Case Title: Lemley v. Wilson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1130160

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:  03/06/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
_________________________
1130160
_________________________
Frank Lemley
v.
Terry Wilson, as father, and as personal representative of
the estate, of Christopher Wilson, deceased
Appeal from Walker Circuit Court
(CV-09-900253)
PER CURIAM.
The defendant, Frank Lemley, appeals from an order of the
trial court granting a motion for a new trial filed by the
plaintiff, Terry Wilson, after a jury had returned a verdict
in favor of Lemley.
1130160
Facts
On April 17, 2009, Christopher Wilson was working for the
City of Sumiton ("the City").  Christopher and his supervisor,
Michael Carr, had been sent to mow grass on Bryan Road.  It
was a clear, sunny day.  Carr and Christopher were in the
City's white Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck, which had emergency
flashers ("the city truck").  Carr and Christopher picked up
four trusties from the City jail and went to mow grass on
Bryan Road.  The trusties were all wearing their City-issued
orange jumpsuits.  At some point, they stopped for lunch and
left the area where they had been mowing.  They left their
mowers and their warning signs in the area.  Carr testified
that Christopher left his safety vest on his mower as he had
been instructed to do.  Carr and Christopher dropped the
trusties off at the City jail around 11:50 a.m., went to the
City shop, and then went to lunch.  After lunch, Carr and
Christopher met back at the City shop and then went and picked
up the trusties. 
Around 1:25 p.m., before Carr and his crew had gotten
back to the work site on Bryan Road, Tony Henderson, the
driver of the City's knuckle-boom truck, radioed Carr and
2
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asked him and his crew to come and flag traffic for him while
he was operating the knuckle-boom truck on Sullivan Road,
"just over the knob."  Carr, Christopher, and the trusties
went to Sullivan Road.  Carr testified that he pulled up on
the top of the knob, parked the city truck in front of some
mailboxes, and turned on the emergency flashers on the city
truck. Carr and a trusty walked below where the knuckle-boom
truck was located to direct traffic.  Christopher and two
other trusties were next to the city truck, and those two
trusties were directing traffic at that end.  While the
knuckle-boom truck was backing up, part of it became stuck in
someone's yard.  The knuckle-boom truck was sticking out into
the road perpendicular to the road; part of it was in the lane
of travel on Sullivan Road for traffic coming from Sumiton.  
Carr testified that between 10 and 15 vehicles went
through the area before the accident and that he did not
notice that any of those vehicles had trouble stopping until
traffic could be directed around the knuckle-boom truck.  Carr
also testified that, when the City crew is mowing, it has
signs that say "Mowers Ahead" but that there were no signs at
the location where the knuckle-boom truck got stuck. 
3
1130160
Additionally, he testified that there were no flashing signs,
orange cones, or anything else to warn about the presence of
the knuckle-boom truck that was in the roadway.  During
defense counsel's re-cross-examination of Carr, the following
occurred:
"[Defense counsel:]  
The 
City of 
Sumiton 
doesn't
have a policy about people working on the side of
the road having safety devices set up?
"[Carr:]  Yes.
"[Defense counsel:]  And they weren't set up,
were they?
"[Carr:]  Not -- as our crew goes, our stuff
gets set up.
"[Defense counsel:]  
But 
in 
this situation, 
they
weren't set up; right? 
"[Carr:]  All of our stuff was on Bryan Road. 
"[Defense counsel:]  Right. At the accident
scene, the safety devices were not set up; correct?"
Carr further testified that, when he received the call
from Henderson, it was a situation that had to be attended to
immediately and that he and Christopher did not have time to
return to Bryan Road to get Christopher's safety vest.  Carr
admitted that he remembered making the statement "that there
were enough vests for everybody on the crew there."  However,
4
1130160
Carr also testified that Christopher did not do anything that
was against his instructions, did not do anything that Carr
considered unsafe, and did not do anything that Carr would
consider as violating the City's policies.
At some point, the two trusties who were near Christopher
went to the city truck to get cigarettes and were no longer
monitoring the traffic.  Christopher was standing on the side
of the road next to the city truck, and he was "kind of"
flagging traffic until the trusties got their cigarettes.  
Lemley had gotten off work that afternoon after working
16.5 hours at the Miller Steam Plant.  Lemley had a commercial
driver's license and  hauled flash at the steam plant.  After
leaving work, Lemley was driving home in his personal vehicle,
a white Chevrolet Silverado, on Sullivan Road.  
Lemley testified that, as he topped the rise on Sullivan
Road, he saw the knuckle-boom truck in the roadway.  He
further testified:
"About 
the 
time 
I 
seen 
the 
knuckle 
truck,
[Christopher] come out and stepped out in the road
and throwed [sic] his hand up."
He testified that Christopher kept going and threw up both
hands. He further testified that he thought Christopher said
5
1130160
"Stop."  He also testified that he put on his brakes as soon
as he saw Christopher and that he "locked [his] truck down and
slid 23 feet."  Lemley was not able to stop in time, and his
vehicle struck Christopher, who died of his injuries.  Lemley
testified that Christopher came into contact with his vehicle
close to the center of his hood.
