Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V RAYMOND A MCCULLER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 267238

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 26, 2007 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 128161 
RAYMOND A. MCCULLER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, J. 
This is one of three companion cases involving the application of Blakely v 
Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), to Michigan’s 
sentencing scheme. See also People v Harper, 479 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ 
(2007) (Docket Nos. 130988 and 131898, decided July 25, 2007).  This case 
returns to us following a remand from the United States Supreme Court.  In our 
previous opinion, we held that a sentencing court must score both the offense 
variables (OVs) and the prior record variables (PRVs) to arrive at a defendant’s 
minimum sentence range. We reasoned that a sentencing court does not violate 
 
 
  
 
                                              
 
Blakely principles when it engages in judicial fact-finding to score the OVs in 
order to calculate a defendant’s recommended minimum sentence range under the 
sentencing guidelines, even if the defendant’s PRV score alone would place him in 
an “intermediate sanction cell.”1 People v McCuller, 475 Mich 176; 715 NW2d 
798 (2006) (McCuller I). The Supreme Court subsequently vacated our judgment 
and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of Cunningham v 
California, 549 US ___; 127 S Ct 856; 166 L Ed 2d 856 (2007).  McCuller v 
Michigan, ___ US ___; 127 S Ct 1247 (2007) (McCuller II). Having now 
considered Cunningham, we reaffirm our original decision for three reasons.2 
First, Cunningham does not alter our view that Michigan’s statutory 
scheme requires the sentencing court to score both the OVs and the PRVs before 
determining the defendant’s minimum sentence.  A defendant’s qualification for 
an intermediate sanction is contingent on the sentencing court’s calculation and 
application of these sentencing variables.  A sentencing court’s fact-finding in 
1 A defendant falling within an intermediate sanction cell must be 
sentenced, absent a substantial and compelling reason for departure, to an 
intermediate sanction that does not include a prison term.  MCL 769.34(4)(a). 
2 In reaffirming our original decision, we do not, as Justice Kelly’s dissent 
contends, imply that the Supreme Court “simply did not understand Michigan’s 
sentencing laws.” Post at 2. Justice Kelly seems to read something into the 
Supreme Court’s order that is simply not there.  Justice Kelly is incorrect that the 
Supreme Court indicated in its order that “there is a Sixth Amendment problem 
with Michigan’s sentencing guidelines.” Post at 60. We take the Supreme 
Court’s order for exactly what it is:  a remand for us to consider the matter further 
in light of the Court’s holding in Cunningham. The order does not direct us to 
decide the case differently from our previous decision. 
2  
 
 
 
                                              
scoring the OVs does not increase the defendant’s statutory maximum under 
Blakely.3  Here, the proper scoring of both the OVs and the PRVs did not place 
defendant in an intermediate sanction cell.  Instead, defendant’s scores placed him 
in a “straddle cell” with a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison.  Defendant 
was sentenced within this statutory maximum. 
Second, as we explained in Harper, supra at ___, Michigan, unlike 
California, has a true indeterminate sentencing scheme.  A sentencing court scores 
the OVs only to calculate the recommended range for the minimum portion of the 
defendant’s sentence, not to arrive at the defendant’s maximum sentence, which is 
set by statute. 
The conditional limit on incarceration contained in MCL 
769.34(4)(a)—an intermediate sanction—does not establish the defendant’s 
statutorily required maximum sentence authorized by the jury’s verdict or the 
guilty plea, but is instead a matter of legislative leniency, giving a defendant the 
opportunity to be incarcerated for a period that is less than that authorized by the 
jury’s verdict or the guilty plea. Harper, supra at ___. Therefore, even if 
defendant were to be sentenced on the basis of his PRV score alone, the 
sentencing court would not violate Blakely by sentencing him to the statutory 
maximum of 15 years in prison. 
3 The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in People v Uphaus, 
___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2007) (Docket No. 267238, issued April 
3, 2007), slip op at 5-6. 
3  
 
 
 
 
Third, even if the sentencing court violated Blakely by sentencing 
defendant to a term of imprisonment based on its scoring of the OVs, the error was 
harmless under the plain error standard of People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763­
764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). The factors underlying the scoring of the OVs were 
uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence. We are firmly convinced 
that a jury would have reached precisely the same result. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant apparently harbored some resentment toward the victim, Larry 
Smith, because a woman who once lived with defendant had left him for Smith. 
Smith and the woman were imbibing at a local bar when Smith was told that a 
man outside in the parking lot was harassing Smith’s dog.  When Smith went 
outside, he heard someone behind him. He turned and saw defendant swinging a 
blunt object that looked like a bat, a pipe, or a club at his head.  The next thing 
Smith remembered was regaining consciousness in the hospital. As a result of 
defendant’s assault on Smith, he suffered a concussion, broken nose, broken cheek 
bone, broken eye socket, fractured skull, and collapsed right inner ear wall.  He 
also lost teeth on the right side of his lower jawbone. 
A jury convicted defendant of assault with intent to do great bodily harm 
less than murder, MCL 750.84, which has a maximum penalty of 10 years in 
prison. Because defendant was a second-offense habitual offender, however, the 
sentencing court had the discretion to enhance defendant’s statutory maximum 
4  
 
 
 
                                              
sentence to 15 years. MCL 769.10(1)(a).4  In determining defendant’s minimum 
sentence range, the sentencing court scored 10 points for OV 1 because the victim 
had been “touched by any other type of weapon,” MCL 777.31(1)(c) (now MCL 
777.31[1][d]); 1 point for OV 2 because defendant “possessed or used any other 
potentially lethal weapon,” MCL 777.32(1)(d) (now MCL 777.32[1][e]); and 25 
points for OV 3 because a “[l]ife threatening or permanent incapacitating injury 
occurred to a victim,” MCL 777.33(1)(c). Defendant’s total PRV score was 2 
points because he had one prior misdemeanor conviction.  These scores placed 
defendant in the B-IV cell for a class D offense.  As a second-offense habitual 
offender, defendant’s calculated minimum sentence range was 5 to 28 months, 
4 MCL 769.10(1)(a) provides that a sentencing court may impose a 
sentence that is 1½ times longer than the maximum sentence on a second-offense 
habitual offender: 
(1) If a person has been convicted of a felony or an attempt to 
commit a felony, whether the conviction occurred in this state or 
would have been for a felony or attempt to commit a felony in this 
state if obtained in this state, and that person commits a subsequent 
felony within this state, the person shall be punished upon 
conviction of the subsequent felony and sentencing under section 13 
of this chapter as follows: 
(a) If the subsequent felony is punishable upon a first 
conviction by imprisonment for a term less than life, the court, 
except as otherwise provided in this section or section 1 of chapter 
XI, may place the person on probation or sentence the person to 
imprisonment for a maximum term that is not more than 1-1/2 times 
the longest term prescribed for a first conviction of that offense or 
for a lesser term. 
5  
 
 
 
                                              
 
which is in a straddle cell.5  Because the scoring of the OVs and the PRVs placed 
defendant in a straddle cell, the sentencing court had the option of sentencing 
defendant to either an intermediate sanction or a prison term with a minimum 
sentence within the guidelines range.  MCL 769.34(4)(c). The court chose to 
sentence defendant within the guidelines range to a 2- to 15-year term of 
imprisonment. 
On appeal, defendant contended that he was entitled to resentencing under 
Blakely because the jury had not found beyond a reasonable doubt the facts 
underlying the sentencing court’s scoring of the OVs.  Defendant argued that 
absent the sentencing court’s scoring of the OVs, his minimum sentence range 
would have been zero to 11 months, which would have placed him in an 
intermediate sanction cell, entitling him to an intermediate sanction as a maximum 
sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence, 
rejecting defendant’s argument because Blakely does not apply to Michigan’s 
indeterminate sentencing system. 
5 A defendant falls within a straddle cell when, after the sentencing 
variables have been scored, the upper limit of the recommended minimum 
sentence exceeds 18 months, but the lower limit of the recommended minimum 
sentence is 12 months or less. MCL 769.34(4)(c). 
6  
 
 
 
                                              
  
 
This Court also affirmed defendant’s sentence.6  We held that the 
sentencing court had not violated Blakely by engaging in judicial fact-finding to 
score the OVs necessary to calculate the recommended minimum sentence range. 
We explained that a defendant cannot be sentenced to an intermediate sanction by 
scoring the PRVs only—the OVs must also be scored.  Thus, defendant was not 
entitled to resentencing, because his maximum sentence was the statutory 
maximum of 15 years, which the sentencing court had not exceeded. McCuller I, 
supra at 181-183. 
The Supreme Court thereafter vacated our judgment and remanded this case 
to this Court “for further consideration in light of Cunningham v California, 549 
U.S. ___; 127 S.Ct. 856; 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007).”  McCuller II, supra, 127 S Ct 
at 1247. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case involves questions of statutory interpretation and constitutional 
questions, which are both reviewed de novo.  People v Stewart, 472 Mich 624, 
631; 698 NW2d 340 (2005); People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 146; 715 NW2d 
6 On appeal, defendant raised issues other than the Blakely issue, but this 
Court denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal with respect to those 
issues. McCuller I, supra at 183. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
778 (2006). An unpreserved claim of constitutional error is reviewed for plain 
error affecting substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763-764.7 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
In Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 490; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 
435 (2000), the Supreme Court held that under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” In Blakely, supra at 303, the Court held that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for 
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the 
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” 
(Emphasis deleted.) In regard to indeterminate sentencing schemes, the Blakely 
Court stated: 
Of course indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, 
in that a judge (like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those 
facts he deems important to the exercise of his sentencing discretion. 
But the facts do not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal 
right to a lesser sentence—and that makes all the difference insofar 
as judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is 
concerned. [Id. at 309 (emphasis in original).] 
7 Defendant agrees that his claim of constitutional error should be reviewed 
under the plain error standard. 
8  
 
 
 
 
                                              
Thus, a sentencing court in an indeterminate sentencing scheme does not violate 
Blakely by engaging in fact-finding to determine the minimum term of a 
defendant’s indeterminate sentence unless the fact-finding increases the statutory 
maximum sentence to which the defendant had a legal right.8 
The constitutional rule of Apprendi, Blakely, and [United 
States v Booker, 543 US 220; 125 S Ct 738; 160 L Ed 2d 621 
(2005)] can be summarized as follows:  (1) a trial court may not 
impose a sentence greater than the statutory maximum unless it does 
so on the basis of a prior conviction or the fact at issue is “admitted 
by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”; (2) 
where a defendant’s maximum sentence is calculated through the 
use of mandatory sentencing guidelines, the statutory maximum is 
the maximum sentence that may be imposed under those guidelines, 
based solely on the defendant’s prior convictions and those facts 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) a trial court may consider 
facts and circumstances not proven beyond a reasonable doubt in 
imposing a sentence within the statutory range.  [Drohan, supra at 
156 (citations omitted).] 
8 In Harris v United States, 536 US 545, 566; 122 S Ct 2406; 153 L Ed 2d 
524 (2002), Justice Kennedy stated: 
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments ensure that the defendant 
“will never get more punishment than he bargained for when he did 
the crime,” but they do not promise that he will receive “anything 
less” than that. 
Apprendi, supra, 530 US at 498 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). If the grand jury has alleged, and the trial jury has 
found, all the facts necessary to impose the maximum, the barriers 
between government and defendant fall.  The judge may select any 
sentence within the range, based on facts not alleged in the 
indictment or proved to the jury—even if those facts are specified by 
the legislature, and even if they persuade the judge to choose a much 
higher sentence than he or she otherwise would have imposed.  That 
a fact affects the defendant’s sentence, even dramatically so, does 
not by itself make it an element. 
9  
 
 
 
  
 
                                              
In Drohan, supra at 160-161, this Court explained that Michigan has an 
indeterminate sentencing scheme.9  “The maximum sentence is not determined by 
the trial court, but rather is set by law.” Id. at 161. Michigan’s sentencing 
guidelines create a range within which the sentencing court must set the minimum 
sentence, but the sentencing court may not impose a sentence greater than the 
statutory maximum. Id.  “Thus, the trial court’s power to impose a sentence is 
always derived from the jury’s verdict, because the ‘maximum-minimum’ 
sentence will always fall within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict.”  Id. at 
162. 
Therefore, Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme is valid under 
Blakely. Drohan, supra at 162-164; Harper, supra at ___. 
B. SCORING THE OVS TO DETERMINE THE  
MINIMUM SENTENCE  
1. DISCUSSION 
Despite our Drohan decision, defendant argues that one aspect of 
Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme nonetheless violates the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Defendant claims that because his 
9 The very limited number of offenses that require determinate sentences 
includes first-degree murder, MCL 750.316 (life in prison without the possibility 
of parole), and carrying or possessing a firearm when committing or attempting to 
commit a felony, MCL 750.227b (two years in prison for the first conviction, five 
years for the second conviction, and ten years for a third or subsequent 
conviction). Drohan, supra at 161 n 12. When a defendant is sentenced for one 
of these crimes, the guidelines are not scored to determine the defendant’s 
minimum sentence. The Legislature has singled out these crimes as rare instances 
in which the sentencing court retains no discretion in sentencing. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
PRV score alone placed him in an intermediate sanction cell, he was entitled to a 
maximum sentence that did not include prison time.  Defendant contends that the 
sentencing court violated Blakely by engaging in judicial fact-finding to score the 
OVs, thereby allegedly increasing his maximum sentence from an intermediate 
sanction to a term of imprisonment.  We again reject defendant’s argument and 
affirm defendant’s sentence. 
Generally, when a defendant is sentenced in Michigan, “[t]he maximum 
penalty provided by law shall be the maximum sentence . . . .”  MCL 769.8(1). 
Our sentencing guidelines set a range only for a defendant’s minimum sentence. 
MCL 769.34(2). 
The sentencing court determines a defendant’s minimum 
sentence range by considering together the OVs, the PRVs, and the offense class. 
MCL 777.21(1).10  Generally, once the sentencing court calculates the defendant’s 
10 MCL 777.21(1) provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, for an offense 
enumerated in part 2 of this chapter, determine the recommended 
minimum sentence range as follows: 
(a) Find the offense category for the offense from part 2 of 
this chapter. From section 22 of this chapter, determine the offense 
variables to be scored for that offense category and score only those 
offense variables for the offender as provided in part 4 of this 
chapter. 
Total those points to determine the offender’s offense 
variable level. 
(b) Score all prior record variables for the offender as 
provided in part 5 of this chapter.  Total those points to determine 
the offender’s prior record variable level. 
(continued…) 
11  
 
 
 
