Case Title: Wentworth v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wentworth v. State1999 WY 32975 P.2d 22Case Number: 97-222Decided: 03/26/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
William WENTWORTH, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Hot Springs County, Gary P. Hartman, J.,

 

Sylvia L. Hackl, 
State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Walter Eggers, 
Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The major issue 
presented by William Wentworth (Wentworth) is the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain his conviction of larceny by a bailee, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-402 (Michie 1997).1 Wentworth contends that the 
evidence was not sufficient to establish that he was a bailee as defined in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-401 (Michie 1997),2 and further, specifically with 
respect to Count III of the Information, the evidence was not sufficient to 
establish the elements of the offense, which demand that the State establish 
specific intent, conversion, and the value of the property. A collateral issue 
is presented asserting error in the admission in evidence of a receipt from 
Wentworth's landlady and a deposit slip for his personal savings account, over 
Wentworth's objection. The record supports our conclusion that the evidence was 
indeed sufficient to sustain Wentworth's conviction, and there was no error 
committed in the admission of the evidence about which Wentworth complains. The 
Judgment and Sentence entered in the trial court is affirmed in all 
respects.

[¶2]      The statement of 
the issues found in Wentworth's Brief of Appellant is:

I. Was there 
sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of felony larceny by 
bailee?

II. Did the 
district court err when it admitted irrelevant evidence over the appellant's 
objections?

[¶3]      The following 
arguments are advanced as the issues in the Brief of Appellee, filed on behalf 
of the State of Wyoming:

ARGUMENT 
I

Sufficient 
evidence was presented at trial to sustain appellant's convictions for larceny 
by bailee.

ARGUMENT 
II

State's exhibits 
7 and 10.2 were relevant to the charges and were properly admitted into 
evidence.

[¶4]      Leo McGinty 
(McGinty) was in the Thermopolis area in September of 1995, looking for an 
opportunity to purchase a bar that would be operated as McGinty's business. 
McGinty met Wentworth in One Eye Jack's, a business that we assume was a saloon. 
Wentworth told McGinty that One Eye Jack's was for sale, but the price suggested 
was more than McGinty wanted to pay. Wentworth then told McGinty about an 
abandoned bar in Kirby, and McGinty and his wife leased that property for a year 
with an option to purchase. McGinty and Wentworth agreed that Wentworth would 
manage the establishment and would also serve as the bartender. Since Mr. and 
Mrs. McGinty were not residents of Wyoming, the liquor license was obtained in 
Wentworth's name.

[¶5]      Before they 
returned to California, the McGintys paid the rent on the bar for a year in 
advance, and they opened a local checking account on which Wentworth was 
authorized to write checks. They also opened a savings account, but Wentworth 
was given no authority to draw upon that account. The McGintys paid Wentworth 
$3,600.00, which was an advance on his first three months salary, and Wentworth 
spent most of November and the first part of December cleaning up the building 
and preparing the bar for operation. On December 12, 1995, McGinty and Friends 
opened for business in Kirby.

[¶6]      That was the 
pinnacle of success for McGinty and Friends, and the business began to 
deteriorate almost immediately. Wentworth withdrew $5,000.00 from the checking 
account, ostensibly to keep a judgment creditor of his from reaching the McGinty 
funds. He re-deposited $3,000.00 into the savings account, but he used $1,000.00 
to retain an attorney to advise him regarding his personal debts. The remaining 
$1,000.00 was utilized to operate the bar. In an effort to keep the business 
afloat, Wentworth began requesting frequent infusions of additional cash, which 
the McGintys supplied.

[¶7]      By March of 1996, 
the McGintys became concerned about Wentworth's continual requests for capital, 
and Mrs. McGinty traveled to Wyoming on March 18, 1996. When she arrived, she 
found the bar closed, and most of the inventory and equipment missing. An 
investigation by the Hot Springs County Sheriff's Department disclosed that 
Wentworth had used checks drawn upon the McGinty and Friends account to purchase 
goods and services for his own use and to obtain cash, and he even had attempted 
to deposit checks payable to the bar into his personal bank account. In 
addition, Wentworth had sold a freezer; a VCR; two televisions; and several 
dozen bottles of liquor to a local business for $2,450.00. Wentworth could not 
account for that money. A search of his residence, pursuant to a warrant, 
revealed more checks that were payable to the bar, as well as bottles of liquor 
that matched the bar inventory.

[¶8]      On August 6, 
1996, Wentworth was charged with four counts of felony larceny by bailee, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(b). One count was dismissed at the 
preliminary hearing. After a trial, a jury, on January 24, 1997, convicted 
Wentworth on two counts, and acquitted him on the remaining count. He was 
sentenced to a term of thirty to sixty months on each count, to be served 
concurrently in the Wyoming State Penitentiary; required to pay restitution in 
the amount of $8,186.86; and ordered to pay $200.00 to the Crime Victims 
Compensation Fund. Wentworth then appealed from the Judgment and Sentence 
entered in the trial court.

[¶9]      Our standard for 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence was established more than sixty years 
ago in Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670, 678 
(1935):

[T]he appellate 
court must assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true, 
leave out of consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party in 
conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the successful party every 
favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. 4 C.J. 
857

Recently, we 
rephrased that same standard, in the context of a criminal 
case:

[W]hether all 
the evidence which was presented is adequate enough to form the basis for a 
reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder 
of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State.

Bloomquist v. 
State, 914 P.2d 812, 823 (Wyo. 1996), followed in Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 
480 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶10]   Wentworth attacks the sufficiency 
of the evidence on two premises. First, he argues that the prosecution failed to 
prove that he was a bailee as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-401. The 
definition of a bailee is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-401(a)(i): " 'Bailee' 
means a person other than the owner of property who rightfully possesses 
property[.]" In accordance with Wentworth's request, the trial court gave that 
statutory definition in an instruction to the jury. The crux of Wentworth's 
argument is that he was not "a person other than the owner of property," which 
excluded him from the definition of a bailee. Wentworth contends that, instead, 
he was a co-owner of the bar, and it was impossible for him to commit larceny by 
a bailee.

[¶11]   In support of this position, 
Wentworth argues that both the lease for the bar and the liquor license 
indicated that he was a co-owner. Neither the lease nor the license was offered 
or received into evidence. Even if they were evidence, however, they would not 
have the dispositive effect claimed. Wentworth's claim of his status as a 
co-owner was not raised at trial, and seems to have originated as a theory on 
appeal.

[¶12]   At trial, Wentworth and his counsel 
referred to Wentworth as "employed by McGinty and friends" as a "[m]anager and 
bartender." Wentworth also testified that his name was placed on the lease and 
the license simply because he was a Wyoming resident. He explained that since 
the McGintys were not Wyoming residents, they could not qualify to hold a liquor 
license. McGinty testified that Wentworth was not a partner in the business. 
When this evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the State, there 
was certainly sufficient evidence to permit the jury to conclude that Wentworth 
stood in the status of a bailee with respect to the 
McGintys.

[¶13]   In his second argument attacking 
the sufficiency of the evidence, Wentworth focuses on Count III3 of the Information contending that 
the prosecution failed to establish the essential elements of specific intent, 
conversion, and the dollar amount. He argues that the evidence presented to the 
jury with respect to Count III was insufficient to establish those elements of 
the offense. The jury instruction given by the trial court on the elements of 
Count III read:

[¶14]   The elements of the crime of felony 
Larceny, as charged in Count III in this case, are:

1. Between the 
dates of March 1, 1996, through March 30, 1996

2. In Hot 
Springs County, Wyoming

3. The 
Defendant, WILLIAM WENTWORTH

4. While a 
bailee entrusted with the control, care or custody of any money or 
property

5. With intent 
to steal or deprive the owner of the property

6. Converted the 
money or property to his own use or the use of another person; 
and

7. The value of 
the money or property converted was $500.00 or more.

(Emphasis 
added.) This jury instruction was requested by Wentworth, and, of course, he did 
not object to it when it was given.

[¶15]   Specific intent is an element of 
the crime of larceny. Wetherelt v. State, 864 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1993). The 
State must establish that element, just as it must any other element, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Wyo. 1991). The 
element of specific intent that must be demonstrated in a larceny case is 
"intent to steal or to deprive the owner of the property * * *." Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-3-402(b). Wentworth asserts that the prosecution presented no evidence of 
intent, but he might more appropriately argue that the prosecution offered no 
direct evidence of intent. The fallacy in Wentworth's claim, however, is that 
the jury may infer specific intent from circumstantial evidence, such as the 
conduct of the defendant. As we said in Schiefer v. State, 774 P.2d 133, 135 
(Wyo. 1989):

The mind of an 
alleged offender may be read from his acts, his conduct, his words and the 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the circumstances of the case. To 
hold otherwise would create an impossible burden in a case requiring a finding 
of specific intent.

When the 
circumstantial evidence found in this record is considered, including the fact 
that Wentworth was unable to satisfactorily account for the funds, we conclude 
that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the requisite specific 
intent.

[¶16]   Wentworth does not deny that the 
property belonged to the McGintys or that he sold it without their permission. 
Instead, he argues that he sold the property to raise capital, which he returned 
to the business. This claim does not recognize a critical factor. Wentworth used 
the proceeds to cover checks he wrote on the business account which were uttered 
for goods, services, and cash that he personally received. The same evidence 
resolves any dispute over dollar amount. Wentworth contends that he put 
$2,000.00 from the sale of the assets back into the business, which would leave 
less than $500.00 unaccounted for. The $2,000.00 Wentworth put back, however, 
was not used in the business; he used it to endeavor to cover his own bad debts. 
Thus, McGinty and Friends simply served as a conduit for Wentworth's conversion 
of funds exceeding $500.00. When viewed in the light most favorable to the 
State, the evidence is more than sufficient to support a holding that the 
elements of conversion and the requisite dollar amount were established with 
respect to Count III.

[¶17]   Turning to the second claim of 
error, Wentworth contends that two prosecution exhibits were irrelevant, and 
should not have been admitted. The State's exhibits that are in issue are 
Exhibit 7, a receipt from Wentworth's landlady; and Exhibit 10.2, a deposit slip 
to Wentworth's personal savings account. Wentworth objected to both documents on 
the basis of relevance. The State argued that the receipt showed Wentworth was 
behind in his rent, which would establish his motive for larceny, and that the 
deposit slip showed a large deposit of cash into Wentworth's bank account at a 
time when funds were missing from McGinty and Friends. The trial court ruled 
both exhibits were admissible.

[¶18]   "Relevant evidence" is defined in 
W.R.E. 401: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." The 
application of W.R.E. 401 is left to the sound discretion of the district court, 
and those rulings with respect to the admission of evidence will not be 
disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Taylor v. State, 
642 P.2d 1294, 1295 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶19]   These two exhibits are 
circumstantial evidence, and, of course, they would not be sufficient, by 
themselves, to sustain the conviction. That does not mean they lack probative 
value. We said in Taylor, 642 P.2d at 1296:

The 
admissibility of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases is extremely liberal, 
allowing for the admission of any circumstances which may throw light upon the 
matter being investigated. 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 266, p. 315 (1967). * * 
*

* * * "Evidence 
of circumstances which tend to connect the accused with the commission of a 
crime is properly admitted even though inconclusive in character." 29 Am.Jur.2d, 
Evidence, § 266, p. 316 (1967).

In light of this 
standard for admissibility, we hold the trial court did not commit an abuse of 
discretion in admitting the State's exhibits 7 and 10.2.

[¶20]   The Judgment and Sentence entered 
in the trial court is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-402 provides:

(a) 
A person who steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another 
with intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of 
larceny.

(b) 
A bailee, a public servant as defined by W.S. 6-5-101(a)(vi) or any person 
entrusted with the control, care or custody of any money or other property who, 
with intent to steal or to deprive the owner of the property, converts the 
property to his own or another's use is guilty of 
larceny.

(c) 
Except as provided by subsection (e) of this section, larceny 
is:

(i) 
A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the 
property is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more; 
or

(ii) [Repealed]

(iii) A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) 
months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both, 
if the value of the property is less than five hundred dollars 
($500.00).

(d) 
Conduct denoted larceny in this section constitutes a single offense embracing 
the separate crimes formerly known as larceny, larceny by bailee or 
embezzlement.

(e) 
A person who steals any horse, mule, sheep, cattle, buffalo or swine is guilty 
of livestock rustling which is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,-000.00), 
or both.

2 The 
applicable definition of a bailee, found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-401(a)(i), is: 
" 'Bailee' means a person other than the owner of property who rightfully 
possesses property[.]"

3 Count III 
of the Information addressed charges of unauthorized sale of the business assets 
and conversion of the proceeds to Wentworth's use.