Case Title: In re G.F., G.F. & J.F., Juveniles

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re G.F., G.F. & J.F., Juveniles (2006-399)

2007 VT 11

[Filed 23-Feb-2007]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2007 VT 11

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2006-399

                             JANUARY TERM, 2007


  In re G.F., G.F. & J.F., Juveniles  }          APPEALED FROM:
                                      }
                                      }
                                      }          Orleans Family Court
                                      }  
                                      }
                                      }          DOCKET NO. 7/8/9-1-05 OsJv

                                                 Trial Judge: Howard E. 
                                                              VanBenthuysen

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Mother and father separately appeal from a judgment of the
  Orleans Family Court terminating their residual parental rights to minors
  G.F., G.F., and J.F.   Mother contends the court improperly failed to: (1)
  make a finding required by the Indian Child Welfare Act; and (2) explore
  alternative disposition options to termination.  Father joins in mother's
  second claim, and also asserts that the court erroneously denied his
  request for appointment of counsel.  We affirm. 

       ¶  2.  The facts and procedural background may be briefly
  summarized.  Additional facts will be set forth in the discussion which
  follows. The children in this case, age eleven, nine, and eight at the time
  of these proceedings, came into the custody of the Department for Children
  and Families (DCF) on an emergency basis in January 2005, when the police
  responded to a report that the children were locked outside their home. 
  Mother was home at the time and admitted to smoking marijuana.  The
  children were placed in a foster home, where they have since remained.   

       ¶  3.  Mother had been granted sole custody of the children under a
  2001 judgment of divorce from father.  Father's relationship with mother
  began when she was twelve, and father physically abused her throughout
  their relationship.  After the divorce, father was frequently out of state,
  avoiding Vermont arrest warrants.  His limited contact with DCF providers
  and the family has been marked by hostility and aggression.

       ¶  4.    The family had been receiving services from DCF and other
  community support agencies since 2001.  Between 2001 and 2005, however,
  mother moved frequently between Vermont and New Hampshire, making it
  difficult to sustain services or keep track of the family.  During this
  period, DCF received numerous reports that mother was leaving the children
  alone and unattended, was abusing alcohol and marijuana, and was the victim
  of domestic violence by a number of domestic partners.  
          
       ¶  5.  Mother stipulated to an adjudication of CHINS in March 2005,
  and stipulated to a disposition order the following month.  The caseplan
  identified reunification as the goal and called for a variety of services,
  including substance abuse counseling, family therapy, and parent education. 
  Although notified of the hearing, father did not appear at the detention
  hearing in January 2005, and also failed to appear at the subsequent CHINS
  and disposition hearings.  The caseplan called for father to participate in
  parenting classes, domestic violence education,  substance abuse
  counseling, and individual therapy, but did not consider father as a
  placement option in view of his continued absence from the children's
  lives. 

       ¶  6.  In December 2005, DCF filed termination of parental rights
  (TPR) petitions as to all three children based on the parents' failure to
  progress under the caseplan.  The court became aware early in the
  proceedings that the children, through mother, might be eligible for
  membership in the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (Tribe) and ordered that the
  Tribe be provided with all hearing notices in the case.  The Tribe
  officially recognized mother and the children as members in February 2006.
  The Tribe did not, however, seek to intervene and failed to appear or
  participate in any of these proceedings.  A three-day TPR hearing was held
  in April 2006 and continued for a final one-day hearing in August.  In the
  interim, at the request of the children, the court issued a ruling that the
  Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C §§ 1901-1963 (ICWA), applied to the
  proceedings, but that the Tribe had consciously waived its right to
  intervene or appear.  The court further found that mother and the children
  had not had any contact with the Tribe or Indian culture, and that she and
  father opposed any placement of the children with the Tribe.

