Case Title: Indorf v. Keep

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2023 ME 11

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2023-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2023 ME 11 
Docket: 
Yor-22-44 
Argued: 
November 2, 2022 
Decided: 
January 31, 2023 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
 
 
CHRISTOPHER INDORF 
 
v. 
 
HEATHER KEEP 
 
 
LAWRENCE, J. 
[¶1]  Christopher Indorf appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Biddeford, Tice, J.), applying the doctrine of abatement to dismiss his action for 
breach of contract1 and awarding Heather Keep attorney fees.  Because Indorf’s 
contract action should have been consolidated with Keep’s partition action, we 
vacate the court’s dismissal of Indorf’s complaint and remand for further 
proceedings.  We also vacate the court’s award of attorney fees. 
 
1  As indicated in the procedural history below, Indorf’s complaint contains two counts.  For 
simplicity, we refer to both counts as Indorf’s contract action. 
 
 
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I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts are taken from Indorf’s complaint, viewing it in 
the light most favorable to Indorf and assuming that the factual allegations are 
true.  See Wawenock, LLC v. Dep’t of Transp., 2018 ME 83, ¶ 4, 187 A.3d 609. 
 
[¶3]  The parties formerly lived together at a residence in Saco and are 
the parents of one minor child.  The parties closed on the Saco property on 
October 31, 2015, and entered a contract where, in exchange for Indorf 
assuming sole responsibility for the down payment (approximately $43,000) 
on the real property, Keep agreed to assume a greater share of the monthly 
mortgage payments, childcare costs, or both.2  Keep also promised that if the 
parties later separated, Indorf would recover the down payment he provided 
when the parties calculated their relative equity in the real property. 
 
[¶4]  In May 2019, Keep moved out of the property and filed a partition 
action.  Keep, through her counsel and in sworn discovery responses, denied 
the existence of the contract, repudiated the contract, and refused to honor the 
contract.  As such, Keep has breached or repudiated the parties’ contract for 
 
2  According to the complaint, the parties also agreed to share “the expenses, maintenance, and 
contributions to the property.” 
 
 
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Indorf to recover the down payment he provided in acquiring the real property, 
which has caused him to suffer damages. 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
[¶5]  The parties in this case, having never been married, initiated four 
separate actions due to the dissolution of their relationship: (1) a parental 
rights and responsibilities action regarding their minor child; (2) a small claims 
action regarding their personal property; (3) Keep’s partition action 
concerning their jointly owned home; and (4) Indorf’s contract action regarding 
the alleged agreement the parties made when they purchased their home.  This 
appeal arises from the court’s dismissal of Indorf’s contract action and the 
award of Keep’s attorney fees in defense of that action. 
[¶6]  On November 4, 2020, Indorf filed a two-count complaint against 
Keep, alleging that Keep breached their contract (Count 1) and seeking a 
declaratory judgment that establishes Keep’s equity in the property and 
declares that Indorf does not need to sell the property unless he lacks the 
financial capacity to retain it (Count 2).  On the same day, Indorf filed a 
M.R. Civ. P. 42(a) motion to consolidate the parties’ small claims, partition, and 
contract actions.3  In her answer to Indorf’s complaint, Keep raised the 
 
3  We take judicial notice of the dockets and other court records from the parties’ separate 
proceedings.  See Cabral v. L’Heureux, 2017 ME 50, ¶ 10, 157 A.3d 795.  The docket record from the 
 
 
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affirmative defense of res judicata and alleged that Indorf filed a “duplicative 
proceeding” with the intent to “increase [her] legal fees and to cause [her] 
hardship and further litigation.”  On July 8, 2021, after the resolution of the 
parties’ parental rights and responsibilities action, Indorf filed a second motion 
to consolidate the parties’ remaining contract and partition actions.  The court 
denied Indorf’s motions to consolidate. 
[¶7]  On October 18, 2021, Keep filed a M.R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for 
judgment on the pleadings in the contract action.  The court entered its 
judgment, granting Keep’s motion to dismiss and awarding Keep attorney fees, 
on January 31, 2022.  In dismissing Indorf’s contract action, the court applied a 
narrow exception to the Rule 12(c) standard of review—that allows the court 
to consider an affirmative defense if it is affirmatively demonstrated in the 
complaint—and considered Keep’s affirmative defense of res judicata that she 
raised in her answer.  The court reasoned that, if it were to rule in Indorf’s favor 
and grant him a declaratory judgment, the doctrine of res judicata would 
prevent the partitioning court from rendering a judgment on the same claims.  
 
