Case Title: Booth v. Garvin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 137, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2023-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSEPH W. BOOTH and 
MARGARET A. BOOTH, 
 
Defendants Below, 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
SHAWN M. GARVIN, 
SECRETARY OF THE 
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES & 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
 
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No. 137, 2022 
 
Court Below—Superior Court  
of the State of Delaware 
 
C.A. No. S18M-10-040  
      
Submitted:  October 19, 2022 
Decided:  January 27, 2023 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices.  
O R D E R 
 
On this 27th day of January 2023, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1)  Joseph W. Booth and Margaret A. Booth appeal from a final judgment of 
the Superior Court in which they were found liable to the Delaware Department of 
Natural Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC) for environmental clean-
up costs and associated administrative costs in the amount of $105,464.87.  They 
contend that the Superior Court committed errors in three rulings issued during the 
course of this litigation.  The environmental contamination occurred at a property 
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the Booths own in Georgetown, Delaware (“the Site”).  The three rulings, the 
Booths’ contentions of error, and this Court’s analysis with respect to each will be 
set forth chronologically in this Order. 
 
(2)  The Booths acquired the Site in 1986.  At the time, the property was and 
had been for some time used for the operation of a dry-cleaning business known as 
Thoro-Kleen, Inc. (“Thoro-Kleen”).  The Booths continued to operate the dry-
cleaning business until 2010.  In that year, Thoro-Kleen ceased operations, but the 
Booths continued to own the property.  During the course of the operation of the 
dry-cleaning business, the Site became contaminated with hazardous substances.  In 
this Order we refer to the Booths and Thoro-Kleen collectively as “the Booths” for 
ease of composition, except where circumstances may require us to refer to them 
separately. 
 
(3)  On January 8, 2015, DNREC sent a notice of violation to the Booths 
informing them of their liability for environmental contamination as owners and 
operators of the property.   
 
(4)  In September 2016, the Booths agreed to donate the property to 
Restoration Worship Center, Inc. (“RWC”), a religious organization, so that RWC 
could take the property through DNREC’s Brownfield Development Program 
(“Brownfield Program”).  On or about November 29, 2016, DNREC entered into a 
“Brownfield Development Agreement” concerning the property with RWC.  The 
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apparent purpose of the agreement was to enable RWC to enter into the Brownfield 
Program to clean up the Site for the purpose of eventually establishing a church 
there.  The Brownfield Program was established within DNREC to provide an 
avenue for properties contaminated with hazardous substances to be properly 
cleaned up and redeveloped.1  After applying, RWC succeeded in having the Site 
certified as a participant in the Brownfield Program.  While Brownfield Grant 
funding is not guaranteed, and RWC was made aware of this fact, DNREC incurred 
remedial costs related to, among other things, paying a company hired by RWC to 
clean up the Site.  The Booths, it appears, continued to be the owners of the property 
after DNREC and RWC entered into the Brownfield Agreement.  The 2015 notice 
was followed on October 31, 2017 by a Secretary’s Order (“the Order”) finding the 
Booths in violation of Delaware’s Hazardous Substance Cleanup Act (“HSCA”) and 
the regulations thereunder.  The Booths (but not Thoro-Kleen) appealed the Order 
to the Environmental Appeals Board.  Ultimately, the Mr. and Mrs. Booth withdrew 
the appeal. 
 
(5)  On October 11, 2018, DNREC filed suit against the Booths to enforce the 
October 31, 2017 Order.  It sought three times the costs incurred in enforcing the 
Order plus civil penalties.  On April 22, 2019, DNREC filed a motion for summary 
 
1 7 Del. C. § 9122. 
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judgment “as to all claims asserted in the Complaint[.]”2 
 
(6)  The Superior Court ruled on DNREC’s motion for summary judgment in 
a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated July 10, 2019.  The court summarized its 
ruling as follows: 
DNREC now sues (1) for damages available under 
Delaware’s 
Hazardous 
Substances 
Cleanup 
Act 
(“HSCA”), and (2) for all expenses, including cleanup 
costs, recoverable pursuant to 7 Del. C. § 6005(c).  Here, 
the Booths did not contest the Secretary’s Order finding 
them liable for releases at the Site.  As a result, the 
statutory appeal provisions in DNREC’s enabling statute 
and the doctrine of issue preclusion make the Secretary’s 
findings and conclusions binding in this Superior Court 
action.  Partial summary judgment as to the Booth’s 
liability is therefore granted.  The amount of damages due 
DNREC, however, remains a factual issue.  For that 
reason, DNREC’s motion for summary judgment is also 
denied, part.3 
 
The Superior Court found that the Booths failed to exhaust their administrative 
remedies by withdrawing their EAB appeal.4  It reasoned that the failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies resulted in the Booths being bound under the doctrine of 
issue preclusion by the Secretary’s findings and conclusions.5  The court denied 
summary judgment for damages, however, as damages had not yet been ascertained.6  
The court further ruled that “the parties may pursue discovery relevant to the amount 
 
2 Opening Br. at 6. 
3 Garvin v. Booth, 2019 WL 3017419, at *1 (Del. Super. July 10, 2019). 
4 Id. at *4.  “EAB” refers to the “Environmental Appeals Board.” 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at *6. 
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of HSCA provided damages resulting from the Booths’ refusal to comply with the 
Secretary’s Order.”7  The court also noted, however, that “DNREC limits its claim 
in the present suit to study and investigation related to costs already incurred.”8 
 
(7)   The Booths claim that the Superior Court erred in granting summary 
judgment as to the Booths’ liability in the July 10, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and 
Order “because the Secretary never met his burden.”9  The essence of the error, the 
Booths assert, lies in the Superior Court’s application of issue preclusion to prevent 
their challenge to the Order’s findings against them.10  The Booths maintain that “the 
Trial Court afforded greater weight than warranted to the Booths’ withdrawal of their 
EAB appeal[.]”11  The Booths explain their view, arguing that “[t]he Trial Court 
failed to appreciate that the Secretary could not sue, under § 9109(e), for 
noncompliance unless the Secretary’s Order survived the EAB appeal and thus, for 
that purpose, there was no difference between the EAB affirming the Secretary’s 
Order and the Booths’ appeal being withdrawn.”12  Furthermore, the Booths take 
issue with the timing of the Secretary’s Order, arguing that it could not have 
addressed events taking place after its issuance, and for this reason the court could 
 
7 Id. at *1. 
8 Id. at *7. 
9 Opening Br. at 28 (emphasis omitted). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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not make findings on compliance or noncompliance.13  The Booths additionally 
argue that per Section 9109(e), the issue of noncompliance can only be asserted in 
the Superior Court, and further that the Secretary never claimed noncompliance.14  
The Booths maintain that their “arguments were sufficient” to support denial of the 
motion for summary judgment.15  Finally, the Booths claim that the Superior Court’s 
action subjected their case to “inject[ion of] an unpled claim.”16 
 
(8)  This Court reviews a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo “to 
determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in 
dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”17  
“Questions of law, including the interpretation of statutes, are also reviewed de 
novo.”18 
 
(9)   Essentially, the Booths’ position is that the Order should not have been 
given preclusive effect and, consistent with this view, the Secretary fell short of his 
burden.19  This view lacks merit.  This is because, by withdrawing their appeal, the 
Booths effectively forfeited the right to challenge their liability.  As for the Booths’ 
 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 28-29, 31. 
15 Id. at 32. 
16 Id. at 32-33. 
17 Homeland Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. CorVel Corp., 197 A.3d 1042, 1046 (Del. 2018) (en banc). 
18 City of Wilm. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 154 A.3d 1124, 1127 (Del. 2017). 
19 Opening Br. at 31. 
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argument that their withdrawal equates to an affirmance by the EAB of the Order,20 
this view misses the significance of the withdrawal.  In the July 10, 2019 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Superior Court explained that the Booths’ 
choice to withdraw their appeal had consequences:  “Given the Booths’ litigation 
choices, they have forfeited their right to now challenge their liability when they had 
a full and fair opportunity to do so below.  Issue preclusion estops them from now 
contesting the Secretary’s factual findings in the Order.”21  As for the Booths’ claim 
that the Secretary “never addressed whether the Booths failed to comply or whether 
they did so without sufficient cause[,]”22 the Secretary clearly stated in his First 
Motion for Summary Judgment (which the Booths reference repeatedly in their 
argument) that “[t]hey [(the Booths and Thoro Kleen)] have failed to comply with 
the Secretary’s Order delivered to them in November 2017.”23  Finally, the record 
and decisions of the Superior Court do not support a finding that the court below 
improperly expanded the scope of liability or damages through “inject[ion of] an 
unpled claim[.]”24 
 
(10)  In the Memorandum Opinion and Order of July 10, 2019, after the 
Superior Court addressed the Order’s requests of the Booths, the court stated: “The 
 
20 Id. at 28. 
21 Garvin v. Booth, 2019 WL 3017419, at *4 (Del. Super. July 10, 2010). 
22 Opening Br. at 31. 
23 App. to Opening Br. at A131. 
24 Opening Br. at 33. 
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Booths complied with none of the deadlines.”25  This statement constitutes a finding 
of the Superior Court on the issue of compliance, separate and apart from the holding 
regarding issue preclusion.  The fact that the Order could not have made conclusions 
about compliance after it was issued is irrelevant to the Superior Court’s decision.  
The Superior Court, not the EAB, made this decision about the Booths’ 
noncompliance.  We find no error in the Superior Court’s application of issue 
preclusion against the Booths and the court’s ultimate determination as to liability 
in the July 10, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and Order. 
 
(11)  On October 1, 2019 DNREC moved for a continuance of the trial date.  
DNREC requested the continuance because it had not fully determined its damages.  
In particular, it argued that it needed more time to determine its remedial costs.  The 
Booths opposed the continuance request.  They argued that the law of the case, as 
established in the Memorandum Opinion and Order dated July 10, 2019, limited the 
damages DNREC could seek to investigation and study related costs only.  They 
also argued that the law of the case limited DNREC to damages that had ripened on 
or before the date of oral argument on the above-mentioned motion for summary 
judgment.  In an Opinion dated October 31, 2019, the Superior Court granted 
DNREC’s request for a continuance.26  The Booths claim on appeal that the Superior 
 
25 Garvin, 2019 WL 3017419 at *2. 
26 Garvin v. Booth, 2019 WL 5654661, at *1 (Del. Super. Oct. 31, 2019). 
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Court erred when it granted the continuance because the action on the continuance 
request had the effect of expanding the scope of potential DNREC damages for 
which they might be held liable to include remedial damages.27  This, they claim, 
violated Superior Court Civil Rule 59(d) (which applies to motions to alter or amend 
a judgment) and affected their substantive rights.28 
 
  (12)  We review the Superior Court’s October 31, 2019 Opinion for an abuse 
of discretion.29  “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has … exceeded the 
bounds of reason in view of the circumstances, or … so ignored recognized rules of 
law or practices so as to produce injustice.”30   
 
(13)  In its discussion of the continuance request, the Superior Court 
interpreted the Secretary’s reasoning for the continuance to be for the development 
and addition of remediation costs.31  In the October 31, 2019 Opinion, the Superior 
Court stated: 
It is inappropriate, however, to limit the Secretary’s 
potential recovery to study and planning costs that were 
incurred before the time of summary judgment oral 
argument.  The Court included references in its 
Memorandum Opinion and Order reciting the Secretary’s 
agreement to so limit its damages.  The Court did so in the 
portion of its decision addressing the future scope of 
 
27 Opening Br. at 37-38. 
28 Id. at 36-37; Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(d). 
29 Opening Br. at 34; Answering Br. at 40. 
30 Chaverri v. Dole Food Co., 245 A.3d 927, 935 (Del. 2021) (en banc) (quoting Senu-Oke v. 
Broomall Condominium, Inc., 2013 WL 5232192, at *1 (Del. Sept. 16, 2013) (ORDER) (citations 
omitted)). 
31 Appendix to Opening Br. at A2181. 
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discovery.  When reviewing the oral argument transcript, 
however, counsel for the Secretary made no representation 
about limiting the Secretary’s claim to damages incurred 
to date.  Rather, counsel estimated that approximately 
$260,000 of investigation and study costs had been 
incurred.  He also represented, on behalf of the Secretary, 
that DNREC would not seek clean-up costs or civil 
penalties.32 
 
 
(14)  The Booths claim that the court’s ruling exposed them to additional 
liability.33  The Secretary counters that, because the Booths’ liability was never up 
for debate, no amendment actually occurred, calling this a “clarifi[cation of] the 
scope of damages DNREC was seeking to be consistent with the Record.”34 
 
(15)  It appears that the statement of the Court in the Opinion of October 31, 
2019 was a mere clarification of the damages being sought rather than an amendment 
of a prior opinion, since summary judgment on damages was not granted in the July 
10, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and Order, and the discussion of the Secretary’s 
limiting of his claim comes within the context of the Superior Court’s decision to 
permit discovery on matters pertinent to available damages.35  It does not appear that 
any amendment of the Memorandum Opinion and Order of July 10, 2019 occurred, 
and because the Booths’ liability was already established, their substantive rights 
were unaffected. 
 
32 Garvin v. Booth, 2019 WL 5654661, at *1 (Del. Super. Oct. 31, 2019). 
33 Opening Br. at 37-38. 
34 Answering Br. at 42. 
35 Garvin v. Booth, 2019 WL 3017419, at *6-7 (Del. Super. July 10, 2019). 
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(16)  In the third Superior Court decision complained of, dated January 27, 
2022, the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of DNREC for 
damages in the amount of $105,464.87.36  The Court determined that the costs 
alleged by the Secretary were remedial costs incurred under the HSCA, and that the 
Booths failed to present adequate evidence to contradict the amounts of damages 
alleged.37 
 
(17)  The Booths argue that the Superior Court incorrectly held that remedial 
costs may include the Brownfield Grants, and that the Superior Court “disregarded 
that § 9109(h) required the Secretary to establish causation of damages to recover 
the amounts sought.”38  The Secretary asserts in response that Brownfield Grants are 
considered to be remedial costs incurred and thus should be recoverable from a 
potentially responsible party under the HSCA.39 
 
(18)  The HSCA provides for strict liability40 for “[a]ny person who owned or 
operated the facility at any time”41 “for all costs associated with a release from a 
facility and for all natural resource damages resulting from the release.”42  
Furthermore, the HSCA provides for remedies:  “[t]he Secretary may bring an action 
 
36 Garvin v. Booth, 2022 WL 247696, at *11 (Del. Super. Jan. 27, 2022). 
37 Id. 
38 Opening Br. at 18 (emphasis omitted). 
39 Answering Br. at 18. 
40 7 Del. C. § 9105(b). 
41 7 Del. C. § 9105(a)(1). 
42 7 Del. C. § 9105(b). 
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in the Superior Court against any potentially responsible party to collect remedial 
costs incurred by the Secretary, or for a party’s refusal to comply, without sufficient 
cause, with an order issued under subsection (a) or (b) of this section.”43   
 
(19)  The Booths claim that DNREC may not recover from them the value of 
Brownfield Grants awarded pursuant to cleanup of the Site because they believe 
Brownfield Grants cannot be classified as remedial costs.44  However, the Superior 
Court has already concluded that the Booths are potentially responsible parties,45 a 
classification that subjects them to suit for remedial costs under the HSCA.46 
 
(20)  The regulations explain the term “remedial costs.”47  While it is true, as 
the Booths assert, that the explanation in the regulations as to how remedial costs 
are to be calculated does not include a mention of Brownfield Grants,48 this does not 
automatically mean that Brownfield Grants cannot be considered remedial costs.  
The regulations do not give an indication that Brownfield Grants warrant a different 
sort of treatment than other types of costs. 
 
(21)  Furthermore, the omission of the term “Brownfield Grants” from this 
section of the regulations does not override the unambiguous language of the HSCA 
that clearly calls for the inclusion of “all costs associated with a release from a 
 
43 7 Del. C. § 9109(e). 
44 Opening Br. at 23. 
45 Garvin v. Booth, 2019 WL 3017419, at *2 (Del. Super. July 10, 2019). 
46 7 Del. C. § 9109(e). 
47 See 7 Del. Admin. C. § 1375-5.2.2. 
48 Opening Br. at 21; see 7 Del. Admin C. § 1375-5.2.2. 
13 
 
facility and for all natural resource damages resulting from the release”49 for which 
the Booths are strictly liable.  Furthermore, the HSCA provides that: 
The Secretary may recover the amount of public funding 
provided under this section from a potentially responsible 
party who has not entered into a settlement agreement 
under this section or fulfilled all obligations under the 
agreement.  For purposes of cost recovery, the public 
funding shall be considered as remedial costs paid by the 
Secretary.50 
 
This language indicates that a Brownfield Grant would be within DNREC’s 
recoverable remedial costs, since the Brownfield Grants were public funding that 
was provided through payment to a contractor for the purpose of cleaning up the Site 
under a Brownfield Agreement with RWC. 
 
(22)  The Booths argue that the Superior Court’s analysis started with the 
conclusion that Brownfield Grants are remedial costs, and “then reverse engineered 
a definition of ‘remedial costs’” from that point.51  The Booths insist that this 
“reverse engineer[ing]” occurred when the Superior Court interpreted the phrase 
“remedial costs incurred” rather than the term “remedial costs.”52  This argument is 
without merit.  The Booths fail to demonstrate how the inclusion or exclusion of the 
term “incur” has bearing on the meaning of the phrase with regards to whether 
Brownfield Grants are included within the definition of remedial costs. 
 
49 7 Del. C. § 9105(b). 
50 7 Del. C. § 9107(d). 
51 Opening Br. at 20. 
52 Id. at 19-20. 
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(23)  Finally, because the Booths are strictly liable under the HSCA for the 
remedial costs, the Secretary need not prove causation in order to recover remedial 
costs from them.  Furthermore, the Booths’ characterization of the Secretary’s claim 
as only pertaining to failure to comply is incorrect.  The Superior Court below found 
that the Secretary has two claims under 7 Del C. § 9109(e):  “one for failure to 
comply with an Order that required the Booths to pay planning and study costs; and 
. . . a second claim permitting DNREC to independently collect the same remedial 
costs in a Superior Court action.”53  It is clear that DNREC can recover remedial 
costs without proving that the costs were incurred because of the Booths’ failure to 
comply with the Secretary’s Order.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS THE ORDER of the Court that the judgment of 
the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
53 Garvin v. Booth, 2022 WL 247696, at *4 (Del. Super. Jan. 27, 2022).