Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Gardner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 74ag/11

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2013-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
HEADNOTE
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Paul Winston Gardner, II, Misc. Docket AG No. 74,
September Term, 2011
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE - SANCTIONS - DISBARMENT: Respondent, Paul Winston
Gardner II, was charged with multiple violations of several Rules. The Petition filed by Bar
Counsel was comprised of Bar Counsel’s complaint and two complaints in respect to
Respondent’s conduct in client matters. The Court held that he violated provisions of Sections
16-701, 16-601.1 and 16-609 of Chapter 600 of Title 16 of the Maryland Rules. There was more
than one violation found in respect to certain of the Title 16 rules. The Court also held that he
violated provisions of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.7, 1.15. 1.16, 5.4, and 8.4 of the Maryland
Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct. There were multiple violations of some of these Rules. 
The appropriate sanction is disbarment.  
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case # 24-C-12-000598 AG
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 74 
September Term, 2011
______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
PAUL WINSTON GARDNER, II
______________________________________
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins 
Barbera
McDonald
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, specially
assigned)
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Cathell, J.
______________________________________
 
Filed: February 11, 2013
1 Where feasible, we shall only quote that portion of a particular rule that relates to the
specific allegations of Bar Counsel’s Petition and the facts as we discern them and shall not
generally include the title, if any, of such rule. When in this opinion we refer to the Maryland
Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct, we shall merely refer to the number of the rule - 1.1,
1.5, etc. When we are referring to Chapter 600, Attorney Trust Accounts of Title 16 of the
Maryland Rules, we will preface the particular rule with the number 16, - 16-606.1, etc.     
2 “. . . . The term [professional misconduct] includes the knowing failure to respond to a
request for information authorized by this Chapter without asserting, in writing, a privilege or
other basis for such failure.” 
3 “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. . . .”
4 “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”
5 “(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to
which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.01(f), is required by these Rules;
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; . . . 
             
            
. . .               
  (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”
6 “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an
unreasonable amount for expenses. . . .” 
7 “(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; . . . 
. . . 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“AGC”), acting through Bar
Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in which it asserted that
Paul Winston Gardner, II, Respondent, violated certain of the Maryland Lawyer’s Rules
of Professional Conduct in respect to several client matters.1  Bar Counsel alleged that
 Gardner violated the provisions of the following rules: 16-701(i),  2 1.1,3 1.3.,4
1.4,5 1.5,6 1.7,7 1.15,8 1.16,9 5.4,10 8.4 (a),(c), &(d),11 Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a)(1)(2) & 
may represent a client if :
. . . 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”
8 “(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds
shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland
Rules, and records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the rules of that Chapter. .
. . Complete records of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and
preserved for a period of at least five years . . . .
. . . 
(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different
arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance into a
client trust account and may withdraw those funds for the lawyer’s own benefit only as fees are
earned or expenses incurred.
(d) . . . . Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with
the client, a lawyer shall deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client . . . ,
shall render promptly a full accounting regarding such property.” 
9 “(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: 
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law; 
. . . 
     (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a
client if:
(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
interests of the client.   
. . . 
(7) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
. . . 
       (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the
client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to
which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not
been earned or incurred. . . .” 
10 “(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, . . .” 
11 “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to :
     (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another. 
. . . 
     (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
2
     (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;” 
12 “(a). . . The following records shall be created and maintained for the receipt and
disbursements of funds of clients . . . 
. . . 
(1) “. . . An identification of all attorney trust accounts maintained, . . . 
(2) . . . A record for each account that chronologically shows all deposits and
disbursements. . . . 
. . . 
(3) . . . A record for each client matter in which the attorney receives funds, . . .”   
13 “a. . . . An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds required by the
Rules in this chapter to be deposited in an attorney trust account, . . ., or use any funds for any
unauthorized purpose.
     b. . . . .An instrument drawn on an attorney trust account may not be drawn payable to
cash or bearer, and no cash withdrawal may be made from an automated teller machine or by any
other method. All disbursements from an attorney trust account shall be made by check or
electronic transfer.
      c. . . . .No funds from an attorney trust account shall be disbursed if the disbursement
would create a negative balance with regard to an individual client matter or all client matters in
the aggregate.”   
14Ms. Boyd is now deceased.
3
(3),12 16-609 (a), (b), & (c).13
Bar Counsel’s Petition is organized in three sections: “A. BC Docket No. 2010-
242-4-8 Complainant: Bar Counsel,” “ B. BC Docket No. 2010-399-4-8 Complainant:
Steve Kang,” and “C. BC Docket No. 2011-119-4-8 Complainant: Vivian McGhee
Boyd.”14 The genesis of this matter began when Bar Counsel was notified by a financial
institution that the Respondent’s trust account had been overdrawn which resulted in Bar
Counsel conducting an investigation as to the activity in Respondent’s trust account. That
investigation apparently led to the complaints in respect to Respondent’s representation 
of Mr. Kang and Ms. Boyd.
4
Pursuant to Md. Rule 16-752, the Court referred the matter to Judge Jeannie J.
Hong of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for a hearing.  Judge Hong conducted a
hearing and filed her findings of fact and conclusions of law on September 28, 2012. 
 The Respondent takes exception to some of the hearing judge’s findings of fact.
Recently in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Zimmerman, 428 Md. 119, 134, 50 A.3d
1205, 1214 (2012), the Court noted, in part quoting from Att’y Grievance Commission  v.
London, 427 Md. 328, 343, 47 A.3d 986, 995 (2012), that:
“ In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and
complete jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record. We
accept hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are
clearly erroneous. That deference is appropriate because the hearing judge
is in a position to assess the demeanor-based credibility of the witnesses. In
that regard, the hearing judge is permitted to pick and choose which
evidence to rely upon from a conflicting array when determining findings of
fact. 
We review de novo the hearing judge’s proposed conclusions of law.
In other words the ultimate determination . . . as to an attorney’s misconduct
is reserved for this Court. In that regard, we examine the record to ascertain
whether there was sufficient evidence to support the hearing judge’s legal
conclusions, by a clear and convincing standard of proof.”
. . .
In sum, the hearing judge’s findings are reasonable, considering the
evidence and the judge’s role in assessing the credibility of witnesses and
choosing which pieces of evidence to rely on during fact-finding. . . . 
We have read the transcripts of testimony that took place over three days 
comprising almost 700 pages, and have reviewed hundreds of pages of various
documents. The testimony of  Mr. Kang comprised over 200 pages during two days of the
proceedings. Respondent’s testimony consumed at least 170 pages of the transcripts.  
5
Upon our independent review of the record, we agree that it is established by clear and
convincing evidence that the Respondent violated the above provisions of these rules.  
 Judge Hong’s fact findings include the following: 
“A. Complaintant: Bar Counsel
On four occasions between May 28, 2009 and September 9, 2009.
Respondent paid his Office Manager, Rosalind Tyner, a total of $700.00 in
administration fees with checks drawn on his attorney trust account. . . . 
. . . 
Respondent paid this money to Ms. Tyner for her work on personal injury
cases.  Ms. Tyner was not a lawyer, and Respondent’s fee agreements did
not state that he would be sharing legal fees with Ms. Tyner from the
portion of the settlement proceeds that were collected as attorney’s fees.
On September 28, 2009, Leonard J. Seigel, Esquire presented check
number 1171 drawn on Respondent’s trust account in the amount of
$2,500.00 for payment, and the account did not contain sufficient funds at
the time of presentation. . . .This caused an overdraft in Respondent’s trust
account which left a [negative] balance of -$922.17. . . . Accordingly a
notification was sent to Bar Counsel by the bank alerting them of the
overdraft.. . . 
On September 30, 2009, Respondent deposited a Personal Injury
Protection (PIP) check on behalf of his client, Angello Gordon, in the
amount of $2,500.00 which left a balance of $1,577.83 in Respondent’s
trust account. [$1,577.83 plus the overdraft amount of $922.17 equals the
$2,500.00 amount of the PIP check.] . . .  Respondent made two cash
withdrawals from his trust account which occurred on June 29, 2009 for
$400.00 and on October 2, 2009 for $1550.00. . .. The October 2
withdrawal left a balance of $27.83. Respondent failed to keep Mr.
Gordon’s funds in trust prior to disbursement.”
In his Answer to Bar Counsel’s Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the
Respondent acknowledged the misconduct alleged in Section A of the petition. He also
acknowledged the same during his testimony and took no exception to this finding.
Maryland Rule 16-759 (b)(2) provides: “If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the
6
findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if
any.” 
B. COMPLAINANT: STEVE KANG
Judge Hong’s findings in respect to the Kang matter are as follows:
“I. Mingshu Li Matter
 
. . . .Acting as an agent [of Mrs. Li], Mr. Kang hired Respondent to
prepare and file a non-immigrant visa application [for Mrs. Li’s husband,
Jin Shifeng]. This was the first instance in which Respondent filed
immigration paperwork with the office of United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (hereinafter ‘USCIS’) on behalf of a client.
Although not listed on any invoice, Mr. Kang testified that
Respondent charged $3,500 for the completion and filing of a L1/L2 visa
application for Mrs. Li. The U.S. Department of State denied the
application on June 19, 2006 because the application did not contain
sufficient information about the company, and because there was nothing to
show the money was committed to be invested in the company. . . . The
application itself also incorrectly listed Jin Shifeng’s gender as being
female.    
Respondent waited until September 15, 2006 to send an email to
Mrs. Li, in care of Mr. Kang, to inform her that the funds had to be invested
in the Yanbian Company prior to refilling the visa petition, and that
Respondent would re-file the petition once the money was transferred. . . .
On September 14, 2006, Mrs. Li transferred $135,185.00 into the account
Mr. Kang opened at Bank of America for the Yanbian Company. . . .
Respondent never refiled the visa application. . . . On February 21, 2007,
Respondent drafted a letter to Mrs. Li suggesting terms for cancellation of
the contract between the Yanbian Company and Kentrexs Ent., Ltd, and
offered Mrs. Li a refund of $100,000 without first consulting Mr. Kang.
Gary Maslin, Esquire [an attorney retained by Mrs. Li apparently in
respect to her efforts to recover the money] sent a demand letter on April
18, 2007 to Respondent on behalf of Mrs. Li calling for a return of money
owed to her, and put Respondent on notice that his representation of both
Mr. Kang and Mrs. Li may be a conflict of interest. . . . Respondent mailed
Mr. Maslin a reply on May 4, 2007 stating that he did not have a retainer
agreement for Jin Shifeng, that the visa application was properly prepared
based on information given to him by Mrs. Li and Mr. Kang, and that Mr.
7
Kang said he would pay Mrs. Li whatever funds were owed to her.. . . Mr.
Kang never returned the money, and Mrs. Li filed a lawsuit on October 31,
2007 . . . against Mr. Kang and Bank of America. . . . Respondent never
mentioned to Mr. Kang the existence of a potential conflict stemming from
his preparation of the visa application until December, 2008. Mr. Kang was
shocked when he found out Respondent would not be representing him in
the lawsuit.
. . .
On November 28, 2008, Ms. Griffith [an attorney that had some type
of working relationship with Respondent] met Mr. Kang for the first time to
discuss the impending trial. . . .  This meeting lasted for approximately forty
minutes. Mr. Kang signed an agreement on December 1, 2008 [the date of
the scheduled Li / Kang trial] retaining Ms. Griffith as trial counsel, and
Ms. Griffith entered her appearance on this date. . . . This agreement
provided that Mr. Kang would pay Ms. Griffith a $5,000.00 fee for
representation at trial. . . . Counsel for Mrs. Li filed a Motion to
Strike/Disqualify Opposing Counsel on December 1, 2008. . . Respondent
then voluntarily withdrew from his representation of Mr. Kang. . . . 
Up until the time Respondent withdrew his appearance, Ms. Griffith
expected that Respondent would be assisting her with the case as he was
familiar with the relevant facts. Ms. Griffith, . . . made a request for a
postponement on December 2, 2008 [during the trial] which was denied.
Ms. Griffith was not prepared to try the case on her own, and did not put
forth any witnesses to testify or introduce any evidence in Mr. Kang’s
defense. Neither Respondent nor Ms. Griffith explained the significance of
punitive damages to Mr. Kang until the day of trial. On December 3, 2008,
the court entered judgment against Mr. Kang in the amount of $150,200.00
in compensatory damages and $50,000.00 in punitive damages. . . .”
 The Respondent did not except to these findings of fact.
“II. Respondent’s Retainer Agreement with Steve Kang    
Respondent and Mr. Kang only executed one retainer agreement . . .
.While the visa application and [the] litigation were pending, Mr. Kang
hired Respondent for his assistance in a number of legal matters. There was
no separate retainer agreement executed by Respondent and Mr. Kang for
any of these matters and Respondent never communicated the basis of the
fees collected for these matters.”
15The record in this case sometimes identifies Choe as Cho. 
8
Respondent did not except to these findings of fact.
“III. The Biddle Street/OK Liquors Matter
On or about May 9, 2007, Mr. Kang engaged Respondent on behalf
of himself and Choe and Choe15 to find the owners of lots of [on] the 2300
block of East Biddle Street and purchase the properties to develop a strip
shopping center. . . . Work in this matter consisted largely of mailing letters
to a number of elected officials seeking whatever information he could find
about the property owners and the city’s plans for the area. . . . Mr. Kang
never received copies of these letters despite notations indicating that he
was sent carbon copies of each. . . .” 
Respondent took no exception to this finding of fact.
“IV. The ‘Night Owl’ Matter
Mr. Kang enlisted Respondent on September 10, 2007 to assist with the sale
of property in Baltimore City. . . . Mr. Kang testified that he spoke with Donna
Wade, an employee at Respondent’s law firm, several times about the Night Owl
matter. In his testimony, Respondent fervently denied ever employing anyone, or
even knowing anyone, named Donna Wade. In Respondent’s bills for the Night
Owl matter, the ‘Donna Wade Issue’ is mentioned nine times. . . .”
Respondent made no exception to this finding of fact. 
“V. Tony Kim and Youngsuk MacPherson
On April 9, 2008, Krystle Myers, Respondent’s senior law clerk,
traveled with Mr. Kang to Virginia to meet with new prospective clients,
Tony Kim and Youngsuk MacPherson. Mr. Kang referred Mr. Kim and
Mrs. MacPherson to Respondent about potentially representing their
business, Kim & MacPherson, LLC. Mr. Kim and Mrs. MacPherson
ultimately declined Respondent’s representation. Respondent billed Mr.
Kang $1,490.00 for trips to Virginia, various communications and
memorandums, and researching co-counsel. . . .”
Respondent took no exception to this finding of fact.
9
“VI. The Jim Peang Lawsuit
On August 13, 2008, Cho and Choe retained Respondent, through
Steve Kang acting as an agent, to file a lawsuit against Jim Peang when a
dispute arose regarding misappropriated funds.  Mr. Kang never saw any of
the work Respondent claims to have completed on this matter. Jim Peang
could not be located for service of process.”
Respondent took no exception to this finding of fact. 
“VII. The Federal Liquors Matter
On or about September 23, 2008, Mr. Kang retained Respondent to
represent him in a liquor license transfer. Respondent drafted numerous
letters to various community associations introducing his clients and
encouraging them to come forward with any concerns they had. . . .
Respondent successfully transferred the license, but the process took
approximately one year. He charged Mr. Kang a flat rate of $3,500.00 for
this matter.” 
Respondent took no exception to this finding of fact.
“VIII. The Canton Café Matter
Respondent’s billing invoices indicate that on October 28, 2008, Mr.
Kang retained Respondent to represent INK Builders, Inc., Mr. Kang’s
contracting company, against Dujamae LLC (hereinafter ‘Dujamae’). . . .
Dujamae hired INK Builders to build a salad bar and café in the First
Mariner Building in Baltimore, Maryland. Dujamae fired Mr. Kang and
INK Builders after they had completed approximately forty percent of the
work. Mr. Kang was never paid for the work completed.
Respondent filed a mechanic’s lien on behalf of Mr. Kang, captioned
as Steve Kang v. Dujamae, LLC, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on
January 6, 2009. . . . After filing the lien, Respondent did not perform any
work in this [mechanic’s lien] case, and Kang v. Dujamae, LLC was
dismissed due to lack of prosecution on February 16, 2010. . . . Mr Kang
was never shown the legal work Respondent claimed he completed, and
only became aware that Respondent had filed a mechanic’s lien after being
told by his new attorney, Dave Clinnon.”
Although Respondent excepts to the proposed conclusion of law on this matter, 
10
infra, he made no exception to this finding of fact that supports the hearing judge’s
conclusion.
“IX. The Essex Property Matter
Respondent was also retained by Mr. Kang to assist with business
matters related to a shopping center renovation in Essex, Maryland. The
land was burdened by a high property tax bill, and Respondent was hired to
file for a hearing to lower the tax liability. For this matter, Respondent
charged Mr. Kang $9,000.00.”
Respondent took no exception to this finding of fact.
“X. Respondents Billing of Steve Kang’s Legal Matters
Respondent did not send regular invoices for any of Mr. Kang’s legal
matters. At one point, Mr. Kang requested itemized bills that detailed the
work performed and the fees charged. Mr Kang then received a single
billing statement encompassing all of his matters with Respondent.
Respondent and Mr. Kang met on four separate occasions in an effort to
generate accurate invoices. After each meeting, Respondent would provide
a new set of bills to Mr. Kang. 
. . . . Mr. Kang could not comprehend the bills provided to him
because line items for work on various matters were still being billed to the
wrong invoice. Respondent did not maintain a separate record of fee
payments for each matter, and routinely listed fee payments on invoices
without designating the matter for which the [requested] payment was
made. . . . Notwithstanding Respondent’s admission that all of the bills
contain inaccuracies, he contends that Mr. Kang still owes him
approximately $13,000.00 in unpaid legal fees.
Respondent attempts to except to this finding, but does so while admitting the bills
were inaccurate (“While Respondent admitted that the . . . designation of the billing of
certain matters was inaccurate,”) arguing only that no evidence had been introduced to
demonstrate that he had overbilled Mr. Kang. The finding did not allege overbilling but  
a pattern of confusing billing that remains unresolved. This exception is overruled. 
16 Aaron Garnell Garner was a principal in the “AG” company. Although his initials are
A.G., he is not the rapper “AG.” The rapper “AG” is Aaron’s brother, Christopher Holden. Mrs.
Boyd was their mother. “AG”, the rapper artist, did not testify at the hearing. Aaron Garnell
Garner did testify.  
11
 
C. COMPLAINANT: VIVIAN BOYD
Judge Hong’s findings of fact on this matter are as follows:
“On February 2, 2010, Respondent was retained by Vivian McGhee
Boyd (hereinafter ‘Ms. Boyd’) and her son Christopher ‘AG’[16]Holden, for
an ‘entertainment matter. . . .Respondent was to earn $250.00 per hour to be
billed monthly. . . .  On February 2, 2010, Respondent also received a
$5000.00 payment from Ms. Boyd into his trust account as a retainer for
legal services. . . .
AG was an aspiring rapper who had a promising career in the music
industry. Prior to Respondent’s involvement in this matter, Capital Records,
Warner Brothers, and Universal had expressed significant interest in signing
AG to their label. Each label had put forth a bid of at least $500,000.00. . . . 
Respondent excepts to this finding saying, that “no tangible evidence of such
offers was put forth at trial, . . .” Interestingly, Petitioner agrees with Respondent. They
are both incorrect. Aaron Garnell Garner, speaking for the company known as AG and
speaking about his brother, Christopher Holden, whose rap name was “AG,” testified as
follows: 
“Answer:  We had three labels that were interested in our company as AG
which is Universal Records, and Warner Brothers and Capital Records . . .
Warner Brothers, Universal and Capital Records was very interested in my
brother AG, which is the artist AG. . . . Christopher Holden is my brother
also my artist too.
Question:  And how much had Universal or Capital initially offer[ed] Mr.
Holden [the artist “AG”]?
Answer: Well they, Warner Brothers offered us five hundred thousand
17 On page 46 of the transcript of the August 16 afternoon session, after Aaron had
testified as above, Respondent testified: “Mr. [Aaron] Garner testified that Universal offered
$600,000, Warner offered $500,000 in a bidding war. And I believe another record [company],
Capital, offered another $500,000 in a bidding war.  Vivian [Ms. Boyd] never mentioned that.
And I have yet to see any evidence to that.” Aaron had already testified. His testimony was
evidence. The fact that Respondent did not know about it is of little significance. Other than his
testimony questioning the evidence presented, Respondent presented absolutely no evidence, as
opposed to mere speculation, contrary to the evidence on this point adduced from Aaron. 
12
dollars. Universal offered us six hundred [thousand] dollars. Capital was
still debating . . . . It’s a bidding war. . . .Capital came in . . . and they
offered the same amount that Universal did, which is six hundred thousand
also too . . .We just needed that . . . album for Rick Ross to be finished. . . .
Since that didn’t happen we lost all of that.”17   
It is obvious to this Court that there was sufficient clear and convincing evidence
to support this finding by Judge Hong. Accordingly, the exception is overruled. Judge
Hong also found: 
“. . . . Respondent presented himself as an effective entertainment lawyer
with connections in the music industry that could make AG’s dreams come
true. Meanwhile, Mrs. Boyd was dying of cancer.   
Respondent made seven (7) cash withdrawals in February 2010
totaling $3,650.00, and paid a Verizon bill on February 22, 2010 in the
amount of $552.62 using funds from his trust account. . . . As of February
23, 2010, Respondent’s invoices indicate he had only worked two billable
hours on behalf of AG. . . . Accordingly, his trust account should have had a
balance of $4,500.00, but the balance of Respondent’s trust account on that
date was $97.38. . . . 
. . . . Respondent then suggested to Ms. Boyd that they contact
Michael ‘Blue’ Williams, a manager in the recording industry, to help
facilitate contact with Rick Ross [apparently an established rap singer]. Mr.
Williams quoted a price of $25,000.00 [to Respondent] to get Rick Ross to
perform a song with AG. Ms. Boyd, using her home as collateral, secured a
loan in the amount of $25,000.00 from investors in Washington[State]. On
March 29, 2010, Ms. Boyd deposited $9,000.00 into Respondent’s trust
account. . . . She made another deposit into Respondent’s trust account in
the amount of $16,000.00 on March 30, 2010. . . . 
On April 2, 2010, Mr. Williams emailed Respondent requesting a
13
wire transfer ‘for Rick Ross and DJ Khalid’ in the amount of $12,500.00
into a Chase Bank account held by Family Tree Entertainment. . . .
Respondent never made a wire transfer. On April 2, 2010, Respondent
made a $12,5000.00 cash withdrawal in Baltimore [from the trust account].
He traveled by train to New York City. Mr. Williams picked him up at the
train station, and Respondent handed the money to him in the car. A
$12,500.00 cash withdrawal was posted to Respondent’s trust account on
April 5, 2010. . . .No contract or agreement memorializing that the funds
were transferred for the purpose of securing the appearance of Rick Ross to
record a commercial quality track was executed. . . . The parties never
signed a contract or recording agreement with Rick Ross. Mr. Williams
ceased communication with Respondent sometime in June 2010, and
Respondent claimed he had not spoken with Mr. Williams since that time.
However, Respondent admitted to giving Blue Williams $1,000.00 from the
trust account after he terminated his representation in July 2010.
Respondent reimbursed himself for the transaction on December 10, 2010
using funds from the trust account. . . . Neither Ms. Boyd nor AG
authorized the payment, and Respondent could not state why he made that
particular disbursement to Mr. Williams.
On May 24, 2010,  Respondent spoke with Ms. Boyd about the
Essence Music Festival in New Orleans, Louisiana that would feature an
author known as ‘Zane’. . . . Respondent asked Ms. Boyd if she wished to
sponsor the event for $2,500.00. . . . Ms. Boyd agreed to the sponsorship. . .
. Respondent withdrew a check in the amount of $2,500.00 from his trust
account and deposited the check into his operating account on May 27,
2010. . . .Respondent could not produce any receipt or other documentation
proving he made the payment for the sponsorship. . . .
. . . .On June 24, 2010,  Respondent issued check number 1696
drawn on his trust account payable to Gardner Law Group in the amount of
$399.40. . . . The memo line on the check indicated that the purpose was
for, ‘Paul’s Airfare for Client Event New Orleans 7/2/10 (Vivian McGee).’ .
. .  Respondent did not use the airline ticket, and never refunded the money
from the disbursement back into his trust account after the event was
canceled.
The balance in Respondent’s trust account at the end of June 2010
was $9,022.98. . . . Out of the $30,000.00 given to Respondent, he should
have been holding $9,630.00 in his trust account in light of an email from
Ms. Tyner detailing expenses for the representation of AG.
. . .
Respondent disbursed a $1,500.00 check from his trust account,
made payable to the Garner Law Group, on July 6, 2010. . . . The memo
14
line notes that the check was for ‘Vivian Boyd McGee - weekend outing +
plane tickets.’ . . . .However, Respondent testified on cross-examination that
Ms. Boyd had purchased the airline tickets herself. Respondent drew
another check on his attorney trust account made payable to Gardner Law
Group in the amount of $2,845.00 on July 19, 2010. . . . Respondent spent
between two and three hours with the group during their trip. . . . 
After Ms. Boyd realized Respondent would not be able to help her
and AG, she emailed Respondent about returning the remaining $20,500 out
of the money that was supposed to go to Rick Ross. Aaron Garner also
attempted to contact Respondent numerous times about returning the
money. He called Respondent approximately thirty (30) times between July
and September 2010, but Respondent did not answer the calls.  Respondent
finally answered one of Garner’s calls and told him he could not return the
money until Blue Williams returned the $12,500.00 to him. Respondent
eventually returned $4,500.00 to Ms. Boyd on July 26, 2010. . . . According
to his ledger, this left a balance of $2,087.50 in the trust account.
Respondent did not return the money to his clients, and could not explain
what happened to those funds. . . . The disbursement of $2,845.00 [to
Respondent] made on July 19, 2010 is listed on the ledger for [against the
original]$5,000.00 retainer and also listed as being deducted from the
$25,000.00 payment according to an email from Rosalind Tyner to Ms.
Boyd dated July 26, 2010. . . . 
. . . . When Respondent did not return the money to Ms. Boyd, [her]
investors foreclosed on her home, her house was taken away, and she died
of cancer shortly thereafter. Christopher ‘AG’ Holden is now detailing cars
trying to get his music career back on track.”
Respondent took several exceptions to the various factual findings regarding this
portion of the Boyd matter. As we stated above in Zimmerman, 428 Md. at 134, 50 A.3d
at 1214 and London, 427 Md. at 343, 47 A.3d at 995 “. . . deference [to the hearing
judge’s findings of fact] is appropriate because the hearing judge is in a position to assess
the demeanor-based credibility of the witnesses.”  While there were certain conflicts in
the testimony between Petitioner’s witnesses and Mr. Gardner, there was more than
sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support Judge Hong’s findings in the Boyd
15
matter. 
Accordingly, Respondent’s exceptions are overruled.
CONCLUSIONS IN RESPECT TO BAR COUNSEL’S COMPLAINT
Judge Hong reached the following conclusions of law in respect to Respondent’s
conduct in the matters contained in Bar Counsel’s Complaint:
 She found “by clear and convincing evidence” that Respondent failed to hold
client funds in a separate account and failed to maintain records as required by Title 16 of
the Maryland Rules and accordingly had violated the provisions of Rule 1.15 (a) in
respect to the PIP check relating to Mr. Gordon. Respondent does not except to this
conclusion nor to the findings of fact supporting the conclusion.   Maryland Rule 16-759
(b)  Review by Court of Appeals provides, in relevant part, “If no exceptions are filed
[in respect to findings of fact], the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for
the purpose of determining appropriate sanctions, if any.”  Upon our de novo review of
the evidence presented, we find it to be clear and convincing, and we, thus, determine that
Judge Hong did not err. We agree with the hearing judge that Respondent violated the
provisions of Rule 1.15 (a).
She next concluded by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent had
violated the provisions of Rule 5.4 (a) in writing the four checks from the trust account to
Ms. Tyner. Respondent does not except to this conclusion nor to the findings of fact that
support the conclusion. Upon our de novo review of the evidence presented, we find it to
be clear and convincing. The hearing judge did not err in concluding that Respondent
16
violated the provisions of Rule 5.4 (a).
  The hearing judge, based upon her findings of fact, concluded that Respondent
had violated Rule 8.4 (a) by violating the requirements of Rule 1.15(a) (the Gordon
matter) and the provisions of 5.4 (a) (the improper sharing of fees with Ms. Tyner).
Respondent did not except to this conclusion of law by Judge Hong nor to the findings of
fact supporting that conclusion. Upon our de novo review of the evidence, we find it to be
clear and convincing, and, thus, we agree with Judge Hong that Respondent violated Rule
8.4 (a). The hearing judge did not err.
Judge Hong concluded, based upon her findings of fact, that Respondent had
violated the provisions of 8.4 (c) by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation in respect to the Gordon matter. She quoted from our case of
Attorney Grievance Commission  v. Herman, 380 Md. 378, 400, 844 A.2d 1181, 1195
(2004) that “‘Absent compelling extenuating circumstances, misappropriation by an
attorney is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty.’” Respondent took no exception to
this conclusion nor to the findings of fact supporting it. Upon our de novo review of the
evidence, we find it to be clear and convincing, and, thus, we agree with the hearing judge
that Respondent has violated the provisions of Rule 8.4 (c).
She concluded, based upon her findings of fact, that Respondent had violated the
provisions of Maryland Rule 16-606.1 (a) that requires a lawyer to create and maintain
records for all attorney trust accounts. She concluded that Respondent admitted to
violations of this Rule, but that he blamed it on “sloppy accounting practices.” She
17
asserted that a violation of this rule was further proven by the fact that Respondent had
allowed a check drawn on his trust account to bounce. Respondent took no exception to
this conclusion of law nor to the supporting facts. Upon our de novo review of the
evidence, we find it to be clear, convincing and supportive of the findings of fact and the
hearing judge’s conclusions based upon those findings, and, thus, we agree with Judge
Hong’s conclusion. She also held that he failed to reconcile his attorney trust account on a
monthly basis and thus violated the provisions of Maryland Rule 16-606.1(b).
Respondent took no exception to this conclusion of law. Upon our review of the evidence
and the findings, we agree with Judge Hong that Respondent violated these rules.     
Judge Hong concluded that Respondent had made or authorized cash withdrawals
from his trust account and, by issuing a check for $2,500.00 to Leonard Siegel, had
permitted his trust account to have a negative balance of -$922.17. The hearing judge
concluded that such actions violated the provisions of Maryland Rule 16-609. We have
reviewed the testimony, exhibits and other evidence on a de novo basis and we conclude
that by the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable on these types of cases,
Judge Hong’s conclusion was correct. Respondent also violated this rule.
CONCLUSIONS IN RESPECT TO STEVE KANG’S COMPLAINT 
The hearing judge noted that the Respondent “did not possess the requisite
knowledge or even a basic level of competence necessary to handle the immigration
matter for which he was retained.” She also concluded that he never refiled the
immigration application. She also concluded that Respondent generated incomprehensible
18
billing statements and demonstrated an absence of knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation in the area of billing practices and did not regularly bill Mr. Kang. She
concluded that even after four meetings with Mr. Kang, Respondent admitted that his
billings still contained inaccuracies. For all of these reasons,  Judge Hong concluded that
Respondent had violated the provisions of Rule 1.1. Respondent took exception to the
hearing judge’s conclusion of law on this issue.  We have reviewed de novo the evidence,
especially the transcripts of testimony in this matter, and the Court also concludes that
there was credible, clear and convincing evidence supporting Judge Hong’s determination
that Respondent violated Rule 1.1. Respondent’s exception to this conclusion is
overruled.    
In her conclusions of law, Judge Hong then addressed Rule 1.3 noting that it states
“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” 
She concluded that Respondent’s deficiencies in this area constituted a violation of  Rule
1.3, stating in summary:
“Respondent failed to act in a prompt and diligent manner by waiting
three months to contact Mr. Kang about the information he needed to
complete the visa application and by not timely refiling Jin Shifeng’s (Ms.
Li’s husband) visa application. Respondent also never took further action
after filing for the mechanic’s lien against Dujamae, and the end result was
dismissal for lack of prosecution.”
Respondent excepted to this conclusion of law by the hearing judge. After our de
novo review of the evidence we conclude that this violation is established. Judge Hong
did not err.  Respondent’s exception(s) are overruled. 
19
In respect to Rules 1.4(a)(1), 1.4(a)(2) and 1.4(b), the trial court concluded, that as
a matter of law, Respondent had violated these rule provisions. After a more extensive
discussion, she concluded:  “Respondent did not adequately communicate to Mr. Kang
what he was doing with his various cases and the status of each. He did not provide Mr.
Kang with enough information to make informed decisions about his legal matters, and
did not seek informed consent when required.”  Respondent took exception to this
conclusion, stating: “. . . . Respondent introduced sufficient evidence that he
communicated with Mr. Kang via email, fax, mail, and in person regarding the matters he
was asked to handle.” 
However, there was sufficient clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The
hearing judge has the primary role in assessing the credibility of the witnesses. She chose
to credit Mr. Kang’s testimony over that of Respondent. That is one of a trial judge’s
functions in these types of matters. We have reviewed the evidence presented and hold
that Judge Hong was not erroneous in making this proposed conclusion of law.
Respondent’s exception is overruled.
The hearing judge also held that Respondent violated the provisions of Rule 1.5 as
to the reasonableness of his fees. In her conclusion, she listed the required factors for her
to consider in assessing whether this particular rule had been violated. After a short
discussion of some of the factors and how they applied (or did not apply), she stated:
“. . . .The factor that most clearly applies in this case is the amount of the
fee charged and Respondent’s failure to obtain meaningful results on behalf
of M. Kang.
20
. . . . While the $250.00 per hour is not facially excessive,
Respondent’s failure to follow through on [m]any of Mr. Kang’s legal
matters make the fees charged unreasonable. The only matter that was
successfully handled was the Federal Liquors liquor license transfer, and
Jean Fugett completed most of the work on that case. For those reasons, this
Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule
1.5(a).
Rule 1.5(b) also mandates that the basis of the fee must be
communicated to the client prior to, or within a reasonable time after, the
onset of representation. . . . Respondent did not communicate the scope of
the representation or the basis for his fee for each of Mr. Kang’s
distinguishable legal matters.”  
Upon our independent review of the testimony and the record in this case, we
agree with Judge Hong. There was sufficient evidence to support her conclusion. She did
not err. Respondent’s exception to this conclusion is overruled.
 In the matter relating to Mr. Kang and potential conflicts of interest, Judge Hong
also concluded that Respondent had violated the provisions of Rule 1.7.  She stated in
relevant part:
“Respondent claims that he did not violate this rule because Mrs. Li
was never his client. . . . 
The representation of both Mr. Kang and Mrs. Li necessarily
involved the same subject matter–the business of bringing a branch of the
Yanbian Company and its officers to the United States. . . . Gary Maslin,
counsel for Mrs. Li, put Respondent on notice of the potential conflict
twenty (20) months before the trial. . . . He [Respondent] entered his
appearance in the lawsuit [on behalf of Mr. Kang], and only withdrew his
appearance after Mrs. Li’s attorney filed a motion to strike his
[Respondent’s] appearance. . . . Respondent thus engaged in representation
where there was a significant risk that he would have been materially
limited by representation of a former client.” 
We agree with the hearing judge that the clear and convincing evidence in this
record supports her conclusion that Respondent had a conflict of interest, was advised that
21
he had a potential conflict of interest, and did not withdraw his appearance until, on the
eve of the trial, a motion was made to strike his appearance. Respondent’s conduct
violated Rule 1.7. Judge Hong did not err. Respondent’s exception as to this conclusion is
overruled. 
The judge then concluded that Respondent had violated Rule 1.16 because he “did
not accurately account for all of Mr. Kang’s fee payments and did not refund any of the
fees collected. Furthermore, Respondent acknowledged that after four revisions, his
invoices were still not accurate.” Respondent took no exception to this conclusion, and
we hold that Judge Hong did not err and hold that Respondent violated Rule 1.16.
In respect to the matter concerning Mr. Kang, Judge Hong found that the
Respondent violated Rule 8.4 (a) by violating the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct and based this conclusion on her other conclusions that he had violated the rules
above mentioned.  She then noted that “An attorney violates Rule 8.4 (c) by engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Once again ‘[a]bsent
compelling extenuating circumstances, misappropriation by an attorney is an act infected
with deceit and dishonesty. Respondent”s numerous billing errors and failure to account
for all of Mr. Kang’s fee payments cause this Court to find . . . .that Respondent acted
deceitfully and dishonestly in violation of Rule 8.4 (c).”  Respondent took no exception to
this conclusion, and we agree with the hearing judge that Respondent violated the
provisions of Rule 8.4 (c) in the Kang matter.
Finally, our hearing judge found that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) because he
22
took no action when he was notified that Mr. Kang’s mechanic’s lien action was facing
dismissal for lack of prosecution. Respondent took an exception to this issue, stating “. . .
Respondent offered to pursue the matter for an additional retainer fee; however Mr. Kang
could not provide the money to pursue the matter.”  However, Mr. Kang testified that he
did not even know of the filing of the mechanic’s lien action until he had hired a new
attorney, and the new attorney told him it had been filed. Obviously, the hearing judge
assessed the credibility of Mr. Kang and the Respondent in concluding that Respondent
had violated this rule. Respondent’s exception on this issue is insufficiently supported by
the credible evidence in the record. The record adequately supports the conclusions of our
hearing judge and we hold that she made no error. We also hold that Respondent violated
the provisions of Rule 8.4(d).    
CONCLUSIONS IN RESPECT TO THE BOYD MATTER  
Judge Hong noted that attorneys violate Rule 1.1 “when they fail to handle a client
matter with ‘lawyerly skill and ability.’”  She then concluded that Respondent failed to
provide competent representation during the course of his representation of Ms. Boyd and
“AG.”  She concluded that he made significant payments to Blue Williams and
Mahogany Jones without adequately protecting the interests of Ms. Boyd and “AG”.
Judge Hong concluded, “He made these payments to Mr. Williams and Mrs. Jones on
behalf of his clients, but failed to act competently by not ensuring that contracts were
executed before the funds were transferred.”  The record and the findings of fact
contained therein,  sufficiently support the conclusion of the hearing judge. She did not
23
err. We hold that Respondent violated Rule 1.1 in his representation of Ms. Boyd and/or
“AG.”
The hearing judge noted that Rule 1.4 (a)(2) requires lawyers to keep their clients
informed in a reasonable manner. After citing Attorney Grievance Commission  v.
Kreamer, 404 Md. 282, 946 A.2d 500 (2008), Judge Hong concluded: “The only
difference between the case at bar and Kreamer is that the Respondent in this case was
representing his clients in an ‘entertainment matter.’” She concluded that he was unable
to respond to his client’s requests for information or declined to do so.  She then said:
“His failure to communicate with his client for over two months without reason causes
this Court to find by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule
1.4(a)(2).  Furthermore, this Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
Respondent violated Rule 1.4 (a)(2) by not timely disclosing the $1,000.00 payment to
Mr. Williams.”  Respondent excepted, saying, “Respondent put forth evidence
demonstrating that he kept in contact with Ms. Boyd in his attempts to track down Zane
and Mr. Williams for the return of her funds.” The evidence before the hearing judge
indicated that there were numerous (30) unanswered communications from the Boyd
interests in reference to the Respondent as to the moneys at issue without an adequate
response. We agree with the hearing judge. Respondent’s exceptions to portions of the
hearing judge’s conclusions are overruled.
She next addressed Rule 1.4(b), concluding: “Respondent should have advised that
he intended to make a cash payment to Mr. Williams [of $12,000.00], and that a danger
24
existed in disbursing the funds to Mr. Williams without the existence of a contract. He
should also have warned his clients about the potential danger in giving a $2,500.00
payment to Mahogany Jones for the Essence Music Festival without a signed contract. . .
.”  Judge Hong concluded that Respondent violated the provisions of Rule 1.4(b).
Respondent took an exception to the conclusion concerning the $12,000.00 payment to
Mr. Williams, saying, “Respondent and Mr. Garner both testified about the rushed nature
of the matter, and Respondent testified and put forth evidence that Ms. Boyd instructed
Respondent to make a deposit without a contract being in place, against the advice of
Respondent.”  He took no exception in respect to the conclusion as to the Mahogany
Jones’  payment.  In any event, the exception made is overruled. Judge Hong’s conclusion
is amply supported by clear,  convincing and credible evidence. We hold that Respondent
violated Rule 1.4(b). 
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rule 1.5 which, as before
stated, prohibits unreasonable fees. Petitioner, in presenting this alleged rule violation,
based it on the fact that Respondent billed his general fee rate for performing non-legal
services such as escorting his clients to Washington D.C. and on the fact that the total
amount of fees charged for the matters relating to Boyd and AG were unreasonable. 
Respondent argued to Judge Hong that it was reasonable to charge his regular fee for non-
legal work because the time he spent with the client on non-legal matters took away the
time he could have been working on other legal matters. Gardner also argued that the
18 Other than his own speculation, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that the
fees charged were “customary’ in the entertainment industry. No experts, no laymen, no
entertainers, no one in the industry testified.
25
charges he made were “reasonable . . .and customary in the [entertainment] industry.”18 
Judge Hong found Respondent’s position that he could bill for non-legal services
because those services compromised the time he could expend on legal matters, could,
under some circumstances, be permitted but, quoting from Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Wright, 306 Md. 93, 104, 507 A.2d 618, 623 (1986), noted that such
charges could only be made when there is “‘some kind of effective disclosure to the client
as part of the terms of the engagement.’” She concluded that “Respondent never made
any such disclosure to his clients, and billed ten hours when he spent at most three hours
with them. This fee was unreasonable. . . . Accordingly, this Court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 1.5.”  As to this conclusion,
Respondent took no exceptions. Judge Hong did not err. We hold that Respondent again
violated Rule 1.5.
Under the provisions of Rule 1.5(a), attorneys must hold their client funds in a
separate trust account and create and maintain proper accounts. Judge Hong concluded
that: 
“Respondent only performed 2.00 hours of billable work [in respect to the retainer
of $5,000.00] on behalf of Ms. Boyd and AG. Thus he should have been holding
$4,500.00 in his trust account, but the balance of the trust account at the end of
February 2010 was $98.38. He also used funds from his trust account to pay a
Verizon bill on February 22, 2010. Finally, he made a $1,000.00 disbursement to
Mr. Williams [in addition to the $12,000.00 cash disbursement previously made
26
from the $25,000.00 forwarded to him and placed in his trust account in respect to
the Rick Ross matter] after the end of representation without telling his clients, and
did not note it on the retainer ledger until December 10, 2010. For these reasons
this Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule
1.5 (a).” 
We agree with the hearing judge. Respondent violated the provisions of Rule
 1.5 (a). Respondent filed no exceptions to this conclusion.
Judge Hong next concluded that Respondent violated the provisions of Rule 1.16
(d) because he did not take reasonable steps to protect Ms. Boyd and AG’s interests. She
concluded that he also failed to return the unearned portion of the trust balance and also
concluded that he billed for work that was done after the termination of his
representation. Judge Hong did not err.  Respondent did not except to these conclusions.
We hold that Respondent violated the provisions of Rule 1.16 (d).
Then the hearing judge concluded once again, by clear and convincing evidence,
that Respondent, in the Boyd/AG matter, had violated the provisions of Rule 8.4(a) by
committing  the numerous other violations of the rules in the representation of these
clients.  She reiterated her prior conclusions in this particular matter, then stated: “Finally,
no explanation was given as to why Respondent wrote another $1,000.00 check to Mr.
Williams. Respondent also double billed his clients when he deducted $2,845.00 from
both the initial $5,000.00 retainer and the $25,000.00 payment.”  No exception was taken
in respect to this conclusion of the hearing judge. We hold that she committed no error
and further hold that Respondent again violated the provisions of Rule 8.4(a).
Judge Hong found that Respondent did not maintain accurate client matter records
27
for either the $5,000.00 retainer or the $25,000.00 trust deposit. She concluded that he
violated Maryland Rule 16-606.1(a) by reason of his failure to maintain said records.
Respondent took no exception to this conclusion. We agree with the hearing judge, and
hold that Respondent violated the provisions of the Maryland Rule 16-606.1 (a).
In her final conclusion, Judge Hong determined that Respondent violated the
provisions of Maryland Rule 16-609 stating:
“Maryland Rule 16-609 prohibits an attorney from making cash
withdrawals from a trust account. Respondent made seven (7) cash
withdrawals [in addition to the $12,500 cash withdrawal he delivered to
Blue Williams] in February 2010 totaling $3,650.00. Thus, [this] Court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Maryland
Rule 16-609.”
Mr. Gardner took no exception to this final conclusion of our hearing judge. We agree
with her and conclude that he violated the provisions of Maryland Rule 16-609.
MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS
There are no credible mitigating factors.
 An aggravating factor is that Respondent has been previously subject to
disciplinary consideration and was, about the time that he was committing some of the
present violations of the rules, or just prior thereto, actually participating, or had just
participated, in a Conditional Diversionary Agreement with the Attorney Grievance
Commission. That agreement included him attending a session on the financial
management of a law firm. He learned little, if anything, apparently, about financial
management from that session. Additionally, Respondent’s conduct resulted in prejudice
28
to his various clients.  His conduct during the progress of this disciplinary proceeding also
is an aggravating factor. He failed to show up for a deposition and was sanctioned as
result. Additionally, he was continually late in appearing at the hearings before Judge
Hong.
SANCTION 
As the Court has often stated, the purpose of imposing sanctions is to protect the
public. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Zimmerman, 428 Md. at 144, 50 A.3d at 1220 (2011),
(“This Court sanctions attorneys to protect the public and the public’s confidence in the
legal profession.”);  Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Dominguez, 427 Md. 308, 327, 47 A.3d
975, 986 (2012),  Att’y Grievance Comm’n  v. Seltzer, 424 Md. 94, 116, 34 A.3d 498
(2011).         
In Zimmerman, 428 Md. at 144, 50 A.3d at 1220, Judge Adkins, for the Court,
recently opined:
We have held that “[m]isappropriation of funds by an attorney is an act
infected with deceit and dishonesty and ordinarily will result in disbarment
in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lessor
sanction. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 410, 773
A.2d 463, 483, 488 (2001) (citations omitted) (attorney disbarred). In
Agiliga, we disbarred an attorney for the previously cited misuse of and
failure to preserve client funds. See Agiliga, 422 Md. [613] 624, 31 A.3d
[103,] 109-10 [2011]. Misappropriation and misuse of client funds has
warranted disbarment in numerous other cases.
Respondent has been found to have violated Rule 1.15(a), Rule 5.4(a), Rule 1.1
(two violations), Rule 1.3, Rule 1.4(a)(1), Rule 1.4(a)(2) (two violations), Rule 1.4(b)
(two violations), Rule 1.5(a) (two violations), Rule 1.5(b), Rule 1.7(a), Rule 1.16 (two
29
violations), 8.4(a) (three violations), Rule 8.4( c ) (three violations), 8.4(d), Maryland
Rule 16.606 (a) (two violations), Maryland Rule 16-606 (b), Maryland Rule 16-609 (2
violations). We shall not address any further the specific rule violations. Looked at in
isolation some violations are so serious in and of themselves that they warrant a severe
sanction.  In the scope and number of the violations, they are particularly egregious.
Some of them address serious mishandling of client’s funds. Some concern the
misappropriation of those funds, withdrawing cash from trust funds (in one case carrying
the sum of $12,500 to New York and giving it to his friend, “Blue” Williams) improper
billing, improper trust records, conflicts of interest and much more. 
Consistent with our duty in such cases, and as Judge Adkins said in Zimmerman,
428 Md. at 146, 50 A.3d at 1221,  quoting from our case of Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Stern, 419 Md. 525, 558, 19 A.3d 904, 926 (2011): 
   “It has long been settled that an attorney’s misappropriation of funds
entrusted to his care, be the amount small or large, is of great concern and
represents the gravest form of professional misconduct. The default
sanction for ethical violations involving intentional misappropriation, or
other intentional dishonest conduct is disbarment. . . .”
 
The sanction in this case is disbarment.
IT IS SO ORDERED. RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS
OF TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH
30
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN
FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST
PAUL WINSTON GARDNER, II.