Case Title: State v. Lipscombe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2023 ME 70

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2023-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2023 ME 70 
Docket: 
Ken-23-21 
Argued: 
September 13, 2023 
Decided: 
 November 9, 2023 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
JARAE LIPSCOMBE 
 
 
HORTON, J. 
 
[¶1]  Jarae Lipscombe appeals from a judgment of conviction of hindering 
apprehension or prosecution (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 753(1-B)(B)(1) (2023), 
entered by the trial court (Kennebec County, Stokes, J.) after a jury trial.  He 
argues that (A) the court committed obvious error in allowing prosecutorial 
argument about the lack of evidence of certain witnesses’ motives to lie and in 
instructing jurors that they could consider whether there was evidence that a 
witness had a motive to lie, and (B) the court abused its discretion in denying 
Lipscombe’s motion to voir dire the jurors after learning that one witness said, 
“[G]ood luck,” to the jurors while leaving the courtroom.  We affirm the 
judgment. 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  On October 5, 2021, the State of Maine charged Lipscombe by 
complaint with hindering apprehension or prosecution (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 753(1-B)(B)(1), based on allegations that he used deception to prevent or 
delay the discovery or apprehension of his brother in connection with the 
killing of a man in Waterville.  A grand jury indicted him on that charge on 
February 24, 2022. 
 
[¶3]  After Lipscombe pleaded not guilty, the court held a jury trial on 
October 31 and November 1 and 2, 2022.  The State offered evidence that on 
June 6, 2020, Lipscombe had given the police a false description of a person 
running out of an apartment where a man had been shot and killed.  There was 
also testimony that when Lipscombe gave the description, he knew that the 
police investigating the crime were seeking that person.  Two witnesses 
authenticated, and the State played, video footage from security cameras in the 
vicinity of the crime shortly after it occurred showing a man who looked like 
Lipscombe’s brother and did not fit the description Lipscombe had given.  An 
officer testified that he had encountered a man who was in the vicinity of the 
crime but did not detain him because he did not match the description that 
 
 
3 
Lipscombe had provided.  That man did match the later-obtained description 
of Lipscombe’s brother. 
 
[¶4]  Another witness testified that a man he later learned was 
Lipscombe’s brother approached him in the same vicinity, gave a false name, 
asked to use his phone for an emergency, and rode off in a vehicle with someone 
who had come to get him.  A friend of Lipscombe’s then testified that at 
Lipscombe’s request, he had picked up Lipscombe’s brother and allowed the 
brother to stay with him overnight on the night of June 6, 2020.  The State’s final 
witness testified that Lipscombe had told her that his brother had shot a person 
and that Lipscombe had given the police a false description of the man who had 
fled the scene of the shooting. 
 
[¶5]  After the State rested, Lipscombe unsuccessfully moved for a 
judgment of acquittal and presented no evidence.  During the State’s closing 
argument, the prosecutor argued as follows: 
 
So, the Court is going to give you some suggestions about 
how you can evaluate different witnesses that you heard testify.  
You can consider all or none of them, that will be part of the jury 
instructions, but when it comes to [the witness who allowed 
Lipscombe’s brother to use his phone] you might consider this.  
Whether a witness, or whether there has been any evidence to 
suggest that a witness had motive, or lack of motive to exaggerate 
or lie.  There is no such evidence for [this witness].  He is a true 
interloper in these events, just like [the witnesses who 
authenticated the video footage], he had no possible motive to try 
 
 
4 
to deceive you here, but [Lipscombe’s brother] never would have 
made it past Columbia Road if [Lipscombe] hadn’t misdescribed 
him delaying his apprehension. 
 
