Case Title: City of Montebello v. Vasquez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S219052

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-08-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
SEE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION 
Filed 8/8/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CITY OF MONTEBELLO, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S219052 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/1 B245959 
ROSEMARIE VASQUEZ et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Appellants; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC488767 
 
 
) 
ARAKELIAN ENTERPRISES INC., 
) 
 
) 
 
Intervener and Respondent. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The City of Montebello sued three of its former councilmembers and a 
former city administrator, claiming they violated Government Code section 1090 
by voting on a waste hauling contract in which they held a financial interest.1  It 
sought to invalidate the contract and force defendants to disgorge campaign 
contributions made by the company that was awarded the contract.  Defendants 
                                              
1  
“[C]ity officers or employees shall not be financially interested in any 
contract made by them in their official capacity . . . .”  (Gov. Code, § 1090, subd. 
(a).)  We sometimes refer to Montebello as the “City.” 
2 
 
moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.  (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 425.16.)2  The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. 
We hold, as did the courts below, that this case does not come within the 
statutory anti-SLAPP exemption for public enforcement actions.  However, the 
votes cast in favor of the contract at issue were protected activity under section 
425.16.  The Court of Appeal’s judgment to the contrary is reversed.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
In 2008, the franchise for residential waste collection in Montebello was 
held by intervener Arakelian Enterprises, doing business as Athens Disposal 
Company (Athens).  Athens had been the City’s residential waste hauler for over 
40 years, but a number of companies provided commercial waste services.  
Athens’s executive vice-president, Dennis Chiapetta, was approached by 
defendant Robert Urteaga, who suggested that Athens consider seeking an 
exclusive commercial waste hauling contract.3 
During subsequent negotiations over adjustments to the residential contract, 
City representatives invited Athens to submit a proposal for a commercial and 
industrial waste hauling contract.  Chiapetta agreed.  He negotiated primarily with 
the city administrator, defendant Richard Torres, but also with the city attorney.  
Chiapetta said Torres had previously opposed the idea of an exclusive contract, 
but changed his mind because the waste hauling industry was undergoing 
                                              
2  
SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” 
(Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57 (Equilon).)  
Hereafter, unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
3  
The timing of Urteaga’s initial contact with Chiapetta is not entirely clear.  
Chiapetta’s deposition testimony unequivocally stated both that it occurred in 
2008, and that Urteaga was not yet a member of the city council.  However, 
Urteaga was elected in 2007.  The complaint alleges that the meeting occurred 
“[e]ither before or shortly after his election.” 
3 
 
consolidation, landfills were preparing to close, and the City faced compliance 
issues under the Integrated Waste Management Act (Pub. Resources Code, 
§ 40000 et seq.).  Under a proposed comprehensive contract, Athens would pay 
the City $500,000, improve its residential services, and indemnify the City for any 
failure to comply with the Integrated Waste Management Act. 
At a city council meeting, more than 20 people spoke against the contract.  
Nevertheless, it was approved by a three to two vote.  Urteaga and codefendants 
Kathy Salazar and Rosemarie Vasquez voted in favor.  Mayor William Molinari 
was in the minority.  When presented with the finalized contract, Molinari 
declined to sign it because of various misgivings.  He sought the advice of the city 
attorney, who told him he had a ministerial duty to execute the document.  The 
city attorney advised Molinari in writing that a decision not to sign would 
“warrant a determination that for purposes of this Agreement only, you are 
deemed ‘absent’ thus vesting in the mayor pro tem the authority to execute this 
contract.”  The city attorney stated he would instruct the mayor pro tem to sign, 
with an annotation reflecting her authority to perform that duty in the mayor’s 
absence. 
Acting as mayor pro tem, Vasquez signed the contract with the city 
attorney’s annotation.  Thereafter, Molinari asked the Los Angeles County District 
Attorney’s office to investigate possible money laundering by Salazar, along with 
Brown Act violations by all three councilmembers who had voted for the contract.  
(See Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.)  The office responded that Brown Act violations 
could not be investigated without some evidence of an illegal closed session, but 
that it would look into the money laundering allegation. 
The district attorney’s office ultimately filed no charges against Salazar.  Its 
investigation revealed no impropriety in her alleged use of campaign donations 
from Athens to make loans to a nonprofit organization where she served as 
4 
 
executive director.  Nor did Athens’s donations to that organization disqualify 
Salazar from voting on the Athens contract.  There was no evidence she had 
offered to vote for the contract in exchange for money.  While a technical conflict 
of interest might “possibly” be established under Government Code section 1090, 
the district attorney did not believe Salazar had a corrupt motive in voting on the 
Athens contract. 
Montebello resident Mike Torres sued the City in April 2009, seeking to 
invalidate the Athens contract on various grounds.4  The trial court denied an anti-
SLAPP motion filed by the City, and it appealed.  Mayor Molinari and 
Councilmember Vasquez were up for reelection in November 2009.  Montebello 
voters qualified a recall of Councilmembers Urteaga and Salazar, and a special 
election was set for February 2010.  Athens contributed $37,300 to defeat 
Molinari, $45,000 to reelect Vasquez, and $352,912.73 to defeat the recall.5  
Despite those efforts Molinari was reelected, Vasquez was not, and Urteaga and 
Salazar were recalled.  Richard Torres announced his retirement as city 
administrator shortly after the November election. 
The City abandoned its appeal in the Mike Torres action, and substituted 
new counsel in place of the city attorney.  In May 2011 it filed an amended 
answer, declaring it no longer disputed the material allegations of the petition.  
Athens, however, continued to defend its contract as real party in interest in the 
Mike Torres litigation. 
                                              
4  
Mike Torres is evidently unrelated to defendant Richard Torres.  His 
lawsuit is distinct from the suit subsequently filed by the City, which is the subject 
of this appeal. 
5  
The City does not dispute defendants’ claim that these contributions were 
properly reported; indeed, it relies on the forms Athens filed with the Fair Political 
Practices Commission as supporting evidence.  
5 
 
The City filed the action now before us in July 2012, represented by the 
same outside counsel who took over in the Mike Torres case.  The complaint 
states a single cause of action against Urteaga, Salazar, Vasquez, and Richard 
Torres for conflict of interest in violation of Government Code section 1090.  It 
seeks a declaration that the Athens contract is void, and an order requiring the 
councilmember defendants to disgorge the campaign contributions they received 
from Athens. 
Three days after the City filed its complaint, the trial court in the Mike 
Torres action issued a writ of mandate setting aside the Athens contract.6  
Defendants then moved to strike the City’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP 
statute.  Noting that the Athens contract had been voided, they contended the 
City’s action was little more than a politically driven attempt to punish them for 
exercising their constitutional right of free speech in connection with issues of 
public interest related to their official duties.  The City claimed its action fell 
within the public enforcement exemption of section 425.16, subdivision (d) 
(hereafter, § 425.16(d)).  Alternatively, the City argued that voting by public 
officials is not protected under the First Amendment, citing Nevada Commission 
on Ethics v. Carrigan (2011) 564 U.S. 117 (Carrigan).  If the court were to 
disagree and consider the likelihood of the lawsuit succeeding, the City maintained 
that its case was sufficiently strong. 
                                              
6  
The court declared the contract void both because it imposed an 
unconstitutional property-related fee, and because Vasquez lacked the authority to 
sign it as mayor pro tem.  That judgment was ultimately affirmed.  The Court of 
Appeal sustained the trial court’s findings that the contract was not validly 
executed, and that Salazar had no improper financial interest in it.  (Torres v. City 
of Montebello (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 382, 389.) 
6 
 
The trial court denied the motion to strike.  It ruled that the public 
enforcement exemption did not apply because, contrary to the requirements of 
section 425.16(d), the action was not “brought in the name of the people” by the 
city attorney as a public prosecutor.  Deciding that defendants’ actions were 
protected activity for purposes of section 425.16, the court went on to consider the 
likelihood the City would prevail.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  It found sufficient 
evidence of a conflict of interest in the showing that Urteaga and Richard Torres 
had encouraged Athens to seek an exclusive contract, and that Athens contributed 
to the campaigns of Urteaga, Salazar, and Vasquez after the contract was 
approved.  
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  It agreed that the public enforcement 
exception did not apply.  However, it held that defendants’ votes on the contract 
were not protected activity under section 425.16.  Accordingly, the court did not 
review the question of whether the City could establish a probability it would 
prevail.  We address the exemption first, because its application would take the 
case entirely out of the anti-SLAPP statutory scheme.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.  The Public Enforcement Exemption 
The Legislature enacted section 425.16 in 1992, noting “a disturbing 
increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the 
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of 
grievances.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)  The statute authorizes defendants to file a 
special motion to strike in order to expedite the early dismissal of unmeritorious 
claims.  (§ 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (f).)  “[T]o encourage continued participation in 
matters of public significance,” and to ensure “that this participation should not be 
chilled through abuse of the judicial process,” the Legislature has specified that 
the anti-SLAPP statute “shall be construed broadly.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) 
7 
 
The statute has always included an exemption for public enforcement 
actions.  (Stats. 1992, ch. 726, pp. 3523-3524.)  Section 425.16(d) provides:  “This 
section shall not apply to any enforcement action brought in the name of the 
people of the State of California by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city 
attorney, acting as a public prosecutor.”  A split of authority has developed on the 
scope of this exemption.  On one side, two opinions from the Second District 
Court of Appeal have taken an expansive view.  (City of Long Beach v. California 
Citizens for Neighborhood Empowerment (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 302 (City of 
Long Beach); City of Los Angeles v. Animal Defense League (2006) 135 
Cal.App.4th 606 (City of Los Angeles).)  On the other, the Fourth District has 
applied the statutory language narrowly.  (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 
Cal.App.4th 751 (City of Colton).)  We conclude that the narrow interpretation is 
consistent with the statutory language and with our decisions construing 
exceptions to the anti-SLAPP statute. 
In City of Long Beach, the city sued an organization and its treasurer for 
violating municipal campaign contribution limits.  (City of Long Beach, supra, 111 
Cal.App.4th at p. 304.)  In response to the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, the 
city claimed its action was exempt.  The defendants argued that the exemption did 
not apply because the action was “not brought in the name of the people of the 
State of California,” as required by section 425.16(d).  The Court of Appeal 
agreed.  It relied on legislative history to conclude that the public enforcement 
exemption was meant to apply to actions in the name of local authorities, as well 
as the people of California.  In a brief opinion, the court conceded that the history 
of section 425.16 was silent on this point.  It referred instead to comments in a bill 
analysis pertaining to a different statute:  section 998, which governs cost awards 
after offers to compromise.  The Legislature added a public enforcement 
8 
 
