Case Title: Hamilton v. Lethem

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPRENE COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

 

00

of AMBER J. LETHEM,

LILY E, HAMILTON, on behalf
a minor, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee.

 

 
 

CHRIS L, LETHEM, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant

 

No. 27580

  

CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APP}
(FC-DA NO. 05-1-1977)

oss

OCTOBER 14, 2008

21 wd 4 1308

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.; AND
RCOBA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

on September 23, 2008, this court accepted a timely

application for a writ of certiorari, filed on August 14, 2008,
by petitioner/defendant-appellant chris L. Lethem (Father),
seeking review of the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (ICA) June

23, 2008 judgment on appeal, entered pursuant to its May 16, 2008

See Hamilton v. Lethem, No.

‘Therein,

 

sumary disposition order (SO)

27580 (App. May 16, 2008) (Foley, J., dissenting).
ICA -- after holding that the underlying appeal brought by Father

 
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was moot -- vacated the Family Court of the First Circuit's

(2) September 23, 2005 ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO)

 

issued against Father; (2) October 23, 2005 order regarding the
TRO; and (3) March 3, 2006 Findings of Fact (FOFs) and
Conclusions of Law (COs) [hereinafter, collectively, the TRO,
FOFs, and COLs] and remanded the case to the family court with
ingtructions to dismiss the underlying case.

Briefly stated, respondent/plaintiff-appellee Lily ©.
Hamilton (Mother), on behalf of her then-fifteen-year-old
daughter (Minor), obtained a TRO against Father based upon
Father's alleged physical and psychological abuse of Minor. At
the show cause hearing on the TRO, Father unsuccessfully asserted

the parental justification defense.? ultimately, the family

1 the Monorable Darryl ¥.C. Chey presided over the underlying
proceedings.

2 the parental justification defense, codified at Hawai'i Revised
Statutes lithe) § 703-309 (1093), 4a, contained in the ‘General Principl

tisieation* section of the Hawai'i Penal Code and provides én relevant
parts

 

 

‘The use of force upon or toxard the person of another
Ae justifiable under the following clreunstancea:
(2) "The actor is the parent or guardian or other
person similarly responsible for the general
Care and supervision of a minor, or @ person
acting at the request of the parent, guardian,
Of other responsible person, and
(a) The force is employed with die
Fogard for the age and size of
Sinor and is reasonably relaced to
the purpose of safeguarding oF
promoting the welfare of the minor,
including the prevention oF
punishnent of the minor’s
Eisconauet; and

      

 

  

 

(continued...)

 
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court confirmed the TRO, allowing it to remain in effect until
December 22, 2005 (the TRO’s original ninety-day term). The TRO
expired during the pendency of Father’s appeal. Consequently,

the ICA unanimously held that, because Father's appeal did not

 

fall within any of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine, the
appeal was noct. A majority of the ICA, however, proceeded to
vacate the family court’s TRO, FOFs, and CoLs, remanding the case
with instructions to the family court to dismiss the underlying
case. The dissent disagreed, opining that the appeal should be
dismissed.

Father argues on application that the ICA erred when it
determined his appeal did not fall within any of the exceptions

to the moctness doctrine. As such, Father contends that the ICA

 

erred in dismissing his appeal without addressing the merits.’
Based upon the discussion below, we hold that the ICA
erred in failing to address the merits of Father's appeal. We,

therefore, vacate the ICA’s June 23, 2008 judgment on appeal and

*( continued)
() The force used is not designed to
Gause of known to create a risk of
‘Sausing substancial bodsly infury,
Aietigurenent, extrene pain oF
mental distress, or neurological
danage.

 

 

 

> on direct appeal before the ICA, Father essentially argued that,
(2) RS chapter 586 unconstitutionally “infringes upon a parent's right)
Giscipline and vaise [nie or her] children without governsental interference”
aa sparental discipline is not child or dosestic abuse"; and (2) the family
Court abused its discretion in finding that past acte of abuse had occurred

 

 

 
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remand this case to the ICA with instructions to address the
merits of Father's appeal, consistent with this opinion.

1. BACKGROUND
Fam!) x!

 

As succinctly summarized by the ICA:

(on September 23, 2005, [Mother], on behalf of [Minorl,
£4100 an ox parte perition for a {TRO} against Father under
lms} ¢'se6-3 (1993 4 Supp. 2004). Father allegedly had
physically and psychologically abused (Minor) on and prior
to August 25, 2008, by striking her during a heated argun
about che (Minor’s{ assisting a friend in obtaining a Biren
Control product. The (TKO), granted on September 23, 2005,
bad an expiration date of Décenber 22, 2005.

