Case Title: MARY TURNER v. FLOYD C. RENO & SONS, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARY TURNER v. FLOYD C. RENO & SONS, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION1985 WY 40696 P.2d 76Case Number: 84-133Decided: 03/05/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARY TURNER, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

FLOYD C. RENO & SONS, 
INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Wade Brorby, of 
Morgan, Brorby, Price & Roberts, Gillette, signed the brief and appeared in 
oral argument for appellant.

Peggy A. Taylor, 
of Daly, Maycock, Anderson & Taylor, P.C., Gillette, signed the brief for 
appellee; appellee submitted the case on the brief.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant-defendant and 
appellee-plaintiff own adjoining lands. After appellant constructed a fence line 
along that which she contended was the actual boundary between the two lands, 
appellee brought an action founded on adverse possession, trespass and 
confirmation of easements. The determining issue was title to real property. At 
a pretrial meeting of the parties for the purpose of taking depositions, 
settlement discussion took place. Appellee contends that an oral settlement was 
reached. Appellant testified to the contrary. Appellant's then counsel prepared 
a written settlement agreement and sent it to appellee's counsel. Appellee's 
counsel added some descriptive material anticipated to be added; appellee signed 
the agreement, and it was returned for appellant's signature. Appellant refused 
to sign. Appellee moved the court to adopt the settlement agreement. Appellant 
filed a motion in limine to bar all testimony or other evidence concerning the 
settlement negotiations based on Rule 408, W.R.E.,1 and the statute of frauds. This 
appeal is from the court's order granting appellee's motion and denying 
appellant's motion.

[¶2.]     We will reverse and 
remand.

[¶3.]     Even if the parties 
orally agreed to terms resolving their contest, the contest and such agreement 
dealt with an interest in real property not to be performed within a year. The 
agreement provided that a portion of the fence line constructed by appellant be 
changed and that the fence line as changed "shall constitute the legal boundary 
between the parties' property." It provided that appellee have an easement 
across appellant's property for an access road to appellee's property. An 
easement is an interest in real property that is covered by the statute of 
frauds. Coumas v. Transcontinental 
Garage, 68 Wyo. 99, 230 P.2d 748, 41 
A.L.R.2d 539 (1951); Linck v. Brown, 
55 Wyo. 100, 
96 P.2d 909 (1939). That required by the contract involved title to real 
property and it would not be performed within one year and thus would be covered 
by the statute of frauds. Hageman & 
Pond, Inc. v. Clark, 69 Wyo. 154, 238 P.2d 919 (1951); Massion v. Mt.Sinai 
Congregation, 40 Wyo. 297, 276 P. 930 
(1929).

[¶4.]     Section 1-23-105(a), 
W.S. 1977, Cum. Supp. 1984, provides in pertinent part:

"(a) In the following 
cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith:

"(i) Every agreement that 
by its terms is not to be performed within one (1) year from the making 
thereof;

* * * * * 
*

"(v) Every agreement or 
contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for more than one 
(1) year;"

[¶5.]     Appellant did not 
subscribe to the agreement and she was one of the parties to be bound thereby. 
Wallis v. Bosler, 70 Wyo. 129, 246 P.2d 771 
(1952). Appellee concedes that the agreement is within the statute of frauds, 
but he argues that:

"The doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, may, in certain circumstances, be used to uphold oral 
agreements and thus prevent the statute [sic] of frauds from becoming itself an 
instrument of fraud."

Appellee 
contends that at the time of the oral conference, appellant had no intention of 
performing under the oral agreement reviewed at that time, and that such 
amounted to fraud which would estop appellant from asserting the statute of 
frauds.

[¶6.]     It is true that the 
statute itself cannot become an instrument of fraud. Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 P. 687 
(1930). The context in which this proposition is to be applied was discussed in 
Kincheloe v. Milatzo, Wyo., 678 P.2d 855, 862 (1984). We said there:

"Fraud, we have held, 
must be clearly proved by the one alleging it. [Citation.] Fraud will never be 
presumed and will only be sustained on evidence that is clear and convincing. 
[Citation.] Finally, we have held that fraud cannot be imputed from facts that 
are as consistent with an honest intention since fraud must be demonstrated in a 
clear and convincing manner. [Citations.]

"* * * [T]he party who 
relies upon estoppel must be able to show that he or she lacks knowledge of the 
facts, is without means of discovering them, relies upon the action and 
representations of the party sought to be charged and must be able to 
demonstrate a changed position accompanying such reliance. * 
*"

[¶7.]     Appellee contends that 
appellant is estopped from invoking the statute of frauds by virtue of her 
promise to execute a written instrument containing that orally agreed to by both 
parties, which promise she did not intend to keep. Basic to this contention is 
the existence of an oral agreement. The motion to have the court adopt the 
agreement and the court's order doing so, in effect, was a request to obtain 
specific performance of an oral contract and an order for such specific 
performance. Was there an oral agreement?

[¶8.]     The law is well stated 
in Hageman & Pond, Inc. v. Clark, 
supra, 238 P.2d at 923-924:

"* * * The courts 
generally hold that whether or not a contract is to be effective only when 
reduced to writing and signed by all the parties is mainly a question of 
intention. In 122 A.L.R. 1248-1250, it is said: `The fact that parties to 
negotiations contemplated the drawing and execution of a formal written contract 
is regarded in numerous cases as evidence that they intended the prior oral or 
informal agreement, * * * to be merely tentative and not final. Indeed, this 
circumstance has been considered as "strong evidence" that the parties did not 
intend that the negotiations should amount to an agreement prior to the 
execution of the formal writing. * * * It has been said that if the parties 
stipulate for a formal written agreement expressive of their intention, there is 
a strong presumption that no contract is made until the formal instrument is 
prepared and executed, also that where there is a statute requiring that a 
contract be reduced to writing there can be no presumption of an intention to 
consummate the contract in any other form.' See the cases cited, and among 
others the case of Atlantic Coast Realty 
Co. v. Robertson's Ex'r, 135 Va. 247, 116 S.E. 476 [1923] which quotes from 
Ridgway v. Wharton, 6 H.L.C. 268. See 
also the opinion of Lord Blackburn in the case of Rossiter et al. v. Miller, 3 App. Cas., 
(Law Rep. 1877-8) 1124, 1152; Pollock on Contracts (11th Ed.) ; 1 Williston on 
Contracts (Rev.Ed.) , note 1. "Counsel for defendant contends that the 
circumstances in this case clearly show that it was the intention of the parties 
that a written contract was to be drawn and signed by all the parties, and that 
the case of Summers v. Mutual Life 
Insurance Co., 12 Wyo. 369, 75 P. 937, 943, 66 L.R.A. 812 [1903] is decisive 
on the point here discussed. The decision was by the late Justice Potter. He 
cites with approval the case of Mississippi & Dominion Steamship Co. v. 
Swift, 86 Me. 248, 29 A. 1063 [1894], enumerating some of the circumstances 
in determining as to whether or not an oral contract should be considered as the 
final contract of the parties, namely, `such as whether the contract is one 
usually put in writing, whether there are few or many details, whether the 
amount involved is large or small, whether it requires a formal writing for a 
full expression of the covenants and promises, and whether the negotiations 
themselves indicate that a written draft is contemplated as the final conclusion 
of the negotiations.' See also Gilbert v. 
Texas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 218 S.W.2d 906, 941-942 [Tex.Civ.App. 1949]. Other 
circumstances may be added in the case at bar, namely that it involves a 
transfer of an interest in real property which ordinarily under the Statute of 
Frauds must be in writing and signed by the party sought to be charged; that the 
contract was in fact reduced to writing and submitted to the other party; the 
fact that the written instrument contains a blank space where the defendant was 
expected to sign his name, Rork v. Las 
Olas Co. [156 Fla. 510, 23 So. 2d 839 (1945)], infra, and perhaps the fact 
that he actually refused or neglected to sign it. * * *"

[¶9.]     The circumstances 
listed to determine whether or not the intent of the parties was to put the 
agreement in writing in order to be effective when applied to this case reflect 
the intention to have the written instrument be the contract between the 
parties. They agreed to have a written document; the statute of frauds requires 
a written document; it is the type of contract usually put in writing; it 
contained many details such as location of gates in the fence and procedure to 
be followed with reference to future boundary disputes; it involved an important 
matter; it was in fact reduced to writing and submitted for signatures; it 
contained a space for signatures; and appellant actually refused to sign 
it.

[¶10.]  For estoppel to apply, fraud must include 
more than the mere breach or violation of an oral agreement which is within the 
statute of frauds, otherwise the statute of frauds would be rendered vain and 
nugatory. Crosby v. Strahan's Estate, 
78 Wyo. 302, 
324 P.2d 492, 496 (1958).

[¶11.]  Appellee is taken to have knowledge of 
that which the foregoing reflects, i.e., that the parties intended the 
understandings to be contained in a written instrument to be subscribed by them 
before the same became effective. Appellee, thus, cannot establish the first 
requirement for estoppel.

[¶12.]  Inasmuch as the parties intended a 
written instrument be a condition precedent to making operational or effective 
any understandings reached by them at the settlement conference, no enforceable 
oral agreement was reached, and either party had a right to reconsider or 
repudiate the terms of such understandings prior to the execution of the written 
instrument by both parties. The statute of frauds had to be satisfied before 
there was an enforceable contract between the parties. There was no clear and 
convincing proof of fraud on the part of appellant which would estop her from 
invoking the statute of frauds.

[¶13.]  The trial court's order adopting the 
settlement agreement is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to 
grant appellant's motion in limine and to proceed with the matter in the regular 
manner.

1 Rule 408, W.R.E., 
provides in pertinent part:

"Evidence of (1) 
furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or 
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to 
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. 
Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise 
not admissible. * * *"