Case Title: Myer, D., et al., etc. v. Community College of Beaver County (Concurring Opinion)

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Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-17T00:00:00Z

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[J-22A&B-2010] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT DAVID J. MEYER, DALLAS BERRY, CHARLES J. BROWN, JEREMY LEE FOX, MARTIN GORECKI, ANTHONY J. HOLLIBAUGH, LISA L. SALYERS, ROCHELL SYKES, JOSEPH W. VUCICK, DAVID L. WIGLEY, DENNIS W. WOODLEY, CHRIS MACK AND TAMMY MUSLO, Appellants v. COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF BEAVER COUNTY, Appellee TIMOTHY L. BARR, JOHN J. BATTAGLIA, MARK BROWN, CHRIS FERRAGONIO, CRAIG P. FRASER, MATT FRASER, IVAN GLENZ, JUSTIN HAFFEY, STEVE HALL, DUSTIN HUFF, JOSEPH A. KANAI, MICHAEL KEALLY, STEPHEN E. KUSMA IV, WILLIAM J. LATUSZEWSKI, JOHN KURT LEITSCHAFT, BOB MASILON, MICHAEL MATZIE, ALEXIS M. MILLER, JOSEPH A. MUSSER, TIMOTHY POLAND, BRIAN A. SALES, MATTHEW J. TEMPLE, TORIE TYSON, JARED UNEN, DALE A. VALENSON, MARK C. WILLIAMS AND AMY M. ZIMMEL, : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 20 WAP 2009 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered February 11, 2009, at No. 1141 CD 2008 reversing the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County entered June 17, 2008 at No. 11345 of 2002. 965 A.2d 406 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) ARGUED: April 13, 2010 No. 21 WAP 2009 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered February 11, 2009, at No. 1142 CD 2008 reversing the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County entered June 17, 2008 at No. 11381 of 2002. 968 A.2d 235 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) ARGUED: April 13, 2010 [J-22A&B-2010] - 2 Appellants v. COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF BEAVER COUNTY, Appellee : : : : : : : : CONCURRING OPINION MADAME JUSTICE ORIE MELVIN DECIDED: AUGUST 17, 2010 I agree with the Majority that 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542 limits governmental immunity “as a reflection of traditional tort jurisprudence” and that the official title of the statute does not prove otherwise. Majority Slip Op. at 6-7. Nonetheless, I write separately because I believe we should also address the Commonwealth Court’s determination that a local agency cannot be held liable for damages under the UTPCPL unless the claim falls within one of the eight exceptions to immunity codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b). See Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County, 965 A.2d 406, 412 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (en banc); Barr v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County, 968 A.2d 235, 239 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (en banc). The parties have briefed this issue of first impression, which was decided on the merits in two published opinions by an en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court, and it is clearly encompassed by our grant of review. Therefore, I offer the following observations. In resolving immunity challenges under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“Tort Claims Act”), the Commonwealth Court usually inquires as to whether the underlying cause of action sounds in tort or in contract. See generally Matarazzo v. Millers Mutual Group, Inc., 927 A.2d 689 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (en banc) (holding that a municipal authority was entitled to immunity under section 8542 because the plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel [J-22A&B-2010] - 3 claim against the authority actually sounded in tort). If the claim is tort-based, it is barred by the immunity provisions of the Tort Claims Act unless it falls within an exception codified at section 8542(b). Id. at 694. If the claim is contract-based, however, it is not precluded by the Act. See, e.g., Com. Dept. of Transportation v. Municipal Authority of the Borough of West View, 919 A.2d 343 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), aff’d, 936 A.2d 487 (Pa. 2007). In the instant case, the Commonwealth Court abandoned that approach for various reasons. Among other things, the Commonwealth Court refused to utilize the traditional analysis because the UTPCPL proscribes a wide range of conduct without differentiating between “tort-like” and “contract-like” violations. Meyer, 965 A.2d at 414 (citing Johnson v. Hyundai Motor America, 698 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. 1997)). The Court also found that consumer protection claims warrant disparate treatment because the UTPCPL enables plaintiffs to recover treble damages and attorneys’ fees. Id. Thus, although it conceded that a common law breach of warranty claim might be actionable under the UTPCPL, the Commonwealth Court concluded that a party cannot assert a consumer protection claim against a local agency unless it falls within an exception listed in section 8542(b). I take issue with the Commonwealth Court’s reasoning because it ignores the legislative intent behind the UTPCPL and elevates form over substance. The UTPCPL is a remedial statute that prohibits service providers and other merchants from engaging in unfair business tactics; enacted in an effort to combat fraud, the statute is to be liberally construed to achieve its objective. See Commonwealth ex rel. Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 817 (Pa. 1974); see also Commonwealth v. Peoples Benefit Services, Inc., 923 A.2d 1230, 1236 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (“the UTPCPL is to be construed liberally to effectuate its objective of protecting consumers of this Commonwealth from fraud and unfair or deceptive business practices.”). Consistent with its stated purpose, the law is broad in scope and applies to the “sale or distribution of any services . . . directly or indirectly affecting the people of this Commonwealth.” 73 P.S. § 201-2(3). Furthermore, as [J-22A&B-2010] - 4 the Commonwealth Court acknowledged in Meyer, supra at 414, the UTPCPL forbids certain acts that would enable the aggrieved party to sue for breach of contract in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(v)-(vii) (relating to representations by sellers concerning non-conforming goods or services). The Commonwealth Court downplayed these considerations and emphasized minor distinctions between the UTPCPL and common law causes of action. In my view, the legislature’s failure to classify prohibited acts as contractual or tort-based violations should not prevent an individual from suing a government agency under the UTPCPL when the action relates to a contract dispute. The Commonwealth Court’s narrow construction hinders the application of a law that was clearly intended to govern all types of service agreements. Moreover, I am not persuaded that the Tort Claims Act precludes contract- based UTPCPL claims simply because the statute gives courts discretionary authority to award treble damages and attorneys’ fees. See 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a). Appellants are not sure to recover treble damages in this case, and I would not deprive them of the opportunity to seek attorneys’ fees under a statute that embodies a legislative effort to place consumers and sellers on equal footing. See Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 976 A.2d 474, 482 (Pa. 2009) (as a rule, litigants in this Commonwealth can recover counsel fees from an adverse party if there is express statutory authorization). Appellants invoked the UTPCPL based on allegations that the College breached a contractual obligation to provide a certificate program in police technology that was designed to meet specific instructional requirements for students interested in pursuing a career in law enforcement. I would direct the Commonwealth Court to examine the pleadings on remand to determine whether Appellants’ claims satisfy the UTPCPL. If sufficient facts have been pled, the Commonwealth Court should then ascertain whether the claims sound in tort or in contract and dispose of the matter accordingly.