Case Title: Allen-Pentkowski v. Dept. of Labor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 VT 71













Allen-Pentkowski v. Dept. of Labor
(Lieber Engineering, Inc., Employer) (2010-167)
 
2011 VT 71
 
[Filed 6-Jul-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 71
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2010-167
 
JANUARY TERM, 2011 
 
Pamela Allen-Pentkowski
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
    v.
}
 Employment Security Board
 
}
 
Department of Labor 
(Liebert Engineering, Inc.,
  Employer)
}
}
 
DOCKET NO. 11-09-206-06
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Plaintiff appeals the Vermont Employment Security Board's (Board)
determination that she was discharged from work for actions constituting
misconduct, a decision which temporarily disqualified plaintiff from collecting
unemployment compensation benefits.  On appeal, plaintiff argues that her
inability to work the hours requested by her employer was not misconduct within
the meaning of the statute and should not disqualify her from unemployment
compensation benefits.  We hold the employer failed to carry its burden of
proof and reverse.
¶ 2.            
Prior to her discharge, plaintiff had worked for over five years at Liebert Engineering, Inc. as a computer assisted design
operator.  She had originally been employed part-time but was offered a
full-time position on November 19, 2007.  The employment offer did not
include a specific work-schedule requirement.  After accepting the
full-time position in November 2007, plaintiff worked Monday through Friday
from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. and maintained this schedule for roughly two
years.  However, in the fall of 2009, demand for plaintiff's work began to
slow.  In order to keep plaintiff on staff, her immediate
supervisor proposed she take on some of the company's administrative
duties.  Specifically, on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays plaintiff
would be required to handle the company's front desk, which entailed answering
phones and greeting clients during business hours, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
The supervisor first proposed this arrangement orally on September 28, 2009,
and followed up with an email delineating the specifics of the change the same
day.  Plaintiff agreed to perform the new duties but expressed concern
about the proposed hours.  She claims she told her supervisor that she
could make the requested change in her hours after she had her baby, but until
then, could not work the extra hour beyond 4:00 p.m. on the three days
requested.*
 At this time, plaintiff was a single mother of a fifteen-year-old and was
several months into a high-risk pregnancy.  Plaintiff was worried about
the added strain on her pregnancy because of the longer hours, and she felt
uncomfortable leaving her fifteen-year-old daughter unsupervised after
school.  Plaintiff began performing the new administrative duties, and
working 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on the requested days.  However, her
supervisor told her that if she needed to leave before 5:00 p.m., then "other
arrangements [would] need to be made."  In response, plaintiff sent an
e-mail to the president of the company, with a subject line entitled
"Harassment."  In the e-mail, plaintiff explained she could not work until
5:00 p.m., that her supervisor would not listen to her, and that she felt harassed
by his repeated insistence.  The president, concerned with the
content and tone of the e-mail, met with plaintiff alone in his office on
October 27, 2009.  The president admits that during that meeting,
plaintiff stated that the new schedule made it "a long day" and that she was
concerned about her fifteen-year-old daughter.  The president's and
plaintiff's accounts differ as to who began shouting, but a verbal disagreement
arose, and eventually plaintiff went home for the day.
¶ 3.            
The following morning, October 28, 2009, the president met with the
supervisor and instructed him "to speak to [plaintiff] about the encounter that
[plaintiff and the president] had the afternoon before."  The supervisor
called plaintiff into his office, and she declined to speak to him about it,
stating the matter was between her and the president.  The supervisor
relayed this statement to the president.  The president responded that the
harassment issue was between plaintiff and the supervisor and told the supervisor
to "settle the matter" concerning plaintiff's schedule.  The supervisor
returned to his office, where plaintiff was waiting, and she reiterated her
inability to work those hours.  Hearing this exchange, the president came
from his office and joined the meeting, telling plaintiff that "can't is equal
to refusal, refusal is reason for termination," at which point, he discharged
the plaintiff.
¶ 4.            
Plaintiff filed for unemployment compensation benefits but the claims
adjudicator determined the nature of plaintiff's discharge from her employer
was misconduct connected with her work.  As a result, she was disqualified
from receiving benefits for the weeks ending October 31, 2009 through December
26, 2009.  Plaintiff appealed this decision to an administrative law judge
(ALJ), who reversed, holding that refusal to work a unilaterally altered
schedule was not per se insubordinate.  Defendant appealed to the Board,
which reversed the ALJ, finding a flat refusal to work and held that this was sufficient
to constitute misconduct.  Plaintiff appealed the Board's decision to this
Court.  
¶ 5.            
"This Court must uphold the Board's decision unless it can be
demonstrated that the findings and conclusions were erroneous."  Trombley
v. Dept. of Emp't & Training, 146 Vt. 332,
334, 503 A.2d 537, 539 (1985).  "This Court cannot disturb the
findings of the Board if there is credible evidence to support them even if
there is substantial evidence to the contrary."  Strong
v. Dept. of Emp't & Training, 144 Vt. 128,
129-30, 473 A.2d 1170, 1171 (1984).
¶ 6.            
Vermont's unemployment compensation statute reads in pertinent part:
 
(a) An individual shall be disqualified from benefits:
 
 
(1) For not more than 15 weeks nor less than six weeks
immediately following the filing of a claim for benefits . . . if the
commissioner finds that:
 
 
(A) He or she has been discharged by his or her last employing unit for
misconduct connected with his or her work
 
21 V.S.A. § 1344.  Thus, if an employer discharges an
employee for "misconduct connected with his or her work" the employee may be
denied unemployment compensation for anywhere between six to twelve
weeks.  This Court has defined misconduct sufficient to constitute
disqualification under § 1344 as "substantial disregard of the employer's
interest, either willful or culpably negligent."  Johnson
v. Dept. of Emp't Sec., 138 Vt. 554, 555, 420 A.2d 106, 107 (1980) (per curiam) (quotation
omitted).  In instances of employee discharge for misconduct,
"[t]he burden of proof is on the employer to establish misconduct."  Mazut
v. Dept. of Emp't Training, 151 Vt. 539, 541, 561 A.2d 1362, 1364 (1989).  The sole issue upon appeal is whether
there is credible evidence to support the conclusion that plaintiff's behavior
constituted misconduct within the meaning of 21 V.S.A. § 1344(a)(1)(A).
 
¶ 7.            
This Court has held that refusal to perform certain tasks is not
necessarily misconduct disqualifying the employee from unemployment
compensation.  See Johnson, 138 Vt. at 555, 420 A.2d  at 107.  In Johnson, an employee was discharged from
his employment at a lumber company and was denied unemployment compensation
because the claims examiner found he had been discharged for misconduct
connected with his work.  Id. at 554-55, 420 A2d. at 106-07.  On appeal, the Board found that "the
claimant occasionally mishandled materials, refused to perform certain tasks,
and argued with the foreman and the owner."  Id. at 555, 420 A.2d  at 107.  However, the Board also found that
"the employer had failed to establish that these acts resulted from anything
other than misunderstanding of the job requirements, and an honest concern for
the safety of the motor vehicles claimant was required to operate."  Id. 
For these reasons, the Board concluded that the legal standard for
disqualifying misconduct had not been met.  Id.  We affirmed,
explaining that the "employer ha[d] proved that the employee was balky and
argumentative, but not that he harbored a willful disregard for the employer's
interests."  Id. at 556, 420 A.2d  at 107. 

¶ 8.            
Here, plaintiff contends that she told her employer she could not work
the additional hour three days a week because of her medical conditiona high
risk pregnancyand because she was concerned about the well-being of her
fifteen-year-old daughter.  The employer claims it did not know the reason
for plaintiff's refusal to work the additional hour, but it is the employer's
burden to prove disqualifying misconduct.  Mazut,
151 Vt. at 541, 561 A.2d  at 1364.  At most,
defendant has demonstrated that plaintiff was "balky," but has failed to show
that plaintiff's actions arose from "anything other than [a] misunderstanding
of the [newly imposed] job requirements."  Johnson, 138 Vt. at 555,
420 A.2d  at 107.  No evidence has been presented
which suggests that plaintiff acted out of substantial willful or negligent
disregard for her employer's interest.  In fact, the evidence shows that
plaintiff attempted to accommodate her employer's workflow by staying at work
until 4:00 p.m. and accepting the additional administrative duties
requested.  Further, she testified before the ALJ to her willingness to
work until 5:00 p.m. after she had given birth.  As we explained in Johnson,
"[m]isconduct that is sufficient for discharge is not
necessarily sufficient to require a disqualification from benefits under the
Unemployment Compensation Act."  Id... at
556, 420 A.2d  at 107.  Plaintiff's inability to work a new schedule may
have been sufficient to warrant discharge from her job, but it was not
misconduct disqualifying her from unemployment compensation benefits.  See
Kuhn v. Dept. of Emp't Sec., 134 Vt. 292, 294,
357 A.2d 534, 535 (1976) ("[T]here is a clear-cut distinction between conduct
which may be legitimate grounds for discharge and that which constitutes
misconduct.  The distinction is an essential one.").  
           
Reversed.
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber,
  Chief Justice
 
 
  
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
  
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 

*  The parties presented conflicting
evidence at the hearing.  In fact, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
noted at the conclusion of testimony that it was "unprecedented" for the
parties to have such "different credible recollections of what occurred." 
In his findings, the ALJ acknowledged that plaintiff "insists that she
discussed" with her employer the reasons she could not work beyond 4:00
p.m.  He also recounted that the company president could not "recall ever
discussing the particulars" with plaintiff, and her direct supervisor claimed
he "never received a definitive answer."