Case Title: Rubin et. al. v. Sterling Enterprises, Inc.

Citation: 164 Vt 582, 674 A.2d 782

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
RUBIN_V_STERLING_ENTERPRISES.94-480; 164 Vt 582; 674 A.2d 782

[Opinion Filed 05-Jan-1996]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 1-Feb-1996]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-480


Matthew Rubin et al.                              Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           Washington Superior Court

Sterling Enterprises, Inc. et al.                 October Term, 1995


Alan W. Cheever, J.

       Richard I. Rubin of Rubin, Kidney, Myer & DeWolfe, Barre, for
  plaintiffs-appellees

       William A. Hunter, Cavendish, for defendants-appellants


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       GIBSON, J.   Defendants Sterling Enterprises, Inc. and Floryan Lohutko
  appeal from both a jury verdict awarding plaintiffs damages for defamation
  and a judgment in plaintiffs' favor following a bench trial.  We affirm.

       On February 17, 1986, the parties entered a lease agreement under
  which plaintiffs rented land for the purpose of constructing and operating
  a hydroelectric facility.  In November 1991, defendants demanded an
  additional $40,791 in rent and reimbursements because plaintiffs had failed
  to:  (1) clean up rock and other construction debris at the site that would
  cost defendants $10,791 to remove; (2) preserve a turbine, with an
  estimated value of $10,000, which plaintiffs had removed from an abandoned
  powerhouse during construction; and (3) pay defendants 50% of additional
  revenues, amounting to $10,000 per year, from alleged increased operations
  at the facility in 1988 and 1989.  When plaintiffs did not pay, defendants
  sent a notice of default to the Marble Bank, which held a mortgage on the
  project worth almost $1,000,000.

       Plaintiffs thereupon commenced a libel action, alleging that
  defendants' defamatory default notice caused the bank to raise the interest
  rate on plaintiffs' loan.  Defendants

 

  counterclaimed for the $40,791 allegedly owed by plaintiffs, and for an
  additional $10,000 in revenues from alleged increased operations in 1990.

       Plaintiffs' defamation claims, together with defendants' counterclaims
  for the cleanup costs, the lost turbine, and the 1988 and 1989 surplus
  revenues, were tried to a jury in Washington Superior Court.  The jury
  rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiffs for $46,000 and awarded nothing
  on defendants' counterclaims.  Defendants' counterclaim for the 1990
  surplus revenues was thereafter tried to the court, which issued findings
  of fact and conclusions of law, and entered judgment for plaintiffs.  The
  court denied defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the jury's
  verdict and for reconsideration of the court's judgment with respect to the
  1990 revenues.  The court granted plaintiffs' motion to amend the judgment
  to include prejudgment interest in the amount of $1,633.

                                     I.

       With respect to the jury trial, defendants claim that the court erred
  in denying their motions for directed verdict and for judgment
  notwithstanding the verdict.  Motions for judgment notwithstanding the
  verdict raise substantially the same questions as motions for directed
  verdict and are treated alike.  Center v. Mad River Corp., 151 Vt. 408,
  411, 561 A.2d 90, 93 (1989). Both motions require a consideration of the
  evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, excluding the
  effect of any modifying evidence.  Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 154
  Vt. 284, 292, 576 A.2d 441, 446 (1990).  The motions should be denied if
  the record contains any evidence that fairly and reasonably supports the
  verdict.  Id.

                                    A.

       Defendants first contend that the lease authorized them to report any
  default to the Marble Bank, and that such a communication was a business
  privilege that could not support plaintiffs' defamation action as a matter
  of law.  We disagree.  We have acknowledged a defendant's right to raise a
  "conditional privilege for the protection of its legitimate business
  interests."  Id. at 293, 576 A.2d  at 446; see Lent v. Huntoon, 143 Vt. 539,
  548-49,