Case Title: Justin Wayne Akins v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC90181

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
Justin Wayne Akins, 
 
 
 
)        
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Director of Revenue, State of 
 
) 
Missouri, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
) 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County 
Honorable Shannon Renee Dougherty, Judge 
 
Opinion issued February 23, 2010 
 
Justin Akins appeals a judgment affirming the denial of driving privileges for 10 
years pursuant to section 302.060(9), RSMo Supp. 2008.  The judgment is affirmed. 
FACTS 
    
The facts of this case are not in dispute.  On July 20, 2006, Akins was driving 
while intoxicated.  He collided with another vehicle and injured three people.  Akins 
pleaded guilty to three separate counts of second degree vehicular assault.   The three 
convictions were consolidated into one criminal case number. The director of revenue 
denied Akins’ driving privileges because Akins had been “convicted more than twice for 
offenses relating to driving while intoxicated” pursuant to section 302.060(9). 
The circuit court affirmed the director’s denial of Akins’ driving privileges.  Akins 
asserts that the trial court erred because his three convictions of vehicular assault arose 
out of one incident and, therefore, should be considered one conviction under section 
302.060(9).   
ANALYSIS 
I. Standard of Review 
Resolution of this case depends on the interpretation of section 302.060(9).  This 
is a legal question of statutory interpretation that is reviewed de novo.  Junior College 
Dist. of St. Louis v. City of St. Louis, 149 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Mo. banc 2004).   
II. Section 302.060(9) 
Section 302.060(9) requires the director to deny driving privileges for 10 years “to 
any person who has been convicted more than twice for offenses relating to driving while 
intoxicated.”  The term “convicted” is not defined in section 302.060(9). In section 
302.010(3), however, the term “conviction” is defined as: 
any final conviction; also a forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to 
secure a defendant’s appearance in court, which forfeiture has not 
been vacated, shall be equivalent to a conviction, except that when 
any conviction as a result of which points are assessed pursuant to 
section 302.302 is appealed, the term “conviction” means the original 
judgment of conviction for the purpose of determining the assessment 
of points, and the date of final judgment affirming the conviction 
shall be the date determining the beginning of any license suspension 
or revocation pursuant to section 302.304. 
 
The statutory definition of “conviction” does not resolve the issue in this case because it 
relies on the word “conviction” as part of the definition.  See Clare v. Director of 
Revenue, 64 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Mo. App. 2002). 
Absent a statutory definition, the primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give 
effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute.  State ex rel. 
White Family Partnership v. Roldan, 271 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Mo. banc 2008).  A court 
will look beyond the plain meaning of the statute only when the language is ambiguous 
or would lead to an absurd or illogical result.  Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255, 
258 (Mo. banc 1998). 
A “conviction” is “the act of proving, finding, or adjudging a person guilty of an 
offense or crime....” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 499 (3d ed.1993).1   “Likewise, the word “convict” means “to find 
or declare guilty of an offense or crime by the verdict or decision of a court or other 
authority....”  Id.; WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 499.2  The 
definitive concept expressed in the words “conviction” and “convict” is that there has 
been a judicial determination that the defendant is guilty of an offense or crime.  What 
matters is the number of convictions, not the number of separate incidents resulting in 
convictions.  Consequently, the phrase “has been convicted” as used in section 
                                             
 
1 See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 335 (7th ed.1999) (defining “conviction” as “[t]he 
act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime” and as “[t]he judgment (as 
by a jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crime.”).   
 
2 See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 335 (the verb “convict” means “[t]o find (a 
person) guilty of a criminal offense either upon a criminal trial, a plea of guilty, or a plea 
of nolo contendere (no contest).”). 
 
 
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302.060(9) refers to the number of offenses or crimes committed irrespective of the 
number of separate incidents resulting in convictions.  Clare, 64 S.W.3d at 879-880.3    
This conclusion further is supported by the language employed in section 
558.016.3 and section 558.016.5.  Section 558.016.3 defines a persistent offender for 
purposes of sentencing as “one who has pleaded guilty to or has been found guilty of two 
or more felonies committed at different times.”  (Emphasis added).  Similarly, section 
558.016.5 defines a persistent misdemeanor offender as “one who has pleaded guilty to 
or been found guilty of two or more class A or B misdemeanors, committed at different 
times….”  (Emphasis added).  The inclusion of the “committed at different times” 
language in section 558.016 demonstrates the legislature’s awareness of the difference 
between convictions and convictions for offenses committed at different times.  Clare, 64 
S.W.3d at 880.  “If the legislature intended section 302.060(9) to only apply to violations 
committed at different times, as provided in section 558.016, then it could have included 
such language in section 302.060(9).”  Id.    
Akins has three convictions for violating state law relating to driving while 
intoxicated.  Pursuant to section 302.060(9), Akins has been “convicted more than twice 
for offenses relating to driving while intoxicated.”  The circuit court did not err in 
affirming the director’s denial of Akins’ driving privileges. 
 
                                             
 
3 The rationale in Clare  also was used in Timko v. Director of Revenue, 86 S.W.3d 132, 
133 (Mo. App. 2002), in which the court affirmed the 10-year denial of driving privileges 
based on four felony convictions resulting from one motor vehicle accident.  
 
 
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This Court must acknowledge the contrary result reached in Harper v. Director of 
Revenue, 118 S.W.3d 195 (Mo. App. 2003).  In Harper, the court concluded that section 
302.060(9) applies only to those whose convictions resulted from multiple drunken 
driving incidents, regardless of the number of criminal charges resulting from each 
incident.  Id. at 202.  The conclusion in Harper was premised on two related 
propositions.  Neither is persuasive.   
The first proposition in Harper is that section 302.060(9) is ambiguous because 
the word “conviction” may “in a general sense” also refer to the “final consummation of 
the prosecution including the judgment or sentence, or as is frequently the case, the 
judgment or sentence itself.”  Id. at 201 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 333-34 (6th 
ed.1990)).  Under this definition, the driver in Harper could have one conviction because 
the prosecution resulted in one judgment of conviction.  Id. at 202.  The word 
“conviction” may, in a general sense, refer to a judgment or sentence, but that judgment 
or sentence necessarily will be based on one or more convictions on the offenses charged.  
As discussed above, the definitive concept of the word “conviction” is a judicial 
determination that the defendant is guilty of an offense or crime.   Under the rationale 
employed in Harper, the application of section 302.060(9) is conditioned on the circuit 
court’s administrative decision to enter separate judgments on each conviction or to 
consolidate the convictions into one judgment.  There is nothing in the plain language of 
the statute that supports such a result.    
The second proposition in Harper is that the perceived ambiguity in section 
302.060(9) should be resolved by interpreting the statute in manner consistent with the 
 
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legislative purpose.  The court reasoned that applying the statute to situations involving 
multiple convictions in a single accident would lead to “absurd results inconsistent with 
the legislative purpose” of protecting the public from those who repeatedly drink and 
then drive.  Id. at 202.   Specifically, the court noted that under the interpretation adopted 
in Clare, a one-time offender could have driving privileges denied because of one 
incident resulting in multiple violations of state law relating to driving while intoxicated, 
while a repeat offender could continue to drive even after multiple incidents, provided 
that only one offense was charged in each incident. Id.   
The second proposition in Harper is not persuasive because even if, as is likely the 
case, the purpose of section 302.060(9) is to deter repeated drunken driving, that purpose 
is fulfilled by applying the plain language of the statute.  There is nothing absurd or 
illogical about applying the plain language of section 302.060(9) in a case involving 
multiple convictions in one drunken driving incident. The prospect of a 10-year denial of 
driving privileges serves as a substantial deterrent to all drivers, particularly to those who 
already have been convicted of an offense related to driving while intoxicated.  When, as 
in this case, the decision to drive while intoxicated results in more than two convictions, 
the 10-year denial of driving privileges required by section 302.060(9) reduces the 
possibility that the driver will become a repeat offender.  The plain language of section 
302.060(9) reflects a clear legislative determination that consequences matter.  Harper is 
overruled.4 
                                             
 
4  There is some confusion among the bench and bar as to whether opinions issued by a 
district of the court of appeals are binding on circuit courts situated within geographical 
 
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CONCLUSION 
The stipulated facts of this case establish that Akins pleaded guilty to three counts 
of second degree vehicular assault arising from one motor vehicle accident that occurred 
while Akins was driving while intoxicated.  Under the plain language of section 
302.060(9), Akins “has been convicted more than twice of violations of state law relating 
to driving while intoxicated.”  The circuit court determined correctly that section 
302.060(9) applies and that the director properly denied Akins’ driving privileges for ten 
years.  The judgment is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge  
 
All concur. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
boundaries of a particular district of the court of appeals.  Article V, section 1 of the 
Missouri Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested in a 
supreme court, a court of appeals consisting of districts as prescribed by law, and circuit 
courts. Article V, section 1 establishes one court of appeals for the entire state of 
Missouri.  Article V, section 13 of the Missouri Constitution provides, in pertinent part, 
that the court of appeals “shall be organized into separate districts, the number, not less 
than three, geographical boundaries, and territorial jurisdiction of which shall be 
prescribed by law.”  The southern, western and eastern districts of the court of appeals 
established pursuant to article V, section 13 are not separate courts but simply different 
districts of a unitary court of appeals.  There is no provision in the Missouri Constitution 
requiring a circuit court to follow a decision from a particular district of the court of 
appeals.    
 
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