Case Title: James E. Laster, Jr., a minor who sues by and through his parents and next friends, James E. Laster, Sr., and Gloria Laster, et al. v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company, Inc., and the Alabama Great Southern Railway Company

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1050532

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 1/16/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
_________________________
1050532
_________________________
James E. Laster, Jr., a minor who sues by and through his
parents and next friends, James E. Laster, Sr., and Gloria
Laster, et al.
v.
Norfolk Southern Railway Company, Inc., and the Alabama
Great Railway Company
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-02-4965)
On Application for Rehearing
SEE, Justice.
This Court's opinion of January 5, 2007, is withdrawn,
and the following is substituted therefor.
1050532
2
James E. Laster, Jr., a minor ("James"), by and through
his parents and next friends, James E. Laster, Sr., and Gloria
Laster, and James E. Laster, Sr., and Gloria Laster,
individually, appeal a summary judgment in favor of Norfolk
Southern Railway Company, Inc., and the Alabama Great Railway
Company.  Because there are no genuine issues of material fact
as to whether the railroads violated any duty to James, we
affirm the summary judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History
In August 2000, a train operated by Norfolk Southern
Railway Company, Inc., and the Alabama Great Railway Company
(collectively "Norfolk Southern") severed the right foot of
10-year-old James, on private property owned by Norfolk
Southern in Birmingham.  Earlier that day, James had left his
parents' house to play with nine-year-old Raymond Smith.
James and Raymond decided to walk to Woodward Park.  However,
instead of walking on McMillion Avenue, they decided to walk
along the railroad right-of-way that runs parallel to
McMillion Avenue.  James's parents had warned him not to walk
on the right-of-way without an adult present, and James
admitted that he knew that it was dangerous to take that
1050532
3
route.  However, he testified that he walked on the right-of-
way because he was afraid of the fast cars, dogs, and "crazy
people" on McMillion Avenue.
While James and Raymond were walking along the right-of-
way, a train approached, and they moved as far from the tracks
as the trees lining the tracks would allow.  The train slowed
and came to a stop in front of them.  They turned around and
began walking back toward James's house, because, James said,
he was afraid that the train might start to move again.  As
James and Raymond passed an open hopper car, Raymond climbed
the ladder to the top of the car.  James had heard a whooshing
sound of air from the brakes of the train, and, because he
thought that the train might start moving, he called for
Raymond to come down.  Instead, Raymond replied, "Hold up."
James decided to pull his friend down, and he stood with his
right foot on the rail in order to reach Raymond.  Raymond
fell on top of James, and James felt a burning pain in his
right foot.  The train had started rolling, and it rolled over
and severed James's right foot.  
James, by and through his parents, and his parents
individually 
(hereinafter 
referred 
to 
collectively 
as
1050532
4
"Laster") 
sued 
Norfolk 
Southern, 
asserting 
claims 
of
negligence and wantonness, as well as the tort of outrage.
Laster argues that Norfolk Southern should have known that
children would trespass on its property and that they possibly
would be injured by a train.  Laster points out that the
stretch of track on which James was injured has one of the
highest incidences of pedestrian casualties and that, in the
past, Norfolk Southern had used a trespasser-abatement program
in the area, visiting schools and monitoring the tracks.
Laster also argues that the engineer on the train failed to
blow the horn before releasing the brakes and allowing the
slack between the cars to work its way out.  He contends that
if the engineer had blown the horn before he released the
brakes, then James and Raymond would have had time to get away
from the railroad car before the train cars actually began to
move.  He further argues that the train should not have
stopped in such a densely populated area, suggesting other
workable locations for a stop that would have posed less of a
risk to children.  Following a hearing, the trial court
granted Norfolk Southern's motion for a summary judgment,
1050532
5
issuing an order that did not include factual findings or
legal analysis.  Laster appeals.
Laster argues that the trial court erred in entering a
summary judgment in favor of Norfolk Southern.  Norfolk
Southern's argument in support of its summary-judgment motion
was that the only duty it owed James was a duty to exercise
reasonable care after its train crew discovered the child in
a position of peril from which he could not remove himself.
Norfolk Southern also contended that James's and Raymond's own
contributory negligence was the sole proximate cause of
James's injuries.  Finally, Norfolk Southern argued that even
if the doctrine of attractive nuisance applied in this
situation, Laster had not produced sufficient evidence
indicating that the train was an attractive nuisance to
survive a motion for a summary judgment. 
II. Standard of Review
To grant a motion for a summary judgment, the trial court
must determine that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.  Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  When the movant makes a
prima facie showing that those two conditions are satisfied,
1050532
6
the 
burden 
then 
shifts 
to 
the 
nonmovant 
to 
present
"substantial evidence" creating a genuine issue of material
fact.  Ex parte CSX Transp., Inc., 938 So. 2d 959, 961 (Ala.
2006); see Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.
2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989).  Evidence is "substantial" if it
is of "such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the
exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."  West v. Founders
Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1989); § 12-21-12(d), Ala. Code 1975.  
In our review of a summary judgment, we apply the same
standard as does the trial court on factual issues. Ex parte
Lumpkin, 702 So. 2d 462, 465 (Ala. 1997).  Our review is
subject to the caveat that we must review the record in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all
reasonable doubts against the movant. Ex parte CSX Transp.,
938 So. 2d at 962; Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.
2d 412, 413 (Ala. 1990).  The trial court's ruling on
questions of law carries no presumption of correctness, and
this Court reviews de novo the trial court's conclusion as to
1050532
7
the appropriate legal standard to be applied.  Ex parte
Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215, 1221 (Ala. 1997).
III. Analysis
A. Duty of Care
Laster first argues that the trial court failed to apply
the correct duty of care owed by the railroad.  In its
summary-judgment motion, Norfolk Southern argued that the
conventional duty of care owed by a possessor of land to
trespassers applies in this case.  In general, "[a] railroad
owes no duty to prevent injury to an undiscovered trespasser
on its track.  But when the railroad discovers the trespasser,
it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring
him or her."  Beam v. Seaboard Sys. R.R.,  536 So. 2d 927, 928
(Ala. 1988) (citation omitted).  Because it is undisputed that
James and Raymond were trespassers on its property, Norfolk
Southern contends, it owed them a duty only to avoid wantonly
or negligently injuring them after Norfolk Southern, through
its agents, discovered that the boys were in a position of
peril. 
Although 
Norfolk 
Southern 
correctly 
states 
the
conventional duty of care a possessor of land owes a
1050532
8
trespasser, this Court has long recognized exceptions to this
limited duty where child trespassers are involved.  First,
this Court has recognized the doctrine of attractive nuisance,
which we have defined as "a condition which is naturally
attractive to children at that place and is likely to be
dangerous to such a person in the ordinary course of events,
all of which is known to the defendant and not to the injured
person and not obviously dangerous in itself."  City of Dothan
v. Gulledge, 276 Ala. 433, 435, 163 So. 2d 217, 219 (1964).
Next, this Court recognized a "straight-negligence" theory of
liability, which "arguably developed as a reaction to the
restrictive use of the attractive nuisance theory."  Tolbert
v. Gulsby, 333 So. 2d 129, 132-33 (Ala. 1976).  Finally, this
Court has adopted the 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Artificial 
Conditions 
Highly 
Dangerous 
to 
Trespassing 
Children
§ 339 (1965), replacing the earlier theories of attractive
nuisance and straight-negligence the Court had previously
applied.  Tolbert, 333 So. 2d at 135. 
Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, like
the doctrines of attractive nuisance and straight negligence,
is an exception to the conventional duty of care in the case
1050532
9
of trespassing children, requiring property owners to exercise
reasonable care in order "to give primacy to child safety
rather than unrestricted property rights."  Motes v. Matthews,
497 So. 2d 1121, 1122 (Ala. 1986).  "A possessor of land owes
a duty to exercise reasonable care to eliminate an artificial
condition on land that poses a danger to children."  Oden v.
Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, Inc., 621 So. 2d 953, 961
n. 5 (Ala. 1993) (citing Fletcher v. Hale, 548 So. 2d 135
(Ala. 1989), and Lyle v. Bouler, 547 So. 2d 506 (Ala. 1989)).
Motes held that the conventional duty of care recited in
Beam is "not applicable ... except where physical harm to a
trespassing child is caused by a natural condition upon the
property. ...  In all other cases, the duty which an occupier
of property owes to a trespassing child is set forth in § 339,
Restatement (Second) of Torts."  Motes, 497 So. 2d at 1122-23.