‘AE a hearing on October 5, 2005, the iflanily [clourt
found the TRO was justified{*) and [ruled]. that no further
action was necessary. It ite Order Regarding (TRO), filed
the came day, the (family) court declared no further acti

 

 

 

     

 

 

‘me tantly court's ruling was based in part upon HRS § 586-4ic)
(2006), wich provides:

‘he family court judge may issue the ex parte [7R0}
orally, if the person being restrained is present in court.
‘Te order shail state that there is probable cause to
believe that a past act or acts of abuse have occurred, or
that threats of abuse wake it probable that acts of abuse
may be imminent. The order further shall state that the
(70) te necessary for the purposes of preventing acts of
abuse of preventing a recurrence of actual donestie abuse;
land enauring a period of separation of the parties involved.
he order shall aiso describe in reasonable devall the act
or acts sought to be restrained, Where necessary, the order
may require either or both of the parties involved to Leave
the pronices during the period of the order, and also may
Featrain the party oF partion to whom St is\directed from
Contacting, threatening, or physically abusing the
applicant's fanily or household members, The order shalt
net only be binding upon the parties to the action, but also
upon their officers, agents, servante, employees, attorneys,
oF any other persona in active concert or participation with
then. The order shall enjoin the respondent or person to be
Festrained fron performing any combination of the following
acts

 

 

 

   

 

 

(2) Contacting, threatening, or physically abusing
the protected party:

(2) Contacting, threatening, or physically
abusing any person residing at the
protected party’s residence: or

(3) Entering of visiting the protected party's
resid

 

 

 

 
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would be taken and that the TRO would expire on its om on
December 22, 2005

 

$00 at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
Additionally, at the close of the hearing, Father's
counel argued that, pursuant to the parental justification
defense, gee supra note 2, the events that transpired between
Father and Minor were not ‘an abuse situation,” but, instead,

what we really have {# = daughter who's you
Find a way not to follow the rules, and a dad who
fo enforce those rules. and the evo things are just in
Senflict, and that’s exactly when it is appropriate to use
discipline.

 

   

 

‘The family court, however, rejected Father's argunent, orally
ruling that ‘what happened in this [case] was not parental
discipline. oa those grounds, this court is compelled to grant
. .. this restraining order. As you know, this [sic] will be no
further action. (The court believes that the restraint was
justified.

on Novenber 3, 2005, Father tinely filed his notice of
‘appeal from the family court's October 5, 2005 order.
Thereafter, on March 3, 2008, the family court -- at the request
of Father -- entered its FOFs and cols. Of particular relevance
to the instant application are the following cous:

‘The material allegations of the petition have been
proven. (Father) ig the father of (Minor) and statutory
Blood relationship has been established. [Father] id
physically harm, injure(] or assault(] {linor] by striking
her on August 25, 2005 and by threatening her with further
physical har.

(Father! has raised parenta) discipline under Inns
701-309(a) 1. However, that section applies to criminal not
civil actions. moreover, while ir would appear that (¥inor]
was disciplined by (rather] for assisting her friend with
obtaining a birth control product, discipline over issues of
morals lies with (Mother), who has sole legal and physical

 

 

 

     

“5.
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custody. Assuming additionally that (Father) struck [xinor]
because of her Fetusal to discuss this inmse late during a
school night, the court concludes that such an action is not
proper parental discipline.

‘The court, therefore, concludes that the allegations
support of the [TRO] have been prove(n) and that allowing
the order to remain in full force and effect neil the set
expiration date of Decenber 22, 2005 as requested by
IMother} ie justified,

Appeal Before the ICA

  

    

 

    

 

on appeal, Father (appearing pre ge) challenged the
family court's FOFs and Cols. Father essentially argued that:

(2) BRS chapter 586 (governing domestic abuse protective orders)
unconstitutionally "infringes upon a parent’s right{] to
Giscipline and raise (his or her] children without governmental
interference’ as “parental discipline is not child or domestic
abuse"; and (2) the family court abused its discretion in finding
that past acts of abuse had occurred. Although recognizing that
the TRO had expired,” Father nevertheless contended that his
appeal was not moot. In his view, the TRO’s effect on Mother's
and Father's ongoing custody case with respect to Minor ~~ of

which he asked the ICA to take judicial notice -- ‘was dramatic,

 

unfair, wrong[,] and significant.*' Further, Father argued that,

5 Father filed Bis opening brief on May 19, 2006, five month after the
Decenber 22, 2005 expiration of the TRO

* we note shat, although Father requested the ICA take judicial notice
of the custody case, he failed co provide the relevant file(s) with hie
appeal

 
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even if his appeal was moot, it fell within the exceptions to the
mootness doctrine.

In response, Mother contended, inter alia, that

 

(1) Father's appeal was moot because the TRO expired on December
22, 2005; (2) Father did not and could not “demonstrate that the
(family) court’s [F0Fs were) ‘clearly erroneous'*; and
(3) Father's contention that the entry of the TRO was erroneous
was without merit because Mother had sole legal and physical
custody of Minor, ané, as such, she had the “sole right to
determine the manner of discipline of said minor." Thus, Mother
requested that the ICA dismiss Father's appeal as moot.

on May 16, 2008, the ICA, in a 2-1 SD0, held that
Father's appeal was moot and that it did not fall within any
exceptions to the moctness doctrine, discussed more fully infra.

