Case Title: State v. Smith

Citation: 393 P.2d 251, 96 Ariz. 150

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1964-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
96 Ariz. 150 (1964) 393 P.2d 251 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Louis Lee SMITH, Appellant. No. 1274. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Division. June 17, 1964. *151 Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., Norman E. Green, County Atty., of Pima County, by Carl Waag, Deputy County Atty., for appellee. John R. McDonald, Tucson, for appellant. BERNSTEIN, Justice. Defendant was charged with and convicted of two counts of the sale of marijuana. His defense was that he had not made the sales. He was sentenced to from five to six years with the sentences to run consecutively. He appeals the convictions. Defendant contends (1) that testimony introduced at the trial that he was a marijuana "addict" was prejudicial, (2) that testimony of an attempted purchase made subsequent to and at a different time from the sales charged in the indictment was improperly admitted, (3) that he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal because the state's testimony shows that the sales were solicited in such a manner as to constitute entrapment. The defendant's contentions will be considered in the order heretofore set forth. During the state's case and in the course of cross examination by defense counsel the following questions and answers were asked of and given by the arresting officer: It will be noted that the mention of the "addict's form" was not responsive to the questions asked by defense counsel, and was not material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Defense counsel did not, as claimed by the state, "open the door" to further discussion of the subject. The state's witness was the one who injected the existence of the addict's form into the case. As was said in People v. Baker, 147 Cal. App. 2d 319, 305 P.2d 97, 100, quoting from People v. Bentley, 131 Cal. App. 2d 687, 690, 281 P.2d 1, 3: In any event, the fact that the testimony was given on cross examination by defense counsel did not give the state the right to attempt to emphasize it. On redirect examination the prosecutor attempted, in the presence of the jury, to introduce the addict form as an exhibit. Defense counsel then objected, the jury was taken out and defense counsel made a request to reserve the right to make a motion. The card was not admitted at this time and the request of defense counsel to reserve the right to make a motion was granted. Defendant later moved for a mistrial in part on the ground that the testimony as to the addict form was so prejudicial that the defendant could not have a *153 fair trial. This motion was denied. Later in the trial, defense counsel attempted to rehabilitate his defendant by having the defendant testify that he had not used marijuana in many years and that he was not addicted to its use. To impeach this testimony the state was allowed on rebuttal to introduce the addict form. In addition the defendant was cross examined on his use of marijuana. He was asked if he knew what one under the influence of marijuana "looks like". A state's witness was questioned on whether he knew what one under the influence of marijuana "looks like" and on stating that he did, was asked if the defendant was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the second sale. Although he was eventually not allowed to answer the question because the trial judge changed his ruling as to the state's witness' qualifications as an expert, the cumulative effect on the jury of the *154 questioning reinforced the immaterial testimony as to the addict's form to the effect that the defendant was a marijuana user. There is nothing in the record to show that the defendant had ever been convicted of using marijuana. Further his testimony is a denial that he was an addict. The introduction of the addict form confronts us with a problem similar to that in State v. Jacobs, 94 Ariz. 211, 382 P.2d 683. In that case a witness for the state referred to a "mug shot". We said: and again As we said in State v. Kellington, 93 Ariz. 396, 398, 381 P.2d 215, 216: In the instant case the having of an addict's form implies the commission of a prior crime of using marijuana at least once, a misdemeanor under A.R.S. § 36-1062 or more than once, a felony under A.R.S. § 36-1002. In State v. Johnson, 94 Ariz. 303, 306, 383 P.2d 862, 863-864 we said: In State v. Johnson, supra, as in this case the misconduct shown was not supported by a conviction. In Johnson the subject of whether defendant had been guilty of the misconduct was first opened by defense questioning. In this case as in Johnson, the misconduct could not be offered for the substantive purpose of tending to prove the crime charged. In this case as in Johnson *155 the misconduct could only be introduced for the purpose of collateral impeachment on an immaterial matter and was therefore highly prejudicial. While what we have said demands that the case be sent back for a new trial we discuss appellant's other contentions for the guidance of the trial court. The trial judge allowed some questioning as to a subsequent unsuccessful attempt to buy marijuana from the defendant. The court sustained an objection to this line of questioning. The state was attempting to prove that defendant would not make the subsequent sale because he then knew the purchaser to be a narcotics agent. If the proof of subsequent sale is reversible error then proof of an unsuccessful attempt to buy after the commission of the crime charged must fall in the same category. State v. Johnson, supra. The ruling of the trial judge was correct. Defendant contends that he was entrapped as a matter of law because the narcotics agent came to town specifically to make "buys" of marijuana. This contention has no merit. State v. Hernandez, 96 Ariz. 28, 391 P.2d 586. Reversed and remanded for new trial. UDALL, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, J., concur.