Case Title: TAYLOR v. SCHUKEI FAMILY TRUST

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
TAYLOR v. SCHUKEI FAMILY TRUST2000 WY 12996 P.2d 13Case Number: 97-205Decided: 01/28/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
ROBERT and LORETTA 
TAYLOR, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v.SCHUKEI FAMILY TRUST, by and through 
GORDON W. SCHUKEI, GERALD D. SCHUKEI, and CAROL A. PARISH as Trustees, Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Converse County, Honorable Barton R. Voigt, 
Judge.

Todd Hambrick of 
Krampner, Fuller & Hambrick Attorneys at Law, L.L.C., Casper, Wyoming, 
representing appellants.Patrick J. Murphy and Stephenson D. Emery of 
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming, representing 
appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
expedited conference; retired November 2, 1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The only 
issue in this case is whether the Schukei Family Trust (the Trust) owed a duty 
of care to Robert Taylor, an employee of the Trust's tenant, Schukei, Inc., who 
was injured by a defective overhead door on the leased premises. The district 
court entered an Order Granting Summary Judgment to the Trust and its several 
trustees. The district court relied upon Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199 (Wyo. 
1995), and ruled that the landlord owed no duty to the tenant or the tenant's 
employees. The district court also held that none of the exceptions to the rule 
of non-liability listed in Ortega are present in this case. We hold that the 
lease in this case is susceptible to a construction that the landlord had 
contracted to repair the premises, resulting in a mixed question of fact and law 
with respect to the intent of the parties to the lease. That question 
constitutes a genuine issue of material fact under the circumstances, and the 
grant of a summary judgment to the landlord was not appropriate. The Order 
Granting Summary Judgment entered in the district court must be reversed and the 
case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.

[¶2] In the 
Brief of Appellant, filed on behalf of Robert and Loretta Taylor (the Taylors), 
the issue, a resolution of the issue, and an outline of the reasons for the 
resolution are articulated in this way:

I. Did the lower court 
commit reversible error by holding that the landlord (Trust) owed Appellant no 
duty of care with regards to the overhead door which fell and injured 
Appellant?

[¶3] Yes, for 
the following reasons:

A. Summary Judgment - 
Questions of Law v. Fact

B. Special Circumstances 
- Landlord & Tenant Same People

C. 
Control

D. Contract Between 
Landlord/Tenant

E. Negligent 
Repairs

[¶4] This 
Statement of the Issue is set forth in the Brief of the Appellee Schukei Family 
Trust:

Whether, under the 
circumstances of the case at bar, the landlord owed a commercial tenant's 
employee a legal duty to protect him from patent defects of the leased 
premises?

[¶5] In 
September of 1993, the Trust acquired a commercial building located at 817 So. 
4th Street in Douglas. The Trust leases that building to Schukei, Inc., d/b/a 
Valley Motor Supply (Schukei, Inc.). There is no written agreement between the 
Trust and Schukei, Inc., but the record demonstrates that pursuant to oral 
agreement rent is payable monthly in the amount of $750.00 and "[b]y mutual 
understanding, the Trust is responsible for repairs to the structure, itself, 
while [Schukei, Inc.] is responsible for interior repairs." More specifically, 
the Trust is responsible for the "[m]aintenance and repair of the building's 
overhead doors."

[¶6] It can be 
inferred logically that the Trust and Schukei, Inc. were able to conduct the 
lease transaction in such an informal way because the trustees and the 
principals of Schukei, Inc. are essentially the same people. The beneficiary of 
the Trust is the mother of all of the trustees. These siblings also are current 
or former shareholders and officers in Schukei, Inc., of which the Trust also is 
a shareholder. The president of Schukei, Inc. is the husband of one of the 
trustees.

[¶7] Robert 
Taylor was employed by Schukei, Inc. in April of 1995, and in June of that year 
he sustained a serious injury to his shoulder when one of the overhead doors in 
the building fell on him. Prior to that accident, Robert Taylor, the Trust, and 
Schukei, Inc. all were aware of the defective condition of the door. The 
defective condition was the cause of Robert Taylor's 
injury.