       ¶  7.  In late August 2006, the court issued a written decision
  concluding that there had been a substantial change of circumstances in
  light of both parents' failure to progress under the caseplan, and further
  concluding that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of
  the children.  The court found that all of the children had suffered from
  neglect while in mother's custody; that as a result the children had
  suffered emotional anxiety and physical distress; that mother had
  consistently abused marijuana, prescription drugs, and alcohol, and had
  failed to make any real progress in substance abuse counseling or parenting
  classes; and that there was no likelihood that mother could resume her
  parental responsibilities within a reasonable time.  The court also found
  that the children had made substantial progress in foster care, where they
  were fully integrated into a stable, loving home.  As to father, the court
  found that he had only sporadic contact with the children since the
  divorce; that he had made no significant progress in parenting education or
  anger management counseling, indeed that he remained subject to angry
  outbursts and impulses; and that he could not resume parenting
  responsibilities within a reasonable period of time.  Accordingly, the
  court granted the TPR petitions.  

       ¶  8.  The State filed a post-judgment motion for additional
  findings under the ICWA.   The State noted that despite the court's finding
  that the Tribe had waived its right to intervene or appear, the ICWA
  continued to apply and required a finding under § 1912(f), which provides: 

    No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such
    [termination] proceeding in the absence of a determination,
    supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including
    testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued
    custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely
    to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.

  25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).  The court denied the motion.  This appeal followed.

        
       ¶  9.  Mother first contends the court improperly failed to make the
  requisite "determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,"
  that her continued custody was "likely to result in serious emotional or
  physical damage to the child," as required by § 1912(f) of the ICWA. (FN1) 
  As we have elsewhere explained, Congress enacted the ICWA in 1978 to
  "protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability
  and security of Indian tribes and families."  In re M.C.P., 153 Vt. 275,
  282, 571 A.2d 627, 631 (1989) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1902).  Congress
  achieved these goals by establishing "minimum Federal standards for the
  removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such
  children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values
  of Indian culture."  25 U.S.C. § 1902.  The ICWA provides that when the
  court has reason to know that an Indian child is involved in a juvenile
  court proceeding, it must notify the child's tribe and afford it the
  opportunity to exercise jurisdiction or intervene.  Id. §§ 1911(b),
  1912(a).  In those cases where the proceeding remains in state court, the
  ICWA sets out standards which must be met before a child can be placed in
  foster care and before the parent's rights can be terminated, including the
  provision at issue here, § 1912(f). 

       ¶  10.  As noted, mother's contention is based solely on the trial
  court's failure to comply with the statutory finding requirement; she does
  not claim that the record evidence would fail to support such a finding,
  had the court chosen to address the issue. The State, in response, does not
  dispute that, notwithstanding the Tribe's apparent indifference to the
  outcome in this case, the ICWA remained applicable; indeed, the State
  acknowledged as much in its post-judgment motion seeking an express finding
  under § 1912(f).  The State asserts, rather, that the trial court
  "substantially complied" with the statutory requirement through its other
  undisputed findings-based on extensive evidentiary support-that
  reunification with mother would be detrimental to the mental health and
  physical well-being of the children.      

       ¶  11.  Although the court acknowledged in its preliminary ruling
  that the ICWA applied, it made no reference there or in its subsequent
  termination ruling to § 1912(f) or to the requirement of a determination,
  supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the children would
  suffer physical or emotional harm if returned to mother.  Accordingly, it
  is difficult to conclude that the court was aware of the statutory
  requirement and intended to address it, albeit implicitly through its other
  findings rather than by express reference to the statute or the statutory
  language.  The cases on which the State relies show that the ICWA "does not
  require that a state court specifically cite the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
  standard of proof" set forth in § 1912(f), In re M.R.G., 97 P.3d 1085, 1087
  (Mont. 2004), but also suggest that the court's findings should
  "demonstrate  an understanding, on the part of the [trial court], that the
  State satisfied its burden of proof." In re M.D.M, 59 P.3d 1142, 1146
  (Mont. 2002).  Such an understanding by the court of its obligation under §
  1912(f) is not apparent from its decision here.  Indeed, the State's motion
  gave the court the opportunity to make that clarification, but the court
  denied it without explanation.  We are therefore unable to conclude that
  the court substantially complied with the statutory requirement. 
        
       ¶  12.  Nevertheless, other states have concluded that errors of this
  nature under the ICWA may be deemed harmless; that a determination of
  harmless error "is dependent upon [the] particular facts and circumstances"
  of each case,  In re Enrique P.,