Case Title: Mared Industries, Inc. v. Alan Mansfield

Citation: 2005 WI 5

Docket Number: 2003AP000097

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 5 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-0097 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Mared Industries, Inc.,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Alan Mansfield, individually, and d/b/a  
Diamond Blade Warehouse,  
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  269 Wis. 2d 542, 674 N.W.2d 680 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 20, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Maxine A. White   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there were 
briefs by Michael J. Cohen, Catherine R. Grogan and Meissner 
Tierney Fisher & Nichols, S.C., Milwaukee; and Glenn L. Udell 
and Brown, Udell & Pomerantz, Ltd., Chicago, IL, and oral 
argument by Michael J. Cohen. 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant 
there 
was 
a 
brief 
by 
Christopher J. Conrad, Mark S. Nelson and Nelson, Connell & 
Conrad, S.C., Brookfield, and oral argument by Christopher J. 
Conrad. 
 
 
2005 WI 5 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-0097  
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 005491) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Mared Industries, Inc.,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Alan Mansfield, individually, and d/b/a  
Diamond Blade Warehouse,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 20, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Alan Mansfield seeks review 
of a portion of the court of appeals' decision that concluded 
(1) 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) 
(2001-02)1 
allows 
substituted 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11 provides in pertinent part:   
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the 
subject matter and grounds for personal jurisdiction 
as provided in s. 801.05 may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant by service of a summons 
as follows: 
. . . .  
No. 
03-0097   
 
2 
 
service on a natural person's agent; and (2) service on 
Mansfield's purported agent under that provision was proper 
because the process server reasonably relied on the purported 
agent's representations that he was authorized to accept service 
for Mansfield.  Mared v. Mansfield, No. 03-0097, unpublished 
slip op., ¶¶12, 19 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2003).2  Mansfield 
argues the court of appeals erred by interpreting § 801.11(1)(d) 
in a manner that allowed service on a natural person's agent 
without authorization from "any other statute."  Alternatively, 
Mansfield contends that even if § 801.11(1)(d) generally allows 
service on a natural person's agent, the court of appeals erred 
by 
essentially 
concluding 
apparent 
authority 
satisfies 
§ 801.11(1)(d)'s requirement that the agent be "authorized by 
appointment" to accept service of summons.  Mansfield submits 
that the appropriate standard is actual express authority. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(d) In any case, by serving the summons in a 
manner specified by any other statute upon the 
defendant or upon an agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to accept service of the summons for the 
defendant. 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 
version unless otherwise indicated.   
2 The other portion of the court of appeals' decision 
concluded Mared did not sue Diamond Blade Warehouse, Inc., by 
naming 
"Mansfield 
individually 
and 
'd/b/a' 
Diamond 
Blade 
Warehouse."  Mared v. Mansfield, No. 03-0097, unpublished slip 
op., ¶¶12, 19, 23 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2003).  As Mared has 
not sought review of the court of appeals' decision concerning 
Diamond Blade Warehouse, Inc., we do not reach that portion of 
the court of appeals' decision.  Further, our recitation of the 
facts and discussion are tailored to those that are relevant to 
Mansfield's appeal. 
No. 
03-0097   
 
3 
 
¶2 
We 
agree 
with 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) 
permits 
substituted 
service 
on 
a 
natural person's agent.  However, we conclude the court of 
appeals erred by determining that apparent authority satisfies 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d)'s 
"authorized 
by 
appointment" 
standard.  We hold that "authorized by appointment" requires the 
principal to provide an agent with actual express authority to 
accept service of summons for the principal.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand this matter  
to the trial court.  
I 
 
¶3 
Mansfield is the sole shareholder and president of 
Diamond Blade Warehouse, Inc., an Illinois corporation located 
in Buffalo Grove, Illinois.  On June 5, 2002, Mared filed a 
complaint against Mansfield individually and doing business as 
Diamond Blade Warehouse, alleging breach of contract and 
intentional interference with contractual relations.   
¶4 
On June 10, William Monsen, an Illinois process 
server, went to the warehouse and told a receptionist he had a 
summons and complaint to serve on Mansfield.  The receptionist 
asked Monsen to wait while she called someone.  A few minutes 
later Michael Levy, a Diamond Blade employee, appeared and 
identified himself as director of operations and asked how he 
could help Monsen.  According to Monsen, he indicated to Levy 
that he had court documents to serve on Mansfield.  Monsen 
testified that Levy stated that he was authorized to accept 
service on behalf of Mansfield.  At that point, Monsen said he 
No. 
03-0097   
 
