Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF LICENSURE OF JERRY PENNEY V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS LICENSING BOARD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF LICENSURE OF JERRY PENNEY V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS LICENSING BOARD2005 WY 117120 P.3d 152Case Number: 04-263Decided: 09/15/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF LICENSURE)

OF JERRY 
PENNY,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex 
rel.,

WYOMING MENTAL 
HEALTH)

PROFESSIONS 
LICENSING BOARD,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Bill G. Hibbler, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; and Angela C. Dougherty, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
  

            
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The district 
court affirmed an Order Denying Licensure issued by the Wyoming Mental Health 
Professions Licensing Board (Board).  
We also affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      Preliminarily, we 
must address an issue not raised by the parties.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-107 (LexisNexis 
2005) requires licenses issued under the Mental Health Professions Practice Act 
to be renewed biennially.  Rules and 
Regulations of the Mental Health Professions Licensing Board, ch. 8 § 1(c) 
(1997) (Board Rule) provides that licenses issued under the Act after July 1, 
1997, expire on the licensee's birth date following the second anniversary of 
the issue date.  On July 11, 2000, 
the appellant submitted an application for re-licensure as a clinical social 
worker.  Had that application, which 
is the subject of this controversy, been approved, the resulting license would 
have expired on December 15, 2002.  
It is now 2005, which fact raises the question, not raised by the 
parties, of whether these issues are moot.  
"The applicable rule is that when we have notice of facts which have the 
effect of making any determination of a question unnecessary, or which would 
render any judgment we might pronounce ineffectual, the appeal should be 
dismissed."  State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, Motor 
Vehicle Div. v. Andrews, 671 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Wyo. 1983).

 
 

[¶3]      In Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters and Professional 
Guides v. Clark, 2002 WY 24, ¶ 15, 39 P.3d 1106, 1109 (Wyo. 
2002), we 
dismissed an appeal for mootness where a present ruling could have no effect 
upon a professional license whose temporal life had passed.  Certainly the same could be said here, 
where a license to practice clinical social work from 2000 to 2002 "would be of 
no practical value to" the appellant.  
See Walker v. Board of CountyCom'rs, AlbanyCounty, 644 P.2d 772, 773-74 (Wyo. 1982) ("[a] cause will not be considered when a 
judgment rendered cannot be carried into effect.").  We do not, however, follow this rule 
blindly and will, despite mootness caused by the passage of time, consider 
issues that may continue to arise or are of special significance.  Lineberger v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Outfitters and Professional Guides, 2002 WY 55, ¶ 1, 44 P.3d 56, 57 (Wyo. 
2002) (authority of Board to impose conditions 
on a license); Andrews, 671 P.2d at 
1244-45 (questions of sufficient public interest 
and of a continuing nature).

 
 
[¶4]      We find the 
instant case to be similar to Lineberger 
and Andrews.  In particular, the issues of whether an 
expert must establish the standard of care, and whether notice may be 
accomplished through the State's disclosure statement, have broad application 
beyond the specific facts of this case and are worthy of being addressed.  Furthermore, licensing issues are 
peculiarly likely to evade judicial review due to their temporal nature.  We will not, therefore, dismiss this 
appeal despite the fact that the issues could, technically, be moot.  Instead, we will address the issues 
raised by the parties:

 
 
            
1.         
Was the law violated when the appellant's license renewal application was 
denied by an administrative staff person, rather than by the 
Board?

 
 
            
2.         
Was an incorrect expiration date used in denying the appellant's license 
renewal application?

 
 
            
3.         
Was expert testimony required to prove alleged licensing 
violations?

 
 
            
4.         
Was the denial of re-licensure supported by substantial 
evidence?

 
 
            
5.         
Was the appellant's right to due process of law violated when evidence 
was presented during the contested case hearing concerning matters not 
identified in the notice of hearing?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      The appellant was 
licensed in Wyoming as a clinical social worker in 1994, 
and his license was renewed in 1996.1  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-107 requires 
licensees to submit a renewal application and fee biennially "at a time 
specified by the board."  Board 
Rule, ch. 8, § 1(c), which became effective on November 4, 1997, provides that 
"licenses issued prior to July 1, 1997 shall expire on the Licensee's birth date 
following the current expiration date."

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant's 
birth date is December 15th.  On 
December 16, 1998, he mailed, and on December 17, 1998, the Board received his 
license renewal application.  The 
Board's executive director returned the renewal fee to the appellant along with 
a letter explaining that the license had expired, that it could not be renewed, 
and that re-licensure was in order.  
The appellant testified that he did not receive the returned fee or 
accompanying letter.  He continued 
to work in Wyoming.

 
 
[¶7]      In October 1999, 
the Board received a citizen complaint (the first complaint) about the 
appellant's services in a court case.  
After discussing the matter with a Board member, the executive director 
sent the appellant a letter informing him of the complaint, encouraging him to 
refrain from practicing clinical social work without a license, and requesting a 
response.  The letter was returned, 
unclaimed, by the postal service.  A 
similar letter was then mailed, with the appellant signing for its receipt on 
December 2, 1999.  Upon receiving no 
response from the appellant, the executive director sent yet another certified 
letter to the appellant in January 2000, seeking a response.  Once again, the letter was returned 
unclaimed.  The Board member 
assigned to investigate the first complaint then authorized employment of a 
private investigator, Gene Giffin, to assist in locating the appellant.  Giffin found and talked to the 
appellant, who, according to the executive director, provided the following 
explanation for his situation:

 
 
Mr. 
Giffin also reported that [the appellant] had informed him that when he received 
his renewal application back in the mail, that he contacted the Board office and 
spoke to a male who answered the phone, didn't recall his name, but that the 
person who answered the phone told him that he would take care of it.  Then Mr. Giffin informed [the appellant] 
that his license was not valid.

 
 
[The 
appellant] asked Mr. Giffin how he could  what should he do.  Mr. Giffin suggested that [the 
appellant] contact the Board office immediately to ask about what he can do to 
get his license back.

 
 
[¶8]      Giffin 
interviewed the appellant on March 6, 2000.  The following week, the appellant 
contacted the Board's executive director and told her that he had never received 
the October 1999 letter concerning the first complaint.  A copy of the letter was then sent to 
him, and he responded on March 27, 2000.  
In his response, the appellant explained that his practice was limited to 
trial consulting, mediation, conflict resolution, and forensic social work, none 
of which fit the definition of "clinical social work."  The Board reviewed the response at its 
next meeting and, on May 30, 2000, the executive director sent the appellant a 
letter stating that the Board had determined that he was practicing clinical 
social work, and that he should cease doing so until he was again 
licensed.

 
 
[¶9]      On July 11, 2000, 
the appellant submitted an application for re-licensure.  That application was returned to him as 
incomplete.  The appellant corrected 
the deficiencies and re-submitted the application.  In the meantime, however, the Board 
received a second complaint.  
Thereafter, the Board contacted the appellant four times in an effort to 
obtain his records concerning the matter underlying this second complaint, for 
the purpose of determining whether he was engaged in clinical social work.  Those efforts were not successful.  After reviewing the appellant's 
application materials, the Board instructed the executive director to send the 
appellant a letter denying his application.  The findings and conclusions of that 
denial letter can be summarized as follows:

 
 
            
1.         
In October 1999, the appellant fraudulently represented to the district 
court, in the matter involving the first complaint, that he was a licensed 
counselor in the State of Wyoming.

 
 
            
2.         
Despite notification that his license had expired, the appellant 
continued to practice as a counselor until criminal charges were brought against 
him.

 
 
            
3.         
In an October 2000 meeting with the Board, the appellant and his attorney 
were told that his continuing education was deficient, that the Board was 
concerned with his inability to locate his files involving the second complaint, 
and that he had practiced for nearly two years without a 
license.

 
 
            
4.         
His application was being denied because he had practiced without a 
license, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-110(a)(i) and (iii) (LexisNexis 
2005) and Board Rule, ch. 12, § 2(a)(iii), and because his inability to produce 
his records concerning the second complaint constituted gross incompetence or 
malpractice, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-110(a)(iii) and Board Rule, 
ch. 12, § 2(a)(vii) and ch. 11, § 2.2

 
 
[¶10]   On August 21, 2001, the appellant 
requested a hearing before the Board.  
The hearing was set for October 25, 2002.3  The Board twice granted the appellant's 
motions for a continuance, but denied a third motion, leaving the hearing set 
for July 25, 2003.  That date was 
vacated, however, because the Board could not meet quorum requirements.  The hearing, at which both parties 
presented evidence, finally took place on October 23-24, 2003.  Thereafter, the Board issued a detailed 
order denying re-licensure.  The 
appellant filed a petition for review of that order in the district court.  It is from the district court's 
affirmance of the Board's order that the appellant now 
appeals.

 
 
[¶11]   Finally, we will note that, during 
the pendency of the appellant's re-licensure application, the Board received two 
additional complaints.  On July 10, 
2002, the Board received a letter (the third complaint) alleging that the 
appellant was providing mental health counseling, without a license, in a 
divorce visitation situation, and that he failed to return telephone calls or 
cooperate with the court-ordered visitation supervisor.  In a complaint (the fourth complaint) 
received on August 22, 2002, the complainant alleged that the appellant failed 
or refused to provide periodic billing statements for counseling her 
children.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶12]   We cannot do better than to 
reiterate the applicable standard of review as we recently stated it in Davis v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, 
¶¶ 6-7, 88 P.3d 481, 484-85 (Wyo. 2004):

 
 
            
We review agency action following contested case hearings in accordance 
with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2003), which 
provides:

 
 
            
"(c)      
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
(ii)        Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
(A)       Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 
 
[(B)      Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

 
 
(C)       In excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 
 
(D)       Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or]

 
 
(E)       Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute."

 
 

State ex 
rel. Department of Transportation v. Legarda, 2003 WY 
130, ¶ 9, 77 P.3d 708, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2003).  
Our review is also governed by the following 
standards:

 
 
            
"We do not afford any special deference to the district court's decision 
when we review a matter initiated before an administrative agency.  Rather, this court reviews the case as if 
it came directly from the administrative agency.  Our review must focus on the evidence 
and consider the reasonableness of the agency's exercise of judgment while 
determining if the agency committed any errors of law.  If the agency committed any errors of 
law, this court must correct them.

 
 
            
Further, in appeals where both parties submit evidence at the 
administrative hearing, appellate review is limited to application of the 
substantial evidence test.  This 
court is required to review the entire record in making its ultimate 
determination on appeal.  The 
substantial evidence test to be applied is as follows:

 
 
            
"In reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to 
determine whether there is substantial evidence to support an agency's 
findings.  If the agency's decision 
is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment 
for that of the agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence."  Newman [v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division, 2002 WY 91, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, ¶ 12 (Wyo.2002)] 
(quoting State ex rel. Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Div. v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶ 10 
(Wyo.2001)).'

 
 
            
Even when the factual findings are found to be sufficient under the 
substantial evidence test, . . .  
this court may be required to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard 
as a "safety net" to catch other agency action [that] prejudiced a party's 
substantial right to the administrative proceeding or [that] might be contrary 
to the other WAPA review standards."

 
 

Id., ¶ 
10.  To survive judicial review, the 
record of a contested agency action must contain such factual findings as would 
permit a court to follow the agency's reasoning from the evidentiary facts on 
record to its eventual legal conclusions.  
Newman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2002 WY 91, ¶ 16, 49 P.3d 163, ¶ 
16 (Wyo.2002).  Similarly, a 
contested case hearing must provide, and the record of that proceeding must 
document, information sufficient to the making of a reasonable decision.  Absent such information, the agency 
decision must be set aside.  
Id.

 
 
            
Of further relevance to our review, we have said:

 
 
"In 
contested cases conducted before administrative agencies, the deference that 
normally is accorded the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the 
administrative agency, and we do not adjust the decision of the agency unless it 
is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on record.  This is so because, in such an instance, 
the administrative body is the trier of fact and has the duty to weigh the 
evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses."

 
 

Id., 
¶ 
26.

 
 

In 
contrast, "[a] hearing examiner's conclusions of law are afforded no special 
deference and will be affirmed only if truly in accordance with law."  Hermosillo v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 175, ¶ 6, 58 P.3d 924, 926 (Wyo. 
2002).  And finally, agency action is arbitrary 
and capricious if it is "willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in 
disregard of the facts and circumstances."  
Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 
1996).

 
 
[¶13]   In reviewing administrative agency 
action, we are also mindful of the allocation of the burden of proof at the 
contested case hearing:

 
 
            
"Allocation of the burden of proof is a matter of law."  Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo.1996).  The general rule in administrative law 
is that, unless a statute otherwise assigns the burden of proof, the proponent 
of an order has the burden of proof.  
Bernard Schwartz, Administrative 
Law § 7.8 (2d ed.1984).  "In 
general, an agency is the proponent of its orders, while an applicant for 
benefits or for a license is the proponent in eligibility determinations."  4 Jacob A. Stein et al., Administrative Law § 24.02 at 24-21 
(1987).

 
 

JM v. 
Department of Family Services, 922 P.2d 219, 221 (Wyo. 
1996).  The effect of this allocation of the 
burden of proof is that, once a license applicant establishes his or her 
qualifications for licensure, the burden of proof shifts to the agency to go 
forward with its evidence justifying denial of the license, but the burden of 
persuading the agency that its grounds for denial were insufficient remains with 
the applicant.  Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides 
v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, ¶ 23, 30 P.3d 36, 44-45 (Wyo. 2001).  The agency's evidence supporting denial 
of a professional license must be clear and convincing.  State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. v. Legarda, 
2003 WY 130, ¶ 15, 77 P.3d 708, 713 (Wyo. 2003); Disciplinary Matter of Billings, 2001 WY 
81, ¶ 20, 30 P.3d 557, 567 (Wyo. 2001) (Billings I).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Was the 
law violated when the appellant's license renewal application was denied by an 
administrative staff person, rather than by the 
Board?

 
 
[¶14]   The appellant filed two license 
applicationsa renewal application submitted on December 16, 1998, and a 
re-licensure application submitted July 11, 2000.  The former is the subject of the present 
issue.  The Board's executive 
director testified that license applications are reviewed by staff members and 
are submitted to the Board for consideration only if deemed "complete."  She further testified that, without 
Board action on the matter, she returned the appellant's renewal application 
because it was postmarked one day too latemeaning that it had expired and could 
no longer be renewed.  The appellant 
characterizes this action as denial of the license application, and contends 
that such denial statutorily can only be by Board action.

 
 
[¶15]   We will not further consider this 
issue because it was not properly preserved for judicial review.  The administrative action of which the 
appellant complainsreturn of his license renewal application as untimely by a 
staff membertook place on January 6, 1999.  Rather than exhaust his administrative 
remedies in response to that action, and rather than petitioning the district 
court for review thereof, the appellant pursued re-licensure through a separate 
application.  It is too late now, in 
the judicial review of the denial of that second application, to contest return 
of the previous application as untimely.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(a) (LexisNexis 2005) and 
W.R.A.P. 12.

 
 
Was an 
incorrect expiration date used in denying the appellant's license renewal 
application?

 
 
[¶16]   The Board's rules, as amended in 
November 1997, provide that "licenses issued prior to July 1, 1997 shall expire 
on the Licensee's birth date following the current expiration date."  Board Rule, ch. 8, § 1(c).  The appellant interprets this language 
to mean that the license issued to him in 1996 did not expire on his birthday in 
December 1998, but in December 1999, meaning that his renewal application was 
timely.  For the reasons set forth 
above, we will not further consider this contention.

 
 
Was 
expert testimony required to prove alleged licensing 
violations?

 
 
[¶17]   A review of the facts is necessary 
to address this legal question.  The 
appellant was licensed to practice clinical social work, but that license 
expired.  His application for 
re-licensure was denied on the ground that he had knowingly practiced clinical 
social work without a license, and that his inability to locate a client's file 
evidenced gross incompetence or malpractice, both in violation of applicable 
statutes and administrative rules.

 
 
[¶18]   A Board hearing was convened to 
consider the appellant's request for reconsideration of the re-licensure 
denial.  The appellant testified on 
his own behalf, and called an attorney to testify about his dealings with the 
appellant in court-related matters.  
The State called the four persons who had filed complaints with the 
Board, plus the Board's executive director and a staff member.  Finally, the State called Laura 
Schmid-Pizzato, a licensed clinical social worker and the current Board 
chairman.  She testified that the 
appellant knowingly practiced clinical social work without a license, a 
statutory violation, and that he violated the profession's code of ethics when 
he could not locate the client's confidential file.  In presenting these opinions, she opined 
that the work the appellant performed in the matters underlying the four 
complaints was regulated practice that required a license.

 
 
[¶19]   After Ms. Schmid-Pizzato testified 
on direct examination, and after she was accepted as an expert by the hearing 
examiner, the appellant objected to her testimony on the ground that she should 
not be allowed to testify as an expert witness before the very board of which 
she was a member.  The objection was 
overruled and appellant's counsel began cross-examination.  That examination, however, was 
interrupted by the Board's attorney, who asked to speak privately with the 
Board.  After a brief recess, the 
following colloquy occurred on the record:

 
 
THE 
HEARING EXAMINER:  Let's go back on 
the record.  Ms. Dougherty, did you 
have anything you would like to state on the record?

 
 
MS. 
DOUGHERTY:  I did.  The Board has directed me, in light of 
the objection raised by Mr. Hibbler with regard to the expert testimony by Ms. 
Pizzato, the Board has directed me to indicate that they are satisfied enough 
with Ms. Pizzato's questions, I believe that Mr. Nelson was done with his 
questioning, and they're certainly willing to listen to any testimony that Mr. 
Hibbler may have in cross-examination of that, of that other format, but because 
of the case law in place, the Billings decision, indicating that the Board 
cannot rely upon its own expertise in formulating care issues, they're satisfied 
that Ms. Pizzato should not be qualified as an expert, and they want to protect 
themselves from any reversible error at this point in considering her testimony 
from that expert standpoint.

 
 
THE 
HEARING EXAMINER:  Since that is the 
judgment of the Board, that will be the ruling for this matter; she will not be 
qualified as an expert witness.  I 
don't believe she has answered any questions as an expert, and maybe, Merissa, 
you could help.

 
 
(Off the 
record.)

 
 
THE 
HEARING EXAMINER:  I will note for 
the record that the only question asked after Ms. Pizzato was offered up as an 
expert, was whether she was familiar with the Mental Health Licensing Act, to 
which she answered yes.  So with 
that in mind, do you have any cross examination of this 
witness?

 
 
MR. 
HIBBLER:  First I would just move to 
strike the question  or the answer to that, if she was asked as an expert, and 
the answer shouldn't stand.

 
 
THE 
HEARING EXAMINER:  All right.  That answer is struck.  You can disregard her answer to that 
question.

 
 
MR. 
HIBBLER:  And second thing, I don't 
have any questions for Ms. Pizzato.

 
 
[¶20]   Because of the rather unique way in 
which this issue developed, we will take a somewhat circuitous route toward 
answering the actual question presented.  
We begin with the appellant's objection to Ms. Schmid-Pizzato's 
testimony:

 
 
MR. 
HIBBLER:  I want to put an objection 
on the record, that Ms. Pizzato is not qualified to act as an expert in this 
hearing, for one of the reasons, I don't know that she has demonstrated any sort 
of  and she very well may be, but the record's not  doesn't contain her 
experience to qualify for that.  But 
more importantly, being a board member, I don't believe that she's able to act 
as an expert witness wherein her same board is sitting.  That's my 
objection.

 
 
[¶21]   As can be seen, this was a 
two-pronged objection:  first, that 
the witness had not properly been qualified as an expert, and second, that a 
board member should not be an expert witness before her own board.  The first part of the objection was 
satisfied through additional foundation questioning.  The second part of the objection was 
overruled by the hearing examiner and Ms. Schmid-Pizzato was allowed to 
testify.  Her testimony was 
interrupted as described above and, based upon the Board's instructions, the 
hearing examiner withdrew qualification of Ms. Schmid-Pizzato as an expert.  The interesting result of the objection 
and its resolution, therefore, was to leave Ms. Schmid-Pizzato's testimony on 
the record, but to strip it of its expert designation.  The appellant did not further object, 
and no issue is now presented as to the propriety of that 
resolution.

 
 

[¶22]   In the hope of clearing up apparent 
confusion, we are inclined to address one more aspect of these curious 
circumstances before we get to the actual question presented.  The Board's attorney sought and obtained 
withdrawal of Ms. Schmid-Pizzato's expert witness status because of "the 
Billings 
decision, indicating that the Board cannot rely upon its own expertise in 
formulating care issues[.]"  
Counsel's reference undoubtedly is to Billings I,  
2001 WY 81, ¶¶ 17-18, 30 P.3d  at 566-67 (footnote 
omitted), where 
we held as follows:

 
 
Finding 
number five suffers from other problems.  
There, the Board found that Billings had willfully endangered the health 
and safety of Dan Nutsch by permitting him to be injured while caring for 
livestock "which should have been properly cared for by employees of John R. 
Billings."   In addition to 
challenging the sufficiency of this finding, Billings also argues it lacks record 
support.  In Billings' view, this 
finding amounts to a conclusion that his conduct fell below the standard of care 
for those in his industry.  He 
contends that, because no expert testimony on the issue was presented to the 
Board, the record does not support the finding.  Obviously, clients on an outfitted 
hunting trip must participate in the adventure.  The extent of such participation, 
however, is not something this court has within its 
knowledge.

 
 
            
Perhaps the Board, which consists of a number of persons who would 
undoubtedly qualify as experts in the field of outfitting, used its expertise to 
determine that Billings' actions failed to meet his duty of 
care as an outfitter.  However, our 
decision in Devous v. State Board of 
Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 418 (Wyo.1993), does not permit the Board 
to do that:

 
 
            
"Turning then to the appeal of the Board with respect to the decision of 
the district court to set aside certain statutory grounds for failure of 
substantial evidence, we affirm the district court in that regard.  The crux of the issue is whether the 
record must include expert testimony with respect to those statutory grounds, or 
whether we must acknowledge and accept the expertise of the Board members in 
establishing standards that demonstrate infringement of the statute.  There was no expert testimony offered at 
the hearing to establish standards with respect to these statutory grounds.  If judicial review has any purpose, it 
must be exercised by objectively evaluating evidence in the record.  There is no way that a judicial review 
could reach the subjective determination of standards by individual members of 
the Board.  Consequently, in order 
to maintain the integrity of judicial review, we conclude it is necessary that, 
with respect to the violations that were asserted under Wyo. Stat.  § 33-26-402(a)(xv), (xviii), and (xxvi), 
expert testimony in the record was required and, lacking such testimony, there 
is no substantial evidence to sustain those allegations."

 
 
            
In this case, if the Board intends to rely on a finding that Billings' conduct 
regarding the mule kick incident fell below the standard of care for those in 
his industry, the Board should rely on expert testimony in making such a 
finding.  In this case, it would not 
have been difficult for the Board to obtain such expert testimony, as many of 
the witnesses would probably have qualified as experts in this field due to 
their "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education."  W.R.E. 702.  Regardless, absent any indication in its 
findings that the Board is relying on expert testimony, we conclude that the 
finding is insufficient to permit review.

 
 

[¶23]   What Billings I, the review of a license 
revocation, and Devous v. Wyoming State 
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1993), the review of a license suspension, 
stand for is the proposition that when a licensing board suspends or revokes a 
professional license for conduct that allegedly falls below the standard of care 
for licensees in that profession, there must be record evidence establishing the 
standard of care.  Stated 
differently, judicial review is impossible if board members, rather than relying 
upon a standard of care established by the evidence, rely upon their own 
respective unidentified and unarticulated standards.

 
 
[¶24]   This rule of law was misinterpreted 
before the Board to mean that a board member may not testify as an expert in 
front of the board of which she is a member.  That question is not now before us, and 
we need not answer it herein.  The 
net effect of the misinterpretation before the Board, however, was to eliminate 
any expert testimony in support of the license denial.  That leads to the question that is now 
before this Court:  was expert 
testimony required under these circumstances to prove the alleged licensing 
violations?

 
 

[¶25]   Citing JM, 922 P.2d  at 221, the 
appellant contends that, once he established his qualifications for licensure 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-106(a)(i)-(v) (LexisNexis 2005),4 the burden shifted to the State to 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the alleged licensing act or 
administrative rule violations justifying denial.  Then, citing Billings I and Devous, the appellant argues that expert 
testimony was required to prove that he violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
33-38-102(a)(iii) and (v) (LexisNexis 2005) by representing himself as a 
clinical social worker and practicing clinical social work without a license.5  For example, the appellant testified 
that he conducts mediation, alternative dispute resolution, and forensic 
evaluations, and that there was no expert testimony stating that those services 
were "clinical social work."  
Further, the appellant contends that the Board cannot properly make a 
finding of an ethical violation based upon the inability to locate a file, 
without there first having been expert testimony establishing the ethical 
standard.  Finally, the appellant 
argues that this case is distinguishable from Billings v. Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters and 
Professional Guides, 2004 WY 42, ¶¶ 51-52, 88 P.3d 455, 474-75 (Wyo. 2004) 
(Billings II), where 
we concluded that expert testimony was not required to prove the professional 
standard and a breach thereof where an outfitter willfully abandoned a client on 
a wilderness trail, because

 
 
[n]either 
the nature of the violation, nor the facts underlying it, involves subject 
matter "not within our knowledge" or requiring additional expert testimony.  The state of the record is such that in 
reviewing the issue, we are not required merely to accept the Board's subjective 
expertise for a standard that demonstrates infringement of the 
statute.

 
 
[¶26]   The State's response to these 
arguments begins with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-110(c), which provides that the 
Board may "refuse to renew, or may deny, suspend, revoke or otherwise restrict 
licensure . . . for any of the following causes: . . . (iii) Unprofessional or 
unethical conduct; (iv) Gross incompetence and malpractice; . . . (ix) Willful 
violation of any provision of this act[.]"  
Next, the State contends that this was a licensing proceeding, at which 
the appellant bore the burden of proving his qualifications, rather than a 
disciplinary proceeding, at which the State bore the burden of proving license 
violations.  It is the State's 
position that, unlike the situation in Billings I, expert testimony is not 
required to establish any of these violations because the Board relied upon 
objective standards set forth in its regulations.  And finally, the State opines that it 
simply cannot be that, in all licensing proceedings, the Board must hire an 
expert to tell it whether the applicant is, or is not, qualified for 
licensure.

 
 

[¶27]   Confident in the rectitude of its 
position, the State cites no authority, other than to say that Billings I does not apply.  The appellant, on the other hand, in 
addition to reliance upon Billings I 
and Devous, cites Dorr v. Wyoming Bd. of Certified Public 
Accountants, 2001 WY 37, ¶ 8, 21 P.3d 735, 741 (Wyo. 2001), for 
the proposition that violations of statutory professional standards of care must 
be proved by the licensing agency by clear and convincing evidence.  Further, the appellant contends that 
misallocation of the burden of proof, being an error of law, requires 
reversal.  See JM, 922 P.2d  at 221.

 
 
[¶28]   To address these issues, we must 
first look at what the Board did.  
The purpose of the contested case hearing was to reconsider licensure 
after the initial denial of the re-licensure application.  That earlier denial was not based upon a 
finding that the appellant lacked statutory qualifications, but upon a finding 
that he had violated professional standards of conduct set by statute and 
administrative rule.  Specifically, 
re-licensure was denied on the ground that the appellant had violated Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 33-38-110(a)(i) by engaging in clinical social work without a license, 
and that he had violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-110(c)(iii) by engaging in 
unethical and unprofessional conduct, as defined by the applicable 
administrative rule.  There were two 
parts to the latter conclusion:  
first, that the appellant represented himself as a licensed clinical 
social worker, and second, that he evidenced gross incompetence by the inability 
to produce a client's file.6

 
 

[¶29]   Before we discuss the facts found 
and conclusions of law reached by the Board in its review of the earlier denial, 
we will briefly mention the appellant's rather generalized contention that, at 
the contested case hearing, the Board misallocated the burden of proof.  Having reviewed the entire record and 
the Order Denying Licensure, we are convinced that, despite the statement in the 
order that the appellant "has not proven he is entitled to licensure or that the 
prior Board erred when it denied him licensure[,]" it is clear from the 
conclusions of law contained in the order that the Board required the State to 
prove the alleged violations by clear and convincing evidence.  As is the law, the Board required the 
appellant to prove he was qualified for licensure, but then required the State 
to go forward with clear and convincing evidence justifying denial of the 
license.  See Clark, 2002 WY 24, 39 P.3d 1106.  
There was no error in regard to the burden of 
proof.

 
 
[¶30]   Getting now to the issue at 
handwas expert testimony required to prove the alleged violations?  The relevant findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are:

 
 
            
1.         
In Findings of Fact 3 and 4, the Board found that in October 1999, in the 
matter underlying the first complaint, the appellant had counseled a child in a 
court custody matter, had testified that he was a licensed social worker, had 
introduced in court a resum© that stated he was a licensed clinical social 
worker in Wyoming, had held himself out to the public as a licensed counselor, 
and had provided counseling services when he held no valid license to provide 
such services.

 
 
2.         
In Finding of Fact 6, the Board found that Investigator Giffin told the 
appellant on March 6, 2000, that the appellant did not have a license to 
practice clinical social work, and further found that the appellant's assertion 
that he did not receive the executive director's letter of October 8, 1999, 
informing him of the first complaint "flies in the face of" his signature on the 
certified mail receipt card.

 
 
3.         
In Findings of Fact 8 and 15, the Board found that its staff member 
credibly testified that, contrary to the appellant's assertions, he did not tell 
the appellant over the telephone that he would issue the appellant a license or 
renew the appellant's license.

 
 
4.         
In Finding of Fact 9, the Board found that, in the matter underlying the 
second complaint, the appellant's records had not been turned over to the Board, 
despite four requests.

 
 
5.         
In Finding of Fact 12, the Board found that, in the matter underlying the 
third complaint, the appellant had, after July 26, 2001, and with knowledge that 
he was not licensed, provided counseling services and billed an insurance 
company for those services.

 
 
6.         
In Finding of Fact 13, the Board found that, in the matter underlying the 
fourth complaint, the appellant had, from August 2001 through May 2002, after 
notice that his application for licensure had been denied, performed counseling 
services for a woman and her three children.

 
 
7.         
Findings of Fact 16-18 contain the Board's central findings, and they 
will be set forth here at length:

 
 
16.       This Board 
finds that [the appellant's] testimony was not credible.  Even if the Board found plausible [the 
appellant's] assertion that he called the Board office and spoke to a male 
person after he received his December 1998 renewal application returned to him, 
[the appellant] knew in January 1999 that his license had expired.  [The appellant] is required to 
conspicuously display his license as a clinical social worker and the Board has 
never sent him a license since his expired in December 1998.  [The appellant] also admitted he knew in 
October 1999 his license was expired after testifying in a court matter.  Regardless, [the appellant] certainly 
knew he held no valid license to practice social work in December 1999 when he 
signed for a certified letter from the Board requesting he cease and desist from 
counseling without a license, yet he continued to provide counseling services 
and continued to bill Blue Cross and Blue Shield for those services.  Even after the Board notified [the 
appellant] on July 26, 2001 that his July 2000 application had been denied, [the 
appellant] continued to provide counseling services and hold himself out to the 
public as a licensed clinical social worker.  [The appellant] denied providing 
counseling services, yet billed clients and insurance companies using billing 
codes identifying individual or family counseling as the service he 
provided.  . . .  [The appellant's] explanation that 
"people" from insurance companies told him to bill that way even though he was 
not providing counseling services lacks any credibility 
whatsoever.

 
 
17.       [The 
appellant's] alternative explanation that he was not providing services that 
required licensure also lacks any credibility whatsoever.  [The appellant] testified he merely 
helped people get through the litigation process and provided dispute 
resolution, as well as "mediating" conflicts between people.  [The appellant] also denied he engaged 
in the activities listed in the Wyoming Statutes defining professional social 
work services, such as assessment, diagnosis, treatment including counseling, 
client-centered advocacy, consultation and evaluation of individuals and 
families.  . . .  Yet [the appellant] admitted he made 
diagnoses from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition 
(DSM-IV).  . . .  [The appellant] also represents himself 
as a counselor in the yellow pages of the phone book.  . . .  Although termed by [the appellant] as 
"conflict resolution" and "mediation" services, it is clear the clients that 
treated with [the appellant] believed they were receiving counseling services 
and that is exactly what [the appellant] was providing, treating individuals 
over the course of months and years.

 
 
18.       [The 
appellant's] testimony under oath was disingenuous and not credible and his 
conduct before this Board was contrary to the integrity of the mental health 
profession.  This Board finds [the 
appellant] was providing counseling services that required licensure.  The Board further finds that [the 
appellant] provided those services for which he billed as counseling, at a time 
when he did not hold a license to do so.

 
 
            
8.         
The Board's primary conclusions of law are found in Conclusion of Law 
10:

 
 
            
10.       
The Board's investigative committee member has proven, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that allowing [the appellant] to hold a Wyoming license as a 
clinical social worker would not be in the public's interest.  The Board's investigative committee 
member proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that [the appellant] violated 
all three of the listed provisions in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-110(c)(iii), (ix), 
and (xi) (Lexis[Nexis] 2003).  
First, [the appellant] failed to make timely application for the renewal 
of his license by December 15, 1998 as set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
33-38-110(c)(xi) (Lexis[Nexis] 2003).  
In addition, [the appellant] acted unprofessionally and unethically in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-110(c)(iii) (Lexis[Nexis] 2003) by 
practicing clinical social work from December 15, 1998 to the time of hearing 
without a license.  [The appellant] 
also unprofessionally and unethically billed insurance companies for those 
professional services despite his protestations at hearing that he was merely 
providing conflict resolution, trial consultation and mediation.  The overwhelming evidence presented by 
the State showed [the appellant] was acting as a clinical social worker and 
practicing clinical social work as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
33-38-102(a)(iii) and (v) (Lexis[Nexis] 2003) in that he clearly provided 
assessments, counseled individuals and made diagnoses in accordance with the 
DSM-IV Manual when he was not licensed to perform those services in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a) (Lexis[Nexis] 2003).  The overwhelming evidence also supports 
the conclusion that [the appellant] knew he was unlicensed and thus committed 
willful violations of this act as set forth in [Wyo.] Stat. Ann. § 
33-38-110(c)(ix) (Lexis[Nexis] 2003).  
Lastly, [the appellant] did not produce a client file as requested by the 
Board, and later admitted he lost the file.  [The appellant's] conduct in losing a 
client file was both unprofessional and unethical pursuant to the Board's Rules 
and Regulations as set forth in further detail below.

 
 

            
9.         
In Conclusions of Law 11-18, the Board detailed its conclusion that the 
appellant's conduct had violated ethical and professional standards, in 
violation of specific regulatory provisions.  In doing so, the Board first noted the 
requirement of Billings I, 2001 WY 
81, ¶ 29, 30 P.3d  at 570 (quoting Matter 
of Bessemer Mt., 856 P.2d 450, 454 (Wyo. 1993)), that 
its decisions be based upon established standards.  Next, the Board noted that it had 
adopted such rules pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-105(a) (LexisNexis 
2003).7

 
 
10.       In 
Conclusions of Law 12-18, which are set out below, the Board applied the 
established rules to the appellant's conduct in a step-by-step 
process:

 
 
12.       In 
accordance with the above statute, the Mental Health Professions Licensing 
Board's Rules and Regulations, Ch. 12, §§ 1 and 2(a)(i) and (b) (February 2000) 
states as follows:

 
 

Section 
1.  Board 
Authorization.  The Board is authorized to refuse to 
renew, or may deny, suspend, revoke or otherwise restrict the license or 
certification of any person violating provisions of the Act pursuant to W.S. 
33-38-110.

 
 

Section 
2.  Grounds.  The Board may also take action for 
unprofessional conduct.

 
 
(a)       Unethical 
conduct shall include, but is not limited to:

 
 

(i)                 
Willful 
violation of any provision of these Rules;

 
 
. . 
.

 
 

(ii)               
Representation 
of oneself as licensed to engage in private practice in professional counseling, 
clinical social work . . . without a license or 
certification;

 
 
. . 
.

 
 

(vi)              
Soliciting 
clients by any form of false or misleading communication;

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
(vii)      Gross 
incompetence or malpractice.

 
 
            
(b)       
Unethical conduct shall be a violation of any provision of the adopted 
Ethical Standards as set forth in Chapter 11 of these 
Rules.

 
 
            
13.       
Chapter 11, § 2 of the Board's Rules provides the following in relevant 
part:

 
 
            
Section 2. Grounds.  The following ethical standards are 
adopted and incorporated herein by the Board:

 
 
b.         
Ethical standards incorporate and are based on the Code of Ethics and 
Professional Standards of the professional organizations.  The published Code of Ethics and 
Professional Standards of the appropriate professional organization are adopted 
by reference herein and shall be used by the Licensee and Certificate and the 
Board to provide additional guidelines to ethical standards.  These Codes of Ethics and Professional 
Standards are:

 
 
(iii)       For 
Licensed Clinical Social Workers, Professional Clinical Social Workers, and 
Certified Social Workersthe National Association of Social Workers, "Code of 
Ethics" incorporated as Appendix E.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
(vii)      Ensure that 
clients are aware of fees and billing arrangements before rendering 
services.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
(ix)       Respect the 
privacy of clients and hold in confidence all information obtained in the course 
of professional service.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
(xv)      When advertising 
their services to the public, ensure that such advertising is neither fraudulent 
nor misleading.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
(xxi)     Respond to all requests 
for information and all other correspondence from the 
Board.

 
 
            
14.       
The Mental Health Professions Licensing Board's Rules and Regulations, 
Appendix E, National Association of Social Workers, Code of Ethics, §§ 1.01, 
1.04, 1.07, 1.08, 3.05, 4.04, 4.06, and 5.01 (February 2000) , states in 
relevant part as follows:

 
 
1.01  Commitment to 
Clients

 
 

            
Social 
workers' primary responsibility is to promote the well-being of clients.  In general, clients' interests are 
primary.  However, social workers' 
responsibility to the larger society or specific legal obligations may on 
limited occasions supersede the loyalty owed clients, and clients should be so 
advised.  (Examples include when a 
social worker is required by law to report that a client has abused a child or 
has threatened to harm self or others.)

 
 

1.04  Competence

 
 
            
(a)       
Social workers should provide services and represent themselves as 
competent only within the boundaries of their education, training, license, 
certification . . ..

 
 
1.07  Privacy and 
Confidentiality

 
 
            
(c)        
Social workers should protect the confidentiality of all information 
obtained in the course of professional service, except for compelling 
professional reasons . . ..

 
 
1.08  Access to 
Records

 
 
            
(a)       
Social workers should provide clients with reasonable access to records 
concerning the client . . ..

 
 
4.04  Dishonesty, Fraud, and 
Deception

 
 
Social 
workers should not participate in, condone, or be associated with dishonesty, 
fraud, or deception.

 
 
4.06  
Misrepresentation

 
 
            
(a)       
Social workers should make clear distinctions between statements made and 
actions engaged in as a private individual and as a representative of the social 
work profession . . ..

 
 

5.01  Integrity of the 
Profession

 
 
            
(a)       
Social workers should work toward the maintenance and promotion of high 
standards of practice.

 
 
            
15.       
[The appellant] acted unprofessionally and unethically by knowingly and 
willfully practicing clinical social work from December 15, 1998 to the time of 
hearing without a license in violation of the following regulatory 
provisions:  Chapter 12, Sections 
2(a)(i), (iii), and 2(b) and Chapter 11, Section 2(b)(iii) which incorporates 
the National Association of Social Workers, Code of Ethics as Appendix E and 
provides that a social worker should only provide services and represent himself 
as competent within the confines of his license or certification.  [The appellant] had no license from 
December 15, 1998 to the time of hearing and therefore could not provide 
assessments, counsel individuals and make diagnoses in accordance with the 
DSM-IV Manual when he was not licensed to perform those 
services.

 
 
            
16.       
[The appellant] acted unprofessionally and unethically by making numerous 
misrepresentations about the services he provided in violation of several 
regulatory provisions:

 
 

·        
Though 
[the appellant] knew his license had expired, he held himself out as a licensed 
clinical social worker in the yellow pages of the phone book.  Such conduct was unethical and 
unprofessional as set forth in Chapter 12, Sections 2(a)(i), (ii), (iv) and (b); 
Chapter 11, Sections 2(b)(xv); and Chapter 11, Section 2(b)(iii) which 
incorporates (as Appendix E of the Board's Rules and Regulations) the National 
Association of Social Workers, Code of Ethics.  Specifically, provisions 4.04 and 4.06 
of the Code of Ethics condemn the type of dishonesty, fraud, deception and 
misrepresentation [the appellant's] yellow page advertisement 
demonstrates.

 
 

·        
By 
willfully and knowingly misrepresenting to a court of law in October, 1999, that 
he was a licensed social worker when he knew his license had expired, [the 
appellant] acted unprofessionally and unethically pursuant to Chapter 12, 
Sections 2(a)(i), (iii) and (b); and Chapter 11, Section 2(b)(iii) which 
incorporates (as Appendix E of the Board's Rules and Regulations) the National 
Association of Social Workers, Code of Ethics.  Specifically, [the appellant] failed to 
fulfill his responsibilities established in provisions 1.01, 1.04, 4.04, 4.06, 
and 5.01 of the Code of Ethics.

 
 

·        
[The 
appellant] charged his clients for services he was not licensed to perform.  Specifically, he billed his clients' 
insurance companies for unlicensed professional services.  In so doing, he deceived both the client 
and the clients' insurance companies.  
Such conduct was unethical and unprofessional pursuant to Chapter 12, 
Sections 2(a)(i), (iii), and (b) as well as Chapter 11, Section 2(vii) which 
requires [the appellant] ensure his clients are aware of fees and billing 
arrangements before he rendered his services.  The insurance documentation clearly 
indicates [the appellant] was providing professional services to clients when he 
was unlicensed to do so.  While [the 
appellant] asserted such services constituted conflict resolution, trial 
consultation and mediation, neither the clients, nor their insurance companies, 
were informed of limited services [the appellant] insisted he was 
providing.  Instead, [the appellant] 
billed for the clinical social work services he was providing without a 
license.  In so doing, he failed to 
fulfill his responsibilities pursuant to Chapter 11, Section 2(b)(iii) which 
incorporates (as Appendix E of the Board's Rules and Regulations) the National 
Association of Social Workers, Code of Ethics.  By billing clients (and their insurers) 
for unauthorized services, [the appellant] failed to promote the well-being of 
his clients, whose insurance companies have been billed for unlicensed 
services.  The Board concludes such 
conduct does not conform to provisions 1.01 and 1.04 of the Code of Ethics found 
in Appendix E of the Board's Rules and Regulations.  Additionally, provisions 4.04, 4.06, and 
5.01 of the Code condemn such dishonesty, fraud, deception and 
misrepresentation.

 
 

·        
By 
losing the . . . client file [in the matter underlying the second complaint], or 
by failing to produce the file as requested by the Board, [the appellant] acted 
unprofessionally and unethically pursuant to Chapter 12, Section 2(b) and 
Chapter 11, Sections 2(b)(ix) and (xxi).  
At best, [the appellant's] failure to produce the file as requested by 
the Board was a violation of subsection (xxi).  More worrisome is [the appellant's] 
misplacement of a client file, which jeopardizes the confidentiality of the 
information contained therein as part of his professional service to the client 
in violation of subsection (ix).  
Such conduct is also unprofessional and unethical pursuant to Chapter 11, 
Sections 2(b)(iii) which incorporates (as Appendix E of the Board's Rules and 
Regulations) the National Association of Social Workers, Code of Ethics.  Specifically, by losing the . . . file 
and failing to acknowledge such loss to [the client], [the appellant] failed to 
fulfill his obligations to the client pursuant to provisions 1.01, 1.07, 1.08 
and 5.01 of the Code of Ethics as set forth in Appendix E.

 
 
            
17.       
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-110(c)(iii) through (xi) (Lexis[Nexis] 2003) 
provides the Board with the discretion to deny [the appellant's] license for any 
of the causes set forth thereunder.  
While the Board may deny a license for even a singular infraction set 
forth under this provision, the Board concludes [the appellant] has committed 
multiple infractions, which preclude licensure in this case.  These infractions, which have occurred 
over a period of years, are egregious.  
[The appellant's] blatant misconduct poses a risk to the profession and 
more importantly, to the public the profession serves, as demonstrated by the 
four independent consumer complaints filed with this 
Board.

 
 
            
18.       
The State has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that [the 
appellant's] actions outlined in this Order constitute violations of the above 
quoted statutes, rules and regulations and code of ethics and that his 
application for licensure as a clinical social worker is contrary to the 
integrity of the profession and should be denied.

 
 
[¶31]   Clearly, this case is wholly unlike 
Billings I and Devous.  Here, rather than relying  upon its members' individual standards, 
the Board meticulously detailed in its order the applicable statutory and 
administrative standards, including the ethical codes adopted therein.  The problem identified in Billings I and Devous is the impossibility of judicial 
review where the record does not reveal the identified standard of professional 
care against which a licensee's conduct is to be measured.  That problem does not exist here.  Once the legislature and the 
administrative agency have fully identified the standard of care, it does not 
require expert testimony, at least in the present circumstances, to establish 
that standard.

 
 
[¶32]   There remains, however, the 
question of whether, although the applicable standard of professional care is 
established in the record, expert testimony is required to establish that the 
appellant's conduct violated that standard.  We are satisfied that expert testimony 
was not required under the particular circumstances now before this Court 
because, as in Billings II, the 
nature of the alleged violations is "within our knowledge."  For instance, accepting the Board's 
credibility determinations, the evidence is such that we are left with little if 
any doubt that the appellant knowingly practiced without a license and knowingly 
represented himself as licensed when he was not.  Further, the evidence fully supports the 
conclusion that the appellant engaged in practices clearly identified in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(v) as "clinical social work," including diagnosis and 
counseling.  And in the matter 
underlying the second complaint, he either lost a client's file, evidencing 
gross incompetence, or he refused to produce it at the Board's request, either 
of which was a licensing violation.  
Expert testimony was not required to establish these 
violations.

 
 
Was the 
denial of re-licensure supported by substantial 
evidence?

 
 
[¶33]   In this section of his appeal, the 
appellant challenges three of the Board's conclusions as having "no bases in 
facts presented in the record."  We 
will review these contentions under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) and the 
substantial evidence test set forth earlier herein.

 
 
[¶34]   The appellant's first argument is 
that there is no evidentiary support for the Board's conclusion that he 
"fraudulently represented himself as a licensed counselor to the First Judicial 
District Court in October 1999."  
The appellant contends that the record lacks substantial evidence that he 
made any representation to that court that he was licensed or practicing as a 
"counselor," which is substantially different from being licensed or practicing 
as a clinical social worker, and furthermore, the appellant contends that it is 
unrefuted that he had no knowledge that his renewal application had been denied 
until December 2, 1999, well after the court hearing at 
issue.

 
 

[¶35]   We reject these arguments and 
affirm the Board on this issue because, as so often happens, the appellant's 
contentions depend upon acceptance of his version of the evidence, rather than 
upon application of the substantial evidence test.  Further, it must be remembered that, in 
its findings and conclusions, the Board clearly resolved all credibility issues 
against the appellant.  This is 
important in our application of the substantial evidence test because we do not 
second-guess the Board in judging witness credibility.  Hicks v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 2005 WY 11, ¶ 18, 105 P.3d 462, 470 (Wyo. 
2005); Davis, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d  at 485 
(quoting Newman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 26, 49 P.3d 163, 173 
(Wyo. 2002)); City of Casper v. Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 
451-52 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶36]   The record contains the following 
evidence that, with credibility issues resolved against the appellant, is 
sufficient for the Board to have found that the appellant knew before the 
October 1999 custody court hearing that he was unlicensed.  First, the appellant testified both that 
he had not received the license application and fee that were returned to him in 
January 1999, and that in January 1999 he spoke with a male Board employee who 
asked him several questions about his application and then told him the license 
would be issued.  In that regard, 
the Board's only male employee testified that no such conversation took 
place.  In further contradiction to 
the appellant's denial of knowledge that his license had expired, the Board's 
executive director testified that the private investigator hired to locate the 
appellant reported the appellant told him that he had contacted the Board and 
spoken to the male employee "when he received his renewal application back in 
the mail . . .."  The Board's 
executive director also testified that the renewal application and fee that were 
returned to the appellant were not received back in the Board's mail, indicating 
that they had been received by the appellant.  Finally, the executive director also 
testified that, when a license is sent to an applicant, a wall certificate is 
also sent, and that the licensee is required to display the wall certificate in 
a conspicuous location.  The Board 
found that the lack of such a wall certificate was additional notice to the 
appellant that he was unlicensed.  
Taken together, there is substantial evidence supporting the Board's 
conclusion that the appellant knew he was practicing without a 
license.

 
 
[¶37]   We will pay scant attention to the 
appellant's rather frivolous argument that he made no representation to the 
First Judicial District Court that he was a "licensed counselor," as opposed to 
a "licensed clinical social worker."  
To begin with, the second complainant testified before the Board as 
follows:

 
 
            
Q.  And during that hearing 
did he indicate to the court that he was licensed as a social worker in the 
State of Wyoming?

 
 
            
A.  He did.  And he also handed out a resum© stating 
that he was licensed in the State of Wyoming, and introduced himself as an expert 
in having served as a counselor with my daughter.

 
 
Beyond 
that, inasmuch as the statutory definition of clinical social work includes 
"counseling," we consider this as little more than an argument over 
semantics.  An unlicensed clinical 
social worker who practices "counseling" is practicing clinical social work 
without a license.

 
 
[¶38]   The appellant's second attack upon 
the evidentiary sufficiency behind the Board's findings and conclusions focuses 
upon the allegation that he failed to produce his file in the matter underlying 
the second complaint.  Although this 
issue is characterized by the appellant as a substantial evidence issue, the 
arguments presented in his appellate brief combine legal and factual 
elements.  Those arguments are:  (1) there is no record-retention 
requirement in the applicable statutes or administrative rules; (2) the file was 
not requested by a client, but by the client's mother; (3) there was no evidence 
to prove loss of the file violated an ethical standard; (4) there was no 
evidence to prove loss of the file violated client confidentiality; and (5) if 
the appellant was unlicensed at the time the Board requested the file, he was 
under no duty or obligation to provide anything to the 
Board.

 
 
[¶39]   The Board's analysis of the "lost 
file" followed two avenues.  First, 
the Board stated that "at best," the appellant's failure to produce the file in 
response to the Board's four requests was unethical and unprofessional under 
Board Rule, ch. 11, § 2(c)(xxi), which requires licensees to respond to requests 
from the Board for information.  And 
second, the Board concluded that the appellant's misplacement of the file 
jeopardized its confidentiality in violation of Board Rule, ch. 12, § 2(b) and 
ch. 11, § 2(b)(iii) and (c)(ix), as well as provisions 1.01, 1.07, 1.08 and 5.01 
of the Code of Ethics.

 
 

[¶40]   The question in a substantial 
evidence challenge is whether there was "relevant evidence [that] a reasonable 
mind might accept in support of the agency's conclusions.'"  Davis, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 6, 88 P.3d  at 485 
(quoting Legarda, 2003 WY 130, ¶ 10, 
77 P.3d at 712).  In the present case, however, the 
appellant does not really challenge the quantum of the evidencehe admits that 
he cannot locate the file at issueinstead, for the most part, he challenges the 
existence of any duty on his part to keep or produce the file.  Three of his five arguments are of that 
nature:  that there is no 
record-retention requirement, that the file was not requested by a client, and 
that unlicensed persons are under no obligation to the Board.  For several reasons, we will not further 
consider these issues.  First, they 
are not substantial evidence issues, and that is how they were presented.  Second, the appellant was not accused of 
violating a record-retention requirement, but of jeopardizing a client's right 
to confidentiality and the integrity of the profession.  Third, the appellant presents no law as 
to the duty, or lack thereof, of a clinical social worker to produce a file at 
the request of a parent of a client who is a minor child.  And fourth, the appellant presents no 
law in support of his interesting theory that, if one is practicing without a 
license, one is not required to follow licensing 
standards.

 
 
[¶41]   The two remaining issues are 
evidentiary in nature:  whether 
there was evidence to prove that loss of the file violated an ethical standard 
and whether there was evidence to prove that loss of the file violated client 
confidentiality.  We will affirm the 
Board as to these issues because they reflect a misunderstanding of the process 
of applying the law to the facts.  
Where the standard of care is identified by statute or rule, and where 
facts are presented such that the Board is able to apply the law to the facts, 
testimony to the effect that "these facts constitute a violation of the law" is 
neither necessary nor appropriate.  
It is the role of the fact-finding decision-maker, not the role of the 
witness, to apply the law to the facts.  
In the instant case, the standard of care is well defined in the 
administrative rules adopted pursuant to statutelicensees are to maintain the 
confidentiality of client files, they are to provide clients with reasonable 
access to records, and they are to respond to reasonable requests from the 
Boardand the conduct at issuelosing a client's filewas fully developed in the 
evidence before the Board.

 
 
[¶42]   The appellant's third challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence is similar to the portion of his first challenge 
where he argues that he made no representation to the First Judicial District 
Court that he was a "licensed counselor," as opposed to a "licensed clinical 
social worker."  Finding of Fact 11 
in the Board's order stated that "after [the appellant] had been notified by the 
Board that his license had expired, he continued to practice as a counselor 
until July 17, 2000 . . .."  In 
regard to this finding, the appellant makes the following 
complaint:

 
 
            
The MHPL Board, who is supposed to be the expert regulators in Wyoming of 
the mental health professions, cannot itself delineate between what comprises 
the "Practice of Clinical Social Work" or the "Practice of Professional 
Counseling", Wyo. Stat. §33-38-102(a)(v) and (vi), respectively!  That is a very important 
distinction!  The MHPL Board wants 
to complain that [the appellant] is not licensed as a Clinical Social Worker, 
but denies his license application upon assertions that he is practicing 
"Counseling"!  WOW, a simple point 
to demonstrate the need for expert testimony and lack of substantial 
evidence!  There is ABSOLUTELY no 
evidence in the record concerning what actions or practice are encompassed 
within the practice of "Counseling", Wyo. Stat. §33-38-102(a)(vi) or practice of 
"Clinical Social Work", Wyo. Stat. §33-38-102(a)(v).

 
 
[¶43]   As with the earlier incarnation of 
this argument, we will give this reincarnation short shrift.  A reading of the entire order makes it 
clear that use of the word "counselor" in the quoted sentence did not indicate 
any intent on the part of the Board to charge the appellant with the unlicensed 
"[p]ractice of counseling" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(vi), rather than 
the unlicensed "[p]ractice of clinical social work" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
33-38-102(a)(v), nor did it indicate any confusion on the part of the Board as 
to any differences between the two professions.  To begin with, as noted earlier herein, 
the practice of clinical social work includes, by statutory definition, 
"counseling."  In addition, repeated 
references throughout the order place the counseling allegation squarely within 
the confines of the practice of clinical social work.  For instance:

 
 
            
[Finding of Fact] 16.  . . 
.  Regardless, [the appellant] 
certainly knew he held no valid license to practice social work in December 1999 
when he signed for a certified letter from the Board requesting he cease and 
desist from counseling without a license, yet he continued to provide counseling 
services and continued to bill Blue Cross and Blue Shield for those 
services.  Even after the Board 
notified [the appellant] on July 26, 2001 that his July 2000 application had 
been denied, [the appellant] continued to provide counseling services and hold 
himself out to the public as a licensed clinical social worker.  . . .

 
 
            
[Finding of Fact] 17.  . . 
.  [The appellant] also denied he 
engaged in the activities listed in the Wyoming Statutes defining professional 
social work services, such as assessment, diagnosis, treatment including 
counseling, client-centered advocacy, consultation and evaluation of individuals 
and families.  . . .  Yet [the appellant] admitted he made 
diagnoses from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition 
(DSM-IV).  . . .  [The appellant] also represents himself 
as a counselor in the yellow pages of the phone book.  . . .

 
 
            
[Conclusion of Law] 10.  . . 
.  The overwhelming evidence 
presented by the State showed [the appellant] was acting as a clinical social 
worker and practicing clinical social work as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
33-38-102(a)(iii) and (v) (Lexis[Nexis] 2003) in that he clearly provided 
assessments, counseled individuals and made diagnoses in accordance with the 
DSM-IV Manual when he was not licensed to perform those services in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a) (Lexis[Nexis] 2003).

 
 

[¶44]   The only real issue presented by 
these circumstances is whether the word "counseling" needs expert definition 
before this Court is able to review the Board's conclusion that the appellant 
provided unlicensed counseling services within the meaning of the "[p]ractice of 
clinical social work" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(v).  We conclude that it does not.  Generally, words used in a statute are 
given their plain, ordinary and usual meaning, unless the statute clearly 
intends otherwise.  Saiz v. State, 2001 WY 76, ¶ 10, 30 P.3d 21, 25 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 657 (Wyo. 2000)).  Where statutory words have both an 
ordinary meaning and a "peculiar and appropriate meaning in law,'" however, the 
technical meaning is preferred unless that construction is contrary to 
legislative intent.  Amoco Production Co. v. State, 751 P.2d 379, 383 (Wyo. 
1988) (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-103(a)(i) 
((LexisNexis 2005)).

 
 
[¶45]   In the instant case, the appellant 
has not even attempted to argue that the word "counseling" as used in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(v) should be given anything but its ordinary dictionary 
definition.  For that matter, we do 
not even need to venture so far as the dictionary, inasmuch as the legislature 
has, in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(ii)(A), defined the word as it pertains 
to mental health procedures:

 
 
"Counseling" 
means assisting clients through the counseling relationship, using a combination 
of mental health, psychotherapy and human development principles, methods and 
techniques, to achieve mental, emotional, physical, social, moral, educational, 
spiritual or career development and adjustment through the life span, but shall 
not include religious instruction[.]

 
 
[¶46]   All four of the complainants in the 
consumer complaints filed against the appellant testified that he provided 
counseling or psychotherapy services during the period of time in which he was 
not licensed to do so.  In the four 
separate cases he provided pre-adoption counseling to a child, he counseled a 
child concerning visitation after a divorce, he provided psychotherapy services 
to a child in a court-ordered supervised visitation situation, and he provided 
conflict resolution and parenting education in an ongoing divorce 
litigation.  That evidence was 
sufficient to place the appellant's conduct squarely within the statutory 
definition of counseling.  In 
addition, the Board also found that the appellant provided assessments and made 
diagnoses under the mental health profession's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM-IV).  While the appellant 
characterized his work as "mediation" and "conflict resolution" in a "forensic" 
setting, it is clear that, in each of these cases at least, he had a specific 
client that he counseled in the statutory sense.

 
 

Was the 
appellant's right to due process of law violated when evidence was presented 
during the contested case hearing concerning matters not identified in the 
notice of hearing?

 
 
[¶47]   Resolution of this issue will 
require an awareness of the precise steps leading to the contested case 
hearing.  As mentioned earlier 
herein, the Board's letter denying the appellant's re-licensure application 
mentioned (1) fraudulent representation to a district court that the appellant 
was a licensed counselor; (2) practicing as a counselor despite notice that his 
license had expired; (3) deficient continuing education; and (4) inability to 
locate a file.  The letter then 
specified that the appellant's application was being denied because (1) he had 
practiced without a license in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-110(a)(i) 
and (c)(iii) and Board Rule, ch. 12, § 2(a)(iii); and (2) his inability to 
produce his records concerning the second complaint constituted gross negligence 
or malpractice, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-110(c)(iv) and Board 
Rule, ch. 12, § 2(a)(vii) and ch. 11, § 2.  
The letter concluded by informing the appellant that he had 30 days in 
which "to request a hearing before the Board for reconsideration . . 
.."

 
 
[¶48]   The appellant filed a timely 
response to the Board's letter, stating "[p]ursuant to your denial letter of 
July 26, 2001, please consider this a written request for hearing before the 
board."  The Board, in turn, 
responded with a Notice of Hearing that stated as follows:

 
 
            
The Mental Health Professions Licensing Board has denied your application 
to become a Licensed Clinical Social Worker due to violation[s] of Wyo. Stat. 
33-38-110(a)(i), 33-38-110(a)(iii) [(c)(iv)], and the Board's Rules and 
Regulations Chapter 12, Section 2(a)(iii), Section 2(a)(vii) and Chapter 11 
Section 2, and failure to meet the continuing education requirements in Chapter 
3 Section 7 and Chapter 10 Section 1(b)(iii).  Pursuant to your request that a hearing 
be held to re-examine your application . . ..[8]

 
 
[¶49]   At the time the appellant's 
application was denied, only the first two of the four consumer complaints had 
been filed with the Board.  
Nevertheless, when the State filed its disclosure statement in 
preparation for the hearing, it listed as witnesses the complainants from all 
four complaints, and offered exhibits related to all four complaints.  Further, rather than stating the issue 
as "reconsideration of denial of the application," or even "reconsideration of 
the application," the disclosure statement stated the issue as:  "Should the Mental Health Licensing 
Board issue [the appellant] a license as a clinical social 
worker?"

 
 
[¶50]   The appellant responded to the 
State's disclosure statement by filing a pre-hearing motion to exclude all 
evidence related to matters that occurred after denial of his application.  At the start of the hearing, the 
appellant's counsel mentioned the outstanding motion and objected to the 
presentation of any evidence concerning matters that occurred after the license 
application was denied.  The hearing 
examiner denied the motion and overruled the objection on the ground that the 
issue was not just whether the earlier denial was justified, but whether the 
appellant should be licensed, and the latter question implicated all relevant 
matters, whether they occurred before or after the denial.  The appellant now claims that this 
ruling violated his right to the due process of law, specifically his right to 
reasonable notice.

 
 

[¶51]   The right to practice a licensed 
profession is a conditional property right protected by the due process clauses 
of the Constitution of the United 
States and the Constitution of the State of Wyoming.  Devous, 845 P.2d  at 415.  "Procedural due process requires the 
applicant be given reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard by 
the body which rules on his application before government action may 
substantially affect a significant property interest."  Frank v. State By and Through Wyoming Bd. of Dental Examiners, 965 P.2d 674, 679 
(Wyo. 
1998).  For that reason, a licensing board may 
not consider in a contested case hearing matters concerning allegations of which 
the licensee had no notice.  Slagle v. WyomingState 
Bd. of Nursing, 954 P.2d 979, 982-83 (Wyo. 1998).  On the other hand, issues not raised in 
a hearing notice may be raised in the parties' disclosure statements, which are 
the equivalent of pleadings in a civil case.  Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 
17, ¶ 20, 19 P.3d 500, 507 (Wyo. 2001); Ireland v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div., 998 P.2d 398, 401 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶52]   Having carefully reviewed the 
record and the parties' appellate briefs, we find no substance to the 
appellant's due process of law arguments.  
We note initially that the appellant does not actually contend that he 
lacked notice of the issues that were considered at the hearing.  Rather, he contends only that the 
evidence should have been limited to the matters reflected in the notice of 
hearing.  That is not the law.  As we stated in Wesaw and Ireland, 
issues may also be formulated in the parties' disclosure statements, just as 
happened here.

 
 

[¶53]   We also conclude that the appellant 
had actual, timely notice of all the allegations with which he was 
confronted.  This administrative 
process began in 1998 with his tardy filing of a renewal application.  All four citizen complaints had been 
filed by August 2002.  The State's 
disclosure statement, listing all its witnesses and exhibits, was served on the 
appellant on October 11, 2002, and the hearing did not take place for a full 
year thereafter!  See Pederson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 743 
(Wyo. 
1997) (disclosure statement two months before 
hearing provided notice).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶54]   The order of the district court 
affirming the Wyoming Mental Health Professions Licensing Board's denial of the 
appellant's application for licensure is affirmed.  The appellant's issues pertaining to his 
earlier renewal application were not preserved for appeal.  Expert testimony was not required to 
prove the alleged licensing violations in this case, those violations were 
proven by substantial evidence, and the appellant received adequate notice prior 
to the contested case hearing.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(v) (LexisNexis 
2005):

 
 
"Practice 
of clinical social work" means applying social work theory and methods to the 
diagnosis, treatment and prevention of psychosocial dysfunction, disability or 
impairment, including emotional and mental disorders.  It is based on knowledge of one (1) or 
more theories of human development within a psychosocial context.  The perspective of person-in-situation 
is central to professional social work practice.  Professional clinical social work 
includes but is not limited to interventions directed to interpersonal 
interactions, intrapsychic dynamics, and life support and management 
issues.  Professional clinical 
social work services consist of assessment, diagnosis, treatment, including 
psychotherapy and counseling, client-centered advocacy, consultation and 
evaluation with individuals, families, groups, communities and 
organizations[.]

 
 
  2There is no Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
33-38-110(a)(iii).  It is presumed 
that this reference should be to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-110(c)(iv), which lists 
"[g]ross incompetence and malpractice" as grounds for negative board action in 
regard to licensure.

 
 
  3Neither the record nor the briefs of 
the parties fully explain this fourteen month delay, and the delay has not been 
made an issue in this appeal.

 
 
  4Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-106(a)(i) - 
(v) require "satisfactory evidence" that an applicant has reached the age of 
majority, has no felony convictions and no misdemeanor convictions involving 
moral turpitude, has a master's or doctorate degree in the appropriate 
discipline, has demonstrated knowledge in an appropriate field by passing a 
standard examination, and has completed 3,000 hours of supervised clinical 
experience.

 
 
  5Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(v) is quoted, 
supra, at n. 1.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(iii) 
provides as follows:

 
 
"Licensed 
professional counselor, (LPC), licensed marriage and family therapist, (LMFT), 
licensed clinical social worker, (LCSW) and licensed addictions therapist, 
(LAT)," mean persons who represent themselves to the public by any title or 
description of psychotherapy services incorporating the words "professional 
counselor", "marriage and family therapist", "clinical social worker", or 
"addictions therapist", who offer to render professional services in these 
fields to individuals, groups, organizations, corporations, institutions, 
government agencies, or the general public for compensation, implying that they 
are licensed and trained, experienced or expert in one (1) or more of these 
fields of practice and who hold a valid license to engage in the practice of one 
(1) or more of these specializations.  
These persons may practice independent of 
supervision[.]

 
 
  6Board Rule, ch. 12, § 2(a)(iii) 
defines as unethical conduct "[r]epresentation of oneself as licensed to engage 
in private practice in professional counseling, clinical social work, marriage 
and family therapy and or addictions therapy without a license or 
certification[.]"  Board Rule, ch. 
12, § 2(a)(vii) defines as unethical conduct "[g]ross incompetence or 
malpractice," and Board Rule, ch. 11, § 2(c)(ii) and (ix) require licensees to 
justify services provided and to maintain client confidentiality.  Furthermore, Board Rule, ch. 11, § 
2(b)(iii) adopts and incorporates into the rules and regulations the Code of 
Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers, a copy of which is 
appended to the rules and regulations and is included in the 
record.

 
 
  7Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-105(a) 
provides:

 
 
The 
board shall adopt rules not inconsistent with this act or the laws of this state 
that are reasonable and necessary to administer this act.  A subcommittee from each discipline 
shall be requested to draft the recommended rules and regulations for that 
particular discipline and shall submit them to the full board for action.  The rules shall be adopted in accordance 
with the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§ 16-3-101 et 
seq.].

 
 

  8The continuing education deficiency 
apparently was resolved along the way and is not now before this 
Court.