Case Title: LANG v. ERLANGER TUBULAR CORP.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 105513

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
LANG v. ERLANGER TUBULAR CORP.  LANG v. ERLANGER TUBULAR CORP. 2009 OK 17 206 P.3d 589 Case Number: 105513 Decided: 03/10/2009 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA Robert Lang, Petitioner, v. Erlanger Tubular Corp., CNA Insurance Group, and the Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, Division III ¶0 The Workers' Compensation Court, Honorable Cherri Farrar, held that the worker's motion to reopen his claim based on a change of condition for the worse was barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Civil Appeals sustained the order. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; ORDER OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT SUSTAINED. Michael C. Bell, The Bell Law Firm, Norman, Oklahoma, for Petitioner, Amanda K. Smallwood, Pierce, Couch, Hendrickson, Baysinger and Green, L.L.P., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Respondents, Erlanger Tubular Corp., and American Casualty Company of Reading PA. COLBERT, J. ¶1 This matter addresses the timeliness of a worker's application to reopen his workers' compensation claim based on a change of condition for the worse under section 43(C) of the Workers' Compensation Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 85, §§ 1 through 211 (2001 & Supp. 2008). This Court determines that the worker's request was time barred. ¶2 Claimant, Robert Lang, suffered a compensable injury to his knee on June 12, 2001, in his employment with Erlanger Tubular Corp. (Employer). He was adjudicated permanently and partially disabled by an order filed on July 1, 2003. The order provided for continuing medical maintenance. That adjudication was followed on July 8, 2003, by an Order for Vocational Examination. ¶3 At a time not fully revealed by the record on appeal, Claimant's medical condition worsened. In October, 2006, surgery was performed on the knee to remove loose bodies from the joint and also for traumatic chondromalacia. An infection developed and Claimant underwent additional surgery in November, 2006. Employer's insurance company paid for the surgeries. It was not until May 15, 2007, however, that Claimant filed a Form 9 to reopen his claim based on a change of condition for the worse. ¶4 The Workers' Compensation Court denied Claimant's "Motion to Reopen" based on "the statute of limitations." The Court of Civil Appeals sustained the order and this Court granted certiorari review to hold that an application to reopen a claim for change of condition for the worse is controlled by section 43(C) which does not contain the "medical treatment rule" found in section 43(A). ANALYSIS ¶5 This matter seeks a construction of a statute and therefore it presents an issue of law. As such, it is reviewed de novo. See Kluver v. Weatherford Hosp. Auth., ¶6 Section 43 of the Workers' Compensation Act contains two provisions which impact this matter. Section 43(A) provides a two-year limitations period for the filing of a worker's claim for compensation. That period begins with the date of injury or from "the last medical treatment which was authorized by the employer or the insurance carrier or payment of any compensation or remuneration paid in lieu of compensation." Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 43(A) (Supp. 2008). Thus, the Oklahoma Legislature has expressly incorporated what the parties term a "medical treatment rule" into the text of the limitation period for the filing of a claim for compensation. ¶7 Section 43 contains a separate time limitation for reopening a claim for compensation based on a change in medical condition for the worse. The current version of section 43(C) requires such an application to be filed within three years "from the date of the last order." ¶8 "The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and follow the intention of the Legislature. If a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear and no occasion exists for the application of rules of construction a statute will be accorded the meaning expressed by the language used." Wylie v. Chesser, ¶9 Beginning in the 1930's, this Court articulated a medical treatment tolling rule to the filing of a workers' compensation claim. Thompson v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., ¶ 10 The Legislature eventually drew a distinction between a "claim for compensation," as that term is used in section 43(A), and an "application to reopen a claim" in section 43(C) by enacting two separate provisions. It treated the provisions very differently when it incorporated the medical treatment rule into the text of section 43(A) but chose not to incorporate that same rule into section 43(C). But the Legislature went further. In section 43(C) it expressed its intent to limit specifically "[t]he jurisdiction of the [Workers' Compensation] Court to reopen any cause" based on a change of condition to three years from "the date of last order." In doing so, the Legislature could not have more clearly expressed its intent. ¶11 The section 43(C) time bar is a statement of legislative intent that is contrary to its acceptance of the judicially created and legislatively adopted medical treatment rule contained in section 43(A). This Court is not at liberty to apply a medical treatment rule to the time bar of section 43(C) and thereby contravene the Legislature's unambiguous limitation on the jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court to reopen a claim. ¶12 This Court is not free to ignore the Legislature's expressed intent by imposing an adverse judicial "gloss." The statutory time bars contained in the Act are not one entity. They involve different demands for action by the Workers' Compensation Court and implicate different policies. The need to give effect to an employer's acts that indicate its assumption of liability, such as by providing medical treatment, are not compelling as to an application to reopen an adjudicated claim. The Legislature was free to draw a distinction between the time bar for filing an original claim and the time bar for an application to reopen a claim. ¶13 Because the medical treatment rule applies only to the filing of a workers' compensation claim, the parties' arguments as to whether Claimant met the requirements for such a rule do not impact this Court's determination of the timeliness of his application to reopen the claim based on a change of condition for the worse pursuant to section 43(C). An issue remains, however, concerning which version of section 43(C) applies to this matter. ¶14 Section 43(C) was amended effective July 1, 2005, to provide for a uniform three-year limitation period and to make the "date of the last order" the sole operative event that marks the beginning of that period. In earlier versions of section 43(C), the limitation period ran from the date of the change of condition. The application to reopen had to be filed within that same limitation period from the date of the last order. ¶15 There are three dates which must be determined by the Workers' Compensation Court in applying section 43(C). First, the date of the change of condition must be determined in order to apply the correct version of section 43(C). Second, "the date of last order" must be established to mark the beginning of the limitation period. "[T]he last order means one that substantially affects the monetary, medical, or rehabilitative benefits conferrable by the Act. An order directing . . . a vocational rehabilitation evaluation is one that . . . qualifies as a last order within the meaning of [section] 43(C)." Id. ¶ 22, ¶16 This matter demonstrates the continued relevance of the date of change of condition and the need for a specific on-the-record finding as to that date. Although no date of change of medical condition appears in the record on appeal, Claimant's Brief-in-Chief states that the current version of section 43(C) was in effect at the time of Claimant's change of condition. This is significant because the prior version would have provided 250 weeks from the date of last order in which to apply to reopen the claim and Claimant's request would have been timely. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; ORDER OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT SUSTAINED. Concur: Edmondson, C.J., Taylor V.C.J., Hargrave, Watt, Winchester, Colbert, Reif, JJ. Dissent: Opala, Kauger, JJ. FOOT