Case Title: In re Flannery

Citation: 

Docket Number: S48338

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  June 7, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of
PAUL FLANNERY,
	Accused.
(OSB 00-98; SC S48338)

	En Banc
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted September 6, 2001.
	Chris L. Mullmann, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the briefs for the Oregon
State Bar.
	Paul Flannery, Vancouver, Washington, argued the cause and
filed the brief for himself.
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is publicly reprimanded.
		PER CURIAM
		In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged the accused with violating two
disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: 
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(2) (prohibiting commission of "a
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness to practice law"); and DR 1-102(A)(3)
(prohibiting lawyer from engaging "in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation").  The Bar also
alleged that the accused is subject to discipline under ORS
9.527(2) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.  During the ensuing proceedings, the accused conceded,
and a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board concluded, that the
accused had violated both disciplinary rules and had been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.  The trial panel
imposed a public reprimand.  
		The Bar sought review of the trial panel's sanction
decision.  ORS 9.536(1); Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.3.  This
court reviews de novo.  ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6.  We also impose a
public reprimand. 
I. FACTS

		The accused became a member of the Oregon State Bar in
1984.  At the time of the relevant events, the accused was
working as a deputy district attorney for Clackamas County.  The
accused lived in Portland, Oregon, until 1997, when he moved to
Vancouver, Washington.  Despite having moved, the accused
continued to use his Oregon driver license.  
		In May 1999, the accused realized that his Oregon
driver license had expired.  The accused also realized that,
unless he replaced the license immediately, he would be unable to
rent a car at an upcoming conference in another state.  The
accused knew that it would take too long (10 to 14 days) to
obtain a Washington driver license, but that he could renew his
Oregon driver license before he left for the conference.  The
accused therefore chose to renew his Oregon license.  In doing
so, he listed as his residence the Canby address of his
girlfriend's parents.  As part of the renewal application, the
accused signed a statement to the effect that he understood that
making any false statement in the application was against the
law.  The accused received a new Oregon driver license on the
basis of that application.
		Several months later, an Oregon City police officer
stopped the accused for a traffic violation.  The accused
presented the Oregon driver license, but told the officer that he
was living in Washington.  The Clackamas County District
Attorney's office learned of the incident and asked the Oregon
State Police to investigate.  As a result of that investigation,
the state charged the accused with making a false application for
a driver license, which is a Class A Misdemeanor.  ORS 807.530. 
The accused entered into a plea agreement, pleaded guilty, and
received probation and a $700 fine.  The district attorney's
office dismissed the accused from his position.  Several months
later, the Bar filed its formal complaint against the accused,
alleging that the foregoing facts constituted violations of DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3), and subjected the accused to
discipline under ORS 9.527(2).  
		As noted, the accused conceded that his conduct
violated both of the rules and the statute charged, and the trial
panel so concluded.  The trial panel then turned to the issue of
an appropriate sanction.  In that connection, the trial panel
determined that the accused had violated his duty to the public
to maintain the standards of personal integrity upon which the
community relies and that he had acted with "knowledge," but that
the conduct caused no actual or potential injury, except dishonor
to the district attorney's office.  The trial panel found two
aggravating factors:  (1) the accused had substantial experience
in the practice of law; and (2) he acted with a dishonest motive. 
At the same time, the trial panel found that there were several
mitigating factors, including the absence of any prior
disciplinary record; the accused's timely good faith effort to
rectify the consequences of his misconduct; his cooperation with
the Bar; his good character and reputation save for this
incident; his clear remorse; delay in the disciplinary
proceeding; and the fact that the accused already had been
subjected to other penalties, including a criminal conviction and
fine, and the loss of his job.  The trial panel concluded that
the accused should receive a public reprimand.  The trial panel
explained:
		"Although the conduct of the Accused was criminal,
the Trial Panel does not find that the conduct
'seriously' adversely reflects on the Accused's fitness
to practice.  This is an isolated victimless incident
which caused no injury and is unlikely to [recur].  The
Accused has lost his career as a prosecutor and
therefore has suffered severe 'other penalties' as a
result of his actions."
		The Bar, in seeking review, accepts the trial panel's
conclusion that the accused violated the disciplinary rules as
charged, but asks this court to suspend the accused for at least
60 days.  
II. DISCUSSION

		As is apparent from the foregoing, the only issue
presented in this case is whether this court ought to impose some
sanction other than a public reprimand.  This court described its
methodology for determining an appropriate sanction in In re
Gustafson, 333 Or 468, 486, 41 P3d 1063 (2002):
		"This court first considers three factors in
determining the appropriate sanctions:  the duty
violated; the accused lawyer's mental state; and the
actual or potential injury caused by the accused
lawyer's misconduct. * * * [Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (Amended 1993) (ABA Standards)]
3.0.  We then examine any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances to determine if the sanction should be
adjusted. * * * ABA Standard 3.0.  Finally, we compare
prior Oregon cases and the sanctions imposed in them. * * *."
(Some citations omitted.)
		The Bar contends that the trial panel selected and
applied the wrong standard when it chose a sanction.  In
particular, the Bar contends that the accused's conduct was
"intentional," as the ABA Standards elsewhere define that term,
and not merely "knowing."  It characterizes the accused's
misrepresentation on his driver license application as an
"intentional, premeditated lie and crime made for personal gain,"
which "seriously" adversely reflects on the accused's fitness to
practice law.  According to the Bar, therefore, a suspension is
appropriate.  
A.  Duty Violated
		We agree with both the trial panel and the Bar that the
accused violated his duty to the public to maintain standards of
personal integrity when he committed a crime that reflected
adversely on his honesty.  ABA Standard 5.1.  As the commentary
to ABA Standard 5.0 explains, that duty is founded on the
public's rightful expectation that lawyers will uphold the
highest standard of honesty and trustworthiness:
	"The public expects the lawyer to be honest and to
abide by the law; public confidence in the integrity of
officers of the court is undermined when lawyers engage
in illegal conduct."
B.  Mental State
		We turn to the accused's mental state.  As noted, the
trial panel found that the accused acted knowingly; the Bar asks
this court to find that he acted intentionally.  On that point,
the accused argues that he "stipulated" to a particular mental
state for purposes of sanction when he acknowledged at the
hearing before the trial panel that he knew that he was not a
resident of Oregon at the time that he certified the information
on his driver license renewal application.  Implicit in the
accused's argument is a contention that the Bar now ought to be
precluded from arguing on appeal that the accused's conduct
warrants a harsher sanction because he acted intentionally.  In
response, the Bar asserts that it "stipulated" only to the
underlying facts alleged in its pleading and to the ultimate
conclusion that the accused had violated the two disciplinary
rules charged and was subject to sanction under the pertinent
statute.  The Bar contends that the fact that its complaint
alleges that the accused "knew" that the information that he
provided to the Department of Transportation was false does not
prevent the Bar from arguing or proving, for purposes of the
determination of an appropriate sanction, that the accused acted
intentionally. 
		Our de novo review of the record discloses that, in
fact, there was no "stipulation" of the kind on which the accused
relies.  At the start of the hearing before the trial panel, the
presiding member asked the parties to describe what actually was
at issue.  Counsel for the Bar suggested that the only issue was
sanction.  The accused, whose answer had admitted the facts
alleged in the Bar's complaint but had denied that those facts
constituted violations of the specified statute and rules, then
acknowledged that he had abandoned that position:
		"At this time I'm prepared, in fact, to stipulate
to the fact that it does constitute a violation.  The
only issue I think that remains would be to determine
an appropriate sanction under these circumstances.
		"* * * * *
		"I would stipulate that it was a single act.  I
would like to emphasize that it was a single act.  It
would constitute violations of [the statute and
rules]."
(Emphasis added.)
		The presiding trial panel member then asked the counsel
for the Bar to "please state for the record what you believe the
stipulated facts are to see if [the accused] agrees to this
stipulation."  Counsel began with a summary of the facts alleged
in the Bar's complaint and then stated:  "I think the additional
facts would be set out in Exhibit 4, I think, which is the
[accused's] deposition. * * *."  The presiding member then asked
the accused directly whether he agreed with Bar counsel's
statement, to which the accused answered, "I do."  
		As the foregoing demonstrates, the accused's premise
for his argument concerning his state of mind is wrong.  The
parties did not stipulate that the trial panel could find only
that the accused acted "knowingly."  Rather, the trial panel was
left to draw whatever conclusion respecting the accused's state
of mind that the panel found to be justified by the evidence,
including the evidence in the accused's deposition.
		Indeed, that appears to us from the record to have been
the accused's understanding at the time.  Following the colloquy
just quoted, the trial panel took a short recess to permit its
members to familiarize themselves with the contents of the
accused's deposition.  The parties then turned to argument
concerning the appropriate sanction.  During that argument, the
Bar urged the trial panel to find that the accused had acted
"intentionally."  The accused responded, in essence, that his
acts were not as pre-meditated as counsel for the Bar portrayed
them.  However, the accused never argued or even suggested that,
in view of the "stipulations" just made, it would be
impermissible for the trial panel to find that he had acted
intentionally, as that concept is used in the ABA Standards.
		We take this opportunity to make the following
observation concerning "stipulations" in lawyer disciplinary
proceedings.  If there are to be such stipulations (and we
encourage them), then it would be valuable to the trial panels
(and to this court in exercising its de novo review function) to
have the parties specify the issues to which such stipulations
apply.  As this proceeding demonstrates, proof of a violation of
the disciplinary rules may require evidence of a particular state
of mind, but the facts actually might demonstrate another, and
more serious, one.  Consequently, in order for a stipulation
regarding a lawyer's state of mind to have the legal effect for
which the accused here advocates, it expressly must identify the
accused's state of mind for purposes of determining both guilt
and sanction.  Absent such a specific statement, this court in
the future will treat a "stipulation" respecting an accused
lawyer's mental state as relevant only to the issue of whether
the accused lawyer violated the particular disciplinary rule or
rules alleged in the Bar's complaint, and not as determinative of
a specific mental state that might bear on the selection of an
appropriate sanction.
		Turning to the merits, we agree with the Bar that the
accused's conduct in the present case was intentional.  The ABA
Standards define "intent" as "the conscious objective or purpose
to accomplish a particular result."  ABA Standards at 17.  When
the accused misrepresented his address in renewing his Oregon
driver license, he did so with the "conscious objective or
purpose" to obtain a valid driver license in time to rent a car
at the upcoming conference.  In light of that conscious purpose,
the trial panel's conclusion that the accused acted merely with
"knowledge" was incorrect. (1) 
C.  Injury 
		The injury caused by an accused lawyer's conduct
includes actual or potential injury to a client, the public, the
legal system, or the legal profession.  ABA Standards at 7.  In
the present proceeding, the only injury that the accused's
conduct caused was the reflection that it temporarily cast on the
office of the Clackamas County District Attorney and on law
enforcement generally. 
D.  Preliminary Sanction
		At this point, we normally look to the ABA Standards
for guidance as to an appropriate sanction.  In this instance,
however, we find that the ABA Standards are not a perfect fit. 
As discussed above, we conclude that the accused's conduct was
"intentional" and not merely "knowing."  The only standard that
addresses a lawyer's intentional conduct relating to a lawyer's
failure to maintain personal integrity is ABA Standard 5.11,
which provides:
	"Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
	"(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a
necessary element of which includes intentional
interference with the administration of justice, false
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion,
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution
or importation of controlled substances; or the
intentional killing of another; or an attempt or
conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of
these offenses; or 
	"(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice."
		By its terms, however, ABA Standard 5.11 applies only
in cases of "serious criminal conduct" or "other intentional
conduct involving dishonesty * * * or misrepresentation" that
"seriously" adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law.  No one argues that the accused's conduct in the
present case rises to a level that would justify disbarment,
notwithstanding that that conduct was intentional, criminal, and
dishonest.  The listed examples of the types of "serious"
criminal misconduct, such as lying under oath in a judicial
proceeding, are of a kind that pose an immediate threat to the
public; those examples are different from the accused's offense
of misrepresenting his address on a driver license application. 
As we explain more fully below, we also do not deem the accused's
conduct to reflect "seriously" on his fitness to practice law. 
We conclude that disbarment is not an appropriate sanction in
this case.  
		Both the standard that the Bar advocates, ABA Standard
5.12, and the standard that the trial panel invoked, ABA Standard
5.13, address a lawyer's knowing conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  ABA Standard 5.12 provides:
	"Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not
contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice."
ABA Standard 5.13 provides:
	"Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and
that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to
practice law."
		The principal difference between those two standards
lies in the degree to which the conduct in question adversely
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.  Suspension is
appropriate if the conduct "seriously" adversely reflects on
fitness; otherwise, reprimand is appropriate.  
		We begin our analysis respecting the foregoing
standards by noting that the accused's misconduct was not
committed in the course of his practice of law.  We also note
that the personal gain that the accused obtained through the
misrepresentation was not financial and was relatively trivial. (2) 
Without minimizing the wrongfulness of the accused's conduct,
those facts lead us to conclude that, although the accused's
intentional misrepresentation of his address on an application
for a driver license does reflect adversely on his fitness to
practice law, it does not do so "seriously."  We therefore
conclude that ABA Standard 5.12 is not, by its terms, applicable
to the present set of facts.  ABA Standard 5.13, on which the
trial panel relied, is closer to the mark.
		In sum, drawing together the duty violated, the
accused's mental state, the injury caused, and the degree to
which the accused's misconduct reflects on his fitness to
practice, the closest fit under the ABA Standards is the sanction
that ABA Standard 5.13 suggests, viz., a public reprimand.  We
next consider whether any aggravating or mitigating factors, or
this court's case law, mandate a different outcome.  
E.  Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
		ABA Standard 9.22 lists aggravating factors that may be
considered to justify an increase in the degree of discipline to
be imposed in a particular case.  Pertinent in the present
proceeding are the facts that the accused acted with a dishonest
or selfish motive, ABA Standard 9.22(b), and that he has
substantial experience in the practice of law, ABA Standard
9.22(i).  
		ABA Standard 9.32 lists factors that may be considered
in mitigation.  There is no dispute that the following mitigating
factors pertain in this proceeding:  The accused has no prior
disciplinary record, ABA Standard 9.32(a); the accused fully and
freely provided information to the trial panel and cooperated
fully in the disciplinary process, ABA Standard 9.32(d); the
accused has demonstrated good character and a good reputation,
save for this one incident, ABA Standard 9.32(g); the accused was
subjected to other penalties and sanctions, ABA Standard 9.32(k);
and the accused is remorseful, ABA Standard 9.32(l).  
		In addition to those mitigating factors, the trial
panel found the following:  that the accused made a timely, good
faith effort to rectify the consequences of his misconduct, ABA
Standard 9.32(d); and that there has been a delay in the
disciplinary proceedings, ABA Standard 9.32(j).  The Bar disputes
both those findings.  With regard to the accused's timely effort
to rectify the misconduct, the Bar points out that the accused
misrepresented his address in May 1999, but he did not obtain a
Washington driver license until after he was stopped by the
police several months later.  In addition, the Bar asserts that
the disciplinary case against the accused proceeded apace and
that there was no unusual delay in the proceedings. 
		We agree with the Bar on both points.  Nonetheless, and
after disregarding those two disputed factors, the mitigating
factors outweigh the aggravating factors.  At the very least, on
this record, we cannot conclude that the combined consideration
of the aggravating and mitigating factors justifies an increase
in the degree of discipline to be imposed on the accused.  
F.  Case Law
		Finally, the Bar argues that Oregon case law indicates
that, in most cases, a misrepresentation by a lawyer should
result in a term of suspension.  In support of that proposition,
the Bar cites In re Wyllie, 327 Or 175, 957 P2d 1222 (1998)
(lawyer suspended for two years for misrepresenting his
compliance with Bar's MCLE requirements and for failing to
cooperate with disciplinary investigation); In re Staar, 324 Or
283, 924 P2d 308 (1996) (lawyer suspended for two years for
committing perjury when applying for restraining order); and In
re Unrein, 323 Or 285, 917 P2d 1022 (1996) (lawyer suspended for
120 days for making multiple fraudulent applications for
unemployment compensation benefits) In re Melmon, 322 Or 380, 908
P2d 822 (1995) (lawyer suspended for 90 days for simultaneously
representing multiple clients with conflicts of interests and for
knowingly making false statement to government agency); In re
Hopp, 291 Or 697, 634 P2d 238 (1981) (lawyer suspended for 60
days for taking action for purpose of harassing another lawyer
and for misrepresenting that he was doing so for "client," when
he registered for local business's recently expired assumed
business name and then demanded $100 to relinquish registration);
In re Houchin, 290 Or 433, 622 P2d 723 (1981) (lawyer suspended
for 30 days for enrolling as student in community college course
that he was teaching to qualify for Veterans' Administration
benefits).  
		In all the foregoing cases but one, the accused
lawyer's misconduct was far more egregious than that presented
here.  Of the cases that the Bar cites to us, the only case with
facts analogous to the present case is Houchin.  In that case, as
here, a lawyer misrepresented a material fact on a government
form to obtain a personal benefit, and the misrepresentation
occurred outside the lawyer's practice of law.  Houchin was a
more serious case, however, because the lawyer derived a direct
financial benefit from his mispresentation.  Indeed, the court
based its determination to suspend Houchin on the fact that the
purpose of his misrepresentation was to obtain a financial
advantage.  Houchin, 290 Or at 439-40.    
		One other relevant case is In re Carstens, 297 Or 155,
683 P2d 992 (1984), on which the trial panel relied.  In that
case, a lawyer was publicly reprimanded after he was convicted of
misdemeanor theft for signing his wife's name to the certificate
of title for an item of personal property that the couple held
jointly, and then selling it.  There, the court considered the
"facts and circumstances of the incident" -- turmoil over the
dissolution of the accused's marriage, which the court concluded
had led to his "rash and impulsive act" -- and concluded that
those facts and circumstances weighed in favor of the accused
lawyer.  Id. at 166.
		Pertinent to this proceeding, the court in Carstens
concluded that the accused lawyer made a "serious mistake in
judgment" in signing his wife's name to the document in question
and that, had the accused reflected on the matter, he would have
realized that whatever consent he once may have had to sign his
wife's name in such circumstances must have been revoked when his
marriage began to fail.  Id.  The accused lawyer otherwise was a
person of good character and good reputation, and the court found
that the act for which the accused lawyer was found guilty was
unlikely to recur.  Id. at 167.  In light of all those
circumstances, the court concluded that a public reprimand would
protect the public adequately.  Id. 
		The facts in this case fall somewhere between the facts
in Houchin and the facts in Carstens.  The accused's act here was
not precipitated by any sort of emotional turmoil, but both the
Houchin and Carstens cases involved greater personal gain for the
accused lawyers than that obtained by the accused here.  Most
significantly, we are persuaded, as the court was in Carstens,
that the conduct giving rise to this proceeding is unlikely to
recur.  Given the foregoing considerations, together with the
facts that the accused has suffered other serious penalties and
that the accused's record heretofore was unblemished, we are
satisfied that the public will be protected adequately if the
accused receives a public reprimand.  
		The accused is publicly reprimanded.  
1. "Knowledge" is defined as "the conscious awareness of
the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without
the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  ABA Standards at 17.  

2. The Bar emphasizes the fact that the accused continued
to drive under the unlawfully obtained Oregon license for several
months.  We do not find that that adds to the significance of his
original, illegal act.  The accused always was eligible for a
Washington driver license.  Obtaining one was only a minor
inconvenience, which was not exacerbated with the passage of
time.