Case Title: Goettl v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Goettl v. State1992 WY 154842 P.2d 549Case Number: 90-284Decided: 11/30/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Edward 
Everette GOETTL, Appellant,

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE 
of Wyoming, Appellee.

 
 
Appeal from 
DistrictCourtofJohnsonCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

 
 
Wyoming 
Public Defender Program: Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; David M. Wallick, Student 
Intern, for 
appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Jennifer L. Gimbel, 
Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. 
Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Linda D. Burt and Roger E. 
Cockerville, Student Interns, for 
appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT,* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The only question 
presented in this case is whether law enforcement officers had probable cause to 
stop Edward E. Goettl (Goettl) and then to arrest him for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver and conspiracy to commit that 
offense. Relying upon Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990), the trial court ruled that the requisite probable cause was present. 
Goettl argues a collateral and alternative issue with respect to the denial of a 
motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the stop on the ground the stop 
was not supported by sufficient probable cause. We agree with the decision of 
the trial court that this record establishes adequate probable cause to justify 
the action of the law enforcement officers in stopping Goettl and then arresting 
him for the offenses with which he was charged. The resolution of that question 
also determines the question arising out of the motion to suppress because that 
motion assumed the absence of the requisite probable cause. The judgment and 
sentence entered by the trial court is affirmed.

 
 

[¶2.]     In the Brief of 
Appellant, Goettl submits his statement of the issues as 
follows:

 
 
I. Whether 
the court below erred when it found that the anonymous tip furnished the 
necessary indicia of reliability to justify a forcible stop of the Appellant's 
vehicle.

 
 
II. Whether 
the court below erred by denying the motion to suppress all evidence obtained 
after the arrest of the Appellant when the arrest was made without probable 
cause.

 
 
In its 
Brief of Appellee, the State of Wyoming sets forth the issues in this 
way:

 
 
I. Did the 
information furnished by the anonymous informant, as corroborated by law 
enforcement officers, exhibit sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the 
investigatory stop of Appellant's automobile?

 
 
II. Was 
Appellant unlawfully arrested, so as to require suppression of his subsequent 
confession?

 
 

[¶3.]     The record demonstrates 
the following facts that are material to the disposition of this case. At about 
3:45 P.M. on Saturday, April 28, 1990, the dispatcher for the Johnson County 
Sheriff's office at Buffalo received a telephone call from an 
anonymous informant who claimed knowledge of illegal drug activity. The 
informant told the dispatcher that Don Goettl, the appellant's brother, had "a 
lot of acid" and that Don Goettl and Goettl were going to Sheridan to sell it. 
Apparently, Goettl had come from Colorado to 
visit his brother and had brought the LSD to Wyoming with him. The informant advised the 
dispatcher that the Goettl brothers planned to transport the drugs in Goettl's 
silver Volvo automobile, bearing Colorado license UKB 606. The informant stated 
that the vehicle was parked at 178 
Western Avenue in Buffalo, which was Don Goettl's address. In 
addition, the informant told the dispatcher the Goettl brothers were going along 
with others; they were getting ready to leave; and they would be leaving 
soon.

 
 

[¶4.]     The dispatcher then 
contacted an officer of the Buffalo Police Department and asked the officer to 
come to the station. After the officer arrived, the dispatcher related the 
content of the anonymous phone call. About 4:00 P.M., the officer went by Don 
Goettl's residence at 178 Western 
Avenue to attempt to verify the information the 
anonymous informant had furnished. The officer saw a silver Volvo bearing 
Colorado 
license plate UKB 606 parked in the driveway of Don Goettl's residence with the 
passenger door open. The make of car, the license number, and its location all 
matched the information given by the informant. The officer then left the 
neighborhood where the residence was situated and drove to the north exit on the 
route from Buffalo leading to Sheridan. In about twenty 
minutes, the officer saw the same silver Volvo traveling north on Highway 87 
toward the interstate. He could see at least four people in the Volvo. At the 
time he saw the car with the people in it, the officer was at a pay telephone 
talking to an agent of the drug task force. That agent then contacted Kevin 
Hughes, the supervisor of the Northeast Drug Enforcement Team, at about 4:15 
P.M. and reported the information he had received from the Buffalo police officer. 
The information given to Agent Hughes consisted of the substance of what the 
informant had told the dispatcher, including a description of the vehicle, 
together with the observations of the Buffalo police officer.

 
 

[¶5.]     Agent Hughes then left 
Sheridan and traveled toward Buffalo after using his 
radio to arrange with officers of the Sheridan Police Department to watch for 
the silver Volvo in case Hughes missed it. After traveling about five miles 
south toward Buffalo, Hughes saw the Volvo 
traveling toward Sheridan. He turned around and followed the 
Volvo, but missed the Coffeen exit at Sheridan which the Volvo had taken. After 
Goettl's Volvo turned off the interstate, an officer of the Sheridan Police 
Department stopped it because of Agent Hughes' earlier request. There were five 
people in the car: Goettl, Don Goettl, Laura Goettl, Shalom Waltenbaugh and 
Matthew Demary.

 
 

[¶6.]     Goettl was driving the 
Volvo when the Sheridan police officer pulled the vehicle 
over. Goettl presented a Wyoming driver's 
license to the officer who made a radio check and learned from the Wyoming 
Highway Patrol that Goettl's Wyoming driver's license had been suspended. 
At that time, the Sheridan police officer arrested Goettl for 
driving while his license was suspended.

 
 

[¶7.]     Agent Hughes arrived at 
the Volvo some three or four minutes after it was stopped by the Sheridan police officer. 
Agent Hughes advised Goettl of his constitutional rights in accordance with the 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 
A.L.R.3d 974, reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 890, 87 S. Ct. 11, 17 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1966). 
Goettl then gave permission to Agent Hughes to search both his person and the 
vehicle he was driving. That search did not disclose any contraband on Goettl's 
person. Agent Hughes then requested, and received, consent to search one of the 
passengers, Matthew Demary. That search revealed a quantity of LSD in the pocket 
of Demary's trousers. Demary then was placed under arrest by Agent Hughes, and 
he was advised of his constitutional rights in accordance with the Miranda 
decision. Thereafter, the other occupants of the car, except for Laura Goettl, 
consented to a search of their persons, but no other contraband was disclosed. 
All five people were then taken to the police station in Sheridan where they were questioned by Agent Hughes and 
another Sheridan 
police officer. In the course of the interrogation that evening, Goettl made 
statements to Agent Hughes. Those statements were not recorded, but the contents 
of the statements were related by Agent Hughes in the course of his testimony at 
Goettl's trial.

 
 

[¶8.]     Goettl was charged with 
possessing a controlled substance, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), as defined 
in Schedule I, Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1014(d)(xii) (1988), with intent to deliver and 
with conspiring to deliver that controlled substance, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
§§ 35-7-1031(a) and 6-1-303 (1988), respectively.1 A hearing was held on two different 
days in July addressing a defense motion to suppress the statements made by 
Goettl to Agent Hughes while he was under arrest. That motion was denied. At his 
trial in August, Goettl was convicted of both charges. He then was sentenced to 
the state penitentiary for a term of not less than three nor more than five 
years on the charge of possessing the controlled substance with intent to 
deliver, and he was sentenced to not less than two nor more than five years on 
the conspiracy charge. Credit was given for 161 days for presentence confinement 
against Count I, possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver. 
Goettl's terms of imprisonment were imposed to run consecutively, but the court 
ordered that the conspiracy sentence was to be reduced to probation if Goettl 
successfully completed his sentence on the count of possession with intent to 
deliver. Goettl appeals from the judgment and sentence.

 
 

[¶9.]     In Neilson v. State, 
599 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980), this court stated:

 
 
     A peace officer may 
arrest a person without a warrant if, at the moment the arrest is made, he has 
probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed by the person to be 
arrested, or he has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime is being 
committed in his presence by the person to be arrested. Stated another way, the 
determination of probable cause to arrest without a warrant depends upon whether 
the facts and circumstances within the peace officer's knowledge and of which he 
has reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a reasonably 
cautious or prudent man to believe that the person arrested has committed or is 
committing an offense. The constitutional standard governing probable cause is 
grounded upon reasonableness. Thus, an appellate court's inquiry into whether or 
not an arrest is legal in a given case is restricted to an objective 
consideration of the evidence in the record. (Citations 
omitted.)

 
 
In 
accordance with Neilson, our review is premised upon an objective consideration 
of the evidence set forth in the record that relates to the issues on 
appeal.

 
 

[¶10.]  Goettl's initial contention is that the 
informant's tip, in the case of White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, was more specific than the one provided in this case. Goettl then 
contends that in White, the officers corroborated more of the predictions of 
future activity than in this case; the officers found less of the informant's 
tips to be false than in this case; the trial court in White had necessary 
indicia of reliability that is not present here; and, finally, the trial court 
in this case applied the law from White to the facts in a manner that produced a 
result outside the boundaries established by the court in White. Our 
consideration of Goettl's arguments in light of the record persuades us that the 
trial court correctly ruled that there was probable cause to stop Goettl and 
correctly applied White to reach its decision.

 
 

[¶11.]  At the time the trial court addressed the 
issues in this case, White was a very recent precedent. Applying the totality of 
the circumstances test, the United States Supreme Court held that an anonymous 
tip encompassing predictions of future activity, the details of which were 
corroborated by independent police investigation, demonstrated sufficient 
indicia of reliability to justify an investigatory stop of White's vehicle. The 
facts in the White case, and those in this case, are strikingly similar. In the 
White case, an anonymous individual called the Montgomery Police Department and 
stated that "Vanessa White would be leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments at 
a particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight 
lens broken, that she would be going to Dobey's Motel, and that she would be in 
possession of about an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attache' case." White, 
496 U.S.  at 327, 110 S. Ct.  at 2414. The 
police officers corroborated the information by observing a woman who did leave 
the 235 Lynwood Terrace Apartments building and enter a brown Plymouth station wagon 
with a broken taillight lens. These events occurred within the time frame 
indicated by the informant, and the woman then took the most direct route to 
Dobey's Motel. She was stopped by the investigative officers just short of 
reaching Dobey's Motel. The investigative officers found a locked brown attache 
case in the vehicle and, after White provided the combination to the lock on the 
case, marijuana was discovered. Subsequently, at the police station, the 
officers discovered a quantity of cocaine in White's 
purse.

 
 

[¶12.]  The Supreme Court of the 
United 
States, in White, acknowledged the fact that 
the information from the anonymous caller, without more, would not have offered 
sufficient indicia of reliability to justify this type of investigatory stop. 
However, when the information furnished to the police by the anonymous informant 
was combined with the corroboration of that information, including predictions 
of future activity, the Court held that the degree of reliability did warrant 
the investigatory stop and further investigation by the police officers. Other 
federal cases are consistent. See United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 504 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (information conveyed by a confidential informant held to encompass 
sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigatory stop of the 
vehicle); United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 671, 112 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1991) (anonymous tip sufficiently 
corroborated by police observations so as to furnish the officers with 
reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigatory stop).

 
 

[¶13.]  In Goettl's case, a number of facts 
corroborative of the anonymous tip were verified by the police officers. The 
Buffalo officer did see several people leaving 
Buffalo in the silver Volvo automobile bearing 
Colorado 
license plate UKB 606, which was owned by Goettl and had been parked at 
178 Western 
Avenue, the home of Don Goettl, within the time frame 
indicated by the informant. The vehicle was taking the most direct route to 
Sheridan and, in fact, it was driven to, and 
arrived at, Sheridan. The information that could not be 
corroborated consisted of the identity of the persons in the silver Volvo; the 
presence of "acid" in the vehicle; and the purpose of the occupants of the 
vehicle to sell the "acid" in Sheridan.

 
 

[¶14.]  As in White, there was a degree of 
particularity in the facts furnished by the anonymous informant, and there also 
was a prediction of the future actions of third parties. The description of the 
brown Plymouth 
station wagon in White and the description of the silver Volvo parked at the 
residence of Don Goettl in this case are examples of facts anyone readily could 
obtain. The accurate prediction by the informant, however, of future behavior is 
not something ordinarily, readily, or easily obtained, and that prediction, when 
corroborated by observation of the police officers, demonstrates inside 
information or a specific familiarity with the affairs of the persons who are 
the subject of the tip. When these more specific future events are predicted, 
and significant aspects of that prediction are verified, it becomes reasonable 
for police officers to believe that the informant has furnished reliable 
information regarding illegal activities of the subjects of the tip. 
White.

 
 

[¶15.]  White is consistent with prior decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court and fits with cases from this court. In a 
series of cases that began with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court has recognized that police 
officers may, without infringing upon the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, briefly stop a moving automobile to investigate their 
reasonable suspicion that the occupants are involved in illegal activity. After 
effecting what has come to be known as the "Terry stop," the officers also are 
permitted to frisk the person upon a reasonable belief that the person may be 
armed. Terry. The test there adopted was whether a reasonably prudent person in 
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or the safety 
of others could be endangered. This reasonable concern for his own safety 
justified the officer in stopping and frisking the suspect for a weapon even 
though there did not exist probable cause for an arrest. 
Terry.

 
 

[¶16.]  About five years later, in Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972), the Supreme Court 
of the United States upheld a "Terry stop" and a frisk undertaken on the basis 
of a tip received from a previously known informant who had given reliable 
information in the past. That tip was not verified, but the Court concluded 
that, even though the information would not have been sufficient to support 
either an arrest or a search warrant, the information did carry sufficient 
indicia of reliability to justify a forcible stop. Adams.

 
 

[¶17.]  The standard for analyzing the 
justification in relying upon an informant's tip has culminated in the "totality 
of the circumstances" test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, reh'g denied, 
463 U.S. 1237, 104 S. Ct. 33, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1453 (1983). In that case, the Court's 
analysis articulated a requirement that there be a balanced assessment of the 
relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability, as well as the 
indicia of unreliability, of the anonymous informant's tip. The Supreme Court of 
the United 
States pointed out that it consistently has 
recognized the value of corroboration of the details of an informant's tip by 
independent police investigation. Pursuant to Gates, the test of the "totality 
of the circumstances" in the case of a tip by an informant can be summarized as 
encompassing: (1) the sufficiency of the information set forth in the 
informant's tip; (2) the prediction of future activity or events by the 
informant; and (3) some corroboration of the current and predicted future events 
by the police officers.

 
 

[¶18.]  In prior cases, this court has recognized 
the validity of a "Terry stop" and also has adopted the "totality of the 
circumstances" test. See Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo. 1992). In Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682 
(Wyo. 1982), a police officer's independent observations of an automobile and a 
suspect driving the car which matched descriptions by eyewitnesses were held to 
be adequate probable cause for an investigatory stop. In Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5 (Wyo. 1981), the circumstances that occurred following a robbery, together 
with reasonable inferences made by an experienced police officer, furnished 
adequate grounds for an investigatory stop. In Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369 
(Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1981), 
the police officers were given a description of a car used by two individuals to 
flee from the scene of the murder, and they also were told the direction the car 
was traveling. The court held the officers were justified in making an 
investigatory stop when a car fitting that description was spotted. In the 
course of developing our state precedent, we consistently have held that 
something less than probable cause will suffice for an investigatory or "Terry 
stop." Simmons v. State, 712 P.2d 887 (Wyo. 
1986); Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1985); Lopez; Cook. "A policeman is not 
required to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur merely because 
he lacks the necessary information required for probable cause to arrest. Adams 
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). He may make an investigatory stop." Olson, 698 P.2d  at 
109-10.

 
 

[¶19.]  Examining the "totality of the 
circumstances" as disclosed by the record in this case, in the light of the 
decision in White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, we conclude that sufficient 
probable cause was present to justify the investigatory stop of Goettl's car. We 
hold that the informant's tip, particularly the prediction of future events, the 
details of which were verified by the observation of the law enforcement 
officers, furnished more than adequate probable cause to stop the Goettl 
vehicle. The subsequent events, including the consensual searches, then 
justified the arrest of Goettl and the others in the 
vehicle.

 
 

[¶20.]  Turning to Goettl's contention it was 
prejudicial error to admit into evidence those things that were seized or 
statements that were made after the arrest because the arrest occurred without 
probable cause, we again are in accord with the trial court that there was 
probable cause to arrest Goettl. The information in the hands of the police 
officers, following the stop and the consensual searches, constituted probable 
cause to believe Goettl had committed the offense of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver and that he had conspired to commit that 
offense. The motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained following that 
arrest properly was denied.

 
 

[¶21.]  The authority for warrantless arrests in 
Wyoming is 
found in Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-103 (1987), which provides, in pertinent part:               

 
 
(a) A peace 
officer may arrest a person without a warrant and detain that person until a 
legal warrant can be obtained when:

 
 
(i) Any 
criminal offense is being committed in his presence by the person to be 
arrested;

 
 
(ii) He has 
probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person 
to be arrested has committed it; or

 
 
(iii) He 
has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed, that the 
person to be arrested has committed it and that the person, unless immediately 
arrested:

 
 
(A) Will 
not be apprehended;

 
 
(B) May 
cause injury to himself or others or damage to property; 
or

 
 
(C) May 
destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the 
misdemeanor.

 
 
The focus 
of the record inquiry in this case is whether the arresting officer had probable 
cause to believe that a felony had been committed and that Goettl had committed 
it to fit the arrest within § 7-2-103(a)(ii).

 
 

[¶22.]  The question that must be resolved is 
what information will suffice to establish probable cause in the context of a 
warrantless arrest. The test adopted by this court is that the determination of 
probable cause to arrest without a warrant depends upon whether the facts and 
circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer and those facts and 
circumstances about which he has reasonably trustworthy information are 
sufficient to justify a reasonably cautious or prudent man in the belief that 
the person arrested has committed, or is committing, an offense. Neilson, 599 P.2d 1326. In Neilson, the court relied upon Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879, reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 839, 70 S. Ct. 31, 94 L. Ed. 513 (1949), and Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 
(1964). In this regard, the following cases from Wyoming also have pertinence. See Jandro v. 
State, 781 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1989); Ostrowski v. 
State, 665 P.2d 471 (Wyo. 1983); Raigosa v. 
State, 562 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1977); Rodarte v. 
City of Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 
1976).

 
 

[¶23.]  According to the record in this case, 
most of the information the police officers had at the time of Goettl's arrest 
came from the telephone call by the anonymous informant. The content of that 
information was corroborated in several respects by those police officers prior 
to arresting Goettl. In Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that an arresting 
officer may use information he gathers to bolster a tip by an informant to the 
point that there exists probable cause for arrest, if the information gathered 
by the officer is corroborative of the informant's tip. That principle can be 
applied in this case. The anonymous informant telephoned law enforcement 
officers at about 3:45 P.M. and stated that Goettl's brother was in possession 
of "a lot of acid" in Buffalo. The informant said that Goettl and his 
brother, together with other people, were preparing to leave Buffalo soon to transport the LSD to Sheridan where they 
expected to sell it. The informant also said that the party would travel in 
Goettl's silver Volvo, with Colorado license 
UKB 606, then parked at 178 Western 
Avenue in Buffalo, the residence of Goettl's brother. 
Within an hour and a half of the phone call, the law enforcement officers had 
corroborated the presence of the silver Volvo parked at 178 Western Avenue; the 
fact that 178 Western Avenue was the residence of Goettl's brother, the Volvo 
was registered to Goettl; and the Volvo left Buffalo soon afterward with at 
least four occupants. The officers also established the Volvo was traveling 
north toward Sheridan and that it was driven on 
the highway toward Sheridan, leaving the 
interstate at the Coffeen 
Avenue exit at Sheridan.

 
 

[¶24.]  The stop having been justified by the 
corroboration of the anonymous informant's information, the arresting officers 
learned, prior to the arrest, that two of the individuals in the vehicle were 
Goettl and his brother; one of the passengers was Shalom Waltenbaugh; and, after 
a consensual search of another passenger, Matthew Demary, approximately 165 
tablets of LSD were found in Demary's pocket. Additionally, one of the police 
officers recognized Shalom Waltenbaugh who then was on probation for a violation 
of the controlled substances laws and was a suspect with respect to selling 
LSD.

 
 

[¶25.]  Based upon the information that had come 
to them from the anonymous informant; the further corroboration of that 
information by the law enforcement officers both prior to and after the 
investigatory stop; and the other information gained at that time, we are 
satisfied the police officers had the requisite probable cause for a warrantless 
arrest in accordance with § 7-2-103. This holding is consistent with our ruling 
in Cook, 631 P.2d 5, in which we held that, after police officers have stopped a 
vehicle for investigatory purposes, they may obtain additional information about 
the suspects that leads to adequate probable cause for an arrest. That 
sequential development is what occurred in this case. Goettl's vehicle was 
stopped, the identities of the passengers and the driver were ascertained, and a 
controlled substance was found on one of the passengers in the 
vehicle.

 
 

[¶26.]  Goettl relies on Rodarte, 552 P.2d 1245, 
to argue that simply being a passenger in a vehicle in which a controlled 
substance is found is insufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless 
arrest. In Rodarte, Susan Rodarte and a friend accepted a ride with two men who 
were in a pickup. Later the pickup was stopped by the police, and the driver was 
arrested based upon a warrant that previously had been issued charging him with 
the sale of narcotics. The police had been looking for him to execute the 
warrant. After two bags of marijuana were discovered on the floor of the pickup, 
the driver was arrested, along with the other three occupants. This court held 
that there was insufficient probable cause to arrest Susan Rodarte. Several 
facts distinguish Rodarte from this case. First, Rodarte was a civil case in 
which the appellant claimed a wrongful arrest. Goettl's case is a criminal 
prosecution in which he alleges that there was insufficient probable cause to 
stop him and insufficient probable cause to arrest him. In Rodarte, the police 
officers stopped the vehicle because they had a warrant previously issued for 
the arrest of the driver. They had been looking for him, and it also is true 
that Susan Rodarte never was arrested for any specific 
crime.