"'Section 339 provides:
"'"A possessor of land is subject to liability for
physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused
by an artificial condition upon the land if
"'"(a) the place where the condition
exists is one upon which the possessor
knows or has reason to know that children
are likely to trespass, and
1050532
10
"'"(b) the condition is one of which
the possessor knows or has reason to know
and which he realizes or should realize
will involve an unreasonable risk of death
or serious bodily harm to such children,
and
"'"(c) the children because of their
youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling
with it or in coming within the area made
dangerous by it, and
"'"(d) the utility to the possessor of
maintaining the condition and the burden of
eliminating the danger are slight as
compared 
with 
the 
risk 
to 
children
involved, and
"'"(e) the possessor fails to exercise
reasonable care to eliminate the danger or
otherwise to protect the children."'"
Ricketts v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 686 So. 2d 1100, 1103 (Ala.
1996) (quoting Lyle, 547 So. 2d at 507).
The threshold issue, then, in deciding whether the
conventional duty of care or the duty of care put forward in
§ 339 applies, is whether the condition that injured the
trespassing child was a natural or an artificial one.  Norfolk
Southern argues that § 339 has no application to a train
operating on active railroad tracks, whether moving or stopped
temporarily.  However, Norfolk Southern has put forward no
viable theory under which this Court could hold that a train
1050532
11
is not an artificial condition.  Norfolk Southern conflates
the inquiry as to whether a train is a natural or an
artificial condition upon the land with the analysis to be
performed once § 339 is held to apply.  
Norfolk Southern cites Holland v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
431 A.2d 597 (D.C. App. 1981), for the proposition that § 339
does not apply where children trespassers are injured by a
moving train.  The Holland court performed an "independent
analysis" of § 339 and concluded that the Restatement test
could not be met because element (c) -- that the child does
not discover the condition or realize the risk -- could not be
satisfied, reasoning that 
"'[n]othing could be more pregnant with warning of
danger than the noise and appearance of a huge,
rumbling string of railroad cars.  It cannot be
compared with the silent, deadly danger of high-
power electricity, the inanimate attraction of
stationary machines, traps or turntables, loose
boards, unseen pitfalls, or the still, inviting
depths of a swimming pool to a tiny child.'" 
431 A.2d at 603 (quoting Herrara v. Southern Pacific Ry., 188
Cal. App. 2d 441, 449, 10 Cal. Rptr. 575, 580 (1961)).   The
fact that a train might be an obvious danger under
subparagraph (c) of § 339, however, does not mean that it is
a natural condition upon the land.  Nor do the other cases
1050532
12
upon which Norfolk Southern relies hold that a train that is
stopped temporarily is not an artificial condition upon the
land; these cases were decided on various other grounds.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Spence's Adm'r, 282 S.W.2d 826,
829 (Ky. 1955), applied the conventional duty of care owed to
trespassing children; it thus did not involve § 339.  Alston
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 433 F. Supp. 553, 570 (D.D.C. 1977),
concluded that "as the 'circumstances' of Myron's accident
unquestionably include his full appreciation of the risk, the
instant case does not meet the requirement of Restatement
339(c)."  Alston dealt with a plaintiff who knew that hopping
onto a freight train was dangerous; it does not stand for the
proposition that a moving train is not an artificial
condition.  Finally, in Hughes v. Union Pacific R.R., 114
Idaho 466, 470, 757 P.2d 1185, 1189-90 (1988), the Supreme
Court of Idaho stated that Restatement § 339 did not represent
the law of Idaho.  The court decided that, based upon the
particular facts of the case, the plaintiff "'appreciate[d]
the dangers created by certain artificial conditions.'"
Hughes, 114 Idaho at 470, 757 P.2d at 1189 (quoting Guilfoyle
v. Missouri, Kansas, & Texas R.R., 812 F.2d 1290, 1292 (10th
1050532
13
Cir. 1987)).  We do note that although the Idaho court did not
apply § 339, the quoted language suggests that that court
considered a train to be an artificial condition.  Thus, the
cases Norfolk Southern cites simply do not hold that § 339
does not apply to a temporarily stopped train. 
Alabama cases distinguish only between those conditions
that are natural and those that are artificial; therefore, a
train must fit in either the one category or the other.
Alabama caselaw suggests that a train, whether stopped or
moving, is an artificial condition upon the land.  In
Slaughter v. Moncrief, 758 So. 2d 1102, 1106 (Ala. Crim. App.
1999), the court held that a temporarily parked pickup truck
on an inclined driveway was an artificial condition.  Alabama
courts have engaged in the § 339 analysis and found a number
of conditions upon the land to be artificial: a railroad
trestle, Ricketts, 686 So. 2d at 1103-07; an electrical
transmission switching tower, Henderson v. Alabama Power Co.,
627 So. 2d 878, 880 (Ala. 1993), abrogated on other grounds,
Ex parte Apicella, 809 So. 2d 865 (Ala. 2001); a swimming
pool, Fletcher v. Hale, 548 So. 2d 135 (Ala. 1989); a clay
pit, Lyle, 547 So. 2d at 507; excavated land, Motes, 497 So.
1050532
In other cases, this Court engaged in the § 339 analysis
1
while specifically declining to decide whether there was an
"artificial condition" on the land.  See Hollis v. Norfolk
Southern Ry., 667 So. 2d 727, 731 (Ala. 1995) (a man-made
cliff that closely resembled a natural cliff); Gentle v. Pine
Valley Apartments, 631 So. 2d 928, 936 n. 3 (Ala. 1994) (a
dog). 
14
2d at 1124; a trampoline positioned near the roof of a house,
Kennedy v. Graham, 516 So. 2d 572 (Ala. 1987); an air rifle,
Tolbert, 333 So. 2d at 135; and a house under construction,
Tanner v. Lee, 725 So. 2d 988, 989 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).1
A train is a machine made by human hands, and it more
closely resembles a pickup truck or an air rifle than it does
a natural condition such as a ravine or a tree.  This Court
held in Copeland v. Pike Liberal Arts School, 553 So. 2d 100,
103 (Ala. 1989), that a ravine was a natural condition and
that the landowner in the case owed a trespassing child only
the conventional duty of care.  In concluding that § 339 did
not apply, we noted that "[t]he ravine was not created by any
action of the defendants, but, instead, was a natural
condition of the land."  553 So. 2d at 102.  Also, in Mullins
v. Pannell, 289 Ala. 252, 255, 266 So. 2d 862, 864 (1972),
this Court held that "[n]atural objects, such as a tree, are
not regarded as constituting an attractive nuisance."  Thus,
1050532
15
the defendant owed only the conventional duty of care to a
child trespasser who fell from his tree.  The fact that there
was various artificial debris, such as planks and boards,
under the tree did not affect the natural character of the
tree.  Id.  The law of other jurisdictions also supports our
determination that a train is an artificial condition.  See
Klein v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (No. Civ.A. 04-955,
March 31, 2006) (E.D. Pa. 2006) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d)
("In this case, the laddered freight car was an artificial
condition upon the land that allowed the 21' high catenary
wires to become dangerous."); Thunder Hawk v. Union Pacific
R.R., 844 P.2d 1045, 1051 (Wyo. 1992) (reversing a summary
judgment for a railroad where a child was injured when he
jumped from a stopped train).
We decline to hold that a train is a natural condition
upon the land.  Thus, we apply the duty of care owed for
artificial conditions as delineated by § 339.
B. The § 339 Elements
Having held that the duty of care set out in Restatement
§ 339, rather than the conventional duty of care, applies in
this case, we turn to the elements of the Restatement test.
1050532
16
Because Laster has the burden at trial of establishing all the
elements of § 339, Norfolk Southern need only demonstrate that
there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding one of
the five elements in order for a summary judgment to be
proper.  Motes v. Matthews, 497 So. 2d at 1123; see also
Copeland v. Samford Univ., 686 So. 2d 190, 191 (Ala. 1996)
("'Once the moving party makes a prima facie showing that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, then the burden of
going forward with evidence shifts to the nonmovant –- who
must demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact.'" (quoting Diamond v. Aronov, 621 So. 2d 263, 265 (Ala.
1993), citing Grider v. Grider, 555 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1989)).
1. James's Appreciation of Danger 
Norfolk Southern argues that there is no genuine issue of
fact with regard to element § 339(c), which deals with the
child's appreciation of the danger of the instrumentality.  We
agree.
The record supports a finding that James understood the
risk involved in walking on the railroad right-of-way and that
he appreciated the danger posed by a stopped train.  James
testified that he knew that trains were dangerous and that his
1050532
The dissent states that "[a] child between the ages of
2
7 and 14 is prima facie incapable of contributory negligence,"
___ So. 2d at ___, and argues that this presumption should
apply 
to 
the 
determination 
of 
James's 
and 
Raymond's
17
parents had repeatedly warned him not to walk on the railroad
tracks without an adult.   He stated that he had heard of a
man who "got killed by, run over by a train."   After the
train came to a stop, James and Raymond turned around and
walked back toward James's house.  James testified: "We didn't
want to get to the front of the train, like if it just started
back and stuff.  That would be kind of scary."  When Norfolk
Southern's attorney asked James if he turned around "because
you knew if the train came to a stop there, it would probably
start back up at some point?" James replied, "Yes, sir."
Finally, James was aware, immediately before the accident,
that the train was ready to move because, he testified, he
heard the "whooshing" sound of the train's air brakes being
released, and he was familiar enough with that sound to
associate it with a train starting to move. 
Norfolk Southern produced sufficient evidence indicating
that James appreciated the danger of approaching the stopped
train and that, therefore, he could not satisfy element (c) of
§ 339.   See Dennis v. Northcutt, 923 So. 2d 275, 281 (Ala.
2
1050532
appreciation of the danger in this case.  However, as
discussed in note 4, infra, this Court has not recognized such
a presumption in the context of § 339.  Moreover, Laster did
not argue that the presumption allegedly recognized in
contributory-negligence cases should be applied in this
context until his application for a rehearing, and then only
implicitly.  "New supporting arguments presented for the first
time on rehearing generally will not be considered." Stover v.
Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 467 So. 2d 251, 253 (Ala. 1985).
18
2005) ("'"If the burden of proof at trial is on the nonmovant,
the movant may satisfy the Rule 56[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] burden
of production either by submitting affirmative evidence that
negates an essential element in the nonmovant's claim or,
assuming discovery has been completed, by demonstrating to the
trial court that the nonmovant's evidence is insufficient to
establish an essential element of the nonmovant's claim
...."'").  Norfolk Southern has thus met its burden of
establishing that summary judgment was appropriate in this
case.  
In order to defeat a properly supported summary-judgment
motion, Laster must present "substantial evidence" creating a
genuine issue of material fact.  Dennis, 923 So. 2d at 280.
Evidence is "substantial" if it is of "such weight and quality
that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment
can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be
1050532
19
proved."  West v. Founders Life, 547 So. 2d at 871.  Laster,
however, put forward no evidence indicating that James did not
appreciate the danger of approaching the train after it had
stopped.  Indeed, Laster states in his brief that the accident
occurred as James was attempting to leave the area of the
train out of respect for the danger it posed.  Laster's brief
at 36.  The evidence suggests that James understood that
trains are dangerous.  He understood that the train could
begin to move again at anytime, yet he attempted to pull his
friend from the train.  
In Hollis v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 667 So. 2d 727 (Ala.
1995), this Court discussed whether § 339(c) applied to a 16-
year-old who was injured as he walked along the edge of a man-
made cliff at night.  The Court, discussing whether the
teenager appreciated the danger of this course of action,
stated that "a landowner is not subject to liability when a
child knows of a danger and appreciates the risk involved, but
chooses to go forward and to encounter the danger out of
'recklessness or bravado.'"  Hollis, 667 So. 2d at 732
(quoting Restatement (Second) Torts  § 339 cmt. m.).  Here,
although James's motive in trying to help his friend is
1050532
20
commendable, he appreciated the danger posed by the train and
nonetheless approached the train.  
Laster argues that, given the stress of the emergency
situation created when the train began to move, the boys
should not be held to the same correctness of judgment and
ability to recognize danger to which a child would be held in
normal circumstances.  See Interstate Eng'g, Inc. v. Burnette,
474 So. 2d 624, 628 (Ala. 1985) ("'[I]f a person without fault
of his own is faced with a sudden emergency, he is not to be
held to the same correctness of judgment or actions as if he
had time to fully consider the situation ....'").  However,
Laster presents no evidence indicating that James did not
appreciate the danger of the situation, notwithstanding the
stress of the moment.
2. The Rescue Doctrine
Laster argues that even if this Court holds that James
appreciated the danger of a stopped train so as to preclude
recovery under § 339 in James's own right, Laster may still be
able to recover if § 339 applies to Raymond, James's nine-
year-old companion.  Because James attempted to come to
Raymond's rescue, Laster argues, the "rescue doctrine"
1050532
21
applies.  This Court has recognized the rescue doctrine as an
exception to the doctrines of assumption of the risk and
contributory negligence.  Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Johnson,
217 Ala. 251, 254, 115 So. 168, 170 (1927).  The rescue
doctrine operates to close a gap in the chain of causation.
As we recognized in Dillard v. Pittway Corp., 719 So. 2d 188,
193 (Ala. 1998),
"[e]ssentially, the rescue doctrine provides that it
is always foreseeable that someone may attempt to
rescue a person who has been placed in a dangerous
position and that the rescuer may incur injuries in
doing 
so. 
Thus, 
if 
the 
defendant 
has 
acted
negligently toward the person being rescued, he has
acted negligently toward the rescuer."  
The rescue doctrine thus provides a mechanism by which a
plaintiff can establish the element of causation in a
negligence claim.  See Lowery v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 891
F.2d 1187, 1194 (5th Cir. 1990) ("We note that the rescue
doctrine is nothing more than a negligence doctrine addressing
the problem of proximate causation.").
This Court has never decided whether the rescue doctrine
applies to allow a plaintiff who otherwise appreciated the
danger of an instrumentality nonetheless to recover under §
339 on the theory that the individual being rescued did not.
1050532
22
However, we have recognized the rescue doctrine in cases where
a rescuer otherwise would have been barred from recovering
damages by the doctrine of assumption of the risk.  Dillard,
719 So. 2d at 193.  Assumption of the risk and appreciation of
danger are analogous concepts, and Norfolk Southern has not
put forward any reason why the rescue doctrine should not
apply in this case.  Further, courts in other jurisdictions
have applied the rescue doctrine to cases falling within §
339.  See Bennett v. Stanley, 92 Ohio St. 3d 35, 43, 748
N.E.2d 41, 48-49 (2001) ("While the attractive nuisance
doctrine is not ordinarily applicable to adults, it 'may be
successfully invoked by an adult seeking damages for his or
her own injury if the injury was suffered in an attempt to
rescue a child from a danger created by the defendant's
negligence.'"); Luck v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,  510 F.2d 663,
667 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (applying the rescue doctrine in an
attractive-nuisance case).
Absent the rescue doctrine, Laster cannot show that
Norfolk Southern's negligence caused James's injuries.  See
Reeves v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 821 So. 2d 319, 321 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ("The basic precept of the 'rescue
1050532
23
doctrine' is that the person who has created a situation of
peril for another will be held in law to have caused peril not
only to the victim, but also to his rescuer, and thereby to
have caused any injury suffered by the rescuer in the rescue
attempt.").  Under the rescue doctrine, if James was injured
in an attempt to rescue Raymond from Norfolk Southern's
negligence, he could recover if Raymond, among other things,
belonged to the class of children protected by § 339.
We have not previously addressed which party bears the
burden of proving whether the child the plaintiff attempted to
rescue belonged to the class of children protected under §
339.  However, we have already noted that Laster has the
burden at trial of establishing all the elements of § 339, and
caselaw from Alabama and other jurisdictions leads us to
conclude that Laster bore the burden of coming forward with
evidence supporting the application of the rescue doctrine. 
In Trapp v. Vess, 847 So. 2d 304, 307 (Ala. 2002), a
summary-judgment case, this Court confronted the issue of
"when a person qualifies as a rescuer under the rescue
doctrine."  In Trapp, Vess and his daughter were traveling in
a car on icy roads when the car slid on the ice and skidded
1050532
24
into a ditch.  Neither Vess nor his daughter was hurt.  The
plaintiff, Trapp, stopped to help, and Vess told him that the
accident occurred as he was taking his daughter to the
hospital for medical tests.  Trapp and others helped remove
the car from the ditch, but, in doing so, Trapp injured his
arm.  Trapp sued Vess, asserting, among other theories, the
rescue doctrine.  This Court held that, "[i]n order to claim
the status of a rescuer, a party must establish that he had a
reasonable belief that the person he was trying to rescue was
in a dangerous position."  Trapp, 847 So. 2d at 307.  We also
noted that the person being rescued does not need to be in
actual peril so long as the rescuer has "'"a reasonable belief
that some person is in imminent peril."'"  Trapp, 847 So. 2d
at 307 (quoting Ellmaker v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 372
S.W.2d 650, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963)).  Nonetheless, we
concluded: 
"[T]he only fact that could have led Trapp to a
'reasonable belief that some person [was] in
imminent 
peril' 
is 
Trapp's 
statement 
in 
his
affidavit indicating that Vess told Trapp that he
needed to get his daughter to the hospital to have
medical 
tests 
performed. 
 
However, 
there 
is
absolutely no other evidence that Vess indicated
that he and his daughter were in peril or that he
requested Trapp's assistance."
1050532
25
Trapp, 847 So. 2d at 307 (footnote omitted).  We thus affirmed
the summary judgment in favor of Vess because "Trapp did not
present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Trapp was a rescuer under the
rescue doctrine."  847 So. 2d at 307.  Thus, Trapp bore the
risk of failing to produce evidence regarding an element of
the rescue doctrine. 
Caselaw from other jurisdictions also suggests that the
party claiming rescuer status bears the burden of establishing
each of the elements of the rescue doctrine, including the
defendant's negligence.  In McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor
Corp., 136 Wash. 2d 350, 355-56, 961 P.2d 952, 956 (1998), the
Supreme Court of Washington held:
"To achieve rescuer 
status 
one 
must 
demonstrate:
(1) the defendant was negligent to the person
rescued and such negligence caused the peril or
appearance of peril to the person rescued; (2) the
peril or appearance of peril was imminent; (3) a
reasonably prudent person would have concluded such
peril or appearance of peril existed; and (4) the
rescuer acted with reasonable care in effectuating
the rescue."
That is, the one asserting the rescue doctrine must prove each
of the elements of it.  Thus, "in order for the rescue
doctrine to be applicable, the party relying upon it must
1050532
26
establish that some negligent act of someone created the peril
with respect to which the rescue attempt was undertaken."
Dubus v. Dresser Indus.,  649 P.2d 198, 206 (Wyo. 1982).  See
also Lowery, 891 F.2d at 1193-94 ("Therefore, in order for
Lowery to recover under Mississippi's rescue doctrine, Lowery
must show: (1) The condition of the locked hand brake on the
car resulted from defendant's negligence; (2) this negligence
exposed the employer's property and unidentified third parties
to danger; and (3) this emergency situation led to Lowery's
rescue attempt and proximately caused his injuries."); Ashwood
v. Clark County, 113 Nev. 80, 85, 930 P.2d 740, 743 n.1 (1997)
("In order for [the rescue] doctrine to apply, the defendants
must first be liable for the injury to the victim being
rescued."); Brazier v. Phoenix Group Mgmt., 280 Ga. App. 67,
72, 633 S.E.2d 354, 358 (2006) ("In order to hold a defendant
liable for the death of a rescuer, ... a plaintiff must show
that the defendant's negligence placed himself or another
person in imminent distress, thereby requiring the rescue and
making injury to the rescuer a foreseeable possibility."). 
The case of Blackburn v. Broad Street Baptist Church, 305
N.J. Super 541, 702 A.2d 1331 (1997), appears to be directly
1050532
27
on point.  In Blackburn, the plaintiff was injured when she
slipped and fell while attempting to remove a three-year-old
child from a "puddle-like pond" that had accumulated on
property belonging to the church.  The trial judge entered a
summary judgment for the church after concluding that the
plaintiff was not a rescuer but a trespasser to whom no duty
was owed.  The appellate division reversed.  That court
analyzed the case from the perspective of the infant
trespasser, holding that if the danger to the child was
created by an attractive nuisance, the "defendant may be
liable ... because the intervention of a rescuer is reasonably
foreseeable."  Blackburn, 305 N.J. Super. at 546, 702 A.2d at
1334.  In determining whether the rescue doctrine applied, the
court examined whether the plaintiff had presented sufficient
evidence to establish each element of the attractive-nuisance
doctrine, holding that "[the] plaintiff must establish each of
the five elements under [Restatement (Second) Torts] § 339 to
prove a prima facie case."  Blackburn, 305 N.J. Super at 547,
702 A.2d at 1334.  Because there was sufficient evidence in
the record to establish that the church had maintained an
1050532
28
attractive nuisance on its property, the court allowed the
case to go forward.
The burden rests on the plaintiff to establish all the
elements of the rescue doctrine, which include, in the case
before us, showing that § 339 applies to Raymond.  For
Laster's claim to survive Norfolk Southern's summary-judgment
motion, he must have put forward substantial evidence
indicating that Norfolk Southern owed a duty to Raymond and
that Norfolk Southern's breach of that duty created the need
for James to attempt to rescue Raymond.  For Norfolk Southern
to have owed a duty to Raymond, Raymond must have been within
the class of children, as identified by § 339(c), the
Restatement protects.  See Ricketts v. Norfolk Southern Ry.,
686 So. 2d at 1105 ("'In adopting § 339, this Court recognized
the special duty owing to a class of plaintiffs, defined in §
339(c), whose natural proclivity for wonder and adventure
exceeds their sense of impending danger.'" (quoting Henderson
v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 881 (Ala. 1993))).  The
protections of § 339 are not unlimited; under § 339, a
possessor of land owes a duty of reasonable care to protect a
child from a dangerous condition on the land if it is
1050532
Comment i. to Restatement § 339 explains: 
3
"The duty of the possessor, therefore, is only to
exercise reasonable care to keep the part of the
land upon which he should recognize the likelihood
of children's trespassing free from those conditions
which, though observable by adults, are likely not
to be observed by children, or which contain the
risks the full extent of which an adult would
realize 
but 
which 
are 
beyond 
the 
imperfect
realization of children. It does not extend to those
conditions the existence of which is obvious even to
children and the risk of which should be fully
realized by them."
  
See also 1 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 236, at 609 (2001)
("If the landowner ... could foresee that children might enter
and be harmed because, given their age and experience, they
might fail to appreciate the danger, and if the landowner
could have avoided such serious risks with a relatively small
expense, courts today generally recognize a duty of care to
the child and liability for negligence."); 5 Fowler B. Harper
et al., Harper, James and Gray Torts § 27.5, at 186 (3d ed.
2008) ("The requirements of the more modern Restatement view
that the plaintiff must satisfy center on unreasonable
probability of harm.").
29
foreseeable that children will trespass and the possessor
should know that the condition poses an unreasonable risk of
harm, outweighing the usefulness of the condition, that
trespassing children could not be expected to appreciate and
avoid.   Restatement (Second) Torts § 339.  However, Laster,
3
who asserts the rescue doctrine in order to establish Norfolk
Southern's negligence, has failed to demonstrate that its
application allows him to recover.  
1050532
30
A summary judgment is appropriate when "it appears from
the combined evidentiary showings before the court at the
hearing that there is no genuine issue of fact to be
resolved."  Jerome A. Hoffman, Alabama Civil Procedure § 10.3
(2d ed. 2001).  Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., states:
"[A summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law."
Thus, if the record does not demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact regarding Raymond's appreciation of the danger
of playing on a stopped train, then the summary judgment was
appropriate.
There is little evidence in the record regarding Raymond
and his appreciation of danger.  Neither party deposed Raymond
or had him execute an affidavit.  As Laster himself admits,
"[i]t is unknown whether nine year old Raymond had any
realization of any risk involved with climbing on the ladder
of the parked rail car, in that no testimony of Raymond was
presented to the trial court."  Laster's brief at 16.  "Such
an explicit admission in a brief is binding on the party
1050532
Lyle overruled Central of Georgia R.R. v. Robins, 209
4
Ala. 6, 7, 95 So. 367, 368 (1923). See Lyle, 547 So. 2d at 508
("By rejecting the age limitation imposed in Central of
Georgia, this Court now embraces § 339 as the only authority
for determining whether a child may recover. This is not to
say that age should not be a factor at all. The comment to §
339 clearly states that recovery will be less likely as the
age of the child increases. Age may be an important factor in
determining liability, but it is one of many factors that must
be examined. ...  Central of Georgia, and those cases relying
on that case, are hereby overruled to the extent that they are
inconsistent with our holding today ....").
31
making it."  Ford v. Carylon Corp., 937 So. 2d 491, 502 (Ala.
2006).  The only evidence regarding Raymond's awareness of the
danger of a temporarily stopped train is the fact that Raymond
was nine years old at the time of the accident.
This Court has recognized that age is a factor in
deciding whether a child can appreciate a hazard on another's
property.  Lyle v. Bouler, 547 So. 2d at 508.  The Court in
Lyle set forth a nonexhaustive list of factors that "merit
examination":
"(1) the intelligence of the child; (2) the capacity
of the child to understand the potential danger of
the hazard; (3) the child's actual knowledge of the
danger; 
(4) 
the 
child's 
ability 
to 
exercise
discretion; (5) the education level of the child;
(6) the maturity of the child; and (7) the age of
the child."
547 So. 2d at 508.   Laster could have attempted to meet his
4
burden of showing that Raymond did not appreciate the danger
1050532
32
of climbing onto a railroad car by putting forward evidence
based on some or all the listed factors.  The Court in Lyle
did not state that any factor –- age included -– was
sufficient, by itself, to meet that burden.  Laster did not
present any evidence as to any factor other than age.
Laster 
states, 
instead, 
that 
he 
relies 
on 
"the
presumption of no negligence (appreciation of danger)" as
establishing a genuine issue of material fact.  However, our
caselaw does not recognize any such presumption in this
context.
The dissent states that "[a] child between the ages of 7
and 14 is prima facie incapable of contributory negligence,"
___ So. 2d at ___, and argues that this presumption should
apply in determining James's and Raymond's appreciation of the
danger in this case.  However, this Court established in Lyle
that, in § 339 cases, determining appreciation of the danger
depends on a factor-based analysis. 547 So. 2d at 508 ("[T]his
Court now embraces § 339 as the only authority for determining
whether a child may recover. ... Age may be an important
factor in determining liability, but it is one of many factors
that must be examined.  Elements that merit examination are:
1050532
33
(1) the intelligence of the child; (2) the capacity of the
child to understand the potential danger of the hazard; (3)
the child's actual knowledge of the danger; (4) the child's
ability to exercise discretion; (5) the education level of the
child; (6) the maturity of the child; and (7) the age of the
child.").  The dissent points to these factors from Lyle but
concludes: "Thus, the respective ages of James and Raymond
constituted substantial evidence that each of them was
incapable of appreciating the risk at issue in this case in
the same manner as an adult, thereby creating a genuine issue
of 
material 
fact 
and 
making 
the 
summary 
judgment
inappropriate."  ___ So. 2d at ___.  However, our decision in
Lyle emphasizes that "[a]ge may be an important factor in
determining liability, but it is one of many factors that must
be examined."  There is no indication in Lyle that age, or any
other factor, is, by itself, dispositive or, as applied in
this case, that any one factor, by itself, constitutes
substantial evidence of a child's appreciation of the danger
under § 339.  We decline to adopt that reading of Lyle in this
case.
1050532
34
Moreover, as noted previously, Laster did not argue on
original submission that the so-called tender-years doctrine
should apply in the § 339 context.  He mentioned the age-based
presumption in support of his argument that James could not be
contributorily negligent, but it was not until his application
for a rehearing that he implied that the presumption ought to
apply 
to 
the 
determination 
of 
James's 
or 
Raymond's
appreciation of the danger in this case.  Therefore, we need
not address this argument. See Stover v. Alabama Farm Bureau
Ins. Co., 467 So. 2d 251 (Ala. 1985).
James testified that Raymond continued to climb on the
railroad car, notwithstanding James's warning that the train
would start moving soon.  "[A] landowner is not subject to
liability when a child knows of a danger and appreciates the
risk involved, but chooses to go forward and to encounter the
danger out of 'recklessness or bravado.'"  Hollis, 667 So. 2d
at 732 (quoting Restatement (Second) Torts  § 339 cmt. m.).
"Section 339(c) is very specific with regard to the lack of
knowledge that must be proven before a landowner will be held
liable for injuries to a child trespasser caused by an
artificial condition."  Hollis, 667 So. 2d at 731.  Given the
1050532
There is scant testimony as to Raymond's state of mind,
5
but James's testimony suggests some awareness of danger:
"Q. Now, then you said something about, I think, you
heard a train coming?
"A. So we said -– it was like coming, so we were
like –- we got scared. So we just came back."
James also explained why he and Raymond decided to turn around
and walk away from the front of the train.  He testified: "We
didn't want to get to the front of the train, like if it just
started back and stuff.  That would be kind of scary."
35
lack of evidence in the record indicating whether Raymond
appreciated the danger involved in climbing on the train car,5
we cannot conclude that the summary judgment entered in this
case was erroneous.
Because discovery had been completed, Norfolk Southern's
burden under Rule 56 could be met by demonstrating to the
trial court that Laster's evidence was insufficient to
establish an essential element of his claim.  Ex parte General
Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 909 (Ala. 1999) ("[A] moving
party 'need not prove a negative in order to prevail on a
motion for a summary judgment.'" (quoting Lawson State Cmty.
Coll. v. First Cont'l Leasing Corp., 529 So. 2d 926, 935 (Ala.
1988)).  Laster then could have "'defeat[ed] a motion for
summary judgment ... by directing the trial court's attention
1050532
Instead, on original submission and in his application
6
for a rehearing, Laster has assumed, incorrectly, that only by
Norfolk Southern's putting forward affirmative evidence that
Raymond did appreciate the danger posed by the train could
Norfolk Southern establish a prima facie case that it was
entitled to a summary judgment. 
The dissent also argues that this case is analogous to
7
Ricketts v. Norfolk Southern Ry., supra.  However, the Court
in Ricketts noted that, in addition to the injured child's
age,
"Eric's mother testified that Eric [the injured
child] was an average 14-year-old boy who made
average grades and who at the time of his injury had
just begun the 9th grade. Eric's mother described
him as 'all boy' who 'did what he had to do to get
by.' There is no evidence that Eric knew that anyone
had ever been injured from being on the trestle. In
fact, there was evidence that he knew that persons
had 
ridden 
across 
the 
trestle 
with 
apparent
impunity. There was testimony that Eric knew that an
uncle of his had ridden a motorcycle across the
trestle."
36
to evidence of that essential element already in the record,
that was ignored or overlooked by [Norfolk Southern], or
[could] submit an affidavit requesting additional time for
discovery ....'"  Id. (quoting Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d
686, 691 (Ala. 1989) (Houston, J., concurring specially)).6
However, Laster did not provide any additional evidence
regarding Raymond's appreciation of danger, and a summary
judgment was proper as to Laster's negligence claim founded on
the rescue doctrine.   See Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P.
7
1050532
686 So. 2d at 1104.
Laster argues that if the trial court entered a summary
8
judgment based on Norfolk Southern's argument that James was
contributorily 
negligent, then the judgment 
should be
reversed.  However, because we hold that Norfolk Southern
breached no duty owed to James or to Raymond, we may affirm
the trial court's judgment on that ground, and we need not
address Laster's contributory-negligence argument.  See
Premiere Chevrolet, Inc. v. Headrick, 748 So. 2d 891, 893
(Ala. 1999) ("The appellate courts will affirm the ruling of
the trial court if it is right for any reason, even one not
presented to or considered by the trial judge."); Smith v.
Equifax Servs., Inc., 537 So. 2d 463, 465 (Ala. 1988) ("An
appellee can defend the trial court's ruling with an argument
not raised below, for this Court 'will affirm the judgment
37
(stating that a party "may not rest on mere allegations or
denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial"); Ronald L. Carlson, Successful
Techniques for Civil Trials § 8:26 (2d ed. 1992) ("The mere
possibility that a fact issue may exist is not enough to
defeat summary judgment, and the litigant opposing summary
judgment may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or
denials as a vehicle for obtaining trial.").  For these
reasons, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in entering
a summary judgment for Norfolk Southern on the basis that
James was injured during an attempt to rescue his friend.8
1050532
appealed from if supported on any valid legal ground.'"
(quoting Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (Ala.
1983))). 
38
IV. Conclusion 
Laster has failed to meet his burden of producing
substantial evidence showing that James did not appreciate the
danger of approaching a stopped train so that a summary
judgment would be improper.  Also, Laster has failed to
produce substantial evidence indicating that Raymond did not
appreciate the danger of climbing on a stopped train; thus,
Laster is unable to demonstrate that the rescue doctrine would
allow him to recover for James's injuries on the basis of
Norfolk Southern's breach of a duty of care owed to Raymond.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in entering a summary
judgment for Norfolk Southern.
APPLICATION OVERRULED; OPINION OF JANUARY 5, 2007,
WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
1050532
39
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
Respectfully, I must dissent.  I cannot agree that this
case was proper for resolution by summary judgment on the
issue of the children's appreciation of the risk presented.
Regardless of which party has the burden of coming forward
with evidence  or the ultimate burden of proof as to elements
of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339(c), the fact of James's
and Raymond's ages, 10 and 9, respectively, is at least
substantial evidence creating a genuine issue as to a material
fact, i.e., whether they appreciated the risk of intermeddling
with a stopped train. Indeed, the children's ages, standing
alone, give rise to what our cases have referred to as a prima
facie case of a child's inability to appreciate that risk in
the same manner as would an adult.  Accordingly, our
precedents also make it clear that it is the unusual case in
which the issue whether a child was capable of appreciating,
and did appreciate, a particular risk is not a question for
the jury.
1050532
40
I. Substantial Evidence of Incapacity to Appreciate the
Risk, Based on the Children's Ages
The railroads' position before the trial court and on
appeal is that the record does not contain substantial
evidence from which jurors could find that James and Raymond
did not appreciate the danger of approaching and climbing up
on the train.  An issue thus presented is whether the fact
that a child is only 9 or 10 years old can itself be
substantial evidence indicating that the child did not
appreciate the risk of climbing on a ladder on the side of a
boxcar of a stopped train.  In answering a question of this
nature, neither this Court nor jurors are required to leave
common sense and life experiences at the door of the
courtroom.  
