Case Title: Blackwood v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 246, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2023-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GLENFORD BLACKWOOD, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 246, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. N1809011229 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: August 11, 2023 
Decided: 
October 11, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears 
to the Court that: 
(1) 
At the conclusion of a ten-day trial in July 2021, a Superior Court jury 
found the defendant-appellant, Glenford Blackwood, guilty of two counts of first-
degree murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and four counts of 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”).  The Superior 
Court imposed a life sentence for each of the murder and attempted murder offenses 
and a total of twenty years in prison for the PFDCF offenses.  This is Blackwood’s 
direct appeal.  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the 
Superior Court. 
 
2 
Facts 
(2) 
Sometime after 1:00 a.m. on June 17, 2018, Duncan Dorsey and his 
friend Vincent DiMenco were sitting in the front yard of Mr. Dorsey’s home at 1 
Lloyd Street in Wilmington, celebrating Mr. Dorsey’s birthday.  Mr. Dorsey’s 
fifteen-year-old daughter, Doris, was sitting in the family car, which was parked in 
the driveway, talking and playing games with a friend via FaceTime.  Mr. Dorsey’s 
wife, whose name was also Doris Dorsey,1 was inside the house.  As Mrs. Dorsey 
descended the stairs, she looked through a window and saw someone walking onto 
the  property.  Not expecting any other visitors, she opened the door to find out what 
was happening.  Mr. Dorsey also noticed someone approaching, carrying a shotgun.  
As he stood up to confront the person, the individual smiled,2 cocked the shotgun, 
and fired into the car where Doris was sitting.  In an attempt to defend his daughter, 
Mr. Dorsey threw a chair at the shooter, who fired a second shot into the car.  After 
shooting into the car, the perpetrator also fired at least two more shots.  One struck 
DiMenco in the head as he tried to run away, killing him.  The other penetrated the 
front door, grazing Mrs. Dorsey’s back, and proceeded through several walls and a 
cabinet before lodging in a shed in the back yard. 
 
1 To distinguish among the members of the Dorsey family, we refer to Duncan Dorsey as “Mr. 
Dorsey,” to his wife Doris as “Mrs. Dorsey,” and to their daughter as “Doris.” 
2 Reporting on the homicide, the Delaware News Journal dubbed the unknown perpetrator the 
“Smiley Face Killer.” 
 
3 
(3) 
Mr. Dorsey ran to a nearby fire station to call 911.  The first 911 call 
was received at 1:26 a.m.  New Castle County Police Department (“NCCPD”) 
officers and other emergency personnel were dispatched to the crime scene; Doris 
was transported to Christiana Hospital for treatment of multiple gunshot wounds, 
where she was ultimately pronounced dead.  Some officers began securing the scene 
and collecting evidence, including four shotgun shells.  Officers found DiMenco’s 
body after some time on the scene; he was pronounced dead at the scene.  Officers 
obtained descriptions of the shooter from Mr. and Mrs. Dorsey at the scene.  Each 
of the Dorseys was also interviewed at the police station on the morning of the 
shooting.  The Dorseys stated that they did not recognize the shooter but described 
him, using various words and gestures, as a tall man with a large build, a bald head 
or short-cropped hair, and a wider, clean-shaven face.3 
(4) 
As part of the investigation, NCCPD officers collected video 
surveillance from various residences and businesses.  A motion-activated camera at 
7 Lloyd Street, three houses down from the crime scene, captured a white SUV 
 
3 On June 21, 2018, after NCCPD identified Blackwood as a person of interest, a detective 
presented Mr. Dorsey with a six-person photographic lineup.  The fourth photo in the array was 
Blackwood.  A video recording of Mr. Dorsey’s review of the photo array was played at trial.  Mr. 
Dorsey did not identify Blackwood as the shooter, and in fact he identified certain features of the 
individuals shown in two other photos as similar to the shooter.  On that same day, Mr. Dorsey 
also met with a composite sketch artist employed by NCCPD.  A video recording of the meeting 
with the sketch artist was also played at trial.  Mr. Dorsey was emotional and agitated during the 
meeting and struggled to select images from the sketch artist’s “catalog” of facial features that he 
could identify as similar to the shooter’s features. 
 
