Case Title: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Lawrence F. Waddick

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 11 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3075-J 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings against the Honorable 
Lawrence F. Waddick, Washington  
County Circuit Court Judge. 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission,  
 
Complainant, 
 
v. 
The Honorable Lawrence F. Waddick,  
 
Respondent. 
  
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST WADDICK 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 18, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
December 1, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the complainant there was a brief by James C. 
Alexander, Madison, for the Wisconsin Judicial Commission, and 
oral argument by James C. Alexander and Thomas S. Sleik and Hale, 
Skemp, Hanson, Skemp & Sleik, La Crosse. 
 
 
For the respondent there was a brief by James P. 
O’Neill and O’Neill, Schimmel, Quirk & Carroll, S.C., Milwaukee, 
 
and oral argument by James P. O’Neill and Hon. Lawrence F. 
Waddick. 
 
2000 WI 11 
  
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-3075-J 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings against the Honorable 
Lawrence F. Waddick, Washington  
County Circuit Court Judge. 
 
Wisconsin Judicial Commission,  
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable Lawrence F. Waddick,  
 
          Respondent.  
FILED 
 
FEB 18, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Acting Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
JUDICIAL disciplinary proceeding.  Judge suspended from 
office.  
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM   We 
review, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.91, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 
judicial conduct panel concerning the judicial misconduct of the 
Hon. Lawrence Waddick, circuit judge for Washington county, and 
the panel's recommendation that Judge Waddick be suspended from 
judicial office for 60 days as discipline for that misconduct.  
The misconduct consisted of Judge Waddick's recurring delay in 
deciding 
cases 
between 
1991 
and 
1998, 
his 
filing 
of 
Certifications of Status of Pending Cases during that time that 
falsely represented that no cases were awaiting decision in his 
court beyond the prescribed period, and stating falsely to the 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
2 
Judicial Commission during an informal appearance in June 1996 
that he had no cases awaiting decision beyond the prescribed 
period.   
¶2 
We determine that the appropriate discipline for Judge 
Waddick's judicial misconduct established in this proceeding is 
his suspension from judicial office for six months.  Twice 
previously we have addressed a judge's delay in deciding cases 
and filing false statements concerning the status of pending 
cases.  One of those cases included the judge's making false 
statements to the Judicial Commission investigating misconduct 
allegations.  Our opinions in those cases put all judges on 
notice of the importance of the timely disposition of judicial 
business in our courts and the seriousness with which we view a 
judge's false certification of pending case status and false 
representations to the Judicial Commission. 
¶3 
Notwithstanding that notice, from the beginning of his 
judicial career and for seven years, Judge Waddick persisted in 
delaying decisions in numerous cases and falsely certifying that 
he was current with the cases assigned to him, and when 
confronted with allegations of delay, he lied to the Judicial 
Commission that he had no cases undecided beyond the prescribed 
time period.  Accordingly, a significant suspension from 
judicial office is called for, not only as a response to Judge 
Waddick's misconduct, but also as an emphatic statement to other 
members of the judiciary and to the public of the seriousness of 
such misconduct. 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
3 
¶4 
Judge Waddick was elected to the circuit court in 1990 
and re-elected in 1996.  He has not previously been the subject 
of a judicial disciplinary proceeding.  The judicial conduct 
panel, composed of Court of Appeals Judges William Eich, 
Margaret Vergeront and Patience Roggensack, made findings of 
fact based on Judge Waddick's admission to the allegations of 
the Judicial Commission's complaint and on a stipulation of the 
parties. 
¶5 
In 
1996, 
the 
Judicial 
Commission 
commenced 
an 
investigation into an allegation that Judge Waddick had delayed 
deciding a case and did not list that case on his Certification 
of Status of Pending Cases as pending beyond the 90-day period 
prescribed in SCR 70.36(1).1  Judge Waddick made an informal 
                     
