Case Title: Wagner v. Roche Laboratories

Citation: 1999-Ohio-309

Docket Number: 19980104

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 1999-Ohio-309.] 
 
 
 
 
 
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WAGNER, APPELLANT, v. ROCHE LABORATORIES ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Wagner v. Roche Laboratories (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 457.] 
Civil procedure — Defendants not sufficiently prejudiced by trial court’s 
instruction on breach of express warranty, so that trial court did not err in 
denying defendants’ motion for a new trial. 
(No. 98-104 — Submitted January 13, 1999 — Decided May 12, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-93-277. 
 
This is the second time this case has been before this court.  In Wagner v. 
Roche Laboratories (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 116, 671 N.E.2d 252, this court 
reviewed a court of appeals’ judgment that had reversed a jury verdict in favor of 
plaintiff-appellant, Josephine Wagner, on her products liability claims against 
defendants-appellees, Roche Laboratories and Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. (“Roche”).  
Wagner’s suit against Roche was based on serious physical complications she 
claimed were caused in part by her ingestion of Accutane, a prescription drug 
developed and marketed by Roche for the treatment of acne.  At issue in that 
appeal was her claim at trial that Roche had failed to provide adequate warnings 
about possible adverse reactions to Accutane that could arise for certain users. 
 
The court of appeals had determined that “ ‘[r]easonable minds could only 
conclude the warning provided by Roche for Accutane was adequate, and, 
therefore, the issue should not have been submitted to the jury,’ ” and further 
determined that the trial court erred by not entering a directed verdict for Roche.  
See 77 Ohio St.3d at 118, 671 N.E.2d at 255.  In light of this holding, the court of 
appeals had found Roche’s other assignment of error, as well as Wagner’s entire 
cross-appeal, moot, and so did not address them. 
 
This court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, determining that 
Wagner had created a jury question on her failure-to-warn claim sufficient to 
[Cite as Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 1999-Ohio-309.] 
 
 
 
 
 
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overcome Roche’s motion for a directed verdict.  See 77 Ohio St.3d at 121, 671 
N.E.2d at 256.  We thus resolved the issue appealed in favor of Wagner, and so 
upheld the jury’s determination of Roche’s liability on failure-to-warn grounds.  
We remanded the cause to the court of appeals for that court to address the 
remaining assignments of error raised by both parties. 
 
On remand, the court of appeals first considered Roche’s remaining 
assignment of error, which urged that the trial court erred in denying its motion for 
a new trial for several distinct reasons.  The court of appeals focused on Roche’s 
argument that the jury was improperly instructed on breach of express and implied 
warranties, and again reversed the jury verdict in favor of Wagner.  The court of 
appeals found, in a split decision, that there was no evidence presented to support 
the jury instruction on express warranty.  The court of appeals further found that, 
despite the absence of interrogatories that could have clarified the grounds for the 
jury’s decision, the giving of the express-warranty instruction was sufficiently 
prejudicial to Roche that a new trial should have been ordered. 
 
The dissenter at the court of appeals determined that there was substantial 
evidence in the record supporting Wagner’s breach-of-express-warranty claim.  
Furthermore, the dissenter would have found that the trial court did not err in 
denying the new trial motion, because there was no indication that Roche was 
prejudiced by the giving of the instruction, even if there would not have been 
support in the record for the claim. 
 
The court of appeals on remand also considered Wagner’s cross-assignments 
of error, upholding various rulings by the trial court with which Wagner took issue. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
[Cite as Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 1999-Ohio-309.] 
 
 
 
 
 
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Don C. Iler Co., L.P.A., Don C. Iler and Nancy C. Iler, for appellant. 
 
Arter & Hadden, L.L.P., Irene C. Keyse-Walker, Janet H. Smith and George 
Gore, for appellees. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  The principal issue presented is whether Roche 
was sufficiently prejudiced by the trial court’s instruction on breach of express 
warranty so that the trial court erred in denying Roche’s motion for a new trial.  
For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on this 
issue and reinstate the judgment of the trial court denying a new trial to Roche. 
 
