Case Title: Ernest E. v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12790

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12790 
 
ERNEST E., a juvenile  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 11, 2020. - November 6, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Act.  Evidence, Sex offender, Juvenile 
delinquency, Expert opinion, Hearsay.  Juvenile Court, 
Delinquent child. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 28, 2019. 
 
 
The case was reported by Budd, J. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick (Michael F. Kilkelly also present) for 
the juvenile. 
 
Elizabeth F. Silverman, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Michael Caldwell, Elizabeth Letourneau, Kim Dawkins, Kevin 
Creeden, Maia Christopher, Robert Kinscherff, Raymond Knight, 
Ryan Shields, Kerry Nelligan, Frank DiCataldo, Tom Leversee, 
& Phil Rich, pro se. 
 
J.P. Christian Milde & Erin K. Higgins for Children's Law 
Center of Massachusetts. 
                     
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
Ryan M. Schiff for youth advocacy division of the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services & others. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This is an appeal by a juvenile challenging the 
denial of his motion seeking relief from sex offender 
registration.  The juvenile appeals on two grounds.  First, he 
argues that he should be relieved of his obligation to register 
because his risk of reoffense is "less than low" as dictated by 
L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169 (2014).  Second, he argues 
that requiring any juvenile to register as a sex offender 
violates due process and constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
We consider the juvenile's petition for relief pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  After admitting to sufficient facts, the 
juvenile filed a motion for relief from sex offender 
registration.  At the hearing on this motion, the 
constitutionality of juvenile registration was not argued.  
Following the denial of the juvenile's motion, he filed a 
petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, arguing that juvenile 
registration is unconstitutional based on advances in our 
understanding of adolescent brains.  A single justice reserved 
and reported this question.  After reviewing the record in 
detail, it is apparent that these constitutional arguments were 
not presented at the juvenile's hearing below, and as a result, 
the evidence necessary to determine the constitutional question 
3 
 
is not in the record before us.  Therefore, we decline to answer 
the constitutional question, and we affirm the order denying the 
juvenile's motion for relief from registration.2 
 
Background.  In 2017, the juvenile was charged with one 
count of rape of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23, and one count of 
indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, G. L. 
c. 265, § 13B.  The charges stem from the accusation that the 
fifteen year old juvenile licked and tickled the vaginal area of 
his seven year old cousin.  In 2019, after a full colloquy, the 
juvenile admitted to sufficient facts to warrant findings of 
guilty on both counts.  That same day, the juvenile filed a 
motion to be relieved from his obligation to register as a sex 
offender under G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f). 
 
On March 1, 2019, the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent 
on both charges, and he was sentenced to Department of Youth 
Services commitment until the juvenile's eighteenth birthday, 
but the sentence was suspended.  Following this sentence, an 
evidentiary hearing was conducted on the juvenile's motion to be 
relieved of his obligation to register as a sex offender. 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
the juvenile by Michael Caldwell, Elizabeth Letourneau, Kim 
Dawkins, Kevin Creeden, Maia Christopher, Kelly Nelligan, Robert 
Kinscherff, Frank DiCataldo, Raymond Knight, Tom Leversee, Ryan 
Shields, and Phil Rich; by the youth advocacy division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, Juvenile Law Center, 
Citizens for Juvenile Justice, and Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers; and by the Children's Law Center. 
4 
 
 
During the hearing, the judge heard testimony from the 
juvenile's expert psychologist and argument from both parties 
and from the probation department.  The only issue argued was 
whether the juvenile showed a risk of reoffense that warranted 
referral to the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB).  The 
juvenile's expert testified that the juvenile presented a low to 
moderate risk of reoffending when compared with other juveniles.  
There was no oral argument and almost no testimony about 
juvenile registration generally or its constitutionality.3 
 
On April 26, 2019, the judge made extensive oral findings 
of fact regarding the juvenile's risk of reoffense and denied 
the juvenile's motion to be relieved from his obligation to 
register with SORB.  The juvenile filed a petition in the county 
court seeking extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.4  The 
                     
3 There was limited testimony concerning juveniles 
generally.  During the hearing, the juvenile's attorney asked 
the expert to explain why she was not recommending that this 
juvenile be required to register with SORB.  The expert 
testified that "based on [her] understanding of the literature" 
registration limits pro-social activities, education, and 
employment.  The expert was asked if there were specific 
research concerning the effect of the sex offender registry on 
juveniles, and she responded that juvenile registrants 
demonstrate more "emotional dysfunction, suicidality and 
behavioral difficulties." 
 
4 We previously have held that, "[a]lthough a sex offender 
may not appeal from a judge's decision not to waive the 
registration requirement, . . . either party may petition a 
single justice of this court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
which grants this court 'general superintendence . . . to 
correct and prevent errors and abuses' for the furtherance of 
5 
 
single justice reserved and reported to the full court the 
question whether "requiring juveniles to register violates due 
process and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment based on 
advances in our understanding of the adolescent brain."  The 
juvenile filed a motion to stay his sex offender registration 
requirement pending this appeal, and the motion was allowed.  As 
a result of the reservation and report, the Juvenile Court judge 
filed findings of fact, rulings of law, and an order on the 
juvenile's motion for relief from sex offender registration. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Juvenile's motion for relief.  The 
juvenile argues that he should be relieved of his obligation to 
register because his risk of reoffense is less than low -- 
placing him within the threshold articulated in L.L., 470 Mass. 
at 179 ("to qualify for exemption from registration under 
§ 178E [f], a juvenile sex offender's risk of reoffense should 
be less than this 'low' registration-triggering risk"). 
At the hearing, the juvenile's expert stated that, although 
she was "reticent to offer certain language" regarding the 
juvenile's risk of future reoffense, she had noted in her report 
that this juvenile fell into the "low to moderate range of risk 
for a variety of reasons," and clarified that this was as 
"compared to other juveniles."  The expert detailed a number of 
                     
justice.  G. L. c. 211, § 3."  Commonwealth v. Ronald R., 450 
Mass. 262, 266–267 (2007). 
6 
 
factors that lowered the juvenile's risk -- the number of 
adjudicated offenses, the fact that the victim was a family 
member, the juvenile's intellectual ability, and his willingness 
to engage in treatment -- as well as a number of factors that 
heightened his risk -- his history of impulsivity, poor 
judgment, trauma, depression, and lack of family support, among 
others. 
 
The judge denied the juvenile's motion for relief from 
registration.  The judge's oral findings referred to a variety 
of factors that would heighten the juvenile's risk of reoffense:  
"social isolation;" the juvenile's lack of contact with his 
father and the suicide of his mother; the juvenile's experience 
in foster care, including abuse, neglect, and possible shaken 
baby syndrome; the juvenile's disturbing comments to a teacher;5 
and the assessment of the juvenile as "a sexually aggressive 
adolescent with emotional difficulties." 
 
The judge's written findings credited the expert's 
testimony that the juvenile was a low to moderate risk to 
reoffend among juveniles,6 and expanded upon the various factors 
                     
5 The juvenile admitted to asking a teacher what she would 
do if she were raped.  He also held a metal ruler while asking a 
teacher if she thought he could rape someone with it. 
 
6 The judge noted that although the expert opined at trial 
that the juvenile was a low to moderate risk among juveniles, 
her written report did not contain that "critical qualifying 
language." 
7 
 
addressing risk of reoffense in G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1) (a)-(l).7  
The judge noted in the findings the juvenile's "many psychiatric 
                     
