Case Title: Loper v. Shillinger

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-59

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Loper v. Shillinger1989 WY 92772 P.2d 552Case Number: 88-59Decided: 04/25/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
DONALD R. LOPER, 
PETITIONER,

 
 
v.

 
 
DUANE SHILLINGER, WARDEN 
OF THE WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY AND JOSEPH B. MEYER, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF WYOMING, RESPONDENTS.

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. Munker, State 
Public Defender, for 
petitioner.

 
 
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
and Paul S. Rehurek, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued) for respondents.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ. 

 
 

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This matter is before 
us on a writ of certiorari. The issue presented is whether a sentence, legally 
imposed on a defendant for crimes committed while on parole, is presumed to run 
concurrently with the remainder of the original sentence reinstated by parole 
revocation. We answer this question in the negative.

 
 

[¶2.]     Petitioner Donald Loper 
was on parole from the Wyoming State Penitentiary when he committed a number of 
burglaries. He was arrested and charged with four counts of burglary. Pursuant 
to a plea bargain agreement, he pled guilty to all four counts and received 
sentences of five to ten years on each count, with all four sentences to run 
concurrently. After his return to the penitentiary, the Board of Parole revoked 
his parole, and informed Loper that he would begin to serve his new sentences 
when his original sentence was completed.

 
 

[¶3.]     Petitioner does not 
contest the legality of his sentences for the burglary counts, nor does he 
contest the legality of his parole revocation. The essence of his argument is 
that in the absence of any express statement to the contrary in the court's last 
judgment and sentence, his last sentence should be presumed to run concurrently 
with the remainder of his original sentence. He asks that we adopt a judicial 
presumption to the effect that a sentence which is silent concerning the effect 
of parole revocation be presumed to run concurrent with a reinstated 
sentence.

 
 

[¶4.]     We decline to adopt the 
presumption advanced by petitioner. The sentencing judge has discretion to 
determine whether sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently. Eaton 
v. State, 660 P.2d 803 (Wyo. 1983). Here, the sentencing judge was 
aware that petitioner was on parole at the time he was sentenced. Petitioner was 
advised that his guilty plea could result in revocation of parole. The judge did 
not specify that the four concurrent sentences would run concurrently with the 
remainder of his original sentence in the event that parole was 
revoked.

 
 

[¶5.]     To presume concurrency 
in this situation ignores the logic of the United States Supreme Court as 
articulated in Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 58 S. Ct. 872, 82 L. Ed. 1399, 116 
A.L.R. 808 (1938):

 
 
"Parole is intended to be 
a means of restoring offenders who are good social risks to society; to afford 
the unfortunate another opportunity by clemency - under guidance and control of 
the [parole] Board. Unless a parole violator can be required to serve some time 
in prison in addition to that imposed for an offense committed while on parole, 
he not only escapes punishment for the unexpired portion of his original 
sentence, but the disciplinary power of the Board will be practically 
nullified." 304 U.S.  at 363, 58 S. Ct.  at 
874.

 
 
We see no reason to adopt 
a presumption which would have the effect of rewarding one who uses release on 
parole as an opportunity to commit further crimes.

 
 

[¶6.]     No 
error.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶7.]     I respectfully dissent. 
The issue presented does not involve the discretion of the trial court to make 
sentences either consecutive or concurrent; what is presented is the effect of 
nondesignation.

