Case Title: People v. McNeal

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84460

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 84460-Agenda 3-November 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								ALDWIN McNEAL, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 13, 2000.
	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	The defendant, Aldwin McNeal, brought this action for post-conviction relief in the circuit court of Lake County. The circuit
judge dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Because the defendant received the death penalty for the
underlying first degree murder convictions, the defendant's appeal
lies directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). We now affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
	The offenses involved in this case arose from the deaths of
two persons at a restaurant in Waukegan on April 7, 1994.
According to the evidence presented at trial, the defendant and an
accomplice, James Woods, entered Maude's Pizza around 11:30
in the evening. Two persons who were present in the restaurant,
Cory Gerlach and Perry Austin, were shot and killed. The
defendant was subsequently convicted, in a jury trial in the circuit
court Lake County, of three counts of first degree murder and one
count of armed robbery with respect to each victim. The same jury
later determined that there were no mitigating circumstances
sufficient to preclude a sentence of death, and the defendant was
therefore sentenced to death for the first degree murder
convictions. The judge concluded that the two armed robbery
convictions merged and sentenced the defendant to 30 years'
imprisonment on one of the convictions. On appeal, this court
affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences. People v.
McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335 (1997). The United States Supreme Court
later denied the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari.
McNeal v. Illinois, 522 U.S. 917, 139 L. Ed. 2d 235, 118 S. Ct. 304 (1997).
	While the defendant's direct appeal was pending before this
court, the defendant began the present action in the circuit court of
Lake County, filing a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.
Counsel was later appointed to represent the defendant in the
matter. Shortly after this court issued its opinion on direct appeal,
appointed counsel filed an amended post-conviction petition.
Counsel later filed second and third amended petitions, with each
new petition incorporating its predecessors and raising additional
grounds for relief. The circuit judge initially dismissed all but one
of the defendant's post-conviction claims without an evidentiary
hearing; the judge allowed the defendant limited discovery with
respect to the reserved issue, which concerned a potential conflict
of interest involving one of the defendant's trial lawyers. After
discovery, the defendant did not submit any further evidence on
the matter, however, and the post-conviction judge then dismissed
that additional claim as well. The present appeal followed. 134 Ill.
2d R. 651(a).
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through
122-7 (West 1996)) provides a method by which a defendant may
challenge his conviction or sentence for violations of federal or
state constitutional rights. People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 377
(1997). An action for post-conviction relief is a collateral
proceeding, not an appeal from the earlier judgment. People v.
Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). To be entitled to post-conviction relief, a defendant must demonstrate a substantial
deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in the
proceedings that produced the conviction or sentence being
challenged. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999).
Considerations of res judicata and waiver limit the scope of post-conviction relief "to constitutional matters which have not been,
and could not have been, previously adjudicated." People v.
Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992). Thus, issues that were raised
on appeal from the underlying judgment of conviction, or that
could have been raised but were not, generally will not be
considered in a post-conviction proceeding. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999).
	The principal issue in this appeal involves the representation
of the defendant at the post-conviction proceedings below. In
addition, the defendant argues that the suppression of a
codefendant's confession in a separate prosecution now requires
the suppression in this case of evidence obtained as a result of the
codefendant's statement. Finally, the defendant raises a number of
issues in pro se materials he has filed with this court. We will
address these contentions in turn.
	The defendant first argues that the cause must be remanded
for further proceedings because post-conviction counsel did not
provide him with a reasonable level of assistance in the circuit
court. Specifically, the defendant complains that post-conviction
counsel filed only an incomplete report from an investigator about
additional mitigating evidence in this case and failed to request
additional time so that the report could be completed. The
defendant believes that post-conviction counsel should have
submitted a complete report and should have requested additional
time, if necessary, for that purpose.
	The report that is at the center of this issue was prepared by
Amy Watson, a forensic social worker for the capital litigation
division of the appellate defender's office. In the report, prepared
August 15, 1997, she set out her preliminary findings, which she
had acquired from a review of certain records in this case and from
interviews with several persons, including the defendant, his
mother, and one of his aunts. Watson stated that a number of other
witnesses should also be interviewed, and that a number of
different areas of inquiry should be explored, including the
defendant's neurological impairments, prenatal problems, and
head injuries. The report also stated that Watson believed she
needed more time to complete the tasks. In an affidavit, Watson
stated that the information regarding the mitigating evidence
presented at the defendant's sentencing hearing was not made
available to her until August 5, 1997, when she received only
summaries of the mitigation testimony. At a hearing on August 19,
1997, post-conviction counsel's law partner appeared on counsel's
behalf, explaining that counsel could not be present that day. In
discussing the social worker's report, the lawyer did not request
additional time so that the research mentioned in the report could
be completed. The defendant now argues that he did not receive
the minimum level of assistance guaranteed to post-conviction
petitioners, for counsel failed to file a complete report and failed
also to request additional time so that the report could be finished.
	There is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539, 546, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987); People v. Moore, 189 Ill. 2d 521, 541 (2000). An indigent defendant who has been
sentenced to death is entitled, under section 122-2.1(a)(1) of the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, to representation in proceedings
under the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (West 1996). Because
the source of the right to counsel in a post-conviction matter is
statutory rather than constitutional, the degree of skill and care that
a lawyer must exercise in representing a post-conviction petitioner
is not controlled by the sixth amendment standard announced by
the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Rather, a post-conviction
petitioner is entitled only to the level of assistance guaranteed by
the Act. This court has determined that to be a "reasonable" level
of assistance. People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 410 (1999);
People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 412 (1995); People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 276 (1992); People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364
(1990).
	Toward that end, Supreme Court Rule 651(c) sets out certain
requirements that counsel must fulfill in representing post-conviction petitioners. Rule 651(c) provides:
			"Upon the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a post-conviction proceeding, if the trial court determines that
the petitioner is indigent, it shall order that a transcript of
the record of the post-conviction proceedings, including
a transcript of the evidence, if any, be prepared and filed
with the clerk of the court to which the appeal is taken
and shall appoint counsel on appeal, both without cost to
the petitioner. The record filed in that court shall contain
a showing, which may be made by the certificate of
petitioner's attorney, that the attorney has consulted with
petitioner either by mail or in person to ascertain his
contentions of deprivation of constitutional right, has
examined the record of the proceedings at the trial, and
has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se
that are necessary for an adequate presentation of
petitioner's contentions." 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c).
	In the case at bar, post-conviction counsel filed a certificate of
compliance under Rule 651(c) when he submitted the defendant's
first amended post-conviction petition. The certificate recited that
counsel had consulted with the defendant "to ascertain his
contentions of deprivation of constitutional right," that counsel
had "examined the record of the proceedings at the trial," and that
counsel had "made any necessary amendments to the petition filed
pro se."
	We believe that the defendant received the reasonable level of
assistance of counsel required by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
notwithstanding counsel's submission of a report that the preparer
said was incomplete. First, the certificate of compliance submitted
by post-conviction counsel demonstrated that counsel satisfied the
requirements of Rule 651(c). According to the certificate, post-conviction counsel reviewed the defendant's pro se petition,
discussed the case with the defendant, and shaped the defendant's
contentions into coherent arguments. We note that counsel also
added arguments that the defendant did not make in his pro se
petition; the defendant's first amended petition, second amended
petition, and third amended petition all contained arguments that
were not raised in the defendant's original, pro se, petition.
Moreover, the defendant's pro se petition did not raise any issue
concerning the mitigating evidence introduced at the capital
sentencing hearing, and appointed counsel did not raise this
contention until he filed the third amended petition, in August
1997. Counsel's delay in presenting the issue may simply indicate
its relative lack of merit.
	In addition, we note that much of the evidence referred to in
the investigator's report had already been introduced at the
defendant's sentencing hearing. The judge who decided the
defendant's post-conviction case had also presided at the
defendant's trial and sentencing hearing, and therefore was well
aware of what evidence the defendant had introduced in mitigation
at the sentencing hearing. In rejecting this ground for relief, the
post-conviction judge stated, in his initial order dismissing all but
one claim of the third-amended petition:
		"Defendant does not, however, point to any allegedly
mitigating evidence presented in the report that would
have changed the outcome of his sentencing hearing.
Absent such a showing, collateral relief should be denied.
People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 370 (1997). Indeed,
virtually everything included in the report was presented
by mitigation witnesses at the sentencing hearing. Given
the mitigation introduced at sentencing and the substantial
amount of evidence in aggravation, there is not a
reasonable probability that the additional evidence now
suggested by the defendant would have produced a
different sentence. See People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472,
490-91 (1996); and People v. Lear, 175 Ill. 2d 262, 277-78 (1997)."
	We have reviewed the evidence presented at the sentencing
hearing, as well as the investigator's report submitted with the
third amended post-conviction petition, and we agree with the
post-conviction court's assessment. At sentencing, the defendant
presented testimony from a number of witnesses, who chronicled
his life's history and who described his psychological functioning.
