Case Title: Davenport v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 690, 2015

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2016-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
FRANK DAVENPORT,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 690, 2015 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
Cr. ID No. 1401014417 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: September 21, 2016 
Decided: 
October 21, 2016 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 21st day of October 2016, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In this case, appellant Frank Davenport argues that his sentence for 
Manslaughter and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a 
Felony should be reversed.  His arguments are: i) that the State impermissibly 
breached its plea deal with him by asking the Superior Court to sentence 
Davenport to no less than the sentence cap to which Davenport and the State 
agreed; ii) that the Superior Court used inaccurate information to sentence 
Davenport in violation of his due process rights; and iii) that the Superior Court 
impermissibly ordered Davenport to pay restitution to the Victim‘s Compensation 
Assistance Program (―VCAP‖). 
2 
 
(2) 
The Superior Court heard evidence at the sentencing hearing about 
how Davenport lived for several years with Holly Wilson, his girlfriend.1  
Evidence was presented that people who knew Wilson thought that Davenport was 
abusing her,2 and, in fact, the record reflected that he was charged in 2008 and 
again in 2009 with offenses related to Wilson—offensive touching and terroristic 
threatening.3  The second offense resulted in a no contact order that was still in 
place during the events at issue in this case.4  On January 15, 2010, Davenport and 
Wilson spent part of the night at bars together—in violation of Davenport‘s no 
contact order—and, according to testimony presented in the police report, they 
fought while they were together.5  After getting home, Wilson was shot.6  
Davenport was at Wilson‘s home when Wilson was shot and reported it to the 
police as suicide.7  Davenport was ultimately charged with Wilson‘s murder and 
related charges.  He took a plea agreement with the State where he pled no contest 
                                          
 
1 E.g., App. State Del.‘s Answering Br. at B11 (Cpl. Burton‘s Supplemental Police Report, May 
5, 2011, complaint #32-10-005632) [hereinafter Cpl. Burton’s Report]. 
2 E.g., id. at B14 (describing interviews with Wilson‘s neighbors and coworkers who reported 
injuries that they took to be signs of abuse). 
3 Id. at B1–B4 (Arrest warrant and affidavit of probable cause, Dec. 10, 2008, State v. Frank 
Davenport, Case No. 0812006991) (reflecting charges against Davenport for offensive touching 
of Wilson); id. at B5–B9 (Arrest warrant and affidavit of probable cause, Oct. 18, 2009, State v. 
Frank Davenport, Case No. 0910012767) (reflecting charges against Davenport for terroristic 
threatening of Wilson). 
4 See App. Appellant‘s Opening Br. at A-22 (DELJIS Charge Summary for Frank Davenport) 
(reflecting no contact order in place). 
5 Id. App. State Del.‘s Answering Br. at B15–B16 (Cpl. Burton‘s Report) (describing interviews 
with bartenders at the bars Davenport and Wilson visited that night). 
6 Id. at B10. 
7 Id. at B11 (describing Davenport‘s call to the police). 
3 
 
to a manslaughter charge and a weapons charge.  The State committed to not seek 
a sentence of greater than ten years.8  In advance of the sentencing hearing, the 
State submitted a case summary describing not only the events on the day leading 
to Wilson‘s death but also the history of Davenport‘s relationship with Wilson, 
pictures of Wilson‘s body, and home videos of Wilson with her family.9  At the 
hearing, Davenport asked for a five-year sentence—the statutory minimum—and 
the State asked for a ten-year sentence.10   
(3) 
After hearing that evidence, the Superior Court noted the series of 
incidents involving Davenport and Wilson before the killing.  The Superior Court 
observed that the charges for offensive touching and terroristic threatening were 
dismissed ―as we sometimes see in domestic violence cases.‖11  The Superior Court 
referred to the existence of the no contact order as ―most significant.‖12  Other than 
those observations, the Superior Court referred to no other events or circumstances 
before the night of the killing.  After making those observations, the Superior 
                                          
 
8 Id. at B210 (Plea Hearing Transcript, May 27, 2015, State v. Frank Davenport, Case No. 
1401014417); App. Appellant‘s Opening Br. at A-29 (Plea Agreement, May 27, 2015, State v. 
Frank Davenport, Case No. 1401014417). 
9 App. Appellant‘s Opening Br. at A-31 to A-74 (Case Summary, Nov. 9, 2015, State v. Frank 
Davenport, Case No. 1401014417). 
10 Compare id. at A-77 (Sentencing Transcript, Nov. 20, 2015, State v. Frank Davenport, Case 
No. 1401014417 (recording the State as saying ―[a]ny sentence less than 10 years would unduly 
depreciate and ignore the violence and the abuse Holly Wilson endured at the hands of the 
defendant‖) [hereinafter Sentencing Hearing]), with id. at A-84 (recording Davenport‘s request 
for ―five years incarceration‖). 
11 Id. at A-85. 
12 Id. 
4 
 