4 
traveling on Lloyd Street at 12:31 a.m., 12:32 a.m., and 1:19 a.m.  A sales manager 
at a GMC dealership reviewed still shots clipped from the 7 Lloyd video and 
identified the vehicle as a GMC Terrain SLE-2 model from between 2009 and 2017.  
Detectives then obtained a list of all white 2009-2017 GMC Terrains registered in 
Delaware. 
(5) 
On June 21, 2018, a detective visited a local Walmart store and 
determined that the store sold the same type of Federal brand, 12-gauge ammunition 
that officers had found at the crime scene.  The most recent sale of that ammunition 
had occurred on April 27, 2018.  Walmart required ammunition purchasers to 
provide a birthdate and had recorded the purchaser’s birthday as August 21, 1986.  
Surveillance videos from the interior and exterior of the store from the date of the 
ammunition sale showed the purchaser to be a large-framed man who arrived in a 
white GMC Terrain with a license plate number beginning with PC14.  The 
registered address of one of the vehicles on the list of GMC Terrains, with a license 
plate number of PC146126,4 matched the address of a man with a birthdate of August 
21, 1986, Glenford Blackwood. 
(6) 
Other surveillance video footage captured on the night of the shooting 
appeared to show a white SUV traveling from an area near Blackwood’s residence 
 
4 Another surveillance video that NCCPD later obtained from the Walmart store showed that the 
complete license plate number of the ammunition purchaser’s vehicle was PC146126. 
 
5 
at approximately 12:26 a.m. on June 17, 2018, before appearing on the 7 Lloyd video 
at 12:31 and 12:32 a.m., and then returning to the area of Blackwood’s residence at 
approximately 12:37 a.m.  Additional footage appeared to show a white SUV 
traveling from the area of Blackwood’s residence at approximately 1:13 a.m. and 
passing 7 Lloyd at 1:19 a.m., before the first 911 call at 1:26 a.m.  As described in 
greater detail below, the State’s theory that the white SUV was Blackwood’s was 
corroborated by—and Blackwood’s alibi defense was undermined by—data 
obtained from Blackwood’s cell phone, cell phone service provider, and Google. 
(7) 
Detectives developed a theory that Blackwood harbored a grudge 
against Mrs. Dorsey arising from an incident that had occurred in 2015.  Blackwood 
was a loss prevention officer and greeter at a Family Dollar store in Wilmington.  He 
was working in October 2015 when Mrs. Dorsey and an individual named Keith 
Whitaker arrived at the store in the Dorseys’ car.  Blackwood observed Whitaker 
shoplifting and confronted him.  Blackwood was injured in an ensuing altercation 
during which Whitaker punched and kicked Blackwood, knocking him out, and tried 
to run Blackwood over with the Dorseys’ car.  Blackwood received medical 
treatment and workers’ compensation related to his injuries.  Whitaker was 
convicted of criminal charges in connection with the incident. 
(8) 
On June 22, 2018, NCCPD officers executed a search warrant at 
Blackwood’s residence.  Blackwood and his wife were present.  Officers seized a 
 
6 
pair of boots, which were later tested and determined to have particles characteristic 
of and consistent with gunshot residue on them, and Blackwood’s cell phone.  In a 
nightstand in Blackwood’s bedroom, they found documents relating to the 2015 
incident at the Family Dollar, including documents regarding Blackwood’s medical 
treatment, a workers’ compensation claim that he filed, and Whitaker’s criminal 
charges from the incident.  The paperwork included various handwritten notations, 
including “Duncan Dorsey,” “owner passenger,” and the 1 Lloyd Street address; and 
“Keith Whitaker, charged robbery, second felony, was in jail.” 
(9) 
Following the execution of the search warrant, officers transported 
Blackwood to NCCPD for questioning.  Detective Eugene Reid, the lead 
investigator, read Blackwood his Miranda rights; Blackwood signed a form 
acknowledging those rights and agreed to speak to Detective Reid.  The interview 
started after 7:00 a.m. and ended after 6:00 p.m., including time for photographs, 
fingerprinting, DNA collection, and administration of a lie-detector test for which 
Blackwood volunteered.   
(10) Blackwood told Detective Reid that he drove his wife’s white GMC 
Terrain to a swingers’ party in Glen Mills, Pennsylvania, on the afternoon of June 
16, 2018.  He said that he arrived at the party after 4:00 p.m., the party ended at 
approximately 12:30 a.m., and he left at approximately 1:00 a.m. and went straight 
 
