Case Title: Willis v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S02-1410-CR-617

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Barbara J. Simmons 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Oldenburg, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ruth Johnson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chandra K. Hein 
Marion County Public Defender 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S02-1410-CR-617 
 
DRAKKAR R. WILLIS, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division, No. 49F25-1301-CM-004568 
The Honorable Clark Rogers, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1310-CR-854 
_________________________________ 
 
 
March 24, 2015 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
Mar 24 2015, 9:36 am
 
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Drakkar R. Willis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for 
Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass.  We reverse.  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 
Working the late shift on Friday, January 18, 2013, Officer Christopher Clouse of the 
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department was dispatched to the Watkins Family Recreation 
Center.  A security alarm at the Center had been activated.  While en route Officer Clouse 
received an additional dispatch declaring the alarm company reported hearing “[v]oices and 
noises” coming from inside the building.  Tr. at 5.  Arriving on the scene Officer Clouse 
observed a black male, later identified as Willis, “running in a field that was just west of the 
building,” tr. at 7, about “a hundred yards away . . . .”  Tr. at 6.  Despite attempts by the State to 
suggest that the Officer observed Willis running out of the building,1 the officer was explicit:  “I 
didn’t see him come out of the building, no, ma’am.”  Tr. at 7.  In fact Officer Clouse testified 
that when he broadcast a description of the person he saw running in the field, he did not recall 
whether he said the individual was running through the field or running from the building.  He 
opined however, “[i]t probably would have said . . . because I didn’t see him come from the 
building.  I probably would have said there’s a subject running westbound in the field.”  Tr. at 8 
(omission in original).  In any event other officers arrived in the area apprehending and arresting 
Willis.  Entering the Center, Officer Clouse observed that a vending machine had been broken 
into and glass-like items were strewn throughout the building.  An Indianapolis Parks and 
Recreation supervisor testified that the Center closes at eight o’clock on Fridays and no one other 
than property managers or police officers have permission to enter the building after hours. 
Apparently Willis was neither. 
 
 
On January 28, 2013, the State charged Willis with criminal trespass as a Class A 
misdemeanor.  After a bench trial held on September 16, 2013, the trial court found Willis guilty 
as charged and subsequently sentenced him to 365 days in the Marion County jail with forty-five 
days suspended to probation.  Willis appealed challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.  In a 
                                                 
1 [State]: “Can you please describe the individual that you saw running out of the back of that building?”  
Tr. at 5.  [State]: “And did . . . were you able to identify that person as the same person you observed 
running from the building?”  Tr. at 6.  
 
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divided opinion the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  See Willis v. 
State, 13 N.E.3d 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).  Having previously granted transfer thereby vacating 
the Court of Appeals opinion, see App. Rule 58(A), we now reverse the trial court’s judgment.  
 
Discussion 
 
 
We recite our familiar standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to 
support a criminal conviction.  First, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of 
witnesses.  Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009).  Second, we only consider “the 
evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such 
evidence.”  Id. (quoting Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008)).  A conviction will be 
affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the 
offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id.  “It is the job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a 
particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting 
evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.”  Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ind. 
2005) (citations omitted).  
 
 
The State charged Willis with criminal trespass under the provision of Indiana Code 
section 35-43-2-2(a)(4) which provides:  “A person who . . . knowingly or intentionally 
interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without the person’s 
consent . . . commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor.”2  See App. at 22.  Willis 
contends the evidence is not sufficient to show that he interfered with the possession or use of 
the property of the Watkins Family Recreational Center.  According to Willis, “the State must 
show that Mr. Willis was actually on or in the recreational center in order to have interfered with 
the use and possession of the property as charged . . . .  In the present case, there was insufficient 
evidence to show that Mr. Willis was ever on or in the property of the Watkins Family 
Recreational Center.”   
 
                                                 
2 This statutory provision was recently amended effective July 1, 2014.  It is now codified at Indiana Code 
section 35-43-2-2(b)(2). 
 
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Br. of Appellant at 6.  The State counters that it was not required to produce direct evidence that 
Willis was on or in the Center.  Instead, according to the State, “[a] conviction can be based on 
circumstantial evidence, and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence, to 
support a conviction.”  Br. of Appellee at 5 (emphasis omitted) (citing Peters v. State, 959 
N.E.2d 347, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (sustaining conviction for unlawful possession of a 
handgun where there was no direct evidence of possession)).  We have no quarrel with this 
general proposition.  Indeed we have held “[a] conviction . . . may be based purely on 
circumstantial evidence.”  Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied.  And it is 
“not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.  The 
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.”  
Meehan v. State, 7 N.E.3d 255, 257 (Ind. 2014) (quotation and alteration omitted).  
 
Here, asserting that Willis was running from the crime scene the State contends 
“evidence of flight is relevant as circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s guilt.”  Br. of Appellee 
at 5 (citing Maxey v. State, 730 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. 2000) (finding error, if any, harmless in 
allowing testimony that police apprehended defendant out of state)).  However, this Court has 
held “[t]he fact that a defendant flees or does not flee does not indicate either guilt or innocence 
of itself . . . .”  Dill v. State 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232-33 (Ind. 2001) (finding trial court error in 
giving the jury a flight instruction).  We elaborated, “it is a matter of common knowledge that 
men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being 
apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses.”  Id. at 1233 
(quoting Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896)) (alteration omitted).  Thus, 
something more than running from the scene is necessary in order to infer Willis’ guilt.  
 
On this score, the State implies that Willis’ presence at the scene represents additional 
circumstantial evidence to support the conviction.  See Br. of Appellee at 6 (declaring “the 
evidence strongly supports the reasonable inference that Willis had been inside the recreation 
center when the alarm sounded . . . .”).  We make the following observations.  First, there is 
nothing in the trial transcript establishing that Willis was present at the recreation center—the 
crime scene—but rather he was spotted in a field about “a hundred yards away.”  Tr. at 6.  
Second, assuming for the sake of argument that Willis’ presence in the field was “close enough” 
 
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for our purposes, the State’s argument still fails.  “Mere presence at the crime scene with the 
opportunity to commit a crime is not a sufficient basis on which to support a conviction.”  Pratt 
v. State, 744 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Ind. 2001).  Instead, presence at the scene in connection with 
other circumstances tending to show participation, such as companionship with the one engaged 
in the crime, and the course of conduct of the defendant before, during, and after the offense, 
may raise a reasonable inference of guilt.  Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind. 2000).  Here, 
there were no other circumstances presented to the trier of fact raising a reasonable inference of 
guilt.   
 
In sum, at best the record shows that Willis was running in a field near a recreation center 
sometime after the burglar alarm was activated.  To be sure this conduct may have been 
considered suspicious, and perhaps Willis may even have had the opportunity to interfere with 
the possession and use of the recreation center without the owner’s consent.  But “[a] reasonable 
inference of guilt must be more than a mere suspicion, conjecture, conclusion, guess, 
opportunity, or scintilla.”  Mediate v. State, 498 N.E.2d 391, 393 (Ind. 1986); see also Vasquez 
v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind. 2001) (“An inference cannot be based upon evidence 
which is uncertain or speculative or which raises merely a conjecture or possibility.” (quotation 
and alteration omitted)).  It appears to us that the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain 
Willis’ conviction for criminal trespass. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We reverse the judgment of the trial court.  
 
Rush, C.J., and Dickson, David and Massa, JJ., concur.