Case Title: Robert D. Konneker v. Robert S. Romano

Citation: 2010 WI 65

Docket Number: 2008AP001546

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 65 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1546 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Robert D. Konneker and Ann M. Konneker, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Robert S. Romano and Francis A. Romano, 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
Norman E. Nelson and Lawrence A. Nelson, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 317 Wis. 2d 732, 768 N.W.2d 63 
(Ct. App 2009-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 11, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Green Lake   
 
JUDGE: 
William M. McMonigal   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Steven R. Sorenson, Emily E. Dinegan, and the Sorenson 
Law Office, Ripon, and oral argument by Steven R. Sorenson. 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief by Jeffrey 
J. Liotta, Lisa M. Arent, and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Lisa M. Arent. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas D. Larson and 
Wisconsin REALTORS® Association, Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin REALTORS® Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William P. O’Connor, 
Mary Beth Peranteau, and Wheeler, Van Sickle & Anderson, S.C., 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association of Lakes. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 65
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP1546  
(L.C. No. 
2007CV35) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Robert D. Konneker and Ann M. Konneker, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert S. Romano and Francis A. Romano, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Norman E. Nelson and Lawrence A. Nelson, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals1 that 
reversed an order of the Green Lake County Circuit Court, Judge 
William M. McMonigal presiding, which granted summary judgment 
to Robert and Ann Konneker (the Konnekers) and denied summary 
                                                 
1 Konneker v. Romano, No. 2008AP1546, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2009). 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
2 
 
judgment to Robert and Francis Romano (the Romanos) and Norman 
and Lawrence Nelson (the Nelsons).  The court of appeals 
remanded, directing the circuit court to enter summary judgment 
in favor of the Romanos.2  The Konnekers petitioned this court 
for review, and we accepted.  We now reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for 
further proceedings. 
¶2 
This case presents the following issues: (1) whether 
this lakefront easement, created by a deed that is otherwise 
silent as to the easement's use and purpose, grants riparian 
rights, including the right to construct and maintain a pier; 
and (2) what impact, if any, do Wis. Stat. §§ 30.131 and 30.133 
(2007-08)3 have on this case.4 
                                                 
2 The Nelsons did not appeal from the circuit court's order. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 30.131, "Wharves and piers placed and 
maintained by persons other than riparian owners," provides:  
(1) Notwithstanding s. 30.133, a wharf or pier of the 
type 
which 
does 
not 
require 
a 
permit 
under 
ss. 30.12(1) and 30.13 that abuts riparian land and 
that is placed in a navigable water by a person other 
than the owner of the riparian land may not be 
considered to be an unlawful structure on the grounds 
that it is not placed and maintained by the owner if 
all of the following requirements are met: 
(a) The owner of the riparian land or the owner's 
predecessor 
in 
interest 
entered 
into 
a 
written 
easement that was recorded before December 31, 1986, 
and that authorizes access to the shore to a person 
who is not an owner of the riparian land. 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
3 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) The person to whom the easement was granted 
or that person's successor in interest is the person 
who places and maintains the wharf or pier. 
(c) The placement and maintenance of the wharf or 
pier is not prohibited by and is not inconsistent with 
the terms of the written easement. 
(d) The wharf or pier has been placed seasonally 
in the same location at least once every 4 years since 
the 
written 
easement 
described 
in 
par. (a) 
was 
recorded. 
(e) The wharf or pier is substantially the same 
size and configuration as it was on April 28, 1990, or 
during its last placement before April 28, 1990, 
whichever is later. 
(f) The placement of the wharf or pier complies 
with the provisions of this chapter, with any rules 
promulgated under this chapter and with any applicable 
municipal regulations or ordinances. 
(2) 
Notwithstanding 
s. 30.133, 
an 
easement 
under 
sub. (1) may be conveyed if it is conveyed at the same 
time, and to the same person, that the land to which 
the easement is appurtenant is conveyed. 
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 30.133 is a "[p]rohibition against 
conveyance of riparian rights":  
(1) Beginning on April 9, 1994, and except as provided 
in s. 30.1355 [s. 30.1335], no owner of riparian land 
that abuts a navigable water may grant by an easement 
or by a similar conveyance any riparian right in the 
land to another person, except for the right to cross 
the land in order to have access to the navigable 
water.  This right to cross the land may not include 
the 
right 
to 
place 
any 
structure 
or 
material, 
including a boat docking facility, as defined in 
s. 30.1335(1)(a), in the navigable water. 
(2) This section does not apply to riparian land 
located within the boundary of any hydroelectric 
project 
licensed 
or 
exempted 
by 
the 
federal 
government, if the conveyance is authorized under any 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
4 
 
¶3 
We conclude that summary judgment was improper in this 
case.  The language of the deed, which created the Konnekers' 
easement, is ambiguous.  The deed conveys to the Konnekers a 20-
foot wide lakefront easement along the west side of the Romanos' 
and Nelsons' property but is otherwise silent as to the 
easement's use and purpose.  It is therefore not clear from the 
deed whether the parties intended the easement holder to have 
riparian rights, including the right to construct and maintain a 
pier.  Because the parties' competing affidavits raised a 
genuine issue of material fact concerning the intent behind the 
easement, summary judgment was improper.  We therefore reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the case to the 
circuit court for further proceedings. 
¶4 
We further conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 30.133 and 
30.131 are inapplicable to this case.  It is undisputed that the 
easement was originally conveyed well before the effective date 
of § 30.133.  In addition, the issue in this case is whether the 
easement 
grants 
riparian 
rights, 
including 
the 
right 
to 
construct and maintain a pier, not whether a pier——if and once 
constructed 
by 
the 
easement 
holder——constitutes 
a 
lawful 
structure under § 30.131. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
                                                                                                                                                             
license, rule or order issued by the federal agency 
having jurisdiction over the project. 
4 The issue of whether Wis. Stat. §§ 30.131 and 30.133 are 
applicable to this case was not invoked, argued, or appealed 
below.  However, pursuant to our order, the parties briefed the 
issue before this court. 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
5 
 
