Case Title: State v. Darmond

Citation: 2013-Ohio-966

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Darmond, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-966.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-966 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DARMOND ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Darmond, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-966.] 
The holding in Lakewood v. Papadelis that “[a] trial court must inquire into the 
circumstances surrounding a discovery rule violation and, when deciding 
whether to impose a sanction, must impose the least severe sanction that is 
consistent with the purpose of the rules of discovery” applies equally to 
discovery violations committed by the state and to discovery violations 
committed by a criminal defendant. 
(Nos. 2012-0081 and 2012-0195—Submitted January 9, 2013—Decided  
March 21, 2013.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
Nos. 96373 and 96374, 2011-Ohio-6160. 
_______________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The holding in Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 511 N.E.2d 1138 (1987), 
paragraph two of the syllabus, that “[a] trial court must inquire into the 
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circumstances surrounding a discovery rule violation and, when deciding 
whether to impose a sanction, must impose the least severe sanction that is 
consistent with the purpose of the rules of discovery” applies equally to 
discovery violations committed by the state and to discovery violations 
committed by a criminal defendant. 
__________________ 
 
O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} On the first day of a nonjury felony trial, during the testimony of 
the first witness, the trial court became aware that the state had failed to disclose 
to the defendant some evidence related to the case.  The record is clear that the 
discovery violation was unintentional.  The court noted that the undisclosed 
evidence “could be inculpatory or exculpatory,” but it never made a finding one 
way or the other.  On motion by the defense, the court declared a mistrial and 
dismissed the charges with prejudice.  The appellate court affirmed, concluding 
that the trial court had not abused its discretion.  For the reasons that follow, we 
hold that the failure of the trial court to explore whether a less severe sanction was 
appropriate was an abuse of discretion.  We accordingly reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
{¶ 2} In its analysis, the appellate court considered Lakewood v. 
Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 511 N.E.2d 1138 (1987), which held that when 
contemplating a sanction for a discovery-rule violation, a trial court must conduct 
an inquiry into the surrounding circumstances and “must impose the least severe 
sanction that is consistent with the purpose of the rules of discovery.”  Id. at 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  The appellate court distinguished Lakewood from 
this case on the basis that Lakewood involved a discovery violation committed by 
a defendant rather than by the state. 
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{¶ 3} The appellate court then certified a conflict on that issue because 
other appellate courts have applied Lakewood to cases involving discovery 
violations committed by the state.  We accepted the conflict for review and also 
accepted the state’s discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 4} We conclude that under the current discovery rules, Lakewood 
applies to all discovery violations, including those committed by the state.  A 
contrary holding would be at odds with this court’s repeated guidance that trials 
are to be conducted on a level playing field and Crim.R. 16’s requirement that 
remedies for discovery violations apply to the defense and the prosecution 
equally.  We therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} The two defendants-appellees in this case, Demetrius Darmond 
and Iris Oliver, were jointly indicted in August 2010 on felony charges of 
trafficking in drugs and possession of drugs, with specifications, and with 
additional charges as to Darmond.  Both defendants pled not guilty and waived 
their right to a jury trial, electing instead to be tried by a judge.  The state and the 
defendants (represented by separate counsel) engaged in reciprocal discovery 
upon the defendants’ demands for discovery pursuant to Crim.R. 16, and the case 
proceeded to a bench trial. 
{¶ 6} After the parties’ opening statements, the state called its first 
witness, a special agent with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and 
Investigations (“BCI”).  The BCI agent testified that on March 13, 2010, she was 
on package-interdiction duty at a FedEx facility after receiving a tip from law-
enforcement authorities.  She testified that she had discovered three suspicious 
packages that day, all sent from Arizona, that were similar to each other.  After a 
drug-sniffing dog alerted to the packages, she obtained search warrants, opened 
the packages, and found marijuana inside.  The packages were addressed to three 
different people at three different addresses. 
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{¶ 7} One of those packages, which was addressed to defendant Oliver’s 
street address but stated a name other than that of any resident of the address as 
the addressee, was the basis for the indictment in this case.  The agent placed the 
marijuana back in that package and rewrapped it.  The package was delivered to 
Oliver’s address under surveillance by officers of the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s 
Office, who were accompanied by the BCI agent, on March 16, 2010.  Defendant 
Darmond later arrived at Oliver’s residence and put the package in his car.  He 
was then arrested. 
{¶ 8} The special agent was again on package-interdiction duty on 
March 17, 2010, and discovered four more suspicious packages, all sent from 
