Case Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fischer

Citation: 2001-Ohio-156

Docket Number: 20001552

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fischer, 92 Ohio St.3d 90, 2001-Ohio-156. 
 
 
 
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. FISCHER. 
[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fischer (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 90. 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Six-month suspension with entire six months 
stayed — Intentionally stealing and lying to an investigating officer 
about the theft — Panel’s dismissal of earlier case qualifies as voluntary 
dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(2), when. 
(No. 00-1552 — Submitted December 12, 2000 — Decided June 13, 2001.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 99-42. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  While working as a blackjack dealer at a church festival in 
1997, respondent, Timothy A. Fischer of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney Registration 
No. 0009186, received a $20 bill from Ben Sublett for betting chips. Instead of 
putting the money in the till, the respondent placed it in his shirt pocket. Shortly 
thereafter he left the table.  When respondent returned to the gaming table, off-
duty police officer Rick Malone asked him about the $20, and respondent denied 
having taken it until Malone said that the bill was marked.  Respondent then 
admitted that he had taken the $20 and returned it.  Malone requested that 
respondent leave the premises and he did so. 
 
A few days later, after discovering that respondent is an attorney, Malone, 
on the advice of a local judge, reported the church festival incident to relator, 
Cincinnati Bar Association.  Relator then filed a complaint charging respondent 
with a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) by intentionally stealing and lying to an 
investigating officer about the theft. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
The matter was referred to a panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline.  The panel originally set a hearing in Columbus, but 
thirteen days before the date of the hearing the parties received notice that it 
would be held in Toledo.  Both relator and respondent filed a joint motion to 
vacate the order that the hearing be held in Toledo because all of the anticipated 
witnesses were from Cincinnati and the police officer had authority to travel to 
Columbus, but not to Toledo.  That motion was denied, as was a similar motion 
filed the day before the scheduled hearing.  Relator then submitted an “entry of 
dismissal” to the panel, which read, “Relator hereby dismisses the above 
captioned case for the reason that the witnesses cannot be presented in Toledo, 
Ohio on August 6, 1998,” and which was signed by counsel for the relator.  
Below the signature, the entry read: “It is so ordered.  This entry is dated 
_____day of August, 1998” with a signature line for the panel’s chair. 
 
The panel did not sign the entry, and the entry does not appear in the 
record. Instead, the panel entered its own order, which stated, “The Panel, based 
upon the Relator’s Dismissal and a specific finding that the Relator would not be 
able to carry its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, hereby 
dismisses the within matter.” 
 
Approximately a year after the dismissal, relator again filed a complaint 
against respondent based on the same facts and requesting the same relief.  
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Respondent 
argued that the record in the earlier case showed no “filing of a voluntary 
dismissal,” and that instead the record reflected that the earlier dismissal was for 
failure to prosecute.  Respondent reasoned that the earlier case was therefore 
dismissed on the merits and hence with prejudice.  The panel denied respondent’s 
motion and found that the panel’s earlier dismissal entry “necessarily was an 
acceptance of Relator’s voluntary dismissal” and therefore “not on the merits with 
prejudice.”  Respondent then answered, and the matter was heard by the panel. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
The panel found the facts as alleged and concluded that the respondent had 
violated DR 1-104(A)(4).  In mitigation the panel found that respondent had 
practiced law for many years, that he was experiencing psychological problems at 
the time of the incident due to a recent divorce and his adjustment to working as a 
sole practitioner, and that this was the first time that he had been the subject of 
any disciplinary action.  The panel recommended that respondent be suspended 
from the practice of law for six months with the entire six months stayed.  The 
board adopted the findings, conclusion, and recommendation of the panel. 
 
In his answer to our show cause order, respondent does not dispute the 
board’s factual findings but argues that the board erred in overruling his motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Respondent argues that the panel’s dismissal 
of the earlier case was a dismissal for failure to prosecute under Civ.R. 41(B)(1), 
and thus was a dismissal on the merits. 
 
We find that the panel dismissed the earlier case not for relator’s failure to 
prosecute, but because relator was unable to present witnesses for the hearing 
scheduled in Toledo.  When the relator has secured a witness to testify at a panel 
hearing to be held at a particular location on a specific date, but the panel changes 
the location of the hearing and refuses requests from both parties to vacate the 
order changing the location of the hearing, the relator’s inability to present its 
witness at the new location does not necessarily equate to a failure to prosecute on 
the part of the relator.  See Jones v. Hartranft (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 368, 372, 678 
N.E.2d 530, 534.  In Jones, this court noted a distinction between a party’s failure 
to secure a necessary witness at all and a party’s inability to have a witness 
available on a specific date.  Id.  Unlike the plaintiff in Jones, who failed to 
obtain a necessary expert witness to testify on any date, the relator here simply 
could not present its witness, Rick Malone, in Toledo on the date of the panel 
hearing.  Relator indicated this problem in its proposed entry of dismissal, and the 
panel entered its dismissal order “based upon the Relator’s Dismissal.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
The panel’s dismissal of the earlier case qualifies as a voluntary dismissal 
under Civ.R. 41(A)(2), which allows the panel to dismiss a case on relator’s 
request “upon such terms and conditions as the [panel] deems proper.”  At that 
time, the panel had not had an opportunity to consider the evidence in the case to 
grant a dismissal based on the merits.  Therefore, the panel necessarily issued its 
order based on relator’s proposed dismissal entry.  We find that the panel’s order 
constituted a voluntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(2), which was without 
prejudice.  Because the earlier panel’s dismissal was without prejudice, the later 
panel acted properly in overruling respondent’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. 
 
Therefore, we adopt the findings, conclusion, and recommendation of the 
board.  Respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for six months 
with the entire six months stayed.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Ernest F. McAdams, Jr., and James A. Vogele, for relator. 
 
John H. Burlew, for respondent. 
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