Case Title: In the Matter of Nicole D. Fraley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 18S-DI-304

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 18S-DI-304 
In the Matter of 
Nicole D. Fraley, 
 Respondent. 
Decided: January 21, 2020 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer Matthew R. Cox 
Per Curiam Opinion 
All Justices concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jan 21 2020, 9:56 am
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-DI-304 | January 21, 2020 
Page 2 of 10 
Per curiam. 
We find that Respondent, Nicole Fraley, committed attorney 
misconduct by severely mismanaging her trust account and by engaging 
in a pattern of dishonest and fraudulent behavior. For this misconduct, we 
conclude that Respondent should be disbarred. 
The matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer 
appointed by this Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court 
Disciplinary Commission’s verified disciplinary complaint. Respondent’s 
2005 admission to this state’s bar subjects her to this Court’s disciplinary 
jurisdiction. See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4. 
Procedural Background and Facts  
The Commission filed a three-count “Verified Complaint for 
Disciplinary Action” against Respondent on June 6, 2018, and we 
appointed a hearing officer. Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing 
officer issued his report on September 13, 2019, finding Respondent 
committed violations as set forth below.  
Count 1. From 2014 through 2018, Respondent engaged in pervasive 
financial misconduct, including multiple overdrafts of her trust account, 
commingling of personal and client funds, use of trust account funds to 
pay personal or business expenses, failing to deposit client funds into a 
trust account, and conversion of client funds. 
Count 2. During the Commission’s investigation into Respondent’s 
trust account mismanagement, Respondent knowingly made false 
statements of material fact to the Commission and submitted to the 
Commission a false and forged affidavit purportedly executed by 
Respondent’s former paralegal. 
Count 3. The Commission initiated a noncooperation case against 
Respondent due to her failure to respond to requests for information, 
which was dismissed with costs after Respondent belatedly complied. 
Respondent did not timely pay those costs, prompting the Commission to 
send Respondent a notice letter in advance of petitioning for a costs 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-DI-304 | January 21, 2020 
Page 3 of 10 
nonpayment suspension. Respondent replied with a letter to the 
Commission falsely stating that she had paid her costs. Respondent 
attached to that letter a copy of a check purportedly drawn on 
Respondent’s personal checking account, which Respondent falsely 
represented she had previously mailed to the Commission. The 
Commission then requested from Respondent a copy of the cancelled 
check and bank records showing that the check was presented for 
payment. Respondent did not provide those items, but rather provided a 
money order to “serve[ ] as a replacement for the original check,” which 
Respondent claimed had not been returned to her office or cashed. 
Discussion 
The Commission alleged, and the hearing officer concluded, that 
Respondent violated these Indiana Professional Conduct Rules 
prohibiting the following misconduct: 
1.15(a): Failing to hold property of a client separate from the 
lawyer’s own property, and failure to maintain complete records of 
client trust account funds and keep them for a period of five years 
after termination of the representation. 
1.15(c): Withdrawing funds from a client trust account without 
earning fees or incurring expenses. 
8.1(a): Knowingly making false statements of material fact to the 
Disciplinary Commission in connection with a disciplinary matter. 
8.4(b): Committing criminal acts that reflect adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. 
8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation. 
8.4(d): Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-DI-304 | January 21, 2020 
Page 4 of 10 
The Commission also alleged, and the hearing officer also concluded, 
that Respondent violated the following Indiana Admission and Discipline 
Rules:1 
23(29)(a)(4) (2016): Commingling client funds with other funds of 
the attorney or firm, and failing to create or retain sufficiently 
detailed records of the attorney’s trust account. 
23(29)(a)(5) (2016): Making withdrawals from a trust account, 
including cash and electronic withdrawals, without written 
withdrawal authorization stating the amount and purpose of the 
withdrawal and the payee. 
23(29)(a)(4) (2017): Failing to retain complete records, including 
copies of fee agreements, and to keep such records for a period of 
five years after termination of the representation. 
23(29)(c)(2) (2017): Paying personal or business expenses directly 
from the attorney’s trust account. 
23(29)(c)(4) (2017): Failing to deposit client funds intact into the 
attorney’s trust account. 
23(29)(c)(5) (2017): Making disbursements from a trust account in 
the form of cash or counter withdrawals. 
In her petition for review, Respondent largely does not contest the 
accounting violations underlying Count 1, although she contends those 
violations did not result in conversion of client funds. Regarding Counts 2 
and 3, Respondent essentially invites us to reweigh what she claims is 
conflicting evidence presented to the hearing officer. Having conducted 
 
1 The time period at issue in this case spans several amendments to Rule 23 that became 
effective on January 1, 2017, including a substantial revision and reorganization of section 29. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-DI-304 | January 21, 2020 
Page 5 of 10 
our own de novo examination of the materials before us,2 we find 
Respondent’s arguments wholly unavailing.  
Respondent’s contention that she did not convert client funds rests on 
her untenable claim that all client payments deposited into her trust 
account were flat fees that had been fully earned by Respondent at the 
time of deposit. (See Pet. for Rev. at 2 (citing Tr. Vol. 2 at 101)). We initially 
note the written fee agreements and appropriate accounting records that 
ordinarily would be available to help test such a claim are not available 
here, because Respondent intentionally destroyed the former and failed to 
maintain the latter. Further, Respondent’s testimony at the final hearing 
that she believed these to have been fully-earned fees at the time of 
deposit is flatly contradicted by Respondent’s statement to the 
Commission during its investigation that “I have never knowingly 
deposited personal funds into any of the firm’s trust accounts.” (Comm’n 
Ex. 52, Ex. Vol. 3 at 64). In any event, Respondent’s admission to having 
improperly commingled client and personal funds in her trust account 
necessarily acknowledges the existence of client funds in that account, and 
the record provides ample direct and circumstantial evidence that 
Respondent converted client funds for her own personal use. To cite just 
two of the more blatant examples, Respondent deposited a $300 retainer 
 
2 Respondent faults the hearing officer for having adopted a substantial portion of the 
Commission’s proposed findings verbatim. In the context of appellate review, we have 
explained that “wholesale adoption of one party’s findings results in an inevitable erosion of 
the confidence of an appellate court that the findings reflect the considered judgment of the 
trial court” and that “near verbatim reproductions may appropriately justify cautious 
appellate scrutiny.” Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 762 (Ind. 2002) (cleaned up). However, 
our process of review in disciplinary cases differs somewhat from the appellate review 
process. See, e.g., Matter of Coleman, 67 N.E.3d 629, 630 n.1 (Ind. 2017) (“Where review is timely 
sought, we review de novo all matters presented to the Court, with the hearing officer’s 
findings receiving emphasis due to the unique opportunity for direct observation of 
witnesses”). Moreover, the hearing officer did not adopt any substantive portion of the 
Commission’s six-page proposed sanction analysis, nor did the hearing officer adopt the 
Commission’s ultimate sanction recommendation, both of which demonstrate that the hearing 
officer “carefully considered and purposefully used [ ] the individual findings proposed by” 
the Commission. See Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 762. In any event, our de novo review of the record 
has revealed ample, and indeed overwhelming, support for the findings in the hearing 
officer’s report. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-DI-304 | January 21, 2020 
Page 6 of 10 
for one client and then promptly withdrew $323.89 as her “flat fee” in that 
case, which Respondent acknowledged “doesn’t make any sense” and left 
her in the negative with that client. (Comm’n Ex. 60, Ex. Vol. 6 at 34-35). In 
a second client’s case, involving the handling of settlement proceeds that 
indisputably included client funds being processed through the trust 
account, Respondent claimed to have paid $1,112 to that client’s insurer 
when in fact Respondent had paid this amount to another client. 
Respondent also told the Commission that two checks totaling about 
$7,800 drawn from settlement proceeds in that case were written to a 
church’s building and scholarship funds pursuant to the terms of 
settlement, when in fact those checks were payments for Respondent’s 
children’s private school tuition. (Comm’n Ex. 29, Ex. Vol. 2 at 46-48; 
Comm’n Ex. 55, Ex. Vol. 4 at 238; Comm’n Ex. 60, Ex. Vol. 6 at 56). Finally, 
Respondent’s series of overdrafts (eight in all, including four totaling 
about $1,000 committed after Respondent had completed two remedial 
financial education courses) and her elaborate pattern of deception 
regarding those overdrafts provide substantial additional support for the 
hearing officer’s finding of conversion.   
Turning to that pattern of deception, the record likewise offers scant 
reason to second-guess the hearing officer’s findings. Regarding Count 2, 
the evidence overwhelmingly supports the findings that Respondent, in 
an attempt to shift blame for one of the overdrafts onto a former paralegal, 
knowingly provided the Commission with a forged and false affidavit 
purportedly from her former paralegal. In the affidavit, the paralegal’s 
name was misspelled, her address and telephone number were incorrect, 
and her signature differed from the paralegal’s signature on other 
documents executed while in Respondent’s employ. Similarly, the 
notary’s signature on the affidavit differed from the signature the notary 
provided to the Commission, and the notary’s commission expiration date 
on the affidavit was inaccurate. Both the paralegal and the notary testified 
they had never met one another and had never seen the affidavit before, 
and Respondent admitted a material factual assertion in the affidavit – 
that the paralegal was responsible for making daily deposits to the trust 
account – was false. (See Comm’n Ex. 60, Ex. Vol. 5 at 242; Tr. Vol. 2 at 43). 
Against this backdrop, Respondent would have us weigh more heavily 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-DI-304 | January 21, 2020 
Page 7 of 10 
testimony from herself and her legal partner and mother, Carol Weber, 
that Weber found the affidavit dropped through the firm’s front door mail 
slot. (Pet. for Rev. at 3). The hearing officer was not required to credit this 
testimony, though. Even if he had, this testimony does not preclude the 
possibility Respondent placed the affidavit in the mail slot herself, 
intending it to be found by Weber. More importantly, under the 
circumstances this testimony simply does not bear on the questions of 
whether the affidavit was forged or known to be false at the time 
Respondent provided it to the Commission. 
The evidence also overwhelmingly supports the findings that 
Respondent made a series of false statements to the Commission 
regarding an “extensive accounting” of her trust account allegedly 
performed by a bank manager at Respondent’s request. Respondent 
identified this manager as “Jessica Wells,” a person with whom 
Respondent indicated she was personally acquainted through her 
daughter’s soccer team. Respondent also provided the Commission with 
an address and phone number for “Jessica Wells” she indicated she had 
obtained through a soccer team list containing the names and contact 
information of the parents. However, the bank has never employed 
anyone by the name “Jessica Wells,” the address provided by Respondent 
is a heavily-wooded and vacant lot, and the phone number provided by 
Respondent belonged to one of Respondent’s clients, M.B., a fact 
Respondent attempted to conceal by omitting M.B. from the list of clients 
she provided to the Commission. Notwithstanding Respondent’s 
reiteration of this “Jessica Wells” narrative during her final hearing 
testimony, Respondent’s counsel expressly stipulated at the hearing that 
“we’re in agreement there was no Jessica Wells” and that “this person 
doesn’t exist.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 73).3 
 
3 Counsel attempted to qualify this stipulation by suggesting that Respondent simply might 
have been mistaken about this person’s name (id. at 72), but such a position cannot be 
reconciled with Respondent’s insistence that she was personally acquainted with this person 
and obtained the person’s contact information from a list identifying parents by name. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-DI-304 | January 21, 2020 
Page 8 of 10 
Respondent also made numerous other false statements to the 
Commission regarding her accounting practices. For example, Respondent 
repeatedly denied being a signatory on her firm’s business account. When 
ultimately confronted at a deposition with several checks drawn on the 
business account bearing her handwriting and signature, Respondent 
simply repeated the phrase “I shouldn’t have signed the check.” (Comm’n 
Ex. 60, Ex. Vol. 6 at 29). And Respondent similarly denied any knowledge 
of the existence of a personal checking account shared jointly with her 
husband, even after being confronted with several checks drawn on that 
account bearing her handwriting and signature. (Id. at 27, 29). 
Regarding Count 3, Respondent argues “there was no evidence to 
support th[e] inference” that Respondent also lied about having mailed a 
check for payment of costs to the Commission (Pet. for Rev. at 3), but the 
evidence readily supports such an inference. Respondent told the 
Commission she had paid her costs via personal check, and she attached a 
copy of “Check No. 195” from her personal account bearing a date of 
August 8, 2017. Respondent did not respond to the Commission’s request 
for copies of Respondent’s bank records or a copy of the cancelled check. 
The Commission eventually subpoenaed Respondent’s personal bank 
records, which revealed that Respondent had disbursed all of her personal 
checks substantially in numeric order, and that from June 2017 through 
November 2017 Respondent had been disbursing checks numbered in the 
160s. (See Comm’n Ex. 53, Ex. Vol. 3 at 87-246 and Vol. 4 at 4-48). 
In sum, we find sufficient support for the hearing officer’s findings and 
conclusions with regard to all three counts against Respondent, and we 
likewise find Respondent violated each of the rules set forth above.  
We address finally the question of appropriate sanction. Respondent 
has no prior formal discipline,4 and if her misconduct had been limited to 
 
4 However, Respondent has been the subject of three separate show cause proceedings arising 
from her noncooperation with investigations by the Commission, and her first four overdrafts 
resulted in an informal disposition reached with the Commission. (See Comm’n Ex. 13, Ex. 
Vol. 1 at 52; Comm’n Ex. 73, Ex. Vol. 6 at 129).  
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-DI-304 | January 21, 2020 
Page 9 of 10 
negligent accounting practices we might have been inclined to agree with 
her proposal for a probationary model of discipline with trust account 
monitoring. See, e.g., Matter of Mercho, 78 N.E.3d 1101 (Ind. 2017) 
(imposing a 90-day active suspension followed by probation with trust 
account monitoring where the attorney’s financial mismanagement was 
negligent but not criminal). However, Respondent’s criminal conversion 
of client funds, and her elaborate pattern of fraudulent and dishonest 
behavior during the investigation and litigation of this matter, elevate this 
case into an entirely different realm. Matter of Ellison, 87 N.E.3d 460, 462 
(Ind. 2017); Matter of Pierce, 80 N.E.3d 888, 890-91 (Ind. 2017). Respondent 
lied at innumerable junctures to the Commission and during sworn 
testimony, forged an affidavit containing false statements of material fact, 
falsified a personal check, and even invented a fictitious bank manager – 
all in an effort to extricate herself from various investigations and 
proceedings that began as simple overdraft inquiries. Put simply, the 
criminal and dishonest nature of Respondent’s pattern of misconduct 
demonstrates that she cannot be safely recommended to the public as a 
person fit to practice law. Further, Respondent’s total lack of insight 
during these proceedings into the wrongfulness of failing to account for 
client funds and using those funds to pay personal expenses, and her 
utterly inexplicable decisions during the progression of this case to double 
and even triple down on her demonstrably false statements, persuade us 
that her fitness to practice law is not capable of being restored. 
Conclusion 
The Court concludes that Respondent violated Professional Conduct 
Rules 1.15(a), 1.15(c), 8.1(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), and Admission and 
Discipline Rules 23(29)(a)(4) (2016), 23(29)(a)(5) (2016), 23(29)(a)(4) (2017), 
23(29)(c)(2) (2017), 23(29)(c)(4) (2017), and 23(29)(c)(5) (2017). For 
Respondent’s professional misconduct, the Court disbars Respondent 
from the practice of law in this state effective immediately. Respondent 
shall fulfill all the duties of a disbarred attorney under Admission and 
Discipline Rule 23(26). The costs of the proceeding are assessed against 
Respondent, and the hearing officer appointed in this case is discharged. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 18S-DI-304 | January 21, 2020 
Page 10 of 10 
All Justices concur. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  RES P O N DE N T  
James R. Williams 
Matthew L. Kelsey 
Muncie, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  I ND I A NA SU P RE ME CO U R T 
D I SC I PL I NA R Y C OMM ISS I O N  
G. Michael Witte, Executive Director 
Indianapolis, Indiana