 
 

[¶27.]  What distinguishes Goettl's case is that 
an anonymous informant had given information concerning illegal drug activities. 
The primary factor that is not present in Rodarte is the informant's tip with 
respect to the implementation of a plan to sell LSD. In this case, the probable 
cause requisite for a warrantless arrest was established by the information 
provided by the anonymous informer, the corroboration by the law enforcement 
officers, both before and after the investigatory stop, and the additional 
information discovered after the stop. No statement by the anonymous informant 
was contradicted or found to be in any way inconsistent with the facts the 
officers developed.

 
 

[¶28.]  We hold there was probable cause to 
arrest Goettl for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver it 
and for conspiracy to commit that offense. The facts and circumstances that were 
within the knowledge of the peace officers at the time of the arrest, including 
the information provided by the anonymous informant, furnished adequate probable 
cause to justify the arrest in this case.

 
 

[¶29.]  The resolution of the first issue argued 
by Goettl also leads to the resolution of his second issue. We have held 
probable cause did exist to stop Goettl and then to arrest him for possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to deliver it and for conspiracy to commit 
that offense. The motion to suppress the evidence obtained after the stop was 
properly denied since the arrest was lawful. The statements that Goettl made 
while being interrogated by the police officers at a subsequent time at the 
police station properly were admitted into evidence.

 
 

[¶30.]  Goettl, in his brief and in his oral 
arguments before this court, encouraged us to offer greater protection under the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming than the 
protection that has been provided pursuant to the Constitution of the 
United 
States. The provisions of the constitutional 
proclamations are substantially identical. In the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming, the 
following appears:

 
 
     The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing 
the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 
 

Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 4.

 
 
The 
language found in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United 
States is:

 
 
     The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.

 
 

[¶31.]  The only difference in these two 
provisions is that, under the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, an affidavit is 
required to support the issuance of a search warrant. Neither U.S. Const. amend. 
IV nor Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 4 prohibits all warrantless searches and seizures. Only those 
that are unreasonable are proscribed. Neilson, 599 P.2d 1326. This court 
previously has adopted the standard of reasonableness, which is the federal 
constitutional standard for searches and seizures. See Ostrowski, 665 P.2d 471; 
DeHerrera v. State, 589 P.2d 845 (Wyo. 1979); Raigosa, 562 P.2d 1009. In 
addition, this court has adopted the federal test justifying an investigatory 
stop, which is something less than the information necessary to establish 
probable cause. Lopez, 643 P.2d 682; Vrooman v. State, 642 P.2d 782 (Wyo. 1982); Cook, 631 P.2d 5; DeHerrera.

 
 

[¶32.]  We are not persuaded in this instance by 
Goettl's argument that we should expand the rights protected by the Constitution 
of the State of Wyoming beyond the protection 
furnished according to the Constitution of the United States. 
In light of precedent which heretofore has adopted the federal standards, we are 
satisfied that adopting the argument of Goettl in this regard would simply 
create an area of the law in which law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and 
trial courts would be left without a standard. There would be no way to predict 
what would, or would not, suffice to establish grounds for an investigatory stop 
or probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest. We are satisfied that it 
would be a disservice to structure a situation within the criminal law of the 
state of Wyoming leading to an ad hoc approach in every future 
instance.

 
 

[¶33.]  The judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1031 
(1988) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

 
 
(a) Except 
as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, 
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 
substance. Any person who violates this subsection with respect 
to:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     (ii) Any other 
controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of a crime 
and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, fined 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both; * * 
*.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. 
§ 6-1-303 (1988) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

 
 
     (a) A person is guilty 
of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more persons that 
they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or more of them 
does an overt act to effect the objective of the 
agreement.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶34.]  "The constitution is a law. It is the 
fundamental, inflexible law in written form which controls, limits, and orders 
the powers of all departments of government." Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 143, 50 P. 819, 
826 (1897). Justice Potter's words describe the function of a too often 
forgotten document, the Wyoming Constitution. In the search for "law," 
attorneys, legislators, prosecutors and judges seek the shelter of "precedent" 
where words written before are occasionally venerated, one suspects, merely for 
their presence on paper.

 
 

[¶35.]  Today, too often, myopic views of 
constitutional precedent are limited to those expressed by the United States 
Supreme Court. Those who participated in the drafting of Wyoming's Constitution, 
including Justice Potter, would be disappointed to learn of the limited respect 
we accord their efforts. Our republican form of government remains a government 
of limited powers given by the people to the state. The protection accorded to 
the people against the abuse of such power depends on the vitality of the 
judiciary's protection of constitutional rights. When we permit infringement of 
constitutional rights, we do not just punish another guilty criminal, we tear at 
the fabric of our society and diminish the freedom and security of every 
citizen. I do not believe, under current federal constitutional precedent, that 
the facts of this case demonstrate the required "reasonable suspicion" to permit 
an investigatory stop. Furthermore, I maintain the Wyoming Constitution offers 
additional protection from such stops. For these reasons, I dissent.1

I. 
FACTS

 
 

[¶36.]  The "war on drugs" captured Edward E. 
Goettl (Goettl) and his companions driving from Buffalo, Wyoming to 
Sheridan, Wyoming. At the time of the "investigatory 
stop," officers had the following information upon which to base their 
"reasonable suspicion." At about 3:45 p.m. on April 28, 1990, the Buffalo Police 
Department received an anonymous telephone call from a female. The caller told 
police that Don Goettl's brother had brought LSD up from Colorado and that the brothers and others the informant 
did not know were getting ready to take the LSD to Sheridan to sell it. The 
anonymous caller, answering a question from the dispatcher, told police the 
group was traveling in a Volvo with a Colorado license plate number. The caller gave 
no indication of the basis of her knowledge.

 
 

[¶37.]  Using his previous knowledge of the 
address, Officer Steve Matheson of the Buffalo Police Department drove to Don 
Goettl's residence and saw a silver Volvo with a license plate number that 
matched the one the caller used. The officer testified at the suppression 
hearing that at the time he observed the Volvo, about eight minutes after the 
anonymous call, no one was around the vehicle, but a passenger door was open. 
After driving past Don Goettl's home, Officer Matheson positioned himself on the 
"most likely" route to Sheridan, the north exit 
of Buffalo, 
taking Main 
Street to Highway 87 leading to the Interstate. While 
using a pay telephone at the Frontier Motel to talk with another investigator, 
Officer Matheson waited for the Volvo to pass. Later, as the Volvo drove by, 
Officer Matheson reported seeing at least four unidentified people in the 
car.

 
 

[¶38.]  At the suppression hearing, Officer 
Matheson offered his appraisal of the activities he 
observed:

 
 
     Q. [By Counsel] * * * 
Now, between the time that you first went to confirm the description of the 
vehicle and the time that you saw it heading north out of Buffalo, did you 
observe anything that you believed to be criminal 
activity?

 
 
     A. [By Officer 
Matheson] No, I did not.

 
 
     Q. You did not believe 
when they went by you on the way to Sheridan that you had probable cause to stop 
the vehicle for the offense?

 
 
     A. No, I did 
not.

 
 
     Q. And you did not 
believe at that time you had a reasonable suspicion to stop the car; is that 
correct?

 
 
     A. No I 
didn't.

 
 
     Q. Now, the facts that 
you observed are facts that could have been observed by anyone, 
correct?

 
 
     A. This is 
correct.

 
 

[¶39.]  Agent Kevin Hughes of the Wyoming 
Division of Criminal Investigation, stationed in Sheridan, was informed of the anonymous 
caller's information. Leaving Sheridan, Agent 
Hughes alerted local police to stand by for assistance and proceeded toward 
Buffalo. Agent 
Hughes spotted the silver Volvo about five miles south of Sheridan. Agent Hughes 
testified that he could not identify anyone in the vehicle as it passed him 
since it was snowing at the time and the cars were going opposite directions on 
the highway. The agent followed the Volvo into Sheridan and ordered Sheridan police to stop the vehicle after it 
took the Coffeen exit.

 
 

[¶40.]  Agent Hughes, during cross-examination at 
the suppression hearing, offered this tortuous "explanation" of his order to 
stop the car:

 
 
     Q. [By counsel] Now, 
you did not witness any attempted sale or delivery of drugs during this entire 
episode, did you?

 
 
     A. [By Agent Hughes] 
Which episode?

 
 
     Q. The stop of the 
vehicle from the time Troy Long [another drug investigator] called you until the 
time that you arrested the occupants in the Volvo?

 
 
     A. Did I see any 
attempted delivery of the drugs?

 
 
     Q. 
Right.

 
 
     A. The information was 
that that's what they were going to Sheridan to 
do, and I saw the vehicle going to Sheridan.

 
 
     Q. Let me ask the 
question again. Did you see any criminal activity during the time between when 
Troy Long called you and the time that you arrested the five occupants of the 
silver Volvo?

 
 
     A. I guess I need to 
ask you what you mean by did I see any criminal activity.

 
 
     Q. Did you observe 
anybody commit a crime?

 
 
    A. That I knew at the moment 
that I saw it that it was, in fact, a crime that was being 
committed?

 
 
     Q. You've attended a 
lot of law enforcement training programs, haven't you?

 
 
     A. Yes, 
sir

 
 
     Q. And you understand 
what I'm trying to find out, don't you?

 
 
     A. No, sir, I 
don't.

 
 
     Q. I'm trying to ask 
you, did you observe anything that at the time you observed it you thought was a 
crime?

 
 
     A. Yes, 
sir.

 
 
     Q. 
What?

 
 
     A. When the vehicle 
was, in fact, heading toward Sheridan. Based upon the information we had, I 
believed a crime was being committed.

 
 

[¶41.]  The trial court summarized the evidence 
from the suppression hearing during its ruling from the bench: "As this court 
sees it, there was the anonymous tip, there were some factors given in that tip 
which led the officers to believe that they had the right to stop the car, at 
least Officer Hughes. He stopped it." Ruling that Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990) governed, the trial court found the 
investigatory stop was justified and the statement Goettl made while in custody 
was admissible. The trial judge admitted that without White, he would have ruled 
differently. "I personally would have to say that I would not agree with [White] 
and if I were on the Supreme Court I would personally have ruled the other way, 
but I am not and I have to follow their rule, as I see it."2

 
 
II. 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶42.]  This court, therefore, is presented with 
a question of constitutional fact. Classified as a mixed question of law and 
fact, constitutional fact questions demand the application of constitutional 
principles to the historical facts determined below. See Henry P. Monaghan, 
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum.L.Rev. 229 (1985). The historical facts are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376, 378 
(Wyo. 1989), 
while the question of whether a violation of constitutional rights occurred is 
reviewed de novo. See Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682, 683-85 (Wyo. 1982); Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Wyo. 1981); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-23, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 
1879-80, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). My analysis begins with federal constitutional 
principles and moves to a review of Wyoming constitutional 
law.

 
 
III. 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

 
 

[¶43.]  Adopting a rule of selective 
incorporation, the United States Supreme Court has held that various portions of 
the first eight provisions of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the states 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Laurence H. 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 11-2 (2d ed. 1988). In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 
(1949), the United States Supreme Court held the Fourth Amendment's rights to be 
free of unreasonable search and seizure applied to the states. The Fourth 
Amendment states:

 
 
     The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.

 
 
The federal 
sanction of excluding from criminal proceedings improperly seized evidence was 
extended to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). Incorporation has therefore created a minimum level of 
constitutional protection from which the states are free to extend greater 
protection. CheyenneAirport Bd. v. Rogers, 
707 P.2d 717, 726 (Wyo. 1985); PruneYardShopping 
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741 (1980).

 
 

[¶44.]  The evolving history of investigatory 
stops reveals, however, that the federal "minimum" fluctuates with the changing 
makeup of the United States Supreme Court. In the most recent example, the facts 
of White disclose the Montgomery, Alabama police department received an anonymous telephone 
call from a person who said Vanessa White would leave a particular apartment at 
a particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight 
lens broken. White, according to the anonymous caller would travel to Dobey's 
Motel with about an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attache' case. When two 
police officers arrived at the apartment, they saw a brown Plymouth station wagon 
with a broken right taillight parked in front of a lot at the apartment building 
the anonymous caller named. Later, officers saw a then unidentified female leave 
the apartment building, but without an attache' case, and enter the station 
wagon. The officers followed as the driver took the "most direct route to 
Dobey's Motel." White, 496 U.S.  at 325, 110 S. Ct.  at 2414. 
Police stopped the car "just short of Dobey's Motel" and informed the driver she 
had been stopped because she was suspected of carrying cocaine in her car. 
Id. With 
White's consent, officers searched the car and found a brown attache case which 
contained marijuana. Later, after police arrested White, three milligrams of 
cocaine were found in her purse.

 
 

[¶45.]  The issue before the court was "whether 
the tip, as corroborated by independent police work, exhibited sufficient 
indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory 
stop." Id. 496 U.S.  at 327, at 
2414. Applying a "totality of the circumstances" test, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 225, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2325, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), the United States 
Supreme Court first determined that the anonymous caller's information provided 
"`virtually nothing from which one might conclude that [the caller] is either 
honest or his information reliable; likewise, the [tip] gives absolutely no 
indication of the basis for the [caller's] predictions regarding [Vanessa 
White's] criminal activities.'" White, 496 U.S.  at 329, 110 S. Ct.  at 2415 (quoting Gates, 
462 U.S.  at 227, 103 S.Ct. at 2326). The 
United States Supreme Court next determined that police corroboration of the 
anonymous caller's information was required. The degree of corroboration was 
determined by the "reasonable suspicion" standard which the majority described 
as "less demanding" than probable cause. White, 496 U.S.  at 329-31, 
110 S. Ct.  at 2416. Critical to the outcome of White is the amount of information 
required. The United States Supreme Court pointed to a balancing framework in 
which "if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information 
will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be 
required if the tip were more reliable." Id.

 
 

[¶46.]  The White majority noted that Montgomery police 
corroborated that a woman left the particular apartment building the anonymous 
caller mentioned, although not the particular apartment. The woman did get into 
the particular vehicle the caller described. The woman left the building within 
the time frame predicted by the anonymous caller. While police stopped White 
before she reached Dobey's Motel, the majority found White's use of the most 
direct route significantly corroborated the anonymous caller's prediction of 
destination.

 
 

[¶47.]  For the majority, the most important 
details in the anonymous caller's information were those predicting White's 
future activities:

 
 
What was 
important was the caller's ability to predict respondent's future behavior, because it demonstrated 
inside information - a special familiarity with respondent's affairs. The 
general public would have had no way of knowing that respondent would shortly 
leave the building, get in the described car, and drive the most direct route to 
Dobey's Motel. Because only a small number of people are generally privy to an 
individual's itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person 
with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable 
information about the individual's illegal activities.

 
 
Id. 496 U.S.  at 332, 110 S. Ct.  at 2417 (emphasis in original). Calling it a "close 
case," the majority held that "under the totality of the circumstances the 
anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to 
justify the investigatory stop of [White's] car." Id.

 
 

[¶48.]  Justice Stevens, writing for the three 
dissenting members of the United States Supreme Court in White, pointed to the 
"mockery" the majority had made of constitutional search and seizure protection. 
White, 496 U.S.  at 333, 110 S. Ct.  at 2418, 
Stevens, J. dissenting. "Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to 
make her the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will 
certainly be able to formulate a tip about her like the one predicting Vanessa 
White's excursion." Id. Noting the potential for abuse, Justice Stevens 
expressed his view that "every citizen is subject to being seized and questioned 
by any officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was based on 
an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed." 
Id.

 
 

[¶49.]  White's pedigree traces to 1968 when the 
United States Supreme Court first approved a "stop and frisk" and began the 
federal constitutional history of investigatory stops using a carefully balanced 
approach. Thus came into the law what has since been explained as the Terry 
stop. In Terry, a plain clothes police detective, with thirty-nine years 
experience, saw two men individually and repeatedly "peering" in a store window. 
Terry, 392 U.S.  at 6, 88 S. Ct.  at 1872. After a 
third man briefly met twice with the others, the detective, suspecting that the 
men were "casing a job, a stick-up," approached the group to ask about their 
activities. Id. at 6, 88 S. Ct.  at 1872. Fearing they might 
be armed, the detective "patted down" Terry and felt what he suspected was a 
gun. Id. at 7, 
88 S. Ct.  at 1872. Terry was armed with a .38 caliber revolver which he attempted 
to suppress at trial.

 
 

[¶50.]  The Terry court considered whether an 
unreasonable search and seizure had occurred. The United States Supreme Court 
said there was no question that a "seizure" occurred and that Terry was 
"searched." Id. at 19, 88 S. Ct.  at 1878-79. The dual 
analysis inquired "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, 
and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 20, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879. To justify the intrusion, the "officer must 
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 
Id. at 21, 88 S. Ct.  at 1880 (emphasis added). The reasonableness of the actions should then be 
evaluated using "an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer 
at the moment of the seizure or the 
search `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken 
was appropriate?" Id. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct.  at 1880 (emphasis 
added).

 
 

[¶51.]  Balancing the governmental interest in 
preventing crime, against the expectation of privacy involved, the United States 
Supreme Court held the activities of the men were suspicious enough to justify 
the detective's approach and temporary seizure. Specifically, the United States 
Supreme Court noted that the detective observed the men walk in front of the 
store window approximately twenty-four times. The weapons search was also 
justified based on the officer's need for protection tested by whether a 
"reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief 
that his safety or that of others was in danger." Id. at 27, 88 S. Ct.  at 
1883. The United States Supreme Court specifically limited its 
holding:

 
 
We merely 
hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be 
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently 
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies 
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the 
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own 
or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in 
the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault 
him.

 
 

Id. at 30, 88 S. Ct.  at 1884-85 (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶52.]  Four years after Terry, the United States 
Supreme Court applied its holding in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). Robert Williams was stopped after a known informant 
told a patrol officer that an individual parked nearby was carrying narcotics 
and had a gun at his waist. When the officer approached the car, he asked 
Williams to open the door. Instead, Williams rolled down the window prompting 
the officer to reach into the car and pull a loaded revolver from Williams' 
waistband. A search incident to Williams' arrest discovered large quantities of 
heroin and other weapons. In upholding the validity of the officer's actions, 
the United States Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the limited Terry 
search "is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue 
his investigation without fear of violence * * *." Id. at 146, 92 S. Ct.  at 
1923. The officer was justified in responding to the informant's tip because the 
officer knew the informant and the informant had provided information in the 
past. "This is a stronger case than obtains in the case of an anonymous 
telephone tip." The majority cautioned, that "while the Court's decisions 
indicate that this informant's unverified tip may have been insufficient for a 
narcotics arrest or search warrant * * *, the information carried enough indicia 
of reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop of Williams." Id. at 147, 92 S. Ct.  at 
1924.

 
 

[¶53.]  The dissenting justices in Williams 
wisely expressed their concern that Terry was being improvidently broadened. 
Justice Marshall noted in his dissent that Terry stands for the limited 
proposition that, without a warrant, police have a "`narrowly drawn authority to 
. . . search for weapons' * * *." Williams, 407 U.S.  at 154, 92 S. Ct.  at 1927 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.  at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883). 
Justices Douglas and Brennan both expressed their agreement with Judge 
Friendly's position during a previous proceeding in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Williams, 407 U.S.  at 149-53, 
92 S. Ct.  at 1924-27, Douglas, J., dissenting and Brennan, J., dissenting. Judge 
Friendly wrote that he had the "gravest hesitancy" about extending Terry to 
crimes such as possession of narcotics because of the danger that "instead of 
the stop being the object and the protective frisk an incident thereto, the 
reverse will be true." Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2nd Cir. 1970), 
Friendly, Cir.J., dissenting, cert. granted 404 U.S. 1014, 92 S. Ct. 670, 30 L. Ed. 2d 661 judgment reversed 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). Judge Friendly also called into question the existence of 
the informer by pointing out that at an initial suppression hearing, the officer 
claimed to be responding to a police signal. At a subsequent hearing, the 
"informer appeared and the signal disappeared." Id. at 36 n. 4.

 
 

[¶54.]  Nearly ten years after Terry, the 
United 
States Supreme Court held that after stopping a 
vehicle for a traffic violation, officers, again in the interests of personal 
safety, may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the 
search and seizure protection. Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n. 6, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 
n. 6, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977).

 
 

[¶55.]  In United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
413-14, 101 S. Ct. 690, 692-93, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 923, 
102 S. Ct. 1281, 71 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1982), border patrol agents investigated 
patterns of footprints in the Arizona desert and deduced that groups of illegal 
aliens were being smuggled into this country. After determining a probable 
pattern to the operation, the agents positioned themselves at a vantage point 
where they could observe vehicles passing on a highway that was being used as a 
pick-up point. When a distinctive truck with a camper shell passed by twice, 
officers stopped it and discovered six illegal aliens. The United States Supreme 
Court stated the test, based on the totality of the circumstances, that "the 
detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting 
the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. at 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 
at 695. Holding that the experienced officers could "reasonably surmise" the 
occupants of the particular vehicle they stopped were engaged in criminal 
activity, the United States Supreme Court concluded the stop did not violate 
federal search and seizure protection. Id. at 421-22, 101 S. Ct.  at 
696-97.

 
 

[¶56.]  Gates, 462 U.S.  at 225, 103 S. Ct.  at 
2325, is technically not a Terry stop case since it deals with probable cause 
determinations for a search warrant. However, Gates plays a critical role in 
defining the verification required in White. In Gates, an anonymous letter was 
sent to Bloomingdale, 
Illinois police. The letter claimed 
Susan and Lance Gates were selling illegal drugs and a Florida trip was planned 
to transport a new shipment. Police confirmed the travel plans outlined in the 
letter, and confirmed Lance Gates' arrival in Florida and subsequent departure for Illinois. When Gates and 
his wife returned to their home, police conducted a warranted search and found 
350 pounds of marijuana in their car along with more marijuana, weapons and 
other contraband in their home. The Illinois court ordered the evidence suppressed 
finding that the letter did not provide a basis for probable cause to issue a 
search warrant.

 
 

[¶57.]  The United States Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the "two-pronged test" derived from Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964) (hereinafter Aguilar-Spinelli test) 
had been too rigidly applied making it unlikely that anonymous tips could be 
used to support probable cause determinations. Gates, 462 U.S.  at 237-38, 
103 S. Ct.  at 2331-32. Instead, the United States Supreme Court directed 
magistrates make probable cause determinations on a "practical, commonsense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 
him, including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime will be found in a particular place." Id. at 238, 103 S. Ct.  at 2332. The majority 
conceded the importance of the "value of corroboration of details of an 
informant's tip by independent police work." Id. at 241, 103 S. Ct.  at 2334. The United 
States Supreme Court also noted that the anonymous letter "contained a range of 
details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at 
the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not 
easily predicted." Id. at 245, 103 S. Ct.  at 2335-36 (emphasis 
added).

 
 

[¶58.]  The immediate predecessor of White was 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1989). Andrew Sokolow was stopped at the airport after returning to Honolulu from Miami. An airline ticket agent had alerted 
police that a young man wearing gold jewelry had purchased tickets with cash. At 
the time drug enforcement agents stopped Sokolow, the agents knew: Sokolow had 
paid $2,100 for two airline tickets from a roll of $20 bills; he had traveled 
under a different name from the name used in his telephone listing; he traveled 
to Miami, a city known for illicit drugs; he stayed in Miami only forty-eight 
hours even though the round trip from Honolulu to Miami requires twenty hours; 
he was nervous during the trip and at stopovers; and no luggage was checked 
although Sokolow and his traveling companion carried four bags. Id. 490 U.S.  at 2-4, 109 S. Ct.  at 1583. 
Sokolow was found to be carrying cocaine and, after suppression, was denied 
entered a conditional plea of guilty. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit found reasonable suspicion was not demonstrated under a two-part 
test it formulated which considered facts describing "ongoing criminal activity" 
separately from facts which described "personal 
characteristics."

 
 

[¶59.]  The United States Supreme Court's 
analysis began by noting that the level of suspicion necessary for an 
investigatory stop is "obviously less demanding than that for probable cause." 
Id. 490 U.S.  at 7, 109 S. Ct.  at 1585. Dismissing the Ninth Circuit's two-part test, the United States 
Supreme Court used the "totality of the circumstances" approach to consider the 
"probabilities" that the facts known to the drug agents disclosed a "reasonable 
suspicion" of criminal activity sufficient to stop Sokolow. Id. 490 U.S.  at 6-9, 109 S. Ct.  at 1585-86. 
The United States Supreme Court then extended language from Gates to apply to 
reasonable suspicion determinations: "`innocent behavior will frequently provide 
the basis for a showing of probable cause,' and that `[i]n making a 
determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular 
conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion that attaches to 
particular types of noncriminal acts.'" Sokolow, 490 U.S.  at 10, 109 S. Ct.  at 1587 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S.  at 243-44 n. 13, 103 S. Ct.  at 
2335 n. 13).

 
 

[¶60.]  The majority held agents had a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity when they stopped Sokolow. Sokolow, 490 U.S.  at 10-11, 109 S. Ct.  at 1587. The 
United States Supreme Court acknowledged that any one of the bits of information 
known to agents would not, by itself, prove illegal conduct and could be "quite 
consistent with innocent travel." Id. 490 U.S.  at 9, 109 S. Ct.  at 1586. For 
example, the United States Supreme Court speculated that a person traveling 
under an alias may do so wishing to conceal travel to a hospital for an 
operation. On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court claimed that 
paying for airline tickets with cash was unusual: "Most business travelers, we 
feel confident, purchase airline tickets by credit card or check so as to have a 
record for tax or business purposes, and few vacationers carry with them 
thousands of dollars in $20 bills." Id. 490 U.S.  at 8-9, 109 S. Ct.  at 1586. The 
short stay in Miami drew the majority's 
attention: "surely few residents of Honolulu 
travel from that city for 20 hours to spend 48 hours in Miami during the month of 
July." Id.

 
 

[¶61.]  There is no emerging constitutional rule 
to be simply applied from this series of case-by-case inquiries because each is 
limited to its facts. Sokolow, 490 U.S.  at 17-18, 109 S. Ct.  at 1591, Marshall, J., dissenting. 
However, the balanced framework of Terry with its attention to "unusual conduct" 
observed by a police officer has been severely mutated by the United States 
Supreme Court. The limited weapons search, the "frisk" of Terry's "stop and 
frisk," is perhaps forgotten, if not lost, by the willingness to broaden 
investigatory stops to evidence searches. Law enforcement officers, faced with 
the task of deciding under difficult field conditions whether reasonable 
suspicion exists, may choose to ponder what is permissible. The options appear 
to direct post hoc justifications which can be made to conform to the facts of a 
prior "safe" case or to risk losing a "bust."

 
 
IV. STATE 
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL PRINCIPLES

 
 

[¶62.]  In the context of investigatory stops 
based upon anonymous informant's tips, a survey of state cases applying White 
reveals attempts are being made to preserve the "unusual conduct" dimension of 
investigatory stops while providing law enforcement with reasoned guidance on 
the level of corroboration necessary to create an indicia of reliability for 
anonymous tips. State courts seek to distinguish the degree of detail the 
informant must provide or the informant's ability to predict future behavior. 
Certainly, the indeterminate views taken of what constitutes "future behavior" 
makes any prediction, or in this context probability estimates, hazardous. Many 
cases attempt to examine the observed behavior. A few examples teach us of the 
infirmity of White while providing vivid evidence of the difficulty facing law 
enforcement in determining whether they truly have the "indicia of reliability" 
necessary to support a "reasonable suspicion."

 
 

[¶63.]  The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts specifically declined to follow the "totality of the 
circumstances" test in considering whether officers had reasonable suspicion to 
stop a car. An anonymous caller's information claimed that a man named 
"Wayne" bought drugs in Chelsea, Massachusetts and 
would be driving a silver Hyundai with a Maine 
license number to Bridgton, 
Maine. Com. v. Lyons, 409 
Mass. 16, 564 N.E.2d 390, 391 (1990). The Massachusetts's justices described the United 
States Supreme Court approach as lacking the precision necessary in stating a 
test for probable cause. The court held that an investigatory automobile stop 
requires proof the officer developed reasonable suspicion that the occupants 
committed, or are committing, or are about to commit a crime. Because the 
anonymous caller's information failed to provide any information on the basis of 
the informant's knowledge or the informant's reliability and because the details 
corroborated by the police were insufficient, the court decided reasonable 
suspicion was not demonstrated. The court found the officers verified only the 
description of the car, the direction of travel and the race and gender of the 
occupants before making their stop. The court found the corroboration of 
"obvious details" did not justify the investigatory stop. See also Com. v. 
Bakoian, 412 Mass. 295, 588 N.E.2d 667 (1992) (holding a known informant's tip 
distinguishable from Lyons because specific non-obvious details were provided) 
and Rojas v. State, 797 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Tex.Cr.App. 1990) (holding for probable 
cause to search, anonymous informer must assert personal knowledge or additional 
facts must provide a showing that contraband will probably be 
located).

 
 

[¶64.]  In People v. Faucett, 193 Mich. App. 499, 
484 N.W.2d 670, 672 (1992), the court held that activities predicted by an 
anonymous telephone caller "were so lacking in significance and particular 
detail that their fruition did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity." The anonymous caller told a dispatcher that a newer blue 
pickup, possibly a Datsun, was traveling to a Michigan town with cocaine or marijuana. The 
caller reported that the vehicle was driven by a specific individual and the 
drugs were located in a carrying case behind a seat. The direction of travel 
along a specific series of streets was given. Police, searching the route, 
located a blue Mazda pickup and a license plate check confirmed that the 
identity of the owner matched the name given by the anonymous caller. The court 
said more than a vehicle description and a general direction of travel was 
required for reasonable suspicion. See Lambert v. State, 34 Ark. App. 227, 808 S.W.2d 788 (1991) (holding an anonymous caller's tip that an individual driving 
a specific truck leaving one city at a specific time driving to another city 
with marijuana did not provide reasonable suspicion when the officer matched 
only the truck description on route and approximate time) and Hardy v. Com., 11 
Va. App. 433, 399 S.E.2d 27 (1990) (holding an officer's corroboration of only 
"innocent details" from an anonymous caller's tip was 
insufficient).

 
 

[¶65.]  The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 
in an en banc decision, held "the suspicious conduct relied upon by law 
enforcement officers must be sufficiently distinguishable from that of innocent 
people under the same circumstances as to clearly, if not conclusively, set the 
suspect apart from them." Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex.Cr.App. 
1991). In Crockett, the court found the behavior of the suspects in a train 
station, including paying cash for tickets, "scoping" the lobby, not talking 
much and walking separately may have seemed "odd" to police but it was not 
sufficiently indicative of drug trafficking to justify an investigative stop. 
Id. at 310, 
313.

 
 

[¶66.]  A concerned New Mexico Court of Appeals 
concluded that officers lacking reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop 
and lacking probable cause for a search improperly seized a man in hopes of 
obtaining a consent to search or developing probable cause. State v. Bedolla, 
111 N.M. 448, 452, 806 P.2d 588, 592, cert. denied 111 N.M. 416, 806 P.2d 65 
(1991). Police received an anonymous call that a man named "Frank" and another 
man, with a purple Nissan pickup with California license plates, were distributing 
cocaine from a motel room. After observing the motel for over an hour and seeing 
no evidence of criminal activity, police stopped the vehicle shortly after it 
left the parking area. The police corroboration "yielded nothing consistent with 
criminal behavior * * *" and corroborated only the existence of the vehicle, its 
license, and it was driven by an unidentified individual. Id. 111 N.M. at 451, 806 P.2d  at 591. With no signs that a crime was being committed or was about to be 
committed, the court concluded that the only purpose of the stop was to 
investigate the anonymous caller's information; therefore, the illegal stop 
tainted the consent to search.

 
 

[¶67.]  In Cunningham v. State, 591 So. 2d 1058, 
1061 (Fla.App. 1991) (emphasis in original), Florida drew a line distinguishing between the 
degree of corroboration required for a stop and that required for a search or 
arrest:

 
 
     It is not sufficient 
merely to corroborate the anonymous information concerning the identity, dress, 
description, location or even future activity of the suspect who is the subject 
of the anonymous information. In addition to independent evidence verifying that 
type of information, there must also be independent evidence of criminal 
activity on the part of the suspect. Otherwise, any totally innocent person 
could be the object of an anonymous tip furnishing verifiable information about 
name, description, whereabouts and future activity. When that type of verifiable 
information is furnished together with unverifiable allegations of criminal 
activity, a detention and search of a person so anonymously informed against is 
not authorized.

 
 
The court 
said it acted from a "growing concern" that even after the anonymous caller's 
information is sufficiently corroborated to justify a stop, the search or arrest 
is not authorized absent "the discovery of evidence sufficient to establish in 
the mind of the detaining officer probable cause to believe that the detainee is 
engaged in criminal activity * * *." Id. at 1060. See also Sapp v. State, 592 So. 2d 786 (Fla.App. 1992) (holding officers lacked reasonable suspicion for an 
investigatory stop when an anonymous caller gave only details of identification 
and location and officers made no independent observations supporting probable 
cause to believe any criminal activity was taking place) and Swanson v. State, 
591 So. 2d 1114, 1116 (Fla.App. 1992) (holding police corroborated only "easily 
obtained facts and conditions presumably existing at the time * * *" of the 
anonymous informant's call).

 
 

[¶68.]  The concern of state courts that innocent 
conduct not be used to justify an investigatory stop is highlighted by a recent 
New Hampshire Supreme Court decision. In State v. Kennison, 134 N.H. 243, 590 A.2d 1099, 1100 (1991), an anonymous caller told police that Gina Kennison had 
four pounds of marijuana in the trunk of her car. The caller said Kennison drove 
a blue Cadillac and gave her license number. According to the caller, Kennison 
would leave her work place in Nashua, New Hampshire at 3:00 p.m. to travel to Hudson, New 
Hampshire where, after going to her home, she would be 
making marijuana deliveries. Police confirmed that the Cadillac was parked at 
Kennison's work place in Nashua and that a woman departed in the car at 
3:00 p.m. Another officer, who knew Kennison, witnessed her arrive home, park 
her car and enter her house. Id. After about two hours, she left her home 
in the Cadillac. The officer followed for less than a mile before he "pulled her 
over." Id. No 
suspicious or illegal activity had been observed.

 
 

[¶69.]  Deciding the case under provisions of the 
New Hampshire Constitution, the court held the police "lacked reasonable 
suspicion" and "unjustifiably intruded upon Kennison's protected privacy 
interests." Id. 590 A.2d  at 1102. First, with no "track 
record" of previously accurate information to point to, the anonymous informant 
lacked reliability. Id. at 1101. Second, minimal information 
existed showing the informant's basis of knowledge. Third, the information about 
the car, license number, place of employment and departure time was readily 
available. The "predictions" that Kennison would leave Nashua, drive to Hudson and then leave home again did not show a 
special familiarity with Kennison's affairs. Fourth, the police corroborated 
"mundane, innocent facts easily available to co-workers or friends, or to 
persons who might wish to harass or embarrass another." Id. Fifth, officers 
observed no suspicious or incriminating activity during the surveillance. Sixth, 
the anonymous caller's information lacked the "wealth of intimate detail" 
necessary to make it self-verifying, such as Kennison's description, her home 
address, the names or addresses of persons she would see during the evening, or 
the method of drug distribution. Id. at 1102.

 
 
V. FEDERAL 
PRINCIPLES PROPERLY APPLIED

 
 

[¶70.]  Under White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, and federal constitutional principles, the question remains of whether the 
anonymous caller's information together with Goettl's conduct created reasonable 
suspicion justifying Agent Hughes' decision to order the investigatory stop. 
While the majority concluded such suspicion existed based on the anonymous 
caller's prediction of future events, a review of the evidence from the 
suppression hearing is in order.

 
 

[¶71.]  Initially, we should attempt to clarify 
what "future events" the anonymous caller predicted and what the police really 
corroborated. The caller said Don Goettl and his brother and others were getting ready to go to Sheridan in a silver Volvo with a Colorado license number. 
Apparently, the anonymous caller did not give police Don Goettl's address, since 
Officer Matheson testified he used his previous knowledge of the address to 
drive to the neighborhood. Officer Matheson corroborated the existence of the 
silver Volvo and the license plate number, but ignored by the majority was his 
testimony that he observed an open car door. A reasonable inference from seeing 
an open car door in a residential neighborhood on a Saturday is that the 
residents are packing for a trip. They were, in fact, getting ready to go. There is no future 
prediction in this information. The officer's observations only confirm what 
every neighbor could have reported from a vantage point anywhere along the 
block. Officer Matheson's testimony indicated he did not believe a reasonable 
suspicion for a stop existed from the activities he 
observed.

 
 

[¶72.]  The only remaining future prediction is 
that the occupants of the Volvo would travel to Sheridan. But a neighbor observing the car 
being packed could also infer that a trip to a nearby larger town was in order. 
Without alerting any suspicion in a typical Wyoming town, a neighbor, acquaintance or 
passing stranger could easily inquire, "Where are you headed?" Even if we assume 
an element of future prediction in the anonymous caller's report that Sheridan was the 
destination, does that fact justify a reasonable suspicion for an investigatory 
stop? I would argue that White teaches it does not and the principles stated in 
the previously discussed cases applying White agree. See, e.g., Lyons, 564 N.E.2d  at 393; 
Faucett, 484 N.W.2d 670; Kennison, 590 A.2d  at 1102; Bedolla, 111 N.M. at 451, 
806 P.2d  at 591; and Crockett, 803 S.W.2d  at 313.

 
 

[¶73.]  Applying a totality of the circumstances 
test to ask whether the tip, as corroborated, "exhibited sufficient indicia of 
reliability to provide reasonable suspicion * * *" justifying an investigatory 
stop, White, 496 U.S.  at 327, 110 S. Ct.  at 2414, I 
believe we see only an attempt on Agent Hughes' part to offer conforming 
testimony. The caller's veracity is as unknown as her identity. No evidence of 
past reliability is presented. The caller's basis of knowledge is undisclosed. 
The record before this court does not indicate whether the anonymous caller 
would be able to identify LSD; whether she actually saw the drugs; whether she 
saw the drugs in the possession of Goettl; whether she witnessed Goettl 
arranging to sell drugs; or whether she actually witnessed Goettl sell drugs. In 
White, the United States Supreme Court directed that despite the demise of the 
Aguilar-Spinelli test, the factors of veracity, reliability and basis of 
knowledge "remain `highly relevant in determining the value of [the anonymous 
caller's] report.'" White, 496 U.S.  at 328, 110 S. Ct.  at 2415 (quoting Gates, 
462 U.S.  at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2328). 
Therefore, since the anonymous caller's information has a relatively low degree 
of reliability, police were under an obligation to establish more information to 
provide reasonable suspicion. White, 496 U.S. 110 S. Ct. 
at 2416.

 
 

[¶74.]  The consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances demands that both the "quantity and quality" of information 
possessed by the police by considered. Id. The quantity of the information the 
anonymous caller revealed about Goettl was minimal, providing little assurance 
of veracity, and could be easily observed. For example, in White, the caller 
described the specific apartment, the specific vehicle and the location of drugs 
in a brown attache' case. The anonymous caller here did not name all the 
individuals involved, apparently only identified the car after being questioned 
by the police dispatcher who took the call and never stated what quantity of 
drugs would be involved nor where they would be located. This discloses a lack 
of special familiarity with Goettl's affairs.

 
 

[¶75.]  Critically absent from the anonymous 
caller's information was any particularized information, the quality component, 
about Goettl's planned activities in Sheridan. In White, the anonymous caller 
specifically indicated Vanessa White's destination would be Dobey's Motel. 
White, 496 U.S.  at 325-27, 110 S. Ct.  at 2414. 
Who was Goettl going to meet? What quantity of drugs would be involved in the 
sale or would there be multiple sales? When was Goettl going to sell the drugs? 
Where in Sheridan was Goettl going to stop? How would 
the transaction be conducted? Simple questions regarding possible criminal 
activity which would support veracity and a basis of knowledge, but the 
anonymous caller provided no details and the police had no answers. Goettl could 
have pulled off the interstate for a rest stop in route to another city at the 
request of one of his passengers, but as far as Agent Hughes was concerned, that 
was all he needed to have reasonable suspicion that the anonymous caller's 
information exhibited a significant indicia of reliability to justify an 
investigatory stop.

 
 

[¶76.]  I would hold, under federal 
constitutional principles, that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to make 
an investigatory stop, under White, and the improper stop tainted the subsequent 
consensual search and the confession requiring suppression. Bedolla, 111 N.M. at 
456, 806 P.2d  at 596. The anonymous caller's information and the limited 
investigation by officers did not provide sufficient indicia of reliability. The 
plain fact is that no criminal activity was observed. The actions that were 
observed did not support an "objective manifestation that the person stopped is, 
or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." Cortez, 449 U.S.  at 417, 101 S. Ct.  at 695. The 
officers' "good faith" in their actions is not enough. Terry, 392 U.S.  at 22, 88 S. Ct.  at 1880-81. The 
stop represented an unreasonable intrusion into Fourth Amendment 
rights.

 
 
VI. 
WYOMING 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

 
 

[¶77.]  The infirmity of today's decision and of 
White is that police and courts are left to speculate on behavioral motives. I 
contend a court of law should not be reduced to rendering justice based upon the 
judge's ability to state "probabilities" of normative spending patterns, travel 
destinations, driving behavior and other characteristics. The concept of a rule 
of law seeks to avoid the whims of an individual police officer or an individual 
judge being imposed upon the people who established the government. I further 
believe the American judiciary best serves the people when we are able to 
provide something more than conforming facts which an officer may use to 
consider the appropriateness of his actions. Therefore, to provide guidance to 
the law enforcement officers of Wyoming, this court should look to the Wyoming 
Constitution for applicable standards of search and seizure protection. See 
Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, 21 Land 
and Water L.Rev. 527 (1986) (arguing the Wyoming Supreme Court should search for 
an independent meaning of provisions of state constitution rather than borrowing 
from federal precedent).

 
 

[¶78.]  Providing more protection for individual 
rights under the language of the Wyoming Constitution is not a unique 
proposition. Beside those cases we have already examined, see, e.g., Kennison, 
590 A.2d  at 1102, other jurisdictions have accorded more expansive protection of 
individual liberty under their state constitutions. In State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324 (Alaska 1985), the Supreme Court of Alaska 
recognized that the Gates totality of the circumstances test "does not provide 
the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures 
required by * * * the Alaska Constitution." The court accurately described the 
value of federal decisions: "[W]e rely on federal precedents to interpret the 
requirements of the Alaska Constitution as we would rely on the precedents of 
other jurisdictions." Id. at 324 n. 7. The court continued to 
utilize the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause determinations based on 
information from confidential informants. See also State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 
211, 217, 784 P.2d 30, 36 (1989) (holding the Aguilar-Spinelli test more 
accurately reflects state constitutional requirements); People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 529 N.Y.S.2d 55, 524 N.E.2d 409 (1988) (holding as a matter of state 
constitutional law, that the Aguilar-Spinelli test will be applied instead of 
totality of the circumstances); State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 
1989) (holding the Aguilar-Spinelli test is more in keeping with specific 
provisions of state constitution); and State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (1984) (state constitution requires affidavit disclosing informant's 
creditability and reliability tested under the Aguilar-Spinelli 
analysis).

 
 

[¶79.]  Wyoming's Constitution 
assures:

 
 
     The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing 
the place to be searched or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 
 

Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 4. Despite the majority's hasty dismissal of the linguistic 
differences between the Fourth Amendment and Wyoming's search and seizure provision, this 
court has previously held those differences to be 
significant.

 
 

[¶80.]  Wyoming, 
as a territory, was governed by the Constitution and laws of the 
United 
States, including the Fourth Amendment, from 
1868 to July 10, 1890. Organic Act § 16, 15 Stat. at Large 178, ch. 235 (1868). 
The preparation of a state constitution, and the Congressional acceptance, 
ratification and confirmation of that document as part of the process of 
statehood, limited Fourth Amendment protection to federal action. Act of 
Admission § 1, 26 Stat. at Large 222, ch. 664 (1890). The majority fails to 
recognize that prior to the selective incorporation of Fourth Amendment 
principles announced by Wolf, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, in 1949, the only 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures by state officials between 
1890 and 1949 was provided by the Wyoming Constitution. Therefore, decisions of 
that era offer special guidance into the protection accorded the citizens of 
Wyoming by our 
state constitution.

 
 

[¶81.]  The first major decision to consider the 
intent of the Wyoming Constitution was Rasmussen, 7 Wyo. 117, 50 P. 819. 
Justice Potter, writing for the court, brought a special insight to his decision 
since he had participated in the drafting of the document as a member of the 
Constitutional Convention. See Journal and Debates of the Constitutional 
Convention of the State of Wyoming (1893). Interpreting a voting rights 
provision, Justice Potter wrote that the "primary principle underlying an 
interpretation of constitutions or statutes is that the intent is the vital 
part, and the essence of the law." Rasmussen, 7 Wyo. at 128, 50 P.  at 821. In constitutional 
construction, it must be presumed that the people "intended whatever has been 
plainly expressed." Id. A presumption attaches that "language has 
been employed with sufficient precision to convey the intent." Id. at 130, 50 P.  at 822. 
"The constitution derives its force from the people who adopted it, and it is 
the intention of the people which is to be sought for." Id. at 131, 50 P.  at 822. 
Perhaps Justice Potter's most lasting caution is that the debates of the 
constitutional convention "are not a very reliable source of information upon 
the subject of the construction of any particular word or provision * * *." 
Id. at 138, 50 P.  at 824.

 
 

[¶82.]  State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342 
(1920) presented the first occasion for the Wyoming Supreme Court to directly 
consider the intent of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 and to compare its protection 
against those of the Fourth Amendment. The issue was the propriety of search 
warrants issued for that illegal substance of the prohibition era, alcohol. The 
court noted that the protection against unreasonable search and seizure was 
adopted in the Fourth Amendment and "appears in all state constitutions in 
slightly varying language." Id. at 197, 194 P.  at 345. Instead of 
dismissing the linguistic differences between Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 and the 
Fourth Amendment, the court termed the Wyoming Constitution as "some stronger" 
because Wyoming required a written affidavit to 
support probable cause determinations. Id. at 198, 194 P.  at 345. The division of 
authority between the Wyoming and the federal constitutions was 
plainly stated. The Fourth Amendment "has been held to operate solely on the 
Federal Government, its courts and officers, and not as a limitation upon the 
powers of the states." Id. at 213, 194 P.  at 350. The Wyoming legislature, 
courts and executive officers are limited by provisions of the state 
constitution. Under this authority, the court concluded a prohibition law was 
unconstitutional because probable cause determinations must be made by a judge 
or magistrate and cannot be deferred to a prosecutor by legislative 
authorization. Additionally, the court held, as a matter of constitutional law, 
a probable cause determination cannot occur based on the affiant's "information 
and belief;" rather, facts showing knowledge of criminal conduct is required. 
See also Wiggin v. State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 P. 373 (1922) (holding affidavit on "information and belief" invalid to secure 
warrant and adopting exclusionary rule in Wyoming for illegally obtained evidence) and State v. 
Boulter, 5 Wyo. 236, 39 P. 883 (1895) (holding affidavit 
on "information and belief" invalid).

 
 

[¶83.]  In State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 245, 231 P. 683, 689 (1924), this court cautioned law enforcement: "The mere discovery of 
evidence of a crime pursuant to a search will not validate a search, or make 
lawful an arrest that would otherwise be unlawful." Adopting the view that the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure is a judicial question, the court said the 
determination is made "from all the circumstances of a case." Id. at 239, 231 P.  at 
687. SeeState v. Hiteshew, 42 Wyo. 147, 154-55, 292 P. 2 (1930) (holding 
general principles of comity permit evidence obtained from search valid under 
federal law to be used in state court). In George, 32 Wyo. at 242-43, 231 P.  at 688-89, Wyoming adopted the "open 
fields" doctrine.

 
 

[¶84.]  Tobin v. State, 36 Wyo. 368, 373, 255 P. 788, 789 (1927) recognized that voluntary consent to permit a search must 
"appear by clear and positive testimony, and if the search and seizure are based 
upon the proposition that consent was given to the officers, there should be no 
question about it in the evidence submitted." Peaceful submission to the officer 
does not constitute a waiver of constitutional rights or consent. The court 
reversed a gambling conviction because sheriff's officers had conducted a search 
without a warrant and the consent of a doorkeeper was insufficient. See also 
State v. Bonolo, 39 Wyo. 299, 305, 270 P. 1065, 1066-67 (1928) 
(holding testimony showed either acquiescence or non-resistance to search, not 
consent).

 
 

[¶85.]  The facts of State v. Kelly, 38 
Wyo. 455, 268 P. 571 (1928) provide a useful comparison under the Wyoming Constitution for our 
present issues. Kelly is the first Wyoming case to consider the validity of an 
automobile search and the subsequent seizure of the owner and a passenger based 
upon a telephone tip from a known informant. The Sheriff of Washakie County, 
Wyoming claimed to receive a telephone call from a Deputy Sheriff of Hot Springs County, Wyoming indicating that two men would be driving through 
the town of Worland, Wyoming with a car 
carrying illegal liquor. The driver was described as a "fat, heavy-set man * * 
*" and the passenger as a "small man." Id. at 457, 268 P.  at 571. A partial 
description of the automobile was also provided. The Sheriff visited two Worland 
area garages looking for the car. At the Worland Garage, the Sheriff saw two men 
matching the description who seemed "agitated" when they noticed the Sheriff. An 
open car of that era, with no side curtains, had been driven into the garage 
area by a boy. As the Sheriff walked past the car, he noticed a quilt covering 
what appeared to be small kegs. The Sheriff discovered about twenty-five gallons 
of whiskey and the two men, who admitted owning the car and the whiskey, were 
arrested. The trial court denied a motion to suppress and Kelly appealed arguing 
that the Sheriff did not have probable cause for the search. 

 
 

[¶86.]  Writing for the court, Chief Justice 
Blume said the court "might not have been satisfied" if the probable cause for 
the search had depended solely on the telephone information from the Deputy 
Sheriff. Id. 
at 460, 268 P.  at 572. The Washakie County Sheriff's confirmation of the 
description of the car's occupants, the confirmation of the car's description, 
the suspicious actions of the men when observed by the Sheriff, the outside 
appearance of the contents of the car, and the Sheriff's observation of the 
manner in which the contents were covered all provided "additional assurance" 
that the telephone information was accurate. Id. at 459, 268 P.  at 572. The court 
acknowledged that at the suppression hearing the Deputy Sheriff had testified he 
did not provide the information, but the fact finder's determination of veracity 
was binding. The court cautioned that the potential is always present 
for

 
 
pretending 
that such information as here mentioned has been given, and if such information 
has not in fact been given, or if it cannot be said that the officer making the 
search had a right to believe the informant as a creditable person and as a 
person who under the circumstances of the case had reasonable cause to believe 
the truth of the information given, or possibly - a point we need not decide - 
if it should appear that the informant did not in fact have reasonable cause to 
believe the truth of the information given by him, then the court should 
suppress the evidence obtained by reason of such search or 
seizure.

 
 

Id. at 459-60, 
268 P.  at 572.

 
 

[¶87.]  Considering the facts of Kelly under the 
standards announced today, two key distinguishing characteristics are present. 
First, in Kelly, the telephone information was provided by an identified law 
enforcement officer from another jurisdiction rather than by an anonymous 
caller. Therefore, the caller's information in Kelly was entitled to greater 
weight in a Terry balancing formula than would be accorded to an anonymous call. 
Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879-80. The 
Wyoming Supreme Court, however, said the call alone might not be sufficient 
under the state constitution. Kelly, 38 Wyo. at 460, 268 P.  at 572. Second, and most 
important, the Sheriff's independent observations of suspicious circumstances 
provided a reasonable belief that contraband was present in the car and that 
criminal activity was about to take place. These independent observations are 
consistent with the "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry, 
392 U.S.  at 21, 88 S. Ct.  at 
1880.

 
 

[¶88.]  Even after Wolf, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359 and Mapp, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 incorporated Fourth Amendment 
protection to the states, Wyoming has continued to find vitality and 
independence in the language of our state constitution's search and seizure 
protection. Ruling that law enforcement authorities acted without probable cause 
in searching a father's ranch for goods believed stolen by a son, the court in 
Smith v. State, 557 P.2d 130, 132, 134 (Wyo. 1976) said the difference in 
language between the Wyoming and the federal constitutions mandated that search 
warrants in this state be issued upon a valid affidavit. In Parkhurst v. State, 
628 P.2d 1369, 1374 n. 7 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1981), the Wyoming Supreme Court held a passenger in 
a car has a legitimate expectation of privacy under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 
sufficient to grant standing to challenge a search or seizure. This court 
decided Bonsness v. State, 672 P.2d 1291, 1292-93 (Wyo. 1983) under the 
Wyoming Constitution. The court stated Wyoming had never accepted the "technical and 
rigid requirements * * *" of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Id. at 1293. But see 
Deeter v. State, 500 P.2d 68, 69 (Wyo. 1972).

 
 

[¶89.]  The consistent view by this court of Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 4 is that the section requires a judicial finding supported by 
a written affidavit disclosing 
sufficient facts to support probable cause to believe a criminal offense is being, or is about to 
be, committed. Smith, 557 P.2d  at 133. Wyoming's Constitution, with its stronger 
requirement, attempts to further protect individual rights by providing a record 
of the probable cause justification provided to the judicial officer. The 
significance of this requirement is the opportunity it provides for a complete 
judicial review of the reasonableness supporting a search or arrest, based on 
facts known at the time the warrant is requested, when compared to facts alleged 
under oath or affirmation as permitted in the Fourth Amendment. Smith, 557 P.2d  
at 132. The level of protection must be seen as accomplishing two goals. First, 
Wyoming's 
Constitution guarantees the rights of individuals to be free of undue 
restriction by the state unless criminal 
conduct is present or threatened. Second, the stronger language of the 
Wyoming Constitution prevents post hoc justification of searches or 
seizures.

 
 

[¶90.]  The criminal conduct component is 
preserved when a law enforcement officer is making the probable cause 
determination under exigent circumstances. In Wyoming, the probable cause 
demanded for a warrantless search of an automobile and that demanded for a 
warrantless arrest are both defined by determining, whether, at the moment that 
the search or seizure is made, "the facts and circumstances within the peace 
officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information were 
sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man to believe that the 
person arrested has committed or is committing an offense." Neilson v. State, 
599 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied 
444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980); accord Rodarte v. City of Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Wyo. 
1976).

 
 

[¶91.]  A useful examination of the criminal 
conduct requirement under the Wyoming Constitution occurs in State v. Munger, 43 
Wyo. 404, 409, 4 P.2d 1094, 1095 (1931), where this court ruled a trial court 
should have suppressed evidence of illegal liquor seized from an automobile. The 
liquor had been seized by the Goshen County, Wyoming Sheriff at the site of a 
large party after the Sheriff observed a visibly drunken man enter an automobile 
along with the vehicle's driver. The issue was whether the arrest of the drunken 
man was invalid, therefore requiring suppression of the liquor which had been 
seized without a warrant or probable cause. The court held that the Sheriff 
lacked probable cause to arrest because the Sheriff observed no illegal conduct 
and there was no threatened criminal activity. At the time, public drunkenness 
was not a crime.

 
 

[¶92.]  In the context of a "reasonable 
suspicion" investigatory stop, judicial review necessarily occurs after the 
fact. However, Wyoming law has required that the peace 
officer's knowledge at the time of the stop include facts or circumstances 
disclosing a particular and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 
stopped of criminal activity. Lopez, 643 P.2d  at 683; Cook, 631 P.2d  at 8. 
Today, however, the court abandons the caution of requiring police observation 
of suspicious or criminal conduct in favor of a standard in which confirmation 
of innocent conduct from an anonymous caller's tip 
suffices.

 
 

[¶93.]  An insightful approach listing evaluative 
criteria for an "indicia of reliability" from anonymous callers is offered by 
the Supreme Court of Washington:

 
 
"It is 
difficult to conceive of a tip more `completely lacking in indicia of 
reliability' than one provided by a completely anonymous and unidentifiable 
informer, containing no more than a conclusionary assertion that a certain 
individual is engaged in criminal activity. While the police may have a duty to 
investigate tips which sound reasonable, [1] absent circumstances suggesting the 
informant's reliability, or some corroborative observation which suggests either 
[2] the presence of criminal activity or [3] that the informer's information was 
obtained in a reliable fashion, a forcible stop based solely upon such 
information is not permissible."

 
 
State v. 
Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 621 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (1980) (quoting State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940, 530 P.2d 243, 246, cert. denied 423 U.S. 891, 96 S. Ct. 187, 46 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1975)) (hereinafter the Washington rule). See also Jackson, 688 P.2d  at 
141.

 
 

[¶94.]  Three examples from Wyoming cases, while not all involving anonymous callers, 
illustrate the guidance provided to law enforcement by the Washington rule. 
Parkhurst is an example of circumstances which suggests an informant's 
reliability. When police arrived at the scene of a late-night shooting in 
Glenrock, Wyoming, a witness described seeing two men leave the 
scene in a blue or green Ford and that he followed the car briefly along a route 
leading to Douglas, 
Wyoming. Parkhurst, 628 P.2d  at 
1372. A sheriff's officer stopped a blue Dodge carrying two men as it arrived in 
Douglas on a back road from Glenrock. The court 
ruled the officer had reasonable suspicion for the investigatory 
stop.

 
 

[¶95.]  Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107, 110-11 
(Wyo. 1985) is 
a textbook example of information from anonymous sources combined with police 
corroboration of criminal behavior. In Olson, this court affirmed a driving 
under the influence conviction after an investigatory stop. Various motorists, 
some in person and some on CB radios, reported a car driving erratically to a 
Wyoming Highway Patrolman who was stopped at the side of the highway. The 
patrolman did not stop the car based solely on the reports, he observed the 
suspect car speeding and weaving and hugging the side of an exit ramp. The 
patrolman's observations of these offenses, supported by the citizen's reports, 
provided a reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop. The court 
specifically declined to decide if the citizen's reports alone would have been a 
sufficient basis for an investigatory stop.

 
 

[¶96.]  Finally, Lopez, 643 P.2d  at 683 
represents an example of police corroboration of suspicious circumstances, a speeding car on a remote road, which 
suggests the caller's information was obtained in a reliable fashion. The Lopez 
court held an eyewitness' telephoned description to the sheriff's office of a 
car leaving the scene of a burglary and the eyewitness' description of the 
individual who had been seen in the car earlier, when combined with a police 
officer's observations of the described car speeding away from the area on a 
remote secondary road only minutes after the burglary, were sufficient bases for 
an investigatory stop.

 
 

[¶97.]  In the present case, the anonymous 
caller's tip to the police department in Buffalo 
fails to meet the Washington rule. First, there are no 
circumstances present in this record which support a finding that the police 
knew of the informant's reliability. The record also fails to disclose if the 
police had any foundation for believing the anonymous caller's claim that a drug 
transaction might take place. Second, the police corroboration of criminal 
activity is totally absent. By stopping the car as it entered Sheridan, the police 
cannot confirm even that a drug transaction was planned or might have taken 
place. Third, the corroboration of the vehicle description and its arrival in 
Sheridan are 
insufficient to show the informant's information regarding criminal activity was 
reliable.3 The police corroboration of the 
vehicle description, a collateral detail, only established that the anonymous 
caller knew or observed the kind of car Goettl drove.

 
 

[¶98.]  The United States Supreme Court addressed 
the deficiency of simply corroborating the vehicle description in Whiteley v. 
Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 
(1971). The United States Supreme Court held the officer's corroborative 
observation of a vehicle description did not, in itself, suggest criminal 
activities and does not support an inference that the anonymous caller is 
reliable or the anonymous caller's conclusion that criminal activity was about 
to occur or had occurred. The corroboration that the vehicle entered Sheridan only justifies an 
inference that the anonymous caller had some knowledge of Goettl and his 
activities, it does not justify an inference of criminal activity. Jackson, 688 P.2d  at 
140.

 
 

[¶99.]  In the context of an investigatory stop 
predicated on an unknown informant's tip, our state constitution provides 
greater protection than the federal constitution by requiring, at a minimum, 
that police confirmation of innocent conduct is an insufficient justification 
for a stop. Other jurisdictions have accepted this concept. See, e.g., Lyons, 564 N.E.2d  at 392; 
Kennison, 590 A.2d  at 1101; Bedolla, 111 N.M. at 451, 806 P.2d  at 591; and 
Crockett, 803 S.W.2d  at 311. This requirement is consistent with past 
interpretations of this court and provides the protection the citizens of 
Wyoming 
demanded when they met in September of 1889 to draft our Constitution and 
establish an independent Supreme Court to provide "the greatest safeguard to the 
public." See Journal and Debates, supra, at 333 (Comments of Delegate 
Potter).

 
 
VII. 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶100.]            
It is unfortunate that we leave to criminals the protection of our rights 
against unreasonable search and seizure, for they make unsympathetic totems. 
Yet, it should never be forgotten that the interpretations given to those rights 
affect both the innocent and the guilty. Sokolow, 490 U.S.  at 10-11, 109 S. Ct.  at 1587, Marshall, J., dissenting. 
The anonymous individual with access to a telephone should not be given the 
power to compromise constitutional principles protecting against unreasonable 
search and seizure. Society's only protection against such abuse is requiring 
police corroboration of elements of criminal conduct as a component of the 
"reasonable suspicion" necessary for an investigatory 
stop.

 
 

[¶101.]            
For whom the bell tolls - when constitutional rights are denigrated, 
disregarded or extinguished. It tolls for all of you - whether in fact fairly 
innocent or completely guilty. Eldon D. Wedlock, Jr., Car 54 - How Dare You!: 
Toward a Unified Theory of Warrantless Automobile Searches, 75 Marq.L.Rev. 79 
(1991); Steve France, First Principles. Rights of Past and Future, 77 ABA Journal 38 (August 
1991).

 
 

[¶102.]            
I respectfully dissent from this court's justification of the warrantless 
stop on the basis presented here and subsequent denied suppression of evidence 
which was developed following the arrest and jail 
incarceration.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Another reason this 
case should be reversed is the failure of the record on appeal to comply with 
W.R.A.P. 4.01 (now Rule 3.02(a)). Effective on July 10, 1990, the rule 
required:

 
 
     Transcripts in 
criminal cases shall consist of all proceedings held in open court including but 
not limited to voir dire, opening statements and final arguments, conferences 
with the presiding judge in open court and in the court chambers, in addition to 
the testimony of the case and other required materials. Edward E. Goettl was 
tried before a jury in proceedings that commenced on August 14, 1990. The jury 
voir dire does not appear in the transcript in the record on appeal, despite the 
designation requesting "the entire transcript" in the Notice of Appeal. Under 
the rule this court announced in Bearpaw v. State, 803 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1990), reversal 
should occur.

 
 

2 A considerable 
suspicion is cynically created from consideration of the large number of Terry 
stop cases that the logical concept applied is to find that the originating 
information must have been valid since authenticated after the stop by the 
determined possession of contraband. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968). Relevant or not in post-fact justification within the many cases, that 
situation did not occur here. No contraband was found on the person of Goettl or 
otherwise in his possession in the vehicle. His subsequent arrest was actually 
justified by the stopping and arresting officer's action in establishing that 
Goettl's driver's license had expired. Consequently, the tipster's report about 
his personal possession and intended delivery was categorically untrue. What did 
happen was that an unrelated passenger also permitted a personal search by the 
officer and was himself discovered to possess controlled substances in his 
possession.

 
 
     Additionally, a real 
question about denied access to legal representation after the driver's license 
arrest was clearly presented in the conflict in the suppression hearing 
testimony.

 
 

3 If reliability rather 
than due process is the current constitutional concept in vogue, perhaps the 
most reliable proof of the unreliability of the informant's information was that 
after the stop, Goettl, as the targeted person for the anonymous call, did not 
in fact have any controlled substance in his possession. This failure of 
confirmation was hardly otherwise replaced in valid justification by the highly 
unusual arrest and trip to jail for the insignificant offense of driving with an 
expired driver's license. For all we know from this record, the tipster may have 
been a female "friend" of the passenger who was, at the stop, the person found 
to be in possession in transporting among the five persons in the travelling 
vehicle.