 
 

[¶8.]     The rules of criminal 
law have been clear for many more years than the time that present jurists of 
this court have been engaged in this activity. Generally, by majority rule, a 
presumption exists for sentences to be concurrent unless specifically defined to 
be consecutive. I reject a thesis that we, as the appellate court, should now 
make the sentencing decision by opining that rationally the trial court should 
have wanted these sentences to be consecutive even though the designation was 
not made or compatible intent is not expressed in written sentence or mittimus. 
Here, even though I might believe that appellant Donald R. Loper (Loper) is not 
ill-served by consecutive sentences when committing burglaries during parole 
release, it is concluded that the trial court should have made that 
determination and included the decision in written document as expressly stated 
to authenticate the option selected.1 Prosecutors in draftsmanship and 
proof-reading in preparation of judgments have a justified obligation to refute 
any later claimed omission of the judge in execution of the order which omitted 
such a critical factor as whether duplicate sentences are to be served 
consecutively or concurrently. The duty of specificity is particularly impressed 
since there is the constitutional fairness and due process concern within which 
a liberty interest is enfolded.2

 
 

[¶9.]     Even if today in 
post-entry cogitation we prefer that this particular sentence should have been 
stated to be consecutive, it was not and should not now be reconstructed to 
write our view of appropriateness by abandonment of the long-standing 
presumption of concurrence and retreat from the principle of lenity. I 
respectfully dissent from appellate court rewriting of what the prosecutor did 
not effectively compose or the trial court did not otherwise 
edit.

 
 

[¶10.]  As a question of intent to make the 
sentences consecutive, which decision failed by non-inclusion in the order and 
sentence, this record is obtuse as usual. In original plea, Loper was asked 
about the plea bargain and sentence by the trial court and then inquired, "That 
is a five to ten concurrent, I take 
it; is that correct? [Prosecuting Attorney] That's correct, Your Honor." 
[Emphasis added.]

 
 

[¶11.]  Likewise at sentencing, the trial court 
stated:

 
 
Credit will be given to 
this defendant off the maximum sentence for time served. The sentences, to make 
the order clear, Mr. Howard, and I trust you will take care of preparing this 
order, are four sentences of five to ten years each to run 
concurrently.

 
 

[¶12.]  Nothing was said about the sentences 
running consecutive to any term of probation revocation which would remain to be 
served. Consequently, the concurrent nature of the sentence and plea bargain was 
twice stated to Loper and it was never indicated by question, comment or other 
detail that the sentence would turn out to be consecutive to the then pending 
sentence for which he had been placed on parole. The rule of lenity surely has 
appropriate application here. Brock v. Sullivan, 105 N.M. 412, 733 P.2d 860 
(1987). Also, I would follow the legalism and moralism stated by the United 
States Supreme Court in United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363-64, 46 S. Ct. 156, 157, 70 L. Ed. 309 (1926), where that court 
stated:

 
 
     Sentences in criminal 
cases should reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court and exclude any 
serious misapprehensions by those who must execute them. * * 
*

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     This and similar 
unfortunate causes should admonish the trial courts to require the use of 
meticulously precise language in all judgment entries. Especial care is 
essential where sentences for crime are imposed.

 
 

[¶13.]  The sentence was entered on February 27, 
1987, and thereafter on April 2, 1987, Loper was called to appear before the 
parole board and his parole was revoked effective April 6, 1987, requiring his 
incarceration for time when he had been released from confinement. An 
administrative decision then followed to require him to first serve revoked 
parole time before commencing to serve the sentences entered by the order of 
February 27, 1987.

 
 

[¶14.]  As presented by these facts, I cannot 
follow the conclusions of the majority in this case nor find authority cited by 
the State to be persuasive. All of these cases cited can be easily distinguished 
because anchored in express state statutes or derived from a long-standing state 
history as within the minority rule that sentences are presumed to be 
consecutive unless expressly stated to be concurrent.

 
 
     In many jurisdictions 
there exists a statutory presumption that any multiple sentences imposed by the 
court will run concurrently, either when such sentences are imposed 
simultaneously or where a sentence or sentences are imposed upon an offender who 
is already serving a prior sentence. Moreover, where there is no such statutory 
presumption and the record of the sentencing court is silent or ambiguous 
regarding the matter, most jurisdictions employ a judicial presumption that the 
sentences are to be served concurrently. The practical effect of either this 
statutory or judicial presumption is similar to that of the so-called "rule of 
lenity" discussed earlier in the context of determining whether multiple 
violations will be regarded as separate offenses.

 
 
A. Campbell, Law of 
Sentencing § 76 at 249-50 (1978) (emphasis in original and footnotes 
omitted).

 
 

[¶15.]  This concept and sentencing criteria has 
recently been addressed in detail by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
United States v. Earley, 816 F.2d 1428, 1429 (10th Cir. 1987), as a rehearing en 
banc, where the issue was stated:

 
 
     The only issue in this 
appeal is whether a federal district judge who failed to state whether sentences 
he imposed were consecutive to or concurrent with a preexisting federal sentence 
may order, five months later and after the defendant was imprisoned, that the 
sentences were to be consecutive. The district judge described his later order 
as a "clarification . . . to eliminate any ambiguity as to the Court's 
intention."

 
 

[¶16.]  As here, the case involved crimes 
committed while the defendant was on parole and whether the new offense 
sentences would be consecutive to incarceration time for parole revocation. No 
designation was provided and the new offense sentences had been plea bargained. 
That court recognized:

 
 
The federal courts have 
adopted a presumption that federal sentences imposed at different times run 
concurrently, absent an express statement to the contrary. Our circuit 
recognized the presumption of concurrent sentences in Subas v. Hudspeth, 122 F.2d 85 (10th Cir. 1941), in which we stated: "Absent clear language to the 
contrary, it is presumed that sentences imposed on more than one offense at the 
same time, or at different times, will run concurrently."

 
 

Id. at 
1431.

 
 

[¶17.]  The federal court then noted that 
Congress in 1987 had changed the rule by statutory enactment that sentences ran 
consecutively if imposed at different times but kept the concurrence rule for 
multiple sentences imposed at the same time. That tribunal then applied the rule 
of concurrence which was in effect at time of sentencing, in the absence of 
"some objective evidence demonstrating that the defendant was aware of the 
court's intent at sentencing." Id. at 1432 n. 4. Consequently, the new 
offense sentence ran concurrently with the revoked parole confinement which 
appellate decision reversed the clarification ordered by the district court 
fives months after the initial sentence had been vacated.3 

 
 

[¶18.]  This similar question was considered also 
in the recent case of State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126, 523 A.2d 98 (1987) with 
resulting holding that the presumption of concurrence required that the 
probation term and subsequent offense term in absence of controlling statement 
of intent would run at the same time.

 
 
"Where a sentencing order 
is silent on when the probationary term commences, there is a strong presumption 
that the term starts on the date sentence is imposed and runs concurrently with 
any period of imprisonment imposed on any remaining count or 
counts.[3]

 
 
[3] If a sentencing court 
does not intend this result, then the probationary sentence should state 
explicitly and precisely when probation is to commence."

 
 
Id. 523 A.2d  at 101 
(quoting United 
States v. Adair, 681 F.2d 1150, 1151 (9th Cir. 
1982)).

 
 

[¶19.]  That case was different in that probation 
revocation was attempted after the subsequent offense jail-time sentence had 
been fully served. Right to amend the original sentencing order did not 
continue. United 
States v. Rodriguez, 682 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 
1982); Adair, 681 F.2d  at 1151. See also the principle that probation and 
incarceration can be served at the same time. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 53 S. Ct. 154, 77 L. Ed. 266 (1932).

 
 

[¶20.]  The rules relating to concurrent 
sentences should not be confused with the cases where nothing is done about the 
parole revocation until after the service of confinement for the later criminal 
sentences has been completed. Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 58 S. Ct. 872, 82 L. Ed. 1399 (1938). These line of cases do not raise the concurrent 
sentence inquiry since "service of the original sentence was interrupted by 
parole violation, the full term of that sentence has not been completed." 
Zerbst, 304 U.S.  at 362, 58 S. Ct.  at 873 
(emphasis in original). See also Hunley v. Hollowell, 199 N.W. 163 (Iowa 1924) and Com. v. Polsgrove, 231 Ky. 750, 22 S.W.2d 126 
(1929).

 
 

[¶21.]  Likewise not presented here as valid 
authority are cases from states with a dispositive statute or a long-standing 
consecutive sentence thesis for separate offenses as established state policy. 
State ex rel. Young v. Ohio Adult Parole 
Authority, 24 Ohio St.2d 67, 263 N.E.2d 399 (1970). In these 
states constituting the rather defined minority, an express statement is 
required to make sentences concurrent. That adaptation is contrary to the normal 
or majority rule that express statement is required to make sentences 
consecutive. See likewise, King v. Maxwell, 173 Ohio St. 536, 184 N.E.2d 380, cert. 
denied 371 U.S. 869, 83 S. Ct. 133, 9 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1962). Nebraska also follows the minority rule, Harpster v. 
Benson, 216 Neb. 776, 345 N.W.2d 335 (1984). Delaware has 
a controlling statute, Semick v. Department of Corrections, 477 A.2d 707 
(Del.Supr. 1984), as does West Virginia, Adams v. Circuit Court of Randolph 
County, 317 S.E.2d 808 (W. Va. 1984) and Tennessee, State ex rel. York v. 
Russell, 180 Tenn. 515, 176 S.W.2d 820 (1944). New York follows a modified concurrence 
concept only, Browne v. New 
YorkState 
Bd. of Parole, 10 N.Y.2d 116, 218 N.Y.S.2d 33, 176 N.E.2d 492 
(1961).

 
 

[¶22.]  Wyoming has no concurrence or consecutive 
presumption statute and no prior history of adopting the minority rule. The 
basic thesis which I follow is that the trial court should make clear what the 
sentence entered is and, in failure to do so, the historical rule of lenity 
should be applied. Obviously, the benefit of all parties is served by explicit 
decision and written authentication. In the absence of that defined intent as 
inscribed in judgment and commitment, I would follow

 
 
the general rule that two 
or more sentences to the same place of confinement run concurrently, in the 
absence of specific provisions in the judgment to the contrary, and where 
defendant is already serving a former sentence, and a second sentence does not 
state that the time is to commence at the expiration of the former, the 
sentences will run concurrently, in the absence of a statute providing for a 
different rule.

 
 
Annotation, Sentences by 
Different Court as Concurrent, 57 A.L.R.2d 1410, 1418 
(1958).

 
 

[¶23.]  I would reverse.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 In January 1980, Loper had received 
a sentence of four to eight years for auto burglary and then in March 1982 an 
additional sentence for escape of three to six years to begin January 10, 1985. 
Released on parole April 3, 1986, he had then served about fifteen months on the 
three to six year escape sentence. The present sentence for the four new 
February 1987 charges is concurrent sentences on each of five to ten years. 
Following entry of the current sentence, his parole was revoked on the earlier 
escape charge and sentence. At issue then is the process whereby his credit for 
incarceration will first be applied to the revoked parole to total the remaining 
approximate twenty-one months to fifty-seven months and then he will commence 
service of time for the more recent conviction. The trial court was aware of his 
parole violation status when the last sentence was given which included the near 
certainty that he would be revoked on earlier sentence by virtue of the criminal 
conduct committed during parole. The sentencing judge could have ran the current 
sentence either concurrent or consecutive to any remaining confinement from the 
revoked parole. Unfortunately, the sentence stated neither option. Under 
Wyoming 
indeterminate sentencing, many other choices also existed, including a minimum 
of six years and nine months on the current offense as concurrent to time to be 
served for revoked parole.

 
 

2 Defense counsel cannot escape 
responsibility completely by neglect to ask the clarifying question while the 
accused is still present in the courtroom. Accuracy has many 
authors.

 
 

3 In another case decided at the same 
time, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also determined that the oral 
pronouncement when unambiguous and clearly shown in the record would control 
over a conflicting judgment and commitment order as the subject of whether the 
sentences were concurrent or consecutive. United States v. 
Villano, 816 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1987).