                                              
guidelines range, it must, absent substantial and compelling reasons, impose a 
minimum sentence within that range.  MCL 769.34(2). There are, however, 
exceptions to this rule.  One exception pertains when the upper limit of the 
recommended minimum sentence range is 18 months or less.  In such cases, the 
court, unless it articulates substantial and compelling reasons, must impose an 
intermediate sanction: 
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence 
range for a defendant determined under the sentencing guidelines set 
forth in chapter XVII is 18 months or less, the court shall impose an 
intermediate sanction unless the court states on the record a 
substantial and compelling reason to sentence the individual to the 
jurisdiction of the department of corrections.  An intermediate 
sanction may include a jail term that does not exceed the upper limit 
of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, 
whichever is less. [MCL 769.34(4)(a).] 
MCL 769.31(b) defines “intermediate sanction” as “probation or any sanction, 
other than imprisonment in a state prison or state reformatory, that may lawfully 
be imposed.  Intermediate sanction includes, but is not limited to, 1 or more of” 
several options, including up to one year in jail, probation with any conditions 
(…continued) 
(c) Find the offense class for the offense from part 2 of this 
chapter. Using the sentencing grid for that offense class in part 6 of 
this chapter, determine the recommended minimum sentence range 
from the intersection of the offender’s offense variable level and 
prior record variable level. The recommended minimum sentence 
within a sentencing grid is shown as a range of months or life. 
12  
 
 
 
                                              
 
authorized by law, probation with jail, and other options such as house arrest and 
community service.11
 
We hold that Cunningham does not require us to modify our previous 
decision. A sentencing court does not violate Blakely by engaging in judicial fact­
11 The nonexhaustive list of intermediate sanction options includes: 
(i) Inpatient or outpatient drug treatment or participation in a 
drug treatment court under chapter 10A of the revised judicature act 
of 1961, 1961 PA 236, MCL 600.1060 to 600.1082. 
(ii) Probation with any probation conditions required or 
authorized by law. 
(iii) Residential probation. 
(iv) Probation with jail. 
(v) Probation with special alternative incarceration. 
(vi) Mental health treatment. 
(vii) Mental health or substance abuse counseling. 
(viii) Jail. 
(ix) Jail with work or school release. 
(x) Jail, with or without authorization for day parole under 
1962 PA 60, MCL 801.251 to 801.258. 
(xi) Participation in a community corrections program. 
(xii) Community service. 
(xiii) Payment of a fine. 
(xiv) House arrest. 
(xv) Electronic monitoring.  [MCL 769.31(b).] 
13  
 
 
 
finding to score the OVs to calculate a defendant’s recommended minimum 
sentence range, even when the defendant’s PRV score alone would have placed 
him in an intermediate sanction cell. Cunningham involved the Supreme Court’s 
examination of California’s determinate sentencing law (DSL).  In Harper, we 
described the facts and holding in Cunningham: 
In Cunningham, the defendant was tried and convicted of 
continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14.  The statute 
defining 
the 
offense 
prescribed 
three 
precise 
terms 
of 
imprisonment—lower, middle, and upper term sentences of 6, 12, 
and 16 years, respectively. The statute that controlled which term a 
sentencing judge should impose provided that “‘the court shall order 
imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.’”  Circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation were to be determined by the court after 
considering the trial record, the probation officer’s report, statements 
submitted by the parties, the victim, or the victim’s family, and “any 
further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.”  The judge in 
Cunningham sentenced the defendant to the 16-year upper term, on 
the basis of the judge’s findings of aggravating facts including the 
particular vulnerability of the victim and the defendant’s violent 
conduct, which indicated a serious danger to the community. 
The Cunningham Court concluded that the sentence violated 
the defendant’s rights because 
“an upper term sentence may be imposed only when the trial judge 
finds an aggravating circumstance. . . .  An element of the charged 
offense, essential to a jury’s determination of guilt, or admitted in a 
defendant’s guilty plea, does not qualify as such a circumstance. . . . 
Instead, aggravating circumstances depend on facts found discretely 
and solely by the judge. In accord with Blakely, therefore, the 
middle term prescribed in California’s statutes, not the upper term, is 
the relevant statutory maximum.  542 U.S., at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531 
(‘[T]he “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the 
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.’ 
(emphasis in original)). Because circumstances in aggravation are 
found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established by a 
14  
 
 
 
 
preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . 
the DSL violates Apprendi’s bright-line rule: Except for a prior 
conviction, ‘any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 530 U.S., at 490, 120 S.Ct. 
2348.” [Harper, supra at ___, quoting Cunningham, supra, 127 S 
Ct at 868.] 
The Supreme Court reiterated its holding from Blakely that “‘[t]he relevant 
“statutory maximum,”’ . . . ‘is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose 
after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 
additional findings.’” Cunningham, supra, 127 S Ct at 860, quoting Blakely, 
supra at 303-304. After holding that California’s DSL violated Blakely, the Court 
advised California that “[o]ther states have chosen to permit judges genuinely ‘to 
exercise broad discretion . . . within a statutory range,’ which, ‘everyone agrees,’ 
encounters no Sixth Amendment shoal.”  Cunningham, supra, 127 S Ct at 871, 
quoting Booker, supra at 233. The Cunningham decision did not modify Blakely. 
Although California’s DSL contains some language facially similar to 
MCL 769.34(4)(a), further examination of the two sentencing schemes reveals 
clear differences. Under California’s DSL, the defendant was legally entitled to a 
maximum sentence of 12 years in prison. The DSL did not attach any conditions 
to the defendant’s entitlement to the 12-year maximum sentence.  The DSL 
violated Blakely by allowing the sentencing court to exceed that 12-year maximum 
sentence on the basis of facts not submitted to the jury and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
By contrast, Michigan’s sentencing scheme does not entitle defendant to a 
maximum sentence of an intermediate sanction in the same way that the defendant 
in Cunningham was entitled to a 12-year maximum sentence.  In Michigan, a 
defendant does not even qualify for an intermediate sanction until after the OVs 
are scored. MCL 769.34(4)(a) plainly prescribes that a defendant qualifies for an 
intermediate sanction only “[i]f the upper limit of the recommended minimum 
sentence range for a defendant determined under the sentencing guidelines . . . is 
18 months or less . . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  To determine a defendant’s minimum 
sentence range under the guidelines, the sentencing court must first score the OVs 
and the PRVs and consider the offense class.  MCL 777.21. Thus, under MCL 
769.34(4)(a), a defendant does not even qualify for an intermediate sanction until 
after the court has scored all the sentencing variables, including the OVs, and 
those variables indicate that the upper limit of the defendant’s minimum sentence 
range is 18 months or less.  In other words, a defendant’s qualification for an 
intermediate sanction is contingent on the sentencing court’s calculation of all of 
the defendant’s sentencing variables. A defendant has no legal right to have his 
minimum sentence calculated using only a portion of the statutorily enumerated 
factors.12 
12 Further, a defendant in Michigan cannot expect to fall into an 
intermediate sanction cell at the time he commits the offense because the 
defendant can never be certain how the OVs will be scored.  Indeed, an offender 
may not even be aware of some facts attending the crime until he is brought before 
(continued…) 
16  
 
 
 
                                              
Upon conviction, a defendant is legally entitled only to the statutory 
maximum sentence for the crime involved.  A defendant has no legal right to 
expect any lesser maximum sentence. As the Blakely Court stated, whether a 
defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence “makes all the difference insofar as 
judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned.”  Blakely, 
supra at 309. Thus, a sentencing court does not violate Blakely principles by 
engaging in judicial fact-finding to score the OVs to calculate the recommended 
minimum sentence range, even when the scoring of the OVs places the defendant 
in a straddle cell or a cell requiring a prison term instead of an intermediate 
sanction cell. 
The sentencing court’s factual findings do not elevate the 
defendant’s maximum sentence, but merely determine the defendant’s 
recommended minimum sentence range, which may consequently qualify the 
defendant for an intermediate sanction. 
In this case, the properly scored guidelines gave defendant a recommended 
minimum sentence range of 5 to 28 months in prison.  This placed defendant in a 
straddle cell, for which the sentencing court had the discretion to impose a 
minimum sentence of either a prison term with a minimum term within the 
(…continued)  
a court. To provide just two examples, a defendant may not know the extent of  
injury he ultimately caused a victim for purposes of OV 3, MCL 777.33, or the  
full value of property he has stolen for purposes of OV 16, MCL 777.46.  
17  
 
 
 
 
                                              
guidelines range or an intermediate sanction.  MCL 769.34(4)(c).13  Defendant 
also faced a statutory maximum sentence of 15 years in prison for his conviction 
of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder as a second-offense 
habitual offender, MCL 750.84; see MCL 769.10. 
Even if Michigan’s 
intermediate sanction cells are characterized as setting maximum sentences for 
Blakely purposes, defendant never gained a legal right to an intermediate sanction. 
Therefore, the sentencing court did not violate Blakely by scoring the OVs and 
imposing a prison sentence within the guidelines, rather than imposing an 
intermediate sanction based on defendant’s PRV scores alone.  Accordingly, we 
affirm defendant’s sentence. 
2. RESPONSE TO JUSTICE KELLY’S DISSENT14 
In concluding that the trial court’s scoring of the OVs violated defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, Justice Kelly’s dissent ignores the 
13 MCL 769.34(4)(c) provides: 
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence 
exceeds 18 months and the lower limit of the recommended 
minimum sentence is 12 months or less, the court shall sentence the 
offender as follows absent a departure: 
(i) To imprisonment with a minimum term within that range. 
(ii) To an intermediate sanction that may include a term of 
imprisonment of not more than 12 months. 
14 Justice Kelly’s dissent discusses issues we address in detail in Harper. 
Post at 32-53. Our response to her arguments regarding these issues can be found 
in the Harper opinion. 
18  
 
 
 
 
statutory language and relies on the faulty premise that defendant’s jury verdict 
entitled him to an intermediate sanction.  Justice Kelly repeatedly recites 
“Apprendi’s bright-line rule: Except for a prior conviction, ‘any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Cunningham, supra, 
127 S Ct at 868, quoting Apprendi, supra at 490 (emphasis added).  Yet Justice 
Kelly woefully misapplies this rule by interpreting it as follows: 
Hence, a defendant is entitled to a sentence based solely on 
(1) the defendant’s prior convictions and (2) any facts that he or she 
admitted and any facts that were specifically found by the jury. 
This requires a conclusion that, in order to determine a 
defendant’s appropriate maximum sentence, a sentencing court 
should score only the PRVs. [Post at 26.] 
This interpretation disregards the integral part of the Apprendi rule that only facts 
used to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum need be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
Justice Kelly’s position demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the function of the legislative sentencing guidelines and how intermediate 
sanctions work within the overall sentencing scheme.  Once the jury convicted 
defendant of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and of 
being a second-offense habitual offender, the jury’s verdict authorized a maximum 
prison sentence of 15 years. At that point, the sentencing court, relying on 
judicially found facts, had to score the various PRVs and OVs to determine the 
recommended range for the minimum portion of defendant’s sentence.  A 
19  
 
 
  
defendant is only eligible for an intermediate sanction if, on the basis of those 
additional findings of fact, “the upper limit of the recommended minimum 
sentence range for a defendant determined under the sentencing guidelines set 
forth in chapter XVII is 18 months or less . . . .”  MCL 769.34(4)(a) (emphasis 
added). In other words, whether a defendant is eligible for an intermediate 
sanction is wholly determined by additional findings of fact undertaken by the 
sentencing court in scoring the guidelines, including the OVs.  Moreover, a 
defendant’s entitlement to an intermediate sanction is itself conditioned on the 
absence of other judicially found facts, i.e., facts that demonstrate a “substantial 
and compelling reason to sentence the individual to the jurisdiction of the 
department of corrections.” 
MCL 769.34(4)(a); see Harper, supra at ___. 
Therefore, under Cunningham, an intermediate sanction does not constitute the 
equivalent of the 12-year presumptive maximum sentence set forth in California’s 
DSL, but operates instead in a manner similar to the 6-year lower term that a 
California court may impose on the basis of its finding of certain mitigating facts 
at sentencing. A court’s use of judicially found facts to determine whether to 
impose a 6-year term or a 12-year term under California’s DSL does not run afoul 
of Blakely because the court remains limited to imposing the maximum sentence 
authorized by the jury’s verdict. Likewise, the use of judicially found facts to 
score the OVs in order to determine whether a defendant is eligible for an 
intermediate sanction does not run afoul of Blakely because a Michigan trial court 
20  
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
may never exceed the maximum sentence authorized by the jury’s verdict, i.e., the 
statutory maximum.  See Harper, supra at ___. Justice Kelly studiously ignores 
the plain language of MCL 769.34(4)(a) and does not even attempt to explain why 
the statute entitles a defendant to an intermediate sanction as a maximum sentence 
before the OVs are scored. Under the plain statutory language, a defendant clearly 
is not eligible for an intermediate sanction until the recommended minimum 
sentence range under the sentencing guidelines has been determined by 
considering all the appropriate factors, including the OVs.  Before that, a 
defendant can only expect the maximum sentence set by statute.15  Thus, although 
Justice Kelly correctly asserts that a defendant is entitled to a statutory maximum 
sentence on the basis of the jury’s verdict, the maximum sentence authorized by 
the jury’s verdict in this case is 15 years. 
15 Justice Kelly compares the instant case to Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584; 
122 S Ct 2428; 153 L Ed 2d 556 (2002), in which the United States Supreme 
Court rejected an Arizona sentencing law allowing a sentencing judge to conduct a 
posttrial hearing to determine whether aggravating circumstances existed to allow 
imposition of the death penalty, as opposed to life imprisonment.  The instant case 
is distinguishable from Ring, however, for the reasons we have discussed—the 
jury’s verdict alone never qualified defendant for an intermediate sanction, 
because an offender’s qualification for an intermediate sanction is contingent on 
the scoring of the OVs. In Ring, on the other hand, the maximum sentence 
allowed by the jury’s verdict—life imprisonment—was not subject to such 
contingencies. Id. at 597. Further, as we discussed in Harper, supra at ___ n 25, 
Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme imposes only one maximum 
sentence—the maximum sentence set forth in the statute applicable to the crime.  
21  
 
 
 
 
 
C. MICHIGAN’S INTERMEDIATE SANCTION CELLS  
Even if defendant may qualify for an intermediate sanction before the OVs 
are scored, we nonetheless conclude that the sentencing court did not violate 
Blakely by sentencing him to a term of imprisonment.  If the sentencing court had 
not scored the OVs and defendant had fallen into an intermediate sanction cell, he 
would still not have been entitled to an intermediate sanction as a statutory 
maximum sentence.  As we held in Harper, supra at ___: 
Under Michigan law, the maximum portion of a defendant’s 
indeterminate sentence is prescribed by MCL 769.8, which requires 
a sentencing judge to impose no less than the prescribed statutory 
maximum sentence as the maximum sentence for every felony 
conviction.[16]  Michigan’s unique law requiring the imposition of an 
intermediate sanction upon fulfillment of the conditions of MCL 
769.34(4)(a) does not alter the maximum sentence that is required 
upon conviction and authorized by either the jury’s verdict or the 
guilty plea. Rather, the conditional limit on incarceration contained 
in MCL 769.34(4)(a) is a matter of legislative leniency, giving a 
defendant the opportunity to be incarcerated for a period of time that 
is less than that authorized by the jury’s verdict or guilty plea, a 
circumstance that does not implicate Blakely. 
[Emphasis in 
original.] 
Thus, even if defendant fell into an intermediate sanction cell, his statutory 
maximum sentence would remain 15 years. The sentencing court did not violate 
Blakely by engaging in judicial fact-finding to score the OVs and impose a 
sentence within that statutory range. 
D. HARMLESS ERROR 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
Finally, even if the sentencing court violated Blakely by scoring the OVs 
and sentencing defendant on the basis of those OV scores, the error was harmless. 
As we explained in Harper, supra at ___, Blakely errors are not structural, but are 
subject to harmless error analysis. See also Washington v Recuenco, ___ US ___; 
126 S Ct 2546, 2551; 165 L Ed 2d 466 (2006).17  Here, defendant did not raise any 
constitutional challenge during sentencing.  Therefore, defendant must show plain 
error affecting substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763-764; see also United 
States v Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F3d 814, 817-818 (CA 10, 2005) (applying the 
same plain error standard to an unpreserved claim of a Blakely violation). 
“Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the 
conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when the error ‘“seriously 
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”’” 
Carines, supra at 763, quoting United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 736; 113 S Ct 
1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993). The important factor in this Blakely harmless error 
analysis is whether the facts supporting the sentencing court’s OV scores were 
(…continued)
16 As we explained in Harper, supra at ___ n 21, the habitual-offender 
statutes are an exception to this rule. 
17 For the reasons we explained in Harper, supra at ___ n 70, Justice 
Kelly’s interpretation of Recuenco would improperly render Blakely errors 
harmful per se. In short, any conclusion that the unavailability of a particular 
procedure in the trial court renders all errors harmful would run directly counter to 
the crux of the harmless error analysis that forms the basis of the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Recuenco. See id. 
23  
 
 
 
                                              
“‘uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.’”  Harper, supra at ___, 
quoting Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 17; 119 S Ct 1827; 144 L Ed 2d 35 
(1999). 
At sentencing, the court scored 10 points for OV 1 because the victim was 
touched by a weapon other than a firearm or a cutting or stabbing weapon and 1 
point for OV 2 because defendant possessed a potentially lethal weapon other than 
a cutting or stabbing weapon, a firearm, or an incendiary or explosive device. 
Defendant has not shown that any error in the sentencing court’s scoring of these 
OVs affected the outcome of the proceedings.  Carines, supra at 763. The jury 
found that defendant assaulted the victim with the intent to do great bodily harm 
less than murder, and, although the elements of that crime do not include the 
touching of a victim with a potentially lethal weapon, those facts were uncontested 
and supported by overwhelming evidence at trial.  In regard to OV 1, the 
uncontroverted evidence showed that the victim was struck in the head with a bat, 
pipe, or club.18  The type and severity of the victim’s injuries corroborated the 
testimony that such a bludgeoning weapon was used.  Defendant did not challenge 
18 Justice Kelly’s dissent mischaracterizes the testimony by arguing that 
defendant’s use of a weapon was contested by Gregory Thompson, a prosecution 
witness. First, Thompson did not witness the assault, but was merely told about it 
by defendant. 
Second, and more importantly, contrary to Justice Kelly’s 
representation, Thompson did not testify that defendant did not use a weapon in 
beating Smith.  Rather, Thompson actually testified during cross-examination that 
he assumed that defendant was armed because of the gestures defendant made 
while describing the beating. 
24  
 
 
 
the testimony that he was armed or the evidence regarding the type of weapon 
used in the assault. 
Rather, he claimed that he was misidentified as the 
perpetrator. 
Thus, the uncontroverted and overwhelming evidence showed 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was touched by a weapon.  In regard to 
OV 2, the uncontested and overwhelming evidence regarding the magnitude of the 
victim’s injuries demonstrated that the weapon used to injure him was potentially 
lethal. The jury rejected defendant’s claim of mistaken identity and convicted 
defendant as the perpetrator who inflicted the injuries.  Therefore, the sentencing 
court’s decision to score OVs 1 and 2 on the basis of its findings that defendant 
possessed a potentially lethal weapon and touched the victim with that weapon, if 
error at all, was harmless. 
The sentencing court also scored 25 points for OV 3 because the victim 
suffered life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury.  The uncontroverted 
evidence at trial showed that the victim was struck so violently that he 
immediately lost consciousness. He suffered a concussion, broken nose, broken 
cheek bone, broken eye socket, fractured skull, and collapsed right inner ear wall. 
He also lost teeth on the right side of his lower jawbone.  The severity of these 
injuries required a ten-day hospital stay.  Because the sentencing court’s finding 
that the victim suffered a life threatening injury was based on uncontested factors 
25  
 
 
 
                                              
and was supported by overwhelming evidence, any error in sentencing based on 
defendant’s OV 3 score was harmless.19 
If the jury had been asked to score the OVs, it unquestionably would have 
reached the same result as the sentencing court.  Like the defendants in Harper, 
supra at ___, and Neder, supra at 15, defendant does not suggest that he would 
offer contrary evidence if given the opportunity to do so.  Accordingly, even if the 
court violated Blakely at sentencing, defendant would not be entitled to 
resentencing because he has not shown that that the error “‘“seriously affect[ed] 
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”’”  Carines, 
supra at 763, quoting Olano, supra at 736. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The sentencing court did not violate Blakely when it engaged in judicial 
fact-finding to score the OVs and then determined defendant’s minimum sentence 
on the basis of those scores. Because defendant’s OV score, PRV score, and 
offense class did not place him in an intermediate sanction cell, he never qualified 
for an intermediate sanction. Even if defendant were entitled to be sentenced 
solely on the basis of the PRVs and the offense class, an intermediate sanction 
19 Justice Kelly’s dissent incorrectly asserts that medical testimony was 
necessary to prove that the victim suffered life-threatening injuries, especially 
because defendant did not contest the prosecution’s evidence proving the victim’s 
serious and extensive injuries. Contrary to Justice Kelly’s assertion, we do not 
shift the burden of proof to the defendant, but merely note that the statute does not 
(continued…) 
26  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
does not constitute the statutory maximum sentence authorized by the jury’s 
verdict or the guilty plea.  See Harper, supra at ___. Finally, even if the trial court 
violated Blakely in sentencing defendant to a prison term, any error was harmless 
because it did not prejudice defendant. 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
(…continued)  
require the prosecution to specifically present medical testimony to prove a “[l]ife  
threatening or permanent incapacitating injury . . . .”  MCL 777.33(1)(c).  
27  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 128161 
RAYMOND A. MCCULLER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
This case presents the majority with the opportunity to correct an error. 
When the Court previously sat in judgment of this case, the majority found that no 
Sixth Amendment1 violation had occurred at defendant’s sentencing.  It sanctioned 
the judge’s fact-finding that increased defendant’s sentence by moving it from an 
intermediate sanction cell to a straddle cell.  The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, vacated the decision, and remanded the case to this Court for 
1 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. [US Const, Am VI.] 
 
 
 
  
 
                                              
 
further consideration in light of its most recent Sixth Amendment precedent, 
Cunningham v California, 549 US __; 127 S Ct 856; 166 L Ed 2d 856 (2007). 
McCuller v Michigan, __ US __; 127 S Ct 1247 (2007).  On remand, the majority 
reaches the same decision as it did before, and it implies that the United States 
Supreme Court, in remanding this case, simply did not understand Michigan’s 
sentencing laws. 
Because I believe that the majority fails to explain why 
Cunningham does not require a different result, I must once again dissent. 
As I previously concluded, the judicial fact-finding occurring in this case 
violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.2  Michigan’s 
sentencing guidelines3 are unconstitutional as applied. 
I. PROCEDURAL FACTS 
A jury convicted defendant of assault with intent to do great bodily harm 
less than murder.  MCL 750.84. In imposing sentence, the trial court attributed 
scores to the prior record variables (PRVs) and the offense variables (OVs).  The 
court assessed 2 PRV points for defendant’s previous misdemeanor conviction.  It 
assessed a total of 36 OV points. But in order to arrive at the OV score, the court 
had to make findings of fact, which it did using a preponderance of the evidence 
standard. It assessed 10 points for OV 1 on the basis of its conclusion that a 
2 See People v McCuller, 475 Mich 176, 183; 715 NW2d 798 (2006) 
(Kelly, J., dissenting). 
3 MCL 777.1 et seq. 
2  
 
 
 
                                              
weapon, other than a gun or knife, touched the victim.  MCL 777.31. It assessed 1 
point for OV 2 on the basis of the finding of fact that defendant possessed a 
potentially lethal weapon. MCL 777.32.  And it assessed 25 points for OV 3 on 
the basis of the finding of fact that the victim suffered a life threatening or 
permanent incapacitating injury.  MCL 777.33. Defendant made no admissions at 
sentencing that supported the points attributed to these OV factors. 
Assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder is a class D 
offense under MCL 777.16d. MCL 777.65 sets forth the class D sentencing grid. 
On this grid, a defendant having a PRV level of 2 points and an OV level of 36 
points is placed in cell B-IV. This cell provides a minimum sentence range of 5 to 
23 months.4  MCL 777.65. Defendant had a prior felony conviction that was not 
used in scoring the PRVs. Consequently, the trial court increased the top number 
of the range by 25 percent, from 23 to 28 months in accordance with MCL 
4 This cell is referred to as a “straddle cell” because the sentencing court 
may impose either a prison sentence or an intermediate sanction.  Straddle cells 
are addressed by MCL 769.34(4)(c), which provides: 
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence 
exceeds 18 months and the lower limit of the recommended 
minimum sentence is 12 months or less, the court shall sentence the 
offender as follows absent a departure: 
(i) To imprisonment with a minimum term within that range. 
(ii) To an intermediate sanction that may include a term of 
imprisonment of not more than 12 months. 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                              
769.105 and MCL 777.21(3)(a).6  This set the minimum sentence range at 5 to 28 
months.  The court sentenced defendant within this range, imposing a minimum 
sentence of 24 months’ and a maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. 
After sentencing, but before defendant filed his claim of appeal, the United 
States Supreme Court released its decision in Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 
124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). Although defendant had been unable to 
rely on Blakely at sentencing, he could, and did, raise it in the Court of Appeals. 
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals did not directly address the issue.  Instead, it 
relied on the dicta discussion of Blakely contained in this Court’s decision in 
People v Claypool, 470 Mich 715, 730 n 14; 684 NW2d 278 (2004).  On that 
basis, it found that defendant was not entitled to resentencing.  People v McCuller, 
5 MCL 769.10, 769.11, and 769.12 deal with habitual offenders.  They 
allow the absolute maximum sentence for an offense to increase by a set 
percentage. 
The new maximum set forth in these statutes is the absolute 
maximum to which the sentencing judge can sentence a defendant.  In this case, 
because defendant was a second-offense habitual offender, his maximum possible 
sentence increased from 10 to 15 years. MCL 750.84; MCL 769.10(1)(a). 
6 MCL 777.21(3) provides, in relevant part: 
If the offender is being sentenced under section 10, 11, or 12 
of chapter IX [MCL 769.10, 769.11, and 769.12], determine the 
offense category, offense class, offense variable level, and prior 
record variable level based on the underlying offense.  To determine 
the recommended minimum sentence range, increase the upper limit 
of the recommended minimum sentence range determined under part 
6 for the underlying offense as follows: 
(a) If the offender is being sentenced for a second felony, 25%. 
4  
 
 
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 11, 2005 
(Docket No. 250000). 
Originally, this Court held the case in abeyance for the matter of People v 
Drohan, see 472 Mich 881 (2005). Later, oral argument was heard for the 
purpose of determining whether to grant the application or take other peremptory 
action pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1). The majority dispatched the case in a mere 
memorandum opinion. 
It concluded that defendant was not entitled to an 
intermediate sanction cell sentence and that the sentencing court properly made 
judicial findings of fact in assessing OV points, regardless of Blakely. People v 
McCuller, 475 Mich 176; 715 NW2d 798 (2006).  I dissented, concluding that a 
Sixth Amendment violation had occurred and that the entire sentencing guidelines 
must be found unconstitutional when applied as they were in this case.  Id. at 183. 
Defendant sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis and petitioned for a 
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.  The Court granted both 
motions. It then vacated this Court’s judgment, remanding the case for further 
consideration and directing us to reconsider it in light of Cunningham. McCuller, 
127 S Ct at 1247. This Court ordered that the case be argued with People v 
Harper, (Docket No. 130988), and People v Burns, (Docket No. 131898). People 
v McCuller, 477 Mich 1288 (2007). We heard oral argument in the three cases in 
April 2007. 
5  
 
 
  
 
 
II. MICHIGAN’S SENTENCING SCHEME 
A review of Michigan’s sentencing statutes must begin with MCL 769.8, 
which provides: 
(1) When a person is convicted for the first time for 
committing a felony and the punishment prescribed by law for that 
offense may be imprisonment in a state prison, the court imposing 
sentence shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment, but shall fix a 
minimum term, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.  The 
maximum penalty provided by law shall be the maximum sentence 
in all cases except as provided in this chapter and shall be stated by 
the judge in imposing the sentence. 
(2) Before or at the time of imposing sentence, the judge shall 
ascertain by examining the defendant under oath, or otherwise, and 
by other evidence as can be obtained tending to indicate briefly the 
causes of the defendant's criminal character or conduct, which facts 
and other facts that appear to be pertinent in the case the judge shall 
cause to be entered upon the minutes of the court. 
Under this statute, in a case not falling into an exception, a court must 
initially determine the minimum sentence. That sentence must be within the range 
set by the sentencing guidelines unless the sentencing judge finds that substantial 
and compelling reasons exist to exceed the range.  MCL 769.34(2) and (3). 
Typically, in Michigan, the maximum sentence is established by statute.  For 
instance, MCL 750.84 provides that the maximum sentence for assault with intent 
to do great bodily harm less than murder is ten years or a fine of $5,000.  Unless a 
6  
 
 
 
 
  
                                              
 
 
defendant has past convictions, the sentencing court cannot exceed the maximum 
sentence provided by statute.7 
But MCL 769.8 makes clear that it is only the general rule.  It makes this 
apparent by noting that exceptions do exist.  They are indicated by the phrases 
“except as otherwise provided in this chapter” and “except as provided in this 
chapter.” MCL 769.8(1). 
One major exception to MCL 769.8 is a determinate sentence.8 
Determinate sentences are specific, fixed sentences, in contrast to indeterminate 
sentences, which fall within a range.  The Legislature sets these fixed sentences by 
statute. 
For instance, a first offense of carrying or possessing a firearm when 
committing or attempting to commit a felony (felony-firearm) carries a mandatory 
determinate sentence of two years. A second conviction of felony-firearm requires 
a five-year sentence. 
MCL 750.227b(1). 
Given that these crimes require 
determinate sentences, the guidelines do not apply to them.  Instead, they fall into 
the exceptions noted in MCL 769.8(1). 
Another major exception to the focus on minimum sentences in MCL 769.8 
involves sentences falling in an intermediate sanction cell.  It is this exception that 
is the centerpiece of this case. 
Under Michigan’s sentencing guidelines, 
7 As noted above, MCL 769.10, 769.11, and 769.12 set new maximum 
sentences for habitual offenders. 
7  
 
 
 
  
 
                                              
intermediate sanction cells shift the sentencing court’s attention from minimum 
sentences to maximum sentences. 
III. INTERMEDIATE SANCTION CELLS 
MCL 769.34(4)(a) creates intermediate sanction cells.  It provides: 
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence 
range for a defendant determined under the sentencing guidelines set 
forth in chapter XVII is 18 months or less, the court shall impose an 
intermediate sanction unless the court states on the record a 
substantial and compelling reason to sentence the individual to the 
jurisdiction of the department of corrections.  An intermediate 
sanction may include a jail term that does not exceed the upper limit 
of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, 
whichever is less. 
MCL 769.31(b) further defines “intermediate sanction”: 
“Intermediate sanction” means probation or any sanction, 
other than imprisonment in a state prison or state reformatory, that 
may lawfully be imposed. Intermediate sanction includes, but is not 
limited to, 1 or more of the following: 
(i) Inpatient or outpatient drug treatment or participation in a 
drug treatment court under chapter 10A of the revised judicature act 
of 1961, 1961 PA 236, MCL 600.1060 to 600.1082. 
(ii) Probation with any probation conditions required or 
authorized by law. 
(iii) Residential probation. 
(iv) Probation with jail. 
(v) Probation with special alternative incarceration. 
(…continued)
8 A “determinate sentence” is “[a] sentence for a fixed length of time rather 
than for an unspecified duration.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed), p 1367. 
8  
 
 
(vi) Mental health treatment. 
(vii) Mental health or substance abuse counseling. 
(viii) Jail. 
(ix) Jail with work or school release. 
(x) Jail, with or without authorization for day parole under 
1962 PA 60, MCL 801.251 to 801.258. 
(xi) Participation in a community corrections program. 
(xii) Community service. 
(xiii) Payment of a fine. 
(xiv) House arrest. 
(xv) Electronic monitoring. 
When one reads these statutes together, it becomes apparent that 
intermediate sanction cells have a highly unusual role in Michigan’s sentencing 
scheme.  If a defendant’s minimum sentence range falls in an intermediate 
sanction cell, the guidelines are no longer concerned with the defendant’s 
minimum sentence. Instead, under MCL 769.34(4)(a), the guidelines set the 
maximum sentence to which the court may sentence the defendant.  That 
maximum is a jail term of either the upper limit of the guidelines range for the 
recommended minimum sentence or 12 months, whichever is shorter.  The 
guidelines statutes do not permit a court to sentence a defendant to prison when 
his or her guidelines score falls within an intermediate sanction cell.  The court is 
required to impose a maximum term of 12 months or less, unless it can state 
substantial and compelling reasons for a longer sentence.  MCL 769.34(4)(a). 
9  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
In this case, if the trial court had not entered a score for OVs 1, 2, and 3, 
defendant’s OV score would have dropped to zero.  This would have moved him 
from the B-IV cell to the B-I cell.  The B-I cell provides a minimum sentence 
range for a second-offense habitual offender of zero to 11 months in jail.  MCL 
777.21(3)(a); MCL 777.65. Because its upper limit is less than 18 months, the B-I 
cell is an intermediate sanction cell. Defendant’s maximum sentence would have 
been 11 months in jail. MCL 769.34(4)(a). 
But the trial court did not impose this maximum sentence.  By making 
judicial findings of fact, the judge moved defendant out of the intermediate 
sanction cell and into a straddle cell.  The judge then sentenced defendant to a 
higher maximum sentence than would have been possible had the sentence been 
based only on the jury’s verdict and the defendant’s criminal history.  Because the 
judge increased defendant’s OV score by making his own findings of fact, 
findings not made by the jury, defendant’s sentence violated his Sixth Amendment 
right to a trial by jury. And it contradicted the United States Supreme Court’s 
holding in Blakely, which was most recently reinforced by Cunningham. 
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S  
PRECEDENT REGARDING “STATUTORY MAXIMUMS”  
A. MCMILLAN V PENNSYLVANIA  
There is considerable precedent from the United States Supreme Court 
regarding judicial modification of sentences using facts found by a judge after a 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
jury’s verdict. 
These judge-determined facts are referred to as “sentencing 
factors.” In McMillan v Pennsylvania,9 the Court addressed the constitutionality 
of Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum sentencing act, 42 Pa Cons Stat 9712. 
That act provided for a mandatory minimum sentence for certain felonies if the 
sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant 
“‘visibly possessed a firearm’ during the commission of the offense.”  McMillan, 
477 US at 81. 
The United States Supreme Court found that the visible-possession 
requirement was a mere sentencing factor that did not change the prosecution’s 
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 86-88. It made another 
important point in McMillan: There are constitutional limitations on how far a 
state may go in reducing the factual support needed to prove a criminal offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court paid special attention to the fact that 42 Pa 
Cons Stat 9712 did not increase the maximum penalty faced by the defendant: 
Section 9712 neither alters the maximum penalty for the 
crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate 
penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in 
selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without 
the special finding of visible possession of a firearm. [McMillan, 
477 US at 87-88.] 
9 477 US 79; 106 S Ct 2411; 91 L Ed 2d 67 (1986). 
11  
 
 
  
 
 
                                              
B. JONES V UNITED STATES  
The Supreme Court next discussed sentencing factors in Jones v United 
States, 526 US 227; 119 S Ct 1215; 143 L Ed 2d 311 (1999).  It addressed whether 
the federal carjacking statute10 constituted three separate crimes or one crime with 
sentencing factors that increased the maximum penalty.  Id. at 229. The Court 
concluded that a fair reading of the statute required it to find three separate 
offenses. But it went on to discuss alternative reasons for requiring that the state 
must prove to a jury all the “elements” of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
They involve constitutional law. 
The Court’s focus quickly centered on 
McMillan’s discussion of an increase in the maximum penalty: 
The terms of the carjacking statute illustrate very well what is 
at stake. If serious bodily injury were merely a sentencing factor 
under [18 USC 2119(2)] (increasing the authorized penalty by two 
thirds, to 25 years), then death would presumably be nothing more 
10 18 USC 2119. At the time, the statute provided: 
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of 
this title, takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or 
received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or 
presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or 
attempts to do so, shall— 
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 
years, or both, 
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this 
title) results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 
years, or both, and 
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for 
any number of years up to life, or both. 
12  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
than a sentencing factor under subsection (3) (increasing the penalty 
range to life). If a potential penalty might rise from 15 years to life 
on a nonjury determination, the jury’s role would correspondingly 
shrink from the significance usually carried by determinations of 
guilt to the relative importance of low-level gatekeeping:  in some 
cases, a jury finding of fact necessary for a maximum 15-year 
sentence would merely open the door to a judicial finding sufficient 
for life imprisonment. [Id. at 243-244.] 
The reduction of the role of the jury greatly troubled the Supreme Court. 
In fact, it found the reduction inconsistent with the protections offered by the 
United States Constitution. It indicated that removal from the jury of control over 
the facts necessary for determining a statutory sentencing range would raise a 
genuine Sixth Amendment issue.  Id. at 248. The Court stated that any doubt on 
the issue of statutory construction must be resolved in favor of avoiding such Sixth 
Amendment questions.  Id. at 251. 
C. APPRENDI V NEW JERSEY 
The next year, the Supreme Court took an important step forward in its 
discussion of sentencing factors, in Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 
2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000). Apprendi dealt with a New Jersey hate-crime law. 
The statute allowed a defendant’s maximum sentence to be increased from 10 to 
20 years if the sentencing court found that the defendant “‘acted with a purpose to 
intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, 
handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.’”  Id. at 468-469, quoting NJ 
Stat Ann 2C:44-3(e). The sentencing court could make the finding using a 
preponderance of the evidence. Apprendi, 530 US at 468. In its analysis, the 
13  
 
 
 
  
 
Supreme Court specifically built on Jones. It concluded that the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution commanded the same answer for 
state statutes as the Fifth and Sixth amendments required in Jones. Id. at 476. 
The Court found that a legislature could not change the elements of a crime 
simply by labeling some of them “sentencing factors.”  Such actions run afoul of 
due process and violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment protections.  The Court 
stated that a sentencing court could exercise its judicial discretion on sentencing 
factors only as long as the sentence imposed fell within the appropriate statutory 
limits. Id. at 481-482. The Court expressed concern that a defendant not be 
deprived of his or her liberty or otherwise stigmatized by a conviction and 
sentence not authorized by the jury’s verdict.  For proper protection, the Court 
required that procedural practices adhere to the basic principles undergirding the 
requirement that the prosecution prove all facts constituting the statutory offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 483-484. The Court reasoned that increasing 
punishment beyond the statutory maximum violated those principles:  
If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by 
statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances 
but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the 
stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows 
that the defendant should not—at the moment the State is put to 
proof of those circumstances—be deprived of protections that have, 
until that point, unquestionably attached. [Id. at 484.] 
In reiterating its reasoning and holding in Apprendi, the Supreme Court 
used the phrase “statutory maximum”: 
14  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the 
history upon which they rely, confirms the opinion that we 
expressed in Jones. Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. With that exception, we endorse the statement 
of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in that case:  “[I]t is 
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the 
assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to 
which a criminal defendant is exposed.  It is equally clear that such 
facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  [Id. 
at 490, quoting Jones, 526 US at 252-253 (Stevens, J., concurring).] 
D. RING V ARIZONA 
Two years later, the Supreme Court renewed its discussion of “statutory 
maximums” in Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584; 122 S Ct 2428; 153 L Ed 2d 556 
(2002). 
That case dealt with Arizona’s first-degree murder statute. 
The 
punishment for violation of this statute was life imprisonment or death.  The 
statute referred to another statute that required a separate sentencing hearing.  The 
judge was charged with determining at the hearing whether specific circumstances 
(sentencing factors) existed, allowing imposition of the death penalty.  Id. at 592­
593. The Supreme Court built on its decisions in Jones and Apprendi to conclude 
that a sentence of death violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights under 
these statutes: 
The dispositive question, we said, “is one not of form, but of 
effect.” If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized 
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter 
how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. A defendant may not be “expose[d] . . .  to a 
penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished 
according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.”  [Id. at 
15  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
602, quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 483, 494 (citations omitted; 
emphasis in Apprendi).] 
On the basis of this reasoning, the Court found that the “statutory 
maximum” sentence was life in prison, despite the fact that the statute allowed 
imposition of a sentence of death. This is because, in order to impose the death 
penalty, the judge had to make factual findings in addition to those reflected by the 
jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court found nothing to distinguish the case from 
Apprendi. Ring, 536 US at 604-606. It reached this conclusion because Arizona’s 
enumerated aggravating factors were the functional equivalent of an element of a 
greater offense. Therefore, the Sixth Amendment required that a jury find those 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 609. 
E. BLAKELY V WASHINGTON 
The Supreme Court took its biggest step in defining the expression 
“statutory maximum” in Blakely. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty of 
second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and the use of a firearm. 
The standard sentencing range for the offense was four years and one month to 
four years and five months in prison.  Blakely, 542 US at 298-299.  But under 
Washington State’s sentencing guidelines, a court could impose a sentence above 
the standard range if it found substantial and compelling reasons to justify an 
“exceptional sentence.” Id. at 299. The defendant had admitted no relevant facts 
other than having committed acts in violation of the elements of the crime.  Id. 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
But the sentencing court imposed an exceptional sentence of 7 1/2 years11 after 
hearing the complainant’s version of the kidnapping.   The sentencing court based 
this departure on a finding that the defendant had exhibited deliberate cruelty. 
This was a statutorily enumerated ground for departure in domestic violence cases 
in Washington. Id. at 300. 
Washington argued that its system did not present a Sixth Amendment 
problem because state law provided an absolute maximum sentence of ten years’ 
imprisonment and in no instance could an exceptional sentence exceed this length. 
Id. at 303. 
Washington contended that ten years was the true “statutory 
maximum” for purposes of Sixth Amendment review.   
But the Supreme Court rejected this argument.  Instead, it defined the 
“statutory maximum” as the maximum sentence that can be imposed without 
judicial fact-finding: 
Our precedents make clear, however, that the “statutory 
maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant 
“statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may 
impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may 
impose without any additional findings. 
When a judge inflicts 
punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has 
not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the 
punishment,” and the judge exceeds his proper authority.  [Id. at 
303-304 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).] 
11 Washington’s sentencing scheme provided for determinate sentences. 
Blakely, 542 US at 308. 
17  
 
 
 
  
 
                                              
 
Hence, for Sixth Amendment purposes, the maximum sentence was not ten years. 
It was four years and five months.  This was because that sentence was the 
maximum the court could have imposed solely on the basis of the facts the 
defendant admitted when pleading guilty.  Id. at 304. 
The Supreme Court 
concluded that its determination was the only one that would properly effectuate 
the people’s control of the judiciary as intended by the Framers of the United 
States Constitution: 
Ultimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to what 
degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal 
justice. One can certainly argue that both these values would be 
better served by leaving justice entirely in the hands of 
professionals; many nations of the world, particularly those 
following civil-law traditions, take just that course.  There is not one 
shred of doubt, however, about the Framers’ paradigm for criminal 
justice: not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the 
common-law ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict 
division of authority between judge and jury.  As Apprendi held, 
every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a 
jury all facts legally essential to the punishment.  [Id. at 313 
(emphasis in original).] 
F. UNITED STATES V BOOKER 
The Supreme Court next discussed “statutory maximums” and “sentencing 
factors” in United States v Booker, 543 US 220; 125 S Ct 738; 160 L Ed 2d 621 
(2005). In that case, the Court addressed the applicability of the preceding line of 
cases to the federal sentencing guidelines.  The prosecution charged Booker12 with 
12 Booker involved consolidated cases that included another defendant, 
Fanfan. In the interest of brevity, I will discuss only defendant Booker. 
18  
 
 
 
possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base.  The federal 
statute for this crime provided a maximum sentence of life in prison.  But because 
of Booker’s criminal history and the quantity of cocaine base that the jury found 
was involved, the guidelines required a maximum sentence of 21 years and 10 
months’ imprisonment.  Instead of imposing that sentence, the trial court held a 
hearing during which it made additional findings of fact.  It concluded that Booker 
had possessed another 566 grams of cocaine base and that he had obstructed 
justice. Accordingly, using a preponderance of the evidence standard, the court 
increased his maximum sentence to 30 years in prison.  Id. at 227. 
After a discussion of Jones, Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely, the Supreme 
Court found the federal guidelines indistinguishable from the Washington 
guidelines that were at issue in Blakely: 
Booker’s actual sentence, however, was 360 months, almost 
10 years longer than the Guidelines range supported by the jury 
verdict alone. To reach this sentence, the judge found facts beyond 
those found by the jury: namely, that Booker possessed 566 grams 
of crack in addition to the 92.5 grams in his duffel bag.  The jury 
never heard any evidence of the additional drug quantity, and the 
judge found it true by a preponderance of the evidence.  Thus, just as 
in Blakely, “the jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence. 
The judge acquires that authority only upon finding some additional 
fact.” There is no relevant distinction between the sentence imposed 
pursuant to the Washington statutes in Blakely and the sentences 
imposed pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in these 
cases. 
[Id. at 235, quoting Blakely, 542 US at 305 (citation 
omitted).] 
Again, the Supreme Court found it irrelevant that a statute existed setting 
an absolute maximum sentence.  The sentencing court could not impose the 
19  
 
 
 
