Case Title: In re Adoption of P.L.H.

Citation: 2017-Ohio-5824

Docket Number: 2017-0173

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Adoption of P.L.H., Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-5824.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-5824 
IN RE ADOPTION OF P.L.H. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Adoption of P.L.H., Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-5824.] 
Adoption—R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c)—Putative father’s consent to adoption is not 
necessary if he has “willfully abandoned” birth mother—Putative father’s 
failure to care for and support birth mother is not relevant basis for 
proceeding with adoption without putative father’s consent—Inquiry 
regarding willful abandonment focuses on whether clear and convincing 
evidence establishes that putative father voluntarily or intentionally 
deserted, forsook, or abdicated all responsibility for birth mother. 
(No. 2017-0173—Submitted June 21, 2017—Decided July 18, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No. CA2016-09-185, 
2016-Ohio-8453. 
_____________________ 
 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, C.W., the putative father of minor child P.L.H., appeals 
the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, which concluded that his 
consent to the child’s adoption by appellees, K.H. and P.H., was not necessary 
under R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c) because he “willfully abandoned” the birth mother 
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during her pregnancy and up to the time of the child’s placement with the 
appellees.  For the reasons below, we reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District 
and remand the matter to the probate court to vacate its adoption decree and to 
dismiss the appellees’ adoption petition. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Events leading up to the child’s birth 
{¶ 2} C.W. and the birth mother, S.C., met each other and became 
friends while both were undergraduates at an Ohio university.  C.W. graduated in 
December 2013 and moved back to his native Louisiana in the spring of 2014, but 
he maintained contact with S.C.  In the fall of 2014, while still a student, S.C. 
started a year-long internship in Orlando and lived with a family in Florida as its 
nanny. 
{¶ 3} In February 2015, S.C. visited C.W. in Louisiana during the Mardi 
Gras holiday and stayed with him at his grandmother’s house.  The child was 
conceived sometime during that visit between February 14 and 18, 2015.  After 
returning to Florida, S.C. discovered that she was pregnant.  She called C.W. on 
March 5, 2015, to inform him that she was pregnant and that she wanted to place 
the child for adoption with the appellees, who live in Tennessee and are 
acquaintances of the family S.C. lived with in Florida. 
{¶ 4} The parties do not dispute that C.W. and S.C. did not see each 
other during her pregnancy.  After the March 5, 2015 telephone call, they spoke to 
each other one other time by telephone in early September 2015.  During the 
pregnancy, they exchanged text messages on March 6, March 13, April 3, April 5, 
April 7, April 21, April 22, April 27, May 2, June 8, September 1, September 2, 
September 3, September 9, October 10, and October 15, 2015. 
{¶ 5} Although S.C. testified that she believed that C.W. initially 
supported her decision to place the child for adoption, C.W.’s text messages 
reflect his ambivalence about her decision.  On March 6, the day after the phone 
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conversation in which S.C. told him about the pregnancy, C.W. wrote, “I don’t 
know [if I’ll] want it to be adopted or not.  I won’t for a couple months.”  C.W. 
told S.C. that he was raised without a father and that he “made a vow” never to let 
his own child grow up without a father.  C.W. also stated that the decision is 
“kinda up to both of us” and that he would find it “hard” to “act like it never 
happened.”  S.C. insisted that her “mind [was] made up,” even if C.W. wanted to 
keep the child, and that she wanted the child to “have two parents and a stable 
life.” 
{¶ 6} During the early months of the pregnancy, communication 
between C.W. and S.C. remained friendly and even affectionate, as reflected in 
the following exchange of text messages on April 3, 2015: 
 
C.W.:  Is the baby healthy?  You know the sex? 
S.C.:  Yes!  And no I won’t find out for a couple more 
months!  I’ll let you know! 
C.W.:  Ok cool love you. 
S.C.:  Love you too!  Thanks for checking on me!  I’m in 
South Carolina this weekend visiting my family for Easter! 
* * * 
C.W.:  So how are we? 
S.C.:  We are good! 
C.W.:  Okay I have to ask cause I don’t see you and the 
whole baby thing.  And maybe you do or don’t know how I feel 
about you but just making sure. 
S.C.:  I know you are a good guy!  This doesn’t change 
anything.  We made a mistake, but it’s handled.  I’m not worried 
about it.  I will always [be] here for you! 
C.W.:  Good.  As I am for you. 
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S.C.:  I know :). 
 
{¶ 7} From June 8 to September 1, 2015, a period of almost three 
months, C.W. and S.C. did not communicate with each other.  On September 2, 
2015, S.C. sent a text message asking for C.W.’s address so that she could send 
him a consent form for the adoption.  C.W. gave his address, but he stated that he 
would not sign anything until he talked to his mother.  S.C. then called C.W., 
apparently the next day.  She testified that she was “shocked” and caught off 
guard that C.W. was “not okay with” the adoption.  S.C. told C.W. that he needed 
to contact her attorney and gave him the attorney’s telephone number. 
{¶ 8} After the early September phone call, C.W. texted S.C. three times: 
on September 9 to ask about the baby’s sex, on October 10 to wish her a happy 
birthday, and on October 15 asking her to call him.  Other than saying “thank 
you” to his birthday greeting, S.C. did not respond to these messages. 
{¶ 9} By way of a letter dated September 28, 2015, C.W.’s attorney gave 
notice to S.C.’s attorney that C.W. sought sole custody of the child at birth and 
objected to any adoption proceedings.  Enclosed with the letter was a copy of 
C.W.’s registration form for the Ohio Putative Father Registry, which had been 
completed on September 4, 2015.  The letter also stated that C.W. “is able to 
assist the birth mother with her medical expenses associated with the pregnancy, 
and necessary costs for her care.  [C.W.] certainly does not want the birth mother 
to believe she has been abandoned during her pregnancy, and we are willing to 
ensure all appropriate bills are cared for as needed.” 
Birth of child and adoption proceedings in probate court 
{¶ 10} P.L.H. was born on November 3, 2015, in Butler County, Ohio.  
The next day, S.C. filed an application in Butler County Probate Court to place 
P.L.H. with the appellees as prospective adoptive parents.  On November 6, 2015, 
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the probate court approved S.C.’s application.  On that same day, the appellees 
filed their petition for adoption and S.C. filed her consent to the adoption. 
{¶ 11} C.W. did not know of the child’s birth until he saw a photo of S.C. 
on Facebook showing that she was no longer pregnant.  After seeing the photo, 
C.W. filed a complaint to establish paternity and a motion for temporary custody 
on December 3, 2015, in Butler County Juvenile Court.1  On that same day, the 
probate court issued a notice to C.W. that it had scheduled a hearing on the 
appellees’ adoption petition.  C.W. filed a timely objection indicating that he did 
not consent to the adoption and that he sought to obtain sole custody of the child. 
{¶ 12} On April 13, 2016, the probate court held a hearing, which 
included testimony from S.C., C.W., and the appellees, to determine whether 
C.W.’s consent was required for the adoption to proceed.  The court later 
concluded that his consent was not required under R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c) because 
he “willfully abandoned [S.C.] during her pregnancy and up to the time of the 
minor’s placement in the home of the Petitioners.”  The court found that C.W. had 
provided no financial support to S.C. during her pregnancy, even though he 
earned approximately $70,000 during 2015.  The court also found that C.W.’s 
contact with S.C. during the entire period of her pregnancy and up to the child’s 
placement was “sporadic,” as reflected in the nearly three-month gap in 
communication from June 8 to September 1, 2015.  And the court found that after 
September 1, C.W.’s contact with S.C. was de minimis. 
{¶ 13} The probate court, however, rejected the remaining grounds upon 
which the appellees argued that C.W.’s consent was not required.  The court 
concluded that the appellees did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
C.W. willfully abandoned or failed to care for and support the minor under R.C. 
                                                 
1  To date, C.W. has not established paternity in the juvenile court under R.C. Chapter 3111.  On 
February 23, 2016, C.W. gave notice to the probate court that the juvenile court had dismissed his 
paternity complaint for lack of jurisdiction because of the adoption case already pending in 
probate court and that he had not appealed that decision. 
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3107.07(B)(2)(b).  The court pointed to C.W.’s attorney’s letter of September 28 
to the birth mother’s attorney, which stated C.W.’s intention to raise the child, and 
to C.W’s complaint to establish paternity and motion to obtain custody filed in 
juvenile court.  The court also noted that C.W. had sent a letter to the appellees on 
November 9, 2015, stating that he would reimburse them for all pregnancy 
expenses, totaling approximately $8,500.  The court additionally noted that 
around December 10, 2015, C.W. had sent the appellees a check for $100, 
designated as “child support” on the memo line, and that C.W. had purchased 
baby furniture, bedding, clothes, and diapers and had prepared his home in 
Louisiana for the child. 
{¶ 14} After weighing the relative credibility of the witnesses, the probate 
court also found insufficient evidence that the child was conceived as a result of 
nonconsensual sexual relations instigated by C.W.  The probate court concluded 
that R.C. 3107.07(F) did not provide a basis for proceeding without C.W.’s 
consent. 
{¶ 15} The appellees also argued that requiring C.W.’s consent would 
violate S.C.’s constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution to place her newborn for adoption.  
The court found it unnecessary to address this argument given its conclusion that 
C.W.’s consent was not required because he willfully abandoned the mother.  
Finally, the appellees argued that C.W.’s consent was not necessary because 
adoption would be in the best interest of the child.  The court concluded that the 
best interest of the child is not a valid ground for finding that a putative father’s 
consent is not required under R.C. 3107.07. 
{¶ 16} After determining that C.W.’s consent was not required, the court 
made a separate determination under R.C. 3107.161 that adoption by the appellees 
would be in P.L.H.’s best interest.  The court issued orders on September 7, 2016, 
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finding that C.W.’s consent was not required for the adoption to occur and 
granting the appellees’ adoption petition. 
The appeal 
{¶ 17} C.W. appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, arguing 
that the probate court’s determination that he willfully abandoned the birth mother 
was against the manifest weight of the evidence.  The appellees did not file a 
cross-appeal of the probate court’s findings that they failed to establish other 
grounds for the adoption to proceed without C.W.’s consent. 
{¶ 18} The Twelfth District in a split decision affirmed the probate court’s 
determination that C.W. willfully abandoned S.C.  12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-
09-185, 2016-Ohio-8453, ¶ 19.  The majority concluded that C.W. “never 
provided [S.C.] with any support during her pregnancy, financial or otherwise.”  
Id. at ¶ 20.  The majority noted that C.W. did not call S.C. to inquire about her 
pregnancy and instead communicated only though “sporadic” text messages and 
then had no contact with S.C. for nearly three months from June to September 
2015.  Id. at ¶ 20, 21.  While acknowledging that C.W. offered to assist with 
S.C.’s medical expenses in his September 28, 2015 letter, the majority concluded 
that the letter, sent “a mere 36 days” before the child’s birth, was “a far cry from 
actually tendering that financial and emotional support.”  Id. at ¶ 22.  The 
majority also noted that C.W. sent a $100 check to the appellees for “child 
support” and purchased baby items and furniture.  Id. at ¶ 18, 22.  These attempts 
to provide financial support, however, were directed to the child, not the mother, 
and then only after the child’s birth.  Id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 19} The dissenting judge arrived at a different conclusion by pointing 
to the differences between R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(b) and (c).  Under R.C. 
3107.07(B)(2)(b), a putative father’s consent to adoption is not necessary if he 
“willfully abandoned or failed to care for and support the minor.”  (Emphasis 
added).  By contrast, R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c), which pertains to willful 
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abandonment of the mother, does not contain the words “failed to care for and 
support.”  The dissenter therefore concluded that care or support for the mother 
“has no relevance in determining whether the putative father willfully abandoned” 
the mother.  2016-Ohio-8453, at ¶ 32 (Hendrickson, J., dissenting).  Relying on 
the common meaning of the word “abandon,” the dissenter concluded that the 
record does not establish by clear and convincing evidence that C.W. “deserted,” 
“forsook” or “relinquished all connection with” S.C. during her pregnancy.  Id. at 
¶ 33.  “[A]lthough sporadic, [C.W.] always kept the door of communication open 
and available” to S.C., and it was clear that S.C. had rejected any support from 
C.W.  Id. at ¶ 34, 35. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
{¶ 20} We accepted C.W.’s appeal on the following proposition of law: 
 
Whether a putative father “willfully abandoned” a mother 
during her pregnancy, under R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c), does not 
include a requirement that the putative father failed to provide care 
and support to the mother. 
 
ANALYSIS 
The motion to dismiss 
{¶ 21} We first address the appellees’ motion to dismiss this appeal, in 
which they argue that C.W. has waived the argument he makes in his proposition 
of law.  C.W. argued in the Twelfth District that the probate court’s determination 
of willful abandonment was against the manifest weight of the evidence.  He did 
not assert, however, the specific statutory argument addressed for the first time by 
the Twelfth District’s dissenting judge—that care and support for the mother is 
not relevant in determining whether a putative father willfully abandoned the 
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mother under R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c).  We nevertheless find that C.W. did not 
waive the argument he presents in his proposition of law. 
{¶ 22} In order to resolve the ultimate question before us, whether C.W. 
“willfully abandoned” the birth mother, we must necessarily determine the 
meaning of that phrase and address whether R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c) permits 
consideration of the putative father’s failure to care for and support the mother.  
“When an issue of law that was not argued below is implicit in another issue that 
was argued and is presented by an appeal, we may consider and resolve that 
implicit issue.”  Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn. v. R.E. Roark Cos., 
Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 279, 617 N.E.2d 1075 (1993), modified in part on other 
grounds, Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 119 Ohio St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio-4827, 895 
N.E.2d 538, syllabus.  Stated another way, “if we must resolve a legal issue that 
was not raised below in order to reach a legal issue that was raised, we will do 
so.”  Id.  We therefore deny the motion to dismiss and address the merits of 
C.W.’s appeal. 
Meaning of “willfully abandoned” under R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c) 
{¶ 23} We begin with the premise that “the right of a natural parent to the 
care and custody of his children is one of the most precious and fundamental in 
law.”  In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163, 165, 492 N.E.2d 140 (1986), 
citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 
(1982).  Because adoption terminates those fundamental rights, we must construe 
strictly any exception to the requirement of parental consent to adoption in order 
to protect the right of natural parents to raise and nurture their children.  In re 
Adoption of Schoeppner, 46 Ohio St.2d 21, 24, 345 N.E.2d 608 (1976).  And 
because the meaning of “willfully abandoned” involves a question of statutory 
construction, we review this issue de novo.  See Lang v. Dir., Dept. of Job & 
Family Servs., 134 Ohio St.3d 296, 2012-Ohio-5366, 982 N.E.2d 636, ¶ 12. 
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{¶ 24} R.C. 3107.07(B) states that the consent of a timely registered 
putative father is not necessary if the probate court finds either that the putative 
father “has willfully abandoned or failed to care for and support the minor,” R.C. 
3107.07(B)(2)(b), or “has willfully abandoned the mother of the minor during her 
pregnancy and up to the time of her surrender of the minor, or the minor’s 
placement in the home of the petitioner, whichever occurs first,” R.C. 
3107.07(B)(2)(c). 
{¶ 25} C.W. argues that R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c) does not make the putative 
father’s failure to “care for and support” the mother during her pregnancy a 
relevant basis for proceeding with an adoption without the putative father’s 
consent.  We agree. 
{¶ 26} The statute makes a clear distinction between a putative father’s 
actions toward the minor child and his actions toward the birth mother.  With 
respect to the minor, a putative father’s consent is not necessary if he “willfully 
abandoned or failed to care for and support the minor.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
3107.07(B)(2)(b).  By contrast, R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c), which pertains to willful 
abandonment of the mother, does not contain the words “failed to care for and 
support.”  A probate court’s determination under R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c) must 
focus solely on whether the putative father “willfully abandoned” the mother. 
{¶ 27} Both the probate court and the court of appeals majority relied on 
C.W.’s lack of financial support for S.C. during her pregnancy as evidence that 
C.W. willfully abandoned her.  And the concurring opinion argues that the 
putative father’s lack of financial support should factor as part of the court’s 
analysis in determining whether he willfully abandoned the mother.  We cannot, 
however, add words to the statute.  The express language in R.C. 
3107.07(B)(2)(c) simply does not contain the words “failed to care for and 
support.”  A putative father’s failure to care for and support the minor child 
provides a relevant basis under R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(b) for determining that his 
January Term, 2017 
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consent to the adoption is not required.  R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c), however, does not 
make the failure to care for and support the mother a basis for proceeding with the 
adoption without the putative father’s consent. 
{¶ 28} The appellees and their amici curiae argue that a putative father 
should be required to demonstrate tangible commitment to the mother by 
providing financial, emotional or physical care and support.  They raise a policy 
concern, however, more properly addressed by the General Assembly.  Until and 
unless the legislature chooses to impose a greater burden on putative fathers, and 
in light of our obligation to strictly construe any exception to the requirement of 
parental consent before adoption, we must interpret the statute as written. 
{¶ 29} To be clear, a putative father’s care and support for the mother 
does not lose all relevance in adoption proceedings implicating R.C. 
3107.07(B)(2)(c).  If a putative father does provide care and support for the 
mother, our holding does not constrain a probate court from considering the 
father’s conduct as a factor to refute the allegation that he willfully abandoned the 
mother.  Financial support is one of many ways that a putative father could 
demonstrate involvement in the mother’s life.  R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c), however, 
does not make the father’s failure to care for and support the mother a basis for 
determining that his consent is not required.  The statute does not equate the 
failure to care for and support the mother with willful abandonment of the mother. 
{¶ 30} Having determined what R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c) does not say, we 
now turn to the question of what “willfully abandoned” actually means.  In the 
absence of a statutory definition, we look to the common usage of “willful” and 
“abandon” to determine their intended meanings.  See State ex rel. Data Trace 
Information Servs., L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Fiscal Officer, 131 Ohio St.3d 255, 
2012-Ohio-753, 963 N.E.2d 1288, ¶ 49.  The word “willful” is defined as 
“[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1834 (10th Ed.2014).  To “abandon” means “1. To leave (someone), 
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esp. when doing so amounts to an abdication of responsibility.  2. To relinquish or 
give up with the intention of never again reclaiming one’s rights or interest in.  3. 
To desert or go away from permanently.”  Id. at 1; see also Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 2 (2002) (“abandon” means “to forsake or desert esp. in 
spite of an allegiance, duty, or responsibility”). 
{¶ 31} Using these common definitions, we conclude that a probate 
court’s finding of willful abandonment under R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c) should focus 
on whether the putative father voluntarily or intentionally deserted, forsook or 
abdicated all responsibility for the birth mother during her pregnancy and until the 
mother’s surrender of the child or placement of the child in the prospective 
adoptive home, whichever occurs first. 
Applying definition of “willfully abandoned” to evidence 
{¶ 32} We turn next to the question whether the evidence in the record—
irrespective of C.W.’s failure to care for or support the birth mother—provides a 
basis for the probate court’s determination that C.W.’s consent to the adoption is 
not necessary because he willfully abandoned her.  We have stated that due 
process requires the party invoking an exception to the parental-consent 
requirement to “ ‘establish each of [its] allegations’ ” by clear and convincing 
evidence.  (Emphasis sic.)  Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d at 166, 492 N.E.2d 140, quoting 
In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985); 
accord Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-748, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599.  The 
appellees therefore had the burden of establishing by clear and convincing 
evidence that C.W. abandoned the birth mother during her pregnancy and that the 
abandonment was willful.  Whether willful abandonment has been proven by 
clear and convincing evidence is a determination for the probate court and will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless that determination is against the manifest weight 
of the evidence.  Masa at 166. 
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{¶ 33} Ordinarily, upon a determination that the courts below applied the 
wrong legal standard, we would remand the matter to the probate court or the 
court of appeals to consider the evidence under the correct legal standard.  
Remand for that purpose is not necessary here, however, because the record 
contains no evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, to support a 
finding that C.W. voluntarily or intentionally deserted, forsook or abdicated all 
responsibility for S.C. during her pregnancy. 
{¶ 34} In a letter dated September 28, 2015—more than a month before 
P.L.H.’s birth—C.W. stated that he did “not want the birth mother to believe she 
has been abandoned during her pregnancy” and offered “to assist the birth mother 
with her medical expenses associated with the pregnancy, and necessary costs for 
her care.”  They exchanged text messages from March 6 through June 8, 2015, 
and then from September 1 through October 15, 2015.  In those messages, they 
discussed matters relating to S.C.’s pregnancy and C.W.’s ambivalence about 
placing the child for adoption.  They also expressed care and affection for each 
other and exchanged “I love yous” and assurances that they would support each 
other.  And as friends often do, C.W. communicated by text message to share with 
S.C. important aspects of his life, such as his career plans, as well as mundane 
details, such as how he had rearranged the furniture in his home.  The record does 
not demonstrate that C.W. deserted S.C.  Rather, he sought to maintain open 
communication with her.  Indeed, even after their contentious early September 
2015 phone call, C.W. texted S.C. three times.  He texted on September 9 to ask 
about the baby’s sex, on October 10 to wish her a happy birthday, and on October 
15 asking her to call him.  S.C. did not respond to these messages, aside from 
saying “thank you” to his birthday greeting. 
