Case Title: Smith v. May

Citation: 2020-Ohio-61

Docket Number: 2018-0369

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Smith v. May, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-61.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-61 
SMITH, APPELLANT, v. MAY,1 WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Smith v. May, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-61.] 
Habeas corpus—R.C. 2152.12(G)—Challenge based on juvenile court’s alleged 
failure to fully comply with all procedural requirements for transferring 
petitioner’s case from juvenile court to common pleas court—Common 
pleas court in petitioner’s criminal case did not lack subject-matter 
jurisdiction—Court of appeals’ denial of writ of habeas corpus affirmed—
Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 656 N.E.2d 1282 (1995), overruled. 
(No. 2018-0369—Submitted August 6, 2019—Decided January 14, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County, No. 17 CA 37,  
2018-Ohio-300. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
                                                 
1.  Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B), Harold May, the current warden of Richland Correctional 
Institution, is automatically substituted for David Marquis, the former warden, as a party to this 
action. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 1} In 2012, four delinquency complaints were filed in juvenile court 
against appellant, Ja’Relle Smith, who was then 16 years old.  Based on his age and 
the severity of the charges, the cases were transferred to adult court, where Smith was 
convicted of five felony counts and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 16 years.  
In 2017, he filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Fifth District 
Court of Appeals alleging that the juvenile court had not fully complied with the 
procedures for transferring jurisdiction to the adult court, because it had not timely 
notified his father of a hearing in one of the juvenile-court cases that led to the transfer 
of some of the charges.  The court denied the writ, and Smith appeals here as of right. 
{¶ 2} We appointed counsel for Smith and ordered supplemental briefing 
regarding whether the juvenile court’s noncompliant notice was a defect that 
deprived the adult court of subject-matter jurisdiction.  We hold that the failure to 
provide timely notice did not prevent the juvenile court from transferring subject-
matter jurisdiction to the adult court.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals’ 
judgment. 
I.  THE BINDOVER STATUTE 
{¶ 3} Under R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), “[t]he juvenile court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction * * * [c]oncerning any child who on or about the date specified in the 
complaint, indictment, or information is alleged * * * to be * * * a delinquent * * * 
child.”  But if a child2 is old enough and is alleged to have committed an act that 
would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court may (or may be 
required to) transfer its jurisdiction to the appropriate adult court for criminal 
prosecution.  See R.C. 2152.10(A) (eligibility for mandatory transfer) and 
2152.10(B) (eligibility for discretionary transfer).  This transfer occurs through a 
statutory process that “is generally referred to as a bindover procedure.”  State v. 
Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995). 
                                                 
2.  As relevant here, “child” is generally defined in both R.C. 2151.011(B)(6) and 2152.02(C)(1) as 
a person under age 18. 
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{¶ 4} The procedural requirements for bindover are provided in R.C. 
2152.12.  In general terms, if a child appears to be eligible for mandatory transfer, 
the juvenile court must conduct a hearing to determine whether he meets the 
eligibility criteria and whether there is probable cause to believe that he committed 
the act charged.  See R.C. 2152.12(A)(1); see also Juv. R. 30(A).  When a child 
appears to be eligible for discretionary transfer, the juvenile court, in addition to 
determining eligibility and probable cause, must determine whether the child is 
“amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system” and whether “the 
safety of the community * * * require[s] that the child be subject to adult sanctions.”  
R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). 
{¶ 5} Unless the alleged juvenile offender is taken into custody or 
apprehended after age 21, he “shall [not] be prosecuted as an adult” for the offense 
“unless [he] has been transferred as provided in” R.C. 2152.12(A) or (B).  R.C. 
2152.12(H).  Such a transfer “abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect 
to the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint, and, upon the transfer, * * * the case 
then shall be within the jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred.”  R.C. 
2152.12(I). 
{¶ 6} This appeal involves the bindover statute’s notice provision, R.C. 
