Case Title: Payne-Elliott v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 22S-CP-00302

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2022-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 22S-CP-302 
Joshua Payne-Elliott, 
Appellant, 
–v–
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., 
Appellee. 
Argued: June 28, 2022 | Decided: August 31, 2022 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court 
No. 49D01-1907-PL-27728 
The Honorable Lance D. Hamner, Special Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 21A-CP-936 
Opinion by Justice Slaughter 
Justice Massa concurs. 
Justices David and Goff concur in the judgment. 
Chief Justice Rush not participating. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Aug 31 2022, 10:54 am
 
 
 
 
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Slaughter, Justice. 
Religious freedom protected by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution encompasses the right of religious institutions “to 
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church 
government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Our Lady of Guadalupe 
Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020) (quoting Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 
(1952)). This principle, known as the church-autonomy doctrine, see, e.g., 
Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. 
2003), applies in this case and requires its dismissal under Indiana Trial 
Rule 12(B)(6). 
I 
Joshua Payne-Elliott sued the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 
Indianapolis, Inc., in the Marion Superior Court. His complaint, which 
included attachments as exhibits, asserts claims against the archdiocese 
for intentional interference with his contract and employment with 
Cathedral High School, a Catholic school in Indianapolis. He claims the 
interference was “not justified”.   
More specifically, he alleges as follows. Cathedral, founded in 1918, 
was initially owned by the archdiocese, which later turned over care of 
Cathedral to the Brothers of Holy Cross. Cathedral was incorporated in 
1972 “for the sole purpose of maintaining and operating a Roman Catholic 
secondary school.” In substance, Cathedral’s bylaws state as follows: “the 
essential Holy Cross character of Cathedral as a Catholic high school shall 
be at all times maintained and [] a mission priority is to be an educator in 
the faith.” The archdiocese exercises “significant control” over Cathedral, 
including “its recognition of Cathedral as a Catholic school.”   
From 2006 until June 2019, Cathedral employed Payne-Elliott as a 
world-language and social-studies teacher under a contract that was 
renewed annually. Payne-Elliott, “a homosexual male”, married his same-
sex spouse in 2017; his spouse teaches at Brebeuf Jesuit Preparatory 
School, also in Indianapolis. Cathedral continued renewing Payne-Elliott’s 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CP-302 | August 31, 2022 
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teacher contract through May 2019 for the 2019–2020 school year. The 
archdiocese knew about Payne-Elliott’s contract with Cathedral.  
In June 2019, Brebeuf announced that despite pressure from the 
archdiocese, it would not fire Payne-Elliott’s spouse. Brebeuf explained it 
declined the archdiocese’s directive that Brebeuf dismiss the spouse “due 
to the teacher being a spouse within a civilly-recognized same-sex 
marriage.” The next day, Archbishop Charles C. Thompson issued a 
decree stating that, after extensive dialogue between the archdiocese and 
Brebeuf, the archdiocese no longer recognizes Brebeuf as a Catholic 
institution. The decree states that, in accord with Canon 803 of the 1983 
Code of Canon Law, Brebeuf, “by its own selection, can no longer use the 
name Catholic and will no longer be identified or recognized as a Catholic 
institution by the Archdiocese of Indianapolis nor included in the listing 
of The Official Catholic Directory.” The decree explains that the 
archbishop accepted and respected a school’s right and responsibility to 
make decisions, but that it is his “canonical responsibility to oversee faith 
and morals as related to Catholic identity within the Archdiocese of 
Indianapolis” and that Brebeuf “ha[d] chosen not to implement changes in 
accord with the doctrine and pastoral practice of the Catholic Church[.]”  
The complaint alleges further that the archdiocese gave Cathedral the 
same directive it gave Brebeuf. Cathedral chose differently. On June 23, 
2019, Cathedral’s president informed Payne-Elliott that, according to this 
directive, Cathedral was terminating his employment. The president 
stated that the sole reason for his firing was that “the Archbishop directed 
that we [Cathedral] can’t have someone with a public same-sex marriage 
here and remain Catholic.”   
Cathedral then posted a letter addressed to the “Cathedral Family” on 
its website. The letter stated, in part, that “after 22 months of earnest 
discussion and extensive dialogue” between Cathedral and the 
archdiocese, “Archbishop Thompson made it clear that Cathedral’s 
continued employment of a teacher in a public, same-sex marriage would 
result in our forfeiting our Catholic identity due to our employment of an 
individual living in contradiction to Catholic teaching on marriage.” It 
continued: “Cathedral has been a Catholic school for the past 100 years 
 
