Case Title: Bucktail v. Talbot County

Citation: 352 Md. 530

Docket Number: 38/98

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Circuit Court for Talbot
County Case # CG 3159
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 38
September Term, 1998
_________________________________________
BUCKTAIL, LLC
v.
THE COUNTY COUNCIL OF
TALBOT COUNTY et al.
_________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell, 
JJ. 
_________________________________________
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
_________________________________________
Filed: January 27, 1999
In this appeal a real estate developer contends that Talbot County (the County)
erroneously denied its application for a growth allocation under the Chesapeake Bay Critical
Area Protection Program.  For the reasons set forth below we shall hold that there was
procedural error that requires a remand to the Talbot County Council (the Council).  
I
In 1984, the General Assembly enacted the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection
Program (the Program).  Chapter 794 of the Acts of 1984, codified as amended in Maryland
Code (1974, 1990 Repl. Vol., 1998 Cum. Supp.), §§ 8-1801 through 8-1817 of the Natural
Resources Article (NR).  The purposes of the Program are:
"(1)
To establish a Resource Protection Program for the Chesapeake
Bay and its tributaries by fostering more sensitive development activity for
certain shoreline areas so as to minimize damage to water quality and natural
habitats; and
"(2)
To implement the Resource Protection Program on a cooperative
basis between the State and affected local governments, with local
governments establishing and implementing their programs in a consistent and
uniform manner subject to State criteria and oversight."
Id. § 8-1801(b).  The Chesapeake Bay critical area generally consists of the Chesapeake Bay,
its tributaries to the head of tide, all designated State and private wetlands, and all land and
water areas within 1,000 feet beyond the landward boundaries of designated State or private
wetlands and the heads of tides of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries.  Id. § 8-1807(a).
The General Assembly created the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Commission (the
Commission) to promulgate regulations and to administer the Program.  Id. §§ 8-1803 and
8-1806.  Each county within the critical area has primary responsibility for developing and
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implementing a local critical area protection program pursuant to criteria established by the
Commission and subject to review and approval by the Commission.  Id. §§ 8-1808(a), (d),
and 8-1809.  Each local program must designate the local critical area (the Critical Area),
include a comprehensive zoning map for the Critical Area, and, as necessary, enact new or
amended provisions of the jurisdiction's subdivision regulations, comprehensive or master
plan, zoning ordinances or regulations, and enforcement provisions.  Id. § 8-1808(c).
In 1986, the Commission promulgated regulations establishing the criteria for
development in the Critical Area.  Md. Regs. Code tit. 27, §§ 01.02.01 through 01.02.07
(1992) (COMAR).  These regulations recognize three types of development areas:  Intensely
Developed Areas (IDAs), Limited Development Areas (LDAs), and Resource Conservation
Areas (RCAs).  COMAR § 27.01.02.02A.  Local jurisdictions are directed to identify each
of these three types of areas within their jurisdiction.  COMAR § 27.01.02.02E.
The developer in the case before us seeks to have its Critical Area property
reclassified under the County's program from RCA to LDA.
LDAs are defined as
"those areas which are currently developed in low or moderate intensity uses.
They also contain areas of natural plant and animal habitats, and the quality
of runoff from these areas has not been substantially altered or impaired.
These areas shall have at least one of the following features:
"(1)
Housing density ranging from one dwelling unit per 5 acres up
to four dwelling units per acre;
"(2)
Areas not dominated by agriculture, wetland, forest, barren land,
surface water, or open space;
-3-
"(3)
Areas meeting the conditions of [COMAR § 27.01.02].03A
[defining IDAs], but not [COMAR § 27.01.02].03B [regarding the
concentration of IDA features], of this regulation;
"(4)
Areas having public sewer or public water, or both."
COMAR § 27.01.02.04A.  
RCAs are defined as
"those areas characterized by nature-dominated environments (that is,
wetlands, forests, abandoned fields) and resource-utilization activities (that is,
agriculture, forestry, fisheries activities, or aquaculture).  These areas shall
have at least one of the following features:
"(1)
Density is less than one dwelling unit per 5 acres; or
"(2)
Dominant land use is in agriculture, wetland, forest, barren land,
surface water, or open space."
COMAR § 27.01.02.05A.
In the County the Critical Area zones overlay the pre-existing zoning.  
Under the State statute the amount of growth of IDAs and LDAs allowed in each
county's critical area is known as "growth allocation."  NR § 8-1802(a)(4) ("'Growth
allocation' means the number of acres of land in the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area that a
local jurisdiction may use to create new intensely developed areas and new limited
development areas.").  Each jurisdiction's growth allocation is limited to five percent of its
RCA.  NR § 8-1808.1(b); accord COMAR § 27.01.02.06A(1).
When locating new IDAs or LDAs local jurisdictions are mandated to follow six
guidelines.  They are 
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"(1)
New intensely developed areas should be located in limited
development areas or adjacent to existing intensely developed areas;
"(2)
New limited development areas should be located adjacent to
existing limited development areas or intensely developed areas;
"(3)
No more than one half of the allocated expansion may be located
in resource conservation areas;
"(4)
New intensely developed areas and limited development areas
should be located in order to minimize impacts to habitat protection areas as
specified in COMAR 27.01.09 and in an area and in a manner that optimizes
benefits to water quality;
"(5)
New intensely developed areas should be located where they
minimize their impacts to the defined land uses of the resource conservation
area;
"(6)
New intensely developed areas and limited development areas
in the resource conservation area should be located at least 300 feet beyond the
landward edge of tidal wetlands or tidal waters."
COMAR § 27.01.02.06B.
The County has some 600 miles of shoreline and approximately forty percent of the
County is located within the Critical Area.  Within this Critical Area, 51,000 acres are RCAs;
thus, five percent or 2,554 acres are available for growth allocation.  One-half of the 2,554
acres available for allocation has been set aside for growth in or around the towns of Easton,
Oxford, and St. Michaels.  In early 1997, when the County was considering the request for
growth allocation involved in this case, 2,150 acres had not yet been allocated. 
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Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Talbot County Zoning
1
Ordinance (1991), as amended.
Growth allocation within the County is administered by the Council, pursuant to
§ 19.14(c)(1)(iv) of the Talbot County Zoning Ordinance (1991), as amended.    Under this
1
subsection "a person with a committed financial, contractual, or proprietary interest" in
property in the Critical Area can initiate a growth allocation district boundary amendment.
§ 19.14(c)(1)(iv)[a].  An application is filed in the County Planning Office, along with a
proposed site plan or subdivision plat, or both, that meet the County's development design
standards and site plan review requirements.  § 19.14(c)(1)(iv)[b]; see §§ 19.10 (development
design standards) and 19.12 (site plan review).  The application "should make the maximum
effort to meet the intent of the Critical Area policies and the applicable design standards"
and, specifically, should conform to the nine directives set forth below: 
"[1]
Create lots or parcels that maximize the opportunities for clustered
development that protect habitat and agricultural resources;
"[2]
Locate structures so as to minimize impact on habitat protection areas
and agricultural areas;
"[3]
Provide a minimally disturbed buffer along the shoreline;
"[4]
Minimize soil erosion and runoff;
"[5]
Maximize protection of eroding shorelines;
"[6]
Have a minimal impact or cause an improvement to stormwater,
floodplain and stream characteristics;
"[7]
Minimize impacts on non-tidal wetlands;
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"[8]
Maximize protection of plant and wildlife habitats, particularly for
threatened and endangered species, plant and wildlife common to the
Chesapeake Bay Region, and anadromous fish propagation waters; and 
"[9]
Maximize protection of forests."
§ 19.14(c)(1)(iv)[b].  Recommendations of the Planning Officer and the Planning
Commission are to be submitted to the Council within sixty days after the application is
filed.  § 19.14(c)(1)(iv)[c].
Whether the recommendations are to grant or to deny the application, the Council
"shall introduce a bill (legislation) for the proposed amendment and hold a public hearing
in order that interested parties and citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard."
§ 19.14(c)(1)(iv)[d].  The Council is required to keep "[a] complete record" of the public
hearing, including "the vote of all members of the Council in deciding all questions relating
to the proposed growth allocation district boundary amendment."  § 19.14(c)(1)(iv)[e].  Prior
to voting on the growth allocation bill a majority of council members must make a site visit
to the property "to inspect the physical features of the property and to determine the
character of the surrounding area."  § 19.14(c)(1)(iv)[f].  If the Council votes favorably on
the growth allocation bill, the Council submits the application to the Commission "for
approval as an amendment to the County's Critical Area Program."  § 19.14(c)(1)(iv)[g].  No
provision is made in the County Zoning Ordinance regarding the Council's rejection of a
growth allocation bill.  Prior to the Council's rejection of the growth allocation requested in
this case the Council had never failed to enact a growth allocation bill for a project that met
the requisite criteria. 
-7-
The Council's power to make piecemeal reclassifications of properties within the
boundaries of the Critical Area is governed under § 19.14(c)(1)(iv) ("Growth Allocation
District Boundary Amendments in Critical Area").  Section 19.14(c)(1)(ii) addresses the
Council's power to make "[a]mendments to the Official Zoning District Maps excepting
properties within the boundaries of the Critical Area where growth allocation is requested."
Unlike the growth allocation provisions, § 19.14(c)(1)(ii)[i] specifically provides:
"The fact that an application for a district boundary amendment complies with
all the specific requirements and purposes set forth in this Ordinance shall not
be deemed to create a presumption that the proposed district boundary
amendment would in fact be compatible with surrounding land uses and is not,
in itself, sufficient to require approval."
Further, § 19.14(c)(1)(ii)[k], unlike the growth allocation provisions, addresses the denial of
a district boundary amendment by imposing a one year waiting period before reapplication.
II
The appellant, Bucktail, LLC (Bucktail), was formed in 1995 to acquire and develop
a 93.59 acre tract in the County known as Dawson's Farm.  This property is located about
six-tenths of a mile west of the town of St. Michaels.  A portion of the property, 20.83 acres,
is located outside of the Critical Area and is zoned Town Residential (TR). 
The remaining 72.76 acres of Dawson's Farm are within the Critical Area and, by that
program, are zoned RCA.  By statute, development in RCAs is limited to one unit per twenty
acres, thereby limiting development of Bucktail's RCA parcel to three dwelling units.  NR
§ 8-1808.1(d); accord § 19.3(a)(1)(ii)[a].
-8-
Each bill would have effected the requested changes.  The difference was that Bill
2
No. 640 conditioned the changes upon the approval and recordation of a final plat within two
years after approval of a preliminary plat.
In August 1995, Bucktail applied for a growth allocation to reclassify by district
boundary amendment the 72.76 acre parcel from RCA to LDA within the Critical Area, and
to reclassify that parcel's underlying zoning from Rural Conservation (RC) (Critical Area
only), § 19.3(a)(1)(ii), to Rural Residential (RR) (Critical Area only).  § 19.3(a)(1)(iii).  RR
zoning and LDA zoning permit development of one dwelling unit per five acres.  Thus, with
a growth allotment, that is, a reclassification to LDA in the overlaid Critical Area zoning,
together with a reclassification to RR in the underlying Euclidean zoning, Bucktail would
be able to develop fourteen dwelling units on the Critical Area parcel. 
In a memorandum to the Planning Commission, the planning staff opined that
"[Bucktail's] application has met all mandatory submittal requirements."  Within a week
thereafter the Planning Commission recommended approval of Bucktail's application, subject
to certain conditions that are not presently relevant.  On January 28, 1997, Bills Nos. 640 and
641 were introduced into the Council.2
Following a public hearing on the two bills, the Council voted four to one against Bill
No. 641 on March 11, 1997.  The Council made findings of fact.  Those relevant to the
issues here are the following:
"(5)
The proposed District Boundary Amendment from RC Rural
Conservation to RR Rural Residential is a Critical Areas Growth Allocation
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request and as such the Council must find that the request complies with the
Critical Area Policies and applicable design standards set forth in Section
19.14(c)(iv) of the Zoning Code of Talbot County.
"(6)
The County Council finds 'upon the basis of the evidence of record' that
the request for Critical Area Growth Allocation does not comply with all of
the Critical Area Policies and applicable design standards as referenced in
Section 19.14(c)(iv) of the Zoning Code of Talbot County.
"(7)
The County Council finds that the Growth Allocation request is not
consistent with the purposes and intent of the Talbot County Comprehensive
Plan.
"(8)
The County Council finds that the proposed change will not be
compatible with existing and proposed development and land use in the
surrounding area.
"(9)
The County Council finds upon the basis of the evidence of record that
there have been no population changes that would suggest this reclassification
to be wise.
"(10) The County Council finds that the availability of public facilities and
the present and proposed transportation patterns do not support the
reclassification.
"(11) Five members of the Council inspected the site prior to voting.
"(12) In light of the above findings, the Bill requesting Critical Area Growth
Allocation and reclassification of the property from RC Rural Conservation to
RR Rural Residential will be denied."
Bill No. 640 was tabled. 
Bucktail petitioned for judicial review.  Neighboring property owners, appellees John
W. Renner, Richard J. Conway, Robert Porter, and Sidney H. Dickson (collectively RCPD),
intervened in support of the County's decision.  The circuit court affirmed, ruling that there
was substantial evidence to support the Council's denial of the requested growth allocation,
-10-
based on the findings that the request did not comply with all of the § 19.14(c)(1)(iv) criteria
and that the request was not consistent with the County comprehensive plan nor with existing
and proposed development in the area.  Further, the court disagreed with Bucktail's argument
that once it met the § 19.14(c)(1)(iv) criteria the Council must approve the growth allocation
request.  
Bucktail appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  On our own motion we issued a
writ of certiorari prior to consideration of the matter by that court.
The appellees have moved to dismiss Bucktail's appeal because there is no statute
authorizing review of the Council's action on a growth allocation application.  If the matter
is properly before us the parties join issue over the correct standard of review and over the
application of the correct standard to the facts of this case.  In addition Bucktail argues that
the Council failed to render specific findings of facts as required by law.
III
The appellees have moved to dismiss, contending that there is no statute making the
Council's action judicially reviewable.  Bucktail's petition for appeal to the circuit court
recites that it is filed "pursuant to Maryland Rule 7-202."  The cited rule, however, does not
grant a right of judicial review, and it is inapplicable where judicial review is not authorized
by statute.  Urbana Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Urbana Mobile Village, Inc., 260 Md. 458, 462-63,
272 A.2d 628, 631 (1971).
The Charter that the County adopted in 1974 provides for a county manager form of
government.  Charter of Talbot County, Maryland (1977), Art. III.  All powers which may
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be exercised by the County are vested in the Council.  Charter § 202.  A board of appeals is
created under § 501 of the Charter which may hear and decide matters including "Zoning
matters, exclusive of rezoning."  Charter § 502(1).  The County Zoning Ordinance, effective
June 22, 1991, contains a provision for an "appeal" by "[a]ny person aggrieved by any
decision of the Board of Appeals" to the Circuit Court for Talbot County.  § 19.14(d)(1).
There is, however, no provision in the Charter or Zoning Ordinance for judicial review of
a zoning reclassification by the Council, comprehensive or piecemeal, within or without the
Critical Area. 
Bucktail's reply to appellees' dismissal argument is that its petition may be considered
to invoke the original jurisdiction of the circuit court under the doctrine illustrated in
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 331 A.2d 55 (1975).  Gould
held that there is an inherent right to judicial review of actions by an administrative agency,
despite the fact that in Gould the applicable statute expressly provided that there would be
no judicial review, absent certain conditions which admittedly were not met in that case.  Id.
at 500-01, 512, 331 A.3d at 65, 71.
Recently, in Gisriel v. Ocean City Board of Supervisors, 345 Md. 477, 693 A.2d 757
(1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 702, 139 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998), we applied the
Gould principle.  In Gisriel, an "appeal" had been taken, pursuant to the Ocean City Charter,
to the Circuit Court for Worcester County to review a determination by the City Council of
Ocean City which in turn reviewed voter eligibility determinations by the Ocean City Board
of Supervisors of Elections.  Answering an argument that there was no right of appeal from
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the circuit court in view of Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 12-302(a) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ), we held that the complaint in the circuit court,
in addition to invoking the judicial review jurisdiction of the circuit court, invoked its
mandamus jurisdiction so that the right of appeal was conferred by CJ § 12-301.  In this
connection we said that 
"where a particular action against an administrative agency was allegedly
brought under a statutory judicial review provision, and did not purport to be
a mandamus action, this Court has looked to the substance of the action, has
held that it could be treated as a common law mandamus or certiorari action,
and has exercised appellate jurisdiction."
Gisriel, 345 Md. at 500, 693 A.2d at 768.  See also Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 380, 45
A.2d 73, 76 (1945) (reviewing administrative action in the absence of statutory provision for
judicial review); Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 280, 40 A.2d 673, 677 (1945) (same).
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
IV
Bucktail contends that the standard for review of the Council's determinations is
substantiality of the evidence, asserting that Bucktail's entitlement to a growth allocation is
not even fairly debatable.  The appellees' response is that the Council's action was legislative.
Appellees' point is not that legislative action is beyond challenge in the courts, but that the
applicable standard of review is more favorable to the Council than substantiality of the
evidence.  Appellees rely on the distinction made in Department of Natural Resources v.
Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975).  Linchester involved
the constitutionality, under the separation of powers doctrine, of a statute that permitted a
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de novo jury trial of the reasonableness of administrative action in granting or denying a
permit to build in wetlands.  There, discussing how, "even absent [legislative authority], the
judiciary has an undeniable constitutionally-inherent power to review, within limits, the
decisions of ... administrative agencies," id. at 223, 334 A.2d at 523, we said:  
"This power of review, whether authorized by statute or assumed inherently,
cannot be a substitution of the court's judgment for that of the agency.  In those
instances where an administrative agency is acting in a manner which may be
considered legislative in nature (quasi-legislative), the judiciary's scope of
review of that particular action is limited to assessing whether the agency was
acting within its legal boundaries ...; furthermore, when an agency is acting in
a fact-finding capacity (quasi-judicial) the courts review the appealed
conclusions by determining whether the contested decision was rendered in an
illegal, arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or fraudulent manner."
Id. at 224, 334 A.2d at 523.  Accord Gisriel, 345 Md. at 490 n.12, 693 A.2d at 763 n.12
("Legislative or quasi-legislative decisions of local legislative bodies or administrative
agencies are, of course, not subject to ordinary judicial review; instead, they are subject to
very limited review by the courts.").
A
Note 12 in Gisriel cited only one zoning case, County Council v. Offen, 334 Md. 499,
639 A.2d 1070 (1994).  Offen was a challenge to comprehensive rezoning.  It was "a limited
review of an action of an administrative agency, specifically, the adoption of the [Sectional
Map Amendment] by the District Council."  Id. at 507, 639 A.2d at 1073.  There we plainly
said:   "Our decisions have consistently recognized that appellate review of a comprehensive
rezoning is limited in scope."  Id., 639 A.2d at 1074.  Numerous decisions of this Court were
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cited in support of that statement.  Id. at 507-08, 639 A.2d at 1074.  Here, the action under
review is not comprehensive rezoning.
Appellees RCPD also cite Board of County Commissioners v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 235
Md. 151, 200 A.2d 670 (1964), for the quotation that this Court has "repeatedly held that the
action of zoning or reclassification of zoning is a function that is legislative in nature."  Id.
at 158, 200 A.2d at 674.  Immediately following that quoted language we further said:
"However, this does not prevent the Council from making administrative
findings of fact, drawing administrative inferences, and arriving at
administrative conclusions and decisions, when hearing an application for
rezoning, and the statute clearly anticipates such action."
Id.  Thus, a rezoning procedure is not necessarily wholly legislative or wholly adjudicatory.
Piecemeal rezoning involves adjudicatory procedures, including administrative fact-finding,
that form the basis of the legislative decision whether to approve or deny a rezoning
application.  As this Court has explained in a piecemeal rezoning case, 
"[i]t is clear to us, from the general law elsewhere and our previous
decisions, that the provisions set forth above make it improper and inaccurate
to characterize the whole proceeding at the hearing held by the Council when
considering an application for reclassification and its action of denying or
granting reclassification as quasi-legislative in nature or quasi-judicial in
nature.  The above provisions, without question, required the members of the
Council to resolve disputed questions of adjudicative facts (as
contradistinguished from legislative facts or judicial action) concerning
particular parties.  And, when the Council was considering and determining
these adjudicative facts concerning particular parties, it necessarily was
performing a quasi-judicial function, even though its final action, in granting
or denying the reclassification which was required to be based upon its
findings of adjudicative facts, was quasi-legislative in character."
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Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 64-65, 217 A.2d 578, 584 (1966)
(citations omitted).
The determination of whether a local zoning authority is acting in an adjudicative or
legislative manner "is dependent upon the nature of the particular act in which it is engaged."
Mayor of Rockville v. Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. 572, 585, 705 A.2d 301, 307
(1998).  This determination is not based on whether the zoning decision adversely affects an
individual piece of property but whether the decision itself is made on individual or general
grounds.
"The difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is not easily drawn;
... adjudicative facts are facts about the parties and their activities, businesses
and properties.  They usually answer the questions 'of who did what, where,
when, how, why, with what motive or intent' while legislative facts 'do not
usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which help the
tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.'  The difference,
broadly speaking, involves whether the decision is to be made on individual
or general grounds.  Simply because an individual has a protected interest does
not entitle him to a trial-type hearing where the matter to be determined
involves issues of legislative fact.  That the effect of a zoning authority's
decision may dramatically affect an individual is not determinative of the
difference between adjudicative and legislative facts; rather, it is the nature of
the decision's fact-finding process, not the ultimate effect of the decision, that
determines the party’s right to an adjudicatory hearing."
Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrup, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 711-12, 376 A.2d 483, 497
(1977) (citations omitted) (involving comprehensive rezoning), cert. denied sub nom. Funger
v. Montgomery County, 434 U.S. 1067, 98 S. Ct. 1245, 55 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1978).
The issue in Hyson, 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578, was whether in a piecemeal rezoning
the Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance required cross-examination at the reclassification
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hearing.  The ordinance provided for a public hearing at which oral and written testimony
could be submitted and of which a complete stenographic record was to be made.  Id. at 64,
217 A.2d at 584.  The county council was required to make its decision based on the
evidence of record and approval or disapproval was to be on the merits.  Id.  This Court
concluded that the ordinance conferred adjudicative functions on the county council when
determining the facts at the rezoning hearing and therefore a right of reasonable cross-
examination was permitted.  Id. at 67, 217 A.2d at 585.
The County seeks to distinguish Hyson by comparing the procedural provisions in the
ordinance governing that Montgomery County reclassification to the County's Zoning
Ordinance.  Section 19.14(c)(1)(iv)[e] of the County's Zoning Ordinance requires that "[a]
complete record shall be kept of the hearing including the vote of all members of the Council
in deciding all questions relating to the proposed growth allocation district boundary
amendment."    In the instant matter, a full transcript of the public hearing was prepared.  It
included a forty-four page presentation by representatives of Bucktail and thirty-four pages
of comments and questions from the audience.  The record also includes numerous exhibits,
including a memorandum and reports from the planning commission and its staff.  The
parties to the instant proceedings have indicated to us no unwillingness to proceed on the
record that has been made, and there is no issue presented to us concerning any claimed right
to cross-examination.  Consequently, any difference between the procedure that took place
in deciding this particular rezoning application and the procedure in Hyson does not require
a conclusion that reclassification in the Critical Area is wholly legislative.
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A recent case illustrates how adjudicative fact-finding functions can result in a
legislative decision.  In Mayor of Rockville v. Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. 572, 705
A.2d 301, this Court considered whether there is a right of reasonable cross-examination at
a hearing concerning the levy of a special assessment against a particular property in
connection with the construction of a road and water main.  The municipality argued that the
special assessment hearing was legislative, in the nature of a tax, and that such legislative
action is presumed correct even if the legislative body acted without any supporting evidence
at all.  Id. at 583-84, 705 A.2d at 306.
We disagreed, ruling that the hearing was adjudicative in nature:  "The City's
argument, however, confuses the legislative aspects of the special assessment process with
the adjudicatory aspects of that process."  Id. at 584, 705 A.2d at 306.  We explained that
while the ultimate decision was legislative, the proceeding involved was adjudicative in
nature:
"This Court has stated that the determination of whether to impose a
special assessment and the mode of imposing a special assessment are
legislative determinations.  Nevertheless, the application of the mode of
assessment to a particular piece of property to determine the specific amount
to be assessed against that particular property is an adjudicative act.  The
proceeding to determine the amount of benefit to a specific piece of property
is adjudicatory or quasi-judicial.
....
"... In a case such as this, where the Council was holding a hearing,
receiving written and oral testimony, and considering evidence to determine
the specific amount of special benefit to a particular piece of property, the
Council at that point was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, even if earlier
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No argument is made in this case that under Article 25A the power to make
3
piecemeal amendments of the zoning map must be conferred on the Board of Appeals, either
originally or on review of the action of an administrative officer or agency or of a county
council sitting in an adjudicatory manner.  See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People's Counsel
for Baltimore County, 336 Md. 569, 587-91, 650 A.2d 226, 235-37 (1994); Hope v.
Baltimore County, 288 Md. 656, 664-67, 421 A.2d 576, 580-82 (1980); Klein v. Colonial
Pipeline Co.,, 285 Md. 76, 81-83, 400 A.2d 768, 771-72 (1979).
actions in the process or the final act of passing an ordinance to levy a special
assessment constitute legislative functions."
Id. at 584-85, 705 A.2d at 306-307 (citations omitted).
Similarly, in this case, while the Council's ultimate action in granting or denying a
map amendment utilizing a growth allocation is legislative in nature, the process of applying
the Zoning Ordinance standards to the particular facts of Bucktail's property requires
adjudicative or administrative fact-finding.
B
The case before us involves a chartered county which has determined not to confer
on the board of appeals jurisdiction in piecemeal amendments of the zoning ordinance map,
although such a conferral is permitted under the Express Powers Act, Maryland Code (1957,
1998 Repl. Vol.), Art. 25A, § 5(U).   As pointed out for the Court by Chief Judge Prescott
3
in Hyson:
-19-
"It should be carefully noted and remembered that the holding in any
zoning or rezoning case, here or elsewhere, cannot be accurately appraised
without a knowledge and consideration of the constitutional and statutory
provisions and the local laws and zoning regulations prevailing at the time of
the decisions, below and here."
242 Md. at 62, 217 A.2d at 583.  None of the decisions that have been cited to us or that we
have cited, supra, deals with a piecemeal rezoning by the county council of a home rule
county where there is no express statutory provision for judicial review.
Under the Regional District Act there is judicial review of the final action of the
Montgomery County District Council on any application for a map amendment, and that
proceeding is exclusive.  Md. Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol., 1998 Cum. Supp.), Art. 28, §
8-105(a), (b).  There is no express standard of review for those proceedings.  Statutory
judicial review is also applicable to a final district council decision in Prince George's
County.  Id. § 8-106(e).  In such proceedings from the Prince George's County District
Council there is a statutory standard of review which permits reversal or modification if,
inter alia, the findings or decision are "unsupported by competent, material and substantial
evidence in view of the entire record as submitted" or are "arbitrary or capricious."  Id. § 8-
106(i)(5), (6).  
Under the provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act applicable to
Baltimore City there is statutory judicial review of "a zoning action by the local legislative
body."  Md. Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art. 66B, § 2.09(a).  "Nothing in [that]
subsection shall change the existing standards for review of any zoning action."  Id.   Section
4.08 of Article 66B is applicable to non-home rule counties and to municipalities.  Section
4.08(a) provides for judicial review at the instance of any person aggrieved "by a zoning
-20-
action by the local legislative body."  That subsection similarly does not "change the existing
standards for review of any zoning action."  Id.  By way of contrast, under Articles 25A and
25B, respectively dealing with home rule for chartered and for code counties, there are no
express statutory provisions for judicial review of piecemeal rezoning, if that power is
exercised by the county council or county commissioners.  
Thus, the County's argument to us distills to the question of whether, by its silence
in its zoning ordinance with respect to any judicial review at all, the County has limited
judicial review of the denial of Bucktail's application to the question of whether that denial
was within the power of the Council.
Absent a statutory standard of judicial review of administrative action the standard
is that set forth in Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 273 Md. 245, 329
A.2d 18 (1974), where we said:
"[I]t is clear in Maryland that even '[w]here [a] statute or ordinance makes no
provision for judicial review, an implied limitation upon an administrative
board's authority is that its decisions be supported by facts and that they be not
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.'"  
Id. at 255, 329 A.2d at 25 (quoting Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 380, 45 A.2d 73, 76
(1945)).  See also State v. Board of Education, 346 Md. 633, 647, 697 A.2d 1334, 1341
(1997) (In "disputes between an individual or private entity and a government agency over
a right, entitlement, benefit, or license which the individual or private entity claims is due
under the law, ... courts have the authority, under Article IV of the Maryland Constitution
-21-
and Articles 8 and 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, to insure that the right, benefit,
entitlement, etc., is not illegally or arbitrarily denied by the government").
This standard of review has been used in deciding the validity of a piecemeal
reclassification that was effected by a local legislative body under a statutory scheme that
did not provide any judicial review.  See Ellicott v. Mayor of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23
A.2d 649 (1942).  That case was an appeal from a judgment of a court of the Eighth Judicial
Circuit that sustained, against a challenge by protesting neighbors, the validity of an
ordinance of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore that had reclassified an unimproved
lot, 100 feet by 145 feet, from residential to commercial use and that sustained the action of
the Baltimore City Board of Zoning Appeals in granting a special exception to use the then
commercially zoned lot for a gasoline filling station.  The appeal arose when the procedural
distinction between law and equity was in full bloom.  Distinguishing between the council's
action and the board of appeals' action, the property owner argued that the validity of the
ordinance could not be questioned on the statutory appeal from the board's action.  The
owner relied on many cases, cited at 180 Md. at 180, 23 A.2d at 651, for the proposition that
the challenge to the validity of an ordinance must be by a bill in equity.  This Court held that
the issue of the ordinance's validity could be heard by the court in the law action involving
-22-
At the time of the decision in Ellicott the rule was that an administrative zoning
4
agency could not decide challenges to the validity of the zoning ordinance, even as it applied
to the property involved.  That rule is no longer the law.  See Holiday Point Marina Partners
v. Anne Arundel County, 349 Md. 190, 199-200, 707 A.2d 829, 834 (1998) (citing cases).
When it was decided, therefore, Ellicott presented a stronger argument for "legislative"
classification of the council's action than would be the case today.
the appeal from the board, essentially to avoid a multiplicity of actions.   Id. at 180-81, 23
4
A.2d at 651. 
On the merits of the challenge to the validity of the ordinance in Ellicott, this Court
affirmed, essentially applying a substantial evidence or fairly debatable test.  The Court said:
"The nearest filling stations are a half mile to the west and a mile to the east.
That provision may possibly be regarded as sufficient for the traffic, but it
seems to the court that this is not so clearly true that the action of the City
authorities and the Board should be reversed judicially as arbitrary and
capricious.  We must assume, if it is possible to do so, that these officials
exercised their judgment on its sufficiency, and we cannot say that they did
not, and acted without good reason.  There will doubtless be some reduction
in value of the neighboring property from construction of the additional filling
station, some detraction from the beauty and attractiveness of the region as it
has existed, but if the change is one within the police power of the City, not
arbitrary and capricious, that is a detriment which must be suffered."
Id. at 184, 23 A.2d at 653.
Also instructive, and more recent, is Bellanca v. County Commissioners of Kent
County, 86 Md. App. 219, 586 A.2d 62, cert. denied, 323 Md. 33, 591 A.2d 249 (1991).
Kent County is a code home rule county, and, consequently, its zoning power is conferred
-23-
through the incorporation by reference of Article 25A, section 5(U) and (X) into Article 25B,
section 13.  In Kent County's initial, comprehensive zoning pursuant to the Program the
appellants' property had been zoned RCA.  Shortly thereafter the appellants sought a
piecemeal reclassification to LDA which the County Commissioners of Kent County denied,
after having been advised by the Commission that the requested map amendment should be
denied.  The circuit court sustained that action.  The Court of Special Appeals, speaking
through Judge Robert M. Bell, now Chief Judge of this Court, affirmed on the ground that
there was no mistake in the original zoning within the meaning of NR § 8-1809(h)(2)(i).  The
opinion makes no mention of any statute either providing for judicial review or establishing
the standard for review.  Nevertheless, the court said:  "Because the standard of review is
whether there is any substantial evidence in the record to support the decision of the County
Commissioners, our focus is on whether that decision is supported by the record."  Bellanca,
86 Md. App. at 230 n.10, 586 A.2d at 68 n.10.  
Consistently with Ellicott and Bellanca, with the judicial review statutes for rezoning
in jurisdictions other than the County, and with the Maryland law involving constitutionally
based judicial review of administrative adjudicatory fact-finding in contexts other than
rezoning, we hold that the standard for review in the instant matter is the substantiality of the
evidence.
-24-
V
Logically, the next step in our analysis would be to determine if the facts found by
the Council are supported by substantial evidence.  The difficulty here, however, is that the
Council's "findings" are insufficient to permit judicial review.
"The court's task on review is not to '"substitute its judgment for the expertise
of those persons who constitute the administrative agency[.]"'  A reviewing
'Court may not uphold the agency order unless it is sustainable on the agency's
findings and for the reasons stated by the agency.'  A court's role is limited to
determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support
the agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative
decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law."
United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md. 569, 576-77,
650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994) (citations omitted).  Accord Harford County v. Earl E. Preston,
Jr., Inc., 322 Md. 493, 505, 588 A.2d 772, 778 (1991) ("[A] fundamental right of a party to
a proceeding before an administrative agency [is] to be apprised of the facts relied upon by
the agency in reaching its decision and to permit meaningful judicial review of those
findings.  In a judicial review of administrative action the court may only uphold the agency
order if it is sustained by the agency's findings and for the reasons stated by the agency.");
United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO, Local 2610 v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 298 Md.
665, 679, 472 A.2d 62, 69 (1984) (same).  
In accordance with the above standard of judicial review, in order for the reviewing
court to determine whether the Council's action was fairly debatable, findings of fact are
required.  
-25-
Findings of fact must be meaningful and cannot simply repeat statutory criteria, broad
conclusory statements, or boilerplate resolutions.  Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41, 55-56,
310 A.2d 543, 551 (1973) (local board of zoning appeals denied application for a special use
exception by filling out a preprinted form; "[w]e think the 'reasons' given by the Board for
denying the application suggest a rather cavalier attitude in respect of its duties and
responsibilities.  It made no findings of fact worthy of the name and we think citizens are
entitled to something more than a boiler-plate resolution"); Rodriguez v. Prince George's
County, 79 Md. App. 537, 550, 558 A.2d 742, 748 ("It is not permissible for the Council, or
any administrative body, simply to parrot general statutory requirements or rest on broad
conclusory statements."), cert. denied, 317 Md. 641, 566 A.2d 101 (1989); Ocean Hideaway
Condominium Ass'n v. Boardwalk Plaza Venture, 68 Md. App. 650, 662, 515 A.2d 485,
490-91 (1986) ("Although the Ocean City Board [of Zoning Appeals] did not use a prepared
printed form, the method it used and the content of its 'Findings of Fact' amount to a simple
repetition of the nine statutory requirements and nothing more.").
Other judicial review cases have presented the issue of insufficient findings of fact
by an administrative agency or local legislative body.  In a case decided prior to United
Steelworkers, supra, a Baltimore City board denied a city employee accidental disability
retirement benefits.  Baker v. Board of Trustees, 269 Md. 740, 741, 309 A.2d 768, 768
(1973).  The circuit court, in effect, affirmed in a mandamus action.  Id., 309 A.2d at 769.
The board had refused to apprise the employee of the reasons for its denial simply because
no statute required the board to do so.  Id. at 746-47, 309 A.2d at 771.  In affirming on the
-26-
basis that there was substantial evidence to sustain the decision, this Court stated that it
would "remand, for appropriate findings of fact, any case which hereafter reaches us in the
posture of this one."  Id. at 747, 309 A.2d at 772.  We explained that "[t]his is no more than
a recognition of the fundamental right of a party to be apprised of the facts relied upon by
the agency, and, even in the absence of a statutory provision, is frequently required by a
court as an aid to judicial review."  Id. (citation omitted).  
In Board of County Commissioners v. Ziegler, 244 Md. 224, 223 A.2d 255 (1966),
the Board of Commissioners of Prince George's County, sitting as a district council, denied
an application for a special exception.  Id. at 226, 223 A.2d at 256.  The circuit court
reversed.  Id.  On appeal, the problem was that, contrary to the requirements of the county
zoning ordinance, the district council failed to make findings of fact in the record on which
its decision was based.  Id. at 228, 223 A.2d at 257.  Remanding for such findings of fact,
we explained:
"There are several reasons for requiring a more comprehensive record
of what transpired in this case at the hearing before the district council.  Aside
from the rule that a zoning authority, in the absence of evidence to support its
action, cannot apply its expertise in granting or refusing a zoning change or
exception, it is clear that without a record of the facts on which the zoning
authority acted or a statement of the reasons for its action, the reviewing court
could not properly perform the duty it had of determining whether the action
of the zoning authority was arbitrary or capricious.  The rule is as applicable
to a special exception as it is to a reclassification.
"Where, as seems to be the case here, the decision of the zoning
authority is apparently contrary to the weight of the evidence introduced on
behalf of the applicants for the special exception, the zoning authority should
have stated the reasons for its action and included them in the record.  When
-27-
this is not done, the record should be remanded for the purpose of having the
deficiency supplied."
Id. at 228-29, 223 A.2d at 257-58 (citations omitted).  See also Harford County v. Earl E.
Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. at 505, 588 A.2d at 778 ("The [county council sitting as a board
of appeals] made no attempt to reconcile the contradictory findings of fact by its hearing
examiner in his two reports as to whether the adverse impacts upon the neighborhood of the
[owners'] proposed special exception uses were beyond those inherently associated with such
special exception uses irrespective of their location within the AG zone.").
In Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 329 Md. 494, 620 A.2d 886 (1993), we struck
down a supermajority requirement for action by a board of appeals on the following
rationale:
"Where there is a supermajority requirement, however, and where (as
in the case at bar) a majority but not a supermajority of the Board of Appeals
votes to grant an application, there will usually be no findings of fact or
conclusions of law setting forth the basis for the agency's denial.  Furthermore,
the settled principle that an agency's decision will be judicially reviewed only
on the grounds relied upon by the agency cannot be adhered to under such
circumstances.  In addition, while there may be in a particular case substantial
evidence supporting the denial of an application on a certain ground, such
ground may not have been the basis for the minority votes.  In fact, the two
minority members might not agree with each other."
Id. at 508, 620 A.2d at 893.
One leading commentator has articulated the rule in the manner set forth below:
"'Given express findings, the court can determine whether the findings are
supported by substantial evidence, and whether the findings warrant the
decision of the board.  If no findings are made, and if the court elects not to
remand, its clumsy alternative is to read the record, speculate upon the
portions which probably were believed by the board, guess at the conclusions
-28-
drawn from credited portions, construct a basis for decision, and try to
determine whether a decision thus arrived at should be sustained.  In the
process, the court is required to do much that is assigned to the board, and the
latter becomes a relatively inefficient instrument for the construction of a
record.'"
Gough v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 21 Md. App. 697, 702, 321 A.2d 315, 317-18 (1974)
(emphasis court's) (quoting 3 R.M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 16.41, at 242
(1968)); see also Ocean Hideaway Condominium Ass'n v. Boardwalk Plaza Venture, 68 Md.
App. at 662, 515 A.2d at 490 (same).
In the instant case, the Council made twelve "Findings of Fact."  Findings one through
four pertain to the procedural history and have not been set forth in Part II, supra.  Findings
five through twelve are set forth in Part II, supra.  Finding five simply refers to
§ 19.14(c)(1)(iv) as controlling.  Finding eleven states that the required site visit was made,
and finding twelve states that, "[i]n light of the above findings," the application is denied.
We are concerned here with findings six through ten.
-29-
   Council's Findings of Fact
§ 19.14(c)(1)(ii)[f]
5
"In 
granting 
approval 
for 
an
amendment to the Official Zoning
Maps, the Council shall take into
consideration findings of fact in each
specific case, including but not
limited to the following:
"(7)
The County Council finds
"[1]
Consistency 
with 
the
that the Growth Allocation request
purposes and intent of the Talbot
is not consistent with the purposes
County Comprehensive Plan;
and intent of the Talbot County
Comprehensive Plan.
(continued...)
Findings seven, eight, nine, and ten appear to be based on five criteria set forth in
§ 19.14(c)(1)(ii)[f] that are required to be considered for certain amendments to the zoning
maps , as shown by the comparison set forth in the margin.5
-30-
(...continued)
5
"(8)
The County Council finds
"[2]
Compatibility with existing
that the proposed change will not be
and proposed development and land
compatible 
with 
existing 
and
use in the surrounding area;
proposed development and land use
in the surrounding area.
"(9)
The County Council finds
"[3]
Availability 
of 
public
upon the basis of the evidence of
facilities;
record that there have been no
population changes that would
suggest this reclassification to be
wise.
"(10) The County Council finds
"[4]
The effects on present and
that the availability of public
future transportation patterns; and
facilities and the present and
proposed transportation patterns do
not support the reclassification."
"[5]
The effect on population
change within the immediate area."
(continued...)
-31-
(...continued)
5
The introduction to subsection (ii) expressly states the scope of subsection (ii).  It
deals with "Amendments to the Official Zoning District Maps excepting properties within
the boundaries of the Critical Area where growth allocation is requested."  § 19.14(c)(1)(ii).
In contrast, subsection (iv) deals with "Growth Allocation District Boundary Amendments
in [the] Critical Area."  Thus, the directly applicable criteria for Bucktail's requested rezoning
are the nine criteria established by § 19.14(c)(1)(iv)[b], which are set forth in Part I, supra.
In a case such as the instant one, if the developer can satisfy the criteria of subsection (iv)
on a request for rezoning from one dwelling unit per twenty acres to one dwelling per five
acres, the developer will have complied with the requirements for rezoning a property in the
Critical Area from RCA to LDA.  It would seem that reclassification under the underlying
zoning from RC to RR would then follow, simply because there are no additional applicable
requirements in the zoning ordinance.  Thus, findings seven through ten appear to be
irrelevant.
Finding six reads:  
"The County Council finds 'upon the basis of the evidence of record' that the
request for Critical Area Growth Allocation does not comply with all of the
Critical Area Policies and applicable design standards as referenced in Section
19.14(c)(iv) of the Zoning Code of Talbot County."
-32-
This finding does not advise Bucktail, in terms of the facts and circumstances of the record,
in which aspect(s) Bucktail's application fails to comply with the Critical Area criteria or
policies.  Thus, finding six is deficient under the legal principles reviewed above.
In the alternative, we shall assume that the requirements of subsection (ii), as well as
those of (iv), must be complied with to obtain the reclassifications at both levels of zoning
that are requested here.  Findings seven through ten, see note 5, supra, suffer from the same
deficiency as does finding six.  These findings fail to advise Bucktail, in terms of the facts
and circumstances of the record, in which aspect(s) the application is deficient under
subsection (ii).  
Council findings six through ten are merely conclusory statements.  Here, where the
planning staff and the Planning Commission have recommended approval of Bucktail's
project and found that it complies with all applicable requirements, it is not sufficient for the
Council simply to express conclusions, without pointing to the facts found by the Council
that form the basis for its contrary conclusion.
The appellees, by brief and at oral argument, have pointed to certain facts in the
record that arguably might justify the denial of Bucktail's application, but these arguments
cannot cure the deficiency.  As this Court has stated:  "'The courts may not accept appellate
counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action ...."  United Steelworkers, 298 Md. at
679, 472 A.2d at 69 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168, 83 S. Ct. 239, 246, 9 L. Ed. 2d 207, 216 (1962)).  
Accordingly, the appropriate disposition in the instant matter is a remand.
-33-
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
TALBOT COUNTY VACATED.  CASE
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT 
COURT 
FOR
REMAND TO THE COUNTY COUNCIL OF
TALBOT 
COUNTY 
FOR 
FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE
APPELLEES, 
TALBOT 
COUNTY,
MARYLAND, JOHN W. RENNER, RICHARD
J. CONWAY, ROBERT PORTER, AND
SIDNEY H. DICKSON.