Case Title: BMW v. Roth

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 11

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
4127 Nev., Advance Opinion II
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

 

 

 

BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE | No. 60262
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT; AND BMW | i Eg
OF NORTH AMERICA, IN( |

‘onan FILED
ALYSON ROTH; AND JENNIFER E. | R18 2011
STAPLETON, | ane
Respondents. |

BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE No, 52496

AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT AND BMW
OF NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Appellants,

vs,
ALYSON ROTH; AND JENNIFER E.
STAPLETON,

Respondents.

 

Consolidated appeals from a district court order granting a
new trial in a tort action and from post-judgment orders regarding an
award of attorney fees and costs. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez, Judge.

Reversed.

Lewis & Roca LLP and Daniel F. Polsenberg and Heidi J. Parry Stern, Las
Vegas; Law Offices of Greg W. Marsh and Greg W. Marsh, Las Vegas;
Bowman and Brooke, LLP, and Paul G. Cereghini and Curtis J. Busby,

Phoenix, Arizona,
for Appellants,

Mainor Eglet Cottle and Robert Cottle and Robert T. Eglet, Las Vega:
for Respondent Roth,

-1M26

 
Dennett Winspear, LLP, and Gina Gilbert Winspear and Ryan L. Dennett,
Las Vegas,
for Respondent Stapleton.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, J.

This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial in a tort
case involving a single-car rollover. The injured passenger, respondent
Alyson Roth, obtained a $5.9 million judgment against the driver,
respondent Jennifer Stapleton, but lost. on her __ product
defecticrashworthiness claim against the car's manufacturer, appellant
Bayerische Motoren Werke (BMW). The district court granted Roth a new
trial against both BMW and Stapleton, and BMW appeals pursuant to
NRAP 3A@)(2).

‘The district court granted the new trial based on its finding
that BMW's counsel repeatedly violated a pretrial order in limine, The
order in limine grew out of Nevada’s seatbelt statute. This statute
requires adults riding in cars to wear seatbelts but adds that “A violation
of [the statute is] not a moving traffic violation (and mJay not be
considered as negligence [or] misuse or abuse of a product or as causation
in any [civil] action.” NRS 484D.495(4). Because Roth claimed that she
was wearing her seatbelt yet was ejected and suffered grave injury due to
defects in the car's safety restraint system, the district court permitted
BMW to defend with evidence and argument that Roth had not, in fact,

been wearing her seatbelt. However, the court hedged this permission
with a limiting instruction that told the jury it could consider the seatbelt

 

 
 

evidence only in “evaluating [Roth’s} claims) against BMW that the
subject vehicle was defective and unreasonably dangerous,” not “for any
other purpose.” The district court found BMW's counsel went out of these
bounds in voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument, committing
prejudicial misconduct that merited a new trial under Lioce v. Cohen, 124
Nev. 1, 174 P.3d 970 (2008).

We reverse, For violation of an order in limine to constitute
attorney misconduct requiring a new trial, the order must be specific, the
violation must be clear, and unfair prejudico must be shown. The
standards of review established in Lioce apply. Here, the order did not
limit the seatbelt evidence that could be introduced, only the arguments
that could be made about that evidence. The order’s parameters were far
from clear—as is Nevada law, generally, concerning seatbelt evidence in a
crashworthiness case—yet Roth did not object to any alleged violations by
BMW of the order in limine until closing argument. Applying Lioce’® strict
standards, we cannot say that the unobjected-to violations amounted to
plain error, or that the two objected-to violations involved misconduct so
extreme that the objection and admonishment did not remove its
prejudicial effect. In reaching this conclusion, we reject as error the
Aistrict court's legal determination that Roth's motion in limine acted as a
continuous objection and hold instead that, for violation of an order in
limine to constitute objected-to misconduct under Lioce, the complaining
party must make a contemporaneous objection when the asserted violation
occurs.

L

A
‘The accident occurred in Clark County, Nevada. Roth and

Stapleton were driving across country in Roth's 1987 BMW 528e.

  

 
Stapleton w:

 

driving, and Roth was sleeping in the front passenger seat
with her seat back partially reclined. ‘Traveling at an estimated speed of
between 75 and 90 mph, the car strayed onto the shoulder, swerved back

across the highway, decelerating, and rolled into the desert at a trip speed

 

of 36 mph. The car rolled two and one-half times before coming to rest on
its roof. During the rollover, Roth was ejected. She survived but suffered
severe spinal cord injury that rendered her a paraplegic. Stapleton’s
injuries were minor.