¶5 
On October 29, 2004, the Konnekers obtained via deed 
property on Orchard Avenue in Green Lake County, Wisconsin, more 
particularly described as follows: "Lot One (1) of Certified 
Survey Map 2643 recorded in Volume 13 of Certified Survey Maps 
on Page 2643 and 2643B, being a division of Lot Two (2) of 
Certified Survey Map No. 770, being a part of the SE ¼ of the SW 
¼ of Section 34, T16N, R12E."  The conveyance included an 
easement across riparian5 property identified as Lot 3: 
TOGETHER WITH an easement 20 feet in width along the 
Westerly side of Lot Three (3) of Certified Survey Map 
No. 289 as recorded in the office of the Register of 
Deeds for Green Lake County, Wisconsin on September 1, 
1965 in Volume 1 of Certified Survey Maps at page 289 
being a part of the S ½ of the SW ¼ of Section 34, 
T16N, R12E, extending from Orchard Avenue to Beyer's 
Cove.  All of the above lying and being in the 
Township of Princeton, County of Green Lake, State of 
Wisconsin. 
(Emphasis added.)  Lot 3, co-owned by the Romanos and the 
Nelsons, is lakefront property that borders a portion of Green 
Lake known as Beyer's Cove.  Lot 3 is located across the street 
                                                 
5 "Riparian" means "[o]f, relating to, or located on the 
bank of a river or stream (or occasionally another body of 
water, such as a lake)."  Black's Law Dictionary 1328 (7th ed. 
1999); see also Stoesser v. Shore Drive P'ship, 172 Wis. 2d 660, 
665, 494 N.W.2d 204 (1993).  In the legal sense, a landowner 
whose property borders on a body of water has "riparian rights," 
meaning "the right to make reasonable use of the water."  
Black's 1328.  Though subject to regulation, riparian rights 
"include the right to use the shoreline and have access to the 
waters, the right to reasonable use of the waters for domestic, 
agricultural and recreational purposes, and the right to 
construct a pier or similar structure in aid of navigation."  
ABKA Ltd. P'ship v. DNR, 2002 WI 106, ¶57, 255 Wis. 2d 486, 648 
N.W.2d 854. 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
6 
 
from the Konnekers' property, on the opposite side of Orchard 
Avenue.  Accordingly, the Konnekers, unlike the Romanos and the 
Nelsons, are non-riparian landowners.  The Konnekers' easement 
is "20 feet in width" and "extend[s] from Orchard Avenue to 
Beyer's Cove" along the west side of the Romanos' and Nelsons' 
property.  The easement is the subject of this dispute.   
¶6 
The easement was first created and conveyed in 1983 by 
Barbara D. Ciszek, Edward Ciszek, Peter J. Ciszek, and Angeline 
L. Ciszek (the Ciszeks).6  That conveyance and each subsequent 
conveyance7 contained the same substantive language, describing 
the easement as 20 feet in width along the westerly side of Lot 
3 of Certified Survey Map No. 289, extending from Orchard Avenue 
to Beyer's Cove.   
¶7 
The Ciszeks were also predecessors in interest to Lot 
3.  According to an affidavit signed by Edward Ciszek and 
Barbara D. Ciszek on August 13, 1984, and maintained in the 
Register of Deeds Office for Green Lake County, as of that date, 
                                                 
6 On November 23, 1983, the Ciszeks conveyed Lot 2 of 
Certified Survey Map No. 770, together with the easement along 
Lot 3, to Robert Thomas Blizek and Marguerite Blizek.  
7 On February 11, 1989, the Blizeks conveyed Lot 2 of 
Certified Survey Map No. 770, together with the easement along 
Lot 3, to Grant G. Gardner and Patricia A. Gardner.  On May 25, 
1994, the Gardners conveyed Lot 2 of Certified Survey Map No. 
770, together with the easement along Lot 3, to Rose D. 
Carlsson, as Trustee under self declared Trust.  On October 11, 
1999, the Carlsson Trust had Lot 2 resurveyed into two lots, 
creating Lot 1 of Certified Survey Map No. 2643.  Finally, as 
previously mentioned, on October 29, 2004, the Carlsson Trust 
conveyed Lot 1 of Certified Survey Map No. 2643, together with 
the easement along Lot 3, to the Konnekers. 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
7 
 
seven different parcels of land were entitled to use Lot 3 "as 
an access to Beyer[']s Cove, being a part of Green Lake."  The 
affidavit further states that "it was the intention of all 
parties in granting the above-described access easements, that 
said easements should be appurtenant to and run with the 
ownership of the respective lots which they service." 
¶8 
On November 5, 1985, the Ciszeks conveyed Lot 3 to 
Richard A. Fagar and Catherine M. Fagar and the Nelsons, as 
tenants in common.  On May 1, 1987, the Fagars conveyed their 
one-half interest in Lot 3 to the Romanos.  Accordingly, the 
Romanos and the Nelsons are the current co-owners of Lot 3. 
¶9 
According to the Nelsons' affidavit, sometime prior to 
May 1, 1990, the Nelsons "constructed a pier on or close to the 
20 foot easement for mooring their boat."  Beginning in May 
1990, the Romanos and the Nelsons leased to Grant Gardner, a 
predecessor in interest to the Konnekers' property, see supra 
note 7, "a portion of Lot #3 . . . for the purpose of berthing 
[his] boat thereon."  For annual rent of $150, Gardner was 
permitted "to place a boat lift and a limited number of pier 
sections to moor" a particularly described boat through the end 
of the 1994 boating season.  The lease advised Gardner that he 
"may not sublet or assign [his] space to others" and that "seven 
other property owners have access rights on and to the subject 
premises" with which he may not interfere.  On January 24, 1994, 
Robert Romano sent a letter to Lake Realty "concerning the sale 
of Grant Gardner's home" and reiterated that the pier rights 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
8 
 
under the lease were "not transferable and were only extended to 
Grant Gardner and his [] boat." 
¶10 Thereafter, the Romanos and the Nelsons entered into a 
similar lease with Arne Carlsson, the Gardners' successor in 
interest, see supra note 7.  For annual rent of $200, Carlsson 
was "allowed to place a boat lift and a limited number of pier 
sections to moor" a particularly described boat along Lot 3.  
The original term of the lease was May 1, 1994, to October 1, 
1994, but the parties initialed a lease extension from May 1, 
1995, to October 1, 1995.  In an undated letter, Robert Romano 
informed Hagstrom/Schneider Real Estate that "[their] agreement 
with the Carlssons [was] not transferable." 
¶11 As stated by Robert Konneker in his affidavit, when 
the Carlsson Trust conveyed Lot 1 to the Konnekers, the 
Konnekers understood that they would also have access to the 
piers on the Romanos' and the Nelsons' property. 
¶12 At some point, the Konnekers installed their own pier 
along Lot 3.  The Romanos and the Nelsons objected to the pier 
in a letter to Robert Konneker, dated October 10, 2006:  
On October 7, 2006 we learned that you placed a boat 
pier in the water on Lot 3 of [Certified Survey Map] 
289 in Green Lake, Wisconsin.  As you are well aware, 
you are neither an owner nor a lessee of this property 
and we consider your actions in placing the pier to be 
unlawful and to constitute trespassing. 
Your assertion that your property's easement somehow 
conveys 
riparian 
rights 
and 
entitles 
you 
to 
unilaterally place a pier is both incorrect and 
contrary to Wisconsin law.  It was made clear to you 
prior to your purchase of your property and numerous 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
9 
 
times thereafter, that you do not have the right to 
place a pier in Lot 3. 
If you do not remove the pier immediately we will 
arrange to have it removed . . . . 
The Romanos and the Nelsons subsequently removed the Konnekers' 
pier. 
¶13 On March 1, 2007, the Konnekers filed this action, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the easement granted to them 
riparian rights, including the right to erect and maintain a 
pier on the easement.  In their answer, the Romanos alleged that 
the complaint failed to state a legally cognizable claim and 
should be dismissed.  The Romanos counterclaimed for trespass 
and sought an order prohibiting the Konnekers from erecting any 
future structures on the easement.  In their answer, the Nelsons 
likewise sought a declaration that the Konnekers do not have 
riparian rights under the easement and are not entitled to erect 
any structures on the easement. 
¶14 The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  
The Romanos argued that the Konnekers were not granted riparian 
rights under the easement, which provides only "for a 200-foot 
[sic] 
easement 
from 
Orchard 
Avenue 
to 
Beyer[']s 
Cove," 
indicating "that the easement is to simply provide ingress and 
egress to the lake."  The Romanos further asserted that no pier 
was installed at the time the easement was originally conveyed, 
and in fact, when a pier was erected on Lot 3, a lease was 
created specifically for the pier's use.   
¶15 In support of their motion for summary judgment, the 
Nelsons also argued that the easement did not grant to the 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
10 
 
Konnekers the right to construct a pier thereon and that the 
granting of such a right was never the parties' intent:  
[T]he fact that the [Konnekers'] predecessors in title 
(the 
Gardners 
and 
the 
Carlssons) 
entered 
into 
separate, 
private 
lease 
agreements 
to 
use 
the 
[Romanos' and the Nelsons'] pier and actually paid 
rent on an annual basis, illustrate that there was no 
intent between the parties that a pier could be 
constructed on the 20 foot easement. 
In their brief, the Nelsons made a point that their pier "is 
placed well to the east of the 20 foot easement."  However, the 
Nelsons' affidavit asserted that said pier was constructed "on 
or close to the 20 foot easement." 
¶16 The Konnekers, on the other hand, moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that they have a right to install their 
own pier on the easement, consistent with the intent of the 
original parties who granted the easement.  In particular, 
"Beyer's Cove is historically an area of the lake wherein 
individuals enter the lake by boat."  In his affidavit, Robert 
Konneker maintained the following:  
Beyer[']s Cove is an access area into Green Lake and 
consists of large amounts of vegetation.  The water at 
Beyer[']s Cove is not conducive to swimming and there 
is no beach area for sun bathing.  The only use for 
the access area at the end of the easement at 
Beyer[']s Cove is to enter Green Lake by boat. 
His affidavit further asserted that the Konnekers' predecessors 
in interest accessed the lake by using the Romanos' and the 
Nelsons' piers and that when the Konnekers purchased their lot, 
the Konnekers "understood that [they] would have access to the 
piers on the [Romanos' and the Nelsons'] property in order to 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
11 
 
enter Beyer[']s Cove; just as the owners before [them] had the 
use of the piers to access the lake."  Once informed that they 
were not permitted to use the Romanos' and the Nelsons' piers, 
the Konnekers erected their own pier on the easement. 
¶17 On May 5, 2008, the circuit court granted the 
Konnekers' motion for summary judgment and denied the Romanos' 
and the Nelsons' motions for summary judgment.  The court 
declared that the easement "is a lake access easement which 
allows the [Konnekers] access to the lake including the right to 
construct a pier upon that easement."  The court clarified that 
it is "not making any finding that a pier could or could not be 
installed, but that the intent of the parties was to grant the 
easement holder a lake access easement and to allow for the 
construction of a pier." 
¶18 In its oral ruling, the circuit court acknowledged 
that it was making a determination on competing motions for 
summary judgment, in which case he "would theoretically be 
setting the matter up for trial."  Nevertheless, the court was 
satisfied that despite the specific language in the easement, 
the intent of the original parties in granting the easement "was 
to permit a back lot owner to have lake access, and lake access 
inherently would allow for the construction of a pier."  In 
arriving at his conclusion, the circuit court questioned 
Attorney 
Lehner, 
counsel 
for 
the 
Nelsons, 
regarding 
his 
knowledge of Green Lake: 
The Court: Mr. Lehner, I know that your family 
has had a home or a cottage on Green Lake for several 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
12 
 
generations.  How would you describe Beyer's Cove as 
it relates to Green Lake? 
Attorney Lehner: Originally, Your Honor——we have 
a second home on Orchard Avenue, which is——that road 
runs right by, of course, where we're talking here.  
We're further to the east on the main part of the lake 
between Beyer's Cove and Sugar Loaf.  When I was 
growing up, Beyer's Cove was a marshy area . . . [but] 
certainly is navigable now . . . . 
The Court: Would you believe that people who buy 
homes in the Beyer's Cove area, either on the cove or 
with access to Beyer's Cove, do so for the opportunity 
to kayak or canoe on or for the opportunity to have 
access to Green Lake? 
Attorney Lehner: I would say both. . . .  
In addition, the circuit court took judicial notice of the 
apparent fact that many off-shore properties are sold with 
confirmation that the properties enjoy the benefit of lake 
access. 
¶19 The Romanos moved for reconsideration, which the 
circuit court denied in an oral ruling on June 13, 2008.  The 
Romanos appealed. 
¶20 On March 19, 2009, the court of appeals issued a per 
curiam decision reversing the order of the circuit court and 
remanding with directions that summary judgment be entered in 
favor of the Romanos.  Konneker v. Romano, No. 2008AP1546, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2009).  The 
court of appeals concluded that the easement language was 
ambiguous, given its silence as to purpose and scope.  Id., ¶9.  
Accordingly, the court looked to the parties' intent when 
creating the easement to determine the parties' rights, finding 
no evidence to support the Konnekers' contention that the 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
13 
 
easement included a conveyance of riparian rights permitting 
them to erect a pier.  Id., ¶11.  In particular, the court noted 
the fact that there was no pier in place when the easement was 
created, id., ¶9, and that the contemporaneous grant of several 
easements to the same 20-foot parcel made it "inherently 
improbable" that the original grantors contemplated that all of 
the easement holders would have the right to erect their own 
piers, id., ¶11.  Finally, the court rejected the Konnekers' 
assertion that the only use for the access area at Beyer's Cove 
is to enter the lake by boat, id., ¶9, concluding that "other 
than the personal knowledge of the court and counsel, there 
[did] not appear to be any verifiable evidence that the 
historical use of the cove was primarily for access to Green 
Lake by boat," id., ¶10. 
¶21 The Konnekers petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted on October 20, 2009.  We now reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court 
for further proceedings. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 "'Whether the circuit court properly granted summary 
judgment is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.'"  
Hocking v. City of Dodgeville, 2009 WI 70, ¶7, 318 Wis. 2d 681, 
768 N.W.2d 552 (quoting Schmidt v. N. States Power Co., 2007 WI 
136, ¶24, 305 Wis. 2d 538, 742 N.W.2d 294).  We apply the same 
methodology used by the circuit court, which is set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶9, 315 
Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156; Novell v. Migliaccio, 2008 WI 44, 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
14 
 
¶23, 309 Wis. 2d 132, 749 N.W.2d 544.  "Summary judgment is 
appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law."  Schmidt, 305 Wis. 2d 538, ¶24; see also § 802.08(2).  The 
circuit court should not grant summary judgment "unless the 
moving party demonstrates a right to a judgment with such 
clarity as to leave no room for controversy."  Grams v. Boss, 97 
Wis. 2d 332, 338, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980). 
¶23 In this case, we are called upon to interpret a deed 
creating an easement and address the application of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 30.131 and 30.133.  The threshold inquiry of whether a deed 
is ambiguous presents a question of law that this court reviews 
independently.  AKG Real Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 2006 WI 106, 
¶14, 296 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 835.  The construction of an 
unambiguous deed is likewise a question of law.  Id.  However, 
if the language of the deed is ambiguous, then the intent behind 
the language presents a question of fact.  Rikkers v. Ryan, 76 
Wis. 2d 185, 188, 251 N.W.2d 25 (1977). 
¶24 Finally, statutory interpretation and application is a 
question of law that we review de novo while still benefiting 
from the lower courts' analyses.  Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel 
Ins. Co., 2009 WI 27, ¶5, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652. 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
15 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Whether the Konnekers' Easement Grants Riparian Rights, 
Including the Right to Construct and Maintain a Pier 
¶25 "An easement 'is a permanent interest in another's 
land, with a right to enjoy it fully and without obstruction.'"8  
Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis. 2d 338, 343, 254 N.W.2d 282 (1977) 
(quoting Schwartz v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc'y of Wis., 46 
Wis. 2d 432, 438, 175 N.W.2d 225 (1970)).  The "dominant estate" 
enjoys the privileges granted by the easement, and the "servient 
estate" permits the exercise of those privileges.  Atkinson v. 
Mentzel, 211 Wis. 2d 628, 637, 566 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1997).  
While the servient estate may not unreasonably interfere with 
the dominant estate's right to use the easement, "[t]he use of 
the easement must be in accordance with and confined to the 
terms and purposes of the grant."  Stoesser v. Shore Drive 
P'ship, 172 Wis. 2d 660, 668, 494 N.W.2d 204 (1993); Hunter, 78 
Wis. 2d at 343. 
¶26 "Because the easement in question is created by deed, 
the court must look to that instrument in construing the 
                                                 
