Case Title: Espinoza v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Espinoza v. State1998 WY 150969 P.2d 542Case Number: 97-69Decided: 12/10/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Mario ESPINOZA, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Carbon County, Ken Stebner, J.

 

Cary R. Alburn 
III of Alburn & Earnshaw, P.C., Fort Collins, CO, for Appellant. 
Argument by Mr. Alburn.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee. Argument by Mr. 
Pauling.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Mario 
Espinoza was convicted of two counts of delivering a controlled substance. He 
appeals the judgment and sentence, raising issues of prosecutorial misconduct, 
improper admission of an inculpatory statement, improper admission of prior bad 
acts evidence, and error in the jury selection process. Finding no reversible 
error, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Espinoza 
presented eleven issues for our review, which we decline to list here. The State 
succinctly summarizes the issues as:

I. Did the 
district court properly resolve all matters relating to the admission of 
appellant's statements to his arresting officer?

II. Did the 
district court properly resolve all matters relating to the admission of 
evidence touching upon appellant's uncharged misconduct?

III. Did the 
district court properly resolve appellant's post-trial challenges to the 
composition of his jury?

Espinoza's 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct are among the "matters" resolved by the 
district court with respect to each of the three issues listed 
above.

FACTS

[¶3]      In February 1996, 
an informant working with the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) made two 
controlled buys of marijuana from Espinoza. On May 9, 1996, Espinoza was 
arrested and charged with two counts of delivering a controlled substance, in 
violation of W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (1997). Espinoza was tried in October 1996, 
and the jury found him guilty on both counts. Espinoza filed a post-trial motion 
for new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct and discriminatory jury 
selection, which the court denied. He subsequently filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the motion for a new trial, focusing on the allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct, which was also denied. Espinoza timely appeals the 
judgment and sentence entered on January 29, 1997. Additional facts relevant to 
specific issues will be set forth in our discussion of those 
issues.

DISCUSSION

Out-of-Court 
Statements

[¶4]      During trial, 
Detective Kebin Haller gave an account of Espinoza's arrest, indicating that he 
advised Espinoza of his Miranda rights and allowed him to read the affidavit 
supporting the charges against him. Detective Haller then testified that he 
asked Espinoza whether the contents of the affidavit were mostly true or false 
and that Espinoza responded, "Mostly true." This testimony forms the basis for a 
number of Espinoza's allegations of error.

[¶5]      Espinoza claims 
that his out-of-court statement was admitted in error because he was not 
properly advised of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). He frames his argument 
narrowly, contending that the Miranda warnings given by Haller were deficient 
because Haller did not specifically ask Espinoza if he understood his right to 
an attorney and if he wanted an attorney present during questioning. Without 
that specific inquiry, claims Espinoza, there can be no assurance that a 
defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived that 
right.

[¶6]      Miranda requires 
police to inform an accused during a custodial interrogation that 1) he has the 
right to remain silent, 2) that anything said may be used against him in court, 
3) that he has the right to have an attorney present at questioning, and 4) 
that, if he cannot afford to retain an attorney, one will be appointed for him. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.  at 467-73, 86 S.Ct. at 1624-27; Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Wyo. 1996); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 6.8(a) (1984). Whether a defendant has "knowingly and intelligently" 
waived his rights depends in part upon his ability to understand and act upon 
the warnings which Miranda requires. Kolb, 930 P.2d  at 1244, LAFAVE & 
ISRAEL, supra, § 6.9(b).

[¶7]      Haller testified 
that he administered the required warnings by reading from his "Miranda card." 
He asked Espinoza if he understood his rights, and Espinoza replied that he did. 
The record contains no indication that Espinoza lacked the capacity to 
understand the warnings. Moreover, shortly after responding to Detective 
Haller's question regarding the accuracy of the affidavit, Espinoza invoked his 
right to counsel, indicating a full and intelligent awareness of his Miranda 
rights. See Kolb, 930 P.2d  at 1244. Haller complied with the mandates of 
Miranda, and Espinoza's claim that follow-up questions were necessary is without 
merit. The district court did not err when it denied Espinoza's motion to strike 
his inculpatory statement.

[¶8]      Espinoza next 
alleges error because the argument concerning the admissibility of his 
out-of-court statement should not have been heard in front of the jury. Hearings 
on the admissibility of confessions must be conducted outside the hearing of the 
jury, and the court should conduct other proceedings, to the extent practicable, 
so as to prevent the jury from being exposed to inadmissible evidence. W.R.E. 
103(c), 104(c). However, the manner in which Espinoza challenged Detective 
Haller's testimony prevented the trial court from giving full effect to the 
rules of evidence.

[¶9]      Espinoza 
initially halted Haller's testimony during direct examination by objecting to 
the foundation concerning the Miranda warnings Haller gave to Espinoza. Haller 
then testified to the specifics of the warnings he gave, without objection, and 
related Espinoza's statement, also without objection. Espinoza did not request a 
hearing with respect to the admissibility of his statement or seek to question 
Detective Haller outside the jury's presence. Instead, during cross-examination 
he further questioned Haller on the particulars of the Miranda warnings, and 
then moved to strike the evidence of his statement:

[Espinoza's Attorney]: 
Your Honor, at this time, we move to strike and ask the jury be instructed that 
any statement of an inculpatory nature that Mario Espinoza may have made after 
this so called advisement of rights is inadmissable on the grounds that this 
officer failed to tell him his Miranda rights * * *.

Espinoza then 
proceeded to argue his position in front of the jury, without seeking so much as 
a bench conference to discuss the matter out of earshot of the jury. Under these 
circumstances, the court did not err. In any event, as discussed above, Espinoza 
was adequately apprised of his Miranda rights, and his motion to strike was 
properly denied. Consequently, the jury was not exposed to inadmissible 
evidence, and Espinoza was not prejudiced.

[¶10]   We turn now to Espinoza's claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct, which he first raised in his motion for new trial. The 
decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial is within the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and we defer to the ruling of the trial court unless the 
appellant demonstrates an abuse of discretion. Relish v. State, 860 P.2d 455, 
458 (Wyo. 1993). The same standard is applied to the decision of a court in 
dealing with a breach of any discovery order. Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649, 
655 (Wyo. 1986). An abuse of discretion has been described as a ruling which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo. 1996). In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate question is whether the court could reasonably conclude 
as it did. Rubio v. State, 939 P.2d 238, 241 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶11]   Espinoza contends that the 
prosecution did not honor his reasonable and timely discovery request for any 
pretrial statements, and affirmatively misrepresented the reasons therefor to 
the district court. He argues that this misconduct resulted in unfair surprise 
and denied him the right to a fair trial.

[¶12]   Although the State filed a notice 
that it had fully complied with Espinoza's discovery requests, the prosecution 
failed to disclose Espinoza's "mostly true" statement to Detective Haller prior 
to trial. In the State's traverse to Espinoza's motion for new trial, the 
prosecutor reiterated that the State had fully complied with discovery 
obligations and related that Espinoza's statement was shared with the defense 
during the preliminary hearing. As part of discovery, the prosecutor had 
provided Espinoza with two audio tapes of the preliminary hearing, one of which 
was blank, along with an accompanying transcript page stating that tape two was 
inaudible. The recorded portion contained no discussion of Espinoza's pre-trial 
statement. In the hearing on the new trial motion, the prosecutor represented to 
the court that the second tape of the preliminary hearing was not transcribable 
and the county court had had problems with their tape machine not working, but 
that she spoke with Detective Haller and he remembered testifying about 
Espinoza's statement during the preliminary hearing. It was later discovered 
that the original tapes recording the entire preliminary hearing were in the 
possession of the district court, both tapes were clearly audible, and neither 
revealed any discussion or testimony regarding Espinoza's statement. In the 
State's traverse to Espinoza's motion for reconsideration, the prosecutor stated 
that she assumed the original tape was inaudible without listening to it, but 
the problem apparently arose in duplication. The prosecutor acknowledged that, 
after listening to the tapes in their entirety, it was clear Detective Haller 
did not testify about Espinoza's statement at the preliminary hearing, but 
maintained that she had relied on her own and Detective Haller's memories of the 
hearing in good faith. The State's position is that the failure to provide 
discovery was unintentional and harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence 
against Espinoza.

[¶13]   The district court conducted a 
hearing on Espinoza's motion for a new trial. The parties explained their 
respective positions and answered questions from the court. The court expressed 
concern about the potential surprise to Espinoza because he was not provided 
with the "mostly true" statement in the discovery process. However, the court 
made a factual finding that the State's failure to disclose the statement was 
not intentional on the State's part. The court also determined that the record 
contained sufficient evidence for the jury to find as they did regardless of 
that testimony. The trial court was in the best position to make those 
determinations, see Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 (Wyo. 1995), and we 
conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion when it 
denied the motion for new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and discovery 
violations.

Evidence of 
Prior Misconduct

[¶14]   Prior to trial, Espinoza filed a 
motion in limine seeking to prohibit the State from presenting allegations of 
uncharged misconduct by Espinoza. The court granted the motion in limine, 
stating:

At trial, the State will 
refrain from commenting on any uncharged conduct that the Defendant is alleged 
to have committed unless the State gives proper notice as required by the 
Wyoming Supreme Court.

During the 
State's redirect examination of Detective Haller, the prosecutor inquired into a 
confrontation between Haller and Espinoza which had taken place in January 1996, 
a few weeks before the first controlled buy from Espinoza. When asked why he 
confronted Espinoza, Haller responded that he had received information from 
various sources in Rawlins that Espinoza had a large quantity of marijuana at 
his house. Espinoza immediately requested a meeting in chambers and moved for a 
mistrial for violation of the court's order and the notice requirements for 
prior bad act testimony. The court agreed with the State that Espinoza had 
opened the door to the testimony and denied the motion. Espinoza raised the 
issue again in his motion for new trial, which the court also 
denied.

[¶15]   On appeal, Espinoza challenges the 
court's denial of his motions. The court's ruling on a motion for mistrial, as 
with a new trial motion, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ross v. State, 
930 P.2d  at 968.

[¶16]   In chambers, the State contended 
that Detective Haller's testimony did not violate W.R.E. 404(b) because Espinoza 
opened the door to that testimony. "A defendant may 'open the door' on 
cross-examination to evidence of prior criminal misconduct." Chavez-Becerra v. 
State, 924 P.2d 63, 69 (Wyo. 1996); see also Reinholt v. State, 601 P.2d 1311, 
1317 (Wyo. 1979). When the defendant initiates a line of questioning, the 
prosecutor is entitled to make a permissible inquiry without crossing into 
prosecutorial overkill. Chavez-Becerra, 924 P.2d  at 69. Espinoza's theory of 
defense was that Haller bore a grudge against him which motivated unprofessional 
conduct in his handling of the case in the form of harassment and entrapment of 
Espinoza. During his cross-examination of Haller, the following exchange 
occurred:

Q [Espinoza's 
attorney]: Yeah. Now before all of this came around, you went and visited with 
Mario at his place of work in January of '96, didn't you?

A [Detective 
Haller]: It was around that date, yes.

Q: Yeah. And 
basically told him, clean up your act or I'm going to come get you, 
right?

A: I had 
received some information that led me to Mario. I went and had a conversation 
with him and told him, get out of it now or you and I will meet again, 
yes.

During redirect, 
the prosecution asked:

Q: Finally, sir, 
Counsel for the Defendant asked you if you had confronted Mario in approximately 
January of '96.

Do you recall 
that?

A [Detective 
Haller]: Yes, I do.

Q: What reason 
did you confront him?

A: I had 
received information again from various sources in Rawlins. One person wished to 
remain anonymous. They advised me that Mario Espinoza had a large quantity of 
marijuana at his house.

The prosecutor 
permissibly inquired and clarified that Haller's meeting with and comments to 
Espinoza were made during the course of his duties as a law enforcement officer, 
and not motivated by personal feelings. We agree with the district court that 
the defense opened the door to that testimony. Reinholt, 601 P.2d  at 1317; 
Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1147-49 (Wyo. 1992). Further, the prosecutor 
did not exploit Detective Haller's response, and ended the redirect examination 
at that point. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Espinoza's motion for mistrial based on the prior bad act testimony, or when it 
denied Espinoza's new trial motion grounded in the same 
complaint.

Jury 
Selection

[¶17]   The venire from which Espinoza's 
jury was drawn included two individuals with Hispanic surnames, both of whom 
were peremptorily challenged by the State. Espinoza claims the composition of 
the venire violated the "fair cross section" requirement of the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. He also asserts an equal protection 
violation, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), based on the State's use of its peremptory challenges. These 
matters were raised for the first time in Espinoza's post-trial motion for new 
trial.

[¶18]   To establish a prima facie "fair 
cross section" violation, Espinoza was required to show: 1) that the group 
allegedly excluded from the venire is a distinctive group in the community; 2) 
that the group's representation in venires is not fair and reasonable in 
relation to its numbers in the community; and 3) that the group's 
underrepresentation in venires is due to systematic exclusion attributable to 
the process by which venire members are selected. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S. Ct. 664, 668, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979).

[¶19]   Espinoza's showing in this regard 
is inadequate. He offered no proof whatsoever of the process by which venire 
members are selected in Carbon County and, consequently, did not demonstrate 
that Carbon County's selection procedures resulted in Hispanics being 
underrepresented in venires over time. As a result, Espinoza fails to establish 
a prima facie case, and we will not further consider his challenge to the 
composition of the venire.

[¶20]   In Batson v. Kentucky, the United 
States Supreme Court held that, although a defendant has no right to a petit 
jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race, the State may not 
exercise its peremptory challenges to purposefully exclude members of the 
defendant's race solely because of race. 476 U.S.  at 85-86, 106 S. Ct.  at 
1717.

[A] defendant can 
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the 
petit jury [by showing first] that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, 
and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the 
venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to 
rely on the fact * * * that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection 
practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' 
Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant 
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to 
exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their 
race.

Bueno-Hernandez 
v. State, 724 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 907, 107 S. Ct. 1353, 94 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.  at 96, 106 S. Ct.  at 1723 (citations omitted)). Once the defendant makes a prima facie 
showing, the State has the burden of coming forward with a neutral explanation 
for challenging the jurors. Id. The prosecutor's explanation need not rise to 
the level justifying a challenge for cause, but requires more than a mere denial 
of discriminatory motive or a statement that the challenge was based on the 
assumption that members of the defendant's race would be partial to the 
defendant because of their shared race. Id.

[¶21]   Here, the prosecutor offered a 
neutral explanation, unrelated to ethnicity, for challenging the venire members. 
The transcript of the voir dire proceedings substantiates the prosecutor's 
assertion that the two jury members in question knew Espinoza, their children 
were friends with him, and Espinoza had spent time at their homes. Therefore, 
even assuming that Espinoza established a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination, the prosecutor's explanation was sufficient to refute Espinoza's 
claim. See Bueno-Hernandez, 724 P.2d  at 1135; Evans v. State, 653 P.2d 308, 310 
(Wyo. 1982).

[¶22]   For the reasons stated above, the 
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Espinoza's motion for a new 
trial based on discriminatory jury selection.

CONCLUSION

[¶23]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court is affirmed in all respects.