Case Title: Yurick v. State of New Jersey

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-34-04

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY; THE HONORABLE JAMES E. MCGREEVEY, GOVERNOR, STATE OF NEW JERSEY; and DAVID SAMSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF NEW JERSEY and GLOUCESTER COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS, jointly and severally, and in their official and individual capacities, Defendants-Appellants. Argued March 29, 2005 Decided June 22, 2005 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Larry R. Etzweiler, Senior Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellants State of New Jersey, Honorable James E. McGreevey and David Samson (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel). William M. Tambussi argued the cause for appellant Gloucester County Board of Chosen Freeholders (Brown & Connery, attorneys; Mr. Tambussi and Ila Bhatnagar, on the briefs). Linda Wong argued the cause for respondent (Wong Fleming, attorneys; Ms. Wong and Henry Oh, on the brief). JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an unusual case. The plaintiff, a former county prosecutor, asserts that the Governor, the Attorney General and the State of New Jersey violated the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8, when they exercised their statutory power to supersede him as prosecutor after the expiration of his five-year term and that county officials similarly violated CEPA when they underfunded his budget. In respect of the latter claim, plaintiff notably never availed himself of the statutory process designed to resolve budget disputes through a proceeding before a neutral decision-maker, the assignment judge. For the reasons that follow, we find that this constitutional officer has no cognizable CEPA claim against those state officials for the invocation of statutory supersession powers. We similarly find he has failed to state a CEPA cause of action against county officials for an allegedly inadequate budget in the face of his failure to invoke the very statutory process designed to prevent that eventuality. Andrew N. Yurick, II, the former Gloucester County Prosecutor who brought this CEPA action against the State of New Jersey, Governor James E. McGreevey, Attorney General David Samson, and the Gloucester County Board of Chosen Freeholders, had his claim dismissed by the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed that determination. This appeal comes before us based on the dissent of Judge Hoens, who found that plaintiff neither had standing to pursue a CEPA claim nor had stated a claim cognizable under CEPA. As we agree that plaintiff has not stated a claim under CEPA, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division. a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer or another employer, with whom there is a business relationship, that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, . . .; b. Provides information to, or testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any violation of law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law by the employer or another employer, with whom there is a business relationship, . . .; c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law . . .; (2) is fraudulent or criminal; or (3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment. [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.] To establish a prima facie cause of action under CEPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer s conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a whistle-blowing activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (2003) (citation omitted).] With that in mind, we turn to the unique setting of plaintiff s CEPA claims. The statute commits to the assignment judge the authority to see to it that the needs of the county prosecutor are met if they are not provided for by the county freeholders. Bigley, supra, 55 N.J. at 56. The budget is not set until the assignment judge decides the matter, unless the prosecutor sooner ends the process by abandoning it. Thus, the Legislature created a process whereby a prosecutor would have an adequate budget established for his or her office each fiscal year. Here, plaintiff did not complete that process. Plaintiff never made a Bigley application in respect of his budget. The prosecutor bears the responsibility to bring such an application if he or she continues to believe that the budget for the county prosecutor s office is inadequate. That is the case also for plaintiff s claim of inadequacy in the setting of salaries for key personnel in his office, which should have been dealt with as part of the budget-setting process. In the face of plaintiff s abandonment of the legislatively created budget process, we cannot conclude that plaintiff has pled a prima facie claim of retaliatory action under CEPA in respect of the funding of his office by the County Freeholders. We reject the bald contention that the inadequacy that plaintiff perceived in his budget overall, or in salaries specifically - untested by an application before a neutral assignment judge in completion of the statutory process for establishing the budget for his office - constitutes a prima facie claim of retaliatory action. We cannot presume, as plaintiff would have us presume, that the budget was inadequate. That core factual failing dooms plaintiff s CEPA cause of action against the County Freeholders. Plaintiff has not pled any cognizable retaliatory action by the County Freeholders. Similarly, plaintiff claims that his supersedure by State defendants constituted retaliatory action under CEPA. As a matter of law, we do not agree. We do not regard the diminution in power of this constitutional officer, which was accomplished pursuant to a legislative supersession process involving the Governor and the Attorney General at the expiration of plaintiff s five-year term of office, to be a wrong cognizable under CEPA. Pursuant to the supersession, plaintiff technically continued to hold his office; however, he no longer had the power of control over the day-to-day operations of the prosecutor s office and the legislative process permitted the wresting of that control from him. See N.J.S.A. 52:17B-106 (stating that upon supersedure, the county prosecutor . . . shall exercise only such powers and perform such duties as are required of [him] by the Attorney General ). Although plaintiff would have been entitled to be paid for any services that were required of him, see Winne v. County of Bergen, 21 N.J. 311, 323 (1956), it appears that the Attorney General did not require plaintiff to perform any duties following the supersedure. The Attorney General took over the operation of the county prosecutor s office. Plaintiff may have hoped to remain as a holdover officer in charge of the operation of his office at the conclusion of his five-year term, but he had no reasonable expectation that he would be permitted to do so. Supersession must occur when the Governor requests it, and the Governor has wide discretion in the exercise of that power. Compare N.J.S.A. 52:17B-106 (authorizing supersession when in furtherance of [the] interests of the State ) with N.J.S.A. 52:17B-110 (authorizing removal of prosecutor for cause ). That said, we decide only this case and do so on the basis of the specific facts involved. We refuse to equate the fact that the Attorney General took over operation of the Gloucester County Prosecutor s Office at the expiration of the prosecutor s term of office with retaliatory action constituting an element in a CEPA cause of action. Supersession simply is not the equivalent of removal from office under N.J.S.A. 52:17B-110. In sum, we hold that the legislative process for supersession was followed and its execution in respect of plaintiff does not constitute retaliatory action creating a cognizable cause of action under CEPA. NO. A-34/35 SEPTEMBER TERM 2004 ON REMAND FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court ANDREW N. YURICK, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY; THE HONORABLE JAMES E. MCGREEVEY, GOVERNOR, STATE OF NEW JERSEY; and DAVID SAMSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF NEW JERSEY and GLOUCESTER COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS, jointly and severally, and in their official and individual capacities, Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED June 22, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY