Case Title: Dennis J. Flynn v. Department of Administration; Mark D. Bugher

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP003266

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3266 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Dennis J. Flynn, individually and on behalf of 
other citizen users of the Wisconsin Court 
System, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Department of Administration; Mark D. Bugher, 
the Secretary of Administration, and Jack C. 
Voight, the Wisconsin State Treasurer, 
 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 13, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 4, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Mark A. Frankel 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bradley, J., concurs (Opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-appellants the cause was 
argued by Peter C. Anderson, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief (in the court of appeals) was James E. Doyle, 
assistant attorney general. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there were briefs 
(in the Court of Appeals) by J. Ric Gass, John F. Hovel, Joseph 
S. Goode and Kravit, Gass & Weber, S.C., and of counsel Eugene O. 
Duffy and O'Neil, Cannon & Hollman, S.C., all of Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by J. Ric Gass. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed (in the Court of 
Appeals) by Christine Stoneman, and John F. Ebbot, Milwaukee for 
Legal Action of Wisconsin. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed (in the Court of 
Appeals) by Ward I. Richter and Bell, Metzner, Gierhart & Moore, 
S.C., Madison for the Wisconsin Chapter, American Board of Trial 
Advocates. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed (in the Court of 
Appeals) by Daniel W. Hildebrand and DeWitt, Ross & Stevens, 
S.C., Madison for the State Bar Assocation. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed (in the Court of 
Appeals) by Stephen W. Hayes, William A. Jennaro and Milwaukee 
Bar Assocation and of counsel R. Timothy Muth, Colleen D. Ball 
and Reinhart, Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & Rieselbach, S.C.; 
Michael J. Morse and von Briesen, Purtell & Roper, S.C.; William 
J. Mulligan and Davis & Kuelthau, S.C., all of Milwaukee for the 
Milwaukee Bar Association. 
 
No. 96-3266 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3266 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
DENNIS J. FLYNN, individually and on 
behalf of other citizen users of the 
Wisconsin Court System, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, MARK D. 
BUGHER, the Secretary of Administration, 
and JACK C. VOIGHT, the Wisconsin State 
Treasurer, 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 13, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Dane County, Mark A. Frankel, Circuit Court Judge.  Reversed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The power of this court to 
declare invalid duly enacted legislation is an awesome one.  It 
is a power that is largely unchecked, most always final.  If we 
are to maintain the public’s confidence in the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary, we must exercise that power with 
great restraint, always resting on constitutional principles, 
not judicial will.  We may differ with the legislature’s 
choices, as we did and do here, but must never rest our decision 
on that basis lest we become no more than a super-legislature.  
Our form of government provides for one legislature, not two.  
No. 96-3266 
 
2 
It is for the legislature to make policy choices, ours to judge 
them based not on our preference but on legal principles and 
constitutional authority.  The question is not what policy we 
prefer, but whether the legislature’s choice is consistent with 
constitutional restraints.  We find that it is in this case. 
¶2 
The 
issue 
is 
the 
validity 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature’s enactment of 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253, causing the 
lapse of $2,898,000 to the general revenue fund of unexpended 
program revenues designed for court automation.  Dennis J. Flynn 
argues on behalf of himself and other citizen users of the 
Wisconsin court system that this statute is invalid because it 
violates fundamental public policy grounded in the constitution, 
and the separation of powers doctrine.  We disagree with Flynn’s 
arguments.  Accordingly, we reverse. 
¶3 
In 1989, in response to a request by the judicial 
branch, the legislature created an appropriation for court 
automated information systems, later codified as Wis. Stat. 
§ 20.680(2)(j) (1989-90) (reprinted in full below).1  “Automated 
information systems” for the judiciary includes electronic 
filing 
of 
documents, 
document 
imaging, 
computerized 
file 
tracking, 
judicial 
access 
to computerized 
research 
tools, 
Internet access to the Wisconsin court system, computerized 
court rooms, and integrating the computer information systems of 
                     
1 There is appropriated to the supreme court for the 
following programs: . . .(j) Automated information 
systems.  All moneys received under ss. 814.61, 814.62 
and 814.63 that are required to be credited to this 
appropriation under those sections, and 66.7% of the 
moneys 
received 
under 
s. 
814.635, 
for 
the 
establishment of a court automated information system. 
 Wis. Stat. § 20.680(2)(j). 
No. 96-3266 
 
3 
all the circuit courts in the state through a circuit court 
automation program (CCAP). 
¶4 
Court automation is funded through program revenue 
(defined below).2  Several sections of Wis. Stat. ch. 814 provide 
that the clerks of court for each county in Wisconsin shall 
collect filing fees and remit them to the county treasurer.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 814.61, 814.62, 814.63 (1993-94).3  In addition to 
filing fees, court users pay a $3 court automation fee.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 814.635.  The county treasurer then submits a 
statutorily determined portion of the fees to the state 
treasurer.  The state treasurer deposits the funds in the 
general revenue fund.  Although the funds are held in the 
general revenue fund as program revenue, a certain portion, 
designated by statute, is credited to the court automation 
program.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 20.680(2)(j), 814.61, 814.62 and 
814.63. 
¶5 
Until 
the 
1995-1997 
biennium 
budget 
when 
court 
automation became an annual appropriation (defined below),4 the 
court automation program revenue was classified as a continuing 
appropriation 
(defined 
below).5 
Expenditures 
made 
under 
a 
                     
2 Program revenues: revenues which are paid into the general 
fund and are credited by law to an appropriation to finance a 
specified program or state agency.  Wis. Stat. § 20.001(2)(b) 
(1993-94). 
3 All future references to Wis. Stats. will be to the 1993-
94 version of the statutes unless otherwise noted.  
4  Annual appropriations.  “[A]ppropriations which are 
expendable only up to the amount shown in the schedule and only 
for the fiscal year for which made.”  Wis. Stat. § 20.001(3)(a) 
(1993-94). 
5 Continuing appropriations. . . . appropriations which 
are expendable until fully depleted or repealed by 
No. 96-3266 
 
4 
continuing appropriation from program revenues “are limited only 
by the available revenues from which the appropriation is made.” 
 Wis. Stat. § 20.001(3)(c). 
¶6 
At the time of the governor’s 1993-95 budget proposal, 
the Department of Administration (the Department) projected that 
the court automation appropriation would have a positive balance 
of over $4 million at the end of fiscal year 1993.  The court 
automation fees were also scheduled to sunset on December 31, 
1993.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 814.61(1)(a)2., (3)(b), (8)(am), 
814.62(1)(b), (3)(a)2., (3)(d)2., (3)(d)3., 814.63(1)(b) (1991-
1992). 
¶7 
The 
Legislative 
Fiscal 
Bureau 
offered 
four 
alternatives for the court automation program with respect to 
the anticipated $4 million balance for consideration by the 
Joint Finance Committee.  The first alternative was the 
governor’s proposal to extend the sunset of the court automation 
fees by two years, authorize approximately $3.24 million in 
addition to the base funding level, and lapse $3.5 million from 
the court automation program revenue continuing appropriation to 
the general fund.  The second alternative suggested modifying 
                                                                  
subsequent action of the legislature.  . . . The 
amount of a continuing appropriation from program 
revenues . . . consists of the balance in the 
appropriation account at the end of the previous 
fiscal year, if any, together with any revenues 
received during the fiscal year that are directed by 
law to be credited to the appropriation account.  
Dollar 
amounts 
shown 
. 
. 
. 
for 
a 
continuing 
appropriation from program revenues . . . represent 
the most reliable estimates of the amounts which will 
be 
expended 
during 
any 
fiscal 
year. 
 
. 
. 
. 
[E]xpenditures 
made 
. 
. 
. 
under 
a 
continuing 
appropriation from program revenues. . . are limited 
only 
by 
the 
available 
revenues 
from 
which 
the 
appropriation is made.  Wis. Stat. § 20.001(3)(c). 
No. 96-3266 
 
5 
the governor’s recommendation by deleting the $3.5 million 
lapse.  The third alternative would have deleted the $3.5 
million lapse while authorizing additional expenditures of 
$2,372,900 to enhance the CCAP program.  The fourth alternative 
suggested modifying the governor’s proposal by reducing the 
lapse by $602,000 and authorizing additional expenditures of 
$301,000 in each year of the biennium for public access 
terminals.  
¶8 
The Joint Finance Committee reported out the fourth 
alternative, which was adopted by the full legislature.  As a 
result, the legislature increased the appropriations for the 
court 
automation 
program 
authorized 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 20.680(2)(j) by nearly $1 million from the previous biennium, 
extended the CCAP fee sunset another two years, and lapsed 
$2,898,000 million from the court automation program revenue 
appropriation to the general fund.  See 1993 Wis. Act 16, 
§§ 153, 3761, 3763, 3766, 3768-3772, 9253.  Specifically, 1993 
Wis. Act 16, § 9253 provided: 
 
Notwithstanding section 20.001(3)(c) of the statutes, 
on the effective date of this subsection, there shall 
lapse 
to 
the 
general 
fund 
$2,898,000 
from 
the 
appropriation to the supreme court under section 
20.680(2)(j) of the statutes. 
¶9 
In March, 1995, Flynn, individually and on behalf of 
other citizen users of the Wisconsin court system, filed this 
action 
against 
the 
Department, 
requesting 
a 
declaratory 
judgment, under Wis. Stat. § 806.04, that 1993 Wis. Act 16, 
§ 9253 is unconstitutional.  Flynn challenges executive and 
legislative actions in enacting 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 as 
violating public policy grounded in the constitution, statutes, 
No. 96-3266 
 
6 
common law and public expectations.  He further challenges 
§ 9253 as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.  The 
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  
¶10 The circuit court granted Flynn’s motion for summary 
judgment and declared 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 invalid as a 
violation of fundamental public policy grounded in the Wisconsin 
constitution.  The circuit court, however, denied Flynn’s claim 
that the statute was invalid because it violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 20.001(3)(c), and the court did not address Flynn’s argument 
that the statute violated the separation of powers doctrine.  
After hearing arguments pursuant to the court’s Order to Show 
Cause, the circuit court ordered that the funds lapsed to the 
general revenue fund be returned to the court automation program 
which, at the time, was funded through an annual appropriation 
rather than a continuing appropriation.  The circuit court 
granted Flynn’s motion for attorneys fees awarded out of the 
common fund.  The circuit court also ordered a brief interim 
stay, pending determination by the court of appeals of the 
Department’s motion to stay execution of the judgment pending 
appeal.  The defendants then filed their notice of appeal.  This 
court granted Flynn’s petition to bypass the court of appeals 
according to Wis. Stat. § 809.60. 
¶11 The parties agree, and correctly so, that this court’s 
review of the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment is de 
novo, applying the same summary judgment methodology of Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08.  See Millers Nat. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee, 184 
Wis. 2d 155, 164, 516 N.W.2d 376 (1994).  Additionally, both 
parties moved for summary judgment which is equivalent to a 
No. 96-3266 
 
7 
stipulation of facts, thus permitting the circuit court to 
decide the case only on legal issues.  See Friendship Village 
Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, 181 Wis. 2d 207, 219, 511 N.W.2d 345 
(Ct. App. 1993).  
I. 
¶12 In part I. of his brief, Flynn argues that 1993 Wis. 
Act 
16, 
§ 9253 
is 
not 
entitled 
to 
a 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality.  It is unclear from his brief and from oral 
argument what the basis is for his assertion.  We discern two 
possible alternative grounds for Flynn’s assertion.  One 
possibility is that § 9253 is a private or local bill; thus, the 
process by which it was enacted into law is not deserving of the 
presumption of constitutionality.  Alternatively, Flynn could be 
arguing that although § 9253 is not a private or local bill, the 
reasoning employed in cases analyzing Wis. Const. art. IV, § 18 
(reprinted below),6 specifically with respect to the process by 
which the private or local bill was enacted, is equally 
applicable here because, Flynn asserts, § 9253 was smuggled 
through the legislature as part of a multi-subject budget bill. 
 Regardless of the basis, we find no merit in either. 
¶13 1993 Wisconsin Act 16, § 9253 is obviously not a 
private or local bill enacted in violation of Wis. Const. art. 
IV, § 18.  The statute is specific on its face as to a 
particular thing.  It lapsed a specific amount of money 
                     
6 “Title of private bills.  No private or local bill which 
may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one 
subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.”  Wis. Const. 
art. IV, § 18.  
No. 96-3266 
 
8 
($2,898,000) from a specific program revenue fund (court 
automation) to a specific fund (general revenue fund). 
 
[A] legislative provision which is specific to any 
person, place or thing is a private or local law 
within the meaning of art. IV, sec. 18, unless: 1) the 
general subject matter of the provision relates to a 
state responsibility of statewide dimension; and 2) 
its enactment will have direct and immediate effect on 
a specific statewide concern or interest.  
Milwaukee Brewers v. DNR, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 115, 387 N.W.2d 254 
(1986).  If both parts of this two-part analysis are met, the 
statute survives Wis. Const. art. IV, § 18 scrutiny and need not 
be introduced and enacted as a separate bill.  See id. 
¶14 In this case, the statute meets both parts of the 
Brewers analysis and therefore is not a private or local law 
within the meaning of Wis. Const. art. IV, § 18.  First, the 
general subject matter, court automation funding, relates to a 
state responsibility of statewide importance.  The program 
itself is meant to connect the computer systems in courts across 
the state.  Additionally, lapsing the funds to offset other 
court-related 
expenditures 
affects 
the 
entire 
state 
court 
system.  Second, the statute went into effect when the budget 
went 
into 
effect. 
 
The 
funds 
were 
immediately 
lapsed.  
Therefore, this legislation had a direct and immediate effect on 
court automation funding, a specific statewide concern. 
¶15 We next turn to Flynn’s possible alternative argument 
that 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 is not deserving of a presumption 
of constitutionality because it was smuggled through the 
legislature, reasoning by analogy to Wis. Const. art. IV, § 18 
case law. 
No. 96-3266 
 
9 
¶16 We do not decide in this case whether to extend Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 18 analysis to multi-subject bills.  However, 
even were we to extend article IV, § 18 analysis with respect to 
the process by which legislation is enacted to parts of a budget 
bill which are not private or local we conclude that 1993 Wis. 
Act 16, § 9253 was not smuggled through the legislative process. 
¶17 One of the underlying purposes of Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§ 18, which Flynn seems to use by analogy, is to alert the 
public, through its representatives, of the real nature of a 
proposal.  See Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 519, 480 N.W.2d 
460 (1992) (citing Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 107-108).  This 
constitutional 
provision, 
article 
IV, 
§ 18, 
ensures 
the 
legislature’s 
accountability 
to 
the 
public 
by 
preventing 
legislation from being smuggled or logrolled through the 
legislature.  See Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 519.  In Davis, the 
legislature had previously introduced a single subject bill 
authorizing the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) and the 
Senate debated and specifically amended it.  See id. at 523.  
Because the legislature 
had 
intelligently 
participated in 
considering MPCP, “it is proper for [the court] to apply a 
presumption of constitutionality to the process in which the 
MPCP was enacted into law.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
¶18 In sharp contrast, the court of appeals in City of Oak 
Creek v. DNR, 185 Wis. 2d 424, 518 N.W.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1994) 
did not afford the presumption of constitutionality to the 
process by which the legislature included permit exemptions for 
the City of Oak Creek in the 1991 Budget Bill.  See 185 Wis. 2d 
at 439.  In that case, the Joint Finance Committee introduced 
No. 96-3266 
 
10
the proposal without any individual sponsorship, no one had 
previously introduced the legislation and there were no public 
hearings on the issue.  See id. at 438-439.  “The statute did 
not receive the required legislative consideration necessary to 
assure this court that the legislation was not ‘smuggled or 
logrolled through the legislature without the benefit of 
deliberate legislative consideration.’”  Id. at 439 (citing 
Davis, 166 Wis. 2d at 522).  Therefore, the process by which the 
statute was enacted was not afforded the presumption of 
constitutionality. 
¶19 In the case now before this court, the process by 
which the legislature enacted 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 falls 
somewhere between the process used in Davis and in City of Oak 
Creek.  Although § 9253 was one of thousands of sections in the 
budget bill, “this court may indulge the presumption of 
constitutionality where it is evident that the legislature did 
adequately consider or discuss the legislation in question, even 
where such legislation was passed as part of a voluminous bill.” 
 City of Oak Creek, 185 Wis. 2d at 437. 
¶20 The legislature did adequately consider 1993 Wisconsin 
Act 16, § 9253 and it was not smuggled through the legislature. 
 Although the statute was never introduced as single subject 
legislation, it was given considerable attention by the Joint 
Finance Committee.  The Legislative Fiscal Bureau offered four 
alternatives to the Joint Finance Committee for court automation 
funding.  The Committee considered these four alternatives to 
decide how to address the unexpended funds in the court 
automation program revenue fund and the simultaneous increase in 
No. 96-3266 
 
11
other court-related expenditures.  Unlike the statutes in both 
Davis and City of Oak Creek, § 9253 pertained to a budgetary 
matter and therefore, was logically included in a budget bill.  
The statutes challenged in both Davis and City of Oak Creek did 
not involve the state’s budget.  Because there is evidence that 
the legislature “intelligently participated” in considering 
§ 9253, the provision was not “smuggled” or “logrolled” through 
the legislature. 
¶21 Accordingly, we reject Flynn’s argument that 1993 Wis. 
Act 16, § 9253 should not be afforded the presumption of 
constitutionality.  It is not a private or local bill; it was 
not “smuggled” through the legislature.  Therefore, Flynn 
carries the burden to prove this statute unconstitutional beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
II. 
¶22 We now turn to the substantive issues which Flynn 
raises to challenge the validity of 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253.  
He first argues that public policy grounded in the constitution, 
statutes, common law and public expectations prohibits the lapse 
of funds.  Second, he argues that the statute is a violation of 
the separation of powers doctrine.  We disagree with both 
arguments.  Accordingly, we reverse.  We will address each issue 
in turn. 
¶23 Flynn first claims that 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 
violates public policy grounded in the Wisconsin Constitution, 
statutes (specifically Wisconsin's budget rules), common law and 
public expectations.  He asserts that public policy, grounded in 
Wis. Const. Art. VIII, §§  2 and 5, prohibits the Department 
No. 96-3266 
 
12
from proposing and the legislature from enacting a statute to 
reallocate already appropriated funds.  He also argues that 
public policy flows from many sources, not just from the 
legislature.  Because public policy embodies common sense and 
common conscience, courts may independently glean public policy 
from the constitution.  Flynn contends that § 9253 also violated 
the long-standing definition of appropriations first articulated 
in State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 148, 264 
N.W.2d 622 (1936).  "’An appropriation is the setting aside from 
the public revenue of a certain sum of money for a specified 
object, in such manner that the executive officers of the 
government are authorized to use that money, and no more, for 
that object, and no other.’"  Finnegan, 220 Wis. at 148 (quoting 
Hunt v. Callaghan, 257 Pac. 648, 649 (1927)).  Once funds are 
appropriated, they can not later be taken away.  Finally, he 
asserts that this statute violates public expectations – 
expectations that these fees would be used for court automation. 
 We disagree with Flynn’s arguments.   
¶24 This court has long held that it is the province of 
the legislature, not the courts, to determine public policy. 
 
We hardly see how . . . it can be said that the 
legislature, which is the voice of the people, has no 
freedom of action in determining the best methods of 
giving to the public that service for which it is 
willing and able to pay.  It is the best judge of what 
is necessary to meet the needs of the public and in 
what manner the service shall be directed. 
State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 265 Wis. 185, 193, 60 N.W.2d 
873 (1953) (quoting People ex rel. Soble v. Gill, 193 N.E.192 
(1934)).  This court reviews the validity of legislation in 
light of the constitution, not in light of its own wisdom.  See 
No. 96-3266 
 
13
Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Auth. v. Earl, 70 Wis. 2d 464, 
478, 235 N.W.2d 648 (1975).  “If the supreme court and the 
legislature differ on the appropriate public policy, the 
legislative view prevails.  ‘When acting within constitutional 
limitations, the Legislature settles and declares the public 
policy of a state, and not the court.’”  Hengel v. Hengel, 122 
Wis. 2d 737, 742, 365 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Borgnis 
v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 351, 133 N.W. 209 (1911)). 
¶25 Specifically regarding appropriations, Wis. Const. 
art. VIII, §§ 2 and 5 empower the legislature, not the 
judiciary, to make policy decisions regarding taxing and 
spending.  Wisconsin Const. art. VIII, § 2 provides that “[n]o 
money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of 
an appropriation by law.”  This section gives the legislature 
its spending powers.  The legislature derives its taxing power 
from Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 5:  
 
The legislature shall provide for an annual tax 
sufficient to defray the estimated expenses of the 
state for each year; and whenever the expenses of any 
year shall exceed the income, the legislature shall 
provide for levying a tax for the ensuing year, 
sufficient, with other sources of income, to pay the 
deficiency as well as the estimated expenses of such 
ensuing year. 
It is well-established that these constitutional sections should 
be read together.  See Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. The State, 128 
Wis. 553, 634, 108 N.W. 557 (1906).  The court may not “set up a 
judicial standard as to the best method of determining the 
amount of money to be raised by taxation. . . . [T]he 
constitution leaves the way open for the legislature to exercise 
the widest discretion in the matter.”  Id.   
No. 96-3266 
 
14
¶26 Courts may, however, invoke “common sense and common 
conscience” (see Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 213, 321 
N.W.2d 173 (1982)) to determine if private dealings violate 
public policy.  In fact, in each case cited by Flynn to support 
his public policy argument, the court relied on public policy to 
review and invalidate a private action, not a statute.  And even 
in those cases, the court relied on public policy, not as the 
court gleaned it, but as expressed in the Constitution and in 
statutes.  For example, in reviewing an employment-at-will 
relationship, this court held that "an employee has a cause of 
action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to 
fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by 
existing law."  Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 
573, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (emphasis added). 
¶27 Similarly, 
in 
reviewing 
whether 
an 
exculpatory 
contract barred a plaintiff's personal injury claim, this court 
defined public policy as "'that principle of law under which 
freedom of contract or private dealings is restricted by law for 
the good of the community.'"  Merten, 108 Wis.2d at 213 
(emphasis added) (quoting Higgins v. McFarland, 86 S.E.2d 168, 
172 (1955)).  The court based its decision on public policy as 
expressed in laws.  A statute reflects the legislature's 
determination of public policy which itself embodies the 
community common sense and common conscience.  See Merten, 108 
Wis. 2d at 213.  Flynn did not cite to one case in which the 
court invalidated legislation on its independent glean of public 
policy, and we decline to do so here.  
No. 96-3266 
 
15
¶28 Flynn also argues that by definition, an appropriation 
is money no longer available for the legislature to reallocate. 
 Once money is appropriated, the funds are no longer within 
reach unless the legislature repeals the program. 
¶29 Flynn incorrectly interprets this court’s definition 
of “appropriation” found in Finnegan.  In that case, relying on 
Webster’s New International Dictionary and other jurisdictions 
for a definition of appropriation, the court stated: 
 
An appropriation is ‘the setting aside from the public 
revenue of a certain sum of money for a specified 
object, in such manner that the executive officers of 
the government are authorized to use that money, and 
no more, for that object, and no other.’ 
Finnegan, 220 Wis. at 148 (citation omitted).  Flynn also relies 
on cases from other jurisdictions for his assertion that once 
funds are appropriated, they cannot be used for a different 
purpose unless the initial enacting statute is repealed.  For 
example, the court prohibited an agency’s unilateral transfer of 
funds where an executive agency attempted to use funds for a 
purpose other than that for which the legislature appropriated 
the funds.  See McDougall v. Frohmiller, 150 P.2d 89, 90-91 
(Ariz. 1944).  It is "axiomatic that no money can be paid from 
the state treasury unless and except the legislature or the 
constitution itself has made an appropriation therefor, and it 
can only be used then for the purposes specified by the 
appropriation."  Id. at 92. 
¶30 Flynn 
misplaces 
his 
reliance 
on 
Finnegan 
and 
McDougall.  The definition of “appropriation” in Finnegan and 
the holding of McDougall do not constrain the legislative, but 
rather the executive branch.  The definition also does not 
No. 96-3266 
 
16
constrain the legislature’s public policy decisions regarding 
where money will be appropriated, but rather how funds can be 
used once appropriated.  This definition is consistent with Wis. 
Const. art. VIII, § 2 which requires appropriations to be made 
“by law.”  Additionally, the executive branch is prohibited from 
unilaterally reallocating an appropriation.  See Finnegan, 220 
Wis. at 148.  The legislature, as the government body closest to 
the will of the people, may change an appropriation if, in their 
estimation, public policy so dictates.  It is the legislature’s 
role to determine whether to reallocate limited resources. 
¶31 Respondent also requests that we hold that the 1991-93 
legislative session controls court automation funding even into 
subsequent legislative sessions.  We decline such invitation.  
Each legislative session may reassess the needs of the public, 
and the allocation of scarce public resources.  It is the 
province of the legislature to do so.  One legislature may not 
bind a future legislature’s flexibility to address changing 
needs.  Thus, one legislature may not enact a statute which has 
"implications of control over the final deliberations or actions 
of future legislatures."  Wisconsin Solid Waste, 70 Wis. 2d at 
487; see also, State ex rel. Warren v. Nausbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 
450-51, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973).  Although the court automation 
program was appropriated as a continuing appropriation by the 
1991-93 legislature (and even by the 1993-95 legislature), this 
does 
not 
restrict 
the 
1993-95 
legislative 
session 
from 
reallocating unexpended, unencumbered public funds.   
¶32 Flynn further argues that 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 is 
invalid on public policy grounds because the legislature misled 
No. 96-3266 
 
17
the public and courts into believing that the funds would be 
available until expended.  By lapsing the funds, the courts and 
the public were not given adequate notice that these funds would 
no longer be available for court automation.  However, in both 
his brief and at oral argument, counsel for Flynn concedes that 
the 
legislature 
could 
have 
achieved 
the 
same 
result 
(transferring funds from the continuing appropriation for court 
automation to the general purpose revenue fund) if it had 
repealed the continuing appropriation and recreated it with a 
smaller balance.   
¶33 Flynn’s argument elevates form over substance.  This 
court 
will 
not 
invalidate 
a 
statute 
simply 
because 
the 
legislature failed to comply with its own procedural budget 
statutes. 
 
Although since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) courts have had the authority 
to review acts of the legislature for any conflict 
with the constitution, courts generally consider that 
the legislature’s adherence to the rules or statutes 
prescribing procedure is a matter entirely within 
legislative control and discretion, not subject to 
judicial review unless the legislative procedure is 
mandated by the constitution. 
State ex re. LaFollette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 365, 338 
N.W.2d 684 (1983).  If, however, the legislature did comply with 
the letter of its procedural budget statutes, Flynn’s concern 
that the public did not receive notice of the lapse would still 
not be addressed.  If the legislature had repealed the 
continuing appropriation and recreated the court automation 
fund, which Flynn agrees would be valid, the legislature 
probably would have taken such action within the budget bill.  
No. 96-3266 
 
18
The public and courts would have received no more notice of such 
repeal than they did of the lapse. 
¶34 Flynn and amicus curiae, Legal Action of Wisconsin 
(LAW), argue that 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 is retroactive 
legislation because it lapsed funds already appropriated for 
court automation and transferred the funds to the general 
purpose revenue fund.  By lapsing the funds within a provision 
of the budget bill, the legislature did not provide adequate 
notice to interested parties.   
¶35 Although 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 lapsed unencumbered 
and unexpended funds already in the coffers of the court 
automation program, as discussed above, the legislature has the 
constitutional authority to allocate and reallocate scarce 
resources. 
¶36 In sum, Flynn did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 is invalid based on public policy 
grounded on the constitution, statutes, common law or public 
expectations.  It is the province of the legislature to 
determine public policy.  This court will not impose its 
independent view of public policy on duly enacted legislation 
absent a constitutional violation.   
III. 
¶37 Flynn next argues that 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 
violates the separation of powers doctrine.  The circuit court, 
having decided that § 9253 violated public policy, determined 
that it was not necessary to address the separation of powers 
issue. 
No. 96-3266 
 
19
¶38 Flynn argues that the subject matter of the statute 
does not fall within an area of shared powers, but rather it is 
within the judiciary’s core zone of exclusive authority.  This 
court recently provided the analytical framework for evaluating 
a separation of powers challenge.  See State ex rel. Friedrich 
v. Dane County Cir. Ct., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995).  
The doctrine of separation of powers is implicitly found in the 
tripartite 
division 
of 
government 
between 
the 
judicial, 
legislative and executive branches.  See id. at 13 (citing State 
v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982)).  Each 
branch has exclusive core constitutional powers, into which the 
other branches may not intrude.  See id. (citing State ex rel. 
Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 100, 454 N.W.2d 770 
(1990)).  Beyond these core constitutional powers lie "’[g]reat 
borderlands of power’" which are not exclusively judicial, 
legislative or executive.  See id. at 14.  While each branch 
jealously guards its exclusive powers, our system of government 
envisions the branches sharing the powers found in these great 
borderlands.  See id.  Ours is a system of "’separateness but 
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.’"  Id. (quoting 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 
(1952)).  When the powers of the branches overlap, one branch is 
prohibited from unduly burdening or substantially interfering 
with the other.  See Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14. 
¶39 To determine whether a statute unconstitutionally 
infringes on the judicial power, this court must first determine 
whether the subject matter of the statute falls within powers 
constitutionally granted to the legislature.  See id.  This 
No. 96-3266 
 
20
court must also determine whether the subject matter of the 
statute falls within the judiciary's constitutional powers.  See 
id. at 14-15.  If the subject matter of the statute is within 
the 
judiciary’s 
constitutional 
powers 
but 
neither 
the 
legislature’s nor executive’s, it is within the judiciary’s core 
zone of exclusive power and any exercise of authority by another 
branch of government is unconstitutional.  See In Matter of 
Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 776, 348 N.W.2d 559 
(1984) (citing Thoe v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 
465 (1923)).  The court may, however, abide by the statute if it 
furthers the administration of justice, as a matter of comity 
and 
courtesy 
rather 
than 
acknowledgment 
of 
power. 
 
See 
Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 15.   
¶40 If the subject matter of the statute is within the 
constitutional powers of both the judicial and legislative 
branches, it is within shared powers and the statute is 
constitutional 
only 
if 
it 
does 
not 
unduly 
burden 
or 
substantially interfere with the judiciary.  See id.  “The focus 
of this evaluation is on whether one branch’s exercise of power 
has impermissibly intruded on the constitutional power of the 
other branch.”  Id. 
¶41 Turning to the first inquiry, we conclude the subject 
matter of 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 does fall within the powers 
constitutionally granted to the legislature.  “The legislature 
has power to enact legislation for the general welfare and to 
allocate government resources.”  Id. at 16.  There is no dispute 
that 
the 
subject 
matter 
of 
§ 9253 
is 
an 
appropriation, 
allocating government resources.  Several sections of the 
No. 96-3266 
 
21
Wisconsin Constitution together provide that the legislature has 
the power to enact laws which appropriate funds.  “No money 
shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an 
appropriation by law.”  Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 2.  Either the 
senate or assembly, both being vested with the legislative power 
(see Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1), may originate a bill and amend a 
bill passed by the other house.  See Wis. Const. art IV, § 19.  
Further, “[n]o law shall be enacted except by bill.”  Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 17(2).  1993 Wisconsin Act 16 § 9253, which 
lapsed 
funds 
from 
a 
continuing 
appropriation 
for 
court 
automation to the general purpose revenue fund, is clearly an 
appropriation bill and within the legislature’s constitutional 
authority.    
¶42 The second inquiry is whether the subject matter of 
the statute falls within the judiciary’s powers.  We conclude it 
does.  The judicial branch derives its powers from the 
constitution, both explicitly and implicitly.  The constitution 
explicitly provides that the judicial authority of this state is 
vested in a unified court system.  See Wis. Const. art. VII, 
§ 2.  Also, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has “superintending and 
administrative authority over all courts.”  Wis. Const. art. 
VII, § 3(1).  In addition to the explicit powers, the judiciary 
has 
inherent 
powers, 
implied 
in 
the 
constitution. 
 
The 
judiciary’s 
inherent 
powers 
are 
those 
necessary 
for 
the 
judiciary to “accomplish its constitutionally or legislatively 
mandated functions.”  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 16 (quoting 
Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 44).  “Such powers have been conceded 
because without them [the judiciary] could neither maintain 
No. 96-3266 
 
22
[its] dignity, transact [its] business, nor accomplish the 
purposes of [its] existence.”  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 16-17, 
n.7 (citing State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536, 221 N.W. 603 
(1928)).  The judiciary derives the “purpose of its existence” 
from the constitution.  The judiciary exercises its inherent 
powers as necessary to preserve its constitutional duty to 
oversee the administration of justice.  See Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d at 19. 
¶43 Regarding the explicit constitutional powers, the 
judiciary’s “superintending power is as broad and as flexible as 
necessary to insure the due administration of justice in the 
courts of this state.”  In re Hon. Charles E. Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 
508, 520, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975).  This constitutional power, 
however, is over the courts, not the executive or legislative 
branches.  
¶44 Superintending 
powers 
“contemplate[] 
ongoing, 
continuing supervision [of the lower courts] in response to 
changing needs and circumstances.”  Kading, 70 Wis. 2d at 520.  
The judiciary is not vested with constitutional superintending 
authority over the legislative budget process or determinations. 
 Rather, this court’s constitutional superintending authority 
over all courts enables and requires this court to review the 
judicial acts and jurisdictional errors of lower courts.  See 
State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 105 
N.W.2d 876 (1960).  Superintending authority allows this court 
to use writs, such as the writ of mandamus, to “’control the 
course of litigation in inferior courts when such a court either 
refuses to act within its jurisdiction, or acts beyond its 
No. 96-3266 
 
23
jurisdiction, to the serious prejudice of the citizen.’”  Id. 
(quoting State ex rel. Tewalt v. Pollard, 112 Wis. 232, 234, 87 
N.W. 1107 (1901)). 
¶45 The judiciary’s explicit constitutional administrative 
power is a power over all the courts to ensure efficient and 
effective functioning of the court system.  See Grady, 118 
Wis. 2d at 783.  Included in the judiciary’s constitutional 
administrative authority is “the power to formulate and carry 
into effect the budget for the court system . . . .”  State ex 
rel. Moran v. Dept. of Administration, 103 Wis. 2d 311, 317, 307 
N.W.2d 658 (1981).  As part of ensuring efficient and effective 
functioning of the court system, this court “exercise[s] 
administrative control over the funds for the use of the court 
system.”  Id. at 318.  Again, Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3 gives 
this court authority to formulate and carry into effect its 
budget - funds appropriated by the legislature for the court’s 
use. 
¶46 From these explicit grants of authority, articulated 
in the constitution, flow certain inherent powers implicit in 
the constitutional mandates.  By means of inherent powers, the 
supreme court has authority to ensure the courts function 
efficiently 
and 
effectively 
to 
provide 
for 
the 
due 
administration of justice.  See Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 44; see 
also Jacobson v. Avestruz, 81 Wis. 2d 240, 247, 260 N.W.2d 267 
(1977) (holding that the court has inherent power to assess the 
costs of impaneling a jury upon parties withdrawing a demand for 
a jury trial). 
No. 96-3266 
 
24
¶47 The court has exercised its inherent authority to 
regulate members of the bench and bar. The court has exclusive 
inherent power to regulate the practice of law once it has been 
determined that an attorney meets the legislative and judicial 
threshold requirements for membership.  See Fiedler, 155 Wis. 2d 
at 101.  This court has inherent power to adopt statewide 
measures, such as the Code of Judicial Ethics requiring 
disclosure of judges’ assets, which are “absolutely essential to 
the due administration of justice in the state.”  Kading, 70 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
518. 
 
The 
court 
has 
“inherent 
power 
and 
responsibility to determine whether the attorney’s fees in 
question are reasonable and to refuse enforcement of those 
charges which are not . . . .”  Herro, McAndrews & Porter v. 
Gerhardt, 62 Wis. 2d 179, 183, 214 N.W.2d 401 (1974).  Exercise 
of inherent powers in these situations was necessary to preserve 
the 
judiciary’s 
constitutional 
duty 
to 
oversee 
the 
administration of justice. 
¶48 This court also has inherent power to protect the 
courts and the judicial system against any action that would 
unreasonably curtail the powers or materially impair the 
efficacy of the courts or judicial system.  See Holmes, 106 
Wis. 2d at 44.  This court determined that circuit courts have 
exclusive 
inherent 
authority 
to 
remove 
their 
judicial 
assistants.  See Barland v. Eau Claire County, No. 96-1607, op. 
at 27-28 (S. Ct. March 13, 1998).  The court also has inherent 
power to determine that the physical facilities proposed by the 
county for the court to conduct its judicial functions were 
inadequate.  See In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 
No. 96-3266 
 
25
(1912).  The proposed facilities did not have room for a jury 
room 
which 
would 
have 
resulted 
in 
suspending 
all 
court 
proceedings while each jury deliberated.  See id. at 119-120.  
The court exercised its inherent powers in this case to preserve 
its constitutional duty to oversee the administration of 
justice.   
¶49 Although inherent power is essential to a strong and 
independent judiciary, see id., “the power must not extend the 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
court 
nor 
abridge 
or 
negate 
those 
constitutional rights reserved to individuals.”  Jacobson, 81 
Wis. 2d at 247.  The court does not, for example, have inherent 
authority to dismiss a criminal case with prejudice prior to the 
attachment of jeopardy unless the defendant’s constitutional 
right to a speedy trial is implicated.  See State v. Braunsdorf, 
98 Wis. 2d 569, 570, 297 N.W.2d 808 (1980).  This court also 
does not have inherent power to expunge juvenile police records 
which are under the authority of the police chief.  See Breier 
v. E.C., 130 Wis. 2d 376, 387, 387 N.W.2d 72 (1986).  In neither 
situation was the court’s exercise of power “essential to the 
existence or the orderly functioning of a circuit court, nor is 
it necessary to maintain the circuit court’s dignity, transact 
its business or accomplish the purpose of its existence.”  Id.  
Exercise of inherent powers was not necessary in these cases to 
preserve the judiciary’s constitutional duty to oversee the 
administration of justice. 
¶50 This 
review 
of 
cases 
regarding 
the 
court’s 
constitutional powers, including its inherent powers, over the 
administration 
and 
functioning 
of 
the 
courts, 
and 
the 
No. 96-3266 
 
26
legislature’s authority over appropriations illustrates that 
both branches exercise power over determining funding for the 
functioning of the judiciary.  As discussed above, the judiciary 
has constitutional administrative authority to formulate and 
carry into effect its budget.  It also has inherent authority 
necessary to preserve its constitutional duty to oversee the 
administration of justice.  The legislature, however, has clear 
constitutional authority to appropriate scarce resources.  Thus, 
we conclude the subject matter of 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 falls 
within a shared power. 
¶51 Having determined that 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 is 
within shared powers, the subject matter of the statute cannot 
be within the judiciary’s core zone of exclusive authority.  
Flynn’s argument that the subject matter of this statute is 
within the judiciary’s exclusive authority fails.  
¶52 Flynn argues, in the alternative, that if the subject 
matter of 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 is within shared powers, it 
is nonetheless unconstitutional because the statute unduly 
burdens or substantially interferes with the judiciary.  In this 
area of shared powers, the legislature may lapse the court 
automation funds to the general purpose revenue fund only if 
such lapse does not unduly burden or substantially interfere 
with the judiciary.  Flynn has the burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
the 
statute 
unduly 
burdens 
or 
substantially interferes with the judiciary.  “Imposing [this] 
highest standard of proof is particularly necessary in cases 
such as these to ensure that the judiciary will order the 
expenditure of public funds for its own needs only when it 
No. 96-3266 
 
27
articulates a compelling need.”  Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 24.  
In areas of shared powers, “there should be such generous co-
operation as will tend to keep the law responsive to the needs 
of society.”  Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501, 514, 236 N.W. 
717 (1931). 
¶53 Flynn has failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt 
that 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 unduly burdens or substantially 
interferes with the judiciary.  He relies upon certain evidence 
in the record and on affidavits submitted by Mr. Timothy Hicks, 
the Judicial Information Systems Manager for Milwaukee County, 
and former Chief Justice Nathan Heffernan.  However, these do 
not show beyond a reasonable doubt that the lapse of funds 
unduly burdens or substantially interferes with the judiciary.   
¶54 Flynn points to the record as proof that the lapse of 
nearly $2.9 million had an immediate adverse impact on the court 
automation program.  The court was not able to fully implement 
the system or update the systems currently in place.  Electrical 
problems in many court houses could not be addressed and 
implementing a bar coding pilot program was delayed.  However, 
an “adverse impact” is not, by itself, proof of an undue burden 
or substantial interference much less proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
¶55 He also offers affidavits from Mr. Timothy Hicks, the 
Judicial Information Systems Manager for Milwaukee County, and 
former Chief Justice Nathan Heffernan.  Mr. Hicks stated that 
the problems he is having with the implementation of court 
automation in Milwaukee County are a direct result of the 1993 
lapsing of funds to the general revenue fund.  He was not able 
No. 96-3266 
 
28
to get a Data Server (the “heart” of the CCAP system) online in 
a timely fashion, hire sufficient personnel, or adequately 
update computer equipment.  Chief Justice Heffernan stated that 
the lapse prevented the judicial branch from setting aside funds 
for equipment purchases to ensure compatibility, prevented the 
judicial branch from administering CCAP in the manner it saw as 
most efficient, and caused four counties to drop out of the CCAP 
system for fear that funds would again be lapsed in the future.  
¶56 Again, there is no question that 1993 Wis. Act 16, 
§ 9253 had, as both Chief Justice Heffernan and Mr. Hicks 
assert, an adverse impact in particular courts and the court 
system in general.  We did then, and do now, consider § 9253 to 
some degree penny-wise and pound foolish, as well as a poor 
management choice.  But that is a far cry from saying beyond a 
reasonable doubt that § 9253 unduly burdened or substantially 
interfered with the court system.  A burden?  Yes.  An 
interference?  Yes.  But undue or substantial?  Not beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The legislature continued to fund the court 
automation program.  Our needs continued to be met, though at a 
slower pace, and certainly not as sufficiently, economically, 
efficiently or conveniently as we would have liked. 
¶57 We may, as a court, disagree with the legislature.  
But unless we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute 
unduly burdens or substantially interferes with our ability to 
function, we must uphold 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253.  In Friedrich 
we held that only when the action of the legislature unduly 
burdens or substantially interferes with the judiciary, i.e., 
when qualified and effective counsel are not available at the 
No. 96-3266 
 
29
rate set by the legislature, will we assert our constitutional 
power to ensure the effective administration of justice.  See 
Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 29-30.  In this case, we similarly 
hold that if the legislature’s appropriation to the court system 
unduly burdens or substantially interferes with the judiciary, 
the court may declare such act unconstitutional, thus ensuring 
that the judiciary can preserve its constitutional duty to 
oversee the administration of justice.  The lapse of funds from 
the court automation program to the general purpose revenue fund 
is not, however, such a situation.  The lapse of funding may 
have delayed full implementation of court automation, but such 
delay did not cause an undue burden or substantially interfere 
with the judiciary.  Based on the evidence in this record, we 
cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that this legislation 
unduly burdens or substantially interferes with the judiciary.  
Accordingly, Flynn has failed to carry his burden on this issue. 
¶58 Flynn also raises for the first time on appeal and in 
a footnote, the argument that 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 may 
violate Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 1 which requires taxation to be 
uniformly applied.  This court generally refuses to consider 
issues raised for the first time on appeal, especially a claim 
that a statute is unconstitutional.  See Blenski v. State, 73 
Wis. 2d 685, 702, 245 N.W.2d 906 (1976).  Although the court 
retains the discretion to consider arguments raised for the 
first time on appeal, we decline to do so here.  See State v. 
Wilks, 121 Wis. 2d 93, 107, 358 N.W.2d 273 (1984). 
¶59 Finally, because we determine that the legislature, 
not the judiciary, determines public policy and that 1993 Wis. 
No. 96-3266 
 
30
Act 16, § 9253 does not violate the separation of powers 
doctrine, we need not address whether the remedies allowed by 
the circuit court were appropriate. 
¶60 In sum, we conclude that it is the province of the 
legislature, not the courts, to determine public policy.  
Because one legislature may not bind future legislatures, it is 
fully within the legislature’s power to change an appropriation 
put into place by a previous legislative session.  It is assumed 
such action reflects public will, and if not, those legislators 
will be answerable at the ballot box.  We also conclude that 
appropriating funds for the judiciary is one of shared powers.  
The legislature clearly has the appropriation power and the 
judiciary has explicit constitutional administrative powers and 
inherent powers to ensure that the judicial system functions 
efficiently.  However, Flynn failed to show beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the lapse of $2,898,000 from the court automation 
program revenue fund to the general purpose revenue fund unduly 
burdened 
or 
substantially 
interfered 
with 
the 
judiciary.  
Therefore, we hold that the lapse in 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253 is 
constitutional. 
By the Court.—The order and judgment of the circuit court 
is reversed. 
96-3266.awb 
 
1 
¶61 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J. 
(Concurring).  
I 
write 
separately because the majority's smuggled legislation analysis 
of an item of general legislation gives legitimacy to a 
meritless argument and in the process confuses our law. 
¶62 The majority goes to great lengths to respond to what 
it views as an alternative argument by Flynn.  The majority 
surmises that Flynn argues that while 1993 Wis. Act 16, § 9253, 
is not a private or local bill, pursuant to Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§ 18, 
the 
court 
should 
engage 
in 
a 
parallel 
"smuggled 
legislation" analysis to determine if the legislation deserves a 
presumption of constitutionality. 
¶63 In 
doing 
so, 
the 
majority 
first 
analyzes 
the 
preservation of public notice purpose of Wis. Const. art. IV, 
§ 18.  The majority then parses our previous anti-smuggling case 
law to determine the number of sponsors, supporters, and amount 
of public hearing time necessary to defeat an assertion of 
smuggled 
legislation 
for 
private 
or 
local 
law 
purposes.  
Finally, the majority applies its interpretation of our art. IV, 
§ 18 smuggling framework to the case at hand and determines that 
the legislation was not smuggled through the legislature.  The 
majority finds dispositive the fact that § 9253 was not single 
subject legislation and that considerable attention was given to 
the bill by the Joint Finance Committee which considered four 
alternative proposals relating to the lapsed funds.  In the 
majority's view, the legislature "intelligently participated" in 
considering the bill. 
96-3266.awb 
 
2 
¶64 The majority's extensive engagement of this elusive 
and unsupported argument confuses the law and threatens to open 
new avenues of attack on legislation.  Prior to Flynn, this 
court accorded legislation that was not a private, local, or 
special bill a presumption of constitutionality that had to be 
overcome by the challenging party.  See State v. Holmes, 106 
Wis. 2d 31, 41, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982); ABC Auto Sales v. Marcus, 
255 Wis. 325, 330, 38 N.W.2d 708 (1949).  However, the 
majority's failure to reject out-of-hand the perceived smuggling 
analysis in this case opens all legislation to threshold 
allegations that the legislation was smuggled through the 
legislature and an accompanying legal skirmish between the 
parties over the proper presumption of constitutionality to be 
applied. 
¶65 A review of our precedent demonstrates that the 
smuggling of legislation argument has never been, is not, and 
never should be an independent basis to attack the general 
presumption of constitutionality of legislation.  The smuggling 
analysis has been confined to attacks on legislation based on 
the terms of art. IV, § 18. 
¶66 In Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 109 Wis. 9, 23, 85 
N.W. 
131 
(1901), 
we 
noted 
that 
"[t]he 
framers 
of 
the 
constitution, in adopting sec. 18, art. IV, intended to guard 
against the danger of legislation, affecting private or local 
interests, being smuggled through the legislature . . . ."  In 
subsequent cases wherein a party has alleged a § 18 violation, 
we have conducted a smuggled legislation analysis.  See, e.g., 
96-3266.awb 
 
3 
Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992)(finding 
no evidence that program was smuggled through the legislature in 
violation of § 18); Milwaukee Brewers v. Department of Health & 
Social Services, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 107-08, 387 N.W.2d 254 
(1986)(holding legislation not smuggled in violation of § 18); 
City of Oak Creek v. DNR, 185 Wis. 2d 424, 518 N.W.2d 276 (Ct. 
App. 1994)(holding statute not entitled to presumption of 
constitutionality as a private or local bill under § 18).  
However, we have never before conducted such an inquiry in the 
absence of a § 18 constitutional objection.  This fact and the 
majority's failure to provide an alternative substantive basis 
requiring such a test for legislation indicates that absent a 
§ 18 allegation, a smuggling claim should not lie. 
¶67 By opening the door to plaintiffs eager to attack 
legislation with the complexities of the smuggling analysis, the 
majority forces courts to forego the previous presumption of 
constitutionality and determine the circumstances in which a 
piece of legislation will not pass the smuggling test.  How many 
sponsors must a bill have?  How many citizens must attend a 
public hearing on a bill?  How many minutes of consideration in 
committee or before the Assembly and Senate must a bill receive? 
 How much attention must be drawn to each specific provision of 
a bill?   
¶68 These are questions that courts will be forced to 
consider because of the majority's damaging legitimatization of 
an argument that the majority is not even sure that Flynn raises 
before this court.  Therefore, while I agree with the majority's 
96-3266.awb 
 
4 
holding that the legislature did not violate the separation of 
powers doctrine by lapsing the CCAP funds, I do not subscribe to 
the smuggling analysis in which the majority engages. 
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion.   
 
96-3266.awb 
 
1