Case Title: Kosmann v. Dinius

Citation: 

Docket Number: 45779

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2019-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 45779 
 
DAVID A. KOSMANN, 
 
               Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
KEVIN DINIUS, an individual; DINIUS & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC, an Idaho professional 
limited liability company, 
  
               Defendants-Respondents. 
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Boise, January 2019 Term 
 
Opinion filed: May 14, 2019 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Canyon County.  Hon. Gene A. Petty, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
 
Messerly Law, PLLC, Boise, for Appellant.  Loren K. Messerly argued. 
 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, Boise, for Respondents.  Yvonne A. Dunbar 
argued. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
 
MOELLER, Justice.  
David Kosmann appeals from a judgment of the district court. He asserts that the district 
court erred in enforcing an oral settlement agreement reached in mediation between Kosmann, 
Kevin Dinius, and Dinius & Associates, PLLC (collectively “Dinius”). Kosmann also assigns 
error to the trial court for (1) awarding attorney fees to Dinius as a sanction against Kosmann and 
his attorney, (2) declining to impose sanctions against Dinius and his attorney, and (3) striking an 
untimely memorandum and declaration in support of his motion to reconsider. He further 
requests that the Court award him attorney fees on appeal. For the reasons stated below, we 
affirm in part and reverse in part. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Kosmann retained Dinius to represent him in a dispute with a third party concerning the 
sale of real property. Following trial, Kosmann was awarded a judgment of approximately 
2 
$32,000. The opposing party appealed. Kosmann had difficulty paying Dinius’s attorney fees, so 
Dinius withdrew from representation and filed a lien for his attorney fees against the judgment. 
Kosmann then hired Loren Messerly to replace Dinius as his attorney throughout the appeal. The 
judgment was ultimately affirmed on appeal. Kosmann v. Gilbride, 161 Idaho 363, 386 P.3d 504 
(2016). One month later, Kosmann filed a lawsuit against Dinius alleging claims of professional 
negligence and breach of contract. Dinius was represented by Yvonne Dunbar. 
The trial court ordered mediation and appointed a mediator.1 The mediation occurred on 
July 26, 2017. After several hours of contentious negotiations, the parties reached a tentative 
agreement to settle the dispute by having Dinius make a payment of $40,000 to Kosmann.2 
However, before the agreement was final, Messerly met in the hallway with Dunbar and 
requested an additional term: a release of all potential claims by Dinius against Messerly.3 
Dunbar and Dinius refused, stating that they believed it was unethical for Messerly to make such 
a request. The request caused a considerable delay in the mediation while the attorneys contacted 
and spoke with counsel from the Idaho State Bar regarding the ethical concern. Eventually, 
Messerly dropped his request and instructed Kosmann to inform the mediator that he would 
accept the original proposed settlement of $40,000 without the release for Messerly. 
Kosmann left the room alone and went into the hall to inform the mediator that he was 
willing to accept the settlement agreement without the release. However, in addition to 
conveying his decision, Kosmann asked the mediator if he (Kosmann) could meet one-on-one 
with Dinius. Messerly claims that he was unaware that Kosmann was going to make this request. 
Without informing Messerly, the mediator communicated Kosmann’s wish to Dinius. Dinius 
initially refused, but claims that after repeated urging from the mediator, he acquiesced and 
agreed to meet alone with Kosmann. Neither Dinius nor Dunbar were informed that Messerly 
was unaware of the meeting. During the meeting, Dinius and Kosmann agreed to settle their 
dispute for approximately $32,000 (the amount held by the court in the property sale dispute 
between Kosmann and the third party), with the stipulation that Dinius would not pursue 
litigation against Messerly. 
                                                 
1 The mediator was a sitting district judge from another district. 
2 The Court recites the specifics of the mediation throughout this Opinion in accordance with Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 507(5)(a)(6), which provides that claims of “professional misconduct … against a mediation party … 
occurring during a mediation” are an exception to the general rule of privilege applied to mediation 
communications. 
3 Messerly alleges that Dinius had threatened to sue him for indemnification on a claim relating to the property sale 
dispute and for interfering with his attorney-client relationship with Kosmann.  
3 
When about twenty minutes had passed without Kosmann’s return, Messerly went into 
the hallway to see what was going on. At that time, the mediator informed him that Kosmann 
and Dinius were having a private discussion. Messerly expressed concern over the meeting 
because Dinius was an attorney and should not have been speaking to Kosmann without 
Messerly being present. However, the mediator reportedly advised him that the parties to a 
mediation are allowed to meet alone, if they wish. Soon thereafter, Kosmann returned and 
informed Messerly of the new settlement terms. At that point, Messerly advised Kosmann that he 
could either adhere to the renegotiated settlement agreement and end the litigation or continue to 
pursue the $40,000 settlement. Kosmann chose to end the litigation.  
The parties and their counsel then put the renegotiated settlement agreement on the 
record. Messerly noted on the record that Kosmann initially agreed to settle the matter for 
$40,000, but that after the private meeting with Dinius, which Messerly did not consent to, 
Kosmann agreed to settle for approximately $8,000 less in exchange for the release for Messerly. 
Messerly further stated that he had advised Kosmann not to request the release and that due to 
ethical considerations he did not want to be included in it. Nevertheless, despite his protestations, 
Messerly never objected to the revised terms of the settlement. In fact, when it was Dinius’s turn 
to speak, Messerly intervened to ensure that Dinius mentioned “the other part of the deal” on the 
record—his agreement not to pursue any claims against Messerly. After it was apparent that an 
accord had been reached, the mediator asked Dinius’s attorney, Dunbar, to “take the lead” in 
drafting the stipulation and a proposed order of dismissal.  
In the weeks following the mediation, Dunbar submitted several drafts of a proposed 
Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement to Messerly. Messerly disagreed with multiple 
sections of the agreement and proposed his own language. With the parties at an apparent 
impasse, Dunbar obtained a transcript of the oral settlement agreement put on the record at the 
conclusion of mediation to confirm that her draft of the agreement was consistent with the terms 
of the oral agreement. Messerly rejected Dunbar’s suggestion that his client share in the cost of 
the transcript, authoring several heated emails to Dunbar before ultimately advising her that 
Kosmann had decided to back out of the settlement agreement. As a result, Dinius filed a motion 
to enforce the oral settlement on August 2, 2017. The following day, Kosmann filed a cross-
motion to enforce the $40,000 settlement that the parties agreed to before Dinius met with 
Kosmann. The district court held a hearing on both motions on August 31, 2017.  
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Shortly after the hearing—and without leave from the court—Kosmann filed a 
supplemental brief in support of his motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The 
following week, Dinius filed a motion to strike Kosmann’s supplemental brief on the basis 
that it was untimely and filed without leave. Two days after Dinius filed his motion to strike, 
Kosmann filed a corrective Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Material. The district 
court granted Kosmann’s motion and took the supplemental brief under advisement. On 
November 3, 2017, the district court issued a memorandum decision in which it enforced the 
oral settlement agreement that was put on the record at mediation.  
Meanwhile, the parties had filed cross-motions for sanctions. Kosmann argued that 
Dinius violated Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 by meeting with him alone and that 
the district court should use its inherent authority to impose sanctions against Dinius for that 
ethical violation. He also argued that Dinius violated Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) by 
filing (and not withdrawing) the motion to enforce the oral settlement agreement that he 
believed resulted from Dinius’s alleged breach of Rule 4.2. Dinius also argued for sanctions 
against Kosmann pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(c) on the basis that Kosmann’s motions to enforce 
the settlement and for sanctions were frivolous and unwarranted by existing law or fact. He 
also requested payment for one hour of billable time as a sanction against Kosmann and 
Messerly on the basis that he was forced to file a motion to strike Kosmann’s untimely 
supplemental brief.  
The district court denied Kosmann’s motion for sanctions on the bases that Dinius’s 
motion to enforce the settlement did not violate I.R.C.P. 11 and that even if Dinius violated 
Rule 4.2, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct do not provide a legal basis for a trial 
court to impose sanctions for alleged ethical violations. It partially denied Dinius’s motion 
for sanctions to the extent that it found that Kosmann’s arguments were not frivolous or 
unwarranted, but granted the motion in regard to payment for the one hour of billable time 
Dunbar spent on the motion to strike Kosmann’s untimely supplemental brief. The district 
court’s stated reason for granting that sanction was that the brief was not warranted under 
existing law. It then issued a final judgment in the case. 
On December 5, 2017, Kosmann filed a motion to reconsider the court’s decisions 
regarding enforcement of the settlement agreement and the imposition of sanctions. However, he 
failed to file his memorandum and declaration of counsel in support of the motion within the 
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timeline prescribed by I.R.C.P. 11.2(b). Consequently, Dinius filed a motion to strike 
Kosmann’s untimely filings. On January 24, 2018, the district court issued its Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider and Defendants’ Second Motion to 
Strike in which it struck Kosmann’s untimely filings and denied Kosmann’s motion to reconsider 
in its entirety. Kosmann timely appealed.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“This Court has frequently stated that ‘[a] motion for the enforcement of a settlement 
agreement is treated as a motion for summary judgment when no evidentiary hearing has been 
conducted.’ ” Seward v. Musick Auction, LLC, 164 Idaho 149, ___, 426 P.3d 1249, 1255 (2018) 
(quoting Budget Truck Sales, LLC v. Tilley, 163 Idaho 841, 845–46, 419 P.3d 1139, 1143–44 
(2018)). “Such a motion seeks specific performance of the settlement agreement or a declaration 
of the rights of the parties. As these claims for relief lie in equity, there is no right to jury trial.” 
Id. at ___, 426 P.3d at 1256. Accordingly, 
the trial court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable 
inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the 
summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. This Court 
freely reviews the entire record that was before the district court to determine 
whether either side was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and whether 
inferences drawn by the district court are reasonably supported by the record. 
Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176–77, 233 P.3d 102, 107–08 (2010) (internal quotation 
omitted). Thus, the Court applies the summary judgment standard “when reviewing the district 
court’s order enforcing the settlement agreement.” Seward, 164 Idaho at ___, 426 P.3d at 1256. 
“The standard of review for an appellate court reviewing a trial court’s imposition of 
sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 is one of abuse of discretion.” Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 
640, 649–50, 115 P.3d 731, 740–41 (2005). The abuse of discretion standard also applies when 
we review a district court’s decision to reject an untimely filing. See Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161 
Idaho 211, 221, 384 P.3d 975, 985 (2016).  
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the 
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial 
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by 
the exercise of reason. 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).  
6 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The district court did not err in enforcing the $32,047.19 settlement agreement.  
The district court thoroughly reviewed the facts and the applicable law, and concluded 
that the settlement agreement was an enforceable contract:  
[A]fter discussing the status of the case and the proposed agreement with his 
attorney, Kosmann exercised his ultimate authority as a client to settle these 
matters. Idaho R. Prof. Conduct 1.2(a) and comment 1. Kosmann and his attorney 
knew what had occurred in the meeting between Kosmann and Dinius prior to 
agreeing to the settlement on the record. They had an opportunity to disaffirm the 
agreement reached by Kosmann and Dinius and/or to end the mediation without 
reaching a settlement. Yet Kosmann chose not to walk away, and instead agreed 
to the settlement he had reached with Dinius. The Court has already found that the 
settlement agreement as entered on the record is a valid and enforceable contract. 
The facts and circumstances surrounding the meeting between Kosmann and 
Dinius and subsequent opportunity for Kosmann to discuss that meeting with his 
attorney do not render the settlement agreement void for violation of public 
policy, and the Court finds no basis to upset the settlement agreement under these 
facts. 
Kosmann argues that the district court erred in applying contract law principles to determine 
whether the settlement agreement was enforceable, in deciding that he voluntarily agreed to the 
$32,047.19 settlement, and in declining to decide whether a violation of Rule 4.2 rendered the 
agreement unenforceable. We address Kosmann’s arguments in turn.  
1. The district court did not err in applying contract law principles to determine whether the 
settlement agreement was enforceable. 
Kosmann argues that the district court erred in applying contract law principles to 
determine whether the settlement agreement was enforceable and that the contract issues in the 
case “should be moot” because the district court should have applied ethical principles instead.  
In addressing whether an oral settlement agreement is enforceable as a contract, we 
recently stated: 
A settlement agreement stands on the same footing as any other contract 
and is governed by the same rules and principles as are applicable to contracts 
generally. A contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its material 
terms, or contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to 
certainty. . . . [F]ormation of a valid contract requires a meeting of the minds as 
evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. Oral agreements for 
settlement are generally enforceable as contracts . . . . especially when acted upon 
or entered on the court records.  
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Seward, 164 Idaho at ___, 426 P.3d at 1258–59 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Notwithstanding our misgivings over the ethical issues associated with this case, the heart of this 
dispute is an oral contract. Kosmann has cited no authority for his position that the law of 
contracts must be entirely abandoned when ethical concerns are raised. Accordingly, the district 
court correctly applied contract law principles in determining whether the oral settlement 
agreement entered on the court record was enforceable.  
2. The district court did not err in holding that the settlement agreement was enforceable. 
Kosmann next argues that the district court erred in holding that the settlement agreement 
was enforceable because he did not voluntarily agree to it and because the alleged violation of 
Rule 4.2 rendered it void. The district court found that Messerly had fully advised Kosmann of 
his option to return to the original agreement and concluded that Kosmann knowingly ratified the 
settlement agreement and waived any potential objections based on the alleged ethical violation 
by voluntarily assenting to the settlement agreement on the record. 
“A motion for the enforcement of a settlement agreement is treated as a motion for 
summary judgment when no evidentiary hearing has been conducted.” Estate of Holland v. 
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 94, 100, 279 P.3d 80, 86 (2012). Thus, the “Court freely 
reviews the entire record that was before the district court to determine whether either side was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and whether inferences drawn by the district court are 
reasonably supported by the record.” Borley, 149 Idaho at 177, 233 P.3d at 108.  
All contracts “must be complete, definite and certain in all [their] material terms, or 
contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty.” Seward, 164 
Idaho at ___, 426 P.3d at 1258–59. Here, the district court found that the terms of the agreement 
were definite and “the parties agreed to the essential terms of the settlement agreement on the 
record . . . . Both the clients and counsel for each side made clarifying remarks. Neither client 
repudiated the agreement or sought to modify the material terms.” Kosmann does not challenge 
the district court’s findings in that regard, but argues that his agreement to the terms was not 
voluntary.  
“The best evidence to support the parties’ intent to contract is to look at the words of 
counsel and their clients.” Id. at ___, 426 P.3d at 1259. In its decision to enforce the settlement 
agreement, the district court considered the relevant documents, including an affidavit that 
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Messerly submitted describing a conversation he had with Kosmann before Kosmann agreed to 
the settlement on the record. In the affidavit, Messerly asserts, in pertinent part:  
I . . . told Kosmann that he had two options: 1) we would fight to get the 
$40,000 settlement and enforce it, through more mediation that day or likely 
through a motion practice, with the unfortunate belief that [the mediator] would 
do whatever he could to support the other side; or 2) he could take the $32,000 
and be done but I would put on the record that I had not asked for Dinius’ verbal 
release and also the other highly irregular things that had happened during the 
mediation. . . . Kosmann wanted to be done and did not want to have to litigate for 
many more weeks to try and get back his $40,000 settlement. So he chose the 2nd 
option. 
The district court also considered Kosmann’s statements on the record at the conclusion 
of mediation, in which he explained his decision to settle:  
I’ll express the same things I expressed with [Dinius]. It is my hope to be 
done today. And I want to move forward with my life. I feel comfortable with the 
agreement that I made with [Dinius] just from man to man, besides all the legal 
stuff. Would I prefer having more money? Yes. But I also want my peace of 
mind. And I want to continue with my lawyer, [Messerly], to go on to the 
litigation that I have ahead of me. And I want bygones to be bygones between 
[Dinius] and I so that we can end on good terms and we can – we can both move 
on with our lives. . . . I’m doing this for my own accord because today is the day 
to move forward. 
Kosmann’s statements not only establish that he was comfortable with the terms of the 
agreement, but also support the district court’s conclusion that he entered into the agreement 
knowingly and willingly.  
On reconsideration, Kosmann asserted that he was coerced into abiding by the agreement 
with threats of litigation and sanctions from the mediator, Dinius, and Dunbar.4 The district court 
considered all relevant documents that were timely filed and determined that “[a] client has the 
ultimate authority to decide whether to settle his case, and Mr. Kosmann exercised that 
authority.” After reviewing the relevant evidence, the district court again concluded in its 
decision on reconsideration that: 
                                                 
4 Notwithstanding the party’s allegations that the mediator not only permitted, but repeatedly urged Dinius to meet 
privately with Kosmann without confirming Messerly’s consent, the Court rejects the notion from both sides that 
they were “ordered” to participate in these acts because the mediator was a sitting judge. Although the mediator is a 
district judge, he was not the presiding judge on this case and he had no actual or apparent authority to order the 
attorneys or their clients to do anything. Additionally, although we are mindful that both parties have accused the 
mediator of using coercive tactics during the mediation, we recognize that the mediator is not a party to this case and 
did not have an opportunity to address these allegations. 
9 
Mr. Kosmann had the opportunity to confer with his attorney after the 
meeting with Mr. Dinius and prior to agreeing to the settlement on the record. Mr. 
Kosmann and Mr. Messerly discussed Mr. Kosmann’s options regarding the 
settlement, and his attorney provided him with advice on those options. The Court 
found all of this was sufficient to overcome any potential overreaching or 
influence exerted by Mr. Dinius in the parties’ one-on-one meeting. Mr. Kosmann 
decided to settle after he had consulted and received the counsel of his attorney 
and was advised as to his options. Mr. Kosmann is bound by his decision.  
As a result, it again found that “Kosmann knowingly and willingly entered into the settlement 
agreement after consulting with his attorney.” 
Although Kosmann contends that the mediator, Dinius, and Dunbar pressured him into 
accepting the renegotiated settlement agreement, the record demonstrates that Kosmann had 
access to Messerly’s counsel throughout mediation. The evidence supports the district court’s 
finding that after Kosmann’s meeting with Dinius, Messerly instructed him regarding his options 
and told him that he did not have to accept the renegotiated agreement. As Kosmann himself 
stated, he chose to do so because he wanted “to move forward” with his life.  
As we have said, “a party may not avoid the duties imposed under the terms of a valid 
and enforceable contract simply because that party subsequently decides that additional terms 
may be desirable.” Seward, 164 Idaho at ___, 426 P.3d at 1259–60. Likewise, a party may not 
avoid a contract simply because that party subsequently decides that different terms are 
desirable—i.e., a $40,000 payment without a release rather than a $32,047.19 payment with a 
release. The record clearly demonstrates that Kosmann voluntarily agreed to the settlement 
agreement at the conclusion of mediation. Furthermore, Kosmann initiated the contact with 
Dinius himself, thereby creating the very problem he now cites as a basis for undoing the 
settlement.5 As a result, notwithstanding the discomfort we have with the manner in which the 
settlement agreement was consummated, we hold that the district court properly determined that 
the oral settlement agreement was enforceable. 
3. We decline to decide whether Dinius violated Rule 4.2.  
The remaining question, then, is whether the alleged ethical violations have so tainted the 
agreement to render it void. Whether an ethical violation in the negotiation process renders an 
agreement void is an issue of first impression in Idaho. However, we decline to decide that issue 
                                                 
5 Although the fact that Kosmann initiated the contact with Dinius may be relevant for determining whether 
Kosmann consented to the settlement agreement, it does not immunize Dinius from claims he violated his ethical 
duties under Rule 4.2. See I.R.C.P 4.2, comment 3 (“The Rule applies even though the represented person initiates 
or consents to the communication.”) 
10 
here. Even if a contract could be deemed void or violative of public policy for that reason, there 
are no findings in the record as to whether Dinius (or any of the attorneys) actually violated the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct because the trial court properly left that determination to 
the State Bar. Kosmann argues that Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 925 P.2d 1118 
(1996), which holds that an attorney acting pro se in a matter is bound by Rule 4.2, applies to 
Dinius’s conduct during mediation even though Dinius was represented by counsel. The district 
court found that whether Runsvold applies is an issue of first impression, and again left to the 
Idaho State Bar the responsibility to make the initial factual determinations necessary to 
ascertain whether Dinius violated Rule 4.2. We must defer as well, inasmuch as there are no 
factual findings upon which this court can determine the issue on appeal. However, as will be 
discussed further below, this question may be answered in the future, if it is presented to us in the 
proper context. 
Additionally, while Messerly is quick to point out that Dinius’s behavior constituted a 
potential ethical violation under Rule 4.2, he completely ignores his own substantial 
contributions to this case’s descent into an ethical quagmire. Specifically, the Court is mindful of 
the allegations that Messerly initially refused to accept the $40,000 settlement without securing a 
personal release from Dinius. If proven, such conduct also raises the specter of additional ethical 
violations under Rules 1.2(a) and 1.7(a)(2).6 Therefore, given the breadth of the problematic 
behavior alleged in this case, we properly leave the initial factual determinations as to whether 
ethical violations occurred to the Idaho State Bar. See I.C. § 3-412.  
B. The district court did not err in declining to impose sanctions against Dinius for the 
alleged violation of Rule 4.2. 
Kosmann argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to sanction 
Dinius for an alleged violation of Rule 4.2 and in declining to sanction Dinius and Dunbar for 
allegedly abusing I.R.C.P. 11. The district court found that it did not have authority to impose 
                                                 
6 Rule 1.2(a) states that “[a] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter,” while Rule 
1.7(a)(2) provides that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of 
interest.” In demanding a personal release for himself as a condition of settlement, Messerly may have created a 
conflict of interest between himself and his client. Further, had Messerly not requested this personal release—which 
he acknowledges would be of no benefit to his client—it is likely that the entire Rule 4.2 issue would not have 
arisen. In fact, even if we fully accept Messerly’s view of the facts, it is highly probable from an objective view of 
the record that Kosmann—a man Messerly describes as susceptible to pressure—would not have made the decision 
to privately meet with Dinius and seek a release for Messerly, had he not been prompted to do so by his attorney’s 
actions. 
11 
sanctions for an ethical violation. It did not address whether to impose sanctions against Dinius 
and Dunbar for abusing I.R.C.P. 11 because that issue was not raised before it.  
“The standard of review for an appellate court reviewing a trial court’s imposition of 
sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 is one of abuse of discretion.” Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 
640, 649–50, 115 P.3d 731, 740–41 (2005).  
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the 
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial 
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by 
the exercise of reason. 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).  
Kosmann did not preserve the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in 
declining to sanction Dinius and Dunbar for abusing I.R.C.P. 11. While Kosmann alleged before 
the district court that Dinius and Dunbar’s repeated requests for sanctions were in “clear 
retaliation” for Kosmann challenging Dinius’s actions, merely asserting that their conduct was 
retaliatory was not sufficient. “A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other 
motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).” I.R.C.P. 
11(c)(2). Kosmann did not move for sanctions on the basis that Dinius and Dunbar abused 
I.R.C.P. 11, and the district court did not address the issue sua sponte. As a result, this issue was 
not preserved for appeal, and therefore, we will not address it. Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, 
By & Through Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799, 589 P.2d 540, 546 (1979) (“[I]ssues not 
raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal.”). 
Regarding the alleged violation of Rule 4.2, the district court concluded that “a potential 
violation of Rule 4.2, where I.R.C.P. 11 had not been violated, did not warrant invoking the 
Court’s inherent authority to impose sanctions.” The court further stated that ethical violations 
“should be raised with the Idaho State Bar.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to impose sanctions for the alleged ethical violation.  
Idaho Code section 3-408 provides that the board of commissioners of the Idaho State 
Bar (board) “shall formulate rules governing the conduct of all persons admitted to practice and 
shall investigate and pass upon all complaints that may be made concerning the professional 
conduct of any person admitted to the practice of the law.” See also I.C. § 3-412 (“The board of 
commissioners shall establish rules, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, governing 
12 
procedure in cases and investigations involving alleged misconduct of members of the Idaho 
State Bar, and to make and create committees for the purpose of investigating complaints and 
charges, which committees may be empowered to recommend to the board discipline . . . .”). 
Accordingly, the board promulgated the Idaho Bar Commission Rules, which established the 
“requirements, qualifications and procedures for . . . maintenance of membership in the Idaho 
State Bar.” I.B.C.R. 101. With those rules, the board has designed a comprehensive scheme for 
submitting complaints alleging ethical violations, investigating those complaints, imposing 
sanctions where warranted, and for appealing an adverse decision to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
See I.B.C.R. 500, et seq. Thus, the district court appropriately recognized that whether to issue 
sanctions for an ethical violation is a decision for the Idaho State Bar.  
Kosmann argues that a district court should be able to impose sanctions for a violation of 
an ethical rule; otherwise, there will be no recourse for an injured party. He is incorrect. To 
reiterate, “[t]he Rules [of Professional Conduct] are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and 
to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not 
designed to be a basis for civil liability.” I.R.P.C., Scope, 20. This is so because “the purpose of 
the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons.” 