  
 
 
absolute maximum sentence in every case.  Instead, in cases like Booker’s, the 
jury’s verdict supported only a lower maximum sentence.  Booker, 543 US at 234­
235. The Supreme Court concluded: 
Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Apprendi: Any fact 
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a 
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established 
by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the 
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  [Id. at 
244.] 
On this basis, the Supreme Court invalidated the statutory provisions that made the 
federal sentencing guidelines mandatory. Id. at 226-227. 
G. CUNNINGHAM V CALIFORNIA 
The final link in the “sentencing factor”/“statutory maximum” chain is 
Cunningham. Cunningham was convicted of “continuous sexual abuse of a child 
under the age of 14.” Cunningham, 127 S Ct at 860. California’s determinate 
sentencing law (DSL) created a three-tiered sentencing system for most crimes. 
The statute defining a defendant’s offense provided a lower, a middle, and an 
upper sentence. Cal Penal Code 1170 mandated that the trial court impose the 
middle term, unless circumstances in mitigation or aggravation existed.  The trial 
court made factual findings under a preponderance of the evidence standard 
regarding whether aggravating circumstances existed.  Cunningham, 127 S Ct at 
861-863. 
In Cunningham’s case, the DSL provided for sentences of 6, 12, or 16 
years. 
The sentencing court found by a preponderance of the evidence the 
20  
 
 
 
existence of one mitigating factor and six aggravating factors. It found that the 
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor and imposed the 16-year 
sentence. Id. at 860-861. As in the cases preceding Cunningham, the United 
States Supreme Court found that the judicial fact-finding that increased the 
maximum sentence violated the Sixth Amendment. 
Despite California’s arguments to the contrary, the Supreme Court found 
nothing to distinguish the DSL from the sentencing that occurred in Blakely and 
Booker: 
California’s DSL, we note in this context, resembles pre-
Booker federal sentencing in the same ways Washington’s 
sentencing system did:  The key California Penal Code provision 
states that the sentencing court “shall order imposition of the middle 
term” absent “circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the 
crime,” [Cal Penal Code] 1170(b) (emphasis added), and any move 
to the upper or lower term must be justified by “a concise statement 
of the ultimate facts” on which the departure rests, [Cal Ct R] 
4.420(e) (emphasis added). [Cunnigham, 127 S Ct at 866 n 10 
(emphasis in original).] 
Quite simply, the Supreme Court viewed Cunningham as a continuation of 
its earlier precedent. It broke no new ground.  But for the first time, the Supreme 
Court characterized its often-repeated holding as a bright-line rule: 
Under California’s DSL, an upper term sentence may be 
imposed only when the trial judge finds an aggravating 
circumstance. An element of the charged offense, essential to a 
jury’s determination of guilt, or admitted in a defendant’s guilty 
plea, does not qualify as such a circumstance.  Instead, aggravating 
circumstances depend on facts found discretely and solely by the 
judge. In accord with Blakely, therefore, the middle term prescribed 
in California’s statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant statutory 
maximum.  542 U.S., at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (“The ‘statutory 
21  
 
 
 
 
  
 
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (emphasis in original)). 
Because circumstances in aggravation are found by the judge, not 
the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, the DSL violates 
Apprendi’s bright-line rule: Except for a prior conviction, “any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.” 
[Cunningham, 127 S Ct at 868, quoting 
Apprendi, 530 US at 490 (citations omitted; second emphasis 
added).] 
Again, it was irrelevant that there existed the possibility of an absolute maximum 
sentence of 16 years. The Supreme Court stressed that the only concern was 
whether the bright-line rule laid down in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker was 
violated. The Court expressed frustration at the state’s inability or unwillingness 
to follow this precedent. Id. at 869-870. The Supreme Court left to California 
how to eliminate the constitutional violation. Id. at 871. 
In summary, the Supreme Court established a consistent precedent from 
McMillan to Cunningham. The bright-line rule established was the same before 
and after Cunningham. And the Court’s decision to remand this case must be 
considered in light of this fact. 
V. THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE AND MICHIGAN’S GENERAL SENTENCING SCHEME 
As discussed earlier, Michigan’s sentencing guidelines generally focus on a 
defendant’s minimum sentence. The average defendant’s criminal history, the 
admitted facts, and the jury’s verdict alone would allow the sentencing court, 
without recourse to judicial fact-finding, to impose the maximum sentence 
22  
 
 
 
 
provided by law. Because of this, the judicial fact-finding necessary to score the 
OVs moves the typical defendant within a predetermined range of possible 
sentences. And the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are not implicated, 
because all the facts necessary to support the maximum sentence have been proved 
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Such situations do not threaten the basic principles undergirding this 
country’s jury-driven legal system. A defendant knows what maximum sentence 
he or she is facing regardless of judicial fact-finding.  Apprendi noted that judicial 
fact-finding is acceptable when it does not increase the maximum penalty for a 
crime or create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty.  “‘[Judicial fact­
finding] operates solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting a 
penalty within the range already available to it without the special 
finding[s] . . . . ’” Apprendi, 530 US at 486, quoting McMillan, 447 US at 88. 
Because the right to a trial by jury is completely protected in such situations, there 
are no Sixth Amendment concerns. 
The typical application of the Michigan sentencing guidelines more readily 
relates to McMillan. The score given to the OVs merely shifts a defendant’s 
sentence within the minimum sentence range under the guidelines.  It does not 
increase the defendant’s maximum sentence.  A defendant whose criminal history 
and jury verdict do not place him or her in an intermediate sanction cell always 
knows what the potential maximum sentence will be:  it is the maximum penalty 
23  
 
 
  
 
 
 
prescribed by Michigan law. All of this changes, however, when an intermediate 
sanction cell is involved. 
VI. THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE AND MICHIGAN’S INTERMEDIATE SANCTION CELLS 
When a defendant is entitled to a sentence that is within the range specified 
in an intermediate sanction cell, MCL 769.34(4)(a) sets his or her maximum 
sentence. That maximum sentence is a jail term of either the upper limit of the 
recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, whichever is shorter. 
Under the guidelines, the court must impose this maximum sentence, unless it can 
state substantial and compelling reasons to increase the sentence.  Therefore, the 
process is no longer concerned with the defendant’s minimum sentence.  Under 
the Supreme Court’s bright-line rule, this alteration in focus changes the 
defendant’s “statutory maximum.” 
The new maximum sentence set under MCL 769.34(4)(a) becomes the 
defendant’s “statutory maximum.” This is true because it is the longest sentence 
the court can give a defendant solely on the basis of the defendant’s criminal 
record and admissions and the jury’s verdict.  Cunningham, 127 S Ct at 868; 
Booker, 543 US at 244; Blakely, 542 US at 301; Apprendi, 530 US at 490; Jones, 
526 US at 251-252. And if the court makes findings of fact moving the sentence 
to a higher statutory maximum, the defendant faces either (1) a different criminal 
charge or (2) the increased stigma of an extended sentence.  This is specifically 
what the Supreme Court sought to avoid.  Apprendi, 530 US at 484. 
24  
 
 
  
 
 
Any judicial fact-finding that shifts a defendant’s sentence above the 
statutory maximum is unconstitutional and violates Jones and its progeny. A court 
engages in judicial fact-finding by scoring the OVs or stating substantial and 
compelling reasons to depart from the sentencing guidelines range.  The 
sentencing court makes its own findings of fact by a preponderance of the 
evidence. These findings are separate and distinct from the findings establishing 
the elements of the crime, which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Such sentencing mirrors the sentencing in Cunningham, in which the 
Supreme Court held: 
Because circumstances in aggravation are found by the judge, 
not the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . [this] violates 
Apprendi’s bright-line rule: Except for a prior conviction, “any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” 
[Cunningham, 127 S Ct at 868, quoting 
Apprendi, 530 US at 490 (emphasis added).] 
As in Cunningham, any judicial fact-finding that increases a defendant’s 
maximum sentence crosses the Supreme Court’s bright line.  And in doing so, it 
violates the constitution. 
To fully analyze Michigan’s sentencing system, it must be determined who 
is entitled to an intermediate sanction cell sentence.  The Supreme Court’s bright­
line rule provides the answer to this question.  “Except for a prior conviction, ‘any 
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 
25  
 
 
 
  
                                              
 
 
Cunningham, 127 S Ct at 868, quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 490. Hence, a 
defendant is entitled to a sentence based solely on (1) the defendant’s prior 
convictions and (2) any facts that he or she admitted and any facts that were 
specifically found by the jury. 
This requires a conclusion that, in order to determine a defendant’s 
appropriate maximum sentence, a sentencing court should score only the PRVs. 
They reflect the defendant’s prior convictions and relations to the criminal justice 
system. The sentencing court is free to score these because they fall under one of 
the exceptions noted in the bright-line rule:  the defendant’s prior convictions. 
Scoring the OVs, on the other hand, requires factual determinations that are 
made by the trial court using a preponderance of the evidence standard.  They are 
judicial determinations that occur only after the jury’s verdict.  Such findings of 
fact fall directly in line with the Cunningham decision. “Because [OVs] are 
found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance 
of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . [scoring them] violates 
Apprendi’s bright-line rule[.]” Cunningham, 127 S Ct at 868.13  The only time the 
13 The majority accuses me of ignoring the language of MCL 769.34(4)(a). 
Even a casual review of this opinion will show that the accusation is untrue.  The 
majority asks why I would not require the OVs to be scored along with the PRVs. 
The answer is simple: The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to a sentence 
based solely on (1) the defendant’s prior convictions, (2) any facts he or she has 
admitted, and (3) any facts that were specifically found by the jury.  Cunningham, 
127 S Ct at 868. The statutory language must bow to the requirements of the 
United States Constitution. 
26  
 
 
court should score an OV is when the defendant admitted the fact justifying the 
score or a jury found its existence beyond a reasonable doubt.  This occurs only in 
rare cases, and it did not occur in this case. 
Under the bright-line rule, a Michigan defendant is entitled to an 
intermediate sanction as a sentence when his or her PRV level alone supports such 
a sentence. On the other hand, a defendant whose PRV level is too high to place 
him or her in an intermediate sanction cell is not entitled to an intermediate 
sanction cell sentence. The latter defendant falls under the general sentencing 
scheme and is subject to the absolute maximum sentence set by law.  In that case, 
the trial court is free to make the judicial findings of fact necessary to score the 
OVs. 
27  
 
 
  
 
 
 
A. HOW THE TRIAL COURT CALCULATED DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE 
The case before us demonstrates the distinction.  Defendant did not admit 
the facts necessary to attribute a score to OVs 1, 2, and 3.  And the jury made no 
specific findings of fact regarding these OVs.  Thus, defendant’s sentence was 
based on judicial fact-finding, in violation of the bright-line rule.  His sentence 
should have been based solely on his PRV level.  Defendant’s PRV level was 2 
points, which placed him in the B-I cell.  The B-I cell provides a minimum 
sentence range of zero to 11 months for a second-offense habitual offender.  MCL 
777.65; MCL 777.21(3)(a). 
This is an intermediate sanction cell. 
MCL 
769.34(4)(a). Therefore, defendant was entitled to an intermediate sanction cell 
sentence. As discussed earlier, his maximum sentence was supposed to be 11 
months in jail.  The court could not properly impose a maximum sentence 
exceeding 11 months without using facts that defendant had not admitted or that 
were not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
But the trial judge made such findings of fact to score OVs 1, 2, and 3. 
These judicial findings increased defendant’s maximum sentence because they 
moved him into a straddle cell. At that point, he was no longer entitled to an 
intermediate sanction cell sentence that would be capped at 11 months in jail. 
Because the judge’s findings of fact increased defendant’s maximum sentence, 
they violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi. Defendant 
suffered greater stigma through an increased sentence than the stigma he would 
28  
 
 
 
                                              
have faced had his sentence been based solely on his PRV level.  This increased 
stigma and punishment undermine the basic concepts of the right to a trial by jury 
and defeat the intent of the Framers to ensure a publicly controlled judiciary. 
Apprendi, 530 US at 483-484. 
Scoring the OVs in this case was the functional equivalent of convicting 
defendant of a different criminal offense. Although he had been convicted of 
assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, the trial court 
sentenced defendant for an assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than 
murder (1) in which the victim was touched by a weapon,14 (2) in which the 
defendant possessed a potentially lethal weapon,15 and (3) in which the victim 
suffered life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury.16  Just as in Ring, the 
Sixth Amendment requires that the jury find  the facts that enhanced defendant’s 
sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. Ring, 536 US at 609. Because this did not 
occur, defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the sentence 
imposed. 
14 This was the finding under OV 1.  MCL 777.31(1)(c), now MCL 
777.31(1)(d). 
15 This was the finding under OV 2.  MCL 777.32(1)(d), now MCL 
777.32(1)(e). 
16 This was the finding under OV 3. MCL 777.33(1)(c). 
29  
 
 
  
 
B. AT WHAT POINT MAY THE OVS BE SCORED?  
The majority relies on MCL 777.21 to argue that no defendant is entitled to 
a sentence in Michigan until after the sentencing court scores the OVs. This 
argument withers when examined in light of the Blakely line of cases. The 
holding there is easily recited: 
Any facts, aside from past convictions, that 
increase a defendant’s maximum sentence must either be admitted by the 
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Booker, 543 US at 244. 
The majority avoids directly applying this central tenet.  Its insistence that a 
defendant would or could have received a longer sentence under the traditional 
application of the sentencing scheme is irrelevant.  A defendant is entitled to the 
maximum sentence authorized by his or her past convictions, the facts he or she 
admitted, and the facts established by the jury’s verdict.  See id. A defendant’s 
sentence cannot properly be based on facts that the judge later found using a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.  Hence, if the judge determines the facts 
used to score the OVs, the OVs must be scored after it is determined whether a 
defendant falls into an intermediate sanction cell. 
The majority’s reliance on MCL 777.21 does not obviate this central tenet. 
This statute is similar to the statute in Ring.  There, the judge was directed to 
conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence of specified 
circumstances in order to decide whether to impose the death penalty or life 
imprisonment. Ring, 536 US at 592. The fact that it is possible to impose a longer 
30  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                              
sentence under the sentencing scheme is not relevant.  A defendant is entitled to a 
sentence based solely on the jury’s verdict and the defendant’s admissions and 
criminal history.  The Supreme Court explained: 
In an effort to reconcile its capital sentencing system with the 
Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Apprendi, Arizona first restates 
the Apprendi majority’s portrayal of Arizona’s system:  Ring was 
convicted of first-degree murder, for which Arizona law specifies 
“death or life imprisonment” as the only sentencing options, see 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1105(C) (West 2001); Ring was therefore 
sentenced within the range of punishment authorized by the jury 
verdict. See Brief for Respondent 9-19.  This argument overlooks 
Apprendi’s instruction that “the relevant inquiry is one not of form, 
but of effect.” 530 U.S., at 494. In effect, “the required finding [of 
an aggravated circumstance] expose[d] [Ring] to a greater 
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.”  [Id. 
at 603-604.] 
The same is true of the Michigan sentencing guidelines.  It does not matter 
that, as in defendant’s case, there are two possible maximum sentences for the 
offense of which defendant was convicted.  Defendant must receive the maximum 
sentence that is supported by the jury’s verdict, his prior record, and his 
admissions alone.17 Id. But that did not occur in this case.  Instead, he was given 
17 The same analysis applies to another of the majority’s contentions:  that a 
defendant is not entitled to an intermediate sanction until after the sentencing court 
decides whether substantial and compelling reasons exist to exceed the guidelines 
range. That the statute provides for judicial fact-finding is irrelevant.  The Sixth 
Amendment requires that all that may be considered are the defendant’s 
admissions, his or her prior record, and the jury’s verdict.  A defendant is entitled 
to whatever maximum sentence these warrant without any judicial fact-finding 
whatsoever. 
31  
 
 
  
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
a longer sentence than was authorized by the jury’s verdict.18  For that reason, the 
sentence violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 609. 
VII. A MAXIMUM BY ANY OTHER NAME 
Here and in People v Harper,19 the majority strives to convince the reader 
that the maximum sentence that MCL 769.34(4)(a) sets for intermediate sanction 
cells is really a minimum sentence. To arrive at this conclusion, it takes the reader 
through what might be mistaken for a shell game of statutory language.  But a 
reading of the pertinent statutes as they are written undermines the central support 
18 In People v Harper, 479 Mich ___, ___ n 25; ___ NW2d ___ (2007) 
(Docket Nos. 130988 and 1319898, decided July 26, 2007), the majority attempts 
to distinguish Ring by focusing on the fact that the death sentence in that case 
could be imposed only if a judge found aggravating circumstances.  It concludes 
that the situation in Ring is distinct from the situation in Michigan because only 
one maximum sentence exists in Michigan.  As explained above, this is simply not 
accurate. The instant case illuminates the reason why.  Here, just as in Ring, 
defendant faced one maximum sentence (11 months in jail) until the court made 
findings of fact to move him out of an intermediate sanction cell.  Whether this is 
called identifying “aggravating circumstances” or “scoring of the OVs,” the fact 
remains the same: The trial court increased the defendant’s sentence by making 
findings not supported by the jury’s verdict, the defendant’s admissions, and the 
defendant’s past record. In so doing, it violated Blakely’s bright-line rule. 
The argument that there is only one maximum sentence is the argument 
made unsuccessfully by Arizona in Ring.  Just as the argument failed in Ring, it 
must fail in this case. That an absolute maximum sentence exists is irrelevant if 
judicial fact-finding not supported by his admissions or prior conviction or the 
jury’s verdict prevented defendant from receiving a lower statutory maximum 
sentence. 
19 Id. at ___. 
32  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
for the majority’s decision to affirm defendant’s sentence despite the Supreme 
Court’s remand. For example, MCL 769.34(4)(a) provides: 
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence 
range for a defendant determined under the sentencing guidelines set 
forth in chapter XVII is 18 months or less, the court shall impose an 
intermediate sanction unless the court states on the record a 
substantial and compelling reason to sentence the individual to the 
jurisdiction of the department of corrections.  An intermediate 
sanction may include a jail term that does not exceed the upper limit 
of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, 
whichever is less. [Emphasis added.] 
The language of this statute is not ambiguous.  It mandates that the 
sentencing court impose an intermediate sanction when a defendant falls into an 
appropriate cell, unless the court makes judicial findings of fact to support a 
departure. MCL 769.34(4)(a). It also defines the outer limit of an intermediate 
sanction: 12 months in jail. Because this is the highest sentence a defendant may 
face, it is a maximum sentence. Without judicial fact-finding, the trial judge is not 
authorized to impose so much as a 13-month sentence.20 
Even the majority seems to concede that, considering only the language of 
MCL 769.34(4)(a), 12 months is the maximum sentence.  But it believes that this 
20 The majority claims that a Michigan defendant is liable to serve the 
absolute maximum sentence in every case.  See Harper, 479 Mich at ___ n 25. 
MCL 769.34(4)(a) shows the fallacy of this point.  Some Michigan defendants 
face no higher maximum than 12 months in jail, even though a second, higher 
statutory maximum sentence exists for their crime.  This undeniable fact destroys 
the majority’s premise that Michigan has only one maximum sentence for each 
crime. 
33  
 
 
 
 
 
conclusion changes when MCL 769.34(4)(a) is viewed in light of other sentencing 
statutes. The majority first relies on MCL 769.8(1), which provides: 
When a person is convicted for the first time for committing a 
felony and the punishment prescribed by law for that offense may be 
imprisonment in a state prison, the court imposing sentence shall not 
fix a definite term of imprisonment, but shall fix a minimum term, 
except as otherwise provided in this chapter. The maximum penalty 
provided by law shall be the maximum sentence in all cases except 
as provided in this chapter and shall be stated by the judge in 
imposing the sentence.  [Emphasis added.] 
The majority focuses on the language “[t]he maximum penalty provided by 
law shall be the maximum sentence in all cases . . . .”  But it dismisses as 
inapplicable the fact that this phrase is modified by “except as provided in this 
chapter . . . .” The Legislature twice makes clear that there are exceptions to the 
general rule stated in the statute. MCL 769.8(1).  By treating these clauses as 
irrelevant, the majority ignores language chosen by the Legislature and rewrites 
the statute. 
The majority concludes that the clauses must not refer to intermediate 
sanction cells. It reasons that the provisions creating intermediate sanction cells 
were enacted after the language contained in MCL 769.8(1) and that the clauses 
must refer only to preexisting exceptions. Not only does this defy logic, it is 
unsupported by any authority whatsoever. 
The majority’s new rule of statutory construction would render it nearly 
impossible to read statutes together. Someone reading two statutes that seem to 
discuss the same subject would be obliged to review the date of enactment of each 
34  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
statute to see which came first.  If the language in the earlier statute made the two 
relate to one another, that language would have to be ignored.  Hence, any attempt 
to read two statutes together must be accompanied by a history lesson.  Such an 
odd requirement seems ill-advised. 
Not only does the majority’s new rule create confusion, it contradicts the 
majority’s supposed “plain language” approach to statutory interpretation.  The 
majority effectively rewrites MCL 769.8(1) to read: 
When a person is convicted for the first time for committing a 
felony and the punishment prescribed by law for that offense may be 
imprisonment in a state prison, the court imposing sentence shall not 
fix a definite term of imprisonment, but shall fix a minimum term, 
except as otherwise provided in this chapter (but only if this 
exception predates this statute). The maximum penalty provided by 
law shall be the maximum sentence in all cases except as provided in 
this chapter (but not if that exception was enacted after 1927) and 
shall be stated by the judge in imposing the sentence.   
This Court has repeatedly admonished that a court must not read into a statute 
something that the Legislature did not put there.  AFSCME v Detroit, 468 Mich 
388, 412; 662 NW2d 695 (2003).21  But the majority has done just that in this 
case. Does the majority now abandon this classic rule of statutory interpretation? 
21 This principle has often been repeated by those comprising the majority 
here. 
See People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 259; 716 NW2d 208 (2006), 
Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 572, 577; 683 NW2d 129 (2004), People v Phillips, 
469 Mich 390, 395; 666 NW2d 657 (2003), People v Davis, 468 Mich 77, 79; 658 
NW2d 800 (2003), Lesner v Liquid Disposal, Inc, 466 Mich 95, 101; 643 NW2d 
553 (2002), and Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 
663 (2002). 
35  
 
 
 
 
 
The majority notes that, under MCL 769.8(1), there are cases in which the 
sentencing court will not fix the minimum sentence and in which the absolute 
maximum sentence will not apply. It notes that other provisions in the chapter of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure in which MCL 769.8(1) appears state the 
exceptions to the general rule. MCL 769.34 is in that chapter of the code.  And 
MCL 769.34(4)(a) provides that the sentencing court will set the maximum 
sentence rather than the minimum in cases involving intermediate sanction cells. 
Therefore, far from indicating that intermediate sanction cells set minimum 
sentences, when read together, these statutes demonstrate a legislative intent that 
intermediate sanction cells serve as an exception to the general rule.  The 
Legislature intended intermediate sanction cells to dictate a maximum sentence. 
MCL 769.34(4)(a); MCL 769.8(1). 
The majority also turns to MCL 769.9, which provides: 
(1) The provisions of this chapter relative to indeterminate 
sentences shall not apply to a person convicted for the commission 
of an offense for which the only punishment prescribed by law is 
imprisonment for life. 
(2) In all cases where the maximum sentence in the discretion 
of the court may be imprisonment for life or any number or term of 
years, the court may impose a sentence for life or may impose a 
sentence for any term of years. If the sentence imposed by the court 
is for any term of years, the court shall fix both the minimum and the 
maximum of that sentence in terms of years or fraction thereof, and 
sentences so imposed shall be considered indeterminate sentences. 
The court shall not impose a sentence in which the maximum 
penalty is life imprisonment with a minimum for a term of years 
included in the same sentence. 
36  
 
 
 
 
(3) In cases involving a major controlled substance offense 
for which the court is directed by law to impose a sentence which 
cannot be less than a specified term of years nor more than a 
specified term of years, the court in imposing the sentence shall fix 
the length of both the minimum and maximum sentence within those 
specified limits, in terms of years or fraction thereof, and the 
sentence so imposed shall be considered an indeterminate sentence. 
The majority argues that, because this statute contains nothing to indicate 
that the sanctions are determinate, it supports a reading of intermediate sanction 
cell sentences as minimum sentences. But a reference to MCL 769.9 shows the 
fallacy of this reasoning. MCL 769.9(1) limits the courts’ ability to impose 
intermediate sanction cell sentences. It provides that intermediate sanctions may 
not be used for offenses for which “the only punishment prescribed by law is 
imprisonment for life.” It makes no other limitation, and no other should be read 
into it. 
The majority claims that nowhere does the Legislature state that 
intermediate sanctions are an exception to the Michigan scheme of indeterminate 
sentencing. But it is more accurate to assert that nowhere does the Legislature 
indicate this except in the statutes creating intermediate sanctions. 
MCL 
769.34(4)(a) makes clear that the maximum sentence possible, absent substantial 
and compelling reasons to exceed it, is 12 months in jail.  MCL 769.31(b) also 
specifically allows for jail sentences.  The Legislature wrote determinate sentences 
into these statutes. There would be no point in endeavoring to do it more clearly. 
And there was no need to do it anywhere else. 
37  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                              
In the final analysis, the point is irrelevant.  What matters is not whether the 
statute establishes intermediate sanction cell sentences as indeterminate or 
determinate sentences. 
What is crucial is whether a defendant’s maximum 
sentence can be increased as a result of judicial fact-finding.  Cunningham, 127 S 
Ct at 868. It is not significant that defendant’s sentence in this case was zero to 11 
months in jail or simply 11 months in jail.  In either case, the Sixth Amendment 
would be violated by judicial fact-finding that increases the maximum sentence 
above the 11-month mark.  Id. 
A. MICHIGAN’S MIXED DETERMINATE-INDETERMINATE 
SENTENCING SCHEME 
It seems that the preceding argument is a component of the majority’s 
contention that Michigan has a true indeterminate sentencing scheme.  I would 
agree that Michigan generally has an indeterminate scheme in cases in which a 
defendant’s PRV level places him or her somewhere other than in an intermediate 
sanction cell.22  But I disagree with respect to cases in which the sentencing 
scheme sets two possible maximums,23 which is exactly what occurs in cases 
involving intermediate sanction cells.  In such cases, the sentencing scheme 
resembles the determinate sentencing schemes discussed in the Blakely line of 
22 As has been noted, exceptions exist with respect to the crimes of first­
degree murder and felony-firearm. 
23 Here the two possible maximums were 15 years (set by MCL 750.84 and 
MCL 769.10) and 11 months (set by the guidelines). 
38  
 
 
 
 
cases. Blakely itself contains a discussion of the difference between indeterminate 
and determinate schemes: 
Justice O’Connor argues that, because determinate sentencing 
schemes involving judicial factfinding entail less judicial discretion 
than indeterminate schemes, the constitutionality of the latter implies 
the constitutionality of the former. This argument is flawed on a 
number of levels.  First, the Sixth Amendment by its terms is not a 
limitation on judicial power, but a reservation of jury power.  It 
limits judicial power only to the extent that the claimed judicial 
power infringes on the province of the jury.  Indeterminate 
sentencing does not do so. It increases judicial discretion, to be sure, 
but not at the expense of the jury’s traditional function of finding the 
facts essential to lawful imposition of the penalty.  Of course 
indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge 
(like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems 
important to the exercise of his sentencing discretion.  But the facts 
do not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser 
sentence—and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial 
impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned.  In a 
system that says the judge may punish burglary with 10 to 40 years, 
every burglar knows he is risking 40 years in jail.  In a system that 
punishes burglary with a 10-year sentence, with another 30 added 
for use of a gun, the burglar who enters a home unarmed is entitled 
to no more than a 10-year sentence—and by reason of the Sixth 
Amendment the facts bearing upon that entitlement must be found 
by a jury. [Blakely, 542 US at 308-309 (emphasis in original; 
citation omitted).] 
Once this reasoning is applied to the case at hand, it becomes apparent that 
Michigan’s sentencing scheme is not a traditional indeterminate sentencing 
scheme. It would be one thing if every second-offense habitual offender convicted 
of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder faced the same 15­
year maximum. Then, no problem would arise if judicial fact-finding resulted in a 
sentence within the range of zero to 15 years.  But that is not the case. Some 
39  
 
 
 
                                              
second-offense habitual offenders convicted of assault with intent to do great 
bodily harm less than murder face a maximum sentence of 11 months in jail.  They 
are offenders whose criminal records and admissions, together with the jury’s 
verdict, do not support an OV score.24  These offenders are entitled to a sentence 
that is an intermediate sanction. Id. 
Given that there are two possible maximum sentences for the offense in 
question, a defendant is entitled to whichever is supported by the defendant’s 
conviction, admissions, and criminal record alone.  “[A]nd by reason of the Sixth 
Amendment the [additional] facts bearing upon that entitlement must be found by 
a jury.” Id. at 309. Therefore, if certain other facts are necessary to move the 
defendant to the higher maximum sentence, they must be proved to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The majority ignores this unusual nature of Michigan’s intermediate 
sanction cells as compared with a traditional indeterminate sentencing scheme. 
Because intermediate sanction cells set maximum sentences, Michigan’s 
sentencing scheme is distinct from the traditional indeterminate scheme.  For Sixth 
Amendment purposes, it is properly viewed as a mixture of determinate and 
indeterminate sentencing schemes. This is because, as discussed in Blakely, a 
traditional indeterminate scheme can have only one maximum sentence.  Id. at 
24 These would be the equivalent of Blakely’s “burglar who enters a home 
unarmed . . . .” Blakely, 542 US at 309. 
40  
 
 
 
308-309. The fact that Michigan’s indeterminate scheme is different in this way 
mandates that it be treated differently. The majority fails to honor this distinction. 
The majority’s argument seems at least partially grounded in the argument 
raised by the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Attorney 
General in their amici curiae brief. They assert that Michigan’s sentencing system 
involves too much judicial discretion to violate the Sixth Amendment.  They argue 
that the amount of discretion involved in sentencing in Michigan makes our 
system equivalent to traditional indeterminate systems.  Cunningham specifically 
rejected this argument: 
The [California Supreme Court’s] conclusion that the upper 
term, and not the middle term, qualifies as the relevant statutory 
maximum, rested on several considerations.  First, the court 
reasoned that, given the ample discretion afforded trial judges to 
identify aggravating facts warranting an upper term sentence, the 
DSL 
“does not represent a legislative effort to shift the proof of particular 
facts from elements of a crime (to be proved to a jury) to sentencing 
factors (to be decided by a judge) . . . .  Instead, it afforded the 
sentencing judge the discretion to decide, with the guidance of rules 
and statutes, whether the facts of the case and the history of the 
defendant justify the higher sentence. Such a system does not 
diminish the traditional power of the jury.”  [People v Black, 34 Cal 
4th 1238, 1256; 29 Cal Rptr 3d 750; 113 P3d 534 (2005)]  (footnote 
omitted). 
We cautioned in Blakely, however, that broad discretion to 
decide what facts may support an enhanced sentence, or to 
determine whether an enhanced sentence is warranted in any 
particular case, does not shield a sentencing system from the force of 
our decisions. If the jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the 
sentence, if, instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impose 
the longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied. 
41  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blakely, 542 U.S., at 305, and n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 2531.  [Cunningham, 
127 S Ct at 868-869.] 
The amount of discretion involved does not matter.  What matters is what sentence 
a defendant would have received solely on the basis of the jury’s verdict, his or 
her prior record, and any admissions he or she made.  Whatever sentence a 
defendant would face as a maximum considering only these factors is the statutory 
maximum. 
Any fact-finding that changes this maximum violates the Sixth 
Amendment, regardless of how much discretion the trial court has in finding those 
facts. Id. 
Both Blakely and Booker make clear that it is irrelevant that the possibility 
exists for the judge to depart from the statutory maximum sentence in some 
circumstances. Under Blakely, the statutory maximum in this case remains the 11­
month intermediate sanction sentence, even though the judge was empowered to 
increase it after additional fact-finding. Blakely succinctly explained the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning on this point: 
The judge in this case could not have imposed the exceptional 
90-month sentence solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the 
guilty plea. Those facts alone were insufficient because, as the 
Washington Supreme Court has explained, “[a] reason offered to 
justify an exceptional sentence can be considered only if it takes into 
account factors other than those which are used in computing the 
standard range sentence for the offense,” [State v] Gore, [143 Wash 
2d 288, 315-316; 21 P3d 262 (2001)], which in this case included 
the elements of second-degree kidnapping and the use of a firearm, 
see [Wash Rev Code] 9.94A.320, 9.94A.310(3)(b).  Had the judge 
imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the plea, he 
would have been reversed. See [Wash Rev Code] 9.94A.210(4). 
The “maximum sentence” is no more 10 years here than it was 20 
42  
 
 
 
 
  
 
years in Apprendi (because that is what the judge could have 
imposed upon finding a hate crime) or death in Ring (because that is 
what the judge could have imposed upon finding an aggravator). 
[Blakely, 542 US at 304.] 
In this case, the statutory maximum was 11 months in jail.  Only the 
judicial fact-finding necessary to score the OV factors allowed the judge to impose 
the higher maximum sentence. Had the judge sentenced defendant to a maximum 
of 15 years without scoring the OVs or making additional fact-finding, he would 
have committed an error requiring reversal. The same rule of law applies as in 
Ring, Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham. Therefore, there is a Sixth Amendment 
violation in this case, regardless of the fact that the trial judge exercised the 
discretion that the sentencing guidelines allowed. 
B. THE COURT’S COMPANION DECISION IN HARPER 
In its decision in Harper, the majority relies heavily on the fact that 
probation is one of the possible intermediate sanctions provided for in MCL 
769.31(b). It believes that this fact presents a strong indication that intermediate 
sanction cell sentences are not really maximum sentences, despite the language of 
MCL 769.34(4)(a). It is true, as the majority contends, that probation is a matter 
of grace. MCL 771.4. It may be revoked without a jury trial or proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. United States v Knights, 534 US 112, 120; 122 S Ct 587; 151 L 
Ed 2d 497 (2001). But, again, this consideration is simply irrelevant to the 
question at hand. 
43  
 
 
 
It is not relevant that a court may revoke probation without violating the 
Sixth Amendment.  What matters is what the court may do after it revokes 
probation. 
“If a probation order is revoked, the court may sentence the 
probationer in the same manner and to the same penalty as the court might have 
done if the probation order had never been made.”  MCL 771.4. This does not 
require the court to impose the same sentence it could have imposed at the initial 
sentencing. But after a probation violation, the court still is required to follow the 
sentencing guidelines. People v Hendrick, 472 Mich 555, 560; 697 NW2d 511 
(2005). Therefore, the sentencing court is in the same position before and after a 
probation violation. 
A sentencing court is not free to impose any sentence it may wish after a 
probation violation. Instead, it must comply with the same guidelines as before 
probation. And just as before probation, it can impose a sentence departing from 
the sentencing guidelines range only if it makes judicial findings of fact that 
substantial and compelling reasons exist to depart.  The sentencing court may 
consider the defendant’s postprobation conduct when determining if substantial 
and compelling reasons exist. But the fact that probation was violated does not 
automatically constitute a substantial and compelling reason. See id. at 562-563. 
The trial court still can depart from the guidelines range only if it makes findings 
of fact at sentencing justifying the departure.  Because of this, a probation 
violation changes nothing for purposes of the Sixth Amendment analysis. 
44  
 
 
 
 
 
Although the trial court did not impose probation in this case, the facts of 
this case can be used for demonstration purposes.  If only the PRVs had been 
scored, defendant’s minimum sentence range would have been zero to 11 months. 
MCL 777.21(3)(a); MCL 777.65. Because the cell involved is an intermediate 
sanction cell, MCL 769.34(4)(a) provides that defendant’s maximum sentence 
would have been 11 months in jail.  The sentencing court could have imposed 
probation rather than a jail term. MCL 769.31(b).  If, later, defendant had violated 
that probation, the court could have revoked the probation and resentenced 
defendant. But when it did so, it still would have had to comply with the 
guidelines. Hendrick, 472 Mich at 560. Defendant again would have fallen into 
the zero- to 11-month guidelines range. Again, his maximum sentence would 
have been 11 months in jail, absent substantial and compelling reasons to exceed 
the maximum. MCL 769.34(4)(a). Because a maximum sentence is involved, the 
Blakely bright-line rule would apply.  “Except for a prior conviction, ‘any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 
Cunningham, 127 S Ct at 868, quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 490. 
Increasing a defendant’s maximum sentence solely on the basis of judicial 
fact-finding violates the Sixth Amendment just as much after a probation 
revocation as it does before. A defendant who has violated probation could be 
sentenced to no more than the original maximum sentence that was based on the 
45  
 
 
 
jury’s verdict. The court has no right to impose a new maximum simply because 
of the violation. Cunningham, 127 S Ct at 868. 
In Harper, the majority relies heavily on United States v Ray25 to support 
its argument that Blakely’s bright-line rule does not apply to resentencing after 
probation. Ray is highly distinguishable. Unlike the Michigan probation system, 
the federal system at issue in Ray did not mandate resentencing under the federal 
sentencing guidelines. 
It imposed a completely new sentence based on the 
violation. 
The federal criminal sentencing system has a process called supervised 
release. Federal supervised release differs from probation in that it is imposed in 
addition to imprisonment, rather than instead of it.  Samson v California, __ US 
__; 126 S Ct 2193, 2198; 165 L Ed 2d 250 (2006), quoting United States v Reyes, 
283 F3d 446, 461 (CA 2, 2002). 
18 USC 3583 allows a federal court at 
sentencing to impose a term of supervised release distinct from the time for 
incarceration set by the federal sentencing guidelines.  That same statute 
authorizes a new maximum sentence that can be imposed after revocation of 
supervised release. 18 USC 3583(e)(3). 
Therefore, a federal court imposing sentence after a revocation of 
supervised release does not return to the sentencing guidelines to impose a 
sentence. It turns to the new sentence allowed by 18 USC 3583.  Given that the 
46  
 
 
  
 
                                              
federal system allows supervised release in addition to incarceration, a defendant 
faces this possible sentence from the beginning.  It is not a judicially created 
increase in the defendant’s statutory maximum sentence.  It is a sentence created 
by the Legislature and faced by a defendant from the time that he or she commits 
the crime. 
C. MICHIGAN’S PROBATION SYSTEM 
This differs from Michigan’s probation system.  Michigan has no statute 
equivalent to 18 USC 3583. Rather than facing a new sentence set by statute 
specifically for the probation violation, a Michigan defendant is merely 
resentenced under the guidelines. Hendrick, 472 Mich at 560. Therefore, a 
Michigan defendant does not face an increased maximum in every case.  A 
Michigan court can move a defendant out of an intermediate sanction cell after 
probation only by making judicial findings of fact using a preponderance of the 
evidence standard. Again, because these findings of fact increase the defendant’s 
statutory maximum sentence, they violate Blakely’s bright-line rule. Cunningham, 
127 S Ct at 868. 
A Michigan court imposing prison after a probation violation in an 
intermediate sanction cell case equates to a federal court imposing a sentence 
exceeding that allowed by 18 USC 3583 for revocation of supervised release.  In 
(…continued)
25 484 F3d 1168 (CA 9, 2007). 
47  
 
 
 
both cases, the sentencing court is limited to the maximum sentence set by the 
Legislature. And in both instances, the imposition of a longer sentence violates 
the Sixth Amendment. 
A similar distinction exists between the federal probation system and the 
Michigan probation system. Unlike a Michigan probationer, a federal probationer 
who violates the conditions of probation is not resentenced under the federal 
sentencing guidelines. 
Rather, the court must refer to a nonbinding policy 
statement released by the United States Sentencing Commission.  United States v 
Goffi, 446 F3d 319, 322 (CA 2, 2006). The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit explained why Blakely does not apply to sentencing after a federal 
probation violation: 
The statutory scheme thus requires a sentencing court to 
consider a variety of factors, including the non-binding policy 
statements applicable to probation violations, in determining an 
appropriate sentence. Nowhere, however, does it require a court to 
sentence within the Guidelines range for the underlying conviction 
in determining punishment for separate and distinct malfeasance by 
the defendant—violation of probation. . . . United States v. Pena, 
125 F.3d 285, 287 (5th Cir.1997)  (“Because there are no guidelines 
for sentencing on revocation of probation, and because the district 
court was not limited to the sentencing range available at the time of 
the initial sentence, we find no error in the trial court’s failure to 
employ the analysis normally required in departure case[s].”) . . . . 
[Id. at 322-323 (emphasis added).] 
The exact opposite is true in Michigan. The guidelines continue to apply to 
a Michigan defendant. Hendrick, 472 Mich at 560. The sentencing court is 
limited to the sentence range available at the time of the initial sentence.  And the 
48  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
probation violation is not treated as a separate malfeasance in Michigan.  People v 
Kaczmarek, 464 Mich 478, 483-484; 628 NW2d 484 (2001). 
These fundamental differences between Michigan’s system and the federal 
system mandate different results in applying Blakely’s bright-line rule.  Because 
none of the factors relied on by the federal courts exists in Michigan, Blakely 
continues to apply after probation revocation in Michigan.  This completely 
undermines the majority’s argument that, because of the possibility of probation as 
an intermediate sanction, intermediate sanction cells produce a minimum rather 
than a maximum sentence.26 
Further undermining the majority’s theory is the fact that, in practice, 
Michigan treats intermediate sanction cell sentences as maximum sentences. 
When a defendant receives an intermediate sanction that includes only a jail 
sentence, he or she faces that sentence and nothing more.  A defendant who 
receives an 11-month jail sentence is released from supervision at the end of 11 
months.  The court does not review the case after 11 months to determine if more 
26 The majority simply disregards the reasoning of Goffi and Pena. And, in 
doing so, it disregards the distinctions between the two systems.  See Harper, 479 
Mich ___ at n 51. In fact, the two systems differ greatly.  In the federal system, a 
court no longer sentences under the guidelines, probation is viewed as a distinct 
malfeasance, and the former statutory maximum no longer applies.  Goffi, 446 F3d 
at 322-323; Pena, 125 F3d at 287. In Michigan, probation is not a separate 
offense. The guidelines still apply, and the defendant remains subject to the 
statutory maximum sentence created by MCL 769.34(4)(a).  Therefore, unlike the 
federal system, the Michigan system is still subject to the Blakely bright-line rule 
after a defendant violates probation. 
49  
 
 
                                              
incarceration is warranted. Simply, the defendant finishes the sentence and is 
released from jail. Therefore, an intermediate sanction cell sentence that includes 
a jail term is treated just like any other maximum sentence. 
In Harper, the majority further argues that intermediate sanctions must be 
minimum sentences because a defendant subject to them can be given a sentence 
of probation with jail. It argues that recognizing that intermediate sanction cell 
sentences are statutory maximum sentences will limit the effectiveness of 
imposing such sentences.  Although it is true that MCL 769.31(b)(iv) allows for 
intermediate sanction cell sentences that include both probation and jail, the 
majority’s reliance on this point is irrelevant. 
The Legislature has determined that a sentence of 12 months in jail is an 
appropriate statutory maximum sentence for defendants who merit an intermediate 
sanction.27  Our constitution vests the Legislature with the ultimate authority to set 
criminal penalties. Const 1963, art 4, § 45; People v Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 
436; 636 NW2d 127 (2001). The Legislature inserted the 12-month limit on jail 
sentences in MCL 769.34(4)(a). 
Only the Legislature, not this Court, may 
increase this limit. Someone who believes that the 12-month cap is insufficient 
can petition the Legislature to amend the statute.  But the Court cannot ignore the 
27 “An intermediate sanction may include a jail term that does not exceed 
the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, 
whichever is less.” MCL 769.34(4)(a). 
50  
 
 
 
statutory maximum sentence and a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights with 
regard to it because the Court finds the statutory penalty insufficient.   
For example, those who believe that 12 months is insufficient incarceration 
to punish probation violators could petition the Legislature to change Michigan’s 
probation system to mimic the federal system.  The Legislature could follow the 
lead of Goffi and treat a probation violation as a separate malfeasance.  It could 
make probation violation subject, not to the guidelines for the underlying offense, 
but to independent punishment.  See Goffi, 446 F3d at 322-323; Pena, 125 F3d at 
287. If the Legislature effected such a change, it could eliminate the Sixth 
Amendment violation now lurking in the Michigan system.  But, again, this 
decision must be left to the Legislature. 
Ultimately, and most importantly, the majority cannot disregard the Sixth 
Amendment simply because it is convenient for purposes of the status quo or 
because it comports with legislative intent.  Blakely specifically rejected any such 
approach: 
Ultimately, our decision cannot turn on whether or to what 
degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal 
justice. One can certainly argue that both these values would be 
better served by leaving justice entirely in the hands of 
professionals; many nations of the world, particularly those 
following civil-law traditions, take just that course.  There is not one 
shred of doubt, however, about the Framers’ paradigm for criminal 
justice: not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the 
common-law ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict 
division of authority between judge and jury.  As Apprendi held, 
every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a 
51  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
jury all facts legally essential to the punishment.  [Blakely, 542 US at 
313 (emphasis in original).] 
It might be easier to continue the current modus operandi:  to punish 
probation violators by allowing judges to increase their statutory maximum 
sentence by using findings of fact not supported by the violator’s prior record or 
admissions or a jury’s verdict.  But the Sixth Amendment does not allow courts to 
disregard defendants’ rights just because making a correction would require the 
judicial system to undergo change.  Id. 
The majority is also incorrect in relying on its belief that the Legislature 
intended that probation violators be punished with more than 12 months in jail. 
Even if the Legislature intended that punishment, it is irrelevant.  This fact was 
made obvious by the decision in Ring. The Arizona legislature intended that a 
sentence of death should be imposed in first-degree murder cases in which 
aggravating factors existed. Ring, 536 US at 592-593. But the Supreme Court 
found that this intent could not be effectuated in light of the Sixth Amendment. 
Notwithstanding the Arizona legislature’s intent, the judicial fact-finding that 
increased Ring’s maximum sentence to the death penalty violated Blakely’s bright­
line rule: “If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment 
contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it— 
must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 602. 
Moreover, the proper application of the Sixth Amendment to Michigan’s 
intermediate sanction cells need not weaken an intermediate sanction cell sentence 
52  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
of probation with jail. The system easily could be made to comply with Blakely. 
For example, this Court could amend our court rules to provide for a jury to be 
impaneled after a court finds a probation violation.  If the jury then found beyond 
a reasonable doubt the facts necessary to move the defendant from an intermediate 
sanction cell, there would be no Sixth Amendment violation.  Therefore, Michigan 
could both retain its current probation system and protect a defendant’s 
constitutional rights. 
In sum, intermediate sanction cells require a sentence that contains all the 
attributes of, and is in fact, a maximum sentence.  This maximum sentence can be 
increased only by using judicial fact-finding occurring after the jury’s verdict. 
This makes the intermediate sanction cell sentence equivalent to the middle term 
sentence under California’s sentencing scheme.  Cunningham, 127 S Ct at 868. 
Both sentences amount to the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes. And a 
court violates the Sixth Amendment when it sentences a defendant to a sentence 
longer than this statutory maximum using judicial fact-finding.  Id. at 870. 
VIII. HARMLESS ERROR 
The majority concludes that, even if defendant’s sentence violated Blakely, 
the error was harmless. I disagree.  While it is true that Blakely violations are 
subject to harmless error review, I believe that the error in this case was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
53  
 
 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that Blakely errors are not structural errors 
requiring automatic reversal. Washington v Recuenco, __ US __; 126 S Ct 2546, 
2553; 165 L Ed 2d 466 (2006). The Court reasoned that sentencing factors are the 
equivalent of the elements of the crime, which must be proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. at 2552. “‘[A]n instruction that omits an element of the 
offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an 
unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.’”  Id. at 2551, quoting Neder 
v United States, 527 US 1, 9; 119 S Ct 1827; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999) (emphasis in 
original). Given that the failure to present a sentencing factor to a jury is the 
equivalent of the failure to submit an element of the offense, it cannot be a 
structural error. Recuenco, 126 S Ct at 2552. 
The majority reviews this issue under a plain error standard because 
defendant did not raise a constitutional challenge at sentencing.  But the trial court 
sentenced defendant before the United States Supreme Court decided Blakely. 
Given that Blakely was a seminal case and significantly clarified Sixth 
Amendment rights, I believe that it is excusable for defendant not to have raised 
the issue before Blakely was decided. The appropriate standard of review is 
whether the omission of an element of the offense is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Neder, 527 US at 18-19. 
Of course, safeguarding the jury guarantee will often require 
that a reviewing court conduct a thorough examination of the record. 
If, at the end of that examination, the court cannot conclude beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same 
54  
 
 
                                              
absent the error—for example, where the defendant contested the 
omitted element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary 
finding—it should not find the error harmless. [Id. at 19.] 
This case involves three specific findings of fact.  For OV 1, the court 
found that a weapon, other than a gun or knife, touched the victim.  For OV 2, it 
found that defendant possessed a potentially lethal weapon.  And for OV 3, it 
found that the victim suffered a life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury.   
None of these findings is an element of the charged offense of assault with 
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.  MCL 750.84.  Therefore, the jury 
would have had to make special findings of fact to support an increase in the 
maximum sentence in this case.  Michigan has no procedure for criminal juries to 
use to make such special findings.28  See MCR 6.420.29  This procedural 
28 In Harper, 479 Mich at ___ n 70, the majority mistakenly states that this 
Court has left open the question of special verdicts in criminal cases.  The majority 
actually relies on a proposition in Justice Levin’s dissenting opinion in People v 
Ramsey, 422 Mich 500; 375 NW2d 297 (1985), to reach this conclusion.  In fact, 
this Court specifically rejected special findings by a jury in a criminal case as long 
ago as 1874. In People v Marion, 29 Mich 31, 40 (1874), the Court rejected the 
defendant’s claim that a statute allowing special findings in civil trials should 
apply to criminal trials as well: 
The only remaining question relates to the refusal of the court 
to direct the jury to find specially upon certain particular points of 
fact. The statute which provides for this practice is found in a 
chapter relating to the “Trial of issues of fact” (chap. 103, R. S.; ch. 
189, C. L., 1871), the general purpose of which is to regulate the trial 
of civil causes, and many of its provisions are not only inapplicable 
but repugnant to the rules in criminal cases.  There is a separate 
chapter devoted to “Trials in criminal cases” (ch. 165, R. S.; ch. 261, 
Comp. L., 1871), covering the same ground for them that is covered 
by the other chapter in regard to civil cases. 
(continued…) 
55  
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
deficiency is significant. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the lack 
of a procedure enabling a jury to make a finding suggests that a defendant will 
succeed in demonstrating the Blakely violation was not harmless.  Recuenco, 126 
(…continued) 
Unless an intention to the contrary is apparent, it would create 
much difficulty and confusion to blend the two sets of regulations, 
and presumptively the chapters must be confined to their respective 
purposes. 
In fact, the Court stated that allowing special findings in criminal cases would be 
revolutionary. Id. at 41; see also People v Roat, 117 Mich 578, 583; 76 NW 91 
(1898). Until today, this Court has never questioned the holding of these cases.     
The Court of Appeals cases cited by the majority also do not support the 
majority’s contention that special findings are permissible in criminal trials.  Both 
cases mentioned “special verdict forms” merely in passing. And both of these 
references were directed at forms that would allow the court to distinguish 
multiple charges for the same offense.  Neither case dealt with special findings 
made by a jury beyond a general verdict for the individual offense.  People v 
Kiczenski, 118 Mich App 341, 345; 324 NW2d 614 (1982); People v Matuszak, 
263 Mich App 42, 51; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).  Neither case can fairly be 
characterized as creating the “revolution” cautioned against in Marion and Roat. 
And, contrary to the majority’s contention, this area of law appears well settled.     
29 In Harper, the majority also argues that special findings are permissible 
in criminal trials because the court rules allow for the application of the rules of 
civil procedure to criminal proceedings in certain circumstances.  First, this is 
essentially the same argument that this Court rejected in Marion, 29 Mich at 40. 
Second, MCR 6.001(D)(2) specifically limits the application of the rules of civil 
procedure “when it clearly appears that they apply to civil actions only[.]”  Given 
that this Court rejected the availability of special findings to criminal trials, it is 
clear that MCR 2.514 applies only to civil actions.  Third, MCR 6.001(D)(3) 
indicates that the civil rules do not apply when a “court rule provides a like or 
different procedure.” MCR 6.420 provides a similar but different standard for the 
returning of jury verdicts in criminal cases.  Hence, this standard, which does not 
include special findings, takes precedence over the procedures allowed in MCR 
2.514. 
56  
 
 
 
                                              
S Ct at 2550. In this case, the lack of a procedure renders more difficult the 
prosecution’s burden of showing that the error was harmless.30 
Both OV 1 and OV 2 deal with possession of a weapon.  The majority 
argues that the evidence that defendant possessed a weapon was overwhelming 
and uncontested. 
But this argument is unfair.  At trial, defendant had no 
opportunity or reason to contest the evidence regarding the weapon.  It was not an 
element of the offense or relevant to defendant’s defense strategy.  For defendant 
to have objected to the existence of a weapon would have been distracting, 
irrelevant, and potentially confusing to the jury.  Given that there was no reason or 
opportunity to present evidence on this point, defendant can hardly be faulted for 
not doing so. 
Moreover, the evidence regarding the use of a weapon was in fact 
contested. 
One key prosecution witness, Gregory Thompson, testified that 
defendant did not use a weapon but beat the complainant with his fists.31  And no 
30 The majority accuses me of effectively finding all Blakely errors 
“harmful per se.” Ante at 23 n 17. This is inaccurate.  I acknowledge that the 
Blakely error in Recuenco was not harmful per se. But when I apply the words of 
the United States Supreme Court, it is not clear to me that Blakely errors in 
Michigan may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  This is because, as the 
Supreme Court advises, the lack of a procedure will increase the difficulty of the 
prosecution’s burden to prove any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  And 
Michigan lacks a procedure.  If the jury has no means of making the finding, how 
can a reviewing court presume that the jury would have made that finding 
regardless of the prohibition against it? 
31 I have not mischaracterized Thompson’s testimony, as the majority 
claims. During initial questioning, Thompson stated that defendant indicated that 
(continued…) 
57  
 
 
  
                                              
 
weapon was ever found at the scene of the offense.  This evidence contradicts the 
conclusion that a weapon was involved. Because of this, the prosecution cannot 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have made the findings 
of fact necessary to score OV 1 and OV 2. 
OV 3 deals with the injury suffered by the complainant.  To warrant 25 
points under OV 3, there must be a “[l]ife threatening or permanent incapacitating 
injury . . . .” MCL 777.33(1)(c). While there was evidence that the complainant’s 
injuries were significant, there was no specific evidence that they were life 
threatening or permanently incapacitating.  This lack of evidence precludes a 
conclusion that the error was harmless. 
No medical expert testified at trial.  And defendant’s medical records were 
not submitted to the jury. 
Again, this is because neither defendant nor the 
prosecution had any reason to argue these issues at trial.  Without some medical 
evidence of permanent incapacitation or that the injuries were life threatening, a 
jury could not have made such a determination beyond a reasonable doubt.32 
(…continued)  
defendant beat the complainant with his fists.  During cross-examination,  
Thompson stated that it was possible that defendant used a weapon.    
32 An argument can be made that the evidence presented at trial supports a 
finding that the complainant suffered bodily injury requiring medical treatment. 
This evidence, it could be argued, would justify 10 points under OV 3.  MCL 
777.33(1)(d). But given that the prosecution never made this argument on appeal, 
it is not properly before the Court. 
(continued…) 
58  
 
 
   
                                              
 
Hence, the prosecution cannot carry its burden to prove that the Blakely error 
occurring in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Neder, 527 US at 
18-19.33 
There is insufficient evidence that the jury would have made the findings of 
fact necessary to score the OVs. This is especially true in light of the fact that 
there are no procedures in place for a jury to make special findings in a criminal 
trial in Michigan. Therefore, the prosecution did not carry its burden.  Id.; 
Recuenco, 126 S Ct at 2550. 
Defendant must be resentenced in a manner 
consistent with the Sixth Amendment. 
(…continued) 
Even if the prosecution had made this argument, however, it would not 
have rendered the error in defendant’s sentence harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. A score of 10 points would have given defendant a PRV score of 2 and an 
OV score of 10. This would have placed him in the B-II cell of the class D grid. 
MCL 777.65. The B-II cell sets a range of zero to 13 months for a second-offense 
habitual offender. MCL 777.65; MCL 777.21(3)(a).  This is still an intermediate 
sanction cell. Defendant’s statutory maximum sentence would have increased 
from 11 months to 12 months in jail.  MCL 769.34(4)(a).  Hence, imposition of a 
15-year maximum sentence would still have violated Blakely’s bright-line rule. 
33 The majority summarily concludes that no medical evidence was 
necessary in this case. Its conclusion is contrary to the statute, which requires 
proof of “[l]ife threatening or permanent incapacitating injury . . . .”  MCL 
777.33(1)(c). The majority also inappropriately shifts to defendant the burden to 
disprove the nature of the injuries. This is inconsistent with harmless error review, 
which is required here. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the very nature of 
criminal trials, which mandates that the prosecution, not the defense, prove the 
elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 
59  
 
 
  
 
IX. CONCLUSION  
Although it concedes that Cunningham presented nothing new and that it 
must follow the precedent of the Blakely line of cases, the majority reaffirms its 
previous decision in this case. In essence, the majority states today that the United 
States Supreme Court did not comprehend the majority’s previous decision and 
misunderstood Michigan law.   
The maximum sentence resulting from an intermediate sanction cell is a 
true statutory maximum for purposes of Cunningham. A court cannot increase 
this maximum sentence by scoring the OVs without violating the Sixth 
Amendment. Finally, the sentencing error in this case was not harmless, because 
the OVs were scored using facts that were not supported by overwhelming 
evidence. 
I take the Supreme Court’s order for what it is: an indication that there is a 
Sixth Amendment problem with Michigan’s sentencing guidelines.  This case 
illustrates that a grave constitutional violation occurs in this state when Blakely is 
correctly applied. Specifically, the judicial fact-finding that moved defendant 
from an intermediate sanction cell to a straddle cell violated his Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by jury. 
60  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
Defendant’s sentence should be vacated, and the case should be remanded 
to the trial court for resentencing. The Michigan sentencing guidelines statutes 
should be held unconstitutional as applied in this case.34
 
Marilyn Kelly 
34 Because this is a remand from the United States Supreme Court, I believe 
that it is not necessary to address here the cure for the constitutional violation.  I 
continue to believe what I articulated in my prior dissenting opinion.  Given that a 
large portion of Michigan’s sentencing guidelines involve intermediate sanction 
cells that intertwine with the rest of the guidelines, the unconstitutional sections 
cannot be severed. Therefore, the entire guidelines must be found unconstitutional 
when applied as they were in this case.  In future cases, Michigan trial judges 
should implement a bifurcated hearing system.  And the prosecution should be 
required, after a guilty verdict, to submit the facts not admitted but necessary for 
scoring the OVs to a jury for resolution beyond a reasonable doubt.  For a more 
thorough discussion of this issue, I refer the reader to my previous dissent. 
McCuller, 475 Mich at 208-213 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
61  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 128161 
RAYMOND A. MCCULLER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I agree with the result advocated by Justice Kelly in her dissent because it 
comports with my position in this case the first time it was before this Court.  See 
People v McCuller, 475 Mich 176, 214; 715 NW2d 798 (2006) (Cavanagh, J., 
dissenting). 
When dealing with intermediate sanctions, I believe that the 
requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Blakely v 
Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), and further 
applied in Cunningham v California, ___ US ___; 127 S Ct 856; 166 L Ed 2d 856 
(2007), must be followed.  Thus, the trial court improperly engaged in judicial 
fact-finding, and this case should be remanded for resentencing. 
Michael F. Cavanagh