Case Title: Vermont v. Myers

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2009-355

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 VT 43


  

  






State
v. Myers (2009-355)
 
2011
VT 43
 
[Filed
22-Apr-2011]
 
NOTICE: 
This opinion is subject
to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before
publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the
Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street,
Montpelier,
Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that corrections may be made
before
this opinion goes to press.

2011 VT 43 
 
No. 2009-355
 
State
of Vermont
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
    
v.
District
Court of Vermont,
 
Unit
No. 2, Bennington Circuit
 
 
Michael
J. Myers
September
Term, 2010
 
 
 
 
John P. Wesley, J.
 
Christina Rainville, Bennington
County Deputy State’s
Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
 
William A. Nelson, Middlebury, for
Defendant-Appellant.
 
 
PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J.,
Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and
Burgess, JJ.
 
 
¶
1.            
SKOGLUND,
J.  
Defendant appeals a jury verdict finding him guilty
of seven charges all resulting from a drunken altercation in which he
drove his
truck around the complaining witness’s lawn and eventually
into the complaining
witness’s home, then drove it at the complaining witness, and
finally fled the
scene, only to be arrested by the police some time later.  He
makes a series of
related claims on appeal, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) denying
his in
limine motion to exclude prejudicial evidence; (2) failing to instruct
the jury
on simple assault as a lesser included offense to the aggravated
assault
charges; (3) giving the jury a flawed instruction on intent, which
violated his
federal due process rights; (4) neglecting to instruct the jury on his
diminished capacity with regard to the aggravated assault charges; (5)
refusing
to instruct the jury on the necessity defense in connection with the
charge of
leaving the scene of an accident; (6) allowing the State to prosecute
him on a
flawed information; and (7) denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal on one
of the charges of aggravated assault.  We affirm.
¶
2.            
Defendant
started the evening of
March 4 by drinking a half liter of vodka.  By about 11:00 pm
a friend described
his intoxication level as a nine out of ten.  The friend
declined to let
defendant into his house and sent him on his way.  Defendant
then drove to the complaining
witness’s home.  Testimony differs as to exactly
what transpired at the complaining
witness’s mobile home, but the basic facts are
uncontested.  Defendant had
known the complaining witness for about six months and had previously
stopped
by his home on multiple occasions.  The complaining witness
worked as a tattoo
artist, and defendant, in the past, had requested that he rework some
of
defendant’s tattoos.  The complaining witness had
refused, due to the racist
subject matter of the tattoos.  
¶
3.            
Defendant
arrived at the complaining
witness’s home around 11:30 pm, looking to have another
drink.  The complaining
witness, his girlfriend, and their daughter were all asleep when
defendant arrived. 
The complaining witness went out onto his deck to see what defendant
wanted.  Observing
that defendant, who was walking towards the mobile home, was clearly
drunk, the
complaining witness asked him to leave.  Defendant got back
into his truck but
did not leave.  Instead he sat in the truck listening to music
at a high volume. 
Eventually, the complaining witness told him he was trespassing and was
“not welcome
here.”  At this point, the exchange rapidly became
more heated, and defendant
got out of his truck and approached the complaining witness, who was
still on
the deck of the mobile home.  The complaining witness then
threatened to shoot
defendant if he did not leave.  He went inside his home and
got a steak knife. 
He did not own a gun.  When he came back outside, defendant
was driving his
truck around on the driveway and lawn.  
¶
4.            
The
two exchanged more
threats—defendant from the cab of his truck and the
complaining witness out in
his yard—and at some point defendant drove over the
complaining witness’s
mailbox.  Eventually, defendant rammed the truck into a corner
of the mobile
home where the complaining witness’s two-and-a-half-year-old
daughter slept, causing
considerable damage and knocking the home off its foundation. 
After hitting
the home, defendant backed the truck up and, in leaving the property,
drove toward
the complaining witness.  He missed him and then drove
approximately a mile to
his mother’s house.
¶
5.            
Meanwhile,
the complaining witness’s
girlfriend had called the police, who arrived at the home shortly after
defendant had left.  While the police were on the scene,
defendant called the complaining
witness, threatening him further.  During the call, the
complaining witness had
one of the officers speak to defendant.  At the same time,
other officers had
located defendant’s truck at his mother’s house and
had followed footprints
leading from the truck to a locked camper in the woods where they found
defendant.  They arrested him without incident, handcuffed
him, and walked him towards
their cruisers.  This took place approximately one half hour
after defendant
left the complaining witness’s house.  As they
approached the cruisers,
defendant began shouting and struggling against the officers.
 Conditions were
icy; footing was slippery.  The officers testified that while
attempting “to
regain control of [defendant]” because he “was
struggling so violently,” one of
them tripped and fell, jamming three fingers on his hand. 
When defendant calmed
down, the officers put him in a patrol car.  Once in the car,
defendant again
began to swear and struggle, and he kicked a second officer several
times in
the leg, knocking the officer backward.  The officers brought
defendant to the
police station, and one officer noted that defendant was intoxicated
enough
that he was “having some difficulty standing up”
while in the holding cell.  On
the processing report for defendant’s driving under the
influence charge, the
officer indicated defendant had the highest level of
intoxication.  
¶
6.            
Based
on the foregoing, defendant
was charged with eleven different crimes.[1] 
Before trial, defendant moved to exclude evidence of events that took
place prior
to his arrival at his friend’s house.  Specifically,
the State sought to
introduce testimony that defendant had been in a local bar where he got
into an
argument with another patron.  The bartender separated the two
and asked
defendant to leave.  Defendant wanted the evidence from the
bar excluded
because during the course of the interaction the two men discussed
defendant’s beliefs
about racial supremacy.  The interaction grew heated when
defendant learned of
the patron’s mixed racial background and allegedly called the
patron a “spic.” 
Defendant argued that evidence of the event would be prejudicial
because of its
racist content and had no probative value because it was irrelevant to
the
charges.  The prosecution opposed the motion arguing that the
evidence would
show defendant’s consumption of alcohol a short time before
the incident,
discussion of his racists beliefs, and an angry argument between
defendant and
the patron.  In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that
evidence from the
bar was relevant as “highly probative” on the
issues of defendant’s motivation
and intent in committing the later crimes.  On this point the
court held “any
racist statements defendant made tend to cast light on his motive to be
violent
with [the complaining witness], whom—according to the
State’s version of the
facts—defendant knew has a daughter whose godfather is
black.”  The court agreed
that the evidence would be somewhat prejudicial, but it judged the
events at
the bar to be sufficiently relevant and probative because they were
part of the
res gestae of the charged crimes, meaning they “form[ed] a
body of evidence
relating to the events surrounding the crime of which a defendant is
charged.” 
State v. Maduro, 174 Vt. 302, 306, 816 A.2d 432, 435
(2002) (quotation
omitted).  
¶
7.            
In
March 2006, the case was set
for a jury draw.  During voir dire, apparently in response to
the judge’s denial
of the motion in limine, the defense attorney discussed with the jury
defendant’s racist beliefs to assess potential bias against
him.  He told the
jury panel that defendant was a “white
supremacist.”  Due to the defense
attorney’s health, the case did not go to trial with this
first jury pool, and
the parties were forced to draw a second jury.  Because some
of the original
jurors who learned of defendant’s beliefs would be in this
second draw, the defense
attorney again believed it necessary to discuss defendant’s
racist beliefs
during voir dire.  During a conversation
with the court before the jury
draw, the State asserted that its case was
“just . . . not
about white supremacy.”  The trial judge noted that
reraising this issue was “a
difficult decision tactically [for the defense attorney],
so . . . whether
or not you do it is completely your election.  It’s
not compelled by anything
that’s obvious in the State’s presentation of how
it intends to proceed.” 
After the defense attorney brought up white supremacy during voir dire,
the
court dismissed several jurors who said they could not be impartial to
defendant based on his beliefs.
¶
8.            
During
the trial, the issue of
defendant’s beliefs came up several times.  Both
attorneys brought it up during
their opening statements.  The bar patron was unavailable to
testify for the
State; however, the bartender testified that defendant had gotten in an
argument
and called the patron a “spic.”  The
complaining witness also testified to the
fact that many of the tattoos defendant wanted him to rework were Aryan
Brotherhood and Nazi tattoos.  The complaining witness stated
that he refused
to work on such tattoos because he “didn’t believe
in what the tattoos stood
for” and because his “daughter’s
godfather is black.”  Finally, defendant took
the stand, and the defense attorney elicited testimony from defendant
related
to his “sacrodist” or racial purist religious
beliefs.  
¶
9.            
At
the close of the State’s case,
defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal.  The court denied
the motion, and
after defendant presented his case, the parties met to discuss the jury
instructions.  Defendant raised several concerns about the
instructions, requesting
a necessity defense instruction for the
leaving-the-scene-of-an-accident charge
and an instruction on simple assault as a lesser included offense to
the
charges of aggravated assault.  The court denied the
requests.  After
instructing the jury, the trial judge had a bench conference and asked:
 
THE COURT: Any objections to the charge as given?
 
 
[THE STATE]: No.
 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Other than what we talked about in the charge
conference,
the answer is no.
 
 
THE COURT:  All right.  Then thank
you. . . . On that
representation, I will put on the record, at least, that I do have in
mind all
of the matters that were articulated during the charge conference, and
I think
they were made quite clearly at that time, and I’m going to
rely on the rulings
that I made at that time to preserve any other objections.  
 
¶
10.        
The
jury convicted defendant of: reckless
endangerment, 13 V.S.A. § 1025; unlawful trespass, 13
V.S.A.
§ 3705(a); leaving the scene of an accident with
property damage resulting,
23 V.S.A. § 1128(a); driving under the influence
(DUI), third offense, 23
V.S.A. § 1201; two counts of aggravated assault,
preventing a law
enforcement officer from performing a lawful duty, 13 V.S.A.
§ 1024(a)(4);
and resisting arrest, 13 V.S.A. § 3017(a). 
They acquitted him of assault
with a deadly weapon (his vehicle) against the complaining witness,
attempted
murder, and misdemeanor unlawful mischief.  He appeals.
¶
11.        
Defendant’s
claims before this
Court fall into three categories.  First, he takes issue with
the trial court’s
ruling on his in limine motion to exclude evidence of his argument at
the bar
wherein his racist beliefs were revealed.  Second, he assigns
error to the jury
instructions on several grounds.  Finally, he makes two
additional arguments contending
that the information charging him with reckless endangerment was
unconstitutionally vague and that the trial court erred in denying his
motion
for judgment of acquittal on one of the aggravated assault
charges.  We affirm defendant’s
convictions.

I.
¶
12.        
Defendant
claims that evidence
demonstrating his particular beliefs on racial superiority could prove
prejudicial.  We do not contest this point, but recognize that
in this trial,
the court’s denial of defendant’s motion to exclude
evidence was not error and resulted
in only one minor addition to the evidence illustrating
defendant’s racial
beliefs presented by his tattoos and testimony.  Moreover, we
find no merit in
defendant’s claim that the court’s ruling on the
in limine motion forced
his hand and required him to relay his beliefs to the jury during voir
dire.
¶
13.        
In
ruling on admission of evidence
in the face of claims of irrelevance and prejudice, trial courts rely
on
Vermont Rules of Evidence 401 and 403.  See V.R.E. 401
(defining relevant
evidence as “having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable
than it would be without the evidence”); V.R.E. 403
(permitting exclusion of
otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice”).  On appeal,
defendant argues only that the
trial court’s ruling on his motion to exclude violated Rule
403.[2] 
We review such evidentiary determinations deferentially, recognizing
that the
trial court is in the best position to determine admissibility in the
first
instance, and we reverse only on a showing of prejudice.  See State
v. Hill,
174 Vt. 566, 566-67, 816 A.2d 440, 442-43 (2002) (mem.) (reviewing Rule
403
decision under abuse of discretion standard).
¶
14.        
This
is a close question.  Based
on the information before it, the court concluded that evidence
regarding
defendant’s visit to the bar was relevant, relying on the
fact that defendant
acted aggressively toward the patron, the incident was close in time to
the
charged crimes, and the evidence showed that defendant was under the
influence
of alcohol at the time of the charged crimes, one of which was
DUI.  In
weighing the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 403, the court
took note
of the fact that it carried with it “some
prejudice,” but said prejudice did
not substantially outweigh its probative value.  Further, the
court rightly
recognized that to tip the Rule 403 scale on prejudice, the primary
purpose of
the evidence must be to “provoke horror or punish the
defendant, or to appeal
to the jury’s sympathies.”  State
v. Kelley, 163 Vt. 325, 329, 664 A.2d 708, 711 (1995).  While evidence of defendant’s use
of a racial epithet may
have troubled the jury, that was not its primary purpose.  The
evidence of
defendant’s presence at the bar focused on his high level of
intoxication and
his aggressive interaction with another patron.  We do not
find the trial court
abused its discretion and defer to its authority on this
matter.  See State
v. Hinchliffe, 2009 VT 111, ¶ 29, 186 Vt. 487, 987 A.2d 988 (noting that
“although this information was prejudicial to
defendant,” its admission “gave
the jury further context for evaluating” the case and did not
unduly prejudice
defendant).  Defendant’s reliance on the prejudicial
effect of a criminal
defendant’s racist beliefs in sentencing cases does nothing
to persuade us.  
¶
15.        
We
pause to note, however, that
defendant’s claim highlights a potential problem in ruling
with finality on in
limine matters.  As we wrote in State v. Williams,
“we take the
opportunity to point out the pitfalls in granting such broad pre-trial
motions,
and to underscore the advantages of either deferring a ruling until
trial or,
at a minimum, establishing a clear basis for deciding the issue in
advance.” 
2010 VT 77, ¶ 11, ___ Vt. ___, 9 A.3d 315.  Here, the
court ruled, in part,
that the racial evidence was relevant because defendant’s
racist beliefs
provided a potential motive for his crimes against the complaining
witness. 
Ultimately, the State did not adopt this attenuated theory of the case,
thus
rendering defendant’s specific use of a racial epithet in the
bar irrelevant.
¶
16.        
Even
if we viewed this pretrial
ruling as error, any such error was harmless.  Testimony about
defendant’s actions
at the bar was but a small part of the evidence admitted at trial on
defendant’s racist credo—the nature of his tattoos
and the complaining witness’s
refusal to work on them were part of the State’s case,
regardless.  The defense
attorney recognized that the subject of defendant’s tattoos
would arise during
the trial and chose to make the jury aware of their essence during voir
dire.  The
issue came up again during cross-examination of the complaining
witness, and
the defense attorney brought it out during his examination of
defendant.  One
racial slur adduced from the altercation at the bar was insignificant
in light
of the testimony about defendant’s tattoos and personal
values.  See State
v. Laprade, 2008 VT 83, ¶ 24, 184 Vt. 251,
958 A.2d 1179 (holding that
prejudice from additional testimony about crime “was minimal
at worst”).  Though
defendant argues that much of this information came into the trial as a
result
of the court’s early ruling, this conclusion is belied by the
fact that
defendant knew evidence of his tattoos was already coming in.
 He cannot claim
prejudice for his own tactical decisions.  Cf. State
v. Koveos, 169 Vt.
62, 71, 732 A.2d 722, 728 (1999) (refusing to relieve defendant
“of the results
of his tactical decision” to avoid certain testimony based on
a pretrial
evidentiary ruling).
II.
¶
17.        
Defendant’s
next set of arguments
revolves around the instructions given to the jury.  Before
delving into each
claim, we must establish the appropriate standard of review. 
Under Vermont
Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, to preserve an objection to a jury
instruction
for appellate review, a party must object “before the jury
retires to consider
its verdict” and must “stat[e] distinctly the
matter to which [the party]
objects and the grounds for [the] objection.” 
V.R.Cr.P. 30.  We have explained
the “primary reason for the rule is to give the trial court
one last
opportunity to avoid an error.”  State v.
Wheelock, 158 Vt. 302, 306,
609 A.2d 972, 975 (1992).  We have held fast to the position
that absent a
specific objection—after the judge reads the charge but
before the jury retires—we
review any appealed instructions for plain error.  State
v. Rounds, 2011
VT 39, ¶ 19, ___ Vt. ___, ___ A.3d ___.  Indeed,
since deciding Wheelock,
we have chosen to stray from this rule on only one occasion. 
See State v.
Bacon¸ 163 Vt. 279, 284-85, 658 A.2d 54, 59 (1995)
(reviewing objection to
jury instructions as preserved even though no objection made after
charge given
to jury).  
¶
18.        
Given
defendant’s failure to make a
detailed objection to the instructions before the jury recessed, he
relies on Bacon
to support his claimed preservation.  This aspiration is
untenable—Bacon
has some similarities with the procedural posture of this case but is
ultimately unique.  As in this case, after the charging
conference in Bacon
and before the jury retired, defendant did not restate his objection
per Rule
30, and the trial court assured counsel that it was preserving all
earlier
objections.  We treated the defendant’s objection in
Bacon as preserved
because, in the interest of fairness, our decision in Wheelock,
which
clarified Rule 30’s demands, had issued only two weeks before
the trial in Bacon
took place and because the defendant had continually raised the
objection from
pretrial to the charging conference; it was “the focus and
the heart of his
principal defense at trial.”  163 Vt. at 285, 658 A.2d  at 59.  The timing and multiple
attempts at preservation that made Bacon an anomaly
are not present
here.  Thus, we affirm what we said in Bacon:
“in the future parties may
not rely on the trial court's advice that all objections raised at the
charge
conference will be preserved.”  Id.
at 286, 658 A.2d  at 60.  We will
therefore review all of defendant’s claims regarding the jury
instructions for
plain error.  See Rounds, 2011 VT 39,
¶ 31 (explaining plain error
standard for jury instructions); see also V.R.Cr.P. 52(b) (defining
plain
error).  
¶
19.        
Defendant
first suggests that the
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on simple assault as
a lesser
included offense to the two aggravated assault charges, which were
based on his
preventing a law enforcement officer from performing a lawful
duty.  A
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included
offense when
the evidence supports it.  State v. Delisle,
162 Vt. 293, 301, 648 A.2d 642, 637 (1994); see also V.R.Cr.P. 31(c) (“The defendant may
be found guilty
of an offense necessarily included in the offense
charged . . . .”). 
An offense is considered lesser
included when “it is composed of some, but not all, elements
of the greater
offense and does not have any element not included in the greater
offense.”  State
v. Forbes, 147 Vt. 612, 616-17, 523 A.2d 1232, 1235
(1987).  
¶
20.        
Here,
the trial court was correct
in recognizing an important distinction between the elements of the
crime of
aggravated assault, as charged, and those of simple assault. 
Defendant was
charged with aggravated assault under 13 V.S.A.
§ 1024(a)(4), which
requires the State to prove a person “causes physical injury
to any person”
when acting “with intent to prevent a law enforcement officer
from performing a
lawful duty.”  Simple assault, under
13 V.S.A. § 1023(a), also
requires proof of a “bodily injury to another,” but
the defendant must act “purposely,
knowingly or recklessly” in causing the injury.  The
difference between the two
lies in the required mental state: intent to prevent in the aggravated
assault
charge and intent to harm—or doing so knowingly or
recklessly—for simple
assault.  Because the requisite mental element is different
for each charge,
simple assault is not a lesser included element of aggravated assault
as charged
and omitting an instruction on simple assault was not error.
¶
21.        
Defendant
next argues that the
trial court gave the jury an erroneous instruction that violated his
federal
due process rights by creating a mandatory presumption against
him.  In
instructing the jury on the intent element of the two
aggravated-assault-preventing-a-police-officer
charges, the court explained:
 
A person acts intentionally if he or she acts
purposefully and not
inadvertently because of mistake or by accident.  You may find
that the
defendant acted intentionally if it was his conscious objective to
prevent the
law enforcement officer from performing a lawful duty.
 
 
The law presumes that unless there is some other reasonable
explanation, a
person may be presumed to have intended the consequences of his actions
that
might be normally expected.  Since it is not
possible to know exactly what
is in another person’s mind, in determining
defendant’s intent, you should
consider all of the surrounding facts and circumstances as established
by the
evidence.  
 
(Second
emphasis added.)  Defendant takes issue with the emphasized
sentence above.  While
we agree that the instruction created a mandatory inference, we do not
find it
to be plain error.
¶
22.        
We
have ruled that mandatory inferences,
whether they impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant
or remove
determination of an element of the crime from the jury, likely
constitute
reversible error.  See State v. Martell,
143 Vt. 275, 279-80, 465 A.2d 1346, 1348 (1983).[3]
 Determining “[w]hether an instruction is mandatory
or permissive hinges on
'the way in which a reasonable juror could have
interpreted’ it.”  State v.
Dusablon, 142 Vt. 95, 98, 453 A.2d 79, 81 (1982) (quoting Sandstrom
v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979)).  This requires
that we “give careful
attention to the words actually spoken to the
jury.”  Id. (quotation
omitted).  In reviewing a jury charge for error, we examine it
as a whole to
ensure that it “breathes the true spirit of the
law” and that “there is no fair
ground to say that the jury has been misled.”  Id.
(quotation omitted).
¶
23.        
As
our standard of review is an
objective one, we look to case law interpreting similar jury provisions
for
guidance.  The United States Supreme Court, in Sandstrom
v. Montana,
determined that a similar jury instruction created a mandatory
inference.  442 U.S.  at 519.  The instruction at issue there read,
“the law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts.”  Id. at
512.  The Court recognized that this instruction did not
inform the jury “that
they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were
told
only that the law presumed it,” and as such “a
reasonable juror could easily
have viewed such an instruction as mandatory.”  Id.
at 515.  The Court
went on to highlight the fact that the jury was “not told
that the presumption
could be rebutted . . . by the
defendant’s simple
presentation of 'some’ evidence; nor even that it
could be rebutted at all.”  Id.
at 517.  On the issue of rebuttal, the Court also noted that
though the
instructions had mentioned the presumption of innocence and the
State’s burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, these other instructions were not
“rhetorically
inconsistent with
a . . . burden-shifting
presumption”
because the jury could have “interpreted the two sets of
instructions as
indicating that the presumption was a means by which proof beyond a
reasonable
doubt as to intent could be satisfied.”  Id.
at 518 n.7.  The Court
reversed the defendant’s conviction in light of the flawed
instruction.  Id.
at 527.
¶
24.        
On
the heels of Sandstrom,
we upheld a similarly worded instruction in State v. Dusablon. 
142 Vt.
at 99, 453 A.2d  at 82.  The trial court in Dusablon
instructed the jury:
“It is ordinarily reasonable to infer that a person intends
the reasonable and
probable consequences of an act knowingly done or knowingly
committed.”  Id.
at 97, 453 A.2d  at 80.  Reading the jury charge as a whole, we
recognized the
trial court had highlighted that the only evidence as to the
defendant’s intent
was circumstantial, had instructed the jury that the State
“must by law exclude
every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence,”[4]
had clarified the permissive nature of the inference, had mandated that
the
jury examine the evidence of intent with “strict
scrutiny,” and finally had
told them that “mere suspicion” was not adequate
grounds for convicting the
defendant.  Id. at 96-97, 98-99, 453 A.2d 
at 80-81, 82.  Thus, the
instruction as a whole “left the trier of fact with the
freedom to accept or
reject the inference.”  Id. at
99, 453 A.2d  at 82.
¶
25.        
Less
than a year after Dusablon,
we struck down an instruction in State v. Martell
that read:
 
The State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant broke
and
entered into this dwelling house with the intent to commit larceny and
the
essential aspect of this element is the defendant’s intent or
state of mind. 
The question of the defendant’s intent is one for you the
jury to consider
based on all the circumstances brought before you during the course of
this
trial. Under the law a person is presumed to intend the
natural and probable
consequences of his acts. And you as jurors must look into
all the
circumstances surrounding the offense in order to establish whether the
defendant engaged in the acts alleged with the intent to commit a
larceny, and
if you so find beyond a reasonable doubt then the State has met its
burden of
proof as to that element.
 
143
Vt. at 278, 465 A.2d  at 1347.  Recognizing that the
instruction, specifically
the emphasized passage, was nearly identical to the one the United
States Supreme
Court had struck down in Sandstrom, we relied on
that holding to
conclude that the instructions in Martell created a
mandatory inference
against the defendant.  Id. at 278-79, 465 A.2d  at 1347.
¶
26.        
Turning
to the instruction at
issue here, we find it is closer to those in Martell
and Sandstrom
than those in Dusablon, and so it constitutes
error.  On its face, the
contested sentence is garbled.  Whether the jury understood it
at all is unknown. 
Simplified, it suggests that, absent an alternative reasonable
explanation,
under the law the jury may presume defendant’s intent based
on “the
consequences of his actions that might be normally
expected.”  The instruction
raises two distinct concerns, which result in our determination that it
created
a mandatory inference and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to
defendant.  The first is that, notwithstanding the use of the
permissive “may,”
nothing in the body of the instruction or the entirety of the jury
charge
suggests that the jury had a choice about whether to accept or reject
this
presumption, nor were they informed that the law’s
presumption could be
rebutted.  Cf. Sandstrom, 442 U.S.  at 515
(noting jury was not informed
they “had a choice” in accepting or rejecting
inference regarding “ordinary
consequences”).  Express choice for the jury is the
hallmark of a permissive
inference.  See Dusablon, 142 Vt. at 99,
453 A.2d  at 82 (highlighting
fact that instruction “plainly directed the jury to consider
all of the
circumstances tending to support or contradict the inference”
and directing
jury “to decide the matter for itself”). 
Here the language at issue is
directive: “The law presumes that unless there is some other
reasonable
explanation, a person may be presumed to have intended the consequences
of his
actions that might be normally expected.”  The
addition of the proviso “unless
there is some other reasonable explanation” cements the
matter.  Rather than
making clear that the prosecution “had to still prove that
there was no 'other
reasonable explanation,’ ” as the State
argues, this language at best
suggests some burden of proof less than our reasonable doubt standard
and at
worst requires defendant to provide the “other reasonable
explanation” to rebut
the inference—assuming the jury knew it was rebuttable at
all.  Indeed, “a
review of the [whole] charge in this case reveals nothing
'rhetorically
inconsistent with a conclusive or burden-shifting
presumption.’ ”  Martell,
143 Vt. at 278, 465 A.3d  at 1347 (quoting Sandstrom,
442 U.S.  at 518-19
n.7).  
¶
27.        
Having
established that the
instruction was error, we must assess its import.  In Martell,
we held
that a mandatory inference in a jury instruction was reversible error
per se
because it created “a conclusive presumption on an essential
element of the
crime charged,” thus removing determination of the issue from
the jury’s
purview.  143 Vt. at 279-80, 465 A.2d  at 1348.  We
have since tempered that
ruling with our recognition that the creation of “a category
of errors which
are plain per se” is “bad
policy.”  State v. Roy, 151 Vt.
17, 23, 557 A.2d 884, 888 (1989), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Brillon,
2008 VT 35, 183 Vt. 475, 955 A.2d 1108; see also State v.
Lambert, 2003
VT 28, ¶ 13, 175 Vt. 275, 830 A.2d 9 (rejecting request to
treat omission of
element of a crime from jury instruction as plain error per se); Koveos,
169 Vt. at 66, 732 A.2d  at 725 (“Our recent decisions reflect
a strong policy
against finding categories of errors as plain per se, such that
preservation is
not required for appellate intervention.”).  
¶
28.        
We
have questioned the foundation
of Martell’s holding in the past, State
v. Jackowski, 2006 VT
119, ¶ 26, 181 Vt. 73, 915 A.2d 767 (Burgess, J., dissenting),
and have sought
to limit its scope.  Jackowski, 2006 VT
119, ¶¶ 8, 9 n.3 (recognizing
reversible error in Martell because the instruction
at issue “amounted
to a directed verdict,” but refusing to
“foreclos[e] a harmless-error analysis
on review of all criminal cases involving a conclusive presumption or
the
equivalent”).  Without dismissing the value of our
reasoning in Martell,
we now expressly overrule it to the extent that it created a category
of per se
reversible error.  As we held in Roy, the
creation of a per se category
of error would both limit the value of Rule 30 and “reduce
any incentive for
trial counsel to object to errors” in the jury instruction
and so hinder a
trial court’s ability to correct such errors in the first
instance.  151 Vt. at
23, 557 A.2d  at 888.  
¶
29.        
Accordingly,
we assess this error
under the familiar plain error standard.  See V.R.Cr.P. 52(b)
(defining plain
error as those “defects affecting substantial
rights”).  We reverse such error
when it is obvious, affects substantial rights bringing prejudice to
the
defendant, and “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
public reputation
of judicial proceedings.”  Rounds,
2011 VT 39, ¶ 31 (quotation omitted). 
We affirm when the error is harmless.  State v.
Kultzer, 2009 VT 79,
¶ 16, 186 Vt. 264, 979 A.2d 1031.  
¶
30.        
Use
of a mandatory inference against
a defendant in a jury instruction has long been disfavored in this
state and
has constituted grounds for reversal of conviction in the
past.  See, e.g., State
v. Young, 143 Vt. 413, 415, 465 A.2d 1375, 1376 (1983)
(noting “a mandatory
presumption here would impermissibly act to shift the burden of
producing evidence
from the State to the defendant”); Martell,
143 Vt. 275, 279-80, 465 A.2d 1346, 1348.  It is a tenet of our nation’s law
that the State holds the
burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt
and
shifting that burden from the State to the defendant violates due
process. 
See, e.g., Dusablon, 142 Vt. at 97, 453 A.2d  at 81
(“The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the state prove every
element
of a crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.  It violates due
process to shift
the burden of proof on an essential element from the state to the
defendant.”
(citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) and
Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977))).  A mandatory
inference has no place in a
criminal trial.  See State v. Koons, 2011
VT 22, ¶ 13, ___ Vt. ___, ___
A.3d ___ (noting plain error must be “one that is clear or
obvious under
existing law”).  
¶
31.        
Obvious
though the error may have
been, and though it may have violated a substantial right, the
instruction was
not ultimately prejudicial.  The central danger of a mandatory
presumption in a
jury instruction is that it can operate like a directed verdict against
a
defendant, providing him no recourse to combat the State’s
case.  See Sandstrom,
442 U.S.  at 523; Jackowski, 2006 VT 119, ¶
9 (“[W]e are persuaded that
the effect of the erroneous instruction [permitting the jury to ignore
any
evidence of defendant’s intent and to convict solely based on
her knowledge]
was analogous to a directed verdict for the
State.”).  This danger is
diminished, however, when the facts of the case and the specifics of
the charge
at issue are examined more closely.  Simply put, the question
of why defendant lashed
out at the officers was never at issue.  The State’s
evidence centered on
defendant physically struggling with the arresting officers and trying
to pull
away while yelling at them to let him go.  Defendant raised
only the issue of
whether the officers were actually injured by him and the degree to
which his
actions delayed the arrest.  The jury was instructed that it
could find he
acted intentionally “if it was his conscious objective to
prevent the law
enforcement officer from performing a lawful duty.” 
Supra, ¶ 21.  Indeed,
the jury found him guilty of resisting arrest beyond a reasonable
doubt.  See
13 V.S.A. § 3017(a) (outlawing
“intentionally attempt[ing] to prevent a
lawful arrest . . . , which is being
effected or attempted by a
law enforcement officer”).  There was no evidence to
suggest defendant was
struggling or kicking at the officers for some other purpose. 
The evidence of
defendant’s struggle supports the jury finding that he
intended to hinder the
officers.  Though a violation of his constitutional rights,
the mandatory
presumption portion of the instruction did not prejudice
defendant.    
¶
32.        
Defendant’s
next claim again
focuses on his conviction for these same two charges of aggravated
assault.  He
argues the trial court’s failure to include a diminished
capacity instruction for
these two charges was error in light of his extreme level of
intoxication at
the time he was arrested.  He suggests this error prejudiced
his cause because
he received a diminished capacity instruction on the charge of
attempted
aggravated assault and the attempted murder charge, and he was
acquitted of
both of these crimes.  As above, defendant did not raise this
objection before
the trial court, and we do not find it constitutes plain error.
¶
33.        
We
have long recognized that
voluntary intoxication can provide a defense to certain
crimes.  See, e.g., State
v. Turley, 87 Vt. 163, 176, 88 A. 562, 568 (1913) (permitting
jury
instruction “that dealt with voluntary intoxication as a
defense to a criminal
charge”).  “Where there is evidence of
intoxication such as to negate the
requisite criminal intent, the court should normally instruct the jury
that it
may consider the intoxication evidence as bearing on
intent.”  State v.
Kinney, 171 Vt. 239, 243, 762 A.2d 833, 837 (2000); see State
v. Joyce,
139 Vt. 638, 639-40, 433 A.2d 271, 272 (1981) (“When specific
intent is an
element of a crime, evidence of either voluntary or involuntary
intoxication
may be introduced to show that the defendant could not have formed the
necessary intent.”).  However, “evidence
of alcohol or drug consumption, even
in large quantities, will not by itself require the court to charge the
jury
that it can consider defendant's intoxication as bearing on whether he
had the
requisite intent to commit the crimes charged.”  Kinney,
171 Vt. at 243,
762 A.2d  at 838.
¶
34.        
Defendant
points out that here
there is more evidence than simply his consumption of
alcohol.  He points to
the quantity of alcohol he ingested, the officer’s report of
his “substantial”
intoxication while in the holding cell, and the relatively short time
frame in
which all of these events occurred.  In doing so, he likens
his cause to Kinney
where this Court found that “evidence of the amount [of
alcohol] consumed,
together with the assessment of a witness that defendant appeared
intoxicated
on the night in question, and defendant's statement that his faculties
were
'fairly clouded,’ were sufficient to warrant the
charge.”  Id. at 244,
762 A.2d  at 838.  But in Kinney we
recognized the issue of the
instruction as a close question and ultimately found the preserved
error
harmless in light of the totality of the evidence.  Id. 
We face a
different circumstance here.
¶
35.        
While
the question of whether the
evidence produced at trial should have given rise to a diminished
capacity
instruction is an open one, even were we to assume that the omission
both was
error and was obvious, we do not find it prejudicial.  As
noted above,
defendant never raised the issue of his intent with regard to the
aggravated
assault charges.  Indeed, he never even raised the matter of
intoxication
directly when addressing the twin assault charges, only questioning one
of the
officers about his level of intoxication upon processing his
arrest.  Contrary
to Kinney, defendant never testified about his own
level of intoxication
beyond repeatedly admitting he was aware at the time that he was
driving
drunk.  Defendant’s closing argument—not
to mention his lack of objection to
the charges as given—solidify our opinion; his defense to
these charges was to
suggest that his actions did not delay his arrest or did not actually
cause
harm to the officers.  In contrast, the State spent ample time
addressing his aggressive
actions toward the officers when they attempted to take him into
custody.  He
struggled, he kicked, he told them to let him go, and the arresting
officers
testified that his actions made the “entire process [of
taking him into
custody] . . . difficult.”  We
find no prejudice here.
¶
36.        
In
response, defendant argues that
the true prejudice he suffered from the omitted instruction came about
as a
result of the diminished capacity instructions provided to the jury in
connection with other charges, notably the attempted aggravated assault
charge
and the attempted murder charge.  He makes much of the fact
that he was
acquitted of these two crimes but not of the aggravated assaults and
suggests
that the jury “would have understood that diminished capacity
could not be a
defense for [his] alleged crimes against the arresting officers,
although it
could be for his [other] alleged crimes.”  This
argument is fruitless.  The
absence of the desired instruction did nothing to change the facts
presented in
the case.  While upon review of the record there was evidence
that defendant
was intoxicated at the time of his arrest, as illustrated above the
impact of
his intoxication on his mental capacity was never raised, and he never
argued
this theory to the jury nor even addressed his intent
generally.  The lack of a
diminished capacity instruction did not influence the jury’s
consideration of
defendant’s intoxication as a defense.  It was his
failure to make that
argument at all.
¶
37.        
Defendant’s
final claim regarding
the jury instructions centers on his unpreserved request for a
necessity
defense instruction on the charge of leaving the scene of an
accident.  The law
requires a driver involved in an accident causing property damage to
“immediately stop and render any assistance reasonably
necessary” and “give his
or her name, residence, license number” and other information
“to any
person . . . whose property is
damaged and to any
enforcement officer” or face criminal sanction for leaving
the scene of an
accident.  23 V.S.A.
§ 1128(a).  We have held that the immediacy
with
which a defendant renders aid and provides information is a
fact-specific
inquiry, but that aid and identification should occur “as
soon as reasonably
possible.”  State v. Severance,
120 Vt. 268, 274, 138 A.2d 425, 429
(1958); see also State v. Loso, 151 Vt. 262, 266,
559 A.2d 681, 684
(1989) (noting 13 V.S.A. § 1128 requires rendering
assistance and
providing information “at a time and in a manner reasonable
under the
circumstances”).  Based on this reasonableness
requirement, defendant argues
that the complaining witness here was brandishing what defendant
believed was a
gun and suggests that stopping immediately to provide information after
hitting
the complaining witness’s mailbox and mobile home could have
resulted in
tragedy for defendant.  He posits that these facts give rise
to a necessity
defense instruction, permitting the jury to find that it was necessary
for defendant
to delay giving information to the complaining witness and law
enforcement
following the accident and thus acquit him of the crime.
¶
38.        
The
trial court was correct in
denying defendant a necessity instruction.  In brief,
defendant must make a
prima facie showing that: (1) there was an emergency situation
“arising without
fault on the part of the actor concerned;” (2) the emergency
was “so imminent
and compelling as to raise a reasonable expectation of
harm[;]” (3) the
emergency presented “no reasonable opportunity to avoid the
injury without
doing the criminal act;” and (4) harm from the impending
emergency was “of
sufficient seriousness to outmeasure the criminal
wrong.”  State v. Thayer,
2010 VT 78, ¶ 6, ___ Vt. ___, 14 A.3d 231 (quotations
omitted).  The first
requirement for such an instruction is that the defendant is not
responsible
for causing the emergency giving rise to the necessity.  Here,
there is little
question that defendant was driving his truck around the complaining
witness’s
property and threatening same, thus creating any
“emergency” that existed.  That
defendant was armed with a truck and the complaining witness had a
knife were
also circumstances defendant created.  See, e.g., State
v. Squires, 147
Vt. 430, 431, 519 A.2d 1154, 1155 (1986) (per curiam) (affirming trial
court’s
denial of necessity instruction where defendant’s
intoxication created
emergency).  He also fails under the third prong because he
had ample
opportunity to inform the police of the accident and did not do
so.  Upon leaving
the complaining witness’s property, defendant drove to his
mother’s house.  He
was arrested roughly half an hour later, locked in a trailer on his
sister’s adjoining
property.  He had made no attempts to contact the police
during this time.  In
fact, over those intervening thirty minutes, defendant found time to
call the complaining
witness and at one point during that call even spoke with a law
enforcement
officer.  He never provided either party the information
23 V.S.A. § 1128
requires.  Lack of an instruction thus did not constitute
error. 
III.
¶
39.        
Defendant’s
final two claims are
that the information charging him with reckless endangerment was
“constitutionally insufficient” and that the court
erred in denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal on one of the aggravated assault
charges.  The first
claim is without merit.  Though defendant is correct that such
a claim can be
raised for the first time on appeal, State v. Neisner,
2010 VT 112, ¶
27, ___ Vt. ___, ___ A.3d ___, his suggestion that the information at
issue
failed in “its basic task of informing a reasonable person of
the exact offense
charged” is unpersuasive.  In assessing the validity
of an information, we
review it in an objective manner, taking a common sense
approach.  Id. 
Additionally, we read it in conjunction with any supporting
affidavits.  Id. 
To succeed in challenging the sufficiency of an information, the
defendant must
prove that it did not “reasonably indicate the exact offense
the accused [was]
charged with” and that this lack of precision prejudiced his
defense.  Id.
¶ 29 (quotation omitted).  As prosecuted, Count Three
of the information
charged:
 
[Defendant], . . . on or about March 4, 2008,
recklessly engaged in
conduct which placed or may have placed another person in danger of
death or
serious bodily injury, in violation of 13 V.S.A.
§ 1025.  
 
This
charge was preceded with charges of aggravated assault with a weapon,
specifically his truck; attempted murder of the complaining witness
with his
truck; unlawful mischief resulting in property damage not exceeding
$250; unlawful
mischief resulting in property damage greater than $1000; and unlawful
trespass
on the complaining witness’s property.  
¶
40.        
There
can be no serious claim that
defendant did not understand the charge he faced, especially in light
of the associated
affidavits.  The language of the information is drawn from the
statute and is
sufficient on its face to inform defendant of the crime in
question.  See State
v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 308, 561 A.2d 392, 399 (1989)
(noting
“[g]enerally, a crime defined by statute is sufficiently
charged in the words
of the statute”).  The two accompanying affidavits
clearly describe defendant’s
reckless operation of his truck, including its impact with the
complaining
witness’s home and the resulting damage, and the fact that
the truck struck the
complaining witness’s daughter’s room. 
That aside, defendant makes no showing
that the perceived lack of clarity in the information prejudiced his
defense. 
See Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 32
(“This was not a case where a
defendant is surprised by an additional charge and is unprepared to
present
evidence in defense.”).  To the contrary, his
attorney made clear that he
understood the basis of the charge, focusing during voir dire on the
fact that
a young child was one of the alleged victims of defendant. 
Defendant’s
reliance on State v. Phillips, 142 Vt. 283, 455 A.2d 325 (1982), does
not further his cause.  That case involved a three-charge
information that alleged
three crimes based on a single statute, included no specific acts, and
referenced a sixteen-month span of time when the defendant may have
committed
the alleged crimes.  Defendant faced no such
“morass” here.  Id. at
290,
455 A.2d  at 329.
¶
41.        
The
final claim before us returns
our focus to defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault,
preventing a police
officer from performing a lawful duty.  Defendant moved for a
judgment of
acquittal on both assault charges, arguing neither officer suffered
bodily
injury.  The trial court denied the motion, and defendant
appeals the denial on
one of the charges.  We review such a request under an
exacting standard.  State
v. O’Dell, 2007 VT 34, ¶ 4, 181 Vt. 475,
924 A.2d 87 (explaining standard
of review to require viewing evidence in light most favorable to the
State, and
determining if it is sufficient to fairly and reasonably convince jury
of
defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt). 
Defendant claims the State did not
prove that his kick, which pushed one of the arresting officers
backward,
caused physical “injury” sufficient to sustain a
conviction under 13 V.S.A.
§ 1024(a)(4) beyond a reasonable doubt.[5] 
“Injury,” for the purposes of § 1024,
means “physical pain, illness or any
impairment of physical condition.”  13 V.S.A.
§ 1021(1).  When asked if he
suffered any physical pain from the kick, the officer in question
testified
that “[t]here was some discomfort, yes.”
 While we recognize that “discomfort”
and “pain” are not strictly synonymous, the
officer’s testimony was sufficient
to support defendant’s conviction on this charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.
 
 
FOR
THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate Justice
 

[1] 
The State dismissed a charge of felony unlawful mischief, causing
damage to
property with a value greater than $1000, under 13 V.S.A.
§ 3701(a),
before the trial.
[2] 
To the extent defendant suggests a heightened balancing of prejudice
versus
probative value under Rule 403 when evidence involves racial beliefs,
neither
the case law he cites nor the facts of this case support his position.
[3] 
Though Martell held that use of a mandatory
inference was reversible
error per se, we overrule that holding.  See infra,
¶ 28.
[4] 
The necessity of this portion of a jury instruction was repudiated as
inconsistent with the State’s burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.  State
v. Derouchie, 140 Vt. 437, 445, 440 A.2d 146, 150 (1981). 
[5] 
13 V.S.A. § 1024(a):  “A person is
guilty of aggravated assault if the
person: . . . (4) with intent to
prevent a law enforcement
officer from performing a lawful duty, the person causes physical
injury to any
person . . . .”