Lipscombe raised no objection.  The court later instructed the jury about how 
to consider witnesses’ credibility: 
 
You may consider whether the witnesses[’] testimony was 
corroborated, which means supported, or contradicted by other 
testimony or by the exhibits.  You may consider how well each 
witness has remembered what took place during the time periods 
in question.  You may consider whether a witness had a good 
opportunity to make the observations he or she says were made.  
You may consider whether a witness appeared to be biased in favor 
of or against the State or the defendant.  You may consider whether 
there has been any evidence introduced of any motive or lack of 
motive for a witness to exaggerate or lie. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Lipscombe again raised no objection.  The court also 
instructed, “The law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the 
burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence 
whatsoever. . . . [T]he burden of proof in this case is entirely on the State.  The 
defendant does not have to prove anything. . . . Throughout the trial the 
defendant is favored with a presumption of innocence . . . .” 
 
[¶6]  The jury returned a verdict finding Lipscombe guilty.  After 
discharging the jury, the court went to the jury room, in keeping with its usual 
practice, to thank the jurors off the record for their service and to accept 
questions and feedback about the trial.  While speaking with jurors, the court 
 
 
5 
learned that several jurors had heard one of the State’s witnesses—the friend 
of Lipscombe who had sheltered Lipscombe’s brother on the night of the 
killing—mutter, “[G]ood luck,” after his testimony as he was leaving the witness 
stand.  The court promptly met with counsel in chambers on the record and 
disclosed what it had learned, indicating that the foreperson had said, “[I]t was 
insubstantial to us, so that’s why I didn’t mention anything.”  The court 
indicated that “not everyone heard it, pretty much the foreperson, the person 
next to him, I think maybe the one next to her, the first three in the row there, 
he muttered something under his breath, they thought it was good luck.”  When 
asked by defense counsel, the court confirmed that the jurors “thought it was 
being directed at them.”  The court said, “I know who [the jurors] are, we have 
the list of jurors if we ever—if there is anything you wanted to pursue.”  Defense 
counsel said he would “need to think about it,” and when the court replied, “I 
don’t know what that means, frankly,” counsel said, “I can’t imagine the voir 
dire would go anywhere.” 
 
[¶7]  Three days later, Lipscombe filed a motion to voir dire the jurors to 
“determine the impact of this comment on [the jury’s] verdict and 
deliberations.”  He filed an additional motion on December 14, 2022, seeking to 
“determine the impact” of the witness’s comment.  He argued that the statement 
 
 
6 
was extraneous information that would be prejudicial to the extent that the jury 
considered it in its deliberations.  The State then moved to preclude juror 
testimony under Rule 606(b) of the Maine Rules of Evidence on the ground that 
the in-court utterance did not convey “information” within the meaning of the 
rule’s narrow exception and that the jurors had merely observed a witness in 
court. 
 
[¶8]  Before Lipscombe’s sentencing hearing on January 12, 2023, the 
court announced its ruling on Lipscombe’s two motions and the motion filed by 
the State.  The court denied Lipscombe’s motion for voir dire of the jurors and 
granted the State’s motion to preclude juror testimony.  The court reasoned 
that it would not speculate what muttering “good luck” meant, and determined 
that the witness did not, through his comment, convey extraneous, prejudicial 
information to the jurors. 
 
[¶9]  The court then held the sentencing hearing and entered a judgment 
sentencing Lipscombe to five years in prison, with all but three years 
suspended and with three years of probation.  The order also made him 
responsible for paying thirty-five dollars to the Victims’ Compensation Fund.  
Lipscombe timely appealed.  See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2023); M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1). 
 
 
7 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
 
[¶10]  Lipscombe challenges (A) the court’s inaction regarding the 
prosecutor’s argument and its jury instructions about witnesses’ motives to lie, 
and (B) the court’s denial of Lipscombe’s motion to voir dire the jurors after 
they delivered their verdict.  We consider each of his arguments in turn. 
A. 
Closing Argument and Jury Instruction Regarding Evidence of a 
Motive to Lie 
 
 
[¶11]  Lipscombe argues that the court committed obvious error in 
allowing a closing argument that implied that Lipscombe had a burden of 
proving that the State’s witnesses had a motive to lie and delivering jury 
instructions that made the same implication.  As Lipscombe recognizes, 
because Lipscombe did not object to the prosecutor’s argument or the court’s 
instruction during trial, we review for obvious error.  See State v. Warner, 2023 
ME 55, ¶ 13, 301 A.3d 763; M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b).  “To show obvious error, there 
must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  “[E]ven if those three conditions are met, we will 
set aside a jury’s verdict only if we conclude that (4) the error seriously affects 
the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  A statement that does not prompt an objection will 
rarely be found to have affected substantial rights because there is seldom, in 
 
 
8 
such circumstances, “a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of 
the proceeding.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
1. 
Prosecutorial Error 
 
[¶12]  We refer to “prosecutorial error” rather than “prosecutorial 
misconduct” because our “review focuses not on the prosecutor’s subjective 
intent but on the due process rights of the defendant.”  State v. White, 2022 ME 
54, ¶ 19 & n.9, 285 A.3d 262.  To decide whether a judgment should be vacated 
due to prosecutorial error, we first determine “whether error occurred, and, if 
there was error, we will then review the State’s comments as a whole, 
examining the incidents of error both alone and cumulatively.”  Warner, 2023 
ME 55, ¶ 14, 301 A.3d 763 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶13]  Although a prosecutor may “forcefully argue to the jury that the 
evidence does not support or is not consistent with the defendant’s theory of 
the case,” State v. Cheney, 2012 ME 119, ¶ 35, 55 A.3d 473, “[s]hifting the burden 
of proof to the defendant or suggesting that the defendant must present 
evidence in a criminal trial is improper closing argument,” Warner, 2023 ME 
55, ¶ 14, 301 A.3d 763 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶14]  Contrary to Lipscombe’s contention, a prosecutor’s reference to 
the lack or absence of evidence of a motive for a witness to testify falsely does 
 
 
9 
not inherently imply that the defendant has a duty or obligation to present 
evidence of motive.  See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 2023 ME 35, ¶¶ 23-25, 295 A.3d 
1227.  Moreover, the court’s instructions that the State has the burden of proof 
and the defendant is not required to present any evidence to negate any such 
implication.  See Warner, 2023 ME 55, ¶ 17, 301 A.3d 763.  Accordingly, like 
other courts, we do not consider a prosecutor’s comment on the lack of 
evidence of a witness’s motive to lie to be error.  See, e.g., United States v. Gracia, 
522 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2008) (“A prosecutor may argue fair inferences from 
the evidence that a witness has no motive to lie . . . .”); State v. Burton, 778 A.2d 
955, 967 (Conn. 2001) (“[T]he state may properly argue that the witnesses had 
no apparent motive to lie.”); cf. United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 540 
(9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he argument that witnesses had no motive to lie is a 
permissible response to . . . attacks on the witnesses’[] credibility.”). 
 
[¶15]  We have held that there was no prosecutorial error when the 
prosecutor asked, “What motive would there possibly be for [the victim] to 
recite to you anything other than what actually happened to her?”  Cummings, 
2023 ME 35, ¶¶ 23-25, 295 A.3d 1227 (quotation marks omitted).  We held that 
the prosecutor could argue that the witness “did not testify to anything that 
suggested a motive for her to lie.”  Id. ¶ 25.  On the other hand, in Cheney, we 
 
 
10 
held that it was improper for the prosecutor in closing argument to say that the 
defendant “d[id]n’t have any evidence” to support his theory and that “they 
desperately want you to believe that somebody else hit [the victim] . . . . Yet, 
they have no evidence of it.”  2012 ME 119, ¶¶ 16-17, 35, 55 A.3d 473 
(quotation marks omitted).  The statements in Cheney specifically linked the 
lack of evidence to the defendant and therefore violated the requirement “that 
the State avoid making any statement suggesting that a criminal defendant has 
any burden to disprove the charges against him or her.”  Id. ¶ 35. 
[¶16]  The prosecutor’s argument here was similar to that in Cummings.  
The State elicited evidence that certain witnesses did not know anything about 
Lipscombe’s brother before the events at issue but that they either encountered 
a man meeting his description on the day of the murder or had cameras that 
recorded footage of a man meeting his description near the scene.  The 
prosecutor did not err in arguing that there was no evidence that these 
witnesses had a motive to lie, and the court did not commit obvious error in 
allowing that argument. 
2. 
Jury Instructions on Witness Credibility 
 
[¶17]  Similarly, the court did not commit obvious error in instructing the 
jury that it could “consider whether there has been any evidence introduced of 
 
 
11 
any motive or lack of motive for a witness to exaggerate or lie.”  We considered 
this very issue in Warner and concluded that there was no obvious error in the 
court’s delivery of the challenged instruction when it was delivered along with 
instructions that the State had the burden of proof, the defendant was 
presumed innocent, and the defendant did not have to prove anything or 
present any evidence.  2023 ME 55, ¶¶ 18-21, 301 A.3d 763.  We reach the same 
conclusion here. 
B. 
Denial of Motion for Voir Dire of Jurors 
 
[¶18]  Lipscombe argues that voir dire was necessary to ensure that the 
off-the-record statement made to jurors by Lipscombe’s friend as he was 
leaving the witness stand did not undermine the jurors’ impartiality.  
Lipscombe further contends that the court improperly gathered information 
from jurors outside his presence and relied on juror representations not made 
under oath about how the comment, “good luck,” affected them without 
allowing Lipscombe to voir dire the jurors.  As a remedy, he seeks a remand for 
an evidentiary hearing.  He contends that he preserved the claim of error by 
indicating that he would “think about it” and then moving to allow post-verdict 
voir dire. 
 
 
12 
 
[¶19]  We agree that Lipscombe preserved his argument by indicating 
that he would have to consider what the judge had told him and then filing a 
post-verdict motion, and we therefore review for an abuse of discretion the trial 
court’s denial of Lipscombe’s request for post-verdict voir dire.1  See State v. 
St. Pierre, 1997 ME 107, ¶ 10, 693 A.2d 1137. 
 
[¶20]  We have long adhered to “the general rule . . . that the testimony of 
a juror is not available to impeach a verdict in which [that juror] participated.”  
Patterson v. Rossignol, 245 A.2d 852, 856 (Me. 1968).  This rule—now codified 
in Maine Rule of Evidence 606(b)—is grounded in policy considerations that 
include 
(1) the need for stability of verdicts; (2) the need to conclude 
litigation and desire to prevent any prolongation thereof; (3) the 
need to protect jurors in their communications to fellow jurors 
made in the confidence of secrecy of the jury room; (4) the need to 
save jurors harmless from tampering and harassment by 
disappointed litigants; [and] (5) the need to foreclose jurors from 
abetting the setting aside of verdicts to which they may have 
agreed reluctantly in the first place or about which they may in the 
light of subsequent developments have doubts or a change of 
attitude. 
 
State v. Leon, 2018 ME 70, ¶ 8, 186 A.3d 129 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
1  Although the exception based on outside influence, M.R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(B), was not explicitly 
argued in the written motions before the trial court, the court referenced the exception in its ruling, 
and Lipscombe challenges that ruling on appeal. 
 
 
13 
 
[¶21]  As it pertains here, Rule 606(b) of the Maine Rules of Evidence 
provides that “[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a 
juror may not testify about . . . [t]he effect of anything on that juror’s or another 
juror’s vote; or [a]ny juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or 
indictment.”  M.R. Evid. 606(b)(1)(B), (C).  There are two exceptions to this rule; 
these exceptions permit a juror to “testify about whether . . . (A) Extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; or 
(B) An outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.”  
M.R. Evid. 606(b)(2).  These provisions are “substantially similar” to the 
corresponding federal rule, Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).  M.R. Evid. 606 Maine Restyling 
Note [November 2014].2  The federal rule included the exceptions to allow 
jurors “to testify as to matters other than their own inner reactions” because 
testimony about what happened—as opposed to jurors’ internal thought 
processes—would “involve[] no particular hazard to the values sought to be 
protected” by Rule 606.  Fed. R. Evid. 606 advisory committee notes to 1972 
proposed rules. 
 
2  The Maine rule further narrows the circumstances in which a juror may be called as a witness 
because Maine has not adopted the federal “exception . . . for testimony about a mistake in entering 
the verdict on a verdict form.”  M.R. Evid. 606 Maine Restyling Note [November 2014]. 
 
 
14 
 
[¶22]  As we have stated, Rule 606 embodies the law’s strong disfavor for 
“inquiry into the deliberations of juries.”  State v. Watts, 2006 ME 109, ¶ 15, 907 
A.2d 147.  “Courts should inquire into the validity of a jury verdict only in very 
limited circumstances and should be very cautious in overturning jury 
verdicts.”  Id. ¶ 17 (citation and quotation marks omitted).  “Only in the most 
extraordinary circumstances would a court inquire of a juror regarding 
deliberations.”  State v. Robinson, 2019 ME 46, ¶ 7 n.4, 205 A.3d 893. 
 
[¶23]  Such voir dire would be allowed only as an exception to the general 
prohibition against a juror testifying about “[t]he effect of anything on that 
juror’s or another juror’s vote” or the “juror’s mental processes concerning the 
verdict or indictment.”  M.R. Evid. 606(b)(1)(B), (C).  Exceptions to the rule 
against inquiring into a jury’s deliberations are narrowly drawn, for instance to 
allow inquiry into “serious allegations of juror bias in the context of juror 
dishonesty or inaccuracy in answering a voir dire questionnaire.”  Ma v. Bryan, 
2010 ME 55, ¶ 9, 997 A.2d 755 (quotation marks omitted); see Watts, 2006 ME 
109, ¶ 17, 907 A.2d 147; see also State v. Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶¶ 43-47, 211 A.3d 
205 (identifying the importance of the exceptions to safeguard “[t]he Maine and 
federal constitutions[’] guarantee that criminal defendants shall have the right 
to an impartial jury trial”). 
 
 
15 
 
[¶24]  If the court engages in voir dire of the jury, the purpose is 
objective—to determine whether the jury was presented with improper 
extraneous prejudicial information or an improper outside influence—to 
enable the court to determine whether the probability of a prejudicial effect is 
sufficient to warrant setting aside the verdict.  See M.R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(A)-(B).  
The purpose is not to probe the actual, subjective effect of the extraneous 
information or outside influence on jurors; “[t]he judge is limited to deciding 
the probability of a prejudicial effect” because Rule 606 “prohibits inquiry in the 
actual effect of . . . irregularities on the minds of the jurors.”  Field & Murray, 
Maine Evidence § 606.2 at 279 (6th ed. 2007) (emphasis added); see M.R. Evid. 
606(b)(1)(B), (C). 
 
[¶25]  If “[t]he record is entirely devoid of any indication that the jury 
reached its verdict on any improper basis” and there are no “verifiable external 
manifestations of such impropriety, we must accept the verdict as is.”  Ma, 2010 
ME 55, ¶ 10, 997 A.2d 755 (quotation marks omitted).  We will generally accept 
the verdict when 
(1) there is no evidence in the record of any juror bias, prejudice, 
or misconduct; (2) there is no evidence to support a suggestion that 
the jurors failed to follow the law; and (3) the trial court, which saw 
the witnesses at the same time and place as the jurors, concluded 
that the verdict was supportable. 
 
