Case Title: Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co.

Citation: 2008-Ohio-2010

Docket Number: 20070035 and 20070112

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 215, 2008-Ohio-2010.] 
 
 
 
TURNER, ADMR., APPELLEE, v. OHIO BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, D.B.A. SBC 
OHIO, ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 215, 2008-Ohio-2010.] 
Public utilities — Right-of-way — Public highways — Placement of utility poles 
— Liability — Public utility not liable for vehicular collision with utility 
pole located off improved portion of roadway but within right-of-way if 
utility has obtained permission to install pole and pole does not interfere 
with usual and ordinary course of travel. 
(Nos. 2007-0035 and 2007-0112 — Submitted November 27, 2007 — Decided  
May 7, 2008.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 87541, 2006-Ohio-6168. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When a vehicle collides with a utility pole located off the improved portion of the 
roadway but within the right-of-way, a public utility is not liable, as a 
matter of law, if the utility has obtained any necessary permission to 
install the pole and the pole does not interfere with the usual and ordinary 
course of travel. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This case presents us with the question of when a utility company 
may be liable when a driver hits one of its utility poles.  The facts of this case are 
undisputed.  In the early morning of September 10, 2003, Bryan Hittle and his 
passenger, Robert Turner, were on their way to work at Layton Excavating, Inc., 
driving south on State Route 188 in Pleasant Township, Ohio.  Hittle had trouble 
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seeing oncoming traffic and the center and edge lines of the road because of the 
darkness and fog.  Due to the poor visibility, he followed the taillights of a truck 
immediately in front of him. While negotiating a curve, Hittle drove his car off 
the road, striking a utility pole and killing Turner. The utility pole was located in a 
grassy area two feet five inches from the berm and three feet nine inches from the 
white edge line of the road.1   It was estimated that the speed of Hittle’s Ford 
Mustang at impact was between 55 and 59 m.p.h. in a posted 45 m.p.h. zone.  
Hittle was convicted of vehicular manslaughter. 
{¶ 2} Appellee Lorri Turner, individually and as administrator of the 
estate of Robert Turner, instituted this action on February 22, 2005, against 
appellants, Ohio Bell Telephone Company, d.b.a. SBC Ohio, and South Central 
Power Company. The complaint alleged (1) that appellants “were negligent in 
placing, maintaining and continuing to utilize the utility pole in such close 
proximity to the traveled portion of State Route 188,” (2) that “[t]he presence of 
the utility pole in such close proximity to the traveled portion of State Route 188 
constituted a violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 4931.01 for which 
[appellants] are negligent per se,” and (3) that “[t]he presence of the utility pole in 
such close proximity to the traveled portion of State Route 188 constituted an 
absolute and/or qualified nuisance.”  Appellants filed motions for summary 
judgment on all claims. 
{¶ 3} In opposing the summary judgment motions, appellee produced 
affidavits from James B. Crawford, an accident reconstructionist, and Ronald W. 
Eck, a professor of civil and environmental engineering.  Both opined that the 
utility pole at issue was located unreasonably close to the roadway, especially 
                                                 
1.  Although there is evidence that the Ohio Department of Transportation issued a permit for 
installing the pole in 1977, whether appellant Ohio Bell Telephone Company or appellant South 
Central Power Company had responsibility for placement of the pole is in dispute but not at issue 
in this appeal. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
because it would have been feasible to relocate the pole farther back from the 
improved portion of the roadway before the accident. 
{¶ 4} The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment, stating 
that “the record demonstrates that the pole was neither placed on the traveled and 
improved portion of the road nor in such close proximity as to constitute an 
obstruction dangerous to anyone properly using the highway.”  It concluded that 
Turner could not demonstrate a breach of the duty of care.  The court also ruled 
against appellee on the remaining nuisance claims. 
{¶ 5} On appeal, the Eighth District reversed on the negligence and 
qualified nuisance claims, finding that a jury should decide the reasonableness of 
the pole placement based upon the facts of the case.  The court of appeals stated 
that “liability may be imposed where the placement of a pole in close proximity to 
the edge of a roadway constitutes a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to 
users of the roadway.”  Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 8th Dist. No. 87541, 2006-
Ohio-6168, at ¶ 17.  The court, however, affirmed the entry of summary judgment 
for appellants on the claims of negligence per se and absolute nuisance. 
{¶ 6} Upon motion by appellants, the Eighth District acknowledged that 
its decision was in conflict with other appellate cases, and we recognized the 
conflict.  We also accepted appellants’ discretionary appeal and consolidated the 
cases for review. 
{¶ 7} Public utility companies have enjoyed at least a qualified right to 
place utility poles within the right-of-way of public roads since 1847.  See 45 
Ohio Laws 34 (permitting erection of telegraph poles and related fixtures along 
public roads and highways).  This right was initially limited by a single condition: 
that the utility poles not incommode the public in the use of the roads or 
highways.  Id.  Today, before erecting poles or other fixtures on a public right-of-
way, a utility company is generally required to obtain the approval of the public 
entity that owns the right-of-way.  See R.C. 4939.03 (municipalities), 5547.04 
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(counties), and 5515.01 (the state).  In the case of highways that are part of the 
state system, as in this case, approval may be granted only when the use “will not 
incommode the traveling public.”  R.C. 5515.01. 
{¶ 8} The question in this case is when does a utility pole incommode 
the public in the use of the roads or highways?  An early decision from this court 
involved a passenger who sued a utility company for injuries she sustained when 
the car she was riding in hit a rough spot in the berm, causing the vehicle to crash 
into a telephone pole located either on the berm or within 11 inches of it. 
Cambridge Home Tel. Co. v. Harrington (1933), 127 Ohio St. 1, 186 N.E. 611.  
This court declared in the syllabus as follows: 
{¶ 9} “1. The traveling public has a right to the use of a public highway, 
to the entire width of the right of way, as against all other persons using such 
highway for private purposes. 
{¶ 10} “2. Section 9170, General Code, provides as follows:  ‘A magnetic 
telegraph company may construct telegraph lines, from point to point, along and 
upon any public road by the erection of the necessary fixtures, including posts, 
piers and abutments necessary for the wires; but shall not incommode the public 
in the use thereof.’  The last clause of that section constitutes a danger signal to 
public utilities using the highways for their own private purposes, to the effect 
that if they place ‘posts, piers and abutments’ within the right of way of the 
highway, they must not prejudice the superior rights of the traveling public by the 
location and maintenance of such posts, piers or abutments.” 
{¶ 11} Two years later, in Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Lung (1935), 129 Ohio St. 
505, 2 O.O. 513, 196 N.E. 371, we held that “[w]here a guest is killed while 
riding in an automobile which collides with a telephone pole located in an 
improved portion of the highway 5.1 feet from the pavement, the questions 
whether the telephone company is guilty of negligence by placing the pole in the 
highway so as to incommode the traveling public, and whether such negligence is 
January Term, 2008 
5 
a proximate cause of such fatality are properly submitted to the jury for 
determination.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 12} Subsequently, a line of cases began to emerge involving collisions 
with utility poles located off the improved portion of the highway but within the 
right-of-way.  In Ohio Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Yant (1940), 64 Ohio App. 189, 
18 O.O. 57, 28 N.E.2d 646, a motorist negligently collided with a telegraph pole 
located 13 feet from the hard surface of the highway and 11 feet from the adjacent 
gravel strip.  The Yant court determined that the pole did not incommode the 
public’s use of the highway, noting that unlike in Harrington, the pole’s location 
was “clearly without the roadway and not in close proximity to the improved 
portion.”  Id. at 192, 18 O.O. 57, 28 N.E.2d 646.  The court commented that “[i]t 
is significant that the statute uses the word ‘use.’  To our notion, the traveling 
public has no superior right to misuse the highways.”  Id. It went on to say, “It 
seems crystal clear that the traveling public has no right to drive upon that portion 
of a public highway which is not dedicated, improved and made passable for 
vehicular use.  To accord him pre-eminence is to deny the statutory right of 
occupancy given to public utilities, and to withhold from public authority the right 
to regulate public thoroughfares.  We grant that emergencies may arise where 
such use is permissive.  But we do not recognize any such unqualified superior 
right to a negligent traveler who abuses his privilege.”  Id. at 193, 18 O.O. 57, 28 
N.E.2d 646. 
{¶ 13} The First District Court of Appeals affirmed a directed verdict for 
a utility company because the light pole located 11 inches from the curb was not a 
hazard to anyone operating a motor vehicle on the paved portion of the road 
normally used for vehicular traffic.  Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bayer (Nov. 3, 
1975), 1st Dist. Nos. C-74627 and C-74628, 1975 WL 182100.  In a more recent 
case, the First District determined that a utility company was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law because “[e]vidence that a utility pole is adjacent to the 
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travelled portion of a street does not, without more, create an inference that the 
street was unsafe or reflect any breach of duty.”  Ferguson v. Cincinnati Gas & 
Elec. Co. (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 460, 463, 590 N.E.2d 1332.  In this case, a bus 
rider who had her arm resting on the window frame with her elbow extending 
outside the window was injured when her elbow allegedly struck a utility pole.  
The court held that the utility company was not liable, because the pole, even 
though leaning into the street, did not extend past the curb into the traveled 
portion of the street, and the bus itself was able to safely pass the pole.  Id. at 463, 
590 N.E.2d 1332. 
{¶ 14} Similarly, the Ninth Appellate District determined that a utility 
company does not breach a duty to the traveling public by placing a pole 
alongside a roadway but not on or immediately adjacent to the portion that is 
improved for travel.  Jocek v. GTE N., Inc. (Sept. 27, 1995), 9th Dist. No. 17097, 
1995 WL 569101. 
{¶ 15} In the instant case, however, the Eighth District rejected the 
proposition that a utility company can never be liable when a driver strikes a 
utility pole outside the traveled and improved portion of the road.  Turner, 2006-
Ohio-6168, at ¶ 16.  It found that the relevant inquiry was not whether the utility 
pole was located on the traveled portion of the road but whether the pole was in 
such close proximity to the edge of a roadway to constitute a foreseeable and 
unreasonable risk of harm to travelers.  Id. at ¶ 17.  The appellate court developed 
an eight-factor test to determine the reasonableness of the pole location.  Those 
factors include (1) the narrowness and general contours of the road, (2) the 
presence of sharp curves in the road, (3) the illumination of the pole, (4) any 
warning signs of the placement of the pole, (5) the presence or absence of 
reflective markers, (6) the proximity of the pole to the highway, (7) whether the 
utility company had notice of previous accidents at the location of the pole, and 
(8) the availability of less dangerous locations.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
January Term, 2008 
7 
{¶ 16} The Eighth District premised its holding in part on Harrington’s 
statement in the syllabus that the superior right of motorists must not be 
prejudiced by the placement of utility poles within the right-of-way.  Harrington, 
127 Ohio St. 1, 186 N.E. 611, paragraph two of the syllabus.  This court has 
cautioned, however, that the syllabus of a decision must be read with reference to 
the facts and issues presented therein. Williamson Heater Co. v. Radich (1934), 
128 Ohio St. 124, 190 N.E. 403, paragraph one of the syllabus.  The utility pole in 
Harrington was either on or immediately adjacent to (being less than a foot from) 
the improved part of the road.  As the Fifth District noted: “The public as a 
general rule does not use or travel upon the entire limits of the right-of-way of a 
road but there is a certain portion of it prepared by public authorities to be used to 
travel over * * *.”  Curry v. Ohio Power Co. (Feb. 14, 1980), 5th Dist. No. CA-
2671, 1980 WL 354093, at *7. 
{¶ 17} Indeed, a motorist is not free to drive on the right-of-way as he or 
she pleases.  R.C. 4511.33 provides:  
{¶ 18} “(A) Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more 
clearly marked lanes for traffic, or wherever within municipal corporations traffic 
is lawfully moving in two or more substantially continuous lines in the same 
direction, the following rules apply: 
{¶ 19} “(1) A vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven, as nearly as is 
practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic and shall not be moved 
from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained that such movement 
can be made with safety.” 
{¶ 20} Nevertheless, utility companies do not enjoy unfettered discretion 
in the placement of their poles within the right-of-way, for they are required to 
obtain approval from the owner of the right-of-way.  R.C. 4939.03, 5515.01, and 
5547.04.  The appropriate public authority presumably will consider many of the 
factors in the Eight District’s reasonableness test when deciding whether to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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approve a pole location. In ruling against a vehicular passenger who sustained 
injuries when her right arm struck a roadside rural mailbox, we relied in large part 
on the fact that the placement of the mailbox substantially complied with the 
requirements of the Post Office Department. Black v. Berea (1941), 137 Ohio St. 
611, 19 O.O. 427, 32 N.E.2d 1, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Placement that 
complies with the requirements of the public authority that owns the right of way 
is indicative that the object is not an obstacle to the traveling public. 
{¶ 21} Therefore, we hold that when a vehicle collides with a utility pole 
located off the improved portion of the roadway but within the right-of-way, a 
public utility is not liable, as a matter of law, if the utility has obtained any 
necessary permission to install the pole and the pole does not interfere with the 
usual and ordinary course of travel. 
{¶ 22} This holding is consistent with the approach that we have taken 
regarding liability of political subdivisions and private landowners for injuries 
caused by objects within the right-of-way of the road.  In Strunk v. Dayton Power 
& Light Co. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 429, 6 OBR 473, 453 N.E.2d 604, we addressed 
whether a municipality’s duty to keep highways free from nuisance, as required 
by R.C. 723.01,2 extends to a driver who collided with a light pole off the traveled 
portion of the roadway.  We determined that the light pole was not a nuisance, in 
that it was not a condition that would “render the highway unsafe for its usual and 
ordinary mode of travel.” Id. at 431, 6 OBR 473, 453 N.E.2d 604.  We therefore 
declined to extend a municipality’s duty “past the portion of the highway 
considered the berm or shoulder.”  Id.  Nine years later, we modified Strunk to the 
extent that it barred any liability for conditions within the right-of-way and held 
                                                 
2.  The version of R.C. 723.01 in effect at the time stated: “Municipal corporations shall have 
special power to regulate the use of the streets.  The legislative authority of such municipal 
corporation shall have the care, supervision, and control of public highways, [and] streets * * * 
within the municipal corporation, and shall cause them to be kept open, in repair, and free from 
nuisance.”  1953 H.B. No. 1. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
that “[a] permanent obstruction to visibility, within the highway right-of-way, 
which renders the regularly travelled portions of the highway unsafe for the usual 
and ordinary course of travel, can be a nuisance for which a political subdivision 
may be liable * * *.”  Manufacturer’s Natl. Bank of Detroit v. Erie Cty. Rd. 
Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 318, 322, 587 N.E.2d 819, and at paragraph one of 
syllabus.  The focus in both Strunk and Manufacturer’s is whether an object that 
is not on the improved portion of the road but within the right-of-way is a 
condition that makes the roadway unsafe for the usual and ordinary course of 
travel.  Id. at 322, 587 N.E.2d 819. 
{¶ 23} In Ramby v. Ping (Apr. 13, 1994), 2d Dist. No. 93-CA-52, 1994 
WL 124829, the Second District Court of Appeals declined to extend 
Manufacturer’s to impose a duty on adjacent landowners and municipalities to 
keep a right-of-way free of objects that pose a danger to vehicles that may 
foreseeably leave the traveled portion of the roadway.  It noted, “No precedent 
exists for imposing a duty on public or private landowners to remove an off-road 
hazard that renders only off-road travel unsafe, unless the off-road travel is shown 
to be an aspect of the usual and ordinary course of travel on the roadway.  
Otherwise, every tree and solid fixed object on roadsides and road-shoulders 
would impose potential liability on public and private landowners for collisions 
occurring whenever a vehicle was driven off-road and into the object.”  Id. at *3.  
The Sixth and Tenth District Courts of Appeals have also noted that cases 
involving other types of off-the-road obstructions focus upon whether the 
obstruction affects safe travel on the regularly traveled highway.  Floering v. 
Roller, 6th Dist. No. WD-02-076, 2003-Ohio-5679, at ¶ 14; Steele v. Ohio Dept. 
of Transp., 162 Ohio App.3d 30, 2005-Ohio-3276, 832 N.E.2d 764, at ¶11.  We 
see no reason why utility poles located beyond the improved portion of the 
highway should be treated any differently. 
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{¶ 24} In this case, there is no evidence that the utility pole, which was 
located in a grassy area two feet five inches from the berm and three feet nine 
inches from the white edge line of the road, interfered with the ordinarily and 
usually traversed portion of State Route 188.  Had Hittle stayed within the marked 
lanes as required by R.C. 4511.33, or even on the improved portion of the 
roadway, his vehicle would not have come into contact with the utility pole. 
{¶ 25} Although appellee argues that this case is similar to Swaisgood v. 
Puder, 6th Dist. No. E-06-033, 2007-Ohio-307, we find that it is distinguishable. 
In Swaisgood, a tractor-trailer while making a right-hand turn struck a Verizon 
utility pole located at the corner of the intersection, three feet nine inches from the 
paved portion of the road.  There was evidence that the pole did not allow 
sufficient clearance for long vehicles, such as tractor-trailers, making a proper 
right-hand turn from the traveled portion of one highway to the traveled portion of 
the other.  Due to the presence of a truck stop at the southeast corner of the 
intersection, the need for sufficient clearance for such vehicles should have been 
anticipated.  Although it relied on the Eighth District’s eight-factor test instead of 
the test we endorse today, the Sixth District’s finding that there is a material issue 
of fact as to whether the Verizon pole interfered with the usual and ordinary 
course of travel is not inconsistent with the holding in this case.  No such 
interference with normal turns has been demonstrated here. 
{¶ 26} The evidence in this case indicates that the utility pole was erected 
pursuant to a permit issued by the Ohio Department of Transportation.  Because 
the utility pole is located in the right-of-way but off the improved portion of the 
road and because a motorist properly using the usual and ordinary course of travel 
would not come into contact with the utility pole, we conclude that the utility pole 
did not incommode or interfere with the public’s use of the highway, and 
therefore appellants are not liable as a matter of law. 
January Term, 2008 
11 
{¶ 27} The judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals is 
reversed on the claims of negligence and qualified nuisance and affirmed on the 
claims of absolute nuisance and negligence per se, and judgment is entered for 
appellants. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 28} I respectfully dissent.  We accepted jurisdiction over this case to 
resolve two questions certified to us by the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals.  
The first is “[w]hether a utility pole that is located off the improved portion of the 
roadway, but in close proximity to the improved portion thereof and within the 
right-of-way, may constitute an obstruction dangerous to anyone properly using 
the highway.”  Turner v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 113 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2007-Ohio-
1266, 863 N.E.2d 656.  The second is “whether a utility company may be held 
liable in negligence to motorists who strike a utility pole located in close 
proximity to the improved portion of a roadway and within the right-of-way when 
it presents a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to users of the roadway.”  
Id.  Based on this court’s precedent, I would answer these questions in the 
affirmative and accordingly affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in its 
entirety. 
{¶ 29} R.C. 4931.03(A)(1) permits a telephone company to construct 
telephone lines “upon and along any of the public roads and highways.”  The 
statute, however, provides that the lines “shall be constructed so as not to 
incommode the public in the use of the roads or highways.”  Id. 
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{¶ 30} Today the majority holds that a utility company’s placement of a 
telephone pole, regardless of its proximity to the improved portion of the 
roadway, cannot be a basis for liability if the utility obtained any necessary 
permission to place the pole in the particular location and the pole “does not 
interfere with the usual and ordinary course of travel.”  Majority opinion at 
syllabus.  Thus, if the utility complied with the requisite statutory requirements, 
its placement does not, as a matter of law, “incommode the public in the use of 
the roads or highways.”  Id.  In my view, this is an overbroad reading of our 
precedent and an infringement on the province of a jury. 
{¶ 31} This court considered a similar issue in Cambridge Home Tel. Co. 
v. Harrington (1933), 127 Ohio St. 1, 186 N.E. 611.  There, Harrington sustained 
injuries while riding in the passenger seat of a car when the car collided with a 
telephone pole.  A jury found Cambridge Home liable for its placement of the 
pole.  We noted that there was some dispute as to the exact location of the pole, 
i.e., whether the pole was located on the finished road or just to the side, but we 
held that, regardless of the pole’s location, “[t]he traveling public has a right to 
the use of a public highway, to the entire width of the right of way, as against all 
other persons using such highway for private purposes.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  In so holding, we reasoned that the statutory 
phrase “shall not incommode the public in the use thereof” “constitutes a danger 
signal to public utilities using the highways for their own private purposes * * * . 
[T]hey must not prejudice the superior rights of the traveling public by the 
location and maintenance of such posts, piers or abutments.”  (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Harrington therefore establishes that the 
public has a right to use “the entire width of the right of way” and that this right is 
“superior” to any rights belonging to a utility company.  Id. at paragraphs one and 
two of the syllabus.  None of the statutes regulating the procedure for placement 
of utility poles, whether R.C. 4939.03, 5547.04, or 5515.01, alters this rule. 
January Term, 2008 
13 
{¶ 32} Two years later in Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Lung (1935), 129 Ohio St. 
505, 2 O.O. 513, 196 N.E. 371, we affirmed a jury verdict in favor of a passenger 
who had been killed when his car hit a pole located in the berm.  We stated, 
“Where a guest is killed while riding in an automobile which collides with a 
telephone pole located in an improved portion of the roadway * * * , the 
question[] whether the telephone company is guilty of negligence by placing the 
pole in the highway so as to incommode the traveling public * * * [is] properly 
submitted to the jury for determination.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at paragraph one 
of the syllabus.  In both Harrington and Lung, therefore, we permitted the jury to 
determine whether the placement of a utility pole “incommod[ed] the public in the 
use of the roads or highways,” R.C. 4931.03(A)(2). 
{¶ 33} The majority relies on several cases in support of its holding, 
including Ohio Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Yant (1940), 64 Ohio App. 189, 18 O.O. 
57, 28 N.E.2d 646; however, Yant recognized a superior right belonging to drivers 
and stated that the right is qualified only by negligent travelers who “abus[e] [the] 
privilege.”  Id. at 193, 18 O.O. 57, 28 N.E.2d 646. 
{¶ 34} Yant further illustrates my disagreement with the majority:  its 
holding fails to mention either negligent travelers who abuse their driving 
privileges or the location of the pole in proximity to the road.  I agree that “the 
traveling public has no superior right to misuse the highways,” id. at 192, 18 O.O. 
57, 28 N.E.2d 646, but not every car that leaves the roadway “misuses” it.  
Circumstances arise where drivers leave the roadway without necessarily abusing 
their superior right to the use of the right-of-way.  The majority’s position does 
not allow for these possibilities. 
{¶ 35} Moreover, the majority makes no distinction between a pole 
located two feet five inches from the berm, as in this case, or one located 11 feet 
from the berm as in Yant.  According to the majority, no utility company – even 
one that obtains permission to place a pole just to the side, as in Harrington – can 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
be held liable if it has obtained any necessary permission to install the pole from 
the owner of the right-of-way and it does not interfere with the ordinary course of 
travel.  Majority opinion at syllabus.  This holding seems to contradict our 
decisions in Harrington and Lung by removing the question from jury 
consideration. 
{¶ 36} Obtaining permission for pole placement from the proper authority 
is not the test established by the General Assembly to determine whether liability 
arises from pole placement.  Rather, in accordance with R.C. 4931.03, the issue 
presented is whether the construction of the poles and the telephone lines 
incommode the public in the use of the highway.  The relevant factors for 
consideration, then, would include whether those using the roadway have been 
incommoded by the pole and whether they have misused the highway or are 
negligent travelers who have abused their driving privileges, as determined from 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident. 
{¶ 37} In this instance, based on the placement of the pole, the evidence 
of prior accidents involving this pole, and the other attendant circumstances, 
including the speed of the vehicle, road conditions, and visibility, a jury issue is 
presented – whether or not the placement of the pole has incommoded the public 
in the use of the roads or highways.  Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
______________________ 
 
John J. Spellacy; and Allan & Gallagher, L.L.P., and Sean P. Allan, for 
appellee. 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., William R. Case, Scott A. Campbell, and Jennifer 
E. Short, for appellant South Central Power Company. 
 
Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., Thomas I. Michals, and Anthony F. 
Stringer, for appellant Ohio Bell Telephone Company, d.b.a. SBC Ohio. 
January Term, 2008 
15 
 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., and Richik Sarkar, urging reversal for amici 
curiae Ohio Edison Company, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Toledo 
Edison Company, and FirstEnergy Corp. 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., and Kurt P. Helfrich, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives, Inc. 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Thomas E. Lodge, Andrew H. Cox, and William 
J. Hubbard, urging reversal for amicus curiae Verizon North, Inc. 
 
Douglas E. Hart, urging reversal for amicus curiae Cincinnati Bell 
Telephone Company, L.L.C. 
 
Joseph R. Stewart, urging reversal for amicus curiae United Telephone 
Company of Ohio, d.b.a. Embarq. 
 
Bailey Cavalieri, L.L.C., and William A. Adams, urging reversal for amici 
curiae Windstream Ohio, Inc., and Windstream Western Reserve, Inc. 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Thomas E. Lodge, and Carolyn Flahive, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Telecom Association. 
______________________