7 
home, arriving home between 1:15 and 1:18 a.m.5  He insisted multiple times that 
he went straight home from the party and did not leave home again that night, and 
he denied ever having been on Lloyd Street.6  Blackwood repeatedly implored 
Detective Reid to verify his alibi and suggested various ways that Detective Reid 
could do so.  Blackwood denied ever having owned or fired a gun.  He admitted that 
he had purchased 12-gauge shotgun ammunition at Walmart a few months earlier 
because he had planned to go target shooting with a friend, but stated that the plans 
were canceled and he had then misplaced the ammunition when cleaning out some 
winter clothes.  When Detective Reid asked Blackwood if he knew Duncan Dorsey, 
Blackwood described the 2015 incident with Whitaker and Mrs. Dorsey at the 
Family Dollar.  He denied harboring any ill-will toward the Dorseys; indeed, he 
claimed that Mrs. Dorsey had saved his life by intervening when Whitaker tried to 
hit Blackwood with the car. 
(11) Detectives were able to verify certain aspects of Blackwood’s 
statements about his activities on the night of the murder, but the evidence did not 
support the timeline that Blackwood provided.  The host of the swingers’ party 
testified that he hosted monthly parties at his house and that Blackwood had attended 
several of the parties.  The host testified that the party on June 16, 2018, started 
 
5 E.g., Appendix to Answering Brief at B-36, B-39, B-82-83, B-87-89, B-101, B-106. 
6 E.g., id. at B-87-89, B-90-91, B-94-96. 
 
8 
between 4:00 and 5:00 in the afternoon.  He stated that Blackwood attended the 
party, paid $60, and signed the guest list when he arrived.  The guest list confirmed 
that Blackwood had signed in as “Glen” and written his phone number.  But the party 
host further testified that all guests left by midnight and that he was in bed by 12:15 
or 12:30 a.m. 
(12) Blackwood’s insistence that he went straight home after the party and 
did not leave home again that night also did not withstand further investigation.  A 
former romantic partner of Blackwood’s (the “Maryland Witness”) testified that she 
and Blackwood had dated for approximately two years until sometime in 2017.  
After their relationship ended, they did not communicate until one night in June 
2018, when Blackwood contacted her by phone and then visited her home in 
Chestertown, Maryland, arriving in a white SUV.  She estimated that Blackwood 
spent two or three hours at her house that night.   
(13) Data retrieved from Blackwood’s smartphone also undermined 
Blackwood’s statements regarding his whereabouts on the night of the murder.  
Special Agent William Shute of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cellular 
Analysis Survey Team testified regarding his analysis of data retrieved from 
Blackwood’s cell phone, phone service provider, and Google.  Special Agent Shute 
testified that Blackwood’s phone used a cell tower near the swingers’ party to handle 
 
9 
a call at 10:54 p.m.  He testified that Google location data7 showed that the phone 
was located at or near the party address until 12:08 a.m., when it began leaving that 
location and moving down Route 202, reaching the area of Route 202 and Interstate 
95 at 12:18 a.m. and continuing toward the area of the crime scene between 12:24 
and 12:30 a.m.  He further testified that the phone was on Lloyd Street at 12:32:05 
and 12:32:21 a.m.  The phone then began moving back toward Blackwood’s 
residence, arriving at the residence by 12:40 a.m.  The location data points and 
timing corresponded with the movement of the white SUV on the surveillance 
footage, including the video from 7 Lloyd Street that captured the white SUV at 
12:31 and 12:32 a.m.  
(14) Special Agent Shute testified that the phone was at Blackwood’s 
residence from 12:40 a.m. until 1:11 a.m.  Between 1:11 and 1:31 a.m., no location 
data registered.  Special Agent Shute testified that the lack of location data indicated 
that the phone was powered off or set to “airplane mode” during that period.  At 1:31 
 
7 Special Agent Shute testified regarding maps that he created based on his analysis of the Google 
location data.  The maps showed the location of the cell phone at various times on June 16-17, 
2018, in relation to the party, Blackwood’s residence, the various surveillance videos of the white 
SUV, Lloyd Street, the Maryland Witness’s residence, and routes between those locations.  He 
stated that Google derives location data by using GPS information and Wi-Fi location information, 
and that Google location data is highly precise, with an accuracy radius of 10 meters.  He further 
testified that Google collects location data approximately every minute when the phone is powered 
on.  In contrast, location information based on cell phone tower locations is less precise, indicating 
locations at a neighborhood level of precision.  Most of Special Agent Shute’s analysis was based 
on Google location data; only the analysis regarding the 10:54 p.m. call was based on cell phone 
tower location information. 
 
