 
1990, an informal discussion 
was held at which the participants were Dr. Devous, two Board members, and the 
Board's attorney. Dr. Devous was not advised that the Board would be voting on 
revocation of his medical license for the alleged violations of the conditions 
and restrictions on his license. Those conditions and restrictions were alleged 
to be: (1) prior notification of his intention to return to 
Wyoming; (2) his submission to 
random drug testing if he did return to Wyoming; and (3) his involvement 
in an impaired physician's support group.

[¶7]      On 
June 8, 
1990, the Board revoked Dr. 
Devous' license to practice medicine on the grounds that he had violated the 
conditions set forth above. Dr. Devous' request for a contested court hearing 
was denied by the Board. He then filed a Petition for Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in the District Court of the First Judicial District 
asserting the violation of his substantive and procedural due process rights, 
including notice of the charges against him; the opportunity to present 
evidence; and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. At that juncture, the 
Board entered an order withdrawing the revocation of Dr. Devous' license, and it 
filed a complaint and notice of contested case hearing, setting the issue of the 
revocation of his license for a contested case hearing before a retired 
jurist.

[¶8]      One week before 
the contested case hearing which was scheduled in front of the retired jurist, 
the Board required Dr. Devous to attend another informal interview in 
Casper. Dr. Devous received a 
letter from the Board, dated October 
2, 1990, directing him to bring 
to the interview certain documents, consisting mainly of specific patient 
records. The letter did not incorporate any notice of facts or conduct that 
would warrant any intended Board action. In addition, while the letter was 
drafted by the executive secretary of the Board, it was never signed, nor was it 
introduced or received into evidence even though the hearing officer, with 
respect to those matters, specifically ordered that it be admitted into 
evidence. Dr. Devous attended this "informal interview," but he invoked his 
constitutional rights against self-incrimination on several occasions. His 
motivation was to avoid anything that might incriminate him because of a fear 
that something he said might be used against him in a subsequent criminal 
proceeding.1

[¶9]      In its Decision 
and Order, the Board relied upon Wyo. Stat. § 33-26-402(a)(xv), (xviii), 
(xxiii), and (xxvi) (1987). These respective statutory provisions 
provide:

(a) The board may refuse 
to grant or renew, revoke, suspend or restrict a license or take other 
disciplinary action on the following grounds:

* * * * * *

(xv) Failure to 
appropriately supervise or collaborate with nonphysicians to whom the licensee 
has delegated medical responsibilities;

* * * * * *

(xviii) Willful and 
consistent utilization of medical service or treatment which is inappropriate or 
unnecessary;

* * * * * *

(xxiii) Failure to submit 
to an informal interview or a mental, physical or medical competency examination 
following a proper request by the board;

* * * * * *

(xxvi) Unprofessional or 
dishonorable conduct not otherwise specified in this subsection, including but 
not limited to:

(A) Any conduct or 
practice:

(I) Contrary to 
recognized standards of ethics of the medical profession;

(II) Which does or may 
constitute a substantial risk of:

(1) Danger to the health 
or safety of a patient or the public; or

(2) Impairing a 
physician's ability to safely and skillfully practice medicine.

[¶10]   The contested case hearing 
involving the violations of the alleged conditions or restrictions upon Dr. 
Devous' medical license went on as scheduled, and the retired jurist who 
presided at that hearing filed his decision on December 5, 
1990. He ruled that Dr. 
Devous had a full and unrestricted license to practice medicine in 
Wyoming. Apparently judicial 
review was not pursued with respect to that determination, and the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in that proceeding are not at issue in this appeal. 
The matter does serve to demonstrate the vigor with which the Board fulfilled 
its statutory duties with respect to Dr. Devous' license.

[¶11]   On October 15, 1990, the day before 
the contested case hearing before the retired jurist, the Board filed a new 
complaint and notice of a contested case hearing pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 
33-26-101 to -511 (1987), and specifically asserting grounds identified for 
discipline in Wyo. Stat. § 33-26-402. The new complaint was presented by two of 
the Board members who were present at the informal interview in 
Casper on October 9, 
1990. The new case was set 
for a contested case hearing approximately one month later before an attorney 
appointed by the Board as the hearing officer.

