Case Title: BILLINGS v. WYOMING BOARD OF OUTFITTERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUIDES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-20

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
BILLINGS v. WYOMING BOARD OF OUTFITTERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUIDES2004 WY 4288 P.3d 455Case Number: 03-20Decided: 04/20/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

JOHN 
R. BILLINGS, Licensed Outfitter,

License 
No. BFG-295,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

WYOMING 
BOARD OF OUTFITTERS

AND 
PROFESSIONAL GUIDES,

 

Appellee(Respondent)

 

and

                                                                                                

JOHN 
R. BILLINGS, d/b/a OPEN CREEK

OUTFITTING; 
and OPEN CREEK

OUTFITTING, 
LLC,

 

Appellants(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

WYOMING 
BOARD OF OUTFITTERS

AND 
PROFESSIONAL GUIDES,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellants:

 

            
Daniel B. Frank of the Frank Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming; and S. 
Joseph Darrah of Darrah, Darrah & Brown, P.C., Powell, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Kennard F. Nelson, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      In February 2002, 
the Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Professional Guides (Board) revoked 
appellant John R. Billings' (Billings) outfitter's license based on several 
violations of state statutes and/or the Board's rules.  Billings subsequently filed a petition 
for review of the Board's decision, and a complaint for declaratory judgment, in 
the district court.  Following the 
district court's respective rulings, three incidents underlying these violations 
remain at issue on appeal:  (1) 
Billings' livestock and its proximity to his lower hunting camp and that camp's 
water supply; (2) whether Billings failed properly to dispose of a dead mule 
carcass; and (3) whether Billings willfully endangered Sandra Ditzler's health 
and safety while traveling from the lower hunting camp to the 
trailhead.

 

[¶2]      Billings argues 
that the evidence was insufficient to support the Board's findings that 
Billings' conduct violated state statutes and/or the Board's rules and that the 
Board did not sufficiently explain why it revoked Billings' license rather than 
impose a lesser sanction.  He also 
raises several issues regarding the constitutionality of state statutory 
provisions and the Board's rules.  
We affirm.

 

 

[¶3]      We rephrase the 
parties' issue statements as follows:

 

1.         
Whether the record contains sufficient evidence 
that:

 

A.        
Billings willfully endangered the health and safety of consumers of the 
lower camp's water supply, maintained an unsanitary camp, failed to keep 
livestock facilities separate from camp facilities, and failed to protect a 
stream from contamination;

 

B.        
Billings violated a significant federal regulation pertaining to 
wildlife, game and fish; and

 

C.        
Billings willfully endangered the health and safety of Sandra 
Ditzler.

 

2.         
Should we find sufficient evidence to support one or more of these 
violations, was the Board's decision to revoke Billings' outfitter's license 
proper?

 

3.         
Whether the constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(v) 
(LexisNexis 2003) remains at issue on appeal?

 

4.         
Whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(iv) and (ix) and Chapter 3, Section 
1(n) (1997) of the Board's rules are unconstitutionally 
vague?

 

5.         
Whether Billings has standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
Chapter 3, Section 2 of the Board's rules?

 

 

[¶4]                              
Appellant Billings is an outfitter licensed by the Board.  Billings has provided commercial 
outfitting services in the Bridger Teton National Forest since the early 
1980s.  His business consists of 
outfitting hunters, through the use of horses and mules, into an area near the 
southeast corner of Yellowstone Park, in the Thorofare River Drainage.  There, Billings maintains two hunting 
camps.  His lower hunting camp is 
approximately 37-39 miles from the Ishawooa Creek Trailhead while his upper 
hunting camp is located 30-32 miles from that trailhead.  Billings also maintains a "layover" camp 
along the Ishawooa Creek Trail, where clients stop overnight en route to the 
hunting camps.  The hunting camps 
may also be reached by way of a trail known as the Deer Creek Trail.  

 

            
On July 20, 1998, the Board filed a complaint against Billings seeking 
censure, suspension, or revocation of Billings' outfitter's license.  The Board's complaint was based on 
written complaints from hunters who hired Billings' during the 1996 and 1997 
hunting seasons.  The Board's 
complaint first alleged that Billings acted unethically and dishonorably in the 
treatment of, and correspondence with, his clients.  The complaint next alleged that Billings 
had willfully endangered his clients.  
One endangerment allegation asserted the abandonment of clients on Deer 
Creek Trail as the clients packed out of camp.  The other willful endangerment 
allegation asserted Billings had permitted a client to lead a troublesome mule, 
Mel, along the trail and that the client was eventually kicked in the chest by 
the mule.  (The evidence produced at 
the hearing indicated that the client, Dan Nutsch, was actually kicked by the 
mule he had been riding, Bo, when he dismounted Bo in order to gather up 
troublesome Mel.)

 

            
The complaint also alleged that Billings had violated significant federal 
regulations pertaining to wildlife, game, and fish by (1) improperly disposing 
of a mule carcass, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.58(s); and (2) caching items 
in the wilderness without permission from the United States Forest Service in 
violation of 36 C.F.R. § 261.57(f).  
The complaint further alleged that Billings had failed to maintain neat 
and sanitary camps and that Billings had substantially breached his contract 
with his clients by, inter alia, utilizing hunting guides who were not properly 
trained and by failing to maintain a sufficient number of employees in 
camp.  The complaint finally alleged 
that Billings had treated his livestock in an inhumane 
fashion.

 

            
After four days of hearings, held December 11, 1998, and February 2-4, 
1999, the Board issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law on April 22, 
1999, revoking Billings' outfitters license.  . . .

 

            
. . .

 

            
The Board also specifically found and concluded that Billings did not 
engage in the inhumane treatment of his livestock.  The Board did not make any findings 
regarding the allegation that Billings had illegally cached items in the 
wilderness.

 

            
Billings filed a combined petition for review and complaint for 
declaratory judgment with the district court, which certified the case pursuant 
to W.R.A.P. 12.09.

 

Disciplinary 
Matter of Billings, 
2001 WY 81, ¶¶ 3-6, 8-9, 30 P.3d 557, 562-64 (Wyo. 2001)  (Billings I).1

 

[¶5]      In Billings 
I, 2001 WY 81, ¶¶ 19, 23, 42, 30 P.3d  at 567-68, 573, 
we proceeded to resolve several issues raised by Billings, and ultimately 
concluded that the Board's findings were "inadequate to permit appellate 
review," that the Board exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating two of 
its rules, and that the district court was without authority to certify the 
declaratory judgment action to this Court.  
We remanded the case to the district court "with instructions to enter a 
judgment vacating the order of the Board and remanding the proceedings to the 
Board for further proceedings consistent with [our] opinion."  Id., 2001 WY 81, ¶ 43, 30 P.3d  at 
573.

 

[¶6]      On remand, the 
Board issued new findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 26, 2002, 
and again revoked Billings' outfitter's license.  In March 2002, Billings filed a Petition 
for Review of Agency Action, Request for Stay and Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment.  The district court 
bifurcated its consideration of the complaint for declaratory judgment and the 
petition for review.  The district 
court found that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(v) was unconstitutionally vague, 
but otherwise rejected the constitutional arguments Billings raised in seeking a 
declaratory judgment.  The district 
court affirmed the Board on the issues raised in Billings' petition for 
review.  Billings now appeals the 
district court's adverse rulings.  
The Board did not cross-appeal the district court's decision on the 
constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(v).

 

 

[¶7]      Under the 
circumstances of the instant case, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(c) provides for 
judicial review of license revocation proceedings pursuant to the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2003) sets forth the standards for judicial 
review of agency action:

 

(c)        To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

(i)         
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 

(ii)        Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

(A)       Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 

(B)       Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

 

(C)       In excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 

(D)       Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

 

(E)       Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 

[¶8]      As we said in 
Bryant v. State ex rel. Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 2002 WY 140, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d 4, 8 (Wyo. 2002), 
we do not

 

afford 
any special deference to the district court's decision when we review a matter 
initiated before an administrative agency.  
Rather, this court reviews the case as if it came directly from the 
administrative agency.  . . .  Our review must focus on the evidence 
and consider the reasonableness of the agency's exercise of judgment while 
determining if the agency committed errors of law.  . . .  If the agency committed any errors of 
law, this court must correct them.

 

See 
also State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. v. Legarda, 
2003 WY 130, ¶ 10, 77 P.3d 708, 712 (Wyo. 2003).  In the instant case, both parties 
submitted evidence.  We afford 
respect and deference to the Board's findings of fact if they are supported by 
sufficient evidence and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
Board's when sufficient evidence supports the Board's decision.  Hermosillo v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 175, ¶ 6, 58 P.3d 924, 926 
(Wyo. 2002).  We examine the entire record to 
determine whether sufficient evidence supported the Board's findings.  Id.  Even if the Board's factual findings are 
found to be supported by sufficient evidence, the ultimate agency decision may 
be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other reasons.  Id.  We do not examine the record only to 
determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the Board's decision, but 
we must also examine the conflicting evidence to determine if the Board could 
have reasonably made its findings and order upon all of the evidence before 
it.  
Id.

 

            
A disciplinary proceeding before a licensing board is an adversary 
proceeding where the burden is on the complaining party to present its case in a 
proper manner and to state with precision the charges against the licensee.  Dorr v. Wyoming Board of Certified 
Public Accountants, 2001 WY 37 ¶ 8, 21 P.3d 734 ¶ 8 (Wyo.2001); Devous v. 
State Board of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 416 (Wyo.1993).  Those charges must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence.  
Id.; Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 939-40 
(Wyo.2000).

 

Billings 
I, 
2001 WY 81, ¶ 11, 30 P.3d  at 565.  Accordingly, we seek to determine 
"whether the evidence adduced at the hearing was sufficient to have convinced 
the deciding body that violations had been shown by clear and convincing 
evidence."  Minton v. Board of 
Medical Examiners, 110 Nev. 1060, 881 P.2d 1339, 1352 (1994).  In other words, the "judicial eye looks 
to see" whether a reasonable or "fair-minded fact finder might have found the 
evidence clear and convincing that the offense had occurred 
. . .."  See Riddle v. 
Mississippi State Bd. of Pharmacy, 592 So. 2d 37, 41 (Miss. 1991).

 

[¶9]      "Clear and 
convincing evidence is something more than a preponderance, but less than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  
Brierley v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Div., 2002 WY 121, ¶ 14, 52 P.3d 564, 570 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Bando v. Clure Bros. 
Furniture, 980 P.2d 323, 329 (Wyo. 1999)).

 

Clear 
and convincing evidence is the "kind of proof which would persuade a trier of 
fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable."  MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting 
Co., 612 P.2d 830, 839 (Wyo.1980); see also Dorr v. Wyoming Board of 
Certified Public Accountants, 2001 WY 37, ¶ 8, 21 P.3d 735, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2001); 
Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 291 (Wyo.1989).  Evidence which is of such a nature that 
the mind readily reaches a satisfactory conclusion as to the existence or 
nonexistence of a disputed fact is, of necessity, clear and satisfactory.  RS v. Johnson County Department of 
Family Services (In re JL), 989 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Wyo.1999); Thomasi v. 
Koch, 660 P.2d 806, 811-12 (Wyo.1983); Continental Sheep Co. v. 
Woodhouse, 71 Wyo. 194, 256 P.2d 97, 99 (1953).  . . .  We have also adopted more objective 
criteria for clear and convincing evidence with respect to witnesses' 
testimony:

 

"[T]he 
witnesses to a fact must be found to be credible; the facts to which the 
witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the details in connection with 
the transaction must be narrated exactly and in order; the testimony must be 
clear, direct and weighty; and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to 
the facts at issue.'"  Wigand v. 
Union National Bank of Wichita, [227 Kan. 747], 610 P.2d 572, 577 
(Kan.1980).

 

[Meyer, 
780 P.2d  at 291.]

 

Alexander 
v. Meduna, 
2002 WY 83, ¶ 29, 47 P.3d 206, 216 (Wyo. 2002).  We note that the Board did not 
specifically find any witness to be credible or not 
credible.

 

[¶10]   The issues addressed herein 
pursuant to Billings' complaint for declaratory judgment all involve questions 
of law, which questions are reviewed de novo.  Airtouch Communications, Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue, State of Wyo., 2003 WY 114, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 342, 347 
(Wyo. 2003).

 

 

 

[¶11]   On remand, the Board utilized five 
incidents in finding that Billings violated state statutes and the Board's 
rules.  However, the Board utilized 
two separate incidents in finding two separate violations of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
23-2-416(a)(v), which statute the district court found unconstitutionally 
vague.2  Because the Board did not cross-appeal 
that decision, three incidents remain at issue in the instant appeal.  Billings questions the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the violations the Board found based on these three 
incidents.

 

 

[¶12]   Billings argues that the evidence 
was insufficient to support the Board's findings that in allowing or permitting 
his livestock to remain and leave excrement near the lower camp's water supply, 
Billings willfully endangered the health and safety of consumers of that water 
supply, maintained an unsanitary camp, did not keep livestock facilities 
separate from camp facilities, and failed to protect a stream from 
contamination.  Specifically, the 
Board found as follows:

 

6.         
On or about Fall, 1997, Billings was hired to provide outfitting services 
to a client by the name of Henry Krantz.

 

A.        
During Krantz's hunting trip with Billings, Krantz noticed one of 
Billings' horses urinating in a stream and saw both fresh and old horse manure 
by the same stream that the camp's cook retrieved water for the cook tent.  . . .

 

B.        
Krantz took pictures of the area, which demonstrated the proximity of the 
horse manure to the stream.  . . 
.

 

C.        
Krantz also took a video, which showed the horses were actually inside 
the camp area.  . . 
.

 

D.        
Krantz's recollection of what he witnessed was corroborated by his 
pictures, video and the complaint he filed with the Board on October 19, 1996  
almost immediately following his outfitting trip with Billings.  . . .

 

E.        
Billings knew the hazards associated with humans consuming water in which 
an animal was urinating or defecating when he acknowledged horses should not be 
near the camp's water supply.  . . 
.

 

F.         
By allowing his livestock to remain in and near the camp water supply 
utilized for human consumption and by allowing his livestock to leave excrement 
near the water supply, Billings willfully endangered the health and safety of 
consumers of the water supply, failed to maintain a sanitary camp, failed to 
separate camp facilities from livestock facilities, and failed to protect the 
stream from contamination.

 

The 
Board concluded that, as a matter of law, Billings "permitted livestock to 
remain in and near the camp water supply and left livestock excrement near this 
water supply which was ultimately utilized for human consumption" in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(ix) and (x) and Chapter 3, Sections 1(n), (o) 
and (t) of the Board's rules.

 

[¶13]   Our review of the record does not 
reveal sufficient evidence to support the Board's finding that Billings 
willfully endangered the health and safety of those consuming water from the 
lower camp's water supply.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416 provides, in pertinent part:

(a)       The board 
may . . . suspend or revoke a license issued under this act for any of the 
following causes:

 

                                    
. . .

 

(ix)       Willfully 
endangering the health and safety of any person[.3]

 

When 
"looking at the willfulness of a licensee's conduct, this court's duty [is] to 
determine if the evidence establishes intentional, or knowing, or voluntary acts 
as distinguished from accidental.'"  
Billings I, 2001 WY 81, ¶ 34, 30 P.3d at 571 (quoting Kirbens v. Wyoming State Bd. 
of Medicine, 992 P.2d 1056, 1064 (Wyo. 1999)).  The term "endanger" has "an easily and 
commonly understood meaning . . .."  
Billings I, 2001 WY 81, ¶ 34, 30 P.3d at 571 (quoting Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 658 (Wyo. 2000)).  We have said that the plain meaning of 
"endanger" is "to bring into danger or peril.'"  Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 
25, 30 P.3d 47, 55 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Merriam-Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary 381 (10thed. 1999)).

 

[¶14]   Krantz stayed at Billings' lower 
hunting camp near Open Creek for several days while hunting.  The lower camp's natural water supply 
consisted of an area known as the "spring" (where "water washes through the 
gravel . . . underground") and a small creek that flowed from the spring.  The spring is located approximately 
thirty yards east of the camp's cook tent.  
The camp sits on a "bench," which bench is elevated about fifteen feet 
above the spring.  Billings 
acknowledged that the "cook gets water for the camp generally" from the area of 
"this stream or little spring" and that it is "not a good idea to have horses 
near your water supply . . .."

 

[¶15]   Contrary to the Board's findings, 
the record is not clear that a horse urinated "in" the creek or, for that 
matter, that any excrement contaminated the spring or creek.  After arriving at the lower camp, Krantz 
noticed "horses roaming and feeding on the grass" in a meadow near the spring 
and saw a particular black horse "wandering around a small stream of 
water."  He did not specify how 
close the meadow was to the spring, the creek, or the camp.  Krantz wrote in an October 1996, letter 
to the Board that the black horse "urinated in the water" and left "manure on 
the bank next to the water."  
However, Krantz testified during the contested case hearing that the 
black horse urinated "[p]robably 2 feet, 3 feet" from the spring, noting 
specifically that it "wasn't the creek but it's the spring."  He further observed "manure, fresh as 
well as older, right at where that spring was," some "right along the bank" and 
some "right at the water."4  Krantz did not indicate how many piles 
of manure he observed, how much of the manure was old manure versus new manure, 
and aside from the black horse that left new manure "on the bank next to the 
water," Krantz did not otherwise identify the "manure" he observed as "horse" 
manure.5

 

[¶16]   Between twenty or thirty minutes 
and an hour later,6 Krantz saw the camp cook go 
"downstream a little ways" from where Krantz observed the black horse urinate 
"and [he] gets the water for the cook tent."  Beyond this vague reference, the record 
does not establish the purpose for which this water was actually utilized or 
that this water was ever utilized for human consumption.  Krantz did not say anything to the cook 
(or apparently anyone else) about the "potentially contaminated" water.7  He later asked the cook whether the 
water was filtered, to which the cook replied "[n]o, in fact, we had a doctor in 
here a couple of outfits ago and was very upset, too . . .."  Yet, Krantz continued to drink water 
from that area "after it was boiled as much as [possible]" (he "never drank so 
much coffee" in his life) and to eat food prepared with water from the area.8  "[M]ost of the time," he also used a 
water bottle to retrieve water from the creek to drink in his camp tent.  Krantz did not "get 
sick."

 

[¶17]   The record was not sufficient for 
the Board to conclude that Billings intentionally, knowingly, or voluntarily, as 
distinguished from accidentally, allowed or permitted livestock to remain near 
the camp water supply and to leave excrement near the water supply.  Several witnesses provided evidence on 
the lower camp's configuration and where the livestock was confined, the 
frequency of livestock in the spring area, the circumstances in which livestock 
might briefly become loose and what actions were taken when someone discovered 
loose livestock.

 

[¶18]   The lower camp included an area of 
tents utilized by those staying and working in camp, a "tack" area with "hitch 
rails" (an "enclosure" for a pack train of up to twenty mules, "all tied up and 
ready for the next phase of the operation") north of these tents, and livestock 
corrals north of the tack area.  
While at the lower camp, some livestock was kept on a "picket"9 and the "majority of the animals" 
were pastured for six-and-one-half weeks out of the eight-week hunting season in 
a large meadow across Open Creek10 from the camp.  According to Billings, there were times 
when rotating the livestock that "[m]aybe a few" horses were turned loose "clear 
up the creek" drainage to feed in the meadows.

 

[¶19]   Just to the east of the spring, a 
mobile electric fence pen was at times also used to hold five or six saddle 
horses or mules.  According to 
Billings, the pen kept "horses away from the water supply" and provided a "ready 
reserve of horses in proximity to camp and not too far from the corrals where" 
one could "get ready to saddle up and take people hunting."  Jim Bruno, a professional guide at the 
lower camp, further testified that if 

 

we 
knew we were going to need a couple hunter horses the next morning, we'd keep 
them over there in that fence so they were easier to catch but they were able to 
eat grass all night.

 

Bill 
Crooks, another professional hunting guide for Billings, stated that while the 
electric fence pen was enclosed at all times, they would sometimes "maybe lose 
some horses" for one or two hours while moving the fence and "have to run after 
them or kind of contain them as you were moving the 
fence."

 

[¶20]   Krantz himself testified that the 
camp staff "always" kept the livestock "down the creek from where we were after 
that . . . first day" and that shortly after he observed the referenced black 
horse urinate, the "wranglers had taken the horses off somewhere else."  While horses "were loose in camp quite 
often," the "only time" Krantz saw horses loose in the spring area was when he 
observed the black horse urinate.  
Billings testified that he never observed, or had personal knowledge of, 
a horse "being next to the spring during the hunting season of 1996" and never 
received a complaint regarding livestock near the water supply during Krantz's 
trip.

 

[¶21]   Jim Bruno, who had been a 
professional guide for Billings since 1991, added:

 

[Billings' 
counsel]:     Is there 
 can horses go around that [spring] area?

 

A.        They 
can.  They 
can.

 

Q.        Are 
they supposed to be around there?

 

A.        No, 
not really.  They really don't go 
there, though.  They just don't hang 
around there.  I mean, they can get 
there if they wanted to.

 

Q.        Do 
you do anything to keep them from going there?

 

A.        Well, 
generally no, because usually we have that electric fence up in that area and it 
kind of is in the position where it blocks them from getting there easily.  It's just not a place they 
go.

 

Q.        So 
it's not something you usually 

 

A.        We 
never take any precautions to keep them away from there because we've never had 
a problem of them being there.  In 
all the years I've been there I've never seen the mules or the horses congregate 
around the drinking well.  

 

Q.        Have 
you ever seen one in the area?

 

A.        
Yeah.

 

Q.        What 
do you do when you see one there?

 

A.        Run 
it off.  If not, catch it and just 
bring it back to where it's supposed to be, but generally we keep the horses on 
picket far away from the drinking water and that's where the mules  the mules 
stick with the picket horses.

 

[¶22]   As to the remaining violations, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(x) states that the Board may suspend or revoke a 
license for a violation of "any rule or regulation of the board."  Chapter 3 of the Board's rules provides, 
in pertinent part:

 

Section 
1. Rules of Professional Conduct.  
The following includes, but is not limited to, rules of professional 
conduct, a violation of which may be considered unethical or dishonorable 
conduct;

 

. 
. .

 

(n)        A 
licensee shall maintain neat, orderly and sanitary camps at all times . . 
..  Livestock facilities shall be 
separate from camp facilities.  
Streams shall be protected from contamination.

 

[¶23]   Based on the state of the record 
and the Board's findings, the issue appears to be not so much whether Billings 
maintained a neat, orderly and sanitary camp, but rather whether livestock 
facilities were separate from camp facilities, particularly the spring area.11  Importantly, the rule does not prohibit 
the livestock's presence in camp facilities per se, but requires that camp 
"facilities" be separate from livestock "facilities."  The term "facility" connotes a use for a 
particular function; something that is "built or installed to perform some 
particular function" or "something that promotes the ease of any action or 
course of action."  Black's Law 
Dictionary at 591 (6th ed. 1990).

 

[¶24]   The record was insufficient for the 
Board to conclude that the spring area or creek was used as a livestock 
"facility," considering the above-referenced evidence regarding the lower camp's 
configuration and where the livestock was confined, the frequency of livestock 
in the spring area, the circumstances in which livestock might briefly become 
loose and what actions were taken when someone discovered loose livestock.  Although the Board appears to have based 
its conclusions on its finding that Billings allowed or permitted the livestock 
to remain in the spring area, the Board also found that Krantz's video showed 
horses "inside the camp area"12 and Krantz testified that horses 
were often "loose in camp."  Once 
again, these general references do not indicate the livestock's location in 
relation to particular camp facilities, what the livestock was doing while 
there, or delineate precisely what livestock "facility" Billings failed to 
separate from what camp "facility."  
The rule's use of the term "facilities" would seem to require more than 
the livestock's mere presence in an unspecified area of the 
"camp."

 

[¶25]   Given the referenced evidence, and 
that the record does not sufficiently establish that any livestock excrement 
ever contaminated the spring or creek, the evidence was similarly insufficient 
to support a violation for failing to protect the stream from 
contamination.

 

 

[¶26]   Billings argues that he did not 
violate a significant federal regulation pertaining to wildlife, game, and fish 
by improperly disposing of a mule carcass.  
In this regard, the Board found as follows:

 

5.         
We find that on or about August 25, 1997, Billings violated significant 
federal regulations pertaining to wildlife, game and fish in that he failed to 
properly dispose of the carcass of a dead mule as required by 36 C.F.R. 
261.58(s), Special Order, relating to Grizzly Bears, properly issued by the 
United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service.

 

A.        
Billings was issued a special use permit by the U.S. Forest Service.  . . .  The special use permits mandated 
compliance with the Grizzly Bear Management and Protection Plan.  . . .

 

B.        
Billings was also issued a Forest Service Order which specified the 
purpose of such an order was "minimizing grizzly/human encounter[s]."  . . .  The Order also set forth the 
requirements of 36 C.F.R. 261.58(s) and specifically prohibited Billings from 
possessing or leaving unattended any animal carcass unless the carcass was (a) 
at least ½ mile from any sleeping area, trail, or recreation site or (b) at 
least 100 yards from any sleeping area, trail or recreation site and acceptably 
stored, or (c) being eaten, being prepared for eating or being transported.  . . .

 

C.        
Billings' employee, Bill Crooks, testified in detail that he  along with 
two other individuals and Billings  drug a dead mule and left it somewhere 
between 250 and 275 yards from camp and 75 yards from the trail.  . . .  He further testified the carcass was 
"bound to attract bears" and that he witnessed several bears feeding on the 
carcass and at one point witnessed up to eight grizzly bears feeding on the 
mule's carcass at once.  . . 
.

 

D.        
Billings admitted he knew the scent of a carcass could attract bears and 
that close proximity of the carcass to humans could therefore, be 
dangerous.  . . .  He further admitted that while he 
attempted to move the carcass away from the camp, it was not moved far enough 
from the camp in accordance with his special use permit and the federal 
regulation.  . . 
.

 

E.        36 
C.F.R. 261.58(s) is a significant federal law pertaining to wildlife, game and 
fish which is designed to protect an endangered species and to minimize 
grizzly/human encounters.

 

The 
Board concluded that, as a matter of law,

 

7.         
. . . Billings violated a significant federal law pertaining to wildlife, 
game and fish on or about August 25, 1997.  
Specifically, Billings failed to properly dispose of a dead mule's 
carcass as required by 36 C.F.R. 261.58(s), Special Order properly issued by the 
United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service.  That particular federal regulation is a 
significant federal law in that its purpose is to minimize grizzly/human 
encounters and protect an endangered species.  By violating 36 C.F.R. 261.58(s), 
Billings violated a significant federal law and such conduct therefore, is a 
basis for revocation of his license pursuant to WYO. STAT. 23-2-416(a)(iv), (x) 
and the Board's Rules and Regulations, Chapter 3, Section 
1(t).

 

[¶27]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a) 
provides, in pertinent part:

 

(a)       The board 
may . . . suspend or revoke a license issued under this act for any of the 
following causes:

 

. 
. .

 

(iv)       Violation 
of any significant federal or state law or related regulations pertaining to 
wildlife, game and fish;

 

. 
. .

 

(x)        
Violation of this act or any rule or regulation of the board.[13]

 

With 
the "primary goal of minimizing grizzly/human encounters and thereby providing 
for user safety and" grizzly bear protection, a Special Order was implemented 
pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 261.50(a) and (b) (2003)14 prohibiting the 
following:

 

The 
following acts are prohibited while occupying or using the grizzly bear use 
areas shown in Exhibit A of this Order.[15]

 

1.         
Possessing or leaving unattended any animal carcass (36 CFR 
261.58(s))[16] unless the carcass 
is:

 

(a)       at least ½ 
mile from any sleeping area, trail, or recreation site or

 

(b)       at least 
100 yards from any sleeping area, trail or recreation site and acceptably 
stored, or

 

(c)        being 
eaten, being prepared for eating or being transported.[17]

 

[¶28]   While Billings admitted during his 
hearing testimony that he did not dispose of the mule carcass according to the 
referenced Order's distance requirements, Billings contends that he "took every 
common sense precaution available" to comply with the regulation and to minimize 
the issues concerning human/bear interaction.  Billings does not cite to any pertinent 
legal authority in advancing this argument.

 

[¶29]   Bill Crooks, a professional hunting 
guide, testified that in August 1997 (prior to any hunters arriving), he and 
three others (including Billings) were setting up the hunting camps when a 
"thousand, 1100-pound" mule died one evening in the lower camp.  The next morning, with Billings 
directing, they attempted to move the mule carcass, which was "quite a 
chore."  They pulled the carcass 
away from camp through brush, sandbars, water, around trees, across a creek, and 
into timber using two saddle horses "and at times we had one, two and up to 
three mules in line pulling," breaking the "tree" on a pack saddle in the 
process.  According to Crooks, they 
ultimately left the carcass two-hundred-fifty to two-hundred-seventy-five yards 
from camp, closer to camp than the designated "meat pole."  Billings disputed this distance, 
claiming that they took the carcass approximately the same distance from camp as 
the meat pole (four hundred yards).  
Crooks also testified that Billings instructed them not to say "anything 
to anybody" about the carcass and told one individual to cover the carcass with 
cut tree limbs.

 

[¶30]   Crooks, who could see the carcass' 
location from the lower camp area, was concerned that the carcass would attract 
bears and testified there had been other human/bear confrontations in the area 
that year.  The carcass did attract 
bears to the camp's vicinity, as nine or ten days later Crooks saw "bear scat 
around camp," and, between 3:00 p.m. and dark one day, observed a sow grizzly 
bear and two cubs at the carcass, another single bear at the carcass, and at 
some point eight grizzly bears simultaneously at the carcass.  Nothing but bones remained of the 
carcass after that day.

 

[¶31]   The Board's findings and the 
referenced testimony sufficiently establish that Billings violated the 
regulation at issue.  Billings 
admitted as much during his testimony, and the mule carcass was well short of 
the distance required by the regulation even according to Billings' 
testimony.  Billings' emphasis on 
what he did accomplish under the circumstances, although potentially relevant to 
the Board in imposing a sanction vis a vis Billings' outfitter's license 
for violating the regulation, does not meaningfully undermine such a conclusion 
and does not implicate any listed exception to the regulation's 
requirements.

 

[¶32]   Billings also argues that the 
regulation/order at issue is not "significant" because the penalty specified for 
a violation of the Order is the equivalent of a misdemeanor,18 and no evidence in the record 
indicates the Forest Service, which was apparently aware of the circumstances, 
attempted to enforce the regulation against Billings.  With one exception,19 Billings does not cite to any 
pertinent legal authority in advancing these arguments.  Further, we essentially resolved issues 
concerning the regulation/order's "significance" in our prior 
opinion:

 

Despite 
Billings' complaints that the Board has provided no definition of which 
regulations will be considered significant, that is not a concern in this 
case.  The federal regulation/order 
in question relates to the disposal of carcasses and was enacted to prevent 
those carcasses from attracting grizzly bears.  Indeed, the regulation/order was 
implemented "with a primary goal of minimizing grizzly/human encounters."  Common sense and human experience tell 
us that human interaction with grizzly bears is a dangerous and potentially 
deadly proposition.  Peterson v. 
Game and Fish Com'n, 989 P.2d 113, 116 (Wyo.1999).  We have no trouble concluding that a 
regulation/order developed to minimize such interactions is 
"significant."

 

Billings 
I, 
2001 WY 81, ¶ 27, 30 P.3d  at 569.

 

Willfully 
Endangering the Health and Safety of Sandra 
Ditzler

 

[¶33]   The Board found that Billings 
willfully endangered Sandra Ditzler's (Ditzler) health and safety while Ditzler 
was returning from the lower hunting camp to the trailhead in October 1997.  Ditzler, a registered nurse, booked a 
trip with Billings through her fiancé, Peter D'Amico (D'Amico).  D'Amico hunted on the trip, but Ditzler 
did not and was along for the experience and to relax in the mountains.  Eric Ryan (Ryan), Roderick Ryan, Hillary 
Ryan, and Brian McCabe were also on the trip as hunters.  Ryan knew of D'Amico prior to the trip, 
but D'Amico and Ditzler were, at most, Ryan's "casual 
acquaintances . . .."

 

[¶34]   Billings acknowledged that he is 
responsible for his clients' well being, even his clients who are 
non-hunters.  Billings knew Ditzler 
was "new to mountain travel."  Ryan 
also noted that D'Amico and Ditzler were "not terribly experienced when it came 
to saddle stock."  Ditzler had 
informed Sherrie Quinn, one of Billings' employees who initially accompanied the 
hunters from the trailhead to the hunting camps, that Ditzler "hadn't done much 
riding or it had been a long time since [she] had done riding and [Sherrie] told 
me not to worry, that the stock was very used to the trail . . 
.."

 

[¶35]   Ryan had "an extensive background 
in wilderness travel" and had taken two courses from the National Outdoor 
Leadership School (NOLS), which school teaches "the skills to be comfortable in 
the wilderness."  Some of these 
skills included "foraging for food, fire starting in adverse conditions, [and] 
low-impact camping . . .."  For his 
courses, Ryan spent two weeks backcountry skiing in Yellowstone Park during 
January, and three months backpacking in Kenya, where he ascended Mount Kenya (a 
19,000-foot peak) and traveled the wilderness and areas frequented by dangerous 
game.  Ryan stated that based on his 
discussions with Billings, Billings had "some idea" of Ryan's background as an 
outdoorsman, including that Ryan had participated in the NOLS.  Billings testified that he knew of 
Ryan's NOLS participation and that Ryan was an "ice climber or he said he was, 
. . . [had a] history of outdoor travel and interest in wilderness 
issues, et cetera.  So I thought 
that [Ryan] was a pretty good guy that was qualified with survival and those 
types of issues."

 

[¶36]   On October 8th, Billings 
fired two trail hands just prior to taking a new group of hunters from the 
trailhead to the lower camp because he suspected the employees were hung over 
(or had been indulging in alcohol) and they were late to work for the second 
time.  Billings did not want to 
burden a remaining trail hand with running the "layover" camp and "getting these 
hunters up the trail and all the way into camp by himself," so Billings, the 
trail hand, a pack string of mules, and the group of hunters traveled together 
from the trailhead to the lower hunting camp in one day.

 

[¶37]   Two days later, on October 
10th, Eric Ryan, Roderick Ryan, Hillary Ryan, Brian McCabe, D'Amico, 
and Ditzler were scheduled to leave the lower hunting camp.  Ryan noted that as "the staff shrank," 
the "impact of [Billings'] schedule in fatigue and morale was obvious."  Though in the previous forty-eight 
hours, Billings had traveled approximately seventy-four miles on the trails with 
four to four-and-one-half hours of sleep (total), he decided to take this group, 
their respective riding animals, and a twelve-mule pack string (hauling four elk 
and the party's gear, etc.) from the lower hunting camp to the trailhead by 
himself via the Deer Creek trail in one day.

 

[¶38]   The trailhead is thirty to 
thirty-two miles from the lower hunting camp via the Deer Creek trail.  Owen Tucker, a professional guide for 
Billings, stated the Deer Creek trail "is not what you call a safe, easy ridden 
trail, any of it," it is "all steep side hills, narrow trail" with "no place to 
stop" and "once you get started on it, you just need to stay going because 
there's not a rest spot hardly on it.  
There's just  it's just narrow and in a short canyon and many areas of 
switchbacks and many areas of just kind of ledgy, straight, dropoff 
canyon."

 

[¶39]   Tucker added that there was "only 
one person in the world that pulls 13 mules out of . . . Deer Creek and that's 
John Billings . . ..  There's no 
place you can stop a string like that even hardly on the face."  Billings knew that when utilizing a mule 
train or "a lot of stock, you kind of walk the tightrope to keep control of 
them.  You've got to keep moving and 
if you do stop and they're hungry, their mind is on the trailhead and the corral 
and you've got everything kind of hanging by a thread."  According to Billings, a "normal" pack 
string of mules is comprised of four to eight mules.  The largest pack string Billings had 
utilized was sixteen, and Billings would "never give that responsibility to 
anybody but [himself]."  When asked 
"if it's unsafe for others to lead in a pack string that size, why isn't it 
unsafe for you?," Billings replied "I don't know the answer to that 
question.  I don't know 
why."

 

[¶40]   The group left the lower camp the 
morning of October 10th.  
After firing the two trail hands, Billings' staff was comprised of 
himself, two guides, one trail hand/guide, and two cooks.  Billings wanted two guides and a cook to 
remain in the lower camp with the new group of three hunters.20  Instead of having one of the remaining 
two staff members travel with the group, Billings sent a cook and one guide to 
the upper hunting camp to finish packing the upper camp because they were "at 
that time facing weather which was promising to be quite difficult."  Billings knew that by doing so, he would 
not "have enough help to adequately bring out the Ryan party with more than one 
person" and that he "may have some difficulty with 12 mules staying with these 
clients by [himself] . . . coming down Deer Creek Trail . . .."  Ryan testified that he informed Billings 
that it was "pretty thin coverage" and a "dangerous situation" for Billings to 
take the group out by himself.  
According to Ryan, Billings was evasive and "sort of shrugged his 
shoulders."  Ryan also stated that 
he discussed the situation with one of the guides in the lower camp and they 
both agreed that the plan posed "a high potential for serious 
problems."

 

[¶41]   Billings took the lead with the 
pack string of mules.  According to 
Ryan, Ditzler's inexperience with saddle stock was "apparent." She and D'Amico 
experienced "difficulty controlling their mules, some difficulty in mounting and 
remounting, extreme difficulty on Sandy's part in remounting" due to fear and "a 
lack of conditioning and flexibility."  
Ditzler testified that she began having a "really hard time" with her 
mule.  It was not cooperating and 
when Ditzler "would get off of [the mule, it] would try and get around me on 
this narrow trail."

 

[¶42]   The group eventually reached an 
area near the top of Deer Creek Pass.  
The trail was still "treacherous," there "was a lot of snow and the snow 
was melting and there was a lot of mud and so it was a little hard going."  Ryan noted "a heavy cloud cover was 
developing" and became "concerned over the possibility of the weather 
deteriorating . . .."  
Parts of the trail involved switchbacks and sheer drops at the trail 
edge, a "lot of sheer on one side and sheer drop on the other," at times the 
"trail falls away hundreds of feet to streambed and the valley floor."  As Billings described the area, it is 
"full of cliffs and precipices and balks, little coulees and cuts and timber 
down," "really dangerous" in some places.

 

[¶43]   Ditzler "had a great deal of 
anxiety about that," was tired, hungry, and afraid of heights, and could feel 
herself "hyperventilating."  Ryan 
noted Ditzler was intimidated by the heights involved and began to "exhibit 
signs of exhaustion."  Billings 
recalled that at one point on the trail Ditzler was "having a little dizzy 
spell," was afraid of the height, and said she was afraid she was "going to 
faint . . .."  Thereafter, according 
to Ryan, Ditzler's "ability to walk without frequent rest stops was steadily 
deteriorating."

 

[¶44]   Ryan and Ditzler became delayed 
when Ditzler dismounted her mule and was unable to remount near a creek 
crossing.  Billings went back to the 
location.  Based on the following 
testimony, Billings clearly recognized that at this point, Ditzler's condition 
required his continued, personal attention and that he remain in close proximity 
to her.  Ryan testified that 
Billings asked "what the difficulties were," and assured Ditzler that Billings 
would check on her, "keep an eye on her," warn her in advance of "any dangerous 
parts of the descent" and help her "mount and dismount."  Ditzler testified that Billings asked 
what was "going on," she told him that she needed to eat, sit and rest for a few 
minutes, was having trouble with the switchbacks, it was becoming a bit "too 
much," and she asked Billings how the trail was ahead.  According to Ditzler, Billings replied 
that the trail was rough in places but not to worry because he "would come back 
and help me get over those or at least come back and tell me where those areas 
were" and not to worry, all Ditzler had to do was "holler" and Billings would be 
"right there."  Billings testified 
that he addressed, or attempted to address, Ditzler's food and water needs.  He told Ditzler to "go at the speed you 
can," Ryan and D'Amico were with her, but that Billings would "come back and 
check on her."  He further stated 
that he needed to "get this show on the road" because the mules could not be 
"tied up forever" and he could not "hardly stop."  According to Ryan, Billings never asked 
Ryan to stay with Ditzler or assist her on the trail.

 

[¶45]   At this point, Ryan estimated that 
he was eight miles from the trailhead; Billings estimated it was between 
four-and-one-half to five miles from the trailhead.  Ditzler thought it was about 1:00 p.m. 
or 2:00 p.m., Ryan stated that he last saw Billings about "2:30, 3:00 in the 
afternoon," and Billings estimated the time to be between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 
p.m. . . ..  Billings stated that 
when he ultimately separated from Ryan and Ditzler, it was a little over two 
hours from the trailhead.  Billings 
returned to the mule pack string and resumed down the trail with Roderick Ryan, 
Hillary Ryan, and Brian McCabe, leaving Ditzler with Eric Ryan and D'Amico.21  Ryan and Ditzler testified that they 
never saw Billings again until they reached the trailhead.

 

[¶46]   According to Billings, he got to 
the top of some switchbacks on the trail ten minutes after his conversation with 
Ditzler and couldn't see Ryan and Ditzler.  
Billings stated that Brian McCabe told him that he didn't see Ryan, 
Ditzler, and D'Amico "back there" and McCabe "didn't like that."  Billings also "did not like that."  However, the mules in Billings' pack 
string began to "dance around and were pushing on each other and jamming a 
little bit," consistent with Billings' own testimony as to what he would expect 
from a pack string of mules as they proceeded closer to the trailhead, and 
Billings decided he "had to do something about this" and proceeded down the 
trail.  Billings had "to keep 
moving" to prevent a problem and could not stop easily or "for any length of 
time" between that point and the trailhead due to the terrain.  He would "be heading for disaster if 
[he] tied them up at that point and then spent anything more than two or three 
minutes away from them."  While 
Billings was not "totally happy" about this, he decided it made "sense that 
maybe we could preclude 12 other problems from beginning to surface in addition 
to [Ditzler's] problem."  Billings 
felt "somewhat good" that Ryan and D'Amico remained with Ditzler in case 
"something went and got worse."

 

[¶47]   Ditzler could not remount her mule 
and walked the remaining distance to the trailhead.  At about 5:30 p.m. or 6:00 p.m., Ditzler 
crossed a stream, "soaking her boots and jeans to the knees."  Ditzler, who was overweight or "heavy," 
was tired, cold, it had "started to snow a little bit," and Ryan "knew that the 
temperature would drop after dark."  
Ditzler remained increasingly tearful, fearful and fatigued, and Ryan was 
"very concerned" that she "was a candidate for hypothermia."  Ditzler would require frequent rest 
stops, would need to be coaxed a hundred yards at a time, sobbed, and exhibited 
signs of mental confusion.

 

[¶48]   Billings arrived at the trailhead 
twenty minutes before dark.  He 
"figured" that Ditzler was "maybe 45 minutes, an hour" behind him, although he 
had not seen her since shortly after their prior conversation on the trail.  Instead of immediately returning to the 
trail to check on, and assist, Ditzler, Billings merely left his horse saddled 
in case Ryan and Ditzler did not arrive within his arbitrary time estimate, and 
"started getting packs undone and things put away.  I wanted to be ready when the other 
group got out so that they could just get to town."  Ryan indicated in a written statement 
that he and Ditzler reached the trailhead at about 7:45 p.m.  He testified that they reached the 
trailhead at about 7:00 p.m. or 7:15 p.m. and that his brothers told him 
Billings had been there for at least two hours.  Ditzler was "not real sure," but 
testified that they reached the trailhead "around eight o'clock."  Billings estimated that they reached the 
trailhead forty-five minutes to an hour after Billings had arrived at the 
trailhead, or "about the time I expected them."  Billings stated that he could see the 
party coming down the trail for some distance before they actually reached the 
trailhead.  Billings and Ryan then 
became involved in a verbal, and to some degree, a physical, confrontation.  According to Billings, he did not 
believe Ditzler was hypothermic when she arrived at the 
trailhead.

 

[¶49]   The Board found as 
follows:

 

4.         
On or about October 10, 1997, as his client, Sandra Ditzler, was making 
her way out of the wilderness, Billings abandoned Ditzler when she was 
experiencing difficulty with the return to the wilderness 
trailhead.

 

A.        
Ditzler became exhausted and had difficulty mounting her mule as she made 
her way back to the trailhead.  . . 
.

 

B.        
Billings knew Ditzler was experiencing problems and assured her he would 
return for her or would at least be within yelling distance.  . . .  Billings told Ditzler he "would be 
checking on her throughout the descent", "would warn her of any dangerous parts" 
and "would keep and eye on her."  . 
. .  Billings admitted he left 
Ditzler to move his pack down the trailhead and never returned for them.  . . .  He also acknowledged he knew Ditzler was 
experiencing some problems in that she was having "a little dizzy spell" and was 
possibly suffering from "vertigo".  
. . .  Billings told Ditzler, 
"go at the speed you can" and assured her [Eric] Ryan and her husband would be 
there to help her.  . . 
.

 

C.        
Billings left Ditzler and the rest of his hunting party around 2:30 or 
3:00 p.m.  . . .  Ditzler did not see Billings again until 
reaching the trailhead at approximately 7:00 or 7:45 p.m. that evening.  . . .

 

D.        After 
Billings left Ditzler, her mule became increasingly difficult to handle, and 
Ditzler became "tearful" and "fearful".  
. . .  Ditzler was "wearing 
low-cut hiking boots and blue jeans" and was "soaked from her knees down" in low 
temperatures and falling snow.  . . 
.  She was suffering from fatigue 
and that "(a)t . . .several points, she asked to be left on the trail" and "had 
the idea that if (Ryan) rode on out (he'd) be able to get a truck and come up 
and get her with a truck" which was "(a)n absurd notion to anyone who has seen 
that trail."  . . .  Ditzler had to be coaxed out of the 
wilderness by another hunter, Mr. Ryan.  
. . .

 

E.        
Ditzler did not see Billings again until she returned to the trailhead 
with the assistance of two other hunters; several hours after Billings left her 
in the mountains.  . . 
.

 

F.         
Billings prioritized his mules over the wellbeing and safety of his 
client, Sandra Ditzler.  . . 
.

 

G.        
Billings contemplated the seriousness of leaving his client, and chose to 
leave Ditzler behind with Mr. Ryan and Mr. [D'Amico].  . . .  Despite the fact he acknowledged that 
Ditzler was dizzy and assured her he would come back and check on her, he 
decided to leave Ditzler's wellbeing to the survival skills of his other 
clients.  . . 
.

 

H.        
Billings' rationale for leaving his hunters was not a justification for 
abandoning Ditzler in a wilderness area.  
The fact that Billings contemplated Mr. Ryan's survival skills and felt 
"somewhat good" about Ditzler's husband and Eric Ryan being with Ditzler if 
"something went and got worse" indicates Billings knew and contemplated 
potential dangers to his client, and chose to abandon her in spite of those 
potential risks.  . . .  Consequently, Billings willfully 
endangered Ditzler's health and safety by abandoning her in the wilderness on or 
about October 10, 1997.

 

The 
Board concluded, as a matter of law, that Billings willfully endangered 
Ditzler's health and safety by leaving or abandoning Ditzler in the wilderness 
in order to get his livestock back to the trailhead and never returning to check 
on her well-being or progress, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(ix) 
and (x) and Chapter 3, Sections 1(o) and (t) of the Board's rules.22  We have previously set forth the 
language contained in these provisions, as well as relevant definitions of its 
terms.

 

[¶50]   Billings first argues that the 
Board could not properly conclude that Billings willfully endangered Ditzler 
absent expert testimony establishing a standard of care and Billings' breach of 
that standard of care.  Billings 
asserts that he exercised his professional judgment on the trail due to 
difficulties with his pack string of mules, and the Board essentially concluded 
that Billings' professional judgment fell below some industry standard.  He contends that the Board therefore 
subjectively evaluated Billings' judgment without the "guidance of expert 
opinion, or any regulations in place which set a standard related to the 
abandonment'" of Ditzler.

 

[¶51]   Billings advanced a similar 
argument in Billings I regarding the Board's finding that Billings 
willfully endangered the health and safety of Dan Nutsch by "permitting him to 
be injured while caring for livestock which should have been properly cared for 
by'" Billings' employees.  
Billings I, 2001 WY 81, ¶ 17, 30 P.3d  at 566.  We commented on that issue, in pertinent 
part, as follows:

 

Obviously, 
clients on an outfitted hunting trip must participate in the adventure.  The extent of such participation, 
however, is not something this court has within its 
knowledge.

 

            
Perhaps the Board, which consists of a number of persons who would 
undoubtedly qualify as experts in the field of outfitting, used its expertise to 
determine that Billings' actions failed to meet his duty of care as an 
outfitter.  However, our decision in 
Devous v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 418 (Wyo.1993), 
does not permit the Board to do that:

 

"Turning 
then to the appeal of the Board with respect to the decision of the district 
court to set aside certain statutory grounds for failure of substantial 
evidence, we affirm the district court in that regard.  The crux of the issue is whether the 
record must include expert testimony with respect to those statutory grounds, or 
whether we must acknowledge and accept the expertise of the Board members in 
establishing standards that demonstrate infringement of the statute.  There was no expert testimony offered at 
the hearing to establish standards with respect to these statutory grounds.  If judicial review has any purpose, it 
must be exercised by objectively evaluating evidence in the record.  There is no way that a judicial review 
could reach the subjective determination of standards by individual members of 
the Board.  . . 
."

 

In 
this case, if the Board intends to rely on a finding that Billings' conduct 
regarding the mule kick incident fell below the standard of care for those in 
his industry, the Board should rely on expert testimony in making such a 
finding.  . . . [A]bsent any 
indication in its findings that the Board is relying on expert testimony, we 
conclude that the finding is insufficient to permit 
review.

 

Id., 
2001 WY 81, ¶¶ 17-18, 30 P.3d  at 566-67 (footnote 
omitted).

 

[¶52]   We find that the record is 
sufficient in the instant case, without additional expert testimony, to allow us 
objectively to evaluate the evidence, the Board's findings, and the applicable 
statutory language.  While expert 
testimony might have assisted the Board, the concerns we referenced in 
Billings I do not exist with respect to the Ditzler violation, which 
violation arises in a different context.  
Neither the nature of the violation, nor the facts underlying it, 
involves subject matter "not within our knowledge" or requiring additional 
expert testimony.  The state of the 
record is such that in reviewing the issue, we are not required merely to accept 
the Board's subjective expertise for a standard that demonstrates infringement 
of the statute.  Contrary to 
Billings' argument, it does not appear that the Board's use of the term 
"abandonment" was for purposes of establishing a formal standard of care, but 
was the Board's factual characterization of Billings' 
actions.

 

[¶53]   Billings also argues that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish that he willfully endangered Ditzler's 
health and safety.  Billings 
contends that he did not "abandon" Ditzler, and his decision to proceed down the 
trail did not "increase the danger or peril" to Ditzler.  We conclude that the Board could 
properly have found that Billings willfully endangered Ditzler's health and 
safety from the totality of the evidence, especially considering the evidence as 
to:  (1) Billings' knowledge prior 
to, and throughout, the incident, including his knowledge in deciding to take 
the entire group and the mule pack string to the trailhead by himself, his 
knowledge of Ditzler prior to departing on the trail, his knowledge as to the 
nature of the trail and the nature of the livestock, etc.; (2) Ditzler's 
difficulties and condition as the group navigated the trail;  (3) Billings' resulting response as to 
what he felt was required under the circumstances; (4) Billings' actions in 
leaving Ditzler on the trail; (5) the terrain, the time of day, and the weather; 
(6) the subsequent deterioration in Ditzler's condition; and (7) Billings' 
actions upon arriving at the trail head vis a vis the surrounding 
circumstances.  "We do not 
substitute our judgment on the facts for that of the agency if [sufficient] 
evidence exists, even though different conclusions might be drawn from that 
evidence."  Gray v. Wyoming State 
Bd. of Equalization, 896 P.2d 1347, 1348 (Wyo. 1995).       

 

 

[¶54]   Billings asserts that even if there 
was sufficient evidence for the Board to find that he committed these 
violations, the Board failed adequately to explain why it revoked his 
outfitter's license, as opposed to some other sanction, and acted arbitrarily by 
failing to link its findings and conclusions to its ultimate decision regarding 
an appropriate sanction and to Billings' general fitness to be a licensed 
outfitter.  The Board argues that its findings were 
"detailed and thorough," and sufficiently explained why the violations were 
"adequate grounds" to revoke Billings' outfitter's 
license.

 

[¶55]   In reviewing the merits of a 
sanction imposed by an agency, several courts have defined the scope of our 
review as one in which we will not overturn an agency's choice of sanction 
unless we find that the sanction is unwarranted in law or without justification 
in fact.  See, for example, Butz 
v. Glover Livestock Commission Co., Inc., 411 U.S. 182, 185-89, 93 S. Ct. 1455, 1458-59, 36 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1973); 
Norinsberg Corp. v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 47 F.3d 1224, 
1228 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 974 (1995); 
Chapman v. United States, Dept. of Health & Human Services, 821 F.2d 523, 529 (10th Cir. 1987); 
Larsen v. Commission on Medical Competency, 1998 ND 193, 585 N.W.2d 801, 
808 (N.D. 1998); 
and Johnson v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists of State of 
Okl., 1996 OK 41, 913 P.2d 1339, 1347 (Okl. 1996).  The Board found that the violations 
Billings committed were, "separately and/or collectively, . . . adequate grounds 
to revoke" his outfitter's license.

 

[¶56]   The Board's decision to revoke 
Billings' outfitter's license clearly was warranted in law because Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(iv) and (ix) grant the Board the authority to "suspend or 
revoke a license" for a "[v]iolation of any significant federal or state law or 
related regulations pertaining to wildlife, game and fish" and for "[w]illfully 
endangering the health and safety of any person[.]"

 

[¶57]   We further find that the facts 
supporting the imposition of a license revocation are apparent from the record 
before us.  Billings' argument 
tracks with our recent holding that the record must contain sufficient factual 
findings for this Court to understand the basis for an agency's conclusion that 
a licensee's violations warranted a license revocation rather than a license 
suspension or some other lesser sanctionthe agency's findings must be 
sufficient for this Court to follow the agency's reasoning from the evidentiary 
facts on record to its eventual legal conclusions.  Legarda, 2003 WY 130, ¶ 12, 77 P.3d  at 712-13.

 

[¶58]   In Legarda, 2003 WY 130, ¶¶ 
3-4, 77 P.3d  at 710, 
the Department of Transportation (DOT) instituted license revocation proceedings 
against Legarda, doing business as Laris Auto Sales, for violating several state 
statutes and the department's rules and regulations.  Following a contested case hearing, the 
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) concluded that Legarda violated two 
statutes and one department rule.  
Id., 2003 WY 130, ¶ 6, 77 P.3d  at 710.  "Based upon these violations and DOT's 
discretion to revoke licenses when violations are found, OAH upheld DOT's 
proposed revocation of Laris' dealer license and bond forfeiture."  Id.  Legarda appealed that determination to 
this Court.  On appeal, we concluded 
that

 

the 
OAH order does not contain sufficient factual findings to enable this Court to 
understand the basis for the hearing examiner's conclusion that Laris' 
violations warranted revocation of its dealership license rather than suspension 
or some other lesser punishment.  That is, we hold the record does not 
contain such factual findings as would permit us to follow the agency's 
reasoning from the evidentiary facts on record to its eventual legal 
conclusions.  Newman [v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div.], 2002 WY 91, ¶16, 49 P.3d 163 [(Wyo.2002)].

 

. 
. .

 

In 
the present case, it is clear from the findings of fact in the order that OAH 
found Laris violated certain DOT statutes and regulations.  While we do not question the validity of 
those findings, we do observe their relatively minor nature.  Nothing in the record indicates Laris 
had a history of such violations despite its many years of operation in Fremont 
County.  While the violations may 
have resulted in minor inconveniences to those who purchased automobiles from 
Laris, no one alleged Laris was acting fraudulently or intentionally trying to 
take advantage of its customers.  
Following the compliance review, a follow-up inspection revealed no 
violations.  Yet, DOT proposed 
revoking the license and forfeiting the bond, thus putting Laris out of business 
permanently.  What is not clear from 
the findings, and what is not apparent anywhere in the record before us, is the 
reason for the decision to revoke Laris' license rather than suspend or take 
some other less drastic action to obtain compliance.  There is quite simply nothing in the 
record indicating what facts supported the imposition of the most severe penalty 
available.  Under these 
circumstances, the OAH order cannot stand absent further findings explaining the 
reasons why revocation, rather than suspension or some other lesser penalty, is 
warranted.  Scott [v. 
McTiernan], 974 P.2d 966 [(Wyo.1999)]; Billings, 2001 WY 81, ¶13, 30 P.3d 557.

 

Legarda, 
2003 WY 130, ¶¶ 12, 14, 77 P.3d  at 712-13.

 

[¶59]   It is certainly advisable that, 
when imposing a sanction, an agency take special care to ensure that its 
findings establish a clear nexus between the evidentiary facts and the agency's 
legal conclusion.  However, the 
circumstances underlying our decision in Legarda are distinguishable from 
those in the instant case.  In 
Legarda, we emphasized the "relatively minor nature" of Legarda's 
violations, which violations "may" have resulted in "minor inconveniences" to 
Legarda's clients but did not involve fraudulent conduct or an intentional 
attempt to take advantage of a client.  
Id., 2003 WY 130, ¶ 14, 77 P.3d  at 713.  In the instant case, Billings' conduct 
willfully endangered a client's health and safety and violated a significant 
federal regulation relating to wildlife, the stated goal of which regulation is 
"minimizing grizzly/human encounters and thereby providing for user safety" and 
grizzly bear protection.

 

[¶60]   Billings also claims that, based on 
the dispositions of other cases before the Board, he was subjected to arbitrary, 
selective and unequal treatment by the Board in revoking his outfitter's 
license, as opposed to imposing a lesser sanction.  Billings filed a motion in the district 
court to supplement the administrative record with pertinent portions of the 
Board's meeting minutes for a five-year period.  Billings offered the meeting minutes to 
demonstrate that the Board,

 

in 
nearly every instance when an outfitter or guide applies for the issuance or 
renewal of a license and has violated a law or regulation pertaining to 
wildlife, game or fish or has been convicted of a felony, usually admonishes the 
applicant and either grants the license as requested or grants a conditional 
license, but almost never denies a license.

 

It 
does not appear that the district court ruled on Billings' motion to supplement 
the record.  Billings does not cite 
to any pertinent legal authority in advancing this argument.  Notwithstanding the district court's 
failure to rule on Billings' motion to supplement the record, the "employment of 
a sanction within the authority of an administrative agency is . . . 
not rendered invalid in a particular case because it is more severe than 
sanctions imposed in other cases" and "mere unevenness in the application of the 
sanction does not render its application in a particular case unwarranted in 
law.'"  Butz, 411 U.S.  at 
187-88.

 

 

[¶61]   Billings filed a Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 to 1-37-115 (LexisNexis 2003)) within the same document 
as his Petition for Review of Agency Action.  In that complaint, he set forth nine 
counts alleging constitutional infirmities concerning various state statutes and 
rules promulgated by the Board, and that the Board lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate particular issues.  The 
district court found that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(v) was 
unconstitutionally vague, but otherwise rejected Billings' declaratory judgment 
allegations.  The Board did not 
cross-appeal the district court's ruling.

 

[¶62]   In his appellate brief, Billings 
begins his discussion of the declaratory judgment issues by summarizing each of 
the nine counts contained in the original complaint.  These summaries are not accompanied by 
any citations to pertinent legal authority.  "We have consistently held that we will 
not consider claims unsupported by cogent argument or pertinent authority."  Barkell v. State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 
32, 55 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶63]   Several more specific arguments 
follow these summaries.  Billings 
first contends that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(v), which statute provides 
that the Board may suspend or revoke a license for "[u]nethical or dishonorable 
conduct," is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.  The Board utilized this statutory 
provision in finding that Billings acted "unethically and dishonorably" in:  (1) calling a former client a "son of a 
bitch" and threatening the client with physical violence by expressing a desire 
to settle their dispute "face to face" and "with our fists" in an October 29, 
1997, letter; and (2) challenging Eric Ryan to a fight and shoving him when Ryan 
and Ditzler returned to the trailhead in October 1997.

 

[¶64]   Billings advances this argument on 
appeal to preserve the issue in light of a potential "ambiguity" in the district 
court's orders.  In its August 15, 
2002, Order On Declaratory Judgment, the district court found that the statutory 
language "unethical or dishonorable conduct" was "unconstitutionally 
vague."  The district court 
otherwise rejected Billings' declaratory judgment arguments.  In its November 27, 2002, Findings and 
Order Affirming Order of the Board, the district court referred to its prior 
determination that the statutory language was unconstitutional and proceeded to 
consider the merits of the issues Billings raised in his petition for 
review.  The district court 
ultimately ordered that the Board be "affirmed and for the reasons given in the 
August 15, 2002 order of this Court, the declaratory judgment action is 
dismissed."  Although this quoted 
language is imprecise, it remains clear from the totality of both the district 
court's orders that the district court did not intend to deviate from, or alter, 
its finding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(v) was unconstitutionally 
vague.  We need not consider the 
merits of the issue on appeal because the Board did not cross-appeal the 
district court's ruling on the issue.

 

[¶65]   Billings next asserts that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(iv), which statute allows the Board to suspend or 
revoke a license for a "[v]iolation of any significant federal or state law or 
related regulations pertaining to wildlife, game and fish," is 
unconstitutionally vague on its face.  
He contends that the provision does not sufficiently define the terms 
"significant laws or regulations" or "violation."  Billings also argues generally that 
"willful endangerment," as utilized by the Board in the instant case, does not 
establish an adequate standard for measuring one's conduct, although he does not 
cite any pertinent legal authority in advancing this 
argument.

 

[¶66]   We addressed these arguments in our 
prior opinion in this matter:

 

Despite 
Billings' complaints that the Board has provided no definition of which 
regulations will be considered significant, that is not a concern in this 
case.  . . .

 

. 
. . 

 

Billings 
also complains that certain statutory provisions require definition.  He complains that the Board must define 
"willfully endangering" found in § 23-2-416(a)(ix).  We are of the opinion that those terms 
are not so technical that further definition is required.  . . .

 

Billings 
also complains that the Board must define the term "violation" found in § 
23-2-416(a)(iv).  However, we agree 
with the State that this term needs no further definition.  Violation in this context simply means 
non-compliance with the law or regulation in question.

 

Billings 
I, 
2001 WY 81, ¶¶ 27, 34-35, 30 P.3d  at 569, 571.

 

[¶67]   Billings argues that Chapter 3, 
Section 1(n) of the Board's rules is similarly vague.  That provision states that a licensee 
shall

 

maintain 
neat, orderly and sanitary camps at all times and shall provide clean, fresh 
drinking water, protect all food from contamination and dispose of all garbage, 
debris and human waste.  Livestock 
facilities shall be separate from camp facilities.  Streams shall be protected from 
contamination.

 

Billings' 
three-paragraph argument (primarily in the form of a series of questions based 
on the rule's language) on this issue does not constitute cogent argument, and 
Billings does not cite to any pertinent legal authority in advancing this 
particular argument.

 

[¶68]   Billings' final argument is that 
several subsections of a Code of Ethics (Chapter 3, Section 2 of the Board's 
rules) the Board promulgated and filed of record in 2001 (after the contested 
case hearing and our prior opinion in this matter) are unconstitutionally 
vague.23  Billings challenges the "prospective 
application of these rules" because a future violation "may" result in the 
denial, suspension or revocation of his outfitter's license, and his expected 
future business "will be" affected by the rules.  He also expresses "concern" that the new 
rules "will serve as a convenient vehicle for retribution for the lengthy and 
expensive battle that Mr. Billings has mounted against the Board."  The Board counters that Billings lacks 
standing to challenge the new rules and that the rules are not constitutionally 
infirm.24

 

[¶69]   "Standing is a concept utilized to 
determine if a party is sufficiently affected to insure that a justiciable 
controversy is presented to the court.'"  
Memorial Hosp. of Laramie County v. Department of Revenue and Taxation 
of State of Wyo., 770 P.2d 223, 226 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Washakie County School Dist. 
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980)).  A party has standing "only if he has a 
tangible and legally protectible interest at stake in the litigation; his 
interest must be injured or threatened with injury by the administrative action 
of which he complains."  Memorial Hosp. of Laramie County, 770 P.2d  at 226.  Further,

 

[d]eclaratory 
relief should be liberally administered if the elements of a justiciable 
controversy exist to give the trial court jurisdiction.  Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 
577 (Wyo.1974).  For that 
controversy to exist, a genuine right or interest must be at issue between 
adversarial parties, and the trial court must be able to make an effective 
judgment which will finally determine the rights of the parties.  Id. at 578.  Even these prerequisites, however, may 
properly be avoided or relaxed when matters of great public interest or 
importance are presented to the trial court.

 

Memorial 
Hosp. of Laramie County, 
770 P.2d  at 226.  The Declaratory Judgments Act "gives 
the courts no power to determine future rights or anticipated disputes or 
controversies.'"  State Dept. of 
Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1169 (Wyo. 
1994) (quoting White v. Board of Land 
Com'rs, 595 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo. 1979)).

 

[¶70]   In Pacificorp, 872 P.2d  at 
1164-65, 
taxpayers sought a declaratory judgment regarding rules the State Department of 
Revenue and Taxation promulgated "pertaining to the ad valorem tax exemption for 
pollution control property, claiming that the State exceeded its statutory 
authority when it promulgated the rules."  
The rules took effect in February 1992, and the taxpayers filed for 
declaratory relief in June 1992.  
Id.  The taxpayers 
acknowledged that the tax exemption issues were "not the subject of a direct 
dispute in the 1992 valuation determination,'" but argued that the "threat of 
harm and improper taxation [was] present and real'" and that "a justiciable 
controversy existed because they may apply in the future for the exemption . . . 
and the State may deny the request."  
Id. at 1168.  We 
concluded that no justiciable controversy existed, stating the 
following:

 

The 
taxpayers contend that the threat of harm and improper taxation was present and 
real.  We 
disagree.

 

            
The taxpayers did not present any evidence which indicated that their 
interests had actually been injured or that an imminent threat of such an injury 
existed.  If we were to rule on the 
validity of the [rule's] language, our ruling would not effectively operate to 
terminate an actual controversy.

 

            
The taxpayers rely on Memorial Hospital of Laramie County as 
authority for their argument that a justiciable controversy existed in this 
case.  In Memorial Hospital of 
Laramie County, the controversy centered around the sales and use taxation 
of materials which were used in the construction of an addition to a 
hospital.  The Department of Revenue 
and Taxation notified a subcontractor who supplied materials "through a direct 
contract with the hospital while providing labor relating to those materials 
through a separate labor subcontract with [the construction manager]" that the 
materials were subject to taxation.  
[Memorial Hospital of Laramie County,] 770 P.2d  at 225.  The hospital filed a claim for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that its tax-exempt status precluded 
taxation of the materials.  
Id.  It also paid, 
under protest, the taxes which were assessed against the subcontractor.  Although the hospital may not have been 
immediately obligated to pay the tax, the Court held that a justiciable 
controversy existed because "the injury [was] sufficiently imminent as to 
warrant judicial consideration."  
770 P.2d  at 227.

 

            
The Memorial Hospital of Laramie County situation is different 
from the situation in the case at bar.  
In that case, the Department of Revenue and Taxation had already notified 
the subcontractor that the materials were subject to taxation.  Even if, as the Court suggested, the 
hospital may not have been immediately obligated to pay the tax, the parties had 
taken certain material steps which presented a real and imminent threat to the 
hospital's interest.

 

            
In this case, the State had neither made nor threatened to make a demand 
for payment of a tax on uncapitalized property.  In fact, the taxpayers concede that the 
[rule's] language "was not the subject of a direct dispute in the 1992 valuation 
determination."  The threat was not 
real at that point.

 

            
This case did not present a matter of great public interest or importance 
and, therefore, did not warrant relaxation of the justiciability 
requirement.  This Court stated in 
Brimmer that the great public interest or importance exception to the 
justiciability requirement "must be applied with caution and its exercise must 
be a matter where strict standards are applied."  521 P.2d  at 578.  Since an exemption for uncapitalized 
property was not requested or denied, our refusal to entertain this action will 
not put the taxed entities or the public coffers at risk.

 

Pacificorp, 
872 P.2d at 1169 (footnote omitted).

 

[¶71]   We similarly conclude in the 
instant case that no justiciable controversy exists as to the Board's Code of 
Ethics at this time because any decision regarding the validity of certain 
sections of the new rules would not effectively operate to terminate an actual 
controversy.  Billings was not 
subject to the new rules at the time he filed for declaratory relief, and we 
have upheld the Board's revocation of Billings' outfitter's license.  Further, the only administrative action 
at issue is the Board's issuance of the new rules.  The Board promulgated the new rules well 
after this matter commenced, the Board did not utilize the new rules as a basis 
to sanction Billings, and there is no evidence constituting a real and imminent 
threat of any such action.  Billings 
admittedly challenges the "prospective" application of the new rules which "may" 
result in some future action by the Board and Billings does not argue that this 
case presents a matter of great public interest or importance.  Such a challenge does not meet our 
criteria for standing, especially considering our decision in 
Pacificorp.

 

 

[¶72]   The evidence was sufficient to 
support the Board's findings that Billings violated a significant federal 
regulation pertaining to wildlife, game and fish, that Billings willfully 
endangered the health and safety of Sandra Ditzler, and that Billings' 
outfitter's license should therefore be revoked.  Our conclusion that insufficient 
evidence existed to support the Board's finding that Billings willfully 
endangered the health and safety of consumers of the lower camp's water supply, 
maintained an unsanitary camp, failed to keep livestock facilities separate from 
camp facilities, and failed to protect a stream from contamination does not 
affect the result or ultimate affirmance of this case.  Billings' declaratory judgment arguments 
were either resolved by the district court, resolved in Billings I, not 
supported by citation to pertinent legal authority, or did not present a 
justiciable controversy.  We 
affirm.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Billings v. Wyo. State Bd. of 
Outfitters and Professional Guides, 837 P.2d 84 (Wyo. 1992) involved the same parties, but is not 
factually relevant to the current dispute between the 
parties.

 

  2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(v) is 
the only meaningful substantive provision at issue concerning these two 
violations.  The Board found the 
same two violations pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a)(x) and Chapter 3, 
Section 1(t) of the Board's rules.  
But subsection (a)(x) of the statute provides only that the Board may 
suspend or revoke a license for a violation "of this act or any rule or 
regulation of the board" and Chapter 3, Section 1(t) of the Board's rules 
provides that a licensee "shall not violate any provision of the Act [defined by 
Chapter 1, Section 2(a) of the Board's rules as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-406 et 
seq.]"

 

  3Chapter 3, Section 1(o) of the 
Board's rules similarly provides that a "licensee shall not willfully endanger 
the health or safety of the public" and Section 1(t) states that a "licensee 
shall not violate any provision of the Act."

 

  4After his testimony was completed, 
Krantz supplied the Board (at the Board's request) with photographs from his 
hunting trip, which the Board admitted, without objection, as an exhibit.  Krantz did not specifically testify to 
the contents of the photographs or how the photographs corresponded with his 
testimony regarding what he observed at the lower camp.

 

Some 
of the photographs depict two areas:  
an area near the spring and an area near the creek.  Two to three locations near the spring 
and two to three locations near the creek are circled on the photographs, 
presumably to indicate piles of manure.  
It is not apparent from the record who circled these locations nor is it 
readily apparent from the photographs what is contained in the circled 
locations.  Two circled locations 
(one near the spring and one near the creek) do not even appear to correspond to 
any decipherable object.  Neither 
Krantz's written statement, nor his hearing testimony, specifically refers to 
"manure" in the creek area.

 

  5Indeed, Krantz also referred to 
"bear sign" as "manure" during his testimony.

 

  6Krantz testified at the hearing that 
it was an hour later, but his October 1996, letter states that it was "about" 
twenty to thirty minutes later.

 

   7Billings testified that had Krantz 
informed someone of what he observed, any resulting problems could have easily 
been solved.

 

  8Krantz did not eat dinner the night 
he observed the black horse near the spring, but did not state that this was due 
to any concerns regarding what he had previously observed.

 

  9A "picket" is a stake driven into 
the ground, to which livestock is tied through the halter via a thirty to 
forty-foot rope on a swivel.

 

  10The lower camp's tents were about 
one-hundred-fifty yards from Open Creek.  
For purposes of this issue, it does not appear that Open Creek is 
considered the same body of water as the spring or the creek flowing from the 
spring.

 

  11Billings testified that in terms of 
cleanliness, the camp "is to be impeccable and kept that way."  Krantz testified that "in general," the 
lower camp was sanitary.  According 
to Jim Bruno, the hunting camps were "clean."  Owen Tucker, a professional guide, 
testified that "cleanliness was good and the camp was . . . well maintained," 
and that compared to other outfitters he had worked for, Billings' camps were 
"as good or better than any of them . . .."  Michael Melnar, who accompanied hunters 
and livestock along the trail for Billings, testified that in 1997, the hunting 
camps were "very clean."  Robert 
Marvin, a hunter who had been on twenty-five outfitted hunts including several 
with Billings, testified that Billings' hunting camps were "as good as any" 
others he had seen.  Lon Hoyer, who 
hunted in Billings' camps in 1997, testified that Billings' camp was "a lot 
better than a lot of camps I've had myself" in terms of 
cleanliness.

 

  12The Board did not refer to any 
particular portion of the video when making this finding.

 

  13Chapter 3, Section 1(t) of the 
Board's rules provides that a licensee "shall not violate any provision of the 
Act."

 

  1436 C.F.R. § 261.50(a) and (b) 
provide:

 

(a)        The 
Chief, each Regional Forester . . . and each Forest Supervisor may issue orders 
which close or restrict the use of described areas within the area over which he 
has jurisdiction.  An order may 
close an area to entry or may restrict the use of an area by applying any or all 
of the prohibitions authorized in this subpart or any portion 
thereof.

 

(b)        The 
Chief, each Regional Forester . . . and each Forest Supervisor may issue orders 
which close or restrict the use of any National Forest System road or trail 
within the area over which he has jurisdiction.

 

  15Billings does not contend that the 
incident at issue occurred outside the areas regulated by the Order. 

 

  1636 C.F.R. § 261.58 (2003) states, 
in pertinent part:

 

When 
provided by an order, the following are prohibited:

 

. 
. .

 

(s)        
Possessing, storing, or transporting any bird, fish, or other animal or 
parts thereof, as specified in the order.

 

  17The Order defines an "[a]nimal 
carcass" as "the dead body or parts thereof, of any mammal, bird, or fish 
including domestic livestock" and "[a]cceptable storage" as "stored in a bear 
resistant container," "stored in a closed vehicle constructed of solid, 
nonpliable material," or "suspended at least 10 feet clear of the ground at all 
points and 4 feet horizontally from any supporting tree or 
pole."

 

  18The Order states that violations 
are punishable by a specified fine and/or imprisonment "for not more than six 
months . . .."  See also 36 
C.F.R. § 261.1b (2003).

 

  19In a footnote, Billings argues that 
the federal Forest Service had "special competence to determine whether its own 
regulation was violated," creating "primary jurisdiction" in the Forest 
Service.  Citing People v. 
Fremont Energy Corp., 651 P.2d 802, 810 (Wyo. 1982), 
he summarily concludes that because the Forest Service "did not find a 
violation," "neither can the Board."

 

First, 
the state of the record appears to be that there is no evidence that the Forest 
Service sought formally to enforce the regulation against Billings, not that the 
Forest Service found no violation.  
As previously discussed, the record clearly and convincingly established 
that Billings violated the regulation.  
Second, Billings' discussion of this issue (four sentences in one 
footnote) does not amount to cogent argument regarding how the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction applies to the particular circumstances of the instant case 
(i.e., the application of the doctrine to issues involving a state licensing 
board and a federal agency, how the mule carcass incident raised issues not 
within the conventional experience of the Board, what legislative intent exists 
that the Forest Service should decide the issue initially, and how the doctrine 
operates to preclude the Board from addressing a licensing issue entirely or 
indefinitely).  See Fremont 
Energy Corp., 651 P.2d  at 810-14.

 

  20Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-401(a) 
(LexisNexis 2003) states that no nonresident "shall hunt big or trophy game 
animals on any designated wilderness area . . . unless accompanied by a licensed 
professional guide or a resident guide" and that there "shall be at least one 
(1) licensed professional guide or resident guide accompanying each two (2) 
nonresident hunters."

 

  21Billings stated that Brian McCabe 
traveled with him ahead of the others but by the time the respective parties 
reached the trailhead, it appears that McCabe arrived just slightly ahead of 
Ryan and Ditzler.

 

  22In a footnote, Billings argues that 
the Act only applies to "situations where a non-resident hunter' is hunting big 
or trophy game animals," and therefore does not apply to Ditzler's situation 
because she was not a hunter on the trip.  
Billings does not dispute that he met the definition of an "outfitter" 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-406(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003) or that the 
Board licensed him as an outfitter pursuant to the Act.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-416(a) grants the 
Board the authority to suspend or revoke an outfitter's license issued under the 
Act for willfully endangering the health and safety of any 
person.  Chapter 3, Section 
1(o) of the Board's rules states that a licensee shall not willfully endanger 
the health and safety of the public.

 

  23Interestingly, several sections of 
the Code of Ethics Billings discusses in his principal appellate brief are not 
specifically referenced in his Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment.

 

  24The Board does not argue that 
Billings lacks standing as to any other issue.