Case Title: In re: Dennis v. Alabama)

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0146

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2023-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: November 17, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0146 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte State of Alabama 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 
CRIMINAL APPEALS  
 
(In re: Nathaniel Dennis  
 
v.  
 
State of Alabama)  
 
(Houston Circuit Court: CC-12-163;  
Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-18-1211) 
 
MITCHELL, Justice. 
SC-2023-0146 
2 
 
 
This case stems from a cold-case murder that took place decades 
ago.  On a Saturday night in 1981, an armed robber broke into a gas 
station where Russell Earnest Douglas was working, shot him several 
times, robbed the station, and fled.  Douglas's murderer eluded capture 
for decades.  Then, some 30 years later, forensic scientists retested DNA 
evidence found at the crime scene and turned up a match to the 
respondent here, Nathaniel Dennis, who was serving a 600-year sentence 
in Virginia for an unrelated crime.  In 2011, a Houston County grand jury 
indicted Dennis for the murder of Douglas, and he was transferred to 
Alabama to stand trial.  In 2019, after a series of pretrial delays, Dennis 
was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed during 
a burglary.   
Dennis appealed, arguing that the delay between his indictment 
and trial violated his right to a speedy trial.  The Court of Criminal 
Appeals agreed, holding that the over-eight-year period between 2011 
and 2019 required the trial court to "presume" that the delay prejudiced 
Dennis's liberty interests -- even though Dennis had not put forward any 
affirmative evidence of prejudice and likely could not have done so 
SC-2023-0146 
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because he was already serving a 600-year sentence in Virginia.  Dennis 
v. State, [CR-18-1211, July 8, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2022). 
That was error.  As this Court and the United States Supreme 
Court have made clear, the speedy-trial inquiry turns on how much delay 
has been caused by the government, not the bare amount of time between 
the indictment and trial.  In this case, the portion of the delay caused by 
government negligence falls well short of the amount needed to justify a 
presumption of prejudice.  Absent that presumption, Dennis's speedy-
trial claim fails.  We therefore reverse the judgment below and remand 
for consideration of the other arguments that Dennis raised in his appeal.   
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Russell Earnest Douglas was brutally murdered on September 26, 
1981, while he was working a late shift as a gas-station clerk in Dothan.  
The assailant shot Douglas several times, ransacked and robbed the 
station, and fled.  Douglas -- who was still alive, though only barely, when 
police arrived -- told officers that his assailant had been a black male 
wearing a stocking cap.  Douglas was then transported to a nearby 
hospital, where he eventually died.  Meanwhile, the officers located a 
stocking cap at the scene of the crime, which they determined belonged 
SC-2023-0146 
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to Douglas's assailant.  The cap had a few strands of black hair embedded 
in the fabric, but initial attempts to test that hair for DNA were fruitless, 
with forensic analysts concluding that the sample was insufficient to 
produce useful results.   
Many years later, between 2010 and 2011, forensic scientists 
reexamined the strands of hair using updated technology and were able 
to extract a viable DNA profile from two of the hairs.  The DNA on each 
hair turned up a match to Nathaniel Dennis, who was then serving a 600-
year sentence in Virginia for a similar crime -- this time involving the 
burglary of a newspaper facility -- in which the premises of the facility 
had also been ransacked and during which the victim had also been 
robbed and shot multiple times.  See Dennis v. Commonwealth, No. 1285-
98-1, Oct. 19, 1999 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (not reported in South Eastern 
Reporter).   
After considering the newly discovered DNA evidence, a grand jury 
indicted Dennis for Douglas's murder on May 4, 2011.  The governors of 
Virginia and Alabama then reached an agreement to transfer Dennis to 
this State so that he could stand trial in Houston County.  Owing to a 
series of delays, however, Dennis's trial did not begin until June 2019 -- 
SC-2023-0146 
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over eight years after his indictment.  Near the onset of trial, Dennis 
moved to dismiss the case against him based on speedy-trial grounds, but 
the trial court denied that motion.  The case proceeded to trial, and, on 
June 17, 2019, a jury found Dennis guilty of murder made capital because 
it was committed during a burglary.  The trial court sentenced Dennis to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole. 
Dennis appealed, arguing that: (1) the delay between his 
indictment and trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
trial; (2) the trial court improperly allowed the admission of an evidence 
label and certain forms that, he says, contained inadmissible hearsay; (3) 
Douglas's last words were improperly admitted into evidence as a dying 
declaration; (4) Douglas's death certificate was improperly admitted into 
evidence; and (5) the trial court erred in denying Dennis's motion for a 
judgment of acquittal.   
The Court of Criminal Appeals accepted Dennis's first argument 
and, on that basis, reversed the judgment of the trial court, vacated 
Dennis's conviction and sentence, and dismissed Dennis's indictment 
with prejudice.  Dennis, ___ So. 3d at ___.  The court did not address 
Dennis's four alternative arguments.   
SC-2023-0146 
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The opinion setting forth the court's judgment was joined in full by 
only one judge, with the other four judges concurring in the result only.  
The judges who concurred in the result did not write separately on 
original submission, but two of them did sign a special concurrence on 
application for rehearing to explain the reason for their votes on original 
submission.  See Dennis, ___ So. 3d at ___ (McCool, J., concurring 
specially on denial of rehearing, joined by Minor, J.).  As discussed below, 
that special concurrence makes clear that certain dispositive aspects of 
the reasoning of the opinion on original submission below were joined by 
a majority of the court.   
The opinion began by explaining that the test from Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), governs any inquiry into whether a 
defendant's speedy-trial rights have been violated.  That test, the opinion 
explained, "'considers the following factors: (1) the length of the delay; 
(2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her 
right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.'"  ___ So. 
3d at ____ (quoting State v. Pylant, 214 So. 3d 392, 394-95 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 2016)).  The first factor operates both as part of the overall balancing 
test and as a threshold inquiry: unless there is a significant delay, then 
SC-2023-0146 
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"'there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors.'"  Ex parte 
Walker, 928 So. 2d 259, 264 n.6 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 
530).   
The opinion below determined -- and the State does not dispute at 
this stage -- that all of the first three factors, including the threshold 
factor, favor Dennis to at least some degree.  First, the opinion concluded 
that the length of the delay exceeded Barker's one-year threshold.  ___ 
So. 3d at ___.  
Second, the opinion concluded that the reason for at least part of 
that delay was the State's negligence, and negligence is weighed against 
the State -- though much less so than strategic or deliberate delay.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the opinion broke down the entire time frame 
from Dennis's indictment to his trial into eight discrete periods and then 
analyzed whether each period could be attributed to the State:   
"The delay in this case can be divided into eight different time 
frames, each with different reasons for the delay:  
 
"(1) From May 4, 2011, when Dennis was 
indicted, until January 25, 2012, when he 
was transferred from prison in Virginia to 
Houston County to face the capital-murder 
charge.  … [T]he record on appeal does not 
SC-2023-0146 
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reflect why it took nine months to return 
Dennis from Virginia .… 
"(2) From January 25, 2012, until August 20, 
2013, when Dennis filed his first motion for 
a speedy trial and requested a trial date. 
During this time, one judge recused himself 
from the case and the second judge set 
motion deadlines and ordered at least one 
status conference in the case. This 17-month 
period 
involved 
ordinary 
procedural 
occurrences in a case of this nature and this 
delay was justified or, at worst, negligent. 
"(3) From August 20, 2013, until September 16, 
2015, when this case was originally set for a 
suppression hearing.  …  
"… [T]his period was partially justified, 
but a majority of this two-year delay should 
be regarded as negligent delay due to the 
trial court's failure to set the [suppression] 
hearing within a reasonable time after the 
motion contesting the admissibility of DNA 
evidence was filed. 
"(4) From September 16, 2015, until November 2, 
2015, when the DNA suppression hearing 
was eventually held. This seven-week delay 
was caused by the [prosecutors'] failure to 
meet the trial court's deadline for producing 
certain documents ….  [T]his delay weighs 
against the State as a negligent delay. 
"(5) From November 2, 2015, until February 5, 
2016. This period was the time given to both 
parties to file briefs in support of their 
position on the DNA suppression issue. 
Although this was a reasonable time to allow 
SC-2023-0146 
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Dennis and the [prosecutors] to file the 
necessary arguments, the due date was well 
over two years after the suppression motion 
had been filed. Again, this delay weighs 
against the State …. 
"(6) From February 5, 2016, until April 18, 2016. 
Both parties were ordered to turn in briefs by 
February 5, 2016. Dennis complied with the 
trial court's order, but the [prosecutors] 
failed to file a brief as ordered. ... This 10-
week delay was clearly negligent delay by 
the State .... 
"(7) From April 18, 2016, until the first trial 
setting on June 11, 2018. Neither the 
[prosecutors] nor Dennis contributed to this 
delay. ... At least one year of this delay, in 
particular after the trial court denied 
Dennis's motion to suppress on March 13, 
2017, was attributable to the trial court and 
weighs against the State, but not as heavily 
as the delays caused by the [prosecutors'] 
action or lack of preparedness. 
"(8) From June 11, 2018, until the case went to 
trial on June 10, 2019. … [T]he [prosecutors] 
filed a motion to continue to allow the 
[prosecutors] to do additional DNA testing. ...  
Although the [prosecutors] asserted that the 
new DNA tests could result in exculpatory 
evidence for Dennis, it is also clear that the 
[prosecutors] could have obtained a tactical 
advantage if the tests had further implicated 
Dennis. …  [T]his final delay was not a bad-
faith delay, but the [prosecutors were] 
exceedingly negligent in failing to have the 
tests performed years earlier. Although this 
final delay weighs heavily against the State, 
SC-2023-0146 
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it is mitigated by the [prosecutors'] offer, 
which was accepted by Dennis, to depose any 
witnesses that Dennis requested while the 
additional DNA testing was being conducted. 
…" 
___ So. 3d at ____-____.   
In sum, the opinion classified roughly four and a half years (four 
years, seven months, and about three and a half weeks) -- a little over 
half of the eight-year-and-two-month total delay -- as attributable to 
some form of official negligence.  Accordingly, the opinion found that, 
overall, the cause-for-delay factor weighed in Dennis's favor.  Id. at ___. 
Third, the opinion concluded that Dennis had acted with reasonable 
diligence in asserting his speedy-trial right, so that this factor also 
favored him.  ___ So. 3d at ____.   
The opinion then turned to the final and most important Barker 
factor: prejudice to the defendant.  It noted that Dennis had put forward 
"no evidence" of "actual prejudice" and likely could not have done so given 
that: (1) Dennis had "acknowledge[d] that he would have been in prison 
in Virginia if he had not been in custody in Alabama" during the "entire 
eight years pending trial,"  ___ So. 3d at ____, and (2) there was no 
suggestion that any witnesses had died or that any evidence had gone 
SC-2023-0146 
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stale during the delay between indictment and trial (as opposed to the 
much longer period between the commission of the crime and the 
indictment), id. at ____. 
But even though Dennis had failed to establish any evidence of 
actual prejudice, the opinion concluded that he was nonetheless entitled 
to a presumption of prejudice under the United States Supreme Court's 
holding in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992).  Doggett, as the 
opinion below explained, sets out an elaborate multifactor balancing test 
that specifies whether and how "prejudice [should] be presumed in 
circumstances when the delay is excessive."  ___ So. 3d at ____. 
"'"The United States Supreme Court in Doggett [v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992),] used three hypothetical 
cases to demonstrate the accused's burden under the fourth 
Barker factor. The accused's burden 'of proof in each 
situation varies inversely with the [State]'s degree of 
culpability for the delay.' In the first scenario, where the state 
pursues the accused 'with reasonable diligence,' the delay -- 
however long -- generally is excused unless the accused 
demonstrates 'specific prejudice to his defense.' Thus, when 
the state acts with reasonable diligence in bringing the 
defendant to trial, the defendant has the burden of proving 
prejudice caused by the delay. 
"'"The second situation recognized in Doggett involves 
bad-faith efforts by the state to delay the defendant's trial. 
…' 
"'"The third scenario recognized in Doggett involves 
delay caused by the state's 'official negligence.'  Official 
SC-2023-0146 
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negligence 'occupies the middle ground' between bad-faith 
delay and diligent prosecution. In evaluating and weighing 
negligent delay, the court must 'determine what portion of 
the delay is attributable to the [State]'s negligence and 
whether this negligent delay is of such a duration that 
prejudice to the defendant should be presumed.'  The weight 
assigned to negligent delay 'increases as the length of the 
delay increases.'  Negligent delay may be so lengthy -- or the 
first three Barker factors may weigh so heavily in the 
accused's favor -- that the accused becomes entitled to a 
finding of presumed prejudice.  When prejudice is presumed, 
the burden shifts to the state, which must then affirmatively 
show either that the delay is 'extenuated, as by the 
defendant's acquiescence,' or 'that the delay left [the 
defendant's] ability to defend himself unimpaired.'"'" 
___ So. 3d at ____ (citations omitted).   
 
The opinion found that "Dennis's case falls under the third Doggett 
category of negligent delay" because "Dennis does not allege bad-faith 
efforts by the State to gain an unfair advantage based upon the delay." 
___ So. 3d at ____.  The opinion then reasoned that the trial court was 
required to presume that the delay in this case prejudiced Dennis 
because the delay between his indictment and trial, like the delay in 
Doggett itself, "was over eight years" in total length.  ___ So. 3d at ____.  
Based on this finding of presumed prejudice, the Court of Criminal 
SC-2023-0146 
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Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment 
for Dennis.  The State sought rehearing, which the court denied.   
In denying the State's rehearing application, two judges submitted 
a separate special concurrence to "explain [their] reasons for concurring 
in the result on original submission."  They noted their frustration with 
the decision to grant Dennis relief, emphasizing: (1) the "complete lack of 
proof of any actual prejudice" to Dennis; (2) the "conclusive nature of the 
DNA evidence" against him; and (3) the "'fact that [Dennis] has suffered 
none of the harms that the [speedy-trial] right was designed to prevent.'" 
___ So. 3d at ____ (McCool, J., concurring specially on denial of rehearing, 
joined by Minor, J. (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 659)). Nonetheless, they 
believed that they were compelled to overturn the trial court's judgment 
because, in their view, "United States Supreme Court precedent requires 
that prejudice should be presumed" in Dennis's case because, as in 
Doggett, the "delay was [approximately] eight and a half years" long.  Id. 
at ____. 
Following the denial of rehearing, the State filed a petition for a 
writ of certiorari, asking this Court to consider whether "[t]he decision 
below conflicts with prior decisions of this Court and the U.S. Supreme 
SC-2023-0146 
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Court because it presumed prejudice based on the entire post-indictment 
period rather than the period of delay caused by the State's negligence." 
Petition at 6.  We ordered an answer and briefs.  
Standard of Review 
Because the question presented to this Court "involves only issues 
of law and the application of the law to the undisputed facts," our "review 
is de novo."  Walker, 928 So. 2d at 262. 
Analysis 
The decision below rests on a straightforward legal error.  In its 
application of the second Barker factor (cause for delay), the Court of 
Criminal Appeals attributed only about four and a half years of the post-
indictment delay to official negligence; yet in assessing the fourth Barker 
factor (prejudice), it based its presumption of prejudice on the eight-year-
plus period of total delay.  That reasoning conflicts with decisions from 
the United States Supreme Court and this Court, both of which have 
specified that prejudice should be presumed based only on those periods 
of delay that are attributable to the government.  Since delay of less than 
five years is insufficient to support a presumption of prejudice in the 
absence of any aggravating factors, as this Court and courts across the 
SC-2023-0146 
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country have consistently held, Dennis is not entitled to such a 
presumption.  And without that presumption, his speedy-trial claim fails, 
as the trial court correctly determined.     
A. The Court of Criminal Appeals erred by presuming prejudice 
based on the entire post-indictment period, rather than only the 
portion of that period attributable to the State's negligence. 
While the reasoning below was fractured -- with the main opinion 
on original submission joined by only a single judge -- a majority of the 
court agreed on one key point: the United States Supreme Court's 
precedent in Doggett compelled the court to grant Dennis relief because, 
the majority reasoned, the "delay in Doggett, like the delay in Dennis's 
case, was over eight years from the time of [the] indictment," and the 
Court in Doggett found a delay of the same length sufficient to presume 
prejudice.  ___ So. 3d at ___; see also id. at ____ ("In this case, the delay 
of over eight years was excessive."); id. at ____ (McCool, J., concurring 
specially on denial of rehearing) (describing the relevant delay as an 
"eight-year" period); id. at ____ (McCool, J., concurring specially on denial 
of rehearing) (stating that the Doggett Court determined that prejudice 
SC-2023-0146 
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was presumed because the "delay [in that case] was eight and a half 
years").   
That was error.  Both Doggett itself and this Court's post-Doggett 
precedents have made clear that prejudice cannot be presumed based on 
the entire post-indictment period as such but, rather, only on whatever 
subset of that period was caused by government misfeasance.  See 
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657-58 (explaining that the Court's presumption of 
prejudice was based on the "6 years" long delay "attributable to the 
Government's negligence," rather than on the "8½ years" long lag 
"between … indictment and arrest"); Ex parte Anderson, 979 So. 2d 777, 
780, 783 (Ala. 2007) (noting that the total delay period was "three years," 
but explaining that only "25 months" of that period were attributable to 
the State's negligence, and finding that "the State's negligent delay of 
approximately 25 months" was not "so severe as to relieve Anderson of 
any responsibility to demonstrate at least some actual, as opposed to 
conjectural, prejudice").   
The law on this point is so well established that Dennis does not 
even attempt to dispute it in his response brief.  Instead, his arguments 
before this Court take a different tack.  Despite asserting below, at the 
SC-2023-0146 
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rehearing stage, that the opinion below had "appropriately categorized" 
each period of delay, see Dennis's brief in opposition to application for 
rehearing at 5, Dennis now argues that the opinion erred by attributing 
only four and a half years of the delay to official negligence.  Instead, he 
argues, the opinion should have categorized every period not provably 
caused by Dennis as negligent delay.   
The State contends that Dennis is estopped from taking this 
position after having successfully relied on the opposite position below.  
See Russell v. Russell, 404 So. 2d 662, 665 (Ala. 1981) ("The law is settled 
in Alabama that a party who has, with knowledge of the facts, assumed 
a particular position in a judicial proceeding is estopped from assuming 
a position inconsistent to the first one to the prejudice of an adverse 
party.").  But even if Dennis were not barred from advancing this 
argument, it would fail.   
A finding of "negligent delay" requires a finding of negligence.  That 
is true both in the obvious definitional sense and under controlling 
precedent.  Doggett itself emphasized that "pretrial delay is often both 
inevitable and wholly justifiable" because the "government may need 
time to collect witnesses against the accused, oppose his pretrial motions, 
SC-2023-0146 
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or, if he goes into hiding, track him down." 505 U.S. at 656.  In keeping 
with that understanding, Doggett held that delays are deemed justified 
so long as the State acts with "reasonable diligence" in bringing the 
defendant to trial.  Id.; accord Walker, 928 So. 2d at 267 ("[W]here the 
state pursues the accused 'with reasonable diligence,' the delay -- 
however long -- generally is excused unless the accused demonstrates 
'specific prejudice to his defense.'" (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656)). 
Dennis asks us to resist this straightforward conclusion.  According 
to Dennis, the Supreme Court held in Barker that even "'neutral 
reason[s]'" for delay count as governmental "negligence" in the speedy-
trial context, so long as the delay was not provably caused by the 
defendant.  Dennis's brief at 17 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531).   
But Dennis's argument on this point reflects a fundamental 
misreading of Barker.  Here is the relevant language from Barker, in its 
full context: 
"Closely related to length of delay is the reason the 
government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different 
weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate 
attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense 
should be weighted heavily against the government. A more 
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts 
should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be 
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such 
SC-2023-0146 
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circumstances must rest with the government rather than 
with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing 
witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay." 
407 U.S. at 531 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).   
As that context makes clear, Barker held that both overt 
prosecutorial negligence (such as authorities simply losing track of the 
case for the better part of a decade, as happened in Doggett) and other 
"more neutral" forms of State mismanagement, such as "overcrowded 
courts," can be considered against the government.  407 U.S. at 531 
(emphasis added).  The Court put overcrowding in the "government's 
fault" bucket because overcrowding is generally caused by the failure of 
state actors to take reasonable steps to ensure that trial courts have 
manageable dockets.  So while court overcrowding might be "more" 
neutral than overt prosecutorial misfeasance, it is not entirely neutral 
and therefore weighs (lightly) against the State.  In contrast, 
administrative pretrial delays that do not reflect any negligence -- such 
as the time necessary to locate a "missing witness" or to handle an 
unusually "complex" charge -- are not counted against the State at all, 
even though such delays are also not caused by the defendant.  407 U.S. 
at 531. 
SC-2023-0146 
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In keeping with these principles, appellate courts across the 
country have held that a delay does not trigger a presumption of 
prejudice unless the reasons for that delay reflect government negligence 
or other misconduct.  See, e.g., United States v. Small, No. 22-1469, July 
7 (3d Cir. 2023) (not reported in Federal Reporter) (emphasizing that "a 
neutral reason" for delay "weighs against neither party" under Barker); 
United States v. Keith, 61 F.4th 839, 853 (10th Cir. 2023) (explaining 
that "a truly neutral justification" does "not favor[] either side" in the 
Barker analysis and "cannot fairly be attributed to the government"); 
United States v. Snyder, 71 F.4th 555, 577-78 (7th Cir. 2023) (similar); 
Vlahos v. State, 518 P.3d 1057, 1072 (Wy. 2022) (similar); In re Timothy 
C., 376 Md. 414, 433, 829 A.2d 1024, 1034 (2003) (emphasizing the long-
standing rule that "'"a neutral reason"'" for delay is "'"chargeable to 
neither party"'" (citations omitted)).1 
 
1It is no coincidence that many of these cases involve delays caused 
by the COVID-19 virus.  These cases provide an especially salient 
example of the way in which courts conduct the Barker analysis in the 
face of truly neutral delays.     
 
Under Dennis's theory, all COVID-related delays should count 
against the government, because none of those delays were caused by the 
defendant.  But virtually every court that has considered that question 
has reached the opposite conclusion.  See, e.g., United States v. Small, 
SC-2023-0146 
21 
 
Dennis does not even acknowledge these cases in his briefing.  
Instead, he contends that we are required to presume prejudice because, 
 
No. 22-1469, July 7, 2023 (3d Cir. 2023) (not reported in Federal 
Reporter); United States v. Keith, 61 F.4th 839, 853 (10th Cir. 2023); 
United States v. Snyder, 71 F.4th 555, 577-78 (7th Cir. 2023); United 
States v. Marquez, No. 21-30134, Nov. 10, 2022 (9th Cir. 2022) (not 
reported in Federal Reporter) (classifying COVID-related delays as 
"valid" under Barker, and therefore as weighing in favor of the State); 
State v. Adams, 364 Ga. App. 864, 868, 876 S.E.2d 719, 725 (2022) 
(refusing to weigh COVID-related suspensions of jury trials against 
either party); State v. Paige, 977 N.W.2d 829, 838 (Minn. 2022) ("[T]rial 
delays due to the statewide orders issued in response to the COVID-19 
global pandemic do not weigh against the State."); State v. Brown, 310 
Neb. 224, 237-41, 964 N.W.2d 682, 691-93 (2021) (holding that COVID-
related delays count as "valid" delays under Barker); Ali v. 
Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 16, 43, 872 S.E.2d 662, 675 (2022) (holding 
that pandemic-related delays fall within the third Doggett category of 
"'valid' reasons for delay that are not directly attributable to the 
government"); United States v. Campbell, No. 1:19-cr-25, Apr. 20, 2021 
(S.D. Ohio 2021) (not reported in Federal Supplement) (holding that "the 
COVID-19 pandemic, and the court system's efforts to minimize the 
public health impacts of that pandemic," constitute "valid reasons" for 
delay and therefore "'weigh in favor of the government'" (citation 
omitted)). 
 
The only decision we know of that has reasoned differently is the 
Supreme Court of Vermont's opinion in State v. Labrecque, [No. 22-AP-
314, July 7, 2023] ___ A.3d ___ (2023), which found that COVID-related 
delays are technically "attributable to the State" under Barker but should 
be accorded "very little weight" in light of their non-negligent character.  
Id. at ___.  Accordingly, the court held that such delays are insufficient 
to support a presumption of prejudice.  Id. at ___.  Thus, despite taking a 
different analytical approach, the Supreme Court of Vermont seems to 
ultimately agree with its sister courts' conclusion that non-negligent 
delays do not, by themselves, justify a presumption of prejudice. 
SC-2023-0146 
22 
 
he says, our own precedent in Anderson "held that only '[d]elays 
occasioned by the defendant or on his behalf are excluded from the length 
of delay,'" Dennis’s brief at 23 (quoting 979 So. 2d at 781), and that our 
earlier precedent in Walker similarly held that "[j]ustified delay is 
likewise limited to 'delay for which the defendant is primarily 
responsible,'" Dennis’s brief at 22 (quoting 928 So. 2d at 265).   
Once again, Dennis mischaracterizes the cases on which he relies.  
In Anderson, this Court repeated the familiar principle that "[d]elays 
occasioned by the defendant or on his behalf are excluded from the length 
of delay," 979 So. 2d at 781, but we never held that those delays are the 
only types of delays that are excluded.  By inserting the word "only" 
ahead of the quoted sentence, Dennis transforms a sufficient condition 
for exclusion into a necessary one and -- in doing so -- distorts the 
meaning of the passage.   
He repeats that mischaracterization when describing our holding 
in Walker.  Walker explained that justified delay "includes such 
occurrences as missing witnesses or delay for which the defendant is 
primarily responsible," 928 So. 2d at 265 (emphases added), but never 
held that justified delay is "limited" to the latter situation.  In fact, 
SC-2023-0146 
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Walker made clear that the opposite is true when it expressly listed 
another example of justified delay.   
As Anderson and Walker illustrate, this Court has never held that 
prejudice must be presumed based on reasonable, non-negligent delays.  
Instead, we have long recognized, in keeping with United States Supreme 
Court precedent, that delays do not count against the State so long as the 
"'the state pursue[d] the accused "with reasonable diligence"'" during the 
relevant time frame.  Anderson, 979 So. 2d at 783 (quoting Walker, 928 
So.2d at 267, quoting in turn Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656). 
The upshot here is that "negligent delay" is just what it sounds like: 
delay caused by negligence.   Turning back to the findings recited in the 
opinion below, the only periods attributable to governmental negligence 
were:  
• 
an unspecified "partial[]" portion of the 2-year-and-27-day 
period between August 20, 2013, when Dennis filed his first 
speedy-trial motion, and September 16, 2015, when the court 
scheduled a pretrial hearing -- which we, in the interests of 
being maximally charitable to Dennis, treat as the full 2 years 
and 27 days for purposes of resolving this issue;   
• 
1 month and 17 days given to the State to produce documents 
for the DNA suppression hearing; 
 
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• 
3 months and 3 days given to both parties to brief the DNA 
suppression issue;2 
• 
2 months and 13 days of extra time granted to the State to file 
a brief; 
• 
1 year of the period from April 18, 2016, to June 11, 2018, for 
various motions and rulings; and 
• 
1 year of time for additional DNA testing by the State. 
___ So. 3d at ____-____. 
 
When added together, these periods come to a little over four and a 
half years of arguably negligent delay.  The remaining portion of the eight 
years and two months between Dennis's indictment and trial was, as the 
opinion below found, attributable to a variety of non-negligent factors, 
 
2While it does not affect the result in this case or our analysis below, 
we note for the sake of clarity -- and in the interest of avoiding future 
confusion -- that the opinion below mistakenly double-counted this 
period.  Specifically, the opinion acknowledged that this roughly three-
month period "was a reasonable time to allow Dennis and the State to 
file the necessary arguments," but nonetheless went on to weigh that 
delay against the State because the due date for the briefs was almost 
two years after Dennis had initially filed his motion to suppress.  ___ So. 
3d at ____.  The problem with that approach is that the opinion had 
already counted that same two-year delay against the State when it 
concluded that much of that delay was attributable to "the trial court's 
failure to set the hearing within a reasonable time."  Id. at ____.  Since 
everyone agrees that this period represented a reasonable amount of time 
to brief the suppression issue, only the delay preceding the briefing -- not 
the reasonable amount of time for the briefing itself -- can count against 
the State.   
 
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such as the time necessary to arrange and complete Dennis's transfer 
from Virginia to Alabama3 and an array of other routine and reasonable 
"procedural occurrences," including the recusal of one judge, the 
retirement of another, and the handling of dozens of motions, briefs, and 
objections, many if not most of which were filed by Dennis.  ___ So. 3d at 
____.  As the opinion below recognized, these delays represented either 
the "ordinary" workings of reasonably diligent courts, ___ So. 3d at ___, 
or else were affirmatively occasioned by Dennis or on his behalf, id. at 
____.  In short, even under a calculation that is charitable to Dennis, the 
total portion of delay caused by government negligence is less than five 
years.    
The five-year figure is significant because courts across the country, 
including this one, have consistently found negligent delays insufficient 
to relieve a defendant of his burden to demonstrate actual prejudice 
 
3Dennis's unsupported assertion that the time necessary to 
complete this transfer should be attributed to the government is 
perplexing.  Nothing in the record suggests that Dennis's transfer took 
an unusual or unreasonable amount of time relative to transfers for 
comparably dangerous prisoners.  And the reason that this transfer had 
to take place at all lies with Dennis himself: had he not brutally attacked 
a man during an armed burglary in Virginia, he would not have been 
incarcerated in that jurisdiction and could have come to Alabama 
immediately to stand trial.   
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unless the "delay is five years or more."4  Walker, 928 So. 2d at 270 
(collecting numerous federal cases); see also 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., 
Criminal Procedure § 18.2(e) (4th ed.) (also collecting cases) ("[C]ourts 
'generally have found presumed prejudice only in cases in which the post-
indictment delay lasted at least five years,' except where the government 
was responsible for the delay by virtue of something beyond simple 
negligence." (footnotes and citations omitted)).  Dennis does not challenge 
this body of caselaw, and we see no reason to reach a contrary result here.  
If anything, a presumption of prejudice based on a period less than 5 
years would be especially inappropriate in this case, given that Dennis 
was already serving a 600-year sentence for an unrelated crime and has 
not put forward an even superficially plausible theory as to how the delay 
 
4Walker makes clear that, in some cases, the length of negligent 
delay required to presume prejudice may be "more" than five years.  928 
So. 2d at 270.  That is particularly likely to be the case when "other 
circumstances" -- such as the defendant's incarceration for a different 
crime during the relevant period -- make such a presumption especially 
unreasonable.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.  But since the negligent delay in 
this case is well under five years, we need not address how much 
additional delay might be required to justify a presumption of prejudice 
in such circumstances.         
 
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27 
 
between his indictment and trial could have prejudiced either his liberty 
interests or his ability to marshal a defense.5 
B. Without a presumption of prejudice, Dennis's speedy-trial claim 
fails. 
The absence of prejudice, either actual or presumed, is fatal to 
Dennis's speedy-trial claim.  As the State points out -- and as Dennis does 
not refute -- it appears that no post-Doggett opinion from the United 
States Supreme Court, this Court, or the Court of Criminal Appeals has 
granted relief based on a speedy-trial claim without finding prejudice.  
Instead, courts have consistently denied speedy-trial claims absent either 
 
5The closest Dennis has come to putting forward such a theory is 
when he asserted below that four of the people he "'would have called in 
his defense passed away before he faced trial.'" ___ So. 3d at ____ (citation 
omitted).  But Dennis alleged only that these people passed away 
between the night of the murder and his trial; he never alleged (as he 
would have needed to do to show prejudice) that they passed away 
between the indictment and trial, see id. at ___.  That omission is 
compounded by another, equally significant deficiency, which is that 
"Dennis did not make any proffer to establish how the four individuals in 
question could have assisted his defense if the case had gone to trial 
earlier and if they had been able to testify."  Id. at ___.  On top of all that, 
"the conclusive nature of the DNA evidence" placing Dennis at the crime 
scene, in contradiction of his core defense claim -- which was "that he was 
not at the crime scene" at all -- makes it difficult to imagine how anything 
these individuals might have said could have swayed a reasonable jury. 
___ So. 3d at ____ (McCool, J., concurring specially on denial of 
rehearing).   
 
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actual or presumed prejudice, even when the other factors weighed in the 
defendant's favor.  See Walker, 928 So. 2d at 267, 277; see also State's 
brief at 47-48 (collecting dozens of similar cases from the Court of 
Criminal Appeals). 
There is good reason for that consensus.  Courts place immense 
weight on the prejudice factor because that is the factor that most directly 
reflects the "core concern" of the Speedy Trial Clause: "impairment of 
liberty."  United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986).  And 
while Barker's ad hoc balancing test leaves open the possibility that there 
could be circumstances in which the first three factors weigh so 
overwhelmingly in favor of the accused that prejudice becomes 
unnecessary, those circumstances are extraordinarily rare -- as 
evidenced by the dearth of decisions granting relief in the absence of 
either actual or presumed prejudice.   
In any event, no such extraordinary circumstances are present 
here.  Even on the accounting of the opinion below, only a slight majority 
of the total eight-year delay can be attributed to the State, and none of 
that delay was attributable to anything more than simple negligence.  We 
have never required a trial court to vacate a conviction in similar 
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circumstances, and Dennis offers us no reason to chart a new course now.  
His speedy-trial claim fails.   
Conclusion 
 
The court below erred by presuming prejudice based on the entire 
period between Dennis's indictment and trial, rather than on the more 
limited period attributable to government negligence.  And because the 
period attributable to government negligence is too short to presume 
prejudice -- and because Dennis has not put forward any evidence of 
actual prejudice -- his speedy-trial claim fails.  We therefore reverse the 
judgment below and remand the case to the Court of Criminal Appeals 
for it to address the remaining arguments raised in Dennis's initial 
appellate brief.  
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED.  
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., 
concur. 
 
Sellers, J., concurs in the result. 
 
Mendheim, J., recuses himself.