Case Title: Commonwealth v. Hudson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 021891

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 021891 
JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
April 17, 2003 
LOUIS SCOTT HUDSON 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
A jury found Louis Scott Hudson (“Hudson”) guilty of the 
second-degree murder of his wife, Mary Donovan Hudson, known as 
“Mimi,” and use of a firearm in the commission of the murder.  
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
judgment and dismissed the indictments.  Hudson v. Commonwealth, 
No. 0917-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 389 (Va. Ct. App. July 16, 
2002).  For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment. 
I. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
Hudson was indicted for first-degree murder of his wife and 
for using a firearm in the commission of murder.  At trial, the 
court denied Hudson’s motion to strike the evidence but 
permitted the case to proceed on charges of second-degree murder 
and use of a firearm in the commission of murder.  The jury 
returned verdicts of guilty to both charges submitted.  The 
trial court imposed the sentence set by the jury of seventeen 
years for murder and three years for use of a firearm and 
suspended five years of the sentence for murder. 
Hudson and Mimi had been living together for about six to 
eight years prior to marrying in July 1999, three months before 
her death.  There was no evidence of abuse between the two.  In 
fact, evidence was presented that they had a good relationship. 
Mimi had been declared incompetent in 1972 and was 
estimated to have the mental age of a twelve-year old.  Mimi 
took prescription medicine and pain killers for chronic back 
pain, and at the time of her death, she had an infection in her 
right elbow.  The infection in her elbow caused Mimi a “great 
deal of pain,” and she was having “difficulty bending it and 
lifting, or holding anything.”  Just a few weeks prior to her 
death, Mimi had “overdosed” on Darvocet, a mild prescription 
pain-killer.  Mimi’s physician testified that she did not 
understand how to properly take the medicine, would not wait for 
it to work, and took excessive amounts.  Evidence was presented 
that Darvocet can intensify the effects of alcohol. 
 
Neither Mimi nor Hudson worked during the time they lived 
together.  Mimi’s allowance from her family trust fund supported 
the couple financially.  Upon her death, none of the proceeds of 
the trust benefited Hudson. 
 
Mimi loved horses and spent much of her time riding, and on 
the morning of September 20, 1999, she went on a fox hunt.  
After the hunt, she attended her father’s memorial service.  Her 
father had been sick for about 18 months, battling Parkinson’s 
 
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disease and colon cancer and had died several days previously.  
Evidence was presented that Mimi was unhappy with the property 
distribution from her father’s estate; however, there was 
evidence that Mimi was in good spirits after the fox hunt, had 
bought a new dress for the memorial service, and was excited 
about the family heirloom ring she had received from her 
father’s estate. 
 
During the luncheon following the memorial service, Mimi 
and Hudson consumed alcohol.  When they returned home, they 
continued to drink.  At the time of Mimi’s death, her blood 
alcohol content was between .22 and .24, and Darvocet was 
present in her system. 
 
David G. Donovan, the victim’s twin brother, testified that 
Mimi did not like guns and did not like to handle them, but 
Hudson kept guns in the house.  Evidence, however, was presented 
that on one occasion prior to the date of her death Mimi had 
fired a .22 revolver.  Neighbors testified that on the night of 
September 20, between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., they heard two or 
three high-powered rifle shots from the direction of Hudson’s 
residence. 
 
Wesley A. Thompson (“Thompson”), a friend of Mimi’s, 
testified that about 7:45 p.m. on the night of September 20, 
Mimi called him to talk about her father’s death.  During the 
call, Hudson interrupted the conversation with obscenities and 
 
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asked Thompson why he was talking to Mimi.  Thompson then hung 
up the telephone. 
 
Anne H. Hudson, Hudson’s mother, testified that Hudson 
called her at approximately 7:30 p.m. and said that Mimi had 
shot and killed herself.  Obviously, the timing of the telephone 
calls is in dispute because Mimi could not have been dead at 
7:30 and alive and speaking with Thompson on the telephone at 
7:45.  Hudson’s parents estimated that they arrived at Hudson 
and Mimi’s house about five minutes after Hudson’s call and saw 
Mimi’s body, but that Hudson was not there.  Hudson’s father 
then returned to his house and called the police at 7:52 p.m. 
 
The police arrived at Hudson and Mimi’s house at 7:57 p.m. 
They observed Mimi’s body on the living room couch, with a .22 
caliber revolver lying across her right palm in a manner 
described by an officer as looking “like it was backwards.” 
There were bloody handprints on the back cushion of the couch, 
on Mimi’s jeans, and on her forearm.  The officers did not see 
any blood on Mimi’s hands.  Outside of the house, the garden 
hose was turned on “full blast” despite the fact that it was 
raining heavily that night. 
 
Around 9:00 p.m. that night, Hudson’s brother, Steven 
Hudson (“Steven”), saw Hudson sitting in his car in their 
parents’ driveway.  Steven took Hudson inside to “sober up,” 
while Hudson’s father called the police.  Hudson’s father saw no 
 
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blood on Hudson when he came in the house.  At 9:17 p.m., the 
police arrived at Hudson’s parents’ house.  When they entered 
the house, Hudson was sitting on the couch with a cup of coffee 
in his hand, and he appeared extremely intoxicated.  Hudson’s 
father told the police that he wanted Hudson out of his house.  
The police arrested Hudson for being drunk in public and took 
him into custody.  At the time of his arrest, Hudson’s blood 
alcohol content was .215.  Although he did not tell the police 
when they arrived at his house, Hudson’s father had removed a 
.270 caliber rifle from Hudson’s car and taken it into the house 
prior to the arrival of police. 
 
After being transported to the jail, Hudson was searched, 
and a .22 caliber bullet was found in his coat pocket.  At 6:30 
a.m. on September 21, Hudson was advised of his Miranda rights, 
and he gave a statement.  According to Hudson, Mimi was unhappy 
after her father’s memorial service because she felt that she 
deserved more money and property from her father’s estate.  He 
stated that while they were in the house, Mimi picked up the .22 
caliber revolver that Hudson kept either on the couch or in a 
drawer adjacent to the couch, and started playing with it.  
Hudson told her, “[p]lease don’t do that[,]” and said that 
“[e]verything will be okay.”  He said that while he was in the 
bathroom he heard a shot.  He stated that when he returned, he 
saw Mimi slumping over on the couch.  He said he never went near 
 
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the body.  He did not remember calling anyone after the 
shooting, including his mother, and he did not know why he did 
not call the 911 emergency number.  He said that he left his 
house after the shooting, but cannot account for his whereabouts 
or actions from the time of Mimi’s shooting until 9:00 p.m., 
when he arrived at his parents’ house.  Regarding the .22 
caliber bullet found in his coat pocket, Hudson said he must 
have picked it up when he picked up loose change from his 
dresser. 
 
On November 18, 1999, the Virginia State Police interviewed 
Hudson with his attorney present.  Hudson made reference to a 
trust established for Mimi’s benefit.  He again stated that he 
and Mimi had been drinking at home after the memorial service 
and that Mimi was upset because her brother, as trustee of the 
trust, would not allow her to purchase a pick-up truck and a 
trailer.  He stated that Mimi then began playing with the .22 
caliber revolver.  After Hudson went into the bathroom, Mimi 
announced that she was going to shoot herself.  Hudson replied 
not to worry about it, referring to the trust.  He then heard a 
shot, and when he came out he saw that Mimi had shot herself.  
Hudson said he saw a little bit of blood around one of Mimi’s 
eyes.  During the interview, Hudson said he never went near the 
body, but later he said he did not recall going near the body or 
touching it.  He denied handling any firearms that night; he 
 
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stated that his most recent handling of a firearm was two days 
prior to Mimi’s death.  Again, he could not account for his 
whereabouts between the time of the shooting and the time he 
arrived at his parents’ house.  Hudson did not remember any 
telephone calls being made or received that night, either by 
Mimi or him, including the telephone call to Thompson. 
 
During trial, the medical examiner, Dr. Carolyn Revercomb 
(“Revercomb”), who conducted the autopsy on Mimi, testified that 
Mimi had a contact range wound to her head through her left ear.  
The bullet traveled from the left ear up towards the right and 
towards the back of her head.  Revercomb testified that such a 
wound would cause immediate unconsciousness, and death would 
follow within minutes.  She also testified that after the shot 
was fired, rapid and copious bleeding occurred and there would 
have been no voluntary movement by the victim. 
 
Gary Arnsten (“Arnsten”), a forensic scientist with a 
specialty in firearms, testified that the bullet recovered from 
Mimi’s brain was fired from the .22 caliber revolver found on 
her right palm.  Arnsten also testified that it is necessary to 
manually cock the hammer of this revolver before firing it. 
 
Additionally, a fingerprint expert, Richard Willett 
(“Willett”) and a gunshot residue expert, Eugene R. Harrison 
(“Harrison”) testified.  Willett testified that no latent 
fingerprints were found on the revolver or any cartridges.  
 
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Harrison, however, testified that both Hudson and Mimi had 
primer residue on their hands.  Only Mimi’s right hand had 
primer residue on it, and the residue matched the .22 caliber 
cartridge identified as having contained the fatal bullet.  
Harrison identified primer residue on both of Hudson’s hands, 
containing three elements, lead, barium, and antimony.  The 
residue found on Mimi’s right hand contained only two elements, 
lead and barium.  In light of these findings, Harrison testified 
that it would be “unlikely” but not “inconceivable” that the 
residue on Hudson’s hands came from the revolver that caused 
Mimi’s death. 
 
Marjorie Harris (“Harris”), an expert in blood stains, 
testified regarding the blood stains found on the couch cushion, 
the front left thigh of Mimi’s jeans, and Mimi’s right forearm.  
Harris testified that the blood contact transfer stains came 
from heavily bloodied hands, but the stains did not come from 
Mimi’s hands because she had no visible blood on her hands.  
Harris also testified about the large blood stain that was found 
on the couch underneath a telephone book.  She opined that 
[t]he blood would have had to be placed there 
first and then the telephone book on top of that. 
. . .  [T]he stain that is prevalent and shows on 
the telephone book is not consistent with the 
stain underneath it.  That cushion had to be open 
to receive the blood and then the telephone book 
at a later time covered that blood stain. 
 
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Carol Palmer (“Palmer”), an expert in forensic biology, 
testified concerning the DNA composition of the various blood 
stains.  First, Palmer testified that a spot of blood found on 
Hudson’s left shirt sleeve was consistent with Mimi’s DNA 
profile, and inconsistent with Hudson’s DNA profile.  Palmer 
further testified that the probability of finding someone with 
the same DNA profile as Mimi would be approximately one in 
fifty-one million in the Caucasian population.  Palmer also 
identified the stains on the couch, the back cushion of the 
couch, and Mimi’s jeans as having the same DNA profile as Mimi’s 
blood, but a different DNA profile than that of Hudson. 
II. Analysis 
 
The burden of proof upon the state in a criminal case was 
given constitutional status in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970) wherein the Court stated “that the Due Process Clause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged.”  Later, with an analysis of the 
history of the use of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, 
the Court acknowledged that the standard “defies easy 
explication,” but held the following: 
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a 
requirement of due process, but the Constitution 
neither prohibits trial courts from defining 
reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a 
matter of course.  Indeed, so long as the court 
 
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instructs the jury on the necessity that the 
defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the Constitution does not require that any 
particular form of words be used in advising the 
jury of the government’s burden of proof.  Rather 
“taken as a whole, the instructions [must] 
correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt 
to the jury.” 
 
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 
Generally, there are two types of evidence presented during 
a trial – direct evidence and circumstantial evidence.  Direct 
evidence is offered to prove as a fact the point in issue.  
Circumstantial evidence, by contrast, is offered to prove a fact 
not directly in issue, from which a fact in issue may reasonably 
be inferred. 
 
There is no distinction in the law between the weight or 
value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. 
The finder of fact is entitled to consider all of the evidence, 
without distinction, in reaching its determination.  See Downden 
v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 468, 536 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2000). 
 
An instruction given in the case before us included the 
following: 
 
 
When the Commonwealth relies upon circumstantial 
evidence, the circumstances proved must be consistent with 
guilt and inconsistent with innocence.  It is not 
sufficient that the circumstances proved create a suspicion 
of guilt, however, strong, or even a probability of guilt. 
 
The evidence as a whole must exclude every reasonable 
theory of innocence. 
 
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While such an instruction properly paraphrases our case law, the 
instruction, properly understood, does not add to the burden of 
proof placed upon the Commonwealth in a criminal case.  The 
statement that circumstantial evidence must exclude every 
reasonable theory of innocence is simply another way of stating 
that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Cox v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 513, 517, 
125 S.E. 139, 141 (1924). 
 
In the case before us, the Court of Appeals held that “the 
Commonwealth’s evidence fails to exclude all reasonable 
hypotheses of innocence.”  Noting that Hudson argued that Mimi 
may have been “shot by accident” or “intentionally by her own 
act[,]” the Court of Appeals held that, “[t]here is evidence to 
support this hypothesis [sic] of innocence.”  With respect to 
the question of who fired the weapon, the Court of Appeals held 
that “there is some evidence that Mrs. Hudson may have fatally 
fired the gun.”  The error of the Court of Appeals is manifest 
in these holdings. 
 
