Case Title: People v. Flores

Citation: 

Docket Number: S116307

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ALFRED FLORES III, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S116307 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
FVA-015023 
 
 
May 4, 2020 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, and 
Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in which 
Justice Cuéllar concurred. 
 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
S116307 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
A jury found defendant Alfred Flores III guilty of the first 
degree murders of Ricardo Torres, Jason Van Kleef, and 
Alexander Ayala.  (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)  It found true the 
special circumstance allegation of multiple murder (id., 190.2, 
subd. (a)(3)), as well as the sentence enhancement allegations 
that defendant had personally discharged a firearm to commit 
each murder (id., § 12022.53, subd. (d)).  Following the penalty 
phase, the jury returned a death verdict, and the trial court 
entered a judgment of death.  This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. 
Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)  We 
affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
Over the course of three consecutive days in March 2001, 
the bodies of three teenage boys were discovered at three 
separate locations in San Bernardino County.  The victims were 
subsequently identified as Torres, Van Kleef, and Ayala.   
1.  Evidence 
a.  Discovery of Torres’s Body 
After dark on March 19, 2001, Anita Rita Saldana and her 
teenage daughter, Sheila Leyerly, were passengers in a car 
driving uphill on Lytle Creek Road toward Lytle Creek.  
Saldana, sitting in the front passenger seat, noticed a Chevrolet 
Astro van parked facing downhill in a dirt pull-off area on the 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
 
opposite side of the two-lane road.  According to Saldana, three 
or four Latino men stood outside, by the side of the van facing 
Lytle Creek Road.  One appeared to her to be about 40 years old.  
It looked like they were drinking.  One of the men was wearing 
an oversized white T-shirt. 
Approximately 15 minutes later, Saldana and Leyerly 
traveled in their car back toward where they had seen the van.  
When they passed the area where the van had been parked, 
Leyerly spotted a white tennis shoe.  Saldana’s husband, who 
was driving, pulled over and shined the car’s headlights, which 
illuminated a dead body.  Saldana and Leyerly both recognized 
the victim as one of the people they had seen standing by the 
van in that same area 15 minutes earlier.  Saldana told police 
she thought the victim had been standing next to the man 
wearing the white T-shirt.   
The victim was 15-year-old Ricardo Torres.  Torres had 
been shot seven times, including twice in the back of the head.  
Crime scene personnel found a pair of eyeglasses, a plastic Pepsi 
bottle, a cigarette butt, multiple nine-millimeter shell casings, 
and one live round near Torres’s body.  No fingerprints were 
found on any of these items.  Crime scene personnel also noted 
and photographed tire tracks and shoe prints near the body.  
The presence of shell casings and blood pooling underneath the 
body suggested Torres had been shot at the scene.   
b.  Discovery of Van Kleef’s Body 
Shortly after midnight on March 20, 2001, Tamara 
Phoenix was returning a tractor trailer to the trucking yard 
where she worked on Willow Avenue in Rialto.  As she drove up 
the yard’s dark driveway, her headlights revealed a dead body.  
Phoenix called the police.   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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The body belonged to 18-year-old Jason Van Kleef.  Van 
Kleef had been shot once in the back of the head at close range.  
The size of the wound suggested a larger caliber weapon, such 
as a .38-caliber, .357-caliber, or nine-millimeter handgun.  Van 
Kleef was wearing Etnies tennis shoes.  Etnies-pattern shoe 
prints had been found at the Torres murder scene.  Van Kleef’s 
body was on top of a size XXL Stafford-brand white T-shirt and 
under a thin blue sheet.  There were no bullet casings or signs 
of struggle at the scene, which suggested to investigators that 
Van Kleef had been killed elsewhere and then moved to where 
he was found.  Crime scene personnel noted and photographed 
tire tracks arcing toward Van Kleef’s body.   
c.  Discovery of Ayala’s Body 
At approximately 6:40 a.m. on March 21, 2001, Brenda 
Horton was driving her children to school when she noticed a 
body on the side of Lytle Creek Road.  The body was 
approximately two-tenths of a mile from the location where 
Saldana and Leyerly had found Torres’s body.  Horton’s son 
called 911.   
The body belonged to 17-year-old Alexander Ayala.  
Despite cold weather, Ayala was found wearing only a white 
tank top and blue denim jeans.  He had been shot five times, 
including twice in the head.  Crime scene personnel found nine-
millimeter cartridge casings and a fired bullet in a pool of blood.  
They also noted and photographed tire tracks curving toward 
the location where they believed Ayala had been shot.    
d.  Connection Between Victims and Defendant 
Police investigation revealed all three victims were friends 
of 17-year-old Andrew Mosqueda, a member of the El Monte 
Trece gang.  Mosqueda and his friends regularly spent time at 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
 
an apartment on Linden Avenue in Rialto.  The apartment was 
rented by Mosqueda’s aunt, Carmen Alvarez, and her husband, 
Abraham Pasillas.  Alvarez and Pasillas were also members of 
the El Monte Trece gang.  They claimed they were not active in 
the gang at the time of the murders but admitted to associating 
with El Monte Trece gang members and attending gang 
gatherings.   
Defendant was also a member of the El Monte Trece gang.  
He had been “jumped into” the gang at a young age and was 
known as either “Casper” or “Wizard.”  He was friends with 
Alvarez and Pasillas.  Starting in early 2001, he frequently 
stayed the night at their apartment.  He kept some personal 
belongings in the master bedroom closet.   
 
According to Alvarez, Pasillas, and Mosqueda, defendant 
sought to recruit new members to El Monte Trece, including 
Mosqueda and his friends.  Pasillas told defendant he wanted 
no part in any recruitment effort, and Alvarez told defendant 
that Mosqueda and his friends were not “gang member types.”  
Defendant nonetheless successfully recruited Mosqueda.  
Mosqueda was given a gang name (“Apache”) and started taking 
orders from defendant.   
 
Torres, Van Kleef, and Ayala were not members of El 
Monte Trece.  Van Kleef and Ayala had no interest in gang 
membership.  Torres had agreed to join the gang but then did 
not attend his jumping-in ceremony.  According to Mosqueda, 
this “disappointed” defendant.  Mosqueda claimed to have 
attended the jumping-in ceremony in Torres’s stead.   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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e.  Torres’s Murder 
 
Mosqueda and Alvarez both claimed to have been present 
when defendant killed Torres.  They testified under grants of 
use immunity.   
 
On the evening of March 19, 2001, defendant, Mosqueda, 
Van Kleef, Torres, Ayala, and another friend, Erick Tinoco, were 
at Alvarez’s apartment.  At some point, defendant suggested 
they take a ride to Lytle Creek in Alvarez’s Astro van.  Privately, 
defendant told Mosqueda to put a gun in the van; he did not say 
why.  Defendant handed Mosqueda a rifle wrapped in a towel 
and Mosqueda put it in the back of the van.   
 
With Alvarez as their driver, defendant, Mosqueda, 
Torres, and Van Kleef entered the van.  Tinoco and Ayala left 
separately.  With the four boys in the van, Alvarez drove to an 
ampm convenience store where she purchased beer.    
 
Alvarez then drove up Lytle Creek Road before pulling 
over into a dirt pull-off area.  Everyone except Alvarez got out 
and began drinking beer by the back of the van.  Mosqueda and 
Van Kleef chatted, while Torres and defendant had a separate 
conversation.  Mosqueda heard defendant say to Torres, “Hey, 
don’t you trust me?”  Torres put his arm around defendant.  
Defendant suddenly shot Torres in the stomach and continued 
to shoot Torres after he fell to the ground.   
 
Defendant, Mosqueda, and Van Kleef returned to the van, 
and Alvarez started driving.  Alvarez testified that defendant 
was holding what looked like a pistol when he returned to the 
van.  Alvarez dropped defendant and Van Kleef off near her 
apartment, then drove Mosqueda to his home.  Defendant and 
Van Kleef were at Alvarez’s apartment when she returned.  Van 
Kleef then left the apartment; defendant followed within a few 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
 
minutes, holding Alvarez’s car keys.  Defendant returned after 
about an hour.  He told her that “he had gotten into an argument 
or something and . . . somebody broke the window” of her van on 
the front passenger’s side; she and Mosqueda both saw that the 
window was damaged.  Mosqueda described the damage as a 
“bullet hole.”   
 
Defendant followed Alvarez around throughout the next 
day and threatened to harm her family.  She testified she 
thought defendant would hurt her or her family if she called the 
police.  Around 11:00 p.m. that night, defendant again borrowed 
Alvarez’s van and left for about an hour.  Ayala was found early 
the next morning, shot on the side of the road about two-tenths 
of a mile from where Torres was found.  Ayala was last seen by 
his sister at their house around 11:00 p.m.; he was dressed for 
bed and said he was in for the night.   
 
After the police started investigating the murders, 
defendant left the United States for Mexico.  He reportedly was 
staying at the home of one of Alvarez’s relatives.  Detectives 
traveled to Mexico to find defendant, the van, and the murder 
weapon.  They did not locate defendant but saw the van, which 
was later burned. 
 
On a second trip to Mexico, detectives traveled with 
Alvarez’s mother, Maria Jackson, who was helping with the 
investigation.  The detectives and Jackson there met with 
Jackson’s nephew, who said he had the murder weapon—a nine-
millimeter handgun.  Jackson paid her nephew $100 for the 
handgun, and the detectives reimbursed her.  The gun was in a 
plastic bag, but two of the detectives removed it briefly to check 
if it was loaded.  One of these detectives was a Mexican 
detective, Trini Cambreros, who was assisting in the 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
 
investigation.  Jackson said she told him his fingerprints would 
now be all over the gun.  Then, according to Jackson, Cambreros 
“got a blanket, a sheet that was on the bed, and wipe [sic] it off 
and put it back in the plastic bag and put it on my purse.”  
Criminalist Kerri Heward later testified for the prosecution that 
the nine-millimeter handgun recovered from Mexico matched 
bullets found at the Ayala and Torres crime scenes.    
 
Defendant was later arrested trying to cross the border 
from Mexico into the United States.  He used a false name, but 
agents discovered his identity by running his fingerprints.  A 
border patrol agent asked defendant if he was “the Wizard.”  He 
replied, “You guys got me.  You found me out . . . .”   
2.  Arguments 
 
The prosecution’s theory was that defendant killed Torres 
for refusing to join the gang.  Then defendant killed Van Kleef 
because he witnessed the Torres murder.  Defendant likewise 
killed Ayala to prevent him from implicating defendant in the 
Torres murder; the prosecution theorized that defendant was 
concerned Ayala had learned about the murder from his good 
friend Mosqueda, who had also witnessed the murder but was a 
member of the gang.   
 
The defense argued defendant was a scapegoat and did not 
shoot the three boys.  Pasillas, Alvarez, and Mosqueda—all of 
whom had testified against defendant—were instead to blame.  
The defense argued Alvarez and Pasillas were the gang 
members in control and that Pasillas or Mosqueda shot the boys.   
 
The jury convicted on all three counts.   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Aggravating Evidence 
 
At the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence 
that defendant had committed multiple crimes unrelated to the 
three murders:  that he had brandished a gun while driving by 
a birthday party; assaulted a correctional counselor while a 
ward at a youth correctional facility; participated in the nonfatal 
shooting of his former girlfriend; stabbed his sister’s boyfriend 
with an ice pick; and committed two armed robberies with other 
El Monte Trece gang members, during which innocent people 
were shot.  Also, while he was in custody awaiting trial in this 
case, deputies found defendant with a “slashing type weapon”—
a toothbrush with a razor attached.   
 
The aggravation case also included evidence that 
defendant had committed another murder, that of Mark Jaimes.  
Jaimes’s body was found in the trunk of a car belonging to Rick 
Milam.  Milam had hired defendant’s mother as a prostitute and 
was with her at a motel when his car disappeared from the 
parking lot.  Jaimes’s body was discovered when the car was 
recovered.   
 
Lieutenant Roderick Kusch of the Los Angeles Police 
Department, who investigated the Jaimes murder, conducted an 
interview with defendant.  A videotape of that interview was 
played for the jury.   
 
During the interview, defendant said he went to the motel 
room where his mother lived and found Jaimes there, seemingly 
taking drugs.  Defendant asked him to leave but he would not 
leave and was “disrespecting” and “coming at my mom.”  
Defendant told Kusch:  “I murdered him ey.  I did it.  All right?  
And I enjoyed doing it ay.  I’m gonna tell you why, because it 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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was defending my mother.”  Defendant later said, “I pulled out 
my gun and I blew his fucking head off ay.”   
 
The prosecution also introduced evidence of the impact of 
the victims’ deaths on the Torres, Van Kleef, and Ayala families.  
Torres’s sister testified that her brother was “very smart” and a 
“[v]ery happy boy,” who “loved taking pictures,” and their father 
testified about how his son’s death had “destroyed the family.”  
Van Kleef’s sister testified about how hard it was not having him 
around for holidays; their father spoke about Van Kleef’s dream 
to serve in the military and as a firefighter; and their mother 
testified about how her son “thought a lot about people” and 
“wanted to help people” and about how difficult it has been for 
her and her family since his death.  Ayala’s sister said Ayala 
“always had a smile on his face,” “was really smart” and 
“caring,” and “loved playing with his nieces and nephews”; he 
“wanted to go to school to become a computer technician.”  
Ayala’s mother testified Ayala “was [her] life.”   
2.  Mitigating Evidence 
 
The defense presented evidence concerning prison 
conditions for prisoners sentenced to life without the possibility 
of parole.  Retired San Quentin State Prison Associate Warden 
Anthony Casas testified that such prisoners are held at top 
security level 4, have little access to educational and work 
opportunities, and do not have conjugal visits.  He also testified 
there had never been an escape from one of the new level 4 
institutions, where defendant would have been housed.   
 
Retired Police Officer Steven Strong testified as an expert 
on Hispanic street gangs in Los Angeles.  He explained that 
many gang members come from families where the parents may 
be drug dealers, prostitutes, or incarcerated and that the gang 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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provides food and other things for the members that they cannot 
get from their families.  He testified that defendant had an 
unstable childhood and that the only time defendant had 
stability was when he joined the gang and started living with 
Pasillas at age 11 or 12.  Defendant’s mother and father were 
both incarcerated, leaving defendant with “no other . . . 
examples to learn from or see.”  Strong testified that, for 
defendant, the gang is “all he knows.”   
II.  JURY SELECTION ISSUES 
A.  Stipulated Prescreening of Jurors Based on 
Questionnaire 
 
Before jury selection began, the parties stipulated to a 
juror prescreening procedure that defendant now challenges on 
appeal.  According to the agreed-upon procedure, prospective 
jurors first filled out a hardship questionnaire.  The parties then 
stipulated that certain jurors could be excused for hardship 
based on their answers.  Remaining jurors completed a different, 
case-specific questionnaire.  The parties reviewed the case-
specific questionnaires and stipulated that certain jurors should 
be removed for cause or hardship before voir dire.  The court 
excused these jurors before the parties continued with jury 
selection.   
 
Defendant argues this prescreening procedure violated 
Code of Civil Procedure sections 222 and 223.  Section 222, 
subdivision (a) requires courts to “randomly select the names of 
the jurors for voir dire, until the jury is selected or the panel is 
exhausted.”  Section 223, subdivision (a) says, “[T]he trial judge 
shall conduct an initial examination of prospective jurors.”  
Finally, defendant invokes Civil Code section 3513, which 
provides:  “Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
 
solely for his benefit.  But a law established for a public reason 
cannot be contravened by a private agreement.”  Defendant 
argues that sections 222 and 223 were enacted for a public 
reason, and his agreement to the prescreening procedure 
therefore should not have been given effect.  
 
Our cases have consistently rejected similar challenges to 
the excusal of jurors under similar mutually agreed-upon 
prescreening procedures.  “A court may allow counsel to screen 
juror questionnaires and stipulate to juror dismissals.”  (People 
v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 540 (Duff); accord, e.g., People v. 
Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 159.)  Further, “a stipulation to 
the excusal of jurors forfeits any subsequent objection to their 
omission from the jury pool.”  (Duff, at p. 540.) 
 
Here, by agreeing to the prescreening procedure he now 
challenges, defendant has forfeited the claim.  (E.g., People v. 
Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 73.)  In any event, the claim lacks 
merit.  Contrary to defendant’s argument, neither Code of Civil 
Procedure section 222 nor section 223, subdivision (a) forbids 
the prescreening procedure employed in this case.  Section 222 
requires random selection of prospective jurors for voir dire but 
says nothing about prescreening through a questionnaire.  
Section 223, subdivision (a), which requires the trial court to 
conduct an initial examination of prospective jurors, does not 
bar the court from exercising its discretion to allow counsel to 
prescreen jurors and stipulate to dismissals.  (People v. 
Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 88–89.) 
 
Defendant makes a number of related additional 
arguments, which we also reject.  He argues the prescreening 
procedure allowed the parties “to trade discriminatory 
removal[s] of potential jurors,” as well as to create a jury not 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
 
selected from a fair cross-section of the community.  But 
defendant has not alleged that any of the stipulated removals 
were discriminatory, nor does he adequately explain how 
permitting him to stipulate to the dismissal of certain jurors 
could have undermined his right to trial by a jury selected from 
a fair cross-section of the community.  Defendant also claims the 
prescreening procedure “frustrates the public policy requiring 
that voir dire be open to the public.”  (See, e.g., Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. (1984) 464 U.S. 501, 508–509.)  But 
voir dire in this case was open to the public; the trial court 
simply permitted the parties to stipulate to the removal of 
certain jurors based on their written questionnaire responses.  
Having agreed to this procedure, defendant may not now 
complain that it violated his right to a public trial.  (See People 
v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 813.)   
B.  Dismissal of Prospective Juror for Cause 
Defendant contends the trial court erred by excusing 
Prospective Juror S.M. for cause during the death-qualification 
portion of jury selection.  Defendant contends the excusal of S.M. 
violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due 
process of law, to a fair and impartial jury, and to a reliable 
penalty verdict.  (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. 
Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 16, 17.)  We discern no error. 
“ ‘A prospective juror in a capital case may be excluded for 
cause if his or her views on capital punishment “would ‘prevent 
or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror 
in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ”  (Wainwright 
v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 
844].)’ ”  (People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 78.)  “Both this 
court and the United States Supreme Court have cautioned that 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
 
mere personal opposition to capital punishment is an 
insufficient basis on which to justify dismissal of a juror during 
jury selection.”  (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1064 
(Thompson).)  “ ‘[N]ot all who oppose the death penalty are 
subject to removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly 
believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve 
as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they 
are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in 
deference to the rule of law.’ ”  (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
583, 614 (Jones), quoting Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 
162, 176.)   
“That prospective jurors are not always clear in 
articulating their beliefs (or accurately assessing their ability to 
set aside those beliefs) is a difficulty trial and appellate courts 
frequently encounter in capital cases.”  (Thompson, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 1065.)  “ ‘ “ ‘[I]n many cases, a prospective juror’s 
responses to questions on voir dire will be halting, equivocal, or 
even conflicting.  Given the juror’s probable unfamiliarity with 
the complexity of the law, coupled with the stress and anxiety of 
being a prospective juror in a capital case, such equivocation 
should be expected.’ ” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  For this reason, a prospective 
juror’s bias against the death penalty need not be demonstrated 
with “ ‘unmistakable clarity.’ ”  (Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 615; see People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1235 
(Bramit) [“ ‘ “many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough 
questions to reach the point where their bias has been made 
‘unmistakably clear’; these veniremen may not know how they 
will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may 
be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true 
feelings” ’ ”].)  “ ‘Instead, after examining the available evidence, 
which typically includes the juror’s written responses in a jury 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
 
questionnaire and answers during voir dire, the trial court need 
only be left with a definite impression that the prospective juror 
is unable or unwilling to faithfully and impartially follow the 
law.’ ”  (Jones, at p. 615, quoting Thompson, at p. 1066.)   
On appellate review, we recognize that “ ‘in assessing a 
prospective juror’s true state of mind, the trial court occupies a 
superior position vis-à-vis an appellate court, for the former 
court is able to consider and evaluate a juror’s demeanor during 
voir dire.’ ”  (Jones, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 615; see also ibid. 
[“ ‘ “ ‘ “[A]ppellate courts recognize that a trial judge who 
observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that 
person’s responses (noting, among other things, the person’s 
tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor) . . . 
gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the 
record” ’ ” ’ ”].)  “ ‘Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling regarding 
the juror’s true state of mind is entitled to deference on appeal 
if supported by substantial evidence.’ ”  (Ibid.; see Bramit, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1235.)1  Applying these principles, we 
conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
decision to dismiss S.M. for cause.   
In his responses to the juror questionnaire, S.M. 
acknowledged he had reservations about imposing the death 
                                        
1  
Defendant argues that this approach is outdated and 
inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court’s holdings 
in Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38 and Gray v. Mississippi 
(1987) 481 U.S. 648.  The argument lacks merit.  The Supreme 
Court has long emphasized deference to a trial court’s 
“determinations of demeanor and credibility” (Wainwright v. 
Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 428; see Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 
477 U.S. 168, 178) and has continued to do so following Adams 
and Gray (see Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9).   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
 
penalty.  When asked to select from among five responses the 
one that most clearly aligned with his view on the death penalty, 
S.M. chose, “I have doubts about the death penalty, but I would 
not vote against it in every case.”  Elsewhere, S.M. indicated he 
had “moral[,] philosophical, or religious” objections to capital 
punishment and that his decisionmaking was “greatly” 
influenced by his moral preferences.  He further wrote that the 
death penalty should be used “sparingly,” only “where an 
individual is beyond compunction,” and “for the most heinous of 
crimes.”  And when asked to “list any biases you may have that 
could interfere with your ability to be an impartial juror if 
selected to sit on this case,” S.M. wrote:  “Imposition of the death 
penalty.”   
Though S.M. indicated in response to one question that he 
believed the death penalty law in California is fair, in response 
to another he said he had “reservations about [the death 
penalty’s] effectiveness to deter crime, [and its] fairness.”  And, 
despite having checked “[n]o” when asked whether he would be 
reluctant to state a death verdict in open court, he checked 
“[y]es” when asked whether he would be reluctant to vote for a 
sentence of death or personally sign the verdict form.   
Along with these reservations, however, S.M. expressed 
the view that he could faithfully follow the law.  Indeed, he 
stated both that he would not automatically vote for life without 
the possibility of parole and that he could “weigh the evidence 
and the circumstances” to select a sentence.  He further stated 
he could consider both the death penalty and life without parole 
as a “realistic and practical possibility” (underscoring omitted) 
for an individual found guilty of three separate killings, with the 
handwritten elaboration that the ultimate sentence rendered 
would “[d]epend[] on the degree of severity of the crime.” 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
 
When asked to elaborate on his views of the death penalty 
at voir dire, however, S.M. grew more equivocal about his ability 
to fairly apply the law.  When questioned by the prosecutor, S.M. 
maintained he could be fair and impartial but said he would be 
“reluctant to impose the death penalty[,]” raised concerns 
regarding recent exonerations based on DNA evidence, and 
agreed that sitting on the jury would put him in a “moral 
dilemma.”  When asked if his concerns might “carry over in the 
guilt portion of the trial,” he said it was “possible,” but “it would 
be hard to say,” since this was the first time he had been in such 
a situation. 
When questioned by the defense, S.M. continued to 
vacillate on his ability to follow the law as given and impose the 
death penalty.  Although S.M. said he could “consider those 
different factors” per the court’s sentencing instructions and 
impose the death penalty in an “appropriate case,” he also stated 
he did not “know if [he] could in good conscience vote [for] the 
death penalty.”  He expressed a belief that the death penalty is 
appropriate “for the most heinous of crimes” but acknowledged 
that he was “still in the process of soul searching” to determine 
“what that is.”  When asked if he could impose the death penalty 
in a case involving a multiple murder special circumstance, he 
said:  “I’m trying to decide whether I agree with if something is 
indeed a special circumstance, you know.  I understand the law 
defines it one way, but I have to look within and decide whether 
I can use that factor in determining whether I can take 
someone’s life or vote that someone’s life be taken.”   
At the conclusion of defense counsel’s questioning, the 
prosecution challenged S.M. for cause.  The trial court granted 
the challenge over defense objection “based on what [it] heard” 
during voir dire.  
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
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The record reveals no error in the trial court’s 
determination that S.M.’s views on capital punishment would 
have substantially impaired his performance as a juror.  When 
asked about his ability to set aside his personal views and follow 
the law, S.M. gave equivocal and inconsistent answers.  At times 
he professed he could do so, but he also stated in his written 
questionnaire that “[i]mposition of the death penalty” was one 
of his “biases” that “could interfere” with his “ability to be an 
impartial juror.”  When questioned further at voir dire, S.M. 
acknowledged he was not sure he could “in good conscience” vote 
for death and agreed that serving as a juror in a capital case 
would put him in “a moral dilemma.”  Defendant argues that 
these responses demonstrate only that S.M. had reservations 
about the death penalty, not that he would face substantial 
difficulties in considering death as a potential option.  This is 
one possible conclusion to be drawn from S.M.’s statements, but 
it is not the only possible conclusion.  Another possible 
conclusion was that S.M. did “ ‘ “not know how [he would] react 
when faced with imposing the death sentence” ’ ” (Bramit, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1235), but in the end he would not, “in 
good conscience,” realistically be able to consider voting in favor 
of death.  (Compare, e.g., People v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 
659 [affirming dismissal of juror who “mentioned his ‘reluctance 
about the death penalty’ as something which may affect his 
ability to be a juror or his participation as a juror in this trial”]; 
People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 255 [affirming dismissal of 
juror who “initially denied she had any feelings about the death 
penalty that would affect her decision” but then “consistently 
responded, ‘I don’t know’ in answer to the question whether she 
was capable of voting for death”].) 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
 
Where, as here, a juror gives ambiguous responses, it is 
for the trial court to resolve that ambiguity in the first instance. 
In such cases we “ ‘defer to the trial court’s evaluation of a 
prospective juror’s state of mind, and such evaluation is binding 
on appellate courts.’ ”  (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 
696.)  The trial court was in the best position to observe S.M.’s 
demeanor, vocal inflection, and other cues not readily apparent 
on the record, and we reasonably infer that the trial court based 
its decision not only on what S.M. said, but also on how he said 
it.  (See People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 897 (Clark) 
[“Although at the end of the voir dire questioning L.C. expressed 
greater certainty concerning his ability to vote for the death 
penalty in an appropriate case, the court was entitled to find 
those assurances were severely undercut by his demeanor and 
his hesitant, inconsistent, and equivocal responses”]; People v. 
Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1016 [inferring that trial court 
reached its conclusion based on juror’s demeanor and 
responses]; accord, e.g., Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1070.)  
Given the trial court’s careful conduct of jury selection, we have 
no basis to doubt the trial court applied the appropriate 
standard in determining that S.M. was subject to excusal for 
cause.  Even though S.M. also made other statements that, 
viewed in isolation, “ ‘might have warranted keeping [him] as [a 
juror],’ ” the record as a whole includes substantial evidence to 
support the trial court’s definite impression that S.M. would not 
be able to faithfully and impartially apply the law.  (People v. 
Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 431 (Martinez); see People v. 
Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 414 (Thornton).)  The record 
thus supports the court’s exercise of discretion in dismissing 
S.M. for cause. 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
 
C.  Alleged Unfairness in Applying Witt Standard 
Defendant contends the trial court failed to apply the Witt 
standard impartially and evenhandedly to both “pro-death” and 
“pro-life” prospective jurors and that the court thereby violated 
of his state and federal constitutional rights.  (U.S. Const., 6th, 
8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 16, 17.)  In 
particular, defendant alleges the court treated S.M., who had 
doubts about the death penalty, differently than it treated 
Prospective Jurors L.T., D.S., and S.T., who favored the death 
penalty.  He maintains that the court selectively and leadingly 
questioned these “pro-death” jurors to rehabilitate them and did 
not accord the same treatment to S.M.  Defendant argues the 
trial court’s conduct resulted in a jury “ ‘uncommonly willing to 
condemn a man to die.’ ”  (Quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 
391 U.S. 510, 521.)  The argument lacks merit.2 
                                        
2  
The Attorney General asks us to reject defendant’s claim 
on the ground that it has been forfeited because defendant failed 
to make the same objection in the trial court.  We have, however, 
previously exercised our discretion to address the merits of 
similar claims despite the defendant’s failure to object below.  
(See, e.g., Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 902, fn. 10; Martinez, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 439, fn. 8.)  We will do so again here. 
 
To the extent defendant intends to separately challenge 
the trial court’s decision not to dismiss Prospective Jurors L.T., 
D.S., and S.T. for cause, that claim has not been preserved.  
Generally speaking, to complain on appeal of a denial of a 
challenge for cause, a litigant must “exercise a peremptory 
challenge and remove the prospective juror in question,” 
“exhaust all of the peremptory challenges allotted by statute and 
hold none in reserve,” and “express to the trial court 
dissatisfaction with the jury as presently constituted.”  (People 
v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 186 (Mills); cf. People v. Black 
 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
 
We agree with defendant that “trial courts should be 
evenhanded in their questions to prospective jurors during the 
‘death-qualification’ portion of the voir dire, and should inquire 
into the jurors’ attitudes both for and against the death penalty 
to determine whether these views will impair their ability to 
serve as jurors.”  (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908–
909.)  But trial courts have “ ‘broad discretion over the number 
and nature of questions about the death penalty.’ ”  (Mills, 
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 189.)  We presume “the trial court 
formulated its questions based on the individual characteristics 
of each juror, including the juror’s questionnaire answers and 
in-court demeanor.”  (Id. at p. 190.)  “To second-guess these 
choices would encourage the trial court to engage in 
substantially the same questioning of all prospective jurors 
irrespective of their individual circumstance, something we 
have declined to do.”  (Ibid., citing Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th 
at p. 425.)  Accordingly, an argument “based solely on a 
numerical counting of questions” asked to “pro-death” and “pro-
life” jurors “is not sufficient to establish a constitutional 
violation.”  (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 487; see 
Mills, at p. 190, citing Thornton, at p. 425.)   
                                        
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 920 (Black) [“When a defendant uses 
peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors who should 
have been removed for cause, a defendant’s right to an impartial 
jury is affected only when he exhausts his peremptory 
challenges and an incompetent juror, meaning a juror who 
should have been removed for cause, sits on the jury that decides 
the case”].)  Here, defendant exercised peremptory challenges to 
remove each of the three jurors, but never asked for more 
challenges nor otherwise expressed dissatisfaction with the jury 
as constituted.  Defendant therefore did not preserve this 
challenge to the trial court’s rulings for appellate review.   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
 
In his effort to establish judicial bias, defendant points to 
the trial court’s questioning of three prospective jurors.  
Defendant claims the questioning of these three individuals 
demonstrates the court’s bias toward the death penalty.  But 
three prospective jurors “constitutes an extremely limited 
sample of the trial court’s overall performance, thereby 
diminishing the probative value of the examples proffered by 
defendant to support the inference” that the court made a 
greater effort to rehabilitate pro-death penalty jurors.  
(Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 447.)  Review of the record as 
a whole shows the trial court rehabilitated both “pro-death” and 
“pro-life” jurors and sometimes elected not to intervene because 
counsel’s 
questioning 
rendered 
further 
questioning 
unnecessary.  The trial court on multiple occasions questioned 
prospective jurors who expressed reluctance about or opposition 
to the death penalty and determined they were fit to serve.  On 
other occasions, the court declined to question prospective jurors 
who expressed leanings in favor of the prosecution and later 
dismissed them for cause at defendant’s request.3  
                                        
3 
For example, the trial court questioned the following 
prospective jurors, with the results indicated:  D.J., denying the 
prosecution’s challenge for cause despite juror’s initial 
statement that she did not believe she could impose the death 
penalty; V.B., denying prosecution’s challenge for cause despite 
V.B.’s skepticism of the death penalty; T.P., excusing pro-law 
enforcement juror for cause; V.D., denying prosecution’s 
challenge for cause despite the appearance of an intent to hold 
the prosecution to a higher standard than beyond a reasonable 
doubt; S.C., dismissing prospective juror for cause after she said 
she believed the only appropriate penalty for three murders is 
death, despite her claim that she could follow the law; R.H., 
denying the prosecution’s challenge for cause despite her 
 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
 
But even if we focus exclusively on the three prospective 
jurors on whom defendant trains his attention, the record does 
not support defendant’s allegations of judicial bias.  Having 
carefully reviewed the record of voir dire, we see no lack of 
evenhandedness or impartiality in the court’s questioning of 
L.T. and S.T. to clarify their ability to follow the law.  The trial 
court did not question D.S., but we see nothing untoward in that 
decision either.  In his written responses to the questionnaire, 
D.S. indicated a belief that the death penalty is appropriate 
when imposed on criminals who would kill again.  When 
questioned further by both the defense and prosecution, D.S. 
stated he could consider both death and life without parole and 
that he would be as fair and impartial as possible.  Given the 
general consistency of his answers to both attorneys during voir 
dire, the trial court evidently concluded there was no need to ask 
further questions to clarify D.S.’s views.  In denying defendant’s 
challenge for cause, the trial court explained that “after both 
attorneys had an opportunity to ask [D.S.] in person about his 
feelings, he made it very clear he can remain open minded and 
fair and base his decision on what the evidence and the laws are 
and what he is instructed on.”    
Defendant argues that the trial court’s decision to excuse 
S.M., despite S.M.’s similar responses about impartiality, and 
                                        
statement that she would “need to be 100 percent” before 
imposing the death penalty or convicting defendant; R.B., 
denying the prosecution’s challenge for cause, despite her 
statement that she could vote for death but could not announce 
it to defendant in open court; and J.D., denying the prosecution’s 
challenge for cause after J.D., who previously indicated he could 
not impose the death penalty based on the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard, stated he could follow the law. 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
 
without questioning S.M. further, demonstrates a lack of 
evenhandedness.  But as discussed above, S.M.’s answers were 
equivocal and inconsistent.  In response to the attorneys’ 
questioning, S.M. at times indicated he was willing to consider 
both penalty options but also expressed substantial qualms 
about the possibility of imposing a sentence of death and 
questioned his own ability to accept the law’s determination 
about the crimes warranting a potential death sentence.  The 
trial court, having observed both these responses and S.M.’s 
demeanor, acted within its discretion in concluding that “further 
questioning was not likely to render [S.M.] qualified to sit in a 
capital case.”  (Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 190; see Thornton, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 423 [finding “nothing improper in the 
court’s explaining the law to the prospective juror, nor in its 
failing to engage in a similar dialogue with other prospective 
jurors whose voir dire did not give rise to the same concerns”].) 
In sum, we see no basis for defendant’s claim that the trial 
court disproportionately attempted to rehabilitate and retain 
jurors with pro-death penalty views.  The record instead shows 
that the trial court carefully evaluated jurors on an individual 
basis.   
Although that conclusion suffices to dispose of defendant’s 
argument, we also note that defendant fails to support his claim 
that the trial court’s purported lack of evenhandedness in voir 
dire affected the fairness of the jury that sat on his case.  None 
of the three “pro-death” jurors at issue served on the jury; 
defendant was able to remove all three by peremptory strike or 
stipulation.  “If no biased or legally incompetent juror served on 
defendant’s jury, the judgment against him does not suffer from 
a federal constitutional infirmity . . . .”  (Black, supra, 58 Cal.4th 
at p. 917.)  Here, defendant fails to show that any empaneled 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
 
jurors were biased in favor of death.  He likewise fails to show 
that the trial court’s handling of Prospective Jurors L.T., D.S., 
and S.T. undermined his constitutional right to an impartial 
jury. 
III.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Denial of Motion To Exclude Firearm Evidence 
or To Instruct Jury on State’s Bad Faith 
Destruction of Evidence  
During their investigation, San Bernardino detectives 
twice traveled to Mexico in search of defendant and evidence 
related to the homicides.  On their second trip, Detectives Chris 
Elvert and Robert Acevedo were accompanied by Maria Jackson, 
Alvarez’s mother and Mosqueda’s grandmother.  Jackson had 
told the detectives that her nephew, who lived in Mexico, could 
purchase from a third party the nine-millimeter handgun 
allegedly used in the homicides and deliver it to her.  The 
detectives picked up Jackson in Southern California and drove 
across the border to Tijuana, where they met Cambreros, a 
Mexico-based detective.  Jackson recalled that, before they all 
drove to meet her nephew, the three men discussed whether 
Cambreros should return the handgun to Mexican authorities 
and “go through some kind of paperwork for permission from the 
governments,” but they decided to retrieve it informally instead.   
The testimony at trial was uncontroverted that Elvert 
offered Jackson’s nephew $100 in cash for the handgun, but 
Jackson’s nephew refused to accept the money for fear that it 
was marked.  Jackson’s nephew instead agreed to accept $100 
from Jackson, and Elvert later reimbursed her.  Jackson, Elvert, 
and Acevedo all testified that Jackson’s nephew retrieved the 
handgun, which was in a plastic bag, and placed it in Jackson’s 
purse.  At that point, however, their testimony diverged.   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
 
Jackson, who was called as a witness for the prosecution, 
testified that Acevedo pulled the handgun out of Jackson’s purse 
to see if it was loaded and then handed it to Cambreros, who 
“was handling it too and trying to see if it work[ed].”  Jackson 
recalled telling Cambreros that “now the gun is going to have all 
kinds of fingerprints” on it, at which point Cambreros “got a 
blanket . . . and wipe[d] [the gun] off and put it back in the 
plastic bag and put it [in] my purse.”  According to Jackson, the 
handgun then remained in her purse until she reached the 
border with Elvert and Acevedo.   
The detectives provided different accounts.  Elvert 
testified that the handgun remained in Jackson’s purse until 
“we came back to [the] United States and then myself and 
Acevedo took possession of that weapon.”  He further testified 
that the handgun was never wiped down by Cambreros; but on 
redirect examination, he acknowledged that Cambreros “could 
have” touched the handgun even though he “did not see that.”   
Acevedo testified Jackson gave him the nine-millimeter 
handgun immediately before they crossed the border into the 
United States.  He recalled that Cambreros “inspected” the 
handgun before it was placed in Jackson’s purse, but he said he 
never saw Cambreros wipe it down.  On cross-examination, 
Acevedo reiterated that “[i]f [Cambreros] wiped the gun off, I 
didn’t see it.”   
 
At one point, Acevedo instructed Jackson not to mention 
Cambreros’s name to anyone, because Cambreros “did not want 
to be subpoenaed” in the United States.  Acevedo testified he 
“could understand that” because “[i]t’s very difficult for officers 
to come across” the border.  Acevedo also testified that, before 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
 
returning to the United States, Elvert placed $100 in 
Cambreros’s pocket and said, “This is for your expenses.”   
 
The nine-millimeter handgun was later tested for DNA.  A 
criminologist testified she identified DNA material from 
multiple people on the inner slide of the handgun.  She 
compared the recovered material to DNA samples that had been 
collected from defendant, Pasillas, Alvarez, Mosqueda, Torres, 
Van Kleef, and Ayala.  All of the tested individuals, including 
defendant, were excluded as possible contributors, except for 
Pasillas and Van Kleef.  No useable fingerprints were found on 
the gun. 
 
Criminalist Kerri Heward also test-fired the handgun and 
compared the bullets and cartridge casings from the test-fire to 
those found at the crime scenes.  She ultimately determined that 
the cartridge cases from the Torres and Ayala crime scenes came 
from the nine-millimeter handgun retrieved in Mexico.   
 
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss.  He also moved to 
suppress the handgun, any testimony as to its use and recovery, 
and the ballistics evidence comparing the handgun and 
recovered casings.  In the alternative, defendant asked that the 
jury be instructed on the government’s bad faith destruction of 
evidence.  He claimed the police manipulated and destroyed 
evidence, as well as violated the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
with Mexico.  And he argued the destroyed evidence would have 
been exculpatory because fingerprints on the handgun could 
have excluded him and instead inculpated Pasillas, Alvarez, or 
Mosqueda.  Had the detectives recovered the handgun through 
formal channels, defendant argued, Cambreros would have had 
no reason to wipe down the handgun, and more prints would 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
 
have been found tying the alleged murder weapon to other 
suspects.   
 
