Case Title: Jason Dirk Walton v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2003-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC78070
____________
JASON DIRK WALTON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA
Appellee.
____________
No. SC76695
____________
JASON DIRK WALTON,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc.,
Respondent.
REVISED ON REHEARING
[May 29, 2003]
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PER CURIAM.
The opinion issued in this case on February 27, 2003, is withdrawn, and the
following revised opinion is substituted in its place.  Jason Dirk Walton appeals a
final order of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit (Downey, J.) denying
his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850.  This appeal is accompanied by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  We
have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1) and (9) of the Florida Constitution.
Facts and Procedural History
On April 6, 1983, Jason Dirk Walton was indicted by a Pinellas County,
Florida grand jury and charged with three counts of murder in the first degree.  The
facts surrounding the instant case are described in detail in the opinions of this
Court addressing Walton's direct appeals.  See Walton v. State, 481 So. 2d 1197
(Fla. 1985) ("Walton I"); Walton v. State, 547 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1989) ("Walton
II").  Walton pled not guilty and the case proceeded to trial.  At the conclusion of
the trial, the jury recommended that Walton be sentenced to death for each of the
three murders, and the judge followed the jury's recommendation.  
An appeal
was taken to this Court, and Walton's convictions were affirmed.  However, this
Court vacated Walton's death sentences because the State improperly used hearsay
accounts during the penalty phase.  Therefore, a new penalty proceeding was
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ordered.  See Walton I, 481 So. 2d at 1200.  Following Walton's second penalty
proceeding, the jury again recommended three death sentences, each by a vote of
nine to three.  The trial court reimposed the death sentences, and on appeal, this
Court affirmed.  See generally Walton II, 547 So. 2d 623.
Walton's petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme
Court on January 8, 1990.  See Walton v. Florida, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).  Shortly
thereafter, a request by Walton for clemency was denied when Governor Bob
Martinez signed a death warrant ordering Walton's execution on September 24,
1990.  Subsequently, Walton's execution was stayed by order of this Court which
allowed him to file a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850 by December
15, 1990.  Walton timely filed such a motion attacking the validity of his
convictions and sentences.  Following a hearing on Walton's ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, Judge Brandt C. Downey III entered oral findings into the trial
record and later formally denied Walton's motion in a written order.  Walton
appealed, and this Court reversed on the grounds that Walton was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to address the alleged failure of the State to produce certain
public records.  See Walton v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1993).
This Court relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court to facilitate document
production under Walton's public records requests and to allow for an evidentiary
1.  The substantive claims asserted in Walton's original 3.850 appeal were:
(1) the jury received improper instructions regarding statutory aggravating
circumstances; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a codefendant's mental health
expert to testify at Walton's evidentiary hearing; (3) Walton was denied the effective
assistance of counsel; (4) the trial court failed to independently weigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (5) Walton's second sentencing
proceeding was contaminated with the same evidence that was determined to have
been inappropriately presented at his first sentencing proceeding; (6) Walton's
sentence is devoid of a finding of his individual culpability; (7) Walton's sentence is
disproportionate, disparate, and invalid because an equally culpable codefendant
received a life sentence; (8) the jury was improperly instructed; (9) Walton's
conviction should be reversed because new law now mandates a holding that his
statements should have been suppressed; (10) Walton's absence from a portion of
the proceedings prejudiced his resentencing; (11) Walton's death sentence rests
upon the unconstitutional aggravating circumstance of lack of remorse; (12) the trial
court unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof in its instructions at sentencing;
and (13) the application of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 violated
Walton's constitutional rights.
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hearing on any claims resulting therefrom.  See id. at 1062.  Pending resolution of
the public records claim, this Court reserved ruling on the remaining issues raised
on appeal by Walton.1 
An evidentiary hearing on Walton's ineffective assistance of counsel claims
was held on February 25 and 26, 1991.  Following the conclusion of that hearing,
the trial judge entered extensive findings into the record, and explicitly denied relief
in a subsequent written order.  Walton now appeals, reasserting his original claims
and raising additional issues based upon evidence adduced at the evidentiary
2.  Walton's new postconviction claims are: (1) Walton was denied effective
assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to adequately investigate and prepare
for trial; (2) the State prejudiced Walton by withholding exculpatory and
impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (3)
Walton was denied his fundamental rights to confrontation, due process, and a
reliable and individualized hearing when a codefendant's mental health expert
testified as a witness for the State at the postconviction hearing; and (4) newly
discovered evidence tending to show that Walton was not the leader of the group
committing the murders at issue mandates a new trial.
3.  The claims raised in Walton's habeas petition are: (1) decisions issued by
the U.S. Supreme Court following this Court's opinion on Walton's direct appeal
mandate reconsideration of his original evidentiary claims; (2) Walton's sentence of
death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because the record is devoid of a
finding of individual culpability; (3) the jury is required to make a unanimous
finding, or at least a majority finding, as to the theory of prosecution to arrive at a
capital conviction and death sentence; (4) the sentencing court failed to
independently weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (5) Walton's
sentencing phase was tainted by the admission of evidence of collateral crimes; (6)
the committed to avoid arrest aggravating circumstance was improperly applied in
Walton's case; (7) Walton's sentence of death is unconstitutional because the
penalty phase jury instructions shifted the burden of proof to Walton to prove that
the death penalty should not apply; (8) it is constitutionally impermissible to use an
underlying felony in a felony murder case as an aggravating circumstance; (9)
Walton's sentencing jury was improperly instructed on the especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance ("HAC"); and (10) the cold,
calculated, and premeditated aggravating circumstance ("CCP") is unconstitutional
because it fails to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty.
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hearing.2  Walton has also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging ten
bases for relief.3
Analysis
4.  As Walton's claim regarding public records was fully litigated below and
has not been reasserted in this action, it is moot.  Additionally, Walton's claim that
he was unconstitutionally absent from a conference at which the charging of the
jury was discussed is insufficiently pled and completely unsupported.  As the
burden of proof at the postconviction stage rests upon Walton, this claim must fail. 
See, e.g., Cave v. State, 529 So. 2d 293, 297 (Fla. 1988).  Walton's contention that
his prosecution on, and the jury's instruction regarding, alternative premeditated
murder and felony murder theories was unconstitutional is also without merit.  See
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-32, 636 (1991).  Finally, Walton's claims
relating to the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty scheme -- that Florida's
death penalty statute shifts the burden to the capital defendant during the penalty
phase, presumes that death is the appropriate punishment, and imposes an
unconstitutional "automatic aggravator" when a defendant is prosecuted under a
theory of felony murder -- have been rejected by this Court numerous times and are
entirely devoid of merit.  See, e.g., Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1067 (Fla.
