Case Title: Ex parte The Utilities Board of the City of Foley, Alabama

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1161168

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
rel:  June 28, 2018
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2017-2018
_________________________
1161168
_________________________
Ex parte The Utilities Board of the City of Foley,
Alabama, d/b/a Riviera Utilities; Tom DeBell;
James Wallace; Kevin Saucier; and Roby Tomlin
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Charles D. Hilburn, Jr., and Christa Hilburn 
v.
The Utilities Board of the City of Foley,
Alabama, d/b/a Riviera Utilities; Tom DeBell;
James Wallace; Kevin Saucier; and Roby Tomlin)
(Baldwin Circuit Court, CV-15-901200)
PER CURIAM.
1161168
The Utilities Board of the City of Foley, Alabama, d/b/a
Riviera 
Utilities 
("Riviera Utilities"), and 
Tom 
DeBell, 
James
Wallace, Kevin Saucier, and Roby Tomlin (those individuals are
hereinafter 
collectively 
referred 
to 
as "the 
Riviera
employees") are the defendants in a personal-injury action
filed by Charles D. Hilburn, Jr., and his wife, Christa
Hilburn, that is pending in the Baldwin Circuit Court. 
Riviera Utilities and the Riviera employees petition this
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Baldwin Circuit
Court to vacate its order denying their motion for a summary
judgment as to the claims filed against them by the Hilburns
and to enter a summary judgment in their favor.  As to the
Riviera employees, we grant the petition and issue the writ. 
As to Riviera Utilities, we deny the petition.  
I. Facts and Procedural History
Riviera Utilities is a legislatively created municipal
utilities board and a public corporation under the provisions
of Act No. 175 adopted at the 1951 regular session of the
legislature, as amended (now codified as §§ 11-50-310 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975).  Riviera Utilities provides electrical,
water, 
wastewater-treatment, 
natural-gas, 
and 
TV-cable
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services within the corporate limits of the City of Foley.  It
also provides electrical and other services to other areas of
Baldwin County. 
On July 22, 2014, Riviera Utilities was one of eight
Baldwin County entities that received an "811 ticket," also
known as a line-locate ticket, through a computer program
known as "KorWeb."  Anyone planning to begin excavation is
required by statute to give notice to a utility or a one-call-
notification center before beginning the excavation work. 
Alabama 811 is the one-call-notification center for Alabama,
commonly known as the "Call Before You Dig" program.  Once it
receives a call, Alabama 811 electronically notifies its
members that have underground utilities, by means of an 811
ticket, about excavation work to be performed so they can mark
those utilities before excavation begins.  Riviera Utilities
employs personnel known as "line-locate technicians," whose
job it is to locate and mark underground lines at excavation
sites.  Riviera Utilities received approximately 16,000 line-
locate calls through the Alabama 811 system in 2014,
approximately 20,000 in 2015, and approximately 50,000 in
2016.  In the early months of 2017, Riviera Utilities received
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approximately 9,500 line-locate calls through the Alabama 811
system.
The 811 ticket Riviera Utilities received on July 22
stated that "bridge construction" would take place on Baldwin
County Road 52 in Robertsdale.  Gulf Equipment Corporation was
in charge of a bridge-repair project on County Road 52
pursuant to a contract between Gulf Equipment and the Baldwin
County Highway Department calling for repairs to an existing
box culvert, which is similar to a storm-drain pipe.  The
construction site was not within the corporate limits of the
City of Foley.  Riviera Utilities owned, operated, and
maintained power lines in the area where the bridge was being
repaired; however, Riviera Utilities was not a party to the
bridge-repair contract.  The power poles near the bridge-
repair project contained several power lines.  The top three
lines on those power poles are 46-KV lines leased by Alabama
Power Company; the bottom lines are Riviera Utilities' 7200-KV
primary lines. 
Kris Deese, a line-locate technician employed by Riviera
Utilities, received the 811 ticket generated for the bridge-
repair project on July 22.  He went to the project site on
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July 23 to locate and mark any underground lines.  While Deese
was at the site, he saw a bridge, but there was no equipment
present and no one was working.  Locating no underground
utilities owned or operated by Riviera Utilities at the
bridge-repair project site, Deese did not mark anything
regarding underground utilities or note the presence of the
overhead power lines. 
