Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3647

Docket Number: 2022-0121

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3647.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3647 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3647.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2941.401—A prisoner satisfies the “causes to be delivered” 
requirement of R.C. 2941.401 when he delivers written notice of place of 
his imprisonment and request for final disposition of pending matter to 
warden where he is imprisoned, even if warden fails to deliver notice and 
request to prosecuting attorney or appropriate court—Court of appeals’ 
judgment reversed. 
(No. 2022-0121—Submitted February 7, 2023—Decided October 10, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, 
No. 20CA011703, 2021-Ohio-4469. 
__________________ 
DONNELLY, J. 
{¶ 1} R.C. 2941.401 delineates how an Ohio prisoner is to enforce his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial on an untried indictment.  The statute triggers 
the 180-day speedy-trial clock to start running when the prisoner “causes to be 
delivered” to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court a written notice of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
the place of his imprisonment and a request for a final disposition of the pending 
matter.  Today, we hold that a prisoner satisfies the “causes to be delivered” 
requirement of R.C. 2941.401 when he delivers the written notice and the request 
to the warden where he is imprisoned, even if the warden fails to deliver the notice 
and the request to the prosecuting attorney or the appropriate court.  Therefore, we 
reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals, which held otherwise. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} In October 2018, appellant, Tyler Williams, was indicted in Lorain 
County on one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of robbery, and a 
warrant was issued for his arrest.  In February 2019, Williams was sentenced in a 
separate case in Cuyahoga County to a prison term of three years.  On March 7, 
2019, he was transferred to the Lorain Correctional Institution (“LCI”), where he 
was immediately notified of the charges pending against him in Lorain County.  
That same day, with assistance from LCI’s law-library staff, Williams completed 
and gave to LCI’s warden a written notice of the place of his imprisonment and a 
request for a final disposition pursuant to R.C. 2941.401.  Williams did not receive 
a response. 
{¶ 3} In March 2019, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
sent a letter to the Lorain County Sheriff’s Office informing it of charges pending 
against Williams in its jurisdiction.  The letter explained that Williams had 
expressed an interest in disposing of the pending aggravated-robbery and robbery 
charges while incarcerated and that he would be offered the opportunity to file for 
a quick and speedy trial on those charges.  The trial court found that this letter 
would not have been sent unless Williams had first sent a written notice and request 
to the warden under R.C. 2941.401. 
{¶ 4} Having received no response to his written notice of the place of his 
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition, Williams repeated the process 
about a week later.  Another month passed with no response, so Williams completed 
January Term, 2023 
3 
 
and gave a third written notice and request to the LCI warden.  Once again, 
Williams did not receive a response.  Despite receiving the various written notices 
and requests from Williams—and despite having a statutory duty to do so—the 
warden never sent the written notices and requests to the prosecuting attorney or 
the appropriate court. 
{¶ 5} Williams was later transferred to Richland Correctional Institution 
and then to Lake Erie Corrections, where he completed his sentence.  After his 
release, in September 2020, Williams was arrested on the outstanding charges in 
Lorain County.  Williams was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the counts of 
aggravated robbery and robbery.  He then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment 
on speedy-trial grounds, which the trial court granted.  The court concluded that 
Williams had strictly complied with R.C. 2941.401 when he provided written notice 
of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition to the warden at 
LCI and that the 180-day speedy-trial time was not tolled by the warden’s failure 
to comply with his duty under the statute. 
{¶ 6} The state appealed.  The Ninth District reversed the trial court’s 
judgment based on its own precedent, concluding that Williams had not strictly 
complied with the requirements of R.C. 2941.401, because Williams had not caused 
the delivery of the notice and request to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate 
court and the speedy-trial clock therefore never began to run.  2021-Ohio-4469, 
¶ 17. 
{¶ 7} We accepted Williams’s appeal on the following proposition of law: 
“An incarcerated individual satisfies the ‘causes to be delivered’ obligation in R.C. 
2941.401 by making a written demand to the warden of the incarcerating 
institution.”  See 166 Ohio St.3d 1448, 2022-Ohio-994, 184 N.E.3d 158. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
{¶ 8} Williams asserts that the court of appeals made an error of law when 
it held that he did not strictly comply with R.C. 2941.401.  We review alleged errors 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
of law de novo.  Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147, 
593 N.E.2d 286 (1992). 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 9} We agree with Williams that the court of appeals made an error of 
law.  R.C. 2941.401 does not put burdens on a prisoner to deliver a written notice 
of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition beyond the explicit 
requirement that he deliver the notice and the request to the warden.  R.C. 2941.401 
states: 
 
When a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in 
a correctional institution of this state, and when during the 
continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this 
state any untried indictment, information, or complaint against the 
prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days 
after he causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the 
appropriate court in which the matter is pending, written notice of 
the place of his imprisonment and a request for a final disposition to 
be made of the matter, except that for good cause shown in open 
court, with the prisoner or his counsel present, the court may grant 
any necessary or reasonable continuance.  The request of the 
prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the warden or 
superintendent having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time served 
and remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time 
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any 
decisions of the adult parole authority relating to the prisoner. 
The written notice and request for final disposition shall be 
given or sent by the prisoner to the warden or superintendent having 
January Term, 2023 
5 
 
custody of him, who shall promptly forward it with the certificate to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court by registered or 
certified mail, return receipt requested. 
* * * 
If the action is not brought to trial within the time provided, 
subject to continuance allowed pursuant to this section, no court any 
longer has jurisdiction thereof, the indictment, information, or 
complaint is void, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the 
action with prejudice. 
 
(Emphasis and boldface added.) 
{¶ 10} The resolution of the dispute in this case depends on the meaning of 
“causes to be delivered” in R.C. 2941.401.  The Third, Fifth, and Eighth District 
Courts of Appeals have held that a prisoner satisfies the requirements of R.C. 
2941.401 and starts the 180-day speedy-trial clock when he provides written notice 
of the place of his imprisonment and a request for final disposition to the warden.  
See State v. Moore, 2014-Ohio-4879, 23 N.E.3d 206, ¶ 29 (3d Dist.); State v. Colon, 
5th Dist. Stark No. 09-CA-232, 2010-Ohio-2326, ¶ 26; State v. Gill, 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 82742, 2004-Ohio-1245, ¶ 26.  Here, however, the Ninth District 
held that only actual delivery of the notice and the request to the prosecuting 
attorney and the appropriate court triggers the 180-day speedy-trial clock to start 
running.  2021-Ohio-4469 at ¶ 17. 
{¶ 11} The state argues that R.C. 2941.401 is unambiguous and therefore 
should be applied as written.  According to the state, a prisoner’s providing a 
written notice of the place of his imprisonment and a request for a final disposition 
to the warden where he is incarcerated does not cause that notice and request to be 
delivered for purposes of the statute.  Therefore, the state contends, Williams has 
not satisfied the “causes to be delivered” requirement of R.C. 2941.401.  The Ninth 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
District agreed, stating that R.C. 2941.401 is triggered only upon a showing of 
delivery of a written notice and a request to both the prosecuting attorney and the 
appropriate court.  2021-Ohio-4469 at ¶ 17.  A dissenting judge countered that 
“failure of the warden to cause notice to be sent should not be attributed to the 
prisoner.”  Id. at ¶ 21 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 12} The state relies on State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-
969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 20, in which this court held that the state is not required to 
exercise reasonable diligence in locating an incarcerated defendant who has 
criminal charges pending so that he may file a notice of his imprisonment and a 
request for a final disposition with the warden.  Not only are the facts of Hairston 
inapposite, but the tenor of that opinion is more supportive of Williams’s position 
than of the state’s.  In Hairston, the prisoner did not give notice and a request to the 
warden, because he did not know that an indictment against him had been filed.  Id. 
at ¶ 8, 21.  Nevertheless, we stated that R.C. 2941.401 “unambiguously impose[s] 
the initial duty upon the defendant to trigger action on the part of the state.”  Id. at 
¶ 24.  Williams fulfilled that initial duty here. 
{¶ 13} The state also relies on Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52, 113 
S.Ct.1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993), in which the United States Supreme Court held 
that a prisoner’s actual delivery of his request for a final disposition of pending 
charges is necessary to trigger the 180-day speedy-trial clock under the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”).  The IAD and R.C. 2941.401 contain similar 
language, but the IAD applies to prisoners who are incarcerated in one state or in a 
federal prison but are accused of having committed crimes in another state, whereas 
R.C. 2941.401 applies to prisoners who are accused of having committed crimes in 
Ohio and are held in Ohio state prisons.  Moreover, in Fex, the prisoner had given 
his notice and request to the warden, and the warden had mailed the notice and 
request to the prosecuting attorney and the court.  Id. at  46.  The only question was 
whether the 180-day speedy-trial clock began to run when the prisoner delivered 
January Term, 2023 
7 
 
his notice and request for a final disposition to the warden or when the court and 
the prosecuting attorney received them.  In Fex, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the speedy-trial clock begins to run upon delivery of the notice and request 
to the court and the prosecuting attorney.  Id. at 52.  Because the holding in Fex is 
based on the analysis of a different statute and different circumstances, Fex does 
not control the outcome here.  But this court’s interpretation of the language of the 
IAD remains good law.  See State v. Mourey, 64 Ohio St.3d 482, 597 N.E.2d 101 
(1992), paragraph one of the syllabus (the 180-day time period in Ohio’s 
codification of the IAD “begins to run when a prisoner substantially complies with 
the requirements of the [IAD]”). 
{¶ 14} In this case, Williams argues that when he delivered the written 
notice of his place of imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to the 
warden at LCI, he satisfied the “causes to be delivered” requirement of R.C. 
2941.401.  He argues that his actions triggered the 180-day speedy-trial clock to 
begin running because he met every requirement in his power to cause delivery of 
the notice and the request and that he should not be penalized for the warden’s 
negligence or bad faith.  Compare Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 
804 N.E.2d 471, at ¶ 26.  See also Mourey at paragraph two of the syllabus (“A 
prisoner substantially complies with [the 180-day notice-and-request language of 
the IAD] when he or she causes to be delivered to the prison officials where 
incarcerated, appropriate notice or documentation requesting a disposition of the 
charges for which the detainer has been filed against him or her”). 
{¶ 15} We have already held that R.C. 2941.401 does not allow a prisoner 
to be punished for the failures of the state.  In State v. Dillon, 114 Ohio St.3d 154, 
2007-Ohio-3617, 870 N.E.2d 1149, ¶ 23, we held that R.C. 2941.401 requires the 
state to dismiss untried charges against a prisoner when the state fails to inform the 
prisoner in writing of the charges against him and of his speedy-trial rights.  In 
Dillon, the state asked a warden in February 2004 to serve an indictment for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
burglary on a prisoner in his custody.  Id. at ¶ 5.  The prisoner was not served with 
the indictment until August 2004.  Id. at ¶ 8.  We held that the speedy-trial clock 
began to run in February even though no notice and request had been delivered to 
the prosecuting attorney and the court during the prisoner’s incarceration.  Id. at 
¶ 18.  Because the warden had not given the prisoner written notice of the burglary 
indictment against him as required by R.C. 2941.401 until after the 180-day speedy-
trial period had passed, we affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment that reversed 
the defendant’s burglary conviction.  Id. at ¶ 23.  Indeed, we stated, “Permitting a 
warden or superintendent to avoid complying with the duty imposed by R.C. 
2941.401 would circumvent the purpose of the statute and relieve the state of its 
legal burden to try cases within the time constraints imposed by law.”  Id. at ¶ 23.  
We thereby impliedly rejected the tenet that the “causes to be delivered” language 
of R.C. 2941.401 requires actual delivery to the prosecuting attorney and the 
appropriate court. 
{¶ 16} In Dillon, we rejected the hyper-technical reading of R.C. 2941.401 
that the state proffers in this case.  R.C. 2941.401 states that after a prisoner delivers 
written notice of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition “to 
the warden * * * having custody of him,” the warden “shall promptly forward it 
with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court by registered 
or certified mail, return receipt requested.”  In this case, Williams satisfied his every 
obligation under the statute three times.  We therefore follow our precedent in 
holding that Williams caused his written notice and request to be delivered when 
he provided them to the warden at LCI. 
{¶ 17} The General Assembly is well aware that prisoners cannot 
themselves cause the written notice and request under R.C. 2941.401 to be 
delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court.  What the prisoner 
can do is provide the written notice and request to the warden having custody of 
him.  That compliance with R.C. 2941.401 triggers a statutory duty of the warden.  
January Term, 2023 
9 
 
In this case, Williams triggered the LCI warden’s statutory duty as prescribed by 
the General Assembly.  We have consistently held that when a warden fails to act, 
whether intentionally, inadvertently, or otherwise, the consequences of that failure 
should inure to the state on whose behalf the warden acts.  We see no reason to 
deviate from that precedent now. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 18} A prisoner satisfies the “causes to be delivered” requirement in R.C. 
2941.401 by providing written notice of the place of his imprisonment and a request 
for final disposition to the warden of the institution where he is incarcerated.  
Therefore, Williams caused to be delivered his written notice and request for final 
disposition under that statute even though the warden failed to deliver them to the 
prosecuting attorney and appropriate court.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment 
of the Ninth District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
FISCHER, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and 
DETERS, J. 
__________________ 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 19} This case presents a simple question: Can someone cause a notice to 
be delivered if the notice is never actually delivered?  The obvious answer is no.  It 
“is self-evidently true” that “no one can have ‘caused something to be delivered’ 
unless delivery in fact occurs.”  Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 47, 113 S. Ct. 1085, 
122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993). 
{¶ 20} The majority, though, disregards the self-evident reading of R.C. 
2941.401 in favor of one that reflects its own policy preferences.  And while it 
makes a faint-hearted attempt to clothe its preferred reading in precedent, ultimately 
its decision is grounded in its own conception of what the statute ought to say.  I 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
don’t believe that disliking a statute is a good reason to disregard its text.  So I must 
dissent. 
An Unambiguous Statute 
{¶ 21} The federal and state Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right 
to a speedy trial.  See Sixth Amendment, U.S. Constitution; Article I, Section 10, 
Ohio Constitution.  This constitutional right is not at issue in this case.  What is at 
issue is a special provision that the state legislature has enacted that deals with 
prisoners who are in custody for one matter and face charges in other proceedings.  
That provision provides that when 
 
there is pending in this state any untried indictment, information, or 
complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 
one hundred eighty days after he causes to be delivered to the 
prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court in which the matter 
is pending, written notice of the place of his imprisonment and a 
request for a final disposition to be made of the matter * * *. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2941.401. 
{¶ 22} Here, Tyler Williams provided notice to the warden where he was 
imprisoned of pending charges against him, but the warden neglected to send the 
notice to the prosecutor and the appropriate court.  Under a plain reading of the 
statute, the 180-day period never began because the notice was never “delivered to 
the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court in which the matter is pending,” 
id. 
{¶ 23} The majority, though, eschews the plain reading.  Instead, it 
advances the view that a defendant may have caused a notice to be delivered even 
though it was not actually delivered.  See majority opinion, ¶ 1.  As a matter of 
linguistics, this is nonsense, of course.  Webster’s Third New International 
January Term, 2023 
11 
 
Dictionary 356 (1986) offers the following definitions for “cause” as a transitive 
verb: “to serve as cause or occasion of”; “bring into existence”; and “to effect by 
command, authority, or force,” id. at 356.  Similarly, it defines the noun “cause” as 
a “person, thing, fact, or condition that brings about an effect or that produces or 
calls forth a resultant action or state.”  Id.  Obviously, one cannot “bring into 
existence” something that never happens.  Nor can one “effect” an action that 
doesn’t ensue. 
{¶ 24} But, of course, we don’t need a dictionary to understand that the 
majority’s reading of R.C. 2941.401 is at odds with its plain meaning.  No ordinary 
speaker of the English language would say that someone caused a war if war was 
averted.  And no one would say that the mixture of two chemicals caused a reaction 
if a reaction didn’t result. 
{¶ 25} Indeed, when confronted with nearly identical statutory language, 
the United States Supreme Court had little difficulty concluding that a prisoner 
cannot have caused a notice to be delivered unless it was actually delivered.  See 
Fex, 507 U.S. at 47, 52, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406.  In Fex, the court took 
up an appeal from the Michigan Supreme Court under the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers (“IAD”), a statute that imposes nearly identical requirements for the 
exercise of statutory speedy-trial rights for out-of-state prisoners as R.C. 2941.401 
does for in-state prisoners.  See Fex at 46-47.  At issue was the commencement date 
for the 180-day clock.  Id. at 47.  The United States Supreme Court began its 
analysis by making short shrift of the position advanced by the majority today: 
 
[The state] argues that no one can have “caused something 
to be delivered” unless delivery in fact occurs.  That is self-evidently 
true, and so we must reject [the prisoner’s] contention that a 
prisoner’s transmittal of an IAD request to the prison authorities 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
commences the 180-day period even if the request gets lost in the 
mail and is never delivered to the “receiving” State * * *. 
 
(Footnote omitted.)  Id.  Thus, if we decide this case based simply on the statutory 
text, the state prevails.1 
The Cases Cited by the Majority Do Not Justify 
Ignoring Unambiguous Statutory Text 
{¶ 26} The majority never engages with the plain meaning of the phrase 
“causes to be delivered,” R.C. 2941.401.  Instead, it tries to cobble together support 
for its atextual reading from our caselaw.  But the cases it cites do not justify 
disregarding unambiguous statutory text. 
{¶ 27} For example, the majority cites State v. Mourey, 64 Ohio St.3d 482, 
597 N.E.2d 101 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus, in support of a “substantial 
compliance” standard for claims under the IAD.  See majority opinion at ¶ 13.  But 
Mourey’s substantial-compliance standard was effectively overruled by the United 
States Supreme Court.  See Fex at 52.  Fex rejected any notion that a prisoner’s best 
efforts to cause notice to be delivered would suffice, and instead, the court strictly 
construed the requirements of the IAD.  Id. at 47.  Nevertheless, the majority says 
that “this court’s interpretation of the language of the IAD [in Mourey] remains 
good law.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 13.  But that’s flat wrong.  In addition to being 
codified as state law, the IAD is a compact among the states that has been approved 
by the United States Congress under the authority of the Compacts Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10, cl. 3.  See 18 U.S.C.App. Section 2; 
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985).  
Consequently, decisions of the United States Supreme Court are controlling over 
 
1. Of course, in an appropriate case, a prisoner might have other remedies for the failure of a prison 
warden to comply with his legal obligation to forward the statutory notice, including mandamus and 
other civil actions. 
January Term, 2023 
13 
 
conflicting state decisions.  Carchman at 719.  (“The [IAD] is a congressionally 
sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, 
cl. 3, and thus is a federal law subject to federal construction”).2  Indeed, Fex itself 
involved an appeal from the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Michigan’s statutory enactment of the IAD.  Fex at 44.  If the federal interpretation 
were not controlling, the United States Supreme Court would not have had the 
authority to review the Michigan Supreme Court’s judgment. 
{¶ 28} The majority also cites State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-
Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, opining that the “tenor of that opinion is more 
supportive of Williams’s position than the state’s.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 12.  But 
one would be hard-pressed to see how that is so.  Hairston did not offer any insight 
into the question at issue in this appeal: whether a prisoner causes a notice to be 
delivered when that notice is never delivered.  It did, however, firmly reject the type 
of extratextual analysis employed by the majority today: 
 
Hairston * * * seeks to have us read a duty of reasonable 
diligence into the statute; to accept his interpretation, “this court 
must read into the statute language that does not exist.”  Middleburg 
Hts. v. Ohio Bd. of Bldg. Standards (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 510, 514, 
605 N.E.2d 66.  We decline to do so.  Had the legislature wanted to 
impose such a duty on the state in similar cases, it could have done  
 
2. It is also worth noting that because Fex is controlling for IAD claims, the majority’s decision 
today means that prisoners in Ohio will be subject to different rules depending on whether they face 
in-state or out-of-state charges.  For out-of-state charges, Fex controls and the 180-day clock doesn’t 
start ticking until the notice is received by the prosecutor and the court.  See Fex at 52.  For in-state 
charges, under the majority’s opinion the clock starts to tick as soon as notice is given to the warden.  
See majority opinion at ¶ 17. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
so.  As our task is to apply unambiguous laws and not rewrite them, 
we decline to impose duties on prosecutors or courts not imposed by 
the legislature. 
 
Hairston at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 29} In fairness, the majority does cite one case that offers indirect 
support for its decision to look beyond what R.C. 2941.401 actually says: State v. 
Dillon, 114 Ohio St.3d 154, 2007-Ohio-3617, 870 N.E.2d 1149.  See majority 
opinion at ¶ 15.  In Dillon, this court upheld the dismissal of charges based on a 
warden’s failure to give written notice of pending charges to a prisoner in a timely 
manner.  Though the statute imposed a duty on the warden to notify the prisoner of 
the pending charges, nothing in the statutory language required dismissal as a 
remedy for the warden’s failure.  See R.C. 2941.401.  But whatever the wisdom of 
the Dillon decision, it did not construe the “causes to be delivered” language that is 
at issue here.  See Dillon at ¶ 1, 23.  And nothing in Dillon requires that we ignore 
the plain import of the statutory language at issue in this case. 
Policy Concerns Should Not Trump Plain Statutory Text 
{¶ 30} The majority’s reading is contrary to plain text and finds only 
minimal support in our caselaw.  So how does one account for its holding?  The 
answer is evidently its concerns about the potential unfairness of a textual reading.  
We are told that “R.C. 2941.401 does not allow a prisoner to be punished for the 
failures of the state,” majority opinion at ¶ 15; that the state’s reading of the statute 
is “hyper-technical,” id. at ¶ 16; that “Williams satisfied his every obligation under 
the statute three times,” id. at ¶ 16; that “[t]he General Assembly is well aware that 
prisoners cannot themselves cause the written notice and request under R.C. 
2941.401 to be delivered,” id. at ¶ 17; and that when a warden fails in his duties, 
“the consequences of that failure should inure to the state on whose behalf the 
warden acts,” id. at ¶ 17. 
January Term, 2023 
15 
 
{¶ 31} In essence, the majority believes that a literal interpretation of the 
statute is unfair to the prisoner who has diligently sought to exercise his rights under 
the statute.  I don’t disagree with the majority on that point.  But where I part 
company with the majority is that I don’t believe that this perceived unfairness 
gives us license to rewrite the statute. 
{¶ 32} Policy judgments are the purview of the General Assembly.  “It is 
the role of the legislature to weigh * * * competing policy concerns and make the 
public policy of this state; ‘[o]ur role, in the exercise of the judicial power granted 
to us by the Constitution, is to interpret the law that the General Assembly enacts.’ ”  
State v. Parker, 157 Ohio St.3d 460, 2019-Ohio-3848, 137 N.E.3d 1151, ¶ 37, 
quoting State v. Taylor, 138 Ohio St.3d 194, 2014-Ohio-460, 5 N.E.3d 612, ¶ 14.  
There may be good reasons for the General Assembly to revise the statute to 
account for a warden who fails to deliver the statutory notice to the prosecutor and 
the court, but those reasons do not justify our assuming the legislative role. 
{¶ 33} Further, in fixing what it finds to be a problem with the statute as 
written, the majority creates other potential problems.  Under the majority’s fix, the 
180-day statutory time clock starts as soon as the prisoner gives notice to the 
warden, regardless of when—or if—that notice is received by the prosecutor and 
the court.  See majority opinion at ¶ 17.  In essence, prosecutors and crime victims 
are strictly liable for a warden’s failures.  The state can lose the opportunity to 
forever prosecute a prisoner before it learns that prosecution was requested. 
{¶ 34} The United States Supreme Court noted these considerations in Fex, 
comparing the “worst case scenarios” under the competing interpretations of the 
IAD that were offered in that case.  507 U.S. at 49, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 
406. It explained that under the prisoner’s interpretation, the “careless or malicious 
warden” could prevent commencement of the 180-day period by failing to forward 
the request.  Id. at 50.  This result was “bad,” but the court found the worst-case 
scenario under the state’s interpretation to be “significantly worse”: “If, through 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
negligence of the warden, a prisoner’s IAD request is delivered to the prosecutor 
more than 180 days after it was transmitted to the warden, the prosecution will be 
precluded before the prosecutor even knows it has been requested.”  Id. 
{¶ 35} The point is that the positions advanced by the parties in this case 
involve policy tradeoffs.  One might favor a rule that forces prosecutors and crime 
victims to bear the cost of a warden’s dilatoriness, or one might favor a rule that 
imputes those consequences to prisoners.  The United States Supreme Court opined 
in Fex that the policy outcome opted for by the majority today is “significantly 
worse” than the alternative of requiring actual receipt, id.  The majority apparently 
disagrees. 
{¶ 36} But ultimately, policy tradeoffs are not our call.  The language of the 
statute is clear.  I would leave any tweaking of its language to the General 
Assembly. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 37} Because it is self-evident that one cannot cause something to be 
delivered unless delivery actually occurs, I would affirm the decision of the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals.  Because the majority does otherwise, I respectfully 
dissent. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and DETERS, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
________________________ 
J.D. Tomlinson, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lindsey C. 
Poprocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Peter Galyardt, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
________________________