Case Title: DARIN C. BAREKMAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0119

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
DARIN C. BAREKMAN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 13200 P.3d 802Case Number: S-08-0119Decided: 02/05/2009
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
DARIN 
C. BAREKMAN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.   Argument by Mr. Rehurek.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1] 
Darin C. Barekman pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to 
deliver a controlled substance, marijuana, while reserving his right to appeal 
the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his trash.  In his motion, and on appeal, he claimed 
the search of his trash without a warrant violated his right to be free from 
unreasonable searches, as protected by the United States and Wyoming 
constitutions.  We hold the search 
did not violate Mr. Barekman's constitutional rights and affirm the denial of 
his suppression motion.  

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]  The issue for our determination is 
whether the search of Mr. Barekman's trash violated his right to be free from 
unreasonable searches guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution or Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On May 24, 2007, Eric Ford, a Carbon 
County Sheriff's Deputy assigned to the Wyoming Division of Criminal 
Investigation as a Special Agent, met with an individual who was in custody in 
Rawlins awaiting trial on drug charges.  
The individual informed Special Agent Ford that on approximately 7 to 10 
occasions from June of 2006 to February of 2007, he had purchased marijuana in 
one ounce to one-quarter pound quantities from Mr. Barekman at his residence in 
Rawlins.  The informant stated that 
Mr. Barekman had possessed up to 10 pounds of marijuana at a time and sold it to 
numerous people, sometimes making sales every 15 minutes.  He said that Mr. Barekman worked for 
Shepard Construction during the day and sold marijuana in the evenings.  According to the informant, Mr. Barekman 
drove his Shepard Construction work truck to Colorado about twice per month, 
usually on Friday, to pick up the marijuana and bring it back to his 
residence.  He informed Special 
Agent Ford that Mr. Barekman kept the marijuana in a clear Tupperware container 
behind a couch in his living room and had a blue glass pipe that he used to 
smoke the marijuana.

 
 
[¶4] 
 The same day, after the interview 
with the informant, Special Agents Ford and Nicholas Bisceglia went to Mr. 
Barekman's address, located some trash cans in front of the residence and 
removed a trash bag.  Inside, they 
found mail addressed to Mr. Barekman, a paper plate with what appeared to be 
marijuana cigarette butts on it, and packing material with what appeared to be 
marijuana residue and pieces inside.  
Special Agent Ford recognized the packing material as consistent with the 
type used for concealing and transporting marijuana.  The agents performed field tests on the 
materials, the results of which were presumptively positive for marijuana.  

 
 
[¶5]  Later, the agents conducted surveillance 
at Mr. Barekman's residence.  They 
observed a pickup truck matching the description provided by the informant pull 
into the driveway.  They also 
observed an individual whom they identified by photo verification as Mr. 
Barekman get out of the pickup truck and enter the residence.  

 
 
[¶6]  On the basis of the information received 
from the informant and the evidence found in the trash can, Special Agent Ford 
obtained a warrant to search Mr. Barekman's residence.  He executed the warrant on June 4, 2007, 
and found three to four ounces of marijuana, misdemeanor amounts of LSD, 
psilocybin mushrooms and cocaine, as well as packaging materials, scales and 
other drug paraphernalia.  

 
 
[¶7]  The State charged Mr. Barekman with two 
felony counts, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and possession of 
marijuana, and three misdemeanor counts for possession of cocaine, psilocybin 
mushrooms and LSD.  Prior to trial, 
Mr. Barekman filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the trash can 
outside his residence.  The district 
court held a hearing on the motion and, after taking the matter under 
advisement, issued a decision letter and order denying the motion.  Mr. Barekman and the State subsequently 
reached a plea agreement in which Mr. Barekman agreed to enter a conditional 
plea of guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana and 
the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and recommend a sentence of 
three to five years in prison.  
After a sentencing hearing, the district court entered judgment against 
Mr. Barekman and sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement with credit 
for 333 days served.               

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]  Our review of alleged error in the 
denial of a motion to suppress is governed by the following 
standards:

 
 
            
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion 
of the trial court.  We will not 
disturb such rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion.  An abuse of discretion occurs when it is 
shown the trial court reasonably could not have concluded as it did.  Factual findings made by a trial court 
considering a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous.  Because the 
trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness 
credibility, and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination.  Whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights 
presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo.  