S00 at 2-4. However, as previously stated, the ICA, relying on

 

its decision in McCabe Hamilton & Renny Co. v. Chung, 98 Hawai'i
107, 43 P.3a 244 (App. 2002) (holding that imposition of issue
preclusion where appellate review has been frustrated by mootness
4s obviously unfair) [hereinafter McCabe), vacated the family
court’s TRO, FOFs, and COLs, remanding the case to the family

court with instructions to dismiss the underlying action. SDO at

 

As discussed more fully infra, this court has recognized two
‘exceptions to the mootness doctrine (1) the public interest exception; and
(2) "the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception. See Doe v
Dog, 116 Hawai't 323, 427 ned, 272 P.34 1067, 1071 n.4 (2007) (noting the
Dablic interest exception and the capable of repetition, yet evading review
Exception are "separate and distinct)

 
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5-6. Specifically, the majority concluded that, in li

 

MoCabe,

  

Father's appeal from the September 23, 2005 TRO (and the
related orders) [was] moct(,] and we do not reach the seri
ef his points on appeal. see Johnston v. tng, 50 Haw. 379,
81, 441 P.24 138, 140 (1968) (noting That “appellate cot
will not consider soot questions"). rm reaching this
Conclusion, we note chat the mootases of this case was not
tke result of any action taken by (Plather. Because we
uable to reach the merits of Father's claim, we vacate
{[flanily {elourt's orders so that they will fot have any
issue preclusive effect.

      

        

 

       

Ud. at 5. Consequently, the ICA remanded the case to fami.

 

court ‘with direction to dismiss the action." Id. at 6.

Contrary to the majority’s position, Associate Judge
Foley, in his two-sentence dissent, declared that, inasmuch as
Father's appeal was moot, it should have simply been dismissed.
Dissenting Op. at 1. In support of its position, the dissent
cites to this court's decision in Lathrop v, Sakatani, 111
Hawai'i 307, 312-13, 141 P.34 480, 485-86 (2006) (dismissing the
appeal as moot because the appellants failed to seek a stay on
the execution of the circuit court's order expunging the
Lis pendens and the property was sold to a third party pending
appeal).

‘The ICA entered its judgment on appeal on June 23,
2008. On August 14, 2008, Father filed his application for a

weit of certiorari. Mother did not file a response.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

It is axionatic that mootness is an issue of subject
matter jurisdiction. ‘whether a court possesses subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law reviewable de novo."
Kaho'chanohano v, Dep‘t of Hunan Serv., 117 Hawai'i 262, 281, 178
P.3d 538, 557 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) .

TIT. DISCUSSION

As previously stated, Father -- arguing pro
s@ -- contends that the ICA erred in its application of the
mootness doctrine to the facts of his case. Specifically, Father
argues that his appeal falls within at least one of the
exceptions to the mootness doctrine.

Tt is well-settled that:

‘The mootness doctrine ie said to encompass
circunatances that destroy the justiciabiiity of a suit
previously suitable for derersination. Pit another way, the
Bult must renain alive throughout the course of litigation
to the nonent of final appellate disposition. Its chief
purpose ie to ageure that the adversary system, once set in
Eperation, resains properly fueled. The doctrine seems
appropriate where events subsequent to the judgment of the
tial court have so affected the relations between the
parties that the two conditions for Justiciability relevant
Sa appeal =~ adverse interest and effective renedy == hat
been’ compromised

Lathrop, 111 at 312-13, 141 P.34 at 485-86 (citations omitted)

   

 
 

 

(format altered); see also In xe Doe Children, 105 Hawai'i 38,
57, 93 P.34 1145, 1164 (2004) (stating that “the two conditions
for justiciability relevant on appeal [are] adverse interest and

effective remedy").

 
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In this case, the TRO issued by the family court
expired on December 22, 2005, two years and six months before the

ICA issued its SDO. Thus, the ICA believed that Father’s appeal

 

was moot because “the expiration of the TRO prevent{ed the ICA)

from providing an effective remedy." SD0 at 3 (citations

 

omitted). However, this court has explicitly recognized two
exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" exception [hereinafter, CRER
exception]; and (2) the public interest exception. see Doe vw.
Pog, 116 Hawai'i 323, 327 n.4, 172 P.3d 1067, 1071 n.d (2007)
(noting the public interest and CRER exceptions are “separate and
Gistinct"). Additionally, although never explicitly adopted by
this court, the ICA, in In re Doe, 81 Hawai'i 91, 912 P.2d 588
(app. 1996), adopted and applied another mootness exception --
the ‘collateral consequences” exception -- which Father argues
should be adopted by this court. Accordingly, the issue here, as
framed by Father in his application, is whether any of the
aforementioned exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply, thereby

requiring review of the merits of his appeal. we, therefor

 

review each exception in turn,
With regard to the first exception, this court has

stated:

‘The phrase, ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
a court will sot diemige s cage on the grounds
here a challenged governsental action would
review because the passage of tine would prevent
plaintife from remaining subject to the

 

 

       

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restriction complained of for the period necessary to

  

Inxe Thomas, 73 Haw. 223, 226-27, 832 P.24 253, 255 (1992)
(citation omitted) .

Here, the ICA concluded that “there [was] no reasonable
expectation that the precise factual situation underlying this
Gispute is likely to recur and, therefore, the facts in this case
[were] not capable of repetition, yet evading review, within the
meaning of the recognized exception to mootness.* SD0 at 3-4.
(citations omitted) .

