Case Title: Russell Owen Isko v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC06-1619

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-1619 
____________ 
 
RUSSELL OWEN INSKO, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[September 20, 2007] 
 
CANTERO, J. 
 
We must decide whether, for purposes of a statute outlawing lewd or 
lascivious conduct, the defendant’s age is an element of the crime or a potential 
sentencing enhancement.  If age is an element of the crime, then it must be alleged 
in the indictment or information, proven at trial, and found by the jury.  If it is a 
potential sentencing enhancement, then, after the jury’s verdict on guilt, a judge 
may consider it in determining whether to enhance the sentence.  The Second 
District Court of Appeal held that it was a potential sentencing enhancement, see 
Insko v. State, 933 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (Insko II), but certified to us a 
question of great public importance.  Id. at 682-83.  We granted review to answer 
the question.  See Insko v. State, 937 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2006).  As we explain 
below, we hold that the age of the defendant is an element of the crime.  Because 
we find that Insko waived the issue, however, we approve of the Second District’s 
affirmance of the judgment in this case. 
I.  STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
 
Insko was charged with lewd or lascivious conduct, in violation of section 
800.04(6)(a)(2) and (b), Florida Statutes (2001).  Under this provision, a person 
age eighteen or older who solicits a person under age sixteen to commit a lewd or 
lascivious act commits a second-degree felony punishable by up to fifteen years’ 
imprisonment.  The jury was instructed that the State had to prove two elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt: that the victim was under age sixteen and that Insko 
solicited the victim to commit a lewd or lascivious act.  The court also instructed 
the jury as follows: 
The punishment provided by law for the crime of lewd or lascivious 
conduct is greater depending on the age of the defendant.  Therefore, 
if you find the defendant is guilty of lewd or lascivious conduct, you 
must determine by your verdict whether at the time of the offense: (a) 
the defendant was eighteen years of age or older; (b) the defendant 
was under the age of eighteen years. 
The verdict form provided four alternatives: (1) guilty of Lewd or Lascivious 
Conduct (Solicit) (defendant eighteen years of age or older) as charged, a second-
degree felony; (2) guilty of Lewd or Lascivious Conduct (Solicit) (defendant under 
eighteen years of age), a third-degree felony; (3) assault, a lesser-included offense 
 
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Insko requested; and (4) not guilty.  The jury chose the second alternative 
(defendant under eighteen years of age), and the court sentenced Insko to five 
years in prison. 
 
Insko appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial 
court allowed prejudicial evidence of prior bad acts.  Insko  v. State, 884 So. 2d 
312, 313-14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (Insko I).  The district court agreed and reversed 
for a new trial.  Id.  On remand, double jeopardy principles prevented a retrial for 
the offense of which Insko had been acquitted—lewd or lascivious conduct by a 
defendant at least eighteen years old.  Before the retrial, Insko filed a motion to 
dismiss.  Presenting a birth certificate showing that he was thirty-three years old at 
the time of the offense, Insko argued he could not be retried for the offense of 
which he had been convicted—lewd or lascivious conduct by a defendant under 
eighteen.  The trial court concluded, however, that the age of the defendant was a 
potential sentencing enhancement, not an element of the crime, and therefore the 
fact that he was thirty-three years old did not prevent a retrial.  Insko entered a plea 
to the third-degree offense, reserving the right to appeal the issue. 
 
On appeal, the Second District followed “the determination made in 
Desbonnes[ v. State, 846 So.2d 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)], which concludes that 
the age of the offender is not an element of the offense of lewd or lascivious 
conduct.”  Insko II, 933 So. 2d at 682-83.  The court certified the following 
 
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question as one of great public importance: “In light of the ruling in Glover v. 
State, 863 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2003), is the age of the offender an element of the 
offense of lewd or lascivious conduct under section 800.04(6), Florida Statutes?” 
 
Below, we first consider the certified question.  We then address Insko’s 
claim of entitlement to a discharge. 
II.  ELEMENT OR SENTENCING FACTOR? 
 
In this case, we consider whether the age of the defendant is an element of 
the crime of lewd or lascivious conduct or a sentencing factor.  In criminal law, 
whether a fact constitutes an element of a crime carries constitutional implications.  
Historically, the “elements of a crime” are the facts “‘legally essential to the 
punishment to be inflicted.’”  Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 561 (2002) 
(plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 232 (1876) 
(Clifford, J., dissenting)).  Thus, to apprise the accused of the specific charges 
against him, an information or indictment must contain all facts essential to the 
“offence intended to be punished.”  United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612-13 
(1881) (noting that the indictment should “set forth all the elements necessary to 
constitute the offence intended to be punished”); State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538, 541 
(Fla. 1977) (“An information must allege each of the essential elements of a crime 
to be valid.”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(d)(1) (“Each count of an indictment or 
information on which the defendant is to be tried shall allege the essential facts 
 
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constituting the offense charged.”); see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 
117 (1974) (stating that although the language of a statute may be sufficient to 
generally describe an offense, the indictment must contain the facts and 
circumstances of the specific offense charged).  Further, the “Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”  In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 
Of course, the legislature has full authority to define the elements of a crime.  
See State v. Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d 512, 516 (Fla. 2004).  In doing so, however, it 
“must still ‘act within any applicable constitutional constraints in defining criminal 
offenses.’”  Id. (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 n.6 (1985)). 
Thus, for example, the legislature may not evade these constitutional requirements 
by redefining elements and denominating them as “factors that bear solely on the 
extent of punishment.” Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975) (noting 
that the criminal law is “concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract 
but also with the degree of criminal culpability” and finding unconstitutional 
Maine’s requirement that the defendant prove that a killing occurred in the heat of 
passion). 
 
The issue of whether a particular fact is an element of the crime or a 
sentencing factor has been rendered somewhat academic after Apprendi v. New 
 
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Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  Before that case, as stated above, if a fact was an 
element of the crime, it had to be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  If it was a sentencing factor, however, a judge could determine 
the fact at sentencing.  In Apprendi, the Court noted that “[a]ny possible distinction 
between an ‘element’ of a felony offense and a ‘sentencing factor’ was unknown to 
the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it 
existed during the years surrounding our Nation's founding.”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 478 (footnote omitted).  Based on American jurisprudence, the Court stated that 
“[t]he judge's role in sentencing is constrained at its outer limits by the facts 
alleged in the indictment and found by the jury,” meaning that “facts that expose a 
defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed were by 
definition ‘elements’ of a separate legal offense.”  Id. at 483 n.10.  Rejecting New 
Jersey’s argument that the finding under the statute in that case was a sentencing 
factor, the Court stated that the legislature’s placement of the provision in its 
sentencing provisions was not determinative and noted that the effect of the 
“enhancement” was “to turn a second-degree offense into a first degree offense, 
under the State's own criminal code.”  Id. at 494.  Accordingly, the Court held that 
“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490 (citing Jones v. United States, 526 
 
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U.S. 227 (1999)).  Regarding facts that form the basis for sentencing a defendant, 
the Court warned that “when the term ‘sentence enhancement’ is used to describe 
an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional 
equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's 
guilty verdict.”  Id. at 494 n.19.  As a plurality of the Court later explained, “Read 
together, McMillan[v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)] and Apprendi mean that 
those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to 
impose it, are the elements of the crime for the purposes of the constitutional 
analysis.”  Harris, 536 U.S. at 567. 
 
The Court subsequently clarified that the “‘statutory maximum’ for 
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the 
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”  
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).1  The Court explained that “the 
relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose 
after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 
additional findings.”  Id. at 303-04; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605 
(2002) (noting that Arizona's argument based on the distinction between an 
offense's elements and sentencing factors is rendered “untenable” by Apprendi’s 
                                          
 
 
1.  The Court distinguished indeterminate sentencing schemes and those that 
impose statutory minimum sentences because they do not involve imposition of a 
sentence greater than state law authorizes.  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304-05, 308-09. 
 
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repeated instruction “that the characterization of a fact or circumstance as an 
‘element’ or a ‘sentencing factor’ is not determinative of the question ‘who 
decides,’ judge or jury”). 
 
In this case, the issue of the defendant’s age was submitted to the jury.  The 
jury had a choice between, among other things, finding the defendant guilty of 
lewd or lascivious conduct (defendant eighteen years of age or older) and lewd or 
lascivious conduct (defendant under eighteen years of age).  Therefore, Apprendi is 
not implicated. 
 
As we noted earlier, Apprendi renders moot most discussions of whether a 
particular fact is an element of the crime or a potential sentencing enhancement.  
Both must now be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Whether a fact is an element, however, remains important to whether it must be 
alleged in indictments and informations.  And it is pertinent here—where a 
defendant must be retried after a conviction is reversed.  Insko correctly notes, and 
the State does not dispute, that because the jury acquitted him of the greater 
crime—lewd or lascivious conduct on a person under sixteen by one eighteen or 
older—he cannot be retried for that crime.  See, e.g., Brock v. State, 954 So. 2d 87, 
88 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (stating that “[b]y finding appellant guilty of the lesser-
included offense of attempted sexual battery, the jury necessarily found appellant 
not guilty of the charged sexual battery,” and “double jeopardy prohibits” the state 
 
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again trying the defendant on the greater charge).  On remand, the most Insko 
could be convicted of was lewd or lascivious conduct by a defendant under 
eighteen.  Insko argues, however, that his age is an element of the offense that the 
State must prove at a retrial; and because the State cannot possibly prove that he 
was under eighteen years old—he was in fact thirty-three years old at the time of 
the crime—his case must be dismissed.  We now address that issue. 
III.  THE CERTIFIED QUESTION 
 
The certified question presents a pure legal issue.  Therefore, our review is 
de novo.  See, e.g., Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 2006) (“The 
interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de 
novo standard of review.”), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1268 (2007).  The question 
asks, “In light of the ruling in Glover v. State, 863 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2003), is the 
age of the offender an element of the offense of lewd or lascivious conduct under 
section 800.04(6), Florida Statutes?”  In other words, is the age of the offender a 
fact essential to the specific statutory offense? 
 
 We first review the statute, and then compare it to the one we considered in 
Glover. 
 
The statute at issue provides as follows in pertinent part:  
 
(6) LEWD OR LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT.— 
 
(a) A person who: 
 
1. Intentionally touches a person under 16 years of age in a 
 
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lewd or lascivious manner; or 
 
2. Solicits a person under 16 years of age to commit a lewd or 
lascivious act 
commits lewd or lascivious conduct. 
 
(b) An offender 18 years of age or older who commits lewd or 
lascivious conduct commits a felony of the second degree, punishable 
as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
 
(c) An offender less than 18 years of age who commits lewd or 
lascivious conduct commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as 
provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 
 
§ 800.04(6), Fla. Stat. (2001). 
 
Applying a plain language analysis, the Second District observed that 
paragraph (a) defines lewd or lascivious conduct and paragraphs (b) and (c) 
establish the offense level based on the defendant’s age.  The court concluded that 
“the wording and structure of the statute alone would lead us to conclude that the 
age of the offender is a sentencing consideration rather than an element of the 
offense itself.” Insko II, 933 So. 2d at 681.  Our examination of the statute, 
however, leads us to the opposite conclusion. 
 
We begin with paragraph (6)(a) of the statute, which defines “lewd or 
lascivious conduct.”  § 800.04(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001).  That definition does not 
itself criminalize the conduct.  To be sure, the paragraph states that the person 
engaging in the conduct “commits lewd or lascivious conduct.”  But it does not go 
further to provide that the conduct “is unlawful,” see, e.g., § 810.13(4), Fla. Stat. 
(2005), or that the person who engages in the conduct “shall be guilty of,” see, e.g., 
id. § 806.101, or “commits a felony,” see, e.g., id. § 790.161(1).  Standing alone, 
 
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the definition “merely describe[s] some obnoxious behavior, leaving any reader 
assuming that it must be a crime, but never being actually told that it is.”  Jones, 
526 U.S. at 233. 
 
Paragraphs (6)(b) and (c) of section 800.04 fill in the missing terms.  
Paragraph (6)(b) provides that “[a]n offender 18 years of age or older who commits 
lewd or lascivious conduct commits a felony of the second degree.”  This sentence 
makes lewd or lascivious conduct a crime.  The person engaging in the conduct 
“commits a felony.”  Paragraph (c) also makes lewd or lascivious conduct a crime.  
It provides that “an offender less than 18 years of age who commits lewd or 
lascivious conduct commits a felony of the third degree.”  Accordingly, paragraph 
(a) is, in a sense, incomplete without paragraph (b) or (c).  
 
Paragraphs (b) and (c), however, are independent of each other.  A person 
eighteen or older “commits a felony of the second degree,” but a person under age 
eighteen “commits a felony of the third degree.”  In each paragraph, the legislature 
has made the conduct a crime and provided different penalties conditioned on an 
additional fact, the age of the defendant.  This structure more than suggests that the 
defendant’s age is an element of the crime, not a sentencing factor.      
 
Further, we note that it is not uncommon for the age of the defendant to be 
an element of sexual offenses.  In similar statutes, other states have held the 
defendant’s age to be an element.  See, e.g., Staton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 470, 471, 
 
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472 n.1 (Ind. 2006) (holding that the defendant’s age was an element of the crime 
in a statute providing that a person at least eighteen years of age who, with a child 
at least fourteen years of age but less than sixteen years of age, performs or 
submits to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct commits sexual 
misconduct with a minor, a Class C felony); State v. Watson, 900 So. 2d 325, 331 
(La. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that the essential elements of the crime of molesting a 
juvenile include that “the accused was over the age of seventeen”); Robinson v. 
State, 904 So. 2d 203, 206 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that, under a subsection 
providing that the victim be under the age of fourteen and the accused be twenty-
four months older than the child, the age of the defendant is an element of sexual 
battery). 
 
Florida courts also have found the defendant’s age to be an element in such 
statutes.  In considering a similar statute, we held that the age of the defendant was 
an element of sexual battery.  In Glover, the defendant was convicted of capital 
sexual battery.  Like the statute here, that statute did not criminalize sexual battery 
within the definition.  The statute defined sexual battery as “oral, anal, or vaginal 
penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal 
penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual battery does not 
include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.”  § 794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. 
 
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(1999).  The statute then declared sexual battery a crime in certain circumstances, 
including the following: 
 
(2)(a) A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual 
battery upon, or in an attempt to commit sexual battery injures the 
sexual organs of, a person less than 12 years of age commits a capital 
felony, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082 and 921.141. 
 
(b) A person less than 18 years of age who commits sexual 
battery upon, or in an attempt to commit sexual battery injures the 
sexual organs of, a person less than 12 years of age commits a life 
felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 
775.084. 
 
§ 794.011(2), Fla. Stat. (1999).  The Fifth District held that because the victim’s 
age was an element of the crime, “the age of the defendant, set out in the same 
section of the statute creating the offense, should also be.”  Glover v. State, 815 So. 
2d 698, 699 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).  We agreed.  Glover, 863 So. 2d at 238. 
 
The State argues that the sexual battery statute is different because section 
794.011(1)(h) does not make sexual battery a crime; only later subsections do so.  
The State contends that, in contrast, section 800.04(6) (that is, paragraphs (a), (b), 
and (c)) itself defines lewd or lascivious conduct and provides the punishment 
depending on the defendant’s age.  Stated a different way, the sexual battery statute 
makes sexual battery a crime only under certain enumerated circumstances, while 
under the statute in this case lewd or lascivious conduct is always a crime; the age 
of the defendant determines only the degree of the offense.  While we understand 
 
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the distinction, we disagree that it makes the defendant’s age a sentencing factor 
instead of an element of the offense. 
 
Section 800.04(6) is similar to the statute we considered in Glover: one 
paragraph defines the offense, while others make the conduct a crime and establish 
the degree of the crime.  As we explained above, the definition of lewd or 
lascivious conduct does not make such conduct a crime.  See § 800.04(6)(a), Fla. 
Stat. (2001).  Paragraph (a) defines lewd or lascivious conduct for purposes of 
paragraphs (b) and (c).  Similarly, paragraph (1)(h) of section 794.011 defines 
“sexual battery” for purposes of subsection (2)(a) and (b), which then criminalize 
the conduct and designate capital and life felonies depending on the defendant’s 
and the victim’s ages.  
 
Comparing these statutes, other Florida courts have concluded that the age 
of the defendant is an element of lewd or lascivious conduct.  In State v. D.A., 939 
So. 2d 149 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), the Fifth District considered the question in the 
context of the lewd or lascivious molestation statute.  See § 800.04(5), Fla. Stat. 
(2001).  Section 800.04(5) is structured similarly to subsection (6).  Paragraph 
(5)(a) describes the conduct of lewd or lascivious molestation and paragraphs (b), 
(c), and (d) criminalize the conduct and ascribe the classification and degree of the 
offense based on both the offender’s age and the victim’s age.  Before our decision 
in Glover, the Fourth District had considered section 800.04(5) and held that the 
 
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age of the offender was a sentencing factor.  Desbonnes v. State, 846 So.2d 565, 
566 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).  In D.A., however, the Fifth District concluded, based on 
Glover, that the age of the defendant was an element of lewd or lascivious 
molestation.  The court commented on the Second District’s decision in this case to 
follow Desbonnes: 
While we agree with the Second District's conclusion that under a 
“plain reading” of the statute, the age of the defendant is probably 
more properly viewed as a sentencing consideration, and not an 
element of the offense, we do not believe that Glover can be 
distinguished.  The very reason that the Fourth District applied its 
analysis and holding from Jesus[v. State, 565 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1990)] in Desbonnes was that the two statutes are “virtually 
identical.”  This being true, we believe that we are compelled by 
Glover to conclude that the age of the defendant is also an element of 
the crime of lewd or lascivious molestation. 
D.A., 939 So. 2d at 152-53.2  
 
The State’s contention that the age of the defendant is not an element in 
subsection 800.04(6) fails to recognize the integral role the fact plays in defining 
the crime.  As stated above, an element is a fact essential to the offense charged.  
This includes material facts necessary to determine the degree of the offense. 
 
An example from a different statute is instructive.  Section 812.014(1), 
Florida Statutes (2001), defines “theft.”  Subsection (2) provides various degrees 
and classifications of grand theft (and thus varying punishments), that are largely, 
                                          
 
 
2.  In Glover, we disapproved of the Fourth District’s decision in Jesus.  
Glover, 863 So. 2d at 238. 
 
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though not exclusively, based on property value.  If the property stolen is valued at 
$300 or more, grand theft is a felony of the third degree.  Id. § 812.014(2)(c).  
Thus, in a prosecution for the crime of third-degree grand theft, one of the 
elements is the value of the items taken.  See  V.W. v. State, 870 So. 2d 102, 103 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“With certain exceptions not material here, one of the 
elements of grand theft of the third degree is that the value of the property stolen is 
$300 or more.”); cf. Peoples v. State, 760 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) 
(holding that proof of the value of a fire extinguisher was not required where the 
statute provided that the theft of “[a]ny fire extinguisher” was a third-degree grand 
theft).  Accordingly, courts have held that where a timely motion or objection is 
raised that the evidence does not support the value required for the degree of the 
crime charged, a conviction for that specific theft offense cannot stand.  See Pickett 
v. State, 839 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (reversing the trial court’s denial 
of a motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove that the 
value of stolen property exceeded $300, and remanding for “entry of conviction 
and sentence for petit theft of the second degree”); see also Pena v. State, 901 So. 
2d 781, 785-86 (Fla. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s age was an element of 
first-degree murder by drug distribution, but that this was not a situation where the 
charge was totally unsupported by the evidence or “the State had to prove the value 
of items when such value was necessary to sustain a higher-grade offense”); State 
 
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v. Rodriguez, 575 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 1991) (holding that prior DUI 
convictions are an essential element of felony DUI); State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 
315, 316 (Fla. 1978) (stating that the statute’s requirement of prior petit larceny 
convictions was an element of the offense raising the offense level from a second-
degree misdemeanor to a third-degree felony). 
 
The statute in this case is similar.  That is, the age of the defendant under 
section 800.04(6) is necessary to the provision criminalizing the conduct and 
ascribing the degree of the crime.  It is therefore an element of second- and third-
degree felony lewd or lascivious conduct.  Unless a defendant who commits lewd 
or lascivious conduct is at least eighteen years old at the time of the offense, he 
cannot be convicted of a second-degree felony.  Thus, the definition of the crime is 
integrally linked to the defendant’s age.  In other words, to establish a second-
degree felony, the State must prove that the defendant is at least eighteen years old.  
Otherwise, the crime is only a third-degree felony.  Thus, under Glover the 
defendant’s age is an element of the crime.  In this statute, the defendant’s age does 
not enhance a separately prescribed sentence; it determines the statutory maximum 
of the offense.  The fact of the defendant’s age functions this same way in the 
sexual battery statute. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the defendant’s age is an element of the offense of 
lewd or lascivious conduct under section 800.04(6), Florida Statutes (2001). 
 
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IV.  THE DEFENDANT’S WAIVER 
 
Although we agree with Insko that a defendant’s age is an element of the 
offense of lewd or lascivious conduct, we nevertheless conclude that he is entitled 
to no relief.  Insko waived any claim to relief long before the retrial. 
 
Under the contemporaneous objection rule, to preserve error for review a 
litigant must object at trial.  This requirement is “based on practical necessity and 
basic fairness in the operation of a judicial system.”  Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 
701, 703 (Fla. 1978).  The rule “not only affords trial judges the opportunity to 
address and possibly redress a claimed error, it also prevents counsel from 
allowing errors in the proceedings to go unchallenged and later using the error to a 
client’s tactical advantage.”  F.B. v. State, 852 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2003). 
 
Jury instructions are subject to the rule.  State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 644 
(Fla. 1991).  Thus, unless fundamental error occurred, to obtain appellate review of 
a claimed error in instructing the jury, a party must have preserved the error by 
timely objection.  Id.  Both the erroneous omission of instruction on an uncontested 
element of an offense, id. at 645, and the erroneous inclusion of instruction on an 
element that “the State does not argue is present and about which it presents no 
evidence,” must be preserved by contemporaneous objection.  State v. Weaver, 957 
So. 2d 586, 588 (Fla. 2007); see also Pena v. State, 901 So. 2d 781, 784 (Fla. 2005) 
(holding that the failure to instruct the jury that the defendant’s age is an element 
 
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of first-degree murder by drug distribution was not fundamental, and noting that 
the element was undisputed and no timely objection was raised); Glover, 863 So. 
2d at 238 (holding that the defendant’s age is an element of capital sexual battery, 
but affirming the conviction because the failure to so instruct the jury was not 
fundamental where the element was undisputed).  So, too, must almost all claims 
that the evidence was insufficient.  F.B., 852 So. 2d at 230. 
 
As noted earlier, the verdict form in this case gave the jury several options: it 
could find Insko guilty of lewd or lascivious conduct by a person age eighteen or 
older, a second-degree felony; it could find Insko guilty of the lesser crime of lewd 
or lascivious conduct by a defendant less than eighteen, a third-degree felony; it 
could find Insko guilty of simple assault, a misdemeanor; or it could acquit Insko 
altogether.  Although it was apparently obvious that Insko was eighteen or older 
(he was thirty-four years old at the time of the trial), the jury exercised its pardon 
power and found him guilty of only the third-degree felony, reducing the 
maximum possible prison term from fifteen years to five.3 
 
At the original trial, the defendant reviewed the jury instructions, which 
included an instruction on lewd or lascivious conduct by a defendant under age 
eighteen.  He also reviewed the verdict form providing this alternative.  He 
                                          
 
 
3.  As we recently explained, the jury’s “pardon power” is its ability to 
convict a defendant of a lesser offense despite evidence supporting the greater one.  
Sanders v. State, 946 So. 2d 953, 957-58 (Fla. 2006). 
 
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specifically stated that he did not object to them.  He also did not object when the 
court instructed the jury on the lesser felony and did not object when the jury found 
him guilty of the lesser crime.  Nor, on appeal, did he raise any argument about his 
age and the offense of which the jury found him guilty.  See Insko I, 884 So. 2d at 
313; Insko II, 933 So. 2d at 683 (Wallace, J., concurring) (“Following his initial 
conviction in the trial court, Insko did not challenge the jury’s verdict on the 
ground that he could not be convicted of the third-degree felony offense of lewd or 
lascivious conduct because he was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the 
offense.”).  In any event, such an argument would have had little chance of 
success.  See Jones v. State, 492 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (stating, in 
response to the defendant’s argument he could not be retried for attempt because 
the evidence showed a completed burglary, that “[a]n accused who is convicted of 
an attempt as the lesser of a charged offense will not be heard to complain that he 
should be set free merely because the evidence shows that he was guilty of the 
greater offense”). 
 
Instead, Insko raised this claim for the first time after the Second District 
reversed his conviction on other grounds and remanded for a new trial.  We 
recently held that a similar argument was waived in the context of a theft claim 
where the State failed to prove the amount stolen.  In F.B. v. State, the defendant 
had been adjudicated delinquent for petit theft of items valued between $100 and 
 
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$300.  F.B.,  852 So. 2d at 227.  The State presented evidence of the items stolen, 
but not about their value.  Id.  The defendant did not object.  Instead, he claimed on 
appeal that the State’s failure to prove an essential element of the crime was 
fundamental error.  We held “that, with two exceptions, a defendant must preserve 
a claim of insufficiency of the evidence through timely challenge in the trial 
court.”  Id. at 230.  The first exception is in death penalty cases, in which our 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence is required by rule; the second “occurs 
when the evidence is insufficient to show that a crime was committed at all.”  Id.  
Insko’s case does not fall within either exception.  He is not a death-sentenced 
prisoner, and the evidence is not insufficient to show that a crime was committed.  
Accordingly, Insko was required to object to preserve the error and, having failed 
to do so, waived it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the age of the defendant is an element 
of the offense of lewd or lascivious conduct under section 800.04(6).  By failing to 
object to the instruction allowing the jury to find that he was under eighteen when 
he committed the offense, however, Insko waived the claim.  We therefore approve 
the judgment below affirming Insko’s conviction and sentence. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
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LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D05-1221 
 
 
(Hillsborough County) 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Maureen E. Surber, Assistant 
Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss, Bureau 
Chief, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent