Case Title: State ex rel. Thomas v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2024-Ohio-379

Docket Number: 2024-0072

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Thomas v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-379.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-379 
THE STATE EX REL. THOMAS ET AL. v. WOOD COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Thomas v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip 
Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-379.] 
Elections—Prohibition and mandamus—Writs sought to compel board of elections 
to remove zoning-amendment referendum from primary-election ballot—
Relators failed to demonstrate that board of elections abused its discretion 
or disregarded applicable law in certifying referendum for placement on 
ballot—Writs denied. 
(No. 2024-0072—Submitted January 31, 2024—Decided February 2, 2024.) 
IN PROHIBITION and MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this expedited election matter, relators, Theodore Thomas and T 
Thomas Properties, L.L.C. (“TT Properties”), seek writs of prohibition and 
mandamus to order respondent, the Wood County Board of Elections (“the board”), 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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to remove a zoning-amendment referendum from the March 19, 2024 primary-
election ballot.  Relators have also filed a motion for leave to amend the caption of 
their complaint to comply with R.C. 2731.04’s requirement that a mandamus claim 
be brought “in the name of the state on the relation of the person applying.” 
{¶ 2} We grant relators’ motion for leave to amend the caption of their 
complaint.  But because the board did not abuse its discretion or disregard 
applicable law in certifying the referendum for placement on the ballot, we deny 
relators’ request for writs of mandamus and prohibition. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} In 2023, Thomas purchased a parcel of real property located at 0 
Bailey Road (the “Bailey Road property”) in Lake Township, Wood County; that 
property is zoned “R-2 Residential.”  The Bailey Road property is currently an 
abandoned junkyard surrounded by a barbed-wire fence.  When the township 
adopted its zoning resolution in 1963, the Bailey Road property was zoned for 
residential use even though a junkyard was already being operated on the property.  
Since 1963, the Bailey Road property has never been used for residential purposes.  
TT Properties, of which Thomas is the manager and sole member, is the current 
owner of the Bailey Road property. 
{¶ 4} TT Properties also owns a parcel located at 5826 Woodville Road in 
Lake Township, which is adjacent to and behind the Bailey Road property.  A car 
wash is operated on the Woodville Road property, which is zoned “B-2 General 
Commercial.”  Thomas would like to combine the Bailey Road and Woodville 
Road properties into one parcel with ingress and egress to the combined parcel 
solely through the Woodville Road property.  According to the Lake Township 
zoning map, no parcel fronting Bailey Road is currently zoned B-2 General 
Commercial. 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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{¶ 5} In July 2023, Thomas filed an application to change the zoning of the 
Bailey Road property from R-2 Residential to B-2 General Commercial so that he 
could construct self-storage facilities on the property.  The application states: 
 
TO THE TRUSTEES OF LAKE TOWNSHIP  
Application is submitted herewith requesting that the Zoning 
Resolution of Lake Township be * * * AMENDED to: 
 
Request zoning change from R-2 Residence to B-2 General 
Commercial. 
Address – 0 – Bailey Rd.  H28-712-110202027000  
Theodore Thomas (owner) request[s] the change to construct 
self-storage facilities. 
The legal description of the property is: 
Parcel # H28-712-110202027000 
* * * 
The request for zoning change is being submitted because: 
(state reason or proposed use) 
 
From R-2 – B-2 for new construction of self-storage facilities. 
 
{¶ 6} The Lake Township Zoning Commission voted unanimously that the 
requested zoning amendment should be approved and forwarded its 
recommendation to the Lake Township Board of Trustees.  On September 19, the 
township trustees adopted the amendment, to become effective 30 days later.  As a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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condition of rezoning, the trustees required that the Bailey Road property be 
combined with the adjacent Woodville Road car-wash property.1   
{¶ 7} On the date of the zoning amendment’s adoption, R.C. 519.12(H), 
which governs the adoption of proposed zoning amendments by township boards 
of trustees and referendums on adopted zoning amendments, provided: 
 
The proposed amendment, if adopted by the board, shall 
become effective in thirty days after the date of its adoption, unless, 
within thirty days after the adoption, there is presented to the board 
of township trustees a petition, signed by a number of registered 
electors residing in the unincorporated area of the township or part 
of that unincorporated area included in the zoning plan equal to not 
less than eight per cent of the total vote cast for all candidates for 
governor in that area at the most recent general election at which a 
governor was elected, requesting the board of township trustees to 
submit the amendment to the electors of that area for approval or 
rejection * * *. Each part of this petition shall contain the number 
and the full and correct title, if any, of the zoning amendment 
resolution, motion, or application, furnishing the name by which the 
amendment is known and a brief summary of its contents. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Former R.C. 519.12(H), 2018 Sub.H.B. No. 500 (effective Mar. 
22, 2019) (“H.B. 500”). 
 
1. According to Thomas, the township trustees also required that access to the Bailey Road property 
be only via the Woodville Road car-wash property.  However, neither Thomas’s application nor the 
minutes from the township trustees’ meeting at which the amendment was adopted state this 
condition.   
 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
5 
{¶ 8} In the 30 days following the trustees’ adoption of the zoning 
amendment, circulators obtained signatures on a referendum petition to submit the 
amendment to voters at the March 19, 2024 primary election.  On October 3, 
2023—after the trustees adopted the proposed zoning amendment but before the 
referendum petition was submitted—a new version of R.C. 519.12(H) took effect.  
Amended R.C. 519.12(H) increased the number of signatures that must be 
submitted by petition before a referendum on a zoning amendment will be placed 
on a ballot.  Under the amended statute, the number of signatures must be equal to 
at least 15 percent of the total votes cast for all candidates for governor in that area 
at the most recent gubernatorial election.  2023 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 33 (“H.B. 33”).  
The amendment also changed the language of the petition-for-zoning-referendum 
form to include the 15 percent requirement, but it made no other changes to the 
statute.  Id. 
{¶ 9} On October 18, Jean Garrison, a resident of Lake Township, 
submitted the petition to the township trustees.  The petition consisted of 31 part-
petitions containing 470 signatures.  The petition summarized the proposed zoning 
amendment as follows: 
 
Rezone from R-2 (Residential District) to B-2 (General 
Business District) Parcel Number H28-712-1100202027000, 
commonly referred to as “0 Bailey Road, Northwood, OH 43619” 
and legally described as: 
Lot number thirty-three (33) in Ketcham’s Cresceus Farms, 
an Addition in Lake Township, Wood County, Ohio, excepting 
therefrom the following described parcel: That part of Lot number 
thirty-three (33) described as follows: commencing at a point where 
the north line of said Lot number thirty-three (33) intersects the east 
side of Bailey Road; thence one hundred four and nine tenths (104.9) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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feet east along said north line of Lot thirty-three (33) to the point 
where said north line turns northeast; thence southwest along a 
continuation of the boundary line between Lots thirty-three (33), 
thirty-five (35), and thirty-six (36) to Bailey Road; thence in a 
northerly direction to the point of beginning, being a triangle out of 
the northwest corner of said Lot thirty-three (33) containing one-
eight [sic] (1/8) of an acre, more or less. 
Reference: Lake Township Zoning Commission Application 
# 2023-144. 
 
{¶ 10} The township trustees determined that the petition was facially valid 
and certified it to the board in accordance with R.C. 519.12(H).  The board 
determined that the petition contained 382 valid signatures, which was more than 8 
percent but less than 15 percent of the number of voters in the unincorporated 
territory of Lake Township who voted in the 2022 gubernatorial election. 
{¶ 11} At its regular meeting on December 21, the board considered the 
certification of candidates and issues that would appear on the March 19 ballot, 
including certification of the referendum on the proposed zoning amendment. The 
board voted unanimously to certify the referendum for placement on the ballot. 
{¶ 12} On December 29, Thomas filed a protest with the board.  Thomas 
protested the validity and sufficiency of the referendum petition on six grounds: 
1. The petition does not satisfy the 15 percent signature requirement of R.C. 
519.12(H). 
2. The petition violates R.C. 519.12(H) because it does not set forth a brief 
summary of the zoning amendment’s contents. 
3. Signatures on the referendum petition were coerced, in violation of R.C. 731.40. 
4. The petition does not contain the statutorily mandated election-falsification 
statement. 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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5. Any refusal to approve the zoning amendment would result in an 
unconstitutional taking of the Bailey Road property without just compensation. 
6. The board failed to provide notice of its December 21 meeting at which it 
certified the referendum for placement on the ballot. 
{¶ 13} In addition to Thomas’s protest, the township trustees passed a 
resolution “to protest the [board’s] acceptance of the referendum petition as it 
relates to [the Bailey Road property].”  In their protest, the trustees asserted three 
of the same grounds that Thomas raised (the signature requirement, notice of the 
board’s meeting, and unconstitutional taking of property).  The trustees also 
protested on the grounds that (1) the referendum “stands to disrupt the operation 
and legal development of private property” in the township and (2) the zoning 
change approved by the township trustees does not pose any threat to the health, 
safety, or welfare of the immediate area. 
{¶ 14} On January 9, 2024, the board held a hearing on the protests.  The 
board heard sworn testimony from three witnesses and arguments from counsel 
representing Thomas and the township trustees and counsel representing the 
referendum petitioners.  The board also allowed the parties to submit various 
exhibits as evidence. 
{¶ 15} The board did not consider the argument that denying a zoning 
change to the Bailey Road property would constitute a taking without just 
compensation, noting that “it [was] outside of the powers granted to [the board] to 
consider.”  For the same reasons, the board did not consider the township trustees’ 
objections that the referendum petition would disrupt the operation and 
development of private property in the township and that the approved zoning 
change did not pose a threat to health, safety, or welfare of the immediate area.  
Following the hearing, the board unanimously overruled the remainder of 
Thomas’s and the township trustees’ arguments and affirmed its certification of the 
referendum for placement on the March 19 ballot. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 16} Relators commenced this action on January 12, 2024, seeking writs 
of prohibition and/or mandamus ordering the board to sustain Thomas’s protest and 
to prevent the board from certifying the zoning-amendment referendum for 
placement on the March 19 ballot.2  We sua sponte designated this case as an 
expedited election matter under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08 and set an expedited schedule 
for the board to file an answer to the complaint and for the parties’ to submit 
evidence and merit briefs.  172 Ohio St.3d 1448, 2024-Ohio-136, __ N.E.3d __.  
Relators filed a motion for leave to amend the caption of their complaint to include 
“State ex rel.” before their names, indicating that they are bringing this action in 
the name of the state on their relation, in compliance with R.C. 2731.04. 
{¶ 17} Relators and the board have filed evidence and merit briefs.  Amici 
curiae Joseph Zemenski and Garrison, registered electors in Lake Township who 
are proponents of the referendum petition at issue in this case, have filed a brief 
urging denial of the writs. 
II.  MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND CAPTION 
{¶ 18} Relators move to amend the case caption to specify that this action 
is being brought in the name of the state on their relation.  The board did not file a 
response to the motion but argues in its merit brief that relators’ complaint should 
be dismissed because a “complaint for an extraordinary writ must be brought by 
petition in the name of the state on relation of the person applying.” 
{¶ 19} As an initial matter, there is no requirement that a complaint for 
extraordinary relief in prohibition be brought in the name of the state on the relation 
of the applicant.  Rosen v. Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241, 2008-Ohio-853, 883 
N.E.2d 420, ¶ 16.  R.C. 2731.04 does require that an application for mandamus be 
brought in the name of the state on relation of the applicant.  The failure of a relator 
in mandamus to do so is a ground for dismissal of the complaint.  Litigaide, Inc. v. 
 
2. The board of township trustees, though a protestor before the board, is not a party in this action.   
January Term, 2024 
 
 
9 
Custodian of Records for Lakewood Police Dept., 75 Ohio St.3d 508, 664 N.E.2d 
521 (1996). 
{¶ 20} However, before the board sought dismissal for this defect, relators 
filed their motion to amend.  This court has granted such motions in the past, noting 
the policy “favoring liberal amendment of pleadings and the resolution of cases on 
their merits rather than upon pleading deficiencies.”  State ex rel. Rust v. Lucas Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 100 Ohio St.3d 214, 2003-Ohio-5643, 797 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 6, citing 
State ex rel. Huntington Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Duryee, 73 Ohio St.3d 530, 533, 653 
N.E.2d 349 (1995).  We therefore grant relators’ motion to amend the caption of 
their complaint. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 21} To obtain a writ of prohibition, relators must show that (1) the board 
exercised quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was unauthorized by 
law, and (3) relators have no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  
State ex rel. McCord v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 106 Ohio St.3d 346, 2005-
Ohio-4758, 835 N.E.2d 336, ¶ 27.  A board of elections exercises quasi-judicial 
authority when, as here, it decides a protest after a mandatory hearing that includes 
sworn testimony.  State ex rel. Moscow v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 169 Ohio 
St.3d 161, 2022-Ohio-3138, 202 N.E.3d 684, ¶ 15; see also State ex rel. Barney v. 
Union Cty. Bd. of Elections, 159 Ohio St.3d 50, 2019-Ohio-4277, 147 N.E.3d 595, 
¶ 12 (R.C. 3501.39 requires a quasi-judicial hearing on a protest to a referendum 
petition). 
{¶ 22} To obtain a writ of mandamus, relators must establish by clear and 
convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to have the board remove the zoning-
amendment referendum from the ballot, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the 
board to do so, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 
law.  State ex rel. Clark v. Twinsburg, 169 Ohio St.3d 380, 2022-Ohio-3089, 205 
N.E.3d 454, ¶ 16. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 23} In this case, relators lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of the law because the election is less than two months away.  Id.  As to the 
remaining elements for obtaining a writ of prohibition or mandamus, relators must 
show that the board engaged in fraud or corruption, abused its discretion, or clearly 
disregarded applicable law in denying their protest.  State ex rel. Jacquemin v. 
Union Cty. Bd. of Elections, 147 Ohio St.3d 467, 2016-Ohio-5880, 67 N.E.3d 759, 
¶ 9.  Relators have not alleged fraud or corruption here.  Therefore, the relevant 
inquiry is whether the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable 
law in denying Thomas’s protest and certifying the referendum for placement on 
the ballot. 
A.  Jurisdiction over the Mandamus Claim 
{¶ 24} The board argues that relators’ mandamus claim is a disguised claim 
for a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction and that this court should 
therefore dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.  The board contends that relators seek 
an order preventing it from placing the referendum on the March 19 ballot.  See 
Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923, 
778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 8-10 (dismissing mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction because 
it was “an ill-disguised request for prohibitory injunctive relief: to prevent [a 
candidate’s] candidacy at the November 5, 2002 general election”). 
{¶ 25} Notwithstanding Whitman, we have held that “[e]xtraordinary relief 
in mandamus is appropriate to keep a measure from the ballot when there is a 
‘failure to comply with statutory ballot-access requirements.’ ”  State ex rel. Fritz 
v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 165 Ohio St.3d 323, 2021-Ohio-1828, 179 N.E.3d 
67, ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Cornerstone Developers, Ltd. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 145 Ohio St.3d 290, 2016-Ohio-313, 49 N.E.3d 273, ¶ 22.  This is the 
relief that relators seek in their mandamus claim.  Relators seek an affirmative act 
of the board: they seek a writ of mandamus ordering the board to sustain Thomas’s 
protest, which would result in removing the referendum from the ballot, because 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
11 
they claim that the referendum petition does not meet certain statutory 
requirements.  Accordingly, relators have stated a proper mandamus claim over 
which we have jurisdiction. 
B.  Validity of the Referendum Petition 
{¶ 26} Relators argue that the board abused its discretion or disregarded 
applicable law in four ways.  First, they argue that the referendum petition is invalid 
under R.C. 519.12(H) because it does not contain enough signatures to qualify for 
placement on the ballot.  Second, they contend that the referendum petition failed 
to contain a valid “brief summary” of the zoning amendment at issue.  Third, 
relators argue that a “refusal to amend the zoning” of the Bailey Road property 
would constitute an unconstitutional taking of their property without just 
compensation.  Finally, relators argue that the board’s decision to certify the 
referendum for placement on the ballot is invalid because the board failed to give 
proper notice under R.C. 121.22(F) of its December 21, 2023 meeting.  None of 
relators’ arguments has merit. 
1.  The Petition-Signature Requirement 
{¶ 27} The parties dispute the number of signatures required to qualify the 
referendum for placement on the ballot.  The board agreed with the referendum 
petitioners’ argument at the protest hearing that the applicable signature 
requirement was the one in effect on September 19, 2023, the date that the township 
trustees adopted the proposed zoning amendment.  Under the law in effect on that 
date, to qualify for placement on the ballot, a referendum petition on a zoning 
amendment needed to contain a number of signatures equal to at least 8 percent of 
the total votes cast for governor in the township at the most recent gubernatorial 
election.  See Former R.C. 519.12(H), H.B. 500.  Under this version of R.C. 
519.12(H), the referendum petition had enough signatures to qualify for placement 
on the ballot. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 28} In contrast, relators argue that the version of R.C. 519.12(H) that 
became effective on October 3, 2023, controls the validity of the referendum 
petition at issue.  Amended R.C. 519.12(H) increased the signature requirement for 
a zoning-referendum petition to at least 15 percent of the total votes cast for 
governor in the township at the most recent gubernatorial election.  And because 
the referendum petition was filed with the trustees on October 18, 2023, relators 
contend that the version of R.C. 519.12(H) that became effective on October 3 is 
the controlling version.  Relators note that although H.B. 33, which amended R.C. 
519.12(H), was enacted on July 4, 2023, the amendment did not go into effect until 
90 days later (i.e., October 3, 2023).  This 90-day period, say relators, gave the 
public ample time to become aware of the impending change in the law, leaving 
the referendum petitioners no excuse for noncompliance with the amended statute.  
And if amended R.C. 519.12(H) controls this case, then the referendum petition 
does not qualify for placement on the ballot. 
a.  Prospective Application of R.C. 519.12(H) 
{¶ 29} Effective October 3, 2023, R.C. 519.12(H) provides:  
 
The proposed amendment, if adopted by the board [of 
township trustees], shall become effective in thirty days after the 
date of its adoption, unless, within thirty days after the adoption, 
there is presented to the board of township trustees a petition, signed 
by a number of registered electors residing in the unincorporated 
area of the township or part of that unincorporated area included in 
the zoning plan equal to not less than fifteen per cent of the total 
vote cast for all candidates for governor in that area at the most 
recent general election at which a governor was elected * * *.” 
 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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{¶ 30} Under the statute, the date of the township trustees’ adoption of a 
proposed zoning amendment determines the effective date of the amendment and 
is also used to determine the deadline for submitting referendum petitions.  The 
requirements of the referendum petition are tied specifically to the date of the 
adoption of the zoning amendment.  Applying amended R.C. 519.12(H) only to 
zoning amendments adopted after the effective date of the amended statute—and 
referendum petitions associated with such amendments—gives effect to the plain 
meaning of the statute, as well as to the rule that “[a] statute is presumed to be 
prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective,” R.C. 1.48.  See 
Estate of Johnson v. Randall Smith, Inc., 135 Ohio St.3d 440, 2013-Ohio-1507, 989 
N.E.2d 35, ¶ 19-21. 
{¶ 31} Relators do not argue that amended R.C. 519.12(H) was expressly 
made retrospective by the General Assembly.  They argue, however, that this court 
“has had occasion to review claimed retroactive changes in the law and held under 
circumstances similar to the circumstances in this case that the change in the law 
did not preclude the Petitioners from obtaining the requisite number of signatures.”  
The only case relators cite for this proposition is State ex rel. Ohioans for Secure 
& Fair Elections v. LaRose, 159 Ohio St.3d 568, 2020-Ohio-1459, 152 N.E.3d 267 
(“Ohio-SAFE”).  But there is nothing about Ohio-SAFE that remotely resembles 
the issue before us in this case.  There was no statute addressing petition-signature 
requirements at issue in Ohio-SAFE, much less a statutory change in the number of 
signatures needed for a petition to qualify for placement on a ballot. 
{¶ 32} Relators have failed to demonstrate that the board acted in clear 
disregard of applicable law in determining that the version of R.C. 519.12(H) that 
was in effect on the date the township trustees adopted the zoning amendment 
(September 19, 2023) controlled the number of signatures required for a 
referendum petition (i.e., a number equal to at least 8 percent of the total votes cast 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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in the township for governor at the most recent gubernatorial election).  The 
referendum petition in this case satisfied that requirement. 
b.  Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution is not implicated 
{¶ 33} The board and amici also argue that if the amended version of R.C. 
519.12(H) applies to the referendum petition at issue, the statute would be 
unconstitutionally retroactive.  “Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution 
prohibits the General Assembly from passing retroactive laws that, when applied, 
act to impair vested rights.”  State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, 
772 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 34} It is unnecessary for us to reach the constitutional retroactivity 
arguments in this case.  “Inquiry into whether a statute may be constitutionally 
applied retrospectively continues only after an initial finding that the General 
Assembly expressly intended that the statute be applied retrospectively.”  Id. at ¶ 
14.  Since the General Assembly did not express that amended R.C. 519.12(H) be 
retroactive, any constitutional analysis under Section 28, Article II is unnecessary.  
And for the reasons explained above, under a prospective application of amended 
R.C. 519.12(H), the 15 percent signature requirement does not apply to the 
referendum petition at issue in this case. 
2.  Summary of Zoning Amendment 
{¶ 35} Relators next argue that the referendum petition lacks an adequate 
summary of the zoning amendment.  R.C. 519.12(H) requires each part-petition 
calling for a referendum on a zoning amendment to contain “a brief summary of 
[the amendment’s] contents.”  A referendum petition must strictly comply with this 
requirement.  State ex rel. Quinn v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 152 Ohio St.3d 
568, 2018-Ohio-966, 99 N.E.3d 362, ¶ 30. 
{¶ 36} The phrase “brief summary of its contents” in R.C. 519.12(H) “refers 
to the zoning resolution, motion, or application passed or approved by the board of 
township trustees.”  E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections, 83 Ohio St.3d 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
15 
298, 300-301, 699 N.E.2d 916 (1998); see also State ex rel. Barney v. Union Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 159 Ohio St.3d 50, 2019-Ohio-4277, 147 N.E.3d 595, ¶ 31.  The 
summary must be accurate and unambiguous.  S.I. Dev. & Constr., L.L.C. v. Medina 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 100 Ohio St.3d 272, 2003-Ohio-5791, 798 N.E.2d 587, ¶ 17.  
If a summary is misleading, inaccurate, or contains material omissions that would 
confuse the average person, the petition is invalid and the referendum may not be 
submitted for a vote.  State ex rel. Gemienhardt v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
109 Ohio St.3d 212, 2006-Ohio-1666, 846 N.E.2d 1223, ¶ 38. 
{¶ 37} No written zoning resolution was submitted as evidence in this case.  
The record reflects that instead of passing a resolution, the township trustees simply 
approved Thomas’s application for a zoning amendment.  Thus, the relevant inquiry 
is whether the petition accurately summarized Thomas’s application, which 
contained (1) a request to change the zoning of the Bailey Road property from “R-
2 Residence” to “B-2 General Commercial,” (2) the address and legal description 
of the property, and (3) a statement that Thomas intended to construct self-storage 
facilities on the Bailey Road property. 
{¶ 38} We have held that the referendum-petition summary of a zoning 
amendment must (1) identify the location of the relevant property and (2) inform 
the reader of the present zoning status of the land and the precise nature of the 
requested change.  State ex rel. Donaldson v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 166 
Ohio St.3d 55, 2021-Ohio-2943, 182 N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 14-15.  If material information 
is omitted, resulting in a summary that would confuse the average person, the 
referendum petition is invalid.  State ex rel. T-Bill Dev. Co., L.L.C. v. Union Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 166 Ohio St.3d 250, 2021-Ohio-3535, 185 N.E.3d 50, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 39} Relators argue that the referendum petition’s summary was defective 
because it failed to apprise readers of (1) the present zoning status of the Bailey 
Road property, (2) the precise nature of the requested change, and (3) the present 
use of the Bailey Road property.  The first two of these contentions are without 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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merit because they are belied by the text of the referendum-petition summary.  The 
summary in this case identified the property affected by the zoning change by its 
street address, parcel number, and legal description, and it stated that the proposed 
amendment would rezone the property “from R-2 (Residential District) to B-2 
(General Business District).”  This statement includes both the present zoning status 
and the nature of the zoning change, and relators do not contend that the statement 
was inaccurate in this respect. 
{¶ 40} Relators also contend that the referendum-petition summary is 
invalid because it does not include any information about the present or historical 
use of the Bailey Road property.  Though currently zoned residential, relators argue 
that petition signers should have been apprised of the facts that (1) the most recent 
approved conditional use for the Bailey Road property was for baseball batting 
cages, (2) the property had historically been used as a junkyard, and (3) the property 
is currently surrounded by a six-foot-high fence.  For this argument, relators rely 
on Donaldson, in which we found a referendum petition’s summary deficient 
because, among other reasons, it did not describe “the current use of the property.”  
Id., 166 Ohio St.3d 55, 2021-Ohio-2943, 182 N.E.3d 1135, at ¶ 15.  Relators also 
emphasize language from State ex rel. O’Beirne v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
80 Ohio St.3d 176, 685 N.E.2d 502 (1997), a case in which this court stated that 
the “present use” of property was “material” information and that its omission 
renders a referendum-petition summary invalid.  Id. at 181. 
{¶ 41} Both cases are distinguishable.  In Donaldson, the board of elections 
sustained a protest to a referendum petition because the petition’s summary of a 
proposed zoning amendment was deficient in numerous respects.  Our observation 
that the summary did not describe “the current use of the property” came within a 
larger discussion of the referendum petition’s failure to “describe the nature of the 
zoning amendment.”  Id. at ¶ 15.  We held that “the petition must summarize the 
contents of the zoning amendment passed by the township trustees.”  Id. at ¶ 13.  
January Term, 2024 
 
 
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Thus, the better reading of Donaldson is that the absence of a description of the 
current use rendered the referendum-petition summary deficient because the 
current use was part of the zoning amendment as passed by the township trustees.  
Here, the zoning amendment adopted by the trustees did not describe the current 
use of the property. 
{¶ 42} O’Beirne is similarly distinguishable.  In that case, the reason the 
property’s present use was material information and was thus required to be 
included in the referendum-petition summary is that the zoning resolution included 
that information.  Id. at 181.  Indeed, the zoning resolution at issue in O’Beirne had 
incorporated the application for the zoning amendment, id. at 176, which included 
a page that detailed “the present use and zoning of the property” at issue, id. at 181.  
The referendum-petition summary, however, did not include that information.  Id.  
In contrast here, Thomas’s application, as approved by the township trustees, did 
not contain any information about the present use of the property.  The referendum 
petitioners in this case were not required to include information about present use 
that was not contained in the approved zoning-amendment application. 
{¶ 43} Relators also argue that the referendum-petition summary omitted 
the fact that after the zoning amendment and proposed development, access to the 
Bailey Road property would only be from the Woodville Road property.  However, 
this information was not contained in Thomas’s application for a zoning 
amendment; nor was it contained in the trustees’ approval of Thomas’s zoning-
amendment application.  Accordingly, there was no reason for the referendum-
petition summary to include this information. 
{¶ 44} For the foregoing reasons, the board did not abuse its discretion or 
disregard applicable law in concluding that the referendum-petition summary 
satisfied R.C. 519.12(H). 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
3.  Constitutionality of the Referendum 
{¶ 45} Relators also argue that the board should not have certified the 
referendum for placement on the ballot because any refusal to amend the Bailey 
Road property’s zoning to commercial use would “constitute an unlawful taking of 
property without just compensation.”  In other words, relators argue that the 
referendum, if approved by the voters, would be unconstitutional. 
{¶ 46} The board did not abuse its discretion or disregard applicable law in 
certifying the referendum for placement on the ballot, despite relators’ protest of its 
constitutionality.  “The boards of elections * * * do not have authority to sit as 
arbiters of the legality or constitutionality of a ballot measure’s substantive terms.”  
(Emphasis deleted.)  State ex rel. Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
144 Ohio St.3d 239, 2015-Ohio-3761, 41 N.E.3d 1229, ¶ 11.  “An unconstitutional 
amendment may be a proper item for referendum or initiative.  Such an amendment 
becomes void and unenforceable only when declared unconstitutional by a court of 
competent jurisdiction.”  Id.; see also State ex rel. Cramer v. Brown, 7 Ohio St.3d 
5, 6, 454 N.E.2d 1321 (1983) (“this court will not consider, in an action to strike an 
issue from the ballot, a claim that the proposed amendment would be 
unconstitutional if approved, such claim being premature”).  Accordingly, relators’ 
objection to the constitutionality of keeping the Bailey Road property zoned for 
residential use is not a proper basis to invalidate the referendum petition. 
4.  Notice of the Board’s December 21 Meeting 
{¶ 47} Relators also contend that the referendum should not qualify for 
placement on the ballot because the board failed to provide sufficient notice that it 
would consider the referendum petition at its December 21, 2023 meeting. 
{¶ 48} R.C. 121.22(F) provides: 
 
Every public body, by rule, shall establish a reasonable 
method whereby any person may determine the time and place of all 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
19 
regularly scheduled meetings and the time, place, and purpose of all 
special meetings.  A public body shall not hold a special meeting 
unless it gives at least twenty-four hours’ advance notice to the news 
media that have requested notification, except in the event of an 
emergency requiring immediate official action. 
 
{¶ 49} Relators argue that the board was required to provide notice “of the 
time, place, and purpose of the meeting” at which the referendum petition was 
going to be considered.  They further contend that individualized notice was 
required to be given to relators, the township trustees, the county prosecutor, and 
the township police chief, all of whom were “interested” in the petition.  Relators 
argue that because the board failed to satisfy these notice requirements, its 
certification of the referendum for placement on the ballot is invalid. 
{¶ 50} Relators’ argument rests on the incorrect premise that the board was 
required to give individualized notice of its December 21 meeting, including a 
specific description of the matters that would be discussed at that meeting.  But 
R.C. 121.22(F) does not require that such notice be given.  The December 21 
meeting was a regular meeting of the board.  All that the statute requires for a 
regular meeting is that a public body give notice through “a reasonable method” it 
has established, “whereby any person may determine the time and place of all 
regularly scheduled meetings.”  R.C. 121.22(F).  In this case, the board found that 
the December 21 regular meeting “was noticed in the normal fashion, both with 
public posting and on the [board’s] website,” which relators do not dispute.  Indeed, 
Thomas testified at the protest hearing that he saw the notice of the December 21 
meeting on the board’s website. 
{¶ 51} Moreover, though not required for regular meetings, the meeting 
notice on the board’s website included a link to yet another notice that stated that 
the December 21 meeting was for the purpose of “certifying candidates and issue 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
petitions to the 2024 primary election.”  Thus, any person who saw the board’s 
notice of its December 21 regular meeting could have also learned that the board 
would consider the certification of candidates and issue petitions at that meeting.  
Relators have not established that the board violated R.C. 121.22(F)’s meeting-
notice requirement. 
{¶ 52} Relators contend that even if the board’s notice satisfied statutory 
requirements, the notice was insufficient and it violated their procedural-due-
process rights.  But this argument is flawed for at least two reasons.  The first 
requirement of a procedural-due-process claim is a right or interest that is entitled 
to due-process protection.  State ex rel. Emhoff v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, 153 
Ohio St.3d 313, 2018-Ohio-1660, 106 N.E.3d 21, ¶ 35.  In this case, relators have 
not articulated the right or interest that they were deprived of by virtue of the 
board’s holding a meeting without specifically informing them that the 
referendum’s certification for placement on the ballot would be considered.  And 
even assuming that the right to appear at the December 21 meeting to oppose 
certification of the referendum for placement on the ballot is a protected liberty or 
property interest for due-process purposes, relators cannot establish that they have 
been deprived of this right without due process of law.  This extraordinary-writ 
proceeding, wherein relators are afforded the opportunity to challenge the board’s 
action, provides all the process that relators are due.  See State ex rel. Nauth v. 
Dirham, 161 Ohio St.3d 365, 2020-Ohio-4208, 163 N.E.3d 526, ¶ 24. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 53} For the foregoing reasons, we grant relators’ motion to amend the 
case caption of their complaint and deny the writs. 
Writs denied. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by DONNELLY and BRUNNER, 
JJ. 
January Term, 2024 
 
 
21 
_________________ 
STEWART, J., concurring. 
{¶ 54} I join the majority opinion in full but write separately to point out 
that applying amended R.C. 519.12(H) to proposed zoning amendments that were 
adopted before the statute’s effective date would effectively change the signature 
requirement for a referendum petition during the period that petitioners are 
obtaining signatures.  This would be inconsistent with our instruction to apply R.C. 
519.12(H) liberally in favor of the citizens’ right of referendum.  See State ex rel. 
Miller Diversified Holdings, L.L.C. v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 Ohio St.3d 
260, 2009-Ohio-4980, 915 N.E.2d 1187, ¶ 36. 
DONNELLY and BRUNNER, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
The Law Office of Norman A. Abood, Norman A. Abood, and Tyler J. 
Lantzsch, for relators. 
John A. Borell, Special Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
Nolan Law, L.L.C., and Joshua J. Nolan, urging denial of the writs, for 
amici curiae Jean Garrison and Joseph Zemenski. 
_________________