Case Title: FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS INC V CITY OF LANSING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 118186

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 25, 2002  
FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS, INC, doing business as 
THE LANSING STATE JOURNAL,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 118184  
CITY OF LANSING,  
Defendant-Appellant,  
and  
CAPITOL CITY LODGE NO. 141 OF THE FRATERNAL  
ORDER OF POLICE LABOR PROGRAM, INC, and 
Jane Doe, and John Doe,  
Intervening Defendants.  
FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS, INC, doing business as 
THE LANSING STATE JOURNAL,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 118186  
CITY OF LANSING,  
Defendant,  
and  
________________________________ 
CAPITOL CITY LODGE NO. 141 OF THE FRATERNAL  
ORDER OF POLICE LABOR PROGRAM, INC, 
Intervening Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
In this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) matter, we are  
called upon to consider whether the circuit court erred in  
concluding that city police department records regarding  
citizen-initiated 
investigations 
were 
not 
exempt 
from  
disclosure while records regarding department-initiated  
investigations 
were 
exempt 
from 
disclosure 
under 
MCL  
15.243(1)(s)(ix).  We take this opportunity to clarify the  
appropriate standards of appellate review of the circuit  
court’s determination in a FOIA dispute and the method by  
which the circuit court is required to perform its analysis  
under § 243(1)(s) of the FOIA.  
First, we hold that the application of exemptions  
requiring legal determinations are reviewed under a de novo  
standard, 
while 
application 
of 
exemptions 
requiring  
determinations of a discretionary nature, such as the one  
presented here, are reviewed under a clearly erroneous  
standard.   Second, we hold that MCL 15.240(4) of the FOIA  
specifically places the burden of proof on the public body to  
show that the public record is exempt from disclosure.  Third,  
in applying the public interest balancing test, the circuit  
2  
 
court should consider the fact that records have been made  
exemptible under § 243(1)(s).  Fourth, the “particular  
instance” language set forth in § 243(1)(s) requires the  
circuit court to analyze the FOIA request to determine whether  
further 
categorization of the requested records is required in  
order to determine whether the public interest in disclosure  
outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure.  If further  
categorization is required to perform the balancing test, the  
circuit court should direct the public body to assist it in  
reasonably categorizing the sought-after records.  
Because the city released the records regarding citizen­
initiated complaints, that issue has been rendered moot.  
Further, with regard to the department-initiated complaints,  
we remand this matter to the Court of Appeals for  
reconsideration in light of the principles expressed in this  
opinion.  
I. FOIA OVERVIEW  
The Michigan Legislature enacted FOIA, MCL 15.231 et  
seq., to provide for the “disclosure of ‘public records’ in  
the possession of a ‘public body.’”  Kent Co Deputy Sheriff’s  
Assoc v Kent Co Sheriff, 463 Mich 353, 360; 616 NW2d 677  
(2000), quoting Bradley v Saranac Comm Schs Bd of Ed, 455  
Mich 285, 292; 565 NW2d 650 (1997).  Affording such public  
disclosure  effects the state’s policy of providing “full and  
3  
 
 
complete information regarding the affairs of government and  
the official acts of those who represent the people as public  
officials.” MCL 15.231(2).  
When a party desires to inspect or receive a copy of a  
public record, it “shall make a written request [of the public  
body] for the public record . . . .”1  MCL 15.235(1). After  
receiving a FOIA request, a public body  may grant, deny,  
grant in part, deny in part, or issue a notice extending (for  
not more than ten business days) the period for responding to  
the FOIA request. MCL 15.235(2)(a), (b), (c), (d).  If a  
public body denies the request, in full or in part, it must  
explain the basis, under the FOIA or another statute, for its  
denial.
 MCL 15.235(4)(a).  A denial may be based upon a  
record’s inclusion in one of the enumerated classes of  
exemptible records set forth in § 243.  
Once a public body denies a FOIA request, the requesting  
party may either submit a written appeal to the head of that  
public body or commence an action in circuit court.  MCL  
15.240(1)(a), (b).  If the requesting party appeals the matter  
to the head of the public body, the public body must either  
reverse its denial of disclosure, issue a written notice  
1  A public record is statutorily defined as a “writing 
prepared, owned, used, in the possession of, or retained by a 
public body in the performance of an official function, from 
the time it is created.” MCL 15.232(e).  
4  
 