 
 
 
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and our Catholic faith is at the core of who we are and what we teach at 
Cathedral. We are committed to educating our students in the tenets of 
the Catholic faith[.]” It stated further that “to remain a Catholic Holy 
Cross School, Cathedral must follow the direct guidance given to us by 
Archbishop Thompson and separate from the teacher.” During oral 
argument, Payne-Elliott’s counsel told us that his client “threatened” to 
sue Cathedral for breach of contract, and Cathedral settled. 
Payne-Elliott then sued the archdiocese, which moved to dismiss the 
complaint and invoked three First Amendment defenses, including the 
church-autonomy doctrine. The trial court initially denied the motion to 
dismiss, but later it reconsidered and dismissed with prejudice for failure 
to state a claim under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) and lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction under Rule 12(B)(1). Payne-Elliott appealed, and the court of 
appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Payne-Elliott v. 
Roman Cath. Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., 180 N.E.3d 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2021), reh’g denied.  
We heard oral argument on the archdiocese’s transfer petition, which 
we grant today, thus vacating the appellate opinion.  
II 
 To begin, we agree with Payne-Elliott that the trial court erred by 
dismissing under Rule 12(B)(1), which allows dismissal for “[l]ack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter”. Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(1). In 
determining whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, we ask 
whether the action or claim falls within the general scope of authority 
conferred upon the court by the constitution or by statute. State v. Reinhart, 
112 N.E.3d 705, 711‒12 (Ind. 2018) (citing State ex rel. Young v. Noble Cir. 
Ct., 263 Ind. 353, 356, 332 N.E.2d 99, 101 (1975)). A court with general 
authority to hear matters like employment disputes is not ousted of 
subject-matter jurisdiction just because the defendant asserts a religious 
defense. Brazauskas, 796 N.E.2d at 290.   
Thus, we turn to consider Trial Rule 12(B)(6) as the trial court’s 
alternative basis for dismissal. A 12(B)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency 
of the plaintiff’s claim, not the facts supporting it. Bellwether Properties, 
 
 
 
 
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LLC v. Duke Energy Indiana, Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 466 (Ind. 2017) (citing 
Thornton v. State, 43 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2015)). Dismissal under 12(B)(6) 
is not proper “unless it appears to a certainty on the face of the complaint 
that the complaining party is not entitled to any relief.” Id. (quoting State 
v. American Family Voices, Inc., 898 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ind. 2008)). We review 
a 12(B)(6) dismissal anew, giving no deference to the trial court’s 
judgment. Id. (citing Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC v. Nat'l Trust Ins. Co., 3 
N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014)). A reviewing court takes the complaint’s 
allegations as true and considers them in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, drawing every reasonable inference in that party’s 
favor. Id. (citing Veolia Water, 3 N.E.3d at 4–5). Dismissal under Rule 
12(B)(6) is rarely appropriate when the asserted ground for dismissal is an 
affirmative defense; but where a plaintiff has pleaded himself out of court 
by alleging, and thus admitting, the essential elements of a defense, his 
complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Id. at 464. 
Here, as grounds for dismissal, the archdiocese asserted three 
affirmative defenses: church autonomy, freedom of expressive association, 
and the ministerial exception. Based on the complaint and its attachments, 
we hold that Payne-Elliott has pleaded all elements of the archdiocese’s 
church-autonomy defense. Because the archdiocese is entitled to dismissal 
on this ground, we need not pass on its other two defenses.  
Brazauskas guides our church-autonomy analysis. Brazauskas sued a 
diocese and a priest for blacklisting and for tortiously interfering with a 
business relationship. Brazauskas, 796 N.E.2d at 288. She alleged the 
defendants prevented her from obtaining a job at the University of Notre 
Dame, a Catholic university, by truthfully informing its president (a 
Catholic priest) about her pre-existing employment lawsuit against the 
defendants. Brazauskas, 796 N.E.2d at 288, 291‒92. The defendants asserted 
a defense under the church-autonomy doctrine. We explained:  
This doctrine deals with a church’s First Amendment right to 
autonomy in “making decisions regarding [its] own internal 
affairs,” including matters of faith, doctrine, and internal 
governance. [Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 
F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002)]. 
 
