Case Title: People v. Thurow

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90911

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90911-Agenda 18-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								ERIN N. THUROW, Appellee.
Opinion filed February 6, 2003.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Defendant Erin Thurow was charged, under sections 9-3(a)
and (f) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a), (f)
(West 1998)), with involuntary manslaughter of a family or
household member. The jury was instructed on the elements of
simple involuntary manslaughter (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West
1998)), and defendant was found guilty by the circuit court of Will
County. At sentencing, the judge determined that defendant was
eligible for an enhanced sentence because the victim, Michael
Mostowski, was a member of defendant's household. 720 ILCS
5/9-3(f) (West 1998). In the alternative, the judge concluded that
defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence because of
the tender age of the victim. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(4)(i) (West
1998). The court sentenced defendant to eight years in prison. On
appeal, the appellate court vacated the sentence, concluding that
it violated the Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
The appellate court remanded for a new sentencing hearing,
directing that the sentence not exceed the five-year maximum for
simple involuntary manslaughter. 318 Ill. App. 3d 128. We
allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in
part the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	The following facts, which are essentially undisputed, are
taken from the testimony at trial and other materials of record.
Defendant Erin Thurow first met Michelle Mostowski in
November 1997 when Mostowski moved into a homeless shelter
in Elgin where defendant Thurow and her three-year-old daughter,
Tianna, were staying. During the next several weeks, the two
women became friends. On December 14, defendant left the
shelter and moved into an apartment in Joliet, where her daughter
joined her a few days later. At defendant's suggestion, Mostowski
moved in with defendant and her daughter on January 2, 1998. For
the next eight months, defendant was the sole source of financial
support for the household.
	Mostowski, who had been pregnant when she entered the
shelter in Elgin, gave birth to a son, Michael, on April 21, 1998.
Defendant was in the delivery room with Mostowski when the
child was born. Up until this time Mostowski, who was not
employed, had taken care of defendant's child while defendant
was working. Subsequently, Mostowski watched both of the
children.
	In September 1998, Mostowski returned to work. She and
defendant were on different shifts, but for a time there was an
overlap of about four hours a day when they were both at work and
needed to hire a baby-sitter for their children. In January 1999,
defendant and Mostowski adjusted their work schedules so they
were working opposite shifts and no longer needed to hire a baby-sitter. Mostowski worked from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. at a local
restaurant, and defendant worked from 4 p.m. to midnight at a
different restaurant. Each watched the children while the other was
at work.
	Prior to February 11, 1999, the date of the victim's death,
defendant had indicated to Mostowski that she thought Mostowski
was too indulgent with Michael and was spoiling him. The two
women occasionally argued about this, with defendant telling
Mostowski that she had difficulty consoling Michael when
Mostowski went to work, and Michael's constant crying frustrated
her. Beginning in late 1998, unbeknownst to Mostowski,
defendant had begun putting her hand over Michael's mouth to
calm him down. Defendant testified at trial that she did this a total
of about 30 to 40 times, and that it seemed to work and did not
seem to hurt him.
	On the morning of February 11, defendant awoke at about 6
a.m. after falling asleep on the couch the night before. Mostowski
left for work that morning at about 8 a.m. Before leaving, she
placed Michael in his walker and left him next to the couch.
Defendant then went back to sleep on the couch. At about 10 a.m.
she awoke when she heard Michael crying. She tried to calm him
but was unsuccessful. At about 10:30 a.m. she took him to his crib
for a nap. He was still crying, so she put her hand over his mouth
to quiet him down. Defendant testified that she held her hand there
until he was quiet, about 15 seconds. He took a breath of air, and
his legs and arms moved. Defendant then turned him over on his
stomach, pulled his blanket up, and left the bedroom.
	Defendant's boyfriend arrived at about 1:30 p.m., and
defendant borrowed his car and went shopping. According to
defendant, when she returned about 45 minutes later, her boyfriend
said he had checked on Michael while she was out, and the child
was still sleeping. Defendant's boyfriend left at about 2:45 p.m.,
and at about 3 p.m. defendant went to check on Michael.