2000); Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363, 367 (Fla. 1997).
5.  Walton asserts this claim in both his 3.850 postconviction appeal and his
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
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In the first of Walton's claims warranting discussion,4 he asserts that the trial
court presiding over his resentencing proceedings improperly and unconstitutionally
instructed the jury as to the aggravating factors they could consider in making their
recommendation.5  Walton’s resentencing jury was instructed on the aggravators of
prior commission of a violent felony; commission of the murder while engaged in a
robbery; commission for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest;
commission for financial gain; that the crime was especially wicked, evil, atrocious
or cruel (HAC); and commission in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner
(CCP).  The record reflects that the trial court instructed the jury in the following
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manner:
The aggravating circumstances you must consider are:
One, that the defendant has been previously convicted of
another capital offense or of a felony involving the use of violence to
some person.
Two, that the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced
was committed while he was engaged in or an accomplice in the crime
of burglary or robbery.
Three, the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or
affecting an escape from custody.
Four, the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was
committed for financial gain.
Five, the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was
especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or cruel.
Six, the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any
pretense or [sic] moral or legal justification.
Following this set of instructions, the trial court gave a brief description of
premeditation only, and did not inform the jury of any further narrowing
requirements necessary to prove the existence of these aggravating factors.
The instructions given the jury in the instant case violated the precepts of the
United States Supreme Court’s Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992),
decision.  In Espinosa, the Supreme Court held that “an aggravating circumstance
is invalid . . . if its description is so vague as to leave the sentencer without
sufficient guidance for determining the presence or absence of the factor.” 505 U.S.
-8-
at 1081.  The Court then proceeded to declare the precise “especially wicked, evil,
atrocious, or cruel” instruction given Walton’s jury in the instant case invalid under
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  See id. at 1082.
Further, our decisions certainly require much more extensive instruction than
was given in the instant case for application of the CCP aggravator.  See, e.g.,
Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994) (holding that proper application of
the CCP aggravator requires proof “that the killing was the product of cool and
calm reflection and not an act prompted by an emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of
rage (cold); and that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to
commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated); and that the defendant
exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated); and that the defendant had no
pretense of moral or legal justification.”) (citations omitted).  
Because the instructions were clearly insufficient under the United States
Supreme Court’s, as well as this Court’s, jurisprudence governing instructions
designed to narrow the class of defendants constitutionally eligible for the death
penalty, it is necessary for this Court to assess whether Walton should be granted
retroactive relief.  In the postconviction procedural setting before us today, it is
dispositive that the defense did not register an objection to the jury instructions at
trial.  Because no objection was interposed during Walton’s resentencing
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proceedings, Walton is foreclosed from claiming relief under Espinosa, as well as
our decisions requiring more comprehensive jury instructions.  This bar to
requesting retroactive relief based upon subsequent changes in the law was set forth
by this Court in a clear fashion in James v. State, 615 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1993).  In
James, we held: "Claims that the [jury] instruction . . . is unconstitutionally vague
are procedurally barred unless a specific objection on that ground is made at trial
and pursued on appeal."  Id. at 669.  In James, we concluded that the defendant's
challenge to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator was not barred, because he
objected at trial, while his challenge to the cold, calculated, and premeditated jury
instruction was barred because James failed to register an objection thereon during
the trial.  See id.; see also Clark v. Dugger, 559 So. 2d 192, 193-94 (Fla. 1990)
(holding that “an objection at trial is necessary to trigger . . . retroactivity”); Parker
v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989) (same).  Clearly, Walton’s claim to
relief under Espinosa is barred.  No objection to the jury instructions was registered
at trial, no claim regarding the instructions was raised on Walton’s direct appeal,
and none of the decisions upon which Walton now relies mandate retroactive
application of their holdings.  Indeed, “if punishment is ever to be imposed for
society’s most egregious crimes, the disposition of a particular case must at some
point be considered final notwithstanding a comparison with other individual
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cases.”  Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 927 (Fla. 1980).  Walton's claim asserting an
entitlement to a new trial based upon improper jury instructions is barred.
Walton’s claims that his trial counsel and appellate counsel should have
anticipated the above-cited jury instruction decisions are without merit.  Because
the Espinosa decision was delivered by the United States Supreme Court in 1992,
and refinement of Florida's jury instructions by this Court began thereafter, trial and
appellate counsel cannot be faulted for failing to assert claims that did not exist at
the time they represented Walton.  This Court has consistently held that trial and
appellate counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to anticipate changes in the
law.  See, e.g., Nelms v. State, 596 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 1992); Stevens v. State,
552 So. 2d 1082, 1085 (Fla. 1989). 
Walton next contends that his fundamental rights to confrontation, due
process, and an individualized and reliable hearing were violated when Dr. Sidney
Merin was allowed to testify at his postconviction evidentiary hearing.  Because
Merin was previously appointed as a confidential mental health expert to Richard
Cooper, Walton’s codefendant, Walton contends that the obvious conflict of
interest violated his constitutional rights.  Additionally, Walton contends that the
error in allowing Dr. Merin to testify was compounded by the trial court's limitation
of cross-examination regarding the doctor's conflict of interest.
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It is clear that because Dr. Merin assisted in preparing Richard Cooper’s
defense strategy, a conflict of interest existed.  Merin agreed to evaluate the new
evidence before the court in the postconviction proceeding to determine what
impact, if any, the mitigating evidence obtained during postconviction discovery
would have upon a mental health professional’s diagnosis of Walton.  He testified
regarding his impressions, despite having consulted with Cooper’s attorneys during
Cooper’s prior trial proceedings.  Because these two codefendants’ interests were
antagonistic to each other, it is unlikely that Merin could render a truly objective
opinion with regard to both.  Thus, it was error to allow Merin to testify as a
witness for the State. 
While the testimony of Dr. Merin may be questioned, it does not justify relief
because no prejudice has been demonstrated by Walton.  Despite Walton’s
assertion that the circuit court “relied upon Dr. Merin in denying relief,” the
transcript of the trial court’s evidentiary hearing clearly refutes this claim.  The only
mention of Dr. Merin by the trial court when announcing its findings consisted of
the following statement:
The testimony of the psychologist was there was no brain
damage.  Certainly it seems to me and I almost -- I didn’t, but I almost
was going to ask Dr. Merin if looking at Page 133, starting at about the
middle of the page to ask Dr. Merin if someone who allegedly abused
drugs as much as he did, according to what’s on page 133, if it
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wouldn’t cause permanent brain damage.
Because this is the only instance in which the trial court even mentioned Dr. Merin,
it certainly did not rely upon him in reaching its sentencing conclusions.  Therefore,
the error committed by the trial court in allowing Dr. Merin to testify did not
contribute to the trial court’s final determinations.  Under State v. Diguilio, 491 So.
2d 1129 (Fla. 1986), the commission of an error is nonetheless harmless where
“there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.”  Id.
at 1135; see also Moore v. State, 701 So. 2d 545, 549-50 (Fla. 1997).  While it was
error for the trial court to allow a mental health professional with an obvious
conflict of interest to testify during the postconviction proceedings below, any
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court did not
actually rely upon Merin’s testimony in reaching its decision.
Next, Walton asserts in both his postconviction motion and his habeas
corpus petition that his resentencing trial court improperly relied upon a sentencing
order submitted by the State in sentencing him to death.  He contends that the
sentencing order contained information not before the court on resentencing, and
because the trial court relied upon the State’s sentencing memorandum, the trial
judge improperly abdicated his sentencing responsibilities.  Additionally, Walton
asserts that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of
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counsel for failing to object to the trial court’s adoption of the State’s sentencing
memorandum as its sentencing order.
This claim is procedurally barred.  Clearly, any claims regarding the conduct
of the resentencing trial judge in the creation of his sentencing order could and
should have been raised on direct appeal.  See Young v. State, 739 So. 2d 553, 555
n.5 (Fla. 1999).  Indeed, in Swafford v. Dugger, 569 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1990), this
Court specifically foreclosed argument regarding the trial court’s failure “to
independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors” because “they should
have been raised, if at all, on direct appeal.”  Id. at 1267.
Even if this claim was not procedurally barred, Walton’s contentions here are
not supported by the record.  The only evidentiary support for Walton’s assertions
here is the use of identical language in somewhat substantial portions of the final
sentencing order and the sentencing memoranda submitted to the trial court by the
State.  This Court has specifically declared that trial courts must not delegate “the
responsibility to prepare a sentencing order” to the State Attorney.  Patterson v.
State, 513 So. 2d 1257, 1261 (Fla. 1987).  In the instant case, however, it is clear
that the State simply submitted a sentencing memorandum to the trial court for its
consideration, which the trial court subsequently considered before writing its
sentencing order.  This act alone does not constitute error.  See Patton v. State,
6.  Likewise, Walton’s assertions that the sentencing order recites evidence
outside the resentencing record is without merit, because evidence of Walton’s
active participation in the robbery and behavior while at the murder site was
certainly before the court.  See Walton I, 547 So. 2d at 623-24.
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784 So. 2d 380, 388 (Fla. 2000) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 572 (1985), for the proposition that “even when the trial court adopts
proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be
reversed only if clearly erroneous”).  Walton does not assert that any impermissible
ex parte discussions regarding the resentencing or any other wrongful acts occurred
in the creation of the sentencing order.6  Thus, because there is no evidence
contained in the record supporting Walton’s contention that the State created or
originated the sentencing order, we find no reversible error.
As nothing in the record supports Walton’s assertions that the trial court
delegated its responsibility regarding preparation of the sentencing order to the
State, no reversible error occurred.  Therefore, Walton’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is also without merit.  See Engle v. Dugger, 576 So. 2d 696
(Fla. 1991); Card v. State, 497 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1986) (holding that counsel is not
ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims).
In a somewhat related claim, Walton next contends that his resentencing trial
was contaminated by the admission of statements from non-testifying
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codefendants—evidence which this Court specifically deemed inadmissible in
Walton I.  Specifically, Walton contends that there was no evidence before the
resentencing court supporting its findings regarding Walton’s purported leadership
of the group, and no evidence is contained in the record regarding Walton’s
supposed grabbing of a victim by the hair, items noted by the trial court in its
sentencing order.  Finally, Walton contends that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the trial court’s findings, and
his appellate counsel was ineffective because he did not raise this claim on direct
appeal.
In Walton I, this Court held that the confessions of codefendants Cooper
and McCoy were “the primary evidence relied on by the state in the penalty phase
before the jury and that the trial judge considered the confessions in sentencing
appellant to death.”  Walton I, 481 So. 2d at 1200.  For this reason, this Court
vacated Walton’s sentences of death and mandated a new sentencing hearing. 
Walton now contends that the resentencing trial court simply utilized the same
information in sentencing Walton to death a second time.
An examination of the record reveals that neither of the confessions used in
Walton’s first trial were introduced as evidence in his resentencing hearing. 
Additionally, as identified by the State, a large amount of evidence independent of
7.  This phrase in the trial court’s sentencing order is also cited by Walton in
support of his claim that the trial court relied upon nonrecord material in sentencing
him to death.
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McCoy and Cooper’s confessions was before the trial court which supported the
State’s theory regarding Walton’s role in the murders.  Specifically, the trial court
had before it Walton’s own confession to his role in, and the planning of, the
robbery; testimony by John Gray regarding statements Walton made to him
describing how he had attempted to fire his pistol, but it had misfired; and
the testimony of others who detailed the relative roles each perpetrator played in the
crime.  See Walton II, 547 So. 2d 623-24.  Clearly, extensive evidence was before
the trial court which supports its conclusions regarding Walton’s leadership of the
criminal venture which resulted in the deaths of the three victims.  The evidence
before the trial court during the resentencing was not the same as that deemed
erroneously admitted and relied upon by this Court in Walton I.
Walton seizes upon the trial court’s determination in its order that “Walton
grabbed one of the victims by the hair,” in an attempt to show that the entire
resentencing was tainted with evidence from the previous penalty phase reversed in
Walton I.7  The State cannot identify any source for this information, and there is
seemingly no record material from the resentencing proceedings which supports
this statement by the trial court.  While this presents questions, the inclusion of one
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errant phrase by the trial court in its sentencing order is not significant evidence that
the trial court relied upon the original confessions of McCoy and Cooper in
sentencing Walton to death.  Clearly, taken in conjunction with the presence of the
overwhelming evidence before the court supporting its conclusions as to Walton’s
leadership role in the burglary planning, this mistaken statement by the trial court
within its final order was harmless.  Certainly, the trial court’s final sentencing
decision did not hinge upon whether Walton actually placed his hands upon a
victim’s hair or not.  Thus, this error did not contribute to Walton’s sentence, and
we conclude that it is harmless under State v. Diguilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).