 
 
 
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The Bryce court cited Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 
94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952), in which the Supreme 
Court applied the First Amendment and struck down a statute 
that reassigned control over a cathedral among church officials. 
In Kedroff, the Court said that religious freedom encompasses 
“an independence from secular control or manipulation, in 
short, power [of churches] to decide for themselves, free from 
state interference, matters of church government as well as 
those of faith and doctrine.” Id. at 116-17, 73 S.Ct. 143. 
Id. at 293; see Dwenger v. Geary, 113 Ind. 106, 115, 14 N.E. 903, 908 (1888) 
(“No power save that of the church can rightfully declare who is a 
Catholic. The question is purely one of church government and discipline, 
and must be determined by the proper ecclesiastical authorities.”). Thus, 
we rejected Brazauskas’s claim because to allow it to proceed would 
violate the church-autonomy doctrine. Brazauskas, 796 N.E.2d at 294.  
This doctrine’s vital protection for religious institutions is not 
unlimited, however. Brazauskas also explained that the “First Amendment 
does not immunize every legal claim against a religious institution and its 
members”, and that the analysis in each case “is fact-sensitive and claim 
specific, requiring an assessment of every issue raised in terms of 
doctrinal and administrative intrusion and entanglement.” Id. at 293–94 
(quoting McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 844 (N.J. 2002)). In other words, 
the church-autonomy doctrine does not provide an automatic per se 
defense simply because a religious organization invokes it. And Brazauskas 
explained further that criminal conduct is not protected by the church-
autonomy doctrine—even if carried out using communications about 
church doctrine or policy. Id. at 294 n.6.   
In sum, Brazauskas teaches that under the church-autonomy doctrine a 
civil court may not (1) penalize via tort law (2) a communication or 
coordination among church officials or members (3) on a matter of 
internal church policy or administration that (4) does not culminate in a 
criminal act. Id. at 294, 294 n.6. Here, based on the complaint’s allegations, 
the church-autonomy doctrine bars the case. First, the complaint alleges 
tort claims, i.e., intentional interference with contract and employment.   
 
 
 
 
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Second, the complaint rests on communications between church 
officials and members, here the archbishop and Cathedral. It alleges that 
the archdiocese “directed” Cathedral to fire Payne-Elliott in accordance 
with the archbishop’s “directive”; that the archbishop “directed” 
Cathedral that it could not have Payne-Elliott on staff and remain 
Catholic; that the archbishop “made it clear” that if Cathedral were to 
continue to employ Payne-Elliott, it would forfeit its status as a Catholic 
school; and that Cathedral must “follow the direct guidance given to us by 
[the] Archbishop”. 
Third, the archdiocese’s decision whether a school maintains its 
Catholic identity is an internal matter that concerns both church policy 
and administration. The gist of Payne-Elliott’s claims is communication 
between the archbishop and Cathedral, a Catholic school, over a matter 
involving church discipline and doctrine: whether and when the 
archdiocese would continue to recognize Cathedral as Catholic is at the 
heart of the communication (i.e., the “directive” to Cathedral). The 
complaint and attachments show the directive was, like the one to 
Brebeuf, a choice the archdiocese gave Cathedral. It could either retain its 
recognition as a Catholic school by following the archdiocese’s instruction 
on what was required to be recognized as a Catholic school or forfeit 
continued recognition. This choice reflects the archdiocese’s authority to 
declare which schools are Catholic, consistent with Dwenger.  
Fourth, the complaint does not allege the archdiocese’s tortious conduct 
ended in a criminal act. Thus, Payne-Elliott’s complaint establishes the 
church-autonomy defense and requires dismissal for much the same 
reason Brazauskas lost.  
Payne-Elliott also argues the trial court had no basis for reversing its 
original ruling that denied the motion to dismiss.  Substantively, the basis 
is Rule 12(B)(6). And, procedurally, the court had authority to “reconsider 
previous orders in the case” while the case remained in fieri, or pending 
resolution. State ex rel. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Marion 
Superior Ct., 160 N.E.3d 182, 183 (Ind. 2020) (citing Matter of Est. of Lewis, 
123 N.E.3d 670, 673 (Ind. 2019)). 
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Finally, we note that when a motion to dismiss is sustained under Rule 
12(B)(6), “the pleading may be amended once as of right pursuant to 
[Trial] Rule 15(A) within ten [10] days after service of notice of the court’s 
order sustaining the motion[.]” T.R. 12(B). The archdiocese observes 
correctly that Payne-Elliott did not amend within ten days. But this 
omission is not fatal here because, on this record, it would have been futile 
for the plaintiff to have amended his complaint. This is so because the trial 
court dismissed Payne-Elliott’s claims under Rules 12(B)(6) and 12(B)(1), 
which means that an amended complaint that actually stated a claim 
would have still failed on jurisdictional grounds, under the trial court’s 
judgment. Thus, we modify the trial court’s dismissal under Rule 12(B)(6) 
to allow leave to amend. 
*          *          *
For these reasons, we hold that dismissal under Rule 12(B)(1) was 
improper. But because the complaint shows the church-autonomy 
doctrine bars Payne-Elliott’s claims, we affirm the judgment of dismissal 
under Rule 12(B)(6) but modify it to reflect the dismissal is without 
prejudice.    
Massa, J., concurs. 
David and Goff, JJ., concur in the judgment. 
Rush, C.J., not participating. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Kathleen A. DeLaney 
Matthew R. Gutwein 
Christopher S. Stake 
DeLaney & DeLaney LLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CP-302 | August 31, 2022 
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A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
John S. (Jay) Mercer 
Paul J. Carroll 
Wooton Hoy, LLC 
Greenfield, Indiana 
Luke W. Goodrich 
Daniel H. Blomberg 
Joseph C. Davis 
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 
Washington, D.C.  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  A M IC I CU R IA E C O NST I TU TI O NA L L A W 
S C H OLA R S  
Stephen M. Judge 
Paul Edgar Harold 
SouthBank Legal: LaDue | Curran | Kuehn 
South Bend, Indiana  
A TT O R N E Y F O R  AMI C I CU R IAE  E PA R CH Y  O F O U R LA D Y OF  
L EB AN O N O F  L OS  AN G E LES  & T HE O R TH O D O X  C HU R C H IN  
A ME R IC A  
John A. Meiser 
Notre Dame Law School Religious Liberty Clinic   
Notre Dame, Indiana  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AM IC US CU R IA E LAM B DA LE G AL D E FEN SE  & 
E D UC AT I O N FU N D, I NC .  
Gregory R. Nevins 
Decatur, Georgia 
Jeanine Kerridge 
Jeffrey M. Barron 
Kara M. Kapke 
Peter J. Rusthoven 
Barnes & Thornburg LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CP-302 | August 31, 2022 
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A TT O R N E YS F O R  A M IC US CU R IA E S TAT E O F  I N DI A NA  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Thomas M. Fisher 
Solicitor General  
Julia C. Payne 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana