Case Title: State v. Miranda

Citation: 2014-Ohio-451

Docket Number: 2012-1741

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Miranda, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-451.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-451 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MIRANDA, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Miranda, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-451.] 
 Criminal law—Sentencing—Allied offenses of similar import—R.C. 2941.25—
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act—R.C. 2923.32(A)(1)—
RICO offense does not merge with its predicate offenses for purposes of 
sentencing. 
(No. 2012-1741—Submitted November 5, 2013—Decided February 12, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 11AP-788, 2012-Ohio-3971. 
_____________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the Tenth District, we determine 
whether a trial court can impose separate sentences for engaging in a pattern of 
 
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criminal activity under R.C. 2923.32(A)(1)  (“RICO”1) and for the underlying 
predicate offenses.  The appellant, Arnaldo R. Miranda, advances one proposition 
of law:  
 
Ohio appellate courts are required to apply the new standard 
announced in State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-
6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061[,] when deciding whether the imposition of 
multiple convictions and sentences for the offense of engaging in a 
pattern of corrupt activity and one or more of its predicate felonies 
violates R.C. 2941.25 (the Allied Offenses Statute) and a 
defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of [the] Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
{¶ 2} Appellee, the state of Ohio, argues that the prohibition against 
multiple punishments for allied offenses of similar import is not applicable, 
because the General Assembly, as evidenced in the RICO statute, intended that 
courts may sentence defendants for both the RICO violation and the predicate 
offense. 
{¶ 3} We hold that Johnson is not applicable to a RICO violation and 
that a RICO offense does not merge with its predicate offenses for purposes of 
sentencing.  We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.   
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} The state’s investigation revealed that Arnaldo Miranda was 
involved in a marijuana-trafficking ring.  Consequently, the state charged Miranda 
                                                          
 
1 RICO is the acronym for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, which is a 
federal law found at 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.  Because Ohio’s corrupt-activity statute, R.C. 
2923.32(A)(1), is in general based on the federal statute, we have referred to it as “Ohio’s RICO 
statute.”  State v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 330, 681 N.E.2d 911 (1997).       
 
January Term, 2014 
 
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with one RICO violation under R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) and six predicate offenses 
(three counts of trafficking in marijuana and three counts of possessing 
marijuana).  Miranda pleaded guilty to the RICO count and one count of 
trafficking in marijuana under R.C. 2925.03.  The state dismissed the remaining 
counts.  In addition to other sanctions, the trial court imposed a six-year prison 
term for the RICO offense and an eight-year prison term for the trafficking 
offense, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 14 years.  
Miranda did not object to the sentence at the sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 5} Miranda appealed, asserting that the trial court’s imposition of 
consecutive prison sentences for the RICO offense and the predicate offense of 
trafficking in drugs violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and 
Ohio Constitutions.  He contends that the offenses were allied offenses of similar 
import and should have been merged for purposes of sentencing under R.C. 
2941.25(A), which protects defendants from multiple punishments for a single 
criminal act.  The court of appeals held that double jeopardy was not implicated, 
because the General Assembly intended that a defendant convicted of a RICO 
violation could be sentenced for both the RICO offense and its predicate offenses.  
Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed Miranda’s separate sentences.   
II. Analysis 
A. Double Jeopardy, Multiple Sentences, and RICO 
{¶ 6} “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: ‘[N]or shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb.’ ”  Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 
615 (1998).  The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Ohio Constitution, Article I, 
Section 10, provides the same protection.  State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398, 
2002-Ohio-6661, 780 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 7.  Both clauses protect a defendant against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for 
 
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the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense.  
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 
(1969).  In this case, Miranda claims that he was punished twice for the same 
offense when the trial court sentenced him for both the RICO violation and for the 
predicate offense of trafficking in drugs.  However, “[w]ith respect to cumulative 
sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more 
than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the 
legislature intended.”  Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 
L.Ed.2d 535 (1983).  Therefore, we must determine “whether the General 
Assembly intended to permit multiple punishments for the offenses at issue.”  
State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 561, 728 N.E.2d 379 (2000). 
{¶ 7} “[T]he primary legislative statement on the multiplicity issue is 
found in R.C. 2941.25, concerning allied offenses of similar import.”  Id.  That 
statute provides, “Where the same conduct can be construed to constitute two or 
more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain 
counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.” 
{¶ 8} In State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 
N.E.2d 1061, we held that R.C. 2941.25(A) requires the sentencing court to first 
determine “whether it is possible to commit one offense and commit the other 
with the same conduct.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 48.  If the defendant’s conduct 
constituting commission of one offense constitutes commission of the other, then 
the offenses are of similar import, and the court must then decide whether the 
offenses were committed with a single state of mind, i.e., a single animus.  Id. at 
¶ 48-49.  If so, the offenses are allied offenses of similar import that must be 
merged, and the defendant can be punished for only one.  Id. at ¶ 50. 
{¶ 9} Alternatively, if it is not possible to commit the offenses with the 
same conduct, or if the offenses were committed separately or with a separate 
 
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animus, then the court may sentence the defendant for all the offenses at issue.  Id. 
at ¶ 51. 
{¶ 10} “R.C. 2941.25, however, is not the sole legislative declaration in 
Ohio on the multiplicity of indictments.”  Childs at 383.  “While our two-tiered 
test for determining whether offenses constitute allied offenses of similar import 
is helpful in construing legislative intent, it is not necessary to resort to that test 
when the legislature’s intent is clear from the language of the statute.”  State v. 
Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, 895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 37.  R.C. 
2941.25 generally provides the appropriate test to determine whether the court 
may impose multiple punishments for offenses arising from the same conduct.  
However, in this case, we find that the RICO statute evinces the General 
Assembly’s intent that a court may sentence a defendant for both the RICO 
offense and its predicate offenses. 
{¶ 11} We begin our analysis by examining Ohio’s RICO statute, R.C. 
2932.32(A)(1).  “The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give 
effect to the intent of the legislature.” State ex rel. Cordray v. Midway Motor 
Sales, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 234, 2009-Ohio-2610, 910 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 15.  “A court 
must look to the language and purpose of the statute in order to determine 
legislative intent.” State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 416, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998).  
“[W]hen the General Assembly has plainly and unambiguously conveyed its 
legislative intent, there is nothing for a court to interpret or construe, and 
therefore, the court applies the law as written.”  State v. Kreischer, 109 Ohio St.3d 
391, 2006-Ohio-2706, 848 N.E.2d 496, syllabus. 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), Ohio's RICO statute, provides: “No person 
employed by, or associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, 
directly or indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt 
activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.”   “Enterprise” is defined as 
including “any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, 
 
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corporation, trust, union, government agency, or other legal entity, or any 
organization, association, or group of persons associated in fact although not a 
legal entity.” R.C. 2923.31(C).  “Corrupt activity” is defined as any of the 
criminal offenses listed in R.C. 2923.31(I).  And finally, a “pattern of corrupt 
activity” means “two or more incidents of corrupt activity * * * that are related to 
the affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated, and are not so closely related to 
each other and connected in time and place that they constitute a single event.”  
R.C. 2923.31(E). 
{¶ 13} A RICO offense is dependent upon a defendant committing two or 
more predicate offenses listed in R.C. 2923.31(I).  However, a RICO offense also 
requires a defendant to be “employed by, or associated with” an “enterprise” and 
to “conduct or participate in” an “enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity.”  
R.C. 2923.32(A)(1).  “Such pattern must include both a relationship and 
continuous activity, as well as proof of the existence of an enterprise.  Thus, the 
conduct required to commit a RICO violation is independent of the conduct 
required to commit [the underlying predicate offenses].”  (Emphasis added.)  
State v. Dudas, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2008-L-109 and 2008-L-110, 2009-Ohio-
1001, ¶ 46.  See also State v. Moulton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93726, 2010-Ohio-
4484, ¶ 36; State v. Caudill, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 05-97-35, 1998 WL 833729, * 
9 (Dec. 2, 1998).  The intent of RICO is “ ‘to criminalize the pattern of criminal 
activity, not the underlying predicate acts.’ ”  State v. Thomas, 3d Dist. Allen Nos. 
1-11-25 and 1-11-26, 2012-Ohio-5577, ¶ 61, quoting State v. Dodson, 12th Dist. 
Butler No. 2009-07-1147, 2011-Ohio-6222, ¶ 68.  See also Dudas at ¶ 47. 
{¶ 14} Moreover, one of the purposes of the RICO statute is to provide “ 
‘enhanced sanctions * * * to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in 
organized crime.’ ” (Emphasis added.)  State v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 
332, 681 N.E.2d 911 (1997), quoting the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 
Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code 
 
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7
Cong. & Adm.News at 1073.  “The RICO statute was designed to impose 
cumulative liability for the criminal enterprise.”  Id. at 335.  In State v. Thomas, 
2012-Ohio-5577, ¶ 61, the court stated that “[i]f the purpose of [RICO] is to 
provide enhanced sanctions, this purpose is furthered by not merging [the 
predicate offenses with the RICO offense].”   See also Dudas, 2009-Ohio-1001, ¶ 
47; Moulton, 2010-Ohio-4484, ¶ 37. 
{¶ 15} Construing the similarly worded federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 
1962(c), federal circuit courts have similarly concluded that the purpose of RICO 
of providing enhanced sanctions indicates an intent to permit cumulative 
punishments for the RICO offense and its underlying predicate offenses.  See 
United States v. Sutton, 700 F.2d 1078, 1081 (6th Cir.1983); United States v. 
Greenleaf, 692 F.2d 182, 189 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 
359, 361 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 282-284 (3d 
Cir.1986);  United States v. Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1128-1130 (4th Cir.1984), 
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th Cir.1996); 
United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1015 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. 
Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358, 1367 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 
842, 864 (8th Cir.1987); United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1437 (11th 
Cir.1991). 
2006 Sub.H.B. No. 241 
{¶ 16} Despite this wealth of authority indicating otherwise, Miranda 
claims that the RICO statute no longer permits cumulative punishments because 
of a 2006 amendment. 
{¶ 17} In 2006, Sub.H.B. No. 241 (“H.B. 241”) amended the former RICO 
statute by removing division (D).  151 Ohio Laws, Part V, 9092, 9133.  That 
division stated:  
 
 
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Criminal penalties under this section are not mutually 
exclusive, unless otherwise provided, and do not preclude the 
application of any other criminal or civil remedy under this or 
any other section of the Revised Code.  A disposition of 
criminal forfeiture ordered pursuant to division (B)(3) of this 
section in relation to a child who was adjudicated delinquent by 
reason of a violation of this section does not preclude the 
application of any other order of disposition under Chapter  
2152. of the Revised Code or any other civil remedy under this 
or any other section of the Revised Code. 
 
148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 9447, 9646. 
{¶ 18} Miranda argues that by removing the language “[c]riminal 
penalties under this section are not mutually exclusive, unless otherwise 
provided,” the General Assembly expressed an intent that courts could merge 
RICO offenses and their predicate offenses for purposes of sentencing.  A 
thorough examination of H.B. 241 reveals otherwise. 
{¶ 19} H.B. 241 created R.C. Chapter 2981, which addresses civil and 
criminal forfeitures.  151 Ohio Laws, Part V, 9092, 9217-8243.  Much of the 
remainder of H.B. 241 repealed former forfeiture provisions in various sections of 
the Revised Code, removed references to those provisions, and replaced them 
with language from the new provisions.  H.B. 241 also repealed R.C. 
2923.32(B)(4)(a) through (G), all of which dealt with forfeiture.  We will not 
presume that in the midst of this broad repeal, the single sentence stressed by 
Miranda was deleted for a different reason, and we certainly will not presume that 
the deletion was intended to overturn the universal reading of R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) 
as permitting cumulative punishment.  The purpose of the RICO statute—to 
provide enhanced sanctions for patterns of corrupt activity—remains the same.  
 
January Term, 2014 
 
9
That purpose has always been found in division (A)(1) of the statute, which 
specifies that it is the pattern that constitutes the offense.  Thus, a violation of 
R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) may be punished separately from the underlying offenses.  
Accordingly, we hold that the repeal of former division (D) of R.C. 2923.32 does 
not affect the availability of cumulative punishments for violations of RICO and 
its predicate offenses.   
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 20} We hold that Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 
N.E.2d 1061, is not applicable to a RICO violation, and a RICO offense does not 
merge with its predicate offenses for purposes of sentencing.  In this case, the trial 
court sentenced Miranda for both RICO and the predicate offense of trafficking in 
marijuana.  Therefore, the trial court did not err in sentencing Miranda.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, and PIPER, JJ., concur in judgment. 
ROBIN N. PIPER III, J., of the Twelfth Appellate District, sitting for 
FRENCH, J. 
______________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in judgment. 
{¶ 21} I would hold simply that because a RICO offense and its 
underlying predicate offenses are offenses of dissimilar import, they do not 
merge.  R.C. 2941.25(B) states: 
 
 
Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more 
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in 
two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed 
 
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separately or with a separate animus as to each, the 
indictment or information may contain counts for all such 
offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 22} In reviewing whether multiple crimes constitute allied offenses that 
merge, heretofore we have mainly discussed the concept of offenses of the same 
or similar import that result in offenses committed separately or with a separate 
animus. We have not often discussed situations in which offenses are of dissimilar 
import.   Yet if the defendant’s conduct does not constitute two or more offenses 
of similar import (i.e., of similar nature or character), a defendant may be 
convicted and sentenced consecutively or concurrently for each conviction. 
 
{¶ 23} It is helpful in the merger analysis to remember that R.C. 
2941.25(B) distinguishes between offenses that are dissimilar in import from 
offenses similar in import but committed separately or with a separate animus.  If 
the conduct of the offender has led to charges of dissimilar import, the offenses do 
not merge, and there is no need to consider the animus with which they were 
committed or whether they were committed separately.  
{¶ 24} Miranda’s case provides a prime example of offenses of dissimilar 
import.  He was charged with trafficking in marijuana and possession of 
marijuana, felonies involving the sale and possession of a specific drug.  He was 
also charged with a RICO violation, specifically, with “engag[ing] in violations of 
law, to wit: [R.C.] 2925.11 and 2925.03” while “associat[ing] with an enterprise” 
and “conduct[ing] or participat[ing] in * * * the affairs of the enterprise.”  As the 
majority explains, RICO is a felony offense that was designed to punish 
participation in an enterprise that engages in a pattern of corrupt activity. R.C. 
2923.32(A)(1).  The predicate offense of trafficking in marijuana provides one of 
the elements needed for a RICO conviction.  Miranda’s marijuana offense differs 
 
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11
from the RICO offense, and the convictions are not the same in their nature or 
character.  The predicate offense here involves the sale of drugs while, as the 
majority explains, RICO was promulgated to “ ‘deal with the unlawful activities 
of those engaged in organized crime.’ ˮ  State v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 
332, 681 N.E.2d 911 (1997), quoting the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 
Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code 
Cong. & Adm.News at 1073.  
{¶ 25} Miranda argues that his sentences for the same conduct in these 
offenses violate the rule expressed in State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-
Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061.  While it is true that the syllabus in Johnson says 
that “[w]hen determining whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar 
import subject to merger under R.C. 2941.25, the conduct of the accused must be 
considered,” this language does not offer the complete analysis necessary to 
determine whether offenses are subject to merger rather than multiple convictions 
and cumulative punishment.   Consideration of the defendant’s conduct is but the 
first step in determining whether multiple offenses are allied offenses of similar 
import pursuant to R.C. 2945.21(B).  As a justice in Johnson succinctly stated 
about allied offenses of similar import: “In practice, allied offenses of similar 
import are simply multiple offenses that arise out of the same criminal conduct 
and are similar but not identical in the significance of the criminal wrongs 
committed and the resulting harm.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at ¶ 64 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in judgment).  In other words, offenses are dissimilar if they are not 
alike in their significance and their resulting harm.  
{¶ 26} In enacting the RICO statute, the General Assembly has shown its 
intention to create a new offense that will punish more severely certain specified 
conduct in which individuals participate in a pattern of corrupt activity within a 
criminal enterprise. As a result, RICO is dissimilar from any underlying offenses 
 
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upon which a defendant is convicted, for the offenses do not involve similar 
criminal wrongs and similar resulting harm.   
 
{¶ 27} For these reasons I concur in judgment, emphasizing that RICO 
and its underlying predicate offenses are of dissimilar import and will therefore 
never merge.   
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PIPER, J., concur in the forgoing opinion. 
____________________ 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
David P. Rieser, for appellant. 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 
T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, 
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office. 
______________________