2152.12(G), which provides that a juvenile court “shall give notice in writing of the 
time, place, and purpose of any hearing held pursuant to division (A) or (B) of this 
section to the child’s parents, guardian, or other custodian and to the child’s counsel 
at least three days prior to the hearing.” 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Juvenile and criminal proceedings 
{¶ 7} In 2012, the state filed four delinquency complaints3 against Smith in 
Summit County Juvenile Court related to three different robberies.  Because each of 
                                                 
3.  A fifth delinquency complaint filed by the state is not relevant to this appeal. 
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the charged offenses was a “category two offense” involving a firearm and Smith 
was 16 years old at the time, he appeared to be eligible for mandatory transfer to adult 
court under R.C. 2152.10(A)(2).  See also R.C. 2152.02(BB) (defining “category two 
offense”). 
{¶ 8} The juvenile court held a hearing on three of the delinquency 
complaints on March 22, 2012.  Smith’s father was present at that hearing.  At the 
hearing, Smith waived his right to a probable-cause hearing and stipulated to findings 
of probable cause in each case.  The juvenile court found that Smith’s cases were 
subject to mandatory transfer and transferred the cases to the general division of the 
Summit County Court of Common Pleas. 
{¶ 9} The juvenile court held a hearing on the fourth delinquency complaint 
on March 27, 2012.  Although R.C. 2152.12(G) required the court to give written 
notice of the hearing to Smith’s father at least three days in advance, the court sent 
him notice only one day in advance, and Smith’s father did not attend the hearing.  
When the juvenile court inquired about his father’s absence, Smith indicated that he 
was aware of his right to have his father present after discussing that right with his 
attorney and he agreed to proceed without him.  Then Smith waived his right to a 
probable-cause hearing and stipulated to a finding of probable cause.  The juvenile 
court then transferred the fourth case to the adult court. 
{¶ 10} In April 2012, a grand jury indicted Smith on five counts of 
aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of kidnapping, 
and one count of burglary.  Each count included a firearm specification.  Smith later 
pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated robbery (one with a firearm 
specification), one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of kidnapping.  The 
court dismissed the remaining counts and specifications and imposed an aggregate 
prison sentence of 16 years. 
{¶ 11} The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed Smith’s convictions and 
sentences.  State v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26804, 2015-Ohio-579. 
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B.  Habeas proceedings 
{¶ 12} In 2017, Smith filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Fifth 
District Court of Appeals against David Marquis, then the warden of Richland 
Correctional Institution.  Smith primarily argued that the common pleas court lacked 
jurisdiction to convict him because the juvenile court had not provided timely notice 
of the March 27, 2012 hearing to his father as required under R.C. 2152.12(G).  The 
court of appeals denied the petition.  2018-Ohio-300, ¶ 11.  The court concluded that 
R.C. 2152.12(G) did not apply to the March 27 hearing because, in its view, it was a 
pretrial hearing, not a bindover hearing.  Id. at ¶ 9.  It also determined that Smith had 
an adequate remedy at law because he could have challenged the bindover in his 
direct appeal of the common pleas court’s judgment.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 13} After Smith appealed to this court, we appointed counsel for him and 
ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on this question: “Does the procedural 
error in the juvenile-bindover proceeding create a jurisdictional defect that deprived 
the general division of the common pleas court of subject-matter jurisdiction?”  155 
Ohio St.3d 1418, 2019-Ohio-1315, 120 N.E.3d 865. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Legal standard 
{¶ 14} “A writ of habeas corpus lies in certain extraordinary circumstances 
where there is an unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty and there is no adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  Pegan v. Crawmer, 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99, 
666 N.E.2d 1091 (1996).  In general, habeas relief is available when the sentencing 
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.  Ellis v. McMackin, 65 Ohio St.3d 161, 162, 
602 N.E.2d 611 (1992); see also R.C. 2725.05. 
B.  Applicability of R.C. 2152.12(G) 
{¶ 15} The juvenile court did not comply with R.C. 2152.12(G).  While the 
statute requires that written notice be given at least three days in advance, the juvenile 
court sent Smith’s father notice only one day before the March 27 hearing.  But the 
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warden argues that R.C. 2152.12(G) did not apply to the March 27 hearing.  He says 
that it was merely a “pretrial hearing,” not a “probable cause hearing” or an 
“amenability hearing” under R.C. 2152.12(A) or (B).  The court of appeals reached 
the same conclusion.  See 2018-Ohio-300 at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 16} We reject this narrow reading of R.C. 2152.12(G), which does not 
refer to a “probable cause hearing” or an “amenability hearing” but instead to “any 
hearing held pursuant to division (A) or (B) of this section.”  The juvenile court held 
the March 27 hearing to consider the state’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction—a 
motion the state had filed pursuant to R.C. 2152.12.  As a result of that hearing, the 
juvenile court found that “transfer of this matter to the General Division is mandatory 
pursuant to” R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12.  Clearly, the March 27 hearing was “held 
pursuant to” R.C. 2152.12(A), and R.C. 2152.12(G) applied. 
