Case Title: Silva v. City and County of Honolulu.

Citation: 115 Haw. 1

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Law Liprany

 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

00

 

LORIN SILVA and CAROL SILVA, individually and as
personal representative of the Estate of Kevin Silva,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, Defendant-Appellee,
and

10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10,
DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, and DOE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 1-10,

Defendants. a
No. 27385
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 05-1-0286-02)

 

‘Sn¥fonr

oats

 

20:6 we oF

AUGUST 10, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ., AND
JL, RECUSED

CIRCUIT JUBGE CHANG, IN PLACE OF ACOBA,

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, Jy

‘The plaintiffs-appellants Lorin and Carol Silva
Ihereinafter, collectively, “the Plaintiffs”) appeal from the
the Honorable

firet cireult court’s dune 14, 2008 judgment,

Randal K,0, Lee presiding, in favor of the defendant-appellee
City and County cf Honolulu [hereinafter, “the County”] and

effectively dismissing their complaint

 

against the Plaintiffs,
$04 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS 2ND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
On appeal to this court, the Plaintiffs contend that:
(2) Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 663-3(b) (Supp. 1997)! is

the controlling statute of limitations in wrongful death actions

 

against the County, not HRS § 46-72 (Supp. 1998); (2) in any

case, the “Plaintiffs substantially complied with the provisions

of HRS § 46-72"; (3) the notice period “should have been tolled

until . . . a personal representative was appointed to represent
[the Plaintiffs’ decedent son Kevin's} estate”

(hereinafter, “the estate”]; and (4) “[t]he application of HRS

 

y Wns § 663-3, entitied “Death by wrongful act," provides in
relevant part:

   

‘or any of the persons enunersted in
Bay agintain an action againet the person causing
the death oF ageinat the person responsibie for the seath- The
action shall be scintained on benalf of the persons enumerates in
Subsection (b), except that the legal representative may recover
on Eehalf of the estate the reasonable expenses cf the deceased’ s
Inst iiness and burial.

{b) In any action under this section, such damages say be
given as uncer the circumstances shell be deened fair and just
Compensation, with reference to the pecuniary injury and loss of
love ane affection, - . - By the surviving... father| and]
nother: . . Any action Brought Under this section shall be
Connenced within tye years from the date of Geath of the injured
person, except se otheruise provided

  

 

 

 

 

HRS § ¢6-72 (Sopp. 1988), entitled “Lisbility for damages notice
of injuries," provided in pertinent part:

Before the {sic} county shall be liable for damages to any
person for injuries to person or property received upon any of

   

 

fhe... public places of the county, or on sccount ef any

negligence of any official or employee of the county, the Person

sc injured, . . . oF someone in the person'e behalf, shall, within
cf give the chaszperson,

Sf the counesi cf the county or the city clerk of Henolule notice
Sn writing ef the injuries end the specific canager resulting,
stating fully in the notice unen, where, and how the injuries
cccurres, the extent shereof, and the amount clasned therefor.

 

(Emphasis added.) Effective June 7, 2007, the legislature anenced this
fection, in respects gernare to thit appeai, such that the emphatized language
ow reads: “tuo years after the injuries accrued”. Sex Act 152, 28th Leges
Reg. Sess., $68, 14 (2007).

 

  
/+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+*
§ 46-72 to the instant case . . . violates the Equal Protection
Clauses of . . . the Hawai'i Constitution and the . . . United
States Constitution.”

We conclude that the Plaintiffs’ first three points are
meritiess, but on the basis of their fourth point, as discussed
infra in section IIT.D, we vacate the circuit court's judgnent

and remand for further proceedings.

1. BACKGROUND

In this appeal, we consider whether the notice-of-claim
requirement set forth in HRS § 46-72, supra note 2, as applied to
the circumstances of this case, operates as a legal bar to the
County’s liability for Kevin's death.

On September 7, 2004, Carol filed a petition in the
circuit court sitting in probate, the Honorable Colleen K. Hirai
presiding, for adjudication of intestacy and appointment of a
personal representative for the estate. Effective upon its
January 21, 2005 order, the probate court granted Carcl’s
petition and appointed her the estate's personal representative.
on February 22, 2008, Lorin (individually) and Carol
(individually and as the estate's personal representative) filed
@ complaint in the circuit court, the Honorable Randal K.0. Lee
presiding, against, inter alia, the County for damages arising
out of Kevin's death.

‘The Plaintiffs alleged that, on July 4, 2004, Honolulu
Folice Department (HPD) officers, “acting within the course and
scope of their employment by” the County, arrested Kevin in the
vicinity of Kipapa Neighborhood Park, The Plaintiffs further

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION INV WEST'S HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++#
alleged the following facts: (1) that Kevin “sustained severe

and life threatening physical injuries as a result of the conduct

 

of one or more of the [HPD] officers who arrested him” and thet
“the police knew or should have known that he needed immediate
medical attention”; (2) that Kevin, however, “was not provided
with any medical treatment” until “hie physical condition
Geteriorated further”; (3) that Kevin died the same day at
Wahiews General Hospital as 2 result of the injuries inflicted by
the HPD officers and by unnaned Doe defendants and the officers’
failure to provide Kevin with timely medical care; (4) that, on
July 6 end 7, 2004, at least three articles in Honolulu
Rewspapers discussed the incident and Carcl's consequent grief:
(5) that, on August 17, 2004, the Plaintiffs’ attorney, Dennis W.
Potts, wrote two letters to HPD Detective Sheryl Sunia, which
stated in relevant part:

RE: My Client: Kevin sii
Date of Deaths July

 

200

 

Wie’ Tithe Plaintétte’ counse2)] are writing this letter

Sue to cur understanding thet yeu are conducting sn
internal’ investigation at HPD inte the cireunstances
Surrounding the death of Kevin’... on duly 4, 2008 in

hie «It}e have been Setained by [kevsn]'s

fanily to’ conduct an investigation inte the cireunstances
serrounding his death. Ae part of this investigation we do
inten... te review and/or listen to the HPO dispatch
topes releting to (Kevin) 's arrest, detention and citinate
Gesth.

We ere therefore writing this letter to request that
these dispatch tapes not be cestroyes or discarded and that
they be held intact until... Gur review of these capes

 

    

 

 

 

RE: My Client: Kevin sive
Date of Death: July 4, 200¢

Ll! inpne request made in my prior letter
encompasses net only the dispetch tapes, but any
Communications, dispaten loge or printouts feleting

é and

 

 
 

POR PUBLICATION IN MEST" AWAZ'T REFORTS AID PACIFIC REPORTER *#¢

 

 

(emphases in original); (6) that, on August 25, 2004, Potts wrote
a letter to the County's then-corporation counsel, David 2.

Arakawa, which read in relevant part:

Re 4, 2008
iwje are investigating the circunstances
surrounding the death ef Kevin Sn polsce custody . «
fon July 4, 2006." Me nelve] previously written to...
Detective’... Sonia, who is epparently conducting an

 

internel snwestigation inte the eiveunstances surrounding
[kevin]"s Geath, requesting that 212 HPD daspaten tapes, and
any ang all connunications, dispatch loge or printouts
Teleting thereto be preserved pending the conpletion of our
invest igetien.

fare enclosing herewith the twe letters that I sent
to Detective Sunie in this regard.

wwe are. making the
office thet we nade of HPD

(emphasis in original); (7) that, on April 13, 2008, Potts sent a

 

 

 

 

 

sme request of your

letter to the County's Department of the Corporation Counsel

concerning Kevin's death and describing itself as a “notice of

claim” within the meaning of HRS § 46-72, Kahale v. City & County
of Honolulu, 104 Hawai'i 341, 90 P.3d 233 (2004), and Salavea v
City & County of Honolulu, 55 Haw. 216, 517 P.2d 51 (1973).
Citing the Plaintiffs’ complaint and his letters to Detective
Sunia and Arakawa, supposedly attached, Potts esserted that

the attached cccunente provide you with ali of the available
information regarding (Wevin]’s death ane the clains of [the
ejetate against the = . «County which we have at the
present tire... . [T]he [eletaie. . . is at this tine
Etering » .» $800,000.00 as. . . daniges resulting fron
his desth at Wentau(Z) General fogpite! en July 4, 2008.
Tkevin)'s Geath oppeare to have Deen caused by injuries that
he receives at Kiilpape (Neighborhood) Fark ee the
Fercit cf sn alsercetion with persens using thet perk
Nell as inturies that be received subsequent to hit arrest
Caused by employees of [HPD]. These injuries includee
traumatic Snvuries to his head ane ecay. .- caused by the
manner in which he was restrasrea 1h saaition, [the
[kevin] wae not provided with’
of [HPD] once st became
he has

 

 

 

 

   

 

     

 

 

 

sustained

 

  
‘+44 FOR PUBLICATION 8 MEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

 

On March 22, 2005, the County filed a motion to dismiss
the Plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground, inter alia, that the
Plaintiffs had not complied with HRS § 46-72. (Citing Kahale,
104 Hawai'i at 343, 90 P.3d at 235; Albert v, Diets, 283 F. Supp.
854 (D. Haw. 1968); Oaklev v. State, 54 Haw. 210, 220, 505 F.2d
2182, 1187 (1973) (Abe, J, concurring).)

on April 25, 2005, the Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in
opposition to the County’s motion, which advanced several
alternative arguments: (1) that (a) their letters to Detective
Sunia and Arakawa, their ostensible “notice of claim,” “the

highly publicized nature of [the) case,” and/or HPD's Internal

 

Affairs investigation complied with the netice requirement in and
of themselves or (b) BRS § 46-72 should be liberally construed to
recognize that the County was adequately “‘protect{ed] . .
against fraud arising out of stale claims’” (emphasis omitted)
(citing Cochran v. Pfluecer Autos., Inc., 72 Haw. 460, 621 P.2d
934 (1991); Levi vy, Univ, of Hawaii, 67 Haw. 90, 679 P.2d 129
(1964); Shibuya v, Architects Hawaii Ltd., 65 Hew. 26, 647 P.2d
276 (1982)); (2) that HRS § 46-72 was tolled pending appointment
of @ personel representative; (3) that HRS § 663-3(b), see supra
note 1, which sets forth a two-year limitation period, is the
controlling statute and that HRS § 46-72, which only concerns
“injury” cases, is of no consequence te the present wrongful

death matter (quoting Kahale, 104 Hawai'i at 346, 90 P.30

 

at 236); and (4) that BRS § 46-72, as applied to the Plaintiffs,
contravenes the equal protection clauses of the United States and

Hawai'i constitutions insofar as “no rational basis existe for

 

the disparate treatment of claimants when a cese of wrongful

€
 

‘104 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +1
death involving the [County, as opposed to the state,] arises”
(quoting Kahale, 104 Hewai"i et 383-84, 90 P.3d at 245-46 (Acobe,

Ju, concurring and dissenting)).

 

During a hearing conducted on May 4, 2005, the circuit

court reasoned in relevant part es follows:

Kahale . . . overruled Salavea . . . and held that HRS
Siteri2 provices the statute of limitations that governs
fort claine agsinst the counties. . . . The reel question
[o'inis cece de uhecher or not notice wes ectusily given te
the (County] within... int Inonth(s) oie Oakey
ree [ovthe Soprene Court indicaved that (*jthe basic
purpose of the stetutery requirenent of filing » written

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rotice olf) clsin | ] 1s to snform the municipal
Suthorities [*Jwnen, where, ang how the injuries

Occurred « , . .* 54 Haw. at 216, S08 PrZd at 1186). The
Purpose is [*)io guard the (counties) egeinst fraudslent anc
Snfeunced claine end[") provide the(m) an opportunity te
(Jinvectiget le.) wale tne facts

fohditions rensin subetantislly the same(_. + | Tihe test
fo'determine » . . suféiciency of compliance .'.'. is
whether. - the municipal officials [have been misled] to

ie] under aii. the elreunstances of the
da. at 216-17, S05 P20 at 16).
J wieh reqoires & broad reading of the notice
requirerent, refers to Sayre v. E] Corece County Hioh Schl!
p21? B.26 713. (Ca! Toso). (5¢ Haw.
BIE boS pt ee 1167.)
3 bos collision, and ou
sth the schoo! district, rather then the municipality.
Nith a Brose reading of the netice requirenent, Saye ihelc!
thet the notice filed with the school Getrict wae
Sufficient [te put the muniespality on notice of the tort
Claim). In beth Qakley anc Sauzg, cleins were files.

in this partscular case, (e} clain() wlas) not filed
with the [Clounty within eix months [after]... the cate
Of the alleged injuri "

Stn Hegvive State, 51 P.3d 632 (Idaho ct. App.

2002)); a wrongful ceeth clase], the plaintiffs alleges thet
the state “eS breschea ite duty te the decedent because
[it]. failed te involuntarily ceanit the decedent to s mental

     

    

  

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

      

health inetstutisen! (a) letter was written te the
Stete seserting thet the decedent hed cied end request [ing]
fan investigatien into the circumstances . . . . (The court

held that the pecsing reference to the decedent was
Sheaffseient to put the Stare on netice «

 

 

See U.S, Const. amend. xIV, § 2 ("Ne State shall... ceny te any
person within ite suriediction the equa? protection of the lave."}; Haw.
EGnets art. fy €.5 (Ne persen shell be cenieg the equel protectin of

the lame sso)
‘1** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +44

This Court views this cese [ae] similar to aay in
thet the issue te whether or not the letter toe 1 Araka
vas sufficient notice. The fetter to
Arakawa (vale written with the intent ef placing (him) on
notice that there should be an investigation surrounding the
Circumstances of [Kevin]’s desth. This letter... wae
Insufficient... . te place (the County] en netice thot a
claix was going to be filed eguinst it

y rejected the Plaintiffs’

 

 

Furthermore, the circuit court summa:

 

equal protection and tolling arguments. Accordingly, the circuit
court granted the County's notion to dismiss and, on June 14,
2005, entered final judgment in faver of the County and against
the Plaintiffs. On July 5, 2005, the Plaintiffs filed a timely

notice of appeal.

aa DARD:
A. Sunmary dudanent*

We review the
sonmary Judgment ge
“ 3

 

cuit court’ grant or denial of

nove. Hauai's C/miey crease
5 11 F.38 7, 8 (2000)

“for ‘summary Judgment Se

 

  
  

 

 

[Slunmary judonent is appropriate if the pleadings,
Gepesitions, aneuere to interrogatories, and
Sdnissione cn file, together with the alficavite, if

 

 

 

any, show that there ie no genuine sesue ae teeny
fateriei fect ond that the moving parey 48 entitled to
Sussrent ae 2 nevter of fect is sstersel if

 

Broct of that fact would have the effect of
Geteblishing or refuting one cf the essentiel elements
Of @ cause cf action cr defence asserted by the

ee. The evidence must be viewed in the Tight
fetoratle to the nen-noving party. In other
words, we must view all cf the evidence and the
Inferences Grawn therefren in the liant soet favorable
te the party opposing the motion

2a. (eit

    

    

 

 

 

ions ang internal quotation marke omitted)

 

a motion . . . to dienise fer failure of the pleading te
which relier con ke graztes, matters outsice the pleosios
are presented to and rot excluded by the court, the notion shell be trestes
ene for summary judgment : +. +" Haws"! Rules of Civil Procedure

Role 1202)

        

 

 
 

‘4+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
, 112 Hawai'i 184, 188, 145 P.36 727, 731 (2006)
(brackets in original) (quoting Querubin v. Throngs, 107 Hawai'i
48, 56, 109 P.3d 683, 697 (2005) (quoting Durette v. Aloha
Plastic Recveling, Inc., 105 Hawai'i 490, $01, 100 P.3d 60, 71
(2004) (quoting Simmons v. Puy, 105 Hawai'i 112, 117-18, 94 P.3¢
667, 672-73 (2004) (quoting Kahale, 104 Hawai" at 344, 90 P.3d
at 236 (quoting SCi Mamt, Corp, v. Sims, 101 Hawai'i 438, 445, 71
P.3d 389, 396 (2003) (quoting Coon vs City & County of Honolulu,
96 Hawai'i 233, 244-45, 47 P.3d 348, 369-60 (2002))))))}«

ws Sue

B. ry Interpys

["]the interpretation of = statute is = question of
Ele ge ngve-("] State v. Aicea, 84 Hawai'd
Pizd ses, 82" (1986) [ ianterne: quotation signal's

onittes) |:

    

Furthermore, our statutory construction is guided by
established rules

 

Tihen construing a statute, cur forenoet
Sbiigation 14 to ascertain and give effect to
the intention of the legicleture, uaien is to be
y fron the language contained
ne statute itself. And we sust read

‘utcry language in the context of the entire
ute ang construe it ins manner consistent
with ite purpose

 

 

 

  

  

  

 

 

When there i¢ doubt, dovbleness of
tinctiveness er uncertainty of
G ine statute, an ambiguity

 

3h construing sn enbiguovs statute, “{t]he
mening of the anbiguovt words ray be scught BY.

 

 

 

Ghenining the context, sith whieh the sxbiquovs
Words, phrases, enc sentences my be compared,
In orer te ascertain tnesr true mesning.” BRS

S 1-252) [(1983)]. Merecver, the courte may
Petort to extrinsic aice in determining
ive intent. One evenve if the use of
sry ag an interpre:

   

le, Admin, Diz, of the Court), 64 Hawai’
gat Poze foe, S90 (ilsei1) queting

€, 16-19, 906 Fre €5
Tiprackets anc ‘ellipsis points in original)
LEootnete onsetes) 56 coneider,
weich inguced the legislature to enact it te

      

 

  

     
"+ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST"S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

discover its true meaning.” HRS § 1-112)
“Laws 40 Bard MALexia, oF upon the sane subject
matter, theil be construed with reference t2 each
Other.’ Wher is clear in one stetute may be called
lupen in aig to explain shat is doubtful sn another.”
mks '§ 1-16 (1993)

 

 

State ve Koch, 107 Hawai's 215, 220, 112 P30 €8, 74 (2008)
Tieone brackets sddes and sone in origi

added anc sone in eriginsl)] laueting Stace vf
Hawaii 1, 7-8, 72 P34 473, 479-880 (200317 Abe
sBSUrG of unjust result, see State v. Hauser, 106 Ha
7, 77, ts F.36 178, 184 (200¢), thie court ie bound to give
eftect’ te the plain'meaning of Unenbigvour statutory

   

 

 

 

      

snguage: we nay only resort to the vse of lesisle:
hietory wnen interpreting an enbigvoue statute. £t
Valdivia, so Hawaii 46s, ¢72, 26 P30 661, 666 (200TTS
Hawaii Home Infusion Assocs, v, Befitel, 114 Hawai's 87, 92, 157
P.3d $26, 530 (2007) (quoting Courbat v, Dahana Ranch, inc., 111

Hawai'i 254, 260-61, 142 P.3d 427, 433-34 (2006)) (brackets and
ellipses in original).
C. Questions of Constitutional Law

“We answer questions of constitutional law ‘by
exercising our own independent . . . judgment besed on the facts
of the case.’ Thus, we review questions of constitutional law
{*Junder the [Jright/wrong[] standard.*” Arceo, 64 Hawai'i
at 11, 928 F.2d at 853 (quoting State v. Lee, 83 Hawai" 267,
273, 928 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996); State v. Trainor, @3 Hawas'd
250, 255, 925 P.2d 818, €23 (1996); Zovomura, 80 Hawai'i at 15,
904 F.2d at 900; State v, Beranco, 77 Hawai'i 361, 355, 884 P.2d
728, 733 (1994).

 

111. Discussion
On appeal, as in the circuit covrt, the Plaintiffs
erque: (1) thet HRS § 6€3-3(b), see supra note 1, is the

controlling statute of limitations in wrongful death actions

 

against the County, not HRS § 46-72, see supra note 2; (2) thet,

10
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +++
in any case, the “Plaintiffs substantially complied with the
provisions of HRS S{ )46-72"; (3) that the notice period “should
have been tolled until . . . @ personal representative was
appointed to represent . . . [Kevin's] estate"; and (4) that

“t]he application of BRS § 46-72 to the instant case. . «

violates the Equal Protection Clauses of . . . the Hawai'i
Constitution and the . . . United States Constitution,” see supra
note 3.
AL 2 e of

rf i

Claime Brisine Opt OF Injuries Resulting In Death
‘The Plaintitte «

 

m to reason that, inasmuch as HRS
§ 663-3 applies more “specifically” to wrongful death actions,
HRS § 46-72's notice requirenent is applicable only to cases
“injuries” shy of death.! (Citing Crawford v
Cranford, 62 Haw. 610, 415, 745 P.26 285, 288 (2987).)

Furthermore, they urge that, even if we were to determine that

involving

HRS § 46-72 applied to their claims, that statute must yield to
the longer limitation period set forth in HRS § 663-3(b).
(Citing Crawford, 69 Haw. at 415, 745 P.2¢ at 287.)

The County counters: (a) that an “injury” is simply

*L, [t]he violation of ancther‘s legal right . . . [,] a wrong

 

 

cer", or IhJarm or damage’

“even HRS § 663-3(b) [], the

whereas (b) “a death

 

is the result of injuries sustained”,

+ consuner Lawyers of Hawai'i enphaticelly concurs in its amicus

brief. citing Grawiera v Crasterg, 420, 145 FeZ0 265 (1987}-) The

Seppesing” Steynere are
Wrongful

3° (SURE

 

     
   
 

+4 FOR PUBLICATION I WEST'S RAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +
statute that [the] Plaintiffs would like this . . . Court to
apply to their claims, concerns the ‘death of the injured
person[)’ (emphasis added). (Citation omitted.)

Consumer Lawyers of Hawaii, as amicus curize, adds:

the legislature has not blended personel injury cleins
and death Claims... s0 that e single period of Limitation
governs each.

Claims for wrongful desth are governed sclely by H.R.S.
Is) ee

it'mist be presumes that the legislature, in enscting W.R.S.
[g] €87=7,(") for perscnal injery elaine, and {HRS S$] ee5-3{] for
death claims, was aware of the serious... differences between
+ injury’ soffere by s ISving person versus Gesth =

 

 

ize tne egislature had wanted #.R.S. [8] 46-72 to
apply to ceath claims, . . . it could nave aie #6.

(Some emphases omitted and some in original.)
We hold, following Kahale, that the statute of
Limitations applicable to the estate's claims arising out of
Kevin's injuries and the Plaintiffs’ own derivative wrongful
Geath damages, is HRS § 46-72. See Kahale, 104 Mi at 343,
345, 347 & n.7, 90 P.3d at 235, 237, 239 6 n.7, We ascribe no

  

significance to HRS § 46-72's general reference to “injuries” as
compared to HRS § 663-3's uses of the term “death.” The

Plaintiffs’ first amended compleint alleged that their damages

 

sprang from the physical harm allegedly visited upon Kevin in the
hours before his death and, to a substantial degree, from the

trauma that Kevin experienced while still alive:

ed the “genera” personel insury
letions fer the Fecovery ef

cr property ensil be sneticut
lceruea, ane not after, except

    

  

compensation fer a

      
 
 

 

br sneansty)

2
+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S KAWAZ"I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++#

 

ip] sustained severe end ite
threatening’ phvsisal-intuties as's result of the conduct of
one or nore of the police cfficers who srrectes Nir

a2. ss [HPD] knew or should have known that
[Kevin] needed inmeciate medical sttention for the phusical

8: “Those police officers who were involved in the
arrest, transportation end ineerceration of (Kevin)

inflicted physical intury on (hin), [es a) direct and
picainate result

‘of unich he . . + ultimately ered

 

20. "ab

   

of the Derensencs tithe estate susteines spec
Garages by way of aedical, funeral and burial expenses and
Joes of excess earnings a vell as general canages for the
SonEGious cain, sufterina and eactional distress which
Tkevin} experiences piact to lig death while [Lorin ene
Carol] sustained canages by way of loss of financial
Sopport, masntenence snd other, miscellaneous costs and
expenses, ‘the lose of filial love, affection, cere, support
fane counsel, encticnal distress end the disruption ef their
fone and family Life. «+

(Emphases added.) The fortuity of Kevin's death should not allow

 

 

the Plaintiffs to evade the statute of limitations applicable to
“injuries.”

Moreover, we reject the Plaintiffs’ argument that

 

Gecedents' estates, per ss, enjoy the longer limitation period of
two years because of the logistical difficulties inherent in the
appointment of @ personal representative. The Plaintiffs’
Antimation that the legislature intended to create an additional
eighteen-month allowance for lengthy probate proceedings is
purely conjectural; the Plaintiffs do not, and we believe could
not, point te eny authority in support of their suggestion.

In any case, the statute of limitations that the
Plaintiffs offer as the correct one is facially inapposite to the

estate’s claims (with a minor exception). Wrongful death clains,

the sole subject of HRS § 66:

 

3, are derivative claims for the

exclusive benefit of a “surviving spouse, reciprocal beneficiary,

 
   

FOR PUBLICATION 1 WEST! KAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
children, father, mother, [or] . . . any person wholly or partly
dependent upon the deceased person,” not primary claims of the

Gecedent’s estate except with regard to “reasonable expenses of

last illness and burial." In any event, by its plain language,

HRS § 663-3 yields to a more restrictive provisic!

 

any action
brought under this section shall be conmenced within two years
from the date of death of the injured person, except as otherwise
provided” (emphasis added).

For the foregoing reasons, HRS § 46-72 applies to
claims against counties arising fron fatal injuries -- holding
aside for now the Plaintiffs’ constitutional argument. But see
iniza section 111.0.

B 46-72 Is Not Toll. eviod Befor:
Plaintiff fetate’s Fe fepresentative is Aeseint

‘The Plaintiffs argue that the six-month notice period
“should have been tolled until such time as @ personal
representative was appointed to represent . . . Kevin[’s]
estate.” They urge = liberal construction of HRS § 46-72:
“Justice (Bernard #.] Levinson was clearly aware of the

difficulties that would ensue if the limitations period were not

 

 

 

Neither party discusses the possibility that any claim egainst the
County dic not gccrue until Corel use sppeinted. in any case, this court has
that the

      

eines ‘the estate notes
ns aR Person may seek appointment of special
chinistretor where necessary to preserve the estate oF to secure its proper

ineluding bur net limited to eitustsone wh (e) fer

 

 

   

‘Set glsc APR Rule S6ie) cet the nominated
persons ve is not 2 close fan:iy nenber probate say
toke tec jong if the statute of linitetsone en the claim Je ebeut te
orpire Sie uns € 56053-6148 Supp. 18) ("Spectel eeninieteter:
Sproincnen

  

      

   

 

 

a
s+ POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ TWAT REFORTS AND FACTFIC REFORTER ++
tolled pending the appointment of @ guardian ad litem for a
minor. Without . . . a personal representative, there would
Likewise be needless confusion and unnecessary litigation with
respect to who is legally authorized to act on behalf of the
decedent.” (Citing Salavea, $5 Haw. at 223-25, $17 P.2d at 56-57

(Levinson, J., dissenting).) The Plaintiffs’ argument is

 

meritless.
‘There appears to be a long-standing consensus among
foreign jurisdictions that, in the absence of @ specific
enactment te the contrary, the applicable limitation period is
not tolled, nor is its onset postponed, by delays in the
appointment of personal representative. See J.N.P.,

Annotation, Delay in Procurino Appointment of Persona:

 

Representative of Deceased o: His Death in

Action for Death, 70 A.L.R. 472, 472-74 (1931 & Supp. 2007);

Riley v. $, Transp. Co., 90 F. Supp. 642, @44 (S.D.N.Y. 1950),
: n 4g, 192 F.2d 391 (2d Cir.

 

assay: ve Bu : We, 107 F. Supp. 270, 274-76 (W.D.
Mich. 1952); Straub v. Jaecer, 9 F.R.D. 672, 678 (B.D. Pa. 1950);
Williams v. Quebec $.8. Cou, 126 F. $91, $82 ($.D.N.¥. 1903)
("The Language of the Act is explicit: ‘Such an action must be
commenced within two years after the decedent's death,’ and, in
view of the plain langua:

not be extended by construction.”}; Badezky v. Sargent & Co., 58

the time to conmence an action can

 
 

‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION I WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +
A, 708, 710 (Conn. 1904) ("The language of the statute('] is
clear and explicit, conteining no exception and suggesting no
qualification. Neither the failure of the . . . beneficiaries
+ to secure the appointment of an administrator, nor the
failure of an administrator to commence an action, affect the
time limit fixed by statute."); Miller v. United Teche, Corp.,
S15 A.2d 386, 389 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (where wrongful death

statute of limitations

 

arred actions “brought” more than “two

 

years [after] date of injury or discovery of injury,” see Conn.
Gen. Stat. Anni. § 52-555(a) & historical notes (Lexis 2007),

holding that, “(where the permanent administrator is appointed
after the running of the (wrongful-death] statute of limitations

, the action is barred by said statute of limitations”),

rev'd in part on other grounds, 660 A.2d €10, €37 (Conn. 1995);
Hannay. Jeffersonville RR, Co., 32 Ind, 113, 123-14 (1869)

("{T]t does not appear possible . . . that the legislature neant

that [the two years begin to run upon] the appointment of the

 

administrator. . . . [Bly delay to procure the eppointrent of an
administrator, the suit might . . . be delayed for any length of
time."); Van Vactor's Adn’x v. Louisville & N. RAR, Cou, 66 8.¥.
4, 4-5 (Ky. 1902); Carden v. L, & NRRL, 39 8.W. 1027, 1028

(ky. 1897); Cashman v. Hedbere, 10 N.W.2d 388, 392-92 (Minn.
1943) (quoting Rugland v, Anderson, 15 N.W. 676, 676 (Minn. 1883)

(The action “must ‘be commenced within two years after the act or

 

16
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S WAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +++
omission by which the death was caused.’ To this limitation the
statute makes no exception, and none can be made by
construction.”)); Davis v. State, 253 N.¥.S.2d 267, 268 (App.
Div. 1964) (where statute “provide(d) that ‘[i]n any event [a]
claim shall be filed within two years after the death of the
decedent,’” effectively dismissing complaint on grounds of

untimely notice of cla:

 

, despite acknowledging that estate had
no recoverable claim until appointment of representative)
(emphasis omitted); Davis v, Schactmeistner, 112 N.Y.8.2d 208,
208-09 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Cohen v, Steigman, 292 N.¥.S. 750, 753
(app. Div. 1937); Beat v, Town of Kinston, 10 S.£. 997, 997-98
(N.C. 1890); Eldridge v, Eastmoreland Gen, Hosp., 769 P.2d 775,
778 (or. 1989) (“[T]he appointment of the personal representative

  

is not relevant to the determination whether the limitations

period established by [the controlling Oregon statute] hes

expired. "); Mann v. Dep't of Transp., 836 P.2¢ 1353, 1355 n.2
(or. Ct. App. 1992), adhered to, abrogated on different crounds

after remand, @56 F.2d 1055, 1085 (Or. Ct. APP. 1993); Mierts
Adn'x vs Eover, 196 A.2d $01, 502-03 (Vt. 1963); Dodson vs Cont’)
Gan Cou, 294 P. 265, 266-67 (Wash. 1930) (following analogous
interpretation of Federal Employers’ Liability Act by Reading Co.
vs Koons, 271 U.S, $8, $8-65 (1926)); Georce vs Chin, Milw. & St
Foul By. Cou, € NW. 374, 374 (Wis, 1681) (while acknowledging
that action could have been brought no earlier than
representative's sppointment, applying “absolute and
unconditional” language of statute to bar action): cf. Safir v
Conpacnie Generale Transatiantique, 261 F. Supp. $01, 505

(E.D.N.Y, 1965) (resting analysis on express statutory exception

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION 8 MEST’ § HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

 

delaying limitation period until appointment of administrator
Smith vu. Deller, 288 S.E.2d 828, 826-27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)
(same); Hehrer v. N. Ninth Lumber Co., 92 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (App.
Div. 1949) (men.) (seme); Gibson v. Meehan, 178 N.Y.S.24 674, 675
(Sup. Ct. 1958) (same); Carpenter v. Johnson, 514 S.W.2d 968,
869-70 (Tenn. 1974) (same).

In the case of HRS § 46-72, the legislature obviously

recognized that, where the injured person has died, the act of

 

supplying notice must be perforned by “someone in the person's
behalf," see supra note 2, and yet, in the same penstroke, the
legislature set the limitation period at six months from the
indury, not from the appointment of a pereonal representative or
special administrator and without reference to 2 delayed
“accrual.” Accordingly, and in view of (1) the overwhelming
foreign case law in support of @ literal construction of “six
months after the injuries are received,” HRS § 46-72 (Supp.

1998), and (2) the availability of special administration as an

 

expedient mechanism by which to preserve an estate's claims, see

HRS $§ 560:3-614 to -617 (Supp. 1996); Hawai'i Probate Rule 56 6

 

ent., we hold that the limitation period set forth in HRS § 46-72
is not tolled pending the appointment of 2 personel
representative.
C. Zhe Elaintifts complaint Was Untinely

Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs did not file their complaint
within six months ef Kevin's injuries, it was categoricelly
untimely and, accordingly, we need not address the questions of
the effectiveness of the Plaintiffe’ letters ee notices of claim
or whether the County essentially “notified itself” of the

38
 

+6 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'® HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER
Plaintiffs’ claims as circumstantially reflected in the HPD
investigation,

As we observed in Salavea and reiterated in Kahale,
while the notice requirement set forth in ERS § 46-72 may appear
to be a mere “condition precedent to liability,” it “operates, in
reality, as 2 statute of limitations.” Selaves, 55 Haw. at 216,
517 P.2d at $3; see also Kahale, 104 Hawai'i at 343, 345, 347 &
n.7, 90 P.3¢ at 235, 237, 239 & n.7. Furthermore, the
legislature recently affirmed HRS § 46-72's character as a
statute of limitations by enacting Act 152, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(2007), the preambles of which describe HRS § 46-72 as “the
statute of limitations for claims for damage and injury against
the counties.” See Act 162 §§ 1, 7, 8, and 14 (emphasis added).
That being the case, the Plaintiffs did net comply with HRS
§ 46-72 (holding aside their equal protection argument, see infra
section II1.D), inesmoch es they filed their initial complaint on
February 22, 2005, more than seven months after Kevin's alleged
Jely 4, 2004 injuries. Cf. Kahale, 104 Hawai'i at 349, 90 F.3d
at 24] ("Rachael, as Brandzie’s next friend, having filed claims
for relief on Brandzie’s behalf while she was still @ minor,
ensured that HRS § 46-72 would not act as @ bar to those claims

against the [County].”).
 

‘1** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAI'I REPORTS AD PACIFIC REPORTER +

>. 1;
es? Tort Victins Fron tate’s Tort Victins W

aii Coni on.
Finally, given our disposition of the Plaintiffs’ first
three points of error, it becones necessary to reach their equal
protection’ argument, on which basis we vacate and remand.

1, The Plaintifte’ Arouments:

The Plaintiffs contend that HRS § 46-

 

creates a class
of tort claimants, to wit, those injured by the conduct of a

county, who are subject to disparate treatment vis-a-vis victins

 

of injuries caused by the state" without @ rational basis to
support such a distinction." (Quoting Felder v, Casey, 487 U.S.
131, 145-46 (1988); Turner v. Stages, 510 P.2d 879, 882-£3 (Nev.

1973); Jenkins v. State, $40 P.2d 1363, 1367-68 (Wash. 2975).)
(Citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S, 71, 75-76 (1973); Crandall v, city
ef Birmingham, 442 So. 2¢ 77, 78-79 (Ala, 1983); Gleason
Davenport, 275 N.W.2c 431, 436 (Iowa 1979); Reich v. State, 194
NW.2d 700, 702 (Wich. 1912); Glassman v. Miller, 38€ N.W.2d 655,

 

 

+ We confine our interpre
ESE SUBLE note 3, ingenuch oe we reed

tion to Rewaii's equel protection clause,
t comment cn ite federel counterpart

     

 

© Set BRS § 662-4 (1993) (7A tort claim against the State shall be
forever barreo unless action is begun within two yeors after the cleim
eccrues, except in the case of @ medical tert clals )

  

           

  

 

 

* the Fleintsffe cet fundamental rights nor suspect
claeessics are ot ietve. Tod Wawast ot 383, 90 oad at
245 (Acts, o-, concursing ang disser! But see" Shoemaker v. sugror
Mont inc, 251°8.6.28 $48, S61 m1 62) iRsity Pedey STE

(his eteunes that the right to recover cempensatery caneces

tortfeasor is not = “fundesentel zaght ¥

        

S04, $08 {Joma 1973) iReynoldsen, ng) Tit would plainiy sapinge
gx besic rights to ceny reascnable opportunity fer redress in court to ene whe
Ehrough the wrongful ect cf ancther hee been permanently oieabied, with e
consequent inebility te enjoy life ane to follew ¢ geinful eccepation in order
te acquire ane pe

 

   

              

20
‘449 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **#
656 (Minn. 1984).) In substance, the Plaintiffs argue that,
whereas tort cleimants against private parties or the state
derive the benefit of @ two-year limitation period, they and
other plaintiffs allegedly injured by a county are subject to a
more restrictive six-month limitation for which no rational basis
exists.!? We agree.”
2. Analysis

our case law construing Hawaii's equal protection
clause is heretofore silent as to the particular nuance before
us. Justice Sernard H. Levinson postulated that “the purpose of
protecting the public fisc from fraudulent claims justifies the
imposition on victims of governmental torts a more onerous
requirement of prompt notice of claims than on victims of private
torts,” Salavea, $$ Haw. at 223 n.3, $17 P.2d at 56 n.3

(Levinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphases added), but

 

we are not willing simply to transform this explanation of the
separate classification of governnent and private tortfeasors’
victims into  retionél besis for the distinction between county

and state defendants; we have no reason te believe that the

 
   

r= of Maui and Howai'i Counties,
hore counties haves two-year shelf
‘ofpesea to the six nonths mandates by ARS § 46-72 (Sopp. 1992). (The
County of Mevs's charter wae anended in 200, but this is net pertinent here.
We igegree with the Plaintstfe’ implicetion thet county charters. supplas
stove eeatuter. See Hew. Const. ert. VIIJ, $6 1-2, €7 HRS § 80-26 (1998). In
any cere, the only chaluenges classificaticn to wnich the Plaintiffs belong 2
of clasmante againet the City and County ef Henolube

 

      
          

 

    

® ie should nete, in response to the County's understandable
suppesition that, "if [we] Believed ARE § 46-72 to be unconstitutional,” we
rotle neve scopted custice Acobe’s position in Kenaie, 104 Hewari at 382-8,
50 F.3a at 248-46 thecbe, OW, concurring end dissenting), thet the Kabale
pleinti¢is sid not advance 2 constitutiens] argurent.

 

       

 

 

 

o
‘14 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +*+#

counties endure greater budcetary strain or more freudulent

clains than the state.

Among the few authorities on point, Farnum v. 6.0.
Searle 4 Co., 339 N.W.2d 392 (Iowa 1983), advances the most

detailed justification of @ county/state distinction, but we
believe it to be distinguishable. In Farnum, the plaintiffs
“contendied] there is no rational basis for having @ more
stringent limitations period for actions against county doctors

than for

 

tions against state doctors.” Id. at 396. The Iowa

Supreme Court disagreed:

Despite hone rule, counties eperate under greater
SSecel constraints than’ the state does. Their mein scarce
of revenue is the property tax. The property tex levy 15
subject to a statutory ceiling. Strict tine lines are
established in the Local fidget hondn conteast, the
(lowe) General Assenbly is free te raise revenue from
nunber of sources, and its procedure ‘chebles it to
appropricte funds es necessery, after the fact, te pay
claims.
‘This court has previously noted the special problems

encountered by ons municipelities tn
inplenenting Budgets. Euogetary cone:
Sn’ Lungayly, Vogelmann, 213 Bl.20 $00 (Iowa

re 1 354 N.W.2d 776,
Tel (2986),1 a8 supporting the notice fequirenent
See [ida] at $07-08.” Other courte have alse given weight to
This factor in upholding similar netice requivenentes

he sane reasoning lea the hew Mexice Supreme Court to
uphold differential treatment of victina and tertfeasers in
shalogous facts in Eerancls Hogs[-] Ashley Atencio,

+ = $68 P.261259 (IN. 1971); the court Baler

In this state, cities are clearly limited in
their expencitures.” The absiity of cities te re
soney to meet such extraordinary expense 15 230
restrictes.

Therefore, it appears that sone rational basis
coes exist for limiting the tine period in weich
soit may be brought against a city.

es... at 1236. other cou:
Sohciusicn. We find these case

vpnoleing the cifferential tr

 

 

 

    

   

     

 

 

 

   

 

 
 
 

  

 
‘448 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Seoarra v. Chi, Transit Auth., 637 N.E.2d 572, S75 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (where plaintiff challenged notice requirement for suits
against the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) thet did not apply to
suits against municipalities, upholding stetute as consistent
with equal protection, noting that the CTA, “having as its only
purpose the operation of one of the largest mass transit systems
in the United States{,] performs @ . . . governmental function
with ite own peculiar problems having no parallel in the usual

functions of . . . governmental entities,” such as a “large
number of personal injury claims") (internal quotation signals
omitted) .

unlike Seoarra, Farnum, and Atencio, the record before
us is silent with respect to any difference between the levels of
government in this state that would constitute @ rational basis
for a more stringent limitation period when the County is the

defendant as compared to when the state is the defendant. In

% the Farnum court relied upon Tous statutes to illustrate
differences between the scurces of and procedures for allocating funds of the
State versus the counties. See 322°N,k.2e st 287 (citing lows code ensps. 24,
B5R ang §6 331.422, 424. (corrent vertion available at

http! /swm legis. state. 12.os/ionalaw. nts!

 

 

     

 

,
Sintleriy, in Atencio, the New Hexico Suprene Court cbrerved thet, “[i)n

IWew Mexico], cities ere Ciesrly linited in their expenditures” and that

 

 

sItine ability of caties to raise neney co meet extraordinary expense se
alec restricted,” S68 F,20 at 1286 (citing Nit. Stat. Ann, $6 11-61 end =6
(1852 ¢ Repl. 1974)/- Uniske the present matter, the Gefendent city hae

froffered some atecrtedly “rational” beses for enjoying a shorter statute of
: rey 1asites [in thesy bility] to

isnel 4 wcities have @ greeter heed te know whet
ing a fiscal year becouse, potentially, they

3 f iseality.

wisie Ganatta coed not sirettiy Gite factual support for the CThte

unique stature, the court cited S by $8 Habezd 4€7 (211. 1986), in

hich the 11]inote Supreme Cou ) of the nagnitude of

    

      

  

    

 

 

 

the gperstione ef [ene CTA) ‘ipevating ef the busy streets and
crougefares cf the second largee: city in tne United states, one cf the
rgest cities of the werle, [it] becenes involved in the largest velune of

  

{cent inves...)
 

++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
fact, the legislature has expressly recognized that the disparity
is at least unnecessary and at most unfair. Effective June 7,
2007, the legislature enacted Act 12, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess.,

$8, which amended HRS § 46-72 so as to expand the limitation

 

period to “two years after the injuries accrued.” See supra
note 2. Act 152’s preamble states that “it ie necessary to
conform the statute of limitetions . . . against the counties
with the Limitations period applicable to the State and private
individuals generally to ensure fair and consistent application
of the law." See Act 182 § 1; accord 4
“{eJhe purpose of” the amendnent): Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 276

 

§ 7 (articulating

 

at 2 (Feb, 14, 2007) (“This [amendment] will bring county clains
in conformity with all other government and private sector cleins
and the reasonable expectations of the public.”). Furthermore,
while the County and the state’s Department of the Attorney
General opposed the amencnent from its inception, when testifying
against it, they failed te demonstrate how, if at all, the
County's exposure to or procedure for handling tort claims is
different from the state’s so as to justify a disparate

Limitation period:

 

4. scentinved)
personal Injuries litigation in the state. There are, no doubt, many, if not
Bere, “Blind” claine - thoee not reported by ite employece =~ than in

   

‘ony Other municipality in ilisnele."” igs at 9] (emphasis eded)
We are unwiiiing te “fine” or juescially netsce thet the ceunty’s
bodgetary fetters place it ine worse posiesor than the states Te the
contrary, the county's cherter appears te sanction certein emergency
appropriations, even if on unaresespated deficit results, fee Revived Charter
cf Woneluis § $08.3 (2000 Sone ‘not inciuged in the
Eusget orci ia) To meet contingencies
which could not 6 then the budget or:
Unless pete

 

   

 

  
   

 

matt be ineluces

  
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +

 

‘The eix-nonth requirenent is @ policy matter .
Because the Counties rely on public funds to operate, it is
critics! that the Counties have all possible avenues to
Protect their scarce resources.

‘The mesority of the laine received by the
counties ore not the sentational mettere ebout which the
negia reports; rather the majority of the clains are the
hore monsane types of mattere that sffect ronicspalsties and
Counties an their citizens, (egal, pothole claims, ‘damage
fo mailboxes from refuse trucks, eidewalk trip snd falls,
noney lest in parking meters, tree branches dinging ears,
‘yensele danage fron debris in the readwey, land) injuries
From divete in parke ws +

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

See Hearing on S.B. 1641," Sen. Intergov’tal ¢ Mil. Affairs
Comm., 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 12, 2007) (statement of Corp.

Counsel Carrie K.8. Okinaoa) (on file with committee clerk);

 

It just as easily

 

(statement of the Dep't of the Att’y Gen
could be said of the state that ite “resources” are “scarce” and
that it 4s regularly sued over “debris in the roadway,” “damage
fron refuse trucks,” and similar workaday perils.
Finally, the cases offered by the County in its
answering brief concern only the governnent-versus-private

tortfeasor distinc

 

n that we have already rejected as
dissiniler to the classification scheme at work in HRS § 46-72
(Supp. 1998). See Rios v. Montoonerv County, £72 A.2é 1, 16-19
(Mé. 2008); Johnson v, Marviand State Police, 626 A.2¢ 162, 167
(Nd. Ct. App. 1993); Biccitelli v, Brockhvizen, $96 N.W.2d 392,
401 (Wis. 1999) .1

 

 

S.E, 1681, 24th Le
ef the anenanent te Bhs §. 46-7
incorporated it inte the bill
Conn. Rep. No, 919 at 2 (Hal

Reg, Sere (2007) wae an esriser incarnation
the Senate Judiciary and Lazer Comittee

sat would become Act 182. See Sen. Stanc

2, 200).

 

     

  

 

 

spect tully decline to follow the contrary conclusion of

   

 

 

Shoemsier v. Alancr Most., Ins., 291 S.£.22 £68, ©: (G2. 1982) (opnolaine

Retice statute at not viclotive of equel protection). The Georgie Supreme

Cosrt plainly sisrese the limitation statute's cistinction Eetween the
Teontinced...)
 

‘+4 TOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

3. The Bottom Line
Wie hold that there is no rational basis for the

classification scheme effectuated by HRS § 46-72 as it read in
2004. The County offers no rationale for the distinction between
the classes, nor can we deduce one. ‘The record on appeal and the
legislative history are silent with respect to any budgetary,
logistical, or other difference between the County and the state
that might justify the unequal treatment of victims of their
torts.

We cure this constitutional error by severing HRS
§ 46-72's (since repealed) six-month provision, thereby
relegating the Plaintiffs’ clains to the same two-year limitation

M1. -continved)
Fequireneits of notice to sunicipslities and to counties, concluding simply
that “sufficient differences exist between governmental ond Eri
tortieasors to justify... requiring that. - sotice be given to one but
not the other,” gee 4g, et 550 (enphases added). Preeiging Justice Mist
protestes thet “the different tines for netice as between counties and
Cities... Go) not beara ressonable relationship tos legitimate
Gevernnental purpose,” but His dissenting opinion prompted not moment's
Fetlecticn by the sajerity.” See ig. at S8I°S2 |Hiil, Feds, eissencine)

oh 1976), disturb
‘Suprene Court uphele & statutory’ schene
t netice periods applied to the State of Utah (one
@ county Ininety days), ane 2 city or town (six months). dd. at

The court ressoned!

 

  

 

     

  

 

   

 

nile no precise formula has been enunciated, it is generally hele
that the lesisisture hat a wide discretion in enacting lews which
affect ene group of citizens differently then other groupe

‘The legislature is presuned to have actee within their
Constitutional authority even though inequality resuites

[nsie ."- de may hove Seen preserabie fer ne
iegssiatore to'nave specified ¢ uniform period for all
an subcivicione ef Stete government, ss tne state
be stricken down merely because the legsslatore adoptes three
pericas curing unieh notices of claine mst be files.

647 Ifoctnete omitted). We generally agree with Croudes’s intimation

subject to only rationg:-basis scrutiny ie pretonptively valid
for equal-protection purpeses, Ost, a we noted gupta, the Haws: iegitieture
sitimatively acknowleages that parity aneng cleine against the counties and
the state “ie necessary.”

 

     

    

 

          

  

 

26
‘1° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAS'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++*

 

applicable to claims against private tortfeasors under HRS
$§ 657-7, see supra note 6, and 663-3(b), see supra note 1. See
Kehale, 104 Hawai'i at 348 n.8, 90 P.3d at 240 n.8 ("{T]he
legislature is perfectly free to amend [HRS § 46-72) to provide,
say, for @ two-year limitations period or to repeal st

altogether, in which case tort claims against the counties would

 

be governed by HRS § €57-7."). Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs filed
their complaint well within two years of Kevin's initial contact
with HPD on July 4, 2004, a fortiori “within two years after the

WRS § €S7-7, they are entitled to

 

cause of action accrued,”

pursue their claims.

IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analysis, we vacate the
circuit court's judgment and remand the matter to the circuit

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

on the briefs:

Dennis W. Potts and Todd W. Eddins, Goro

for the plaintiffs-appeliants
Lorin and Carol Silva

Moana A. Yost, Deputy Corporation
Counsel (DCC), for the

\
defendant -appellee Pei OM rusleny aren
City and County of Honoluly

Janes Krueger, Karee &. Dusty +

Consumer dangers ef haw! WBC be,

 

Jane E, Lovell, DCC,
for the amicus curiae
County of Maui