Case Title: Weedon v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 133, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Corrected Page
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
WILLIAM WEEDON,
)
)  No. 133, 2001
Defendant Below,
)
Appellant,
)  Court Below:  Superior Court
)  of the State of Delaware in
v.
)  and for Sussex County
)
STATE OF DELAWARE,
)  Cr.A. Nos. 93-01-0052, 0053,
)  0054, 0056R1
Plaintiff Below,
)  ID No. 93S00177DI
Appellee.
)
Submitted:  November 8, 2001
Decided:  December 27, 2001
Before WALSH, HOLLAND, and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 27th day of December 2001, upon consideration of the briefs of the
parties, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
In May 1993, a Superior Court jury convicted Appellant William
Weedon of Attempted Murder First Degree, Burglary First Degree, Conspiracy
First Degree, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon.  During trial, the judge ruled
that a statement Weedon made to his spouse was not protected by marital privilege
because Weedon had communicated the same statement to a third party, Michael
Falahee.  The trial judge allowed Mrs. Weedon to relate the statement to the jury.
In September 1997, Weedon filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief under Rule
2
61,1 alleging, inter alia, that Falahee had recanted his testimony concerning
Weedon’s publication of the arguably privileged statement and that, therefore, the
trial judge improperly admitted Mrs. Weedon’s testimony.  Pursuant to an order of
this Court,2 the Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing on the issues of
recantation and marital privilege.  In a decision dated March 6, 2001, the Superior
Court denied the Motion for Postconviction Relief.  This is Weedon’s appeal from
that decision.
(2)
A motion to expand the trial record accompanied Weedon’s
September 1997 petition for postconviction relief.  The Superior Court judge
granted this portion of Weedon’s motion and expanded the record to include the
videotaped testimony of Falahee recanting the testimony he gave at Weedon’s
criminal trial, and affidavits by Mrs. Weedon, Patricia Woodland, and JoEllen
Trader, each of which purportedly supported Falahee’s recantation.  Eventually,
the record also included a letter to this Court from Mrs. Weedon in which she
stated that she had instructed Falahee to perjure himself at trial.  During the
evidentiary hearing, the judge considered these statements along with the live
testimony of Trader, Woodland, Mrs. Weedon, Mrs. Weedon’s sister, the
prosecutor who handled the trial, and a retired police detective who had
                                                
1 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61.
2 Weedon v. State, Del. Supr., 750 A.2d. 521 (2000).
3
interviewed Mrs. Weedon at the time of the original trial.  Falahee died before the
evidentiary hearing.
(3)
In deciding whether to grant Weedon a new trial based on a
recantation, the Superior Court judge properly applied the three-pronged test
adopted by this Court in Blankenship v. State.3  We held that recantations are to be
evaluated using the test announced in Larrison v. United States4 and that, under
this standard, the court should grant a new trial when:
(a) The Court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a
material witness is false.
(b) 
That without it the jury might have reached a different conclusion.
(c) That the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false
testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its
falsity until after trial.5
(4)
After conducting the evidentiary hearing on the validity and effect of
the recantations at issue, the Superior Court judge concluded that he was not
“reasonably well satisfied” that either Mrs. Weedon or Falahee testified falsely at
trial.  This Court will not disturb conclusions of fact made by a trial judge who was
able to observe the demeanor of witnesses and assess their credibility when those
findings are supported by competent evidence.6  The record provides sufficient
                                                
3 447 A.2d 428, 433 (1982).
4 7th Cir., 24 F.2d 82 (1928).
5 Blankenship, 447 A.2d at 433.
6 See State v. Rooks, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 943, 949 (1979).
4
evidence that the trial judge’s conclusions were the product of sound reasoning and
a logical and orderly deductive process.
(5)
Because we today affirm the trial judge’s determination that the
recantations of Mrs. Weedon or Falahee did not “reasonably well satisfy” him that
they had both testified falsely at trial, we find it unnecessary to review the trial
judge’s conclusions concerning the remaining two prongs of the Larrison test.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele_______________
Justice