 
 

Negrette 
v. State, 
2007 WY 88, ¶ 11, 158 P.3d 679, 682 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Fourth Amendment

 
 
[¶9]  Mr. Barekman claims the trash search 
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  In concluding otherwise and denying the 
suppression motion, the district court relied on California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 
108 S. Ct. 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988).  
Mr. Barekman asserts that Greenwood is factually distinguishable 
from this case and does not support the ruling.

 
 
[¶10]  In Greenwood, a police investigator 
received information from an informant that Mr. Greenwood was involved in drug 
trafficking at his Laguna Beach residence.  
After conducting surveillance at the residence, observing vehicles 
stopping briefly during late night and early morning hours and following one of 
them to another residence that had been investigated for drug trafficking, the 
investigator asked the trash collector to pick up the trash bags left in front 
of the Greenwood residence and give them to her.  She examined the contents of the bags 
without obtaining a search warrant and found evidence of drug use.  She obtained a warrant to search the 
residence based upon an affidavit describing the items found in the trash 
bag.  The search resulted in Mr. 
Greenwood's arrest on felony drug charges.

 
 
[¶11]  After Mr. Greenwood posted bail, another 
investigator obtained more of his trash bags from the trash collector, examined 
the contents and found more evidence of drug use.  He obtained a search warrant and 
arrested Mr. Greenwood again on the basis of evidence seized in the 
search.

 
 
[¶12]  The California superior court dismissed 
the charges, ruling in accordance with California precedent that the search of 
Mr. Greenwood's trash bags without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and 
the California Constitution and, without the evidence found in the search, 
investigators did not have probable cause to obtain a search warrant.  The state court of appeals affirmed, the 
California Supreme Court denied a petition for review and the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed.

 
 
[¶13]  In holding that the search did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court 
said:

 
 
The 
warrantless search and seizure of the garbage bags left at the curb outside the 
Greenwood house would violate the Fourth Amendment only if respondents 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society 
accepts as objectively reasonable.  

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 

Here, 
we conclude that respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to 
defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection. It is 
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public 
street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and 
other members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the 
curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash 
collector, who might himself have sorted through respondents' trash or permitted 
others, such as the police, to do so. Accordingly, having deposited their 
garbage "in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner 
of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers 
take it," respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
inculpatory items that they discarded.      

 
 

Greenwood, 
486 U.S.  at 40-41 (citations and footnotes omitted).

 
 

[¶14]  Mr. Barekman contends that his case is 
distinguishable from Greenwood 
because the trash law enforcement removed from outside his residence and later 
searched was located on private property.  
The evidence was undisputed that the trailer park in which Mr. Barekman 
lived was privately owned by an out-of-state resident who contracted with a 
private individual in Rawlins for trash collection and removal to the city 
landfill.  The contractor provided 
the barrels in which residents placed their trash and required them to place it 
in bags before putting it in the collection barrels.  Special 
Agent Ford testified that the barrels were located on the curb approximately 25 
to 30 feet from Mr. Barekman's residence.  
Mr. 
Barekman contends that these facts, along with a city ordinance prohibiting the 
separation, collection or removal of trash from the landfill without city 
permission, gave him a subjective expectation of privacy in his garbage that 
society would accept as objectively reasonable; therefore, the search 
violated 
the Fourth Amendment. 

 
 
[¶15]  The State contends the factual 
differences Mr. Barekman relies on are insignificant and that Greenwood compels the conclusion that 
the search in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  The State asserts, whether private or 
not, the street where Mr. Barekman placed his trash was open to the public and 
he placed the trash there for removal by a third party.  The State argues he could not have had 
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy under these 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶16]  In Greenwood, the Court reaffirmed the 
principle established in earlier cases that what a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 41.  The Court reiterated that a person has 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information that he voluntarily turns 
over to third parties and society would not accept as reasonable a claim to such 
an expectation in trash left for collection in an area accessible to the 
public.  Id. 41-42.  Applying these principles, we conclude 
the facts Mr. Barekman relies upon are not sufficient to give rise under the 
Fourth Amendment to a claim of privacy that society would accept as reasonable. 
As in Greenwood, Mr. Barekman exposed 
his garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat his claim to Fourth Amendment 
protection.  He placed it at the 
curb away from his residence, where others could access it, for the express 
purpose of conveying it to and having it removed by a third party.  Having deposited his garbage in an area 
exposed to the public for the purpose of having a third party take it away, Mr. 
Barekman could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the items he 
discarded.  

 
 
[¶17]  Mr. Barekman asserts that the fact that 
the agents removed his trash from a privately-owned trailer court and that he 
placed it curbside for collection by a specific individual rather than an 
unknown person gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.  In United States v. Long, 176 F.3d 1304 
(10th Cir. 1999), the court considered similar 
facts and concluded they did not create an expectation of privacy protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.  There, the 
defendant made special arrangements with a trash collector for removal of his 
trash from where he left it on top of a trailer parked on his property near the 
alley.  Law enforcement stepped onto 
the defendant's property, removed the bags, searched them and found evidence of 
drug activity.  The Court held that 
neither the special arrangement for trash removal nor the fact that police, 
rather than the trash collector, removed the bags gave rise to an expectation of 
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.  
Upon placing the bags in a location where they were readily visible and 
accessible from a public thoroughfare and exposed not just to the trash 
collector but to anyone, including the police, coming down the alley, the 
defendant had no expectation of privacy.  Id. at 1308-1309.  Similarly, neither the fact that a 
specific individual collected Mr. Barekman's trash nor the fact that the agents 
themselves removed the bags from the barrel gave Mr. Barekman an expectation of 
privacy.  The seizure and search did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.  

 
 
2.         
Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Barekman also asserts the 
seizure and search of his trash bags violated Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  Relying on cases from 
other states, he asks this Court to find that the state constitution provides 
Wyoming citizens greater protection from searches and seizures of trash than the 
United States Constitution provides.  
He acknowledges this Court's holding in Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122 (Wyo. 
1970), that Mr. Croker did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to the 
contents of his trash once he placed it in garbage cans for purposes of 
removal.  Mr. Barekman argues, 
however, that in Croker the Court did 
not conduct the analysis required for deciding the issue under the state 
constitution.  

 
 
[¶19]  In Croker, police officers asked the 
individuals responsible for collecting trash in Mr. Croker's neighborhood to 
turn his trash over to them after collecting it from cans located near the alley 
gate inside his backyard.  The 
officers examined the contents and found marijuana.  They then obtained a search warrant on 
the basis of an affidavit describing the items found in the trash.  Mr. Croker claimed that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash protected by the federal and 
state constitutions.  

 
 
[¶20]  This Court held that the trash search did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, § 4.  It reasoned that once Mr. Croker put his 
trash in the cans for purposes of removal "he impliedly consented to entry upon 
his premises by the garbage collectors in the regular performance of their 
duties and to the removal of the garbage by them to the alley, which was open to 
the public.  At that time, the 
officers or anyone else, if the garbage collectors did not object, were free to 
examine the contents of the collectors' barrel."  Croker, 477 P.2d  at 
125.

 
 
[¶21]  Mr. Barekman is correct that this 
Court's decision in Croker did not 
independently analyze the state constitutional claim.  Croker was decided nearly 40 years ago, 
before this Court began applying the Gunwall factors for determining state 
constitutional claims.  Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 
(Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring).  
Mr. Barekman asks us to consider his claim in accordance with current 
Wyoming law.  Citing at length from 
State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 
1990) and State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996), he urges this Court to hold that the Wyoming Constitution does 
not allow law enforcement to rummage through citizens' trash without a 
warrant.

 
 
[¶22]  Under the Tenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, the freedom of the state to provide greater expectations of 
privacy for its citizens than those provided under the federal constitution is 
guaranteed if, in either its legislative or judicial discretion, it deems it 
necessary or appropriate to do so.  
Saldana, 846 P.2d  at 612.  Acknowledging that five of the factors 
this Court considers in deciding whether the state constitution provides greater 
protection are of little assistance in determining the scope of Article 1, § 4, 
Mr. Barekman focuses on the sixth factor:  
matters of particular state or local concern.1  He argues it is of great concern to the 
citizens of Wyoming that the personal items they place in their trash not be 
subjected to government search without a warrant.  

 
 
[¶23]  Under Wyoming law, a person alleging an 
illegal search must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
searched property.  Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 636 (Wyo. 
2000).  In order to demonstrate a 
legitimate expectation of privacy a defendant must show "both an actual 
subjective expectation of privacy and a reasonable expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize."  
Id.  The factors we consider in making this 
determination include:  (1) the 
precautions the defendant took to maintain privacy; (2) the likely intent of the 
drafters of the Wyoming Constitution; (3) the property rights the defendant 
possessed in the invaded area; and (4) the legitimacy of the defendant's 
possession of the property which was searched or seized.  Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 14, 152 P.3d 376, 381 (Wyo. 2007).   

 
 
[¶24]  There is no dispute that the trash 
contained in the bag the agents seized came from Mr. Barekman's residence.  There also is no dispute that when the 
agents retrieved the bag it was inside a barrel belonging to someone else who 
placed it next to the curb on a public thoroughfare for residents of the trailer 
park to leave their trash.  Mr. 
Barekman placed the trash in the barrel for it to be taken away and deposited in 
the city landfill. Other than placing his trash in a bag as the collector 
required, Mr. Barekman took no precautions to keep his trash private.  Under these circumstances, it is 
difficult for us to conclude that he had either an actual subjective expectation 
of privacy or a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize. While he certainly had an expectation of privacy in his trash when it 
was inside his property, out of public view, we are not persuaded that 
expectation was reasonable once he placed it out on the curb for pickup.  A majority of state courts have reached 
this conclusion under their own constitutions.2    

 
 
[¶25]  Mr. Barekman urges this Court to adopt 
the minority view that a reasonable expectation of privacy does exist under 
circumstances like those presented here.  
In Hempele, after concluding 
the trash search at issue did not violate the federal constitution, the court 
considered the question of whether it violated the New Jersey Constitution.  The court applied a different test under 
the state constitution than the United States Supreme Court applied under the 
federal constitution in Greenwood.  The New Jersey Court found that "the 
manifestation of a subjective privacy expectation should not be a separate 
requirement for protection" under the state constitution; rather, "the New 
Jersey Constitution requires only that an expectation of privacy be reasonable." 
 Hempele, 576 A.2d  at 802.   

 
 
[¶26]  From that starting point, the Court then 
considered the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in garbage left 
curbside for collection:

 
 
[W]e 
start from the premise that "expectations of privacy are established by general 
social norms." The "ultimate question" is whether, if garbage searches are 
"permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy 
and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent 
with the aims of a free and open society." With that question in mind, we first 
examine whether it is reasonable for a person to want to keep the 
contents of his or her garbage private.

 
 

Id. 
(citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶27]  The court considered the variety of 
private information discoverable from one's trash, such as financial and 
professional status, political affiliations and inclinations, health and medical 
conditions, personal relationships, eating habits, reading preferences and 
private thoughts, and held that "it is reasonable for a person to prefer that 
his or her garbage remain private."  
Id. at 803.  The court concluded that the New Jersey 
search and seizure provision, like the Fourth Amendment, "provides protection to 
the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view."  "Because ordinary opaque garbage bags 
conceal their contents from plain view," the court stated, "the presumption is 
that an expectation of privacy in the contents is reasonable."  Id. at 804.  

 
 
[¶28] 
Analogizing trash to mail left for pickup by a mail carrier, the court rejected 
the State's contention that trash should be excluded from the opaque container 
rule because it is left in locations vulnerable to outsiders' inspection for the 
specific purpose of being taken by a third party.  The court also rejected the State's 
argument that police should not be required to avert their eyes from evidence 
left in plain view of the public.  
"By enclosing their trash in opaque bags," the court stated, "people can 
maintain the privacy of their garbage even though they may place them in an area 
accessible to the public."  Id. at 807.  Finally, the court rejected the State's 
arguments that garbage is not constitutionally protected because it is 
pervasively regulated or because it is abandoned.  The court concluded the existence of 
ordinances prohibiting scavenging likely increases people's expectation that 
garbage set out for collection will remain private.  Likewise, the court concluded that the 
abandonment of an item by throwing it away may be an effort to maintain privacy, 
not to relinquish it.  On the basis 
of this reasoning, the court held:  
"A person has as much right to privacy in items concealed in a 
garbage bag as in items concealed in other opaque containers.  Defendants had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the contents of their trash bags and can claim the protection of 
article I, paragraph 7" of the New Jersey Constitution.   Id. at 810.

 
 
[¶29]  In Morris, 680 A.2d  at 92-93, the Vermont 
case upon which Mr. Barekman relies, the court also held the state 
constitution's search and seizure provision provided greater protection from 
warrantless trash searches than the federal constitution.  "Given the intimate details of people's 
lives that may be revealed by searching through their refuse, we conclude that 
persons have a reasonable interest in keeping private the contents of their 
sealed trash containers" which "is not lost merely because people follow the 
customary practice of depositing their garbage in closed containers at curbside 
for collection and disposal."  Id. at 94-95.  In reaching this result, the Vermont 
court followed much the same analysis as the New Jersey court conducted in Hempele.   

 
 
[¶30]  Hempele and Morris are factually indistinguishable 
from Mr. Barekman's case.  In all 
three cases, an informant told police the defendant was involved in drug 
trafficking.  On the basis of that 
information, police went to the defendants' residence and seized trash bags 
placed for pickup in containers outside.  
Search of the bags revealed evidence of illegal drugs.  Based on the informants' statements and 
the evidence seized from the trash bags, police obtained search warrants.  Given these factual similarities, we 
could join the states that have held trash searches by law enforcement without a 
warrant violated their state constitutional provisions.  See also, State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Haw. 
1985); State v. Goss, 834 A.2d 316 
(N.H. 2003); State v. Granville, 142 P.3d 933 (N.M. App.Ct. 2006); State v. 
Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990).

 
 
[¶31]  However, having fully considered the 
courts' reasoning for finding greater protection under their state 
constitutions, we decline to recognize in this instance any increased protection 
under Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  We conclude instead that once Mr. 
Barekman placed his trash in the barrel at the curb on the public roadway for 
someone else to take it away, he evidenced the intent to relinquish any 
expectation of privacy he had in the contents.  Additionally, even assuming it were 
possible to find a subjective expectation of privacy once Mr. Barekman placed 
his trash at the curb for removal, we conclude society would be unwilling to 
recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable.  As the Montana Supreme Court 
stated:

 
 
 While garbage bags oftentimes remain 
intact until their contents are collected by a designated hauler, it is also 
common to see homeless people, stray pets and wildlife, curious children, and 
scavengers rummaging through trash set out for collection, in hope of finding 
food, salvageable scrap, or deserted treasure.  The wind and the elements are also 
factors, particularly in Montana.  
Routinely, cans are knocked over, bags are exposed to the predations of 
dogs and raccoons, and garbage is found strewn across streets and 
alleyways.  In short, society's 
experience with trash left at the alley or curb for collection is anything but 
consistent with an objective expectation of privacy. 

 
 

State 
v. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 
116 P.3d 800, 804-804 (Mont. 2005).  
Mr. Barekman did not have an expectation of privacy in his trash that 
society would accept as objectively reasonable and the search did not violate 
Article 1 § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.3   Id.  

 
 
[¶32]  In his final issue, Mr. Barekman asserts 
Special Agent Ford's affidavit was not sufficient to support issuance of a 
search warrant absent the evidence seized in violation of the state and federal 
constitutions.  Our holding that the 
trash search did not violate either constitutional provision makes consideration 
of this issue unnecessary.   

 
 
[¶33]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1The factors previously identified by this Court are:  1) the textual language of the Wyoming 
Constitutional provision; 2) the differences in the texts; 3) constitutional 
history; 4) preexisting state law; 5) structural differences; and 6) matters of 
particular state or local concern.  
Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, 
¶ 15, 146 P.3d 492, 496 (Wyo. 2006).

 

2Smith 
v. State, 
510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973); Rikard v. 
State, 123 S.W.3d 114 (Ark. 2003); People v. Ayala, 1 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2000); 
People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271 
(Colo. 1992); State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993); State v. 
Donato, 20 P.3d 5 (Idaho 2001); Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 
(Ind. 2005); State v. Henderson, 435 N.W.2d 394 (Iowa 1988); State v. 
Alexander, 981 P.2d 761 (Kan. 1999); State v. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 116 P.3d 800 (Mont. 2005); State v. 
Washington, 518 P.2d 14 (N.C. App.Ct. 1999); State v. Schmalz, 744 N.W.2d 734 (N.D. 
2008); State v. Payne, 662 N.E.2d 60 
(Ohio App.Ct. 1995); State v. 
Stevens, 734 N.W.2d 344 (S.D. 2007); State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 544 (Utah 
1997); State v. Stevens, 367 N.W.2d 788 (Wis. 1985).  

 
 

3In 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 116 P.3d  at 805, the Montana court imposed two limitations on trash searches.  First, the officers must retrieve the 
trash "in substantially the same manner as the trash collector would take it." 
Id.  "In other words, officers cannot openly 
rummage through a person's garbage at the curb or in the alley, to the 
embarrassment or indignity of the owner."  
Id.  Second, the officers must have an 
articulable individualized suspicion that a crime is being committed in order to 
justify the garbage seizure.  Id.  The issue of whether similar limitations 
should be imposed on trash searches under the Wyoming Constitution was not 
raised in the present case.