Case Title: STATE v BRETZ

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13826 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- L. R. BRETZ, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the EighlhJudicial District, Honorable A. B. Martin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: George W. Huss argued, Miles City, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert S. Keller argued, Assistant Attorney General, Kalispell, Montana Thomas Budewitz argued, Townsend, Montana Submitted: December 11, 1978 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. On December 1, 1976, a f t e r a t r i a l by jury i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l District, t h e Honorable A. B. arti in presiding, defendant w a s convicted of fourteen counts of grand larceny, two counts of obtaining money and property by f a l s e pretenses, and two counts of preparing f a l s e evidence. H e was sentenced t o fourteen-year prison terms on each count with t h e exception of two counts of preparing f a l s e evidence which offenses w e r e found t o be i n c i d e n t t o o t h e r offenses f o r which defendant w a s sen- tenced. The sentences were grouped so t h a t defendant was ultimately sentenced t o 56 years i n prison, t h e l a s t 30 years t o be suspended on t h e condition t h a t defendant reim- burse t h e victims of t h e offenses within one year from t h e t i m e of sentencing. Defendant w a s unable t o make r e s t i t u - t i o n within the prescribed t i m e and brings t h i s appeal. I n view of t h e number and complexity of t h e i s s u e s presented f o r review, f a c t u a l summaries, i n s o f a r as they a r e p e r t i n e n t , w i l l accompany our discussion of individual i s s u e s . Defendant presents twenty-one i s s u e s f o r review by t h i s Court: 1. Whether defendant was denied h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l under t h e S i x t h and Fourteenth Amendments t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and A r t i c l e 11, Section 24 of t h e 1972 Montana Constitution. 2. Whether defendant was denied h i s r i g h t t o t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel under t h e S i x t h and Four- teenth Amendments t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and A r t i c l e 11, Sections 4 and 24 of t h e 1972 Montana Consti- t u tion. 3 . Whether defendant was denied h i s r i g h t t o t r i a l by a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l jury under t h e F i f t h and Fourteenth Amendments t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t i c l e 11, Sections 4 and 24 of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n by v i r t u e of extensive p r e t r i a l and t r i a l p u b l i c i t y . 4 . Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying defen- d a n t ' s motion t o quash t h e information due t o t h e lack of showing of probable cause f o r i t s f i l i n g . 5. Whether prosecution of t h i s case w a s barred by t h e double jeopardy c l a u s e of t h e F i f t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e accompanying d o c t r i n e of col- l a t e r a l estoppel and by t h e provisions of s e c t i o n 95-1711, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 46-11-501 through -505 MCA. 6. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n refusing t o g r a n t a new t r i a l on t h e b a s i s of a j u r o r ' s independent knowledge of t h e f a c t s of t h e case. 7. Whether defendant's sentence c o n s t i t u t e d c r u e l and unusual punishment under t h e Eighth and Fourteenth Amend- ments t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and A r t i c l e 11, Sections 22 and 28 of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1972. 8. Whether conditioning suspension of t h e last 30 y e a r s of defendant's 56 year sentence on defendant's payment of r e s t i t u t i o n by December 13, 1977, was improper and c o n s t i - t u t e d c r u e l and unusual punishment. 9. Whether defendant's sentencing hearing was properly conducted. 1 0 . Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n admitting c e r t a i n evidence. 11. Whether t h e S t a t e proved t h e e s s e n t i a l elements of t h e o f f e n s e of preparing f a l s e evidence. 12. Whether t h e S t a t e proved t h e e s s e n t i a l elements of larceny by bailee. 13. Whether defendant was denied h i s r i g h t t o a funda- mentally f a i r t r i a l under t h e Sixth and Fourteenth Amend- ments t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and A r t i c l e 11, Section 24 of t h e 1972 Montana Constitution because of alleged over-zealous a c t s on t h e p a r t of t h e prosecution. 1 4 . Whether defendant was denied t h e opportunity t o present h i s defense. 15. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n allowing c e r t a i n testimony with r e s p e c t t o reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 16. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n excluding o t h e r testimony with r e s p e c t t o reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 17. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred i n allowing testimony concerning o t h e r crimes of t h e accused. 18. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred i n allowing t h e S t a t e t o impeach i t s own witness i n t h e absence of a showing of s u r p r i s e by t h e S t a t e . 19. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred i n allowing t h e testimony of Larry Sanford. 20. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d with r e s p e c t t o i t s jury i n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e offenses of obtaining money and property by f a l s e pretenses and preparing f a l s e evidence. 21. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred i n refusing c e r t a i n of defendant's jury i n s t r u c t i o n s and i n giving c e r t a i n of t h e S t a t e ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s . W e w i l l address these i s s u e s i n t h e order of t h e i r presentation. SPEEDY TRIAL The following i s a t a b l e of d a t e s and e v e n t s r e l e v a n t t o o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f whether defendant w a s denied h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l : D A T E 7/30/74 8/5/74 9/16/74 9/26/74 10/15/74 10/16/74 4/16/75 5/8/75 5/20/75 7/29/75 8/27/75 ACTION Information f i l e d D A Y S ELAPSED 0 Arraignment 6 New Information f i l e d 48 Motion f o r Change o f Venue f i l e d 58 Change o f Venue g r a n t e d 77 S t a t e a p p e a l s o r d e r 78 Supreme Court r e v e r s e s o r d e r 260 R e m i t t i t u r f i l e d 282 Amended Information f i l e d 294 Defense procedural motions f i l e d 364 S t a t e ' s response to motions f i l e d 393 Hearing of motions and a r r a i g n - ment of defendant 414 S t a t e moves t o c o n t i n u e pre- t r i a l conference 478 P r e t r i a l conference--speedy t r i a l motions 517 The r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l i s guaranteed by b o t h t h e United S t a t e s and Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s . U.S. Const., Amend. V I ; 1972 Mont.Const., A r t . 11, 524. The f e d e r a l s t a n d a r d , a s a minimum, i s imposed upon t h e s t a t e s by t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e of t h e Fourteenth Amendment. See Dickey V. F l o r i d a (1970), 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L Ed 2d 26; Smith v. Hooey (1969), 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L Ed 2d 101, 116-17, i s t h e touchstone i n a n a n a l y s i s of speedy t r i a l i s s u e s . See S t a t e v. Tiedemann (1978) I Mont. , 584 P.2d 1284, 1287, 35 St.Rep. 1705, 1707; S t a t e v. C o l l i n s (1978), Mont. , 582 P.2d 1179, 1186, 35 St.Rep. 993, 1002; S t a t e v. Cassidy (1978) Mont. , 578 P.2d 735, 737, 35 St.Rep. 612, 614; S t a t e ex rel. Briceno v. District Court (1977), Mont. , 568 P.2d 162, 164, 34 St.Rep. 927, 930; S t a t e v. Keller (1976), 170 Mont. 372, 377, 553 P.2d 1013, 1016; S t a t e ex rel. Sanford v. ~ i s t r i c t Court (1976), 170 Mont. 196, 199, 551 P.2d 1005, 1007; S t a t e v. Steward (1975), 168 Mont. 385, 389, 543 P.2d 178, 181; F i t z p a t r i c k v. C r i s t (1974), 165 Mont. 382, 388, 528 P.2d 1322, 1325; S t a t e v. Sanders (1973), 163 Mont. 209, 213, 516 P.2d 372, 375. I n Barker, t h e p e t i t i o n e r was not t r i e d u n t i l more than f i v e years had passed from t h e time he w a s a r r e s t e d . The delay i n t h a t case l a r g e l y r e s u l t e d from t h e f a c t t h a t Barker's accomplice w a s t r i e d s i x t i m e s a l t o g e t h e r before f i n a l l y being convicted. I n Barker , 407 U.S. a t 521, 92 S.Ct. a t 2187, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 111, t h e Supreme Court noted: "A . . . d i f f e r e n c e between t h e r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l and t h e accused's other c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s i s t h a t deprivation of t h e r i g h t may work t o t h e accused's advantage. Delay i s not an uncommon defense tactic. A s t h e t i m e between t h e commission of t h e c r i m e and t r i a l lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable o r t h e i r memories may fade. I f t h e witnesses support t h e prosecu- t i o n , i t s case w i l l be weakened, sometimes seri- ously so. And it i s t h e prosecution which c a r r i e s t h e burden of proof. Thus, unlike t h e r i g h t t o counsel o r t h e r i g h t t o be f r e e from compelled self-incrimination, deprivation -- of t h e r i g h t t o speedy ----- t r i a l does n o t per se prejudice t h e accused's a b i l i t y - t o defend himself." (Emphasis added.) The Court went on t o r e j e c t two approaches which could have eliminated a g r e a t d e a l of uncertainty i n prokecting t h e r i g h t . The suggestions w e r e t h a t t h e Court (1) hold t h a t t h e Constitution r e q u i r e s a criminal defendant t o be offered a t r i a l within a s p e c i f i e d t i m e period, o r (2) adopt some form of t h e demand-waiver doctrine. "The demand-waiver d o c t r i n e provides t h a t a defendant waives any consideration of h i s r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l f o r any period p r i o r t o which he has not demanded a t r i a l . " Barker, 407 U . S . a t 525, 9 2 S.Ct. a t 2189, 33 L Ed 2d a t 1 1 4 . The Court found each of t h e s e approaches too inflexible--"the fixed-time period because it goes f u r t h e r than t h e Constitution requires; t h e demand-waiver r u l e because it i s i n s e n s i t i v e t o a r i g h t which w e have deemed fundamentalv--and adopted i n s t e a d "a balancing test, i n which t h e conduct of both t h e prosecution and t h e defendant a r e weighed." Barker, 407 U.S. a t 529-30, 92 S.Ct. a t 2191-2192, 33 L Ed 2d a t 116. Noting t h a t c o u r t s must approach speedy t r i a l cases on an ad hoc b a s i s , t h e Court i d e n t i f i e d four f a c t o r s t o be considered a s p a r t of t h e balancing test: "Length of delay, t h e reason f o r t h e delay, t h e defendant's a s s e r t i o n of h i s r i g h t , and prejudice t o t h e defendant." Barker, 407 U.S. a t 530, 92 S.Ct. a t 2192, 33 L Ed 2d 117. W e w i l l discuss each of these f a c t o r s i n t u r n a s we examine defendant's claim i n t h e i n s t a n t case. S t a t e v. Sanders (1973), 163 Mont. 209, Length - of delay. The Supreme Court addressed t h e delay f a c t o r as follows: "The length of t h e delay i s t o some e x t e n t a t r i g - gering mechanism. Until t h e r e i s some delay which i s presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l , t h e r e is no necessity f o r inquiry i n t o t h e other f a c t o r s t h a t go i n t o t h e balance. Nevertheless, because of t h e imprecision of t h e r i g h t t o speedy. t r i a l , - t h e length of delay t h a t w i l l provoke such an inquiry i s n e c e s s a r i l -- -- dependent upon t h e p e c u l i a r c i r c u m ~ a n c e s -- of t h z case. To take b u t one example, t h e delay t h a t can ---- -- be t o l e r a t e d f o r an ordinary street crime i s con- - -- -- siderably --- less than f o r a s e r i o u s , complex conspir- acy charge." Barker, 407 U.S. a t 530-31, 92 S.Ct. a t 2192, 33 L Ed 2d a t 117. ( ~ m p h a s i s supplied.) There i s no question t h a t t h i s case i s a complex one. Defendant noted i n h i s b r i e f t h a t t h e "case c o n s i s t s of a t r a n s c r i p t of 4,316 pages . . . and f i v e f u l l volumes of c o u r t f i l e s . There w e r e hundreds of e x h i b i t s offered and admitted a t t r i a l . " I n addition t o t h a t , w e note t h a t t h e b r i e f s submitted t o t h i s Court on appeal addressing twenty- one i s s u e s presented f o r review a r e over 300 pages i n length. Thus, t h e delay here t h a t can be t o l e r a t e d i s considerably more than f o r an ordinary street crime. Even so, t h e delay i n t h i s case i s extremely long. W e note, i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t t h e 205 days exhausted by t h e S t a t e ' s appeal of t h e change of venue order must be charged a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e . Section 95-2407, R.C.M. 1947, now sec- t i o n 46-20-205 MCA. Therefore, w e f i n d t h a t t h e 517 days between t h e i n i t i a l f i l i n g of an Information i n t h i s case and defendant's motion t o dismiss f o r lack of speedy t r i a l i s of s u f f i c i e n t length under t h e circumstances of t h i s case t o t r i g g e r t h e inquiry i n t o t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s enumerated i n Barker and a s adopted previously by t h i s Court. Reason -- f o r t h e delay. Addressing t h i s f a c t o r , t h e Supreme Court s t a t e d : "Here, too, d i f f e r e n t weights should be assigned t o d i f f e r e n t reasons. A d e l i b e r a t e attempt t o delay t h e t r i a l i n order t o hamper t h e defense should be weighed heavily a g a i n s t t h e government. A more n e u t r a l reason such a s negligence o r over- crowded c o u r t s should be weighed less heavily b u t nevertheless should be considered s i n c e t h e u l t i - mate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r such circumstances must rest with t h e government r a t h e r than with t h e de- fendant. F i n a l l y , a v a l i d reason, such a s a m i s s - i n g witness, should serve t o j u s t i f y appropriate delay." Barker, 407 U.S. a t 531, 92 S.Ct. a t 2192, 33 L Ed 2d a t 117. The S t a t e , i n t h e i n s t a n t case, argues t h a t i n l i g h t of t h e complexity of t h e case, matters proceeded i n an o r d e r l y fashion. I t demonstrates one delay of 54 days when defen- d a n t ' s defense motions were overdue. Viewing t h e record a s a whole, t h e m o s t s e r i o u s delay on t h e p a r t of t h e prose- c u t i o n appears t o be t h e 205 days taken up by t h e S t a t e ' s appeal of t h e October 15, 1974, change of venue order. There i s no showing o r any attempt t o show i n t h e record t h a t t h i s delay was i n any way a " d e l i b e r a t e attempt t o delay t h e t r i a l i n order t o hamper t h e defense." I t appears thatrthis.delay may have been the result of some negligence on the part of the State, but crowded calendars and courts were also involved and accordingly, the time should "be weighed less heavily but nevertheless considered." Defendant relies heavily on a Federal ~istrict Court decision in a related case, In the Matter of Carden (1978), CY-77-61-H, decided May 12, 1978. Defendant asserts that the most significant element of that Court's decision to dismiss for lack of speedy trial was the reason for the delay, specifically the length of the Carden Information. The State addresses the length of the charging document and any delay occasioned by it in the following terms: "The dismissal of the first information and the filing of the second information constituted no delay; three individuals were dropped, which did not prejudice the defendant, and six individuals were added, but the basic motions of the defen- dant against either information remained the same. The six new individuals had to be added, or the defendant would be prejudiced with another suit. The counts were doubled, but that was be- cause of the confusion under the old larceny statutes, and it was a matter of pleading the same counts in the alternative, with the same individuals involved." Another factor considered negligent in Carden which is not present in the instant case was delay attributable to the State by its untimely disqualification of Judge Allen and the subsequent appeal. The Federal Court held that "the decision to disqualify Judge Allen was reached in order to gain a tactical advantage over the defendants." See also Fitzpatrick v. Crist (1974), 165 Mont. 382, 528 P.2d 1322, involving a four-month delay in appointment of counsel. The wisdom of the Supreme Court's instruction that each case be considered on an "ad hoc" basis becomes apparent at this point. The Court was undoubtedly strongly influenced by the disqualification of Judge Allen after seven months and held it was d e l i b e r a t e t o gain advantage. W e have no such a l l e g a t i o n here, not even w i l l f u l negligence, and a c l e a r l y distinguishable f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n . Assertion of t h e r i g h t . I n discussing t h e t h i r d f a c t o r -- i n t h e Barker balancing test, t h e Supreme Court s t a t e d : "Whether and how a defendant a s s e r t s h i s r i g h t i s closely r e l a t e d t o t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s we have mentioned. The s t r e n g t h of h i s e f f o r t s w i l l be a f f e c t e d by t h e length of t h e delay, t o some e x t e n t by t h e reason f o r t h e delay, and most p a r t i c u l a r l y by t h e personal prejudice, which i s n o t always r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e , t h a t he experiences. The more serious t h e deprivation, t h e more l i k e l y a defendant i s t o complain. The defendant's a s s e r t i o n of h i s speedy t r i a l r i g h t , then, i s e n t i t l e d t o strong evidentiary weight i n determining whether t h e defendant is being deprived of t h e r i g h t . W e emphasize t h a t f a i l u r e t o a s s e r t t h e r i g h t w i l l make it d i f f i c u l t f o r a defendant t o prove t h a t he w a s denied a speedy t r i a l . " Barker, 407 U.S. a t 531-32, 92 S.Ct. a t 2192-2193, 33 L Ed 2d a t 117-18. I n t h e i n s t a n t case, defendant moved f o r dismissal f o r lack of speedy t r i a l p r i o r t o t h e t r i a l ' s commencement. W e cannot ignore t h e f a c t , however, t h a t a t t h e t i m e defendant submitted h i s motion he had already indicated t o Judge Bradford t h a t he intended t o c a l l more than 120 witnesses and t h a t he f e l t t h e t r i a l would l a s t two months. A t v a r i - ous times over t h e next s e v e r a l months defendant a s s e r t e d time and again t h a t because of t h e complexity of t h e case, he could not possibly be prepared t o defend himself. This f a c t o r weighs heavily a g a i n s t any prejudice i n t h e time l a p s e between f i l i n g and t r i a l and gives substance t o t h e Barker comment t h a t speedy t r i a l d e n i a l i s n o t per -- se preju- d i c i a l t o defendant's a b i l i t y t o defend himself. Prejudice. The prejudice f a c t o r i s analyzed as f o l - lows: "Prejudice, of course, should be assessed i n t h e l i g h t of t h e i n t e r e s t s of defendants which t h e speedy t r i a l r i g h t w a s designed t o p r o t e c t . This Court has i d e n t i f i e d t h r e e such i n t e r e s t s : (i) t o prevent oppressive p r e t r i a l incarceration; (ii) t o minimize anxiety and concern of t h e accused; and (iii) t o l i m i t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e de- fense w i l l be impaired. O f these, t h e most seri- ous i s t h e last, because t h e i n a b i l i t y of a de- fendant adequately t o prepare h i s case skews t h e f a i r n e s s of t h e e n t i r e system. If witnesses d i e o r disappear during a delay, t h e prejudice i s obvious. There i s a l s o prejudice i f defense w i t - nesses a r e unable t o r e c a l l accurately events of t h e d i s t a n t past. Loss of memory, however, i s not always r e f l e c t e d i n t h e record because what has been forgotten can r a r e l y be shown." Barker, 407 U.S. a t 532, 92 S.Ct. a t 2193, 33 L Ed 2d a t 118. Defendant lists f i v e ways i n which he f e l t he was prejudiced by t h e delay: " ( 1 ) economic hardship; ( 2 ) death of witnesses; (3) p r e - t r i a l p u b l i c i t y of a long duration; ( 4 ) d i f f i c u l t y of now finding and interviewing t h e S t a t e ' s witnesses; and (5) emotional stress and s t r a i n . " The i n s t a n t c a s e w a s n o t t h e only case defendant w a s defending a t t h i s t i m e . Aside from disbarment proceedings before t h e Commission on P r a c t i c e and t h i s Court, defendant was involved i n t h r e e other criminal cases and one c i v i l case. The emotional stress and s t r a i n and t h e economic hardship and consumption of t i m e w a s t o a l a r g e e x t e n t commingled with t h e s e o t h e r proceedings and it i s d i f f i c u l t t o a s s e s s f a u l t by any p r e c i s e means. Defendant contends t h a t f i v e defense witnesses had died, b u t t h e r e was no c r e d i b l e evidence given a s t o when they died, what t h e i r testimony would have been, o r whether it went t o one o r more counts. A mere self-serving statement does not m e e t t h e test required by Barker which demands a showing of preju- d i c e , not merely a self-serving a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e r e may have been some prejudice. Application. Continuing from Barker: " W e regard none of t h e four f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d above as e i t h e r a necessary o r s u f f i c i e n t condi- t i o n t o t h e finding of a deprivation of t h e r i g h t of speedy t r i a l . Rather, they a r e r e l a t e d fac- t o r s and must be considered together with such o t h e r circumstances a s may be r e l e v a n t . I n sum, t h e s e f a c t o r s have no talismanic q u a l i t i e s ; c o u r t s must still engage i n a d i f f i c u l t and s e n s i t i v e balancing process." Barker, 407 U.S. a t 533, 92 S.Ct. a t 2193, 33 L Ed 2d a t 118. The Court, i n applying t h e test t o t h e five-year delay i n Barker found c e r t a i n d e f i c i e n c i e s p r e s e n t b u t went on t o say: "Two counterbalancing f a c t o r s , however, outweigh t h e s e d e f i c i e n c i e s . The f i r s t i s t h a t prejudice w a s minimal. "More important than t h e absence of s e r i o u s p r e j - udice, i s t h e f a c t t h a t Barker d i d n o t want a speedy t r i a l . " Barker, 407 U.S. a t 534, 9 2 S.Ct. a t 2194, 33 L Ed 2d a t 119. ". . . b a r r i n g extraordinary circumstances, w e would b e r e l u c t a n t indeed t o r u l e t h a t a defendant was denied t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t on a record t h a t s t r o n g l y i n d i c a t e s , a s does t h i s one, t h a t t h e defendant d i d n o t want a speedy t r i a l . " Barker, 407 U.S. a t 536, 92 S.Ct. a t 2195, 33 L Ed 2d a t 120. I n t h i s case, a s i n Barker, we cannot f i n d a showing of s u f f i c i e n t a c t u a l prejudice t o invoke t h e extremely harsh remedy of dismissal of t h e cause. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e record r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e speedy t r i a l o b j e c t i o n s were again com- mingled with defendant p e r i o d i c a l l y claiming he could n o t be ready f o r t r i a l up t o t h e day t h e t r i a l commenced, i n d i - c a t i n g , of course, a need f o r a d d i t i o n a l t i m e . With t h e recognition t h a t t h e defendant has t h e r i g h t t o submit numerous and complex procedural motions p r i o r t o t r i a l , t h e r e s u l t i n g delays cannot now be charged exclusively t o t h e S t a t e . Much of t h e complexity and delay of t h i s c a s e i s t h e r e s u l t of defendant's defense and he cannot now use t h e delay t h a t r e s u l t e d t o h i s advantage w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e speedy t r i a l without an a c t u a l showing of prejudice. W e cannot f i n d i n t h i s record a genuine d e s i r e f o r a speedy t r i a l , which makes any prejudice minimal. A s a r e s u l t , p r e j u d i c e w a s a s s e r t e d b u t never demonstrated and t h e r e a r e no o t h e r extraordinary circumstances t o compel t h i s Court t o r u l e t h a t defendant w a s denied h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE - OF COUNSEL I n h i s b r i e f t o t h i s Court, defendant s t a t e s t h a t t h e ". . . i s s u e r a i s e d here i s n o t t h a t t h e t r i a l counsel were incompetent due t o t h e i r lack of s k i l l s o r a c t i o n s a t t r i a l , b u t t h a t they w e r e rendered impotent and i n e f f e c t i v e by t h e S t a t e ' s d e n i a l t o them of adequate funds t o prepare t h e defense up u n t i l a p o i n t a t which they had inadequate t i m e t o prepare. I' Defendant's argument i s divided i n t o t h r e e p a r t s . F i r s t , he claims t h e r e was a " c h i l l i n g e f f e c t " c r e a t e d by t h e District C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o provide funds - i n advance f o r appointed defense counsel. Second, he argues t h a t by t h e t i m e funds became a v a i l a b l e , any d e l a y s having been t h e r e s u l t of t h e S t a t e ' s r e s i s t a n c e t o c e r t a i n motions, t h e r e was inadequate t i m e i n which t o prepare a defense. Thus t h e S t a t e had a l l e g e d l y p u t t h e defense i n t h e awkward p o s i t i o n of e i t h e r having t o go t o t r i a l unprepared, o r , having t o move f o r a continuance, s a c r i f i c i n g t h e i r speedy t r i a l claim. Third, defendant complains t h a t t h e District Court f a i l e d t o provide him with an i n v e s t i g a t o r t o m e e t t h e e f f e c t of t h e manpower employed by t h e Attorney General i n t h e prosecution of t h i s case. Defendant does n o t argue t h a t t h e S t a t e must supply an i n v e s t i g a t o r i n a l l cases b u t t h a t it should have i n t h i s case because of t h e complexity of t h e case and t h e number of witnesses l i s t e d on t h e S t a t e ' s Information.  here was never any question t h a t defendant's appointed counsel would be compensated; t h e problem arose with r e s p e c t t o whether they w e r e e n t i t l e d t o be compensated i n advance. The record does n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t defendant ever requested a continuance because of t h e claimed problem of preparation and hence he is i n a poor p o s i t i o n t o a l l e g e prejudice. F i n a l l y , t h e appointment of - two counsel f o r defendant ob- v i a t e d any need f o r an i n v e s t i g a t o r f o r t h e general prepara- t i o n f o r t r i a l and i n addition t h e c o u r t d i d authorize t h e h i r i n g of an i n v e s t i g a t o r i n Alaska who worked f o r t h e defense. Defendant's retained counsel moved t o withdraw from t h e c a s e i n November 1975. The D i s t r i c t Court subsequently ap- pointed counsel f o r defendant i n January 1976. The f i r s t real problem with appointment of counsel a r o s e on March 31, 1976, when t h e S t a t e moved t o set a s i d e t h e D i s t r i c t Court's March 23 order f o r interim payment of counsel i n t h e amount of $gr068.74. The S t a t e argued t h a t t h e payment w a s exces- s i v e and t h a t t h e county, as opposed t o t h e S t a t e , was l i a b l e f o r payment of defense counsel. The matter w a s appealed by t h e S t a t e t o t h i s Court, Application of Barron (1976), 170 Mont. 218, 552 P.2d 70. This Court affirmed t h e District Court's r u l i n g and remanded t h e case f o r an evi- dentiary hearing t o determine t h e amount of money due ap- pointed counsel. The decision was issued J u l y 9, 1976. A hearing w a s held on August 25 which r e s u l t e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court's ordered payment of $5000 and $9,760.43 t o defense counsel f o r t h e i r f e e s and expenses. B y September 15, defendant's counsel had s t i l l not received t h e i r money and moved t h e District Court on t h a t day t o permit t h e i r with- drawal a s counsel and t o dismiss t h e a c t i o n on t h e ground of misconduct on t h e p a r t of t h e Attorney General. The motion t o permit t h e i r withdrawal was based on d i s c i p l i n a r y r u l e DR2-110 (b) (2) addressing mandatory withdrawal when an a t t o r - ney cannot continue h i s employment without v i o l a t i n g another d i s c i p l i n a r y r u l e , i n t h i s case DR6-101: "Failure t o act competently: (A) A lawyer s h a l l not: ( 2 ) Handle a l e g a l matter without preparation adequate t o t h e circumstances . " The motion was submitted 21 days p r i o r t o t h e day scheduled f o r t r i a l , and defense counsel received t h e i r funds t h e following day. The problem with defendant's argument concerning t h i s i s s u e i s t h a t he has made no showing t h a t t h e alleged lack of preparation on t h e p a r t of h i s appointed counsel preju- diced him i n any way. I n f a c t , defendant asks us t o presume h i s counsel were i n e f f e c t i v e because they were not compen- sated f a r i n advance. Defendant does n o t reveal what h i s counsel had been a b l e t o accomplish during t h e time they had been on h i s case. W e can only speculate a s t o whether any prejudice r e s u l t e d due t o alleged lack of preparation on t h e p a r t of defendant's counsel. Again, without a motion f o r continuance on these grounds and without any showing of a c t u a l prejudice, w e cannot presume t h a t counsel w e r e there- by rendered i n e f f e c t i v e . PUBLICITY AND -- FAIR TRIAL Statewide p u b l i c i t y , e s p e c i a l l y concentrated i n Great F a l l s , accompanied t h e prosecution of t h i s case a t each stage. On J u l y 29, 1975, defendant moved t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o dismiss t h e charges o r , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , continue t h e d a t e f o r t r i a l due t o extensive p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y . The c o u r t - d e n i e d t h e motion. Defendant again moved f o r d i s - missal on December 29, 1975. The c o u r t denied t h i s motion a s w e l l . ~ e f e n d a n t again r a i s e d t h e i s s u e of p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y a f t e r t h e swearing of t h e jury a t h i s t r i a l on October 18, 1976. By t h a t t i m e defendant had become t h e o b j e c t of heavy statewide p u b l i c i t y because of a t r i a l i n which he had been charged with and a c q u i t t e d of s o l i c i t i n g persons t o assas- s i n a t e t h e Attorney General. Also, a statewide general e l e c t i o n w a s imminent i n which,the Attorney General was a g u b e r n a t o r i a l candidate. The p u b l i c i t y continued during t h e t r i a l of t h e case. I t culminated i n t h e door-to-door d i s t r i b u t i o n of a p o l i - tical newsletter e n t i t l e d t h e "Montana Gazette" i n which defendant's name was mentioned. On October 2 7 , 1976, defen- d a n t f i l e d a motion f o r a m i s t r i a l because of t h e p u b l i c i t y . Defendant argues t h a t w e should presume, under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case, t h a t t h e m i d - t r i a l p u b l i c i t y reached t h e nonsequestered jury. H e goes on t o argue t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t should have examined t h e jury concerning (1) t h e i r c o n t a c t with t h e m a t e r i a l and ( 2 ) i t s p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t upon them. Throughout h i s argument, it is t h e Attorney General's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e p u b l i c i t y t h a t defendant o b j e c t s t o most strongly. Again, w e have a sword t h a t c u t s both ways. The record i s clear and evidence s u b s t a n t i a l regarding defendant's own attempt t o use t h e media t o h i s advantage a s w e l l a s h i s f a i l u r e t o move f o r change of venue on t h e b a s i s of t h e p u b l i c i t y . For example, on October 27, 1976, defendant moved t o hold prosecutor G i l b e r t i n contempt p a r t i a l l y on t h e grounds t h a t t h e prosecution had been seen t a l k i n g t o r e p o r t e r s . Coincidentally, t h e Great F a l l s Tribune had predicted t h i s a c t i o n and s t a t e d t h a t defendant had con- t a c t e d t h e reporter. The t h e a t r i c s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e record by defendant is n o t i n d i c a t i v e of conduct tending t o show genuine concern over t h e amount of p r e t r i a l and t r i a l pub- l i c i t y and when reported cannot be condemned. Additionally, t h e motion was not accompanied by an a f f i d a v i t leaving t h e court, again, no f a c t s upon which it could act. The c o u r t d i d s t a t e t h a t : "The c o u r t has observed and read t h e publi- c a t i o n , a t l e a s t i n t h e Great F a l l s Tribune, and they have seemed straightforward reporting, nothing else. And how t h a t is ever going t o be p r e j u d i c i a l i s beyond me." Beyond t h a t , defendant's argument t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t should have conducted a p o l l of t h e jury t o determine whe- t h e r t h e members had seen a copy of t h e "Montana Gazette" i s n o t properly before t h i s Court inasmuch a s defendant made no - motion f o r t h e p o l l i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t and raises t h e i s s u e f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n t h i s Court. Section 95-1710, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-13-203 MCA, sets o u t t h e procedure t o o b t a i n r e l i e f i n a proper c a s e of untoward publicity: " ( a ) The defendant o r the prosecution may move f o r a change of place of t r i a l on t h e ground t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s i n t h e county i n which t h e charge i s pending such prejudice t h a t a f a i r t r i a l cannot be had i n such county. The motion s h a l l be made a t least f i f t e e n (15) days p r i o r t o t r i a l , unless, f o r good cause shown, it may be made t h e r e a f t e r . "(b) The motion s h a l l be i n writing and supported by a f f i d a v i t which s h a l l s t a t e f a c t s showing t h e nature of t h e prejudice alleged. The defendant o r t h e s t a t e may f i l e counteraffidavits. The c o u r t s h a l l conduct a hearing and determine t h e m e r i t s of t h e motion. " ( c ) I f t h e c o u r t determines t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s i n t h e county where t h e prosecution i s pending such prejudice t h a t a f a i r t r i a l cannot be had it s h a l l t r a n s f e r t h e cause t o any o t h e r c o u r t of competent j u r i s d i c t i o n i n any county where a f a i r t r i a l may be had." Unlike t h e cases c i t e d by defendant, t h i s case did not spawn e d i t o r i a l s crying f o r defendant's conviction. Rather, defendant has simply provided t h i s Court with h i s statement of inferences and conclusions and t h e s e are not enough. See S t a t e v. Davis (1921), 60 Mont. 426, 431, 199 P. 421, 4 2 2 . I n S t a t e v. Lewis (1976), 169 Mont. 290, 297, 546 P.2d 518, 522, w e quoted with approval t h e following excerpt from I r v i n v. Dowd (1961), 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L Ed 2d 751, 756. It seems e s p e c i a l l y appropriate i n t h e i n s t a n t case: " I t i s not required, however, t h a t t h e jurors be t o t a l l y ignorant of t h e f a c t s and i s s u e s involved. I n these days of s w i f t , widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected t o arouse the i n t e r e s t of t h e public i n t h e v i c i n i t y , and scarcely any of those b e s t q u a l i f i e d t o serve a s jurors w i l l n o t have formed some impression o r opinion as t o t h e m e r i t s of t h e case. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n criminal cases. To hold t h a t t h e mere existence of any preconceived notion as t o t h e g u i l t o r innocence of an accused, without more, i s s u f f i c i e n t t o r e b u t t h e presumption of a prospective j u r o r ' s i m p a r t i a l i t y would be t o e s t a b l i s h an impossible standard. It is s u f f i c i e n t i f t h e juror can l a y a s i d e h i s impression o r opinion and render a ver- d i c t based on t h e evidence presented i n court." A s set f o r t h above, defendant has f a i l e d t o m e e t h i s burden of showing t h e nature of t h e p u b l i c i t y , t h e e f f e c t of t h e p u b l i c i t y , and t h e necessity of such a d r a s t i c remedy. H e has a l s o f a i l e d t o m e e t t h e procedural requirements of moving f o r a change of venue and submitting an a f f i d a v i t containing s p e c i f i c a l l e g a t i o n s a s t o t h e p r e j u d i c i a l nature of t h e publicity. PROBABLE C A U S E F O R FILING INFORMATION On September 16, 1974, t h e S t a t e f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t i n support of a motion f o r leave t o f i l e an Information a g a i n s t defendant. The a f f i d a v i t l i s t e d t h e alleged victims i n a l p h a b e t i c a l order. Defendant sets f o r t h t h e charges i n h i s summary i n t h r e e b a s i c categories. The S t a t e combines defendant's f i r s t two categories, arguing t h a t t h e existence o r nonexistence of an accounting i n each c a s e i s of l i t t l e o r no relevance i n discussion probable cause. " ( 1 ) A settlement was made by t h e compensation insuror, t h e settlement check w a s deposited i n t o a bank account, some time t h e r e a f t e r , ranging from days t o years, t h e alleged victim received a check f o r t h e i r portion of t h e settlement b u t received no accounting from M r . Bretz a s t o t h e amount and d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e t o t a l settlement. (This f a c t s i t u a t i o n i s applicable t o t h e f o l - lowing alleged victims--Aker, Baran, DuBois, Early, H i l l , Springer, Stroop and Weisgerber.) " (2) A settlement w a s made by t h e compensation insuror, t h e settlement check was deposited i n t o a bank account, some time t h e r e a f t e r , ranging up t o a few years, t h e alleged victim received a check f o r t h e i r portion of t h e settlement along with an accounting from Bretz a s t o t h e amount and d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e t o t a l settlement. (This f a c t s i t u a t i o n i s applicable t o t h e following alleged victims--Curtissf Gaines, G i l b e r t , Gus- zregan, Hall, Lavalley, McMaster, Pohjola, Swims Under and Wesland.) " ( 3 ) A settlement w a s made by t h e compensation insuror, t h e settlement check was deposited i n t o a bank account and t h e alleged victim was never contacted by M r . Bretz and, t o t h e d a t e of t h e a f f i d a v i t , had not received any p o r t i o n of t h e settlement. (This f a c t s i t u a t i o n i s applicable t o t h e following alleged victims--Barry, Fischer, Gardipee, Morris and Tannehill.)" I n h i s p r e t r i a l motion f i l e d J u l y 29, 1975, defendant moved t o quash t h e Information on t h e grounds t h a t (1) t h e r e was an abuse of probable cause set f o r t h i n t h e a f f i d a v i t to j u s t i f y f i l i n g of t h e Information; and (2) no crime o r c r i m e s w e r e s t a t e d i n t h e f a c t s alleged i n t h e a f f i d a v i t . Defendant again r a i s e d t h i s i s s u e on December 29, 1975, i n another p r e t r i a l motion. Defendant argues t h a t t h e f a c t lacking i n t h e a f f i d a v i t i s t h e showing of i n t e n t r e q u i s i t e t o prove larceny. H e then argues t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n allowing t h e S t a t e t o f i l e t h e Information where t h e supporting a f f i d a v i t f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause. The basic crime with which defendant was charged and upon which he w a s t r i e d w a s larceny by b a i l e e a s s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 94-2701, R.C.M. 1947: "Every person who, with t h e i n t e n t t o deprive o r defraud t h e t r u e owner of h i s property, o r of t h e use and b e n e f i t thereof, o r t o appropriate t h e same t o t h e use of t h e taker, o r of any other per- son either-- "2. Having i n h i s possession, custody o r c o n t r o l , a s a b a i l e e , servant, attorney, agent, c l e r k , t r u s t e e , o r o f f i c e r of any person, association, o r corporation, o r a s a public o f f i c e r , o r a s a person authorized by agreement o r by competent a u t h o r i t y t o hold, o r take such possession, cus- tody, o r control, any money, property, evidence of debt, o r contract, a r t i c l e of value of any nature, o r thing i n a c t i o n o r possession, appro- p r i a t e s t h e same t o h i s own use, o r t h a t of any o t h e r person o t h e r than t h e t r u e owner, o r person e n t i t l e d t o t h e b e n e f i t thereof, s t e a l s such prop- e r t y and i s g u i l t y of larceny." Section 95-1301, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-11-201 MCA, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " (a) The county attorney may apply d i r e c t l y t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r permission t o f i l e an in- formation a g a i n s t a named defendant. The appli- c a t i o n must be by a f f i d a v i t supported by such evidence as t h e judge may require. I f it appears t h a t there is probable cause to believe t h a t an offense has been committed by t h e defendant t h e judge s h a l l g r a n t leave t o f i l e t h e information, otherwise t h e application s h a l l be denied." The r a t i o n a l e of probable cause f o r f i l i n g an informa- t i o n i s t h e same a s probable cause f o r a r r e s t . S t a t e ex rel. Pinsoneault v. D i s t r i c t Court (1965), 145 Mont. 233, "Probable cause i s t h e knowledge of f a c t s , ac- t u a l o r apparent, strong enough t o j u s t i f y a rea- sonable man i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t he has lawful grounds f o r prosecuting the defendant i n t h e manner complained of." Pinsoneault, 145 Mont. a t 239, 400 P.2d a t 272. Any determination with r e s p e c t t o t h e existence of probable cause f o r t h e f i l i n g of an Information must be made on a case-by-case b a s i s viewing t h e p e c u l i a r i t i e s of t h e p a r t i c u l a r case. I n addition, a s t h e t e r m "probable cause" implies, it i s a concept necessarily concerned with proba- b i l i t i e s . The f a c t s alleged i n t h e Information charging defendant with a number of offenses a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o es- t a b l i s h probable cause. I n so finding, w e emphasize t h e improbability t h a t t h e f a c t s alleged r e s u l t e d from innocent bookkeeping e r r o r s o r c l e r i c a l mistakes. Viewing t h e Infor- mation a s a whole, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d not e r r i n con- cluding t h a t probable cause e x i s t e d f o r d i r e c t l y f i l i n g t h e Information. D O U B L E JEOPARDY -- COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL Defendant was a l s o a defendant i n S t a t e v. Cline (1976), 170 Mont. 520, 555 P.2d 724, r e f e r r e d t o by t h e p a r t i e s a s t h e Wampole case. Defendant claims t h a t t h a t case could and should have been joined with t h e i n s t a n t case as being p a r t of t h e "same transaction" a s defined i n sec- t i o n 9 5 - 1 7 1 1 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( i i ) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-11-501 MCA : "(1) ( a ) The t e r m 'same transaction' includes con- duct consisting o f : " ( i i ) a series --- of a c t s o r omissions which a r e motivated by a common purpose or plan and which r e s u l t -- i n t h e repeated commission of t h e s a m e --- offense o r a f f e c t -- t h e same person o r persons o r - t h e thereof. " (Emphasis added. ) Defendant argues t h a t t h e S t a t e merely used t h e Wampole case as a "dry run" t o test t h e i r prosecution success. Defendant then argues t h a t t h e p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of multiple prosecutions w a s t o (1) c o n t r i b u t e t o h i s eventual i n d i - gency; (2) expand p r e s s coverage; and, (3) provide p r a c t i c e f o r t h e prosecution. W e note t h a t t h e Information f i l e d i n Cascade County named d i f f e r e n t defendants than t h e Information f i l e d i n L e w i s and Clark County. I n addition, t h e Lewis and Clark County Information w a s f i l e d subsequent t o t h a t f i l e d i n Cascade County. Both p a r t i e s c i t e Ashe v. Swenson (1970), 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L Ed 2d 469, 475, f o r t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " c o l l a t e r a l estoppel": " I t means simply t h a t when an i s s u e of ultimate f a c t has once been determined by a v a l i d and f i n a l judgment, t h a t i s s u e cannot again be liti- gated between t h e same p a r t i e s i n any f u t u r e l a w s u i t . " (Emphasis added. ) The i n s t a n t case involves no i s s u e of ultimate f a c t which was twice l i t i g a t e d . I f any v a l i d objection e x i s t e d i n t h i s a r e a , it would have been proper t o make t h e objection upon t h e f i l i n g of t h e second Information i n Lewis and Clark County. JUROR'S INDEPENDENT KNOWLEDGE Juror Thomas Clary was a Great F a l l s attorney who had been asked t o act as a s p e c i a l prosecutor t o bring disbar- ment proceedings a g a i n s t another man under a Workmen's Compensation indictment. I n d r a f t i n g t h e pleadings, he had used defendant's disbarment a s a model. Juror Clary had s t a t e d during v o i r d i r e t h a t he had no knowledge of t h e p a r t i c u l a r counts defendant faced. But defendant's disbar- ment d e a l t a t length with t h e f a c t s of t h e G i l b e r t , Barry, Guszregan, Hall and Morris counts of t h i s criminal case. Defendant argues t h a t under t h e circumstances of t h i s case, C l a r y ' s knowledge r e q u i r e s r e v e r s a l of t h e conviction. A t t h e conclusion of t h e t r i a l J u r o r Clary m e t with t h e judge and counsel i n chambers and t o l d them what he knew. Defendant's attorney made no objection a t t h a t t i m e even though t h e r e w e r e t h r e e a l t e r n a t e jurors a v a i l a b l e . The defense f a i l e d t o m e e t its r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e c o u r t by i t s f a i l u r e t o properly o b j e c t and thereby give t h e c o u r t an opportunity t o remedy any alleged d e f e c t s t h a t may have e x i s t e d by replacing Juror Clary with one of t h e a l t e r n a t e jurors. Section 95-2404(b), R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-20- 104 MCA, provides: " ( b ) Upon appeal from a judgment, t h e c o u r t may review t h e v e r d i c t o r decision, and any order o r decision objected t o which involves t h e merits, o r necessarily a f f e c t s t h e judgment." (Emphasis added. ) CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT Defendant w a s convicted of eighteen counts i n t h i s case and sentenced on sixteen. The c o u r t imposed t h e maximum t e r m of fourteen years f o r each of t h e s i x t e e n convictions and divided t h e convictions i n t o four groups of four con- v i c t i o n s each. The sentences within each group w e r e t o be served concurrently, b u t t h e four groups of ,convictions w e r e ordered t o run consecutively r e s u l t i n g i n a 56 year prison t e r m . I n imposing sentence, t h e D i s t r i c t Court s t a t e d : "NOW, t h e length of t h e sentence t h a t t h i s Court imposes cannot be understood by someone who has n o t heard t h e evidence t h a t has been presented i n t h i s case. NOW, it i s t r u e t h e defendant has n o t committed a v i o l e n t crime, b u t h i s method of oper- a t i o n i s d e c e i t , h i s playing and praying upon t h e weak and t h e poor, knowing t h e i r condition, i s more reprehensible, i n t h e view of t h i s Court, than many c r i m e s of violence. I could review some of t h e cases. The Hardy case stands o u t , and a number of o t h e r s , which a r e unbelievable. I t i s unbelievable t h a t an attorney, admitted t o t h e p r a c t i c e of l a w , would engage i n t h e type of a c t i v i t i e s t h a t M r . Bretz engaged i n . I d o n ' t want t o dramatize it, because t h e cases speak f o r themselves, and I refer t h e Sentence Review Board t o t h e f a c t s of those cases. Now, i n t h e eyes of many, o r a t least some, t h e l e g a l profession has been branded and stigmatized by Bretz. H e , of course, has been disbarred, no longer can prac- t i c e , but I ' m taking t h i s i n t o account a l s o i n t h e imposition of sentence. Now, during t h e t r i a l M r . Bretz, through t h e news media, made c e r t a i n public statements t h a t demonstrate an unbelievable arrogance and lack of conscience on h i s p a r t . N o w one thing he r e f e r r e d t o is a r e v e r s a l of t h e Wam- pole case by t h e Federal Appeals Court. That re- v e r s a l apparently c l e a r s h i s conscience. H e a l s o , i n t h a t same news i t e m , c r i t i z e d [ s i c ] t h e S t a t e f o r wasting money i n t h e prosecution of these Workmen's Compensation cases, saying t h a t only one man has spent s i x t y e i g h t days i n prison f o r a l l t h a t has been done. I take t h i s i n t o note, and perhaps I w i l l c o r r e c t t h a t imbalance. He a l s o s t a t e s t h a t he has many grounds f o r appeal, and t h a t ultimately t h e r e w i l l be a r e v e r s a l , as t h e r e w a s i n t h e Wampole case. This may be so. H i s conscience may be c l e a r , i f t h a t s o happens. But t h e harsh r e a l i t y of h i s greed t o t h e people who have been victimized w i l l never be erased by any reversal." Defendant w a s sentenced t o one-fourth of t h e maximum sentence allowed by law f o r t h e offenses of which he w a s convicted. The general r u l e i s t h a t " a sentence within t h e maximum authorized by s t a t u t e i s not c r u e l and unusual . . ." S t a t e v. Karanthos (1972), 158 Mont. 461, 468, 493 P.2d 326, 330. Considering t h e number of counts of which defendant w a s convicted, t h e unbelievable arrogance and t h e lack of any showing of remorse by defendant and t h e sentence being 25 percent only of t h a t allowed by l a w and considering a l l t h e circumstances of t h e case, t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge cannot be c a l l e d i n t o question. CONDITIONING SUSPENSION - ON RESTITUTION The D i s t r i c t Court included t h e following conditions i n t h e judgment and order of commitment: "It i s Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed t h a t t h e l a s t 30 years of t h e 56 year sentence herein imposed be suspended upon t h e following conditions. "1. That t h e defendant pay i n t o d i s t r i c t c o u r t on o r before December 13, 1977, an amount s u f f i c i e n t t o pay a l l victims of t h e offenses f o r t h e f u l l amount of settlement awarded by t h e IAB/WCD in- cluding Dennis J. Aker, Stanley C. Gaines and Eu- gene R. H a l l . "2. A s a f u r t h e r penalty t h e r e s h a l l be no deduc- t i o n f o r attorney f e e s o r c o s t s claimed by t h e de- fendant. "3. A t t h i s t i m e t h e Court i s advised t h a t a f t e r allowance f o r payments made by t h e defendant, t h e t o t a l sum of $42,259.68 remains owing t o t h e claim- a n t s alleged t o have been defrauded. " 4 . Should t h e defendant n o t make f u l l payment within t h e t i m e prescribed, t h e defendant w i l l serve t h e sentences hereinabove imposed." Defendant argues t h a t these conditions are improper and amount t o c r u e l and unusual punishment f o r two reasons. F i r s t , t h e D i s t r i c t Court included t h e amount of t h e settle- ment on t h r e e counts upon which he was acquitted. Second, he argues t h i s amounted t o an excessive f i n e and was uncon- s t i t u t i o n a l l y c r u e l and unusual punishment considering defendant's indigent s t a t u s . Section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-18-201 MCA, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "(1) Whenever a person has been found g u i l t y of an offense upon a v e r d i c t o r a plea of g u i l t y , t h e c o u r t may: " (b) suspend execution of sentence up t o t h e maxi- m u m sentence allowed f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r offense. The sentencing judge may impose on t h e defendant any reasonable r e s t r i c t i o n s during t h e period of suspended sentence. Such reasonable r e s t r i c t i o n s may include: " ( i v ) r e s t i t u t i o n ; " ( d ) commit t h e defendant t o a c o r r e c t i o n a l i n s t i - t u t i o n with o r without a f i n e as provided by law f o r t h e offense; " (e) impose any combination of subsections (1) (b) , (1) (c) I and (1) (dl . " When t h e judgment i s entered on t h e v e r d i c t of g u i l t y and t h e sentence i s imposed, t h e criminal proceeding i s a t an end. Any mitigation by suspension, e t c . , i s t h e begin- ning of t h e probation and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n process, and t h e defendant a t t h i s s t a g e of t h e proceeding i s not possessed of f u l l c i t i z e n s h i p and not e n t i t l e d t o a l l of t h e con- s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of a f r e e man. W e have m e t t h i s problem i n r e c e n t cases and have held a s have o t h e r j u r s i d i c t i o n s and t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court, see S t a t e v. May ( l 9 6 9 ) , 93 Idaho 343, 461 P.2d 126; F u l l e r v. Oregon (19741, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L Ed 2d 642, t h a t r e s t i t u t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n connection with theft-type convictions, i s a proper condition f o r suspension o r probation. A considera- t i o n of t h e e n t i r e record i n t h i s case demonstrates t h a t t h e t r i a l judge has been more than f a i r and h i s granting defen- dant an opportunity f o r suspension i s an a c t of mercy he w a s n o t required t o extend t o t h i s defendant. SENTENCING HEARING After t h e v e r d i c t had been returned by t h e jury on December 1, 1976, t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : "NOW, i n view of t h e circumstances p e c u l i a r t o t h i s case, t h e Court deems i t s e l f w e l l enough advised t o impose penalty without c a l l i n g f o r a pre-sentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n and report. I am going t o set next Tuesday, December t h e 7th, a s t h e t i m e f o r sentencing, a t t h e hour of 1 1 : O O o'clock A.M. "Now, a t t h a t t i m e Counsel f o r t h e Defense may present any matters i n mitigation of punishment i f they wish it a t t h a t t i m e . " O n December 3, 1976, t h e prosecutors f o r the S t a t e s e n t a l e t t e r t o Judge Martin s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e i r views with r e s p e c t t o defendant's sentencing. They attached a copy of a l e t t e r from t h e daughter of one of t h e victims i n t h e case, which had been s e n t t o a judge i n California i n an- o t h e r matter. Because of i l l n e s s , defendant's sentencing w a s delayed u n t i l December 13. A t t h a t t i m e , defense coun- sel s t a t e d t h a t , i n h i s opinion, i n t h e absence of a pre- sentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n , " t h e Court lack[ed] t h e proper necessary information t o pass judgment i n t h i s matter." The S t a t e answered t h a t , among other things, t h e c o u r t had had access t o a copy of another presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n pre- pared i n another t r i a l of defendant. The c o u r t s a i d t h a t it had looked a t t h e r e p o r t , found t h a t it was not h e l p f u l , and then d e t a i l e d f o r t h e record t h e reasons f o r t h e sentence it was about t o impose. Defendant o b j e c t s t o two p a r t s of t h i s procedure. F i r s t , he argues t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court should have ordered a presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n and t h a t t h e p r i o r document was not an adequate s u b s t i t u t e . Citing S t a t e v. Orsborn (1976), 170 Mont. 480, 555 P.2d 509, defendant argues t h a t he should have been advised of t h e contents of t h e presentence r e p o r t from t h e p r i o r t r i a l and given t h e opportunity t o r e b u t any misinformation it might have contained. Next, he argues t h a t t h e S t a t e should have produced f o r cross-examination t h e v i c t i m ' s daughter who had w r i t t e n t h e l e t t e r t h e prose- c u t o r s presented t o t h e court. F a i l u r e t o do t h i s , says defendant, w a s a d e n i a l of due process. Section 95-2203, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-18-111 MCA, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "No defendant convicted of a crime which may re- s u l t i n commitment f o r one (1) year o r more i n t h e s t a t e prison, s h a l l be sentenced o r otherwise disposed of before a w r i t t e n r e p o r t of investiga- t i o n by a probation o f f i c e r i s presented t o and considered by t h e court, unless t h e c o u r t deems such r e p o r t unnecessary." (Emphasis added.) The obvious import of t h i s s t a t u t e i s t o provide a means by which a c o u r t can fashion a punishment which w i l l f i t not only t h e circumstances of t h e crime b u t a l s o t h e individual c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e person convicted. The c o u r t i n t h e i n s t a n t case, because of i t s f a m i l i a r i t y with defendant and h i s crimes w a s i n a p o s i t i o n t o sentence without having a presentence investigation. Defendant had seen a copy of t h e p r i o r presentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n and had t h e opportunity t o dispute its contents b u t he d i d not. Beyond t h a t , t h e c o u r t indicated t h a t it had n o t been helpful and t h e c o u r t ' s reli- ance on it i n any way i s extremely doubtful. The D i s t r i c t Court d e t a i l e d a t some length its reasons f o r t h e sentence imposed on defendant and he had t h e opportunity t o respond t o those reasons a t t h a t t i m e with any mitigating f a c t o r s he could find. The same i s t r u e of t h e l e t t e r s e n t t o Judge Martin by t h e prosecutors with i t s attachment. Defendant w a s fur- nished with a copy of t h e letters and with t h e opportunity t o m i t i g a t e any e f f e c t he f e l t it might have. The letter from t h e daughter of one of t h e victims was not mentioned by t h e judge as a contributing f a c t o r i n h i s sentencing deci- s i o n and t h e p a r t i c u l a r count t o which it r e l a t e d d i d not r e s u l t i n an enhanced punishment. ADMISSION - OF EXHIBITS The S t a t e introduced t h e f i l e s of t h e I n d u s t r i a l Acci- dent Board Worker's Compensation Division as Exhibit No. 1 under t h e Business Records a s Evidence A c t , s e c t i o n s 93-801- 1 through 93-801-6, R.C.M. 1947. Each f i l e consisted p r i - marily of t h e following documents: 1. Settlement d r a f t ; 2. P e t i t i o n f o r compromise settlement; 3. Carden settlement memorandum; 4 . Appointment of Attorney i n Fact submitted by defen- dant; 5. Medical r e p o r t s ; 6. A f f i d a v i t i n support of lump s u m settlement; 7. Correspondence between t h e IAB and defendant; 8. Order approving settlement. Section 93-801-2, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "A record of an a c t , condition o r event, s h a l l , i n so f a r a s r e l e v a n t , be competent evidence i f t h e custodian o r other q u a l i f i e d witness t e s t i f i e s t o i t s i d e n t i t y and mode of i t s prepara- t i o n , a n d ' i f it was made i n t h e regular course of business, a t o r near the t i m e of t h e a c t , condi- t i o n o r event, and i f , i n t h e opinion of t h e court, t h e sources of information, method and t i m e of preparation w e r e such a s t o j u s t i f y ad- mission." Defendant argues t h a t t h e S t a t e w a s required t o produce evidence of t h e source, mode, and t i m e of preparation of t h e IAB f i l e e x h i b i t s . I n f a c t , t h e testimony of Albert G. P i l l e n , who w a s t h e claims manager f o r t h e S t a t e Insurance Fund a t t h e t i m e of most of t h e events i n question, provided t h i s foundation. Defendant, though, claims t h a t P i l l e n could n o t l a y t h e proper foundation because he had n o t examined t h e individual documents i n t h e f i l e . W e f i n d t h a t P i l l e n was a q u a l i f i e d witness and t h a t a q u a l i f i e d witness under circumstances l i k e those presented i n t h i s case need n o t have examined every document i n a f i l e . Furthermore, again defendant has f a i l e d t o demonstrate t h a t any of t h e evidence presented i s not trustworthy . Defendant next addresses t h e admission i n t o evidence of c e r t a i n handwriting examples of defendant's t h r e e secre- t a r i e s . These included a b s t r a c t s of v e h i c l e titles, d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e applications, notary public records, and v o t e r r e g i s t r a t i o n cards. Defendant objected t o t h e introduction of these e x h i b i t s because t h e r e was no testimony t h a t t h e signatures on t h e documents were authentic. The purpose f o r which t h e signatures w e r e introduced was f o r comparison with o t h e r questioned signatures. Defendant has never alleged t h a t t h e signatures are f a l s e . The signatures were properly admitted i n t o evidence under t h e Public Records Exception t o t h e Hearsay Rule, s e c t i o n s 93-901-1 through 93-901-5, R.C.M. 1947. Each of t h e records i s kept by an o f f i c i a l state o r county agency f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e public. he f a c t t h a t a number of signatures were introduced helped t o i n s u r e t h e i r a u t h e n t i c i t y . PROOF - O F ELEMENTS - O F PREPARING FALSE EVIDENCE Defendant argues t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o prove t h e two counts of preparing f a l s e evidence. Count V I I alleged t h a t defendant's preparation of p e t i t i o n s f o r lump sum and com- promise settlements, submitted t o t h e IAB/WCD i n t h e Donald Barry case a f t e r Barry had died v i o l a t e d s e c t i o n 94-1703, R.C.M. 1947. Count L I alleged s i m i l a r circumstances with r e s p e c t t o E a r l Tannehill, who was a l s o dead. Defendant contends t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o prove t h e following material allegations: "A. That t h e documents w e r e intended ' a s evidence.' "B. That t h e documents produced w e r e of t h e type intended t o be covered by t h e criminal s t a t u t e . "C. That t h e documents were produced i n a t r i a l , proceeding o r inquiry authorized by law. "D. That t h e documents were prepared i n Cascade County, t h e venue of t h e t r i a l . " Section 94-1703, R.C.M. 1947, provides a s follows: "Every person g u i l t y of preparing any f a l s e o r antedated book, paper, record, instrument i n w r i t - ing, o r o t h e r matter o r thing, with i n t e n t t o pro- duce o r allow it t o be produced f o r any fraudulent o r d e c e i t f u l purpose, a s genuine or t r u e , upon any t r i a l , proceeding, o r inquiry whatever, authorized by law, i s g u i l t y of a felony." The elements of t h e offense of preparing f a l s e evidence which w e r e required t o be proved i n t h e i n s t a n t case a r e (1) preparation of a f a l s e r e p o r t ; ( 2 ) with i n t e n t t o produce it f o r any fraudulent o r d e c e i t f u l purpose, a s true; (3) upon any inquiry authorized by l a w . Here, t h e p e t i t i o n s pre- supposed l i v e claimants s i n c e t h e r i g h t t o compensation ceases a t death. I n t e n t i s a f a c t u a l question f o r t h e jury, t h e fraudulent purpose being t o o b t a i n money knowing he w a s n o t e n t i t l e d t o it. The p e t i t i o n s w e r e a s t a t u t o r y pre- r e q u i s i t e t o t h e exercise of t h e board's d i s c r e t i o n i n awarding lump sum o r compromise settlements. See s e c t i o n 92-715, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 39-71-741 MCA. With respect t o venue, we recognize t h a t venue must be proven i n a criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt. S t a t e v. W i l l i a m s (1949), 122 Mont. 279, 202 P.2d 245. I n t h i s case, s u f f i c i e n t evidence w a s presented from which t h e jury could determine t h a t t h e S t a t e proved venue beyond a reason- a b l e doubt. Both p e t i t i o n s f o r lump s u m settlement con- tained defendant's signature followed by h i s Great F a l l s address. The p e t i t i o n s f o r compromise settlement r e s u l t e d i n checks being s e n t t o defendant i n Great F a l l s . LARCENY - BY BAILEE PROOF I n t h e amended Information, with t h e exception of t h e Barry and Tannehill counts, defendant was charged with a l t e r n a t i v e counts of Larceny by Trick and Device, s e c t i o n 94-2701(1), R.C.M. 1947, and Larceny by Bailee, s e c t i o n 94- 2701 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947. The S t a t e chose t o go t o t r i a l on t h e Larceny by Bailee charges and dismissed t h e a l t e r n a t e counts of Larceny by Trick and Device. Section 94-2701(2), R.C.M. 1947, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "Larceny defined. Every person who, with t h e i n t e n t t o deprive o r defraud t h e t r u e owner of h i s property, o r of t h e use and b e n e f i t t h e r e o f , o r t o appropriate t h e same t o t h e use of t h e t a k e r , o r of any o t h e r person . . . " 2 . Having i n h i s possession, custody, o r c o n t r o l , a s a b a i l e e , s e r v a n t , a t t o r n e y , agent, c l e r k , t r u s t e e , o r o f f i c e r of any person . . . o r a s a person authorized by agreement o r by competent a u t h o r i t y t o hold, o r t a k e such possession, cus- tody, o r c o n t r o l , any money, property . . . ap- p r o p r i a t e s t h e same t o h i s own use, o r t h a t of any o t h e r person o t h e r than t h e t r u e owner, o r person e n t i t l e d t o t h e b e n e f i t t h e r e o f , s t e a l s such property and i s g u i l t y of larceny." Defendant argues t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o prove t h r e e elements of t h e crime charged. F i r s t , he argues t h a t t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o prove t h a t defendant was an "attorney." Second, he argues t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s proof negated t h e requi- site element of " i n t e n t t o permanently deprive" t h e owner of funds. F i n a l l y , he argues t h a t t h e S t a t e o f f e r e d proof which negated t h e element of a u t h o r i t y under which defendant was holding t h e funds. I n i t i a l l y , w e note t h a t t h e function of t h i s Court i n reviewing a jury v e r d i c t i s t o determine i f t h e v e r d i c t i s supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence. S t a t e v. Pepperling (1974), 166 Mont. 293, 533 P.2d 283. ". . . t h i s c o u r t i s n o t a trier of f a c t . . . I n view of t h e presumption of innocence a t t h e t r i a l , t h e jury must have been i n s t r u c t e d t o t h a t e f f e c t , b u t on appeal a f t e r conviction t h e r u l e changes. Then, i f t h e record shows any s u b s t a n t i a l evi- dence t o support t h e judgment, t h e presumption i s i n favor of such judgment." S t a t e v. Stoddard (1966), 147 Mont. 402, 408. 412 P.2d 827, 831. See a l s o S t a t e v. Cor (1964), 1 4 4 Mont, 323, 396 P.2d 86. he record i n t h i s case amply demonstrates t h a t defen- d a n t intended t o permanently deprive h i s own injured c l i e n t s of t h e i r money. Exhibits presented a t t r i a l showed low d e p o s i t s i n bank accounts maintained by defendant i n t o which t h e settlement checks from t h e c l i e n t s w e r e deposited. I n each case, it w a s demonstrated t h a t t h e r e was a t l e a s t one p o i n t i n t i m e when defendant could not possibly have d i s - t r i b u t e d t h e c l i e n t ' s share of t h e money t o t h e c l i e n t . A s applied t o t h e charges i n t h i s case, section 94- 2701(2) r e q u i r e s t h e S t a t e t o prove t h a t defendant took possession of t h e funds e i t h e r as an attorney - o r a s a person authorized by agreement o r competent a u t h o r i t y . With re- s p e c t t o each count, t h e S t a t e need prove one o r t h e o t h e r ; it need not prove both. I n each case presented here, defendant received s e t t l e - ment money because he had been retained a s an attorney; he represented himself as an attorney; d e a l t with t h e IAB a s t h e c l i e n t ' s attorney; wrote letters, received correspon- dence, f i l e d documents with t h e IAB, and received h i s c l i - e n t ' s money, a l l a s an attorney. H e cannot now claim t h a t he was not an attorney, a f t e r a jury, presented with t h i s evidence, found t h a t he w a s . The essence of defendant's next argument i s t h a t t h e S t a t e attempted t o prove t h a t defendant sought o u t h i s c l i e n t s with t h e i n t e n t t o ultimately s t e a l from them. This p r i o r i n t e n t i s n o t c o n s i s t e n t with t h e i n t e n t element present i n t h e crime of Larceny by Bailee where, defendant argues, t h e i n t e n t t o s t e a l a r i s e s a f t e r t h e point i n t i m e when t h e embezzler gains c o n t r o l of t h e funds. Here, a f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s created when defen- d a n t acted on behalf of h i s c l i e n t s as t h e i r a t t o r n e y . Defendant is estopped, under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , from a s s e r t i n g a s a defense t h a t he harbored a felonious i n t e n t p r i o r t o t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e f i d u c i a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p . S t a t e v. Gould (1932), 329 Mo. 828, 46 S.W.2d 886. Furthermore, t h e element of i n t e n t and t h e t i m e of i t s formation i s a question f o r t h e jury, a question which w a s resolved a g a i n s t defendant. Therefore, w e f i n d t h a t t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n t h e record t o support t h e j u r y ' s determination t h a t defendant was g u i l t y of t h e crime of Larceny by Bailee. OVERZEALOUS PROSECUTION Defendant argues t h a t t h e cumulative e f f e c t of a series of a c t s by t h e prosecution denied him h i s b a s i c c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . He lists s i x s p e c i f i c a c t s : 1. F i l i n g of m u l t i p l e counts; 2. P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y ; 3. Resistance of payment of appointed counsel; 4 . D i s m i s s a l and r e f i l i n g of charges without n o t i c e o r opportunity f o r hearing being afforded t o t h e defendant; 5. Demand of document from t h e defense i n v i o l a t i o n of defendant's F i f t h Amendment r i g h t t o s i l e n c e ; and, 6. S t a t e ' s withholding of names of witnesses. W e have previously addressed t h e underlying f a c t u a l circumstances of t h e f i r s t t h r e e p o i n t s made by defendant. Number 4 r e f e r s t o t h e dismissal of t h e J u l y 30, 1974, Information. Defendant s t a t e s t h a t i f he "had been allowed t o appear, t h i s c a s e might w e l l have been prosecuted on a s h o r t e r , o r i g i n a l 29-count Information with a r e s u l t i n g speedup i n t h e proceedings, s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of t h e i s s u e s and minimi zing of p u b l i c i t y . " ÿ umber 5 r e f e r s t o an exchange appearing on pages 2346 and 2347 of t h e t r a n s c r i p t . Prosecutor G i l b e r t was ques- tioning witness Earley about a v i s i t he had received from defense counsel Connor. G i l b e r t asked Earley i f Connor had shown him a l e t t e r a t t h a t time. Earley answered affirma- t i v e l y and G i l b e r t then asked him i f a letter he was holding was t h e same letter. Earley s a i d it w a s n o t and G i l b e r t then asked Connor t o check h i s f i l e s f o r t h e l e t t e r . After a b r i e f exchange, t h e two attorneys approached t h e bench f o r some discussion off t h e record. Defense counsel then moved f o r a m i s t r i a l due t o t h i s request, c i t i n g it a s v i o l a t i v e of t h e F i f t h Amendment guarantee t h a t a defendant cannot be compelled t o f u r n i s h evidence a g a i n s t himself. Number 6 r e f e r s t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e S t a t e was per- mitted t o add c e r t a i n witnesses t o i t s l i s t of witnesses following v o i r d i r e . Three of these witnesses were u l t i - mately c a l l e d t o t h e stand i n t h e course of t h e t r i a l . Addressing t h i s l a s t i s s u e f i r s t , w e note t h a t one of t h e t h r e e witnesses who could have possibly prejudiced defendant's case w a s a witness defendant had l i s t e d a s h i s own. Aside from t h i s , t h e D i s t r i c t Court s t a t e d a t t h e t i m e t h e witnesses were l i s t e d t h a t he would g r a n t a continuance on defendant's request p r i o r t o t h e examination of these witnesses i f defense counsel needed e x t r a t i m e t o interview t h e witnesses and develop t h e i r questions. This opportunity cured any prejudice which might have otherwise developed. Concerning t h e alleged v i o l a t i o n of defendant's F i f t h Amendment r i g h t s , w e note t h a t no objection was made on F i f t h Amendment grounds a t t h e t i m e of t h e incident. More- over, t h e request was made of counsel and not of t h e defen- dant. ~ e v i e w i n g t h e t r a n s c r i p t w e cannot discern how defen- dant could have been prejudiced by t h e exchange. Certainly it i s not apparent from t h e record. I n addition, t h e record f i l e d with t h i s Court does not contain an objection by defendant with r e s p e c t t o t h e dismissal of t h e f i r s t Infor- mation and t h e f i l i n g of t h e second. Having previously discussed t h e f i r s t t h r e e matters with r e s p e c t t o o t h e r i s s u e s , we a r e l e f t with t h e t a s k of assessing t h e o v e r a l l impact of t h e s e matters considered together. W e f i n d t h a t t h e i s s u e s presented here, i f they were t o be considered e r r o r , a r e n o t of t h e q u a l i t y t o be i n any sense p r e j u d i c i a l . DENIAL - O F OPPORTUNITY - TO PRESENT DEFENSE Defendant contends t h a t c e r t a i n alleged e r r o r s and erroneous r u l i n g a t t e n d a n t t o t h i s case had t h e e f f e c t of v i o l a t i n g h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t " t o have compulsory process f o r obtaining witnesses i n h i s favor a s guaranteed by t h e S i x t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s Constitution and A r t i c l e 11, Section 24 of t h e Montana Constitution of 1972." H e breaks t h i s assignment of e r r o r i n t o f i v e p a r t s . 1. F a i l u r e t o pay appointed counsel; 2. Denial and quashing of subpoenas without proper b a s i s ; 3 . Refusal t o allow i n evidence of accountings sub- mitted by defendant t o an alleged victim; 4 . The r e f u s a l t o allow testimony a s t o work per- formed; 5. Having t o clear out-of-state witnesses with t h e c o u r t and S t a t e before obtaining subpoenas. W e have previously discussed defendant's f i r s t assign- ment of e r r o r i n t h i s regard and found no showing of preju- d i c e t o h i s defense. The d e n i a l and quashing of subpoenas mentioned r e f e r t o two incidents. The f i r s t involved defendant's f a i l u r e t o o b t a i n a a subpoena duces tecum commanding M r s . Robert Morris, t h e wife of an alleged victim, t o bring copies of t h e couple's I n t e r n a l Revenue r e t u r n s f o r a number of years. Defendant himself s t a t e d t h e purpose f o r which he wished t o subpoena t h e records: "Mrs. Morris w i l l be a witness i n t h i s case f o r t h e defendant, and t h e purpose of t h i s subpoena, Your Honor, it i s going t o become r e l e v a n t i n t h i s case concerning t h e addresses and employers and earnings of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r witness f o r t h e S t a t e . And t h e b e s t evidence probably of t h e earnings, employer and addresses and s o f o r t h w i l l by t h e I n t e r n a l Revenue records. I f M r . and M r s . Morris have f i l e d a j o i n t r e t u r n of course t h i s information is t h e r e and M r s . Morris can provide it. And it i s most r e l e v a n t on t h i s i s s u e . This is one of t h e main p a r t s of t h e Morris count. " The S t a t e objected t o t h e granting of t h e subpoena on t h e grounds t h a t it w a s not t h e b e s t evidence and no need was shown f o r t h e records. The D i s t r i c t Court, i n denying t h e subpoena, s t a t e d t h a t "[wlhen you e s t a b l i s h a foundation and b a s i s f o r it, then t h e c o u r t w i l l look a t i t . " I t i s not e r r o r t o r e q u i r e a proper foundation. A s i m i l a r i n c i d e n t occurred concerning a subpoena by t h e defense of a representative of t h e C r e d i t Bureau. The C r e d i t Bureau moved t o quash and t h e S t a t e supported t h e motion arguing t h a t t h e r e was no foundation l a i d f o r t h e evidence t o be gained. After some argument, defense counsel Barron asked t h a t t h e matter be postponed u n t i l a s u f f i c i e n t foundation was l a i d . The defense apparently did not pursue t h i s matter following t h a t acquiescence. This s p e c i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e s no comment. Turning t o defendant's next argument regarding evidence of accountings, it appears t h a t t h e testimony of Greg Warner, an attorney who represented victim Hortick i n a lawsuit a g a i n s t defendant, was excluded by t h e t r i a l court. ~ e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r of proof was t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t M r . War- n e r ' s testimony would show t h a t defendant was holding t h e money openly under a claim of r i g h t . However, t h i s pur- ported good f a i t h claim t o t h e settlement was n o t made u n t i l nearly a year a f t e r t h e settlement had been obtained and only a f t e r a demand by t h e victim through h i s attorney had been made following Hortick's being contacted by t h e a t t o r - ney g e n e r a l ' s o f f i c e thus becoming aware of t h e settlement. A s such, t h i s evidence w a s not r e l e v a n t t o h i s defense of good f a i t h . Next, defendant claims t h a t he offered t o prove t h a t victim Hortick had been involved i n criminal d i f f i c u l t i e s , t h a t he had retained defendant t o defend him, t h a t defendant d i d some work i n t h i s matter and was e n t i t l e d t o a fee. This f e e was then claimed a s an o f f s e t a g a i n s t t h e Hortick settlement. But defendant attempted t o introduce t h i s testimony through a former deputy county attorney. Only Hortick's o r defendant's testimony could have established t h a t defendant had been h i r e d by Hortick, t h a t a f e e agree- ment had been reached, t h a t he performed a c e r t a i n amount of work, t h a t he was therefore e n t i t l e d t o a f e e and t h a t , i n f a c t , he retained a portion of Hortick's Workers' Compensa- t i o n settlement f o r t h a t purpose. Hortick d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t he had retained defendant i n t h e matter and t h e defense d i d not examine him on t h a t point. Defendant chose not t o t e s t i f y , and we are precluded from drawing any conclusions from t h a t f a c t . However, i n t h e absence of t h e proper foundational testimony, t h e evidence was properly excluded. F i n a l l y , before obtaining subpoenas f o r out-of-state witnesses, t h e defense was required t o demonstrate t h e m a t e r i a l i t y of t h e witness' testimony. The S t a t e was al- lowed t o be p r e s e n t during such demonstrations. Defendant argues t h a t h i s defense was thereby revealed and prejudiced. This i s s u e a r i s e s o u t of a l i s t of out-of-state witnesses containing approximately 40 names submitted j u s t two weeks before trial. The l i s t included persons from Alaska, Nevada, I l l i n o i s , and West Germany. The purpose of t h e i n q u i r y was t o determine whether t h e s e were l e g i t i m a t e witnesses. Again, defendant has made no showing of preju- d i c e with r e s p e c t t o h i s i n a b i l i t y t o o b t a i n any of t h e s e witnesses. Without such a showing, t h e r e i s no e r r o r . TESTIMONY REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES These i s s u e s relate t o testimony regarding reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s fees. The first testimony which i s objected t o by defendant came from Bud P i l l e n , Bureau Chief of t h e S t a t e Insurance Fund. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n h i s observation a t t o r - neys r e g u l a r l y charged "twenty-five percent [of settlements] unless t h e c a s e went t o hearing, and then it was u s u a l l y one-third." I f it went t o t h e Supreme Court, possibly f o r t y percent. Next, N e i l Keefer, a Montana a t t o r n e y s p e c i a l i z i n g i n Workers' Compensation, t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s normal f e e t o Workers' Compensation c l i e n t s was 25 percent. Defendant argues t h a t t h i s testimony should n o t have been admitted because it had nothing t o do with t h e i s s u e before t h e jury, whether defendant embezzled from t h e c l i - e n t . A t t h e t i m e t h e r e w a s no s t a t u t o r y l i m i t on Workers' Compensation f e e s . A s a r e s u l t , defendant claims t h i s testimony's only e f f e c t w a s t o "inflame t h e passions of t h e jury and confuse t h e t r u e issues." Thereafter, defendant attempted t o present t h e testi- mony of James Walsh, Deputy County Attorney f o r Cascade County. H i s testimony r e l a t e d t o t h e alleged representation of Donald Hortick i n t h e criminal matter previously discussed. The testimony of witnesses P i l l e n and Keefer about t h e reasonableness of attorney f e e s w a s r e l e v a n t t o t h e tran- s a c t i o n s i n which no f e e agreement w a s made between t h e c l i e n t and Bretz. Keefer's testimony was primarily limited t o t h e Stanley Gaines f i l e and defendant w a s ultimately acquitted of t h e count. Beyond t h a t , t h e purpose of expert testimony i s t o a s s i s t t h e jury i n making i t s determination; it does not l i m i t t h e j u r y ' s capacity t o decide f o r i t s e l f . Since t h e s t a t u t e i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e provided t h a t an agreement a s t o a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s could be implied, some standard by which t h e jury could determine what such an implied agreement might be w a s e s s e n t i a l . I n addition t o t h i s , even where t h e r e was an agreed f e e , defendant o f t e n d i d not adhere t o t h e agreement though t h i s gave t h e jury an independent b a s i s f o r i t s determination. I n t h e G i l b e r t case, f o r example, defendant kept 80 percent f o r h i s fee. W e have already addressed t h e foundational d e f i c i e n c i e s of Walsh's testimony and f i n d no e r r o r . TESTIMONY - BY GERLACH CONCERNING O T H E R CRIMES D r . W i l l i a m Gerlach was c a l l e d by t h e S t a t e t o r e f u t e c e r t a i n medical r e p o r t s t h a t appeared i n t h e I A B f i l e s . D r . Gerlach t e s t i f i e d t h a t he would d i c t a t e medical r e p o r t s on various p a t i e n t s and then would have them typed by defen- d a n t ' s o f f i c e . They would be returned t o him f o r h i s review o r signature. D r . Gerlach went on t o t e s t i f y t h a t t h e medical r e p o r t s on Ray Pohjola and E a r l Tannehill w e r e n o t prepared o r signed by him. Defendant argues t h a t t h i s testimony was i r r e l e v a n t i n t h a t it amounted t o an accusation t h a t defendant had com- mitted t h e crimes of forgery and obtaining money by f a l s e p r e t e n s e s , crimes which he was n o t charged with i n t h e Pohjola o r Tannehill counts. Furthermore, defendant was charged i n t h e Tannehill matter with preparing a f a l s e p e t i t i o n f o r compromise settlement and t h e jury may have confused t h e i s s u e s and t h e proof. I n S t a t e v. P h i l l i p s (1953), 127 Mont. 381, 394, 264 P.2d 1009, 1016, w e s t a t e d : ". . . t r a n s a c t i o n s which a r e so r e l a t e d t o , and connected with, t h e forgery charged a s t o be otherwise admissible a r e n o t inadmissible because they tend t o prove a wholly d i s s i m i l a r crime, p a r t i c u l a r l y where they c o n s t i t u t e p a r t of a con- nected o r continuous t r a n s a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e accused. " The evidence i n t h i s case tends t o show t h a t t h e Gerlach medical r e p o r t s had been f r a u d u l e n t l y submitted t o t h e IAB and c o n s t i t u t e p a r t of a connected o r continuous t r a n s a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of defendant. The testimony goes t o demonstrate t h e manner i n which defendant set up t h e system by which he could commit t h e crimes with which he was eventually charged. I M P E A C H M E N T - OF WITNESS M c M A S T E R BY - STATE George McMaster w a s t h e S t a t e ' s second witness and once he w a s on t h e stand t h e c o u r t allowed t h e S t a t e t o impeach him. Section 93-1901-8, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "The p a r t y producing a witness i s n o t allowed t o impeach h i s c r e d i t by evidence of bad c h a r a c t e r b u t he may c o n t r a d i c t him by o t h e r evidence, and may a l s o show t h a t he has made a t o t h e r t i m e s statements i n c o n s i s t e n t with h i s p r e s e n t testi- mony, as provided i n s e c t i o n 93-1901-12." Because t h e S t a t e made no showing of s u r p r i s e and because it w a s long aware t h a t McMaster's p o s i t i o n was t h a t he had n o t been a victim, defendant argues t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n permitting h i s testimony. Witness McMaster t e s t i f i e d t h a t when h e f i r s t v i s i t e d defendant's o f f i c e , t h e men agreed they would s p l i t t h e s e t t l m e n t 50-50. This w a s a s u r p r i s e t o t h e S t a t e because t h e S t a t e believed he would t e s t i f y t h e r e had been no f e e agreement. McMaster was a h o s t i l e witness as w e l l because he was suing t h e S t a t e f o r $100,000 as a r e s u l t of having been named a s a victim i n t h e Information f i l e d a g a i n s t defendant. The S t a t e w a s only aware of t h e l a t t e r hos- t i l i t y of McMaster y e t d i d not want t o dismiss t h e McMaster count. I n S t a t e v. Bloor (1898), 20 Mont. 574, 585, 52 P. 611, t h i s Court s t a t e d : " I t not i n f r e q u e n t l y happens t h a t a witness is brought under t h e influence of an adverse p a r t y , and upon t h e t r i a l completely deceives t h e p a r t y c a l l i n g him. When such i n s t a n c e s arise i n c r i m - i n a l cases, by t h e g r e a t weight of a u t h o r i t y t h e r i g h t t o cross-examine arises as one necessary f o r t h e prosecution of t h e r i g h t s of t h e S t a t e a g a i n s t t h e p e r j u r y o r evasion of an unwilling witness. 'I I n S t a t e v. Traufer (1939), 109 Mont. 275, 285, 97 P.2d 336, w e s t a t e d : " . . . A p a r t y i s n o t bound t o accept t h e testi- mony of h i s own witness a s c o r r e c t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n c a s e s of t h i s nature where t h e r e is motive i n changing t h e e f f e c t of a previously made s t a t e - ment. . ." The D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t err i n allowing t h e S t a t e t o impeach t h e testimony of McMaster under t h e circumstances presented i n t h i s case. This s e e m s p a r t i c u l a r l y compelling i n l i g h t of McMaster's testimony t h a t it was defendant's i d e a t h a t he make t h e c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e . L A R R Y S A N F O R D TESTIMONY I n t h e Swims Under Count (Count 4 7 ) , an i s s u e arose a s t o whether defendant had prosecuted a products l i a b i l i t y s u i t f o r M r . S w i m s Under a g a i n s t Heston Corporation. Larry Sanford, s t a f f attorney f o r Heston, t e s t i f i e d t h a t corpora- t i o n policy was t o immediately inform i t s l i a b i l i t y c a r r i e r by l e t t e r of any claims a g a i n s t t h e corporation. Then he t e s t i f i e d no such letter appeared i n t h e i r f i l e . Defendant o b j e c t s t o t h i s testimony because Sanford w a s n o t employed by Heston when t h e s u i t was allegedly brought and had only been t o l d t h a t t h a t was t h e policy a t Heston a t t h a t t i m e a s well. Section 93-401-2, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "A witness can t e s t i f y t o those f a c t s only which he knows of h i s own knowledge; t h a t is, which a r e derived from h i s own perceptions, except i n those few express cases i n which h i s opinions o r i n f e r - ences, o r t h e declarations of o t h e r s , are admis- s i b l e . " Any problem with Sanford's testimony i s a problem of weight. Defendant had t h e opportunity t o cross-examine with r e s p e c t t o the completeness of Heston Corporation records of t h e d a t e i n question. H e was f u r t h e r e n t i t l e d t o argue t o t h e jury t h a t t h i s testimony could n o t be conclusive. JURY INSTRUCTIONS Counts 6 and 50 of t h e amended Information alleged t h a t defendant obtained money from t h e IAB by f a l s e pretenses i n t h e Barry and Tannehill cases. Counts 7 and 51 of t h e amended Information alleged t h a t defendant prepared f a l s e evidence i n those cases. I n a l l four counts t h e i t e m s alleged t o be f a l s e were P e t i t i o n s f o r Compromise S e t t l e - ment and P e t i t i o n s f i l e d by defendant. Though t h e jury was adequately i n s t r u c t e d with r e s p e c t t o t h e nature and ele- ments of t h e crimes charged, defendant o b j e c t s because no i n s t r u c t i o n explained t o t h e jury t h a t t h e items alleged t o be false w e r e t h e p e t i t i o n s . F i r s t w e note t h a t during h i s opening statement, de- fense counsel requested t h a t t h e c o u r t read t h e charging document t o t h e jury and t h e court advised him t h a t he might read those charges t o t h e jury himself. Defense counsel Barron read t h e charges which are r e f e r r e d t o i n t h i s i s s u e a t t h a t t i m e . I n addition t o t h i s , prosecutor G i l b e r t , i n h i s summation, discussed t h e f a l s e representations and f a l s e evidence r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e Information. Reviewing h i s statements i n t h i s regard, it appears t h a t t h e jury w a s ade- quately apprised of t h e nature and s u b j e c t of these charges. Beyond t h i s , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s which were given i n t h i s a r e a were not erroneous; i f defendant f e l t f u t h e r i n s t r u c - t i o n s , including more s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s were necessary, it was incumbent upon him t o request more s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c - t i o n s . N o such request appears i n t h e record. Defendant goes on t o o b j e c t t o t h e giving of t h r e e p a r t i c u l a r i n s t r u c t i o n s . The f i r s t i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t e d , i n essence, t h a t i n t h e c r i m e of larceny by b a i l e e r e s t i t u t i o n i s not a defense when t h e criminal i n t e n t e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e taking. I n o t h e r words, t h e crime i s complete a t t h e p o i n t of taking with t h e i n t e n t t o permanently de- prive. R e s t i t u t i o n i s only a defense when t h e defendant intended t o r e t u r n t h e property a t t h e t i m e it was taken. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o n s i s t e n t with s e c t i o n 94-2717, R.C.M. 1947. Defendant next o b j e c t s t o t h e giving of t h e following i n s t r u c t i o n : "When, as i n t h i s case, it i s alleged t h a t t h e crime charged was committed on o r about a cer- t a i n date, i f t h e jury f i n d s t h a t t h e crime was committed, it i s not necessary t h a t t h e proof show t h a t it was committed on t h a t p r e c i s e date; it i s s u f f i c i e n t t h a t t h e proof shows t h a t t h e crime was committed p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g of t h e information. " Defendant maintains t h a t no evidence w a s presented t o t h e jury as t o when t h e Information w a s f i l e d s o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was meaningless t o t h e jury a s t o determining t h e t i m e of t h e offense. To properly u t i l i z e t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , a jury should be apprised of t h e d a t e of t h e f i l i n g of t h e charging document. However, i n t h e absence of any showing of preju- d i c e , t h e f a i l u r e of t h i s a p p r i s a l i s n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . I n t h i s case, t h e r e i s no showing t h a t any proof was pre- sented which tended t o prove t h a t any offense had been committed a f t e r t h e Information was f i l e d . The next i n s t r u c t i o n objected t o by defendant reads a s follows: " I f t h e evidence shows t h a t defendant made s i m i - l a r f a l s e representations o r pretenses t o persons o t h e r than t h e owner, such evidence, i f believed by you, is s u f f i c i e n t corroboration." Defendant argues t h a t t h e r e i s no evidence of f a l s e repre- s e n t a t i o n s t o o t h e r s a s t o t h e f a l s e pretense counts and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s should not have been given. The S t a t e argues t h a t c e r t a i n evidence was t o be considered a s such and it i s within t h e province of t h e jury t o have considered it. I n e i t h e r case, it would not be p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r upon which t o gain a reversal. Defendant next complains of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o i n s t r u c t t h e jury t h a t i n order t o convict defendant of embezzlement o r larceny by b a i l e e , they must f i n d t h a t t h e i n t e n t t o s t e a l w a s not present a t t h e t i m e he took posses- s i o n of t h e funds. This i s s u e has been previously discussed and w e f i n d no e r r o r . The c r u c i a l element here i s t h a t t h e defendant s t o l e t h e money by v i r t u e of h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p with h i s c l i e n t . Defendant next o b j e c t s t o c e r t a i n i n s t r u c t i o n s being refused and o t h e r s given with respect t o defendant's posi- t i o n t h a t he had a l i e n upon t h e settlement funds of t h e victims f o r l e g a l s e r v i c e s rendered. Our review of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n given and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s refused i n d i c a t e s no e r r o r . F i n a l l y defendant argues t h a t it w a s improper f o r t h e c o u r t t o give t h e jury an i n s t r u c t i o n pertaining t o t h e purposes f o r which t h e jury could consider evidence of o t h e r crimes not charged. This i n s t r u c t i o n b e n e f i t s t h e defen- dant, not t h e S t a t e , i n t h a t it narrowly r e s t r i c t s t h e consideration which may be given such evidence. An i n t e n s e review of t h i s complex record reveals no p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r upon which a r e v e r s a l of t h e t r i a l c o u r t could be founded. The judgment and sentence of t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court is affirmed. W e concur: 3~4$.%4L ~ l x l e f J u s t i c e F- ono or- ~ o b e r p J. Boyd, @is- t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n place of M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea. M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy s p e c i a l l y concurring: I concur only i n t h e r e s u l t . The defendant i s undoubtedly g u i l t y . I am unable t o condone t h e ignoble a c t i o n s of t h e S t a t e t h a t contributed t o t h e delay i n t r i a l and t h e r e f u s a l t o pay defendant's a t t o r n e y s u n t i l forced by t h e c o u r t . Were defendant n o t an a t t o r n e y , I should have dissented.