Case Title: Tipton-Whittingham v. City of LA

Citation: 

Docket Number: S112943

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 12/2/04 (this opn. should follow companion case filed same date, S112862) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
TERRY TIPTON-WHITTINGHAM et al., ) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
S112943 
 
 
) 
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
We granted the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit to answer two related questions of law.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.8.)  
(1)  May attorney fees as provided for in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 
and Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), be awarded where the 
plaintiff has been the “catalyst” in bringing about the relief sought by the 
litigation?  (2)  If the catalyst theory is viable under California law, will that theory 
support an award of attorney fees where the plaintiff “activates” the defendant to 
modify its behavior; or does California law require a judicially recognized change 
in the legal relationship between the parties, such as a judgment on the merits, a 
consent decree, or a judicially ordered settlement? 
The facts, as described in the request for decision, are as follows:  The City 
of Los Angeles (the City), appeals from the district court’s order of September 21, 
2001, awarding interim catalyst attorney fees and costs, under California law, to 
plaintiffs, Terry Tipton-Whittingham, et al..  The case filed in the district court is a 
 
 
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class action on behalf of women officers and women civil employees of the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) who allege they have been subjected to 
discrimination on the basis of sex and/or race.  Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief 
and damages pursuant to federal and state constitutional claims, federal and state 
statutory claims, and state tort claims. 
After the case was filed, the parties entered into settlement discussions 
leading to a consent decree that later was revoked by United States District Judge 
Keller.  Thereafter, plaintiffs began new settlement discussions with the newly 
appointed LAPD Chief, Bernard C. Parks.  Those talks did not result in any 
contractual or court-ordered agreement.  Instead, the LAPD voluntarily instituted 
several changes directed toward antidiscrimination.  Noting that the changes were 
very similar to the original consent decree, plaintiffs represented to the district 
court that their injunctive relief claims were moot as they had been “resolved 
informally through negotiations that have not resulted in a formal agreement 
between the parties, but have resulted in comprehensive change sufficient to moot 
plaintiffs’ claims.”  On a joint motion of the parties, the district court dismissed 
plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief.  Approximately one year later, plaintiffs 
moved for attorney fees and costs under California Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1021.5 and the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government 
Code section 12965, subdivision (b).  They asserted they had prevailed on their 
state and federal injunctive relief claims as evidenced by the City’s policy 
changes, and they contended their efforts had brought about those changes.  
United States District Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr., granted the motion, awarding 
plaintiffs costs and more than $1,703,383 in attorney fees.  The City did not appeal 
from that order and in fact paid the award in the fall of 2000. 
 
 
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On July 20, 2001, the City moved for reconsideration of the district court’s 
order in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Bd. v. 
West Virginia D.H.H.R. (2001) 532 U.S. 598 (Buckhannon), which rejected the 
catalyst theory as a legal basis for the recovery of prevailing-party attorney fees 
under certain federal statutes.  The district court granted the City’s motion for 
reconsideration, denied plaintiffs’ attorney fees and costs under federal law, but 
upheld the entire award under California law.  The Ninth Circuit then certified to 
this court the above questions pertaining to the viability of the catalyst theory 
under California law. 
For the reasons explained in the companion case of Graham v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation (Dec. 2, 2004, S112862) ___ Cal.4th ___ 
(Graham), we answer the questions as follows.  California law continues to 
recognize the catalyst theory and does not require “a judicially recognized change 
in the legal relationship between the parties” as a prerequisite for obtaining 
attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.  In order to obtain 
attorney fees without such a judicially recognized change in the legal relationship 
between the parties, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst 
motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought; (2) that the lawsuit 
had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of 
nuisance and threat of expense, as elaborated in Graham; and, (3) that the 
plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit. 
Because this case concerns a public entity, we emphasize another critical 
limitation first articulated when we originally recognized the catalyst theory over 
20 years ago.  In Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo 
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 348, we considered a suit demanding the defendant Secretary of 
the Health and Welfare Agency establish guidelines implementing legislation that 
 
 
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would prohibit various types of discrimination by state-funded programs.  We 
found no causal connection between the lawsuit and the eventual issuance of those 
regulations, the process of which was already well underway when the lawsuit was 
filed.  The majority rejected as a factual matter the dissent’s argument that the 
lawsuit expedited the issuance of the regulations, but went on to state that even if 
that were true, attorney fees should not be awarded.  As this court stated: 
“[A]warding attorney fees to plaintiffs on the basis of the expedited [promulgation 
of regulations] would have detrimental consequences for the public in future 
lawsuits involving similar causes of action against public agencies.  Once an 
agency was sued, it would refrain from taking any steps that it would normally 
take to accelerate the promulgation process, for fear that its actions would be 
perceived by the court as having been induced by the litigation.  To avoid the 
possibility of having to pay attorney fees, the agency would strictly adhere to the 
original timetable that it had set for completing its work.  This would deprive the 
public of the benefit to be gained from a speedier promulgation of the 
regulations.”  (Id. at p. 354, fn. 6.)   
We reiterate Westside Community’s holding.  Attorney fees may not be 
obtained, generally speaking, by merely causing the acceleration of the issuance of 
government regulations or remedial measures, when the process of issuing those 
regulations or undertaking those measures was ongoing at the time the litigation 
was filed.  When a government agency is given discretion as to the timing of 
performing some action, the fact that a lawsuit may accelerate that performance 
does not by itself establish eligibility for attorney fees. 
The City argues that the catalyst theory will deter public agencies from 
making voluntary policy changes after litigation has been filed.  As noted above, 
we have adopted the requirement that a plaintiff attempt to settle its grievance 
 
 
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short of litigation.  Thus, for example, when the responsible authorities of a public 
agency are unaware of a discriminatory policy by their subordinates, prompt 
correction of this policy once it is brought to their attention will avoid payment of 
attorney fees.  Moreover, when a government agency is clearly given discretion to 
choose among a number of courses of action, the fact that it chooses to exercise its 
discretion in a manner favorable to a plaintiff in a lawsuit filed against it does not 
mean that its actions were required by law. 
The certified question also asks about the viability of the catalyst theory 
under Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), a part of the FEHA.  That 
subdivision states, in pertinent part: “In actions brought under this section, the 
court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s 
fees and costs . . . .”  The FEHA is, inter alia, a statutory expression of the 
fundamental policy against employment discrimination.  (Flannery v. Prentice 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 584.)  “[S]ection 12965 [attorney] fees are intended to 
provide ‘fair compensation to the parties involved in the litigation at hand and 
encourage[] litigation of claims that in the public interest merit litigation.’ ”  
(Ibid.)  In deciding whether to, and how to, award attorney fees under section 
12965, subdivision (b), courts will look to the rules set forth in cases interpreting 
section 1021.5.  (See, e.g., Greene v. Dillingham Construction N.A., Inc. (2002) 
101 Cal.App.4th 418, 422; Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 
1128, 1172.) 
 
 
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In light of similarities in language and purpose between Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1021.5 and Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), 
we conclude that the catalyst theory, as articulated above, should apply to the 
award of fees under the latter statute.  The City’s argument to the contrary is based 
primarily on the meaning of the term “prevailing party.”  As explained in Graham, 
“prevailing party” and “successful party” are synonymous terms, and neither 
preclude the application of the catalyst theory in an attorney fee statute nor require 
that the successful or prevailing party obtain a court judgment.  Nor do we accept 
the argument that anything in prior case law or legislative history binds us to 
accept the most recent interpretation of similar federal statutes by the United 
States Supreme Court.  We therefore affirm that the catalyst theory, as articulated 
in Graham and above, fully applies to fees awarded under Government Code, 
section 12965, subdivision (b). 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
 
 
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C O P Y  
 
 
TIPTON-WHITTINGHAM ET AL. v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 
 
S112943 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I dissent. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has asked us to 
answer two related certified questions of California law:  (1)  May attorney fees as 
provided for in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and Government Code 
section 12965, subdivision (b), be awarded where the plaintiff has been the 
“catalyst” in bringing about the relief sought by the litigation?  (2)  If the catalyst 
theory is viable under California law, will that theory support an award of attorney 
fees where the plaintiff “activates” the defendant to modify its behavior; or does 
California law require a judicially recognized change in the legal relationship 
between the parties, such as a judgment on the merits, a consent decree, or a 
judicially ordered settlement? 
The certification request (Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles (9th 
Cir. 2003) 316 F.3d 1058, 1060-1061) informs us that plaintiffs filed this action as 
a class action seeking injunctive relief and damages against the City of Los 
Angeles (City) on behalf of women officers and women civil employees of the 
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).  The suit alleges they have been 
subjected to racial or sexual discrimination, or both.  The parties entered into 
settlement discussions leading to a consent decree that the district court later 
revoked.  The plaintiffs then began new settlement negotiations with the newly 
 
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appointed Los Angeles Police Chief, Bernard C. Parks.  Those talks did not result 
in any contractual or court-ordered agreement.  Instead, the LAPD voluntarily 
instituted several changes directed toward anti-discrimination.  Noting that the 
changes were similar to the original consent decree, the plaintiffs told the district 
court that their injunctive relief claims were moot as they had been “resolved 
informally through negotiations that have not resulted in a formal agreement 
between the parties, but have resulted in comprehensive change sufficient to moot 
plaintiffs’ claims.”  On the parties’ joint motion, the court dismissed the claims for 
injunctive relief. 
Plaintiffs moved for attorney fees.  They claimed they had prevailed on 
their injunctive relief claims due to the City’s policy changes, and that their efforts 
had brought about those changes.  The court granted the motion and awarded 
plaintiffs costs and more than $1,703,383 in attorney fees.  Later the City moved 
for reconsideration of the award in light of Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. 
v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources (2001) 532 U.S. 598.  The 
district court granted the motion for reconsideration.  It denied attorney fees and 
costs under federal law but upheld the entire award under California law.  The 
City appealed. 
For the reasons explained in my dissent in the companion case of Graham 
v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation (December 2, 2004, S112862) ___ Cal.4th ___, 
___(Graham), we should reject the catalyst theory.  I would answer the 
certification questions as follows:  (1)  The catalyst theory alone will not support 
an award of attorney fees under California law.  (2)  California law requires a 
judicially recognized change in the legal relationship between the parties to 
support an award of attorney fees. 
 
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This case differs from Graham in one significant respect that makes the 
catalyst theory especially pernicious here:  The defendant is a governmental entity.  
Plaintiffs are seeking $1.7 million in attorney fees from the taxpayers of Los 
Angeles.  Obviously, it is not for this court to decide whether a federal court 
should award attorney fees under a state statute that federal law does not permit 
and, if so, how to apply the majority’s catalyst jurisprudence to this case.  The 
federal court will have to struggle with these questions.  But the majority has 
certainly opened the door to attorney fee awards of this kind. 
Thus, the taxpayers may ultimately bear the cost even though, judging from 
what the Ninth Circuit has informed us, no court has found that the City or any 
City official ever violated the law.  A city can finance a lot of municipal services 
for $1.7 million.  It can pay for law enforcement officers, fire trucks and 
firefighters, parks, libraries, mental health care, and much more, all of which is 
actually beneficial to society.  A large award like this against a school district 
could consume tax resources needed for teachers, textbooks, computers, music, 
art, and sports programs.  Such an award could devastate, even bankrupt, a smaller 
governmental entity.  Taxpayers should not have to pay millions of dollars to 
attorneys who never established that any public official violated the law.  We 
should not endorse this raid on the public fisc. 
In this case, the LAPD, under a newly appointed police chief, instituted 
voluntary changes that triggered a $1.7 million award of attorney fees against the 
City of Los Angeles.  The threat of such large awards of attorney fees will 
“discourage[] public officials from taking initiatives to revise outmoded 
ordinances or to improve institutional conditions, because [the catalyst] theory 
expressly recognizes ‘voluntary actions taken by a defendant’ as a proper basis for 
a fee award . . . whether or not the court could have ordered that change in 
 
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conduct.  In this way, catalyst theory serves to disable public officials, who may 
come to fear that worthwhile changes may be retroactively linked to a lawsuit and 
result in a hefty bill for attorneys’ fees.”  (S-1 By and Through P-1 v. State Bd. of 
Educ. (4th Cir. 1993) 6 F.3d 160, 172 (dis. opn. of Wilkinson, J.).) 
We expressed a similar concern ourselves in Westside Community for 
Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 348, where we overturned an 
award of attorney fees against a governmental agency predicated on the catalyst 
theory.  In a discussion that argues against the entire catalyst theory, and not just 
its application in that case, we rejected the argument that attorney fees were 
appropriate because the lawsuit had caused the public agency to accelerate the 
process of issuing certain regulations:  “[A]warding attorney fees to plaintiffs on 
the basis of the expedited fiscal study would have detrimental consequences for 
the public in future lawsuits involving similar causes of action against public 
agencies.  Once an agency was sued, it would refrain from taking any steps that it 
would normally take to accelerate the promulgation process, for fear that its 
actions would be perceived by the court as having been induced by the litigation.”  
(Id. at p. 354, fn. 6.)  This concern can be expressed more broadly.  Awarding 
attorney fees on the basis of a governmental agency’s voluntary actions would 
have detrimental consequences for the public in future lawsuits against 
governmental agencies.  Once sued, an agency may hesitate to take steps that 
might be good policy, although not legally required, for fear that its actions will 
expose it to substantial attorney fee awards. 
 
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We should reject the entire catalyst theory, not extend it to governmental 
defendants. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR:        BAXTER, J. 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
 
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See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX (on certification pursuant to rule 29.8, Cal. Rules of Court) 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S112943 
Date Filed: December 2, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Law Office of Carol A. Sobel, Carol A. Sobel; Litt & Associates, Barrett S. Litt, Paula A. Daniels; English, 
Munger & Rice, Constance L. Rice; NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Theodore Shaw; ACLU 
Foundation of Southern California, Mark D. Rosenbaum; Schonbrun, Desimone, Seplow, Harris & 
Hoffman and Paul L. Hoffman for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Richard M. Frank, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorney General, and Edward G. Weil, Deputy 
Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
F. Paul Bland, Kerry-Ann T. Powell, Victoria W. Ni, Arthur H. Bryant; Michael Schuster, Deborah 
Zuckerman; and Mark Savage for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, AARP, ACLU of Northern California, 
ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties, Asian Law Caucus, Asian Pacific American Legal Center of 
Southern California, Bet Tzedek-The House of Justice, California League for Environmental Enforcement 
Now, California Women’s Law Center, Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., Disability Rights Advocates, 
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Inc., The First Amendment Project, The Impact Fund, Law 
Offices of Joaquin G. Avila, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Legal 
Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, National 
Association of Consumer Advocates, National Center for Youth Law, Prison Law Office, Protection and 
Advocacy, Inc., Public Advocates, Inc., Public Citizen, Public Counsel, Public Interest Law Project, Rosen, 
Bien & Asaro, Western Center on Law and Poverty, Western Law Center for Disability Rights and Youth 
Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Rockard Delgadillo, City Attorney, Claudia McGee Henry and Gary G. Geuss, Assistant City Attorneys, 
Angel Manzano, Jr., Deputy City Attorney; Bergman & Dacey, Gregory M. Bergman, Mark W. Waterman 
and Beth D. Orellana for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
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Page 2 - counsel continued - S112943 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Marsha Jones Moutrie, City Attorney (Santa Monica), for League of California Cities and California State 
Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Somach, Simmons & Dunn, Timothy M. Taylor, Erica R. Arceo and Nicholas A. Jacobs for Western Placer 
Waste Management Authority as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Carol A. Sobel 
Law Office of Carol A. Sobel 
429 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 550 
Santa Monica, CA  90401 
(310) 393-3055 
 
Beth D. Orellana 
Bergman & Dacey 
10880 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900 
Los Angeles, CA  90024-4101 
(310) 470-6110