Case Title: Craver v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-156

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Craver v. State1997 WY 95942 P.2d 1110Case Number: 96-156Decided: 07/22/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

Bobby 
Charles CRAVER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming,

Appellee (Plaintiff).

                                   

 

Appeal from District Court of Platte County, Barton 
R. Voigt, J.

    

 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Michael Dinnerstein, 
Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; Raymond D. Macchia and Amy M. Taheri, 
Student Interns, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, for 
Appellant.

 William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Assistant Attorney General; 
Georgia L. Tibbetts, Sr. Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Michael A. Iozzo, Student Intern, 
Prosecution Assistance Program,

for 
Appellee.

 

      Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

      GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

 [¶1]          Appellant Bobby 
Charles Craver appeals his conviction and sentence of two felony counts of 
obtaining property by false pretenses. We affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]            Craver presents 
these issues for our review:

 

            1. Did the State 
fail to prove that Appellant ever intended to defraud 
anyone?

 

            2. Did the trial 
court deny the Appellant his due process right to a fair trial by failing to 
order a continuance to obtain a 
material witness necessary for presenting the Appellant's 
defense?

 

            3. Did the trial 
court err by allowing the judgment of a civil court in a criminal trial, 
causing prejudice to the Appellant 
and a diminished burden of proof on the State?

 

  [¶3]       The issues of the State 
are:

 

            I. Was there 
sufficient evidence for the district court to find Appellant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of obtaining 
property by false pretenses?

 

            II. Did the 
district court abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion for a 
mistrial because the whereabouts of 
a witness had become unknown?

 

            III. Did plain 
error occur when a witness who testified to uncharged dealings with Appellant 
stated that she had obtained a 
civil judgment against Appellant?

 

FACTS

 

  [¶4]        On September 16, 1994, 
Craver and a citizen of Wheatland, Wyoming, Jerry Orr, entered into a contract 
for Craver, doing business as Custom Craft Masters, Incorporated, (Custom) to 
install siding on Orr's home. The contract represented that Craver was 
incorporated and was licensed, bonded, and insured.  The total cost was to be $4,725.00, and Orr gave 
Craver a check for $2,362.50. Work was to be completed by October 1, 1994.  Craver did not return to complete the 
work and did not return Orr's numerous phone calls until after Orr contacted the 
police.  The police determined 
Craver was not licensed or bonded as he had claimed, and an agent for the Wyoming Division of 
Criminal Investigation determined that his company was not incorporated.  In January of 1995, Craver called Orr, 
stated he had heard there was a warrant out for his arrest, and offered to 
install the siding. Orr refused. Shortly after that, Craver traveled to 
Arizona.

    

  [¶5]        On July 28, 1994, Craver and 
another citizen of Wheatland, Chanae Dennewitz, had entered into a contract for 
Custom to install siding, windows, and doors on her doublewide home at a cost of 
$17,620.25. Dennewitz paid $100.00 cash down and signed a mortgage contract with 
a finance company, AVCO, to pay for the rest. Dennewitz signed over the check 
from AVCO to Craver. Craver installed the siding, but did not complete the 
siding work and has never installed the windows or doors. The siding that he 
installed was not finished or vented, and Dennewitz expects damage to her 
flooring. Dennewitz attempted to contact Craver the next three to four months by phone and certified mail 
but was unsuccessful. Craver did not return any of her money; however, Dennewitz 
continues to repay the loan. At the time of trial, Dennewitz had filed suit 
against Craver.

 

 [¶6]          On January 9 and July 
3, 1995, Craver was charged with obtaining property valued at more than $500.00 
by false pretenses, with the intent to defraud Orr and Dennewitz, and had a 
trial without a jury beginning December 4, 1995. The State had filed notice that 
it would use prior acts of uncharged misconduct and, before trial, the court ruled this evidence 
admissible.  Janette L. Chambers, a 
school teacher living in Glendo, Wyoming, testified that, on July 15, 1992, she 
had contracted with Craver to have a metal roof put on her house for $5,700.00 
and had given Craver a check for $2,500.00 as down payment, which cleared 
her account the following day. Craver, however, did no 
work on the roof. Over a year after the contract was made, Chambers told Craver 
that the work had to be started by August 26, 1993, and finished by September 1, 
but Craver did nothing. After Chambers contacted the Attorney General, Craver 
installed soffit and fascia worth about $216.00. Scott Walby testified that in 
the fall of 1993, Craver paid him $75.00 to install 48 feet of soffit 
and fascia on Ms. Chambers' house. He 
also measured the Chambers house to determine what materials would be needed. 
Mr. Walby split the $75.00 with his brother, who helped him, and although he and 
his brother were willing to continue working, Craver did not assign him further 
work on Chambers' house.