C.  The subject-matter-jurisdiction question 
{¶ 17} Smith alleges that he is entitled to habeas relief because the juvenile 
court did not conduct “a proper bindover procedure.”  In Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio 
St.3d 149, 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282 (1995) (“Gaskins I”), this court held that a petition 
that alleges that a bindover was improper “state[s] a potentially good cause of action 
in habeas corpus.”  This court stated that “without a proper bindover procedure * * *, 
a juvenile court’s jurisdiction is exclusive and cannot be waived.”  Id.  And without 
a valid transfer to adult court, a juvenile’s conviction and sentence are void, and 
habeas is “an appropriate remedy despite the availability of appeal.”  Id. 
{¶ 18} But more recently, we have held that key parts of the bindover 
procedure may be waived.  See State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 
978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 21.  And we have reviewed for plain error when a juvenile failed 
to object at a bindover hearing to a juvenile court’s procedural error.  See State v. 
Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, 103 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 49.  These cases 
implicitly provide, contrary to Gaskins I, that noncompliance with a statutory 
bindover requirement does not prevent a juvenile court from transferring its subject-
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7
matter jurisdiction and does not render an adult court’s judgment void.  We must 
decide whether to adhere to Gaskins I in view of this more recent caselaw. 
1.  Gaskins I’s tenuous foundation 
{¶ 19} In Gaskins I, a prison inmate brought a habeas claim in a court of 
appeals, initially raising a constitutional challenge to his criminal conviction.  
Gaskins I at 149.  That claim was dismissed as clearly meritless.  Id. at 150.  But the 
inmate also had asked the court of appeals for leave to amend his petition to add an 
improper-bindover claim based on the juvenile court’s purported failure to have him 
undergo mental and physical examinations as required by a statute that was in effect 
at that time.  Id. at 149-150.  The court of appeals did not allow the inmate to amend 
his petition.  Id. at 150.  On appeal, we held that the court of appeals should have 
allowed the amendment and considered the bindover claim.  Id.  We stated that 
“without a proper bindover procedure * * *, a juvenile court’s jurisdiction is 
exclusive and cannot be waived.”  Id. at 151, citing Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 
N.E.2d 196, at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 20} The central holding of Gaskins I—that a juvenile offender may 
collaterally attack an adult criminal conviction in a habeas action based on a bindover 
error—has been repeated by this court numerous times.  For example, in Johnson v. 
Timmerman-Cooper, 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 617, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (2001), we granted a 
writ of habeas corpus because the bindover was substantively invalid and, as a result, 
the juvenile “had not been lawfully transferred to [the adult] court.”  In other cases, 
we have acknowledged the rule of Gaskins I but found it to be inapplicable under the 
facts of the case.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Fryerson v. Tate, 84 Ohio St.3d 481, 484-
485, 705 N.E.2d 353 (1999); Agee v. Russell, 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 544, 751 N.E.2d 
1043 (2001).  And in State v. Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 692 N.E.2d 608 (1998), a 
case concerning a defendant’s appeal of his adult-court conviction (therefore not 
involving a collateral attack), we applied Gaskins I and held that the juvenile court 
had “failed to accomplish a legal transfer of its jurisdiction” and that the criminal 
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prosecution in adult court was “void ab initio” because the juvenile court had failed 
to provide for a physical examination of the juvenile, id. at 547. 
{¶ 21} Gaskins I’s foundation was Wilson, a case in which the state 
prosecuted a juvenile in adult court under the mistaken belief that he was an adult 
when he committed his offense.  In fact, Wilson was a juvenile when he committed 
the offense, and he was never bound over from a juvenile court.  Wilson at 42, 44.  
