Case Title: Glazier v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-49

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Glazier v. State1992 WY 182843 P.2d 1200Case Number: 92-49Decided: 12/22/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
MASON 
G. GLAZIER, Appellant (Defendant)

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee, 
(Plaintiff)

 
 

Representing 
Appellant: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender; Gerald M. Gullivan, Defender Aid 
Program; Julia M. Houser, Student Intern. Argument presented by Mr. 
Gallivan.

 

Representing 
Appellee: 
Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General; Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Attorney General; 
Barbara L. Boyer, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Charles T. Solomon, Student 
Intern. Argument presented by Mr. Solomon.

 
 
Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT, and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 
CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant seeks review 
of his conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide under W.S. 6-2-106(b). He 
contends that the evidence was not sufficient to convict and that causation was 
not proven. He also argues that the statutory presumption that a person with a 
blood alcohol content of .10 percent is impaired, is an impermissible mandatory 
presumption.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues:

 

I. 
Whether the trial court's decision must be reversed based on insufficiency of 
the evidence.

 

A. 
Whether the injuries sustained by both Mr. Glazier and Ms. Davis are consistent 
with Ms. Davis being the driver of the motorcycle.

 

B. 
Whether the positions where Mr. Glazier and Ms. Davis landed prove that Ms. 
Davis was the driver of the motorcycle.

 

C. 
Whether Mr. Glazier's recanted admissions that he was the driver of the 
motorcycle provide conclusive evidence that he actually was the 
driver.

 

II. 
Whether, if it is found that Mr. Glazier was the driver at the time of the 
accident, his actions were the proximate cause of Ms. Davis' 
death.

 

III. 
Whether the conviction must be reversed because the statute establishes an 
impermissible mandatory presumption that the defendant was incapable of safely 
driving because he had an alcohol concentration of 0.10% or 
more.

 
 

[¶4.]     On May 18, 1991, Mason 
Glazier (appellant) and his companion, Sunni Davis, were on a "poker run." A 
"poker run" is an activity in which a participant pays an admission fee and then 
makes five predetermined stops along a predetermined route and obtains a card at 
each stop. When all have arrived at the final destination, the person with the 
best hand wins. Appellant and Davis were riding 
the poker run intending to rendezvous with the rest of their group in Story, Wyoming, where, at the conclusion of the poker 
run, there was to be a weekend party.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant and Davis left Casper on appellant's Harley Davidson 
motorcycle at about 12:30 in the afternoon. Their first stop was at the Hole in 
the Wall Bar in Kaycee where they stayed about 45 minutes. Their next stop was 
the Buffalo Bar in Buffalo, 
Wyoming where they stayed 45 
minutes to an hour. Appellant and his companion consumed alcoholic beverages at 
these two stops.

 
 

[¶6.]     At about 5:00 p.m. law 
enforcement officers and an ambulance were summoned to respond to a one-vehicle 
accident just east of the I-25 and I-90 interchange near Buffalo, Wyoming. When Patrolman Stauffacher arrived at 
the scene, he observed a female lying on her stomach with her head facing 
downhill in a cement drainage ditch. She appeared to be critically injured. 
Patrolman Stauffacher observed appellant, who was walking and did not appear to 
be as critically injured. Patrolman Stauffacher asked appellant if he remembered 
what happened. He responded that they "were pushed wide in the corner." The 
patrolman also asked if they had been passed by a car or a truck, and appellant 
replied that he did not know.

