Case Title: P. v. Ramos

Citation: 

Docket Number: S030956

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 11/29/04 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S030956 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
WILLIAM JAMES RAMOS, 
) 
 
) 
Contra Costa County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 913003-0 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In 1991, an information charged defendant with three counts of murder 
(Pen. Code, § 187),1 with a personal use of a firearm enhancement on each count. 
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)  The information included a multiple-murder special-
circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), and charged two violations of 
section 12021, subdivision (a) (felon in possession of a firearm).  In addition, 
defendant was charged with two enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision 
(b) (prior violent felony prison convictions).  He was held in the Martinez 
Detention Facility. 
Nearly a year later, county prison officials considered defendant a 
continuing threat to staff and inmate safety.  A judge ordered him removed from 
Martinez to San Quentin, where he engaged in criminal and other questionable 
activity.  He attacked a jailhouse deputy, threatened the same deputy, and 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2 
allegedly hoarded medication for a possible suicide attempt.  Defendant also filed 
numerous complaints about staff procedural violations.  
Three months after he was placed in San Quentin, defendant pleaded guilty 
to all charges.  The court determined that the murders were of the first degree and 
made a specific finding that defendant was competent to make the plea.  (§ 1368.)  
In November 1992, after a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The 
trial court denied defendant’s motions for new trial (§ 1181) and to modify the 
penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and sentenced him to death.  This appeal is 
automatic. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  The Charged Crimes 
1.  Tonya Karr Murder 
On March 7, 1991, at approximately 7:20 p.m., neighbors in the vicinity of 
706 J Street in Antioch heard a male shouting, followed by two gunshots.  They 
saw a stocky White male with long hair leave 706 J Street, walk to an adjacent 
parking lot, and get into a Ford pickup truck with a camper shell on the back.  
When Antioch police responded to the scene, they found Tonya Karr lying in a 
pool of blood with two gunshot wounds to her head.  She died the next day.  Mary 
Cagle, defendant’s ex-wife and Karr’s mother, had seen defendant leaving the 
parking lot next to Karr’s apartment earlier in the evening.  
2.  Minnie Mae Coombs Murder 
Minnie Mae Coombs was Cagle’s sister.  At 8:30 p.m. on March 7, 1991, 
Coombs’s daughter, Theresa Bodkin, went to Coombs’s residence looking for her 
mother.  She heard Ramos’s voice on Coombs’s answering machine stating that 
Coombs could be found in the parking lot next door.  Coombs was found dead in 
her car.  She had been shot once in the chest and once in the head.  
 
3 
3.  Janice Butler Murder 
On March 6, 1991, defendant picked up his girlfriend, Janice Butler, from 
her house.  Two days later, her body was found in the camper portion of 
defendant’s pickup truck as it was parked at the Riverview Lodge in Antioch.  
That same day, defendant surrendered to police after they spotted him in a white 
van he also owned.  Police then conducted a probation search of defendant’s home 
and found evidence indicating that Butler had been shot and killed in defendant’s 
home on the evening of March 6.    
B.  Other Crimes 
1.  Prior Convictions 
The prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s prior felony convictions.  
(§ 190.3, subd. (c).)  In October 1976, defendant attempted to kill his former 
girlfriend, Patricia Mowery, in Reno, Nevada.  After Mowery, a card dealer at a 
Reno casino, ended her relationship with defendant, he damaged items in her 
house and was arrested for destruction of property.  As he was led away, defendant 
threatened Mowery that he would return.  That same evening, defendant 
approached Mowery at work and shot her in the chest.  Defendant then 
surrendered his weapon to the pit boss, folded his jacket, sat down, and watched 
Mowery as she bled from the mouth and chest.   
While awaiting trial, defendant asked his brother Steve to “do something” 
to Mowery.  In early 1977, Steve told the Nevada Grand Jury that his brother had 
said:  “I want her dead.”  Defendant was convicted of attempted second degree 
murder and sent to the maximum security Nevada State Prison in Carson City. 
Defendant had two other felony convictions, namely, battery with a deadly 
weapon in July 1979 in Washoe County, Nevada, and driving under the influence 
causing bodily injury in Sacramento, California in August 1990.  
 
4 
2.  Prior Criminal Activity 
On December 2, 1976, while awaiting trial on the attempted murder charge 
in Washoe County Jail, defendant exploded in a rage against jail personnel.  He 
threw a cup of what he said was urine at Deputy Richard Pico, who was 
supervising the evening meal service.  Later that night, defendant pounded his 
head against the wall for several hours, and told a supervising sergeant that he was 
going to kill Deputy Pico.  
In March 1979, while serving time in Nevada State Prison on the attempted 
murder conviction, defendant heaved a tray of hot food at a correctional officer in 
charge of serving the dinner meal.  Later that day, defendant threw a hard-boiled 
egg at the officer and later threatened him that he would get him “on his mother’s 
grave.”  Defendant was moved to the prison segregation unit the next morning, 
where he threw a cup of urine at an officer who entered his cell.  
In 1992, while awaiting trial in the present matter in Contra Costa County 
Jail, defendant attacked Sheriff’s Deputy Sean Dexter as he accompanied a jail 
nurse on her “pill call” rounds, breaking Dexter’s thumb and punching his head.  
Defendant later threatened to kill Dexter. 
C.  Defense Evidence 
Dr. Harry Kormos, a psychiatrist hired to examine defendant, testified that 
defendant suffers from a paranoid personality disorder due to the influence of 
several factors, including an abusive childhood and time spent fighting in Vietnam 
as a soldier during the Vietnam War.  He characterized defendant’s condition as a 
long-term behavior pattern that will last throughout defendant’s lifetime.  Dr. 
Kormos also noted that defendant’s disorder does not mean that he is insane or 
that he does not appreciate the gravity of his acts; indeed, defendant knows what 
he is doing.  Defendant’s aunt testified that his mother, who eventually committed 
suicide, physically abused her children.  His father isolated the family and actively 
 
5 
discouraged contact with other people.  He taught the children that “if you fight, 
fight to win.”  Defendant was known for his quick temper, which became more 
severe, with the potential for greater violence, after his Vietnam experience.   
Although there is no evidence defendant ever attempted to take his own life, 
defense counsel presented the evidence to show that defendant may have intended 
to commit suicide at a later date, and thus supporting defendant’s claim that he had 
a “death wish.”2  He apparently hoarded medication while in prison awaiting his 
penalty trial.   
In addition, defendant’s brother, Steve Ramos, testified that he and 
defendant were extremely close when they were children, but that trouble seemed 
to find them.  Former Warden James Park testified that he believed defendant 
would adjust well to prison life and would remain in high-security prison for the 
remainder of his life.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Motion to Suppress Evidence   
Before pleading guilty, defendant raised several claims in a motion to 
suppress the evidence found in a police search of defendant’s house and pickup 
truck, including Janice Butler’s body, a blood stained blanket, an empty box of 
.38-caliber ammunition, receipt for a Mossberg shotgun (all found in the pickup 
truck), women’s clothing, blood swabs from the metal frame of a sofa bed, shot 
wads on the ground outside, and other items connecting him to the murders.  The 
police opened the pickup truck by prying off the lock and opening the camper.  
The police searched defendant’s house and truck pursuant to a probation search 
                                             
 
2  
As the People observe, the record is silent on whether defendant ever 
actually attempted suicide, although correctional personnel testified that defendant 
did hoard drugs, and that someone in prison had voiced a concern that the drugs 
could be used for an overdose.  
 
6 
condition imposed after defendant was convicted of violating Vehicle Code 
section 23253, subdivision (a) (felony driving under the influence (DUI) with 
injury) in 1990.  The blanket search condition required defendant to “submit his 
person, property and automobile, and any object under the defendant’s control, to 
search and seizure by any probation officer or other peace officer at any time of 
the day or night with or without a warrant.”  The officers were aware of the search 
condition prior to their search.3  
Defendant contends (1) the court improperly imposed the probation search 
condition; (2) the condition was overbroad; (3) the police relied on the condition 
as a subterfuge in order to avoid the warrant requirement; (4) the police had no 
reasonable cause to search even with the probation condition; and (5) the police, 
not a probation officer, initiated the searches, making them invalid.  The trial court 
denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the probation search condition was 
reasonably related to the DUI offense.  
Initially, we note that defendant’s challenge to the propriety of the search 
condition is timely because the condition was imposed before we adopted a rule 
requiring defendant to object to the condition at the time of sentencing or forfeit 
the claim.  (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.)  Welch, however, made its 
objection and forfeiture rule prospective in application only.  (Id. at p. 238.)  The 
Welch rule, therefore, does not apply to defendant, who received the probation 
condition before Welch was decided. 
In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical 
facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether 
                                             
 
3  
We recently held that when officers conduct a warrentless search unaware 
of a parole search condition, the condition cannot be used to make the search 
valid.  (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 333.)  That is not the case here, 
as the officers were aware that defendant was on probation and subject to a search 
condition at the time of their search. 
 
