Case Title: In re M.P.

Citation: 2010-Ohio-599

Docket Number: 20081562

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re M.P., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-599.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-599 
IN RE M.P. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re M.P., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-599.] 
Juvenile delinquency — Bindover order — R.C. 2152.10, 2152.12, and 
2945.67(A) — Juv.R. 30 — Appealability of denial of discretionary 
bindover on finding of amenability to care or rehabilitation within juvenile 
system. 
(No. 2008-1562 — Submitted October 21, 2009 — Decided February 25, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hardin County, No. 6-08-09. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An order of a juvenile court denying a motion for a discretionary juvenile 
bindover in a delinquency proceeding because the court finds that the 
child is amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system is not 
a final order from which the state may appeal as a matter of right. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
{¶ 1} This case presents the question of whether the judgment of a 
juvenile court that denies a motion for discretionary bindover of a child to the 
general division of the common pleas court for prosecution as an adult because 
the court finds that the child is amenable to care or rehabilitation within the 
juvenile system is a final order from which the state may appeal as a matter of 
right.  We conclude that it is not and therefore affirm the court of appeals’ 
judgment. 
{¶ 2} This case arises from a delinquency complaint filed in the juvenile 
court alleging that a 15-year-old child murdered her mother.  The state filed with 
the juvenile court a motion for a discretionary bindover to transfer jurisdiction of 
the case to the common pleas court to prosecute the child as an adult. 
{¶ 3} After holding a preliminary hearing on the state’s motion, the 
juvenile court found that there was probable cause to believe that the child had 
committed the act charged.  Thereafter, a full investigation took place, and the 
court found after an amenability hearing that the child was amenable to care and 
rehabilitation in the juvenile system.  The court denied the state’s discretionary-
bindover motion. 
{¶ 4} The state sought leave to appeal the juvenile court’s denial of its 
discretionary-bindover request pursuant to App.R. 5(C).  The appellate court 
denied the state’s request for leave to appeal.  In re M.P. (June 25, 2009), Hardin 
App. No., 6-08-09. 
{¶ 5} The state appealed to this court, and we accepted review under our 
discretionary jurisdiction.1  120 Ohio St.3d 1452, 2008-Ohio-6813, 898 N.E.2d 
967. 
                                                 
1.  When we accepted this discretionary appeal, we accepted seven propositions of law.  After 
consideration of this matter and of our resolution of the first proposition of law, we dismiss the 
remaining propositions of law as having been improvidently accepted.   
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 6} After the state filed its jurisdictional request in this case, but before 
we accepted jurisdiction, we decided In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-
5307, 897 N.E.2d 629.  In A.J.S., we held at the syllabus: 
{¶ 7} “The order of a juvenile court denying a motion for mandatory 
bindover bars the state from prosecuting a juvenile offender as an adult for a 
criminal offense.  It is therefore the functional equivalent of a dismissal of a 
criminal indictment and constitutes a final order from which the state may appeal 
as a matter of right.” 
{¶ 8} In reaching this conclusion, we relied on the statute that 
specifically governs appeals by the state in criminal and juvenile delinquency 
proceedings.  Id. at  ¶ 30, 33.  This statutory provision is R.C. 2945.67(A), which 
provides: 
{¶ 9} “A prosecuting attorney * * * may appeal as a matter of right * * * 
any decision of a juvenile court in a delinquency case, which decision grants a 
motion to dismiss all or any part of an indictment, * * *  and may appeal by leave 
of the court to which the appeal is taken any other decision, except the final 
verdict, * * * of the juvenile court in a delinquency case.” 
{¶ 10} The state urges this court to apply the rationale used in A.J.S. to 
allow appeals as a matter of right by the state from juvenile court decisions in 
which discretionary-bindover requests are denied because the court concludes that 
the child is amenable to care and rehabilitation in the juvenile system, even 
though the court also finds probable cause to believe that the child committed the 
act charged.  Because of the important difference between mandatory-bindover 
and discretionary-bindover proceedings, we decline the state’s invitation. 
{¶ 11} Juvenile courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over children alleged 
to be delinquent for committing acts that would constitute a crime if committed 
by an adult.  R.C. 2151.23(A).  Under certain circumstances, however, the 
juvenile court has the duty to transfer a case, or bind a juvenile over, to the adult 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
criminal system.  R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12.  When the state requests a 
mandatory bindover, the juvenile court determines whether the child is eligible for 
mandatory bindover, according to the child’s age, the nature of the act, and other 
circumstances, and whether probable cause exists to believe that the juvenile 
committed the act charged.  R.C. 2152.10(A) and 2152.12(A)(1); Juv.R. 30(A).  If 
the child is eligible for mandatory bindover and if probable cause exists to believe 
that the juvenile did commit the acts charged, the only procedural step remaining 
is for the court to enter the order of transfer.  Juv.R. 30(B). 
{¶ 12} When the state requests a discretionary bindover, the juvenile court 
is also to determine the age of the child and whether probable cause exists to 
believe that the juvenile committed the act charged.  R.C. 2152.10(B) and 
2152.12(B)(1) and (2).  However, if probable cause exists and the child is eligible 
by age, the juvenile court must then continue the proceeding for a full 
investigation.  R.C. 2152.12(C) and Juv.R. 30(C).  This investigation includes a 
mental examination of the child, a hearing to determine whether the child is 
“amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system” or whether “the 
safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions,” 
and the consideration of 17 other statutory criteria to determine whether a transfer 
is appropriate.  Juv.R.30(C); R.C. 2152.12(B), (C), (D) and (E). 
{¶ 13} In a mandatory-bindover proceeding, when a juvenile court 
determines that no probable cause exists to believe that the juvenile committed the 
act charged, the court’s finding is the “functional equivalent of a dismissal of a 
criminal indictment and constitutes a final order from which the state may appeal 
as a matter of right” under R.C. 2945.67(A).  In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 
2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, syllabus.  Because the issue of whether the 
state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause to believe that 
the juvenile committed the act charged is a question of law, an appellate court 
applies a de novo review.  Id. at ¶ 47, 51. 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 14} The issue whether the same rule obtains in a discretionary-
bindover proceeding when the juvenile court determines that no probable cause 
exists is not presented in this case.  Here, the court determined that probable cause 
did exist to believe that the child committed the act charged, and the question 
presented is the appealability of the court’s order that nevertheless denied the 
state’s requested discretionary bindover because the court concluded that the child 
was amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile system.  In contrast to the 
probable-cause inquiry, an amenability hearing is a broad assessment of 
individual circumstances and is inherently individualized and fact-based.  Thus, a 
juvenile court’s determination regarding a child’s amenability to rehabilitation in 
the juvenile system is reviewed by an appellate court under an abuse-of-discretion 
standard.  Id. at ¶ 39, 40; see also State v. Golphin (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 
546, 692 N.E.2d 608; State v. Watson (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 547 N.E.2d 
1181; State v. Douglas (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 36-37, 20 OBR 282, 485 N.E.2d 
711; State v. Carmichael (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 64 O.O.2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568, 
paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 15} Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that under the statute, 
juvenile court decisions regarding a child’s amenability to care or rehabilitation 
within the juvenile system are different from probable-cause determinations.  The 
legal effects of such determinations are also different.  In contrast to a probable-
cause determination, a denial of a discretionary-bindover request on the basis of 
amenability does not necessitate dismissal of any of the charges in the complaint.  
Rather, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction of the case, the complaint continues 
as it was filed, and if appropriate, the child is prosecuted as a serious youthful 
offender under R.C. 2152.11.  If the child is adjudicated a serious youthful 
offender, the child may receive both a disposition as a child, to be served while 
the child is under 21 years of age, and a suspended adult sentence, to be served 
after the child attains the age of 21 years and only if the child violates set 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
conditions or institutional rules in such a way as to impede rehabilitation.  R.C. 
2152.13 and 2152.14. 
{¶ 16} Accordingly, the rationale of A.J.S. does not apply to control the 
outcome of a case in which the juvenile court has found that there is probable 
cause to believe that the child committed the act charged, but the court also 
determines that the child is amenable to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile 
system.  When a discretionary-bindover request is denied in these circumstances, 
there is no “functional equivalent of a dismissal of a criminal indictment” and 
there is no authority under R.C. 2945.67(A) for the state to appeal as a matter of 
right.  R.C. 2945.67(A).  Therefore, any appeal must be by leave of the court.  
App.R. 5(C). 
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that an order of a juvenile court 
denying a motion for a discretionary juvenile bindover in a delinquency 
proceeding because the court finds that the child is amenable to care or 
rehabilitation within the juvenile system is not a final order from which the state 
may appeal as a matter of right. 
{¶ 18} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed, and the cause is 
remanded to the trial court. 
Judgment affirmed  
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Bradford W. Bailey, Hardin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Collen P. 
Limerick, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant, state of Ohio. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Elizabeth R. Miller, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellee, M.P. 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Barbara A. 
Farnbacher and Laura R. Swisher, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging 
reversal on behalf of amicus curiae, Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
______________________