Case Title: RICHARD SETEREN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-199

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD SETEREN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 144167 P.3d 20Case Number: 06-199Decided: 09/17/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
RICHARD 
SETEREN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the DistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

The Honorable John C. Brackley, 
Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

D. Terry 
Rogers, InterimState Public Defender; and 
Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Richard Seteren (Seteren), entered a guilty plea to felony level driving under 
the influence of alcohol (DUI).  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (b)(i) and (e) (LexisNexis 2003) (fourth 
conviction within a five-year time span).  
That plea was conditioned on reservation of his right to appeal the 
district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the information for lack of a 
speedy trial.  Seteren also contends 
the district court erred in imposing sentence.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Seteren raises 
these issues:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court erred when it sentenced [Seteren] for a fourth 
DUI conviction when he was sentenced on June 15, 2006 and one of the convictions 
used for enhancement occurred on May 24, 2001.

 
 
II.         
Whether [Seteren] was denied his right to a speedy trial when none of the 
delay was attributable to [him].

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court err in sentencing [Seteren] for the felony of 
having four DUI convictions within five years, given that the earliest of those 
convictions occurred on May 24, 2001, and that he entered a guilty plea to the 
most recent charge on April 18, 2006?

 
 
II.         
Was [Seteren] denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the 
facts of this case?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The facts are not 
contested.  Seteren was arrested on 
April 27, 2005, for DUI.  He was 
arraigned in the Sheridan Municipal Court on April 29, 2005.  An attorney for the City of Sheridan ascertained that 
Seteren had at least three other recent DUI convictions.  Thus, under § 31-5-233(e), he became 
eligible to be prosecuted for a felony.  
That subsection provides:

 
 
On a 
fourth or subsequent conviction within five (5) years for a violation of this 
section or other law prohibiting driving while under the influence, he shall be 
guilty of a felony and fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), 
punished by imprisonment for not more than two years, or 
both.

 
 
[¶4]      One part of the 
controversy here is whether or not the State managed to get the "conviction" 
accomplished within a five-year period as contemplated by the statute.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2003) directs our attention to § 31-7-102(a)(xi) for the definition 
of "conviction," as used in the instant circumstances:

 
 
(xi)  "Conviction" 
means a final conviction and shall include:

            


(C)  A 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court.

 
 
[¶5]      Seteren appeared 
before the district court on April 18, 2006, and entered a plea of guilty to the 
charged felony of four DUI convictions in a five-year period.  He next appeared before the district 
court on June 15, 2006, for sentencing and the "Judgment and Sentence" was 
entered of record on June 21, 2006.  
At sentencing, Seteren protested the sentence imposed based on the same 
theory that he pursues in this appeal, i.e., that his April 27, 2005 violation 
of the statute did not ripen into a conviction until June 21, 2006, when the 
sentence was finally entered of record.  
Seteren not only contends that the fourth conviction was "without" the 
relevant five-year time period; he also contends that his right to a speedy 
trial was violated along the way.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
The 
Five-Year Period

 
 
[¶6]      At the time he 
entered his guilty plea, Seteren admitted that he had three previous convictions 
for DUI within the preceding five years:

 
 
            
1.  The first offense occurred on March 10, 2001, and a 
conviction was achieved on May 24, 2001.

 
 
            
2.  The second offense occurred on December 28, 2001, and a 
conviction was achieved April 30, 2004.1

 
 
            
3.  The third offense occurred on September 13, 2003, and a 
conviction was achieved on January 27, 2004.

 
 
            
4.  The fourth occurred on April 27, 2005, and a guilty plea 
was accepted by the district court on April 18, 2006.2

 
 
[¶7]      We deem the 
language of the governing statute to be plain and unambiguous.  Based upon Seteren's own testimony and 
the materials available to us in the record on appeal, Seteren was convicted of 
DUI four times in the course of five years and he was properly sentenced for 
that crime.  Because the statute is 
clear and unambiguous we need not engage in an application of any of the rules 
of statutory construction.  E.g., Harris v. State, 2006 WY 76, 
¶¶ 11-14, 137 P.3d 124, 128-29 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶8]      The language of 
the statute is clear and unambiguous, but the Legislature may wish to consider 
altering the focus of the statute.  
The purpose of the statute seems plain:  Persons who drive under the influence 
four or more times in a five-year period are guilty of a felony, if each of 
those episodes results in a conviction.  
As the statute is written, the focus is not so much on the conduct as it 
is on the conviction for the conduct.  
As written, the statute requires the prosecutor to be attentive to 
whether or not the fourth conviction is achieved within five years; whereas if 
the language were more precise, the crime would be complete once a fourth 
conviction was achieved, so long as all four incidents of conduct occurred 
within a five-year period.

 
 
Speedy 
Trial

 
 
[¶9]      Seteren concedes 
that Wyoming's 
speedy trial rule was not violated by the circumstances of this case.W.R.Cr.P. 
48 provides:

 
 
(a)  By attorney for state. -- The attorney 
for the state may, by leave of court, file a dismissal of an indictment, 
information or citation, and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate.  Such a dismissal may not be filed during 
the trial without the consent of the defendant.

(b)  Speedy trial. --

            
(1)  It is the responsibility of the court, counsel and the 
defendant to insure that the defendant is timely tried.

            
(2)  A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 180 
days following arraignment unless continued as provided in this 
rule.

            
(3)  The following periods shall be excluded in computing the 
time for trial:

(A)  All 
proceedings related to the mental illness or deficiency of the 
defendant;

                        
(B)  Proceedings on another charge;

                        
(C)  The time between the dismissal and the refiling of the 
same charge; and

(D)  Delay 
occasioned by defendant's change of counsel or application 
therefor.

            
(4)  Continuances exceeding 180 days from the date of 
arraignment may be granted by the trial court as follows:

(A)  On 
motion of defendant supported by affidavit;

(B)  On 
motion of the attorney for the state or the court if:

(i)  The 
defendant expressly consents;

(ii)  The 
state's evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; 
or

(iii)  Required 
in the due administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially 
prejudiced; and

(C)  If 
a continuance is proposed by the state or the court, the defendant shall be 
notified.  If the defendant objects, 
the defendant must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the 
defense.

            
(5)  Any criminal case not tried or continued as provided in 
this rule shall be dismissed 180 days after arraignment.

            
(6)  If the defendant is unavailable for any proceeding at 
which the defendant's presence is required, the case may be continued for a 
reasonable time by the trial court but for no more than 180 days after the 
defendant is available or the case further continued as provided in this 
rule.

            
(7)  A dismissal for lack of a speedy trial under this rule 
shall not bar the state from again prosecuting the defendant for the same 
offense unless the defendant made a written demand for a speedy trial or can 
demonstrate prejudice from the delay.

 
 
[¶10]   However, it is possible for a 
defendant to be tried within the time limits of Rule 48 and still suffer a 
constitutional deprivation due to delay which seriously prejudices his 
defense.  Compliance with Rule 48 
answers only part of any constitutional speedy trial question.  We must also apply the four part test 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).  That 
analysis requires us to balance:  
(1) The length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the 
defendant's assertion of the right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.  Jennings v. State, 4 P.3d 915, 921 (Wyo. 200).  We examine de novo the constitutional 
question of whether or not a defendant has been denied a speedy trial in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 
10 of the Wyoming Constitution.  To the extent that the district court 
makes factual determinations in that process, we review them for clear 
error.  State v. Humphrey, 2005 WY 131, 
¶ 8, 120 P.3d 1027, 1029 (Wyo. 2005).  
In Humphrey, we settled 
several questions pertinent to the instant appeal.  The speedy trial clock begins to run 
upon arrest or when charges are filed.  
The speedy trial guarantee is no longer applicable once charges are 
dismissed.  The speedy trial clock 
resumes running when a second charge is filed that is closely related to the 
first charge (essentially arises out of the same crime or the same set of facts 
and circumstances).  Humphrey, ¶¶ 11-17, 120 P.3d  at 
1029-31.

 
 
[¶11]   As noted above, Seteren was 
arrested for DUI on April 27, 2005.  
He entered a plea of not guilty on April 29, 2005.  That charge was dismissed on May 25, 
2005.  The record becomes somewhat 
muddled for a considerable period of time.  
The information was dated and signed by the county attorney on May 9, 
2005.  That same piece of paper 
indicates that it was filed in the circuit court on October 4, 2005, and then in 
the district court on October 25, 2005.  
A criminal warrant was issued by the circuit court on June 9, 2005 (and 
it was filed of record that same date).  
However, that warrant was not served on Seteren until October 5, 
2005.  An attorney was appointed to 
represent Seteren and she entered her appearance on his behalf on October 14, 
2005.  After a preliminary hearing 
on October 18, 2005, Seteren was bound over to the district court.  Seteren appeared before the district 
court for arraignment on November 22, 2005.  In a document titled "Order After 
Arraignment," the district court set Seteren's case for a pretrial conference on 
April 18, 2006, and for trial on May 17, 2006.

 
 
[¶12]   Seteren filed his first motion to 
dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on February 8, 2006, and an amended motion to 
dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on February 10, 2006.  A hearing was held on March 10, 2006, to 
inquire into Seteren's motion to dismiss.  
In its April 18, 2006 order denying the motion, the district court made 
these findings:

 
 
I..         
On April 27, 2005, [Seteren] was arrested on charge through Sheridan 
Municipal Court;

II.         
On April 29, 2005, [he] was arraigned and released;

III.        On 
May 25, 2005, the charge in Sheridan Municipal Court was 
dismissed;

IV.       On June 9, 
2005, the State filed the Information in this case against [him] and an arrest 
warrant was issued;

V.        On 
June 10, 2005, said warrant was received by the Sheridan County 
Sheriff;

VI.       On October 
4, 2005, [Seteren] voluntarily appeared in Circuit Court on this 
Information;

VII.      On October 6, 
2005, [he] filed an Affidavit of Indigency and Order for Court Appointed 
Counsel;

VIII.     On October 14, 2006, 
Public Defender enters her appearance in this case;

IX.       On October 
18, 2005, the preliminary hearing is held; probable cause is found and the case 
is bound over; and

X.        On 
October 25, 2005, Information is filed with District 
Court.

 
 
THE 
COURT FURTHER FINDS that there were no continuances or delays in District Court 
that would violate W.R.Cr.P. Rule 48 or prejudice 
[Seteren].

 
 
THE 
COURT FURTHER FINDS, as to whether the time from [Seteren's] initial arrest is 
so unreasonable as to prejudice [his] rights to receive a fair trial, as 
follows:

 
 

I.        From 
April 29, 2005, to October 4, 2005, [Seteren] was not in 
custody;

II.         
District Court assumed that [he] would want a speedy trial; the fact that 
[Seteren] did not file motion until February 8, 2006, does not prejudice 
[him];

III.        
Attorney for [Seteren] (public defender) acknowledged that the charge was 
pending prior to the initial appearance;

IV.       [Seteren] 
voluntarily appeared on October 4, 2005, without being served arrest 
warrant;

V.        The 
delay from May 25, 2005, to October 4, 2005, was neutral; and 

VI.       W.R.Cr.P. 
48(B)(7) permits State to dismiss and refile matter.

 
 
[¶13]   The district court reached the 
ultimate conclusion that the circumstances of this case did not violate 
Seteren's constitutional speedy trial rights.

 
 
[¶14]   The factual circumstances of this 
case are not in significant dispute.  
We conclude that the district court's findings are not erroneous.  As noted in the standard of review, we 
look at these constitutional questions de novo.  We have applied the same facts to the 
same standards as did the district court, and we agree that Seteren's 
constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated.  The delay was not extraordinary and, to 
a great extent, it appears Seteren acquiesced in the delay until he thought the 
speedy trial clock had run.  The 
reason for the delay appears to be the trial court's crowded docket, combined 
with some inattention to speedy trial concerns.  The defendant asserted his right to a 
speedy trial, but at the same time he expressed his need to work and to seek 
medical treatment during the time of the delay.  The only apparent prejudice to Seteren 
is the time he spent in jail (for which he received full 
credit).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The district court did not err in 
sentencing Seteren as it did because he had been convicted of DUI four times in 
the previous five years.  Seteren's 
constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated.  The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
delay between the date of the DUI incident is explained, in part, by the 
record.  It appears that sentencing 
was deferred, but then reinstated because of yet another DUI incident.  Of course, so far as the "crime" is 
concerned, Seteren admitted it and it is fully borne out by the record--in 
addition to his admissions.  The 
district court commented on this circumstance noting,

 
 
"In 
fact, I think that very scenario may have occurred in Mr. Seteren's case with 
respect to his December 28th, 2001, arrest.  The conviction in that case was not 
entered until April 30, 2004.  And 
there is some reason why there was that type of delay between the arrest and 
sentencing.  The record indicates 
that somewhere during that time frame the defendant was re-arrested.  So it is not good public policy to allow 
either side in a criminal case to manipulate times for purposes of determining 
whether or not an enhanced penalty is appropriate."

 
 

2Seteren 
attempts to construct an argument that the district court really did not accept 
the guilty plea on April 18, 2006.  
However, our careful examination of the record reveals that, while the 
district court could have been more precise in its use of language, the plea was 
accepted on that date.