Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Ucheomumu

Citation: 

Docket Number: 58ag/16

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Andrew Ndubisi Ucheomumu, Misc. Docket AG No. 58, 
September Term, 2016 
 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT – Court of Appeals 
disbarred lawyer who failed to order transcripts that were necessary for appeal to proceed, 
failed to advise client to do so, and failed to file timely motion for extension of time to file 
transcripts, resulting in appeal’s dismissal; completely failed to accomplish objectives of 
his representation of client in appeal; did not advise client of deadline for ordering 
transcripts, his failure to meet it, his failure’s possible consequences, and show cause order 
that Court of Special Appeals issued; failed to comply with client’s requests for copies of 
certain documents; failed to communicate, before or during his representation, that he 
would charge hourly rate; collected, and failed to earn or refund, $6,200 that client paid 
him; withdrew unearned funds from, and failed to deposit unearned funds into, his attorney 
trust account; falsely represented to Court of Special Appeals that there had been delay in 
ordering transcripts because he had not received client’s case file from her previous 
counsel; falsely represented to Bar Counsel that he had advised client to order transcripts, 
that she had never paid him so that he could order transcripts, and that Court of Special 
Appeals had dismissed appeal because client had failed to order transcripts; and falsely 
represented to client that she was responsible for appeal’s dismissal.  Such conduct violated 
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1.1 (Competence), 1.2(a) 
(Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 
1.4(b) (Communication), 1.5(a) (Unreasonable Fees), 1.5(b) (Communication of Fees), 
1.15(a), 1.15(c) (Safekeeping Property), 1.16(d) (Terminating Representation), 3.3(a)(1) 
(Candor Toward Tribunal), 8.1(a) (Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, 
Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to Administration of 
Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating MLRPC).
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 58 
 
September Term, 2016 
______________________________________ 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
ANDREW NDUBISI UCHEOMUMU 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
*Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:  November 16, 2018 
 
*Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the 
hearing and conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court; after being recalled 
pursuant to the Md. Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 3A, she also participated in the decision 
and adoption of this opinion.
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CAE17-07944   
 
Argued: October 4, 2018  
  
 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal  
Materials Act   
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document " authentic.   
  
 
  
  
Suzanne C. Johnson, Acting Clerk  
2018-11-16 
08:19-05:00
 
This attorney discipline proceeding involves a lawyer who, among other 
misconduct, caused an appeal in his client’s case to be dismissed and lied to his client, Bar 
Counsel, and the Court of Special Appeals in an attempt to deflect the blame for the 
appeal’s dismissal.  
Shannan Martin retained Andrew Ndubisi Ucheomumu, Respondent, a member of 
the Bar of Maryland, to represent her in an appeal.  For an appeal to proceed, transcripts of 
relevant proceedings in the trial court need to be ordered by a certain deadline.  In this case, 
after the deadline passed, Ucheomumu requested from Martin money to cover the cost of 
obtaining transcripts, and she paid him $3,000.  Ucheomumu, however, never ordered the 
transcripts or advised Martin to do so.  The Court of Special Appeals issued an order 
directing Martin to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file 
the transcripts.  Ucheomumu filed a motion for extension of time to file the transcripts in 
which he falsely stated that one of the reasons why there had been a delay in filing the 
transcripts was that Martin’s previous counsel had not provided him with them.  
Martin terminated Ucheomumu’s representation.  Although Ucheomumu had not 
earned the total of $6,200 that Martin had paid him, he did not refund the $6,200.  
Additionally, after the Court of Special Appeals denied the motion for extension of time 
and dismissed the appeal, Ucheomumu falsely advised Martin that she was responsible for 
the appeal’s dismissal.  Martin filed a complaint against Ucheomumu with Bar Counsel.  
In his response to Martin’s complaint, Ucheomumu falsely stated that he had advised 
Martin to order the transcripts, that she had never paid him so that he could order the 
transcripts, and that the Court of Special Appeals had dismissed the appeal because Martin 
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had failed to order the transcripts.  
On November 18, 2016, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, 
Petitioner, Bar Counsel filed in this Court a “Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” 
against Ucheomumu, charging him with violating Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”)1 1.1 (Competence), 1.2(a) (Allocation of Authority 
Between Client and Lawyer), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Reasonable 
Fees), 1.5(b) (Communication of Fees), 1.8(a), 1.8(h) (Conflict of Interest; Current Clients; 
Specific Rules), 1.15(a), 1.15(b), 1.15(c) (Safekeeping Property), 1.16(d) (Terminating 
Representation), 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 8.1(a) (Disciplinary Matters), 
8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is 
Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating or Attempting to Violate 
the MLRPC), and current Maryland Rule 19-408 (Commingling of Funds).2  
On November 22, 2016, this Court designated the Honorable David A. Boynton of 
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to hear this attorney discipline proceeding.  On 
March 29, 2017, Ucheomumu filed in this Court a “Motion for Change of Venue and to 
Amend Order Designating Judg[e.]”  On March 31, 2017, this Court issued an Order 
                                              
1Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules 
of Professional Conduct, or MARPC, and renumbered.  We will refer to the MLRPC 
because the misconduct at issue occurred before this change. 
2On June 12, 2017, Bar Counsel filed in this Court an “Amended Petition for 
Disciplinary or Remedial Action,” charging Ucheomumu with violating former Maryland 
Rule 16-607 (Commingling of Funds), as opposed to current Maryland Rule 19-408.  The 
charges in the two Petitions for Disciplinary or Remedial Action were otherwise identical. 
Before a hearing judge, Bar Counsel withdrew the charges that Ucheomumu had violated 
former Maryland Rule 16-607 and MLRPC 1.15(b).  
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granting the Motion for Change of Venue.  On April 12, 2017, this Court designated the 
Honorable Tiffany H. Anderson (“the hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Prince 
George’s County to hear this attorney discipline proceeding.   
On December 22, 2017, Ucheomumu filed in this Court a “Motion to Dismiss 
Improperly-Filed and Unauthorized Charges[] and Request for Oral Argument[,]” a brief 
in support thereof, and a Motion to Seal as to one of the exhibits that he attached to the 
brief.  On December 28, 2017, Ucheomumu filed in this Court an “Emergency Motion to 
Stay Trial Court Proceedings[,]” a “Motion for Issuance of Additional Briefing Schedule 
as to Questions of Law Capable of Repetition, but Consistently Evading Review, or in the 
Alternative, Motion for Appropriate Reli[e]f[,]” and a brief in support of the motions.  On 
January 2, 2018, this Court issued an Order granting the Motion to Seal and denying the 
Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Issuance.  
On January 10, 16, and 17, 2018, the hearing judge conducted a hearing.3  On April 
25, 2018, the hearing judge filed in this Court an opinion including findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, concluding that Ucheomumu had violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 
1.5, 1.15(a), 1.15(c), 1.16, 3.3, 8.1, 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(a), and had attempted to violate 
MLRPC 1.8(h)(1) and 1.8(h)(2) in violation of MLRPC 8.4(a).4  
On July 16, 2018, Ucheomumu filed in this Court a “Motion to Compel Production 
                                              
3The Petitions for Disciplinary or Remedial Action also charged Ucheomumu with 
violating various MLRPC involving another client in a separate matter.  After the hearing, 
however, Bar Counsel withdrew the charges with respect to the allegations concerning 
Ucheomumu’s representation of the second client. 
4The hearing judge did not address whether Ucheomumu violated, or attempted to 
violate, MLRPC 1.8(a).  Accordingly, neither do we. 
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of Documents [Bar Counsel] Improperly[ ]Withheld During the Trial Court Proceedings; 
and Exceptions to Trial Court Rulings Regarding Such Documents” and a “Motion to 
Unseal Records and Deposition and Vacate Non-Dissemination Order[.]”  On August 23, 
2018, this Court issued an Order denying the Motion to Compel and the Motion to Unseal. 
On September 7, 2018, Ucheomumu filed in this Court motions for reconsideration of this 
Court’s denial of the Motion to Compel and the Motion to Unseal.  On the same date, this 
Court issued an Order denying the motions for reconsideration.  
On October 4, 2018, we heard oral argument.  For the below reasons, we disbar 
Ucheomumu. 
BACKGROUND 
The hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize. 
On June 16, 2009, this Court admitted Ucheomumu to the Bar of Maryland.  At all 
relevant times, Ucheomumu was a solo practitioner with a virtual office in Montgomery 
County.  
On July 31, 2014, in a child custody case, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s 
County issued an order that was unfavorable to Martin.  On November 3, 2014, 
Ucheomumu and Martin signed an “Attorney Engagement Agreement,” which stated as 
follows.  Martin had “filed a pro se appeal and need[ed] the legal services of 
[Ucheomumu’s firm] to handle the Appeal Brief and oral argument[.]”  Martin would pay 
Ucheomumu a flat fee of $10,500, and would also pay the filing fees and the cost of 
obtaining transcripts.  Ucheomumu’s firm would “deposit any and all” payments “in [its] 
general operating account, and not in a trust account.”  If, “[a]fter starting the work,” 
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Ucheomumu’s firm withdrew from the representation “due to any conflict,” Martin would 
receive a refund on a “pro[ ]rata basis[,] or” her payments would be applied to “outstanding 
legal bills.”  The Attorney Engagement Agreement did not specify an hourly rate, or 
explain how the amount of any “outstanding legal bills[,]” or the amount of any refund on 
“a pro[ ]rata basis[,]” would be calculated.  Ucheomumu did not advise Martin to seek 
independent counsel to review the Attorney Engagement Agreement’s statement that he 
would not deposit unearned funds into an attorney trust account.  
After Martin retained Ucheomumu to represent her in the appeal, she requested from 
him legal advice that pertained to the child custody case, but that was outside the scope of 
his representation of her in the appeal.  Specifically, Martin requested from Ucheomumu 
legal advice regarding visitation with her children.  Ucheomumu reviewed e-mails and 
other documents that pertained to the child custody case, and, on Martin’s behalf, made 
phone calls and engaged in negotiation with opposing counsel regarding visitation with her 
children.  The Attorney Engagement Agreement did not mention the costs of these legal 
services.  There was no evidence that Ucheomumu and Martin entered into a separate or 
amended retainer agreement that addressed the costs of these legal services. Ucheomumu 
did not advise Martin that he applied at least some of her payments for the appeal toward 
the costs of these legal services.  
On November 3, 2014, Martin paid Ucheomumu $3,000, which he deposited into 
his attorney trust account; he drafted a Notice of Appeal and advised Martin to file it in the 
circuit court; and she did so.  On November 4, 2014, Ucheomumu e-mailed Martin’s 
previous counsel in an attempt to obtain her case file.  Martin’s previous counsel never 
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provided any documents to Ucheomumu.  On November 7, 2014, Ucheomumu filed a Civil 
Appeal Information Report on Martin’s behalf, and withdrew $1,000 from his attorney trust 
account.  On November 19, 2014, Martin paid Ucheomumu $200, which he did not deposit 
into his attorney trust account.   
On November 20, 2014, the Court of Special Appeals issued an order to proceed, 
stating that there would be no prehearing conference, and that the appeal would be 
governed by Maryland Rule 8-207(a), which provides for expedited appeals in child 
custody and visitation cases.  See Md. R. 8-207(a)(1)(B).  In November 2014, Maryland 
Rule 8-411(b)(1) stated that, generally, “[t]he appellant shall order the transcript within ten 
days . . . after [] the date of an order . . . that the appeal proceed without a prehearing 
conference, . . . unless a different time is fixed by that order[.]”  (Paragraph break omitted).  
Here, ten days after the date of the order to proceed was November 30, 2014, which was a 
Sunday; thus, the transcripts of the relevant proceedings in the circuit court needed to be 
ordered by December 1, 2014, the next business day.5  See Md. R. 1-203(a)(1).  
Ucheomumu never ordered the transcripts, never advised Martin to do so, and never filed 
a timely motion for extension of time to file the transcripts.  
On December 2, 2014, Ucheomumu withdrew $2,000 from his attorney trust 
account.  On December 8, 2014, a week after the date on which the transcripts were to be 
ordered, Ucheomumu sent a text message to Martin, requesting a payment for the purpose 
of “order[ing] the transcript[s] ASAP without any further delay.”  This was the only 
                                              
5The hearing judge inadvertently stated that the deadline was November 30, 2014.  
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occasion on which Ucheomumu requested a payment to cover the cost of obtaining 
transcripts.  Ucheomumu did not inform Martin that he had missed the December 1, 2014 
deadline for ordering the transcripts.  On December 10, 2014, for the purpose of covering 
the cost of obtaining the transcripts, Martin paid Ucheomumu $3,000, which he did not 
deposit into his attorney trust account.  Ucheomumu never earned $6,200 in attorney’s fees 
that Martin had paid him, as he failed to take any action to advance the appeal, he never 
ordered the transcripts that were necessary to the appeal, and his legal services pertaining 
to visitation with Martin’s children were not a significant undertaking.  Additionally, 
Ucheomumu never drafted a brief on Martin’s behalf.   
At some point, Ucheomumu contacted a transcription company.  On January 15, 
2015, the transcription company responded to Ucheomumu, confirming the existence of 
transcripts of two days of a trial.  The hearing judge did not find that Ucheomumu took any 
action in response.   
On February 2, 2015, the Court of Special Appeals issued an order directing Martin 
to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the transcripts.  On 
February 24, 2015, Ucheomumu e-mailed Martin, stating that he lacked the transcripts. 
Ucheomumu did not inform Martin of the show cause order, or advise her that the Court 
of Special Appeals would dismiss the appeal for failure to file the transcripts.  
On February 27, 2015, in the Court of Special Appeals, Ucheomumu filed an 
“Appellant[’]s Motion for Extension of Time to Order Transcript[s] and File Appellant’s 
Brief.”  In the Motion for Extension, Ucheomumu requested a two-month extension of the 
deadline for filing Martin’s brief, and represented that there had been a delay in ordering 
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the transcripts because: (1) the circuit court had been closed for multiple days; (2) he was 
uncertain of how long the trial had been due to confusing information on the docket; and 
(3) he had not received Martin’s case file from her previous counsel, who, he believed, had 
copies of the transcripts.  Ucheomumu knowingly made a false statement by stating that 
there had been a delay in ordering the transcripts because he had not received Martin’s case 
file from her previous counsel.  By requesting from Martin on December 8, 2014 a payment 
for the cost of obtaining transcripts, Ucheomumu indicated that, as of that date, he was no 
longer waiting for Martin’s previous counsel to provide the transcripts, and instead planned 
to use a payment from Martin to order the transcripts himself.  Ucheomumu “misled [] the 
Court of Special Appeals . . . in an attempt to explain his failure to order the transcripts.”  
On March 10, 2015, Martin requested a copy of the Motion for Extension, but she 
did not hear back from Ucheomumu.  On March 11, 2015, Martin again requested a copy 
of the Motion for Extension, and again did not hear back from Ucheomumu.  Subsequently, 
Martin requested that Ucheomumu provide copies of all of the documents that he had 
drafted on her behalf.  Ucheomumu never did so.  
On March 18, 2015, Martin terminated Ucheomumu’s representation, sought a 
refund, and requested an accounting of all of the legal services that he had performed for 
her.  At some point, Martin hired new counsel to represent her in the appeal.  On March 
20, 2015, Ucheomumu provided Martin with an invoice that indicated that she owed him 
$10,944.50 based on an hourly rate of $295.  This was the first occasion on which 
Ucheomumu indicated that he would charge Martin an hourly rate.  On the same date, 
Ucheomumu offered to refund Martin $1,200, but did not explain how he calculated that 
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amount.  Martin declined Ucheomumu’s offer and requested that the two of them discuss 
the payments.  Ucheomumu e-mailed Martin and her new counsel, again offering to refund 
Martin $1,200—on the condition that she would sign a release that was attached to the e-
mail, and that would preclude her from suing him.  Ucheomumu did not advise Martin to 
seek independent counsel to review the release.  Martin declined Ucheomumu’s second 
offer.   
On March 25, 2015, the Court of Special Appeals issued an order denying the 
Motion for Extension and dismissing the appeal.  Ucheomumu’s inaction caused the 
appeal’s dismissal.  On March 30, 2015, Ucheomumu e-mailed the order and the Attorney 
Engagement Agreement to Martin and stated: 
Our agreement specifically specified that you are responsible for paying the 
transcripts; see attached.  I told you many times to deposit the money for the 
transcript[s] and you told me that your grand[]father was going to loan you 
money, but that did not materialize.  I specifically did not want to let the 
Court of Special Appeals know that you have not paid for the transcripts 
because it is my duty to protect you.  
 
(Cleaned up). 
On April 1, 2015, in the Court of Special Appeals, Martin’s new counsel filed a 
Motion to Reinstate.  On April 6, 2015, in the Court of Special Appeals, Martin’s new 
counsel filed transcripts of certain circuit court proceedings.  On April 14, 2015, the Court 
of Special Appeals denied the Motion to Reinstate.  Martin’s new counsel then filed in this 
Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court denied.  
On April 13, 2015, Martin filed a complaint against Ucheomumu with Bar Counsel. 
On June 10, 2015, Ucheomumu provided to Bar Counsel a response to Martin’s complaint 
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in which he falsely stated that he had advised Martin to order the transcripts, that she had 
never paid him so that he could order the transcripts, and that the Court of Special Appeals 
had dismissed the appeal because Martin had failed to order the transcripts.   
According to the hearing judge, Ucheomumu’s misconduct was aggravated by prior 
attorney discipline, a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple 
violations of the MLRPC, and false statements during this attorney discipline proceeding. 
Ucheomumu’s misconduct was mitigated by his “provision of some legal services [that 
were] related to” visitation with Martin’s children.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing 
judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of 
law.  See Md. R. 19-741(b)(2)(B) (“The Court [of Appeals] shall give due regard to the 
opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Slate, 457 Md. 610, 626, 180 A.3d 134, 144 (2018) (“This Court 
reviews for clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact.”  (Cleaned up)); Md. R. 19-
741(b)(1) (“The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the [hearing] judge’s conclusions 
of law.”).  This Court determines whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that a 
lawyer violated an MLRPC.  See Md. R. 19-727(c) (“Bar Counsel has the burden of 
proving the averments of the [P]etition [for Disciplinary or Remedial Action] by clear and 
convincing evidence.”). 
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DISCUSSION 
(A) Ucheomumu’s Requests for Dismissal or Remand 
In his “Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Recommendation for Disposition[,]” Ucheomumu requests that we dismiss this 
attorney discipline proceeding “due to [Bar Counsel]’s discovery misconduct as set forth 
in the Motion to Compel[.]”  In his Exceptions, Ucheomumu repeats multiple contentions 
that he made in the Motion to Compel, as well as the Motion to Unseal and the Motion to 
Dismiss.  Specifically, in both his Exceptions and the Motion to Compel, Ucheomumu 
argued that Bar Counsel improperly failed to answer interrogatories under oath, Bar 
Counsel improperly withheld certain documents, and those documents were similar to a 
memorandum that this Court stated was not attorney work product in Matter of White, 458 
Md. 60, 92, 181 A.3d 750, 768 (2018).  In both his Exceptions and the Motion to Unseal, 
Ucheomumu argued that the hearing judge improperly sealed the transcript of his 
deposition of the Attorney Grievance Commission’s Executive Secretary.  And, in both his 
Exceptions and the Motion to Dismiss, Ucheomumu argued that the Peer Review Panel 
was improperly comprised of individuals from Montgomery County rather than individuals 
from Prince George’s County.   
This Court denied the Motion to Compel, the Motion to Unseal, the Motion to 
Dismiss, and the motions for reconsideration of this Court’s denials of the Motion to 
Compel and the Motion to Unseal.  Ucheomumu’s exceptions, which raise the same 
arguments that were made in the Motions to Compel, Unseal, and Dismiss, are overruled.  
We decline to yet again consider arguments of which we have already disposed. 
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In his Exceptions, Ucheomumu contends that the hearing judge erred in limiting his 
deposition of the Attorney Grievance Commission’s Executive Secretary by denying him 
the opportunity to ask about “fundamental topics[,] such as the factual basis for its 
contentions in the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, . . . or [Bar Counsel’s] 
compliance with its discovery obligations.”  Ucheomumu also argues that the hearing judge 
made several errors at the hearing, such as “[i]mproperly [h]urr[ying him] along[,]” not 
taking judicial notice of certain documents, and denying him the “opportunity to introduce 
evidence inuring to unauthorized charges[.]”  Ucheomumu seeks dismissal of this attorney 
discipline proceeding on these grounds.  Upon a careful review of the record, we discern 
no procedural error or abuse of discretion on the hearing judge’s part, and we decline to 
dismiss this attorney discipline proceeding. 
In his Exceptions, Ucheomumu also requests that we remand this attorney discipline 
proceeding so that the hearing judge “can consider [] newly-discovered evidence”—
namely, a purported November 3, 2014 e-mail in which Ucheomumu stated to Martin: “We 
need to . . . order the transcript[s] . . . as quickly as possible”; purported records of telephone 
calls and text messages between Ucheomumu and Martin from October 2014 to March 
2015; and the testimony of “a witness who [allegedly] has knowledge of attempted 
settlement negotiations in the” child custody case.  None of this proffered evidence causes 
us to conclude that the hearing judge’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  In the 
purported November 3, 2014 e-mail, Ucheomumu did not advise Martin to order the 
transcripts, nor did Ucheomumu indicate that Martin was responsible for ordering the 
transcripts; significantly, in a December 8, 2014 text message, he stated to Martin: “I need 
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to order the transcript[s] ASAP without any further delay.”  Ucheomumu does not draw 
our attention to the content of any of the purported telephonic conversations and text 
messages, or proffer that any of them contradict the hearing judge’s findings that 
Ucheomumu failed to inform Martin of the December 1, 2014 deadline for ordering the 
transcripts, and failed to inform Martin that he had missed the deadline.  Testimony 
regarding settlement negotiations in the child custody case would be of no consequence 
because Bar Counsel did not charge Ucheomumu with any misconduct that arose out of 
the alleged settlement negotiations.  We decline Ucheomumu’s request to remand the 
attorney discipline proceeding. 
(B) Findings of Fact 
Bar Counsel does not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact. 
Ucheomumu raises fifteen exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact.  We overrule 
all but one of the exceptions. 
First, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that, on December 8, 2014, 
he requested from Martin money to cover the cost of obtaining transcripts.  The hearing 
judge admitted into evidence a series of text messages between Ucheomumu and Martin, 
including a December 8, 2014 text message in which he stated: “Shannan, how is your 
funding coming?  I need to order the transcript[s] ASAP without any further delay.” 
Ucheomumu contends that, in his text message, he did not expressly ask Martin for money. 
Ucheomumu’s contention is without merit.  Given that Ucheomumu asked Martin how her 
“funding [was] coming[,]” and, in the next sentence, informed her that he “need[ed] to 
order the transcript[s,]”  the hearing judge did not clearly err in determining that the text 
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message was a request for money to cover the cost of obtaining transcripts. 
Second, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that the purpose of 
Martin’s $3,000 payment on December 10, 2014 was to cover the cost of obtaining the 
transcripts.  Contrary to Ucheomumu’s position, the evidence supports the hearing judge’s 
finding.  As mentioned previously, on December 8, 2014, Ucheomumu sent Martin a text 
message, requesting money to cover the cost of obtaining transcripts.  On the same day, 
Martin replied, stating: “I was just informed that it should be wired to my account within 
72 hours.”  On December 10, 2014, Martin paid Ucheomumu $3,000.  The timing of 
Martin’s payment—just two days after the date on which Ucheomumu requested from her 
money to cover the cost of obtaining transcripts, and that Martin stated that she would 
receive money within 72 hours—supports the hearing judge’s finding that the purpose of 
the payment was to cover the cost of obtaining the transcripts. 
Third, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that, after Martin 
terminated his representation, he billed her for legal services that were outside the scope of 
his representation of her in the appeal.  Ucheomumu argues that the $10,500 flat fee 
covered all of the legal services that he provided to Martin, including services related to 
visitation with her children; that he calculated the $10,944.50 balance due in the invoice in 
response to her request for an accounting; and that he did not attempt to collect the balance 
due.  Ucheomumu’s logic is faulty.  The Attorney Engagement Agreement stated that 
Ucheomumu would represent Martin in the appeal for a flat fee of $10,500, and did not 
contemplate that he would provide any other legal services to her.  Yet, after Martin 
terminated Ucheomumu’s representation, he provided her with an invoice with a balance 
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due of $10,944.50.  Given that Ucheomumu could not have provided Martin with more 
than $10,500’s worth of legal services in the appeal, as he never ordered transcripts of the 
circuit court proceedings, filed briefs, or appeared at any oral argument, he necessarily 
billed her $10,944.50 for legal services that were not related to his representation of her in 
the appeal, or services that he did not perform at all. 
Fourth and fifth, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that he never 
earned the $6,200 that Martin had paid him, that he failed to deposit and maintain the funds 
in an attorney trust account until earned, and that he failed to take any action to advance 
the appeal.  The evidence provides ample support for the hearing judge’s findings.  Martin 
retained Ucheomumu to represent her in the appeal, draft and file a brief on her behalf, and 
participate in oral argument.  Ucheomumu never drafted a brief on Martin’s behalf, and 
there was no oral argument because the Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal for 
failure to file the transcripts of proceedings in the circuit court.  The transcripts were never 
filed because Ucheomumu never ordered them and never advised Martin to do so.  
Ucheomumu was responsible for the appeal’s dismissal, and he did not earn $6,200 for 
work that he failed to perform.  Ucheomumu clearly did not earn the $6,200 by performing 
such perfunctory tasks as e-mailing Martin’s previous counsel, drafting a notice of appeal, 
filing a Civil Appeal Information Report, and filing an untimely Motion for Extension.  
Nor did Ucheomumu earn the $6,200 by performing legal services that were related to 
visitation with Martin’s children, as the hearing judge found, and this work was outside the 
scope of Ucheomumu’s representation in the appeal.  Specifically, Ucheomumu reviewed 
e-mails and other documents that pertained to the child custody case, and, on Martin’s 
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behalf, made phone calls and engaged in negotiation regarding visitation with her children. 
The hearing judge found that Ucheomumu’s legal services pertaining to visitation with 
Martin’s children were not a significant undertaking.  The hearing judge also found that, 
although Ucheomumu deposited into an attorney trust account the initial $3,000 that Martin 
had paid him, he withdrew those funds from the attorney trust account, and he did not 
deposit into an attorney trust account the additional $3,200 that Martin paid him.  The 
hearing judge did not clearly err in finding that Ucheomumu never earned the $6,200, and 
that he failed to deposit and maintain the funds in an attorney trust account until earned. 
Sixth, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he did not advise 
Martin to seek independent counsel to review the Attorney Engagement Agreement’s 
statement that he would not deposit unearned funds into an attorney trust account. 
Ucheomumu asserts that there is no evidence that he did not provide such advice. 
Ucheomumu’s assertion is a red herring.  MLRPC 1.15(c) required Ucheomumu to obtain 
Martin’s “informed consent, confirmed in writing, to” his practice of not depositing 
unearned funds into an attorney trust account.  Comment 6 to MLRPC 1.0 addresses 
informed consent, in pertinent part, as follows: “In some circumstances[,] it may be 
appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client . . . to seek the advice of another lawyer.”  
Ucheomumu failed to put into writing advice of Martin’s right to seek independent counsel, 
or a statement that he had orally provided such advice.  And Ucheomumu simply makes a 
bald allegation that the hearing judge clearly erred with respect to the finding. 
Seventh, although Ucheomumu does not challenge the hearing judge’s finding that 
he never ordered the transcripts or advised Martin to do so, he contends that he promptly 
- 17 - 
attempted to obtain the transcripts from her previous counsel.  Ucheomumu’s contention 
does not undermine the hearing judge’s finding.  On November 4, 2014, in an attempt to 
obtain Martin’s case file, Ucheomumu e-mailed her previous counsel, who, he believed, 
had copies of the transcripts.  Regardless of whether Ucheomumu’s belief was accurate, 
Martin’s previous counsel never provided the transcripts.  As of November 20, 2014, when 
the Court of Special Appeals issued an order to proceed—which triggered a ten-day 
deadline for ordering the transcripts, see Md. R. 8-411(b)(1)—it was incumbent on 
Ucheomumu to promptly order the transcripts.  
Eighth, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that his inaction caused 
the appeal’s dismissal.  Ucheomumu argues that he could not have been responsible for the 
appeal’s dismissal, as the appeal was “a nullity” because Martin prematurely filed a notice 
of appeal while a motion to alter or amend the judgment was pending.  Ucheomumu is 
wrong.  The hearing judge admitted into evidence the child custody case’s docket entries. 
According to a docket entry dated July 24, 2014, at a hearing, the circuit court awarded the 
opposing party primary physical and sole legal custody of Martin’s children.  According 
to a docket entry dated September 22, 2014, Martin filed a motion to alter or amend the 
judgment.  And, according to a docket entry dated October 3, 2014, the circuit court issued 
an order in which it again awarded the opposing party primary physical and sole legal 
custody of Martin’s children.  The order was a final judgment, regardless of whether the 
circuit court expressly denied the motion to alter or amend.  Indeed, another docket entry 
dated October 3, 2014 stated that the child custody case was closed.  Martin needed to file 
a notice of appeal within thirty days of the ruling disposing of the motion to alter or amend.  
- 18 - 
See Md. 8-202(c).  The date that was thirty days from October 3, 2014—namely, 
November 2, 2014—was a Sunday, so the deadline for the filing of the appeal was the next 
day.  See Md. R. 1-203(a)(1).  On November 3, 2014, Martin filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal.  In short, the appeal was not “a nullity,” and its dismissal was Ucheomumu’s fault. 
Ninth, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he did not advise 
Martin to seek independent counsel to review the release that he had e-mailed to Martin 
and her new counsel.  Ucheomumu also states that Martin testified that he orally advised 
her to discuss the release with her new counsel.  In light of the record confirming Martin’s 
testimony, we sustain Ucheomumu’s exception. 
Tenth, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he never complied 
with Martin’s requests for a copy of the Motion for Extension.  Contrary to Ucheomumu’s 
position, the evidence supports the hearing judge’s finding.  The hearing judge admitted 
into evidence a series of e-mails between Ucheomumu and Martin with the subject 
“Date[.]”  On March 10, 2015, Martin e-mailed Ucheomumu, stating in pertinent part: 
“How does the exten[s]ion process work? . . . Please forward me a copy of what you filed.” 
On March 11, 2015, at 7:41 a.m., Martin e-mailed Ucheomumu, stating: “Please respond.” 
At 10:08 p.m., Martin e-mailed Ucheomumu, stating in pertinent part: “I did not receive a 
copy of the exten[s]ion [that] you filed.  If you were not able to figure out how to e[-]mail 
it, please leave a sealed envelope copy at the concierge desk tomorrow[.]”  Martin’s 10:08 
p.m. e-mail is the last in the series.  In other words, the record demonstrates that 
Ucheomumu never replied to Martin’s requests for a copy of the Motion for Extension. 
Additionally, Martin testified that she did not recall ever receiving a copy of the Motion 
- 19 - 
for Extension.  Martin’s testimony, and the e-mails between Martin and Ucheomumu, 
demonstrate that the hearing judge did not clearly err in finding that he failed to provide 
her with a copy of the Motion for Extension. 
Eleventh, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he made a false 
statement by representing in the Motion for Extension that there had been a delay in 
ordering the transcripts because he had not received Martin’s case file from her previous 
counsel.  The hearing judge found that, in the Motion for Extension, Ucheomumu 
stated that the delay in filing the transcripts . . . was due to: (1) the uncertainty 
concerning the length of the [] trial[,] and[,] specifically[,] whether the trial 
spanned two or three days; (2) [Ucheomumu]’s inability to obtain [] Martin’s 
[case] file from her [previous counsel]; and (3) the [circuit court] 
experiencing several closures.  Although[] the reasons for the delay [that 
were] proffered by [Ucheomumu] are not persuasive[—]and, in fact, did not 
convince the Court of Special Appeals to grant the [Motion for E]xtension—
[]there is not clear and convincing evidence that they are knowingly false 
statements.  The evidence presented was not clear and convincing with 
regard to [Ucheomumu]’s proffer in the [M]otion [for Extension] that his 
uncertainty of the trial dates caused him to do further research on the issue, 
and him thereby violating [MLRPC 3.3].  Additionally, no such ruling was 
made by the Court of Special Appeals [i]n the denial of [the M]otion [for 
Extension]. 
[Ucheomumu]’s inability to obtain [] Martin’s [case] file from her 
[previous counsel] may or may not have delayed the filing because[,] as 
proffered in [the Motion for Extension, Ucheomumu] believed [that] 
Martin’s previous [counsel] already had copies of the transcript[s].  
However, this argument falls short because[,] in [Ucheomumu]’s December 
08, 2014 [text message to] Martin[,] he specifically ask[ed] her for $3,000.00 
for the purpose of ordering the transcripts.  Therefore, as of December 8, 
2014[, Ucheomumu] was no longer waiting for [] Martin’s [previous 
counsel] to provide the transcripts, as he indicated he would order them with 
[] Martin’s $3,000.00 payment.  [] Martin made the payment as requested[] 
on December 10, 2014, yet the Motion for Extension [] was not filed until 
February 27, 2015, almost three months later.  It is clear from 
[Ucheomumu]’s [text message] on December 08, 2014 that he was no longer 
waiting for copies of the transcripts from [] Martin’s [previous counsel].  
When [Ucheomumu] received the second $3,000.00 payment for the purpose 
- 20 - 
of ordering the transcripts, there was no evidence of any impediment that 
would cause a delay in ordering them. 
This representation made by [Ucheomumu] within [the M]otion 
[Extension] is a knowingly false statement of fact[.]  
 
(Cleaned up). 
Ucheomumu asserts that the hearing judge contradicted herself by finding both that 
“there [wa]s not clear and convincing evidence that [Ucheomumu’s statements we]re 
knowingly false[,]” and that Ucheomumu made “a knowingly false statement of fact[.]”  In 
context, it is clear that, when the hearing judge found that “there [wa]s not clear and 
convincing evidence that [Ucheomumu’s statements we]re knowingly false[,]” she was 
referring to Ucheomumu’s statements that he was uncertain of how long the trial had been, 
and that the circuit court had been closed for multiple days.  Indeed, immediately after 
making this finding, the hearing judge stated that there was not “clear and convincing” 
evidence that Ucheomumu’s statement in the Motion for Extension about “his uncertainty 
of the trial dates” was a violation of MLRPC 3.3—i.e., a false statement.  And, elsewhere 
in the opinion, the hearing judge observed that the circuit court was closed every day 
between February 19, 2015 and March 8, 2015.  A fair reading of the hearing judge’s 
remarks leads to the conclusion that the hearing judge’s finding of dishonesty pertained to 
Ucheomumu’s statement that there had been a delay in ordering the transcripts because he 
had not received Martin’s case file from her previous counsel.  
Alternatively, Ucheomumu maintains that the hearing judge’s finding that he made 
a false statement in the Motion for Extension was clearly erroneous because the hearing 
judge clearly erred in finding that he requested from Martin money to cover the cost of 
- 21 - 
obtaining transcripts on December 8, 2014, and that the purpose of Martin’s $3,000 
payment on December 10, 2014 was to cover the cost of obtaining the transcripts.  In his 
twelfth exception, Ucheomumu makes the same argument in challenging the hearing 
judge’s finding that he made a false statement to Bar Counsel when he represented that he 
had advised Martin to order the transcripts, that she had never paid him so that he could 
order the transcripts, and that the Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal because 
Martin had failed to order the transcripts.  As explained above, the hearing judge did not 
clearly err in making the findings of fact to which Ucheomumu excepts. 
Thirteenth, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he made 
misrepresentations to Martin.  The hearing judge found that Ucheomumu 
misled . . . Martin in an attempt to explain his failure to order the transcripts.  
Ultimately, [the] appeal was dismissed because [Ucheomumu] did not order 
the transcripts. . . . [Ucheomumu] tried to disclaim his responsibility for the 
dismissal of the appeal by placing blame on [] Martin for the delay in the 
order, via an e[-]mail.  This Court finds [that Ucheomumu] made several 
knowing and intentional misrepresentations and omissions . . . to [] Martin[.]  
 
