Case Title: Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc.1995 WY 114899 P.2d 56Case Number: 94-77Decided: 07/21/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Shane 
D. NEAL, 

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 v.

 CABALLO ROJO, INC., 

Appellee 
(Employer), 

and 

State 
of Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 

Appellee 
(Objector-Defendant).

 

R. 
Douglas Dumbrill and Thomas E. Lubnau II of Lubnau, Hand & Bailey, Gillette, 
for appellant.

Catherine 
W. Hansen of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, for Caballo Rojo.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen.; Kenneth E. Spurrier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne; and M. 
Greg Carlson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Drew & Carlson, Gillette, for State, 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The primary 
question in this case is whether changes in the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act, WYO. STAT. §§ 27-14-101 to -805 (1991 & Supp. 1994), justify the entry 
of a summary judgment by a hearing examiner in a contested case. Collateral 
questions are raised with respect to the necessity of reporting injuries 
occurring over a period of time pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-502 and the 
propriety of a summary judgment in this case. We hold the statute has been 
changed to justify the availability of summary judgment in the administrative 
proceeding. Consistent with prior rulings, we hold an injury which develops over 
a period of time must be reported after it is diagnosed, and the entry of a 
summary judgment in this case was appropriate. We affirm the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Summary Judgment and the Order Denying 
Benefits entered in the Office of Administrative Hearings by the hearing 
examiner.

[¶2]      In his Brief of 
Employee - Appellant Shane D. Neal, the employee (Neal) identifies these 
issues:

1. 
Is summary judgment available to bar hearing of the facts in this Worker's 
Compensation case?

2. 
When this worker's injury occurred over a substantial period of time and there 
was no accident, can his case be dismissed for not timely filing an accident 
report?

In 
the Brief of Appellees (Employer & Objector), filed by Caballo Rojo, Inc. 
(Caballo) and the State of Wyoming (State), the issues are stated in this 
way:

A. 
Was the Hearing Officer Entitled to Utilize Summary Judgment Proceedings in the 
Administrative Forum Below?

B. 
Are There Any Disputed Issues of Material Fact Which Would Preclude Grant of 
Summary Judgment in Favor of Appellees?

C. 
Was the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law Granting Summary Judgment to 
Appellees in Accordance with the Law?

[¶3]      Before we 
consider the facts in this particular case, we must dispose of the question of 
whether a summary judgment is available in an administrative proceeding 
addressing issues under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act. Neal sought 
judicial review of the administrative proceeding, and the case then was 
certified to our court pursuant to WYO.R.APP.P. 12.09(b) upon a joint 
stipulation for certification by the parties. Neal contends that summary 
judgment is not available in administrative proceedings arising under the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, relying upon State, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1990), and Jackson v. State, 
ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 786 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1990). Caballo and the 
State agree Jackson and Halstead stand for the proposition that an 
administrative hearing officer has a limited power to invoke a summary judgment 
to dispose of the agency case. We noted in Halstead, however, that we were not 
considering the effect of the amendment to the statute now found in WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-602(b) (1991) which provides, in pertinent part:

The 
case shall be determined by a hearing examiner in accordance with the law in 
effect at the time of the injury following the contested case procedures of the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure as 
applicable under rules of the office of administrative hearings.

We 
recall the rationale of Jackson:

Additional 
restrictions [in addition to general due process considerations of fairness and 
specific statutory restrictions] are imposed by the often stated principle that 
an agency enjoys only those powers which the legislature has expressly 
conferred and the corollary rule of construction that statutes under which 
an agency purports to exercise a doubtful power must be strictly construed 
against the exercise of that power. Hupp v. Employment Security Comm'n, 715 P.2d 223, 225 (Wyo. 1986); Tri-County Electric Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Gillette, 525 P.2d 3, 8-9 (Wyo. 1974).

Jackson, 
786 P.2d, at 878 (emphasis added).

It 
appears that the legislature expressly has conferred authority to invoke the 
WYOMING RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, and the RULES FOR CONTESTED CASE PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS (1993) (hereinafter RULES 
FOR CONTESTED CASE PRACTICE) now provide in Chapter I, Section 6, entitled 
"General Course of Contested Case Proceedings:"

Unless 
otherwise provided by law, proceedings before the Office are governed by the 
contested case provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and, to 
the extent their application is not inconsistent with the particular 
administrative contested case proceeding, the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure and other court rules may be looked to for guidance. (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶4]      We hold that, to 
paraphrase Jackson, the legislature conferred authority upon the Office of 
Administrative Hearings to invoke the summary judgment rules of the WYOMING 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. The RULES FOR CONTESTED CASE PRACTICE specifically 
provide that the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are invoked for guidance. The 
desirability of resolving the case when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law * * *" (WYO.R.CIV.P. 56(c)) 
is as desirable in an administrative proceeding as it may be in a case before 
the court. In light of the amendment of the statute and the adoption of the 
WYOMING RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE by the RULES FOR CONTESTED CASE PRACTICE, a 
summary judgment can be utilized in a case before the Office of Administrative 
Hearings and should be granted when appropriate.

[¶5]      We turn then to 
the substantive disposition of the case by the hearing examiner. Our examination 
of the record satisfies us there are no genuine issues of material fact in this 
case. Before he was employed at Caballo, Neal worked in heavy industry, in the 
oil fields, in construction, and as a truck driver. In 1984, he began working at 
Caballo as a heavy equipment operator. During eight years of employment, he 
operated haul trucks, blades, dozers, loaders, shovels, and water trucks. In 
addition, he worked for a while in blasting, which included working with a 
sledge hammer, dragging cable, and oiling the shovel.

[¶6]      The essence of 
Neal's claim of injury is that the seats in the vehicles and the machinery he 
operated for Caballo caused the injury to his back because they were worn, 
wobbled, leaned, and needed to be replaced. He contends he learned some 
equipment seats caused him more discomfort than others, and he notified Caballo 
of that fact. His position is that Caballo discouraged him from reporting the 
poor conditions of the seats.

[¶7]      In 1986, Neal 
began to experience frequent low-back pain which intensified during the work 
day. Over time, it extended to his midback and then to his neck and head. He 
began to develop shooting pains in his left leg and those symptoms finally 
extended into his right leg down to his toes. He consulted a physician for 
treatment in 1986. By 1987, he was often working ten-hour shifts with only a 
half hour for lunch and no other breaks. He utilized acetaminophen to relieve 
his pain and, in the evenings, he would use heating pads and hot tubs. As the 
condition progressed, he began to experience pain and cramps in the calves of 
his legs and began to have difficulty sleeping because of pain. In 1988, he 
consulted three physicians about his symptoms, and one physician discussed the 
potential for disc excision surgery to remedy his back pain.

[¶8]      In late 1988 or 
early 1989, he became an equipment operator trainer. His symptoms eased when he 
was in the classroom but, when he supervised the trainees on the job and sat on 
armrests and in back windows, his pain became intense. He finally told his 
supervisor he couldn't sit in the equipment and supervise the trainees, and 
Caballo then reassigned him to equipment operation. He went back to the ten-hour 
shifts and accrued 300 to 400 hours of overtime during the year. Neal claims 
much of the overtime was forced upon him because Caballo required employees to 
sign time cards refusing overtime work. He believed Caballo noted in permanent 
employee records those instances in which employees turned down 
overtime.

[¶9]      In 1990 through 
1992, he was assigned to the blasting duties. The back pain diminished and, many 
days, he was totally free from pain. When he was shoveling, that pain would 
recur. The blasting duties ended, and Neal was reassigned to equipment 
operation. His back pain returned, and he "wrote up" the seats which he found to 
be as bad as ever.

[¶10]   Neal testified that, on March 29, 
1992, he was knocked down while he and his crew were moving a shovel. He 
continued to work that day, but became stiff and developed pain. About one month 
later and, again two months later, he went to a chiropractor. He experienced no 
relief, but neither was there any increase in pain or stiffness. Later, he began 
to miss work because of back pain and, on September 6, 1992, he was advised by a 
physician in Salt Lake City that he should seek surgical relief. The surgery was 
accomplished on September 9, 1992.

[¶11]   Up until the time of his surgery, 
Neal had filed no report with his employer, and he did not file a report of 
occupational injury or disease in the district court until February 11, 1993. He 
had signed that document on February 2, 1993. Caballo concedes it knew, on 
February 10, 1993, Curnow intended to file a claim. After the claim was filed, 
the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division (Division) requested additional 
information which Neal provided. The Division then denied the claim because he 
had not reported the injury within the time required by WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-502(a). Neal objected to this Final Determination, and the matter was 
referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for the contested case 
hearing.

[¶12]   Discovery was conducted in 
connection with the contested case proceeding. The following information is 
taken from Neal's deposition:

Q. 
Okay. So you believed, at least at that point in time, that your back pain was 
work related back in 1986?

A. 
Yes.

Q. 
And then in 1988, you went to see Dr. Tejano? Is it Dr. Tejano?

A. 
Yes.

Q. 
In Kansas?

A. 
Yes.

Q. 
And he discussed at that point this disc excision, the potential for the surgery 
with you then, didn't he?

A. 
He discussed that with me, yes.

Q. 
And at that time you had a series of tests done on your back in Kansas, 
correct?

A. 
Yes.

Q. 
And then this letter from your attorney and other things I've read reflect that 
in July of '92, you came to a point where you were having a lot of pain and 
finally decided to go off work and get some surgery, right?

A. 
Yes.

Q. 
And that was when you went and saw Dr. Thoen in August?

A. 
Dr. Lamb?

Q. 
And Dr. Thoen?

A. 
Right.

Q. 
I think Dr. Thoen assisted in the CT scan and other tests?

A. 
Right, he did an EMG and stuff like that.

Q. 
On your neck and lower back?

A. 
Right.

Q. 
And then it was at that point in time that Dr. Lamb talked with you about the 
disc excision and fusion surgery, correct?

A. 
Yes.

Q. 
And then you actually underwent that surgery on September 9th, '82 [sic]; is 
that right?

* 
* * * * *

Q. 
But then it wasn't until February 2nd [sic], 1993, that you actually filed your 
claim with Workers' Comp?

A. 
Yes, I believe that's the date.

[¶13]   Recently, we held WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-502 requires reporting of an injury under these circumstances. Curnow v. 
State of Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., No. 94-189, 1995 
WL 429449, ___ P.2d ___ (Wyo. July 21, 1995). The pertinent language of the 
statute provides:

As 
soon as is practical but not later than seventy-two (72) hours after the general 
nature of the injury became apparent, an injured employee shall report the 
occurrence and general nature of the accident to the employer and within ten 
(10) days after the injury became apparent, file the report in the office of the 
clerk of court of the county in which the accident occurred.

WYO. 
STAT. § 27-14-502(a) (1991).

In 
Curnow, we cited to Big Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1972), 
for the proposition that the term "injury" in this statute alludes to a 
compensable injury. We reiterated our rule that the injury is compensable when 
it is properly diagnosed, citing Little America Refining Co. v. Witt, 854 P.2d 51 (Wyo. 1993). In Curnow, No. 94-189, 1995 WL 429449, at [*]3, ___ P.2d at ___, 
we said, "[w]e are satisfied Curnow knew he had suffered a compensable injury at 
least on July 6, 1993, after his visit with the orthopedic 
physician."

[¶14]   When we review Neal's testimony, he 
concedes he discussed the potential for surgery in 1988. He agrees that, in July 
of 1992, he decided to take time off from work and have the surgery. The 
following month, he discussed surgery with his physician, and the surgery was 
accomplished on September 9. It is clear Neal knew he had suffered a compensable 
injury, at least by the date of the surgery and in fact when he decided, upon 
consultation with his physician, to have the surgery. Under Curnow and the cases 
cited there, it is probable Neal knew as early as 1988 he had suffered a 
compensable injury.

[¶15]   Neal argues, creatively, that in 
the instance of an injury occurring over a period of time, no reporting is 
required pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-502 because there is no "accident" which 
is alluded to in the statute. His position is that he is only required to meet 
the one-year period for filing a claim set forth in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-503. The 
cases which we have cited above are squarely contrary to Neal's position. In 
Aanenson v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 
1083 (Wyo. 1992), we noted an important role for WYO. STAT. § 27-14-503 in 
"providing certainty and a ripe opportunity to investigate an injury." The same 
role is served by WYO. STAT. § 27-14-502, particularly with respect to the 
monitoring of medical treatment. See Curnow.

[¶16]   We harmonize these two statutes by 
holding that, even in the case of an injury which occurs over a period of time, 
the reporting requirements of WYO. STAT. § 27-14-502 are as important as the 
filing requirements of WYO. STAT. § 27-14-503, perhaps more so. It is apparent 
from the language of WYO. STAT. § 27-14-502(c) (providing there is a presumption 
of denial of claim unless the injured workman rebuts it by evidence that the 
employer or the division was not prejudiced in investigating the accident and in 
monitoring medical treatment) that the legislature was relying upon the statute 
to afford the employer or the Division an opportunity to investigate and monitor 
medical treatment. In contrast, the primary thrust of WYO. STAT. § 27-14-503 is 
that of the usual statute of limitations, to avoid stale claims.

[¶17]   After discovery was completed, 
Caballo and the State filed a Combined Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, in 
which they asserted that the failure of Neal to give timely notice of his claim 
and file his report of injury entitled them to judgment as a matter of law. The 
hearing examiner held a hearing on the motion and granted it. In the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Summary Judgment, the hearing 
examiner found Neal was aware of the general nature of his injuries in 1986, and 
he then believed they were related to his employment. The hearing examiner 
further found that, certainly no later than 1988, the general nature of his 
injuries was apparent to Neal. The hearing examiner also found there was no 
report of injury filed until February of 1993, and Neal continued with his 
employment until 1992.

[¶18]   In addressing the law, the hearing 
examiner concluded that, for purposes of WYO. STAT. § 27-14-502, Neal was aware 
of the general nature of his injuries between 1986 and 1988 and believed those 
injuries were related to his employment. The examiner ruled Neal was required, 
but failed, to report his injuries to Caballo and to file a report of injury 
with the clerk of court within the time limits set forth in WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-502. The hearing examiner then invoked the presumption found in WYO. STAT. 
§ 27-14-502(c), which provides:

Failure 
of the injured employee, any dependent or personal representative to report the 
accident to the employer and to file the report with the clerk of court in 
accordance with subsection (a) of this section is a presumption that the claim 
shall be denied. The presumption may be rebutted if the employee establishes by 
clear and convincing evidence a lack of prejudice to the employer or division in 
investigating the accident and in monitoring medical treatment.

The 
hearing examiner concluded the untimely reporting by Neal prejudiced both 
Caballo and the Division in monitoring his medical treatment and in their 
investigation of his injury. The hearing examiner further concluded Neal had the 
opportunity to rebut that presumption of prejudice through clear and convincing 
evidence, but he failed to do so. This resulted in the grant of summary judgment 
as a matter of law.

[¶19]   Caballo presented an affidavit from 
an employee relations/safety supervisor stating Caballo was prejudiced by its 
inability to reconstruct or investigate the variety and multitude of incidents 
which allegedly caused Neal's injuries over a period of six years. He also 
stated Caballo was prejudiced because it was precluded from following policies 
for reporting work-related injuries and for processing workers' compensation 
claims. Those policies include requirements that any work-related accidents and 
injuries must be reported as soon as possible, but no later than the end of the 
shift in which they occurred; the directives relating to accident reporting be 
made available to employees in the employees' health and safety manual and the 
supervisor's guide for health and safety; and injured employees be accompanied 
to the hospital by a person in management. The affidavit reflects the purpose of 
these policies is to ensure Caballo is able to monitor medical treatment, choice 
of physicians, obtain an early diagnosis, and minimize the seriousness of the 
injury. The purpose also encompasses the opportunity to investigate the 
workplace, interview witnesses, and obtain essential onsite information 
surrounding an injury. In addition, these purposes include the monitoring of the 
workplace duties, and the adjustment of duties or work environment relating to 
the injury if that is necessary.

[¶20]   The Division also submitted an 
affidavit, through its claims unit supervisor, in which the Division declared it 
was prejudiced because it was precluded from properly monitoring, investigating, 
auditing, approving, denying, or otherwise dealing with Neal's claims. 
Specifically, upon the receipt of a report of occupational injury or disease, 
the Division, through physicians, nurses, medically-trained personnel and 
independent medical review, monitors claims for necessity and propriety of the 
treatment; monitors fees to determine if they are in accordance with the amount 
specified for procedures, services, and supplies; and verifies certification by 
health providers that the treatment rendered is for the injury which forms the 
basis of the claim. Neal presented no evidence addressing any of the facts 
articulated in these affidavits.

[¶21]   In light of Curnow, the hearing 
examiner could have granted summary judgment based upon the record and the 
conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact. The hearing 
examiner, however, properly invoked the statutory presumption.

[¶22]   We recognized, in a summary 
judgment context, the thrust of a presumption in Anderson v. Schulz, 527 P.2d 151, 152 (Wyo. 1974), where we alluded to the rule that structures a presumption 
of due care when the plaintiff has suffered amnesia:

Both 
parties to a motion for summary judgment are entitled to any presumption 
applicable, Caldwell v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Company, D.C.Pa. [1971], 322 F. Supp. 43, 44; 6 Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 56.15[3], p. 2343 (2d Ed.). For 
the same holding, see Becker v. Safelite Glass Corporation, D.C.Kan. [1965], 244 F. Supp. 625, 631, with an explanation of the reason for this rule as 
follows:

"* 
* * And the same reasons that warrant the use of presumptions at trial warrant 
their use in a summary judgment hearing. * * *"

Earlier, 
we had acknowledged the thrust of a presumption in the context of summary 
judgment proceedings. Edmonds v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 518 P.2d 7 (Wyo. 
1974).

[¶23]   We hold, in considering the motion 
for summary judgment before it, the Office of Hearing Examiners properly invoked 
the presumption found in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-502(c). In light of that 
presumption, Neal was required to present clear and convincing evidence that the 
employer and the Division experienced no prejudice in either investigating the 
accident or in monitoring medical treatment. Neal presented nothing.

[¶24]   We hold summary judgment is 
available in contested case hearings before the Office of Hearing Examiners. It 
should be invoked when, in the language of WYO.R.CIV.P. 56(c), "[t]here is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and * * * the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as matter of law." Caballo and the State were entitled to the benefit 
of the presumption set forth in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-502(c), and Neal failed to 
offer any clear and convincing evidence that there was no prejudice. We reject 
the assertion that WYO. STAT. § 27-14-502 is not applicable to injuries 
occurring over a period of time based upon our cases in this area. The Office of 
Hearing Examiners appropriately and correctly granted the joint motion for 
summary judgment. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting 
Summary Judgment and the Order Denying Benefits are affirmed.