Case Title: Bremer v. Doctors Building Partnership

Citation: 

Docket Number: 950730

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
                    
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, 
and Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
JAMES BREMER, ET AL.  
 
v.  Record No. 950730 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                      January 12, 1996 
DOCTOR'S BUILDING PARTNERSHIP 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
Arthur B. Vieregg, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in granting a nonsuit when a defendant's plea filed pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-422 was pending. 
 
Doctor's Building Partnership (Doctors) filed a motion for 
judgment against James Bremer, Lewis F. Shrensky, and Jose 
Rodrigues, general partners of Castle Way Partnership 
(collectively, Bremer).  Doctors sought to enforce payment of a 
deferred purchase money note executed in connection with the 
1983 sale of a commercial office building.  Bremer filed an 
"answer," counterclaims, and a plea under Code § 8.01-422.  
Both the statutory plea and one of the counterclaims were based 
on an allegation that Doctors breached express warranties 
contained in the purchase agreement that the office building 
conformed to the requirements set out in the applicable state 
and county building codes.
1
 
 
Bremer labeled his statutory plea as a "claim for 
recoupment."  Doctors did not appeal the trial court's holding 
that Bremer's statutory "claim for recoupment" was within the 
pleas authorized by Code § 8.01-422.  Therefore, that issue, 
whether a plea of recoupment based on a breach of warranty 
claim is cognizable under Code § 8.01-422, is not before us for 
review. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Trial was set for October 31, 1994.  Prior to the trial 
date, Bremer nonsuited the counterclaims and, after an ore 
tenus hearing, the trial court ruled that, although the 
purchase agreement had been modified by a subsequent addendum, 
the modification did not displace the warranties and they 
remained in effect.  On the day of the trial, the trial court 
granted Doctors' motion for nonsuit. 
 
Bremer filed an appeal asserting that the trial court's 
nonsuit order violated the provisions of Code § 8.01-380 
because his statutory plea was pending and because the case had 
been submitted for decision.  Bremer also contended that, even 
if Code § 8.01-380 was not violated, the trial court's action 
was contrary to "extra-statutory common-law principles which 
prohibit a plaintiff from taking a nonsuit if, by so doing, it 
allows the plaintiff an advantage, and serves to prejudice or 
oppress the defendant, or deprives the defendant of any just 
defense."  We awarded Bremer an appeal and, because we conclude 
that the trial court properly applied Code § 8.01-380, we will 
affirm the order of the trial court. 
 
I. 
 
Consideration of Bremer's contention that Code § 8.01-
380(C) precluded a nonsuit because of his pending statutory 
plea requires a review of the legislative history of the 
nonsuit statute and of the provision upon which Bremer's 
statutory plea is based, Code § 8.01-422.  In the 1977 
 
 
 
 
3 
recodification of Title 8, the Code sections dealing with 
nonsuits were consolidated in Code § 8.01-380 of new Title 
8.01.  Report of the Virginia Code Commission to the Governor 
and the General Assembly of Virginia, House Document No. 14, at 
243 (1977).  Code § 8.01-380 provides in pertinent part: 
 
A. 
A party shall not be allowed to suffer a nonsuit as 
to any cause of action or claim . . . unless he does so 
. . . before the action has been submitted to the court 
for decision. . . . 
 
 
B. 
Only one nonsuit may be taken . . . as a matter 
of right . . . . 
 
 
C. 
A party shall not be allowed to nonsuit a cause 
of action, without the consent of the adverse party who 
has filed a counterclaim, cross claim or third-party claim 
. . . unless the counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party 
claim can remain pending for independent adjudication by 
the court. 
 
Subsection C is based on former Code § 8-244 which prohibited a 
nonsuit if a defendant had filed a counterclaim and did not 
consent to the nonsuit.  Acts 1954, ch. 611 at 785.  Prior to 
1954, Code § 8-244 did not refer to a counterclaim, but 
prohibited a nonsuit without the consent of the defendant if 
the defendant had filed a "plea or account under [Chapter 14 of 
Title 8]."  Code § 8-244 (1950).  Former Code § 8-241 was 
within Chapter 14 of Title 8, and, thus, pleas filed thereunder 
were protected from nonsuit.  In 1977, Code § 8-241 was 
recodified as Code § 8.01-422, the source of Bremer's statutory 
plea.  Acts 1977, ch. 617 at 1125. 
 
The premise underlying Bremer's position is his assertion 
that the amendments to and recodification of former Code §§ 8-
241 and -244 made no substantive changes and that the 
 
 
 
 
4 
insertions of the word "counterclaim" in those sections were 
changes in nomenclature only.  Based on this premise, Bremer 
asserts that his statutory plea is entitled to protection 
against nonsuit as a "counterclaim" in Code § 8.01-380(C) in 
the same manner that former "plea[s] and account[s]" under 
Chapter 14 of Title 8 were protected by former Code § 8-244.  
Thus, Bremer concludes that because his statutory plea is a 
"counterclaim" which cannot "remain pending for independent 
adjudication," the trial court erred in granting a nonsuit.   
 
Our review of the legislative history of these sections 
shows, however, that Bremer's premise is flawed.  Substantive 
changes were made to both former Code §§ 8-241 and -244 based 
on the distinctions between counterclaims and pleas filed under 
former Code § 8-241.  Following the enactment of the 1950 Code, 
the General Assembly instructed the Virginia Code Commission to 
identify statutes dealing with court practice and procedure 
which had been rendered obsolete by the new Code.  In its 
report, the Commission noted that certain procedural statutes 
had also been rendered obsolete by new Rules of Court effective 
contemporaneously with the 1950 Code.  Repeal of Obsolete 
Procedural Statutes, A Report of the Virginia Code Commission 
to the Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia, House 
Document No. 16 (1954)(hereinafter, House Document No. 16).  
Consequently, the Commission's recommendations included changes 
needed as a result of both the 1950 Code and Rules of Court.  
 
 
 
 
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One of the areas identified by the Commission for 
legislative action was precipitated by the adoption of Rule 
3:8, which, for the first time, identified a counterclaim as a 
specific form of pleading.  New Rule 3:8 defined a counterclaim 
broadly by covering various types of relief a defendant could 
seek from the plaintiff which could be resolved in the same 
litigation.
2  Counterclaims were limited, however, to actions 
at law.  Thus, as the Commission explained, the new rule 
encompassed many of the pleas formerly authorized by Code § 8-
241 but did not include pleas seeking equitable relief in the 
form of damages which were allowed by the statute.  To make 
Rule 3:8 coextensive with former Code § 8-241, the Commission 
recommended that Rule 3:8 be amended to include "any matter 
which would entitle [a defendant] to relief in equity in the 
nature of damages."  House Document No. 16, at 24.  If the Rule 
was not changed, however, the Commission recommended that only 
 
     
2The new Rule 3:8 provided: 
 
 
 
 
Within twenty-one days after service on him of the 
notice of motion for judgment, a defendant may, at his 
option, plead as a counterclaim any cause of action at law 
for a money judgment in personam that he has against the 
plaintiff or all plaintiffs jointly, whether or not it 
grows out of any transaction mentioned in the notice of 
motion for judgment, whether or not it is for liquidated 
damages, whether it is in tort or contract, and whether or 
not the amount demanded in the counterclaim is greater 
than the amount demanded in the notice of motion for 
judgment.  The court in its discretion may order a 
separate trial of any cause of action asserted in a 
counterclaim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There have been no further changes to this rule. 
 
 
 
 
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"so much of § 8-241 as relates to equitable defenses" be 
retained.  Id.  
 
Rule 3:8 was not amended and, following the Commission's 
recommendation, the General Assembly amended Code § 8-241 to 
eliminate a number of the pleas formerly authorized under that 
section but now embraced as counterclaims under Rule 3:8.
3  
Pleas seeking relief in equity remained in the statute as 
amended.  The Commission also recommended that the title of the 
section be changed from "Special pleas of set-off" to "Special 
plea of equitable defenses," further highlighting the altered 
scope of Code § 8-241.  House Document No. 16, at 24.  This 
change was reflected in the 1977 recodification.  Acts 1977, 
                     
 
Prior to 1954 former Code § 8-241 provided in pertinent 
part: 
  
 
In any action on a contract, the defendant may file a 
plea, alleging any such failure in the consideration 
of the contract, or fraud in its procurement, or any 
such breach of any warranty to him of the title or 
the soundness of personal property, . . . or any 
other such matter as would entitle him either to 
recover damages at law from the plaintiff, or the 
person under whom the plaintiff claims, or to relief 
in equity, in whole or in part, against the 
obligation of the contract; or, if the contract be by 
deed, alleging any such matter arising under the 
contract, existing before its execution, or any such 
mistake therein, or in the execution thereof, or any 
such other matter as would entitle him to such relief 
in equity; and in either case alleging the amount to 
which he is entitled by reason of the matters 
contained in the plea. 
 
Code § 8-241 (1950)(emphasis added).  The italicized language 
was deleted by the 1954 amendments to this section.  Acts 1954, 
ch. 617 at 788. 
 
 
 
 
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ch. 617 at 1125 (Code § 8.01-422 entitled "Pleading equitable 
defenses").  
 
The General Assembly also amended former Code § 8-244 as a 
result of the Code Commission's report.  The Commission 
proposed a new Rule 3:9.2 which continued the limitations on 
nonsuits contained in former Code § 8-244, but applied them to 
counterclaims and cross claims only.
4  House Document No. 16, 
at 25.  The proposed Rule 3:9.2 was not adopted, however, but 
the General Assembly, following the Commission's 
recommendation, replaced the existing language of Code § 8-244 
with the language proposed for the rule.  Acts 1954, ch. 611 at 
785. 
 
Contrary to Bremer's assertion, the 1954 amendments were 
substantive amendments.  The word "counterclaim" in the newly 
enacted Code § 8-244 was not simply a change in nomenclature 
but was deliberately chosen to refer to Rule 3:8 counterclaims 
 
     
4Rule 3:9.2 as proposed by the Commission provided as 
follows: 
 
 
A defendant who pleads a counterclaim or cross-claim 
shall be deemed to have brought an action at the time 
he files such pleading, provided that if the subject 
matter of the counterclaim arises out of the same 
transaction or occurrence upon which the plaintiff's 
claim is based, the statute of limitations with 
respect to such counterclaim shall be tolled by the 
commencement of the plaintiff's action.  In such case 
the plaintiff shall not, after the counterclaim is 
filed, dismiss his case without the defendant's 
consent. 
 
House Document No. 16, at 25. 
 
 
 
 
8 
                    
only.  The General Assembly, after consideration of the 
Commission's report, enacted the 1954 amendments with full 
knowledge and intent that counterclaims referenced in Code § 8-
244 did not include pleas filed under Code § 8-241. 
 
Based on this review of legislative history, we hold that 
a statutory plea filed pursuant to Code § 8.01-422, successor 
to Code § 8-241, is not a counterclaim as that term is used in 
Code § 8.01-380(C), successor to Code § 8-244.  Therefore, the 
conditions attaching to a nonsuit under subsection C of Code 
§ 8.01-380 do not apply to this case.
5
 
II. 
 
Bremer next contends that the nonsuit was barred under 
Code § 8.01-380(A) because the matter had been submitted to the 
court for decision prior to the motion for nonsuit.  Bremer 
bases his contention on the trial court's determination that 
the warranties contained in the purchase agreement survived the 
subsequent amendment to the agreement.  This ruling, however, 
did not resolve any issue of liability.  It is no different 
from numerous rulings made by trial courts in the course of the 
trial which impact the conduct of the trial, but do not involve 
submitting "the action . . . to the court for decision" under 
 
 
We also note that earlier in this litigation Bremer 
successfully argued that his claim was not a counterclaim.  See 
City of Hopewell v. Cogar, in which this Court stated that a 
litigant cannot "say that what they identified as an 
affirmative defense actually was a counterclaim."  237 Va. 264, 
269, 377 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1989). 
 
 
 
 
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Code § 8.01-380(A).  Accordingly, the order granting a nonsuit 
did not violate Code § 8.01-380(A) because the matter had not 
been submitted to the court for decision. 
 
III. 
 
Finally, Bremer contends that the trial court erred in 
granting the nonsuit, even if there was no violation of Code 
§ 8.01-380, because under principles of common law a plaintiff 
is not entitled to a nonsuit if the rights of the defendant 
would be prejudiced by the dismissal of the action.  See, e.g., 
Kemper v. Calhoun, 111 Va. 428, 430-31, 69 S.E. 358, 359 
(1910).  The prejudice resulting from the dismissal was the 
inability of the defendant to pursue his claims against the 
plaintiff.  Defenses asserted in response to a motion for 
judgment, such as Bremer's filed under Code § 8.01-422 seeking 
affirmative relief, are not barred or otherwise lost.  They may 
be reasserted if the motion for judgment is subsequently 
refiled.  Furthermore, the common law considerations of 
prejudice were codified in Code § 8.01-380(C) by prohibiting a 
nonsuit if a pending counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party 
claim could not be independently adjudicated.  Therefore, a 
plaintiff is entitled to one nonsuit as a matter of right if 
the provisions of Code § 8.01-380 are met without further 
analysis of prejudice to the defendant.  Gilbreath v. Brewster, 
250 Va. 436, 463 S.E.2d 836 (1995); Clark v. Butler Aviation, 
238 Va. 506, 511, 385 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1989); Nash v. Jewell, 
 
 
 
 
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227 Va. 230, 237, 315 S.E.2d 825, 829 (1984). 
 
In summary, Doctors' motion for a nonsuit was made before 
the matter was submitted to the court for decision.  No 
counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party claim was pending.  
Therefore, Doctors was entitled to a nonsuit as a matter of 
right.  Code § 8.01-380.  Accordingly, we will affirm the order 
of the trial court. 
 
Affirmed.