Case Title: State v. Weller

Citation: 162 Vt. 79, 644 A.2d 839

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_WELLER.92-342; 162 Vt. 79; 644 A.2d 839

[Opinion Filed May 20, 1994]


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-342


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

 Scott E. Weller                              June Term, 1993



 Linda Levitt, J.

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
     Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney,
    Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      JOHNSON, J.   Defendant Scott Weller appeals from a conviction of arson
 in violation of 13 V.S.A. { 502.  On appeal he argues that the trial court
 erred in (1) refusing to instruct the jury that it could not convict on the
 basis of his admissions of guilt alone, and (2) excluding an excited
 utterance by a woman at the scene that someone other than defendant had
 started the fire.  We affirm.
      Defendant was charged with arson in the burning of a portion of an
 apartment building where the boyfriend of his then-estranged wife lived.
 The State presented a police arson investigator who described his
 investigation in detail and offered his opinion that the fire was not caused

 

 accidentally, but rather was the result of human action.  The State linked
 defendant to the setting of the fire by introducing evidence of defendant's
 admissions of guilt.  The State presented testimony and a tape recording of
 defendant's statement, made on the telephone to his former sister-in-law and
 overheard by his ex-wife, that he had set the fire.  The State also called a
 witness who knew defendant when they were both correction center inmates.
 This witness testified that defendant had confided that he was worried that
 he would be charged with arson of a building where his ex-wife and her
 boyfriend lived.  The witness also testified that defendant had told the
 witness that he had set the fire in the hallway and made it look like
 someone else had started it, that defendant had commented when he saw a fire
 on television that "his fire" had been bigger, and that defendant was going
 to use a friend as an alibi.
      Defendant called several alibi witnesses.  In addition, defendant
 called David Laney, who testified that he had been at the scene of the fire.
 The court ruled that Laney's proffered testimony that he heard a "dark-
 haired stranger" say that her brother had set the fire was inadmissible
 hearsay.  The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the present appeal
 followed.
                                     I.
      Defendant's first argument is that the trial court should have
 instructed the jury that it could not convict defendant on the basis of his
 extrajudicial admissions alone and that its refusal to do so was reversible
 error.  Accordingly, defendant contends that he could have been convicted on
 the basis of his admissions without other evidence of the corpus delicti,
 and thus his conviction must be reversed.

 

      The State argues that we need not reach this issue because defendant
 failed to preserve it.  At the charge conference, defense counsel asked the
 court to instruct the jury that it could not convict defendant on the basis
 of his extrajudicial statements alone.  After a discussion, the court
 indicated that it would not give the proposed instruction.  After further
 discussion of the issue, defense counsel stated that if the first element of
 the arson charge "were to say that the fire had been set by human action,"
 rather than that the fire had been set by defendant, "then I would agree
 with you."  The judge agreed.  After the judge instructed the jury, defense
 counsel objected that the initially proposed instruction was not given.
      Because defense counsel expressed agreement to the instructions at the
 charge conference, the State argues the issue was not preserved.  We dis-
 agree.  Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 provides: "No party may
 assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
 objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
 distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection."
 (Emphasis added.)  Defendant's post-charge objection satisfied the require-
 ment of the rule and the "primary reason for the rule" -- it gave "the trial
 court one last opportunity to avoid an error."  State v. Wheelock, 158 Vt.
 302, 306, 609 A.2d 972, 975 (1992); cf. State v. Parker, 139 Vt. 179, 183,