	The first thing she noticed was that he did not move when she
came through the doorway. She went to the crib and discovered
that he was cold and not breathing. Defendant telephoned
Mostowski at work and told her that there was an emergency and
she should come home. Defendant then telephoned her employer
and stated that the baby was dead. Defendant's manager told her
to call 911. She did, and the 911 operator instructed her on CPR,
which she performed. Police and emergency personnel arrived, as
did Mostowski. The child was taken to the hospital, and
Mostowski went there as well. The police left, and defendant and
her daughter remained in the apartment.
	About two hours later, Joliet police detectives Jeff Allbert and
Richard Raasch arrived at the apartment and questioned defendant.
She told them what happened, but omitted mentioning that she had
held her hand over Michael's mouth. Defendant and her daughter
were then taken to the police station, where police first questioned
defendant's daughter and then spoke to defendant. They told
defendant that there were inconsistencies between her story and
her daughter's. Defendant then "broke down" and again told police
what had happened, this time including the fact that she had put
her hand over Michael's mouth. She was then arrested.
	Forensic pathologist Brian Mitchell, who performed an
autopsy on Michael the next day, testified that, to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, it was his opinion that Michael died
of suffocation. Mitchell's examination of Michael revealed a
pinpoint hemorrhage in one eye, bruising around his mouth, and
swelling of the brain, all of which were consistent with death by
asphyxiation. Mitchell added that he found evidence in Michael's
lungs indicative of prior episodes of suffocation.
	Defendant was subsequently indicted for involuntary
manslaughter with the enhancement that the victim was a family
or household member, which is a Class 2 felony. The indictment,
as presented to the jury, read:
			"[S]aid defendant, acting in a reckless manner,
performed an act likely to cause death or great bodily
harm to some individual, in that she covered the mouth
and nose of Michael Mostowski with her hand, thereby
causing the death of Michael Mostowski, a family or
household member of the defendant."
	At trial, the judge instructed the jury on the elements of
involuntary manslaughter:
			"To sustain the charge of involuntary manslaughter, the
State must prove the following propositions: First
proposition, that the defendant performed the acts which
caused the death of Michael Mostowski, and, second
proposition, that the defendant performed those acts
recklessly, and, third proposition, that those acts were
likely to cause death or great bodily harm."
	The State offered no instruction regarding the proposition that
the victim was a family or household member of defendant. The
defense did not object to the proposed instruction.
	Defendant was convicted on September 2, 1999. Defense
counsel moved for a new trial, and the motion was denied.
	The State argued at the sentencing hearing that defendant
should be sentenced to at least 10 years in prison. Defense counsel
argued for probation. He noted in addition that the jury was not
instructed on the element of Michael's being a family or
household member of defendant. Defense counsel thus contended
that if defendant were given a prison sentence, it could not exceed
the two-to-five-year range for simple involuntary manslaughter,
which is a Class 3 felony. The judge rejected defense counsel's
arguments, finding that defendant "was a household member of
Michael Mostowski" and the 3-to-14-year enhanced sentencing
range for involuntary manslaughter therefore applied. According
to the statute, "household members" include "persons who share
or formerly shared a common dwelling." 725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3)
(West 1998). The judge added that even if Michael were not a
member of defendant's household, defendant was eligible for an
extended-term sentence because of the tender age of the victim.
Accordingly, defendant was sentenced to eight years in prison, a
term that is within both the 3-to-14-year enhanced sentencing
range (720 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West 1998)) and the 5-to-10-year range
for an extended-term sentence (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(5) (West
1998)). Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence was denied.
	On appeal (318 Ill. App. 3d 128), the appellate court
concluded that defendant's sentence was imposed in violation of
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435,
455, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000), which held that "[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
The appellate court noted that the jury in the instant case "was
instructed to make a finding on only the basic elements of
involuntary manslaughter" and "did not make a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that the victim was a family or household
member." 318 Ill. App. 3d at 134. According to the appellate
court, because there was no jury finding as to this enhancement
element, it was improper to sentence defendant "under the
enhancement provision of the involuntary manslaughter statute."
318 Ill. App. 3d at 134.
	The appellate court also rejected the argument that defendant
was eligible for an extended-term sentence based on the tender age
of the victim. The court noted that the question of the victim's age
was not before the jury, and it would therefore be a violation of
Apprendi to impose an extended-term sentence based on this
factor. The court concluded that the extended-term provision at
issue (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(4)(i) (West 1998)) is
"unconstitutional under Apprendi to the extent that it allows an
increase in punishment for a felony based on the age of the victim
where that specific finding is not charged to the jury." 318 Ill.
