Case Title: Painter v. General Motors Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-253

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Painter v. General Motors Corp.1999 WY 16974 P.2d 924Case Number: 97-253Decided: 02/24/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Rebecca A. PAINTER, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

GENERAL MOTORS 
CORPORATION, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Campbell County, Dan R. Price, II, J.

Nicholas H. 
Carter, of Carter Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellant.

Misha E. Westby, 
of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Does the statute 
of limitations set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-725(b) (Michie 1997), a 
part of Wyoming's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), begin to run on 
the date of delivery of a motor vehicle or on the date of discovery of the 
alleged breach? This is the only question presented by Rebecca A. Painter 
(Painter) in her appeal. Painter's 1991 GMC "Jimmy" was destroyed when it first 
exploded and then caught fire while being driven by Painter's mother-in-law. The 
district court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by General Motors 
Corporation (General Motors), ruling that the warranty of the "Jimmy" did not 
explicitly extend to future performance of the motor vehicle so that discovery 
would have to await the time of future performance. We hold that the ruling of 
the district court was correct, and the Order and Judgment Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing Case With Prejudice is 
affirmed.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, filed by Painter, the issue is stated in this 
way:

I. Did the 
District Court err in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
finding that the statute of limitations for breach of warranty was four years 
from the date of delivery as opposed to four years from the date of discovery of 
the alleged breach pursuant to W.S. 34.1-2-725?

General Motors, 
in its Brief of Appellee, by repeating identical language, accepts the issue 
stated by Painter.

[¶3]      On April 8, 1991, 
Painter purchased the "Jimmy" from Rolly Creech, who had originally acquired it 
from a dealer on September 28, 1990. The vehicle was covered by a three-year, 
50,000 mile "bumper to bumper" warranty. On December 22, 1991, the "Jimmy" was 
being driven by Painter's mother-in-law, who heard a loud explosion, pulled the 
vehicle into the emergency lane, and stopped. The vehicle burst into flames 
immediately, and it was destroyed in the fire. The odometer reading at that time 
was approximately 14,500 miles. Painter filed her action against General Motors 
on December 20, 1995, more than four years after delivery of the vehicle, but 
two days short of four years after the explosion and fire. Painter initially 
asserted claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of 
warranty.

[¶4]      After answering 
Painter's complaint, General Motors filed its motion for summary judgment in 
which it asserted that a claim for pure economic loss does not lie on a theory 
of negligence or strict liability, leaving only the breach of warranty claim 
before the district court. General Motors argued that the statute of limitations 
for the breach of warranty claim is four years and begins to run on the date of 
delivery. General Motors claimed that the district court should grant its motion 
because Painter had not filed her complaint within four years, but actually had 
filed it one year and three months after the statute of limitations had run. 
Painter filed a Plaintiff's Traverse and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, in which she conceded that the theories of strict 
liability and negligence were not valid and that the only claim for the district 
court to address was the claim for breach of warranty. She asserted that the 
action for breach of warranty based upon the sale of the motor vehicle started 
to run four years after the cause of action had accrued, and she premised her 
argument on her analysis of the "bumper to bumper" warranty, which she argued is 
a future performance warranty not a service warranty.

[¶5]      The district 
judge held a hearing on General Motors' motion for summary judgment and took it 
under advisement. The district judge later ruled that the warranty relied upon 
by Painter was a service warranty and not a warranty of future performance. The 
effect of the district judge's ruling is that the four-year statute of 
limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-725(a) commenced running on the 
date of delivery. In arriving at the determination that the action accrued at 
the time of delivery on September 28, 1990, not on December 22, 1991, the date 
the vehicle was destroyed, the judge relied on Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 
Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371 (1976). The district judge then granted summary judgment 
in favor of General Motors, which was entered on July 25, 
1997.

[¶6]      Painter maintains 
her argument before this court contending the four-year statute of limitations 
started to run on the date of the explosion and fire. General Motors is 
consistent in its argument, asserting that the four years began to run on the 
date of delivery of the vehicle. Wyoming has adopted the statute of limitations 
found in the UCC for breach of a warranty in sales cases, and it is set forth in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-725(b), which provides:

A cause of 
action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack 
of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery 
is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance 
of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance 
the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been 
discovered.

(Emphasis 
added.) The sale of the "Jimmy" to Painter comes within the sales provisions of 
the UCC, and our analysis of the law confirms the position of the district court 
in granting summary judgment to General Motors. The correct interpretation of 
the foregoing statute is the key to the resolution of this 
case.

[¶7]      The facts in Voth 
were similar to those presented by this case. Relying on a twelve-month or 
12,000 mile warranty for defects in material and workmanship, and a five-year or 
50,000 mile warranty on the engine and power train, and arguing that the 
warranty upon which he relied extended to future performance, Voth filed a 
complaint more than four years after delivery of the vehicle to him. Voth, 545 P.2d  at 373-74. The Kansas court recognized that the controlling concern was 
whether the warranty came within the future performance exception of Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 84-2-725(2), which is identical to subsection (b) of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
34.1-2-725. Voth, 545 P.2d  at 375. The Kansas court analyzed the specific 
language of the warranty, and held that the statutory exception requires, "that 
the warranty must explicitly extend to future performance and further that 
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance." Voth, 545 P.2d  
at 376 (emphasis in original). Voth offered the same argument that Painter 
makes, that the defect existed at the time of the sale but was not discoverable 
until some time after the sale. The Kansas court rejected this argument and 
adopted the position of Chrysler stating, "there is nothing concerning the 
discovery of an alleged defect which caused the malfunction * * * which must 
await future performance." Voth, 545 P.2d  at 376 (emphasis in original). The 
court held that the breach occurred on the date of the sale, and, therefore, the 
claim had to be brought within four years from the date of the 
purchase.

[¶8]      Painter argues 
that the warranty in issue here, a three-year, 50,000 mile, "bumper to bumper" 
warranty, obviously applies to future performance of the product. This 
contention is misplaced. In Connor v. Bogrett, 596 P.2d 683, 688 (Wyo. 1979), we 
said "an express warranty of future performance of the goods must be explicit, 
and it follows logically that all warranties of future performance of goods 
should be explicit." The opinion in Connor continues to define "explicit" as 
"that which is so clearly stated or distinctly set forth that there is no doubt 
as to its meaning." Connor, 596 P.2d  at 688. In extending a warranty to Painter, 
General Motors provided for future repairs, but it did not warrant performance 
without malfunction during the term of the warranty. Instead of an explicit 
warranty extending to future performance of the "Jimmy," General Motors simply 
recognized that there may be problems in the future which it would be 
responsible for correcting. That is not the equivalent of an express warranty as 
defined in Connor. See also Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Engineering 
& Equipment Co., 611 P.2d 863, 870 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶9]      In Ogle v. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986), we had occasion to address 
the issue of future warranties in the context of the accrual of the statute of 
limitations. That case involved serious personal injuries rather than property 
damage. We said:

Section 2-725 
was not intended to punish plaintiffs who allow their claims to grow stale. 
Instead, it was enacted to govern the out-of-court commercial conduct of sellers 
* * * to permit sellers to discard their warranty records within a reasonable 
time after sale * * *.

Ogle, 716 P.2d  
at 340. In Ogle, 716 P.2d  at 340, we specifically adopted the official comment 
to Section 2-725 of the UCC, which states a purpose:

To introduce a 
uniform statute of limitations for sales contracts, thus eliminating the 
jurisdictional variations and providing needed relief for concerns doing 
business on a nationwide scale whose contracts have heretofore been governed by 
several different periods of limitation depending upon the state in which the 
transaction occurred.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 34.1-2-725 off. cmt. This purpose would be frustrated by the adoption of 
Painter's contention.

 [¶10]  Painter relies upon R.W. Murray Co. v. 
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983). That case is 
distinguishable, however, because the court specifically said, "Shatterproof 
expressly warranted to appellants that for a period of twenty years vision and 
spandrel panels supplied by Shatterproof would be free from defects * * *." R.W. 
Murray Co., 697 F.2d  at 822. That understanding of the warranty language 
permitted the appellants to satisfy the exception to the UCC providing that, " 
'[a] breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that 
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods * * *.' " 
R.W. Murray Co., 697 F.2d  at 822 (quoting Mo. Ann. Stat § 400.2-725(1) (Vernon 
1965) (identical to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2.725(b)) and emphasis in original). 
The facts as presented by Painter and General Motors do not warrant a conclusion 
that the warranty explicitly extended to future 
performance.

[¶11]   Painter also relies on Grey v. 
Bradford-White Corp., 581 F. Supp. 725 (D.Kan. 1984). While Grey addresses the 
issue of express warranties and the statute of limitations and speculates as to 
how the Kansas court might rule in the future, Grey does not overrule Voth. The 
validity of Voth as a decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas stands. In any 
event, in reaching his decision, the judge in Grey premised it on tort rather 
than contract law. Both the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
in Winchester v. Lester's of Minnesota, Inc., 983 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1993) and 
our Court in Ogle recognized that where the recovery which is sought is purely 
economic, the appropriate remedy is in contract, not in tort. That is a key 
distinction from Grey, and as the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit stated, "[t]he economic losses occasioned by a qualitative defect 'that 
precludes the product from being fit for its intended use or functioning as 
expected for the purpose it was designed,' * * * are not recoverable in tort." 
Winchester, 983 F.2d  at 996.

[¶12]   The Wyoming legislature adopted UCC 
§ 2-725 without change, and in the absence of any legislative enactment that 
provides otherwise, the plain language of the statute must control. Like the 
claims in Ogle and in Voth, Painter's cause of action arose when the breach 
occurred, which was the date of the delivery, not the date of the explosion and 
fire. Painter clearly did not file her complaint within the four-year period 
provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-725, and she is precluded from recovering 
from General Motors. The case does not fall under the statutory exception 
because the warranty did not explicitly extend to future performance of the 
"Jimmy."

[¶13]   In summary, Painter's claim for 
purely economic loss limits her to a contract remedy under the UCC. A "bumper to 
bumper" warranty that does not explicitly extend to future performance is merely 
a "repair and replace" warranty under the UCC. The acknowledgment by General 
Motors of the possibility of future problems does not make the "bumper to 
bumper" warranty one that explicitly extends to future performance. The statute 
of limitations starts to run in such an instance on the date of the delivery 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-725(b). Painter did not file her complaint 
within that four-year period.

[¶14]   The Order and Judgment Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing Case With Prejudice is 
affirmed.