“An express warranty is an affirmation of fact by the seller as to a product or 
commodity to induce the purchase thereof, on which affirmation the buyer relies in 
making the purchase.”  Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co. (1958), 167 Ohio St. 
244, 4 O.O.2d 291, 147 N.E.2d 612, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
The court reporter’s transcription of the trial court’s oral instruction to the 
jury on breach of express warranty follows: 
 
“[Mrs. Wagner] alleges that Hoffman-La Roche breached it’s [sic] expressed 
[sic] * * * warranties of fitness and merchantability.  Mrs. Wagner claims that 
Hoffman-La Roche breached an expressed [sic] warranty that Accutane was a 
good, safe and merchantable quality and that Accutane was safe for its intended 
use.  Mrs. Wagner must prove to you by the greater weight of the evidence that 
Hoffman-La Roche made to Mrs. Wagner an affirmation or promise about 
Accutane that became part of the basis of the bargain. 
 
“If you so find an expressed [sic] warranty was created by that, the Accutane 
shall conform to the affirmation or promise. 
 
“It is not necessary to the creation of an expressed [sic] warranty that the 
seller used former [sic] words such as warranty or guarantee or that he have a 
[Cite as Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 1999-Ohio-309.] 
 
 
 
 
 
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specific intention to make a warranty but a general statement about the value of the 
goods or a statement purporting to [be] the seller’s opinion or praise of the goods 
does not create a warranty.  * * * ” 
 
The court of appeals first found that the trial court’s instruction on breach of 
express warranty was totally unjustified by the evidence.  Then, building on that 
conclusion, the court of appeals found that the giving of the instruction was 
inherently prejudicial to Roche, so that a new trial, under the requirements of 
Civ.R. 59, was necessary. 
 
An important factor going to the issue of whether Roche is entitled to a new 
trial is that the jury returned a general verdict unaccompanied by interrogatories 
that may have clarified the basis for the jury’s decision finding Roche liable to 
Wagner.  Thus, it is impossible for us to precisely determine whether the jury 
might have based its determination on something other than the failure-to-warn 
claim put forth by Wagner.  We definitely resolved the validity of the jury’s 
determination on that claim in our earlier consideration of this case. 
 
We must resolve whether, in the circumstances of this case, the record 
supports the court of appeals’ conclusion that Roche was sufficiently prejudiced by 
the breach-of-express-warranty instruction so that a new trial is in order.  The trial 
court’s decision to deny Roche’s new trial motion in this situation is entitled to 
deference to the extent that the trial court exercised judicial discretion in reaching 
its decision.  However, to the extent that the trial court decision being challenged 
did not involve the exercise of discretion, but was based on a question of law, no 
deference is afforded.  See Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 52 O.O.2d 
376, 262 N.E.2d 685, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. 
 
This case potentially implicates the so-called two-issue rule, first adopted in 
Ohio in Sites v. Haverstick (1873), 23 Ohio St. 626.  “The two-issue rule is, that 
[Cite as Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 1999-Ohio-309.] 
 
 
 
 
 
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error in the charge of the court dealing exclusively with one of two or more 
complete and independent issues required to be presented to a jury in a civil action 
will be disregarded, if the charge in respect to another independent issue which 
will support the verdict of the jury is free from prejudicial error, unless it is 
disclosed by interrogatories or otherwise that the verdict is in fact based upon the 
issue to which the erroneous instruction related.”  Bush v. Harvey Transfer Co. 
(1946), 146 Ohio St. 657, 33 O.O. 154, 67 N.E.2d 851, paragraph three of the 
syllabus; Pulley v. Malek (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 95, 97, 25 OBR 145, 147, 495 
N.E.2d 402, 404.  The rule generally applies “where there are two causes of action, 
or two defenses, thereby raising separate and distinct issues, and a general verdict 
has been returned, and the mental processes of the jury have not been tested by 
special interrogatories to indicate which of the issues was resolved in favor of the 
successful party * * *.”  H.E. Culbertson Co. v. Warden (1931), 123 Ohio St. 297, 
303, 175 N.E. 205, 207. 
 
The two-issue rule is in essence a rule concerned with prejudice.  “[A]n 
appellant, in order to secure reversal of a judgment against him, must not only 
show some error but must also show that that error was prejudicial to him.”  Smith 
v. Flesher (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 107, 110, 41 O.O.2d 412, 414, 233 N.E.2d 137, 
140. 
 
However, the two-issue rule does not apply when there was a charge on an 
issue upon which the jury should not have been charged at all.  Ricks v. Jackson 
(1959), 169 Ohio St. 254, 8 O.O.2d 255, 159 N.E.2d 225, paragraph four of the 
syllabus.  In that situation, prejudice is generally presumed. 
 
The court of appeals majority below determined that the trial court should 
not have instructed the jury on Wagner’s breach-of-express-warranty claim, and 
further concluded that Ricks applied, because there was no support in the record for 
[Cite as Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 1999-Ohio-309.] 
 
 
 
 
 
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giving such an instruction.  Consequently, the court of appeals majority found no 
need to resort to the two-issue rule to evaluate whether Roche was prejudiced by 
the instruction. 
 
Our extensive review of the record in our previous consideration of the 
jury’s award in this case convinces us that Wagner’s presentation of evidence to 
the jury was overwhelmingly premised on developing her failure-to-warn claim.  
Reviewing the record in the context of Wagner’s breach-of-express-warranty 
claim, we find that the record is not totally devoid of evidence going to support a 
breach-of-express-warranty instruction.  At the same time, the wording of the 
instruction does not seem to have been particularly well suited to the circumstances 
of this case. 
 
However, it is not necessary for us to definitively determine whether the 
instruction was properly given in order to resolve the overall new trial question.  
Even if we assume for the purposes of argument that the instruction should not 
have been given, we find that the record does not require overturning the trial 
court’s decision to deny a new trial.  Our specific disagreement with the court of 
appeals’ approach is with the degree of prejudice that the court of appeals 
apparently attributed to the giving of the instruction. 
 
Concluding that the instruction should not have been given is not the same 
as concluding, as a majority of the court of appeals did, that absolutely no evidence 
in the record supported the giving of the instruction, so that the instruction was so 
prejudicial under Ricks that a new trial was warranted.  In Ricks, 169 Ohio St. at 
255-257, 8 O.O.2d at 256-257, 159 N.E.2d at 226-227, a personal injury 
negligence case, the trial court instructed the jury on the plaintiff’s assumption of 
the risk, at the defendant’s request, when there was no basis whatsoever in the 
record for the giving of that instruction.  After the jury returned a general verdict in 
[Cite as Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 1999-Ohio-309.] 
 
 
 
 
 
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favor of the defendant, this court found that a new trial was necessary because of 
the fundamental way that the giving of that instruction misled the jury.  We 
distinguish this case from Ricks because the degree of prejudice in this case, even 
assuming that the instruction should not have been given, is totally unlike the 
inherent prejudice that resulted from the giving of the instruction at issue in that 
case. 
 
Since Ricks does not apply, resort to the two-issue rule is appropriate.  When 
we apply the two-issue rule, it becomes apparent that the giving of the instruction 
was not prejudicial to Roche.  Thus, a new trial is not required.  In this situation, 
we will not assume the presence of prejudice to Roche but must find prejudice on 
the face of the record.  Given that Roche failed to request interrogatories that might 
have explained the jury’s general verdict in Wagner’s favor, and finding no clear 
indication in the record that Roche was prejudiced by the instruction, we reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals on this issue. 
 
Roche’s new-trial assignment of error in the court of appeals also urged that 
a new trial is warranted on other grounds unrelated to the giving of the breach-of-
express-warranty instruction.  Even though this cause has been through the court of 
appeals twice, that court has not yet addressed those aspects of Roche’s argument 
because the court of appeals found that its respective decisions reversing the jury 
verdict in favor of Wagner made the contentions moot each time.  We have 
thoroughly examined the record regarding Roche’s remaining unaddressed new-
trial arguments.  We find no prejudice on any remaining ground raised in Roche’s 
appeal sufficient to warrant a new trial, and so reinstate the trial court’s denial of a 
new trial as to all grounds relied upon by Roche.  We therefore reinstate the trial 
court’s entry of judgment as entered on the jury’s verdict. 
[Cite as Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 1999-Ohio-309.] 
 
 
 
 
 
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Furthermore, all of Wagner’s remaining propositions of law that are not 
addressed in this opinion are hereby dismissed as improvidently allowed.  The end 
result is that all of the various rulings of the trial court that were challenged on 
appeal are either reinstated or upheld, and this litigation is concluded. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent.  Because Josephine Wagner’s 
evidence did not support her breach-of-express-warranty claim, the jury instruction 
on that issue was given in error to the prejudice of Roche, and the appellate court 
properly remanded for a new trial. 
 
An ultimate consumer may maintain an action directly against a 
manufacturer for breach of express warranty where all the following exist:  (1) the 
manufacturer of the product, through advertising, makes representations regarding 
the quality and merit of its product, (2) the representations are aimed directly at the 
ultimate consumer, urging the consumer to purchase the product, (3) the consumer, 
relying on the manufacturer’s representations, does purchase the product, and (4) 
the consumer suffers harm as a result of that reliance.  Rogers v. Toni Home 
Permanent Co. (1958), 167 Ohio St. 244, 4 O.O.2d 291, 147 N.E.2d 612, 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  Here, on the undisputed state of the evidence, 
Wagner failed to satisfy the second and third elements of this test.  She does not 
argue to this court that Roche made any representations directly to her, or that she 
relied on such.  Instead, she attempts to support her claim for breach of express 
warranty by arguing Roche made representations to her doctor upon which her 
doctor relied, and that she, in turn, relied upon her doctor in ingesting the drug.  
[Cite as Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 1999-Ohio-309.] 
 
 
 
 
 
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Because this evidence cannot support the express-warranty claim, the court erred 
in presenting the issue to the jury.  See Ricks v. Jackson (1959), 169 Ohio St. 254, 
8 O.O.2d 255, 159 N.E.2d 225, paragraph three of the syllabus.  
 
Under Ricks, the two issue rule “does not apply where there is a charge on 
an issue upon which there should have been no charge.”  Id. at paragraph four of 
the syllabus.  The majority attempts to distinguish this case from Ricks, however, 
by concluding that greater prejudice resulted from the improper charge in that case.  
The quantum of prejudice, however, is not the barometer for application of the 
Ricks analysis. Here, as in Ricks, there was no evidence supporting the improper 
charge.  In both cases, the jury was allowed to believe that a certain state of facts 
was possible where, under the evidence, it was not.  See Denzer v. Terpstra (1934), 
129 Ohio St. 1, 7, 1 O.O. 303, 306, 193 N.E. 647, 649.  It cannot be said, then, that 
the jury would have arrived at the same conclusion absent the error.  As the 
majority here concedes, in cases such as this, where an instruction is given with no 
evidence to support it, prejudice is generally presumed. 
 
Even if the state of the plaintiff’s evidence had warranted a breach-of-
express-warranty charge here, the instruction the court offered was the wrong one.  
Its breach-of-express-warranty charge did not require the jury to find that Wagner 
relied on any representation by Roche.  Reliance is a necessary element of the 
cause of action.  Hence, the jury was permitted not only to find Roche liable on a 
charge that was unsupported by the evidence, but also to find Roche liable on that 
charge without finding all the necessary elements. 
 
In Wagner v. Roche Laboratories (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 116, 671 N.E.2d 
252 (Wagner I), this court concluded that Wagner had presented enough evidence 
on her failure-to-warn claim to overcome Roche’s motion for directed verdict.  But 
we remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of Roche’s claim that a new 
[Cite as Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 85 Ohio St.3d 457, 1999-Ohio-309.] 
 
 
 
 
 
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trial was warranted.  Id. at 124, 671 N.E.2d at 259.  Upon remand, Roche 
successfully demonstrated that there was no evidence supporting Wagner’s breach-
of-express-warranty claim and that, under Ricks, the faulty instruction on that issue 
tainted the process to Roche’s prejudice.  Roche having so demonstrated, the court 
of appeals properly remanded for a new trial. 
 
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
dissenting opinion.