App. 3d at 135.
	Accordingly, as noted above, the appellate court vacated
defendant's sentence and remanded for a new sentence not to
exceed the five-year statutory maximum for the Class 3 felony of
simple involuntary manslaughter. We allowed the State's petition
for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS
	Involuntary manslaughter is a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS
5/9-3(d)(1) (West 1998)) for which the penalty is "not less than 2
years and not more than 5 years" (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(6) (West
1998)). However, where the victim is a family or household
member, involuntary manslaughter is a Class 2 felony "for which
a person if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be
sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14
years." 720 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West 1998). The prescribed maximum
penalty of five years thus is increased to 14 years if the victim of
involuntary manslaughter is a family or household member of the
defendant. Under the rule announced in Apprendi, because this
enhancement factor "increase[s] the prescribed range of penalties
to which a criminal defendant is exposed," it is an element of the
offense and must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 494,
147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 455, 457, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363, 2365 (2000),
quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 332, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1228-29 (1999).
	The State effectively concedes that it was a violation of
Apprendi for the trial judge to enhance defendant's sentence based
on a finding that Michael was a member of defendant's household.
The parties agree that the jury was not instructed as to this
element, and, therefore, there was no jury determination with
regard to this element. However, the State urges that the evidence
in support of Michael's being a household member was
"uncontested and overwhelming" and "no properly instructed jury
would have found otherwise." Therefore, according to the State,
any failure to instruct the jury was harmless error. Defendant
argues that the Apprendi violation in the case at bar "implicated a
host of her most fundamental rights" and therefore harmless-error
analysis "would not be appropriate in this case."
	The rights at issue in Apprendi were unquestionably of
constitutional dimension. At stake were "constitutional protections
of surpassing importance": a criminal defendant's right to a jury
determination as to every element of the crime with which he is
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 476-77, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 447, 120 S. Ct.  at 2355-56. In Apprendi, as in
the instant case, the defendant was given an enhanced sentence
based on a finding that was made by the trial judge. The defendant
in Apprendi was indicted on charges stemming from his having
fired several shots into the home of an African-American family
that had recently moved into an all-white neighborhood. The
defendant pleaded guilty, inter alia, to possession of a firearm for
an unlawful purpose, an offense that carried a penalty of 5 to 10
years in prison. However, under a separate "hate crime" statute,
the defendant was given an enhanced 12-year sentence based on
a finding by the judge that the crime was motivated by racial bias.
The judge made this finding based upon a preponderance of the
evidence, pursuant to the statute at issue.
	The Court in Apprendi held that this procedure
unconstitutionally removed from the jury the determination of a
fact that increased the maximum penalty to which the defendant
was exposed. Hence the holding in Apprendi: "Other than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at 2362-63.
	The Supreme Court has not determined whether a violation of
this rule could be deemed harmless. The issue was not raised in
Apprendi, and it has not been dealt with in subsequent decisions.
However, in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002), the Court ruled on a similar question:
whether an Apprendi violation to which there was no timely
objection could be viewed as "plain error." The federal indictment
in Cotton charged the defendants with involvement in a drug
conspiracy, but it made no mention of the specific drug quantities
that could lead to enhanced penalties. The jury found the
defendants guilty, and the district court judge then determined the
relevant drug quantities. Based on these findings, the judge
imposed sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum reflected
by the jury's verdict. On appeal, the Court in Cotton applied a
plain-error analysis and concluded that, although the indictment's
failure to allege drug quantity violated Apprendi, it "did not
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings" and therefore did not rise to the level of plain
error. Cotton, 535 U.S. at ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 868-69, 122 S. Ct. 
at 1785-86. According to the Court, the evidence in support of the
judge's drug-quantity findings was overwhelming and essentially
uncontroverted. The Court therefore concluded that the grand jury
"surely" would have found the requisite drug amounts. Cotton,
535 U.S. at ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 869, 122 S. Ct.  at 1786.
	Though plain-error analysis normally requires the same kind
of inquiry as does harmless-error review, there is an "important
difference" between the two. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 520, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993).