Ucheomumu contends that the hearing judge’s opinion leaves unclear the 
misrepresentations that he made to Martin.  We disagree.  The hearing judge found that 
Ucheomumu “misled . . . Martin in an attempt to explain his failure to order the transcripts.” 
The hearing judge explained that Ucheomumu was responsible for the appeal’s dismissal, 
yet he blamed Martin for it in an e-mail.  The hearing judge found that, on March 30, 2015, 
Ucheomumu e-mailed to Martin the order in which the Court of Special Appeals dismissed 
the appeal, and he stated to her: “[Y]ou have not paid for the transcripts[.]”  Ucheomumu’s 
statement was false, as the purpose of Martin’s $3,000 payment on December 10, 2014 was 
- 22 - 
to cover the cost of obtaining the transcripts.  By e-mailing the order to Martin and stating 
that she had not paid for the transcripts, Ucheomumu not only lied about her alleged failure 
to pay for the transcripts, but also falsely implied that she was responsible for the appeal’s 
dismissal.  
Fourteenth, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he “did not 
instruct [] Martin to order the transcripts by the [December 1], 2014 deadline.” 
Ucheomumu argues that, in the Amended Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, 
Bar Counsel did not allege that he failed to advise Martin to order the transcripts by a 
certain date, and instead simply alleged that he never advised Martin to order the 
transcripts.  Ucheomumu’s claim of lack of notice is without merit.  In the Amended 
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, Bar Counsel alleged: “On November 20, 
2014, the Court of Special Appeals ordered [] Martin’s appeal to proceed without a pre-
hearing conference.  Maryland Rule 8-411(b) requires that an appellant order the transcripts 
of the underlying proceedings within ten [] days from the date of that Order.”  
(Emphasis added).  The Amended Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action indicated 
that Ucheomumu allegedly failed to meet the deadline of December 1, 2014—the day after 
November 30, 2014, which was a Sunday that was ten days after November 20, 2014, when 
the Court of Special Appeals issued the order to proceed. 
Fifteenth, Ucheomumu excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to find that he 
communicated with Martin on multiple occasions from October 2014 to March 2015. 
Ucheomumu does not proffer that any of his communications contradict the hearing 
judge’s findings that Ucheomumu failed to inform Martin of the December 1, 2014 
- 23 - 
deadline for ordering the transcripts, and failed to inform Martin that he had missed the 
December 1, 2014 deadline.  And, at various points within the opinion, the hearing judge 
discussed communications between Ucheomumu and Martin that occurred between 
October 2014 and March 2015—namely, Ucheomumu’s December 8, 2014 text message 
to Martin, her November 3, 2014, November 19, 2014, and December 10, 2014 payments 
to him, and his February 24, 2015 e-mail to her.  We decline to find that the hearing judge 
clearly erred in failing to determine that Ucheomumu communicated with Martin numerous 
times between October 2014 and March 2015. 
(C) Conclusions of Law 
Bar Counsel does not except to any of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. 
Ucheomumu excepts to all of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  We reverse the 
hearing judge’s conclusions that Ucheomumu attempted to violate MLRPC 1.8(h)(1) and 
1.8(h)(2), thereby violating MLRPC 8.4(a), and uphold the rest the hearing judge’s 
conclusions of law.  
MLRPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.2(a) (Allocation of Authority Between Client and 
Lawyer), and 1.3 (Diligence) 
 
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”  MLRPC 1.1.  “A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”  MLRPC 1.3.  MLRPC 
1.2(a) states in pertinent part: 
[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
the representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to 
- 24 - 
the means by which they are to be pursued.  A lawyer may take such action 
on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the 
representation. 
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2(a), and 1.3.  The Attorney Engagement Agreement 
set forth the objectives of Ucheomumu’s representation of Martin in the appeal—namely, 
that he would draft a brief and participate in oral argument on her behalf.  On November 
20, 2014, the Court of Special Appeals issued an order to proceed, meaning that the 
transcripts of the relevant proceedings in the circuit court needed to be ordered by 
December 1, 2014.  Ucheomumu never ordered the transcripts, never advised Martin to do 
so, and never filed a timely motion for extension of time to file the transcripts.  As a result, 
the Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal, and there was no oral argument.  
Ucheomumu never drafted a brief on Martin’s behalf.  Ucheomumu’s inaction constituted 
a failure of competence and diligence, as well as a failure to accomplish the objectives of 
his representation of Martin. 
MLRPC 1.4 (Communication) 
MLRPC 1.4 states: 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
 
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with 
respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in [MLRPC] 1.0(f), 
is required by [the MLRPC]; 
 
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; 
 
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and 
 
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the 
- 25 - 
lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance 
not permitted by the [MLRPC] or other law. 
 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.[6] 
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.4(a)(2).  On November 20, 2014, the Court of Special 
Appeals issued an order to proceed, meaning that the transcripts of the relevant proceedings 
in the circuit court needed to be ordered by December 1, 2014.  See Md. R. 8-411(b)(1) 
(2014), 1-203(a)(1).  Ucheomumu did not inform Martin of the December 1, 2014 deadline.  
On December 8, 2014, Ucheomumu sent Martin a text message, requesting money to cover 
the cost of obtaining transcripts.  Ucheomumu did not inform Martin that he had missed 
the December 1, 2014 deadline for ordering the transcripts.  On February 2, 2015, the Court 
of Special Appeals issued an order directing Martin to show cause why the appeal should 
not be dismissed for failure to file the transcripts.  Ucheomumu did not inform Martin of 
the show cause order, or advise her that the Court of Special Appeals would dismiss the 
appeal for failure to file the transcripts.  By not advising Martin of the December 1, 2014 
deadline, his failure to meet it, his failure’s possible consequences, and the show cause 
order, Ucheomumu failed to keep Martin reasonably informed about the appeal’s status. 
                                              
6Without specifying a section, the hearing judge concluded that Ucheomumu 
violated MLRPC 1.4.  The hearing judge stated that Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.4 
“when he did not keep [] Martin reasonably informed[,]” “by failing to promptly comply 
with [] Martin’s reasonable requests for information[,]” and “by failing to inform [] Martin 
about any additional hourly costs of his legal services outside of the original $10,500.00 
flat fee[.]”  These conclusions are consistent with violations of MLRPC 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 
and 1.4(b), respectively.  
- 26 - 
 Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.4(a)(3).  On two occasions, Martin requested a copy of 
the Motion for Extension, but she did not hear back from Ucheomumu.  Subsequently, 
Martin requested that Ucheomumu provide copies of all of the documents that he had 
drafted on her behalf.  Ucheomumu never did so.   
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.4(b).  The Attorney Engagement Agreement stated that 
Ucheomumu would represent Martin in the appeal for a flat fee of $10,500, and that, if, 
“[a]fter starting the work,” Ucheomumu’s firm withdrew from the representation “due to 
any conflict,” Martin would receive a refund on a “pro[ ]rata basis[,] or” her payments 
would be applied to “outstanding legal bills.”  The Attorney Engagement Agreement did 
not specify an hourly rate or explain how the amount of any “outstanding legal bills[,]” or 
the amount of any refund on “a pro[ ]rata basis[,]” would be calculated.  After Martin 
terminated Ucheomumu’s representation, sought a refund, and requested an accounting of 
all of the legal services that he had performed for her, he provided her with an invoice that 
indicated that she owed him $10,944.50 based on an hourly rate of $295.  This was the first 
occasion on which Ucheomumu indicated that he would charge Martin an hourly rate.  By 
failing to explain to Martin before the representation began that he would charge an hourly 
rate, and that he would charge more than the $10,500 flat fee, Ucheomumu failed to explain 
his manner of billing to the extent reasonably necessary to permit Martin to make an 
informed decision regarding whether to retain him. 
- 27 - 
MLRPC 1.5(a) (Reasonable Fees) and 1.5(b) (Communication of Fees) 
MLRPC 1.5 states in pertinent part: 
(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an 
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.  The factors to be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the 
likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment of the lawyer; (3) the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount 
involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the 
client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the 
lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed 
or contingent. 
 
(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and 
expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to 
the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after 
commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a 
regularly represented client on the same basis or rate.  Any changes in the 
basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.[7] 
 
(Some paragraph breaks omitted). 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.5(a).  Martin paid Ucheomumu a total of $6,200 to 
represent her in the appeal.  The Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal due to 
Ucheomumu’s failure to order the transcripts or advise Martin to do so.  Ucheomumu did 
                                              
7Without specifying a section, the hearing judge concluded that Ucheomumu 
violated MLRPC 1.5.  Bar Counsel specifically charged Ucheomumu with violating—and, 
in the opinion, the hearing judge mentioned only—MLRPC 1.5(a) and 1.5(b).  The hearing 
judge concluded that Ucheomumu charged “unreasonable” fees and “fail[ed] to fully 
communicate the basis or rate of his fees[,]” which constitute violations of MLRPC 1.5(a) 
and 1.5(b), respectively. 
- 28 - 
not draft a brief on Martin’s behalf or appear at oral argument.  Although Ucheomumu 
provided legal services pertaining to visitation with Martin’s children, those were not a 
significant undertaking on his part.  The $6,200 that Ucheomumu collected constituted an 
unreasonable fee. 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.5(b).  The conduct that constitutes a violation of MLRPC 
1.4(b), which is discussed above, also constitutes a violation of MLRPC 1.5(b). 
MLRPC 1.15(a) and 1.15(c) (Safekeeping Property) 
MLRPC 1.15 states in pertinent part: 
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a 
lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the 
lawyer’s own property.  Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained 
pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules[.] 
 