parental rights and responsibilities action shows that the partition action and the small claims action 
were scheduled to be heard at the same time as the hearing on the parental rights and responsibilities 
action; however, the parties both agree that the court never reached the issues in these other actions 
at that hearing.  The hearing on the parties’ parental rights and responsibilities action was held on 
February 24 and 25, 2021, and that action was resolved by final order on June 30, 2021. 
 
 
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The court also reasoned, in the alternative, that if the partitioning court were 
to make a ruling before the court did, Indorf’s contract action would be barred. 
[¶8]  Although the court recognized that res judicata did not apply in this 
circumstance because there was no final judgment in either action,4 the court 
concluded that it faced an “inevitable issue of res judicata, also known as 
abatement,” and that dismissal of Indorf’s complaint would not substantially 
harm his rights.  Finally, the court found that, because Indorf had acknowledged 
that his claims would be adjudicated in Keep’s partition action, it was just and 
proper to award Keep attorney fees for her defense of Indorf’s contract action.  
Indorf timely appealed.  See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Motion to Consolidate 
 
[¶9]  Indorf first argues that the court abused its discretion by denying 
his motion to consolidate the contract and partition actions.  We review the 
court’s procedural decisions regarding consolidation of hearings for an abuse 
of discretion.  See Tucker v. Lilley, 2015 ME 36, ¶ 16, 114 A.3d 201. 
[¶10]  Rule 42(a) “complements the liberal provisions for joinder of 
claims and parties,” M.R. Civ. P. 42 Reporter’s Notes December 1, 1959, by 
 
4  The court, however, never conducted a full res judicata analysis. 
 
 
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allowing the court to consolidate issues or actions that involve “a common 
question of law or fact,” M.R. Civ. P. 42(a).  When deciding whether to 
consolidate, “the court shall give due regard to the convenience of parties and 
witnesses and the interests of justice.”  M.R. Civ. P. 42(c).  In Tucker, we held 
that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied a party’s motions to 
consolidate several cases regarding the proper allocation of attorney fees in a 
large jury verdict.  2015 ME 36, ¶¶ 16-17, 114 A.3d 201.  We explained that 
although our “standard of review is deferential, it does not give a trial court 
unfettered discretion to separate cases, or parts of cases, when closely-related 
claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims among the parties directly affect what 
any particular party may eventually be awarded and which party will be 
required to pay those awards.”  Id. ¶ 16.  We held that the trial court’s failure to 
consolidate was an abuse of discretion because “several important claims and 
issues . . . remain[ed] unresolved” and nearly all of the disputes had to “be 
resolved in one consolidated action before a single fact-finder.”  Id. ¶ 17. 
[¶11]  In this case, the court’s denial of Indorf’s motion to consolidate 
constituted an abuse of discretion, for two reasons.  First, the contract action 
and the partition action involve common questions of law and fact.  There are 
legal and factual questions as to whether a contract exists and, if so, whether its 
 
 
7 
terms would affect the division of the property in the partition action.5  Second, 
as in Tucker, Indorf and Keep’s closely related claims directly affect the other 
party’s requested relief.  Therefore, dismissing Indorf’s complaint may 
substantially harm his asserted right to recover his contribution toward the 
down payment on the real property. 
B. 
Abatement 
[¶12]  The court applied the doctrine of abatement in its dismissal of 
Indorf’s contract action.  In a defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, “only the legal sufficiency of the complaint is tested” because the 
motion “is nothing more than a motion under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss 
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  
Cunningham v. Haza, 538 A.2d 265, 267 (Me. 1988).  Thus, in ruling on Keep’s 
Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss, the court was required to assume that Indorf’s 
factual allegations were true, examine the complaint in the light most favorable 
to Indorf, and ascertain whether Indorf’s complaint alleged the elements of a 
cause of action or facts entitling him to relief on some legal theory.  See id. 
 
5  The overlap of the legal and factual questions in these actions is further underscored by the 
court’s own determination that res judicata was inevitable.  See Doe v. Forino, 2020 ME 135, ¶ 8, 
242 A.3d 1098 (explaining that one of the requirements of res judicata is that “the matters presented 
for decision in the second action were, or might have been, litigated in the first action.” (alteration 
and quotation marks omitted)); M.R. Civ. P. 42(a). 
 
 
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[¶13]  Although there is “one narrow exception” to the rule barring 
movants from taking advantage of affirmative defenses in a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, the exception requires that “the complaint itself 
affirmatively demonstrates the existence and the applicability of the 
affirmative defense.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Because Indorf’s complaint does 
not affirmatively demonstrate a res judicata affirmative defense, the narrow 
exception does not apply in this case.  Therefore, under the Rule 12(c) standard 
of review, the court should not have considered the res judicata affirmative 
defense raised in Keep’s answer.  Moreover, even if the court could have 
considered Keep’s affirmative defense, the remedy of abatement is available 
only if properly pleaded by a party, see, e.g., Fahy v. Brannagan, 56 Me. 42, 43-44 
(1868); 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 6 (2005) (explaining 
that “[a] party bringing a motion in abatement has the burden of proving the 
facts necessary to support a judgment of dismissal, including showing that he 
or she is within the reason for its enforcement”), and because Keep never 
pleaded abatement, the court’s application of the remedy sua sponte was 
inappropriate.6 
 
6  Because we conclude that the remedy of abatement was inappropriate, we do not need to reach 
the issue of whether the promulgation of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure effectively abrogated the 
doctrine of abatement.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the Rules’ allowance for liberal merger of claims 
and defenses, which increase the efficiency of proceedings in most instances, were better suited than 
 
 
9 
[¶14]  We therefore vacate the court’s order dismissing Indorf’s contract 
action.  The parties indicated at oral argument that the partition action had 
already gone to trial and was under advisement by the court.  We now take 
judicial notice of the court’s recent entry of its judgment in Keep’s partition 
action.  See Cabral v. L’Heureux, 2017 ME 50, ¶ 10, 157 A.3d 795.  We therefore 
leave the resolution of Indorf’s contract action to the trial court’s discretion, 
with the direction to use all appropriate trial management tools and practices 
available to resolve any remaining issues that were not addressed in its 
judgment entered in Keep’s partition action.7 
C. 
Attorney Fees 
 
[¶15]  Indorf also contends that the court erred by awarding Keep 
attorney fees because the circumstances do not fit within the exceptions to the 
American rule.  “[W]e review a court’s authority to award attorney fees 
de novo.”  Fortney & Weygandt, Inc. v. Lewiston DMEP IX, LLC, 2022 ME 5, ¶ 15, 
 
abatement to address these parties’ related claims.  See, e.g., M.R. Civ. P 12(g) & Reporter’s Notes 
(enabling parties to consolidate motions in defense of an action to prevent parties from “delaying an 
action by making successively a series of motions”); M.R Civ. P. 18 & Reporter’s Notes (“allow[ing] 
unlimited joinder of claims by a plaintiff or a counterclaiming defendant,” regardless of whether the 
claims are based in law or equity); M.R. Civ. P. 42 & Reporter’s Notes (containing provisions that 
allow for the consolidation of claims to “complement[] the liberal provisions for joinder of claims”). 
7  This opinion must not be construed to limit any otherwise available relief or remedy that Indorf 
may have in Keep’s partition action.  See, e.g., M.R. Civ. P. 60 (permitting relief from a judgment in 
certain circumstances). 
 
 
10 
267 A.3d 1094 (emphasis omitted).  “Maine follows the American rule that 
litigants bear their own attorney fees . . . .”  Soley v. Karll, 2004 ME 89, ¶ 10, 
853 A.2d 755.  A court may, however, award attorney fees under the following 
exceptions to the American rule: “(1) [a] contractual agreement of the parties, 
(2) clear statutory authority, or (3) the court’s inherent authority to sanction 
egregious conduct in a judicial proceeding.”  Fortney, 2022 ME 5, ¶ 12, 
267 A.3d 1094 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶16]  In determining that it was just and proper to award Keep attorney 
fees for her defense of Indorf’s contract action, the court relied upon its finding 
that Indorf had acknowledged that his claim would be adjudicated in 
Keep’s partition action.  The court’s limited finding regarding Indorf’s 
acknowledgment seems to suggest that the court, to some degree, accepted 
Keep’s argument that Indorf filed a “duplicative proceeding” with the intent “to 
increase [Keep’s] legal fees and to cause [her] hardship and further litigation.”  
Therefore, the court’s award of half of Keep’s attorney fees appears to have 
been a sanction for Indorf’s conduct in the parties’ litigation and thus based 
upon the court’s inherent authority to sanction egregious conduct in a judicial 
proceeding. 
 
 
11 
 
[¶17]  We have held that, given the American rule, “trial courts should 
exercise their inherent authority to award attorney fees as a sanction only in 
the most extraordinary circumstances.”  Baker v. Manter, 2001 ME 26, ¶ 14, 
765 A.2d 583 (quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, “[t]he trial court’s 
authority to sanction parties and attorneys for abuse of the litigation process 
should be sparingly used and sanctions imposed only when the abuse of [the 
litigation] process by parties or counsel is clear.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
In Baker, for example, we vacated the award of attorney fees, despite the 
defendant’s egregious actions toward the plaintiff, because the defendant’s 
conduct was not abusive of the litigation process.8  Id. ¶ 16-17.  In Baker, we 
reasoned that where there is no abuse of the litigation process, the court lacks 
the inherent authority to sanction parties.  See id. ¶ 16 (explaining that the court 
has other available remedies when a “litigant acts outside of the proceedings in 
contempt of the court’s order, or with malice towards other parties”). 
 
8  In contrast, we have held that the court did not err in awarding attorney fees where a party 
“repeatedly refused to comply with a final order of the court . . . [and] filed multiple suits in several 
jurisdictions . . . [that] amounted to little more than collateral attacks on the [court’s] order.”  Linscott 
v. Foy, 1998 ME 206, ¶¶ 16-19, 716 A.2d 1017 (emphasis added) (“[W]e have no difficulty concluding 
that these actions were undertaken in bad faith and were abusive of the court . . . , thereby providing 
the court with authority to consider imposition of attorney fees”); see also Soley v. Karll, 2004 ME 89, 
¶¶ 14-15, 853 A.2d 755 (vacating an award of attorney fees because, despite the parties causing a 
delay in an eviction proceeding by filing a bankruptcy petition, “it [was] not apparent that the delay 
. . . was an extraordinary circumstance” and there was “no evidence that [the parties] refused to obey 
a court order”). 
 
 
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[¶18]  In this case, the court erred when it awarded Keep attorney fees.  
Under the American rule, Keep and Indorf were responsible for paying their 
own attorney fees, unless the action fell within one of the three exceptions.  
There is no statutory authority for the award of attorney fees in this case, nor 
is there any agreement between the parties that entitled Keep to receipt of her 
attorney fees.  Finally, there is no support in this record for any contention that 
Indorf clearly abused the litigation process.  We, therefore, vacate the award of 
attorney fees. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment dismissing Indorf’s contract and 
declaratory judgment action and awarding 
attorney fees vacated.  Remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keith P. Richard, Esq. (orally), Westbrook, for appellant Christopher Indorf 
 
Pamela Holmes, Esq. (orally), and Mary-Ann Letourneau, Esq., Holmes Legal 
Group, LLC, Wells, for appellee Heather Keep 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number CV-2020-110 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY