Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian

Citation: 2006-Ohio-6510

Docket Number: 20060779

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510.] 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. AGOPIAN. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-
6510.] 
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation—Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice 
law—Public reprimand. 
(No. 2006-0779 — Submitted August 8, 2006 — Decided December 27, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 05-079. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are called upon to determine the appropriate 
sanction for an attorney who submitted inaccurate fee bills to the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas for legal services rendered as court-appointed 
counsel to indigent criminal defendants. 
{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
adopted the panel’s sanction and recommended that the Supreme Court impose a 
one-year stayed suspension of Richard V. Agopian’s license to practice law for 
allegedly improperly billing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for 
court-appointed legal services.  After a careful review of the facts in this case, we 
reject this recommendation and conclude that the conduct here warrants a public 
reprimand. 
{¶ 3} Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint against Richard Van 
Agopian of Cleveland, Attorney Registration No. 0030924, in connection with fee 
bills he submitted to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for 
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representation of indigent defendants charged with criminal conduct.  Admitted to 
the practice of law in Ohio in 1975, Agopian has primarily represented defendants 
in criminal matters in Cuyahoga County since about 1985, and he often served as 
appointed counsel for indigent parties.  This case involves a series of fee bills he 
submitted to the court for approval primarily between the months of October 2002 
and April 2003, a period during which he represented between 30 and 40 such 
clients.  The majority of these cases involved third-, fourth-, and fifth-degree 
felonies, for which Loc.R. 33 of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga 
County, General Division, specified an hourly rate of $40 for out-of-court and $50 
for in-court representation and set a maximum fee for these felonies at $400. 
{¶ 4} Because his practice necessitated his daily appearance in court, 
Agopian would spend his weekends preparing fee bills and would approximate 
the amount of time he spent working on a particular case in drafting his fee 
requests. 
{¶ 5} In a hearing before a three-member panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Agopian stipulated that he 
submitted bills to the court that did not reflect the day upon which he rendered the 
services mentioned.  The panel found that his billing records reflected a pattern of 
recording the same number of hours to prepare and file motions in a number of 
cases regardless of the actual time spent and that he would assign those hours to a 
date regardless of whether he actually performed that work on that day.  He 
admitted that he had approximated his actual time to perform these services but 
had nevertheless certified to the court the accuracy of the information. 
{¶ 6} The panel found that Agopian submitted fee bills for work 
performed in excess of 24 hours on three days:  Saturday, October 12, 2002; 
Saturday, November 2, 2002; and Saturday, November 23, 2002.  But the reality 
is that Agopian spent those weekends in his office preparing fee bills for cases he 
had worked on during the previous weeks and months, giving the appearance that 
January Term, 2006 
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he had performed more than 24 hours of work on a given day.  Despite the 
perception, Agopian did all the work on each individual case but failed to 
accurately record the exact days of his appearances in court or the specific 
number of hours that he spent on each case.  Rather, Agopian recorded the same 
number of hours spent in motion practice and in opening each of these case files 
in an effort to obtain the $400 maximum legal fee authorized by local rule for the 
work he performed.  Despite this careless and sloppy timekeeping practice, there 
is no evidence of deceit or any course of conduct designed to collect fees for work 
not performed.  The panel found that Agopian “routinely performs services in an 
amount far in excess of the time for which he submits payment requests.”  One 
panel member noted that Agopian “wasn’t taking one hour * * * and turning it 
into three.  It looks to me like he was taking three hours and turning it into one.” 
{¶ 7} Following the hearing, the panel determined that Agopian had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and 1-102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall 
not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice 
law).  The panel recommended dismissal of the Disciplinary Counsel’s allegation 
of a third rule violation, finding no evidence that Agopian had violated DR 2-106 
(a lawyer shall not charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee). 
{¶ 8} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
adopted the panel’s recommendation and recommended a one-year stayed 
suspension of Agopian’s license to practice law. 
