Case Title: Commonwealth v. Gulla

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11361

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11361 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT GULLA. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 10, 2017. - April 5, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, & Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Fair 
trial.  Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel, Argument 
by counsel, Instructions to jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 4, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Thomas P. Billings, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on October 29, 2014, was heard by 
him. 
 
 
 
Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant. 
 
Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney (Casey 
E. Silvia, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Robert Gulla, was convicted of 
murder in the first degree of the victim on the theories of 
 
1 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
                     
2 
 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.2  In 
this appeal,3 the defendant asserts that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel and a meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense, as well as denied a fair trial based on the 
judge's failure to give certain jury instructions.  The 
defendant also seeks relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After 
full consideration of the record and the defendant's arguments, 
we affirm the defendant's convictions and the denial of his 
motion for a new trial, and decline to grant extraordinary 
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence that the jury could 
have found, reserving certain details for discussion of specific 
issues.  On January 23, 2010, the defendant beat, strangled, 
stabbed, and shot the victim, killing her.  The victim's 
homicide was the culmination of a short but violent relationship 
between the two.  The defendant met the victim, who was 
attending a State university, in early September of 2009 at a 
college party; the defendant was not a student there.  Soon 
thereafter they began a dating relationship. 
 
2 The defendant also was convicted of violation of an abuse 
prevention order. 
 
 
3 This court consolidated the appeal from the denial of his 
motion for a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel 
with his direct appeal. 
                     
3 
 
 
On September 25, 2009, an altercation between the victim 
and the defendant in her dormitory led campus police to escort 
the defendant off campus and issue a no-trespass order.  
Approximately one and one-half weeks later, the victim lodged a 
complaint with police after the two had an argument and the 
defendant pushed her out of his truck and drove away, leaving 
her stranded on the side of the road. 
 
They spent less time together after that, and the victim 
began dating a fellow student; however, she continued to see the 
defendant.  One night in early December the victim was visiting 
with the defendant at his home where he lived with his mother 
and brother.  After the two argued loudly, the defendant punched 
the victim in the stomach and took her cellular telephone to 
review its contents.  He later smashed it and threw it into the 
woods near his house.  The defendant's mother telephoned the 
police, and he subsequently was arrested. 
 
On January, 19, 2010, the defendant had an argument via 
telephone with the victim because she was spending time with her 
fellow student.  The victim thereafter applied for and received 
a temporary restraining order against the defendant. 
 
Despite the restraining order, three days later, the 
defendant borrowed his mother's automobile to pick the victim up 
and drive her to his house to spend the night.  The next 
evening, the defendant's mother found the two of them covered in 
4 
 
blood lying face down, side by side on the floor of the 
defendant's basement bedroom.  First responders determined that 
the victim was deceased:  her body was severely bruised and 
swollen, and she had several stab wounds, including to her 
throat.  The injuries to her face, including bruises and a 
pellet gunshot wound between the eyes, rendered her 
unrecognizable.  By contrast, the defendant regained 
consciousness and his wounds were less severe.  He had a large 
cut on his left wrist and a pellet gunshot wound to the temple, 
consistent with self-inflicted wounds; he also had superficial 
cuts on his hand, consistent with forceful stabbing motions, and 
an area at the back of his head that first responders described 
as filled with fluid feeling "like a sponge."4  Nearby was a copy 
of the temporary restraining order and what appeared to be a 
suicide note admitting his culpability for the homicide.5 
 
Discussion.  1.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  At 
trial, defense counsel pursued a diminished capacity defense.  
He presented a psychiatrist who testified that the defendant 
suffered from a mental impairment that made him incapable of 
forming the requisite intent for murder in the first degree.  
The defendant claims that his trial attorney was ineffective 
 
4 The defendant told first responders that the victim bit 
him on the back of the head. 
 
 
5 The note read:  "To my family I love you all This is the 
last thing I wanted to happen but it just did." 
                     
5 
 
because the attorney (1) failed to raise a lack of criminal 
responsibility defense, which would have absolved the defendant 
of culpability altogether; (2) failed to request a lack of 
criminal responsibility instruction; and (3) failed to 
adequately argue the theory that counsel did pursue, diminished 
capacity, in his closing argument.  The defendant unsuccessfully 
made the same claims in his motion for a new trial. 
 
Rather than evaluating an ineffective assistance claim 
under the traditional standard of Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 
Mass. 89, 96 (1974),6 in cases of murder in the first degree, we 
apply the standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether 
there was a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681-682 (1992), 
S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. LaCava, 438 
Mass. 708, 712-713 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Harbin, 435 
Mass. 654, 656 (2002).  More particularly, we determine whether 
there was an error in the course of the trial by defense counsel 
(or the prosecutor or the judge) "and, if there was, whether 
that error was likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion."  Wright, supra at 682.  Here, the defendant has not 
6 Under Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96, the standard is whether 
an attorney's performance fell measurably below that which might 
be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer and, if so, whether 
such ineffectiveness has likely deprived the defendant of an 
otherwise available substantial defense. 
                     
6 
 
met his burden to show that there was a serious failure by his 
trial counsel. 
 
a.  Lack of criminal responsibility defense.  The defendant 
claims that the brutal nature of the crime, his attempted 
suicide afterward, and his mental condition made lack of 
criminal responsibility a viable, complete defense to the murder 
charge.7  Consequently, he argues, trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to pursue a lack of criminal responsibility defense, 
and for failing to request a jury instruction on it. 
 
The decision of defense counsel regarding the best defense 
to pursue at trial is a tactical one and will not be deemed 
ineffective unless manifestly unreasonable when 
made.  Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 435 Mass. 743, 758 (2002).  
Here, the defendant has not shown that his trial counsel's 
tactical decision was manifestly unreasonable.  At a hearing on 
the motion for a new trial, trial counsel testified that he 
considered the lack of criminal responsibility defense but 
decided against it because he was unable to find an expert who 
would testify that the defendant lacked criminal responsibility 
 
7 "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at 
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect 
he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law."  Commonwealth v. LaCava, 
438 Mass. 708, 713 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 
Mass. 544, 546-547 (1967), S.C., 365 Mass. 465 (1974) and 372 
Mass. 11 (1977) and 445 Mass. 143 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 
1114 (2006). 
                     
7 
 
due to a mental disease or defect.8  The motion judge, who was 
also the trial judge, made detailed findings including that, 
understanding that expert testimony is not necessary to pursue a 
lack of criminal responsibility defense, see Commonwealth 
v. Monico, 396 Mass. 793, 797-798 (1986), trial counsel chose 
not to assert, or request an instruction for, a defense that his 
own expert did not support and that could undercut the 
diminished capacity defense, which he did assert and which had a 
basis in the evidence.  The judge concluded that this was not 
ineffective assistance.  We agree.  See Commonwealth v. Cutts, 
444 Mass. 821, 828 (2005); LaCava, 438 Mass. at 714-
715; Commonwealth v. Genius, 387 Mass. 695, 697-699 (1982), 
S.C., 402 Mass. 711 (1988).  See also Commonwealth v. Mosher, 
455 Mass. 811, 827 (2010) ("Many decisions of defense counsel 
that are characterized in hindsight as errors may have been 
reasonable tactical or strategic decisions when made . . ."). 
 
b.  Closing argument.  The defendant contends that his 
trial counsel's closing argument was constitutionally 
ineffective because counsel failed to argue diminished capacity 
forcefully enough to the jury.  We conclude, as did the judge 
below, that this claim is without merit. 
 
8 The defendant's trial counsel sought opinions from three 
experts, two psychologists and a psychiatrist, none of whom 
found that the defendant met the legal criteria for lack of 
criminal responsibility. 
                     
8 
 
 
While "[w]ith hindsight, one can always craft a more 
eloquent and forceful closing argument," trial counsel covered 
all the necessary points.  Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 
627 (2004).  He argued that although the two experts on the 
opposing sides of the case diagnosed the defendant differently, 
they both agreed that the defendant suffered from mental illness 
from an early age.  The fact that the defendant had trouble 
"connecting the dots" was a theme throughout counsel's closing.  
He emphasized the unusual way the defendant handled common, 
albeit stressful, situations as compared to a "normal person."  
He also underscored, more than once, the defendant's issues with 
alcohol.  Finally, he specifically asked the jury to consider 
that, given the defendant's mental impairment and intoxication, 
he was unable to form the intent for murder in the first degree.  
"[S]uggesting ways in which counsel's closing argument might 
have been stronger does not make out a claim of ineffective 
assistance."  Id. at 628. 
 
2.  Jury instructions.  a.  Lack of criminal responsibility 
instruction.  The defendant claims that he was denied a 
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense because the 
trial judge did not instruct the jury on lack of criminal 
responsibility, claiming that the judge should have done so 
despite the fact that the defendant's trial counsel did not 
request such an instruction.  The argument fails. 
9 
 
 
Although we have stated that it is best to err on the side 
of giving a lack of criminal responsibility instruction where 
the "appropriateness of [such an instruction] is marginal," we 
did so in a case where the defendant requested the 
instruction.  Commonwealth v. Mattson, 377 Mass. 638, 642, 644 
(1979).  See Monico, 396 Mass. at 802-803.  Here, as 
discussed supra, the defendant's trial counsel made a tactical 
decision not to pursue a lack of criminal responsibility 
defense, and given the paucity of evidence to support such a 
defense, it would arguably have been error for the judge to have 
nevertheless, sua sponte, instructed the jury on that theory.  
See Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 Mass. 131, 144 (2012) (where 
evidence suggests defense would be unconvincing, judge sua 
sponte issuing instruction on that defense "might well . . . 
interfere[] with the defendants' right to present their chosen 
defenses"). 
 
b.  Manslaughter instruction.  The defendant requested a 
voluntary manslaughter instruction on the theory that he killed 
the victim during a fight (pointing to evidence of the injury to 
the back of his head) or, alternatively, that he killed the 
victim upon learning anew that she had been unfaithful to him.  
See Commonwealth v. Valentin, 474 Mass. 301, 311 (2016), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 443 (2006) 
("Where an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is requested, a 
10 
 
trial judge should so instruct the jury if any view of the 
evidence would warrant a finding that the unlawful killing arose 
not from malice, but 'from . . . sudden passion induced by 
reasonable provocation, sudden combat, or excessive force in 
self-defense'").  The judge denied the request.  The defendant 
objected at the time and now claims that the denial deprived him 
of his right to a fair trial.  We review the ruling for 
prejudicial error, and find none.  See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 
470 Mass. 682, 687-688 (2015). 
 
The evidence at trial did not support a finding of sudden 
passion induced by reasonable provocation, sudden combat, or 
excessive use of force in self-defense.  Although the defendant 
told first responders that the victim bit him, there is no 
evidence that she initiated physical contact.  See Commonwealth 
v. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 838-839 (2004) ("provocation must come 
from the victim"). 
 
As for the theory that the defendant was provoked by the 
victim's infidelity, "[v]oluntary manslaughter based on heat of 
passion requires evidence that there was 'provocation that would 
have been likely to produce in an ordinary person' such a state 
of mind as would overcome reflection or restraint and that the 
provocation 'actually did produce such a state of mind in the 
defendant.'"  Commonwealth v. Tassinari, 466 Mass. 340, 355 
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Sirois, 437 Mass. 845, 854 
11 
 
(2002).  Here, given the evidence that the defendant had prior 
knowledge of the victim's relationship with her fellow student, 
he cannot claim a sudden discovery that would serve as 
reasonable provocation.  See Commonwealth v. LeClair, 429 Mass. 
313, 316-317 (1999).  There was no error. 
 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
briefs and the entire record and discern no reason to reduce the 
degree of guilt or grant a new trial pursuant to our powers 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.