 
 

[¶7.]     The ambulance crew 
placedthe critically injured woman into the ambulance. Two officers escorted 
appellant to the ambulance as well. Both officers testified that they could 
smell alcohol on appellant. Later in the evening, Patrolman Stauffacher went to 
the hospital to complete his accident report. He spoke with appellant again 
about the cause of the accident. Appellant said that he had been "pushed wide in 
a turn." The patrolman inquired what had pushed them, and appellant stated he 
was not sure but it may have been a gust of wind. Patrolman Stauffacher then 
asked why the brakes were not applied before leaving the roadway. Appellant 
responded that he was afraid to apply the brakes in lose dirt since he might 
lose control of the motorcycle and that he believed he could "ride it out" 
without applying the brakes. However when he saw they were approaching a deep 
ravine, he did apply the brakes and lost control of the motorcycle. Appellant 
also told Patrolman Stauffacher that neither of the riders was wearing a helmet. 
Since Patrolman Stauffacher had detected the odor of alcohol, he requested that 
blood be drawn. Appellant's blood alcohol concentration was 
.17.

 
 

[¶8.]     One week after the 
motorcycle wreck in which SunniDavis sustained severe head injuries, she died. 
Appellant also sustained severe injuries in the wreck. He was hospitalized for 
twenty-three days and spent eighteen of those days on the critical 
list.

 
 

[¶9.]     A criminal complaint 
charging appellant with aggravated vehicular homicide was filed May 18, 1991. 
The complaint alleged that appellant was operating a motorcycle in violation of 
W.S. 31-5-233, Wyoming's driving under the influence law, and 
that the violation of law was the proximate cause of a death. Appellant waived 
his right to a jury trial. The case was tried in a bench trial to the district 
court. The district court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to a term of 
five to ten years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Timely notice of appeal was 
filed.

 
 
SUFFICIENCY 
OF EVIDENCE

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellant contends that the evidence at 
trial was insufficient to prove the elements of aggravated vehicular homicide. 
The Wyoming 
aggravated vehicular homicide statute, W.S. 6-2-106(b) (1988), 
provides:

 

(b) 
A person is guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, 
if:

 

(i) 
While operating or driving a vehiclein violation of W.S. 10-6-103, 31-5-233 or 
41-13-206, he causes the death of another person and the violation is the 
proximate cause of the death; or

 

(ii) 
He operates or drives a vehicle in a reckless manner, and his conduct is the 
proximate cause of the death of another person.

 

The 
complaint charged appellant with driving under the influence in violation of 
W.S. 31-5-233.

 
 

[¶11.]  In reviewing sufficiency of evidence 
claims, we apply the following standard of review:

 

"Our 
standard for arriving at a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence is 
to determine whether it is adequate to support a reasonable inference of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the finder of fact, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State. The test is the same, whether 
the case was tried to the court or to a jury.

 

Longstreth 
v. State, 
832 P.2d 560, 562 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting 
Walter v. State, 811 P.2d 716, 719 (Wyo. 1991)).

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellant's primary argument is that Ms. 
Davis was driving the motorcycle at the time of the wreck. Appellant testified 
that while in Buffalo, Ms. Davis asked to drive 
the motorcycle and, afterthey left the town traffic in Buffalo, she began driving 
and was driving when the accident occurred.

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellant criticizes the State's reliance 
on his admissions that he was the driver of the motorcycle, arguing that 
admissions do not fill a void in the burden of proof. Appellant cites Eagan 
v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 198, 128 P.2d 215, 225-26 (1942) for 
the proposition that if the accused is the sole witness to a crime, his 
testimony cannot be automatically rejected. While appellant's argument is 
recognized in Eagan, it is also expressly 
limited by the court. In Leeper v. State, we defined the limits by 
holding that the Eagan rule applies only if three 
conditions are fulfilled: 1) defendant is the sole witness, 2) defendant's 
testimony is accepted if not improbable or not inconsistent with the facts and 
circumstances shown, and 3) defendant's credibility has not been impeached.  Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379, 
382 (Wyo. 
1979). See also, Leitel v. State, 579 P.2d 421, 424 (Wyo. 1978); Dangel v. State, 724 P.2d 1145, 1149 
(Wyo. 1986). 
In thisinstance, appellant's testimony was not automatically rejected, rather 
his version of the events was presented to the court and weighed along with the 
other evidence presented.

 
 

[¶14.]  However, appellant's credibility was an 
issue in that the claim that Ms. Davis was driving was not totally consistent 
with the facts and circumstances and was impeached on cross-examination. The 
following question and answer demonstrates the problem with appellant's 
claim:

 

Q. 
You know she's suspended [her driver's license], and you let her drive your 
bike; is that correct?

 

A. 
Yes, sir.

 

In 
addition to the unlikely scenario that appellant had portrayed, Ms. Davis' 
mother testified at trial that she had never seen Ms. Davis drive a 
motorcycle.

 
 

[¶15.]  Appellant, at different times after the 
accident, admitted to four different persons that he was the driver of the 
motorcycle at the time of the wreck. Appellant informed Undersheriff Kozisek, 
the first officer on the scene, that he was driving the motorcycle at the time 
of the wreck. He told Patrolman Stauffacher the same thing. He also indicated to 
the ambulance attendant that he was the driver. After Ms. Davis' funeral, 
appellant spoke to her mother and told herthat he was the driver. Appellant 
claims that he made the statements about being the driver because he knew that 
Ms. Davis had a suspended license and was trying to protect her. He claims that 
he told her mother he was driving in order to prevent Ms. Davis' mother from 
experiencing more pain.

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellant is correct that his previous 
admissions, which he now disavows, are not completely dispositive. However it is 
also true that the prior admissions are evidence which the district court was 
entitled to accept and weigh together with other evidence and appellant's 
testimony.

 
 

[¶17.]  Appellant also argues that the injuries 
sustained by both himself and Ms. Davis were more consistent with Ms. Davis 
driving. He states that Ms. Davis had bruising on her left hand and that she did 
not have external bruises on her back; that appellant had back bruises and 
multiple broken ribs and a broken shoulder; that because of the placement of the 
injuries, the argument goes, Ms. Davis must have been the 
driver.

 
 

[¶18.]  Appellant then points to the location of 
the bodies where he and Ms. Davis landed as evidence that Ms. Davis was driving. 
He states that Ms. Davis landed farthest from where the motorcycle left the 
interstate, that she probably was able to hold onto the handlebars and ride out 
the motorcycle longer than he could. Problematic to appellant's argument is the 
lack of conclusive evidence of where appellant landed. In his brief appellant 
admits that Patrolman Stauffacher was unable to determine where he landed, and 
yet goes on to state that "the evidence is uncontested that Mr. Glazier landed 
on the hillside, at the top of the ravine."

 
 

[¶19.]  Appellant also cites a photograph of the 
wrecked motorcycle at the scene. In that photograph a pair of women's boots are 
next to the motorcycle. Appellant claims that the proximity of the boots to the 
motorcycle proves that he was not driving. The location of the boots, however, 
is not conclusive but is to be considered by the court with all other evidence 
in determining the question of who was driving at the time of the 
accident.

 
 

[¶20.]  Given the inconclusive arguments of 
appellant, the contradicting admissions, and physical facts of the incident, 
there was evidence sufficient for the district court to find that appellant was 
the driver of the motorcycle at the time of the wreck.

 
 
PROXIMATE 
CAUSE

 
 

[¶21.]  Appellant argues that his conviction is 
infirm because his actions werenot the proximate cause of Ms. Davis' death. In 
order to prove causation, the State must prove that appellant was incapable of 
driving safely because he was under the influence and his inability to drive 
safely caused the death of Ms. Davis.  
W.S. 6-2-106(b) (1988).

 
 

[¶22.]  We analyze appellant's driving under the 
influence under our definition of proximate cause:

 

Proximate 
cause means that the accident or injury must be the natural and probable 
consequence of the act of negligence.

 

McClellan 
v. Tottenhoff, 
666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1983) (citing 
Frazier v. Pokorny, 349 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1960)). See also Buckles v. State, 
830 P.2d 702, 709 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting 
with approval a jury instruction from Kansas 
containing similar language); Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1092 
(Wyo. 1985); Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533, 540 (Wyo. 
1991). There is no proximate cause unless the driver was driving under the 
influence to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle.  Hodgins v. State, 
706 P.2d 655, 657 (Wyo. 1985).See also 
Redland v. State, 766 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Wyo. 
1989) (must be incapable of driving safely); Felske v. State, 706 P.2d 257, 260 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 

[¶23.]  In this case, the motorcycle left the 
highway in broad daylight at a high rate of speed. Appellant was under the 
influence of alcohol and drugs. This accident resulted. This evidence was 
sufficient to support the trial court's finding that appellant was incapable of 
safely driving and that this was the proximate cause of the accident. A 
reasonable person would foresee that driving a motorcycle while under the 
influence of impairing substances to such a degree that they are unable to drive 
safely might cause severe injury or death to themselves or another 
person.

 
 

[¶24.]  Appellant claims that Patrolman 
Stauffacher testified that the driver of the motorcycle did everything he would 
have done under the circumstances. The claim is too broad. Patrolman Stauffacher 
did not testify that he would have gotten drunk, used cocaine and then driven a 
motorcycle. Patrolman Stauffacher merely testified that once the vehicle was off 
the road, the driver did all one could do.

 
 

[¶25.]  Next, appellant claims thathis criminal 
responsibility is diminished if there was an intervening cause. Appellant argues 
that the wind and the presence of a ravine next to the highway were both 
intervening causes substantial enough to eliminate or reduce his criminal 
responsibility. In order to determine the effect of a claimed intervening cause, 
we utilize our definition of an intervening cause:

 

A 
defendant is usually relieved of liability by an unforeseeable intervening 
cause. However, an intervening cause does not relieve an earlier actor of 
liability if it was reasonably foreseeable. The causal connection is not broken 
where the original wrongdoer could reasonably have foreseen that injury to 
another would be a probable consequence of his negligence.

 

McClellan 
v. Tottenhoff, 
666 P.2d  at 414 (citations omitted). See also Century Ready-Mix Co. v. 
CampbellCountySch. 
Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 802 (Wyo. 1991). Appellant could only be relieved 
of criminal liability if the wind and the ravine were unforeseeable. However, 
they were not. The State's argument that wind in Wyoming is foreseeable, especially when 
emerging from an underpass, is persuasive. There was testimony that the wind was 
not blowing hard that day, and Patrolman Stauffacher could find no reason why 
the motorcycle left the highway other than that the driver was under the 
influence. We also agree with the State that it is foreseeable that there are 
stationary and often dangerous objects if one deviates from the established 
roadway. While certainly the wind and the ravine were factors that made the 
accident worse, they were not unforeseeable. The fact that there may have been 
wind and there was a ravine along the highway does not relieve appellant from 
his criminal negligence for driving the motorcycle under the influence of 
alcohol and drugs to a degree that he was incapable of driving 
safely.

 
 
IMPERMISSIBLE 
MANDATORY PRESUMPTION

 
 

[¶26.]  In Buckles v. State, we noted that 
the vehicular homicide statute does not carry a presumption that specified 
quantities of alcohol render one incapable of driving safely. Buckles, 
830 P.2d  at 706. Rather, we said the sole question is whether the driver, being 
under the influence, was incapable of driving safely. Id.

 
 

[¶27.]  Appellant argues that his conviction must 
be reversed because the statutory scheme establishesan impermissible mandatory 
presumption that appellant was incapable of safely driving because he had an 
alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more. The State, on the other hand, 
argues that any "mandatory presumption" is not at issue in this case because the 
district court did not employ an impermissible mandatory presumption in 
convicting appellant of aggravated vehicular homicide.

 
 

[¶28.]  After reviewing the record, we agree with 
the State that the district court did not rely on presumptions but instead found 
each element from the evidence presented at trial. Based on the evidence, and 
not any presumption, the district court properly concluded that appellant drove 
his motorcycle while under the influence of alcohol and cocaine to an extent he 
could not drive safely and that his impairment was the proximate cause of Ms. 
Davis' death.

 
 

[¶29.]  In this trial the State did not merely 
point to appellant's blood alcohol content as evidence of intoxication. Rather 
the State presented independent evidence of impairment. Both Undersheriff 
Kozisek and Patrolman Stauffacher testified that they could smell alcohol on 
appellant's breath at the scene of the accident. Deedra Hawk, a chemist from 
state publichealth, testified about an individual's level of 
impairment:

 

At 
above .17 you're going to have a decrease in judgment, your sensory perceptions 
are going to be altered, decreased, and your motor skills, your reaction time 
and such is also decreased.

 

Q. 
How would a blood alcohol concentration of a .17 affect a person's ability to 
operate a motor vehicle?

 

A. 
Well, your sense of judgment for one thing is going to be off. It's not going, 
as you know, it's not going to be normal. You're not going to be able to react 
to situations near as quickly and your judgment on what you should do in that 
situation is going to be altered also.

 
 

[¶30.]  Ms. Hawk also testified that the cocaine 
present in appellant's blood stream was ingested within a 12-hour period of time 
prior to when the sample was taken after the accident. Ms. Hawk then testified 
about the effect of cocaine and alcohol together:

 

Q. 
Now, what can you tell us then about the effect of cocaine and alcohol together 
on the human physiology?

 

A. 
They are going to accentuate each other. The cocaine is going to make the 
alcohol more evident and vice versa. The one thing that they have also found in 
the studies that I have read is that thealcohol increases the toxicity of the 
cocaine which makes it more lethal. It also seems to increase the paranoia and 
hallucinations, especially the paranoia. They think that people are after them 
and such.

 
 

[¶31.]  The State also points out that the 
prosecutor was attempting to prove a violation of W.S. 6-2-106(b)(i), the 
driving while under the influence provision of the vehicular homicide statute 
rather than the recklessness provision under W.S. 6-2-106(b)(ii).  While the indictment and complaint are 
not tailored that specifically, the evidence presented does reflect that 
approach, which is certainly permissible.

 
 

[¶32.]  Under W.S. 31-5-233, driving while under 
the influence can be proven in two ways. Section (b)(i) prohibits driving if the 
person has an alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more.  W.S. 31-5-233 (1989). Section (b)(ii) 
prohibits driving if the person is under the influence of alcohol or a 
controlled substance to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving. 
W.S. 31-5-233(b)(ii). If the prosecutor had attempted to prove the aggravated 
vehicular homicide by using the blood alcohol concentration alone, then the 
mandatory presumption issue appellant discusses might be beforeus. However, the 
prosecutor proved that appellant was incapable of driving safely because he was 
under the influence of alcohol and a controlled substance. The prosecutor did 
not merely put on evidence of the blood alcohol concentration and then rest his 
case. Rather, he presented evidence demonstrating specifically that appellant 
was incapable of driving safely. Appellant's conviction did not result because 
he was presumed incapable of driving safely solely because of his blood alcohol 
concentration, rather he was shown incapable of driving safely because of the 
effect of the amount of alcohol he had consumed and the accentuating effect of 
the cocaine. Therefore, the prosecutor did what the statute requires and proved, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was incapable of driving safely 
because he was operating the motorcycle while under the 
influence.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶33.]  The evidence in the record is sufficient 
to support the district court's finding that appellant was driving the 
motorcycle at the time of the wreck. The evidence is also sufficient to 
demonstrate that appellant's operation of the motorcycle while under the 
influence, to the extent he was incapable of driving safely, was the proximate 
cause of Ms. Davis' death. The district court did not rely on a mandatory 
statutory presumption to determine appellant's guilt of the crime charged. The 
evidence demonstrated that appellant was incapable of driving safely because he 
was under the influence of alcohol and cocaine. Finding no error, appellant's 
conviction is affirmed.

 
 

[¶34.]  Affirmed.