Case Title: In the Matter of Juanita A. v. Kenneth Mark N.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 75  
In the Matter of Juanita A.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Kenneth Mark N.,
            Appellant.
Mary P. Davison, for appellant.
Susan Gray Jones, law guardian.
PIGOTT, J.:
The issue before this Court is whether a biological
father may assert an equitable estoppel defense in paternity and
child support proceedings.  Under the circumstances of this case,
where another father-figure is present in the child's life, we
hold that he may assert such a claim.
On June 25, 1994, the child, A., was born.  At the
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time, mother was unmarried, but living with Raymond S., who was
listed as A.'s father on her birth certificate.  Mother and
Raymond had a previous child together and, after the birth of A.,
had another child.  When A. was seven years old, during a family
dispute, she became aware that Raymond may not be her biological
father.  At that time, mother called Kenneth at his home in
Florida and had him speak with A.  The conversation lasted less
than ten minutes, during which time A. asked questions concerning
his physical characteristics.  Kenneth's attempt to speak with A.
a second time was rebuffed by Raymond, who warned Kenneth not to
speak to A. again.  Kenneth has had no further contact with A. 
In 2006, when A. was approximately twelve years old,
mother filed the instant petition against Kenneth, seeking an
order of filiation and child support.  Kenneth appeared before
Family Court for the first time by way of telephone.  The Support
Magistrate advised Kenneth, among other things, that he had the
right to admit or deny that he was the father of A.  However, he
did not advise Kenneth that he had the right to assignment of
counsel, or inquire whether he wished to consult with counsel
prior to proceeding.  Kenneth agreed to the ordered genetic
marker testing, which indicated a 99.99% probability that Kenneth
is indeed A.'s biological father.
At a hearing in January 2007, Kenneth, having now been
assigned counsel, appeared once again via telephone, but
protested that he had yet to speak with the lawyer assigned to
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him.  Counsel admitted that he had not spoken to his client, and
that the "file fell through the cracks for me."  Despite
Kenneth's protest, the Support Magistrate proceeded with the
hearing.  When the issue of equitable estoppel was raised by
Kenneth, the Magistrate, lacking the authority to hear that
issue, transferred the case to a Judge of the Family Court.  That
court, determining the issue on motion papers and oral argument,
held that Kenneth was the father of A. and entered an order of
filiation.
The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable in paternity
proceedings only where it is invoked to further the best
interests of the child, and "generally is not available to a
party seeking to disavow the allegation of parenthood for the
purpose of avoiding child support" (63 AD3d 1662 [4th Dept
2009]).  The court also rejected Kenneth's contention that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel (id.).  We granted leave
to appeal and now reverse.
In Shondel J. v Mark D. (7 NY3d 320 [2006]), we set
forth the law applicable to equitable estoppel in paternity and
child support proceedings.  We noted that the
"purpose of equitable estoppel is to preclude
a person from asserting a right after having
led another to form the reasonable belief
that the right would not be asserted, and
loss or prejudice to the other would result
if the right were asserted.  The law imposes
the doctrine as a matter of fairness.  Its
purpose is to prevent someone from enforcing
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rights that would work injustice on the
person against whom enforcement is sought and
who, while justifiably relying on the
opposing party's actions, has been misled
into a detrimental change of position." 
We concluded that the "paramount" concern in such cases "has been
and continues to be the best interests of the child" (id. at
326).
Equitable estoppel has been used, as it was in Shondel
J., to prevent a man from avoiding child support by claiming that
he is not the child's biological father (id. at 328).  In such a
case, the man has represented himself to be the child's father
and the child's best interests are served by a declaration of
fatherhood.  The doctrine in this way protects "the status
interests of a child in an already recognized and operative
parent-child relationship" (In re Baby Boy C., 84 NY2d 91, 102n
[1994]).  Here, Kenneth seeks to invoke the doctrine against
mother, who led Kenneth to form the reasonable belief that he was
not a father and that Raymond is A.'s father.  He argues that it
is not in A.'s best interest to have her current, child-father
relationship with Raymond interrupted.  
At the time the instant petition was brought, A. was 12
years old and had lived in an intact family with Raymond and her
mother.  His name appears on her birth certificate and he is the
biological father of her older and younger siblings.  For most of
A.'s life, she referred to Raymond as father.  Thus, Kenneth
appropriately raises an issue as to whether it is in A.'s best
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No. 75
1  We note that Family Court should have addressed the
equitable estoppel issue prior to directing that Kenneth undergo
genetic marker tests (see Shondel, 7 NY3d at 330).  The fact that
testing was conducted, however, does not bar the court from
thereafter deciding the estoppel issue, as Shondel itself held.
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interest to have someone besides Raymond declared her father this
late in her childhood.  As a result, we conclude it is proper for
him to assert a claim of estoppel to, among other things, protect
the status of that parent-child relationship.
We disagree with the Law Guardian's position that a
person who has already been determined to be a child's biological
father cannot raise an equitable estoppel argument.1  Indeed, the
doctrine has been used to prevent a biological father from
asserting paternity rights when it would be detrimental to the
child's interests to disrupt the child's close relationship with
another father figure (see e.g. Fidel A. v Sharon N., __ AD3d __
[1st Dept 2010]; Richard W. v Roberta Y., 240 AD2d 812 [3d Dept
1997]; Purificati v Paricos, 154 AD2d 360 [2d Dept 1989]).  The
same best-interests considerations that justify estopping a
biological father from asserting his paternity may justify
preventing a mother from asserting it.  Indeed, whether it is
being used in the offensive posture to enforce rights or the
defensive posture to prevent rights from being enforced,
equitable estoppel is only to be used to protect the best
interests of the child.  Therefore, we hold that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be used by a purported biological father
to prevent a child's mother from asserting biological paternity -
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No. 75
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- when the mother has acquiesced in the development of a close
relationship between the child and another father figure, and it
would be detrimental to the child's interests to disrupt that
relationship.
We conclude that a hearing is needed in this case to
decide the merits of Kenneth's claim.  At that hearing, Raymond
must be joined as a necessary party, so that Family Court may
consider the nature of his relationship with the child and make a
proper determination of A.'s best interests.  Consequently, we
remit the matter to Family Court for such a hearing and
determination.
In view of the foregoing, we need not address Kenneth's
remaining issues.  However, both the Support Magistrate's failure
to advise Kenneth of his right to counsel before genetic testing
was done and counsel's failure to consult with Kenneth before the
January 2007 hearing are troubling events, which should not have
occurred.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to Family Court
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed, with costs, and matter remitted to Family Court,
Ontario County, for further proceedings in accordance with the
opinion herein.  Opinion by Judge Pigott.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur.
Decided May 4, 2010