Because the trial court had before it substantial evidence in support of the
conclusions contained in its sentencing order, trial counsel was not ineffective for
failing to register an objection.  See Engle, 576 So. 2d at 701-02; Card, 497 So. 2d
at 1177 (counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims).  Likewise,
appellate counsel did not render constitutionally defective assistance in failing to
raise this meritless claim.  See id.
Walton next contends that imposition of the death penalty upon him in the
instant case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because he was prosecuted
under a theory of felony murder and it was never proven that he was actually
individually responsible for the deaths of the victims.  Additionally, he contends
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that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to register
an objection on these grounds, and that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel by not arguing this claim on direct appeal.
This claim is meritless.  In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the United
States Supreme Court settled the issue of what manner of participation by a
defendant convicted on a theory of felony murder must be shown to make the
defendant constitutionally eligible for the death penalty.  The Court’s conclusion
was concisely stated: “[W]e simply hold that major participation in the felony
committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to
satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.”  481 U.S. at 158.  
In the instant case, there can be no doubt that Walton’s participation in the
felony robbery was “major.”  Walton planned, led, and perpetrated the robbery
from start to finish.  See Walton II, 547 So. 2d at 623-24.  Additionally, Walton
was certainly indifferent to human life here–Walton does not contest that he armed
the group, ensured that the group was masked, and participated in the binding of
the victims with duct tape--all actions which set the stage for the eventual murders. 
Clearly, the trial court had before it evidence which fulfills the United States
Supreme Court’s Tison requirements.  Thus, this claim is without merit, and the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims must also fail.
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As his next claim, Walton asserts that this Court’s vacation of codefendant
Terry Van Royal’s death sentences, combined with the fact that Van Royal was a
triggerman, while Walton was not, renders his sentence of death disproportionate. 
Additionally, he contends that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel for failing to raise this issue on appeal.
This Court has consistently held that “the sentence of an accomplice may
indeed affect the imposition of a death sentence upon a defendant.”  Foster v.
State, 778 So. 2d 906, 922 (Fla. 2000); see also Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263,
285-86 (Fla. 2000).  Just as steadfastly in this situation, this Court has also held that
“[d]isparate treatment of a codefendant, however, is justified when the defendant is
the more culpable participant in the crime.”  Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394, 407
(Fla. 1996); see also Foster, 778 So. 2d at 922; Ray v. State, 755 So. 2d 604, 611-
12 (Fla. 2000).
As detailed above, and as related in this Court’s Walton II opinion,
significant evidence was introduced during Walton’s resentencing proceedings
showing that he was the only participant with knowledge of the victims’ location,
the only party with a motive to end the life of Stephen Fridella, and the leader in the
planning of the robbery operation.  See Walton II, 547 So. 2d at 624.  While Van
Royal did participate in the murders, his death sentences were vacated only
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because the trial court in his case failed to support its sentencing with specific
findings.  See Van Royal v. State, 497 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1986).
In the postconviction proceedings below, Walton failed to introduce any
evidence which would negate the findings of the resentencing court regarding
Walton’s leadership of the robbery/murder enterprise.  Indeed, this claim is based
only upon Walton’s unsupported assertion that Van Royal was a triggerman, while
Walton was not; therefore, he should not receive the death penalty.  Because, as
concluded by the resentencing court, and unrebutted by Walton, “[a]ll of the
victims in the ghastly incident died as a result of gunfire brought down upon them
through the leadership of the defendant, Jason D. Walton,” Walton was indeed
more culpable than Van Royal.  Thus, under Larzelere, Walton’s death sentence is
entirely proper, even after Van Royal’s sentence was reduced to life imprisonment.
Because Walton’s death sentence was warranted by his relative culpability
and leadership of the operation which caused the deaths of the three victims here,
Van Royal’s life sentence does not make Walton’s sentence disproportionate. 
Therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this meritless
claim.  See Suarez v. Dugger, 527 So. 2d 190, 193 (Fla. 1988) (“The failure of
appellate counsel to brief an issue which is without merit is not deficient
performance . . . ."); Martin v. Wainwright, 497 So. 2d 872, 874 (Fla. 1986)
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(same). 
While admitting that this claim was presented and fully addressed in his first
direct appeal, Walton contends in both his postconviction appeal and his habeas
corpus petition that United States Supreme Court decisions delivered after the
finality of his direct appeal require us to reconsider our Walton I decision.  Walton
asserts that Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), and McNeil v. Wisconsin,
501 U.S. 171 (1991), make it clear that his confession, which occurred after he had
consulted with an attorney, should not have been admitted into evidence at his
original trial.
In Walton I, this Court detailed and addressed this issue in the following
manner:
Appellant first asserts that the trial judge erred in denying
appellant's motion to suppress his two statements.  Appellant
acknowledges that prior to giving the statements, he had been fully
advised and executed written waivers of his Miranda rights, but argues
that he invoked his right to terminate questioning when he remarked, "I
would like to but I don't really want to [give a statement]."  Appellant
contends that his subsequent statements were, therefore, obtained in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel present during questioning.
The record reveals that despite repeated reminders from police
that appellant had the right to remain silent, appellant's first statement
resulted when he persisted in attempting to exculpate himself by
suggesting to detectives that he was present at the scene of the crime
but did not participate in the actual murders.  We reject appellant's
argument that his remark, in the context in which it occurred, is subject
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to the interpretation that appellant was invoking his right to silence
under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).  We find Edwards is
not applicable under the facts of this case and that the trial judge
properly admitted the challenged statements.
Walton I, 481 So. 2d at 1199.  Clearly, any claim regarding the admissibility of
Walton’s confession was raised and addressed in Walton I.  Therefore, it is barred
from relitigation in this collateral postconviction proceeding.
Even though this claim is certainly barred, it is clear that the Minnick and
McNeil decisions only address the situation in which law enforcement officials
initiate a conversation with a defendant after he has consulted with counsel. 
Indeed, in Minnick, the Court was specific:
Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth
Amendment protections after counsel has been requested, provided he
has initiated the conversation or discussions with the authorities; but
that is not the case before us.  There can be no doubt that the
interrogation in question was initiated by the police; it was a formal
interview which petitioner was compelled to attend.
Minnick, 498 U.S. at 156; see also McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177.  The conversations at
issue here were begun by Walton.  Specifically, this Court noted that “[f]ollowing
his apprehension, appellant initiated a conversation with detectives who were
transporting him from the courthouse to jail.”  Walton I, 481 So. 2d at 1198
(emphasis supplied).  Despite repeated reminders from the police that he had the
right to remain silent, Walton “persisted in attempting to exculpate himself by
-23-
suggesting to detectives that he was present at the scene of the crime but did not
participate in the actual murders.”  Id. at 1199.  Because the statements were
initiated by Walton himself, Minnick and McNeil do not apply.  As this claim was
fully addressed by this Court in Walton I, and no grounds exist for a reexamination
of the issue, we deny relief.
In his next claim for relief, Walton asserts that this Court erred in Walton II
when it held that Walton’s counsel initiated the submission of evidence regarding
remorse for the killings, and that the transcripts of Walton’s resentencing show that
the State unconstitutionally introduced evidence regarding Walton’s lack of
remorse during his sentencing proceedings.  Because lack of remorse may not be
used as an aggravating factor, Walton contends that this Court should grant him a
new penalty phase.  Additionally, Walton asserts that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the State’s submission of this evidence.
This precise claim was raised on the direct appeal of Walton’s resentencing. 
There, we held:
In his second point, Walton argues that the state improperly
presented evidence concerning lack of remorse as a nonstatutory
aggravating circumstance.  In response, the state asserts that Walton's
counsel initiated the questioning of defense witnesses concerning
remorse and expressly asked one witness "what if any remorse" had
Walton shown, thus opening the door concerning this issue.  This
Court has consistently held that lack-of-remorse evidence cannot be
-24-
presented by the state as an aggravating circumstance in its case in
chief, see Robinson v. State, 520 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1988); Patterson v.
State, 513 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1987); Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073
(Fla. 1983); Jackson v. Wainwright, 421 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1982), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983), but that does not mean the state is
unable to present this evidence to rebut nonstatutory mitigating
evidence of remorse presented by a defendant.  See Agan v. State,
445 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984).
Walton II, 547 So. 2d at 625.  Walton, in a strikingly direct fashion, simply
proceeds in his postconviction appeal to reargue the precise claim addressed by
this Court in Walton II.  Clearly, this type of reargument is improper, and this claim
is barred.  See Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So. 2d 1377, 1384 (Fla. 1987) (“If [an]
issue is raised on direct appeal, it will not be cognizable on collateral review.”). 
Likewise, since this Court has held that the State's submission of evidence
supporting a conclusion that Walton had no remorse for the killings was not
wrongful, the lack of an objection from Walton's trial counsel does not evidence
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Walton next contends that under rule 3.851, the signing of a death warrant by
the governor unconstitutionally shortens the time period in which a death-sentenced
defendant may file his rule 3.850 motion.  In Cave v. State, 529 So. 2d 293 (Fla.
1988), we addressed this claim by stating:
Appellant presents one additional point.  Under rule 3.850,
appellant's conviction and sentence became final in early June 1986,
-25-
when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review of
Cave, our affirmance on direct appeal.  Burr v. State, 518 So. 2d 903
(Fla. 1987).  Rule 3.850 prescribes a two-year period following final
conviction for filing petitions for post-conviction relief, after which
such petitions are procedurally barred.  The Governor signed a death
warrant on appellant on April 27, 1988, providing for execution during
the week of July 6, 1988.  Under these circumstances, Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.851 requires that any post-conviction petitions
be filed within thirty days of the signing of the warrant.  Appellant filed
his petition on May 27, 1988, which, he now claims, shortened by
thirteen days his asserted right to a two-year period under rule 3.850. 
Essentially, appellant is claiming that procedural rule 3.850 prohibits
the Governor of Florida from signing a death warrant until two years
after a death sentence becomes final.  This issue was not presented
below and is procedurally barred.  Moreover, this Court has no
constitutional authority to abrogate the Governor's authority to issue
death warrants on death sentenced prisoners whose convictions are
final.  Unless there is a petition for post-conviction relief, the
affirmance of a final conviction ends the role of the courts.  Rule 3.850
merely provides a time period after which petitions may not be filed. 
It does not act as a bar to execution of sentences immediately after
they become final.
Cave, 529 So. 2d at 298-99.  Clearly, we have resolved this claim contrary to
Walton’s assertions, and must deny relief. 
In the first independent claim of his supplemental rule 3.850 filings, Walton
contends that the State withheld evidence revealing possible deception and a role in
motivating the murders by Robin Fridella, in contravention of the dictates of Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Walton contends that handwritten police notes
from officer interviews, a police report relating the details of a civil disturbance
-26-
which occurred between Robin and Stephen Fridella, and a polygraph examiner’s
handwritten notes from an examination of Robin were all suppressed by the State,
and could have been used effectively by the defense at trial.
To establish a Brady violation, Walton must prove:
[1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that
evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.
Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).  
Walton contends that the State wrongfully suppressed handwritten police
notes and a domestic disturbance report which show the tumultuous relationship
and hatred between Robin Fridella and Stephen Fridella.  The handwritten notes
created by an unidentified police officer indicate initial uncertainty in the murder
investigation regarding Robin Fridella’s veracity and possible involvement in the
murders.  Additionally, Walton argues that the State should have turned over a
polygraph report indicating the possibility that Robin was not being entirely frank
with the police investigating this crime.  This evidence, Walton contends, could
have been used by the defense to craft a different theory of defense -- in particular,
it would have enabled Walton to assert that Robin was the mastermind who
-27-
dominated him and encouraged the murders so that she could have sole custody of
her child.
The court below addressed this claim by stating:
The Court finds that Defendant fails to successfully assert a
Brady violation.  First, Defendant fails to demonstrate that the
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearings was favorable to him. 
Assuming arguendo that Robin Fridella was more involved in planning
the burglary/robbery and the murders, it would not have lessened
Defendant’s guilt in the guilt phase given the questionable admissibility
of such evidence in the guilt phase.
Furthermore, the record is clear that Defendant was aware of the
witness in question (his girlfriend), and more importantly, he knew the
information about which she testified.  Although the “due diligence
requirement is absent from the Supreme Court’s most recent
formulation of the Brady test, it continues to follow that a Brady claim
cannot stand if a defendant knew of the evidence allegedly withheld or
had possession of it, simply because evidence cannot be found to
have been withheld from the defendant.”  Occhicone v. State, 768 So.
2d 1037 (Fla. 2000).  Thus, the police officer’s notes were not
exculpatory, nor did they have any impeachment value.  This is
evidenced by defense attorney Donald O’Leary’s testimony . . . that
although he would have expected to have received pursuant to Brady
the information that the police had about Robin Fridella’s custody
problems in the divorce proceeding against her husband and that she
had accused him of sleeping with another woman, he said it would not
have been consistent with his theory of the defense and would, in his
opinion, have actually been antagonistic.
. . . Mr. O’Leary said that the exhibits of which he had been
made aware (the polygraph examiner’s notes on Robin Fridella, the
civil trespass report about Robin’s custody dispute and the police
officer’s notes on Robin Fridella) would not have changed his strategy
and that he was surprised they had not been used by the State against
him because they would have added fuel to the fire that the murders
were planned and premeditated. . . .
8.  As concluded by Walton’s trial counsel, the evidence is largely
inculpatory in nature.
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. . . .
In this case, the notes or documents to which Defendant alludes
do not contain material information that would produce an acquittal or
a life sentence on retrial.  This Court acknowledges that the Florida
Supreme Court has stated that attorney notes of witness interviews
maintained by the State constitute Brady material.  However, in this
case, the notes were handwritten by a police officer, and the record
affirmatively reflects that Defendant was aware of this witness (his
girlfriend), and more importantly, he knew about the information to
which she testified.
. . . .
Thus, Defendant’s Brady claim is without merit because there is
no reasonable probability of a different outcome had the handwritten
police notes been used by the defense at trial.
(Citations omitted.)
The trial court’s conclusions are not clearly erroneous.  Indeed, regardless of
the dubious favorableness of this evidence to Walton,8 Occhicone v. State, 768 So.
2d 1037 (Fla. 2000), holds that evidence known by a defendant cannot violate the
precepts of Brady.  According to Walton, the alleged usefulness of this evidence
lies in revealing the troubled nature of Robin and Stephen Fridella’s relationship, as
well as the relationship between Robin Fridella and Walton before and after the time
of the murders.  As noted by the court below:
Defendant’s [pretrial] admissions to the police . . . included that
he was aware that Robin had a child custody hearing coming up and
that they were fighting for the kids. . . . Defendant said that he was
-29-
dating Robin at the time, that they were not living together, and that
she had said something about going back to her husband, but that he
did not believe they were planning on getting back together.
Clearly, Walton himself was fully informed of Robin Fridella’s troubles with her
husband, and he obviously was aware of the nature of his own relationship with
Robin.  Thus, under Occhicone, Walton’s Brady claim “cannot stand [because he]
knew of the evidence withheld or had possession of it, simply because the evidence
cannot then be found to have been withheld” from him.  768 So. 2d at 1042.
Even assuming that Occhicone is not dispositive here, Walton cannot prove
that his case was prejudiced by the State’s suppression of the identified evidence. 
To prevail, Walton must show that the evidence was material.  See Way, 760 So.
2d at 913.  Evidence is material if it places “the whole case in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. at 290
(quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).  In the instant case, Walton
has not shown that evidence revealing that his girlfriend at the time of the murders
would have benefitted from the death of her husband undermines any confidence
that Walton was properly convicted of murder and sentenced to death.  Indeed,
this evidence actually tends to support the State’s primary prosecutorial theory that
Walton carefully planned and carried out the instant murders.  Walton’s Brady
claim must fail.
-30-
As a corollary to his Brady claim, Walton contends in his newly filed 3.850
appeal that the trial court failed to consider newly discovered evidence which
shows that Walton was not the ringleader in the instant case, and was merely a
bystander.  Walton identifies various statements by codefendant Terry Van Royal
in which Van Royal disavows earlier statements he made asserting that Walton was
the mastermind or leader of the group committing the murders.  Additionally,
during the evidentiary hearing below, Walton introduced testimony from Ken
Driggs and Elizabeth Wells, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel attorneys who
interviewed codefendant Van Royal subsequent to the resentencing trial of Walton. 
They testified that Van Royal told them that Walton was not the leader of the group
which killed the victims in the instant case, and that the murders were entirely
unexpected.  Walton contends that this information is newly discovered evidence
which would probably produce a life sentence on retrial. 
To justify the granting of a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence, Walton must first show that the evidence was unknown at the time of
trial, and could not have been obtained at that time through due diligence. 
See Robinson v. State, 770 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 2000).  Once past this
threshold finding, Walton must also show that the newly discovered evidence
would “probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”  Id.   
-31-
It is plain that Van Royal was available at the time of trial.  He was available
to be deposed, all parties were aware of his existence because he was a charged
codefendant, and he gave multiple statements to the police which were available to
counsel.  What Walton has presented as “newly discovered evidence” is simply a
new version of the events from a witness/participant who has presented multiple
stories since the time of the occurrence of the events themselves.  As is clear from
the testimony of attorneys Driggs and Wells, Van Royal was a very untrustworthy
person when it came to providing the truth about the murders.  Indeed, the
following exchange and conclusion during the questioning of Ken Driggs evidences
one instance of Van Royal’s changing testimony:
Q: So you were aware that in December of 1999 that Mr. Van
Royal testified in this courtroom that he said that Jason Walton had
shot possibly two or three of the victims?
A: Recently I was made aware of that, yes, subsequent to the
execution of my affidavit.
Q: Were you aware that he said in this courtroom, December of
1999, that he did not shoot anyone?
A: Yes
. . . .
Q: So, I take it then, sir, that it would be fair to say that from the
information you received, Mr. Van Royal has made a number of
different statements that are difficult to reconcile?
A: That would appear to be the case.
Even if Van Royal’s newest version of the events culminating in the murders
qualifies as newly discovered evidence, it is obvious that this evidence is composed
-32-
of statements made by an extremely untrustworthy person.  If Van Royal’s new
statements were introduced into the current body of evidence in the instant case --
subject to impeachment through introduction of prior inconsistent statements -- its
effect would likely be negligible.  See Lightbourne v. State, 742 So. 2d 238, 247
(1999) (“[R]ecanted testimony can be considered newly discovered evidence, but .
. . the trial court must examine all of the circumstances of the case.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).  Certainly, the trial court did not err in concluding that
this evidence would not cause a different result if it were before a jury in a new
resentencing proceeding.
Walton's set of claims asserting that his trial attorneys rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance deserves close examination.  Walton
contends, as part of both his initial and supplemental 3.850 motion filings, that his
counsel failed to rebut the prosecution’s assertions that he was the mastermind of
the murders with evidence available through reasonable investigation, failed to
object to the admission of evidence tending to prove Walton’s involvement in drug
transactions and use, mistakenly opened the door to the prosecution’s admission
of Walton’s “rap sheet,” failed to object to improper jury instructions, and failed to
perform adequate investigation to obtain full materials to present as mitigating
evidence.