4 
 
reiterated that he had to serve Mansfield personally, but Levy 
again indicated that he was authorized to accept the summons on 
Mansfield's behalf.  Satisfied with Levy's representations, 
Monsen gave Levy the papers and explained that an action had 
been initiated against Mansfield and that he had 45 days to 
answer.3  Monsen then left and later completed an affidavit of 
service that reflected he served Mansfield by leaving copies of 
the summons and complaint with Levy, "a registered agent or 
agent 
of 
the 
company" 
who 
"insisted 
that 
he 
has 
full 
authorization from Mr. Mansfield to accept these documents on 
behalf of Mr. Mansfield." 
¶5 
After Mansfield's time to answer passed, Mared moved 
for a default judgment, which the trial court granted on 
August 5.  On August 22, Mansfield filed a motion to reopen the 
judgment on the grounds that he was not properly served.  
Mansfield submitted an affidavit that stated he did not 
authorize Levy to accept summons and that Levy was not his 
agent.   
¶6 
At the motion hearing on September 9, Monsen testified 
he 
served 
Levy 
because 
of 
Levy's 
clear 
and 
repeated 
                                                 
3 There is a factual dispute concerning how many copies of 
the summons and complaint Monsen served on Levy.  Monsen 
testified that he served Levy with two copies, while Levy 
averred in an affidavit that Monsen only served one copy. 
No. 
03-0097   
 
5 
 
representations that he was authorized to accept service for 
Mansfield.  Neither Mansfield nor Levy testified.4 
¶7 
On September 19, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 
Honorable Maxine A. White, vacated the default judgment.  
Monsen's testimony notwithstanding, the circuit court concluded 
Mansfield should have been served personally, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(a), or by leaving a copy of the summons 
at his abode with either a competent family member over the age 
of 14 or an adult currently residing at the abode, pursuant to 
§ 801.11(1)(b)1 and 1m.  Because Monsen left the summons at 
Mansfield's workplace and not his abode, the circuit court 
concluded the service was ineffective.  The circuit court did 
not reach the issues of whether Levy was Mansfield's agent and 
whether substituted service on an agent was permissible under 
§ 801.11(1)(d) because, apparently, Mared did not raise them.  
The circuit court later dismissed Mared's action for lack of 
personal jurisdiction over Mansfield.   
¶8 
Mared appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) 
permitted substituted service on a natural person's authorized 
                                                 
4  Nearly two months after the trial court reopened the 
default judgment against Mansfield, Levy submitted an affidavit 
in response to Mared's contention that Diamond Blade Warehouse, 
Inc., was properly served.  In the affidavit, Levy indicated he 
was an employee of Diamond Blade; Monsen served him with one 
copy of a summons and complaint; and, if requested, he would 
appear in court to testify.  Although the affidavit related to 
an issue not before us, we note that the affidavit does not 
establish Mansfield authorized Levy to accept service on 
Mansfield in his individual capacity.  
No. 
03-0097   
 
6 
 
agent.  Mared, No. 03-0097, unpublished slip op., ¶12.  The 
court further concluded that it was reasonable for Monsen to 
believe Levy was authorized to accept the summons for Mansfield.  
Id., ¶19.  Thus, the court of appeals upheld the circuit court's 
implicit finding that Levy was Mansfield's agent.  Although 
Mansfield submitted an affidavit asserting Levy was not his 
agent and that he did not authorize Levy to accept process, the 
court of appeals determined the affidavit was conclusory and 
could not disprove Monsen's reasonable belief that Levy was 
authorized to accept service on behalf of Mansfield.  Id., ¶¶16, 
19.  Mansfield seeks review of that portion of the court of 
appeals' decision.  
II 
 
¶9 
Granting, and granting relief from, a default judgment 
rests within the circuit court's discretion.  Split Rock 
Hardwoods, Inc. v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., 2002 WI 66, ¶63, 
253 Wis. 2d 238, 646 N.W.2d 19; Holman v. Family Health Plan, 
227 Wis. 2d 478, 483, 596 N.W.2d 358 (1999).  "A circuit court 
properly exercises its discretion when it considers the relevant 
facts, applies the correct law, and articulates a reasonable 
basis for its decision."  National Auto Truckstops, Inc. v. DOT, 
2003 WI 95, ¶12, 263 Wis. 2d 649, 665 N.W.2d 198 (citations 
omitted).  If the circuit court decision involves a question of 
law, "'we review the question of law de novo and reverse if the 
exercise of discretion is based on an error of law.'"  Paige 
K.B. v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 225, 594 N.W.2d 370 (1999) 
(citations omitted).   
No. 
03-0097   
 
7 
 
¶10 "The service of a summons in a manner prescribed by 
statute is a condition precedent to a valid exercise of personal 
jurisdiction."  Danielson v. Brody Seating Co., 71 Wis. 2d 424, 
429, 238 N.W.2d 531 (1976).  "Whether service of a summons is 
sufficient to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
involves the interpretation and application of a statute to 
undisputed facts and is reviewed as a question of law."  Useni 
v. Boudron, 2003 WI App 98, ¶8, 264 Wis. 2d 783, 662 N.W.2d 672.  
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what a 
statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and 
intended effect.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  We 
begin with the statute's language.  Id., ¶45. Generally, 
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning.  
Id.  If the meaning is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry. 
Id.  Further, we consider language "in the context in which it 
is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  
If this process yields a plain meaning, then there is no 
ambiguity and the statute is accordingly applied.  Id. 
III 
¶11 The first issue is whether Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) 
generally allows service on a natural person's agent.  That 
section provides: 
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the 
subject matter and grounds for personal jurisdiction 
No. 
03-0097   
 
