Case Title: In re Webb

Citation: 

Docket Number: S247074

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re BETTIE WEBB 
on Habeas Corpus 
 
S247074 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D072981 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
HC11619 & SCS293150 
 
 
May 23, 2019 
 
Justice Chin authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
IN RE WEBB 
S247074 
 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
Bettie Webb, defendant in the underlying criminal matter, 
was arrested and charged with two felony counts.  She posted 
bail and was released from custody.  At arraignment, the court 
imposed, as an additional condition of release, that she waive 
her Fourth Amendment right to be free of warrantless or 
unreasonable searches.  We granted review to decide whether, 
when a criminal defendant posts bail, the court has authority to 
impose additional release conditions.  We conclude that the 
court does have authority to impose reasonable conditions 
related to public safety.  Because the question has become moot 
as to defendant, we do not decide whether the court properly 
imposed the specific condition. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
As the Court of Appeal summarized, defendant “was 
arrested and eventually charged in a felony complaint with 
knowingly bringing controlled substances into a state prison 
(Pen. Code, § 4573)[1] and unauthorized possession of a 
controlled substance in a prison (§ 4573.6).  She posted a 
$50,000 bond in accordance with the bail schedule and was 
released.  At her arraignment, Webb pleaded not guilty to the 
charges, but over her objection the magistrate imposed a 
condition that she would be subject to a Fourth Amendment 
                                        
1 
All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 
IN RE WEBB 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
2 
waiver, finding it had inherent authority to do so.”  (In re Webb 
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 44, 47, fns. omitted (Webb).)  Specifically, 
the court ordered defendant to “ ‘submit your person, property, 
vehicle, personal effects to search at any time and any place, 
with or without a warrant, with or without reasonable cause 
when required by a pretrial services officer, a probation officer, 
or any other law enforcement officer.’ ”  (Id. at p. 47, fn. 2.) 
Defendant challenged the search condition by a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, which that court 
denied.  She then filed the instant “petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus contending the magistrate lacked statutory or inherent 
authority to impose the bail search condition, and imposition of 
the condition constitutes a pretrial restraint without due 
process protections such as notice and a hearing or any showing 
that she poses a heightened risk of misbehaving while on bail.”  
(Webb, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 47-48; see People v. 
Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 884 [“defendants may correct 
error in the setting of bail by seeking a writ of habeas corpus or 
other extraordinary writ ordering reconsideration of custody 
status or release”].) 
The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause.  
Ultimately, the majority concluded the trial court had neither 
statutory nor inherent authority to condition defendant’s bail on 
a Fourth Amendment waiver, and it ordered the condition 
vacated.  It disagreed with language in Gray v. Superior Court 
(2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 629 (Gray) and In re McSherry (2003) 
112 Cal.App.4th 856 (McSherry) that concluded that, even when 
a defendant posts bail, the court has inherent authority to 
impose reasonable bail conditions.  Because the majority 
concluded the court had no authority to impose the condition at 
IN RE WEBB 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
3 
all, it did “not reach Webb’s contention that the court denied her 
due process rights to notice and a fair hearing in imposing the 
bail condition.”  (Webb, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 57.) 
Acting Presiding Justice Benke authored a concurring 
opinion.  Relying heavily on Gray, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 629, 
and McSherry, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th 856, she argued “that a 
trial court has inherent authority to impose conditions on a 
defendant’s release, even when a defendant is able to post the 
amount of bail set forth in the court’s bail schedule.”  (Webb, 
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 57 (conc. opn. of Benke, Acting P.J.).)  
However, noting that this authority is “fairly narrow” (id. at p. 
59), she agreed that the court erred in imposing the search 
condition under the circumstances.  She argued that when 
defendant had posted bail and her guilt had not been 
established, “any invasion of her other constitutional rights 
must be closely connected to a risk of flight or a risk of harm to 
the community and based on a factual record which supports 
such intrusion.  Importantly, where a condition of bail invades 
a constitutional right, trial courts must consider whether the 
extent of the invasion is warranted by the nature and 
imminence of the risk, and whether . . . there are alternative 
means of protecting the public’s interests.  [Citation.]  While it 
is true, as the trial court stated, that given the circumstances 
which gave rise to the charges against Webb, there is some 
likelihood she is a habitual drug user and associates with other 
drug users and distributors, on this record which comes to us 
only after her arraignment, I am not convinced the fairly 
intrusive remedy of imposing a Fourth Amendment waiver on 
her is appropriate.  Such a waiver is unrelated to any flight risk 
IN RE WEBB 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
4 
and only indirectly related to preventing harm to the 
community, as opposed to Webb herself.”  (Id. at pp. 59-60.) 
The San Diego County District Attorney petitioned for 
review, raising a single issue:  “Do trial courts possess inherent 
authority to impose reasonable bail conditions related to public 
safety on felony defendants who are released on monetary bail?”  
We granted the petition to resolve the conflict between the 
majority opinion in the Court of Appeal and the opinions in 
Gray, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 629, and McSherry, supra, 112 
Cal.App.4th 856. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The district attorney informs us that, after the petition for 
review was filed, the underlying matter was resolved by a guilty 
plea and probation disposition.  Accordingly, this question is 
moot as to defendant.  Nevertheless, the district attorney urges 
us to decide “the issue presented because it presents a question 
of statewide general public concern.”  We agree.  “We have 
discretion to decide otherwise moot cases presenting important 
issues that are capable of repetition yet tend to evade review.”  
(Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 524, fn. 1.)  
Questions involving release on bail especially tend to evade 
review.  Accordingly, we will decide the issue presented even 
though it is moot as to defendant. 
Regarding the merits, we note preliminarily what the 
issue does not involve.  The petition for review presented only 
the broad question of whether trial courts have authority to 
impose conditions on felony defendants who are released on bail, 
i.e., the point on which the majority below disagreed with Gray, 
supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 629, and McSherry, supra, 112 
Cal.App.4th 856.  The district attorney expressly did not seek 
IN RE WEBB 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
5 
review of the specific question “of whether the bail condition 
imposed in this case was a proper exercise of the trial court’s 
inherent authority.”  Additionally, this question has become 
moot as to defendant.  Accordingly, we need not and do not 
decide the narrow question. 
We are also aware that recent legislation, titled “Pretrial 
release or detention:  pretrial services,” makes major changes in 
California’s pretrial release procedures.  (§§ 1320.7 et seq.; Sen. 
Bill No. 10 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.).)  If and when that legislation 
becomes the law, the issue here will become moot, as release 
procedures will be governed by statute.  By its terms, the new 
legislation was to be effective October 1, 2019.  (§ 1320.6; Stats. 
2018, ch. 244, § 3.)  Following its enactment, this legislation was 
suspended pursuant to a referendum petition.  Now, it will only 
be effective if approved as a referendum measure at the 
November 2020 election.  Accordingly, the issue before us 
remains important. 
Finally, defendant did post bail.  For this reason, the 
issues regarding the propriety of requiring bail as a condition of 
release raised in In re Humphrey (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1006, 
review granted May 23, 2018, S247278, are not presented.  We 
express no opinion regarding the recent legislation or the issues 
raised in Humphrey. 
  In In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133 (York), we held that 
a trial court could condition the release of an accused on his or 
her own recognizance on “the defendant’s agreement to submit 
to random drug testing and warrantless search and seizure 
during that period.”  (Id. at p. 1137.)  In doing so, however, we 
distinguished 
between 
persons 
released 
on 
their 
own 
recognizance and those released after posting bail.  We said that 
IN RE WEBB 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
6 
the petitioner’s challenge to the release condition “rests upon 
the flawed premise that a defendant who seeks [own 
recognizance] release has the same reasonable expectation of 
privacy as that enjoyed by persons not charged with any crime, 
and by defendants who have posted reasonable bail.”  (Id. at p. 
1149.) 
The majority below believed that York’s distinguishing 
between those released on their own recognizance and those 
released on bail in this way was a “persuasive indication” that 
such a condition could not be placed on a person who, like 
defendant, has posted bail.  (Webb, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 
53.)  But York did not confront — let alone decide — the question 
now before us:  whether any release conditions may be imposed 
on felony defendants who post money bail at the scheduled 
amount. 
Two cases postdating York, however, considered whether 
a court may impose release conditions on a person who has 
posted bail.  In McSherry, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th 856, a case 
involving misdemeanor charges, the court held that “a trial 
court may impose reasonable bail conditions on the granting of 
that bail,” but it also cautioned that “the conditions have to be 
reasonable and related to public safety.”  (Id. at p. 858.)  The 
court modified the conditions the trial court had imposed.  As 
modified, it upheld conditions that the petitioner — who had 
been convicted in the past of sex-related crimes involving 
children and a vehicle — (1) not drive a motor vehicle, (2) stay 
at least 200 yards away from children under the age of 17, and 
(3) stay at least 200 yards from specified places where children 
were present.  (Id. at pp. 859, 863.) 
IN RE WEBB 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
7 
In Gray, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 629, the petitioner, a 
medical doctor charged with various felony counts, was released 
on bail.  The court ordered, as a release condition, that the 
petitioner be prohibited from practicing medicine.  The Court of 
Appeal held that, procedurally, the order violated the 
petitioner’s due process rights.  (Id. at pp. 636-641.)  But, citing 
McSherry, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th 856, the court also held that 
a trial court may impose reasonable conditions even if the 
person has been released on bail, and that the condition imposed 
in that case is not necessarily unreasonable.  (Id. at pp. 642-
643.) 
In reaching this conclusion, the Gray court explained that 
“[t]here is no explicit statutory authority for the trial court to do 
what it did here.  Penal Code section 1269c authorizes a 
magistrate to ‘set bail on the terms and conditions that he or 
she, in his or her discretion, deems appropriate’ in the case of a 
defendant arrested without a warrant.[2]   In addition, Penal 
Code section 1270, subdivision (a) authorizes a court to ‘set bail 
and specify the conditions’ after the court makes the requisite 
                                        
2 
Section 1269c permits a peace officer to seek higher bail 
than that set forth in the bail schedule when the defendant is 
arrested without a warrant and permits a defendant to apply for 
lower bail or own recognizance release.  It also provides:  “The 
magistrate or commissioner to whom the application is made is 
authorized to set bail in an amount that he or she deems 
sufficient to ensure the defendant’s appearance or to ensure the 
protection of a victim, or family member of a victim, of domestic 
violence, and to set bail on the terms and conditions that he or 
she, in his or her discretion, deems appropriate, or he or she may 
authorize the defendant’s release on his or her own 
recognizance.” 
 
IN RE WEBB 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
8 
findings that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor is not 
entitled to an own recognizance (OR) release.[3]  Here, because 
Gray surrendered voluntarily pursuant to a warrant setting bail 
and because he is charged with felony counts, the statutes 
expressly 
authorizing 
bail 
conditions 
do 
not 
apply.  
Nevertheless, although the statutory authority is limited, there 
is a general understanding that the trial court possesses 
inherent authority to impose conditions associated with release 
on bail.  [Citing, inter alia, McSherry, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th 
856.]  In McSherry, the court reasoned that if a trial court is 
statutorily authorized to impose bail conditions on a person 
charged with a misdemeanor (see Pen. Code, § 1270, subd. (a)), 
then the Legislature surely intended similar conditions could be 
imposed when a defendant facing felony charges is released on 
bail.  (McSherry, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.)”  (Gray, 
supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 641-642.) 
The Gray court also explained that “[b]efore legislative 
amendments to the Penal Code in 1987, the only permissible 
purpose of bail was to ensure the defendant’s presence in court.  
                                        
3 
Section 1270, subdivision (a), provides, as relevant:  “A 
defendant who is in custody and is arraigned on a complaint 
alleging an offense which is a misdemeanor, and a defendant 
who appears before a court or magistrate upon an out-of-county 
warrant arising out of a case involving only misdemeanors, shall 
be entitled to an own recognizance release unless the court 
makes a finding on the record . . . that an own recognizance 
release will compromise public safety or will not reasonably 
assure the appearance of the defendant as required.  Public 
safety shall be the primary consideration.  If the court makes 
one of those findings, the court shall then set bail and specify 
the conditions, if any, whereunder the defendant shall be 
released.” 
IN RE WEBB 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
9 
(McSherry, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.)  Now, ‘public 
safety . . . is . . . the primary factor for the court to consider in 
the setting of bail.’  (Id. at p. 861; see Pen. Code, § 1275, subd. 
(a).)”  (Gray, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 642.)  The court noted 
that the specific statute relied on to impose the condition of that 
case (§ 1275, subd. (a)) did not refer to bail conditions.  But it 
agreed with McSherry “that because public safety is the 
Legislature’s overriding theme in the bail statutory framework, 
and because the trial court has the inherent power to impose 
bail conditions, it follows that the trial court may impose bail 
conditions intended to ensure public safety.”  (Gray, at p. 642, 
citing McSherry, at pp. 861-863.) 
The concurring justice below agreed with Gray and 
McSherry in this respect.  She believed that “we must recognize 
the practical necessity that in particular cases, in order to 
assure a defendant’s appearance and protect the public from 
harm, a trial court has the power to impose conditions which 
restrain the behavior or provide monitoring of a defendant while 
criminal proceedings are pending — even where as here, the 
defendant has the ability to post cash bail.”  (Webb, supra, 20 
Cal.App.5th at p. 58 (conc. opn. of Benke, Acting P.J.).) 
The 
majority 
below 
found 
Gray 
and 
McSherry 
“unpersuasive.”  (Webb, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 56.)  It noted 
(as did the Gray court) that the references to bail conditions in 
sections 1269c and 1270 involved situations other than this 
one — deciding whether to increase or decrease bail for a person 
arrested without a warrant (§ 1269c) or a misdemeanor charge 
(§ 1270).  “In contrast, the Legislature makes no mention of a 
court or magistrate’s authority to impose conditions for a person 
released on the scheduled amount of bail for a felony offense.”  
IN RE WEBB 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
10 
(Webb, at p. 50.)  The majority found no express statutory basis 
for imposition of bail conditions.  “No other scenario in which the 
Legislature 
authorized 
imposition 
of 
appropriate 
bail 
conditions — for misdemeanants or departures from the bail 
schedule — applies, and we will not insert text to the statutory 
scheme to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on its 
face.”  (Id. at p. 51.)  It also found no inherent authority to 
impose the Fourth Amendment waiver condition or, apparently, 
any condition.  (Id. at pp. 51-56.) 
We agree with McSherry, Gray, and the concurring 
opinion below that the trial court does have authority to impose 
reasonable release conditions even when the person has posted 
bail.  Several statutes provide for release conditions on bail.  In 
addition to the two statutes cited in Gray and the majority below 
(§§ 1269c, 1270), others include sections 646.93, subdivision (c), 
and 1506.  None of these statutes govern this precise situation.  
But nothing in them suggests that bail conditions were unique 
to the situations they governed.  As McSherry and Gray 
indicated, it would be illogical for the Legislature to authorize 
conditions of release on bail for those charged with a 
misdemeanor but prohibit such conditions for those charged 
with a felony.  (Gray, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 642; 
McSherry, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.)  Instead, these 
statutes imply that courts do have authority to impose release 
conditions even if the defendant has posted bail. 
Moreover, after McSherry and Gray were decided, the 
voters amended California’s Constitution to make clear that 
trial courts do have authority to impose reasonable release 
conditions on persons who post bail.  California Constitution, 
article I, section 28, subdivision (b)(3), as amended in November 
IN RE WEBB 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
11 
2008 by an initiative measure, provides that a victim has the 
right “[t]o have the safety of the victim and the victim’s family 
considered in fixing the amount of bail and release conditions for 
the defendant.”  (Italics added.) 
In Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, we 
encountered a similar situation.  There, the trial court issued 
orders to protect jurors’ privacy that went beyond what the 
statutes had expressly authorized.  Recognizing that “trial 
courts have always possessed the inherent power to protect 
jurors’ physical safety and privacy,” we upheld the orders.  (Id. 
at p. 1087.)  We explained that the protective measures the trial 
court imposed were within its authority in part because they 
were “fully consistent” with the purpose of protecting juror 
safety — a purpose reflected in the relevant statutes.  (Id. at p. 
1096.) 
The same is true for bail:  reasonable conditions generally 
further, rather than undermine, the important legislative 
purpose of protecting public safety.  (See § 1275, subd. (a)(1) [“In 
setting, reducing, or denying bail, a judge or magistrate shall 
take into consideration the protection of the public, the 
seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record 
of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at 
trial or at a hearing of the case.  The public safety shall be the 
primary consideration.”  (Italics added.)].)  Authorizing courts to 
impose reasonable conditions of release on bail is fully 
consistent with this legislative policy. 
Accordingly, we conclude that trial courts have authority 
to impose reasonable conditions related to public safety on 
persons released on bail.  We need not here consider in detail 
the exact contours of this authority.  We stress, however, that, 
as the concurring justice noted below, this authority is “fairly 
IN RE WEBB 
Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 
 
12 
narrow.”  (Webb, supra, 20 Cal.App. 5th at p. 59 (conc. opn. of 
Benke, Acting P.J.).)  Any condition must be reasonable, and 
there must be a sufficient nexus between the condition and the 
protection of public safety. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We disagree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal 
majority to the extent it held that trial courts have no authority 
to impose release conditions on persons who post bail.  Because 
the question is moot as to defendant, we need not decide whether 
the specific condition was valid.  Instead, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that 
court with directions to discharge the order to show cause and 
deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus as moot. 
CHIN, J. 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Webb 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 20 Cal.App.5th 44 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S247074 
Date Filed: May 23, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Stephanie Sontag 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Angela Bartosik, Chief Deputy Public Defender, and Robert Louis Ford, Deputy Public Defender, for 
Petitioner Bettie Webb. 
 
Summer Stephan, District Attorney, Mark A. Amador, Linh Lam, James Atkins, Lilia E. Garcia and 
Marissa A. Bejarano, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent the People. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, 
Assistant Attorney General, Katie L. Stowe, Deputy Attorney General, and Joshua A. Klein, Deputy State 
Solicitor General, for Attorney General as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent the People. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert Louis Ford 
Deputy Public Defender 
450 B Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 338-4831 
 
Marissa A. Bejarano 
Deputy District Attorney 
330 West Broadway, Suite 860 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 531-4040