Barbara Holloway, who lived on Sullivan Road, testified
that, on the afternoon of the accident, she was sitting on the
front porch of her house, which was across the street from the
area where the city truck was parked.  She also testified that
she saw Lemley's vehicle hit Christopher; that the point of
impact was in the street at her driveway; and that Lemley was
in the lane of travel coming from Sumiton.  Holloway further
testified that she saw a white vehicle coming up the hill;
that it did not look like the vehicle was slowing down; that
Christopher was waving his hands and trying to get the vehicle
to stop; and that she saw Christopher fly over the hood of the
vehicle.  When asked if it looked like Lemley had slowed down
or if she saw Lemley slow down before he hit Christopher, she
replied: 
"It looked like he was going to go around
[Christopher] and then another truck -- I saw the
6
1130160
hood of the other truck as it got up there at the
top of the hill." 
She further testified that it did not look like Lemley tried
to brake and that she did not hear squealing tires or any
other noise that made her think that Lemley had tried to stop
his vehicle before striking Christopher. 
Regina Higgins testified that she was a passenger in a
blue Chevrolet Avalanche truck traveling in the opposite
direction of Lemley's vehicle and that her sister-in-law,
Janice Gilkey, was driving.  She testified that the knuckle-
boom truck was stuck at the bottom of the hill and that a
flagger had told them to go on; that they were proceeding up
the hill; that they saw Christopher and stopped; that
Christopher was on the side of the road by the mailboxes; that
Christopher turned and saw a vehicle coming; and that
Christopher went to the center of the road and motioned with
his hands to get the vehicle to stop.  Higgins testified that,
apparently, 
the 
vehicle 
kept 
coming 
because 
Christopher 
darted
in front of the Avalanche to keep from getting hit and that
the driver's side of Lemley's vehicle clipped Christopher on
the side.  She testified that, at the time he was struck,
Christopher "was in the center -- about the center line trying
7
1130160
to get completely out of that lane."  Higgins further
testified that she did not hear the squealing of brakes or
hear brakes being applied; that she did not see Lemley's
vehicle move in any way to make it look like it was locked
down; and that she did not see any indication of Lemley's 
slowing down before he struck Christopher.
Carr testified that he did not see Christopher get hit;
that he heard one of the trusties yell, "'Watch out, Chris'";
that, by the time he turned around, Christopher had already
been hit; and that he did not hear the squealing of brakes,
did not hear the sound of skid marks being laid down, and did
not hear anything to indicate that someone was trying to stop
quickly.  Carr testified that he then telephoned the
dispatcher and reported that there had been an accident, and
the dispatcher sent paramedics.  He also telephoned his
supervisor, George Woods.
Evidence 
was 
presented 
indicating 
that, 
after 
Christopher
was hit, he was thrown into the air, landed on the road in
front of the Avalanche, and rolled underneath the Avalanche. 
The evidence established that the speed limit on Sullivan
Road at the time fo the accident was 25 miles per hour. 
8
1130160
Trooper David Larimer, a traffic-homicide investigator with
the Alabama Department of Public Safety, and his supervisor,
Cpl. Shane Porter, investigated the accident resulting in
Christopher's death.  Trooper Larimer testified that he 
talked
to Lemley after the accident and that Lemley stated that, as
Lemley topped the hill, Christopher stepped into the road  and
he applied his brakes and started sliding.  Trooper Larimer
testified that, based on the skid marks and the coefficient of
friction, he calculated that Lemley's vehicle was 
traveling at
40 miles per hour when he applied his brakes, but  that he did
not calculate Lemley's speed at the top of the rise or until
he reached the area where the skid marks started and that he
did not know whether Lemley had applied his brakes without
leaving a skid mark before that.  In his report, Trooper
Larimer stated: "[T]his crash occurred due to Frank Richard
Lemley speeding and not being able to stop in time."  Trooper
Larimer also testified that the top of the rise Lemley crested
was 460 feet from the area of impact.  During further redirect
examination of Trooper Larimer by Terry's counsel, the
following occurred:
"[Terry's counsel:]  Is that ample time to have
stopped if you are doing 40 miles an hour?
9
1130160
"....
"[Trooper Larimer:]  In my opinion in 460 feet,
you should be able to stop at 40 miles an hour. 
"[Terry's counsel:]  So, he sees Chris and he
has got time to stop, would that be why you didn't
contribute any part of the vest to the cause of this
fatality? 
"[Trooper Larimer:]  
Good question. My 
answer 
to
that would be the cause of the wreck was the speed
and not being able to stop in time. 
"[Terry's counsel:]  That was your only
conclusion, nothing to do with the vest or not a
vest; correct? 
"[Trooper Larimer:]  Can I expound on my answer?
I don't want to say yes or no and not be able to
talk. 
"[Terry's counsel:]  Okay.
"[Trooper Larimer:]  All right. In my report, I
have that he wasn't wearing a vest and the reason he
wasn't wearing a vest.  Under conclusions and
recommendations, I am showing what the cause of the
crash was.  Contributing, if somebody was just out
in the road and wasn't with a road crew, the vest
wouldn't have come into play.
"In any opinion, there needs to be all of that
involved.  But by just putting down this, it is kind
of 
clearcut 
in 
any 
mind 
in 
conclusion 
and
recommendations, if I [am] making any sense of this
at all.  That is all that I can put down from the
evidence that we have.  I can't really give my
opinion on that.