8 
 
as provided in s. 801.05 may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant by service of a summons 
as follows:  
. . . .  
(d) In any case, by serving the summons in a 
manner specified by any other statute upon the 
defendant or upon an agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to accept service of the summons for the 
defendant. 
Mansfield argues the phrase "any other statute" plainly modifies 
both "upon the defendant" and "upon an agent."  Thus, Mansfield 
interprets the statute to allow service (1) by serving the 
summons in a manner specified by any other statute upon the 
defendant; or (2) by serving the summons in a manner specified 
by any other statute upon an agent authorized by appointment or 
law to accept service.  We disagree. 
¶12 As did the court of appeals, we read this section as 
clearly providing a distinct ground for effectuating service 
upon "an agent authorized by appointment or by law to accept 
service of the summons for the defendant."  From the statute's 
face, we do not interpret Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) as requiring 
service on an agent to be linked to "any other statute."  Thus, 
we read the statute as providing the following two grounds for 
carrying out service:  (1) by serving the summons in a manner 
specified by any other statute upon the defendant; or (2) by 
serving the summons upon an agent authorized by appointment or 
by law to accept service of the summons for the defendant.   
¶13 Our reading does not break new ground.  On several 
different occasions, this court has commented on what is now 
No. 
03-0097   
 
9 
 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) and arrived at the same conclusion.  
In Punke v. Brody, 17 Wis. 2d 9, 14, 115 N.W.2d 601 (1962), this 
court 
viewed 
the 
predecessor 
to 
§ 801.11(1)(d), 
Wis. Stat. § 262.06(1)(d) (1959),5 as allowing "service upon an 
agent authorized by appointment to accept service of summons for 
the defendant" without referring to "any other statute."  There, 
Punke initiated an action against Brody, an out-of-state 
resident, and served the summons and complaint on Nathan Altman, 
"Agent for Harry Brody," in Wisconsin.  Id. at 10.  This court 
concluded that service on Brody's agent was defective because 
the service statute at that time, Wis. Stat. § 262.08(3) (1953),6 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 262.06(1)(d) 
(1959), 
is 
textually 
identical to § 801.11(1)(d).  Section 262.06(1)(d) provided: 
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the 
subject matter and grounds for personal jurisdiction 
as provided in s. 262.05 may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant by service of a summons 
as follows:   
. . . . 
(d) In any case, by serving the summons in a 
manner specified by any other statute upon the 
defendant or upon an agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to accept service of the summons for the 
defendant.  
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 262.08(3) (1953) read: 
For personal service or its equivalent, the summons, 
and the accompanying complaint or notice aforesaid, if 
any, shall be served by delivering a copy thereof as 
follows: 
 . . . . 
(3) In all other cases by delivering within the 
state a copy thereof to the defendant personally; or, 
No. 
03-0097   
 
10 
 
required either "a direct and actual delivery of the papers to 
the defendant himself by the one making service," or "le[aving] 
[the papers]  at defendant's usual place of abode in the 
presence of a competent member of the family at least fourteen 
years old."  Id. at 11-12.  At that time, there was no provision 
which provided for substituted service on a natural person's 
agent.  
¶14 In its later discussion, and particularly important 
here, the Punke court observed that the recently enacted 
Wis. Stat. § 262.06(1)(d) (1959), now Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d), 
"although 
inapplicable 
to 
this case, 
expressly 
authorizes 
service upon an agent authorized by appointment to accept 
service of summons for the defendant."  Id. at 14.  The court 
did not bind this provision to "any other statute."   
¶15 This 
court 
returned 
to 
what 
is 
now 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) four years later in Howard v. Preston, 
30 Wis. 2d 663, 668, 142 N.W.2d 178 (1966), and again viewed 
subsection (1)(d)'s agency provision in isolation from "any 
other statute."  In Howard, a process server personally 
delivered a summons to the plaintiff's husband after the husband 
purportedly represented to the server he would accept service on 
behalf of his wife, the plaintiff.  Id. at 665-67.  
                                                                                                                                                             
if not found, by leaving within the state a copy 
thereof at his usual place of abode in the presence of 
some competent member of the family at least fourteen 
years of age, who shall be informed of the contents 
thereof. 
No. 
03-0097   
 
11 
 
¶16 As will be discussed more in depth in connection with 
the next issue, this court concluded the husband's authority to 
accept process had not been established.  What is significant 
here, however, was that the Howard court, as did the Punke 
court, 
read 
the 
agency 
clause 
in 
what 
is 
now 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) 
apart 
from 
"any 
other 
statute."  
Howard, 30 Wis. 2d at 668.  The court isolated subsection (1)(d) 
to "provide[] for service of a summons upon an agent authorized 
by law to accept service of the summons for the defendant."7  Id. 
¶17 Consistent with Howard, and underlying this court's 
decision in Fontaine v. Milwaukee County Expressway Commission, 
31 Wis. 2d 275, 279, 143 Wis. 2d 3 (1966), was the acceptance 
that agency service under what is now Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) 
was not joined by "any other statute."  In that case, attorneys 
who represented Fontaine in a matter before the condemnation 
commission accepted, as Fontaine's attorneys, a notice of an 
appeal from the commission to the circuit court.  Id. at 276.  
At issue was whether the attorneys were Fontaine's agents for 
purposes of accepting service under what is now § 801.11(1)(d).  
Id. at 278.  The court concluded they were, and in so doing 
                                                 