1 SCR 70.36 provides, in pertinent part:  Judges' and 
circuit court commissioners' certification of status of pending 
cases. 
(1)(a) Every judge of a circuit court shall decide each 
matter submitted for decision within 90 days of the date on 
which the matter is submitted to the judge in final form, 
exclusive of the time the judge has been actually disabled by 
sickness.  If a judge is unable to do so, within 5 days of the 
expiration of the 90-day period the judge shall so certify in 
the record of the matter and notify in writing the chief judge 
of the judicial administrative district in which the matter is 
pending, and the period is thereupon extended for one additional 
period of 90 days.  . . .    
(b) In 
the 
exercise 
of 
its 
superintending 
and 
administrative authority over all courts and upon written 
request from a chief judge, the supreme court may extend the 
period specified in par. (a) for decision in specific matters as 
exigent circumstances may require. 
(2)(a) Within the first 10 days of each month every judge 
of a circuit court shall execute and file with the office of the 
director of state courts: 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
4 
appearance before the Commission on June 27, 1996, at which he 
stated falsely that no other decisions were overdue and that his 
Certification of Status of Pending Cases was then correct.  When 
                                                                  
1. A certificate stating that there are no matters awaiting 
decision beyond the 90-day or, if extended by certification and 
notification, the 180-day period specified in sub (1)(a), but if 
the 90-day period has been extended by certification and 
notification, a copy of the certification and notification shall 
be attached to the certificate; or 
2. If there are matters so pending, a certificate setting 
forth the name and docket number of each matter, the court in 
which it is pending, and the date on which it was submitted to 
the judge in final form. 
(b) The office of the director of state courts shall send a 
copy of certificates listing pending matters to the chief judge 
of the judicial administrative district in which those matters 
are pending and shall notify the chief judge of a judicial 
administrative district of the failure of a judge within the 
district to file an certificate pursuant to this subsection. 
(3) The director of state courts, pursuant to SCR 70.10, 
and the chief judge, pursuant to SCR 70.19(3)(a), shall assign 
judges as needed to take other steps for the timely disposition 
of judicial business to assist a judge who has filed a 
certificate under sub. (2)(a)2 or 3. 
(4) Failure of a judge to comply with the requirements of 
sub. (1)(a) or sub. (2)(a) may result in one or more of the 
following remedial measures: 
(a) Change of the judge's assignment, pursuant to SCR 
70.19(3)(a). 
(b) Referral of the matter by the director of state courts 
to the supreme court for the initiation of contempt proceedings. 
(c) Referral of the matter by the director of state courts 
to the judicial commission for investigation of possible 
misconduct.   
 . . .  
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
5 
he made that statement, Judge Waddick knew that other undecided 
cases had been submitted to him more than 90 days earlier and 
that his Certification was not correct. 
¶6 
Following that appearance, the Judicial Commission 
expressed its concern to Judge Waddick that he timely decide 
cases and file correct Certifications, but it took no further 
action against him at that time.  Despite his assurances to the 
contrary, Judge Waddick's delay in deciding cases continued 
through March 31, 1998.  In all, from 1991 through March 1998, 
Judge Waddick failed to decide at least 15 cases timely.  Also, 
for every month from January 1991 through March 1998, he signed 
and filed Certifications of Status of Pending Cases falsely 
representing that he did not have any matter awaiting decision 
beyond 90 days.   
¶7 
Since April 1998, Judge Waddick has been current with 
his decisions, and as of the date of the parties' stipulation in 
this proceeding, January 19, 1999, he had no cases pending that 
were not decided within two weeks of submission in final form.  
In addition to stipulating that he is an experienced judge and 
is now fully and timely performing his official duties, the 
parties stipulated that Judge Waddick has cooperated fully with 
the Commission's investigation and is "deeply remorseful and 
ashamed of his conduct" and "promises that such conduct will 
never reoccur." 
¶8 
On the basis of those facts, the panel concluded that 
Judge Waddick wilfully violated the following rules governing 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
6 
judicial conduct2 and engaged in judicial misconduct, as defined 
in Wis. Stat. § 757.81(4)(a). 
(1) His delay in deciding cases from 1997 through March 
1998 violated SCR 60.04(1)(h),3 which requires the prompt 
disposition of judicial matters; for the period 1991 through 
1996, that delay in deciding cases violated former SCR 60.01(4)4 
and, as the conduct was "aggravated and persistent," constituted 
a violation of former SCR 60.17.5  
(2) Judge Waddick's filing of false Certifications of 
Status of Pending Cases for the period 1997 through March 1998 
violated SCR 60.02 and 60.03(1),6 which hold a judge to high 
                     
2 Prior to January 1, 1997, judges were subject to the Code 
of Judicial Ethics, SCR ch. 60; that Code was replaced by the 
current Code of Judicial Conduct.   
3 SCR 60.04(1)(h) provides: 
(h) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, 
efficiently and fairly.  
4 Former SCR 60.01(4) provided: 
(4) A judge should be prompt in the performance of his or 
her duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, jurors, 
witnesses and attorneys is of value.  A judge should organize 
his or her court and supervise the personnel under his or her 
charge so that the business of the court is dispatched with 
promptness and convenience.   
5 Former SCR 60.17 provided:  Rule violation. 
An aggravated or persistent failure to comply with the 
standards of SCR 60.01 is a rule violation.  
6 SCR 60.02 provides: A judge shall uphold the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary. 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
7 
standards of conduct and require a judge to observe those 
standards personally so that the integrity and independence of 
the judiciary will be preserved and to comply with the law and 
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in 
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  For the period 
1991 through 1996, that conduct violated former SCR 60.13.7  
(3) Judge Waddick's lying to the Judicial Commission 
during his informal appearance in June 1996 violated former SCR 
60.13.   
¶9 
As discipline for that judicial misconduct, the panel 
recommended that Judge Waddick be suspended from judicial office 
for 60 days.  The panel adverted to this court's statements in 
prior cases that judicial discipline should be responsive to the 
gravity of the misconduct and determined by the extent the 
public needs protection from unacceptable judicial behavior and 
                                                                  
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to 
justice 
in 
our 
society. 
A 
judge 
should 
participate 
in 
establishing, 
maintaining 
and 
enforcing 
high 
standards of 
conduct and shall personally observe those standards so that the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. 
This chapter applies to every aspect of judicial behavior except 
purely legal decisions. Legal decisions made in the course of 
judicial duty on the record are subject solely to judicial 
review.  
SCR 60.03(1) provides: 
(1) A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall 
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in 
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
7 Former SCR 60.13 provided:  Misconduct. 
A judge shall not indulge in gross personal misconduct.  
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
8 
the likelihood of its recurrence. The panel asserted that Judge 
Waddick's false statements to the Commission and his recurring 
false statements on his case status certifications showed 
significant disrespect for the essential judicial qualities of 
honesty and integrity and had a significant adverse impact on 
the public's trust and confidence in the judicial system. 
¶10 The panel distinguished the misconduct in this case 
from similar misconduct in In re Dreyfus, 182 Wis. 2d 121, 513 
N.W.2d 604 (1994).  There, a circuit judge initially had 
reported on his case status certifications two cases that had 
been pending beyond the prescribed time period but prepared and 
submitted certifications for six months thereafter stating 
falsely that no matters were pending beyond that time period.  
The judge also made false and misleading statements to the chief 
judge concerning his asserted completion of the decisions in the 
two cases and told a Judicial Commission investigator that he 
had dictated the decisions in them earlier and had considered 
them concluded for purposes of the certifications.  Those 
statements to the investigator were false, and approximately one 
week after he made them, the judge requested a meeting with the 
investigator and admitted to their falsity.  We suspended the 
judge from judicial office for 15 days as discipline for that 
misconduct.   
¶11 In the instant case, the panel considered Judge 
Waddick's conduct "markedly more serious" than that in Dreyfus, 
thereby warranting more severe discipline.  It noted that for 
nearly his entire judicial career, Judge Waddick did not decide 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
9 
cases in a timely manner and that the integrity of the judicial 
system has been affected by his actions.  In addition, unlike 
the mitigating factor in Dreyfus, Judge Waddick never corrected 
the false statement he made to the Commission.   
¶12 Thus, the panel asserted, Judge Waddick's conduct 
cannot be considered an isolated incident, as was the conduct in 
Dreyfus; rather, it reflects "a long-standing course of conduct 
that delayed justice for the litigants of Washington County and 
the State of Wisconsin and showed a serious disrespect for the 
judicial system and the 'mechanisms designed to assist' judges 
experiencing 
difficulty 
managing 
their 
caseloads." 
 
The 
mechanisms to which the panel referred are the certifications of 
pending case status required under SCR 70.36 and designed to 
alert chief judges and the director of state courts office to a 
need for assistance.   
¶13 The panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are not contested by either party, and we adopt them.  We 
consider, then, the appropriate discipline to impose for Judge 
Waddick's judicial misconduct.   
¶14 We 
agree 
with 
the 
panel's 
assessment 
of 
the 
seriousness of Judge Waddick's misconduct and the distinction it 
made between that misconduct and the judicial misconduct 
considered in Dreyfus.  Prior to Dreyfus, we had occasion to 
consider in the context of a judicial disciplinary proceeding a 
circuit judge's failure to perform judicial duties promptly.  
Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 
762, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984).  We reprimanded the judge for delay 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
10
in decision making that extended over a 4-year period and 
involved 21 cases.  In addition, we reproved him for filing 
affidavit forms pursuant to statute knowing they misrepresented 
the status of his pending cases -- as it "constitutes conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice and brings the 
judicial office into disrepute."  Id., 785.   
¶15 In Grady we struck down a statute that required a 
judge's salary to be withheld for failure to decide cases within 
a specified time and adopted in its place a court rule requiring 
trial judges to report the status of cases remaining undecided 
beyond an established period of time.  That rule's explicit 
purpose is to alert the administrative offices, including the 
director of state courts and the chief judge of the appropriate 
judicial administrative district, of the need for additional 
judicial personnel or other measures to ensure that cases be 
decided promptly.  Id., 783-84.  In adopting that rule, we 
underscored the importance of the prompt disposition of judicial 
business in our courts.  
¶16 Despite our creation of SCR 70.36 in 1984 to ensure 
timely case deciding in order to promote the efficient and 
effective operation of the court system and our reiteration in 
Dreyfus 10 years later of the importance of the prompt 
disposition of cases to the parties, as well as to the integrity 
of the judicial system on which Wisconsin citizens rely, Judge 
Waddick continued a lengthy pattern of not deciding cases in a 
timely manner throughout his judicial career, and in order to 
conceal his delay, he consciously evaded the very mechanism we 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
11
designed and provided to assist him.  Then, when his delay in 
deciding only one case was brought to the Judicial Commission's 
attention, he responded falsely to a direct question from the 
Commission, asserting that all of his decisions were then 
current 
and 
that 
his 
recently 
filed 
certifications 
were 
accurate.  Relying on those false statements, the Commission 
dismissed allegations of misconduct with an expression of 
concern that Judge Waddick strive to keep his caseload current 
and file accurate certifications.  Judge Waddick assured the 
Commission that he would do so, but he continued to file false 
certifications and persistently delayed deciding cases for 21 
more 
months, 
until 
the 
Commission 
commenced 
another 
investigation.   
¶17 At the hearing before the panel, Judge Waddick 
detailed medical problems he had suffered since 1989, for which 
he took medication and for which he was hospitalized and 
underwent surgery in 1993.  He had not, however, asserted any 
facts about his medical condition either in his answer to the 
Commission's complaint or in the stipulation of facts presented 
to the panel.  Judge Waddick explicitly did not offer his 
medical condition as an excuse for his delay in deciding cases, 
filing 
false 
certifications, 
and 
lying 
to 
the 
Judicial 
Commission, and the panel made no mention of the medical 
problems in its report to this court.  At oral argument in this 
review, Judge Waddick reiterated his medical history but made no 
attempt to explain or excuse his misconduct as the result of 
medical problems.   
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
12
¶18 In this review, the Judicial Commission took the 
position that a one-year suspension from judicial office is the 
appropriate response to Judge Waddick's continued and protracted 
delay in deciding cases, filing false and misleading documents 
with this court, and lying to the Judicial Commission.  The 
Commission distinguished Judge Waddick's case from Dreyfus in 
several respects. First, Dreyfus involved only two cases in 
which decisions were delayed over a one-year period; the instant 
case concerns fifteen cases, nine of which were delayed for over 
one year.  Second, Judge Dreyfus, who had been on the bench for 
one and one-half years, filed six false certifications; Judge 
Waddick filed false certifications monthly over a seven-year 
period.  Third, while both cases involved a judge who lied to 
the 
Commission, 
Judge 
Dreyfus 
contacted 
the 
Commission 
investigator one week after he had lied and admitted to the lie; 
Judge Waddick never admitted his lie until he became the subject 
of a second Commission investigation two years later.  Fourth, 
Judge Waddick had the benefit of the court's decision in Dreyfus 
to appreciate how seriously the court views judicial delay in 
deciding cases and filing false certifications.   
¶19 On the issue of discipline, Judge Waddick argued 
before the panel that a "severe public reprimand" would be 
appropriate.  He took no position in this review other than to 
assert that the discipline urged by the Judicial Commission is 
too severe.  He reported that he now has reorganized his office 
to ensure that cases are decided timely and that accurate 
certifications are submitted regarding the status of pending 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
13
cases.  He also asserted that his suspension from judicial 
office would be disruptive for the citizens of the state and, in 
particular, of Washington county.   
¶20 Because Judge Waddick's misconduct is substantially 
more serious than that for which we imposed a 15-day suspension 
from office in Dreyfus, it warrants a substantially longer 
suspension.  We determine that the appropriate discipline to 
impose is a suspension from judicial office for six months.  We 
deem that sufficient to protect the public from unacceptable 
judicial behavior and to ensure that it will not recur.  It 
should also suffice to inform the judiciary and the public of 
the importance of the prompt disposition of cases brought to the 
courts for resolution, which is essential to the integrity of 
the judicial system on which the citizens of this state have the 
right to rely.  In addition, in order to assist Judge Waddick in 
remaining current with his caseload following his return to the 
bench after the period of suspension, we direct the chief judge 
of the judicial administrative district and the Director of 
State Courts office to monitor Judge Waddick's caseload and 
pending case status certifications for a period of one year 
following his return to the bench.    
¶21 Judge Waddick has notified the court that he has 
resigned his judicial office, effective May 1, 2000.  To the 
extent the suspension we impose extends beyond that date, it 
will continue in respect to Judge Waddick's eligibility to serve 
as a reserve judge.   
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
14
¶22 We turn now to an issue that arose before the conduct 
panel but was not raised in this review.  While it was pending 
before the panel, twelve letters generally supportive of Judge 
Waddick and critical of the Judicial Commission's position on 
the issue of discipline were filed in this matter.  Nine of 
those letters came from attorneys practicing in Washington 
county, and three were from circuit judges.  Judge Waddick asked 
the panel to consider the letters as evidence in mitigation of 
the discipline to be recommended for his misconduct, and the 
Judicial Commission objected on the grounds that there was no 
statutory authority for their submission to the panel and that, 
as they did not testify in the proceeding, it had no opportunity 
to examine the attorneys and judges in regard to their motives 
for writing or the accuracy of what they wrote.  The panel 
concluded that it could consider the letters when determining 
the discipline to recommend to this court for Judge Waddick, and 
the Judicial Commission did not contest that determination in 
this review.  Consequently, it is unnecessary that we address 
it.  
¶23 Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to discuss the 
propriety of a judge's writing letters in support of a 
respondent in a disciplinary proceeding, whether a judge or an 
attorney.  The Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits a judge from 
"lend[ing] the prestige of judicial office to advance the 
private interests of the judge or of others  . . . ."  SCR 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
15
60.03(2).8  That rule specifies further: "A judge may not testify 
voluntarily as a character witness."   
                     
8 SCR 60.03(2) and its Comment provide: 
(2) A judge may not allow family, social, political or 
other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or 
judgment.  A judge may not lend the prestige of judicial office 
to advance the private interests of the judge or of others or 
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are 
in a special position to influence the judge. A judge may not 
testify voluntarily as a character witness.  
Comment 
Maintaining the prestige of judicial office is essential to 
a system of government in which the judiciary functions 
independently 
of 
the 
executive 
and 
legislative 
branches.  
Respect for the judicial office facilitates the orderly conduct 
of legitimate judicial functions.  Judges should distinguish 
between proper and improper use of the prestige of office in all 
of their activities.  For example, it would be improper for a 
judge to allude to his or her judgeship to gain a personal 
advantage such as deferential treatment when stopped by a police 
officer for a traffic offense.  Similarly, judicial letterhead 
must not be used for conducting a judge's personal business. 
A judge must avoid lending the prestige of judicial office 
for the advancement of the private interests of others.  For 
example, a judge must not use the judge's judicial position to 
gain advantage in a civil suit involving a member of the judge's 
family.  As to the acceptance of awards, see SCR 60.05(4)(e)1. 
Although a judge should be sensitive to possible abuse of 
the prestige of office, a judge may, based on the judge's 
personal knowledge, serve as a reference or provide a letter of 
recommendation.  Such a letter should not be written if the 
person who is the subject of the letter is or is likely to be a 
litigant engaged in a contested proceeding before the court. 
However, 
a 
judge 
must not 
initiate 
the communication of 
information to a sentencing judge or a probation or corrections 
officer but may provide to such persons information for the 
record in response to a formal request.  
 
Judges may participate in the process of judicial selection 
by 
cooperating 
with 
appointing 
authorities 
and 
screening 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
16
¶24 Here, the judges who wrote letters in support of Judge 
Waddick did not testify as character witnesses at the hearing 
before the panel.  Indeed, had they done so, the Judicial 
Commission likely would not have objected to the panel's 
consideration of their testimony, having had the opportunity to 
cross-examine them.  Yet, the content of their letters addressed 
the character of Judge Waddick and, no less than their testimony 
would have, had the potential of lending the prestige of their 
judicial office in his support. 
¶25 Supreme Court Rule 60.03(2) does not create an 
absolute prohibition of a judge's serving as reference or 
providing letters of recommendation based on personal knowledge. 
 The Comment to the rule cautions, however, that such letters 
should not be written if the person being recommended is or is 
likely to be a litigant engaged in a contested proceeding before 
                                                                  
committees seeking names for consideration and by responding to 
official inquiries concerning a person being considered for a 
judgeship.  
 
This subsection does not reach the matter of a judge's 
endorsement of a candidate for judicial or other nonpartisan 
elective office.  That matter is left for consideration together 
with other issues involving a judge's political and campaign 
activity by the committee the court will appoint to study and to 
make recommendations to the court. 
 
A judge must not testify voluntarily as a character witness 
because to do so may lend the prestige of the judicial office in 
support of the party for whom the judge testifies.  Moreover, 
when a judge testifies as a witness, a lawyer who regularly 
appears before the judge may be placed in the awkward position of 
cross-examining the judge. A judge may, however, testify when 
properly summoned.  Except in unusual circumstances where the 
demands of justice require, a judge should discourage a party 
from requiring the judge to testify as a character witness.  
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
17
the judge's court.  It adds, "However, a judge must not initiate 
the communication of information to a sentencing judge or a 
probation or corrections officer but may provide to such persons 
information for the record in response to a formal request."  
Significantly, the conduct panel concluded that it could 
consider written material going to the character of Judge 
Waddick because the panel was "performing a function akin to 
sentencing in a criminal matter."  While we do not reach the 
issue of whether a judge's writing of a letter speaking to the 
character of a respondent in a judicial or attorney disciplinary 
proceeding would violate SCR 60.03(2), we call the attention of 
the judiciary to it and express our view that the writing of 
such letters is, at the least, inadvisable. 
¶26 That is not to say that a judge may not testify as a 
character witness in a judicial or attorney disciplinary 
proceeding, but as stated in the Comment to SCR 60.03(2), that 
testimony must not be given voluntarily.  A judge may, however, 
testify when properly summoned, as were the judges who testified 
in Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tesmer, 219 Wis. 2d 
708, 580 N.W.2d 307 (1998).  Even then, the Comment exhorts 
judges to discourage a party from requiring the judge to testify 
as a character witness "except in unusual circumstances where 
the demands of justice require."   
¶27 IT IS ORDERED that the Hon. Lawrence F. Waddick is 
suspended from the office of circuit judge for Washington county 
and prohibited from exercising the powers and duties of a judge 
No. 
98-3075-J 
 
18
for six months, commencing March 17, 2000, and that he receive 
no compensation for the period of suspension. 
 
 
1