10 
a.m., approximately five minutes after the first 911 call, the phone began registering 
data again.  It had moved from the area of Blackwood’s residence, beyond the crime 
scene, and begun traveling south toward Christiana Hospital, registering very near 
the hospital at 1:34 a.m.  Between 1:34 and 1:54 a.m., there was another gap in the 
location data.  When the location data reappeared at 1:54, it reflected that during that 
second twenty-minute black-out period, the phone had traveled approximately two 
miles, from the hospital area to a location near Route 4 and Route 896.  After 1:54 
a.m., the phone began moving south, arriving at the Maryland Witness’s address in 
Chestertown, Maryland, at 2:52 a.m. 
(15) Other data obtained from Blackwood’s phone and Google also 
supported a conclusion that Blackwood had knowledge of and opportunity to 
commit the crime.  The phone was used to conduct several internet searches on June 
20 and 21, 2018—before police identified him as a suspect on June 21 and executed 
the search warrant at his residence on June 22—concerning which states have the 
death penalty and “Smiley Face Killer.”  The phone also contained a photograph, 
taken August 24, 2017, of Blackwood holding a shotgun. 
(16) Blackwood testified at trial.  He said that he drove his wife’s white 
GMC Terrain to the party in Glen Mills, Pennsylvania, on June 16, 2018.  He 
testified that he told Detective Reid during the interview that the party ended at 
midnight, that he left between 12:30 a.m. and 12:40 a.m. and went straight home, 
 
11 
and that he arrived home between 1:05 a.m. and 1:07 a.m.  He claimed that someone 
had spliced the video of his interview to make it appear that he had told Detective 
Reid that he stayed at the party later.  He acknowledged that he had lied to Detective 
Reid about going straight home.  He testified that he was at home from 12:40 a.m. 
until 1:11 a.m. and then had left for Chestertown, Maryland, stopping near Christiana 
Hospital to get gas.  He acknowledged that some of the surveillance videos from the 
night of the murder depicted his vehicle.  He denied that the 7 Lloyd video showed 
his vehicle and insisted that he had never been on Lloyd Street.  He testified that he 
always carried his phone with him and asserted that the phone had failed to capture 
location data during the two black-out periods because it had run out of power.   
(17) Blackwood testified that he had heard that the media had dubbed the 
perpetrator the “Smiley Face Killer” and admitted that he had conducted the “Smiley 
Face Killer” and death penalty searches on his phone.  He further testified that he 
had withdrawn $7,000 and sent it to Jamaica on the day after the murder because he 
wanted to buy a house there.  He also admitted that he had told Detective Reid that 
if he had committed the murder, they would have to catch him in Jamaica.  He denied 
feeling any ill-will toward the Dorseys in connection with the Family Dollar 
incident. 
(18) After more than two days of deliberations, the jury returned guilty 
verdicts on all counts.  After trial but before sentencing, Blackwood sought to 
 
12 
proceed pro se.  Defense counsel then moved to withdraw.  After a hearing, the 
Superior Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and appointed new counsel.  
Several months later, Blackwood again sought to proceed pro se.  After a hearing, 
the court granted the motion to proceed pro se and continued the sentencing date.  
The Superior Court sentenced Blackwood on June 24, 2022, and Blackwood filed 
this appeal pro se.  Blackwood has raised several issues for consideration by the 
Court.  We address each of his arguments in turn. 
Denial of Motion to Suppress Smartphone Evidence 
(19) On June 22, 2018, while Detective Reid was questioning Blackwood 
after the execution of the search warrant at Blackwood’s residence, another detective 
prepared and submitted an application and affidavit to search the contents of 
Blackwood’s cell phone.  A magistrate issued the warrant.  As discussed in greater 
detail below, Blackwood encouraged Detective Reid during the June 22 interview to 
look on the phone for information to verify Blackwood’s alibi, and he provided 
Detective Reid with the passcode to access the phone.8  On June 27, 2018, Detective 
Reid and another officer went to Blackwood’s residence and obtained his written 
consent to search the contents of the phone. 
(20) On July 15, 2019, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress, arguing 
that NCCPD obtained evidence from Blackwood’s cell phone pursuant to an 
 
8 E.g., Appendix to Answering Brief at B-62. 
 
13 
unconstitutional search warrant.  A later submission identified the evidence that 
Blackwood sought to suppress as the location data from June 16-17, 2018, the 
internet search history from June 17-22, 2018, and the photograph of Blackwood 
holding a shotgun.  The motion argued that the warrant application did not establish 
probable cause to search his phone or allege a sufficient nexus between the murders 
and the cell phone.  The motion also argued that the warrant authorized a search of 
an overly broad range of file types and dates and therefore constituted a general 
warrant.  Finally, the motion argued that the warrant authorized a search of file types 
that exceeded the scope of file types that the application even sought to search.   
(21) In opposition to the motion, the State argued that the probable cause 
and particularity requirements were satisfied at least to the extent that the warrant 
authorized a search for communications and location data.  To the extent that the 
application or warrant were overbroad as to a search for other information, the State 
argued that the resulting evidence should not be suppressed because Blackwood had 
consented to a search of the entire contents of the phone and NCCPD had an 
independent source for the location data and internet search history—a subpoena to 
Google. 
(22) The Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to 
suppress on November 18, 2019, during which Blackwood and Detective Reid 
testified.  After additional submissions from counsel and a second evidentiary 
 
14 
hearing on January 17, 2020, the Superior Court denied the motion to suppress.  The 
court determined that the warrant satisfied the particularity requirement9 but was 
“too broad for the probable cause upon which it was based.”10  As to the warrant’s 
overbreadth, the court concluded that (i) even if the application and affidavit 
established probable cause to search call logs, SMS messages, and MMS messages, 
the warrant’s authorization to do so for a period extending from October 26, 2015, 
to June 22, 2018, was broader than the probable cause on which it was based;11 (ii) 
the authorization to search images on Blackwood’s phone was not supported by 
probable cause because it was based solely on generalized statements that cell 
phones can capture photographs and videos and perpetrators often take photographs 
and videos before and after their crimes;12 and (iii) although the application and 
affidavit established probable cause to search communications and location data, the 
date range for the search was overly broad.13  The Superior Court determined that 
suppression was not warranted, however, because Blackwood voluntarily consented 
 
9 See Taylor v. State, 260 A.3d 602, 615 (Del. 2021) (articulating the “constitutional and statutory 
requirements that [a search warrant] describe the items to be searched for and seized with as much 
particularity as the circumstances reasonably allow and is no broader than the probable cause on 
which it is based”). 
10 See State v. Blackwood, 2020 WL 975465, at *3-5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2020) (addressing 
the breadth and particularity of the warrant to search Blackwood’s cell phone). 
11 Id. at *4. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at *5. 
 
15 
to a search of the entire contents of the phone.14  The Superior Court also concluded 
that suppression was not required because NCCPD also obtained the evidence from 
independent sources, such as obtaining location data by subpoena sent to Google.15 
(23) Blackwood argues that the Superior Court erroneously denied the 
motion to suppress.  He argues that the warrant was overly broad as to the sources 
and date range to search, did not satisfy the particularity requirement, and was a 
general warrant.  The State argues that the Superior Court correctly denied the 
motion to suppress because Blackwood consented to the search and the consent 
extended to the entire contents of the phone.  Blackwood argues that his consent was 
not voluntary and that the scope of the consent that he provided during the police 
interview was limited to obtaining the phone number of the party host, in order to 
verify Blackwood’s alibi.   
(24) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to suppress, 
after an evidentiary hearing, for abuse of discretion.16  We review the trial court’s 
legal conclusions de novo.17  “We review the Superior Court’s factual findings to 
 
14 Id. at *6-7. 
15 Id. at *8. 
16 McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1122 (Del. 2002). 
17 Id.; see also Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1, 16 (Del. 2018) (“As for Buckham’s challenge to the 
warrant’s particularity and breadth, we review those questions de novo.”); Wheeler v. State, 135 
A.3d 282, 295 (Del. 2016) (“We also apply de novo review to the Superior Court’s legal 
conclusions when reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress.”). 
 
