Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V TARAJEE SHAHEER MAYNOR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 123760

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JUNE 29, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 123760 
TARAJEE SHAHEER MAYNOR, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, J.   
The issue presented in this case is whether first­
degree child abuse1 requires the prosecution to establish 
only that defendant intended to commit an act that causes 
serious 
physical 
harm 
or 
whether 
it 
requires 
the 
prosecution to prove not only that defendant intended the 
act, but also that, by so acting, she intended to cause 
1 MCL 750.136b(2). 
This statute provides: 
A person is guilty of child abuse in the first degree if
the person knowingly or intentionally causes serious 
physical harm or serious mental harm to a child.
 Child 
abuse in the first degree is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than fifteen years. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
serious physical harm or knew that serious physical harm 
would be caused. 
We hold that, pursuant to the current language of the 
statute, first-degree child abuse requires the prosecution 
to establish, and the jury to be instructed that to convict 
it must find, not only that defendant intended to commit 
the act, but also that defendant intended to cause serious 
physical harm or knew that serious physical harm would be 
caused by her act. 
Because the Court of Appeals reached 
the same result, we affirm its decision, but for different 
reasons. 
FACTS2 
On June 28, 2002, defendant left her two children, 
Adonnis, age three, and Acacia, age ten months, in her car, 
a black Dodge Neon, while she visited a beauty salon. 
The 
children were belted in their seats, and defendant’s car 
was parked some distance from the salon, in an unshaded, 
asphalt parking lot. 
The temperature that day was in the 
eighties. 
The child-safety locks on the car were engaged, 
and the driver’s side window and possibly a rear window 
were rolled down 1 to 1½ inches. 
2 This case has not yet been tried; all facts are taken from 
the preliminary examination transcript. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
During her appointment, which lasted approximately 3½ 
hours,3 defendant had her hair washed, relaxed, and styled. 
She also had a sit-up massage, tried on a sundress, and 
purchased a snack. 
Defendant did not mention the children 
to anyone in the salon and never left the salon to check on 
the children. 
When 
defendant 
returned 
to 
her 
car 
after 
the 
appointment, her children were dead. 
Acacia was lying on 
the floorboard near the back seat, and Adonnis was lying on 
the back seat. 
The children had died of hyperthermia, or 
heat exposure. 
After discovering the children in that 
state, defendant drove around for several hours before 
driving to a hospital emergency room around 11:00 p.m. 
When initially questioned by the police, defendant 
indicated that she had been abducted and raped and that her 
children had been left in her car during the abduction. 
But when confronted by the police, she admitted that she 
had left her children in the car while she was at the 
beauty salon. 
Defendant then provided a written statement 
to the police. When asked why she made up the story about 
the abduction, she responded, “So that I wouldn’t appear to 
be a horrible person, someone who left their [sic] children 
3 The appointment started about 4:00 or 4:20 p.m. and ended
about 7:30 or 7:50 p.m. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
in a hot car.” She also stated, “I had never left them in 
the car before and I didn’t know (was too stupid to know) 
that they would die. I didn’t want them to die.” 
Defendant was charged with two counts of felony 
murder, with first-degree child abuse as the underlying 
felony. 
Following the preliminary examination, the district 
court declined to bind defendant over on the felony-murder 
charges 
and 
bound 
defendant 
over 
on 
two 
counts 
of 
involuntary manslaughter. 
The district court concluded 
that first-degree child abuse was a specific intent crime 
and that there was not sufficient evidence to establish 
probable cause to believe that defendant knowingly or 
intentionally caused her children’s deaths. 
The district 
court noted that defendant had stated that she did not 
intend to hurt her children but that she was too stupid to 
know that they would die, and that there was no evidence in 
the record to negate this statement. 
Consequently, the 
district court determined that there was insufficient 
evidence of intent to establish the underlying felony of 
first-degree child abuse. 
The prosecution moved to have the circuit court 
reinstate the felony-murder charges. 
The circuit court 
granted the prosecution’s motion, reversing the district 
court and reinstating the felony-murder charges. 
The 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
circuit court reasoned that first-degree child abuse was a 
general intent, not a specific intent, crime. 
Thus, the 
circuit court reasoned that the prosecution was required to 
establish that defendant had the intent to perform the 
physical act itself that resulted in the children’s death. 
