Case Title: Dixon v. State

Citation: 470 N.E.2d 728

Docket Number: 1183S412

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1984-11-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
470 N.E.2d 728 (1984)
Robert L. DIXON, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 1183S412.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
November 20, 1984.
*729 Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Melanie C. Conour, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Amy Schaeffer Good, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
PIVARNIK, Justice.
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner Robert L. Dixon was found guilty by a jury in the Marion Superior Court of class D felony theft and also was found to be a habitual offender. The trial court subsequently sentenced Appellant to thirty four years imprisonment. This Court affirmed Appellant's conviction on direct appeal with Justice Prentice dissenting to Issues I and II and Justice Hunter dissenting to Issue II. Dixon v. State, (1982) Ind., 437 N.E.2d 1318. Appellant, pro se, subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief which, after amendment, was denied by the Marion Superior Court. Appellant, by counsel, now appeals and raises the following four issues:
1. trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to represent himself at trial;
2. trial court's finding that Appellant's prior theft conviction was a felony and therefore could support a habitual offender finding;
3. trial court's instruction 6 given during the habitual offender portion of Appellant's trial; and
4. adequacy of Appellant's trial and appellate counsel.
We first note, as we have repeatedly, that a post-conviction action under Ind.R.P.C. 1 is a special, quasi-civil remedy whereby a party can present an error which, for various reasons, was not available or known at the time of the original trial on appeal. Phillips v. State, (1982) Ind., 441 N.E.2d 201. As such, the petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden to prove any grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge who presides over the post-conviction hearing possesses exclusive authority to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses. The reviewing court therefore will not set aside the trial court's ruling on a post-conviction petition unless the evidence is without conflict and leads solely to a result different from that reached by the trial court. Metcalf v. State, (1983) Ind., 451 N.E.2d 321.
Appellant first alleges that the trial court erred by denying his motion to represent himself at trial. Appellant concedes in his brief, however, that he raised this issue in his direct appeal and that this Court found that the trial court did not err in refusing Appellant's demand because Appellant had not properly asserted his United States Sixth Amendment waiver by a "clear and unequivocal request within a reasonable time prior to the first day of trial." (Issue II on direct appeal). Appellant now argues that his appellate counsel failed to include in the record on direct appeal Appellant's October 9, 1979, letter or a transcript of his June 11, 1980, pre-trial conference wherein he asked to represent himself well in advance of his trial on June 23, 1980. Notwithstanding Appellant's claim, our opinion clearly indicates that this Court fully considered Appellant's various and conflicting requests including his requests to represent himself. Our opinion noted:
Dixon, Ind., 437 N.E.2d  at 1321. Of course our test to determine the necessity of a hearing on the question of a defendant's self-representation is that the request for self-representation must be clear, unequivocable and timely made. Russell v. State, (1978) 270 Ind. 55, 383 N.E.2d 309. Inasmuch as this Court considered Appellant's pre-trial requests to represent himself but nonetheless upheld his conviction, we found that Appellant's pre-trial requests were not "clear and unequivocable" and therefore did not require any pre-trial hearings. Moreover, we note that although Appellant's self-representation request made on the morning of trial may have been clearly and unequivocably made, it was untimely. This issue was decided on the merits in Appellant's direct appeal. An issue decided on direct appeal is not reviewable in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Richardson v. State, (1982) Ind., 439 N.E.2d 610, reh. denied; Adams v. State, (1982) Ind., 430 N.E.2d 771. We find no error.
Appellant next alleges that the trial court erred by finding that his 1976 theft conviction was a felony for habitual criminal purposes. This exact issue was considered and decided by us as Issue VI on Appellant's direct appeal and therefore is not reviewable in this post-conviction relief proceeding. Richardson, supra; Adams, supra.
Appellant's third alleged error is that an improper mandatory instruction was given by the trial court during the habitual offender phase of his trial. The instruction complained about was as follows:
Appellant concedes that no objection was made to this instruction at trial and that this issue was not presented to us on direct appeal. The issue therefore was waived. Morris v. State, (1984) Ind., 466 N.E.2d 13; Kimble v. State, (1983) Ind., 451 N.E.2d 302. We do note, however, that this Court approved a similar instruction utilizing the imperative word "should" since that instruction, like this one using the imperative "must", was phrased in alternatives which did not bind the jury to one course of action. Maisonet v. State, (1983) Ind., 448 N.E.2d 1052, 1056. We find no error.
Appellant lastly claims that he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. In particular, he suggests at various points in his brief one example of his trial counsel's conduct and three examples of his appellate counsel's conduct to substantiate his general claim. We find that Appellant did not specifically raise and argue this issue in his brief on post-conviction appeal as required by Ind.R.App.P. 8.3(A)(3) and (7) and therefore he has waived it. Although this Court generally does not consider waived issues, we will consider a waived issue which indicates an error so fundamental that it denied the accused of a fair trial. Mitchell v. State, (1983) Ind., 455 N.E.2d 1131. This Court has held:
Warriner v. State, (1982) Ind., 435 N.E.2d 562, 563. Accordingly, we now consider only whether or not the conduct of Appellant's trial and appellate counsel amounted to fundamental error.
Appellant first suggests that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object when the habitual criminal instruction discussed in Issue III, infra, was proposed and given during trial. Appellant also faults his appellate counsel for not raising the instruction issue on his direct appeal. Noting that we decided above that this instruction was proper, we find no fundamental error as alleged. We again find, as we did in Issue XI on direct appeal, that Appellant was adequately represented during his trial.
Appellant next suggests that his appellate counsel was inadequate because he failed to convince this Court that Appellant's prior theft conviction was not a felony and therefore could not support a habitual offender finding. Appellant's entire argument in this regard is as follows:
We now find no merit in this contention, the gist of which was decided in Issue VI *732 on Appellant's direct appeal (See Issue II, infra.).
Appellant also suggests that his appellate counsel was inadequate because he neglected to include in the record on direct appeal Appellant's October 9 letter and a transcript of Appellant's June 11 pre-trial conference to "evidence the unequivocal demand for self-representation [Appellant] made prior to the day of trial." This contention was discussed in Issue I, infra, where we found no merit to Appellant's substantive claim. Notwithstanding the fact that said letter and transcript were not included in the original record on appeal, the record actually considered by this Court clearly indicated Appellant's equivocation in requesting to represent himself at trial. We find no fundamental error here.
Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction relief court in all things.
GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER, HUNTER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.