Dr. Lawrence Heinrich, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified
as a defense witness. Dr. Heinrich had interviewed the defendant
and had reviewed various records about the defendant, including
those compiled while the defendant was serving an earlier prison
sentence in Wisconsin for armed robbery. At the defendant's
sentencing hearing, Dr. Heinrich testified that the defendant was
under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance
at the time of the present offenses. Dr. Heinrich believed that the
defendant had paranoid schizophrenia and both borderline
personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder. Dr.
Heinrich described the defendant as being suspicious, impulsive,
and aggressive. Dr. Heinrich also stated that, according to prior
testing, the defendant was of average intelligence.
	At the defendant's capital sentencing hearing, the defense also
introduced evidence about the defendant's difficult childhood and
his personal development. The defendant's mother, Cynthia
Taylor, and one of his brothers, Tyron McNeal, described in detail
the defendant's upbringing. The defendant was born in
Milwaukee. The defendant's father, Hertie Jones, was described
by Tyron as a pimp, drug dealer, addict, and thief. Family life was
chaotic. The family moved to Chicago when the defendant was
about seven years old, and his father went to prison at that time.
The defendant's mother later remarried. The family eventually
moved to Lake County. According to the defendant's mother and
brother, when the defendant was only three or four, he was raped
by an uncle who was baby-sitting the family.
	The defendant's grandmother, Estella Bender, also testified in
the defendant's behalf at the sentencing hearing. She stated that
the defendant and his siblings would visit her at her home in
Youngstown, Ohio, every summer when the defendant was young.
There, the children would attend church regularly, take part in
Bible study, and participate in sports and games. Bender also said
that on one occasion the defendant told her that he had been raped
as a child, when he was three or four. A fellow inmate of the Lake
County jail also provided favorable testimony at the defendant's
sentencing hearing, stating that the defendant had encouraged him
to earn a GED while incarcerated, which the defendant had done.
	The report submitted by the investigator mentioned a number
of areas of inquiry that the investigator believed might yield useful
information about the defendant. As the post-conviction judge
found, however, many of these subjects had already been
presented at the sentencing hearing. In this regard, the investigator
cites a number of studies that purport to show that certain events
like those experienced by the defendant may result in problems
later in life. Yet trial counsel introduced evidence at sentencing of
the sexual abuse experienced by the defendant, as well as his
exposure to drugs, crime, and violence. In addition, Dr. Heinrich
testified regarding the defendant's psychological functioning,
covering much of the same territory the defendant now argues
should be reexamined. On this record, we cannot say that
appointed counsel in the proceedings below, by submitting a
report that its preparer said was unfinished and by failing to
request additional time so that it could be completed, provided a
less than reasonable level of representation to the defendant, as
required by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
	The defendant next argues that evidence used against him at
his trial must be suppressed because it was obtained as a
consequence of a confession given by James Woods, a
codefendant in this case. In People v. Woods, 184 Ill. 2d 130
(1998), this court held that Woods' confession must be suppressed
and that Woods must be retried. The defendant now contends that
the suppression of the codefendant's confession requires the
suppression of evidence in his own case.
	The defendant cannot raise this question for the first time on
review. Section 122-3 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
provides, "Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights
not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived." 725
ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1996). Accordingly, the issue has been
waived. People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 233 (1993). We need
not consider here whether this court's determination in Woods
would support the filing of a successive petition by the defendant.
Cf. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205 (1997) (defendant allowed
to pursue second post-conviction petition to raise sentence-disparity issue after codefendant was sentenced). It is well
established, however, that the defendant may not add an issue to
the case while the matter is on review.
	The defendant was allowed to file a brief pro se, raising
several issues that appointed counsel has not argued. The State
objects to our consideration of these questions, correctly observing
that a defendant is not entitled both to be represented by counsel
and to proceed as a pro se litigant. See People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 435 (1995). In keeping with our past practice in capital
cases, however, we will briefly address the questions raised by the
defendant in his pro se brief. See People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 516-17 (2000); McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d  at 435; People v. Gacy,
125 Ill. 2d 117, 133-34 (1988).
	The defendant first contends that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge the search of the defendant's townhouse,
from which the police took a bullet and a stereo receiver that
belonged to one of the victims. The defendant's wife, Regina
McNeal, had consented to the search. The defendant argues,
however, that Regina's consent was coerced, because the police
threatened to take her children from her, and that the ensuing
search was therefore invalid.
	The post-conviction court rejected this argument. The judge
noted that the defendant failed to support the contention with an
affidavit from Regina McNeal; the judge found that an affidavit to
this effect from Cynthia Taylor, the defendant's mother, contained
inadmissible hearsay. On appeal, the defendant has attempted to
supplement the record with an additional affidavit, that of Evelyn
Castro, but it too suffers from the same defect. The post-conviction judge also noted that defense counsel was aware of the
contention yet chose not to pursue it. At trial, Regina McNeal was
questioned briefly by defense counsel regarding her consent to the
search, and McNeal alleged then that law enforcement authorities
threatened to remove her children from her custody if she did not
consent to the search.
	Because trial counsel was aware of Regina McNeal's
assertions, the post-conviction judge ascribed counsel's inaction
to trial strategy. The post-conviction judge also found that,
because the facts supporting the argument existed at the time of
trial, the defendant's failure to raise the issue on direct appeal
resulted in its waiver for purposes of post-conviction relief. We
agree with the post-conviction court's resolution of this issue.
	The defendant, in his pro se brief, also argues that Regina
McNeal's trial testimony was coerced or fabricated and that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to contest it. The defendant did
not include this particular claim in any of his post-conviction
petitions, however, and therefore we must conclude that it has
been waived. As noted earlier, section 122-3 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides that post-conviction claims not
raised "in the original or an amended petition" are waived. 725
ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1996). The defendant's failure to present this
issue to the circuit court precludes our consideration of it here. See
People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 233 (1993).
	The defendant next alleges that law enforcement authorities
engaged in misconduct toward two potential witnesses, Delores
Smith and Gloria Lomack. According to the defendant's amended
post-conviction petition, cited by the pro se brief, Smith was
threatened by authorities if she testified in the defendant's behalf,
and Lomack was threatened if she failed to testify in behalf of the
prosecution. Neither woman testified at trial or sentencing.
	Delores Smith, in an affidavit submitted with the amended
post-conviction petition, states that she knew of exculpatory
evidence about the case and that the police threatened her if she
testified on the defendant's behalf. The post-conviction judge
rejected this claim, noting that the defendant's trial lawyers were
aware of Smith's proposed testimony yet chose not to present her
as a witness. The record further showed that the defendant had
concurred with counsel's decision.
	Gloria Lomack, in an affidavit attached to the defendant's
post-conviction petition, stated that law enforcement authorities
threatened her if she refused to testify against the defendant.
Lomack did not testify at either trial or sentencing, however, and
therefore the defendant's post-conviction claim is moot with
respect to her, even if one assumes her affidavit to be true.
	The defendant also contends in his pro se brief that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to have forensic tests performed
on blood found under the victims' fingernails and on Caucasian
hairs found in the hand of one of the victims. The defendant
believes that such testing might have disclosed the existence of
other offenders.
	The post-conviction judge rejected these contentions in the
initial order of dismissal, which disposed of all but one of the
defendant's post-conviction claims, and we agree with the judge's
assessment. In the order, the judge explained that counsel could
not be considered deficient for failing to seek testing of blood
found under the victims' fingernails when the victims were lying
in pools of their own blood and had blood on their hands and
arms. With respect to the Caucasian head hair found in the hand
of victim Cory Gerlach, the judge referred to the forensic evidence
that showed that Gerlach apparently had his hand against the back
of his head when he was shot, because the same bullet went
through Gerlach's hand and then into his head. The judge also
noted that any contention that a Caucasian committed the offenses
would have conflicted with the defense theory at trial, which
asserted that codefendant Woods committed the offenses while the
defendant waited outside.
	The defendant's pro se brief raises several additional
allegations regarding trial counsel's failure to introduce evidence
at trial and to investigate possible sources of exculpatory evidence.
The defendant mentions that fingerprints and a footprint were
found at the scene of the crime but were never linked to the
defendant. He now contends that this evidence was exculpatory
and should have been presented to the jury. The defendant also
says that a person whom he identifies as "Mr. Soto" saw two white
males leave Maude's Pizza, threaten Soto with a gun, and drive
off. According to the defendant, Mr. Soto wrote down the license
plate number of the vehicle and gave it to the police. The
defendant states in his pro se brief that trial counsel was aware of
this information, and he contends that counsel was ineffective for
failing to interview Mr. Soto and present his testimony to the jury.
	At no time in the post-conviction proceedings below did the
defendant raise any argument concerning the footprint, the
fingerprints, or Mr. Soto. As we have noted, a post-conviction
petitioner may not add issues to the case while it is on appeal. The
defendant also states that he instructed post-conviction counsel to
include these issues in the post-conviction petitions filed below,
but that counsel refused to do so. We would note that the offenses
occurred in a restaurant, and that the presence of a footprint or
fingerprints of other persons unrelated to the crimes would
therefore be unremarkable. Furthermore, the defendant's
allegations regarding the previously unknown witness, Mr. Soto,
simply defy belief.
	In a further argument in the pro se brief, the defendant argues
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the
testimony of eight witnesses who were friends or relatives of the
defendant and who could have provided exculpatory testimony.
We have already discussed two of the persons identified by the
defendant in his amended post-conviction petition-Delores Smith
and Gloria Lomack-and we need not consider them further. Four
other persons named as possible witnesses by the defendant both
in his amended post-conviction petition and in his pro se brief are
Tony Gilmore, Andrea Green, Carnell Taylor Jr., and David Pitts.
The post-conviction judge rejected this argument with respect to
those four persons because the defendant failed to present any
affidavits showing what their testimony would have been.
	The defendant has attempted to remedy that omission by
attaching to his pro se brief the affidavits of Andrea Green and
Carnell Taylor, Jr. In addition, the brief contains affidavits from
two more persons, Errol Flynn and Lorenzo McNeal, whom the
defendant, in his pro se brief, now contends should also have been
called to testify. According to the affidavits attached to the pro se
brief, these additional witnesses would have provided testimony
supporting the notion that James Woods acted alone in committing
the offenses involved here. The post-conviction court correctly
rejected this challenge to counsel's conduct, noting the defendant's
failure to submit any affidavits in support of this contention. We
agree with the State that the defendant may not now attempt to
supply the omitted information while the case is on appeal. People
v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 401 (1995). Nor may the defendant
further expand the list of overlooked witnesses by offering up
additional names in his pro se brief.
	The defendant also briefly argues that trial counsel was
ineffective in waiving his right to a jury for trial. The defendant's
case was presented to a jury, however, at both the guilt and
sentencing phases of the proceedings. Contrary to the defendant's
complaints, trial counsel introduced evidence, cross-examined
prosecution witnesses, and presented a coherent defense.
	In a final pro se argument, contained in what the defendant
termed a "Motion to File an Additional Claim of Constitutional
Deprivation," which this court allowed, the defendant contends
that there is a conflict between a rule of this court and a statute
regarding the number of peremptory challenges a capital defendant
may assert during jury selection. Supreme Court Rule 434 (134 Ill.
2d R. 434) limits a capital defendant being tried alone to 14
peremptory challenges for jury selection, with one additional
challenge for each alternate juror chosen. Section 115-4 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, in contrast, allows a capital
defendant being tried alone 20 peremptory challenges for jury
selection, and further permits the selection of two alternate jurors,
allowing one additional challenge for each alternate. 725 ILCS
5/115-4(e), (g) (West 1996). The defendant, in his own
proceedings, was tried alone and received 14 peremptory
challenges for jury selection and an additional three peremptory
challenges for the three alternate jurors chosen in this case, in
accordance with Rule 434; unexercised challenges from the
original allotment of 14 could also be used during the selection of
the alternate jurors. The defendant now argues that the rule
improperly limits the legislature's determination of the number of
peremptory challenges a capital defendant may have.
	The defendant failed to raise this issue in any of his post-conviction petitions, however, and therefore we must consider the
question waived. As noted earlier, section 122-3 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act requires that post-conviction claims be
included in "the original or an amended petition." 725 ILCS
5/122-3 (West 1996). A post-conviction petitioner may not wait
until appeal to formulate the matters that he wishes to assert as
grounds for post-conviction relief. In any event, we note that the
defendant used only 11 of his 14 peremptory challenges during the
selection of a jury, and three more during the selection of the
alternate jurors. Thus, the defendant did not run short of
peremptory challenges, even with the more limited number of
challenges authorized by Rule 434.
*   *   *
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Lake County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to enter
an order setting Wednesday, January 10, 2001, as the date on
which the sentence of death, entered in the circuit court of Lake
County, is to be carried out. The defendant shall be executed in the
manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998). The
clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this
case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms
Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where the
defendant is now confined.
Judgment affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that McNeal's murder convictions should not be
disturbed. In my view, however, his sentence of death cannot be
allowed to stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial
concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179
(1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). McNeal's sentence of
death should therefore be vacated and he should be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1994). Because
McNeal was found guilty of murdering more than one victim, the
term of his imprisonment must be natural life. 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1994).