Because Wilson had been deprived of a bindover proceeding altogether, this court 
agreed with the court of appeals that the adult court lacked jurisdiction.  We held that 
“[a]bsent a proper bindover procedure * * *, the juvenile court has the exclusive 
subject matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged to be a 
delinquent.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  And “[b]ecause the general 
division of the court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict 
Wilson, the judgment of conviction against him was void ab initio.”  Id. at 44.  See 
also State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson, 76 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 667 N.E.2d 1 (1996) 
(habeas case involving an allegedly mistaken belief that a child was an adult).  
Significantly, the Wilson court recognized that the General Assembly had compelled 
this result—the bindover statute expressly provided that “ ‘[a]ny prosecution that is 
had in a criminal court on the mistaken belief that the child was eighteen years of 
age or older at the time of the commission of the offense shall be deemed a nullity.’ 
”  (Emphasis added in Wilson.)  Wilson at 44, quoting former R.C. 2151.26(E), 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 27, 144 Ohio Laws Part II, 2745, 2747 (that provision, with 
nonsubstantive differences, is now R.C. 2152.12(H)). 
{¶ 22} Gaskins I significantly extended Wilson’s holding.  The problem in 
Wilson was that a juvenile-court proceeding had never happened at all.  The state had 
not used “the only method by which a juvenile court may relinquish its exclusive 
original jurisdiction concerning a delinquent child,” Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d at 44, 652 
N.E.2d 196.  That is quite different from Gaskins I, in which the subject-matter 
January Term, 2020 
 
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jurisdiction of a juvenile court was invoked, a bindover proceeding was held, and 
subject-matter jurisdiction ostensibly was transferred to an adult court. 
{¶ 23} What is more, Gaskins I abandoned Wilson’s analytical focus on 
statutory language.  The Wilson court rightly allowed the legislature to determine the 
sentencing court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Article IV, Section 4(B) of the 
Ohio Constitution (“The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have 
such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law” 
[emphasis added]).  The Gaskins I court, in contrast, did not examine whether the 
bindover statute expressly made the juvenile court’s error jurisdictional.  This court 
in Gaskins I simply applied Wilson’s broadly worded holding, despite the clear 
differences between the two cases. 
{¶ 24} Notably, the parties both seem to accept that Wilson’s focus on the 
statutory text was correct; they both cite United States Supreme Court cases that 
ultimately ask whether the legislature has “clearly state[d]” that a particular statutory 
requirement is jurisdictional, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-516, 
126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.E.2d 1097 (2006).  Indeed, we have used the same approach 
when deciding whether statutory requirements in other contexts are jurisdictional.  
See Pryor v. Dir., Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 148 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2907, 
68 N.E.3d 729, ¶ 14, 16; Nucorp, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 64 Ohio 
St.2d 20, 22, 412 N.E.2d 947 (1980). 
2.  The erosion of Gaskins I 
{¶ 25} When Gaskins’s case returned to this court after our remand, we 
abandoned Gaskins I’s main premise that a noncompliant bindover procedure renders 
the resulting adult criminal conviction void.  Gaskins had alleged that the juvenile 
court had failed to have him undergo mental and physical examinations, which were 
required by statute at the time.  Gaskins I, 74 Ohio St.3d at 150-151, 656 N.E.2d 
1282.  On remand, the warden presented evidence showing that Gaskins had 
affirmatively waived his right to those examinations.  Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 76 Ohio 
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St.3d 380, 381, 667 N.E.2d 1194 (1996) (“Gaskins II”).  In Gaskins I, this court had 
viewed all the requirements of the bindover procedure as jurisdictional (and thus not 
waivable).  Gaskins I at 151.  But Gaskins II held that the evidence of waiver showed 
that there had been “full compliance with the bindover procedure,” id. at 382, thus 
signaling that the mandates of the bindover statute were not jurisdictional after all. 
{¶ 26} Just last year, we validated Gaskins II.  See Johnson v. Sloan, 154 Ohio 
St.3d 476, 2018-Ohio-2120, 116 N.E.3d 91, ¶ 16-17.  And in another recent case, we 
held that a juvenile may waive the right to an amenability hearing, which is central 
to any discretionary bindover procedure.  D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-
4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, at ¶ 21.  This all shows that a bindover procedure is “proper” 
even when the juvenile waives R.C. 2152.12’s mandatory requirements.  And if the 
requirements are waivable, they are not jurisdictional.  See Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 
652 N.E.2d 196, at paragraph two of the syllabus (“The exclusive subject matter 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court cannot be waived”); State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 
325, 2011-Ohio-2880, 951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 10 (“Because subject-matter jurisdiction 
involves a court’s power to hear a case, the issue can never be waived or forfeited 
and may be raised at any time”). 
{¶ 27} While Gaskins II undermined Gaskins I by concluding that a juvenile 
may waive the bindover procedure’s statutory mandates, other cases have 
undermined Gaskins I by concluding that a juvenile may forfeit them.  In Morgan, 
we held that R.C. 2151.281(A)(1) requires a juvenile court to appoint a guardian ad 
litem at an amenability hearing when the juvenile’s parents are deceased and there is 
no guardian or legal custodian.  153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, 103 N.E.3d 
784, at ¶ 28.  But we held that noncompliance with the statute is subject to plain-error 
review.  Id. at ¶ 49.  We also reviewed for plain error in State v. Martin, another case 
in which a bindover error had occurred.  154 Ohio St.3d 513, 2018-Ohio-3226, 116 
N.E.3d 127, ¶ 27.  In these cases, we did not view an improper bindover procedure 
as a fundamental defect that prevented the juvenile court from transferring subject-
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matter jurisdiction to an adult court.  Indeed, in Martin, we distinguished Wilson, 
noting that the juvenile “was not deprived of R.C. 2152.12 bindover proceedings 
altogether.”  Martin at ¶ 25. 
3.  We overrule Gaskins I 
{¶ 28} Gaskins I wrongly extended Wilson’s holding with no analysis 
reconciling the significant differences between the two cases.  Specifically, unlike 
Wilson, Gaskins I did not involve a statutory provision expressly depriving the adult 
court of jurisdiction.  The Gaskins I court was wrong in adopting the broad rule that 
any deviation from the statutory bindover procedure renders the adult court’s 
judgment void.  The Gaskins I court should have examined the statute’s text 
concerning the specific error alleged, to determine whether the statute clearly 
established a barrier to the adult court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Pryor, 148 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2907, 68 N.E.3d 729, at ¶ 14.  That error has led to 
significant confusion about when a defendant can challenge a procedural defect in a 
juvenile-court bindover proceeding, and it necessitates this court’s clarification. 
{¶ 29} Juveniles facing bindover to an adult court maintain the right to object 
to a juvenile court’s noncompliance with bindover procedures and the right to appeal 
from any error in the ordinary course of law.  See In re D.H., 152 Ohio St.3d 310, 
2018-Ohio-17, 95 N.E.3d 389, ¶ 19.  However, we overrule Gaskins I’s holding that 
any deviation from the statutory bindover procedure creates a potentially good cause 
of action in habeas corpus.  Deviation from a bindover procedure gives rise to a 
potentially valid habeas claim only if the applicable statute clearly makes the 
procedure a prerequisite to the transfer of subject-matter jurisdiction to an adult court.  
See Pryor, 148 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2907, 68 N.E.3d 729, at ¶ 14. 
4.  Smith’s sentencing court had subject-matter jurisdiction 
{¶ 30} No language in R.C. 2152.12(G) suggests that the provision of notice 
is a prerequisite to the transfer of subject-matter jurisdiction to an adult court.  
Smith’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. 
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{¶ 31} Initially, Smith focuses on R.C. 2152.12(G)’s mandatory language—
“[t]he court shall give notice.”  According to Smith, treating the notice requirement 
as waivable or subject to forfeiture renders it nonmandatory and ineffective.  But “not 
every requirement, even if mandatory, is jurisdictional in nature.”  Pryor at ¶ 15; see 
also Martin, 154 Ohio St.3d 513, 2018-Ohio-3226, 116 N.E.3d 127, at ¶ 27 (“R.C. 
