Case Title: Pennewell v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 410, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAVID PENNEWELL,  
 
§ 
§ 
Defendant Below,  
§ No. 410, 2002 
Appellant,  
 
§ 
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ of the State of Delaware in and 
§ for New Castle County 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ Cr. ID No. 0102006372 
§ 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted: January 28, 2003 
Decided: 
April 29, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 29th day of April 2003, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties it 
appears that: 
(1) 
The appellant, David Pennewell (“Pennewell”), was convicted following a 
jury trial in the Superior Court of several drug offenses including Trafficking in 
Cocaine.  In this appeal, he asserts three claims of error: (i) the refusal of the trial judge 
to entertain an untimely motion to suppress; (ii) improper comments by the prosecutor 
in jury summation and (iii) admission of evidence allegedly in violation of the Best 
Evidence Rule. We find no merit in any of these claims and accordingly affirm. 
 
 
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(2) 
Pennewell’s arrest resulted from a “sting” operation by the Wilmington 
Police Department.  On the afternoon of February 7, 2001, in the 300 block of Clayton 
Street, Detective Richard Armour, acting on information he received, observed 
Pennewell exiting a green Ford Taurus.  Armour returned to the police station to check 
on Pennewell’s status, i.e., to determine if he was a wanted person, and to gather a team 
of officers to assist in a possible arrest.  Upon his return to the 300 block of Clayton 
Street, Armour could not locate the green Taurus but, using his cell phone, Armour was 
able to contact Pennewell to set up a drug purchase at Fourth and DuPont Streets, two 
blocks away.  Armour advised fellow officers to be on the lookout for the Taurus.  
Other officers observed Pennewell parking the Taurus in the 1600 block of Fifth Street 
– about one block from the site of the planned drug buy.  As the officers approached, 
Pennewell ran and apparently activated the car’s alarm system.  After a short chase, 
Pennewell was apprehended and taken into custody.  He had $2,442 in cash on his 
person and a search of the Taurus revealed 42.45 grams of crack cocaine and a scale. 
(3) 
Pennewell was originally represented by Eugene Maurer, Esquire, an 
experienced criminal defense lawyer.  Pennewell’s trial was originally scheduled for 
November 8, 2001 but was rescheduled because of Maurer’s illness.  A new trial date 
was set for April 9, 2002.  On April 3, 2002, substitute counsel, including a member of 
 
 
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the Pennsylvania Bar who was to act as principal trial counsel, filed a motion to 
suppress the physical evidence seized from Pennewell as well as any statements made by 
him.  The trial judge denied the motion as untimely and refused to hold a suppression 
hearing. 
(4) 
As the trial judge noted in a post-trial decision denying Pennewell’s motion 
for a new trial, under the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Court’s 
Case Management Plan, motions to suppress evidence must be filed no later than ten 
days after the date of the initial case review.  The initial case review in this case was held 
on May 28, 2001, but the motion to suppress was filed on the eve of trial, which was 
more than ten months later.  Untimely motions to suppress evidence need not be 
considered in the absence of exceptional circumstances.   Barnett v. State, 691 A.2d 614, 
616 (1997).  This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of late-filed motions to suppress 
under an abuse of discretion standard.  Id.  
(5) 
We find no abuse of discretion in this case.  Although there was an 
eleventh hour substitution of out-of-state counsel, the defendant was represented by 
experienced Delaware counsel from the time of his arrest until shortly before trial.  
Since there was ample opportunity on the part of competent counsel to file suppression 
 
 
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motions had they been warranted, we agree with the Superior Court that “exceptional 
circumstances” were not present in this case. 
(6) 
Pennewell next complains that the prosecutor on two occasions in his 
summation to the jury violated the “Golden Rule,” i.e., asking the jury to place 
themselves in the place of the defendant to gauge his actions.  In the first instance, the 
prosecutor asked the jury “how many of you came to court today with $2,242 in your 
pocket or wallet?”  Later the prosecutor asked the jurors if they would run from police 
“if you were doing absolutely nothing wrong?  Absolutely not.”   
(7) 
Pennewell raised no objection at trial to the prosecutor’s statements and 
we thus view his claim of error under a plain error standard.  Wainwright v. State, 504 
A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).  (“Under the plain error standard of review, the error 
complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the 
fairness and integrity of the trial process.”)  The rationale for the golden rule doctrine is 
to discourage improper arguments that play on jurors’ emotions and sympathies.  
Delaware Olds, Inc. v. Dixon, 367 A.2d 178, 179 (Del. 1979).  But the rule is not 
intended to prevent counsel from urging jurors to use their common sense or life 
experiences.  Id.  We find no basis in the comments here under review for application 
of the golden rule standard, since the comments were, in essence, a request for the jury 
 
 
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to use its every day experiences as citizens.  The comments clearly do not rise to the level 
of plain error nor did they require a sua sponte reaction from the trial judge. 
(8) 
Finally, Pennewell raises an evidentiary claim based on the “best evidence” 
rule.  We review this claim under an abuse of discretion standard.  Lilly v. State, 649 
A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del. 1964).  Detective Armour testified that he observed an insurance 
card bearing Pennewell’s name during the search of the Taurus.  This evidence was 
relevant to the State’s effort to connect Pennewell to the drugs and scale found in the 
vehicle.  The insurance card was not seized and apparently remained with the vehicle.  
At trial, Pennewell objected to Armour’s testimony on the ground that the card itself 
was the best evidence of its contents.  The Superior Court ruled that the officer’s 
testimony was not offered to prove the contractual relationship between the insurance 
company and Pennewell but merely to show Pennewell had some connection to the 
vehicle. 
(9) 
The Delaware Rules of Evidence codify the “best evidence rule” in D.R.E. 
1002 which provides that “to prove the contents of a writing ... the original writing ... is 
required, except as otherwise provided in [the] Rules or by statute.  In Day v. State, 297 
A.2d 50, 51 (Del. 1972), this Court considered a best evidence challenge to the 
testimony of a police officer who testified that two bills connected to the defendant 
 
 
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bore serial numbers matching those previously recorded by the officer.  In upholding 
the admissibility of such testimony, we noted that the best evidence rule applies only 
where the object of the testimony is to prove the contents of the writing and not merely 
to provide identification of the document.  Id.  This Court also rejected a best evidence 
challenge to the testimony of a security guard as to the value of stolen items based on 
his familiarity with the price tags on the items, without the necessity of offering the 
price tags into evidence.  State v. Young, 1986 WL 17135 (Del. 1986) [ORDER].  We 
conclude that the Superior Court correctly ruled that the proffered testimony of 
Detective Armour did not run afoul of the best evidence rule. 
(10) Pennewell also asserts that the failure of the police to preserve the 
insurance card precludes any reference to it through testimony at trial under Deberry v. 
State, 457 A.2d 744, 750 (Del. 1983). Although this claim was not directly raised at 
trial, it was suggested in defendant’s motion for a new trial.  In any event, there is no 
claim that the police failed to preserve important evidence through negligence or bad 
faith.  Moreover, to the extent the insurance card was intended to link Pennewell to the 
Taurus, it was secondary to “other evidence produced at trial” establishing that 
connection.  Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1090 (Del. 1987).  The primary direct 
evidence of Pennewell’s connection to the Taurus included Pennewell’s flight from the 
 
 
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vehicle observed by other police officers, as well as Pennewell’s activation of the 
vehicle’s car alarm while fleeing.  Whatever prejudice Pennewell suffered from 
testimony concerning the insurance card was fully mitigated by the testimony of other 
eyewitnesses connecting him to the Taurus.  We find no merit to this claim. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.  Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 18, 
the time within which a motion for reargument may be filed in this matter is shortened 
to seven days from the date of this Order. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
   s/Joseph T. Walsh 
 Justice