Case Title: Brenman v. Demello

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-13-06

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). In October 2001, plaintiff Rena Brenman was driving in stop-and-go traffic when her car was struck from behind by a car driven by defendant Stephanie Demello. Brenman s family physician prescribed medication, physical therapy, and the use of a cervical pillow. Brenman was away from work for two and one-half months. Following additional diagnostic tests, in August 2002, Brenman underwent a three-level cervical fusion, which involved the removal of three discs and their replacement with spacers. All parties concede that there was minimal damage to Brenman s car. The issue was narrowed to the cause and extent of the injuries to plaintiff attributed to this car accident. Eight months after the accident, Brenman filed a complaint alleging that her injuries were the direct and proximate result of Demello s negligent behavior that resulted in the car accident. At trial, Brenman claimed $713,000 in damages. Demello sought to introduce at trial photographs showing admittedly minimal damage to the rear bumper of Brenman s car with the purpose of arguing to the jury that, due to the small amount of damage to Brenman s rear bumper, Demello could not have suffered either the type or extent of injuries she alleged. Brenman did not resist that effort until jury selection, when she filed a motion in limine seeking to bar the admission of the photographs absent expert proofs to connect the condition depicted in the photographs and the biomechanical forces that resulted from the impact between the two cars. The trial court ultimately admitted the photographs, concluding that [j]urors can infer from their viewing photographs that the plaintiff could not have been as seriously injured as she claimed. The trial court further concluded that the admissibility of said photographs is best left to the discretion of the trial court. The court particularly noted that the testimony of the investigating police officer would be probative as to the condition of the vehicles at the scene of the accident and would be important in determining whether the photographs will result in undue prejudice. The trial court denied Brenman s motion for a new trial. On appeal, Brenman argued that the trial court erred in admitting the photographs without a corresponding limiting instruction restricting their use to prove causation. Brenman also argued that, by failing to require expert testimony as to the link between vehicle damage and the occupant s injuries, the trial court improperly allowed Demello to invite the jury to speculate as to that link. The Appellate Division agreed, and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The panel adopted a per se rule that requires expert testimony to prove a causal link between the extent of damage to an automobile in an accident and the cause or extent of injuries arising from that accident. The panel explained that photographic evidence is neither automatically admissible nor excludable, but rather subject to the sound exercise of the trial court s discretion. The Supreme Court granted Demello s petition for certification. Also, the Court granted amicus curiae status to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America New Jersey (ATLA-NJ). HELD: The admissibility of any relevant photographs rests on whether the photograph fairly and accurately depicts what it purports to represent, an evidentiary decision that properly lies in the trial court s discretion. The Court rejects a per se rule that requires expert testimony as a foundation for the admissibility of a photograph of vehicle damage when the photograph is used to show a correlation between the damage to the vehicle and the cause or extent of injuries claimed by an occupant of the struck vehicle. 1. Like any other evidence tendered at trial, photographs must be relevant. Once deemed relevant, the evidence is admissible unless otherwise prohibited by law. However, even if relevant, evidence nonetheless may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. N.J.R.E. 403. In addition to proving the evidence s relevance and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, the persuasive representational nature of photographs demands that the foundation for the admission of photographs must be properly laid. The sole issue in this appeal is whether, in order to satisfy the requirement that the probative value of this evidence is not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, expert testimony is required when photographs of vehicle damage are offered to prove either the cause or the extent of the occupant s injuries. Because the determination made by the trial court concerned the admissibility of evidence, the Court gauges that action against the palpable abuse of discretion standard. (Pp. 15-18) 2. There are three basic requirements for the admission of expert testimony. The first is that the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror, and it is that requirement that is squarely implicated by the issue posed in this appeal. In most cases, there is a relationship between the force of impact and the resultant injury, and the extent of that relationship remains in the province of the factfinder. Juries are entitled to infer that which resides squarely in the center of everyday knowledge: the certainty of proportion, and the resulting recognition that slight force most often results in slight injury, and great force most often is accompanied by great injury. In the end, the standard is clear: in the absence of competent proofs to the contrary, the aggregate of everyday knowledge and experience fairly entitles a jury to infer that there is a proportional relationship between the amount of force applied and the injuries resulting therefrom. The trial court did not palpably abuse its discretion when it permitted the admission of photographs that fairly and accurately depicted the condition of the rear of Brenman s car and allowed Demello s counsel to argue that neither the cause nor the extent of plaintiff s injuries could have been the proximate result of the impact. (Pp. 18-22) 3. The Supreme Court cannot subscribe, as the Appellate Division did, to the limits of Davis v. Maute, 770 A.2d 36 (Del. 2001), in which the Supreme Court of Delaware required expert testimony in a similar setting. In the main, the fundamental relationship between the force of impact in an automobile accident and the existence or extent of any resulting injuries does not necessarily require scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge in order to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue[.] N.J.R.E. 702. Of course, a party opponent remains free to offer expert proofs for the purpose of persuading the factfinder to overcome an absence of proportionality between the force of the impact and the cause and severity of the resulting injuries. Conversely, a party proponent may tender its own expert proofs to further support the proposition in its case-in-chief either that slight impact force results in no or slight injury, or that great impact force results in great injury or to rebut its opponent s assertions. Such expert proofs, however, address the weight to be given to photographs of impact, not their admissibility. (Pp. 22-25) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the judgment of the Law Division is REINSTATED. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate CONCURRING opinion, stating that because lay testimony describing the force of impact and personal injury is permissible, photographs corroborating that testimony by depicting vehicular damage must be admissible too. JUSTICE WALLACE, Jr., filed a separate DISSENTING opinion, agreeing with the Appellate Division s holding calling for corroborative expert proof. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI, and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, and HOENS join in JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate concurring opinion. JUSTICE WALLACE filed a separate dissenting opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 13 September Term 2006 RENA BRENMAN and MITCHELL D. BRENMAN, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MICHAEL DEMELLO and STEPHANIE DEMELLO, Defendants-Appellants, and ABC COMPANY, (said name being fictitious and unknown), Defendant. Argued November 29, 2006 Decided May 30, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 383 N.J. Super. 521 (2006). Kathleen S. Murphy argued the cause for appellants (Connell Foley LLP, attorneys). Michael F. Wiseberg argued the cause for respondents (Leonard & Leonard, P.A., attorneys). Bruce H. Stern argued the cause for amicus curiae, Association of Trial Lawyers-New Jersey (Stark & Stark, P.C. and Pellettieri, Rabstein & Altman, attorneys; Mr. Stern, Michael G. Donahue, III, and Anne P. McHugh, on the brief). JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents a single issue germane to automobile accident cases: whether expert testimony is required as a condition precedent to the admission of photographs of vehicle damage when the cause or extent of a plaintiff s injuries are at issue. We answer that question in the negative. The admissibility of any relevant photograph rests on whether the photograph fairly and accurately depicts what it purports to represent, an evidentiary decision that properly lies in the trial court s discretion. We reject a per se rule that requires expert testimony as a foundation for the admissibility of a photograph of vehicle damage when the photograph is used to show a correlation between the damage to the vehicle and the cause or extent of injuries claimed by an occupant of the struck vehicle. Instead, we commend that judgment to the sound discretion of the trial court. Consistent therewith, a party opposing the admission of photographs of damage to a car remains free to offer expert proofs for the purpose of showing that there is no relationship between the extent of the damage and the cause and severity of the resulting injuries. Conversely, a party proposing the use of photographs of impact may tender its own expert proofs to further support the proposition in its case-in-chief -- either that slight impact force results in no or slight injury, or that great impact force results in great injury -- or to rebut its opponent s assertions. In the end, however, such expert proofs address the weight to be given to photographs of impact, not their admissibility. [(emphasis supplied).] The trial court thus found that the photograph is admissible under the circumstances of this case because [w]e do anticipate that there will be investigating officer[] testimony, which will further be probative as to the condition of the vehicles at the scene of the accident. See footnote 5 At trial, defendant conceded that she was liable for the accident, but, relying in large measure on the photographs, she contested whether plaintiff s injuries were caused by the accident and, if so, to what extent. Thus, during her opening statement to the jury, defendant s counsel explained that Stephanie was driving under 10 miles an hour when she tapped the rear of this car bumper to bumper. That s what happened. That s the photograph. Plaintiff presented her case-in-chief, including the testimony of her medical expert, Dr. Paul Ratzker, a neurosurgeon. He opined that the cause of plaintiff s symptoms was osteophyte, an abnormal protrusion of bone. He explained that osteophyte is a degenerative condition that frequently is a byproduct of the aging process. He testified that, in plaintiff s case, the bone protrusion in her spine was pressing against the nerve root, thus causing plaintiff s maladies. He explained that plaintiff s osteophyte existed prior to her car accident, but that the trauma of the accident caused plaintiff s bone protrusion to impact her nerve root. Dr. Ratzker acknowledged, however, that no objective findings of the osteophyte had been found for at least four to six months after the accident, and that only an MRI disclosed that condition. In order to counter defendant s assertion that the force of the impact was too slight to cause, either in whole or in part, the injuries claimed by plaintiff, on re-direct examination Dr. Ratzker addressed the correlation between the amount of force applied to the rear bumper of plaintiff s car and the cause and extent of plaintiff s injuries. In his view, the cause of plaintiff s injuries, which he described as an extension flexion injury, totally depends on the momentum or the velocity of [the car s] seat against the patient s upper back. It doesn t have anything to do with what happened to the bumper or what not. T he core of the defense was presented through the testimony of defendant s medical expert, Dr. Eric Fremed, a neurologist. Although he candidly agreed that plaintiff required surgery to correct her spinal problems, he strongly disagreed that plaintiff s ailments were caused by the accident. In Dr. Fremed s own words, I m simply saying that [the] need for surgery has nothing to do with the accident. According to Dr. Fremed, plaintiff s condition was degenerative in nature, one that takes years to form and one that was not caused by the trauma of the automobile accident. In her closing argument, defendant returned to the theme first explored in her opening statement: that the slight impact between her car and plaintiff s car could not have caused plaintiff s injuries. She argued to the jury, in part, as follows: I opened as a fender bender. I m going to close as a fender bender. That s what [it] was. [Plaintiff and her husband], however . . . now want [defendant] to pay for some close to $400,000 in future lost wages, some $270,000 they re claiming for future household items, for a surgery, a triple cervical fusion all as a result of that. All as a result of that fender bender. . . . . My client Stephanie Demello is being charged with a lot of things, all this future income, all these household services, all this money, all this injury from a minor fender bender. I opened with it, ladies and gentlemen, and I ll close with it. This is a fender bender. This is not a lottery. Plaintiff did not object contemporaneously to those remarks, either when made or at the close of defendant s summation. After being charged on proximate causation in the context of a claim of aggravation of a preexisting condition that was asymptomatic at the time of the accident, and later, at the jury s request, being re-instructed on the concept of proximate cause, the jury determined that defendant s actions were not the proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries and returned a verdict of no cause of action. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, principally arguing that it was error to admit the photographs without an appropriate limiting instruction, and that defendant s repeated reference to the accident as a fender-bender caused the jury to speculate as to the cause of plaintiff s injuries without the benefit of expert biomechanical testimony. The trial court denied plaintiff s motion, specifically stating that it would not substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury who entered what [it] believe[d] to be a fair and just verdict under the circumstances. The trial court noted that, while it might have been somewhat surprised by the outcome, [it] certainly wasn t shocked by it. It explained: The determination by the jury in finding against the plaintiff was certainly within the realm of probability based upon the evidence submitted. Credibility - the credibility of the plaintiff and the plaintiff s witnesses were certainly an issue, perhaps to a higher degree than other trials [the court had] been involved in . . . . But this was -- this was a trial which was well presented by both sides, and the jury made a determination, which [the court is] satisfied should not be set aside and should stand. Speaking directly to the issue of the photographs, the trial court noted that the matter was evidential, and you say [ ]well, it was prejudicial[. I]n [the court s] opinion[,] all evidence presented by both sides is prejudic[ial.] The question is, is it unduly prejudicial? Is it unfair to present that under the circumstances? And [the court does not] believe that it was unfair. [I]n compliance with the Rules of Evidence, the attorneys were able to present on behalf of their respective clients significant testimony . . . . [The court does] not find that there was a miscarriage of justice, nor do[es the court] find that the plaintiff s case was unduly prejudiced by the presentation and admission into evidence of the photograph of the plaintiff s vehicle . . . . [I]t was totally fair and appropriate to introduce that photograph . . . . [T]he trial was conducted appropriately, the evidence submitted, including the photographs[,] was appropriate, the charge . . . given to the jury [] was also appropriate . . . . On appeal, plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in admitting the photographs without a corresponding limiting instruction restricting their use to prove causation. Plaintiff also argued that, by failing to require expert testimony as to the link between vehicle damage and the occupant s injuries, the trial court erred when it allowed defendant to invite the jury to speculate as to that link. The Appellate Division agreed, and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. Brenman v. Demello, 383 N.J. Super. 