exemption to section 998 in 2001, using terms identical to those of section 
425.16(d).  (§ 998, subd. (g)(2); Stats. 2001, ch. 153, § 1, p. 1444.)   
 The section 998 bill analysis explained that when section 425.16 was 
enacted in 1992, subdivision (d) was included “[a]t the request of the Attorney 
General’s office.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 732 
(2001–2002 Reg. Sess. July 3, 2001, p. 5.)  “Legislative staff involved in the 
drafting of the [anti-SLAPP] bill report that this provision was not included to 
provide a special exemption that otherwise would have been considered 
nonexistent, but rather to confirm the existence of the prosecutorial exemption 
assumed by the drafters.”  (Ibid.)  The City of Long Beach court relied on this 
passage to support its belief that the section 998 exemption was intended to “apply 
broadly to ‘civil enforcement actions’ seeking injunctions, restitution and civil 
penalties, but not damages.”  (City of Long Beach, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 
307.)  Based on that inference, the court reasoned that nearly a decade after the 
anti-SLAPP statute was enacted, “the Legislature understood the language at issue 
in this case (albeit in the context of section 998) to encompass the type of lawsuit 
now before us.”  (Ibid.) 
The court also noted that a committee analysis of the first anti-SLAPP bill, 
which was ultimately vetoed, had reflected the Attorney General’s concern over 
the unintended consequence of hindering enforcement of consumer protection 
laws by local as well as state agencies.  (City of Long Beach, supra, 111 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 307-308.)  It pointed out that the anti-SLAPP statute was meant 
to thwart abusive lawsuits intended to chill the exercise of First Amendment 
rights, whereas “ ‘[t]he prosecutor’s motive derives from the constitutional 
mandate to assure that the laws of the state are uniformly enforced and to 
prosecute any violation of these laws . . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 308.)  The court declared 
its unwillingness to allow political committees to “use section 425.16 as a shield 
9 
 
behind which to hide from otherwise valid local election regulations.”  (Id. at p. 
309.) 
City of Los Angeles, decided by the same division of the Second District, 
reaffirmed the City of Long Beach holding but declined to extend it further.  Los 
Angeles sought protective orders against animal rights activists who had protested 
at a city employee’s home.  (City of Los Angeles, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
609-610.)  The court reversed the denial of the protesters’ special motions to 
strike.  It maintained its earlier view that “although the express language of the 
statute limits the exemption to enforcement actions ‘brought in the name of the 
People of the State of California,’ an otherwise exempted enforcement action 
brought in the name of a city or county itself, rather than ‘the People’ is not 
necessarily outside the ambit” of section 425.16 (d).  (City of Los Angeles, at p. 
618, citing City of Long Beach, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 307-308.)  
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that “only actions brought by a governmental 
agency to enforce laws aimed generally at public protection qualify for this 
exemption to anti-SLAPP scrutiny.”  (City of Los Angeles, at p. 618.)  Because the 
city was acting as an employer to protect its employee, not as a prosecutor 
protecting the public interest, the exemption did not apply.  (Id. at p. 619.) 
The City of Los Angeles court acknowledged that City of Long Beach was 
out of step with this court’s subsequent anti-SLAPP jurisprudence.  “[A]lthough 
[we] departed from the express language of section [425.16(d)], in [City of Long 
Beach], supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pages 307-308, when we applied the exemption 
to a civil enforcement action that had not been brought literally ‘in the name of the 
people of the State of California,’ any further erosion of the specific requirements 
of that provision is unwarranted in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
admonition in Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 735, 
that the plain language of section 425.16 is to be respected and that exceptions to 
10 
 
the statute’s broad reach must not be lightly implied:  ‘The Legislature clearly 
knows how to create an exemption from the anti-SLAPP statute when it wishes to 
do so.’  (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, at p. 735.)”  (City of Los Angeles, 
supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 620.)7 
Subsequently, a divided court in the Fourth District disagreed with City of 
Long Beach.  In City of Colton, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th 751, a developer sued to 
enforce a contract with the city even though he had been convicted of procuring it 
through bribery.  When the city cross-complained, the developer filed an anti-
SLAPP motion to strike the city’s causes of action for unfair business practices 
and injunctive relief.  (Id. at pp. 758-759.)  The City of Colton court rejected the 
city’s claim that its cross-action qualified for the public enforcement exemption.  
The majority disagreed with City of Long Beach over whether an action must be 
brought in the name of the people to qualify for the exemption.  It found the 
reasoning in City of Long Beach inconsistent with the “clear and unambiguous” 
terms of section 425.16(d).  (City of Colton, at p. 777.)8  The dissent agreed that 
the public enforcement exception did not apply, but for a different reason:  it 
deemed section 425.16(d) inapplicable because the action was not brought by the 
city attorney.  Therefore, the dissent found it unnecessary to disagree with City of 
Long Beach.  (City of Colton, at p. 794 (dis. opn. of Richli, Acting P. J.).) 
                                              
7  
In Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 735, we 
declined to infer an exemption from section 425.16 for malicious prosecution 
actions, mentioning section 425.16(d) to make the point that the Legislature knows 
how to articulate exemptions when it so desires.   
8 
Addressing the City of Long Beach court’s concern that violations of local 
campaign contribution laws might be shielded by the anti-SLAPP statute, the 
Colton majority noted that violations of city ordinances may be prosecuted in the 
name of the People of the State of California under Government Code section 
36900, subdivision (a).  (City of Colton, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 777.)   
11 
 
Both the majority and the dissent in City of Colton are correct.  The terms 
of section 425.16(d) unambiguously limit the scope of the exemption to 
enforcement actions brought both “in the name of the people of the State of 
California” and “by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting 
as a public prosecutor.”  The Legislature’s choice of this specific language reflects 
its understanding that actions brought in the name of local entities, or by attorneys 
other than the public officers identified in the statute, are not included in the 
exemption.9 
As to section 425.16, we have said that “ ‘[t]he plain language of the statute 
establishes what was intended by the Legislature.’  [Citation.)  ‘ “If the language is 
clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to 
resort to [extrinsic] indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .” ’  [Citation.]”  
(Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 735; see Equilon, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 61.)  We may consult the legislative record to supply 
context, but the fragments of history recited by the City of Long Beach court are at 
best inconclusive.  Moreover, expansive interpretation of exemptions from the 
anti-SLAPP statute is inconsistent with the Legislature’s express intent that the 
statute’s core provisions “shall be construed broadly.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)  We 
have repeatedly emphasized that the exemptions are to be “narrowly construed.”  
(Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 22 [commercial speech 
exemption of § 425.17, subd. (c)]; Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra 
                                              
9  
We note that various statutes authorize city attorneys to prosecute actions in 
the name of the People of the state, including the Government Code section noted 
by the City of Colton majority.  (Gov. Code, § 36900; see, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17206 [civil penalties for unfair competition under the UCL]; Civ. Code, § 52.1 
[interference with civil rights]; Code Civ. Proc., § 731 [action to abate public 
nuisance].) 
12 
 
Club (2008) 45 Cal.4th 309, 316 [public interest exemption of § 425.17, subd. 
(a)].)10 
  Here, the City’s action was not brought in the name of the People by the 
city attorney’s office, acting as a public prosecutor.  Instead, with private counsel 
and in its own name, the City seeks to set aside a contract and obtain disgorgement 
of campaign contributions.  The action does not qualify for the public enforcement 
exemption. 
 
B.  Protected Activity 
In the absence of an applicable exemption, a special motion to strike under 
section 425.16 involves a two-step process.  First, the moving defendant must 
make a prima facie showing “that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains 
were taken ‘in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech 
under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public 
issue,’ as defined in the statute.”  (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.)  If the 
defendant makes this initial showing of protected activity, the burden shifts to the 
plaintiff at the second step to establish a probability it will prevail on the claim.  
(Ibid.)  The plaintiff need only state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim.  
(Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.)  The plaintiff’s 
evidence is accepted as true; the defendant’s evidence is evaluated to determine if 
it defeats the plaintiff’s showing as a matter of law.  (Ibid.)  The procedure is 
meant to prevent abusive SLAPP suits, while allowing “claims with the requisite 
minimal merit [to] proceed.”  (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94.) 
                                              
10  
City of Long Beach v. California Citizens for Neighborhood Empowerment, 
supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 302, and City of Los Angeles v. Animal Defense League, 
supra,135 Cal.App.4th 606, are disapproved insofar as they are inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
13 
 
The City contends defendants cannot make the threshold showing that their 
votes fell within the scope of section 425.16.  It relies on Carrigan, supra, 564 
U.S. 117, for the proposition that voting by elected officials is not protected under 
the First Amendment.  In Carrigan, the Nevada Commission on Ethics ruled that a 
city councilmember had violated a conflict of interest statute by voting to approve 
a hotel/casino project on which his long-time friend and campaign manager had 
worked as a paid consultant.  (Id. at p. 120.)  The councilmember challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute.  The Nevada Supreme Court sustained the 
challenge, holding that the act of voting by a public officer is speech protected by 
the First Amendment.  (Id. at pp. 120-121; see Carrigan v. Commission on Ethics 
(Nev. 2010) 236 P.3d 616, 621.) 
The high court reversed, noting that conflict of interest rules are a long-
established feature of federal and state law.  (Carrigan, supra, 564 U.S. at pp. 122-
124.)  It reasoned that “restrictions upon legislators’ voting are not restrictions 
upon legislators’ protected speech,” because “a legislator’s vote is the 
commitment of his apportioned share of the legislature’s power to the passage or 
defeat of a particular proposal.  The legislative power thus committed is not 
personal to the legislator but belongs to the people; the legislator has no personal 
right to it.”  (Id. at pp. 125-126.)  “[T]he act of voting [is] . . . nonsymbolic 
conduct engaged in for an independent governmental purpose.”  (Id. at p. 127.) 
The Court of Appeal below found Carrigan controlling.  It concluded that 
defendants’ votes on the Athens contract did not implicate their right to free 
speech or convey any symbolic message.  “To hold otherwise,” said the court, 
“would cause the anti-SLAPP statute to swallow all city council actions and 
require anyone seeking to challenge a legislative decision on any issue to first 
make a prima facie showing of the merits of their claim.” 
14 
 
Carrigan, however, is not dispositive here.  The Legislature did not limit 
the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute to activity protected by the constitutional 
rights of speech and petition.  It went on to include “any act . . . in furtherance of” 
those rights.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1), italics added.)  We must give meaning to this 
statutory term, under settled principles of statutory construction.  (Briggs v. Eden 
Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118.)  The 
Legislature’s directive that the anti-SLAPP statute is to be “construed broadly” so 
as to “encourage continued participation in matters of public significance” 
supports the view that statutory protection of acts “in furtherance” of the 
constitutional rights incorporated by section 425.16 may extend beyond the 
contours of the constitutional rights themselves.  (§ 425.16, subds. (a), (b)(1); see 
Briggs, at pp. 1119-1120.)11 
The Legislature spelled out the kinds of activity it meant to protect in 
section 425.16, subdivision (e):  “As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a 
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California 
Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes:  (1) any written or oral 
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, 
or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral 
                                              
11  
As defendants point out, the Legislature saw fit to include the free speech 
protections of both the state and federal Constitutions in the anti-SLAPP statute, 
and “the California liberty of speech clause is broader and more protective than 
the free speech clause of the First Amendment.”  (San Leandro Teachers Assn. v. 
Governing Bd. of San Leandro Unified School Dist. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 822, 842; 
see § 425.16(b)(1).)  The Court of Appeal gave no consideration to defendants’ 
rights under our state Constitution.  On the other hand, defendants make no 
specific argument supporting broader protection under the liberty of speech clause 
than under the First Amendment for votes cast by elected officials.  We need not 
consider that constitutional issue, given our conclusion on the scope of the 
statutory protection provided by section 425.16. 
15 
 
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or 
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official 
proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in 
a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public 
interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the 
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in 
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” 
Because of these specifications, courts determining whether a cause of 
action arises from protected activity are not required to wrestle with difficult 
questions of constitutional law, including distinctions between federal and state 
protection of free expression.  “The only means specified in section 425.16 by 
which a moving defendant can satisfy the requirement is to demonstrate that the 
defendant’s conduct . . . falls within one of the four categories described in 
subdivision (e), defining subdivision (b)’s phrase, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s 
right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution 
in connection with a public issue.’ ”  (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 66; see 
Vargas v. City of Salinas (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1, 17-18  (Vargas); Jarrow Formulas, 
Inc. v. LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 734; City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 
Cal.4th 69, 78.)  As explained in Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco 
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 992, courts determining whether conduct is protected 
under the anti-SLAPP statute look not to First Amendment law, but to the 
statutory definitions in section 425.16, subdivision (e).  (Schaffer, at p. 1001; 
accord, City of Costa Mesa v. D’Alessio Investments (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 358, 
372; see Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures (2010) 
184 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1548-1549.) 
Requiring the moving party to make a constitutional case in support of 
every anti-SLAPP motion would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s desire to 
16 
 
establish an efficient screening mechanism for “disposing of SLAPP’s quickly and 
at minimal expense to taxpayers and litigants.”  (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 
66.)  The statutory categories provided in section 425.16, subdivision (e) provide 
objective guidelines that lend themselves to adjudication on pretrial motion.  (See 
Equilon, at p. 65.)  Here, the councilmembers’ votes, as well as statements made 
in the course of their deliberations at the city council meeting where the votes 
were taken, qualify as “any written or oral statement or writing made before a 
legislative . . . proceeding.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1).)  Anything they or City 
Administrator Torres said or wrote in negotiating the contract qualifies as “any 
written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a legislative . . . body . . . .”  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) 
No conflict arises between Carrigan’s rule that city council votes are not 
protected by the First Amendment and the definitions of section 425.16, 
subdivision (e), due to the leeway provided by the “in furtherance” term of the 
statute.  The councilmembers’ participation in the meeting that preceded the vote 
was constitutionally protected activity.  “[P]ublic meetings, at which council 
members discuss matters of public interest and legislate, are conduct in 
furtherance of the council members’ constitutional right of free speech in 
connection with public issues and issues of  public interest.  ‘Under the First 
Amendment, legislators are “given the widest latitude to express their views” and 
there are no “stricter ‘free speech’ standards on [them] than on the general public.”  
[Citation.]’  (Levy v. City of Santa Monica (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1261.)”  
(Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1247-1248; see 
Bond v. Floyd (1966) 385 U.S. 116, 136; Carrigan, supra, 564 U.S. at pp.129-132, 
conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.)  The councilmember defendants’ votes were cast in 
17 
 
furtherance of their rights of advocacy and communication with their constituents 
on the subject of the Athens contract.12     
There is an important exception to the protections established by the 
statutory categories set out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).  In Flatley v. Mauro 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley), we held that “section 425.16 cannot be invoked 
by a defendant whose assertedly protected activity is illegal as a matter of law and, 
for that reason, not protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and 
petition.”  (Flatley, at p. 317.)  We emphasized that section 425.16 was expressly 
intended to protect valid speech and petitioning activity.  (Flatley, at p. 317; see 
§ 425.16, subd. (a); Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 
1365.) 
The City contends the illegal conflict of interest that infected the 
councilmember defendants’ votes deprives them of protection under section 
425.16.  This assertion of illegality is premature.  The first step of the anti-SLAPP 
analysis is limited to whether a claim arises from protected activity.  We made it 
clear in Flatley that conduct must be illegal as a matter of law to defeat a 
defendant’s showing of protected activity.  The defendant must concede the point, 
or the evidence conclusively demonstrate it, for a claim of illegality to defeat an 
                                              
12  
We note that Carrigan’s holding has no application to defendant Richard 
Torres.  As the city administrator, he had no vote on the contract. 
 
We also note that, unlike Carrigan, this case presents no issue concerning 
the constitutionality of a statute restricting legislators’ participation in debate.  
(See Carrigan, supra, 564 U.S. at pp. 121-122 [“If Carrigan was constitutionally 
excluded from voting, his exclusion from ‘advocat[ing]’ at the legislative session 
was a reasonable time, place and manner limitation”].)  If the councilmember 
defendants in this case had no conflict of interest, as they claim, there was no 
restriction on their participation in the debate at the council or in their 
consultations with constituents, even though Carrigan establishes that their votes 
were not constitutionally protected. 
18 
 
anti-SLAPP motion at the first step.  (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 316-318, 
320.) 
We do not minimize the seriousness of the City’s conflict of interest 
allegations.  However, at this early stage of the litigation, defendants vigorously 
dispute those allegations, both as a matter of law and a question of fact.  As to the 
law, they rely on Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1980) 26 
Cal.3d 938, 945-947, which held that the Political Reform Act (Gov. Code, § 8100 
et seq.) does not bar city councilmembers from acting on matters involving 
contributors.  We noted that campaign contributions are constitutionally protected, 
and “do not automatically create an appearance of unfairness.”  (Woodland Hills, 
at p. 947.)  The bribery statutes, as well as the Political Reform Act itself, provide 
“[a]dequate protection against corruption and bias.”  (Ibid.)  In Lexin v. Superior 
Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1091-1092, we observed that Government Code 
section 1090 et seq. are in pari materia with the Political Reform Act.  Lexin 
involved a statutory exception to Government Code section 1090’s conflict of 
interest provision.  (Lexin, at p. 1085 et seq.)  We construed the relevant 
Government Code provisions to be consistent with parallel Political Reform Act 
provisions, rendering the laws regulating “government contracts consistent with 
the laws governing government decisions more generally.”  (Lexin, at p. 1092.) 
On the facts, defendants deny any quid pro quo in connection with the 
Athens campaign contributions.  The City concedes that its claim depends on 
inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence of the councilmember 
defendants’ advocacy and votes in favor of the Athens contract, followed by their 
receipt of the campaign contributions.  This state of the case forecloses a 
resolution at the first step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry.  “If . . . a factual dispute 
exists about the legitimacy of the defendant’s conduct, it cannot be resolved within 
the first step but must be raised by the plaintiff in connection with the plaintiff’s 
19 
 
burden to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.”  (Flatley, supra, 39 
Cal.4th at p. 316.) 
Accordingly, the City’s reliance on the alleged illegality of defendants’ 
conduct gains it no traction on the question of whether its cause of action arises 
from protected activity.  The Court of Appeal did not reach the second-step issue 
of whether the City could establish a likelihood of success.  It will have the 
opportunity to do so on remand. 
We address one other matter that troubled the Court of Appeal:  the concern 
that affording anti-SLAPP protection to these defendants would chill the rights of 
those seeking to challenge legislative decisions.  The court’s apprehension was 
based on a misreading of San Ramon Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. Contra Costa 
County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 343 (San Ramon).  
In San Ramon, a fire district challenged a county retirement board’s decision to 
increase contributions payable by the district and its employees.  (Id. at pp. 347-
348.)  The court affirmed the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, holding that the 
board’s “collective action” in requiring additional contributions did not implicate 
its “rights of free speech or petition.”  (Id. at p. 353.) 
The San Ramon court drew a distinction between action taken by a 
government body and the expressive conduct of individual representatives.  “[T]he 
fact that a complaint alleges that a public entity’s action was taken as a result of a 
majority vote of its constituent members does not mean that the litigation 
challenging that action arose from protected activity, where the measure itself is 
not an exercise of free speech or petition.  Acts of governance mandated by law, 
without more, are not exercises of free speech or petition.”  (San Ramon, supra, 
20 
 
125 Cal.App.4th at p. 354.)13  The court noted that “an action against individual 
lawmakers, challenging their vote cast in the exercise of individual legislative 
prerogative,” might arguably “be held to arise from conduct in the furtherance of 
the exercise of speech rights, protected by section 425.16.”  (San Ramon, at p. 
356.)  No individual board members were sued in San Ramon, however, so the 
court did not reach that question. 
Here, the Court of Appeal seized on the San Ramon court’s observation that 
holding acts of governance to be protected activity under section 425.16 “would 
significantly burden the petition rights of those seeking mandamus review for 
most types of governmental action.  Many of the public entity decisions 
reviewable by mandamus or administrative mandamus are arrived at after 
discussion and a vote at a public meeting.  [Citation.]  If mandamus petitions 
challenging decisions reached in this manner were routinely subject to a special 
motion to strike,” the result would be to “chill the resort to legitimate judicial 
oversight over potential abuses of legislative and administrative power . . . .”  (San 
Ramon, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 357-358.) 
These comments pertained only to the San Ramon court’s reservations 
about burdening actions challenging government decisions, not the acts of 
                                              
13  
In Vargas, we made it clear that when a public entity’s act is one taken in 
furtherance of the right of free expression, it is protected by section 425.16.  At 
issue in that case were a city’s publicly funded communications opposing a 
pending ballot measure.  We concluded that this advocacy was protected activity:  
“[T]he statutory remedy afforded by section 425.16 extends to statements and 
writings of governmental entities and public officials on matters of public interest 
and concern that would fall within the scope of the statute if such statements were 
made by a private individual or entity.”  (Vargas, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 17.)  The 
Vargas holding has no application here.  Defendants’ participation in the making 
of a government contract is not expressive activity of the kind that might be 
engaged in by private individuals or entities. 
21 
 
individual officials.  It is not necessary to sue government officers in their personal 
capacities to challenge the propriety of a government action.  Notably, here the 
Athens contract was successfully challenged in a citizen’s suit brought against the 
City.  We have observed that the Legislature was specifically concerned with 
actions against public officials as individuals when it reconsidered the scope of 
section 425.16 in 1997.  (Vargas, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 18-19.) 
“Section 425.16 was first enacted in 1992.  In 1997, in response to several 
Court of Appeal decisions that had narrowly construed the scope of the statute, the 
Legislature amended the measure to clarify its intent that the provisions of the 
statute are to be interpreted broadly.  (Stats. 1997, ch. 271, § 1 [amending § 
425.16, subd. (a)].)  A legislative analysis of this amendment approvingly quoted a 
passage from a then recent law review article that identified as ‘a typical SLAPP 
suit scenario’ a situation in which an abusive lawsuit is brought against both 
public officials and private individuals.  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 1296 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23, 1997, p. 2, 
quoting Sills, SLAPPS: How Can the Legal System Eliminate Their Appeal? 
(1993) 25 Conn. L.Rev. 547 (Sills article).”  (Vargas, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 19, 
fn. 9.)  “ ‘Just as SLAPPs filed against individuals have a ‘chilling’ effect on their 
participation in government decision making, SLAPPs filed against public 
officials, who often serve for little or no compensation, may likely have a similarly 
‘chilling’ effect on their willingness to participate in governmental processes.’ ”  
(Ibid., quoting the Sills article, supra, at p. 550.) 
The San Ramon court’s distinction between public agencies and individual 
officials was reaffirmed in Schwarzburd v. Kensington Police Protection & 
Community Services Dist. Bd. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1345 (Schwarzburd), which 
also centered on votes by public representatives.  There, a local board as well as 
individual board members were named respondents in a writ proceeding 
22 
 
challenging a merit bonus awarded to a city official.  (Id. at p. 1349.)  The court 
followed San Ramon in holding that the action did not arise from protected 
activity insofar as it targeted the board as an entity.  (Id. at p. 1353.)  However, it 
held that the actions of the individual board members were protected by the anti-
SLAPP statute.  The petition claimed they had violated board policy by voting to 
extend a meeting, and discussing and voting on a matter that was not properly 
noticed.  They were sued not “simply because they voted, but based on how they 
voted and expressed themselves.”  (Id. at p. 1355.) 
The Schwarzburd court noted that the claims against the board members 
arose out of “protected First Amendment voting and legislative deliberative 
activities,” without considering Carrigan’s holding precluding First Amendment 
protection for votes.  (Schwarzburd, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353.)  Its 
conclusion, however, is consistent with our reasoning that votes taken after a 
public hearing qualify as acts in furtherance of constitutionally protected activity.  
And Schwarzburd, like this case, demonstrates that elected officials may assert the 
protection of section 425.16 when sued over how they voted without chilling 
citizens’ exercise of their right to challenge government action by suing the public 
entity itself.
23 
 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with the views expressed above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J.  
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY LIU, J. 
 
The City of Montebello (City) sued three of its former councilmembers and 
a former city administrator, claiming they violated Government Code section 1090 
by voting for a waste-hauling contract in exchange for campaign contributions 
from the contractor.  Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) (hereafter section 425.16(b)(1)), 
claiming that their votes were acts in furtherance of their constitutional right to 
free speech.  Settled law makes clear that the vote of a legislator is not protected 
activity under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the free 
speech clause of the California Constitution (art. I, § 2, subd. (a)) provides no 
independent basis for such protection.  Yet the court concludes that the anti-
SLAPP statute protects the councilmembers’ votes anyway. 
Today’s decision expands the anti-SLAPP statute beyond its proper bounds, 
making it harder to combat public corruption in government contracting and other 
abuses of power.  Because the anti-SLAPP statute does not cover the act of voting 
by an elected official, I respectfully dissent from today’s contrary holding. 
Government Code section 1090, subdivision (a) states that “city officers or 
employees shall not be financially interested in any contract made by them in their 
official capacity, or by any body or board of which they are members.”  This 
statute reflects the “truism that a person cannot serve two masters simultaneously.”  
(Thomson v. Call (1985) 38 Cal.3d 633, 637.)  “The duties of public office 
demand the absolute loyalty and undivided, uncompromised allegiance of the 
2 
 
individual that holds the office.”  (People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 
314.)  Section 1090 recognizes that “ ‘an impairment of impartial judgment can 
occur in even the most well-meaning men when their personal economic interests 
are affected by the business they transact on behalf of the Government.’ ”  (Stigall 
v. City of Taft (1962) 58 Cal.2d 565, 570, quoting U.S. v. Mississippi Valley 
Generating Co. (1961) 364 U.S. 520, 549.) 
The defendant councilmembers, facing a lawsuit alleging that their votes on 
the waste-hauling contract violated Government Code section 1090, filed an anti-
SLAPP motion pursuant to section 425.16(b)(1), which states:  “A cause of action 
against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s 
right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the 
California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a 
special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has 
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”  
The question is whether the councilmembers’ votes were acts in furtherance of 
their constitutional right of free speech under section 425.16(b)(1). 
In Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan (2011) 564 U.S. 117 
(Carrigan), the United States Supreme Court held that a legislator’s vote is not an 
exercise of speech protected by the First Amendment.  Instead, “a legislator’s vote 
is the commitment of his apportioned share of the legislature’s power to the 
passage or defeat of a particular proposal.  The legislative power thus committed is 
not personal to the legislator but belongs to the people; the legislator has no 
personal right to it. . . .  [T]he legislator casts his vote ‘as trustee for his 
constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power.’  In this respect, voting by a 
legislator is different from voting by a citizen.  While ‘a voter’s franchise is a 
personal right,’ ‘[t]he procedures for voting in legislative assemblies . . . pertain to 
3 
 
legislators not as individuals but as political representatives executing the 
legislative process.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 125–126.) 
Although the California Constitution’s free speech clause (Cal. Const., art. 
I, § 2, subd. (a)) has sometimes been interpreted more broadly than the First 
Amendment, “defendants make no specific argument supporting broader 
protection under the liberty of speech clause than under the First Amendment for 
votes cast by elected officials.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14, fn. 11.)  Nothing in the 
language or history of California’s free speech clause suggests a concern with 
protecting legislative votes, and I see no reason to depart from Carrigan’s sound 
analysis in construing our state constitutional guarantee.  The act of voting by a 
municipal legislator is not an exercise of the “right of petition or free speech under 
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution.”  (§ 425.16(b)(1).) 
Today’s opinion nonetheless concludes that the councilmembers’ votes are 
protected activity under section 425.16(b)(1) because, in the court’s view, the 
statute’s language covering “any act . . . in furtherance of” the constitutional right 
of petition or free speech broadens the scope of protected activities “beyond the 
contours of the constitutional rights themselves.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  Code 
of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e) (hereafter section 425.16(e)) 
defines the phrase “ ‘act in furtherance of [a constitutional] right of petition or free 
speech’ ” to include “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a 
legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding 
authorized by law” and “(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in 
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, 
or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.”  The court 
says the councilmembers’ votes fall within these definitions.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 16.) 
4 
 
I do not read today’s opinion to mean that a legislator’s act of voting 
qualifies as a “written or oral statement or writing” under sections 425.16(e)(1) 
and 425.16(e)(2) simply because it involves the legislator writing or saying the 
word “yea” or “nay” during a legislative proceeding.  If that were the case, then 
arguably electronic voting (pushing a button “yea” or “nay”) would fall outside the 
scope of this language.  As the catchall category of section 425.16(e) makes clear, 
sections 425.16(e)(1) and 425.16(e)(2) are intended to capture types of “conduct in 
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the 
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of 
public interest.”  (§ 425.16(e)(4).)  The dispositive question here is whether a 
legislator’s act of voting is a type of conduct in furtherance of the constitutional 
right of free speech. 
On this question, the court says:  “Beyond doubt, the councilmembers’ 
participation in the meeting that preceded the vote was constitutionally protected 
activity.  ‘[P]ublic meetings, at which council members discuss matters of public 
interest and legislate, are conduct in furtherance of the council members’ 
constitutional right of free speech in connection with public issues and issues of  
public interest.  “Under the First Amendment, legislators are ‘given the widest 
latitude to express their views’ and there are no ‘stricter “free speech” standards 
on [them] than on the general public.’  [Citation.]”  [Citation.]’  [Citations.]  The 
councilmember defendants’ votes were cast in furtherance of their rights of 
advocacy and communication with their constituents on the subject of the Athens 
contract.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 16–17, fn. omitted.) 
But this last sentence characterizing the councilmembers’ votes runs 
directly counter to the reasoning in Carrigan.  There the high court considered and 
rejected the argument that a legislator’s act of voting has an “ ‘expressive 
character’ ” (Carrigan, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 128) of the sort posited above:  
5 
 
“Carrigan and Justice Alito say that legislators often ‘ “us[e] their votes to express 
deeply held and highly unpopular views, often at great personal or political 
peril.” ’  [Citation.]  How do they express those deeply held views, one wonders?  
Do ballots contain a check-one-of-the-boxes attachment that will be displayed to 
the public, reading something like ‘( ) I have a deeply held view about this; ( ) this 
is probably desirable; ( ) this is the least of the available evils; ( ) my personal 
view is the other way, but my constituents want this; ( ) my personal view is the 
other way, but my big contributors want this; ( ) I don’t have the slightest idea 
what this legislation does, but on my way in to vote the party Whip said vote 
“aye” ’?  There are, to be sure, instances where action conveys a symbolic 
meaning—such as the burning of a flag to convey disagreement with a country’s 
policies, [citation].  But the act of voting symbolizes nothing.  It discloses, to be 
sure, that the legislator wishes (for whatever reason) that the proposition on the 
floor be adopted, just as a physical assault discloses that the attacker dislikes the 
victim.  But neither the one nor the other is an act of communication.  [Citation.] 
“Moreover, the fact that a nonsymbolic act is the product of deeply held 
personal belief—even if the actor would like it to convey his deeply held personal 
belief—does not transform action into First Amendment speech.  Nor does the fact 
that action may have social consequences—such as the unpopularity that cost John 
Quincy Adams his Senate seat resulting from his vote in favor of the Embargo Act 
of 1807, [citation].  However unpopular Adams’ vote may have made him, and 
however deeply Adams felt that his vote was the right thing to do, the act of voting 
was still nonsymbolic conduct engaged in for an independent governmental 
purpose.”  (Carrigan, supra, 564 U.S. at pp. 126–127.) 
Suppose a councilmember in this case had said before casting his vote, “I 
am voting for this waste-hauling contract because I believe it’s the best value for 
the City’s money.”  What Carrigan elucidates is that while this statement has 
6 
 
expressive value and is protected speech, the councilmember’s act of voting itself 
has no additional expressive value over and above the accompanying statement.  
(See Carrigan, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 127 [analogizing to Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (2006) 547 U.S. 47, 66, as an instance 
where “expressive value was ‘not created by the conduct itself but by the speech 
that accompanies it’ ”].)  As noted, “a legislator’s vote is the commitment of his 
apportioned share of the legislature’s power to the passage or defeat of a particular 
proposal”; beyond that, it “symbolizes nothing.”  (Carrigan, at pp. 125–126.)  A 
legislator’s vote therefore cannot be understood as an act “in furtherance of” the 
constitutional right of free speech within the meaning of section 425.16. 
The court’s contrary holding will make it harder to enforce civil laws against 
public corruption.  “[U]nder Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), 
any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to 
mandatory attorney fees.  The fee-shifting provision was apparently intended to 
discourage such strategic lawsuits against public participation by imposing the 
litigation costs on the party seeking to ‘chill the valid exercise of the constitutional 
rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.’  (Id., subd. 
(a).)”  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.)  We have recognized that a 
fee-shifting statute that awards attorney fees to prevailing defendants carries the risk 
of chilling meritorious lawsuits.  (Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 101.)  Today’s extension of anti-SLAPP protections, including 
attorney fees for prevailing defendants, to the act of voting by legislators will 
potentially lead to underenforcement of Government Code section 1090 as well as 
other conflict of interest laws designed to ensure integrity and deter abuse of power in 
government decisionmaking on matters beyond public contracting.  (See Gov. Code, 
§§ 8920, subd. (b)(5), 84308, subd. (c), 87100 et seq.) 
7 
 
For the reasons above, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
on the ground that the defendant councilmembers’ votes were not protected by 
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.  In all other respects, I join the opinion of 
the court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
I CONCUR: 
KRUGER, J. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion City of Montebello v. Vasquez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 226 Cal.App.4th 1084 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S219052 
Date Filed: August 8, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Rolf M. Treu 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Revere & Wallace and Frank Revere for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
AlvaradoSmith, Raul F. Salinas, Mary M. Monroe; Leibold McClendon & Mann, Leibold McClendon and 
John G. McClendon for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Joseph T. Francke and Steven J. André for Californians Aware, First Amendment Coalition, First 
Amendment Project, Penelope Canan, Michael Harris, Libertarian Law Council, Klaus J. Kolb and Center 
for Constitutional Jurisprudence as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
No appearance for Intervener and Respondent. 
 
Janis L. Herbstman for California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities as Amici 
Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Frank Revere 
Revere & Wallace 
355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-1560 
(213) 943-1333 
 
Raul F. Salinas 
AlvaradoSmith 
633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1100 
Los Angeles, CA  90071 
(213) 229-2400