Case Title: Hall v. Henn

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95431

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 95431-Agenda 28-September 2003.
							ELLEN HALL, Appellee, v. TIM HENN et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed December 18, 2003.
	
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this case, we are asked to construe the scope of the Recreational
Use of Land And Water Areas Act (745 ILCS 65/1 et seq. (West
2002)). Specifically, we are asked to decide whether the Act's limitation
of liability applies only to landowners who open their property for
recreational use by the general public, or whether it also applies to
landowners who open their property for recreational use by invited guests
only.

BACKGROUND
	During the winter of 2000-01, defendants, Tim and Sue Henn, built
and maintained a sled run in their backyard. The run included steps, a
platform, and a luge-like course, all of which were constructed out of
snow, sprayed with water, and hardened into ice. Although the run was
not open to the general public, defendants made it available to certain
friends and neighbors. Those using the run first had to ask for and receive
defendants' permission, and defendants allowed the run to be used only
when they were present to supervise.
	The Friel family lived across the street from defendants. On January
6, 2001, plaintiff, Ellen Hall, was visiting the Friels with her children.
During the visit, Jody Friel called defendants and asked if her family and
plaintiff's family could use the sled run. Defendants agreed. After taking
several successful turns on the run, plaintiff slipped and fell down the icy
stairs. The fall knocked plaintiff unconscious, and she suffered both a
fractured right arm and a torn anterior cruciate ligament in her left knee.
	Plaintiff filed a negligence action against defendants. Defendants
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Act immunizes them from
negligence liability arising out of the recreational use of their property. The
trial court agreed with defendants and granted the motion. The appellate
court reversed, explaining that defendants were not entitled to the Act's
protection because they had not opened their land for recreational use by
the public. No. 2-02-0435 (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). We granted defendants' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS
	Summary judgment is proper where, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and affidavits on file reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002); Ragan v. Columbia Mutual
Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (1998). The standard of review for
the entry of summary judgment is de novo. Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d  at 349.
	The Recreational Use of Land And Water Areas Act (the Act) exists
"to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to
the public for recreational or conservation purposes by limiting their
liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes." 745 ILCS
65/1 (West 2002). To that end, the Act provides that owners of land owe
"no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by any person
for recreational or conservation purposes, or to give any warning of a
natural or artificial dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such
premises to persons entering for such purposes." 745 ILCS 65/3 (West
2002). In addition, the Act provides that:
			"an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or
permits without charge any person to use such property for
recreational or conservation purposes does not thereby:
			(a) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any
purpose.
			(b) Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or
licensee to whom a duty of care is owed.
			(c) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to
person or property caused by an act or omission of such person
or any other person who enters upon the land.
			(d) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to
such person or property caused by any natural or artificial
condition, structure or personal property on the premises." 745
ILCS 65/4 (West 2002).
The Act does not immunize landowners who engage in wilful and wanton
conduct, nor does it apply to landowners who charge a fee for the use of
their property. 745 ILCS 65/6 (West 2002).
	As defined by the Act, "land" includes "roads, water, watercourses,
private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when
attached to the realty." 745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 2002). "Recreational or
conservation purpose" means "any activity undertaken for conservation,
resource management, exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on land
owned by another." 745 ILCS 65/2(c) (West 2002). Finally, the Act
defines "[p]erson" as "any person, regardless of age, maturity, or
experience, who enters upon or uses land for recreational purposes." 745
ILCS 65/2(e) (West 2002).
	Defendants argue that, under the Act, they cannot be held liable for
plaintiff's injuries because defendants had invited plaintiff onto their
property for recreational purposes, namely, using the sled run. Citing
section 1 of the Act, plaintiff counters that the Act's limitation of liability
applies only when land is made available "to the public." Here, defendants
concede that use of the sled run was limited to invited guests only and was
not available to the public.
	The resolution of this dispute turns on a question of statutory
interpretation. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National
Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). Accordingly,
courts should consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the
subject it addresses and the legislature's apparent objective in enacting it.
People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002). The best indication of
legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary
meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994).
Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute
without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Davis v. Toshiba
Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999). Nevertheless,
we will presume that the General Assembly did not intend an absurd,
inconvenient, or unjust result. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 508 (2003). The construction of a statute is a question of law
that is reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330
(2000).
	We agree with plaintiff that the Act applies only to those landowners
who open their property to the public. Section 1 of the Act specifically
states that the Act exists "to encourage owners of land to make land and
water areas available to the public for recreational or conservation
purposes." (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 65/1 (West 2002). Sections 3
and 4, in turn, immunize landowners from negligence liability with respect
to "any person" who enters their property for recreational purposes. 745
ILCS 65/3, 4 (West 2002). Reading these provisions together, as we
must, we conclude that the Act immunizes landowners from negligence
liability with respect to any person who enters their property for
recreational purposes, provided that such property is open to the
public. Conversely, the Act's protections are not available to landowners
who restrict the use of their property to invited guests only. This reading
both considers the Act in its entirety and vindicates the legislature's
obvious objective in enacting it. See Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at135.
	In reaching this result, we note that defendant's reading of the Act,
while textually plausible, renders an absurd and unjust result. The Act is
sweeping in its scope, immunizing a landowner from negligence liability
with respect to any person who enters the landowner's property for,
among other things, "exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure." 745
ILCS 65/2(c), 3, 4 (West 2002). "Exercise, education, relaxation, or
pleasure" encompasses just about every purpose, absent commerce, for
which a person is invited onto another's property. Consequently, were we
to ignore section 1's express caveat that the property in question be made
available for such purposes to the public, we would largely eliminate
premises liability in this state. This clearly was not the legislature's intent.
	As the Act applies only to those landowners who open their property
to the general public, the appellate court correctly reversed the trial
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Defendants
testified that the sled run was available only to certain friends and
neighbors, and that anyone using the run first had to ask for and receive
defendants' permission. When specifically asked whether the run was
open to the public, defendants testified that it was not. In light of these
admissions, defendants cannot claim the Act's protection, and they were
not entitled to summary judgment. Whether defendants are ultimately liable
for plaintiff's injury is not before us, and we express no opinion on that
question.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.