521, 538 (App. Div. 2006). Defining the issue as the intersection between the physics of a particular accident and a particular injury to a particular individual[,] the panel held that a party s use of photographs depicting minimal vehicular damage to suggest just such a causative correlation invites and encourages jury supposition and conjecture, without a basis in the evidence, that the plaintiff s injuries could not have been caused by a relatively minor accident. Id. at 535-36. Endorsing the analysis embraced by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Davis v. Maute, 770 A.2d 36 (Del. 2001), the panel adopted a per se rule that requires expert testimony to prove a causal link between the extent of damage to an automobile in an accident and the cause or extent of injuries arising from that accident. Brenman, supra, 383 N.J. Super. at 535. The Appellate Division concluded that the cumulative effect of admitting the photographs without a limiting instruction and allowing counsel to prominently argue an improper inference resulted in an unfair verdict requiring a new trial. Id. at 536. The panel cautioned, however, that its holding should not be construed broadly to require expert testimony in every case in order for jurors to be permitted to view photographs of vehicles involved in an accident. Id. at 537. It explained that photographic evidence is neither automatically admissible nor excludable, but rather subject to the sound exercise of the trial court's discretion. Ibid. It noted that [w]hether an expert foundation is required depends, of course, on the particular issue in the case to which the photographic evidence relates. Ibid. The Appellate Division nonetheless concluded that because no expert proof of correlation was produced . . . the introduction of the photographs without restriction on their use and the use actually made of them by the defense constitute reversible error. Id. at 537-38. We granted defendant s petition for certification. 187 N.J. 492 (2006). On application, we also granted leave to appear as amicus curiae to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America New Jersey (ATLA-NJ). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate the judgment of the Law Division. We further have noted that the rule sets forth three basic requirements for the admission of expert testimony: (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art that an expert s testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony. [State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 567-68 (2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] It is the first requirement for the admissibility of expert testimony -- that the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror -- that is squarely implicated by the issue posed in this appeal. Plaintiff asserts that, in an automobile accident, there is no correlation between the amount of vehicle damage and the infliction of injuries on the occupants or the extent thereof and, hence, expert testimony is needed in order to link them. We do not accept that proposition because, in most cases, there is a relationship between the force of impact and the resultant injury, and the extent of that relationship remains in the province of the factfinder. We acknowledge those instances where slight force causes grave injury -- a simple misstep off a sidewalk curb resulting in a compound, complex fracture of the leg - as well as those where great force results in little or no injury -- the child who miraculously survives a fall out of a high-rise window, or the driver who walks away unscathed from a hideous car crash. Those instances inhabit, however, the margins of common knowledge. Juries are entitled to infer that which resides squarely in the center of everyday knowledge: the certainty of proportion, and the resulting recognition that slight force most often results in slight injury, and great force most often is accompanied by great injury. Thus, although [i]t must be conceded that the force of the impact, when two automobiles collide, does not necessarily justify an inference that the occupants of the vehicles sustained serious physical injuries[,] Gambrell v. Zengel, 110 N.J. Super. 377, 380 (App. Div. 1970), [a]t the same time it is a generally accepted rule that evidence of the speed at which the colliding cars were traveling, the severity of the physical impact and the manner of the happening of the accident is admissible where there is an issue as to the seriousness of plaintiff s injuries. And this, too, despite admitted liability. [Ibid.] But see Suanez v. Egeland, 353 N.J. Super. 191, 201-03 (App. Div. 2002) (holding that defendant failed to establish a reliable scientific foundation for [the] purported expert opinion on the basis of [the expert] s own research work, authoritative scientific literature or persuasive judicial decisions and that there is no reliable scientific foundation in bio-mechanical studies for an expert opinion that a low-impact automobile accident cannot cause a . . . serious injury ). In the end, the standard is clear: in the absence of competent proofs to the contrary, the aggregate of everyday knowledge and experience fairly entitles a jury to infer that there is a proportional relationship between the amount of force applied and the injuries resulting therefrom. In a similar and more recent setting, the Appellate Division addressed both the admission of photographs showing damage to a vehicle involved in a collision and counsel s argument based thereon. Spedick v. Murphy, 266 N.J. Super. 573 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 567 (1993). The panel summarily dispatched the argument that the photographs should not be admitted into evidence; it referred solely to the standard for admission of a photograph, and concluded that [t]he photographs, as explained, fairly and accurately depicted the condition of the automobile immediately following the accident, and thus, were properly admitted into evidence. Id. at 590. Significantly, in respect of the argument made by counsel based on the photographs, the Appellate Division explained that [i]t is fundamental that counsel may argue from the evidence any conclusion which a jury is free to arrive at. Ibid. We too have embraced that rule. We have held that, [a]s a general matter, counsel is allowed broad latitude in summation[.] Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 431 (2006) (citations, internal quotation, and editing marks omitted). We have emphasized that [s]ummation commentary, however, must be based in truth, and counsel may not misstate the evidence nor distort the factual picture. Ibid. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The potential peril incurred by a transgressor is clear: When summation commentary transgresses the boundaries of the broad latitude otherwise afforded to counsel, a trial court must grant a party s motion for a new trial if the comments are so prejudicial that it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. Ibid. (quoting R. 4:49-1(a)). On the whole, that analysis leads us to conclude that the trial court did not palpably abuse its discretion when it permitted the admission of photographs that fairly and accurately depicted the condition of the rear of plaintiff s car - the place where her car was struck by defendant s car -- and allowed defendant s counsel to argue that neither the cause nor the extent of plaintiff s injuries could have been the proximate result of the impact. We commend and therefore repeat the analysis applied by the trial court: if evidence is relevant, it is to be admitted unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by its undue prejudicial effect and, once admitted, counsel is permitted to argue to the jury based on that evidence. Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MICHAEL DEMELLO and STEPHANIE DEMELLO, Defendants-Appellants, and ABC COMPANY, (said name being fictitious and unknown), Defendant. JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring. I concur with most of the majority s analysis, though I do find the admissibility of the photographs to be a close issue. Because I believe that lay testimony describing the force of impact and personal injury is permissible, photographs corroborating that testimony by depicting vehicular damage must be admissible too. I disagree with the majority that there is certainty of proportion in relation to force of impact and personal injury. See ante at __ (slip op. at 19). Based on its common knowledge and experience, and depending on the condition of the victim and all of the surrounding circumstances, a jury may infer that a slight impact in a motor vehicle accident generally results in a slight injury. To the extent that the photograph corroborates the nature of the impact, the photograph has probative value. On the other hand, with or without a photograph, the jury is not required to draw what may seem a natural inference -- slight impact equals slight injury -- if it is inconsistent with the available evidence. To accept plaintiff s argument that the admissibility of a photograph is conditioned on expert testimony explaining how biomechanical forces caused personal injury in a motor vehicle crash would likewise require expert testimony in every motor vehicle accident involving personal injury to prove causation, even without a photograph. Because I cannot accept that proposition, I concur with the majority. Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MICHAEL DEMELLO and STEPHANIE DEMELLO, Defendants-Appellants, and ABC COMPANY, (said name being fictitious and unknown), Defendant. JUSTICE WALLACE, JR., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. To be sure, it is common nature for a fact-finder to conclude from a photograph depicting minor vehicle damage that the resulting injuries were also minor. However, that inclination should not influence the admissibility of the photographs. I agree with the Appellate Division that photographs depicting slight vehicular damage, although conceivably serving other valid purposes, simply do not support, without corroborative expert proof, the inference that the accident could not have caused the serious injury of which a plaintiff complains. Brenman v. Demello, 383 N.J. Super. 521, 533 (App. Div. 2006). In this case, the issue was causation of plaintiff s injuries. Because the parties failed to present expert proof demonstrating that the slight damage to the vehicle could not have caused plaintiff s serious injuries, the photographs should not have been admitted without restrictions on their use. In my view, the Appellate Division struck the proper balance in holding that: photographic evidence is neither automatically admissible nor excludable, but rather subject to the sound exercise of the trial court s discretion. Whether an expert foundation is required depends, of course, on the particular issue in the case to which the photographic evidence relates. Here, that issue was causation and because no expert proof of correlation was produced, we hold that the introduction of the photographs without restriction on their use and the use actually made of them by the defense constitute reversible error. [Id. at 537-38.] I would affirm the judgment substantially for the reasons expressed by the Appellate Division. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-13 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court RENA BRENMAN and MITCHELL D. BRENMAN, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MICHAEL DEMELLO and STEPHANIE DEMELLO, Defendants-Appellants, And ABC COMPANY, (said name being Fictitious and unknown), Defendant. DECIDED May 30, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto CONCURRING OPINION BY Justice Albin DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Wallace