* * * 
 
(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a 
different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit legal fees and expenses that 
have been paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those 
funds for the lawyer’s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses 
incurred. 
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusions that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.15(a) and 1.15(c).  The Attorney Engagement Agreement 
stated that Ucheomumu’s firm would “deposit any and all” payments “in [its] general 
operating account, and not in a trust account.”  Ucheomumu did not advise Martin to seek 
independent counsel to review the Attorney Engagement Agreement’s statement that he 
would not deposit unearned funds into an attorney trust account.  Ucheomumu failed to 
- 29 - 
obtain Martin’s informed consent not to deposit unearned funds into an attorney trust 
account.  Martin paid Ucheomumu a total of $6,200 in payments that he either failed to 
deposit into, or deposited and subsequently withdrew from, his attorney trust account.  
Ucheomumu never earned the $6,200; thus, he violated MLRPC 1.15(a) and 1.15(c) by 
failing to maintain that $6,200 in his attorney trust account. 
MLRPC 1.16(d) (Terminating Representation) 
MLRPC 1.16(d) states: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent 
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of another 
lawyer, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled[,] and 
refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned 
or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent 
permitted by other law.[8] 
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.16(d).  Ucheomumu never earned the $6,200 that Martin 
had paid him.  Yet, after Martin terminated Ucheomumu’s representation, he offered to 
refund only $1,200.  Additionally, when Ucheomumu repeated his offer to refund $1,200, 
he conditioned the offer on Martin signing a release that would preclude her from suing 
him.  
 
 
                                              
8Without specifying a section, the hearing judge concluded that Ucheomumu 
violated MLRPC 1.16.  Given that Bar Counsel specifically charged Ucheomumu with 
violating, and the hearing judge quoted only, MLRPC 1.16(d), it is evident that the hearing 
judge concluded that Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.16(d). 
- 30 - 
MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 8.1(a) (Disciplinary Matters), 
8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (Conduct That 
Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice) 
 
“A lawyer shall not knowingly[] make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal[.]”  MLRPC 3.3(a)(1).  “[A] lawyer . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter[] 
shall not[] knowingly make a false statement of material fact[.]”  MLRPC 8.1(a).9  “It is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation[.]”  MLRPC 8.4(c).  “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]”  MLRPC 
8.4(d).  “Generally, a lawyer violates MLRPC 8.4(d) where the lawyer’s conduct would 
negatively impact the perception of the legal profession of a reasonable member of the 
public.”  Slate, 457 Md. at 645, 180 A.3d at 155 (cleaned up). 
The hearing judge concluded that Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 
8.4(c) by falsely representing to the Court of Special Appeals that there had been a delay 
in ordering the transcripts because he had not received Martin’s case file from her previous 
counsel.  The hearing judge concluded that Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) 
by falsely representing to Bar Counsel that he had advised Martin to order the transcripts, 
that she had never paid him so that he could order the transcripts, and that the Court of 
Special Appeals had dismissed the appeal because Martin had failed to order the 
transcripts.  The hearing judge concluded that Ucheomumu also violated MLRPC 8.4(c) 
                                              
9Without specifying sections, the hearing judge concluded that Ucheomumu 
violated MLRPC 3.3 and 8.1.  Given that Bar Counsel specifically charged Ucheomumu 
with violating, and the hearing judge quoted only, MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.1(a), it is evident 
that the hearing judge concluded that Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.1(a). 
- 31 - 
by falsely representing to Martin that she was responsible for the appeal’s dismissal.  The 
hearing judge concluded that Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 8.4(d) through his “conduct 
toward” Martin, Bar Counsel, and the Court of Special Appeals.  We uphold all of these 
conclusions. 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusions that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) by falsely representing to the Court of 
Special Appeals that there had been a delay in ordering the transcripts because he had not 
received Martin’s case file from her previous counsel.  On November 4, 2014, Ucheomumu 
e-mailed Martin’s previous counsel in an attempt to obtain her case file.  Ucheomumu 
believed that Martin’s previous counsel had copies of the transcripts.  Martin’s previous 
counsel, however, never provided any documents to Ucheomumu.  Ucheomumu never 
ordered the transcripts, never advised Martin to do so, and never filed a timely motion for 
extension of time to file the transcripts.  As a result of Ucheomumu’s inaction, the 
transcripts were not ordered by the December 1, 2014 deadline.  On December 8, 2014, 
Ucheomumu sent Martin a text message, stating: “Shannan, how is your funding coming?  
I need to order the transcript[s] ASAP without any further delay.”  (Emphasis added).  
As the hearing judge explained, by stating that he “need[ed] to order the transcript[s]” 
himself, Ucheomumu indicated that, as of that date, he was no longer waiting for Martin’s 
previous counsel to provide the transcripts.  Almost two months later, on February 2, 2015, 
the Court of Special Appeals issued an order directing Martin to show cause why the appeal 
should not be dismissed for failure to file the transcripts.  On February 27, 2015, 
Ucheomumu filed the Motion for Extension, in which, instead of acknowledging that he 
- 32 - 
was at fault for the failure to order the transcripts, he falsely represented that one of the 
reasons for the delay in ordering the transcripts was that Martin’s previous counsel had not 
provided her case file. Whereas the truth was that Ucheomumu was responsible for 
ordering the transcripts—a fact that he had expressly acknowledged almost two months 
earlier—he instead blamed Martin’s previous counsel for the failure to order the transcripts.  
As the hearing judge found, Ucheomumu “misled . . . the Court of Special Appeals . . . in 
an attempt to explain his failure to order the transcripts.”  
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusions that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) by falsely representing to Bar Counsel that 
he had advised Martin to order the transcripts, that she had never paid him so that he could 
order the transcripts, and that the Court of Special Appeals had dismissed the appeal 
because she had failed to order the transcripts.  Ucheomumu’s first statement was false 
because he never advised Martin to order the transcripts.  Ucheomumu’s second statement 
was false because, on December 10, 2014, Martin paid him $3,000 for the purpose of 
covering the cost of obtaining the transcripts.  Ucheomumu’s third statement was false 
because he, not Martin, was responsible for both the failure to order the transcripts and the 
appeal’s dismissal.  
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by falsely representing to Martin that she was 
responsible for the appeal’s dismissal.  On March 30, 2015, Ucheomumu e-mailed to 
Martin the order in which the Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal, and he falsely 
stated: “[Y]ou have not paid for the transcripts[.]”  
- 33 - 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 8.4(d).  Ucheomumu’s false statements to Martin, Bar 
Counsel, and the Court of Special Appeals would certainly “negatively impact the 
perception of the legal profession of a reasonable member of the public.”  Slate, 457 Md. 
at 645, 180 A.3d at 155 (cleaned up). 
MLRPC 8.4(a) (Violating or Attempting to Violate the MLRPC) and 1.8(h) 
(Conflict of Interest; Current Clients; Specific Rules) 
 
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to[] violate or attempt to violate the” 
MLRPC.  MLRPC 8.4(a).  MLRPC 1.8(h) states: 
A lawyer shall not: 
 
(1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to 
a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in 
making the agreement; or 
 
(2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an 
unrepresented client or former client unless that person is advised in writing 
of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek 
the advice of independent legal counsel in connection therewith. 
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 8.4(a) by violating other MLRPC.  As discussed above, 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b), 1.5(a), 1.5(b), 
1.15(a), 1.15(c), 1.16(d), 3.3(a)(1), 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). 
The hearing judge also concluded that Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 8.4(a) by 
attempting to violate MLRPC 1.8(h)(1) and MLRPC 1.8(h)(2).  We reverse these 
conclusions. 
After Martin terminated Ucheomumu’s representation and hired new counsel to 
- 34 - 
represent her in the appeal, Ucheomumu e-mailed Martin and her new counsel, offering to 
refund her $1,200 on the condition that she would sign a release that was attached to the e-
mail, and that would preclude her from suing him.  Ucheomumu did not advise Martin in 
writing to seek independent counsel to review the release, but mailed the written release to 
Martin and her new counsel.  
These circumstances do not constitute clear and convincing evidence of an attempt 
to violate MLRPC 1.8(h)(1).  Ucheomumu e-mailed the release to both Martin and her new 
counsel.  To be sure, the hearing judge found that Martin retained new counsel to represent 
her in the appeal—not to represent her in her dealings with Ucheomumu.  That said, the 
hearing judge did not find that Martin’s new counsel did not or could not review, and/or 
advise her regarding, the release. 
As to MLRPC 1.8(h)(2), Ucheomumu e-mailed the release to Martin and her new 
counsel, and Martin testified that Ucheomumu orally advised her to discuss the release with 
her new counsel.  Although Ucheomumu did not advise Martin in writing of the desirability 
of consulting with independent legal counsel about the release, under these circumstances, 
we decline to find an attempted violation of MLRPC 1.8(h)(2). 
(D) Sanction 
Bar Counsel recommends that we disbar Ucheomumu, who does not expressly 
recommend a sanction in the event that we deny his requests to dismiss this attorney 
discipline proceeding or remand for a new hearing.  
In Slate, 457 Md. at 646-47, 180 A.3d at 155-56, this Court stated: 
This Court sanctions a lawyer not to punish the lawyer, but instead to protect 
- 35 - 
the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.  This Court 
accomplishes these goals by: (1) deterring other lawyers from engaging in 
similar misconduct; and (2) suspending or disbarring a lawyer who is unfit 
to continue to practice law. 
 
In determining an appropriate sanction for a lawyer’s misconduct, this Court 
considers: (1) the MLRPC that the lawyer violated; (2) the lawyer’s mental 
state; (3) the injury that the lawyer’s misconduct caused or could have 
caused; and (4) aggravating factors and/or mitigating factors. 
 
Aggravating factors include: (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or 
selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the 
MLRPC; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by 
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; 
(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to 
acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s 
vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) 
indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s 
consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of 
controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. 
 
Mitigating factors include: (1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) 
the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional 
problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the 
misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel or a 
cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) 
inexperience in the practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical 
disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including 
alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical evidence that the 
lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the 
chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the 
lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is 
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the 
misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline 
proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; 
(13) remoteness of prior violations of the MLRPC; and (14) unlikelihood of 
repetition of the misconduct. 
 
(Cleaned up). 
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Aita, 458 Md. 101, 140, 134-35, 139, 181 A.3d 
- 36 - 
774, 796, 795, 792-93 (2018), this Court unanimously disbarred Anna Aita, who violated 
MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a), 1.15(c), 1.15(d), 1.16(d), 
3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), and former Maryland Rules 16-604 (Trust Account—
Required Deposits) and 16-606.1 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping).  Aita 
represented two clients in separate immigration cases.  See id. at 108, 181 A.3d at 777.  
Aita failed to deposit unearned funds from both clients into an attorney trust account.  See 
id. at 110, 113, 181 A.3d at 779, 781. 
In the first immigration case, Aita filed an application for cancellation of removal.  
See id. at 110, 181 A.3d at 779.  Aita’s client provided documents that would have 
supported the application, but she failed to file them.  See id. at 110, 118, 181 A.3d at 779, 
783.  After a hearing was scheduled, Aita failed to inform her client of the hearing.  See id. 
at 122, 181 A.3d at 785.  Neither Aita nor her client attended the hearing; Aita arranged for 
another lawyer, who knew nothing about the first immigration case, to substitute for her.  
See id. at 122, 118, 181 A.3d at 785, 783.  An Immigration Court ordered Aita’s client 
removed from the United States.  See id. at 111, 181 A.3d at 779.  Aita’s client sent her 
two text messages, to which she failed to respond.  See id. at 111, 181 A.3d at 779.  On her 
client’s behalf, Aita filed a motion to reopen in which she falsely represented that her client 
failed to appear at the hearing because his car broke down.  See id. at 112, 181 A.3d at 780.  
The Immigration Court granted the motion to reopen and scheduled another hearing.  See 
id. at 112, 181 A.3d at 780.  Aita failed to inform her client of the second hearing, which 
neither she nor her client attended.  See id. at 112, 181 A.3d at 780.  Once again, the 
Immigration Court ordered Aita’s client removed from the United States.  See id. at 112, 
- 37 - 
181 A.3d at 780.  Aita’s client’s partner paid her to file a second motion to reopen, but she 
never did so.  See id. at 112, 181 A.3d at 780.  Aita’s client retained new counsel, to whom 
she did not provide her client’s case file until after Bar Counsel requested that she do so.  
See id. at 112-13, 181 A.3d at 780. 
In the second immigration case, Aita’s client retained her to file an application for 
suspension of removal, and to represent her at a hearing.  See id. at 113, 181 A.3d at 780-
81.  Aita, however, never filed anything on her client’s behalf, and failed to attend the 
hearing; Aita arranged for another lawyer, who knew nothing about the second immigration 
case, to substitute for her.  See id. at 114-15, 181 A.3d at 781. 
This Court noted nine aggravating factors: a dishonest or selfish motive; a pattern 
of misconduct; multiple violations of the MLRPC; submission of false evidence, false 
statements, or other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; a refusal 
to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; the victims’ vulnerability; substantial 
experience in the practice of law; indifference to making restitution or rectifying the 
misconduct’s consequences; and likelihood of repetition of the misconduct.  See id. at 139, 
181 A.3d at 795.  This Court noted two mitigating factors: the absence of prior attorney 
discipline, and character or reputation.  See id. at 139, 181 A.3d at 795. 
Here, Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2(a), and 1.3 by never ordering the 
transcripts, never advising Martin to do so, and not filing a timely motion for extension of 
time to file the transcripts.  Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.4(a)(2) by not advising Martin 
of the deadline for ordering the transcripts, his failure to meet it, his failure’s possible 
consequences, and the show cause order.  Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.4(a)(3) by 
- 38 - 
failing to comply with Martin’s requests for copies of certain documents.  Ucheomumu 
violated MLRPC 1.4(b) and 1.5(b) by failing to communicate that he would charge an 
hourly rate.  Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.5(a) by collecting, and failing to earn, the 
$6,200 that Martin paid him.  Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.15(a) and 1.15(c) by failing 
to deposit unearned funds into, and withdrawing unearned funds from, his attorney trust 
account.  Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.16(d) by failing to refund unearned funds and 
attempting to get Martin to sign the release that would preclude her from suing him.  
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) by falsely representing to the 
Court of Special Appeals that there had been a delay in ordering the transcripts because he 
had not received Martin’s case file from her previous counsel.  Ucheomumu violated 
MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) by falsely representing to Bar Counsel that he had 
advised Martin to order the transcripts, that she had never paid him so that he could order 
the transcripts, and that the Court of Special Appeals had dismissed the appeal because 
Martin had failed to order the transcripts.  Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) 
by falsely representing to Martin that she was responsible for the appeal’s dismissal. 
The hearing judge found that Ucheomumu’s misrepresentations to Martin and Bar 
Counsel were “knowing and intentional[,]” and that he made “a knowingly false statement 
of fact” to the Court of Special Appeals.  Ucheomumu’s misconduct injured Martin, in that 
he caused the appeal’s dismissal.  Notably, Martin’s new counsel’s attempts to salvage the 
appeal were unsuccessful; