Case Title: State ex rel. Bolzenius v. Preisse

Citation: 2018-Ohio-3708

Docket Number: 2018-1221

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Bolzenius v. Preisse, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3708.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3708 
THE STATE EX REL. BOLZENIUS ET AL. v. PREISSE ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Bolzenius v. Preisse, Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-3708.] 
Elections—Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel board of elections to 
place proposed city ordinance on the ballot—Proposed ordinance attempts 
to enact provisions that are beyond the scope of municipality’s legislative 
power—Writ denied. 
(No. 2018-1221—Submitted September 11, 2018—Decided September 14, 2018.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relators, six Columbus electors,1 seek 
a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, the members of the Franklin County 
                                                 
1 The relators are Sandra M. Bolzenius, Karyn A. Deibel, Connie M. Hammond, Robert R. Krasen, 
William M. Lyons, and Gregory Thomas Pace. 
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Board of Elections (collectively, the “board members”),2 to place a proposed city 
ordinance on the November 6, 2018 ballot.  If adopted, the proposal would establish 
a “bill of rights” related to water, soil, and air protection and prohibit certain oil-
and-gas-extraction activities within the city.  The board members excluded the 
measure from the ballot, finding that the proposed ordinance is beyond the city’s 
legislative power because it would, among other things, create new causes of action.  
Because the board members did not abuse their discretion, we deny the writ. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Relators seek the adoption of a municipal ordinance that would 
establish for Columbus residents—and for “natural communities and ecosystems” 
in the city—a “Community Bill of Rights for Water, Soil, and Air Protection.”  
Among the rights enumerated are rights to “Potable Water,” “Clean Air,” “Safe 
Soil,” and “Peaceful Enjoyment of Home” and the “Right to be Free from Toxic 
Trespass.”  The proposal also would declare that “[n]atural communities and 
ecosystems, including, but not limited to, wetlands, streams, rivers, aquifers, and 
other water systems, possess the rights to exist and flourish within the City of 
Columbus.” 
{¶ 3} In an effort to secure and protect these rights, relators’ proposal would 
prohibit most hydrocarbon-extraction activities within the city and impose strict 
liability on any government or corporation that violates its terms.  It also 
purportedly would invalidate any permit or license “issued by any state, federal or 
international entity that would violate the prohibitions of this ordinance or any 
rights secured by this Ordinance, the Ohio Constitution, the United States 
Constitution, or other laws.”  Any violation of the ordinance would be a first-degree 
misdemeanor.  The proposed ordinance provides that “any resident of the City of 
Columbus” may “enforce the rights and prohibitions of this Community Bill of 
                                                 
2 The board members are Douglas J. Preisse, Kimberly E. Marinello, Michael E. Sexton, and Brad 
K. Sinnott. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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Rights through an action brought in any court possessing jurisdiction over activities 
occurring within the City.” 
{¶ 4} On June 26, 2018, the committee formed to place the measure on the 
ballot submitted its part-petitions to the Columbus city clerk.  After the Franklin 
County Board of Elections certified a sufficient number of valid signatures to 
qualify the measure for the ballot, the Columbus City Council, on July 30, passed 
an ordinance instructing the elections board to place the initiative petition on the 
November 2018 ballot.  Before the matter was considered by the elections board, 
two Columbus electors, Loretta Settelmeyer and Robert Wall, protested the 
proposed measure, arguing that it does not comply with the Columbus City 
Charter’s requirements for initiative petitions and that it is outside the city’s 
legislative power.  The board members agreed with the latter argument and on 
August 24 voted to exclude the initiative from the ballot. 
{¶ 5} On August 28, relators filed this original action seeking a writ of 
mandamus to compel the board members to certify the initiative petition for 
placement on the ballot.  On August 31, we granted a motion to intervene filed by 
Settelmeyer and Wall (collectively, the “intervening respondents”). 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The board members properly determined that the proposed ordinance is 
outside the city’s power to enact legislation 
{¶ 6} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators must prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal 
duty on the part of the board members to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio 
St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6, 13.  Given the proximity of the 
November election, relators lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 
law.  State ex rel. Ohio Liberty Council v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-
1845, 928 N.E.2d 410, ¶ 27.  To satisfy the first two requirements, relators must show 
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that the board members engaged in fraud or corruption, abused their discretion, or 
acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.  State ex rel. Jacquemin v. 
Union Cty. Bd. of Elections, 147 Ohio St.3d 467, 2016-Ohio-5880, 67 N.E.3d 759, 
¶ 9.  Because relators make no allegation of fraud or corruption, they must show that 
the board members abused their discretion or disregarded the law when they rejected 
the initiative petition. 
{¶ 7} In their first proposition of law, relators assert that they have a clear 
right to have their proposed ordinance placed on the ballot because their initiative 
petition satisfies the signature requirement and Columbus city council passed an 
ordinance calling for placement of the measure on the ballot.  Relators make three 
basic arguments in support of their claim.  First, they contend that the board members 
have only a ministerial role with respect to initiative petitions, with no legitimate 
statutory authority to exclude a measure from the ballot for substantive legal reasons.  
Second, they argue that the separation-of-powers doctrine prevents the board 
members from deciding substantive legal questions and thus renders unconstitutional 
the statutory amendments introduced by 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 463 (“H.B. 463”), which 
permit boards of elections to determine whether a proposed ordinance is beyond a 
municipality’s legislative power.  Finally, they assert that Columbus Charter 42-11 
prevents the board members from making substantive legal determinations regarding 
relators’ proposed ordinance.  We reject these arguments. 
1.  R.C. 3501.11(K)(1) authorizes a county board of elections to determine 
whether a proposed ordinance is beyond a municipality’s legislative power 
{¶ 8} Before the General Assembly enacted H.B. 463, we interpreted 
former R.C. 3501.11(K) (now R.C. 3501.11(K)(1))—which grants county boards 
of elections the power to “[r]eview, examine, and certify the sufficiency and 
validity of petitions”—as authority for the boards “to determine whether a ballot 
measure falls within the scope of the constitutional power of referendum or 
initiative.”  State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 144 Ohio 
January Term, 2018 
 
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St.3d 239, 2015-Ohio-3761, 41 N.E.3d 1229, ¶ 9.  We reaffirmed that reading of 
former R.C. 3501.11(K) in State ex rel. Sensible Norwood v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 148 Ohio St.3d 176, 2016-Ohio-5919, 69 N.E.3d 696.  In Sensible 
Norwood, we concluded that under former R.C. 3501.11(K), an elections board was 
authorized to exclude an initiative petition from the ballot if the initiative petition 
sought to enact municipal legislation that would be beyond a municipality’s 
legislative power.  Id. at ¶ 9-12. 
{¶ 9} H.B. 463, effective April 6, 2017, introduced new provisions related 
to the authority and duty of elections boards to review the substantive terms of 
proposed ballot measures.  For example, the act added R.C. 3501.11(K)(2), which 
requires elections boards to examine an initiative petition “to determine whether 
the petition falls within the scope of authority to enact via initiative.”  And it added 
R.C. 3501.38(M)(1)(a), which requires elections boards to examine an initiative 
petition to determine 
 
[w]hether the petition falls within the scope of a municipal political 
subdivision’s authority to enact via initiative, including, if 
applicable, the limitations placed by Sections 3 and 7 of Article 
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution on the authority of municipal 
corporations to adopt local police, sanitary, and other similar 
regulations as are not in conflict with general laws, and whether the 
petition satisfies the statutory prerequisites to place the issue on the 
ballot. 
 
Importantly, H.B. 463 retained the language of former R.C. 3501.11(K), 
recodifying it as R.C. 3501.11(K)(1). 
{¶ 10} In State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, 152 Ohio St.3d 244, 2017-Ohio-8109, 
95 N.E.3d 329, we held that R.C. 3501.11(K)(1) authorizes elections boards “ ‘to 
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determine whether a ballot measure falls within the scope of the constitutional 
power of referendum or initiative.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 11, quoting Youngstown at ¶ 9.  Thus, 
without relying on the changes introduced by H.B. 463, we again held that an 
elections board has the authority to determine whether a municipal initiative falls 
within the municipality’s legislative power.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 11} Guided by Flak, we apply our pre-H.B. 463 caselaw in this case.  
Accordingly, we must determine whether the board members abused their 
discretion in determining that the proposed ordinance exceeds Columbus’s 
legislative power.  See Flak at ¶ 9, citing Jacquemin, 147 Ohio St.3d 467, 2016-
Ohio-5880, 67 N.E.3d 759, at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 12} The board member who moved to invalidate the initiative petition 
cited three reasons in support of his conclusion that the proposed ordinance is outside 
Columbus’s legislative power: the proposal would regulate oil-and-gas extraction 
and transportation, it would regulate corporations, and it would create new causes of 
action.  It is not necessary for us to consider the first two reasons, because the board 
members clearly acted within their discretion by rejecting the petition for the third 
reason. 
{¶ 13} Section 4(b) of the proposed ordinance would authorize “any resident 
of the City of Columbus” to “enforce the rights and prohibitions of this Community 
Bill of Rights through an action brought in any court possessing jurisdiction over 
activities occurring within the City.”  This provision is similar to the offending 
provision in Flak that would have authorized “private citizens to enforce their rights 
* * * by filing suit as a private attorney general.”  Flak at ¶ 4.  Like the proposal in 
Flak, the proposed ordinance here would create a new cause of action—something 
we have held municipalities lack the power to do.  See id. at ¶ 15.  Because Columbus 
clearly lacks the power to enact the proposed ordinance, we hold that the board 
members did not abuse their discretion in keeping relators’ proposal off the ballot. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
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2.  We need not reach relators’ constitutional challenges to H.B. 463 
{¶ 14} Relators challenge the constitutionality of H.B. 463 on two grounds.  
They argue that the statutory provisions permitting the board to conduct a 
substantive review of ballot initiatives violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, 
and that the bill itself violates the one-subject rule in Article II, Section 15(D) of 
the Ohio Constitution.  Because we have already found that the board had the 
authority to exclude the proposal from the ballot under our pre-H.B. 463 caselaw, 
we need not reach the constitutionality of H.B. 463 in this case.  See Flak, 152 Ohio 
St.3d 244, 2017-Ohio-8109, 95 N.E.3d 329, at ¶ 17 (“we do not reach constitutional 
issues unless it is necessary to do so”), citing State ex rel. BSW Dev. Group v. 
Dayton, 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 345, 699 N.E.2d 1271 (1998). 
3.  Columbus Charter 42-11 does not conflict with or supersede R.C. 
3501.38(M)(1)(a) 
{¶ 15} Relators also argue that Columbus Charter 42-11 overrides R.C. 
3501.38(M)(1)(a) and prevents preenactment review of a proposed ordinance by 
the board of elections.  Relators contend that the city-charter provision conflicts 
with the statute and that under the city’s home-rule authority, the local provision 
controls as “a matter of local self-government.”  See State ex rel. Minor v. Eschen, 
74 Ohio St.3d 134, 138, 656 N.E.2d 940 (1995) (“In matters of local self-
government, if a portion of a municipal charter expressly conflicts with parallel 
state law, the charter provisions will prevail”).  We reject this argument because 
relators’ initial premise—that the charter provision conflicts with R.C. 
3501.38(M)(1)(a)—is unfounded. 
{¶ 16} Columbus Charter 42-11 provides: 
 
 
Council action on a petition for any proposed ordinance, 
referendum, or charter amendment shall be by ordinance.  No city 
officer may consider the subject matter of a petition when 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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determining the legal sufficiency thereof, except as required to 
assure compliance with applicable provisions of this charter, 
general laws of the state, or ordinance of council.  Any petition and 
any signatures upon the part-petitions thereof found to be sufficient 
as provided herein shall be presumed to be in all respects sufficient, 
unless not later than forty-five days before the election, it shall be 
otherwise proven. 
 
{¶ 17} Relators argue that Columbus Charter 42-11 conflicts with R.C. 
3501.38(M)(1)(a), because the charter provision prohibits the consideration of the 
subject matter of a petition while the statute requires a substantive examination.  
Contrary to relators’ argument, there is no conflict between the two provisions.  
Columbus Charter 42-11 requires Columbus City Council to take action on a 
petition by ordinance and prohibits a “city officer” from considering the subject 
matter of a petition when determining the legal sufficiency of the measure.  R.C. 
3501.38(M)(1)(a), in contrast, instructs “the board of elections” regarding the way 
it shall examine an initiative petition when determining whether the measure 
should be placed on the ballot.  By their plain terms, the two provisions apply to 
different political bodies carrying out different governmental roles.  We therefore 
reject relators’ argument. 
B.  Relators’ free-speech argument fails 
{¶ 18} In their second proposition of law, relators assert that the decision to 
exclude the proposed ordinance from the ballot violates the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution.  
According to relators, the board members impermissibly excluded the initiative 
petition from the ballot based on their review of the content of the proposed 
measure.  We reject this argument because there is no evidence suggesting that the 
board members rejected the initiative petition based on the particular message 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
relators sought to convey.  See Reed v. Gilbert, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2227, 
192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015) (“Government regulation of speech is content based if a 
law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or 
message expressed”); State ex rel. Ethics First—You Decide Ohio Political Action 
Commt. v. DeWine, 147 Ohio St.3d 373, 2016-Ohio-3144, 66 N.E.3d 689, ¶ 23 
(stating that government action is not content-based if it “applies to all petitions, 
irrespective of the substantive message the petition seeks to communicate”).  The 
board members voted to exclude the initiative from the ballot because Columbus 
lacks the power to create causes of action.  That restriction is content-neutral 
because it applies to all municipal initiative proposals—not just relators’—
regardless of the proposal’s content. 
C.  We need not reach relators’ final argument 
{¶ 19} Through their fourth proposition of law, relators ask us to require 
the board members to modify the ballot-summary language prepared by 
Columbus City Council.  Because we deny the writ, this proposition is moot and 
we need not address it. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 20} Applying pre-H.B. 463 caselaw, we deny the writ and hold that the 
board members did not abuse their discretion in finding that the proposed ballot 
measure is beyond the scope of Columbus’s legislative power. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, FRENCH, DEWINE, and DEGENARO, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
 
FISCHER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 21} I respectfully dissent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 22} This court has not previously decided whether the statutory 
amendments introduced by 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 463 (“H.B. 463”) are 
unconstitutional in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine, and a majority 
of the court continues to avoid that question.  In State ex rel. Flak v. Betras, 152 
Ohio St.3d 244, 2017-Ohio-8109, 95 N.E.3d 329, ¶ 17, this court specifically stated 
that “we leave consideration of the constitutionality of [H.B. 463] for another day.”  
In State ex rel. Khumprakob v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
2018-Ohio-1602, ___ N.E.3d ___, I wrote an opinion concurring in judgment only 
in which I concluded that portions of H.B. 463 are unconstitutional and that certain 
pre-H.B. 463 decisions of this court had been decided in error and should be 
overruled.  Id. at ¶ 42 (Fischer, J., concurring in judgment only).  However, in 
Khumprakob, the majority once again declined to reach the constitutionality issue 
and decided that case by distinguishing Flak on a factual basis.  Khumprakob at  
¶ 5-9. 
{¶ 23} In State ex rel. Espen v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections, ___ Ohio St.3d 
___, 2017-Ohio-8223, ___ N.E.3d ___, which this court decided before 
Khumprakob but after Flak, the three justices joining the per curiam opinion agreed 
with the board of elections’ determination that it had no authority to invalidate a 
charter petition based on a substantive evaluation of that petition’s legality.  Id. at 
¶ 16.  The lead opinion specifically stated that “[t]o the extent that R.C. 
3501.38(M)(1)(a) authorizes and requires boards of elections to make substantive, 
preenactment legal evaluations, it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine and is 
unconstitutional.”  Id. at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 24} The constitutionality of H.B. 463 continues to be argued before this 
court, and the court has not definitively settled that issue.  We will eventually have 
to resolve that question after conducting a substantive analysis.  In doing so, I 
believe that we will need to reexamine our pre-H.B. 463 caselaw to determine 
whether that line of decisions is in accord with the separation-of-powers doctrine. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 25} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would grant the writ of 
mandamus for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Khumprakob. 
_________________ 
Terry J. Lodge and Jensen Silvis, for relators. 
Ronald J. O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. 
Lecklider, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents. 
McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, J. Corey Colombo, 
Derek S. Clinger, and Ben F.C. Wallace, for intervening respondents. 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., and L. Bradfield Hughes, urging 
denial of the writ for amici curiae Affiliated Construction Trades Ohio Foundation, 
Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Columbus Realtors, Ohio Oil and Gas Association, 
Ohio Chemistry Technology Council, and American Petroleum Institute. 
_________________