Case Title: Marriage of Sonne

Citation: 48 Cal. 4th 118

Docket Number: S166221

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 2/22/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re the MARRIAGE of GORDON 
) 
ALBERT SONNE and THERESSA LYNN ) 
SONNE. 
) 
 
) 
 
) 
GORDON ALBERT SONNE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S166221 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H030110 
THERESSA LYNN SONNE, 
) 
 
) 
Monterey County 
 
Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. DR 41290 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Gordon Albert Sonne (Husband), the former Sheriff-Coroner-Public 
Administrator of Monterey County, is a member of the California Public 
Employees‟ Retirement System (CalPERS).  Members of CalPERS, once vested, 
participate in a defined benefit retirement plan, which supplies a monthly 
retirement allowance under a formula comprising factors such as final 
compensation, service credit (i.e., the credited years of employment), and a per-
service-year multiplier.  The retirement allowance consists of an annuity (which is 
funded by member contributions deducted from the member‟s paycheck and 
interest thereon) and a pension (which is funded by employer contributions and 
which must be sufficient, when added to the annuity, to satisfy the amount 
2 
specified in the benefit formula).  (Gov. Code, §§ 21350, 21362.2, subd. (a), 
21363.1, subd. (a).)   
In 1995, Husband transferred to his former wife, Dalia, 8.677 years of 
service credit, which represented her one-half interest in the service credit 
Husband had earned during their marriage.  Dalia subsequently exercised her right 
to a refund of the accumulated contributions in the account, thereby permanently 
waiving her rights to any further claim on Husband‟s retirement benefits, 
including any service credit.  (Gov. Code, § 21292, subds. (a), (d).)  Husband, who 
was then married to Theressa Lynn Sonne (Wife), exercised his right to redeposit 
the contributions (id., § 20751) and paid for it with community funds through 
monthly deductions from his salary.  By the time Husband and Wife had 
separated, the community had redeposited 70.83 percent of the scheduled 
payments, and the question arose:  What was the community‟s share of the service 
credit from the Husband-Dalia marriage?   
The trial court and the Court of Appeal agreed with Wife that the 
community was entitled to 70.83 percent of the service credit because the 
community had redeposited 70.83 percent of the member contributions for that 
period of service.  Husband contends that such an apportionment vastly overstated 
the community‟s interest, in that it accorded no weight or value to Husband‟s 
service as a deputy sheriff during that earlier period, which had supplied the 
consideration for the service credit.  Amicus curiae Barbara A. DiFranza, Certified 
Family Law Specialist, contends further that since community funds contributed 
only to the annuity component of the retirement allowance, the community was 
entitled only to a pro tanto share of the annuity—and not to a share of the much 
larger pension component, which was funded by employer contributions.     
3 
We agree with amicus curiae.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal and remand the matter for reconsideration of the apportionment 
of the service credit arising from the Husband-Dalia marriage. 
BACKGROUND 
In March 1971, Husband began working as a deputy sheriff for Monterey 
County.  He was elected Sheriff of Monterey County in 1998 and retired in 
December 2002.  He earned 31.918 years of service credit in the CalPERS 
retirement system.     
For present purposes, we discuss two of Husband‟s marriages, each of 
which ended in dissolution.  The first marriage, to Dalia, ended in 1991 after more 
than 17 years.  Under the original divorce settlement, Husband was awarded all 
CalPERS pension and retirement rights earned during the marriage.  In return, 
Husband was to make an offsetting cash payment to Dalia.     
Husband married Wife on November 12, 1994.  In 1995, because Husband 
could no longer keep up with the equalization payments to Dalia, he transferred to 
her one-half of the CalPERS service credit earned during their prior marriage.  
Accordingly, CalPERS credited Dalia‟s nonmember account with 8.677 years of 
service credit and $42,555.64 in member contributions and interest.  When Dalia 
withdrew the contributions and interest, Husband elected to redeposit them into his 
member account through a paycheck deduction over a period of years.  The 
deduction at first was taken from his salary and then, when he retired, from his 
monthly retirement allowance.  The redeposit ultimately restored the service credit 
to his member account.      
Husband filed for dissolution of his marriage to Wife in January 2004, after 
he had retired, but the deductions from his retirement allowance for the redeposit 
continued.  The total of the deductions taken during his marriage to Wife was 
$31,938.92.  The member contributions and accumulated interest over Husband‟s 
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entire career totaled $238,064.35.  The actuarial present value of the retirement 
benefit at the time of trial was in excess of $2 million.  The difference between 
Husband‟s total contributions and the actuarial present value of the retirement 
account was funded entirely by Husband‟s employer as a “current period 
expense.”          
In the dissolution proceeding arising from the Husband-Wife marriage, the 
parties disputed the character of the redeposited member contributions and the 
service credit arising from the Husband-Dalia marriage, among other issues.   
Husband‟s expert, Ronald G. Reddall, opined that the service credit was 
Husband‟s separate property and that the community had a right only to 
reimbursement of the community funds used to make the redeposit.  However, 
when asked whether the community would be entitled to “a pro tanto share of the 
appreciation,” Reddall replied that he “would leave that to the lawyers.”   
Wife‟s expert, George McCauslan, did not address the issue of the 
redeposited member contributions or the service credit in his trial testimony.  In an 
unsworn posttrial letter that was considered by the trial court, he articulated his 
understanding that the service credit should be allocated between community and 
separate property in the same proportion by which those estates had contributed to 
the redeposit.  He determined that community funds had been used to redeposit 
70.67 percent of the member contributions from the Husband-Dalia marriage and 
concluded that the community should therefore be allocated an additional 6.132 
years (0.7067 x 8.677 years) of service credit.  When these years were added to the 
service credit that was earned during the Husband-Wife marriage, McCauslan 
calculated the community share of the retirement allowance to be 41.22 percent.    
Husband offered an unsworn posttrial letter from Reddall, who determined 
the community share through a different method, which assigned only an 
additional 0.47 years of service credit to the community.  Reddall began with an 
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estimate of the actuarial present value of the 8.677 years of service credit:  
$594,322.  Because the community had redeposited only 5.374 percent 
($31,938.92 divided by $594,322) of the actuarial value of the service credit, the 
community was entitled only to 5.374 percent of the 8.677 service years—which is 
0.47 service years.  
The trial court largely adopted Wife‟s approach.  It calculated that the 
community had provided $31,938.92 of the $45,090.24 in redeposited member 
contributions (or 70.83 percent) and concluded that the community share of the 
service credits from the Husband-Dalia marriage was therefore 70.83 percent.  
When added to the service credit earned during the Husband-Wife marriage, the 
total community share of the retirement allowance was calculated by the trial court 
to be 41.22 percent, and Wife was awarded one-half of this as her share.     
The Court of Appeal affirmed this aspect of the judgment, but on different 
grounds.  The Court of Appeal agreed that Husband had a separate property 
interest in the premarital service to his employer, “which created his right to 
repurchase the service credits.”  However, the court found that Husband had 
commingled community property with his separate property when he used 
community funds to redeposit member contributions in order to recoup the 
premarital service credit, and he did not “indisputably establish” or “unequivocally 
trace” what proportion of the service credit was attributable to his separate 
property and what proportion to the community so as to overcome the presumption 
that the service credit became community property.  (See Fam. Code, § 760.)  
According to the Court of Appeal, the trial court “could have credited” Reddall‟s 
allocation of the respective shares but “was not required to credit this evidence,” 
since “[t]he trial court was vested with the power to credit or discredit Husband‟s 
evidence.  If it discredited Husband‟s evidence, it could properly conclude that the 
community property presumption applicable to property purchased during a 
6 
marriage with community funds had not been rebutted, and therefore the 
repurchased service credits were community property.”  The appellate court also 
rejected Husband‟s suggestion that the community be reimbursed for its 
contribution instead of being awarded an interest in his retirement allowance.       
We granted Husband‟s petition for review and now reverse. 
DISCUSSION 
Generally, all property acquired by a spouse during marriage prior to 
separation is community property.  (Fam. Code, §§ 760, 770.)  Community 
property “may include the right to retirement benefits accrued by the employee 
spouse as deferred compensation for services rendered. . . .  The right to retirement 
benefits „represent[s] a property interest; to the extent that such [a] right[] 
derive[s] from employment‟ during marriage before separation, it „comprise[s] a 
community asset . . . .‟  [Citation.]  „Throughout our decisions we have always 
recognized that the community owns all [such] rights attributable to employment 
during marriage‟ before separation.”  (In re Marriage of Lehman (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 169, 177, italics added.)  We review the superior court‟s characterization 
of Husband‟s service credit from the Husband-Dalia marriage as community 
property—a mixed question of law and fact that is predominantly one of law—de 
novo.  (Id. at p. 184; In re Marriage of Rossin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 725, 734.)     
In a dissolution proceeding, “[t]he superior court must apportion an 
employee spouse‟s retirement benefits between the community property interest of 
the employee spouse and the nonemployee spouse and any separate property 
interest of the employee spouse alone.  [Citations.]  It has discretion in the choice 
of methods. . . .  Whatever the method that it may use, however, the superior court 
must arrive at a result that is „reasonable and fairly representative of the relative 
contributions of the community and separate estates.‟ ”  (In re Marriage of 
Lehman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 187.)  In awarding the Husband-Wife community 
7 
70.83 percent of the service credit earned during the Husband-Dalia marriage, the 
lower courts failed to make a reasonable and fair allocation of the respective 
contributions by Husband and the community and failed as well to apprehend the 
two distinct components of Husband‟s retirement allowance—the annuity and the 
pension—only one of which derived from Husband-Wife community 
contributions.       
The trial court assumed that the community acquired a 70.83 percent share 
of the service credit arising from the Husband-Dalia marriage because the 
community had redeposited 70.83 percent of the member contributions for that 
time period.  The trial court‟s approach, in essence, is that the community 
purchased the service credit by redepositing member contributions.  But a 
redeposit of member contributions for a prior period of service does not constitute 
consideration for the service credit for that period; it is merely a condition 
precedent to a credit for that previously rendered service.  (See Gov. Code, 
§ 20756.)  The service credit (and the pension component of the retirement 
allowance) are more correctly described as “ „a form of deferred compensation for 
services rendered.‟ ”  (In re Marriage of Skaden (1977) 19 Cal.3d 679, 686.)  The 
trial court‟s analysis gave no weight whatsoever to the service Husband rendered 
as a deputy sheriff during those years, all of which preceded the Husband-Wife 
marriage.   
In other words, the trial court apportioned to the community the same share 
of service credit it would have received had Husband and Wife actually been 
married during those years of Husband‟s service to Monterey County.  This 
apportionment failed to consider that the right to the 8.677 years of service credit 
was Husband‟s separate property, which preexisted the Husband-Wife marriage, 
inasmuch as the service credit was offered in consideration for that prior 8.677 
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years of service.  (See In re Marriage of Lehman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 182-
183; In re Marriage of Lucero (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 836, 841 (Lucero).) 
Lucero, which involved almost the mirror image of the present case, is 
instructive.  There, the husband redeposited his federal employee retirement 
contributions after he and his wife had separated, using his own separate funds.  
Part of the redeposited contributions related to service years during the marriage.  
(Lucero, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d at p. 839.)  In rejecting the husband‟s claim that 
the increase in his retirement benefit due to the redeposit was entirely his separate 
property, the Court of Appeal recognized that the substantial increase in the 
husband‟s retirement benefit “was possible only as consideration for husband‟s 
service” during the marriage (id. at p. 841) and that “ „the community owns all 
pension rights attributable to employment during the marriage.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 842.)  
Accordingly, the court concluded that the wife had a right “to share in the 
increased retirement benefits upon payment of her pro rata share of the redeposit.”  
(Ibid.)   
The service credit at issue here, by contrast, was not attributable to 
employment during the Husband-Wife marriage.  Rather, it was earned during the 
Husband-Dalia marriage and was originally an asset of that community.  In the 
divorce proceeding in 1991, Husband and Dalia entered into a stipulated judgment 
that awarded the entirety of the community‟s CalPERS pension and retirement 
rights to Husband.   These rights remained Husband‟s separate property at the time 
of Husband‟s marriage to Wife in 1994.  (In re Marriage of Stenquist (1978) 21 
Cal.3d 779, 788 [“that portion of the husband‟s pension attributable to 
employment before marriage” is “correctly” classified “as separate property”]; 
Fam. Code, § 770, subd. (a)(1).)  In May 1995, Husband transferred one-half of 
the accumulated member contributions and service credit attributable to the 
Husband-Dalia marriage to Dalia to satisfy an outstanding obligation to Dalia.  
9 
Dalia‟s share was placed in a separate nonmember account (Gov. Code, § 21290), 
and it entitled her to receive “a retirement allowance based on the service 
retirement formula applicable to the service credited to the nonmember,” which 
would “consist of a pension and an annuity, the latter of which shall be derived 
from the nonmember‟s accumulated contributions.”  (Gov. Code former § 
21215.8, added by Stats. 1988, ch. 542, § 6, p. 1999, and repealed by Stats. 1995, 
ch. 379, § 1, p. 1955, italics added; see now § 21298, subd. (b).)   
Husband retained, as his separate property, a right to recoup that service 
credit in the event Dalia were to withdraw the assets in her nonmember account.  
(See In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 846, fn. 8 [“The law has long 
recognized that a contingent future interest is property [citation] no matter how 
improbable the contingency”]; In re Marriage of Joaquin (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 
1529, 1533 [“ „property to which one spouse has acquired an equitable right before 
marriage is separate property, though such right is not perfected until after 
marriage‟ ”].)  Dalia did just that (see Gov. Code, § 21292), and Husband elected 
to exercise his right to redeposit his member contributions plus interest.  (See id., 
§§ 20750, 20751.)  Had he made that redeposit with separate property funds, the 
recouped service credit would unquestionably have been his separate property.  
(Cf. In re Marriage of Shea (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 713, 717 [“where a fringe 
benefit is earned entirely by employment before marriage, it is the separate 
property of the employee even if received after marriage”].)  Wife errs in 
characterizing Husband‟s right to redeposit his member contributions as an 
investment opportunity governed by the interspousal fiduciary duty (see Fam. 
Code, § 1100, subd. (e)), inasmuch as the right to recover the prior service credit 
was Husband‟s separate property.                  
We therefore agree with the Court of Appeal that the service credit earned 
during the Husband-Dalia marriage was Husband‟s separate property at the time 
10 
Husband invoked his right to redeposit his member contributions plus interest.  
The rest of the Court of Appeal‟s analysis, however, is problematic.  The appellate 
court devised a new theory to uphold the trial court‟s apportionment of the 
Husband-Dalia service credit —i.e., that Husband had used community funds to 
make the redeposit, thus commingling community property with his separate 
property, yet had failed to discharge his burden of demonstrating “what proportion 
of the value of the repurchased service credits was attributable to his separate 
property as opposed to the community‟s funds.”  (See See v. See (1966) 64 Cal.2d 
778, 783.)  Where separate and community funds are commingled in such a 
manner that it is impossible to trace the source, the Court of Appeal continued, 
“ „ “the whole will be treated as community property . . . .” ‟ ”  (Quoting In re 
Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 611.)   
The Court of Appeal‟s commingling analysis rests on the erroneous legal 
assumption that Husband‟s retirement benefit was a unitary and indivisible asset.  
It is not.  As amicus curiae Barbara A. DiFranza, a certified family law specialist, 
points out, Husband‟s retirement allowance under the Public Employees‟ 
Retirement Law (Gov. Code, § 20000 et seq.) consists of two distinct components:  
an annuity and a pension.  (Gov. Code, § 21350.)  “[C]ontributions made by a 
member” are converted on retirement to an “ „[a]nnuity,‟ ” which makes 
“payments for life” and is equal in value to the accumulated normal contributions 
and interest in the member‟s individual account.  (Id., § 20018; see id., §§ 20012, 
21351.)  “[C]ontributions made from employer controlled funds,” in turn, form a 
“ „[p]ension,‟ ” which also makes “payments for life.”  (Id., § 20054.)  The 
retirement allowance thus consists of “a pension derived from the contributions of 
the employer sufficient when added to the service retirement annuity that is 
derived from the accumulated normal contributions of the member at the date of 
his or her retirement to equal 3 percent of his or her final compensation at 
11 
retirement, multiplied by the number of years of  . . . local safety service subject to 
this section with which he or she is credited at retirement.”  (Id., § 21362.2, subd. 
(a), italics added; see § 20576, subd. (a).)   
In this case, the community made a redeposit of a portion of Husband‟s 
accumulated contributions (id., § 20012) for the period of the Husband-Dalia 
marriage.  Those contributions were converted into an annuity upon Husband‟s 
retirement.  The obligation of the employer to contribute to the pension 
component, on the other hand, derived from Husband‟s service during the 
Husband-Dalia marriage.  Accordingly, the community had a claim only on the 
annuity component relating to the time period of the Husband-Dalia marriage, and 
was entitled only to a pro tanto share of that portion of Husband‟s retirement 
allowance.  (Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 414(k)(2) [“A defined benefit plan which provides a 
benefit derived from employer contributions which is based partly on the balance 
of the separate account of a participant shall [¶] . . . [¶] be treated as consisting of a 
defined contribution plan to the extent benefits are based on the separate account 
of a participant and as a defined benefit plan with respect to the remaining portion 
of benefits under the plan”].)   
Wife contends that Husband forfeited his right to seek apportionment on 
this basis by failing to present evidence at trial concerning the appropriate 
apportionment of the annuity portion of the retirement allowance.  However, Wife 
presented no evidence at trial concerning apportionment, either.  As the Court of 
Appeal remarked, “Wife‟s expert did not address the issue of the repurchased 
service credits in his trial testimony.”  Indeed, the issue was not even joined until 
Husband‟s expert addressed the issue in his posttrial letter and Wife‟s expert 
submitted a responsive letter.  Notably, neither the trial court nor the Court of 
Appeal ever asserted that Husband had forfeited his right to contest the 
12 
apportionment of the service credit, and we decline to interpose a procedural bar 
for the first time here.  
Instead, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court had chosen not to 
credit the evidence that Husband had presented—and that the trial court was 
within its discretion to do so.  But both the trial court and the Court of Appeal 
made an error of law in assuming that Husband‟s redeposit of member 
contributions with community funds entitled the community to a corresponding 
fraction of the entire retirement allowance attributable to the years of the Husband-
Dalia marriage.  In their view, since the community had redeposited 70.83 percent 
of the member contributions from the Husband-Dalia marriage, the community 
was entitled to 70.83 percent of the service credit earned during the Husband-
Dalia marriage.  But, as demonstrated above, the redeposit was of member 
contributions, and member contributions are used to purchase the service 
retirement annuity, which is only one component of the retirement allowance.  
(Gov. Code, §§ 20018, 21362.2, subd. (a).)  The remainder of the retirement 
allowance is supplied by the pension, which derives from the contributions of the 
employer and which, the record shows, is several orders of magnitude larger than 
the accumulated member contributions.  The Husband-Wife community did not 
contribute to that larger component of the retirement allowance, and it was 
therefore an abuse of discretion to award any share of it to the community.  (Cf. 
Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1427 [“there may be reason to 
consider the value of the acreage separately from that of the home, if the 
improvements enhanced only the residence”].)   
Accordingly, the trial court was correct in its general statement that “Wife 
is entitled to a pro tanto share of the appreciation of the [retirement benefit] in 
proportion to her community share of its purchase.”  But the trial court abused its 
discretion in assuming that the community, by redepositing member contributions 
13 
under Government Code section 20751, had any entitlement at all to the pension 
component of Husband‟s retirement benefit arising from the Husband-Dalia 
service years.  The trial court should instead have apportioned to the community 
only a pro tanto share of the annuity.1  (See Gov. Code, § 20576, subd. (a)(2).)        
Husband asserts that his expert already performed this calculation in his 
posttrial letter.  In that letter, Reddall derived the community‟s share of the service 
years arising from the Husband-Dalia marriage by dividing the community‟s 
redeposit of member contributions by the total actuarial present value of the 
service credit for that period.  Amicus curiae proposes a somewhat different 
calculation; she derives the community‟s share of the retirement allowance by 
dividing the community‟s redeposit of member contributions by the actuarial 
present value of the total retirement allowance.   
As we stated above, a trial court in general has discretion in selecting its 
method of apportionment, so long as the result “is „reasonable and fairly 
representative of the relative contributions of the community and separate 
estates.‟ ”   (In re Marriage of Lehman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 187.)  Tracing the 
community‟s contributions (and accumulated interest thereon) in the annuity 
component of Husband‟s retirement allowance would satisfy that standard.  We 
believe, though, that it is most prudent to grant the trial court the opportunity to 
                                              
1  
Wife seems to suggest that the trial court‟s apportionment was nonetheless 
fairly representative of the relative contributions of the community and separate 
estates, in that Husband‟s salary and the value of his retirement benefit increased 
substantially because of his tenure as Sheriff-Coroner-Public Administrator of 
Monterey County during their marriage.  Nothing in the record, however, indicates 
that the trial court apportioned Husband‟s retirement benefit on this basis.  
Moreover, a trial court has discretion to accord equal weight to each year of 
service in calculating the community interest in retirement rights, even though the 
employee‟s salary may be much higher in the later years than the early years.  (In 
re Marriage of Gowan (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 80, 90-91.)   
14 
exercise its discretion as to apportionment of the annuity component in the first 
instance, especially since the court did not take evidence at trial concerning the 
apportionment issue, the experts‟ posttrial letters on the issue were unsworn, and 
neither expert was available for cross-examination about their findings and 
opinions on the issue.  We therefore remand the matter to the Court of Appeal for 
remand to the trial court so it may take evidence and select and apply the 
appropriate method of apportionment.  (In re Marriage of Skaden, supra, 19 
Cal.3d at p. 689; Bono v. Clark, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1424-1425.)  
 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed to the extent it affirmed 
the trial court‟s apportionment of the service credit arising from the Husband-
Dalia marriage and is otherwise affirmed.  The matter is remanded to the Court of 
Appeal for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Marriage of Sonne 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 164 Cal.App.4th 1331 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S166221 
Date Filed: February 22, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Monterey 
Judge: Robert A. O‟Farrell 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Tarkington, O‟Neill, Barrack & Chong and Robert A. Roth for Appellant Gordon Albert Sonne. 
 
Barbara A. DiFranza as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant Gordon Albert Sonne. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Law Offices of Bernard N. Wolf, Bernard N. Wolf; Law Office of Billie C. French and Billie C. French for 
Appellant Theressa Lynn Sonne. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert A. Roth 
Tarkington, O‟Neill, Barrack & Chong 
2111 Vine Street, Suite B 
Berkeley, CA  94709-1576 
(510) 704-0921 
 
Bernard N. Wolf 
Law Offices of Bernard N. Wolf 
225 Bush Street, Suite 1439 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 788-7030