[¶12]   Four Board members other than those 
who presented the new complaint were present at the contested case hearing on 
November 19, 
1990. After voir dire had 
been conducted by the hearing officer and the parties, Dr. Devous moved to 
disqualify three of the four Board members. The hearing officer granted Dr. 
Devous' motion with respect to two of the Board members, but denied the motion 
with respect to another physician. Approximately four months later, Dr. Devous 
was furnished a copy of the hearing officer's proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with a proposed decision and order. The Board 
adopted, substantially, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 
hearing officer, but it imposed additional penalties against Dr. Devous that 
went beyond those recommended. The penalties included a public reprimand; a 
ninety-day suspension; a showing of good conduct as a requisite to reinstatement 
of the suspended license; a two-year license restriction after reinstatement, 
which required that he obtain the co-signature of another physician before 
prescribing or administering schedule II controlled substances; and assessment 
of attorney fees and costs in the sum of $12,509.97. These cases on appeal 
emanate from the recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law by the 
hearing officer in this latter proceeding and the decision and order of the 
Board based upon them.

[¶13]   On May 30, 
1991, Dr. Devous filed a 
Petition for Judicial Review of Administrative Action together with a Motion for 
Stay of Enforcement of the Board's ninety-day suspension order. Before any 
ruling was issued, the ninety-day license suspension period had expired. On 
August 5, 1991, the district court published an opinion letter to the parties in 
which it announced that it would set aside several aspects of the Board's 
decision including the assessment of attorney and hearing officer fees; the 
requirement that Dr. Devous make a showing of good conduct as a requisite to 
license reinstatement; the restriction on his license after reinstatement 
requiring co-signature by another physician for any schedule II controlled 
substance prescriptions; and the reprimand. The district court did rule that the 
Board appropriately imposed a ninety-day suspension based upon its conclusion 
that Dr. Devous violated Wyo. Stat. § 33-26-402(a)(xxiii). Specifically, the 
court held that Dr. Devous failed to participate in the informal interview of 
October 9, 
1990 because of the exercise 
of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United 
States. The decision letter of 
the district court was incorporated by reference in its Order Granting Partial 
Relief.

[¶14]   Dr. Devous appealed from that 
portion of the Order Granting Partial Relief and the decision letter of the 
district court that upheld the ninety-day license suspension. The Board appealed 
from that portion of the court's order that set aside the several aspects of its 
decision discussed above.

[¶15]   The Medical Practice Act of 1987 
(Wyo. Stat. §§ 33-26-101 to -511 (1987))2 provides for judicial review of the 
actions of the Board pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
[hereinafter WAPA].3 The scope of the review provided 
for in WAPA is:

(c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (ii) Hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D) Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) 
(1990).

These standards, 
of course, relate to review both in the district court and in this 
court.

[¶16]   As those standards of review have 
been discussed in our cases, one precept which has evolved is that agency action 
will be set aside if it is not supported by substantial evidence. Cody Gas Co. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wyoming, 748 P.2d 1144 
(Wyo. 1988). Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the conclusions of the agency. Matter of Farman, 841 P.2d 99 
(Wyo. 1992); State ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Div. v. White, 837 P.2d 1095 (Wyo. 1992); Amax Coal Co. v. 
Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 819 P.2d 825 (Wyo. 1991); Vandehei 
Developers v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wyoming, 790 P.2d 1282 
(Wyo. 1990); Palmer v. Bd. of 
Trustees of Crook 
County 
School 
District 1, 785 P.2d 1160 
(Wyo. 1990); Trout v. 
Wyoming Oil & Gas 
Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047 (Wyo. 1986). The entire record 
is to be examined to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the 
agency's findings. Farman; White; Amax; Palmer; Trout. The reviewing court does 
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency with respect to findings of 
fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Trout. When the case comes 
before the supreme court, the findings of the agency are reviewed without 
according any special deference to the decision of the district court. Union 
Pacific R.R. Co. v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856 (Wyo. 1990). See Holly Sugar 
Corp. v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 839 P.2d 959 (Wyo. 1992). The burden is 
assigned to the party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to demonstrate 
that the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Christensen 
v. Wyoming Bd. of Certified Pub. 
Accountants, 838 P.2d 723 (Wyo. 1992); Union Telephone 
Co., Inc. v. Wyoming Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1991); Amax; 
Palmer.

[¶17]   If the agency action is supported 
by substantial evidence, its decision should be reversed only for errors of law. 
Union Telephone. We have summarized the three possibilities that exist upon a 
review of agency conclusions of law in this way:

The agency may correctly 
apply their findings of fact to the correct rule of law. In such case, the 
agency's conclusions are affirmed. But the agency could apply their findings of 
fact to the wrong rule of law or they could incorrectly apply their findings of 
fact to a correct rule of law. In either case, we correct an agency conclusion 
to ensure accordance with law.

Employment Sec. 
Comm'n of Wyoming v. Western Gas 
Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 871 (Wyo. 1990) (citations 
omitted). See Wilson v. State of 
Wyoming ex rel. Office of 
Hearing Examiner, 841 P.2d 90 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶18]   If the correct rule of law has not 
been invoked and correctly applied, the court does not defer to the agency's 
conclusion, but rather the agency's errors are to be corrected. Union Telephone. 
In the light of these precepts of administrative review, we turn to an 
examination of the Order Granting Partial Relief entered in the district 
court.

[¶19]   In pressing his claim of 
deprivation of due process, Dr. Devous contends Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-113(c) (1990) 
is controlling. The statute provides in pertinent part:

No revocation, 
suspension, annulment or withdrawal of any license is lawful unless, prior to 
the institution of agency proceedings, the agency gave notice by mail to the 
licensee of facts or conduct which warrant the intended action, and the licensee 
was given an opportunity to show compliance with all lawful requirements for the 
retention of the license. * * *.

Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-113(c).

Dr. Devous' 
position is that the failure of the Board to give him written notice before the 
informal interview and before the filing of its complaint and notice of 
contested case hearing resulted in an unlawful suspension of his license. Dr. 
Devous' contention here is valid.

[¶20]   The significance of constitutional 
protections with respect to professional licensure was summarized by the Supreme 
Court of Iowa almost fifty years ago. The Court said:

The cases, from which we 
have quoted, clearly announce fundamental principles, essential to the life of a 
free people living under a republican form of government. The right to earn a 
living is among the greatest of human rights and, when lawfully pursued, cannot 
be denied. It is the common right of every citizen to engage in any honest 
employment he may choose, subject only to such reasonable regulations as are 
necessary for the public good. Due process of law is satisfied only by such 
safeguards as will adequately protect these fundamental, constitutional rights 
of the citizen. Where the state confers a license to engage in a profession, 
trade, or occupation, not inherently inimical to the public welfare, such 
license becomes a valuable personal right which cannot be denied or abridged in 
any manner except after due notice and a fair and impartial hearing before an 
unbiased tribunal. Were this not so, no one would be safe from oppression 
wherever power may be lodged, one might be easily deprived of important rights 
with no opportunity to defend against wrongful accusations. This would subvert 
the most precious rights of the citizen.

Gilchrist v. 
Bierring, 14 N.W.2d 724, 732 (Iowa 1944).

This 
capsulization of the import of constitutional principles with respect to 
licensure is consistent with our law in Wyoming.

[¶21]   In Garrison v. Bd. of Trustees of 
Memorial Hospital of Laramie County, 795 P.2d 190 (Wyo. 1990), we acknowledged 
that the right to practice medicine is a conditional property right subject to 
the police power of the state. It follows that the provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
pertain and require that due process of law be afforded prior to revocation of 
such a property right. The record in this case does not include a written notice 
to Dr. Devous of the facts or conduct which were to be the subject of the 
informal interview. There is discussion about an unsigned letter, dated October 
2, 1990, that arguably provided Dr. Devous with the requisite notice of the 
charges that were the subject of the informal hearing. That letter never was 
introduced into evidence and is not to be found in this record. Consequently, it 
cannot be considered. We have no way of knowing what Dr. Devous was told, 
although he assures the court that he would have challenged the sufficiency of 
the notice prior to the hearing and would have moved to dismiss the proceedings 
on the grounds of inadequate notice, if the notice had been 
established.

[¶22]   In Fallon v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Medical Examiners, 441 P.2d 322 (Wyo. 1968), an unsworn report of the Grievance 
Committee of the Wyoming State Medical Society, which was endorsed by the State 
Medical Society and constituted the case against the physician, was submitted ex 
parte to the state Board of Medical Examiners for consideration prior to the 
hearing in the disciplinary proceeding. We held that the physician was denied a 
fair and impartial hearing. We ruled he was entitled to such a hearing as a 
matter of law and that right was derived from his constitutional claim to due 
process in the suspension proceeding. Factually, Fallon is distinguishable, but 
the significant principles of law are applicable here.

