Case Title: In re A.J.

Citation: 2016-Ohio-8196

Docket Number: 2016-0353

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re A.J., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8196.] 
  
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8196 
IN RE A.J. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re A.J., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8196.] 
Juvenile procedure—Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-05—Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-
18—Substitute-care placement—Exclusion of a relative as a substitute 
caregiver. 
(No. 2016-0353—Submitted August 16, 2016—Decided December 20, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Crawford County, 
No. 3-15-12, 2016-Ohio-248. 
_____________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether a children-services 
agency followed Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-05 and 5101:2-42-18, which set forth 
conditions for the placement of a child with a suitable relative in a substitute-care 
setting.  The plain language of the administrative code provisions does not support 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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the interpretation proposed by appellant, Brittany J.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Brittany gave birth to A.J. in July 2014 while serving the first month 
of a nearly five-year prison sentence for robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) 
and drug possession in violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(1).  Appellee Crawford 
County Department of Job and Family Services (“agency”) filed a complaint 
alleging that A.J. was a neglected child pursuant to R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) because of 
Brittany’s incarceration.  The agency’s complaint requested permanent custody of 
A.J. 
{¶ 3} Following a shelter-care hearing, the juvenile court committed A.J. to 
the temporary custody of the agency, pending further hearings.  The court ordered 
the agency to “evaluate the homes of available relative placements” with whom the 
agency could place the child.  The court scheduled an adjudication hearing for 
August 18, 2014. 
{¶ 4} Prior to the adjudication hearing, A.J.’s maternal grandmother and 
maternal great-grandmother moved to intervene and seek temporary custody of A.J.  
The agency opposed the motion because the grandmother had been involved with 
the agency several times and Brittany had not requested placement with the 
grandmother and the great-grandmother had failed a home-study evaluation. 
{¶ 5} On August 18, 2014, the court held an adjudication hearing and 
concluded that A.J. was a neglected child pursuant to R.C. 2151.03(A)(2).  Among 
those present at the hearing were court-appointed counsel for A.J.’s reputed father, 
Brian, court-appointed counsel for Brittany, and counsel for A.J.’s maternal 
grandmother and maternal great-grandmother.  Neither the mother nor the reputed 
father were present. 
{¶ 6} At the parties’ request, the court postponed the disposition portion of 
the hearing to allow the agency time to investigate possible placement with Brian.  
January Term, 2017 
 
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The court continued the previous order granting temporary custody of A.J. to the 
agency.  The court also denied the grandmothers’ motion to intervene. 
{¶ 7} On October 10, 2014, the court held the disposition hearing.  Present 
at the hearing were representatives of the agency, the assistant prosecuting attorney, 
court-appointed counsel for Brittany, court-appointed counsel for Brian, counsel 
for the grandmothers, and a guardian ad litem to represent A.J.’s interests.  The 
agency withdrew its request for permanent custody based on indications from 
Brittany and Brian that they intended to fully cooperate with the agency’s efforts to 
pursue reunification of A.J. with Brian.  But the parties agreed that A.J. be formally 
committed to the agency’s temporary custody.  The court ordered reasonable 
visitation arrangements be permitted between A.J. and Brian and adopted the 
agency’s case plan with a stated goal of reunifying A.J. with Brian. 
{¶ 8} On January 22, 2015, the agency filed its semiannual administrative 
review (“SAR”).  The SAR stated that the agency’s goal was reunification of A.J. 
with Brian but that insufficient progress had been made toward that goal.  
Specifically, the report noted that Brian’s housing had not been verified, his income 
was unknown, and he had failed to visit A.J.  The SAR also stated that the agency 
had checked relatives whose names were provided by Brittany, but none were 
considered to be an appropriate placement.  According to the SAR, A.J.’s foster 
placement was a safe and stable environment that met all of the child’s needs.  The 
court approved and adopted the findings in the SAR on January 28, 2015. 
{¶ 9} The next day, the agency moved for permanent custody.  The motion 
stated that the father had failed to cooperate with completing the case plan 
objectives and that it had evaluated “all other possible placements” but had 
determined them to be unavailable or unsuitable.  The court scheduled a hearing for 
April 2015 and issued Brittany and Brian summonses and notices of termination of 
parental rights. 
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{¶ 10} Before the hearing on the motion, the judge received ex parte 
correspondence from Brittany asking why placement of A.J. with a maternal aunt, 
Jody J., had been denied.  Brittany or her mother filed a pro se response to the 
motion for permanent custody that stated that Jody had been told she was approved 
for placement of A.J. and that accused the agency and court of “secret dealings.” 
{¶ 11} Brittany also contacted the court asking that counsel be appointed.  
The court then appointed substitute counsel on March 26, 2015.  Brittany later 
requested new substitute counsel on the grounds that the second appointed counsel 
was biased against her and was not willing to advocate for her. 
{¶ 12} After a continuance requested by the agency, the court held the 
permanent-custody hearing on May 26, 2015.  In attendance were a representative 
of the agency, the assistant county prosecutor, court-appointed counsel for Brittany, 
court-appointed counsel for Brian, and the guardian ad litem, who had filed a report 
stating that granting permanent custody in the agency was in A.J.’s best interests.  
Brian was not present and his counsel was not able to explain the reason for the 
absence.  Brittany was not present because she was incarcerated. 
{¶ 13} As a preliminary matter, the court inquired about Brittany’s request 
for substitute counsel.  After discussion with the parties present, the judge declined 
to appoint new substitute counsel. 
{¶ 14} Susan Bauer, the agency’s foster-care and adoption coordinator, 
testified that Jody had been charged with child endangering in 2002 and that that 
conduct excluded her as a foster placement.  Bauer also testified that the second 
reason the agency denied placement of A.J. with Jody was because, at the time of 
Jody’s home study, she did not have any income. 
{¶ 15} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted permanent 
custody to the agency.  In a written opinion issued on June 23, 2015, the court set 
forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered A.J. committed to the 
January Term, 2017 
 
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permanent custody of the agency for appropriate adoptive placement.  The court 
terminated the parental rights of Brittany and Brian. 
{¶ 16} On appeal, Brittany argued that the agency did not make a good-faith 
effort to reunify the parent and the child, because A.J. could have been placed with 
Brian or Jody, and that the trial court’s decision was not supported by clear and 
convincing evidence.  The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed.  The appellate 
court concluded that the testimony presented at the permanent-custody hearing 
established an appropriate basis for rejecting Jody as a relative caregiver. 
{¶ 17} We accepted Brittany’s discretionary appeal to review the following 
proposition:  
 
Absent proof of conviction of one of the charges specified in 
O.A.C. 5101:2-42-18, a children services agency does not act in 
“good faith”/ignores the mandates of O.A.C. 5101:2-42-05 when it 
refuses to place a minor child in substitute care with a relative based 
solely upon allegations that are in excess of ten (10) years old. 
 
See 145 Ohio St.3d 1443, 2016-Ohio-1596, 48 N.E.3d 583. 
{¶ 18} The proposition before us relates only to the agency’s decision not 
to place A.J. in Jody’s care as a substitute caregiver.  We are not asked to review 
the agency’s conclusion not to place A.J. with Brian and to terminate his parental 
rights.  We are also not asked to review the court’s decision to terminate Brittany’s 
parental rights and grant permanent custody to the agency.  We limit our discussion 
and holding to the narrow issue before us. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 19} We apply the same rules of construction to interpreting 
administrative regulations as we do to interpreting statutory provisions.  McFee v. 
Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 126 Ohio St.3d 183, 2010-Ohio-2744, 931 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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N.E.2d 1069, ¶ 27.  Thus, we give the words of the administrative rules their plain 
and ordinary meaning to discern the intent of the rule.  State ex rel. Brilliant Elec. 
Sign Co. v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.2d 51, 54, 386 N.E.2d 1107 (1979). 
{¶ 20} Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-18 identifies a number of factors that 
could disqualify a relative or nonrelative from being named a substitute caregiver.  
For example, if the relative or nonrelative has been convicted of or pleaded guilty 
to certain offenses enumerated in the rules, the agency “shall not approve” 
placement unless conditions set forth in the rules apply.  Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-
42-18(H).  One of those conditions is that ten years has passed from the time the 
person was fully discharged from prison or probation.  Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-
18(H). 
{¶ 21} A conviction of or plea of guilty to child endangering under R.C. 
2919.22 is one of the enumerated offenses that precludes placement.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 5101:2-42-18(I).  But based on Bauer’s hearing testimony, the charge 
did not exclude placement with Jody because nothing in the record established that 
she had been convicted of or pleaded guilty to the offense, and over ten years had 
elapsed since she was charged.  In fact, Bauer testified that the case, which 
originated in Richland County, was ultimately closed.  Thus, Brittany is correct that 
the plain language of the rule requires proof of a conviction or guilty plea.  And had 
the trial court relied solely on Bauer’s testimony that Jody had been charged with 
endangering a child, we might accept the argument that she should not have been 
excluded from being named a substitute caregiver. 
{¶ 22} However, Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-18 requires the agency to 
adhere to additional procedures before placing a child with a relative substitute 
caregiver.  For example, the agency must “[a]ssess the prospective caregiver’s 
ability and willingness to provide care and supervision of the child and to provide 
a safe and appropriate placement for the child.”  Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-
18(B)(6).  Bauer testified that another reason the agency denied placement of A.J. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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with Jody was because, at the time of Jody’s home study, she did not have any 
income.  Thus, contrary to what the proposition asserts, the allegation of child 
endangering was not the sole basis for the agency’s decision. 
{¶ 23} Additionally, to the extent the proposition of law asserts that the 
agency must act in good faith, we note that the plain language of Ohio Adm.Code 
5101:2-42-18 does not use those words.  Prior to 1989, the statute governing a 
motion for permanent custody, R.C. 2151.414, required a juvenile court to find that 
the agency had made a good faith effort to implement the agency’s reunification 
plan.  But the statute was changed to require that an agency make reasonable efforts 
to implement a reunification plan.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 89, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
198, 238-242.  See In re Lacy, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA93-06-101, 994 WL 372231.  
We decline to read language into the rules that the General Assembly removed from 
the corresponding statutes. 
{¶ 24} Pursuant to the plain language of the rules, placement of the child 
with a substitute caregiver is in the agency’s discretion based on an assessment of 
the child’s best interest.  Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-18(A).  In fact, a substitute 
care setting must be “consistent with the best interest and special needs of the 
child.”  Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-05(E). 
{¶ 25} Particularly relevant here is that the substitute-care setting must be 
“the least restrictive, most family-like setting available to meet the child’s 
emotional and physical needs” and must “provide a safe environment for the child.”  
Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-05(E)(1) and (5).  Although the rules define the home 
of a suitable relative as the least restrictive setting for a substitute-care setting while 
an agency has temporary custody, a foster home is on the list of least restrictive 
placements if there is no suitable relative or nonrelative with whom to place the 
child.  Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-05(F).  Thus, Jody’s suitability was a key 
determination for the agency while it had temporary custody of A.J. 
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{¶ 26} Here, the record indicates that Jody’s lack of income excluded her 
as a relative substitute caregiver for A.J.  Jody was not present at the dispositional 
hearing in October 2014 or at the permanent-custody hearing in January 2015 to 
contest the agency’s determination and the record does not reveal why she was 
absent.  Nor is there any indication in the record that Brittany or Jody objected to 
the agency’s reunification plan to place A.J. with Brian or that Jody moved for 
permanent custody of A.J. or objected to reunifying A.J. with Brian. 
{¶ 27} Although Brittany’s proposition addresses substitute-care placement 
rather than the trial court’s permanent-custody determination, a trial court’s 
decision in a custody proceeding is subject to reversal only upon a showing of abuse 
of discretion.  Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 417, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997).  
Given the narrow scope of the appeal, and the record before us, we cannot say that 
the trial court abused its discretion in not finding error in the agency’s decision to 
deny Jody as a substitute caregiver when the agency had temporary custody of A.J. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 28} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
PFEIFER, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, J. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 30} In my view, the Crawford County Department of Job and Family 
Services (“agency”) did not comply with Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-05(E)(1) by 
selecting a substitute care setting that “[i]s considered the least restrictive, most 
family-like setting available to meet the child’s emotional and physical needs.”  
“The home of a suitable relative” is the least restrictive setting, Ohio Adm.Code 
January Term, 2017 
 
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5101:2-42-05(F)(1), and here, in my view, the agency failed to show that Jody J., 
the great aunt of A.J., is an unsuitable relative. 
{¶ 31} The agency based its finding of unsuitability on an allegation of child 
endangering that was more than a decade old and on Jody’s lack of income at the 
time of her home study.  The majority correctly concludes the child endangering 
charge did not preclude placement with Jody (see Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-
18(H)), but finds “the record indicates that Jody’s lack of income excluded her as a 
relative substitute caregiver for A.J.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 32} Here, however, the majority failed to consider that Ohio Adm.Code 
5101:2-42-18 contemplates that a relative may be suitable to care for a child but 
may require financial or other assistance.  Division (B)(4) of the regulation 
mandates that prior to placing a child with a relative substitute caregiver, the agency 
shall “[p]rovide the prospective caregiver with known information regarding 
educational, medical, child care, and special needs of the child including 
information on how to access support services to meet the needs of the child.”  In 
addition, division (B)(5) mandates that prior to placement, the agency provide the 
prospective caregiver with information on how to apply for Ohio Works First child-
only financial assistance and Medicaid coverage and for certification as a foster 
caregiver and information on the requirements for foster caregiver certification, the 
difference in payment between an Ohio Works First child-only payment and the 
foster care per diem, and any difference in eligibility for supportive services. 
{¶ 33} This record is silent about whether the agency gave this information 
to Jody, and it contains no information about her assets or employment history or 
prospects aside from the fact that she may have a teaching license.  The only 
information in the record about Jody’s financial situation is that she had no income 
at the time the agency conducted the home study.  That fact, standing alone, does 
not demonstrate Jody is unsuitable to care for A.J. 
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{¶ 34} Accordingly, the record does not demonstrate that the agency 
complied with Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-05(E)(1), and thus, the court of appeals 
erroneously concluded that the testimony presented at the permanent custody 
hearing “established an appropriate basis for rejecting [Jody] as a relative 
caregiver.”  3rd Dist. Crawford No. 3-15-12, 2016-Ohio-248, ¶ 42.  Therefore, I 
would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, vacate the judgment of the trial 
court granting permanent custody to the agency, and instruct the trial court to order 
a new home study where the agency can evidence its compliance with Ohio 
Adm.Code 5101:2-42-05(E)(1) and make an appropriate placement consistent with 
the Ohio Administrative Code. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Starkey and Stoll, Ltd., and Geoffrey L. Stoll, for appellant. 
Matthew Crall, Crawford County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael J. 
Wiener, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Crawford County Job and 
Family Services. 
_________________