Father argues that the ICA erred by failing to hold

 

that his appeal fell within the CRER exception because
the iamue Se. . . whether @ challenged governmental action
would evade £11 review due solely to the passage of time(-]
Undoubtedly, the iswue of a (ninety-)day TRO ~~ tt
Challenged governmental action (--] would always re
Sn expiration pricr to appellate review

  

ae in

 

Additionally, Father alleges that he continues to seek custody of
the parties’ youngest daughter." Thus, he argues that the sane
situation is capable of repetition inasmuch as a “reasonable
person could conclude that Father has before and will again move
for custody of (Minor-sister,] and Mother, with or without her
attorney, will apply for another . . . ex arte TRO on behalf of

[Minor-sister) to prevent a custody decision on the merits."

 

+ the record reveals that Father and Mother have a daughter who is
younger than Minor, Although the age of che younger daughter is not
Bpecifically reflected in the record, both parties appear to agree that she 1s
currently a minor (hereinafter, Kinor-sister].

 

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Conversely, Mother contended on direct appeal that
Father's case did not fall within any of the exceptions to the

mootness doctrine inasmuch as

 

[tlhe present case, as with all other 780 cases involving
snily nember[, was] based on the facts of each
(family cloure sust decide on a case by case
basis whether the acte of an alleged perpetrator arise
to such @ Level that an order for protection should art

   

sic]

   

    

Goctrine. This [clour does not have all the facts before
to sake sich a decision

 

We believe that a TRO, by its very nature, will always
evade review because it would, as it did here, expire within the
initial ninety-day term. See HRS § 586-5 (2006) (stating that a
TRO granted pursuant to chapter 586 shall not exceed ninety
Gays). ‘The ICA seemingly agrees, having held in Yccabe that
*TROS, because of their fundamentally fleeting nature, will in
most instances evade review." 98 Hawai'i at 120, 43 P.3d at 257.
‘Thus, the issue here is whether the factual situation underlying
this case is “capable of repetition."

In McCabe, the ICA determined that an ex parte TRO
entered against one employee in favor of a group of other
employees, pursuant to Hawai"! Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP)
Rule €5 (2007) (governing the issuance of TROs), was rendered
moot due to the TRO's expiration. 98 Hawai'i at 117, 43 P.3d at
254. ‘The McCabe court concluded that the appellants’ contention,
seu, that the factual situation presented was ‘capable of

repetition,” was "mere speculation[]" because “there [was

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nothing ia jenonstrateld) a Le
empectation that the alleed violation (would! recur.’" id. at
119, 43 P3d at 256. (emphases added) (citation omitted). The
McCabe court, therefore, held that the case did not fall within
the CRER exception. Id.

Here, Minor, during the pendency of this appeal,
reached the age of majority and, as such, can no longer be the
subject of Father's and Mother’s custody dispute. $00 at 4.
‘Thus, with regard to Minor, there is no ‘reasonable expectation’
that the factual situation presented in this case could or would
recur, Father, nevertheless, argues that, because there remains
a dispute between Mother and Father regarding the custody of
Minor-sister, the factual situation presented is capable of
repetition. However, there is no evidence in the record that
Father *has moved before and will again move for custody of
IMinor-sister,] and Mother, with or without her attorney, will
apply for another . . . 9x parte TRO on behalf of (minor-sister]
to prevent a custody decision on the merits.* Although Father
cites to the family court case that allegedly involved Father's
and Mother‘s custody over Minor-sister, he has failed to include

such case as part of the record on appeal. Thus, "there is

» we note that the Mecabe court did not address the merits of
appellant's appeal but, nevertheless, vacated the TRO issued by the circuit
SBurt and remanded the case for dismiesal in order to prevent the TRO, "which
fwas] unreviewsble because of mootness, fron spawning any regal consequences.
Se tewal't at 121, G2 P.2d at 258 (eltations and internal quotation marks
emitted)

 

 

 

 

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nothing in the record that demonstrates a ‘reasonable expectation
that the alleged violation will recur.’* MeCabe, 98 Hawai'i ar
119, 43 P.3d at 256 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude
that Father’s “contention that the precise factual situation
underlying this dispute is likely to recur is ‘too conjectural
for appellate review.’* Id. (citation omitted) .

With regard to the second exception to the mootness
doctrine, this court has recently stated: “When analyzing the
public interest exception, [this court] look[s] to (1) the public
or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability
of an authoritative determination for future guidance of public
officers, and (3) the likelihood of future recurrence of the
question." oe v, Doe, 116 Hawai'i 323, 327, 172 P.3d 1067, 1071
(2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The ICA
sunmarily concluded that “the dispute in this case is of a
private nature and it does not involve questions that affect the
public interest.” spo at 3.