7 
the law as applied has been violated.  (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 
279.)  We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential 
substantial evidence standard.  The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to 
the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review.  
(Ibid.)   
Using these guidelines, we find no error.  The trial court properly held that 
the probation search condition was reasonably related to the DUI conviction, 
which allowed officers to search and seize defendant’s person, property, and 
automobile in order to protect the public.  As we have held, “The level of intrusion 
is de minimis and the expectation of privacy greatly reduced when the subject of 
the search is on notice his activities are being routinely and closely monitored.  
Moreover, the purpose of the search condition is to deter the commission of crimes 
and to protect the public, and the effectiveness of the deterrent is enhanced by the 
potential for random searches.”  (People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753.) 
We also conclude the warrantless searches here were proper.  As we have 
held, by accepting probation, a probationer consents to the waiver of Fourth 
Amendment rights in order to avoid incarceration.  “A probationer who has been 
granted the privilege of probation on condition that he submit at any time to a 
warrantless search may have no reasonable expectation of traditional Fourth 
Amendment protection.”  (People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 759, 765.)  Therefore, 
“when defendant in order to obtain probation specifically agreed to permit at any 
time a warrantless search of his person, car and house, he voluntarily waived 
whatever claim of privacy he might otherwise have had.”  (Id. at p. 766; see also 
People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 607.)   
The facts known to the police when they undertook the probation search 
provide ample support for the intrusion on defendant’s privacy.  Mary Cagle, who 
arrived on the scene of her daughter’s murder shortly after the shooting, told 
 
8 
officers that she had seen defendant driving his Ford pickup away from Karr’s 
residence shortly before the shooting.  Cagle told police that she feared defendant 
had shot Karr because he blamed her for their pending divorce.  Officers also 
listened to a tape-recorded answering machine message defendant had left for 
Cagle shortly after he murdered Karr.  In the message, defendant indicated where 
police could find Minnie Coombs’s body.  Thus, when the officers, as here, have 
reasonable suspicion that a probationer is engaged in criminal activity, there is 
enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the 
probationer’s privacy is reasonable.  (See United States v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 
112, 121.)4   
B.  Competency Issues 
Defendant contends the trial court was required to hold a competency 
hearing under sections 1367 and 1368 at specific points during the proceedings:  
before the court accepted his guilty plea and admitted the special circumstance 
allegations; before the beginning of his penalty trial; and before sentencing.  He 
claims that at each point, the trial court was presented with substantial evidence 
sufficient to raise a doubt as to his mental competence and was therefore required 
to hold a competency hearing.  As an alternative argument, defendant contends 
that even if substantial evidence did not support the need for a competency 
hearing, the cumulative effect of the evidence should have led the court, in its 
exercise of discretion, to order such a hearing. 
The law on competency is well established.  A defendant is presumed 
competent unless it is proved otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.  (§ 
                                             
 
4  
We have also rejected defendant’s claim that a search conducted under a 
search condition is invalid if the police, rather than a probation officer, conducts 
the search.  (See In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 80, fn. 2.)  We see no reason 
to revisit the issue here. 
 
9 
1360, subd. (f).)  As a matter of due process, the state may not try or convict a 
mentally incompetent defendant.  (Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 172; 
Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378 (Pate); People v. Welch (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 701, 732 (Welch).)  Under section 1367, subdivision (a), a defendant 
“cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while he is mentally incompetent.”  
Section 1368, subdivisions (a) and (b), respectively, require the trial court to 
initiate proceedings in order to determine a defendant’s present sanity if  “a doubt 
arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant” or 
“[i]f counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is or may be 
mentally incompetent.”  To be competent to stand trial, defendant must have 
“sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding” and “a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.”  (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 737, quoting Dusky v. 
United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402.)   
If a defendant presents substantial evidence of his lack of competence and 
is unable to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational matter during 
the legal proceedings, the court must stop the proceedings and order a hearing on 
the competence issue.  (Pate, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 384-386; People v. 
Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 516-517 (Pennington).)  In this context, 
substantial evidence means evidence that raises a reasonable doubt about the 
defendant’s ability to stand trial.  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 951-952 
(Frye).)  The substantiality of the evidence is determined when the competence 
issue arises at any point in the proceedings.  (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 739.)  
The court’s decision whether to grant a competency hearing is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard.  (§ 1368; Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 742.) 
Substantial evidence of incompetence may arise from separate sources, 
including the defendant’s own behavior.  For example, if a psychiatrist or 
 
10 
psychologist “who has had sufficient opportunity to examine the accused, states 
under oath with particularity that in his professional opinion the accused is, 
because of mental illness, incapable of understanding the purpose or nature of the 
criminal proceedings being taken against him or is incapable of assisting in his 
defense or cooperating with counsel, the substantial evidence test is satisfied.”  
(Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 519.)  If a defendant presents merely “a litany 
of facts, none of which actually related to his competence at the time of sentencing 
to understand the nature of that proceeding or to rationally assist his counsel at that 
proceeding,” the evidence will be inadequate to support holding a competency 
hearing.  (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1280-1281.)  In other words, a 
defendant must exhibit more than bizarre, paranoid behavior, strange words, or a 
preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question of whether 
the defendant can assist his defense counsel.  (See Welch, supra 20 Cal.4th at p. 
742; see also People v. Jensen (1954) 43 Cal.2d 572, 579.)  We apply these legal 
standards to defendant’s claim. 
1.  Competence to Plead Guilty or Stand Trial Prior to Penalty Trial 
Defendant pleaded guilty to all charges and admitted the special 
circumstance allegations on August 28, 1992.  Two days before defendant entered 
his plea, the court conferred in a closed session with trial counsel and defendant 
present.  During the closed session, counsel told the court that defendant wanted to 
receive the death penalty and that after the entry of his guilty plea, defendant 
would seek to have the penalty imposed.  Counsel informed the court that if he did 
not consent to defendant’s proposed plea, defendant had threatened to remove him 
as counsel.  As evidence of defendant’s incompetence, counsel introduced 
evidence of his prior criminal activity and his erratic behavior while incarcerated, 
 
11 
including his attacks on Deputy Dexter at the Martinez Detention Facility, and his 
apparent hoarding of medication for an alleged planned future suicide attempt.  
After considering the evidence, the court denied the requested competency 
hearing and accepted defendant’s guilty plea.  The court observed:  “I have had a 
chance to consider this matter both on Wednesday and again today, and consider 
the demeanor of the defendant, the manner in which he is approaching this.  It is 
not an easy thing for anybody here, but the Court is finding the defendant 
competent.  I want to make that clear.  I have no reason whatsoever to question his 
competency to enter into this.”  
Defendant contends the court did not fully consider his propensity to 
commit violent acts or his desire to receive the death penalty when it made its 
competency finding.  Indeed, defendant asserts that “a capital defendant whose 
stated goal is lethal injection will never be in a position to assist his trial counsel in 
presenting a defense.”  Defendant contends that his “death wish,” together with his 
past violent behavior, attempt to hoard drugs for a suicide attempt, and history of 
psychiatric treatment, indicated that he was incompetent and incapable of assisting 
in his own defense, and required the court to order an independent psychiatric 
evaluation before finding him competent to plead guilty. 
We disagree.  We have held that a defendant’s preference for the death 
penalty and overall death wish does not alone amount to substantial evidence of 
incompetence or evidence requiring the court to order an independent psychiatric 
evaluation.  (People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 963-965.)  We have also 
held that a defendant’s testimony as to his preference for the death penalty does 
not render the ensuing death judgment constitutionally unreliable.  (People v. 
Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 719.) 
In addition, defendant’s propensity for violence, hoarding of medication for 
an alleged suicide attempt, and history of psychiatric treatment do not indicate he 
 
12 
was incompetent at the time he pleaded guilty.  (People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 
829, 859.)  Thus, although defendant’s prior violent acts and other bizarre 
behavior would lead us to agree he has violent propensities, and may even harbor 
a death wish, they do not raise doubts that he was incapable of assisting in his own 
defense or otherwise competent to plead guilty, admit the special circumstance 
allegations against him, or stand trial.  (Ibid.) 
We also reject defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly relied 
exclusively upon defendant’s demeanor during court appearances in order to 
determine his competency and should have ordered a psychiatric evaluation prior 
to finding him competent.  Although a court may not rely solely on its 
observations of a defendant in the courtroom if there is substantial evidence of 
incompetence, the court’s observations and objective opinion do become 
important when no substantial evidence exists that the defendant is less than 
competent to plead guilty or stand trial.  (See People v. Castro (2000) 78 
Cal.App.4th 1402, 1416.)  Here, the court specifically stated that in its discretion 
and under all the evidence, including, but not limited to, observations of 
defendant’s demeanor, it had “no reason whatsoever to question [defendant’s] 
competence to enter into [the guilty plea].”  When a defendant has not presented 
substantial evidence to indicate he was incompetent, and the court’s declaration of 
a doubt is therefore discretionary, its brief reference to the defendant’s demeanor 
is not error.  (See, e.g., Pate, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 385-386; Welch, supra, 20 
Cal.4th at pp. 741-742.) 
2.  Competence During Penalty Phase and Before Sentencing 
Defendant claims that even if the evidence was insufficient to require a 
suspension of the criminal proceedings before his guilty plea and commencement 
of trial, additional evidence surfaced during the penalty trial and before sentencing 
 
13 
that required the court to order a competency hearing.  Specifically, defendant 
points to the fact that penalty phase testimony indicated he was physically abused 
by his mother from the time he was an infant.  The childhood abuse led to his 
violent behavior as a young adult, such as kicking in the front door of former 
girlfriend Mowery, threatening her with a butcher knife, and later shooting her.  
He also gave a pretrial interview to a news reporter, implying that he would kill 
again if crossed.   
In addition, as noted (ante, at pp. 5-6), Dr. Kormos, a board-certified 
psychiatrist, testified as a defense witness that defendant suffered from paranoid 
personality disorder.  Dr. Kormos added that the paranoid condition is not 
episodic; it differs from a true psychosis because the sufferer never loses touch 
with reality.   
Defendant contends that Dr. Kormos’s testimony “should have alerted the 
trial court that defendant’s pursuit of a death sentence was the product of mental 
illness and not a rational choice.  Dr. Kormos’s testimony made clear, or at least 
provided substantial evidence to suspect, that [defendant’s] mental illness, his 
paranoid personality disorder, precluded him from assisting in his defense, since 
any rational defense would have to concede that the homicides were unjustified 
and inevitably suggest that there was something wrong with defendant’s view that 
when lines are crossed or rules are violated, the threatened consequences must be 
meted out.  In effect, [defendant’s] desire to receive the death penalty is perfectly 
in keeping with his mental illness.  To defend himself and defend his life would be 
to admit that what he did was wrong.”   Defendant lists 18 examples from Dr. 
Kormos’s testimony that “would have alerted” the trial court to defendant’s 
incompetence, including the evidence of defendant’s attack on Deputy Dexter, his 
attempt to kill Mowery, and his statements to the reporter.  
 
14 
Defendant claims that the evidence presented at the penalty phase was a 
“changed circumstance” or “new evidence casting a serious doubt” on his 
competency.  (See People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 149.)  The evidence, 
defendant contends, required the trial court to suspend proceedings and hold a 
competency hearing under section 1368. 
We disagree.  Dr. Kormos testified that although defendant suffered from a 
paranoid personality disorder, that disorder did not render him mentally 
incompetent to understand the proceedings or assist the defense in any way.  The 
evidence defendant presented at the penalty trial did indicate that defendant lived 
by his own set of rules and acted without regard for the lives of others.  That 
defendant lived by his own code of conduct neither indicates he was mentally 
incompetent and could not understand the penalty proceedings, nor presents any 
new evidence or changed circumstance that would require the court to suspend the 
proceedings.  As the People observe, the focus of the penalty phase is to determine 
whether the death penalty should be imposed on a defendant who has been 
determined death eligible as a result of the findings and verdict reached at the guilt 
phase.  (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1266-1267.)  Although 
defendant’s mental capacity and his lack of remorse may have been factors the 
defense wanted the jury to consider in its penalty determination, the record fails to 
indicate that defendant could not understand the proceedings or otherwise assist in 
his defense.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct a 
competency hearing during the penalty phase of the proceedings.  (Welch, supra, 
20 Cal.4th at pp. 739-740 [no abuse of discretion in court’s failure to hold 
competency hearing when defendant shows sufficient present ability to consult 
lawyer and rational and factual understanding of proceedings against him].) 
 
15 
C.  Penalty Trial Issues 
1.   Jury Selection:  Adequacy of Voir Dire of Prospective Jurors 
The trial court conducted voir dire under Code of Civil Procedure former 
section 223, which, at the time of defendant’s trial, provided that in a criminal case 
the court “shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors,” but that the parties 
“upon a showing of good cause” may “supplement the examination.”  (As added 
by Prop. 115, approved by voters June 5, 1990.)  The court permitted the parties to 
prepare a detailed jury questionnaire designed to streamline the voir dire process.  
The court also privately questioned individual prospective jurors, when it believed 
that sequestered questioning was necessary. Defendant now makes several claims 
regarding the voir dire.  We address each claim separately. 
a.  Constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure Section 223  
Before the penalty phase, the defendant filed a motion asking the court to 
permit counsel to conduct voir dire in a manner similar to that used in civil cases 
under Code of Civil Procedure section 222.5, rather than the voir dire process used 
in criminal cases, including death penalty matters, under Code of Civil Procedure 
former section 223 (as added by Prop. 115, approved by voters June 5, 1990).  The 
prosecution filed a short opposition and the court denied the motion.  
Defendant’s motion attacked, on equal protection grounds, the 
constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure section 223, as enacted in 1990 as a 
part of Proposition 115.  The statute, both as enacted and at present, provides that 
in all criminal cases, including those involving the death penalty, the trial court 
shall conduct the voir dire of “any prospective jurors. . . , where practicable, . . . in 
the presence of other” prospective jurors.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 223; see People v. 
Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713 (Waidla).)  As Waidla observed, the change in 
voir dire procedure abrogated prior law which had required individual and 
sequestered voir dire in capital cases.  (Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 713; 
 
16 
Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168 (Covarrubias) 
[section 223 abrogated former individual voir dire procedure required under Hovey 
v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1].) 
Defendant’s contention rests on his belief that this provision of Code of 
Civil Procedure former section 223 unfairly places the voir dire in the hands of the 
court, and allows counsel to ask questions on a showing of good cause only.5  By 
contrast, defendant observes, Code of Civil Procedure section 222.5, gives counsel 
in a civil action the right to examine, by oral and direct questioning, prospective 
jurors.  The difference between civil and criminal case voir dire, defendant claims, 
denied him equal protection under the state and federal Constitutions. 
We conclude, as the Courts of Appeal have, that Code of Civil Procedure 
former section 223 did not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States 
and California Constitutions, and reject defendant’s claim that his equal protection 
challenge is subject to the strict scrutiny doctrine, which is applicable when there 
is a significant interference with the exercise of a fundamental right.  (Lucas v. 
Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 733, 738.) 
The right to voir dire the jury is not constitutional, but is a means to achieve 
the end of an impartial jury.  (People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 84.)  In 
addition, “the peremptory challenge is not a constitutional necessity but a statutory 
privilege.”  (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 281, fn. 28.)  Therefore, 
“there is no constitutional right to any particular manner of conducting the voir 
dire and selecting a jury so long as such limitations as are recognized by the 
                                             
 
5  
Although not applicable to the present matter, we do note that in 2000 the 
Legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure section 223 in order to allow 
counsel in criminal cases to question prospective jurors without a good cause 
showing.  (Stats. 2000, ch. 192, § 1.) 
 
17 
settled principles of criminal law to be essential in securing impartial juries are not 
transgressed.”  (People v. Boulerice (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 463, 474 (Boulerice).)   
Federal and state courts have held, however, that the Legislature may 
establish reasonable regulations or conditions on the right to a jury trial as long as 
the essential elements of a jury trial are preserved, including number of jurors 
(12), unanimity, and impartiality.  (Boulerice, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 474.)  
The purpose of Code of Civil Procedure former section 223 was to curb 
commonly known abuses during the voir dire process in criminal cases.  
(Boulerice, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 474.)   
As the People observe, therefore, the statute’s distinction between criminal 
and civil voir dire is constitutional as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate 
state purpose under the rational relationship test, a test met here.  (People v. Leung 
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 482, 496 (Leung).)  By enacting Code of Civil Procedure 
section 223, the voters sought to prevent abuse of the jury selection process in 
criminal cases.  Prevention of abuse of a statutory right is a legitimate purpose, 
and the voters’ action was aimed at achieving a legitimate purpose rationally 
related to the distinction made by the law.  (Leung, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 
496.)  Because the classification drawn by Code of Civil Procedure section 223 
was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, it did not deny defendant his 
equal protection rights under the California and United States Constitutions.  
(Leung, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 496.) 
b.  Abuse of discretion in allowing group voir dire 
Defendant next contends the trial court abused its discretion because it 
conducted group voir dire under Code of Civil Procedure former section 223, and 
did not use its discretion to engage in sequestered and individual voir dire as also 
 
18 
allowed under the statute.6  Section 223 requires that voir dire of any prospective 
jurors must, “where practicable,” occur in the presence of other jurors, and applies 
“in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases.”  Under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 223, sequestration is left to the trial court’s discretion, based on 
the court’s determination that it is practicable to conduct voir dire in the presence 
of other prospective jurors.  (Covarrubias, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.) 
In support of his claim, defendant includes two affidavits, one from retired 
Superior Court Judge Norman Spellberg, and one from jury consultant Therese 
Waller, a psychologist and staff member of the National Jury Project.  In the 
affidavits, the jury selection experts give their opinions on the potentially unfair 
effect of the statutory voir dire procedures, including the apprehension prospective 
jurors may feel when voir dire is conducted in the presence of other prospective 
jurors.  
Although the court did indicate that group voir dire would save time and 
was convenient, given the courtroom size (and its inability to accommodate all 
prospective jurors at once), it did not, defendant contends, appropriately weigh the 
fact that the prospective jurors had been exposed to substantial pretrial publicity 
and another venire person’s experience with an unsolved murder, both of which 
could desensitize the panel to its task of determining the appropriate penalty.  In 
review of potential error under Code of Civil Procedure section 223, we apply the 
abuse of discretion review standard to the trial court’s denial of defendant’s 
                                             
 
6  
The People initially assert that defendant forfeited his objections to the trial 
court’s group voir dire because defense counsel only complained about the pace at 
which voir dire would proceed and requested that voir dire should be conducted in 
private.  Because defendant’s claim involves voir dire generally through the 
question of practicability, we conclude defendant adequately preserved the 
question on appeal.  (See People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590 (Saunders) 
[general waiver doctrine encourages defendants to bring potential claim of error to 
trial court’s attention].) 
 
19 
request to conduct individual voir dire of prospective jurors.  (Waidla, supra, 22 
Cal.4th at pp. 713-714.) 
In considering defense counsel’s claim that “every question of every juror 
should be outside the presence of the other jurors,” the trial court expressly stated 
that it had discretion to order individual and sequestered voir dire if group voir 
dire was impracticable.  The court specifically permitted the parties to prepare a 
jury questionnaire designed to streamline the voir dire process and to ensure that 
the pretrial publicity did not taint or bias the jurors’ view of the case.   The court 
admonished the jurors not to read any newspaper articles about the case and, even 
though some jurors did later read accounts of the trial, nothing suggests that the 
voir dire process was responsible for their actions.  The court also offered to 
permit defense counsel to conduct private questioning of particular jurors when 
necessary and, in order to ensure the panel was impartial, conduct in-depth 
questioning of jurors who indicated they strongly believed in capital punishment.   
Nor do the declarations discussed above assist defendant’s argument.  The 
declarations are general in character and do not point to problems in this case.  In 
addition, the declarations do not undermine the constitutionality of Code of Civil 
Procedure section 223.  The trial court’s approach to group voir dire, and its 
thoughtful questioning on specific points, were reasonable, and we find no abuse 
of discretion in the court’s conduct.  (See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 
1180-1181 [trial court’s reasonable approach to group voir dire upheld].)   
c.  Questioning of Prospective Juror C. 
The trial court excused for cause a prospective juror who indicated on her 
questionnaire that a friend of hers had been murdered.  She gave a detailed 
account of the murder, and the court ascertained that she could not be fair and 
impartial.  Another prospective juror who did not serve on the panel mentioned 
 
20 
that the first juror’s story had influenced him.  Defendant now claims that the 
prospective juror who was excused should have been questioned in private, and 
the court should have delivered a curative admonition to the other prospective 
jurors. 
Defendant forfeited his right to raise any error because he never asked the 
court to question privately the prospective juror whose friend had been murdered 
and did not request an admonition for the remaining panel members.  (People v. 
Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 61-62 (Sanchez) [failure to object to court’s 
questioning of prospective juror during voir dire forfeits claim].)  On the merits, 
we find the trial court’s careful questioning of the panel ensured the removal of the 
first prospective juror, and there is no indication that the second prospective 
juror’s remarks that he was influenced by the account of the unrelated murder 
affected the other prospective jurors or undermined the court’s ability to empanel a 
fair and impartial jury.  (People v. Martinez (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1456, 1465-
1467 [using totality of circumstances test to evaluate effect of juror’s remark on 
other prospective jurors].) 
d.  Prospective juror exposure to media and gender bias 
Defendant next complains that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
a fair and unbiased jury because the court refused to remove jurors who were 
exposed to the media and who were sensitive to issues involving gender bias.  (See 
People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 852-853 [trial court must conduct adequate 
voir dire to ensure defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury].) 
Initially, we note that defendant has forfeited the right to raise any alleged 
error because he failed to object on either basis during trial.  (Sanchez, supra, 12 
Cal.4th at pp. 61-62.)  Even on the merits, we would reject the claims.  The jury 
questionnaire that the parties provided the court fully explored potential media 
 
21 
bias and whether the jurors could avoid media exposure.  The questionnaire also 
probed the effect of media exposure on the panel and satisfied the court that the 
voir dire adequately probed the media question.   
In addition, the trial court supplemented the questionnaire with follow-up 
questioning on potential media exposure.  For example, the court’s discussion with 
prospective Juror C. about the potential media influence on her views of the case 
proceeded as follows: 
“[Court:]  Now that you have sat through this process before, do you feel 
you have heard something about the case, or heard something about the case 
beyond what is in this questionnaire answer? 
“[Juror C.:]  I remember reading a little bit about the  -- it, when it 
happened.   
“[Court:]  Would you be able to set aside what you might have read about 
it, and decide this case based on the evidence – 
“[Juror C.:]  Yes. 
“[Court:]  Received here? 
“[Juror C.:]  Yes, I can. 
“[Court:]  You heard the questions I have asked other jurors that may have 
read something about this.  It is important that this case be decided with a fresh 
mind, based only on evidence that appears here in the courtroom. 
“[Juror C.:]  Um-hum, yes. 
“[Court:]  Okay.  Even though you may have some vague recollection 
about reading something, the case can not be based on that.  Would you be able to 
set that aside and listen to the evidence here? 
“[Juror C.:]  Yes, I can.”  
The above colloquy is typical of the trial court’s follow-up voir dire on 
media exposure, and adequately explored the potential for prejudice.  After 
 
22 
reviewing the entire voir dire of all prospective jurors, we are satisfied that the 
inquiry into possible media bias was adequate under the Sixth Amendment.  We 
find no error here. 
Defendant’s additional claim that gender bias was not fully explored on 
voir dire is also without merit.  First, defendant failed to preserve the issue by 
timely objection.  (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 61-62.)  In addition, his claim 
that gender bias caused him to commit the murders is without merit.  The jury had 
ample evidence that defendant’s violent acts were not gender specific, and that his 
prior criminal activity included several acts of violence against men.  For example, 
defendant committed acts of violence against male jail and prison personnel and 
threatened to harm male acquaintances, including Jess Martin, Mary Cagle’s 
boyfriend.  In addition, the fact that the jury may have been exposed to a 
newspaper article discussing defendant’s apparent disdain for women serving in 
combat does not make his gender bias defense claim any more credible, and his 
attempt to blame Cagle for “inciting” his murder spree is nothing more than an 
attempt to refuse to take responsibility for the brutal murders.  Because the case 
did not involve a credible gender bias claim, no need arose for the additional voir 
dire questioning on the subject.   
e.  Other voir dire related claims 
Defendant also claims that the court inadequately conducted follow-up 
questioning of another prospective juror who was excused for cause because she 
strongly believed she could not impose the death penalty.  The record is devoid of 
any objection from defendant or any question offered by defendant in an attempt 
to rehabilitate the juror, indicating defendant forfeited his right to raise the claim.  
In addition, as the record shows, the court’s questioning of that juror revealed 
significant bias against the death penalty.  She indicated she could never vote to 
 
23 
impose the penalty, regardless of the evidence, and repeated similar sentiments 
when the court’s questioning continued.  Given the prospective juror’s adamant 
bias against imposing the death penalty, we find no error in the removal for cause. 
Defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly exercised peremptory 
challenges to remove prospective jurors who opposed the death penalty or were 
neutral to the penalty has been considered and rejected in other cases.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 912; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 932, 967-968.) 
2.  Alleged Juror Misconduct 
Defendant makes specific claims of error involving separate instances of 
juror misconduct during the penalty trial.  We address the contentions seriatim.  
As to all claims, we find that even if misconduct did occur, it was not prejudicial. 
a.  Reading of newspaper articles 
The jury commenced deliberation on Monday, November 9, 1992.  After 
less than two hours, it recessed until the next morning.  The jury then deliberated 
all that day, making several requests for clarification of legal issues and reading of 
testimony.  The jury next deliberated on November 12.  That day, the court 
received a note from the jury foreperson:  “We are having great difficulty in 
reaching a unanimous decision.  We would like further instruction on how to 
proceed.”  After discussion, the jury agreed to return the next day and attempt to 
resolve its differences.  
On Friday, November 13, at 2:30 p.m., the jury sent another note to the 
court:  “We can go no further.  We are not unanimous in our decision.”  Before the 
court could act on the note, the jury sent another one at 2:55 p.m., stating:  “Upon 
further discussion, we have decided to take one last vote on Monday morning.”  
On Monday, November 16, the jury returned a verdict of death.  
 
24 
On December 22, defendant moved for a new trial.  He alleged that a juror 
had read newspaper articles about the case during the trial and that two other 
jurors had considered an article before rendering the verdict.  Jury Foreman M.G., 
in a supplemental declaration, identified the juror who said she had read articles 
about the case during trial as Juror R.D.  Juror M.G. was “reasonably certain” that 
some jurors had discussed the article on November 16, before reaching the verdict, 
namely, Juror M.B.  and either Juror S.S. Juror or P.B.   The foreman also stated:  
“I am reasonably certain that it was Juror S.S. who pulled the newspaper article 
out of her purse.” 7 
These jurors submitted counterdeclarations.  Juror R.D. denied reading any 
articles during the trial or deliberations. “I never told anyone that I was reading 
articles about the case during the trial.”  Juror M.B. also denied reading any 
articles.  She did state that after the jury was discharged, she heard someone (she 
could not remember who) mention one article.  Juror S.S. also stated that she had 
not read any newspaper articles or heard Juror P.B. discuss the weekend article in 
the jury deliberation room on November 16. 
                                             
 
7  
Juror M.G.’s supplemental declaration contained several other comments, 
including additional references to juror misconduct.  “During the course of 
deliberations in this case, the content of newspaper articles was never discussed by 
the jury, as far as I can recall.”  The one juror who, until the final vote, held out for 
life imprisonment, never mentioned the newspaper articles during the trial, and 
there is no evidence to suggest that the articles allegedly read by other jurors 
influenced the holdout juror’s eventual willingness to impose the death penalty.   
Defendant contends that this portion of the supplemental declaration must be 
ignored because it violates Evidence Code section 1150’s prohibition against 
allowing a court to consider a juror’s mental processes in reaching the verdict.  We 
do not find, however, the testimony of the juror holdout to be anything other than 
a statement of an objective fact, and it does not concern the mental processes by 
which the verdict was determined.  (See People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 
1261.) 
 
25 
Juror S.S. did describe what occurred in a restaurant when the jury gathered 
after rendering the verdict:  “After the verdict had been reached on Monday, 
November 16, the jury was waiting to be called into the courtroom.  Juror B.T.  
pulled a folded newspaper out of her purse.  She stated someone had given her the 
paper, but she had not read it.  [¶]  I told [B.T.] I would like to read the article.  
[B.T.] handed me the folded paper and I put it in my purse.  I did not read it at that 
time.  [¶]  After the verdicts were read, and the jury dismissed, many jurors met 
for breakfast.   [¶]  At the restaurant, I remembered the newspaper in my purse. I 
took the paper out and read the Saturday, November 14 article at that time.”  
Juror L.S. also filed a declaration stating she did not read any newspaper 
articles during the trial or deliberations.  She did note that after the jurors had 
reached a verdict and were waiting to be called into the courtroom, Juror M.B. 
pulled an article about the case out of her purse that a coworker had given her 
sometime over the weekend.  Juror L.S. interrupted and advised Juror M.B. not to 
discuss the article.  
The new trial motion was argued on January 8, 1993.  The court found that 
under a preponderance of the evidence “the defense has shown misconduct, in that 
the articles may have been read during the course of this trial.”   The court 
summarized the content of the articles, and concluded that in general, they 
consisted of neutral summaries of the trial events.  In finding misconduct, the 
court never identified which incident or article influenced its conclusion.  The 
court simply stated:  “I feel that by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defense has shown misconduct, in that articles may have been read during the 
course of this trial.”  The objective nature of the articles, and their seemingly 
innocuous content, however, led the court to conclude that defendant had not been 
prejudiced, even assuming the jurors read them.  The court also noted that “[t]his 
was also a case in which the facts really were not in dispute.”  After assessing the 
 
26 
entire case record, and determining the jury was conscientious, the court denied 
defendant’s motion for a new trial.  
b.  General legal principles 
Juror misconduct involving the receipt of extraneous information about a 
party or the case that was not part of the evidence received at trial, creates a 
presumption that the defendant was prejudiced by the evidence and may establish 
juror bias.  (People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578.)  This is because “due 
process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence 
before it.”  (Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 217.)  When, as here, the jury 
receives the evidence from an outside source, the verdict is set aside if there is a 
“substantial likelihood” of juror bias.  (Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 578.)  
Defendant may establish bias if (1) the extraneous material, judged objectively, “is 
so prejudicial in and of itself that it is inherently and substantially likely to have 
influenced a juror” (id. at pp. 578-579) or (2) from the nature of the misconduct 
and surrounding circumstances, it is substantially likely a juror “was actually 
biased” against the defendant.  (Ibid.)  Because it is impossible to shield jurors 
from every contact that may influence their vote, courts tolerate some imperfection 
short of actual bias.  (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296 (Hamilton).) 
As noted, although the trial court determined that misconduct did occur, it 
concluded that any misconduct was not prejudicial because it did not influence the 
jurors to the defendant’s detriment.  The court relied on Juror M.G.’s initial 
declaration specifying two possible times when jurors could have been exposed to 
information from an extraneous source.  First, Juror M.G. accused Juror R.D. of 
informing him, during deliberations, that he had read “all of the articles that have 
come out” during the proceedings.  Although Juror R.D. later denied reading the 
 
27 
articles, the court resolved the apparent conflict between her declaration and Juror 
M.G.’s comments in defendant’s favor. 
In addition, Juror M.G. accused Jurors M.B. and S.S. of discussing an 
article, following their sentencing vote, “in a way that indicated that each of them 
had read the article prior to taking their final vote.”  As the People observe, Juror 
L.S.’s counterdeclaration absolved Juror M.B, and Juror S.S.’s counterdeclaration 
absolved Juror P.B.  The court resolved the conflicting declarations in defendant’s 
favor, after weighing all the evidence. 
An appellate court will accept the trial court’s determinations and findings 
on questions of historical fact if they are supported by substantial evidence.  (In re 
Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 646 (Carpenter).)  Because we find the evidence 
supporting defendant’s allegations close, we agree with the trial court’s finding of 
misconduct.  The question whether the misconduct was prejudicial is a mixed one 
of law and fact, and is subject to an appellate court’s independent determination.  
(Id. at pp. 658-659.)  Keeping these principles in mind, we review the trial court’s 
finding that the articles, even if read, were not prejudicial. 
c.  Prejudice analysis 
Defendant contends that each of the articles “skews and telescopes” the 
evidence and testimony presented toward the rendering of a verdict of death.  He 
complains that the articles were “inherently prejudicial,” and the fact that several 
jurors were aware of them and filed dishonest affidavits in response to the court’s 
questions regarding their reading of the articles, should have led the trial court to 
grant his new trial motion.   
Defendant initially discussed two separate articles appearing October 27, 
1992, and November 14, 1992.  The first article reported on Mary Cagle’s 
testimony, and is objective and contained no information the jurors did not hear 
 
28 
themselves in the courtroom.  Nothing in the article’s description of Cagle’s 
testimony harbored the potential for influencing a juror who might read it.  (See 
Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 301, fn.21.) 
The second article described defendant’s behavior while listening to the 
tape of his threats to Cagle.  Defendant complains that the article reports that while 
listening to the tape, he was “slightly smiling,” “tapping his fingers,” and 
“stroking his beard.”  As the People point out, however, the article describes a 
momentary change in facial expression, nothing else.  Defendant fails to note that 
the jurors observed, firsthand, his change of expression, and it is doubtful that his 
brief change in expression influenced the jury’s overall impression of the 
defendant.  Although the article briefly referred to the fact that defendant did not 
believe women should engage in combat, the jury was already aware of 
defendant’s views on women and combat.  We find no substantial likelihood that 
the article influenced the jury negatively. 
Two additional newspaper articles, printed on October 23, and November 
10, 1992, described the opening and closing arguments.  Defendant claims the 
summaries focused on his violent past, and contained gruesome details of his 
murders, but so did the arguments.  The articles contained nothing significant that 
the jury did not hear themselves.  They contained no extraneous information.  We 
conclude the trial court correctly found that the information they disclosed was not 
prejudicial. 
Other articles reporting on defendant’s statement that he believed he would 
be sentenced to death, and reporting the events at trial, were evenhanded in their 
discussions and noninflammatory.  No evidence exists that any of the jurors read 
these articles, and even if they did, there is no evidence the jurors exposed to the 
articles discussed the information with the other jurors.  (Hamilton, supra, 20 
Cal.4th at p. 301, fn. 21.)  We have held that reading a newspaper account of the 
 
29 
trial is not sufficient to create a substantial likelihood of prejudice, and we find 
none here.  (Ibid.; Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 656-657.) 
Defendant’s remaining complaint about the trial court’s no prejudice 
finding is that the court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing “to resolve any 
conflicts that required resolution and to permit counsel to elicit further details 
relevant to the issue of prejudice.”  The details defendant seeks “existed in all of 
the jurors’ declarations submitted in defendant’s motion for a new trial and the 
prosecution’s opposition to the motion.”    
As the People observe, although defendant’s initial showing satisfied the 
evidentiary standard for proving that misconduct occurred, it was insufficient to 
require the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.  The court gave defendant 
the benefit of the doubt in interpreting the statements made in the declarations in 
favor of finding misconduct, and conducting an evidentiary hearing would not 
have changed the misconduct finding. 
In addition, the evidence supporting the death verdict was overwhelming.  
Defendant pleaded guilty to the murders and admitted the special circumstance 
allegations.  The proof of his prior violent acts was extensive, and there was no 
evidence that any offending juror discussed the newspaper articles with any 
innocent juror.  (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 301, fn. 21.)  We find no reason 
to overturn the trial court’s finding that the jurors’ exposure to newspaper articles 
reporting on defendant’s trial did not prejudice the verdict. 
3.  Juror’s Request to Speak with Defendant 
After the defense completed its case on November 5, 1992, the trial court 
excused the jury until Monday morning, November 9, for final arguments.  Once 
the jurors left the courtroom, the court revealed to counsel that Juror M.B. had sent 
it a note earlier that afternoon that stated:  “I would like to talk to the defendant at 
 
30 
the close of trial in the presence of the attorney and Your Honor.”  Asked to 
explain the note, the juror indicated “it has nothing to do with me, as a juror.”  The 
juror also told the court that her inquiry was related to her work as a missionary, 
and that she “would just like to talk to [defendant], person to person, and maybe 
say a prayer with him.”  Juror M.B. also revealed that Jurors S.S. and R.D. had 
expressed the same desire to meet with defendant, although the jurors had not 
discussed the case among themselves.  “[T]his was just a question that was 
brought up:  Was it ever permissible for the jurors to talk to the defendant after the 
trial was over?”  During the discussion, defense counsel never objected to Juror 
M.B.’s request, but stated that “I think we need to get together and work out a 
specific question to ask each of them.  Because the one that you said here about 
the moral or humanitarian, it could kind of impinge on what they are told in the 
instruction.  There might be some divergence there.  I think we have to be 
extremely careful of our words.”  Before leaving the courtroom, Juror M.B. told 
the court that she promised to follow the court’s directions about how to evaluate 
the case.  
The following Monday, the trial court questioned Jurors R.D. and S.S.  
Juror R.D. indicated she simply wondered whether jurors could say “hi” to 
defendant.  Juror S.S. stated she had been a bystander when the discussion about 
communication with defendant occurred, and she did not desire to speak with him.  
Defendant contends “that the manner in which the trial court conducted its 
bias inquiry of Juror M.B. compromised the juror’s ability to be impartial and 
rendered her unable to fulfill her juror duties.”  He claims that the court’s 
questioning effectively nullified any sympathy she may have felt toward defendant 
by alerting her to the fact that her note may have compromised her ability to 
impose the death penalty.  
 
31 
By failing to object, defendant forfeited his claim.  (Evid. Code, § 353; see 
Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 589-592.)  We also find the claim lacks merit.  
Nothing indicates that Juror M.B.’s note contained information that “jurors had 
commenced their deliberations or had formed any tentative conclusions regarding 
the appropriate penalty.”  (People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 481.)  The 
note indicated the juror was concerned only with defendant’s spiritual well-being.  
Because the note did not raise the possibility of juror misconduct, the court had no 
duty to conduct an inquiry into the juror’s motives.  (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 1044, 1117.) 
4.  Shield Law Claim 
a.  Facts 
Following defendant’s arrest, William Hutchinson, a reporter for the 
Antioch Daily Ledger Post Dispatch, interviewed defendant about the charges 
pending against him.  On March 12, 1991, the newspaper published the interview, 
entitled I’ll Get Death Penalty.  (Hutchinson, I’ll Get Death Penalty, Antioch 
Daily Ledger-Post Dispatch (Mar. 12, 1991), p. 1.)  According to Hutchinson, 
defendant told him that he expected to be convicted of the crimes, and “ ‘I figure 
they will find me guilty because they’ve got a lot of evidence against me.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 1.)  The article also quoted defendant as saying, “ ‘I figure I’ll get the death 
penalty.  I knew that before any of this happened.  But like I said, I weighed all 
that before I did anything.’ ”  He also commented that, “ ‘if you push my button, 
then whatever happens, happens.’ ”  (Id. at p. 12.) 
Prior to the penalty trial, the prosecution subpoenaed Hutchinson as a 
witness.  Hutchinson and the newspaper filed a motion to quash the subpoena, on 
the ground that the information the prosecution sought was protected by the 
California shield law (Cal. Const. art I, §2, subd.(b); Evid. Code § 1070).  The 
 
32 
shield law, as explained further below, provides newspersons, including reporters 
who are engaged in legitimate journalistic purposes, protection against compulsory 
disclosure of the information they acquire in gathering news.  (Delaney v. Superior 
Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798 (Delaney); Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b) 
[repeats language of Evid. Code, § 1070 immunity and elevates protection to 
constitutional status]; Evid. Code, § 1070 [immunity applies to any unpublished 
information obtained in gathering, receiving, or processing information for 
communication to public].) 
A hearing on the motion to quash was held on October 27, 1991.  The 
prosecutor told the court that “all the People would seek to elicit from Mr. 
Hutchinson is an affirmation as to whether or not [defendant] made certain 
statements which are attributed to him in the article.” The prosecution noted that it 
did not seek any unpublished information or Hutchinson’s notes.   
The prosecutor then asked Hutchinson whether defendant had made the 
comments attributed to him in the March 12 article.  Hutchinson replied that 
although he could not remember exactly what defendant told him during the 
interview, “at the time I wrote it, I believed it to be accurate.”  Defense counsel 
then moved to strike Hutchinson’s proposed testimony “[o]n the grounds I can’t 
adequately cross-examine him.”  
The court stated that Hutchinson’s testimony would be allowed, but that it 
was concerned with defendant’s cross-examination rights.  When asked to identify 
areas of potential cross-examination, defense counsel replied, “I want to know 
every single thing about this conversation from start to finish.  If he had a tape 
recording of it, that would be great.  If he doesn’t, then I want to elicit as much 
information as I can get; short of there being some recording of every single 
statement that was made, every question that was asked.”  
 
33 
The court continued the hearing after learning that Hutchinson had not 
taped the interview.  Defense counsel objected to any in camera hearings that 
counsel could not attend, commenting, “I am asserting now that this Court can not, 
in any way, shape or form make a decision about what’s useful to the defense in 
this case, Your Honor.  It’s too complicated a defense.”  
The court then granted defendant’s request for an in camera hearing, with 
defendant and his counsel present.  The court conducted the in camera hearing 
without the prosecutor, in order to explore what would assist in defendant’s cross-
examination.   Defendant told the court that he sought Hutchinson’s notes “and the 
following information:  (1) The context of [defendant’s] statements; (2) the flow 
of conversation; (3) the specific words [defendant] used; (4) the intensity of 
[defendant’s] voice; (5) how long [defendant] spoke about matters which in his 
mind justified his action without interruption; (6) whether [defendant] presented 
his justifications logically; and (7) whether [defendant] evidenced a strong belief 
in what he was saying.”  
The court next held an in camera hearing with Hutchinson, his attorneys, 
the prosecutor, and defense counsel present.  During the hearing, Hutchinson 
indicated he had no independent recollection of the interview, except the 
information provided in his notes.  The notes indicated that defendant made the 
reported statements to Hutchinson, appeared calm and spoke in a monotone, 
discussed very seriously his life philosophy, did not appear delusional, presented 
his arguments logically, and believed what he was saying.  
The court determined that on the basis of Hutchinson’s in camera 
testimony, it would allow the defense to cross-examine Hutchinson on his 
observations of defendant’s demeanor, mental status, and the manner in which 
defendant answered questions.  Hutchinson’s notes would not be produced.  
 
34 
The court allowed the defense to question Hutchinson outside the jury’s 
presence in order to determine the scope of his potential trial testimony and 
whether he would rely on the shield law.  Hutchinson invoked the shield law as to 
all questions regarding defendant’s demeanor during the interview.  The trial court 
found the reporter in contempt for his refusal to answer the questions initially.  
The court suggested that Hutchinson answer the questions that were covered in the 
protected notes “independent of the notes.” Hutchinson eventually spoke on the 
length of his interview with defendant and whether defendant smiled.  The trial 
court then discharged the contempt citation.  
During trial, Hutchinson testified for the prosecution (with the jury present)  
that he had written the March 12 article a day or so after interviewing defendant.  
He noted that defendant “is not a man who does things impulsively and he thinks 
beforehand of the consequences of his actions.”  According to Hutchinson, 
defendant told him:  “Let’s say, I consider everything before I do it.  I weigh all 
the angles, make my decision and I go ahead and do it.”  Hutchinson also recalled 
that defendant told him in reference to the fact that he shaved his head shortly after 
the murders, “I wanted to change my looks.  I wasn’t done.  I didn’t intend for 
them to catch me for awhile.”  “I had some other things I wanted to do.  Getting 
caught wasn’t one of them.  At least getting caught so quick wasn’t part of my 
plan.”  In reference to Janice Butler, defendant told Hutchinson, “she crossed the 
line.  I told her if she ever got between me and my wife, they’d find her body out 
back in Brentwood.”  Defendant made similar comments regarding his ex-wife, 
Mary Cagle, his belief that “If I draw a line and tell you not to cross that line, 
you’ve got everything coming to you if you cross it because I’m not going to draw 
two lines.”  
On cross-examination, Hutchinson testified that throughout the interview, 
defendant spoke in a stern voice and was calm, and that at times his eyes stared 
 
35 
intently through the glass.  Hutchinson could not recall the order in which 
defendant made the statements the article attributed to him, but believed that the 
statements, though paraphrased, were accurate.  Hutchinson noted that his 
“definition of someone who is calm would be someone who is lucid, rational, 
someone who isn’t jumping around or delusional,” although he did acknowledge 
to defense counsel that a person could appear calm but be irrational at the same 
time. Dr. Kormos later testified that Hutchinson’s account of the interview would 
not change his diagnosis.  
b.  Failure to produce interview notes 
Defendant’s principal complaint is that the trial court abused its discretion 
in failing to require Hutchinson to produce his interview notes and limiting his 
responses to describing defendant’s demeanor and perceived mental state.  
Defendant claims the interview notes were essential to support his mental disorder 
defense and necessary for his counsel to show that his statements “were said in a 
context and manner to validate [defendant’s] psychiatric disorder and to provide 
evidence of a mitigating factor for the jury to consider in rendering a verdict.”  We 
disagree. 
As both defendant and the People agree, the standard for determining 
whether a defendant may compel disclosure of information otherwise protected 
under the shield law was set forth in Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d 785.  Delaney held 
that the law protects a reporter from contempt for refusal to disclose either 
unpublished information or the source of the information, whether published or 
unpublished.  (Id. at pp. 796-797.)  Delaney observed that “a newsperson’s 
protection under the shield law must yield to a criminal defendant’s constitutional 
right to a fair trial when the newsperson’s refusal to disclose information would 
unduly infringe on that right.”  (Id. at p. 793.)  As we have observed in several 
 
36 
cases, “In order to compel disclosure of information covered by the shield law, the 
defendant must make a threshold showing of a reasonable possibility that the 
information will materially assist his defense.  The showing need not be detailed 
or specific, but it must rest on more than mere speculation.”  (People v. Cooper 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 820, paraphrasing Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 809-
813; see also Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 53.)  If the threshold showing is 
made, the court then balances various factors in determining whether it must 
compel disclosure of the information.  (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 809-813.)  
These factors include whether the information is confidential or sensitive, the 
interests that the shield law protects, the importance of the information to the 
defendant, and, in some cases, whether there is an alternative source for the 
information.  (Id. at p. 813.) 
We have observed that “[a]lthough Delaney did not and could not specify 
what evidence would meet its threshold test, the court did observe that the 
defendant need not prove evidence he sought to discover would lead to his 
exoneration and that ‘the defendant’s showing need not be detailed or specific, but 
it must rest on more than mere speculation.’ ”  (Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 
56, quoting Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 809.)  One example in capital cases 
where we have recognized the evidence might meet the threshold test and is 
necessary to a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial, is in his ability to 
“establish mitigating circumstances relevant to the penalty determination.”  
(Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 809.) 
Using Delaney’s threshold test, defendant claims Hutchinson’s notes of the 
March 12 interview were essential to validate defendant’s psychiatric disorder and 
provide evidence of a mitigating factor for the jury to consider in favor of a life 
sentence.   
 
37 
The evidence defendant asserts would have materially assisted his mental 
state defense consists of nothing more than mere speculation on his part.  
Defendant has made no attempt to show that the notes reveal anything different 
from Hutchinson’s testimony, and the record does not suggest the notes contain 
anything of substance that the jury had not already heard.  In addition, the only 
matters in the notes to which Hutchinson did not testify (whether defendant was 
promised confidentiality and the interview’s duration) do not bear on defendant’s 
mental state at the time of the murders.  Dr. Kormos did testify that nothing in 
Hutchinson’s testimony changed or contradicted his diagnosis of paranoid 
personality.  But defendant has failed to meet Delaney’s threshold test, and we 
find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s use of the shield law in protecting 
Hutchinson’s notes.  Because defendant has not met Delaney’s threshold test, we 
need not balance the Delaney factors in order to determine whether disclosure is 
required.  (Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 813.)  
c.  The in camera proceeding 
Defendant contends that the trial court’s determination that nothing existed 
in Hutchinson’s notes to materially assist his defense was the result of a 
constitutionally defective in camera hearing.  Claiming Hutchinson’s notes were 
“neither confidential nor sensitive,”  defendant asserts that the notes were essential 
to establishing his mental health defense because they contained the demeanor 
evidence the defense sought to procure to demonstrate his mental state.  
Again, defendant overlooks the fact that Hutchinson did testify as to 
defendant’s demeanor and mental state during the interview.  The fact that the 
court held an in camera hearing to determine the extent of Hutchinson’s reliance 
on the shield law in no way affected the gist of his later testimony as to 
defendant’s interview demeanor. 
 
38 
In a related argument, defendant claims that the trial court’s decision to 
hold an in camera hearing excluding both defendant and his counsel denied him 
his constitutional right to be present and to assistance of counsel.  He also claims 
that application of the shield law denied him his right to the “entirety of the 
interview,” thwarting his ability to present a defense and obtain a fair trial.  (See 
Evid. Code, § 356.)  Defendant again fails to show how the in camera proceeding 
or the protection of the unpublished notes in any way negatively influenced his 
ability to present a defense or receive assistance from counsel, or in any way 
changed his defense or the context of Hutchinson’s testimony.  (Sanchez, supra, 
12 Cal.4th at p. 58.) 
d.  Additional claims 
Defendant also claims that the failure to produce Hutchinson’s interview 
notes denied him his right to confront and cross-examine the reporter, his right to 
present a defense, a fair and reliable penalty phase trial, compulsory process, and 
his right to effective assistance of counsel.   As the facts show, Hutchinson was 
cross-examined on his testimony regarding the interview, and defendant does not 
establish that further cross-examination would have revealed additional 
information or otherwise influenced the jury’s verdict.  No evidence suggests 
Hutchinson’s testimony prejudiced the presentation of defendant’s case. 
5.  Exclusion of Evidence 
Defendant complains that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
excluded evidence, and in so doing denied him his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to present a penalty phase defense.  He specifically refers to 
three types of evidence:  (1) the proposed testimony of prison expert James Park 
concerning Park’s anti-death-penalty beliefs; (2) the proposed testimony of Mary 
Cagle’s former boyfriend, Jess Martin, as to Cagle’s alleged bias as a witness; and 
 
39 
(3) Martin’s proposed testimony about Cagle’s alleged manipulative behavior.  In 
each instance, defense counsel offered proof as to the evidence he sought to 
introduce.  (See People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 778 [requiring offer of 
proof].)  We find no abuse of discretion and no violation of defendant’s 
constitutional rights in the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony. 
As the People observe, defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a 
defense includes the right not to have the trial court interfere with a defendant’s 
ability to receive a fair trial.  The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the 
jury in a capital case to hear any relevant mitigating evidence that the defendant 
offers, including “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence 
less than death.”  (Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1015.)  In turn, the court does have 
the authority to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence that does not bear on the 
defendant’s character, record, or circumstances of the offense.  (Ibid.)  “[T]he 
concept of relevance as it pertains to mitigation evidence is no different from the 
definition of relevance as the term is understood generally.”  (Id. at pp. 1015-
1016.)  Indeed, “excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does 
not impair an accused’s due process right to present a defense.”  (People v. Fudge 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103 (Fudge).) 
a.  James Park’s testimony 
James Park, a former correctional employee and prison condition expert, 
testified for the defense about defendant’s likely ability to adjust well in a 
maximum security prison if he were sentenced to life without parole.  He was 
asked on cross-examination whether he supported imposition of the death penalty.  
He replied that he did not.  On redirect, defense counsel asked why he was 
opposed to the penalty, and the court sustained the prosecution’s objection to the 
 
40 
question, under Evidence Code section 352, finding the information irrelevant.  
The trial court correctly concluded that Park’s views on the death penalty were 
irrelevant to defendant’s ability to adjust to prison life or any other factor in 
mitigation. 
b.  Jess Martin’s testimony 
During a sidebar conference outside the presence of the jury, defense 
counsel sought to proffer the testimony of Jess Martin, Mary Cagle’s former 
boyfriend, (1) that Cagle asked Martin to retaliate against defendant’s family after 
the murders, in an effort to show Cagle’s testimony was biased, and (2) that Cagle 
was prone to manipulating men and committing welfare and other “scams” in 
order to get her way.  The court properly excluded the evidence as irrelevant.  
(Evid. Code, § 352.) 
Martin’s proposed testimony about Cagle’s behavior after the murders was 
cumulative and did not help further explain defendant’s character, the facts of the 
offense, or defendant’s prior record.  (Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1015-1016.)  
The jury had been permitted to view Cagle’s record, and Dr. Kormos had testified 
that defendant’s paranoid personality disorder was triggered in part by Cagle’s 
manipulative tendencies.  In addition, there is no indication that Cagle’s alleged 
scams had anything to do with defendant or that defendant was even aware of her 
behavior when he committed the three murders.  The court’s exclusion of these 
minor or subsidiary points did not amount to an abuse of discretion.  (Fudge, 
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1103.) 
6.  Alleged Instructional ErrorsCALJIC No. 8.85 
The jury was given the standard instruction on aggravating and mitigating 
factors under CALJIC No. 8.85 and its requirement that the jury, in determining 
penalty, shall be guided by and “shall consider all of the evidence which has been 
 
41 
received during any part of the trial of this case.”  Defendant complains that, for 
several reasons, the court deprived him of his right to due process and a reliable 
sentence when it instructed the jury as to the statutory sentencing factors.  As will 
appear, we have repeatedly considered and rejected defendant’s claims in previous 
opinions, and we see no reason to reconsider those decisions in light of 
defendant’s arguments. 
a.  Argument that CALJIC No. 8.85 is misleading 
Defendant first claims the instruction is misleading because it required the 
jury to aggravate “the sentence upon the basis of statutory sentencing factors 
which, as a matter of state law, were relevant solely as mitigators.”  In particular, 
defendant complains that CALJIC No. 8.85, repeating section 190.3, factors (d) to 
(h), and (j), should have been deleted because they misled the jury into believing 
that the absence of a mitigating factor becomes a factor in aggravation and the jury 
would be confused by the inconsistent scheme of aggravating and mitigating 
factors, potentially giving greater weight to the absence of mitigating factors. 
We have considered and rejected the identical contention in several recent 
cases, and no evidence suggests the jury was unable to properly apply the 
instruction.  (See, e.g., People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 191 (Mendoza); 
People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 380-381 (Kipp).)  In addition, the jury was 
also given defendant’s requested supplemental instructions that limited the jurors’ 
consideration to only those aggravating factors that actually existed:  “You have 
been read the list of aggravating circumstances which the law allows you to 
consider if you find they have been established as required.  These are the only 
aggravating circumstances that you may consider.  You are not allowed to take 
into account any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the 
 
42 
death penalty would be appropriate in this case.”  There is no indication the jury 
misapplied CALJIC No. 8.85, as defendant suggests. 
b.  Factors (d) and (k) 
CALJIC No. 8.85 factor (d), reflecting section 190.3, factor (d), asks the 
jury to consider, if applicable, “Whether or not the offense was committed while 
the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance.”  Defendant complains that the court erroneously refused to modify 
the factor in order to inform the jury that it should consider “any mental or 
emotional disturbance” or delete the factor altogether so that the jury would give 
due weight to defendant’s mental illness.  The trial court also rejected defendant’s 
request to modify the catchall factor in section 190.3, factor (k), to include 10 
items described by Dr. Kormos as the possible causes of defendant’s mental 
illness.  
As the People observe, the court did not err.  CALJIC No. 8.85, as given, 
permitted the jury to consider defendant’s mental illness even though it might have 
amounted to an extreme condition, and defendant is not entitled to a pinpoint 
instruction.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1054-1055 (Jenkins).)  In 
addition, in refusing to modify the wording of section 190.3, factor (k) as reflected 
by CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k), the court placed no improper limitation on 
mitigating evidence.  Under the instruction as given, the jury could consider any 
circumstance that extenuated the gravity of the crime, including Dr. Kormos’s 
testimony on the causes of defendant’s mental illness.  (See Jenkins, supra, 22 
Cal.4th at p. 1055.) 
c.  Failure to instruct the jury not to double-count aggravating 
factors 
Defendant also complains that the court’s refusal to modify CALJIC No. 
8.85, factor (a), reflecting section 190.3, factor (a), the circumstance of the 
 
43 
offense, led the jury to double count that factor by inviting the jury to count the 
special circumstance he admitted twice, “once by itself, and once as a 
circumstance of the crime.”  The trial court rejected defendant’s proposed 
alternative instruction telling the jury to “not consider an aggravating factor if you 
have already considered the facts surrounding it as a circumstance of the crime.”  
He adds that the prosecutor “implicitly coaxed the jury to count the special 
circumstance twice.”  
Defendant’s argument has no merit.  As we held in People v. Ayala, supra, 
at page 289, the possibility the jury would double-count the aggravating factors is 
remote, in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct.  Here, the prosecutor’s limited 
explicit reference to section 190.3, factor (a) was that the items under the factor 
“as the [c]ourt has instructed you, are all considered as one big aggravating 
factor.”  There is no reason for us to believe the prosecutor’s brief reference to 
factor (a) in any way misled the jury. 
d.  Failure to admonish the jury 
As discussed ante, at pages 12-15, during the jury’s first and only weekend 
recess after the first week of trial, several jurors might have read and shared 
newspaper articles about defendant’s crimes. We concluded that although there 
may have been misconduct, it did not prejudice the verdict.  Defendant also 
complains that the trial court’s failure to admonish the jury prior to its weekend 
recess, that it should not read newspapers or consult outside sources, led the jurors 
to read the articles related to the crimes, and prejudiced the penalty verdict.  (§ 
1122, subd. (b) [requiring the court, at each adjournment, to admonish jury not to 
converse among themselves or anyone else on any subject connected with trial].) 
Initially, we note that defendant failed to object to the court’s omission, and 
therefore forfeited the claim on appeal.  (People v. Campbell (1976) 63 
 
44 
Cal.App.3d 599, 609-610.)  In addition, the jury was admonished several times 
(while receiving jury instructions, and after closing and rebuttal arguments) that it 
must not consult reference works or persons for additional information, must not 
discuss the case with any person other than a juror after the case is submitted, and 
must not seek or receive any evidence outside the evidence that was presented at 
trial.  The jury was also told that the Hutchinson newspaper article, which was an 
exhibit in the case, was not in evidence and that “Headlines on a newspaper are 
not evidence.”  Also, as we have observed, although the jurors should not have 
referred to any articles about the crimes, the fact that some jurors might have been 
exposed to media reports did not prejudice the penalty verdict.  Declarations from 
several jurors satisfied the court that the exposure, if any, was limited in nature, 
and not prejudicial to a fair verdict.  Thus, although the court should have repeated 
the admonition not to consult outside sources prior to the final weekend recess, we 
do not find the omission was prejudicial.  (See, e.g., People v. Heishman (1988) 45 
Cal.3d 147, 174 [failure to admonish jury at time of adjournment not grounds for 
reversal unless the defendant shows prejudice resulting from the omission].) 
7.  Motion to Modify the Verdict 
Following the death verdict, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to 
modify the verdict under section 190.4, subdivision (e).  Defendant complains the 
court erred in refusing to modify the verdict by failing to consider defendant’s 
mental illness as the causative factor for the murders and in mitigation the fact that 
he pleaded guilty.  During the court’s consideration of defendant’s motion, the 
court observed that “I am independently reweighing the evidence, trying to 
determine whether the weight of the evidence supports the jury’s findings and the 
verdict.”  The court then described the defense evidence in detail and what 
 
45 
aggravating factors it deemed important.  After concluding the aggravating factors 
outweighed mitigating ones, the court denied the modification motion.  
We find the court’s explanation for denying the motion sufficient.  The 
court reasonably found the evidence of defendant’s mental condition did not 
influence his conduct.  (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 775.)  It also did not accept 
defendant’s assertion that he pleaded guilty in order to mitigate his sentence, and 
the court’s failure to refer to that fact was not error.  (See People v. Memro (1995) 
11 Cal.4th 786, 885.) 
8.  Constitutionality of Death Penalty 
Defendant makes familiar arguments that the 1978 death penalty scheme is 
unconstitutional.  We have repeatedly rejected the claim that the statute does not 
meaningfully narrow the class of persons eligible for the penalty.  (Mendoza, 
supra, at p. 191.) 
Defendant also asserts that section 190.3, factor (a), is impermissibly vague 
because the phrase “circumstances of the crime” can be interpreted too broadly to 
encompass any fact.  The United States Supreme Court has rejected the identical 
claim that factor (a) is unconstitutionally vague.  (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 
512 U.S. 967, 976.)  This court has also found that “the purpose of the sentencing 
selection factors set forth in section 190.3 is to guide the jury’s discretion in 
deciding the appropriate penalty, not to distinguish a death-worthy case from one 
that is not.”  (Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 192.) 
In addition, defendant complains that the court should require the jury to 
make written findings or achieve unanimity as to aggravating circumstances.  We 
have previously rejected the identical claim.  (Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 381.) 
Other claims defendant makes are largely repetitive of earlier claims, or 
have been rejected in numerous cases.  We touch on his key arguments.  The court 
 
46 
need not have instructed the jury that aggravating circumstances must outweigh 
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and jury unanimity on the 
findings was not required.  (Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 191.)   
Intercase proportionality review is not required.  (See People v. Crittenden 
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 157.)  Conducting intracase proportionality review does not 
assist defendant’s cause because the penalty is proportionate to his culpability; he 
committed three brutal first degree murders of defenseless victims.  (See Sanchez, 
supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 84-85.)  Use of unadjudicated criminal activity during the 
penalty phase does not violate due process or lead to an unreliable verdict.  
(People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1060-1061.)  The presence of 
certain adjectives in section 190.3 (“extreme” in factor (d) and “substantial” in 
factor (g)) does not impermissibly limit consideration of mitigating factors in 
violation of the federal Constitution.  (Jenkins, supra, at pp. 1054-1055.)  The 
court need not designate what mitigating factors the jury may consider as 
mitigating.  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1063-1064.)   
9.  International Law Claim 
Defendant’s final contention is that international law compels the 
elimination of the death penalty.  We have previously concluded, however, that 
international law and treaties do not compel elimination of the death penalty in 
this state, when it has been rendered in accordance with state and federal 
constitutional and statutory requirements.  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
469, 511; Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1055.)   
 
47 
III. DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
48 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Ramos 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S030956 
Date Filed: November 29, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Contra Costa 
Judge: James J. Marchiano 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Katherine Alfieri and Mark R. Vermuellen, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, 
Assistant Attorney General, Ronald S. Matthias and Herbert F. Wilkinson, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Katherine Alfieri 
P.O. Box 460238 
San Francisco, CA  94146-0238 
(415) 558-9300 
 
Ronald S. Matthias 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5559