Case Title: White Sands Group, LLC, Jeff Valentine and Chris Rolison v. PRS II, LLC et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070050

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 04/18/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1070050
_________________________
White Sands Group, L.L.C.; Jeff Valentine; and Chris Rolison
v.
PRS II, LLC, et al.
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-05-923)
WOODALL, Justice.
This appeal is brought by Jeff Valentine, Chris Rolison,
and White Sands Group, L.L.C. ("White Sands") -- a real-estate
developer 
whose 
members include Valentine and Rolison
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Group") --
1070050
2
following the entry of a summary judgment in favor of PRS II,
LLC, and others in a quiet-title action commenced by PRS II
against White Sands and Valentine.  We affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand.
I. The Case
This action began on August 3, 2005, when PRS II filed a
complaint against White Sands and Valentine.  The complaint
sought a judgment declaring that PRS II owned an undivided fee
interest in approximately 96 acres known as "Pilot Town" in
Baldwin County, and that White Sands and Valentine had no
valid interest in or claim to any portion of the property.  In
September 2005, White Sands and Rolison filed a five-count
counter-complaint against PRS II and numerous additional
entities and individuals.  At the motions of the counterclaim
defendants, the trial court dismissed counts four and five of
the counter-complaint and entered a summary judgment against
White Sands and Rolison on the remaining counts of the
counter-complaint, as well against White Sands and Valentine
on PRS II's complaint.  This appeal challenges the propriety
of the summary judgment, as well as the dismissal of counts
four and five.
1070050
3
II. Factual Background
Viewed in a light most favorable to the Group, the
evidence tends to show the following.  The dispute underlying
this litigation arose out of the proposed development of Pilot
Town and the purported purchase by White Sands of a portion of
the property within the Pilot Town development.  The property
on which Pilot Town was to be developed was owned by Thomas
Langan, Jr. (also referred to as "Tommy Langan"), and other
members of the Langan family, either individually or through
various business entities hereinafter described.  By May 2004,
the Langans had begun contemplating the platting and
subdivision of that property for sale as single-family
residences.  Indeed, on December 4, 2002, the Baldwin County
Planning and Zoning Commission granted "Preliminary Plat
Approval" for the development and subdivision of Pilot Town.
The Langans' real-estate operations, and the Pilot Town
project in particular, involved various business entities
owned by one or more of the Langans.  One such entity was
Langan Development Company, Inc. ("Langan Development"), a
corporation wholly owned by Thomas Langan, Jr.  Other entities
included Bar Pilot Land, L.L.C. ("Bar Pilot"), and Pilots
1070050
4
Pointe Development, L.L.C. ("Pilots Pointe").  These three
entities will be referred to collectively herein as "the
Langan entities."
 In May 2004, Valentine and Rolison met with Langan to
discuss a possible purchase by White Sands of property within
Pilot Town.  Subsequently, on May 12, 2004, Valentine, on
behalf of White Sands, addressed a letter to "Thomas J.
Langan, Jr.," and "Langan Development Company."  The letter
stated, in pertinent part:
"I'm writing to make a formal offer on lots in the
Pilot Town subdivision at mile marker 3 off hwy 180
in Fort Morgan.
"We are making the offer thru our development
company, White Sands Group, L.L.C. in the amount of
$85,000 cash on (5) lots 23-27.  We are agreeable to
making a deposit to show good faith in the project.
"We are in contact with potential buyers of some of
your waterfront lots as well.  We propose a 5%
compensation to White Sands Group for any successful
purchasers of additional lots in the neighborhood.
"This offer is contingent on amenities described and
discussed previously.  They are inclusive of but not
limited to a swimming pool with waterfall, community
entertainment area, community access to the bay
front with a possible pier, neighborhood to be
gated, etc.
"The 
offer 
is 
also 
contingent 
on 
successful
subdivision of lots and completion of roadways.  It
was also expressed that environmental, wetlands
1070050
5
delineation, archeological, beach mouse, and all
other issues have been addressed which will provide
these 
lots 
to 
be 
buildable 
thru 
the 
normal
permitting process.  The offer is also subject to
our ability to obtain reasonable financing at the
completion of the neighborhood.
"I look forward to hearing from you promptly.
Please call me if you have any questions."
(Emphasis added.)  The letter was signed by Valentine as the
purchaser.
Langan "penciled in" some changes in the third paragraph,
and struck out the words "with waterfall" in the fourth
paragraph.  These changes were reflected in a letter addressed
to "Thomas J. Langan, Jr.," and "Langan Development Co.,"
dated May 17, 2004, which stated, in pertinent part:
"I'm writing to make a formal offer on lots in the
Pilot Town subdivision at mile marker 3 off hwy 180
in Fort Morgan.
"We are making the offer thru our development
company, White Sands Group, L.L.C. in the amount of
$85,000 cash on (5) lots 23-27.  We will place a
deposit of $2,000.00 per lot until the subdivision
is complete and we can proceed with closing.  Upon
closing, we agree to pull building permits and begin
construction on one of the lots within 2 months.
Any delays in the permitting process will be in
addition to the 2 month projected start.
"White Sands Group will receive 5% compensation for
purchasers of waterfront lots, in the amount of
$210,000.00 or greater.  These buyers will be
1070050
6
introduced by us, and this commission option expires
on 6/11/2004.
"This offer is contingent on amenities described and
discussed previously.  They are inclusive of but not
limited to a swimming pool, community entertainment
area, community access to the bay front with a
possible pier, neighborhood to be gated, etc.
"The 
offer 
is 
also 
contingent 
on 
successful
subdivision of lots and completion of roadways.  It
was also expressed that environmental, wetlands
delineation, archeological, beach mouse, and all
other issues have been addressed which will provide
these 
lots 
to 
be 
buildable 
thru 
the 
normal
permitting process.  The offer is also subject to
our ability to obtain reasonable financing at the
completion of the neighborhood.
"I look forward to hearing from you promptly.
Please call me if you have any questions."
(Emphasis added.)  The letter  (hereinafter referred to as
"the Valentine letter") was signed by Valentine as the
purchaser and initialed by Thomas Langan as the seller. 
On July 8, 2004, Langan accepted an "offer to purchase"
Pilot Town ("the Pilot Town contract") from Peter Sterling and
Michael Asfour, members of P&M Builders, LLC ("P&M"), an
entity based in New York.  The contract expressly excluded
lots 23-27, as well as several lots reserved by various
members 
of 
the 
Langan 
family. 
 
It 
contemplated 
the
construction on the remainder of the property of "five
1070050
7
condominium 
structures" 
and 
a 
"full 
service 
marina,"
consisting of at least 275 "boat slips."  On July 22, 2004,
Sterling and Asfour contracted with Rolison ("the Rolison
contract") for Rolison to perform construction services on the
facilities to be built under the Pilot Town contract.
Sterling and Asfour sought financing through Peter Morris
of PRM Realty, Inc. ("PRM"), in Chicago.  In August 2004,
Morris, Sterling, Asfour, and Langan viewed the property.  At
that time, they discussed White Sands' interest in Pilot Town.
Also at that time, Morris and Sterling expressed an interest
in acquiring Pilot Town in its entirety for the construction
of condominiums.  In that connection, P&M hired Volkert &
Associates, 
Inc. 
("Volkert"), 
"to 
perform 
certain 
professional
surveying, planning, environmental, and engineering services
for improvements" to Pilot Town.
Subsequently, Tommy Langan and Morris began to discuss
whether the Valentine letter was an enforceable contract.
Morris wanted the purchase of Pilot Town to include the
property in its entirety, and he began, in his words, to "put
pressure on" the Langans to include in the sale some or all of
the lots excluded from the Pilot Town contract.
1070050
8
On October 11, 2004, the Langans sent Valentine a letter,
stating, in pertinent part:
"Per your conversation the other day with Tommy
Langan, I am writing about your option dated
5/[17]/04 to Langan Development Company.  Due to
[damage inflicted by Hurricane Ivan] we are having
to add some additional cost to the lots to cover the
damage, interest and fee delays, and clean-up to
name just a few items.  At this point we also are
not able to complete the swimming pool, community
entertainment area, community access to bay or the
front wall and gates and are not sure when they will
be complete.  However once the roadways and base
utilities are in we will give you the total cost
change per lot and at that time you will need to
close on the lots in your option letter.  Any
additional 
environmental, 
wetlands 
delineation,
archeological, or other issues will also have to be
taken into consideration as to the total lot cost.
Also as previously agreed we are adding the pro-rata
share per lot the cost of the proposed pier/marina,
bulkhead (time frame for construction not yet
determined) and sewer and water cost."
(Emphasis added.)  On October 21, 2004, after receiving this
letter, Valentine sent a letter to Mark Langan, stating, in
pertinent part:
"I'm writing to express that we are still interested
in our reserved lots in Pilot Town.  I am enclosing
our deposits on lots 23 thru 27.  I'm sending the
agreed upon $2,000.00 per lot (total $10,000).  
"I understand there will be delays due to the storm,
and we will patiently await the completion of the
neighborhood.  If there is anything we can be of
assistance with, please contact me."
1070050
9
(Emphasis added.)
Meanwhile, on October 14, 2004, Morris, individually, and
on behalf of PRM; Sterling, individually, and on behalf of
P&M and another entity based in New York executed a joint-
venture agreement.  The joint venture was conducted "under the
name and style PRS."  The stated purpose of PRS was, among
other things, to "acquire, hold, improve, develop, sell,
lease, or manage developed or undeveloped properties," and
Pilot Town in particular.
Eventually, Volkert drew maps and alternative plans of
the proposed project.  At least one of the maps displayed
condominiums on the entire property.  During a planning
meeting attended by Rolison, Rolison expressed concern to
Sterling regarding any plans to place condominiums on the lots
White Sands had expressed an interest in.  In response,
Sterling told Rolison: "[W]e'll take care of you if we go [to
condominiums on the whole property]; we're not choosing to go
that direction right now."  (Emphasis added.)
In January 2005, PRS II was formed to assume essentially
the same functions and purposes as PRS.  PRS II was composed
1070050
According to the Group, "the closing was directly linked
1
to the original [Pilot Town] contract."  Group's brief, at 25.
10
of the same entities as PRS, except that Thomas Langan was
added as a member.  
In February 2005, Morris submitted to Tommy Langan a
written proposal to purchase "[a]ll lots" at Pilot Town with
the "stipulat[ion] that [the] unenforceable contract to [White
Sands would] be voided on five of th[o]se lots," and that "no
parcels [would] be carved out and sold to other parties."
(Emphasis added.)  In a letter to Valentine dated February 11,
2005, the Langans returned White Sands' check for the $10,000
deposit, which had never been cashed, stating, in pertinent
part: "At this point the company has decided not to pursue the
subdivision, for a variety of reasons.  If plans change White
Sands will be notified."  On March 1, 2005, PRS II received a
warranty deed for Pilot Town -- which included the excluded
lots -- in exchange for approximately $19 million.1
Two days later, on March 3, Valentine filed an affidavit
in the Baldwin Probate Court.  The affidavit stated, in
pertinent part:
"2. On behalf of White Sands Group, L.L.C., I
negotiated a purchase contract for the sale of
certain lands located in Baldwin County, Alabama,
1070050
Considerable confusion exists regarding the precise
2
Langan entity, or entities, that actually owned Pilot Town.
Disposition of this appeal, however, does not depend on
resolution of this confusion.
11
with Thomas J. Langan, Jr. acting in the line and
scope of his authority with BAR PILOT LAND, L.L.C.
and 
PILOT'S 
[sic] 
POINTE 
DEVELOPMENT, 
L.L.C.
[description followed].
".... 
"4. The negotiations for the purchase of the
real property resulted in the entry into a contract
for the sale of Lots 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the
property owned by Bar Pilot Land, L.L.C. and being
developed 
by 
Pilot's 
Pointe Development, L.L.C. ..."2
Subsequently, Morris sent Sterling an  e-mail, stating,
in pertinent part:
"Tommy [Langan] received a very hostile lawyer
letter 
from 
Chris 
[Rolison] 
and 
his 
partner
regarding the five lots on which they ([Rolison] and
partner) 
had 
conditionally 
entered 
into 
an
understanding to acquire said lots on a very
advantageous basis a little while ago.  I have read
the documents carefully and am very comfortable with
the fact that there were so many conditions which we
unilaterally imposed upon Tommy and his family
regarding 
condition 
of 
land, 
subdivision,
achievement along with subdivision restrictions, and
other items (all which were exclusively in [Rolison]
and partner's domain) to accept or walk away from
the deal -- none of which had been accomplished by
Tommy or his family at the time of, what I consider,
a non-binding statement of facts and understanding
to try to agree to go forward.
"In my opinion, the Langans have total discretion to
make 
the 
subdivision 
and 
to 
create 
whatever
1070050
12
conditions they want and, obviously, this would not
be considered a one-way option for [Rolison] and his
partner to cherry-pick their visions and get in or
out.  In my mind, the understanding has so much
ambiguity in open trading yet to go that it never
roles [sic] through level specificity.  Therefore,
it is not binding and more an expression of intent.
Now, all of a sudden since we have closed,
mysteriously, this guy and his partner and lawyer
surface, acting as if there was a binding contract
with all of the facts fixed and no open-ended
variables, with demands of a closing and threats to
sue.  You have repeatedly told Tommy, and several
times told me, that you can handle Mr. [Rolison] and
his partner and move him into another direction, as
it makes no sense for a guy, who turns out to have
very little pull with Volkert, very little standing
in the community, and has provided no real palpable
service or benefit, to somehow potentially hijack a
$500 
million 
project, 
with 
five 
misapplied,
misdesigned, mismarketed, and misplaced, out of
context units, with a tail to wag the proverbial dog
of our master planned project.  It is demonstrably
not in your interest to allow this to happen and you
have repeatedly reflected and represented to Tommy
and to me that you can control the situation.  I
think it would be a show of good faith to intervene,
prior to an unnecessary lawsuit -- which, in my
opinion, this gentleman and his partner will lose --
and move this forward so we don't have this level of
contention with a bunch of third parties .... I
think this would avoid messy litigation, which, of
course, none of us are afraid [of] and will take in
stride, but is truly not necessary for anyone's
relationship or for the Venture on these deals we do
have."
(Emphasis added.)
In August 2005, when it appeared to Morris that an action
by White Sands was imminent, PRS II sued White Sands and
1070050
13
Valentine, seeking a judgment quieting title to Pilot Town in
PRS II and declaring that White Sands and Valentine have no
legal or equitable interest in the property.  The counter-
complaint subsequently asserted against PRS II added Rolison
as a counterclaim plaintiff and added (1) Langan Development,
(2) Pilots Pointe, and (3) Bar Pilot as counterclaim
defendants.  It also added as counterclaim defendants P&M,
Sterling, and Asfour. Finally, the style of the counter-
complaint listed "fictitious defendants 11-23" (hereinafter
referred to as "the fictitiously named parties"), described as
"those individuals and/or entities who conspired with any of
the named defendants in the commission of the wrongs alleged
herein."  
More specifically, count one of the counter-complaint
asserted a breach-of-contract claim by White Sands against the
Langan entities.  Count two was asserted by White Sands
against PRS II and the Langan entities, seeking specific
performance of the contract.  Count three alleged that White
Sands "had a valid and existing contract and business relation
with [the Langan entities]" and asserted that  Sterling,
Asfour, and PRS II had "separately and/or collectively
1070050
14
intentionally and wrongfully interfered with said business
and/or contractual relations."  (Emphasis added.) Count four
was a breach-of-contract claim asserted by Rolison.  He
averred that he had "a contract with [Sterling, Asfour, and
P&M] ... for the payment of $800,000.00 for the performance of
certain services," and that they had breached that contract.
(Emphasis added.)  Count five was asserted by White Sands
against the fictitiously named parties and alleged conspiracy
to "intentionally interfere with the contract and business
relations of [the Group]."  
Motions were filed by all the named counterclaim
defendants to dismiss the counter-complaint on the ground that
the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize the
joinder of the new parties or claims or, in the alternative,
to sever the counterclaims, pursuant to Ala. R. Civ. P. 21.
White Sands and Rolison expressly opposed severance, as well
as dismissal, and specifically argued that the "severance
position [had] no merit." 