2152.021’s mandates are not jurisdictional requirements”); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 
U.S. 134, 146, 132 S.Ct. 641, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012) (“calling a rule 
nonjurisdictional does not mean that it is not mandatory or that a timely objection can 
be ignored”); Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & 
Trainmen Gen. Commt. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 81, 130 S.Ct. 584, 
175 L.Ed.2d 428 (2009), quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 
L.E.2d 1097 (“Not all mandatory ‘prescriptions, however emphatic,’ ” are properly 
classified as “ ‘jurisdictional’ ”).  Holding that R.C. 2152.12(G) is nonjurisdictional 
would not mean that notice is nonmandatory.  A juvenile still may object to 
noncompliance and, even absent an objection, may raise an issue of noncompliance 
on direct appeal following conviction.  See Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 692 N.E.2d 
608.  But it would mean that a criminal offender may not collaterally attack a final 
judgment years after the fact. 
{¶ 32} Smith next points to the notice requirement’s inclusion within R.C. 
2152.12, the statute providing the exclusive means for the transfer of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  To be sure, this court has in some cases viewed R.C. 2152.12’s 
mandatory requirements as prerequisites to the transfer of subject-matter jurisdiction.  
But in view of our decision to overrule Gaskins I, Smith’s argument has little force, 
because he does not consider whether R.C. 2152.12(G), in particular, clearly 
establishes a barrier to the transfer of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
{¶ 33} Finally, Smith emphasizes that the statutory notice requirement is a 
due-process protection.  Invoking language used in some United States Supreme 
Court cases, he contends that such an important constitutional protection cannot be 
January Term, 2020 
 
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treated as a mere “claim-processing rule,” see, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 
559 U.S. 154, 161, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010).  This argument misses an 
important fact.  We have held that a juvenile may waive other key parts of the 
bindover procedure, such as an amenability hearing.  D.W., 133 Ohio St. 3d 434, 
2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, at ¶ 21.  In support of that holding, we explained 
that “[e]ven though ‘[t]here is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional 
rights,’ an individual can still waive his constitutional rights as long as the waiver is 
made knowingly and intelligently and is an intentional relinquishment of a known 
right.”  Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 
L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).  Smith has not shown why his waiver of R.C. 2152.12(G)’s 
protections—even if they are constitutional in character—was not permissible. 
{¶ 34} Because R.C. 2152.12(G) does not clearly make the provision of 
notice a jurisdictional barrier, Smith’s sentencing court did not lack subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
D.  Smith had an adequate remedy at law 
{¶ 35} Finally, we emphasize that Smith had an adequate remedy at law.  He 
could have objected to the juvenile court’s failure to give his father timely notice, and 
if the court overruled his objection, he could have appealed the ruling in his appeal 
from his criminal convictions.  But he chose instead to waive his right to have his 
father present at the hearing.  He thus gave up his right to complain of the juvenile 
court’s noncompliance with R.C. 2152.12(G).  See State v. Fitzgerald, 9th Dist. 
Summit No. 23072, 2007-Ohio-701, ¶ 8 (“Where a party has affirmatively waived 
an objection * * *, the error may not be asserted on appeal even if it does amount to 
plain error”).  We therefore affirm the court of appeals’ denial of the writ of habeas 
corpus. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
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KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by 
DEWINE, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 36} Because appellant, Ja’Relle Smith, has not demonstrated that he is 
entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, I concur with the majority’s affirmance of the 
Fifth District Court of Appeals’ judgment denying the requested writ.  I also agree 
that it is time to revisit our caselaw treating “an improper bindover procedure,” 
majority opinion at ¶ 27, as a jurisdictional defect for which habeas relief may be 
available and to clarify that a procedural error in conducting a bindover hearing 
does not deprive the general division of the common pleas court of subject-matter 
jurisdiction over a case that has been transferred from the juvenile court.  However, 
because my analysis for determining whether an improper bindover procedure 
affects the subject-matter jurisdiction of the common pleas court differs from that 
of the majority, I concur in judgment only. 
{¶ 37} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory 
power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.  Pratts v. Hurley, 
102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11-12, 34.  It is a 
“ ‘condition precedent to the court’s ability to hear the case.  If a court acts without 
jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void.’ ”  Pratts at ¶ 11, quoting 
State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998).  
“A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of 
the individual parties involved in a particular case.”  Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 
141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19.  Rather, the focus is on 
whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.  18A Wright, Miller 
& Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 4428, 6 (3d Ed.2017) 
(“Jurisdictional analysis should be confined to the rules that actually allocate 
judicial authority among different courts”). 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
{¶ 38} “Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution grants exclusive 
authority to the General Assembly to allocate certain subject matters to the 
exclusive original jurisdiction of specified divisions of the courts of common 
pleas.”  State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, ¶ 2.  
The General Assembly exercised that power in enacting R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), which 
grants juvenile courts exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over children alleged to 
be delinquent for committing acts that would constitute a crime if committed by an 
adult.  R.C. 2152.12 establishes an exception to that rule, authorizing a juvenile 
court to relinquish its exclusive jurisdiction in certain cases involving a delinquent 
child and to transfer a case to the general division of the common pleas court.  And 
once a juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction, “[t]he transfer abates the jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint, 
and, upon the transfer, all further proceedings pertaining to the act charged shall be 
discontinued in the juvenile court, and the case then shall be within the jurisdiction 
of the court to which it is transferred.”  R.C. 2152.12(I). 
{¶ 39} It is therefore within the subject-matter jurisdiction of a juvenile 
court to transfer a case and within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the general 
division of the common pleas court to receive it. 
{¶ 40} “ ‘Once a tribunal has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of an 
action and the parties to it, “* * * the right to hear and determine is perfect; and the 
decision of every question thereafter arising is but the exercise of the jurisdiction 
thus conferred.” ’ ”  (Ellipsis sic.)  Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 
N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Pizza v. Rayford, 62 Ohio St.3d 382, 384, 
582 N.E.2d 992 (1992), quoting Sheldon’s Lessee v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494, 499 
(1854).  And when a specific action is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, 
any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction renders the court’s judgment voidable, 
not void.  Pratts at ¶ 12, 21.  Generally, a voidable judgment is not subject to 
collateral attack and therefore may not be challenged in habeas corpus as a 
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substitute for a direct appeal.  State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 240, 714 N.E.2d 
867 (1999); State ex rel. Drexel v. Alvis, 153 Ohio St. 244, 246, 91 N.E.2d 22 
(1950). 
{¶ 41} We have stated that “[a]bsent a proper bindover procedure * * *, the 
juvenile court has the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any case concerning 
a child who is alleged to be a delinquent.”  State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 
N.E.2d 196 (1995), paragraph one of the syllabus.  But Wilson did not involve an 
erroneous bindover procedure.  Rather, because the state and the trial court had 
mistakenly believed that the offender was an adult at the time of the offense, no 
bindover had occurred at all, see id. at 44.  For that reason, the juvenile court’s 
exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the case had not been relinquished and 
the general division of the common pleas court’s jurisdiction was never invoked. 
{¶ 42} Cases following Wilson, however, confused the difference between 
a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction and a court with jurisdiction but 
improperly exercising it.  In Gaskins v. Shiplevy, we noted that a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus asserting that a child had not been represented by counsel at his 
bindover hearing and had not been given the mental and physical examination 
required by Ohio’s statutes at that time “stated a potentially good cause of action in 
habeas corpus, alleging, as it did, that the court of common pleas lacked jurisdiction 
over [the child] because of improper bindover.”  74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 
N.E.2d 1282 (1995).  We reversed the court of appeals’ dismissal of the petition 
and ordered the court to require a return and determine whether the bindover was 
improper. 
{¶ 43} In Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, a juvenile court had ordered the 
mandatory bindover of a juvenile for prosecution in an adult court, despite the 
uncontroverted evidence in the case that the juvenile was in fact not subject to a 
mandatory bindover.  93 Ohio St.3d 614, 616-617, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (2001).  This 
court held that the adult court “patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
convict and sentence [the juvenile] on the charged offenses when she had not been 
lawfully transferred to that court.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 617.  Accordingly, 
“[t]he resulting conviction and sentence [were] void, and the availability of 
alternate remedies [did] not prevent issuance of the writ.”  Id.  This court 
distinguished between “merely challenging the accuracy of the bindover entry” and 
“challenging the propriety of her bindover.”  Id. 
{¶ 44} We adhered to both Gaskins and Timmerman-Cooper in Johnson v. 
Sloan, 154 Ohio St.3d 476, 2018-Ohio-2120, 116 N.E.3d 91, ¶ 14, in which we 
explained that “[i]f the juvenile court fails to comply with the mandatory 
requirements of the bindover statute, its purported transfer to adult court is 
ineffective and any judgment issued by the adult court is void.” 
{¶ 45} And in Turner v. Hooks, 152 Ohio St.3d 559, 2018-Ohio-556, 99 
N.E.3d 354, we reviewed a court of appeals’ holding that a juvenile court’s failure 
to give notice of a bindover hearing to a child’s legal custodian invalidated the 
transfer of the case to adult court and rendered the resulting judgment of conviction 
void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  We reversed the court of appeals’ 
judgment, id. at ¶ 14, explaining that the notice that the juvenile court had provided 
to the child’s biological mother satisfied R.C. 2152.12(G)’s requirement of written 
notice of the time, place, and purpose of a bindover hearing “to the child’s parents, 
guardian, or other custodian.”  But nothing in our opinion disputed the underlying 
premise of the court of appeals’ holding that a complete lack of notice to a custodian 
would render a resulting conviction void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and 
it is telling that we considered the merits in Turner rather than concluding that a 
direct appeal of the conviction would have been an adequate remedy. 
{¶ 46} As these cases show, and contrary to the majority’s assertion, 
Gaskins, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 656 N.E.2d 1282, is not an outlier that has been eroded 
by subsequent decisions.  Nonetheless, I agree that it is time to overrule Gaskins 
and its progeny and clarify that an error in following the statutory procedures 
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prescribed for conducting a bindover hearing—including the notice required by 
R.C. 2152.12(G)—does not vitiate the subject-matter jurisdiction of the general 
division of the common pleas court over a case that has been transferred from the 
juvenile court.  Rather, it is an error in the exercise of the juvenile court’s 
jurisdiction that renders the transfer and resulting conviction voidable, not void. 
{¶ 47} Here, the juvenile court allegedly conducted a bindover hearing 
without providing Smith’s father with timely notice as required by R.C. 
2152.12(G).  But importantly, that alleged error would not have required reversal 
had Smith raised it in a direct appeal.  Smith had already been bound over for 
prosecution in adult court for multiple felony offenses.  The newest complaint 
alleged additional counts subject to a mandatory bindover: aggravated robbery, 
aggravated burglary, and kidnapping.  The juvenile court sent Smith’s father, who 
had attended the earlier hearing, notice of the second bindover hearing, but he did 
not appear.  However, Smith expressly waived his father’s presence and then 
stipulated to the existence of the facts that were necessary to transfer the case to 
adult court.  Accordingly, any alleged error in that procedure was harmless, and a 
bindover to adult court on the new counts was a foregone conclusion.  It strains 
reason to assume that an error that would not have required reversal in a direct 
appeal could support a collateral attack on an adult court’s jurisdiction. 
{¶ 48} In any case, the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to 
conduct the bindover proceeding and any failure to comply with R.C. 2152.12(G) 
did not divest it of that jurisdiction to transfer the case to adult court, because “once 
conferred, [jurisdiction] remains,” Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 
N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 34.  The juvenile court therefore retained its exclusive jurisdiction 
over Smith’s case until it journalized the bindover order, which “abate[d] the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the 
complaint,” R.C. 2152.12(I).  The general division of the common pleas court then 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
had subject-matter jurisdiction over Smith’s case and therefore had the authority to 
proceed to judgment. 
{¶ 49} Any alleged procedural error in transferring Smith’s case to adult 
court is at most an error in the exercise of jurisdiction that would render the affected 
convictions potentially voidable on direct appeal, not void.  For this reason, Smith 
had an adequate remedy for purposes of challenging any errors in the bindover 
proceeding, and the court of appeals correctly denied his request for the writ of 
habeas corpus. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Charlyn Bohland and Timothy 
B. Hackett, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Jerri L. Fosnaught, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
_________________