Father argues that his appeal falls within the public
interest exception because the underlying issues affect “the
fundamental rights of many Hawai'i families . . . specifically
given the conflict between a parent applying for a HRS [chapter]
586 ex parte TRO, on behalf of a minor, based on the other parent
exercising their parental rights to discipline . . . their
child.” Father additionally contends that "the facts of this
appeal demonstrate the significant and problematic abuses with

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such TRO processes, and the negative harmful effect on families

and that, therefore, the issue waether the parental discipline

 

defense applies in TRO proceedings "requires authoritative

guidance from [this court]." We disagree.
Although Father contends that the TRO affects his
constitutional right to raise his children, such right is
personal to Father. As such, the question presented is of a
private nature. Conversely, the cases in this jurisdiction that
have applied the public interest exception have focused largely
on political or legislative issues that affect a significant
number of Hawai'i residents. For example, in Doe, we held that
the public interest exception applied because it was "in the
public's interest for this court to review the family court's
ruling that Hawaii's grandparent visitation statute [was]

unconstitutional on its face." 116 Hawai‘i at 327, 172 P.3d at

 

1071. Additionally, in Kaho'chanohano v, State, 114 Hawai'i 302,
162 P.3d 696 (2007), this court held that the subject appeal was
of a public nature because the outcome would affect all state and
county employees. Id. at 333, 162 P.3d at 727, Likewise, in
Right to Know Committee v. City & County of Honolulu, 117 Hawai‘
1, 175 P.34 111 (App. 2007), the ICA held that the question
presented was of a public nature because the issue whether the
City council must conduct its business in full view of the public
and in compliance with the Sunshine Law was more public in nature

than private. Id, at 9, 175 P.3d at 119. In the instant case,

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Father has not provided any evidence in the record that the

issues presented in his appeal involve political or legislative

  

matters that will affect a significant number of people. Thus,

inasmuch as Father’s appeal is of a purt

 

y personal nature, it
fails to meet the first prong of the public interest exception
Accordingly, the ICA was correct in concluding that Father's
appeal “does not involve questions that affect the public
interest." S00 at 3

We turn next to the “collateral consequences" exception
to the mootness doctrine. Although never explicitly adopted by
this court, the ‘collateral consequences” exception to the

mootness doctrine, as previously indicated, was adopted and

 

applied by the ICA in In-re Dos, 81 Hawai'i 91, 912 P.24 588
(app. 1996). In Dog, the ICA determined that an appeal by a
father from a family court order awarding full legal and physical
custody of the father’s and mother’s children to the mother was
not moot because, although an anended divorce order had been
entered, “the case appealed ha[d) substantial continuing
collateral consequences on the {father]." id. at 99, 912 7.24 at
596. Specifically, the ICA -- citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 392
U.S. 234 (1968)-~ held that, *in addition to any other impact it
may have on his life, the result of Father’s appeal will have a
Girect impact on his rights to visit his children.” I,

However, the ICA's decision in Doe does not provide much guidance

with regard to what ‘collateral consequences” should be

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considered when determining whether this exception to the
mootness doctrine applies

Likewise, Carafas provides only limited guidance as to
what factors a court should consider when applying the
“collateral consequences” exception to the mootness doctrine. In
Caratas, the Court granted certiorari to determine the sole issue
whether the expiration of appellant’s sentence while he was
awaiting appellate review terminated federal jurisdiction due to
mootness. 391 U.S. at 237. Ultimately, the Court determined
that the appeal was not moot due to the “collateral consequences”
flowing from the appellant's conviction. Id, at 237-38. in
particular, the Court pointed out that appellant could not, as a
result of his conviction, engage in certain businesses, serve as
an official of a labor union for a specified period of time, vote
in any election, or serve as a juror, Id, Inasmuch as the
Garafas Court determined that the appellant’s appeal was not
moot, it remanded the case for a decision on the merits. Id. at
241-42.

on direct appeal in the instant case, Father urged the
ICA to adopt the reasoning of the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Putman v, Kennedy, 900 A.24 1256 (Conn. 2006). Therein, the
Putman court was faced with the sole issue whether an appeal by a
former husband from two separate domestic viclence restraining
orders entered in favor of former wife and against former husband
was moot. 900 A.2d at 1258. During the pendency of the appeal,

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qROs expired. Id, However, the Putman court concluded that
the expiration of a donestic violence restraining order does not
render an appeal from that order moot because it is reasonably
possible that there will be significant collateral consequences
for the person subject to the order." Id, at 1258-59
Specifically, the Putman court held that:

‘To invoke successfully the col

 

.teral consequences doctrine,

the litigant guut ghow cha: there is o resonable
possibility that preiudictal col laversl eonsequences vil

peo - =
a

Dot this standard provides the necessary Timieations on
festiclabilicy underlying the mootness doctrine itsel!
mere there is no direct practical relief avaliable from the
Feversal of the Judgment, as
doctrine acte a
mn whether a deci ‘the case can afford the
Litigant some practical relief in the fut)
‘The array of collateral consequence:
aismissal on sootness grounds is
Excludes tarm toe defendant's reputation
Sudgnent at issue. ["*)

Id. at 1261-62 (emphases added) (citations, internal quotation

 

  

    
    

 

 

 

     

 

narks, and original brackets omitted). ‘The Putman court reasoned
that, in the case before it, "the threat of reputation[al] harm
[was] particularly significant . . . because domestic violence
restraining orders [dol not issue in the absence of the showing
of a threat of violence[.]* Id. at 1262 (emphasis added). Thus,
the court concluded that ‘being the subject of a court order

intended to prevent or stop domestic violence may well cause harm

ag support for this proposition, che putuan court pointed to a
number of cases within its jurisdiction that had Fecogaized harm to reputation
as a valid collateral consequence in situations other than those involv:

iGo restraining orders that precluded disniseal of a cage a

     

   

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to the reputation and legal record of the defendant. id. at
1263. In so concluding, the court relied on cases from other
jurisdictions which have examined the collateral consequences of
domestic violence restraining orders and opined that such cases
represent the majority view *that appeals fron domestic violence

restraining orders are not rendered moot by their expiration.*

 

Id, at 1263-64. Specifically, the Putman court agreed with other

 

courts that have concluded that reputational harm is a collateral
consequence of donestic violence TRos because of the *legitinate
public contempt for abusers,” “enhanced technology for
information dissemination," and the *social stigma" of a
“protective order granted based on a finding of family
violencel.]* Id, (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Additionally, the Putman court agreed that a
collateral consequence also includes the legal ramifications
flowing from the issuance of domestic violence THOs because of

their “effect in future bail proceedings » future

 

presentence investigations, in-court impeachments{,] and child

 

custody determinations." Id, (citations omitted).

 

4 im support of its view, the Butuan court relied on the following

Roark vs Roark, $51 8.6.24 865, 868-69 (Ind. App. 1990)

noting ‘potestially devastating" collateral consequences

for parent of expired "child in need of services’ order,
cluding impacts on fut

in-court inpeschnents and child custody determinations) ;
perv. Laven, 726-R.24 687{, 891) (ud. 11999)
‘expiration of the protective order does not automatically

render the matter most because of *(hJeightened public.

(continued...)

     

 

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Accordingly, the Putnam court held that the former husband's case
was not moot and remanded the case *for consideration of the
merits." Id. at 1266.

A number of other jurisdictions have adopted
“collateral consequences" as an exception to the mootness
doctrine. Of particular relevance to the instant case (due to
its similar factual background) is a case from the Ohio Court of
Appeals, Wilder v. Perna, 883 N.E.2d 1095 (Ohio ct. app. 2007).
in Wilder, the court concluded that an appeal by a father froma
restraining order filed by the mother, seeking to protect the
parties’ minor child, was not rendered moot by the restraining
order's expiration "because it [was] reasonably possible that

adverse collateral consequences may occur." 883 N.E.2d at 1099.

 

5 (continued)
‘avareness and sensitivity to the existence of domestic
Violence, as well as legitinate public contempt for abusers*
fend enhanced technology for information disserinat ion):

vot 700 No.2 296(, 298) ( (Mass,

App. Ct. 11998) (appeal from abuse prevention order not
rendered soot by order's expiration because of its

collateral consequences, including effect in future bail

proceedings and other “atigna'); Suithy. suith, .. . 549

S..24 912[, 914) (IN.C. Ce. App. 12001) (expired domestic

jience protective order not moot because of "collateral

Tegal consequences’* such as consideration in custody

Geternination and “non-legal collateral consequences" such

fas reputation{al] harm) games v, Hubbard, 21 8.W.3d 558,

560. (Pex. app. 2000) (~[alienoagh expired tenporary,

rote 1g orders have been

Considered moot, none of these cases has carried the sane

Social stigma ag a protective order granted based on =

fading of faxily violence) in-re Interest of HO.

449 Now.24 75, 77-78] [Wis] Ce. App. 1989) (expired child

abuse protective order not moot because of possibie effect

on custody determination in inpending divorce)

 

  

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

      

 

 

Putman, 900 A.24 at 1264 (footnote omitted)

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Specifically, the Wilder court -- quoting Putman -- held that:

. iat art
stent of Thus, Inasmuch as we

Breviously have recognized the importance of reputation
Ganage as a collateral consequence in other contexts, we see
no reason not co 9 e0 here, for

 

Hav wall cause han to the remtation and teasl record of
‘Ensdstenaans.
Moreover, donestic violence restraining orders

 

have other collateral legai disabilities for their subjects.
Gace filed, they are available to agencies investigating,
future allegations involving the sane family, and a trial
judge making a future custody.

ight consider the issuance of
Festraining order in naking that sensitive decision. zhus.
4m the sensitive and often emlosively litigated context of

 

 

 

exe ot
Ne
have oteiudicial coljateral Leanl consequences tor its

‘iblect. even after ite expiration. Accordingly, ene
Subject of an improperly rendered donestic violence
Festraining order in iikely to benefit from the vacatur of
that order, and dismissal of his or her appeal az moot
solely on the basis of that order's expiration 1s improper.

Id. (quoting Butman, 900 A.24 at 1262-63) (emphases added)

 

 

(ellipses onitted). tm other words, the Wilder court, like the
Putman court, determined that there was a reasonable possibility
that an expired domestic violence restraining order would have
collateral consequences to the appellants’ reputation and legal

record “because donestic violence restraining orders will not

 

issue in the absence of the showing of a threat of violence.
Id, Inasmuch as the Wilder court determined that the appeal was
not moot, it "proceed{ed] to address the merits of the appeal.’

14.

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Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded by the line of
cases that have adopted the collateral consequences exception to
the mootness doctrine in cases involving domestic violence TROs
where there "is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial
collateral consequences will occur’ as a result of the entry of
the TRO. We, therefore, explicitly adopt -~ as has the ICA
-- the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine
in this jurisdiction. Accordingly, we now examine its
application in the context of this case

The ICA reviewed the collateral consequences exception
in light of the facts of the case at bar and held:

Father claims generally that proceedings related to custody
and visitation of (Minor) may be affected by the ieaued TRO.
He also claine reputational harm from the TRO and the
Felated findings, At thie point, [Minor] is no longer a
Binor and Pather's laine that he will suffer negative
Collaterat consequences are too speculative to show that he

1"sutfer substantial continuing collateral consequences
from the September 23, 2005 TRO.

