Case Title: JOVAN DOVANTE PRESBURY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0111

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOVAN DOVANTE PRESBURY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 32226 P.3d 886Case Number: S-09-0111Decided: 03/22/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
JOVAN 
DOVANTE PRESBURY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. 
Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Jovan Dovante 
Presbury pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery.  After not being given the opportunity to 
address the court during sentencing, he appeals.  We reverse, and remand for 
resentencing.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Presbury states 
his single issue as follows:

 
 
The 
trial court denied Mr. Presbury's right of allocution prior to 
sentencing.

 
 
The 
State responds that

 
 
Although 
the district court did not address [Mr. Presbury] during sentencing, any such 
error was harmless.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Jovan Dovante 
Presbury was charged in Laramie County, Wyoming, with three counts arising out 
of the same incident: conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, accessory to 
aggravated robbery, and robbery.  He 
was later charged with a count of attempted second degree murder, also arising 
out of the same incident.

 
 
[¶4]      Eventually the 
two cases were joined, and the parties reached a plea agreement.  An amended information was filed 
combining the cases, but reducing the charge to a single count of aggravated 
robbery.  Presbury entered a guilty 
plea to this single charge, and was sentenced to a term of fourteen to eighteen 
years with credit for time served.

 
 

[¶5]      Presbury appeals 
based on his claim that the district court failed to follow the requirements of 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1)(C) ("before imposing sentence, the court shall also 
address 
the defendant personally and determine if the defendant wishes to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence.")  Presbury claims that he was never 
addressed by the court, and was thus not offered any opportunity to make a 
statement or present any mitigating information.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      The following 
standard of review applies to alleged errors during 
sentencing:

 
 
Sentencing 
decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial court.  "A sentence 
will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can 
show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and 
circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which 
offends the public sense of fair play."  "An error 
warrants reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's 
substantial rights. The party who is appealing bears the burden to establish 
that an error was prejudicial."

 
 

Carothers 
v. State, 2008 
WY 58, ¶ 23, 185 P.3d 1, 14-15 (Wyo. 2008) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Presbury 
argues on appeal that he should have been given his right to allocution under 
the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure (akin to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure).  The State responds that 
while the record is clear that the district court did not address Presbury at 
sentencing to determine if he wished to make a statement and present any 
mitigating evidence, Presbury nevertheless fails on appeal to show how that 
omission materially prejudiced him  thus, any error by the district court was 
harmless.

 
 
[¶8]      Wyoming Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1)(C) states in relevant part:

 
 
            
(c) Sentence.  

                        
(1) 
Imposition.  --  Before imposing sentence, the 
court shall also:

                        
.

(C) 
Address the defendant personally and determine if the defendant wishes to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation of the 
sentence.

 
 
[¶9]      Rule 32 preserves 
the historically common-law "right to allocution," which this Court has before 
characterized as "constitutionally protected."  A criminal defendant's right to 
allocution is both rule-based and constitutionally protected.  Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 
(Wyo. 1987).  
Moreover,

 
 
            
The origin of a defendant's right to allocution -- to address the court 
before having sentence pronounced -- lies in English common law. Under 
early English criminal practice, an accused was not allowed counsel nor was he a 
competent witness for himself. Allocution provided a convicted defendant the 
only opportunity to speak for himself, and its omission would generally have 
required reversal. Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Question to 
Defendant as to Whether He Has Anything to Say Why Sentence Should Not Be 
Pronounced Against Him, 96 A.L.R.2d 1292, 1295 (1964). In the early days of 
Wyoming jurisprudence, this court did not consider it reversible error if the 
trial court failed to properly allow the defendant to allocute. Kinsler v. 
Territory of Wyoming, 1 Wyo. 112 (1873) (Convicted murderer resentenced 
using procedures in accordance with statutory sentencing provisions). The 
omission of the court to address the defendant did not require a new trial, but 
it did require setting aside the judgment in order to allow compliance with the 
requirement. Keffer v. State, 12 Wyo. 49, 73 P. 556, 560 
(1903).

 
 

Harvey 
v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1081-82 (Wyo. 1992).

 
 
[¶10]   Federal courts have recognized that 
in the absence of an opportunity to allocute being given, it is almost 
impossible to ascertain what the effect of the opportunity would have been had 
the error not occurred.  See United States v. Luepke, 495 F.3d 443, 451 (7th Cir. 2007) (when there has been a violation of the 
right to allocute, a reviewing court should presume prejudice when there is any 
possibility that the defendant would have received a lesser sentence had the 
district court heard from him before imposing sentence); United States v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 
1252 (11th Cir. 2002) ("prejudice must be found if a defendant has 
not been given the opportunity to speak to the court when the possibility of a 
lower sentence existed"); United States 
v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 
2008) ("The government concedes that a denial of allocution is per se 
prejudicial and requires a remand without an investigation of 
prejudice").

 
 
[¶11]   In this case, Presbury, who at the 
time was 20 years old, was sentenced to fourteen to eighteen years in 
prison.  He was not addressed by the 
court, nor was he given a chance to say anything on his own behalf.  Whether or not he would have done so is 
unknown, but the rule is clear in its language ("Before imposing sentence, the 
court shall").  We reject the 
State's argument that the error in this case was harmless.  Presbury should have been afforded his 
right to allocution, and therefore, we remand for resentencing after he has been 
given a chance to exercise his right.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   Because Presbury was denied his 
right to allocution by the district court, we remand Mr. Presbury's case to the 
district court for resentencing after he has been afforded an opportunity to 
allocute under W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1)(C).