Case Title: COMPTON v ALCORN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13335 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 19 7 6 DUANE L. C O M P T O N and SHIRLEY C O M P T O N , husband and wife, P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents, FRED A L C O R N d/b/a ALCORN'S TRAILER CITY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable R. 3 . Nelson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : John M. McCarvel argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondents: LaRue Smith argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Cameron Ferguson appeared, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted : October 20, 1976 Decided :mC 1 4 1 9 7 6 Filed : DEC 14 1376 Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant Fred Alcorn d/b/a Alcorn's Trailer City, appeals from a judgment for plaintiffs Duane L. Compton and Shirley Compton, husband and wife, entered in the district court, Cascade County, for rescission of a retail installment contract to purchase a three bedroom doublewide mobile home for $21,270 ($7,000 down, balance plus interest paid at month). The contract was entered into June 14, 1975, the mobile home delivered July 10, 1975, after payment of the down payment, andinitial installation was completed four days later. After this initial installation Comptons discovered these defects : The home was not level; the two halves did not match up on the outside; the carpet was not properly laid along the seam of the two halves; the damaged dining room table was not exchanged as promised; slip covers were not furnished to cover small holes in the ribbing of the couch; the hanging and installation of a dining room light fixture and the master bathroom light fixture was not completed; the cross-over air duct, heat transfer systems, and electrical connection between the two halves were not completed; nine bolts were omitted underneath the trailer in connecting the two halves; the cabinet support around the dishwasher was broken; the shelf in the front closet was not firmly attached; the smoke detector in the hall leading to the master bedroom was hanging loose; the shelves in the china closet were not assembled; there was no T joint connecting the Wtkz bath to the hot water tank; the heater unit was loose in its alcove; and a full set of keys was not delivered with the home. - 2 - Compton telephoned Alcorn on three separate occasions t o inquire about t h i s delay i n completing the installation, during the period of July 14, 1975 t o August 18, 1975, during which period Mrs. Compton was i n Alabama. Furthermore, he and h i s son finished leveling and blocking the home, and fixed the cabinet support around the dishwasher. The only other work Alcorn did was the repair t o the carpet, and the securing of the heater unit on August 1 and 2, 1975. Sometime between July 10, 1975 and August 1, 1975, the T joint t o connect the master bath and the hot water tank was also installed. Alcorn contends that the remainder of the installation could not be completed u n t i l the u t i l i t i e s were hooked up, and such was the obligation of Comptons. -During the l a s t of July, water damage and stains appeared i n the ceiling of the family room and the h a l l i n the north end of the home from roof leaks a f t e r a rainstorm. O n August 8, 1975 Compton discovered the furnace was not vented t o the outside, leaving the furnace unusable and dangerous. Smoke damage t o the ceiling was also present above the heater, indicating the furnace had been started sometime prior t o delivery, even though no vent was installed. Following t h i s l a s t discovery, Compton awaited h i s wife's return, contacted an attorney and sent h i s notice of rescission t o Alcorn Ahgust 25, 1975. Alcorn made no attempt t o contact the Comptons, contacted h i s attorney, and t h i s s u i t followed. Alcorn questions the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the d i s t r i c t court granting rescission, specifically: 1) That Comptons had performed t h e i r obligations under the contract; 2) That there was a substantial failure of consideration promised by Alcorn t o Comptons; 3) That rescission of the contract was i n order; and 4) Comptons were entitled t o reasonable attorney fees. The scope of review applied t o a d i s t r i c t court's findings of fact and conclusions of law is that t h i s Court w i l l not disturb such i f they are supported by the evidence and the law. Brady v. State Highway Comm'n, 163 Mont. 416, 517 P.2d 738; Timmerman v. Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528; Wash. Water Power Co. v. Morgan Elec. Co., 152 Mont. 126, 448 P.2d 683. A s to the f i r s t issue for review, the record discloses that Comptons had paid a l l monies then owing under the contract, which was t h e i r only obligation within the terms of t h i s contract. The contract i t s e l f makes no mention of the Comptons' obligation t o have the u t i l i t i e s i n working order before f i n a l installation. There, also, was conflicting evidence a s t o the understanding of the parties that complete hookup of the u t i l i t i e s was essential t o f i n a l installation of the mobile home. Both Comptons t e s t i f i e d that the water, sewer, and gas lines had been extended t o the s i t e of the home, but were not connected because they did not intend t o keep the mobile home because of its many defects. Furthermore, we f a i l t o see that the u t i l i t i e s were essential t o complete boltiqg the unit together, fixing the cabinet support around the dishwasher, hanging and installing the l i g h t fixtures i n the dining room and master bathroom, properly installing the smoke detector, replacing a damaged dining room table, assembling the china closet shelves, firmly attaching the front closet shelf, and providing a usable and properly vented furnace. The record also supports the d i s t r i c t court's finding that there was a substantial failure of consideration promised by Alcorn. Comptons sold t h e i r family home i n Great Falls, Montana a s a result of marital problems. Then, a f t e r reconciliation, the family moved into a small three room house i n Vaughn, Montana, i n which M r . Compton had been living, u n t i l adequate housing was found. Alcorn was made aware of t h i s situation and the primary object of the Comptons was t o purchase a - new mobile home t o provide readily available housing for them and t h e i r three children. Expert witness testimony from the c i t y of Great Falls mechanical inspector was that the furnace lacked proper venting, was dangerous t o use and as such violated sections 69-2122 and 69-2123, R.C.M. 1947, which adopts national construction standards for mobile homes issued by United States of America Standards Institute. H e also t e s t i f i e d the mobile home violated these standards for its failure t o have another smoke detector i n the h a l l leading t o the two bedrooms a t the opposite end of the home from the master bedroom. This evidence combined with the other defects substantiates the d i s t r i c t court's finding there was a substantial failure of consideration promised by the s e l l e r Alcorn. Alcorn next alleges the d i s t r i c t court abused its discre- tion i n allowing rescission of the contract. It is not the duty of t h i s Court t o determine whether we agree with the d i s t r i c t court's conclusions, i f supported by the evidence and the law. Stromberg and Brown v. Seaton Ranch Co., 160 Mont. 293, 502 P.2d 41. The d i s t r i c t court concluded that the p a r t i a l breach was so substantial and fundamental as t o defeat the object of the parties i n making the agreement, and that the Comptons did a l l that was necessary t o effectuate rescission. This i s a correct statement of the law allowing rescission of a contract for p a r t i a l breach, Johnson v. Meiers, 118 Mont. 258, 164 P.2d 1012. Furthermore, there is evidence t o support that conclusion. The l a s t issue concerns the award of attorney fees t o Comptons. The contract did p r ~ v i d e attorney fees t o the holder of the contract, should such holder bring a default action on the contract. Section 93-8601.1, R.C.M. 1947, provides a reciprocal r i g h t . t o attorney fees t o - a l l parties t o the contract i n any action on the contract. W e reject Alcorn's interpretation of section 93-8601.1, R.C.M. 1947, that the reciprocal right t o attorney fees exists on'ly when the party who has the right t o attorney fees under the contract i n s t i t u t e s the action. A reading of the section displays the incorrectness of t h a t inter- pretation: "Whenever by virtue of the provisions of any contract or obligation in the nature of a con- t r a c t , made and entered into a f t e r the effective date of t h i s a c t , one party t o such contract o r obligation has an express right t o recover attorney fees from any other party t o the contract i n the event the party having that right s h a l l bring an action upon the contract or obligation, - then i n any action on such contract or obligation - a l l parties t o the contract or obligation s h a l l be deemed t o have the same right t o recover attorney fees, and the prevailing party i n any such action, whether by virtue of the express contractual right, or by virtue of t h i s a c t , s h a l l be entitled t o recover h i s reasonable attorney fees from the losing party parties." (Emphasis supplied.) Seller Alcorn is correct i n h i s contention that evidence i s required t o be introduced a t t r i a l t o allow an award of attorney fees t o e i t h e r party. Crncevich v. Georgetown Recreation Cor- poration, Mont . , 541 P.2d 56, 32 St. Rep. 963. How- ever, such evidence was introduced when the d i s t r i c t court on motion of Comptons, allowed the case t o be reopened a f t e r a motion t o amend the findings and conclusions by the s e l l e r Alcorn, Alcorn contends the motion of Comptons was one governed by Rules 52 and 59, M.R.Civ.P., and as such was not made within the t i m e allowed under those rules, and that the court l o s t jurisdiction t o entertain the motion pursuant t o those rules. These rules govern motions t o amend the d i s t r i c t court's findings and motions for a new t r i a l , respectively. Comptons made neither. What they did was move the d i s t r i c t court t o reopen the case for taking further testimony; they did not want the findings and conclusions altered. It is well settled that the ruling upon a motion t o reopen a case for taking further testimony i s within the sound discretion of the d i s t r i c t court, which w i l l only be reversed on appeal for manifest abuse of that discretion. Gilcrest v. Bowen, 95 Mont. 44, 24 P.2d 141; Nadeau v. The Texas Company, 104 Mont. 558, 69 P.2d 586; Kipp v. Wong, 163 Mont. 476, 517 P.2d 897. The testimony .as t o attorney fees was offered t o support an affidavit previously f i l e d during the t r i a l , a practice accepted by t h i s particular d i s t r i c t court prior t o Crncevich. Also a more accurate account of the time spent on the case by Comptons' attorney, up t o and including motions t o amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law, could be provided a t t h i s time. W e find no manifest abuse of the d i s t r i c t court's discretion i n reopening the.xase t o allow t h i s testimony under these circumstances. The j udgmen t W e Concur: Q_//Lt on. Jack L. Green, District f l u d g e , s i t t i n g for Justice Wesley Castles. Mr.,Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting: I dissent. I do not agree with the fault assigned in the factual recitation by the majority opinion. The purchasers had im- properly prepared the site for such a large building and there- after many problems did occur on both sides of the agreement. I fail to find any breach by the seller of such a substantial and fundamental nature as to defeat the object of the parties to the contract. I further find, in any event, the purchasers did not proceed lproperly to effectuate a rescission. I further feel the reopening of the case for further testimony was a manifest abuse of discretion. The cause should be reversed and remanded , * ' , , 7 f / for a new trial. /,' -" Justice.