 

 [¶7]          Lori Knighten 
testified that on July 7, 1994, she and her husband contracted with Craver to 
have siding work done and a window replaced on their home in Douglas. The 
contract amount was $11,200.00, and the 
Knightens gave Craver a check for $5,600.00.  Craver said the work would be started on 
August 1 and completed in two to three weeks. However, Craver did not perform 
any work in August. The Knightens 
attempted repeatedly to contact Craver without success. Finally, at the end of 
October, Craver showed up with insulation and installed two windows. The next 
day, the house was "red-tagged" because Craver had been denied a building permit 
because he did not have any insurance. No further work was done by Craver; no 
siding was installed. The Knightens had to hire someone else and pay again to 
have the work completed. The Knightens brought suit against Craver in Converse 
County and obtained a judgment which remained unpaid; however, they did take 
possession of Craver's tools in November of 1994 but later returned 
them.

 

  [¶8]        Rebekha McCartney testified 
that she entered into a contract with Craver on August 14, 1994, to do 
insulation and siding work on her home in Wheatland. A check for $3,775.00 was 
given to Craver on that date upon his promise that the work was to be completed 
within a week. However, Craver did not show up to perform the work until September 23, and did not 
finish until October 5th. Although the work was completed, the siding fell off, 
and McCartney had to pay a construction company $2,650.00 to reapply the siding 
and replace some that had been damaged by falling.

 

 [¶9]          Craver had seven 
satisfied customers testify for his defense concerning work he had performed 
between August of 1989 and December of 1994. Mark Strickland, a defense witness 
under subpoena, failed to show due to 
illness, and the court granted the defense a continuance until February 7, 1996. 
In February, Craver informed the court that Strickland had moved and could not 
be located. Arguing that Strickland was a material witness to the defense, 
Craver moved for a mistrial which the court denied.   Craver testified that because he was in jail from 
January 1994, until March or April of 1994, he lost workmen and had difficulty 
replacing them.  He testified that 
in January of 1995, he had hired Strickland as an applicator for Orr and purchased the materials for 
the job but that Orr's refusal to allow him on his property prevented him from 
performing the contract. He also testified that he had purchased Dennewitz's 
windows but had not received them. The judge found Craver 
guilty.

 

DISCUSSION

 

 [¶10]       In his first claim, 
Craver contends that the State failed to prove he had a criminal intent to 
defraud because it was Orr who had repudiated the contract when Orr told Craver 
not to come on to his property after Craver had called and said that he would 
send an installer on the next Monday and because he fulfilled the large part of his contract with Dennewitz. In his 
view, the State did not prove that Craver had the requisite intent not to 
perform on his contracts at the time that he entered them, and any deficiencies 
in his work are civil matters as evidenced by the civil suits filed against him 
and are not criminal conduct.

 

  [¶11] 
    In Wyoming, 
convictions for the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses have been 
limited to misrepresentations of an existing or past fact. In Driver v. State, 
589 P.2d 391 (Wyo. 1979), this Court acknowledged that it had not yet decided 
whether a false promise of future action, which at the time of its making the promisor does not intend to perform, 
will constitute a false pretense under the Wyoming statute. Id. at 393. It 
remains an open question. At one time, most courts limited the crime of 
obtaining property by false pretenses to those cases of a misrepresentation of 
existing fact, but an increasing number of states are applying it to future 
acts. The reasoning for the change has been explained as 
follows:

 

            While a large 
number of jurisdictions, sometimes invoking the danger of persons who are guilty 
of no more than a breach of 
contract being held criminally liable, have continued to adhere to the 
traditional rule that the crime of 
obtaining money or property by false pretenses can only be predicated upon 
a            misrepresentation 
of a past or existing fact and not upon an intention not to comply with a 
promise or a statement as to a 
future act, an increasing number of jurisdictions, usually stressing the 
opportunities for fraud with 
impunity under the traditional rule, have held that a present intent not to 
comply with a             promise or a 
statement as to a future act can be the basis of the crime of obtaining money or 
property by false 
pretenses.

 

Michael A. DiSabatino, 
Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Crime of False Pretenses Cannot Be 
Predicated Upon Present Intention Not To Comply With Promise Or Statement As To 
Future Act, 19 A.L.R.4th 959, 964 (1983).