[¶8] The Taylors 
brought an action against the Trust on multiple theories of liability. The 
district court, after authoring a Decision Letter and a Supplemental Decision 
Letter, granted the Trust's motion for a summary judgment, and the Order 
Granting Summary Judgment was entered on July 7, 1997. The essence of the 
justification for the district court's ruling is found in its reliance upon 
Ortega, 902 P.2d 199 and Hefferin v. Scott Realty Co., 71 Wyo. 114, 254 P.2d 194 
(1953). The district court concluded that as a matter of law, under the thrust 
of these prior cases, the Trust owed no duty to Schukei, Inc. or to Robert 
Taylor, its employee.

[¶9] Our 
jurisprudential rules relative to summary judgment are consistently applied by 
this Court. A summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of 
material fact exist, and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56; Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell County School 
Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 798 (Wyo. 1991). When an order granting a summary judgment 
comes before this Court for review, we examine the record in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, in this instance the Taylors, and 
give to that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that fairly may be 
drawn from the record. Id. at 799 (quoting Doud v. First Interstate Bank of 
Gillette, 769 P.2d 927, 928 (Wyo. 1989)). Our statement of the facts set forth 
above is gleaned from the record consistently with those 
principles.

[¶10] More 
recently, we have summarized our standard for the review of summary judgment in 
this way:

A. When a motion for 
summary judgment is before the supreme court, we have exactly the same duty as 
the district judge; and, if there is a complete record before us, we have 
exactly the same material as did he. We must follow the same standards. The 
propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment should only be granted where it is clear that there are no 
issues of material facts involved and that an inquiry into the facts is 
unnecessary to clarify the application of law. Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867 (1975). A material fact is one which has legal significance. Johnson v. 
Soulis, supra. It is a fact which would establish a defense. Wood v. Trenchard, 
Wyo., 550 P.2d 490 (1976). * * *"

Nowotny v. L 
& B Contract Industries, Inc., 933 P.2d 452, 455 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Thomas 
By Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Wyo. 
1985)).

[¶11] We find no 
fault with the reliance by the district court upon our decision in Ortega where 
we held that Wyoming continues to follow the common law rule of landlord 
immunity from tort liability under most circumstances. We said in deciding that 
case:

In the landlord and 
tenant relationship, Wyoming follows the common law rules. Lyden v. Winer, 878 P.2d 516 (Wyo. 1994); Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1099 (Wyo. 
1987); Medlock v. Van Wagner, 625 P.2d 207, 208 (Wyo. 1981); Matter of Estate of 
Mora, 611 P.2d 842, 847 (Wyo. 1980). Under those rules, a landlord owes no 
greater duty to a tenant's guests than the landlord owes to the tenant himself. 
Clemmons v. Fidler, 58 Wn. App. 32, 791 P.2d 257, 260 (1990). Generally, that 
duty is nonexistent since landlords enjoy immunity from tort liability, being 
one of the few classes of defendants who can invoke caveat 
emptor.

[¶12] The common 
law rule as applied today actually originated during 16th century feudalism when 
a tenant leased to acquire land. Buildings were simple and their living 
conditions of little concern to the tenant. Tenants' rights were best protected 
by the common law view that a landlord's lease to a tenant was a conveyance of 
the premises for the term of the lease. From that view, the tenant was the owner 
and occupier subject to all the responsibilities of one in possession and 
burdened with maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition to protect 
persons who came upon the land. Borders v. Roseberry, 216 Kan. 486, 532 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (1975). As a general rule, the landlord owed no duty to the tenant 
or the tenant's guests for dangerous or defective conditions of the premises. 
Medlock, 625 P.2d  at 208; Hefferin v. Scott Realty Co., 71 Wyo. 114, 254 P.2d 194, 197 (1953); and see Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 335, 356 
(1965).

[¶13] Over time, 
the courts created exceptions to the rule of landlord nonliability, some of 
which have been recognized in Wyoming:

1. Undisclosed conditions 
known to lessor and unknown to the lessee which were hidden or latently 
dangerous and caused an injury. Medlock, 625 P.2d  at 208.

2. The premises were 
leased for public use and a member of the public was 
injured.

3. Part of the premises 
was retained under the lessor's control, but was open to the use of the lessee. 
Lyden, 878 P.2d  at 518.

4. Lessor had contracted 
to repair the premises. Hefferin, 254 P.2d  at 197.

5. Negligence by lessor 
in making repairs. Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge Int'l Order of Odd Fellows, 526 P.2d 52 (Wyo. 1974). and see Restatement (Second) of Torts 356-362 (1965). 
Ortega, 902 P.2d  at 202 (footnote omitted).

[¶14] The 
district court ruled that none of these exceptions to landlord non-liability 
were applicable in this case. We perceive, however, that Hefferin, 254 P.2d 194, 
needs to be examined more critically in considering the fourth exception. In 
that case, we said:

As heretofore stated the 
lease in this case contained no covenant to repair. It is stated in 32 Am.Jur. § 
657, p. 521: "In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the landlord is 
not obligated to make repairs upon the demised premises during the term either 
to put the premises in repair or to keep them in such condition." The landlord 
is not bound to repair defects in the demised premises existing at the time he 
leased the same or occurring thereafter from any cause other than the act of the 
landlord. So it is said in 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 366, pp. 1073, 
1074: "There is no implied covenant that the lessor will make any repairs to the 
demised premises during the term, even if the premises are in a dangerous 
condition,." As a corollary to the foregoing rule, it is stated in 32 Am.Jur. § 
662, p. 526, as follows: "The logical conclusion from the principle that the 
landlord is under no implied obligation as to the condition of the demised 
premises or as to the repair of defects therein is that the landlord is not 
responsible to the tenant for injuries to person or property caused by defects 
in the demised premises where the landlord has not made any warranty or contract 
as to the condition of the demised premises or as to the repair of defects and 
is guilty of no willful wrong or fraud." To a like effect see Restatement of the 
Law of Torts, section 355 and subsequent sections.

[¶15] In this 
case plaintiff does not rely upon any contract contained in the lease between 
the parties but asserts that the defendant was liable under the promise which it 
made on or about March 9, 1951, to install a new ventilation system. There was 
no new consideration for any such promise or contract. It has been held that 
"when the relation of the parties is such that the tenant is not bound to 
continue the tenancy, the promise of the landlord to make repairs if the tenancy 
is continued is based on a sufficient consideration." 51 C.J.S. 1085. In the 
case at bar, however, the lease was for a definite term of three years, and 
hence the foregoing statement does not apply. The rule applicable here is that 
stated in 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, § 368, p. 1084: "A contract or 
covenant to repair must be supported by a consideration a promise to repair, 
made by a landlord to his tenant during the tenancy, with no other consideration 
than such tenancy, is a nudum pactum, without consideration, and cannot be 
enforced." Numerous authorities are cited, among them the case of Grace v. 
Williams, 36 Ohio App. 569, 173 N.E. 448, 449, in which the court stated: "Two 
rules of law are involved: First, the landlord is under no obligation to repair 
premises, if he has not covenanted to do so 16 Ruling Case Law, 1030, § 552; 
Goodall v. Deters, 121 Ohio St. 432, 169 N.E. 443. Second, the promise to make 
repairs during tenancy must be supported by a new consideration 16 Ruling Case 
Law, 1033, § 553: "It has frequently been held that the landlord is under no 
obligation to make repairs, unless such a stipulation is made a part of the 
original contract, and that any subsequent promise to make repairs, founded 
merely on the relation of the parties, and not one of the conditions of the 
lease, is without consideration, and for that reason creates no liability." And 
so it is said in 32 Am.Jur. § 730, p. 604: "An obligation on the part of a 
landlord to make improvements on the demised premises may arise from a 
subsequent agreement with his tenant provided such agreement is supported by a 
consideration, but a subsequent promise, if not supported by consideration, is 
considered a nudum pactum, even though the improvement may benefit the 
reversionary interest." In the case at bar, the promise made by the landlord 
herein was wholly gratuitous and was not binding upon it and it follows from 
what has been said that the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed and it 
is not necessary to consider the other questions raised by the defendant 
herein.

[¶16] Hefferin, 
254 P.2d  at 197. The district court dealt with Hefferin by concluding that the 
Trust had not contracted to make repairs.

[¶17] In our 
judgment, this record is equivocal on that score. It is subject, however, to a 
fair inference that when the original oral lease arrangement was made between 
the Trust and Schukei, Inc., the "mutual understanding" that the Trust was 
responsible for structural repairs, including the overhead doors, was entered 
into at that time. If that were the fact, then the language from Hefferin about 
new consideration being required to support a subsequent promise to make repairs 
would not be pertinent in this instance. Further, if the "mutual understanding" 
was reached at some later date than when the original lease arrangement was 
made, there is no indication in this record that Schukei, Inc. was bound to 
continue the tenancy for any particular term. Consequently, under the rules 
adopted in Hefferin, a subsequent promise by the Trust to make structural 
repairs well may have been based on the agreement of Schukei, Inc. to continue 
the tenancy, which would be sufficient consideration.

[¶18] Ortega did 
not reach any possible agreement to make repairs or maintain the premises. This 
case differs in that regard, and the record could lead to the conclusion that 
the promise to make repairs was a part of the initial lease negotiation, or if 
made later was supported by adequate consideration. What the parties intended 
from their arrangement is a question of fact which is subject to determination 
by the finder of fact, whether court or jury. 

[¶19] We have 
not had any occasion prior to this to discuss the problem of an oral "mutual 
understanding" amounting to a contract to repair. We said in Hefferin, 254 P.2d  
at 197, that an agreement by a landlord to make repairs must take the form of an 
express contract and should not be implied from the conduct of the parties. We 
look to the definition of an express contract found in Black's Law Dictionary 
321 (7th ed. 1999), which is "[a] contract whose terms the parties have 
eplicitly set out."

[¶20] The 
decisions of other state and federal courts are persuasive authority in 
considering an issue of first impression. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Div. v. Sparks, 973 P.2d 507, 510 (Wyo. 1999). Several courts 
in other states have held that a lessor who agrees in a written lease to make 
necessary repairs is liable when failure to do so results in injury to a 
commercial tenant's employee or customer. Ferber v. Orange Blossom Center, Inc., 
388 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla.App. 1980); Wright v. Mr. Quick, Inc., 129 Ill.App.3d 
226, 84 Ill.Dec. 518, 472 N.E.2d 478, 479 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 109 Ill. 2d 236, 93 Ill.Dec. 375, 486 N.E.2d 908 (1985); Great Atlantic and Pac. Tea 
Co., Inc. v. Yanofsky, 380 Mass. 326, 403 N.E.2d 370, 374 (1980); Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Thorn, 401 Mich. 306, 258 N.W.2d 30, 34 (1977); Nicks v. Joseph, 82 A.D.2d 768, 440 N YS.2d 218, 220 (1981). In a similar vein, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, applying Wyoming law, has held that a 
lessor was liable to the employee of a lessee for injuries caused by a defective 
condition when the lessor contractually obligated itself to make repairs. 
Stemple v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 430 F.2d 178, 182 (10th Cir. 1970). The 
Arkansas Supreme Court has held that an oral agreement for repairs was 
sufficient to support such liability. Majewski v. Cantrell, 293 Ark. 360, 737 S.W.2d 649, 651 (1987). In that case, as part of an oral lease, the lessor and 
lessee agreed that the lessor would maintain the roof of the building. An 
employee of the lessee was injured when she slipped on water that had leaked 
through the unrepaired roof. Id. at 650. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld a 
jury verdict for the employee, holding that the oral lease agreement established 
a duty on the part of the lessor to maintain the roof. Id. at 651. We are in 
accord that an oral lease agreement can establish a duty on the part of the 
landlord to make repairs sufficient to invoke the fourth exception to the rule 
of landlord immunity that is set forth in Ortega, 902 P.2d  at 
202.

[¶21] In this 
instance, we know that the Trust and Schukei, Inc. had an oral lease agreement 
and an oral arrangement relating to repairs. The record is equivocal as to 
whether the repair agreement was part of the lease agreement. If it was not, the 
record is silent as to any commitment by Schukei, Inc. to continue the tenancy 
if the Trust agreed to make repairs to the structure, which would constitute 
additional consideration supporting the agreement to repair. We perceive these, 
however, as genuine issues of material fact which, combined with the legal duty 
of care flowing from such an agreement, make the determination a mixed question 
of law and fact in this instance. It is appropriate in such an instance to 
submit the question to the jury or the court as a finder of fact. Wilder v. Cody 
Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 218 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶22] We reverse 
and remand this case for further proceedings in the district court consistent 
with this opinion.