Case Title: State v. Brown

Citation: 2015-Ohio-486

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-486.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-486 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BROWN, APPELLEE. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. SHIPLEY, APPELLEE. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MCCLOUDE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Brown, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-486.] 
Probate judges do not have authority to issue search warrants on criminal 
matters. 
(Nos. 2013-1110, 2013-1111, and 2013-1112—Submitted June 10, 2014—
Decided February 18, 2015.) 
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, Nos. 2012CA00099, 2013-
Ohio-2224; 2012CA00100, 2013-Ohio-2225; and 2012CA00101,  
2013-Ohio-2226. 
_______________________ 
O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} In these three cases we are asked to determine whether probate 
judges have the authority to issue search warrants on criminal matters.  We hold 
that they do not.  Unless a probate judge has been assigned by the chief justice 
pursuant to Article IV, Section 5(A)(3) of the Ohio Constitution to temporarily sit 
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or hold court, a probate judge does not have the authority to hear evidence and 
issue search warrants in criminal matters. 
{¶ 2} These cases arise out of the same set of facts and raise the identical 
issue, so we consolidated the cases for oral argument, and we now consolidate the 
cases for decision. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} There is no dispute among the parties regarding the facts 
underlying these cases.  In February 2012, a detective with the Alliance Police 
Department obtained a search warrant from a judge of the Stark County Court of 
Common Pleas, Probate Division.  The warrant gave law enforcement permission 
to search a business in Alliance for evidence of illegal gambling.  Pursuant to that 
warrant, more than 30 video slot machines were confiscated giving rise to charges 
filed against defendants-appellees, Todd Brown (case No. 2013-1110), Jeff 
Shipley (case No. 2013-1111), and Raymond McCloude (case No. 2013-1112), 
who were operating the business. 
{¶ 4} Appellees filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained during 
the search, arguing that the search warrant was void because probate judges do 
not have the statutory authority under R.C. 2933.21 to issue a criminal search 
warrant.  As a result, appellees asserted, the evidence seized during the search was 
the fruit of an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. 
{¶ 5} The cases were all pending before the same municipal court judge, 
and the cases were consolidated for purposes of the hearing on the motions to 
suppress.  The trial court agreed that the warrant was unlawful and granted the 
motions to suppress the evidence gathered pursuant to the tainted warrant. 
{¶ 6} The state filed an appeal in each case, and the Fifth District Court 
of Appeals affirmed the trial court judgments as to a probate judge’s lack of 
authority to issue a search warrant.  However, the appellate court reversed the 
judgments granting the motions to suppress the evidence, finding that the state 
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had established that the police officers had acted in good-faith reliance on the 
warrant under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 
677 (1984).  The state appealed the judgment in each case to this court asserting a 
single proposition of law in each:  “A ‘probate judge’ has the authority as a 
division of the Ohio Court of Common Pleas to hear evidence and issue search 
warrants on criminal matters within [his or her] territorial jurisdiction.” 
The Unlawful Warrant 
{¶ 7} Because this case involves only a question of law, our review is de 
novo.  In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, 979 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 3. 
{¶ 8} R.C. 2933.21 states, “A judge of a court of record may, within his 
jurisdiction, issue warrants to search a house or place * * *.”  Crim.R. 41(A)(1) 
states, “A search warrant authorized by this rule may be issued by a judge of a 
court of record to search and seize property located within the court’s territorial 
jurisdiction.”  And R.C. 2931.01 provides, “As used in Chapters 2931 to 2953 of 
the Revised Code: * * * (B) ‘Judge’ does not include the probate judge [and] (C) 
‘Court’ does not include the probate court.”  Plainly, pursuant to the Ohio Revised 
Code, a probate judge does not have the authority to issue a search warrant in a 
criminal case. 
{¶ 9} This court recognized an exception to the statute in cases where the 
chief justice, pursuant to Article IV, Section 5(A)(3) of the Ohio Constitution, 
assigns a probate judge to temporarily sit or hold court on any other division of a 
court of common pleas.  State v. Cotton, 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 12-13, 381 N.E.2d 190 
(1978).  However no such assignment was made in these cases.  Accordingly the 
exception does not apply. 
{¶ 10} The state admits that the plain language of R.C. 2931.01 excludes 
probate judges from the definition of “judge” for purposes of R.C. Chapters 2931 
to 2953.  The state suggests that this statute was “missed or improperly re-
codified” when the Modern Courts Amendment to the Ohio Constitution was 
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adopted by voters.  The amendment made the probate court a division of the 
common pleas court.  The state’s supposition may be true, however more than 45 
years have passed since the 1968 Modern Courts Amendment.  Even in legislative 
time, 45 years is long enough to correct an error.  Moreover, unless the court first 
makes a determination that the language of the statute is capable of more than one 
meaning, it is inappropriate to examine legislative history, legislative intent, 
public policy, or any other factors to determine the meaning of a statute.  Dunbar 
v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 16.  The 
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous.  Thus, we decline to ignore the 
plain language of the statute to embrace the state’s supposition.  We hold that 
unless appointed by the chief justice pursuant to Article IV, Section 5(A)(3) of the 
Ohio Constitution, a probate judge does not have the authority to issue search 
warrants in criminal matters. 
Exclusion of the Evidence Obtained in Executing  
an Unlawful Search Warrant 
{¶ 11} We agree with the Fifth District that the good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule set forth in Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 
677, applies in these cases.  Although no party appealed from this portion of the 
Fifth District’s judgments, we address it here for clarity. 
{¶ 12} The exclusionary rule is a judicially created sanction designed to 
protect Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect.  Id. at 906.  Under 
the rule, the state is precluded from using evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  But unbending application of the exclusionary rule “ ‘would 
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.’ ”  Id. at 907, 
quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 65 L.Ed.2d 
468 (1980).  “[W]hen law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith 
or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on 
such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.”  Id. 
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at 908.  For this reason, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that 
the exclusionary rule should not be applied to bar evidence obtained by officers 
acting in reasonable good-faith reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached 
and neutral magistrate that is ultimately found to be unlawful.  Id. at 905-925.  
Accordingly the court of appeals’ rulings that the evidence would not be 
suppressed, which were not appealed from, remain the law of the cases. 
{¶ 13} The judgments of the appellate court holding that probate judges 
do not have authority to issue search warrants on criminal matters are affirmed, 
and the matters are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Judgments affirmed 
and causes remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
___________________ 
Jennifer L. Arnold, Alliance Law Director, for appellant. 
___________________