Case Title: ROBERT ALLEN HOLZHEUSER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT ALLEN HOLZHEUSER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 160169 P.3d 68Case Number: 06-124Decided: 10/11/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
ROBERT 
ALLEN HOLZHEUSER, Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

D. Terry 
Rogers, InterimState Public Defender; and 
Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dana J. Lent, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Lent.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Robert 
Allen Holzheuser (Holzheuser), contends that the district court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress the evidence used against him at trial.  He asserts that the affidavit in support 
of the search warrant was inadequate to justify its issuance.  Holzheuser also contends that the 
evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain two of his three 
convictions.  We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for resentencing in a manner consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Holzheuser states 
these issues:

 
 
            
I.          
The trial court erred in denying [Holzheuser's] motion to suppress, as 
the affidavit executed in support of the search warrant was inadequate to 
establish probable cause to search.

 
 
            
II.         
There is insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for possessing a 
controlled substance precursor with intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation or a conviction for conspiracy to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation because the only evidence on these counts was 
hearsay.

 
 
The 
State essentially conforms its argument to that statement of the 
issues.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      As background for 
this case, we include here the statement of facts from a case that arose out of 
the same facts as those in Holzheuser's case:

 
 
In 
December 2004, Mr. [Norman] Wenger met Robert Holzheuser and allowed him to move 
into an apartment he was renting in Rawlins, Wyoming.  
On February 8, 2005, Mr. Wenger was at the apartment when Mr. Holzheuser 
and two companions arrived.  The 
four individuals smoked methamphetamine together.  

 
 
That 
same evening, Rawlins police officer William Hill was conducting surveillance on 
the apartment in connection with reports from two individuals that they had 
purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Wenger.  
Officer Hill observed Keith Nulle drive up to the apartment, go inside 
for about ten minutes, and then drive away.  Officer Hill checked Mr. Nulle's driving 
record and learned that his license was suspended.  Officer Hill pulled Mr. Nulle over, 
placed him under arrest for driving under suspension, searched him and found 
methamphetamine inside a cigarette pack he was carrying.

 
 
Based on 
the information that Mr. Wenger had sold methamphetamine to others and the 
methamphetamine found on Mr. Nulle after leaving Mr. Wenger's apartment, Officer 
Hill obtained a warrant to search the apartment.  He and five other law enforcement 
officers executed the warrant later that same night.  The officers knocked on the apartment 
door and, when no one responded, they broke down the door.  Upon entering the apartment, the 
officers found four people in the living room, including Mr. Wenger, and 
arrested them.  The officers also 
found methamphetamine, a mini torch, pipes, a car battery with the caps off 
hooked to a charger, a bottle of acetone, and other material associated with the 
manufacture of methamphetamine.  
Additionally, the officers noticed a strong chemical smell in the 
apartment.

 
 
Detective 
Mike Picerno was called to the scene.  
After inspecting the apartment, Detective Picerno was concerned it was 
being used as a methamphetamine manufacturing laboratory.  He contacted the Wyoming Division of 
Criminal Investigation (DCI), the agency trained and experienced in working with 
clandestine laboratories.  Because 
of safety concerns, Detective Picerno removed everyone from the premises and 
secured the apartment.  He 
interviewed Mr. Wenger, who indicated the items found in the apartment belonged 
to Mr. Holzheuser.  Mr. Wenger also 
stated that he used methamphetamine supplied to him by Mr. Holzheuser in 
exchange for use of the apartment.  
He also stated that he, Mr. Holzheuser and the other two individuals had 
smoked methamphetamine that evening before the police arrived.  Subsequent searches of the apartment 
revealed more items associated with the manufacture of 
methamphetamine.

 
 
Mr. 
Wenger was charged with one count of conspiring with another to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation in violation of § 35-7-1059(a)(iv) and a second 
count of aiding another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation in 
violation of the same statute.  
After a two day trial, a jury found Mr. Wenger guilty on both 
counts.  The district court 
sentenced Mr. Wenger to a term of two to eight years in the state penitentiary 
on the conspiracy conviction and a term of two to eight years on the aiding 
conviction with the two terms to be served concurrently.

 
 

Wenger 
v. State, 2007 
WY 121, ¶¶ 3-7, 163 P.3d 824, 825 (Wyo. 2007).  The only issue raised in Wenger's case 
was whether or not two convictions, one for aiding another to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory, and the other conspiring with that same person to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory, merged for purposes of sentencing.  We held that they 
did.

 
 
[¶4]      On February 8, 
2005, Rawlins Police Officer William Hill sought a warrant to search an 
apartment located within his jurisdiction.  
The affidavit in support of the warrant contained this information:

 
 
            
Over the past three weeks, or so, I, together with other law enforcement 
officers in the area, have observed numerous known drug users frequenting 
apartment #307 at the Bitter Creek Apartments located at 503 Sage Hills Street 
in Rawlins, Carbon County, Wyoming.  
These individuals have been observed entering said apartment, remaining 
there for short visits of approximately 5-10 minutes and then 
leaving.

            
The apartment is under the control of Norman Wenger, a person well-known 
to Rawlins Police Department officers from numerous contacts over recent 
years.  Information has been 
provided to your affiant and other law enforcement officers by Chris Garey, an 
individual recently arrested and convicted of Possession of Controlled 
Substances  Methamphetamine, that he had purchased his methamphetamine from 
Norman Wenger.

            
At approximately 9:05 p.m. tonight, February 8, 2005, as I was on routine 
patrol driving through the parking lot of the apartment complex at 503 Sage 
Hills St., I personally observed Keith Nulle walk up to the door of Apartment 
307, and knock on the door.  Keith 
Nulle is well-known to your affiant through numerous law enforcement 
contacts.  I lost site of Keith 
Nulle, but his car was observed to remain in the parking lot by Lt. Eric Ford of 
the Rawlins Police Department, who watched it, noting that it stayed there for 
approximately 10 minutes.  During 
this time, we ran a check on Keith Nulle's driver's license and it came back as 
being suspended.

            
When Keith Nulle left the apartment, I observed him drive his vehicle 
past my patrol car.  I initiated a 
traffic stop on the vehicle, and advised him that he was under arrest for 
driving under suspension.  During a 
search incident to a lawful arrest, a pack of cigarettes was found in the left 
front pocket of his jacket.  Inside 
the pack of cigarettes was found a white plastic bag bindle containing what 
appeared to be a small amount of crystallized methamphetamine.  The substance in the bindle was tested 
with a methamphetamine NIK test kit, showing a presumptive positive result for 
methamphetamine.

            
Keith admitted that he had been to Norman Wenger's apartment, and claimed 
that he had found the pack of cigarettes on the ground outside the 
apartment.

            
Rawlins Police Department officers are continuing to observe the 
apartment this evening, and have noted several known drug users entering said 
apartment, remaining there for a short time of approximately 5-10 minutes and 
then leaving.

 
 
Officer 
Hill anticipated that the search would reveal the presence of controlled 
substances, sums of money, packaging materials, scales and drug paraphernalia, 
and ledgers.

 
 
[¶5]      In fact, many 
such materials were found in the apartment.  Holzheuser was tried before a jury and 
convicted of:  (1) Possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to deliver; (2) possession of a list of I or II 
controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation; and (3) conspiring with another to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation.

 
 
DISCUSSION

Sufficiency 
of the Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant

 
 
[¶6]      At the conclusion 
of the hearing on the motion to suppress the fruits of the search warrant, the 
district court articulated its reasons for denying the motion to suppress, after 
examining the four corners of the affidavit and hearing the arguments of 
counsel.  The district court did not 
have the benefit of our decisions in Rohda or Schirber at the time he considered the 
motion:

 
 
            
The Court disagrees with both counsel regarding what can and cannot be 
considered by the issuing magistrate.  
It is the Court's understanding that the difference between the 
Wyoming constitution and the federal 
constitution is that under the Wyoming constitution, only the four corners of 
the affidavit can be considered for determination on probable cause.  Whether or not Judge Eakin had a memory 
of Chris Garey's recent arrest or not would be immaterial.  Whether or not anything additional on 
the record, any additional information was given to Judge Eakin would also be 
immaterial.  It has to be contained 
within the four corners of the affidavit or it cannot justify the 
search.

            
It would also have been helpful to the Court had the State responded to 
the motion and filed a memorandum, as it would have been helpful had the defense 
filed a memorandum citing the law of Hixson, Page, and TJS.

            
The contents of the first paragraph are not particularly helpful in 
establishing probable cause.  The 
observation of, quote, numerous known drug users, closed quote, doesn't tell the 
issuing magistrate much to establish probable cause.  However, the information received from 
Chris Garey, and in particular the information received from Keith Nulle, when 
added to the overall factual scenario developed by the affidavit of William Hill 
does establish probable cause that allows the  the judge to issue the search 
warrant.  And the Court will deny 
the motion to suppress.

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶7]      We have dealt 
with issues similar to the one at hand in several of our recent cases, including 
Rohda v. State, 2006 WY 120, 142 P.3d 1155 (Wyo. 2006), and Schirber v. 
State, 2006 WY 121, 142 P.3d 1169 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
In 
reviewing an affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant, this 
Court is mindful of the fact that there is a strong preference under the law for 
law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant instead of engaging in a 
warrantless search.  Cordova v. State, 2001 WY 96, ¶ 11, 
33 P.3d 142, 148 (Wyo.2001).  Thus, 
an affidavit comes to this Court with a presumption of validity.  TJS v. State, 2005 WY 68, ¶ 10, 113 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Wyo.2005).  In 
order to promote the warrant process, and remembering that affidavits are not 
normally executed by legal technicians, this Court resolves doubtful or marginal 
cases in this area in favor of sustaining the warrant.  TJS, ¶ 10, 113 P.3d  at 1057; Cordova, ¶ 11, 33 P.3d  at 148; Hixson v. State, 2001 WY 99, ¶ 6, 
33 P.3d 154, 156-57 (Wyo.2001).  
Ultimately, our duty on review simply is to ensure that the 
warrant-issuing judicial officer had a substantial basis for concluding probable 
cause existed.  Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 732-33, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 
2088, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1984) (per curiam).

 
 

Schirber, 
¶ 5, 142 P.3d  at 1172.  See 
also Rohda, ¶ 4, 142 P.3d  at 
1158.

 
 
The 
Warrant-Issuing Judicial Officer's Standard for Determining Probable 
Cause

 
 
[¶8]                              
The judicial officer who is presented with an application for a search 
warrant supported by an affidavit applies a "totality of circumstances" analysis 
in making an independent judgment whether probable cause exists for the issuance 
of the warrant.  See, e.g., Page, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d  at 909; 
Upton, 
466 U.S.  at 732, 104 S. Ct.  at 2087; and 
Bonsness, 672 P.2d  at 1293.  In making that independent judgment, the 
judicial officer is limited to the four corners of the supporting 
affidavit.  Page, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d  at 909.   The "totality of circumstances" 
analysis requires the judicial officer simply "to make a practical, common sense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 
him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place."  Gates, 462 U.S.  at 238, 103 
S.Ct. at 2332;  see Bonsness, 672 P.2d  at 
1293.

            
The hearsay provider's "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" were the 
prongs of the "two-pronged test" established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli 
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969).  See, e.g., Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Hearsay and Probable Cause:  An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 
Mercer L.Rev. 741 (1974).  This 
Court "never specifically adopted," and in fact rejected "the technical and 
rigid requirements" set out in Aguilar and Spinelli.  Bonsness, 672 P.2d  at 1293.   In 1983, when the United States 
Supreme Court in Gates rejected those 
technical and rigid requirements, it realized, as our Court had, that the 
"totality of circumstances" approach was more in keeping with the practical, 
common sense decision required of the warrant-issuing judicial officer.  Upton, 466 U.S.  at 732, 104 S. Ct.  at 2087.  The warrant-issuing 
judicial officer does not measure the affidavit by a "reasonable doubt" standard 
or a "preponderance of evidence" standard;  
instead, the measure is that the circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
must amount to more than a mere suspicion yet need not rise to the level of 
prima facie evidence of guilt.  Lee v. State, 2 P.3d 517, 523 
(Wyo.2000).

            
An appropriate set of guidelines for the "totality of circumstances" 
approach can be derived from United States Supreme Court cases, our Wyoming cases, and the 
work of respected commentators who have reviewed federal and state case law in 
this area.  The judicial officer 
deciding whether probable cause exists relies on information coming to him from 
the outside world.  The primary 
source of that information is a law enforcement officer who is applying for the 
warrant and has signed under oath an affidavit in support of the 
application.  The affiant law 
enforcement officer may include in his affidavit the raw data of his own sense 
perception, that is, what he saw, heard, or smelled firsthand.  This firsthand information constitutes 
the affiant's basis of knowledge--how he acquired his information.  From affiant's firsthand information, 
the judicial officer may draw conclusions about the existence or not of probable 
cause.  With respect to the 
affiant's veracity or reliability, the judicial officer relies on the affiant's 
oath, with its sanctions of perjury, which is an integral part of the affiant's 
affidavit.

            
Frequently, the affiant includes in his affidavit information acquired 
from secondary sources in the persons of other law enforcement officers or 
confidential informants.  As in the 
case of the primary source affiant, so in the case of the secondary source 
person, the judicial officer must know both that person's veracity or 
reliability and basis of knowledge.  
Because the secondary source person is not before the judicial officer 
and has not taken an oath, the judicial officer must have a reasonable 
substitute for an oath in order to be satisfied with the veracity or reliability 
of the secondary source person.  
When the secondary source person is a law enforcement officer, courts 
hold that such an officer is presumed truthful or reliable and, therefore, no 
special showing of veracity or reliability is necessary.  That rule applies not only to law 
enforcement officers in the same organization as the affiant, but also to those 
in different organizations at local, state, or federal levels.  When the secondary source person is a 
confidential informant, the veracity or reliability requirement is usually met 
by the recitation in the affiant's affidavit by either the primary source 
affiant or the secondary source law enforcement officer of previous instances in 
which the law enforcement officer obtained information from the confidential 
informant that led to arrests or convictions.  In the absence of such a recitation, an 
acceptable substitute recognized by courts is the confidential informant's 
admission of activities against his penal interests contained in the information 
provided.  With respect to the 
secondary source person's basis of knowledge, the affiant's affidavit must 
contain the raw data of that person's sense perception--what that person saw, 
heard, or smelled firsthand.  It is 
from that secondary source's firsthand knowledge that the judicial officer will 
be able to draw conclusions about the existence or not of probable cause.  If the affidavit fails to show how the 
secondary source person acquired his information, courts have applied the notion 
of "self-verifying detail" to cure such a failure.  Simply stated, the secondary source 
person's information is considered "self-verifying" if it describes the 
warrant-target's criminal activity in such sufficient detail that the judicial 
officer reasonably may know that he is relying on information more substantial 
than a casual rumor or an accusation based merely on general 
reputation.

 
 

Rohda, 
¶¶ 5-8, 142 P.3d at 1158-60; Schirber, ¶¶ 6-8, 142 P.3d at 
1172-73; also see Abeyta v. State, 
2007 WY 142, ¶¶ 9-11, 167 P.3d 1, 6-7 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Analysis

 
 
[¶9]      As was the case 
in Rohda and Schirber, mindful of this standard of 
review and of the guidelines for the "totality of circumstances" approach, we 
embark on our review as to whether or not the warrant-issuing circuit court 
judge had a substantial basis in the affidavit to make a practical, common sense 
determination that there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would 
be found on Wenger's and Holzheuser's residential 
property.

 
 
[¶10]   A lengthy discussion is not needed 
here.  The affidavit is quite short 
and is set out in its entirety above.  
The district court's analysis was understandably brief, particularly in 
light of the parties' lack of development of the issue below.  We agree with the ultimate conclusion of 
the issuing magistrate, and that of the district court.  There was sufficient evidence for the 
magistrate to conclude that as a matter of practicality and common sense, given 
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before her, including the 
veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there was a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place, i.e., 
the apartment shared by Holzheuser and Wenger.

 
 
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 
[¶11]   In addressing a claim of 
insufficiency of the evidence, we must determine if any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  When considering a claim of 
the sufficiency of the evidence, we review that evidence with the assumption 
that the evidence of the prevailing party is true, disregard the evidence 
favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the benefit of 
every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the evidence.  We will not re-weigh the evidence nor 
will we re-examine the credibility of the witnesses.  Lopez v. State, 2006 WY 97, ¶ 6, 
139 P.3d 445, 450 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 

The 
Evidence  Possession of Precursors    

 
 
[¶12]   Holzheuser contends that the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for possessing a controlled 
substance precursor with intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation 
or a conviction for conspiracy to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation 
because the only evidence on these counts was hearsay evidence.  He does not challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence with respect to his conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver.  
We note here, as well, that Holzheuser was found not guilty with respect 
to a fourth charge, possession of laboratory equipment or supplies with intent 
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation.

 
 
[¶13]   At the time Holzheuser committed 
his crimes, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059 (LexisNexis 2003) 
provided:

 
 
(a)  It 
is unlawful for any person to knowingly or 
intentionally:

            
(i)  Possess a List I or II controlled substance precursor with 
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation;

            
(ii)  Possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent 
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation;

            
(iii)  Sell, distribute or otherwise supply a List I or II 
controlled substance precursor, laboratory equipment or laboratory supplies 
knowing it will be used for a clandestine laboratory 
operation;

            
(iv)  Conspire with or 
aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation.

(b)  A 
person who violates subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years, a fine of not 
more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00), or 
both.

(c)  A 
person who violates subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty-five (25) years, a fine of 
not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), or both if the judge or jury 
also finds any one (1) of the following conditions occurred in conjunction with 
that violation:

            
(i)  Illegal possession, transportation or disposal of 
hazardous or dangerous material or while transporting or causing to be 
transported materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, 
there was created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to 
the environment;

            
(ii)  The intended laboratory operation was to take place or 
did take place within five hundred (500) feet of a residence, business, church 
or school;  or

            
(iii)  Any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation was 
conducted in the presence of a person less than eighteen (18) years of 
age.

(d)  A 
person who violates subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than forty (40) years, a fine of not 
more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00), or both if the judge or 
jury also finds any one (1) of the following conditions occurred in conjunction 
with that violation:

            
(i)  Use of a firearm;

            
(ii)  Use of a booby trap. [Emphases 
added.]

 
 
[¶14]   The jury was instructed that 
Ephedrine, Hydriotic acid, and Pseudoephedrine are List I controlled substance 
precursors.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1058(a)(vi)(H), (O), and (KK) (LexisNexis 2007).  The jury was also instructed that 
Acetone, Hydrochloric acid and Iodine were List II controlled substance 
precursors.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1058(a)(vii)(B),(E), and (F) (LexisNexis 2007).  The testimony at trial is clear, and 
Holzheuser does not disagree, that all of these precursors were found collected 
together in a box that Wenger and Holzheuser had access to, inasmuch as it was 
found in the apartment in which they resided.

 
 
[¶15]   In Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 
562-566 (Wyo. 1992), the crime at issue was burglary, and we held that hearsay 
evidence admitted for a purpose other than to prove the matter stated therein 
could not be bootstrapped to suffice as evidence to prove an element of the 
crime of burglary (the unlawful entry element).  Holzheuser contends that the only 
evidence that tied him to the precursors was hearsay evidence from police 
officers as to what Wenger told them.

 
 
[¶16]   A significant source of the 
evidence that a clandestine lab operation was being conducted in Wenger's 
apartment, which he shared with Holzheuser as a kind of co-tenant, was that many 
of the materials and instruments used in a clandestine lab were found collected 
together in a single box.  As noted 
above, in the Wenger case, Wenger 
testified that the items in the precursor box belonged to Holzheuser.  However, at Holzheuser's trial, he did 
not remember very much, but he attributed the precursor box as belonging to 
James Tremble.1  However, he also conceded that when 
first asked, he placed possession with Holzheuser, although he claimed that that 
was a mistake on his part.  Wenger's 
explanation was that, when he was asked the question, he was searching for a 
name and just came up with the wrong one  i.e., he meant to say Tremble, but 
mistakenly said Holzheuser.  In sum, 
Holzheuser contends that the only evidence admitted at trial on the subject of 
Holzheuser's possession of clandestine lab precursors was hearsay testimony from 
police officers to whom Wenger gave statements.  As such, he continues, that evidence 
cannot be used for the truth of the matter asserted and, thus, there is no 
evidence of Holzheuser's possession of the precursors.

 
 
[¶17]   Holzheuser's contention that there 
is insufficient evidence of his possession of the precursors depends entirely 
upon our holding in Longstreth, and 
we conclude that case does not directly apply to the circumstances of this 
case.  Here, Wenger did incriminate 
Holzheuser in his statements to the police.  Although he tried to change his story at 
Holzheuser's trial, he did not change it entirely.  To some extent, he appeared to 
incriminate James Tremble instead, but to some extent he indicated that he did 
not really know who brought the precursors into the apartment.  The testimony was uncontradicted that 
Wenger and Holzheuser lived in the apartment and as a matter of circumstance, it 
was a fair inference that the precursors belong to both Holzheuser and 
Wenger.

 
 

The 
Evidence  Conspiracy

 
 
[¶18]   The conspiracy is a different 
matter.  It is unclear to us that 
the State even attempted to prove a conspiracy.  The crime of conspiracy is defined in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303 (LexisNexis 2007).  Also see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 
2007); Palato v. State, 988 P.2d 512, 525 (Wyo. 
1999).  In the opening statement, 
the alleged conspiracy is not mentioned at all by the prosecutor.  Only the conclusion that there was a 
conspiracy between Wenger and Holzheuser is mentioned in closing.  In the State's brief we do not find 
references to the transcript where the evidence of conspiracy is to be 
found.  We have searched the record 
and do not perceive the evidence presented at trial as sufficient to sustain the 
jury's conclusion that Wenger and Holzheuser entered into a conspiracy, even in 
light of our adoption of the unilateral approach to conspiracy.  We have searched the record for any 
evidence of the central element of conspiracy -- to agree with one or more 
persons to commit a crime -- and there is no such evidence whether hearsay or 
otherwise.  For this reason we 
conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the conviction for 
conspiracy.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   Holzheuser's conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and his conviction for 
possession of a List I or List II precursor with intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory are affirmed.  
The conviction of conspiracy to engage in a clandestine laboratory is 
reversed.  The case is remanded to 
the district court with directions to dismiss Count IV of the information and to resentence Holzheuser 
accordingly.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Apparently 
none of Wenger's statements were tape recorded, so the memories of the officers 
who questioned Wenger had to substitute for what he actually said during the 
questioning.