Case Title: Blacknall v. Board of Parole

Citation: 

Docket Number: S056861

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: April 8, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DWAINE BLACKNALL,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE
AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent on Review.
(CA A130410; SC
S056861)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 15, 2009.
Meredith Allen, Senior Deputy Public Defender,
Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With her
on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense
Services.
Judy C. Lucas, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. 
With her on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Jerome Lidz,
Solicitor General.
DURHAM, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
*On review from a final order of the Board of
Parole and Post-Prison Supervision. 223 Or App 294, 196 P3d 20 (2008)
DURHAM, J.
Petitioner sought judicial review of
a final order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (board) that
affirmed an earlier order denying him rerelease on parole.  The Court of
Appeals granted petitioner leave to proceed with judicial review.  However,
before the court reached a decision, petitioner was released on parole. 
Petitioner's counsel filed a notice of probable mootness and the Court of
Appeals dismissed the case as moot.  Blacknall v. Board of Parole, 221
Or App 200, 189 P3d 1234 (2008).  The court designated the board as the
prevailing party and, over petitioner's objection, awarded the board its
requested costs and disbursements, payable by petitioner.  Blacknall v.
Board of Parole, 223 Or App 294, 296, 196 P3d 20 (2008).  Petitioner sought
review, arguing that former ORS 144.335(12) (2005), renumbered as ORS
144.335(9) (2007), which governs judicial review of board orders, prohibited
the cost award.(1) 
We conclude that ORS 144.335(12) did not prohibit the allowance of costs and disbursements. 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In 1990, petitioner was convicted of
four counts of first-degree burglary and sentenced to a 20-year term.  He was
paroled in 1991.  In 2003, after petitioner had committed several parole
violations, the board revoked parole, returned petitioner to prison, and
ordered a future disposition hearing to determine the length of the parole
revocation.  After the future disposition hearing, the board denied petitioner
rerelease on parole and reset his release date to May 11, 2008.  In 2004,
petitioner filed a request for an administrative review in which he argued that
he had not received adequate notice that the board could revoke his parole and
deny him rerelease.  In response, the board granted him the option of a
revocation hearing.  The board held petitioner's hearing on May 10, 2005. 
Subsequently, and without holding a second future disposition hearing, the board
affirmed its 2003 order that had revoked petitioner's parole.  Petitioner
requested administrative review, arguing that, in denying his rerelease on
parole, the board had violated his due process rights and the board's own rules
by failing to hold a second future disposition hearing.  The board denied
relief and petitioner timely sought judicial review in the Court of Appeals.
In October 2006, petitioner filed a
motion for leave to proceed.  The Court of Appeals granted petitioner's motion
and the case proceeded to briefing.  However, before the court took any further
action, petitioner's terms of imprisonment expired on May 11, 2008, and
petitioner was released on parole.  Ten days later, petitioner filed a
"notice of fact relating to probable mootness," pursuant to ORAP
8.45, which provides, in part, that "when a party becomes aware of facts
that probably render an appeal moot, that party shall provide notice of the
facts to the court and to the other party or parties to the appeal * * *." 
(Footnote omitted.)
On July 16, 2008, the Court of
Appeals, sua sponte, issued an order dismissing the petition for
judicial review as moot.  The court also designated the board as the prevailing
party and awarded costs to the board, payable by petitioner.  The board filed a
request for costs and disbursements in the total sum of $139.90:  $100 as a
prevailing party fee and $39.90 for the costs of printing the briefs.  Petitioner
objected to the board's statement of costs, arguing that ORS 144.335(12) barred
the court from allowing the board's requested costs and disbursements.  On
October 29, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued a written opinion allowing the
board's statement of costs and disbursements.  Petitioner timely sought review
in this court.
We begin by setting out the relevant
statutory provisions.  Three provisions in ORS chapter 20 provide general
authority for the award of costs and disbursements, including a prevailing
party fee, on review of an agency order:  ORS 20.310, ORS 20.190(1)(a), and ORS
20.120.  First, ORS 20.310 provides for the award of costs and disbursements on
appeal: 
"(1) In any appeal to the Court of Appeals
or review by the Supreme Court, the court shall allow costs and disbursements
to the prevailing party, unless a statute provides that in the particular case
costs and disbursements shall not be allowed to the prevailing party or shall
be allowed to some other party, or unless the court directs otherwise.  If,
under a special provision of any statute, a party has a right to recover costs,
such party shall also have a right to recover disbursements.  On the same terms
and conditions, when the Supreme Court denies a petition for review, the
respondent on review is entitled to costs and disbursements reasonably incurred
in connection with the petition for review.
