Case Title: State of Missouri, Respondent v. Kevin Johnson, Appellant

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC89168

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Missouri 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,     
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
KEVIN JOHNSON,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
The Honorable Melvyn W. Wiesman, Judge 
 
I. Introduction  
A jury found Kevin Johnson (Appellant) guilty of one count of first-degree 
murder, pursuant to section 565.020,1 for killing Sgt. William McEntee and 
recommended the death penalty.  The trial court adopted the jury's 
recommendation and sentenced Appellant to death.  This Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.  The judgment is affirmed. 
II. Facts2
 
Appellant had an outstanding warrant for a probation violation resulting 
from a misdemeanor assault.  Around 5:20 in the evening of July 5, 2005, 
                                             
 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise noted.   
2 The facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.  State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 31 
(Mo. banc 2006).   
Kirkwood police, with knowledge of the warrant, began to investigate a vehicle 
believed to be Appellant's at his residence in the Meacham Park neighborhood.  
The investigation was interrupted at 5:30 when Appellant's younger brother had a 
seizure in the house next door to Appellant's residence.  The family sought help 
from the police, who provided assistance until an ambulance and additional police, 
including Sgt. McEntee, arrived.  Appellant's brother was taken to the hospital, 
where he passed away from a preexisting heart condition.  Appellant was next 
door during this time, and the police suspended their search for Appellant and 
never saw Appellant.   
After the police left, Appellant retrieved his black, nine millimeter handgun 
from his vehicle.  When talking with friends that evening, Appellant explained his 
brother's death as, "that's f____ up, man.  They wasn't trying to help him, that he 
was too busy looking for me."  Around 7:30, two hours after Appellant's brother 
had the seizure, Sgt. McEntee responded to a report of fireworks in the 
neighborhood and Appellant was nearby.  As Sgt. McEntee spoke with three 
juveniles, Appellant approached Sgt. McEntee's patrol car and squatted down to 
see into the passenger window.  Appellant said "you killed my brother" before 
firing his black handgun approximately five times.  Sgt. McEntee was shot in the 
head and upper torso, and one of the juveniles was hit in the leg.  Appellant 
reached into the patrol car and took Sgt. McEntee's silver .40 caliber handgun.   
Appellant proceeded to walk down the street with the black and silver 
handguns.  He then saw his mother and her boyfriend.  Appellant told his mother, 
 
2
"that m____ f_____ let my brother die, he needs to see what it feel[s] like to die." 
His mother replied, "that's not true."  Appellant left his mother and continued to 
walk away.  
Meanwhile, Sgt. McEntee's patrol car rolled down the street, hit a parked 
car, and then hit a tree before coming to rest.  Sgt. McEntee, alive but bleeding and 
unable to talk, got out of the patrol car and sat on his knees.  Appellant reappeared, 
shot Sgt. McEntee approximately two times in the head, and Sgt. McEntee 
collapsed onto the ground.  Appellant also went through Sgt. McEntee's pockets.   
Sgt. McEntee was shot a total of seven times in the head and upper torso.  
Six of the wounds were serious but did not render Sgt. McEntee unconscious or 
immediately incapacitated.  One wound was a lethal injury that caused Sgt. 
McEntee's death.  All seven wounds were from a nine millimeter handgun.   
Appellant left the scene cursing and drove to his father's house.  Appellant 
spent three days at a family member's apartment before arrangements were made 
for Appellant to surrender to a family member who was a police officer.   
Appellant was indicted on one count of first-degree murder, one count of 
first-degree robbery, one count of first-degree assault, and three counts of armed 
criminal action.  The murder count was severed from the other counts.  Appellant's 
first trial ended with a hung jury in the guilt phase.  In this trial, the jury 
deliberated for four hours before finding Appellant guilty of first-degree murder.  
In the penalty phase, the jury spent four hours deliberating and found the 
following aggravating factors present:  (1) "the defendant by his act of murdering 
 
3
Sgt. William McEntee knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one 
person by means of a weapon that would normally be hazardous to the lives of 
more than one person;" (2) "the murder of Sgt. William McEntee 'DID' involve 
depravity of mind, as a result thereof, the murder was outrageously and wantonly 
vile, horrible, and inhuman;" and (3) "the murder of Sgt. William McEntee was 
committed against a peace officer while engaged in the performance of his official 
duty."  
III. Standard of Review 
On direct appeal, this Court reviews a death penalty conviction for 
prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse the trial court's decision only when the 
error was so prejudicial that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.  State v. 
Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 34 (Mo. banc 2006) (Johnson I).  Prejudice exists when 
there is a "reasonable probability that the trial court's error affected the outcome of 
the trial."  Id.  Non-preserved issues are reviewed for plain error, where the error 
resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.  Id. Evidence is reviewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
State v. Johns, 34 S.W.3d 93, 103 (Mo. banc 2000).     
Appellant raises eleven points on appeal.  Each point is denied.   
IV. Point One: Juror Non-disclosure 
In the first point, Appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling the 
motion for new trial because juror Broome failed to disclose in voir dire and at 
trial that she knew a State's witness, Det. Scognamiglio.  Appellant learned after 
 
4
the trial that Broome knew Scognamiglio and raised the issue in a motion for new 
trial.  The record shows that during voir dire, the State read the list of police 
witnesses, including Scognamiglio, and asked: 
Are any of those names familiar to anybody as County police 
officer?  
Anybody --- let me start back with the jury box.  Anybody know, 
friends with County police officers -- or I won't even limit it to County.  
Close friends with police officers, law enforcement officers.  
 
Broome disclosed that her stepbrother is a police officer.  She did not disclose she 
knew Scognamiglio.  At the post-trial hearing, Broome stated that she knew 
Scognamiglio from working with his wife.  She said she did not respond at voir 
dire or during trial because: 
it didn't register to me because he listed off a bunch of people, and I really 
didn't put two and two together because I hadn't seen him in over at least 
two and a half years.  And when I seen him on the stand, I didn't -- I'm like, 
oh.  I didn't know what I could do.  I had no idea.  If I should have said, I 
didn't know.  
 
Broome further testified at the hearing that she told her husband, "I had 
seen Don [Scognamiglio] there, and he was one of the ones who had brought 
evidence in that seemed to be the same evidence as the first time we had seen the 
previous pictures or trial."   
The trial court overruled the motion and found Broome's conduct was not 
non-disclosure or, at worst, was unintentional non-disclosure.  The trial court 
made the following findings in a written order: 
Juror #1 [Broome] was asked, after the list of witnesses was read: 
"Are any of those names familiar to anyone as county police officers?["]  
The juror did not respond to that.  The credible evidence before this court is 
 
5
that the juror did not know Don Scognamiglio as a county police officer, 
although she had been aware that he was a police officer.  Her relationship 
with the officer was peripheral to her familiarity with his wife.  She never 
socialized with the officer and his wife but only knew him as one who 
occasionally appeared at work.  The court finds the juror's denial that the 
mention of his name in the midst of a list of 12 officers did not register with 
her as someone she knew was credible.  She had not seen or had contact 
with him for a few years. 
The remainder of the question by the prosecutor to which there was 
a response sought was if "Anybody - let me start back with the jury box.  
Anybody know, friends with County police officers --- or I won't even limit 
it to County.  Close friends with police officers, law enforcement officers."  
There is no credible evidence before this court that the juror was close 
friends with any officers including the County Detective other than the 
friendships the juror disclosed during voir dire. 
Clearly, even if the court were to find that the juror's conduct could 
be interpreted as non-disclosure, which it does not, there is no credible 
evidence that the non-disclosure would be intentional.  At the very worst it 
would [be] unintentional.  Also there is no credible evidence before the 
court that the Defendant was prejudiced by any non-disclosure that would 
have resulted. 
 
