Case Title: Lentz v. TR. OF IND. UNIV.

Citation: 221 N.E.2d 883, 248 Ind. 45

Docket Number: 30,925

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1966-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
248 Ind. 45 (1966)
221 N.E.2d 883
LENTZ, ETC.,
v.
TRUSTEE OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY ET AL.
No. 30,925.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed December 21, 1966.
*46 Thomas A. Hoadley, of Bloomington, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Lloyd C. Hutchinson and James B. Droege, Deputy Attorneys General, for appellee, State Board of Tax Commissioners.
Snyder, Bunger, Cotner & Harrell, for appellee, Trustees of Indiana University.
RAKESTRAW, J.
This is an appeal from the sustaining of a motion to dismiss the appellant's cause of action in the trial court.
In September, 1964, the Monroe County Board of Review, of which the appellant was president, determine that eight tracts of land owned by the appellees, the Trustees of Indiana University, were not tax exempt under the appropriate statutes of this state. Said trustees later petitioned the State Board of Tax Commissioners, and in April, 1965, the State Board allowed the tax exemption as to six of the tracts of land, disallowed the tax exemption as to one tract of land, and determined that one tract of land was partially exempt and partially non-exempt.
On May 26, 1965, the appellant, as Assessor of Monroe County, and the Monroe County Board of Review filed a complaint in the court below in two paragraphs seeking:
The appellees filed a motion to dismiss addressed to both paragraphs of complaint upon the ground that the court below did not have jurisdiction to entertain either an appeal from the Determination of the State Board of Tax Commissioners or a Declaratory Judgment, in view of the parties bringing the action and the issues involved in the case. The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss as to both paragraphs of complaint, and the appellant has appealed to this court the sustaining of the motion to dismiss only as it applies to the second paragraph of complaint which seeks a Declaratory Judgment.
While the arguments made in the briefs are somewhat long and involved, we believe that the determining issue in this case is the question of whether the appellant, in his capacity as county assessor, has any standing to maintain an action for Declaratory Judgment on a question of property tax exemption.
In the case of Fadell, Assessor v. Kovacik, Auditor (1962), 242 Ind. 610, 181 N.E.2d 228, a township assessor sought a court review of a final determination of the State Board of Tax Commissioners. At page 615 of 242 Ind., this court stated:
Thus this court has recognized that the State Board of Tax Commissioners in the final authority representing the state in the matters of taxation, and that in such matters a county or township assessor is an inferior representative of the state without the right to question decisions of the State Board.
The appellant argues in his brief that this case involves the determination of value for tax purposes, and that the question of exemption involves different legal issues. However, the relevant section of the statute concerning determination of exemptions is found in the Acts 1961, ch. 319, § 306, p. 897, being § 64-506, Burns' 1961 Replacement. This section reads as follows:
It will be noted that in matters of tax exemption as well as matters of tax valuation, the State Board of Tax Commissioners is by statute given the authority to make the final determination. This final determination is in our opinion binding upon all inferior tax officials. It therefore *49 follows that the appellant in his capacity as county assessor does not have an appropriate standing to bring a Declaratory Judgment action. It was therefore not error for the trial court to sustain a motion to dismiss the appellant's complaint.
In the case of Fadell, Assessor v. Kovacik, Auditor, supra, and in the case at bar, this court has dealt only with the standing of a township or county assessor to question a final determination of the State Board of Tax Commissioners. In our opinion, such an officer in his official capacity, cannot question such action. It is not necessary for us to decide at this time whether or not a taxpayer would have sufficient standing to question such final determination in view of the fact that granting exemptions would lower the tax base and increase the tax on other property within a county.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NOTE.  Reported in 221 N.E.2d 883.