7 This court in Howard also suggested that a principal's 
ratification of the agent's acceptance of service would satisfy 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d).  See Howard v. Preston, 30 Wis. 2d 
663, 668-69, 142 N.W.2d 178 (1966) ("Even if [the husband] did 
not have authority to admit service of the summons for his wife 
when he said he would, such exercise of authority might have 
been ratified by the [wife].  But there is no proof of such 
ratification upon which to estop the [wife]." (citations 
omitted)).  As ratification is not before this court in this 
case, we leave resolution of that issue for a later day.   
No. 
03-0097   
 
12 
 
reasoned the attorneys' "prior representation [of Fontaine] can 
be a factor in determining whether an agency had been created 
which enabled her attorneys to accept process under sec. 
[801.11(1)(d)]."  Id. at 279.   
¶18 The court's conclusion was not tied to "any other 
statute" that allowed service upon an individual's agent.  
Indeed, the court had already concluded that a separate statute 
that allowed for service on an attorney who made an appearance 
in an "action or proceeding," Wis. Stat. § 269.37 (1965),8 was 
inapplicable 
because 
the 
matter 
before 
the 
condemnation 
commission was neither an action nor a proceeding.  Id. at 278.  
Consequently, the court's resolution of the appeal stemmed 
solely from what is now Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d). 
¶19 Several years later, in Miller v. Smith, 100 Wis. 2d 
609, 619, 302 N.W.2d 468 (1981), this court, for the first time, 
explicitly severed the two clauses in Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) 
and attributed the "any other statute" language solely to 
service upon a defendant.  In Miller, this court concluded that 
a John Doe complaint against an unknown state employee had to be 
served pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1) to obtain personal 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 269.37 (1965) stated: 
When a party to an action or proceeding shall 
have appeared by an attorney the service of papers 
shall be made upon the attorney.  When a defendant 
shall not have appeared in person or by attorney 
service 
of 
notice 
or 
papers 
in 
the 
ordinary 
proceedings in an action need not be made upon him 
unless he be imprisoned for want of bail. 
No. 
03-0097   
 
13 
 
jurisdiction over the unknown employee before a default judgment 
could be issued.  Emphasizing that the plaintiff had not argued 
the service on the attorney general constituted agency service 
under subsection (1)(d),9 this court stated:  
Sec. 801.11(1), Stats., governs the manner in 
which a court may obtain personal jurisdiction over an 
individual. Under this provision, service upon an 
individual may only be obtained by: (1) personally 
serving the summons upon the defendant; (2) leaving a 
copy of the summons at the defendant's usual place of 
abode with a member of the family who is competent, at 
least 14 years of age, and informed of the contents; 
(3) publication and mailing (mailing may be dispensed 
with if the post office address cannot be ascertained 
with reasonable diligence); or (4) upon an agent 
authorized to accept service or in accord with any 
other statute specifying a manner of service upon an 
individual defendant.  (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 619.  Thus, this court understood subsection (1)(d) as 
providing two distinct grounds for effectuating service, with 
only service on the defendant being modified by "any other 
statute."   
¶20 Therefore, 
from 
the 
time 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d)'s enactment nearly half a century ago, 
this court has recognized that service on a natural person's 
agent under Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) constitutes an altogether 
independent ground to effectuate service on a natural person.  
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11(3) 
(1979) 
provided 
for 
the 
service of a summons and complaint upon the state as follows: 
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the 
complaint to the attorney general or leaving them at 
the attorney general's office in the capitol with an 
assistant or clerk. 
No. 
03-0097   
 
14 
 
Admittedly, the cases above expressed an understanding of 
subsection (1)(d) without scrutinizing the statute's language.  
Either of two conclusions can be drawn from this:  (1) all of 
the cases are merely premised on an assumption, possibly false, 
that "any other statute" does not modify the agency provision; 
or (2) a detailed construction of subsection (1)(d) was 
unnecessary because it was facially clear to the litigants and 
to this court that the agency provision does not require 
authorization from "any other statute."  We affirm the latter 
conclusion here.10 
IV 
                                                 
