Case Title: State v. Karson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,263 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID CHRISTOPHER KARSON, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
An appellant's death during the pendency of a petition for review from the 
conviction of a criminal offense does not automatically abate the appeal. The issues may 
be fully reviewed and adjudicated when doing so is in the public interest or when it is in 
the interest of the appellant's family and estate. 
 
2. 
Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable and invalid unless they fall 
within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. It is the State's burden to 
demonstrate a warrantless search was lawful. 
 
3. 
Neither the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor § 15 of the 
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in 
violation of their protections. Instead, the judicially created exclusionary rule prevents the 
use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in some circumstances. 
 
 
 
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4. 
The exclusionary rule operates to protect Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect on law enforcement, rather than serving as a personal 
constitutional right of the victim of an illegal search and seizure. It does not apply to 
evidence obtained by police who acted in objectively reasonable reliance on K.S.A. 22-
2501(c) prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). 
 
5. 
When it was effective, K.S.A. 22-2501 set forth the permissible circumstances, 
purposes, and scope for a search incident to arrest. An officer's subjective understanding 
or articulation of K.S.A. 22-2501 as the legal basis for a search incident to arrest is not 
determinative of whether there was objectively reasonable reliance.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 44 Kan. App. 2d 306, 235 P.3d 1260 (2010). 
Appeal from Johnson District Court; THOMAS H. BORNHOLDT, judge. Opinion filed June 21, 2013. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Rachel L. Pickering, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, Ramsey A. Olinger, legal intern, Stephen M. 
Howe, district attorney, Steve Six, former attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on 
the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  A now deceased David Karson appealed his drug convictions, claiming 
the incriminating evidence found in his car should have been suppressed because it was 
 
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illegally obtained after his arrest on an outstanding traffic warrant. At the time of his 
arrest, state law authorized a search incident to arrest for the purpose of "discovering the 
fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of a crime." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 22-2501(c). 
But after Karson was convicted, the United States Supreme Court held such searches 
illegal in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009); see 
also State v. Henning, 289 Kan. 136, Syl. ¶ 6, 209 P.3d 711 (2009) (declaring K.S.A. 22-
2501[c] unconstitutional based on Gant). 
 
Karson argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the 
drug evidence obtained from the vehicle search, which was prophetically based on an 
argument that the search incident to arrest was illegal. The State concedes the search was 
illegal under Gant but asserts we do not need to decide this case because Karson died 
while the appeal was pending. In the alternative, the State argues application of a good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule based upon the police officer's objectively 
reasonable reliance on a then-valid statute. Karson counters that the exception should not 
apply, in part, because the State did not prove the officer actually relied on the statute. 
We affirm Karson's convictions based on our two recent decisions in State v. Dennis, 297 
Kan. __, 300 P.3d 81 (2013), and State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010), 
cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2114 (2011).  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The facts are not disputed. On March 12, 2007, Karson parked his car at a gas 
station, where a nearby police officer performed a routine check of the car's license plate. 
The officer determined the vehicle was registered to Karson and that Karson had an 
outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. The officer approached Karson, 
confirmed his identity, and arrested him before securing him in the backseat of a patrol 
car. The officer then began searching Karson's vehicle, where drugs and drug 
 
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paraphernalia were discovered. The State charged Karson with one count of possession of 
cocaine and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.  
 
Karson moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing caselaw precedent limited 
searches incident to arrest to those circumstances when the officer is searching for 
evidence related to the crime of arrest. He claimed the 2006 amendment to K.S.A. 22-
2501(c) was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights because it expanded the 
permissible scope of the search from evidence of "the" crime to evidence of "a" crime. 
See L. 2006, ch. 211, sec. 8. At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated the officer 
arrested Karson for an outstanding warrant and then searched the vehicle. The district 
court denied the suppression motion. Karson was found guilty of both counts at a later 
bench trial.    
 
Karson appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, focusing exclusively on 
the denial of his suppression motion. Before the appeal was decided, the United States 
Supreme Court issued Gant, which held that warrantless vehicle searches were 
unconstitutional unless the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of search or there is reasonable belief the vehicle contains 
evidence of the crime of arrest. 556 U.S. at 351. Shortly thereafter, this court decided 
Henning, which declared K.S.A. 22-2501(c) unconstitutional for too-broadly allowing an 
officer searching a vehicle incident to arrest to search for evidence of a crime. 289 Kan. 
at 148-49. Karson argues these cases mandate reversal of the denial of his suppression 
motion and convictions.  
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, holding that although the search 
was unlawful, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies since the police 
officer conducting the search acted in reasonable reliance on settled caselaw. State v. 
 