The issue upon appellate review is not whether “there is 
some evidence to support” these hypotheses.  The issue is 
whether a reasonable jury, upon consideration of all the 
evidence, could have rejected Hudson’s theories in his defense 
and found him guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.  In 
 
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support of its holding, the Court of Appeals focused primarily  
upon the evidence supporting Hudson’s theories, namely, that the 
“.22 revolver that fired the fatal shot was found in Mrs. 
Hudson’s hand[,]” “the gunshot residue found on Mrs. Hudson’s 
right hand was consistent with the .22 shells at the scene[,]” 
“the gunshot residue . . . found on Hudson’s hands was not 
consistent with that ammunition[,]” “there were no identifiable 
fingerprints found on the .22 revolver or any of the cartridges 
attributable to Hudson[,]” and the unsupported statement that 
“[t]here is simply no evidence establishing Hudson ever touched 
the weapon that fired the fatal bullet.” 
 
We have held in many cases that, upon appellate review, the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in 
the trial court.  Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424, 410 
S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991); Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 
349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975).  Circumstantial evidence 
is not viewed in isolation.  “While no single piece of evidence 
may be sufficient, the ‘combined force of many concurrent and 
related circumstances, each insufficient in itself, may lead a 
reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.’ ”  Derr, 242 Va. 
at 425, 410 S.E.2d at 669 (citations omitted).  It is the 
province of the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.  
Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 821, 554 S.E.2d 84, 87 
 
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(2001); Phan v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 506, 513, 521 S.E.2d 282, 
286 (1999).  It is “within the province of the jury to determine 
what inferences are to be drawn from proved facts, provided the 
inferences are reasonably related to those facts.”  Inge, 217 
Va. at 366, 228 S.E.2d at 567-68. 
 
In the case before us, the analysis of the Court of Appeals 
viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Hudson rather 
than to the Commonwealth as required.  Additionally, the Court 
of Appeals emphasized Hudson’s evidence rather than the totality 
of the evidence as required.  Finally, the Court of Appeals’ 
analysis did not give proper deference to the province of the 
jury to consider the testimony and the credibility of the 
witnesses to determine reasonable inferences from such evidence, 
and reject as unreasonable the hypotheses offered by Hudson. 
 
Of course, upon appellate review, the issue of exclusion of 
reasonable theories of innocence is limited to those theories 
advanced by the accused at trial.  Subject to the ends of 
justice exception, appellate courts will not entertain matters 
raised for the first time on appeal.  Rule 5A:18; Rule 5:25.  In 
the case before us, Hudson did not testify at trial; however, 
many of his pretrial statements were introduced through other 
witnesses.  Hudson’s theory of innocence was advanced in 
counsel’s argument to the jury. 
 
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Hudson argued only that Mimi committed suicide.  He did not 
advance a theory of accidental shooting by Mimi or by himself.  
He did not advance a theory that the fatal shot was fired by 
someone other than Mimi.  In closing argument, counsel stated to 
the jury, “Tragically, tragically, suicide is the only 
reasonable explanation of what happened on September 20th, 
1999.”  Emphasizing the circumstantial nature of the evidence 
and the presumption of innocence, Hudson maintained that Mimi 
shot herself.  He argued that there was no motive for Hudson to 
kill her, that Mimi had recently taken an overdose of 
medication, that there was no evidence of a prior history of 
violence between Hudson and Mimi, that both he and Mimi were 
under the influence of intoxicants, that the time between the 
telephone call to Thompson and Hudson’s telephone call to his 
parents was too short for a murder and a cover-up of the murder 
to take place, and that gunshot residue evidence was 
inconsistent with Hudson having fired the fatal shot. 
 
The Commonwealth argued that the jury must consider all of 
the evidence, not just Hudson’s narrow isolation of certain 
aspects of the evidence.  The Commonwealth argued that Hudson 
committed an unpremeditated killing of Mimi with malice 
sufficient to support a conviction for second-degree murder and 
that his theory of suicide was not reasonable.  The Commonwealth 
properly noted that proof of motive is not an element of the 
 
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offense, but nonetheless noted that the fatal shot was fired 
shortly after Hudson expressed his anger over a telephone call 
between Thompson and Mimi.  Mimi had placed the call, but it was 
terminated when Hudson took the telephone, and directed 
obscenities at Thompson.  Thompson hung up the telephone.  
Shortly thereafter, Mimi died from a gunshot wound to her brain 
through her left ear. 
 
The Commonwealth argued that Hudson shot Mimi immediately 
after the telephone call was terminated.  Further, the 
Commonwealth argued that the crime scene evidence was 
inconsistent with Hudson’s proffered theory of suicide and 
inconsistent with his own statements.  There was no blood on 
Mimi’s hands.  The revolver was on top of Mimi’s right palm in a 
position that was “backwards” from the position in which the 
revolver would have been found had Mimi shot herself.  Mimi had 
an infected right elbow that was painful when manipulated.  To 
have fired a long-barreled .22 revolver with her right hand into 
her left ear would have been awkward at best, and was most 
unlikely given her physical impairment. 
 
Three bloody palm prints were found at the crime scene – 
one on the back of the sofa upon which Mimi’s body was located, 
one on the left pant leg on top of the pocket, and one on her 
forearm.  Mimi had no blood on her hands.  Hudson said that he 
did not touch Mimi after he found her on the sofa with a gunshot 
 
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wound to the head.  Under Hudson’s theory, only two people were 
in the house when the fatal shot was fired, Hudson and Mimi.  
Hudson’s parents came to the crime scene before the police, but 
they stated that neither of them touched Mimi and that they got 
no closer to the body than the coffee table in front of the 
sofa.  Mimi’s right hand was found lying on open pages of a 
commercial telephone book.  Mimi’s blood was pooled under the 
telephone book despite the fact that her right palm with the 
revolver in it was on top of the telephone book.  An expert 
witness opined that the blood pooled on the sofa and thereafter,  
the telephone book covered the blood. 
 
Hudson stated that he found Mimi on the sofa.  
Subsequently, according to his parents, he called his parents to 
tell them that Mimi had shot herself.  Then he disappeared for 
over an hour.  Hudson cannot account for his whereabouts during 
this time.  When he was found by police at his parents’ house 
over an hour later, he had no blood on his hands.  Curiously, 
when police had arrived at the crime scene, they had found a 
garden hose outside the house running “full blast” despite the 
fact that it was “pouring down rain.”  Hudson recalled no 
telephone calls that had been made or received that night.  His 
parents and Thompson refuted this statement.  Hudson stated that 
he had not handled a firearm for two days.  Primer residue was 
found on Hudson’s hands; however, in addition to lead and 
 
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barium, the residue included antimony.  Neighbors had heard 
rifle shots coming from the direction of the Hudson home in the 
afternoon before Mimi’s death.  A .270 caliber rifle was taken 
by Hudson’s father from the back seat of Hudson’s car when he 
arrived at their home after Hudson’s unexplained absence 
following the fatal shot.  Forensic examination revealed a blood 
stain, identified as Mimi’s blood, on Hudson’s shirt. 
 
The Commonwealth argued to the jury that Hudson lied.  He 
said that he had not handled a firearm in two days, yet primer 
residue was on his hands.  He said that he had not touched Mimi 
or the couch, yet there were three bloody palm prints at the 
scene.  Hudson never argued that his parents or anyone else 
accounted for these prints.  Mimi’s hands were not bloody.  When 
examined, Hudson’s hands were not bloody, but the hose had been 
found running “full blast” and over an hour had elapsed from the 
time that the police arrived at the crime scene to the time that 
Hudson was found at his parents’ house.  The Commonwealth noted 
that the additional element of antimony found on Hudson’s hands 
was explained by its theory of the case: that Hudson shot Mimi, 
tried to arrange the crime scene to look like a suicide, washed 
his own hands, disappeared for over an hour, and was found with 
a recently fired rifle that was handled by Hudson after Mimi’s 
murder. 
 
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The jury was entitled to evaluate Hudson’s theory of 
innocence upon consideration of all the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences that flow from that evidence.  It is clear 
that the jury rejected Hudson’s theory as unreasonable.  The 
evidence from the crime scene and the ensuing investigation was 
inconsistent with Hudson’s theory of innocence and with his own 
statements to police.  The jury was entitled to conclude that 
Hudson was lying to police and to reject the explanation offered 
by Hudson and utilized in closing argument by Hudson’s counsel. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the Court of Appeals 
erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court.  We will 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter final 
judgment reinstating the judgment of the trial court. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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