Case Title: MONROE v HARPER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12498 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 WILLIAM J. M O N R O E , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - JACK R. HARPER, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable P e t e r G. Meloy , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Scanlon, Brolin and Connors, Anaconda, Montana Jack M. Scanlon argued, Anaconda, Montana Louis F o r s e l l argued For Respondent : Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana Ronald Waterman argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: January 14, 1974 Decided : f%@ - 1 Filed : F E ~ - I 1 ~ 4 . M r . Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an action for damages arising from a claim of medical malpractice. The d i s t r i c t court of Lewis and Clark County, Hon. Peter G. Meloy, d i s t r i c t judge, granted defendant's motion t o dismiss the complaint. From the d i s t r i c t court's judgment of dismissal and refusal t o grant a motion t o vacate the same, plaintiff appeals. On July 30, 1963, plaintiff William J. Monroe suffered in- juries t o h i s back a s a r e s u l t of an accident while he was em- ployed by the Boland Development Company of Butte, Montana, as a contract miner i n the Kelly shaft. H e placed himself under the care of D r . Jack R. Harper, defendant herein, the following November. Following an examination i n November 1963, defendant advised p l a i n t i f f that he needed surgery on two ruptured discs i n the lower spinal area and that i f plaintiff submitted t o an II anterior spinal fusion" with installation of a spinal clamp he would be able t o return t o work within s i x months. On Dec- ember 30, 1963, defendant performed an anterior lumbar spinal fusion between p l a i n t i f f ' s L-5 vertebra and the sacrum by means of attaching t o the 5th lumbar vertebra and sacrum a device known as a T-Humphrey clamp plate. In h i s complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant: (1) Was negligent i n his care and treatment of plaintiff i n that he failed to possess and exercise that degree of s k i l l ordinarily possessed by reputable members of his profession; (2) Was negligent i n f a i l i n g t o obtain p l a i n t i f f ' s fully informed consent t o the operation; (3) Was negligent i n failing t o consult with more qualified physicians; and (4) Fraudulently concealed from p l a i n t i f f that the T-Humphrey clamp plate was an experimental device, and that plaintiff believed and relied upon statements made by defendant t o the contrary. P l a i n t i f f further alleged t h a t defendant knew and concealed from p l a i n t i f f h i s "true condition" and p l a i n t i f f did not dis- 11 cover t h e fraud" u n t i l he read a newspaper account i n May 1972, of another s u i t brought against defendant by one Ivar Stenberg. It was a t t h i s time t h a t p l a i n t i f f learned t h e operation per- formed was unique, unorthodox and experimental and t h a t the I I T-Humphrey Clamp Plate was an experimental device. 1 I P l a i n t i f f f i l e d t h i s action i n d i s t r i c t court on January 22, 1973, t o recover damages r e s u l t i n g from the alleged professional negligence of defendant. P l a i n t i f f alleged t h a t a s a "~roximate r e s u l t " of defendant's negligence he was t o t a l l y disabled from July 30, 1963, the date of the mine accident, u n t i l December 1, 1969; and t h a t he i s now permanently p a r t i a l l y disabled. The d i s t r i c t court granted defendant's motion t o dismiss and denied p l a i n t i f f ' s motion t o vacate such dismissal. Although the grounds were n o t s t a t e d , both p a r t i e s concede t h e c o u r t ' s action w a s based on t h e bar of the three year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a - tions. P l a i n t i f f appeals from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s judgment of dismissal and r e f u s a l t o vacate the same. The only issue i s whether the action i s barred by t h e three year s t a t u t e of limitations i n section 93-2605, R.C.M. 1947, which requires commencement within three years of: "3. A n action upon an obligation o r l i a b i l i t y , not founded upon an instrument i n writing, other than a contract, account o r promise. 1 I P l a i n t i f f contends the three year s t a t u t e of limitations should begin t o run from the date p l a i n t i f f discovered the "fraud", t h a t i s , l4ay 1972; the date he read a newspaper account of an- other s u i t brought against defendant r e l a t i n g t o a s i m i l a r type of operation. Defendant, on the other hand, contends the three year s t a t u t e of limitations should begin t o run from t h e date of the alleged negligence, t h a t i s , December 1963, t h e d a t e of the operation. p l a i n t i f f ' s argument i s that the s t a t u t e was suspended by reason of fraudulent concealment. H e contends the doctrine of fraudulent concealment i s recognized i n Montana. Carlson v. Ray Geophysical Div., 156 Mont. 450, 481 P.2d 327. Further, that fraudulent concealment i s present i n t h i s case by reason of defendant's failure t o disclose t o plaintiff that the operation was unique, unorthodox, and experimental. H e argues that the complaint on i t s face does not show whether the s t a t u t e of l i m i - tations had run and, therefore, he should be allowed t o prove the exception of fraudulent concealment t o the running of the statute. W e accept p l a i n t i f f ' s general contention that i n certain mal- practice actions the limitation period begins to run when the patient discovers, or by the use of reasonable diligence could have discovered, h i s injury. Johnson v. St. patrick's Hosp., 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469; Grey v. Silver B o w County, 149 Mont. 213, 425 P.2d 819. But, the doctrine of "discovery" or "fraudu- lent concealment" i s not applicable i n the instant case. Statutes of limitation are regarded a s statutes of repose governing the period within which actions must be brought and a r e designed t o compel the exercise of a r i g h t of action within a reasonable t i m e , while the evidence remains fresh i n the memory of the witnesses. They also serve the purpose of suppressing s t a l e or fraudulent claims. Anaconda Min. Co. v. Saile, 16 Mont. 8, 39 B. 909; Billings v, Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Ida. 485, 389 P.2d 224; 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions, $ 16. However, i n a t o r t action based upon malpractice, the applica- tion of the general r u l e becomes d i f f i c u l t where the injured person i s prevented from knowing of h i s injury due t o concealment of facts by the treating physician, o r where, by i t s very nature, it i s d i f f i c u l t t o discover the injury u n t i l a l a t e r date. In such cases most courts give recognition t o certain implied excep- tions which t o l l the running of the statute when it can be shown that fraud has been perpetrated upon the injured party sufficient t o place him i n ignorance of h i s r i g h t t o a cause of action o r to prevent him from discovering his injury. Buck v . Mouradian, (~1a.App. 1958), 1 0 0 S.2d 70. The purpose is to promote equity and justice of the individual case by preventing a party from asserting his rights under a general technical rule of law when he has so conducted himself that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to avail himself of his legal defense. Lakeman v, La France, 102 N . H . 300, 156 A.2d 123. Although not applicable here, the Montana legislature in 1971 saw fit to adopt by statute this exception to the general rule; where such failure to disclose is known or through the use of reasonable diligence subsequent to said negligent act would have been known to the medical practitioner. Section 93-2624, R.C.M. 1947. The doctrines of "discovery1' and "fraudulent concealment" are most commonly applied to fact situations &ere a foreign object is negligently left in the patient's body during the course of the operation and it is not until a later date that the foreign object is discovered. Ruth v . Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660, 453 P.2d 631, They also have been applied to actions as to the wrongful removal of organs or negligent diagnosis or where subsequent infections caused by improper sterilization were not discovered until a later date. Janisch v. Mullins, 1 Wash.App. 393, 461 P.2d 895; Anno. 80 ALR2d 368. In these cases the plaintiff alleged that a past negligent act was fraudulently concealed or a subsequent injury occurred which could not have been discovered by the patient through reasonable diligence at the time the act took place. To toll the statute of limitations the fraud must be of such a character as to prevent inquiry, elude investigation, or to mislead the party who claims the cause of action. Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 138 N.E.2d 891. There first must be injury and then concealment. It is the cause of action which must be fraudulently concealed by failing to disclose the fact of injury from mal- practice, by diverting the patient from discovering the malpractice that i s the basis of the action. Eschenbacher v. Hier, 363 Mich. 676, 110 N.W.2d 731. Fraudulent concealment has been described a s the employment of a r t i f i c e , planned t o prevent inquiry o r escape investigation, and mislead or hinder acquisition of in- formation disclosing a right of action. Draws v. Levin, 332 Mich. 447, 52 N.W.2d 180. From the face of p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint it i s apparent the doctrine of fraudulent concealment i s not applicable t o the instant case. In effect, plaintiff i s really alleging that the operation was performed without h i s informed consent. The complaint alleges that defendant did not make a f u l l disclosure of the "experimental naturett of the operation t o be performed. This i s not the typical fact situation i n which the doctrine i s applied where the defendant-physician informed the patient that he would operate i n one manner, yet selected another method of procedure and failed t o inform the patient of the change. Nor i s t h i s a situation where the physician fraudulently conceals a past negligent a c t i n order t o prevent inquiry or hinder acqui- s i t i o n of information disclosing the f a c t of injury or a right of action. I n h i s complaint p l a i n t i f f admits knowledge of the type of operation t o be performed. It i s conceded that p l a i n t i f f was aware that defendant intended t o perform an anterior fusion with a clamp plate t o be inserted i n h i s back. Plaintiff was informed i n d e t a i l of the operation procedure t o be performed and admits he consented t o that operation. In addition t o p l a i n t i f f ' s failure t o prove fraudulent con- cealment, it appears that he was not reasonably diligent i n h i s discovery of the alleged negligent act. Plaintiff admits by way of allegation that defendant assured him he would be able t o return t o work within s i x months of the operation. Yet, for s i x years a f t e r the operation plaintiff admits t o being t o t a l l y dis- abled and permanently partially disabled since then. H e had notice, by the continuing disability, that the operation had not succeeded, a s expected. H i s condition should have provided him with notice of failure and should have put on inquiry t o ascer- t a i n why the failure had occurred. However, plaintiff did not inquire, rather he slept on and ignored t h i s notice. Eight years elapsed between the t i m e plaintiff was assured recovery and the f i l i n g of his claim. H i s allegation that he was damaged comes too l a t e . It i s now barred by the statute of limitations. Section 93-2605, R.C.M. 1947. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. Justice