Court summarized its view of the aggravating and mitigating factors and imposed a 
twenty-year sentence and ordered that Davenport pay restitution to VCAP.  
Davenport appealed, arguing that his sentence should be modified. 
(4) 
As indicated, Davenport raises three issues on appeal.  First, 
Davenport argues that the State breached its plea agreement to not seek more than 
ten years incarceration for him by presenting materials to the Superior Court that 
suggested his crimes and history justified a lengthy sentence.  Not only was this 
argument not properly presented below and therefore subject only to review for 
plain error,13 it is without merit.  Davenport‘s argument that the State engaged in a 
de facto breach of its plea agreement founders on a key factor he fails to 
emphasize: he did not argue to the Superior Court that it should sentence him to the 
ten-year cap to which the State agreed.  Instead, Davenport argued for a sentence 
of half that.  Because he argued for only a five-year sentence, the State was fully 
within its rights to present evidence justifying the Superior Court in imposing the 
ten-year sentence to which it had agreed.  Nowhere in the record did the State seek 
a sentence above ten years, and to the extent that it presented evidence that the 
Superior Court, in its discretion, utilized to impose a sentence of twenty years, 
Davenport‘s own strategy invited the presentation of that evidence to overcome his 
argument that he should only receive five years. 
                                          
 
13 Russell v. State, 5 A.3d 622, 627 (Del. 2010) (citing Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8; Wainwright v. State, 
504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)). 
5 
 
(5) 
Second, Davenport argues, in essence, that the Superior Court used 
inaccurate information in sentencing him.  At sentencing, the Superior Court stated 
the overall sentence, the potential for trial avoided by the plea agreement, a number 
of points from the record about the relationship between Davenport and Wilson, 
and then summed up Davenport‘s situation by saying:  
I find the aggravating factors as follows: Prior violent criminal 
conduct with respect to Holly Wilson as an identified victim; 
repetitive criminal conduct with respect to Holly Wilson as a 
identified victim; prior abuse of the victim; and vulnerability of the 
victim.  I find in mitigation childhood trauma.14   
 
Davenport argues that this statement represents the Superior Court applying 
specific aggravators used in the guidelines created by the Delaware Sentencing 
Accountability Commission (―SENTAC‖): Prior Violent Criminal Conduct, 
Repetitive Criminal Conduct, and Vulnerability of Victim.  Davenport argues that 
the Superior Court improperly used those defined aggravators to determine the 
length of his sentence.  Each of those aggravators is defined in the SENTAC 
Benchbook, which is ―designed to assist sentencing judges . . . in the formulation 
of sentences that are consistent with the goals of sentencing reform . . . .‖15  The 
Benchbook presents ―recommended‖ sentencing ranges for given crimes ―when 
aggravating or mitigating factors are not present‖ as well as ―[a]ggravating and 
mitigating factors‖ that are ―to be used to explain a sentence imposed either above 
                                          
 
14 App. Appellant‘s Opening Br. at A-85 to A-86 (Sentencing Hearing). 
15 DELAWARE SENTENCING ACCOUNTABILITY COMMISSION, BENCHBOOK 22 (2014). 
6 
 
or below the presumptive sentence.‖16  Salient for this case, the Benchbook also 
notes that ―[o]ther factors, which do not appear on this list, may be utilized at the 
discretion of the sentencing judge.‖17  Thus, the Benchbook defines Prior Violent 
Criminal Conduct as ―[d]efendant has demonstrated, by his prior criminal history, 
a propensity for violent criminal conduct.‖18  Repetitive Criminal Conduct is 
defined in the SENTAC Benchbook as ―conviction or adjudication for the same or 
similar offense on two or more previous, separate occasions.‖19  And Vulnerability 
of Victim is defined in the SENTAC Benchbook as ―[t]he Defendant knew, or 
should have known, that the victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable or 
incapable of resistance due to extreme youth, advanced age, disability, or ill 
health.‖20  Davenport correctly argues that if the Superior Court‘s decision had 
been based on those specific SENTAC aggravators, the resulting sentence would 
have been reversible error because the record before the Superior Court does not 
support the proposition that i) Davenport was a convicted and reoffending violent 
criminal, ii) that he had been convicted of an unlawful killing on two other 
occasions, or iii) that Wilson was especially vulnerable to Davenport due to her 
age or health. 
                                          
 
16 Id. at 23. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 128. 
19 Id. at 129. 
20 Id. 
7 
 
(6) 
But, this Court does not read the Superior Court‘s sentencing 
statement as applying defined SENTAC aggravators to determine Davenport‘s 
sentence.  Instead, the context of the bulk of the sentencing statement leading up to 
its summative paragraph—the paragraph upon which Davenport relies so 
heavily—reveals that the Superior Court permissibly exercised its discretion to 
base its sentence on an overall assessment of Davenport‘s tumultuous relationship 
with Wilson and that relationship‘s horrific ending.  That assessment served as a 
single aggravating circumstance rather than as a mechanistic adding up of 
SENTAC aggravators that result in a sentence of a given length.  The Superior 
Court‘s use of the phrase ―with respect to Holly Wilson‖ in connection with the 
terms ―[p]rior violent criminal conduct‖ and ―repetitive criminal conduct‖ makes 
this clear.21 
(7) 
The summative paragraph on which Davenport singularly focuses is 
actually the culmination of the Superior Court‘s discussion of specific evidence 
that was presented during the sentencing hearing.  In the sentencing statement, the 
Superior Court noted a series of incidents involving Davenport and Wilson before 
the killing, including when Davenport was charged with offensive touching and 
terroristic threatening of Wilson.22  The Superior Court noted both that the charges 
                                          
 
21 App. Appellant‘s Opening Br. at A-85 (Sentencing Hearing). 
22 Davenport also argues that some of his conduct with Wilson that the Superior Court refers to 
was supported by insufficiently reliable evidence that was ―unknown‖ or ―vague.‖  Appellant‘s 
8 
 
were dismissed ―as we sometimes see in domestic violence cases‖ and that the no 
contact order continued to be in place through Wilson‘s death.23  Importantly, the 
Superior Court referred to the existence of the no contact order as ―most 
significant.‖24  The Superior Court referred to no other events or circumstances 
before the night of the killing in its sentencing statement. 
(8) 
Thus, this Court disagrees with Davenport‘s theory that the Superior 
Court mistook him for a previously convicted, violent criminal whose victim was 
elderly or ill.  Rather, in light of the pages of evidence presented to accompany the 
hearing, as well as the Superior Court‘s own description of the record, the most 
reasonable understanding of the Superior Court‘s reference to ―aggravating 
factors‖ is as a matter of rhetorical emphasis—reinforcing the Superior Court‘s 
major point, which was that this killing was the culmination of a long-standing 
pattern of abuse by Davenport toward Wilson that was critical to its decision to 
                                                                                                                                        
Opening Br. at 28.  Due process requires that information used in sentencing meet a ―‗minimal 
indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation‘ standard,‖ but the evidence that the Superior 
Court considered regarding Davenport‘s past domestic abuse of and violence toward Wilson was 
sufficiently reliable.  Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 840 (Del. 1992) (quoting United States v. 
Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982)).  The conduct the Superior Court cites in its 
sentencing statement was supported by arrest warrants and affidavits, App. State Del. Answering 
Br. at B1–B4 (Arrest warrant and affidavit of probable cause, Dec. 10, 2008, State v. Frank 
Davenport, Case No. 0812006991) (reflecting charges against Davenport for offensive touching 
of Wilson); id. at B5–B9 (Arrest warrant and affidavit of probable cause, Oct. 18, 2009, State v. 
Frank Davenport, Case No. 0910012767) (reflecting charges against Davenport for terroristic 
threatening of Wilson), testimony from Wilson‘s son, id. at B19 (Cpl. Burton‘s Report), and 
police interview records with other identified individuals in a position to personally observe 
Wilson‘s conduct and interactions with Davenport, id. at B11, B14, B15, B20. 
23 App. Appellant‘s Opening Br. at A-85 (Sentencing Hearing). 
24 Id. 
9 
 
impose a sentence that, although above the SENTAC guideline range, was half of 
the statutory maximum.  That is, the Superior Court‘s remarks cannot be 
reasonably read as erroneously citing to factors defined in the SENTAC 
Benchbook, but instead the remarks read in context plainly reflect the Superior 
Court‘s own assessment of what factors were relevant, and that the Superior Court 
was not using this terminology in the same sense as it is used in the SENTAC 
Benchbook.  However confusing, that linguistic overlap in usage does not create 
grounds for reversal.  Put simply, it was permissible for the Superior Court to 
consider a woman who remained in a relationship fraught with the potential for 
violence—despite multiple interventions by the police and a no contact order—to 
be vulnerable.  Again, the Superior Court was focused on the abusive relationship 
and Wilson‘s related vulnerability as factors rationally supporting its conclusion 
that Davenport deserved a lengthier sentence.  Davenport cannot have reasonably 
expected that his past tumultuous history of relations with Wilson would not have 
been a central factor in his sentencing.  Trial courts have broad discretion to issue 
sentences within statutory limits and do not have to adhere to the SENTAC 
guidelines, which by their own terms are advisory and do not create any 
enforceable right to have them specifically adhered to by the Superior Court.25  
                                          
 
25 ―[T]his Court has consistently held that it is without appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases to 
review challenges on the sole basis that a punishment deviated from the SENTAC sentencing 
guidelines.‖  Siple v. State, 701 A.2d 79, 83 (Del. 1997) (citing Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 
10 
 
Although we urge the Superior Court to use greater precision, particularly when 
explaining to what extent a sentence is supported by the specific SENTAC factors 
and to what extent a sentence is underpinned by an exercise of judicial discretion 
taking into consideration facts not addressed in the SENTAC factors, in this case 
the record provides rational support for the Superior Court‘s sentence and we find 
no basis to conclude that the Superior Court premised its sentence on an erroneous 
application of the SENTAC guidelines. 
(9) 
Third, Davenport now argues that it was plain error for him to be 
ordered to pay restitution to the VCAP under an amended version of 11 Del. C. 
§ 9014 rather than the one in place at the time he committed the manslaughter.26  
This argument was not properly presented below and cannot possibly rise to plain 
error.  At all relevant times, a statute was in place that required persons convicted 
of crimes like Davenport committed to pay restitution.27  Even had Davenport 
raised this issue properly, he would have to show that somehow the amendment 
                                                                                                                                        
845–46 (Del. 1992); Gaines v. State, 571 A.2d 765, 767 (Del. 1990); Ward v. State, 567 A.2d 
1296, 1297–98 (Del. 1989)). 
26 Before August 12, 2014, 11 Del. C. § 9014 was silent on the VCAP‘s ability to recover a 
restitution award made against a convicted defendant directly rather than indirectly through the 
victim herself.  The revision, effective before Davenport‘s plea hearing and sentencing clarifies 
that ―[w]henever any person is sentenced for an offense and compensation has been paid under 
this chapter to a victim of such offense, the Agency may assert a claim for reimbursement of the 
Victims‘ Compensation Fund as restitution from the criminal defendant.‖  11 Del. C. § 9014(c). 
27 When this Court previously examined the power of courts to award restitution to VCAP, this 
Court considered the law as it existed at the time of the defendant‘s restitution hearing.  State, 
Victims’ Compensation Assistance Program v. Chianese, 128 A.3d 628, 631 (Del. 2015).  Here, 
§ 9014(c) established VCAP‘s authority to seek restitution at the time of the sentencing hearing. 
11 
 
was more than procedural and imposed on him after-the-fact liability.28  Given that 
he did not even argue this issue below and that restitution is a long-standing 
requirement of our law,29 the Superior Court did not commit plain error by 
applying the statute that both the State and Davenport‘s counsel contended was 
applicable to his duty to pay restitution. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                          
 
28 The effect of the statutory difference Davenport focuses on is to whom the Superior Court 
could order him to pay restitution, not if he could be ordered to pay restitution  or its extent.  ―To 
fall within the ex post facto prohibition [of the United States Constitution], a law must be 
retrospective—that is ‗it must apply to events occurring before its enactment‘—and it ‗must 
disadvantage the offender affected by it‘ by altering the definition of criminal conduct or 
increasing the punishment for the crime.‖  Snyder v. Andrews, 708 A.2d 237, 248 (Del. 1998) 
(quoting Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997)).  The amendment did not increase a 
defendant‘s exposure, it just made clear that if VCAP paid the victim restitutionary funds, VCAP 
could recover the restitution from the party ultimately responsible, the defendant found guilty 
and liable to pay it. 
29 11 Del. C. § 4101 has acknowledged the power of a court to impose ―a fine, costs, restitution 
or all 3‖ upon a convicted person since at least the early 1980s.  See 63 Del. Laws ch. 141, § 6 
(1981) (amending the statute to include the words ―restitution or all 3‖).