Case Title: State v. Keith

Citation: 2008-Ohio-3866

Docket Number: 20071854

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Keith, 119 Ohio St.3d 161, 2008-Ohio-3866.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. KEITH, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Keith, 119 Ohio St.3d 161, 2008-Ohio-3866.] 
Criminal appeal—App.R. 26(B)—Application to reopen appeal denied as 
untimely. 
(No. 2007-1854 — Submitted July 22, 2008 — Decided August 7, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Crawford County, No. 3-98-05. 
_____________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Kevin Keith, challenges the denial of his application to 
reopen his direct appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B). 
{¶ 2} Keith was convicted of, and sentenced to death for, the aggravated 
murders of Marichell, Linda, and Marchae Chatman.  On April 5, 1996, the court 
of appeals affirmed Keith’s convictions and death sentences.  State v. Keith (Apr. 
5, 1996), Crawford App. No. 3-94-14, 1996 WL 156710.  We affirmed the 
judgment of the court of appeals on October 1, 1997.  State v. Keith 1997), 79 
Ohio St.3d 514, 684 N.E.2d 47. 
{¶ 3} On his direct appeal to the court of appeals, and subsequently on 
his appeal to this court, Keith was represented by Harry R. Reinhart, Carol A. 
Wright, and Stephen Cockley.  In his application, Keith states that Reinhart and 
Wright continued to represent him during his ensuing collateral challenges in state 
and federal courts until May 9, 2007, when the trial court granted their motion to 
withdraw.  See State v. Keith (Aug. 19, 1998), Crawford App. No. 3-98-05, 1998 
WL 487044 (postconviction relief); Keith v. Mitchell (C.A.6, 2006), 455 F.3d 
662, rehearing en banc denied (C.A.6, 2006), 466 F.3d 540 (federal habeas 
corpus). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 4} On August 3, 2007, Keith – now represented by the Ohio Public 
Defender – filed with the court of appeals an application to reopen his direct 
appeal, pursuant to App.R. 26(B).  The application alleged that his appellate 
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise certain issues in the 
court of appeals.  The court of appeals denied Keith’s application as untimely.  
State v. Keith (Sept. 19, 2007), Crawford App. No. 3-98-05.  Keith now appeals 
from that denial. 
{¶ 5} We affirm.  As the court of appeals held, Keith’s App.R. 26(B) 
application was untimely.  App.R. 26(B)(1) requires that an application for 
reopening be filed “within ninety days from journalization of the appellate 
judgment unless the applicant shows good cause for filing at a later time.”  The 
court of appeals journalized its direct-appeal judgment affirming Keith’s 
convictions and sentences on April 5, 1996.  Thus, absent good cause for filing 
late, Keith’s application for reopening was due on Friday, July 5, 1996.  (The 
court of appeals retained jurisdiction to consider Keith’s App.R. 26(B) 
application, even though he had appealed to this court.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. 
II(2)(D)(1), effective April 1, 1996.  Thus, the pendency of Keith’s appeal to this 
court did not toll the time for filing his application in the court of appeals.)   
{¶ 6} Keith claims to have had good cause for filing his application late 
because during his state postconviction and federal habeas corpus litigation, he 
was represented by the same counsel who had represented him on direct appeal 
before the court of appeals.  We cannot agree with Keith’s contention that this 
circumstance constitutes good cause for his delay in filing his application.  We 
have rejected claims that an applicant had good cause for filing an untimely 
App.R. 26(B) application because his original appellate counsel were still 
representing him in collateral litigation.  See State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162, 
2004-Ohio-4755, 814 N.E.2d 861; State v. LaMar, 102 Ohio St.3d 467, 2004-
Ohio-3976, 812 N.E.2d 970. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
{¶ 7} It is true, as Keith argues, that his counsel could not be expected to 
argue their own ineffectiveness.  State v. Davis (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 212, 214, 
714 N.E.2d 384.  But then, there is no right to counsel on an application to 
reopen.  Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157, 
¶ 21-22; Lopez v. Wilson (C.A.6, 2005), 426 F.3d 339, 352-353.  Thus, lack of 
counsel cannot be accepted as good cause for the late filing of Keith’s application.  
See State v. Twyford, 106 Ohio St.3d 176, 2005-Ohio-4380, 833 N.E.2d 289, ¶ 8.  
As we explained in Gumm and LaMar, Keith could have attempted to obtain other 
counsel to file his application; failing that, he could have filed an application 
himself.  “What he could not do was ignore the rule’s filing deadline.”  Gumm, 
103 Ohio St.3d 162, 2004-Ohio-4755, 814 N.E.2d 861, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 8} Keith raises six other issues in his brief, but because Keith’s 
application was untimely, these issues cannot be considered.  We affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Stanley Flegm, Crawford County Prosecuting Attorney, and Clifford J. 
Murphy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Rachel Troutman and Tyson 
Fleming, Assistant State Public Defenders, for appellant. 
 
 
__________________