The circuit court concluded that the prosecution had 
presented sufficient evidence that defendant intended to 
leave her children alone in the car for several hours and 
that there was probable cause to believe that defendant 
committed the crimes of first-degree child abuse and 
second-degree murder. 
Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal in the Court 
of Appeals. 
Although the Court of Appeals held, in a two­
to-one decision, that first-degree child abuse was a 
specific intent crime rather than a general intent crime, 
it affirmed the circuit court’s decision to reinstate the 
felony-murder charges because it determined that there was 
sufficient evidence of intent to find probable cause to 
believe that defendant had committed first-degree child 
abuse and, consequently, to bind defendant over on the 
felony-murder charges.4
 In so concluding, the Court of 
Appeals relied on the analysis of People v Gould, 225 Mich 
App 79; 570 NW2d 140 (1997), and further explained that the 
4 256 Mich App 238; 662 NW2d 468 (2003). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
facts belied defendant’s claim of ignorance of the risks of 
leaving her children in a hot car. 
The concurring Court of Appeals judge stated that he 
would have concluded that first-degree child abuse is a 
general intent crime rather than a specific intent crime. 
This Court granted the prosecution leave to appeal 
“limited to the issue whether it is sufficient to instruct 
the jury using the statutory language regarding intent 
(‘. . . knowingly or intentionally causes serious physical 
or serious mental harm to a child’), MCL 750.136b(2), or 
whether it is also necessary to instruct the jury regarding 
‘specific intent.’”5 
Standard of Review 
We 
review 
de 
novo 
any 
question 
of 
the 
proper 
interpretation of the underlying criminal law, including 
the intent required. 
People v Perkins, 468 Mich 448, 452; 
662 NW2d 727 (2003). 
Analysis 
When construing a statute, this Court’s goal is to 
give effect to the intent of the Legislature. 
We begin by 
construing the language of the statute itself. 
Where the 
language is unambiguous, we give the words their plain 
5 468 Mich 946 (2003). 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
meaning and apply the statute as written. 
People v 
Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 284; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). 
The child abuse statute, MCL 750.136b(2), provides: 
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
first 
degree 
if 
the 
person 
knowingly 
or 
intentionally causes serious physical harm or 
serious mental harm to a child.
 Child abuse in 
the first degree is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment 
for 
not 
more 
than 
15 
years.
[Emphasis added.] 
The prosecution contends that the italicized language only 
requires the prosecution to prove that defendant intended 
to leave her children in the car, not that she intended to 
seriously harm them by leaving them in the car. 
We 
disagree with this argument because it is contrary to the 
plain language of the statute. 
The plain language of the statute requires that to be 
convicted of first-degree child abuse, a person “knowingly 
or intentionally causes serious physical harm or serious 
mental harm to a child.” 
MCL 760.136b(2). 
The phrase 
“knowingly or intentionally” modifies the phrase “causes 
serious physical or serious mental harm to a child.” Thus, 
this language requires more from defendant than an intent 
to commit an act. 
The prosecution must prove that by 
leaving her children in the car, the defendant intended to 
cause serious physical or mental harm to the children or 
that she knew that serious mental or physical harm would be 
caused by leaving them in the car. 
The recommended 
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
standard jury instruction for first-degree child abuse, 
CJI2d 17.18, correctly focuses the jury by directing it to 
this method of analysis.6  We find it is unnecessary for the 
jury to be given further instruction on “specific intent,” 
6 CJI2d 17.18 states: 
(1) The defendant is charged with the crime
of first-degree child abuse. To prove this 
charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
[Choose (2) or (3):] 
(2) 
First, that [name defendant] is the 
[parent/guardian] of [name child]. 
(3) 
First, that [name defendant] had care 
or custody of or authority over [name child] when 
the abuse allegedly happened. 
(4) 
Second, that the defendant either 
knowingly 
or 
intentionally 
caused 
[serious
physical 
harm/serious 
mental 
harm] 
to 
[name 
child]. 
[Choose (a) or (b):] 
(a) 
By “serious physical harm” I mean any
physical injury to a child that seriously impairs
the 
child’s 
health 
or 
physical 
well-being,
including, but not limited to, brain damage, a 
skull or bone fracture, subdural hemorrhage or
hematoma, dislocation, sprain, internal injury,
poisoning, burn or scald, or severe cut. 
(b) 
By “serious mental harm” I mean an
injury to a child’s mental condition that results
in visible signs of an impairment in the child’s
judgment, behavior, ability to recognize reality,
or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life. 
(5) 
Third, that [name child] was at the time under 
the age of 18. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
such as that found in CJI2d 3.9. 
The need to draw the 
common-law distinction between “specific” and “general” 
intent is not required under the plain language of the 
statute, as long as the jury is instructed that it must 
find that defendant either knowingly or intentionally 
caused the harm. 
Moreover, the enactment of MCL 768.37, 
which abolished the defense of voluntary intoxication 
except in one narrow circumstance, has significantly 
diminished the need to categorize crimes as being either 
“specific” or “general” intent crimes. 
Conclusion 
We conclude that the charge of first-degree child 
abuse in this case requires the prosecution to establish, 
and the jury to be instructed that to convict it must find, 
not only that defendant intended to leave her children in 
the car, but also that, by doing so, defendant intended to 
cause serious physical harm or that she knew that serious 
physical harm would be caused. 
Accordingly, we affirm the 
Court of Appeals decision affirming the circuit court’s 
reinstatement 
of 
the 
felony-murder 
charges 
against 
defendant and remand this case to the trial court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 123760 
TARAJEE SHAHEER MAYNOR, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
WEAVER, J.  (concurring). 
I concur in the result of the majority opinion, but 
write separately because the majority fails to state 
whether first-degree child abuse1 is a general intent crime 
or a specific intent crime.2
 The failure to address this 
aspect of the case will cause confusion in the lower courts 
when attorneys and trial judges attempt to determine what 
1 MCL 750.136b(2). 
This statute provides: 
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
first 
degree 
if 
the 
person 
knowingly 
or 
intentionally causes serious physical harm or 
serious mental harm to a child.  Child abuse in 
the first degree is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than 15 years. 
2 The Court also declined to reach this issue in People v
Sherman-Huffman, 466 Mich 39, 40; 642 NW2d 339 (2002),
because we concluded that there was sufficient evidence in 
that case to convict the defendant of third-degree child
abuse regardless of whether the crime was a specific intent
crime or a general intent crime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
instructions must be provided to the jury. Contrary to the 
majority’s assertion, the standard jury instruction for 
first-degree child abuse, CJI2d 17.18, does not clearly 
explain that the prosecution must establish both that 
defendant intended to leave her children in the car and 
that by doing so, she intended to cause harm or knew that 
serious physical harm would be caused. 
Consequently, 
attorneys and trial judges will be at a loss about how the 
proper burden of proof can be explained to the jury. 
I would hold that pursuant to the current language of 
the statute, first-degree child abuse is a crime of 
specific intent, requiring the prosecution to establish not 
only that defendant intended to leave her children in the 
car, but also that by doing so, defendant intended to cause 
serious physical harm or that she knew that serious 
physical harm would be caused. 
Additionally, I would hold 
that, because first-degree child abuse is a specific intent 
crime, it is appropriate to provide the jury with an 
instruction on specific intent. 
For these reasons, I 
would affirm the Court of Appeals decision affirming 
reinstatement 
of 
the 
felony-murder 
charges3 
against 
defendant. 
3 MCL 750.316(1)(b). 
This statute provides in part that a
person commits murder in the first-degree if the murder is
(continued…)
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
When construing a statute, this Court’s primary goal 
is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.  We 
begin by construing the language of the statute itself. 
Where the language is unambiguous, we give the words their 
plain meaning and apply the statute as written. In re MCI, 
460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). 
Traditionally, general intent crimes involve merely 
the intent to do the physical act, while specific intent 
crimes involve a particular criminal intent beyond the act 
done. 
People v Beaudin, 417 Mich 570, 574; 339 NW2d 461 
(1983). 
Black’s Law Dictionary further explains that 
“general intent” is “the intent to do that which the law 
prohibits. 
It is not necessary for the prosecution to 
prove that the defendant intended the precise harm or the 
precise result which eventuated.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 
(6th ed). 
Specific intent is “[t]he mental purpose to 
accomplish a specific act prohibited by law.” 
Id. 