 

[¶12]         Because early 
common law did not recognize the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses 
when the pretenses amounted to "merely a promise of future conduct, and common 
prudence and caution would have 
prevented any injury arising from it," it became a generally accepted notion 
that the failure to pay back money or use it as specified at the time of 
borrowing raised the concern that disgruntled creditors will instigate criminal 
proceedings against those who blamelessly encounter ordinary commercial 
defaults. People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271, 280-82 (1954), cert. 
denied, 348 U.S. 900, 75 S. Ct. 222, 99 L. Ed. 707 (1954). It is thought by some that allowing the crime to include cases 
involving future conduct would create a considerable risk of prosecuting one who 
is guilty of nothing more than a failure or inability to pay his debts. 
Commonwealth v. True, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 709, 455 N.E.2d 453, 454 (1983); 
Ashley, 267 P.2d  at 
282.

 

 [¶13]       We, however, agree 
with the conventional wisdom of Ashley, and a growing number of courts that this 
result is avoided because something more than mere nonperformance is required to 
prove the defendant's intent not to perform his promise, and proof of 
nonperformance alone is not sufficient in criminal prosecutions based on false promises. True, 455 N.E.2d  at 454; State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425, 358 A.2d 46, 49-50 (1976); 
Ashley, 267 P.2d  at 282. Specific intent is an essential element of the crime of 
obtaining property by false pretenses in 
Wyoming. In order to succeed in a prosecution for a promise to perform future 
acts, the State is required to prove that a defendant had the intent not to 
perform a promise as well as the falsity of the promises/pretenses, that 
property was obtained by reason of the pretenses, and the knowledge of the accused of their 
falsity.  Lopez v. State, 788 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Wyo. 1990); Miller v. State, 732 P.2d 1054, 1063-64 (Wyo. 1987). In 
this case, the trial judge specified the evidence which showed whether or not 
Craver had a criminal intent in this case:

 

            The rapidity with 
which the sales went bad, . . ., almost immediately. It was obvious that the 
money went elsewhere rather than 
where it was supposed to go. And to me this showed a knowledge of 
the inability to perform when that 
money was received.

 

        
    Secondly, I 
noted the pattern of immediately unfulfilled promises. . . . The third thing I 
wrote down was that the defendant 
obviously took on new jobs without finishing old ones. He took 
on obligations to do things for 
people before he completed those old ones.

 

        
    My fourth 
comment was that I noted in the testimony, especially from the prior hearing 
that the defendant was giving the same 
excuses in 1994 that he was giving in 1992 and 1993 as to why he was not 
completing their work. . . . [T]he fifth thing was that he did not complete the 
projects, which I think is at least 
suggestive that he did not have an intent to complete the 
projects.

 

        
    In general what 
I'm saying is that in my view the 404(b) type evidence that was allowed in is 
evidence of specific intent in this 
case and knowledge on the part of the defendant.

 

        
    In addition, 
there are some specific things as far as the falsity that were pointed out. The 
evidence that he was not a corporation, 
although he claimed to be . . . [and] there were questions about bonding and 
licensing and insurance. Once again today the number of years of experience or 
the years this business had been in operation when in truth it was not. And the 
use of that information to get people to come up with additional 
money.

 

        
    One of the most 
telling things for me was the next item and that is this: What I saw as a 
repeated promise of immediate service in 
exchange for a down payment, then that immediate service never happened.  I find that [this] is a very sound basis 
in this case for a finding of false pretenses. It's evidence of the falsity and 
it's also evidence of the intent to defraud.

 

        
    Another matter 
that I noted was that all four of what I have called the bad cases that went 
bad, Orr, Dennewitz, Knighten, and 
McCartney, are basically the last four on the list in the chronology. 
The defendant was accepting money 
at this time after it was obvious that he could not perform on 
contracts that were already in 
existence. For instance, the Chambers' contract that had been in existence 
since July of 1992. Once again, 
obvious evidence to me of an intent to defraud.

 

        
    Another specific 
item, if the dates given to me in testimony were correct, the tools were not 
seized by the Knightens until 
November of 1994, long after most of the failures took place in this 
situation.

 

            The next note is that these 
contracts were entered into, . . . after the jail time was served in 
early 1994. It's impossible for the 
court to see how the jail time served in 1994 could have 
prevented performance under these 
contracts. In fact, if anything, they should have been even more 
evidence for the defendant himself 
that he was not going to be able to perform as he entered into those 
contracts.

 

        
    I think the 
flight to Arizona and the use of an alias is additional evidence of criminal 
intent. The testimony seems to 
indicate to me that at the time these contracts were entered into, or at least 
some of them, particularly the last few, 
the defendant did not have and knew he did not have available workmen for the 
jobs that he contracted to do.

 

        
    In short, the 
court finds that the state has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt on each 
of these two 
crimes.

 

[¶14]         The court's 
findings show that Craver's actions were more than mere nonperformance.  
Craver's defense and actions indicate 
that, after serving time in jail, Craver falsely represented that he had the 
capacity to properly and completely perform these promised services when, as he 
testified, he had lost his workers. This shows that, at the time that he took 
the money, he knew he could not provide labor to perform the work. Despite this, he moved from one 
victim to the next, taking money from Chambers in 1992, Knighten in early July 
of 1994, Dennewitz in late July, 1994, McCartney in August, 1994, and, finally, 
Orr in September of 1994. The court, as the trier of facts, weighed the 
evidence, including Craver's defense, and determined that Craver was not a bad businessman 
who was civilly liable but had acted with criminal intent by a pattern of 
conduct of promising services and taking money for those promised services 
without intending to perform by either purchasing the materials or securing the 
labor needed. True, 455 N.E.2d  at 454; 
Aurgemma, 358 A.2d at 49-50; Ashley, 267 P.2d  at 282.  The evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State supports the verdict.

 

    Denial of Motion for 
Mistrial

 

[¶15]         As our factual 
discussion states, when the trial resumed in February, defense witness 
Strickland was not present to testify, and the defense moved for a mistrial. 
Craver now contends he was denied a fair trial because the court failed to order 
a continuance to obtain a material witness necessary for presenting his defense. Because the record shows that he did not 
request a continuance, and based upon the content of his argument, we conclude 
that he is challenging the failure to grant a mistrial.

 

 [¶16]       The decision to grant 
a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the district court and will not 
be reversed unless an abuse of that discretion is shown to have prejudiced the 
defendant. DeLeon v. State, 894 P.2d 608, 612 (Wyo. 1995). The district court 
denied the motion for mistrial, pointing out that Craver had not shown that 
granting a mistrial "would increase the likelihood for the ability of the 
defendant to actually locate Mr. 
Strickland" when the previous continuance had given him sixty days to try. The 
court also noted that Craver had other witnesses testify for him. It is 
reasonable for the court to expect Craver to make a showing that all reasonable 
efforts had been used to locate the witness and for the court to consider what 
Strickland's testimony would have added 
to the case. The issue in this case was whether Craver made a promise of 
immediate performance in order to get a substantial amount of money from clients 
without intending to provide services. Strickland was to testify that he had 
been hired to side Orr's house. The Orr contract was signed in September of 1994, and Craver 
testified that he hired Strickland in January of 1995, several months after the 
contract was signed and after a warrant had issued for Craver. This testimony 
was not essential to Craver's case. We agree with the district court that Craver 
had not met his burden and that if 
mistrials were granted every time a witness could not be located most cases 
would not be resolved. We hold there was no abuse of 
discretion.

 

    Admissibility of 
Evidence

 

  [¶17] 
    A State witness 
testified that she had obtained a civil judgment against Craver. Craver argues 
that a judgment in a civil action is not ordinarily admissible as evidence in a 
criminal trial because it diminishes the State's burden of proof to a 
preponderance of the evidence standard. In his case, he claims the State used the civil judgment as evidence of 
fraud and relies on the decision in Hodges v. State, 92 Okla. Cr. 176, 222 P.2d 386 (App. 1950), that reversed a jury verdict when civil judgment evidence was 
introduced. He claims admission of this evidence prejudiced him, and without it 
the outcome of the trial may have been different.

 

 [¶18]       We apply a plain error 
standard because Craver did not object to this specific testimony. Craver must 
demonstrate plain error with a showing that the record clearly shows an error 
that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a 
substantial right. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 
938-39 (Wyo. 1997). Hodges 
determined that introducing evidence of the civil  judgment had no other 
purpose than that of leading the jury to believe, in the trial of the criminal 
case, that the same issues had already been determined by another jury in the 
civil action. Finding this prejudicial to the criminal defendant, the Oklahoma 
court reversed.

 

  [¶19] 
    In this case, 
Craver was tried before the court and, as he concedes, the court made no mention 
of the civil judgment when he explained the reasons for his verdict. As 
explained in our sufficiency of the evidence treatment, the district court based 
its guilty verdict on sufficient, competent evidence, and we reject his contention that the outcome of his trial 
would have been different if this evidence had not been 
admitted.

 

 [¶20]       The order of judgment 
of the district court is affirmed.