Case Title: Split Rock Hardwoods, Inc. v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc.

Citation: 2002 WI 66

Docket Number: 2000AP001100

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 66 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1100 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Split Rock Hardwoods, Inc., a Wisconsin  
Corporation,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Lumber Liquidators, Inc., a Massachusetts  
Corporation,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 21, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 13, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Bayfield   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas J. Gallagher   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Michael S. 
Kreidler and Stich, Angell, Kreidler, Brownson & Ballou, P.A., 
Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
Michael 
S. 
Kreidler. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Matthew 
F. Anich and Dallenbach, Anich & Haukaas, S.C., Ashland, and 
oral argument by Matthew F. Anich. 
 
 
2002 WI 66 
 NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-1100 
(L.C. No. 99 CV 75)   
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Split Rock Hardwoods, Inc., a Wisconsin  
Corporation,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Lumber Liquidators, Inc., a Massachusetts  
Corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Bayfield 
County, Thomas J. Gallagher, Judge.   Reversed and cause 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   In Wisconsin, a civil action 
seeking a personal judgment is commenced when a summons and 
complaint naming a defendant are filed with the court, provided 
that service of an authenticated copy of the summons and of the 
complaint is made upon the defendant within 90 days after 
filing.  Wis. Stat. § 801.02(1) (1999-2000).1   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 00-1100 
2 
 
¶2 
After 
these 
papers 
have 
been 
served 
upon 
the 
defendant, the defendant has 45 days to serve a written answer 
upon the plaintiff.  Wis. Stat. §§ 801.09(2)(a); 802.06(1).  The 
defendant must also file the answer with the court "within a 
reasonable time after service."  Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4). 
¶3 
This 
case 
presents 
several 
questions 
about 
the 
interpretation and enforcement of Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4).  Among 
these questions are the following: 
(1) What is "a reasonable time after service" 
for a defendant to file an answer with the court? 
(2) May a circuit court strike a defendant's 
answer if the answer is not filed within a reasonable 
time after service? 
(3) If a circuit court has discretion to strike 
a defendant's answer when the answer is not filed 
within a reasonable time after service, may the court 
strike the answer without finding that either the 
moving party or the court was prejudiced by the late 
filing? 
(4) If a circuit court has discretion to strike 
a defendant's answer when the answer is not filed 
within a reasonable time after service, may the 
circuit court also enter a  default judgment? 
¶4 
This case comes to this court on certification by the 
court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.  It is 
an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Bayfield 
County, Thomas J. Gallagher, Judge.  The circuit court struck 
No. 00-1100 
3 
 
the defendant's answer to the plaintiff's complaint on grounds 
that the answer was not timely filed with the court.  The court 
concluded that timely service of the defendant's answer without 
filing it "within a reasonable time after service" was not 
sufficient to join issue.  Thus, it entered a default judgment 
for the plaintiff.  The defendant appealed.  The court of 
appeals certified variations of the second, third, and fourth 
questions listed above. 
¶5 
We conclude that a circuit court may not enter a 
default judgment against a defendant on grounds that the 
defendant failed to file an answer with the court "within a 
reasonable time after service" unless the court first determines 
that the late filing prejudiced either the plaintiff or the 
court.  Because the circuit court in this case neither discussed 
prejudice nor made any finding of prejudice before entering a 
default judgment against the defendant, the court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  As a result, we reverse the judgment 
and remand the case for further proceedings. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶6 
The background facts are taken from the pleadings.  
Split 
Rock 
Hardwoods, 
Inc. 
(Split 
Rock) 
is 
a 
Wisconsin 
corporation that manufactures and sells hardwood flooring.  
Lumber Liquidators, Inc. (Lumber Liquidators) is a Massachusetts 
corporation that purchases and resells hardwood flooring.  In 
its complaint, Split Rock alleged that on September 23, 1999, 
the parties made an oral agreement that Lumber Liquidators would 
purchase a quantity of hardwood flooring from Split Rock, at a 
No. 00-1100 
4 
 
particular price per square foot, and pay Split Rock for the 
flooring via wire transfer. 
¶7 
Split 
Rock 
delivered 
the 
flooring 
to 
Lumber 
Liquidators "F.O.B. at plaintiff's mill" on September 24, 1999, 
and the shipment arrived at a Lumber Liquidators warehouse in 
Illinois on September 28.  Upon delivery, Split Rock issued an 
invoice for approximately $31,000.  Lumber Liquidators disputed 
some aspects of the transaction, but it acknowledged that it had 
received the flooring.  It claimed, however, that some of the 
flooring was water damaged.  Split Rock and Lumber Liquidators 
discussed adjusting the purchase price to account for the water 
damage, but they came to no agreement and Lumber Liquidators did 
not transfer funds to pay for the flooring.   
¶8 
On October 12, 1999, Split Rock filed suit in the 
Bayfield County Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract and 
false representation.  It served its summons and complaint upon 
Lumber Liquidators on October 27, 1999.  Lumber Liquidators was 
required to answer within 45 days of receiving the complaint, 
but it asked Split Rock for an extension of time to answer so 
that it could retain Wisconsin counsel.  In a letter dated 
December 7, 1999, Split Rock agreed to extend the deadline for 
Lumber Liquidators' answer until December 22, 1999.  Lumber 
No. 00-1100 
5 
 
Liquidators served Split Rock with its answer on December 21, 
1999.2 
¶9 
Lumber Liquidators did not, however, simultaneously 
file its answer with the circuit court.  Consequently, on 
January 31, 2000, the Bayfield County Clerk of Court's office 
informed Split Rock that no answer had been filed as of that 
date.  On February 2, 2000, Split Rock filed a motion pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 806.02 to strike Lumber Liquidators' answer and 
enter default judgment.  In response, Lumber Liquidators mailed 
its answer to the court on February 4, 2000, 45 days after its 
December 21, 1999, service of answer on Split Rock.  Both 
parties 
filed 
affidavits 
in 
support 
of 
their 
respective 
positions. 
¶10 The circuit court held a hearing by telephone on 
February 10, 2000.  After considering the parties' arguments, 
the circuit court granted Split Rock's motion to strike Lumber 
                                                 