 
 
16 
Id. ¶ 11. 
 
[¶26]  Lipscombe argues in his brief that the court violated Rule 
606(b)(1)(B) and (C) by “receiving a juror’s testimony about ‘[t]he effect of 
anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote’ or ‘[a]ny juror’s mental 
processes concerning the verdict . . . .’”  We reject that contention outright—the 
record makes it clear that there was no juror “testimony” and that a juror 
volunteered the information when the court was thanking jurors for their 
service.  Thus, the court did not improperly inquire “into the validity of a verdict 
or indictment” in violation of Rule 606(b)(1).  The court instead acted 
appropriately by sharing the unsolicited disclosure with counsel immediately 
after receiving it. 
 
[¶27]  Lipscombe’s contention that the court should have conducted an 
evidentiary hearing after the disclosure calls for a more nuanced analysis.  He 
makes an argument under Rule 606 that the “good luck” comment was 
“[e]xtraneous prejudicial information,” an improper “outside influence,” or 
both.  M.R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(A), (B). 
[¶28]  His primary argument, however, is that the comment generated a 
“colorable or plausible claim of juror partiality” that the court had an absolute 
duty to investigate.  Federal precedent holds that a defendant need only present 
 
 
17 
a “colorable or plausible claim” to trigger the trial court’s “unflagging duty” to 
investigate.  United States v. French, 904 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Even after a colorable or plausible claim has been 
presented, however, “[t]he type of investigation the [trial] court chooses to 
conduct is within the [trial] court’s discretion; it may hold a formal evidentiary 
hearing, but depending on the circumstances, such a hearing may not be 
required.”  Id.  “[T]he procedures used to investigate allegations of juror 
misconduct and the decision as to whether to hold an evidentiary hearing are 
matters which rest solely within the sound discretion of the [trial] court.”  
United States v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046, 1058 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks 
omitted).  A trial court has “wide latitude in choosing appropriate means of 
investigating claims of juror bias,” and the court should consider as a factor “the 
strength and seriousness of the allegations.”  United States v. Gibson, 353 F.3d 
21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted) (holding that there was “no 
basis on which to second-guess the decision that observing the juror, rather 
than interrogating her, was an appropriate way to investigate [a] 
generalized . . . claim of bias” arising from the defendant’s opinion about a 
juror’s facial expressions).  Thus, we will review the two exceptions at issue to 
determine whether there is, under either, a colorable claim that the “good luck” 
 
 
18 
comment deprived Lipscombe of an unbiased jury and whether the court 
abused its discretion in denying Lipscombe’s request to voir dire the jurors. 
1. 
Exception for Extraneous Prejudicial Information 
 
[¶29]  “A juror may testify about whether [e]xtraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention.”  M.R. Evid. 
606(b)(2)(A). “When a defendant demonstrates that a juror was subjected to 
extraneous information and that the information is sufficiently related to the 
issues presented at trial, a presumption of prejudice is established, and the 
burden of proof shifts to the State to demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that the information did not cause prejudice to the defendant.”  State 
v. Coburn, 1999 ME 28, ¶ 7, 724 A.2d 1239.  Information is extraneous if it is 
“information introduced to the jury from outside the normal deliberative 
process.”3  State v. Fuller, 660 A.2d 915, 917 (Me. 1994) (quotation marks 
omitted).  “[T]o raise a presumption of prejudice to impose a burden of proof 
on the State, the extraneous information communicated to the juror must relate 
to the law or facts of the case.”  Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶ 47, 211 A.3d 205 
(alteration and quotation marks omitted). 
 
3  “Information communicated among jurors during the deliberation process, however, is not 
considered to be extraneous, and may not be inquired into even if the information is improper. “  State 
v. Fuller, 660 A.2d 915, 918 (Me. 1994). 
 
 
19 
 
[¶30]  The exception for extraneous prejudicial information was crafted 
in response to events such as 
the introduction into the jury room by a juror of a pamphlet 
containing the evidence given at a former trial; an independent 
probe by a juror of a defective road condition; a personal 
examination by a juror of a party’s wool shop in relation to its 
location as to a stream and the possible pollution of the waters 
thereof; the secret investigation by a juror culminating in a private 
view of a cow and calf for purposes of comparison; [and] the use in 
the jury room of a book on principles of real estate appraising 
brought in by a juror. 
 
Patterson, 245 A.2d at 856 (citations omitted); see also Coburn, 1999 ME 28, 
¶ 16, 724 A.2d 1239 (holding that the presumption of prejudice had not been 
rebutted when a juror “went to an intersection and gathered additional facts 
about the scene of the events” at issue in the case and then shared the 
information with other jurors). 
 
[¶31]  Here, the witness’s comment was made in open court, but it was 
extraneous in that it was not noticed by the court or counsel and was therefore 
outside the ordinary trial process.  See Gov’t of V.I. v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 138 
(3d Cir. 1987) (“A criminal defendant is entitled to a determination of his or her 
guilt by an unbiased jury based solely upon evidence properly admitted against 
him or her in court.”); Fuller, 660 A.2d at 917-18.  However, the comment did 
not convey any information about the facts or law at issue in the case. See Scott, 
 
 
20 
2019 ME 105, ¶ 47, 211 A.3d 205; see also St. Pierre, 1997 ME 107, ¶¶ 11, 14, 
693 A.2d 1137 (affirming a judgment of conviction where “the record 
reveal[ed] no evidence that any extraneous information reached the jury” 
(emphasis added)); cf. People v. Rodriguez, No. A128678, 2012 WL 4815082, at 
*5-7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2012) (holding that further inquiry of jurors was not 
required when one juror had expressed concerns about seeing a co-defendant 
glare at and mouth words to a witness, but the juror said she had not discussed 
the matter with other jurors). 
 
[¶32]  Here, even though the court considered the witness’s comment not 
to be extraneous, it still determined that the statement did not convey any 
information that would prejudice the jurors.  Moreover, what the court heard 
during its meeting with jurors was sufficient to inform the court of what the 
witness said, making further inquiry into the content of the communication 
unnecessary, and there was no “colorable or plausible claim” that the comment 
contained extraneous information resulting in juror bias or other serious 
prejudice to Lipscombe.  French, 904 F.3d at 117 (quotation marks omitted); 
see Gibson, 353 F.3d at 26; Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶ 47, 211 A.3d 205.  Voir dire 
would have not served any further purpose in any case, given that the only 
remaining questions were ones that the court could not ask: what subjective 
 
 
21 
reaction the comment produced in the jurors who heard it and whether it 
affected their mental processes in deliberations.  See M.R. Evid. 606(b)(1)(B), 
(C); Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 606.2 at 279.  See also Wilson v. Vt. 
Castings, Inc., 170 F.3d 391, 394 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The scope of the court’s inquiry 
under Rule 606(b) is limited: the court may inquire only into the existence of 
the extraneous information.  Once the existence of extraneous information has 
been established, the court may not inquire into the subjective effect of such 
information on the particular jurors.”). 
2. 
Exception for Improper Outside Influence 
 
[¶33]  “A juror may testify about whether . . . [a]n outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear on any juror.”  M.R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(B).  Unlike the 
Rule 606(b)(2)(A) exception for extraneous prejudicial information, an outside 
influence need not incorporate information about the facts or law involved in 
the case.  A threat that contains no information about the case but that is 
intended to intimidate jurors can constitute improper outside influence, for 
example.  See United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 245 (5th Cir. 1998) (“An 
‘outside influence’ refers to a factor originating outside of normal courtroom 
proceedings which influences jury deliberations, such as . . . a threat against a 
juror.”), aff’d, 527 U.S. 373 (1999).  Contact between a witness and a juror 
 
 
22 
outside the courtroom may also involve improper outside influence.  
See 3 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 6:19 
(4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2023). 
 
[¶34]  Although the comment at issue occurred inside the courtroom, it 
can be likened to contact outside the courtroom because the comment did not 
come to the attention of the court or the parties until after the verdict.  “‘In a 
criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or 
indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury 
is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in 
pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of 
the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties.’”  Scott, 2019 
ME 105, ¶ 45, 211 A.3d 205 (quoting Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 
(1954)).  “‘The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily 
upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, 
that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.’”4  Id. (quoting 
Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229).  To determine whether such contact is harmless, the 
 
4  As we acknowledged in State v. Scott, “‘[t]he continuing validity of the presumption of prejudice 
standard articulated in Remmer, placing a special burden of persuasion on the prosecution, has been 
subject to question for some time.’”  2019 ME 105, ¶ 46, 211 A.3d 205 (quoting State v. Cheney, 2012 
ME 119, ¶ 27, 55 A.3d 473, and citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-16 (1982) (addressing the 
opportunity to prove actual juror bias)).  Because we conclude in this case that no hearing was 
required, we do not opine on the parties’ respective burdens if a hearing were held. 
 
 
23 
court must ascertain the content of the contact.  See id. ¶ 49 (affirming the 
denial of a motion to voir dire a juror when the “misconduct had already come 
to light and was not shown to have affected the jury’s verdict”). 
 
[¶35]  Applying these standards, a federal court held—before the Rules 
of Evidence were in place—that a reported conversation between a witness and 
a juror did create a presumption of prejudice when the trial court had not 
inquired to determine the nature and content of that conversation.  Richardson 
v. United States, 360 F.2d 366, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1966).  As with extraneous 
prejudicial information, once the court has determined what occurred, the 
court’s determination of whether juror contact amounts to an improper outside 
influence is objective.  See Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139, 1142–43 (Colo. 1987) 
(adopting an “objective test of whether there is a reasonable possibility that 
extraneous information or influence affected the verdict,” consistent with the 
purposes of Rule 606(b) to protect juror privacy and “enhance the stability of 
jury verdicts”).  Rather than probing the jury’s subjective thoughts and feelings, 
the court “evaluat[es] the contact in light of logic and experience, and the likely 
reaction of a typical or reasonable juror.”  3 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal 
Evidence § 6:19. 
 
 
24 
 
[¶36]  In Scott, we held that no presumption of prejudice arose when a 
juror made comments to a family member of the accused and to a court officer 
“alluding to hoping to make the right decision, praying to make the right 
decision, et cetera,” and acknowledging “the difficulty that the circumstances 
may have with various family members.”  2019 ME 105, ¶¶ 41, 48, 211 A.3d 
205 (quotation marks omitted); cf. State v. Allard, 557 A.2d 960, 961-62 
(Me. 1989) (affirming the denial of a motion for a mistrial when the court’s 
questioning of a juror in chambers revealed that “contact between the [witness] 
and the juror was brief and not concerned with the substance of the case”). 
 
[¶37]  Here, the court had no need to voir dire the jury to learn of the 
content of the communication—“good luck”—and nothing in the record 
suggests that the comment exerted any improper influence, or threatened the 
jurors.  The inquiry that Lipscombe requests would probe the jurors’ “mental 
processes concerning the verdict”—the very thing that Rule 606 prohibits.  
M.R. Evid. 606(b)(1)(C); cf. 3 Mueller & Kirkpatrick § 6:19 (“While juror 
testimony or statements can prove external contacts and can describe their 
nature, such evidence cannot be used to prove their effect . . . .”).  Based on the 
objectively innocuous nature of the comment, Lipscombe has no “colorable” 
claim that the words “good luck” amounted to juror tampering or improper 
 
 
25 
influence that required voir dire examination of the jurors.  See French, 904 F.3d 
at 117; Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶¶ 41, 48, 211 A.3d 205. 
[¶38]  We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Lipscombe’s motion to voir dire the jurors after it made an objective 
determination that the witness’s stray, innocuous, two-word comment having 
nothing to do with the facts of the case or applicable law did not affect the jury’s 
ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant Jarae 
Lipscombe 
 
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, Michael H. Madigan, Asst. Dist. Atty. 
(orally), and Mariah Wood, Stud. Atty., Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for 
appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2021-20533 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY