Case Title: Williams Feed v State

Citation: 2007 MT 79

Docket Number: 97e8257a-1c1a-4d4f-a307-bf3c39d614d3

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
: FILED
Maren 20 2007
' :
No. DA 06-0391

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2007 MT-79

WLANs FEED NC, Manan oper FILED

KIM. WILLIAMS and SHARON WILLIAMS,

 

use 20 207
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Ed Smith
‘ amg EM

 

STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,

Defendant and Respondent,

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Beaverhead, Cause No, DV-05-12787
Honorable Loren Tucker, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:

Wade J. Dahood, Bernard J. “Ben” Everett; Knight, Dahood,
Everett & Sievers, Anaconda, Montana

For Respondent:

Edward G, Beaudette, Lyle Manley, Special Assistant Attorneys
General, Montana Department of Transportation, Helena, Montana

‘Submitted on BriefS: December 20, 2006
Decided: March 20, 2007

Filed:

‘Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court

{1 Williams Feed, Inc., Kim F. Williams, and Sharon Williams (collectively the
Williamses) appeal from the order of the Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaverhead County,
‘denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. We affirm the District
Cour.

2 We state the issues as follows:

3 1. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury verdict in favor of the State of
Montana Department of Transportation (Department)?

{4 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying the Williamses’ motion fora

new trial

 

eging jury misconduct?
{5 3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding from evidence three right-
of-way agreements between the Department and other property owners abutting North
‘Montana Street?

{6 4. Did the District Court abuse its diseretion in excluding testimony from the Dillon
Chief of Police?

BACKGROUND

{7 Kim and Sharon Williams owned and operated Williams Feed, Inc., in Dillon,
Montana, and Sheridan, Montana, ‘Three of the buildings the Williamses owned and used for

their business were located on North Montana Strect in Dillon. The land was leased from the
Union Pacific Railroad Company. The Williamses’ fertilizer plant, located in one of the
buildings on North Montana Street, was the lifeblood of the business,

{8 _InNovember of 2002, the Montana Transportation Commission adopted a resolution
that established limited access control on the west side of a four-block section of North
Montana Street, including the Williamses’ property. The plan included installing curbs along
the street with curb cuts to access the properties. In the initial phase of construction, the
Williamses negotiated with the Department to make adjustments to the size and location of
the curb cuts that allowed access to their property. ‘The Williamses assured Department
representatives that their business would not be negatively impacted by the highway project.
‘The construction project began in April of 2004 and was completed in October of 2005.
{9 On January 10,2005, the Williamses filed an action for inverse condemnation. They
alleged that the limited access designation amounted to a taking because it denied the

wi

 

umses reasonable access to their property. Prior to reconstruction, fertilizer trucks were

 

able to access the property anywhere along the street. The surface surrounding the plant was
dirt and gravel, which was level with the edge of the asphalt on the street. The reconstruction
‘made access available only through forty-foot and fifty-foot wide curb cuts. Further, prior to
reconstruction, truck drivers were able to use the width of North Montana Street to maneuver
their trucks into the plant’s receiving area. After the street was designated a limited access
highway, truck drivers were no longer able to make such maneuvers on the street. The
Williamses alleged that fertilizer trucks were no longer able to make deliveries because the

trucks did not have room between the plant’s receiving area and the curb to stay off the
3
 

street. The fertilizer plant ceased operations in June 2004, and Williams Feed, Inc., shut
down entirely in December 2004,

{10 Prior to trial, the court determined thatthe only issue to be decided by the jury was
‘whether the Williamses were denied reasonable access to their property. Reasonable access
was defined as free and convenient access.

{11 The Williamses” proposed trial exhibits included right-of-way agreements made
between the Department and three other property owners, all agricultural businesses along
North Montana Street, that were impacted by the same project. The District Court excluded
the documents as being irrelevant, ‘The District Court also excluded an affidavit the
Williamses obtained from Dillon Chief of Police John Gutcheck regarding the legality of

‘maneuvering trucks on North Montana Street.

 

{12 Atrial, both sides introduced evidence as to whether the Williamses had been denied

 

reasonable access to their property. The Williamses’ main contention was that delivery
trucks could no longer access the property to make deliveries, and without deliveries, they
could not conduct their fertilizer business. Kim Williams testified as follows: Prior to
reconstruction, trucks could pullin anywhere along approximately 575 feet of road infront of
the fertilizer plant. Although the area was often congested with their own equipment and
other delivery trucks, the fertilizer trucks could maneuver safely without encroaching onto
the street because there was no curb, The gravel in front of the building made it easier to

‘maneuver a large truck. After reconstruction, much of the area in front of the plant was

asphalt, which was harder to tur on because the truck tires would grab. This newly paved
4
‘area —from the boundary ofthe plant property to the curb—was considered a truck frontage
road, which was thirty-two feet nine inches wide. ‘There was a six inch drop from the
frontage road curb to the actual street. The new construction ereated a problem because
drivers could not safely get trucks off the street through the narrow curb cus without running
over the curb. Running over the curb was illegal and could damage the delivery equipment.

{13 William Wehri, the manager atthe f

 

lizer plant testified that the plant would receive
deliveries by trucks ranging from sixty-five to one hundred feet in length. He further

testified as follows: The usual

 

/ery trucks were Super B and A Train trucks, which werea
‘combination of a tractor, a main trailer, and a pup trailer. The plant had the ability to receive
deliveries pneumatically by blowing product from the truck through a hose into the delivery
plant. Use of the pneumatic system, however, blocked access for other trucks trying to load
‘mixed fertilizer and service customers. Unloading product pneumatically cost approximately
'$2.60 more per ton. ‘The plant had the pneumatic delivery system in place for several years
prior to the start ofthe road reconstruction. However, Kim Williams had testified that some
of the products could not be delivered pneumatically because it would ruin the product.
‘Wehti stated that they could request delivery ofthe product in a specific type of truck and
trailer combination. He also testified that the combination trucks could be unhooked and the
up trailer could be pushed into the receiving area with a power unit.

{14 The Williamses introduced a video of a truck driver, Gary Rude, filing in is attempts,
to back his fertilizer truck into the receiving area of the fertilizer plant. Jerry Hillier, another

truck driver involved in the video demonstration, testified that he had delivered products to
3
Williams Feed approximately ten to fifteen times per year prior to reconstruction. He stated
that prior to reconstruction, there was enough room in front of the fertilizer plant to allow
‘him to jackknife the entire trailer and pup into position to deliver the load. Hillier testified
that after reconstruction, there was no longer enough room to deliver the load while staying

off the street and keeping the

 

s from running off the curb. The truck used in the
Williamses’ demonstration was sixty-eight feet long.

{US The Department also introduced a video of one of its employee truck drivers, Russ
Sutton, attempting to back a truck into the receiving area of the fertilizer plant. During the
‘demonstration, Sutton was driving a belly dump tractor with a single trailer, with a total
length of 66.5 feet. He practiced about ten times at the Department yard in Dillon before
attempting the maneuver at Williams Feed. He entered onto the Williamses’ property
through one ofthe curb cuts. His first attempt to back into the receiving area failed because
he did not cut sharp enough and could not line up with the receiving area ramp. He went
around the block and came back for a second try. He was able to back into the receiving area
successfully with a spotter and without driving over the curbs. Sutton tried a third time and
was able to back in then as well. The truck he was driving had a back window, although he
testified that he did not use it. Sutton stated that he had driven fertilizer trucks in the past,
and he felt that he could have successfully backed in the truck driven by the driver in the
Williamnses? demonstration video. He admitted that having more pivot points would make

the backing maneuver more complicated. When driving off the Williamses’ property and
‘turing back onto North Montana Street, Sutton stated his tire hit the slope of the curb cut,
‘but that he could have avoided that if he had moved his truck more to one side.
{16 The jury determined that the Williamses had not been denied reasonable access to

their property. The Williamses filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial

 

sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict. They
also argued that a new trial was warranted because of juror misconduct. Finally, the
Williamses alleged that the court erred when it excluded the right-of-way agreements and
Chief Gutcheck’s affidavit. The District Court denied the Williamses’ motion for judgment
a matter of law or a new trial. The Williamses appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

{17 We will not reverse the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. Hoffinan v, Austin, 2006 MT 289, § 13, 334 Mont. 357, § 13,
147 P.3d 177,413. The standard of review of a district court's refusal to grant a new trial
‘based on a claim of insufficient evidence is whether substantial credible evidence supports,
the jury’s verdict. It is within the province of the jury to determine the credibility of
‘witnesses and the weight ofthe evidence. We view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party. Hoffman, 13.

{18 A district cour’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed to determine
Whether the court abused its discretion. A court abuses its diseretion if it “acts arbitrarily
without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason.”

Faulconbridge v. State, 2006 MT 198, § 22, 333 Mont. 186, 422, 142 P.34 777, 4122.
7
DISCUSSION
{19 ISSUE 1: Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury verdict in favor of the
Department?
{20 The Williamses assert that there was no substantial credible evidence presented by the
Department to establish that the Williamses stil had free and convenient access to their
property on North Montana Street. ‘They argue that the Department had the burden of
proving that fertilizer trucks of all sizes had free and convenient access to the property
through curb cuts. However, the only issue submitted to the jury was whether the

Department's action in establishing North Montana Street as a limited access highway and

 

building curbs and curb cuts deprived the Williamses of reasonable access, which was
defined as free and convenient access

{21 The Williamses point to evidence demonstrating that it was difficult for large trucks to
back into the plant's receiving area without encroaching onthe street, and thatthe tres would
‘run offthe curbs. The Department, however, presented evidence that a 66.5 foot long truck
‘could access the receiving area through the curb cuts without falling off the curb. The jury
hheard testimony that larger truck-trailer combinations could be unhooked to make them
shorter, and a power unit could push the trailers into the receiving area, The jurors also heard
that the plant was set up for pneumatic detivery and, although it was more expensive,
Williams Feed could receive almost all its products in this manner. The former plant
‘manager testified that he could request delivery of product in any size truck or trailer

‘combination he wanted.
{22 We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the jury’s verdict. This
Court will uphold a verdict if supported by substantial credible evidence. “Substantial
evidence may be weak or conflicting, but must be greater than trifling or frivolous.” Moore
v, Beye, 2005 MT 266, 415, 329 Mont. 109, $15, 122 P.3d 1212, § 15 (citing Barret v.
Asarco Inc., 245 Mont. 196, 200, 799 P.24 1078, 1080 (1990). The Department presented
‘evidence that trucks could access the property through the curb cuts. Although the
Williamses provided evidence to the contrary, “itis not this Court’s function to agree or
disagree with the verdict.” Moore, 15, The jury weighed the testimony and the credibility

of the witnesses and determined tha

 

1e Williamses had reasonable access to the property.
{23 We affirm the District Court’s denial of a new trial on this issue.

{24 ISSUE 2: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying the Williamses’
‘motion for a new trial alleging jury misconduct?

{25 The Williamses allege jury misconduct occurred when a juror who had observed a
tuck servicing a business, Standard Lumber, on North Montana Street reported his
‘observations to the rest of the jury. ‘The Williamses provided affidavits from jurors in
support of their argument. Jurors Breanne Smith and Jack McKey stated in affidavits that
‘another juror, Kelly Bockting, told the jury during deliberations that “[s}ince trucks servicing
‘Standard Lumber had no trouble in doing so, the same should apply to Williams Feed...”
Bob Brandbo, an owner of Standard Lumber, provided his own affidavit stating that all
trucks that service that business do so on side streets and never on North Montana Street

‘The Department obtained an affidavit from Bockting in which he acknowledged that while
9
he was returning to the courthouse after lunch, he had seen a semi truck turing into the
North Montana Street entrance of Standard Lumber. He stated that the observation was
happenstance in the course of returning tothe courthouse by his normal route. He stated that,
in response to another juror’s question about drivers needing assistance from spotters, he
“mentioned the fact that [he] had just recently seen a truck pull into the Standard Lumber
Company from North Montana Street and that it was [his] belief that that truck would have to
back out onto North Montana Street once it was unloaded and that they would probably need
spotter or guidance to do so.” Other jurors, Bradley Gillespie and Shawn Ward, provided
affidavits stating that they heard Bockting make such a statement, that it came late in
deliberations, and that one vote of nine to three in favor of the Department had already been
taken, They did not believe this comment had any additional influence on any of the other
jurors,

{26 The Williamses contend that the statement made by Bockting was extraneous

 

Prejudicial information. They argue that Bockting conducted an improper independent

investigation. ‘The Department contends that the information provided by Bockting was an

 

internal influence and not a proper subject for affidavits under M. R. Evid. 606(b).

{27 The Williamses also allege jury misconduct occurred when a jury member mentioned.
that a verdict for the Williamses would mean spending tax dollars. Juror Smith’s affidavit
states that it was mentioned that any “settlement” would involve spending taxpayer dollars.

McKey’s affidavit is silent on the issue, and Bockting, Gillespie and Ward all stated in their

affidavits that they had no recollection of taxes being mentioned.
10
{28 M.R Evid. 606(b) provides that a juror may not testify as to what occurred during a
Jury’s deliberations except when the information pertains to: (1) whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; or (2) whether any
outside influence was brought to bear upon any juror; or (3) whether any juror has been
induced to assent toa verdict or question by a resort tothe determination of chance. State v.
Kelman, 276 Mont. 253, 261, 915 P.2d 854, 859 (1996). Juror affidavits “may not be used to
impeach a verdict based upon internal influences onthe jury such asa mistake of evidence or
misapprehension of the law.” Ke/man, 276 Mont. at 262, 915 P.2d at 860 (citing State v

Brogan, 272 Mont, 156, 161, 900 P.2d 284, 287 (1995). However, where “external

 

influence is exerted or extemal prejudicial information is brought to the jury's attent

 

affidavits can be the basis of overturning the judgment.” Kelman, 276 Mont. at 262, 915
P.2d at 860 (citing Brogan, 272 Mont, at 161, 900 P.2d at 287). External influence may

include a juror making a telephone call to obtain information about a party's previous

 

igation, visting the scene of an accident, or bringing a newspaper article about the trial into
the jury room, Kelman, 276 Mont. at 262, 915 P.2d at 860 (citing Brogan, 272 Mont. at 161,
‘900 P.2d at 287), Extrancous influence does not include knowledge and information shared
bby one juror with the others. Kelman, 276 Mont, at 262, 915 P.2d at 860. In fact, jurors are
‘expected to bring their own knowledge and experience to the courtroom to aid in the
resolution of the case, Kelman, 276 Mont. at 262, 915 P.2d at 860. A statement by a juror
that he had personal knowledge that a log was kept of all telephone calls made from the jail

‘was held to be an internal influence. State v. Hage, 258 Mont. 498, 508, 853 P.2d 1251,
n
1257 (1993). A juror’s statement that he thought the defendant owned a disreputable
business, whether mistaken or not, was also held to be an internal influence. Kelman, 276
‘Mont. at 262, 915 P.2¢ at 860.

{29 Likewise, the mental processes of jurors are internal influences and are thus not
subject to impeachment under M. R, Evid, 606(b). Hage, 258 Mont. at S08, 853 P.2d at 1257,
(citing Stare v. DeMers, 234 Mont. 273, 277, 762 P.2d 860, 863 (1988)). “A juror’s physical,
‘mental, and emotional condition is inherent in the verdict, andthe effect of such a condition
(on a juror’s vote is within the prohibition of Rule 606(b).” Hage, 258 Mont. at S08, 853 P.2d
at 1257 (quoting DeMers, 234 Mont, at 277, 762 P.2d at 863); see also State v. Maxwell, 198
Mont, 498, 507, 647 P.2d 348, 353-54 (1982.

{30 With regard to Bockting’s statement, we must determine if the statement was an
‘external or internal influence on the jury. Kelman, 276 Mont. at 262, 915 P.2d at 860. The

statement at issue is Bockting’s comment that he observed a semi truck entering a business

 

‘on North Montana Street. Bockting made the assumption thet, if that truck could service
‘Standard Lumber, then trucks should also be able to service Williams Feed. The Williamses

allege that he obtained this information by an independent investigation, which, they note, is

 

defined as a close examination or systemati

 

ity. Mirriam Websters Collegiate
Dictionary 616 (10th ed., 1993). We conclude that the information that Bockting relayed to
the jury derived, not from an independent investigation, but from a casual and perhaps

mistaken observation. Bockting’s statement, like the statements at issue in Hage and
Kelman, amounts to one juror sharing information with other jurors. Such sharing of
information does not constitute an external influence on the jury under M. R. Evid. 606(b.

{81 We must also determine if the statement made by an unidentified juror that any verdict
in favor of the Williamses would mean spending taxpayer dollars is an internal or external
influence on the jury. We conclude this statement amounts toan opinion expressed by a juror
as part of his or her mental process in deliberations. The effect of such an opinion inheres in
the verdict and is not subject to impeachment.

932 TheDi

 

ict Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Williamses’ motion fora
‘new trial based on jury misconduct.

{33 _ ISSUE 3: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in excluding from evidence
three right-of-way agreements between the Department and other property owners
abutting North Montana Street?

{34 ‘The Williamses argue that the three right-of-way agreements the District Court
excluded from evidence were statements against interest pursuant to M. R. Evid. 801(4)(2).
‘The agreements demonstrated that the Department compensated three other agricultural
business owners in the reconstruction zone. The Williamses intended to introduce them for
the purpose of showing the similarity between the properties that were affected and the
Williamses’ property. The agreements arguably would show that the Department recognized
the highway project impaired access to other businesses, which were also on leased railroad

land.
 

{5 _ Inreviewing the right-of-way agreement, itis apparent that the Department and the
‘other business owners negotiated over issues such as the size and placement of curb cuts,
placement of lamp posts and traffic lights, the removal of sidewalks, and adequate parking
for customers. When access could not be fully addressed, the Department compensated these
‘businesses for such items as the cost of removing structures and returning the property back
to pre-lease condition pursuant to the lease with the railroad, moving an entrance to a
building, redesigning and building a loading dock, and removing an office building. Other
than negotiating for larger curb cuts, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the
Williamses attempted to address concerns similar tothose expressed by the other businesses
in their negotiations with the Department.

{86 The Department argued, and the District Court agreed, that the agreements were not
relevant to the issue before the jury. M. R. Evid. 401. The District Court stated in its order

that

 

{[plroof of taking of access from one parcel does not prove a taking of access from a

 

separate distinct parcel.” The court noted the well accepted principle of real estate law that
‘each parcel of land is distinct based upon its geographic location. Thus, the court concluded
thatthe question of whether reasonable access for a specific parcel has been denied must be
based upon the merits of that specific parcel, and not differently situated parcels. ‘The
determination of whether there is adequate access to property hinges on the specific
‘geography of the site. For example, the size ofthe parcel, the location of structures on the

property, access into the structures themselves, the surrounding streets, the size of curb cuts,

the minute details of placement of lamp posts, traffic lights, sidewalks, and even ground
4
coverings, al affect how property may be accessed. The right-of-way agreements in this case
demonstrate the Department's negotiations and settlements with property owners based on
the uniqueness of each piece of property.

{37 _ The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded the right-of-way
‘agreements were not relevant in determining whether the Williamses were denied reasonable
access to their specific parcel of land.

88 _ ISSUE 4: Did the Distriet Court abuse its discretion in excluding testimony from
the Dillon Chief of Police?

{89 The Williamses obtained an affidavit from the Dillon Chief of Police, John Gutcheck,
in support of a motion for summary judgment. In their motion, the Williamses relied on the
affidavit to suppor their contention that the “reason the Williams are no longer able to access
their property is because trucks can no longer block traffic on North Montana Street. The
designation of North Montana Street as a limited access control highway prohibits that
practice.” In his affidavit, Chief Gutcheck stated that, asa result of reconstruction, trucks
entering businesses along the reconstructed area of North Montana Street would no longer be
able to use the width of the street to maneuver, stop, and park as they hed in the past. Chief
Gutcheck stated that such maneuvering would be a violation of the law and drivers would be
subject to citation. Attached to Chief Gutcheck’s affidavit was a report which detailed the
Chief's response toa call from Kim Williams who wanted assistance in blocking traffic on
North Montana Street so that a truck could back into the plant. According to the report,

Chief Gutcheck told the Williamses and the truck driver that traffic lanes could not be
Is
blocked, and that if drivers were to interfere with traffic while backing onto the street or
violate restrictions on the controlled access highway, the drivers would be ticketed.

{40 In response to the aflidavit obtained by the Williamses, counsel for the Department
filed their own affidavit, stating they interviewed Chief Gutcheck, and he told them that such
maneuvering across the width of the street was always illegal, but that it would now be
‘enforced because the city no longer wished to have trucks backing across the road and
blocking traffic. The Department filed a motion to vacate the tral date in order to determine
‘whether Chief Gutcheck’s conflicting statements implicated the City of Dillon and others as,
indispensable parties to the action, The District Court denied the motion to vacate, but ruled
thatthe affidavit would not be considered. The Williamses state that ata hearing, the District
Court ruled from the bench that Chief Gutcheck’s testimony would not be allowed in the
cease. The Williamses state that at another hearing, the court again made a bench ruling that
the “testimony of Gutcheck as set forth in his affidavit would not be allowed.” The motion
for summary judgment was denied because there were genuine issues of material fact.

$41. The pre-trial order listed Chief Gutcheck as a

 

ess. The description of his
proposed testimony, according to the Williamses' tril brief, was as follows:

If permitted to testify he would establish free and convenient access along
‘entire frontage of 515 feet of fertilizer plant prior to the imposition of limited
‘access control. Also, that such access no longer exists now that North
‘Montana Street isa controlled access highway. The maneuvering of fertilizer
trucks on North Montana Street to service the fertilizer plant is no longer
permitted.
On appeal, the Williamses argue that Chief Gutcheck’s testimony was relevant to their state
‘of mind because it would have established that they were “officially informed” that fertilizer
trucks no longer had access to the plant, and that based on this information, the Williamses
shut down their operation.

$42 There seems to be some confusion as to whether the Chief was wholly prohibited from

 

testifying or whether he was prohibited from testifying regarding the content of his affidavit.
‘The Williamses admitted they did not want to introduce the affidavit. Rather, they wanted
Chief Gutcheck’s live testimony. The Williamses have not provided the transcripts to any of
the hearings where the District Court made bench rulings regarding this issue. We only have
the notice of ruling from the hearing on the motion to vacate, where the court stated that the
Gutcheck affidavit would not be considered. It is apparent from the District Courts order
denying the motion for a new trial, thatthe court had determined that the Chief could not
testify on matters of law. Although Chief Gutcheck was named in each party's witness list,
neither party called him as a witness at trial. We cannot fault the court for excluding @
witness who was not called to testify.

$43. Thereis also a question as to what would have been the purpose of Chief Gutcheck’s
testimony at trial. In their motion for summary judgment, the Williamses stated hs testimony
was relevant to show that, after reconstruction, trucks would no longer be allowed to
‘maneuver, stop and park on North Montana Street as they had been allowed to do prior to
reconstruction, This testimony, however, would not be relevant to the narrow issue of

‘whether the Department denied the Williamses access to their property. It would merely
1”
indicate the Chief's policy with regard to enforcing laws that had been in place before and
after reconstruction,

144 In their motion for a new trial and on appeal, the Williamses argue that the Chief's
testimony was relevant to the Williamses’ state of mind; that is, when they were advised by
Chief Gutcheck that truckers were no longer allowed to block traffic, they thought that access

hhad be

 

impaired to the point that they could no longer conduct business. Based on this
impression, the Williamses shut down their operations. Again, the issue before the jury was
‘whether the Department, as opposed to the City of Dillon, acting through Chief Gutcheck,
impaired the Williamses” access. The jury was required to make an objective, factual finding
astophysical access. It id not matter that the Williamses were led to believe that, as legal
1matter, access had been impaired because Chief Gutcheck would no longer allow trucks to
block traffic.

{45 All questions of law, including the admissibility of testimony and the rules of
evidence, must be decided by the court. Section 26-1-201, MCA; see Stenberg v. Neel, 188
Mont. 333, 339, 613 P.2d 1007, 1010-11 (1980). The District Court did not abuse its
discretion when it probbited Chief Gutcheck from testifying on matters of law or on matters

relating to the Williamses’ subjective state of mind.

“ ¢ fae iy 4

{46 We affirm the District Court.

8
 
Justice Patricia O. Cotter dissents.

{47 dissent from the Court’s resolution of Issues 3 and 4, Because I would reverse
and remand for a new trial, ! would not reach Issues 1 and 2.

{48 The Williamses argue that the District Court abused its discretion when it
‘excluded from evidence as irelevant the three right-of-way agreements entered into
between the Department and other property owners abulting North Montana Street. 1
agree While I cannot fault the Court's reasoning that each parcel of property is unique,
and that the access that works for one parcel may not work for another (see 36), the
purported similarity between the parcels was not the sole reason the agreements were
offered. As the Court notes at 34, the Plaintiffs also argued the agreements would
arguably show that the Department recognized that its project impaired access to other
businesses, and thus—to the extent the Department was arguing in the instant case that no
‘compensable taking had occurred—constituted an admission against interest. However,
the District Court did not address this rationale for admission of the exhibit in its order
denying admission.

449 Evidence is generally admissible if relevant, M, R. Evid. 402. I would conclude

that the agreements were relevant to show the Department's acknowledgment that its

 

road work did impair the business access enjoyed by other businesses. The Plait
here conceded that the amount of compensation would not be admissible and that the
offer would not be made for purposes of demonstrating comparability of the property
values. In Kiely Construction v. City of Red Lodge, 2002 MT 241, § 95, 312 Mont. 52,

495, 57 P.3d 836,495, we concluded that admission of evidence of prior settlement

20
negotiations and the resulting agreement to demonstrate the arbitrary and capricious
nature of the City’s decision at issue, was not error, Similarly, I would conclude here that
the agreements were admissible to support Plaintiffs’ contention that the Department was
‘being arbitrary when it argued that their particular way of access—as opposed to that of
cothers—was reasonable and not impaired. The purported distinctions between the

properties subject to the right-of-way agreements and Pl

 

tiffs” property, addressed
in 36 of the Court's Opinion, could have been adequately and easily addressed on
cross-examination.

{50 I would also conclude the District Court erred in determining that any testimony
from Chief Guicheck would have been irrelevant. (While I agree with the Court's
statement at $42 that the record on this point is confusing, the District Court did
‘conclude in its order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial that any testimony from
the Chief would have been irrelevant.) The Court states at §43 that the Chief's testimony
would not be relevant to the narrow issue of whether the Department denied the
Williamses access to their property. I agree. However, the evidence was relevant to
demonstrate why Plaintiffs decided to and did go out of business, and to rebut the
Department's contention that Plaintiffs’ damages were the result of their voluntary
termination of their business and not the reconstruction of the street abutting their
property.

{51 In summary, while I agree with the District Court's determination of the sole issue
for trial (see | 10), I would conclude the court too narrowly limited the admission of

relevant evidence to support Plaintiffs’ case and counter the Department's defenses, to

21
the detriment of Plaintiffs. 1 would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. T

dissent from our refusal to do so.