Case Title: Caruthers v. Kroger

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  April 29, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
JERRY CARUTHERS,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN R. KROGER,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S057678)
On petitioner's objections to modified ballot
title filed March 29, 2010; considered and under advisement on March 31, 2010.
Thomas K. Doyle, Bennett, Hartman, Morris &
Kaplan, LLP, Portland, filed the objections and the reply for petitioner.
Douglas F. Zier, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Salem, filed a response to petitioner's objections for respondent.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, Kistler, and Linder, Justices.*
PER CURIAM
The second modified ballot title is certified to
the Secretary of State.
Durham, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in
which Gillette, J., joined.
*Walters, J., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
PER CURIAM
This ballot title
review proceeding involving Initiative Petition 43 (2010) is before the court
for a third time.  See Caruthers v. Kroger, 347 Or 660, 227 P3d 723
(2010) (certified ballot title referred to Attorney General for
modification); Caruthers v. Kroger, 348 Or 63 , ___ P3d ___ (2010) (Attorney General's modified ballot title referred to Attorney General
for further modification).  In response, on March 23, 2010, the Attorney
General certified a second modified ballot title, which we set out in full:
"Amends Constitution:  Prohibits current and future
elections laws from disqualifying
registered voters' signatures on initiative/referendum petitions
"Result of 'Yes' Vote:  'Yes' vote
sets aside many existing controls over initiative/referendum signature
collection and verification process and prohibits the legislature from enacting
statutes for those controls.
"Result of 'No' Vote:  'No' vote
retains existing laws and regulations that control the initiative and
referendum signature collection and verification process for determining if
measure qualifies for ballot.
"Summary:  Amends constitution. 
Initiative and referendum petitions qualify for ballot only when they are
signed by a sufficient number of qualified registered voters.  Currently,
constitutional provisions, statutes, and administrative rules establish
requirements for signature collection, verification, and counting to prevent
fraud, forgery, or improper signature gathering; for example, disqualifying
entire petition signature sheet if circulator's signature is undated or date is
crossed out.  Measure prohibits the disqualification of any individual
registered voter's signature on an initiative/referendum petition, even when
signature on the petition was obtained in violation of current elections laws. 
Prohibits any future statute or administrative rule from disqualifying
registered voters' signatures 'for purposes of determining whether the
initiative or referendum petition has obtained enough signatures to qualify for
submission to voters.'  Other provisions."
Petitioner has filed
objections to the caption and the summary in the second modified ballot title. 
Petitioner argues that, contrary to this court's prior directions, the caption
still focuses incorrectly on election laws that disqualify voters' signatures
on initiative and referendum petitions.  He also contends that the summary is
insufficient.  He complains that, by using only a minor technical deficiency as
an example of an election law that the proposed measure would invalidate, the
summary misleads voters into believing that the subject matter of the measure
is the protection of voters' signatures against invalidation due to similar
minor technicalities.
The court has
reviewed the second modified ballot title and petitioner's objections, and has concluded
that petitioner's objections do not demonstrate that the second modified ballot
title lacks substantial compliance with the requirements of ORS 250.035.  ORS
250.085(8) and (9).  Therefore, the court will certify the second modified
ballot title, quoted above, to the Secretary of State.
The second modified
ballot title is certified to the Secretary of State.
DURHAM, J., dissenting.
Petitioner has filed
objections to the caption and summary in the Attorney General's second modified
ballot title.  In my view, the objection to the second modified caption is well
taken.  For the reasons stated below, I would again refer the ballot title to
the Attorney General for modification of the caption.  Accordingly, I dissent
from the majority's decision to certify the second modified ballot title to the
Secretary of State.
Initiative Petition
43 (2010), if adopted by the voters, would amend the Oregon Constitution by
curtailing the authority of the Oregon legislature to establish procedures for
acceptance and verification of voter signature sheets filed in support of
initiative and referendum petitions.  The proposed measure would accomplish
that result by granting to registered voters a constitutional right to have
their signatures on petitions "counted" toward applicable total
signature requirements.(1)  By creating that sort of constitutional right, Initiative Petition 43 (2010)
would invalidate a host of statutory requirements concerning the circulation,
verification, and filing of petition signature sheets -- requirements that the
legislature adopted to protect petition signers and voters from fraud, forgery,
and other abuses by petition circulators.  Petitioner contends that, despite
three attempts, the Attorney General still has failed to compose a ballot title
caption that accurately states the subject matter of the proposed measure.  ORS
250.035(2)(a) (15-word ballot title caption must "reasonably identif[y]
the subject matter of the state measure").
The context for the
court's consideration of petitioner's argument is a familiar one.  In Yugler
v. Myers, 344 Or 552, 555, 185 P3d 1110 (2008), this court stated:
"The caption serves as the 'cornerstone for the other
portions of the ballot title' and therefore must identify the proposed
measure's true subject matter 'accurately and in terms that will not confuse or
mislead potential petition signers and voters.'  Green v. Kulongoski,
322 Or 169, 174-75, 903 P2d 366 (1995)."
This court has
insisted that a ballot title caption describe a proposed measure's subject
matter accurately and without confusion, because of the central importance of
the caption to the decision-making process of petition signers and voters.
"The caption, which is the first information that most
potential petition signers and voters will see, is pivotal.  It must 'inform
potential petition signers and voters of the sweep of the measure.'  Terhune
v. Myers, 342 Or 475, 479, 154 P3d 1284 (2007).  A caption should not
'understate or overstate the scope of the legal changes that the proposed
measure would enact.'  Kain/Waller v. Myers, 337 Or 36, 40, 93 P3d 62
(2004).  If a proposed measure has more than one subject, each should be
indentified in the caption if it is possible to do so within the 15-word
limit.  Novick/Sager v. Myers, 329 Or 11, 16, 986 P2d 1
(1999)."
Frazzini v. Myers, 344 Or 648, 654, 189 P3d 1277 (2008).
The review
principles mentioned in those quoted passages of course apply in all ballot
title review proceedings.  The court, however, has been particularly vigilant
in scrutinizing ballot title captions that allude to the creation of new legal
rights or the modification of existing legal duties.  The court's vigilance is especially
justified when, as here, the proposed measure's text not only enacts a new
legal "right," but also states, redundantly, that the measure guarantees
the new right to every registered voter and that no other statute or rule may
restrict the guaranteed new right.  One case in particular illustrates that
point.  In Yugler, the proposed measure would have created a statutory
requirement that judges deliver an instruction to juries informing them that
each juror had the "right" and "duty" to judge both the
facts and the law applicable to every case and to disregard a judge's
instructions if the juror believed that those instructions would result in
"an unjust verdict or judgment."  344 Or at 554 (quoting IP 17).  The
Attorney General seized on the words of the proposed measure in certifying the
following ballot title caption:
"Requires Instructing Jury of Right/Duty to
Disregard Law if Verdict Against Defendant is 'Unjust'"
Id.  The
Attorney General defended the use of the "'right/duty'"
characterization in the caption in part because it accurately reflected the
words used in the proposed measure.  This court disagreed, because, in that
context, the terms "'right/duty'" implied that jurors had an existing
right or duty to disregard applicable law in reaching a verdict.  According to
the court, that inference was incorrect and, moreover, it was debatable whether
the proposed measure would create such a right or duty.  Id. at 556.
This court has
declined to approve ballot title captions that repeat the "right,"
"duty," or similar jargon from a proposed measure's text, but fail to
describe accurately the true scope of the legal changes that the measure would
create.  See Frazzini, 344 Or at 655 (certified caption,
"Retroactively Repeals Law Granting State Privileges, Immunities, Rights,
Benefits, Responsibilities of Marriage to Domestic Partners," was
insufficient because it failed to accurately portray the separate subject of
banning enactment of any law granting marriage benefits to same-sex domestic
partners); Hunnicutt/Stacey v. Myers, 343 Or 387, 392, 171 P3d 349
(2007) (caption, "Limits Land Use Goals, Need for Consistency with Goals,
to 'Areas of Critical State Concern'" was insufficient because true legal
effect was not described "limit," but rather nullification of
requirement that local land use planning laws must comply with state land use
planning law); Sizemore/Terhune v. Myers, 342 Or 578, 588, 157 P3d 188
(2007) (caption understated scope of measure's proposed changes to Oregon law
due to failure to disclose that measure (1) created "extensive enforcement
provisions" regarding union security agreements, and (2) actually entitled
employees to receive mandated representation services without sharing in the
cost of the services); Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Roberts, 308 Or 169, 174, 777
P2d 406 (1989) (in caption, "Protects Petition Activity at Malls and
Premises Open to Public," term "protects" was misleading,
because it implied incorrectly that citizens had an existing legal right to
gather petition signatures on all premises open to the public).  Each of those
cases was an application of a principle that this court has long observed in
reviewing ballot titles:
"A ballot title should not misstate
existing law, even by implication, and thereby create a spurious argument to
support the measure's passage."
