Case Title: People v. Eason

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82718-5

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 1990-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Decided July 5, 1990. Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Criminal Division, Research, Training and Appeals, for the people. Monash, Monash & Goldberg, P.C. (by Richard A. Monash), for the defendant. BOYLE, J. We granted leave to appeal to determine whether the procedural safeguards[1] surrounding a formal trial must be afforded a defendant subjected to an enhanced sentence pursuant to the second-offender provisions of the controlled substance act, MCL 333.7413; MSA 14.15(7413). We hold that a defendant charged under a statute which provides for imposition of an enhanced sentence on an individual previously convicted of an offense under the same statute is not entitled to notice within fourteen days of arraignment of the prosecutor's intent to seek sentence enhancement or to a separate proceeding on the question whether he has previously been convicted of a narcotics offense. I The questions presented in this case are: 1) did *232 the Legislature intend to require a supplementary information and a separate fact-finding proceeding under this statute, and, 2) if not, does the legislative scheme offend the constitution? Despite recent modification of sentence enhancement provisions, the Legislature has not granted defendants who are subsequent offenders under the same statute a right to early notice of sentence enhancement. Nor has it provided for a separate proceeding to determine the question of a defendant's prior conviction of a drug offense. The sentence enhancement provision is a legislative authorization for judges to tailor punishment to the criminal on the basis of an objective factor, i.e., a prior conviction under the same statute. The Legislature has long provided that where a prosecutor intends to proceed under the habitual offender act, a separate charge must be filed, the defendant is entitled to a full jury trial, and the defendant's prior convictions[2] must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The habitual offender statutes are considered alternate sentencing provisions rather than penalty-enhancement provisions.[3] In creating a sentence enhancement provision in the controlled substance act, the Legislature took a factor, the defendant's prior criminal convictions, a traditional consideration in determining a defendant's sentence, and authorized a weight to be given that factor, i.e., not more than twice the term authorized.[4] The statute is directed to facts *233 which relate to the criminal, not to the crime, and nothing in the act suggests a proceeding other than that comporting with the fundamental due process requirement that a sentence must be based on accurate information and a defendant have a reasonable opportunity at sentencing to challenge such information. By contrast, in situations in which the state creates a statutory scheme and elements of an offense, due process requires both notice of the charge and proof by the prosecutor of each element beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 US 358; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970). Conversely, a state may define the elements of an offense, and due process does not require the state to satisfy the reasonable-doubt standard as to facts not included in the statutory definition of an offense, so long as the definition does not offend a deeply rooted principle of justice. Patterson v New York, 432 US 197; 97 S Ct 2319; 53 L Ed 2d 281 (1977). Thus, due process does not require the state to proceed by notice of a separate charge, the right to trial by jury, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt wherever sentence enhancement is authorized. Due process does not require the prosecutor to charge the prior drug conviction in the information in order for the defendant's sentence to be enhanced on the basis of the prior conviction because the prior offense is not an element of a separate charge.[5] Nor is the defendant entitled to *234 a trial-type procedure regarding the use of the defendant's prior drug convictions for sentencing purposes.[6] In the instant case, the court informed the defendant prior to sentencing of the increased penalty for a second offense, the defendant had the opportunity at sentencing to contest the accuracy of the information included in the presentence report, and the accuracy of the information was admitted.[7] Where the statute does not contemplate a separate trial-type proceeding but, rather, provides for sentence enhancement, due process requires a reasonable opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the information relied on in passing sentence.[8] Because the defendant did not challenge the fact that he was a second offender, the Court of Appeals erred in vacating his sentence and remanding the case for resentencing. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the sentence imposed by the trial judge is reinstated. *235 II On February 25, 1985, law enforcement personnel raided the defendant's house and seized a small amount of cocaine and more than $30,000 in cash. The defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine. MCL 333.7401(1) and (2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(1) and (2)(a)(iv). The maximum sentence for this offense is twenty years in prison. On July 12, 1985, the defendant was arraigned in Detroit Recorder's Court, and on September 12, 1985, the prosecutor filed a written notice[9] of his intent to seek an enhanced (doubled) sentence pursuant to MCL 333.7413(2); MSA 14.15(7413)(2). The defendant was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, and on January 31, 1986, was sentenced to a maximum of forty years in prison.[10] Although advised at sentencing that the court was relying on the defendant's prior conviction for possession of heroin, neither the defendant nor counsel contested the accuracy of the prior conviction, and counsel confirmed that the presentence report was accurate. On March 7, 1986, the defendant moved to *236 vacate the sentence on the basis that the defendant's prior drug conviction was not charged in either the information or a supplemental information and that the prosecutor had not proven that the defendant was a recidivist drug offender. The defendant relied on People v Stout, 116 Mich App 726, 735; 323 NW2d 532 (1982), in which the Court of Appeals held: In our view the quoted language from [People v] Urynowicz [412 Mich 137; 312 NW2d 625 (1981)] makes clear that a subsequent drug offender's sentence may not be enhanced unless the prior drug offense is charged in either the information or a supplemental information and the prosecutor proves that the defendant is a recidivist drug offender. [Emphasis in original.] The sentencing judge believed the Court of Appeals erred in Stout, but also that, under Stout, the notice filed was sufficient because the defendant received the notice and had not contested his conviction on the underlying charge. The motion was denied. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction but remanded the case for sentencing.[11] The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant that the prosecution must charge the defendant as an habitual offender before his sentence could be enhanced under MCL 333.7413, 769.10(1)(c), 769.13; MSA 14.15(7413), 28.1082(1)(c), 28.1085. Relying on our decisions regarding proceedings under the habitual criminal act, the Court held that the prosecutor must file a supplemental information not more than fourteen days after a defendant is arraigned in circuit court unless the prosecutor *237 is unaware of any prior felony record until after conviction or the delay in filing the information is due to the need to verify out-of-state felony convictions based on the record of a defendant's prior arrests. People v Shelton, 412 Mich 565; 315 NW2d 537 (1982), reh den 413 Mich 1108 (1982). As these exceptions were not applicable, the Court of Appeals vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing[12] solely on defendant's charge of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. The prosecution contends that earlier decisions of this Court imposed procedural requirements in the sentence enhancement context that the Legislature never intended.[13] See People v Urynowicz, supra, People v Wright, 405 Mich 832; 275 NW2d 1 (1979), and People v Lester, 417 Mich 927; 330 NW2d 854 (1983). The prosecutor further submits that the recent ruling of the United States Supreme Court in McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79; 106 S Ct 2411; 91 L Ed 2d 67 (1986), provides a justification for reconsideration regarding the issue what procedures are required under due process when the court enhances a defendant's sentence pursuant to MCL 333.7413(2); MSA 14.15(7413)(2). The defendant claims that the prior drug offense must be charged in either the information or a supplemental information, and that the prosecutor *238 must prove that the defendant is a recidivist drug offender. III The issue presented is whether the sentence provision of the controlled substance act, authorizing an enhanced penalty for a defendant previously convicted of a like offense, offends due process by failing to provide prior notice of intent to enhance or a separate adversarial proceeding to establish proof of the prior conviction. People v Stout, supra. It is well settled that in a criminal trial, the defendant's conviction must rest on evidence which proves "beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged"[14] and includes the right to a trial by jury,[15] a public trial, counsel, confrontation of adverse witnesses, and a fair and speedy trial. The most fundamental of these safeguards in a criminal proceeding is the right to a trial by jury.[16] See Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 158, n 30; 88 S Ct 1444; 20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968); Baldwin v New *239 York, 399 US 66, 72; 90 S Ct 1886; 26 L Ed 2d 437 (1970). By contrast, the due process right at a typical sentencing hearing is the right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information. Trial-type procedures are not required. Williams v New York, 337 US 241; 69 S Ct 1079; 93 L Ed 1337 (1949).[17] In Williams, the United States Supreme Court rejected a claim that the defendant was denied the opportunity to confront and examine his accusers by the trial court's reliance on the presentence investigation as the basis for its sentence. Id., p 244. The Court held the procedure did not violate due process[18] and identified a distinction between guilt determination and sentencing, observing: In addition to the historical basis for different evidentiary rules governing trial and sentencing procedures there are sound practical reasons for the distinction.... [B]efore verdict the issue is whether a defendant is guilty of having engaged in certain criminal conduct of which he has been specifically accused. Rules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials which narrowly confine the trial contest to evidence that is strictly relevant to the particular offense charged.... A *240 sentencing judge, however, is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt.... Highly relevant if not essential to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics. [Id., pp 246-247.] The Court concluded that the "due process clause should not be treated as a device for freezing the evidentiary procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure." Id., p 251. Decisions following Williams supported traditional individualized sentencing on the basis of a broad inquiry.[19] The Court held that while information obtained in violation of a defendant's right to counsel[20] could not be considered, a sentencing judge might permissibly take into account a defendant's trial conduct[21] and the defendant's refusal to cooperate with law enforcement officials.[22] The basic tenor of these cases is that an individualized sentence can be based on any relevant and reliable information, and that, while normal sentencing proceedings are not immune from due process attacks, only minimal due process protections are required in those proceedings. United States v *241 Davis, 710 F2d 104 (CA 3, 1983), cert den 464 US 1001 (1983). However, the Supreme Court has required additional procedural safeguards to satisfy due process requirements in situations in which a court seeks to impose additional penalties on a defendant pursuant to a finding of fact equivalent to invoking a new charge.[23]Specht v Patterson, 386 US 605; 87 S Ct 1209; 18 L Ed 2d 326 (1967). In Specht, the defendant was convicted under one Colorado statute for indecent liberties which carried a maximum sentence of ten years.[24]Id., p 607. Thereafter, the defendant was sentenced under a different act[25] for a sentence of one day to life without full notice or a hearing. Id. The Court noted that the act made one conviction the basis for invoking a separate proceeding under the sex offenders act, thus requiring a determination that constituted "a new finding of fact." Id., p 608. As such, the defendant was entitled to the "`full panoply of the relevant protections which due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings ... all those safeguards which are fundamental rights and essential to a fair trial....'" Id., pp 609-610, citing Gerchman v Maroney, 355 F2d 302, 312 (CA 3, 1966). Subsequent to the Specht decision, in 1970, the United States Supreme Court declared that the *242 Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, supra, p 364. Five years later in Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684; 95 S Ct 1881; 44 L Ed 2d 508 (1975), the Court held that Maine's homicide statute impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant on the issue of heat of passion on sudden provocation. Justice Powell observed: [I]f Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive change in its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment. [Id., p 698.] However, in Riviera v Delaware, 429 US 877; 97 S Ct 226; 50 L Ed 2d 160 (1976), the Court confirmed that it remained constitutional to burden the defendant with proving the insanity defense, and also held that the state could place the burden of proving a new affirmative defense, extreme emotional disturbance, on the defendant when the affirmative defense did "not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict of murder." Patterson v New York, supra, p 207. While Winship and Specht establish that a Legislature is not wholly free to define elements of an offense as factors bearing only on punishment, it is clear that the limitation is a narrow exception to the deference accorded a state's administration of justice. *243 Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the accused have been left to the legislative branch. [Patterson v New York, supra, p 210.] In McMillan, supra, p 86, the Court recently has reaffirmed the state's ability to pursue "its chosen course in the area of defining crimes and proscribing penalties." The Court rejected a due process challenge to a state statute that provided for imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence where a sentencing judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an individual convicted of an offense "visib[ly] possess[ed] a firearm" during its commission.[26] While declining to define the express parameters of the state's authority to define the elements of an offense, the Court observed that Patterson had rejected the claim that whenever a state linked the severity of punishment to the presence or absence of an identified fact, McMillan, supra, p 84, the state must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court further distinguished Specht on the basis that in Specht the defendant was confronted with a "radically different situation" from the usual sentencing proceeding. The Court observed: The Pennsylvania Legislature did not change the definition of any existing offense. It simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment the instrumentality used in committing a violent felony and dictated the precise weight to be given that *244 factor if the instrumentality is a firearm. Pennsylvania's decision to do so has not transformed against its will a sentencing factor into an "element" of some hypothetical "offense." [Id., pp 89-90.] Of significance to the language in Stout, supra, that the prosecution prove the factor that authorizes enhancement, the Court also observed that "Sentencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burdens of proof at all," McMillan, supra, p 91, and noted "embracing ... the clear-and-convincing standard here would significantly alter criminal sentencing, for we see no way to distinguish the visible possession finding at issue here from a host of other express or implied findings sentencing judges typically make on the way to passing sentence." Id., p 92, n 8.[27] The second-offender provision with which we here deal likewise neither seeks to impose additional penalties on the basis of a finding of fact equivalent to a new charge, Specht, nor changes the definition of an existing offense, Winship. It simply takes one factor that has historically been of paramount importance in imposing an appropriate sentence, a previous conviction for a like offense, and authorizes an increased penalty. Therefore, due process neither compels a separate charge nor imposes trial-type evidentiary burdens on the sentencing process. IV In the present case, the Court of Appeals vacated *245 the defendant's sentence and remanded to the lower court for resentencing on the basis that the defendant did not receive sufficient notice of the prosecutor's intent to seek enhanced sentencing. However, we recognize the existence of precedent from this Court that suggests that it is error for a trial court to enhance a defendant's sentence under the controlled substance act unless a defendant is charged as a second or subsequent offender, as required under the habitual offender act. Despite the fact that in Oyler v Boles, 368 US 448, 452; 82 S Ct 501; 7 L Ed 2d 446 (1962), the United States Supreme Court held that due process required reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard relative to a recidivist charge, but not notice prior to trial on the underlying offense,[28] this Court, citing Oyler, thereafter held that the prosecutor separately, or coincidentally, must charge the defendant as an habitual offender prior to trial on the underlying substantive offense.[29]*246 People v Wright, 405 Mich 832; 275 NW2d 1 (1979). The apparent purpose of requiring the information to be filed is to provide the accused notice, at an early stage of the proceedings, of the potential consequences should the accused be convicted of the underlying offense. People v Shelton, supra, p 569. In Shelton, the Court defined "promptly" as not more than fourteen days after the individual the prosecutor elects to charge as an habitual offender is arraigned in circuit court on the underlying felony (or before trial if the defendant is tried within the fourteen-day period). It is clear from a reading of Oyler and McMillan that Shelton is distinguishable, and that due process does not require the filing of a separate charge pursuant to a statute that does not create a new offense but simply authorizes the sentencing court to enhance the sentence.[30] The prosecutor is *247 not required to charge the prior conviction in the information because it is not an element of a new charge, separate from the offense for which the defendant is presently charged. Instead, the prior conviction is a factor which the judge may consider when imposing the sentence. See People v Mellor, 302 Mich 537; 5 NW2d 455 (1942).[31] Where, as here, the factor, a prior conviction, has not historically been considered an element of the crime, is objectively ascertainable, and carries little risk of erroneous determination, and there is no indication that the Legislature is seeking to avoid the procedural protections of Winship,[32] due *248 process requires neither the filing of a separate charge nor adversarial proceedings at sentencing. In sum, "[t]raditional sentencing factors need not be pleaded and proved at trial." United States v Affleck, 861 F2d 97, 99 (CA 5, 1988). The pertinent sentence enhancement provision of the controlled substance act, MCL 333.7413(2); MSA 14.15(7413)(2) provides: (2) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (1) and (3), an individual convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this article may be imprisoned for a term not more than twice the term otherwise authorized or fined an amount not more than twice that otherwise authorized, or both. Under subsection 2, the trial judge may consider a defendant's prior offense if the present offense is a drug-related crime involving an amount less than fifty grams.[33] In the present case, the defendant was convicted of a second offense of an amount less than fifty grams, and the trial judge imposed a maximum sentence of forty years, twice the twenty-year maximum otherwise authorized. It is clear that neither the statute nor its predecessor[34] requires an information filed prior to trial *249 charging the defendant as a second offender under the habitual offender act or prior to a separate jury trial.[35] This Court's reference to Wright,[36] in Urynowicz, *250 supra, a second offense criminal sexual conduct sentence, implied that due process required a separate proceeding whenever a defendant's sentence is increased on the basis of prior offenses. Id. For the reasons stated, we are now of the view that the Court erred in Urynowicz in concluding due process requires a separate proceeding and proof before enhancing the sentence of a second offender.[37] *251 A defendant may challenge the accuracy of the information contained in the presentencing report and is entitled to an opportunity to be heard on the matter if accuracy is contested. However, enhanced sentences based on prior conviction of the same statute are not subject to the Shelton rule, nor do they require adversarial proceedings. CONCLUSION In this case, the defendant contends he did not receive the notice required under People v Shelton. He does not contend he was denied a reasonable opportunity to contest the information in the presentence report.[38] Although we hold that the fourteen-day rule in Shelton is not applicable to sentence enhancement authorized under this statute, we observe that due process requires notice of the information in the presentence report sufficiently in advance of sentence to provide a meaningful opportunity to contest its accuracy.[39] Thus, we would remand the case to the trial court if we were unable to determine that the defendant was provided a reasonable opportunity to respond to the accuracy of the information in the report. Here, the record confirms that counsel reviewed the presentence report and guidelines with the defendant, that defendant was given an opportunity to respond to the accuracy of the information *252 contained in the report,[40] and that counsel agreed that the information was accurate. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the sentence imposed below. RILEY, C.J., and BRICKLEY and GRIFFIN, JJ., concurred with BOYLE, J. CAVANAGH, J. (concurring). I agree with the majority that the Legislature did not intend defendant's status as a second offender under subsection (2) of § 7413 of the controlled substances act, MCL 333.7413(2); MSA 14.15(7413)(2), to be separately charged and proven. I also agree that neither the federal nor the state constitutional guarantees of due process[1] require that defendant's prior conviction be treated as a new crime that must be separately charged and proven at a separate trial. However, I do not join the lead opinion's suggestion that no additional procedural protections are required under the Due Process Clause in a case, like this one, in which a factual finding at sentencing, unrelated to the proof establishing a defendant's underlying conviction, doubles the maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed. As I interpret Specht v Patterson, 386 US 605, 610; 87 S Ct 1209; 18 L Ed 2d 326 (1967), and McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79; 106 S Ct 2411; 91 L Ed 2d 67 (1986), before an enhanced penalty under § 7413(2) may be imposed, a defendant is entitled to contest his alleged prior-offender status at an adversarial hearing where the prosecution carries the burden of proving the *253 sentence-enhancing fact by at least a preponderance of the evidence, and where the defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, to present evidence, and to confront and cross-examine any witnesses against him. This hearing need not be conducted whenever a defendant is sentenced under § 7413(2), but may be conditioned upon the defendant's choice to contest the existence of his prior conviction. Still, the defendant's decision not to contest, but to admit a prior conviction and waive these safeguards must be preceded by adequate notice so that the decision is knowing and voluntary. Nevertheless, even though the record permits an inference of inadequate notice and unintelligent waiver, this defendant simply has not raised such a claim. The defendant has never suggested that he or his counsel had inadequate time or information to prepare to contest his alleged prior conviction. Nor did he or his counsel request a continuance for that purpose either when the sentencing judge questioned defense counsel about the accuracy of the allegations in the presentence report, which included reference to defendant's prior drug conviction, or when the enhancement issue was subsequently raised by the judge. Defendant has never, even in this Court, claimed that he did not commit the prior offense or that the prior conviction is somehow invalid. He claims only that the absence of a separate charge and accompanying proof of his prior conviction requires his enhanced sentence to be vacated, and does not demand an opportunity to contest his prior conviction on remand. Absent either a claim by the defendant that his admission of his prior conviction was not knowing or voluntary, or a showing of prejudice,[2] I *254 conclude that there is no statutory or constitutional basis for vacating defendant's sentence and join the result reached by the majority. ARCHER, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J. LEVIN, J. (to affirm). Eason was charged with possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of a mixture containing cocaine.[1] The prosecutor did not charge Eason as a repeat offender in the information charging the current offense, nor did the prosecutor file a supplemental information within fourteen days after Eason's arraignment. Eason was convicted as charged. On the basis of a prior drug-related conviction, Eason was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty to forty years.[2] The Court of Appeals affirmed Eason's conviction but concluded that the procedures applicable under the habitual offender provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure[3] also apply where the prosecutor *255 seeks sentence enhancement under the controlled substances article. Since the prosecutor had not filed a supplemental information charging Eason as a repeat offender within fourteen days after Eason's arraignment,[4] as required in habitual offender proceedings, the Court vacated Eason's sentence.[5] The majority holds that the procedures applicable to sentence enhancement under the habitual offender provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply to sentence enhancement under the controlled substances article. The majority goes on to hold that the "procedures" in the instant case were not violative of the Due Process Clause. I agree with the majority that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the prosecutor to notify a defendant before trial on the current offense that, if he is convicted of that offense, he is subject to sentence enhancement on the basis of a prior conviction of a similar offense. I would hold that the procedures applicable under the habitual offender provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to sentence enhancement under the controlled substances article. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals *256 because that Court correctly applied this Court's decisions concerning the requisite procedures. I Under both the controlled substances article of the Public Health Code and its predecessor, the Controlled Substances Act, this Court has required the prosecutor to charge the defendant as a second or subsequent offender when seeking sentence enhancement.[6] A The only decision of this Court concerning the procedures to be followed when the prosecutor sought sentence enhancement under the Controlled Substances Act is People v Wright, 405 Mich 832; 275 NW2d 1 (1979). There, the defendant was charged with delivery of cocaine[7] and conspiracy to deliver cocaine.[8] The prosecutor did not charge Wright as a second offender.[9] Wright was convicted as charged. Wright argued on appeal that he had been *257 denied reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[10] The basis for Wright's claim was that at his arraignment he had been misled regarding the maximum possible sentences,[11] and that at the sentencing hearing he was not given an adequate opportunity to explain his prior drug-related conviction. Wright's due process claim was not based on the prosecutor's failure to inform him before trial of the most recent offenses of the possibility of sentence enhancement. This Court issued a peremptory order vacating Wright's sentences, and remanded the case for resentencing: The sentencing court improperly imposed double sentence pursuant to MCL 335.348; MSA 18.1070(48). Oyler v Boles, 368 US 448; 82 S Ct 501; 7 L Ed 2d 446 (1962). See MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, as amended by 1978 PA 77. In Oyler v Boles, cited by this Court in Wright, the United States Supreme Court said that "a defendant must receive reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard relative to [a] recidivist charge," but that "due process does not require that notice be given prior to the trial on the substantive offense."[12] *258 The majority suggests that the reference to Oyler in Wright is evidence that this Court decided Wright on the basis of a mistaken belief that the Due Process Clause required notice of the possibility of sentence enhancement before trial of the current offense, and that Wright was therefore wrongly decided.[13] The suggestion that this Court in Wright misunderstood the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Oyler is unsupported by the language of the order in Wright[14] and (see n 11 and the accompanying text) by the contentions of the parties. There is evidence that the Court understood the applicable law. B The Controlled Substances Act was repealed in 1978 and the Public Health Code was simultaneously *259 enacted. The controlled substances article[15] of the Public Health Code does not specify procedures to be followed when the prosecutor seeks sentence enhancement. The procedural requirements for sentence enhancement under the new law were first addressed in People v Stout, 116 Mich App 726; 323 NW2d 532 (1982). Stout was charged with possession of less than 50 grams of cocaine,[16] and possession of marihuana.[17] The prosecutor filed a supplemental information charging Stout under the habitual offender provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.[18] Stout was convicted as charged. The trial court dismissed the supplemental information, and sentenced Stout for the cocaine conviction pursuant to the repeat offender provision of the controlled substances article.[19] Stout argued on appeal that his sentence should be vacated because he was not given notice of the repeat offender charge and because there was no hearing or trial concerning his prior drug-related convictions. The Court of Appeals agreed. Relying primarily on this Court's opinion in People v Urynowicz, 412 Mich 137; 312 NW2d 625 (1981) (per curiam),[20] the Court of Appeals said: *260 In our view ... Urynowicz makes clear that a subsequent drug offender's sentence may not be enhanced unless the prior drug offense is charged in either the information or a supplemental information and the prosecutor proves that the defendant is a recidivist drug offender. [Stout, supra, p 735. Emphasis in original.] Since the trial court dismissed the supplemental information charging Stout under the habitual offender provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the prosecutor had not proved Stout's prior drug-related convictions, the Court of Appeals held that sentence enhancement was improper.[21] This Court has twice vacated sentences enhanced under the controlled substances article because the defendant was not charged as a second or subsequent offender. People v Lester, 417 Mich 927; 330 NW2d 854 (1983); People v Cobb, 422 Mich 901; 367 NW2d 335 (1985). In these cases, unlike Wright, supra, the Court's orders mention the prosecutor's failure to charge the defendant as a repeat offender as the basis for holding that sentence enhancement was improper.[22] II The Court's decisions applying the sentence enhancement provisions for repeat drug offenders are *261 in a long line of decisions of this Court in which the prosecutor has always been required absent unusual circumstances not present in the instant case[23] to notify the defendant before trial of the current offense that, if he is convicted, he will be subject to sentence enhancement on the basis of a prior conviction. The Court has imposed this requirement without regard to whether a particular statute that authorizes sentence enhancement specifies the procedures to be followed when the prosecutor seeks an enhanced sentence. A The Michigan liquor law authorized sentence enhancement for a second or subsequent conviction without specifying the procedures to be followed when the prosecutor sought sentence enhancement. 1 In People v Ancksornby, 231 Mich 271; 203 NW 864 (1925), the defendant was charged with unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor and with selling and furnishing as a first offender. Ancksornby pled guilty to the information and, on the basis of an alleged post-plea acknowledgment of a prior conviction under the liquor law, the trial court imposed an enhanced sentence.[24] *262 Ancksornby appealed on the ground that an enhanced sentence could not be imposed because the prosecutor had not charged him as a second offender. The prosecutor confessed error.[25] This Court held that Ancksornby's sentence was excessive and illegal: The trial judge was in error. He sentenced the defendant for an offense of which he had not been convicted. The statute provides an increased punishment for a second or subsequent offense, but it must be charged as such in the information. That was not done in this case. [Id., p 272.] In People v McDonald, 233 Mich 98; 206 NW 516 (1925), the defendant was charged in the complaint and the information with unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor as a second offense. McDonald was tried, convicted and sentenced accordingly. At the preliminary examination, however, *263 the prosecutor did not offer evidence concerning McDonald's prior conviction. The Court said that "[t]he information must contain an averment of former conviction ... to justify a conviction and sentence therefor."[26] Although the former conviction was alleged in the information, "[a]s there was no proof of a former conviction submitted on the examination had, the averment thereof should have been stricken from the information and the objection of the defendant to the introduction [at the trial] of proof thereunder sustained."[27]McDonald was followed in People v Van Vorce, 240 Mich 75, 78; 215 NW 5 (1927). 2 Referring to Ancksornby, McDonald, and Van Vorce, the majority says that the "better construction" of those decisions is that "the Court construed the legislation in question as necessarily requiring a separate information filed to provide the opportunity for a preliminary examination for the defendant and to provide the circuit court with jurisdiction."[28] The majority also appears to suggest that a first offense was a misdemeanor, while a second or subsequent offense was a felony, and that the distinction is somehow significant.[29] The majority's attempt to distinguish Ancksornby, *264 McDonald, and Van Vorce is unpersuasive. The assertion that the prosecutor was required to file a separate information to provide the defendant with an opportunity for a preliminary examination ignores that when the Court decided those cases, a defendant who was accused of violating the liquor law was entitled to a preliminary examination and was subject to circuit court jurisdiction without regard to whether he was charged as a first or repeat offender.[30] The majority is again incorrect when it asserts that in the liquor law cases a first offense was a misdemeanor while a second or subsequent offense was a felony. When the liquor law was initially enacted, a first offense was indeed a misdemeanor.[31] By the time the Court decided Ancksornby, McDonald, and Van Vorce, however, the Legislature had amended the liquor law to make a first offense a felony.[32] In any event, the misdemeanor/felony distinction now determinative of whether a preliminary examination is required[33] and the jurisdictions of the district and circuit courts[34] *265 was not determinative when the Court decided those cases.[35] B Another statutory scheme that authorizes sentence enhancement for a second or subsequent conviction without specifying the procedures to be followed when the prosecutor seeks sentence enhancement concerns driving under the influence of alcohol. 1 The Attorney General issued an opinion in 1940 concerning the proper practice when prosecuting a person who had previously been convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol.[36] The Attorney General said: We feel that the proper procedure to be followed in cases of this nature is to charge the offender with a second or subsequent offense in the original *266 complaint, have a preliminary examination before the proper magistrate, and in the event that the magistrate finds probable cause, have the accused bound over to the circuit court to stand trial. The information would charge a second or subsequent offense so as to apprize the accused and the court of the fact that such a second offense is charged. [OAG, 1939-1940, p 427 (February 29, 1940).[37] Emphasis added.] In People v Bosca, 25 Mich App 455; 181 NW2d 678 (1970), the information charged the defendant as a second offender under the drunk driving law.[38] Bosca moved to quash the information on the basis that it was defective because it alleged both the current and the prior offense. The trial court denied Bosca's motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that "before a defendant's punishment for the current offense can be enlarged, the earlier conviction must be charged and proved."[39]*267 The Court of Appeals has followed Bosca,[40] and this Court has expressly approved its holding and rationale.[41] 2 The majority cites People v Mellor, 302 Mich 537; 5 NW2d 455 (1942), a case involving a second conviction of drunk driving, in support of its argument that a prosecutor is not required to charge a prior conviction because an earlier conviction is merely a factor for the judge to consider in sentencing and not an element of a new charge.[42] The defendant in Mellor was charged,[43] convicted, and sentenced[44] as a second offender. On appeal, Mellor argued that the prior conviction and the current *268 offense should have been set forth in separate counts of the information.[45] The Court rejected Mellor's contention and said that it was not error to allege both the current offense and the prior conviction in the same count.[46] The Court did not say that there was no need to charge a defendant as a second offender Mellor had been so charged.[47] 3 The majority appears to attempt to distinguish drunk driving from the case at hand on the basis that a prior conviction is an "element" of a repeat drunk driving offense because a first offense is a misdemeanor whereas a subsequent offense may be a felony.[48] *269 When the Court decided Mellor and the Attorney General issued his opinion, a second or subsequent conviction of drunk driving was a misdemeanor.[49] When the Court of Appeals decided Bosca, a second conviction was a misdemeanor and a third or subsequent conviction within a ten-year period was, indeed, a felony.[50] Thus, when the defendant in Bosca was charged as a second offender,[51] he was charged with committing a misdemeanor, not a felony. The premise of the majority's analysis that a subsequent offense is a felony and the prior offense was a misdemeanor is thus factually incorrect. In all events, the prior conviction is no more an "element" when it constitutes a misdemeanor than when it constitutes a felony.[52] The majority also says that the "better construction" of the drunk driving laws is that "the Court construed the legislation in question as necessarily requiring a separate information filed to provide the opportunity for a preliminary examination for the defendant and to provide the circuit court with *270 jurisdiction."[53] I acknowledge that the difference in the maximum sentence between a first and subsequent conviction of drunk driving is determinative of a defendant's entitlement to a preliminary examination and of the jurisdictions of the justice of the peace and circuit court. The jurisdictional significance of the availability of an enhanced sentence was indeed one basis for the Attorney General's opinion in 1940.[54] It was not, however, the only basis for the Attorney General's opinion.[55] Nor was it a basis of the Court of Appeals decision in Bosca.[56] C Still another statutory scheme that authorizes sentence enhancement for a second or subsequent conviction without specifying the procedures to be followed when the prosecutor seeks sentence enhancement is found in the provisions of the Penal Code concerning criminal sexual conduct. 1 This Court construed those provisions in People v Urynowicz, 412 Mich 137; 312 NW2d 625 (1981) (per curiam). The information charged Urynowicz *271 with first-degree criminal sexual conduct.[57] He pled guilty in exchange for the dismissal of a supplemental information that had been filed under the habitual offender provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.[58] The basis of the habitual offender charge was a prior conviction of gross indecency. That conviction also would have justified the imposition of a mandatory five-year minimum sentence under the criminal sexual conduct provisions of the Penal Code, but Urynowicz was not charged under the provision.[59] When taking Urynowicz' plea, the trial court told him that the maximum punishment for first-degree criminal sexual conduct was life imprisonment, but did not inform him of the mandatory five-year minimum sentence for a second conviction of criminal sexual conduct. Urynowicz was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeals reversed Urynowicz' conviction on the basis of the trial court's failure to inform Urynowicz of the mandatory minimum sentence.[60]The prosecutor argued that the provision requiring a five-year minimum sentence was not operative in Urynowicz' sentencing[61]because *272 he had not been charged under that provision. This Court agreed with the prosecutor's analysis. The Court first observed that "[w]e have said in the past that second-offender provisions with mandatory sentence enhancement require that the information must charge the earlier conviction before a defendant may be liable for the additional punishment."[62] After reviewing the decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, the Urynowicz Court concluded: We believe that [the Court of Appeals] captured the essence of this Court's earlier decisions when [it said] in Bosca that "before a defendant's punishment for the current offense can be enlarged, the earlier conviction must be charged and proved." This defendant was not charged under § 520f. Consequently, there was no mandatory minimum of which advice ... was required. [Id., pp 143-144 (quoting Bosca, supra, p 458).][[63]] 2 The majority would jettison Urynowicz on the basis that "the Court erred in Urynowicz in concluding due process requires a separate proceeding and proof before enhancing the sentence of a second offender."[64] The alleged flaw in Urynowicz is the Court's reference to Wright.[65] The majority *273 says that the reference to Wright "implied that due process required a separate proceeding whenever a defendant's sentence is increased on the basis of prior offenses."[66] The majority's contention that Urynowicz was wrongly decided is predicated on two assumptions: 1) this Court decided Wright on the basis of an incorrect reading of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Oyler; and 2) this Court compounded its error by mentioning Wright in Urynowicz. As previously discussed, however, Wright was not decided on the basis of a mistaken belief that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment always requires notice of the possibility of sentence enhancement before trial on the most recent offense.[67] Further, the decision in Urynowicz contains an accurate description of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Oyler,[68] and of this Court's order in Wright. Even if the reference to Wright in Urynowicz did evidence a mistaken belief that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was *274 implicated on the facts of Urynowicz which it did not that "error" would not be an adequate basis on which to overrule Urynowicz. It is incorrect to suggest that the Due Process Clause was the basis of decision in Urynowicz. The Court discussed six different decisions.[69] While Wright was based on the United States Constitution, the other five decisions relied on the statutory and common law of this state. III In requiring the prosecutor to charge the defendant as a second or subsequent offender when seeking an enhanced sentence, this Court has followed the rule advocated by most legal authorities and adopted in most jurisdictions. A The principle that an accused, subject to a heavier penalty because of his recidivism, must be charged as a recidivist resounds in legal treatises and encyclopedias:[70] [T]he indictment must set out every element of crime which enters into the punishment, since otherwise it does not set out fully the *275 offense.... [Bishop, Statutory Crimes, § 167, p 184.] [U]nder ordinary forms of the statutory provision, if the offence is the second or third, and by reason thereof the punishment is to be made heavier, this fact must appear in the indictment; because by the rules of criminal pleading, every particular which makes heavier the punishment to be inflicted must be set out. [Bishop, Criminal Law (9th ed), § 961, pp 710-711.] The indictment must allege every fact and modification of fact legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted. [I Bishop, New Criminal Procedure (2d ed), § 81.] The result is that in every case, with no exception, the common law requires each individual thing which itself or a statute has made in that wrongful aggregation out of which the punishment proceeds, to be alleged in the indictment. [Id., § 84.] In most jurisdictions, by statute, a person who has been convicted of certain offenses, like larceny or the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors or drunkenness, for instance, is rendered liable to an increased punishment for a second or third offense. The previous conviction enters into the second or third offense to the extent of aggravating it, and increasing the punishment; and, where it is sought to impose the greater penalty for a second or third offense, the previous conviction or convictions, like every other material fact, must be distinctly alleged in the indictment. [Clark, Criminal Procedure, § 84, p 204.]*276 There are many cases in which a second conviction changes the grade of the offense or authorizes the infliction of an increased punishment, and where this is the case the former conviction enters as an element into the new offense and should be alleged as a necessary part of the description and character of the crime intended to be punished directly and not by recital. [Joyce, Indictments (2d ed), § 449, p 516.] So a sentence to an increased penalty, imposed by statute upon a second conviction, cannot be rendered, except upon an allegation in the indictment, and upon proof, of a prior conviction. [Joyce, supra, p 518.] Where a second conviction changes the grade of an offense, or authorizes a higher penalty than could otherwise be imposed, the former conviction enters as an element into the new offense, and must be alleged and proved as a necessary part of the description and character of the crime intended to be punished. [8 Ruling ] A person accused of crime as a recidivist is entitled to be informed by indictment or information that he is being charged as such. [39 Am Jur 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders, § 20, p 324.] In some jurisdictions statutes have been enacted which, without setting up more than one offense or more than one degree of the same offense, permit the infliction of a heavier sentence when it is shown that the accused committed the crime in question under circumstances showing aggravation. The decisions construing these statutes have *277 generally taken the position that in order to justify the imposition of the higher sentence, it is necessary that the matter of aggravation relied upon as calling for such sentence be charged in the indictment or complaint. [4 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law & Procedure, § 1788, p 610.] An indictment under which it is sought to impose a higher penalty by reason of a previous conviction must allege the fact of such conviction. [1 McClain, Criminal Law, § 28, p 28.] B In numerous cases decided in a host of other states, courts have held that repeat offenders, subject to heavier penalties because of their recidivism, must be charged as second or subsequent offenders[71] although the statutes, analogous to the *278 one before this Court, do not specify that an accused must be charged as a recidivist. Many of these cases, like the instant case, involve sentence enhancement provisions contained in drug offense statutes. Louisiana courts have required that prosecutors seeking heavier sentences against repeat offenders of a statute criminalizing possession of marijuana,[72] include in the bill of information an allegation that the crime is a multiple offense. See State v Bouzigard, 286 So 2d 633 (La, 1973).[73] In the case of a defendant charged with distribution under the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, the Louisiana court held that a defendant not charged as a second offender for distributing ethchlorvynol could not be sentenced as such.[74] In Sparkman v State Prison Custodian, 154 Fla 688; 16 So 2d 772 (1944), the Florida Supreme Court, citing numerous Florida and other state cases[75] where it was held that the fact of prior conviction(s) must be alleged to subject an accused to enhanced penalties, held that the general rule *279 applied as well to prosecutions under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Law.[76] The defendant in State v Loudermilk, 221 Kan 157; 557 P2d 1229 (1976), contended that his prior convictions should not have been contained in the indictment charging him as a subsequent violator of the narcotics laws. The court disagreed, explaining: [W]e think the defendant was entitled to know, and to be specifically advised by the information of the specific offense with which he was charged and the seriousness thereof, including the class of felony of which he stood accused. The information before us recited the prior conviction in detail, and noted that the offense charged was a class B felony. This gave the defendant proper notice of the charge. [Id., p 159.] *280 Courts have often spoken to this issue in alcohol offense cases. In Quintana v People, 169 Colo 295; 455 P2d 210 (1969), Quintana was charged with drunk driving and, in a separate count, with a prior conviction of drunk driving within the last five years. The allegation of the prior conviction contained in count two subjected the defendant to a higher penalty under the Colorado drunk driving statute. The Supreme Court of Colorado, finding the indictment to be in proper form, said: A complaint charging the defendant with drunk driving under this statute and also with a second or subsequent conviction within five years, requires procedurally that each be the subject of a separate count. [Id., p 298.][[77]] In Smith v State of Florida, 75 Fla 468; 78 So 530 (1918), the defendant was charged with a violation of the beverage laws of that state. The Florida Supreme Court held that the defendant must be charged with prior offenses if it is intended that he be charged as a second offender. Id., p 473.[78] Similarly, Kentucky courts have required that defendants subject to severer punishment under the sentence enhancement provision of the Prohibition Act be charged with the previous convictions.[79] *281 Courts applied the same rule to various theft statutes containing sentence enhancement provisions. The vehicle theft statute at issue in Studdard v State, 225 Ga 410, 411; 169 SE2d 327 (1969), provided: "The indictment charging any offense under this section shall contain the same allegations as prior to the adoption of this section."[[80]] The Georgia Supreme Court said: Prior to the adoption of such section, it had been consistently held that where the State sought to impose a greater penalty for an illegal act because of the defendant's alleged "incorrigible and dangerous character" resulting from prior convictions, such prior convictions must be alleged in the indictment.... [Citations omitted.] Such allegations are necessary to inform the defendant of the nature of the offense with which he is charged since they involve the penalty which may be invoked.[[81]] Illinois cases have similarly so held with respect to *282 sentence enhancement statutes contained in Illinois theft statutes.[82] In cases focused on sundry other types of statutes, e.g., statutes prohibiting illegal cohabitation,[83] joyriding,[84] lotteries,[85] unlawful use of weapons,[86] pandering,[87] prostitution,[88] and insufficient fund checks,[89] courts have required that prosecutors seeking increased sentences, charge the accused with the prior conviction(s). The majority departs from this long-settled and widely accepted rule. C Particularly relevant are cases in which this general rule was followed although the Legislature had enacted other sentence enhancement statutes containing explicit procedural safeguards. In Haffke v State, 149 Neb 83; 30 NW2d 462 (1948), the Supreme Court of Nebraska was called upon to decide what procedures must be followed when imposing an enhanced sentence for second or subsequent convictions of driving under the influence *283 of intoxicating liquor.[90] Although the applicable statute[91] was silent as to the procedures to be followed when imposing the more severe sentence, the Nebraska Habitual Criminal Act contained explicit procedural safeguards.[92] The Haffke court held that the recently amended procedural requirements in the Habitual Criminal Act were applicable to all situations "where punishment is sought under any statute defining one crime and providing for an enhanced penalty upon conviction of a second or subsequent offense." The court said: While the above statute by its terms applies only to the Habitual Criminal Act, yet it announces rules of practice and procedure that, as a matter of sound public policy, should apply to any statute which imposes the duty upon a court to inflict a greater punishment upon the repetition of an offense. [Id. at 95.] Other cases where courts required prosecutors to charge defendants as repeat offenders under "procedurally silent" statutes even though habitual offender statutes in the jurisdictions expressly provided that defendants must be charged as habitual violators, include State v McClay, 146 Me 104; 78 *284 A2d 347 (1951),[93]People v Hightower, 414 Ill 537; 112 NE2d 126 (1953),[94]People v Ratner, 67 Cal App 2d Supp 902; 153 P2d 790 (1944),[95] and State v Waller, 167 Ind App 231; 339 NE2d 61 (1975).[96] *285 D Many of the cases and authorities cited in the preceding sections predate the enactment of habitual offender provisions in this and other states.[97] Thus, the principle that a defendant may not be sentenced as a recidivist unless he was charged as a recidivist predates the enactment of habitual offender statutes. This principle was developed by the courts over the course of several decades in applying procedurally silent sentence enhancement provisions. IV I agree with the majority[98] that the Legislature's intent should be considered in deciding whether the prosecutor must charge a defendant as a repeat offender. A A statute should be construed to avoid absurd or *286 unreasonable results.[99] The majority says that it was the Legislature's intention that the prosecutor need not inform the defendant before trial on the current offense that if he is convicted of that offense, he will be subject to sentence enhancement on the basis of a prior drug-related conviction. Adoption of the majority's view would mean that a defendant who was subject to a more severe penalty would be afforded fewer procedural safeguards than a defendant who was subject to a less severe penalty. Absent a clear expression of legislative intent, the majority's construction should be rejected. 1 The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for sentence enhancement where a defendant who is convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of one or more felonies.[100] These habitual offender provisions are not limited to cases where the defendant's most recent conviction is for the same or a similar offense as his prior conviction(s). When the prosecutor seeks sentence enhancement under the habitual offender provisions, the general rule is that he must file a supplemental information charging the defendant as an habitual offender within fourteen days of the arraignment *287 or before trial if the defendant is tried within that fourteen-day period. People v Shelton, 412 Mich 565, 566; 315 NW2d 537 (1982) (per curiam).[101] If the prosecutor does not learn of the defendant's prior felony conviction(s) until after the defendant's conviction of the most recent offense, the prosecutor may institute postconviction proceedings *288 to sentence the defendant as an habitual offender.[102] The rules of practice and procedure that have been developed for prosecutions under the habitual offender provisions are based on this Court's construction of the relevant statutes,[103] and its exercise of its supervisory power over the practices and procedures in the courts of this state.[104]Those rules are not based on the United States Constitution.[105] 2 Under the habitual offender provisions, where a defendant with one prior felony conviction is convicted of a felony that is punishable "by imprisonment for a term less than life," the trial court "may place the person on probation or sentence the person to imprisonment for a maximum term which is not more than 1 1/2 times the longest term prescribed for a first conviction of that offense or for a lesser term."[106] Under the sentence enhancement provision of the controlled substances article, where a defendant with one prior drug-related conviction is convicted of another drug-related offense, he "may *289 be imprisoned for a term not more than twice the term otherwise authorized or fined an amount not more than twice that otherwise authorized, or both."[107] However, where both the prior and current convictions involved 50 grams or more of a controlled substance, the defendant "shall be imprisoned for life and shall not be eligible for probation, suspension of sentence, or parole during that mandatory term."[108] The construction placed on the controlled substances article by the majority attributes to the Legislature an intention to provide a defendant facing a possible fifty percent increase in the maximum sentence with the right to be informed of that possibility at an early stage in the proceedings, but deny early notice to a defendant who is facing a possible one hundred percent increase. It attributes to the Legislature an intention to provide a defendant facing a possible five- or ten-year increase in the maximum sentence with early *290 notice of that possibility, but not a defendant facing the possibility of mandatory imprisonment for life. The majority's construction thus attributes to the Legislature a purpose to act in disregard of the conception that the quantity and quality of needed procedural safeguards should be in direct relation to the severity of the possible penalty. I would wait for a clear expression of legislative intent before abandoning the well-established rule that the prosecutor must charge the defendant as a repeat offender when seeking an increased sentence on the basis of a prior conviction. B When the Legislature enacted the controlled substances article of the Public Health Code, it is presumed to have acted in contemplation of the longstanding and unbroken rule that the prosecutor is required to charge the defendant as a repeat offender whenever sentence enhancement is sought on the basis of a prior conviction.[109] This has been the rule without regard to whether the statute that authorizes sentence enhancement contained an express requirement that the prosecutor charge the defendant as a repeat offender. The Legislature could have provided for a departure *291 from this longstanding and unbroken rule by stating that the prosecutor was not required to inform the defendant before trial on the current drug-related offense that, if he is convicted of that offense, he might receive an enhanced sentence on the basis of a prior drug-related conviction. The United States Constitution arguably would permit the Legislature to act in such a manner.[110] When the Legislature disagrees with decisions of the Court, it often amends the statutes to correct the perceived error.[111] The Legislature has not done so in this case.[112] *292 C In not expressly requiring the prosecutor to charge the defendant as a repeat offender, the sentence enhancement provision of the controlled substances article is similar to the sentence enhancement provisions for second or subsequent convictions of criminal sexual conduct, driving under the influence of alcohol, and violation of the liquor law. And in every single case in which the question was raised, this Court has held, or has expressly approved a decision of the Court of Appeals which held, that the prosecutor must charge the defendant as a repeat offender when seeking sentence enhancement.[113] This Court has, on several occasions, endorsed the view expressed by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Burnet v Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 US 393, 406; 52 S Ct 443; 76 L Ed 815 (1932), where he said: Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. This is commonly true even where *293 the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.[[114]] [Emphasis in original; citations omitted.] This is not to say that it is necessarily improper for a court to abandon a longstanding and unbroken rule in the application of statutes. It does, however, mean that the Court should not do so lightly.[115] The majority's attempt to portray this Court's precedents as wrongly decided is inadequate. That effort is founded on unsupportable characterizations of the Court's decisions. The majority does not claim that the long-established rule has led to unjust results. Nor can the majority relieve itself of the burden of justifying a rejection of settled law by "distinguishing" the prior cases. The bases of distinction proffered by the majority either do not explain at all or only explain partially the Court's decisions. D The prosecutor argues, and the majority agrees, that it was the Legislature's intention that the prosecutor would not be required to give early notice of the possibility of sentence enhancement to a defendant who has a prior drug-related conviction. It is said that since the Legislature "required" the prosecutor to charge a defendant as a repeat offender under the habitual offender provisions *294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the failure to restate a similar requirement in the sentence enhancement provision of the controlled substances article evidences an intention to deny to repeat drug offenders the procedural safeguards that are afforded to other recidivists. It is again relevant that this Court has always required the prosecutor to charge the defendant as a repeat offender even when such a requirement was not mandated by the literal language of the statute authorizing sentence enhancement. Given this longstanding and unbroken rule, there was no reason for the Legislature to set forth in the controlled substances article a requirement that the prosecutor charge the defendant as a repeat offender. The Legislature's "omission" amounted to nothing more than a failure to restate a proposition that had always been thought obvious. It is also relevant that the requirement that a prosecutor give early notice of the possibility of sentence enhancement to a defendant in an habitual offender proceeding is the product of this Court's construction of the applicable statutes and of the exercise of its supervisory authority over the courts of this state.[116] The literal language of the habitual offender provisions no more requires early notice than does the literal language of the other sentence enhancement statutes where the Court has imposed a similar requirement. In this respect, there is no difference between the literal language of the various statutes. The majority's argument is based on the "theory" that the Legislature acted with a selective memory. The majority asserts that the Legislature enacted the controlled substances article in contemplation of this Court's decisions that the prosecutor *295 must charge the defendant as a recidivist under the habitual offender provisions even though the literal language of the statute does not so require, but in ignorance of this Court's decisions that the prosecutor must charge the defendant as a repeat offender under all the other sentence enhancement provisions which also do not require early notice of the possibility of sentence enhancement. The majority says that it is "highly doubtful that the Legislature was deemed to be aware of decisions of this Court and relied on liquor law cases from the mid-1920's...."[117] If this is true, then it is also "highly doubtful" that the Legislature acted in contemplation of the habitual offender provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Those provisions were enacted in 1927.[118] In emphasizing the alleged verbal differences between the habitual offender provisions and the sentence enhancement provision of the controlled substances article, the majority employs a mode of analysis that has never before been thought to be persuasive. In McDonald,[119] the Court held that the information must contain an allegation of prior conviction even though the statute authorizing sentence enhancement did not expressly so require, and in support of the rule there announced cited decisions involving sentence enhancement statutes that expressly required the prosecutor to charge the defendant as a repeat offender.[120] So too in Urynowicz,[121] and so too in the Attorney General's opinion concerning second or subsequent convictions *296 of drunk driving.[122] The "verbal difference argument" was the basis of People v McFadden, 73 Mich App 232; 251 NW2d 297 (1977), which was in turn the basis of the Court of Appeals decisions in Wright[123] and Urynowicz,[124] decisions which were reversed by this Court. In sum, the basis for the majority's assertion concerning legislative intent is a distinction that has never before been thought significant. E The majority would reject the longstanding and unbroken rule that the prosecutor must charge the defendant as a repeat offender whenever sentence enhancement is sought on the basis of a prior conviction. It is a rule that until today was thought to be obvious so obvious that the prosecutor in Ancksornby confessed error for failing to charge the defendant as a second offender,[125] the prosecutor in Urynowicz advanced this rule before the Court,[126] and the Attorney General adopted the rule in his 1940 opinion. When the unsupportable characterizations and unpersuasive distinctions of the Court's precedents are "set aside,"[127] the only basis for the majority's *297 abandonment of the longstanding and unbroken rule that the prosecutor must charge the defendant as a repeat offender is that this practice is not required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court has not said that notice of the possibility of sentence enhancement before trial on the current offense was mandated by the United States Constitution. That such notice is not mandated by the United States Constitution is not a reason for abandoning precedent requiring the prosecutor to give early notice of the possibility of sentence enhancement. V Enough prologue. Correct analysis should begin with the Code of Criminal Procedure, enacted in 1927,[128] by which the Legislature adopted a new sentence enhancement scheme for habitual offenders. The prior statute expressly required the prosecutor to charge the defendant as an habitual offender.[129] The Code of Criminal Procedure expressly *298 provides that it is not always necessary to charge the defendant as an habitual offender in the information charging the current offense.[130] The Code, rather, authorized the commencement of a separate sentence enhancement proceeding after conviction of the charged offense if "at any time after conviction ... it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of crimes...."[131] A In People v Judge of Recorder's Court, 251 Mich *299 626; 232 NW 402 (1930), decided three years after passage of the Code,[132] the prosecutor filed a supplemental information charging John Figgins as an habitual offender after he had been convicted of the charged offense. The trial court ruled that Figgins was entitled to a preliminary examination respecting the allegation of prior conviction. The prosecutor petitioned this Court for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to vacate its order regarding the preliminary examination. This Court held that in light of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was no longer necessary to conduct a preliminary examination concerning the allegation of prior conviction. The Court explained: Prior to the criminal code [1927 PA 175], there was no provision in the law for an independent trial to determine the fact of a prior conviction. It was tried out in the trial for the subsequent offense. It was necessary to charge it in the complaint and warrant and prove it on the examination and trial unless examination was waived. Otherwise the court was without jurisdiction to consider it in imposing sentence. But [1927 PA 175, ch IX, § 13], authorizes an independent trial of that question on the filing of a supplemental information after conviction and sentence for the subsequent offense.... The purpose of an examination is to determine if a crime has been committed and if there is probable cause for believing the accused party committed it. If no crime is charged, an examination is not required. In People v Palm, 245 Mich 396 [223 NW 67 (1929)], it was held that a supplemental information, filed after conviction, *300 alleging a prior conviction, does not charge any crime. [Id., p 627. Emphasis added.][[133]] The Court's statements indicate that it was not until the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a trial court had the authority to impose an enhanced sentence where the prosecutor did not proceed from the commencement of the prosecution[134] against the defendant as a repeat offender.[135] B The lack of jurisdiction, adverted to in Judge of Recorder's Court and remedied in part by the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, could be distinguished from a prosecution under the controlled substances article on the basis that the pre-Code habitual offender provisions expressly required the prosecutor to charge the defendant as a repeat offender,[136] while the controlled substances article does not prescribe any particular procedure to be followed when seeking sentence enhancement for a second or subsequent drug-related conviction. In other words, the jurisdictional problem *301 with imposing an enhanced sentence where the prosecutor has not proceeded from the commencement of the prosecution against the defendant as a repeat offender could be viewed as being limited to situations where the Legislature has affirmatively required that the prosecutor charge previous convictions. Such a narrow reading of this Court's precedents concerning the jurisdiction of trial courts to impose enhanced sentences is, again, negatived by other decisions of this Court applying statutes that did not specify any particular procedures to be followed when seeking sentence enhancement on the basis of a prior conviction, as in People v McDonald, 233 Mich 98; 206 NW 516 (1925), where the Court held that "[t]he information must contain an averment of former conviction, and there must be proof on the trial to maintain it, to justify a conviction and sentence therefor."[137] The Court explained: The violation complained of is aggravated by the fact of his former conviction. He is thereby subjected to an enhanced penalty. The purpose of averring and proving it is to give the court jurisdiction to impose it. [Id., p 103. Emphasis added.] The jurisdictional significance of proceeding from the commencement of prosecution against the defendant as a repeat offender even where the statute authorizing sentence enhancement did not expressly so require was confirmed in In re Brazel, 293 Mich 632; 292 NW 664 (1940), where this Court compared the pre-Code habitual offender *302 provisions and the liquor law provisions that were applied in McDonald. The Court first noted the statement in People v Campbell, 173 Mich 381, 386; 139 NW 24 (1912), that charging the defendant as a repeat offender was necessary to give the trial court the authority to sentence the defendant as an habitual offender. The Court then said: It will be noted that [the habitual offender provisions] contained the express mandate that the prior convictions be alleged in the indictment on which conviction of any offense is had. This was not true of the prohibition law of 1917, as amended, which contained certain provisions in respect to increased punishment for second and subsequent offenses. Attention is called to [1917 PA 338], where it will be noted that there was no provision requiring the prior convictions to be alleged in the indictment. However, this court held that in order to confer jurisdiction the information must include allegations which specify the prior convictions and that a respondent under such circumstances was entitled to a preliminary examination.[[138]] [Brazel, p 639. Emphasis added.] In speaking of "jurisdiction," the Court was not referring to the respective jurisdictions of the circuit court and of the justice of the peace.[139] When the Court decided the liquor law cases, the *303 circuit court had jurisdiction over both a first and subsequent offense.[140] The Court's references to "jurisdiction" were references to the authority of a court any court to impose an enhanced sentence on the basis of a prior conviction. Before enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, without regard to whether the particular sentence enhancement statute expressly required the prosecutor to charge the defendant as a repeat offender, a trial court possessed the authority to impose an enhanced sentence only where the prosecutor had proceeded from the commencement of prosecution against the defendant as a repeat offender. C It is against this historical background that the Court should consider the prosecutor's argument that the procedural safeguards applicable under the habitual offender provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply where sentence enhancement is sought under the controlled substances article of the Public Health Code.[141] *304 Rather than disregard this Court's precedents concerning the authority of the trial court to impose an enhanced sentence and rather than hold that the trial court in this case did not have the authority to impose an enhanced sentence because the prosecutor did not proceed from the commencement of prosecution against the defendant as a repeat offender, I would hold that the procedures applicable under the habitual offender provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure also apply where the prosecutor seeks an enhanced sentence pursuant to the provisions of the controlled substances article.[142] I would thus hold that it is not necessary for the defendant to have been charged in the complaint and warrant as a repeat offender or that some evidence respecting the prior conviction be presented at the preliminary examination. It is necessary, where the prosecutor knows of the defendant's prior conviction before trial on the most recent offense, that the prosecutor file a supplemental information charging the defendant as a repeat offender within fourteen days of the arraignment or before trial if the defendant is tried within that fourteen-day period.[143] Where the prosecutor does not learn of the defendant's prior conviction until after the defendant is convicted of the most recent offense, the prosecutor may commence a postconviction proceeding to seek an enhanced sentence.[144] I acknowledge that the habitual offender provisions now state that where the defendant's most *305 recent conviction is a "major controlled substance offense," the defendant "shall be punished as provided by" the controlled substances article of the Public Health Code.[145] I would construe those provisions as evidencing a legislative intent to assure that the quantity and quality of a defendant's punishment as distinguished from the procedures to be utilized in administering that punishment are governed by the controlled substances laws and not by the general habitual offender provisions. In this regard, it is significant that the Legislature first "excluded" major controlled substance offenses from the habitual offender provisions at the same time it first adopted mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for controlled substance offenses.[146] In contrast, the sentencing provisions for habitual offenders are discretionary. The prosecutor in this case did not file a supplemental information charging Eason as a repeat drug offender within fourteen days of Eason's arraignment. The Court of Appeals concluded that the exceptions to the fourteen-day rule were not applicable. I agree with that determination and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals *306 vacating Eason's sentence and remanding the case for resentencing.