Case Title: Clark v. Gale

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-312

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Clark v. Gale1998 WY 127966 P.2d 431Case Number: 97-312, 97-313Decided: 10/02/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Robert CLARK, Suzanne Clark, and Robert J. Clark, II, 
Appellants (Defendants),

v.

Loren GALE, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Leona F. Ganow, Deceased, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Loren GALE, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Leona F. Ganow, Deceased, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Robert CLARK and Suzanne 
Clark, Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Fremont County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J.

 

William L. 
Miller of Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, for the 
Clarks.

Frank Andrews, 
Riverton, for Loren Gale.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.; and NICHOLAS G. 
KALOKATHIS, D.J.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This case 
involves a dispute over estate assets. The trial court held a jury trial and 
entered a judgment and order in accordance with the jury's verdict. The parties 
cross-appealed from the trial court's judgment and order.

[¶2]      We affirm in 
part, reverse in part, and remand.

ISSUES

[¶3]      In Case No. 
97-312, Appellants Robert Clark (Bob), Suzanne Clark (Suzanne), and Robert Clark 
II (Robbie) (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Clarks") present the 
following issues on appeal:

I. Did the trial 
court err when it allowed testimony regarding what a deceased person had said 
over the defendant[s'] hearsay objections?

II. Did the 
trial court err when it allowed a witness to testify that the decedent "appeared 
to trust" one of the defendants?

III. Did the 
trial court err when it refused to permit the defendants to inquire into why the 
plaintiff chose not to pursue the estate of a previously named 
defendant?

[¶4]      In Case No. 
97-313, Appellant Loren Gale (Loren), as the personal representative of the 
estate, offers the following issues, which he phrased as statements, for our 
review:

A. There was no 
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support a money judgment for services to 
a family member in the household[.]

B. The money 
judgment was contrary to law[.]

FACTS

[¶5]      Leona Ganow 
(Leona) and Earl Ganow (Earl) had three children: Ramona Gale (Ramona); Delores 
Clark (Delores); and Wayne Ganow. Loren was Ramona's husband. Delores was 
married to Bob, and they had two children: Suzanne and 
Robbie.

[¶6]      Although there 
were some discrepancies in the record, it appears that Delores and her two 
children lived with Leona and Earl in their home in Riverton from 1972 until 
1977. Bob was working away from Riverton during the weeks, but he spent his 
weekends in an apartment in the Ganows' garage. Bob and Delores were granted a 
divorce in 1978, and Earl passed away in December 1981.

[¶7]      Bob filed for 
bankruptcy in 1985 and again in 1987. In 1989, a creditor bank foreclosed upon 
Bob's ranch. Bob lived in Leona's garage apartment from October 1990 until the 
summer of 1991 when he moved to Chicago, Illinois. He returned to Riverton in 
the summer of 1992, and he resided in the garage apartment from that time 
forward. Delores apparently lived with Leona again from July 1992 until February 
1993. Delores passed away later in 1993.

[¶8]      Bob did not pay 
rent or for the utilities on the apartment, and Leona paid for most of his food 
and other expenses. Bob worked around the house, doing odd jobs and helping to 
care for Leona. In 1994, Bob began helping Leona manage her financial 
affairs.

[¶9]      In December 1994, 
Leona executed a durable power of attorney appointing Ramona as her attorney in 
fact. She also executed a will devising her real property to Ramona and 
reserving a life estate in the apartment for Bob. Leona prepared a personal 
property addendum to her will that provided the household goods and furnishings 
would go to Bob, Suzanne, and Robbie.

[¶10]   In June 1995, Suzanne returned to 
Riverton to help care for Leona. Suzanne was in the process of obtaining a 
divorce, and she did not have a place to live or a vehicle to drive. Suzanne 
lived in Leona's house and did not pay rent.

[¶11]   In July 1995, Leona underwent 
surgery, and, during the night following the surgery, she became disoriented. 
The next day, various members of the family had a heated discussion about 
getting full-time care for Leona. Although the family did not reach an agreement 
with regard to Leona's care, Suzanne continued to live with her grandmother and 
to care for her.

[¶12]   On September 27, 1995, Leona 
revoked the durable power of attorney appointing Ramona as her attorney in fact, 
and she executed a new durable power of attorney appointing her sister, Bernice 
Burns (Bernice), as her attorney in fact. On September 30, 1995, Bernice, as 
Leona's attorney in fact, executed a quitclaim deed to convey Leona's house to 
Robbie and Suzanne, as joint tenants.

[¶13]   In November 1995, Leona suffered a 
serious stroke. The district court subsequently appointed Ramona as the 
conservator of Leona's estate and Suzanne as the guardian of her person. Leona 
died on December 28, 1995; she was eighty-two years old at the time of her 
death. In accordance with her will, Loren was appointed as the personal 
representative for Leona's estate. He filed an action in the district court 
against Bob, Suzanne, Robbie, and Bernice to have the quitclaim deed set aside 
that was executed by Bernice on Leona's behalf and to quiet title to the 
property in the estate. Loren claimed that Leona was incompetent to execute the 
power of attorney in favor of Bernice and that Bernice did not have the 
authority to convey Leona's real property. He also asserted claims against Bob, 
Suzanne, Robbie, and Bernice for conspiracy to defraud.

[¶14]   The defendants answered Loren's 
complaint, and Bob and Suzanne filed counterclaims for payment from the estate 
for the services they had rendered to Leona during her lifetime. Bernice died 
before the case was tried, and Loren elected not to pursue his claims against 
her estate. The case was eventually tried to a jury, and the jury returned 
special interrogatories finding that: (1) Leona was competent to execute the 
durable power of attorney in favor of Bernice; (2) Bob and Suzanne exercised 
undue influence over Leona; (3) Bernice exceeded her authority as attorney in 
fact when she executed the quitclaim deed; (4) Leona did not ratify Bernice's 
conveyance of the property; and (5) Bob was entitled to receive $21,738.36 and 
Suzanne was entitled to receive $21,738.37 for the services they had provided to 
Leona. The trial court entered a judgment and order on the basis of the jury's 
verdict. The Clarks and Loren subsequently perfected their cross-appeals to this 
Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary 
Rulings - Case No. 97-312

[¶15]   In Case No. 97-312, the Clarks 
claim that the trial court erred by either allowing improper evidence to be 
admitted or refusing to admit proper evidence. Loren counters that the trial 
court's rulings on the admissibility of the evidence were correct and that, even 
if the trial court erred, the errors were not prejudicial.

1. Standard of 
Review

[¶16]   The trial court has discretion in 
determining whether or not evidence is admissible. MMOE v. MJE, 841 P.2d 820, 
828 (Wyo. 1992). We will reverse a trial court's decision on the admissibility 
of evidence only if the trial court abused its discretion. Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1995). "A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts 
in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is 
whether or not the court could [have] reasonably conclude[d] as it did." 
Hilterbrand v. State, 930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶17]   Our court rules and case law direct 
us to disregard errors that are harmless and do not affect the parties' 
substantial rights. W.R.C.P. 61; W.R.A.P. 9.04; W.R.E. 103; see also Waggoner v. 
General Motors Corporation, 771 P.2d 1195, 1202 (Wyo. 1989). "An error warrants 
reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial 
rights." Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Wyo. 1995). For an error to 
be prejudicial, it must " 'cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to 
the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process' [or possess] '. 
. . a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.' " Natural Gas Processing 
Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Gluckauf v. Pine Lake 
Beach Club, Inc., 78 N.J. Super. 8, 187 A.2d 357, 366 (N.J. Super. 1963)). See 
also Ahearn v. Tri-County Federal Savings Bank, 948 P.2d 896, 898 (Wyo. 
1997).

2. 
Hearsay

[¶18]   The Clarks maintain that, over 
their objections, the trial court allowed various witnesses to testify 
concerning Leona's statements. They claim that these statements were 
inadmissible hearsay and that the admission of the statements was prejudicial to 
them.

[¶19]   At the trial, Loren related Leona's 
statement that she did not know where Ramona was. Loren and Ramona both 
testified that Leona made statements to the effect that she was not aware of how 
Bob was handling her funds. Ramona also testified that Leona said Bob could live 
in the apartment for as long as he needed to live there. Loren elicited similar 
testimony from one of Leona's neighbors who testified concerning the statements 
Leona made about her loving feelings for Bob and his right to remain in the 
apartment.

[¶20]   The Clarks contend that the 
admission of this testimony was prejudicial to them because the testimony showed 
that confidential relationships existed between Bob and Leona and between 
Suzanne and Leona and that Bob and Suzanne exercised undue influence over Leona. 
Bob and Suzanne argue further that the testimony was prejudicial because it 
showed that Bob was not entitled to Leona's house and that Leona did not, 
therefore, ratify Bernice's execution of the quitclaim 
deed.

[¶21]   Hearsay is defined as being "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." W.R.E. 
801(c). Hearsay generally is not admissible unless the evidence falls within a 
recognized exception to the hearsay rule. W.R.E. 802 to 804; see also Owen v. 
State, 902 P.2d 190, 195 (Wyo. 1995). "In the absence of a statutory provision, 
the death of a declarant is not in itself a ground for invoking an exception to 
the hearsay rule." 29A AM.JUR.2D Evidence § 828 at 214 (1994). Wyoming does not 
have a statute that makes a deceased declarant's statements admissible per se. A 
deceased declarant's testimony must fall within an exception to the hearsay rule 
in order for it to be admissible.

[¶22]   Loren's testimony that Leona stated 
she did not know Ramona's whereabouts was not hearsay because it was not offered 
for the truth of the matter being asserted. Leona's statements were not related 
to the jury to show that Ramona was missing but, instead, were related to show 
Leona's state of mind. See Tageant v. State, 737 P.2d 764, 766 (Wyo. 1987). Much 
of the remainder of the testimony relating to Leona's statements was hearsay and 
did not fall within the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. The admission 
of the hearsay testimony, however, was harmless under the circumstances of this 
case.

[¶23]   The testimony concerning Leona's 
statements about how Bob was handling her funds shed light on the relationship 
between Bob and Leona. A wealth of appropriate evidence pertaining to the 
relationship between Bob and Leona was presented. The admission of the hearsay 
testimony, which simply corroborated the appropriate evidence, was, therefore, 
harmless. See Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 641 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶24]   Leona's will corroborated the 
testimony relating to her statements that Bob was not going to get the house but 
that he could live in the apartment as long as he wanted to. The Clarks were 
not, therefore, prejudiced by its admission. Furthermore, we fail to see the 
significance of this testimony in light of the issues presented in the case. Bob 
was not entitled to the house under any circumstances. If the quitclaim deed had 
been declared to be valid, Suzanne and Robbie would have been the owners of the 
house. The trial court did not commit reversible errors when it allowed the 
hearsay statements to be admitted into evidence at the 
trial.

3. Testimony 
that Leona Appeared to Trust Suzanne

[¶25]   The Clarks maintain that the trial 
court erred by allowing Michelle Webber (Michelle) to testify that Leona 
appeared to trust Suzanne because no showing was made that Michelle had personal 
knowledge about that matter. They also claim that Michelle's testimony was 
improper opinion testimony by a lay witness. The Clarks insist that the 
testimony had a strong bearing on the issue of whether or not a confidential 
relationship existed between Suzanne and Leona and that its admission, 
therefore, prejudiced them. Loren argues that the testimony was 
appropriate.

[¶26]   At the trial, Loren's attorney 
questioned Michelle in part:

Q. Did she 
appear to trust Suzanne?

[THE CLARKS' 
ATTORNEY]: Objection, Your Honor. "Appear to trust" is 
vague.

THE COURT: I'll 
overrule.

[THE CLARKS' 
ATTORNEY]: Speculation.

THE COURT: I'll 
overrule. I'll let her answer.

A. Yes, she did 
trust Susie.

[¶27]   "A witness may not testify to a 
matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has 
personal knowledge of the matter." W.R.E. 602. A lay witness' "testimony in the 
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which 
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a 
clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." 
W.R.E. 701.

[¶28]   Michelle testified that she was 
Leona's neighbor for a long period of time and that she frequented the house 
while Suzanne was caring for Leona. She knew both Leona and Suzanne well. 
Sufficient evidence showing that Michelle had personal knowledge of the 
relationship between Leona and Suzanne was, therefore, presented. She rationally 
based her opinion that Leona trusted Suzanne on her perception of the 
relationship between the two women, and her testimony was helpful to the jury 
because the nature of the relationship between Leona and Suzanne was at issue in 
the case. The evidence was, therefore, admissible. It was up to the jury to 
determine the weight to be given to, and the quality of, Michelle's testimony. 
See Brockett v. Prater, 675 P.2d 638, 642 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶29]   Furthermore, a home health care 
worker, who helped care for Leona, also testified that Leona appeared to trust 
Suzanne. Suzanne testified that Leona called on her whenever she needed 
something and that Leona had confidence in her. The Clarks did not complain 
about the admission of the home health care worker's testimony or Suzanne's 
testimony. We cannot see any reason, in light of the other evidence that was 
presented in the case, why the admission of Michelle's opinion testimony, which 
simply confirmed the other testimony, could have possibly been harmful to the 
Clarks.

4. Inquiry About 
Loren's Choice not to Pursue Claims Against Bernice's 
Estate

[¶30]   The Clarks contend that the trial 
court erred when it refused to allow them to inquire as to why Loren abandoned 
his claims against Bernice's estate. Loren contends that the trial court 
properly excluded that evidence because it was irrelevant to the issues being 
presented at the trial.

[¶31]   Loren originally asserted claims 
against Bernice for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. During the pendency of 
the lawsuit, Bernice died, and Loren elected not to pursue his claims against 
her estate. At the trial, the Clarks' counsel questioned Loren in 
part:

Q. And you 
initially claimed that Bernice was part of the - Bernice Burns was part of this 
conspiracy to defraud -

A. 
Right.

Q. - Leona, 
didn't you?

And you've 
chosen not to pursue that claim against her estate, haven't 
you?

A. I was 
instructed by [my attorney] that I had a choice to make, and that we chose to 
release Bernice's estate and pursue this course of action.

Q. So you're not 
pursuing a claim against Bernice Burns' estate, are you?

A. 
No.

Q. Does that 
mean you don't think Bernice did anything wrong?

A. 
(Laughing.)

[LOREN'S 
ATTORNEY]: Objection. Calls for legal conclusion.

THE COURT: 
Overruled. You may answer.

A. Yes. I think 
Bernice did something wrong.

Q. (BY [THE 
CLARKS' ATTORNEY]) But you're not bringing any claim against her in this matter, 
are you? Or her estate? Excuse me.

 A. Well, 
again, based on advice of counsel, we had - we could choose action against her 
estate or against the property. And because my understanding was that we had to 
make a choice, we were originally concerned about the property and that's the 
way we chose to go.

That doesn't 
mean that we don't think Bernice had anything to do with it. It's simply that we 
made the choice that this is the way we wanted to go.

Q. You made the 
choice not to pursue Bernice and that's a yes or no 
answer.

A. 
Okay.

Q. And isn't it 
true that while Bernice was alive, you chose to pursue Bernice both as against 
the property and for wrongdoing?

[LOREN'S 
ATTORNEY]: Objection. Relevance.

THE COURT: 
Sustained.

[LOREN'S 
ATTORNEY]: I don't know what that's got to do with this 
case.

THE COURT: 
Sustained.

[THE CLARKS' 
ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, I would submit that it is relevant to the extent that he 
has said that he now is not pursuing Bernice because he has to make a choice, 
and at least at one time he did not make that same choice when she was 
alive.

THE COURT: I'm 
still sustaining the objection. Your objection is on the 
record.

[¶32]   Relevant evidence is "evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." W.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible, 
and evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. W.R.E. 
402.

[¶33]   The Clarks argue that the trial 
court should have allowed the evidence to be admitted because it was relevant to 
the issue of whether or not Bernice wrongfully exceeded her authority as Leona's 
attorney in fact. We do not see how questioning Loren about his procedural 
choices would have assisted the jury in determining the issues before it. The 
Clarks have not convinced us that the evidence was relevant, and the trial court 
did not, therefore, abuse its discretion by refusing to allow the Clarks to 
continue with that line of questioning.

B. Money 
Judgments - Case No. 97-313

[¶34]   In Case No. 97-313, Loren claims 
that the jury improperly awarded Bob and Suzanne money judgments for the 
services they had rendered to Leona during her lifetime. He contends that the 
judgments were contrary to law and that sufficient evidence did not support the 
jury's awards. Bob and Suzanne argue that they were entitled to the damages 
awards under the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

The standard for 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is well established. On review, this 
court assumes that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true. We 
leave out of consideration entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful 
party that conflicts with the evidence of the successful party, and we afford to 
the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference that may be 
reasonably and fairly drawn from it.

Kadrmas v. 
Valley West Homeowner's Association, 848 P.2d 826, 828 (Wyo. 1993) (citation 
omitted). See also Turcq v. Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 51-52 (Wyo. 1997). The 
doctrine of unjust enrichment, or quantum meruit, allows for the recovery of 
damages on a contract that has been implied in equity. Eisele v. Rice, 948 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Wyo. 1997).

"The phrase 
'unjust enrichment' is used in law to characterize the result or effect of a 
failure to make restitution of, or for, property or benefits received under such 
circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to account 
therefor. It is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and 
remedies, that one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at 
the expense of another, but should be required to make restitution of or for 
property or benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it is just and 
equitable that such restitution be made, and where such action involves no 
violation or frustration of law or opposition to public policy, either directly 
or indirectly."

R.O. Corporation 
v. John H. Bell Iron Mountain Ranch Company, 781 P.2d 910, 912 (Wyo. 1989) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting 66 AM.JUR.2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3 
at 945 (1973)). See also Coones v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 894 P.2d 613, 617 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶35]   In order to prevail under the 
unjust enrichment doctrine, a party must prove that:

"1) Valuable 
services were rendered, or materials furnished,

"2) to the party 
to be charged,

"3) which 
services or materials were accepted, used and enjoyed by the party, 
and

"4) under such 
circumstances which reasonably notified the party to be charged that the 
plaintiff, in rendering such services or furnishing such materials, expected to 
be paid by the party to be charged. Without such payment, the party would be 
unjustly enriched."

Pancratz 
Company, Inc. v. Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction/Development, Inc., 720 P.2d 906, 
908 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Montes v. Naismith and Trevino Construction Company, 
459 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970)). See also Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 131 (Wyo. 1995). Services that have been rendered by one family member to 
another family member are presumed to have been gratuitous and are not generally 
compensable. Logan v. Logan, 23 Kan. App. 2d 920, 937 P.2d 967, 976 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1997); see also Adkins, 892 P.2d  at 131; Pool v. Pool, 21 Wyo. 435, 133 P. 372, 373 (Wyo. 1913).

"In order for 
one member of a family to recover against the estate of another member for 
services rendered the decedent in his lifetime, the claimant must show either 
that an express contract for remuneration existed or that the circumstances 
under which the services were rendered were such as to exhibit a reasonable and 
proper expectation that there would be compensation. . . ." In re Estate of 
Rogers, 184 Kan. 24, Syl. P 1, 334 P.2d 830 (1959).

Logan, 937 P.2d  
at 976. The Wyoming Supreme Court has defined a family as being "a number of 
persons composing one household and generally speaking hav[ing] one domestic 
government, the members thereof having reciprocal, natural or moral duties to 
support and care for one another." Castor v. Rice, 71 Wyo. 99, 254 P.2d 189, 191 
(Wyo. 1953).

[¶36]   Bob and Suzanne insist that they 
were not members of Leona's family. The record simply does not support their 
contentions. Bob, Suzanne, and Leona lived together on Leona's property. 
Although Bob did not actually live in Leona's house, he lived in an apartment in 
her garage. They spent their free time with one another and took meals together. 
Bob and Suzanne moved freely about the house, and they both called Leona 
"Grandma." Although Bob and Suzanne did chores and took care of Leona's 
property, they did not pay rent for their housing. This evidence clearly shows 
that Bob, Suzanne, and Leona all lived together as a family in one household. 
We, therefore, presume that Bob's and Suzanne's services to Leona were 
gratuitous. They must prove that an express contract existed between them and 
Leona or that they had a reasonable expectation of being paid for their 
services. Logan, 937 P.2d  at 976.

[¶37]   Bob asserted that he was entitled 
to be paid $115,656 for the services he had rendered to Leona from the time he 
left Chicago in 1992 until Leona died in December 1995. He stated that Leona 
told him that she would "pay [him] consideration" for his services.1 Bob claimed that he spent ten hours 
per day, seven days per week caring for Leona and her property in 1992. He 
testified that his working hours increased as time passed: "By January 1993 I 
was spending at least 12 to 13 hours a day, and she was requiring me to do a 
great many more chores. And I had to spend 16 hours a day to care for her." Bob 
stated that he believed a wage of six dollars an hour was "more than fair" for 
the services he had provided to Leona. He admitted, however, that Leona did not 
offer to pay him six dollars per hour and that he did not keep records of the 
hours he actually spent working for Leona.

[¶38]   Suzanne testified that she was 
entitled to be paid $25,776 for the time she spent caring for Leona from July 1, 
1995, until Leona died in December of that year. She stated that her grandmother 
told her that she would be "greatly rewarded monetarily" for her services. 
Suzanne maintained that she cared for Leona twenty-four hours a day, seven days 
per week during that time and that her services were worth six dollars per hour. 
She did not, however, present a record of the time she spent caring for Leona, 
and evidence showing that Suzanne did not provide constant care to her 
grandmother during that time was admitted during the trial. Michelle testified 
that she picked up Suzanne two times per week and that they went out in the 
evenings.

[¶39]   Bob and Suzanne did not testify 
about any agreement they had with Leona regarding the compensation they were to 
be paid or when the payments were to be made. Evidence showing that Leona paid 
other people who provided services to her was presented at the trial, but no 
evidence suggesting that she ever paid Bob or Suzanne direct compensation for 
their services was presented. Furthermore, neither Bob nor Suzanne requested 
payment from Ramona after she was appointed the conservator of Leona's estate. 
Although Leona had the opportunity to change her will to provide compensation 
for Bob and Suzanne, she did not do so. The evidence presented at the trial did 
not establish that an agreement existed for Bob and Suzanne to be compensated 
for their services to Leona or that Bob and Suzanne could have reasonably and 
properly expected to be compensated.

[¶40]   Additionally, adequate evidence was 
not presented to establish that six dollars per hour was reasonable compensation 
for the services Suzanne and Bob had performed. Suzanne testified that six 
dollars per hour was "the same rate as what a girl doing the type of duties I 
was doing would get." She did not embellish on her statement or otherwise 
present evidence to establish that six dollars per hour was a reasonable wage 
for caring for an elderly person and her home. Bob testified that six dollars 
per hour was "more than fair" but did not present an objective basis for that 
statement.

[¶41]   The Clarks' attorney admitted in 
his closing argument that the amounts sought by Bob and Suzanne were "a little 
too much" for the services they had rendered to Leona. He suggested, instead, 
that a reasonable amount for Suzanne's and Bob's services would be the remaining 
value of the estate. The jury acted on the attorney's suggestion and split the 
estate between Suzanne and Bob.

[¶42]   There was simply no rational basis 
for the jury's decision, and we cannot allow it to stand. Even under our lenient 
standard of review, the evidence in this case was not sufficient to support the 
jury's verdict. The evidence is clear that Bob and Suzanne cared for Leona out 
of love and respect for her. It was certainly admirable for them to show such a 
kindness to Leona. Bob and Suzanne were not, however, entitled to be compensated 
for that kindness.

CONCLUSION

[¶43]   We hold that the trial court did 
not commit reversible errors in its rulings on the admissibility of the evidence 
presented at the trial. We further hold that sufficient evidence did not support 
the jury's awards and that the money judgments entered in favor of Bob and 
Suzanne were contrary to law.

[¶44]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded for the entry of an order that is consistent with this 
opinion.

Footnotes

1 Loren 
argues that the dead man statute (WYO. STAT. § 1-12-102 (1997)) precluded a 
judgment from being entered against Leona's estate solely on the basis of 
uncorroborated testimony from Bob and Suzanne because they were adverse parties. 
He did not, however, present this argument to the trial court. Accordingly, we 
will not consider his argument for the first time on appeal. See McCormick v. 
McCormick, 926 P.2d 360, 363-64 (Wyo. 1996); see also Castor, 254 P.2d  at 
192.