Case Title: Ricky Dixon v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC99-193

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC99-193
____________
RICKY DIXON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[July 13, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Dixon v. State, 745 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), in
which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the Second
District’s decision in Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), on
the issue of standing to challenge chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, as violative of
the single subject rule contained in article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution. 
We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
The State of Florida alleged that on March 21, 1997, Ricky Dixon committed
a battery on a law enforcement officer. Dixon was convicted as charged and
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sentenced as a violent career criminal pursuant to section 775.084(1)(c), Florida
Statutes (1995). 
Dixon appealed to the Fourth District, arguing that chapter 95-182, which
created the violent career criminal sentencing category incorporated into section
775.084, violated the single subject rule contained in article III, section 6 of the
Florida Constitution.  The district court affirmed Dixon’s sentence as a violent
career criminal.  See Dixon, 745 So. 2d at 1100.  In addition, the district court held
that Dixon lacked standing to challenge the validity of chapter 95-182  because the
date of the commission of the crime was outside the window period within which
such  challenge could be made.  See id. (citing Salters v. State, 731 So. 2d 826
(Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(holding that only those persons who committed their criminal
offense on or after October 1, 1995, but before October 1, 1996, had standing to
challenge chapter 95-182 on single subject rule grounds)).  In so doing, the Dixon
court certified conflict with Thompson v. State, 708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA
1998), wherein the Second District held that the window period for such challenges
extended from October 1, 1995 thru May 24, 1997. See Dixon, 745 So. 2d at 1100. 
Dixon sought review in this Court. 
Since the issuance of the Fourth District’s decision below, this Court has
resolved the certified conflict.  In Salters v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S365 (Fla.
1  Even though Dixon failed to raise a single subject rule challenge in the trial court, we find that
such challenge may be properly addressed for the first time on appeal.  Cf. Heggs v. State, 25 Fla. L.
Weekly S137, S138, S140 n.4 (Fla. Feb. 14, 2000); Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237, 241-42 (Fla.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 950 (2000); State v. Johnson, 616 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 1993). 
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May 11, 2000), we conclusively determined that those who seek to challenge the
“violent career criminal sentencing provision enacted by chapter 95-182 have
standing to do so if the relevant criminal offense or offenses occurred on or after
October 1, 1995, and before May 24, 1997.”  Thus, consistent with our decision in
Salters, we find that because Ricky Dixon committed the offense charged on
March 21, 1997, he does in fact have standing to assert a single subject rule
challenge to chapter 95-182.1 
 Accordingly, we quash the decision below to the extent it held that Dixon
lacked standing to challenge chapter 95-182.  Further, we reverse Dixon’s  violent
career criminal sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with the valid
laws in effect on October 14, 1996, the date of the offense.  See Thompson v.
State, 750 So. 2d 643, 649 (Fla. 1999)(holding that chapter 95-182 violated the
single subject rule requirement set out in the Florida Constitution and remanding for
resentencing in accordance with the valid laws in effect at the  time the defendant
committed the offense).
It is so ordered.
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SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District - Case No. 4D98-3556
( Broward County)
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Allen J. DeWeese, Assistant Public
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, West Palm
Beach Branch, and James J. Carney, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach,
Florida,
for Respondent