Case Title: JOSEPH MILLER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOSEPH MILLER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 92138 P.3d 688Case Number: 05-98, 99Decided: 07/28/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JOSEPH 
MILLER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, 
Deputy Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL,* KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
* Chief Justice at time of expedited 
conference

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Joseph 
Miller entered pleas of "no contest" to one count of third degree sexual assault 
and one count of aggravated assault and battery on a pregnant woman.  Miller claims that his pleas were not 
knowingly and voluntarily entered and he therefore faults the district court for 
denying his pre-sentence motion to withdraw those pleas.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Miller presents 
the following issue for our review:

 
 
Whether 
the trial court erred in accepting Appellant's guilty pleas?[1]

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issue as follows:

 
 
Whether 
the trial court properly accepted Appellant's no contest pleas and whether it 
abused its discretion in later refusing to allow Appellant to withdraw the 
pleas?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On January 14, 
2004, Miller was charged with one count of third degree sexual assault stemming 
from an incident in which Miller allegedly kissed and fondled an ex-girlfriend 
without her consent in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  While out on 
bond on that charge, Miller was charged on March 12, 2004, with aggravated 
assault and battery on a pregnant woman in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2005).  
The latter charge arose from an incident in November of 2003 in which 
Miller allegedly punched his pregnant girlfriend in the face, resulting in a 
bloody nose, swollen jaw and cheek, a chipped tooth, and a cut on her 
tongue.  

 
 
[¶4]      Miller initially 
pled not guilty to the charges.  
Following plea negotiations, a plea agreement was reached and a change of 
plea hearing was held before the district court on June 3, 2004.  At that hearing, defense counsel 
explained that Miller was willing to plead guilty to both charges in exchange 
for the State's recommendation that Miller be sentenced to concurrent terms of 
imprisonment of five to seven years on the sexual assault charge and three to 
five years on the aggravated assault and battery charge.  Counsel also informed the district court 
that Miller would stipulate, for purposes of a factual basis, to the facts 
presented in the affidavit of probable cause in each case.  After some discussion between the 
district court and counsel concerning the propriety of such a stipulation, 
defense counsel requested that Miller be permitted to enter pleas of no contest 
on each charge.  The district court 
agreed after ensuring that Miller understood the nature and consequences of the 
no contest pleas, including the potential penalties attendant to those 
pleas.  The district court then 
informed Miller that it was not bound by the sentencing recommendation contained 
in the agreement and that, if it rejected the recommendation after reviewing the 
presentence report, he would not be permitted to withdraw his pleas.  Miller indicated his understanding of 
the court's advisements and stated that he still desired to change his 
pleas.  Thereafter, Miller formally 
pled no contest to the charges, and the State provided a factual basis for 
Miller's pleas, which Miller did not contest.  

 
 
[¶5]      On July 8, 2004, 
prior to sentencing, Miller obtained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw 
his no contest pleas.  In his 
motion, Miller alleged that he was forced to enter the pleas, that he was not 
legally advised of possible defenses to the charges and the consequences of his 
pleas and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered pursuant to 
the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions.  After hearing, the district court denied 
Miller's motion.  Miller was 
sentenced on February 17, 2005, to the terms of imprisonment contemplated by the 
plea agreement.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      Withdrawal of a 
guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere before sentencing requires a defendant to 
show a fair and just reason.  
W.R.Cr.P. 32(d).2  We review a district court's decision on 
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion.  Major v. State, 2004 WY 4, ¶ 12, 83 P.3d 468, 473 (Wyo. 2004).  In deciding 
whether or not the trial court abused its discretion, we must "determine whether 
the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its 
ruling was arbitrary or capricious."  
Ingersoll v. State, 2004 WY 
102, ¶ 12, 96 P.3d 1046, 1050 (Wyo. 2004).  
We give deference to the trial court's findings of fact on a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  McCard v. State, 2003 WY 142, ¶ 8, 78 P.3d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Despite the 
phrasing of the issue, Miller's argument is focused on the district court's 
denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his no contest pleas.  Miller assails the district court for 
denying his motion and entering a judgment of conviction against him, alleging 
that his pleas were not voluntary.  
Miller claims he was coerced into pleading no contest by his defense 
attorney and that he was not properly advised of the consequences of his pleas 
and possible defenses to the charges against him.3  The 
district court's factual findings include:

 
 
1.         
That [Miller's] claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
from his assigned attorney, Jose Bustos, has no merit.  Mr. Bustos' testimony as to his 
representation of [Miller] reveals that [Miller] received adequate advice from 
counsel as to the implications of his plea[s] of no 
contest[.]

 
 
2.         
That the Court's record of change of plea proceedings reflects [Miller's] 
acknowledgement that his plea was entered voluntarily, that he was not under 
coercion of threats or any promises not recited into the record, and that he 
understood the consequences of that plea, including the maximum penalties for 
both charges, and that should the Court not accept the Plea Agreement, [Miller] 
would not be allowed to withdraw his plea[s].  

 
 
[¶8]      After careful 
review of the entire record, we find that the district court's factual findings 
are not clearly erroneous.  At the 
motion hearing, Miller testified that he was innocent and that he only pled no 
contest because counsel pressured him into doing so.  Miller testified that he was given only 
two minutes to review and sign the plea agreement, that Mr. Bustos spent less 
than ten minutes with him discussing the plea agreement, and that generally Mr. 
Bustos never adequately explained the case and the consequences of the 
pleas.  Miller also presented 
testimony from the alleged victim of the aggravated assault charge to the effect 
that Miller never assaulted her as she originally claimed. 

 
 
[¶9]      On the other 
hand, Mr. Bustos testified at the motion hearing that he thoroughly discussed 
the case with Miller and explained the nature and consequences of the plea 
agreement.  Mr. Bustos testified 
that he left the written plea agreement with Miller for one to three days and, 
in addition, supplied Miller with a three-page document that outlined the case 
and provided an assessment of Miller's chances at trial and a recommendation to 
accept the plea agreement.  Mr. 
Bustos testified that he provided Miller the three-page document approximately 
three weeks prior to the change of plea hearing.  Additionally, Mr. Bustos detailed his 
rationale for suggesting that Miller accept the plea agreement.  Mr. Bustos explained that the victim's 
recantation would probably have no effect on the outcome of the trial because 
there was an eyewitness to the event.  
Mr. Bustos was also concerned that Miller might qualify as a habitual 
offender and that other charges might be filed against him.  Lastly, Bustos flatly denied pressuring 
Miller into accepting the plea agreement and changing his pleas.  

 
 
[¶10]   It is for the district court to 
resolve any conflicts in the evidence.  
In this instance, the district court obviously did not believe Miller's 
protestations that he entered his pleas involuntarily.  The district court's determination is 
further supported by what occurred at the change of plea hearing.  Our independent review of the record 
reveals that the district court complied with the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11. 
 The district court comprehensively 
discussed with Miller the nature and consequences of the no contest pleas, 
including the potential penalties associated with those pleas, and the rights he 
would be relinquishing if the court accepted the pleas.  The record is clear that Miller 
understood the court's advisements and that he entered his pleas with full 
awareness of the consequences.  
Miller explicitly acknowledged that his pleas were voluntary and not the 
product of coercion, promises or improper inducements.  Taking all of the testimony at the 
hearing into account, as well as what transpired at the change of plea hearing, 
denying Miller's motion to withdraw his pleas was a sound exercise of the 
district court's discretion.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶11]   The district court thoroughly 
considered the testimony presented at the motion hearing and explored the 
circumstances surrounding the entry of Miller's no contest pleas.  It is evident from the record that the 
district court properly accepted Miller's pleas in the first instance and that 
Miller failed to demonstrate a fair and just reason for withdrawing his 
pleas.  We find no reason to 
overturn the district court's decision denying Miller's motion to withdraw his 
pleas.  Affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We assume 
Miller is referring to his "no contest" pleas since he did not plead guilty to 
the instant charges.

 
 

2For purposes 
of appellate review, a nolo contendere (no contest) plea is functionally 
equivalent to a guilty plea.  Becker v. State, 2002 WY 126, ¶ 11, 53 P.3d 94, 98 (Wyo. 2002).

  

3We note that 
Miller has not mentioned, let alone addressed, the seven factors we set forth in 
Frame v. State, 2001 WY 72, ¶ 7, 29 P.3d 86, 89 (Wyo. 2001), as pertinent to the exercise of a trial court's 
discretion in deciding whether to grant a presentence motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea.  Consequently, we will 
not analyze the propriety of the court's decision in the context of those seven 
factors.