On January 11, 2006, the trial court dismissed counts
four and five of the counter-complaint.  On May 18, 2007, PRS
II and the Langan entities moved for a partial summary
1070050
15
judgment as to counts one, two, and three of the counter-
complaint.  On June 27, 2007, Asfour and Sterling filed a
motion for a summary judgment as to count three, the only
counterclaim that remained against them.  That motion stated,
in toto:
"Come now the counterclaim Defendants, Michael
Asfour and Peter Sterling ... by and through
undersigned counsel and will make this their motion
for summary judgment as to all counts asserted
against Asfour and Sterling as there are no genuine
issues of material fact a judgment as a matter of
law is due to be granted.
"In 
support 
of 
their 
motion, 
Asfour 
and
Sterling, Counterclaim Defendants, incorporate by
reference the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
filed on May 18, 2007, by [PRS II and the Langan
entities], as well as all exhibits and documents
filed simultaneously therewith, including but not
limited to the Narrative Summary of Undisputed
Facts; Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment; and Notice of Filing in Support of Partial
Summary Judgment."
(Emphasis added.)  In other words, Sterling and Asfour filed
no supporting argument, brief, or narrative summary of
undisputed facts, apart from those filed by PRS II and the
Langan entities.  On August 6, 2007, PRS II moved for a
summary judgment on the claims in its complaint against White
Sands and Valentine.
1070050
16
On September 12, 2007, the trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of PRS II on the two claims in its complaint
and against White Sands and Rolison on the three remaining
claims of the counter-complaint.  On October 3, 2007, the
Group appealed, challenging the adverse summary judgments, as
well as the dismissals of counts four and five of the counter-
complaint.
III. Summary Judgments
This appeal presents issues regarding two aspects of the
summary judgments.  The first concerns title to Pilot Town,
which, in turn, implicates the two claims asserted in the PRS
II complaint and counts one and two of the counter-complaint.
The second concerns the claims of interference with a
contractual or business relationship, which were asserted by
White Sands in count three of the counter-complaint.
A. Title to Pilot Town
The Group concedes that the resolution of its breach-of-
contract and specific-performance counterclaims, as well as
the resolution of the quiet-title and declaratory-judgment
claims of PRS II, turns on the validity and enforceability of
the Valentine letter.  The issue, as framed by the parties, is
1070050
17
whether the Valentine letter constitutes an enforceable
contract for the purchase of lots 23-27.
In that connection, PRS II and the Langan entities argued
in the trial court, and contend again here, that the Valentine
letter is not a contract, because, they say, it fails for lack
of definiteness.  They allude specifically to the various
contingencies 
described 
in 
that 
letter, 
such 
as 
the
construction by the sellers of certain specified "amenities,"
as well as other unspecified amenities.  This contingency,
they argue, leaves open the total price to be paid for the
lots.  They also refer to the fact that the purchase "offer
[was] contingent on successful subdivision of lots and
completion of roadways,"  and that there is "nothing in the
[Valentine letter] that even required the Langans to
affirmatively proceed ... with the subdivision."  Brief of PRS
II and the Langan entities, at 35 n.3 (emphasis added).  They
characterize the letter as a nonbinding "letter of intent." 
In response, the Group argues that "the contract for the
sale of the lots was absolutely definite and clear," as
indicated by the statement: "We are making the offer ... in
the amount of $85,000 cash on (5) lots 23-27."  The Group's
1070050
18
brief, at 55.  The Group contends that the proposals added by
Tommy Langan to the offer preceding the Valentine letter
constituted 
a 
counteroffer, 
thus 
evidencing 
Langan's
understanding of the meaning of the amenities contingency.
These factors, according to the Group, present at least a jury
question as to "the intent of [the] parties to enter into a
contract, or concerning mutual assent."  Id. at 52.  We
disagree.
"To be enforceable, the [essential] terms of a contract
must be sufficiently definite and certain, Brooks v. Hackney,
329 N.C. 166, 170, 404 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1991), and a contract
that '"leav[es] material portions open for future agreement is
nugatory and void for indefiniteness"' ...."  Miller v. Rose,
138 N.C. App. 582, 587-88, 532 S.E.2d 228, 232 (2000) (quoting
MCB Ltd. v. McGowan, 86 N.C. App. 607, 609, 359 S.E.2d 50, 51
(1987), quoting in turn Boyce v. McMahan, 285 N.C. 730, 734,
208 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1974)).  "A lack of definiteness in an
agreement may concern the time of  performance, the price to
be paid, work to be done, property to be transferred, or
miscellaneous stipulations in the agreement."  1  Richard A.
Lord, Williston on Contracts § 4:21, at 644 (4th ed. 2007).
1070050
19
"In particular, a reservation in either party of a future
unbridled right to determine the nature of the performance ...
has often caused a promise to be too indefinite for
enforcement."  Id. at 644-48 (emphasis added).  See also Smith
v. Chickamauga Cedar Co., 263 Ala. 245, 248-49, 82 So. 2d 200,
202 (1955) ("'A reservation to either party to a contract of
an unlimited right to determine the nature and extent of his
performance, renders his obligation too indefinite for legal
enforcement.'") (quoting 12 Am. Jur. Contracts § 66).  Cf.
Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1440 (7th
Cir. 1992) (an indefinite term may "render[] a contract void
for lack of mutuality" of obligation).
"Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to
be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form
a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably
certain."  17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 183 (2004).  "The terms
of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis
for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an
appropriate remedy."  Id. (emphasis added).  See also Smith,
263 Ala. at 249, 82 So. 2d at 203. 
1070050
20
We may, therefore, state the dispositive question in this
case as whether the parties have "so [definitely] expressed
their intentions [in the Valentine letter] that the court
[can] enforce their agreement?"  Beraha, 956 F.2d at 1440-41.
The plaintiff bears the burden on this question.  State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Williams, 926 So. 2d 1008, 1013 (Ala.
2005); DeVenney v. Hill, 918 So. 2d 106, 116 (Ala. 2005).  We
answer it in the negative.
Indefiniteness infects the Valentine letter in at least
two fundamental respects.  The first uncertainty is the price
ultimately to be paid for the five lots.  Although the letter
ostensibly offers $85,000 per lot, it expressly leaves open
the financial impact of the amenities on the offering price.
The offer was made "contingent on" the future construction of
unspecified amenities, such as, "but not limited to[,] a
swimming pool, community entertainment area, community access
to the bay front with a possible pier, neighborhood to be
gated, etc."  (Emphasis added.)  
Even were we to assume, as the Group insists we do, that
the entire catalog of amenities could properly be ascertained
by parol evidence, more difficult questions remain, such as
1070050
21
whether any of the amenities were to be constructed by the
prospective buyers as part of White Sands' purchase price, or
solely by the sellers, and, if by the sellers, whether the
cost of such construction would be reflected in an adjustment
of the base offering price of $85,000.  The difficulty is
illustrated in the October 11, 2004, letter from the Langans
to Valentine, which expressly contemplated "some additional
cost to the lots" and an adjustment of the "total lot cost,"
due, in part, to the unexpected damage from Hurricane Ivan in
September 2004.  Thus, the total price for the lots is
effectively left open in the Valentine letter.
The second uncertainty presented by the Valentine letter
is even more difficult and fundamental.  The problem is that
no party involved in this transaction has, at any time,
unequivocally committed -- in writing or otherwise -- to
perform any of its essential terms.  White Sands agreed to pay
only after the construction of various amenities and after the
"successful subdivision of lots and completion of roadways."
However, the letter contains no commitment by anyone to build
any amenities or roadways.  It is undisputed that the Langans
never submitted a final subdivision plat to the Baldwin County
1070050
22
Planning and Zoning Commission for approval, but the Valentine
letter contains no commitment by the Langans to do so or to
proceed at all with plans to subdivide Pilot Town.  Because
the Valentine letter left essential aspects of the transaction
"open for future agreement" and negotiation, Miller, 138 N.C.
App. at 588, 532 S.E.2d at 232, and left to the Langans an
"unbridled 
right 
to 
determine 
the 
nature 
of 
[their]
performance," it was "too indefinite for enforcement."
Williston, supra, at 647-48. 
The proposals penciled into the initial offer by Tommy
Langan, whether or not they are considered a "counteroffer" as
the Group contends, did not transform the Valentine letter
into an enforceable contract.  Even if the proposals were
intended to be a counteroffer, they could not have formed the
basis for an enforceable contract.  This is so because simply
proposing modifications to the largely immaterial third
paragraph and deleting the words "with waterfall" from the
fourth paragraph did nothing to eliminate the indefiniteness
that is fatal to the Valentine letter.  17A Am. Jur. 2d
Contracts § 183 (2008) ("Even though a manifestation of
intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot
1070050
But see Burlington Constr. Co. v. R.C. Equip. & Constr.,
3
Inc., 13 Conn. App. 505,  537 A.2d 534 (1988) (question of
fact). 
23
be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the
contract are reasonably certain.").  More specifically, they
did nothing to resolve issues surrounding the financial impact
of the amenities on the offering price and certainly did not
amount to a definite commitment by the Langans to proceed with
plans to subdivide Pilot Town.  We hold, therefore, that the
Valentine letter is unenforceable for lack of definiteness. 
Although there is authority to the contrary, whether a
writing fails for indefiniteness is properly a question of
law.  Beraha, 956 F.2d at 1440; Richter, S.A. v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 1176, 1196 (5th
Cir. 1991) ("whether a contract fails [for indefiniteness] is
a question of law"); Armstrong v. Rohm & Haas Co., 349 F.
Supp. 2d 71, 78 (D. Mass. 2004) ("Whether an alleged contract
is legally enforceable in light of indefinite terms is a
question of law for the court."); America's Favorite Chicken
Co. v. Samaras, 929 S.W.2d 617, 622 (Tex. App. 1996) ("[T]he
issue of whether an agreement fails for indefiniteness is a
question of law to be determined by the court.").3
1070050
24
This view is in accord with Alabama law and practice.
For example, in Smith v. Chickamauga Cedar Co., supra, this
Court affirmed a judgment of nonsuit sustaining a demurrer to
the complaint, holding that an agreement by one party to an
alleged contract to "'furnish logs at such location for
cutting by [the other party] in such quantities as [the first
party] deems feasible and economical," 263 Ala. at 247, 82 So.
2d at 201, was "so indefinite and uncertain as to be
unenforceable."  263 Ala. at 248, 82 So. 2d at 202.  More
recently, in Drummond Co. v. Walter Industries, Inc., 962 So.
2d 753 (Ala. 2006), we affirmed a summary judgment, holding
that an open-ended clause in an agreement purporting to modify
the terms of existing coal leases "'by extending them "to the
extent necessary for plaintiffs to mine the strippable coal"'"
was unenforceable for lack of definiteness and was "void as a
matter of law."  962 So. 2d at 766.
Although the Group argues that the indefiniteness issue
was "inappropriate for summary judgment," the Group's brief,
at 52, the cases it cites, namely, Ex parte W.Y., 605 So. 2d
1175 (Ala. 1992); Wadsworth House Movers, Inc. v. Salvage One
Demolition, Inc., 474 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1985) (alleged oral
1070050
25
agreement); Johnson-Rast & Hays, Inc. v. Cole, 294 Ala. 32,
310 So. 2d 885 (1975); and Big Thicket Broad. Co. of Alabama
v. Santos, 594 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (alleged oral
agreement), are distinguishable and unpersuasive.  None of
those cases involved an issue similar to the one presented
here -- whether the parties have made reciprocal commitments
of performance sufficiently definite to be judicially
enforceable.  Although a jury may resolve ambiguities in a
contract through parol evidence, Cole, 294 Ala. at 35, 310 So.
2d at 889, it is no part of a jury's role to decide whether
language in a letter reputed to be a contract for the purchase
of real estate is sufficiently definite for a court to
enforce.
For these reasons, the trial court did not err in
entering a summary judgment on the breach-of-contract and
quiet-title claims.  That judgment disposed of PRS II's
complaint in a manner favorable to PRS II and disposed of
counts one, two, and a portion of count three of the counter-
complaint in a manner adverse to White Sands and Rolison,
effectively resolving all issues regarding title to Pilot
Town.
1070050
Sterling, Asfour, and PRS II do not challenge the joinder
4
of the counterclaim defendants to the interference-with-
contractual-and-business-relations 
claim, 
which 
is 
count 
three
of the counter-complaint. 
26
B. Interference with Contractual or Business Relations
Count three of the counter-complaint was a counterclaim
by White Sands against Sterling, Asfour, PRS II, and certain
fictitiously named parties, averring that White Sands "had a
valid and existing contract and business relationship" with
the Langan entities and that Sterling, Asfour, and PRS II
knowingly, 
intentionally, 
and 
wrongfully 
"interfered 
with 
said
business and/or contractual relations."  The trial court's
summary judgment disposed of this count.  According to PRS II,
Sterling, and Asfour, affirmance of the summary judgment as to
the breach-of-contract claims asserted in the counter-
complaint ipso facto resolves count three of the counter-
complaint against White Sands.   With regard to the claim for
4
interference with a contractual relationship, we agree.  
A claim of tortious interference with a contractual
relationship presupposes the existence of an enforceable
contract.  Alexander v. Petroleum Installation Co.,  695 So.
2d 30 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); Birmingham Television Corp. v.
DeRamus, 502 So. 2d 761 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).  As the Group
1070050
27
points out, however, there was another claim asserted in count
three, namely, interference with a business relationship.  
It is widely recognized that tortious interference with
a contractual relationship is a claim separate and distinct
from interference with a business relationship or expectancy.
See Gross v. Lowder Realty Better Homes & Gardens, 494 So. 2d
590 (Ala. 1986); see also Korea Supply  Co. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1157, 63 P.3d 937, 952, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 29, 48 (2003); Cochran v. Mullinax , 276 Ga. App. 81,
86, 622 S.E.2d 455, 459 (2005) (interference with contract and
interference with business relations are two "separate and
distinct" torts); Health Call of Detroit v. Atrium Home &
Health Care Servs., Inc., 268 Mich. App. 83, 89, 706 N.W.2d
843, 848 (2005); Trau-Med of America, Inc. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 701 (Tenn. 2002).
The Group further argues correctly that the absence of a
valid contract is not fatal to their claim of tortious
interference with a business relationship.  See Britt/Paulk
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Vandroff Ins. Agency, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1575, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ("Proof of a valid and enforceable
contract is not required as an element of a cause of action
1070050
28
for tortious interference with business relations."), aff'd,
Britt/Paulk v. Vandroff Ins., 137 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 1998);
see also IBP, Inc. v. Hady Enters., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d
1148, 1164 (N.D. Fla.); Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton,
463 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1985); O'Brien v. State Street Bank &
Trust Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 83, 401 N.E.2d 1356, 37 Ill. Dec.
263 (1980); United Educ. Distribs., LLC v. Educational Testing
Serv., 350 S.C. 7, 564 S.E.2d 324 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (the
protectable business "expectation need not be based on an
enforceable contract").  
"The two torts are initially distinguished by their
primary elements -- one tort deals with the interference with
a fixed-term contract that is already in existence; the other
tort deals with 'mere expectancies.'  The latter element
determines which interests along the continuum of business
dealings are protected."  Orrin K. Ames III, Tortious
Interference 
with 
Business 
Relationships: 
The 
Changing
Contours of this Commercial Tort, 35 Cumb. L. Rev. 317, 330
(2004-2005) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
"The [summary-judgment] movant has the initial burden of
making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of
1070050
29
material fact; if the movant makes that showing, the burden
then shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence
of each element of the claim challenged by the movant."
Harper v. Winston County, 892 So. 2d 346, 349 (Ala. 2004)
(emphasis added).   However, if the movant does not satisfy
his initial burden, "then he is not entitled to judgment. No
defense to an insufficient showing is required." Ray v.
Midfield Park, Inc., 293 Ala. 609, 612, 308 So. 2d 686, 688
(1975) (emphasis added).  "A motion that does not comply with
Rule 56(c)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] does not require a response in
defense from the nonmovant."  Horn v. Fadal Machining Ctrs.,
LLC, 972 So. 2d 63, 70 (Ala. 2007).  Simply stated, "'[a]
summary judgment is not proper if the movant has not complied
with the requirements of Rule 56.'"  972 So. 2d at 70 (quoting
Northwest Florida Truss, Inc. v. Baldwin County Comm'n, 782
So. 2d 274, 277 (Ala. 2000)).
The brief in support of the summary-judgment motion in
this case included an argument under the following heading:
"PRS II did not wrongfully interfere with a contractual
relationship of White Sands."  (Emphasis added.)  The entire
thrust of the subsequent 2½-page analysis was that the absence
1070050
30
of a "valid enforceable contract" barred recovery.  The motion
also argued that White Sands could not recover because it had
named PRS II in the specific-performance claim, stating: "If
PRS II is a party to the contract, as alleged, there could be
no wrongful interference."  
Moreover, in this Court, PRS II and the Langan entities
attempt to discount the Group's interference-with-a-business-
relationship claim, stating: "White Sands attempts to argue
that even if there is no contract, there is ... interference
with business relations.  Such a theory stretches the
imagination.  The only business relation between Langan
Development and White Sands was the [Valentine] Letter.
Because the [Valentine] Letter is not a contract, there can be
no interference."  Appellees' brief, at 37-38 (emphasis
added).  Nowhere in their motion for a partial summary
judgment -- or in their brief to this Court -- do these
appellees 
acknowledge 
interference 
with 
a 
business
relationship or expectancy as a distinct tort.  A summary-
judgment movant does not discharge his initial burden to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of a nonmovant's
claim by simply ignoring the claim.   
1070050
31
For these reasons, the burden never shifted to the Group
to present evidence or an argument in support of their
interference-with-a-business-relationship claim.  Because PRS
II and the Langan entities did not satisfy their burden under
Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., the trial court erred in entering a
judgment in their favor on count three of the counter-
complaint to the extent it disposed of the interference-with-
a-business-relationship claim against PRS II and the Langan
entities.
Likewise, to the extent that the summary judgment
disposed of the interference-with-a-business-relationship
claim against Sterling and Asfour, the trial court also erred.
Sterling and Asfour moved for a summary judgment on count
three of the counter-complaint.  In so doing, however, they
merely "incorporat[ed] by reference the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment filed on May 18, 2007, by [PRS II and the
Langan entities], ... including but not limited to [their] ...
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment."  In other
words, Sterling and Asfour confined themselves to the
arguments made by PRS II and the Langan entities.  Because
those arguments were insufficient to shift the burden to White
1070050
32
Sands as to PRS II and the Langan entities, they similarly
failed to shift the burden to White Sands to present evidence
or 
arguments 
in 
support 
of 
their 
interference-with-a-business-
relationship claim against Asfour and Sterling.  Thus, the
Group correctly argues that the judgment is due to be reversed
insofar as it relates to the interference-with-a-business-
relationship claim against Asfour and Sterling.  
IV. The Dismissal of Counts Four and Five
The trial court dismissed counts four and five of the
counter-complaint based on the counterclaim defendants'
arguments 
that 
the 
counter-complaint 
improperly 
joined
Rolison, Sterling, Asfour, P&M, and the Langan entities, who
were not parties to the complaint. 
A. Count Four -- Rolison's Claim 
In count four, Rolison, as a new counterclaim plaintiff,
averred that he had entered into a contract with Sterling,
Asfour, and P&M "for the payment of $800,000.00 for the
performance of certain services," and that they had breached
that contract.  It was the Rolison contract that allegedly
contemplated Rolison's construction of facilities called for
in the Pilot Town contract.  Count four was, therefore, a
1070050
33
breach-of-contract claim against Sterling, Asfour, and P&M,
none of whom was a party to the original action.
The Group contends that the joinder of the new parties
and claims is authorized by Ala. R. Civ. P. 13(h). We
disagree. Rule 13(h) states: "Persons other than those made
parties to the original action may be made parties to a
counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance with the provisions
of Rules 19 and 20." 
It is well settled that Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(h) "only
authorizes the court to join additional persons in order to
adjudicate a counterclaim or cross-claim that already is
before the court or one that is being asserted at the same
time the addition of a nonparty is sought."  FDIC v. Bathgate,
27 F.3d 850, 873 (3d Cir. 1994).  "This means that a
counterclaim or cross-claim may not be directed solely against
persons who are not already parties to the original action,
but must involve at least one existing party."  Id. (emphasis
added).  See also Various Markets, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 908 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1995); 6 Charles A.
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1435, at 271 (1990) (under Rule 13(h), "a
1070050
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended on
5
April 30, 2007, to be effective December 1, 2007.  Rule 13(h)
now reads: "Rules 19 and 20 govern the addition of a person as
a party to a counterclaim or crossclaim."  According to the
Advisory Committee Notes, "[t]he language of Rule 13 [was]
amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to
make them more easily understood and to make style and
terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are
intended to be stylistic only."
34
counterclaim or cross-claim may not be directed solely against
persons who are not already parties to the original action,
but must involve at least one existing party").  
These interpretations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(h) were
generated at a time when that rule read exactly as the Alabama
version of the rule reads, i.e., the federal rule "provid[ed]
that 'persons other than those made parties to the original
action may be made parties to a counter-claim or cross-claim
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 19 and 20.'" Fed. R.
Civ. P. 13(h), quoted in Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra, §
1434, at 263.   "Federal cases construing the Federal Rules of
5
Civil Procedure are persuasive authority in construing the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure because the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure were patterned after the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."  Ex parte BASF Corp., 957 So. 2d 1104, 1107
n.2 (Ala. 2006). 
1070050
35
Rule 13(h) does not authorize the joinder of Rolison's
breach-of-contract claim against Sterling, Asfour, and P&M,
because none of them was a party to the original action and
because Rolison does not assert his breach-of-contract claim
against any of the original parties, namely, White Sands,
Valentine, and PRS II.  In other words, Rolison's claim fails
because it does not "involve at least one existing party."
Bathgate, 27 F.3d at 873 (emphasis added).  
For 
the 
first 
time 
on 
appeal, 
the 
Group 
argues
alternatively that "even if the [joinder] was improper ...,
the only proper remedy would be to sever the actions, and not
to randomly dismiss [the] two counts."  Reply brief, at 31
(emphasis added).  It is well known that "we cannot reverse
the judgment of the trial court based on an argument not made
below and urged for the first time on appeal."  Singleton v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 928 So. 2d 280, 285 (Ala. 2005).
It is equally well settled "that  a party may not induce
an error by the trial court and then attempt to win a reversal
based on that error.  'A party may not predicate an argument
for reversal on "invited error," that is, "error into which he
has led or lulled the trial court."'"  Mobile Infirmary Med.
1070050
36
Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So. 2d 801, 808 (Ala. 2003) (quoting
Atkins v. Lee, 603 So. 2d 937, 945 (Ala. 1992), quoting in
turn Dixie Highway Express, Inc. v. Southern Ry., 286 Ala.
646, 651, 244 So. 2d 591, 595 (1971)).  If there was error in
dismissing count four, it was invited when White Sands and
Rolison responded to the counterclaim defendants' motions to
dismiss or, in the alternative, to sever the counterclaims,
with the argument that the "severance position [had] no
merit."  For these reasons, we refuse to reverse the judgment
dismissing count four of the counter-complaint.
B. Count Five - Conspiracy Claim
Against Fictitiously Named Parties
 
Count five of the counter-complaint represents a claim by
White Sands against "fictitious counterclaim defendants 11-
23," averring that they "conspired with each other and/or
with" other counterclaim defendants, including PRS II, "to
intentionally interfere with the contract and business
relations of [White Sands]."  (Emphasis added.)
To be sure, the fictitiously named parties share the
interference claim in count three with PRS II, an original
party.  However, Rule 13(h) authorizes joinder only where the
requirements of Rule 19 or Rule 20 are also satisfied.  It is
1070050
37
unclear which of these rules the Group regards as a basis for
joinder.  The Group does not contend that all, or any, of the
fictitiously named parties are "persons needed for just
adjudication," as required by Rule 19.  Nor does the Group
attempt to demonstrate how the requirements of Rule 20 are
satisfied. 
More specifically, Rule 20(a) authorizes joinder of all
persons "in one action as defendants if there is asserted
against them ... any right to  relief in respect of or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all defendants will arise in the action."  (Emphasis
added.)  Proper joinder requires satisfaction of both prongs
of Rule 20(a).  Ex parte Novartis Pharms. Corp., [Ms. 1060224,
June 1, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2007).
"This Court has previously stated that 'there is no
absolute rule for determining what constitutes "a series of
transactions or occurrences" [under Rule 20].  Generally, that
is determined on a case by case basis and is left to the
discretion of the trial judge.'"  Novartis, ___ So. 2d at ___
(quoting Ex parte Rudolph, 515 So. 2d 704, 706 (Ala. 1987)
1070050
38
(emphasis added)).  See also 7 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.
Miller, & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1652,
at 396 (3d ed. 2001).
However, the Group offers no such analysis.  It does not
attempt to define the transactional relationship or to
identify the common legal or factual questions that, together,
would be necessary under Rule 20(a) to sustain the joinder of
the fictitiously named parties in count five.  Its discussion
of count five contains no citation to relevant caselaw and no
factual analysis.  Indeed, its argument essentially consists
of the statement that the dismissal of the count was
"nonsensical."  Group's brief, at 36.  Consequently, the
Group's briefs do not contain the legal and factual analysis
necessary to comply with Ala. R. App. P. 28(a)(10).
Rule 28(a)(10) requires that arguments in briefs contain
discussions of facts and relevant legal authorities that
support the party's position.  If they do not, the arguments
are waived.  Moore v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd.
P'ship, 849 So. 2d 914, 923 (Ala. 2002); Arrington v. Mathis,
929 So.2d 468, 470 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); Hamm v. State,
913 So.2d 460, 486 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).  "This is so,
1070050
39
because '"it is not the function of this Court to do a party's
legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a
party based on undelineated general propositions not supported
by sufficient authority or argument."'"  Jimmy Day Plumbing &
Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007) (quoting
Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20 (Ala. 2003), quoting
in turn Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251
(Ala. 1994)).  Because we do not address the Group's arguments
regarding the dismissal of count five, the trial court's
judgment of dismissal as to that count is affirmed.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, the judgment dismissing counts four and
five of the counter-complaint is affirmed.  The summary
judgment in favor of the Langan entities is affirmed.  The
summary judgment in favor of PRS II is affirmed as it relates
(1) to the complaint, (2) to count two of the counter-
complaint, and (3) to the interference-with-contractual-
relations claim in count three of the counter-complaint.  The
summary judgment in favor of Sterling and Asfour is affirmed
as it relates to the interference-with-contractual-relations
claim in count three of the counter-complaint.  However, the
1070050
40
summary judgment in favor of Sterling, Asfour, and PRS II as
it relates to the interference-with-a-business-relationship
claim in count three of the counter-complaint is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.