"[Terry's counsel:]  From the evidence that you
had and what you know and we have mentioned the
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vest, and we have mentioned the lack of cones, this,
that and the other.  Your official conclusion is
what you have already stated, that Mr. Lemley's
speed was the cause of the fatality? 
"[Trooper Larimer:]  That is right."
Finally, Trooper Larimer testified that, a few months after
the accident, he returned to the area to determine how fast
people typically travel on Sullivan Road.  In making that
determination, he took the average speed of 10 vehicles that
day, and the average speed on the part of Sullivan Road where
the accident happened was 39.8 miles per hour.  
Holloway and Higgins both testified that they thought
Lemley was traveling between 40 and 45 miles per hour.  Lemley
testified that he thought he was traveling between 30 and 35
miles per hour.  However, in his deposition, he testified that
he was traveling at 35 miles per hour.  At trial, Lemley
testified that he did not know that Trooper Larimer had found
that he was traveling at 40 miles per hour.  When asked about
testimony that he was going 45 miles per hour, Lemley
responded:
"I wasn't doing no 45.  I don't think I was.  It
might have been doing 40, but I, you know, didn't
look at the speedometer."
11
1130160
Lemley testified that he did not see any flashing lights
on the knuckle-boom truck and that he was positive that the
flashing lights were not on.  He also testified that he did
not remember seeing any flashers on the city truck and that he
did not see any flashing lights as he came over the hill. 
Higgins testified that the knuckle-boom truck had an orange
light on the top and flashers on the rear.  Carr likewise
testified that there was a clear flashing light on the back of
the knuckle-boom truck and an orange light on the top of the
roof of the knuckle-boom truck and that those lights were on
when it was stuck.  However, the defense presented evidence
that, in a statement taken approximately four months after the
accident, Carr stated that he did not know if the lights on
the knuckle-boom truck were on. 
At trial, Carr testified that, after the accident, he
initially went to Christopher and stayed with him until the
paramedics arrived.  He testified that, after the paramedics
arrived, he went to where the trusties were and then went to
talk to Lemley.  Carr testified that he talked to Lemley about
10 to 15 minutes after the accident and that Lemley said that
he was sorry, that he did not see Christopher, and that he was
12
1130160
blind in one eye.  He further testified that Lemley was
wearing glasses at that time.  However, Lemley denied telling
Carr that he was blind in one eye and said that that statement
was not true.  Additionally, the defense presented evidence
indicating that, in the statement he made four months after
the accident, Carr said that he had not talked to the driver
of the white Chevrolet truck and that he had stayed with
Christopher.
Higgins testified that she could not see Lemley's face
immediately before or at the time he hit Christopher. 
However, she testified that, after Christopher was struck,
Lemley's vehicle rolled forward and came to a stop next to the
Avalanche in which she was a passenger; that, when she got out
of her vehicle, she saw Lemley; that Lemley appeared to be
looking for something in his vehicle; that Lemley was not
wearing glasses at that time; and that, by the time law-
enforcement officers approached Lemley, he was wearing
glasses.  Higgins admitted that she did not tell law-
enforcement officers that Lemley was not wearing glasses when
she first saw him, but she stated that no one had asked her. 
Higgins testified that the first statement she made about
13
1130160
Lemley's not wearing glasses was in an affidavit she executed
two and one-half years after the accident.  
Lemley testified that his driver's license had a
corrective-lenses 
restriction; 
that 
he 
was 
wearing 
his 
glasses
at the time of the accident; and that, as soon as he stopped
after the accident, he took off his glasses to wipe tears from
his 
eyes. 
 
Additionally, 
Dr. 
Sam 
Hollingsworth, 
an
ophthalmologist, testified that he had seen Lemley one time in
July 31, 2008; that Lemley's medical-history questionnaire
indicated that Lemley was having problems with his vision,
that could not see well, and that his vision limited his daily
activities; that he thought Lemley could meet the legal
requirements to drive without his glasses, but he would see
better with them; that he thought that Lemley would be able to
drive, especially during the day; that Lemley's glasses did
not have a very big correction; that Lemley's distance vision
was pretty good; and that Lemley would not be able to read
well without glasses.  Finally, he testified that he did not
think it was unsafe for Lemley to drive.
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1130160
Procedural History
On July 10, 2009, Terry, as Christopher's father and as
the personal representative of Christopher's estate, filed a
wrongful-death action against Lemley.   In his complaint, he
1
alleged that Lemley "was guilty of negligence and/or
wantonness by speeding, by failing to keep a lookout and by
needlessly striking Christopher Alton Wilson who was in plain
view."  He further alleged that Christopher was killed as a
proximate 
consequence 
of 
Lemley's 
"negligence 
and/or
wantonness combining or concurring with the negligence and/or
wantonness of any other defendant(s) or alone."
Lemley filed an answer in which he denied each and every
material allegation in the complaint.  He also alleged that
Christopher 
was 
"guilty 
of 
negligence 
which 
proximately 
caused
and/or contributed to his damages." 
Terry also included a claim against Alfa Insurance
1
Company 
and 
One 
Beacon 
Insurance 
Company 
seeking
uninsured/underinsured-motorist benefits.  Terry dismissed
Alfa as a defendant pursuant to a pro tanto settlement
agreement.  One Beacon ultimately opted out of participating
in the trial proceedings.  In his complaint, Terry also
included several fictitiously named defendants.  However, he
did not subsequently amend his complaint to substitute any
named defendants for those fictitiously named defendants.
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1130160
Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor
of Lemley.  On June 13, 2013, the trial court entered a
judgment based on the jury's verdict.  On July 3, 2013, Terry
filed a motion for a new trial in which he argued that the
verdict "is not sustained and/or supported by the great
preponderance of the evidence."  Lemley filed a response in
opposition to Terry's motion for a new trial.  The trial court
set a hearing on the motion for September 25, 2013.   On
2
September 27, 2013, the trial court granted Terry's motion for
a new trial.  This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
"The standard of review to be applied by this
Court in reviewing the granting of a motion for a
new trial is set out in Jawad v. Granade, 497 So. 2d
471, at 477 (Ala. 1986):
"'[A]n order granting a motion for new
trial on the sole ground that the verdict
is 
against 
the 
great 
weight 
or
preponderance of the evidence will be
reversed for abuse of discretion where on
review it is easily perceivable from the
record that the jury verdict is supported
by the evidence.'
The record on appeal does not include a transcript of any
2
such hearing.
16
1130160
"Alpine Bay Resorts, Inc. v. Wyatt, 539 So. 2d 160
(Ala. 1988), sets out the procedure for the
application of the Jawad standard:
"'[W]hen 
the 
evidence 
meets 
the
"sufficiency" test, jury verdicts are
presumed correct, and this presumption is
strengthened by the trial 
court's denial of
a motion for new trial.  Therefore, a
judgment based upon a jury verdict and
sustained by the denial of a post-judgment
motion for a new trial, will not be
reversed 
on 
a 
weight-of-the-evidence 
ground
unless it is "plainly and palpably" wrong.
Ashbee v. Brock, 510 So. 2d 214 (Ala.
1987). See, also, Jawad v. Granade, 497 So.
2d 471 (Ala. 1986).'
"539 So. 2d at 162–63.
"While the 'new trial' test is a subjective one
... and is measured by a discretionary standard, the
range of the trial court's discretion, as announced
in Jawad, has been considerably narrowed.  Thus, the
trial court is left with no discretion to grant a
new trial on a 'weight of the evidence' ground,
except when the verdict and the judgment entered
thereon are so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence as to be 'plainly and
palpably' wrong, i.e., 'manifestly unjust.'"
Richardson v. Joines, 574 So. 2d 787, 787-88 (Ala. 1991).  
Discussion
Lemley argues that the trial court erred in granting
Terry's motion for a new trial.  In his complaint, Terry
asserted claims of negligence and wantonness against Lemley.
17
1130160
"To establish negligence, the plaintiff must
prove:  (1) a duty to a foreseeable plaintiff; (2)
a breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and
(4) damage or injury.  Albert v. Hsu, 602 So. 2d
895, 897 (Ala. 1992).  To establish wantonness, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with
reckless 
indifference 
to 
the 
consequences,
consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act
or omitted some known duty.  To be actionable, that
act or omission must proximately cause the injury of
which the plaintiff complains.  Smith v. Davis, 599
So. 2d 586 (Ala. 1992).
"Proximate 
cause 
is 
an 
essential element 
of 
both
negligence claims and wantonness claims.  See
Albert, supra; Smith, supra.  Proximate cause is an
act or omission that in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any new independent causes,
produces the injury and without which the injury
would not have occurred.  Thetford v. City of
Clanton, 605 So. 2d 835, 840 (Ala. 1992).  An injury
may proximately result from concurring causes;
however, it is still necessary that the plaintiff
prove that the defendant's negligence caused the
injury. Buchanan v. Merger Enterprises, Inc., 463
So. 2d 121 (Ala. 1984); Lawson v. General Telephone
Co. of Alabama, 289 Ala. 283, 290, 267 So. 2d 132,
138 (1972)."
Martin v. Arnold, 643 So. 2d 564, 567 (Ala. 1994).  
A.
Initially, Lemley argues that the evidence at trial was
sufficient for the jury to determine that he was not
negligent.  Specifically, Lemley notes that, in his motion for
a new trial, Terry argued that Lemley's violation of the speed
limit constituted negligence per se but that Terry did not
18
1130160
cite any authority for that position and Alabama law does not
support that position.  As Lemley points out, in Odom v.
Schofield, 480 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Ala. 1985), this Court
stated:
"As Chief Justice Torbert pointed out in Fox v.
Bartholf, 374 So. 2d 294 (Ala. 1979), however,
merely exceeding the statutory speed limit does not,
in itself, establish actionable negligence.  Several
other requirements are involved -- most particularly
the requirement that the jury must find that the
statutory violation proximately caused the injury."
Lemley argues that he presented evidence indicating that
his speed was not the cause of Christopher's death and that
"required safety devices were not placed at the scene in
violation of a City of Sumiton employee policy."   He further
3
argues that the evidence indicated that Christopher was not
At trial, the following occurred:
3
"[Defense counsel:]  
The 
City of 
Sumiton 
doesn't
have a policy about people working on the side of
the road having safety devices set up?
"[Carr:] Yes."
Defense counsel then went on to elicit testimony that the
safety devices in possession of Carr's crew were set up on
Bryan Road and were not set up at the scene of the accident. 
However, the defense did not present evidence regarding what
the City's policy regarding safety devices actually was or
whether the fact that Carr's crew had not set up safety
devices at the site where the knuckle-boom truck was stuck
actually violated any City policy. 
19
1130160
wearing a safety vest when he was struck, had not been
provided with a cautionary sign with which to signal oncoming
traffic, and "voluntarily stepped into the roadway and
directly in the path of an oncoming vehicle."  Thus, Lemley
contends that, because evidence was presented of alternative
causes of Christopher's death, it would not have been
unreasonable for the jury to find that he was not negligent.
In this case, Trooper Larimer testified that, in his
report, he found that "this crash occurred due to Frank
Richard Lemley speeding and not being able to stop in time."
However, the evidence was undisputed that there were no
warning signs to alert motorists like Lemley that work crews
were in the roadway; that Christopher was not wearing a safety
vest; that Christopher did not have any safety flags, signs,
or devices; and that Christopher was wearing neutral-colored
clothing when he was hit.  At trial, Carr testified that
Christopher had left his safety vest on his mower before lunch
as he had been instructed to do.  However, Lemley presented
evidence indicating that Carr had previously 
given 
a statement
in which he had said that there were enough safety vests there
for everyone on the crew. 
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Further, there was conflicting evidence regarding when
Lemley initially applied the brakes in his vehicle.  Holloway
testified that it did not look like Lemley tried to brake and
that she did not hear squealing tires or any other noise that
made her think that Lemley had tried to stop.  Higgins and
Carr both testified that they did not hear squealing brakes
and did hear anything to indicate that the driver was trying
to stop quickly.  However, Lemley testified that he put on his
brakes as soon as he saw Christopher and that he "locked [his]
truck down and slid 23 feet."  Further,  Trooper Larimer
testified that there were skid marks on the road.  The jury
could have resolved these conflicts in favor of Lemley and
found that Lemley had applied his brakes as soon as he saw
Christopher.
Additionally, there was conflicting evidence as to
whether the knuckle-boom truck or the city truck had on lights
and/or flashers.  Lemley testified that he did not see any
flashing lights on the knuckle-boom truck and that he was
positive that the flashing lights were not on.  He also
testified that he did not remember seeing any flashers on the
city truck and that he did not see any flashing lights when he
21
1130160
crested the hill.  Higgins testified that the knuckle-boom
truck had an orange light on the top and flashers on the rear. 
Carr likewise testified that there was a clear flashing light
on the back of the knuckle-boom truck and an orange light on
the top of the roof of the knuckle-boom truck and that those
lights were on.  However, 
Lemley 
presented evidence indicating
that, approximately four months after the accident, Carr gave
a statement in which he said that he did not know if the
lights on the knuckle-boom truck were flashing.  The jury
could have resolved those conflicts in favor of Lemley and
determined that there were no flashing lights on either the
knuckle-boom truck or the city truck.
Terry also presented evidence indicating that Lemley's
driver's license included a corrective-lenses restriction and
that Lemley was not wearing his glasses at the time of the
accident.  However, Lemley testified that he was, in fact,
wearing his glasses at the time of the accident.  Carr also
testified that he talked to Lemley after the accident and that
Lemley had told him that he was blind in one eye and that he
did not see Christopher.  However, Lemley denied making any
such statement and said that that statement was not true. 
22
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Also, Lemley presented evidence indicating that, about four
months after the accident, Carr gave a statement in which he
said that he did not talk to the driver of the white Chevrolet
vehicle.  Additionally, Lemley presented evidence indicating
that his distance vision was not bad and that he could
probably pass the vision requirements for an Alabama driver's
license without corrective lenses.  Thus, the jury was
presented with conflicting evidence as to whether Lemley was
wearing glasses at the time of the accident and as to whether
Lemley's vision was a proximate cause of the accident, and the
jury could have resolved those conflicts in favor of Lemley. 
Terry presented evidence indicating that the speed limit
on Sullivan Road was 25 miles per hour and that Lemley was
traveling 40 miles per hour at the time of the accident. 
However, Lemley presented evidence indicating that, a few
months after the accident, Trooper Larimer went to the area
where the accident occurred to determine how fast people
typically traveled on Sullivan Road and that the average speed
of 10 vehicles that day was 39.8 miles per hour. 
Based on the conflicting evidence, the jury could have
concluded that Lemley's speed at the time of the accident was
23
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not the proximate cause of Christopher's injuries and that
Lemley was not negligent.
B.
Next, Lemley argues that there was evidence at trial that
would have supported a jury determination 
that Christopher was
contributorily negligent. 
"'In order to prove contributory negligence, the
defendant must show that the party charged: (1) had
knowledge of the condition; (2) had an appreciation
of the danger under the surrounding circumstances;
and (3) failed to exercise reasonable care, by
placing himself in the way of danger.'  Brown v.
Piggly–Wiggly Stores, 454 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Ala.
1984) (citing Hatton v. Chem–Haulers, Inc., 393 So.
2d 950 (Ala. 1980); and Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Byars,
289 Ala. 713, 271 So. 2d 847 (1972))."
Lyons v. Walker Reg'l Med. Ctr., 791 So. 2d 937, 944 (Ala.
2000). 
Even if the jury had concluded that Lemley was negligent,
there was evidence that would have supported a finding by the
jury that Christopher was contributorily negligent.  As we
noted in Part A of this opinion, the evidence was undisputed
that there were no warning signs in the area; that Christopher
was not wearing a safety vest at the time of the accident;
that Christopher did not have any warning flags, signs, or
devices near him in the roadway; and that Christopher was
24
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wearing 
neutral-colored 
clothing 
when 
he was 
struck. 
Additionally, Lemley presented evidence indicating that Carr
had previously made the statement "that there were enough
vests for everybody on the crew there."  Also, there was
conflicting evidence from which the jury could have concluded
that the flashing lights or warning lights on the knuckle-boom
truck and the city truck were not actually on.  However,
Christopher stepped out in front of a speeding vehicle,
despite the lack of a safety vest, safety equipment, and
warning devices.  Based on this evidence, the jury could have
reasonably concluded that Christopher had knowledge of the
dangerous condition; that Christopher appreciated the danger
under the circumstances; and that Christopher failed to
exercise reasonable care by stepping out in front of a
speeding vehicle under such circumstances.  Thus, there was
evidence that would have supported a finding by the jury that
Christopher was contributorily negligently.
C.
Lemley also argues that there was evidence at trial that
would have supported a jury determination that he did not act
wantonly.  With regard to the wantonness claim, Terry focused
on evidence regarding Lemley's health problems; evidence
25
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regarding the number of hours Lemley had worked that week;
evidence indicating that Lemley was not wearing his glasses at
the time of the accident; and evidence indicating that Lemley
was traveling 40 miles per hour in a 25 miles per hour zone. 
At trial, Terry presented evidence indicating that Lemley
was being treated for various health conditions, including
uncontrolled diabetes, diabetic renal disease, coronary
disease, high cholesterol, hypertension, some arthritis, and
obesity.  He also presented evidence regarding medications
Lemley was taking.  Terry further presented evidence
indicating that, at the time of the accident, Lemley had
gotten off work after working for 16.5 hours and that Lemley
had worked a total of 63.5 hours that week preceding the
accident.  However, Terry did not present any evidence to
establish that Lemley's health problems, the medications
Lemley was taking, or the hours Lemley had worked that day or
that week proximately caused the accident.
Further, as we noted in Part A of this opinion, there was
conflicting evidence from which the jury could have concluded
that Lemley was wearing his glasses at time of the accident. 
Additionally, although there was evidence indicating that
Lemley was traveling 40 miles per hour at the time of the
26
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accident, Trooper Larimer testified that, when he went to the
area where the accident occurred a few months after the
accident, he determined that the average speed on that part of
the road was 39.8 miles per hour.  Thus, there was evidence
from which the jury could have concluded that Lemley did not
act wantonly.
Conclusion
In this case, the jury was presented with conflicting
evidence.  When the evidence is viewed in a light most
favorable to Lemley and  all reasonable inferences the jury
was free to draw are indulged, it is easily perceivable from
the record that the jury verdict in favor of Lemley as to the
negligence and wantonness claims was supported by the
evidence.  See Syx v. Britton, 894 So. 2d 715, 720-21 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2004) ("We cannot say that it is 'easily
perceivable' from the record that the jury verdict in favor of
Syx and S.P. Richards Company was unsupported by the evidence
....  There was conflicting evidence as to whether Syx's
negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries for which
Britton sought 
recovery 
at trial."); Richardson v. Joines, 574
So. 2d at 788 ("While the plaintiffs presented contrary
evidence sufficient to support a verdict in their favor, we
27
1130160
cannot agree with their argument that the court properly
granted their motion for a new trial.  The jury, after hearing
the evidence presented by the parties and seeing the
witnesses, apparently believed the defendants' evidence and
concluded that the defendants were not liable for the damages
claimed.").  Therefore, the trial court exceeded its
discretion when it granted Terry's motion for a new trial.  
For the above-stated reasons, we reverse the trial
court's order and remand this case for the trial court to
reinstate the jury's verdict and to enter a judgment on the
verdict. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, and Main, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., and Wise and Bryan, JJ., dissent.
28
1130160
WISE, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to
reverse the trial court's 
order 
granting Terry Wilson's motion
for a new trial and to remand this case for the trial court to
reinstate the jury's verdict and to enter a judgment thereon. 
The majority correctly states the standard of review, as
follows:
"'The standard of review to be applied by this
Court in reviewing the granting of a motion for a
new trial is set out in Jawad v. Granade, 497 So. 2d
471, at 477 (Ala. 1986):
"'"[A]n order granting a motion for new
trial on the sole ground that the verdict
is 
against 
the 
great 
weight 
or
preponderance of the evidence will be
reversed for abuse of discretion where on
review it is easily perceivable from the
record that the jury verdict is supported
by the evidence."'"
___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting Richardson v. Joines, 574 So. 2d
787, 787 (Ala. 1991)).   
I agree with the majority's conclusion that it was
"easily perceivable from the record" that there was evidence
that would support the jury's finding that Frank Lemley had
not acted wantonly.  However, I disagree with the majority's
conclusions that it was "easily perceivable from the record"
29
1130160
that the evidence would have supported a finding by the jury
that Lemley had not acted negligently and a finding that
Christopher Wilson had been contributorily negligent.  
In its opinion, the majority finds, based on the
conflicting evidence, that the jury could have concluded that
Lemley's speed at the time of the accident was not the
proximate cause of Christopher's injuries and that Lemley
therefore was not negligent.  In Odom v. Schofield, 480 So. 2d
1218, 1218 (Ala. 1985), this Court stated:
"As Chief Justice Torbert pointed out in Fox v.
Bartholf, 374 So. 2d 294 (Ala. 1979), however,
merely exceeding the statutory speed limit does not,
in itself, establish actionable negligence.  Several
other requirements are involved -- most particularly
the requirement that the jury must find that the
statutory violation proximately caused the injury."
(First emphasis added.)
In this case, Trooper David Larimer testified that he
found that "this crash occurred due to Frank Richard Lemley
speeding and not being able to stop in time."  Thus, the
evidence did establish that Lemley's exceeding  the speed
limit proximately caused Christopher's injuries.  Lemley did
not 
present 
any 
evidence 
to 
dispute 
this 
evidence. 
Additionally, Trooper Larimer testified that a person
30
1130160
traveling at 40 miles per hour should be able to stop in the
460 feet between the hill and the point of impact.  The clear
implication is that Lemley surely would have been able to stop
if he were traveling the posted speed limit, which was 25
miles per hour.  The fact that other drivers on a different
day were traveling at an average of almost 40 miles per hour
in the area of the accident does not change that fact or
suggest that Lemley's negligence was not the proximate cause
of Christopher's death.  
There were factual disputes in this case, and the jury
could have resolved those disputes in favor of Lemley. 
Regardless of whether the jury found that Lemley applied his
brakes the second Christopher stepped out into the roadway,
the undisputed evidence in this case established that the
cause of the accident was the fact that Lemley was speeding
and was therefore unable to stop before hitting Christopher. 
Further, there was evidence to support a finding that Lemley
should have been able to stop while traveling at 40 miles per
hour.  However, there was no evidence to support a finding
that Lemley would not have been able to stop even if he had
been traveling at 25 miles per hour.  
31
1130160
It is true that the undisputed evidence established that
there were no warning signs in the area where the knuckle-boom
truck was stuck partially in the road and where the grass-
mowing crew was directing traffic.  However, Lemley did not
present any evidence indicating that the lack of such warning
signs constituted negligence.  Although he elicited a vague
response that the City had some policy regarding warning
signs, he did not present any testimony regarding what those
policies actually were.  Thus, there was no evidence
indicating that the lack of signs in the area of the accident
violated any City policy.  Further, even if the lack of signs
violated a policy, there is no evidence regarding where such
signs should have been placed.  Therefore, there was no
evidence to establish that the failure to comply with any such
policy proximately caused the accident.  
The same is true regarding testimony as to whether the
flashing lights on the knuckle-boom truck and the city truck
were on.  The majority correctly points out that the evidence
in that regard was disputed and that the jury could have found
that the flashing lights of those two vehicles were not on. 
However, this does not appear to be evidence of negligence on
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the part of Christopher.  He was not the driver of either
vehicle.  Thus, this evidence would not be relevant to the
question 
whether 
Christopher 
was 
contributorily 
negligent. 
 
At
most, this appears to be evidence of negligence by a third
party.  However, 
"[t]he defendant's negligence need not be the sole
cause of an injury in order for an action against
the defendant to lie.  It is sufficient that the
negligence concurred with other causes to produce
the injury.  Lawson v. General Telephone Co. of
Alabama, 289 Ala. 283, 290, 267 So. 2d 132, 138
(1972)."
Buchanan v. Merger Enters., Inc., 463 So. 2d 121, 126 (Ala.
1984), superseded by statute, as stated in Jackson v. Azalea
City Racing Club, Inc., 553 So. 2d 112 (Ala. 1989).  
Further, in light of Lemley's testimony that he saw the
knuckle-boom truck in the road and that he saw Christopher
step out into the roadway when he crested the hill in his
vehicle, it appears that any evidence regarding the lack of
safety equipment, a safety vest, or flags is irrelevant and
nothing more than a red herring.  Thus, there was no evidence
that actually supported a finding that Lemley was not
negligent and that his negligence was not a proximate cause of
the accident.
33
1130160
The majority also concludes:
"Even if the jury had concluded that Lemley was
negligent, there was evidence that would have
supported a finding by the jury that Christopher was
contributorily negligent.  As we noted in Part A of
this opinion, the evidence was undisputed that there
were no warning signs in the area; that Christopher
was not wearing a safety vest at the time of the
accident; that Christopher did not have any warning
flags, signs, or devices near him in the roadway;
and that Christopher was wearing neutral-colored
clothing when he was struck.  Additionally, Lemley
presented 
evidence 
indicating 
that 
Carr 
had
previously made the statement 'that there were
enough vests for everybody on the crew there.' 
Also, there was conflicting evidence from which the
jury could have concluded that the flashing lights
or warning lights on the knuckle-boom truck and the
city truck were not actually on.  However,
Christopher stepped out in front of a speeding
vehicle, despite the lack of a safety vest, safety
equipment, and warning devices.  Based on this
evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded
that Christopher had knowledge of the dangerous
condition; that Christopher appreciated the danger
under the circumstances; and that Christopher failed
to exercise reasonable care by stepping out in front
of a speeding vehicle under such circumstances. 
Thus, there was evidence that would have supported
a finding by the jury that Christopher was
contributorily negligently."
___ So. 3d at ___.
"In Chilton v. City of Huntsville, 584 So. 2d
822, 824–25 (Ala. 1990), this Court held:
"'In 
order 
to 
establish 
the
affirmative 
defense 
of 
contributory
negligence [which the defendant bears the
burden of proving], there must be a showing
34
1130160
that the party charged had knowledge of the
dangerous condition; that he appreciated
the 
danger 
under 
the 
surrounding
circumstances; 
and 
that, 
failing 
to
exercise 
reasonable 
care, 
he 
placed 
himself
in the way of danger.  Bridges v. Clements,
580 So. 2d 1346 (Ala. 1991); Knight v.
Seale, 530 So. 2d 821 (Ala. 1988). 
Although contributory negligence may be
found to exist as a matter of law when the
evidence is such that all reasonable people
must reach the same conclusion, the
question of the existence of contributory
negligence is normally one for the jury. 
Bridges v. Clements; Knight v. Seale.
"'....
"'... In Alabama Power Co. v. Mosley,
294 Ala. 394, 399, 318 So. 2d 260, 263
(1975),  this Court, quoting Dwight Mfg.
Co. v. Word, 200 Ala. 221, 225, 75 So. 979,
983 (1917), stated:
"'"'Contributory negligence is
not 
predicated 
solely 
on
knowledge of the danger, and the
certainty of injury to follow. 
If 
such 
were 
the 
rule,
contributory negligence would be
a synonym for willful suicide or
self-injury.  If plaintiff had
knowledge of facts sufficient to
warn a man of ordinary sense and
prudence of the danger to be
encountered, and of the natural
and probable consequences of his
own conduct in the premises, then
he was guilty of negligence if he
failed to exercise ordinary care
to discover and avoid the danger
35
1130160
and 
the 
injury. 
[Citations
omitted.]'"'
"(Emphasis added in Chilton v. City of Huntsville.)
See Sprouse v. Belcher Oil Co., 577 So. 2d 443 (Ala.
1991); Campbell v. Alabama Power Co., 567 So. 2d
1222 (Ala. 1990); Electric Service Co. of Montgomery
v. Dyess, 565 So. 2d 244 (Ala. 1990); Central
Alabama Elec. Co-op v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371 (Ala.
1989).  Mere heedlessness is not enough.  Campbell
v. Alabama Power Co., supra; Central Alabama
Electric Co-op v. Tapley, supra.
"'[C]ontributory 
negligence, 
while
requiring proof of both knowledge and
appreciation of the danger, does not
require proof of a voluntary affirmative
exposure to the danger [as does assumption
of the risk]; rather, it merely requires
proof that the plaintiff failed to exercise
reasonable care.
"'"... 
[C]ontributory
negligence is a matter of some
fault or 
departure 
from 
the
standard of reasonable conduct,
however unwilling or protesting
the 
plaintiff 
may 
be....
[Contributory 
negligence
involves] risks which he merely
might have discovered by the
exercise of ordinary care."
"'Koshorek v. Pennsylvania R.R., 318 F.2d
364 (3rd Cir. 1963).'
"Sprouse v. Belcher Oil Co., 577 So. 2d at 444.
(Citation omitted.)"
Gulledge v. Brown & Root, Inc., 598 So. 2d 1325, 1327-28 (Ala.
1992).
36
1130160
As I noted previously, in light of Lemley's testimony
that he saw the knuckle-boom truck in the road as he crested
the hill and saw Christopher step into the road, it appears
that any evidence regarding the lack of safety equipment, a
safety vest, or flags is irrelevant to the question whether
Christopher 
was 
contributorily 
negligent. 
 
Therefore, 
based 
on
the specific facts presented in this case, it appears that the
only real question was whether Christopher was negligent
because he stepped out into the road and tried to stop
Lemley's vehicle.  However, in this case, Christopher was an
employee of the City, was part of the grass-mowing crew that
was supposed to be directing traffic for the knuckle-boom
truck that was working in the area, and was merely doing his
job.  Accordingly, Christopher's stepping into the road was
not a departure from the standard of reasonable conduct for a
person in his position.  It seems wrong to suggest that a
person who is tasked with directing traffic fails to exercise
reasonable care and acts negligently if he steps into traffic
to perform his duties.  Thus, under the facts in this case, it
was not "easily perceivable from the record" that there was
evidence that would have supported a finding by the jury that
37
1130160
Christopher was contributorily negligent.  Therefore, the
trial court did not exceed its discretion when it granted
Terry's motion for a new trial.  
For the above-stated reasons, this Court should affirm
the trial court's order granting Terry's motion for a new
trial.  Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
Bryan, J., concurs.
38