Case Title: State ex rel. Roxbury v. Indus. Comm’n

Citation: 2014-Ohio-84

Docket Number: 2012-0815

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Roxbury v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-84.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-84 
THE STATE EX REL. ROXBURY, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Roxbury v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-84.] 
Workers’ compensation—Temporary-total-disability compensation—Voluntary 
abandonment of the work force—Claimant maintained physical ability to 
perform sedentary work—Court of appeals’ judgment denying a writ of 
mandamus affirmed. 
(No. 2012-0815—Submitted October 8, 2013—Decided January 15, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 11AP-125,  
2012-Ohio-1310. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Delores M. Roxbury, appeals the judgment of the court 
of appeals denying her request for a writ of mandamus that would require the 
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Industrial Commission to award her temporary-total-disability compensation 
based on her allowed psychological condition. 
{¶ 2} Because the commission did not abuse its discretion when it 
concluded that Roxbury’s lack of earnings was not due to her psychological 
condition and that her failure to seek other employment or pursue vocational 
rehabilitation was evidence that she had voluntarily abandoned the workforce, we 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 3} Roxbury was injured while working on September 21, 2004.  Her 
claim was originally allowed for lumbar sprain and related injuries.  She collected 
temporary-total-disability compensation until July 10, 2006, when the 
commission concluded that her physical injuries had reached maximum medical 
improvement (“MMI”).1  She withdrew an appeal of that decision before a 
hearing was held. 
{¶ 4} A year later, Roxbury filed a motion to add a psychological 
condition to her claim.  At the same time, she requested temporary-total-disability 
compensation as a result of the condition.  On her application, Roxbury indicated 
that she had not worked since her injury in 2004 and that she was currently 
receiving Social Security disability benefits.  She submitted the report of 
Raymond Richetta, Ph.D., of Weinstein & Associates, Inc., in support of her 
application. 
{¶ 5} On November 14, 2007, a hearing officer approved the additional 
condition of “dysthymic disorder, late onset,” but denied temporary-total-
disability compensation.  The hearing officer relied on the opinion of Walter 
Belay, Ph.D., who had conducted an independent medical examination of 
Roxbury.  Dr. Belay described Roxbury’s symptoms as mild depression.  He 
                                                 
1  “Maximum medical improvement” is defined as a treatment plateau at which no fundamental 
change is expected within a reasonable medical probability in spite of continuing medical or 
rehabilitative procedures.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(1).   
January Term, 2014 
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agreed with the diagnosis of dysthymic disorder but stated that in his opinion, she 
was not temporarily and totally disabled as a result of that disorder. 
{¶ 6} After the commission denied compensation for temporary total 
disability for the psychological condition, Roxbury filed for permanent-total-
disability compensation based on her allowed physical and psychological 
conditions.  In April 2009, the commission denied her request, finding that none 
of her allowed conditions rendered her totally unable to work, the necessary 
threshold for permanent total disability.  The commission concluded that 
Roxbury’s psychological disorder had not yet reached MMI and that she 
maintained the physical ability to perform sedentary work. 
{¶ 7} On July 16, 2009, Roxbury consulted with Jamie Lichstein, Psy.D., 
who, like Dr. Richetta, was affiliated with Weinstein & Associates.  Dr. Lichstein 
evaluated Roxbury for temporary-total-disability compensation for her 
psychological condition. 
{¶ 8} Roxbury 
filed 
a 
request 
for 
temporary-total-disability 
compensation supported by Dr. Lichstein’s opinion.  A staff hearing officer 
awarded temporary-total-disability compensation.  The full commission granted 
reconsideration and, upon further review, denied her request for compensation.  
The commission concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Roxbury was 
disabled as a result of the allowed psychological condition.  The commission 
rejected Dr. Lichstein’s opinion because the doctor had not reviewed all the 
relevant prior medical evidence before retrospectively certifying that Roxbury had 
been temporarily and totally disabled as a result of her psychological condition 
since November 2007.  The commission determined that Roxbury had voluntarily 
abandoned the entire workforce and thus the claimed period of disability was not 
caused by the allowed conditions. 
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{¶ 9} Roxbury filed a complaint seeking a writ in mandamus.  The court 
of appeals concluded that the commission did not abuse its discretion when it 
failed to award temporary-total-disability compensation and denied the writ. 
{¶ 10} Roxbury filed an appeal of right. 
{¶ 11} To be entitled to temporary-total-disability compensation, a 
claimant must establish a causal relationship between the industrial injury and any 
loss of earnings.  State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc., 97 Ohio St.3d 
25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 35.  But a claimant who is no longer part 
of the workforce for reasons not related to the allowed conditions of the industrial 
claim is not eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation.  State ex rel. 
Pierron v. Indus. Comm., 120 Ohio St.3d 40, 2008-Ohio-5245, 896 N.E.2d 140, 
¶ 9.  This is a question of fact for the commission to determine.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 12} Roxbury maintains that she did not voluntarily abandon the 
workforce but that she has been physically unable to return to work since 2004, 
due to her industrial injury, and thus she is entitled to an award of temporary-
total-disability compensation. 
{¶ 13} But the evidence before the commission demonstrated that 
Roxbury was physically capable of performing sedentary work and that her 
psychological condition was not disabling.  In a 2006 order, the commission 
determined that Roxbury’s physical injuries had reached MMI.  Roxbury did not 
pursue an appeal of that finding.  And in 2009, the commission denied 
compensation for permanent total disability, finding that Roxbury remained 
physically capable of sedentary work and that the allowed psychological 
condition of her industrial claim was not disabling.  There was no evidence that 
Roxbury sought other work or attempted vocational rehabilitation.  Consequently, 
the commission did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Roxbury was 
no longer a part of the labor market and that her lack of earnings was not the 
result of her psychological condition. 
January Term, 2014 
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{¶ 14} Roxbury also challenges the commission’s rejection of Dr. 
Lichstein’s retroactive opinion of disability.  Because she did not object to this 
conclusion of law in the court below, 2012-Ohio-1310, ¶ 3, this argument is 
waived.  State ex rel. Wilson v. Indus. Comm., 100 Ohio St.3d 23, 2003-Ohio-
4832, 795 N.E.2d 662, ¶ 4.  However, even if waiver does not apply, we find that 
this argument lacks merit. 
{¶ 15} Before a doctor issues a report that is not based on an examination 
performed contemporaneously with the claimed period of disability, the doctor 
must review all the relevant medical evidence generated prior to the examination.  
State ex rel. Bowie v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 
458, 460, 663 N.E.2d 926 (1996).  If the doctor failed to do so, the doctor’s 
opinion is not evidence upon which the commission may rely.  Id. at 461. 
{¶ 16} Here, Dr. Lichstein examined Roxbury in July 2009 but 
retroactively certified her disability to 2007.  Dr. Lichstein indicated in her report 
that she had reviewed Roxbury’s treatment by others within her practice group, 
but she failed to mention reviewing reports of other examining physicians.  Thus, 
it was within the commission’s discretion to conclude that Dr. Lichstein’s opinion 
was not sufficient evidence to support Roxbury’s request for temporary-total-
disability compensation. 
{¶ 17} Roxbury has failed to demonstrate that the commission abused its 
discretion when it denied her request for temporary-total-disability compensation, 
and the court of appeals properly denied mandamus relief.  Therefore, we affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
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Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg Co., L.P.A., Jennifer L. Lawther, Jerald A. 
Schneiberg, and Stacy M. Callen, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Kevin J. Reis, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Andrews & Wyatt, L.L.C., Thomas R. Wyatt, and Jerry P. Cline for 
appellee Catholic Healthcare Partners, Inc. 
________________________