Id. Simply put, the ethical rules that govern our profession are a shield designed to protect 
litigants from unscrupulous attorney behavior, not a cudgel with which the opposing attorneys 
can bash each other to gain a tactical advantage in litigation. 
Further, while harm to another is not a prerequisite for the Court to sanction an attorney 
for unethical conduct, Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 421–22, 925 P.2d 1118, 
1120–21 (1996), the Court considers harm to others as an aggravating circumstance when issuing 
sanctions. Idaho State Bar v. Souza, 142 Idaho 502, 506, 129 P.3d 1251, 1255 (2006). Indeed, 
the Idaho Bar Commission Rules specifically provide for restitution in situations where a client 
is financially injured by an attorney’s unethical conduct. “Restitution may be imposed as a 
condition of any probation or in conjunction with any Sanction.” I.B.C.R. 506. Accordingly, if 
any of the attorneys in this case committed an ethical violation that caused financial injury to 
Kosmann, it is within the Idaho State Bar’s power to order restitution for such injury.  
In sum, we decline to address Kosmann’s argument that Dinius and Dunbar should be 
sanctioned for abusing I.R.C.P. 11 and hold that that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
13 
in declining to sanction Dinius for the alleged violation of Rule 4.2. Likewise, we leave to the 
Bar responsibility for reviewing the ethical performance of the attorneys in this case. 
C. The district court abused its discretion in imposing I.R.C.P. 11 sanctions against 
Kosmann and Messerly. 
Kosmann argues that I.R.C.P. 11 does not support the district court’s $200 sanction of 
him and Messerly, and that imposing the sanction was an error of law because Dinius did not 
comply with the safe-harbor provision of I.R.C.P. 11(c)(2) in requesting the sanction. The district 
court determined that an untimely supplemental brief filed by Kosmann warranted sanctions 
against him and Messerly under I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2).  
“The standard of review for an appellate court reviewing a trial court’s imposition of 
sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 is one of abuse of discretion.” Kildew, 141 Idaho at 649–50, 
115 P.3d at 740–41.  
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the 
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial 
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by 
the exercise of reason. 
Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863, 421 P.3d at 194.  
In imposing sanctions against Kosmann and Messerly, the district court “found that 
[Kosmann] violated I.R.C.P. 11(b) by filing a brief not warranted by existing law (specifically 
the rules governing filing deadlines set forth in I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) and 2.2(b)(1)(B)).” The district 
court did not properly apply the applicable legal standard from I.R.C.P. 11 in imposing this 
sanction. The relevant portion of I.R.C.P. 11 provides as follows: 
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper, whether by 
signing, filing, or submitting, or later advocating it, an attorney . . . certifies that to 
the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: 
. . . . 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law 
or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law 
or for establishing new law; 
. . . .  
I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2). The language of the rule indicates that it applies where the contents of a 
document—i.e., “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions”—are not warranted by 
14 
existing law, not where the document was merely filed outside of a deadline prescribed by 
another procedural rule. Id. Thus, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable 
legal standard for imposing sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(b). See Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 
863, 421 P.3d at 194. As a result, the district court abused its discretion, and the sanction must be 
returned to Kosmann and Messerly.  
Because we reverse the district court’s decision to impose sanctions against Kosmann and 
Messerly on the basis that I.R.C.P. 11 does not support the sanction, we need not address 
whether the district court erred in imposing sanctions in violation of the safe-harbor provision of 
I.R.C.P. 11(c)(2).  
D. We decline to address Kosmann’s argument that the district court abused its discretion 
in striking Kosmann’s untimely memorandum and declaration in support of his motion 
to reconsider.  
Kosmann argues that the district court abused its discretion in striking his memorandum 
and declaration of counsel in support of his motion to reconsider. The district court found that it 
was appropriate to strike the pleadings because they were untimely and Kosmann did not file a 
motion for leave.  
Kosmann admits that “Messerly initially conceded the issue of the memorandum and 
declaration being untimely,” but asserts that “upon further review, the case law appears unclear.” 
Kosmann’s argument is similar to that made by the State in State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 
721, 404 P.3d 659, 663 (2017). There, we noted that: 
[T]he State maintains on appeal, even though it conceded the point below, that the 
Court must decide whether the interaction between Cohagan and Officer Curtis 
was lawful. This is incorrect. . . . “[I]ssues not raised below will not be considered 
by this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the 
case was presented to the lower court.”  
Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721, 404 P.3d at 663 (quoting Heckman Ranches, Inc., 99 Idaho at 799–
800, 589 P.2d at 546–47). Kosmann conceded before the district court that the memorandum and 
declaration were untimely. Thus, to the extent that Kosmann now asserts on appeal that he may 
have timely filed the documents, we will not address his argument. 
Kosmann further argues that the district court should have considered the documents 
even if they were untimely and that failing to do so “promote[d] a procedural technicality over 
substantive legal issues, contrary to law.” However, he also states that “[i]t is not clear if the 
Court’s ruling to strike the Memorandum and Declaration actually had any substantive impact.”  
15 
“Idaho courts are to ‘disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s 
substantial rights.’ ” Matter of Doe, 163 Idaho 565, 571, 416 P.3d 937, 943 (2018) (quoting 
I.R.C.P. 61). “Consequently, because an appellant can only prevail if the claimed error affected a 
substantial right, the appellant must present some argument that a substantial right was 
implicated.” Id. (quoting Hurtado v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18, 278 P.3d 415, 420 
(2012)). Kosmann has not presented any argument that the district court’s refusal to consider the 
untimely memorandum and declaration implicated a substantial right. As a result, we decline to 
address Kosmann’s argument that the district court abused its discretion in striking the untimely 
memorandum and declaration in support of his motion to reconsider.  
E. Kosmann is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Kosmann argues that he is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to a draft of the 
settlement agreement, under Idaho Code section 12-121, and as a sanction against Dinius for an 
alleged violation of Rule 4.2. However, Kosmann is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal under 
any of his proffered theories.  
First, we address the written settlement agreement drafted by Dunbar. The written 
agreement contained a provision stating that “[t]he prevailing Settling Party in any litigation or 
other enforcement action concerning, relating to, or arising out of this Agreement shall be 
awarded its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with such litigation or 
enforcement.”7 However, both parties acknowledge that the draft agreement was never signed. 
Indeed, Kosmann’s refusal to sign any of the four versions of the written agreement spurred this 
litigation. Thus, notwithstanding our decision to enforce the oral settlement agreement, the 
written settlement agreement was never a binding contract and Kosmann cannot recover attorney 
fees under its attorney-fee provision.  
Next, Idaho Code section 12-121 allows a prevailing party to recover attorney fees where 
“the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” 
Because Kosmann did not prevail on the gravamen of his appeal—setting aside the oral 
settlement agreement and enforcing the earlier $40,000 settlement—he is clearly not the 
prevailing party and is, therefore, not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. 
                                                 
7 This provision of the unsigned agreement was not discussed as part of the oral settlement placed on the record at 
the conclusion of the mediation. 
16 
Finally, Kosmann requests attorney fees as a sanction for Dinius’s alleged violation of 
Rule 4.2. As we previously noted, the Idaho State Bar has implemented a thorough process for 
determining whether an ethical violation occurred and what sanctions are appropriate for a given 
violation. See I.B.C.R. 500, et seq. Accordingly, we decline to circumvent that process and 
impose a sanction in the form of attorney fees against any of the attorneys in this case. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case is so tarnished with questionable conduct that it has presented this 
Court with a vexing ethical and legal dilemma. While we are gravely concerned over the 
potential ethical lapses which allegedly occurred during the mediation of this matter, there are no 
findings in the record concerning these matters. Therefore, as the trial court determined, we will 
leave to the Idaho State Bar, if properly called upon, the responsibility to investigate this matter 
further and make the necessary findings and conclusions as to the ethical issues presented. 
 However, as to the contract issues appropriately before us, we affirm the district court’s 
decisions enforcing the oral settlement agreement and declining to impose sanctions against 
Dinius for the alleged violation of Rule 4.2. We reverse the district court’s imposition of 
sanctions against Kosmann and Messerly and order Dinius and Dunbar to return the $200 
sanction in a timely manner. Because both sides partially prevailed, we do not award attorney 
fees or costs on appeal to either party. 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices BRODY, BEVAN and STEGNER CONCUR.