At the time of the accident causing Charles's injuries,
DeBell was Riviera Utilities' general manager and CEO, Wallace
was its operations manager, Saucier was its risk manager, and
Tomlin was its superintendent of safety and training.  DeBell
worked at Riviera Utilities since 1989.  Wallace had been the
operations 
manager 
at 
Riviera 
Utilities 
since 
2010,
supervising 
all 
five 
operating 
divisions 
of 
Riviera
Utilities--gas, water, electric, wastewater treatment, cable
TV, and safety.  Saucier had worked at Riviera Utilities since
October 2012; the line-locate technicians employed by Riviera
Utilities work in the risk and safety department under
Saucier's supervision.  Tomlin worked at Riviera Utilities
from 2009 through the end of 2015.  He was a superintendent
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whose 
responsibilities 
were 
storage, 
warehousing 
and
inventory, and safety. 
On July 31, 2014, Charles was employed by Gulf Equipment
on the bridge-repair project.  Charles's co-employee, Randall
Hayes, was operating a track hoe1 to drive steel pilings into
the ground when the track hoe and/or a steel piling came in
contact with an uninsulated overhead electrical power line. 
The electrical current traveled from the track hoe and/or
piling into the body of the track hoe while Charles was
touching the body of the track hoe, causing the electrical
charge to enter into his hand, travel through his body, and
exit via his leg.  Charles was permanently disabled by the
electrocution injuries he suffered, including a brain injury
and memory loss. 
The Hilburns sued Riviera Utilities and the Riviera
employees in their individual capacities.  In the complaint as
last amended, the Hilburns alleged:
"22. Prior to July 31, 2014, Riviera [Utilities]
and the [Riviera employees] received actual or
constructive notice that bridge construction was
about to occur on County Road 52 in Baldwin County,
Alabama, 
and 
that 
[Charles's] 
employer, 
Gulf
1A track hoe is a piece of heavy construction equipment
similar to a backhoe.
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Equipment Corporation, would 
be 
performing the 
bridge
construction.
"23. Riviera [Utilities] and the [Riviera
employees] received actual or constructive notice
from Alabama [811] on July 22, 2014, that Gulf
Equipment Corporation would be performing bridge
construction on County Road 52 in Baldwin County,
Alabama.
"24. Riviera [Utilities] and the [Riviera
employees] received actual or constructive notice
that bridge construction was being performed on
County Road 52 in Baldwin County, Alabama, when,
based 
upon 
information 
and 
belief, 
Riviera
[Utilities] trucks owned and operated by Riviera
[Utilities] drove upon the construction site and
observed the construction activities at or near
Riviera [Utilities'] uninsulated, energized lines.
"25. Riviera [Utilities] and the [Riviera
employees] 
reasonably 
anticipated 
that 
Gulf 
Equipment
Corporation 
employees 
working 
at 
the
bridge-construction site may come in contact with
Riviera [Utilities'] uninsulated, energized power
lines."
The Hilburns then asserted claims alleging that Riviera
Utilities and the Riviera employees acted negligently and
wantonly: 
"a. By not insulating the power lines at the
bridge-construction site.
"b. By not de-energizing the power lines at the
bridge-construction site.
"c. By not re-routing the power lines at the
bridge-construction site so the workers engaged in
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the bridge construction would not come in contact
with them.
"d. By not employing fuses or circuit breakers
that could immediately de-energize the power lines at
the bridge-construction site if they came in contact
with people or foreign objects."
The Hilburns alleged that the Riviera employees were
"acting within the line and scope of their capacity as agents,
servants, or employees of Riviera" Utilities at the time of
the accident and that they were "responsible for taking and/or
implementing 
appropriate 
safety 
measures 
when 
Riviera
[Utilities] had actual or constructive notice that persons may
come in contact with its uninsulated, energized power lines." 
The Hilburns also asserted a loss-of-consortium claim on
behalf of Christa.  
Riviera Utilities and the Riviera employees answered,
asserting, 
among 
other 
defenses, 
discretionary-function
immunity, 
substantive 
immunity, 
State-agent 
immunity,
municipal immunity, sovereign immunity, qualified immunity,
and absolute immunity.  The Hilburns filed a motion for a
partial summary judgment as to certain affirmative defenses
raised by the Riviera employees asserting "statutory caps on
damages and various forms of immunity" or, in the alternative,
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to strike those defenses.  Riviera Utilities and the Riviera
employees then filed a motion for a summary judgment as to all
of the Hilburns' claims.  In responding to that summary-
judgment motion, the Hilburns stated that they did not oppose
the entry of a summary judgment in favor of DeBell, Wallace,
and Tomlin or the entry of a summary judgment in favor of
Saucier as to the wantonness claim against him.  The Hilburns
argued, however, that Saucier was not entitled to a summary
judgment as to the negligence claim against him.  Moreover,
they argued, Riviera Utilities was not entitled to a summary
judgment in its favor.  Nevertheless, after the trial court
heard oral argument, it denied both summary-judgment motions
as to all claims.   Riviera Utilities and the Riviera
employees then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus. 
II. Standard of Review
"'"While the general rule is that the
denial of a motion for summary judgment is
not reviewable, the exception is that the
denial of a motion grounded on a claim of
immunity is reviewable by petition for writ
of mandamus.  Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d
794 (Ala. 1996)....
"'"Summary 
judgment 
is 
appropriate 
only
when 'there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' 
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Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young v. La
Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So. 2d 402 (Ala.
1996).  A court considering a motion for
summary judgment will view the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, Hurst v. Alabama Power Co., 675 So.
2d 397 (Ala. 1996), Fuqua v. Ingersoll–Rand
Co., 591 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1991); will
accord the nonmoving party all reasonable
favorable inferences from the evidence,
Fuqua, supra, Aldridge v. Valley Steel
Constr., Inc., 603 So. 2d 981 (Ala. 1992);
and will resolve all reasonable doubts
against the moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex
parte Brislin, 719 So. 2d 185 (Ala. 1998).
"'"An appellate court reviewing a
ruling on a motion for summary judgment
will, de novo, apply these same standards
applicable in the trial court.  Fuqua,
supra, Brislin, supra.  Likewise, the
appellate court will consider only that
factual material available of record to the
trial court for its consideration in
deciding the motion.  Dynasty Corp. v.
Alpha Resins Corp., 577 So. 2d 1278 (Ala.
1991), Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat'l Bank,
599 So. 2d 595 (Ala. 1992), Rowe v. Isbell,
599 So. 2d 35 (Ala. 1992)."'
"Ex parte Turner, 840 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. 2002)
(quoting Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912–13 (Ala.
2000)).  A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy available only when the petitioner can
demonstrate: '"(1) a clear legal right to the order
sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court."'  Ex parte Nall,
879 So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala .2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC
Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001))."
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Ex parte Yancey, 8 So. 3d 299, 303–04 (Ala. 2008).
III. Analysis
A. Wantonness claims asserted against the Riviera employees
Based on the concessions in the Hilburns' response in the
trial court to the Riviera employees' summary-judgment motion
and their responsive brief in this Court, we conclude that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning
the wantonness claims against the Riviera employees and that
the Riviera employees are entitled to a summary judgment as to
those claims.  Their petition for a writ of mandamus as to the
wantonness claims asserted against them is due to be granted. 
B. Negligence claims asserted against the Riviera employees
As to DeBell, Tomlin, and Wallace, based on the
concessions in the Hilburns' response to the Riviera
employees' summary-judgment motion in the trial court and
their responsive brief in this Court, we conclude that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning the
negligence claims asserted against DeBell, Tomlin, and Wallace
and that those employees are entitled to a summary judgment as
to the negligence claims against them.  Their petition for a
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writ of mandamus as to the negligence claims against them is
due to be granted. 
As to Saucier, however, the Hilburns do not concede that
he is entitled to a summary judgment as to their negligence
claim against him.  We therefore address Saucier's argument
that he is entitled to State-agent immunity and to a summary
judgment in his favor as to the Hilburns' negligence claim.  
In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), a
plurality opinion, this Court formulated a test for immunity
referred to as State-agent immunity.  A majority of this Court
subsequently adopted the Cranman test in Ex parte Butts, 775
So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000).  This Court extended State-agent
immunity to municipal employees in City of Birmingham v.
Brown, 969 So. 2d 910, 916 (Ala. 2007).  The standard for
State-agent immunity as stated in Cranman is as follows:
"A State agent shall be immune from civil
liability in his or her personal capacity when the
conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent
is based upon the agent's 
"(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or
"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the
administration 
of 
a 
department 
or 
agency 
of
government, including, but not limited to, examples
such as:
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"(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"(b) allocating resources;
"(c) negotiating contracts;
"(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department
or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as
the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the
manner for performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of
the criminal laws of the State, including, but not
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons
of unsound mind, or educating students.
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the
foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall
not be immune from civil liability in his or her
personal capacity
"(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws,
rules, or regulations of this State enacted or
promulgated for the purpose of regulating the
activities 
of 
a 
governmental 
agency 
require
otherwise; or
"(2) when the State agent acts willfully,
maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his
or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law."
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792 So. 2d at 405.
This Court has established a "burden-shifting" process
when a party raises the defense of State-agent immunity.  Ex
parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).  A
defendant asserting State-agent immunity "bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from a
function that would entitle the State agent to immunity."  Id. 
If the State agent makes such a showing, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of the exceptions to
State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman is applicable.  Ex
parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282 (Ala. 2008).
In their motion for a summary judgment based on State-
agent immunity, the Riviera employees set forth facts they
considered sufficient to establish such immunity.  The
evidence applicable to Saucier, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Hilburns, the nonmovants, see Ex parte Price,
[Ms. 1160956, January 12, 2018] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2018),
reveals the following facts.
The Hilburns' claims against Saucier are based on the 811
ticket submitted by Gulf Equipment that noted "bridge
construction" would be performed during the bridge-repair
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project on County Road 52.  Wallace, the operations manager of
Riviera Utilities, testified in his deposition that the line-
locate ticket--the 811 ticket--alerted Riviera Utilities to
the risk of harm resulting from the proximity of construction
equipment 
to 
uninsulated 
electrical 
wires 
above 
the
construction site and that Riviera Utilities should have de-
energized them or insulated them. Tomlin, who was Riviera
Utilities' superintendent of safety and training during the
period pertinent to this case, testified in his deposition
that the line-locate ticket alerted Riviera Utilities to the
risk of harm resulting from the proximity of construction
equipment 
to 
uninsulated 
electrical 
wires 
above 
the
construction site.  He also testified that had he seen the
line-locate ticket he would have taken steps to see that that
risk was eliminated. 
Saucier testified in 
his deposition that he 
disagreed with
the conclusions as to what Riviera Utilities should have
learned from an examination of the 811 ticket, but that
factual dispute is not dispositive of the threshold issue
whether Saucier has established a prima facie case of State-
agent immunity.  
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The operative facts relevant to this analysis stem from
the undisputed fact that Saucier never saw the 811 ticket
before the accident that is the basis of this claim.  Riviera
Utilities, and specifically Saucier's department, did not have
any policy or procedure that provided any specific direction
to Saucier for supervising line-locate technicians, nor was
there a protocol for making further inquiry of the contractor
as to the necessity for deactivating overhead wires when
notice was received of an impending underground excavation.
The Hilburns contend that whether Riviera Utilities had
any such policy or procedure for review of 811 tickets is
irrelevant because, they maintain, the information concerning
the hazard presented by the bridge-repair project was apparent
on the face of the 811 ticket.  The Hilburns acknowledge that
Saucier did not have actual knowledge of the hazard, but they
contend that Deese's knowledge that the 811 ticket stated that
"bridge construction" would be taking place, combined with the
evidence indicating that other Riviera Utilities employees had
experience with job-hazard analysis in bridge-construction
scenarios, provided Saucier with constructive knowledge of a
potential hazard at the bridge-construction site.  If Saucier
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had 
constructive 
knowledge 
of 
the 
impending 
bridge
construction and his job responsibilities included safety
precautions regarding overhead power lines, the Hilburns
argue, he owed a duty to Charles that allowed no exercise of
judgment or discretion; therefore, they insist, there can be
no State-agent immunity.  On the other hand, the Hilburns
argue, if Saucier had no notice of the danger, either actual
or constructive, or his job responsibilities did not include
safety precautions as to overhead power lines, a view they say
is contrary to the evidence, they concede he would have no
duty to Charles and hence no liability for that reason.  The
Hilburns argue that issues of fact as to Saucier's notice of
the danger and his job responsibilities preclude the entry of
a summary judgment as to their negligence claim against him. 
Therefore, the Hilburns argue, Saucier is either not liable to
the Hilburns because he owed Charles no duty or he is liable
and has no immunity. 
In the context of review by mandamus of claims subject to
a defense of State-agent immunity pursuant to Ex parte
Cranman, supra, we first review the facts surrounding the
activities of the agent.  If those facts support immunity and
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the burden therefore shifts to the claimant, we review any
facts offered to establish an exception to immunity as
prescribed in Cranman to determine whether that exception is
supported by substantial evidence.  Ex parte Price, supra.  
As the head of Riviera Utilities' risk and safety
department, Saucier testified that his responsibilities are
detailed in Riviera Utilities' written position description
for that job.  Item number 4 in the section of the position
description titled "Essential Duties and Responsibilities" 
states that the risk manager 
"[i]nspects and observes equipment, facilities,
and work habits of field crews to detect existing or
potential accident and health hazards.  Responds to
complaints of unsafe conditions and evaluates the
conditions.  Recommends corrective or preventative
measures where indicated, develops new policies and
protocols to address issues, and coordinates with
employees and supervisors to find solutions."
Item number 11 of that section states that the risk manager
"[s]upervises and oversees the daily operations of the Line
Locate Department." 
The 
line-locate 
technicians 
are 
also 
supervised 
by 
Riviera
Utilities' 
compliance 
and 
risk 
supervisor, 
Jacqueline
McClinton, who works in Saucier's department and whose
position 
description 
includes 
monitoring 
line-locate
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notifications.  Saucier, McClinton, and the line-locate
technicians have access to the 811 ticket information;
however, as previously noted, Riviera Utilities receives
thousands of 811 tickets every year.  The operative evidence
for determining State-agent immunity deals with Saucier's
activities relative to his activities as a State agent, and
not with the merits of the Hilburns' underlying tort claim. 
We must first determine, therefore, whether acting without any
policy or procedure that provided for supervising line-locate
technicians or a protocol for making further inquiry of the
contractor as to the necessity for deactivating overhead wires
when notice was received of an impending underground
excavation constituted activity on Saucier's part, as head of
the risk and safety department, that falls outside the
parameters established for immunity in Cranman.  
Put another way, the inquiry turns on whether the facts
associated with Saucier's management of his department in a
manner that failed to prevent the accident made the basis of
this claim deprive him of the immunity afforded under Cranman. 
As previously noted, "[a] State agent shall be immune from
civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the
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conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based
upon" a State agent's "formulating plans, policies, or
designs" 
or "exercising his or her judgment 
in the
administration of a department or agency of government,
including, but not limited to ... allocating resources ...
[and] supervising personnel."  Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405. 
It is undisputed that Deese was the only employee of
Riviera Utilities who actually saw the 811 ticket at issue
here, that he perceived no hazard from the wording of the
ticket or from his visit to the construction site, and that he
did not bring the ticket to the attention of any of his
supervisors or anyone else at Riviera Utilities.  Deese is not
a defendant; therefore, the availability of immunity for his
actions is not before us.  
In light of the thousands of 811 tickets submitted
annually, Saucier's failure to manage his department in a
manner that would have enabled him to prevent the incident
made the basis of this action falls squarely within the
immunity from liability for actions based upon a State agent's
formulating plans, policies, or designs or exercising his or
her judgment in the administration of a department or agency
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of government, including, but not limited to, allocating
resources and hiring and supervising personnel.  That Saucier
may have had constructive notice, as the Hilburns urge, is a
factor that could be of critical importance in a proceeding
against an employee of an entity not entitled to immunity,
such as a private utility, but is not determinative in this
proceeding where the issue is the employee's entitlement to
immunity.
State-agent 
immunity 
under 
Cranman 
having 
been
established, the burden then shifted to the Hilburns "to show,
by substantial evidence, that one of the two exceptions to
State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman applies."  Ex parte
Price, ___ So. 3d at ___ (emphasis added).2  See also Ex parte
City of Homewood, 231 So. 3d 1082, 1088 (Ala. 2017) ("Because
the materials submitted by the officers established that they
qualified for immunity, the burden then shifted to Mines to
show that one of the two Cranman exceptions to immunity
applied.").  The only possible exception here deals with the
merits of the claim as they apply to whether the State agent
2Because the trial court denied the motions for a summary
judgment without explanation, we can only speculate as to
whether it found immunity and then deemed an exception
applicable or simply found no basis for immunity for Saucier. 
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acted "willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,
beyond 
his 
or 
her 
authority, 
or 
under 
a 
mistaken
interpretation of the law."  Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405. 
We turn, therefore, to the Hilburns' contention that
State-agent immunity is not available to Saucier as to their
negligence claim against him.  The Hilburns contend that
Saucier cannot be immune because, they say, he disregarded his
duty to Charles and, in doing so, acted beyond his authority
or under a mistaken interpretation of the law and that,
therefore, he forfeited his State-agent immunity.3 
We see no substantial evidence here that Saucier exceeded
his authority or that he acted under a mistaken interpretation
of law.  His discharge of his duties as head of the risk and
safety department fall well within the parameters of the
authority conferred on him.  The allegation of the commission
of a tort was once viewed as evidence of action in excess of
authority.  See Elmore v. Fields, 153 Ala. 345, 351, 45 So.
66, 67 (1907), in which this Court found immunity unavailable
3The Hilburns do not assert any exception based upon
willful, 
malicious, fraudulent, or 
bad-faith 
conduct. 
 
Indeed,
as previously noted, the Hilburns conceded below and in this
Court that their wantonness claim against Saucier, requiring
a lesser degree of culpability than the conduct involved in
the aforementioned exceptions, was due to be dismissed. 
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to the State agent in his individual capacity and observed
that "the authorities hold that [a State agent] has no
authority to act for the state in the commission of a tort." 
This view no longer prevails.  In Taylor v. Shoemaker, 605 So.
2d 828 (Ala. 1992), cited with approval in Cranman, the Court
noted that the holding in Elmore v. Fields that the commission
of a tort constituted acting beyond authority had subsequently
been very clearly rejected.  Moreover, there is no evidence
indicating that Saucier relied on a mistaken interpretation of
state law simply because the Hilburns alleged that he was
guilty of an unintentional tort in the discharge of his duties
as a State agent.
Saucier has demonstrated that he has "(1) a clear legal
right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3)
the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court."   BOC Group, 823 So. 2d at
1272.  Therefore, his motion for a summary judgment as to the
Hilburns' negligence claim asserted against him was due to be
granted on the basis of State-agent immunity.4  
4
"Mandamus review of the denial of a
summary-judgment motion 'grounded on a
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C. Claims asserted against Riviera Utilities
Riviera Utilities argues that, as a municipal utility, it
is a governmental entity entitled to substantive immunity. 
Substantive immunity shields a municipality from liability for
the negligent acts of its employees "in those narrow areas of
governmental activities essential to the well-being of the
governed, where the imposition of liability can be reasonably
calculated to materially thwart [a municipality's] legitimate
efforts to provide such public services."  Rich v. City of
Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385, 387 (Ala. 1982).  The substantive-
immunity rule is given effect in the context of "those public
service activities of governmental entities ... so laden with
claim of immunity' is an exception to the
general rule against interlocutory review
of the denial of summary-judgment motions. 
Ex parte Auburn Univ., 6 So. 3d 478, 483
(Ala. 2008); Ex parte Hudson, 866 So. 2d
1115, 
1120 
(Ala. 
2003). 
 
In 
those
exceptional 
cases, 
'[w]e 
confine 
our
interlocutory review to matters germane to
the issue of immunity.  Matters relevant to
the merits of the underlying tort claim,
such as issues of duty or causation, [we
leave] to the trial court....'  866 So. 2d
at 1120."  
Ex parte Simpson, 36 So. 3d 15, 22 (Ala. 2009); see also Ex
parte Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 48 So. 3d 621, 628 n.2 (Ala.
2010). 
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the public interest as to outweigh the incidental duty to
individual citizens."  Id. at 387-88.  Riviera Utilities
contends that because it provides utility services to the
public, the substantive-immunity rule applies here.  Moreover,
it argues, its participation in the 811 ticket program is a
benefit to itself and to the public. 
The Hilburns argue that Riviera Utilities has not
demonstrated that it is entitled to substantive immunity.
"[T]he lack of anything other than an incidental duty to a
particular individual prevents the municipality from being
liable from damages, because a breach of a duty owed to the
general public will not form the basis for a negligence claim
by an individual citizen."  Bill Salter Advertising, Inc. v.
City of Atmore, 79 So. 3d 646, 652 (Ala. 2010).  In this case,
the Hilburns argue, Riviera Utilities did not owe a duty to
the general public, but to the employees of Gulf Equipment
Corporation who were working on the bridge-repair project in
close proximity to Riviera Utilities' overhead power lines. 
According to the Hilburns, the safety measures they allege
Riviera Utilities should have implemented would not have been
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directed toward the general public, but only toward the Gulf
Equipment employees working on the bridge-repair project.
We conclude that, because the Hilburns' claims against
Riviera Utilities did not involve actions that took place
within the city limits of Foley, Riviera Utilities clearly is
not entitled to substantive immunity.  The cases cited by
Riviera Utilities are distinguishable.  See, e.g., Rich v.
City of Mobile, in which this Court found the municipality
immune from claims alleging negligent inspection by city
plumbing inspectors checking an individual residence in the
city for compliance with the city's plumbing code, and Bill
Salter Advertising, Inc. v. City of Atmore, 79 So. 3d 646, 653
(Ala. Civ. App. 2010), in which the Court of Civil Appeals
held that enactment of a sign ordinance for the benefit of the
citizens of the municipality is a municipal function giving
rise to substantive immunity and that an employee enforcing
the ordinance shares in that immunity, following Tutwiler Drug
Co. v. City of Birmingham, 418 So. 2d 102, 105 (Ala. 1982). 
We note, however, that the unavailability of substantive
immunity for Riviera Utilities does not foreclose the
availability to it of any defense based upon § 11-93-2, Ala.
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Code 1975, the statutory 
cap on damages 
afforded 
a
governmental entity.  This defense has been asserted by
Riviera Utilities in the trial court and will be addressed in
further proceedings in the trial court.  Because Riviera
Utilities is not entitled to a summary judgment on the basis
of substantive immunity, the trial court properly denied its
motion for a summary judgment on this basis.  
IV. Conclusion
Because the Hilburns concede that the Riviera employees
are entitled to a summary judgment as to the wantonness claims
asserted against them and that DeBell, Wallace, and Tomlin are
entitled to a summary judgment as to the negligence claims
asserted against them, they have established a clear legal
right to a summary judgment on those claims.  Because Saucier
has demonstrated that he is entitled to State-agent immunity
as to the negligence claim asserted against him, he has
established a clear legal right to a summary judgment on that
claim. 
 
However, 
because 
Riviera 
Utilities 
has 
not
demonstrated that it is entitled to substantive immunity as to
the claims asserted against it, it has not established a clear
legal right to a summary judgment on those claims.  Therefore,
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we grant the petition only as to the Riviera employees and
issue a writ directing the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate its
order of August 29, 2017, denying a summary judgment as to the
Riviera employees and to enter a summary judgment in favor of
DeBell, Wallace, Tomlin, and Saucier as to the claims asserted
against them.  We deny the petition as to Riviera Utilities. 
PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.
Champ Lyons, Jr., Special Chief Justice, and Pamela
Baschab, Jean Williams Brown, Robert Bernard Harwood, Jr.,
Gorman Houston, and Thomas A. Woodall, Special Justices,
concur.  
Terry L. Butts, Special Justice, concurs in the result in
part and dissents in part.  
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TERRY L. BUTTS, Special Justice (concurring in the result in
part and dissenting in part).
As to Tom DeBell, James Wallace, and Roby Tomlin, I concur
in the result of granting the petition for a writ of mandamus
as to all claims against them on the basis of State-agent
immunity.  
As to Kevin Saucier, I concur in the result only in
granting the petition for a writ of mandamus on the wantonness
claim against him because the Hilburns do not oppose it.  As
to granting the petition for the writ of mandamus on the
negligence claim against Saucier, however, I dissent.  I would
deny the petition as to that negligence claim and allow the
trial court to address that issue going forward.  Ex parte
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 987 So. 2d 1090, 1101 (Ala. 2007)
(noting that this Court is "aware of the fundamental
disinclination of the appellate courts to intrude into the
trial court's province in conducting the litigation process");
Ex parte Franklin Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 674 So. 2d 1277,
1280 (Ala. 1996) ("Fact-driven immunity questions should be
first decided in the trial court, with a developed record."). 
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As to Riviera Utilities, I concur in the result as to
denying the petition for a writ of mandamus as to all claims
asserted against it. 
30