Case Title: State v. Thompson

Citation: 2009-Ohio-314

Docket Number: 20072389

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Thompson, 121 Ohio St.3d 250, 2009-Ohio-314.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. THOMPSON, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Thompson, 121 Ohio St.3d 250, 2009-Ohio-314.] 
Criminal law — Penalty enhancements under R.C. 4511.19 — Defendant must 
present prima facie case that prior convictions were unconstitutional 
before burden shifts to state to show that right to counsel was properly 
waived — Judgment reversed. 
(No. 2007-2389 — Submitted October 14, 2008 — Decided February 4, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Fairfield County, 
No. 2007-CA-00006, 2007-Ohio-6098. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
For purposes of penalty enhancement in later convictions under R.C. 4511.19, 
after the defendant presents a prima facie showing that the prior 
convictions were unconstitutional because the defendant had not been 
represented by counsel and had not validly waived the right to counsel and 
that the prior convictions had resulted in confinement, the burden shifts to 
the state to prove that the right to counsel was properly waived.  (State v. 
Brooke, 113 Ohio St.3d 199, 2007-Ohio-1533, 863 N.E.2d 1024, 
paragraph one of the syllabus, explained.) 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue in this case is whether Thompson’s prior convictions can 
be used to enhance the indictment against him.  We conclude that they can. 
Background 
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{¶ 2} Appellee, Billy Thompson II, was charged with two counts of 
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of R.C. 
4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (b).  Because Thompson had been convicted of driving 
under the influence (“DUI”) three times within the previous six years, the 
indictments that were issued in this case charged felonies of the fourth degree, not 
misdemeanors.  R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d) (“an offender, who, within six years of the 
offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or four 
violations of division (A) or (B) of this section * * * is guilty of a felony of the 
fourth degree”). 
{¶ 3} Thompson filed a pretrial motion to strike prior uncounseled 
convictions from the indictment based on his belief that “absent a showing by the 
State that he was either represented by counsel or executed a valid waiver of 
counsel in the prior cases, the State cannot utilize those convictions as an element 
of the instant charge.”  Thompson did not submit any affidavits, transcripts, 
testimony, or other evidence to support his motion.  The state filed a 
memorandum contrary to Thompson’s motion, which included copies of the 
waiver-of-rights forms that Thompson had signed prior to each of his three 
previous DUI convictions.  The trial court denied the motion, stating that 
Thompson “was either represented or waived representation on all three prior 
cases.” 
{¶ 4} After a bench trial, the court found Thompson guilty of both counts 
of driving under the influence.  The trial court sentenced Thompson to two years 
in prison and suspended all but 60 days with the condition that Thompson 
successfully complete an inpatient treatment program.  Thompson appealed, and 
the court of appeals reversed, relying on State v. Brooke, 113 Ohio St.3d 199, 
2007-Ohio-1533, 863 N.E.2d 1024, at ¶ 54, in concluding that “the record 
contains no evidence that the prior waivers of the right to counsel were made on 
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the record in open court, nor shown through the court’s colloquy with the 
appellant to have been knowingly and voluntarily made.”  State v. Thompson, 
Fairfield App. No. 2007-CA-00006, 2007-Ohio-6098, 2007 WL 3409329, ¶ 48.  
We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal.  State v. Thompson, 117 Ohio St.3d 
1475, 2008-Ohio-1841, 884 N.E.2d 1108. 
Analysis 
{¶ 5} In Brooke, we stated, “For purposes of penalty enhancement in 
later convictions under R.C. 4511.19, when the defendant presents a prima facie 
showing that prior convictions were unconstitutional because they were 
uncounseled and resulted in confinement, the burden shifts to the state to prove 
that the right to counsel was properly waived.”  Id., 113 Ohio St.3d 199, 2007-
Ohio-1533, 863 N.E.2d 1024, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Our use of the word 
“uncounseled” has two specific meanings with respect to constitutional infirmity: 
“uncounseled” can refer to a person who is not represented by an attorney or to a 
person who is not represented by an attorney and who did not validly waive his or 
her right to counsel.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 6} Even though nothing in the body of Brooke can be construed as 
suggesting that “a prima facie showing that prior convictions were 
unconstitutional” can be established merely by stating that the defendant had not 
been represented in the prior convictions and that the convictions had resulted in 
confinement, that is the interpretation that Thompson has taken.  This case 
highlights the “limitations in the English language with respect to being both 
specific and manageably brief.”  United States Civ. Serv. Comm. v. Natl. Assn. of 
Letter Carriers AFL-CIO (1973), 413 U.S. 548, 578-579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 
L.Ed.2d 796.  Our use of the word “uncounseled” in Brooke encompassed the 
combined definition, not the first alone.  Thus, a defendant cannot establish a 
prima facie showing as to “uncounseled” merely by establishing that he or she had 
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been convicted without representation.  For one thing, it is beyond dispute that a 
person has a constitutional right to represent himself or herself; therefore, it is not 
possible to establish a constitutional infirmity merely by showing that a person did 
not have counsel.  See Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution; State v. Gibson 
(1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 366, 74 O.O.2d 525, 345 N.E.2d 399, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  Furthermore, in State v. Brandon (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 85, 543 N.E.2d 
501, syllabus, we stated, “Where questions arise concerning a prior conviction, a 
reviewing court must presume all underlying proceedings were conducted in 
accordance with the rules of law and a defendant must introduce evidence to the 
contrary in order to establish a prima-facie showing of constitutional infirmity.”  
With respect to “uncounseled” pleas, we presume that the trial court in the prior 
convictions proceeded constitutionally until a defendant introduces evidence to 
the contrary.  Thus, we conclude that for purposes of penalty enhancement in later 
convictions under R.C. 4511.19, after the defendant presents a prima facie 
showing that the prior convictions were unconstitutional because the defendant 
had not been represented by counsel and had not validly waived the right to 
counsel and that the prior convictions had resulted in confinement, the burden 
shifts to the state to prove that the right to counsel was properly waived. 
{¶ 7} In this case, the state sought to enhance the violation, pursuant to 
R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d).  To do so, the state had to prove the prior conviction with 
“a certified copy of the entry of judgment in such prior conviction together with 
evidence sufficient to identify the defendant named in the entry as the offender in 
the case at bar.”  R.C. 2945.75(B)(1).  The state complied with this statutory 
provision, and Thompson has not argued to the contrary.  Instead, Thompson 
moved to exclude the prior convictions because the state had not established that 
he had been represented or had validly waived representation in his prior 
convictions.  But neither R.C. 2945.75 nor Brooke requires the state to prove that 
January Term, 2009 
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Thompson had been represented or that he had validly waived representation.  
According to Brooke, the state does not have the burden of proving that 
Thompson had been represented or that he had validly waived representation 
unless Thompson makes a prima facie showing that he had been “uncounseled” in 
his prior convictions — that is, that he had not been represented and that he had 
not validly waived representation.  Thompson made no such showing.  Unlike in 
Brooke, the defendant here did not submit evidence, whether testimony, affidavits, 
or transcripts, to bolster his argument that his waiver of counsel was 
constitutionally infirm.  A bald allegation of constitutional infirmity is insufficient 
to establish a prima facie showing with respect to an “uncounseled” plea.  
Because Thompson has not introduced evidence to the contrary and established a 
prima face showing, we presume that the trial courts in the prior convictions 
proceeded constitutionally.  Accordingly, there is no need to examine the waiver-
of-rights forms that the state claims Thompson signed prior to his three earlier 
convictions. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 8} We conclude that Thompson has not established a prima facie 
showing that he was “uncounseled” prior to his earlier guilty pleas; therefore, the 
burden of establishing that Thompson had either been represented or had validly 
waived representation did not shift to the state.  We reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court to reinstate the original 
sentence. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
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David L. Landefeld, Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney, and Julia B. 
Dillon and Gregg Marx, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
Burkett & Sanderson, Inc., Andrew Sanderson, and Devon Harmon, for 
appellee. 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. 
Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
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