In a harmless-error analysis, which applies where, as in the case at
bar, the defendant has made a timely objection, it is the State that
"bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice." Olano,
507 U.S.  at 734, 123 L. Ed. 2d  at 520, 113 S. Ct.  at 1778. In other
words, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury verdict would have been the same absent the error. See
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710-11, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,
19, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35, 53, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1838 (1999). The
situation is different under a plain-error analysis, which applies
where the defendant has failed to make a timely objection. There,
"[i]t is the defendant rather than the [State] who bears the burden
of persuasion with respect to prejudice." Olano, 507 U.S.  at 734,
123 L. Ed. 2d  at 520, 113 S. Ct.  at 1778. "In most cases, a court of
appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant
shows that the error was prejudicial." Olano, 507 U.S.  at 734, 123 L. Ed. 2d  at 520, 113 S. Ct.  at 1778.
	Accordingly, while the decision in Cotton may be viewed as
suggesting that the Court eventually will conclude that Apprendi
errors can be harmless, there has been no decision on this precise
issue. In the absence of such a holding, we look to the Court's
earlier decision in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (1999), where a jury instruction that
omitted an element of an offense was found amenable to harmless-error review. See, e.g., United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829-30 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2000).
	In Neder, the defendant was indicted on a number of fraud
counts, including the charge that he filed false statements of
income on his tax returns. In instructing the jury regarding the tax
offenses, the federal district court incorrectly informed the jury
that there was no need to consider whether the false statements
were material. Outside the presence of the jury, the district court
itself found that the statements were material. The jury
subsequently convicted the defendant. On appeal, it was agreed
that the district court erred in refusing to submit the issue of
materiality to the jury. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the
error constituted a violation of the sixth amendment's jury trial
guarantee, but nevertheless held that harmless-error analysis
applied.
	In reaching this conclusion, the Court in Neder acknowledged
that there is a limited group of errors that have been found to be
"structural" and therefore beyond the scope of harmless-error
review. Included among these are the complete denial of counsel
(Neder, 527 U.S.  at 8, 144 L. Ed. 2d  at 46, 119 S. Ct.  at 1833,
citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 728, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549-50 (1997), citing Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963))
and trial before a biased judge (Neder, 527 U.S.  at 8, 144 L. Ed. 2d 
at 46, 119 S. Ct.  at 1833, citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 71 L. Ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927)). However, the Supreme Court
has recognized that most constitutional errors can be harmless.
Neder, 527 U.S.  at 8, 144 L. Ed. 2d  at 46, 119 S. Ct.  at 1833;
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 309-10, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 329, 331, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1263, 1265 (1991) (opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court); see also Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 21-22, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 709, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827
(1967) (rejecting the view that a federal constitutional error in a
criminal trial can never be harmless). According to the Court in
Neder, the omission of an element from a jury instruction falls in
this latter group. "Unlike such defects as the complete deprivation
of counsel or trial before a biased judge, an instruction that omits
an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal
trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining
guilt or innocence." (Emphasis in original.) Neder, 527 U.S.  at 9,
144 L. Ed. 2d  at 47, 119 S. Ct.  at 1833. The Court acknowledged
that the failure to instruct on an element of the offense prevents the
jury from rendering a complete verdict on every element of the
offense, and that this violates the sixth amendment's jury trial
guarantee. However, the Court asserted that this merely establishes
that such a defective jury instruction is error; it does not answer
the question whether the error is subject to harmless-error analysis.
As previously noted, the Court in Neder answered this question in
the affirmative.
	This holding in Neder appears to dictate that Apprendi errors
involving jury instructions that omit an element of the offense may
be subject to harmless-error review. Neder has been cited by
several courts of appeals in applying harmless-error or plain-error
analysis to such violations. United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825,
829 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Neder, 527 U.S. 1, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35,
119 S. Ct. 1827, in applying harmless-error analysis to the
omission of an element from a jury instruction; and concluding
that "Apprendi did not recognize or create a structural error that
would require per se reversal"); United States v. Green, 246 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820 (7th Cir.
2000); see also United States v. Adkins, 274 F.3d 444, 454 (7th
Cir. 2001) ("[I]t is now well established in this circuit that
Apprendi errors in both the indictment and the charge to the jury
are subject to harmless error analysis").
	Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant argues that, under
Apprendi, the statutory scheme under which her sentence was
increased is unconstitutional on its face, and therefore void ab
initio. See People v. Zeisler, 125 Ill. 2d 42, 46 (1988) (a statute
that has been held facially invalid is void ab initio; it is as though
no such law had ever been passed). Defendant contends that the
statute in question, section 9-3(f) of the Criminal Code of 1961
(720 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West 1998)), is facially invalid and therefore
did not exist in February 1999 when the offense at issue was
committed. Absent this statute, which authorized an increase in the
penalty if the victim was a member of defendant's household, this
particular sentence-enhancing element did not exist, and
defendant's sentence therefore was a nullity. Accordingly,
defendant contends that her sentence must be vacated.
	Defendant bases her argument that section 9-3(f) is facially
unconstitutional on two grounds. First, she contends that the
statute, in violation of Apprendi, fails to "provide for notice of the
sentence enhancing facts." According to defendant, the State is
required, under Apprendi, to charge in the indictment any fact that
increases the penalty for the offense beyond the statutory
maximum. Second, defendant claims that section 9-3(f), again in
violation of Apprendi, does not require that the sentence-enhancing facts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
	With regard to defendant's "notice" argument, the Supreme
Court in Apprendi specifically declined to address the indictment
question. See People v. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68, 72 n.1 (2001). The
Court noted that the defendant, Charles Apprendi, did not assert a
constitutional claim based upon the indictment's failure to charge
the sentence-enhancement factors. Instead, the defendant relied
upon the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which
the Court stated has never been construed to make the fifth
amendment right to "presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury"
applicable to the states. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 477 n.3, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 447 n.3, 120 S. Ct.  at 2355 n.3. Indeed, Apprendi's central
holding (Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S.
Ct. at 2362-63) makes no mention of any indictment right. Instead,
as previously noted, it focuses upon the rights to trial by jury and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore reject defendant's
argument that Apprendi requires "notice of the sentence-enhancing
facts." Because no such notice is required, section 9-3(f) cannot
be unconstitutional for failure to provide for it.(1)
	As noted, defendant's other basis for claiming that section
9-3(f) is facially unconstitutional is that the statute fails to require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Our review of the merits of this
claim is guided by the following familiar principles. Legislative
enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and a
party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden
of clearly establishing its invalidity. People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 639 (2000); People v. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d 140, 146 (1987).
It is our duty to affirm a statute's constitutionality if reasonably
possible, and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the validity
of the challenged enactment. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d  at 639; Inghram,
118 Ill. 2d  at 146. A statute is facially unconstitutional only if
" 'no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.' " In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994), quoting United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987).
	As previously set forth, section 9-3(f) provides:
			"In cases involving involuntary manslaughter in which
the victim was a family or household member *** the
penalty shall be a Class 2 felony, for which a person if
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced
to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14
years." 720 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West 1998).
	There is no indication here as to the evidentiary standard that
is to be applied in making the household-member determination.
Under section 9-3(f), this finding could be made by a
preponderance of the evidence. However, it also could be made
based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Apprendi, a
finding, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, that the
victim was a member of defendant's household could not form the
basis for an enhanced sentence. As noted, such a procedure would
be unconstitutional. However, there is no violation if this
determination is made beyond a reasonable doubt. Because this
latter, constitutionally correct procedure is allowed by section
9-3(f), it cannot be said that there is no set of circumstances under
which the statute would be valid. See In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d  at 210-11. Section 9-3(f) is not unconstitutional on its face. Accordingly,
we reject defendant's contention that section 9-3(f) is void ab
initio.
	Lacking an explicit Supreme Court holding to the contrary,
we are compelled by Neder to conclude that the Apprendi
violation in the case at bar is subject to harmless-error review. We
turn then to an analysis of whether it was harmless error for the
judge and not the jury to determine that Michael was a member of
defendant's household.
	As set forth in Chapman, the test for determining if a
constitutional error is harmless is whether it appears "beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict obtained." Chapman, 386 U.S.  at 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d  at
710, 87 S. Ct.  at 828. The test enunciated in Neder, which we must
follow, is slightly different: "Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent
the error?" Neder, 527 U.S.  at 18, 144 L. Ed. 2d  at 53, 119 S. Ct. 
