Case Title: STEVENS v. ELK RUN HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEVENS v. ELK RUN HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.2004 WY 6390 P.3d 1162Case Number: 03-70Decided: 06/02/2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

BURTON 
STEVENS,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

ELK 
RUN HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.,

a 
Wyoming non-profit corporation,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable D. Terry Rogers, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Christopher S. Leigh, Jackson, Wyoming. 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Frank Hess and Paul E. D'Amours of Hess & Carlman, LLC, Jackson, 
Wyoming. 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

KITE, 
J., delivered the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Burton Stevens 
placed a portable hot tub on the exterior deck of his townhouse without the 
express consent of the management committee of the Elk Run Homeowners' 
Association (the Homeowners' Association).  
The covenants which applied to the townhouse development required 
approval of the Homeowners' Association for placement of items within the common 
areas.  The Homeowners' Association 
filed suit against Mr. Stevens seeking to have the hot tub removed.  The district court ruled, as a matter of 
law, that the restrictive covenants encumbering Mr. Stevens' property prohibited 
him from placing a portable hot tub on his deck without the Homeowners' 
Association's approval and ordered him to remove it.  We agree that the restrictive covenants 
required Mr. Stevens to obtain consent from the Homeowners' Association's 
management committee prior to placing the hot tub on his deck.  Consequently, we affirm.  

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mr. Stevens 
articulates three issues on appeal: 

 

1. 
        
When the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Elk Run Townhouses 
(Elk Run CCR's) require Management Committee approval before owners may store 
anything in "common areas" except "in a facility specifically designated or 
approved for their storage," was the District Court correct in holding as a 
matter of law that "common areas" included decks which were designated as 
"Limited Common Area, Deck" on the recorded Elk Run 
plat[?]

 

2. 
        
When the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Elk Run Townhouses 
(Elk Run CCR's) require Management Committee approval before owners may store 
anything in "common areas" except "in a facility specifically designed or 
approved for their storage," was the District Court correct in holding as a 
matter of law that a hot tub did not qualify under the exception for facilities 
specifically designated or approved for storage[?]

 

3. 
        
Whether the district court correctly interpreted the Elk Run CCR's as 
requiring Management Committee approval before placing a portable hot tub on the 
deck of appellant Burton Steven's townhouse, when the CCR's 

            
require Management Committee approval of any "exterior addition to or 
change or  alteration, or 
improvement" upon the property.  Is 
a portable hot tub an[] addition, change, alteration, or improvement within the 
meaning of the CCR's[?]

 

[¶3]      The Homeowners' 
Association phrases the issues on appeal as follows:

 

I. 
         
Was the District Court correct to rule as a matter of law that limited 
common area is part of the common area and subject to the restrictive covenant 
that prohibits owners from placing or storing anything within the common areas 
without the written approval of the Management Committee?

 

II. 
         
Was the District Court correct to rule as a matter of law that by placing 
a hot tub on his limited common area deck without the prior written consent of 
the Management Committee, appellant was in violation of the restrictive covenant 
that prohibits owners from placing or storing anything within the common areas 
without the prior written consent of the Management Committee or its designee 
except in a facility specifically designated or approved for their 
storage?

 

III. 
        
Was the District Court correct to rule as a matter of law that by placing 
a hot tub on his deck without prior written approval from the Management 
Committee, appellant altered his deck in violation of the restrictive 
covenants?

 

IV. 
       Can 
the District Court's grant of summary judgment be affirmed under any other 
proper legal theory?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      In 1993, a 
developer filed a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (the 
covenants) and a plat for the Elk Run Townhouses development in Jackson.  The covenants indicated each townhouse 
was located on a separate lot, allowing for fee simple ownership of each 
townhouse by an individual owner.  
The covenants also established the Homeowners' Association and provided 
that the individual lot owners were members of it.  The members were to elect a management 
committee to govern the affairs of the association.     

 

[¶5]      The covenants 
defined "common areas" as areas "designated as such on the applicable plat(s) 
for the project."  The plat 
identified decks, entryways, and parking areas as "limited common areas."  Other applicable provisions of the 
covenants stated:

 

12. 
      Certain 
Additional Restrictions.  The 
following additional restrictions are applicable to the lots and common 
areas.  Each reference to "owners" 
includes their tenants and invitees.

 

a. 
        
Keeping Outside Areas Clean and Sightly.  The Owners shall not place or store 
anything within the common areas without the prior written consent of the 
Management Committee or its designee except in a facility specifically 
designated or approved for their storage.  
All owners shall keep their residences and their lots in a reasonably 
clean, safe, sightly and tidy condition.  
No clotheslines will be permitted.  
Any tires, lawnmower, garden equipment, children['s] toys and other 
similar items must be stored and appropriately screened from the public view 
when not in use.  No antennas or 
television "dishes" or other items may be placed in public view or upon any of 
the common areas or lots without the express written consent of the Management 
Committee.  Refuse, garbage and 
trash shall be kept at all times in a covered container, and such covered 
container shall be screened from view at all times other than a specified 
regular time period for garbage pickup.  
The parking of recreational vehicles, boats, trailers and inoperative 
vehicles is prohibited in parking areas, garages and other common areas.  . . . 

 

  b.       Obstructing 
Common Areas.  Owners shall not 
obstruct common areas.  Owners shall 
not place or store anything within the common areas without the prior written 
consent of the Management Committee or its designee except in a facility 
specifically designated or approved for such storage.  . . . 

 

 

 

. 
. .  

                                    

g. 
        
Architectural Control.  
Except as otherwise expressly provided herein, no building, fence, wall, 
driveway, excavation or improvement of any kind shall be commenced, erected or 
maintained upon the property, nor shall any exterior addition to or change or 
alteration therein be made (including without limitation any closing in of a 
porch or balcony) by any owner other than Declarant, until the plans and 
specifications showing the nature, kind, shape, height, materials, and location 
of the same shall have been submitted to and approved in writing by the 
Management Committee, as to harmony of external design and location in relation 
to surrounding structures and topography, and in relationship to the quality and 
appearance of the project. . . . 

 

[¶6]      Mr. Stevens 
acquired Lot 12 of the Elk Run Townhouses Addition in 1998.  His warranty deed stated that the 
property was subject to "taxes, reservations, covenants, encroachments, 
conditions, restrictions, rights-of-way and easements of sight and/or 
record."  After moving into his 
townhouse, Mr. Stevens placed a portable hot tub on his exterior deck.  The Homeowners' Association requested 
that Mr. Stevens remove the hot tub from his deck, but he refused.  

 

[¶7]      On June 13, 2001, 
the Homeowners' Association filed a complaint in the district court to enjoin 
Mr. Stevens from keeping the hot tub on his deck.  After filing the complaint, the 
Homeowners' Association amended the covenants to specifically prohibit  hot tubs on the premises.   

 

[¶8]      The parties filed 
opposing motions for summary judgment.  
The district court held a hearing, and, subsequently, granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Homeowners' Association.  The court articulated alternative bases 
for its decision.  First, the 
district court determined that Mr. Stevens was required to obtain management 
committee approval for the hot tub under paragraph 12(g) because the deck was an 
improvement to the townhouse unit and placing a hot tub on the deck amounted to 
a "change" or "alteration" to the deck.  

 

[¶9]      The district 
court also ruled that paragraphs 12(a) and (b) applied to this case because 
"limited common areas," including decks, were governed by the provisions 
pertaining to "common areas."  The 
court concluded that, under paragraphs 12(a) and (b), management committee 
approval was required before a hot tub could be placed on a deck.  Although the Homeowners' Association 
argued that the amended covenants applied to Mr. Stevens, the district court did 
not address that issue in its decision.   Mr. Stevens filed a timely notice 
of appeal of the district court's summary judgment order.  

 

 

DISCUSSION 

 

[¶10]   Mr. Stevens argues that the 
district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Homeowners' 
Association.  He claims that the 
district court misinterpreted the covenants as requiring management committee 
approval prior to the placement of a portable hot tub on an exterior deck.  

 

[¶11]   Summary judgment 
is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Owsley v. Robinson, 2003 WY 33, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 374, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2003).  See 
also, W.R.C.P. 56(c).  The court considers the record in the 
perspective most favorable to the party opposing the motion and gives that party 
the benefit of all the favorable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the 
record.  Hasvold v. Park County School District No. 
6, 2002 WY 65, ¶ 11, 45 P.3d 635, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2002); Anderson v. Solvay Minerals, 
Inc., 3 P.3d 236, 238 (Wyo. 
2000).      

 

[¶12]   This case involves the 
interpretation of restrictive covenants which control the use of land.  Restrictive covenants are contractual in 
nature and are, therefore, interpreted in accordance with principles of contract 
law.  Goglio v. Star Valley Ranch Association, 
2002 WY 94, ¶ 23, 48 P.3d 1072, ¶ 23 (Wyo. 2002); Anderson v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 961 
(Wyo. 1996).  When the contractual 
language is clear and unambiguous, the interpretation and construction of 
contracts is a matter of law for the courts.  We review questions of law de novo without giving any deference to 
the district court's determinations.  
Hasvold,  ¶ 11.  

 

[¶13]   As with all contracts, our goal in 
interpreting restrictive covenants is to determine and effectuate the intentions 
of the parties, especially the grantor.  
When the language of the covenants is clear and unambiguous, we look only 
to the four corners of the instrument itself to determine the parties' 
intent.  Goglio, ¶ 26; Anderson, 926 P.2d  at 961.  The intention of the parties is resolved 
within the context of the entire instrument, rather than from a single 
clause.  Anderson, 926 P.2d  at 961.  "Where the language imposing the 
restrictions is clear and unambiguous, [we] construe it according to its plain 
and ordinary meaning without reference to attendant facts and circumstances or 
extrinsic evidence."  Id.  
In general, restrictions upon the use of land are not favored and, 
accordingly, such restrictions will not be extended by implication.  Hutchinson v. Hill, 3 P.3d 242, 245 
(Wyo. 2000).   Nevertheless, 
when the parties' intent is clear from the plain language of the covenants, "the 
rule of strict construction does not apply."  Anderson, 926 P.2d  at 961-62.     

 

[¶14]   We turn first to Mr. Stevens' 
argument that the district court erred by determining that paragraph 12(g) 
(architectural control) applied to the placement of a portable hot tub on his 
deck.  The district court held that, 
under paragraph 12(g), Mr. Stevens was required to secure management committee 
approval before placing the hot tub on his deck because the deck was an 
improvement to the townhouse unit and placement of the hot tub amounted to a 
change and alteration of the deck.  

 

[¶15]   We do not agree with the district 
court's conclusion on this issue.  
When we read paragraph 12(g) in its entirety and within the context of 
the whole declarations document, we believe that the terms "alteration" and 
"change" clearly and unambiguously denote a degree of permanence.  The declarant included "closing in of a 
porch or balcony" as an example of the type of alterations or changes which fall 
within the paragraph 12(g).  The 
paragraph also specifically refers to buildings, fences, walls, and 
driveways.  Each of these examples 
is a permanent and enduring modification to the premises.  

 

[¶16]   Although, this Court has not 
addressed the meaning of "alteration" or "change" as those terms apply to 
modifications to real property, other states have addressed this issue in the 
context of leases.  The Colorado 
Supreme Court opined:

 

"[T]he 
terms 'alteration' and 'change' are construed to mean any alteration or change 
which substitutes or varies one thing from one form or state to another; which 
changes or substitutes in a substantial particular any part of a building; which 
materially and substantially changes the basic structures; or which varies the 
structural quality."

 

Cohen 
v. Power Investment Co., 532 P.2d 731, 732 (Colo. 1975) quoting Zelinger v. Plisek, 426 P.2d 957 (Colo. 
1967).  See also, Bonan v. Sarni Original Dry Cleaners, Inc., 
268 N.E.2d 366 (Mass. 1971) (holding that tenant did not violate a lease 
provision which prohibited alterations without landlord consent when it placed a 
shirt pressing machine in the front of a dry cleaning store without first 
obtaining consent from the landlord).  

 

[¶17]   Placing a portable hot tub on a 
deck does not affect the structure of the deck or townhouse.  The hot tub could be moved by simply 
unplugging it and draining the water.  
Consequently, a portable hot tub is not the type of permanent alteration 
or change addressed by the plain language of paragraph 12(g).  The district court's decision to the 
contrary was incorrect.  

 

[¶18]   The district court also relied on 
paragraphs 12(a) and (b) of the covenants in concluding that management 
committee approval was required before the hot tub could be placed on the 
deck.  Paragraphs 12(a) and (b) 
address keeping outside areas clean, sightly, and free of obstructions.  Owners are prohibited from placing or 
storing "anything within the common areas without the prior written consent of 
the Management Committee or its designee except in a facility specifically 
designated or approved for their storage."  

 

[¶19]   Mr. Stevens claims that paragraphs 
12(a) and (b) do not apply because his deck is designated on the plat as a 
"limited common area" rather than a "common area."  In addition, he argues that, even if the 
provision does apply to his deck, the hot tub falls within the exception 
allowing facilities specifically designated or approved for storage because it 
is used to store water.  The plat 
indicates that decks, entryways, and parking areas are "limited common 
areas."  The plain and ordinary 
meaning of the term "limited common area" is an area reserved for an owner's 
exclusive use, but subject to observation by others and, consequently, 
regulation by a homeowner's association.  
See e.g.,  Dunlap v. Bavarian Village Condominium 
Association, Inc., 780 P.2d 1012, 1013 (Wyo. 1989).  Clearly, the grantor intended to include 
limited common areas like decks, entryways and parking areas within the 
regulation of paragraph 12(a) and (b).  
The obvious purpose of the provisions is to keep any areas that could be 
observed by the general public and other townhouse owners neat, orderly, and 
free of obstacles.  It would make no 
sense to direct that tires, lawn mowers, garden equipment, and children's toys 
be properly stored and screened from public view if the provision did not apply 
to areas such as decks, entryways and parking areas.  Therefore, we hold that paragraphs 12(a) 
and (b) apply to decks.  

 

[¶20]   Under those provisions, management 
committee approval was required before anything except "facilities specifically 
designated or approved for storage" could be placed on a deck.  Mr. Stevens argues that his hot tub fell 
within the "storage" exception because it was used to store water.  Such an interpretation unduly tortures 
the language of paragraphs 12(a) and (b).  
As correctly recognized by the district court, a hot tub's primary 
purpose is for bathing.  The storage 
of water is incidental to the hot tub's main purpose.  Mr. Stevens' interpretation of the 
"storage" exception would stretch the meaning of that provision well beyond the 
grantor's obvious intent.  The 
district court correctly gave effect to the intent of the restrictive covenants 
by ruling that Mr. Stevens was required to obtain management committee approval 
before he placed a hot tub on his deck.  

 

[¶21]   Finally, the Homeowners' 
Association argues that the district court's decision may be affirmed on the 
basis that the amendment to the covenants that expressly prohibits hot tubs 
applied to Mr. Stevens.  Our ruling 
that paragraphs 12(a) and (b) mandated Mr. Stevens to obtain management 
committee approval before the hot tub could be placed on his deck is 
dispositive.  We do not, therefore, 
need to delve into the issue pertaining to the validity and applicability of the 
amendments to the restrictive covenants.  

 

[¶22]   Affirmed.             

 

  
GOLDEN, 
J., dissenting.

 

[¶23]      
I 
am more persuaded by Mr. Stevens' argument.  Being true to the principle that we 
strictly read restrictive covenants and do not extend them by implication, I do 
not see "limited common area" to be a subset of "common area."  The two areas are separate and 
distinct.  Truth be told, the 
Homeowners Association's CCR's simply failed to cover the limited common area 
and, thus, the hot tub situation.  
The Association took the correct action by later amending the CCR's, but 
that issue is not before us.