Specific intent designates “a special mental element which 
is required above and beyond any mental state required with 
respect to the actus reus of the crime.” Id. 
The child abuse statute provides: 
(…continued) 
committed “in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate 
. . . child abuse in the first degree. . . ."  
3  
 
 
 
 
 
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
first 
degree 
if 
the 
person 
knowingly 
or 
intentionally causes serious physical harm or 
serious mental harm to a child.
 Child abuse in 
the first degree is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than 15 years. 
[MCL
750.136b(2) (emphasis added).] 
The prosecution contends that the italicized language only 
requires a general intent on defendant’s part—that is, the 
prosecution must only prove that defendant intended to 
leave her children in the car, not that she intended to 
seriously harm them by leaving them in the car. I disagree 
with this argument because it is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute. 
The plain language of the current statute requires 
that to be convicted of first-degree child abuse, a person 
“knowingly or intentionally causes serious physical harm or 
serious mental harm to a child.” 
MCL 760.136b(2). 
In 
People v Whitney, 228 Mich App 230, 255; 578 NW2d 329 
(1998), the Court of Appeals concluded that MCL 15.272, 
which addresses violations of the Open Meetings Act, was a 
specific intent crime because the word “intentionally” 
modified the word “violates.” 
Similarly, in the first­
degree child abuse statute, the words “knowingly or 
intentionally” modify the phrase “causes serious physical 
or mental harm to a child.” 
Thus, this language requires 
more from defendant than a general intent to commit an act. 
The prosecution must prove that by leaving her children in
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the car, the defendant intended to cause serious physical 
or mental harm to the children or that she knew that 
serious mental or physical harm would be caused by leaving 
them in the car. 
Contrasting the language of the first-degree child 
abuse provision with the language of the second-degree 
child abuse provision further demonstrates that first­
degree requires more than simply an intent on the part of 
defendant to leave her children in the car. 
The language 
of the second-degree child abuse provision provides: 
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
second degree if any of the following apply: 
(a) The person’s omission causes serious 
physical harm or serious mental harm to a child
or if the person’s reckless act causes serious 
physical harm to a child. 
(b) The person knowingly or intentionally
commits an act likely to cause serious physical 
or mental harm to a child regardless of whether
harm results. 
(c) The person knowingly or intentionally
commits 
an 
that 
is 
cruel
act 
to 
child
a 
regardless 
of 
whether 
harm 
750.136b(3) (emphasis added).] 
results. 
[MCL 
In the second-degree child abuse provision, the words 
“knowingly” and “intentionally” modify the phrase “commits 
an act.” Thus, to establish second-degree child abuse, the 
prosecution must prove only that a defendant intended to 
commit an act likely to cause harm. 
The prosecution does 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
not have to prove that a defendant intended serious 
physical or mental harm. 
Had the Legislature intended that it be enough to 
sustain a conviction for first-degree child abuse by 
proving only that the person intended to commit the act 
that caused harm, the Legislature could have included 
language similar to the language used in the second-degree 
child abuse provision and stated: it is first-degree child 
abuse to “knowingly or intentionally commit an act that 
causes serious physical or mental harm to a child.” 
But 
the Legislature chose not to include this phrasing, and 
I 
will not usurp the Legislature’s role by reading this 
additional language into the statute.4 
Because I would hold that first-degree child abuse is 
a specific intent crime, I would further conclude that it 
4 Several house bills have been introduced to amend the 
child abuse statute. 
See HB 4327, HB 4468, and HB 4583.
Interestingly, one of these bills, HB 4468, would add an
additional means for establishing first-degree child abuse:
it is child abuse in the first degree if “the person
knowingly or intentionally commits an act that causes 
serious physical or serious mental harm to a child.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
On April 1, 2004, consideration of HB
4468 was postponed temporarily. 
2004 Journal of the House 
of Representatives 623 (No. 30, April 1, 2004). 
A House Bill has also been introduced that would make it a 
crime to leave a child unattended in a vehicle.  See HB 
4499. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is appropriate to provide the jury with the instruction on 
specific intent, CJI2d 3.9, which states: 
(1) The crime of __________ requires proof
of a specific intent. This means that the 
prosecution 
must 
prove 
not 
only 
that 
the 
defendant did certain acts, but that [he / she]
did 
the 
acts 
with 
the 
intent 
to 
cause 
a 
particular result. 
(2) For the crime of __________ this means
that 
the 
prosecution 
must 
prove 
that 
the 
defendant 
intended 
to 
[state 
the 
required
specific intent]. 
(3) The defendant's intent may be proved by
what [he / she] said, what [he / she] did, how
[he / she] did it, or by any other facts and
circumstances in evidence.[5] 
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the standard 
jury instruction for first-degree child abuse, CJI2d 17.18,6 
5 I note that because MCL 750.136b(2) makes it a crime to
“knowingly or intentionally” cause harm, I would instruct
the trial court to include both aspects—intentionally
causing harm and knowingly causing harm—when it states the
required specific intent in § 2. 
6 CJI2d 17.18 provides: 
(1) The defendant is charged with the crime
of first-degree child abuse. To prove this 
charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
[Choose (2) or (3):] 
(2) 
First, that [name defendant] is the 
[parent/ guardian] of [name child]. 
(3) 
First, that [name defendant] had care 
or custody of or authority over [name child] when 
the abuse allegedly happened. 
(continued…)
7 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is 
sufficient 
instruction 
regarding 
intent. 
As 
is 
evidenced by this case, CJI2d 17.18 offers no clear 
explanation of intent for the jury. Accordingly, providing 
a specific intent instruction is necessary to guide the 
jury regarding what the prosecutor must prove under MCL 
750.136b(2)—in this case, that defendant not only intended 
to leave her children in the car, but also that, by doing 
so, she intended to cause serious physical harm or knew 
(…continued)
(4) 
Second, that the defendant either 
knowingly 
or 
intentionally 
caused 
[serious
physical harm / serious mental harm] to [name
child]. 
[Choose (a) or (b):] 
(a) 
By “serious physical harm” I mean any
physical injury to a child that seriously impairs
the 
child’s 
health 
or 
physical 
well-being,
including, but not limited to, brain damage, a 
skull or bone fracture, subdural hemorrhage or
hematoma, dislocation, sprain, internal injury,
poisoning, burn or scald, or severe cut. 
(b) 
By “serious mental harm” I mean an
injury to a child’s mental condition that results
in visible signs of an impairment in the child’s
judgment, behavior, ability to recognize reality,
or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life. 
(5) 
Third, that [name child] was at the 
time under the age of 18. 
8  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
that serious physical harm would be caused.7  The majority’s 
conclusion that such an instruction is not necessary will 
only result in confusion at the trial court level. 
Conclusion 
I would conclude that first-degree child abuse is a 
crime of specific intent, requiring in this case that the 
prosecution establish not only that defendant intended to 
leave her children in the car, but also that, by doing so, 
defendant intended to cause serious physical harm or knew 
that serious physical harm would be caused. 
Additionally, 
I would conclude that because first-degree child abuse is a 
7I also note that I agree with the Court of Appeals
that there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could
conclude that defendant acted with the requisite intent for
first-degree child abuse. 
In the present case, defendant
left her children, ages ten months and three years, in a
car for approximately 3½ hours on a day in late June, when
temperatures were in the eighties. Defendant admitted that 
she made up the story about being abducted so that people
would not think that she was a horrible person “who left
[her] children in a hot car.” 
She also explained that she
had never left her children alone in the car before. These 
statements suggest that defendant was aware of the risks to
her children if they were left alone in a hot car. 
Additionally, the fact that at least one of the car windows
was rolled down an inch or two suggests that defendant had
knowledge that the inside of the car would become hot while
it sat in an unshaded, asphalt parking lot on a hot June
day. 
Moreover, given the children’s very young ages,
leaving these children unattended anywhere for 3½ hours
could be considered questionable conduct that might harm 
the children. 
Although defendant left the salon to 
purchase a snack, she did not check on her children during
the 3½ hours that she was in the salon. 
From all this 
evidence, a jury could infer that, by leaving her children
in a hot car for 3½ hours, defendant intended to cause harm
or knew that harm would be caused to her children. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
specific intent crime, it is appropriate to provide the 
jury with an instruction on specific intent. 
Accordingly, 
I concur in the result of the majority opinion, which 
affirms the Court of Appeals decision affirming the circuit 
court’s reinstatement of the felony-murder charges against 
defendant. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
10