7 "Factors relevant to the risk of reoffense shall include, 
but not be limited to, the following:  (a) criminal history 
factors indicative of a high risk of reoffense and degree of 
dangerousness posed to the public, including:  (i) whether the 
sex offender has a mental abnormality; (ii) whether the sex 
offender's conduct is characterized by repetitive and compulsive 
behavior; (iii) whether the sex offender was an adult who 
committed a sex offense on a child; (iv) the age of the sex 
offender at the time of the commission of the first sex offense; 
(v) whether the sex offender has been adjudicated to be a 
sexually dangerous person pursuant to [G. L. c. 123A, § 14,] or 
is a person released from civil commitment pursuant to [G. L. 
c. 123A, § 9]; and (vi) whether the sex offender served the 
maximum term of incarceration; (b) other criminal history 
factors to be considered in determining risk and degree of 
dangerousness, including:  (i) the relationship between the sex 
offender and the victim; (ii) whether the offense involved the 
use of a weapon, violence or infliction of bodily injury; (iii) 
the number, date and nature of prior offenses; (c) conditions of 
release that minimize risk of reoffense and degree of 
dangerousness posed to the public, including whether the sex 
offender is under probation or parole supervision, whether such 
sex offender is receiving counseling, therapy or treatment and 
whether such sex offender is residing in a home situation that 
provides guidance and supervision, including sex offender-
specific treatment in a community-based residential program; (d) 
physical conditions that minimize risk of reoffense including, 
but not limited to, debilitating illness; (e) whether the sex 
offender was a juvenile when he committed the offense, his 
response to treatment and subsequent criminal history; (f) 
whether psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of 
recidivism; (g) the sex offender's history of alcohol or 
substance abuse; (h) the sex offender's participation in sex 
offender treatment and counseling while incarcerated or while on 
probation or parole and his response to such treatment or 
counseling; (i) recent behavior, including behavior while 
incarcerated or while supervised on probation or parole; (j) 
recent threats against persons or expressions of intent to 
commit additional offenses; (k) review of any victim impact 
statement; and (l) review of any materials submitted by the sex 
offender, his attorney or others on behalf of such offender."  
G. L. c. 6, § 178K (1). 
8 
 
diagnoses;" the age difference between the victim, who was seven 
years old at the time of the offense, and the juvenile, who was 
fifteen years old; and the juvenile's consistent participation 
in sex offender treatment.  After reviewing each factor, the 
judge determined that the juvenile "poses a continued risk of 
reoffense and danger to the community," and denied the motion.8 
 
However, the written findings also demonstrated that the 
judge had difficulty reconciling the expert's low to moderate 
risk assessment with her recommendation that the juvenile not be 
required to register.  The "less than low" level of risk 
proscribed by L.L. refers to the general population, not 
juveniles.  Because we also articulated that "there seems to be 
a consensus that juvenile sex offenders have a relatively low 
rate of recidivism" when compared to the general population, 
L.L., 470 Mass. at 180 n.19, when the juvenile's expert 
classified him as "low to moderate among juveniles," the judge 
could have interpreted that classification as meeting the "less 
                     
8 When reading the judge's findings as a whole, it is 
apparent that the judge implicitly found the juvenile to present 
a low to moderate risk of reoffence when compared to the general 
population.  In both his written and oral findings, the judge 
emphasized the holding of L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169 
(2014), as a factor prohibiting the juvenile from being exempt 
from registration; so, he did not assess the juvenile's risk 
level as being "less than low."  While the judge credited the 
expert's "ultimate opinion that [the juvenile] present[ed] a low 
to moderate risk of offense," he also noted that "as compared to 
other juveniles" was "critical qualifying language" that was 
left out of her written report altogether. 
9 
 
than low" requirement of L.L.  However, while the judge is 
obligated to give expert testimony "serious, reasoned 
consideration," it is the judge who must "ultimately determin[e] 
whether to exempt the juvenile from registration."  Id. at 181. 
 
Considering the judge's findings in light of the standard 
for assessing the risk of reoffense set out in G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K, and in L.L., we cannot say that the findings do not 
support the judge's assessment of that risk.  In sum, "we 
conclude that based on the record before [him], the judge's 
ultimate determination that the juvenile should not be relieved 
of the obligation to register as a sex offender did not lie 
outside the bounds of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  L.L., 470 Mass. at 184.  The judge did not 
abuse his discretion. 
2.  Constitutional issue.  The juvenile also argues that 
requiring him, or any juvenile, to register as a sex offender 
violates due process and constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment based on what we know about juvenile brain 
development, the low sexual reoffense risk of juveniles, the 
failure of sex offender registration to prevent sexual 
reoffenses, and the harms of sex offender registration. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that SORB registration is a 
regulatory scheme to promote public safety and does not 
constitute punishment, that the Massachusetts sex offender 
10 
 
registry act (act) recognizes differences between juvenile and 
adult sex offenders, that the act does not violate substantive 
or procedural due process by allowing the registration of 
juvenile offenders, and that no other jurisdiction has ruled 
that a sex offender registry statutory scheme similar to the 
Commonwealth's is unconstitutional as it applies to juvenile 
offenders. 
The Commonwealth also argues that the constitutionality of 
juvenile sex offender registration was not argued at the motion 
hearing.  According to the Commonwealth, the scientific studies 
claiming the inefficacy of juvenile sex offender registration 
and the negative effects of registration on juvenile sex 
offenders were not properly established in the record below.  
Further, although a few studies were mentioned in the juvenile's 
written motion or listed at the end of the juvenile's expert's 
report, none was specifically referred to by the expert in her 
testimony.  Although the judge's written findings contain 
various scientific studies, the Commonwealth asserts that it did 
not have an opportunity to cross-examine a witness about the 
studies, and did not have an opportunity to request a hearing 
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26 (1994).9 
                     
9 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
593-595 (1993), "the [United States Supreme] Court, emphasizing 
the need for a flexible inquiry, provided a nonexhaustive list 
of factors to consider in evaluating the reliability of the 
11 
 
After reviewing the evidence, we agree that the record 
below is inadequate for this court to decide the constitutional 
issue.  While the juvenile's memorandum in support of his motion 
appears to argue that juvenile registration is 
unconstitutional,10 the judge's oral findings do not reference 
                     
expert's testimony, including testing, peer review and 
publication, error rates, and general acceptance in the relevant 
scientific community."  Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 
106–107 (2006).  The progeny of Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 
Mass. 15, 25-26 (1994), "make clear that general acceptance in 
the relevant community of the theory and process on which an 
expert's testimony is based, on its own, continues to be 
sufficient to establish the requisite reliability for admission 
in Massachusetts courts regardless of other Daubert factors."  
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 640 (2005).  "Where 
general acceptance is not established by the party offering the 
expert testimony, a full Daubert analysis provides an alternate 
method of establishing reliability."  Id. at 641. 
 
10 The juvenile's memorandum filed in the Juvenile Court 
argued that requiring juveniles to register violates the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution's prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment and juveniles' due process 
rights.  The juvenile made a similar argument based on the 
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment in art. 26 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and due process rights 
under the Massachusetts Constitution.  First, it is well settled 
that sex offender registration is a civil regulatory scheme, not 
punishment; thus, we need not address the argument that 
registration is cruel or unusual punishment.  See Smith v. Doe, 
538 U.S. 84, 105-106 (2003); Opinion of the Justices, 423 Mass. 
1201, 1237-1239 (1996); Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425, 431-433 
(D. Mass. 1996) (registration not punishment as applied to 
juveniles).  Second, as the juvenile articulates in his brief, 
an offender's due process rights require that SORB base its 
classification on an offender's "current risk to the community."  
See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 7083 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 475, 483 (2015).  Because the juvenile 
has not yet been required to register, and therefore has not 
been classified as a level one, two, or three sex offender, the 
12 
 
this argument because it was not pressed at the hearing in front 
of the judge.  There was no oral argument on this issue.  The 
only related testimony came from the juvenile's expert, and it 
was extremely limited.11  While the expert may have been 
qualified to proffer testimony on the specific juvenile at 
issue, it is unclear whether this expertise extended to juvenile 
registrants generally.12 
In order to determine the constitutional issue, the record 
below must contain evidence -- usually in the form of expert 
testimony -- that would allow this court to explore the 
complicated question of juvenile brain development and its 
impact on risk of reoffense.  The admission of scientific 
testimony is governed by what has come to be known as the 
                     
juvenile's due process argument is best assessed in the context 
of an appeal from a final classification decision. 
 
11 As described earlier, the juvenile's expert testified 
that, "based on [her] understanding of the literature, there is 
-- there can be an iatrogenic effect or a negative effect of 
[registration] on juveniles who have engaged in sexual offending 
behavior, as in, it limits their prospects to engage in pro-
social activities, education, employment, have normal peer 
interactions which can actually isolate and unfortunately raise 
risk as opposed to lower risk."  She also testified that "there 
is some limited research that's very recent that suggests that 
juveniles that have had to register demonstrate more emotional 
dysfunction, suicidality and behavioral difficulties." 
 
12 On cross-examination, the Commonwealth elicited testimony 
that the juvenile's expert had done from twenty to forty sex 
offender evaluations since 2010.  In only two of those cases, 
including the present case, had the expert opined on an 
individual's risk of reoffense. 
13 
 
Daubert–Lanigan standard.  See Commonwealth v. Senior, 433 Mass. 
453, 458 (2001), citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 585-595 (1993), and Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25-26.  
See Mass. G. Evid. § 702 & comments (2020).  The judge, acting 
as gatekeeper, is responsible for "mak[ing] a preliminary 
assessment whether the theory or methodology underlying the 
proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable to reach the trier 
of fact."  Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 761 (2010).  
See Commonwealth v. Camblin, 478 Mass. 469, 475 (2017). 
"Soft sciences" similarly are scrutinized.  Commonwealth v. 
Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 327 (2010) ("The defendant, 
therefore, is correct that a so-called 'soft science,' such as 
psychiatry, in which expert opinions are often based on the 
personal observations and clinical experience of the 
psychiatrist, fall within Lanigan's reach").  See Shanley, 455 
Mass. at 763 n.15 ("the evolving nature of scientific and 
clinical studies of the brain and memory and the controversy 
surrounding those studies made it prudent for the judge to 
proceed with a Lanigan hearing in this case").  See also Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) ("We conclude 
that Daubert's general holding -- setting forth the trial 
judge's general 'gatekeeping' obligation -- applies not only to 
testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony 
based on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge"). 
14 
 
While the foundational studies of the expert's opinion 
themselves may or may not be subject to evaluation under the 
Daubert-Lanigan test, the reliability of the expert's opinion is 
dependent upon the reliability of her foundational material.  
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-595 ("The inquiry envisioned by 
[Fed. R. Evid.] 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one.  Its 
overarching subject is the scientific validity -- and thus the 
evidentiary relevance and reliability -- of the principles that 
underlie a proposed submission.  The focus, of course, must be 
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions 
that they generate").  Contrast Commonwealth v. Bradway, 62 
Mass. App. Ct. 280, 283-287 (2004) (rejecting argument that 
testimony of qualified examiners must meet Lanigan standard, 
because G. L. c. 123A, § 14 [c], expressly provides for 
admission of qualified examiner's report). 
Finally, the judge's written findings contained a number of 
references to scientific studies.  However, it appears that the 
majority of this research was done sua sponte, and after the 
record essentially was frozen by the single justice's decision 
to reserve and report the case to the full court.13  Although the 
                     
13 These written findings also confirm that the "oral 
arguments made during the hearing on relief from registration 
focused on risk assessment, but did not address the larger 
question of whether registration constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment and should be abolished." 
15 
 
judge exerted considerable effort to provide this court with a 
sufficient record to decide this issue, the studies are 
unreviewable for two reasons.  First, "[t]he articles were never 
established as reliable or authoritative, contain nothing but 
inadmissible hearsay, and do not satisfy any of the exceptions 
to the hearsay rule."  Commonwealth v. Reese, 438 Mass. 519, 527 
(2003).  Second, because this research was done by the judge 
rather than by one of the advocates and was not offered as part 
of the adversarial process, the Commonwealth did not have the 
opportunity to challenge the information or to present any 
evidence or testimony disputing this research.14  Because of the 
absence of expert testimony and the failure to introduce 
properly the scientific studies cited in the judge's written 
findings, we do not have the necessary record to reach this 
issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                     
14 The Commonwealth filed a motion requesting that the judge 
redact these findings precisely for this reason, but the motion 
was denied.