Case Title: The Protestant Episcopal Church v. Truro Church

Citation: 

Docket Number: 090682

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, and Millette, JJ., 
and Lacy, S.J. 
 
THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH 
IN THE DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 090682 
 
 
TRURO CHURCH, ET AL. 
OPINION BY 
 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH 
June 10, 2010 
 
v.  Record No.  090683 
 
TRURO CHURCH, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Randy I. Bellows, Judge 
 
 
These appeals arise from a dispute concerning church 
property between a hierarchical church and one of its dioceses 
in Virginia and a number of the diocese’s constituent 
congregations.  The principal issue we must decide is whether 
under the specific facts of these cases Code § 57-9(A) 
authorized the congregations to file petitions in the 
appropriate circuit courts for entry of orders permitting them 
to continue to occupy and control real property held in trust 
for the congregations after voting to disaffiliate from the 
church and affiliate with another polity.1 
                       
1 When used in reference to religious entities, the term 
“polity” refers to the internal structural governance of the 
denomination.  See, e.g., Note, Judicial Intervention in 
BACKGROUND 
While the consolidated record in these cases is 
voluminous, we need recite only those facts necessary to our 
resolution of the dispositive issue of whether the circuit 
court correctly ruled that Code § 57-9(A) is applicable to the 
specific facts in these cases.2  See, e.g., Asplundh Tree 
Expert Co. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 269 Va. 399, 402, 
611 S.E.2d 531, 532 (2005).  Because the resolution of these 
appeals requires us to construe the language of Code § 57-
9(A), we will set out that language here so that the 
relationship of the recited facts to the issues to be resolved 
will be clear:3 
If a division has heretofore occurred or shall 
hereafter occur in a church or religious society, to 
which any such congregation whose property is held 
by trustees is attached, the members of such 
                                                                      
Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 1142, 
1143-44 (1962). 
2 An extended period of discovery, a six-day ore tenus 
hearing with witnesses, and many subsidiary hearings before 
the circuit court generated a manuscript record of over 8000 
pages, many thousands of transcript pages of testimony and 
argument, and copious exhibits. 
3 The original statute addressing how property rights are 
to be determined upon a division within a church or religious 
society was adopted by the General Assembly in 1867.  1866-67 
Acts ch. 210.  Although the statute has been reenacted and 
amended several times during the past 150 years, the most 
significant change being to create separate subsections for 
its application to hierarchical and congregational churches, 
2005 Acts ch. 772, the operative language of the statute 
construed by the circuit court, and which is the focus of our 
discussion in these appeals, has remained unchanged. 
 
2
congregation over 18 years of age may, by a vote of 
a majority of the whole number, determine to which 
branch of the church or society such congregation 
shall thereafter belong.  Such determination shall 
be reported to the circuit court of the county or 
city, wherein the property held in trust for such 
congregation or the greater part thereof is; and if 
the determination be approved by the court, it shall 
be so entered in the court’s civil order book, and 
shall be conclusive as to the title to and control 
of any property held in trust for such congregation, 
and be respected and enforced accordingly in all of 
the courts of the Commonwealth. 
 
The Ecclesiastical Relationships Among the Parties 
We have previously held that Code § 57-9(A) applies to 
congregations of “hierarchical churches,” that is “churches, 
such as Episcopal and Presbyterian churches, that are subject 
to control by super-congregational bodies.”4  Baber v. 
Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 698, 152 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1967).  The 
dispute that resulted in the litigation from which these 
appeals arise involves a complex interplay between various 
entities within a faith community that has local, national, 
and international ties.  It is not disputed that the entities 
involved in this litigation are part of a hierarchical church, 
although the parties differ on which entities compose that 
                       
4 Code § 57-9(B) authorizes a circuit court to approve a 
vote concerning the use and control of property held in trust 
for the benefit of an autonomous congregation not affiliated 
with a hierarchical church.  The parties stipulated in the 
circuit court that the petitioning congregations were “not, in 
their organizations and governments, entirely independent of 
 
3
church.  In order to better understand the context in which 
the dispute arose, we will first identify the entities 
involved and their relationship to one another.   
The Anglican Communion is an international body that 
consists of 38 “provinces,” which are “regional and national 
churches that share a common history of their understanding of 
the Church catholic through the See of Canterbury” in England.  
The Archbishop of Canterbury is the head of the Church of 
England, one of the national churches within the Anglican 
Communion, and is considered the “chief pastor,” “first among 
equals in the wider Anglican Communion,” and the “focus of the 
unity” within the leadership in the Anglican Communion.   
The Anglican Communion functions through three 
“instruments of unity”:  the decennial Lambeth Conference; the 
Anglican Consultative Council, which meets every two or three 
years; and the biennial Primates’ Meeting.  The Lambeth 
Conference is the oldest of these institutions, dating from 
1867.  Participation in the Lambeth Conference is by 
“invitation only” from the Archbishop of Canterbury, with 
invitations being directed to individual church bishops and 
other leaders among the clergy, not to regional or national 
churches as a unit.  Although the Lambeth Conference issues 
                                                                      
any other church or general society” and, thus, Code § 57-9(B) 
 
4
resolutions and reports, these are not binding on the regional 
and national churches.  Rather, the function of the Lambeth 
Conference and the other international activities of the 
Anglican Communion are “primarily consultative.”  Thus, any 
action within the Anglican Communion has efficacy within a 
regional or national church only if the church adopts the 
resolution or report through its own polity structure for the 
governance of that church. 
The Episcopal Church (“TEC”) is a province of the 
Anglican Communion and the principal national church following 
the Anglican tradition within the United States.5  TEC consists 
of 111 geographical dioceses with over 7000 congregations and 
over 2 million members.  The highest governing body of TEC is 
the triennial General Convention, which adopts TEC’s 
constitution and canons to which the dioceses must give an 
“unqualified accession.”  Each diocese in turn is governed by 
a Bishop and Annual Council that adopts the constitution and 
canons for the diocese.  Each congregation within a diocese in 
turn is bound by the national and diocesan constitutions and 
                                                                      
would not apply to the facts of these cases. 
5 TEC is also known by the longer form “The Protestant 
Episcopal Church in the United States of America,” and was 
identified as such, and by the acronym “ECUSA,” in the circuit 
court.  We have adopted the form used in the style of the 
appeal brought by TEC and by the parties in briefing both 
appeals. 
 
5
canons.  The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of 
Virginia (“the Diocese”) is one of the dioceses within TEC.6 
Priests of TEC are “canonically resident” within a 
specific diocese and may not function as priests in any other 
diocese of TEC without the permission of the local bishop.  
Similarly, a priest ordained by a diocese of TEC may not 
function as a priest for one of the other regional or national 
churches that participate in the Anglican Communion without 
permission from the local authority of that church. 
At the 2003 General Convention of TEC, three major points 
of controversy arose:  the Convention’s confirmation of the 
election of Gene Robinson, a homosexual priest, as a bishop of 
one of the dioceses of TEC; the adoption of a resolution 
permitting the blessing of same-sex unions; and the rejection 
of a resolution concerning the “historic formularies of the 
Christian faith.”  Following the 2003 General Convention, 
Peter James Lee, the bishop of the Diocese, who had supported 
the confirmation of Robinson as a bishop, received “hundreds 
of letters” opposing these actions taken by the General 
Convention.  Additionally, several congregations opposed to 
the actions of the General Convention stopped paying pledges 
                       
6 There are three dioceses affiliated with TEC in 
Virginia.  The “Diocese of Virginia” consists of 38 counties 
in the northern and central parts of the Commonwealth. 
 
6
owed to the Diocese and TEC, placing the funds in escrow.  As 
a result, Bishop Lee became concerned that the dissident 
congregations would “attempt to create a parallel province.” 
In response to the discord within the Diocese, in 2004 a 
“Reconciliation Commission” was formed “to find ways to bring 
about some peaceful conflict resolution.”  Despite this 
effort, dissent concerning the actions of the 2003 General 
Convention continued, and in 2005 Bishop Lee created a new 
commission “to give attention to this rising threat of 
division in the Diocese.”  The following year, the commission 
promulgated a “Protocol for Departing Congregations.”  Under 
this protocol, the Diocese initiated procedures for 
congregations to conduct votes “regarding possible departure 
from the Diocese,” and several congregations initiated 
procedures under the protocol to separate from the Diocese.  
However, Bishop Lee subsequently advised leaders of the 
dissident congregations that due to a change in leadership in 
TEC, separation of congregations had become a matter of 
concern to the national church, and that a vote to separate 
would not be binding on the Diocese or TEC. 
Nonetheless, between December 2006 and November 2007, 15 
congregations voted to separate from the Diocese.  As a 
result, 22 members of the clergy associated with these 
congregations were deposed, or removed, from their pastoral 
 
7
duties in the Diocese by Bishop Lee.  Congregations in other 
dioceses of TEC also took similar action to separate from 
their dioceses over the controversies arising from the 2003 
General Convention.  These congregations, as well as newly 
formed congregations of former members of TEC, began seeking 
to affiliate with other polities within the Anglican Communion 
in order “to be a part of the worldwide church.” 
The Church of Nigeria is a province of the Anglican 
Communion and governs the Anglican churches in the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, a former British colony.  In 2005, the 
Convocation of Anglican Nigerians in America was established 
as a mission of the Church of Nigeria to provide oversight for 
expatriate Nigerian congregations in the United States.  In 
2006, the Church of Nigeria changed the name of this mission 
to the Convocation of Anglicans in North America (“CANA”) and 
began accepting former TEC congregations.  In 2006, the 
Anglican District of Virginia (“ADV”) was formed as a district 
of CANA.  By 2007, CANA included 60 congregations in eighteen 
states and 12,000 members, of which 10,000 were in 
congregations previously affiliated with dioceses of TEC.  
This action was viewed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the 
leadership of TEC as an improper “incursion” of one member of 
the Anglican Communion on the territory of another member. 
 
8
The leadership of TEC actively opposed the decision of 
the Nigerian Primate, Archbishop Peter J. Akinola, to install 
Rev. Martyn Minns, the Rector of one of the dissident 
congregations in the Diocese, as the bishop of CANA.  In part 
because of this conflict, Archbishop Akinola made a 
declaration of “broken communion” with TEC.  Although 
Archbishop Akinola installed Minns as the Bishop of CANA, 
Minns was not placed on the “invitation list” for the Lambeth 
Conference. 
Procedural History 
These appeals arise from petitions filed between December 
2006 and July 2007 pursuant to Code § 57-9(A) by nine 
congregations formerly affiliated with the Diocese which now 
purport to be congregations within ADV and CANA (“the CANA 
Congregations”).7   The petitions were originally filed in the 
five circuit courts “wherein the property held in trust for 
[each] congregation or the greater part thereof” is located.  
Each congregation averred in its petition that a “division has 
                       
7 The nine congregations are The Church at the Falls – The 
Falls Church, in Arlington County; Truro Church, Church of the 
Apostles, and Church of the Epiphany, Herndon, in Fairfax 
County; St. Margaret’s Church, Woodbridge, St. Paul’s Church, 
Haymarket, and Church of the Word, Gainesville, in Prince 
William County; Church of Our Saviour at Oatlands, in Loudoun 
County; and St. Stephen’s Church, Heathsville, in 
Northumberland County. 
 
 
9
occurred at the international, national, and local levels” 
that “resulted from a profound theological break by TEC and 
the Diocese from the majority of the other provinces of the 
Anglican Communion.”  The congregations alleged that as a 
result of this division, they had “determined to disaffiliate 
from TEC and the Diocese and to reaffiliate with another 
branch of the Anglican Communion.”  Although the petitions did 
not expressly identify the “branch” with which the 
congregations proposed to affiliate, exhibits attached to the 
petitions identify it as the ADV as a constituent part of 
CANA, acknowledging that CANA is a part of the Church of 
Nigeria. 
The Diocese and TEC intervened in these cases to oppose 
the granting of the petitions and also filed declaratory 
judgment actions against the CANA Congregations, seeking a 
determination of trust, proprietary, and contract rights, if 
any, that the Diocese and TEC had in the properties used by 
the CANA Congregations which were the subject of the Code 
§ 57-9(A) petitions.8  The CANA Congregations filed answers to 
                       
8 TEC filed a single complaint for declaratory judgment 
against the CANA Congregations along with two others, Christ 
the Redeemer Church and Potomac Falls Church; the Diocese 
filed individual complaints for declaratory judgment against 
the CANA Congregations and the two others.  The congregations 
of Christ the Redeemer Church and Potomac Falls Church are not 
parties to these appeals. 
 
10
the declaratory judgment actions as well as counterclaims 
seeking declaratory judgment in favor of the congregations, to 
which the Diocese and TEC filed answers.  A three-judge panel 
appointed by this Court under the Multiple Claimant Litigation 
Act, Code §§ 8.01-267.1, et seq., consolidated all these cases 
in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. 
Both TEC and the Diocese challenged the legitimacy of the 
CANA Congregations’ petitions on multiple grounds.  Their 
threshold position, and the issue that is ultimately 
dispositive in these appeals, was that relief under Code § 57-
9(A) is not available to the CANA Congregations because there 
has been no “division” within TEC or the Diocese and that, 
even if there had been, neither CANA nor the ADV is a “branch 
of the church” resulting from that division to which the 
congregations could, as contemplated by the statute, attach 
themselves.  The circuit court held a six-day evidentiary 
hearing to determine the scope and application of Code § 57-
9(A) and, specifically under the facts of these cases, whether 
the statute would authorize the court to grant the requested 
relief to the petitioning congregations. 
During this hearing, the CANA Congregations, TEC, and the 
Diocese presented extensive expert testimony regarding the 
enactment of Code § 57-9(A) and the history of divisions in 
religious denominations in Virginia.  The CANA Congregations’ 
 
11
experts testified that TEC had experienced a “division” 
because various congregations had separated from TEC in order 
to join a separate polity.  In contrast, TEC’s and the 
Diocese’s experts testified that TEC could not divide without 
action by the General Convention, and therefore TEC had not 
experienced a “division” as a result of the underlying 
ecclesiastical differences.  The experts also gave conflicting 
testimony as to whether the statutory terms “branch,” 
“attached,” and “church or religious society” were met by the 
situation presented.  We will recount more fully the arguments 
of the parties and the evidence of the expert witnesses on 
these points subsequently in this opinion. 
In a letter opinion dated April 3, 2008, the circuit 
court opined that the CANA Congregations had properly invoked 
Code § 57-9(A).  The circuit court found the Diocese, TEC, and 
the Anglican Communion were all “church[es] or religious 
societ[ies],” and that CANA, the ADV, the Church of Nigeria, 
TEC, and the Diocese were all “branches” of the Anglican 
Communion for purposes of applying Code § 57-9(A).  Likewise, 
the court reasoned that CANA and the ADV were also “branches” 
of TEC and the Diocese.  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
the CANA Congregations were entitled to file petitions under 
Code § 57-9(A) in order to have the court determine “the title 
 
12
to and control of any property held in trust” for the benefit 
of those congregations. 
Following these rulings, the circuit court conducted 
further proceedings addressing constitutional challenges to 
Code § 57-9(A) raised by TEC and the Diocese under the 
establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and the equivalent 
provisions of the Virginia Constitution, as well as arguments 
concerning whether the statute violates principles of 
constitutional due process and the contracts clause.  During 
this stage of the proceedings, the Commonwealth intervened for 
the purpose of defending the constitutionality of the statute. 
On June 27, 2008, the circuit court issued a further 
letter opinion in which it upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute.  Following additional proceedings, the court 
ultimately issued a final judgment on January 8, 2009 granting 
the CANA Congregations’ petitions and dismissing TEC’s and the 
Diocese’s declaratory judgment actions as moot.9  By orders 
                       
9 The circuit court ruled that an endowment fund related 
to one of the CANA Congregations was held in corporate form 
and, thus, a determination of its ownership and control could 
not be decided under Code § 57-9(A).  Accordingly, it ordered 
the resolution of the declaratory judgment actions with regard 
to the fund to be severed from the proceedings.  This ruling 
has not been challenged by the effected congregation in these 
appeals.  As relevant to the Diocese’s appeal only, the court 
also determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a 
 
13
dated November 9, 2009, we awarded appeals from this judgment 
to TEC and the Diocese. 
DISCUSSION 
Although the assignments of error in TEC’s appeal and 
that of the Diocese are not entirely concordant, the two 
appeals broadly address the same principal themes in 
challenging the judgment of the circuit court with respect to 
its finding that Code § 57-9(A) is applicable to the facts in 
these cases and is not violative of the various constitutional 
principles argued below.  Consistent with the analytical 
approach taken in the circuit court, we will first decide 
whether Code § 57-9(A) is applicable in these cases, only 
reaching the questions concerning the statute’s 
constitutionality if necessary.  Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 
269 Va. 546, 557, 611 S.E.2d 366, 372 (2005). 
The circuit court’s rulings with respect to the 
applicability of Code § 57-9(A) are addressed in TEC’s first 
three assignments of error: 
1.  The circuit court erred in interpreting and 
applying the term “division” in Va. Code § 57-9(A) 
and the statute itself to supersede the Episcopal 
Church’s polity, because its interpretation ignores 
and conflicts with related Virginia statutory case 
law, the principle of Constitutional avoidance, and 
the statute’s past application.  
                                                                      
challenge to deeds transferring property to one of the CANA 
Congregations from another congregation of the Diocese. 
 
14
2.  The circuit court erred in holding that CANA and 
the ADV are “branches” of the Episcopal Church or 
the Diocese of Virginia (the “Diocese”) for purposes 
of § 57-9(A), because CANA and the ADV were formed 
by the Church of Nigeria, and because the court’s 
holding impermissibly rested on its own finding of 
“communion.”  
3.  The circuit court erred in holding that the 
Anglican Communion satisfied § 57-9(A), because the 
Anglican Communion has not “divided,” even under the 
court’s definition of the term, and also is not a 
“church or religious society” to which the 
congregations were “attached.” 
 
The Diocese addresses the same issues within its third 
assignment of error: 
The Circuit Court erred as a matter of law by 
holding that the requirements of Va. Code § 57-9(A) 
were satisfied in these cases.  That holding was 
error because the court adopted erroneous and 
entangling definitions of the statutory terms 
“division,” “branch,” and “attached,” leading the 
court to err by holding that a “division” has 
occurred in the Anglican Communion, the Episcopal 
Church (the “Church” or “TEC”), and the Diocese of 
Virginia (the “Diocese”); that all relevant entities 
were “branches” of and “attached” to the Anglican 
Communion; and that the Convocation of Anglicans in 
North American [sic] (“CANA”) and Anglican District 
of Virginia (“ADV”) are “branches” of the Church and 
the Diocese. 
 
While the issues raised by these assignments of error 
deal primarily with questions of statutory construction which 
are reviewed de novo, Smit v. Shippers’ Choice of Va., Inc., 
277 Va. 593, 597, 674 S.E.2d 842, 844 (2009), to the extent 
that we must also review the circuit court’s application of a 
statute, we accord deference to the court’s determinations of 
fact.  Virginia Baptist Homes, Inc. v. Botetourt County, 276 
 
15
Va. 656, 663, 668 S.E.2d 119, 122 (2008).  Accordingly, we 
will first consider de novo the meaning of the relevant terms 
in Code § 57-9(A), and then apply our construction of those 
terms to the circuit court’s findings of fact to the extent 
that they remain applicable. 
The circuit court’s analysis of the applicability of Code 
§ 57-9(A) focused on the meanings of the specific words 
“division,” “church or religious society,” “attached,” and 
“branch” within the statute.  The court considered each 
separately and ultimately concluded that, as they were not 
otherwise defined within the statute or elsewhere in the Code, 
each of these words was to be given its plain and ordinary 
meaning, taking into account the historical context of the 
enactment of the original predecessor statute.  While the use 
of “plain and ordinary meaning” is, of course, a fundamental 
rule of statutory construction to be applied where a word or 
phrase is not otherwise defined by the Code, the rule also 
requires that the courts should be guided by “ ‘the context in 
which [the word or phrase] is used.’ ”  Sansom v. Board of 
Supervisors, 257 Va. 589, 595, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999) 
(quoting Department of Taxation v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm 
Serv., 220 Va. 655, 658, 261 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1980)). 
When considered in the overall context of the statute, a 
proper construction of the language of Code § 57-9(A) must 
 
16
take into account the interrelationship of the words being 
considered.  Thus, in order to determine whether a 
congregation is entitled to petition for the relief afforded 
by Code § 57-9(A), as a prerequisite the congregation must 
show that there has been a “division . . . in a church or 
religious society[] to which any such congregation . . . is 
attached.”  Likewise, the authority afforded by the statute 
permitting such congregations to vote in order to determine 
“to which branch of the church or society such congregation 
shall thereafter belong” must be construed within the context 
of the first phrase of the statute.  That is, the “branch of 
the church or society” to which the congregation votes to 
belong must be a branch of the “church or religious society[] 
to which [the petitioning congregation] is attached” prior to 
the “division.”  Accordingly, we will construe the language of 
these two phrases together in this related context. 
Initially, we note that the parties to this litigation do 
not dispute that TEC and the Diocese are each a “church” as 
contemplated by the phrase “church or religious society” 
contained in Code § 57-9(A).  The circuit court correctly 
found that such was true when applying the plain meaning of 
these terms.  The circuit court also found that “it need not 
reach the question as to whether the Anglican Communion is in 
fact a ‘church’ under Code § 57-9(A), because there is 
 
17
abundant evidence in the record . . . that the Anglican 
Communion is, at the very least, a ‘religious society.’ ” 
The clear purpose of Code § 57-9(A) is to provide a 
method by which the disputed title to and control of any 
property held in trust for a congregation may be conclusively 
determined.  The “church or religious society” referenced in 
the statute in which a “division” has occurred contemplates 
one that has an interest in the property for which the title 
and control is at issue.  TEC and the Diocese have asserted an 
interest in the property at issue in this litigation.  No such 
assertion is made by the Anglican Communion.  However, for 
purposes of our analysis in these appeals, we need not decide 
whether the Anglican Communion is a church or religious 
society as contemplated by Code § 57-9(A) because the evidence 
in the record does not establish that there has been a 
“division” in the Anglican Communion.  While undoubtedly there 
was theological disagreement between TEC and the Diocese and 
CANA, the ADV, the dissenting congregations and the Church of 
Nigeria concerning the actions of the 2003 General Convention 
of TEC, all of these entities continue to admit a strong 
allegiance to the Anglican Communion.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the circuit court erred in its holding that 
there was a division in the Anglican Communion for purposes of 
the application of Code § 57-9(A) in these cases. 
 
18
It then follows that the focus of our analysis in these 
appeals is whether the dissenting congregations have 
established that there had been a “division” in TEC and the 
Diocese, churches to which the congregations were “attached,” 
and whether the congregations voted to belong to a “branch” of 
TEC and the Diocese.  We first address the issue of a division 
in TEC and the Diocese. 
As a prerequisite to a congregation being permitted to 
petition a circuit court to confirm the result of a vote to 
separate from a church to which it is attached as provided in 
Code § 57-9(A), the congregation must establish that there has 
been a “division” within that church.  Indeed, the circuit 
court expressed the view that in order to resolve the issue of 
whether Code § 57-9(A) applied to the CANA Congregations’ 
petitions it had to “address the question at the heart of this 
litigation:  Has a division occurred?”  Thus, much of the 
expert testimony presented by the parties was directed toward 
placing the concept of a “division” within a church into a 
historical context in an effort to establish the intention of 
the General Assembly when choosing this word in enacting the 
original predecessor statute to Code § 57-9 in 1867. 
Dr. Mark Valeri, an expert witness for the CANA 
Congregations, testified that the most commonly understood 
definition of “division,” as understood in the mid-19th 
 
19
century, both nationally and specifically in Virginia, is the 
“separation out of the group of members of a religious . . . 
denomination in sufficient numbers to begin to form an 
alternative polity and the renunciation of the authority of 
the original group in that process.”  Further, Dr. Valeri 
stated that typically when a group left the particular 
denomination, it was not an amicable split, nor was it “with 
the approval or consent of the higher ecclesiastical 
authorities.”  Dr. Valeri highlighted several historical 
examples of this type of “division,” agreeing that in these 
instances it was not the case that “the new group be 
acknowledged by the entity from which it divided in order to 
be viewed in common parlance as a branch.” 
The circuit court found that “[i]n sum, Dr. Valeri 
testified that the ‘average, ordinary Virginian in 1867’ would 
have understood ‘division’ to mean ‘the separation out of a 
group in rejection of the authority [of that group],’ and that 
‘it is that act of division which creates a branch.’  This 
understanding would ‘encompass situations in which the church 
or religious society’ did not ‘approve’ of the [‘]division,’ 
as well as situations in which the ‘new entity, the new 
polity, was not formally affiliated with the church and 
religious society from which it divided.’ ” 
 
20
Dr. Charles Irons, another expert for the CANA 
Congregations, testified that “the most common definition of 
division would be the fragmentation of one religious 
jurisdiction to create two or more jurisdictions.”  But there 
were “additional possible meanings of division” including 
“internal conflict or discord within a religious body. . . . 
Division could also be used to describe not the act of 
separation itself, but one of the resulting branches.”  Dr. 
Irons specifically noted that in reviewing prior cases 
involving petitions under the predecessor statutes to Code 
§ 57-9(A), it was never alleged that the division had been 
approved by “higher ecclesiastical authorities,” or that the 
filing of the petitions “had been approved by higher 
ecclesiastical authorities.” 
By contrast, Dr. Ian Douglas, an expert called for TEC 
and the Diocese, asserted that neither TEC nor a diocese of 
TEC could divide “without the action of [the] General 
Convention.”  Dr. Douglas further testified that “a 
congregation or a people can choose to leave a parish or leave 
the Episcopal Church,” but that such action would “not 
fundamentally constitute a division or a departure of a parish 
. . . from the wider Episcopal Church.” 
Dr. Douglas opined that “there can be no division without 
formal approval of the division by the highest adjudicators of 
 
21
the religious body involved.”  Dr. Douglas also testified that 
the term “division” as used in Code § 57-9(A) would not be 
applicable to the Anglican Communion because it was a “family 
of churches” with a shared historical relationship, but it was 
not an “intact whole” that would be subject to division. 
Dr. Robert Bruce Mullen also testified for TEC and the 
Diocese.  Dr. Mullen stated that in the context of 
hierarchical church structures “a division is usually 
understood as a formal separation of a larger religious body 
such that it looks markedly different after this has been 
done.  Such that we might say that one body becomes two. . . . 
[I]t [is] a much more formal category than just simply an 
informal separation.”  According to Dr. Mullen, in the 19th 
century there would have been a distinction made “between a 
division [in] a denomination as a whole and a mere departure 
o[r] separation from that denomination.”  
After reviewing the conflicting testimony of these 
experts in its April 3, 2008 letter opinion, the circuit court 
stated that it found “the testimony of the two CANA 
congregation experts – Dr. Valeri and Dr. Irons – to be more 
persuasive and convincing.”  The court reasoned that these two 
experts had based their opinion on “the particular and 
pertinent historical record relevant to the instant case,” 
 
22
while the opinions of the experts for TEC and the Diocese “did 
not appear to be so tethered.” 
The circuit court also reviewed the prior cases from this 
Court dealing with divisions within churches.  The court 
recognized that Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 152 S.E.2d 23 
(1967), and Reid v. Gholson, 229 Va. 179, 327 S.E.2d 107 
(1985), involved divisions within autonomous congregations, 
not hierarchical churches, but nonetheless found that the 
discussion of the division that occurred in each case to be 
instructive.  The court recognized that in Baber, “division” 
was described as “intra-congregational strife” and 
“dissension,” which the circuit court took as supporting Dr. 
Valeri’s contention “that a division need not be consensual or 
amicable.”  The court noted that in Reid this Court found that 
the requisite “division” had not occurred because the 
petitioners in that case “expressed no desire to separate from 
the body of their church, or to rend it into groups, each of 
which seeks to take over all the property and characterize the 
other as apostate, excommunicated, and outcast.”  229 Va. at 
192, 327 S.E.2d at 115.10  
                       
10 The circuit court also reviewed Brooke v. Shacklett, 54 
Va. (13 Gratt.) 301 (1856), a case decided prior to the 
enactment of the original predecessor statute to Code § 57-9, 
but found that it was “not helpful precedent” because the 
decision in that case was “premised on a ‘division’ whose 
 
23
The circuit court ultimately concluded that “the 
definition of ‘division’ as that term is used in [Code §] 57-
9(A) is in fact that assigned to it by the CANA Congregations, 
which is ‘[a] split . . . or rupture in a religious 
denomination that involve[s] the separation of a group of 
congregations, clergy, or members from the church, and the 
formation of an alternative polity that disaffiliating members 
could join.’”  The court further concluded that the more 
restrictive definition proposed by TEC and the Diocese 
requiring a formal approval of a division by the consent of 
the hierarchical church “would make [Code §] 57-9(A) a 
nullity.”  While agreeing with TEC and the Diocese “that 
division, under [Code §] 57-9(A), ought not be ‘easy,’” the 
court opined that the definition it had adopted placed an 
appropriate burden on a petitioning congregation to show 
“three major and coordinated occurrences.”  That is, a “split” 
                                                                      
existence was not in serious dispute.”  Similarly, the court 
concluded that Hoskinson v. Pusey, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 428 
(1879), did not establish, as the CANA Congregations 
contended, that the statute did not “require that a division 
be recognized or approved by a denomination,” finding that the 
absence of any express discussion of that issue beyond the 
fact that such was apparently the case in Hoskinson could mean 
that the “Court simply did not reach the issue.”  Likewise, 
the court found that Finley v. Brent, 87 Va. 103, 12 S.E. 228 
(1890), was decided “on other grounds” that did not require 
the Court to construe the meaning of division. 
 
24
or “rupture” resulting in a separation from the church and the 
formation of or attachment to an alternative polity. 
In addressing its first assignment of error, TEC contends 
that the circuit court erred in adopting this definition of 
division because it effectively would allow congregational 
majorities to “strip hierarchical churches of property rights 
in violation of denominational polity and rules.”  TEC 
contends that historically Code § 57-9(A) “was prompted by and 
has been applied only to divisions accomplished in conformity 
with denominational polity.”  Similarly, the Diocese contends 
within the argument of its third assignment of error that the 
“[c]ircuit [c]ourt’s interpretation treats the separation of a 
small minority that form or join an alternative polity as a 
‘division,’ ignoring the Church’s hierarchical polity and 
rules and vesting control solely in local majorities.”  TEC 
disputes that its proposed construction of the term would 
render the statute a nullity because even in divisions 
formally recognized by the church, the statute would still be 
necessary to permit congregations to choose between the old 
and the new polities created by the division.  We are not 
persuaded by these contentions. 
Inherent in the concept that a division must be 
recognized through a formal process within the church’s polity 
is that the courts would ultimately be drawn into an 
 
25
ecclesiastical dispute to determine whether a division as 
contemplated by Code § 57-9(A) had occurred.  Such a 
circumstance would risk entangling the courts in matters of 
religious governance, contrary to the well established 
principle that under the First Amendment “civil courts are not 
a constitutionally permissible forum for a review of 
ecclesiastical disputes.”  Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian 
Church, 262 Va. 604, 610, 553 S.E.2d 511, 514 (2001); see also 
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 
696, 710 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue 
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, (1969).  
While what is or is not an “ecclesiastical dispute” is often 
debatable, issues of religious governance are unquestionably 
outside the jurisdiction of the civil courts.  Reid, 229 Va. 
at 187, 327 S.E. 2d at 111-12.  The record of the present 
cases confirms that permitting the polity of the church to 
determine whether a division has occurred could potentially 
involve the court in disputes involving church governance. 
While it is certainly possible that a division within a 
hierarchical church could occur through an orderly process 
under the church’s polity, history and common sense suggest 
that such is rarely the case.  To the contrary, experience 
shows that a division within a formerly uniform body almost 
always arises from a disagreement between the leadership under 
 
26
the polity and a dissenting group.  The construction of 
division adopted by the circuit court does not, as TEC and the 
Diocese contend, “vest[] control solely in local majorities” 
to determine whether a division has occurred.  Indeed, it is 
clear that a majority vote by one or more congregations to 
separate from a hierarchical church under Code § 57-9(A) would 
not alone be sufficient to establish the fact of a division.  
To the contrary, we agree with the circuit court that the 
standard it adopted places a significant burden on the 
petitioning congregation to establish that the requisite 
“division” has occurred and that this “division” led to the 
vote to separate.  Moreover, in resolving the issue of whether 
a division has occurred under the standard adopted by the 
circuit court, there is no requirement that the court involve 
itself in questions of religious governance or doctrine.  
Rather, the court simply determines from the facts presented 
whether the division has occurred, without regard to the 
nature of the dispute, whether over doctrine or some other 
cause, which lead to the separation of the congregation and 
its attachment to a different polity. 
The evidence presented by the CANA Congregations clearly 
establishes that a split or rupture has occurred within the 
Diocese and, given the evidence of similar events in other 
dioceses of TEC, the split or rupture has occurred at the 
 
27
national level as well.  Likewise, there can be no question 
that as a result, members and congregations have separated 
from the Diocese and TEC and have aligned with different 
polities, formed in response to the dissension within the 
Diocese and TEC.  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court 
did not err in finding that a “division” had occurred in the 
Diocese and TEC within the meaning of Code § 57-9(A).   
The circuit court next found that the CANA Congregations 
were “attached” to the Diocese and TEC.  There was not, nor 
could there be, any serious dispute that, until the discord 
resulting from the 2003 General Convention, the CANA 
Congregations were “attached” both to TEC and the Diocese 
because they were required to conform to the constitution and 
canons of TEC and the Diocese.  Accordingly, we agree that for 
purposes of Code § 57-9(A), the CANA Congregations established 
that they were previously “attached” to TEC and the Diocese. 
We turn now to consider the circuit court’s finding that 
CANA and the ADV are “branches” of TEC and the Diocese for 
purposes of applying Code § 57-9(A).  For the reasons that 
follow, we hold that the circuit court’s finding was 
erroneous. 
In its second assignment of error, TEC contends that the 
circuit court’s definition of a “branch” as meaning “a 
division of a family descending from a particular ancestor” 
 
28
demonstrates that CANA is a branch of the Church of Nigeria, 
not of TEC.  Likewise the ADV, as a district of CANA, descends 
from the Church of Nigeria and CANA, not the Diocese or TEC.  
TEC contends that the historical connection between it and the 
Church of Nigeria through the Anglican Communion is not 
sufficient to establish that constituent parts of each church 
are “branches” of the other.  TEC further contends that the 
circuit court erred in giving particular significance to the 
fact that the majority of the congregations in the ADV and 
CANA were formerly affiliated with TEC and its dioceses.  We 
agree. 
When it was initially formed, CANA was a mission of the 
Church of Nigeria designed to minister to expatriate members 
of that church in North America.  The subsequent expanding of 
the mission to allow dissident congregations of TEC and the 
Diocese to affiliate with CANA, and the formation of the ADV, 
unquestionably occurred in response to the disputes that had 
occurred within TEC.  However, it is equally clear that the 
revision of CANA’s mission and the formation of the ADV did 
not occur as a result of the division within TEC and the 
Diocese.  Indeed, the dissenting congregations maintained that 
they had “determined to disaffiliate from TEC and the Diocese” 
in order to join CANA, a pre-existing polity within the Church 
of Nigeria.  Thus, while CANA is an “alternative polity” to 
 
29
which the congregations could and did attach themselves, we 
hold that, within the meaning of Code § 57-9(A), CANA is not a 
“branch” of either TEC or the Diocese to which the 
congregations could vote to join following the “division” in 
TEC and the Diocese as contemplated by Code § 57-9(A). 
In summary, we conclude that the evidence does not 
establish that there was a division in the Anglican Communion 
for purposes of the application of Code § 57-9(A).  We further 
conclude that a proper construction of Code § 57-9(A) requires 
a petitioning congregation to establish both that there has 
been a division within the church or religious society to 
which it is attached and that subsequent to that division the 
congregation seeks to affiliate with a branch derived from 
that same church or religious society.  While the branch 
joined may operate as a separate polity from the branch to 
which the congregation formerly was attached, the statute 
requires that each branch proceed from the same polity, and 
not merely a shared tradition of faith.  The record in these 
cases shows that the CANA Congregations satisfied the first of 
these requirements in that there was a division within TEC and 
the Diocese, but not the second, as CANA clearly is not a 
branch of either TEC or the Diocese.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the circuit court erred in ruling that the CANA 
 
30
Congregations’ petitions were properly before the court under 
Code § 57-9(A).11 
By granting the CANA Congregations’ Code § 57-9(A) 
petitions, the circuit court ruled that this “obviate[d] the 
need to address the merits of the Declaratory Judgment Actions 
filed by the Episcopal Church and the Diocese and thus 
render[s] them legally moot.”  In light of our holding that 
the circuit court erred in granting the Code § 57-9(A) 
petitions, the control and ownership of the property held in 
trust and used by the CANA Congregations remains unresolved.  
Accordingly, the declaratory judgment actions filed by TEC and 
the Diocese, and the counterclaims of the CANA Congregations 
in response to those suits, must be revived in order to 
resolve this dispute under principles of real property and 
contract law.12  See, e.g., Code § 57-7.1; Trustees of Asbury 
                       
11 Because we have concluded that the CANA Congregations 
have not satisfied the requirements for petitioning the 
circuit court for relief under Code § 57-9(A), we need not 
address TEC’s and the Diocese’s assignments of error 
challenging the court’s finding that the statute was not 
violative of the First Amendment and Due Process. 
12 The Diocese has also assigned error to the circuit 
courts’ determination that it lacked jurisdiction to 
reconsider an order entered in a prior proceeding approving 
the transfer of property from Christ Redeemer Church to Truro 
Church.  See note 9, supra.  While we agree with the circuit 
court that the Diocese was attempting to bring an improper 
collateral attack on a final judgment, it is nonetheless 
evident that as the property is held for the benefit of Truro 
Church, the ultimate determination of ownership and control of 
 
31
United Methodist Church v. Taylor & Parrish, Inc., 249 Va. 
144, 452 S.E.2d 847 (1995); Green v. Lewis, 221 Va. 547, 272 
S.E.2d 181 (1980); Norfolk Presbytery v. Bollinger, 214 Va. 
500, 201 S.E.2d 752 (1974). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand with direction to dismiss the CANA 
Congregations’ Code § 57-9(A) petitions.  We will further 
direct the circuit court to reinstate the declaratory judgment 
actions filed by TEC and the Diocese and the counterclaims of 
the CANA Congregations to those actions, and conduct further 
proceedings thereon consistent with the views expressed in 
this opinion. 
 
 
Record No. 090682 – Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
Record No. 090683 – Reversed and remanded. 
                                                                      
that property will be resolved in the proceedings on the 
declaratory judgment actions.  Accordingly, we need not 
address this issue. 
 
32