10 In addition to our previous case law, the Wisconsin 
treatises have uniformly accepted that Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) 
allows service on an agent who is authorized to accept service 
without reference to "any other statute."  See Jay E. Grenig & 
Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Civil Rules Handbook, § 801.11:3, at 
47 (2003 ed.) ("[Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d)] permits service of a 
summons in any manner provided by special statutes authorizing 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction.  Paragraph (d) also gives 
the process server the option of serving an 'agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to accept service of the summons for the 
defendant.'"); see also 3 Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin Practice: 
Civil Procedure, § 111.6, at 120 (3d ed. 2003) ("Subsection (1), 
Paragraph (d) expressly permits service of a summons in any 
manner provided by special statutes which authorize the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction.  Paragraph (d) also gives the process 
server the option of serving an 'agent authorized by appointment 
or 
by 
law 
to 
accept 
service 
of 
the 
summons 
for 
the 
defendant.'"); John E. Conway and Daniel O. Bernstine, Wisconsin 
and Federal Civil Procedure, § 2.07 (1986) ("In the case of a 
natural person, service may be personal, substituted (on an 
agent, such as a member of the family at defendant's abode or on 
an agent appointed by the defendant or by law for service), or 
by publication.").   
No. 
03-0097   
 
15 
 
¶21 The second issue involves what "an agent authorized by 
appointment" means in Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d).  Mansfield 
takes issue with the court of appeals seeming conclusion that 
this phrase includes "apparent authority."11  He argues the 
                                                 
11 As already noted, the court of appeals concluded that the 
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Levy was 
Mansfield's agent because the process server reasonably relied 
on Levy's representations that he was authorized to accept the 
summons for Mansfield.  Mared, No. 03-0097, unpublished slip 
op., ¶19. 
The court of appeals also relied on Fontaine v. Milwaukee 
County Expressway Commission, 31 Wis. 2d 275, 280, 143 N.W.2d 3 
(1966), as requiring "a prima facie showing of agency, and a 
lack of proof to the contrary, for service to be proper under 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d)."  Mared, No. 03-0097, unpublished 
slip 
op., 
¶15. 
 
Fontaine, 
however, 
involved 
"special 
circumstances," and, accordingly, its evidentiary framework for 
establishing agency is confined to those circumstances. 
As briefly touched on before, Fontaine concerned when 
attorneys could accept service as agents of their clients.  This 
court held that "[w]hen an attorney-at-law formally acknowledges 
the receipt of a document as an attorney on behalf of a client, 
it may be presumed (in the absence of contradiction) that he was 
authorized by the client to accept it."  Id. at 279.  Thus, 
"when an attorney acknowledges receipt of delivery as an 
attorney on behalf of a client, the legend itself raises a prima 
facie case of valid service.  If there were in fact no 
authority, proof thereof must be offered."  Id. at 280 (emphasis 
in original).  Because Fontaine did not testify that the 
attorneys did not have authority to accept service for her, the 
court concluded the prima facie showing of agency service under 
now Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) was sufficient. 
 
No. 
03-0097   
 
16 
 
phrase "authorized by appointment" requires a showing of actual 
authority.  We agree with Mansfield.   
¶22 Before 
turning 
to 
our 
analysis, 
we 
pause 
to 
distinguish apparent authority from actual authority.  Apparent 
authority stands in contrast to actual authority.  Restatement 
(Second) of Agency  § 7 cmt. c (1958).  On the one hand, 
apparent authority binds a principal to acts of another who 
reasonably appears to a third person to be authorized to act as 
the principal's agent, because of acts of the principal or agent 
if the principal had knowledge of those acts and acquiesced to 
them.  Pamperin v. Trinity Mem'l Hosp., 144 Wis. 2d 188, 203, 
423 N.W.2d 828 (1988).  Thus, because apparent authority stems 
                                                                                                                                                             
As this court observed in Gangler v. Wisconsin Electric 
Power Company, 110 Wis. 2d 649, 657, 329 N.W.2d 186 (1983), "it 
is well-accepted, black-letter law that an attorney is not 
authorized by general principles of agency to accept on behalf 
of a client service of a process commencing an action."  
Nevertheless, this court held "that when notice of appeal is 
given 
to 
the 
attorney 
who 
represented 
a 
party 
in 
the 
condemnation proceedings and when 'special circumstances' are 
present, the circuit court has jurisdiction to proceed."  Id. at 
658.  The court noted Fontaine represented one of those "special 
circumstances," that is "when an attorney at law formally 
acknowledges the receipt of a document as an attorney on behalf 
of a client." Id. (quoting Fontaine, 31 Wis. 2d at 280).   
Thus, Fontaine's discussion regarding a prima facie showing 
of agency represents "special circumstances" for establishing an 
attorney as a client's agent under Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d).  
Accordingly, we confine Fontaine's applicability.  However, we 
note that Mansfield argues that we should overturn Fontaine 
because, 
he 
asserts, 
the 
legislature 
has 
since 
enacted 
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) to prohibit service of a summons on an 
attorney.  This issue is not squarely before us; hence, we leave 
it for a later day. 
No. 
03-0097   
 
