Case Title: Weatherspoon v State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94, 2007

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RECARDO B. WEATHERSPOON, § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 94, 2007 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Def. ID No. 0001003156 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 13, 2007 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
July 20, 2007 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 20th day of July 2007, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court 
that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Recardo Weatherspoon, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s denial of his second motion for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  The State has 
filed a motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the basis that it is 
manifest on the face of Weatherspoon’s opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
 
2
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Weatherspoon pleaded guilty in June 
2000 to one count of delivery of cocaine and two counts of second degree 
conspiracy.  On the State’s motion and as contemplated in the plea 
agreement, Weatherspoon was declared a habitual offender and was 
sentenced to a total of seventeen years imprisonment, suspended after 
thirteen years for four years of probation.  Weatherspoon did not appeal his 
conviction or sentence. 
 
(3) 
In August 2002, Weatherspoon filed his first motion for 
postconviction relief.  Weatherspoon raised ineffective assistance of counsel 
and several other claims.  The Superior Court considered each claim and 
denied Weatherspoon’s motion on its merits.  On appeal, this Court affirmed 
the Superior Court’s decision.1 
 
(4) 
In August 2003, Weatherspoon unsuccessfully moved to 
modify his sentence.  The Superior Court’s denial of the modification 
motion was affirmed on appeal.2  In May 2006, Weatherspoon 
unsuccessfully moved to correct his sentence.  Again, the Superior Court’s 
denial of Weatherspoon’s motion was affirmed on appeal.3 
                                                 
1 Weatherspoon v. State, 2003 WL 723992 (Del. Supr.). 
2 Weatherspoon v. State, 2004 WL 542163 (Del. Supr.). 
3 Weatherspoon v. State, 2006 WL 2950487 (Del. Supr.). 
 
3
 
(5) 
In December 2006, Weatherspoon filed his second motion for 
postconviction relief.  Weatherspoon complained that the prosecution did 
not establish that Weatherspoon was eligible for sentencing as a habitual 
offender.  In a related claim, Weatherspoon alleged that his defense counsel 
was ineffective.   
 
(6) 
By decision dated January 26, 2007, the Superior Court denied 
Weatherspoon’s motion on the basis that the claims were barred pursuant to 
Rule 61.4  The Superior Court also noted that Weatherspoon’s habitual 
offender claim was without merit.5  This appeal followed. 
 
(7) 
Having carefully considered the parties’ positions on appeal and 
the Superior Court record, the Court concludes that this appeal should be 
affirmed on the basis of the Superior Court’s well-reasoned decision of 
January 26, 2007.  The Superior Court did not err in its determination that 
Weatherspoon‘s motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as 
untimely,6 repetitive,7 and defaulted.8  Moreover, the Court concludes on 
appeal that reconsideration of Weatherspoon’s claims is not warranted in the 
interest of justice,9 on the basis that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction,10 
                                                 
4 State v. Weatherspoon, 2007 WL 441945 (Del. Super. Ct.). 
5 Id. at 9.  
6 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (2004). 
7 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (2007). 
8 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (2007). 
9 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (2007).  
 
4
on the basis of a constitutional violation,11 or on the basis of a newly 
recognized retroactively applicable right.12   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
                                                Justice  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (2007). 
11 Id.  
12 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (2004).