Case Title: State v. Rocha-Mayo

Citation: 2014 WI 57

Docket Number: 2011AP002548-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2548-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Luis M. Rocha-Mayo, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
348 Wis. 2d 262, 831 N.W.2d 824 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2014  
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Wilbur W. Warren III 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, ROGGENSACK, GABLEMAN, JJJ., concur. 
(Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. dissents. (Opinion filed.) 
PROSSER, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., 
dissent. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Rex R. Anderegg and Anderegg & Associates, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Rex R. Anderegg. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 57
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP2548-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF660) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Luis M. Rocha-Mayo, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals decision that upheld Luis M. Rocha-
Mayo's convictions for first-degree reckless homicide by use of 
a dangerous weapon, homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, 
first-degree reckless endangerment by use of a dangerous weapon, 
and operating a motor vehicle without a valid license causing 
death to another person.1  The convictions stem from a high-speed 
collision involving Rocha-Mayo's car and two motorcycles.  The 
                                                 
1 State v. Rocha-Mayo, No. 2011AP2548-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2013).   
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
2 
 
collision resulted in the death of one motorcyclist as well as 
injuries to Rocha-Mayo.     
¶2 
During trial, the State introduced the preliminary 
breath test (PBT) result obtained from Rocha-Mayo by an 
emergency room (ER) nurse for diagnostic purposes.  The Kenosha 
County Circuit Court, the Honorable Wilbur W. Warren III 
presiding, utilized Wis JI——Criminal 11852 in instructing the 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin JI——Criminal 1185 addresses the charge of 
"Homicide by Operation of a Vehicle While Under the Influence."  
Utilizing a slightly modified version of the instruction, the 
circuit court instructed the jury, in part,  
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
there was .08 grams or more of alcohol in 210 liters 
of the defendant's breath at the time the test was 
taken, you may find that the defendant was under the 
influence of an intoxicant at the time of the alleged 
operating, but you are not required to do so.  You the 
jury are here to decide this question on the basis of 
all the evidence in this case, and you should not find 
that the defendant was under the influence of an 
intoxicant at the time of the alleged operating, 
unless you are satisfied of that fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
In contrast, the same passage from the standard 
Wisconsin JI——Criminal 1185 provides, 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
there was .08 grams or more of alcohol in 210 liters 
of the defendant's breath at the time the test was 
taken, you may find from that fact alone that the 
defendant was under the influence of an intoxicant at 
the time of the alleged operating, but you are not 
required to do so.  You the jury are here to decide 
this question on the basis of all the evidence in this 
case, and you should not find that the defendant was 
under the influence of an intoxicant at the time of 
the alleged operating, unless you are satisfied of 
that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
3 
 
jury on the PBT result.  Over Rocha-Mayo's objection, the State 
also offered testimony from Dr. William Falco, an ER physician 
who treated Rocha-Mayo.  The physician testified that Rocha-Mayo 
appeared to be intoxicated at the time he was undergoing 
treatment in the ER. 
¶3 
Rocha-Mayo asks this court to review three issues.  
First, whether Wisconsin statutes governing breath alcohol 
testing allow admission of a PBT result as evidence of 
intoxication in operating while intoxicated (OWI) related trials 
when the results are not obtained by law enforcement.  Second, 
whether the circuit court improperly instructed the jury in 
regard to the PBT result.  Third, whether the circuit court 
erred in allowing an ER physician to testify that Rocha-Mayo 
appeared intoxicated while being treated in the ER.  The State 
asserts that the circuit court did not err in any regard.  In 
the alternative, the State contends that any circuit court error 
was harmless. 
¶4 
Since we conclude that this case can and should be 
resolved by application of a harmless error analysis, we assume, 
without deciding, that the circuit court erred when it allowed 
the State to admit, as evidence, the PBT result obtained by a 
medical professional for diagnostic purposes.  Likewise, we 
assume, without deciding, that the circuit court erred under 
these circumstances in utilizing Wis JI——Criminal 1185 to 
instruct the jury on its use of the PBT evidence.  We conclude, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
4 
 
however, that the circuit court did exercise appropriate 
discretion when it allowed Dr. Falco to testify that, based on 
his 
observations 
and 
medical 
experience, 
Rocha-Mayo 
was 
intoxicated while undergoing treatment in the ER.  We agree with 
the court of appeals that "[t]he legal concept at issue was 
whether Rocha-Mayo was under the influence of an intoxicant at 
the time he operated the motor vehicle."3  Dr. Falco's testimony 
related only to his observations of Rocha-Mayo in the ER, and he 
did not testify about Rocha-Mayo's driving ability on the night 
of the accident.  In fact, Dr. Falco specifically testified that 
he could not give any indication of Rocha-Mayo's level of 
intoxication at the time of the accident.   
¶5 
Although we assume without deciding that the circuit 
court erred in admitting the PBT result as evidence and in 
instructing the jury in regard to the PBT, we conclude that 
these alleged errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Even without the PBT evidence, the jury heard evidence of Rocha-
Mayo's level of intoxication from witnesses and from Rocha-Mayo 
himself.  Rocha-Mayo admitted that he consumed two or three 
beers at home and an additional five or six beers at a bar, and 
that he was drinking alcohol in his car just prior to the 
collision.  Dr. Falco and Steven Edwards, an ER nurse, testified 
that they could smell alcohol on Rocha-Mayo's breath in the ER.  
Finally, Dr. Falco testified that Rocha-Mayo appeared to be 
                                                 
3 State v. Rocha-Mayo, No. 2011AP2548-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶15 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2013). 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
5 
 
intoxicated while being treated in the ER.  We therefore 
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any error by the 
circuit court did not contribute to the verdict. 
I. Background 
¶6 
At trial, the facts leading up to the collision were 
disputed.  We discuss only those facts relevant to our decision. 
¶7 
On June 22, 2008, Rocha-Mayo left El Rodeo,4 a bar in 
Kenosha, Wisconsin, at approximately 2:00 a.m., around the time 
of the bar's closing.5  He left the bar in his vehicle and 
started traveling west on 52nd Street.  Shortly after leaving 
the bar, Rocha-Mayo encountered three motorcyclists.  One of the 
motorcycles in the group also carried a passenger.   
¶8 
At that point, the descriptions of what happened 
diverge; however, a road-rage type incident unfolded in which 
Rocha-Mayo and the motorcyclists were driving within close 
proximity to one another.  At one point one of the motorcyclists 
threw a metal baton through Rocha-Mayo's rear window.  The 
motorcycle carrying two people turned off of 52nd Street.  The 
other two motorcyclists and Rocha-Mayo continued traveling on 
52nd Street at high rates of speed upwards of 70 miles per hour 
(mph).   
                                                 
4 Rocha-Mayo also referred to this bar in a statement to 
police and during his testimony as "Alas de Oro" and "Oro." 
5 The bar's owner and Rocha-Mayo testified that he left 
around bar closing time, which occurs at 2:30 a.m.  However, 
police reports and witness accounts of the accident suggest that 
Rocha-Mayo left the bar closer to 2:00 a.m. 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
6 
 
¶9 
At the intersection of 52nd Street and Green Bay Road, 
Rocha-Mayo's vehicle struck one of the motorcycles.  That 
motorcyclist later died of his injuries.  The other motorcyclist 
was uninjured and left the scene of the accident.  Rocha-Mayo 
also sustained injuries and was taken to St. Catherine's Medical 
Center. 
¶10 Dr. Falco and Edwards attended to Rocha-Mayo in the ER 
and examined him for a possible head injury.  Dr. Falco and 
Edwards both testified that they could smell alcohol on Rocha-
Mayo's breath.  Dr. Falco also testified that he observed Rocha-
Mayo talking rapidly on his phone upon arrival, and that Rocha-
Mayo had a diminished memory of the accident.  Rocha-Mayo also 
told Dr. Falco that he had been drinking alcohol. 
¶11 Due to these observations, Dr. Falco ordered Edwards 
to test Rocha-Mayo's breath for the presence of alcohol to 
determine whether Rocha-Mayo's symptoms might be alcohol-
related.  Edwards performed the PBT and recorded a result of 
0.086.6   
¶12 Rocha-Mayo sought to exclude the PBT test result from 
his trial.  He argued that Wis. Stat. § 343.3037 prohibits the 
use of PBT results in OWI-related trials.  The circuit court 
                                                 
