Case Title: KNOWLES v. CORKILL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
KNOWLES v. CORKILL2002 WY 11951 P.3d 859Case Number: 00-254, 00-255Decided: 08/09/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

CLARK 
TYLER KNOWLES, as

Personal 
Representative for the

Estate 
of Lynn Rae Knowles, deceased, 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

DEBORA 
EILEEN CORKILL,1 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

DEBORA 
EILEEN CORKILL, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

CLARKE 
TYLER KNOWLES, as Personal

Representative 
of the Estate of Lynn Rae

Knowles, 
deceased, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge 

 

 

Representing 
Clark Tyler Knowles, Personal Representative for the Estate of Lynn Rae Knowles, 
Deceased:

Cameron 
S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming 

 

Representing 
Debora Eileen Corkill:

John I. 
Henley of Vlastos, Brooks, Henley & Drell, P.C., Casper, Wyoming

  

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

* 
Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]           
This is a 
wrongful death action that was decided after a jury trial.  Although the alleged tortfeasor, Debora 
Eileen Corkill (Corkill), was apportioned 52% of the fault for the accident 
resulting in Lynn Rae Knowles' death, no monetary damages were awarded.  In appeal number 00-254, Lynn's father, 
Clark Tyler Knowles (Knowles), acting in his capacity as the personal 
representative appeals certain evidentiary rulings made during trial and the 
denial of a motion for a new trial based upon an inconsistent verdict.  In appeal number 00-255, Corkill appeals 
an evidentiary ruling that potentially affected the apportionment of fault.  We find no error in the holdings of the 
trial court as alleged in appeal number 00-254.  Because no monetary damages were 
awarded, appeal number 00-255 is dismissed as moot.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Knowles, as 
appellant in appeal number 00-254, presents the following 
issues:

 

A.        Did 
the District Court err when it refused to admit evidence of the effects of their 
mother's disappearance and death upon Cassandra Ulmer and Chad 
Ulmer?

B.        Did 
the District Court err in refusing to admit evidence of counseling, and the 
sense of loss and abandonment experienced by Chad and Cassandra Ulmer as a 
result of their mother's disappearance and death?

C.        Did 
the District Court err in refusing to admit evidence of emotional distress of 
Lynn Knowles' survivors?

D.        Did the District 
Court err in overruling plaintiff's objection to an inconsistent verdict for 
failure to award damages?

E.        Did the District 
Court err in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial?

 

Appellees restate the issues 
as:

 

1.         
The case law, principles of statutory construction, and logic, all 
support the trial court's application of the Wyoming Wrongful Death 
statute.

2.         
The testimony of Dr. Shilling was irrelevant, without foundation, and 
speculative; the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in limiting 
her testimony.

3.         
The jury applied both the law and the facts of the case in determining 
that the plaintiff, Clark Knowles, who sought reimbursement for disinterment and 
a funeral service, was not entitled to the same.

 

In the cross-appeal, appeal number 
00-255, appellant Corkill challenges the introduction of certain evidence 
relating to her alleged blood alcohol level at the time of the 
accident.

 

 

FACTS2

 

[¶3]           
Lynn Knowles, 
the decedent, grew up in Iowa.  She 
married Randy Ulmer shortly after her eighteenth birthday in 1977.   Lynn and Randy had two children: 
Cassandra, born in 1977; and Chad, born in 1978.   At Lynn's instigation, Lynn and 
Randy separated in August 1979 and were divorced in January 1980. Originally 
upon their separation, Lynn had physical custody of the children.  A strike occurred at Randy's workplace 
so he was able to help take care of the kids during the day.  In December 1979, Randy got a new job 
and was no longer able to help care for the children.  Within a couple of weeks, just before 
Christmas 1979, Lynn asked Randy to take physical custody of the children.  He agreed to take the children, and Lynn 
never had physical custody of the children after that 
time.

 

[¶4]           
Although Randy 
had physical custody of the children at the time of the divorce in January 1980, 
the divorce decree granted legal custody of the children to Lynn.  That arrangement, however, did not last 
long.  In March 1980, Lynn asked 
Randy to assume legal custody of the children because she was thinking about 
joining the Navy.  Randy assumed 
legal custody, but Lynn never did enlist.  
Nor did she ever attempt to regain legal or physical custody of the 
children.  Over the course of the 
next several months, she saw the children only infrequently.  She never paid any child support, nor 
was she required to under the divorce decree or custody agreement. 

 

[¶5]           
In the fall of 
1980, Lynn left her hometown to go to college.  She went to Iowa City and stayed with 
her brother briefly, then briefly tried the college dorms, which she did not 
like, then lived with a female roommate off-campus.  She placed at most two phone calls to 
Randy after she left her hometown.  
During one of these calls Lynn informed Randy that she was going to go to 
another school, perhaps in Cedar Rapids, but she did not give any more 
information.  That was the last 
communication Randy had with Lynn.  
On October 31, 1980, Lynn placed a phone call to her sister's house, 
stating that she was in San Jose.  
That was the last contact any of her family ever had with Lynn.  Eventually, around October or November 
1980, Randy received a phone call from a truck stop.  Lynn had abandoned her automobile (still 
registered in his name) in the parking lot of the truck stop.  The car had some of her clothes in 
it.  Lynn's family picked up the 
car. 

 

[¶6]           
In the early 
morning hours of November 2, 1980, Lynn was struck and killed by a vehicle 
driven by Corkill in Casper.  It is 
alleged that Corkill was operating the vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol.  Corkill fled the scene of 
the accident without rendering aid to the victim or reporting the incident to 
authorities.  Investigators and 
police officers were able to identify Corkill as the driver because pieces of 
her vehicle's grill were left on the highway when she struck the decedent.  Corkill was cited for leaving the scene 
of an accident involving injury or death.  

 

[¶7]           
Authorities were 
unable to identify Lynn after the accident.  Her purse and her wallet were missing, 
and she carried no other form of identification.  For the next fourteen years Lynn's 
family did not know what had happened to her.  Her two children thought she had 
abandoned them.  Knowles hired a 
private investigator to find his daughter, but to no avail.  Fourteen years later, after making 
further inquiries, investigating dental records, and exhuming the body, 
authorities were finally able to identify Lynn and contact her family.  On March 6, 1995, Knowles reviewed 
police photographs of Lynn's body, read a note found on her body, and identified 
the body as that of his daughter.  
Knowles had the body cremated, and the ashes were scattered in a family 
ceremony at Davenport, Iowa.  In his 
capacity as the personal representative, Knowles filed this wrongful death 
action against Corkill in 1996.  The 
case was tried to a jury in November 1999.  
The jury returned a verdict finding Corkill 52% at fault for the 
accident, and Lynn 48% at fault.  
The jury awarded no monetary damages.  These timely appeals 
followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Damages Compensable under the 
Wrongful Death Act

 

[¶8]           
At trial, 
Knowles proffered the testimony of a psychologist, Dr. Martha Shilling, 
regarding feelings of abandonment suffered by the children after their mother 
disappeared.  The trial court 
refused to allow Dr. Shilling to testify on the subject because it determined 
that any damages relating to feelings of abandonment constituted mental anguish 
damages and as such were not compensable under Wyoming law.  The question before this Court, 
therefore, is a question of law regarding damages compensable under Wyoming's 
Wrongful Death statute.  We review 
questions of law de novo.  Gray v. Stratton Real 
Estate, 2001 WY 
125, ¶5, 36 P.3d 1127, ¶5 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶9]           
As will be 
discussed below, based upon Wyoming's Wrongful Death statute and also this 
Court's interpretation of the statute, Wyoming has a long history of allowing 
damages for loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort, but does 
not allow damages for mental anguish.  
On appeal, Knowles first argues that feelings of abandonment are but a 
symptom of the loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort, and, 
therefore, the damages alleged fall within the statutory language.  In the alternative, Knowles argues that, 
if the damages are in the nature of mental anguish, then this Court should take 
this opportunity to recognize damages for mental anguish as compensable under 
the statute.  

 

[¶10]      
With regard to 
Knowles' first argument, we agree with the trial court that any feelings of 
abandonment suffered by the children must be categorized as mental anguish.  The difference between the loss of 
probable future companionship, society and comfort, which is compensable, and 
mental anguish, which is not compensable, has been explained and summarized as 
follows:

[R]ecovery for the beneficiaries' 
mental anguish is primarily concerned, not with the benefits they have lost, but 
with the issue of compensating them for their harrowing experience resulting 
from the death of a loved one.  This 
requires a somewhat negative approach.  
The fundamental question in this area of damages is what deleterious 
effect has the death, as such, had upon the mental tranquility and emotional 
well-being of the claimants?  In 
other areas of damage, the law focuses on more positive aspects of the injury 
such as what would the decedent, had he lived, have contributed in terms of 
support, assistance, training, comfort, consortium, etc.

 

1 Stuart M. Speiser et al., 
Recovery for Wrongful Death and 
Injury §3:38 (3rd ed. 1998).  Put simply, loss of probable future 
companionship, society and comfort entails the loss of positive benefits, while 
mental anguish represents an emotional reaction to the wrongful 
death.

 

[¶11]      
Knowles attempts 
to argue that abandonment is simply the flip side of the same coin as the loss 
of comfort and society  it is the obvious reaction of the children to being 
deprived of their mother's company.  
Even if we were to accept this analogy as true, the obvious result is 
that one side of the coin is compensable while the other is not.  Compensation can be had only for the 
monetary value of any benefits the decedent would have bestowed upon her 
children had she lived.  The 
emotional reaction to their mother's disappearance is not 
compensable.

 

[¶12]      
Dr. Shilling was 
allowed to testify at length.  She 
testified that, in her opinion, the decedent eventually would have returned to 
her children and the children therefore suffered a loss of probable future 
companionship, society and comfort.  
The subject matter on which Dr. Shilling was not allowed to testify 
concerned feelings of abandonment suffered by the two children.  These feelings clearly constitute mental 
anguish  an emotional response of the children to the disappearance of their 
mother.  The proffered testimony was 
properly excluded.

 

[¶13]      
As for the 
alternative argument presented by Knowles, we decline to recognize mental 
anguish damages as compensable in wrongful death actions.  Wrongful death actions did not exist at 
common law; they are purely creatures of statute.  See generally Coliseum Motor Co. v. 
Hester, 43 Wyo. 
298, 3 P.2d 105 (1931).  Thus, we 
must look to the appropriate statute to determine the proper measure of 
damages.  Section 1-38-102(c) of 
Wyoming's statutes defines the proper measure of damages as 
follows:

 

(c) The court or jury, as the case 
may be, in every such action may award such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as 
shall be deemed fair and just.  
Every person for whose benefit such action is brought may prove his 
respective damages, and the court or jury may award such person that amount of 
damages to which it considers such person entitled, including damages for loss 
of probable future companionship, society and comfort.

 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001). 

 

[¶14]      
The first 
opportunity this Court had to discuss the measure of damages available under 
Wyoming's Wrongful Death statute was in 1931 in Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 
supra.  The Wrongful Death statute in effect at 
the time provided for "such damages as [the jury] shall deem fair and just." 
Coliseum, 43 Wyo. at 306, 3 P.2d  at 
106.   In Coliseum, Justice Blume undertook a thorough 
analysis of the historical evolution of wrongful death actions, the language of 
Wyoming's Wrongful Death statute, and the statutory language and damages allowed 
in various foreign jurisdictions.  
Justice Blume concluded that the measure of damages compensable under 
Wyoming's Wrongful Death statute should include loss of care, attention and 
society, while no recovery could be had for mental suffering.  This Court has never altered this 
judicial interpretation of "fair and just" damages.

 

[¶15]      
The legislature 
has amended the statutory language specifically addressing damages three times 
since Coliseum.  Specifically, in 1939, a sentence was 
added to the damages clause: 

 

[T]he jury shall give such damages 
as they shall deem fair and just.  
The court or jury may consider, as elements of damages, the amount the 
survivors failed or will fail, by reason of the death, to receive out of the 
decedent's earnings, and further the court or jury may add, as an element of 
damage, a reasonable sum for the loss of the comfort, care, advice and society 
of the decedent.

 

1939 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 104, § 1 
(emphasis added).  In 1947, the 
language was amended to read:

 

[T]he jury shall give such damages 
as they shall deem fair and just.  
The court or jury may consider, as elements of damages, the amount the 
survivors failed or will fail, by reason of the death, to receive out of the 
decedent's earnings, any other pecuniary loss directly and proximately 
sustained by the survivors by reason of such death including funeral 
expenses, and further the court or jury may add, as an element of damage, a 
reasonable sum for the loss of the comfort, care, advice and society of the 
decedent.

 

1947 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 132, § 1 
(emphasis added).  Finally, in 1973, 
the entire section was rewritten and divided into subdivisions.  Subdivision (c), relating to damages, 
was written as follows:

The court or jury, as the case may 
be, in every such action may award such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as 
shall be deemed fair and just.  
Every person for whose benefit such action is brought, may prove his 
respective damages, and the court or jury may award such person that amount of 
damages to which it considers such person entitled, including damages for loss 
of probable future companionship, society and comfort.

 

1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 139, § 
1.  This language has remained the 
same for almost thirty years and is the exact same language found in the statute 
today.

 

[¶16]      
Knowles argues 
that the change in language in the 1973 amendment allows for recovery for mental 
anguish.  Specifically, Knowles 
argues that the addition of the word "including" in the phrase "including 
damages for loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort" 
indicates that the legislature no longer intends to limit recovery to only 
companionship, society and comfort.  
Knowles argues "including" means "including but not limited to" and, 
therefore, there is no limit on damages and damages for mental anguish must be 
compensable.  

 

[¶17]      
We 
disagree.  The language simply does 
not support such a sweep to the infinite.  
The legislature has continuously used the phrase "fair and just."  As a matter of simple statutory 
construction, the legislature's use of the term "including" cannot be 
interpreted as rendering null and void the legislature's use of the term "fair 
and just" as a limitation on damages.  
See Britton v. Bill Anselmi 
Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc., 786 P.2d 855, 864 (Wyo. 1990) ("We 
construe every word, every clause and every sentence so as to avoid rendering 
the legislature's actions futile or absurd.").  

 

[¶18]      
The phrase "fair 
and just" was clearly defined by this Court in Coliseum to exclude recovery for mental 
anguish.  This judicial 
interpretation of the phrase has carried forward with all the amendments.  See generally Civic Ass'n of Wyoming 
v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 238-39, 116 P.2d 236, 
245 (Wyo. 1941).  We agree with the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Colorado which, when faced with a similar call 
to expand damages by means of statutory construction, 
stated:

 

The suggestion that this Court 
should depart from its prior pronouncements defining the measure of damages 
recoverable under our wrongful death statute would do utter violence to the 
well-established rule of statutory construction that when a legislature 
repeatedly re-enacts a statute which has theretofore received a settled judicial 
construction, there can be no doubt as to the legislative intent, and in such 
circumstances it must be considered that the particular statute is re-enacted 
with the understanding that there be adherence by the judiciary to its former 
construction.

Herbertson v. 
Russell, 371 P.2d 422, 426 (Colo. 1962).  It is for 
the legislature to change the accepted interpretation of "fair and just" and the 
legislature has never expressly done so.  

 

[¶19]      
From judicial 
interpretation to statute, the law in Wyoming is firmly set that no recovery is 
allowed in a wrongful death action for mental anguish.  Because wrongful death actions, 
including compensable damages, are governed by statute, it is the province of 
the legislature to alter the existing law.  
We have no authority to substitute our views for those expressed by the 
Wyoming legislature in a duly enacted statute.  The measure of damages is set by statute 
to exclude damages for mental anguish and we are not at liberty to extend the 
statutorily proscribed remedies.  
"[I]t is a universal rule that courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand 
or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions.  Appellant therefore asks more than we 
can grant."  Lo Sasso v. Braun, 386 P.2d 630, 632 (Wyo. 
1963).  Because damages for mental 
anguish are not recoverable in a wrongful death action, and because feelings of 
abandonment clearly constitute mental anguish, the proffered testimony was 
properly excluded.

 

 

Inconsistent 
Verdict

 

[¶20]      
As to his last 
two issues, in his brief Knowles simply complains that a new trial should be 
granted because the jury verdict was inconsistent in that the jury awarded zero 
monetary damages even though it found Corkill 52% at fault for the death of Lynn 
Knowles.  We review a judge's denial 
of a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard.  John Q. Hammons Inc. v. 
Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Wyo. 1998) ("[A] trial court is vested with broad discretion when 
ruling on a motion for new trial, and we will not overturn the court's decision 
except for an abuse of that discretion.").  

 

[¶21]      
To the extent 
that Knowles is questioning the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury 
verdict, we give great deference to a jury verdict:

  

In reviewing a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence question, we assume the evidence in favor of the 
successful party to be true, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence 
in conflict, and assigning every favorable inference to the evidence of the 
successful party that can be reasonably and fairly drawn from it.  City of Rock Springs v. Police 
Protection Ass'n, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 (1980); Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979).  In addition, when reviewing a jury 
verdict, we leave to the jury the duty of ascertaining the facts, reconciling 
conflict therein and drawing its own inferences if more than one inference is 
permissible.  Neal v. Wailes, Wyo., 346 P.2d 132, 134 
(1959).  Also, when the facts permit 
the drawing of more than one inference, then it is for the jury to choose which 
one will be utilized and, if supported by substantial evidence, the jury's 
choice will be held by us to be conclusive.  Berta v. Ford, Wyo., 469 P.2d 12, 15 (1970); 
Ford Motor Company v. 
Arguello, Wyo., 382 P.2d 886 (1963).

 

Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. 
Admiral Beverage Corp., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (Wyo. 
1982).  
Further:

 

Juries generally have great 
discretion in determining the amount of damages to be awarded.  John Q. Hammons Inc., 954 P.2d  at 1358; see also Union Pacific Railroad 
Company v. Richards, 702 P.2d 1272, 1278 
(Wyo.1985).  We are reluctant to 
interfere with a jury's verdict on damages "unless the award, by its 
excessiveness or inadequacy, denotes passion, prejudice, bias or some erroneous 
basis."  John Q. Hammons Inc., 954 P.2d  at 1358.   See also Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, 702 P.2d  
at 1278.

 

Francis v. Pountney, 972 P.2d 143, 146 (Wyo. 
1999).

 

[¶22]      
Knowles first 
points to the fact that proven and uncontested funeral expenses were presented 
to the jury.  Knowles argues that, 
at the very least, the jury should have awarded these funeral expenses and its 
failure to do so "denotes passion, prejudice, bias or some erroneous 
basis."  Under the unique facts of 
this case, however, we find no inconsistency with the jury's 
verdict.

 

[¶23]      
Evidence exists 
supporting the jury's determination not to award the funeral expenses.  Under the statute, damages are not 
presumed.  Each individual 
participating must bring and prove their respective claim for damages.  See Farmers Ins. Exchange v. 
Dahlheimer, 3 P.3d 820, 823 n.1 (Wyo. 2000) ("each person entitled to participate must establish 
damages").  The funeral expenses 
were incurred by Knowles.  At trial, 
the following exchange took place during the direct examination of 
Knowles:

 

Q.                
Mr. Knowles, 
you're the personal representative in this lawsuit?

A.                 
Yes, 
sir.

Q.                
Are any of 
Lynn's brothers or sisters making a claim?

A.                 
No, 
sir.

Q.                
Why 
not?

A.                 
This is about my 
grandchildren, about Lynn's children.

Q.                
How do you 
feel?

A.        The 
same way. 

 

[¶24]      
It is a 
reasonable inference from this testimony that Knowles, as the personal 
representative, was presenting the lawsuit solely for the benefit of his 
grandchildren.  The jury is entitled 
to take Knowles at his word and consider the request for funeral expenses 
abandoned.  Given this testimony, 
there is no error to be found in the jury not awarding funeral 
expenses.

 

[¶25]      
Finally, Knowles 
cites the general proposition that it is "incomprehensible" that the jury would 
not award even nominal damages to children who have lost their mother.  Knowles provides no argument except one 
sentence and cites no legal authority for this proposition.  As such, we decline to address the issue 
beyond repeating the statement above that there is no presumption of damages 
under Wyoming's Wrongful Death statute.  
No damages can be awarded beyond those damages that are proven at 
trial.  

 

[¶26]      
We are not 
unmindful of the seeming harshness of this verdict.  A zero damages verdict, however, is not 
without precedence.  As an example, 
this Court upheld a zero damages verdict in Woodbury v. Nichols, 797 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1990).  In Woodbury, a wrongful death case, this Court 
determined that "appellate courts should interfere with such a verdict only 
where the evidence of damages is uncontradicted."  Id. at 558.  During the Woodbury trial, conflicting evidence was presented 
regarding the personal relationship between the deceased and the individual 
family members involved in the action.  
Under the unique facts of that case, it ultimately was determined that 
"the conscience of this court is not shocked nor can we conclude that the zero 
damage award was inadequate as a matter of law."  Id. at 559.  

 

[¶27]      
It is impossible 
to generalize the extent to which persons enjoy each other's companionship and 
society.  The value of such highly 
personal relationships must be decided on a case-by-case basis.  In the present case, Lynn's children 
were required to prove that they suffered a loss of probable future 
companionship, society and comfort because of the death of their mother.  The facts of this case, however, show 
that the decedent, Lynn Knowles, had already voluntarily walked away from her 
children before her death.  The jury 
was free to use their own experience and knowledge of human affairs in 
interpreting the evidence presented.3  It is not "incomprehensible" for the 
jury to determine that, under the peculiar facts of this case, Lynn's children 
did not suffer any compensable loss.  

 

[¶28]      
We find nothing 
in the arguments presented by Knowles to indicate that the jury's verdict on 
damages resulted from passion, prejudice, bias or some erroneous basis.  Evidence exists supporting an award of 
zero damages to Knowles and to Lynn's children.  No new trial is 
warranted.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶29]      
We continue to 
hold that damages for mental anguish  a person's emotional response to a 
wrongful death  are not compensable under Wyoming's Wrongful Death 
statute.  It is the province of the 
legislature, not this Court, to expand the remedies available under the 
statute.  The proffered testimony 
regarding feelings of abandonment suffered by Lynn's children was properly 
categorized as mental anguish and was properly excluded.  Under the unique facts of this case, we 
see no reflection of passion, prejudice, bias or any erroneous basis in the zero 
damages verdict.  

 

[¶30]      
The verdict 
appealed from in appeal number 00-254 is affirmed in all respects.  Because no damages were awarded, appeal 
number 00-255 is dismissed as moot.

 

FOOTNOTES

1While this appeal was docketed as 
spelling "Corkill" with an "h," the record is unclear concerning the correct 
spelling; therefore, to be consistent with our prior case, Corkill v. 
Knowles, 955 P.2d 438 (Wyo. 1998), we are omitting the 
"h."

2Many of the facts are taken from the 
opinion in the first appeal, Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438 (Wyo. 
1998).

3Jury Instruction #3 contained the 
following language: "The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony.  In so doing, you may give it such weight 
as you think it is entitled in the light of your experience and knowledge of 
human affairs."