[¶23]   In Fallon, the physician licensee 
did not appear before the Grievance Committee of the Wyoming State Medical 
Society. According to Fallon, there was no obligation upon the licensee to 
appear before the Grievance Committee as far as the Board is concerned. The 
Committee, however, drew conclusions from the contents of the report, and it 
submitted ex parte to the Board that Fallon was guilty of using false and 
fraudulent statements in his practice. Those conclusions were predicated upon 
Fallon's failure to appear before the Committee and that proved to be highly 
prejudicial to him. In Fallon, after the Committee had filed its report with the 
State Board of Medical Examiners, the Board gave notice to the physician 
licensee that it had been requested to consider suspending or revoking his 
license. That notice simply stated, "[t]he nature of the offense charged by the 
complainants is the use of false or fraudulent statements in documents that were 
prepared by you in your practice." Fallon, 441 P.2d  at 324. Fallon filed a 
motion with the Board for a bill of particulars, requesting a more definite 
statement concerning the facts and the nature of the charges against him. That 
motion was denied. The holding of this court in Fallon was that the licensee was 
not accorded the fair and impartial hearing to which he was entitled, and it 
reversed the trial court with instructions to remand the case to the Board for 
rehearing.

[¶24]   A disciplinary proceeding before a 
licensing board is an adversary proceeding. The burden is upon the complainant 
to present its case in a proper way and to state with precision the charges 
against the licensee. Those charges then must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence. With respect to proper findings of fact, where a right of 
judicial review is granted from the decision of an administrative agency, the 
agency must find the basic facts upon which its decision rests. It is 
fundamental that principles of justice and fair play require an orderly 
proceeding appropriate to the case or adapted to its nature, one in which the 
licensee has an opportunity to be heard and to defend, enforce, and protect his 
rights before a competent and impartial tribunal while represented by counsel. 
Finally, we recognize a presumption that the action of the Board is correct, and 
that presumption must be overcome by the challenging party. Fallon.

[¶25]   Dr. Devous had both a statutory and 
a constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. The due process 
clauses of the Constitution of the United 
States and the Constitution of 
Wyoming demand these minimal guarantees. The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United 
States provides, "* * * nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law * * *." (Emphasis added). Article 1, § 6 of the Constitution of 
the State of Wyoming makes a similar 
provision, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law." (Emphasis added.) See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970) (holding minimum procedural safeguards are required in 
administrative proceeding); Palmer, 785 P.2d 1160 (recognizing adequate notice 
is requisite element of administrative agency action upon affirming teacher's 
termination); Bd. of Trustees, Laramie 
County. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161 (Wyo. 1976) (holding notice of termination given teacher 
was inadequate, and school board's failure to grant teacher's motion for more 
definite statement constituted abuse of discretion and denial of due 
process).

[¶26]   The general concepts that are 
articulated in Fallon are applicable to this case. Dr. Devous attended the 
various hearings, including the informal interviews, but he did refuse to answer 
questions, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. Nothing in this 
record indicates that Dr. Devous was afforded any notice of the facts and the 
nature of the charges against him. The action of the Board in demanding that Dr. 
Devous defend against vague and indefinite charges resulted in a denial of not 
only his rights under the statute, but also a constitutional denial of his right 
to due process. In light of the constitutional and statutory authority as 
applied by this court in Fallon, we conclude that Dr. Devous' constitutional 
right to due process in the disciplinary proceeding was infringed, and the 
decision of the district court to sustain the suspension of his license must be 
reversed. The ground that we invoke for this reversal is inadequate notice under 
Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(D).

[¶27]   Even if Dr. Devous' due process 
rights with respect to notice had been protected, reversal would be mandated 
upon another ground. Dr. Devous argues that, absent other substantial evidence 
of the violation of the statutory grounds for discipline, a suspension of his 
license based solely on his exercise, in the course of an agency proceeding, of 
his privilege against self-incrimination found in the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United 
States is unlawful. We agree, 
and we find several decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United 
States to be persuasive and 
controlling. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 97 S. Ct. 2132, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1, (1977); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 47 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1976); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 94 S. Ct. 316, 38 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1973); Garrity v. New 
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S. Ct. 616, 17 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1967). Dr. Devous had been convicted of a felony. He was aware 
before he attended the informal interview that a criminal investigation might 
have been instituted with respect to his alleged use of Demerol at the Wright 
Medical Clinic. He chose to invoke his right to remain silent under the Fifth 
Amendment for that obvious reason and, also, to avoid breaching patient 
confidentiality. Under these circumstances, the failure of the Board to provide 
Dr. Devous with the required notice of the specific facts and conduct that 
warranted the intended action of the Board to revoke his license made it even 
more likely Dr. Devous would exercise his right under the Fifth Amendment. Even 
though that invocation of his constitutional right might hazard his valuable 
property right to practice medicine, his right to preserve his personal liberty 
was equivalent to the property right and might well be perceived as the 
paramount right.

[¶28]   We also accept Dr. Devous' third 
argument that the bias of the physician as to whom his challenge was denied 
prevented him from having a fair and impartial hearing. Under the Fallon 
rationale, we must agree. We said in Fallon, 441 P.2d  at 329, "[w]e also start, 
of course, with the presumption that members of the board `are assumed to be men 
of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular 
controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.'" We summarized our 
perception of our responsibility with respect to the contention of bias and 
prejudice on the part of the board members when we quoted the following 
language:

The Act authorizes the 
Board to enter an order upon a complaint alleging unfair labor practices, only 
after a "hearing." This must mean a trial by a tribunal free from bias and 
prejudice and imbued with the desire to accord to the parties equal 
consideration. There is perhaps no more important right to which litigants are 
entitled than that they be given such a trial. Its impairment, ipso facto, 
brings the court, and administrative bodies as well, into public disrepute, and 
destroys the esteem and confidence which they have enjoyed so generally. Time 
and experience have demonstrated that the public, as well as litigants, will 
tolerate the honest mistakes of those who pass judgment, but not the biased acts 
of those who would deprive litigants of a fair and impartial trial. Foremost 
among the responsibilities imposed upon a reviewing court, is to make sure that 
this foundation of our Judicial system be not undermined.

Fallon, 441 P.2d 322, 329 (citing Inland Steel Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 109 F.2d 9, 20 
(7th Cir. 1940)). 

[¶29]   In light of the clear and 
compelling bias of the other physician, whom he challenged, Dr. Devous' right to 
a fair and impartial hearing was violated by that individual's participation in 
these proceedings. That physician and Dr. Devous were both practitioners in 
Sweetwater 
County in the 1980s. That 
physician appeared before the Board of Medical Examiners during the initial 
investigation of Dr. Devous in the early 1980s, and his opinion at that time was 
that Dr. Devous was guilty of a felony. It is clear that the physician had 
formed unfavorable opinions about Dr. Devous which arguably would taint the 
license revocation proceedings. Under the circumstances, the physician's 
assertion that he could weigh the evidence objectively does not serve to 
eliminate the potential for bias. This is particularly true in light of the 
reliance upon Dr. Devous' exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination 
to draw an adverse inference. It also must be recognized that in reaching its 
decision, even though these aspects were set aside by the district court, the 
board relied upon the subjective expertise of its members for appropriate 
standards with respect to several of the alleged violations by Dr. 
Devous.

[¶30]   Turning then to the appeal of the 
Board with respect to the decision of the district court to set aside certain 
statutory grounds for failure of substantial evidence, we affirm the district 
court in that regard. The crux of the issue is whether the record must include 
expert testimony with respect to those statutory grounds, or whether we must 
acknowledge and accept the expertise of the Board members in establishing 
standards that demonstrate infringement of the statute. There was no expert 
testimony offered at the hearing to establish standards with respect to these 
statutory grounds. If judicial review has any purpose, it must be exercised by 
objectively evaluating evidence in the record. There is no way that a judicial 
review could reach the subjective determination of standards by individual 
members of the Board. Consequently, in order to maintain the integrity of 
judicial review, we conclude it is necessary that, with respect to the 
violations that were asserted under Wyo. Stat. § 33-26-402(a)(xv), (xviii), and 
(xxvi), expert testimony in the record was required and, lacking such testimony, 
there is no substantial evidence to sustain those allegations. We find the 
precepts articulated by other jurisdictions are compelling in this regard. E.g. 
Franz v. Bd. of Medical Quality Assurance, 31 Cal. 3d 124, 642 P.2d 792, 181 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1982); Arthurs v. Bd. of Registration in Medicine, 383 
Mass. 299, 418 N.E.2d 1236 
(1981); New 
Jersey 
State Bd. of Optometrists v. 
Nemitz, 21 N.J. Super. 18, 90 A.2d 740 (1952); Dailey v. 
North 
Carolina 
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 
309 N.C. 710, 309 S.E.2d 219 (1983).

[¶31]   Finally, we turn to the appeal by 
the Board from the refusal of the district court to sustain certain costs that 
the Board had imposed with respect to the license suspension proceedings. The 
order of the district court deleted from the claim of costs amounts claimed for 
legal fees and the expenses of a hearing examiner. We affirm the refusal to 
order the imposition of these costs against Dr. Devous. In UNC Teton Exploration 
Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 1989), we adopted the American rule 
that each party in a lawsuit ordinarily shall bear his or her own attorney fees 
unless there is an express statutory authorization or a contractual provision to 
the contrary. The Board has cited no statutory or contractual justification for 
the award of attorney fees or the expenses of the hearing examiner. The 
applicable statute provides, in pertinent part:

Following a hearing to 
deny, refuse to renew or reinstate, revoke, restrict or suspend a license on the 
grounds that a licensee is impaired or has engaged in errant conduct, the board 
shall enter its order and findings pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act. The Board may take one (1) or more of the following 
actions:

* * * * * * 

(viii) Assess part or all 
of the cost of the proceeding against a disciplined licensee; * * *.

Wyo. Stat. § 
33-26-405(a)(viii).

[¶32]   The Board argues that, since the 
statute provides for it to assess part or all of the costs of the proceeding 
against the disciplined licensee, this aspect of its decision should be 
sustained. We agree with the district court that nowhere in the statutes or 
rules in this jurisdiction has the term "costs" been construed to include such 
items. We disagree that it is overly restrictive and unwarranted to construe the 
language of this statute in relation to other Wyoming statutes, rules, and 
case law which interpret the term "costs." The expenses of the hearing examiner 
are to be treated like attorney fees for these purposes and, for that reason, 
properly were denied.

[¶33]   We reverse the decision of the 
district court sustaining the suspension of Dr. Devous' license to practice 
medicine. We affirm the decision of the district court setting aside certain 
aspects of the decision and order of the Board of Medical Examiners relating to 
other disciplinary action and the imposition of the contested costs against Dr. 
Devous.

Footnotes

1 It should be noted that 
Wyo. Stat. § 33-26-408(e) (1987) does not insulate Board records concerning a 
physician who is the subject of a criminal investigation, providing 
instead:

This subsection shall not 
be construed to prohibit the United 
States or the state of 
Wyoming from obtaining 
information from the board concerning a physician who is the subject of a 
criminal investigation. Upon petition to a state or federal district court, 
supported by affidavit, the judge may order the 
Wyoming board of medical 
examiners to release records of any proceedings, testimony of witnesses, and 
reports or investigation for in-camera inspection by the judge, or the judge may 
deny the petition for failure to show good cause. The petition shall state the 
nature of the criminal investigation and the identity of the physician who is 
under investigation. If the judge grants the petition and orders the board to 
produce the board's records for in-camera inspection, the board shall comply 
within ten (10) days after entry of the order. Upon receipt of the records, the 
judge shall inspect them to determine what material, if any, is relevant to the 
criminal investigation. Material deemed to be relevant shall be made available 
to the investigation if otherwise admissible under the Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence. All records and material deemed by the court to be irrelevant or 
otherwise inadmissible under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence shall be returned to 
the board and the contents thereof shall not be divulged.

2 The 
Wyoming Medical Practice Act of 
1987 has been amended since 1987, but the effective date of the amendments is 
subsequent to the initiation of these proceedings.

3 
Wyo. Stat. § 33-26-407 (1987) 
provided:

Judicial review of the 
findings of the board may be obtained pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act. All licenses revoked or suspended by the board are void pending 
administrative and judicial appeals except where the board finds that the 
licensee's continued practice presents no danger to the public.