Dale v. Kulongoski, 321 Or 108, 113, 894 P2d 462 (1995) (citations omitted).
The justification
for the court's insistence on looking behind the legal jargon in a proposed
measure's text is readily apparent.  A measure's text states the change or
changes in law that the author hopes to enact.  However, the measure's text is
not meant to fulfill the task of a ballot title caption, i.e., to
"reasonably identif[y] the subject matter of the state measure."  ORS
250.035(2)(a).  Any author of an initiative petition, in drafting a proposed
measure, may use any terms he or she may desire, including politically
attractive terms, to state the legal changes that the measure proposes. 
Similarly, an author may avoid referring in the text to politically
unattractive costs or consequences of the approval of the proposed measure. 
However, as the cases cited in the previous paragraph confirm, the ballot title
must identify accurately and clearly the proposed measure's subject matter
without deference to any distorted or politically charged terminology that the
measure's author may have selected, perhaps to boost the measure's appeal to
voters.
The proposed measure
would create a "right" in every registered voter to have his or her
signature counted.  But, by enacting such a "right" as a part of the
Oregon Constitution, the measure also would invalidate a number of statutory
controls that the legislature has created to protect voters from fraudulent
practices by petition circulators.  In net terms, the proposed measure would
circumscribe the heretofore unquestioned authority of the legislature to
regulate the procedures that govern the circulation of signature sheets and the
verification of signatures on petitions.  The question before the court is
whether the latter consequence is part of the measure's subject matter and, if
so, whether the Attorney General has identified that subject matter accurately.
The caption that the
Attorney General first certified for Initiative Petition 43 (2010) provided:
"'Amends Constitution:  Guarantees registered voter
right to have signature counted in determining initiative/referendum qualification
for ballot.'"
In Caruthers v. Kroger, 347 Or 660,
227 P3d 723 (2010), this court, after reviewing the relevant provisions of the
constitution concerning the people's power of initiative and referendum,
concluded that "the constitution empowers the legislature with the authority
and responsibility of fleshing out the process."  Id. at 664.  The
court then reviewed the array of statutes that the legislature had enacted, and
the rules of the Secretary of State that it had authorized, to regulate the
gathering and counting of signatures on initiative petitions.  The court
concluded:  "[I]t is clear that proposed measure is intended to alter the
signature gathering and sampling processes that we have described."  Id.
at 666.  Referring to the measure's creation of a right to have a voter's
signature "counted," the court identified the measure's subject
matter in these terms:
"From those two provisions, it becomes clear that the
subject of the measure is the removal of impediments to that counting, whether
those impediments be statutory or rule-based.  And that necessarily means that
some of the processes by which signatures presently are vetted -- processes
that can prevent the counting of certain individual signatures -- are to be set
aside and that the legislature is forbidden to enact substitutes for them.  The
Attorney General's caption fails to identify this subject, which is at the
heart of the proposed measure.  The Attorney General's certified caption,
therefore, does not substantially comply with the requirements of  ORS 250.035(2)(a). 
The ballot title therefore must be referred to the Attorney General for modification."
Id. at 668
(footnote and citation omitted).  The court also expressly agreed with
petitioner's contention that the Attorney General's use in the caption of a
phrase such as "right to have signature counted," even though taken
from the measure's text, introduced a loaded term into the caption that should
be avoided on referral.  Id.  The court referred the ballot title to the
Attorney General for modification.
On referral, the
Attorney General certified a modified ballot title with the following caption:
"Amends Constitution:  Prohibits laws
restricting count of registered voters' signatures to determine
initiative/referendum qualification for ballot"
Petitioner filed objections to that modified
ballot title, including the caption, arguing that the new caption failed to
focus, as this court had required, on the statutes and rules that the measure
would invalidate.  This court agreed, stating:
"Petitioner is correct.  This court did
state in its earlier opinion that the proposed measure would remove some (not
all) of the impediments to counting signatures, but specifically noted that the
manner in which that would be accomplished was that 
"'some of the processes
by which signatures presently are vetted -- processes that can prevent the
counting of certain individual signatures -- are to be set aside and * * * the legislature is forbidden to enact substitutes for them. 
The Attorney General's caption fails to identify this subject, which is at the
heart of the measure.'
"Caruthers, 347 Or at 668.  As further
clarification, the opinion included examples of statutes and rules that would
be affected by enactment of the proposed measure.  Id. at 665.  Most
such statutes and rules focus on practices and procedures that the legislature
and the Secretary of State have considered desirable to ensure the legitimacy
of the signature-gathering process and to regulate the activities of those who
gather the signatures; few (if any) have as their principal focus or purpose
the disqualification of signatures.  Thus, as our previous opinion
indicated (and as petitioner now argues), the subject of the proposed
measure was the elimination of many existing controls on the present signature
collection and verification process, together with a prohibition on creating
substitutes for those controls.  The Attorney General's caption still does
not capture that subject.  It must."
348 Or at 68 (omission in original; emphasis
added).  The court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for
modification.
It is worth noting
at this point that this court's two opinions created a clear message about the
error that had infected the Attorney General's two captions.  In response to
that message, the Attorney General certified a second modified ballot title
that included the following caption:
"Amends Constitution:  Prohibits current
and future elections laws from disqualifying registered voters' signatures on
initiative/referendum petitions"
Petitioner has filed
an objection to that caption.  Petitioner notes that the new "yes"
vote result statement does comply with the court's prior decisions.  It
states:
"Result of 'Yes' Vote:  'Yes' vote sets
aside many existing controls over initiative/referendum signature collection
and verification process and prohibits the legislature from enacting
substitutes for those controls."
But the new caption bears little
relationship to the "yes" vote result statement.  According to
petitioner, the caption again avoids this court's clear statements about what
the caption must contain to pass muster.
In my view,
petitioner is correct.  The statement that the measure would "prohibit
current and future elections laws from disqualifying registered voters' signatures"
wrongly identifies the measure's focus as "laws" that interfere with
the counting of voters' signatures:  this court already has rejected
that erroneous focus in two previous captions.  Despite this court's statement
in its second opinion that "few (if any) [of the pertinent statutes and
rules] have as their principal focus or purpose the disqualification of
signatures[,]" id., the Attorney General's new caption again
focuses on the prohibition of "elections laws * * * disqualifying
registered voters' signatures * * *."  That phrasing reflects an
overreliance by the Attorney General on the creation by the proposed measure's
text of a right to have a signature counted.  The new caption fails to
identify, as our prior opinions required, the proposed measure's true subject
matter:  "the elimination of many existing controls on the present
signature collection and verification process, together with a prohibition on
creating substitutes for those controls."  Id.
The importance of
requiring an accurate ballot title caption in his matter cannot be gainsaid. 
The proposed measure would amend the Oregon Constitution, and thus would remove
the prospect of any later adjustment of the proposed measure's operation by the
Oregon legislature.
Because the second
modified ballot title caption merely recycles the same substantive information
that this court already has rejected twice as insufficient, I would refer the
second modified ballot title to the Attorney General for modification.
Gillette, J., joins
in this dissenting opinion.
1. Initiative Petition 43 (2010) provides:
"In order to respect voter participation in the
initiative and referendum process, and in order to ensure the integrity of
public officials in reviewing signatures on petitions, the People add the
following provision to Section 1, Article IV of their Constitution:
"Every registered voter who has signed an initiative or
referendum petition that has been filed as provided in section (1)(2)(e) or
section (1)(3)(b) of this Article is guaranteed the right to have his or her
signature counted for purposes of determining whether the initiative or
referendum petition has obtained enough signatures to qualify for submission to
the voters.  No statute or rule may restrict this right."