Case Title: Brisson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-67

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Brisson v. State1998 WY 31955 P.2d 888Case Number: 97-67Decided: 03/18/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Michael BRISSON, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from The District Court, 
Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Diane M. Lozano, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director of the Prosecution 
Assistance Program; and James Kaste, Student Intern for the Prosecution 
Assistance Program, for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, 
Justice.

 

[¶1] The district court 
certified questions to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11. The 
Wyoming Supreme Court agreed to answer the following certified 
questions:

 

1. 
Does a county court conviction, without benefit of counsel, for spousal battery 
expose the person so convicted to a "practical possibility" of 
incarceration?

 

2. 
If the answer to the first question is "yes," may such an uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction be used to enhance the penalty for battery under Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-501(b) under circumstances wherein the defendant did not knowingly 
or intentionally waive counsel and, in fact, requested 
counsel?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶2] Appellant Michael 
Brisson was charged with felony battery upon a household member pursuant to WYO. 
STAT. § 6-2-501(b) (1997) in January of 1997. Although Brisson's charge would 
have been a misdemeanor if it had been his first or second offense, it was 
elevated to a felony charge because he had been convicted of misdemeanor battery 
against a household member twice within ten years of his current charge. Brisson 
filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that his first battery conviction should not 
be used to elevate his current charge to a felony because it was obtained 
without him having the benefit of counsel even though he was indigent and had 
requested an attorney. The district court certified questions to this 
Court.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶3] The United States 
Supreme Court began its discussions on this issue in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972). In that case, the defendant was 
charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of six 
months. 407 U.S.  at 26, 92 S. Ct.  at 2007. The defendant was unrepresented and 
was sentenced to serve ninety days in jail. Id. The Supreme Court held: 
"[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any 
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was 
represented by counsel at his trial." 407 U.S.  at 37, 92 S. Ct.  at 2012. The 
majority recognized that the assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the 
very existence of a fair trial. 407 U.S.  at 31, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2009.

 

"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of 
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the 
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science 
of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for 
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules 
of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a 
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant 
to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [may] have a perfect one. He 
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against 
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men 
of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or 
those of feeble intellect."

 

Id. (quoting Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64, 77 L. Ed. 158 
(1932)).

 

[¶4] In an ensuing opinion, 
the Supreme Court clarified its Argersinger holding by stating: "[T]he central 
premise of Argersinger  that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind 
from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment - is eminently sound and warrants 
adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to 
appointment of counsel." Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 
1162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1979). Uncounseled convictions which do not result in 
incarceration are considered to be valid convictions. Id.

 

[¶5] The Supreme Court 
subsequently contemplated whether such an uncounseled conviction could be used 
to impose a prison sentence for a later conviction. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S. Ct. 1585, 64 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1980). Although the plurality 
acknowledged that an uncounseled misdemeanor was valid if the defendant was not 
actually incarcerated, it held that such a conviction could not later be used to 
incarcerate a defendant on a subsequent offense because "a conviction which is 
invalid for purposes of imposing a sentence of imprisonment for the offense 
itself remains invalid for purposes of increasing a term of imprisonment for a 
subsequent conviction under a repeat-offender statute." Id. at 228, 100 S. Ct.  at 
1588 (Marshall, J., concurring).

 

[¶6] Baldasar was overruled 
by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745 
(1994), in which the Supreme Court held that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor 
conviction could indeed be used as a basis for increasing a prison term under a 
recidivist statute. 511 U.S.  at 747, 114 S. Ct.  at 1927. The Supreme Court 
reasoned:

 

Enhancement statutes, whether in the nature of 
criminal history provisions such as those contained in the Sentencing 
Guidelines, or recidivist statutes which are commonplace in state criminal laws, 
do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction. As pointed out in 
the dissenting opinion in Baldasar, "[t]his Court consistently has sustained 
repeat-offender laws as penalizing only the last offense committed by the 
defendant."

 

Id. (quoting Baldasar, 446 U.S.  at 232, 100 S.Ct. at 1590). The Supreme Court, however, pointed out that 
states are free to provide their citizens greater protection than that given by 
the federal government. 511 U.S.  at 748 n. 12, 114 S. Ct.  at 1928 n. 
12.

 

[¶7] In deciding what 
Wyoming's approach to these issues should be, this Court must interpret the 
language of the relevant Wyoming statutes. We endeavor to interpret statutes in 
accordance with the legislature's intent. We begin by making an "`inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming 
Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. 
Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We construe the statute as a 
whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe 
together all parts of the statute in pari materia. Id. Courts determine as a 
matter of law whether a statute is clear or ambiguous.  Gunderson v. State, 925 P.2d 1300, 1304 
(Wyo. 1996). When we determine that the statute is clear and unambiguous, we 
give effect to the plain language of the statute. Id.

 

[¶8] Under WYO. STAT. § 
7-6-104(a)(i) (1997), a public defender shall be appointed to represent a needy 
person who is under arrest for or charged with a "serious crime" and has 
requested counsel. A "serious crime" is defined as "any felony or misdemeanor 
under the laws of the state of Wyoming for which incarceration as a punishment 
is a practical possibility."1 WYO. STAT. § 7-6-102(a)(v) (1997). 
The legislature has not defined the term "practical possibility." The task 
presented to this Court, therefore, is to determine what the legislature 
intended when it used the term within this particular 
statute.

 

[¶9] The word "practical" is 
defined by WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY as "available, usable, 
or valuable in practice or action: capable of being turned to use or account." 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1780 (1961). "Possible" is defined 
by the same source as being something "that may or may not occur: that may 
chance: dependent on contingency: neither probable nor impossible." Id. at 1771. 
The word "possibility" means "something that is possible." Id. Giving the words 
"practical" and "possibility" their ordinary and obvious meaning according to 
their arrangement and connection within the statute, we conclude that this 
unambiguous term means something that is capable of 
occurring.

 

[¶10] The Wyoming 
legislature apparently intended to afford Wyoming citizens greater protection in 
this area than that afforded by the United States Supreme Court. Section 
7-6-104(a)(i) rejects the actual incarceration approach by requiring that an 
indigent person who is under arrest for or formally charged with a serious crime 
and who faces a practical possibility of being incarcerated must be provided the 
assistance of counsel. We, therefore, decline to follow the United States 
Supreme Court's actual incarceration approach. We also decline to follow the 
United States Supreme Court's holding that an uncounseled conviction can be used 
to enhance a subsequent offense. Our concern with allowing such a practice is 
with the reliability of uncounseled convictions. In order to allow a sentencing 
court to consider previous convictions, we must be convinced that such 
convictions are reliable. See State v. Sinagoga, 81 Haw. 421, 918 P.2d 228, 241 
(Haw.Ct.App. 1996). We hold that, in the absence of a valid waiver of counsel, 
an uncounseled conviction cannot be relied upon to impose or enhance a 
subsequent prison sentence.

 

[¶11] In the case at bar, 
Brisson was charged with felony spousal battery under § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii). 
Section 6-2-501 provides in relevant part:

 

(b) A person is guilty of battery if he unlawfully 
touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly 
or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.

 

          
. . . .

 

(d) Except as provided by subsection (f) of this 
section, battery is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), 
or both. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the term of probation 
imposed by a judge under this subsection may exceed the maximum term of 
imprisonment established for the offense under this subsection provided the term 
of probation, together with any extension thereof, shall in no case exceed one 
(1) year.

 

          
. . . .

 

(f) A household member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 
who commits a second or subsequent battery against any other household member 
shall be punished as follows:

 

          
. . .

 

(ii) A person convicted of a third or subsequent 
offense under this subsection within ten (10) years following the first 
conviction is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
two (2) years, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or 
both.

 

[¶12] Brisson admits that he 
was convicted twice within ten years. He claims, however, that, although he was 
indigent and requested an attorney for the June 1995 conviction, his request was 
denied. Brisson pleaded guilty and received probation. Even though Brisson was 
not sentenced to serve an incarceration term, the statute under which Brisson 
was convicted exposed him to a maximum incarceration term of six months. A 
prison term was, therefore, a practical possibility. We hold that Brisson should 
have been provided counsel for his first conviction and that his uncounseled 
conviction cannot be used to enhance his current charge to a 
felony.

 

[¶13] Accordingly, we answer 
the question of whether a conviction for spousal battery exposes the accused to 
a "practical possibility" of incarceration which requires the assistance of 
counsel in the affirmative. We answer the question of whether an uncounseled 
misdemeanor may be used to enhance the penalty for a subsequent offense in the 
negative.

 

FOOTNOTES

1We 
emphasize that our legislature did not make a distinction between misdemeanor 
cases and felony cases when it enacted this provision.