"(2) Costs and disbursements on appeal to
the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court or on petition for review by the Supreme
Court are the filing or appearance fee, the reasonable cost for any bond or
irrevocable letter of credit, the prevailing party fee provided for under ORS
20.190, the printing, including the excerpt of record, required by rule of the
court, postage for the filing or service of items that are required to be filed
or served by law or court rule, and the transcript of testimony or other
proceedings, when necessarily forming part of the record on appeal."(2)
Thus, under ORS 20.310(1), a court will generally allow the
prevailing party to recover costs and disbursements, subject to two exceptions:
 (1) if "a statute provides that in the particular case costs and
disbursements shall not be allowed to the prevailing party or shall be allowed
to some other party," or (2) if "the court directs otherwise."
Second, ORS 20.190(1)(a) provides
generally for an award of a $100 prevailing party fee on appeal:
"[A] prevailing party in a civil action or
proceeding who has a right to recover costs and disbursements in the following
cases also has a right to recover, as a part of the costs and disbursements,
the following additional amounts: 
"(a) In the Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals, on an appeal, $100." 
Third, ORS 20.120 provides that for
purposes of allowing costs and disbursements, review of decisions of "an
officer, tribunal, or court of inferior jurisdiction" is treated the same
as if the review were an appeal.  Taken together, the above-quoted provisions
of ORS chapter 20 establish that, on review of an agency order, unless another
statute provides to the contrary, the reviewing court has authority to allow
the prevailing party to recover an award of costs and disbursements, including
a prevailing party fee of $100.
ORS 144.335 governs judicial review
of board orders.  A board order is subject to judicial review "if the
order is a 'final order,' the petitioner is 'adversely affected or aggrieved'
by it, and the petitioner has 'exhausted administrative review.'"  Dawson/Fletcher
v. Board of Parole, 346 Or 643, 649, 217 P3d 1055 (2009) (quoting ORS
144.335(1) - (4)).  ORS 144.335 provided, in part: 
"(4) If a person * * * seeks judicial
review of a final order of the board, the person shall file a petition for
judicial review with the Court of Appeals within 60 days after the date the
board mails the order disposing of the person's request for administrative
review.  The person shall serve a copy of the petition for judicial review on
the board.
"* * * * * 
"(6) Within 60 days after being served with
a copy of the record, or such further time as the court may allow, the
petitioner shall file a motion for leave to proceed with judicial review based
on a showing in the motion that a substantial question of law is presented for
review. 
"(7) Notwithstanding ORS 2.570, the Chief Judge,
or other judge of the Court of Appeals designated by the Chief Judge, may, on
behalf of the Court of Appeals, determine whether a motion for leave to proceed
with judicial review under subsection (6) of this section presents a
substantial question of law and may dismiss the judicial review if the motion
does not present a substantial question of law.  * * *
"(8) If the Chief Judge, or other judge of
the Court of Appeals designated by the Chief Judge, determines under subsection
(7) of this section that the motion presents a substantial question of law, the
court shall order the judicial review to proceed.
"(9) At any time after submission of the
petitioner's brief, the court, on its own motion or on motion of the board,
without submission of the board's brief and without oral argument, may
summarily affirm the board's order if the court determines that the judicial
review does not present a substantial question of law.  * * *
"* * * * *
"(12) If the court determines that the
motion filed under subsection (6) of this section, when liberally construed,
fails to state a colorable claim for review of the board's order, the court may
order the petitioner to pay, in addition to the board's recoverable costs,
attorney fees incurred by the board not to exceed $100.  If the petitioner
moves to dismiss the petition before expiration of the time provided for in
subsection (6) of this section, the court may not award costs or attorney fees
to the board."
(Emphasis added.) 
Under that statute, a petitioner could
seek judicial review of a board order by filing a petition for judicial review
with the Court of Appeals, but judicial review would continue only upon a
showing that the motion for leave to proceed presented a "substantial
question of law."(3) 
If the Court of Appeals determined that petitioner's motion for leave to
proceed did not demonstrate the presence of a substantial question of law, the
court could dismiss judicial review.  ORS 144.335(7).  Similarly, if, after
submission of petitioner's opening brief on the merits, the court determined
that "the judicial review does not present a substantial question of
law," the court could summarily affirm the board's order.  ORS 144.335(9).
In this case, as noted, the Court of
Appeals concluded that petitioner had presented a "substantial question of
law" and, therefore, granted petitioner's motion for leave to proceed with
judicial review.  ORS 144.335(8).  As a consequence, the court necessarily also
concluded that petitioner had presented a "colorable claim" for
review under ORS 144.335(12).  Atkinson v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 382,
388, 143 P3d 538 (2006) ("[T]he 'colorable claim' standard embodies a
lower quantum of merit than the 'substantial question of law' standard.").
ORS 144.335(12) does not expressly
address whether a court could allow costs to the board as prevailing party even
if the court had determined that petitioner's motion presented a colorable
claim.  This case presents the question whether the legislature nevertheless
intended, by inference, to prohibit an award of costs in such a situation. 
Stated differently, the issue is whether, when a petitioner has
presented a colorable claim, ORS 144.335 "provides that in [that]
particular case costs and disbursements shall not be allowed" to the board
as prevailing party.(4) 
ORS 20.310(1).
Petitioner argues that ORS
144.335(12) prohibited the Court of Appeals from allowing costs to the board in
this case.  Petitioner focuses on the legislature's use of the word
"if" in ORS 144.335(12), which he asserts means "in the event
that," "so long as," or "on the condition that." 
Petitioner contends that, by using the word "if," the legislature
granted the Court of Appeals authority to allow costs to the board only upon
fulfillment of the specified condition, i.e., a petitioner's failure to
state a colorable claim.  Accordingly, petitioner concludes that, by negative
inference, ORS 144.335(12) prohibited the Court of Appeals from awarding costs
in other situations.  Petitioner also contends that the legislature's reference
to "recoverable" costs described the types of costs that may be
recovered if a petitioner fails to state a colorable claim, but did not suggest
that the court has authority to award costs in any other situation.
The state responds that ORS
144.335(12) only prohibited allowance of costs when petitioner had timely moved
to dismiss his petition for judicial review.  The state asserts that ORS
144.335 did not serve as an independent source authorizing the recovery of
costs.  The state focuses on the phrase "in addition to the board's
recoverable costs" and defines "recoverable" as "capable of
being recovered."  Explaining that costs are not recoverable in the
absence of a statutory or contractual provision authorizing such an award, the
state asserts that the legislature's use of the phrase "recoverable
costs" reflected the legislature's understanding that some other statute,
such as one of those in ORS chapter 20, provided the authority for allowing
costs and disbursements.  The state finds further support for that conclusion
in the legislature's decision to allow the board a limited attorney fee
recovery "in addition to" the board's recoverable costs.  
We first examine the text and context
of the disputed provision to determine its meaning.  In doing so, we are not
constrained by the interpretive arguments proffered by the parties.  See
Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77, 948 P2d 722 (1997) ("In construing a statute,
this court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation, whether
or not asserted by the parties.").
As noted, ORS 20.310(1) authorizes
the Court of Appeals to allow costs and disbursements to the prevailing party
unless some other statute prohibits the award in the particular case.  We must
decide whether ORS 144.335(12) contains such a prohibition.  For ease of
discussion, we again set out the text of ORS 144.335(12):
"If the court determines that the motion
filed under subsection (6) of this section, when liberally construed, fails to
state a colorable claim for review of the board's order, the court may order
the petitioner to pay, in addition to the board's recoverable costs, attorney
fees incurred by the board not to exceed $100.  If the petitioner moves to
dismiss the petition before expiration of the time provided for in subsection
(6) of this section, the court may not award costs or attorney fees to the
board."
Applying the familiar grammatical principle that a phrase set
off by commas functions as a parenthetical, we see that, if petitioner
failed to state a colorable claim, then the Court of Appeals could award
both "the board's recoverable costs," and "attorney fees
incurred by the board not to exceed $100."  See Curly's Dairy v. Dept.
of Agriculture, 244 Or 15, 21, 415 P2d 740 (1966) (punctuation may assist
with discerning legislative intent).  Thus, the text of ORS 144.335(12)
affirmatively authorized the recovery of $100 in attorney fees while
recognizing that some other source might authorize an award of
"recoverable costs."
Both sentences in ORS 144.335(12)
begin with the word "if."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1124
(unabridged ed 2002) defines "if," in part, as "1 a:  in
the event that: in case * * * b:  allowing, conceding, or granting that
* * * c:  supposing * * * d:  so long as: on condition
that."  Applying the ordinary meaning of the word "if," we see
that each sentence in ORS 144.335(12) set out a condition that must be met and
a result that would occur "in the event that" or "so long
as" that condition was satisfied.  First, "in the event that" or
"so long as" petitioner failed to state a colorable claim, then the
court could require petitioner to pay "the board's recoverable costs"
and "attorney fees incurred by the board not to exceed $100." 
Second, "in the event that" or "so long as" petitioner
timely filed a motion to dismiss, then the court was prohibited from
awarding either costs or attorney fees.
The legislature, however, did not
express itself in regard to cases, such as this one, in which neither condition
stated in ORS 144.335(12) applied.  The legislature also did not incorporate
into ORS 144.335(12) any terms suggesting that that statute was the exclusive
source of court authority for an award of costs in this context.
We previously have observed that,
"[d]epending on the context, the legislature's silence can signify a
variety of policy choices * * *."  State v. Hess, 342 Or 647, 660,
159 P3d 309 (2007).  We conclude that the legislature's silence in ORS
144.335(12) in the respects identified above signifies an intent not to disturb
the court's authority under ORS 20.310(1) to award costs where the prohibition
on awarding costs or attorney fees in ORS 144.335(12) did not apply.  Two clues
support that view.  First, we agree with the state that the phrase
"recoverable costs" in ORS 144.335(12) indicated the legislature's
recognition that some other source would authorize the recovery of costs.  That
the legislature enacted ORS 144.335(12) within an existing statutory framework that
included ORS 20.301(1), but did not specifically bar the allowance of costs and
disbursements under other statutes, tends to suggest that the legislature did
not so intend.  Second, ORS 144.335(12) expressly prohibited an award of costs
or attorney fees to the board if a petitioner timely moved to dismiss his or
her petition for judicial review.  If the legislature had intended to prohibit
an award of costs and attorney fees in a different circumstance, such as where
a petitioner did not move to dismiss the petition for judicial review, the
legislature could have done so expressly.  It did not do so.
Petitioner also argues that allowing
the Court of Appeals to impose a cost award against a petitioner who has stated
a colorable claim defeats the legislative intent of providing petitioners with
a disincentive to pursue frivolous claims, because it places "a petitioner
who fails to state a colorable claim equally on par with a petitioner
who overcomes that hurdle."  Petitioner is mistaken.  As explained above,
under ORS 144.335(12), a petitioner who filed a motion for leave to proceed and
presented a colorable claim, but ultimately did not prevail, could have costs
imposed against him or her pursuant to ORS chapter 20, including the $100
prevailing party fee.  In contrast, a petitioner who failed to present a
colorable claim could have costs imposed against him or her (including the $100
prevailing party fee) and, in addition, could be required to pay
"attorney fees incurred by the board not to exceed $100."
The Court of Appeals' opinion and
much of the parties' briefing focuses on the relevance of two previous
decisions by this court that are part of the statutory context:  DeYoung/Thomas
v. Board of Parole, 332 Or 266, 27 P3d 110 (2001) and Atkinson v. Board
of Parole, 341 Or 382, 143 P3d 538 (2006).  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
City of Central Point, 341 Or 393, 397, 144 P3d 914 (2006) (prior case law
interpreting statute considered in first step of statutory analysis).  As
context, those cases may illuminate or explain the meaning of the statutory
text.
The issue in DeYoung/Thomas was
whether ORS chapter 20 authorized the Court of Appeals to award costs and
disbursements to the board when the board had prevailed on judicial review of
one of its orders.  The Court of Appeals had granted the board's motions to
dismiss in two separate parole board cases (consolidated for review),
designated the board a prevailing party, and allowed costs and disbursements
under ORS 20.120.  Parole petitioners sought review in this court and argued
that, notwithstanding ORS 20.120, the board could not recover costs.  The
petitioners first noted correctly that "costs and attorney fees are
controlled entirely by statute and are not recoverable in the absence of a
statute or contractual provision that authorizes such an award."  332 Or
at 277.  The petitioners contended that, because "there [was] no specific
statutory authority in the statutes that govern judicial review of Board
orders [i.e., ORS 144.335 (1999)] for awarding costs to the prevailing
party," no statute authorized an award of costs.  Id. (emphasis in
original).  The court in DeYoung/Thomas rejected the proposition that
the statutory authority to award costs must be located in the statutes that
governed the specific type of judicial review at issue.  To the contrary, the
court explained that an earlier decision, Compton v. Weyerhaeuser, 302 Or
366, 730 P2d 540 (1986), already had clarified that ORS 20.120 was an
independent source of authority for allowing costs on judicial review of an
agency order.  The court thus concluded that, because ORS 20.120 authorized an
allowance of costs, the Court of Appeals had not erred in awarding costs to the
board.
In Atkinson, the petitioner
sought review of the Court of Appeals' denial of his motion for leave to
proceed with judicial review, arguing that he had presented a "substantial
question of law."  In construing the meaning of the "substantial
question of law" standard as used in ORS 144.335 (2005), this court
explained how that standard fit within the broader scheme of judicial review of
board orders: 
"ORS 144.335 thus establishes two different
standards for the court to use when considering the relative merit of motions
for leave to proceed.  Between those standards, the 'colorable claim' standard
embodies a lower quantum of merit than the 'substantial question of law'
standard.  Such a conclusion is apparent from the legislature's desire to
discourage motions failing to satisfy the former [colorable claim] standard by
making the petitioners filing those motions subject to costs and fees. 
Conversely, the legislature chose not to penalize the petitioners filing
motions that fail to satisfy the latter standard, subjecting them to only
dismissal, with no monetary penalty." 
Atkinson, 341 Or at 388-89 (citations omitted; emphasis
added).  After comparing the substantial question of law standard with the
colorable claim standard, the court in Atkinson concluded that "a
'substantial question of law' is a soundly based, firmly supported question
capable of adjudication as to what the law is that is presented by the facts of
the particular case at bar."  Id. at 390.
In this case, the Court of Appeals
framed the issue as "whether there is anything in the Supreme Court's
decision in Atkinson that suggests that the court intended to overrule
its holding in DeYoung/Thomas."  223 Or App at 299.  The Court of
Appeals distinguished Atkinson as a case that decided a different issue
-- the meaning of the phrase "substantial question of law" -- and
thus the court characterized the passage from Atkinson quoted above as dictum. 
The court then concluded that this court's decision in DeYoung/Thomas controlled
the disposition of the case at bar, because the court in that case had upheld a
cost award on facts identical to this case.
Petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals erred by concluding that the holding in DeYoung/Thomas controls
the instant case.  According to petitioner, DeYoung/Thomas is inapposite
because "the statutory scheme has fundamentally changed" since July
6, 2001, the date of the court's decision in DeYoung/Thomas.  We agree
with petitioner, at least in part.  DeYoung/Thomas concerned judicial
review of parole orders under ORS 144.335 (1999).  That version of the statute
contained no reference to cost awards.  The provision at issue in this case,
ORS 144.335(12), was added in 2001, when the legislature amended ORS 144.335
and added the motion practice that we described above.  Or Laws 2001, ch 661,(5) 
It follows that the decision in DeYoung/Thomas does not determine the
meaning of the 2005 version of ORS 144.335(12), a later enacted statutory provision.
The state argues that the decision in
DeYoung/Thomas stands for the broader point that the provisions of ORS
chapter 20 govern the award of costs on review of an agency order, subject to
only one exception:  when judicial review of the agency's order is subject to
review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), ORS chapter 183.  The
state relies on a passage in DeYoung/Thomas in which this court stated
that, according to an earlier decision of this court, Compton, 302 Or at
730, "ORS 20.120 authorizes cost awards to the prevailing party in any
judicial review that the APA does not govern (a category that includes the
present cases as they were considered in the Court of Appeals)."  DeYoung/Thomas,
332 Or at 280 (footnote omitted).  As we discuss below, the state's reading of
that sentence is too broad.
In Compton, a workers'
compensation claimant sought reconsideration of an Oregon Supreme Court order
that had awarded costs against him.  He argued that the award of costs in his
case was inconsistent with a previous reversal of a cost award in Shetterly,
Irick, & Shetterly v. Employment Division, 302 Or 139, 727 P2d 117 (1986). 
The court in Shetterly had explained that the legislative history
revealed that, in enacting the judicial review provisions of the APA, the
legislature had considered authorizing recovery of costs by an agency against a
private claimant on judicial review of a contested case, but had decided not to
authorize such an award.  The court in Compton pointed out that the factor
that distinguished the two cases was that Shetterly had involved
judicial review of an employment division order under the APA, but Compton involved
judicial review of a workers' compensation order, which was not subject to the
APA:
"Shetterly held effectively that ORS
183.497 superseded ORS 20.120 with regard to the cases within the purview of
ORS 183.497.  However, ORS 20.120 still controls cases not subject to the APA
costs limitation.  Compton is such a case."
302 Or at 369.
Properly understood, the issue in Shetterly,
DeYoung/Thomas, and Compton was whether the statutory scheme
governing judicial review of the agency order at issue contained a specific
prohibition on the allowance of costs that operated in a particular case to
nullify the general authority to award costs in ORS chapter 20.  In Shetterly,
in which the APA governed judicial review, the court determined that the APA
did contain such a prohibition on an award of costs.  In contrast, in Compton,
the court concluded that workers' compensation statutes in effect at the time
did not prohibit an award of costs against a workers' compensation claimant
when the Workers' Compensation Board prevailed on judicial review of its own
order.  See Fromme v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 306 Or 558, 560, 761 P2d 515
(1988) (so recognizing).  Similarly, the court concluded in DeYoung/Thomas that
ORS 144.335 (1999) contained no prohibition on an allowance of costs to the
prevailing party on judicial review.
When considered in context, Compton
and DeYoung/Thomas do not stand for the proposition that the APA is
the only statutory scheme that can limit a court's general authority to
award costs.  See Fromme, 306 Or at 560 (recognizing that, in 1987, the
legislature overruled Compton by amending ORS 656.236(2) to prohibit the
assessment of costs on judicial review against unsuccessful workers'
compensation claimants).  Rather, those cases acknowledge only what ORS 20.310
expressly provides:  a prevailing party generally may recover costs and
disbursements unless another, more specific statute provides otherwise. 
As for Atkinson, petitioner
contends that this court held there that ORS 144.335(12) prohibited the Court
of Appeals from awarding costs to a petitioner who had stated a colorable
claim.  Petitioner focuses on a sentence in Atkinson that stated that a
petitioner who failed to state a colorable claim was "subject to costs and
fees," but a petitioner who stated a colorable claim would suffer "no
monetary penalty."  It is clear, however, that that observation was
intended to contrast the legal standard of a substantial question of law with
that of a colorable claim.  The court's discussion included no explanation or analysis
of the phrase "no monetary penalty."  Atkinson did not involve,
much less decide, the propriety of an award of costs.  Accordingly, the court's
reference to "no monetary penalty" in Atkinson does not dictate
any particular outcome in this case.  See State v. McDonnell, 343 Or
557, 567, 176 P3d 1236, cert den, __ US __, 129 S Ct 235, 172 L Ed 2d
180 (2008) (doctrine of stare decisis does not require deference to
prior case holdings when those cases did not involve and determine precise
issue presented by case at bar).
In sum, an examination of text and
context reveals that the legislature did not intend that ORS 144.335 would
prohibit an award of costs in this case.  Both parties also have offered
legislative history that they contend supports their position.  We have
examined the legislative history behind ORS 144.335(12) and we find nothing in
the legislative history that would require a different conclusion.  No part of
the legislative history indicates that, by enacting ORS 144.335(12), the
legislature intended to eliminate a court's general authority under ORS chapter
20 to award costs and disbursements if a petitioner has presented a colorable
claim.(6)
From the foregoing, we conclude that,
in enacting ORS 144.335(12), the legislature used a carrot-and-stick approach
to achieve its goal of reducing the number of meritless cases pursued on
judicial review.  The carrot is found in the second sentence of ORS
144.335(12), which insulated petitioners from an award of costs and
disbursements if they voluntarily dismissed their petition within the time
stated.  The stick is found in the first sentence, which authorized an award of
"attorney fees incurred by the board not to exceed $100," in addition
to the board's costs recovered under ORS chapter 20, if a petitioner decided to
pursue a petition that failed to raise a colorable claim.  However, unless a
petitioner was entitled to the protection described in the second sentence of
ORS 144.335(12) -- which petitioner here was not -- ORS 144.335(12) did not
limit the court's authority under ORS 20.310(1) to award costs and
disbursements to the board.
ORS 144.335(12) did not prohibit the
Court of Appeals from awarding costs and disbursements to the board pursuant to
ORS chapter 20, even if a petitioner had presented a colorable claim on
judicial review, unless the petitioner had timely moved to dismiss the petition
pursuant to ORS 144.335(6).  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in
awarding costs and disbursements in this case.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed.
1. The
legislature amended ORS 144.335(12) in 2007, Or Laws 2007, ch 411, § 1, by
renumbering the subsection as ORS 144.335(9) and modifying certain procedural
references in the 2005 version.  According to the parties, the principal issue
here is whether ORS 144.335(12) (2005) limited the authority of the Court of
Appeals under ORS 20.310 to award costs and disbursements to the board.  In
positing that issue, the parties have assumed that the controlling statute is
the 2005 version of ORS 144.335(12), because that statute was in effect when
petitioner sought judicial review.  To avoid confusion, we adopt the same
assumption:  Unless otherwise noted, citations in this opinion to ORS 144.335
refer to the version in effect in 2005.
The 2007 version of ORS 144.335 was in effect
when the Court of Appeals awarded costs and disbursements to the board in this
case.  However, the 2007 amendments did not modify the scope of the court's
authority to award costs and disbursements to the board, and they do not affect
our analysis in this case.
2. The
legislature in 2007 amended ORS 20.310(2), changing the term
"abstract" to "excerpt."  Or Laws 2007, ch 547, § 6.  That
amendment has no effect on the analysis of this case.
3. In
2007, the legislature amended ORS 144.335 to eliminate the interim step
requiring an inmate to file a motion for leave to proceed.  Or Laws 2007, ch
411, § 1.  Under the
current version of the statute, the Court of Appeals examines the petitioner's
brief to determine whether the judicial review presents a substantial question
of law.  ORS 144.335(6) (2009).  If the judicial review does not present a
"substantial question of law," the Court of Appeals, on its own
motion or on the motion of the board, "may summarily affirm the board's
order."  Id.
4. Petitioner
does not argue that, because the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal sua
sponte for mootness, the board is not a prevailing party for purposes of
ORS 20.310 and ORS 20.190.  Because no party has raised or briefed the issue,
we assume, without deciding, that the Court of Appeals correctly designated the
board as the prevailing party on appeal.  See ORS 20.310(1) (on appeal,
"the court shall allow costs and disbursements to the prevailing party * *
*."); ORAP 13.05(3) ("When an allowance of costs is dependent on
identification of a party as a prevailing party, the * * * petitioner * * * is
the prevailing party only if the court reverses or substantially modifies the
judgment or order from which the appeal or judicial review was taken. 
Otherwise, the respondent * * * is the prevailing party.").
5. The
governor signed House Bill (HB) 2348 (2001) into law on June 28, 2001 and the
law took effect on January 1, 2002.  See Or Laws 2001, ch 661, § 1 (so noting).
6. Petitioner
also argues that, even if ORS 144.335(12) did not prohibit an award of costs
and disbursements generally, the Court of Appeals abused its discretion by
awarding costs and disbursements in this particular case.  First, petitioner
submits that the Court of Appeals failed to make at least a cursory record
reflecting its exercise of discretion to award costs to the board.  Second,
petitioner contends that, in the circumstances presented by this case, where
petitioner's case became moot through no fault of petitioner, such an award is
inequitable and unduly punitive.  Petitioner failed to preserve those arguments
before the Court of Appeals and also failed to raise those issues in his
petition for review.  Accordingly, we decline to address them.