17 
 
from a third party's reasonable observations, it "is not 
necessarily coincidental with authority."  Restatement (Second) 
supra § 8 cmt. e.   
¶23 On the other hand, actual authority "is the power of 
the agent to do an act . . . on account of the principal which, 
with respect to the principal, he [or she] is privileged to do 
because of the principal's manifestations to him [or her]."  Id. 
at §  7 cmt. a.  A third person's reasonable observations of an 
agent's authority have no bearing on determining the scope of an 
agent's 
actual 
authority. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) 
requires actual authority for the following three reasons.   
A 
¶24 Compared 
to 
other 
service 
of 
summons 
statutes, 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) does not contain any variations of the 
word "apparent."  See, e.g., § 801.11(4)(b) (allowing service 
"[i]n lieu of [personally serving a political corporation' or 
other body politic's specified officers, directors, or agents], 
the copy may be left in the office of such officer, director or 
managing agent with the person who is apparently in charge of 
the office.") (emphasis added), and Wis. Stat. §  801.11(5)(a) 
(allowing service "[i]n lieu of [personally serving the summons 
upon an officer, director, or managing agent], the copy may be 
left . . . with the person who is apparently in charge of the 
office.") (emphasis added).  Thus, were we to agree that 
apparent authority satisfied § 801.11(1)(d)'s "authorized by 
appointment" 
standard, 
we 
would 
have 
to 
add 
the 
word 
"apparently" to modify "authorized by appointment."  When 
No. 
03-0097   
 
18 
 
§ 801.11(1)(d) is viewed in context, it is clear that the 
legislature specifically omitted this language.12   
B 
¶25 We find further support for the conclusion that 
"authorized by appointment" requires actual authority in Punke 
and Howard.  As noted above, in Punke, a process server served 
the defendant's purported agent after the purported agent told 
the process server he was the defendant's agent and was 
authorized to accept service on the defendant's behalf.  Punke, 
17 Wis. 2d at 10.  In the context of determining whether the 
defendant consented to jurisdiction by appointing an agent 
within this state, the court observed, "The circuit court made 
no finding that as a matter of fact [the defendant] authorized 
[the agent] to accept service for [the defendant]."  Id. at 14.  
Although the process server testified that the agent stated he 
had authority to accept service, this court determined that 
                                                 
12 The court of appeals was concerned that "[i]f a process 
server 
cannot 
rely 
upon 
repeated 
confirmations 
from 
an 
individual regarding his or her authority to accept service on 
behalf of another individual, and a reasonable belief that that 
person is actually authorized to do so, the option of serving an 
individual's authorized agent would be rendered impractical and 
almost futile."  Mared, No. 03-0097, unpublished slip op., ¶19.  
It is a valid concern, and one that may be correct, but the 
legislature is the appropriate body to rectify any such 
shortcomings.  See State ex rel. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co. v. Smith, 184 Wis. 309, 316, 199 N.W. 954 (1924) 
("It is not the function of the court to add language to a 
statute or to add exceptions because the statute may to the 
court seem unwise.").   
No. 
03-0097   
 
19 
 
"[a]n agent's authority may not be shown by testimony describing 
his declarations to third persons."  Id. at 14. 
¶26 Similarly, in Howard, 30 Wis. 2d at 668, this court 
reaffirmed that an agent's authority cannot be established by 
declarations made to third parties in context of what is now 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d).  Again, in that case, a process 
server personally served the defendant's husband after he stated 
he had authority to accept service for his wife.  The process 
server testified accordingly, but the husband disputed the 
server's testimony and stated he never had authority from his 
wife to accept process on her behalf.  Id. at 667.  The trial 
court found the husband's testimony incredible and attributed 
the husband's acceptance of service to his wife.  Id.   
¶27 This court reversed, concluding that the process 
server's testimony failed to establish the husband had authority 
to accept service for his wife.  Id. at 668-69.  This court 
stated, "Under [now § 801.11(1)(d)], . . . it may be claimed 
[the husband] was the authorized agent of his wife.  [The 
husband], however, testified he had no such authority or 
appointment."  Id. at 668.  The court also stated the record did 
not support a finding of authority, even though the process 
server testified that the husband indicated he could admit 
process for his wife.  Id.  As in Punke, the process server's 
reasonable belief regarding the purported agent's authority 
could not establish the agent's authority to accept service for 
the principal.  See id.   
No. 
03-0097   
 
20 
 
¶28 Thus, in both Punke and Howard, this court precluded 
establishing authority through the testimony and perceptions of 
a third party.  Because the hallmark of establishing apparent 
authority rests with the reasonable observations of third 
parties, these cases essentially foreclosed apparent authority 
as 
the 
appropriate 
standard 
for 
establishing 
an 
agent's 
authority to accept process. 
C 
¶29 Finally, we turn to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
4(e)(2).13  See Ness v. Digital Dial Communications., Inc., 227 
Wis. 2d 592, 602 n.9, 596 N.W.2d 365 (1999) (acknowledging that 
we may consider analogous federal rules and case law to guide 
our interpretation of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure).  
Rule 4(e)(2) contains the same "authorized by appointment" 
language, and cases construing that provision have concluded 
"that an actual appointment for the specific purpose of 
                                                 
13 Rule 4(e)(2) reads: 
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service 
upon an individual from whom a waiver has not been 
obtained and filed, other than an infant or an 
incompetent person, may be effected in any judicial 
district of the United States . . . by delivering a 
copy of the summons and of the complaint to the 
individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at 
the individual's dwelling house or usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion 
then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the 
summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process.  
(Emphasis added). 
No. 
03-0097   
 
21 
 
receiving process normally is expected."  4A Wright and Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1097.14  For this reason: 
[C]laims by an agent of having authority to receive 
process or the fact that an agent actually accepts 
process is not enough to bind the defendant to the 
court's jurisdiction;  there must be evidence that the 
defendant intended to confer that authority upon the 
agent in order to satisfy the terms of Rule 4(e)(2).  
Id. (footnotes omitted.) Thus, federal procedural jurisprudence 
recognizes that actual authority, not apparent authority, is the 
proper standard.  Although we are not bound by interpretations 
of federal statutes that are similarly worded, we find those 
interpretations to be persuasive. 
 
¶30 Based on the statute's language in context, this 
court's prior decisions in Punke and Howard, and federal 
jurisprudence, we conclude that an agent's representations to a 
process server, regardless of the reasonableness of the process 
server's reliance on those representations, is insufficient to 
establish the agent's authority to accept service on the 
principal's behalf.  In other words, apparent authority is 
insufficient to bind a principal to service on an agent.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 801.11(1)(d)'s 
"authorized 
by 
appointment" 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Schultz v. Schultz, 436 F.2d 635, 637, 639 
(7th Cir. 1971) (requiring actual authority by appointment and 
recognizing that both Punke v. Brody, 17 Wis. 2d 9, 115 
N.W.2d 601 (1962), and Howard are consistent with federal law); 
Select Creations v. Paliafito America, 830 F. Supp. 1223, 1234 
(E.D. Wis. 1993) ("[T]he principal arising from Rule 4, Fed. R. 
Civ. P., [is] that, absent actual authority to act as an agent 
for the service of process, an agent is not authorized to accept 
service on behalf of her principal.") 
No. 
03-0097   
 
22 
 
language, therefore, refers only to actual authority.  We now 
focus on what actual authority means in § 801.11(1)(d)'s 
context. 
V 
¶31 In Skrupky v. Elbert, 189 Wis. 2d 31, 43-44, 526 
N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1994), the court of appeals recognized that 
actual authority encompasses both express and implied authority.  
The court stated: 
Actual authority is express when found within the 
explicit 
agency 
agreement 
itself, 
that 
is, 
the 
communication or contract between the principal and 
the agent.  Actual authority is implied when the 
agent, not the third party, reasonably believes he or 
she has authority as a result of the action of the 
principal.  An agent has the implied authority to do 
such acts as are usual, appropriate, necessary or 
proper to accomplish the purpose and objects of the 
agency. 
Id. at 44 (citations omitted).15  Mansfield urges this court to 
conclude the actual authority must be express, whereas Mared 
                                                 
15 The court of appeals also directed attention to the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 7 cmt. c (1958), which 
similarly provides: 
It is possible for a principal to specify 
minutely what the agent is to do.  To the extent that 
he does this, the agent may be said to have express 
authority. 
 
But 
most 
authority 
is 
created 
by 
implication. . . . These powers are all implied or 
inferred from the words used, from customs and from 
the relations of the parties.  They are described as 
"implied authority."  
Skrupky v. Elbert, 189 Wis. 2d 31, 44 n.5, 526 N.W.2d 264 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
No. 
03-0097   
 
23 
 
claims that implied actual authority will suffice.  We agree 
with Mansfield. 
 
¶32 Turning 
to 
the 
statute's 
language, 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) 
allows 
service 
"upon 
an 
agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to accept service of the 
summons for the defendant."16  From the statute's face, it is 
evident that the source of an agent's authorization to accept 
service stems from the principal's appointment.  "Appointment," 
however, is not defined in the statute.  "If a word is not 
defined in the statute, our next recourse has normally been to 
use a recognized dictionary to determine the common and ordinary 
meaning of the word."  State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, ¶19, 253 
Wis. 2d 527, 646 N.W.2d 330.  The common dictionary definition 
of "appointment" means the "designation of a person to hold a 
nonelective office or perform a function."  Webster's Third New 
Int'l Dictionary 105 (unabr. 1986).  Black's Law Dictionary is 
in accord, where it defines "appointment" as "[t]he act of 
designating a person, such as a nonelected public official, for 
a job or duty."  Black's Law Dictionary 96 (7th ed. 1999). 
¶33 After synthesizing these definitions, it is clear that 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) requires the principal to designate 
the agent to perform the function, job, or duty of accepting 
service.  We conclude that "designating the agent to perform the 
function of accepting service" is simply another way of saying 
                                                 
16 The concept of agency service "authorized by  . . . law 
to accept service of the summons for the defendant" is not an 
issue in this case. 
No. 
03-0097   
 
24 
 
the principal must establish an explicit agency agreement.  See 
Skrupy, 189 Wis. 2d at 43.  While such a designation need not be 
in writing, it must be set forth in clear and unambiguous terms.  
In other words, the agent must have actual express authority.   
 
¶34 Our conclusion is bolstered by the policy grounding 
service, namely "to ensure that a defendant receives reasonable 
notice of the action."  2 Callaghan's Wisconsin Pleading and 
Practice § 14.3, at 228 (4th ed. 2002).  Personal service is the 
preferred manner of service because it presents the greatest 
likelihood that the defendant actually receives notice of the 
action.  See id.  However, because "[t]he very essence of 
substituted service is that some person or entity receives 
process on another's behalf," Leonard v. Cattahach, 214 Wis. 2d 
236, 247, 571 N.W.2d 444 (Ct. App. 1997), substituted service 
diminishes the certainty of a defendant receiving notice.  
Construing the authorization under Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) as 
requiring 
actual 
express 
authority 
not 
only 
encourages 
plaintiffs to personally serve defendants, it also preserves the 
policy of ensuring that a defendant receives notice of an action 
by imputing notice through an agent only in cases where the 
defendant has actually ceded the preferred manner of  personal 
service.17   
                                                 
17 Absent specific authority by statute or rule that would 
define appointment to include actual implied service upon an 
agent, we decline the invitation to extend the rule in this 
fashion.   
No. 
03-0097   
 
25 
 
 
¶35 Turning to the facts of this case, the court of 
appeals ably summarized Mared's evidence as follows: 
[Monsen] testified that he walked into the facility 
and told the receptionist that he had some court 
documents that he needed to serve on Mansfield.  She 
asked him to wait a moment and made a phone call.  
Shortly thereafter, he was approached by a man who 
identified himself as "Mr. Levy."  According to the 
process server's testimony, he told Levy that he had 
court documents that he needed to serve on Mansfield.  
Levy told the process server that he was authorized to 
accept service of those papers.  The process server 
reiterated 
that 
he 
needed 
to 
serve 
Mansfield 
personally, and Levy told him that he was authorized 
to accept them on Mansfield's behalf.  After that 
exchange, he left the copies of the summons and 
complaint with Levy . . . . 
Mared, No. 03-0097, unpublished slip op., ¶15. 
¶36 Mared's evidence does not support a finding of actual 
express authority.  The only evidence that is germane to 
establishing Levy's authority, evidence which at this point is 
uncontroverted, 
comes 
from 
Mansfield's 
affidavit, 
wherein 
Mansfield stated that Levy was not his agent, let alone an agent 
authorized to accept summons on his behalf.  We do recognize 
that while personal service was an issue that was before the 
trial court, neither party argued, and the trial court did not 
consider, 
the 
propriety 
of 
agency 
service 
under 
Wis. Stat. §  801.11 (1)(d).  Because this is the first case 
that not only specifically addresses agency service but defines 
its scope, we remand this case to the trial court to determine 
whether Mansfield expressly provided Levy with actual authority 
to accept service of process from Monsen.  The trial court can 
accept additional evidence in view of the fact that agency 
No. 
03-0097   
 
26 
 
service was not previously argued.  If Mared can establish that 
Mansfield entered into an explicit agency agreement with Levy 
for purposes of accepting service, then service was proper.18 
VI 
 
¶37 In sum, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(d) 
creates an independent ground for substituted service on a 
natural person's agent.  However, the agent must have actual 
express authority to receive service of a summons on the 
principal's behalf. 
 Because Mared 
presented 
insufficient 
evidence to establish Levy's actual authority to accept service 
on Mansfield's behalf, we reverse the court of appeals' 
decision.  We remand this matter to the trial court for further 
proceedings so that the trial court can determine whether 
Mansfield expressly authorized Levy to accept service of 
process. 
¶38 We pause to recognize and emphasize that this case 
illustrates how risky it is to attempt to serve a defendant's 
agent.  Because an agent must have actual express authority to 
accept service of summons under Wis. Stat. §  801.11(1)(d), 
plaintiffs who choose to effectuate service under this provision 
had best proceed with extreme care, while being mindful that 
                                                 
18  In Punke, 17 Wis. 2d at 14, this court required the 
trial court to find as a matter of fact that the principal 
authorized the agent to accept service for the principal.  This 
factual determination must be made while bearing in mind that an 
agent's authority "may not be shown by testimony describing [the 
agent's] declarations to third persons."  Id.  Similarly, a 
disbelief of the agent's testimony does not supply the necessary 
proof.  Howard, 30 Wis. 2d at 667.     
No. 
03-0097   
 
27 
 
even the utmost care may not reveal the true scope of an agent's 
authority.  Because the consequences for failing to strictly 
comply with the statutory rules of service are harsh, see 
Bendimez v. Neidermire, 222 Wis. 2d 356, 361, 588 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. 
App. 1998), plaintiffs should err on the side of caution by 
utilizing the more certain means for effectuating service under 
Wis. Stat. § 801.11(1)(a)-(c).   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the matter is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
03-0097   
 
 
 
1