Case Title: People v. Gonzales

Citation: 

Docket Number: s072316

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
Filed 6/2/11 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S072316 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
VERONICA UTILIA GONZALES, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. SCD114421 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
         
 
 
Defendant Veronica Utilia Gonzales was convicted of murdering Genny Rojas.1  
The jury found as special circumstances that the murder was intentional and involved the 
infliction of torture,2 and occurred while defendant was engaged in the commission and 
attempted commission of mayhem.3  It returned a verdict of death.  On this automatic 
appeal, we affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
I.  FACTS 
 
A.  Guilt Phase 
 
 
1.  Prosecution 
 
Defendant was the aunt of Genny Rojas.  Genny and her siblings were removed 
from the custody of defendant‘s sister Mary Rojas, after Mary went into a drug 
rehabilitation program and her husband was arrested for child molestation.  Genny was 
                                              
1  
Penal Code, section 187, subdivision (a).  Further undesignated statutory 
references are to the Penal Code. 
2  
Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18). 
3  
Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(J). 
 
2 
 
first placed with defendant‘s mother, but defendant agreed to take Genny in because her 
mother had other children to care for.  Early in 1995, when she was four years old, Genny 
came to live with defendant, her husband Ivan, and their six children in an apartment in 
Chula Vista. 
 
On the evening of July 21, 1995, Marisa Lozano, a young neighbor in the 
apartment building, was standing outside when she heard a child crying in defendant‘s 
apartment.  Shortly thereafter, she heard a bang, ―like if something hit a wall.‖  The 
crying stopped.  Ivan Gonzales looked out a window, then shut it and closed the curtains.  
A few minutes later Ivan came out of the apartment, slammed the door, and left, looking 
angry.  Marisa‘s Aunt Noemi then called for her to come inside, as she was supposed to 
each night at 8:00.  Ivan appeared at a local liquor store around 8:45 p.m., where he 
bought milk, cereal, and candy.  No more than an hour later Marisa heard a commotion, 
and someone said that a little girl had died.  Going outside, Marisa saw Ivan carrying a 
child into the apartment where Marisa‘s Aunt Patti lived.  Marisa heard defendant say, 
―don‘t call the cops.‖ 
 
Noemi Espinoza testified that sometime after 9:00 that evening there was some 
noise and she heard someone call to her.  She came out of her apartment and saw Ivan 
carrying a little girl.  Noemi asked him what had happened.  Ivan told her the child had 
burned herself with hot water, and that she did not know how to regulate the water.  
Defendant was standing next to Ivan.  Noemi asked him to bring the child into her sister 
Patti‘s apartment, which was across from the Gonzaleses‘.  Ivan did so, followed by 
defendant.  He placed the child on the floor as Noemi told him to do.  She had been 
trained as a nurse‘s assistant, and proceeded to check for a pulse and breathing.  There 
were none, and the body was dry, very cold, and slightly rigid.  Nevertheless, Noemi tried 
to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and told her husband to call 911.  
Defendant ―said not to call the police because they will get blamed for it.‖  Noemi was 
unable to revive the child, and believed she had been dead for a while.  Noemi noticed a 
 
3 
 
bald spot on the child‘s head, marks on her neck and right arm, and a purplish color on 
her leg. 
 
While Noemi was attempting CPR, defendant was running in and out of the 
apartment, looking very nervous.  Ivan sat on the couch but left after a couple of minutes.  
Noemi remembered that earlier in the evening, between 6:00 and 7:00, the Gonzaleses‘ 
son Ivan, Jr. had come to Patti‘s apartment and asked for some rubbing alcohol.  Noemi 
noticed that ―he had a very weird, blank stare.‖ 
 
Around 9:20 p.m., officers William Moe and Barry Bennett of the Chula Vista 
police arrived at the scene.  Moe met defendant as he approached the apartment.  
Defendant told him she had put the baby in the bathtub, and later found her not breathing.  
Moe checked the child for a pulse and respiration, but did not attempt CPR because both 
he and Bennett concluded she was ―obviously dead.‖  The body was ―very cold to the 
touch.‖  Bennett noted that the child was wearing only a shirt, which was dry, as was her 
hair.  She had bare patches and open wounds on her scalp, signs of trauma on her face, 
and a ligature mark under her throat.  She was ―a little rigid,‖ leading Bennett to think 
that rigor mortis might be setting in.  As he knelt next to the body, defendant said she had 
run the bath water, put the child in the bath, and then gone to cook dinner.  About 20 
minutes later, she returned and the child had slipped under the water, so she grabbed her 
and went to another apartment to call 911.  As defendant spoke, Ivan was sitting there 
―like an observer.‖  Moe and Bennett then went to the Gonzales apartment, where they 
found the other children.  The bathtub was empty and dry. 
 
Ten or fifteen minutes after the police arrived, the fire department came to the 
apartment.  The fireman who assessed the victim found her cold and without a pulse.  
When he tilted her head and grasped her chin to try to open an airway, he found that her 
jaw was locked and her teeth tightly clenched, an ―obvious sign‖ of rigor mortis.  He did 
not try CPR, deciding it was too late. 
 
4 
 
 
A medical examiner arrived around 1:00 a.m.  He noted a thermal burn from the 
waist to the toes and numerous other injuries on the body, especially the face.  An 
autopsy was performed later that morning.  A burn injury extended irregularly from the 
top of Genny‘s head down and across the back of her scalp.  This burn was in the process 
of healing, but was infected.  The medical examiner estimated that it was from six days to 
several weeks old.  There was hair loss in the burn area, and thinning and bald patches 
elsewhere on the scalp.  These could have been caused by the hair being pulled out or by 
nutritional deficiencies.  There were scars on Genny‘s shoulders that were consistent with 
burn injuries.  They matched the burned area on the back of her head, if the neck was 
bent back.  An area of hair was spared between the burn on the head and the shoulders, 
which was also consistent with the head being tilted back at the time of the burn.  The 
injury could have been caused by a hot liquid being poured over Genny‘s head. 
 
The examiner discovered a subdural hematoma inside the skull.  This was a life-
threatening injury for a four-year-old like Genny.  It could have been caused by a blow or 
by violent shaking, and appeared to be a few hours old.  The examiner also noted a 
subarachnoid hemorrhage, which is typically the result of a direct impact to the head.  
This was not a life-threatening injury, and was weeks or perhaps months old.  There was 
a pinpoint hemorrhage, or petechiae, in the white of Genny‘s right eye.  This injury, 
which can be caused by strangulation, normally disappears after a few days if the victim 
survives.  The area around the right eye was bruised.  The examiner estimated that this 
injury was a few days old.  The left eye was also bruised.  There were abrasions above 
both eyes in the eyebrow area.  Linear abrasions extended across Genny‘s face from her 
left ear, and the skin was worn away on the bridge of her nose.  The skin on the rim of 
both ears was also worn off, exposing the cartilage.  These abrasions could have been 
caused by a tight band around her head. 
 
There were bruises on Genny‘s right cheek and chin.  On both cheeks, there were 
recent burns in a grid pattern, which matched the grill of a blow dryer found in the 
 
5 
 
Gonzales apartment.4  These appeared to have occurred within hours before Genny‘s 
death.  One of these scars curved in a way that indicated Genny may have pulled away 
when it was inflicted.  Both cheeks also bore multiple small circular marks, which could 
have been caused by the bristles of a brush.  Inside Genny‘s lower lip was a laceration, 
extending down into the gutter between the gum and lip.  This injury was inflamed, and 
could have been several days old. 
 
Genny‘s neck was marked with linear scars, ulcerated in places, which were 
consistent with a long period of hanging with her weight partially supported by her feet.  
They were probably one to three weeks old.  There were also linear, ulcerated scars 
around Genny‘s upper arms, which could have been caused by handcuffs over an 
extended period.5  Scars on her wrists could have been caused by handcuffs or by a cord.  
On her right shoulder were burn marks in a grid pattern matching the burns on Genny‘s 
cheeks, and the shoulder was scraped as well.  The left arm had multiple injuries, 
including abrasions and a recent bruise, the handcuff scars, diagonal scars that appeared 
to be old injuries, and recent burns in the grid pattern.  The top of the left shoulder was 
bruised and abraded, with some triangular scars.  Genny‘s thighs were bruised in a 
pattern indicating that they had been grabbed forcefully, several times.  There were 
ulcerated areas on the back of her ankles, which were several days to a couple of weeks 
old.  Genny‘s spleen and thymus glands were atrophied, a sign of chronic stress. 
 
The burn on Genny‘s lower body was a deep, third-degree burn, which removed 
the superficial layer of her skin.  Areas on the back of her knees were spared, indicating 
that she had been kneeling when burned.  Similar sparing was evident in the groin area, 
where the skin was pressed together and thus protected from the hot water.  This burn, 
                                              
4  
The blow dryer was set on high, and not plugged in when it was collected by an 
evidence technician. 
5  
A pair of handcuffs were found in the Gonzales apartment, and they matched 
Genny‘s scars. 
 
6 
 
which extended from Genny‘s chest to her feet, was recent, probably hours old.  It 
appeared to be a forcible immersion burn, in which she was held down with her hands 
and arms out of the water, unable to get herself up.  There was no evidence of the 
splashing that would have occurred if she tried to get out of the water.  The burn could 
have been inflicted in three to 10 seconds by water between 140 and 148 degrees.  This 
burn was the cause of death, although it would have been a survivable burn had treatment 
been sought.  Without treatment, a child Genny‘s size would go into shock and die in as 
little as three hours.  As the state of shock progressed, the child would slowly lose 
consciousness, becoming pale, cold, and clammy.  Rigor mortis could set in within two or 
three hours of death.  The examiner ruled out drowning as a cause of death, because there 
was no water in Genny‘s lungs.  He deemed the death a homicide, in that the burn did not 
appear to be accidental. 
 
The prosecutor also called to the stand a pediatrician with expertise in injuries 
caused by child abuse, including burns and head injuries.  The doctor‘s testimony was 
consistent with that of the medical examiner, whose report he had reviewed.  The doctor 
further noted, based on his examination of photographs of Genny‘s injuries, that areas on 
her buttocks were less burned than surrounding areas, suggesting she had been held down 
so that the bottom of the tub kept the buttocks from contacting the hot water.  From a 
single splash mark burn on her torso, he concluded that the water was between 140 and 
150 degrees, and that she had entered the water vigorously.  From the overall pattern of 
the burn he deduced that she had been immersed for around 10 seconds in a fully filled 
tub of hot water, with her knees flexed, leaning forward.  Considerable force had to have 
been applied to produce the areas of spared skin, and to prevent Genny from escaping. 
 
The burn could not have been caused by adding hot water to a tub half full of 
water at a tolerable temperature.  The doctor testified that shock was the likely cause of 
death.  The state of shock could have peaked within a few hours, with death occurring 
soon thereafter.  With modern burn care, the survival rate for such a burn would be in the 
 
7 
 
range of 90 percent, although the victim would be permanently scarred and might suffer 
long-term problems such as joint deformity. 
 
The doctor found the burn injury on the back of Genny‘s head inconsistent with a 
scenario in which she had spilled a pot of hot food from a stove, because the burn was 
restricted to the back of the head and the shoulders.  It was also unlikely to have been 
caused by hot tap water, unless Genny had been lying on her stomach with her head tilted 
back under the tap.  It could have been caused by pouring a cup of hot water onto the 
scalp while tilting the head back.  The subdural hematoma Genny suffered was caused by 
the application of great force, as was the injury to her lip.  The triangular marks on her 
shoulder appeared to be burns inflicted with a barrel-shaped object like a curling iron. 
 
An evidence technician came to the Gonzales apartment the night Genny died.  A 
residue of human skin, including toenails, was found in the bathtub.  The water 
temperature from the tap reached 156 degrees, then dropped to 148 degrees after five 
minutes.  After running for 15 minutes, the water in the tub reached the overflow drain 
and was 140 degrees. 
 
One of the bedroom doors had a rag tied around both doorknobs, attached to a 
piece of twine that was tied to a drawer handle on a nightstand close to the wall and near 
the door.  In the area between the door, the nightstand, and the wall was a blanket.  The 
blanket was moist, smelled of urine and feces, and appeared to be bloodstained.  In the 
wall behind the door was an indentation about 36 inches from the floor, which matched 
the size of Genny‘s head and was stained with what appeared to be blood or diluted 
blood.  There were similar stains elsewhere on this area of the wall, which could have 
been produced by the wispy hair on the back of Genny‘s head.  A cut-off section of pant 
leg was found in this room, tied on one side so as to form a cap or hood.  Hair and what 
appeared to be bloodstains were found on this material. 
 
In a closet in the same bedroom was a large wooden box.  A sliding door had been 
removed from its track and leaned into the closet, propped against the box and braced by 
 
8 
 
a desk outside the closet.  The top edge of the box next to the closet wall was about two 
inches wide.  A reddish-brown material consistent with blood or feces was collected from 
this surface.  A stain on the edge of the box appeared to be a toe print, and there were 
more stains inside the box, as well as feces.  Above the box in the center of the closet was 
a brace supporting the wooden clothes bar.  Attached to this brace was a strong steel 
hook.  There was a hole in the closet door, positioned so that by looking through the hole 
from the outside one would see the hook.  Bloodstains were found on the underside of the 
clothes bar, the brace, the inside of the closet door, and the back wall of the closet above 
the box.  Among the stains on the wall was a small footprint, just above the box. 
 
An expert in bloodstain pattern analysis testified that the stains in the closet were 
consistent with a 38-inch tall child with a head injury having been fastened to the hook by 
the neck while standing on the box, and shaking or rubbing blood onto the various 
surfaces where it was found.  Because of the patterns, and the fact that some of the stains 
appeared to be blood diluted with serous fluid from the wounds, the expert believed there 
were a number of such episodes. 
 
The prosecutor presented two videotaped interviews defendant gave to the police 
after waiving her right to remain silent.  The jurors were given transcripts.  The 
prosecutor began with the second interview, conducted on July 24, 1995, several days 
after Genny‘s death.  Defendant said she had begun making dinner around 7:00 on the 
night Genny died.  She put Genny in a lukewarm bath around 7:30.  Ivan was in the 
kitchen.  Defendant looked in on Genny after seven to 10 minutes.  Ivan went to the store 
and came back in less than five minutes.  About 20 minutes after she first checked on 
Genny, defendant took the blow dryer away from her children because they had been 
playing with it and it was hot.  As she walked past the bathroom, she saw Genny lying in 
the tub, face up but turned to the side.  The water was now very hot. 
 
Defendant said she pulled Genny from the tub and called Ivan.  They took her into 
a bedroom and used a fan to try to cool her off.  They also used rubbing alcohol in an 
 
9 
 
effort to cool her and to rouse her with the smell.  They blew on her, and attempted CPR.  
Water was coming out of her mouth.  After five or 10 minutes, Genny was not 
responding, so defendant went to Patti‘s apartment for help.  Defendant saw that Genny 
was red when she took her out of the bath, and her skin was peeling.  When asked if she 
saw marks on Genny‘s face or neck, defendant said she ―couldn‘t say there were marks 
on her face‖ but admitted ―she had that little one on her neck.‖  However, defendant 
could not explain the ligature mark, which she said had been there for about a week.  Nor 
could she account for the marks on Genny‘s arms, which she said were also about a week 
old.  Defendant had no explanation for why Genny‘s upper body was not burned in the 
bathtub. 
 
At this point, the officer questioning defendant told her that Ivan had said he 
wouldn‘t take the blame for something defendant had done, and claimed he had spoken to 
defendant about how she disciplined Genny.  Defendant was surprised and upset, and 
expressed disbelief.  However, she quickly asserted that she was not going to be blamed 
for anything she did not do, and soon began implicating Ivan.  She said, ―he would hit her 
too‖ and ―he has a heavier arm than me.‖  Defendant insisted she did not hold Genny in 
the water, and said, ―I can put that on him maybe.‖  Ivan had been in the bathroom a 
couple of times during Genny‘s bath, and had spanked her, but defendant ―didn‘t see him 
do it.‖  Regarding the blow dryer, defendant said she had it in the room while they were 
trying to revive Genny, and had used it to try to give her some air.  She said, ―maybe I 
got it a little too close.  ‗Cause she was moving.  Maybe I did.  Maybe I didn‘t. . . .‖  
When told, however, that the heating element with the grid pattern was in the back of the 
blow dryer, defendant asserted she could only have touched Genny with the front end. 
 
Defendant admitted that both she and Ivan had put the handcuffs on Genny, to 
keep her from picking at her wounds.  Once, Ivan had put them on her for the entire 
night.  Defendant tried restraining Genny‘s hands with a cloth tie, but she would free 
herself.  Defendant also admitted that Genny was made to stay in the closet.  Ivan put her 
 
10 
 
in the box for punishment.  Sometimes she would climb in by herself.  Once or twice, she 
slept halfway in the box, tipped over on its side.  Defendant said she and Ivan had tied 
Genny to the hook in the closet one time, to keep her from falling off the box.  Genny had 
been scraping her head against the ledge around the rim of the box, so they put the lid on 
the box and made her sit or stand on it.  As a form of punishment and to keep her from 
falling, they tied her to the hook.  Defendant said they did this only for two days, a few 
hours at a time.  Then, however, she conceded Genny had spent the night once tied to the 
hook.  When defendant took her down, she saw the mark on her neck. 
 
Defendant maintained that the burn on Genny‘s head happened while Ivan was 
away, when Genny climbed up on the stove and reached for a hot pot.  When told that the 
burn was confined to the back of Genny‘s head, defendant had no explanation.  She 
denied putting Genny under the tap to try to get the bugs out of her hair.  Defendant said 
she did not seek treatment for that burn because she did not have Medi-Cal and was 
afraid she might be blamed for Genny‘s scars and abrasions. 
 
Defendant then described how Ivan would hit the children, sometimes with a belt.  
He hit Genny when she picked at her scabs, or when she yelled.  Defendant added, 
however, that she had hit Genny as well.  When pressed about how the fatal burn 
happened, defendant acknowledged that someone must have held Genny down, but 
insisted it was not her.  She did not see Ivan do it.  She also said she had not heard 
anything, but then remembered that Genny had told Ivan, ―please don‘t drown me.‖  Ivan 
responded, ―you don‘t tell me what to do.‖  He then went to the store, and about fifteen 
minutes later defendant found Genny in the tub, burned.  Genny was unconscious and 
sitting up in the tub, but beginning to slide down.  When asked about the abrasions on 
Genny‘s ears and on the bridge of her nose, defendant had no explanation.  Defendant 
said she knew she should be punished for what happened to Genny.  When asked if Ivan 
should be punished, she said ―damn right.‖  She knew she had been charged with murder, 
but swore she ―didn‘t do it.‖ 
 
11 
 
 
When she was interviewed earlier on July 22, at 6:25 a.m., defendant was less 
coherent.  At around 10:30 the previous evening, a police officer at the crime scene had 
reported his suspicion that she was under the influence of methamphetamine, but one of 
the officers conducting the interview testified that she no longer appeared to be under the 
influence.6  Defendant cast aspersions on Mary Rojas, who was her sister and Genny‘s 
mother, calling her a ―little bitch‖ and saying she had lost her children because of her 
drug problems.  In a rambling statement, defendant said she had been making dinner, the 
children were being noisy, Ivan had just gone to the store, and she found Genny in the 
bathtub, ―just laying there.‖  Defendant repeatedly said she did not know what happened. 
 
Defendant told the officers that she had run the bath water for Genny.  Genny was 
on her back, underwater, when defendant found her.  The water was warm.  She and Ivan 
tried to revive Genny with the fan and alcohol.  Water came out of her mouth when Ivan 
tried CPR.  Genny had burned her head by climbing onto the stove and spilling spaghetti 
or beans.  Defendant made Genny sleep behind the door in a bedroom apart from the 
other children to keep the other children from picking on her.  Defendant could not 
explain the burn marks on Genny‘s cheeks, but said they had not been there when she put 
Genny in the bath.  The stains on the wall behind the door were from Genny rubbing her 
head.  Defendant said she and Ivan both spanked Genny when she would do this.  
Defendant said Ivan had a ―heavier hand,‖ but volunteered that she had ―never seen him 
torture her or anything like that.‖ 
 
Asked if Genny rubbed her head on any other walls, defendant acknowledged that 
she would put her in the closet with the box.  Genny would come out when ―she started 
being good.‖  She was put in the closet ―maybe three or four days you know just to scare 
her, you know, just so she could think. . . .  But I mean there was no torture there was no I 
mean no, no, nothing like that.‖  Defendant could not explain the scars on Genny‘s arms.  
                                              
6  
Methamphetamine paraphernalia were found in a closet in the apartment. 
 
12 
 
She admitted using a piece of cloth to tie Genny‘s hands together, and said she also put 
on ―her little bonnet.‖  Genny sometimes went to the bathroom in her pants and refused 
to take a bath.  Defendant made her lie in the bathtub once to scare her, ―just to show her 
ugly butt.‖  Defendant had used the cloth tie on Genny‘s hands on that occasion, but 
denied that she or Ivan ever put the handcuffs on her.  When pressed about how she tried 
to correct Genny‘s behavior, defendant said, ―I‘m always holding my brush.‖  She 
admitted hitting Genny with the brush but added, ―like actually you know, just torture, 
torture you know I‘m not . . . doing nothing to her like that and I know . . . Ivan‘s not 
either because . . . I would see [it].‖ 
 
Defendant conceded that Genny was badly burned in the bath, and would not have 
done that to herself, but denied putting her in hot water and insisted she did not know 
how it happened.  She maintained that she found Genny lying in the water, even when 
told this was inconsistent with the nature of the burn, which could only have occurred if 
Genny had been held down in the tub.  She adamantly denied doing that, and said she did 
not think Ivan would have done it.  Defendant had no explanation for the ligature mark 
on Genny‘s neck.  Defendant was vague and contradictory about when the bloodstains 
had appeared on the closet wall, and denied that she or Ivan ever put Genny on the hook.  
Asked again about the marks on Genny‘s cheeks, defendant conceded that she had taken 
the blow dryer away from the children, but denied burning Genny with it.  Defendant 
admitted she had failed to get medical care for Genny when she burned her head, even 
though she knew it was a serious injury. 
 
 
2.  Defense 
 
The defense called a forensic pathologist who opined that Genny‘s burns could 
have occurred in three to five seconds in 140 degree water, and that she could have died 
as a result of shock within an hour.  He also believed Genny‘s subdural hematoma could 
have resulted from a violent shaking in an attempt to revive her. 
 
13 
 
 
A forensic psychologist with experience in child abuse cases also testified.  
Counsel introduced videotapes and audiotapes of interviews with defendant‘s oldest 
child, Ivan Jr., then questioned the psychologist about the interviews.  Transcripts were 
provided to the jury.  The first interview presented at trial was conducted by a detective 
on the morning after Genny‘s death.  Ivan, Jr., who was eight years old, told the detective 
that Genny had drowned, and also that she ―was taking a warm bath, and I think she, uh, 
put in hot, . . . and she was laying down in the water and she got burned.‖  He had been in 
a bedroom with his brothers and sisters, and saw his mother start the bath for Genny.  His 
mother made it warm, but Genny made it hot.  After Genny was taken to ―the other 
house‖ to get help, Ivan, Jr. went into the bathroom, felt the hot water, and drained the 
tub.  He did not hear Genny make any noises in the bath.  His mother told him she found 
Genny lying in the water, and she couldn‘t breathe. 
 
Ivan, Jr. said he and his siblings would be spanked when they were ―real bad,‖ but 
that Genny was quiet and didn‘t get into trouble.  The detective reminded Ivan, Jr. about 
the difference between the truth and lies, and encouraged him to be more truthful.  Ivan, 
Jr. said that defendant had put Genny in a warm bath, and then he and his siblings had 
been locked in their room.  He now said he had heard Genny make ―a little peeping 
sound‖ in the bathroom, like someone saying ―ow,‖ four or five times.  When his dad 
unlocked the bedroom door, Genny was in the other house and his dad told them Genny 
had drowned and was not breathing.  Ivan, Jr. admitted he had lied about letting the water 
out of the tub.  He said he had seen the water going down, though, and that his dad told 
him it was hot. 
 
The next interview was conducted the following day, and was audiotaped.  Ivan, 
Jr. said no one had been playing with the blow dryer the day Genny was hurt, nor did he 
know if his parents had used it.  He did not see the blood on the wall in his parents‘ 
closet, and said he never went in their room, except for one time.  He did not see a hole in 
the closet door.  Genny would pick at the wound on her head.  Ivan, Jr. did not know how 
 
14 
 
the injury happened, though he remembered she had all her hair when she first came to 
live with them.  Genny would be spanked, and sometimes put in the bathtub when she 
picked her scabs or got dirty. 
 
Ivan, Jr. said he was with his mother when she started the bath for Genny, and the 
water was warm.  When told that his father admitted putting the water in the tub, Ivan, Jr. 
suggested Genny had taken another bath in the afternoon.  He said his father had told him 
Genny couldn‘t breathe, and his mother had told him Genny drowned.  He didn‘t 
remember the scars on Genny‘s cheeks with the grid pattern, but he did see the wound on 
her nose.  He didn‘t see the line on her neck. 
 
Ivan, Jr. was interviewed again on July 26, 1995, five days after Genny‘s death.  
He was in a foster home by this time.  This interview took place at a county facility for 
children, and was videotaped.  The detective began by explaining that he knew Ivan, Jr. 
had not been telling the truth, and encouraging him not to be afraid and not to tell any 
more lies.  Ivan, Jr. said the last time he saw Genny she was in the bathtub, playing.  He 
could see her through the hole in his bedroom door, which had no doorknob.  His mother 
had put her in the bath.  When he heard Genny say ―ow‖ four or five times, he did not 
look through the hole.  He tried to get out but the door was locked.7  His father opened 
the door and told the children to stay in the room.  Later, he let them out and said Genny 
couldn‘t breathe.  His mother said the water was hot and Genny drowned. 
 
Ivan, Jr. at first denied hearing his mother screaming and yelling, even when told 
his brother and sister said she did.  When pressed about telling lies, he said he was scared.  
He then admitted that his mother had screamed, after Genny said ―ow‖ and before his 
father came to tell them to stay in the room.  He also said Genny, like all the children, 
was spanked and hit with a belt, a broom, or a plastic bat.  She slept behind the door in 
                                              
7  
A sliding lock was installed on the outside of the door.  The hole where the 
doorknob would have been afforded a view of the entire bathroom if the bathroom door 
was open. 
 
15 
 
the other bedroom, and sometimes in the closet.  Ivan, Jr. never saw handcuffs on Genny, 
but her hands were tied with rope or cloth to keep her from picking her wounds.  He 
never saw the hook in the closet, or Genny being hung in the closet.  He did not know 
how she had burned her head, or how she got marks on her ears.  Ivan, Jr. was unable to 
explain what he had meant when he said he was scared earlier in the interview.  He said 
he thought the police would punish him if he did not tell the truth. 
 
Next, the defense played a videotape of an interview conducted by a district 
attorney on October 25, 1995.  Ivan, Jr. said he was going to be nine in December.  On 
this occasion, he made some rather dramatic new statements.  He volunteered that his 
parents had made Genny eat her own excrement.  He said Genny would not eat every 
day, because his parents wanted to get rid of one of the children, and she was going to be 
the first.  His parents spent their money on drugs instead of food, and had too many kids.  
They were torturing Genny, hitting her and cutting her skin off.  Ivan, Jr. said they would 
cut her skin with a knife, ―and you could see her meat and her blood.‖  Both parents 
would do this, all over Genny‘s body.  Genny‘s hair was missing because his parents 
pulled it out.  Genny would scream, and his parents would hit her, punch her, ―throw her 
in the bathtub . . . and get the knife and cut all her skin off.‖ 
 
Ivan, Jr. said that on the night Genny died both his parents had put her in the bath.  
Genny kicked the water and tried to fight back, but she was weak.  Ivan, Jr. said he knew 
the water was hot because ―they would always put hot water.‖  When he looked through 
the hole in his bedroom door, his parents had closed the door to the bathroom, but he 
knew they had put her in the bathtub because ―they would always do that.‖  His dad said 
Genny had drowned, but Ivan, Jr. thought they had killed her instead.  He had gotten 
some alcohol from a neighbor, and his mother poured it over Genny.  However, Ivan, Jr. 
then said this was before Genny had taken her bath, and Genny had been in the children‘s 
bedroom when his mother poured the alcohol on her. 
 
16 
 
 
When asked if he had seen anything hanging in the closet, Ivan, Jr. said his parents 
had tied Genny to a metal thing and left her hanging, with her hands tied together.  This 
happened a lot, and Genny would be left in the closet for ―four hours or something.‖  His 
parents had made the children throw a hard ball at Genny, but Ivan, Jr. would ―keep 
throwing it crooked.‖  His parents would not give Genny food, and when she asked for it 
they would put hot sauce on it.  The children made Genny a sandwich, and were punished 
for doing so.  The district attorney explained that he would be asking Ivan, Jr. questions 
in court soon, and encouraged him to tell the truth. 
 
Finally, the defense played videotapes of Ivan, Jr.‘s testimony at the preliminary 
hearing, which took place on November 8, 1995.8  Ivan, Jr. said that Genny had slept in 
his parents‘ bedroom both behind the door and in the closet, and also in the bathtub.  His 
parents put her in the tub with her hands and feet tied.  Her hands were also tied with rope 
when she slept in the closet.  On the night Genny died, Ivan, Jr. was locked in his room 
with his brothers and sisters.  He saw Genny in the tub when he looked through the hole 
in the door.  At a later point, he heard Genny screaming and crying, but he did not look 
through the hole then.  He also heard his mother scream, after he heard Genny.  His father 
then unlocked the door, asked the children to stay in their room, and locked the door 
again.  
 
Ivan, Jr. said that when Genny first came to live with them, she had no marks on 
her face and she had all her hair.  She lost her hair when his parents burned her and pulled 
it out.  They had burned her with hot water in the bathtub, a long time before the night 
she died.  Ivan, Jr. had seen his parents in the bathroom on that occasion, looking through 
the hole in his door.  Genny lay down in the tub, and his mother helped his father hold 
her down.  The hot water came out of the spout and onto her head.  She was crying and 
                                              
8  
Ivan, Jr. did not testify at defendant‘s trial.  A single preliminary hearing was held 
for defendant and her husband, but their cases were later severed.  Ivan was tried first, 
convicted, and sentenced to death.  The same judge presided over both trials. 
 
17 
 
screaming.  Ivan, Jr. saw this ―a lot of times.‖  When Genny would rub her head against 
the wall, his parents would hit her with a belt.  Ivan, Jr. said Genny did not have accidents 
going to the bathroom, and was potty trained. 
 
Ivan, Jr. testified that he and his brothers and sisters ate in the kitchen, but Genny 
ate in his parents‘ room.  He said ―she only ate a couple of times.‖  He and his siblings 
gave Genny food, but his parents hit them when they found out about it.  They also made 
the children throw balls at Genny.  One of the balls was hard, but it was not heavy.  Ivan, 
Jr. had once seen Genny hanging in the closet, ―and she was in a basket.‖  Her hands 
were tied, and she was hanging without her feet touching the ground. 
 
On cross-examination by defendant‘s counsel, Ivan, Jr. said that both his parents 
were ―the boss of the house.‖  If they disagreed, his mother would usually get her way, 
―because she‘s the girl and my dad‘s not.‖  He also said he thought his mother was afraid 
of his father, because his father was stronger and would hit her when they got into fights.  
On cross-examination by his father‘s counsel, Ivan, Jr. again said his mother usually got 
her way, and that she often told his father what to do.  Sometimes he would do it. 
 
Defendant‘s psychological expert noted the strikingly different statements Ivan, Jr. 
had made in his fourth interview, on October 25, 1995.  He pointed out that the 
interviewers did not challenge the new statements about his parents cutting off Genny‘s 
skin, and forcing her to eat feces.  It was possible that at first Ivan, Jr. had tried to protect 
his parents, but became more comfortable as time passed.  He might also have been 
influenced to change his story.  The psychologist had reviewed the notes and testimony 
of Ivan, Jr.‘s therapist and his social worker.  He observed that neither had done a 
forensic interview, that it was not their role to challenge the boy‘s accounts, and that 
neither controlled for contamination of his recollections by outside influences. 
 
Defense counsel called the therapist, Edna Lyons, and the social worker, Karen 
Oetken.  Their testimony was consistent with the observations of the psychologist.  
Lyons, who began seeing Ivan, Jr. in August, 1995, had not reviewed any of the tapes of 
 
18 
 
the interviews with him.  Her notes indicated that Ivan‘s first statement about Genny‘s 
treatment in the home was on October 10, 1995.  He said his parents had hit Genny, and 
when she pooped in the tub, they would put the poop up to her mouth.  In advance of his 
preliminary hearing testimony, he told Lyons he was worried about seeing his parents, 
who hit him, and afraid that when he told the truth they would shout that he was lying.  
However, he felt safe because police would be present. 
 
Oetken testified that she had interviewed Ivan, Jr. on July 24, 1995, not long after 
Genny‘s death.  She asked him what had happened.  He said Genny had drowned, and 
couldn‘t breathe.  He did not hear her cry, but she had said ―ow.‖  The other children 
were in the bedroom, and the parents in the living room.  His mother checked on Genny 
and found her in the water.  His parents had told him this.  He did not think his parents 
had hurt Genny.  On August 1, Oetken spoke to Ivan, Jr. in a foster home.  He told her 
that Genny had rarely come out of his parents‘ bedroom, and he asked if she had died.  
He was sad when told that she had.  On August 2, Oetken interviewed defendant, who 
said that she had been molested by her stepfather as a child, and that her husband was 
abusive to her but good to the children.  Genny soiled her pants and would not listen.  
Defendant said she spanked Genny with her hand and a belt but did not hurt her.  The 
children also hit Genny.  On August 11, Ivan, Jr. denied hitting Genny. 
 
Oetken attended the preliminary hearing, and made a note of Ivan, Jr.‘s courage in 
testifying.  She also noticed that his testimony differed from the things he had told her 
about what happened to Genny.  The next time she spoke to Ivan, Jr., she asked him if 
anyone had told him what to say at the hearing.  He said no. 
 
The defense called Cynthia Bernee, a marriage and family therapist with 
experience in cases of domestic violence.  She described battered woman syndrome.9  
                                              
9  
The jury was instructed that the battered woman syndrome evidence was offered 
for the limited purpose of providing a potentially innocent explanation for defendant‘s 
 
19 
 
Defendant then took the witness stand, and denied that she killed, tortured, maimed, 
burned, beat, hung, or disfigured Genny.  Under counsel‘s questioning, defendant then 
provided a lengthy description of her childhood and her marriage.  Her stepfather had 
sexually molested her when she was a child.  When she was 15 years old, she reported 
the molestation, and a dependency court proceeding was initiated.  She was placed in a 
guardianship with her older sister, but her stepfather was never prosecuted.  Defendant‘s 
mother drank and was verbally and physically abusive.  She yelled at defendant, slapped, 
hit, and kicked her, pulled her hair, forced her to stand with her sister on newspaper that 
she then set on fire, and made her kneel in the backyard in the sun holding bricks.  
Defendant met Ivan when she was 15 years old and they married when she was 16.  She 
soon became pregnant, and he began to be abusive and controlling.  She tried to leave 
him, but he threatened her and the children and said he would kill himself.  He sexually 
abused her. 
 
Defendant testified that both she and Ivan used marijuana and crystal 
methamphetamine.  In 1994 and 1995, the drug use became heavy.  Ivan had not worked 
for years, and they used their welfare payments to buy drugs.  Ivan was abusive to the 
children, yelling at and hitting them.  Defendant admitted spanking the children with her 
hand, a belt, and a brush.  She also admitted to an affair with Eugene Luna, Jr., a co-
worker of Ivan‘s.  She told Ivan about the affair and briefly separated from him, but he 
persuaded her to come back.  At the time of Genny‘s death, the family‘s apartment was 
dirty and the children had lice.  Defendant said these conditions resulted from her drug 
use and from being overwhelmed by trying to cope with Ivan and the children. 
 
When her sister Mary‘s children were being considered for placement with 
defendant‘s mother, a social worker contacted defendant to ask if the molestation 
allegations she had made against her stepfather were true.  She said they were not.  Her 
                                                                                                                                                  
failure to protect Genny or to provide medical care for her, and to provide a context for 
defendant‘s statements after Genny‘s death. 
 
20 
 
mother had asked her to recant so that her mother could keep the children.  Genny came 
to live with defendant at the end of January, 1995.  Earlier, she had lived with 
defendant‘s sister Anita for a while.  Defendant took Genny because her mother was 
having difficulty with the children.  Ivan agreed, after defendant‘s mother promised to 
give them a hundred dollars a month.  However, her mother did not make those 
payments.  Defendant‘s family was under financial stress.  Their welfare payments were 
to end, their rent rose, and sometimes the electricity was cut off.  Sometimes they ran out 
of food.  Still, she and Ivan spent money on drugs. 
 
Defendant testified that Ivan abused Genny the same way he abused his own 
children.  After Genny burned her head, the abuse got worse.  Ivan had taped Genny‘s 
hands and burned her head with hot water in the bathtub, in a rage because she had 
spilled his marijuana.  Defendant wanted to take Genny to the doctor, but Ivan would not 
let her.  She called a 24-hour nurse and said Genny had been burned with a pot of hot 
water, because Ivan told her to say that.  She tried to care for the burn as best she could.  
Ivan hit and kicked Genny and kept her in the parents‘ bedroom, apart from the other 
children.  He tied Genny‘s hands with bootlaces, and used handcuffs on her.  Defendant 
herself used a cloth tie on Genny‘s hands, but it did not keep her from scratching herself.  
Genny got less to eat after Ivan started keeping her in the bedroom. 
 
Defendant did not report Ivan‘s abuse of Genny because she was afraid of him.  
On one occasion, she found Genny tied up in the closet, standing on the box and tied to 
the closet pole by a cloth around her waist.  Defendant took Genny down.  When she 
asked Ivan why he was doing this, he became angry with her.  Defendant thought about 
returning Genny to her family, but Ivan did not want anyone to find out what he had done 
to her, and her mother was not ready to take Genny back.  Defendant found Genny 
hanging in the closet a second time, after defendant awoke from a drug-induced stupor.  
The cloth was around Genny‘s neck, her face was swollen and red, and there was a mark 
on her neck when defendant took her down.  She and Ivan fought physically on this 
 
21 
 
occasion.  Defendant had tried to protect Genny‘s head by fashioning a bonnet out of a 
pant leg and a hairband.  She said the bonnet had not caused the abrasion on Genny‘s 
nose.  She did not know how that injury occurred. 
 
Defendant and Ivan had been up for two or three days, using methamphetamine, 
on the day Genny died.  That afternoon, a grocery store owner had confronted Ivan at the 
apartment about an unpaid bill, which made Ivan angry.10  Defendant began cooking 
dinner in the evening.  She interrupted the preparations to draw a warm bath for Genny, 
and put Genny in the bath.  She went back to the kitchen, and on her way saw Ivan lock 
the other children in their room.  Then she heard Ivan in the bathroom, yelling at Genny 
to hurry up.  He came out and asked defendant to make some lines of methamphetamine.  
Defendant went into a closet to do this.  Ivan began yelling at Genny again.  From inside 
the closet, defendant heard Genny tell Ivan, ―please don‘t drown me.‖  Then, defendant 
heard Genny scream.  Defendant went to the bathroom, and saw Ivan holding Genny 
down by the shoulders, with her arms on the side of the tub.  Defendant yelled at Ivan, he 
let go of Genny, and defendant picked her up. 
 
Genny seemed to be unconscious.  Defendant carried her into the parents‘ 
bedroom.  Defendant was screaming.  Ivan told her to shut up, and closed the window.    
He told defendant to get a fan, and said he would do CPR.  He began blowing in Genny‘s 
mouth, but she did not move or make a sound.  Defendant believed Genny was dying, 
and ―wanted so bad for her to come back.‖  Ivan said he was going to the store, and told 
defendant to stay there and not tell anyone, because they would blame her and only he 
knew what had happened.  He left, and defendant stayed with Genny.  She thought he 
might be getting help.  When Ivan returned with bread, beer, and cigarettes, defendant 
was angry and went to Patti‘s apartment to get help. 
                                              
10  
Juan Banuelos, the store owner, testified and confirmed that he had visited the 
apartment that day in an attempt to collect the bill from Ivan. 
 
22 
 
 
Defendant claimed she said ―don‘t call the cops‖ at Patti‘s because Ivan had told 
her that, and because she wanted to get help for Genny, not contact the police.  Ivan also 
told her to say that Genny had drowned, and that her head was burned by a hot pot.  
Defendant said she had lied during her interviews with the police.  She was shocked, 
confused, and too afraid of Ivan to tell the truth.  During the first interview, she was 
under the influence of methamphetamine.  During the second interview she was not, but 
she was confused, unable to think for herself, and afraid that Ivan would get out and hurt 
the kids.  She could not account for all the scars on Genny‘s body, because she had not 
been there when they were inflicted.  Defendant said Genny did not have the blow-dryer 
burns before she took her last bath.  Defendant had left Genny alone with Ivan, however, 
while she paced around the apartment after pulling Genny from the bathtub. 
 
Defendant testified that she had seen Ivan a few times since their arrest when they 
were being transported to juvenile court and to the criminal proceedings.  He told her that 
he loved her, and to stick to the story he had told her.  Defense counsel introduced into 
evidence 26 pages of correspondence Ivan had sent to defendant while they were in jail.  
Ivan had tried to persuade her to fire one of her attorneys.  On one letter, he had written 
―if it comes right down to it,‖ beneath which he drew a face labeled ―me‖ with a finger 
pointing toward it.  Defendant said this diagram meant that Ivan was telling her what to 
say.  She said he used his finger ―as a sexual thing, and it implies that, too.‖  Defendant 
believed Ivan was trying to get her to fire her attorney because the attorney wanted her to 
blame Ivan.  Most of the correspondence, however, was about sex and how much he 
loved her.  At first it felt good to hear this, but then she realized he was trying to get her 
to do what he wanted her to do. 
 
The defense called a series of witnesses who were friends, family members, or 
neighbors of defendant‘s.  Counsel questioned them about defendant being abused by her 
mother and stepfather when she was a child, and by her husband during the marriage.  
Victor Negrette, the husband of defendant‘s sister Anita, testified about the months when 
 
23 
 
he and Anita had custody of Genny before returning her to defendant‘s mother.  He said 
Genny was undisciplined and would throw tantrums in stores if they did not buy her what 
she wanted.  He had told Anita that Genny ―needed professional help,‖ and ultimately 
decided they were financially incapable of caring for her.  They had seen Genny once 
after she moved in with defendant‘s family, and she seemed healthy and happy.  Anita 
also testified.  She too mentioned Genny‘s misbehavior in stores, and her good condition 
when they visited defendant‘s home. 
 
  A doctor specializing in addiction testified about methamphetamine abuse and its 
effects.  The defense then called Kenneth Ryan, a psychologist with experience 
counseling battered women, who testified about battered woman syndrome and his 
evaluation of defendant.  He had interviewed defendant many times while she was in 
custody, and had given her the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) 
twice.  He concluded that the first test, administered in September 1995, was invalid 
because defendant‘s responses were characteristic of a subject who is lying.  The second 
test, conducted in February 1997, also reflected a high score for falsity, but not so high as 
to automatically invalidate the test results.  This test showed that her self-esteem had 
been improving.  Ryan believed defendant suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder 
and battered woman syndrome.  He observed that it is characteristic of a battered woman 
to fail to protect children in her care.  Furthermore, a battered woman will lie to protect 
her batterer, and accept responsibility for the actions of the batterer. 
 
Following the psychologist‘s testimony, the defense recalled Cynthia Bernee, the 
therapist who had testified generally about battered woman syndrome.  Bernee gave her 
opinion that defendant was a battered woman.  She testified that a battered woman may 
accept responsibility for the batterer‘s abuse of a third party, such as a child. 
 
3.  Rebuttals 
 
The prosecutor called a number of witnesses on rebuttal.  Eugene Luna, Jr., the co-
worker of Ivan‘s who had an affair with defendant, testified that she had initiated the 
 
24 
 
encounter.  He had seen defendant throw a plate at Ivan on one occasion, and from his 
observations of their relationship he believed defendant ―had the upper hand.‖  Luna also 
related an incident when defendant, intoxicated after a party, threw a temper tantrum in a 
parked car with Ivan, Luna, and some of the Gonzales children present.  Defendant was 
screaming incoherently and kicking the dashboard.  Neither Ivan nor Luna could calm her 
down, and witnesses called the police, who took defendant into custody. 
 
Luna‘s father testified.  He had socialized with defendant and Ivan over a period 
of four or five years, and he also deemed defendant the ―boss of the apartment.‖  He had 
seen her hit Ivan in the mouth.  She would tell Ivan what to do, and he would usually do 
it.  If he did not, she would curse at him and push him.  The wife of the grocery store 
owner who visited the apartment on the day of the murder testified that she had seen 
defendant and Ivan in the store together about eight times.  Defendant seemed to be in 
charge of the relationship; she told Ivan what kind of cigarettes he could buy, and he 
would stand behind her watching the children. 
 
Rosemarie Price, a childhood friend of defendant‘s who was Ivan‘s cousin, 
testified that she had introduced Ivan to defendant.  On one occasion, defendant had 
shown Price some papers relating to her molestation claim against her stepfather.  
Defendant did not seem embarrassed, and snickered when Price asked why she had not 
told her about it before.  Lorena Peevler was a friend of Ivan‘s, with whom defendant and 
Ivan had lived for a period of months in 1990 or 1991.  Peevler said the two fought a lot.  
Defendant blamed the conflict on Ivan‘s mother.  Defendant would push and scratch at 
Ivan and threaten to leave; he would not retaliate and pleaded with her to stay.  After they 
moved, Peevler visited defendant and they talked.  She did not complain about abuse by 
Ivan.  Peevler felt defendant was the boss of the relationship.  Ivan‘s sisters, Patricia 
Andrade and Guadalupe Baltazar, testified to the same effect.  Baltazar had visited the 
apartment in early July, and saw the burn on Genny‘s head.  Genny had no other scars at 
that time. 
 
25 
 
 
Mark Mills, a forensic psychiatrist, testified for the prosecution.  The court had 
ordered defendant to submit to an evaluation by Dr. Mills.  She refused on the advice of 
counsel, as the jury had learned during her testimony.  Dr. Mills had reviewed the 
videotaped interviews of defendant, and transcripts of her trial testimony.  He offered no 
clinical or forensic opinion, but gave his opinion on three issues.  First, Mills said the fact 
that defendant faced the death penalty provided a motive for malingering, i.e., a 
conscious attempt to deceive psychological evaluators about her mental state.  Second, he 
opined that if defendant had posttraumatic stress disorder, it did not interfere with her 
ability to perceive reality or vitiate her free will.  Finally, Mills believed the 
inconsistencies in defendant‘s various accounts of events in her life made it impossible to 
reliably conclude that she had posttraumatic stress disorder. 
 
Defendant did submit to an evaluation by the other mental health expert called by 
the prosecution, Nancy Kaser-Boyd.  Kaser-Boyd, a psychologist, met with defendant 
over the course of two days for around 15 hours, seven of which were spent on testing.  
Defendant communicated well and Kaser-Boyd estimated her intelligence as ―certainly 
average and probably above average.‖  Defendant‘s test results were inconsistent with 
those usually obtained from battered women, and consistent with those of a subject who 
is exaggerating her symptoms.  Kaser-Boyd reviewed the second MMPI test given by 
Ryan, the defense psychologist, going over the answers with defendant and making 
corrections.  On this test, which showed some exaggerated features but was within the 
range of a valid profile, defendant‘s scores were elevated in categories reflecting a 
tendency to act out angrily in socially unacceptable and irrational ways.  This was not the 
typical profile of battered women. 
 
Kaser-Boyd testified that defendant‘s account of Ivan‘s spousal abuse did not 
approach the level of violence at which women are immobilized by terror and unable to 
come to the aid of an abused child.  Kaser-Boyd found it difficult to say whether 
defendant did suffer from battered woman syndrome, due to her tendency to exaggerate 
 
26 
 
and to give inconsistent accounts of the traumatic events in her life.  Kaser-Boyd found it 
―completely illogical‖ to conclude that defendant had been protecting Ivan in her 
statements to the police, when she implicated both him and herself in Genny‘s abuse.  
Kaser-Boyd agreed with Ryan that defendant suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder.  
She deemed it a complex, chronic form of the disorder that could have resulted from 
defendant‘s childhood experiences alone, though being a battered woman might have 
contributed. 
 
On surrebuttal, the defense called another expert psychologist, Thomas Mac 
Speiden.  He had given defendant an intelligence test and a reading achievement test.  
Defendant‘s intelligence was in the low average range, and her reading ability was that of 
a beginning eighth grader.  The tests given by Ryan and reviewed by Kaser-Boyd 
required an eighth grade reading level.  Mac Speiden believed the profile derived by 
Kaser-Boyd from the second MMPI test was flawed because she had only reviewed 
certain answers with defendant.  Mac Speiden found the validity of this test highly 
questionable.  He also believed Hispanics were underrepresented during the test 
standardization process, so that the results might reflect a cultural bias. 
 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
The prosecutor presented no additional evidence at the penalty phase.  The defense 
presented witnesses who related defendant‘s exemplary conduct and religious observance 
in jail.  Employees of the social services department testified about defendant‘s 
supervised visits with her children.  Ivan, Jr.‘s therapist said the boy‘s psychological 
problems would be exacerbated if his mother were given the death penalty.  A therapist 
for defendant‘s son Michael gave similar testimony. 
 
Defendant‘s sister Anita testified about the effect a capital sentence would have on 
the family, as did Anita‘s husband Victor and their sons Victor, Jr. and Gabriel.  Genny‘s 
mother, Mary Rojas, described the abusive environment she and defendant grew up in, 
and the drug problems that led her to lose custody of her children.  Although Genny‘s 
 
27 
 
death was very difficult, Rojas said her family would be hurt again if defendant were 
given the death penalty.  Rojas‘s substance abuse counselor testified about the progress 
she had made in treatment. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.  Guilt Phase 
 
 
1.  Claims Regarding the Battered Woman Theory 
 
Defendant‘s first argument is convoluted and diffuse.  She contends a variety of 
improprieties permitted the prosecutor to insinuate that defendant and Ivan had each 
agreed to blame the other for Genny‘s death.  However, the actual claims she advances 
under this heading are more accurately characterized as challenges to various aspects of 
the prosecutor‘s rebuttal of defendant‘s claim that she suffered from battered woman 
syndrome.  We address each claim separately, in the order defendant makes them. 
 
 
 
a.  Cross-examination on Ivan’s Defense 
 
Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct when cross-examining her 
regarding a letter in which Ivan tried to persuade her to fire her attorney.  At the end of 
this letter, Ivan had drawn a diagram of a face labeled ―me‖ with a finger pointing to it, 
below the statement ―if it comes down to it.‖  Defendant maintained the position she had 
taken on direct examination, that the letter reflected Ivan‘s attempt to control her, and the 
diagram referred to his practice of using his finger for sexual purposes.  The following 
exchange occurred: 
 
―Q:  Well, you knew that Ivan Gonzales claimed he was a battered man, didn‘t 
you? 
 
―A :  He never testified to that; no, I didn‘t. 
 
―Q:  He didn‘t testify to it, but he claimed that, didn‘t he?‖ 
 
Defense counsel objected, on the ground that the question had been asked and 
answered.  The court sustained the objection ―on the grounds that we shouldn‘t go 
through with that line.‖  Nevertheless, the prosecutor proceeded to ask defendant, ―well, 
 
28 
 
were you aware that that was his defense?‖  Defense counsel objected and asked for a 
sidebar conference.  The court agreed. 
 
Out of the jury‘s presence, the court noted that ―we‘ve tried to stay away from 
what happened at Ivan‘s trial altogether, and this is asking about what happened at Ivan‘s 
trial.‖  The court also pointed out that ―Ivan, as far as I know, didn‘t do anything but 
enter a plea of not guilty and deny the special circumstances.  All the things that she 
might answer about are things his attorneys did . . . I‘m not so sure I see how relevant that 
is.‖  The prosecutor explained that he was trying to dispute defendant‘s claim that Ivan 
was manipulating her.  The court noted that defendant‘s attempt to characterize the 
drawing as anything other than an invitation to cast blame on Ivan was weak, and did not 
justify drawing the jury‘s attention to what Ivan‘s position at his trial had been.  It stated:  
―I‘m inclined to sustain the objection and to find that we ought to stay away from 
anything about what happened at Ivan‘s trial.‖ 
 
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor had created the 
impression that the battered spouse defense was ―bogus‖ because Ivan as well as 
defendant had asserted it.  Counsel noted that Ivan in fact raised no such defense at his 
trial.  If a mistrial were denied, counsel asked the court to permit him to introduce 
statements Ivan had made in his interviews with the police, admitting that he had put 
Genny in the bath.  The court denied the motion for a mistrial, and agreed to consider 
remedial measures at a later time.  It granted defense counsel‘s request for an admonition 
telling the jury not to consider counsel‘s questions as evidence, and in particular not to 
consider the question when an objection was sustained. 
 
At the next break in the proceedings, the court brought up the question of how the 
defense might respond to the prosecutor‘s questions, suggesting that perhaps on redirect 
the defendant could testify she was unaware of any attempt by Ivan to blame her for what 
happened to Genny.  Defense counsel noted that Ivan‘s defense was indeed that 
defendant was responsible for what happened, although Ivan himself never directly 
 
29 
 
blamed her.  In any event, counsel declined the court‘s invitation to explore defendant‘s 
knowledge on this subject, saying it would open ―more cans of worms.‖11 
 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed intentional misconduct by 
questioning her about Ivan‘s battered spouse defense.  ―The standards governing review 
of misconduct claims are settled.  ‗A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible 
methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal 
under the federal Constitution when they infect the trial with such ― ‗unfairness as to 
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.‘ ‖  [Citations.]  Under state law, a 
prosecutor who uses such methods commits misconduct even when those actions do not 
result in a fundamentally unfair trial.‘  [Citation.]  ‗In order to preserve a claim of 
misconduct, a defendant must make a timely objection and request an admonition; only if 
an admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of misconduct preserved for 
review.‘  [Citation.]  When a claim of misconduct is based on the prosecutor‘s comments 
before the jury, ‗ ―the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.‖ ‘  
[Citations.]‖  (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29.) 
 
Here, defendant did not object on grounds of misconduct, and the court did 
admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor‘s questions.  In any event, while it was 
improper for the prosecutor to persist with his line of questioning after the court sustained 
an objection, this conduct did not amount to the kind of ― ‗deceptive or reprehensible‘ ‖ 
tactic that rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.  (People v. Friend, supra, 47 
Cal.4th at p. 29.)  On direct examination, defendant had offered her interpretation of 
Ivan‘s letter as an example of his continuing efforts to dominate and control her.  A claim 
                                              
11   
Counsel  pressed his argument that he should be allowed to present Ivan‘s 
incriminating statements, but the court declined to hear the argument at that time.  Later 
in the trial, defense counsel reminded the court that it had not ruled on this point.  The 
court heard from both sides, and decided that no door had been opened to bring in Ivan‘s 
statements.  We discuss the admissibility of these statements post, in part II.A.1.d. 
 
30 
 
by Ivan that he was battered by defendant would have tended to rebut that theory.  There 
was at least some factual basis for the prosecutor‘s suggestion.  Defendant had been 
present in pretrial proceedings when Ivan‘s attorney announced his intent to employ a 
battered spouse defense, though ultimately he decided not to.  While the question positing 
―that was his defense‖ was misleading, there was no opportunity to clarify the issue 
because an objection was sustained.  The jury was reminded that statements in the 
attorneys‘ questions were not evidence.  Defense counsel did not ask the court to inform 
the jury that Ivan did not actually claim that he was a battered spouse. 
 
Defendant contends the court erred when it denied her request for a mistrial.  We 
disagree.  ―In reviewing rulings on motions for mistrial, we apply the deferential abuse of 
discretion standard.  [Citation.]  ‗A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of 
prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction.  [Citation.]  Whether a 
particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the 
trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.  
[Citation.]‘  [Citation.]‖   (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1068.)  Here, the 
court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that an admonition was sufficient to cure 
any prejudice stemming from the prosecutor‘s questions. 
 
 
 
b.  Cross-examination on Expert Opinion  
 
The matter of conflicting expert opinions on whether Ivan was a battered spouse 
first surfaced in a hypothetical question posed by the prosecutor when cross-examining 
Cynthia Bernee, defendant‘s expert on battered woman syndrome.  During Bernee‘s 
initial testimony, before defendant took the stand, the prosecutor asked Bernee to assume 
that a husband and wife were both involved in a crime, both claimed to be a battered 
spouse, both had expert opinion supporting that claim, and the prosecution had experts 
saying that neither spouse suffered from the syndrome.  He then asked, ―what‘s a jury 
supposed to do?‖  The court sustained a defense objection on the ground that the question 
was outside the witness‘s expertise.  The prosecutor proceeded to ask, ―how would you 
 
31 
 
expect a jury to evaluate a situation like that?‖  The court again sustained a defense 
objection. 
 
The matter was squarely raised later, when the prosecutor sought permission to 
cross-examine defense experts about the existence of two reports, one by a Dr. Weinstein 
concluding that Ivan was a battered spouse, and one by Dr. Mills, the prosecution expert, 
concluding that he was not.  The prosecutor proposed using these reports for two 
purposes:  showing that expert opinion on this subject was unreliable, and showing that 
an expert believed Ivan was a battered man, which would rebut the defense position that 
any violence by defendant against Ivan was merely counter-violence consistent with her 
status as a battered woman. 
 
Defense counsel objected strenuously.  Among other claims, counsel argued that 
the reports on Ivan were irrelevant, would bring in hearsay, and would prejudice the 
defense because it would be unable to meet the evidence by disputing the conclusion that 
Ivan was a battered man.  Ivan was not available to defense experts for examination.  The 
court observed that the scope of cross-examination of an expert is broad, and the critical 
issue was whether the reports were more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code 
section 352.  The court noted that the prosecutor might use the reports to show that 
experts reach different conclusions on battered spouse syndrome; to show that the 
defense experts ignored the reports on Ivan, if that were the case; and to show that Ivan 
was not a batterer.  However, the latter point depended on hearsay.  On the other hand, 
the court reasoned that the reports on Ivan would distract the jurors from their focus on 
defendant; confuse them because the prosecutor did not contend that Ivan was a battered 
man; consume undue time if the substance of Dr. Weinstein‘s opinion were allowed in; 
and prejudice the defense due to its limited opportunity to challenge the conclusion that 
Ivan was a battered man.  If the prosecutor were to cross-examine the defense experts 
with the substance of that conclusion, the court thought it would be hard for the jury to 
follow a limiting instruction telling them not to consider it. 
 
32 
 
 
The court proposed a middle ground, allowing the prosecutor to simply ask the 
defense experts if they were aware of the conflicting reports, one finding that Ivan was a 
battered man and the other that he was not, without including any details.  The court 
would then instruct the jury that the reports could be considered only on the reliability of 
expert opinion in this area, not on the factual question of whether Ivan was either a 
battered man or a batterer.  The prosecutor was amenable.  The defense objected, and the 
matter was argued at length.  Defense counsel agreed with the court that prejudice was 
the determinative issue under Evidence Code section 352.  As to conflicting expert 
opinion, counsel noted there were already conflicting experts in this case, so the 
prosecutor did not need the reports on Ivan to make that point.  It would be very difficult 
for the defense to rebut Dr. Weinstein‘s conclusion that Ivan was a battered man, or for 
the jury to put it aside and follow a limiting instruction.  Indeed, allowing the prosecutor 
to tell the jury that experts reached different conclusions on Ivan‘s status was no middle 
ground at all, but exactly what the prosecution wanted, because it would both cast doubt 
on the defense experts and present the substance of Weinstein‘s report.  Counsel argued 
that if Weinstein‘s opinion came before the jury, the defense was entitled to rebut it by 
bringing in statements by Ivan that Weinstein had considered. 
 
The court asked whether the prosecutor intended to argue that Ivan was a battered 
man.  The prosecutor said he did not.  His position was that it was simply a case of 
mutual violence between the spouses.  The court, noting that it had devoted a significant 
amount of time to this issue, ruled that the prosecution could use the reports on Ivan for 
the limited purpose of showing that they differed on his status as a battered man.  The 
court saw no prejudice to the defense, because neither party would be arguing that Ivan 
was a battered man, and a limiting instruction would tell the jury to consider the reports 
only on the question of the reliability of expert opinion on battered spouses, not as to 
whether Ivan actually was a battered spouse.  Because of that limitation, the court refused 
to permit defense counsel to go into the basis for Dr. Weinstein‘s opinion. 
 
33 
 
 
During his cross-examination of Ryan, the defense psychologist, the prosecutor 
asked if Ryan was aware of conflicting opinions on Ivan, one that he was a battered man 
and one that he was not.  Ryan said he was aware of them.  The court instructed the jury:  
―The doctor has testified to other opinions that he is aware of with regard to Ivan 
Gonzales.  You are allowed to use that and consider that only for a limited purpose.  You 
are allowed to consider it only for the limited purpose of considering the reliability of 
such expert testimony in this area in general.  You are not to consider it on the question 
of whether Ivan Gonzales is or is not a battered person.  I emphasize to you that you are 
to decide only Veronica Gonzales‘s issues in this case.  It is her status, her case, that is 
before you.  In this case, both sides will be arguing to you at the end of the case that Ivan 
Gonzales is not a battered man.  So the reasons for your not considering it on that issue 
are obvious and, I think, clear to you.‖ 
 
Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in weighing the prejudicial and 
probative impacts of the reports, and violated her federal Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to present a defense by precluding defense counsel from exploring the 
bases of Dr. Weinstein‘s opinion that Ivan was a battered spouse.12  The question is a 
close one, as the trial court recognized.  The scope of cross-examination of an expert 
witness is especially broad.  (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 105.)  Evidence 
that is inadmissible on direct examination may be used to test an expert‘s credibility, 
though the court must exercise its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to limit the 
evidence to its proper uses.  (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 833.)  Experts who 
testify regarding a mental condition may be questioned regarding their awareness of other 
                                              
12  
Defendant also contends the hypothetical posed by the prosecutor to Bernee, 
regarding conflicting expert opinions, amounted to misconduct.  However, defendant did 
not preserve this claim below; counsel argued only that the question ―border[ed] on 
misconduct.‖  Even if the objection had been made, the prosecutor‘s questions were not a 
deceptive tactic that injected incurable unfairness into the trial.  (People v. Friend, supra, 
47 Cal.4th at p. 29.) 
 
34 
 
inconsistent opinions by similar experts.  (People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 923-
924.) 
 
Here, there is some merit in defendant‘s claims.  The probative value of the 
opinion evidence was minimal.  The fact that conflicting opinions had been obtained 
specifically on Ivan‘s status as a battered man carried little weight for the very limited 
purpose the court allowed, i.e., determining the general reliability of expert opinion on 
battered spouse syndrome.  There were already conflicting opinions in defendant‘s case.  
Ryan readily conceded that experts could differ, even before the prosecutor questioned 
him about the opinions on Ivan.  Moreover, the court permitted the jury to weigh the fact 
that an expert had deemed Ivan a battered spouse, yet barred defendant from exploring 
the bases for that opinion. 
 
Nevertheless, any error was plainly harmless.  A trial court‘s determinations under 
Evidence Code section 352 do not ordinarily implicate the federal Constitution, and are 
reviewed under the ―reasonable probability‖ standard of  People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836.  Assuming defendant has a cognizable federal constitutional claim here, 
we would also find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard 
prescribed in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.  Our reasons are several. 
 
 First, the battered woman theory put forward by the defense was damaged far 
more seriously and directly by other evidence than by the conflicting expert opinions on 
Ivan‘s status.  A number of witnesses, including those who knew the family well, like the 
Lunas and Lorena Peevler, testified that defendant was the dominant spouse in the 
relationship.  The wife of the grocery store owner confirmed that impression with her 
testimony regarding the spouses‘ behavior in the store.  Ivan, Jr., in testimony presented 
by the defense, said his mother was more likely than his father to get her way.  Most 
tellingly, defendant‘s responses in the July 24 police interview were flatly inconsistent 
with the notion that she was intimidated by Ivan.  When told that he had blamed her, 
defendant displayed anger and surprise, and promptly began implicating him, along with 
 
35 
 
herself, in the prolonged and varied course of abuse that led to Genny‘s death.  She did 
not suggest she had been acting under Ivan‘s control, and her statements certainly did not 
reflect an effort to protect him.  Although she indicated at times that Ivan had hit her, she 
more frequently described blows he inflicted on the children.  At the end of the interview, 
she emphatically agreed that Ivan should be punished for what had happened to Genny.   
Defendant‘s statements and demeanor were quite incompatible with the defense theory 
that she was the cowed victim of a battering husband.  The defense experts‘ attempts to 
explain away her performance during this videotaped interview were feeble.  Compared 
to the powerful videotape evidence of defendant‘s interview, and the testimony of 
witnesses who knew the couple well, the impact of conflicting opinion evidence on 
whether Ivan was a battered spouse was minimal. 
 
Second, the prosecutor did not dwell on the opinion evidence.  Even including his 
earlier unsuccessful attempts to bring up the idea that Ivan claimed to be a battered man, 
in the hypothetical posed to Bernee and the cross-examination of defendant on the letter 
she received from Ivan, no great emphasis was placed on this factor.  In closing, the 
prosecutor mentioned it only as an example of the unreliability of expert opinion in the 
fields of psychology and psychiatry. 
 
Finally, the battered woman theory was not a defense to the crimes charged 
against defendant.  The jury could have believed she was a battered spouse, yet also 
decided that her failure to protect Genny and her participation in severe acts of child 
abuse were criminally culpable.  Indeed, the abuse of Genny was so horrific, and so much 
worse than any of the spousal abuse defendant claimed to have suffered, that the jury was 
highly likely to hold her responsible even if it accepted the battered woman theory.  For 
all the above reasons, we have no doubt that the result of the trial would have been the 
same had the court refused to permit the prosecutor to impeach Ryan with the conflicting 
expert opinions on Ivan‘s status as a battered man. 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
c.  Requiring Defendant to Submit to Interviews with 
 
 
 
     Prosecution Experts 
 
Before trial the prosecutor moved for an order directing defendant to submit to a 
psychiatric evaluation by a prosecution expert, if she produced expert testimony of her 
own about her mental condition.  The motion was based on People v. Danis (1973) 31 
Cal.App.3d 782 (Danis) and Evidence Code section 730, among other authorities.  
Defendant opposed the motion, claiming she was not presenting a defense based on her 
mental condition but instead offering battered woman syndrome as an explanation for 
certain of her actions, such as failing to protect Genny and lying to the police.  The court 
issued a tentative ruling that the prosecution‘s request was proper under Danis.  
 
The parties argued the matter on several occasions.  The prosecutor noted that the 
defense would be calling Bernee, a marriage and family therapist, as well as Ryan, a 
psychologist.  He asked that two prosecution experts be allowed to examine defendant, 
Kaser-Boyd and Dr. Mills.  He said Kaser-Boyd would testify on battered woman 
syndrome, and Mills on more general psychiatric issues.  The prosecutor described Dr. 
Mills as a ―debunker.‖  The defense, in addition to maintaining that no examination 
should be permitted, objected to the idea of more than one examiner and particularly to 
an examination by Dr. Mills.  Counsel argued that Dr. Mills had no expertise in battered 
woman syndrome, and that his views of defendant would be colored by his examination 
of Ivan before Ivan‘s trial.  Moreover, the defense would be at a disadvantage because it 
had no opportunity for an expert to examine Ivan.  The court granted the prosecutor‘s 
request.  It saw no legal obstacle to examinations by two experts, and found it reasonable 
for one to examine defendant with regard to battered woman syndrome and one to 
determine more generally whether other mental conditions might explain her behavior.  
The court also saw no reason why Dr. Mills should not be one of the examiners, though it 
was inclined to exclude any statements Ivan had made to Mills.13 
                                              
13  
Defendant‘s writ petition challenging the court‘s order was denied. 
 
37 
 
 
Defendant was examined by Kaser-Boyd, but refused to submit to examination by 
Dr. Mills.  The defense was aware that a consequence of that refusal was that the jury 
would be told it could consider her decision in its evaluation of the expert testimony.  At 
the conclusion of the guilt phase, the court advised the jury that it had ordered 
examinations by Kaser-Boyd and Mills, that defendant had refused to be examined by Dr. 
Mills, and that her refusal ―may be considered by you when weighing the opinions of the 
defense experts in this case.  The weight to which this factor is entitled is a matter for you 
to decide.‖ 
 
Defendant raises a number of claims of error regarding the court‘s rulings.  She 
contends (1) there was no authority for the court to order any examinations by 
prosecution experts; (2) in any event, it was improper to order examinations by more than 
one such expert; (3) it was improper to permit an examination by Dr. Mills in particular; 
and (4) Dr. Mills‘s testimony amounted to improper profile evidence. 
 
Defendant argues that the Danis holding, recognizing the trial courts‘ inherent 
power to authorize prosecution experts to examine defendants who place their mental 
state at issue, did not survive the enactment of the criminal discovery statutes in 1990.14  
(Danis, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 786; see § 1054, subd. (e) [―no discovery shall occur 
in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory provisions, or 
as mandated by the Constitution of the United States‖].)  After defendant‘s opening brief 
was filed, this court vindicated her argument in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 1096, 1106 (Verdin).  The Attorney General concedes that the trial court‘s order 
was based on Danis, and therefore could not stand under Verdin.  However, the Attorney 
                                              
14  
Defendant claims the order for examination by prosecution experts violated her 
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well 
as her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and the effective assistance 
of counsel in that counsel was not allowed to be present during the examinations. 
 
38 
 
General contends we should not apply Verdin retroactively, and alternatively claims the 
error did not prejudice defendant. 
 
The Attorney General‘s retroactivity argument is without merit.  Our opinion in 
Verdin did not declare a new rule, but simply established the meaning of the discovery 
statutes as they then stood.15  Because Verdin ―only elucidate[d] and enforce[d] prior law, 
no question of retroactivity arises.‖  (Donaldson v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 
36; see Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1023; People v. Mutch (1971) 4 
Cal.3d 389, 394-395.  See also People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1087 [applying 
Verdin].) 
 
Although we held in Verdin that the criminal discovery statutes had deprived trial 
courts of their inherent authority to require a criminal defendant to submit to a mental 
examination, we also made it clear that there was a separate statutory basis for appointing 
mental health experts.  (Verdin, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1109.)  Under Evidence Code 
section 730, ―[w]hen it appears to the court, at any time before or during the trial of an 
action, that expert evidence is or may be required by the court or by any party to the 
action, the court on its own motion or on motion of any party may appoint one or more 
experts to investigate, to render a report as may be ordered by the court, and to testify as 
an expert at the trial of the action relative to the fact or matter as to which the expert 
evidence is or may be required.‖  In Verdin, the Court of Appeal had denied the 
defendant‘s pretrial petition for writ relief.  We reversed, noting that the People had not 
requested the appointment of an expert under Evidence Code section 730, nor had the 
trial court made such an appointment.  Thus, the People had forfeited reliance on that 
                                              
15 
 The Legislature promptly responded to Verdin by enacting section 1054.3, 
subdivision (b), which authorizes courts to order examination by a mental health expert 
retained by the prosecution whenever a defendant places his or her mental state at issue 
through expert testimony.  (Stats. 2009, ch. 297, § 1.)  Whether the new statute would be 
applicable on a retrial is a question we need not consider.  (See Tapia v. Superior Court 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288, 299-300; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 663-664; 
People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 849.) 
 
39 
 
source of authority.  (Verdin, at pp. 1109-1110.)  Nevertheless, we noted that the People 
were free to seek an appointment under Evidence Code section 730 upon remand.  
(Verdin, at p. 1117.) 
 
Here, defendant did not argue in the trial court that the prosecutor‘s request was 
precluded by the discovery statutes.16  Had she done so, the court could and likely would 
have resorted to its power to appoint experts under Evidence Code section 730, which 
was invoked in the prosecutor‘s motion. 17  During arguments on the motion, the court 
twice mentioned its authority under Evidence Code section 730, although the Attorney 
General properly concedes that the court ultimately relied on its inherent authority under 
Danis.  However, defendant‘s failure to object on the statutory grounds discussed in 
Verdin bars her from raising the error on appeal.  A different rule would be unfair to the 
prosecution and the trial court, which could have avoided the error had it been brought to 
their attention.  (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590; see also, e.g., In re Seaton 
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 198.)  In any event, even if defendant had not forfeited the claim, 
the Verdin error would be harmless.  The court expressly recognized that the interests of 
―fairness‖ and ―the ascertainment of truth‖ required the prosecutor to be able to meet the 
evidence of the defense experts.  Its mistaken reliance on Danis was not prejudicial, 
given the alternate source of authority provided by Evidence Code section 730. 
                                              
16  
Defendant asserts she made such a claim, but the record shows otherwise.  
Defendant refers to a page of her opposition where she relied on her Fifth Amendment 
privilege and claimed that ―statements by a defendant are specifically omitted from the 
discovery provisions of the Penal Code (section 1054.3).‖  This claim did not alert the 
court to the idea that the prosecutor‘s request for examination was barred by the 
discovery statutes; rather, it argued that defendant‘s statements were exempt from 
discovery.  That argument was incorrect, of course; statements made by defendant to her 
own experts and reflected in their reports were discoverable and were provided to the 
prosecution without objection below. 
17  
Defendant suggests the court was unlikely to appoint experts, because their fees 
would have been payable from the court‘s own budget.  However, Evidence Code section 
731, subdivision (a) specifies that fees fixed under Evidence Code section 730 are 
payable from the county treasury. 
 
40 
 
 
Defendant also argues, as she did below, that she did not raise her mental 
condition as a defense, and therefore did not waive her constitutional rights against self-
incrimination and due process.  This position is untenable.  The centerpiece of the 
defense was defendant‘s assertion that her actions were explained by battered woman 
syndrome.  Defendant squarely placed her mental state at issue, claiming she was a 
victim unable to overcome her fear of Ivan and protect the child she had taken into her 
care.  The evidence she presented in support of that claim was subject to rebuttal.  As the 
Attorney General points out, had the defense been content with evidence of battered 
woman syndrome in general, without presenting experts who had examined defendant, 
the prosecution would have had no ground for requesting an examination by its experts.  
But since the defense did present expert testimony based on interviews with defendant, 
the court properly found that fairness required giving the prosecution the opportunity to 
counter that testimony.  It is settled that a defendant who makes an affirmative showing 
of his or her mental condition by way of expert testimony waives his or her Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights to object to examination by a prosecution expert.  (People v. 
Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 412-413; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 
1190; Danis, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 786.) 18 
 
  Defendant further claims that a rule exposing her to examination by prosecution 
experts on battered woman syndrome would open the door to compulsory examination of 
witnesses who are claimed to suffer from this syndrome, or from rape trauma syndrome.  
However, nothing in the Danis rule, now codified in section 1054.3, subdivision (b), 
implicates the situation of witnesses, who are not parties and do not choose to place their 
mental condition at issue as defendants may. 
 
Defendant contends the court erred by ordering her to submit to more than one 
interview, by instructing the jury that it could consider her refusal to be interviewed by 
                                              
18  
The same reasoning applies to defendant‘s claim that her Fourteenth Amendment 
right to due process was violated. 
 
41 
 
Dr. Mills, and by preventing her from explaining the reasons for her refusal when she 
was on the witness stand.19  Defendant‘s briefs are devoid of legal authority in support of 
these arguments.  We cannot say the court abused its discretion by deciding that two 
prosecution experts would be permitted to rebut the testimony of two defense experts.  
The jury instruction on defendant‘s refusal to be examined was similar to the instruction 
approved in People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 412-413.  While the instruction 
was infected by the Verdin error in ordering the examinations (People v. Wallace, supra, 
44 Cal.4th at p. 1087), defendant forfeited that claim and was not prejudiced in any event, 
as discussed above.  Moreover, the court permitted her to explain that her refusal to be 
examined by Dr. Mills was based on the advice of counsel.  Defendant claims she should 
have been able to tell the jury that her counsel believed Dr. Mills was not an expert in 
battered woman syndrome, and that Dr. Mills had an unfair advantage because he, unlike 
the defense experts, had interviewed Ivan.  However, Dr. Mills did not testify about 
battered woman syndrome, and defense counsel established his lack of expertise in that 
area on cross-examination.  It is unclear how defendant would have benefited had the 
jury learned of Dr. Mills‘s access to Ivan.  In any event, hearsay conversations between 
defendant and her counsel regarding their legal strategy were clearly inadmissible. 
 
Defendant argues that it was an abuse of discretion to permit Dr. Mills to evaluate 
defendant over the defense‘s objections that he was biased by his prior evaluation of Ivan 
and lacked expertise in battered woman syndrome.20  Again, defendant provides no legal 
authority for her claim, and we find no merit in it.  It is a matter of speculation what 
effect the doctor‘s interview with Ivan may have had, and the jury did not learn that he 
had evaluated Ivan.  Nor did the prosecutor seek to use Dr. Mills as an expert on battered 
                                              
19  
Defendant asserts violation of her federal Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to a fundamentally fair trial, and her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
20  
She claims violation of her federal Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights, and her Eighth Amendment right to a reliable verdict. 
 
42 
 
woman syndrome.  Instead, he offered the doctor‘s testimony for purposes of general 
psychiatric evaluation and the exploration of alternate explanations for defendant‘s 
mental state.  Defendant fails to establish an abuse of discretion in the order allowing Dr. 
Mills to serve as one of the prosecution experts. 
 
Finally, defendant claims the court erred by allowing Dr. Mills to testify that 
defendant had an incentive to malinger because she faced the death penalty, and that her 
inconsistent statements on various subjects reflected malingering.  She analogizes the 
doctor‘s testimony to improper profile evidence.21 
 
Before Dr. Mills took the stand, defense counsel objected to any testimony that 
would invade the province of the jury by opining on defendant‘s credibility.  The court 
agreed that it would be improper for the doctor to tell the jury what to think about 
defendant‘s credibility, but ruled that it would be proper for him to express a view on 
whether it was reasonable for another expert to form a professional opinion based on 
defendant‘s statements.  The court noted that the issue ―somewhat straddl[es] the line 
between what a jury should believe and what a mental health expert should believe in 
forming an opinion.‖  It advised the prosecutor to ―draw your questions carefully and talk 
to the doctor carefully about not telling the jury what they should believe.‖  Regarding 
the significance of the fact that defendant was facing the death penalty, the court stated, 
―we don‘t need an expert to opine that somebody facing the death penalty has a motive to 
generally lie.‖  The prosecutor said he had no intention of asking Dr. Mills about that, 
because he did not want to bring the subject of penalty into the guilt phase. 
 
However, when Dr. Mills took the stand the prosecutor made it clear that he 
intended to elicit an opinion that ―the incentive for malingering in a case like this is 
high.‖  Defense counsel‘s objection was overruled.  Dr. Mills testified that the death 
penalty created a ―very high‖ incentive for ―embellishing or distorting.‖  In the remainder 
                                              
21  
Again, defendant refers to her federal Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights, and her Eighth Amendment right to a reliable verdict. 
 
43 
 
of his direct testimony, which was not prolonged, Dr. Mills described the nature of 
posttraumatic stress disorder, the problems experts have with unreliable data from those 
whose stakes in litigation give them reason to lie, and some of the inconsistencies in 
defendant‘s statements that led him to believe a reliable diagnosis of posttraumatic stress 
disorder was impossible. 
 
During a break, defense counsel expressed concern over the doctor‘s views on the 
death penalty as a motive for lying, given the court‘s earlier ruling.  Counsel did not, 
however, ask for an admonition to the jury.  The court did not share counsel‘s concern, 
noting that the jury was well aware of the stakes in the case and taking the view that the 
prosecutor‘s questions properly had to do with ―evaluating credibility and taking a 
history.‖  Counsel responded that if Dr. Mills‘s view on this point was not adding 
anything to what the jury already knew, it was more prejudicial than probative for the 
expert to ―keep highlighting it.‖  The court overruled the objection. 
 
The proper scope of expert testimony is limited to subjects ―sufficiently beyond 
common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.‖  (Evid. 
Code, § 801, subd. (a); see People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 45.)  Here, the court 
properly determined in advance of Dr. Mills‘s testimony that the doctor‘s view on the 
death penalty as an incentive to malinger was not necessary to assist the jury, and the 
prosecutor agreed not to explore the subject.  However, the prosecutor proceeded to ask 
the doctor generally about defendant‘s incentive for malingering, and Dr. Mills 
immediately brought up the death penalty in his response.  The court should have 
sustained defense counsel‘s objections, and an admonishment would have been proper. 
 
The possibility of prejudice, however, was minimal.  As the court observed, it was 
―not news to the jury‖ that it was a capital case, and the incentive described by Dr. Mills 
was an obvious one.  Defense counsel effectively cross-examined Dr. Mills on this point, 
getting him to concede that the stakes were high for all concerned in the case, and that a 
defendant is not to be disbelieved simply because he or she is facing the death penalty.  
 
44 
 
Moreover, far more direct and damaging evidence of defendant‘s malingering was 
supplied by her own expert, Ryan, who told the jury that defendant‘s responses to the 
personality tests he gave her reflected a high degree of falsity, to such an extent that the 
results of one test were invalid. 
 
Defendant contends the court also erred by permitting the doctor to give his view 
on whether defendant‘s malingering, as reflected in the conflicts in her statements about 
various events, undermined the opinions given by her expert witnesses.  We disagree.  
The defense relied heavily on expert testimony to explain the inconsistencies in 
defendant‘s statements.  It was proper to allow the prosecution to rebut that testimony 
with Dr. Mills‘s opinion that the foundation for the defense experts‘ conclusions was 
unreliable. 
 
 
  
d.  Exclusion of Statements by Ivan 
 
Defendant filed a pretrial motion seeking the admission of certain statements made 
by Ivan when he was questioned by detectives after Genny‘s death.  Defendant 
summarized the statements as follows:  ―[T]he defendant and the codefendant left the 
bathroom together after placing the decedent in the tub.  The codefendant admits that 
only he came back into the bathroom after both had previously left.  He admits that the 
decedent was still alive when he went back to the bathroom.  The codefendant indicated 
that he did not think the water was hot.  He said the decedent was making a noise but he 
thought it was because she didn‘t want to take a bath.  He admits he set the water and if 
she had told him it was hot he would have taken her out and put cool water in.  The 
codefendant admits that the child may have been too scared of him to say anything.  He 
admits yelling at her to take a bath and not to come out.‖ 
 
Defendant contended these statements amounted to declarations against interest 
under the hearsay exception codified in Evidence Code section 1230.  When the motion 
was heard, counsel argued that because Ivan knew he was under suspicion when he was 
interrogated, his statements tended to incriminate him and therefore were reliable enough 
 
45 
 
to be admitted.  Counsel was unwilling, however, to concede that exculpatory statements 
by Ivan should be admitted, characterizing them as ―self-serving.‖  The court denied the 
motion, ruling that all of Ivan‘s statements were essentially exculpatory, not self-
incriminating.  The court reasoned that while certain statements taken out of context 
might be useful to defendant for casting blame on Ivan, those statements could not be 
characterized as admissions that no reasonable person would make unless they were true. 
 
After Ivan‘s trial concluded, defendant sought reconsideration.  In this motion, she 
argued that the prosecutor had used Ivan‘s statements to prove his guilt, telling Ivan‘s 
jury that the statements contained ―kernels of truth.‖  If the statements were reliable 
enough to be used against Ivan, defendant asserted they should also be admitted at her 
trial.  In arguing this motion, counsel told the court he now recognized that if defendant 
were allowed to introduce certain of Ivan‘s statements, the prosecutor could ―put on the 
whole tape if he wants to.‖  The court adhered to its previous ruling, finding that Ivan‘s 
statements were not declarations against interest but instead efforts to deny responsibility 
for Genny‘s death. 
 
Defendant again pressed the court to allow Ivan‘s statements into evidence after 
the prosecutor raised the issue of Ivan‘s attempt to use a battered spouse defense.  (See pt. 
II.A.1.a., ante.)  Counsel argued that Ivan‘s statements would ―set the record straight as 
to what Ivan actually did say as far as his involvement is concerned.‖  Counsel renewed 
this claim after the court permitted the prosecutor to inform the jury that an expert had 
deemed Ivan a battered spouse.  The court ruled that the prosecutor‘s comments did not 
open the door to the admission of Ivan‘s statements to the police. 
 
In this court, defendant claims the court erred by ruling that Ivan‘s statements 
placing him in the bathroom with Genny at crucial times were inadmissible under the 
hearsay exception for declarations against interest.  We disagree.  Evidence Code section 
1230 permits a hearsay statement to be admitted if it ―so far subjected [the declarant] to 
the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not 
 
46 
 
have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.‖  ― ‗The focus of the declaration 
against interest exception to the hearsay rule is the basic trustworthiness of the 
declaration.  [Citations.]  In determining whether a statement is truly against interest 
within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is sufficiently trustworthy 
to be admissible, the court may take into account not just the words but the circumstances 
under which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the 
declarant‘s relationship to the defendant.‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Geier (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 555, 584 (Geier).)22 
 
Here, the court accurately noted that Ivan‘s statements were attempts to excuse 
himself from liability.  Some were plainly unbelievable, such as his claim that he would 
have done something if Genny had told him the water was hot.  The court observed that a 
child being severely scalded would make it obvious to anyone that ―she was in mortal 
danger.‖  Defendant claims that Ivan incriminated himself merely by admitting he was in 
the bathroom around the time Genny was burned.  However, ― ‗[e]ven when a hearsay 
statement runs generally against the declarant‘s penal interest and redaction has excised 
exculpatory portions, the statement may, in light of circumstances, lack sufficient indicia 
of trustworthiness to qualify for admission. . . .‘  [Citation.]‖  (Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 
p. 584.)  This is such a case. 
 
Defendant argues that even if Ivan‘s statements were false, they reflected 
consciousness of guilt.  However, basic trustworthiness and factual truthfulness are 
required for a statement to qualify for admission under Evidence Code section 1230.  
(Geier, supra, at p. 584.)  Defendant essentially concedes that Ivan‘s statements did not 
disclose the true circumstances of Genny‘s death.  She goes so far as to contend that 
Ivan‘s statements were lies comparable to her own lies to the police, and thus were 
                                              
22  
We note that Ivan‘s statements were admissible at his trial as statements of a party 
under Evidence Code section 1220.  A different analysis is required when a nonparty‘s 
statements are offered as declarations against interest under Evidence Code section 1230.  
 
47 
 
admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that ―dependent spouses would lie to 
protect the other.‖  This unusual theory was not raised below.  We do not address it here, 
except to note that it does not tend to support the conclusion that defendant was innocent. 
 
In any event, Ivan‘s consciousness of guilt was not at issue; both sides at 
defendant‘s trial took the position that he was knowingly guilty of Genny‘s murder.  The 
court, with the agreement of counsel, informed the jury that Ivan had been convicted and 
sentenced to death.  It advised the jury that this information was only relevant to its 
evaluation of the testimony of witnesses who were friends or family members of both 
defendant and Ivan, and reminded the jury that only defendant‘s guilt was at issue in the 
present trial.  Thus, statements by Ivan reflecting his guilt were not relevant on any 
contested issue.  
 
Defendant also claims the trial court should have allowed her to bring in Ivan‘s 
statements to rebut the prosecutor‘s insinuations that Ivan had employed a battered 
spouse defense.  The argument lacks logic.  Ivan‘s statements to the police were not 
inconsistent with a battered spouse claim, nor did they tend to reflect the nature of the 
defense his attorneys presented. 
 
 
2.  The Evidence of Defendant’s History of Abuse as a Child 
 
Before trial, the prosecutor objected to the admission of evidence of the abuse 
defendant suffered as a child, noting that he would have to respond to it and time would 
be spent on collateral issues.  The defense insisted the evidence was relevant because its 
expert psychologist, Ryan, believed defendant‘s experiences as a child had contributed to 
her battered woman syndrome, and were mirrored in the dynamics of her marriage.  The 
court agreed that the defense was entitled to bring in this evidence. 
 
Defendant testified at length about her childhood abuse at the hands of her mother 
and stepfather.  Ryan testified that the emotional and physical abuse defendant‘s mother 
inflicted on her, and the sexual abuse by her stepfather, which her mother refused to 
believe, contributed to her low self-esteem and to the development of a marital 
 
48 
 
relationship in which she became a battered woman.  On cross-examination, Ryan agreed 
that batterers tend to come from violent homes, and that children tend to identify with and 
model their behavior after the parent of the same gender as the child.  A girl, for instance, 
might ―learn domestic violence from her mother.‖  On redirect, Ryan said that about 75 
percent of battered women come from a home where they observed domestic violence, 
and that defendant‘s experience of abuse as a child made it more likely that she would 
become a battered woman.  She would submit to a battering relationship more readily 
than someone who had not had such experiences. 
 
Cynthia Bernee, the other defense expert on battered woman syndrome, also 
testified that childhood abuse is a significant factor in the syndrome.  In defendant‘s case, 
her experiences had taught her that she lacked control over her environment and 
predisposed her to become a victim of domestic violence by Ivan. 
 
After the defense rested, the court and counsel engaged in an extended discussion 
on the scope of the prosecutor‘s rebuttal regarding the child abuse evidence.  The 
prosecutor said his expert psychologist, Kaser-Boyd, would testify that victims of 
childhood abuse develop poor rage control mechanisms and tend to model the abusive 
behavior of their parents.  He conceded that the evidence was similar to profile evidence, 
and could not have been presented as part of his case-in-chief, but claimed the defense 
had opened the subject by presenting evidence that defendant‘s childhood abuse set her 
up to become a victim of domestic abuse as an adult.  The court expressed concern about 
testimony directly tying defendant‘s experiences as a child to her propensity for 
committing child abuse herself.  It noted that the defense evidence of abuse and battered 
woman syndrome was limited to explaining defendant‘s failure to protect Genny. 
 
The defense responded that while it would not object to a prosecution expert 
testifying that defendant‘s experiences made her more likely to be a battering spouse, it 
did oppose testimony that she was more likely to be a child abuser.  There was a good 
deal of discussion about whether, if the prosecutor introduced evidence that Ivan‘s 
 
49 
 
childhood home was not a violent one, the defense would be able to introduce Ivan‘s 
report to Dr. Weinstein that his brother and an uncle had molested him.  The prosecutor 
ultimately decided that his rebuttal as to defendant‘s child abuse would be limited to two 
points:  (1) that children model their parents‘ behavior and may learn from abuse to react 
with rage as adults; and (2) that child abuse can set a person up to be an abuser as easily 
as a victim. 
 
The court suggested that, as so limited, the proffered testimony was proper 
rebuttal.  The defense objected that it had not tried to show that defendant‘s experience 
made her less likely to be a child abuser, and that the inference the prosecutor sought to 
draw went directly to an ultimate issue in the trial, unlike the defense‘s battered woman 
syndrome evidence.  The court was not persuaded. 
 
The prosecutor questioned Kaser-Boyd about the concept of role modeling.  She 
responded that children learn by imitation and parents are strong role models, so that 
children may imitate the behavior they see at home and subsequently reenact it.  The 
prosecutor asked if poor emotional control was related to role modeling.  Kaser-Boyd 
said:  ―If one has had a role model with poor emotional control who acted out frustration 
in emotionally uncontrolled ways, let‘s say a parent who goes into a rage or a parent who 
is abusive in their actions, hits too hard, does things that make a child suffer, the child 
goes through terror, really, when they experience that.  And the act of, or the experience 
of terror, we believe, causes changes in personality, and it also causes changes in the 
developing brain.  [¶]  Little people who feel terrified have more cortisol in their brains.  
They have often the frequent tapping of adrenalin and, over the long term, that damages 
parts of the brain that are required for good emotional control.‖ 
 
Kaser-Boyd explained that children do not necessarily reenact exactly the abuse 
they suffered.  Asked whether the research showed that battered women could abuse 
children themselves, she responded that a leading study showed 28 percent of battered 
women admitted being abusive to their children.  In her own practice, she did not have a 
 
50 
 
statistic but had found that ―it‘s definitely the case that some battered women are also 
physically abusive to their children.‖  The prosecutor proceeded to question Kaser-Boyd 
about her examination of defendant, but elicited no opinion as to whether defendant‘s 
experience of child abuse predisposed her to be a child abuser herself. 
 
Kaser-Boyd‘s testimony lasted for an entire day.  The following day, the jury was 
excused and the court and counsel discussed instructions.  On the next court day, before 
proceeding with the defendant‘s surrebuttal witnesses, the court gave the following 
instruction to the jury, which was repeated at the end of the guilt phase: 
 
―It‘s important for you to understand the purpose for which certain evidence has 
been offered.  The defense has offered defendant‘s testimony that she did not commit the 
crimes for which she‘s charged.  They‘ve also offered extensive evidence regarding the 
battered woman‘s syndrome.  The battered woman‘s syndrome evidence is not offered to 
show that someone suffering from the battered woman‘s syndrome could not or would 
not commit the crimes charged; rather, it is offered to prove a potentially innocent 
explanation for defendant‘s failure to protect Genny and failure to provide medical care 
for her as well as to provide a context for defendant‘s statements following Genny‘s 
death. 
 
―Likewise, the people have offered evidence that a person‘s childhood physical 
abuse could result in that person growing up to be either a victim or an abuser.  This is 
not offered to show that someone abused as a child is more likely to be an abuser as an 
adult; rather, it is offered to show that being a victim of physical abuse as a child is not 
inconsistent with commission of violent crimes as an adult. 
 
―You must not consider this evidence for any purpose other than the purposes for 
which it was offered.‖ 
 
Defendant argues that Kaser-Boyd‘s testimony amounted to improper ―battering 
parent syndrome‖ evidence, of the kind disapproved in People v. Walkey (1986) 177 
 
51 
 
Cal.App.3d 268 (Walkey).23  In Walkey, a physician testified that the murder victim, a 
child, had been abused.  The doctor described the profile of a child abuser, telling the jury 
that the most important single factor was being abused oneself as a child.  After the 
defendant testified in his own behalf, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to cross-
examine him about abuse he had suffered as a child.  In closing, the prosecutor argued 
that the defendant fit the profile of a battering parent.  (Id. at p. 277.)  The Court of 
Appeal held it was error to permit what amounted to character evidence showing that the 
defendant was a typical battering parent.  It noted, however, that if a defendant introduces 
evidence of his good character, cross-examination to counter that evidence would be 
proper.  (Id. at pp. 278-279.) 
 
Here it was defendant who, over the prosecutor‘s objection, introduced the subject 
of her abuse as a child and the effect it had on her as an adult.  The trial court properly 
allowed the prosecutor to respond to that evidence.  This is not a case like Walkey, where 
the prosecution improperly sought to prove guilt on the basis of general characteristics.  
(See also People v. Robbie (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1086 [―Profile evidence is 
unfairly relied upon to affirmatively prove a defendant‘s guilt based on his match with 
the profile‖].) 
 
Defendant argues, as she did below, that her evidence was strictly limited to the 
impact of child abuse on the likelihood of becoming an abused spouse, so that proper 
rebuttal should have also been so limited.  We disagree.  ―The scope of rebuttal evidence 
is within the trial court‘s discretion, and on appeal its ruling will not be disturbed absent 
‗ ― palpable abuse.‖ ‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1088.)  
Defendant introduced evidence of her childhood abuse in an attempt to bolster her claim 
that she was an abused spouse.  The purpose of this evidence was to explain her failure to 
protect Genny and her contradictory statements to the police, including admissions that 
                                              
23  
Defendant claims her rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to a fair trial and a reliable verdict were violated. 
 
52 
 
she participated in some of the abuse Genny suffered.  The defense experts testified that a 
battered woman may take responsibility for acts of abuse perpetrated by the battering 
spouse.  Certainly it was proper for the prosecutor to counter this testimony with expert 
opinion that an abused child may also grow up to be an abuser.  The trial court instructed 
the jury on the limited purpose for which this testimony could be considered.  No error 
appears. 
 
Defendant argues that the court should have permitted her to respond to the 
prosecutor‘s rebuttal by questioning Ivan‘s brother about his sodomization of Ivan as a 
child.  However, not only did the brother not testify, but also the prosecutor made no 
attempt to show that Ivan had a good childhood.  Defendant further claims she should 
have been able to call Dr. Weinstein and question him about Ivan‘s report that he had 
been sodomized.  Defendant did not seek that opportunity below; the defense had rested 
by the time this point was discussed, and defense counsel never asked to call Dr. 
Weinstein for any purpose other than rebutting the notion that Ivan was not abused as a 
child.  Defendant‘s argument on this point lacks any merit.  It was her choice to bring her 
own childhood abuse before the jury.  The court properly allowed the prosecutor to 
respond to defendant‘s evidence, but nothing in that response justified allowing defendant 
to explore Ivan‘s childhood experiences as well. 
 
 
3.  Instructional Issues 
 
Defendant complains that the jury instructions on the mental states required for 
murder and the special circumstances were  incomprehensible.24  However, she fails to 
develop a legally coherent argument.  She merely recites instructions, parses certain 
                                              
24  
The prosecutor advanced two theories of first degree murder:  murder perpetrated 
by torture, and felony murder committed in the course of mayhem.  (§ 189.)  Two special 
circumstances were alleged:   torture felony murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)) and mayhem 
felony murder  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(J)). 
 
53 
 
terms, and questions whether the jury could have understood them. 25  The Attorney 
General correctly notes that many of the instructions with which defendant now quibbles 
were not objected to below, or were requested by defense counsel.  The doctrine of 
invited error bars defendant from challenging instructions she requested as a tactical 
choice.  (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1293.)  While defendant may raise a 
claim that her substantial rights were affected by instructions to which she did not object 
(§ 1229; People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 111), she falls well short of making 
such a showing. 
 
Defendant claims the instructions left the jury with the impression that mayhem 
felony murder must be first degree murder.  That impression was accurate; mayhem 
felony murder is by statute murder in the first degree.  (§ 189.)  Defendant objects that 
the instructions on the elements of mayhem and the mayhem-murder special 
circumstance required no more than the intent to vex, annoy, or injure.  That is incorrect; 
the instructions properly informed the jury that mayhem felony murder requires the 
specific intent to commit mayhem.  (People v. Sears (1965) 62 Cal.2d 737, 744-745.)  
The fact that the instruction on the elements of mayhem mentioned only the intent to vex 
or annoy did not render the instructions confusing or circular, as defendant claims.  (See 
People v. Hayes (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 796, 804-805.) 
 
Defendant asserts the instructions did not adequately distinguish between first 
degree murder by torture and second degree torture felony murder.  However, the 
distinction was accurately noted by defense counsel when he pressed for the second 
degree torture felony murder instruction:  the second degree offense does not require 
premeditation.  This difference was plain on the face of the instructions, and defense 
                                              
25  
She claims her rights to due process and a jury trial under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments were violated, as well as her right to a reliable factfinding process under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
54 
 
counsel explained it to the jury as ―real simple‖ in his closing argument.  There was no 
error here. 
 
Defendant next claims that CALJIC No. 8.34, explaining aiding and abetting 
liability for second degree torture felony murder, failed to distinguish between first and 
second degree murder by an aider and abettor.  That distinction was beyond the scope of 
the instruction.  CALJIC No. 8.27 explained aiding and abetting liability for first degree 
mayhem felony murder.  Together, these two instructions covered the liability of an aider 
and abettor for felony murder in this case.  Defendant complains that no instruction 
directly explained aiding and abetting liability for first degree murder by torture.  
However, the jury was instructed generally and properly on the liability of aiders and 
abettors, and those instructions were sufficient to guide the jury in determining whether 
defendant aided and abetted a first degree murder by torture.  Defendant did not request a 
more specific instruction.  (See People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 598.) 
 
Defendant notes that the definition of torture was presented to the jury as it related 
to torture as a lesser related offense.  She contends the jury would not have understood 
that the definition also applied to the earlier instructions on first degree murder by torture 
and second degree torture felony murder.  We are satisfied, however, that there is no 
reasonable likelihood the jury would have failed to make those connections.  (See People 
v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803.)  Defendant also claims the first degree murder by 
torture instruction, requiring the jury to find a ―willful, deliberate and premeditated intent 
to inflict extreme and prolonged pain,‖ was confusing when compared with the 
instruction on the crime of torture, requiring merely the ―intent to cause cruel or extreme 
pain and suffering.‖  It was not.  Defendant acknowledges that the distinctions between 
these intent requirements are explained in People v. Aguilar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 
1204-1206, but she contends they were too subtle for the jury.  We are not so skeptical of 
the jurors‘ abilities.  It is fundamental that jurors are presumed to be intelligent and 
capable of understanding and applying the court‘s instructions.  (People v. Lewis (2001) 
 
55 
 
26 Cal.4th 334, 390.)  The record reflects no confusion on the part of the jury, or requests 
for further guidance on these points. 
 
Defendant‘s final argument concerns a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.81.17, 
regarding the mayhem-murder special circumstance.  At defense counsel‘s request, the 
court added the element of specific intent to commit mayhem.  Over the prosecutor‘s 
objections and with defense counsel‘s agreement, the court also imported a version of the 
third paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.80, explaining the intent requirements should the jury 
find that defendant was an actual killer, on the one hand, or an aider and abettor, on the 
other.  Defendant contends the instruction was ―hopelessly complicated.‖  We disagree; 
the instruction was approved by defense counsel and comprehensible by the jury.26 
 
 
4.  Sufficiency of the Evidence of Torture and Mayhem 
 
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the criminal intent 
required for mayhem felony murder, murder by torture, and the mayhem and torture 
felony-murder special circumstances.27  The argument is meritless.  As to the mayhem 
felony-murder special circumstance, the jury found that defendant specifically intended 
                                              
26  
Defendant particularly objects to the following paragraph, which the court derived 
from CALJIC 8.80:  ―If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
actually killed a human being, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill in 
order to find the special circumstance to be true.  However, if you find that the defendant 
was not the actual killer of a human being, or if you‘re unable to decide whether the 
defendant was the actual killer or an aider and abettor, you cannot find the mayhem 
special circumstance to be true as to the defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that such defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, 
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any act of the commission of 
murder in the first degree, or with reckless indifference to human life and as a major 
participant, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or 
assisted in the commission of the crime of mayhem which resulted in the death of a 
human being.‖ 
 
Defendant does not argue that the instruction was legally incorrect, but merely 
claims it was confusing.  We find no error. 
27  
She claims violation of her due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and her right to a reliable verdict under the Eighth Amendment. 
 
56 
 
to commit mayhem, in the course of which Genny was murdered, and that defendant was 
either the actual killer or an aider and abettor who acted with the intent to kill or with 
reckless indifference to human life.  As to the torture felony-murder special circumstance, 
the jury found that the murder was intentional and that defendant meant to inflict extreme 
and cruel physical pain for a sadistic purpose.  The evidence supporting these findings 
was more than adequate.  
 
―The standard of appellate review for determining the sufficiency of the evidence 
is settled.  ‗ ―On appeal we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the 
judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence that 
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of fact could 
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 
Cal.3d 557, 578; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317–320.)‖ ‘  (People 
v. Abilez [(2007)] 41 Cal.4th [472,] 504.)  ‗. . . We review the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support an enhancement using the same standard we apply to a conviction.  (People v. 
Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1382.)  Thus, we presume every fact in support of 
the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence.‘  (People 
v. Carrasco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1058.)‖  (People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th 
at p. 806.) 
 
Defendant contends there was no evidence she harbored a specific intent to maim 
Genny.  She relies on cases holding that evidence showing no more than an 
indiscriminate attack on the victim does not support a mayhem felony-murder conviction.  
(People v. Sears, supra, 62 Cal.2d 737, 745; People v. Anderson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 351, 
359.)  This is not such a case.  Genny suffered discrete injuries over an extended period 
of time, including a serious burn wound on her head, multiple bruises, scars, abrasions, 
and lacerations all over her body, subdural and subarachnoid hematomas, and the severe 
scalding that ultimately caused her death.  The scalding required the bathtub to be filled 
in advance with hot water, and Genny was deliberately held down in the water for long 
 
57 
 
enough to cause her skin and toenails to slough off.  The jury had more than enough 
evidence of specific intent to maim.  Direct evidence that defendant actually inflicted the 
fatal scalding was lacking, but powerful direct and circumstantial evidence supported the 
conclusion that she at least aided and abetted Ivan in inflicting the terminal injury. 28  
Defendant admitted that she removed Genny from the bathtub, severely burned, and did 
not seek medical help.  She also admitted that she used the blow dryer to blow air on 
Genny, and the jury could have inferred that defendant inflicted the scars on Genny‘s 
cheeks and elsewhere that matched the blow dryer‘s grill. 
 
A similar analysis applies to defendant‘s claim that the evidence failed to establish 
her deliberate intent to inflict the extreme and prolonged pain required for murder by 
torture.  (See People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 546; Walkey, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 
at pp. 275-276.)  The long course of painful abuse suffered by Genny suggested that 
defendant and Ivan habitually tortured her.  Defendant‘s answers in the July 24 interview 
with detectives confirmed that she and Ivan acted together.  On the day of Genny‘s death, 
one or both of them deliberately filled the tub with hot water and forced Genny into it.  
Both witnessed the extreme and prolonged pain that ensued as Genny lay dying, and did 
nothing to secure assistance until her body began to stiffen.  Regarding the torture felony-
murder special circumstance, defendant claims the evidence failed to establish her intent 
to kill.  We disagree.  Defendant admitted she thought Genny was dying when she pulled 
her from the bathtub, unconscious.  By failing to get help, she ensured Genny‘s death.  
The evidence of intent to kill was sufficient. 
                                              
28  
In her reply brief, defendant relies on People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 
Cal.App.4th 1148, 1164-1165, for the proposition that when the aider and abettor may 
have had a less culpable mental state than the perpetrator, it is error to instruct the jury 
that an aider and abettor is ―equally guilty.‖  Defendant‘s jury was similarly instructed.  
However, as defendant concedes, the Samaniego court deemed the instructional error 
harmless where a special circumstance alleging intent to kill was found true.  (Id. at pp. 
1165-1166.)  Here, the jury returned such a true finding.  Accordingly, Samaniego does 
not aid defendant. 
 
58 
 
 
 
5.  Merger of Mayhem and Homicide 
 
Defendant contends a conviction of mayhem felony murder in this case would 
violate the ―merger doctrine‖ articulated in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, a 
second degree murder case, and extended to first degree felony murder in People v. 
Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 441-442 (Wilson).29  In her reply brief, defendant notes that 
this court recently overruled Wilson and held, prospectively, that the merger doctrine has 
no application to first degree felony murder.  (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 
1121-1122.)  Although Farley does not apply here, the Attorney General correctly notes 
that our preexisting jurisprudence had limited Wilson to cases of burglary felony murder 
where the defendant‘s only felonious purpose was to assault or kill the victim.  (People v. 
Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1262; People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 387-388.) 
 
Defendant relies on People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806, a second degree 
murder case holding that felony child abuse, when it consists of a direct assault on a child 
resulting in death, comes within the merger doctrine.  Smith has no application here.  We 
have long restricted the merger doctrine in first degree murder cases to felony murder 
based on burglary, ―due to the unusual nature of burglary.‖  (People v. Burton, supra, 6 
Cal.3d at p. 388.)  In any event, the crime of mayhem felony murder has an ―independent 
felonious purpose‖ that distinguishes it from the felony child abuse discussed in Smith.  
(Burton, at p. 387.)  The defendant must intend to permanently disfigure the victim, 
which goes well beyond the merely assaultive purpose the Smith court considered 
incompatible with the felony-murder rule.  (Smith, at pp. 805-806; People v. Sears, supra, 
62 Cal.2d at pp. 744-745.) 
 
The primary policy reason for the felony-murder doctrine was fully operative in 
the circumstances of this case.  ―The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter those 
who commit the enumerated felonies from killing by holding them strictly responsible for 
                                              
29  
Defendant claims that allowing the jury to consider the felony-murder theory 
violated her rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
59 
 
any killing committed by a cofelon, whether intentional, negligent, or accidental, during 
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the felony.‖  (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 187, 197.)  Although defendant contends ―the felony-murder rule cannot be much 
of a deterrent to a person who has decided to assault a child with intent to maim,‖ the 
medical testimony here was that Genny could have survived had she been given prompt 
medical care, though the scalding would have scarred her for life.  This mayhem need not 
have resulted in a murder.  Thus, the merger doctrine has no logical application in this 
case. 
 
 
6.  Cumulative Guilt Phase Error 
 
Defendant argues that this was a close case, and that the errors during the guilt 
phase, even if not prejudicial in themselves, justify reversal when considered together.  
Neither proposition is supportable.  The case presented at the guilt phase was quite 
strong, supported by graphic and telling physical evidence, both in the condition of 
Genny‘s body and the conditions found in defendant‘s apartment.  Defendant‘s own 
statements were powerfully incriminating.  The attempt by the defense to explain away 
those statements and minimize defendant‘s culpability, by presenting her as a battered 
woman controlled by her husband, was weak.  (See pt. II.A.1.b., ante.) 
 
Any errors during the guilt phase were relatively insignificant.  Assuming it was 
improper to allow the prosecutor to inform the jury that Ivan had been deemed a battered 
spouse by one expert, the effect on the determination of defendant‘s guilt was negligible.  
As we have noted, battered woman syndrome was not a defense to the charged crimes, 
and other evidence cast serious doubt on defendant‘s status as a battered woman.  (Pt. 
II.A.1.b., ante.)  The Verdin error discussed in part II.A.1.c., ante, was merely a technical 
one, given the alternate source of authority in Evidence Code section 730 for ordering 
defendant to submit to examination by mental health experts.  The error in permitting Dr. 
Mills to opine that the death penalty was an incentive to malinger had minimal impact, as 
 
60 
 
also discussed in part II.A.1.c., ante.  We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 
these irregularities, considered together, did not affect the outcome of the guilt phase. 
 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
 
1.  Rebuttal Evidence and Cross-Examination of Mary Rojas 
 
The defense called Mary Rojas, defendant‘s sister and Genny‘s mother, as a 
penalty phase witness.  Rojas testified about the abuse she and defendant suffered as 
children.  She testified that she had seven children, including ―Genny, the one that died,‖ 
and another daughter whom she had also named Genny.  Rojas said her children were 
taken away from her twice, once because her husband Pete had molested the oldest 
daughter, and again because of Rojas‘s drug problems.  Rojas was in a rehabilitation 
program when she learned that Genny had died.  She was currently living with five of her 
children, and did not allow Pete to live with her. 
 
Defense counsel asked Rojas about Genny‘s funeral and burial.  Rojas said her 
mother did not help with the expenses.  Rojas, her church, and Pete had contributed 
money to cover the costs.  Genny was buried in a family plot with Rojas‘s aunt.  Rojas 
was still making monthly payments, and hoped to get a headstone when the plot was paid 
for.  Rojas loved and missed Genny and her death had been very hard on the family.  
However, defendant‘s life also meant a lot to Rojas.  If defendant were given the death 
penalty ―it‘s going to hurt my kids again.‖ 
 
Defendant takes issue with the prosecutor‘s cross-examination of Rojas.  She 
objects to questions regarding Rojas‘s drug abuse and neglect of her children, exploring 
where the money for Genny‘s burial came from, asking why Rojas had chosen to have 
another child and name her Genny even before ―the old Genny‖ had a headstone, and 
establishing that Pete was the father of the newest baby and had been at the house when 
Rojas was interviewed by an investigator for the prosecution.  Defendant also contends 
the court erred by allowing the prosecutor to introduce photographs of Genny‘s burial 
plot.  She claims the prosecutor improperly attacked Rojas‘s character, which was not at 
 
61 
 
issue, and vilified defendant‘s entire family in an attempt to make the jury feel 
comfortable voting for the death penalty. 30 
 
Defendant‘s indignation is unwarranted.  As the Attorney General points out, 
defendant did not object at trial to many of the questions about which she now complains.  
To that extent, she has forfeited her claims of error.  (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 
168, 215.)  Furthermore, there was no error.  ―Cross-examination . . . ‗may be directed to 
the eliciting of any matter which may tend to overcome or qualify the effect of the 
testimony given . . . on direct examination.‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. McClellan (1969) 71 
Cal.2d 793, 811; accord, People v. Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1109; see also People 
v. Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 102 [― ‗It is settled that the trial court is given wide 
discretion in controlling the scope of relevant cross-examination.‘ ‖].) 
 
Here, the prosecutor‘s questions were well within the scope of Rojas‘s direct 
testimony, which was aimed at establishing that she had overcome the problems that led 
her to lose custody of Genny, that she cared about Genny and had done what she could to 
ensure a proper burial, and that despite her feelings for Genny she wanted defendant‘s 
life to be spared.  Questions about how Rojas‘s drug problems had affected her as a 
mother, and positing that no one in the family had wanted Genny, were responsive to 
considerations raised by the defense and supported by the evidence that Genny was 
shuttled among Gonzales family households.  It was defense counsel who established that 
Rojas had another daughter named Genny, and that she did not allow Pete to live with 
her.  It was proper for the prosecutor to meet this testimony with evidence that Pete was 
in fact the father of the second Genny, and had been seen at Rojas‘s house.  The court 
sustained an objection to the question about why Rojas did not wait until Genny had a 
headstone before having another baby and naming her ―Genny.‖  
                                              
30  
Defendant contends the prosecutor‘s tactics, both here and in the closing 
arguments discussed in the next part, violated her rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to a fundamentally fair and reliable penalty verdict. 
 
62 
 
 
Defense counsel also introduced the subject of Genny‘s funeral expenses and her 
burial in the family plot.  The prosecutor was entitled to explore this subject further.  It 
was within the court‘s discretion to allow the introduction of photographs, so that the jury 
could see where Genny was buried.  Defendant argues that the photographs were 
improperly admitted as victim impact evidence without the notice required by section 
190.3.  ―Evidence offered as rebuttal to defense evidence in mitigation, however, is not 
subject to the notice requirement of section 190.3 and need not relate to any specific 
aggravating factor.  (In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 206–207; § 190.3.)‖  (People 
v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 109.)  Although the prosecutor claimed that 
the photographs were proper victim impact evidence, the court did not admit them on that 
ground, but correctly ruled they were rebuttal evidence.   
 
 
2.  The Prosecutor’s Closing Argument 
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly employed inflammatory rhetoric 
during closing argument, calculated to appeal to the jury‘s emotions.31  Before turning to 
the statements at issue, we note generally that ―[u]nlike the guilt determination, where 
appeals to the jury‘s passions are inappropriate, in making the penalty decision, the jury 
must make a moral assessment of all the relevant facts as they reflect on its decision.  
[Citations.]  Emotion must not reign over reason and, on objection, courts should guard 
against prejudicially emotional argument.  [Citation.]  But emotion need not, indeed, 
cannot, be entirely excluded from the jury‘s moral assessment.‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. 
Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1418; accord, People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 
691.) 
 
Defendant objects to the following comments on Mary Rojas‘s testimony:  ―As we 
sat here on Thursday and listened to the victim‘s mother come into this trial, it had to be 
                                              
31  
Defendant claims violation of her rights to a fundamentally fair trial and a reliable 
penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
63 
 
the most offensive and repulsive testimony ever heard in a courtroom.  It was shocking.  
It was without humanity, and it was without compassion. 
 
―Now, think about this, don‘t think about it in this case setting; just think about it 
generically.  We had a victim‘s mother, a victim‘s mother come in and testify for the 
defense in a case where a daughter was horribly murdered — that, that is different again 
than any reality that we will ever know outside of a courtroom like this, a victim‘s mother 
testifying for the defense — we didn‘t just have any victim‘s mother, it was Genny‘s 
mother, this little girl‘s, in this last photograph that we have of her, her mother. 
 
―And I hate even saying those words, ‗mother.‘  Let‘s call her the biological 
mother because that‘s all she is.  She is genetically related to what was Genevieve Rojas, 
not Genny Rojas, Genevieve Rojas, the old Genny.‖ 
 
After asserting that Rojas‘s testimony reflected no compassion for Genny, the 
prosecutor continued:  ―Real parents who lose a child freak out.  They lose their minds.  
They wear their child‘s death on their sleeve as a badge.  They never get over it.  It alters 
their lives forever.  They lose their marriages.  They lose their jobs.  They end up with 
alcohol problems.  They commit suicide because, when you lose a child, you lose a part 
of you.  That‘s what being a parent is. 
 
―And if you remember in voir dire, back in February, when I asked you about — 
and it sounded like a stupid question — what‘s a parent?  It was for Thursday.  It was for 
Mary Rojas, because she‘s not a parent; she‘s biologically related to Genny Rojas, and 
that is it.‖ 
 
A little later, the prosecutor added these comments:  ―Of course, then she names 
her daughter ‗Genny,‘ her new Genny.  She gets back together with her molesting 
husband, who molested one of the other daughters.  And she testifies on direct that she 
never sees Pete anymore, Pete Rojas, and that‘s her choice.  Of course, on cross, she 
finally admits, ‗Oh, yeah, he‘s the father of new Genny.‘  New Genny, people who lose 
dogs and cats don‘t rename their new pets after their old pets.  That shows you what a 
 
64 
 
fungible item Genevieve Rojas was to Mary Rojas and this family, if that‘s what you 
want to call them.‖ 
 
Defendant argues that Rojas‘s shortcomings as a parent were irrelevant to the 
penalty determination, and that the prosecutor sought to dehumanize the entire family in 
the eyes of the jury.  No such objection was raised below, and therefore defendant has 
forfeited this claim of error.  (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 251-252.)  
Defendant contends the court and both parties agreed that no objections would be 
required to preserve objections made by defense counsel in advance of the penalty phase 
arguments.  However, counsel did not refer to Rojas‘s testimony in his anticipatory 
objections, and made it plain that he understood the necessity of objecting to any new 
matter he deemed improper.32 
 
Even if counsel had objected, the court could properly have allowed this argument.  
Certainly, Rojas‘s testimony opposing the death penalty for defendant was an important 
part of the penalty defense.  The prosecutor was entitled to seek to undermine her moral 
standing and cast doubt on the weight to be given her testimony.  What we said in People 
v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468 applies here as well:  ―In the challenged remarks, the 
prosecutor did not substantially misstate the facts or go beyond the record.  Ultimately, 
the test for misconduct is whether the prosecutor has employed deceptive or 
reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury.  (People v. Rowland 
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 274.)  As we observed in Rowland, ‗Although harsh and 
unbecoming, the challenged remarks constituted reasonable — if hyperbolic and 
tendentious — inferences from the evidence.  There is no reasonable likelihood that the 
                                              
32  
Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion seeking to preclude the prosecutor 
from commenting that Mary Rojas did not care about Genny.  This motion, however, 
concerned only the guilt phase, and was premised on the idea that without calling Mary 
Rojas to the stand, the prosecutor had no ground for asserting that she did not care about 
Genny.  Thus, the motion did not operate to preserve any objections during the penalty 
phase.  It did, however, demonstrate that the defense was fully aware of the risks entailed 
in putting Mary Rojas on the witness stand. 
 
65 
 
jury understood the words otherwise.‘  (Id. at p. 277.)  Here, as was true in Rowland, the 
prosecutor‘s remarks did not amount to deceptive or reprehensible methods of 
persuasion.‖  (People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 522; see also People v. Huggins, 
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 253.) 
 
Defense counsel did object during the next portion of the argument challenged by 
defendant on appeal.  We set out this passage in full: 
 
―[The prosecutor]:   Remember who this case is about.  We‘re here because of this 
little girl.  She is special, and that‘s why it‘s a capital case.  Genny didn‘t have a trial and 
she had no one to speak for her, no one in society to speak for her; so I wrote a letter to 
Genny about what society‘s outrage is regarding this case. 
 
―[Defense counsel]:  Your honor, I object to this, inflammatory rhetoric, ask for an 
admonition. 
 
―The Court:  Overruled.  Thus far. 
 
―[The prosecutor]:  Genevieve Rojas, born January 3rd, 1991, murdered July 21st, 
1995.  That means she was four and a half when she was murdered and tortured.  Genny, 
perhaps it was a rainy, balmy day when you first cried in pain.  Perhaps it was a day like 
this, a sunny day when happy children like to swing in swings, tumble down grassy banks 
and laugh and experience the freshness of life when the darkness we call child abuse 
crept into your life.  Wherever it was, whenever it was, Genny, we were not there.  We 
were too late to hear your cry for help. 
 
―[Defense counsel]:  Objection, your honor.  It‘s inflammatory rhetoric, ask for an 
admonition. 
 
―The Court:  Overruled. 
 
―[The prosecutor]:  You were too young to know that we would care, too young to 
know that you could reach out and we would help you.  We hear your cries of pain now 
as the story of those horrible last weeks of your life begin to unfold.  It is so painful to 
picture the life as you saw it, to picture the life of a beautiful little girl being destroyed.  
 
66 
 
We know now what they did to you.  Before your death, we never imagined any human 
being with a heart and a soul could do that to a human being. 
 
―As if we were hearing a nightmare, we heard how you were handcuffed behind 
your back and until your tiny biceps bled.  We heard how you were hung from a hook at 
night in a closet, alone and afraid.  We felt your claustrophobic conditions when the 
defendant put you into a box, a closet, and a tub to scare you, that you were so frightened 
that you had diarrhea, which brought about more abuse and more torture.  We know that 
now, too. 
 
―[Defense counsel]:  Objection, your honor.  Misstates the evidence, ask for an 
admonition. 
 
―[The prosecutor]:  It‘s what the defendant said. 
 
―The Court:  Overruled, overruled.  Just let me add a comment, ladies and 
gentlemen, excuse the interruption of both counsel.  It‘s impossible in a case like this for 
there not to be substantial emotions on both sides.  No matter whose version of the 
events, no matter whose take on the events you hear, it will be loaded with emotion; so 
you will hear and feel emotion today.  I only remind you that that emotion needs to be 
channeled through the factors in aggravation, mitigation that I‘ve instructed you about.  
Excuse me.  Go ahead. 
 
―[The prosecutor]:  We see the shattered remnants of your smiling face, scarred 
with burns from a blow dryer as the defendant inflicted unimaginable amounts of pain on 
what was once your cute little chubby cheeks.  We see the bruises and wounds from 
people who embraced the pain of hitting a four-year-old in the face.  We see your head, 
no longer with the wavy locks of a four-year-old child, but the grotesque red masses of a 
horrible burn.  We try to conceptualize, rationalize and make sense of your maiming, yet 
we can never know what it feels like to have the skin burned off your naked, bruised 
body.  We will never know the horror you went through as your skin weeped and your 
life slowly and methodically was taken away from you. 
 
67 
 
 
―How did it feel to stare at your abusers as your life ended?  Did you think of 
love?  Did you think of your choice, your choice to live, your choice to die?  Genny, we 
do not understand.  All of us want to hold you.  All of us want to stop them from 
attacking you, but we can‘t.  It is too late to stop them from hurting you.  And for that, we 
are truly sorry.  You must have been frightened.  You must have been cold.  You must 
have been lonely.  You must have been tired and hungry; but worst of all, you must have 
felt abandoned by all of us. 
 
―To know the agony, the humiliation and the intimidation and other abuse you 
suffered before you gave into death makes us angry.  To think that death would be a 
merciful end to your pain only illuminates the torture and abuse that you suffered.  That, 
too, angers us, anger that society sleeps while other young children like yourself suffer. 
 
―[Defense counsel]:  Objection, your honor.  It‘s irrelevant, ask for an admonition. 
 
―The Court:  Overruled. 
 
―[The prosecutor]:  That we did not hear you nor see your sadness in your eyes, 
your fear and your anxiety brings us shame.  You had no spokesperson for life.  And for 
that, we are truly sorry.  For your whole life, not one person ever cared for you, cared for 
you as a parent and cared for you as a human being.  You will never be able to go to a 
ball game, to play soccer, to play bobby sox softball or even go to a school play.  When 
you needed it most, no one would hold you and love you, love you and tell you that 
everything would be all right. 
 
―Genny, you will not be forgotten.  We promise that you will not die in vain.  We 
promise that you will always be in our hearts, in our souls.  We choose, we collectively 
choose to adopt you and to care for you. 
 
―[Defense counsel]:  Objection, your honor.  Inflammatory rhetoric, statement of 
personal opinion, ask for an admonition. 
 
―The Court:  Overruled. 
 
―[The prosecutor]:  You — 
 
68 
 
 
―The Court:  Excuse me.  With regard to the statement of personal opinion, the 
personal opinion of none of the attorneys in this case is relevant to you, ladies and 
gentlemen.  Your personal opinions are relevant, and I remind you of that.  Go ahead.  
 
―[The prosecutor]:  We choose as a group to adopt you and to take care of you.  
You are a member of our family, those of us who have lived with you here in Department 
32.  We refuse to reject you as your mother and father did for a life of drugs and 
molestation.  We refuse to ignore you as your grandmother and other relatives did to you.  
You are us and we are a part of you.  We will hold your torturers accountable, no matter 
what pain it puts us through, for we, Genny, will put you first and foremost in our souls.  
We will not allow the defendant to portray herself as a victim.  We have seen your 
journey of torture and abuse — 
 
―[Defense counsel]:  Your honor, I object, also inflammatory rhetoric, statement of 
personal opinion, improper, ask for an admonition. 
 
―The Court:  Overruled.  Go ahead, counsel. 
 
―[The prosecutor]:  The defendant is not a victim.  No one who does this to a child 
can ever be called a victim.  No one who embraces inflicting pain upon your body should 
ever be allowed to portray herself as a victim.  We know now what a victim is.  A victim 
is someone who has a blow dryer placed against her face, who is hung in a closet and 
who is stuffed in a box.  We, Genny, make a commitment, a commitment to stop the 
defendant and hold her accountable.  Our strength will not wax nor wane despite the 
assaults on our logic and common sense.  We see you as an example of courage and 
commitment.  We will not let you go nor will we ever let you down.‖ 
 
Defendant contends this ―letter to Genny‖ was an improper emotional appeal for 
the jury to commit themselves to vote for execution, to reject defendant‘s family and 
substitute themselves as Genny‘s family, and to personally exact vengeance for what 
happened to Genny.  Defendant argues that the court‘s admonitions were ineffective.  
First, the court told the jurors to channel their emotions through the factors in aggravation 
 
69 
 
and mitigation, in effect telling them to allow the emotions evoked by the prosecutor to 
be a factor in the weighing process.  Then, the court advised that the attorneys‘ opinions 
were irrelevant but the jurors‘ personal opinions were relevant, opening the door for the 
jury to accept the prosecutor‘s impassioned assertions, which were couched in the first 
person plural, and act on the basis of passion and prejudice during deliberations. 
 
The Attorney General responds that the ―letter to Genny‖ was proper as an 
expression of community outrage (see People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 
1178-1179), an invitation to empathize with the suffering of the victim (see People v. 
Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 794), and a description of Genny‘s vulnerability (see 
People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1156).  Noting that during the penalty phase, 
―considerable leeway is given for emotional appeal so long as it relates to relevant 
considerations‖ (People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1110, fn. 35; see also People 
v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 323), the Attorney General argues that the trial court 
properly reminded the jurors to channel emotion through the statutory aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and to rely on their own opinions rather than those of counsel. 
 
No bright line separates unduly inflammatory prosecutorial argument from 
legitimate advocacy at the penalty phase of a capital trial, where the jury must make a 
moral assessment and the harm inflicted on the victims is a relevant consideration.  We 
have noted that allowing the jury to consider victim impact evidence ― ‗does not mean 
that there are no limits on emotional evidence and argument. . . .‘ ‖  (People v. Robinson 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 651, quoting People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 836.)  
― ‗ ―[T]he jury must face its obligation soberly and rationally, and should not be given the 
impression that emotion may reign over reason.‖ ‘ ‖  ― [A]lthough a court should  
‗ ―allow evidence and argument on emotional though relevant subjects that could provide 
legitimate reasons to sway the jury to show mercy or to impose the ultimate sanction,‖ ‘ 
still, ‗ ―irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury‘s attention 
from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response should be 
 
70 
 
curtailed.‖ ‘  (Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 836, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 
Cal.3d 841, 864.)‖  (Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 651-652; see also People v. 
Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1286-1287; People v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 
108.) 
 
Here, the court should have curtailed the prosecutor‘s extended and melodramatic 
oration couched as a letter to the victim, by sustaining defense counsel‘s objections and 
admonishing the jury.  Portions of the argument were permissible as expressions of 
outrage, appeals to empathy, and descriptions of both Genny‘s vulnerability and 
defendant‘s conduct.  However, the passages urging jurors to personally feel shame for 
society‘s failure to protect Genny and other abused children, the assertion that ―we 
collectively choose to adopt you and to care for you,‖ and similar invitations to take the 
role of a protective family for this victim were plainly improper.  The prosecutor asked 
the jurors, in emotional terms, to go far beyond their role as the arbiters of punishment 
prescribed by law.  He invited them to consider the failure of society at large to protect 
abused children, and then to join him in assuming the role of a nuclear family for Genny.  
These purely emotional appeals invited a subjective response from the jurors and tended 
to divert them from their proper role of rational deliberation on the statutory factors 
governing the penalty determination.  It was the trial court‘s responsibility to intervene 
and redirect the jury, to remind it that its duty was not to replace Genny‘s family or to 
answer for the failures of society at large to prevent child abuse, but to reach a penalty 
decision based on the facts of this case. 
 
The court‘s admonitions, while partially effective, were insufficient.  Reminding 
the jury to channel its emotions through the aggravating and mitigating factors was 
appropriate insofar as the prosecutor‘s emotional appeals related to those factors, or to the 
jury‘s proper role as the conscience of the community operating within the criminal 
justice system.  (See People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179.)  This was 
not, however, an adequate check on the prosecutor‘s untethered summons to the jury to 
 
71 
 
―adopt‖ the victim as the benevolent family she never had, and essentially to act as her 
protector and advocate during deliberations.  Similarly, while it was proper to remind the 
jury that the opinions of counsel were irrelevant, the court‘s advice that the jurors‘ own 
opinions were relevant did not sufficiently stem the effects of the argument soliciting 
subjective, irrational emotions from the jurors. 
 
We turn to the question of prejudice.  In evaluating the effects of improper 
argument at the penalty phase, ― ‗we apply the reasonable possibility standard of 
prejudice first articulated in People v. Brown [(1988)] 46 Cal.3d [432,] 448,  . . . which 
. . . is the ―same in substance and effect‖ as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test for 
prejudice articulated in Chapman v. California [, supra,] 386 U.S. 18.‘  (People v. 
Wallace [, supra,] 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1092.)‖  (People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 
786.)33  Thus, we must decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the jury 
would have returned a different penalty verdict absent the inflammatory and irrelevant 
aspects of the prosecutor‘s ―letter to Genny.‖  We conclude there is not, for the following 
reasons.   
 
First, the prosecutor‘s improper remarks were not central to the case he presented 
in closing argument.  They were rhetorical flourishes following the prosecutor‘s initial 
comments on the defense penalty phase witnesses.  The prosecutor then proceeded with  
a more traditional series of arguments focused on the circumstances of the offense and 
                                              
33  
The Attorney General notes that for purposes of federal constitutional error, ―it ‗is 
not enough that the prosecutor‘s remarks were undesirable or even universally 
condemned.‘  [Citation.]  The relevant question is whether the prosecutor‘s comments ‗so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process.‘  [Citation.]‖  (Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181.)  While the 
Darden court did not frame its holding in terms of prejudice (id. at p. 183, fn. 15), our 
review under the reasonable possibility standard is equivalent to a determination whether 
the prosecutor‘s inflammatory rhetoric undermined the fundamental fairness of the 
penalty phase.  If there is no reasonable possibility the jury‘s verdict was affected, the 
proceeding could not be deemed a denial of due process.  Nor would it be an unreliable 
verdict for purposes of defendant‘s Eighth Amendment claim. 
 
72 
 
defendant‘s character.  He methodically went through the statutory aggravating and 
mitigating factors, and did not return to the objectionable themes of the ―letter to Genny.‖ 
 
Second, the circumstances of this murder were almost unimaginably horrible.  
They involved a prolonged and varied course of neglect, starvation, torture, and maiming 
ultimately culminating in the death by scalding of a four-year-old child.  No medical 
attention was sought for Genny, and the evidence supported a conclusion that defendant 
and Ivan continued to abuse her even as she lay dying.  All the events took place in 
defendant‘s home, and her attempt to escape blame by casting herself as an abused 
spouse could only have been viewed by the jury as desperately weak.34  The attitudes 
expressed by defendant in her videotaped interviews placed her in a very unsympathetic 
light.  The emotions inevitably aroused by the guilt phase evidence were substantially 
more powerful than those the prosecutor sought to stir in the improper portions of his 
argument, and were a legitimate factor supporting capital punishment. 
 
Third, the defense at the penalty phase was hobbled by the fact that the adult 
family members asking the jury to spare defendant‘s life were themselves complicit in 
Genny‘s endangerment.  The Negrettes and Mary Rojas had returned Genny to her 
grandmother, even though they knew she was an abusive caretaker.  This was an unusual 
case in which witnesses who would ordinarily be giving victim impact testimony for the 
prosecution were not only testifying for the defense, but also had failed to protect the 
victim.  Furthermore, while defendant relied on evidence of her own abuse at the hands 
                                              
34  
At the penalty phase, the defense put little weight on the battered woman theory.  
It argued that defendant was a minor participant compared to Ivan, and that her 
culpability was mitigated by intoxication, posttraumatic stress disorder, and her own 
history of abuse as a child.  Counsel urged the jury to consider the impact of a death 
verdict on defendant‘s family, especially her children, to avoid vindictive emotion during 
deliberations, and to consider that life in prison was an appropriately harsh punishment. 
 
Nevertheless, the jury would naturally and properly have considered the evidence 
presented at the guilt phase, including defendant‘s attempt to cast herself as an abused 
victim rather than an abuser. 
 
73 
 
of her parents and husband, the abuse she described paled in comparison to the torture 
and maiming she and Ivan inflicted on Genny.  When a murder is the result of extreme 
forms of child abuse, mitigating evidence of the kind presented here loses much of its 
persuasive impact. 
 
For all these reasons, we hold that there is no ―reasonable (i.e., realistic) 
possibility‖ that the jury was diverted from returning a life sentence by the improper 
arguments in the prosecutor‘s ―letter to Genny.‖  (People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 
448; see People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 491.) 
 
Defendant raises a final claim of improper argument.  The prosecutor, in the 
course of asserting that defendant‘s participation in the murder was not minor (§ 190.3, 
factor (j)), commented:  ―One other thing that proves she did it, and that‘s her child abuse 
history.  She learned, she was schooled in terror.  She has a bachelor‘s degree in child 
abuse.  She learned to discipline and she learned to punish.  She is Tillie [defendant‘s 
mother] — actually, she‘s worse than Tillie.  She‘s graduated.  She has a Ph.D. in child 
abuse.‖  Defendant incorporates by reference her guilt phase arguments that the 
prosecutor made improper use of the child abuse evidence (pt. II.A.2., ante) and contends 
it was unconscionable to again use that evidence to persuade the jury that death was the 
proper penalty.35  Defendant did not object at trial, and therefore she has forfeited this 
claim of error.  (People v. Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 251-252.)   In any event, we 
have held that the prosecutor was properly allowed during the guilt phase to respond to 
the evidence of abuse during defendant‘s childhood with expert testimony that such a 
history can lead the victim to become an abuser.  (Pt. II.A.2., ante.)  His passing 
reference to this point in closing at the penalty phase overstated the impact of that 
                                              
35  
Defense counsel made this objection in advance of the penalty phase argument.  
The court ruled that both sides were free to argue the inferences that might rationally be 
drawn from the child abuse evidence. 
 
74 
 
testimony, but was not so flagrant as to amount to misconduct or to prejudice the jury‘s 
deliberations. 
 
 
3.  Restriction of Defense Counsel’s Closing Argument 
 
In a discussion before the penalty phase began, defense counsel indicated that he 
intended to talk about other capital cases only if the prosecutor argued that ―if there ever 
was a case that cries out for the death penalty, this is it.‖  The prosecutor said he did 
indeed intend to make that argument.  The court was skeptical about ―counsel litigating 
other cases in their argument.‖  Further discussion was deferred.  When the parties 
returned to the subject, defense counsel explained that he meant to respond to the 
prosecutor‘s argument by commenting on two or three other cases, such as the murder of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., the murders of children by Wayne Williams in Atlanta, and the 
Terry Nichols prosecution for the Oklahoma City bombing.  He wanted to tell the jury 
about ―cases that people are generally familiar with through the media that are bad cases 
[where] there wasn‘t a death penalty for whatever reason . . . just to show that the death 
penalty . . . isn‘t always required for every single bad case and is not mandatory.‖ 
 
The prosecutor responded that there were many reasons why the death penalty was 
not imposed in such cases, which he would explore if defense counsel mentioned them.  
The court was not willing to allow references to other specific cases, noting that it would 
take the focus away from the individualized sentencing determination that was the jury‘s 
task, and divert its attention toward the various reasons why the death penalty was not 
administered in other cases.  However, the court told defense counsel he was free to tell 
the jurors that they were all aware of other horrible cases in which the death penalty was 
not imposed, without mentioning specific instances.  The court noted that the 
prosecutor‘s argument was ―hyperbole,‖ and added ―you‘re absolutely entitled to meet 
that on the same level that it‘s offered.‖ 
 
75 
 
 
Defendant contends the court improperly restricted defense counsel‘s argument.36  
We disagree.  In the first place, as a matter of logic the prosecutor did not open the door 
to an exploration of other murder prosecutions by claiming, as he did in closing 
argument, that ―if any murder requires the death penalty, this is it.  If this isn‘t an 
appropriate case for capital punishment, then nothing is.‖  This is not a comparative 
claim, but a categorical one.  The consideration that other cases might seem equally 
appropriate for capital punishment, yet not reach that result, is not responsive to the 
assertion that this case justifies the death penalty if any case does.  The prosecutor‘s 
argument was not premised on the notion that the present case was worse than any other, 
or that all similar cases required the death penalty.  Instead, it stood on the ground that 
defendant‘s case was so suitable for capital punishment that the only justification for not 
imposing it would be an objection to capital punishment in all cases.  This is an entirely 
proper argument and does not invite comparisons with other specific notorious cases. 
 
Furthermore, the court was rightly concerned with the distraction involved in the 
argument proposed by defense counsel.  To meet the point counsel wanted to make, the 
prosecutor would have been entitled to explain why the death penalty was not imposed in 
the other cases.  We have repeatedly upheld trial court restrictions on arguments 
comparing a defendant‘s case to other well-known murders.  (People v. Farley, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at p. 1130-1131, citing cases; see also People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 
800-801.)  ―A criminal defendant has a well-established constitutional right to have 
counsel present closing argument to the trier of fact.  [Citations.]  This right is not 
unbounded, however; the trial court retains discretion to impose reasonable time limits 
and to ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark.  [Citation.]‖  (People v. 
Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 854-855.)  The court did not abuse its discretion here. 
                                              
36  
Although she recognizes that such a claim of error is grounded in the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, defendant also asserts error under the Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
76 
 
 
 
4.  Alleged Flaws in Capital Trial and Sentencing Procedures 
 
Defendant raises a series of familiar objections to California capital trial and 
sentencing procedures.  We reject them, as we have before.  Thus: 
 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by refusing her request for sequestered 
voir dire pursuant to Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1.  She contends the 
Hovey procedures are constitutionally required.  We have rejected that claim, and do so 
again here.  (E.g., People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 494; People v. Brasure (2008) 
42 Cal.4th 1037, 1050-1051; People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1315.) 
 
The federal constitution requires neither unanimity nor proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt for the jury to make findings on aggravating and mitigating factors.  The 
reasonable doubt standard is also inapplicable to the jury‘s determination that death is the 
appropriate penalty.  Nothing in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, or Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 
affects our conclusions in these regards.  (E.g., People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 
455; People v. Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 1133-1134; People v. Loker (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 691, 755.) 
 
The absence of written findings reflecting the jury‘s consideration of the 
sentencing factors does not violate a defendant‘s constitutional rights.  (E.g., People v. 
Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 455; People v. Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1134; 
People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 755.) 
 
The statutory special circumstances that qualify a defendant for the death penalty, 
including the felony-murder special circumstance, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.  
(E.g., People v. Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1133; People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
p. 755; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 365.) 
 
77 
 
 
Intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally required.  (E.g., People v. 
Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 455; People v. Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1134; 
People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 755.)37 
 
The use in the sentencing factors of such adjectives as ―extreme‖ (§ 190.3, factors 
(d), (g)) and ―substantial‖ (§ 190.3, factor (g)) does not act as an unconstitutional barrier 
to the consideration of mitigating evidence.   (E.g., People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th 
at p. 455; People v. Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1134; People v. Parson (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 332, 369-370.) 
 
Defendant claims broadly, and without supporting argument, that the factors in 
aggravation provided in section 190.3 have been applied so broadly as to result in 
arbitrary and contradictory results.  We have consistently rejected this argument in 
connection with the broadest factor, the ―circumstances of the crime.‖  (§ 190.3, factor 
(a); see, e.g., People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 590; People v. Farley, supra, 46 
Cal.4th at p. 1133; People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 755.)  Defendant offers no 
reason for altering our conclusion with respect to the other more specific aggravating 
factors. 
 
Prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to seek the death penalty does not 
result in a violation of equal protection, due process, or reliability in capital sentencing.  
(E.g., People v. Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 589; People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 
p. 366; People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 403.) 
 
The delays entailed in the appellate process for capital cases do not amount to 
cruel and unusual punishment.  (E.g., People v. Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 589; 
                                              
37  
Defendant also asserts that California unconstitutionally fails to require intracase 
proportionality review.  However, as the Attorney General points out, this court routinely 
performs such review.  (E.g., People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 800.)  For the first 
time in her reply brief, defendant claims error in the failure to permit her jury to perform 
intracase proportionality review by comparing her culpability with that of her husband 
Ivan.  Even if this claim were timely raised, defendant fails to explicate it in sufficient 
detail to permit meaningful review. 
 
78 
 
People v. Bennett, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 629-630; People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 
1229, 1267.) 
 
Defendant claims that this court has been so influenced by political pressure in its 
review of capital cases that various constitutional rights associated with meaningful 
appellate review have been abrogated.  We disagree, as we have in past cases.  (E.g., 
People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1299; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 
615; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1140-41.)   
 
The failure to provide for a ―presumption of life‖ does not violate the federal 
constitution.  (E.g., People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 594-595; People v. Gamache 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 407; People v. Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 371.)  Nor does 
California‘s death penalty law violate international law, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man.  (E.g., People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 961; People v. Alfaro, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1332; People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 615.) 
 
 
5.  Cumulative Prejudice 
 
Defendant argues that errors deemed harmless at the guilt phase may nevertheless 
have been determinative at the penalty trial.  We have reviewed the cumulative impact of 
the guilt phase errors above, and entertained no reasonable doubt that they had any 
significant impact on defendant‘s conviction.  (Pt. II.A.6., ante.)  We also conclude there 
is no reasonable possibility that they affected the penalty determination.  (See People v. 
Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1299.) 
 
Defendant further argues that her penalty phase presented an unusually close case, 
so that any error during that phase must be deemed prejudicial.  We have concluded that 
the court‘s error in failing to curtail unduly inflammatory passages in the prosecutor‘s 
closing argument was harmless, ―under the most exacting standard of review.‖  (People v. 
Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1299; see pt. II.B2., ante.)  Defendant contends this case 
involved only ―a single period of aberrant behavior,‖ and that the evidence in mitigation 
 
79 
 
was compelling.  While it is true there was only one victim here, the evidence 
demonstrated that defendant was at least complicit in the abuse and torture Genny 
suffered for a period of weeks if not months.  This prolonged course of conduct 
culminated in a particularly horrible death by scalding that defendant did nothing to avert, 
despite ample opportunity to seek help.  When these circumstances are balanced against 
the evidence in mitigation, we cannot say this was an especially close case at the penalty 
phase.  We will not disturb the jury‘s verdict. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J.  
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY WISEMAN, J. 
 
 
I concur with the majority‘s conclusion that there was no reversible error in the 
guilt phase portion of the trial.  I also agree that portions of the prosecutor‘s letter to 
Genny Rojas were ―plainly improper.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 70.)  I disagree, however, 
with the majority‘s holding that the reading of the letter was harmless error.  To be 
reversible error, there need only be a reasonable possibility that the jury would have 
returned a verdict of life without possibility of parole if the prosecutor had not improperly 
appealed to the jury‘s passions.  Based on this record, I cannot say there is no reasonable 
possibility.  On the basis of this one issue, I would conclude the sentence of death must 
be reversed.   
 
I fully recognize that many cases have held that a prosecutor‘s argument, although 
emotional, does not cause the proceedings to cross over into the realm where emotion 
reigns over reason.  (E.g., People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1418 [―‗Emotion 
must not reign over reason and, on objection, courts should guard against prejudicially 
emotional argument‘‖].)  Neither the cases cited by the parties nor any case I have 
located, however, contain anything similar to the prosecutor‘s letter to Genny. 
 
In numerous cases, this court has approved prosecutors‘ penalty phase arguments 
that urged the jury to stand in the victims‘ shoes and consider the pain and fear felt by the 
victims and the years of life of which the victims were deprived.  (E.g., People v. 
Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1212; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1233; 
People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 388.)  In other cases, the court has approved 
 
 
2 
penalty phase arguments urging the jury to consider the anguish felt by the victims‘ 
families.  (E.g., People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 692.)  The court has also 
approved penalty phase summations stating that all members of society are victims when 
a person is murdered and describing the jurors as the conscience of an injured society.  
(People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 706.)   
 
In none of those cases, however, did the prosecutors reach the emotional pitch the 
prosecutor attained in his letter in this case.  No previous case has approved an argument 
in the form of an impassioned, imaginary letter to a child victim.  The court has never 
found proper an invitation to jurors to adopt the victim posthumously and become her 
parents.  Never before has the court found proper or harmless an argument that 
purports—using the first person plural—to speak for the jurors themselves, saying ―[y]ou 
are a member of our family, those of us who have lived with you here in Department 32,‖ 
and ―we will hold your torturers accountable‖ by imposing death.  (Italics added.)  In this 
case, the prosecutor‘s argument not only undertook to replace the jurors‘ reason with 
their emotions as adoptive ―parents,‖ it also undertook to tell them in their own voices 
what their decision was.  Because of the tactics of (1) telling the jurors that they not only 
should sympathize with the victim but that they were the victim’s parents, and 
(2) identifying the jurors with the prosecutor (―we‖) and telling them we will impose 
death, the prosecutor‘s letter is something new.   
 
Case law makes it clear that emotion is relevant to a jury‘s assessment of the 
suitability of the death penalty.  (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1418 
[―‗emotion need not, indeed, cannot, be entirely excluded from the jury‘s moral 
assessment‘‖].)  We are confronted here with the rare situation in which the prosecutor‘s 
penalty phase argument goes too far.  It is essential that the point at which passion 
becomes excessive be real and enforceable, and enforced, not merely theoretical.   
 
In my opinion, the prosecutor‘s letter in this case crosses the line.  This court‘s 
discussion of a Texas case in People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592 is instructive.  
 
 
3 
The Robinson court described Salazar v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) 90 S.W.3d 330 as 
an ―extreme example‖ of a ―due process infirmity.‖  (Robinson, supra, at p. 652.)  In 
Salazar, the prosecution introduced a 17-minute video montage of the victim‘s life, 
which included 140 photographs and was set to emotional music, including ―My Heart 
Will Go On‖ by Celine Dion from the soundtrack of the film Titanic (20th Century Fox 
1997).  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a lower court‘s ruling that this 
presentation was admissible and remanded for an assessment of prejudice.  The Texas 
court stated that ―‗the punishment phase of a criminal trial is not a memorial service for 
the victim.  What may be entirely appropriate eulogies to celebrate the life and 
accomplishments of a unique individual are not necessarily admissible in a criminal 
trial .…‘‖  (Robinson, supra, at p. 652.)  After remand, the error was found prejudicial.  
(Id. at p. 652, fn. 32.)  The prosecutor‘s letter in this case was argument, not evidence, but 
its purpose and effect were similar.   
 
The situation in People v. Mendoza, supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 706, illustrates how 
the letter was excessively emotional.  In Mendoza, the prosecutor stated in the penalty 
phase summation that people in society as a whole were victims of the murder.  This 
court held that this was a proper argument about the harm to society done by the 
defendant.  The prosecutor went on, however, to state that the jurors in particular were 
victims because the defendant burdened them with the difficult duty of deciding whether 
to impose death.  This court held that it was improper to single out the jurors as especially 
victimized, but concluded that the trial court identified the error and gave an adequate 
curative instruction.   
 
In this case, the prosecutor did not tell the jurors they were victims, but told them 
they were something perhaps even more emotionally powerful—the victim’s parents.  
The prosecutor did not merely ask the jurors to stand in the victim‘s shoes or the victim‘s 
family‘s shoes.  He informed the jurors that ―we‖—himself and the jury—were the 
victim‘s parents by adoption.  This is not a proper role for a juror to assume even in a 
 
 
4 
death penalty case where appeals to emotion are appropriate.  The reason why becomes 
obvious by simply looking to the prosecutor‘s own words used when describing the role 
of a parent.  He said, ―Real parents who lose a child freak out.  They lose their minds.  
They wear their child‘s death on their sleeve as a badge.  They never get over it.  It alters 
their lives forever.  They lose their marriages.  They lose their jobs.  They end up with 
alcohol problems.  They commit suicide because, when you lose a child, you lose a part 
of you.  That‘s what being a parent is.‖  Despite defense counsel‘s objections to the 
reading of the letter, the court gave no curative instruction except the general statement 
that the attorneys‘ personal opinions were not relevant, which, as the majority holds, was 
insufficient.   
 
The United States Supreme Court‘s comment in Gardner v. Florida (1977) 430 
U.S. 349, 358, is relevant to our situation:  ―It is of vital importance to the defendant and 
to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, 
based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.‖  (Italics added.)  A death sentence lacks 
the moral authority the community intends it to have if, because of a prosecutor‘s 
overzealous evocation of the passion for retribution, the sentence appears not to have 
issued from the jurors‘ reason.  In this case, the prosecutor‘s argument created a danger 
that the jury‘s death verdict was not reached through reason but instead as a result of an 
overzealous desire to exact parental retribution.   
 
I am aware that this court has held that retribution is a proper purpose for 
imposing the death penalty.  (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1178, 
overruled on other grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)  This 
does not mean, however, that there should be no limits on the amount or kinds of passion 
for retribution the prosecution is permitted to evoke.  The combination of retribution as 
an acceptable purpose and emotion as an appropriate factor, without limits, has the 
potential to overwhelm reason.   
 
 
5 
 
On the subject of prejudice, what I have already said shows part of the reason the 
prosecutor‘s erroneous use of the letter was not harmless.  As the majority states, an 
exacting standard of harmless error review applies:  There must be no reasonable 
possibility that the jury would have rendered a different penalty verdict absent the error, a 
standard equivalent to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18.  (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1092.)  In my view, the 
extreme emotional nature of the letter makes it reasonably possible that the improper 
argument tipped the balance.  The majority takes the position that the letter was not 
―central‖ to the prosecutor‘ summation (maj. opn., ante, at p. 71).  I respectfully disagree 
with this conclusion and, to the contrary, believe the letter likely was the most memorable 
part of the prosecutor‘s summation.  The prosecutor was an experienced attorney and 
used the letter as a very powerful strategy in a highly emotional case.  It must have been 
obvious to the prosecutor that his use of the letter to Genny was having a major impact on 
the jury in light of the repetitive and impassioned nature of the defense objections to it.   
 
The nature of Gonzales‘s penalty phase defense, in my view, reinforces this 
conclusion.  Gonzales wanted the jury to believe that Ivan was the actual killer and that 
she was a minor participant.  She also wanted the jury to believe that her responsibility 
for failing to try to stop Ivan or get help for Genny was mitigated by battered woman 
syndrome, her own history of abuse as a child, posttraumatic stress disorder, and 
intoxication.  She wanted the jury to find that, because of these factors, even though her 
conduct still constituted first degree murder, life without parole would be an adequate 
punishment.  Without the improper argument, it is reasonably possible that the jury could 
have accepted her contentions and concluded that she should receive life without 
possibility of parole.   
The majority states that the facts were so horrible that the improper influence of 
the letter must have been of minor significance by comparison.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 72.)  This may well be so with respect to Gonzales‘s guilt phase objectives, for the 
 
 
6 
evidence that Gonzales was guilty on one or another of the theories of first degree murder 
presented by the prosecution was very powerful.  At the penalty phase, however, matters 
were different.  The jury could have concluded that, despite Gonzales‘s guilt, it was 
likely that Ivan was the actual killer or that Gonzales‘s culpability was lessened by the 
factors she presented, or both.  It could have found that, under these circumstances, life 
without parole would be enough punishment.  There is a reasonable possibility that this 
would have happened had the prosecutor not read the letter.  This may not be reasonably 
probable because, for instance, there was evidence that Gonzales was dominant over 
Ivan.  It is still reasonably possible, which is the standard we must apply.  
 
The majority also states that a life verdict was unlikely because ―the defense at the 
penalty phase was hobbled by the fact that the adult family members asking the jury to 
spare defendant‘s life were themselves complicit in Genny‘s endangerment.‖  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 72.)  Without any doubt, the family members asking the jury to spare 
Gonzales‘s life were not ideal witnesses.  This does not show beyond a reasonable doubt, 
however, that the jury would not have been persuaded to impose life without parole 
absent the improper argument.  Her penalty phase defense had other components.   
 
The majority states that Gonzales‘s mitigation evidence in general ―loses much of 
its persuasive impact‖ because the murder resulted from terrible forms of child abuse.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 73.)  The question, however, is not how persuasive we find the 
mitigation evidence to be, but whether there is a reasonable possibility the jury would 
have found it persuasive absent the improper appeal to passion.  I do not believe we can 
say with any confidence that there is not.   
 
For example, the majority concludes that the evidence that Gonzales was herself 
abused as a child ―paled in comparison‖ with the crime of which she was convicted (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 73), so it too has little persuasive impact.  It is reasonably possible, 
however, that the jury would have found otherwise absent the prosecutor‘s improper 
appeal to passion.  A major theme on which the prosecution relied, of course, was the 
 
 
7 
horror of child abuse.  There is little doubt that the prosecution was keenly aware that this 
theme could be turned against it in the penalty phase because Gonzales also was an 
abused child.  The prosecutor‘s recognition of the possible impact of this evidence is 
apparent in his effort to undermine it by making the novel assertion that Gonzales‘s 
history as an abused child somehow proved she was the actual killer.  He said, ―‗[o]ne 
other thing that proves she did it, and that‘s her child abuse history.  She learned, she was 
schooled in terror.…  She has a Ph.D. in child abuse.‘‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 73.)   
 
The prosecutor evidently did not believe that the abuse Gonzales suffered as a 
child was comparatively insignificant, for he went to considerable rhetorical lengths in 
trying to neutralize its effect on the jury.  In fact, his strategy was emphatically not to 
minimize the abuse she suffered—this must have seemed to him unlikely to persuade—
but to magnify it and turn it against her.  Absent the improper appeal to passion, the jury 
might have been moved to mercy by the evidence of Gonzales‘s childhood suffering 
while at the same time rejecting the prosecution‘s unusual contention that this suffering 
increased her culpability. 
 
In summary, I fear that holding that the prosecutor‘s improper argument was 
harmless in this case establishes a new low bar for harmless error on the issue of 
appealing to passion in penalty phase closing arguments.  The law intends to make it 
relatively difficult for the prosecution to show harmless error when the prosecutor 
improperly appeals to emotion in the penalty phase of a capital trial.  This is why the 
legal standard of review requires a mere reasonable possibility of prejudice in order to 
reverse a verdict of death.  It is, in my opinion, essential for the court to ensure that the  
 
 
8 
rule has some teeth and will be enforced.  Otherwise, overly zealous prosecutors may be 
incentivized to push the limits without serious fear of reversal.  I believe the death 
penalty verdict should be reversed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wiseman, J. 
 
                                              
  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the 
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Gonzales 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S072316 
Date Filed: June 2, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Michael D. Wellington 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Mark E. Cutler, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala G. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Annie Featherman Fraser, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark E. Cutler 
Post Office Box 172 
Cool, CA  95614-0172 
(530) 885-7718 
 
Annie Featherman Fraser 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2427