On appeal, defendant challenges the court’s denial of this 
motion.  We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
trial court’s ruling and review its decision for substantial 
evidence.  (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 837; People 
v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 510 (Roybal).) 
 
The principles that guide our analysis are well 
established.  Law enforcement agents have a constitutional duty 
to preserve evidence, but that duty is limited to “evidence that 
might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s 
defense.”  (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488.)  To 
reach this standard of “constitutional materiality,” the “evidence 
must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent 
before [it] was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the 
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by 
other reasonably available means.”  (Id. at p. 489; accord, People 
v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1246.)   
 
The defendant bears a higher burden to establish a 
constitutional violation when “no more can be said” of the 
evidence “than that it could have been subjected to tests, the 
results of which might have exonerated the defendant.”  
(Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 57 (Youngblood).)  In 
such cases, “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on 
the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful 
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.”  (Id. 
at p. 58; accord, Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 549.)  The 
assessment of bad faith “must necessarily turn on the police’s 
knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time 
it was lost or destroyed.”  (Youngblood, at p. 57, fn. *.)   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
 
We have had several occasions to consider the 
constitutional materiality of fingerprint evidence that law 
enforcement fails to preserve.  (E.g., Roybal, supra, 19 Cal.4th 
481; People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1; People v. Medina 
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 870.)  In Roybal, the defendant claimed the 
prosecution destroyed exculpatory evidence when it lost a 
doorjamb that was photographed and removed from the crime 
scene after an “ ‘orangish-red’ ” print was found on it.  (Roybal, 
at p. 498.)  Witnesses for both sides testified that the print, as 
captured in the photograph, did not match the defendant’s 
fingerprints.  On appeal, the defendant argued he was deprived 
of the opportunity to inspect the doorjamb and enhance the 
print, which he claimed “ ‘was believed to have been made by 
the person who committed the homicide or by a person 
involved.’ ”  (Id. at p. 508.)  But we held there was no discernable 
exculpatory potential in the print at the time the doorjamb 
disappeared.  Simply put:  “[T]he print may or may not have 
been defendant’s and may or may not have been the 
perpetrator’s.”  (Id. at p. 510; see also DePriest, at p. 41 
[exculpatory value of fingerprints not apparent when the 
prosecution failed to retain the victim’s car, which contained 
“three unidentified fingerprints that could have been made by 
. . . the person who supposedly killed [the victim] and stole her 
car”]; Medina, at p. 893 [fingerprint on water bottle at crime 
scene was not constitutionally material because the investigator 
“could not know at the time the prints were taken whether, or 
to what extent” they matched the defendant’s].) 
Similarly here, any potentially exculpatory value in prints 
(or DNA) on the nine-millimeter handgun would not have been 
apparent at the time Cambreros was said to have wiped it 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
 
down.4  Like the fingerprint evidence destroyed or lost in 
Roybal, DePriest, and Medina, any prints removed from the 
handgun “may or may not have been defendant’s and may or 
may not have been the perpetrator’s.”  (Roybal, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at p. 510.)  This is thus a case in which “no more can be 
said” than that the handgun “could have been subjected to tests, 
the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.”  
(Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 57.) 
To establish a due process violation, defendant therefore 
must prove that the police acted in bad faith.  (Youngblood, 
supra, 488 U.S. at p. 57; Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 549.)  
Defendant’s primary argument is that bad faith is shown by the 
detectives’ failure to follow the procedures set forth in the 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Between the United States and 
Mexico (Dec. 9, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 91-503 (eff. May 3, 1991) 
(MLAT)). 
The MLAT generally provides for mutual legal assistance 
between the United States and Mexico in criminal matters, 
including “the prevention, investigation and prosecution of 
crimes.”  (MLAT, supra, art. 1, par. 1.)  It sets forth procedures 
by which either country can request assistance from the other, 
including requests to take testimony, provide “documents, 
                                        
4  
Like the trial court, we assume without deciding that 
Cambreros wiped down the handgun, as Jackson testified.  We 
also accept defendant’s argument that Cambreros was acting as 
an agent of the San Bernardino Police Department when he 
wiped down the gun—a point the Attorney General has not 
contested.  (See Dyas v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 628, 
633, fn. 2 [exclusionary rule applies to a person acting “as an 
agent of the police or participat[ing] in a joint operation with law 
enforcement authorities”].) 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
 
records and evidence,” execute searches and seizures, and 
“locat[e] or identify[] persons.”  (Id., art. 1, par. 4, subds. (b), (g).)  
Although the MLAT provides formal mechanisms for requesting 
such assistance, it does not preempt nor otherwise impair other 
avenues for providing mutual assistance.  (Id., art. 15 [“The 
Parties may also provide assistance pursuant to any bilateral or 
multilateral arrangement, agreement, or practice which may be 
applicable”].)  And it states expressly that it “is intended solely 
for mutual legal assistance between the [sovereign] Parties”—
not for the vindication of private rights.  (Id., art. 1, par. 5; see 
also U.S. v. Rommy (2d Cir. 2007) 506 F.3d 108, 129 (Rommy) 
[“As the Supreme Court has long observed, absent explicit treaty 
language conferring individual enforcement rights, treaty 
violations are generally addressed by the signatory sovereigns 
through diplomatic channels”].) 
Although defendant does not argue that failure to follow 
the MLAT is in itself a basis for reversal, he does argue that the 
failure to follow the formal protocols of the MLAT is evidence of 
the detectives’ bad faith.  He points to case law outside our 
jurisdiction to argue violating formal procedures governing the 
preservation of evidence constitutes bad faith.  (See U.S. v. 
Montgomery (D.Kan. 2009) 676 F.Supp.2d 1218; State v. 
Durnwald (Ohio Ct.App. 2005) 837 N.E.2d 1234; U.S. v. Elliott 
(E.D.Va. 1999) 83 F.Supp.2d 637 (Elliott).)  In Elliott, the 
defendant argued the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
destroyed fingerprint evidence in bad faith when it failed to 
preserve glassware implicated in a drug crime after 
photographing the evidence and dusting it for prints.  (Id. at 
p. 640.)  The court agreed this destruction rose to the level of bad 
faith primarily because the DEA’s actions violated the agency’s 
procedures and regulations respecting the disposal of drugs.  (Id. 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
 
at p. 647.)  The court noted that, although the failure to follow 
standard procedures does not “ipso facto establish bad faith,” it 
“is probative evidence of bad faith, particularly when the 
procedures are clear and unambiguous.”  (Ibid.)  In Montgomery, 
DEA agents were again found to have acted in bad faith, this 
time for destroying marijuana plants without photographing 
them, in violation of clear DEA policies.  (Montgomery, at 
pp. 1244–1245.)  Lastly, in Durnwald, a state trooper was found 
to have acted in bad faith when he erased dashboard video 
footage of a field sobriety test in violation of Ohio State Highway 
Patrol regulations.  (Durnwald, at p. 1242.) 
Defendant compares the procedural violations in Elliott, 
Montgomery, and Durnwald to the San Bernardino detectives’ 
failure to retrieve the firearm through the formal channels of 
the MLAT.  But while it is true the detectives could have filed 
an official request for assistance through the treaty (MLAT, 
supra, art. 1, pars. 1, 4; id., art. 4), compliance with its 
procedures was not mandatory, as it was in the cases on which 
defendant relies; the treaty does not establish the exclusive 
means for recovering evidence located in the other country (id., 
art. 15).  (See Rommy, supra, 506 F.3d at p. 129 [interpreting 
similar provisions in Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters between the United States and the Netherlands and 
noting that “the treaty has no application to evidence obtained 
outside the MLAT process”].)  Thus, in contrast to Elliott, 
Montgomery, and Durnwald, defendant cannot identify any 
violation of “clear and unambiguous” procedures based on the 
detectives’ failure to request assistance through the treaty.  
(Elliott, supra, 83 F.Supp.2d at p. 647.)   
 
Defendant also contends Cambreros demonstrated the 
requisite bad faith by intentionally wiping down the handgun.  
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
32 
 
But by defendant’s own account, Cambreros wiped down the 
handgun only to avoid the possibility of being subpoenaed in the 
United States.  Cambreros had no apparent reason to believe 
that by doing so, he was destroying any potentially exculpatory 
evidence, and defendant does not claim otherwise.  (See People 
v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 519 [due process rule is “intended 
to deter the police from purposefully denying an accused the 
benefit of evidence that is . . . known to be exculpatory”].)  
Cambreros’s action may have been negligent, but negligence 
does not establish constitutional bad faith.  (U.S. v. Flyer (9th 
Cir. 2011) 633 F.3d 911, 916 [“Bad faith requires more than 
mere negligence or recklessness”]; e.g., Youngblood, supra, 488 
U.S. at p. 58 [failure to preserve clothing with semen samples 
was “at worst . . . negligent” and did not evince bad faith]; Webb, 
at p. 520 [no bad faith where law enforcement negligently left 
possible murder weapon in apartment after finding it during a 
search].)  While Cambreros should not have wiped down the 
gun, defendant has not shown that Cambreros’s action 
amounted to a violation of due process.  Because defendant has 
not carried this burden, we uphold the trial court’s denial of his 
motion to dismiss or suppress. 
 
Finally, defendant argues in passing that the trial court 
should have at least given an adverse inference jury instruction 
regarding the government’s destruction of evidence.  We have 
held that such an instruction “need not be given where . . . no 
bad faith failure to preserve the evidence was shown.”  (People 
v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1351.)  We therefore reject this 
argument as well. 
B.  Admission of Gang Expert Testimony 
At trial, the prosecution offered testimony by Detective 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
33 
 
Marty Penney, an expert in the culture, structure, and practices 
of criminal gangs in the El Monte area.  He testified about the 
importance of gang recruitment, the significance of disrespect in 
gang culture, and the concept of “good murders.”  In addition to 
this general testimony, Penney offered opinions about potential 
gang-related motives for hypothetical killings that closely 
tracked the facts of this case.  Defendant contends Penney’s 
expert testimony was irrelevant (Evid. Code, § 1101), and 
unduly prejudicial (id., § 352).  He further argues that 
admission of the evidence violated his constitutional rights to 
due process and to reliable guilt and penalty verdicts.  (U.S. 
Const., 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)  We review 
the trial court’s admission of expert testimony for abuse of 
discretion.  (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1222 
(Prince).) 
The Attorney General contends defendant forfeited his 
argument by failing to object to the expert testimony on 
precisely the same grounds as he does now.  We disagree.  “In a 
criminal case, the objection will be deemed preserved if, despite 
inadequate phrasing, the record shows that the court 
understood the issue presented.”  (People v. Scott (1978) 21 
Cal.3d 284, 290.)  Here, before Penney testified, defendant filed 
a motion to exclude or limit gang-related testimony, arguing it 
was irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and speculative.  In 
expressing its intention to deny the motion, the trial court 
acknowledged the defense’s objection “to the entire information 
about the defendant’s involvement with the gang and the theory 
that goes to the prosecution in terms of motive and intent . . . .”  
Later, when Penney took the stand, defense counsel again 
objected to answers that called for speculation or were beyond 
the subject matter of Penney’s expertise, including answers 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
34 
 
related to the perpetrator’s possible motives.  This was adequate 
to preserve defendant’s challenge to Penney’s testimony.  We 
will therefore address the challenge on the merits. 
California law authorizes qualified experts to offer opinion 
testimony if the subject matter is “sufficiently beyond common 
experience” such that the expert’s opinion “would assist the trier 
of fact.”  (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).)  In general, “ ‘[t]he subject 
matter of the culture and habits of criminal street gangs . . . 
meets this criterion.’ ”  (People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 
1044 (Vang).)  When relevant to prove motive or identity, gang 
evidence is admissible “so long as its probative value is not 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”  (People v. Williams (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 153, 193; see, e.g., People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
186, 210 [allowing expert opinion explaining why the defendant 
may have entered rival gang territory and the defendant’s 
“likely reaction to language or actions he perceived as gang 
challenges”]; People v. Martinez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 400, 413 
[allowing expert testimony about “the concept of payback within 
gang culture,” where the defendant had previously been 
assaulted by rival gang members and several witnesses testified 
that the defendant made a gang-related comment before he shot 
the victim].) 
An expert opinion may be rendered in the form of 
responses to hypothetical questions that ask the expert to 
assume the truth of certain facts rooted in the evidence.  (People 
v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1008; accord, People v. 
Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 405 (Moore); Vang, supra, 52 
Cal.4th at p. 1046.)  But “the expert’s opinion may not be based 
‘on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support [citation], or 
on speculative or conjectural factors.’ ”  (Richardson, at p. 1008; 
accord, Moore, at p. 405; Vang, at p. 1046.)  
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
35 
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting 
Penney’s testimony on possible gang-related motives for the 
three homicides because the testimony was not grounded in the 
evidence and did not rest on the witness’s expert knowledge of 
gang culture, but rather on the witness’s personal view of the 
evidence.  We discern no prejudicial error in the admission of 
the challenged testimony. 
In response to hypothetical questions, Penney opined it 
was possible Torres was killed because he had “some 
information” on defendant and because Torres showed 
disrespect by failing to “jump into the gang after giving his word 
that he would.”  Penney acknowledged, however, that he had 
never heard of anyone being killed for refusing to join a gang.  
Penney also surmised that Van Kleef was killed because he 
witnessed the Torres homicide and posed a threat to the 
perpetrator, especially since Van Kleef was not committed to the 
gang lifestyle and rules.  As for the Ayala killing, Penney 
testified Ayala would have shown disrespect to defendant by 
declining to join the gang despite defendant’s recruitment 
efforts, and that the manner of Ayala’s death reflected an 
“assassinat[ion]” similar to the Van Kleef killing.  Drawing on 
his knowledge of gang culture, Penney concluded the three 
hypothetical killings would have been considered so-called “good 
murders.”   
As an initial matter, the parties agree there was no 
evidentiary support for part of Penney’s first opinion—that 
Torres could have been killed because he had “some 
information” on defendant.  Defendant asserts, and the Attorney 
General does not dispute, that the reference to “some 
information” likely related to the prosecution’s theory that 
defendant believed Torres knew about the killing of Mark 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
36 
 
Jaimes and shot Torres to prevent him from disclosing what he 
knew about the connection between defendant and Jaimes.  But 
the trial court had excluded evidence of the uncharged Jaimes 
killing from the guilt phase of trial.  The Attorney General 
therefore concedes that Penney’s reference to this possible 
motive was admitted in error. 
We accept the Attorney General’s concession but agree 
with the Attorney General that the error was harmless.  
Penney’s reference to “some information” was ambiguous.  
Before the reference, the prosecutor had said:  “There is some 
information that Alfred Flores is angry with Ricardo Torres 
about that particular issue, that he didn’t show up to jump into 
the gang.”  Given that the prosecutor used the same phrase 
(“some information”) to describe Torres’s failure to jump into the 
gang, and given that neither the prosecutor nor Penney specified 
the nature of the “some information” Torres might have had on 
the person who shot him, it is unclear what significance the jury 
could have attributed to the reference.  The colloquy contained 
no hint of any theory that defendant believed Torres knew 
information about a prior homicide.  After the prosecutor asked 
if it was possible Torres was killed because he had “some 
information” on defendant, Penney responded with a simple 
“[y]es,” and the prosecutor immediately pivoted back to the 
notion of disrespect and Torres’s failure to jump into the gang.   
Turning to the remainder of Penney’s testimony, 
defendant contends Penney’s opinions were inadmissible 
because there was no evidence that defendant personally asked 
the boys to join the gang or that criminal street gangs ordinarily 
kill people who refuse to join them.    
Based on our review of the record, we conclude Penney’s 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
37 
 
testimony was sufficiently grounded in the evidence to both 
satisfy evidentiary standards and pass constitutional muster.  
Defendant’s gang affiliation and philosophies were well 
established before Penney’s testimony.  Officer Loveless 
previously testified defendant admitted he was an active 
member of El Monte Trece and spoke about killing for a 
“righteous cause” as part of his philosophy of “street justice.”  
Loveless specifically recalled defendant’s statement that killing 
someone who demonstrated disrespect would be a “righteous 
cause according to gang culture.”  The prosecution also 
introduced evidence defendant was interested in expanding his 
gang’s footprint by recruiting young men, specifically friends of 
Mosqueda.5  Loveless recalled that during his interview of 
defendant, defendant explained he 
viewed 
himself 
as 
responsible for “school[ing]” Torres, Ayala, and Mosqueda in 
“the right way.” 
The prosecution also introduced evidence to support the 
hypothetical fact patterns it posed for each of the three killings.  
With respect to the Torres homicide, the prosecution elicited 
testimony from Mosqueda that Torres had backed out of his 
“jump[ing] in” ceremony and thereby declined to join defendant’s 
gang.  Although Mosqueda’s testimony was inconsistent on this 
                                        
5 
Much of the evidence regarding defendant’s intent to 
expand the influence of El Monte Trece came from statements 
made by Mosqueda, whose testimony conflicted from one 
interview to the next.  But there was additional supporting 
evidence, and the prosecution was not barred from offering 
hypothetical fact patterns based on some—but not all—of 
Mosqueda’s conflicting statements.  The ultimate resolution of 
disputed facts underlying the prosecution’s hypothetical 
questions was a task assigned to the jury, which was properly 
instructed on its role. 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
38 
 
matter, he stated before the jury that defendant was 
“disappointed” by Torres’s failure to appear.  Mosqueda also 
testified that immediately before Torres was shot, defendant 
said, “Hey, don’t you trust me?”  When combined with 
defendant’s own statements about disrespect, “street justice,” 
and “righteous” killings, the testimony about Torres’s failure to 
join the gang and defendant’s resulting disappointment, there is 
sufficient support for the hypothetical fact pattern presented to 
Detective Penney.   
Defendant argues Penney’s opinion on the hypothetical 
tracking the Torres killing was not based on Penney’s 
specialized knowledge of gang culture because he admitted he 
had never before heard of someone being killed for failing to join 
a gang.  But an expert need not have personal experience with 
the precise fact pattern to offer an informed opinion that is 
“sufficiently beyond common experience” so as to “assist the 
trier of fact.”  (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); see also id., subd. (b) 
[expert opinion may be based on matter “made known to him at 
or before the hearing,” even if not “perceived by or personally 
known” to him].)  Notably, Penney acknowledged the novelty of 
the hypothetical situation before the jury.  And the jury was 
instructed it was not bound by the expert’s opinion, but rather 
should give it the weight it deserved and decide independently 
whether the facts assumed in the hypothetical questions had 
been proved.  (See Vang, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1050 [noting 
jury’s “critical role” in vetting expert’s opinion in response to 
hypothetical questions]; id. at p. 1051 [noting that “the 
defendant has the opportunity during argument to stress to the 
jury that an expert’s testimony is one opinion concerning the 
motivations of actors in a hypothetical scenario; the expert has 
no personal knowledge concerning the particular defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
39 
 
state of mind”]; see also Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1227; 
Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 406.)  Because Penney’s opinion 
drew on his expertise about the significance of gang 
recruitment, jumping-in ceremonies, and disrespect, we 
disagree with defendant’s assertion that Penney offered a 
merely personal, rather than expert, view of the evidence.   
Applying our deferential abuse of discretion standard 
(Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1222), we also find there was an 
adequate evidentiary basis for the hypothetical fact patterns 
relating to the Ayala and Van Kleef killings.  With respect to 
Ayala, the prosecution asked Penney if Torres’s killer would 
have wanted to kill Ayala because Ayala was not in the gang, 
was not loyal to the gang, and was close friends with Mosqueda.  
The hypothetical was adequately grounded in the evidence 
presented.  Mosqueda testified that he and Ayala were close 
friends, that Ayala and defendant were not close friends, and 
that Mosqueda and Ayala had spent time together after Torres 
and Van Kleef were killed.  Ayala was not in the gang, and 
Alvarez testified she had a conversation with defendant about 
trying to get “the boys” to join the gang, where she told 
defendant they were not gang types.  The prosecution offered 
enough evidence that Ayala resisted efforts by defendant to 
recruit him into El Monte Trece to support its hypothetical 
questions to Penney.   
With respect to Van Kleef, the prosecution presented a 
hypothetical in which Van Kleef witnessed Torres’s murder, was 
not a gang member, and was shot in the back of the head.  This 
hypothetical assumed facts fairly within the limits of the 
evidence.  Jessica Ramirez, who was dating Ayala, testified she 
saw Van Kleef in Alvarez’s van on the night of Torres’s murder.  
Mosqueda similarly testified that Van Kleef was in the van that 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
40 
 
night and that he and Van Kleef were outside the van when 
defendant shot Torres.  Etnies-pattern shoe prints—the kind of 
shoes Van Kleef was wearing—were found at the Torres murder 
scene.  Multiple witnesses acknowledged that Van Kleef was not 
in the gang.  And the forensic pathologist who examined Van 
Kleef’s body testified he was shot in the back of the head.  It is 
true that the record did not include evidence drawing a line 
between Van Kleef as a potential witness to the crime and Flores 
therefore wanting him killed—which is to say, there are no 
statements by Flores expressing a desire to eliminate potential 
witnesses.  We acknowledge the evidence of motive was not 
equally strong with respect to all three murders.  But applying 
the usual standard of review, we conclude the trial court did not 
err by allowing the prosecution’s hypotheticals.  
The record not only provides adequate support for the 
hypotheticals, it also illustrates the trial court’s care in 
exercising its discretion to exclude questions lacking evidentiary 
support.  The court repeatedly struck Penney’s testimony when 
it was not grounded in facts in evidence.  (Cf. Prince, supra, 40 
Cal.4th at p. 1222 [recognizing trial court’s exclusion of 
improper expert testimony and careful attention to the issue].)   
Defendant further argues that even if the expert 
testimony was relevant and supported by the evidence, the trial 
court should have excluded it as unduly prejudicial.  (See Evid. 
Code, § 352.)  Trial courts must “carefully scrutinize” gang-
related testimony before admitting it into evidence, because the 
content of such testimony “may have a highly inflammatory 
impact on the jury.”  (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
p. 193.)  The risk of injecting undue prejudice is particularly 
high in cases where the prosecution has not charged a gang 
enhancement and the probative value of the gang evidence is 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
41 
 
minimal.  (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049.)   
Here, the prosecution did not charge defendant with a 
gang enhancement, and the expert’s testimony occasionally 
touched on inflammatory subjects; for example, Penney noted 
that the “ultimate” discipline for “rat[t]ing out another gang 
member” is death.  But any prejudice resulting from this 
testimony was far outweighed by its probative value.  Penney’s 
testimony about gang culture—particularly the importance of 
recruitment, the significance of disrespect, and the concept of 
“good murders”—was highly relevant to defendant’s possible 
motive for the charged crimes.  Moreover, the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion in limiting the scope of the 
expert’s testimony to exclude any mention of specific crimes 
committed by other members of El Monte Trece.  The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert’s testimony.  
C.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct 
by misstating the evidence during her opening statement and 
eliciting inadmissible hearsay when questioning a witness, in 
violation of his rights to confrontation, due process, and a 
reliable guilt and penalty determination.  (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th, 
& 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) 
Defendant 
asserts 
there 
were 
two 
instances 
of 
prosecutorial misconduct at the guilt phase.  First, he points to 
the prosecutor’s remark during her opening statement that 
defendant admitted taking the nine-millimeter handgun to 
Mexico with him.  Because this statement was not borne out by 
the evidence at trial—witness testimony revealed that 
defendant admitted to taking a .22-caliber rifle to Mexico but 
not the nine-millimeter handgun—defendant claims the 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
42 
 
prosecutor improperly attested to an otherwise unsupported 
material issue of fact.  Second, defendant points to the 
prosecutor’s questioning of Maria Jackson regarding the 
interaction Jackson had with her nephew, from whom she 
purchased the nine-millimeter handgun in Mexico.  In response 
to one of the prosecutor’s questions, Jackson relayed hearsay 
that her nephew recognized a picture of defendant as “the man 
that was here.”  Defendant argues the prosecutor deliberately 
solicited inadmissible hearsay to fill an evidentiary gap as to 
how the gun arrived in Mexico.  Both these incidents, defendant 
claims, rendered the trial fundamentally unfair by introducing 
damaging evidence without affording him his right to confront 
the witnesses against him.   
The United States Constitution requires reversal when a 
prosecutor makes improper remarks that “ ‘so infected the trial 
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process.’ ”  (Darden v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. at 
p. 181.)  “ ‘Conduct by a prosecutor that does not reach that level 
nevertheless [can] constitute[] misconduct under state law, but 
only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods 
to persuade the court or jury.’ ”  (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 
Cal.5th 735, 795.)   
“A defendant’s conviction will not be reversed for 
prosecutorial misconduct . . . unless it is reasonably probable 
that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been 
reached without the misconduct.”  (People v. Crew (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 822, 839 (Crew).)  To preserve a claim of misconduct for 
appeal, a defendant must make a timely objection and ask the 
court to admonish the jury, unless an objection would have been 
futile and a request for admonition ineffective.  (People v. Hill 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 (Hill).) 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
43 
 
Defendant has forfeited his challenge to the first of the 
claimed 
instances 
of 
prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
 
He 
acknowledges his failure to object to the prosecutor’s remark 
during her opening statement and offers no persuasive reason 
to excuse this forfeiture.  The remark was made at the very 
beginning of the trial, and there is no reason to suspect that 
corrective action would have been futile.  (Cf. People v. Friend 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29 (Friend) [failure to object excused “when 
the ‘misconduct [is] pervasive, . . . and the courtroom 
atmosphere was so poisonous that further objections would have 
been futile’ ”]; Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 822 [same].)   
Defendant did successfully object to the prosecutor’s 
questioning of Jackson, but he did not object on misconduct 
grounds or request a specific admonition to cure any harm.6  
Again, defendant fails to persuade that such a request would 
have been ineffective.  (See People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 
969.)  He insists the harm of Jackson’s testimony could not have 
been undone because without the hearsay statement, “there was 
no credible evidence to establish that [defendant] brought the 
gun to Mexico, or that he sold it to [Jackson’s nephew] or anyone 
else.”  But this argument places too much weight on Jackson’s 
testimony, which communicated only that her nephew said 
                                        
6  
Several days after Jackson’s testimony, defendant 
requested Jackson’s answer be formally stricken from the 
record.  The court erroneously believed it had ordered the 
comment stricken when it sustained defendant’s objection in 
front of the jury, but the court nonetheless granted defendant’s 
subsequent request to strike the testimony.  Defendant never 
requested a specific admonition to the jury.   
 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
44 
 
defendant “was here”—a fact supported by ample other 
evidence.7 
In any event, regardless of whether defendant forfeited 
either or both asserted errors, the prosecutor’s actions did not 
amount to prejudicial misconduct.  “ ‘[R]emarks made in an 
opening statement cannot be charged as misconduct unless the 
evidence referred to by the prosecutor “was ‘so patently 
inadmissible as to charge the prosecutor with knowledge that it 
could never be admitted.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 
731, 762 (Dykes).)  During her opening statement, the prosecutor 
said defendant “admits to having the 9 mm.  He also admits to 
taking down his rifle.  That he had all of those.  Went to Mexico 
with him.”  As explained below, the prosecutor’s implied 
assertion—that defendant admitted to taking the nine-
millimeter handgun to Mexico—was not directly supported by 
the evidence; the prosecutor’s misstatement, however, does not 
amount to prosecutorial misconduct. 
Although the prosecution did not produce direct evidence 
that defendant admitted taking the nine-millimeter handgun to 
Mexico, it did produce evidence of ambiguous admissions made 
by defendant with respect to the same gun.  Most pointedly, 
                                        
7  
This fact was supported by defendant’s own statements to 
Detective Elvert that he had been in the same area of Mexico, 
that defendant had “torched” the van, and that he had removed 
the seats from the van beforehand.  The jury easily could have 
inferred defendant had been at the same residence as Jackson’s 
nephew:  Elvert testified the area where the van was burned 
was “very close . . . [w]ithin a mile up the hill from the 
[nephew’s] residence”; Acevedo testified he saw the van intact 
during his first trip to Mexico in that same neighborhood; and 
both detectives testified they recovered the van seats from the 
very residence where they met Jackson’s nephew. 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
45 
 
Loveless testified about an interview he conducted with 
defendant.  During direct examination by the prosecutor, 
Loveless recalled defendant “admitted that the 9mm belonged 
to him” and defendant said, “Just because my fingerprints are 
on that gun, doesn’t mean I killed anybody.”  In response to a 
clarifying question from the prosecutor, Loveless said “[t]hat 
was the gist” of the “discussion about the 9mm that was 
recovered in Mexico.”  Defendant did not object to this exchange.   
On recross-examination, however, defense counsel asked 
Loveless about a report he wrote documenting the interview.  
After consulting the report and in response to questioning from 
the defense, Loveless confirmed defendant “admitted to 
transporting the .22-caliber rifle to Tijuana but not the 9mm 
handgun.”  Loveless testified defendant’s answers were at times 
“vague” and “evasive” during the interview; for instance, 
Loveless recalled defendant answering multiple questions with 
responses such as “[m]aybe so, maybe not” and “those theories 
[are] possibilities.”  
With the benefit of the complete record before us, we agree 
with 
defendant 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
mischaracterized 
defendant’s admission regarding the transportation of the nine-
millimeter handgun in her opening statement.  But given the 
ambiguous nature of defendant’s answers, which appeared to 
confuse even the detective conducting the interview, we cannot 
say the prosecutor’s characterization of what she expected the 
evidence to show was wholly unsupported.  (See Dykes, supra, 
46 Cal.4th at p. 762.) 
In any event, any mischaracterization by the prosecutor 
was not prejudicial.  “ ‘[P]rosecutorial misconduct in an opening 
statement is not grounds for reversal of the judgment on appeal 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
46 
 
unless the misconduct was prejudicial or the conduct of the 
prosecutor so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair trial.’ ”  
(People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1109.)  The court twice 
instructed the jury that the attorneys’ statements did not 
constitute evidence.  (See People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 
911, 957 [“We presume the jury followed the court’s 
instruction”].)  And defendant had a full opportunity “to 
challenge and rebut all evidence offered against him.”  (Wrest, 
at pp. 1109–1110; accord, Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 762.)  As 
noted above, during recross-examination, defense counsel 
elicited a clarification from Loveless that defendant “admitted 
to transporting the .22-caliber rifle to Tijuana but not the 9mm 
handgun.”  Defense counsel reiterated this point in closing 
argument, underscoring the lack of direct evidence as to how the 
handgun arrived in Mexico.  In light of the court’s cautionary 
instructions and defendant’s challenge of the very evidence the 
prosecutor misstated, we discern no prejudice or denial of 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.  
The prosecutor’s questioning of Jackson similarly does not 
constitute misconduct requiring reversal of the judgment.  
Defendant maintains the prosecutor deliberately elicited a 
hearsay statement made by Jackson’s nephew, who was not 
available for cross-examination, thereby violating defendant’s 
confrontation rights.  (See People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 
673–675 [prosecutor commits misconduct by deliberately 
drawing out inadmissible testimony]; People v. Tulley (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 952, 1035 [same].)  Even if we were to assume that the 
prosecutor deliberately elicited Jackson’s hearsay response, the 
misconduct was not prejudicial.  The trial court sustained 
defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s question and 
Jackson’s response; it later struck the question and response 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
47 
 
from the record; and it twice instructed the jury not to consider 
any evidence that was rejected.  (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 
Cal.4th at p. 957.)  It is true that this was a general instruction, 
not one that was directed specifically at Jackson’s testimony.  
But if “defendant believed the jury should have been more 
directly admonished on this point, it was incumbent on him to 
request such an admonishment.”  (Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 
p. 199.)  As noted above, defendant did not do so.  
 
Moreover, as explained above (see ante, fn. 7), defendant 
overstates the evidentiary value of the improper testimony.  The 
jury heard other evidence indicating defendant had been at 
Jackson’s nephew’s residence, including defendant’s own 
statements that he had been in that same area of Mexico and 
had burned the van, which was seen near the residence.  Given 
this properly admitted evidence, and given the court’s 
cautionary instructions, any prejudice from the prosecutor’s 
question was minimal.  (Cf. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 33 
[prosecutor’s eliciting of inadmissible hearsay was harmless in 
light of the defendant’s admissions to the same effect].)  The 
prosecutor did not, in short, commit prejudicial misconduct. 
D.  Restrictions on Defendant’s Cross-Examination 
of Polygraph Examiner 
After his arrest, defendant agreed to take a polygraph 
examination.  Both the fact of the examination and the results  
were excluded at trial (see Evid. Code, § 351.1, subd. (a) 
[prohibiting admission of references to polygraph exams and 
their results absent stipulation]), but defendant’s otherwise 
admissible statements made during the examination were 
admitted (see id., subd. (b)).  Rather than introduce defendant’s 
statements through audio or video recordings, which would have 
required redactions to eliminate any indicia of the polygraph 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
48 
 
examination, 
the 
prosecution 
introduced 
defendant’s 
statements through the testimony of the polygraph examiner, 
Robert Heard. 
 
Defendant sought to exclude Heard’s testimony about one 
particular exchange during the polygraph examination.  Heard 
had asked if defendant was present when each victim was shot 
and had written down three options from which defendant could 
select:  (A) “I shot 1, 2 or all 3,” (B) “I was there (present) when 
1, 2 or all 3 were shot,” or (C) “I told someone to shoot 1, 2 or all 
3.”  Defendant denied options A and C.  Heard then asked 
defendant about specific victims.  Defendant denied being 
present when Torres and Ayala were shot, but, according to 
Heard, defendant said, “I was present” when asked about the 
Van Kleef shooting.  When Heard sought confirmation that 
defendant was present only when Van Kleef was shot, defendant 
refused to answer the question.   
 
Defendant argued to the trial court that his answer to 
Heard’s question about the Van Kleef shooting was inaudible 
and that the prosecution should not be allowed to introduce 
Heard’s testimony about that particular answer.  The trial court 
listened to the audio recording approximately 30 times and 
concluded defendant did, in fact, say, “I was present” in response 
to Heard’s question.  The court, therefore, allowed the 
prosecution to elicit Heard’s testimony on the matter.  The court 
also indicated that, depending on defendant’s cross-examination 
of Heard, it might allow the prosecution to play the videotape of 
the interview so the jury could listen firsthand to defendant’s 
response and observe his mannerisms and gestures.  Although 
the court did not make a final determination about the 
admissibility of the videotape, it made clear that the prosecution 
could not introduce the video under any circumstances unless 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
49 
 
the video was redacted to eliminate any indication that 
defendant was taking a polygraph examination.   
 
At trial, Heard testified for the prosecution about the three 
options he presented to defendant and defendant’s alleged 
admission to being present when Van Kleef was shot.  Defense 
counsel cross-examined Heard about his exchange with 
defendant.  The prosecution did not seek to introduce any part 
of the video, and the court never revisited the question of the 
video’s admissibility.  Defendant now challenges the trial court’s 
earlier determination about the conditional admissibility of the 
videotape.  He claims the trial court forced him to make a 
“Hobson’s Choice” between his constitutional right to cross-
examine Heard and his constitutional right to exclude evidence 
of the polygraph examination.  We disagree.   
In People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, we rejected a 
similar claim.  The prosecution in that case introduced a 
redacted videotape of the defendant’s polygraph examination 
and called the polygraph examiner to testify about the 
defendant’s responses.  (Id. at p. 700.)  On cross-examination, 
defense counsel asked the examiner about portions of the 
interview the court had previously ruled inadmissible and 
therefore had been redacted from the video.  (Id. at p. 701.)  The 
court warned defense counsel that further questioning on such 
subjects “would ‘open the door’ to the whole tape being admitted 
into evidence.”  (Ibid.)  After multiple warnings, the court 
offered to allow defense counsel to ask questions regarding 
redacted portions of the video if coupled with a limiting 
instruction to the jury that certain material had been redacted 
from the videotape.  (Id. at p. 702.)  The defendant did not accept 
the court’s offer.  (Ibid.)  On appeal, the defendant argued the 
court’s conditional ruling left him with “no real choice but to 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
50 
 
forgo further questioning.”  (Id. at p. 703.)  We rejected the 
defendant’s claim, noting, “[T]he trial court’s ruling did not give 
the prosecution permission to introduce the entire tape 
containing the inadmissible polygraph evidence . . . .”  (Ibid.) 
Similarly here, defendant argues he was forced to sacrifice 
his right to cross-examine Heard to prevent the introduction of 
inadmissible polygraph evidence.  But the trial court placed no 
limitations on defendant’s cross-examination; the court simply 
indicated that certain questioning about the nature of 
defendant’s statements might lead it to consider admitting a 
redacted portion of the videotape so the jury could evaluate the 
issue for itself.  In light of the court’s factual finding that 
defendant’s answer to Heard’s question was in fact audible, the 
court’s tentative determination was reasonable. 
Defendant also fails to persuade that introduction of the 
video would have violated his right to a fair trial.  He insists the 
prosecution would not have been able to redact all indicia of the 
polygraph examination.  But the court expressly conditioned 
any admission of the videotape on such removal, and defendant 
merely speculates that the court would have been unwilling or 
unable to uphold this condition.  Indeed, defendant’s own 
attorney had previously told the court that she “viewed the 
videotape and . . . can’t tell really that that’s a polygraph room.”  
Absent any support for the contention that he was forced to 
sacrifice his right to confrontation to preserve his right to a fair 
trial, defendant’s constitutional claims fail. 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
51 
 
E.  Admission of Testimony That Defendant Was 
“Taken to the Polygraph Unit” and Trial Court’s 
Curative Instruction 
 
During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Loveless 
about the chronology of events at the end of his interview with 
defendant.  Loveless testified that after he concluded the 
interview, defendant “was escorted over to the polygraph unit.”  
The trial court immediately called for a recess to address 
Loveless’s reference to “the polygraph unit.”  (See Evid. Code, 
§ 351.1, subd. (a) [prohibiting the admission into evidence of 
“any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a 
polygraph examination”].)  At sidebar with counsel, the court 
expressed the opinion that Loveless did not intentionally exceed 
the bounds of admissible testimony, but the court did consider 
the reference “prejudicial” and noted, “[I]t doesn’t take much to 
deduce that Mr. Heard is a polygraph examiner.”  Defendant 
moved to strike Heard’s testimony and for a mistrial; the court 
denied both motions.  The court decided to instruct the jury, at 
defense counsel’s request, that defendant “was never offered nor 
ever submitted himself to a polygraph examination” but was 
“physically transported to that area [i.e., the polygraph unit] 
only because that’s where Mr. Heard’s office is.”   
 
On appeal, defendant claims Loveless’s reference to “the 
polygraph unit” was prejudicial and the court’s instruction 
failed to cure the resultant harm.  He maintains the jury must 
have deduced Heard was a polygraph examiner because Heard, 
who testified immediately before Loveless, stated he was retired 
from the police force and agreed he now “assist[s] homicide 
detectives with interviewing particular witnesses.”  Defendant 
also asserts Heard’s testimony reflected the kind of “yes or no” 
questions the jury would have associated with a polygraph 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
52 
 
examination.  Taking this evidence together, defendant 
contends the jury was likely to disbelieve the court’s admonition 
and to discredit the defense as a result, thereby violating his 
rights to due process and to reliable guilt and penalty 
determinations.  (U.S. Const., 8th & 14th Amends.)   
We review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of 
discretion.  (Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1120 [applying 
abuse of discretion standard to “questions involving the 
admission of polygraph-related evidence”]; People v. Jenkins 
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 986 [“ ‘[w]hether a particular incident is 
incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and 
the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on 
mistrial motions’ ”].)  Under this deferential standard, we 
discern no error.  
As an initial matter, we note that the fleeting reference to 
“the polygraph unit” did not clearly constitute a “reference to an 
offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph 
examination” (Evid. Code, § 351.1, subd. (a)).  While the jury 
could have inferred defendant took a polygraph examination 
when he was escorted to “the polygraph unit,” that is not the 
only plausible inference; the trial court offered the jury another 
one—that Heard’s office was located nearby.  And the court’s 
unequivocal statement that defendant “was never offered nor 
ever submitted himself to a polygraph examination” forcefully 
pointed the jury toward the latter inference.  “In the context of 
erroneously offered polygraph evidence, we have held that a 
trial court’s timely admonition, which the jury is presumed to 
have followed, cures prejudice resulting from the admission of 
such evidence.”  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 953 (Cox).)  
Assuming that the reference to “the polygraph unit” was 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
53 
 
inadmissible, we have no reason to conclude the admonition was 
insufficient here.8 
Nor are we persuaded by defendant’s argument that the 
admonition was ineffective given the other evidence from which 
the jury may have deduced that Heard was a polygraph 
examiner.  Heard testified he had worked in a number of law 
enforcement roles; he was then working as an investigator for 
the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department and 
previously worked as an employee of the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department and the Pomona Police Department.  The 
fact that Heard said he now helped “homicide detectives with 
interviewing particular witnesses” did not meaningfully 
differentiate him from other law enforcement personnel, nor did 
it necessarily signal he was a polygraph examiner. 
In sum, defendant fails to show that the trial court’s 
immediate and forceful curative instruction—an instruction 
defendant himself suggested—was insufficient.  (See Thompson, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1122.)  Defendant fails to establish a 
violation of his rights under either state or federal law. 
                                        
8  
Defendant compares his case to People v. Basuta (2001) 94 
Cal.App.4th 370, 389–391, where the prosecutor violated a 
preexisting court order not to mention a polygraph examination, 
which, when combined with another serious error, prejudiced 
the outcome of the trial.  Defendant’s argument is undeveloped 
and, in any event, fails for the same reasons that we rejected 
similar arguments in Cox and Thompson.  (See Cox, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at pp. 953–954 [noting that Basuta involved multiple 
evidentiary errors, including one more significant than the 
reference to polygraph-related evidence]; Thompson, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 1122 [noting that Basuta involved cumulative 
errors that “ ‘substantially affected the crucial issue in the 
case—[the main witness’s] credibility’ ”].) 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
54 
 
F.  Admission of Testimony That Victim Was Afraid 
of Defendant 
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting 
certain testimony by Erick Tinoco, a friend of Torres, Van Kleef, 
and Ayala.  According to Tinoco, Torres said he was concerned 
he might have been “in trouble” because he did not show up to 
his jumping-in ceremony, where he was supposed to join the 
gang.  Torres also “said he didn’t know if he should go back to 
Andrew’s aunt’s apartment because he was afraid that 
[defendant] was going to get mad at him, so he didn’t know what 
to do.”  The court allowed this testimony to come in for the 
limited purpose of showing Torres’s state of mind.   
 
Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a)(1) provides 
that hearsay statements reflecting an existing state of mind of 
the speaker are admissible for the limited purpose of proving the 
declarant’s state of mind.  But this state of mind exception 
applies only if the declarant’s state of mind is relevant to a 
disputed issue at trial.  (People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 
621 (Noguera).)  A trial court errs by admitting a murder 
victim’s out-of-court statement of fear of the defendant when the 
victim’s state of mind is not at issue.  (Ibid.)  “[A] victim’s prior 
statements of fear are not admissible to prove the defendant’s 
conduct or motive (state of mind).  If the rule were otherwise, 
such statements of prior fear or friction could be routinely 
admitted to show that the defendant had a motive to injure or 
kill.”  (People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 609.)  Here, Torres’s 
state of mind was not at issue.  It was error to admit his 
statements on this basis.  (See Noguera, at pp. 621–622.)   
 
We conclude, however, that the error in admitting the 
statements was harmless.  It is not reasonably probable the jury 
would have reached a different result had it not heard evidence 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
55 
 
that Torres was afraid defendant “was going to get mad at him.”  
(See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  Torres’s 
statements were relatively inconsequential compared to the 
other evidence adduced at trial.  Multiple witnesses placed 
defendant at the scene of Torres’s murder.  Mosqueda testified 
that he saw defendant shoot Torres many times.  And Alvarez 
testified that defendant was holding what appeared to be a 
pistol when he returned to her van immediately after the 
shooting.  In addition, there was other, nonhearsay evidence to 
support the prosecution’s theory of motive, including testimony 
that Torres did not attend his jumping-in ceremony and expert 
testimony that backing out of an agreement to join the gang 
would be considered disrespectful.  The jury could have inferred 
defendant’s motive from that evidence without Torres’s hearsay 
statements expressing fear of defendant.  We therefore conclude 
that any hearsay error in admitting Tinoco’s testimony was 
harmless.  (See Noguera, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 622–623.)   
G.  Sufficiency of the Evidence as to the First 
Degree Murders of Van Kleef and Ayala 
 
Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence that he 
murdered Van Kleef and Ayala.  We conclude there was 
sufficient evidence as to both murders. 
 
The test for evaluating a sufficiency of evidence claim is 
deferential:  “whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of 
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
(People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)  We must “view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the People” and “presume 
in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier 
could reasonably deduce from the evidence.”  (Ibid.)  We must 
also “accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
56 
 
from the circumstantial evidence.”  (People v. Maury (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 342, 396.)   
 
We begin with the evidence supporting defendant’s 
conviction for the first degree murder of Van Kleef.  Multiple 
witnesses testified that Van Kleef witnessed defendant murder 
Torres.  Van Kleef was then himself murdered later that night.  
Defendant had no alibi and the jury could have logically 
concluded from the evidence that he was with Van Kleef at the 
time he was murdered.  Alvarez testified she returned to her 
apartment after Torres was murdered to find defendant and 
Van Kleef there.  Van Kleef then left the apartment, and 
defendant followed within a few minutes, holding the keys to 
Alvarez’s van.  Alvarez testified she was at that point worried 
about Van Kleef’s safety.  Defendant was gone for about an hour.  
When he returned to Alvarez’s apartment, he told her “he had 
gotten into an argument or something and they broke the 
window, somebody broke the window” of her van on the front 
passenger’s side.  Alvarez said she went to her van and saw that 
half the passenger’s side windshield had been shattered.  
Mosqueda testified he also saw the damage to the windshield.  
He described it as a “bullet hole.”9  From these facts, the jury 
could have inferred that defendant was with Van Kleef when he 
was killed; that defendant had shot someone near the van; and 
that the person defendant shot was Van Kleef.  These inferences 
                                        
9  
Defendant argues Mosqueda’s testimony should be 
discredited because he changed his story over time.  But “it is 
the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the 
credibility of a witness . . . .”  (People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d 
at p. 314.)  The jury was made aware of the discrepancies in 
Mosqueda’s various accounts, and nonetheless presumably 
found his trial testimony to be credible.  
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
57 
 
would have been particularly reasonable given defendant’s 
apparent motive to eliminate Van Kleef because he witnessed 
Torres’s murder and was not loyal to the gang.   
 
Significant physical evidence also linked the van, which 
was in defendant’s possession at the relevant time, and 
defendant himself to Van Kleef’s murder.  Loveless, who 
investigated the Van Kleef crime scene, testified that Van 
Kleef’s body was covered in a thin blue blanket or sheet, and 
Alvarez testified that she kept a blue sheet in her van.  Loveless 
also testified that he found a white Stafford Polo-type T-shirt 
underneath Van Kleef’s body.  The prosecution introduced into 
evidence an open package of T-shirts of this type and brand that 
belonged to defendant.  The forensic pathologist who examined 
Van Kleef testified he could have been shot by a nine-millimeter 
handgun, and defendant was known to carry a nine-millimeter 
handgun.  Defendant himself also admitted he was “present” at 
the Van Kleef murder.  Based on all this evidence, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact 
could have found defendant guilty of murdering Van Kleef 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
We now turn to the evidence concerning Ayala’s murder. 
The trial evidence showed that defendant again borrowed 
Alvarez’s van during the time period when Ayala was murdered.  
On the night of the murder, Mosqueda drove Ayala home in 
Alvarez’s van around 11:00 p.m.  Mosqueda gave the keys to 
Alvarez, then returned to his home.  Defendant then borrowed 
the van and left for approximately one hour.  Ayala’s sister 
testified about Ayala’s whereabouts on the night he was killed.  
She was home that night around 10:30 p.m. or 11:00 p.m., and 
Ayala was there with her.  Ayala told her he was not going out 
that night and was in the clothes he usually wore to bed.  Ayala 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
58 
 
was killed around midnight and left on the side of the road, in 
clothes inadequate for the weather.  Detective Joe Palomino 
testified he clocked the mileage between the place where Torres 
was killed and the place where Ayala was killed the next day, 
and it was only two-tenths of a mile.  Based on this evidence, the 
jury could logically infer that Flores killed Ayala during the time 
period when he borrowed Alvarez’s van. 
 
Furthermore, a rational jury could have logically 
concluded that the ballistics evidence—together with the other 
evidence presented—showed defendant murdered Ayala.  Two 
bullets were recovered from the Ayala crime scene.  Heward 
testified that she test-fired the nine-millimeter handgun 
recovered from Mexico and compared the test-fires to the two 
bullets found at the Ayala crime scene.  She was able to identify 
one of the bullets as coming from the handgun but was not 
positive about the other bullet.  This was the same nine-
millimeter handgun that she identified was used in the Torres 
murder.  The handgun was linked to defendant in that he was 
known to carry a nine-millimeter handgun; Mosqueda identified 
the nine-millimeter handgun from Mexico as the one defendant 
carried; and multiple witnesses testified that defendant 
appeared to have shot Torres.  The jury could have logically 
inferred that defendant shot Torres and Ayala with the same 
handgun.   
 
We agree with defendant that there was limited evidence 
of defendant’s motive for killing Ayala.  The jury heard 
testimony that Ayala was friends with Van Kleef and Mosqueda, 
both of whom had witnessed the Torres killing; indeed, 
Mosqueda testified he saw Ayala every day.  The jury also heard 
evidence that defendant was a member of the El Monte Trece 
gang and that, according to Detective Penney, in the gang 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
59 
 
culture, “disrespect” would be a reason to murder someone.  
Ayala was not in the gang; Penney testified that declining to join 
the gang, as Ayala did, would have been considered a form of 
disrespect.  Penney also testified that, because Ayala was shot 
in the back of the head while on his knees, he appears to have 
been assassinated, just like Van Kleef.  Based on this evidence, 
the jury may have inferred that defendant believed Van Kleef or 
Mosqueda had told Ayala about the Torres murder and that 
defendant killed Ayala for much the same reason he killed Van 
Kleef—that is, to silence all potential witnesses to the Torres 
murder not affiliated with the gang.  Alternatively, the jury 
could have believed defendant felt it was disrespectful for Ayala 
to decline to join the gang and murdered him for that reason.  
But in any event, motive is not an element of murder, so the 
prosecution could prove its case without definitive evidence of a 
motive.  The relatively limited evidence of motive does not 
undermine the sufficiency of the evidence that defendant 
committed the crime. 
 
Defendant compares his case to People v. Blakeslee (1969) 
2 Cal.App.3d 831.  There, the Court of Appeal found insufficient 
evidence where the defendant could be placed at the murder 
scene but where there was little else to connect her to the 
murder.  (Id. at pp. 837–840 [highlighting, in particular, the 
absence of a murder weapon or any evidence “linking the 
defendant in some manner to a weapon” (id. at p. 840)].)  The 
comparison is inapt.  Here, unlike in Blakeslee, the prosecution 
presented evidence linking defendant to the type of weapon used 
in the murders.  There was also other physical evidence linking 
defendant to the Van Kleef murder, including the T-shirt, the 
blue sheet, and the bullet hole in the van window.  Finally, 
defendant does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence that 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
60 
 
he murdered Torres.  The close proximity in time and space of 
the other two murders, and the fact that all three boys were in 
the same friend group, also supported an inference that the 
murders were related to one another.  Based on these facts and 
all the evidence in the record, we conclude there was sufficient 
evidence showing defendant murdered Van Kleef and Ayala. 
IV.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Purported Miranda Violation Regarding 
Admission of Guilt for Jaimes Murder 
1.  Background 
During the penalty phase of trial, the prosecution 
introduced a taped interview during which defendant confessed 
to killing Jaimes.10  Defendant admitted he killed Jaimes after 
Jaimes allegedly disrespected defendant and his mother; Jaimes 
had solicited defendant’s mother as a prostitute and then 
refused to promptly leave the motel where defendant and his 
mother were living.  After a verbal altercation between the two 
men, defendant killed Jaimes by shooting him multiple times in 
the stomach, chest, and head.  Defendant recalled wrapping 
Jaimes’s body in plastic, placing it in the trunk of a car he stole, 
and then taking the car for a joyride before parking it near the 
motel.  Jaimes’s body was later discovered by Milam, the owner 
of the car, who recovered it from an impound lot. 
The Jaimes killing occurred in Los Angeles.  Los Angeles 
authorities did not locate defendant until Customs and Border 
Patrol caught him attempting to cross the United States-Mexico 
                                        
10 
As noted above, the court did not allow the prosecution to 
introduce evidence of this uncharged homicide during the guilt 
phase of trial, deeming it unduly prejudicial. 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
61 
 
border on September 6, 2001.  The San Bernardino authorities, 
who were actively investigating the three homicides in the 
present case, transported defendant from the border to their 
jurisdiction and informed the Los Angeles Police Department 
defendant was in their custody.  Defendant was booked that 
evening.  At approximately 10:55 p.m., Detective Chris Elvert of 
the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department interviewed 
defendant about the Torres, Van Kleef, and Ayala homicides.11  
Elvert advised defendant of his Miranda rights at the start of 
the interview, and defendant indicated that he understood his 
rights and was willing to speak with the detective.  Elvert 
continued to question defendant for approximately one hour.  
Defendant answered many of Elvert’s questions but refused to 
answer others; throughout the interview, defendant denied 
responsibility for the crimes. 
The following morning, Elvert walked defendant across 
the street to a nearby facility where Lieutenant Kusch of the Los 
Angeles Police Department was waiting.  Elvert told Kusch 
defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights the previous 
night and had participated in a lengthy interview.  Kusch 
introduced himself to defendant and explained that he planned 
to ask defendant about a different crime—the Jaimes killing.  
He told defendant Los Angeles County did not have an arrest 
warrant out for him at that time.  Kusch also noted that 
defendant may have already known quite a bit about their 
                                        
11 
Elvert had driven defendant from the border to San 
Bernardino and had spoken with defendant during the drive 
without giving any Miranda advisements.  The prosecution did 
not introduce any evidence related to the drive, and defendant 
does not rely on the lack of Miranda advisements during the 
drive to support his arguments here.   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
62 
 
investigation through his mother or other family.  Before Kusch 
began any substantive questioning, he readvised defendant of 
his Miranda rights, and defendant indicated that he understood 
all of them.  Kusch then said:  “Basically what I’d like to do is 
talk about the the [sic] case that we investigated that we got 
called out on back on November 17th, 2000.  Uh I’ll tell you how 
we got called out on it in a minute but uh do you want to take a 
few minutes to talk a little bit about that?”  The transcript 
records defendant’s response as “No,” although in the videotape 
of the interview, the response sounds more like, “Nah.”  Kusch 
responded as follows:  
“Well essentially what I want to do is to take a minute and 
kind of explain to you what uh what we got called out on and 
what the investigation entailed and what not.  Of course you 
know whether you choose to answer the questions is completely 
up to you um but obviously you know I just wanted to at least 
give you the thumbnail sketch of what we investigated, what we 
what we [sic] did and talk a little bit about that.  Again, you 
know you don’t have to answer any questions.  We’re just sitting 
here, if you don’t want to answer certain questions you don’t 
have to answer them, if you want to answer other questions you 
can answer those.  So, you know . . . for example some of the 
stuff I want to talk to you about is what’s your name and birth 
date and stuff like that which are pretty simple questions.  So.  
Do you want to take a few minutes and talk to me about that 
stuff?”   
Defendant answered:  “Oh yeah, well whatever.”  The 
interview continued from there, and eventually defendant 
described in detail how he killed Jaimes.  Defendant told Kusch:  
“I’m gonna tell you what happened.  [¶] . . .  [¶]  Not because I 
have to not because, I mean because I want to, ay.  Cuz I feel 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
63 
 
what happened wasn’t right.”  Defendant said he went to the 
motel room where his mother lived to find Jaimes there, 
seemingly taking drugs; defendant asked him to leave, but he 
would not leave and was “disrespecting” and “coming at my 
mom.”  Defendant told Kusch:  “I murdered him ey.  I did it.  All 
right?  And I enjoyed doing it ay.  I’m gonna tell you why, 
because it was defending my mother.”  Defendant later said, “I 
pulled out my gun and I blew his fucking head off ay.”   
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress his 
statements to Kusch, claiming he invoked his right to remain 
silent by saying, “No” when asked whether he wanted “to talk a 
little bit about that.”  The trial court held an evidentiary hearing 
and reviewed audio recordings and transcripts of the 
aforementioned interviews.  The court ruled that defendant’s 
“[n]o,” in context, was not an unambiguous invocation of his 
right to remain silent.  In the court’s view, defendant’s answer 
was ambiguous because Kusch’s question was ambiguous:  when 
Kusch asked defendant whether he wanted to talk “about that” 
(italics added), it was unclear whether Kusch was referring to 
the Jaimes case in general or to the specific matter of how the 
Los Angeles Police Department “got called out on” it.  In light of 
this ambiguity, the court reasoned, Kusch properly clarified 
defendant’s right to refuse to answer questions, and defendant 
thereafter waived his Miranda rights by willingly engaging in 
the interview. 
Defendant now challenges the trial court’s admissibility 
ruling.  He claims the statements he made to Kusch were 
obtained in violation of Miranda and that their introduction 
during the penalty phase of trial violated his rights to due 
process, to a reliable penalty verdict, and to be free from cruel 
and unusual punishment.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 8th & 14th 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
64 
 
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)  We conclude the trial court 
did not err in ruling defendant’s statements admissible.  
2.  Analysis 
“Under California law, issues relating to the suppression 
of statements made during a custodial interrogation must be 
reviewed under federal constitutional standards.”  (People v. 
Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 374.)  To protect suspects’ Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment rights, in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 
U.S. 436, the high court held that before questioning, 
individuals in custody must be advised of their right to remain 
silent, that anything they say may be used as evidence against 
them, and that they have the right to the presence of an 
attorney, whether retained or appointed.  (Id. at p. 444.)  But a 
suspect can waive these rights and agree to speak with law 
enforcement.  (Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 104.)  
The burden is on the prosecution to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary, based on a totality of the circumstances.  (Ibid.)   
The requirements for a valid waiver of rights differ from 
the requirements for a valid invocation of rights.  (Smith v. 
Illinois (1984) 469 U.S. 91, 98 (Smith) [“Invocation and waiver 
are entirely distinct inquiries, and the two must not be blurred 
by merging them together”].)  “A valid waiver need not be of 
predetermined form, but instead must reflect that the suspect 
in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated 
in the Miranda decision.”  (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 
667 (Cruz).)  “A suspect’s expressed willingness to answer 
questions after acknowledging an understanding of his or her 
Miranda rights has itself been held sufficient to constitute an 
implied waiver of such rights.”  (Ibid.)  The critical question with 
respect to waiver is whether it was knowing and voluntary, 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
65 
 
which is “directed at an evaluation of the defendant’s state of 
mind.”  (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 428 
(Williams).)   
In contrast, a suspect’s invocation of Miranda rights must 
be “unambiguous[]” from the perspective of a reasonable officer.  
(Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 381 (Berghuis).)  If 
“a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have 
understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right,” 
then the officer need not cease all questioning immediately.  
(Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459 (Davis).)  
Whether or not a reasonable officer would perceive a suspect’s 
statement as ambiguous may depend on context.  (People v. 
Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203, 218 (Sauceda-
Contreras); Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 428–429; People 
v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 49–50.)  “ ‘[W]hen a suspect 
under interrogation makes an ambiguous statement that could 
be construed as an invocation of his or her Miranda rights, “the 
interrogators may clarify the suspect’s comprehension of, and 
desire to invoke or waive, the Miranda rights.” ’ ”  (Williams, at 
p. 428.)   
“In reviewing constitutional claims of this nature, it is well 
established that we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed 
facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if 
supported by substantial evidence.  We independently 
determine from the undisputed facts and the facts properly 
found by the trial court whether the challenged statement was 
illegally obtained.”  (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
926, 992.)   
 
 
a.  Invocation of the Right To Remain Silent 
Defendant advances a series of layered arguments 
challenging the admission of his confession to the Jaimes 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
66 
 
murder.  First, he contends he unambiguously invoked his right 
to remain silent when he answered, “No” in response to Kusch’s 
initial query whether defendant “wanted to talk a little bit about 
that.”  Defendant argues that, at that point, Kusch should have 
immediately terminated the encounter.  Instead, as noted above, 
Kusch asked a follow-up question to clarify the nature of his 
inquiry, repeatedly reminding defendant of his right not to 
answer questions.  In response to this follow-up, defendant 
expressed willingness to answer Kusch’s questions.  Defendant 
argues there never should have been a follow-up question, so his 
expressed agreement to continue the interview should be given 
no effect.  After closely reviewing the record, including a 
videotape of the interview, we are not persuaded.12 
It is true, as defendant emphasizes, that a “no” response 
to a simple question whether the suspect wishes to speak with 
law enforcement generally constitutes an unambiguous 
invocation.  (See, e.g., People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 21 [“In 
this case, defendant was asked whether he would talk to the 
detectives and answered no.  This seems clear enough”]; Garcia 
v. Long (9th Cir. 2015) 808 F.3d 771, 773 [similar].)  But here, 
considered in context, neither the question asked, nor the 
answer given was this simple—and, as is true with most 
questions of interpretation, context does matter.  In certain 
                                        
12 
To avoid any confusion, we emphasize that the question 
before us is not whether Kusch was entitled to refuse to “take 
‘no’ for an answer” and simply forge ahead with his substantive 
questioning.  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 9.)  That is not the 
situation we confront here, and we do not address it.  The only 
question is whether it was permissible for Kusch to ask his 
follow-up clarifying question, to which defendant responded 
with willingness to continue the interview.  
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
67 
 
situations, statements that might seem clear in isolation 
“actually may be equivocal under an objective standard, in the 
sense that in context it would not be clear to the reasonable 
listener what the defendant intends.  In those instances, the 
protective purpose of the Miranda rule is not impaired if the 
authorities are permitted to pose a limited number of followup 
questions to render more apparent the true intent of the 
defendant.”  (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 429; see also, e.g., 
People v. McGreen (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 504, 522 [head shake, 
followed by verbalized “no,” unclear in context; permissible for 
officer to clarify suspect’s meaning]; Medina v. Singletary (11th 
Cir. 1995) 59 F.3d 1095, 1105 [defendant’s “no” unclear in 
context; under circumstances, “[t]o prohibit a clarifying question 
. . . would ‘transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly 
irrational 
obstacles 
to 
legitimate 
police 
investigative 
activity’ ”].) 
Several circumstances, taken together, lead us to conclude 
that this is a case in which the officer acted reasonably in 
clarifying defendant’s intent.  First, the clarity of a suspect’s 
answer may depend in part on the clarity of the officer’s 
question.  (Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 219; cf. 
Smith, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 98 [“Where nothing about the 
request . . . or the circumstances leading up to the request would 
render it ambiguous, all questioning must cease” (italics 
added)].)  Here, as the trial court found, the nature of Kusch’s 
initial question was unclear.  Kusch said he would “tell 
[defendant] how [the police] got called out on [the case] in a 
minute” 
immediately 
before 
asking 
whether 
defendant 
“want[ed] to take a few minutes to talk a little bit about that.”  
(Italics added.)  It was not entirely clear whether Kusch was 
asking defendant whether he was willing to answer questions 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
68 
 
about the Jaimes case or whether defendant wanted to talk 
about how “we got called out on it,” or both.  Because Kusch’s 
question was imprecise, defendant’s answer could have meant 
either, “No, I do not want to talk to you at all,” or “No, I do not 
want to hear about how the police got called out.”13   
The factual backdrop to the conversation makes the 
second interpretation particularly plausible.  Although a 
suspect normally might not care much about how a law 
enforcement agency began its investigation, in this case there 
was cause to think defendant might react differently.  That is 
because defendant’s own mother played a central role in that 
story by providing information that helped lead the police to 
                                        
13  
The dissent disagrees with this assessment, concluding 
that the “plain language and flow of Kusch’s prefatory 
statements . . . leave no doubt” about the intended referent of 
the “that.”  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 6.)  We do not disagree 
that the dissent has the better reading of Kusch’s intended 
meaning—indeed, Kusch would make this intent clear in his 
follow-up question.  But was this the only way defendant could 
have understood Kusch’s imprecise initial question?  We agree 
with the trial court that it was not. 
 
The dissent also argues that the form of Kusch’s question 
“invit[ed] Flores to speak,” not the other way around, because 
Kusch asked if defendant “wanted to ‘talk a little bit about 
that.’ ”  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 6, italics added.)  But in 
ordinary speech, we understand that asking another person if 
he or she is willing to talk about something often means the 
speaker has something to say (consider, for example, the age-old 
“We need to talk”).  Here, Kusch’s question contained a promise 
to talk to defendant about a subject of which defendant had no 
personal knowledge—the path of the police investigation of the 
Jaimes murder.  It is not unreasonable to think defendant was 
focused on that promise when he answered Kusch’s question.  
 
 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
69 
 
defendant, as Kusch himself would explain to the jury during 
the penalty phase of trial.  Kusch had reason to believe 
defendant was aware of that fact and indeed alluded to it shortly 
before asking if defendant wanted to talk:  “Um pretty clearly 
you know we’ve done a pretty thorough investigation,” Kusch 
said, “I don’t know if you had a chance to talk to any family or 
your mom or anything between you know November and now 
but uh I have a sense that you probably know a little bit about 
uh our investigation et cetera.”  As Kusch was aware, how the 
police “got called out on” the case may have been a subject of 
particular personal importance to defendant.  Knowing that, a 
reasonable officer might well wonder whether defendant’s 
response to Kusch’s poorly framed question was aimed at 
Kusch’s promise to talk more about the path of the police 
investigation, as opposed to signaling unwillingness to answer 
Kusch’s questions about the Jaimes murder.   
The videotape of the interview, which we have reviewed, 
also provides context to our inquiry and reinforces our 
conclusion about the lack of clarity in the initial exchange 
between Kusch and defendant.  The interview begins with 
Kusch and defendant in the interrogation room, with defendant 
sitting calmly and Kusch audibly fumbling with his papers.  
Kusch then begins a lengthy, somewhat unfocused discussion of 
the various things Kusch plans to disclose to defendant and 
what he is generally interested in learning from defendant.  
Kusch then begins to read defendant his Miranda rights.  
Defendant smiles and nods in response.  When Kusch ultimately 
asks whether defendant wants to “take a few minutes to talk a 
little bit about that” defendant says a casual sounding “no,” or, 
perhaps, “nah”; as he says this, defendant is still smiling and 
gives a short laugh.  The dissonance between defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
70 
 
seemingly bemused demeanor and his spoken response is 
confusing; the combined effect is murky and unclear.  A 
reasonable officer, having just asked a badly framed question, 
might legitimately wonder whether this response was rooted in 
some misunderstanding of the officer’s intended meaning.  
(Compare, e.g., Com. v. Mazariego (2016) 474 Mass. 42, 53 [47 
N.E.3d 420, 430] [relying on the defendant’s laughter, as shown 
on the videotape of his interview, to help explain that when he 
said, “ ‘No, no, no,’ ” he was responding to a different proposition, 
not to the question whether he wanted to continue talking].) 
Finally, we note that at the time of this exchange, Kusch 
knew that defendant had, the previous day, already waived his 
Miranda rights and voluntarily engaged in an extended 
conversation with Detective Elvert about the homicides charged 
in this case.  At least until this point, nothing in defendant’s 
interactions with Kusch suggested that defendant would be less 
willing to answer questions about the Jaimes homicide.  
Defendant was of course entitled to refuse to answer questions 
about the Jaimes homicide, as Kusch properly informed 
defendant, and defendant’s willingness to talk about the 
homicides charged in this case creates no presumption that he 
would also be willing to talk about a different homicide.  But 
this, too, may add context to Kusch’s decision to ask a question 
clarifying his initial, poorly framed inquiry into defendant’s 
willingness to answer questions about the Jaimes murder. 
Based 
on 
all 
of 
these 
case-specific 
contextual 
considerations, we agree with the trial court that Kusch was not 
bound to cut off the encounter immediately; it was not 
unreasonable for Kusch to ask a neutral follow-up question to 
clarify defendant’s intent. 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
71 
 
This conclusion is consistent with our precedent in this 
well-trodden area of the law.  (See Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 
Cal.4th 203; Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th 405.)14  In Williams, 
the defendant, then a suspect in custody, expressed a 
willingness to waive his right to remain silent.  (Id. at p. 426.)  
The interrogating officers then inquired about defendant’s 
willingness to waive the right to counsel, and the following 
colloquy took place: 
“[Defendant]:  ‘You talking about now?’     
“[First Officer]:  ‘Do you want an attorney here while 
you talk to us?’   
“[Defendant]:  ‘Yeah.’   
“[First Officer]:  ‘Yes you do.’   
“[Defendant]:  ‘Uh huh.’   
“[First Officer]:  ‘Are you sure?’   
“[Defendant]:  ‘Yes.’   
“[Second Officer]:  ‘You don’t want to talk to us right 
now.’   
“[Defendant]:  ‘Yeah, I’ll talk to you right now.’   
“[First Officer]:  ‘Without an attorney.’  
“[Defendant]:  ‘Yeah.’ ”   
                                        
14 
Williams and Sauceda-Contreras involved purported 
invocations of the right to counsel rather than the right to 
remain silent, but we apply the same analysis to both inquiries.  
(See Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 381 [“there is no principled 
reason to adopt different standards for determining when an 
accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the 
Miranda right to counsel”].) 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
72 
 
(Ibid.)  The officers went on to explain that if the defendant 
wanted a lawyer, a public defender would be present in a couple 
days, but the defendant insisted he did not want to wait and 
preferred to talk with the officers immediately.  (Ibid.) 
On appeal, the defendant argued the officers were 
required to cease all questioning as soon as he said, “ ‘Yeah’ ” in 
response to their question whether he wanted an attorney.  
(Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 426.)  In response, we 
explained that while the defendant’s “ ‘Yeah’ ” may have seemed 
clear in isolation, the answer was ambiguous in context.  (Id. at 
pp. 429–431.)  The defendant had previously waived his right to 
remain silent and appeared confused about the timing of when 
an attorney would be available; under those circumstances, the 
officers were permitted to ask follow-up questions to clarify 
what he truly intended.  (Id. at p. 429.)   
In Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.4th 203, a detective 
similarly advised the defendant of his Miranda rights with the 
help of a translating officer, and the defendant said he 
understood.  (Id. at p. 206.)  He was then asked:  “ ‘Having in 
mind these rights . . . , the detective would like to know if he can 
speak with you right now.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The defendant responded:  
“ ‘If you can bring me a lawyer, that way I[,] I with who . . . that 
way I can tell you everything that I know and everything that I 
need to tell you and someone to represent me.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The 
translator said, “ ‘[P]erhaps you didn’t understand your rights,’ ” 
and rephrased the question:  “ ‘[W]hat the detective wants to 
know right now is if you’re willing to speak to him right now 
without a lawyer present?’ ”  (Ibid.)  The defendant responded 
affirmatively.  The detective, through the translator, reiterated 
that “[t]he decision is yours” and repeated the question.  (Ibid.)  
After the defendant repeatedly expressed a desire to continue 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
73 
 
without an attorney, the detective conducted an interrogation 
and ultimately obtained a confession.  (Ibid.)   
We rejected the defendant’s argument that the officers 
were required to cease all questioning after his initial response 
referred to “ ‘bring[ing him] a lawyer.’ ”  (Sauceda-Contreras, 
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 206.)  We explained that his answer was 
“conditional, ambiguous, and equivocal,” in part because of the 
question asked of him.  (Id. at p. 219.)  Because the question was 
qualified with “ ‘right now,’ ” the defendant’s answer was 
“impliedly asking whether [an attorney] could be provided right 
now.”  (Ibid.)  We concluded that “[f]rom an objective standpoint, 
a reasonable officer under the circumstances would not have 
understood defendant’s response to be a clear and unequivocal 
request for counsel.”  (Ibid.)  It was therefore appropriate for the 
detective 
to 
“seek[] 
confirmation 
that 
[the defendant] 
understood the decision to proceed with the interview . . . was 
his alone, and that he in fact wished to do so.”  (Id. at p. 220.)   
Much as in Williams and Sauceda-Contreras, we conclude 
that defendant’s “[n]o,” in context, was susceptible of more than 
one possible interpretation.  Kusch therefore was not forbidden 
from asking his follow-up question to clarify defendant’s intent.  
We emphasize, as we did in these prior cases, that Kusch’s 
question was both brief and neutrally phrased and delivered; 
Kusch did not in any way badger defendant nor otherwise use 
coercive tactics to induce a waiver of his right to remain silent.  
(See Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 220 [“No 
coercive tactics were employed in order to obtain defendant’s 
waiver of his rights”]; Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 429 [“it 
does not appear that the officers were ‘badgering’ defendant into 
waiving his rights”].)  On the contrary, in clarifying whether 
defendant was willing to answer questions, Kusch reminded 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
74 
 
defendant—no fewer than three times—that he was under no 
obligation to do so. 
The dissent does not appear to take issue with the basic 
lesson of these cases:  That, in some instances, context may raise 
questions about the meaning of a seemingly unequivocal 
response.  Nor does the dissent dispute that, “[i]n those 
instances, the protective purpose of the Miranda rule is not 
impaired if the authorities are permitted to pose a limited 
number of followup questions” to clarify.  (Williams, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at p. 429.)  The dissent argues, however, that Kusch’s 
effort to clarify here was impermissible because defendant’s 
response was meaningfully less ambiguous, in context, than 
were the responses of the defendants in Sauceda-Contreras or 
Williams.   
Our prior cases are not easily distinguished on the 
grounds cited by the dissent.  The dissent claims that Sauceda-
Contreras differs from this case because the defendant’s 
invocation there was ambiguous “based on a number of facts, not 
just the nature of the detective’s question.”  (Conc. & dis. opn., 
post, at p. 10.)  But surely the nature of the question matters in 
evaluating the meaning of the answer.  And in any event, we 
have explained that, here, too, the available facts support the 
conclusion that defendant’s “[n]o” answer in response to Kusch’s 
poorly framed question may have rested on a misunderstanding 
of Kusch’s intended meaning.   
The dissent would distinguish Williams on the ground 
that the defendant there asked a question about timing (“ ‘You 
talking about now?’ ”) before responding “ ‘Yeah’ ” to the 
question “ ‘Do you want an attorney here while you talk to us?’ ”  
(Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 426.)  Here, by contrast, 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
75 
 
defendant did not ask Kusch questions when asked whether he 
wanted to “talk a little bit about that.”  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, 
at p. 12.)  But it is not clear why this distinction matters.  In 
Williams, the interrogating officer’s question was clear, while 
here it was not.  Nonetheless, despite the defendant’s seemingly 
absolute response to the officer’s question in Williams, we 
concluded there was “sufficient ambiguity” in the exchange 
“that a reasonable officer would be uncertain of defendant’s 
actual intent,” and that it was therefore reasonable to clarify.  
(Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 431; see id. at p. 430.)  The 
same is true here.  
The dissent relies heavily on Anderson v. Terhune (9th Cir. 
2008) 516 F.3d 781, but that case differs markedly from this one.  
There the court found it unambiguous when the defendant said, 
“ ‘I plead the Fifth,’ ” and concluded the interrogating officer did 
not ask a “legitimate clarifying question” when he responded, 
“ ‘Plead the Fifth.  What’s that?’ ”  (Id. at pp. 784, 787–790.)  But 
unlike defendant’s simple “[n]o,” “ ‘I plead the Fifth’ ” is a 
“pristine invocation of the Fifth Amendment” that does not vary 
its meaning based on the question asked.  (Id. at p. 784.)  And 
unlike the interrogating officer’s feigned ignorance of the Fifth 
Amendment in Anderson, Kusch did ask a follow-up question 
legitimately aimed at clarifying defendant’s intent. 
Finally, in arguing it was improper for Kusch to ask his 
neutral follow-up question, defendant and the dissent rely on 
the testimony of Sergeant Robert Dean, who monitored Kusch’s 
interrogation in real time and testified about it during the 
evidentiary hearing.  When asked whether he “ever hear[d] 
Mr. Flores ask for an attorney, ask to remain silent, or any 
nonverbal behavior that would tell you he didn’t want to talk to 
Lieutenant Kusch,” Dean said, “At one point.  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
76 
 
Lieutenant Kusch asked Mr. Flores if he wanted to talk about 
that, meaning the Maywood murder, and Alfred replied, ‘No.’ ”  
We do not find Dean’s characterization to be particularly telling.  
Dean’s testimony certainly provides one plausible interpretation 
of Kusch’s question (and, by extension, of defendant’s response).  
But as explained above, it is not the only plausible 
interpretation.  Considering the exchange in its broader factual 
context, it was objectively reasonable for Kusch to ask his brief, 
neutrally worded follow-up question to ensure he understood 
what defendant meant.  (See Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 
p. 428 [the “question of ambiguity in an asserted invocation” is 
an “objective inquiry”].)   
In sum, in light of the circumstances surrounding 
defendant’s “[n]o” answer, we conclude a reasonable officer 
certainly could have understood that defendant might be 
invoking his right to remain silent but would not have 
understood whether he was in fact invoking his right to remain 
silent.  (See Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459.)  It was therefore 
reasonable to clarify.  This conclusion is a narrow one, based on 
the particular circumstances surrounding the interrogation in 
this case.  Although we ultimately agree with the trial court that 
defendant’s initial “[n]o” answer was unclear because Kusch’s 
initial question was imprecise, our conclusion is based on other 
contextual 
factors 
as 
well, 
including 
the 
background 
information known to Kusch and defendant’s demeanor and 
vocal inflection as recorded in the videotaped interview.  We do 
not hold that an officer may purposefully create ambiguity in a 
suspect’s invocation of rights by asking an unclear question.  
Officers should do just the opposite.  They should ask clear 
questions amenable to simple answers.  But given the 
circumstances of the case, we conclude Kusch acted reasonably 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
77 
 
in asking a neutral follow-up question to clarify whether 
defendant wished to answer questions, while repeatedly 
reminding defendant of his right to remain silent.  (See 
Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 428.)15 
                                        
15 
This conclusion also disposes of defendant’s alternative 
argument that even if his response was ambiguous, Kusch was 
obligated to stop and clarify whether defendant indeed intended 
to invoke his right to remain silent.  For this argument, 
defendant relies on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in U.S. v. 
Rodriguez (9th Cir. 2008) 518 F.3d 1072, 1080, in which the 
court held that “[p]rior to obtaining an unambiguous and 
unequivocal waiver, a duty rests with the interrogating officer 
to 
clarify 
any 
ambiguity 
before 
beginning 
general 
interrogation.”  The court distinguished Davis, supra, 512 U.S. 
452, 461–462, where the high court held that officers are 
permitted—but not required—to clarify ambiguous invocations 
that arise partway through lawful interrogations. 
 
This court has previously acknowledged the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling in Rodriguez without expressly approving or 
rejecting it.  (Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 553 [noting that 
whereas “we have held that an officer is permitted to clarify the 
suspect’s intentions and desire to waive his or her Miranda 
rights,” the Ninth Circuit has held that “an officer not only may, 
but must, clarify the suspect’s intentions”]; see id. at p. 554 
[observing that “[w]e have occasionally implied the same rule as 
the Ninth Circuit’s,” citing People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 
1194].)  We do the same in this case:  Even if Kusch was under 
a duty to stop and clarify defendant’s intent following his 
ambiguous response to the Miranda warnings, Kusch did just 
that. 
 
We likewise conclude that Kusch’s follow-up question was 
adequate for this task.  As we explained in Duff, an officer is “not 
under a legal obligation to follow any particular script in 
ascertaining [the defendant’s] desires.”  (Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th 
at p. 554.)  Kusch explained that what he was asking was 
whether defendant was willing to answer questions and 
 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
78 
 
 
 
b.  Limited Waiver 
As noted above, when Kusch asked his follow-up question 
to clarify whether defendant was willing to answer questions, 
defendant this time responded affirmatively, if dispassionately:  
“Oh yeah, well whatever.”  Defendant argues that even if this 
was a valid waiver of the right to remain silent, it was a limited 
one:  It extended only to background questions about his name 
and age.  He emphasizes that Kusch said, “[S]ome of the stuff I 
want to talk to you about is what’s your name and birth date 
and stuff like that.”  It was immediately after this description 
that Kusch asked:  “Do you want to take a few minutes and talk 
to me about that stuff?”  Defendant argues, in effect, that the 
scope of Kusch’s question delimited the scope of his own answer, 
such that defendant’s waiver extended only to basic personal 
information.  We disagree. 
A suspect may invoke his right to remain silent selectively.  
(People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1070.)  For instance, in 
People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, we held that the 
defendant’s remark that he did not want to be tape-recorded 
placed a “ ‘partial restriction’ on his willingness to speak to the 
officers.”  (Id. at p. 25.)  Likewise, in People v. Clark (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 41, we characterized the defendant’s waiver of the right 
to counsel as selective based on his statement that he was “ ‘not 
going to . . . talk any further about [a different crime] without 
an attorney.’ ”  (Id. at p. 122.)  The defendant’s waiver there only 
                                        
reiterated—multiple times—that defendant did not have to 
answer questions.  Only after reviewing defendant’s rights and 
explaining the general nature of the interview did Kusch ask 
defendant if he wanted to “take a few minutes and talk.”  When 
defendant clarified his intent, Kusch permissibly continued the 
interrogation.  
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
79 
 
encompassed a willingness to speak on the primary crime.  
(Ibid.)   
Defendant’s statements here did not evince a comparable 
intent to waive his right to remain silent selectively.  Even 
though his initial expression of willingness to speak with Kusch 
was dispassionate and arguably directed only to background 
questions “and stuff like that,” defendant continued to answer 
more substantive questions without any prodding by the officer.  
He points to nothing in the record that reflects his asserted 
desire to stop talking about the Jaimes murder.  In contrast, 
there were multiple instances when defendant expressed an 
unwillingness to discuss events unrelated to his role in the 
Jaimes killing.  Kusch asked defendant, for example, about a 
bullet hole found in the window screen of the motel room; 
defendant said, “Oh no, no, no, no.  I won[’]t tell you how that 
happened.”  Kusch honored defendant’s right not to speak about 
that.  On another occasion, Kusch asked defendant whether 
there was another person involved; defendant said, “I’ll never 
tell you that man.”  Kusch, again, did not pursue it.  Defendant 
clearly knew how to exercise his right to remain silent 
selectively but chose to speak about the Jaimes murder.  By 
willingly answering substantive questions about the crime, 
defendant impliedly waived his right to remain silent, without 
any limitation to only background information.  (See Cruz, 
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 667 [suspect can waive Miranda rights 
impliedly by willingly answering questions after acknowledging 
an understanding of his rights].)   
 
 
c.  Voluntariness of Confession 
Finally, defendant contends that, even if he wholly waived 
his right to remain silent, his waiver was coerced and 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
80 
 
involuntary.  The trial court disagreed:  It concluded that “based 
on the totality of the circumstances and [the court’s] review of 
the entire interview process, it appears the defendant 
definitively, knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights and he [was] willing to speak to Lieutenant 
Kusch based on the prior advisements, based on Lieutenant 
Kusch’s going over the Miranda rights again, and based on the 
defendant’s willingness to speak about this incident with 
Lieutenant Kusch after those rights were given.”  We agree with 
the trial court. 
In determining whether the prosecution met its burden of 
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant’s confession was voluntary, we consider the totality of 
the circumstances.  (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 436.)  
“[N]o single factor is dispositive.  [Citation.]  The question is 
whether the statement is the product of an ‘ “essentially free and 
unconstrained choice” ’ or whether the defendant’s ‘ “will has 
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically 
impaired” ’ by coercion.”  (Ibid.)   
To the extent defendant’s argument is premised on 
Kusch’s failure to honor defendant’s asserted invocation of his 
Miranda rights, we have already rejected the basis of that claim.  
Defendant’s remaining arguments that Kusch utilized coercive 
interrogation tactics are belied by the record.  At the start of the 
interview, Kusch reiterated defendant’s right to refuse to 
answer questions, stating, “[Y]ou know whether you choose to 
answer the questions is completely up to you,” and “you know 
you don’t have to answer any questions.”  Following defendant’s 
initial expression of a dispassionate willingness to speak, 
defendant actively engaged in the interview.  He appeared calm 
throughout.  His confession was vivid, thorough, and largely 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
81 
 
without interruption; defendant even acted out part of his 
altercation with Jaimes and explained how the incident 
unfolded with reference to visual aids.  (Cf. People v. Parker 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1216 [concluding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights 
where he “actively participate[d] in the conversation with the 
detectives—answering questions, asking for clarification, and 
generally contributing to a discussion he knew was being tape-
recorded”].)  Defendant’s clear understanding of his right to 
remain silent is evidenced by his selective refusal to answer 
certain questions throughout the interview.  Notably, when 
defendant chose not to answer questions, Kusch respected that 
choice. 
Defendant also contends Kusch made a coercive “implied 
promise” that defendant could escape a murder charge if he 
waived his rights.  We see no evidence of such coercion in the 
record.  Defendant prompted the mention of murder charges by 
asking Kusch what charges would be brought against him.  
Kusch responded candidly that murder was the likely charge, 
but that there are certain “things that may mitigate” or 
“justif[y]” a killing and that the ultimate decision would fall to a 
jury.  There was nothing improper or coercive about Kusch’s 
response.   
Ultimately, defendant’s own statements provide the 
strongest evidence that his admissions were made of his own 
free will.  Defendant prefaced his confession with the following 
statement:  “I’m gonna tell you what happened.  [¶] . . .  [¶]  Not 
because I have to not because, I mean because I want to, ay.  Cuz 
I feel what happened wasn’t right ay.  You know what I mean?  
And I feel that I shouldn’t even have to be like this because of 
that.  I feel that that’s that [sic] it wasn’t right.  And I’m pretty 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
82 
 
sure you would do the same thing if you were in my shoes.”  
(Italics added.)  Immediately before admitting to the murder, 
defendant expressed a similar sentiment, saying, “[I]f you guys 
want to charge me with murder or whatever, I know it’s for 
something righteous and I don’t mind that.”  And after 
admitting to the murder, defendant said, “I enjoyed doing it ay.  
I’m gonna tell you why, because it was defending my mother.”  
He repeated this theme later saying, “[L]ike I told you I mean, 
I’m telling you the story all right because it’s righteous and I’d 
rather you guys convict me.”  In light of these statements, we 
see no reason to doubt that defendant’s confession was “the 
product of an ‘ “essentially free and unconstrained choice.” ’ ”  
(Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 436.)  We hold that, in view of 
the totality of circumstances—with great weight given to 
defendant’s own statements—the prosecution met its burden of 
establishing that defendant’s confession was voluntary. 
B.  Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct at 
the penalty phase by soliciting inadmissible hearsay in her 
direct examination of Lieutenant Kusch.  The prosecutor did err 
by asking, “Now, did you at some point—well basically Lillian 
Perez told you basically her son is the one who shot Mr. Jaimes, 
correct?”  Kusch answered, “In short, yes.”  Defense counsel then 
objected on hearsay grounds.  The court sustained the objection 
and granted defendant’s motion to strike. 
To have a conviction or sentence reversed for prosecutorial 
misconduct, a defendant must show it is reasonably probable 
that a result more favorable would have been reached without 
the misconduct.  (See Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 839.)  
Defendant fails to demonstrate any prejudice from the 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
83 
 
prosecution’s single question soliciting hearsay.  The trial court 
sustained defendant’s objection and struck the answer, thereby 
eliminating any prejudice from the improper testimony.  (People 
v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1038.)  Moreover, the 
prosecution properly introduced defendant’s detailed confession 
to the Jaimes murder, which was corroborated by testimony by 
a firearms expert, who opined that the same gun was used in 
the Jaimes murder as in the shooting of defendant’s former 
girlfriend, Mary Muro.  Even without the prosecutor’s question 
and Kusch’s response, it is highly unlikely the jury would have 
reached a different result.   
C.  Instructions on Mitigating and Aggravating 
Factors 
 
The trial court instructed the jury to take into account all 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Penal Code section 
190.3, factors (a) through (k), “if applicable” in determining the 
appropriate penalty.  As we have consistently held, the jury is 
capable of deciding which factors are “ ‘applicable.’ ”  (People v. 
Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 777.)  Defendant offers no 
persuasive reason for us to overturn this settled law.   
 
Defendant further claims the trial court erred by failing to 
instruct the jury sua sponte that the absence of a mitigating 
factor is not itself aggravating.  Although such an instruction 
would have been a true statement of the law, we have long held 
that a court has no duty to give this instruction unless the court 
or a party suggests that the absence of mitigation is 
aggravating.  (People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 784–785.)  
There was no such suggestion here.   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
84 
 
D.  Eighth Amendment Challenge to the Death 
Penalty for Those Age 21 and Under 
 
Defendant argues the death penalty may not be 
constitutionally applied to persons who were 21 years of age or 
younger at the time of their crimes, as defendant was in this 
case.  Specifically, he argues the death penalty for those 21 and 
younger is “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, which has been incorporated 
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
Eighth Amendment bars imposition of the death penalty on 
individuals who were under 18 at the time of their offenses.  
(Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 (Roper).)  Defendant 
asks us to expand Roper to reach those ages 18 to 21, arguing 
that research shows that young adults suffer from many of the 
same cognitive and developmental deficiencies as adolescents.  
We have previously rejected similar arguments, most recently 
just two years ago in People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191.  
(Accord, People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 405.)  As we 
noted in those cases, the high court in Roper recognized that the 
“ ‘qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not 
disappear when an individual turns 18,’ ” but nonetheless held 
that the “ ‘age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for 
many purposes between childhood and adulthood’ ” and is “ ‘the 
age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.’ ”  
(Powell, at pp. 191–192, quoting Roper, at p. 574.) 
 
Defendant 
makes 
no 
persuasive 
argument 
for 
reconsidering this precedent here.  He does point to various 
developments from the past few years, including a 2018 
resolution from the American Bar Association House of 
Delegates urging the prohibition of the death penalty for those 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
85 
 
ages 21 and under (Res. No. 111 (Feb. 2018)); a nonprecedential 
opinion from a trial court in Kentucky declaring the death 
penalty unconstitutional for this same group (Commonwealth v. 
Bredhold (Ky.Cir.Ct., Aug. 1, 2017, No. 14-CR-161) 2017 WL 
8792559); and the California Legislature’s expansion of Penal 
Code section 3051, subdivision (a)(1), which provides “youth 
offender parole hearing[s]” to inmates who were 25 or younger 
at the time of their commitment offense.  But these 
developments do not establish the “national consensus” 
necessary to justify a categorical bar on the death penalty for 
individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 at the time of their 
offenses.  (Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 316.)  Nor has 
defendant presented much in the way of new scientific evidence 
that might be relevant to the issue.   
 
Defendant further contends that, for those ages 18 to 21, 
a death sentence is inherently unreliable.  The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that “the features that 
distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a significant 
disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”  (Graham v. Florida 
(2010) 560 U.S. 48, 78.)  Juveniles may, for example, “mistrust 
adults,” “have limited understandings of the criminal justice 
system,” and have trouble “work[ing] effectively with their 
lawyers to aid in their defense.”  (Ibid.)  But, again, the high 
court has concluded that the federal Constitution draws the line 
at age 18.  (Id. at pp. 74–75.)  There was no Eighth Amendment 
violation here.   
E.  Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty 
Law 
Defendant claims his death sentence violates the United 
States Constitution; we reject his contentions, as we have in 
previous cases.  “California’s death penalty statute is not 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
86 
 
impermissibly broad and adequately narrows the class of death-
eligible defendants.”  (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 
590.)  Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a), which directs the jury 
to consider the “circumstances of the crime” in determining the 
penalty, is not unconstitutionally vague, nor does it violate the 
Eighth Amendment.  (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 
967, 980.)  The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional 
because it does not require “findings beyond a reasonable doubt 
that an aggravating circumstance (other than Pen. Code, 
§ 190.3, factor (b) or factor (c) evidence) has been proved, that 
the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or 
that death is the appropriate sentence.”  (People v. Rangel (2016) 
62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235.)  The absence of written findings by the 
jury does not render the California death penalty scheme 
unconstitutional.  (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 
444.)  Nor does the lack of intercase proportionality review.  
(People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1039; Pulley v. Harris 
(1984) 465 U.S. 37, 44.)  And the use of restrictive adjectives, 
such as “ ‘extreme’ ” and “ ‘substantial’ ” in section 190.3’s list of 
mitigating factors, “does not act unconstitutionally as a barrier 
to the consideration of mitigation.”  (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 872, 927.)  The use of the prefatory “whether or not” in 
certain mitigating factors does not invite the jury to convert 
those mitigating factors into aggravating circumstances.  
(People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730.)  Capital 
defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants; 
thus, providing certain procedural protections to noncapital 
defendants but not to capital defendants is not unconstitutional.  
(People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 497.)  The death penalty 
as applied in California does not violate international law.  
(Ibid.)   
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
87 
 
 
The high court’s decision in Roper, supra, 543 U.S. 551 did 
not preclude admission of evidence of defendant’s juvenile 
criminal activity as an aggravating factor.  (People v. Taylor 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 653; Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 
p. 1239.)   
 
The trial court did not err by admitting victim impact 
testimony evidence from the murder victims’ family members.  
(Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825.)  The prosecution 
“ ‘has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating 
evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding 
the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as 
an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death 
represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his 
family.’ ”  (Ibid; see also People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 
p. 835.)   
F.  Cumulative Error 
 
Defendant argues that the claimed errors at trial 
cumulatively rose to the level of reversible and prejudicial error.  
Whether considered separately or together, the three or four 
minor errors at defendant’s trial were harmless and did not 
interfere with his due process right to a fair trial. 
G.  Enhancements Imposed Under Penal Code 
Section 12022.53, Subdivision (d) 
 
In addition to convicting defendant of three counts of first 
degree murder, the trial jury found true as to each count that 
defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in 
violation of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d) (section 
12022.53(d)).  Section 12022.53(d) imposes a 25-years-to-life 
sentencing enhancement for each count as to which it attaches.  
Because defendant was sentenced to death, the court imposed 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
88 
 
but stayed the section 12022.53(d) enhancements.  (See Pen. 
Code, § 654.)  When defendant was sentenced, these 
enhancements were mandatory.  (§ 12022.53, former subd. (h).)  
But the Legislature subsequently passed Senate Bill No. 620 
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 12022.53 to now 
provide that “[t]he court may, in the interest of justice . . . strike 
or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by 
this section.”  (§ 12022.53, subd. (h).)  In his second 
supplemental brief, defendant asks us to remand his case to the 
trial court for it to exercise the discretion section 12022.53 now 
provides.  The Attorney General concedes that the revision of 
section 12022.53 applies retroactively to defendant’s case but 
argues a remand is unnecessary here.  We agree with the 
Attorney General.   
 
“ ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in 
the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court.  
[Citations.]  A court which is unaware of the scope of its 
discretionary powers can no more exercise that “informed 
discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have been based 
on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s 
record.’  [Citation.]  In such circumstances, we have held that 
the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the 
record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have 
reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it 
had such discretion.’ ”  (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 
1354, 1391.)   
 
The record in this case demonstrates with unusual clarity 
that remand would be an idle act.  (See People v. McDaniels 
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425.)  At sentencing, the trial court 
said, “[Q]uite frankly, based on what I know about the defendant 
and based on what I know the defendant did . . . I think 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
89 
 
Mr. Flores does fall into the category of the worst of the worst 
offenders thereby deserving the ultimate sentence of death.”  It 
“believe[d] that in this situation the punishment does fit the 
crimes based on the senseless murders of four separate 
individuals, three being charged in the information in this case.”  
Defendant, the court remarked, “show[ed] absolutely no 
remorse”; “[i]t’s as if he has no soul.”  In the court’s “opinion[,] 
justice will be served” by a death sentence.  Given that the trial 
court explicitly said it thought it “just[]” for defendant to receive 
a death sentence—the most severe sentence available under 
California law—it is clear the trial court would not have 
exercised its discretion to eliminate the firearm enhancements 
“in the interest of justice,” had such discretion been available to 
it at the time of sentencing (Pen Code., § 12022.53, subd. (h)).  
Under these circumstances, a remand is not required.16 
V.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment, including the judgment of death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
GROBAN, J.
                                        
16  
We express no opinion here on the utility of remand for 
application of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h) 
where the record shows the trial court approved of a high 
sentence short of the death penalty.   
 
 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
S116307 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
During the penalty phase of this case, the trial court 
admitted a videotaped interrogation in which defendant Alfred 
Flores confessed to the murder of Mark Jaimes.  At the 
beginning of the interrogation, Lieutenant Roderick Kusch 
asked Flores if he wanted to talk about the Jaimes murder.  
Flores responded, “No.”  His response was an unequivocal 
invocation of his right to silence, requiring the interrogation to 
stop.  (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).)  But 
Kusch continued the interrogation, and the evidence obtained 
was quite damaging:  Flores described in detail how he killed 
Jaimes and said he “enjoyed doing it.”  Because this evidence 
was admitted in violation of Flores’s right to silence under 
Miranda, the penalty judgment cannot stand. 
Today’s opinion declines to hold that “No” means no and 
instead treats Flores’s simple one-word answer as a “question[] 
of interpretation.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 66.)  Invoking the 
truism that “context does matter” (ibid.), the court undertakes 
an exquisite parsing of the interrogation and conjures ambiguity 
from an implausible reading of ordinary language and from 
signals so faint as Flores’s fleeting smile on a grainy videotape.  
This is an exercise at which lawyers (especially lawyers in robes) 
may excel.  But the Miranda warnings and the rights they 
secure are for everyday people, and “[i]nterpretation is only 
required where the defendant’s words, understood as ordinary 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
2 
people would understand them, are ambiguous.”  (Connecticut v. 
Barrett (1987) 479 U.S. 523, 529 (Barrett).)  The right to silence 
is one of the fundamental ground rules for interactions between 
citizens and the police.  Today’s decision erodes that right and, 
in its speculative reasoning, sets a dangerous precedent. 
I. 
For half a century, it has been settled law that “if a person 
in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be 
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right 
to remain silent. . . .  [S]uch a warning is an absolute 
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the 
interrogation atmosphere. . . .  Further, the warning will show 
the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize 
his privilege should he choose to exercise it.”  (Miranda, supra, 
384 U.S. at pp. 467–468.)  “Once warnings have been given, the 
subsequent procedure is clear.  If the individual indicates in any 
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he 
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.”  (Id. at 
pp. 473–474.) 
In order to invoke the right to silence, the suspect must do 
so unambiguously from the perspective of a reasonable officer.  
(Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 381; see Davis v. 
United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459 (Davis).)  A suspect need 
not “ ‘speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don’ ” in order 
to invoke Miranda rights, but the suspect must speak 
“sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the 
circumstances would understand the statement to be” an 
invocation.  (Davis, at p. 459; see ibid. [“this is an objective 
inquiry”].) 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
3 
When a suspect has clearly expressed a desire not to talk, 
“it is presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come at the 
authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is 
itself . . . not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.”  
(Arizona v. Roberson (1988) 486 U.S. 675, 681.)  The reason is 
that “subsequent requests for interrogation” in the face of a clear 
invocation “pose a significantly greater risk of coercion.  That 
increased risk results not only from the police’s persistence in 
trying to get the suspect to talk, but also from the continued 
pressure that begins when the individual is taken into custody 
as a suspect and sought to be interrogated — pressure likely to 
‘increase as custody is prolonged.’ ”  (Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 
559 U.S. 98, 105.)  Any statements or evidence obtained in 
disregard of a suspect’s invocation of the right to silence are 
inadmissible.  (Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 104.) 
II. 
Applying an objective inquiry, I see no ambiguity in 
Flores’s invocation of his right to remain silent.  Lieutenant 
Kusch asked Flores if he wanted to speak about the Jaimes 
murder, and Flores’s response, “No,” indicated that he did not 
want to speak about it. 
Today’s opinion accurately recounts the portion of the 
interrogation at issue.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 61–62.)  From the 
beginning, Kusch made clear to Flores that he planned to ask 
him about a Los Angeles case that occurred on November 17, 
2000 — i.e., the Jaimes homicide.  Kusch began, “I’m Rod Kusch 
uh one of the investigators on a case that happened out in 
Maywood [in Los Angeles County] . . . .  [T]he case I’d like to take 
a minute and chat with you about uh is uh a case we’re 
investigating happened back on November 17th back in uh 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
4 
2000.  So pushing close to a year about nine months I guess right 
about now or so.”  He repeated his intention to ask about the 
Jaimes homicide by saying, “I can tell you right now that we in 
Los Angeles County do not have a warrant for your arrest on 
any case that I’m investigating.  So uh I didn’t or I wanted to 
have an opportunity to chat with you first and uh try to clear up 
some loose ends and try to get a clear picture of what happened.”  
Kusch then read Flores his Miranda rights and confirmed that 
Flores understood them.  Next, Kusch asked Flores the critical 
question:  “Basically what I’d like to do is talk about the case that 
we investigated that we got called out on back on November 17th, 
2000.  Uh I’ll tell you how we got called out on it in a minute but 
uh do you want to take a few minutes to talk a little bit about 
that?”  (Italics added.)  Flores answered, “No.”  Today’s opinion 
says the answer sounds more like “Nah” on the videotape (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 62), but no one disputes that “Nah” is 
synonymous with the word “No,” which is what appears in the 
transcript. 
There is no ambiguity in this exchange.  The word “that” 
at the very end of Kusch’s question plainly refers to “the case” 
that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) “got called out 
on back on November 17th, 2000,” which was the Jaimes 
homicide.  Flores’s answer, “No,” indicated he did not want to 
talk about it.  At that point, Kusch was required to stop all 
questioning regarding the Jaimes murder.  Instead, Kusch 
rephrased his question and continued the interrogation until he 
eventually elicited a confession from Flores.  Today’s opinion 
characterizes Kusch’s question immediately following Flores’s 
“No” as merely a clarifying question.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 66 
& fn. 12.)  But whether Kusch’s subsequent question was 
intended to clarify Flores’s response or to ignore it is irrelevant 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
5 
for purposes of determining whether it was constitutionally 
permissible.  The high court has repeatedly held that “[w]here 
nothing about the request for counsel or the circumstances 
leading up to the request would render it ambiguous, all 
questioning must cease.”  (Smith v. Illinois (1984) 469 U.S. 91, 
98; see Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 719 [“[A]n 
accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his 
Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation 
cease.”]; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473–474 [“If the 
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or 
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the 
interrogation must cease.”].) 
While acknowledging that the word “no” in response to 
whether a suspect wishes to speak with the police will “generally 
constitute[] an unambiguous invocation,” the court says that 
“here, considered in context, neither the question asked, nor the 
answer given was this simple . . . .”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 66.)  
Of course, context matters.  But none of the contextual 
circumstances discussed in today’s opinion comes close to 
suggesting that Flores’s “No” could have meant something other 
than that he did not want to talk about the Jaimes murder. 
First, today’s opinion posits that when Kusch asked Flores 
if he wanted to “talk a little bit about that,” Kusch could have 
been asking Flores “whether he was willing to answer questions 
about the Jaimes case or whether defendant wanted to talk 
about how ‘we got called out on it.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 67–
68.)  Because the question was ambiguous, the court says, a 
reasonable officer could have interpreted Flores’s response to 
mean either, “ ‘No, I do not want to talk to you at all,’ or  ‘No, I 
do not want to hear about how the police got called out.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 68.)  But this reading of the interview evinces “a disregard 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
6 
of the ordinary meaning of [Kusch’s and Flores’s] statement[s].”  
(Barrett, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 530.)  The plain language and flow 
of Kusch’s prefatory statements, in the transcript and on 
videotape, leave no doubt that he was asking Flores to talk 
about the Jaimes murder when he asked if Flores wanted to 
“talk a little bit about that.” 
Recall that Kusch immediately prefaced his question by 
saying he would “tell [Flores] how we got called out on [the case] 
in a minute,” thereby indicating that Kusch was tabling that 
topic for later.  So, when Kusch asked in the next clause, “do you 
want to take a few minutes to talk a bit about that,” he was 
plainly asking Flores if he wanted to talk about the case itself.  
Kusch’s question was not an offer to share information with 
Flores; it was an invitation for Flores to speak.  The court 
compares Kusch’s phrasing to “the age-old ‘We need to talk’ ” 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 68, fn. 13), but this was a police 
interrogation, not a heart-to-heart.  A reasonable officer would 
not interpret Flores’s response to mean, “ ‘No, I do not want to 
hear about how the police got called out.’ ”  (Id. at p. 68, italics 
added.) 
Equally important, consider the context of the question:  
Having opened the interrogation by saying he wanted “to get a 
clear picture of what happened” in a case that occurred on 
November 17, 2000, why would Kusch then ask Flores whether 
he wanted to hear about how the LAPD “got called out” on the 
case?  Kusch already knew how the LAPD got called out; his 
stated objective was to get Flores to talk about “what happened” 
in the homicide.  No reasonable officer could have understood 
the exchange as anything but an effort to ask Flores to discuss 
the case itself, not how the LAPD got called out.  Indeed, a 
firsthand witness to the interrogation — a police officer no less 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
7 
— confirmed this understanding:  Sergeant Robert Dean, who 
monitored the interview in real time, testified that “[a]t one 
point . . . . Lieutenant Kusch asked Mr. Flores if he wanted to 
talk about that, meaning the Maywood murder, and Alfred 
replied, ‘No.’ ”  (Italics added.) 
Today’s opinion speculates that because Flores’s mother 
“played a central role” in the LAPD’s investigation of the crime, 
how the LAPD “got called out on” the murder “may have been a 
subject of particular personal importance to defendant.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 69.)  To be clear, Flores’s mother did not play a 
central role in how the LAPD “got called out on” the case.  Kusch 
and the LAPD were alerted to the Jaimes homicide by Rick 
Milam, who had discovered Jaimes’s body in the trunk of his car.  
Only after Kusch had begun investigating the case, identified 
the body, and interviewed Jaimes’s family members did Kusch 
learn that Milam and Jaimes had been clients of Flores’s mother 
and that Milam’s car had disappeared while Milam was with 
Flores’s mother in a motel room. 
But even assuming that the topic of how the LAPD “got 
called out” would have involved a reference to Flores’s mother, 
the court’s reliance on this point is unpersuasive for the simple 
reason that Flores’s mother played a central role in the events 
surrounding Jaimes’s murder itself.  On the night Jaimes was 
killed, he had solicited Flores’s mother as a prostitute and 
refused to promptly leave the motel where Flores and his mother 
were living when Flores confronted him.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 8.)  Kusch knew these facts because he had interviewed 
Flores’s mother before the interrogation, and she had recounted 
the events of the Jaimes murder to him.  So, any sensitivity 
Flores might have had about his mother could not have led a 
reasonable officer in Kusch’s position to infer that Flores’s “No” 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
8 
was a refusal to hear about how the LAPD got called out on the 
case as opposed to a refusal to talk about the Jaimes murder.  
To the contrary, given the tangential role of Flores’s mother in 
how the LAPD got called out and her far more significant role in 
the events leading to the Jaimes murder itself, any such 
sensitivity would have bolstered the plain meaning of Flores’s 
“No”:  He did not want to talk about the Jaimes murder. 
Second, the court notes that Flores answered Kusch’s 
question with “a casual-sounding ‘no,’ or, perhaps, ‘nah’; as he 
says this, defendant is still smiling and gives a short laugh.  The 
dissonance between defendant’s bemused demeanor and his 
spoken response is confusing; the combined effect is murky and 
unclear.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 69–70.)  This is a remarkable 
dissection of a fleeting snippet of grainy video footage recorded 
almost 20 years ago on VHS cassette tape.  Having watched the 
tape, I see no lack of seriousness in Flores’s response to Kusch’s 
question.  But even accepting the court’s description of Flores’s 
demeanor, these faint cues (which seem indicative of 
nervousness more than anything else) are not remotely 
sufficient to cast doubt on Flores’s spoken word, “No.”  (See 
Barrett, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 529 [“Interpretation is only 
required where the defendant’s words, understood as ordinary 
people would understand them, are ambiguous.”].)  After today’s 
decision, ordinary people must beware:  If you say “no” when the 
police ask if you want to talk, your answer better not be too 
“casual-sounding,” and you better not “smil[e]” or “laugh” or 
betray, in a judge’s estimation, a “bemused demeanor.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 69–70.) 
This aspect of the court’s opinion is especially misguided 
because judges are not theater critics and suspects facing 
custodial interrogation are not method actors.  I would like to 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
9 
believe that today’s decision is “a narrow one, based on the 
particular circumstances surrounding the interrogation in this 
case.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 76.)  But I fear it portends further 
erosion of Miranda rights.  Under its reasoning, interrogating 
officers, whether unscrupulous or well intentioned, need not 
take “no” for an answer if they can parse a suspect’s intonation, 
facial expression, or body language for hints of uncertainty.  In 
cases without a videotape, courts will have little basis to reject 
an officer’s sworn testimony that a suspect’s refusal to talk, as 
indicated by the word “no,” was “confusing,” “murky,” or 
“unclear” in light of the suspect’s demeanor and therefore 
warranted further questioning to “clarify [the] defendant’s 
intent.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 70.)  We should not open the door 
to such “interpretation” (id. at p. 66) when the suspect has used 
clear language. 
Third, the court explains that because Kusch knew Flores 
had willingly talked the previous day about the murders of 
Ricardo Torres, Jason Van Kleef, and Alexander Ayala, a 
reasonable officer in Kusch’s position would have had no reason 
to think Flores would be unwilling to talk about the Jaimes 
murder as well.  But this gets the presumption backwards:  The 
law “presume[s] that a defendant did not waive his rights” 
(North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 373), and “[a] 
person may invoke his Miranda rights selectively” (People v. 
Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1070).  The fact that Flores 
previously agreed to talk about a different case to different 
officers the day before does not raise a presumption that he was 
willing to talk about the Jaimes murder.  (See Anderson v. 
Terhune (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 781, 788 (en banc) (Anderson) 
[“[T]he fact that [the defendant] had answered the officers’ 
questions for over two hours does not somehow undermine or 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
10 
cast doubt on an unambiguous invocation.”].)  And even if some 
presumption could have been drawn by Flores’s willingness to 
talk about a different case, it was certainly overcome when 
Flores said, “No.”   
Finally, today’s opinion compares this case to People v. 
Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203 (Sauceda-Contreras) 
and People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405 (Williams), both of 
which held that asserted Miranda invocations were ambiguous.  
Both cases are distinguishable. 
In Sauceda-Contreras, a detective read the defendant his 
Miranda rights and then asked through a translator:  “ ‘Having 
in mind these rights . . . , the detective would like to know if he 
can speak with you right now?’ ”  (Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 
Cal.4th at p. 216.)  Sauceda-Contreras responded:  “ ‘If you can 
bring me a lawyer, that way I[,] I with who . . . that way I can 
tell you everything that I know and everything that I need to 
tell you and someone to represent me.’ ”  (Ibid.)  We held that 
Sauceda-Contreras’s invocation was “conditional, ambiguous, 
and equivocal” based on a number of facts, not just the nature of 
the detective’s question.  (Id. at p. 219.)  We said, “It was 
conditional in that it began with an inquiry as to whether a 
lawyer could be brought to defendant.  By responding ‘[i]f you 
can bring me a lawyer . . .’ (italics added), defendant was 
expressly asking the officer whether a lawyer could be brought 
to him, and impliedly asking whether one could be provided 
right now, given that the officer had asked him if he would speak 
with Detective Blazek ‘right now.’  It was equivocal in that 
defendant went on to plainly state his intent and desire to waive 
his right to remain silent and ‘tell you everything that I know 
and everything that I need to tell you,’ but then ended his 
response ambiguously with the words ‘and someone to represent 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
11 
me.’  From an objective standpoint, a reasonable officer under 
the circumstances would not have understood defendant’s 
response to be a clear and unequivocal request for counsel.”  
(Ibid.)  Flores’s one-word statement, “No,” is nothing like the 
defendant’s 
winding 
statement 
in 
Sauceda-Contreras.  
Moreover, Sauceda-Contreras did not rely on non-verbal cues to 
find ambiguity as today’s opinion does. 
In Williams, after an interrogator read the defendant his 
Miranda rights and confirmed his understanding of them, the 
following exchange occurred: 
“[Interrogator]: ‘Do you wish to give up your right to 
remain silent?’  
“[Williams]: 
‘Yeah.’ 
“[Interrogator]: ‘Do you wish to give up the right to speak 
to an attorney and have him present 
during questioning?’ 
“[Williams]: 
‘You talking about now?’ 
“[Interrogator]: ‘Do you want an attorney here while you 
talk to us?’ 
“[Williams]:   
‘Yeah.’ 
“[Interrogator]: ‘Yes you do.’ 
“[Williams]: 
‘Uh huh.’ 
“[Interrogator]: ‘Are you sure?’ 
“[Williams]: 
‘Yes.’ 
“[Interrogator]: ‘You don’t want to talk to us right now.’ 
“[Williams]: 
‘Yeah, I’ll talk to you right now.’ 
“[Interrogator]: ‘Without an attorney.’ 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
12 
“[Williams]: 
‘Yeah.’ ” 
(Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 426.) 
We concluded that Williams’s request for counsel was 
ambiguous because “[h]e already had agreed to waive his right 
to remain silent, and his question [‘You talking about now?’] 
suggests to us that his willingness to waive the assistance of 
counsel turned on whether he could secure the presence of 
counsel immediately.”  (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 426.)  
Here, by contrast, Flores did not ask Kusch any questions 
suggesting that his willingness to waive his right to silence was 
conditional.  His response to whether he wanted to talk about 
the Jaimes case was simply “No.”   
In sum, there is nothing ambiguous or confusing in the 
words spoken by Kusch and Flores “as ordinary people would 
understand them.”  (Barrett, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 529.)  Kusch 
asked Flores a yes-or-no question about whether he wanted to 
speak about the Jaimes case.  Flores said, “No.”  I am unsure 
how an ordinary person (or even an Oxford don) could have more 
clearly expressed his desire to remain silent.  As for “context,” 
the Ninth Circuit put it well in an en banc opinion rejecting a 
California decision purporting to find ambiguity on interpretive 
grounds similar to those offered by the court today:  “Using 
‘context’ to transform an unambiguous invocation into open-
ended ambiguity defies both common sense and established 
Supreme Court law.  It is not that context is unimportant, but it 
simply cannot be manufactured by straining to raise a question 
regarding the intended scope of a facially unambiguous 
invocation of the right to silence.”  (Anderson, supra, 516 F.3d at 
p. 787.)  Because there was nothing in Flores’s response for 
Kusch to clarify, Kusch’s continued questioning of Flores 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
13 
violated Miranda, and the trial court erred in admitting Flores’s 
self-incriminating statements about the Jaimes homicide. 
III. 
The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)  During the 
penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence that Flores 
committed several crimes unrelated to the three murders, 
including brandishing a gun while driving to a birthday party, 
assaulting a correctional officer while a ward at a youth 
correctional facility, participating in the nonfatal shooting of his 
ex-girlfriend, stabbing his sister’s boyfriend, committing two 
armed robberies with other El Monte Trece gang members, 
possessing a “slashing type weapon” while in custody, and 
murdering Jaimes.  The prosecution also introduced victim 
impact statements from members of the Torres, Van Kleef, and 
Ayala families. 
In mitigation, Flores introduced evidence of the harsh 
conditions for prisoners sentenced to life without parole, as well 
as the low risk of escape in the prisons housing such inmates.  
Retired police officer Steven Strong testified that individuals 
from “broken homes” like Flores’s often joined gangs at a young 
age and learned to resolve problems through violence.  Strong 
read transcripts of interviews with Flores’s mother, father, two 
sisters, and the adoptive mother of his youngest brother.  Based 
on these interviews, Strong testified that Flores had an unstable 
childhood and was “bounced around . . . from different family 
members to social services.”  At the age of two, Flores was 
separated from his brother, who was adopted by another set of 
parents.  Both of Flores’s parents were imprisoned for drug 
offenses, and at the age of 11 or 12, Flores became involved in 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
14 
gang life because the authority figures he lived with were in 
gangs. 
In view of the evidence offered at trial, there is a 
reasonable possibility that exclusion of the Jaimes confession 
tape would have resulted in a different verdict.  First, the hour-
long taped interrogation provided the only direct evidence that 
Flores killed Jaimes.  During the penalty phase, the jury heard 
Flores confess, “I murdered him [Jaimes] ay.  I did it.  All right?  
And I enjoyed doing it ay,” and “I pulled out my gun and I blew 
his fucking head off ay.”  Flores then described the events 
leading up to the murder and his motivation for killing Jaimes.  
“A confession is like no other evidence.  Indeed, ‘the defendant’s 
own confession is probably the most probative and damaging 
evidence that can be admitted against him.’ ”  (Arizona v. 
Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296.)  Although the prosecution 
also introduced circumstantial evidence to corroborate Flores’s 
statements on the tape, the tape itself provided the primary 
evidence and motivation for the murder. 
Second, although the prosecution presented evidence that 
Flores may have committed a number of prior offenses during 
the penalty phase, the Jaimes murder was the most serious.  
During closing argument, the prosecution recounted several of 
Flores’s past offenses and then said, “But it didn’t end there, and 
we know that.  Because there had to be something even worse.  
And even worse is the murder of Mark Jaimes.”  The prosecution 
went on to devote a significant amount of its closing argument 
to discussing the murder. 
Finally, the Jaimes confession may have been particularly 
weighty because it erased any lingering doubt the jury may have 
had that Flores committed multiple murders.  The evidence in 
PEOPLE v. FLORES 
Liu, J., concurring and dissenting 
15 
support of Flores’s guilt for the murders of Van Kleef and Ayala 
was rather thin.  Two witnesses, Andrew Mosqueda and 
Carmen Alvarez, provided much of the testimony implicating 
Flores in the Van Kleef and Ayala murders during the guilt 
phase and much of the testimony that Flores committed past 
offenses during the penalty phase.  During the penalty phase, 
Flores impeached both witnesses based on contradictions 
between their guilt and penalty phase statements.  To the 
extent that these contradictions sowed doubt in the jury about 
its multiple-murder finding, the Jaimes confession made clear 
that Flores committed multiple murders, which qualified him 
for the death penalty.  In sum, the erroneous admission of 
Flores’s confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I join the portions of today’s opinion affirming Flores’s 
convictions, but for the reasons above, I would vacate the 
judgment of death. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
I Concur: 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Flores 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S116307 
Date Filed:  May 4, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  San Bernardino 
Judge:  Ingrid Adamson Uhler 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Robert H. Derham, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Ronald S. Matthias, Julie L. Garland and Dane R. 
Gillette, Assistant Attorneys General, Holly D. Wilkens, Heather F. Crawford, Ronald A. Jakob and 
Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert H. Derham 
Attorney at Law 
369-B Third St., #364 
San Rafael, CA 94901 
(415) 485-2945 
 
Heather Clark 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9033