Arizona, that she opened after obtaining warrants.  Each contained marijuana.  
One of those packages was addressed to Oliver’s street address but stated a name 
other than that of any resident as the addressee.  The agent took that package to 
the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Office.  That package was not delivered to 
Oliver’s address, because Darmond had been arrested the previous day.  The other 
three packages found on March 17 were addressed to three separate addresses 
different from any address on any of the other packages the agent had already 
intercepted. 
{¶ 9} The agent prepared separate reports for each of the seven 
packages.  In the report relating to the package that was delivered to Oliver’s 
address, the agent noted that a second package addressed to Oliver’s residence 
and containing marijuana had been intercepted on March 17, but other than that, 
the reports did not mention the other packages.  The agent did not have the other 
reports with her at trial, was not involved with any follow-up investigations that 
may have taken place on the other five packages, and was able to remember only 
sketchy details of the police action regarding those packages after she discovered 
them.  As to at least one other package, she believed that a controlled delivery had 
January Term, 2013 
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been made to the address on the package and that an arrest had resulted, but she 
was unsure of the specifics. 
{¶ 10} The record clearly supports the fact that the assistant prosecuting 
attorney handling the case and both defense attorneys were unaware of the other 
five packages prior to the BCI agent’s testimony.  In response to the defendants’ 
pretrial discovery requests, the state had provided the BCI agent’s reports relating 
to the two packages the prosecutor knew to exist and also provided other 
information.  After several sidebars during the agent’s testimony, the defense 
attorneys moved the trial court to dismiss the case with prejudice due to the state’s 
failure to disclose prior to the trial the interception of the five additional packages 
and the reports regarding them. 
{¶ 11} The defense attorneys renewed the motion to dismiss after the 
agent completed her testimony, arguing that the undisclosed information was 
exculpatory and that dismissal was the only remedy.  In response, the prosecutor 
asserted that the undisclosed packages were not exculpatory evidence.  He also 
emphasized that neither he nor the BCI agent had been trying to hide anything. 
{¶ 12} After a one-hour recess, the parties conducted discussions off the 
record, and the case then resumed on the record.  The prosecutor again argued in 
opposition to the motions to dismiss that it was not clear that the undisclosed 
packages were exculpatory, and he suggested that they may have instead been 
inculpatory because further investigation may have shown them to be evidence 
implicating the defendants in a scheme to distribute drugs. 
{¶ 13} After the defense attorneys again pressed for dismissal with 
prejudice, the trial court reviewed the details of the situation.  The court noted that 
the undisclosed evidence “could be inculpatory or exculpatory” and then stated 
that the full details regarding all seven packages and what occurred in the 
aftermath of their discovery should have been supplied to the defense.  The court 
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concluded the proceedings by declaring a mistrial and dismissing the case with 
prejudice, barring the state from further indicting the defendants. 
{¶ 14} The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the 
trial court had not abused its discretion.  State v. Darmond, 8th Dist. Nos. 96373 
and 96374, 2011-Ohio-6160, ¶ 26.  In considering the preference expressed in the 
second syllabus paragraph of Lakewood for imposing the least severe sanction 
consistent with the purpose of the discovery rules, the appellate court 
distinguished Lakewood and declined to apply it.  Id. at ¶ 15-18.  The court in 
essence interpreted that case’s holding as applying only to cases involving a 
defendant’s discovery violation and did not extend it to cases involving a 
discovery violation committed by the state. 
{¶ 15} The court of appeals determined that its resolution of the case 
conflicted with the decisions of the Third Appellate District in State v. Engle, 166 
Ohio App.3d 262, 2006-Ohio-1884, 850 N.E.2d 123 (3d Dist.), and the First 
Appellate District in State v. Siemer, 1st Dist. Nos. C-060604 and C-060605, 
2007-Ohio-4600, 2007 WL 2541121.  The court of appeals then certified a 
conflict on the following issue:  “Does the holding in Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 
Ohio St.3d 1, 511 N.E.2d 1138 (1987), apply equally to instances where the state 
has committed a discovery violation?”   
{¶ 16} This court determined that a conflict exists and ordered the parties 
to brief the certified issue (case No. 2012-0195), accepted jurisdiction over the 
state’s discretionary appeal (case No. 2012-0081), and consolidated the two cases 
for consideration, 131 Ohio St.3d 1497 and 1498, 2012-Ohio-1501, 964 N.E.2d 
438 and 439. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 17} Our consideration is guided by Crim.R. 16, which was extensively 
amended on July 1, 2010.  The pertinent provisions for purposes here are Crim.R. 
16(A) and 16(L)(1).  Crim.R. 16(A) provides: 
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(A) Purpose, Scope and Reciprocity.  This rule is to 
provide all parties in a criminal case with the information necessary 
for a full and fair adjudication of the facts, to protect the integrity 
of the justice system and the rights of defendants, and to protect the 
well-being of witnesses, victims, and society at large.  All duties 
and remedies are subject to a standard of due diligence, apply to the 
defense and the prosecution equally, and are intended to be 
reciprocal.  Once discovery is initiated by demand of the defendant, 
all parties have a continuing duty to supplement their disclosures. 
 
{¶ 18} Crim.R. 16(L)(1) provides: 
 
(L) Regulation of Discovery. 
(1) The trial court may make orders regulating discovery not 
inconsistent with this rule.  If at any time during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party 
has failed to comply with this rule or with an order issued pursuant 
to this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery 
or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from 
introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may make 
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
 
{¶ 19} The overall objective of the criminal rules “ ‘is to remove the 
element of gamesmanship from a trial.’ ”  Lakewood, 32 Ohio St.3d at 3, 511 
N.E.2d 1138, quoting State v. Howard, 56 Ohio St.2d 328, 333, 383 N.E.2d 912 
(1978).  The purpose of the discovery rules “is to prevent surprise and the 
secreting of evidence favorable to one party.”  Id. 
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A.  The Conflict Issue:  Does the Holding in Lakewood Apply to 
Discovery Violations Committed by the State? 
{¶ 20} Sanctions for a Crim.R. 16 discovery violation are within the 
discretion of the trial court and should be imposed equally, without regard to the 
status of the offending party.  The state has conceded that it should have disclosed 
the existence of the other five packages prior to the trial pursuant to Crim.R. 16 
and therefore does not contest the trial court’s conclusion that a discovery 
violation occurred.  The state asserts that the trial court’s order of dismissal with 
prejudice was flawed because the trial court failed to consider whether less severe 
sanctions were appropriate given the circumstances.  We agree. 
{¶ 21} In Lakewood, the defendant committed a discovery violation by 
failing to turn over his witness list to the city, and as a sanction, the trial court 
excluded the testimony of all the defendant’s witnesses.  32 Ohio St.3d at 2, 511 
N.E.2d 1138.  In reviewing the propriety of the sanction, this court first noted that 
the effect of the sanction was to deny the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to 
present a defense.  Id. at 4.  This court then adopted the rationale of courts in other 
jurisdictions that had reviewed similar situations, and held that a trial court must 
inquire into the circumstances surrounding a discovery violation, must balance the 
competing interests, and “must impose the least severe sanction that is consistent 
with the purpose of the rules of discovery.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 5, and at 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 22} Lakewood mentions several factors to be considered in the 
balancing test:  the extent of surprise or prejudice to the state if the testimony 
were allowed, the impact that excluding the testimony would have on the trial, 
whether the violation was willful or in bad faith, and the effectiveness of less 
severe sanctions.  Id. at 5. 
{¶ 23} A number of Ohio appellate courts, including the courts that issued 
the judgments certified as being in conflict with the appellate court’s judgment in 
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this case, have determined that Lakewood applies to discovery violations 
committed by the state just as it applies to discovery violations committed by the 
defense.  For example, in Siemer, 2007-Ohio-4600, at ¶ 9, the First District 
recognized that the balancing test in Lakewood was created in the context of a 
defendant’s discovery violation, but concluded that the holding in Lakewood is 
“equally applicable to cases involving discovery violations committed by the 
state.”  The Siemer court cited a number of decisions, from the majority of Ohio’s 
appellate districts, in support of that conclusion.  Id. 
{¶ 24} In Engle, 166 Ohio App.3d 262, 2006-Ohio-1884, 850 N.E.2d 123, 
the Third District applied Lakewood to reverse a trial court’s decision dismissing 
the charges against the defendant as the sanction for a discovery violation 
committed by the state.  The Engle court observed that the trial court had failed to 
determine “whether a less severe sanction would be appropriate” and failed to 
“properly balance the need to impose a sanction with the purpose of the discovery 
rules.”  Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 25} The appellate court in this case, however, declined to apply 
Lakewood because this case involved a discovery violation by the state, not a 
defendant.  In so doing, the court relied on precedent from its district: State v. 
Jones, 183 Ohio App.3d 189, 2009-Ohio-2381, 916 N.E.2d 828 (8th Dist.).  Jones 
reasoned that Lakewood should not be applied in cases involving the state’s 
failure to provide discovery, because Lakewood was primarily concerned with the 
accused’s ability to present a defense.  Jones at ¶ 12, citing State v. Crespo, 7th 
Dist No. 03 MA 11, 2004-Ohio-1576, 2004 WL 615705, ¶ 11 (“the holding in 
Lakewood is not directly applicable in cases where sanctions are imposed upon 
the prosecution”). 
{¶ 26} We recognize that the analysis in Lakewood was driven to a large 
extent by the consideration that the sanction imposed by the trial court effectively 
deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.  
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However, we do not agree that this consideration prevents the application of 
Lakewood to a case in which it is the state that has committed a discovery 
violation. 
{¶ 27} In State v. Parker, 53 Ohio St.3d 82, 86, 558 N.E.2d 1164 (1990), 
which involved a discovery violation committed by the state, this court cited 
Lakewood, 32 Ohio St.3d at 5, 511 N.E.2d 1138, with approval for the 
propositions that a trial court must inquire into the circumstances of the alleged 
violation of Crim.R. 16 and must impose the least severe sanction consistent with 
the purpose of the discovery rules.  Parker strongly supports the state’s position 
on the certified issue. 
{¶ 28} Even if Parker left room for debate regarding whether Lakewood 
applies to discovery violations committed by the state, the 2010 amendments to 
Crim.R. 16 removed any doubt.  Current Crim.R. 16 essentially places the state 
and a criminal defendant who has filed a discovery demand on equal footing as a 
trial court contemplates the imposition of the appropriate sanction for a discovery 
violation. 
{¶ 29} Current Crim.R. 16(A) applies to “all parties in a criminal case,” 
and “all duties and remedies” of the rule apply “to the defense and the prosecution 
equally” and are “intended to be reciprocal.”  (Emphasis added.)  The Staff Notes 
to the 2010 amendment to Division (A) of Crim.R. 16 state that the purpose of the 
revisions “is to provide for a just determination of criminal proceedings and to 
secure the fair, impartial, and speedy administration of justice.”  To that end, the 
Staff Notes point out, the current rule “expands the reciprocal duties in the 
exchange of materials” and “balances a defendant’s constitutional rights with the 
community’s compelling interest in a thorough, effective, and just prosecution of 
criminal acts.” 
{¶ 30} In Lakewood, this court viewed the sanction imposed by the trial 
court as extremely severe because it effectively deprived the defendant of the 
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ability to present a defense, and the court therefore held that the sanction should 
not have been imposed without the trial court’s first weighing and rejecting the 
feasibility of less severe sanctions.  In the same way, the sanction of dismissal 
with prejudice in this case is extremely severe because it forecloses the possibility 
of further prosecution; such a sanction should not be imposed without a trial 
court’s specifically weighing and rejecting the feasibility of less severe sanctions. 
{¶ 31} Crim.R. 16’s emphasis on equal and reciprocal treatment of parties 
clarifies that the strong preference expressed in Lakewood for imposing the least 
severe sanction that will further the purposes of the discovery rules is a critical 
consideration that must be taken into account in any criminal case before a severe 
sanction is imposed for a discovery violation.  We accordingly conclude that 
Lakewood applies to discovery violations committed by the state, and we 
therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative. 
B.  Did the Trial Court Abuse Its Discretion? 
{¶ 32} Having determined that Lakewood applies in this case, we next 
consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the case with 
prejudice. 
{¶ 33} As we observed in State v. Parson, 6 Ohio St.3d 442, 445, 453 
N.E.2d 689 (1983), a trial court has discretion in determining a sanction for a 
discovery violation.  This long-standing principle continues in force after the 
recent amendments to Crim.R. 16.  Crim.R. 16(L)(1) is identical to former 
Crim.R. 16(E)(3) in detailing a trial court’s authority to issue orders in the wake 
of a party’s failure to comply with discovery obligations, and in particular 
provides that the trial court may issue any order “it deems just under the 
circumstances.”  34 Ohio St.2d lvii.  See also Staff Notes to 2010 amendment to 
Division (L) of Crim.R. 16 (“The trial court continues to retain discretion to 
ensure that the provisions of the rule are followed.  This discretion protects the 
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integrity of the criminal justice process while protecting the rights of the 
defendants, witnesses, victims, and society at large”). 
{¶ 34} A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is 
unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.  State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 
157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).  An abuse of discretion includes a situation in which 
a trial court did not engage in a “ ‘sound reasoning process.’ ”  State v. Morris, 
132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., 
Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 
161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).  Abuse-of-discretion review is deferential and does 
not permit an appellate court to simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court.  Id. 
{¶ 35} In Parson, 6 Ohio St.3d 442, 453 N.E.2d 689, we established three 
factors that should govern a trial court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a 
sanction for a discovery violation committed by the prosecution.  The three 
Parson factors a judge should consider are (1) whether the failure to disclose was 
a willful violation of Crim.R. 16, (2) whether foreknowledge of the undisclosed 
material would have benefited the accused in the preparation of a defense, and (3) 
whether the accused was prejudiced.  Id. at syllabus.  See also State v. Hale, 119 
Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 115. 
{¶ 36} Several of the factors discussed in Lakewood are similar to those 
expounded in Parson, including the degree of prejudice to the opposing party and 
whether the violation was willful or in bad faith.  See Lakewood, 32 Ohio St.3d at 
5, 511 N.E.2d 1138. 
{¶ 37} The application of the three Parson factors to this case is unclear.  
The record definitively shows that the discovery violation here was not willful, 
but was instead unintentional.  However, as to the second and third factors, in 
light of the trial court’s stated acknowledgement that it was not possible to 
ascertain whether the undisclosed information was exculpatory or inculpatory, it 
January Term, 2013 
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is not at all clear that foreknowledge of the information would have benefited the 
defense or that there was prejudice. 
{¶ 38} In addition to the Parson factors, Lakewood also focused on the 
effectiveness of less severe sanctions as an important factor in the balancing test.  
Id. at 5.  The trial court did not indicate that it had considered whether a less 
severe sanction than a dismissal with prejudice would have accomplished the 
purposes of the discovery rules.  While the trial court’s decision was generally in 
accord with earlier holdings by the Eighth District, which declined to apply 
Lakewood to discovery violations committed by the state, those holdings are 
clearly at odds with the mandates of current Crim.R. 16.  To the extent that this 
position may have been justifiable under former Crim.R. 16, the current rule 
makes clear that that is no longer the proper view. 
{¶ 39} The state opposed the defendants’ motions to dismiss on several 
grounds, including that the evidence that was not disclosed was not particularly 
material to the defendants’ case and that there was a substantial possibility that 
the undisclosed evidence could have been inculpatory rather than exculpatory.  
Although it would have been helpful for the state in opposing the dismissal 
motions to offer the trial court specific alternatives to dismissal with prejudice, 
the trial court nevertheless should not have dismissed this case with prejudice 
without first giving the parties the opportunity to develop the record regarding the 
other packages and then weighing the relevant factors. 
{¶ 40} Although we are not mandating a specific procedural course of 
conduct in this case, we note that rather than dismissing the case with prejudice, 
the trial court could have continued the case to allow further inquiry into the 
details regarding the other packages.  See Lakewood, 32 Ohio St.3d at 5, 511 
N.E.2d 1138 (a continuance should be ordered if it is feasible and would allow for 
an opportunity to minimize any surprise or prejudice caused by the discovery 
violation).  This was a bench trial, and the defendants were out on bond.  Clearly, 
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a continuance to clear up the facts of the discovery violation would have been a 
feasible alternative. 
{¶ 41} Based upon the above analysis, we conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion.  We emphasize that we do not hold that a discovery 
violation committed by the state can never result in the dismissal with prejudice 
of a criminal case.  That option remains available when a trial court, after 
considering the factors set forth in Parson and in Lakewood, determines that a 
lesser sanction would not be consistent with the purposes of the criminal 
discovery rules. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 42} For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the holding in 
Lakewood, 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 511 N.E.2d 1138, paragraph two of the syllabus, that 
“[a] trial court must inquire into the circumstances surrounding a discovery rule 
violation and, when deciding whether to impose a sanction, must impose the least 
severe sanction that is consistent with the purpose of the rules of discovery” 
applies equally to discovery violations committed by the state and to discovery 
violations committed by a criminal defendant.  Applying that holding to this case, 
we determine that the trial court abused its discretion. 
{¶ 43} We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, 
JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 44} We need look no further than Crim.R. 16(L)(1) to decide this case.  
The rule states: 
 
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to 
the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this 
rule or with an order issued pursuant to this rule, the court may 
order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the 
material not disclosed, or it may make such other order as it deems 
just under the circumstances. 
 
This court’s only inquiry should be whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
making an order it deemed “just under the circumstances.”  The trial court gave 
detailed reasoning for its dismissal of the case against the defendants, and there is 
no reason for this court to overturn its ruling. 
The Inapplicability of Lakewood 
{¶ 45} Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 511 N.E.2d 1138 (1987), 
has no application in this case.  In Lakewood, this court addressed a trial court’s 
discovery sanction that excluded all the witnesses the defendant had intended to 
call at trial.  This court found that “the effect of the sanction of exclusion imposed 
on [the defendant] was to deny him the right to present a defense.”  Id. at 4.  The 
court stated that “exclusion may infringe on a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to present a defense, particularly where, as in this case, all the 
defendant’s witnesses are excluded.”  Id. at 5. 
{¶ 46} In Lakewood, this court looked to other states’ jurisprudence on the 
exclusion of witnesses in determining whether the trial court’s sanction had been 
too harsh: 
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The courts of other states, when presented with the claim 
that exclusion of a criminal defendant’s witnesses is too harsh a 
sanction, have held that the trial court must make an inquiry into 
the surrounding circumstances prior to excluding a party’s 
witnesses.  Before imposing the sanction of exclusion, the trial 
court must find that no lesser sanction would accomplish the 
purpose of the discovery rules and that the state would be 
prejudiced if the witnesses were permitted to testify. 
 
(Emphases added.)  Id. 
{¶ 47} It was because the sanction imposed in Lakewood was an 
exclusion—which affected the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a 
defense—that this court concluded that the trial court should have considered 
lesser sanctions: “In this case, the trial court did not indicate that it balanced the 
state’s interests against [the defendant’s] Sixth Amendment right to present a 
defense by considering any sanction other than excluding the testimony of his 
witnesses.”  Id. 
{¶ 48} Lakewood does not apply to every discovery sanction; it and the 
cases it cites deal with the exclusion of evidence offered by a defendant.  The 
holding of Lakewood is that a court must apply a balancing test before imposing 
discovery sanctions against a defendant that result in exclusion of testimony or 
evidence, but that “[i]t is only when exclusion acts to completely deny [a] 
defendant his or her constitutional right to present a defense that the sanction is 
impermissible.”  Id. 
{¶ 49} Which of the state’s constitutional rights was violated in this case?  
{¶ 50} There is no right of complete equality of treatment between the 
state and a defendant, and the Constitution has seen to that.  Is it unfair that the 
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state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a 
preponderance of the evidence, or that it must prepare its case quickly so that a 
defendant may have a speedy trial?  Defendants have special rights, and courts 
must respect those.  In determining appropriate discovery sanctions for 
defendants, courts must be careful to tailor the sanctions so they do not infringe 
on a defendant’s constitutional rights.  The state does not have those same rights; 
thus, a trial court is not constrained to impose the least severe sanction possible to 
preserve those nonexistent rights. 
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
{¶ 51} The trial court was not required to give the state the least severe 
discovery sanction available.  The trial court’s duty in this case was to simply 
abide by Crim.R. 16(L)(1).  It did, by making an order it deemed just under the 
circumstances.  It made clear that the fact that the state had failed to disclose to 
the defendants that it had intercepted similar packages addressed to different 
addressees meant that additional evidence—all the evidence related to those other 
packages—was also not provided to the defendants.  In short, the agent’s 
testimony had opened Pandora’s (FedEx) box.  The trial court reasoned: 
 
I agree it could be inculpatory or exculpatory.  The issue 
that I am faced with now is, as this witness testified, it became 
known to the State of Ohio * * * and now defense counsel, about a 
number of other packages that were recovered on the 13th and the 
17th of March of 2010. 
In looking at those, I’ll point out on the record there are a 
number of items which I believe would be important to the defense 
to have the ability to review or research that may be beneficial or 
may not be with respect to the case. 
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18 
 
Just pointing out some of those, even that the special agent 
pointed out, the addresses.  She had all the addresses.  She was not 
able to give those specifically because they were on different 
papers that she had back at her office. 
She was able to point out the names, again, similarities in 
names, relationships in names.  I believe at least of the eight or of 
the seven, as I look at them, there may be seven females on all the 
names.  Is there a possibility of a relationship?  Are the addresses 
related?  Are the possibilities of prosecution or any of those 
individuals indicted, are they charged? 
The special agent indicated that there was a single report 
for each of those boxes, so possibly six additional reports that 
would have been, I believe, needed to be provided in order for the 
case to be looked at in a fashion that was fair to both of the 
Defendants charged. 
Now, you take all of that that wasn’t given.  Then you say, 
Well, okay, if that wasn’t given, why should it have been given?  Is 
there any other connection?  None of those names matched the 
Defendants in this case, the addresses didn’t match the Defendants 
in this case.  And so why should the other information come in? 
I think the tie possibly comes, as the special agent 
continued to testify, that all seven of the boxes were very similar in 
nature and all were the same box size. All seven of them were 
addressed and came from either the Phoenix or Tempe, Arizona 
area from a Kinko’s store. 
All of them were handwritten with the same handwriting. 
Possibly the inside packaging on some of them were not exactly 
January Term, 2013 
19 
 
the same, but all of them came in a very similar packaging, 
birthday packaging, birthday cards, and so forth. 
To then relate these seven boxes together, that I believe all 
the other information should have been supplied, the reports, the 
addresses, the names, the investigation, whether there were 
charges, and quite possibly maybe if there was an indictment, 
which I don’t know if there was or wasn’t, and I don’t think 
anyone can speak to that. 
You know, based on those indictments, did someone own 
up to a scheme that maybe would have been information and 
evidence that could have been brought in here and testimony by 
another person to exonerate the two individuals that were charged 
in this case. 
Based on that and the testimony given by this witness that 
then became known to all of us here this morning and then later 
this afternoon, I am going to find that the State of Ohio is going to 
be barred from future prosecution of this case and that double 
jeopardy does attach. 
 
{¶ 52} The trial court made its decision after giving each side the 
opportunity to argue whether dismissal was appropriate.  It granted a recess at the 
prosecutor’s request so that the prosecutor could research the issue.  The state 
never sought a continuance on the record, in contrast to the state’s request in one 
of the cases in conflict with the court’s decision below, State v. Siemer, 1st Dist. 
Nos. C-060604 and C-060605, 2007-Ohio-4600, 2007 WL 2541121, ¶ 4.  In the 
other conflict case, State v. Engle, 166 Ohio App.3d 262, 2006-Ohio-1884, 850 
N.E.2d 123 (3d Dist.), the trial court never gave the state a chance to respond to 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  Finally, Demetrius Darmond had previously 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
been under indictment in case No. CR-535469 for the same charges.  That case 
was dismissed without prejudice by the state on August 9, 2010, “for further 
investigation.”  The state re-indicted him in this case on August 11, 2010.  State v. 
Darmond, 8th Dist. Nos. 96373 and 96374, 2011-Ohio-6160, 2011 WL 5998671, 
¶ 2, fn. 1. 
{¶ 53} Can we really say that the trial judge abused his discretion in 
dismissing this case with prejudice?  Should the trial judge have continued this 
case until the attorneys for Darmond and his mother-in-law, Iris Oliver, chased 
down every lead that might have arisen from the undisclosed packages?  Would it 
be in the best interest of justice to routinely grant long continuances to correct 
prosecutorial ball-fumbling?  How many mistakes are prosecutors allowed in one 
case before a continuance to allow for further investigation is deemed too weak a 
sanction?  
Conclusion 
{¶ 54} The state made a mistake in this case, a mistake not easily or 
quickly corrected.  Out of that mistake, the state has somehow become the 
wronged party, and it asks this court to ensure that in future cases, trial courts 
impose the least severe sanction possible upon the state when it innocently 
withholds evidence from defendants.  This request is based upon the fact that in 
Lakewood, this court protected the constitutional rights of defendants by requiring 
that discovery sanctions not infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.  
The state’s premise is that the state and defendants are equals; but the fact is that 
we have a Constitution because the state and individuals are not equal.  The intent 
of the discovery rules is to guarantee fair play between the state and the 
defendant, not to change the nature of the game. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Katherine Mullin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
January Term, 2013 
21 
 
 
John P. Parker, for appellee Demetrius Darmond. 
 
Jeff Hastings, for appellee Iris Oliver. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. 
Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal on behalf of amicus 
curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
______________________