Case Title: The People v. Sirico

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 116  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Thomas Sirico,
            Appellant.
John M. Dowden, for appellant.
Anne E. Oh, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of
murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1][intentional
murder]).  The charges arose after defendant, an experienced
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No. 116
archery hunter, shot an arrow from his compound bow towards his
neighbor's yard, fatally striking the victim.  On appeal,
defendant principally contends that he was entitled to an
intoxication charge (see Penal Law § 15.25).  That section
provides, in its entirety:
Intoxication is not, as such, a defense to a
criminal charge; but in any prosecution for
an offense, evidence of intoxication of the
defendant may be offered by the defendant
whenever it is relevant to negative an
element of the crime charged.
An intoxication charge is warranted if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, "there is
sufficient evidence of intoxication in the record for a
reasonable person to entertain a doubt as to the element of
intent on that basis" (People v Perry, 61 NY2d 849, 850 [1984];
see also People v Farnsworth, 65 NY2d 734, 735 [1985]).  A
defendant may establish entitlement to such a charge "if the
record contains evidence of the recent use of intoxicants of such
nature or quantity to support the inference that their ingestion
was sufficient to affect defendant's ability to form the
necessary criminal intent" (People v Rodriguez, 76 NY2d 918, 920
[1990]).  Although a "relatively low threshold" exists to
demonstrate entitlement to an intoxication charge, bare
assertions by a defendant concerning his intoxication, standing
alone, are insufficient (People v Gaines, 83 NY2d 925, 927
[1994]).
Here, there is insufficient evidence to support an
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No. 116
inference that defendant was so intoxicated as to be unable to
form the requisite criminal intent.  Indeed, the uncontradicted
record evidence, including defendant's own account, supports the
conclusion that his overall behavior on the day of the incident
was purposeful.  Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to an
intoxication charge. 
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and
find them to be without merit.  
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People v Sirico (Thomas)
No. 116 
JONES, J. (dissenting):
It is uncontroverted that defendant, on the day of the
criminal incident, consumed two large glasses (approximately 12
to 15 ounces each) of Southern Comfort whiskey and ingested a
Xanax pill.  Shortly thereafter, he threatened friends and
neighbors with a bow and arrow, fired an arrow into the side of a
truck, and then fatally shot the victim -- actions that call into
question defendant's state of mind.  Thus, given this record
evidence and the "relatively low threshold" a defendant is
required to meet for entitlement to a jury charge of
intoxication, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the
Appellate Division.
People v Perry (61 NY2d 849, 850 [1984]) established
that "[a] charge on intoxication should be given if there is
sufficient evidence of intoxication in the record for a
reasonable person to entertain a doubt as to the element of
intent on that basis."  Certainly, given the low evidentiary bar
set for the entitlement to a charge of intoxication, that rule
was subject to abuse and we have rejected conclusory and "bare
assertion[s] by a defendant that he was intoxicated" (People v
Gaines, 83 NY2d 925, 927 [1994]).  Accordingly, there must be
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No. 116
objective evidence in the record,
"such as the number of drinks, the period of
time during which they were consumed, the
lapse of time between consumption and the
event at issue, whether [the defendant]
consumed alcohol on an empty stomach, whether
his [or her] drinks were high in alcoholic
content, and the specific impact of the
alcohol upon his [or her] behavior or mental
state" 
(id.).  
The record evidence in this case satisfies the rule of
Perry and Gaines and may serve to negate the mens rea element of
intent for murder in the second degree (see Penal Law § 15.25;
Penal Law § 125.25 [1]).  Thus, it was error for the trial court
to deny defendant's request for a charge of intoxication.  
The People contend that defendant's testimony
establishes that an issue with the mechanism of his prosthetic
leg, and not intoxication, precipitated the fatal firing of the
bow and arrow.  However, it should be emphasized that in
determining whether a theory of defense should be charged, a
defendant is entitled to the "most favorable view of the record"
(People v Steele, 26 NY2d 526, 529 [1970]), and a trial court is
obligated to charge a theory of defense where it is supported by
a reasonable view of the trial evidence (see People v Butts, 72
NY2d 746, 750 [1988]).  Here, contrary testimony should not
preclude the charge of intoxication where there is a reasonable
view of the record evidence that would support such an
instruction (see Perry, 61 NY2d at 850-851 [Court held that
intoxication should be charged "although defendant testified that
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No. 116
he was aware of his actions"]; People v Smith, 43 AD3d 475, 475-
476 [2d Dept 2007] [court held that defendant was entitled to a
charge of intoxication based on evidence that he was observed
drinking vodka even though two detectives testified that he was
"walking fine" and they did not detect any signs of
inebriation]).  
A trial court simply cannot forego its obligation to
properly charge a theory of defense when there is record support. 
Ultimately, whether a jury credits or discredits the testimony of
defendant in rendering its factual determinations is a matter
beyond our purview.  But before reaching its final decision, the
trier of fact should be presented with all relevant instructions,
as supported by the record, for its due consideration. 
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Order affirmed, in a memorandum.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.  Judge Jones
dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion.
Decided June 7, 2011
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