Roth sued both Stapleton and BMW. She proceeded to trial on
claims of negligence against Stapleton and strict product liability against
BMW. Roth made no claim that the BMW caused the accident. Rather,
Roth alleged that driver error caused the accident and that, although she
the BMW's safety restraint system
allowed her to be thrown from the car. These defects made the car less

 

was wearing her seatbelt, defects

crashworthy and caused greater injuries than an ordinary consumer who
was properly restrained should expect to suffer in an accident like this.
Roth and BMW had completely opposite theories of how Roth
came to be ejected. Roth and Stapleton testified that Roth was wearing
her seatbelt. Roth's experts accepted this testimony as fact. They
concluded that multiple defects in the car allowed her to be ejected out the
rear passenger door after the car had rolled twice. In their view, the
passenger side B-pillar (the roof support between a car's front and rear

side windows) separated from the roof rail during the rollover, which both
deformed the geometry of the seatbelt system and popped the rear door
open. When this happened, Roth slipped underneath her suddenly slack

seatbelt, over her reclined seat, and out the rear door.

 

 
BMW disputed Roth's theory that she was ejected out the rear

door as inconsistent with the physics of the accident. It maintained that

 

the physical evidence showed that Roth was not wearing her seatbelt and
was ejected out the front passenger window before the vehicle began its
second roll.! BMW's experts theorized that debris caught the latch on the
rear passenger door, causing it to open on the final roll, which in turn
separated the B-pillar from the roof rail as the car pitched onto the open
door, However, they argued the B-pillar failure was irrelevant, since by
then Roth had already been ejected out the front passenger side window.
Trial lasted almost a month, The jury found that Stapleton
awarding Roth $6.9 million
to

 

had been negligent and caused Roth’s injuric
against Stapleton. However, the jury returned a defense verdict

 

BMW. Answering special interrogatories, it marked “no” to Question No.
1, which asked: “Was the subject vehicle defective?” Given this answer,
the verdict form directed the jury to skip the questions that followed as to
BMW. It thus did not answer Question No. 4, which asked: “Was the
defect in the subject vehicle a proximate cause of the damages or injuries
to Alyson Roth?”

‘Roth's seatbelt was found in the stowed position shortly after the
accident and lacked the pronounced load marks on the latch plate and
webbing that a barrel roll accident like this one normally will produce.
Also, BMW maintained that contact marks on and damage to the front
passenger door and window frame, from which strands of hair were
recovered, showed that Roth had been ejected out the front window. It
also argued that too much cargo had been loaded into the back seat for
Roth to have a clear ejection path out the rear door.

 

 

 
B

In the motion in limine underlying this appeal, Roth asked for
‘an Order prohibiting BMW, its attorneys and witnesses from any
argument, opinion or even mentioning any information that would imply
that Alyson Roth was not wearing her seat belt at the time of the subject
incident.” Roth sought this relief even though, as her motion in limine
acknowledged, her claim against BMW was that she was wearing her
seatbelt and the car

 

fety restraint system failed. Her argument wa:
that she should be allowed to testify that she was wearing her seatbelt but
that BMW should be prohibited from presenting evidence or argument to
the contrary.

Roth based her motion in limine on Nevada's seatbelt statute,
now codified as NRS 484D.495. Subsection 1 of NRS 484.495 makes it
“unlawful to drive a passenger car manufactured after... January 1,
1970, unless it is equipped with at least two shoulder-harness-type safety
belt assemblies for use in the front seating positions,” while subsection 2
mandates that any person “driving, and any passenger who [ile 6 years of
age or older . . . shall wear a safety belt if one is available.” Roth's motion
relied on subsection 4 of NRS 484.495, which reads in full as follows:

A violation of subsection 2:

(a) Is not a moving traffic violation under
RS 483.473."

2NRS 483.473 establishes a demerit and point system for traffic
violations by persons who hold a Nevada driver's license. NRS 484B.653
makes reckless driving a misdemeanor and provides that a driver's willful
or wanton disregard of safety, resulting in death or substantial bodily
harm to another, is a felony.

 

 
 

(b) May not be considered as negligence or
as causation in any civil action or as negligent or
reckless driving under NRS 484B.653.

(©) May not be considered as misuse or abuse
of a product or as causation in any action brought
to recover damages for injury to a person or
property resulting from the manufacture,
distribution, sale or use of a product.

Submitted in connection with the motion in limine were
excerpts from the depositions of Roth and Stapleton, who both testified
that Roth had her seatbelt on, and expert reports that previewed the
competing theories Roth and BMW would offer at trial to explain her
ejection. Roth confirmed that her case theory was that the safety restraint
system, including the seatbelt, was defective. BMW argued that NRS
484D.495(4) did not by its terms—and constitutionally could not—prohibit
evidence of seatbelt nonuse in a crashworthiness case seeking damages for
enhanced injuries due to alleged defects in a car's safety restraint system.
It insisted that, “[tJo defend against plaintiff's allegations of defective
seatbelt design and other crashworthy defects, BMW must be permitted to
demonstrate that if plaintiff was not wearing her seatbelt, her allegations
of design defect with respect to the seat belt are moot.”

‘The district court largely agreed with BMW. Its written order:

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
as plaintiff raises a claim of defect relating to the
seat belts in the subject vehicle, in order for
plaintiff to demonstrate the seatbelt was defective,
plaintiff must show that the seat belt was used at
the time of the accident. Therefore, the BMW
defendants must be permitted to present evidence
of seat belt non-use. Accordingly, plaintifi's
‘Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Of Non-Use
Of Seatbelt is denied. A limiting instruction will

 

 
es

be given at the time evidence of seat belt use or

nonuse is mentioned.
As promised, the court crafted a limiting instruction (with input from all
parties), which read as follows:

BMW [will introduce} [has introduced] evidence

the Plaintiff was not wearing her seatbelt. This

evidence may be considered by you in evaluating

Plaintiffs claim against BMW that the subject

vehicle was defective and unreasonably

dangerous. You may not consider this evidence for

any other purpose.
‘This instruction was given before opening statements and included in the

 

final written instructions the jury received.
&

In his opening statement, Roth's lawyer told the jury that the
evidence would show that Roth was wearing her seatbelt when the
accident occurred. He described “the sixty-four thousand dollar question”
as being: “When you wear your seat belt should you remain in a car in a
crash?” Before opening statements, the jury had been given an instruction
on proximate cause, along with the limiting instruction on seatbelt
evidence. Tying the two instructions together, Roth’s lawyer continued:

Proximate cause means something happened as a
consequence of something else. As a consequence

of the roof collapsing she’s ejected. As a
consequence of the restraint not working she's

ejected. As a consequence of being ejected she’s a

paraplegic.

BMW's lawyer's opening statement mirrored Roth’s, only in

reverse. After previewing the physical evidence, he said:

‘The evidence, the physical evidence, will tell us
what happened to Ms. Roth in the accident, and it
tells us that she was ejected because she wasn’t
wearing her belt. And further, that had she been

 

 
or

wearing her seatbelt she would not have been
ejected, and had she not been ejected she would
not have sustained her spinal cord injury.

Neither Roth nor Stapleton, who sided with Roth on her crashworthiness
theory, objected to these statements.

Whether Roth was belted when the accident occurred and how
she came to be thrown from the car were thoroughly vetted at trial
However, the order in limine and its companion limiting instruction did
not come up until shortly before closing arguments, when Roth made an
NRCP 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law on BMW's defense of
assumption of the risk, which was granted. ‘The parties then turned to the
issue of causation and the extent to which the limiting instruction
concerning seatbelt evidence permitted argument that any defect in the
safety restraint system could not have caused Roth's enhanced injuries if,
in fact, the seatbelt was not being worn. During the colloquy, BMW's
lawyer, Paul Cereghini, advised that he planned to make the same points
in closing argument regarding seatbelt nonuse that he had made during
his opening statement. In response, the district judge stated, “And I think
you're going to be okay because you didn't get slayed after your opening
statement, so you're unlikely to get slayed or held in contempt after

closing if it stays along the same lines’

 

BMW's closing argument on the seatbelt issue was similar to,
but less expansive than, its opening statement. C
: “[LJet’s look at what [Roth is}
claiming here and ask the question, did any of these alleged defects cause

‘oghini reprised BMW's

 

evidence and then turned to Roth's theori

 

any injury to Ms, Roth or the accident? Take the seatbelt. It wasn't being
Roth objected. At the bench conference that followed, the
court sustained Roth's objection. It deemed the comment too broad and a

worn.

 

 

 
violation of the order in limine. However, the court reiterated that, “ly]ou
are permitted to say that there is evidence she was not wearing her seat
belt, 80 the seat belt couldn't have been defective, and, therefore, the
defect in the seat belt could not be a cause of the injuries. But you can't
say anything beyond that." At Roth’s request, the district judge struck
the comment and re-read the limiting instruction on seatbelt evidence.

Later in his closing argument, BMW's lawyer referred to
Roth’s seatbelt and B-pillar claims as “red herrings.” He continued: “Ms.
Roth is ejected from her side window, she was ejected because she was not
belted and the....” Roth objected, the district court sustained Roth’s
objection, and the court directed the lawyer to clarify the statement, which
he did:

‘The plaintiff claims there was a seatbelt defect.
‘The seatbelt, we believe the evidence has shown,
was not being worn, so there's no proof that any.
defect in the seatbelt was a cause of injury to Ms.
Roth. We've proven with respect to this question
that the ejection happened before the roof impact
and before the B-pillar separation ....so none of
those alleged defects were a cause of injury.

‘The clarification was accepted without objection. The final instructions

 

included the limiting instruction on the jury’s use of the seatbelt evidence.
Db.

As noted, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Roth and

against Stapleton for $5.9 million but against Roth and in favor of BMW,

 

5BMW attached the supplemental transcript in which this exchange
appears to its July 1, 2010, motion to supplement appendix, which was not
opposed. We grant the motion, and therefore, we consider the
supplemental transcript.

10

 
finding no product defect. After the court entered judgment on the jury's
verdict, Roth timely moved for a now trial as to BMW, Roth based her
motion on NRCP 59(a)(2), which provides that “[mJisconduct of
the... prevailing party” may warrant a new trial, when the misconduct
“materially affect{s] the substantial rights of an aggrieved party.”

In her motion for new trial, Roth charged BMW's counsel with
myriad misconduct, ranging from use of leading questions to failure to
provide translations of German documents (that were excluded in
consequence). Her main point—and the point credited by the district
court—was that BMW's lawyer intentionally violated the order in limine
during closing argument when he made the two objected-to statements
about Roth's seatbelt nonuse described above.

‘The district court granted a new trial on Roth’s claims against
both BMW and Stapleton.* To BMW's lawyer's two objected-to statements
during closing argument the court added as further acts of misconduct

statements he made about Roth's seatbelt nonuse during voir dire and in

‘Stapleton did not join Roth's motion for a new trial. Although
Stapleton’s counsel attended both hearings on the new trial motion, she
did not argue in support of it. At the initial hearing, Roth orally confirmed
that her motion for new trial only went to her claims against BMW, The
district judge later advised the parties that if she granted the motion, it
would apply to both defendants.

Given that Roth did not move for a new trial as to Stapleton, that
Stapleton did not join Roth's motion, that the district court did not make
findings of fact or conclusions of law to justify a new trial against
Stapleton, and our reversal of the new trial order as to BMW, we conclude
that the district court erred in granting the motion as to Stapleton and
reverse the new trial as to Stapleton.

 

 

 
 

opening statement. It concluded that his misconduct was intentional,

 

ted, continuous, and persistent, and that it prejudiced both Roth and
Stapleton. The district court then ordered BMW to pay Roth’s and
Stapleton’s attorney foes

 

ind costs as a sanction for attorney misconduct.
Th

An attorney's violation of an order in limine can amount to
misconduct justifying a new trial under NRCP 59(a)(2) if the standards
established by Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1, 174 P.3d 970 (2008), are met.
Whether an attorney's comments are misconduct is a question of law that
we review de novo. Id, at 20, 174 P.8d at 982, “A violation of an order
granting a motion in limine may only serve as a basis for a new trial when
the order is specific in its prohibition and the violation is clear.” Black v.
Schultz, 530 F.3d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 2008); accord Garden View, LLC v,
Fletcher, 916 N.E.2d 565, 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Kierstad v, Ravellette
Publications, Inc,, 517 N.W.2d 419, 426 (S.D. 1994). To justify a new trial,
‘a8 opposed to some other sanction, unfair prejudice affecting the reliability
of the verdict must be shown, Black, 530 F.3d at 706, which includes

 

consideration of whether the “argument was actually proper or improper
under the law.” People v, Ward, 862 N.E.2d 1102, 1142 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007).

‘The standards that a district court is to apply to a motion for
new trial based on attorney misconduct vary depending on whether
counsel objected to the misconduct during trial. Lioce, 124 Nev. at 6-7,
174 P.8d at 973. For objected-to misconduct, a party moving for a new
‘trial bears the burden of demonstrating that the misconduct is so extreme
that objection, admonishment, and curative instruction cannot remove its
effect. Id, at 17-18, 174 P.3d at 981. If the misconduct is not objected-to,
the district court should deem the issue waived unless it is plain error. Id.

12.

 
 
 

at 19, 174 P.8d at 981-82. Plain error in this context exists “only when the
misconduct amounted to ‘irreparable and fundamental error... that
results in a substantial impairment of justice or denial of fundamental
rights such that, but for the misconduct, the verdict would have been
different.” Grosjean v, Imperial Palace, 125 Nev. _, __, 212 P.3d 1068,
1079 (2009) (quoting Lioce, 124 Nev. at 19, 174 P.3d at 982).

“The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Southern Pac. Transp. Co,
v, Fitzgerald, 94 Nev. 241, 244, 677 P.2d 1284, 1236 (1978). “While review
for abuse of discretion is ordinarily deferential, deference is not owed to
logal error.” AA Primo Builders v, Washington, 126 Nev. _, __, 245
P.3d 1190, 1197 (2010); see Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.

384, 405 (1990) (“A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if

 

it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence.”); Tanner v. Beck ex rel, Hagerty,
907 So. 24 1190, 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (‘Were we to agree with
the premise upon which the trial court relied and merely disagree with the
trial court’s decision as to whether to grant a new trial based upon that
premise, we would not reverse”; reversing because “(1) defense counsel did
not violate the motion in limine; (2) his argument was fair argument in
light of the evidence presented at trial; and (3) even if the jury could have
drawn an improper inference from [his] comment, any potential prejudice
was cured by the trial court’s subsequent admonition and curative
instruction.’.
OL,

“When ruling on a motion for a new trial based on attorney
misconduct, district courts must make express factual findings, applying
the [Lioce] standards.” Lioce, 124 Nev. at 7, 174 P.3d at 974. In its order

13

 
granting Roth's motion for a new trial, the district court identified three
occasions in which Cereghini engaged in misconduct: voir dire, opening
statement, and closing argument. We consider each in turn.
AL

As voir dire began, the district judge asked the lawyers to
introduce themselves to the venire and offer a short factual description of
the case. BMW's lawyer said, “plaintiff claims she was seatbelted [and]
BMW claims that the physical evidence shows that she was not wearing
her seatbelt.” The district judge interrupted and admonished him to only
provide factual statements and refrain from arguing the case.* In the
order granting a new trial, the district court treats this as an instance of
BMW committing misconduct by violating the order in limine. This
finding is clearly erroneous. The order in limine permitted introduction of
seatbelt evidence. Cereghini’s statement in voir dire violated neither the
order in limine nor the limiting instruction and did not amount to
misconduct.

 

The order granting Roth's motion for a new trial indicates that the
court had to instruct him three times not to argue BMW's case, The
record shows that the district judge admonished BMW for one remark and
that BMW then adhered to the court's instruction. We note that the
Nevada Jury Improvement Commission recommends the use of “mini-
opening statements” at the beginning of jury selection to introduce the
jurors to “the claims and the disputed factual issues involved.” Report of
the Supreme Court of Nevada 59-60 (2002). See also NRS 16.090(1)
(providing that once the jury is sworn, the pleadings may be read or the
issues stated),

uu

 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 

Be
L

‘The order granting a new trial identifies four instances in
which BMW's lawyer violated the order in limine during his opening
statement: (1) his statement that the physical evidence would show Roth
was ejected because she was not wearing her seatbelt and that, had she
not been ejected, she would not have suffered a spinal cord injury; (2) his
observation that Stapleton was wearing her seatbelt, wasn’t ejected, and
only suffered minor soft tissue injuries; (3) the statement that the rear
door opened “after Ms. Roth's ejection, which occurred because she was not
seatbelted”; and (4) a statement comparing the protection the vehicle
afforded Stapleton, who was belted, with Roth, who was ejected through
the front passenger window and seriously injured as a result of not having
worn the seatbelt.

Roth did not object to any of these statements, nor did the
court admonish BMW's counsel sua sponte for making them. Nonetheless,
the district court analyzed the statements as objected-to misconduct under
Lioce. Citing Richmond v. State, 118 Nev. 924, 932, 59 P.8d 1249, 1254
(2002), the district court held that the order in limine and its associated
limiting instruction were definitive and clear, and that Roth's motion in
limine constituted an adequate objection to what the court found was
BMW's violation of them. This was error on both counts.

First, the order was definitive and specific only in permitting
evidence to be introduced on whether Roth was wearing her seatbelt. It
was neither definitive nor specific, however, as to the limitations being
imposed on use of the seatbelt evidence. The reference to a limiting
instruction was added by hand to the order denying Roth's motion in
limine. While the limiting instruction said that the evidence that Roth

16

 
wi

 

not wearing her seatbelt could only be considered “in evaluating [her]
claim... that the subject vehicle was defective and unreasonably
dangerous” and not “for any other purpose,” it didn't explain what that
meant or specify its prohibitions. Indeed, when BMW broached the

question of cause-in-fact and how Roth could claim a defect in the seatbelt

 

caused her injuries if she wasn't wearing it, the court stated, “I
understand what you're saying,” and that “causation is covered in
numerous other instructions,” In its prohibitory, as opposed to permissive,

 

aspect, the order in limine was not definitive enough to obviate the need
for a contemporaneous objection/proffer under Richmond, 118 Nev. at 932,
59 P.Sd at 1254, much less specific enough to make a subsequent violation
clear for purposes of establishing attorney misconduct under Liace.

Second, while Roth's motion in limine may have preserved her
objection to the admission of seatbelt evidence, that was not the basis for
her motion for new trial or the order granting it and is not what she
argues on appeal. Her argument is that BMW violated the limiting
instruction associated with the order in limine, committing misconduct
that merited a new trial under NRCP 59(a)(2). To claim misconduct
associated with an asserted violation of an order in limine requires a
contemporaneous objection, even when the order is clear, though this one
was not.

‘The decision in Wilson v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 170 F.3d 391
(Bd Cir. 1999), is on point. In Wilson, as in this case, a pretrial motion in
limine produced a split ruling in a products liability ease: The district
court denied the motion in limine to the extent it sought to exclude
evidence and argument as to the cause-in-fact of a fire; it granted the
motion, however, to the extent it sought to characterize the plaintiff's

16

 
 

conduct as negligent or as absolving the defendant of liability. Id, at 395
n.7, After a defense verdict, the plaintiff sought a new trial based on the
defense’s violation of the prohibitory aspect of the trial court's order in
limine. Because the plaintiff did not contemporaneously object to the
defendant's violations of the order in limine, the objections were deemed
waived: “Because Wilson prevailed on the motion in limine to limit
‘Vermont Castings’s arguments, her counsel had an obligation to renew his
objection once he thought Vermont Castings violated this ruling.” Id,
zB

Although Roth argues otherwise, requiring a party to object to
her opponent's violation of an order in limine to preserve error for
purposes of a subsequent Lioce motion for new trial is fully consistent with
Richmond v, State. In Richmond, the ruling on the motion in limine was
unqualified; the district court denied Richmond’s motion in limine to
exclude testimony. 118 Nev. at 929, 59 P.3d at 1253. Richmond did not
make a contemporaneous objection when the State offered the testimony
at trial. Id, We concluded that the motion in limine preserved the claim
of error. Id. at 932, 59 P.3d at 1254. In doing so, we held that “where an
objection has been fully briefed, the district court has thoroughly explored
the objection during a hearing on a pretrial motion, and the district court
has made a definitive ruling, then a motion in limine is sufficient to
preserve an issue for appeal.” Id,

Lioce did not address Richmond. Rather, Lioce generally held,
without considering the effect of a motion in limine, that unobjected-to
attorney misconduct is waived unless it constitutes plain error. 124 Nev.
at 19, 174 P.3d at 981-82. Accordingly, we now decide the question of
whether a motion in limine serves as a continuing objection under Lioce to
attorney misconduct consisting of violation of an order in limine.

17

 
Whether a motion in limine preserves error depends on
whether the error alleged is in compliance with or violation of the court's
ruling on the motion, See 21 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham,
Jr, Federal Practice & Procedure: Hvidence § 5037.16, at 804-05 (2d ed.
2005). As in Richmond, where the admission or exclusion of evidence at
trial is in harmony with the order in limine, the alleged error at trial is the
same as the error alleged in the ruling on the motion. 118 Nev. at 929, 59
P.8d at 1253, Therefore, because there is no new error, the motion in
limine properly preserves the error claim. However, when “the opposing
party violates the terms of the initial ruling, objection must be made when
the evidence is offered to preserve the claim of error for appeal.” Fed. R.
Evid. 103 advisory committee's comment, reprinted in 2 McCormick on
Evidence Appendix A (6th ed, 2003) (iting United States Aviation
Underwriters v, Olympia Wings, Inc,, 896 F.2d 949, 956 (5th Cir. 1990).
‘This is because the violation of the prior ruling introduces a new error into,
the case. Thus, an objection is required when an opposing party or the
court violates an order in limine.

Judicial economy and fairness justify the rule requiring
contemporaneous objection to preserve error associated with an opposing
party's violation of an order in limine:

[O]bjection is required to preserve error when an
opponent, or the court itself, violates a motion in
limine that was granted. This rule is necessary to
conserve judicial resources. Had plaintiff's
counsel promptly objected to the violations of the
‘motion in limine in this case, the trial court could
have either avoided the violations or given an
instruction to cure any harm suffered by the
plaintiffs. The courts cannot adopt a rule that
would permit counsel to sit silently when an error

 

 
is committed at trial with the hope that they will
get a new trial because of that error if they lose.

United States Aviation Underwriters, $96 F.2d at 956.
United States Aviation Underwriters is persuasive, and its

reasoning applies here. When an attorney violates an order in limine, a
contemporaneous objection to the violation affords the court and the
parties the opportunity to correct the misconduct and/or clarify the order,
if the order's parameters are unclear. The objection need not be elaborate,
but it needs to be made. See State v. Kallio, 92 Nev. 665, 668, 557 P.2d
705, 707 (1976) (citing NRS 47.040(1)(a)). Dispensing with the
requirement of a contemporaneous objection would allow the proponent of
the order in limine to remain silent and hope for a new trial even though,
in many instances, an objection and curative instruction would prevent
the need to relitigate the case, ‘Thus, contemporaneous objections to
claimed violations of an order produced by a motion in limine are required
to prevent litigants from wasting judicial, party, and citizen juror
resources.
3

Here, the conference before closing argument and the bench
conferences during closing argument demonstrate the confusion regarding
the limitations imposed on argument by the order in limine. Moreover,
the district judge may have misapprehended the law, augmenting the
confusion.

 

°lf the order in limine is unclear or compound, the court may, once
objection is made, take up the issue outside the jury's presence in more
detail as, in fact, occurred during closing argument in this case.

 

 
“Enough has been written about the ‘seat-belt defense’ to show
the body of law related to it is split, fragmented and changingl, varying] in
time, place, rationale, effect and implementation.” LaHue v. General
Motors Corp,, 716 F. Supp. 407, 410 (W.D. Mo, 1989). It is one thing to
exclude seatbelt evidence and argument in a suit alloging that the
accident itself—and therefore the injuries flowing from that accident—
were caused by a defect in tho automobile. Seo Jeep Corporation v,
Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 708 P.2d 297 (1985), superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in Countrywide Home Loans v, Thitchener, 124
Nev. 725, 192 P.3d 243 (2008), It is another thing to exclude such
evidence and argument in a crashworthiness case, where evidence that an
automobile was equipped with seatbelts is generally admitted to defend
the overall design of the safety restraint system and to defend against the
claim that the defect in the safety restraint system was the cause-in-fact of
the plaintiff's enhanced injuries, for which liability would not otherwise
attach. See Gardner By and Through Gardner v, Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d
729, 787 (10th Cir, 1996); DePaepe v. General Motors Corp., 33 F.3d 737,
745 (7th Cir. 1994); General Motors Corp. v. Wolhar, 686 A.2d 170, 175
(Del. 1996); Clark v. Mazda Motor Corp,, 68 P.3d 207, 209 (Okla. 2003).

‘Thus, “in secondary-collision product-liability actions,” seatbelt nonuse

may necessarily “be admissible to show, or, as in this action, rebut, the
essential element of causation.” Hodges v. Mack Trucks Inc,, 474 F.3d

188, 202 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (applying Texas law).
Seatbelt statutes take a variety of forms. David G. Owen, M.
Stuart Madden & Mary J. Davis, Madden & Owen on Products Liability §

 

 
an ae

 

21:7 (Bd ed. 2000 & Supp. 2010). We recognize that NRS 484D.495(4)
addresses causation,? in addition to negligence and abuse or misuse of
product. However, unlike some seatbelt statutes, NRS 484D.495(4) does
not say that “evidence of failure to wear a seat belt shall not be
admissible” in any proceeding. See Barron v. Ford Motor Co, of Canada,
Ltd,, 965 F.2d 195, 198 (7th Cir, 1992) (quoting N.C, Gen. Stat, § 20-
185.2A(4) and noting that, read literally, that statute would hold that, “if
an irate passenger ripped off his seat belt, tore it from ite moorings, and
used it to strangle the driver, in the ensuing murder trial the prosecution
would be forbidden to identify the murder weapon because to do so would
be to show that the defendant had not been wearing his seatbelt’)
Rather, NRS 484D.495(4)(b) and (¢) say that “[a] violation of section 2”

(the vehicle code provision requiring adults to wear seatbelts when riding

 

in cars) “{m]ay not be considered as negligence or ... as misuse or abuse of
a product or as causation” in any civil action. (Emphasis added.) This
wording suggests that NRS 484D.495(4)(b) and (¢) only bar evidence in a
civil action that a party's conduct constituted a statutory violation of law,
not evidence of the underlying conduct. See Cantinca v, Fontana, 884
A.2d 468, 471-72 Del. 2005) (deeming this the “plain meaning” of a
statute similarly prohibiting consideration of evidence of a “violation” of a
mandatory smoke detector law); Evans v. Evans, 695 8.E.2d 173, 177 (Va.
2010) (interpreting a similarly worded statute as permitting a child’s suit

 

 

/f note, when the predecessor to NRS 484D.495(4) was enacted in
1985, the role that comparative fault should play, if any, in the context of
strict product liability was actively being debated. Jeep Corporation, 101

Nev. at 645, 708 P.2d at 301 (citing Young’s Machine Co. v. Long, 100 Nev.
692, 692 P.2d 24 (1984),

a

 
against her father for not putting her in a child restraint device; statute
precluded only a negligence per se claim based on violation of the child
safety restraint statute, or mention of the statutory provision). ‘This would
prevent use of the seatbelt statute to establish duty or fault but not the

admissibility of the underlying fact the seatbelt was not being worn,

 

Although we do not resolve these issues now, we raise them to
demonstrate that the order in limine may not have been as
straightforward as Roth and the district judge assumed. Allowing BMW
to introduce seatbelt nonuse evidence without arguing causation is a
delicate and difficult line to draw.* The boundaries of such lines are
established through the court's ruling on objections. If Roth had objected
during BMW's opening statement, the court would have had an
opportunity early in trial to define the boundaries of its ruling. Because
Roth failed to object, however, that guidance was not provided. And as the
exchange between the court and counsel before closing arguments
reflects—“And I think you're [BMW's counsel, Cereghini] going to be okay
because you didn't get slayed after your opening statement, so you're
unlikely to get slayed or held in contempt after closing if it stays along the
same lines’—the failure to object to an opposing party’s interpretation of
an unclear order in limine can affect further proceedings in the case. See
also Beccard v. Nevada National Bank, 99 Nev. 63, 65-66, 657 P.2d 1154,
1156 (1983) (“The failure to object to allegedly prejudicial remarks at the

"As the authorities discussed in this section suggest, once a plaintiff
makes an affirmative claim that a vehicle's safety restraint system was
used and failed, court-imposed limits on a manufacturer's ability to rebut

such claims with proof that an integral part of the safety restraint
system-the seatbelts—were not used will rarely, if ever, be appropriate.

 

 
time an argument is made, and for a considerable time afterwards,
strongly indicates that the party moving for a new trial did not consider
the arguments objectionable at the time they were delivered, but made
that claim as an afterthought.

 

‘Therefore, we reaffirm that a fully briefed and definitively
ruled-on motion in limine on an evidentiary question preserves error for
challenges to whether the district court properly ruled on the motion.
However, the motion in limine does not serve as an objection for violation
of the order in limine, including attorney misconduct for that violation. To
hold otherwise would adopt a rule that violates principles of judicial
economy by “permit[ting] counsel to sit silently when an error is
committed at trial with the hope that they will get a new trial because of
that error if they lose.” United States Aviation Underwriters, 896 F.2d at
986 (internal quotation omitted). Where the meaning of an order in limine
is not clear, as was the case here, a party may not realize it has violated
the order without the court's ruling on a contemporaneous objection. The
objection allows the district court to instruct the parties on how the court
will apply the order, and it provides the parties with a necessary
opportunity to conform their conduct and remarks to the order. Therefore,
a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve attorney misconduct
for violating an order in limine.

Because BMW's comments during opening statement were not
objected to, any claim that they amounted to attorney misconduct was
waived unless they amounted to plain error. The lack of specificity in the

court’s order in limine and the genuine uncertainty in the law with respect
to the seatbelt defense in crashworthiness cases, coupled with Roth's
affirmative claim that the seatbelt and safety restraint system were

 

 
ne

defective, makes the misconduct claim associated with these comments
highly questionable,

Even assuming the comments amounted to misconduct, they
did not constitute plain error. The comments involved arguably improper
causation arguments. The jury, however, did not even reach the causation
issue. Rather, answering special interrogatories, the jury concluded that
the BMW vehicle was not defective. Thus, the misconduct did not affect

 

the verdict. This point is reemphasized in the fact that the jury awarded
Roth a $5.9 million judgment against Stapleton, Had improper causation
arguments influenced the jury, it would not have returned a verdict in
Roth's favor. Thus, the comments during opening statement did not
amount to “irreparable and fundamental error...that results in a
substantial impairment of justice or denial of fundamental rights such
that, but for the misconduct, the verdict would have been different.”
Grosjean v, Imperial Palace. 125 Nev. at__, 212 P.8d at 1079 (quoting
Lioce, 124 Nev. at 19, 174 P.3d at 982).
GQ
‘This leaves the two objected-to statements during closing
argument to sustain the new trial order.” The first statement did not

*Stapleton and, to a lesser extent, Roth argue that, even if this court
rojects the district court's specific findings of attorney misconduct, we
should affirm based on other misconduct they contend occurred and the
fact that, in their view, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Doing so would be contrary to Lioce’s requirement of specific oral and
written findings of misconduct to facilitate appellate review of orders
granting or denying new trials based on attorney misconduct. See Lioce,
124 Nev. at 19-20, 174 P.3d at 982. Nevada does not permit the grant of a
new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. Fox v, Cusick, 633 Nev. 218, 221, 583 P.2d 466, 468 (1975). The

continued on next page...

24

 

 
 

constitute misconduct. All that was said was, “let’s look at what the
plaintiffs are claiming here and ask the question, did any of these alleged
defects cause any injury to Ms. Roth or the accident? Take the seatbelt, It
wasn’t being worn,” Roth’s claim was that the seatbelt’s failure to restrain
her betrayed her legitimate expectations as an ordinary consumer. If she

arter. If the court had

 

wasn't wearing her seatbelt, this claim was a non.
specifically forbidden this argument, the question would arise of the
sanctions appropriate for an attorney's disobedience of an erroneous order
in limine, but it didn't. The exchanges up to that point between the court
and the parties, as well as the order in limine and associated limiting
instruction, did not interdict this argument, Thus, it did not constitute
misconduct.

Although the statement was proper, the court struck it. In
doing so, it told the jury, “You are instructed to disregard the reference
made to the causation of any injuries to the plaintiff with respect to not
wearing the seatbelt and any injuries relating to the defect in the seatbelt.
This evidence may be used by you only for the purpose of evaluating the

claim of defect in the seatbelt and any injuries relating to the defect in the
seatbelt” (emphasis added).

 

continued

additional issues asserted as misconduct were dealt with by the district
court as they arose and did not merit a new trial as, indeed, the district
court implicitly recognized in settling the form of new trial order.

‘This instruction highlights the subtleties of the district court's
order in limine and the problems in using it as the predicate for a finding
of attorney misconduct.

 

 
Cereghini’s final comment was in the context of describing the

 

seatbelt and B-pillar claims

 

“red herrings" because “Ms. Roth is ejected
from her side window, she was ejected because she was not belted and
the...” The court sustained Roth's objection and directed Cereghini to
clarify his statement, which he did, stating that because the evidence
showed that the seatbelt was not being worn, there was no proof that any
defect in the seatbelt caused Roth's injury. Roth did not object. This

 

 

occurred shortly after the prior admonition and instruction, which the
court did not repeat. Given the closeness in time, however, we treat the
incident as involving objected-to and admonished misconduct under Lioce.

“{Flor objected-to and admonished misconduct, a party moving
for a new trial bears the burden of demonstrating that the misconduct is
80 extreme that the objection and admonishment could not remove the
misconduet'’s effect.” Lioce, 124 Nev. at 17, 174 P.3d at 981, Roth did not
carry that burden here. In closing argument, Roth made clear that the
limiting instruction on seatbelt nonuse could not be used to assign fault to
Roth. And as discussed earlier, the misconduct did not affect the verdict
because the jury found no product defect and did not reach the causation
issue. Therefore, the objected-to misconduct did not warrant a new trial
because the district court judge's admonishment and instruction
sufficiently cured the misconduct.

wv
‘The district court awarded attorney fees and costs to Roth and
Stapleton when it granted Roth's motion for new trial based on BMW's

 

 
   

counsel's misconduct, Because we reverse the order granting a new trial,

|we reverse the award of fees and costs as well.

Pickering

Ca.

Parraguirre