16 
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the findings and whether 
those findings were clearly erroneous.”18 
(25) We affirm the Superior Court’s denial of the motion to suppress on the 
basis that Blackwood consented to a search of the entire contents of his smartphone.  
Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution “protect the right of persons to be secure from 
‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’”19  “Generally, searches and seizures are per 
se unreasonable . . . unless authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.”20  
There is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, however, for 
searches that are conducted with a person’s valid consent.21  Consent may be express 
or implied.22  This waiver of constitutional rights need not be knowing and 
intelligent, but it must be voluntarily given.23  “To determine whether consent was 
given voluntarily, courts examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
consent, including (1) knowledge of the constitutional right to refuse consent; (2) 
 
18 Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 295 (internal quotations omitted). 
19 Flonnory v. State, 109 A.3d 1060, 1063 (Del. 2015) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV; DEL. 
CONST. art. 1, § 6)). 
20 Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted); see also Higgins v. State, 2014 WL 1323387, 
at *2 (Del. Apr. 1, 2014) (“A warrantless search is deemed per se unreasonable unless that search 
falls within a recognized exception.”). 
21 Flonnory, 109 A.3d at 1063; Higgins, 2014 WL 1323387, at *2; see also Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“[A] search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is 
constitutionally permissible.”); id. (“[A] search authorized by consent is wholly valid.”). 
22 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 855 (Del. 2009). 
23 Id. 
 
17 
age, intelligence, education, and language ability; (3) the degree to which the 
individual cooperates with police; and (4) the length of detention and the nature of 
questioning, including the use of physical punishment or other coercive police 
behavior.”24  Moreover, although knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one 
factor to be taken into account when determining whether consent was voluntary, 
proof of such knowledge is not a “necessary prerequisite” to a voluntary consent.25  
When the State relies upon consent to demonstrate the lawfulness of a search, the 
State has the burden of proving that the consent was voluntarily given.26 
(26) We agree with the Superior Court’s conclusion that Blackwood 
voluntarily consented to the search of the phone during the June 22, 2018 interview 
at NCCPD.  Blackwood confirmed to Detective Reid that it was his Samsung Galaxy 
phone that officers had seized during the search of his residence that morning.  After 
telling Detective Reid that he had been at a party at the time of the murders and that 
he had previously contacted the party host on Craigslist, he encouraged Detective 
Reid to verify his alibi by calling the party host and said that the phone contained 
the host’s contact information.  Following discussion of other matters, Detective 
Reid said that he was going to go call the party host; Blackwood responded by 
 
24 Id. 
25 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232-33, 234. 
26 Id. at 222; Higgins, 2014 WL 1323387, at *2. 
 
18 
volunteering the pattern passcode that was necessary to gain access to the phone.27  
Hours later, when Detective Reid said that the officers had trouble using the pattern 
passcode, Blackwood entered the passcode for him and then again showed him how 
to enter it.28  Detective Reid then asked Blackwood for the phone number for that 
cell phone, and Blackwood told him.29 
(27) Later in the day, Detective Reid challenged Blackwood regarding his 
alibi by referring to information obtained from the phone, such as where the cell 
phone was “pinging” during the night of the murders.30  Detective Reid also 
confronted Blackwood with other information obtained from the phone, including 
asking why Blackwood had conducted searches concerning which states had the 
death penalty.31  Blackwood attempted to explain or rebut the information presented, 
but did not question why or under what authority officers were searching his phone 
or otherwise suggest that he had not consented to the search.  He even offered 
additional information for the officers to look for on his phone, saying that Detective 
Reid should verify that he was on his home Wi-Fi and using “Tag” to text a woman 
known as “Love3D” between 2:00 a.m. and 3:15 a.m.32 
 
27 Appendix to Answering Brief at B-62-63. 
28 Id. at B-70. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at B-85, B-87. 
31 Id. at B-86, B-97-98. 
32 See id. at B-90-91, B-98. 
 
19 
(28) Examining the totality of the circumstances, it is apparent that 
Blackwood’s consent during the interview was voluntary.  Blackwood was thirty-
seven years old, and he wrote and spoke English.  He was a legal resident of the 
United States, having immigrated to Delaware approximately six years earlier.  He 
held a full-time job in retail loss prevention; had some experience with the criminal-
justice system; expressed interest in legal issues and legal- or law-enforcement-
related entertainment; and said that he had previously tried to become a police 
officer.  His responses to Detective Reid’s questions—such as challenging Detective 
Reid to show him a photo that captured his license plate when he was confronted 
with images of the white SUV—also demonstrated his awareness of concepts such 
as the evidentiary value of the information that Detective Reid presented to him.  
Although the interview at the NCCPD was quite lengthy, Detective Reid remained 
calm and civil, even when expressing doubt about Blackwood’s truthfulness.  
Detective Reid did not engage in or threaten physical harm to coerce consent—
indeed, Blackwood volunteered his passcode.  Nor did Detective Reid say or imply 
that he had a warrant to search the phone.33  Blackwood was very cooperative, 
 
33 See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (“When a law enforcement officer 
claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no 
right to resist the search.  The situation is instinct with coercion—albeit colorably lawful coercion.  
Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.”); see also United States v. Parrish, 942 F.3d 
289, 294-95 (6th Cir. 2019) (discussing Bumper and affirming trial court’s determination that 
defendant consented to a search of his cell phone). 
 
20 
repeatedly saying that he would “do anything” to clear himself of the accusations 
and suggesting various investigatory steps that the detective could take. 
(29) We also conclude that the scope of Blackwood’s consent extended to 
the entire contents of the phone.  The scope of a search authorized by consent is 
governed by the language used in giving the consent,34 and consent may be express 
or implied.35  Blackwood told Detective Reid how to access the phone, accessed the 
phone for Detective Reid while the detective observed, and then again showed 
Detective Reid how to enter the passcode, without expressing any limitations on 
what content Detective Reid could access.  Viewed in the context of Blackwood’s 
repeated entreaties to verify his alibi and to contact the party host, Blackwood’s 
actions indicate that his consent extended to the entire contents of the phone, and 
certainly, as the Superior Court determined, to the location data, data from 
communications applications, and contact information.36  Our conclusion that the 
scope of Blackwood’s consent extended to the entire contents of the phone is 
buttressed by Blackwood’s repeated insistence that he would “do anything” to prove 
his innocence, his suggestions of additional information to seek, and his failure to 
raise any issues concerning the scope of his consent when Detective Reid began 
 
34 Ledda v. State, 564 A.2d 1125, 1129 (Del. 1989); see also id. (holding that the scope of a consent 
to search a vehicle was as broad as the form that the driver signed consenting to a “complete and 
thorough search” of the vehicle). 
35 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 855 (Del. 2009). 
36 Blackwood, 2020 WL 975465, at *6. 
 
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referring to the location data and search history.  Moreover, five days after the 
interview in which Detective Reid indicated to Blackwood that he suspected him of 
murder and pointed to unfavorable evidence on the phone, Blackwood signed a 
written consent authorizing a search of the entire contents of the phone, without 
expressing any concern that the scope of the earlier search had exceeded the scope 
of his consent. 
(30) For these reasons, we affirm the Superior Court’s determination that 
Blackwood voluntarily consented to a search of the entire contents of his cell phone.  
Because of our conclusions regarding consent, we need not address Blackwood’s 
challenges to the warrant.37 
Alleged Brady Violation 
(31) Blackwood also contends that the prosecution withheld evidence in 
violation of Brady v. Maryland.38  Because Blackwood did not raise this claim in the 
Superior Court, we review for plain error.39  To constitute plain error, the error must 
so clearly prejudice substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of 
the trial process.40  There are three elements of a Brady violation:  (i) evidence exists 
that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (ii) 
 
37 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (“[A] search authorized by consent is wholly valid.”); 
Flonnory, 109 A.3d at 1063 (stating that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement). 
38 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
39 Goode v. State, 136 A.3d 303, 312 (Del. 2016). 
40 Id. 
 
22 
the State suppressed that evidence; and (iii) suppression of the evidence prejudiced 
the defendant.41  We find no error because Blackwood has not identified any 
nondisclosed Brady material. 
(32) When the officers presented Mr. Dorsey with the photo array, Mr. 
Dorsey said that the shooter had certain features—such as a larger build and similar 
head shape—that were like the features of the individuals in the third and sixth 
photos.  Mr. Dorsey did not identify Blackwood, whose photo was fourth in the 
array, as the shooter.  Blackwood claims that, because Mr. Dorsey failed to identify 
Blackwood as the shooter, the State then “altered and manipulated” Mr. Dorsey’s 
statement before producing it to defense counsel. 
(33) Blackwood has failed to identify any exculpatory or impeaching 
evidence that the State withheld.  Blackwood concedes that the video of Mr. 
Dorsey’s review of the photo array was produced to the defense, and the video was 
played for the jury.  Detective Reid testified at trial that Mr. Dorsey was unable to 
identify the shooter.  The jury also heard evidence of the varying descriptions of the 
perpetrator that the Dorseys provided, saw video of the Dorsey interviews, and 
viewed the video of Mr. Dorsey’s meeting with a police sketch artist, during which 
he struggled to describe the shooter with clarity and to identify the shooter’s features 
 
41 Wilson v. State, 271 A.3d 733, 740 (Del. 2022). 
 
23 
with the tools used by the police sketch artist.  We find no plain error as to 
Blackwood’s Brady claim. 
Video of Blackwood Interview 
(34) Blackwood also asserts that the State and the trial court violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial because the prosecution presented to the jury 
an “altered and manipulated” video of Blackwood’s interview at NCCPD.  
Specifically, Blackwood alleges that the State altered the video of his interview to 
make it appear that Blackwood told Detective Reid that he left the swingers’ party 
after 1:00 a.m. and arrived home between 1:15 and 1:18 a.m., in contrast with 
Blackwood’s testimony at trial that he told Detective Reid that he left the party at 
approximately 12:30 a.m. and arrived home between 1:05 a.m. and 1:07 a.m.  He 
contends that the Superior Court erred by not excluding the video from evidence and 
by providing a redactions instruction to the jury. 
(35) The parties agreed to redact the video of the interview to shorten the 
lengthy interview for trial and to remove certain material that was unfavorable to 
Blackwood.  When he took the stand, Blackwood asserted that the State had 
“spliced” the video to make it appear that he told Detective Reid that he had left the 
party after 1:00 a.m., pointing out that the video was “skipping.”  Counsel then went 
to side-bar to discuss a redactions instruction, which the court provided to the jury.  
 
24 
Blackwood’s counsel did not ask the court to suppress the video as redacted or claim 
that the video was altered or manipulated beyond the agreed-upon redactions. 
(36) We find no merit to Blackwood’s claims.  He has not provided any 
evidence that the State altered or manipulated the video, other than applying the 
approved redactions.  Nor does he assert that the State did not provide the defense 
with an unredacted copy of the video, such that the defense could have argued to the 
Superior Court that the State had spliced the video, if that were true. 
Alibi Instruction 
(37) Finally, Blackwood contends that the Superior Court erred by providing 
an alibi instruction.  Although unclear, it appears that Blackwood’s argument is that 
his trial testimony was that he did not claim to be at the swingers’ party at the time 
of the murder, and the court therefore should not have instructed the jury regarding 
an alibi claim.  We find no merit to this argument.  The defense did not object to an 
alibi instruction, and the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support such an 
instruction.42  We discern no error in the instruction as given, nor do we discern how 
the omission of the instruction would have changed the result at trial.  Even without 
the instruction, the jury would have been presented with Blackwood’s statements to 
Detective Reid about his whereabouts on the night of the murder, his conflicting 
 
42 See generally Brown v. State, 958 A.2d 833, 839 (Del. 2008) (“[A] trial judge must give the jury 
an alibi instruction where sufficient credible evidence is presented and a timely request is made.”). 
 
25 
statements at trial, and the strong circumstantial evidence that he was actually on 
Lloyd Street that night.43 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice  
 
 
43 In his reply brief, Blackwood asserts for the first time that his conviction should be reversed 
because the Superior Court pressured the jury to reach a guilty verdict after they sent out a note 
saying that they could not reach a unanimous verdict and felt that further deliberation would not 
help.  “This Court’s rules provide that an appellant waives any argument not raised in the body of 
his opening brief.”  White v. State, 2023 WL 3675801, at *2 (Del. May 25, 2023).  In any event, 
we find no plain error in the Superior Court’s provision of an Allen charge to the jury.  See Jenkins 
v. State, 401 A.2d 83, 87 (Del. 1979) (“Supplementary instructions which encourage the jury to 
reach a verdict, sometimes referred to as an ‘Allen charge’ or ‘dynamite charge,’ are generally 
proper.” (citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896)); Collins v. State, 56 A.3d 1012, 1020 
(Del. 2012) (reviewing challenges to an Allen charge that were not raised at trial for plain error).