It is fundamental that a jury is to weigh the evidence
before it "in the light of common sense, common reason, and
the common experience of men, in connection with all the facts
and circumstances in the case."  Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Shaw, 22 Ala. App. 54, 55, 112 So. 179, 180 (1927).  "The
jury, in the discharge of its duty, is called upon to exercise
[its] common sense, observation, and every day experience" in
assessing the facts and circumstances developed and in
1050532
41
determining "such inferences as should be accorded" those
facts.  Brown v. State, 31 Ala. App. 54, 58, 11 So. 2d 874,
877 (1943).  See also United Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. St. Clair,
41 Ala. App. 243, 251, 130 So. 2d 213, 219 (1961) ("Surely the
jury, by common sense and by common knowledge, must have known
that 
Mr. 
St. 
Clair 
had 
suffered 
pain 
during 
this
experience."); Thomas v. State, 37 Ala. App. 179, 181, 66 So.
2d 189, 190 (1953) ("The jury was privileged to apply its
common sense and every-day experiences and observations
...."); and Louisville & N.R.R. v. Gray, 199 Ala. 114, 120, 74
So. 228, 230 (1916) (holding that a jury should not assess the
facts presented "without regard to the teachings of common
sense and experience").  "It is presumed that jurors do not
leave their common sense at the courthouse door."  Ex parte
Rieber, 663 So. 2d 999, 1006 (Ala. 1995) (quoted with approval
in Ex parte Walker, 972 So. 2d 737, 747 (Ala. 2007)).
Common sense and life experience tell us, without fear of
contradiction, that, as to a given risk, there must be some
point at which a child's age, standing alone, constitutes
evidence from which a jury reasonably could infer an
incapacity to understand that risk.  If not age 9 or 10,
1050532
The viability of this question inevitably returns us to,
9
and 
reinforces 
the 
viability 
of, the long-established
presumptions in our law as to children of tender years. See
Part II, infra.
42
perhaps age 6?  If not 6, what about age 4, or age 3?  If this
is so, then the logical underpinning of the railroads'
position as to the substantial-evidence issue is removed, and
the only question remaining is –- at what age?  
9
The reasonableness of a jury's finding that a child
cannot appreciate certain dangers, based solely on the fact
that the child is only 9 or 10 years of age, is borne out by
a review of decisions by this Court both before and since Lyle
v. Bouler, 547 So. 2d 506 (Ala. 1989), discussed by the main
opinion.  As this Court noted in Lyle, "[f]or over 50 years,
this Court continued to use the age of 14 as the demarcation
line in determining whether a child would be liable for his
actions."  547 So. 2d at 507.  In the pre-Lyle case of Central
of Georgia R.R. v. Robins, 209 Ala. 6, 7, 95 So. 367, 368
(1923), a case involving a child who was injured while playing
upon a railroad turntable, this Court quoted with approval 20
R.C.L. 87, § 77:
"'The truth of the matter seems to be that the
turntable doctrine furnishes justification for a
recovery by children who have gotten old enough to
1050532
See also Birmingham & Atlantic Ry. v. Mattison, 166 Ala.
10
602, 609, 52 So. 49, 51 (1909) (noting that "there are ...
ages, usually 7, after reaching which, it becomes a prima
facie presumption only, and may then be rebutted by evidence
of unusual natural capacity, physical condition, training,
habits of life, experience, surroundings, and the like" that
the child is not capable of appreciating risks and danger in
the same manner as an adult).
43
go about unattended but are yet unaware of the
perils 
embodied 
by 
machinery 
and 
other
instrumentalities of an artificial nature -- the
period between the ages of five and ten.'"
(Emphasis added.)  In the same opinion, the Court noted:
"The cases seem to fully sustain the statements
of the text above quoted, and in practically every
statement of the rule of liability it is grounded
upon the duty owed to children of 'tender years,'
whose imprudences are usually due to the play of
childish instincts, unenlightened by experience, and
unrestrained by reason.  See note to Barnes v.
Shreveport City R.R. Co., 49 Am. St. Rep. 417, 418.
In his note to Westbrook v. Mobile, etc., R. Co.
(Miss.) 14 Am. St. Rep. 595, Judge Freeman remarks
that the rule of the 'turntable cases' has been
applied by the courts in many of the states 'to
children from five to twelve years of age.'"
209 Ala. at 7-8, 95 So. at 368 (emphasis added).10
Even if the children in this case had been over 14 years
of age, which they were not, Lyle makes clear that their ages
would still be important facts to be considered by the jury:
"By rejecting the age limitation imposed in
Central of Georgia [R.R. v. Robins, 209 Ala. 6, 95
1050532
The "age limitation" imposed in Central of Georgia was
11
the age after which children would be presumed to be capable
of appreciating risk and exercising judgment and discretion:
"In [Central of Georgia] this Court ruled that a child of
'tender years' could not be over 14 and that those over 14 are
'presumed to be capable of the exercise of judgment and
discretion.'"  Lyle, 547 So. 2d at 507 (emphasis added).  
44
So. 367 (1923),
] this Court now embraces § 339 as
11
the only authority for determining whether a child
may recover.  This is not to say that age should not
be a factor at all.  The comment to § 339 clearly
states that recovery will be less likely as the age
of the child increases. Age may be an important
factor in determining liability, but it is one of
many factors that must be examined."
Lyle, 547 So. 2d at 508 (emphasis added).  The Court then
proceeded to identify seven factors that merited examination,
the age of the child being one of them.  In addition, the age
of a child obviously can be a fact from which a jury can draw
inferences as to many of the other factors identified in Lyle,
those factors being  
"(1) the intelligence of the child; (2) the capacity
of the child to understand the potential danger of
the hazard; (3) the child's actual knowledge of the
danger; 
(4) 
the 
child's 
ability 
to 
exercise
discretion; (5) the education level of the child;
(6) the maturity of the child; and (7) the age of
the child."
547 So. 2d at 508.  Thus, the respective ages of James and
Raymond constituted substantial evidence that each of them was
incapable of appreciating the risk at issue in this case in
1050532
45
the same manner as an adult, thereby creating a genuine issue
of 
material 
fact 
and 
making 
the 
summary 
judgment
inappropriate. 
 
This 
is 
so 
despite 
the 
presence 
of
countervailing evidence in the case of James.  
Further, even if the record allowed us to conclude as a
matter of law that James personally appreciated the risk he
assumed in approaching the stopped train as he did and
therefore that the railroads had no direct duty to him in this
case, the "rescue doctrine" nonetheless would extend to James
the duty the railroads owed Raymond as a result of Raymond's
lack of appreciation of the risks at issue.  As to Raymond,
there is little, if any, countervailing evidence.
Raymond's age is a proven fact for purposes of this case.
That fact is direct evidence of what Raymond himself did or
did not appreciate in terms of the risks presented the
children.  It is not necessary that jurors be provided expert
witness testimony or treatises explaining what nine-year-olds
are and are not capable of appreciating.  As noted, jurors are
not required to check their common sense, life experience, and
basic understanding of human development and human nature at
the courthouse door.
1050532
Laster argues in his initial brief to this Court the
12
significance of the fact that James and Raymond were children
who did not fully appreciate the nature of the risk they
confronted and on the effect of the application of § 339 of
the Restatement.  Although the main opinion asserts otherwise,
see ___ So. 2d at ___ n.2, the principles discussed in
Part II, including the prima facie effect of the children's
ages, are essential to a proper exposition of the law in this
regard, to establishing the proper view of the evidence of
record in this case, and to a proper understanding of the
operation of § 339.
46
II. Further Comments on the Significance of the
Children's Ages on Lyle and on § 33912
The issue in Lyle was merely "whether the landowner may
owe a duty of care to a trespassing minor over the age of 14."
547 So. 2d at 506-07 (emphasis added).  Relying on Central of
Georgia, supra, the trial court in Lyle had ruled that, as a
matter of law, the landowner had no duty to a trespassing
minor over the age of 14 because of the principle that
children "over 14 are 'presumed to be capable of the exercise
of judgment and discretion.'"  Lyle, 547 So. 2d at 507
(quoting Central of Georgia, 209 Ala. at 8, 95 So. at 368).
See also Justice Maddox's dissent in Lyle, 547 So. 2d at 509
(criticizing the rationale employed by the majority in Lyle to
reverse the trial court's judgment, namely that "Tolbert [v.
Gulsby, 333 So. 2d 129 (Ala. 1976),] had the effect of
overruling the principle ... that a child over the age of 14
1050532
47
is 'presumed to be capable of the exercise of judgment and
discretion'").
What Lyle did was to make clear that Alabama law, in
fact, no longer presumed that children over 14 years of age
are capable of exercising judgment and discretion.  In place
of that presumption, the Court held that the determination of
whether a child over 14 years will be responsible for his or
her own actions in the context of § 339(c) would depend upon
the age of the child and other elements as articulated
therein:  
"In entering summary 
judgment, 
the 
Circuit 
Court
of Mobile County held that no duty was owed minors
over the age of 14.  The circuit court ruled that
this issue was settled in Central of Georgia R.R. v.
Robins, 209 Ala. 6, 95 So. 367 (1923).  In that
case, this Court ruled that a child of 'tender
years' could not be over 14 and that those over 14
are 'presumed to be capable of the exercise of
judgment and discretion.'  Central of Georgia, 209
Ala. at 8, 95 So. 367.
"For over 50 years, this Court continued to use
the age of 14 as the demarcation line in determining
whether a child would be liable for his actions.  In
1976, however, this Court ruled that 'for clarity
and certainty's sake now and in the future,'  § 339
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) would be
the law.  Tolbert v. Gulsby, 333 So. 2d 129, 135
(Ala. 1976).
"Justice Houston, writing for the Court in Motes
v. Matthews, 497 So. 2d 1121, 1122 (Ala. 1986),
1050532
48
reiterated our adoption of § 339, regardless of
whether the child was a trespasser or a licensee.
Because the Court has never reconciled § 339 with
Central of Georgia, the two standards continue to be
applied, although they are clearly contradictory. In
order to prevent further confusion, we reject the
14-year age limitation imposed in Central of Georgia
and reassert our adherence to § 339, Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1965).
"....
"It 
is 
clear that § 339 recognized the
irrationality of assigning arbitrary age limits to
determine a time when a child must assume total
responsibility for his actions."
Lyle, 547 So. 2d at 507-08 (emphasis added).  
What Lyle did not do was eliminate -- indeed, Lyle did
not even address -- the presumption in Alabama law that a
child under 14 years of age, or a child of "tender years,"  is
incapable of exercising the same judgment and discretion as an
adult.  This Court has specifically explained, since Lyle,
that "we apply a different standard to children below the age
of 14.  A child between the ages of 7 and 14 is prima facie
incapable of contributory negligence.   Superskate, Inc. v.
Nolen, 641 So. 2d 231, 236 (Ala. 1994); Savage Indus., Inc. v.
Duke, 598 So. 2d 856, 858 (Ala. 1992)."  Aplin v. Tew, 839
So. 2d 635, 639 (Ala. 2002).  
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49
There is no difference between a child's ability to
appreciate risks for the purpose of being contributorily
negligent and his ability to appreciate danger for the purpose
of satisfying § 339(c).  The very foundation upon which the
law presumes that a child between the ages of 7 and 14 is not
legally responsible for purposes of contributory negligence is
the fact that such an age constitutes prima facie evidence
that a child is not capable of appreciating certain dangers.
Section 339(c), by its terms, applies to children who
"because of their youth," i.e., their age, do not realize the
risk involved in intermeddling with the artificial condition
with which they are presented.  Moreover, the synonymous
nature of the issue whether a child is capable of contributory
negligence and the issue whether a child can appreciate risk
sufficiently to satisfy § 339(c) is self-evident.  The law
cannot embrace one rule in the former case and another in the
latter without producing illogical and conflicting results.
In Tolbert v. Gulsby, 333 So. 2d 129, 135 (Ala. 1976),
the Court noted "the similarity between Alabama cases using
the 
straight 
negligence 
doctrine 
in 
relationship 
to
trespassing 
children," 
which 
obviously 
implicates 
the 
doctrine
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50
of contributory negligence, "and Section 339, Restatement of
Torts 2d."  It was for "clarity and certainty's sake ...
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
children 
are 
licensees 
or
trespassers" that the Court adopted § 339 as the framework for
analyzing landowner-liability cases involving children.  333
So. 2d at 135.
Moreover, in Central of Georgia, the issue before the
Court was not an issue of contributory negligence itself, but
rather whether the landowner owed a duty to the injured child.
The Court’s opinion made clear that it considered the age-
based presumption for purposes of contributory negligence and
the age-based presumption for purposes of landowner liability
to be synonymous.  After quoting the observation in an earlier
case that no age had previously been determined to be, as a
matter of law, an age at which a landowner no longer owed a
duty to a trespassing minor, the Court stated:  
"'It must, however, in any case, be the age at which
the child is capable of contributory negligence.'
...
"We think this is the correct view of the
matter, deducible from the nature of the duty
prescribed, and from the necessities of the class
for whose benefit the law has raised the duty.
Certainly it is in accord with the general consensus
of judicial opinion ...."
1050532
The Court in Central of Georgia continued:
13
"In Cedar Creek [Store] Co. v. Stedham, [187
Ala. 622, 625, 65 So. 984, 985 (1914)], speaking of
children under 14 years of age, it was said:
"'Such a child may not, however -- and
he is rebuttably presumed by the law not to
-- possess that maturity of discretion
which dictates those precautions against
the dangers of fire that are conclusively
presumed by the law to belong to normal
children who are 14 years of age. ...  If
such a child, a child between 7 and 14
years of age and not possessing that
discretion and maturity of judgment which
the law conclusively presumes a normal
child of 14 years of age to possess, is
injured through the actionable negligence
of another, such a child is entitled to
recover, although his own carelessness
proximately contributed to his injury.'
"On 
the 
foregoing 
considerations 
and
authorities, we hold that, as a matter of law, the
plaintiff in this case was not within the class to
whom defendant owed the duty invoked, and therefore
is not entitled to recover as for a violation of
that duty."
209 Ala. at 8-9, 95 So. at 369.
51
209 Ala. at 8, 95 So. at 369 (some emphasis added).13
Lyle makes it clear that § 339 replaced the doctrines of
attractive nuisance and strict negligence as the legal
framework, or theory, within which courts are to analyze a
landowner's liability to trespassing children.  Regardless of
1050532
52
which legal framework is used, however, at some point in the
analysis it becomes necessary to assess the ability of the
child to appreciate the danger at issue.  (Under the framework
provided by § 339, that point is described in § 339(c).)  It
is at that point that the use of the age-based presumption
becomes applicable.  Nothing in Lyle (which had as its focus
whether the presumption against a child's being able to
appreciate a danger continued to apply to children over the
age of 14) or in the cases decided since Lyle eliminates that
presumption from our law.
In Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So. 2d 231 (Ala. 1994),
and other cases decided since Lyle, this Court has repeatedly
intermingled its discussion of the prima facie inability of
children between the ages of 7 and 14 to appreciate risks
sufficiently to be contributorily negligent and the inability
of children to appreciate risks for the purpose of satisfying
the elements required for landowner liability.  In Superskate,
for example, the Court specifically applied the factors
identified in Lyle to be determinative of whether a child
appreciates risks sufficiently to establish a duty on the part
of a landowner under § 339(c) as the factors to be used in
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53
determining whether a child between the ages of 7 and 14 is
capable of contributory negligence:
"'A child between the ages of 7 and 14 is prima
facie deemed incapable of contributory negligence.
King v. South, 352 So. 2d 1346 (Ala. 1977), citing
Alabama Power Co. v. Taylor, 293 Ala. 484, 306
So. 2d 236 (1975).  However, a child between the
ages of 7 and 14 may be shown by evidence to be
capable of contributory negligence by evidence that
he possesses that discretion, intelligence, and
sensitivity to danger that the ordinary 14-year-old
possesses.  Fletcher v. Hale, 548 So. 2d 135 (Ala.
1989).
"'"... 
To 
apply 
[contributory
negligence] to a child, the Court must
examine the following elements: (1) the
intelligence of the child; (2) the capacity
of the child to understand the potential
danger of the hazard; (3) the child's
actual knowledge of the danger; (4) the
child's ability to exercise discretion;
(5) the educational level of the child;
(6) the maturity of the child; and (7) the
age of the child. See, Lyle v. Bouler, 547
So. 2d 506 (Ala. 1989)."'"
641 So. 2d at 236-37 (quoting Works v. Allstate Indem. Co.,
594 So. 2d 60, 63 (Ala. 1992), quoting in turn Jones v. Power
Cleaning Contractors, 551 So. 2d 996, 999 (Ala. 1989)).
In Aplin, supra, this Court again addressed the prima
facie inability of a child between the ages of 7 and 14 to be
capable of contributory negligence by citing Lyle and
concluding that we should not hold such a child to the same
1050532
54
standard to which we would hold an adult.  839 So. 2d at 639.
The Court made clear that a child's "conscious appreciation of
the danger" was the issue in regard to whether the child was
"capable of contributory negligence." Id.
Similarly, Superskate made clear that the application of
the doctrine of assumption of the risk to a child is dependent
upon a showing "that the child subjectively appreciated the
danger and voluntarily undertook it."  641 So. 2d at 237.  In
reference to a child between the ages of 7 and 14, the Court
stated that "[w]here the defendants have not made such a
showing, the trial court properly would not submit the
question to the jury."  641 So. 2d at 237.  
Thus, while it may be that the plaintiff has the burden
of proving the elements of § 339, including § 339(c), the
plaintiff is aided in that effort by the fact that our law has
long recognized the inability of children between the ages of
7 and 14, as a general rule, to appreciate risks and dangers
in the same manner as do adults.  This inability to appreciate
risk logically must apply both to the issue whether a child is
incapable of appreciating a risk so that the law must in all
fairness deem the child incapable of contributory negligence
1050532
55
(or assumption of the risk) and thus leave responsibility for
protecting the child from that risk solely on the party
responsible for creating it, and to the corollary issue
whether a child is incapable of appreciating a risk such that
the law must in all fairness impose a duty on the landowner to
protect the child from an artificially created condition on
his or her land.  In short, the age-based presumptions of
incapacity found in the law of contributory negligence are the
same as the presumptions of incapacity that inform the rules
of landowner liability.
III. Application of the Foregoing Principles 
Under 
the 
above-discussed 
principles, 
the 
summary
judgment was inappropriate in this case.  First, the evidence
reflects that James was only 10 years of age.  Under our
caselaw, this fact alone creates a prima facie case that James
was not capable of appreciating the risk presented by the
stopped train.  Even if this were not true, however, the fact
would remain that James's age is itself one of the seven Lyle
factors. Furthermore, it is a fact from which the jury could
make inferences as to many of the other six factors. 
1050532
56
The main opinion recites countervailing evidence as to
James's appreciation of the risk, and that evidence certainly
is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.  It
does not, however, negate the evidentiary value of, and the
presumption resulting from, James's age —- it merely creates
a genuine issue of fact.  
It also is worth emphasizing that at the time Raymond
"intermeddled" with the railroad cars and James intervened to
"rescue" Raymond, the railroad cars were not "rumbling" down
the track, but had been stationary for some period.  Further,
the danger that James articulated in respect to the start-up
of the train while Raymond remained on the boxcar ladder was
simply that Raymond might be "taken off" by the train if it
started to move:
"I pulled Raymond down.  I told him it was going to
start up, because I didn't want it to just take him
off.  I thought it was going to zoom off with him on
the ladder and stuff like that, so I tried to grab
him off.  I had my foot on, not on the wheel, but
had it on the rail thingy, had it on the rail.  Like
I tried to pull him off.  It started up, like
started moving.  It was like boom, like lurched
forward, I guess.  It got my foot.  I pulled him
off, though."
This testimony itself corroborates the view that, because of
his age, James did not appreciate the danger of placing his
1050532
57
foot on the rail during his effort to remove Raymond from the
stationary train.
Indeed, given the foregoing testimony by James and the
fact that the artificial condition presented was a stationary
train, the opinion in Engel v. Chicago & North Western Transp.
Co., 186 Ill. App. 3d 522, 542 N.E.2d 729, 134 Ill. Dec. 383
(1989), is noteworthy.  Engel involved an injury to a 12-year-
old boy resulting from what was known as "flipping," or "[t]he
practice of grabbing a short ride on slow-moving freight
trains."  186 Ill. App. 3d at 525, 542 N.E.2d at 730-31, 134
Ill. Dec. at 384-85.  The court found a sufficient basis to
submit the case to the jury, explaining that 
"[t]he main reason the case cannot be determined as
a matter of law is that the 'obviousness' of the
danger is not such that no minds could reasonably
differ.  The policy determination that most children
are presumed to know the risks of injury inherit in
certain types of activities, such as playing with
fire or playing in bodies of water[,] does not
per se extend to the train flipping cases." 
 
186 Ill. App. 3d at 530-31, 542 N.E.2d at 734, 134 Ill. Dec.
at 388.
This case compares favorably to Ricketts v. Norfolk
Southern Ry., 686 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. 1996).  The only evidence
in Ricketts tending to support the conclusion that the injured
1050532
58
child should be treated differently from a similarly situated
adult in regard to whether he appreciated the danger involved
in his activity (driving an all-terrain vehicle across an
elevated railroad trestle) was the fact of the child's age --
14 -- and the fact that he made average grades for a 14-year-
old.  686 So. 2d at 1104.  Countervailing evidence —- i.e.,
evidence tending to prove that the child did appreciate the
risk — was presented in Ricketts in the form of comments  by
the injured child that "if he fell off [the trestle], the
helmet would not help him."  686 So. 2d at 1105.  Despite this
countervailing evidence of the child's appreciation of the
risk, this Court concluded that it could not say as a matter
of law that the child appreciated the risk so as to bar
recovery:
"Norfolk Southern emphasizes this statement as proof
that Eric Ricketts fully understood and appreciated
the risk of going onto the trestle.  As Dean Prosser
said in his article, Trespassing Children, 47 Cal.
L.Rev. 427 (1959), '"appreciation" of the danger is
what is required to bar recovery, rather than mere
knowledge of the existence of the condition, or of
some possible risk.'  Id. at 462. The question of a
child's appreciation of danger is ordinarily one for
the jury and not for the court.  Patterson v. Palley
Mfg. Co., 360 Pa. 259, 267, 6l A.2d 861, 865 (1948).
As this Court has said:
1050532
59
"'In 
adopting 
§ 
339, 
this 
Court
recognized the special duty owing to a
class of plaintiffs, defined in § 339(c),
whose natural proclivity for wonder and
adventure often exceeds their sense of
impending danger.  See Motes v. Matthews,
497 So. 2d 1121 (Ala. 1986).  Whether a
particular plaintiff falls within this
class will ordinarily present a jury
question. See Lyle v. Bouler, 547 So. 2d
506 (Ala. 1989).'
"Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 881
(Ala. 1993)[(involving a claim on behalf of a 12-
year-old boy)].  Thus, the question whether the
criterion of § 339(c) was met was for the jury's
determination."
686 So. 2d at 1105 (emphasis added).
The present case is a stronger candidate for a jury's
consideration than was Ricketts.  Here, James was only 10
years old, rather than 14.  He testified that he acted to pull
Raymond off the ladder by putting his foot "on the rail
thingy," and there is no evidence indicating that James
specifically appreciated the risk that would be associated
with stepping onto such a rail.  It is true that he testified
that he did appreciate the general danger of moving trains.
This, however, simply constitutes countervailing evidence.
Despite comparable countervailing evidence in Ricketts (also
in the form of the injured child's testimony indicating an
1050532
60
appreciation of the risks), this Court held that the issue was
not appropriate for a decision as a matter of law but was "for
the jury's determination." 
If the question of James's appreciation of the danger is
one for the jury, the question of Raymond's appreciation of
that danger is, a fortiori, also for the jury.  Consequently,
the question of the application of the "rescue doctrine,"
which is explained in the main opinion, should have been put
to the jury.
Unlike James, there is no countervailing evidence as to
Raymond.  All we have is the evidentiary value of the fact
that Raymond was only 9 years of age, the inferences that can
be drawn from that fact in relation to the other Lyle factors,
and the presumption generated by that fact under our law, as
well as the fact that Raymond did, in fact, proceed to engage
in an activity that a more mature person would have seen as
risky.  That was exactly the situation in Motes v. Matthews,
497 So. 2d 1121 (Ala. 1986).  
All we know from the reported opinion in Motes is that
the injured child was 12 years old and that he did in fact
engage in an activity that a more mature person would have
1050532
61
seen as risky (digging tunnels in excavated mounds of dirt at
a construction site).  With nothing other than these facts to
draw upon, this Court (1) quoted the elements of § 339;
(2) noted that
"[i]f there is any evidence tending to establish
each element of the cause of action, then summary
judgment would be inappropriate. In determining
whether there is evidence to support each element --
to raise a genuine question of material fact as to
whether that element exists, Rule 56(c) -- this
Court must review the record in a light most
favorable 
to 
the 
plaintiff 
and 
resolve 
all
reasonable doubts against the defendants."
497 So. 2d at 1123 (emphasis added); and then (3) stated that
"there is evidence from which the trier of fact could find
that [the child] did not appreciate the risk of intermeddling
with the embankment," which collapsed on him, causing his
death.  497 So. 2d at 1124.
The railroads argue that the release of the air brakes
and James's admonition to Raymond to come down from the side
of the boxcar constitute countervailing evidence as to
Raymond's appreciation of the risk.  The appropriate response
to that argument is twofold:  (1) By the time those events
occurred, Raymond already was in harm's way, with little time
to extricate himself from the danger in which he then found
1050532
62
himself.  (Indeed, Laster argues that one of several ways in
which the railroads breached their duty of due care was in not
sounding a warning with the horn, which would have given
reasonable advance notice that the train was about to move.)
(2) Even if the release of the air brakes and James's
admonition to Raymond constituted countervailing evidence,
those facts still would be only that -- countervailing
evidence, i.e., evidence countervailing against the prima
facie showing resulting from the child's age and the
inferences that can be drawn from it.
IV. Conclusion
To say that this case should not go to a jury based on
the record before us is, in my view, inconsistent with our law
and with the premise that juries are capable of appreciating,
without any additional evidence, the significance of what it
means to be only 9 or 10 years of age.  I, therefore,
respectfully dissent.
Cobb, C.J., concurs.