Case Title: State v. Monahan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002187-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 80 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2187-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
     v. 
Kyle Lee Monahan, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent- 
 
 
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 375 Wis. 2d 796, 899 N.W.2d 737 
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 28, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Lafayette 
 
JUDGE: 
William D. Johnston 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J., and A.W. BRADLEY, J. (opinion 
filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
defendant-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioner, 
there were briefs filed and an oral argument by Andrew R. 
Hinkel, assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross-appellant, there was a 
brief filed and an oral argument by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant 
attorney general, with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, 
attorney general. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
 
2018 WI 80
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2187-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF72) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Kyle Lee Monahan, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent-
Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished, authored decision of the court of appeals affirming 
the Lafayette County Circuit Court's1 judgment of conviction 
                                                 
1 The Honorable William D. Johnston, presiding. 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
2 
 
against Kyle Lee Monahan.2  State v. Monahan, No. 2014AP2187-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2017).  Monahan 
raises a single issue for our review:  was the erroneous 
exclusion of data from a portable GPS unit harmless? 
¶2 
We hold that the circuit court's erroneous exclusion 
of the GPS data was harmless, and therefore affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Monahan was involved in a single-vehicle crash that 
took place on August 20, 2011, in Shullsburg, Wisconsin.  As a 
result of this crash, Monahan was seriously injured and his 
girlfriend, R.C., who was also in the vehicle, was killed.  The 
State subsequently charged Monahan with three counts of criminal 
conduct:  (1) homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) (2011-12)3; (2) homicide by 
                                                 
2 The court of appeals also reversed a circuit court order 
granting Monahan's postconviction motion to relieve Monahan from 
paying the DNA surcharge.  State v. Monahan, No. 2014AP2187-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶56 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2017).  
Monahan states in his petition for review that he does not raise 
this issue for our review.  Accordingly, we do not consider it 
further.  See State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶7 n.5, 369 
Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659 (quoting Jankee v. Clark Cty., 2000 
WI 64, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 612 N.W.2d 297) ("If an issue is not 
raised in the petition for review or in a cross petition, 'the 
issue is not before us.'"). 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
3 
 
intoxicated use of a vehicle contrary to § 940.09(1)(b)4; and (3) 
homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 940.10(1).  The only factual dispute at trial was 
whether it was Monahan or R.C. who was driving at the time of 
the crash. 
¶4 
Monahan and R.C. met in early summer 2011 and started 
dating shortly thereafter.  R.C. worked as a nanny in the 
Chicago suburb of Glenview, and she would often drive to 
Shullsburg on weekends to visit Monahan.  The crash occurred 
during one such weekend. 
¶5 
R.C. arrived in Shullsburg at approximately 12:30 p.m. 
on Saturday, August 20, 2011.  The couple engaged in several 
social activities during the course of that day.  One such event 
was a birthday party for Monahan's cousin, which was held at 
that cousin's farm.  Monahan and R.C. arrived at the farm in 
R.C.'s Saab 9-5 station wagon at approximately 6:30 p.m.  
Monahan 
and 
R.C. 
each 
had 
a 
couple 
drinks, 
but 
left 
approximately 45 minutes later at about 7:15 p.m. because R.C. 
                                                 
4 Though count one and two have the same title, they are 
based on different statutory provisions.  Count one prohibits 
"[c]aus[ing] the death of another by operation or handling of a 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.09(1)(a).  Count two prohibits "[c]aus[ing] the death of 
another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the 
person 
has 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration . . . ."  
§ 940.09(1)(b).  See also infra note 9. 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
4 
 
was exhausted from the day.5  Multiple eyewitnesses testified 
that Monahan was in the passenger seat when he left in the Saab 
with R.C. 
¶6 
After leaving the party, the Saab experienced a 
catastrophic rollover event.  Both Monahan and R.C. were ejected 
from the vehicle.  At the scene, emergency personnel asked 
Monahan multiple times how many people were in the Saab in order 
to ensure there were no others to be found (first responders 
were especially concerned by an empty child seat they found in 
the back of the Saab, which R.C. kept in her vehicle due to her 
job as a nanny).   
¶7 
Multiple emergency personnel asked Monahan who was 
driving.  To each, he initially stated that he did not know, but 
then stated that he probably was the driver.6  Throughout the 
                                                 
5 Between the time R.C. arrived in Shullsburg and the start 
of the party, Monahan and R.C. had socialized at his home and a 
local restaurant, and assisted his cousin in preparing for the 
party. 
6 While Monahan was still lying on the ground after the 
crash, he told Shullsburg firefighter Timothy Corley "I was 
driving, I guess." 
After Monahan was placed on a backboard at the side of the 
road, Lafayette County Sheriff's Deputy Paul Klang walked 
towards him to question him.  While walking towards Monahan, 
Deputy Klang heard him say "that is the last time I will drink 
and drive."  When Deputy Klang questioned Monahan directly, 
Monahan did not remember who was driving.  After being informed 
a female was also in the vehicle, Monahan said "I was probably 
driving, then." 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
5 
 
following several hours, Monahan's recollection of who had been 
driving at the time of the crash continued to evolve, eventually 
adhering to the conclusion that he, in fact, had been the 
driver.  While in a medical helicopter on the way to the 
hospital, Monahan unequivocally stated that he was driving the 
Saab.  At the hospital, after undergoing emergency surgery, 
Monahan——unprompted——asked for a pen and pad of paper and wrote 
that he remembered the accident and that he had been driving.  
However, on January 13, 2012, while signing a DNA sample consent 
form, Monahan told Wisconsin State Trooper Ryan Zukowski, "[i]t 
doesn't matter, you know, I wasn't driving."  Ten months after 
the accident, in July 2012, Monahan told Wisconsin State Trooper 
Thomas Parrott "[i]t's not like I meant [it to] F'ing happen."  
At trial, Monahan testified that he did not remember the 
accident and did not remember ever admitting that he was the 
driver. 
¶8 
The State and Monahan engaged their own respective 
experts.  Trooper Parrott prepared a report and testified on 
                                                                                                                                                             
After Monahan was moved to a gurney, while being treated by 
EMS personnel, Lafayette County Sheriff's Deputy Michael Gorham 
asked Monahan who was driving.  Monahan responded, "I don't 
know, I might have been."  Shortly after this exchange, Deputy 
Gorham returned with a digital recorder at the instruction of 
Lafayette County Sheriff's Sergeant Darrell Morrissey.  Deputy 
Gorham again asked Monahan, "were you the driver?"  Monahan 
responded, "yeah, I guess."  After informing Monahan that a 
firefighter reported seeing Monahan driving the car out of 
Shullsburg, Deputy Gorham asked Monahan "so you were the 
driver?"  Monahan responded "yeah."  Gorham followed up "you 
were?"  Monahan again responded "yeah."  
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
6 
 
behalf of the State.  Paul Erdtmann, a Licensed Professional 
Engineer, prepared a report and testified on behalf of Monahan.   
¶9 
Erdtmann and Trooper Parrott both came to some of the 
same conclusions.  Both experts agreed that the Saab was 
traveling between approximately 87 and 100 miles per hour when 
the crash sequence began.  The crash sequence began when the 
Saab's wheels left the pavement and fell onto the grassy 
shoulder.  After leaving the pavement, the Saab "furrowed" 
towards the passenger's side——that is, the Saab moved sideways 
through the grassy shoulder area such that the passenger's side 
(and not the front) of the Saab was leading the path of travel.  
The Saab went airborne after "tripping" on something on the 
shoulder and rolled multiple times with the passenger's side 
leading the rolls. 
¶10 Both experts also agreed that at the time of the 
crash, the passenger's side window was open, the sunroof was 
open, the driver's side window was closed, neither occupant wore 
their seatbelt, and both occupants were ejected from the Saab.  
The experts further agreed that R.C. had been ejected from the 
vehicle before Monahan based on each occupant's resting position 
at the crash scene. 
¶11 The two experts disagreed, however, as to the ultimate 
conclusion to be drawn from the physical evidence.  Trooper 
Parrott concluded that Monahan was the driver.  He based this 
conclusion on a number of pieces of physical evidence.  First, 
the amount of dirt on both R.C. and Monahan's clothing indicated 
that R.C. had been in the passenger's seat.  R.C.'s clothes were 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
7 
 
covered in dirt; conversely, Monahan's clothes were relatively 
clean.  This indicated to Trooper Parrott that R.C. was in the 
passenger's 
seat 
because 
the 
Saab 
would 
have 
kicked 
up 
substantial amounts of dirt that would have entered the vehicle 
through the open passenger's side window.  Further, the 
passenger's side windowsill had an area where the dirt was 
rubbed off.  Based on the amount of dirt on each occupant's 
clothing, Trooper Parrott concluded that R.C. rubbed the dirt 
off the windowsill while she exited the Saab. 
¶12 Next, Trooper Parrott testified that the physics of 
the crash showed that R.C. had been ejected through the open 
passenger's side window, making it likely she had been seated in 
the passenger's seat and not the driver's seat at the time of 
the crash.  He further testified that the positions of the 
driver's seat and front passenger's seat in the Saab indicated 
that Monahan was driving. 
¶13 Finally, Trooper Parrott testified that the driver's 
side airbag was covered in blood.  Analysts at the State Crime 
Lab found Monahan's DNA in this blood.  Analysts found a second 
DNA profile in the blood, but it was insufficient for 
identification.  This indicated that Monahan had to be in the 
driver's seat, as his blood would not have covered the airbag 
had he been in the passenger's seat. 
¶14 On the other hand, Erdtmann testified that he could 
not determine, to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, 
who had been driving at the time of the accident.  He agreed 
with Trooper Parrott that R.C. had been ejected first, but he 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
8 
 
concluded that R.C. could have been ejected through the open 
sunroof and therefore could have been the driver.  He testified 
that it was equally likely that R.C. was ejected through the 
sunroof from the driver's seat as it was that she was ejected 
through the passenger's side window from the passenger's seat. 
¶15 In regard to the seat positions, Erdtmann conducted a 
test on an exemplar Saab that was the same model and year as 
R.C.'s.  He placed the seats in the exact positions at which 
they were found after the crash.  He then found individuals to 
serve as models who were approximately the same height and 
weight as Monahan and R.C.  The R.C. model was able to reach the 
pedals and steering wheel from the driver's seat with no 
"physical 
constraints." 
 
The 
Monahan 
model 
was 
able 
to 
"comfortably" sit in the passenger's seat.  On rebuttal, the 
State offered the testimony of R.C.'s mother, who testified that 
R.C. "would always have her seat as close up to the steering 
wheel as she possibly could" and that the R.C. model was "much 
farther back than [R.C.] would have been." 
¶16 Erdtmann also testified that he inferred that the 
second DNA profile found on the driver's side airbag was R.C.'s.  
He testified that, given the jostling that occurred inside the 
Saab while it was rolling, the DNA was inconclusive as to seat 
position——meaning that Monahan's DNA could have fallen on the 
driver's side airbag from the passenger's seat when the Saab was 
rolling.   
¶17 It is against this factual backdrop that we come to 
the evidentiary crux of this matter——the erroneously excluded 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
9 
 
GPS data.  R.C. owned a portable GPS unit that she kept in the 
Saab.  The GPS unit recorded timestamped coordinates when it was 
powered on.  This allowed both Erdtmann and Trooper Parrott to 
recreate the Saab's movements and calculate its speed on the 
date of the accident. 
¶18 The data extracted from the GPS unit for the trip 
commencing at approximately 7:15 p.m. on August 20, 2011, from 
the farm to the crash site showed that the Saab was driving at a 
high rate of speed——sometimes in excess of 100 miles per hour——
after leaving the farm.  It also showed that after leaving the 
farm, the Saab stopped for approximately two minutes in downtown 
Shullsburg before resuming the trip.  Neither party presented 
any direct evidence as to what happened during this stop.  After 
resuming the trip, the Saab again traveled at a high rate of 
speed——again sometimes exceeding 100 miles per hour——during the 
time period between the two-minute stop and the crash. 
¶19 Both the State and Monahan filed pretrial motions 
regarding the GPS data for the portion of the trip between the 
farm and the two-minute stop.  Monahan moved for its admission, 
intending to use the GPS data of the entire trip between the 
farm and the crash to show that the same person was likely 
driving both before and after the stop in Shullsburg.  He based 
this argument on the fact that the GPS data revealed similar 
driving patterns both before and after the stop.  He reasoned 
that combined with eyewitness testimony that R.C. was driving 
when the pair left the farm, the jury could reasonably conclude 
that R.C. was driving at the time of the crash.  
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
10 
 
¶20 The State opposed admission of the GPS data detailing 
the portion of the trip between the farm and Shullsburg, arguing 
that only the GPS data of the segment between Shullsburg and the 
crash should be admitted.  The State argued that admitting the 
GPS data relating to the trip between the farm and Shullsburg 
would constitute other acts evidence used to show propensity.  
See Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).7  The State argued that, if Monahan's 
motion was granted, the GPS data would be improperly used to 
show that R.C. had a propensity for driving above the speed 
limit, and thus must have been driving at the time of the crash.  
See id. 
¶21 The circuit court denied Monahan's motion and admitted 
only the GPS data relating to the period of time between the 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) states, in relevant part:  
"[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show that the 
person acted in conformity therewith."   
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
11 
 
two-minute stop in Shullsburg and the crash.8  This ruling 
reflected the circuit court's determination that the GPS data 
between the farm and two-minute stop constituted other acts 
evidence offered to show R.C.'s propensity for driving fast.  In 
the circuit court's view, the continuum of relevant events 
leading to the crash started at the two-minute stop, not the 
farm. 
¶22 Although the GPS data relating to the time period 
between the two-minute stop and the crash was admitted, it did 
not become the centerpiece of either party's case.  In fact, 
after its introduction into evidence, it was not discussed again 
                                                 
8 The pretrial motions filed by Monahan and the State also 
addressed GPS data that would show the Saab traveled at a high 
rate of speed on the way to the farm; a period during which the 
parties agree R.C. was driving.  The circuit court excluded this 
GPS data for the same reasons it excluded the GPS data of the 
trip between the farm and Shullsburg.  The extent to which 
Monahan appeals exclusion of the trip to the farm is unclear——at 
various points in briefing, he appears to challenge only the 
exclusion of the trip from the farm to Shullsburg, but at other 
points, he appears to also challenge the exclusion of the trip 
to the farm.  The scope of the State's confession of error is 
similarly unclear.  In its brief to the court of appeals——the 
first point at which the State confessed error in this case——the 
State conceded error only as to the trip between the farm and 
Shullsburg.  However, other areas of briefing and oral arguments 
to this court indicate that the State may also confess error as 
to the trip to the farm.  Neither party offers analysis of the 
trip to the farm separate from its analysis of the trip from the 
farm to Shullsburg. 
We determine that separately addressing the exclusion of 
the GPS data relating to the trip to the farm is unnecessary 
because our analysis and holding would remain the same even if 
we assumed error regarding that trip. 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
12 
 
until the State's closing argument.  In closing argument, the 
State asserted that it did not "make sense that a young girl who 
doesn't know the area is driving on some rural road and driving, 
no less, after she'd been drinking[,] and at speeds of 40 to 50 
miles per hour over the speed limit[.]  That doesn't make 
sense." 
¶23 The jury returned verdicts of guilty as to all three 
counts.9   
¶24 Monahan appealed, arguing that the circuit court 
erroneously excluded the GPS data relating to the time period 
between the farm and the two-minute stop in Shullsburg.  The 
State conceded——and the court of appeals accepted for purposes 
of appeal——that the circuit court's exclusion of the GPS data 
                                                 