6 Since 2003, the legal limit for driving in Wisconsin has 
been 0.08 BAC.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.63; 2003 Wis. Act 30, § 1.  
However, Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) generally prohibits driving 
under the influence of any intoxicant, which "renders him or her 
incapable of safely driving . . . ." 
7 This and all subsequent references to the Wisconsin 
statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
7 
 
denied his motion to suppress the result.  The circuit court 
reasoned that Wis. Stat. § 343.303 must be read in its entirety, 
and that the plain language of the statute applies to PBT 
results obtained by law enforcement.  Therefore, the circuit 
court found that the PBT result was admissible because it was 
taken by a medical professional for diagnostic purposes.  In 
addition, the PBT was not taken at the direction of, or at the 
request of, law enforcement.  The circuit court pointed out that 
no law enforcement officers were present in the ER at the time 
Edwards administered the PBT. 
¶13 Rocha-Mayo proceeded to trial on the charges of first-
degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon, homicide 
by intoxicated use of a vehicle, and first-degree reckless 
endangerment by use of a dangerous weapon.  Before trial, he 
pleaded guilty to the charge of operating a motor vehicle 
without a valid license causing death to another person.   
¶14 At trial, the State presented several witnesses who 
observed the motorcyclists and Rocha-Mayo on 52nd Street prior 
to the collision.  These witnesses consistently estimated that 
the vehicles were traveling upwards of 70 mph.  A police officer 
on patrol observed the vehicles just prior to the accident and 
testified that all three were driving "recklessly and at a high 
rate of speed" that he estimated as between 70 and 80 mph.   
¶15  The State also elicited other testimony regarding 
Rocha-Mayo's level of intoxication.  A police officer who 
obtained a statement from Rocha-Mayo read the statement during 
her trial testimony.  In this statement Rocha-Mayo admitted to 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
8 
 
drinking three beers at his home between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. 
before going to El Rodeo, where, he admitted, he drank another 
six beers.8  Rocha-Mayo's statement also provided information 
that he purchased two six-packs of beer from the bar as he left 
and that he continued to drink an open beer in his car as he 
drove away from the bar.  A third officer testified that he 
inspected Rocha-Mayo's car following the accident and that he 
observed one empty beer bottle and five full beer bottles 
scattered on the front floorboard of the car. 
¶16 The State also called El Rodeo's owner, who worked as 
a bartender on the night in question, as a witness.  She 
testified that she did not recall serving alcohol to Rocha-Mayo 
and that she could not remember selling him any packaged 
alcohol.  On cross-examination, the bar owner testified that 
Rocha-Mayo did not appear to be intoxicated, but she then 
admitted that her recollection of the evening was poor.  When 
pressed, she testified that she did not recall Rocha-Mayo 
exhibiting any obvious signs of intoxication, such as falling 
down. 
¶17 The State also presented testimony from Dr. Falco and  
Edwards who both testified that they could smell alcohol on 
Rocha-Mayo's breath.  In addition, Dr. Falco testified that, in 
                                                 
8 Rocha-Mayo testified at trial.  His testimony was largely 
consistent with his prior statement to police.  He testified 
that he drank two or three beers at home and then consumed an 
additional five or six beers at the bar. 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
9 
 
his professional opinion, Rocha-Mayo was intoxicated at the time 
he was treated in the ER.  
¶18 A jury found Rocha-Mayo guilty of all charges.9 
¶19 The court of appeals affirmed.  Like the circuit 
court, it found that the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 343.303 
applies only to PBT results obtained by law enforcement.  It 
concluded that the circuit court's decision to allow the PBT 
result was a proper exercise of discretion.  The court of 
appeals also rejected Rocha-Mayo's argument that the circuit 
court erred in utilizing Wis JI——Criminal 1185 when instructing 
the jury that it could rely on the PBT result as evidence of 
intoxication because the instruction allowed, but did not 
require, the jury to find that the defendant was under the 
influence of an intoxicant at the time of the alleged operating.  
Finally, the court of appeals found that Dr. Falco's testimony, 
that Rocha-Mayo appeared intoxicated while in the ER, was not 
error because he offered no opinion on Rocha-Mayo's state of 
intoxication at the time of the accident. 
¶20 This case presents four issues.  First, whether Wis. 
Stat. § 343.303 prohibits the admission of a PBT test result 
obtained by a medical professional in an OWI-related trial.  
Second, whether the circuit court erred in utilizing Wis JI——
Criminal 1185 to instruct the jury on its use of the PBT 
evidence.  Third, whether Dr. Falco's testimony, that Rocha-Mayo 
                                                 
9 As previously noted, Rocha-Mayo had pleaded guilty to the 
charge of operating a motor vehicle without a valid license 
causing death to another person prior to his trial. 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
10 
 
was intoxicated while in the ER, was improper because it 
embraced a "legal concept for which a definitional instruction 
was required." Finally, whether circuit court error, if any, was 
harmless.   
¶21 We assume without deciding that the circuit court 
erred when it admitted the PBT result and instructed the jury on 
that result.  Therefore, we first address whether the circuit 
court erred in allowing Dr. Falco's testimony.  We then turn to 
the parties' harmless error arguments. 
II. Standard of Review 
¶22 We review a prior court's admission of evidence under 
the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  State v. Doss, 
2008 WI 93, ¶19, 312 Wis. 2d 570, 754 N.W.2d 150.  That means we 
will not overturn the prior court's determination unless there 
is a clear showing of such discretion having been exercised in 
an erroneous manner.  Id.  "A proper exercise of discretion 
requires that the circuit court rely on facts of record, the 
applicable law, and, using a demonstrable rational process, 
reach a reasonable decision."  Id. 
¶23 Our harmless error analysis requires us to determine 
whether the error in question affected the jury's verdict.  
State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485.  
Therefore, we ask, "Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error?"  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189 (quoting Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).     
 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
11 
 
III. Analysis 
A. Admissibility of Dr. Falco's Testimony 
¶24 Rocha-Mayo argues that the circuit court erred when, 
over his objection, it allowed Dr. Falco to testify that, in his 
expert opinion, Rocha-Mayo was intoxicated at the time he was 
treated in the ER.  Rocha-Mayo's argument is that Dr. Falco's 
testimony was improper because it "embraced a legal concept for 
which a definitional instruction was required."  The legal 
concept to which Rocha-Mayo refers is the definition of "under 
the influence of an intoxicant," which was one element of the 
charge of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle.  As to this 
charge, the circuit court instructed the jury, "The third 
element is the defendant was under the influence of an 
intoxicant at the time the defendant operated a vehicle.  'Under 
the influence of an intoxicant' means that the defendant's 
ability to operate a vehicle was materially impaired because of 
consumption of an alcoholic beverage."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶25 In contrast, the State argues that Dr. Falco never 
offered any opinion as to Rocha-Mayo's condition or level of 
intoxication at the time of the accident.  In fact, the State 
points out that Dr. Falco specifically testified that he could 
not make any judgment as to Rocha-Mayo's blood alcohol content 
at the time he operated his vehicle or his ability to operate a 
vehicle. 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.04 governs "opinion on ultimate 
issue."  It states, "[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
12 
 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."  
Wis. Stat. § 907.04.  Both parties agree that Dr. Falco's 
testimony was permissible under Wis. Stat. § 907.04.  However, 
Rocha-Mayo argues that the circuit court erred in allowing Dr. 
Falco to testify in regard to his level of intoxication because 
the definitional instruction for "under the influence of an 
intoxicant" was required. 
¶27 The court of appeals has explained that the "ultimate 
issue" described in Wis. Stat. § 907.04 cannot "be one that is a 
legal 
concept 
for 
which 
the 
jury 
needs 
definitional 
instructions."  Lievrouw v. Roth, 157 Wis. 2d 332, 351-52, 459 
N.W.2d 850 (1990). 
¶28 Here, we conclude that Dr. Falco's testimony complies 
with both Wis. Stat. § 907.04 and Lievrouw.  This is because the 
ultimate issue at stake was whether Rocha-Mayo was intoxicated 
at the time of the collision.  Furthermore, a significant part 
of the defense was that even if Rocha-Mayo was intoxicated while 
driving, the accident would have occurred regardless of that 
fact.10    
¶29 Dr. Falco's testimony was permissible because it did 
not 
embrace 
the 
ultimate 
issue: 
whether 
Rocha-Mayo 
was 
                                                 
10 As we noted previously, Wis JI——Criminal 1185, addresses 
the charge of "Homicide by Operation of a Vehicle While Under 
the Influence."  From this instruction the jury was told, 
"Wisconsin law provides that it is a defense to this crime if 
the death would have occurred even if the defendant had been 
exercising due care and had not been under the influence of an 
intoxicant."  Wis JI——Criminal 1185. 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
13 
 
intoxicated at the time of the accident.  As previously noted, 
Dr. Falco's testimony related only to his belief that Rocha-Mayo 
was 
intoxicated 
while 
undergoing 
treatment 
in 
the 
ER.  
Furthermore, Dr. Falco did not give any opinion as to Rocha-
Mayo's ability to drive his vehicle safely.  In fact, on cross-
examination Rocha-Mayo's counsel specifically asked Dr. Falco if 
he could opine on Rocha-Mayo's level of intoxication at the time 
of the accident.  After explaining that Rocha-Mayo's blood 
alcohol level on the night of the accident would have fluctuated 
depending on the rate his body metabolized the alcohol, Dr. 
Falco responded, "I cannot."  Therefore, we conclude that the 
circuit court acted appropriately within its discretion when it 
allowed Dr. Falco to testify about Rocha-Mayo's state of 
intoxication while he was being treated in the ER. 
B. Harmless Error  
¶30  Rocha-Mayo argues that any circuit court error related 
to the PBT evidence or the instruction to the jury regarding the 
PBT results cannot be harmless error.  We disagree.  While we 
assume without deciding that admission of the PBT result and the 
jury instruction at issue was error, we conclude that these 
errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other words, 
we conclude that admission of the PBT result and the use of 
Wisconsin JI——Criminal 1185, in regard to the PBT evidence, did 
not affect the jury's verdict.  It is clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the jury would have found the defendant guilty absent 
the alleged errors. 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
14 
 
¶31 Under Wisconsin statutes and precedent, harmless error 
analysis 
is 
applicable 
to 
this 
case. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 805.18(2) provides,  
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of . . . the improper admission of evidence . . 
. unless in the opinion of the court to which the 
application is made, after an examination of the 
entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that the 
error complained of has affected the substantial 
rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside 
the judgment, or to secure a new trial. 
(Emphasis added.)  Although Wis. Stat. § 805.18 specifically 
applies to civil procedure, this statute is applicable to 
criminal proceedings through Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1).11  Harvey, 
254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶39.   
¶32 In Harvey, this court addressed the application of 
harmless error analysis in the context of a challenged jury 
instruction.  Id., ¶6.  In doing so, we relied heavily on Neder, 
527 U.S. 1.  Id., ¶¶35-46.  In considering the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 805.18, we also relied on the following question when 
conducting harmless error analysis: "Is it clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error?"  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 
¶46 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18). 
                                                 
11 The 
applicable 
portion 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(1) 
provides, "Except as provided in subs. (2) to (4), the rules of 
evidence and practice in civil actions shall be applicable in 
all criminal proceedings unless the context of a section or rule 
manifestly requires a different construction."  Subsections (2)-
(4) are not applicable to this case. 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
15 
 
¶33 The following year we again found guidance from Harvey 
and Neder in discussing harmless error analysis in the context 
of an alleged confrontation clause violation.  Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 
434, ¶29.  In doing so, we again relied on the harmless error 
test set forth in Harvey.  Id. (citing Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 
¶44). 
¶34 Assuming, without deciding, that the circuit court 
erred when it allowed admission of the PBT result and the 
corresponding jury instruction, we conclude that such alleged 
errors were harmless.  This is because the jury heard ample 
evidence to conclude that Rocha-Mayo was intoxicated at the time 
of the accident. 
¶35 First, while speed is not necessarily indicative of 
intoxication, the jury heard from multiple witnesses who all 
testified that Rocha-Mayo and the motorcyclists were driving 
recklessly and traveling at high rates of speed.  Witnesses 
consistently estimated that the vehicles were travelling between 
70 and 80 mph along 52nd Street.  At the point where a patrol 
officer observed the vehicles, the posted speed limit on 52nd 
Street was 30 mph. 
¶36 In addition, the jury heard evidence of Rocha-Mayo's 
level of intoxication.  First, the jury heard Rocha-Mayo's 
statement to police in which he admitted to drinking three beers 
at his home between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m.  His statement also 
provided that he arrived at El Rodeo around 9 p.m. and that he 
consumed an additional six beers before purchasing two six-packs 
of beer from the bar as he left.  His statement and his 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
16 
 
testimony at trial was that he carried a partially consumed 
bottle of beer to his car and finished that beer while driving 
his vehicle.12  Rocha-Mayo's statements were confirmed in part by 
a police officer who testified that he examined Rocha-Mayo's 
vehicle after the accident.  This officer found one empty bottle 
of beer and five unopened bottles in Rocha-Mayo's vehicle. 
¶37 The jury also heard testimony from Dr. Falco and 
Edwards who both attended to Rocha-Mayo in the ER.  Rocha-Mayo 
told Dr. Falco that he had been drinking alcohol immediately 
prior to the collision.  Dr. Falco and Edwards both testified 
that they could smell alcohol on Rocha-Mayo's breath.  In 
addition, Dr. Falco testified that, based on his observations 
and experience, Rocha-Mayo was intoxicated while undergoing 
treatment in the ER.13 
¶38 Due to other evidence of Rocha-Mayo's intoxication, we 
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that admission of the PBT 
result and the related jury instruction did not affect the 
jury's verdict.  Therefore, assuming, without deciding, that 
admission of the PBT evidence and use of the corresponding jury 
instruction were error, we conclude that those alleged errors 
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
                                                 
12 Rocha-Mayo testified that the beer he finished in his car 
was part of the estimated five or six beers that he consumed at 
the bar. 
13 As noted previously, El Rodeo's owner testified that she 
could not recall serving or selling alcoholic beverages to 
Rocha-Mayo.  She admitted, however, that her memory of that 
night was poor.   
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
17 
 
IV. Conclusion 
¶39 This case can and should be resolved by application of 
a harmless error analysis.  We assume, without deciding, that 
the circuit court erred when it allowed the State to admit, as 
evidence, the PBT result obtained by a medical professional for 
diagnostic purposes.  Likewise, we assume, without deciding, 
that the circuit court erred under these circumstances in 
utilizing Wis JI——Criminal 1185 to instruct the jury on its use 
of the PBT evidence.  We conclude, however, that the circuit 
court did exercise appropriate discretion when it allowed Dr. 
Falco to testify that, based on his observations and medical 
experience, 
Rocha-Mayo 
was 
intoxicated 
while 
undergoing 
treatment in the ER.  We agree with the court of appeals that 
"[t]he legal concept at issue was whether Rocha-Mayo was under 
the influence of an intoxicant at the time he operated the motor 
vehicle."14 
 
Dr. 
Falco's 
testimony 
related 
only 
to 
his 
observations of Rocha-Mayo in the ER, and he did not testify 
about Rocha-Mayo's driving ability on the night of the accident.  
In fact, Dr. Falco specifically testified that he could not give 
any indication of Rocha-Mayo's level of intoxication at the time 
of the accident.   
¶40 Although we assume, without deciding, that the circuit 
court erred in admitting the PBT result as evidence and in 
instructing the jury in regard to the PBT, we conclude that 
                                                 
14 State v. Rocha-Mayo, No. 2011AP2548-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶15 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2013). 
No. 
2011AP2548-CR   
 
18 
 
these alleged errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Even without the PBT evidence, the jury heard evidence of Rocha-
Mayo's level of intoxication from witnesses and from Rocha-Mayo 
himself.  Rocha-Mayo admitted that he consumed two or three 
beers at home and an additional five or six beers at a bar and 
that he was drinking alcohol in his car just prior to the 
collision.  Dr. Falco and Steven Edwards, an ER nurse, testified 
that they could smell alcohol on Rocha-Mayo's breath in the ER.  
Finally, Dr. Falco testified that Rocha-Mayo appeared to be 
intoxicated while being treated in the ER.  We therefore 
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any error by the 
circuit court did not contribute to the verdict. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶41 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion.  I concur and write separately to go 
further than the majority opinion and conclude that the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 343.303 "expressly bars" admission of 
preliminary breath test ("PBT") results in trials which involve 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant 
("OWI").1  See State v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, ¶4, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 
778 N.W.2d 629.  In Fischer the court stated "the legislature's 
policy decision regarding the absolute inadmissibility of the 
PBT results under these circumstances simply could not be 
clearer."  Id., ¶25.  I wrote separately in Fischer, and concur 
in the case at issue, because I conclude that, as a matter of 
law, PBT results are neither reliable nor admissible for the 
purpose of proving a defendant's intoxication or specific 
alcohol concentration when either is an element of the crime 
charged. 
¶42 While it is indeed true that precedent instructs us 
that under some circumstances PBT results may be deemed 
admissible, those cases do not approve of the admission of PBT 
results 
as 
proof 
of 
intoxication 
or 
a 
specific 
alcohol 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.303 provides, in relevant part: 
The result of the preliminary breath screening test 
shall not be admissible in any action or proceeding 
except to show probable cause for an arrest, if the 
arrest is challenged, or to prove that a chemical test 
was properly required or requested of a person under 
s. 343.305(3). 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
concentration when those factors are an element of the crime.2  
See State v. Doerr, 229 Wis. 2d 616, 622-25, 599 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (agreeing with the circuit court that PBT results 
were admissible at trial to assist the jury in evaluating the 
defendant's charges of battery to a law enforcement officer in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.20(2) and resisting an officer in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41); State v. Beaver, 181 
Wis. 2d 959, 969-71, 512 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1994) (concluding 
that PBT results may be admissible at trial as evidence of the 
defendant's comprehension of his Miranda rights or his ability 
to intelligently waive them).3 
¶43 Thus, I conclude that the legislature has spoken and 
PBT results are not admissible for the purpose of confirming or 
dispelling intoxication or a specific alcohol concentration when 
                                                 
2 For example, in order to find Rocha-Mayo guilty of 
homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) or (b), the State had to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he (1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) 
caused the death of another by operation of that motor vehicle, 
and (3) was either under the influence of an intoxicant or had a 
prohibited alcohol concentration at the time he or she operated 
the motor vehicle.  Wis JI——Criminal 1189.  "[A]n alcohol 
concentration of more than 0.04 but less than 0.08 is relevant 
evidence 
on 
the 
issue 
of 
intoxication," 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 885.235(1g)(b), and "an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more 
is prima facie evidence" that the defendant was under the 
influence of an intoxicant, § 885.235(1g)(c). 
3 I recognize that PBT results are considered admissible at 
a probable cause hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 343.303; State v. Faust, 
2004 WI 99, ¶26, 274 Wis. 2d 183, 682 N.W.2d 371.  PBT results 
are also utilized as a "screening tool" prior to arrest.  See 
Cnty. of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 313, 603 N.W.2d 541 
(1999).  Unlike the PBT, however, the Intoxilyzer provides for 
chemical testing that is subject to certain safeguards so to 
ensure reliability. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
these considerations are an element of the crime.  Accordingly, 
I would conclude and decide that the PBT results were 
inadmissible as a matter of law. 
¶44 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶45 I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶46 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with Justice Prosser's dissent that it was error for the circuit 
court to admit the results of the defendant's preliminary breath 
test (PBT)1 as evidence and that it was error for the circuit 
court to use the modified jury instruction.2  I join Justice 
Prosser's dissent. 
¶47 The majority opinion assumes that the admission of the 
PBT and the modified jury instruction were erroneous.3   
¶48 Justice Ziegler's concurrence agrees with the majority 
opinion that the admission of the PBT results can be assumed to 
be error.  But the concurrence goes further, concluding that the 
introduction of the PBT was indeed erroneous; "the PBT results 
were inadmissible as a matter of law."  Concurrence, ¶43.4  This 
concurrence is consistent with Justice Ziegler's concurrence in 
State v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, ¶37, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 778 
N.W.2d 629, which states that "as a matter of law PBT results 
are 
neither 
reliable 
nor 
admissible 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
confirming 
or 
dispelling 
a 
defendant's 
specific 
alcohol 
concentration."  
¶49 Thus six justices——Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, Justice 
David Prosser, Justice Patience Roggensack, Justice Annette 
Kingsland Ziegler, Justice Michael Gableman, and I——agree that 
                                                 
1 Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶¶96-111. 
2 Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶¶112-118. 
3 Majority op., ¶4. 
4 See also Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶97 (quoting Justice 
Ziegler's concurrence). 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
the circuit court erred in admitting the PBT results in the 
present case. 
¶50 The majority opinion (joined by Justice Ziegler) 
declares the assumed errors to be harmless.5  In contrast, 
Justice Prosser's dissent concludes that the errors in the 
instant case were not harmless.6  Once again I agree with the 
dissent.  The PBT results and erroneous jury instruction were 
central to the prosecution's case; the errors were prejudicial. 
¶51 I 
write 
separately, 
however, 
to 
highlight 
an 
additional error, namely the admission of the expert testimony 
of Dr. William Falco.  The doctor was allowed to give an expert 
opinion that the defendant was "intoxicated" when he was in the 
emergency room.  Such testimony is barred by our jurisprudence 
regarding the limits of expert opinion testimony 
¶52 The State did not have to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was "intoxicated."  Rather, the State 
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
"under the influence of an intoxicant" while operating the 
vehicle.7   
¶53 "Under the influence of an intoxicant" is a legal term 
of art defined in Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) to mean "the actor's 
ability to operate a vehicle . . . is materially impaired 
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶5. 
6 Justice Prosser's dissent, ¶¶119-134. 
7 See Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) (defining the crime of 
"caus[ing] the death of another by the operation or handling of 
a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant").  
No.  2011AP2548-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
because 
of 
his 
or 
her 
consumption 
of 
an 
alcoholic 
beverage . . . ."   
¶54 The legal definition of "under the influence of an 
intoxicant" is not necessarily the same as a doctor's use of the 
word "intoxicated" for purposes of determining proper medical 
diagnosis or treatment in a hospital, or the same as the common 
usage of the word "intoxicated." 
¶55 I now turn to the Wisconsin rules of evidence 
governing expert opinion testimony. 
¶56 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.04 provides as follows: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact.8   
                                                 
8 The 1974 Judicial Council Committee's Note to § 907.04, 
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R211, states that the 
rule is consistent with Rabata v. Dohner, 45 Wis. 2d 111, 172 
N.W.2d 409 (1969).  The court declared in Rabata, 45 Wis. 2d at 
125 (citing Charles T. McCormick, Some Observations Upon the 
Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 Tex. L. Rev. 109, 118, 119 
(1944)), that opinion testimony on ultimate issues could be 
barred if phrased as a legal term of art: 
[A] court, even though not banning opinions on an 
ultimate issue, might nevertheless properly condemn a 
question phrased in terms of a legal criterion which 
could be misunderstood by the laymen on the jury.  
Such questions as, "Did X have sufficient mental 
capacity to make a will," or "Was X negligent," would 
properly be condemned on this basis——that they would 
confuse the jury rather than assist it——and be 
excluded from evidence. 
Wis. Stat. § 907.04 adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 704 
verbatim.   
Federal Rule 704 was amended in 1984 to add subsection (b) 
as follows:  
Rule 704.  Opinion on an Ultimate Issue 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶57 As the majority opinion acknowledges, an expert 
witness cannot give opinion testimony on an ultimate issue "that 
is a legal concept for which the jury needs definitional 
instructions,"9 although the expert may give opinion testimony as 
to an "ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."  The 
phrase "under the influence of an intoxicant" is a legal concept 
and a jury is instructed regarding the legal definition of 
"under the influence of an intoxicant." 
¶58 The majority opinion acknowledges that the ultimate 
issue of whether the defendant was "under the influence of an 
intoxicant" under Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) was one requiring a 
specific, definitional jury instruction.  Wisconsin JI——Criminal 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) In General——Not Automatically Objectionable.  An 
opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces 
an ultimate issue. 
(b) Exception.  In a criminal case, an expert witness 
must not state an opinion about whether the defendant 
did or did not have a mental state or condition that 
constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a 
defense.  Those matters are for the trier of fact 
alone. 
For a discussion of the Federal Rule, see Charles Alan 
Wright et al., 29 Federal Practice & Procedure:  Evidence § 6282 
(2d ed. 1997 & Supp.); 1 McCormick On Evidence § 12 (Kenneth S. 
Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013). 
For other rules of evidence governing admissibility of 
expert opinion testimony, see Wis. Stat. ch. 907.  
9 Majority op., ¶¶26-27 (citing Wis. Stat. § 907.04 & 
Lievrouw v. Roth, 157 Wis. 2d 332, 351-52, 459 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. 
App. 1990)). 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
1185, which was given to the jury in the instant case,10 defines 
"under the influence of an intoxicant" for the jury as follows: 
"Under the influence of an intoxicant" means that the 
defendant's 
ability 
to 
operate 
a 
vehicle 
was 
materially impaired because of consumption of an 
alcoholic beverage. 
Not every person who has consumed alcoholic beverages 
is "under the influence" as that term is used here.  
What must be established is that the person has 
consumed a sufficient amount of alcohol to cause the 
person to be less able to exercise the clear judgment 
and steady hand necessary to handle and control a 
motor vehicle. 
It is not required that impaired ability to operate be 
demonstrated by particular acts of unsafe driving.  
What is required is that the person's ability to 
safely control the vehicle be materially impaired 
(footnote omitted). 
¶59 In the instant case, the doctor's testimony used the 
term "intoxication" in its medical sense, not the sense of the 
legal term of art "under the influence of an intoxicant" as 
defined in the statutes and the jury instruction.  Dr. Falco 
testified that when the defendant entered the emergency room, in 
his expert opinion the defendant was intoxicated.  The exchange 
between the prosecutor and the doctor, over the defense's 
objection, ensued as follows: 
[PROSECUTOR]: Doctor, over the 13 years where you had 
occasion to treat accident patients that have consumed 
alcohol, were you able to make a diagnosis of whether 
or not they were under the influence of alcohol? 
[DOCTOR]: Yes, several times. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Do you believe you're qualified to in 
this case render that opinion? 
                                                 
10 See majority op., ¶2. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
[DOCTOR]: I do.  I mean, I see intoxicated patients 
not in accidents pretty much on a daily basis that 
I'm—— 
[PROSECUTOR]: 
And 
when 
you're 
looking 
at 
those 
patients, what are those things that you are looking 
at?  What are the factors?  What are the symptoms of 
alcohol intoxication? 
[DOCTOR]: Well, their behavior; their——you know, the——
obviously the smell of alcohol on their breath; their 
speech, the clarity of their speech; you know, if they 
had redness to their eyes; their ability to ambulate 
or, you know, walk with the steady gait, things like 
that. 
[PROSECUTOR]: And based upon your treatment, based on 
your experience and medical practice as an emergency 
room physician, and your contact and examination and 
assessment of this patient, [the defendant], do you 
have an opinion as to his state of sobriety? 
[DOCTOR]: I do. 
[PROSECUTOR]: And what is your opinion? 
[The defense objected and was overruled.] 
[DOCTOR]: I believe he was intoxicated at the time. 
[PROSECUTOR]: And do you hold that opinion to a 
reasonable degree of scientific and medical certainty? 
[DOCTOR]: I do. 
¶60 Expert opinion testimony?  Check.  Ultimate issue in 
the case?  Check.  Requiring a definitional jury instruction?  
Check.   
¶61 Nonetheless, the majority opinion in the instant case 
permits 
the 
doctor's 
testimony 
about 
the 
defendant's 
intoxication when he entered the emergency room.   
¶62 The 
majority 
opinion 
creatively 
but 
fallaciously 
reasons that the testimony is admissible because the doctor 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
"never offered any opinion as to [the defendant's] condition or 
level of intoxication at the time of the accident."11 
¶63 The State defends the admission of the doctor's 
testimony on the grounds that the doctor never offered an 
opinion as to whether the defendant's ability to safely control 
the vehicle was materially impaired. 
¶64 True, the doctor did not express an opinion about the 
defendant's intoxication at the time of the accident or about 
the defendant's ability to operate a vehicle.  So, I ask, what 
is the relevance of the doctor's expert opinion about the 
defendant's intoxication in the emergency room?  Is it relevant 
because it enables a jury to infer from the doctor's testimony 
that the defendant, who was intoxicated at the hospital, had a 
materially impaired ability to operate a vehicle at the time of 
the accident?  It seems to me this must be the unstated 
rationale.  Is this inference permissible?  No!  Why not?  
Because the doctor's medical definition of "intoxicated" for 
purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment at the emergency 
room is different than the legal definition of "under the 
influence of an intoxicant."   
¶65 Admitting the doctor's expert testimony in the present 
case leads the jury to the mistaken belief that "intoxication" 
as used by a doctor as a medical term is the same as the legal 
term of art "under the influence of an intoxicant."  
¶66 How can the jury make the inferential leap from the 
doctor's expert opinion about intoxication for medical diagnosis 
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶25 (emphasis added). 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
and treatment purposes to finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant was "under the influence of an intoxicant" as a 
defined legal element of the crime?   
¶67 The doctor's testimony therefore does not assist the 
trier of fact under the relevance-assistance standard of Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02(1).12  Indeed, the doctor's testimony confuses, 
rather than assists, the jury. 
¶68 To avoid jury confusion, the rules of evidence and the 
case law militate against the admission of expert testimony on 
legal concepts or terms of art.  Analyzing our case law, 
Professor Blinka's treatise wisely advises that when weighing 
whether expert testimony phrased in terms of legal standards is 
admissible, "a prime consideration is whether the concept under 
consideration is a peculiarly legal construct or one that is 
also rooted in common usage."13   
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02(1) provides: 
(1) If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
The rules of evidence thus exclude the doctor's opinion in 
the present case, not only as violating Wis. Stat. § 907.04 and 
our case law, but also as not helpful to the trier of fact and 
as a waste of time. 
13 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series:  Wisconsin 
Evidence § 702.603 (3d ed. 2008). 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶69 Professor 
Blinka 
cites 
Lievrouw 
v. 
Roth, 
157 
Wis. 2d 332, 351-52, 459 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1990), as does the 
majority opinion.14  The Lievrouw court ruled that an expert 
witness's opinion may not be admissible on a "legal concept for 
which the jury needs definitional instructions."  In Lievrouw, 
the court determined that a witness's opinion regarding the 
existence of an "emergency" was admissible because "emergency" 
was not defined for the jury and was not a "term of art."15  
¶70 By admitting the doctor's expert opinion testimony on 
the defendant's intoxication, the circuit court permitted 
exactly the kind of confusing expert testimony on an ultimate 
legal concept that was held inadmissible under Lievrouw.   
¶71 More can be and has been written on the meaning, 
application, continued vitality, and nuances of Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.04 and the proper phrasing of questions for the expert to 
comply with the rule.  For the purposes of this dissent in the 
present case, I do not write on the rule at length.  I think it 
important to engage this issue, point out the problems with the 
majority opinion's discussion, and foster discussion of the 
rule.     
¶72 For the foregoing reasons, I join Justice Prosser's 
dissent and write separately. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Majority op., ¶¶26-27 (citing Wis. Stat. § 907.04 and 
Lievrouw, 157 Wis. 2d at 351-52). 
15 Lievrouw, 157 Wis. 2d at 351-52. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶73 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
opinion has been constructed to present a black and white 
picture of a reckless defendant.  Unfortunately, there is more 
to the story.  The facts left out are not pretty, and their 
ugliness helps explain why a Kenosha County jury deliberated 
about 20 hours, over four days, before reaching a verdict. 
¶74 When a jury deliberates for 20 hours on a seemingly 
simple case, something about the case has troubled them.  When a 
jury has deliberated for 20 hours before convicting a defendant, 
facile assurances that critical errors in the trial were 
harmless to that defendant can be unpersuasive and unsettling.  
For the reasons stated below, I believe this defendant should be 
given a new trial.  Consequently, I respectfully dissent. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶75 The defendant in this case, Luis M. Rocha-Mayo, was 19 
years old at the time of the accident.  He was an undocumented 
immigrant from Mexico whose primary language is Spanish and who 
required an interpreter throughout the criminal proceedings.  
The jury knew that many months had passed between the charges 
and the trial.1  None of this affected the jury's conscientious 
consideration of the case.  
¶76 On June 21, 2008, the defendant was at his apartment 
with family.  Between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. he consumed three beers.  
About 9 p.m., the group traveled in separate cars to El Rodeo, a 
                                                 
1 Rocha-Mayo was in custody, on $100,000 bond, from the time 
of his arrest until the time of trial, and he received 865 days 
of credit on the ten years of confinement in his bifurcated 
sentence. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
bar at the corner of 14th Avenue and 52nd Street in Kenosha.  
Over the next five hours, the defendant consumed five beers and 
ordered a sixth, which he partially consumed at the bar and took 
with him to finish in his car when he left at 2 a.m. 
¶77 Thus, between 7 p.m. on June 21 and 2 a.m. on June 22—
—seven hours——the defendant consumed at least nine beers.  He 
claimed also that between the initial three beers and the last 
six beers he drank some soda.  The defendant's drinking is not 
in dispute; the effect of his drinking is. 
¶78 When the defendant left El Rodeo, he pulled his 
vehicle onto 52nd Street and proceeded west, intending to return 
to his apartment on 40th Avenue.  Within a few blocks, three 
motorcycles entered 52nd Street from the parking lot for Coins 
Tavern, which has an address of 1714 52nd Street. 
¶79 The defendant's version of the story is that a 
motorcycle carrying two people, Curtis Martin (Martin) and 
Shawna Bestwick (Shawna), merged into the right lane directly in 
front of the defendant's vehicle.  Two other motorcycles then 
entered the street immediately behind the defendant's vehicle.  
One of these cycles was driven by Travis Bestwick (Bestwick); 
the other was driven by Jason Walters (Walters).  Bestwick was 
Shawna's brother.  He was riding Martin's motorcycle, and Martin 
was riding Bestwick's motorcycle, because Bestwick's cycle was 
better suited for carrying a passenger. 
¶80 The motorcyclists had been riding as a group, and 
apparently Bestwick and Walters became offended when members of 
the group were separated by Rocha-Mayo's car.  Walters pulled up 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
parallel to the defendant's car, alongside the driver's window.  
He yelled at Rocha-Mayo with an obscenity and gestured for him 
to pull over.  Martin and Shawna heard the yelling behind them 
and then turned off on 25th Avenue in a maneuver that enabled 
them to end up behind the defendant's car with the other 
motorcycles.  The defendant's brief reads in part as follows: 
 
At this point, Rocha Mayo testified, he sensed 
Walters and his group were looking for trouble and the 
situation felt threatening.  Realizing he now had 
three cycles around him, and believing them all in a 
mood to harm him, Rocha Mayo did not pull over as 
Walters demanded.  Instead, he resolved to continue 
home, which required he remain on 52nd Street and turn 
right 
at 
40th 
Avenue. 
 
He 
therefore 
continued 
westbound at the approximate speed limit, just hoping 
to get home. 
¶81 Walters pulled back behind Rocha-Mayo's car.  He 
reached into his jacket for an expandable metal baton and 
flicked it open with the wrist of his right hand.  He then 
accelerated his bike to the left of the defendant's car and 
launched the metal baton at the car's rear window while 
traveling at high speed.  The baton shattered the rear window of 
the car and landed on the floor in front of the passenger's 
seat.  Glass fragments flew throughout the car.  Bestwick 
followed Walters past the defendant's car.  The defendant's 
brief explains: 
 
From Rocha Mayo's perspective, his premonition of 
danger suddenly became a rude reality when his rear 
window exploded as two cycles roared by him on the 
left.  The explosion caused Rocha Mayo to momentarily 
duck and he was convinced he was going to get hit.  
When 
he 
regained 
his 
wits, 
he 
instinctively 
accelerated because another cycle was behind him, in 
addition to the two cycles now in front of him, and he 
was scared.  He feared another assault from the rear.  
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
Although still in the right lane and somewhere near 
30th and 33rd Avenues, he resolved not to turn off on 
40th Avenue so the cyclists would not learn where he 
lived. 
¶82 After Walters' baton shattered Rocha-Mayo's window, 
Rocha-Mayo and the two motorcycles in front of him speeded 
westward on 52nd Street at approximately 70 miles per hour.  The 
third motorcycle followed for several blocks, then turned off on 
39th Avenue.  Rocha-Mayo testified, however, that he continued 
to believe he was being pursued by the third cycle, so that he 
thought he had two cycles ahead of him and one cycle behind him.  
As noted, he did not slow down to turn off on 40th Avenue, 
allegedly because he was afraid he would be followed to his 
apartment. 
¶83 The ostensible "race" with the three vehicles on 52nd 
Street continued for more than 20 blocks until the vehicles came 
to the intersection with Green Bay Road.  The defendant's brief 
reads as follows: 
As the vehicles approached that intersection, the stop 
light for westbound traffic was red . . . .  The two 
westbound lanes, that were also free of traffic, 
widened first to three lanes (a dedicated left turn 
lane) and then to four lanes (a shorter dedicated 
right turn lane). . . .  Rocha Mayo believed he still 
had a third cycle behind him. . . .  
 
As the vehicles neared the intersection, Bestwick 
and Walters, via hand signals (but unbeknownst to 
Rocha Mayo), decided to attempt a right turn onto 
North Green Bay Road, a maneuver the State's accident 
investigator agreed would have been impossible at 
their speed.  Rocha Mayo was still in the right hand 
lane and from his perspective, Walters and Bestwick 
were off to the left in front of him.  Suddenly 
Walters 
braked, 
but 
realized 
a 
turn 
would 
be 
impossible, and wound up sliding into and stopping in 
the middle of the intersection.  Bestwick, however, 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
attempted the turn and moved to the right, directly in 
front of Rocha Mayo's vehicle, while braking.  Rocha 
Mayo could not react fast enough to avoid striking 
Bestwick. 
¶84 Rocha-Mayo's 
vehicle 
collided 
with 
Bestwick's 
motorcycle.  Bestwick, who had not been wearing a helmet, was 
thrown from the cycle and eventually died of blunt force trauma 
to the head.  Rocha-Mayo was injured in the crash, was found by 
police lying in pain in nearby grass, and like Bestwick, was 
transported to a hospital. 
¶85 Walters, according to testimony at the trial, came to 
a complete stop in the intersection, looked around from the 
vantage point where he could see both vehicles at a complete 
rest, with Bestwick lying in the street.  Walters then took off 
southbound on Green Bay Road as a police car approached. 
¶86 Walters called Shawna about the accident, and she and 
Martin quickly drove to the accident scene.  However, they left 
without telling police of their knowledge or involvement and 
waited more than 19 hours before contacting authorities.  When 
they came to talk, the motorcyclists blamed the tragic events 
entirely on Rocha-Mayo.  Whether the motorcyclists had been 
operating under the influence was never established, in large 
part because they absented themselves from authorities.  None of 
the motorcyclists, including the baton-launching Walters, was 
ever charged with any offense.2 
                                                 
2 Motorcycles have been a rich and important part of 
Wisconsin history.  Nothing in this dissent is intended to imply 
any 
criticism 
whatsoever 
of 
the 
overwhelming 
number 
of 
responsible motorcycle owners and operators in this state. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
¶87 Bestwick died on Sunday, June 22, 2008.  The following 
day, Rocha-Mayo was charged with second-degree reckless homicide 
with a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.06(1), 
939.50(3)(d), and 939.63(1)(b), a Class D felony. 
¶88 Following a preliminary examination on July 2, 2008, 
the State filed an information charging Rocha-Mayo with three 
offenses: 
(1) First-degree reckless homicide, with use of a 
dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02(1), 
939.50(3)(b), and 939.63(1)(b), a Class B felony instead of 
the Class D felony originally charged. 
(2) First-degree reckless endangerment, with use of a 
dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1), 
939.50(3)(f), and 939.63(1)(b), a Class F felony.  The 
information 
asserted 
that 
Rocha-Mayo 
"did 
recklessly 
endanger 
the 
safety 
of 
Jason 
A. 
Walters, 
under 
circumstances which show utter disregard for human life." 
(3) Operating without a valid license causing death 
to another person, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 343.05(5)(b)3d 
and 939.51(3)(a), a Class A misdemeanor. 
¶89 Seven months later, on February 11, 2009, the State 
moved the circuit court to amend the information to add a fourth 
charge of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.09(1)(a) and 939.50(3)(d), a Class 
D felony.  The motion was granted by Circuit Judge Bruce 
Schroeder.  In his motion, District Attorney Robert Zapf wrote: 
At the court hearing on the defendant's motion to 
adjourn the trial date, the Court inquired whether the 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
State was intending to pursue any alcohol related 
charges.  At that time, this writer advised the Court 
that I did not think the BAC test performed by the 
hospital would be admissible.  However, your affiant 
has reviewed all of the evidence and reconsidered its 
original position. 
¶90 Rocha-Mayo 
thereafter 
successfully 
moved 
Judge 
Schroeder to recuse himself from the case.  Judge Wilbur W. 
Warren III was assigned to the case. 
¶91 The facts stated above closely follow the defendant's 
brief and obviously convey the defendant's perspective on some 
of the facts.  Significantly, however, the State did not rewrite 
the statement of facts.  Rather, the State said: 
Rocha-Mayo's statement of facts consists largely of 
facts about the criminal incident itself, from the 
viewpoint most favorable to him.  Because the criminal 
incident facts are not directly pertinent to the legal 
issues, the State will not present a counter statement 
of criminal incident facts.  By declining to do so, 
the State does not in any way intend to agree with 
Rocha-Mayo's partisan presentation of the facts.  The 
evidence presented, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the State as it must be after conviction, was 
sufficient 
to 
prove 
Rocha-Mayo 
guilty 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt. 
¶92 The facts above, presented in large part from the 
defendant's perspective, are damaging to the defendant.  But 
they also suggest the possibility that Bestwick's tragic death 
would not have happened but for actions initiated by Walters and 
the other motorcyclists.  This was Rocha-Mayo's explanation from 
the day of his arrest and his defense throughout the trial.  It 
underlies his position now.  Consequently, the issues presented 
in this review are integrally related to the specific felonies 
with which Rocha-Mayo was charged and convicted, and the 
specific facts leading up to Bestwick's death.  If the issues 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
presented by the defendant reveal errors in the trial, it is 
very, very difficult to assert that these errors did not 
"contribute" to the verdict. 
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE PBT RESULT 
¶93 Rocha-Mayo states his first issue as follows: "whether 
Wisconsin's breath testing regimen allows the State to present 
evidence of a PBT result in an OWI prosecution to quantitatively 
prove the defendant was under the influence of an intoxicant, 
simply because the PBT was not administered by law enforcement." 
¶94 Following the accident, Rocha-Mayo was taken to the 
emergency room at St. Catherine's Medical Center.  The State's 
brief states that Rocha-Mayo was strapped to a backboard and had 
swollen lips and blood on his face; he was confused and emitted 
an obvious odor of alcohol.  The State's brief goes on to 
describe how Dr. William Falco, the emergency room doctor, 
almost immediately ordered the emergency room nurse, Steven 
Edwards, to do a breath alcohol test to try to determine whether 
Rocha Mayo's confusion was caused by a head injury or alcohol.  
The defendant's brief states, "Nurse Edwards complied, Rocha 
Mayo consented and cooperated, and a PBT test result of 0.086 
was taken.  It was a single sample test."   
¶95 Prior to trial, Rocha-Mayo moved to suppress the 
result of the PBT obtained at the hospital emergency room.  
Rocha-Mayo argued that the result of the test was inadmissible 
under Wis. Stat. § 343.303.  After a hearing, the circuit court 
disagreed and admitted the test result at trial. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶96 This issue——the admissibility of the PBT result in a 
trial involving traffic-related offenses, including homicide by 
intoxicated use of a motor vehicle——is surely the reason the 
court took this case.  Significantly, no one on the court is 
prepared to say that the circuit court correctly admitted the 
evidence. 
¶97 In State v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, ¶4, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 
778 N.W.2d 629, the court unanimously held that "Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 343.303 expressly bars PBT results in OWI cases."  After 
joining the opinion, Justice Ziegler concurred, stating, "I 
conclude that as a matter of law PBT results are neither 
reliable nor admissible for the purpose of confirming or 
dispelling a defendant's specific alcohol concentration in an 
OWI or PAC trial."  Id., ¶37 (Ziegler, J., concurring, joined by 
Justices Roggensack and Gableman).   
¶98 In her concurrence in the present case, Justice 
Ziegler adds that "the legislature has spoken and PBT results 
are not admissible for the purpose of confirming or dispelling 
intoxication or a specific alcohol concentration when these 
considerations are an element of the crime."  Concurrence, ¶43. 
¶99 Against this background, the majority nonetheless is 
willing to decide the case by assuming, without deciding, "that 
the circuit court erred when it allowed the State to admit, as 
evidence, the PBT result obtained by a medical professional for 
diagnostic purposes," majority op., ¶4, and then affirming 
Rocha-Mayo's convictions on the basis of harmless error. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
¶100 In this case, assuming error rather than deciding 
error has the unfortunate effect of ducking a vital issue that 
should 
be 
decided 
and 
burying 
the 
reasons 
for 
an 
"inadmissibility" ruling. 
¶101 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.303 reads as follows: 
Preliminary breath screening test.  If a law 
enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that 
the person is violating or has violated s. 346.63(1) 
or (2m) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith, 
or s. 346.63(2) or (6) or 940.25 or s. 940.09 where 
the offense involved the use of a vehicle, or if the 
officer detects any presence of alcohol, a controlled 
substance, controlled substance analog or other drug, 
or a combination thereof, on a person driving or 
operating or on duty time with respect to a commercial 
motor vehicle or has reason to believe that the person 
is violating or has violated s. 346.63(7) or a local 
ordinance in conformity therewith, the officer, prior 
to an arrest, may request the person to provide a 
sample of his or her breath for a preliminary breath 
screening 
test 
using 
a 
device 
approved 
by 
the 
department for this purpose.  The result of this 
preliminary breath screening test may be used by the 
law enforcement officer for the purpose of deciding 
whether or not the person shall be arrested for a 
violation of s. 346.63(1), (2m), (5) or (7) or a local 
ordinance in conformity therewith, or s. 346.63(2) or 
(6), 940.09(1) or 940.25 and whether or not to require 
or request chemical tests as authorized under s. 
343.305(3).  The result of the preliminary breath 
screening test shall not be admissible in any action 
or proceeding except to show probable cause for an 
arrest, if the arrest is challenged, or to prove that 
a chemical test was properly required or requested of 
a person under s. 343.305(3).  Following the screening 
test, additional tests may be required or requested of 
the driver under s. 343.305(3).  The general penalty 
provision under s. 939.61(1) does not apply to a 
refusal to take a preliminary breath screening test. 
¶102 The most important sentence in this section is: "The 
result of the preliminary breath screening test shall not be 
admissible in any action or proceeding except to show probable 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
cause for an arrest, if the arrest is challenged, or to prove 
that a chemical test was properly required or requested of a 
person under s. 343.305(3)."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶103 The 
title 
of 
§ 343.303 
is 
"Preliminary 
breath 
screening test."  The phrase "preliminary breath screening test" 
appears four times in the text of the section.  The key word 
among the four words is "preliminary," and that word is wholly 
consistent with the expectation that "additional tests may be 
required or requested of the driver under s. 343.305(3)."  Id. 
¶104 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305 is entitled "Tests for 
intoxication; 
administrative 
suspension 
and 
court-ordered 
revocation."  This section outlines the tests for intoxication 
that are admissible in evidence in traffic-related prosecutions.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(5)(d) provides in part: 
[T]he results of a test administered in accordance 
with this section are admissible on the issue of 
whether the person was under the influence of an 
intoxicant . . . to 
a 
degree 
which 
renders 
him . . . incapable of safely driving . . . or any 
issue relating to the person's alcohol concentration.  
Test results shall be given the effect required under 
s. 885.235.3 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 885.235(1g) reads in part:  
 
In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was under the 
influence 
of 
an 
intoxicant . . . evidence 
of 
the 
amount 
of 
alcohol 
in 
the 
person's 
breath, 
is 
admissible on the issue of whether he . . . was under 
the influence of an intoxicant or had a prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration 
or 
a 
specified 
alcohol 
concentration if the sample was taken within 3 hours 
after the event to be proved.  The chemical analysis 
shall be given effect as follows without requiring any 
expert testimony as to its effect: 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
These tests include taking a sample of the person's breath, 
consistent with the "techniques or methods of performing 
chemical analysis of the breath" set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(6)(b) and (c). 
¶105 The 
Department 
of 
Transportation's 
(DOT) 
administrative rules, as required by statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(6)(b), spell out in detail the approved techniques and 
methods for performing chemical analysis of the breath.  See 
Wis. Admin. Code § TRANS 311.06 (Mar. 2012).  Much of Rocha-
Mayo's argument seeks to show that the test taken at the 
hospital emergency room, the result of which was admitted at 
trial, did not satisfy the requirements set out in statute and 
rules, thereby rendering the result not only inadmissible but 
also unreliable. 
¶106 The distinction between breath tests admissible under 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(5)(d) and Wis. Stat. § 885.235 and PBTs 
inadmissible under Wis. Stat. § 343.303 is highlighted in Wis. 
Admin Code § TRANS 311 in the definition section, which 
distinguishes 
"Quantitative 
breath 
alcohol 
analysis" 
from 
"Qualitative breath alcohol analysis." 
¶107 "'Qualitative breath alcohol analysis' means a test of 
a person's breath, the results of which indicate the presence or 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
. . . .  
 
(c) The fact that the analysis shows that the 
person had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more is 
prima facie evidence that he . . . was under the 
influence of an intoxicant and is prima facie evidence 
that he . . . had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or 
more. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
13 
 
absence of alcohol."  Wis. Admin. Code § TRANS 311.03(12) (Mar. 
2012).  "'Quantitative breath alcohol analysis' means a chemical 
test of a person's breath which yields a specific result in 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath."  Wis. Admin. Code 
§ Trans 311.03(13) (Mar. 2012).  Wisconsin Admin. Code § TRANS 
311.06(2) 
explains 
that 
"[t]echniques 
used 
in 
performing 
quantitative breath alcohol analysis shall be those which are 
designed 
to 
assure 
accuracy, 
detect 
malfunctions 
and 
to 
safeguard 
personnel 
and 
equipment." 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  
Wisconsin Admin. Code § TRANS 311.06(5) provides only that 
"[m]ethods and techniques used in performing qualitative breath 
alcohol 
analysis 
shall 
be 
approved 
by 
the 
department."  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶108 In testimony at trial, Susan Hackworthy, chief of the 
chemical test section, Division of State Patrol, in the DOT, 
explained that "The qualitatives are PBT and the quantitatives 
are evidential."  She also testified that the Alco-Sensor IV, 
the PBT device used at St. Catherine's Medical Center, is not 
certified by the DOT for evidentiary use in Wisconsin courts and 
that the DOT does not certify breath testing devices in the 
private sector. 
¶109 Rocha-Mayo's trial counsel cross-examined Hackworthy 
on various procedures in the administrative rules designed to 
assure accuracy in test results and to avoid error——procedures 
that are required to be followed in "evidential" tests but are 
not part of the ordinary regimen for PBTs.  The State's expert 
grudgingly acknowledged: "A preliminary breath test is generally 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
14 
 
not allowed in an OWI trial in front of a jury."  She further 
acknowledged in response to hypothetical questions that in the 
absence of certain protocols, a breath test would not satisfy 
State Patrol guidelines for evidence.  In this case, several of 
the protocols were not met in the hospital PBT, including an 
assurance that Rocha-Mayo did not have an unusual amount of 
mouth alcohol because of his recent drinking or the accident, 
which affected both his head and his chest. 
¶110 To sum up, Wis. Stat. § 343.303 provides that a 
preliminary breath screening test is not admissible in any 
action or proceeding except as authorized by that statute.  When 
court decisions have deviated from this statutory directive, 
they have deviated only in cases that did not involve traffic 
enforcement and did not require a quantitative analysis that 
shows "a specific result in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath."  Wis. Admin. Code § TRANS 311.03(13) (Mar. 2012).  In 
this case, the admission of the PBT result does not fit within 
any plausible exception to the statutory directive and comes 
with few of the protocols that assure the integrity and 
reliability of the tests authorized by Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3). 
¶111 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.303 creates a regimen that 
encourages a driver's cooperation with law enforcement inasmuch 
as the test result is inadmissible, except as provided by 
statute, and a refusal to take the PBT strengthens the probable 
cause for an arrest.  Permitting the results of PBTs taken in 
hospital settings to be used later against hospital patients in 
court will engender distrust between doctors and patients and 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
15 
 
create disincentives for patients to comply with the requests of 
their doctors.  Once courts open the door to use of PBT results 
without 
safeguards 
and 
without 
legislative 
authorization, 
evasions of the directive in § 343.303 will become commonplace, 
and the essential purpose of the statute will be thwarted. 
CORRECTNESS OF MODIFIED JURY INSTRUCTION 1185 
 
¶112 Rocha-Mayo's second issue is "whether it was error to 
instruct the jury it could find, based solely on a qualitative 
test result, that Rocha-Mayo was intoxicated at the time of the 
accident." 
 
¶113 The majority's response to this question is, "[W]e 
assume, without deciding, that the circuit court erred under 
these circumstances in utilizing Wis JI——Criminal 1185 to 
instruct the jury on its use of the PBT evidence," majority op., 
¶4, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id., 
¶5. 
 
¶114 The circuit court gave the following instruction in 
relation to the third element of the offense charged under Wis. 
Stat. § 940.09(1)(a), namely, that the defendant was under the 
influence of an intoxicant at the time the defendant operated a 
vehicle. 
The third element is the defendant was under the 
influence of an intoxicant at the time the defendant 
operated a vehicle.  
"Under the influence of an intoxicant" means that 
the defendant's ability to operate a vehicle was 
materially impaired because of consumption of an 
alcoholic beverage.  
Not every person who has consumed alcoholic 
beverages is "under the influence" as that term is 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
16 
 
used here.  What must be established is that the 
person has consumed a sufficient amount of alcohol to 
cause the person to be less able to exercise the clear 
judgment and steady hand necessary to handle and 
control a motor vehicle. 
It is not required that impaired ability to 
operate be demonstrated by particular acts of unsafe 
driving.  What is required is that the person's 
ability to safely control the vehicle be materially 
impaired.  
The law states that the alcohol concentration in 
a defendant's breath sample taken within three hours 
of operating a vehicle is evidence of the defendant's 
alcohol concentration at the time of the operating.  
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that there was .08 grams or more of alcohol in 210 
liters of the defendant's breath at the time the test 
was taken, you may find that the defendant was under 
the influence of an intoxicant at the time of the 
alleged operating, but you are not required to do so.  
You, the jury, are here to decide this question on the 
basis of all the evidence in this case, and you should 
not find the defendant was under the influence of an 
intoxicant at the time of the alleged operating, 
unless you are satisfied of that fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
¶115 The circuit court omitted four words from the standard 
instruction when it gave the instruction above: namely, "from 
that fact alone."  Normally, the last paragraph of the 
instruction reads: 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that there was .08 grams or more of alcohol in 210 
liters of the defendant's breath at the time the test 
was taken, you may find from that fact alone that the 
defendant was under the influence of an intoxicant at 
the time of the alleged operating, but you are not 
required to do so.  You the jury are here to decide 
this question on the basis of all the evidence in this 
case, and you should not find that the defendant was 
under the influence of an intoxicant at the time of 
the alleged operating, unless you are satisfied of 
that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
17 
 
Wis JI——Criminal 1185. 
 
¶116 The wording of the standard instruction makes clear 
that it is derived from Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1g)(c) and is 
intended to be used for a test authorized by Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(3), not a PBT authorized under Wis. Stat. § 343.303.  
Removal of the four words really changes nothing, because the 
standard instruction never requires the jury to find that the 
defendant was under the influence of an intoxicant.  The 
instruction as written and the instruction as modified both 
authorize or permit the jury to find a defendant guilty if it is 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had .08 
grams or more of alcohol in 210 liters of his breath at the time 
the test was taken.  After all, to quote the instruction, "The 
law states that the alcohol concentration in a defendant's 
breath sample taken within three hours of operating a vehicle is 
evidence of the defendant's alcohol concentration at the time of 
the operating," and the test result was .086. 
¶117 Immediately following instruction 1185 cited above, 
the court gave an instruction in relation to the defendant's 
defense: 
 
Wisconsin law provides that it is a defense to 
this crime if the death would have occurred even if 
the defendant had been exercising due care and had not 
been under the influence of an intoxicant. 
 
The burden is on the defendant to prove by 
evidence which satisfies you to a reasonable certainty 
by the greater weight of the credible evidence that 
this defense is established. 
 
"By the greater weight of the credible evidence" 
is meant evidence which, when weighed against that 
opposed to it, has more convincing power.  "Credible 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
18 
 
evidence" is evidence which in the light of reason and 
common sense is worthy of belief. 
 
Evidence has been received relating to the 
conduct of Travis Bestwick at the time of the alleged 
crime.  Any failure by Travis Bestwick to exercise due 
care does not by itself provide a defense to the crime 
charged against the defendant.  Consider evidence of 
the conduct of Travis Bestwick in deciding whether the 
defendant has established that the death would have 
occurred even if the defendant had not been under the 
influence of an intoxicant and had been exercising due 
care. 
 
If you are satisfied to a reasonable certainty by 
the greater weight of the credible evidence that this 
defense is proved, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
 
If 
you 
are 
not 
satisfied 
to 
a 
reasonable 
certainty by the greater weight of the credible 
evidence that this defense is proved and you are 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that all elements 
of this offense have been proved, you should find the 
defendant guilty. 
 
If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that all elements of this offense have been 
proved, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
 
¶118 More than anything else in the court's instructions to 
the jury, these paragraphs relate to Rocha-Mayo's explanation 
and defense of his conduct.  But the quoted paragraphs 
immediately followed a potent instruction that should not have 
been given. 
HARMLESS ERROR 
 
¶119 The majority assumes, even if it does not concede, two 
critical errors in Rocha-Mayo's trial.  It dismisses these 
errors as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by pointing to 
evidence sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
19 
 
 
¶120 In State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶45, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 
816 N.W.2d 270, this court repeated the classic test for 
harmless error: whether it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty 
absent the error."  Id. (quoting State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 
¶49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189).  But the court added 
valuable commentary: 
Framed a different way, an "error is harmless if the 
beneficiary of the error proves 'beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained.'"  State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, 
¶47, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115 (quoting State v. 
Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶114, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 
N.W.2d 74).  Therefore, this court must be satisfied, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, not that the jury could 
have 
convicted 
the 
defendant 
(i.e., 
sufficient 
evidence existed to convict the defendant), State v. 
Weed, 
2003 
WI 
85, 
¶28, 
263 
Wis. 2d 434, 
666 
N.W.2d 485, but rather that the jury would have 
arrived at the same verdict had the error not 
occurred.  See Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶46 (quoting 
[Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)]). 
Id. (citation omitted). 
¶121 The court went on to cite several factors that assist 
a court's analysis of whether an error is harmless.  Id., ¶46.  
These factors include "the importance of the erroneously 
admitted evidence" and "the nature of the defense."  Id. 
¶122 It would be hard for this writer to contend that the 
defendant would not have been convicted and should not have been 
convicted of something for his role in Bestwick's death.  The 
issue, however, is whether the jury would have arrived at the 
same verdict on all the offenses charged had the errors not 
occurred. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
20 
 
¶123 It must be remembered that the Kenosha County District 
Attorney did not charge Rocha-Mayo with a violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) (homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle) 
until many months after the accident because he did not have an 
authorized breath or blood test, and he thought the PBT result 
was inadmissible.  If he had not been encouraged to file this 
charge with the implication that the PBT result would be 
admitted, he might never have filed the charge at all. 
¶124 If the test result had not been admitted, the jury 
would not have had any numerical evidence of the amount of 
alcohol in the defendant's breath.  If the test result had not 
been admitted, the court likely would not have read the disputed 
portion of Wis JI——Criminal 1185, even if a homicide by 
intoxicated use of a vehicle charge had been filed. 
¶125 Erroneously admitting the PBT result as legitimate 
evidence gave scientific support to Dr. William Falco's opinion 
testimony that the defendant was intoxicated.  This testimony, 
whether it was correct or incorrect, would have been much less 
powerful absent the PBT result. 
¶126 In short, to assert not only that the jury could have 
convicted the defendant of Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) but also 
that the jury would have convicted the defendant of that 
offense——beyond a reasonable doubt——without the inadmissible PBT 
result and the mistaken instruction——is not persuasive because 
it greatly undervalues the effect of having a chemical test of 
the defendant's breath, blood, or urine as evidence in a 
criminal prosecution. 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
21 
 
¶127 But the effect of the two errors may have been even 
greater. 
¶128 Rocha-Mayo had a recognized legal defense to the 
charge of homicide by operation of a motor vehicle while under 
the influence——a defense alluded to in Judge Warren's jury 
instructions.  He did not have an equivalent legal defense to 
the charges under Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02 and 941.30.  Nonetheless, 
Rocha-Mayo did have an avenue for attacking the element of 
"circumstances that show utter disregard for human life" in both 
offenses.  The jury instructions for Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02 and 
941.30 both contain the following language: 
 
In determining whether the circumstances of the 
conduct 
showed 
utter 
disregard 
for 
human 
life, 
consider these factors: what the defendant was doing; 
why the defendant was engaged in that conduct; how 
dangerous the conduct was; how obvious the danger was; 
whether the conduct showed any regard for life; and, 
all other facts and circumstances relating to the 
conduct. 
Wis JI——Criminal 1020, 1345 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 
¶129 The comment to Wis JI——Criminal 1020 for first-degree 
reckless homicide observes, "All the circumstances relating to 
the defendant's conduct should be considered in determining 
whether that conduct shows 'utter disregard' for human life.  
These circumstances would include facts relating to the possible 
provocation of the defendant."  The comment continues: "Evidence 
of provocation will usually be admissible in prosecutions for 
crimes 
requiring 
criminal 
recklessness . . . (and, 
in 
prosecutions under this section, whether the circumstances show 
utter disregard for human life)."  Comment, Wis JI——Criminal 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
22 
 
1020 (quoting Judicial Council Note to § 940.02, 1987 S.B. 191).  
Similar language is found in the Comment to Wis JI——Criminal 
1345 related to first-degree recklessly endangering safety. 
 
¶130 Wisconsin Jury Instruction 1185 invited the jury to 
find the defendant guilty of operating his vehicle under the 
influence and causing the death of Bestwick because of the .086 
PBT result.  Any juror who accepted that invitation was likely 
to disregard Rocha-Mayo's legal defense and likely to dismiss 
the effect of provocation in evaluating an attack on the element 
of "utter disregard for human life." 
 
¶131 The admission of inadmissible evidence and the faulty 
instruction that was given because of the admission of that 
inadmissible evidence were critically tied to all three felony 
convictions.  
 
¶132 The jury deliberated in Rocha-Mayo's case for about 20 
hours, over four days, before rendering its verdict.  It twice 
advised the court that the jurors were deadlocked.  When the 
verdicts finally came, many of the jurors cried as the verdicts 
were read. 
 
¶133 When an admired circuit court judge instructed the 
jury "upon the principles of law which you are to follow in 
considering the evidence," he made this statement: "It is your 
duty to follow all of these instructions.  Regardless of any 
opinion you may have about what the law is or ought to be, you 
must base your verdict on the law I give you in these 
instructions." 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
23 
 
 
¶134 The jury struggled to discharge its duty.  It agonized 
over its decision.  For the court now to say that two critical 
errors at trial were harmless in their effect on the jury is to 
deny reality and forget our purpose as a reviewing court. 
¶135 Because I believe the defendant must be given a new 
trial, I respectfully dissent. 
¶136 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP2548-CR.dtp 
 
 
 
1