Juror non-disclosure during voir dire requires a two-prong analysis.  State 
v. Mayes, 63 S.W.3d 615, 625 (Mo. banc 2001).  First, non-disclosure occurs 
when the juror reasonably can "comprehend the information solicited by the 
question asked." Id.  A response is reasonable based on the language and context, 
and the question's clarity is subject to de novo review.  Nadolski v. Ahmed, 142 
S.W.3d 755, 765 (Mo. App. 2004).  Second, it must be determined whether the 
non-disclosure is intentional or unintentional.  Mayes, 63 S.W.3d at 625.  
Intentional non-disclosure occurs when the juror "actually remembers the 
experience or that it was of such significance that his purported forgetfulness is 
unreasonable."  Id.  When material information is intentionally withheld, bias and 
prejudice are presumed.  Id.  Unintentional non-disclosure involves an 
 
6
insignificant or remote experience, misunderstanding the question, or disconnected 
information.  Williams v. Barnes Hosp., 736 S.W.2d 33, 36-37 (Mo. banc 1987).   
For unintentional non-disclosure, a new trial is warranted when the verdict is 
prejudicially influenced.  Mayes, 63 S.W.3d at 625. The trial court has discretion 
to grant a new trial.  Id.   
Broome was not instructed at any time what to do in the unlikely event that 
she recognized a witness during trial.  While Broome should have brought this to 
the trial court's attention, her silence is not unreasonable.   
The trial court's written findings, made after observing the trial and hearing 
the evidence, are supported by evidence in the record.  The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in overruling the motion.  The point is denied. 
V. Point Two: Batson Challenge 
In the second point, Appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling a 
Batson3 challenge for juror Cottman.  The State used a peremptory challenge to 
strike Cottman and Appellant made a Batson challenge.  In response to the Batson 
challenge, the State's race-neutral reasons were Cottman's unwillingness to answer 
death penalty questions and her role as a foster parent with Annie Malone 
Children's Home, which provided services to Appellant as a youth.  Appellant's 
only response was that another juror was a foster parent.  The trial court allowed 
                                             
 
3 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 
7
the strike.4  Appellant preserved this point by objecting at trial and raising the 
issue in the motion for new trial.   
A peremptory strike may not be based on an improper purpose, such as race 
or gender, and is objected to by a Batson challenge.  Johnson I, 207 S.W.3d at 35.  
A Batson challenge has three components: (1) the defendant must object that the 
                                             
 
4 The relevant portion of the transcript is: 
MR. MCCULLOCH [State]:  Judge, I note that Cottman, I felt when we were questioning her in 
small groups was not antagonistic towards me but not all that willing to answer the questions 
regarding the death penalty and other issues surrounding that.  
Also as a development in the large group, she was a foster parent for the Annie Malone 
Children's Home.  She indicated that she still sees a lot of the kids that she was a foster parent for 
during that time now that they have grown up some.  I don't know what the age group is, but they 
were around the Defendant's age based on her time frame of when she said she was a foster 
parent down there.  And since there will be evidence in this case, particularly if we get to a 
second half, there will be evidence that the Defendant was at least for some period of time in 
Annie Malone's custody, I don't want anybody associated with Annie Malone.  I assume she has 
probably  -- rightly so I suggest, but a very high opinion of Annie Malone, anything that went on 
there.  I think that's not something that would be favorable to our position regarding the 
Defendant's time away from home. 
THE COURT: Any response from defense? 
MS. KRAFT [Defense]: I would note for the record that Juror Robert Bayer, who is a white 
male, also stated that he was a foster parent at one point in time, and the State has not struck Mr. 
Mayer. 
MR. MCCULLOCH: Mayer or Bayer? 
MS. KRAFT: Bayer, I'm sorry.  Mr. Bayer. 
THE COURT: I don't recall that.  Is Annie Malone in some way connected with the Defendant in 
this case? 
MS. KRAFT: Yes, he spent some time there.  He spent some time at Annie Malone's. 
MR. MCCULLOCH: With Mr. Bayer, he was a foster parent for a brief period of time, in fact for 
St. Vincent's.  No connection to Annie Malone.  And that I think is a completely different 
situation. 
THE COURT: Okay.  Anything else from the defense? 
MS. KRAFT: In addition, I would state that Mr. Fenton, who was one of the -- no, I'm sorry, he's 
not in the alternate group.  Never mind. 
THE COURT: Okay.  I don't believe -- I can't recall that there were any other jurors who were 
foster parents for Annie Malone or connected with Annie Malone other than the juror who's not 
on this -- either the primary panel or the alternate panel, Juror 77, who had some connection 
with Annie Malone, but I think he was the only other one with Annie Malone, am I correct? 
MS. KRAFT: I believe so. 
THE COURT: Okay.  The motion to strike for cause will be granted.  I will allow that strike. I 
believe there is a racially-neutral basis for the strike. 
MR. MCCULLOCH: Peremptory strike, Judge. 
(Emphasis added). 
 
8
state's peremptory challenge is based on an improper purpose, (2) the state has the 
burden to prove a race-neutral reason for the strike, and (3) the defendant has the 
burden to prove the reason is pretextual.  State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 524 
(Mo. banc 2003).   
To determine if pretext exists, this Court considers a non-exclusive list of 
factors including: the explanation in light of the circumstances; similarly situated 
jurors not struck; the relevance between the explanation and the case; the 
demeanor of the state and excluded venire members; the court's prior experiences 
with the prosecutor's office; and objective measures relating to motive.  Id. at 527.   
The trial court's ruling is reversed only for clear error.  Id. at 525.   
Failing to raise a Batson challenge with the trial court does not preserve the 
argument for appeal.  State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 713 (Mo. banc 2004).  
However, when the non-preserved claim involves a constitutional issue, it is 
reviewed for plain error.  Id. at 714.   
During voir dire, Appellant argued the State's explanation for striking 
Cottman was pretextual because another member of the venire was also a foster 
parent but not struck.  A review of the record shows no other venire member was 
involved with Annie Malone Children's Home, which was significant because it 
previously provided services to Appellant.  The trial court did not err in finding 
the explanation was not pretextual. 
Because the trial court found one race-neutral reason to strike Cottman, it is 
unnecessary to review Appellant's argument that Cottman's unwillingness to 
 
9
answer death qualification questions was pretextual.  See State v. Taylor, 18 
S.W.3d 366, 370 n.6 (Mo. banc 2000). 
Appellant also argued that the prosecutor's demeanor and that the trial 
court's previous experience with the prosecutor's office warrants pretextual 
behavior.  As noted above, the prosecutor's decision to strike Cottman was not 
pretextual.  There is no evidence that the State engaged in improper behavior to 
constitute a Batson violation regarding Cottman.  A previous Batson violation by 
the same prosecutor's office does not constitute evidence of a Batson violation in 
this case, absent allegations relating to this specific case.     
 
The trial court did not err.  The point is denied. 
VI. Point Three: Trial Court Errors 
 
In the third point, Appellant argues: A) the trial court erred in overruling 
the motion for judgment of acquittal; B) the trial court erred in submitting the first-
degree murder jury instruction because section "565.002(3)'s definition of 
deliberation, 'cool reflection for any amount of time no matter how brief,' reduces 
the distinction between first and second degree murder to imperceptibility;" and C) 
the trial court committed plain error in: 1) allowing the State to "[r]epeatedly 
argu[e] that [Appellant's] conscious decision to shoot was deliberation, Prosecutor 
McCulloch misled the jury, contravened the law, and created manifest injustice: a 
conscious decision to kill is second degree murder" (emphasis in original); 2) 
"allowing argument that the jury had to acquit [Appellant] of first-degree murder 
to consider second-degree murder;" and 3) submitting "[i]nstruction 5, the first-
 
10
degree murder verdict-director, [which] failed to require unanimity as to each 
element of first-degree murder."   
A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
 
Appellant alleges the trial court erred in overruling the motion for judgment 
of acquittal.  A sufficiency of the evidence argument is reviewed to determine if a 
reasonable juror had enough evidence to find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  State v. Salter, 250 S.W.3d 705, 710 (Mo. banc 2008).  
Evidence and inferences favorable to the state are accepted, and contrary evidence 
and inferences are disregarded.  Id.   
The record shows Appellant retrieved his gun from his vehicle after his 
brother was taken to the hospital and expressed his belief that the police did not 
help his brother because they were focused on finding him.  Two hours later, 
Appellant approached Sgt. McEntee's patrol car, squatted down to see into the 
window, and said "you killed my brother" before firing his handgun approximately 
five times at Sgt. McEntee's head and upper body.  Appellant took Sgt. McEntee's 
silver gun and walked down the street with both guns.  He then saw his mother 
and told her "that m___ f____ let my brother die, he needs to see what it feel[s] 
like to die."  After leaving his mother, Appellant walked around the neighborhood 
and came to Sgt. McEntee, whose patrol car had rolled down the street and hit a 
tree.  Appellant approached Sgt. McEntee and shot him two more times in the 
head.  Appellant drove to his father's house and later went to a family member's 
apartment for several days until he surrendered to police.  The trial court did not 
 
11
err in overruling the judgment of acquittal as a reasonable juror had sufficient 
evidence to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
B. Distinction between First-Degree and Second-Degree Murder 
Appellant argues that the definition of "deliberation" in the first-degree 
murder jury instruction reduces the distinction between first-degree and second-
degree murder and is unconstitutionally vague.  Appellant objected during the 
instruction conference and raised the point in the motion for new trial.  An 
instructional error is reviewed for an error in submitting the instruction and 
prejudice.  State v. Zink, 181 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Mo. banc 2005).  MAI instructions 
are presumed valid.  Id.  
The Court has previously found first-degree murder is distinguished from 
second-degree murder by deliberation.5  Strong, 142 S.W.3d at 717.  Deliberation 
is defined as a "cool reflection for any length of time no matter how brief."  
Section 565.002(3).   
The first-degree murder instruction6 provided was based on MAI-CR3d 
314.02, which included the statutory definition of "deliberation."  The instruction 
                                             
 
5 First-degree murder is defined as "knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon 
the matter," section 565.020.1, and second degree murder is defined as "knowingly causes the death of 
another person," section 565.021.1.   
6 First-degree murder jury instruction:  
If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First, that on or about July 5, 2005, in the County of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant 
caused the death of Sgt. William McEntee by shooting him, and  
Second, that defendant knew or was aware that his conduct was practically certain to cause the 
death of Sgt. William McEntee, and  
Third, that defendant did so after deliberation, which means cool reflection upon the matter for 
any length of time no matter how brief, 
then you will find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. 
 
12
adequately sets out the additional element of deliberation to distinguish first-
degree murder.  There is also no evidence Appellant was prejudiced.     
The statutory definition of "deliberation" is not unconstitutionally vague.   
This Court has rejected the claim that first-degree murder is unconstitutionally 
vague for failing to distinguish first-degree and second-degree murder.  See State 
v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 231 (Mo. banc 2006).   
The trial court did not err in submitting the instruction.     
C. Plain Errors 
Three of Appellant's arguments were not preserved as Appellant did not 
object at trial or raise the points in the motion for new trial.  These points are 
reviewed for plain error.  Johnson I, 207 S.W.3d at 43.  Plain error requires a 
finding of "manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice." Id. at 34.   
1. Conscious Decision Argument 
Appellant argues the trial court erred in allowing the State, during its 
closing argument, to: 
blatantly misle[a]d the jury to believe that if [Appellant] consciously or 
knowingly decided to kill a police officer, he had 'coolly reflected' and 
deliberated.  These arguments eliminated deliberation, cool reflection, from 
the elements the jury had to find to convict [Appellant] of first degree 
murder. 
 
Appellant also argues "a conscious decision to kill someone, without more, is 
second degree murder."  
                                                                                                                                      
 
However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all 
of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder in the first degree.  
MAI-CR3d 314.02. 
 
13
The State in its closing argument first defined deliberation as "cool 
reflection upon the matter for any length of time no matter how brief"7 and went 
on to say "you make a conscious decision to go after somebody and kill them, that 
is cool reflection."  The State proceeded to use the terms "deliberation," "cool 
reflection," and "conscious decision" to illustrate Appellant's actions.    
Plain error review of a closing argument not objected to will be considered 
only if "there is a sound, substantial manifestation, a strong, clear showing, that 
injustice or miscarriage of justice will result if relief is not given."  Johnson I, 207 
S.W.3d at 49.  A conviction is reversed due to an improper closing argument when 
the argument "had a decisive effect on the jury's determination."  Id.  The burden 
is on the criminal defendant to show a decisive effect.  Id.  Rarely is plain error 
relief granted for a closing argument claim, absent an objection, because it may be 
a strategic decision by counsel.  Id.  The trial court is vested with discretion 
regarding closing arguments.  Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 537.  The entire record is 
considered when interpreting a closing argument, not an isolated segment.  Id.     
The term "conscious decision" is neither an element nor description of first-
degree or second-degree murder.  See sections 565.020, 565.021.  Conscious is 
defined as "perceiving, apprehending, or noticing with a degree of controlled 
thought or observation: recognizing as existent, factual, or true."  Webster's Third 
                                             
 
7 The same definition of "deliberation" is in the jury instruction for first-degree murder, MAI-CR3d 314.02, 
and the statute defining deliberation, section 565.002(3). 
 
14
New International Dictionary, 482 (1993).  Decision is defined as "a determination 
arrived at after consideration."  Id. at 585.   
In the context of the State's entire closing argument, the State argued both 
deliberation and conscious decision.  The State initially defined "deliberation" and 
in the process of arguing the deliberation element used the terms "deliberation," 
"cool reflection," and "conscious decision."  Although the term "conscious 
decision" is not used in the instruction, the use of this phrase in closing argument, 
especially after reciting the actual language of the instruction, was not plain error.8  
Furthermore, it is presumed the jury followed the instruction, see Tisius v. State, 
183 S.W.3d 207, 217 (Mo. banc 2006), which properly defined "deliberation." 
2. Acquittal First Argument 
Appellant argues that allowing the State to argue "the jury had to acquit 
[Appellant] of first-degree murder to consider second-degree murder was plain 
error contrary to law."   
The jury instruction for second degree murder provides, "If you do not find 
the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, you must consider whether he is 
guilty of murder in the second degree." MAI-CR3d 314.04 (emphasis added).  In 
closing arguments, the State read the instruction and explained "you're considering 
Murder in the First Degree, which is only if you decide that he didn't commit 
Murder in the First Degree that you even get to Murder in the Second Degree." 
(Emphasis added). 
                                             
 
8 We do not reach whether the term "conscious decision" was error at all. 
 
15
An acquittal first instruction requires the defendant to be acquitted of the 
greater offense before the lesser offense is considered.  An acquittal first 
instruction is: "[i]f you determine that the defendant is not guilty of the crime of 
_____ you may consider the lesser included crime of _____."  State v. Allen, 717 
P.2d 1178, 1180 (Or. 1986) (citing comments to UCrJI No. 1009, Uniform 
Criminal Jury Instruction for Lesser Included Offense Order of Deliberation).  
Thus, if an acquittal is first required, a deadlocked jury could not consider a lesser 
offense.  State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 517 (Mo. banc 1994) (overruled on other 
grounds by Joy v. Morrison, 254 S.W.3d 885 (Mo. banc 2008)).  However, an 
acquittal first argument will be upheld if "the strength of the evidence of 
deliberation precludes a finding of prejudice."  Tisius, 183 S.W.3d at 217.   
The second-degree murder jury instruction in Missouri, MAI-CR3d 314.04, 
is not an acquittal first instruction.  Wise, 879 S.W.2d at 517.  The instruction does 
not require the defendant to be found "not guilty" on the greater offense, first-
degree murder, before the lesser-included offense, second-degree murder, is 
considered.  Id.  Instead, a lesser-included offense may be considered if the jury 
does "not find the defendant guilty of the greater offense."  Id.  Thus, a lesser-
included offense may be considered when the jury is deadlocked on the greater 
offense.  Id. 
The difference between the State's closing argument and MAI-CR3d 314.04 
is minimal.  Regardless, this Court assumes that the jury followed the instruction 
of the court, see State v. Bowman, 741S.W.2d 10, 15 (Mo. banc 1987), which was 
 
16
a proper instruction mirroring MAI-CR3d 314.14.  "Additionally ... the strength of 
the evidence of deliberation precludes a finding of prejudice."  Tisius, 183 S.W.3d 
at 217.9  
3. Unanimity for Elements of First-Degree Murder 
Appellant argues the first-degree murder jury instruction did not require 
unanimity for each element of first-degree murder.   
The first-degree murder instruction provided, "unless you find and believe 
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, 
you must find the defendant not guilty of murder in the first degree."  MAI-CR3d 
314.02.  The jury was also instructed: 
You will then discuss the case with your fellow jurors.  Each of you 
must decide the case for yourself, but you should do so only after you have 
considered all the evidence, discussed it fully with the other jurors, and 
listened to the views of your fellow jurors.   
Your verdict, whether guilty or not guilty, must be agreed to by each 
juror.  Although the verdict must be unanimous, the verdict should be 
signed by your foreperson alone.   
When you have concluded your deliberations, you will complete the 
applicable form to which you unanimously agree and return it with all the 
unused forms and the written instructions of the Court. 
 
MAI-CR3d 302.05 (emphasis added). 
 
The instructions require unanimity as to each element.  See State v. 
Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 752 (Mo. banc 1997) (finding no constitutional error 
when the trial court refused to further explain the jury instructions when the jury 
                                             
 
9 See pages 11-12 for a discussion of evidence applicable to this point.   
 
17
asked if each element had to be unanimously agreed to).  The instruction is not 
erroneous.      
D. Conclusion 
 
For the third point, the trial court did not err.  The point is denied.   
VII. Point Four: Lesser-Included Offense Instructions 
 
 
In the fourth point, Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to give 
jury instructions for second-degree murder without sudden passion and voluntary 
manslaughter.   
 
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction when the evidence, "viewed in 
light most favorable to the defendant," establishes a theory or supports contrary 
results.  State v. Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Mo. banc 2003).  A jury instruction 
for a lesser-included offense is required when the evidence "provides a basis both 
for the acquittal of the greater offense and the conviction of the lesser offense."  
Id. at 205.   
 
The failure to give a different lesser-included offense instruction is neither 
erroneous nor prejudicial when instructions for the greater offense and one lesser-
included offense are given and the defendant is found guilty of the greater offense.  
State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 515 (Mo. banc 2004); Johnston, 957 S.W.2d at 
751-52.   
 
18
 
Appellant requested instructions for second-degree murder without sudden 
passion10 and voluntary manslaughter.11  The trial court refused Appellant's 
request and submitted instructions for first-degree murder12 and second-degree 
murder.13  The failure to give instructions for the different lesser-included offenses 
                                             
 
10 Appellant's proposed jury instruction for second-degree murder without sudden passion: 
If you do not find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, you must consider whether he 
is guilty of murder in the second degree under this instruction. 
If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First, that on or about July 5, 2005, in the County of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant 
caused the death of Sgt. William McEntee by shooting him, and  
Second, that defendant knew or was aware that his conduct was practically certain to cause the 
death of Sgt. William McEntee, and  
Third, that defendant did not do so under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate 
cause, 
then you will find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree. 
However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all 
of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder in the second degree. 
As used in this instruction, the term "sudden passion" means passion directly caused by and 
arising out of provocation by St. William McEntee or another acting with Sgt. William McEntee 
which passion arose at the time of the offense.  The term "adequate cause" means cause that would 
reasonably produce a degree of passion in a person of ordinary temperament sufficient to 
substantially impair an ordinary person's capacity for self-control. 
MAI-CR3d 314.04. 
11 Appellant's proposed jury instruction for voluntary manslaughter:  
If you do not find defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, you must consider whether he 
is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 
 
If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First, that on or about July 5, 2005, in the County of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant 
caused the death of Sgt. William McEntee by shooting him, and  
Second, that defendant knew or was aware that his conduct was practically certain to cause the 
death of Sgt. William McEntee, 
 
then you will find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 
However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all 
of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of voluntary manslaughter.  
MAI-CR3d 314.08. 
12 See footnote 6 for the submitted first-degree murder instruction, MAI-CR3d 314.02. 
13 The submitted jury instruction for second-degree murder: 
If you do not find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, you must consider whether he 
is guilty of murder in the second degree under this instruction. 
 
If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First, that on or about July 5, 2005, in the County of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant 
caused the death of Sgt. William McEntee by shooting him, and  
Second, that defendant knew or was aware that his conduct was practically certain to cause the 
death of Sgt. William McEntee,  
then you will find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree. 
However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all 
of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder in the second degree.  
MAI-CR3d 314.04. 
 
19
was not erroneous or prejudicial as the jury was instructed as to a lesser-included 
offense and found Appellant guilty of the greater offense.  The trial court did not 
err and the point is denied. 
VIII. Point Five: Improper Sentence 
 
 
In the fifth point, Appellant makes the following arguments: A) "the trial 
court erred in sentencing [Appellant] to death violating due process, fundamental 
fairness, and reliable, proportionate sentencing;" B) "[n]umerous trial errors, 
strong mitigating evidence, and a previous jury not finding [Appellant] guilty of 
first degree murder show this is an inappropriate case for death;" and C) 
"Missouri's lack of standards afford prosecutors unguided discretion in seeking 
death sentences resulting in inconsistent application of the death penalty.  To 
safeguard against the arbitrariness of unguided prosecutorial discretion, when the 
state seeks death, it should be required to afford the accused an opportunity to 
avoid a death sentence by pleading guilty to first degree murder or a lesser 
offense."    
A.  Proportionality Review 
This Court is statutorily required to engage in a proportionality review and 
determine:  
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and  
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection 2 of section 
565.032 and any other circumstance found;  
 
20
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the 
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime, the strength 
of the evidence and the defendant.  
 
Section 565.035.3. 
1. Passion, Prejudice and Arbitrary Factors 
 
Appellant does not allege, and a review of the record does not indicate, the 
death sentence was influenced by passion, prejudice, or arbitrary factors.  
2. Aggravating Factors 
 
The evidence supports beyond a reasonable doubt the jury's findings of 
three aggravating factors.  Appellant "knowingly created a great risk of death to 
more than one person by means of a weapon that would normally be hazardous to 
the lives of more than one person" when he shot Sgt. McEntee multiple times and 
a bullet struck a juvenile standing next to the patrol car.  The act involved 
depravity of mind and the murder was "outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, 
and inhuman," as the act involved two distinctly separate shootings within a short 
period of time and Sgt. McEntee was seriously injured and helpless at the time of 
the second shooting.  The act was "committed against a peace officer while 
engaged in the performance of his official duty" as Sgt. McEntee was responding 
to a call and was in his patrol car.   
3. Similar Cases 
The death sentence is neither excessive nor disproportion in this case.  This 
Court has upheld death sentences when a police officer was killed.  See State v. 
Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 765-66 (Mo. banc 2002) (Tisius I); State v. Clayton, 995 
 
21
S.W.2d 468, 484 (Mo. banc 1999); State v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 123, 135 (Mo. 
banc 1998).  This Court has also upheld death sentences where an injured and 
helpless victim is subject to a fatal blow.  See Tisius I, 92 S.W.3d at 765-66; State 
v. Cole, 71 S.W.3d 163, 177 (Mo. banc 2002); Johns, 34 S.W.3d at 118; State v. 
Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 467 (Mo. banc 1999). 
B. Trial Errors, Mitigating Evidence 
Appellant alleges that "[n]umerous trial errors, strong mitigating evidence, 
and a previous jury not finding [Appellant] guilty of first degree murder show this 
is an inappropriate case for death."  This Court found no trial errors when 
reviewing the record; thus, the alleged errors did not make the sentence unreliable.  
See Johnson I, 207 S.W.3d at 50.     
During the punishment phase, Appellant presented mitigating evidence of 
childhood abuse and neglect and good character.  Deference is given to the jury's 
decision when "there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could 
have found that the mitigating evidence did not outweigh the aggravating 
evidence."  State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 157-58 (Mo. banc 2008).  On 
reviewing the evidence, a reasonable juror could properly find the mitigating 
evidence of Appellant's childhood and good character did not outweigh the 
aggravating factors.  This Court has upheld the death penalty despite evidence of 
childhood neglect.  See id. at 157; State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 503 (Mo. banc 
1997).   
 
22
 
Appellant also alleges the strength of the evidence is insufficient to support 
the sentence because his first trial ended when the jury could not reach a verdict.  
A prior mistrial is not dispositive on imposing the death sentence.  See State v. 
Barton, 240 S.W.3d 693 (Mo. banc 2007) (death penalty upheld after two prior 
mistrials and a conviction reversed).   
C. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Appellant argues his death sentence should be set aside due to prosecutorial 
discretion in seeking the death penalty.  This Court has rejected this argument.  
State v. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d 297, 309 (Mo. banc 1998). 
D. Conclusion 
 
Point five is denied. 
IX. Point Six: Strike for Cause 
 
 
In the sixth point, Appellant argues the trial court erred in striking Juror 
Tompkins for cause.  The State struck juror Tompkins for cause due to her 
position on the death penalty.  During voir dire the following exchange occurred: 
MR. MCCULLOCH [State]: Ms. Tompkins, let me ask you the 
questions.  Do you think the death penalty is the appropriate punishment in 
some cases? 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: I really could not see any case 
where it would be appropriate.  I do feel I am somewhat impartial.  I can be 
convinced otherwise, but I really do not see any case where the death 
penalty is appropriate.   
MR. MCCULLOCH: And other than what you may have read or 
heard about this case and setting that aside, you haven't heard any of the 
facts, you haven't heard any evidence in this case, correct? 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Right, I mean, I don't even think 
with Jeffrey Dahmer, you know, things like that.  You know, I'm -- 
 
23
MR. MCCULLOCH: From what you know through the media about 
the facts in that case -- let me ask you the question directly.  I'm not going 
to ask you what they are, but can you imagine a set of circumstances where 
you would think death is the appropriate punishment? 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: I've been sitting here as you asked and I'm 
trying to think, and I mean, maybe genocide or something like that. 
 
 
MR. MCCULLOCH: Involving mass murder? 
 
 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Yeah. 
MR. MCCULLOCH: Okay.  Let me ask you, in this case you have 
heard a couple of times already, if the jury finds Kevin Johnson guilty of 
Murder in the First Degree, we go into that second phase, the jury makes 
the decision that at least one aggravating circumstance exists beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and then the jury weighs the mitigating evidence against 
the aggravating evidence.  If you as a juror on a jury decide that the 
evidence in aggravation outweighs the evidence in mitigation, would you 
automatically at that point -- the only decision left is which punishment is 
appropriate, which one do we impose.  Would you exclude the death 
penalty as a possible punishment? 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Unless something, you know, 
tremendously -- you know, something within the evidence that is given can 
convince me otherwise, I really don't think that -- I think there would be 
only one option unless something real extraordinary happened that I saw.  
MR. MCCULLOCH: As you have been sitting here for the last half 
hour or so, you haven't been able to think of something that would be that 
extraordinary, have you? 
 
 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: No. 
MR. MCCULLOCH: Okay.  And believe me, I don't want to put 
words in your mouth, but it sounds like other than in the case of mass 
murder -- genocide.  Not even mass murder.  Genocide, you don't think 
death would be a possibility for you? 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: I mean, not that I can think of 
unless something is presented that I never thought about, you know, 
somewhat possible. 
. . . . 
MS. KRAFT [Defense]: Okay.  Thank you.  Ms. Tompkins, with 
regard to the issue on the death penalty versus life without parole, is it 
possible that you could hear some evidence as you sat in this courtroom 
that would convince you that the death penalty was the appropriate 
punishment? 
 
 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Anything is possible. 
MS. KRAFT: Okay.  So you haven't ruled out the possibility in your 
own mind that that could happen? 
 
24
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: No.  I mean, even when she spoke 
of, you know, someone being psychopathic, I thought I would -- in that 
situation, if I was would told to consider it, I might be open.  Most of me 
says it's not a possibility, but I'm open. 
MS. KRAFT: Okay.  So you're not entirely closed off to the idea that 
you could hear something that would make you think that death would be 
an appropriate punishment? 
 
 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Right. 
 
 
MS. KRAFT: Even in this case? 
 
 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Uh-huh. 
 
 
MS. KRAFT: Is that yes? 
 
 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: Yeah. 
MS. KRAFT: Okay.  And you wouldn't automatically reject any 
kind of mitigating evidence that you might hear, evidence presented on 
Kevin's behalf, his background, upbringing, that kind of thing? 
 
 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: I wouldn't reject any evidence. 
 
MS. KRAFT: Okay.  You wouldn't reject any that the State 
presented either? 
 
 
VENIREPERSON TOMPKINS: No. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
The following exchange occurred when the State struck Tompkins: 
MR. MCCULLOCH [State]: I move to strike for cause Juror No. 32, 
Ms. Tompkins.  Ms. Tompkins made it initially very clear she didn't think 
death was ever appropriate.  She modified it somewhat to genocide cases, 
perhaps to something a little more nebulous, a psychopath would be better 
off executed.  It's real clear she will reject that automatically as a -- death 
automatically as a possible punishment in the case. 
 
 
THE COURT: Response? 
MS. KRAFT [Defense]: Yes, because Ms. Tompkins did say it was 
possible that something could be presented in this courtroom that would 
convince her that death would be an appropriate punishment in this case. 
 
 
THE COURT:  Any objection? 
MR. MCCULLOCH: I think like the previous panel, Judge, a 
credibility issue there.  Yes, this is a different situation, but she said, yeah, I 
got an opinion, but I can.  I think credibility is the appropriate word, but 
certainly she talked about maybe genocide, a psychopath is better off 
executed.  It think it's very clear that she is not going to consider death as a 
possible punishment in this case, noting for the record there will be no 
evidence of genocide. 
THE COURT: Based upon the answer that she gave and the Court's 
view of her body language and assessing her credibility, she could not 
 
25
consider the death penalty.  The motion to strike for cause will be 
sustained.   
(Emphasis added). 
Appellant raised this issue in the motion for new trial. 
 
A strike for cause is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Tisius I, 92 S.W.3d 
at 763.  The standard to remove a juror for cause because of his or her position on 
the death penalty is "whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions 
and his oath.'" Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)).   
 
While a juror's qualification is determined from the entire voir dire and not 
from a single response, the trial court may give more weight to a single response 
when presented with "conflicting testimony regarding a prospective juror's ability 
to consider the death penalty."  Id.  In determining a juror's qualifications, the trial 
court is granted broad discretion given its position to observe the juror.  State v. 
Ringo, 30 S.W.3d 811, 816 (Mo. banc 2000).   
 
This case is similar to Tisius I, where this Court found no abuse of 
discretion in striking a juror for cause when the juror unequivocally opposed the 
death penalty and later supported it only for terrible crimes.  92 S.W.3d at 762-63. 
The trial court acted within its discretion.  The point is denied. 
X.  Point Seven: Miranda Rights 
In the seventh point, Appellant argues the trial court plainly erred in 
admitting Appellant's interview with the police into evidence because he did not 
waive his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
26
A.  
Appellant surrendered three days after Sgt. McEntee was killed.  Appellant 
was given his Miranda rights when taken into custody and again before he was 
interviewed.  Appellant gave a response to the Miranda rights before the interview 
was taped, but it was inaudible and a written waiver was not signed.  The 
transcript of the interview shows the conversation, in context, as:  
DETECTIVE [N]ESKE14:  Okay.  We're going to talk about some 
things, all right?  Before you make any answers, say anything, I want you 
to listen to what I have to say, all right?  I'm going to read you your rights, 
okay?  Just advise you of all that stuff.  I'm going to talk to you for a minute 
before you make any decisions, okay?  Can you do that for me? 
 
 
KEVIN JOHNSON: Yeah. 
DETECTIVE [N]ESKE:  All right. I want you to speak loud and 
clear, okay?  I have trouble hearing sometimes, all right? 
 
 
KEVIN JOHNSON: Yeah. 
DETECTIVE [N]ESKE: You know you have the right to remain 
silent.  You know anything you say can be used against you in a court of 
law. You're entitled to talk to an attorney, have an attorney present.  If you 
can not afford an attorney, one will be appointed to you.  Do you 
understand all of that? 
 
 
KEVIN JOHNSON: (inaudible). 
 
 
DETECTIVE [N]ESKE: Okay.  We all know why we're here? 
 
 
KEVIN JOHNSON: Yeah.   
 
(Emphasis added). 
 
At trial, Det. Neske testified that he read Appellant his Miranda rights and 
that Appellant wanted to speak with police.  Det. Neske's testimony was: 
Q [State]: And we heard testimony earlier that when he was taken 
into custody he had been advised of his rights.  Was he advised of his rights 
again? 
A [Det. Neske]: Yes, I was told by Detective Bradley that his rights 
were read upon him being placed in his custody.  And when Detective – or 
                                             
 
14 The transcript of the interview mistakenly names Det. Neske as Det. Meske.     
 
27
Officer Bales and I entered the interview room, I orally advised him of his 
rights. 
Q Did he understand those rights, indicated that he understood 
them? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Including the right to remain silent? 
A Yes. 
Q Did he agree to waive the rights and speak with you? 
A Yes, he wanted to talk to me. 
Q Without a lawyer, or did he ask for an attorney or anything along 
those lines? 
A Never asked for an attorney. 
Q Wanted to talk to you about this occurrence? 
A Yes. 
(Emphasis added). 
 
After Appellant was advised of his rights, the interview commenced and 
lasted for more than five hours.  At three points in the interview, Appellant stated 
"I don't want to talk to you now. You want --," "I don't want to answer no more 
questions," and "I don't want to answer your questions."  After making these 
statements, Appellant continued to engage in the conversation, either answering 
the questions directly or stating he did not know.  He never asked for an attorney. 
Appellant did not file a motion to suppress his statements, as shown by the 
record: 
MR. MONAHAN [State]: There are no motions to suppress on file.  
I was anticipating they might file some I had discussions with Ms. Kraft 
that apparently there will be none that will be filed.  That's a matter of trial 
strategy for her.  I just wanted to get that out in the open that that's what's 
going on. 
 
 
THE COURT: Do you anticipate filing any motions to suppress? 
MS. KRAFT [Defense]: Not unless something comes up somehow in 
these jail phone calls that we have received. 
THE COURT: That's either evidence seized or statements or 
identification? 
 
 
MS. KRAFT: That's correct. 
 
28
 
 
THE COURT: Okay.  Thank you. 
 
(Emphasis added). 
Appellant also did not object when the recording of the statement was offered into 
evidence, as shown by the transcript: 
Q [Mr. McCulloch, State] Let me show you what we've marked as 
State's Exhibit 70.  Do you recognize this? 
A [Det. Neske] Yes, that's the DVD that I download from the 
interview. 
. . . . 
MR. MCCULLOCH [State]: Judge, at this time, I would offer State's 
Exhibit 70 into evidence. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MS. KRAFT [Defense]: No. 
THE COURT: Exhibit 70 will be admitted. 
 
B.  
1. Miranda Rights 
Miranda rights inform a criminal defendant of his constitutional rights 
during the interrogation process.  State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 173 (Mo. 
banc 1997).  The state must prove a challenged statement complied with the 
guidelines established in Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, and was voluntary.  State v. 
Groves, 646 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo. banc 1983).  A defendant may waive his 
Miranda rights by "orally indicating his willingness to cooperate with the police 
questioning" despite refusing to sign a written waiver.  Id. at 85.  In Groves, this 
Court found, on plain error review, the defendant was fully aware of his Miranda 
rights without a written waiver when a police officer testified the defendant did 
not object to the interview and freely talked with police.  Id. at 83-85.  From the 
record, it is evident that Appellant indicated his willingness to talk with police by 
 
29
orally agreeing to talk and engaging in a five-hour interview, despite not signing a 
waiver.   
Miranda rights may be invoked at any time by giving "a clear, consistent 
expression of a desire to remain silent."  Simmons, 944 S.W.2d at 173-74.  
Appellant did not invoke his Miranda rights at any point.  Appellant's statements 
did not convey a clear desire to remain silent and he continued to talk after making 
each statement.  Appellant's constitutional rights were not violated.   
2. Waiver of Appellate Review  
 
Additionally, Appellant's strategic decision not to object to the admission of 
the statement constituted a waiver.  An objection to the admission of evidence 
must be made to preserve the issue for appeal.  Johnson v. State, 189 S.W.3d 640, 
646 (Mo. App. 2006).  Plain error review would apply when no objection is made 
due to "inadvertence or negligence."  State v. Mead, 105 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Mo. 
App. 2003).  Plain error review is waived when "counsel has affirmatively acted in 
a manner precluding a finding that the failure to object was a product of 
inadvertence or negligence."  Id.  Plain error review does not apply when "a party 
affirmatively states that it has no objection to evidence an opposing party is 
attempting to introduce" or for a trial strategy reason.  Id. at 556.  Appellant 
affirmatively stated "no objection" to the admission of the interview, thereby 
waiving plain error review of his constitutional rights. 
 
 
 
30
3. Substantial Right 
 
Appellant's argument that his constitutional right to remain silent was 
violated and that the interview is inadmissible was not objected to or preserved.  
This Court has discretion to review a point regarding a substantial right not 
preserved.  Rule 30.20.  This Court finds no plain error as Appellant failed to show 
a manifest injustice resulted from the actual interview or admission of the 
interview into evidence. 
C.  
 
The trial court did not plainly err.  The point seven is denied. 
XI. Point Eight: Aggravating Circumstances 
 
In the eighth point, Appellant argues the trial court erred in: A) overruling 
Appellant's objection to admitting and reading a victim impact statement from Sgt. 
McEntee's son as it was hearsay and invited the sentence to be based on passion 
and emotion; and B) submitting the aggravating circumstances jury instruction, 
MAI-CR3d 314.40, and refusing to submit Appellant's modified aggravating 
circumstances instruction as the jury was not instructed how to consider non-
statutory aggravating factors. 
A. Victim Impact Statement 
 
Appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling Appellant's objection to 
admitting and reading a victim impact statement from Sgt. McEntee's son as it was 
hearsay and invited the sentence to be based on passion and emotion.  Appellant 
 
31
also raised constitutional arguments related to aggravators and the Confrontation 
Clause. 
Sgt. McEntee's wife read a letter their then nine-year-old son wrote to his 
father.  The son was twelve years old at the time of the trial and did not testify in 
the guilt or penalty phases.  Appellant objected to the letter's admission as hearsay, 
and the State defended the exhibit as a victim impact statement from a twelve-
year-old.  The trial court judge overruled the objection and admitted the letter.  On 
cross examination, Appellant did not ask Mrs. McEntee any questions about the 
letter.  
The son's letter is as follows:  
  
Day one.  The next day.  I was all shook up about what happened.  I 
did not go outside until five o'clock.   
Day two. Coming out.  I was still sad but I came out and went to my 
friend's house, Michael.  I had a good time, but I miss him.   
Day three.  Lay out.  It was hard to get past.  I was about to burst, 
but I didn't. I sat in a room for seven hours wondering why I still didn't 
know, nobody does know except the guy who did it.   
Day four.  Funeral.  It was sad day for me and everyone else.  Then 
it was the end.  Everyone said their goodbyes, and they left.  Then I 
wondered why.   
Those are the four most saddest days of my life.  I am still sad today, 
and I wonder why.  It has been three to four months from then, and we are 
doing better.   
I am sad because he was the best coach ever and no one who could 
take my dad's spot, nobody.  He was also my baseball coach, and I am sad 
about him not being there when I need him and I am lonely, when I kick a 
soccer ball.  He was the greatest dad ever.  He was ready for soccer season, 
and someone took his life away.  I was so mad.  I was in shock that night.  I 
thought he would be okay, but I was wrong.  He had passed away.   
Dad, if you hear me right now, I love you. 
 
 
32
 
The trial court has discretion to admit evidence deemed helpful to the jury 
in the penalty phase.  State v. Clark, 197 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Mo. banc 2006).  A 
victim impact statement is admissible to show the victim was a unique individual.  
Forrest, 183 S.W.3d at 225.  Evidence of the specific harm a defendant caused 
may be presented in the sentencing phase for the jury to "assess meaningfully the 
defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness."  State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 
342, 359 (Mo. banc 1997).  A victim impact statement violates the federal and 
state constitutions only when it "is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial 
fundamentally unfair."  Forrest, 183 S.W.3d at 225.  
 
"A hearsay statement is any out-of-court statement that is used to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted and depends on the veracity of the statement for its 
value."  State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135, 146 (Mo. banc 2007).  The victim impact 
statement offered during the sentencing phase was offered to show the effect of 
the crime on the victim's son and his feelings, not for the truth of any factual 
matter asserted therein. 
In Basile, this Court found the trial court properly overruled a motion to 
exclude a family member's victim impact statement read by another family 
member.  942 S.W.2d at 358-59.  The letter described the victim and the effect the 
crime had on the family.  Id. at 358.  This Court found the letter admissible 
because it "was directed at [the] defendant's moral culpability in causing harm to 
the victim and her family."  Id. at 359.  Sgt. McEntee's son's letter is similar to the 
 
33
letter in Basile as the son described how he felt and the impact his father's death 
had on his life.   
 
A victim impact statement is not offered to prove an element of the charged 
offense or a statutory aggravating circumstance.  As this Court said in Basile:   
Under our statutes, there is no requirement that the victim impact statement 
evidence be related to the specific aggravators submitted by the State.  It is 
sufficient that it is relevant to inform the jury as to the effect of the crime 
for which the defendant is being sentenced even if no instruction is given 
regarding the evidence.   
 
942 S.W.2d at 359. Here, the son's letter was not used to support any of the three 
statutory aggravating circumstances and was only used to show the effect of the 
crime on the son.  The letter was properly used as a victim impact statement 
because it addressed the effect of the crime.   
A victim impact statement is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.  "The 
Confrontation Clause does not operate to bar the admission of testimony relevant 
only to a capital sentencing authority's selection decisions." United States v. 
Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 326 (5th Cir. 2007).  In Fields, the challenged hearsay 
statements related to non-statutory aggravating factors and were not barred by the 
Confrontation Clause because the factors were not used to determine if the 
defendant was eligible for the death penalty.  Id. at 325.  See also United States v. 
Wallace, 408 F.3d 1046, 1048 (8th Cir. 2005). 
B.  Aggravating Circumstances Jury Instructions 
 
Appellant argues the trial court erred in submitting the aggravating 
circumstances jury instruction, MAI-CR3d 314.40, and refusing to submit 
 
34
Appellant's modified aggravating circumstances instruction, because the jury was 
not instructed how to consider the non-statutory aggravating factors. 
 
The State submitted the MAI jury instruction for aggravating 
circumstances,15 which the trial court accepted.  Appellant submitted a modified 
aggravating circumstances instruction,16 which instructed the jury to consider the 
non-statutory aggravating circumstances only if they are found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  During the instruction conference, Appellant objected to the 
State's proposed instruction because it does not address the burden of proof for 
                                             
 
15 The submitted jury instruction for statutory aggravating circumstances: 
In determining the punishment to be assessed against the defendant for the murder of Sgt. William 
McEntee, you must first consider whether one or more of the following statutory aggravating 
circumstances exists: 
1. Whether the defendant by his act of murdering Sgt. William McEntee knowingly created a great 
risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon that would normally be hazardous to 
the lives of more than one person. 
2. Whether the murder of Sgt. William McEntee involved depravity of mind and whether, as a 
result thereof, the murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman.  You can 
make a determination of depravity of mind only if you find that the defendant committed repeated 
and excessive acts of physical abuse upon Sgt. William McEntee and the killing was therefore 
unreasonably brutal. 
3. Whether the murder of Sgt. William McEntee was committed against a peace officer while 
engaged in the performance of his official duty. 
You are further instructed that the burden rests upon the state to prove at least one of the foregoing 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.  On each circumstance that you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt, all twelve of you must agree as to the existence of that circumstance. 
Therefore, if you do not unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that at 
least one of the foregoing statutory aggravating circumstances exist, you must return a verdict 
fixing the punishment of the defendant at imprisonment for life by the Department of Corrections 
without eligibility for probation or parole.   
MAI-CR3d 314.40. 
16 Appellant's proposed modified jury instruction for non-statutory aggravating circumstances, based on 
MAI-CR3d 314.40: 
If you have, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, found that one or more of the statutory 
aggravating circumstances submitted in Instruction No. __ exists, you must next consider whether 
any other aggravating evidence exists.  In deciding whether any other aggravating evidence exists, 
you may consider all of the evidence presented in both the guilt and the punishment stages of trial. 
You are further instructed that the burden rests upon the state to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, evidence of non-statutory aggravating circumstances.  On each circumstance that you find 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all twelve of you must agree as to the existence of that circumstance.  
You must list at the bottom of this instruction each non-statutory aggravating circumstance, if any, 
that you have unanimously found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.   
(Modifications in italics).  
 
35
non-statutory circumstances.  The trial court refused to submit the modified 
instruction.  Appellant relies on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. banc 
2003); and State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. banc 1992).  
 
Under section 565.030.4, the jury is required to find a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Gill, 167 S.W.3d 184, 193 (Mo. 
banc 2005); section 565.030.4(2).  The reasonable doubt standard does not apply 
to mitigating evidence, Gill, 167 S.W.3d at 193, or non-statutory aggravating 
factors, including victim impact statements, see Forrest, 183 S.W.3d at 226. 
Appellant's reliance on Ring, Apprendi, and Whitfield is misplaced.  This Court 
has stated that under Ring and Apprendi only evidence functionally equivalent to 
an element, including statutory aggravating circumstances, must be found beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Clark, 197 S.W.3d at 601.  The trial court was not obligated 
to instruct the jury to find non-statutory aggravators, including a victim impact 
statement, beyond a reasonable doubt.   
C. Conclusion 
 
The trial court did not err.  Point eight is denied.   
XII. Point Nine: Depravity of Mind 
 
In the ninth point, Appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling the 
objection to the statutory aggravating circumstances instruction because the 
depravity of mind factor is unconstitutionally vague. 
 
36
 
The statutory aggravating circumstances instruction included the "depravity 
of mind" factor.  The relevant portion of the instruction, based on MAI-CR3d 
314.40: 
In determining the punishment to be assessed against the defendant 
for the murder of Sgt. William McEntee, you must first consider whether 
one or more of the following statutory aggravating circumstances exists: 
. . . . 
2. Whether the murder of Sgt. William McEntee involved depravity 
of mind and whether, as a result thereof, the murder was outrageously and 
wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman.  You can make a determination of 
depravity of mind only if you find that the defendant committed repeated 
and excessive acts of physical abuse upon Sgt. William McEntee and the 
killing was therefore unreasonably brutal.   
(Emphasis added). 
 
Appellant's objection to the factor as unconstitutionally vague was overruled.  
 
During deliberations, the jury asked for the definition of "depravity of 
mind" to which the trial court directed the jury to the instructions provided.  The 
jury then requested a dictionary, which was denied.  The jury found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the murder of Sgt. McEntee involved depravity of mind.17  
Appellant renewed his objection to the instruction as unconstitutionally vague in 
the motion for new trial.   
This Court has previously found the instruction is not unconstitutionally 
vague as sufficient guidance is provided.  Johnson I, 207 S.W.3d at 46.  The 
"depravity of mind" factor requires evidence to support at least one factor 
established in State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Mo. banc 1984).  State v. 
                                             
 
17 The jury also found beyond a reasonable doubt the two other aggravating circumstances, great risk of 
death by a hazardous weapon and the act was committed against a peace officer. 
 
37
Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475,490 (Mo. banc 1988); see also MAI-CR-3d 314.40, Notes 
on Use 8(D).  The Preston factors are: 
mental state of defendant, infliction of physical or psychological torture 
upon the victim as when victim has a substantial period of time before 
death to anticipate and reflect upon it; brutality of defendant's conduct; 
mutilation of the body after death; absence of any substantive motive; 
absence of defendant's remorse and the nature of the crime.   
 
673 S.W.2d at 11.  The notes to MAI-CR3d 314.40 provide ten phrases that may 
be used, depending upon the facts of a case, to comply with the Preston factors.18  
MAI-CR-3d 314.40, Notes on Use 8(B), (D).  In this case, the instruction used the 
phrase "that the defendant committed repeated and excessive acts of physical 
abuse upon Sgt. William McEntee and the killing was therefore unreasonably 
                                             
 
18 The ten phrases that may be used to find depravity of mind are: 
[1] That the defendant inflicted physical pain or emotional suffering on [name of victim] and that 
defendant did so for the purpose of making [name of victim] suffer before dying. 
[2] That the defendant committed repeated and excessive acts of physical abuse upon [name of 
victim] and the killing was therefore unreasonably brutal. 
[3] That the defendant killed [name of victim] after he was bound or otherwise rendered helpless 
by (defendant) (or) ([name or describe person acting with defendant]) and that defendant thereby 
exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity of all human life. 
[4] That the defendant killed [name of victim] knowing that [name of victim] was physically 
disabled and helpless and that defendant thereby exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity of 
all human life. 
[5] That the defendant, while killing [name of victim] or immediately thereafter, purposely 
mutilated or grossly disfigured the body of [name of victim] by (an act) (acts) beyond that 
necessary to cause his death. 
[6] That the defendant, while killing [name of victim] or immediately thereafter, (had sexual 
intercourse with her) (sexually violated her (by inserting a [Describe object.] into the (anus) 
(vagina) of [name of victim]) (by inserting his penis into the (mouth) (anus) of [name of victim])). 
[7] That the defendant killed [name of victim] as a part of defendant's plan to kill more than one 
person and thereby exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity of all human life. 
[8] That the defendant's selection of the person he killed was random and without regard to the 
victim's identity and that defendant's killing of [name of victim] thereby exhibited a callous 
disregard for the sanctity of all human life. 
[9] That the defendant killed [name of victim] for the purpose of causing suffering to another 
person and thereby exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity of all human life. 
[10] That the defendant killed [name of victim] for the sole purpose of deriving pleasure from the 
act of killing and thereby exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity of all human life.   
MAI-CR3d 314.40, Notes on Use 8(B) (brackets and parentheses in original). 
 
38
brutal," which the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt.  The instruction was not 
vague as the specific language defines "depravity of mind."   
There was no error in submitting the instruction, and Appellant was not 
prejudiced.  The point is denied. 
XIII. Point Ten: Mitigating Circumstance Instruction 
In the tenth point, Appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling 
Appellant's objection to the mitigating circumstances instruction and refusing 
Appellant's modified instruction.  Appellant argues the state, not the defendant, 
has the burden to prove the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors.    
 
In the penalty phase instruction conference, the mitigating circumstances 
instruction19 was offered over Appellant's modified instruction20 and objections.  
                                             
 
19 The submitted jury instruction for evidence in aggravation and mitigation: 
If you have unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the statutory 
aggravating circumstances submitted in Instruction No. 12 [statutory aggravating instruction] 
exists, you must then determine whether there are facts or circumstances in mitigation of 
punishment which are sufficient to outweigh facts and circumstances in aggravation of 
punishment. 
In deciding this question, you may consider all of the evidence presented in both the guilt and the 
punishment stages of trial, including evidence presented in support of the statutory aggravating 
circumstances submitted in Instruction No. 12, and evidence presented in support of mitigating 
circumstances submitted in this instruction. 
As circumstances that may be in mitigation of punishment, you shall consider: 
1. Whether the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
2. Whether the murder of Sgt. William McEntee was committed while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
3. The age of the defendant at the time of the offense. 
You shall also consider any other facts or circumstances which you find from the evidence in 
mitigation of punishment. 
It is not necessary that all jurors agree upon particular facts and circumstances in mitigation of 
punishment.  If each juror determines that there are facts or circumstances in mitigation of 
punishment sufficient to outweigh the facts or circumstances in aggravation of punishment, then 
you must return a verdict fixing defendant's punishment at imprisonment for life by the 
Department of Corrections without eligibility for probation or parole.     
MAI-CR3d 314.44. 
20 Appellant's proposed modified jury instruction for evidence in aggravation and mitigation, based on 
MAI-CR3d 314.44: 
 
39
The three objections Appellant raised were: (1) the instruction did not contain a 
burden of proof that the aggravating factors must outweigh the mitigating factors; 
(2) the burden of proof is shifted to the Appellant to prove the mitigating factors 
outweigh the aggravating factors; and (3) the jury was not informed that when the 
aggravating and mitigating factors are given equal weight, life without parole is 
the proper verdict.  The trial court accepted the instruction as submitted by the 
State.21  Appellant preserved this point in the motion for new trial.   
                                                                                                                                      
 
As to Count I, if you have unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances submitted in Instruction No. __ exists, you must then 
determine whether there are facts or circumstances in mitigation of punishment and, if so, whether 
the aggravating circumstances that you, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt have found 
to exist, outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 
The state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
circumstances that you have unanimously found outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 
In deciding whether there are facts and circumstances in mitigation of punishment, you may 
consider all of the evidence presented in both the guilt and the punishment stages of trial. 
However, the only aggravating evidence that you may consider in determining whether the 
aggravating evidence outweighs the mitigating evidence is that aggravating evidence that you 
have unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt found to exist. 
As circumstances that may be in mitigation of punishment, you shall consider: 
1. Whether the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
2. Whether the murder of William McEntee was committed while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
3. The age of the defendant at the time of the offense 
You shall also consider all other facts or circumstances which you find from the evidence in 
mitigation of punishment.  It is not necessary that all jurors agree upon particular facts and 
circumstances in mitigation of punishment.  In weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence, 
each juror must decide, individually, what mitigating evidence exists.  However, the only 
aggravating evidence that may be weighed against the mitigating evidence is the aggravating 
evidence that all jurors unanimously find to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. 
If all the jurors do not agree that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
evidence in aggravation of punishment outweighs the evidence in mitigation of punishment, then 
you must return a verdict fixing defendant's punishment at imprisonment for life by the 
Department of Corrections without eligibility for probation or parole.   
(Modifications are in italics).  
21 The approved instruction was typed by the State but would have been submitted by Appellant.  After 
Appellant objected to the instruction and offered a modified version, Appellant said it "would be more 
appropriate for the State to submit it since I made some objections to it."  The State responded, "I don't 
think I should be in the business of submitting mitigating evidence, but --" when the trial court judge 
marked the State as submitting the instruction.    
 
40
Appellant's argument that the instruction improperly shifts the burden of 
proof has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court and this Court.  The 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
So long as a State's method of allocating the burdens of proof does not 
lessen the State's burden to prove every element of the offense charged, or 
in this case to prove the existence of aggravating circumstances, a 
defendant's constitutional rights are not violated by placing on him the 
burden of proving mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call 
for leniency. 
 
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 170-71 (2006) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 
U.S. 639, 650 (1990) (overruled on other grounds by Ring, 536 U.S. 584)). 
This Court has also rejected the argument in State v. Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 
21, 30 (Mo. banc 2004).   
The trial court did not err.  The point is denied.   
XIV. Point Eleven: Indictment  
 
In the eleventh point, Appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling the 
motion to quash the information or preclude the death penalty because the State 
did not plead the statutory aggravators in the indictment. 
 
Appellant was indicted for first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, first-
degree assault, and three counts of armed criminal action.  The State later filed 
notice of aggravation pursuant to section 565.005.1(1).  Appellant raised this 
argument in a pre-trial motion and in the motion for new trial. 
 
Appellant relies on Ring, 536 U.S. 584, and Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, for the 
proposition that statutory aggravators must be included in the charging document 
 
41
because it is the "functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense."  This 
Court has repeatedly rejected the argument because "Missouri's statutory scheme 
recognizes a single offense of murder with a maximum sentence of death, and the 
required presence of aggravating facts or circumstances to result in this sentence in 
no way increases this maximum penalty."  Johnson I, 207 S.W.3d at 48.  See also, 
e.g., Gill, 167 S.W.3d at 193-94; Glass, 136 S.W.3d at 513, State v. Gilbert, 103 
S.W.3d 743, 747 (Mo. banc 2003).  Notice of statutory aggravators, as required by 
section 565.005.1, "stands in lieu of charging them in the information or 
indictment."  Johnson I, 207 S.W.3d at 48. 
 
The State was not required to include the statutory aggravators in the 
indictment and filed the necessary notice.  The trial court did not err.  The point is 
denied.   
XV. Conclusion 
 
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.   
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., JUDGE 
Stith, C.J., Russell, Wolff, Breckenridge and Fischer, JJ., concur; Teitelman, J., 
concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed.    
 
 
 
42
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,     
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
KEVIN JOHNSON,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
)  
 
Opinion Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part 
 
I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion to the extent that it finds no 
Batson1 violation with respect to the state’s peremptory strike of Ms. Cottman.   
In response to appellant’s Batson challenge, the state offered two 
justifications for striking Ms. Cottman: her past association with the Annie Malone 
Children’s Home and her alleged unwillingness to answer questions regarding 
whether she could impose the death penalty.  A review of the record demonstrates 
that neither justification is race-neutral.   
As a child, appellant was under the legal custody of the Division of Family 
Services.  The division placed appellant in several children’s homes, including 
Father Dunne’s, St. Joseph’s Home for Children and the Annie Malone Children’s 
Home.   The state justified its strike of Ms. Cottman, in part, because she had 
                                                 
1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
served as a foster parent for children placed with the Annie Malone Children’s 
Home.  The state’s justification has a factual, race-neutral relationship to this case 
because both Ms. Cottman and appellant share an association with the Annie 
Malone Children’s Home.  There are, however, two critical flaws in the state’s 
justification. 
  First, the logical relevance of appellant’s and Ms. Cottman’s association 
with Annie Malone Children’s Home applies with equal force to any other juror 
who was associated with an agency or organization that provided services to 
appellant.  There were at least four white jurors who had substantial contacts with 
the division, which had legal custody of appellant for most of his childhood.  None 
of these jurors was stricken.  The failure to strike similarly situated white jurors 
severely undermines the race-neutrality of the state’s strike.  Miller-El v. Dretke, 
545 U.S. 231, 247 (2005). 
A second and related flaw is that the state did not ask any other jurors, 
including some who had experience with the division and the foster care system, if 
they were familiar with the Annie Malone organization or any of the several other 
private organizations that had offered services to appellant during his childhood.   
If the state’s concerns regarding Ms. Cottman’s service were truly race-neutral, 
then it follows that the prosecutor would have asked the remaining jurors if they, 
like Ms. Cottman, had any past association with any of these organizations.  The 
state’s failure to ask this simple question of similarly situated white jurors 
indicates the state’s concern regarding Ms. Cottman’s association with Annie 
 
2
Malone Children’s Home was not race-neutral and was, instead, an impermissible 
pretextual “makeweight” justification for striking Ms. Cottman.  See Miller-El, 
545 U.S. at 246.  
The state also justified its strike of Ms. Cottman by arguing that she 
exhibited an “unwillingness” to answer questions during the death-qualification 
voir dire.  The state asked nearly all the prospective jurors if they could consider 
imposing the death penalty.  Ms. Cottman, like most other jurors, responded with 
short and direct answers to the question posed.   The state did not raise an issue as 
to her demeanor regarding any unwillingness by Ms. Cottman to answer questions 
during voir dire.  Instead, the state first raised this issue in response to appellant’s 
Batson challenge.  If Ms. Cottman exhibited by her demeanor an unwillingness to 
answer the state’s questions, this demeanor is not reflected in the record.  A “strike 
based on vague references to attributes like demeanor are largely irrelevant to 
one’s ability to serve as a juror and expose venirepersons to peremptory strikes for 
no real reason except their race.”  State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648, 655 (Mo. 
banc 2006); quoting State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 550 (Mo. banc 
2003)(Teitelman, J., concurring).  The state’s vague allegation of an unfavorable 
demeanor is not apparent in the record and should not be considered a sufficient 
rebuttal to appellant’s initial Batson objection.   Id.  
In light of the totality of the foregoing facts and circumstances, I am left 
with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in overruling 
appellant’s Batson challenge to the state’s peremptory strike of Ms. Cottman.  
 
3
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion to the extent that it 
finds no Batson violation with respect to the state’s peremptory strike of Ms. 
Cottman.  The Batson violation requires the judgment to be reversed and the case 
to be remanded.  I concur in all other parts of the principal opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge 
 
 
 
4