Case Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Stidham

Citation: 2000-Ohio-476

Docket Number: 19991156

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Stidham, 87 Ohio St.3d 455, 2000-Ohio-476.] 
 
 
 
 
 
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. STIDHAM. 
[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Stidham (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 455.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Two-year suspension with second year stayed 
— Failure to deposit client funds into an identifiable bank account — 
Failure to maintain records of funds and render appropriate accounts — 
Failure to promptly pay funds that client is entitled to receive — Neglect of 
an entrusted legal matter — Failure to seek lawful objectives of client — 
Failure to carry out contract of employment — Prejudicing or damaging 
client — Concealing or knowingly failing to disclose what attorney is 
required by law to reveal — Disregarding a standing rule of a tribunal — 
Conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation — 
Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law — Using firm name 
containing name of one not a member of the firm — Holding oneself out as 
having a partnership with one who is not a partner. 
(No. 99-1156 — Submitted September 15, 1999 — Decided January 5, 
2000.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 98-43. 
 
On March 30, 1999, relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, filed a second 
amended complaint charging respondent, Chuck Ray Stidham of Cincinnati, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0031507, with violating several Disciplinary Rules.  The 
parties entered into numerous stipulations of fact and also stipulated to multiple 
rules violations prior to a hearing before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”).  After the stipulations 
were entered into, relator withdrew several charged Disciplinary Rule violations. 
 
The charges against respondent relate to six separate matters.  Five of the 
 
 
2
matters, relating to grievances concerning respondent’s handling of legal affairs, 
are contained within Count One of relator’s complaint.  The sixth matter, 
concerning respondent’s alleged use of a firm name containing the name of an 
attorney not a member of the firm, and also alleging that respondent held himself 
out as having a partnership with an attorney who is not a partner, is detailed in 
Count Two of relator’s complaint. 
 
The hearing before the panel was held on May 24, 1999.  Following the 
hearing, the panel determined findings of fact generally based upon the stipulations 
entered into by the parties.  The panel’s conclusions of law, with several 
exceptions, are also generally based upon the stipulations of rules violations 
entered into by the parties.  The six separate matters are detailed below. 
I.  Count One 
A.  The Feltner Matter 
 
In this matter, the panel adopted the relevant stipulations as its findings of 
fact. 
 
In August 1994, Barbara Feltner hired respondent to represent her in an 
appeal in a personal injury case, and respondent, on September 1, 1994, filed a 
notice of appeal on Feltner’s behalf.  Respondent accepted a $1,000 retainer from 
Feltner for attorney fees and did not deposit the retainer in his trust account.  
Respondent failed to keep time records regarding the work he performed on the 
appeal. 
 
On February 27, 1997, respondent received a certified letter from Feltner 
requesting an accounting of all funds expended on her appeal, as well as an 
accounting of funds in another case that respondent handled on behalf of Feltner’s 
minor son, and the return of all files.  Respondent did not provide Feltner with the 
accountings and did not return the files. 
 
The panel adopted the relevant stipulated violations as its conclusions of 
 
 
3
law, concluding that respondent violated DR 9-102(A) (failure to deposit client 
funds into an identifiable bank account), 9-102(B)(3) (failure to maintain records of 
funds and render appropriate accounts), and 9-102(B)(4) (failure to promptly pay 
funds that a client is entitled to receive). 
B.  The Caldwell Matter 
 
In this matter, the panel also adopted the relevant stipulations as its findings 
of fact. 
 
Kimberly A. Caldwell retained respondent in June 1993 to represent her in a 
divorce action.  On July 2, 1994, Caldwell was shot in the chest by her husband.  
Caldwell then became interested in filing a reparations application with the Court of 
Claims of Ohio, Victims of Crime Division, seeking the recovery of expenses she 
incurred due to the shooting. 
 
After Caldwell and respondent discussed the application, Caldwell brought a 
blank application form to respondent’s office, and respondent’s secretary typed in 
information provided by Caldwell.  Respondent wrote “will provide other 
information when available” on page three of the form. 
 
Caldwell signed the application on July 2, 1995, and left it at respondent’s 
office.  Respondent signed the application as Caldwell’s attorney.  At the time, 
respondent believed that the application was required to be filed within one year of 
the date of the perpetrator’s conviction.  Caldwell’s application remained in 
respondent’s office from July 1995 until Caldwell picked it up in August 1996.  
Caldwell sent her application to the Court of Claims, where it was rejected for being 
untimely filed. 
 
Caldwell filed a civil action against respondent and the attorney who shared 
office space with him.  The matter was settled for $11,000, to be paid by respondent 
over a period of time.  At the time the stipulations were entered into, a total of 
$9,000 had been paid.  The case was dismissed without prejudice at the time of the 
 
 
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settlement, and the settlement provided that it would be dismissed with prejudice 
upon completion of the payments. 
 
The panel adopted the relevant stipulated violations as its conclusions of 
law, concluding that respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of a legal matter 
entrusted to him), 7-101(A)(1) (failure to seek the lawful objectives of the client), 7-
101(A)(2) (failure to carry out a contract of employment), and 7-101(A)(3) 
(prejudicing or damaging a client). 
C.  The Rose Weiss Estate 
 
In this matter, the panel also adopted the relevant stipulations as its findings 
of fact. 
 
Respondent was retained in January 1997 to represent the estate of Rose W. 
Weiss.  On February 12, 1997, respondent opened the estate.  On March 18, 1997, 
respondent requested and received from the executor a check for $18,750 for 
attorney fees.  The parties stipulated that under both a local rule of the Hamilton 
County Probate Court and the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio, 
attorney fees for the administration of estates are not to be paid until the final 
account is prepared for filing, unless otherwise approved by the court upon 
application and for good cause shown.  Respondent never applied to the probate 
court for permission to receive his attorney fees early.  Respondent was required to 
pay $1,313.91 plus a penalty to the estate for taking attorney fees prematurely. 
 
The panel adopted the relevant stipulated violations as its conclusions of 
law, concluding that respondent violated DR 7-102(A)(3) (concealing or knowingly 
failing to disclose what an attorney is required by law to reveal) and 7-106(A) 
(disregarding a standing rule of a tribunal). 
D.  The Ruth Bollmer Estate 
 
In this matter, the panel also adopted the relevant stipulations as its findings 
of fact.  The situation was very similar to that of the Rose Weiss estate, with 
 
 
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respondent collecting $18,570.60 in attorney fees from the estate in 1997 before 
the final account was prepared for filing, and without obtaining the permission of 
the probate court.  Respondent was required to pay $1,193.75 plus a penalty to the 
estate for taking attorney fees prematurely. 
 
The panel adopted the relevant stipulated violations as its conclusions of 
law, concluding that respondent violated the same disciplinary provisions as he had 
violated in the administration of the Rose Weiss estate. 
E.  The Adkins Matter 
 
In this matter, the panel adopted the relevant stipulations as its findings of 
fact and also entered several additional findings of fact. 
 
On September 26, 1998, Sandra D. Adkins and Sharon Bryant entered into a 
contract for Adkins to sell her bar to Bryant.  Respondent did not draft the contract.  
Bryant was the client of respondent.  Adkins was not respondent’s client. 
 
Pursuant to the purchase agreement, $37,000 of the purchase price of 
$74,000 was to be held in escrow until the liquor license was transferred and until 
certain obligations were satisfied.  Respondent agreed to act as escrow agent and 
took possession of the $37,000.  Respondent agreed to prepare all necessary 
paperwork to accomplish the transfer of the liquor license from Adkins to Bryant.  
Respondent told Adkins that the transfer would be completed in six to twelve 
weeks. 
 
Respondent did not open an escrow account on behalf of Adkins.  Instead, 
on September 30, 1998, respondent deposited the $37,000 into his IOLTA account 
at Valley Central Savings Bank in Reading, Ohio.  Before this deposit was made 
into the IOLTA account, there was no money in the account.  Respondent also 
maintained a business account for his law practice and a personal checking account 
held jointly with his wife at Valley Central Savings Bank. 
 
Between October 1, 1998 and February 18, 1999, approximately fifty-seven 
 
 
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checks were written on respondent’s IOLTA account.  Only a few of these checks 
involved the sale of the bar.  Respondent himself wrote more than twenty checks.  
Almost all of those checks were written to pay court costs, settlements, and other 
charges involving matters that were not related to the sale of the bar.  During this 
period, respondent made deposits into the IOLTA account in excess of $43,000 
from other sources. 
 
Respondent authorized more than fifteen transfers of funds from his IOLTA 
account into either his business account or his personal account at Valley Central 
Savings Bank between October 14, 1998 and February 10, 1999.  During this time, 
respondent’s office expenses were being paid from his business account and his 
personal living expenses were being paid from his personal checking account. 
 
By late January 1999, the balance in respondent’s IOLTA account was 
$234.84.  In January 1999, Adkins inquired of respondent about the location and 
status of the money.  Respondent wrote Adkins a letter dated January 22, 1999, 
regarding the funds, but did not give Adkins any information identifying the 
account holding the escrowed funds, and did not give the balance of the account.  
In this letter respondent stated, “I sincerely apologize that you believe that I have 
absconded with your funds.  This could not be further from the truth.”  Respondent 
also stated, “I assure you that there is nothing untoward, nor out of the ordinary 
happening with those funds.”  The panel found that respondent also threatened 
Adkins in this letter, apparently based on respondent’s statement in the letter 
suggesting that he would take legal action against Adkins if she continued to 
question his handling of the funds, and his accompanying statement that “if I hear 
that you have impugned my name and reputation in any way, I assure you this is a 
nightmare that you do not want to become involved in.” 
 
On February 17, 1999, the day respondent was notified of Adkins’s 
grievance against him, the balance in the IOLTA account was $3,755.24.  
 
 
7
Respondent on that day presented three cash advance checks on credit card 
accounts totaling $25,000 to Valley Central Savings Bank for deposit into the 
IOLTA account.  Valley Central Savings Bank refused to accept the checks after 
determining that they would not be honored.  The next day, respondent made two 
cash deposits, one in the amount of $9,900 and one in the amount of $9,950, into a 
bank account at Fifth Third Bank in the name of a business owned by respondent’s 
wife.  The money for these deposits came from a safe in respondent’s office. 
 
Later that day, respondent presented Valley Central Savings Bank with a 
check in the amount of $19,850 written on his wife’s business account at Fifth 
Third Bank.  This check did not clear until the next day.  On February 18, 1999, 
respondent also deposited cash in an amount in excess of $9,000 at Valley Central 
Savings Bank. 
 
On February 18, 1999, respondent obtained from the manager of Valley 
Central Savings Bank a letter confirming that the current balance in the IOLTA 
account was $32,755.24.  Respondent submitted this letter to relator along with his 
initial response to Adkins’s grievance. 
 
On February 23, 1999, relator told respondent that he should open a separate 
account for the escrowed funds.  On February 24, 1999, respondent withdrew 
$29,705.24 from the IOLTA account at Valley Central Savings Bank and opened a 
new IOLTA account, a new business account, and a separate account for the 
escrow funds at Firstar Bank in Reading, Ohio.  On March 4, 1999, respondent 
obtained a cashier’s check payable to both Adkins and Bryant in the sum of 
$32,190.21, and turned it over to them.  This $32,190.21 was what remained of the 
original escrow account amount of $37,000 after bills and expenses were paid 
pursuant to the escrow agreement. 
 
The panel concluded in this matter that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) 
(conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and 1-
 
 
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102(A)(6) (conduct adversely reflecting on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  The 
panel concluded that two other alleged violations, of DR 9-102(B)(3) and 9-
102(B)(4), were not proven. 
II.  Count Two 
 
In this count, the panel adopted the relevant stipulations as its findings of 
fact. 
 
When relator’s complaint was filed, respondent and attorney Christopher J. 
Bernard practiced law under the firm name of Sand, Stidham & Bernard, even 
though respondent and Bernard have never been partners and are not members of 
the same law firm.  The two merely shared office space.  The parties stipulated that 
as recently as January 29, 1999, respondent continued to use letterhead with “Sand, 
Stidham & Bernard” printed on the top. 
 
The panel concluded in this count that respondent violated DR 2-102(B) 
(using a firm name containing the name of one not a member of the firm) and 2-
102(C) (holding oneself out as having a partnership with one who is not a partner). 
 
After reviewing the mitigation evidence, the panel considered that 
respondent grew up in a home with an alcoholic father and a clinically depressed 
mother, and that respondent had served his country in the United States Air Force 
during the Vietnam war era until his honorable discharge.  The panel also 
considered the numerous physical ailments suffered by respondent, and 
respondent’s clinical depression, which respondent dated to the 1990 death of his 
law partner, mentor, and friend, Robert Sand. 
 
The panel recognized that respondent accepted fault for his problems and 
acknowledged responsibility for his acts, and that respondent attributed many of 
his ethical lapses to his depression and to the increased workload respondent 
assumed upon the death of Sand.  Furthermore, the panel considered respondent’s 
assertions that he had “turned the corner” regarding the depression and that he had 
 
 
9
modified office practices to prevent future ethical problems.  However, the panel 
expressed concerns about the truthfulness and candor of respondent in the Caldwell 
matter and in the Adkins matter.  The panel concluded that in the Adkins matter, 
respondent acted with the intent of misleading relator about his wrongdoing, and 
reasoned that respondent’s depression “does not prohibit him from distinguishing 
right from wrong.”  The panel recommended that respondent be indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law.  The board adopted the findings, conclusions, 
and recommendation of the panel. 
__________________ 
 
Sandra P. Kaltman and David T. Croall, for relator. 
 
H. Fred Hoefle, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law of the board, but not its recommendation.  Respondent principally takes issue 
with two aspects of the board’s report, and so objects to the board’s findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction.  Respondent’s major points 
of contention involve (1) some of the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in the Adkins matter, particularly the board’s conclusion that he violated DR 
1-102(A)(4) by engaging in willful deceit, and (2) his position that the board failed 
to take all mitigating factors into account, particularly the effects of his depression, 
in recommending an indefinite suspension as a sanction. 
 
Issues relating to respondent’s depression color our consideration of both of 
his major points of contention. 
 
In disciplinary cases, the relator must prove that the respondent committed 
the alleged violations by clear and convincing evidence.  See Gov.Bar R. V(6)(J); 
Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 708 N.E.2d 193, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  Respondent argues that relator did not fully meet its 
 
 
10
standard of proof. 
 
With regard to the board’s conclusion that respondent violated DR 1-
102(A)(4) in the Adkins matter, we accept the findings of fact and also this 
accompanying conclusion of law, but with a caveat.  When respondent’s 
depression is taken into account, respondent’s assertions that he ignored all the 
warning signs that would have alerted a reasonable attorney that something was 
seriously wrong in his handling of the escrow account do seem somewhat credible. 
 
Respondent testified that he simply tossed all of his bank statements aside 
without opening them since sometime in 1996, so that he was totally unaware of 
the huge problems that had arisen in his handling of the money at issue.  
Respondent further testified that he had an understanding with Valley Central 
Savings Bank that if one of his several different accounts there ran short of funds, 
bank employees would call him and get his authorization to shift the money around 
to the fund that needed it.  Respondent testified that he routinely gave the approval 
without realizing that it often was the IOLTA account that was being depleted to 
raise the balances in other accounts.  Respondent stated that he made deposits of 
more than $43,000 into the IOLTA account from sources other than Adkins, and 
further stated that his safe at all times contained enough cash to cover Adkins’s 
escrow amount.  Therefore, respondent claims, Adkins, who was never his client, 
was never in any danger of losing the money. 
 
However, after thoroughly reviewing the entire record, we can appreciate 
how the panel members could have become convinced that respondent’s testimony 
that he ignored all the warning signs in the Adkins matter was lacking in 
credibility.  The severity of the problems in the Adkins matter accelerated to a 
point that, even if one accepts at face value respondent’s testimony that he 
committed no intentional misconduct but was merely negligent, the degree of 
obliviousness to the problems became exacerbated so that it could be viewed as the 
 
 
11
equivalent of intentional deceit.  In addition, when Adkins inquired about the funds 
in the account, respondent told her, “I assure you that there is nothing untoward * * 
* happening with these funds,” apparently without even checking into the matter at 
that time to verify the truth of what he was stating.  Considering that the board’s 
finding of a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) in this situation was effectively a mixed 
determination of fact and law, and that the panel had an opportunity to evaluate the 
credibility and demeanor of the witness through his actual testimony, we will not 
second-guess the panel‘s and board’s determinations. 
 
Nevertheless, we are impressed that respondent’s battle with the debilitating 
effects of his depression is genuine, and recognize that the possibility remains that 
respondent actually was subjectively unaware of the numerous warning signs all 
around him that normally would have indicated problems with the IOLTA account.  
Respondent acknowledged at the hearing that when everything came to light, he 
knew that he had “totally screwed it up” in handling the funds.  Due to his 
depression, respondent was not functioning as a reasonable attorney in his 
approach to this entire matter, but at times was paralyzed into inaction by his 
depression.  When, however, he did become aware of the magnitude of the 
problems, he took immediate steps to correct them. 
 
In sum, although we do not second-guess the board’s finding of a violation 
of DR 1-102(A)(4) in the Adkins matter, the circumstances surrounding that 
violation affect our evaluation of what sanction is appropriate.1 
 
Respondent contends that the board, in recommending an indefinite 
suspension, did not give enough weight to all the mitigating factors present, 
including his depression.  We agree that there are significant mitigating factors.  
Respondent was cooperative with relator, allowing the parties to achieve extensive 
stipulations of fact in the matters at issue.  Respondent also stipulated to most of 
the violations charged by relator.  Respondent had an exemplary record in the 
 
 
12
military service of this country.  Many letters attesting to respondent’s character 
and standing in the legal community were supplied to the board by respondent 
from judges and lawyers who had come into contact with respondent in his practice 
of law.  Respondent has no prior disciplinary history.  Respondent shows remorse 
for what he has done, takes responsibility for his actions, and has changed his 
office and accounting practices to prevent future problems.  Respondent has 
suffered from many physical ailments during the time of the events at issue. 
 
In addition, as stated above, we are convinced that respondent’s depression 
had a severe and debilitating effect on his ability to function as an attorney.  The 
depression manifested itself most directly in the Adkins matter, but also appears to 
have played a role in some of the other matters, notably the Feltner matter and the 
Caldwell matter.  The stipulations of fact, particularly in the Adkins matter, 
support respondent’s position on the severity of the depression. 
 
Respondent’s treating psychiatrist, J. Stephen Meredith, M.D., provided 
testimony and a letter detailing respondent’s condition that was entered into 
evidence by respondent at the disciplinary hearing.  Dr. Meredith diagnosed 
respondent with dysthemia and major depression — recurrent.  Dr. Meredith 
explained that respondent in his depression has experienced feelings of guilt, loss 
of energy, distraction, preoccupation, anxiety, feelings of worthlessness, crying 
spells, suicidal thoughts, social withdrawal, and sleep impairment.  Dr. Meredith 
stated that depression can impair the ability to follow up or to do needed things, 
and that one who suffers from depression sometimes is unable to do what to 
observers appear to be very simple tasks.  Dr. Meredith also testified that 
respondent often did not feel able to take care of details, so that respondent would 
allow routine matters to go unattended, and that problems would worsen while 
respondent put off dealing with them. 
 
Dr. Meredith stated that he believed that respondent is fit to practice law, 
 
 
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and that there had been recent improvements in respondent’s condition.  He also 
stated that respondent needs continuing treatment, and that respondent’s prognosis 
for recovery is good. 
 
Respondent testified at the hearing about his struggle with depression, 
detailing his inability to get any quality sleep, and graphically describing his 
feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness, as well as his despair, exhaustion, and 
anxiety.  Respondent stated that he is now “dealing with it,” in part due to recent 
successes with medications.  He explained that he still has depression symptoms, 
including problems sleeping, but that he feels that his recent treatment causes him 
to be optimistic. 
 
At the same time that we acknowledge the severity of respondent’s 
depression, we cannot overlook the way that depression manifested itself in the 
multiple disciplinary violations respondent has committed.  Even though it does 
not appear that anyone was seriously hurt by respondent’s ethical violations, his 
fitness to practice law has been called into question. 
 
In balancing all the considerations, we conclude that a two-year suspension, 
with the second year of the suspension stayed, is the appropriate sanction.  In 
addition, respondent must submit to a monitoring program established by relator, 
including the terms we detail below, and must satisfy the conditions we impose as 
a prerequisite to resuming the practice of law. 
 
Even though Dr. Meredith stated that respondent was making progress with 
his treatment, Dr. Meredith also expressed an opinion that respondent’s recovery 
might have progressed more rapidly in the past if respondent had scheduled more 
treatment visits, and if respondent had devoted more time to his treatment.  As a 
part of the monitoring obligations we impose, we require relator, respondent, and 
respondent’s treating therapist (presumably Dr. Meredith) to agree upon a 
treatment schedule that requires respondent to undergo more consistent treatment 
 
 
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than he has in the past.  In addition, we impose the further requirement that 
respondent’s treating therapist submit reports to relator, on a schedule established 
by relator, concerning the course of treatment. 
 
As a prerequisite to respondent’s resumption of the practice of law at the end 
of the first year of the suspension, we require respondent to comply with the 
monitoring conditions, and we require respondent to submit evidence to the court 
establishing that he is at that time managing the depression and is capable of 
returning to the practice of law.  If these requirements are fulfilled, and respondent 
returns to the practice of law, we require the monitoring to continue during the 
second year of respondent’s suspension.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
We note at this point that, although the board also found that respondent was 
not totally truthful and candid in the Caldwell matter, the record appears to support 
respondent’s contentions that once he realized that he had earlier had a mistaken 
impression regarding the events in that episode, he recanted his previous resistance 
to Caldwell’s claims against him, admitted his mistake, and settled the claims for 
more than they may have been worth.  Since respondent stipulated to all four 
violations charged in that matter, and since the board adopted the stipulated facts 
as its findings of fact without adding any further findings, respondent does not 
directly challenge the findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the 
Caldwell matter, but takes issue with the board’s comment that he was less than 
truthful. 
 
In addition, we also recognize that the board’s finding that respondent 
attempted to mislead relator in the investigation of the Adkins matter is similarly 
 
 
15
based on the board’s interpretation of events that could have been viewed 
differently.  In the same way that we accept the board’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in the Adkins matter, we do not separately address or 
specifically agree with respondent’s contention that the board misinterpreted the 
record in reaching the conclusion that respondent intended to mislead relator. 
__________________ 
 
Cook, J., dissenting.  I agree with the majority’s decision to adopt the 
findings and conclusions of the board, but I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 
decision to impose a more lenient sanction than the board recommended.  I do not 
believe that the majority should have assigned weight to respondent’s depression 
as a mitigating circumstance in regard to the disciplinary violations that respondent 
committed in the Adkins matter.  Depression symptoms of inattention or 
unawareness should not bear any mitigating weight in the application of the 
appropriate sanction in light of the explicit deceit and threats contained in 
respondent’s letter to Adkins. 
 
The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provide that before 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances are considered, disbarment is appropriate 
for disciplinary violations of the character that respondent committed in the Adkins 
matter.  See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions (1991 and Amend.1992), Standard 5.1.  Under the ABA 
Standards, “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when * * * a lawyer engages in * 
* * intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.”  Standard 5.1. 
 
After failing to open an escrow account on behalf of Adkins as he had 
agreed to do, and after mishandling the funds that were to be escrowed, respondent 
answered Adkins’s inquiry (about the location and status of the funds) with a 
misleading and threatening letter.  For these acts, the panel and board determined 
 
 
16
that respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4).  A lawyer who engages in 
deceitful or dishonest conduct “has violated one of the most basic professional 
obligations to the public, the pledge to maintain personal honesty and integrity.”  
Standard 5.1, Commentary. 
 
My initial determination of disbarment as the appropriate sanction would 
give way to the board’s lesser recommended sanction — indefinite suspension — 
due to the presence of several mitigating factors in this case.  Respondent’s 
military service in Vietnam and his honorable discharge from the armed services 
attest to his positive character and reputation.  His cooperative attitude toward the 
disciplinary proceedings, lack of prior disciplinary record, and effort to modify his 
questionable office practices are additional mitigating factors recognized in both 
the ABA Standards and the Board of Commissioners’ Proposed Guidelines for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  Cf. ABA Standards, supra, Standard 9.32; Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Proposed Rules and Regulations 
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings, Section 10, Guidelines for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, 87 Ohio St.3d xliv-xlvi. 
 
I would, therefore, accept the board recommendation to indefinitely suspend 
respondent rather than disbar him.  The majority’s decision to credit additional 
mitigation centers on its willingness to accept respondent’s depression as an 
explanation for respondent’s behavior in the Adkins matter.  The majority 
concludes that due to respondent’s depression, “the possibility remains that 
respondent actually was subjectively unaware of the numerous warning signs all 
around him that normally would have indicated problems with the IOLTA 
account.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The tone and language of respondent’s letter, however, belie the majority’s 
assertion that the respondent could have been “subjectively unaware” of what was 
 
 
17
happening.  Respondent explicitly assured Adkins that there was nothing 
“untoward” or “out of the ordinary” happening with the funds, and explicitly 
threatened Adkins with a “nightmare” if respondent felt that Adkins was 
impugning his name or reputation. 
 
I do not suggest that clinical depression may never constitute a mitigating 
factor under appropriate circumstances.  And like the majority I believe that 
respondent’s battle with depression is genuine.  However, due to the tone and 
content of the Adkins letter, I do not believe that respondent was “paralyzed into 
inaction” or was “subjectively unaware” of what was happening when he 
committed the disciplinary violations in the Adkins matter. 
 
For these reasons, I would have accepted the board’s recommendation to 
indefinitely suspend respondent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.