Case Title: SCHULTZ v ADAMS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12369 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1973 F R A N K J . S C H U L T Z , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - RICHARD C H A R L E S A D A M S and DAVID A M S K , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Sixth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Bennett and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana Lyman H. Bennett Jr. and Lyman H , Bennett, I11 argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Berger, Anderson, S i n c l a i r and Murphy, Billings Montana Arnold A. Berger argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: February 28, 1973 Decided : MAR f. 4.2973 Filed : MAR 1.4 lm M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an appeal from an order granting summary judgment i n an a c t i o n f o r personal i n j u r i e s as t h e r e s u l t of an automobile accident. The order w a s granted by t h e d i s t r i c t court upon motion by t h e respondent i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Park County. It w a s ordered by t h e court: " * * * That P l a i n t i f f ' s Motion f o r Summary Judgment, be, and t h e same is hereby granted, on t h e question of l i a b i l i t y i n t h i s case." This motion was made on J u l y 26, 1972, pursuant t o Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t portion of subsection ( c ) , which reads: " * * * A summary judgment, i n t e r l o c u t o r y i n character, may be rendered on t h e i s s u e of l i a - b i l i t y alone although t h e r e is a genuine i s s u e a s t o t h e amount of damages." The motion was opposed by t h e appellants and a hearing had and t h e d i s t r i c t court entered its order on August 18, 1972. This appeal followed. The c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e i n t h i s case is whether t h e order i s an appealable order. Respondent has f i l e d a motion request- ing t h a t t h e appeal be dismissed. The ground f o r t h i s motion is t h a t t h e order was a summary judgment which i s not an appeal- a b l e order. The appellants resist t h e motion, contending t h a t under Rule l ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., t h i s is a f i n a l judgment. They urge t h i s Court t o adopt a s a d e f i n i t i o n of "a f i n a l judgment" t h e meaning given t o t h a t t e r m by Chief J u s t i c e Brantly i n S t a t e ex rel. Heinze v. D i s t . C t . , 28 Mont. 227, 234, 72 P. 613, where- i n he held: "I* * * A judgment t h a t is conclusive of any question i n a c a s e i s f i n a l a s t o t h a t question.'" This Court must point out t h a t t h e decision i n t h a t ease w a s made under t h e code p r a c t i c e system and t o make such a holding i n t h i s is t h e e f f e c t which t h e r u l e s t a t e s . Therefore we must hold t h a t t h e order by t h e d i s t r i c t court was i n e f f e c t an " i n t e r - locutory summary adjudication", and a s a r e s u l t it i s not an appealable order. I n S t a t e ex rel. G.F. Nat. Bk. v. District Court, 154 Mont. 336, 463 P.2d 326, an o r i g i n a l proceeding seeking a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l , we held: "The f i r s t i s s u e involves procedural matters only. Relator here seeks supervisory c o n t r o l t o review two orders of t h e d i s t r i c t court: * * * and ( 2 ) t h e order granting p l a i n t i f f summary judgment on t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y . These orders are not d i r e c t l y appealable, n e i t h e r being denominated an appealable order i n Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P., presumably be- cause each is i n t e r l o c u t o r y i n character and review- a b l e on appeal from f i n a l judgment." While w e f u r t h e r held i n t h a t case t h a t an appeal from t h a t f i n a l judgment would impose undue hardship on t h e r e l a t o r and would be wholly inadequate a s a remedy, we do not f e e l t h a t such a s i t u a t i o n e x i s t s i n t h i s cause. Case l a w a r i s i n g under t h e Federal Rule and which i s ap- p l i c a b l e here due t o t h e i d e n t i c a l language supports t h i s decision. I n a case where t h e United S t a t e s District Court entered judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f and ordered t h e case t o proceed t o t r i a l on t h e i s s u e of damages, t h e c o u r t of appeals, i n granting a motion t o dismiss t h e appeal held: " * * * The motion must be granted s i n c e t h e order appealed from, although it determines t h e l i a b i l i t y of t h e defendant t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , w i l l not become a f i n a l adjudication of t h e controversy between them u n t i l t h e damages t o which t h e p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d have been assessed." Russell v. Barnes Foundation, 136 F.2d 654, 655 (3d. C i r . 1943). This same r e s u l t was reached i n Tye v. Hertz Drivurself S t a t i o n s , 173 F.2d 317 (3d C i r . 1948), on t h e question whether t h e appeal had been timely f i l e d , t h e court held t h a t t h e time would not run from t h e d a t e of e n t r y of t h e " p a r t i a l summary judgment", on t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y f o r overtime wages, because t h e order case would do serious harm to the intent of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. It is apparent after extensive research that the drafters of the Federal Rules and the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure had a different result in mind than that urged by the appellants. The wording of the federal rule and last sentence of subsection (c) of Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. are identical. Professor Moore in his treatise on Federal Practice writes: " * * * If, however, there is no genuine issue of material fact relative to defendant's liability and claimant is entitled to a favorable adjudica- tion thereon as a matter of law, but there is a genuine factual issue as to the amount of damages that are recoverable, the court may summarily ad- judicate the issue of liability, and remit the issue of damages for trial. In that event the summary adjudication in favor of the claimant is interlocutory, as the Rule states, and non-appeal- able, unless there is some special statutory pro- vision authorizing an appeal from such an inter- locutory order." 6 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d., 1 1 56.18, pages 2732-2733. Following the clear wording of the rule this Court cannot see how one can reach any other conclusion than that expressed above. The rule clearly states that a judgment made pursuant to the rule is "interlocutory in character". Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. 1968, defines interlocutory in the following manner: "Provisional; temporary; not final". Under our system of prac- tice such an order is not appealable unless there is some special provision making it so. Such a special provision if it existed would be found in Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P., subsections (b) and (c). In reading those sections this Court is of the opinion that nothing contained therein would permit the appeal of the instant order. While the order of the district court sets out no.specific authority for its decision, this Court will presume it was made in reliance upon Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. The effect of the order was not final. In a suit to recover for advance payments for goods bought the Court of Appeals held in Leonidakis v. International Telecoin Corp., 208 F.2d 934, 936 (2d Cir. 1953), in dismissing the appeal: " * * * Moreover, the specific authority for enter- ing a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability alone, leaving the issue of damages for trial, is F.R. 56(c), which designates this type of summary judgment as 'interlocutory in character.' The appeal is therefore premature." This is not to say that the appellants are foreclosed from ever presenting these issues on appeal. Professors Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 9 2715, p. 422, in their treatise discuss this issue: " * * * Similarly, an interlocutory summary judg- ment on the issue of liability, which is authorized by the last sentence in Rule 56(c), is not appeal- able until after the damage issue has been resolved." For the foregoing reason the motion of the respondent to dismiss the appeal is granted a missed, We concur: I I 1 A sociate Justices f P