-33-
As stated by this Court following the announcement of the United States
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), ineffective assistance of counsel claims are to be evaluated in the following
fashion:
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered
meritorious, must include two general components.  First, the claimant
must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown
to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance
under prevailing professional standards.  Second, the clear, substantial
deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected
the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).  Importantly, a court
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel “need not make a specific ruling
on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice
component is not satisfied.”  Id.  
Walton first contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
because he did not attempt to rebut the prosecution’s arguments and evidence
tending to show that Walton organized and led the robbery that ended in the
murders here.  In support of this assertion, Walton identifies certain statements
made by the State’s attorney during codefendant Cooper’s trial in which the State
argued that Cooper was not under the direction of Walton.  In particular, Walton
cites two statements during the prosecution’s closing argument in which the State
-34-
asserted that it was “absolutely ludicrous” to say that Walton was at fault for
Cooper’s actions, and there was no evidence to support the “incredible
proposition” that Walton dominated Cooper during the crime.
The factual circumstances at issue here are quite similar to those presented in
Fotopoulos v. State, 838 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2002).  In that case, Fotopoulos
asserted that his trial counsel was deficient for not attempting to introduce a large
amount of evidence and argument by the State from a codefendant’s trial which
tended to negate the prosecution’s theory of domination and leadership of the
crimes by the defendant.  In Fotopoulos, we concluded that Fotopoulos had not
demonstrated deficient performance by his trial counsel, despite the fact that he did
not use the evidence admitted in a codefendant’s trial.  See Fotopoulos v. State,
838 So. 2d at 1128-30.  
When compared to the large amount of evidence not utilized by the defense
in Fotopoulos, the two small statements ignored by trial counsel in the instant case
are somewhat insignificant.  Thus, under the reasoning recently adopted by this
Court in Fotopoulos, Walton has failed to make the required showing to fulfill the
Strickland performance prong.  Additionally, Walton cannot show prejudice here. 
Evidence introduced at Walton’s trial showed that Walton originated the plan to
rob the victims on a rainy night, Walton armed the group prior to the robbery, and
-35-
Walton was the only defendant involved who knew the location of the victims’
house.  See Walton II, 547 So. 2d at 623-24.  In the face of this overwhelming
evidence, it is clear that the introduction of two statements by a state attorney in a
codefendant’s trial would not have been overly persuasive.  Certainly, non-
introduction of this evidence does not undermine our confidence in the outcome.
Next, Walton contends that his trial counsel deficiently failed to object to the
State's admission of evidence showing that Walton had previously been involved in
drug transactions and use.  At trial, Walton’s counsel attempted to prove the
existence of the no significant history of prior criminal activity mitigator.  In
rebuttal, the State introduced evidence which supported its assertions that Walton
had been involved in drug dealing; specifically, it introduced evidence that Walton
sold marijuana, and that codefendant Cooper had been seen carrying a fifty-pound
bale of marijuana towards Walton’s home.  See Walton II, 547 So. 2d at 624. 
Walton now contends that trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of this
evidence constitutes deficient performance.
This Court specifically addressed the admission of this evidence during the
direct appeal of Walton’s resentencing.  In Walton II, this Court specifically held
that this testimony was proper, stating:  “Once a defendant claims that this
mitigating circumstance is applicable, the state may rebut this claim with direct
-36-
evidence of criminal activity.”  Id. at 625.  Because this Court has addressed this
claim in a manner adverse to Walton’s contentions here, his trial counsel’s failure to
contest the admissibility of this evidence cannot be deemed ineffective assistance. 
Additionally, Walton’s assertion that his appellate counsel failed to raise this claim
on direct appeal is positively refuted, as appellate counsel clearly fully litigated the
issue before this Court.  See id.
In a claim related to the issue raised above, Walton asserts that it was error
for his trial counsel to attempt to show the existence of the no significant history of
prior criminal activity mitigator here, because it opened the door for the State to
introduce evidence of Walton’s previous illegal conduct -- including Walton’s “rap
sheet,” which included a reference to an arrest and charge for theft of marijuana. 
Additionally, Walton contends that his counsel erred by not objecting to the rap
sheet’s admission into evidence.
Regardless of whether trial counsel’s performance violated the first prong of
the Strickland standard, it is absolutely clear that the jury’s exposure to evidence of
Walton’s drug-related criminal activity could not have prejudiced him.  The entirety
of Walton’s guilt and sentencing proceedings revolved around a factual scenario in
which it was proven and uncontested that Walton had organized a group robbery to
obtain drugs and money obtained through the sale of drugs.  A foundational issue
-37-
accepted as true at the resentencing was that Walton had participated in a robbery
whose sole object was the procurement of drugs and cash.  Certainly, the
introduction of evidence showing that Walton had been involved in drug sales and
thefts prior to the night of the murder was harmless, and when evaluated in the
context of a trial which revolved entirely around Walton’s attempt to forcibly obtain
drugs, did not “so affect the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that
confidence in the outcome is undermined.”  Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d at
932.
Walton next contends that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally
ineffective assistance by failing to object when the trial court instructed the jury that
it “must” consider the aggravators related by the judge, but “may” consider the
mitigators listed by the court.  Walton asserted the claim that this instructional error
was prejudicial on direct appeal of his resentencing, and it was decided adversely to
him.  See Walton II, 547 So. 2d at 625-26 (“We find no fundamental error in the
instructions.  Taken as a whole, they demonstrate that the burden of proving the
aggravating circumstances rested with the state.”).  Walton’s attempt to resurrect
the claim through an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is entirely improper. 
See Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla. 1990) (holding that allegations of
ineffective assistance cannot be used to circumvent the rule that postconviction
-38-
proceedings cannot serve as a second appeal).
In his final allegation of ineffective assistance, Walton contends that his trial
counsel failed to adequately investigate for evidence which could have been used as
proof of nonstatutory mitigation.  During the resentencing, Walton’s counsel
presented three witnesses: a coworker, a childhood friend, and Walton’s mother. 
At the evidentiary hearing below, Walton’s trial counsel related his theory of the
defense, stating:
The avenue of thought was pretty limited, and the theory of
defense was that we -- the road we went down was that this was, as
far as my client was concerned, nothing more than a planned robbery
gone bad, that he had divorced himself from that when it became
apparent there were no goods to be had -- goods, money, or drugs --
and that he was in the act of leaving, having abandoned the robbery,
when the murders occurred.
During the postconviction hearings below, Walton introduced evidence
through the testimony of his mother and sister that his home life as a child was
awful -- he grew up in a single parent home, his mother engaged in promiscuous
behavior in front of Walton and his siblings, his alcoholic stepfather often
encouraged Walton to abuse drugs, and his stepfather subsequently choked to
death in front of Walton when he was an adolescent.  Evidence was also introduced
which revealed that Walton had abused drugs as an adolescent and teenager, and
had been enrolled in a radical therapy program which likely left him severely
-39-
emotionally scarred, but which had not halted his continued abuse of illegal drugs.
Walton also introduced evidence during his postconviction hearings which
raised questions regarding whether Robin Fridella, Walton’s girlfriend and the wife
of one of the victims at the time of the murders, may have played some role in the
planning of the robbery and murders.  Finally, Walton introduced the testimony of
Bruce Jenkins, a friend of Walton’s who explained that Walton’s statement prior to
the murder that he might be required to “waste” victim Stephen Fridella did not
necessarily mean that he would kill him.
While it is clear that the evidence in mitigation illuminated during the
postconviction proceedings below could have aided Walton's case before his
resentencing jury, it is also absolutely clear that his trial counsel competently
investigated for evidence in mitigation before trial.  Walton’s trial attorney, Donald
O’Leary, stated that he asked Walton and his family members "every question [he]
could think to draw out relevant information concerning Jason’s background.” 
Indeed, the record reflects that O'Leary performed extensive discovery prior to
trial, and the following portion of the hearing transcript details the facts before
O'Leary after the completion of his investigation:
Q: During that time [before trial] did you have rather extensive contact
with the defendant, Jason Walton?
A: Yes.
-40-
Q: Okay.  You met with him, talked with him, spent many hours with
him?
A: Yes.
Q: And you also had a lot of contact with his mother and with other
family members; did you not?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay.  Now, I don't want to leave the impression that you just sat
there in their presence waiting for them to say something.  You asked
them questions, didn't you?
A: Yes.
Q: You asked them every question you could think to draw out
relevant information concerning Jason's background?
A: Yes.
Q: Some of them may have been general as opposed to specific
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: But you did ask questions that . . . you would have expected had
Mrs. Walton known all about these drug problems, known about brain
damage or known about head injuries, you asked sufficient questions
that she should have answered those?  She should have told you about
those things?
A: In my own mind, yes.
Q: So you weren't just sitting there waiting for her to bring up these
facts to you?
A: No sir.
Q: You didn't expect her to decide what the issues might be, you
asked questions that would give you relevant information?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay.  And nobody told you anything about any of this?
A: No.
Q: Including your client, Mr. Walton?
A: Yes.
Q: And you made your decisions as to what evidence was going to be
put on based upon the information that he gave you, correct?
A: Yes.
Clearly, O'Leary was entitled to rely upon the veracity of his client and his client's
-41-
family.  Walton's trial counsel made every effort to explore his client's childhood
and family background.  Every person he spoke with -- Walton's mother,
coworkers, and other family members -- related to him the same story.  As O'Leary
stated: "I kept getting this feedback that he was a normal, average, usual person,
nonviolent, nonaggressive, average intelligence."  The moderate alcohol and
marijuana use revealed to Walton's attorney seemed to be "just what young boys,
his peers in Marion county [did] on weekends."  Our examination of the record
before this Court leads us to conclude that Walton's trial attorney performed an
adequate and thorough investigation for mitigating evidence before trial.  Walton
cannot be heard to complain now that his attorney failed to unearth evidence which
Walton and his family affirmatively kept from counsel before trial.
In sum, there simply was no information before O'Leary at the time of
Walton's resentencing which should have led him to investigate Walton's drug
habits or mental state.  A thorough investigation was performed, and O'Leary's
performance certainly did not fall below "prevailing professional standards."
The second category of evidence identified by Walton in support of his
claim that his attorney failed to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation, relating to
the role of Robin Fridella and the testimony of Bruce Jenkins, does not warrant
extended discussion.  The record reveals that counsel attempted to contact and
-42-
depose Bruce Jenkins, but was informed by the State that he was unavailable.  As
stated by O’Leary himself during the 3.850 hearing, it was hardly unreasonable for
him to rely upon the representations of the State Attorney’s Office that the police
could not locate Jenkins.  Certainly, his reliance upon the State was not outside
“prevailing professional standards.”  See Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.  Likewise,
the only person in possession of information regarding Robin Fridella’s possible
role in the crimes at issue and her manipulative effect upon Walton was Walton
himself.  As O’Leary definitely consulted with Walton, and Walton did not reveal
any of this information, O’Leary cannot be faulted.
Finally, Walton contends that the postconviction trial court erred when it
improperly consolidated a hearing regarding codefendant Van Royal’s recanted
testimony by allowing counsel for codefendant Cooper to participate in the hearing
and cross examine the witnesses.  The record reveals that the trial court below held
a joint hearing in which CCRC attorneys Driggs and Wells testified regarding their
discussion with Van Royal.  At that hearing, both Walton and Cooper were present
and represented by counsel.  In response to Walton’s claim alleging improper
joinder, the trial court held:
Regarding Defendant’s allegation that an illegal consolidation of
two (2) Postconviction cases occurred, this Court finds that it is
without merit.  The Court merely held a joint hearing which included
-43-
the same witnesses . . . . This was done in the interests of judicial
economy to avoid conducting the same hearing twice.  The joint
hearing was legal because both codefendants Walton and Cooper
were present, each with his own counsel, and each had the right to
either present or cross-examine the witnesses on their individual
considerations.  Teffeteller v. Dugger, 676 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1996). 
Although Cooper’s attorney objected at the beginning of such hearing
regarding hearsay and relevancy, it is important to note that he
withdrew his objection on the record during the proceeding.
It is plain from the record that the trial court did not consolidate the postconviction
motions or proceedings of Walton and Cooper; moreover, Walton has not
demonstrated any prejudice resulting from this joint hearing.  Walton was afforded
a full and fair opportunity to participate and elicit testimony from the witnesses, and
has identified no prejudice.  While this Court has mandated that postconviction
proceedings may not be consolidated, see Teffeteller v. Dugger, 676 So. 2d 369,
371 (Fla. 1996); see generally Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1981),
there was no consolidation in the instant case, and no prejudice resulted from the
joint hearing below.  This claim is without merit.
Conclusion
Based upon the forgoing analysis, we affirm the trial court's denial of
postconviction relief, and deny Walton's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS and LEWIS, JJ., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
-44-
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Two Cases:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,
Brandt C. Downey, III, Judge - Case No. CR83-00630 CFANO
and An Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Pamela H. Izakowitz, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - South, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Kimbery Nolen Hopkins, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent