Case Title: State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators' Labor Council v. Cleveland

Citation: 2007-Ohio-2452

Docket Number: 20061688

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. Cleveland , 113 Ohio 
St.3d 480, 2007-Ohio-2452.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT OPERATORS’ 
LABOR COUNCIL, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. 
Cleveland, 113 Ohio St.3d 480, 2007-Ohio-2452.] 
Collective bargaining—Exclusive jurisdiction of State Employment Relations 
Board—Ripeness of dispute for judicial review. 
(No. 2006-1688─Submitted April 3, 2007─ Decided June 6, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 86263, 2006-Ohio-
4273. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of 
mandamus filed in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County by appellant, 
Municipal Construction Equipment Operators’ Labor Council (“Municipal 
Construction”), the certified bargaining representative of certain construction-
equipment operators and master mechanics employed by the city of Cleveland, to 
compel appellees, Cleveland and its mayor and city council, to pay these 
employees the difference between the prevailing wage and the amounts they were 
actually paid from January 30, 2003, to February 13, 2005.  Municipal 
Construction also appeals from the court of appeals’ denial of its request for a writ 
of mandamus to compel Cleveland to provide sick-leave benefits for the same 
period and to pay for unused sick leave for certain retired members. Because at 
the time the court of appeals denied the writ the case was not ripe, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Consolo v. Cleveland, Cuyahoga App. No. 81117, 2002-Ohio-7065 
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{¶ 2} On October 30, 2001, certain construction-equipment operators 
and master mechanics employed by Cleveland filed a complaint in the common 
pleas court against the city and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 
18 (“Local 18”), an employee organization that had purported to represent the 
employees, for declaratory judgment, mandamus, and damages.  These employees 
raised several claims, including that the city was obligated to pay them the 
prevailing wage without any offset for pension contributions, that the city had 
denied them equal protection of the law by failing to provide them with paid sick 
leave and other benefits that the city had provided to similarly situated city 
employees, that Local 18 was not the employees’ exclusive bargaining 
representative, and that Local 18 had failed to adequately represent them.  The 
common pleas court dismissed the case because the employees’ allegations were 
tantamount to claims of unfair labor practice and were thus within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”). 
{¶ 3} On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the common pleas court’s 
judgment in part.  Consolo v. Cleveland, Cuyahoga App. No. 81117, 2002-Ohio-
7065, 2002 WL 31839150.  The court of appeals held that the common pleas 
court erred in dismissing the employees’ claims because they did not necessarily 
arise out of or depend upon the public-employment collective-bargaining rights in 
R.C. Chapter 4117.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
Consolo v. Cleveland, 103 Ohio St.3d 362, 2004-Ohio-5389, 815 N.E.2d 1114 
{¶ 4} On October 20, 2004, this court reversed the court of appeals’ 
judgment in Consolo and held that the claims asserted by the Cleveland 
construction-equipment operators and master mechanics were correctly dismissed 
by the common pleas court because “[a]ll of the claims asserted * * * relate to 
rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117,” and “[t]hese claims must be pursued 
through SERB.”  Consolo v. Cleveland, 103 Ohio St.3d 362, 2004-Ohio-5389, 
815 N.E.2d 1114, ¶ 24. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
SERB’s Post-Consolo Actions 
{¶ 5} On January 30, 2003, SERB certified Municipal Construction as 
the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit including city employees in the 
classifications of Construction Equipment Operator A, Construction Equipment 
Operator B, and Master Mechanic. 
{¶ 6} In April 2005, Municipal Construction filed a petition requesting 
that SERB appoint a hearing examiner to adjudicate the issues that this court held 
to be within SERB’s exclusive jurisdiction in Consolo, 103 Ohio St.3d 362, 2004-
Ohio-5389, 815 N.E.2d 1114.  SERB granted the petition and directed that a 
hearing be held before an administrative law judge. 
{¶ 7} On July 20, 2006, the administrative law judge recommended a 
determination on the specified issues, and on September 28, 2006, SERB adopted 
the recommendation and found that Local 18 was not a deemed-certified 
bargaining agent for construction-equipment operators employed by Cleveland.  
In re Cleveland, SERB 2006-008. 
Collective-Bargaining Agreement Between  
Municipal Construction and Cleveland 
{¶ 8} Effective February 2005, Municipal Construction and Cleveland 
entered into a collective-bargaining agreement, which specified that the 
agreement “shall address all matters pertaining to hourly wages, and hours, or 
terms or conditions of employment mutually expressed between the parties.”  The 
agreement specified that “[i]n recognition of no wage increases for the period of 
January 1, 2004 through January 31, 2005, the City shall make a one-time lump 
sum payment of $2,500.00 to each employee who worked 1,400 or more hours 
during 2004, on the first regular pay-day after Agreement ratification.”  Under the 
agreement, all regular full-time employees would immediately be credited with 
three days of paid sick leave and would thereafter be credited with paid sick leave 
of ten hours per month, which is 15 days per year. 
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{¶ 9} The agreement also contained the following clause: 
{¶ 10} “Agreement Has No Effect on Pending Litigation 
{¶ 11} “This Agreement shall have no effect on or be used by either party 
to this Agreement, or any other entity, in lawsuits related to any claims for back 
or future pay of benefits pertaining to prevailing wage rates, or outside contracts, 
except with respect to a $2,500.00 offset to any judgment against the City for 
back pay pertaining to the period from January 1, 2004 through January 31, 
2005.” 
{¶ 12} At the time of the agreement, no lawsuit on these matters was 
pending. 
State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council 
v. Cleveland, Cuyahoga App. No. 86263, 2006-Ohio-4273 
{¶ 13} In April 2005, Municipal Construction filed an action in the Court 
of Appeals for Cuyahoga County against appellees, Cleveland and its city council 
and mayor.  In its amended petition, Municipal Construction requested a writ of 
mandamus to compel the city to pay its members the prevailing wage paid in the 
building and construction trades from January 30, 2003 (the date that Municipal 
Construction became the certified collective-bargaining representative for the 
city’s construction-equipment operators and master mechanics), to February 13, 
2005 (the day before the collective-bargaining agreement between Municipal 
Construction and Cleveland became effective).  Municipal Construction also 
sought a writ of mandamus to compel Cleveland to provide sick-leave benefits for 
the same period and to pay for unused sick leave for certain retiree members.  The 
parties filed motions for summary judgment. 
{¶ 14} On August 15, 2006, the court of appeals granted appellees’ 
motion, denied Municipal Construction’s motion, and denied the writ.  State ex 
rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. Cleveland, Cuyahoga App. 
No. 86263, 2006-Ohio-4273, 2006 WL 2374408.  The court of appeals held that 
January Term, 2007 
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(1) Municipal Construction’s claims were not ripe because they raise matters that 
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of SERB to initially determine, (2) Municipal 
Construction had an adequate remedy by way of its collective-bargaining 
agreement to resolve its claims for back wages and sick-leave benefits, and it 
exercised that remedy by negotiating the agreement, and (3) res judicata barred 
Municipal Construction’s mandamus action because it raised the same claim in its 
2003 contempt motion in this court in the State ex rel. Internatl. Union of 
Operating Engineers v. Cleveland, 102 Ohio St.3d 1419, 2004-Ohio-2003, 807 
N.E.2d 365; and (1992) 62 Ohio St.3d 537, 584 N.E.2d 727. 
{¶ 15} This cause is now before the court upon Municipal Construction’s 
appeal as of right from the court of appeals’ denial of the writ. 
{¶ 16} Municipal Construction asserts that the court of appeals erred in 
denying the writ.  As noted previously, the court of appeals cited several 
independent reasons for its denial of the writ, including that the claims were not 
ripe for review. 
Ripeness 
{¶ 17} “In order to be justiciable, a controversy must be ripe for review.”  
Keller v. Columbus, 100 Ohio St.3d 192, 2003-Ohio-5599, 797 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 26.  
In Consolo, 103 Ohio St.3d 362, 2004-Ohio-5389, 815 N.E.2d 1114, the court 
held that the issues raised therein were not ripe for review because SERB had 
exclusive jurisdiction to initially resolve the issues: 
{¶ 18} “Because [the employees] allege that Local 18 approved or 
acquiesced in the compensation decisions, [Internatl. Union, 62 Ohio St.3d 537, 
584 N.E.2d 727] does not apply here.  * * * SERB should be given the 
opportunity to determine whether Local 18 was an employee organization, an 
exclusive representative, or neither.  SERB also has exclusive authority to 
determine whether [the employees’] compensation levels were the result of 
collective bargaining.  Where collective bargaining has occurred, R.C. Chapter 
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4117 prevails over any and all other conflicting laws.  * * * In [Internatl. Union], 
we stated that the city must comply with its charter, specifically because the 
employees’ compensation was not the result of collective bargaining.  If [the 
employees’] compensation levels were the result of collective bargaining under 
R.C. Chapter 4117, then the city’s charter provisions would be inapplicable.  We 
have already stated that SERB has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether 
collective bargaining occurred.”  Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 19} After Consolo, SERB directed that a hearing be held before an 
administrative law judge to answer several questions, including the following: 
{¶ 20} “(6) Were the wages of the construction equipment operators who 
were appellees in the Consolo case the result of collective bargaining between 
Local 18 and the City? 
{¶ 21} “(7) Did the City and Local 18 negotiate and implement a benefits 
package that provided the construction equipment operators described in 
Paragraph (6) with equal or better benefits than are provided by the City 
Charter?”   
{¶ 22} As noted by the court of appeals, if SERB ultimately determined 
that the wages and benefits for Cleveland’s construction-equipment operators and 
master mechanics had been set by collective bargaining between Local 18 and the 
city,  those bargaining terms would have continued until the collective-bargaining 
agreement between Municipal Construction and Cleveland became effective on 
February 14, 2005.  2006-Ohio-4273 at ¶ 19.  Cf., e.g., Young v. Washington 
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 37, 41, 619 N.E.2d 62 
(“where both parties to a public employee collective bargaining agreement 
continue to operate as if there were a contract, and neither party breaches or 
indicates its intention to no longer be bound, then the status quo continues”); 
Hastings, Manoloff, Sheeran & Stype, Baldwin’s Ohio School Law (2007), 
Section 18:45 (“SERB has adopted a principle from federal labor law applicable 
January Term, 2007 
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to the private sector that during negotiations following the expiration of a 
collective bargaining agreement, the employer is generally required to ‘maintain 
the status quo’ as to wages and working conditions and that, therefore, at least for 
some purposes, the agreement effectively survives its expiration date”). 
{¶ 23} Municipal Construction claims that because no exclusive 
bargaining agent for these construction-equipment operators and master 
mechanics existed before SERB’s certification of Municipal Construction in 
January 2003, the court of appeals erred in holding that this case was not ripe at 
the time of that court’s judgment denying the writ.  The issue of whether Local 18 
was the exclusive representative of the employees, however, was raised by this 
court in Consolo, 103 Ohio St.3d 362, 2004-Ohio-5389, 815 N.E.2d 1114, ¶ 21, 
and SERB thereafter directed a hearing on the issue in order to resolve it.  Nor did 
the lack of a collective-bargaining agreement between Local 18 and the city divest 
SERB of its initial jurisdiction to determine whether the employees’ 
compensation levels resulted from collective bargaining.  Id. at ¶ 10-12, 21. 
{¶ 24} Municipal Construction also relies on the SERB administrative law 
judge’s July 2006 recommended determination and SERB’s September 2006 
decision adopting that recommendation.  Yet Municipal Construction did not 
notify the court of appeals of the administrative law judge’s recommended 
decision in the proceedings below.  Municipal Construction thus invited any error 
that exists in the court of appeals’ failing to consider this recommended 
determination in its decision.  State ex rel. Lecklider v. School Emp. Retirement 
Sys., 104 Ohio St.3d 271, 2004-Ohio-6586, 819 N.E.2d 289, ¶ 20 (party is not 
entitled to take advantage of an error that the party itself induced the court to 
make).  Further, the court of appeals’ decision was rendered before SERB’s final 
determination on the Consolo issues in September 2006. 
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{¶ 25} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err in denying 
the requested writ of mandamus, because at the time that the court rendered its 
decision, the claims were not ripe for review. 
Remedy to Address Municipal Construction’s Claims 
{¶ 26} This result does not leave Municipal Construction without any 
remedy to address the claims for back wages based on the prevailing wage and for 
sick-leave benefits for the applicable period from the January 30, 2003 date that 
SERB certified it as the exclusive representative of the city’s construction-
equipment operators and master mechanics until the February 14, 2005 effective 
date of the current collective-bargaining agreement.  In fact, Municipal 
Construction and certain individual operators and mechanics have a pending case 
in this court that raises similar claims that cover the same period but does not 
suffer from the same ripeness defect.  State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. 
Operators’ Labor Council v. Cleveland, case No. 2006-2056, 112 Ohio St.3d 
1438, 2007-Ohio-152, 860 N.E.2d 764.  We will examine these claims in that 
case. 
Other Grounds for Court of Appeals’ Decision 
{¶ 27} Because the ripeness determination renders moot Municipal 
Construction’s challenge to the remaining grounds relied upon by the court of 
appeals to deny the writ─adequate remedy at law by way of collective bargaining 
and res judicata─we need not address these claims in this appeal.  As noted 
previously, we will discuss these contentions in case No. 2006-2056. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 28} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals because Municipal Construction’s case was not ripe at the time the court 
rendered its decision. 
Judgment affirmed. 
January Term, 2007 
9 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
 
Stewart D. Roll and Patricia M. Ritzert, for appellant. 
 
Robert J. Triozzi, Cleveland Director of Law, Theodore M. Monegan, 
Chief Assistant Director of Law, and José M. González, Assistant Director of 
Law, for appellee. 
____________________