8 Title does not pass to an easement holder, "but only a 
right of use or privilege in the land of another."  Polebitzke 
v. John Week Lumber Co., 157 Wis. 377, 381, 147 N.W. 703 (1914); 
see also Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis. 2d 338, 344, 254 N.W.2d 282 
(1977) ("The [easement holder's] interest is not an estate in 
land, but rather a right to use the land of another for a 
special purpose not inconsistent with the general property in 
the owner.").  "Thus, this court has stated, 'A conveyance of a 
right-of-way two rods wide is a conveyance of a right-of-way 
over a strip of land two rods wide, not a conveyance of the 
strip of land itself.  Title to the land does not pass but only 
the right to pass over it.'"  Hunter, 78 Wis. 2d at 344 (quoting 
Kleih v. Van Schoyck, 250 Wis. 413, 418, 27 N.W.2d 490 (1947)). 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
16 
 
relative rights of the landowners."  Hunter, 78 Wis. 2d at 342-
43. 
 
"Deeds 
are 
construed 
as 
are 
other 
instruments"; 
accordingly, "the purpose of the court is to ascertain the 
intention of the parties."  Rikkers, 76 Wis. 2d at 188; see also 
Gilbert v. Geiger, 2008 WI App 29, ¶10, 307 Wis. 2d 463, 747 
N.W.2d 188.  The primary source of the parties' intent is what 
is written within the four corners of the deed.  Rikkers, 76 
Wis. 2d at 188.  If the language is unambiguous, it would be 
improper to resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the 
parties' intent.  Id.  However, if the language of the deed is 
ambiguous, meaning it is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation, then the parties may introduce other evidence to 
demonstrate the intent behind the language.  Id.; see also 
Grosshans v. Rueping, 36 Wis. 2d 519, 528, 153 N.W.2d 619 (1967) 
("[I]t is only when a deed is ambiguous that the intent of the 
parties can be manifested by extrinsic evidence."). 
¶27 In this case, the issue is whether the Konnekers' 
lakefront easement grants riparian rights, including the right 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
17 
 
to construct and maintain a pier.9  Riparian rights, one of which 
is the right to construct a pier to access navigable waters, are 
generally reserved for riparian landowners.  See Stoesser, 172 
Wis. 2d at 666.  However, up until April 9, 1994,10 Wisconsin 
                                                 
9 The concurrence posits that "the focus on remand should 
not be on whether the easement grants riparian rights, but on 
determining what rights or interests the easement was intended 
to grant."  Concurrence, ¶45.  However, our framing of the issue 
is consistent with the relief that the Konnekers seek in their 
complaint. 
 
They 
seek 
a 
judgment 
"[d]eclaring 
that 
the 
plaintiffs have an easement, which include[s] riparian rights" 
and that "with those easement rights, the plaintiffs have the 
right to erect and maintain a pier on said easement."  Likewise, 
in their answer, the Nelsons requested a judgment "[d]eclaring 
that the Plaintiffs do not have riparian rights under said 
easement" and that "the Plaintiffs do not have the right to 
erect and maintain a pier, boat lift or other structure upon 
said easement."  In addition, in their motions for summary 
judgment, both the Romanos and the Nelsons framed the issue in 
terms of whether the Konnekers' easement grants riparian rights.  
Thus, consistent with the parties' requests for relief, we 
determine that the proper focus in this case is whether the 
Konnekers' lakefront easement grants riparian rights, including 
the right to construct and maintain a pier. 
10 Effective April 9, 1994, the legislature prohibited 
riparian landowners from conveying "any riparian right in the 
land to another person, except for the right to cross the land 
in order to have access to the navigable water."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.133(1).  For a detailed discussion of § 30.133 and its 
application to this case, see infra Part III.B.1. 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
18 
 
recognized the ability of a riparian landowner to convey 
riparian rights by easement.  Id. at 668.11 
¶28 For example, in Wendt v. Blazek, 2001 WI App 91, 242 
Wis. 2d 722, 626 N.W.2d 78, the court of appeals affirmed a 
summary judgment declaring that an easement, conveyed to the 
Blazeks and other non-riparian landowners, included the right to 
use and maintain a pier.  In that case, the Jaeckle family owned 
a resort on Okauchee Lake along with other non-riparian lots 
                                                 
11 The circuit court relied principally on this court's 
decision in Stoesser to arrive at its conclusion that in this 
case, the parties' intent in creating the easement "was to 
permit a back lot owner to have lake access, and lake access 
inherently would allow for the construction of a pier."  
However, the holding in Stoesser that "[r]iparian rights can be 
conveyed by easement to non-riparian owners" was premised on our 
recognition that a deed, which in that case expressly granted 
the easement holders the right "to use the lake shore for 
bathing, boating or kindred purposes," should not be rewritten 
by the court.  See 172 Wis. 2d at 670.  We explained:  
Since one cannot bathe or boat on the shore this 
language was obviously intended to allow the [easement 
holders] access to Lake Beulah from the [servient 
estate's] lakeshore.  The [easement holders] seek to 
use their easement for the purposes expressly stated 
in the deed and must be allowed that right.   
Id. at 668.  A conclusion otherwise "would destroy the certainty 
upon which contracting parties are entitled to rely."  Id. at 
670.   
Accordingly, our holding in Stoesser should not be relied 
upon to support the proposition that a lakefront easement, 
created by a deed that is otherwise silent as to the easement's 
use and purpose, necessarily permits lake access, let alone 
"inherently . . . allow[s] for the construction of a pier."  A 
lakefront easement, like any easement, must be used only in 
accordance with and confined to the terms and purposes of the 
grant.  See id. at 668; Hunter, 78 Wis. 2d at 343. 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
19 
 
that adjoined the resort property.  Id., ¶2.  The Jaeckles 
constructed and maintained a private pier on the resort 
property.  Id., ¶3.  When they sold the resort property, the 
deed "reserved to the Jaeckles and their heirs and assigns 'an 
easement for the purpose of access to Okauchee Lake on and over 
a strip of land 15 feet in width [along the resort property].'"  
Id., ¶2.  The aforementioned pier was located at the point where 
the easement met the edge of the lake.  Id., ¶3.  The Jaeckles 
eventually sold their non-riparian lots, one of which was sold 
to the Blazeks, and the conveyances included the easement.  Id., 
¶2. 
¶29 Thereafter, the Wendts acquired the servient estate 
(the former resort property).  Id., ¶4.  The Wendts then sought 
a judgment declaring that the easement did not include a right 
to use and maintain the pier.  Id.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to 
the Blazeks and the other non-riparian landowners, concluding 
that the easement was intended to confer to the Jaeckles and 
their assigns the right to use and maintain the pier.  Id., ¶18.  
According to the court of appeals, the critical evidence was an 
affidavit by a Jaeckle family member representing that the 
Jaeckles constructed the pier long before the easement was 
created, and when they sold the resort property, they reserved 
the easement in order to still use the pier and lakeshore.  Id., 
¶15.  Because that affidavit was unrefuted, id., the court 
concluded that no material issue of fact existed, and the 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
20 
 
Blazeks and the other non-riparian landowners were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, id., ¶18. 
¶30 Turning to the case at issue, we conclude that the 
language of the October 29, 2004, deed, which created the 
Konnekers' easement, is ambiguous.  The relevant portion of the 
deed conveyed to the Konnekers Lot 1 "TOGETHER WITH an easement 
20 feet in width along the Westerly side of Lot Three (3) of 
Certified Survey Map No. 289 . . . extending from Orchard Avenue 
to Beyer's Cove."  Clearly, the deed conveys to the Konnekers a 
20-foot wide lakefront easement along the west side of the 
Romanos' and Nelsons' property.  However, the deed is otherwise 
silent as to the easement's use and purpose.  In particular, it 
is not clear from the deed whether the parties intended the 
easement holder to have riparian rights, including the right to 
construct and maintain a pier.  Accordingly, the deed is 
ambiguous, and the court must resort to extrinsic evidence to 
ascertain the parties' intent. 
¶31 In 
support 
of 
their 
cross 
motions 
for 
summary 
judgment, 
the 
parties 
presented 
competing 
affidavits 
demonstrating the intent behind the easement.  Because the 
evidence as represented in the affidavits raised genuine issues 
of material fact, summary judgment was improper. 
¶32 In support of their position that when the easement 
was created, the parties intended the easement holder to have 
riparian rights, including the right to construct and maintain a 
pier, the Konnekers submitted an affidavit representing that the 
only use for the easement's access area is to enter the lake by 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
21 
 
boat 
because 
Beyer's 
Cove 
consists 
of 
large 
amounts 
of 
vegetation, is not conducive to swimming, and lacks beach area 
for sun bathing.12  That evidence, however, was refuted by the 
Nelsons' affidavit.  The Nelsons asserted that when the easement 
was originally conveyed in 1983, no pier, boat lift, or boat was 
located on the easement, and therefore, it was not the parties' 
intent to permit the easement holder to construct or maintain a 
pier thereon.  According to the Romanos, the fact that a pier 
did not exist on the easement at the time the easement was 
created raised a significant distinction between the facts of 
this case and those in Wendt.  See 242 Wis. 2d 722, ¶15.  In 
addition, in support of their motion for reconsideration, the 
Romanos introduced evidence that as of August 1984, seven 
                                                 
12 At the motion hearing, the circuit court questioned 
Attorney Lehner, counsel for the Nelsons, regarding his personal 
knowledge of Green Lake, specifically relating to whether 
Beyer's Cove is used for boat access.  See supra Part I, ¶18.  
Attorney 
Lehner's 
testimony, however, does not constitute 
evidence and therefore should not have been relied upon in 
support of the circuit court's order.  Pursuant to Wisconsin 
Supreme Court Rule 20:3.7, a lawyer is generally not permitted 
to serve dual roles as advocate and witness.  Comment (2) 
explains:  
The tribunal has proper objection when the trier 
of fact may be confused or misled by a lawyer serving 
as both advocate and witness.  The opposing party has 
proper objection where the combination of roles may 
prejudice that party's rights in the litigation.  A 
witness is required to testify on the basis of 
personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to 
explain and comment on evidence given by others.  It 
may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-
witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of 
the proof. 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
22 
 
parcels of land were entitled to use Lot 3 for access to Beyer's 
Cove, and accordingly, the parties could not have possibly 
intended for each of those easement holders to have the right to 
construct a pier on the easement.   
¶33 At the same time, the evidence put forth by the 
Nelsons and Romanos contradicted itself.  Their assertion that 
it was never the parties' intent to have a pier constructed on 
the easement conflicted with the Nelsons' affidavit, which 
provided generally that "sometime prior to May 1, 1990, [the 
Nelsons] constructed a pier on or close to the 20 foot easement 
for mooring their boat."  (Emphasis added.)  While the Nelsons 
maintained that "said pier was not to be used in common with any 
of the easement holders," the pier leases to Grant Gardner and 
Arne Carlsson raised an inference otherwise.  Each lease 
provided the same language: "Lessees are advised and understand 
that seven other property owners have access rights on and to 
the subject premises and agree not to interfere with those 
rights."  That provision can be construed as consistent with the 
Konnekers' position; that is, the parties intended for all the 
easement holders to have use of a pier for access to Green Lake.  
Because these competing affidavits raised a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning whether the parties intended the 
easement holders to have riparian rights, including the right to 
construct and maintain a pier, summary judgment was improper. 
B. Impact of Wis. Stat. §§ 30.131 and 30.133 
¶34 The issue of whether Wis. Stat. §§ 30.131 and 30.133 
are applicable to this case was not invoked, argued, or appealed 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
23 
 
below.  However, we asked the parties to brief the issue before 
this court. 
¶35 Pursuant to the public trust doctrine, the state holds 
the beds of navigable waters in trust for all its citizens.  
Hilton v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166.  
The legislature has the primary authority to administer and 
effectuate the purposes of the public trust, id., ¶19, and does 
so through the regulations of Wis. Stat. ch. 30.  See ABKA Ltd. 
P'ship v. 
DNR, 2002 WI 106, ¶11, 255 Wis. 2d 486, 648 
N.W.2d 854.  The legislature has delegated to the Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) broad authority to administer ch. 30.  
Hilton, 293 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20; ABKA, 255 Wis. 2d 486, ¶12. 
1. Wisconsin Stat. § 30.133 
¶36 In Stoesser v. Shore Drive Partnership, this court 
held that riparian rights can be conveyed by easement to non-
riparian landowners.  172 Wis. 2d at 670.  The legislature 
responded to Stoesser by enacting Wis. Stat. § 30.133.  ABKA, 
255 Wis. 2d 486, ¶60.  Beginning April 9, 1994, "no owner of 
riparian land that abuts a navigable water may grant by an 
easement or by a similar conveyance any riparian right in the 
land to another person, except for the right to cross the land 
in 
order 
to 
have 
access 
to 
the 
navigable 
water."  
§ 30.133(1)(a).  Further, the "right to cross the land may not 
include the right to place any structure" in the navigable 
water.  Id.   
¶37 In this case, it is undisputed that the easement was 
originally conveyed in 1983, well before the April 9, 1994, 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
24 
 
effective date of Wis. Stat. § 30.133.  Therefore, § 30.133 is 
inapplicable. 
2. Wisconsin Stat. § 30.131 
¶38 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 30.131, a pier placed in 
navigable water by a non-riparian landowner is considered a 
lawful 
structure 
if 
six 
statutory 
conditions 
are 
met.  
Ellingsworth v. Swiggum, 195 Wis. 2d 142, 148, 536 N.W.2d 112 
(Ct. App. 1995).  Those six conditions include:  
(a) The owner of the riparian land or the owner's 
predecessor 
in 
interest 
entered 
into 
a 
written 
easement that was recorded before December 31, 1986, 
and that authorizes access to the shore to a person 
who is not an owner of the riparian land. 
(b) The person to whom the easement was granted 
or that person's successor in interest is the person 
who places and maintains the wharf or pier. 
(c) The placement and maintenance of the wharf or 
pier is not prohibited by and is not inconsistent with 
the terms of the written easement. 
(d) The wharf or pier has been placed seasonally 
in the same location at least once every 4 years since 
the 
written 
easement 
described 
in 
par. (a) 
was 
recorded. 
(e) The wharf or pier is substantially the same 
size and configuration as it was on April 28, 1990, or 
during its last placement before April 28, 1990, 
whichever is later. 
(f) The placement of the wharf or pier complies 
with the provisions of this chapter, with any rules 
promulgated under this chapter and with any applicable 
municipal regulations or ordinances. 
§ 30.131(1). 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
25 
 
¶39 Here, the Romanos argue that even if the easement is 
construed as granting the Konnekers the riparian right to 
construct and maintain a pier, the easement is unenforceable as 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 30.131.  In particular, they assert 
that 
the 
easement 
does 
not 
meet 
the 
requirement 
of 
subsection (1)(d) because a pier was neither built at the 
creation of the easement in 1983 nor erected seasonally every 
four years thereafter. 
¶40 As the court of appeals explained in Wendt, the 
Romanos' argument is "off the mark."  See 242 Wis. 2d 722, ¶14.  
The issue in this case is whether the easement grants riparian 
rights, including the right to construct and maintain a pier, 
not whether a pier——if and once constructed by the Konnekers——
constitutes a lawful structure under Wis. Stat. § 30.131.  See 
Wendt, 242 Wis. 2d 722, ¶14.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶41 We conclude that summary judgment was improper in this 
case.  The language of the deed, which created the Konnekers' 
easement, is ambiguous.  The deed conveys to the Konnekers a 20-
foot wide lakefront easement along the west side of the Romanos' 
and Nelsons' property but is otherwise silent as to the 
easement's use and purpose.  It is therefore not clear from the 
deed whether the parties intended the easement holder to have 
riparian rights, including the right to construct and maintain a 
pier.  Because the parties' competing affidavits raised a 
genuine issue of material fact concerning the intent behind the 
easement, summary judgment was improper.  We therefore reverse 
No. 
2008AP1546   
 
26 
 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the case to the 
circuit court for further proceedings. 
¶42 We further conclude that Wis. Stat. §§ 30.133 and 
30.131 are inapplicable to this case.  It is undisputed that the 
easement was originally conveyed well before the effective date 
of § 30.133.  In addition, the issue in this case is whether the 
easement 
grants 
riparian 
rights, 
including 
the 
right 
to 
construct and maintain a pier, not whether a pier——if and once 
constructed 
by 
the 
easement 
holder——constitutes 
a 
lawful 
structure under § 30.131. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2008AP1546.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion that the case should be remanded to 
the circuit court.  The language in the deed creating the 
easement is silent about the purpose and scope of the easement, 
leaving a factual dispute that warrants further proceedings.   
¶44 The majority remands the matter to the circuit court 
because "it is not clear from the deed whether the parties 
intended the easement holder to have riparian rights, including 
the right to construct and maintain a pier."  Majority op., ¶41.   
¶45 In my view, the focus on remand should be not on 
whether the easement grants riparian rights, but on determining 
what rights or interests the easement was intended to grant.  An 
easement expressly granted by deed conveys only those rights or 
interests that the parties intended to convey.1  I would 
therefore remand the matter for the circuit court to ascertain 
what rights or interests the easement was intended to convey and 
specifically whether the right to install and maintain a pier 
was intended.  The majority opinion at ¶2 and passim focuses on 
the bundle of riparian rights rather than on the intent of the 
parties.  The majority opinion (¶2) states: "This case presents 
the following issues: (1) whether this lakefront easement, 
created by a deed that is otherwise silent as to the easement's 
use and purpose, grants riparian rights, including the right to 
construct and maintain a pier . . . ." 
                                                 
1 See 
Hunter 
v. 
McDonald, 
78 
Wis. 2d 338, 
343, 
254 
N.W.2d 282 (1977). 
No.  2008AP1546.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶46 The circuit court declared that the easement "is a 
lake access easement which allows [the Konnekers] access to the 
lake including the right to construct a pier upon that 
easement."  The Konnekers' brief here asks this court to 
"reinstate the trial court's Order and Judgment granting summary 
judgment . . . ." 
¶47 An easement conveyed to a non-riparian owner [the 
Konnekers] does not confer riparian ownership to the non-
riparian landowner.2  The easement may convey one, several, or 
all riparian rights to a non-riparian landowner.3  
¶48 "Riparian rights" are generally defined by common law.  
The phrase "riparian rights" is expansive, referring to a vast 
array of water-related rights.  Riparian rights include the 
right to reasonable use of the waters for domestic, agricultural 
and recreational purposes; the right to use the shoreline and 
have access to the waters; the right to any lands formed by 
accretion or reliction; the right to have water flow to the land 
without artificial obstruction; the limited right to intrude 
upon the lakebed to construct devices for protection from 
                                                 
2 Stoesser v. Shore Drive P'ship, 172 Wis. 2d 660, 669-70, 
494 N.W.2d 204 (1993). 
3 Stoesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 668-70.  See Wis. Stat. § 30.133 
(overruling Stoesser and prohibiting the conveyance of riparian 
rights effective Apr. 9, 1994, as discussed in ABKA Ltd. P'ship 
v. DNR, 2002 WI 106, ¶¶57-61, 255 Wis. 2d 486, 648 N.W.2d 854). 
No.  2008AP1546.ssa 
 
3 
 
erosion; and the right, "now conditioned by statute," to 
construct a pier or similar structures in aid of navigation.4  
¶49 The only mention the Konnekers make of any potential 
riparian rights other than egress and ingress and the right to 
install a pier is in arguing that Beyer's Cove is not conducive 
to various water uses other than boating.5 
¶50 Although the Konnekers' filings refer to "riparian 
rights" generally, including the right to install a pier,6 their 
affidavits on the summary judgment motion, their position before 
the circuit court and their arguments on appeal all center 
                                                 
4 Stoesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 666 n.2, citing Cassidy v. DNR, 
132 Wis. 2d 153, 159, 390 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1986).  See also 
ABKA Ltd. P'ship v. DNR, 2002 WI 106, ¶57, 255 Wis. 2d 486, 648 
N.W.2d 854. 
5 In his affidavit in support of his motion for summary 
judgment, Robert Konneker stated: "That Beyer[']s Cove is an 
access area into Green Lake and consists of large amounts of 
vegetation.  The water at Beyer[']s Cove is not conducive to 
swimming and there is no beach area for sunbathing.  The only 
use for the access area at the end of the easement at Beyer[']s 
Cove is to enter Green Lake by boat."  The implication appears 
to be that the Konnekers are not seeking rights other than 
access to the water and the right to install and maintain a 
pier. 
6 The Konnekers' Complaint asks for judgment "declaring that 
[they] have an easement, which include [sic] riparian rights" 
and "[t]hat with those easement rights, [they] have the right to 
erect and maintain a pier on said easement."  
The Konnekers' motion for summary judgment sought judgment 
"declaring 
[their] 
rights 
as 
easement 
holders 
to 
have 
unobstructed access to Beyer's Cove on Green Lake including the 
right to install and maintain a pier"  
The Konnekers' brief in support of their motion for summary 
judgment argued for judgment "declaring their interest and 
rights as lake access easement holders; specifically their right 
to install, use and maintain a pier" at the end of the easement. 
No.  2008AP1546.ssa 
 
4 
 
solely on access to the lake and the right to install and 
maintain a pier.  Before the circuit court, the Konnekers' 
attorney stated that "the question I think for the Court 
is . . . whether or not as a matter of law it can be determined 
that that easement contained the riparian right to install and 
maintain a pier."  For a narrative supporting my summary of the 
record, see majority op., ¶¶11-18.  
 ¶51 Considering the expansive nature of "riparian rights" 
and the focused arguments of the Konnekers, I conclude that the 
proper inquiry for the circuit court is to determine what 
specific rights or interests are included in the terms and 
purpose of the easement, rather than to state the inquiry 
broadly as a question of whether the easement conveyed other 
unspecified riparian rights.   
¶52 This case is very similar to Wendt v. Blazek, 2001 WI 
App 91, ¶14, 242 Wis. 2d 722, 626 N.W.2d 78, in which the court 
had to interpret an expressly conveyed lake access easement and 
review a summary judgment record to determine whether the 
easement was intended to confer the right to use and maintain a 
pier.  There the court of appeals focused its determination 
simply on whether "the easement was intended to confer the right 
to use and maintain the pier."  242 Wis. 2d at 732, ¶18.   
¶53 As presented to this court, the instant case is very 
similar and I would similarly focus the determination to be made 
on remand.  The majority determines that the parties' competing 
affidavits have raised a genuine issue of material fact.  I 
No.  2008AP1546.ssa 
 
5 
 
agree, but the issue raised centers on the right to install and 
maintain a pier, not on riparian rights more generally.     
¶54 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶55 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2008AP1546.ssa 
 
1