Case Title: Prince v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 35, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2022-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RADEE PRINCE, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 35, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 1710010993A(N)  
§                      
§ 
 
Submitted: July 8, 2022 
Decided: 
September 9, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Radee Prince, has appealed the Superior Court’s denial 
of his motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  After 
careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
Prince was indicted on multiple charges, including attempted murder, 
after he shot a long-time acquaintance, Rashan Baul (also known as Jason Baul), in 
an office at Baul’s auto-sales business on the morning of October 18, 2017.  This 
Court described the incident and summarized the evidence presented at trial in its 
decision on Prince’s direct appeal.1  That evidence included video footage from 
 
1 Prince v. State, 2019 WL 3383880, at *1-2 (Del. July 25, 2019). 
 
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surveillance cameras that showed Prince arriving on the scene and shooting into the 
office; the testimony of a witness who was meeting with Baul when Prince shot Baul; 
the testimony of one of Baul’s employees, who had known Prince since childhood, 
who testified that she spoke with Prince when he arrived at the business, saw him 
enter the building and pull out a gun, and then fled after hearing a gunshot; and 
evidence that Prince drove from Maryland to Delaware shortly before the shooting, 
purchased ammunition from a Wal-Mart store, exchanged that ammunition for a 
different type, and then proceeded to Baul’s business.   
(3) 
Prince did not contend at trial that he was not the shooter.  Rather, his 
defense was that he had learned that Baul had hired someone to kill him, and that he 
therefore shot Baul in self-defense or under extreme emotional distress.  To rebut 
Prince’s position that his past interactions with Baul supported a finding of self-
defense or extreme emotional distress, the State sought to introduce evidence that on 
the morning of the shooting, before going to Baul’s business, Prince shot and killed 
three people and injured others at his workplace in Edgewood, Maryland.  The 
Superior Court ruled that the evidence was admissible,2 and the State introduced 
evidence of the Maryland shooting, including a video of the incident; the ensuing 
manhunt; and Prince’s arrest later that evening in Newark, Delaware, by federal 
agents, which involved a brief foot chase during which Prince discarded a gun. 
 
2 See id. at *2, 5-6 (discussing and affirming the Superior Court’s analysis). 
 
3 
(4) 
A Superior Court jury found Prince guilty of attempted manslaughter 
under extreme emotional distress, a lesser-included offense of attempted murder, as 
well as first-degree reckless endangering, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, 
resisting arrest, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of 
a felony.  The Superior Court sentenced Prince to a total of forty years of 
unsuspended prison time, followed by probation.  Prince was represented by counsel 
before and during trial, but he elected to proceed pro se on appeal.3  This Court 
affirmed on direct appeal.4 
(5) 
Prince filed a timely motion for postconviction relief, which the 
Superior Court denied.5  Prince has appealed to this Court.  On appeal, Prince asserts 
multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  He argues that trial counsel 
failed to object to the admission of the video of the Delaware shooting on the basis 
that the video that was shown to the jury differed from the version produced to the 
defense in discovery; failed to object to certain statements made by counsel for the 
State during closing arguments; failed to object to the admission of the Maryland 
shooting video on the basis that it was not properly authenticated; and failed to object 
to certain contents of the State’s sentencing memorandum.  In addition to his claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, Prince asserts that the Superior Court abused its 
 
3 Id. at *3. 
4 Id. at *14. 
5 State v. Prince, 2022 WL 211704 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2022). 
 
4 
discretion by denying him the opportunity to present evidence or witnesses to 
support his defense, thereby forcing Prince to take the stand, and by admitting the 
video of the Maryland shooting without requiring the State to properly authenticate 
it.  He also asserts that the State wrongfully withheld information regarding 
misconduct by a ballistics expert who did not testify at Prince’s trial.  Finally, he 
contends that he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. 
(6) 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for 
postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.6  We review legal or constitutional 
questions, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, de novo.7  The Court 
considers the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive 
issues.8  
(7) 
As the Superior Court correctly determined, Prince’s claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel are not procedurally barred.9  In order to prevail on 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (i) 
his defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s 
 
6 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013). 
7 Id. 
8 Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 756-57 (Del. 2016). 
9 See Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020) (“[I]neffective-assistance claims are not 
subject to Rule 61(i)(3)’s bar because they cannot be asserted in the proceedings leading to the 
judgment of conviction under the Superior Court’s rules and this Court’s precedent.”). 
 
5 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.10  
Although not insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s 
representation was professionally reasonable.11  A defendant must also make and 
substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice to prevail on an ineffective-
assistance claim.12 
(8) 
Prince first argues that his trial counsel failed to object to the admission 
of the video of the Delaware shooting on the basis that the video that was shown at 
trial differed from a version that the defense obtained in discovery.  He asserts that 
the trial video showed Prince firing four shots, while the video obtained in discovery 
showed Prince firing three shots.  The Superior Court determined that Prince had 
failed to establish prejudice on this basis, and we agree.  Prince does not claim that 
he was not the shooter, and the jury accepted Prince’s claim that he shot Baul under 
extreme emotional distress.  In light of that result and considering all the evidence 
presented to the jury, it is not reasonably probable that the result of the proceeding 
would have been different—that is, that the jury would have found Prince not 
 
10 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
11 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
12 Bradley, 135 A.3d at 760; see also Ploof, 75 A.3d at 821 (“To establish prejudice, ‘[t]he 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694) (alteration in original)); id. (“‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome’—a lower standard than ‘more likely than not.’” (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94)). 
 
6 
guilty—if the jury had seen a video of Prince firing three shots at Baul rather than 
four. 
(9) 
Next, Prince argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did 
not object to the prosecutor’s statement during closing arguments that Prince 
“huddled people together in a workplace in Edgewood, Maryland, and murdered 
three of them, and shot two others” on the basis that the evidence presented during 
the trial did not inform the jury that three of the five Maryland shooting victims had 
died.  The Superior Court concluded that Prince did not establish that the result of 
the trial would have been different if defense counsel had objected to the 
prosecutor’s statement because, on the facts of this case, whether Prince “went to his 
workplace and shot five coworkers” or whether he “went to his workplace and shot 
five coworkers, three of whom died” “cannot have impacted the verdict 
negatively.”13   
(10) We agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion.  On direct appeal, this 
Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision to permit the State to introduce 
evidence of the Maryland shooting, including the video.14  Thus, to the extent that 
Prince is attempting to recast his challenge to the admission of the Maryland video 
 
13 State v. Prince, 2022 WL 211704, at *8-9 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2022). 
14 Prince, 2019 WL 3383880, at *5-6. 
 
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as an ineffective-assistance claim, that attempt is unavailing.15  Moreover, counsel 
for the State had the following exchange with Prince during cross-examination: 
Q:  That exact morning at your place of work in 
Edgewood, Maryland, on October 18, 2017, when a group of 
people were gathered in a room, you shot them, right? 
You shot five people.  Three of them are dead. 
And isn’t it true that that has a little bit more to do with 
your state of mind on October 18, 2017, that morning, than 
whatever this stuff was from 2014, and 2015, and 2016, right?   
[No response indicated in transcript.] 
Q:  That’s a non-answer? 
A:  You’ve seen the pictures.  You’ve seen the evidence.16 
 
Even accepting Prince’s argument, despite the foregoing exchange, that the “jury 
had no knowledge that three people died until [the prosecutor] told them” so during 
closing argument,17 Prince has not explained, in light of the video and other evidence 
of the Maryland shooting, how there is a reasonable probability that the jury would 
have acquitted Prince if the prosecutor had not made that statement in closing 
argument. 
(11) Prince also contends that his counsel was ineffective because he did not 
object to the admission of the Maryland shooting video on the basis that it was not 
properly authenticated.  Prince did not present this claim to the Superior Court in the 
 
15 See Ruffin v. State, 2019 WL 719038, at *3 (Del. Feb. 19, 2019) (“Having failed to prevail on 
the merit of the claims on direct appeal, Ruffin cannot succeed on the claims now by reframing 
them as grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
16 Appendix to Answering Brief at B130-31. 
17 Opening Brief at 10. 
 
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first instance, and we therefore review for plain error.18  We find no plain error here.  
Prince argues that authentication of a surveillance video requires a witness to testify 
regarding the type of equipment or camera used, the quality of the recorded product, 
the process by which it was focused, or the general reliability of the recording 
equipment and system.19  But this Court has held that a party may authenticate video 
evidence “either by establishing a chain of custody, which establishes the continuous 
whereabouts of the evidence, or by having a witness with knowledge testify that the 
evidence is what it is claimed to be.”20  Moreover, “while the authentication 
requirement is fundamental, it imposes only a lenient burden that is easily met.”21  
“The proponent need not conclusively prove the evidence’s authenticity, but merely 
provide a ‘rational basis’ from which a reasonable finder of fact could draw that 
conclusion.  And there are no hard-and-fast rules about how that must be done.  The 
proponent can point to witness testimony, corroborative circumstances, distinctive 
characteristics, or other evidence probative of authenticity.”22   
(12) Here, the State presented the testimony of an agent of the federal 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) that he and other ATF officers 
 
18 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 8. 
19 Opening Brief at 10. 
20 Masarone v. State, 2014 WL 1515038, at *2 (Del. Apr. 16, 2014). 
21 Schaffer v. State, 2018 WL 1747793, at *5 (Del. Apr. 10, 2018) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). 
22 Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 
9 
had responded to notifications of a workplace active shooter incident in Edgewood, 
Maryland, on October 18, 2017; that he had previously viewed a video of that 
workplace shooting and was familiar with its contents; that the video was the same 
one that led to an investigation on October 18, 2017; and that he recognized the 
contents of the video that was then played for the jury.23  Prince has not raised any 
actual challenge to the authenticity of the Maryland shooting video, and we conclude 
that he has not sufficiently established that his defense counsel acted in a 
professionally unreasonable manner by not objecting to the authentication of the 
Maryland video. 
(13) As his final ineffective-assistance claim, Prince asserts that his counsel 
should have objected to the State’s inclusion in its sentencing memorandum of 
purportedly unreliable or misleading information regarding a 2015 arrest of Prince 
during which he was alleged to have been in possession of a firearm and a detective’s 
report stating that Prince went to another former workplace between the time of the 
Maryland shooting and the time of the Baul shooting.  On direct appeal, Prince 
argued that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by including inadmissible 
information about those events in its sentencing memorandum.24  Addressing that 
claim, this Court wrote:  
 
23 Appendix to Answering Brief at B148-49. 
24 Prince v. State, 2019 WL 3383880, at *13 (Del. July 25, 2019). 
 
10 
This information was not presented to the jury at trial, but only at sentencing.  
At sentencing, a trial court may consider “unsworn or out-of-court 
information relative to the circumstances of the crime and to the convicted 
person’s life and circumstance.”  In the sentencing context, the court may 
consider information about other, unproven crimes or conduct for which the 
defendant was not convicted, as long as the information presented does not 
lack minimal indicia of reliability.  Prince has not demonstrated that the 
information submitted by the State in connection with sentencing lacked 
minimal indicia of reliability.25 
 
Having failed to prevail on the merits of this issue on direct appeal, Prince cannot 
succeed now by reframing the issue as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.26 
(14) In addition to his claims that his counsel was ineffective, Prince 
presents various claims of “trial court errors” and prosecutorial misconduct.  He 
argues that the Superior Court prohibited him from presenting evidence to rebut 
Baul’s testimony denying that he had threatened Prince with a gun at Prince’s 
father’s funeral in 2016 or solicited someone to kill Prince, thereby “forcing” Prince 
to take the stand to present evidence to support his self-defense and extreme-
emotional-distress theories.  He also contends that the purported improper 
authentication of the Maryland shooting video warrants reversal of his conviction, 
independent of any ineffective-assistance claim.  Finally, he asserts that the State 
violated Brady v. Maryland27 by withholding information regarding misconduct by 
 
25 Id. 
26 Ruffin v. State, 2019 WL 719038, at *3 (Del. Feb. 19, 2019); Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 
762 (Del. 2016). 
27 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
11 
Carl Rone, a ballistics expert who did not even testify at Prince’s trial.  We agree 
with the Superior Court’s determination that these claims were procedurally barred 
because they were formerly adjudicated28 or could have been asserted in the 
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction but were not.29  Prince’s attempts 
to overcome the procedural bars are unavailing.30  His decision to represent himself 
on direct appeal did not preserve for later adjudication issues that he did not raise—
or raised unsuccessfully—in that appeal.  And the information regarding Rone’s 
misconduct is not new, nor does it create a strong inference that Prince is actually 
innocent in fact of shooting Baul.31   
(15) Finally, Prince’s claim that he is entitled to relief because of cumulative 
error also is without merit.  “Cumulative error must derive from multiple errors that 
 
28 DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(4). 
29 Id. R. 61(i)(3). 
30 See id. R. 61(i)(2), (5) (providing that the procedural bars set forth in Rule 61(i)(1)-(4) do not 
apply if the movant pleads with particularity that “new evidence exists that creates a strong 
inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which 
he was convicted” or that “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 
review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the 
movant’s case and renders the conviction . . . invalid”). 
31 See generally Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1095 (Del. 2021) (stating that showing innocence 
of the “acts underlying the charges” as set forth in Rule 61(d)(2)(i) requires showing “more than 
innocence of intent; it requires new evidence that a person other than the petitioner committed the 
crime” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 
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caused ‘actual prejudice.’”32  Because the Court has found no errors that caused 
actual prejudice, Prince’s claim of cumulative error also fails.33 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
32 Michaels v. State, 970 A.2d 223, 231 (Del. 2009). 
33 Abbatiello v. State, 2020 WL 7647926, at *6 (Del. Dec. 22, 2020); see also Swan v. State, 248 
A.3d 839, 884 (Del. 2021) (“As described above, all of the claims Swan asserts are procedurally 
barred.  Therefore, Swan has failed to establish cumulative error.”).