Case Title: MUSTAIN v. GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96056

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
MUSTAIN v. GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY  MUSTAIN v. GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY 2003 OK 43 68 P.3d 991 Case Number: 96056 Decided: 04/22/2003 Modified: 04/23/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA ROBIN MUSTAIN, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY and DAVID HARRIS GRANDIN, Defendant/Appellees. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III ¶0 Plaintiff sustained severe bodily injuries when the personal water craft on which she was a passenger struck an abandoned railroad bridge. She sought to recover from the Grand River Damn Authority and from the water craft's driver. The District Court, Delaware County, Robert G. Haney, Judge, concluded that the statute of repose barred plaintiff's claim and the Grand River Dam Authority was shielded from liability by the provisions of Oklahoma's Recreational Land Use Act. He dismissed the claim. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division III, affirmed. On certiorari previously granted, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED AND THE NISI PRIUS ORDER, INSOFAR AS CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT, IS AFFIRMED. Robert Bell, Norman, and James T. Thompson, Edleman & Thompson, Kansas City, Missouri, for appellant, Robert A. Franden, Jody R. Nathan, Feldman, Franden, Woodard Farris & Boudreaux, Tulsa, and Allen B. Pease, General Counsel, Grand River Dam Authority,Vinita, for appellees. Opala, V.C.J. ¶1 The certiorari quest presses for our decision two questions: (1) Does the Grand River Dam Authority's collection of commercial- and private-dock permit fees and miscellaneous rents constitute "commercial activity" which would except it from the immunity otherwise extended by the Recreational Land Use Act? (2) Does the Governmental Tort Claims Act's protection extend to the Grand River Dam Authority? We answer the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative. I. ANATOMY OF THE LITIGATION ¶2 Robin Mustain (plaintiff/appellant) sustained severe bodily injuries when the personal water craft (water craft ¶3 The bridge at issue in today's controversy is over ninety-five years old. It was left uncompleted when a dam was built to impound the waters of the Grand River to create a source for producing hydroelectric power. The bridge and portions of the support structure (including the cross bar which was struck) were visible above the water line. The structure bore no markings or warnings. Mustain produced an affidavit from a maritime safety expert which states the bridge structure constitutes a navigational hazard and should have been marked and lighted in accordance with federal regulations. She also relied on evidentiary material to show that the Authority generated miscellaneous rent income attributable to its operation of the lake and permit fees for commercial and private docks on the lake. Mustain does not claim nor did she produce probative material to show that she or Grandin were charged a fee for using the lake or that the Authority charges user fees. The Authority contends it is prohibited from charging such fees. ¶4 Mustain seeks recovery from Grandin, ¶5 The Authority moved to dismiss the action claiming (1) the suit is time-barred by the statute of repose, ¶6 The trial court sustained the Authority's motion to dismiss. ¶7 Treating the nisi prius order as summary adjudication, the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the trial court's disposition. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY PROCESS ¶8 We agree with COCA that the trial court's disposition stood effected by summary process. Summary process is a procedural pretrial device for the prompt and efficient disposition of an action sans forensic combat. III. A. THE RULE IN HUGHEY - THAT COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY UNRELATED TO LAND/WATER USE BY INVITED GUESTS IS NOT A BAR TO § 1301-315 IMMUNITY - APPLIES TO TODAY'S CONTROVERSY. ¶9 Mustain's certiorari challenges COCA's holding that the Authority's commercial activities here in question are not of the type that bring it within the RLUA's commercial-activity exception and stand outside the immunity protection otherwise afforded by that Act. She contends that its activities - the collection of dock-permit fees and miscellaneous rents - are to be likened to those present in Boyd v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers16 where we determined the Corps was engaged in commercial activity that served to exempt it from the Act's liability provisions. The Authority contends that our later decision in Hughey v. Grand River Dam Authority17 controls today's controversy. ¶10 Boyd is distinguishable from this cause. Boyd's widow brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) after her husband was hit by a motor boat while swimming in a lake under its supervision. The question certified to us there was whether our recreational-use statute applied to afford immunity to the United States? Boyd dealt with a federal agency whose statutorily authorized powers encourage its operation18 of public parks and recreational facilities, including the assessment of fees19 for the use of developed recreation sites and facilities. The Corps charged fees for lake activities and, in addition to exacting a flat rental rate for various concessions, obligated some commercial lessees to consign (to the Corps) an additional graduated rent based on a percentage of its income from sales and services.20 We held that under these facts the Corps was precluded from invoking the immunity provisions of the RLUA. ¶11 The Authority contends the facts and legal issues in today's controversy more closely parallel those that spawned the litigation in Hughey. There two boaters drowned after their motor boat collided at night with the bridge in contest here, and the decedents' representatives sought to recover from the Authority. Our pronouncement in Hughey was twofold. We first held that the Authority, whether viewed as a private entity or as an instrumentality of the State, could take advantage of the immunity from premises liability provided by the RLUA. Second, although we determined that neither of the Act's two immunity exceptions applied under the facts demonstrated in the record, Hughey established that "the type of commercial activity that takes a landowner out of the purview of § 1301-315 immunity must be connected with the invitees' recreational use of the lands or waters."21 Commercial activity unrelated to land/water use by invited guests is not a bar to immunity.22 The for-profit activity at the center of the controversy in Hughey - the Authority's generation of electricity - was held to have had no "profit-related nexus to the admitted public's presence upon the premises or with its free use of the locus delicti."23 ¶12 Our review of Boyd and Hughey reveals the cases address two different governmental entities, operating under two different legislative frameworks, only one of which had a direct financial interest in the income generated by its lessees. Mustain's attempt to rely on Boyd is unavailing. Today's controversy deals neither with the Authority's direct commercial interest in a percentage of its lessees' profits nor with lake-user fees as in Boyd. We must hence rely here on the distinguishing feature of Hughey as outcome-determinative for today's answer to the question before us. B. The Authority's Assessment of Dock-Permit Fees and Miscellaneous Rents Does Not Constitute Commercial Activity Within the Meaning of the RLUA Immunity Exception. ¶13 Having settled that our pronouncement in Hughey governs Mustain's first theory of recovery,24 we turn to Mustain's assertion that the Authority's commercial activities take it out of the immunity otherwise extended by the RLUA. Applying the test developed in Hughey, the question here is whether the Authority's collection of dock-permit fees and miscellaneous rents creates a profit-related nexus to the admitted public's presence upon the premises or with its free recreational use of the locus delicti? ¶14 The terms of the RLUA do not prohibit the Authority from engaging in commercial or other for-profit activity. Section 1301-315(C)25 operates to remove from the Authority its immunity protection only when its for-profit activities are connected to (1) the admitted public's presence upon the premises or (2) its free use of the locus delicti. We must examine today's evidentiary materials to see if an impermissible nexus exists. ¶15 The collection of dock-permit fees is not, as plaintiff asserts, directly connected and inextricably intertwined with one's recreational use of the park or lake. Dock permit fees are issued against, and paid solely by, dock owners, not by the admitted public. Certainly those who use the park area for non-lake recreational activities are not impacted by the Authority's collection of dock fees. Even those who use the lake for recreational purposes have no inevitable connection to the docks or dock permit fees. It is entirely possible - and even likely- for a boater to launch a craft onto the water and enjoy the use of the lake without utilizing either a public or private dock. The Authority's assessment of commercial- and private-dock permit fees is neither based upon nor connected to the public's admission to the lake or park premises. ¶16 That the public's recreational use of the district's land or lakes is to be free to the public is expressed plainly and repeatedly by the terms of enabling legislation. The text of 82 O.S. 1991 § 875 (A) begins with this proposition and states "[t]he district shall not prevent free public use of its lands and lakes for recreation purposes . . .". Section 875(B) maintains this theme and provides "no charge shall ever be made to the public for right to engage in hunting, fishing, boating or swimming in said lakes, . . . except that the Authority may prescribe an annual fee for the issuance or renewal of a permit for a private anchorage, wharf, dock or boathouse."26 The Authority's statutory text requires that the public's recreational use of the water and land be without charge and, in the same sentence, authorizes it to collect permit fees for docks open for the public's use. Further text of the enabling act reveals that § 875(C)27 permits commercial establishments to keep for hire or operation various recreational water devices on lake waters once permits have been obtained. When drafting the Authority's enabling legislation, the legislature plainly did not view the right to exact permit fees from private or commercial enterprises to comprise an indirect fee to lake users or otherwise interfere with the public's free use of the lake. Neither do we. ¶17 We can perceive of no commercial or other for-profit nexus to arise between the Authority's statutorily-authorized collection of dock-permit fees and the admitted public's access to, or its free use of, the lake premises. The Authority is a not-for-profit agency28 whose statutory authorization permits the collection of permit fees for the operation and equipping of the Authority's Lake Patrol.29 Mustain has presented no evidentiary material to indicate the Authority receives a percentage of revenues from any dock owner which would create a profit-related nexus to the public's use of the lake. This distinguishes this case from Boyd.30 We hence hold the Authority's exaction of dock-permit fees from owners does not amount to a commercial or other for-profit endeavor contemplated by the terms of §1301-315(C).31 IV. BECAUSE THE AUTHORITY IS GOVERNED BY THE TERMS OF THE GTCA, MUSTAIN'S THEORY OF RECOVERY - THAT THE AUTHORITY'S ACTIONS WERE DELIBERATE, WILLFUL OR MALICIOUS - DOES NOT BRING IT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF LIABILITY IMPOSABLE UNDER THE ACT, EVEN IF IT IS CORRECT. ¶18 Mustain's other argument on certiorari challenges COCA's holding that the Authority's liability (on her other theory of recovery) - that her evidentiary materials present a question of fact as to whether the Authority's failure properly to mark the bridge and warn lake users of its danger was so reckless as to constitute deliberate, willful, or malicious conduct - need not be addressed because it is controlled by the terms of the GTCA. She contends this theory of her claim against the Authority is not subject to the GTCA. This is so because 82 O.S. 1991 § 862(l)32 adds to the list of powers granted to the Authority the right "to sue and be sued in . . . tort."33 The quoted language, she urges, stands as a waiver of sovereign immunity. In her view, because the provision in question predates the GTCA's enactment, and because the legislature has not repealed that language, § 862(l) operates to control her claim. ¶19 The common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity was abrogated in 1983 by this court's pronouncement in Vanderpool v. State.34 There we held that in the absence of a statute conferring immunity, the state, its political subdivisions and employees acting within the scope of their employment would stand liable in tort in the same manner as a private individual or corporation.35 The legislature promptly responded by adopting the GTCA, which codified its version of sovereign immunity for the state, its political subdivisions, and for all their employees acting within the scope of employment.36 Governmental immunity of the state and its political subdivisions is waived "only to the extent and in the manner provided" in the Act.37 ¶20 Central to Mustain's argument is the question whether the Authority is a state entity governed by the terms of the GTCA. While our holding in Hughey did not call for a resolution of this first-impression question, we address it today. A review of the relevant statutes and case law leads us to the conclusion that the Authority is indeed covered by that act's provisions. Section 152 of the GTCA defines what instrumentalities are to be included within the term "State." Among those listed is an "agency."38 The legislature has declared the Authority to be "a governmental agency of the State of Oklahoma,"39 and we, as well, have recognized the Authority's status as an agency of state government.40 We hence hold the Authority is a governmental entity intended to be encompassed within the protective cloak of the GTCA. ¶21 Having decided that the GTCA applies to the Authority, we now examine Mustain's theory to see if it falls under the Act's purview. The GTCA makes a distinction between a government employee acting within the scope of employment and one who does not. Section 153(A) of the GTCA rules out the State's liability "for any act or omission of an employee acting outside the scope of his employment."41 An employee whose acts are malicious, willful, wanton and in bad faith is not acting in the scope of his employment.42 As an artificial legal entity, the Authority can act solely through its employees. If Mustain's characterization of the actions by the Authority's employees in this case is correct and sustainable by proof, those actions by the agents must be considered as falling outside the scope of their employment. Because Mustain's claims against the Authority are governed by the GTCA, she cannot recover against the Authority for injuries occasioned by deliberate, willful or malicious conduct of its employees. ¶22 We turn to Mustain's final assertion - that her claim against the Authority is nevertheless not subject to the GTCA because the provisions of 82 O.S. 1991 § 862(l) authorize tort actions against the Authority. We note first that the "sue and be sued" phrase on which plaintiff relies was enacted at a time when the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity was in force. We have held that this language does not preclude the government's immunity but is confined in meaning to suits that are cognizable at law. It neither confers on plaintiff a greater right to bring an action than otherwise available nor operates to extend anyone's legal liability.43 ¶23 Mustain maintains legislative intent is unclear concerning which statutory provision controls her claim because the legislature, at the time it enacted the GTCA, did not repeal its earlier provisions that authorized tort suits against the Authority. Generally, statutes addressing the same subject matter are to be construed in a manner which reconciles differing provisions and imparts to each of them an intelligent effect. ¶24 The legislature could not have been clearer in expressing its intent that the GTCA form the sole, comprehensive plan for compensating those injured in their person or property by tortious acts of the state, a political subdivision, or of their employees. Section 153 of the Act expressly provides that liability "shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the state, a political subdivision or employee at common law or otherwise." V. SUMMARY ¶25 The injuries sustained by plaintiff in today's controversy are indeed tragic, but the burden for bearing loss does not fall upon the Grand River Dam Authority. Neither of the Recreational Land Use Act's two exceptions to immunity operates here to remove the Authority from the Act's purview of liability protection. The commercial-activity exception is not triggered by the Authority's collection of commercial- and private- dock permit fees. No "profit-related nexus" exists between the Authority's dock permit-fee assessments and the public's presence upon, or free access to, lake or park premises. Plaintiff's reliance on the Act's other claimed exception - that of bearing liability for deliberate, willful or malicious actions of Authority employees - is likewise of no avail. The Authority is a state agency. Because it falls under the aegis of the Governmental Tort Claims Act, it bears no liability for the willful conduct of its officials. ¶26 On certiorari previously granted upon Mustain's petition, the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is vacated and the nisi prius order, insofar as consistent with today's pronouncement, is affirmed. ¶27 Watt, C.J., Opala, V.C.J., Hodges, Lavender, Hargrave, Boudreau and Winchester, JJ., concur. ¶28 Kauger and Summers, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. FOOT