{¶ 35} The record also contradicts S.C.’s contention that C.W. never 
inquired about the pregnancy.  On April 3, 2015, C.W. initiated contact and 
asked, “Is the baby healthy?  You know the sex?”  S.C. responded that she would 
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not know for a couple of months but would let him know, to which C.W. 
responded, “Ok cool love you.”  S.C. then responded, “Love you too!  Thanks for 
checking on me!”  On September 9, 2015, C.W. again asked whether the baby 
would be a boy or a girl.  S.C. never responded, even though she admits that she 
knew the baby’s sex by then and had already told the appellees. 
{¶ 36} The probate court and the court of appeals majority pointed to the 
nearly three-month gap in communication from June to September 2015 as 
evidence that C.W. abandoned S.C.  R.C. 3107.07, however, does not mandate 
consistent or frequent contact with the mother.  The fact that C.W. demonstrated 
continued involvement throughout her pregnancy is sufficient to refute the 
allegation that he “abandoned” her under the ordinary meaning of the word. 
{¶ 37} Moreover, the record contains conflicting evidence as to who 
stopped communicating with whom.  S.C. testified that C.W. “stopped talking” to 
her for several months prior to September 2015.  C.W. testified that he and S.C. 
“talked day and night” before the pregnancy but that when S.C. realized that C.W. 
did not want the adoption to proceed, she “severed” communications and stopped 
responding to him.  Given that S.C. stated her very clear intention to proceed with 
the adoption without C.W.’s input or involvement, the communication gap was 
just as likely the result of S.C. distancing herself from C.W.  Indeed, it was C.W. 
who sent the last text message before that nearly three-month gap, on June 8, 
2015: “Thinking of you.  Enjoy your day.”  And it was C.W. who broke the nearly 
three-month silence by sending S.C. a text message on September 1, 2015.  The 
record does not substantiate the conclusion that C.W. abandoned S.C. nor that any 
silence in communication between the two parties was willful and intentional on 
C.W.’s part. 
{¶ 38} We conclude that the probate court’s determination that C.W. 
willfully abandoned S.C. was both contrary to the express language in R.C. 
3107.07(B)(2)(c) and against the manifest weight of the evidence.  We therefore 
January Term, 2017 
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reverse the Twelfth District’s judgment and remand the matter to the probate 
court to vacate its adoption decree and, for the further reasons explained below, to 
dismiss the appellees’ adoption petition. 
No remaining grounds for adoption to proceed 
without putative father’s consent 
{¶ 39} We also conclude that the appellees cannot assert any additional 
grounds for proceeding with their adoption petition without C.W.’s consent.  The 
appellees argued below that requiring the consent of the putative father would 
violate S.C.’s constitutional right as a birth mother to place her newborn for 
adoption.  The probate court construed this argument as an attack on the 
constitutional validity of R.C. 3107.07(B).  But it declined to rule on the merits of 
the argument because of its finding that C.W.’s consent was not required. 
{¶ 40} The appellees have reasserted their constitutional argument here.  
We decline, however, to address the merits of that argument because the appellees 
do not have standing to assert the constitutional rights of someone else.  See N. 
Canton v. Canton, 114 Ohio St.3d 253, 2007-Ohio-4005, 871 N.E.2d 586, ¶ 1; 
Util. Serv. Partners, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 124 Ohio St.3d 284, 2009-Ohio-
6764, 921 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 49 (“ ‘a litigant must assert its own rights, not the 
claims of third parties’ ”), quoting N. Canton at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 41} The appellees asserted before the probate court three additional 
grounds for claiming that C.W.’s consent was not required.  The court rejected 
those arguments, and the appellees did not file a cross-appeal of those findings.  
Because the appellees have not asserted any other bases for the adoption to 
proceed without C.W.’s consent, our ruling here conclusively resolves the 
appellees’ adoption petition. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 42} As a final matter, we acknowledge that all parties have the child’s 
best interest at heart and that our decision is the end result of a process in which 
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we must choose between two imperfect and unsatisfying options.  This appeal 
charges us with the unenviable task of reaching a result that either overrides the 
adoption plan of a diligent birth mother and separates P.L.H. from the only home 
he has ever known or that terminates permanently C.W.’s fundamental right to 
raise and nurture his child.  In light of our responsibility to strictly construe any 
exception to the requirement of parental consent to adoption and based on the 
specific facts of this case, we reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District Court 
of Appeals and remand the matter to the probate court to vacate the adoption 
decree and to dismiss the appellees’ adoption petition. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, O’NEILL, and FISCHER, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
_____________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 43} I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence does not 
support a finding that C.W. willfully abandoned P.L.H.’s birth mother, S.C., 
during her pregnancy.  But I am compelled to write separately because I believe 
that the majority’s analysis strays from the plain meaning of the phrase “willfully 
abandoned” and unnecessarily limits the evidence that a lower court may consider 
in determining whether a putative father has willfully abandoned an expectant 
mother. 
{¶ 44} The statute at issue provides that a putative father’s consent to 
adoption is not required if he “willfully abandoned the mother of the minor during 
her pregnancy and up to the time of her surrender of the minor, or the minor’s 
placement in the home of the petitioner, whichever occurs first.”  R.C. 
January Term, 2017 
17 
 
3107.07(B)(2)(c).  The majority notes the dictionary definitions of the words that 
make up the phrase “willfully abandoned”: 
 
The word “willful” is defined as “[v]oluntary and intentional, but 
not necessarily malicious.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1834 (10th 
Ed.2014).  To “abandon” means “1. To leave (someone), esp. 
when doing so amounts to an abdication of responsibility.  2. To 
relinquish or give up with the intention of never again reclaiming 
one’s rights or interest in.  3. To desert or go away from 
permanently.”  Id. at 1; see also Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 2 (2002) (“abandon” means “to forsake or desert esp. in 
spite of an allegiance, duty, or responsibility”). 
 
Majority opinion at ¶ 30.  The majority should have begun and stopped there.  
The record demonstrates that under these common definitions of the words, C.W. 
did not willfully abandon S.C.  He did not abdicate all responsibility toward her.  
That is all that is needed to decide the case. 
{¶ 45} The majority, however, goes beyond the ordinary meaning of 
“abandon” and provides additional guidance about what the phrase “willfully 
abandoned” means.  In doing so, the majority unnecessarily limits a lower court’s 
consideration of financial support.  This limitation has little relation to the plain 
language of the statute. 
{¶ 46} Rather than starting with the plain language of the statutory 
provision at issue, R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c), the majority chooses to begin its 
analysis by looking at another statutory provision, R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(b).  That 
statute provides another avenue for finding that a putative father’s consent to 
adoption is not required—if he “willfully abandoned or failed to care for and 
support the minor.”  The majority postulates that because this statute includes the 
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words “failed to care for and support” in addition to “willfully abandoned” and 
R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c) does not, the probate court and the court of appeals erred 
when they considered C.W.’s lack of financial support in determining whether he 
had willfully abandoned S.C.  In the majority’s view, lack of financial support can 
never be relevant to the question whether a putative father willfully abandoned a 
pregnant mother. 
{¶ 47} But that makes little sense.  Under a plain reading of the term 
“willfully abandoned,” the failure to provide financial support is something that 
may have relevance to the determination.  Turn back to the definitions of 
abandon.  The first definition emphasizes “abdication of responsibility”—no 
question failing to provide financial support could be relevant here.  Next, “to 
relinquish or give up with the intention of never again reclaiming one’s rights or 
interest in”—again, it is hard to see how the failure to provide financial support to 
the mother couldn’t be relevant to a determination whether the father has 
voluntarily relinquished his rights.  Third, “to desert or go away from 
permanently”—once again, it is pretty clear that lack of financial support is 
conceivably relevant to a determination whether the father has voluntarily 
deserted the mother.  To acknowledge that the lack of financial support could be 
evidence of abandonment does not add words to the statute; to the contrary, it 
gives effect to the plain meaning of the statute’s words. 
{¶ 48} True, the failure to provide financial support by itself cannot be 
determinative in the analysis.  None of the definitions regarding willful 
abandonment deals solely with the failure to provide financial support.  That 
financial support cannot by itself be determinative is reinforced by the 
legislature’s decision to make care and support a separate factor under R.C. 
3107.07(B)(2)(b) but not under R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c).  Thus, the lack of financial 
support is relevant under the statutory scheme only to the extent that it sheds light 
on the issue whether the father willfully abandoned the mother. 
January Term, 2017 
19 
 
{¶ 49} This case is a good illustration of why the lack of financial support 
is not dispositive.  C.W. may not have sent S.C. money during her pregnancy, but 
his other actions—his telephone calls and text messages—evince his intent not to 
abdicate his responsibility.  Yet, in another set of circumstances, a putative 
father’s failure to financially support a pregnant mother could be relevant.  What 
of a millionaire putative father who ignores the pleas for help of an expectant 
mother who has no resources?  Are the courts to ignore his failure to provide 
financial support?  No doubt such a lack of support is probative of the 
millionaire’s abdication of responsibility.  The lack of support should not be the 
only factor considered in deciding whether the father willfully abandoned the 
mother, but it should be a part of the court’s analysis. 
{¶ 50} The majority opinion gets even more curious when it says that 
even though the failure to provide financial support may not be considered, the 
provision of financial support may be considered.  That’s certainly a 
headscratcher. 
{¶ 51} On the one hand, the majority argues that lack of financial support 
cannot be considered as evidence of willful abandonment because the words “care 
for and support” don’t appear in R.C. 3107.07(B)(2)(c).  Yet, somehow, the 
absence of the words in the statute doesn’t prevent the courts from considering the 
converse—a putative father’s provision of financial support. 
{¶ 52} What the majority apparently means is that while the father’s 
failure to provide financial support can’t be held against him, it can be used as a 
factor in his favor.  But this makes little sense.  After all, the question is about the 
construction of “willfully abandoned.”  Financial support either may have some 
relevance to the determination or it may not have relevance to the determination.  
If what we are doing is simply applying the plain meaning of “willfully 
abandoned,” it is hard to see how financial support counts in the analysis but the 
lack of support doesn’t count at all. 
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{¶ 53} Far from providing lower courts guidance to aid their 
determination whether willful abandonment has occurred, the majority opinion 
confuses matters more.  I would keep it simple: the failure to provide financial 
support is not dispositive but may properly be considered part of the 
determination whether the father has “willfully abandoned” the mother under R.C. 
3107.07(B)(2)(c). 
{¶ 54} In determining whether willful abandonment has occurred, a 
probate court should look to the plain meaning of the phrase.  Its focus should be 
on whether the father has voluntarily abdicated all responsibility toward the 
mother, whether he has voluntarily given up his rights, and whether he has 
voluntarily deserted the mother during her pregnancy.  We should not 
unnecessarily limit the evidence that a probate court may consider in its inquiry.  
Financial support as well as phone conversations, letters, and text messages 
may—in an appropriate case—be proper considerations.  But they are relevant 
only to the extent that they inform the question whether the father willfully 
abandoned the mother. 
{¶ 55} I did not vote to accept the discretionary appeal in this case, 
because it seemed to be simply about the weight of the evidence rather than about 
an error of law.  After reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments, my 
opinion in that regard has not changed.  The full court having chosen to accept the 
appeal—and having conducted my own independent review of the evidence—I 
am convinced that the probate court’s decision was against the manifest weight of 
the evidence.  Thus, I concur in the majority’s judgment. 
{¶ 56} But I concur only in its judgment, because in applying R.C. 
3107.07(B)(2)(c), I feel constrained to stick to the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the phrase “willfully abandoned.” 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_____________________ 
January Term, 2017 
21 
 
Voorhees & Levy, L.L.C., and Michael R. Voorhees, for appellees. 
The Farrish Law Firm and Michaela M. Stagnaro, for appellant. 
Faruki, Ireland, Cox, Rhinehart & Dusing, P.L.L., and Ruth T. Kelly, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Adoption Law Roundtable. 
Barbara T. Ginn, urging affirmance for amicus curiae S.C., birth mother. 
Landis Terhune-Olaker, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Adoption 
Circle. 
Mary Beck; and Susan Garner Eisenman, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae American Academy of Adoption Attorneys. 
___________________________