at 1838. The Court in Neder found the district court's failure to
submit the issue of materiality to the jury harmless, emphasizing
that the evidence in support of materiality was uncontested and
overwhelming. The Court explained:
		"In a case such as this one, where a defendant did not, and
apparently could not, bring forth facts contesting the
omitted element, answering the question whether the jury
verdict would have been the same absent the error does
not fundamentally undermine the purposes of the jury trial
guarantee." Neder, 527 U.S.  at 19, 144 L. Ed. 2d  at 53,
119 S. Ct.  at 1838.
	In the case at bar, as in Neder, the evidence in support of the
omitted element was uncontested and overwhelming. Both
defendant and Mostowski testified to facts establishing that
Michael was a member of defendant's household. It is undisputed
that the two women lived together in the same apartment and that
each watched the children while the other was at work. The
definition of a household member includes "persons who share or
formerly shared a common dwelling." 725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3)
(West 1998). Given the evidence in support of this element, it is
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed, rational
jury would have found defendant guilty of involuntary
manslaughter against a household member. We therefore conclude
that the failure to instruct the jury as to this element was harmless
error.
	We recognize, as does the dissent, that there is tension
between our conclusion here and the holding in Apprendi. The
essence of the holding in Apprendi is that it is unconstitutional for
a judge and not a jury to make a factual finding that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. Yet
in applying harmless-error analysis here, we are engaging in the
very practice that Apprendi forbids: we, as judges, are making the
factual determination that Michael was a member of defendant's
household. Moreover, we are in a sense adding error upon error by
repeating the violation committed by the trial judge, who made the
original, erroneous determination. See Neder, 527 U.S.  at 32, 144 L. Ed. 2d  at 61, 119 S. Ct.  at 1845 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part, joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.) ("The
Court's decision today [in Neder] is the only instance I know of
(or could conceive of) in which the remedy for a constitutional
violation by a trial judge (making the determination of criminal
guilt reserved to the jury) is a repetition of the same constitutional
violation by the appellate court (making the determination of
criminal guilt reserved to the jury"). Strict adherence to the
Apprendi rule here would avoid this situation, and would honor
the "surpassing[ly] importan[t]" constitutional protections that
entitle a criminal defendant to " 'a jury determination that [he] is
guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged,
beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 476-77, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 447, 120 S. Ct.  at 2355-56, quoting United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 444, 449, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2313 (1995); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged" (emphasis added)).
	Undoubtedly, our application of harmless-error analysis here
is more efficient than requiring, in conformity with Apprendi, that
a jury make the household-member determination. However, it is
questionable whether this increased efficiency warrants the
resulting encroachment upon the jury right. As Justice Scalia noted
in Apprendi:
		"The founders of the American Republic were not
prepared to leave [criminal justice] to the State, which is
why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least
controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never
been efficient; but it has always been free." Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 498, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 460, 120 S. Ct.  at 2367
(Scalia, J., concurring).
Nevertheless, the decision in Neder says what it says, and absent
a Supreme Court holding to the contrary, we are bound to follow
Neder.
	We necessarily reject the dissent's contention that Neder need
not be followed. According to the dissent, Apprendi vitiated the
prior decision in Neder. However, Apprendi is silent regarding the
harmless-error issue, and it makes no mention of Neder. We
decline to conclude, as the dissent urges, that Neder has been
invalidated by Apprendi. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
237, 138 L. Ed. 2d 391, 423, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997)
(reaffirming rule that it is the prerogative of the Supreme Court to
overrule its own decisions).
	Because of our disposition as to the household-member issue,
it is unnecessary to address the propriety of the alternative basis
for defendant's sentence: the judicial finding that the victim was
of a tender age. Defendant's eight-year enhanced sentence may be
upheld on the ground that Michael was a member of defendant's
household. While it was error for the trial court to base
defendant's enhanced sentence on the judge's finding as to this
element, this error, as noted, was harmless.

CONCLUSION
	We conclude, as did the appellate court below, that it was a
violation of Apprendi for the trial court to impose an enhanced
sentence for involuntary manslaughter based on a judicial finding
that the victim was a member of defendant's household. This fact
should have been proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, given the overwhelming nature of the uncontradicted
evidence in support of this element, we find this error harmless.
Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court's judgment that
defendant's enhanced sentence was imposed in error, but reverse
the appellate court's vacating of the sentence and remandment for
a new sentencing hearing. We thus affirm the eight-year sentence
imposed on defendant by the trial court.
Appellate court judgement affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part.
	 
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	I agree with the majority's conclusion that Apprendi claims
are susceptible to harmless error analysis. I cannot fully join the
majority because I do not believe that Neder and Apprendi are
fundamentally at odds, a point on which the majority appears-at
least to some extent-to agree with the dissent. I write separately to
briefly set out the shortcomings in the argument presented by the
dissent and to clarify why Apprendi and Neder are not in conflict.
	First, it is clear that Apprendi did not directly overrule Neder.
Apprendi did not even mention Neder. In fact, Apprendi did not
even mention the phrase "harmless error." Moreover, Apprendi
explicitly rejected the suggestion from the decision on review that
there was " 'rarely any doubt' " regarding the fact proof of which
was required by the statute under review. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at
475, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 446, 120 S. Ct.  at 2354-55, quoting State v.
Apprendi, 159 N.J. Super. 7, 25, 731 A.2d 485, 495 (1999). In so
doing, the Court removed any question of harmless error in the
case.
	Because the Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled
Neder, we must proceed on the assumption that case remains good
law. For even if Apprendi could be read as implicitly overruling
Neder-which it cannot, as I shall explain shortly-the Supreme
Court has stated:
			"We do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that
other courts should conclude our more recent cases have,
by implication, overruled an earlier precedent. We
reaffirm that '[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions.' [Citation.]" (Emphasis added.) Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 138 L. Ed. 2d 391, 423, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997).
Thus, the error of the dissent's conclusion is clear.
	And in any event, Apprendi and Neder are not in conflict,
such that Apprendi could reasonably be said to have overruled the
earlier case. The majority and the dissent both question how Neder
and Apprendi can be reconciled. The bases for this concern are the
statements in Apprendi that "constitutional protections of
surpassing importance" were at stake in the case (Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 447, 120 S. Ct. at 2355), and the
quote which is generally cited as the holding of that case: "Other
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct.  at
2362-63. How, my colleagues question, can an Apprendi violation
be harmless when the Supreme Court explicitly stated that proof
of certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury is required by
"constitutional protections of surpassing importance"?
	First, the Court immediately names the "constitutional
protections" to which it is referring: the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and the sixth amendment jury trial
guarantee. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 447, 120 S. Ct.  at 2355. It is from these sources that the Court derives its
conclusion that the facts undergirding the sentencing range must
be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, I submit,
what the Court has truly held in Apprendi is simply that the sixth
amendment jury trial guarantee-made applicable to the states
through the due process clause-extends to those facts necessary to
establish the precise sentencing range within which the
defendant's sentence falls. The above quote-"Other than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt" (Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63)-is implicitly
preceded by the phrase "The Sixth Amendment requires that." The
entirety of Apprendi is interpretation and application of the sixth
amendment.
	Thus, Apprendi cannot fairly be read as implicitly overruling
Neder, because the two cases are talking about related, but distinct,
questions. The only subject under consideration in Apprendi is: To
what facts does the sixth amendment jury trial right extend? By
contrast, the question in Neder is: In the context of facts to which
we know the sixth amendment jury trial right applies, can a
violation of that right be harmless error? In other words, the
questions addressed in the cases relate to different steps in the
analysis of a defendant's claim that his sixth amendment rights
were violated because a particular fact or facts were not proven to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi relates to a threshold
question in such a claim: Is the fact in question one to which the
sixth amendment right attaches? If so, and if that fact was indeed
not proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, then there is a
sixth amendment violation. Neder relates to a subsequent step:
Given a violation of the sixth amendment jury trial right, can such
a constitutional violation be harmless? Succinctly, Apprendi deals
with the scope of the sixth amendment jury trial right, while Neder
deals with the effect of a violation of that right. Although both
cases involve the sixth amendment, I respectfully suggest that
there is no overlap between their subject matter. Apprendi
violations are susceptible to harmless error review, in my reading
of the cases, because what we label an "Apprendi violation" is
simply a specific type of violation of the sixth amendment jury
trial guarantee-a violation with respect to facts establishing the
applicable sentence. Neder has already held, however, that all
violations of the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee are
susceptible to harmless error review.
	In the end, perhaps all my colleagues in the majority are
saying is that it seems, for lack of a better word, peculiar for the
Court to have labeled the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee one
of "surpassing importance," in Apprendi, shortly after having held
that a violation thereof is susceptible to harmless error review, in
Neder. In such an observation I would concur. However, the cases
are not in conflict. Whatever one's personal opinion might be with
respect to the correctness of the Court's decision in Neder-a 5-4
decision with very strong dissents-neither Apprendi nor any other
case has overruled it. So long as it remains the law of the land we
are bound to follow it, unless we determine that there is a reason
to depart lockstep and find that the Illinois constitution provides
greater protection than the federal.
	I respectfully dissent from the majority because I believe that
removing an element of the crime from consideration by the jury
can never be subject to a harmless error analysis. The case at bar
presents this court with the same issue posed to the United States
Supreme Court in Apprendi: other than the fact of a prior
conviction, whether every fact necessary to increase the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to the trier of fact and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court answered
this question affirmatively. Today's decision sharply departs from
Apprendi.
	The majority acknowledges the State's concession that it was
an Apprendi violation for the trial judge to enhance defendant's
sentence based on a finding that the victim was a member of
defendant's household. Slip op. at 6. The majority circumvents
Apprendi using United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002), and Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (1999). Nonetheless,
neither Cotton nor Neder justifies the conclusion drawn by the
majority.
	The United States Supreme Court's holding in Cotton is not
applicable to a harmless error analysis. In Cotton, the defendant
did not timely object to the State's failure to allege enhancement
factors in the indictment. Without a contemporaneous objection,
the defendant waived his Apprendi argument. Thus, plain error
was the only method for the Cotton defendant to invoke the
Apprendi holding. In Cotton, the United States Supreme Court
specifically noted that " 'a constitutional right may be forfeited in
criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely
assertion of the right.' " Cotton, 535 U.S. at ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at
869, 122 S. Ct.  at 1787, quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444, 88 L. Ed. 834, 859, 64 S. Ct. 660, 677 (1944). In this
case, defendant raised and preserved his Apprendi challenge at the
earliest opportunity, the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the
present case is distinguishable from Cotton.
	Turning to Neder, I am persuaded that Justice Scalia's partial
dissent in Neder (see Neder, 527 U.S.  at 30-40, 144 L. Ed. 2d  at
60-66, 119 S. Ct.  at 1844-48 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.)) is
embodied in the Apprendi holding and, thus, although Apprendi
did not expressly overrule Neder, the Apprendi holding is so
fundamentally inconsistent with Neder that Neder can no longer
be followed. I recognize, as does the majority and Justice
Freeman's concurring opinion, that it is the prerogative of the
Supreme Court to overrule its own decisions. See Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 138 L. Ed. 2d 391, 423, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2017 (1997). Nonetheless, that rule does not help to
harmonize what Justice Freeman terms the "peculiar[ity]" between
the Apprendi and Neder holdings. In my mind, the holdings are
more than just peculiar. They are irreconcilable. After all, the
question posed to the Court in both Neder and Apprendi was
essentially the same: must every element of a crime be submitted
to the trier of fact and proved beyond a reasonable doubt? In
Neder, the Court said "no." After Neder, in Apprendi, the Court
said "yes." Left with the choice to follow one of two conflicting
opinions of the Supreme Court, we quite simply should follow the
most recent of the two.
	In this post-Apprendi case, the majority sanctions the removal
of one element from consideration by the jury. What would the
majority have done if, in this case, two elements had been taken
away from the jury? What about three? Four? I cannot discern how
"taking one of the elements of the crime away from the jury" is
different from "taking all of them away-since failure to prove one,
no less than failure to prove all, utterly prevents conviction."
(Emphases in original.) Neder, 527 U.S.  at 33, 144 L. Ed. 2d  at 62,
119 S. Ct.  at 1845 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.). A directed verdict
against a defendant would be per se reversible no matter how
overwhelming the unfavorable evidence (Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460, 471, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3106 (1986)),
and what the majority has done here is tantamount to affirming a
directed verdict for the State. "[T]he fundamental meaning of the
jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts
essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the
defendant receives-whether the statute calls them elements of the
offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must be found by the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. __, __,
153 L. Ed. 2d 556, 578, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2444 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
concurring, joined by Thomas, J.).
	There are some constitutional errors that involve rights so
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be subject to
harmless error analysis. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
23, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827-28 (1967); Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 330, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991). I believe that an Apprendi violation is the
type of error that defies harmless error review. For these reasons,
I would remand the cause for a new sentencing hearing. Therefore,
I respectfully dissent.
 



1.      1In the instant case, as previously set forth, the indictment included
the fact that the victim was a family or household member of the
defendant.