Case Title: HUBERT NICKLE V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PLATTE COUNTY, STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-128

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
HUBERT NICKLE V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PLATTE COUNTY, STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 115Case Number: 06-128Decided: 07/24/2007NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
HUBERT 
NICKLE,Appellant(Defendant),v.BOARD OF 
COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF PLATTECOUNTY, STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofPlatteCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Frank J. 
Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Eric 
Alden, Wheatland, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Hubert 
Nickle (hereafter, "Nickle"), challenges the district court's order that had the 
effect of applying a portion of a supersedeas bond that Nickle posted in an 
earlier appeal, which arose out of the same circumstances as the instant appeal, 
so as to recompense the Appellee, Platte County Board of County Commissioners 
("the County"), for damages it suffered as a result of that appeal (which was 
dismissed for want of prosecution).  
We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Nickle states the 
issue he wants the Court to address as follows:

 
 
            
Does [the County] have the right to recover the costs expended for 
abatement of a nuisance?

 
 
The 
County poses an entirely different question:

 
 
            
Is [the County] entitled to recover against the supersedeas bond in [Case 
No.] 05-252 for its damages incurred by the delay caused by filing of that 
appeal?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      At the outset we 
will take note that, as the record on appeal in this case, we have only a 
portion of a very short district court record.  It consists of 49 pages from the clerk's 
record, and that includes counting certificates of service and designations of 
the record by the parties.  
Transcripts of the several hearings held in this case are not 
included.

 
 
[¶4]      A complaint was 
first filed on February 19, 2004, although it is not included in the record on 
appeal.  On March 12, 2004, Nickle 
answered that complaint pro se, 
stating:  "I don't believe I am in 
violation of statutes referred to in this complaint.  My zoning is proper for this 
purpose.  These regs. were adopted 
after I was zoned & established this use.... P.S. You weren't able to even 
spell my name right."

 
 
[¶5]      On March 31, 
2004, the County filed an amended complaint.  The County prefaced its complaint with 
the statement that it is the governing body of PlatteCounty 
and in that capacity had adopted a zoning resolution regulating the use of lands 
within PlatteCounty.  The zoning resolution itself is not in 
the record.  Continuing, the County 
alleged:

 
 
2.  [Nickle 
is] the owner of part of the SE1/4NW1/4, 
Section 20, Township 24 North, Range 67 West of the 6th P.M., in 
Platte County Wyoming.

            
3.  [Nickle is] currently using [his] property for the storage 
of derelict vehicles and miscellaneous junk.

            
4.  [Nickle has] not obtained a special permit as required 
under the Platte County Zoning Rules and Regulations for the maintenance or 
operation of a junkyard on the lands in question.

            
5.  [Nickle's] use of the lands in question is in violation of 
the Platte County Zoning Resolution.  
Pursuant to W.S. § 18-5-204 each day's continuation of the violation is a 
separate offense.

            
6.  Pursuant to W.S. 18-5-206 each day's violation is subject 
to a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars 
($750.00).

            
7.  Pursuant to W.S. § 18-5-205 the zoning resolution is 
enforceable by injunction and abatement.

            
NOW THEREFORE the plaintiffs pray that the Court enjoin [Nickle] from 
continued use of [his] lands in violation of the Platte County Zoning Resolution 
and order the abatement of the violating use at the expense of [Nickle] and 
further that the Court fine [Nickle] an appropriate amount for [his] continuing 
violation of the zoning resolution.

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court's order, entered on October 8, 2004, recites that a trial was had on 
September 28, 2004.  There is no 
transcript of that trial in the record.  
The district court's findings, made after that trial, 
were:

 
 
            
1.  The property in question is zoned industrial and does not 
have a special permit for use as a commercial junkyard.

            
2.  PlatteCounty's zoning regulations require that a 
special permit be obtained for industrial property to be used as a 
junkyard.

            
3.  The current use of the property by Nickle is as a junkyard 
as that term is defined in the Platte County Zoning 
Regulations.

            
4.  The Defendant Nickle raises three defenses which the Court 
addresses as follows:

                        
a.  The Defendant's ex-wife, Maria Nickle, was not served with 
the Complaint.  The Court finds that 
Maria Nickle, although named as a defendant in the case, has no interest in the 
property, that interest having been set over to Defendant, Hubert Nickle, in a 
divorce approximately ten years ago.

                        
b.  The use of the property as a junkyard is 
grandfathered.  The Court finds that 
the Defendant's use of the property did not begin until after the adoption of 
the Platte County Zoning Regulations and so is not 
grandfathered.

                        
c.  The Defendant's use of the property as a junkyard results 
in an estoppel in this action.  The 
Defendant has not established the elements necessary to support a finding of 
estoppel.

            
NOW THEREFORE the Court finds generally for the Plaintiff, Board of 
County Commissioners for PlatteCounty, State of Wyoming, in this matter 
and enters the following orders of injunction and 
abatement.

 
 
ORDER OF 
INJUNCTION

 
 
            
The Defendant Hubert Nickle is hereby enjoined from using the SE1/4NW1/4, 
Section 20, Township 24 North, Range 67 West of the 6th P.M., in 
Platte County Wyoming, as a junkyard as that term is defined in the Platte 
County Zoning Regulations until such time as he secures a special use permit 
authorizing the use of the property for that purpose.  The Defendant is enjoined from receiving 
onto the property additional scrap metal, derelict vehicles, or other similar 
materials until such time as a special use permit is 
obtained.

 
 
ORDER OF 
ABATEMENT

 
 
            
The Defendant Hubert Nickle is ordered to abate his illegal use of the 
property within sixty (60) days of September 28, 2004, by removing from that 
property all scrap metal, abandoned mobile homes, unlicensed vehicles and other 
salvage materials.

 
 
[¶7]      Nickle's efforts 
to subvert and delay said order were called to the district court's 
attention.  On December 8, 2004, the 
district court issued an order to show cause.  A hearing was held on December 20, 2004, 
but a transcript of it is not included in the record on appeal.  On January 6, 2005, after that hearing, 
the district court supplemented its original order as 
follows:

 
 
            
1.  The Defendant has not made good faith efforts to comply 
with the Court's Order of Abatement filed herein on October 8, 
2004.

            
2.  The Defendant may comply with the October 8, 2004, Order 
between this date and January 23, 2005.

            
3.  It is necessary to issue an Order authorizing the County to 
remove the illegal materials as listed in the Order filed October 8, 2004, and 
impose a lien against the property to acquire payment of such 
removal.

            
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that effective January 24, 2005, the County 
may remove all scrap metal, abandoned mobile homes, unlicensed vehicles and 
other salvage materials from the lands of the Defendant.  The County shall have a lien against the 
materials removed or the proceeds of their sale and the Defendant's lands 
located in the SE1/4NW1/4, Section 20, 
Township 24 North, Range 67 West of the 6th 
P.M., in Platte County, 
Wyoming, known as 
26 Sawmill Rd., Wheatland, Wyoming
, to assure repayment of the costs of 
removal.

 
 
[¶8]      Nickle wrote to 
the district court on January 23, 2005, indicating that he had done a 
significant amount of work toward satisfying the district court's order, but 
that he needed an extension of time in order to fully be in 
compliance.

 
 
[¶9]      The record does 
not reflect what the County's or the district court's responses were, but the 
next document in the record is a letter to the County, from Nickle, dated 
September 30, 2005.  In that letter 
he stated that he had removed 1.5 million pounds of material from his 
property.  He conceded there were a 
few things left to be removed, but most of the remaining materials were things 
that were not "other salvage material."  
Continuing, Nickle related this to the County:

 
 
We do 
not own the scrap cars that are visible east of our property.  If one were to see those cars that Walt 
Hall has on his property, one might assume they were mine, and they are 
not.  There is similar items on 
others adjoining properties.

            
Eric Alden, the CountyAttorney, admitted that he doesn't know 
anything about the "scrap business."  
Marlin Johnson stated in his December 3, 2003 letter:  "In addition, a junkyard is allowed in 
the Industrial Zoning District only with an approved Special Permit.  Although the junkyard use established 
prior to 1976 is grand fathered without any Special Permit, any expansion of the 
junkyard use since 1976 requires [an] approved Special Permit prior to obtaining 
a Zoning Certificate."  I really 
haven't expanded my recycling project for the past almost 40 years.  And it is zoned for 40 acres of area 
anyway.

            
Under the amnesty rules I 
applied for a Permit for Trucking, Truck and Trailer Rebuilding and Scrap Recycling on 5/20/04.  I paid the permit Special Permit fee on 
9/27/04 #2449.  The county took the 
money and never has sent me a rejection of my permit.

            
Actually, all along I've also been in the "Scrap Recycling" business, and 
even in this year's "clean up" nothing has fit the description of "junk" and 
been hauled to the Landfill.  All 
items have been part of Saleable or Sold Recycling 
products.

            
I am most interested to make an agreement "in definition" of what exactly 
needs to be additionally removed.  
But the words "all junk" is not adequate.  This might be Scrap Recycling Steel or 
Iron, or maybe my sawmill or lumber inventory.  If one would drive past my property one 
would easily be able to see stacked lumber inventory. You would also see a 
Sawmill and sawmill equipment.

            
Remember the saying:  "One man's junk is another man's 
treasure."  And the treasure 
part of it is my business.  I do 
clean up and sell other peoples junk.  
Otherwise yard sales and garage sales would be outlawed and people would 
have to be licensed to sell their "junk."  
And maybe a special use permit should be given to them, to have their 
junk on their front lawn for sale, in a residential district.  If it were all junk, no one would buy 
anything from a yard sale.

            
So, I think I have complied with the Court Order.  I still think there is more 
beautification to be done and am working at it.  I also request that no one comes on to 
my property to steal anything of value to me.

            
Now, remember, I will be most happy to discuss what exactly additionally 
needs to be removed to keep you or your experts happy. [Emphases in 
original.]

 
 
[¶10]   On October 3, 2005, the County 
filed in the district court a petition to hold Nickle in contempt of the 
district court's order, on the basis that he was ordered to complete the removal 
of materials from his property by January 24, 2005, and he had failed to do 
so.  In addition, it was asserted 
that on October 3, 2005, Nickle refused to allow County personnel onto his 
property as required by the order "and has refused to allow the county's 
contractor to remove materials from the property pursuant to the Court's 
Order."

 
 
[¶11]   On October 5, 2005, the district 
court held a hearing on that motion, and at this point Nickle was represented by 
counsel.  The transcript of that 
hearing is not in the record on appeal either.  On October 6, 2005, after the hearing, 
the district court issued another order that specified that the materials which 
had not been removed, but which were required to be removed under the district 
court's order of October 5, 2004, were to be removed.  Nickle was also directed not to 
interfere with the County's efforts to do its removal work.  Finally, that order stated:  "Questions relating to the extent of the 
County's lien for reimbursement of clean-up expenses and delay costs occasioned 
by [Nickle's] refusal to allow contracted personnel to enter the property will 
be considered at a later hearing."

 
 
[¶12]   On October 7, 2005, Nickle filed a 
notice of appeal in the district court, seeking review of the district court's 
October 6, 2005 order.  That case 
was docketed in this Court on October 26, 2005, as Case No. 05-252.  On October 14, 2005, the district court 
set a supersedeas bond in the amount of $20,000.00, in connection with that 
appeal.  W.R.A.P. 4.02.1  On December 14, 2005, this Court 
dismissed Nickle's appeal in Case No. 05-252, because Nickle failed to timely 
file a brief in that case.

 
 
[¶13]   On January 24, 2006, the County 
filed a motion for an additional clean up order, and on that same date, 
petitioned the district court to forfeit Nickle's supersedeas bond.  In the petition to forfeit the 
supersedeas bond in the amount of $17,000.00, the County 
alleged:

 
 
            
1.  Pursuant to the Order of this Court and upon [Nickle's] 
failure to abate the nuisance on his property as ordered, the [County] 
contracted with private parties for the clean-up of [Nickle's] 
property.

            
2.  After repeated efforts to block the [County's] contract 
agents both physically and through legal proceedings, [Nickle] was ordered to 
allow the County to clean up his property.

            
3.  [Nickle] filed an appeal of the Court's Order to the 
Wyoming Supreme Court and pos[t]ed a supersedeas bond in connection with that 
appeal.

            
4.  The County has paid its contracting agent the sum of 
Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000.00).

            
5.  [Nickle's] appeal has been dismissed by the Wyoming Supreme 
Court for failure [to] file timely briefs.

            
6.  [Nickle] has failed to clean up the 
property.

 
 
[¶14]   In its March 13, 2006 memorandum 
supporting the petition to forfeit the supersedeas bond, the County alleged that 
its expenses of $17,000.00 arose out of the delays occasioned by Nickle's 
appeal.  The record indicates that 
several other papers were filed in the meantime and that a hearing on those 
matters was held, but these things, likewise, are not included in the record on 
appeal.

 
 
[¶15]   The district court issued a 
decision letter on April 12, 2006, articulating the reasons why $17,000.00 of 
the supersedeas bond should be paid to the County.  The remaining $3,000.00 was returned to 
Nickle.  An order effectuating that 
decision was entered on April 19, 2006.

 
 
DISCUSSSION

 
 
[¶16]   To the extent this case involves 
the district court's construction of W.R.A.P. 4.02 that is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  E.g., Bixler v. Oro Management, L.L.C., 2006 
WY 140, ¶ 5, 145 P.3d 1260, 1262 (Wyo. 2006).  However, in its totality the question 
presented here is a mixed question of law and fact.  Whether the rule in question 
contemplates an award for the sorts of damages at issue here is a question of 
law, but the district court must also take evidence on which to base any award 
of damages that may be allowed by the rule.  The factual findings of a judge are not 
entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict.  While the findings are presumptively 
correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence 
in the record.  Due regard is given 
to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, and our review does not entail weighing disputed evidence.  Findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  
A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.  E.g., Forshee v. Delaney, 2005 WY 103, 
¶ 6, 118 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶17]   It is the appellant's burden to 
bring us a complete record on which to base a decision.  When no transcript has been made of 
trial proceedings, this Court accepts the trial court's findings as being the 
only basis for deciding the issues which pertain to the evidence.  In the absence of anything to refute 
them, we will sustain the trial court's findings, and we assume that the 
evidence presented was sufficient to support those findings.  E.g., Chancler v. Meredith, 2004 WY 27, 
¶ 5, 86 P.3d 841, 842 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶18]   The record here is woefully 
incomplete.  From the material 
forwarded to this Court as "the record on appeal," we can only conclude that the 
district court did not err as a matter of law to the extent that it applied 
W.R.A.P. 4.02.  So far as facts are 
concerned, applying the rule recited above, we presume that a complete record 
would sustain the district court's fact findings.

 
 
[¶19]   Finally, we note that Nickle 
purports to appeal from two orders issued in 2005, as well as the order entered 
on April 19, 2006, for which Nickle filed a timely notice of appeal.  Of course, he did appeal one of the 
earlier orders, but that appeal was dismissed.  We need not dispositively discuss 
whether the earlier orders were subsumed into the April 19, 2006 order, because 
whether they were or not, we do not have a complete enough record to perform any 
sort of meaningful appellate review in this case.  It would be a disservice to the 
jurisprudence of this Court to attempt to fashion any sort of precedent from 
such a chaotic record.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   The order(s) of the district court 
are affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1           
Rule 4.02.  
Supersedeas bonds.

(a)  Whenever an appellant so entitled desires a stay on 
appeal, appellant may present to the trial court a supersedeas bond in such 
amount as shall be fixed by the trial court and with surety or sureties to be 
approved by the court or by the clerk of court. The bond shall be conditioned 
for the satisfaction of the judgment in full together with costs, interest, and 
damages for delay, if for any reason the appeal is not perfected or is 
dismissed, or if the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full such 
modification of the judgment and such costs, interest, and damages as the 
appellate court may adjudge and award.

            
(b)  When the judgment is for the recovery of money not 
otherwise secured, the amount of the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will 
cover the whole amount of the judgment remaining and unsatisfied, costs on 
appeal, and interest, unless the court, after notice and hearing and for good 
cause shown, fixes a different amount or orders security other than the bond. 
When the judgment determines the disposition of the property in controversy, as 
in real actions, replevin, and actions to foreclose mortgages, or when such 
property is in the custody of the sheriff, or when the proceeds of such property 
or a bond for its value is in the custody or control of the court, the amount of 
the supersedeas bond shall be fixed at the sum as will secure the amount 
recovered for the use and detention of the property, the costs of the action, 
costs on appeal, interest, and damages for delay.  When appellant has already filed a 
surety bond in the trial court, a separate supersedeas bond need not be given, 
except for the difference in amount as determined by the trial court to be 
attributable to the appeal.

            
(c)  When the judgment directs the execution, assignment or 
delivery of a conveyance or other instrument, appellant may execute, assign or 
deliver the conveyance or other instrument, leaving same in the custody of the 
clerk of the trial court in which the judgment was rendered, there to remain and 
abide the judgment of the appellate court, and in such case appellant shall give 
bond only for costs on appeal and damages for 
delay.