  
upholding the denial of disclosure, reverse the denial of  
disclosure in part and issue a written notice upholding the  
denial of disclosure in part, or issue a notice extending the  
period of response for a period not exceeding ten days. MCL  
15.240(2)(a), (b), (c), (d). If the public body upholds its  
decision to deny the request, in full or in part, the  
requesting party may then seek judicial review. 
MCL  
15.240(3).  
At issue in the instant case is the FOIA exemption  
applicable to personnel records of a law enforcement agency,  
§ 243(1)(s)(ix), which provides as follows:  
(1) A public body may exempt from disclosure as 
a public record under this act:  
* * *  
(s) Unless the public interest in disclosure 
outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure in 
the particular instance, public records of a law 
enforcement agency, the release of which would do 
any of the following:  
* * *  
(ix) Disclose personnel records of law 
enforcement agencies.  
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS  
In 1998, plaintiff, Federated Publications (doing  
business as The Lansing State Journal), submitted a FOIA  
request to defendant, city of Lansing, requesting disclosure  
of  
any reports or other documents regarding complaints 
investigated by the Lansing Police Department  
5 
Internal Affairs Bureau for the time period of 
January 1, 1997 through December 31, 1997.  To the  
extent you believe the officers’ identities may be 
subject to a privacy exemption, the names of the 
officers may be concealed, though the content of 
the reports and complaints themselves must be 
provided.  
The city denied plaintiff’s request, asserting that the  
records 
were 
exempt 
from 
disclosure 
pursuant 
to 
§  
243(1)(s)(ix), among other provisions of law.2  Instead, the  
city voluntarily disclosed a “statistical summary of internal  
affairs investigations for the year 1997.” 
In response to  
the city’s denial of its FOIA request, plaintiff filed an  
administrative appeal with the city council president.  MCL  
15.240(1)(a).  Plaintiff argued that the public interest in  
the subject matter of its request required disclosure of the  
records that it had sought.  In response, the city provided  
a more detailed explanation of its position in opposition to  
plaintiff’s FOIA request.  
Plaintiff subsequently sued under FOIA for disclosure,  
and 
both 
parties 
unsuccessfully 
moved 
for 
summary 
disposition.  
The circuit court observed that it must, first, determine  
whether the records were indeed law enforcement personnel  
2  In a letter from defendant to plaintiff, the city also 
contended that the requested records were exempt pursuant to 
MCL 15.243(d) (citing MCL 423.501, Employee Right to Know 
Act).  The circuit court and the Court of Appeals rejected 
this argument below, and this Court limited its review to FOIA 
issues, specifically those relating to § 243(1)(s)(ix).  
6  
 
 
records, and, second, weigh the public interest in disclosure  
against the public interest in nondisclosure “in each  
particular instance.”3  
Upon 
consideration of the various 
interests 
at stake, the  
court 
ordered 
the 
release 
of 
all 
internal 
affairs  
investigation records, except those relating to department­
generated complaints. Shortly after the circuit court’s  
decision, the city, as well as intervening defendant Capital  
City Lodge, filed an emergency motion in the Court of Appeals  
for a stay of the circuit court proceedings. After initially  
granting the motion, the Court of Appeals vacated its order.  
Without taking any further action, the city then released the  
non-exempt citizen-generated complaint records to plaintiff.  
The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the circuit  
court’s decision in part and reversed in part.  After  
observing that “FOIA embodies this state’s strong public  
policy favoring public access to government information,” the  
Court 
stated 
that 
defendants failed 
to 
satisfy their statutory  
burden of producing evidence explaining why the public  
interest 
in 
nondisclosure of the 
records 
outweighed the public  
interest in disclosure. Consequently, it ruled that all the  
3  Before renewing these motions for summary disposition, 
defendant Capitol City Lodge No 141 of the Fraternal Order of 
Police was granted permission to intervene in the present 
lawsuit.  
7  
 
    
  
requested records were subject to disclosure. Unpublished  
opinion per curiam, issued November 14, 2000 (Docket Nos.  
218331, 218332).  
Defendants filed separate applications for leave to  
appeal in this Court. We granted leave, limited to “whether  
the requested files were exempt from disclosure under  
§ 243(1)(s)(ix) . . . .” 465 Mich 910 (2001).  
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We are required in this case to determine whether the  
circuit court properly applied § 243(1)(s)(ix) in determining  
that 
the 
department-initiated records were exempt and that the  
citizen-initiated investigation records were not exempt under  
the FOIA.  This Court has not had prior occasion to enunciate  
the specific standard of review applicable to this inquiry.4 
 We conclude that a circuit court’s decision regarding the  
applicability of exemptions to public records does not  
automatically require de novo review.  
Although the FOIA expressly addresses the standard that  
governs a circuit court’s review of a public body’s own  
4  This Court has, without elaboration, applied a de novo 
standard of review in some FOIA cases.  In cases applying a de 
novo standard, this Court has either assumed that the  
application of a FOIA exemption is purely an issue of 
statutory 
interpretation, see, e.g., Bradley, supra at 293, or 
has reviewed the matter in the context of a summary 
disposition motion, see, e.g., Herald Co v Bay City, 463 Mich 
111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000).  
8  
 
 
determination of what public records must be disclosed,5 it is  
silent regarding the standard that governs appellate review  
of the circuit court’s decision.  Therefore, we turn to our  
case law to determine the appropriate standard of review.  As  
stated above, questions of law are reviewed de novo.  Factual  
findings and matters of discretion, on the other hand, are  
generally reviewed either for clear error or an abuse of  
discretion. See, e.g., People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 269;  
547 NW2d 280 (1996).  
Several statutory exemptions exist in the FOIA.  
Depending 
on 
the 
particular 
language of an exemption, judicial  
determinations of its applicability may implicate different  
standards of appellate review. We hold that the application  
of exemptions involving legal determinations are reviewed  
under a de novo standard. Lincoln v General Motors Corp, 461  
Mich 483, 489-490; 607 NW2d 73 (2000).  Exemptions involving  
discretionary determinations, such as application of the  
instant exemption requiring a circuit court to engage in a  
5  Section 240(4) provides in relevant part:  
In an action commenced under subsection  
(1)(b), a court that determines a public record is 
not exempt from disclosure shall order the public 
body to cease withholding or to produce all or a 
portion of a public record wrongfully withheld, 
regardless of the location of the public record. 
The circuit court . . . has venue over the action.  
The court shall determine the matter de novo  
. . . .  
9  
 
  
 
  
 
balancing of public interests, should be reviewed under a  
deferential standard.  We therefore hold that the clearly  
erroneous standard of review applies to the application of  
exemptions 
requiring 
determinations 
of 
a 
discretionary 
nature.  
A finding is “clearly erroneous” if, after reviewing the  
entire evidence, the reviewing court is left with the definite  
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.  In re  
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).  
IV. DISCUSSION  
As stated on numerous occasions by this Court, the  
primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to  
discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.  
This Court discerns that intent by examining the specific  
language of a statute. If the language is clear, this Court  
presumes that the Legislature intended the meaning it has  
plainly expressed and the statute will be enforced as written.  
Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219  
(2002).
 Unless otherwise defined in the statute, or  
understood to have a technical or peculiar meaning in the law,  
every word or phrase of a statute will be given its plain and  
ordinary meaning. See MCL 8.3a.  
A. BURDEN OF PROOF  
Defendant urges this Court to embrace its position that  
the FOIA requester carries the burden of proving that the  
10  
 
 
public interest in the disclosure of public records outweighs  
the 
public 
interest 
in 
nondisclosure. 
 
Specifically, 
defendant  
argues that the public body is required initially only to  
establish that public records sought under the FOIA fall  
within one of the exemptible categories, in this instance,  
that the records were “personnel records of law enforcement  
agencies.”  Once established, defendant contends that the  
burden 
of 
demonstrating that the 
public 
interest in disclosure  
outweighs that of nondisclosure shifts to the  requester.  In  
support of its view, defendant focuses on the following  
language in § 243(1)(s):  “[u]nless the public interest in  
disclosure outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure in  
the particular instance.”   Plaintiff, in response, argues  
that § 240(4) places the burden of proof on the public body.  
Further, plaintiff maintains that the language in § 243(1)(s)  
neither conflicts with nor alters the burden of proof set  
forth in § 240(4). We agree with plaintiff.  
First, § 240(4) provides:  
In an action [in the circuit court to compel 
disclosure under the FOIA], . . . [t]he court shall 
determine the matter de novo and the burden is on  
the public body to sustain its denial. [Emphasis  
added.]  
This language plainly states that the burden of proof is on  
the public body to demonstrate why it is entitled to protect  
a record from disclosure.  
11  
 
 
Second, the language of § 240(4) is consistent with that  
of § 243(1)(s).  The latter provision merely sets forth the  
public interest balancing test. When read together with the  
introductory language in § 243(1), this provision states that  
a public body may exempt from disclosure a class of public  
records 
identified 
in § 243(1)(s), 
unless 
the “public interest  
in disclosure outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure”  
in the particular instance.  In light of the express language  
of § 240(4), we do not view § 243(1)(s) as allocating the  
burden of proof in FOIA matters; rather, it merely prescribes  
a balancing test for determining whether a class of records  
is exemptible.  
In sum, in determining which party bears the burden of  
proof regarding the applicability of a FOIA exemption, we have  
no reason to depart from the settled principle that the burden  
of proof is on the party asserting that a record is exempt  
under the FOIA.6  Accordingly, we hold that the language set  
forth in § 240(4) controls and places the burden of proof on  
the public body to show that it is entitled to protect a  
record from disclosure.  
B. “PUBLIC INTEREST”  
In carrying out its public interest balancing under §  
6See, e.g., Herald Co, supra at 119; Bradley, supra at  
293; Evening News Ass’n v Troy, 417 Mich 481, 503; 339 NW2d  
421 (1983).  
12  
243(1)(s), a circuit court is confronted in each case with  
differing 
public 
interest 
considerations. 
 
In 
undertaking 
this  
balancing, however, the circuit court must consider the fact  
that the inclusion of a record within an exemptible class  
under § 243(1)(s) implies some degree of public interest in  
the nondisclosure of such a record.  In contrast with the  
universe of public records that are non-exemptible, the  
Legislature has specifically designated these classes of  
records as exemptible.  That is, some attribute of these  
records has prompted the Legislature to designate them as  
subject to disclosure only upon a finding that the public  
interest in disclosure predominates.  However, we emphasize  
that these records are merely exemptible and not exempt, and  
that exemption is not automatic.  Nonetheless, in performing  
the 
requisite 
balancing of public interests, the circuit court  
should remain cognizant of the special consideration that the  
Legislature has accorded an exemptible class of records .  
C. “PARTICULAR INSTANCE” 
  As stated previously, a public body may exempt from  
disclosure certain classes of records, including law  
enforcement personnel records, “[u]nless the public interest  
in disclosure outweighs the public interest in nondisclosure  
in the particular instance . . . .” 
MCL 15.243(1)(s)  
(emphasis added). 
 In the emphasized phrase at issue, the  
13  
 
  
first 
significant 
word 
is 
“particular,” 
which 
means  
“pertaining to a single or specific person, thing, group . .  
. not general.”  Random House Webster’s College Dictionary  
(2001).  Next, there is “instance,” which means “a case or  
occurrence of something.” Id.  In light of this language, we  
believe that public records reviewed under the FOIA balancing  
test must be organized within reasonably specific categories  
that enable the circuit court to weigh similar competing  
aspects of the public interest.  In some cases, it may be  
clear that the FOIA request is comprised of a sufficiently  
precise or narrow category of records that the circuit court  
can adequately balance the public interests at stake without  
the need of further “particular instance” categorization.7  
See, e.g., Kent Co, supra at 399, which involved a narrow  
request for records on which disciplinary decisions regarding  
two prison guards were based.  
Conversely, a FOIA request may be general and entail a  
request for records relating to varied subjects, arguably  
implicating several different aspects of the public interest.  
In such cases, the circuit court may be required to conduct  
a “particular instance” categorization of records to enable  
it to identify and weigh similar aspects of the public  
7 
  A FOIA request must “sufficiently” describe the 
sought-after records. MCL 15.233.  
14  
 
  
  
  
interest in favor of disclosure or nondisclosure.8  
The circuit court is charged with balancing the records  
sought by a FOIA requester. The more general or complicated  
the request, however, the more likely the court is to require  
the assistance of the parties, in particular that of the  
public body because it has custody of the sought-after  
records. Schiffer v FBI, 78 F3d 1405, 1408 (CA 9 1996). The  
requester may be unaware of what records the public body  
8For example, in Newark Morning Ledger Co v Saginaw Co  
Sheriff, 204 Mich App 215, 216; 514 NW2d 213 (1994), the Court 
of Appeals determined that, although an exemption may apply to 
a category of records, “any category must be clearly described 
and ‘drawn with sufficient precision so that all documents 
within a particular category are similar in nature.’”  Id. at  
226, quoting Anderson v Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 907 
F2d 936, 944 (CA 10, 1990). The Court of Appeals emphasized 
that 
drafting 
categories 
with 
sufficient 
precision 
is 
required 
because it enables the circuit court to properly balance the 
competing public interests:  
The difficulty with the court’s treatment of 
the internal affairs investigatory records as a 
single 
category 
is 
that 
public 
interest 
in  
disclosure and nondisclosure may vary depending on 
the circumstances of an investigation, and the 
nature of the documents produced. For example, the 
court’s 
analysis 
of 
the 
public 
interest 
in  
nondisclosure is focused on the potential harm that 
may result from disclosing information about  
unfounded allegations of misconduct.  That analysis 
is clearly not applicable to those investigations 
in which it was determined that the employee had 
engaged in wrongdoing.  Yet, in determining the 
applicability of the exemption, the court did not 
distinguish between investigations in which the 
allegations 
were 
determined 
to 
be 
clearly 
unfounded, and those that even the department found 
warranted disciplinary action. [Newark, supra at  
225.]  
15 
  
possesses, how such records have been categorized, or the  
precise nature of their contents.  Such a disparity in  
information suggests that the public body will often be in the  
best position to categorize the information sought to be  
disclosed. Vaughn v Rosen, 157 US App DC 340, 343-344; 484  
F2d 820 (1973).9  
Therefore, if because of the diverse nature of the  
records sought, the circuit court is unable to apply the  
statutory public interest balancing test, the court should  
direct the public body to assist it in reasonably categorizing  
the sought-after records.  
V. APPLICATION  
A. CITIZEN-INITIATED COMPLAINTS  
As stated above, the city released the citizen-initiated  
complaints 
to 
plaintiff. 
 
Therefore, we must determine whether  
a claimed exemption for those records was rendered moot by  
their release.  
The principal duty of this Court is to decide actual  
cases and controversies.  Anway v Grand Rapids R Co, 211 Mich  
592, 610; 179 NW 350 (1920).  To that end, this Court does not  
reach moot questions or declare principles or rules of law  
that have no practical legal effect in the case before us  
unless the issue is one of public significance that is likely  
9  See also Evening News Ass’n, supra at 503.  
16  
  
to recur, yet evade judicial review.  Id.; see also In re  
Midland Publishing, 420 Mich 148, 152, n 2; 362 NW2d 580  
(1984).  
Applying these principles to the present case, we hold  
that any existing “controversy” regarding whether the citizen  
complaint records were properly ordered to be disclosed was  
rendered moot by their release.10
 A decision from this Court  
regarding the released records would have no practical legal  
effect.  Defendants are advocating the nondisclosure of the  
citizen complaint records; they want to ensure that these  
records remain secret.  Yet, because the city has already  
publicly released these records, they are obviously no longer  
“secret.” No decision by this Court can transform disclosed  
records into nondisclosed records.  
Further, this case does not present an issue that is  
likely to recur yet regularly evade judicial review.  Quite  
simply, all that the city would have had to do here to secure  
review of this issue was to appeal the disclosure order to  
this Court.  A similar course of action is open to a public  
body that finds itself situated in the city’s circumstances  
in the future.  
10See, 
e.g., 
Regional Mngt Corp Inc v Legal Services Corp, 
186 F3d 457 (CA 4, 1999).  
17  
 
 
B. DEPARTMENT-INITIATED COMPLAINTS  
The Court of Appeals, not having had the benefit of this  
opinion clarifying the appropriate standards of review  
applicable to this FOIA matter, engaged in a de novo review  
of the circuit court’s determination that the department­
initiated investigation records were exempt from disclosure  
under § 243(1)(s)(ix).  Because we hold today that the clearly  
erroneous standard of review applies to exemptions involving  
discretionary determinations, we believe that it is necessary  
to remand this matter to the Court of Appeals for  
reconsideration of its determination that the circuit court  
erred in holding that the department-initiated internal  
affairs investigation files were exempt from disclosure.  
Should the Court of Appeals on remand find that it is not  
“left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has  
been made,” Miller, supra at 337, it must affirm the circuit  
court’s grant of summary disposition.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
We hold that: (1) Depending on the language of the  
particular FOIA exemption at issue, the circuit court may be  
entitled to a level of deference that is not accorded to legal  
issues.  Where, as here, application of the statutory  
exemption requires the circuit court to exercise discretion,  
the appellate court must apply a clearly erroneous standard  
18  
 
 
 
of review.  (2) The public body has the burden of establishing  
that records are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.  (3)  
In applying the public interest balancing test pursuant to  
§ 243(1)(s), the circuit court should consider the fact that  
the records have been designated as exemptible by the  
Legislature. 
 
(4) 
The “particular 
instance” 
language set forth  
in § 243(1)(s) requires the trial court to analyze the FOIA  
request to determine whether further categorization is needed  
to conduct the proper balancing of the public interests  
involved.  
We therefore remand this matter to the Court of Appeals  
for reconsideration in light of the principles expressed in  
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, KELLY, TAYLOR, and YOUNG, JJ.,  
concurred with MARKMAN, J.  
19  
 
 
  
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS, INC, doing business as
THE LANSING STATE JOURNAL, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 118184 
CITY OF LANSING, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
CAPITOL CITY LODGE NO. 141 OF THE FRATERNAL 
ORDER OF POLICE LABOR PROGRAM, INC, and
Jane Doe, and John Doe, 
Intervening Defendants. 
________________________________ 
FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS, INC, doing business as
THE LANSING STATE JOURNAL, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 118186 
CITY OF LANSING, 
Defendant, 
and 
CAPITOL CITY LODGE NO. 141 OF THE FRATERNAL 
ORDER OF POLICE LABOR PROGRAM, INC,
Intervening Defendant-Appellant. 
________________________________ 
WEAVER, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result of the majority opinion, but write  
separately to make clear that the inclusion of certain classes  
of records within those exemptible under MCL 15.243(1)(s)  
creates no presumption of exemption.  
The 
Legislature 
has 
not indicated that the mere inclusion  
of a record within an exemptible class of records is to be  
accorded weight in favor of nondisclosure where the statute  
requires a balancing of the public interest in disclosure  
versus the public interest in nondisclosure.  The inclusion  
of a record within an exemptible class means that the record  
may be, under certain circumstances, exempt from disclosure.  
It remains incumbent upon the public body to “sustain its  
denial” of disclosure of exemptible records.  MCL 15.240(4).  
Thus, I do not agree with the majority suggestion that the  
“circuit court must consider the fact that the inclusion of  
a record within an exemptible class under § 243(1)(s) implies  
some degree of public interest in the nondisclosure . . . .”  
Slip op at 13.  
It is the policy of the Freedom of Information Act to  
afford 
the 
public 
“full and complete information 
regarding 
the  
affairs of government . . . .”  MCL 15.231(2). In light of  
this express policy, one would assume that the Legislature  
intended that the balancing of the public interest in  
disclosure versus its interest in nondisclosure under MCL  
2  
 
15.243(1)(s) at least be conducted on level ground.  According  
weight to nondisclosure because of the Legislature’s mere  
inclusion of a class of records among those that are  
exemptible tips the scale in favor of nondisclosure and is,  
therefore, inconsistent with a fair balancing of the public  
interest.  
3