Case Title: State v. Niesen-Pennycuff

Citation: 2012-Ohio-2730

Docket Number: 2011-1070

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Niesen-Pennycuff, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2730.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2730 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. NIESEN-PENNYCUFF, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Niesen-Pennycuff, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2730.] 
Criminal law—Intervention in lieu of conviction—R.C. 2951.041—Trial court has 
discretion to employ R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) and determine that defendant 
may have record sealed immediately upon successful completion of 
intervention program. 
(No. 2011-1070—Submitted February 8, 2012—Decided June 21, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Warren County,  
No. CA2010-11-112, 2011-Ohio-2704. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When a defendant who has successfully completed a program of intervention in 
lieu of conviction moves for an order sealing his or her record under R.C. 
2951.041(E), the trial court has discretion either to grant the motion 
immediately under R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) or to impose the waiting period set 
forth in R.C. 2953.32(A)(1).  (R.C. 2951.041(E), construed.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today we are called upon to interpret R.C. 2951.041(E), a 
provision of the statute governing intervention in lieu of conviction (“ILC”).  
Specifically, we are asked to establish the scope of a trial court’s discretion to seal 
the record of a defendant who has successfully completed the ILC program.  For 
the reasons that follow, we hold that a trial court has discretion to determine that 
successful completion of the ILC program entitles the defendant to immediate 
sealing of his or her record under R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) or to impose the waiting 
period set forth in R.C. 2953.32(A)(1).  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and remand the matter to the trial court. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} On April 21, 2009, appellant, Regina Niesen-Pennycuff, was 
indicted on 12 counts of deception to obtain a dangerous drug, in violation of R.C. 
2925.22(A), felonies of the fifth degree.  Niesen-Pennycuff initially pled not 
guilty, but later moved for ILC pursuant to R.C. 2951.041.  The trial court found 
that she was eligible for intervention and ordered an intervention plan.  As 
required by the ILC statute, Niesen-Pennycuff retracted her initial plea and pled 
guilty to the charges, pending successful completion of her intervention program, 
and was placed on community control for three years. 
{¶ 3} On August 24, 2010, the court filed a termination entry in which it 
recognized Niesen-Pennycuff’s successful completion of the intervention program 
and thereby dismissed the 12 pending charges against her.  On September 23, 
2010, Niesen-Pennycuff filed an application for sealing of her record after 
dismissal of the proceedings.  The state opposed the application and argued that 
Niesen-Pennycuff was ineligible for sealing until three years after the dismissal of 
the charges against her, or August 24, 2013.  The trial court agreed and denied 
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Niesen-Pennycuff’s application, but invited her to reapply in 2013 once she is 
eligible. 
{¶ 4} Niesen-Pennycuff appealed, and the Warren County Court of 
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but sua sponte certified its 
decision as in conflict with the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ decision in State 
v. Fortado, 108 Ohio App.3d 706, 671 N.E.2d 622 (9th Dist.1996).  State v. 
Niesen-Pennycuff, 12th Dist. No. CA2010-11-112, 2011-Ohio-2704. 
{¶ 5} Niesen-Pennycuff filed a notice of certification of conflict, and this 
court granted discretionary review and certified a conflict on the following issue:   
 
Must a trial court order the sealing of records in the manner 
provided in R.C. 2953.32, which requires a one-year waiting 
period for misdemeanors and a three-year waiting period for 
felonies, or may the trial court employ R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) and 
determine that a defendant who has successfully completed the 
intervention in lieu of conviction program is eligible to have their 
record sealed immediately upon successful completion of the 
program?   
 
State v. Niesen-Pennycuff, 129 Ohio St.3d 1473, 953 N.E.2d 840. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 6} Intervention in lieu of conviction is established in R.C. 2951.041, 
and pursuant to R.C. 2951.041(A)(1), 
 
If an offender is charged with a criminal offense * * * and 
the court has reason to believe that drug or alcohol usage by the 
offender was a factor leading to the criminal offense with which 
the offender is charged * * *, the court may accept, prior to the 
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entry of a guilty plea, the offender’s request for intervention in lieu 
of conviction. 
 
{¶ 7} As we held in State v. Massien, 125 Ohio St.3d 204, 2010-Ohio-
1864, 926 N.E.2d 1282,  
 
ILC is a statutory creation that allows a trial court to stay a 
criminal proceeding and order an offender to a period of 
rehabilitation if the court has reason to believe that drug or alcohol 
usage was a factor leading to the offense.  R.C. 2951.041(A)(1).  
* * *  
“In enacting R.C. 2951.041, the legislature made a 
determination that when chemical abuse is the cause or at least a 
precipitating factor in the commission of a crime, it may be more 
beneficial to the individual and the community as a whole to treat 
the cause rather than punish the crime.”  State v. Shoaf (2000), 140 
Ohio App.3d 75, 77, 746 N.E.2d 674.  * * * [For that reason,] ILC 
is not designed as punishment, but rather as an opportunity for 
first-time offenders to receive help for their dependence without 
the ramifications of a felony conviction.  State v. Ingram, 
Cuyahoga App. No. 84925, 2005-Ohio-1967, 2005 WL 977820, 
¶ 13. 
   
Massien at ¶ 9-10. 
{¶ 8} The section of the ILC statute that deals with the sealing of 
records, R.C. 2951.041(E), provides:  
 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
If the court grants an offender’s request for intervention in 
lieu of conviction and the court finds that the offender has 
successfully completed the intervention plan for the offender, * * * 
the court shall dismiss the proceedings against the offender.  
Successful completion of the intervention plan and period of 
abstinence under this section shall be without adjudication of guilt 
and is not a criminal conviction for purposes of any 
disqualification or disability imposed by law and upon conviction 
of a crime, and the court may order the sealing of records related to 
the offense in question in the manner provided in sections 2953.31 
to 2953.36 of the Revised Code. 
 
{¶ 9} The state argues that the statute’s reference to R.C. 2953.31 to 
2953.36 means that the sealing of records in ILC is governed by R.C. 
2953.32(A)(1), which requires a three-year waiting period before a defendant may 
move for an order sealing the record.  However, R.C. 2953.31 to 2953.36 govern 
the sealing of an individual’s record following the conviction of a crime.  See, 
e.g., R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) (“a first offender may apply to the sentencing court if 
convicted * * * for the sealing of the conviction record”).  That subsection further 
provides that “[a]pplication may be made at the expiration of three years after the 
offender’s final discharge if convicted of a felony, or at the expiration of one year 
after the offender’s final discharge if convicted of a misdemeanor.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  But in an ILC case, an offender who has successfully completed ILC has 
no conviction. 
{¶ 10} Niesen-Pennycuff urges us to refer instead to R.C. 2953.52, which 
governs the sealing of a record after the dismissal of a case.  Under that statute, 
any person who is found not guilty of an offense or whose complaint, indictment, 
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or information was dismissed, may apply for an order to seal related records any 
time after the not-guilty finding or dismissal is entered.  R.C. 2953.52(A)(1). 
{¶ 11} Thus, whether Niesen-Pennycuff is eligible to have her record 
sealed immediately or whether she has to wait for the period specified in R.C. 
2953.52 depends on the meaning of the phrase in R.C. 2951.041(E) that the court 
“may order the sealing of records related to the offense in question in the manner 
provided in sections 2953.31 to 2953.36 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 12} In this case, the trial court denied Niesen-Pennycuff’s application 
for sealing of her record after dismissal of the proceedings, but invited her to 
reapply in 2013, when the trial court thought she would be eligible.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the language of R.C. 
2951.041(E) requires a court to follow the provisions in R.C. 2953.31through 
2953.36, rather than R.C. 2953.52(A)(1).  The court of appeals also sua sponte 
certified a conflict between its holding in this case and the holding of the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals in State v. Fortado, 108 Ohio App.3d 706, 671 N.E.2d 
622 (9th Dist.1996). 
{¶ 13} We disagree with the approach taken by the appellate court below 
as well as the approach taken in Fortado and instead hold that (1) R.C. 
2951.041(E)’s use of the phrase “in the manner provided in” R.C. 2953.31 to 
2953.36 does not connote a legislative intent that the court must comply with 
those statutes and (2) the use of the word “may” in R.C. 2951.041(E) allows trial 
courts the discretion to apply—or not apply—the statutes from R.C. Chapter 
2953. 
{¶ 14} The Twelfth District below took the approach that under the plain 
language of R.C. 2951.041(E), R.C. 2953.31 to 2953.36 govern the sealing of the 
defendant’s record after his or her case is dismissed following successful 
completion of ILC.  Thus, under R.C. 2953.32(A)(1), Niesen-Pennycuff must wait 
three years before applying for the sealing of her records.  But this approach 
January Term, 2012 
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thwarts the legislative intent behind ILC.  As we have said, R.C. 2951.041 was 
designed to eliminate punishment by offering first-time offenders an opportunity 
to receive help for their dependence without the ramifications of a felony 
conviction.  Massien, 125 Ohio St.3d 204, 2010-Ohio-1864, 926 N.E.2d 1282, 
¶ 10. 
{¶ 15} It is unreasonable, therefore, to view R.C. 2951.041(E)’s reference 
to R.C. 2953.31 to 2953.36 as imposing a requirement that ILC defendants must 
carry a criminal record for three years after the charges have been dismissed due 
to successful completion of the ILC program. 
{¶ 16} In the conflict case, State v. Fortado, 108 Ohio App.3d 706, 671 
N.E.2d 622, the defendant successfully completed ILC and the trial court 
dismissed the charges.  The defendant then moved the court for an order sealing 
the record pursuant to R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) rather than R.C. 2951.041(E).  The 
court granted the motion.  The state appealed, arguing that R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) 
requires a defendant to wait three years before requesting that his records be 
sealed. 
{¶ 17} The Fortado court held that the trial court had not erred in granting 
the motion before three years had passed, because the indictments had been 
dismissed, and R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) applies generally to dismissals.  The court 
quoted R.C. 2951.041, but did not apply it or comment on it. 
{¶ 18} We are persuaded by the rationale advanced in State v. Smith, 3d 
Dist. No. 9-04-05, 2004-Ohio-6668.  Although the issue in Smith is somewhat 
different from the issue here, the analysis contains certain insights that we find 
relevant.  In upholding the trial court’s sua sponte order relating to the records of 
the dismissed charges, the court noted that based on R.C. 2951.041(E),  
 
the trial court has the authority to seal the record of an offender 
who has successfully completed an intervention program and 
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against whom proceedings have been dismissed.  Based on the 
language of R.C. 2951.041(E) that the court may order the records 
sealed in the “manner provided” by the expungement statutes, we 
find that the legislature intended the trial court to have the 
authority to order the records sealed even without an application by 
the offender. 
 
Id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 19} We believe that the Smith court’s observation about the language 
of R.C. 2951.041(E) is correct.  R.C. 2951.041(E) employs the unusual phrase “in 
the manner of” rather than “pursuant to.”  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 
“pursuant to” means “[i]n compliance with; in accordance with; * * * [a]s 
authorized by; under.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1356 (9th Ed.2009).  “In the 
manner of” does not connote such rigid compliance. “Manner” is defined as “the 
mode or method in which something is done or happens: a mode of procedure or 
way of acting.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1376 (1986). 
{¶ 20} We conclude that R.C. 2951.041(E)’s use of the phrase “in the 
manner provided in” signifies that  R.C. 2951.041(E) was not intended to impose 
on ILC defendants all the requirements and limitations of R.C. 2953.31 to 
2953.36.  The phrase “in the manner provided in” is less prescriptive and more in 
the nature of guidance than a command.  It connotes only the “mode or method,” 
i.e., the general procedure provided in those statutes. 
{¶ 21} Thus, R.C. 2951.041(E)’s reference to R.C. 2953.31 to 2953.36 is 
meant to incorporate the general procedures for filing an application to seal.  It is 
not meant to impose on all ILC defendants the requirements and limitations 
imposed by those statutes on convicted persons.  For example, a court in an ILC 
case may be guided by the procedures set out in R.C. 2953.32, such as the 
procedures for setting a hearing, notifying the prosecutor, making the findings 
January Term, 2012 
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described in subdivision (C)(1), determining forfeiture of bail, determining 
whether criminal proceedings are pending against the applicant, etc. 
{¶ 22} In sum, trial courts may refer to R.C. 2953.31 to 2953.36 for 
guidance in matters of procedure but are not bound to follow those provisions.  
Thus, a trial court may be guided by R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) and, in its discretion, 
impose a waiting period before granting a motion to seal under R.C. 2951.041(E).  
This reading further comports with the use of the permissive word “may” in R.C. 
2951.041(E): “the court may order the sealing of records related to the offense in 
question in the manner provided in sections 2953.31to 2953.36 of the Revised 
Code.”  Had the legislature intended to impose the requirements and limitations of 
those statutes on every ILC defendant, it would have used the word “shall.”  
Finally, this reading is in line with the remedial purpose of ILC without rendering 
the phrase “in the manner provided in” superfluous or meaningless. 
{¶ 23} As the Fourth District noted in State v. Mills, 4th Dist. No. 
10CA3144, 2011-Ohio-377, “the process for sealing criminal records does not 
always fit neatly within the treatment-in-lieu-of-conviction statute.”  Id. at ¶ 10.  
The court went on to note that it had interpreted any inherent ambiguities in the 
defendant’s favor because we “must liberally construe [R.C. 2953.31-36] so as to 
promote the legislative purpose of allowing expungements.” (Brackets sic.)  Id., 
citing State v. Hilbert, 145 Ohio App.3d 824, 827, 764 N.E.2d 1064 (2001).  We 
agree.  Thus, we conclude that the trial court has discretion to seal the record of a 
case that was dismissed following successful completion of ILC without a waiting 
period. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 24} Treating all ILC defendants as though they have been convicted of 
a crime when their charges have been dismissed pursuant to a program designed 
to avoid the very ramifications of a conviction would run counter to the purpose 
of ILC.  Accordingly, we hold that when a defendant who has successfully 
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completed a program of intervention in lieu of conviction moves for an order 
sealing his or her record under R.C. 2951.041(E), the trial court has discretion 
either to grant the motion immediately under R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) or to impose the 
waiting period set forth in R.C. 2953.32(A)(1). 
{¶ 25} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, 
JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring. 
{¶ 26} I concur with the majority’s holding that R.C. 2951.041(E) confers 
discretion upon courts to seal the records of defendants who successfully 
complete intervention in lieu of conviction, permitting those courts to decide 
whether to impose the restrictions and limitations contained in R.C. 2953.31 
through 2953.36. 
{¶ 27} I further agree that defendants can apply for the sealing of records 
pursuant to R.C. 2951.041(E) once the trial court journalizes an entry that 
dismisses the pending charges and terminates the case. 
{¶ 28} I concur in the majority’s judgment and write separately only to 
reinforce the majority’s determination that a conviction is required to trigger the 
application of R.C. 2953.31 through 2953.36. 
{¶ 29} Intervention in lieu of conviction provides first offenders with the 
opportunity to obtain treatment for chemical dependency without any criminal 
sanction and shows that the General Assembly recognizes that treatment can be 
“ ‘more beneficial to the individual and the community as a whole’ ” because it 
January Term, 2012 
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treats “ ‘the cause rather than punish[es] the crime.’ ”  State v. Massien, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 204, 2010-Ohio-1864, 926 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Shoaf, 140 
Ohio App.3d 75, 77, 746 N.E.2d 674 (10th Dist. 2000). 
{¶ 30} Dispositive of the issue presented in this appeal is the language of 
R.C. 2951.041(E): 
 
Successful completion of the intervention plan and period of 
abstinence under this section shall be without adjudication of guilt 
and is not a criminal conviction for purposes of any 
disqualification or disability imposed by law and upon conviction 
of a crime, and the court may order the sealing of records related to 
the offense in question in the manner provided in sections 2953.31 
to 2953.36 of the Revised Code. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 31} R.C. 2953.31 through 2953.36 relate to sealing a record of 
conviction.  R.C. 2953.32 sets forth the method by which a trial court may seal 
the record of conviction for an individual who is a “first offender,” which R.C. 
2953.31(A) defines as one “who has been convicted of an offense in this state or 
any other jurisdiction and who previously or subsequently has not been convicted 
of the same or a different offense in this state or any other jurisdiction.”  
Applications to seal records pursuant to R.C. 2953.32 are subject to a prescribed 
waiting period.  R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) governs the sealing of records following a 
finding of not guilty or the dismissal of a complaint, indictment, or information 
and imposes no waiting period. 
{¶ 32} By its express terms, R.C. 2953.32 applies only to those 
individuals who have been convicted of a criminal offense.  The purpose of 
successful completion of an intervention plan is to avoid conviction; the pending 
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charges are dismissed and the matter is adjudicated without a finding of guilt.  In 
my view, because the successful completion of an intervention plan prevents a 
criminal conviction, R.C. 2953.32 does not apply to the sealing of those records. 
{¶ 33} The reference in R.C. 2951.041(E) to R.C. 2953.31 through 
2953.36 indicates that the General Assembly intended for courts to have 
discretion in sealing the records of an individual who successfully completes an 
intervention plan: a court may do so according to the manner provided in either 
R.C. 2953.32, by imposing a waiting period before a defendant may move for an 
order to seal, or R.C. 2953.52, by allowing a defendant to apply for an order to 
seal at any time after dismissal.  But the court is not required to impose R.C. 
2953.32’s waiting period, because there has been no conviction.  This 
construction gives effect to the intent of the legislature, while a contrary 
determination thwarts the very purposes for which the legislature created 
intervention in lieu of conviction. 
{¶ 34} Accordingly, the trial court had no duty to follow R.C. 2953.32 in 
sealing the records of Niesen-Pennycuff because R.C. 2951.041(E) did not 
mandate sealing pursuant to that statute and because she did not have a conviction 
that otherwise triggered R.C. 2953.32. 
{¶ 35} For these reasons, I concur in the judgment reversing the court of 
appeals. 
__________________ 
 
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael 
Greer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Rittgers & Rittgers and Nicholas D. Graman, for appellant. 
______________________