Case Title: Claims of Naylor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86-57

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Claims of Naylor1986 WY 163723 P.2d 1237Case Number: 86-57Decided: 08/15/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
Claims of Linda M. NAYLOR, wife of Stanley D. Naylor, deceased, an employee of 
Railworks, Inc. RAILWORKS, INC. Appellant (Employer-Defendant), The State of 
Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, Appellant 
(Objector-Defendant),

v.

Linda M. NAYLOR, Appellee 
(Claimant).

Appeal from The District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Josephine T. Porter, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Cheyenne, for appellant, State of Wyoming.

Harlan W. 
Rasmussen, Sheridan, for appellant, 
Railworks, Inc.

Hardy H. Tate, 
Sheridan, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal comes to us 
from an award of worker's compensation to appellee Linda M. Naylor, widow of 
Stanley D. Naylor. Mr. Naylor was killed in an automobile accident while 
returning home to Sheridan, Wyoming after quitting work as a rail cutter in Colorado. Appellants 
Railworks, Inc., the employer, and the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division 
(the state), contested the award and bring this appeal raising the following 
issues:

"I

"Was appellee an 
independent contractor or an employee of appellant at the time of the accident? 

"II

"Did appellee's death 
arise out of and in the course of employment under Section 27-12-102(a)(xii), 
W.S. 1977?"

[¶2.]     We will affirm the 
trial court's finding that Mr. Naylor was an employee, but reverse the award of 
worker's compensation inasmuch as we find Naylor was not within the scope of his 
employment when the accident occurred.

[¶3.]     The facts show that Mr. 
Naylor was hired by Railworks, Inc., to cut boxcars and rails. Naylor was hired 
in Sheridan, Wyoming, but the job site was in Keenesburg, Colorado. To facilitate the transporting of 
employees, Naylor used his personal van. On several occasions, Naylor was given 
money for gas to drive his van.

[¶4.]     On October 21, 1985, 
Naylor terminated his employment. Work was slow and he felt he could make more 
money "selling firewood," so he quit. Later that day Naylor went to a bar and 
began drinking. Around 5:30 or 6:00 p.m., he informed his supervisor, Bill 
Workman, in the bar, that "he was going to quit." Mr. Workman testified that 
Naylor was "intoxicated" at the time.

[¶5.]     Around 8:00 p.m. Naylor 
left in his van, driven by a co-employee, Albert Kukuchka. Mr. Kukuchka had also 
quit that day. They were driving back to Sheridan when Naylor fell out of the passenger 
door and died of massive head injuries. The accident occurred approximately 100 
miles from Keenesburg, 
Colorado. His widow, appellee Linda 
Naylor, filed for worker's compensation. After a hearing, the trial court found 
Mr. Naylor was an employee operating within the scope of his employment and 
entitled to benefits. The trial court made a factual determination that Naylor 
had quit his job and appellant does not contend otherwise.

I

[¶6.]     In their first issue, 
appellants ask whether the trial court erred in determining that Naylor was an 
"employee" within the meaning of the worker's compensation act, as opposed to an 
"independent contractor." Section 27-12-102(a)(viii), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement), defines employee as:

"`Employee' means any 
person who has entered into the employment of or works under contract of 
services or apprenticeship with an employer engaged in an extrahazardous 
occupation, except a person whose employment is purely casual and not for the 
purpose of the employer's usual trade or business, or those engaged in clerical 
work and not subject to the hazards of the business. `Employee' also includes 
the officers of a corporation, the business of which is classed as 
extrahazardous, if the officers are actually subject to the hazards of the 
business in the regular performance of their duties, and the employer elects to 
come under the provision of this act by notifying the division by registered 
mail at least thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of the coverage. 
Coverage remains effective until withdrawn by written notice to the division. 
Any reference to an employee who has been injured and dies, includes his 
dependents or his legal representatives, or his guardian or next friend if the 
employee is a minor or incompetent. No minor employee shall be denied the 
benefits of this act for the sole reason that his employment is in violation of 
the labor laws governing the employment of minors."

[¶7.]     When Naylor went to 
work for Railworks, Inc., he was required to sign a contract. Paragraph 8 of 
this contract provided that the company "shall have no right to control or 
direct the details, manner or means by which contractor accomplishes the results 
of his work on each project." Based upon this, appellants claim Naylor was an 
independent contractor. But the evidence shows that Railworks, Inc., paid 
worker's compensation for its employees. When the company president was asked 
why worker's compensation was paid when he claimed employees were "independent 
contractors," he stated he purchased the worker's compensation because, "It's 
the cheapest form of insurance. * *" 

[¶8.]     We have oft-stated that 
the main determining factor in deciding whether one is an employee or an 
independent contractor is whether the employer retains the right to control the 
details of the work. Noonan v. Texaco, Wyo., 713 P.2d 160 (1986); Scott v. Fagan, Wyo., 684 P.2d 805 
(1984); Burnett v. Roberts, 57 Wyo. 511, 121 P.2d 896 
(1942).

[¶9.]     In Fox Park Timber Co. 
v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 467, 488, 84 P.2d 736, 743, 120 A.L.R. 
1020 (1938), we stated the following regarding whether one is an employee or 
independent contractor:

"* * * An outstanding * * 
* [test] is whether the employer has or has not retained the right of control 
over the party whose status is in question. If he has retained such right, the 
party is generally regarded as a servant. Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189; 28 
R.C.L. 762; 71 C.J. 455, and cases cited. Another test is whether either of the 
parties possesses the right to terminate the services at will without incurring 
liability to the other, this embracing, of course, the right of the employer at 
any time to discharge the party performing the work, an affirmative answer 
establishing the status of master and servant. * * *"

[¶10.]  From a review of the evidence, it appears 
that the employment relationship could be terminated at any time, thus 
indicating a master-servant relationship.

[¶11.]  In response to questioning by the court, 
Bruce Harbel, a co-worker testified that Bill Workman, supervisor of Railworks, 
was indeed the boss:

"THE COURT: The Court has 
a couple questions, Mr. Harbel.

Mr. Workman - what was 
his function as far as you were concerned?

"THE WITNESS: He was our 
boss.

"THE COURT: What would he 
do? Did he tell you what to do or what?

"THE WITNESS: 
Yeah.

"THE COURT: How did he 
tell you what to do?

"THE WITNESS: He told us 
to go to work. He was - well - huh, I don't know really.

"THE COURT: Did he direct 
you in any way on the work you were to do?

"THE WITNESS: Yeah. He 
told us when - like, they had a big Cat out there pulling rail, and Bill would 
come back to the house and tell us that it was ready to go on out - things like 
that, yes.

"THE COURT: But did he 
direct you on how you were to perform the job once you were 
there?

"THE WITNESS: Well, on 
the rail it was more or less no one really knew what they were doing, so it was 
kind of a group discussion on what to do next.

"* * 
*

"THE COURT: Well, other 
than telling you when you were to go out there, did Mr. Workman do anything 
else? That's what I'm trying to get at. Did he direct you when you were on the 
job or were you your own director or your own boss, or was he your boss on the 
job?

"THE WITNESS: He was the 
boss on the job.

"THE COURT: In what way? 
What did he tell you to do or not to do?

"THE WITNESS: He could 
tell us to cut this part over here and go to this part over here and finish up 
this part over here. You know, that was his plan.

"THE COURT: So he 
directed you in what you did?

"THE WITNESS: 
Yes.

"THE COURT: How you cut 
these boxcars or the rails up?

"THE WITNESS. 
Yes."

[¶12.]  Although there is evidence to the 
contrary, we think the trial court was correct in concluding that Naylor was an 
employee of Railworks, Inc., and not an independent contractor. Furthermore, the 
company did pay worker's compensation for its employees. It is inconsistent and 
a misuse of the worker's compensation system to pay for employees as such and 
then claim the workers are independent contractors once a claim is 
made.

[¶13.]  We rejected a similar argument in the 
case of In re Reed, Wyo., 444 P.2d 329, 330 (1968), wherein we 
stated:

"We find no merit in the 
first-mentioned ground of appeal. Although there is some intimation and casual 
reference by Husman Bros. to the fact that appellee was performing a contract 
which created the relationship of principal and independent contractor rather 
than employer and employee, there is no cogent argument presented to 
substantiate this, and the fact that the corporation reported him to the 
Workmen's Compensation Department as being on its payroll is inconsistent with 
the contention."

[¶14.]  For all the reasons stated, we affirm the 
trial court's determination that Naylor was indeed an employee of Railworks, 
Inc.

II

[¶15.]  In their second issue, appellants claim 
the trial court erred in finding that Naylor was within the scope of his 
employment when he was killed while traveling home.

[¶16.]  To be compensable, an injury must arise 
out of and in the course of employment. § 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977 (June 
1983 Replacement). There must be a causal connection between the injury and the 
course of employment, and such a causal connection is found when there is a 
logical nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or 
some requirement of the employment. Parker v. Energy Development Co., Wyo., 691 P.2d 981 
(1984).

[¶17.]  It is the general rule in this state that 
workers are not within the course of their employment while they are going to or 
from work. Matter of Van Matre, Wyo., 657 P.2d 815 (1983); and Wyoming State 
Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Department v. Boston, Wyo., 445 P.2d 548 (1968). However, if an employer supplies transportation or somehow 
subsidizes the cost of travel, the coming-and-going rule does not apply and an 
employee injured while traveling to or from work is considered within the scope 
of his employment. Matter of Willey, Wyo., 
571 P.2d 248 (1977). This rule was recognized by the court in the case of In re 
Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 99-100, 178 P.2d 897, 900 (1947):

"* * * [W]here the 
employer himself as a part of the employment arrangement supplies transportation 
to and from the place where the duties of the employee actually commence, an 
exception to the general rule arises and a different result 
ensues."

[¶18.]  A further complication is added when, as 
here, an employee has quit and is winding up his affairs. It is generally 
recognized that an employee has a reasonable period of time after quitting or 
being fired in which to finish his business. Injuries incurred during this 
period of time may entitle an employee to worker's compensation. One authority 
has stated:

"§ 26.00 Injuries 
incurred by an employee while leaving the premises, collecting pay, or getting 
his clothing or tools within a reasonable time after termination of the 
employment are within the course of employment, since they are normal incidents 
of the employment relation. * * *

"§ 26.10 Leaving the 
premises after quitting

"Compensation coverage is 
not automatically and instantaneously terminated by the firing or quitting of 
the employee. He is deemed to be within the course of employment for a 
reasonable period while he winds up his affairs and leaves the premises. The 
difficult question is: what is a reasonable period?

* * * * * 
*

"The issue of 
reasonableness may also turn on the question of what the employee was doing 
during the interval before leaving the premises, and whether his activity bore 
any relation to his employment or was purely personal. * * 
*

* * * * * 
*

"On the other hand, it is 
quite possible for an employee, whose employment has ended, to remain at a place 
of employment such as a restaurant, taking on the status of customer or member 
of the public. * * * Moreover, when the employee for a substantial amount of 
time before leaving is engaged in an unmistakably personal pursuit, such as 
picking up pieces of coal for his own use, fooling with an unlicensed 
motorcycle, or playing cards and drinking, the interlude is not within the 
course of employment." 1A Larson, the Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 26.10, 
pp. 5-285 to 5-292 (1985).

[¶19.]  The case of Blade v. Mervis, La. App., 226 So. 2d 552 (1969), is somewhat 
similar to this case. There, the claimant, a siding contractor for his employer, 
finished a job and went to his employer's place of business to collect his pay. 
While there, he became involved in a card game and began drinking. He continued 
such activity several hours after collecting his pay. Later he suffered a 
gunshot wound following an argument over a drink. The Louisiana appellate court 
denied worker's compensation and stated:

"In the instant case we 
are satisfied plaintiff was not in the course of his employment at the time he 
sustained the injuries. As we have pointed out, his stay on the defendants' 
premises after he had received the checks had no connection whatsoever with his 
employment or the defendants' business; following receipt of the checks he 
remained on the premises solely and only for his own pleasure, participation in 
the card game and the drinking activities in connection therewith. Since he 
received the checks not later than 1:30 p.m. and the shooting occurred at 
approximately 4:30 p.m., a lapse of three hours during all of which time he was 
engaged in the card game, it is abundantly clear that any reasonable period 
involving preparation for leaving or other similar purposes had expired long 
before the shooting took place." Id., at 556.

See also the 
cases of Knowlton v. Porter Trucking Co., Inc., 117 R.I. 28, 362 A.2d 131 
(1976), and Emmel v. State Compensation Director, 150 W. Va. 277, 145 S.E.2d 29 
(1965), in which worker's compensation was denied employees who remained after 
work to drink and were injured while doing so.

[¶20.]  Of further interest is § 
27-12-102(a)(xii)(B), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), which reads in 
part:

"`Injury' means any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging, and includes 
damage to or loss of a prosthetic appliance and death, arising out of and in the 
course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer, incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. The term does not 
include:

* * * * * 
*

"(B) Injury 
caused by an employee's intoxication or by his willful intention to injure or 
kill himself or another. * * *"

[¶21.]  In Richard v. George Noland Drilling 
Company, 79 Wyo. 124, 331 P.2d 836 (1958), we denied worker's compensation to an 
employee who was intoxicated and died of asphyxiation while lying near a butane 
stove. There we stated that: "* * * [A] claimant in an advanced state of 
intoxication may abandon his employment by making himself incapable of engaging 
in his duties." Id., 79 Wyo. 136, 331 P.2d 840.

[¶22.]  In the present case, Naylor informed his 
supervisor that he was quitting around 5:30 or 6:00 p.m. At that time, the 
supervisor testified he believed Naylor was intoxicated. Naylor did not leave 
the bar until sometime around 8:00 p.m. He was killed when he fell out of his 
van on the way home. There is no evidence which shows that Naylor was to be paid 
for the trip home. Even though the company had paid for some of his gas on an 
intermittent basis in the past, Terry Johnson, president of Railworks, Inc., 
testified that Naylor was not performing any duties or functions for the 
corporation at the time of his death. There was no discussion of gas 
reimbursement when Naylor and Kukuchka quit.

[¶23.]  Payments made by the employer to Naylor 
for transportation were sporadic, and the purpose of such payments was 
uncertain. Slight evidence of these payments is insufficient to establish a 
custom or course of conduct; rather, the payments were a "sometime" thing. 
Appellant failed to demonstrate that the principles set out in Matter of Willey, 
supra, and In re Jensen, supra, apply here.

[¶24.]  In the absence of any showing that the 
employer was to compensate Naylor for his return trip home after quitting, we 
are unable to find that Naylor was acting within the scope of his employment 
when he died. Therefore, we are unable to sustain the trial court's 
determination and award of worker's compensation in this regard. We think 
appellee has failed to meet her burden of proof.

"We will reverse a 
factual determination if there is little or no evidence to support the judgment. 
Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 (1982). This is especially true 
when the evidence is not in conflict.

"`We think that the 
nonconflicting evidence here admits of only one conclusion, and a contrary 
conclusion cannot stand. [Citation.] Even if the evidence here did justify 
either of two reasonable inferences, this court will reverse the finding if it 
can say, as a matter of law, that the inference in favor of the party which did 
not have the burden of proof was more, or at least equally, probable. 
[Citation.] * * *' Murphy v. Stevens, Wyo., 645 P.2d 82, 83 (1982)." Matter of 
Van Matre, supra, 657 P.2d  at 817.

[¶25.]  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's 
determination that Naylor was an "employee" for purposes of worker's 
compensation, but reverse the award of worker's compensation since we find 
Naylor was not within the scope of employment when the accident 
occurred.

CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom URBIGKIT, Justice, joins.

[¶26.]  The trial court found that Naylor was to 
be paid for travel expenses and was therefore within the course of his 
employment at the time of his death. As a matter of law, this reasoning was 
sound. If an employer assumes an obligation to transport a worker as an express 
or implied part of an employment contract, the employee is within the course of 
employment during that transportation. In re Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897, 
901-910 (1947). It does not matter what method of travel is employed or whether 
the employee is actually reimbursed for the trip. Id. at 910. If the trial 
court's premise that the employer assumed an obligation to pay Naylor for his 
return trip to Sheridan is supported by substantial evidence, then we should 
affirm the trial court's conclusion that the accident occurred during the course 
of his employment.

[¶27.]  The record contains evidence which shows 
that the employer assumed a general obligation to provide Naylor's 
transportation. First, the employer was aware that the workmen needed 
transportation to Colorado to begin work. The employer testified that he had 
originally considered transport by company vehicle, but the men proposed to 
travel in Naylor's van. However, they could not afford to drive to Colorado 
unless they received money for gas. The employer did in fact pay for the 
gasoline. Second, Mr. Harbel, Naylor's co-worker, stated that Naylor took the 
job on the condition that travel expenses would be paid. Finally, several 
witnesses agreed that Naylor was also reimbursed by the employer for travel 
expenses incurred on trips to Denver, a round trip to Sheridan to get married, 
and daily transport to the work site.

[¶28.]  The trial court could reasonably infer 
that the employer's general transportation obligation included an obligation to 
pay for Naylor's return trip to Sheridan. This is not a situation where the 
employee was simply commuting from his home to a nearby work site. Instead, 
Naylor took an extended work-inspired trip away from his home - the kind of trip 
which an employer generally subsidizes. In In re Jensen, supra, 178 P.2d  at 910, 
we quoted with approval the following statement made by the United States 
Supreme Court in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 330 U.S. 469, 67 S. Ct. 801, 810, 91 L. Ed. 1028 (1947):

"`[T]here was also 
evidence that the distant location * * *, the hours of work and the inadequacy 
of public transportation facilities all combined to make it essential, as a 
practical matter, that the employer furnish transportation in some manner if 
employees were to be obtained for the job. This was not a case of employees traveling 
in the same city between home and work. Extended cross-country transportation 
was necessary. And it was transportation of a type that an employer might fairly 
be expected to furnish. Such evidence illustrates the setting in which the 
contract was drawn.'" (Emphasis added)

[¶29.]  The trial court's conclusion that the 
employer was obligated to pay for Naylor's return trip to Sheridan was valid 
even though Naylor quit his job before the trip. In his treatise on Workmen's 
Compensation, Professor Larson states:

"[W]hen the employee is * 
* * any worker whose duties include a journey to some distant point in the 
course of which he is considered within his employment, such an employee, fired 
in the midst of his journey, remains within the course of his employment as he 
makes his way back to his starting-point." 1A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation 
Law § 26.10 at 5-293 (1985).

This rule should 
also apply to the worker who quits his job at a distant job site under the 
circumstances of this case. Wages paid here were incredibly meager and the 
working conditions so intolerable as to in effect force Naylor to quit his job. 
An employer who chooses this course of action rather than discharging an 
employee should not benefit by defeating his worker's compensation claim. In any 
event, both the fired worker and the quitting worker presumably went to the site 
for their employer's benefit. Once they arrived at the job site, the trip home 
became inevitable - whether they quit under these circumstances, were fired, or 
stayed on until the project was completed. Since the return trip is a necessary 
adjunct to the job and the employer has impliedly agreed to pay for it, the 
worker remains within the course of employment during that trip even if it takes 
place earlier than expected.

[¶30.]  The majority makes much of Naylor's 
apparent intoxication before he left for Sheridan. But he was not injured while 
he was in the bar drinking. He was killed several hours later while traveling as 
a passenger in a vehicle on his way home. Even if he left the course of 
employment while drinking, he did not necessarily leave the course of employment 
forever. The issue is whether he was in the course of employment when he 
died.

[¶31.]  There was sufficient evidence for the 
trial court to conclude that Naylor's employment contract contained an implied 
term that he be paid for his return trip. He was, therefore, within the course 
of employment when he was killed. I would affirm the trial court's decision 
granting benefits.