{¶ 9} Disciplinary Counsel objected to the board’s recommendation that 
the alleged violation of DR 2-106 be dismissed.  We overrule Disciplinary 
Counsel’s objection and accept the board’s recommendation to dismiss this 
allegation. 
{¶ 10} This court has consistently recognized that “in determining the 
appropriate length of the suspension and any attendant conditions, we must 
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recognize that the primary purpose of disciplinary sanctions is not to punish the 
offender, but to protect the public.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53; see, also, Ohio State Bar Assn. 
v. Weaver (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 97, 100, 70 O.O.2d 175, 322 N.E.2d 665.  As we 
stated in Weaver, “ ‘In [a] disciplinary matter, the primary purpose is not to 
punish an offender; it is to protect the public against members of the bar who are 
unworthy of the trust and confidence essential to the relationship of attorney and 
client; it is to ascertain whether the conduct of the attorney involved has 
demonstrated his unfitness to practice law, and if so to deprive him of his 
previously acquired privilege to serve as an officer of the court.’ ”  Id., quoting In 
re Pennica (1962), 36 N.J. 401, 418-419, 177 A.2d 721. 
{¶ 11} As the panel noted, Agopian’s conduct “did not involve the 
exploitative motive found in Disciplinary Counsel v. Holland, 106 Ohio St.3d 
372, 2005-Ohio-5322 [835 N.E.2d 361],” in which we suspended an attorney for 
one year for double billing, i.e., “ ‘billing of fees and costs to more than one client 
for the same work or the same hours.’ ”  Holland, ¶ 21, quoting Hopkins, Law 
Firms, Technology, and the Double-Billing Dilemma (1998), 12 Geo.J.Legal 
Ethics 93, 99.  Agopian did not pad his bills or charge for work he did not 
perform.  Moreover, he took full responsibility for his sloppy record keeping. 
{¶ 12} We have considered similar cases involving fees and determined a 
public reprimand to be the appropriate sanction.  In Dayton Bar Assn. v. Schram, 
98 Ohio St.3d 512, 2003-Ohio-2063, 787 N.E.2d 1184, in which an attorney 
violated DR 2-106(A) by charging a nonrefundable fee, we determined that a 
public reprimand should be imposed.  We noted Schram’s lack of a prior 
disciplinary record, her cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings, and the 
panel’s determination that she “had not intended to keep more money than she 
earned from her client.”  Id., ¶ 7. 
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5 
{¶ 13} In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Randolph (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 325, 
708 N.E.2d 192, we publicly reprimanded an attorney who violated DR 2-106(A) 
by retaining a portion of a fee he had not earned.  In so holding, we noted 
Randolph’s lack of a disciplinary record, his character letters attesting to his 
honesty and integrity, and his complete acceptance of responsibility.  The same 
considerations expressed in Schram and Randolph militate against imposing any 
sanction other than a public reprimand for Agopian’s conduct.  While we do not 
condone the billing practices employed in this case, the conduct involves neither a 
deliberate effort to deceive in order to generate funds not earned nor an effort to 
collect for services not rendered, and it is not a double-billing case. 
{¶ 14} We have also held that “mitigating evidence can justify a lesser 
sanction.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Carroll, 106 Ohio St.3d 84, 2005-Ohio-3805, 
831 N.E.2d 1000, ¶ 13.  In this case, the mitigating evidence demonstrates that 
Agopian has no prior disciplinary record, has fully cooperated with the 
disciplinary process, and has accepted responsibility for his conduct.  The panel 
received more than 40 letters attesting to his character, including one from Judge 
Janet Burnside (“I have always found him honest and forthright in all my dealings 
with him”) and two from former presidents of the Cuyahoga Criminal Defense 
Lawyers Association, David L. Grant and James M. Kersey, who attested to his 
integrity, reputation, and professionalism.  In other letters, colleagues Mark A. 
Stanton noted “an unwavering belief that Richard Agopian embodies the highest 
standards of professional excellence and integrity,” and William T. Doyle wrote 
that Agopian “always conducted himself in a very professional manner.”  This 
mitigating evidence counsels against imposing the sanction recommended in this 
case. 
{¶ 15} Weighing the mitigating factors against the conduct at issue, we 
reject the board’s recommendation that a one-year stayed suspension be imposed, 
and instead, based on the fact that Agopian has no prior disciplinary record, has 
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fully complied with the disciplinary process, and has accepted responsibility for 
his conduct, and further considering the character letters attesting to his 
reputation, integrity, and professionalism, we issue a public reprimand for the 
conduct in this case.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., O’CONNOR and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 16} I respectfully dissent.  I would impose a one-year stayed 
suspension as recommended by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, Christopher J. Weber, and Geoffrey Stern, 
for respondent. 
______________________