Case Title: FORSYTHE v WENHOLZ

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13262 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T OF T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 JOHN S. FORSYTHE, P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent, ALICE W E h W O L Z , J u s t i c e of t h e Peace i n Department #1, I n and For the County of Rosebud, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Sixteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable A. B. Martin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : William F. Meisburger argued, Forsyth, Montana For Respondent : John S. Forsythe argued, Forsyth, Montana Submitted: September 8, 1976 Decided: OCT -5 1976 3% 1jG i ; - 5 \ J r 0 Filed : M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by Alice Wenholz, J u s t i c e of the Peace i n Department No. 1, i n and f o r the County of Rosebud, from an order of the d i s t r i c t court requiring her t o r e i n s t a t e a judgment and penalty previously imposed i n a criminal misdemeanor case. The case a r i s e s from an action brought i n the j u s t i c e court e n t i t l e d "State of Montana v. Stanley Brian Johnson". M r . Johnson was found g u i l t y of driving while intoxicated by jury verdict i n the j u s t i c e court, Department No. 1, County of Rosebud. After t r i a l , Johnson f i l e d a motion f o r a new t r i a l , pursuant t o section 95-2101, R.C.M. 1947. The j u s t i c e of the peace, appellant here, took the motion under advisement, ruled i n favor of Johnson and dismissed the charge against him. The dismissal was granted under the authority of section 95-2101(c) ( 3 ) , which s t a t e s : "(c) Alternative Authority of the Court on Hearing Motion f o r N e w T r i a l . On hearing the motion f o r a new t r i a l , i f j u s t i f i e d by the law and the weight of t h e evidence, the court may: "3. Modify o r change the verdict o r finding by finding the defendant g u i l t y of a l e s s e r degree of the crime charged, finding the defendant g u i l t y of a l e s s e r included crime o r finding the defendant not guilty." Thereafter, Rosebud County Attorney John S. Forsythe, respondent here, f i l e d a "Petition f o r W r i t of Mandate and W r i t of Supervisory Control" i n the d i s t r i c t court, seeking, i n t e r a l i a , reinstatement of the j u s t i c e court jury's g u i l t y verdict i n the case of S t a t e v. Stanley Brian Johnson. Forsythe alleged the defendant Johnson's exclusive remedy f o r alleged e r r o r s i n the j u s t i c e court t r i a l was an appeal f o r a t r i a l de novo i n the d i s t r i c t court pursuant t o the terms of section 95-2009, R.C.M. 1947. The d i s t r i c t court limited i t s review t o the question of whether section 95-2101 applies t o j u s t i c e of t h e peace courts, and ruled t h a t it does not. On January 5, 1976, t h e judgment and penalty of the j u s t i c e court i n the case of S t a t e v. Stanley Brian Johnson were ordered reinstated. Wenholz appeals. The issue on appeal i s whether a j u s t i c e of t h e peace court has the j u r i s d i c t i o n t o dismiss an action under the new t r i a l provisions of section 95-2101, R.C.M. 1947. Appellant advances two principal arguments t o s u s t a i n her position: (1) t h a t the word "court" i n section 95-2101 includes j u s t i c e of the peace courts; and (2), t h a t i f a section 95-2009, R.C.M. 1947, appeal is the exclusive remedy f o r a new t r i a l i n j u s t i c e of the peace courts, then a serious inequity t o j u s t i c e court defendants a r i s e s . Section 95-2101 r e f e r s four times t o the "court". Nothing on t h e face of t h e s t a t u t e indicates which courts a r e within i t s scope. I n the Code of Criminal Procedure, T i t l e 95, R.C.M. 1947, "court" i s defined a s "a place where j u s t i c e is j u d i c i a l l y administered and includes a judge thereof ." Section 95-205. A "judge" i s defined a s "a person who is invested by law with the power t o perform j u d i c i a l functions and includes court, j u s t i c e of the peace o r police magistrate when a p a r t i c u l a r context so requires." Section 95-206. (Emphasis supplied.) With respect t o appellant's f i r s t argument, the task i s t o determine whether t h e p a r t i c u l a r context of section 95-2101 requires t h a t "court" be read t o include j u s t i c e s of the peace. I n i t i a l l y , we note t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Bush, 164 Mont. 81, 518 P.2d 1406, stated: "* * * since the code [of criminal procedure] was adopted a s one comprehensive piece of l e g i s l a t i o n it should be considered i n i t s e n t i r e t y t o determine the e f f e c t of any one section." The d i s t r i c t court was correct i n excluding j u s t i c e s of the peace from the purview of section 95-2101 because the p a r t i c u l a r context of t h a t section i n Montana's Code of Criminal Procedure c l e a r l y requires a d i f f e r e n t meaning than t h a t propounded by the appellant. Section 95-201, R.C.M. 1947. Chapter 20, T i t l e . 9 5 , R.C.M. 1947 "Justice and Police Court Proceedings", was accompanied by a Criminal Law Commission Comment which s t a t e s i n part: "This Chapter includes only those sections which a r e peculiar o r apply exclusively t o j u s t i c e and police courts. * * *I1 I n Chapter 20, the only p o s t - t r i a l r e l i e f afforded is an appeal t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r a trial de novo. Section 95-2009, R.C.M. 1947. It would be anomalous t o expressly provide f o r a t r i a l anew i n the d i s t r i c t court under section 95-2009 and a t t h e same time i n f e r the r i g h t t o a t r i a l anew i n the j u s t i c e court under section 95-2101. This inconsistency i s demonstrated by the f a c t t h a t under section 95-2009(b) the defendant is given ten days t o f i l e notice of appeal, while under section 95-2101 (b) (2) the defendant i s given t h i r t y days t o f i l e a motion f o r a new t r i a l . Surely a defendant i n j u s t i c e court could not allow h i s appeal time t o lapse and s t i l l be afforded the remedy of a new t r i a l i n the same court. I n City of B i l l i n g s v. Smith, 158 Mont. 197, 212, 490 P. 2d 221, t h i s Court stated: "Where s t a t u t e s r e l a t e t o the same general subject they should be so construed together, where t h e r e i s no inconsistency between them, so as t o give e f f e c t t o both where possible. * * * A l l a c t s r e l a t i n g t o the same subject, o r having t h e same general purpose a s the s t a t u t e being construed, should be read i n connection with such s t a t u t e . * * * Statutes passed a t t h e same time, and r e l a t i n g t o the same general subject a r e t o be construed together and both given e f f e c t i f possible. * * * * ' I Under these principles of statutory construction, we decline t o construe section 95-2101 i n the manner urged by appellant. The d i s t r i c t court properly held t h a t section 95-2009 i s a j u s t i c e court defendant's exclusive remedy for a new trial. Appellant's second a t t a c k is t h a t the exclusive remedy of appeal pursuant t o section 95-2101 is inequitable t o j u s t i c e court defendants. I n p a r t i c u l a r , it i s alleged t h a t there was extensive prosecutorial misconduct i n the j u s t i c e court t r i a l and defendant Johnson should not be compelled t o bear t h e expense of a t r i a l de novo i n d i s t r i c t court t o correct t h e e r r o r s of the prosecution. It is further alleged t h a t denial of defendant's access t o the new t r i a l procedure of section 95-2101 is a denial of equal j u s t i c e t o j u s t i c e court defendants vis-a-vis d i s t r i c t court defendants. N o authority i s c i t e d f o r these propositions, and w e r e j e c t them. Any defendant convicted i n j u s t i c e court has t h e f u l l benefit of a new t r i a l i n d i s t r i c t court. Compare: Bailey v. S t a t e , 163 Mont. 380, 383, 517 P.2d 708, where the appeal procedure of section 95-2009, R.C.M. 1947, w a s described a s "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy a t law." Appellant's arguments regarding additional costs and personal involvement i n a d i s t r i c t court t r i a l de novo a r e not persuasive. The order of the d i s t r i c t court of January 5, 1976, is a£ firmed. W e concur: /' , i \ / ef Justice.