 

 

 

 

sD0 at 4, Father generally challenges the ICA’s holding,

contending that the ICA’s "remedy regarding

 

‘sue preclusion and

vacating the TRO orders is not meaningful enough because the fact

 

remains the TRO orders were issued and the vacating was not done
on the merits.*

In Hawai'i, a family court TRO cannot be entered
without a finding “that a past act or acts of abuse have
occurred, or that threats of abuse make it probable that acts of

abuse may be inminent." HRS § 586-4(c). Moreover, the family

court’s issuance of the TRO in the instant case was accompanied

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by COLs, which stated, inter alia, that “Lfather! nysicall
ha let ." (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether it is
“reasonably possible" that the unreviewed findings and

conclusions of the family court, , that Father is a child

 

abuser, will cause reputational or other harm to Father:
‘The issue whether the entry of a family court TRO
against an individual harms that person’s reputation is an issue
of first impression in this jurisdiction; however, our decision
in State v. Bani, 97 Hawai'i 285, 36 P.3d 1255 (2001), provides
some guidance in determining what constitutes reputational
harm. In Bani, we were faced with the issue whether Hawaii‘s
sex offender registration and notification statute was
constitutional. Id, at 286, 36 P.3d at 1256. In holding the
statute unconstitutional, the Bani court reasoned that the

statute's public notification provisions were “likely to cause

% We have previously recognized the importance of reputational damage
in other Contexts, ae well, See, 2.34, 113 Hawai 174,
Ai, 150 P.3d 823, 830 (2006) (holding thac the proper standard of proof for a
civi fraudulent transfer proceeding was the ‘and convincing standard of
proof inasmich as a finding of Liability for a fraudulent transfer produces
Peputational harm that should act be inflicted absent that degree of proof):

7 100 Hawai'i 149, 171, 58 P.3a 1196, 1218
(2002) (recogaiting that the tort of defasation protects the interest of
reputation). Ses also 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (holding that
harm to reputation coupled with some nore tangible interest is sufficient to
Snveke the Due Process Clause)

 

   

  

 

 

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irreparable harm to Bani’s reputation and professional life,
employment opportunities, association with neighbors, and choice

of housing.” Id. at 296, 36 P.3d at 1266. Specifically, we held

 

that the statute’s public notification provisions: (1) implied
that Bani ‘was potentially dangerous, thereby undermining his
reputation and standing in the community"; (2) could result in
“(plotential employers and landlords . . . foreseeably be[ing)

reluctant to employ or rent to Bani once they learn of his status

as a ‘sex offender’"; and (3) could adversely affect Bani‘s

 

“personal and professional life, employability, associations with
neighbors, [and] choice of housing." zd. at 294-96, 36 P.3d at
1264-66 (citations omitted). Additionally, we reasoned that
“public disclosure may encourage vigilantism and may expose the
offender to possible physical violence." Id, at 291-92, 36 P.3d
at 1261-62 (footnote omitted). In so reasoning, we relied on
Bohn v. Dakota County, 772 F.2d 1433 (Sth cir. 1985), for the
analogous proposition that there was ‘a protectable interest in
reputation where the stigna of being identified as a child abuser

was tied to the protectable i

 

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family relationships.*® ani, 97 Hawai'i at 296, 36 P.3d at 1266

(citing Bohn, 772 ¥.24 at 1436 n.4).

 

Although the TRO issued against Father is, admittedly,

less serious than Bani’s conviction as a sex offender, the TRO

was issued by the family court based upon its express ruling that

*{Father] did physically harm, injure{] or assault(] [Minor]
Such ruling implies that Father is a child abuser and is,

therefore, ‘potentially dangerous, thereby undermining his

According to the court in Bohn, Mr. Bohn

forcibly interceded to break up @ fight between his two
fons, one of whom hen ran to. neighbor's house as a
Feaule. The incident prompted an investigation by the
Dakota ‘County Departnent of Social Services [hereinafter,
the Department]; which concluded that there was “substantial
evidence’ of child abuse by the Bohns. Although the Bohne
Sieputed this conclusion, the Department assigned a child
protection worker to the case... and the social worker
et with the Sohne and the:r children repeatediy in an
Rttenpt to renedy the presumed problens #teming fron the
aleged child abuse.

 

 

72 F.2d at 1434-35. The Bons, through a variety of legal and political
‘attempted to clear the record of the(] charges, but their efforts
Mere geierally ineffective,’ Id, at 1435. ‘hus, the Sohne filed an action in
federal district court arguing, inter alia, that’ sdeficient, adxinistrative
Brocedures for contesting of appealing @ finding of child abuse violate the
fourteenth amendment.” Id. at 1434, Although the Boba court ultinately
Gstersined thar the Bohn Teceived sufficsent due process, it first addressed
Whether the bonne had a protectable linerty interest st stake so 25 to trigger
‘analysis. id at 1435-36, Specifically, the Bohn court noted

   

 

 

 

 

‘The stigma Mr. Bohn suffers a a reported child abuser
Undoubtesly has eroded the family’s solidarity internally
tnd impaired the faniiy's ability to function in the
Gormunity. In light of these clear adverse effects on
familial integrity and stability, we find that Mr. nohn’s
reputation is'a protectibie [sic] interest. Because this
Stigna strikes so directly at the vitality of the family, we
find the reputation interest at stake to be clea
Gistinguishable from (other cases in which the] record of
petty crimes vas tied £0 no other protectible [eic)

 

 

 

Bobp, 772 F.2d at 1436 ne
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reputation and standing in the community." id, at 294, 36 P.3d
at 1264. Additionally, unlike Bani, the issuance of the TRO
against Father did not require him to register in a public
Gatabase; however, the TRO, once issued, became part of the
public record. As such, there is a reasonable possibility that
*[plotential employers and landlords [might be) reluctant to
employ or rent to [Father] once they learn of his status as a
(‘child abuser’}." Id, at 295, 36 P.3d at 1265. Indeed,
pursuant to HRS chapter 586, any THO issued under such chapter
must be copied to the appropriate law enforcement agency, HRS

§ 586-10 (2006), and reported to the department of human services
for investigation, HRS § 586-10.5 (2006). Thus, the issuance of
the 7R0 could also adversely affect Father’s “personal and
professional life, employability, associations with neighbors,
[and] choice of housing.* Bani, 97 Hawai"i at 296, 36 P.3d at
1266.

Accordingly, there is a ‘reasonable possibility” that
the family court’s issuance of the TRO against Father, which was
based upon its findings and conclusions that Father abused his
daughter, will cause harn to Father’s reputation. Consequently,
we conclude that Father's appeal falls within the collateral
consequences exception to the mootness doctrine. We, therefore,
vacate the ICA’s judgment on appeal and remand this case to the

ICA for consideration of the merite of Father‘s appeal.

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We are, indeed, cognizant that doing 60 may be to
Father's detriment inasmuch as the TRO, FOFs, and COLs wilt be
treinstated* and that the underlying case will not be dismissed
as previously instructed by the ICA. As such, if Father pursues
custody of Minor-sister as he insists he will, it is reasonably
possible that the TRO, FOFs, and COLs that Father abused Minor
could have prejudicial legal consequences to Father.
consequently, allowing the ICA‘s decision to stand would be
beneficial, at least in part, to Father inasmuch as the vacation
and dismissal would effectively nullify the legal effects of the
TRO, FOFs, and COLs. However, the ICA's solution to dismiss the
underlying action so as to prevent the subject documents “from
spawning any legal consequences," SD0 at 5 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), fails to take into account the fact
that the documents thenselves will remain in the court's case
file and continue to be a matter of public record. See HRS

§ 606-4 (1993) and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Circuit Court of
the state of Hawai'i (RCCH)

Under HRS § 606

 

the “clerks of the supreme,
intermediate appellate court, circuit, and district courts shall
have custody of ali records . . . pertaining to their respective
courts.* As the custodian of records, all court clerks are bound
by RCCH Rule 6, which was promulgated by the supreme court

pursuant to the responsibility delegated to it under HRS

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§ 602-5.5(b) (Supp. 2007).%* The rule states in relevant part
that *[t]he clerk shall permit no pleading or paper to be taken
from his custody [i.e., removed from the record] except as .
ordered by the judge.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, although the
subject documents have been ordered vacated and the underlying
case dismissed by the ICA, the physical file will not be
destroyed and will remain available and subject to inspection and
copying. Indeed, as this court has observed in In re Estate of
Campbell, 106 Hawai'i 453, 106 P.34 1096 (2005), *the public
generally has the right, established by the common law, to
inspect and copy . . . judicial records." Id. at 463, 106 P.34
at 1106 (citation, internal quotation marks, brackets, and
original ellipsis omitted).

It is apparent from Father‘s briefs and application
that the legal ramifications of the TRO case and related
Gocunents are not the focus of his appeal. He is clearly seeking

a review of the merits of his appeal, hoping to “clear his name"

 

as he firmly believes he did not abuse Minor, but was simply
attempting to discipline his child as he believes is his

constitutional right as a parent

MaRS § 602-5.5(b} provides in relevant part that ‘the suprene court
shall determine the care, custody, and disposition of all judiciary case
Hiscat, and administrative records."

 

 

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Iv. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we adopt the collateral
consequences exception to the mootness doctrine in this
Jurisdiction and hold that, because there is a reasonable
possibility that the family court's issuance of the TRO against
Father will cause harm to Father's reputation, we vacate the
ICA's June 23, 2008 judgment on appeal and remand the case to the
ICA with instructions to address the merits of Father's case.
See Pelosi v. Wailea Ranch Estates, 91 Hawai'i 478, 486, 985 P.2d
1045, 1053 (1999) (remanding case to the ICA for reconsideration

in Light of this court’s holding)

Robert H. Thomas (of a,
Damon Key Leong Kupchak a

Hastert), for petitioner/

defendant-appellant am

seeghen 7. Hioki, for
Eespondent/pleintitf-appetiee, Rissa Creede panes

on the record
Bom Rats

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