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Karson, 44 Kan. App. 2d 306, 314-15, 235 P.3d 1260 (2010). Karson petitioned this 
court for review, which we granted along with two companion cases involving the same 
issue but containing differing outcomes and rationales. See State v. Dennis, No. 101,052, 
2011 WL 425987 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished decision) (denying application of good-
faith exception), rev. granted May 31, 2011; State v. Carlton, No. 103,086, 2010 WL 
2817048 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished decision) (reversing district court's suppression 
order and applying good-faith exception), rev. granted May 17, 2011. 
 
Karson died while this appeal was pending. The State now argues his death makes 
our review unnecessary. We will address that issue first. 
 
KARSON'S DEATH DOES NOT ABATE THIS APPEAL 
 
We have previously held that a defendant's death during the pendency of a direct 
appeal does not abate the appellate process. In State v. Jones, 220 Kan. 136, 137, 551 
P.2d 801 (1976), we determined: 
 
 
"A defendant's conviction is at this state in midair. The judgment of conviction is 
not final due to the pendency of the appeal. While death moots the sentence, renders 
impossible a new trial and abates any fine imposed, the matter of costs remain. . . . The 
family of the defendant and the public have an interest in the final determination of a 
criminal case." (Emphasis added.)  
 
This has been a long-standing principle in Kansas. See State v. Salts, 288 Kan. 
263, 265, 200 P.3d 464 (2009) (defendant's death 12 days after his notice of appeal was 
filed did not render his direct appeal moot); State v. Burnison, 247 Kan. 19, 32, 795 P.2d 
32 (1990) ("[I]n Kansas the death of a defendant does not abate his direct appeal as it is 
in the interest of the public that the issues raised on appeal be adjudicated upon the 
merits."); State v. Ellvin, 51 Kan. 784, Syl. ¶ 1, 33 P. 547 (1893) (court reviewed 
 
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judgment for costs related to late defendant's conviction for selling intoxicating liquors); 
State v. Fisher, 37 Kan. 404, 405, 15 P. 606 (1887) (considered merits of case after 
defendant's death to resolve issues of costs).   
 
 
The State points out that when a defendant's conviction is affirmed on direct 
appeal and the defendant dies while the case is pending discretionary review, many states 
dismiss the discretionary appellate proceeding and keep the judgment below intact. See 
Surland v. State, 392 Md. 17, 19, 895 A.2d 1034 (2006). But in Kansas a party aggrieved 
by a decision of the Court of Appeals has the statutory right to petition this court for 
review. K.S.A. 20-3018(b). And if a petition is filed, the appeal does not become final 
until either review is refused or the court issues its disposition on review. Supreme Court 
Rule 8.03(i) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 72). As a result, a defendant's right to petition this 
court for review is an integral part of the appellate process.   
 
More importantly, when review was granted, this case and its companions 
collectively presented questions of public importance because they touch on rights under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 15 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights relating to vehicle searches incident to an occupant's arrest. 
And Karson's case is somewhat different factually because it is based solely on a search 
incident to arrest based on an outstanding warrant. In other words, in Karson's case the 
officer did not observe prior criminal activity before the arrest. In addition, Karson 
directly challenged K.S.A. 22-2501's constitutionality before the district court, and his 
case resulted in a published Court of Appeals decision. We hold that Karson's appeal 
should not be abated because of his death in light of the public interest considerations 
attendant to the case. We proceed next to the merits.  
 
 
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THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION APPLIES 
 
Karson argues the evidence obtained by a search later found to be unconstitutional 
should be suppressed. The State argues the good-faith exception applies, rendering 
suppression unnecessary. We agree with the State and hold that the good-faith exception 
applies because an objectively reasonable officer could have reasonably relied on K.S.A. 
22-2501(c) at the time the search incident to arrest occurred. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Our review of an evidence suppression issue is bifurcated. Without reweighing the 
evidence, the appellate court first examines the district court's findings to determine 
whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Sanchez-Loredo, 
294 Kan. 50, 54, 272 P.3d 34 (2012). The district court's legal conclusions are then 
reviewed de novo. If there are no disputed material facts, the issue is a question of law 
over which the appellate court has unlimited review. 294 Kan. at 54. In Karson's case, the 
facts material to the legal issues on review are not in dispute. The only remaining inquiry 
is whether the appropriate remedy is to suppress the evidence seized. This is a question of 
law. 
 
Discussion 
 
Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable and invalid unless they meet 
one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. One such exception is a search incident 
to a lawful arrest. See 294 Kan. at 55 (citing State v. Fitzgerald, 286 Kan. 1124, 1127, 
192 P.3d 171 [2008]). The officer searched Karson's vehicle incident to his arrest, but as 
the State concedes that search was later found to be unconstitutional. See Gant, 556 U.S. 
 
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at 351; Henning, 289 Kan. at 148-49. It is the State's burden to demonstrate a warrantless 
search was lawful. Dennis, 297 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 2.  
 
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the 
exclusionary rule, which was created by the United States Supreme Court to deter police 
misconduct. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426-27, 180 L. Ed. 2d 
285 (2011). Kansas similarly recognizes the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings as 
an appropriate remedy for an unlawful search. See Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496. But neither 
the Fourth Amendment nor § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly 
prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. 291 
Kan. at 496. Exclusion is not a personal constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to deter 
violations by the State. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 496. Accordingly, 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule exist. See 291 Kan. at 492.  
 
In Daniel, this court considered whether to apply a good-faith exception for 
warrantless searches incident to arrest authorized by K.S.A. 22-2501(c) before it was 
determined to be unconstitutional. We adopted the rule set out by the United States 
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 94 L. Ed. 2d 
364 (1987), in which the exception was held to apply to an officer's good-faith reliance 
on a statute permitting warrantless administrative searches before the statute was 
invalidated. We held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained in a 
search incident to arrest by an officer who acted in objectively reasonable reliance on 
K.S.A. 22-2501(c) before the United States Supreme Court's Gant decision. Daniel, 291 
Kan. at 493. 
 
Karson makes two arguments to avoid application of the good-faith exception. 
First, he claims that Gant and Henning require suppression based on the doctrine of 
retroactivity, citing United States v. Gonzales, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009). Second, he 
 
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contends there was no evidence the officer actually relied on K.S.A. 22-2501(c) when 
conducting the search incident to arrest in his case. Both of these arguments fail based on 
subsequent caselaw.  
 
In Davis, the United States Supreme Court made clear the good-faith exception is 
applicable to searches conducted incident to arrest, even if Gant subsequently rendered 
them illegal. The Court reasoned that Gant rendered the search unconstitutional, but 
examined whether the purpose of the exclusionary rule would be met by excluding the 
evidence obtained from the unlawful search. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426-27. In declining to 
exclude the evidence, the Davis Court noted that the binding federal court precedent in 
the jurisdiction in which the search occurred allowed the search. Given the lack of police 
culpability or evidence of recurring or systemic police negligence, the Court held that the 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. 131 S. Ct. at 2428-30. Based on 
Davis, Karson's first argument that Gant and Henning require suppression is without 
merit. 
 
Similarly, Karson's contention that there is no evidence the officer relied on 
K.S.A. 22-2501(c) fails. The record reflects that at the preliminary hearing that served as 
the evidentiary basis for the suppression hearing, the officer was asked, "Officer, did you 
have an occasion to search Mr. Karson's vehicle incident to that arrest?" And the officer 
replied, "Yes, I did." 
 
In Dennis, we recently held that an officer's subjective understanding or explicit 
reference to K.S.A. 22-2501(c) as the basis for the search incident to arrest is not 
determinative. To qualify for the good-faith exception, there needs to be objectively 
reasonable reliance on the statute. 297 Kan. __, Syl. ¶ 5. We reasoned that our prior 
caselaw had established that K.S.A. 22-2501 controlled the permissible circumstances, 
purposes, and scope of any search incident to arrest, citing State v. Conn, 278 Kan. 387, 
 
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Syl. ¶ 1, 99 P.3d 1108 (2004) (search incident to arrest may only be conducted for the 
purposes listed in the statute) and State v. Anderson, 259 Kan. 16, 19, 910 P.2d 180 
(1996). Dennis, 297 Kan. __, 300 P.3d at ___. Accordingly, we held that when an officer 
said he conducted a "search incident to arrest," that testimony necessarily carried with it 
an understanding that his authority for that search emanated from K.S.A. 22-2501. 297 
Kan. at __, 300 P.3d at ___.  
 
We see no substantive difference between the officer's testimony in Dennis and the 
officer's testimony at Karson's hearing. In both instances it was confirmed the officer was 
conducting a search incident to arrest, so K.S.A. 22-2501 controlled the permissible 
circumstances, purposes, and scope of the officer's search. The legal question then is 
whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to rely on K.S.A. 22-2501(c). Our 
holdings in both Dennis and Daniel confirm that application of a good-faith exception 
was appropriate under the circumstances because it was objectively reasonable for the 
officer to rely on K.S.A. 22-2501(c) before the United States Supreme Court decided 
Gant. Dennis, 297 Kan. __, Syl. ¶ 5; Daniel, 291 Kan. at 505. 
 
Affirmed.