2 Split Rock asserts that its extension letter granted 
Lumber Liquidators until December 22, 1999, to file its answer, 
not to serve it.  It asserts that the extension letter overrides 
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4), setting a firm December 22, 1999, 
deadline for filing.  It does not dispute that the December 21, 
1999, 
service 
was 
timely 
but 
argues 
that 
the 
filing, 
accomplished after December 22, 1999, was in violation of the 
extension agreement.  We reject this argument.  Split Rock had 
no authority to limit the time for filing, which is required 
"within 
a 
reasonable 
time 
after 
service."  
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4) (emphasis added).  We interpret the 
extension agreement not as setting a definite time for filing, 
but as extending the time for service, thereby extending the 
time for filing. 
No. 00-1100 
6 
 
Liquidators' answer, and it entered default judgment.  The court 
stated: 
 
The filing was late in this case, there's no question 
about that, and I'm not going to find that 45 days was 
a reasonable time after service to file an answer when 
the general practice is that you do them at the same 
time.  [W]hen you send the answer out to people you 
also send the original to the Court.  The issue then 
really comes down to whether or not there's been 
joinder of issue under 806.02. . . . I think at the 
present time issue is not joined until service and 
filing of the answer, so I'm going to grant the 
plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's answer 
and enter default judgment. 
¶11 Lumber Liquidators appealed, and the court of appeals 
certified the case to this court.  On appeal, Lumber Liquidators 
contends that filing the answer 45 days after service was 
"within a reasonable time after service," as provided in 
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4), and it asserts that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in granting the motion to 
strike the answer and enter default judgment. 
¶12 Conversely, Split Rock claims that by failing to file 
an answer until 45 days after service, Lumber Liquidators failed 
to file "within a reasonable time after service" and the circuit 
court properly exercised its discretion in granting the motion 
to strike the answer and enter default judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
¶13 This 
case 
requires 
an 
examination 
of 
several 
provisions of the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure.  This 
court adopted revised rules of civil procedure in 1975, 
effective January 1, 1976.  Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, 
No. 00-1100 
7 
 
67 Wis. 2d 585 (1975).  The court and the legislature have 
modified the rules from time to time over the last quarter 
century, but the 1975 rules remain largely intact. 
¶14 Some of the Wisconsin rules are patterned after the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Charles D. Clausen & David P. 
Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure Chapters 801-
803, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1976).  Hence, federal rules 
decisions are often helpful in interpreting the Wisconsin rules.  
Nevertheless, there are distinctions between the federal rules 
and 
the 
state 
rules,3 
and 
Wisconsin 
appellate 
decisions 
constitute the controlling interpretation of the state rules. 
A. 
A Reasonable Time After Service 
¶15 The first issue is, what is a "reasonable time after 
service" for a defendant to file an answer with the court?  The 
answer 
to 
this 
question 
requires 
an 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4)——a court-made rule.  In interpreting a 
court rule, our objective is to discern and give effect to the 
intent of this court.  State v. Sorenson, 2000 WI 43, ¶15, 234 
                                                 
3 Professor Charles Clausen has written: 
It will be apparent to all who study the new rules 
that . . . the Wisconsin Rules do not represent a 
complete adoption of the Federal Rules, or even of a 
patched-up version of the Federal Rules.  Although 
most of the provisions governing pleading, parties, 
and discovery are derived from the Federal Rules, the 
provisions on commencement of actions, trials, and to 
a 
lesser 
degree, 
judgments, 
are 
different 
from . . . the Federal Rules. 
Charles D. Clausen & David P. Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of 
Civil Procedure Chapters 801-803, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1976). 
No. 00-1100 
8 
 
Wis. 2d 648, 611 N.W.2d 240 (citing County of Door v. Hayes-
Brook, 153 Wis. 2d 1, 21-22, 449 N.W.2d 601 (1990) (Abrahamson, 
J., concurring)). 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14 
is 
entitled 
"Service 
and 
filing of pleadings and other papers."  This rule is based upon 
Rule 5 of the Federal Rules.  Clausen & Lowe, supra, at 24.  The 
rule emphasizes in subsection (1) that, with few exceptions, a 
copy of all pleadings, written motions, and other important 
papers must be served upon all other parties.4 
¶17 The 
rule 
then 
provides 
in 
subsection 
(4) 
that 
virtually all papers that are required to be served also "shall 
be filed with the court within a reasonable time after service."5  
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(1) reads in part: 
(1) Every order required by its terms to be 
served, every pleading unless the court otherwise 
orders because of numerous defendants, every paper 
relating to discovery required to be served upon a 
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written 
motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of 
judgment, undertaking, and similar paper shall be 
served upon each of the parties. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(4) reads: 
(4) All papers after the summons required to be 
served upon a party, except as provided in s. 
804.01(6), shall be filed with the court within a 
reasonable time after service.  The filing of any 
paper 
required 
to 
be 
served 
constitutes 
a 
certification by the party or attorney effecting the 
filing that a copy of such paper has been timely 
served on all parties required to be served, except as 
the 
person 
effecting 
the 
filing 
may 
otherwise 
stipulate in writing. 
No. 00-1100 
9 
 
The "papers" covered by this subsection include more than 
answers. 
¶18 Under the present rule, filing an answer with the 
court accomplishes at least two objectives: First, filing 
certifies to the court that the answer has been served upon the 
plaintiff and thereby eliminates the need for a separate 
affidavit of service.  Second, filing notifies the court that 
issue has been joined and the case is ready to proceed.6 
¶19 The present rule is a departure from prior law, which 
permitted some papers, including answers, to be filed with the 
court "not later than ten days after the action is noticed for 
trial." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 263.23 
(1971). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 801.14(4) has the effect of narrowing the time period in which 
to file answers and other papers with the court. 
¶20 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(4) differs from rules that 
delineate a specified number of days within which service or 
filing must be accomplished.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 801.02(1) 
("within 90 days after filing"); Wis. Stat. § 801.09(2) ("within 
45 days, exclusive of the day of service, after the summons has 
been served").  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(4) uses the phrase 
"reasonable time."  A "reasonable time" is not a specified time.  
It is an imprecise, unspecified time and requires a judicial 
                                                                                                                                                             
Subsection (4) is based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
5(d). 
6 Lumber Liquidators contends that "Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4) 
was enacted for no purpose other than to eliminate the prior 
practice of requiring that affidavits of service be routinely 
filed with the trial courts."  We disagree. 
No. 00-1100 
10 
 
determination.  To determine whether an answer or other paper 
was filed "within a reasonable time after service," the circuit 
court must make a finding of fact,7 subject to the clearly 
erroneous standard of review.8 
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(4) does not spell out what 
factors to consider in determining whether a filing has been 
made "within a reasonable time after service."9  Nonetheless, the 
                                                 
7 See Sadowski v. Bombardier, Ltd., 527 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th 
Cir. 1975) (concluding that whether defendant filed motion for 
new trial within a reasonable time is a question of fact). 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.17(2) provides in part: "Findings of 
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses."  Last term this court 
applied the clearly erroneous standard to a circuit court's 
finding of untimely notice to an insurer.  See Neff v. Pierzina, 
2001 WI 95, ¶35, 245 Wis. 2d 285, 629 N.W.2d 177. 
9 The phrase "within a reasonable time" appears in 170 
Wisconsin 
statutes 
and 
court 
rules. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. §§ 59.43(1)(g), 
88.90(2), 
103.93(1)(b), 
452.14(3)(h), 
802.05(2), 805.03, 806.07(2), 806.247(2)(a)1, and 810.12.  The 
words 
"reasonable 
time" 
appear 
together 
in 
many 
other 
enactments. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. Stat. § 802.01(2)(b).  
Consequently, the meaning of the term "reasonable time" is 
highly context-dependent.  
No. 00-1100 
11 
 
complete text of the rule furnishes evidence of why its framers 
used an indefinite time rather than a specified time in 
subsection (4). 
¶22 Subsection (2) of the rule outlines several different 
methods of making service.10  Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2).  Subsection 
(4) then declares that the filing of any paper required to be 
served "constitutes certification by the party or attorney 
effecting the filing that a copy of such paper has been timely 
served on all parties required to be served, except as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
For instance, in State ex rel. Cynthia M.S. v. Michael 
F.C., 181 Wis. 2d 618, 511 N.W.2d 868 (1994), this court held 
that a circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion 
when it ruled that ten years and six months was "a reasonable 
time" for a mother to move to vacate a paternity judgment under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(2), given the extraordinary circumstances of 
the case.  Interpreting the phrase "within a reasonable time" in 
§ 806.07(2) requires the consideration of various factors, 
including "[a]ny other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment."  Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  Thus, 
the context under the relief statute is different from the 
context under the filing statute, and the determination that 
must be made under the relief statute is more complex than the 
relatively pure time consideration under Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4). 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14(2) provides in part: 
Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be 
made by delivering a copy or by mailing it to the 
last-known address, or, if no address is known, by 
leaving it with the clerk of the court.  Delivery of a 
copy within this section means: handing it to the 
attorney or to the party; transmitting a copy of the 
paper by facsimile machine to his or her office; or 
leaving it at his or her office with a clerk or other 
person in charge thereof; or, if there is no one in 
charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, 
if the office is closed or the person to be served has 
no office, leaving it at his or her dwelling house or 
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion then residing therein. 
No. 00-1100 
12 
 
person effecting the filing may otherwise stipulate in writing."  
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4). 
¶23 These two provisions imply that a defendant should not 
file an answer with the court until the defendant is able to 
certify that all necessary parties have been timely served, 
unless the defendant stipulates otherwise.  A defendant may have 
difficulty serving a plaintiff or multiple plaintiffs or an 
impleaded third party.  The rule provides some latitude, in 
these unusual situations, to assure that filing——which certifies 
service——is not premature.  If service upon a party were always 
a matter of certainty, there would be little reason not to 
require simultaneous filing at the time of service. 
¶24 Once a defendant is able to certify that service has 
been made, there should be no reason, in ordinary situations, to 
delay filing the answer with the court.  To illustrate, 
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(2) states in part that: "Service by mail is 
complete upon mailing" and "[s]ervice by facsimile is complete 
upon transmission."  If a defendant chooses to serve a party by 
mail or by facsimile, there is no apparent reason why the 
defendant 
should 
not 
be 
able 
to 
file 
with 
the 
court 
simultaneously, or shortly after service.  By contrast, if a 
defendant chooses to serve a party by personal delivery, the 
fact of personal service may require time for verification. 
¶25 We 
believe 
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4) 
is 
intended 
to 
encourage prompt filing of papers with the court.  This is 
especially true of answers.  Prompt filing is the surest way to 
No. 00-1100 
13 
 
inform the court of the status of pending litigation so that the 
court can effectively manage its docket. 
¶26 If and when a court is called upon to determine 
whether an answer has been filed "within a reasonable time after 
service," the court should focus on the length of time between 
service and filing that allegedly amounts to unreasonable delay.  
The 
court 
should 
examine 
whether 
there 
are 
any 
factual 
circumstances that explain the delay, such as a problem with 
service, a need for verification of service, or the existence of 
a judicial stay.11  If no such factors are present, the court 
should consider whether the answer was filed within 45 days 
after service of the complaint——the statutory time limit for 
answering the complaint.  In theory, a defendant could serve an 
answer upon the plaintiff the very day the complaint was served 
but not file the answer for another 45 days.  Although it would 
be difficult to find a factual basis justifying the defendant's 
delay in filing, a court would be hard pressed to impose a 
sanction upon a defendant who had a legal basis for delay——
namely, compliance with the statutory time frame for answering 
the complaint.  Finally, the court should consider whether the 
time period between service and filing is too insignificant to 
warrant any sanction.  As a policy matter, the court should 
discourage technical objections in circumstances in which no 
sanction of any kind is warranted. 
                                                 
11 See Riggs Marine Serv., Inc. v. McCann, 160 Wis. 2d 846, 
467 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1991). 
No. 00-1100 
14 
 
¶27 We acknowledge that the "too-insignificant-to-warrant-
sanction" factor may appear inconsistent with a judicial finding 
of fact.  Our goal is to develop an objective standard for the 
prompt filing of papers.   
¶28 Consistent with this goal, the determination whether 
the time period between service and filing was "reasonable" 
should exclude unrelated issues such as whether a party suffered 
prejudice because of the delay.  Filing a timely served answer 
three months after service is not "reasonable" simply because 
the late filing did not prejudice the plaintiff or the court.  
Conversely, filing a timely served answer three days after 
service does not become "unreasonable" simply because the non-
simultaneous filing caused some prejudice to the plaintiff.  
Injecting 
extraneous 
factors 
like 
prejudice 
into 
the 
determination whether a specific time period is "a reasonable 
time after service" undermines an objective standard for prompt 
filing.   
¶29 The Wisconsin rules expect that answers will be timely 
served and promptly filed.  Courts ought to have authority to 
impose a serious sanction for failure to timely "serve," and an 
appropriate sanction, however modest, for failure to file 
"within a reasonable time after service." 
¶30 This analysis is consistent with the practice in the 
federal courts.  Rule 5(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure is the model for Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4).  It reads in 
part: "(d) Filing; Certificate of Service.  All papers after the 
complaint required to be served upon a party, together with a 
No. 00-1100 
15 
 
certificate of service, must be filed with the court within a 
reasonable time after service. . . ."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) 
(emphasis added). 
¶31 Professors Wright and Miller observe that federal 
courts "have liberally construed the words 'reasonable time' in 
order to minimize the incidence of technical objections that a 
paper, although served in ample time, was not filed . . . at the 
proper time."  4A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1152 (3d ed. 1997).12  
They note that "failure to file generally is corrected by an 
order to compel filing."  Id.  Addressing motions for default, 
the professors conclude that under Rule 5, entry of default for 
failure to file timely is exceptional.  "In general, the rules 
regard the serving of a paper as the critical act that must be 
done within the specified time.  A default cannot be predicated 
on a failure to file within the time permitted for service."  
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶32 In deciding a motion for default judgment based upon 
an alleged violation of Rule 5(d), federal courts usually 
consider whether the moving party was prejudiced by the delay.  
                                                 
12 In support of this proposition, Professors Wright and 
Miller cite cases in which filings after various numbers of days 
are deemed to be within a reasonable time.  These cases include: 
Claybrook Drilling Co. v. Divanco, Inc., 336 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 
1964) (4 days); Strasser v. Fascination Candy Co., 7 F.R.D. 267 
(N.D. Ill. 1945) (4 days); Sadowski v. Bombardier, Ltd., 527 
F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1975) (10 days); and Keohane v. Swarco, 
Inc., 320 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1963) (11 days).  4A Charles Alan 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 
§ 1152 (3d ed. 1997). 
No. 00-1100 
16 
 
See Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 660, 
668 (D. Kan. 1998); Wilson v. United States, 112 F.R.D. 42, 43 
(N.D. Ill. 1986). 
¶33 We agree that prejudice should be considered in 
determining the sanction, if any, for violation of the prompt 
filing requirement.  As we explain below, prejudice must be 
considered and found before the court weighs default judgment as 
a sanction for failure to file promptly.  As a practical matter, 
when the plaintiff moves to strike an answer to facilitate a 
default judgment for an alleged failure to file "within a 
reasonable time after service," the court may begin with an 
analysis of prejudice; if it is not present, there is no need to 
go back to determine the reasonableness of the filing, except as 
the basis for a lesser sanction. 
¶34 In this case, Judge Gallagher began his analysis with 
the question whether Lumber Liquidators had filed "within a 
reasonable time after service."  He determined that Lumber 
Liquidators' filing, 45 days after service, was "late."  The 
judge said he was not going to find "that 45 days was a 
reasonable time after service to file an answer when the general 
practice is that you do them at the same time."  The record 
shows that Lumber Liquidators knew its answer had to be served 
by December 22, 1999, and it served its answer by mail on 
December 21, 1999, in order to meet this deadline.  Lumber 
Liquidators offered no explanation why it did not file the 
answer until 45 days after it had served Split Rock——44 days 
after the extended period for serving the answer had expired.  
No. 00-1100 
17 
 
Under these circumstances, the circuit court was not clearly 
erroneous when it determined that filing the answer 45 days 
after service was not within a reasonable time after service.13  
B. 
Judicial Discretion to Strike the Answer 
 
¶35 The second issue is whether a circuit court may strike 
an answer if the answer is not filed within a reasonable time 
after service. 
¶36 A circuit court's determination that an answer has not 
been filed within a reasonable time after service permits the 
court to impose a sanction on the late filer, but the 
appropriate sanction, if any, is not identified in the rule.  In 
this 
case, 
Split 
Rock 
moved 
the 
court 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.02(2) to strike Lumber Liquidators' answer and 
then enter a default judgment. 
¶37 A party may move for default judgment in a variety of 
situations under various statutes.  When a motion is made under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.02(1)-(4), the movant must show that no issue 
                                                 
13 In Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 
660, 668 (D. Kan. 1998), a federal court applying Rule 5 stated: 
Courts have found that documents filed up to six 
days after service are filed within a "reasonable 
time" under Rule 5(d).  [Defense counsel] however, had 
not filed notice of these subpoenas by the time of 
this hearing——almost two months after he mailed notice 
to plaintiffs.  [Defense counsel's] filings (or lack 
thereof) 
stretch 
far 
beyond 
the 
bounds 
of 
reasonableness. 
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  The time frame in the 
present case is similar to the time frame in Biocore.  It 
stretched beyond the bounds of reasonableness. 
No. 00-1100 
18 
 
of law or fact has been joined.  Thus, when an answer has been 
served late or filed late, a motion to strike the late answer is 
a prerequisite to a default judgment.  See Reynolds v. Taylor, 
60 Wis. 2d 178, 179, 208 N.W.2d 305 (1973); Martin v. Griffin, 
117 Wis. 2d 438, 441-42, 344 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1984); see 
also Connor v. Connor, 2001 WI 49, ¶14, 243 Wis. 2d 279, 627 
N.W.2d 182.   
¶38 A successful motion to strike an answer will normally 
lead to a default judgment.  Therefore, a motion to strike an 
answer to facilitate a default judgment should satisfy the same 
criteria as the motion for default judgment.  Martin, 117 
Wis. 2d  at 442.  The criteria will vary depending upon the 
circumstances.14   
 
¶39 In short, a circuit court may strike an answer if the 
answer is not filed within a reasonable time after service——but 
only in those circumstances in which the circuit court, 
exercising sound discretion, may enter default judgment. 
C. 
Criteria to Consider in Striking an Answer 
 
¶40 The third issue concerns the criteria the court should 
consider in deciding a motion to strike an answer when the 
answer is not filed within a reasonable time after service.  
                                                 
14 To illustrate, a plaintiff may move for default judgment 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.02(2) for failure to serve an answer 
within the time specified in Wis. Stat. § 802.06(1).  The 
criteria for this motion will be different from the criteria for 
a motion for default judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5), 
where the defendant has appeared in the action but later failed 
to appear at trial. 
No. 00-1100 
19 
 
Specifically, must the circuit court find that either the moving 
party or the court was prejudiced by late filing of the answer 
before it can grant a motion to strike? 
 
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.02 authorizes the court to enter 
a default judgment under subsections (1)-(4) "if no issue of law 
or fact has been joined and if the time for joining issue has 
expired."  Wis. Stat. § 806.02(1).  Subsection (1) raises two 
questions: (1) When is an issue of law or fact joined?; and (2) 
When does the time for joining issue expire? 
 
¶42 A 
court 
may 
not 
enter 
default 
judgment 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.02(1)-(4) if the defendant has joined issue.15  
For purposes of this case, we will assume without deciding that 
the defendant's timely service of the answer did not join issue, 
in the absence of timely filing.   
¶43 Making this assumption does not settle the matter.  A 
defendant's failure to join issue does not require a court to 
enter default judgment.  Shirk v. Bowling, Inc., 2001 WI 36, ¶9, 
242 Wis. 2d 153, 624 N.W.2d 375; Hansher v. Kaishian, 79 Wis. 2d 
374, 387, 255 N.W.2d 564 (1977).  The use of the word "may" (a 
                                                 
15 Failure to join issue is not a prerequisite for a default 
judgment in other situations.  For example, a court may enter 
default judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5) against a party 
who fails to appear at trial.  A court may enter default 
judgment under Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(a) against a party for 
failure to comply with a discovery order.  Midwest Developers v. 
Goma Corp., 121 Wis. 2d 632, 650, 360 N.W.2d 554 (1984).  A 
court may enter default judgment as a sanction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.03 for failure of a party to comply with the statute's 
governing procedure.  Chevron Chem. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche 
LLP, 207 Wis. 2d 43, 48, 575 N.W.2d 775 (1997).   
No. 00-1100 
20 
 
default judgment "may" be rendered) in Wis. Stat. § 806.02(1) 
compels the circuit court to exercise sound discretion before 
entering a default judgment.  Oostburg State Bank v. United Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n, 134 Wis. 2d 4, 11, 386 N.W.2d 53 (1986).  In any 
event, the failure to join issue does not necessarily mean that 
the time for joining issue has expired. 
¶44 If we assume that issue is not joined solely by timely 
service of the answer, when does the time for joining issue 
expire?  We conclude that the time for joining issue expires, 
with respect to filing an answer, when: (1) the answer is not 
filed "within a reasonable time after service"; and (2) the 
defendant is unsuccessful in moving to enlarge time to file the 
answer. 
¶45 If an answer is filed late and the plaintiff moves to 
strike the late answer, the defendant must take some step, 
sooner or later, to bring itself into compliance and have its 
late filing recognized as valid.  The most logical step is a 
motion to enlarge time.  If the defendant makes no effort to 
enlarge time, there continues to be no joinder of issue (as 
assumed for purposes of this case). 
¶46 In this case, Lumber Liquidators did not move to 
enlarge time under Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2) or any other rule.  
Split Rock contends that Lumber Liquidators should have filed a 
motion under Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2) to enlarge time, and it 
reasons that a circuit court should not be expected to decide a 
motion that was never filed.   
No. 00-1100 
21 
 
¶47 This common sense argument would be very persuasive 
were it not for the language in Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2)(a).  The 
rule reads in part: 
 
(a) When an act is required to be done at or 
within a specified time, the court may order the 
period enlarged but only upon motion for cause shown 
and upon just terms. . . . If the motion is made after 
the expiration of the specified time, it shall not be 
granted unless the court finds that the failure to act 
was the result of excusable neglect.  The order of 
enlargement shall recite by its terms or by reference 
to an affidavit in the record the grounds for granting 
the motion. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2)(a). 
¶48 This rule contemplates enlarging a specified time 
period for an act "required to be done at or within a specified 
time."  We have already determined that a "reasonable time" is 
not a specified time.  It is an unspecified time.  Hence, 
§ 801.15(2) does not apply in this situation.   
¶49 The inapplicability of this rule is quite clear.  When 
a rule requires that an act be done at or within a specified 
time, it gives clear notice of what is expected.  Thus, when a 
party 
moves 
to 
enlarge 
a 
specified 
time 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2), it knows that it has the burden to show 
"cause" before the specified time expires or "excusable neglect" 
after the specified time expires.  If, however, a party were to 
move to enlarge an "unspecified" time under § 801.15(2), it 
would not know when its burden shifted from "cause" to 
"excusable neglect."  In effect, all motions would concede 
lateness and all would be treated as though the filings were 
No. 00-1100 
22 
 
late.  Hence, if a defendant were required to submit a motion 
under Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2) to enlarge the time to file a 
timely served answer, it would trigger an analysis of excusable 
neglect.   
¶50 Under the rule, the burden of establishing excusable 
neglect is on the moving party, not on the party seeking to 
strike the answer.  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.15(2) provides in part 
that, "If the motion is made after the expiration of the 
specified time, it shall not be granted unless the court finds 
that the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect."  
We reinforced this tough language in Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 
saying: "If the motion is made after the expiration of the 
specified time, an order enlarging the time for performing an 
act must be based on a finding of excusable neglect; when the 
circuit court determines that there is no excusable neglect, the 
motion must be denied."  Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 
461, 468, 326 N.W.2d 727 (1982) (emphasis added). 
¶51 Consequently, the probable effect of a motion under 
§ 801.15(2)——in any situation in which the defendant failed to 
file 
within 
a 
reasonable 
time 
after 
service 
because 
of 
inadvertence, 
carelessness, 
or 
inattentiveness——would 
be 
a 
denial of the motion, leading to a default judgment.  The rule 
would dictate a default judgment for a relatively minor 
infraction even if the late filing did not prejudice the 
plaintiff or the court.  This result would be completely at odds 
with the practice under Federal Rule 5. 
No. 00-1100 
23 
 
¶52 As noted above, in the federal system, failure to 
promptly file generally is corrected by an order to compel 
filing, inasmuch as federal courts view the timely serving of a 
paper, particularly an answer, as far more significant than the 
filing of a paper with the court.  "[E]ntry of default is 
exceptional."  Wright & Miller, supra, § 1152.  A motion for 
default judgment under Rule 5(d) isn't taken seriously until the 
moving party shows prejudice.  See Biocore, 181 F.R.D. at 668; 
Wilson v. United States, 112 F.R.D. 42, 43 (N.D. Ill. 1986).16 
¶53 We believe the federal practice is sound and conclude 
that a plaintiff should not move to strike an answer that is not 
filed "within a reasonable time after service" unless the 
plaintiff is prepared to show prejudice to itself or to the 
court.  Offering less-compelling grounds to strike an answer in 
this situation is an attempt to secure a judicial sanction that 
is disproportionate to the defendant's error. 
¶54 This brings us to a discussion of what each party 
should have done under the circumstances of this case.  If a 
defendant fails to file a timely served answer within a 
                                                 
16 In Wanderer v. Johnston, the Ninth Circuit set out five 
factors to consider in determining whether a dismissal or 
default is appropriate as a Rule 37 sanction for discovery 
violations: "(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution 
of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its dockets; (3) 
the risk of prejudice to [the party seeking sanctions]; (4) the 
public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and 
(5) the availability of less drastic sanctions."  Wanderer v. 
Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).  
In this formulation, prejudice to the moving party is a key 
factor to be considered under a procedural rule similar, if not 
identical, to Rule 5. 
No. 00-1100 
24 
 
reasonable time after service, the plaintiff may move for a 
"just" order under Wis. Stat. § 805.03.17  This rule authorizes 
the circuit court to issue a full range of orders in response to 
a party's failure "to comply with the statutes governing 
procedure 
in 
civil 
actions." 
 
Wis. Stat. § 805.03. 
 
The 
plaintiff's motion may seek the immediate filing of the answer 
or an appropriate sanction, including costs and attorney's fees, 
or both.  The motion may also ask the court to strike the answer 
and enter a default judgment as a sanction if the plaintiff can 
show prejudice to itself or to the court. 
 
¶55 The appropriate response to a motion to strike an 
answer on grounds that the answer was not filed within a 
reasonable time after service is to file the answer and then 
move to enlarge time under Wis. Stat. § 802.01(2).18  Moving to 
enlarge time under § 802.01(2) will give the circuit court  
flexibility in weighing the facts, the equities, and the 
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.03, Failure to prosecute or comply 
with procedure statutes, provides in part:  
For failure of any claimant to prosecute or for 
failure of any party to comply with the statutes 
governing procedure in civil actions or to obey any 
order of court, the court in which the action is 
pending may make such orders in regard to the failure 
as are just, including but not limited to orders 
authorized under s. 804.12(2)(a). 
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.01(2) 
provides 
in 
part: 
"(2) 
MOTIONS. (a) How made.  An application to the court for an order 
shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, 
shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the 
grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order 
sought." 
No. 00-1100 
25 
 
policies at issue.  This would not be the case under 
Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2), which imposes upon a movant a heavy 
burden to avoid the ultimate sanction.  In Connor, we said that 
in its exercise of discretion in considering default judgment, 
the circuit court "must attempt to strike the appropriate 
balance between the countervailing policy considerations that 
consistently pull at either end of the default judgment 
spectrum."  Connor, 2001 WI 49, ¶27 (quoting J.L. Phillips & 
Assocs. v. E&H Plastic Corp., 217 Wis. 2d 348, 577 N.W.2d 13 
(1998)). 
 
This would 
be 
very difficult 
if 
the court's 
determination pivoted on the presence or absence of excusable 
neglect. 
¶56 There are at least two reasons why a defendant should 
move to enlarge time under Wis. Stat. § 802.01(2) rather than 
Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2) in the specific instance of a late-filed 
answer.  First, as noted above, when the defendant fails to file 
a timely served answer within a reasonable time after service, 
the defendant is not in violation of a rule requiring that an 
act "be done at or within a specified time."  As a result, the 
defendant need not seek to enlarge time under a rule that speaks 
to compliance with a specified time. 
¶57 Second, a defendant who fails to file an answer within 
a reasonable time after service is in violation of a somewhat 
imprecise rule.  We stated in Sorenson that, "if a procedural 
rule is ambiguous, we are likely to construe it liberally so as 
to encourage a resolution of the controversy on the merits."  
Sorenson, 2000 WI 43, ¶15 (citing DOT v. Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d 
No. 00-1100 
26 
 
623, 633, 594 N.W.2d 765 (1999) (citations omitted)).  We would 
not be construing this rule liberally if we forced an erring 
defendant to seek relief under Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2). 
¶58 To sum up, a plaintiff may address a defendant's 
failure to file an answer "within a reasonable time after 
service" 
by 
filing 
a 
motion 
for 
a 
"just" 
order 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 805.03.  The motion may seek to strike the answer 
as a sanction when the plaintiff is prepared to establish 
prejudice to itself or to the court.  The court may exercise its 
discretion to enter an order that is "just," but it may not 
strike the answer unless and until it finds prejudice to the 
plaintiff or to the court, examines the merits of any motion to 
enlarge time, and explains the reasoning for its determination 
in writing or on the record. 
D. 
Default Judgment 
 
¶59 Having determined that a circuit court may strike an 
answer when the answer is not filed within a reasonable time 
after service if the court finds prejudice, the next question 
is, may the court enter a default judgment? 
¶60 The answer is yes.  We can foresee situations in which 
a defendant's failure to file an answer with the court within a 
reasonable time after service is unreasonable, unexplained, and 
prejudicial to the plaintiff or the court.  In these situations—
—after careful consideration of the competing factors, including 
the defendant's motion to enlarge time——the court may enter a 
default judgment. 
E. 
Sound Judicial Discretion 
No. 00-1100 
27 
 
 
¶61 We now apply these principles to the present case.  
The circuit court entered default judgment against Lumber 
Liquidators under Wis. Stat. § 806.02.   
¶62 This default judgment rule does not instruct the 
circuit court how to exercise its discretion in deciding motions 
to strike an answer and enter default judgment.  A long history 
of court decisions has attempted to provide guidance.  However, 
the policy considerations at play in interpreting this default 
rule often conflict, so that the reported decisions appear 
inconsistent. 
¶63 Entry 
of 
default 
judgment 
is 
not 
mandatory.  
Wis. Stat. § 806.02(1).  "The use of the word 'may' indicates 
that the circuit court 'is not required to enter a default 
judgment.'"  Shirk, 2001 WI 36, ¶15 (quoting Hansher, 79 Wis. 2d 
at 387).  Granting or denying a motion for default judgment 
requires an exercise of sound discretion. 
¶64 An appellate court will not reverse a circuit court's 
discretionary decision unless the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  See, e.g., Shirk, 2001 WI 36, ¶9; 
Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 470.  At the same time, we note that 
default judgment is the ultimate sanction.  The law prefers, 
whenever reasonably possible, to afford litigants a day in court 
and a trial on the issues.  As a corollary to this preference, 
default judgments are regarded with particular disfavor.  Shirk, 
2001 WI 36, ¶9 (citing Dugenske v. Dugenske, 80 Wis. 2d 64, 68, 
257 N.W.2d 865 (1977)).  Consequently, default judgments are 
bound to attract close scrutiny in appellate review. 
No. 00-1100 
28 
 
¶65 A circuit court's exercise of discretion "is not the 
equivalent of unfettered decision-making."  Hartung v. Hartung, 
102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).  "A discretionary 
determination, to be sustained, must demonstrably be made and 
based upon the facts appearing in the record and in reliance on 
the appropriate and applicable law."  Id.  In Howard v. 
Duersten, the court stated: 
 
The trial court must undertake a reasonable 
inquiry and examination of the facts as the basis of 
its decision.  The exercise of discretion must depend 
on facts that are of record or that are reasonably 
derived by inference from the record and the basis for 
the exercise of discretion should be set forth. 
Howard v. Duersten 81 Wis. 2d 301, 305, 260 N.W.2d 274 (1977) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
As 
the 
Hartung 
court 
put 
it, 
"[A] 
discretionary determination must be the product of a rational 
mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon 
are stated and are considered together for the purpose of 
achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination."  Hartung, 
102 Wis. 2d at 66 (emphasis added).  In reviewing these 
discretionary determinations, an appellate court should not be 
expected to read the mind of the trial judge.  When the circuit 
court imposes the ultimate sanction of default judgment in a 
contested hearing, the court must set forth the basis for its 
exercise of discretion. 
¶66 In this case, Split Rock moved to strike the answer 
and enter default judgment.  Lumber Liquidators responded with 
an attempt to persuade the court that its answer was filed 
"within a reasonable time after service."  This argument was 
No. 00-1100 
29 
 
properly rejected.  In addition, however, Lumber Liquidators 
contended, both in its written submission and in its oral 
presentation to the circuit court, that even if its answer were 
not timely filed, default judgment was not an appropriate 
sanction. 
¶67 Admittedly, Lumber Liquidators did not move to enlarge 
time, as it should have, and it made no argument to the court 
denying prejudice or showing excusable neglect.  Nonetheless, it 
opposed the motion for default judgment as an erroneous exercise 
of the court's discretion. 
¶68 The circuit court struck the answer and entered 
default judgment.  The court determined that Lumber Liquidators' 
filing was late and that issue had not been joined by timely 
service of the answer.  Then it stopped.  The court did not 
examine why the filing was late, or whether there was prejudice 
to either the moving party or the court.  It did not ask if 
there was "excusable neglect" or whether alternative sanctions 
would serve the interests of "promoting prompt adjudication and 
encouraging quality legal representation."  See Connor, 2001 WI 
49, ¶16.  It did not discuss the qualitative differences between 
No. 00-1100 
30 
 
late service of an answer and late filing of the answer,19 or the 
preference of giving litigants their day in court.  It did not 
attempt to justify the harsh result of default judgment on any 
basis except that issue had not been joined.  As noted above, 
failure to join issue does not automatically entitle a party to 
default judgment.  Hansher, 79 Wis. 2d at 387. 
¶69 We reluctantly conclude that the circuit court did not 
set forth the basis for its exercise of discretion.  It did not 
state the law it relied upon or articulate any analysis of 
prejudice or the policy factors supporting the issuance of the 
ultimate sanction.  It erroneously exercised its discretion.  As 
a result, the default judgment cannot stand.  We vacate the 
order to strike the defendant's answer, vacate the default 
judgment, and remand the case to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                 
19 A 
violation 
of 
the 
prompt 
filing 
requirement 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 801.14(4) 
is 
qualitatively 
different 
from 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
time-specified 
service 
requirement 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 802.06(1).  The failure to file a timely served 
answer is usually a technical violation, capable of immediate 
redress.  As in this case, the plaintiff has been told the 
defendant's position, is able to move forward with discovery, 
and may not even be aware of the defendant's procedural error in 
failing to file with the court.  By contrast, when the defendant 
fails to serve the plaintiff in violation of a specific 
deadline, the violation is not technical.  The defendant may 
have failed altogether to prepare a written answer to the 
complaint and certainly has not given the answer to the 
plaintiff.  As a result, the defendant has not formally advised 
the plaintiff of its position in the case, and has not framed 
the issues for resolution at trial. 
No. 00-1100 
31 
 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
No.  00-1100.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶70 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  The majority acts 
"reluctantly" because, even though it recognizes that the 
circuit court correctly held that Lumber Liquidators did not 
file its answer within a reasonable time, and it recognizes that 
the circuit court has the discretion to grant default judgment, 
the majority still manages to come to the conclusion that the 
circuit court reached the wrong result.  While I agree that the 
remedy of default judgment is generally disfavored, it is a 
remedy that, according to the plain language of the statutes, 
still falls squarely within the discretion of the circuit court.  
In this case, I cannot find that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion, and for that reason I dissent. 
¶71 When interpreting a statute, we first look to its 
plain language.  Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶14, 
245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893.  If the language of the statute 
is clear and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the statutory 
language to ascertain its meaning.  Id. 
¶72 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.14 (1999-2000)20 is clear in its 
requirements. 
 
Subsection 
(1) 
requires 
that 
"Every . . . 
pleading . . . shall be served upon each of the parties."  
Subsection (4) adds that: 
 
All papers after the summons required to be served 
upon a party . . . shall be filed with the court 
within a reasonable time after service.  The filing of 
any 
paper 
required 
to 
be 
served 
constitutes 
a 
certification by the party or attorney effecting the 
filing that a copy of such paper has been timely 
served on all parties required to be served, except as 
                                                 
20 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  00-1100.jpw 
 
2 
 
the 
person 
effecting 
the 
filing 
may 
otherwise 
stipulate in writing. 
¶73 These statutory subsections, read together, make it 
apparent that two steps are required for the effective service 
of a pleading: (1) the pleading must be served on every party; 
and (2) the document must then be filed with the circuit court 
within a reasonable time, thereby certifying that all parties 
required to be served have been timely served with the document.  
Ness v. Digital Dial Communications, 227 Wis. 2d 592, 601, 596 
N.W.2d 365 (1999).  These steps are mandatory, as indicated by 
the use of the word "shall" in each subsection.  Cmty. Credit 
Plan, Inc. v. Johnson, 228 Wis. 2d 30, 41, 596 N.W.2d 799 
(1999).  The language of the statute is unambiguous in these 
respects. 
¶74 In this case, the parties do not dispute that the 
answer was served on Split Rock in a timely manner.  Thus, the 
only questions that remain pertain to the filing of the answer 
and the remedy for failure to file the answer in a timely 
manner.  Specifically, this court must decide (1) whether the 
filing was made in a reasonable time, (2) whether the circuit 
court had the discretion to strike the answer and grant default 
judgment, and (3) if so, whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised that discretion. 
¶75 The majority correctly decides that the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it found that 
the defendant failed to file its answer within a reasonable 
time.  Majority op. at ¶34.  Having already received a courtesy 
extension from Split Rock, Lumber Liquidators was well aware 
No.  00-1100.jpw 
 
3 
 
that its answer had to be served by December 22, 1999.  Lumber 
Liquidators actually served the answer a day earlier.  Lumber 
Liquidators should have been equally aware that the answer had 
to be filed with the court within a reasonable time after the 
service was made, and yet it failed to do so for 45 days.  This 
was after Split Rock had filed its motion to strike the answer.  
Additionally, Lumber Liquidators never made a motion to extend 
time to file under Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2)(a).21  Under such 
circumstances, the circuit court did not err when it held that 
Lumber Liquidators' answer was not filed within a "reasonable" 
time.22  As a consequence, Lumber Liquidators failed to meet the 
requirements of § 801.14. 
¶76 Our next questions are whether the circuit court had 
the discretion to strike the pleading and grant default judgment 
as a remedy for the failure, and, if the circuit court had such 
discretion, whether the circuit court erroneously exercised it. 
                                                 
21 The majority tries to nullify Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2)(a) 
by suggesting that the "reasonable time" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.14(4) is not a "specified time" under § 801.15(2)(a).  
Majority op. at ¶¶ 20, 48-49.  This adds little to the analysis.  
If Lumber Liquidators had an excuse to file the pleadings after 
what would be considered a "reasonable time," it could have 
easily sought leave from the court to do so——it did not.  If 
there was no excuse for Lumber Liquidators to file late, it then 
should have filed the pleadings promptly after service, which is 
both the intent of the statute, and the general practice in 
litigation. 
22 I further note that, although I generally agree with the 
factors that the majority considers in making its determination 
of reasonableness, majority op. at ¶¶ 26-28, I would emphasize 
that the factors listed are not all-inclusive, and that the 
determination of reasonableness must be made on a case-by-case 
basis. 
No.  00-1100.jpw 
 
4 
 
¶77 The first question is easily answered.  We have long 
held that the decision of whether or not to enter a default 
judgment is a matter that is within the sound discretion of the 
circuit court.  See, e.g., Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 
110, ¶18, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768; Oostburg State Bank v. 
United Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 130 Wis. 2d 4, 11, 386 N.W.2d 53 
(1986); Hollingsworth v. Am. Fin. Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 172, 181, 
271 N.W.2d 872 (1978); Willing v. Porter, 266 Wis. 428, 430, 63 
N.W.2d 729 (1954).  We will only reverse a circuit court's grant 
of default judgment in a situation where the circuit court 
erroneously exercises that discretion, such as when circuit 
court applies an incorrect legal standard in deciding whether to 
enter judgment.  Oostburg, 130 Wis. 2d 4, 11-12. 
¶78 The question of erroneous exercise thus turns on the 
underlying question of whether the circuit court properly struck 
Labor Liquidators' answer when it was not filed within a 
reasonable time.  I am unable to find any statutory provision 
that would have forbidden it from doing so.  Quite the opposite, 
in fact, Wis. Stat. § 805.03 states that: 
 
For failure . . . of any party to comply with the 
statutes governing procedure in civil actions . . . 
the court in which the action is pending may make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, including 
but 
not 
limited 
to 
orders 
authorized 
under 
s. 804.12(2)(a). 
 
Among the orders in Wis. Stat. § 804.12(2)(a) is: 
 
3. An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, 
or staying further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any 
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party. 
No.  00-1100.jpw 
 
5 
 
 
Take together, these statutes plainly give the circuit court the 
discretionary authority to strike a pleading or to grant default 
judgment if, in the court's discretion, such a remedy is 
appropriate for a party's violation of the rules of civil 
procedure.  In the present case, Lumber Liquidators violated the 
rules of civil procedure and the court imposed a sanction it was 
authorized by statute to impose.  Thus, the circuit court did 
not apply an incorrect legal standard. 
¶79 The only way the majority is able to find that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion here is by 
grafting a prerequisite finding of prejudice onto the court's 
discretion.  By requiring that the circuit court find that the 
failure to file within a reasonable time was prejudicial before 
it may strike the pleading, majority op. at ¶58, the court adds 
a mandatory element that is plainly not mandatory under the 
statute.  While I agree that the factors cited by the majority——
including 
prejudice——should 
influence 
the 
circuit 
court's 
reasoning in exercising its discretion, there is no statutory 
requirement for a finding of prejudice. 
¶80 There are also practical reasons for not requiring a 
showing of prejudice in a situation such as this.  The failure 
to file a pleading, as opposed to the mere failure to serve a 
pleading, has a significant impact on the judicial process and 
on the administration of justice as a whole.  That is, the 
failure to file a pleading within a reasonable time greatly 
affects the court's ability to manage its own calendar and to 
No.  00-1100.jpw 
 
6 
 
conduct efficient proceedings.  Thus, the failure to file a 
pleading within a reasonable time may actually "prejudice the 
court" more than it prejudices the opposing party, and could 
have an impact not only on the parties involved, but on parties 
in other cases currently being heard by the same court.  
Furthermore, under the majority's reasoning, a pleading that is 
timely served but not filed with the court until months or even 
years later would still require the non-dilatory party to go in 
front of the court and demonstrate prejudice, a situation that 
strikes me as unreasonable.  These practical concerns reinforce 
my conclusion that the remedy for a failure to file——including a 
grant of default judgment——belongs with the discretion of the 
circuit court. 
¶81 Again, I recognize that default judgment is an extreme 
remedy, and one that is generally not favored.  Rhodes v. Terry, 
91 Wis. 2d 165, 177, 280 N.W.2d 248 (1979) (citing Dugenske v. 
Dugenske, 80 Wis. 2d 64, 68, 257 N.W.2d 865 (1977)).  But 
despite its disfavored status, default judgment is not a 
prohibited remedy under the circumstances of this case.  The 
discretion to grant default judgment lies clearly with the 
circuit court, and the circuit court applied the correct legal 
standard here.  Thus, I am unable to conclude that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion in this case.  For 
that reason, I disagree with the holding of the majority, and I 
would uphold the judgment of the circuit court. 
¶82 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
No.  00-1100.jpw 
 
7 
 
¶83 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this opinion. 
 
No.  00-1100.jpw 
 
 
 
1