9  The circuit court dismissed count two by operation of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1m), which states in relevant part:  "[a] 
person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon an 
information based upon a violation of any combination of sub. 
(1)(a) . . . or (b) . . . for acts arising out of the same 
incident or occurrence. . . .  If the person is found guilty of 
more than one of the crimes so charged for acts arising out of 
the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single 
conviction for purposes of sentencing . . . ."  The circuit 
court 
dismissed 
count 
three 
by 
operation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.66(2), 
which 
states, 
in 
relevant 
part: 
 
"[u]pon 
prosecution for a crime, the actor may be conviction of either 
the crime charged or an included crime, but not both.  An 
included crime may be . . . [a] crime which is a less serious 
type of criminal homicide than the one charged." 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
13 
 
was erroneous.10  Monahan, 2014AP2187-CR, ¶2.  However, the court 
of appeals concluded that the error was harmless.  Id.  In 
explaining its conclusion, the court of appeals emphasized the 
strength of the State's case.  Id., ¶17. 
¶25 First, the court of appeals noted that Monahan's many 
admissions that he had been driving at the time the accident 
provided strong evidence for the State.  Id., ¶¶19-26.   
¶26 Next, the court of appeals noted that Monahan had 
never substantially contradicted Trooper Parrott's testimony 
that Monahan had been the driver.  Id., ¶33.  The court observed 
that Erdtmann testified that "it was possible that either 
Monahan or R.C. was the driver."  Id, ¶37.  It further observed 
that 
Erdtmann's 
testimony 
regarding 
his 
exemplar 
of 
the 
vehicle's seats and his conclusions therefrom had been rebutted 
by the testimony of R.C.'s mother, which would have allowed the 
jury to accept Trooper Parrott's reconstruction.  Id., ¶¶38-39.   
¶27 Finally, the court of appeals chastised the State for 
exploiting the excluded GPS data in closing argument.  Id., ¶29.  
However, it concluded that the State's discussion was harmless 
because its argument concerning the excluded evidence comprised 
                                                 
10 The State agreed with Monahan that "[t]he vehicle's speed 
after it left the cousin's residence was not other acts 
evidence[,] but part of the continuum of facts relevant to the 
crime" pursuant to State v. Dukes, 2007 WI App 175, ¶28, 303 
Wis. 2d 208, 736 N.W.2d 515.  The court of appeals did not 
"weigh in on whether the [circuit] court erroneously excluded 
the GPS data," but rather accepted the State's concession for 
purposes of the appeal.  Monahan, 2014AP2187-CR, ¶2. 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
14 
 
an 
aggregate 
of 
five 
sentences 
out 
of 
approximately 
70 
transcript pages of closing argument.  Id. 
¶28 The court of appeals determined that "even if the jury 
heard the excluded GPS data evidence, the GPS data would have 
paled in comparison to the strong evidence that Monahan was 
driving at the time of the accident."  Id., ¶40.  Consequently, 
the court of appeals saw "no reason to think that, in light of 
all the evidence that Monahan was the driver, admission of the 
excluded evidence would have changed the outcome of this case."  
Id. 
¶29 Monahan petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on November 13, 2017.   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶30 Circuit court evidentiary decisions are reviewed for 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 
102, ¶20, 360 Wis. 2d 576, 851 N.W.2d 434.  However, in this 
case, the State concedes that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in excluding the GPS data from the farm 
to the two-minute stop.11 
¶31 Whether a circuit court's erroneous exclusion of 
evidence is harmless is a question of law we review de novo.  
Id., ¶21. 
                                                 
11 We are not bound by a party's concession of law.  State 
v. Anderson, 2014 WI 93, ¶19, 357 Wis. 2d 337, 851 N.W.2d 760.  
For purposes of this opinion, however, we assume without 
deciding that the circuit court's exclusion of the GPS data was 
erroneous. 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
15 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶32 We first set forth and discuss the harmless error 
rule.  We next apply the rule to Monahan.  We then hold that the 
circuit court's erroneous exclusion of the GPS data was 
harmless, and consequently affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.   
A.  The Harmless Error Rule 
¶33 An erroneous evidentiary ruling is reversible only if 
"a substantial right of the party is affected."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 901.03(1).  We construe this to mean that an error is harmless 
if the party benefitted by the error shows "beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained."  Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 576, ¶26 (quoting State v. 
Harris, 2008 WI 15, ¶42, 307 Wis. 2d 555, 745 N.W.2d 397).  In 
the present case, the State has the burden to prove "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found [Monahan] 
guilty absent the error."  Id. (quoting State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, ¶49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189). 
¶34 The harmless error rule originated in response to the 
perception 
that 
appellate 
courts 
were 
"applying 
a 
rule 
approximating automatic reversal" when trial error was found.  
John M. Greabe, The Riddle of Harmless Error Revisited, 54 Hous. 
L. Rev. 59, 67 (2016); see also 7 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Crim. 
Proc. § 27.6(a) (4th ed. 2017).  The United States Supreme Court 
aptly described the problem:  "So great was the threat of 
reversal, in many jurisdictions, that criminal trial became a 
game for sowing reversible error in the record, only to have 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
16 
 
repeated the same matching of wits when a new trial had been 
thus obtained."  Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946).  
The goal of the harmless error rule is to "inject reasoned 
judgment . . . into appellate review" to ensure retrials occur 
only when the error actually affected the original trial.  Id. 
at 759-60; see also Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, but not 
Always Harmless:  When Should Legal Error be Tolerated?, 70 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1167, 1174 (1995). 
¶35 We use several non-exclusive factors to aid our 
application of the harmless error rule in the evidentiary 
context:  (1) the frequency of the error; (2) the importance of 
the 
erroneously 
included 
or 
excluded 
evidence 
to 
the 
prosecution's or defense's case; (3) the presence or absence of 
evidence corroborating or contradicting the erroneously included 
or excluded evidence; (4) whether erroneously excluded evidence 
merely duplicates untainted evidence; (5) the nature of the 
defense; (6) the nature of the State's case; and (7) the overall 
strength of the State's case.  State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶46, 
343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270; State v. Norman, 2003 WI 72, 
¶48, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 N.W.2d 97; see also Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 
576, ¶27; State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶46, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 
N.W.2d 317. 
B.  Application to Monahan 
1.  Frequency of the error 
¶36 This factor requires us to consider whether the error 
scarcely appeared in the record or pervaded it.  Martin, 343 
Wis. 2d 278, ¶47.  An error that pervades the record is more 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
17 
 
likely to be harmful than an error that appears only a few 
times, though an error may be so prejudicial that reversal is 
required despite appearing in the record only once.  See id.; 
see also United States v. Impson, 531 F.2d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 
1976).  
¶37 In this case, the error manifested in the record once.  
The GPS data was not a centerpiece of the State's case, but 
rather was mentioned only briefly in closing argument, when the 
State argued that it did not make sense that a driver who was 
unfamiliar with the area would operate a vehicle at the speed 
the Saab was traveling at the time of the crash.  While the 
excluded GPS data would have undoubtedly undercut this argument 
because it would have allowed the jury to conclude that R.C. 
had, in fact, been operating the Saab at a high rate of speed 
over (presumptively) unfamiliar roadways, the argument was not 
central to the State's theory of the case.  The State's theory 
of the case rested on Trooper Parrott's crash reconstruction; 
the argument that R.C. would not have driven so recklessly given 
her 
unfamiliarity 
with 
the 
area 
constituted 
a 
miniscule 
percentage of a 70-page closing argument transcript.12 
                                                 
12 The court of appeals considered five sentences in the 
State's 
closing 
argument 
to 
be 
objectionable. 
 
Monahan, 
2014AP2187-CR, ¶29; see also infra, ¶27.  Depending on how one 
classifies certain sentences in the State's closing argument, 
the objectionable portion of the State's closing argument could 
constitute up to three paragraphs or 24 lines of the transcript.  
See dissent, ¶3.  This would add up to approximately one full 
page of transcript (the transcript pages from closing arguments 
contain 25 lines of text each) out of 70 pages of closing 
arguments, or approximately 1.4 percent.   
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
18 
 
¶38 This is in contrast to Martin, where erroneously-
admitted testimony constituted the bulk of the State's case.  
Id.  The testimony was "discussed at length in both the State's 
opening statement and closing argument."  Id.  The error was 
repeated often in the record and was "the backbone of the 
State's argument."  Id.  The extent to which the State relied 
upon the excluded GPS data in the present case simply did not 
rise anywhere close to that level of repetition, duration, or 
extent.  We conclude that this factor weighs in favor of the 
State. 
2.  Importance of the erroneously excluded evidence 
¶39 This factor considers the extent to which the excluded 
evidence impacted the verdict.  Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 576, ¶29; 
Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶47; see also Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 
¶51.  Exclusion of evidence that would go to the foundation of 
the verdict is less likely to be harmless than exclusion of 
evidence that would have little impact on the verdict.  See 
Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶51. 
¶40 The excluded GPS data did not go to the foundation of 
the verdict.  Rather, the excluded GPS data is direct evidence 
of a fact that is not of consequence:  how fast the Saab was 
traveling between the farm and the two-minute stop.  Given the 
other evidence presented——and emphasized——by the parties, the 
GPS data would have been largely inconsequential to the verdict. 
¶41 Hunt, while factually disparate, is instructive on 
this question. 360 Wis. 2d 576.  In that case, the defendant, 
Hunt, was convicted of causing a child under 13 to view or 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
19 
 
listen to sexual activity based on an incident in which Hunt 
showed his adopted daughter a video of sexual intercourse.  Id., 
¶¶1-2, 4.  At the preliminary hearing, the victim testified that 
Hunt referred to the video as stuff that he received from a 
certain friend, Venske.  Id., ¶5.  Hunt admitted that the victim 
may have seen an image of a testicular hernia sent by Venske, 
but 
denied 
ever 
showing 
the 
victim 
a 
video 
of 
sexual 
intercourse.  Id., ¶8.  Hunt argued that the victim embellished 
the story due to an ongoing custody dispute.  Id., ¶9. 
¶42 Consistent with that defense, Hunt proffered testimony 
from Venske that he sent Hunt an image of a testicular hernia, 
but never sent Hunt a video of sexual intercourse.  Id., ¶12.  
The circuit court excluded Venske's testimony.  Id., ¶13.  We 
held that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
when it excluded Venske's testimony because the testimony would 
have corroborated Hunt's testimony.  Id., ¶25.  We held the 
error to be harmless, however, because the source of the 
sexually explicit content was not an element of the crime.  Id., 
¶30.  Stated differently, the excluded testimony did not go to 
the foundation of the verdict because it would have demonstrated 
a fact that was irrelevant to the crime charged.  See id., ¶34. 
¶43 Similarly, in the present case, the excluded GPS data 
would have bolstered Monahan's contention that R.C. may have 
been driving the Saab at the time it crashed.  For this reason, 
excluding that portion of the GPS data was error.  See id., ¶29.  
Establishing that the evidence was admissible does not, of 
course, answer the harmless error question.  Id.  Though the 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
20 
 
excluded GPS data should have been admitted, it nonetheless did 
not impact the verdict because it bears little relation to the 
elements of homicide by intoxicated use of vehicle.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 940.09(1)(a).13  Because neither the speed of the Saab 
between the farm and two-minute stop, nor who was driving it 
during that time period, were "required element[s] of the 
State's case, the value of [the excluded GPS data] lay solely in 
its potential to corroborate [Monahan]'s version of events."  
Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 576, ¶34. 
¶44 Thus, while the excluded GPS data may have added some 
credibility to Monahan's defense, it was not a fact that was 
important to the verdict.  Accordingly, we conclude that this 
factor weighs in favor of the State. 
 
3.  The presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the erroneously excluded evidence 
¶45 This factor is closely related to the preceding one, 
the importance of the erroneously excluded evidence.  Hunt, 360 
Wis. 2d 576, ¶30.  If other evidence demonstrates what the 
excluded GPS data was offered to show, or if the excluded GPS 
data would not contradict any of the State's evidence, then its 
erroneous exclusion is more likely harmless.  See Martin, 343 
Wis. 2d 278, ¶54.   
                                                 
13 A person commits homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle 
if he "[1] causes the death of another [2] by the operation or 
handling of a vehicle [3] while under the influence of an 
intoxicant."  Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a).  
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
21 
 
¶46 The excluded GPS data was neither corroborated nor 
contradicted because no other evidence was admitted to establish 
the speed of the vehicle between the farm and the two-minute 
stop.  Again, Hunt is helpful to our understanding of the 
application of this factor.  360 Wis. 2d 576.  In Hunt, Venske's 
excluded testimony did not contradict any of the State's 
evidence because the State did not offer any evidence of the 
source of the sexually explicit video.  Id., ¶33.  In holding 
the 
error 
harmless, 
we 
reasoned 
that 
"the 
excluded 
evidence . . . would not have served to weaken the State's case 
on the issue of where Hunt obtained the sexually explicit video, 
because the State never alleged it was sent by Venske."  Id.  A 
similar reasoning applies here:  the excluded GPS data would not 
have served to weaken the State's case on the issue of how fast 
the Saab was traveling between the farm and the two-minute stop 
because the State never alleged that the Saab was speeding 
during that segment.  Consequently, this factor weighs in favor 
of the State. 
 
4.  Whether the erroneously excluded evidence duplicates 
untainted evidence.  
¶47 This factor reflects our understanding that the error 
is more likely harmless if the excluded evidence would serve 
only to duplicate admitted evidence.  Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 
¶50.  Conversely, if the erroneously excluded evidence would 
have been the only evidence to support a factual finding by the 
jury, then the error is more likely prejudicial.  See Martin, 
343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶57. 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
22 
 
¶48 Literal application of this factor leads us to observe 
that the GPS data does not duplicate any evidence because no 
other evidence regarding the speed of the Saab between the farm 
and two-minute stop was offered.  The State did not offer any 
evidence as to either how fast the Saab was traveling or who was 
driving it between the farm and two-minute stop.  Conversely, 
Monahan offered evidence in the form of eyewitness testimony 
that R.C. was driving when the couple left the farm.  The 
excluded GPS data, had it been admitted, would have constituted 
circumstantial evidence that the same person was driving both 
before and after the two-minute stop.  While the excluded GPS 
data would have fractionally overlapped with the eyewitness 
testimony, we cannot say that the erroneously excluded GPS data 
would have duplicated the eyewitness testimony——or any other 
untainted evidence.  The result of our consideration is that 
this factor weighs in favor of Monahan. 
5.  The nature of the defense 
¶49 If the erroneously excluded evidence closely fits the 
defense theory of the case, then its exclusion is more likely 
prejudicial.  See State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, ¶43, 350 
Wis. 2d 138, 834 N.W.2d 362; see also Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 
¶59.  Conversely, if the erroneously excluded evidence would not 
have furthered the defense, its exclusion is more likely 
harmless.  Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶49.   
¶50 Monahan's defense was that either he or R.C. could 
have been driving at the time of the crash.  Stated otherwise, 
Monahan argues that the jury could not have found beyond a 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
23 
 
reasonable doubt that Monahan was driving at the time of the 
crash.  The excluded GPS data could have raised an inference 
that the same person was driving both before and after the two-
minute stop.  When combined with the eyewitness testimony that 
R.C. was driving at the time the couple left the farm, this 
inference could have supported a jury determination that R.C. 
was driving at the time of the crash. 
¶51 Although the weight, if any, the jury would have given 
to such an inference is (by definition) impossible to know, it 
is 
clear 
that 
the 
excluded 
evidence 
would 
have 
been 
complementary to the nature of the defense.  Accordingly, this 
factor weighs in favor of Monahan. 
6.  The nature of the State's case 
¶52 If the erroneously excluded evidence is consistent 
with the State's case, then its exclusion is more likely 
harmless.  See Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶60.   
¶53 The GPS data is irrelevant to the State's case.  The 
State focused its evidence on who was driving at the time of the 
crash; its theory of the case is compatible with either Monahan 
or R.C. driving between the farm and the two-minute stop.  The 
State's evidence that Monahan was driving at the time of the 
crash——Trooper 
Parrott's 
crash 
reconstruction, 
Monahan's 
admissions, and the DNA found on the driver's side airbag——are 
not affected by who was driving between the farm and the two-
minute stop.  The GPS data would have neither bolstered nor 
undercut the State's case had it been admitted because the 
State's evidence was consistent with either Monahan driving the 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
24 
 
whole way or Monahan and R.C. switching seats during the two-
minute stop. 
¶54 Because the GPS data was not inconsistent with the 
State's case, this factor weighs in favor of the State. 
7.  The overall strength of the State's case 
¶55 If the State's case was strong notwithstanding the 
erroneous exclusion of the GPS data, then the error is more 
likely harmless.  Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 576, ¶35.  Conversely, if 
the State relied heavily on the exclusion of the GPS data, then 
the error is more likely to be prejudicial.  Martin, 343 
Wis. 2d 278, ¶62. 
¶56 We first address Monahan's complaint that considering 
the strength of the State's case improperly transforms harmless 
error analysis into sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis.  We 
begin by noting that the strength of the State's case has long 
been 
considered 
an 
appropriate——and 
important——factor 
in 
harmless error analysis.  E.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. 673, 684 (1986) ("These factors include . . . ,of course, 
the overall strength of the prosecution's case."); United States 
v. Wilson, 134 F.3d 855, 867 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[Van Arsdell] 
recognize[ed] that, 'of course,' an important factor to consider 
is 'the overall strength of the prosecution's case.'"); State v. 
Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 267, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985); State v. 
Drusch, 139 Wis. 2d 312, 324 n.1, 407 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 
1987).  Second, we understand that courts cannot properly answer 
the core question——whether the State proved "beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
25 
 
verdict obtained"——without considering the strength of the 
State's case.  See United States v. Littrell, 439 F.3d 875, 883 
(8th Cir. 2006).  Finally, we note that error is less likely to 
have a "substantial influence" on the verdict where the State 
presented overwhelming evidence of guilt.  United States v. 
Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 450 (1986). 
¶57 For these reasons, consideration of the strength of 
the State's case has been——and remains——a proper and useful 
factor in evaluating whether a circuit court's error was 
harmless.  
¶58 This factor cuts decisively in favor of the State 
because the State's case was strong, and would have remained 
strong even if the excluded GPS data had been admitted.  First 
and foremost, Monahan's numerous admissions that he was driving 
provide substantial evidence of his guilt.  He told Shullsburg 
firefighter Timothy Corley "I was driving, I guess" while lying 
in the cornfield.  He then said "that is the last time I will 
drink and drive" within earshot of Deputy Klang.  When Deputy 
Klang told Monahan that a female was also in the vehicle, 
Monahan said "I was probably driving, then."  Once on the 
gurney, Monahan responded "yeah" when Deputy Gorham asked him 
"so you were the driver."  While in the medical helicopter en 
route to the hospital, Monahan again unequivocally admitted to 
driving the Saab.  While at the hospital, he again admitted to 
being the driver.  He wrote that he remembered the crash and 
that he was driving.  At the time of this writing, the attending 
nurse described him as "neurologically . . . intact."  Finally, 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
26 
 
ten months after the accident, Monahan told Trooper Parrott 
"[i]t's not like I meant [it to] F'ing happen." 
¶59 Even if the jury had discounted all of Monahan's 
admissions, Trooper Parrott's crash reconstruction provided 
compelling evidence for the State.  Trooper Parrott testified 
unequivocally that all of the physical evidence pointed to 
Monahan as the driver.  Ertdmann, on the other hand, did not 
contradict Trooper Parrott's conclusion.  In fact, Erdtmann 
concluded that Monahan could have been the driver.  Erdtmann 
merely disagreed as to whether that was the only reasonable 
conclusion one could draw from the physical evidence.   
¶60 Moreover, the physical evidence supported the State's 
assertion that Monahan was the driver.  The seat positions——
coupled with the testimony of R.C.'s mother that the driver's 
seat was found "much farther back than [R.C.] would have been"——
indicated that Monahan was driving.  The position of the bodies 
at the crash scene, the closed driver’s side window, and the 
open passenger's side window indicated that R.C. was ejected 
first and from the passenger's seat.  The dirt patterns on 
R.C.'s clothing——and the relative lack of dirt on Monahan's 
clothing——indicated that R.C. was in the passenger's seat, next 
to the open window. 
¶61 All of these factors lead us to conclude that the 
State's case was very strong——and would have remained so even if 
the excluded GPS data had been admitted into evidence.  Because 
of the strength of the State's case, we are not surprised that 
the jury came to the only reasonable conclusion:  Monahan was 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
27 
 
driving at the time of the crash; this factor weighs in favor of 
the State.   
*** 
¶62 Applying the relevant circumstances of Monahan's case 
to these factors leads to the conclusion that the erroneous 
exclusion of the GPS data was harmless; that is, the State has 
met its burden to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found [Monahan] guilty absent the 
error." 
Hunt, 
360 
Wis. 2d 576, 
¶26 
(quoting 
Harvey, 
254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶49). 
¶63 Though we utilize the seven factors to aid in our 
analysis, 
harmless 
error 
is 
not 
subject 
to 
a 
precise 
mathematical formula.  See State v. Bolstad, 124 Wis. 2d 576, 
589-90, 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985); see also State v. Anthony, 2015 
WI 20, ¶104, 361 Wis. 2d 116, 860 N.W.2d 10; State v. Grant, 139 
Wis. 2d 45, 77, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987) (Day, J., concurring) 
(describing the underlying rationale of the harmless error test 
to be "eliminating prejudicial error but not becoming bogged 
down in endless formulas for determining harmless error.").   
¶64 Factors four and five weigh in favor of Monahan, as 
the excluded GPS data would have bolstered Monahan's theory of 
defense that R.C. was driving.  Supra, ¶¶47-51.  However, it 
would have done so by demonstrating a fact that was not 
necessary for conviction.  Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 576, ¶34; see also 
supra, ¶46. 
¶65 Though the excluded GPS data would have bolstered 
Monahan's theory of defense, the factors weighing in favor of 
No. 
2014AP2187-CR   
 
28 
 
the State——especially the final factor, the strength of the 
State's case——"tip the scales in support of harmless error."  
Anthony, 361 Wis. 2d 116, ¶104.  As in Hunt, the State's case 
did not hinge on establishing who was driving the Saab, and how 
fast it was traveling, between the farm and two-minute stop.  
See Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 576, ¶36.  Rather, the strength of the 
State's case rested largely on Monahan's five admissions that he 
was driving at the time of the accident, Trooper Parrott's crash 
reconstruction testimony, and the DNA evidence.  See id.  The 
State never raised at trial the issue of who was driving the 
Saab between the farm and two-minute stop, nor how fast it was 
traveling during that segment, in proving the essential elements 
of the crime for which Monahan was convicted.  See id.  We agree 
with the court of appeals that "the [excluded] GPS data would 
have paled in comparison to the strong evidence that Monahan was 
driving at the time of the accident."  Monahan, 2014AP2187-CR, 
¶40. 
¶66 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that "it is beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained."  Hunt, 360 Wis. 2d 576, ¶26 
(quoting Harris, 307 Wis. 2d 555, ¶42). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶67 We hold that the circuit court's erroneous exclusion 
of the GPS data was harmless, and therefore affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2014AP2187-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶68 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In this 
court, everyone agrees the circuit court erred in excluding the 
GPS data, which revealed the excessive speeds R.C.'s car 
traveled both on the way to the party and on the way from the 
party to the stop in Shullsburg.  The only question is whether 
this erroneous exclusion of evidence was harmless.  It was not.  
If the jury had heard that R.C.'s car grossly exceeded the speed 
limit both on the way to the party and while traveling from the 
party to Shullsburg——when independent witnesses testified that 
R.C. drove away from the party——the State could not have made 
the same closing argument and Monahan would have had evidence to 
support his defense.  The excluded evidence plus the State's 
argument——unrefuted at trial as a result of the erroneous 
evidentiary ruling——that R.C. never would have driven that fast 
on unfamiliar roads, create reasonable doubt as to whether a 
rational jury would have found Monahan guilty absent the error.  
Accordingly, 
I 
conclude 
the 
error 
was 
not 
harmless 
and 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶69 There 
were 
no 
eyewitnesses 
to 
this 
single 
car 
accident.  Only two people actually knew what happened.  One of 
them did not survive the accident; the other, Monahan, testified 
he does not remember anything between the time he and R.C. left 
the party and the time he woke up in the hospital.  The car's 
GPS unit does give some information about the car's speed and 
location on the day of the accident.  The GPS data allowed 
Monahan's accident reconstruction expert to calculate how fast 
No.  2014AP2187-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
the car was driven both on the way to the party and on the way 
from the party to Shullsburg.  The GPS data also showed a two-
minute stop in Shullsburg.  Finally, the data allowed both 
Monahan's 
and 
the 
State's 
accident 
reconstructionists 
to 
calculate the speed the car was traveling after the two-minute 
stop until the crash.  The speed calculations estimated the 
car's speed on the way to the party at 79-93 miles per hour.  
The car's estimated speed during the segment from the party to 
the Shullsburg stop was 82-105 miles per hour.  After the brief 
stop in Shullsburg, the car's speed reached 97-120 miles per 
hour during the trip from Shullsburg until the crash.1  The GPS 
unit listed the "max speed" the car had traveled as 123 miles 
per hour.  The only estimated speed evidence the jury heard was 
that at the time of the crash, the car's speed was 87-98 miles 
per hour.  We also know that both occupants were ejected from 
the car during the crash and neither Monahan nor R.C. were 
wearing seatbelts.  The sunroof and the front passenger side 
window were open.  Finally, it is undisputed that both Monahan 
and R.C. had been drinking.  Both had blood alcohol content 
above the legal limit. 
¶70 The State's entire case depended on proving that 
Monahan was in fact driving at the time R.C.'s car crashed.  
There were no eyewitnesses to the crash itself and no eyewitness 
                                                 
1 These numbers come from Monahan's expert engineer's 
report.  The State's expert calculated only the speed at the 
time of the crash, and told the jury the car was traveling at 
87-98 miles per hour. 
No.  2014AP2187-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
put Monahan behind the wheel.  To prove its case, the State 
presented testimony from State Trooper Thomas Parrott who 
prepared a reconstruction of the accident.  Parrott testified he 
believed Monahan was driving based on where Monahan's and R.C.'s 
bodies landed after ejection.  Parrott believed R.C. was ejected 
through the open passenger window before the airbags deployed.  
The State also introduced evidence showing that the driver's 
seat 
was 
positioned 
four 
inches 
farther 
back 
than 
the 
passenger's seat.  Using this information, together with the 
fact that Monahan was taller than R.C., the State argued Monahan 
was the driver at the time of the crash.  Additionally, the 
State relied on evidence showing the driver's side airbag had a 
major and a minor contributor of DNA and that the major 
contributor was Monahan.  The State also introduced Monahan's 
numerous statements.  In some of these statements, Monahan said 
he was the driver.  The only GPS evidence the circuit court 
admitted showed that the car stopped for just over two-minutes 
in Shullsburg, and Parrott testified that he estimated the car's 
speed at the time of the crash to be between 87-98 miles per 
hour based upon the GPS data.  The prosecutor seized upon this 
speed evidence to argue during closing:   
[Monahan] testified he knew the hills, knew the 
curves, knew the terrain of that road.  Why would a 
young woman from Maine who's living in Chicago, who 
doesn't know the roads, who by all accounts hadn't 
been on that road and if -- had been maybe once or 
twice, why would she be driving?  She didn't know the 
area. 
The prosecutor further emphasized this point by arguing: 
No.  2014AP2187-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
[R.C.] didn't know her way around.  So using your 
common sense, you need to ask yourself, does it make 
sense that a young girl who doesn't know the area, is 
driving on some rural road and driving, no less, after 
she'd been drinking and at speeds of 40 to 50 miles 
per hour over the speed limit?  That doesn't make 
sense . . . .  Using your common sense, that tells you 
it's the defendant behind the wheel. 
And, later, the State emphasized again: 
If it's [R.C.] who was driving that night, again we'd 
have to believe she's driving on that rural country 
road in a place she's not familiar with on a road 
she's not familiar with.  Despite the fact that she's 
not familiar with that road, we have to believe that 
she's traveling -- after having some drinks, traveling 
40 to 50 miles per hour over the speed limit on a road 
she has no experience or familiarity with. 
¶71 Without the pre-Shullsburg stop GPS speed calculations 
in evidence, Monahan could not refute the State's "common sense" 
and persuasive argument.  Now, on appeal, the State concedes 
that excluding the pre-Shullsburg stop GPS-calculated speeds was 
in fact error, but it asserts the exclusion was harmless error.  
The majority agrees with the State that this error was harmless—
—that it had no impact on the verdict and even if the jury heard 
the complete GPS evidence, the jury still would have convicted 
Monahan.  In reaching its harmless error conclusion, the 
majority 
improperly 
applied 
the 
harmless 
error 
standard.  
Applying the harmless error standard correctly, I conclude the 
exclusion of the GPS evidence was not harmless and I would 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand for a 
new trial. 
II 
¶72 Before Congress adopted the harmless error rule in 
1919, criminal cases were retried with some regularity when an 
No.  2014AP2187-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
error occurred during the trial, regardless of whether the error 
was minimal or material.  See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 
328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946) ("[Appellate courts] tower above the 
trials 
of 
criminal 
cases 
as 
impregnable 
citadels 
of 
technicality" (quoting Marcus A. 
Kavanagh, Improvement of 
Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power 
11 A.B.A.J. 217, 222) (1925)).  The federal harmless error rule 
was codified "to prevent matters concerned with the mere 
etiquette of trials and with the formalities and minutiae of 
procedure from touching the merits of a verdict."  Bruno v. 
U.S., 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).  The rule, versions of which 
have been enacted in Wisconsin and other states, "block[s] 
setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have 
little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the 
trial."  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).  The 
error in Monahan's trial cannot be fairly characterized as "mere 
etiquette" nor minutiae of procedure.  The error precluded him 
from presenting his defense with respect to the main issue at 
trial:  who was driving the car. 
¶73 Whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
is a question of law.  See State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶18, 355 
Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317.  The harmless error test is easily 
defined but difficult to apply.  The test requires the State to 
prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained" by showing "that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error."  State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, ¶26, 360 Wis. 2d 576, 851 
No.  2014AP2187-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
N.W.2d 434.  The reviewing court looks at the effect the error 
had on the verdict.  Id.  In applying the harmless error test, 
we consider several factors.  As relevant here, the court 
examines:  (1) the importance of the erroneously excluded 
evidence; (2) whether there is evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the erroneously excluded evidence; (3) "the nature 
of the defense"; (4) "the nature of the State's case"; and (5) 
"the overall strength of the State's case."  Id., ¶27.2 
¶74 Factor (1), the importance of the excluded evidence, 
cannot be disputed, particularly given the State's exploitation 
of it during closing argument.  Monahan's only defense was that 
he was not driving at the time of this accident.  The excluded 
evidence would have supported that defense.  If all the GPS 
evidence had been admitted, the jury would have learned R.C. 
drove her car excessively fast.  It would have shown that 
despite her unfamiliarity with the area, she drove far above the 
posted 55 miles per hour speed limit.  Applying factor (1) 
demonstrates the harmfulness of excluding the GPS data. 
                                                 
2 The majority considers two additional factors——frequency 
of the error and whether the excluded evidence would have been 
duplicative.  These extra factors are referenced in a 2012 case, 
State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, 
¶46, 343 Wis. 2d 78, 816 
N.W.2d 270, cited by the majority.  Majority op., ¶35.  The list 
of factors considered under the harmless error test are non-
exhaustive.  See State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, ¶27, 360 
Wis. 2d 576, 851 N.W.2d 434.  In any event, the frequency-of-an-
error factor is of limited value when the error was exclusion of 
evidence and thus I do not address it.  As for the duplicative 
factor, the majority concedes that this favors Monahan as it is 
undisputed that exclusion of the complete GPS speed evidence was 
not duplicative of other admitted evidence.  Majority op., ¶48. 
No.  2014AP2187-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
¶75 As to factor (2), Monahan would have used the GPS 
evidence to show R.C. drove at high rates of speed.  There was 
no evidence in the record to that effect.  The State did not and 
could not present any direct evidence or eyewitness testimony to 
disprove Monahan's defense that R.C. was driving her car and 
refused to let anyone else drive it.  The main evidence 
contradicting this defense was Parrott's supposition, bolstered 
by the State's closing argument that R.C. never would have 
driven so fast on unfamiliar roads.  Admitting all the GPS 
evidence would have supported Monahan's defense and poked holes 
in the State's argument.  Applying factor (2) illustrates how 
excluding this evidence was harmful. 
¶76 Factor (3) looks to the nature of the defense.  
Monahan presented contrary expert witness testimony from  his 
engineering 
expert, 
Paul 
Erdtmann, 
who 
reconstructed 
the 
accident.  Erdtmann opined that it is impossible, based on the 
physical evidence, to discern who was driving at the time of the 
crash.  Erdtmann refuted each of the factors underlying 
Parrott's opinion that Monahan was driving.  Erdtmann presented 
a photo showing a woman of R.C.'s height could comfortably reach 
the controls to operate the same type of car with the driver's 
seat in the same position.  Another photo showed that a man of 
Monahan's height would fit comfortably in the passenger side of 
the same type of car with the seat in the same position as the 
subject car's passenger seat.  Erdtmann offered an explanation 
for the major and minor DNA located on the driver's airbag——the 
bodies were moving around during the rollover and both could 
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leave DNA on the airbag regardless of which seat each occupied.  
Moreover, 
State-witness, 
Dr. 
Robert 
Corliss, 
a 
forensic 
pathologist who performed R.C.'s autopsy, testified on cross-
examination that, in a rollover accident during which the car's 
occupants were not wearing seatbelts and were ejected from the 
car, it is not possible to discern whether R.C. was in the 
driver's or passenger's seat.   
 
¶77 Monahan also testified in his own defense.  He 
explained he had no memory of the accident.  He remembered 
leaving the party with R.C., who was driving him in her car.  
She had driven him to the party and she drove him after the 
party.  He told the jury that he never drove R.C.'s car because 
she never let anyone else drive it. 
¶78 One eyewitness testified R.C. was driving when the two 
arrived at the party.  No witness contradicted that testimony.  
Two other independent eyewitnesses who were at the party 
testified they recalled R.C. driving when she and Monahan left 
the party.  One remembered Monahan flashing a big smile at her 
from the passenger seat as the car drove away.  The other 
testified that Monahan and R.C. walked by him on the way to her 
car and the witness saw R.C. get in the driver side and saw 
Monahan in the passenger seat.  No witness contradicted that 
testimony.  A third independent witness testified that R.C. 
never let anyone drive her car.  No witness contradicted that 
testimony. 
¶79 The defense case was not weak, and admission of the 
excluded GPS evidence certainly would have strengthened it, 
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9 
 
lending 
credibility 
to 
Monahan's 
testimony 
and 
raising 
reasonable 
doubt. 
 
Applying 
factor 
(3) 
necessitates 
the 
conclusion that the erroneous exclusion was harmful. 
¶80 Factors (4) and (5) each address the State's case and 
will be considered together.  The State's case was likewise not 
weak.  Its accident reconstructionist put Monahan in the 
driver's seat at the time of the crash.  The State presented 
Monahan's multiple statements to the effect that he was driving 
through live testimony of the eyewitnesses who heard the 
statements.  These statements consisted of (1) statements at the 
scene, (2) statements in the helicopter transporting him to the 
hospital, (3) statements at the hospital, and (4) statements 
after recovery.  First, at the scene: 
 When emergency personnel found Monahan in a cornfield, he 
was 
unconscious 
and 
unrecognizable. 
 
When 
Monahan 
regained 
consciousness, 
he 
repeatedly 
asked 
"what 
happened"; he did not know who he was or how many people 
were in the car or where he had been.  EMTs repeatedly 
asked him who was driving, but received no answer.  
Monahan eventually responded, "I was driving, I guess." 
 The Chief of Police, Richard Moyer, asked Monahan if 
there was anyone else in the car and Monahan said he did 
not know; when Moyer asked who was driving, Monahan 
responded that he did not know. 
 Sergeant Darrell Morrissey testified that when he asked 
Monahan who was driving, Monahan said he did not remember 
or did not know.  When Morrissey asked Monahan if there 
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10 
 
was anyone else in the car besides R.C., Monahan answered 
he was not sure. 
 Deputy Sheriff Paul Klang testified he asked Monahan if 
he was the driver and Monahan replied that he did not 
remember.  When Klang told Monahan there was a female in 
the car, Monahan said, "I probably was driving, then."  
Monahan told Klang he did not remember where he was 
coming from.  Klang also told the jury that he overheard 
Monahan say to an EMT or firefighter, "that is the last 
time I will drink and drive." 
 An EMT, who was also a religious minister, testified he 
heard Monahan say "I fell asleep" and "I'll never drink 
again." 
 Sheriff Deputy Michael Gorham testified he spoke with 
Monahan at the scene while Monahan was lying on a 
backboard and being tended to by emergency personnel.  
Gorham asked how many people were in the car.  Monahan 
answered:  "It depends who's asking" and subsequently 
said that he and "his girlfriend" were in the car.  When 
Gorham asked who was the driver, Monahan said "I might 
have been, I guess." 
 Gorham again approached Monahan, this time with a digital 
tape recorder to get a more definitive statement.  When 
Gorham asked, "Were you the driver?", Monahan answered, 
"Yeah, I guess."  Gorham told Monahan a fireman said he 
saw Monahan driving the car out of Shullsburg and asked 
"so you were the driver?"  Monahan replied, "Yeah, I 
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guess."  When Gorham asked, "You're not BSing or anything 
right?", Monahan answered, "I don't think so."  The 
audio-recording was played for the jury and Monahan can 
be heard groaning in pain.  Medical personnel interrupted 
Gorham's questioning to insert an IV.  Monahan expressed 
he was in pain.  Gorham resumed the questioning, asking 
if Monahan could "explain what happened," and Monahan 
replied, "No."  Gorham pressed, "You don't remember how 
the crash occurred?" to which Monahan replied,  "My tires 
went off the side of the road and I believe it was I lost 
control." [sic] When Gorham followed up by asking about 
the tires, Monahan asked, "Can we talk tomorrow?"3 
¶81 During the flight to the hospital, Monahan told the 
flight nurse and medic he remembered what happened——he was 
driving and he was wearing his seatbelt.  Prior to the flight, 
Monahan had been given Fentanyl, a pain medication. 
¶82 At the hospital, Monahan signaled to his nurse that he 
wanted paper and pencil.  He could not speak because he was 
intubated.  Monahan wrote he remembered the accident——he was 
going too fast over a hill and lost control. 
¶83 During an interview with a state trooper ten days 
after the crash and after Monahan had been released from the 
hospital, Monahan said he had "no idea" who was driving at the 
time of the crash and he "did not have memory of the crash at 
                                                 
3 No firefighter testified to making the statement to Gorham 
and Gorham told the jury he was not able to locate the 
firefighter. 
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12 
 
all."  Monahan also told the trooper that the car belonged to 
R.C. and he had never driven her car.  Five months after the 
crash, the state trooper interviewed Monahan again.  Monahan 
told the trooper he still had no recollection of the crash.  
Monahan said R.C. was an aggressive, "kind of nuts" driver.  The 
trooper asked Monahan to give a DNA sample so it could be 
compared to physical evidence collected from the car.  Monahan 
agreed, saying, "It doesn't matter, you know, I wasn't driving."  
At the time of this statement, Monahan was still seeing a 
neurologist.  He was not cleared to return to work until nine 
months after the accident. 
¶84 The State's case relied on Monahan's statements, 
Parrott's reconstruction opinion, and the DNA airbag evidence.  
In addition, R.C.'s mother testified during the State's rebuttal 
case that R.C. drove as close to the steering wheel as possible.4  
Although this evidence is certainly sufficient to convict 
Monahan, it is by no means overwhelming.  First, Monahan's 
statements are far from conclusive.  Most could be accurately 
described as equivocal.  Many of his statements were given 
within minutes of a high-speed car crash, which caused serious 
injury, 
including 
immediate 
unconsciousness 
and 
a 
later-
                                                 
4 The actual testimony was:  "She would always have her seat 
as close up to the steering wheel as she possibly could."  And 
when shown Erdtmann's photo she said:  "The model is much 
farther back than [R.C.] would have been." 
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13 
 
diagnosed head injury.5  One of Monahan's statements was given 
only after being told he was the driver.  Many of these 
statements were given while Monahan was in severe pain.  His 
statement in the helicopter admitting that he was driving was 
given at the same time he either lied or mistakenly stated he 
was wearing his seatbelt.  It could easily be discounted. 
¶85 Second, Parrott was not the only reconstructionist to 
testify at trial.  Monahan's expert refuted Parrott's testimony 
in every regard.  And, the jury heard that Parrott's report 
included false information.  Namely, his report said he excluded 
R.C. as the driver because lab results analyzing the car's 
window fragments did not contain R.C.'s DNA.  At trial, Parrott 
admitted that this was an error——no glass fragments were ever 
tested in this case.  Parrott explained this mistake appeared in 
his report because he "cut and pasted" it from another report 
for a different "who was the driver" reconstruction case; he 
inserted R.C.'s name in place of the person from his other case.  
Moreover, Parrott's opinion that Monahan was driving was based 
on his comparison of Monahan's and R.C.'s shoes to what he 
claimed were "little flecks" on the gas and brake pedal.  But, 
he admitted he was not a footprint expert.  He conceded that 
Karley Hujet of the Wisconsin State Crime Lab, who performed the 
official analysis of the pedals and the shoes, was the footprint 
                                                 
5 Monahan's medical records show he had surgery on his 
spleen, was hospitalized for six days, and his injuries included 
traumatic shock, lung contusion, fractures to the cervical, 
lumbar, and thoracic vertebrae, rib fracture, and a concussion 
with loss of consciousness. 
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14 
 
expert.  Hujet testified that she could not conclusively say 
there was a footwear impression and in comparing the pedals to 
the shoes, she could not say who was driving.  Parrott told the 
jury the reason he could opine that Monahan's shoes were on the 
pedals when Hujet could not was because Hujet was bound by 
industry standards, which did not apply to him. 
¶86 Third, Monahan's expert gave an explanation regarding 
the DNA on the airbag, which refuted Parrott's opinion on seat 
position and dirt evidence.  Parrott's reconstruction theory had 
R.C. ejecting from the car before the airbags deployed, leaving 
unanswered the question of why the driver's airbag had a second 
person's DNA on it. 
¶87 Finally, R.C.'s mother's testimony that her daughter 
would drive with her seat as close to the steering wheel as 
possible cannot prove that R.C. did so while driving her car on 
the day of the crash nor can it establish that Monahan was 
driving.  We simply do not know, and the mother's testimony 
alone cannot make the erroneous exclusion of the complete GPS 
evidence harmless. 
¶88 There certainly are cases in which the State's 
evidence is so overwhelming and uncontested that a reviewing 
court can say, as a matter of law, the evidentiary error had no 
impact.  But this is not one of those cases.  Factors (4) and 
(5) do not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that excluding 
the GPS evidence had no impact on the verdict or that the jury 
would have convicted Monahan absent the error. 
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15 
 
¶89 Application of the Hunt factors shows that the 
erroneous exclusion of evidence in this case was not harmless.  
This was a close case.  Excluding the complete GPS data 
prevented Monahan from introducing evidence to corroborate his 
expert's opinion and his defense.  At the same time, its 
exclusion allowed the State to persuasively argue in favor of 
its expert's theory.  We do not know which theory a jury 
presented with all the GPS evidence would believe.  But, its 
exclusion, exploited by the State in its closing, creates 
reasonable doubt as to whether a rational jury would have found 
Monahan guilty absent the error; the State has failed to prove 
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained."  Therefore, the error was 
not harmless and Monahan should get a new trial during which he 
can present the GPS evidence to support his defense. 
III 
¶90 The trial court's erroneous exclusion of evidence 
prevented Monahan from fully presenting his defense, which is a 
constitutional error.  A criminal defendant has a Sixth 
Amendment right to present his defense.   Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967) (discussing criminal defendant's 
"right to present a defense, the right to present the 
defendant's version of the facts" so the jury can compare to the 
State's version to "decide where the truth lies.").  "The 
evidence the defendant seeks to introduce, however, must be 
'both material and favorable to his defense.'"  State v. Ward, 
2011 WI App 151, ¶16, 337 Wis. 2d 655, 807 N.W.2d 23 (quoting 
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16 
 
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).  
The evidence excluded in this case is material and favorable to 
Monahan's defense, satisfying both criteria.  By excluding this 
evidence, the circuit court violated Monahan's right to present 
a defense.  A new trial would give him a fair opportunity to 
defend 
against 
the 
State's 
accusations. 
 
Chambers 
v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The right of an accused 
in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to 
a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."). 
¶91 The trial court committed a constitutional error in 
depriving the jury of evidence material to Monahan's defense and   
the majority errs in denying Monahan a new trial in which he 
could present it.  Because it is far from clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Monahan 
guilty if it had heard the excluded evidence, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶92 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
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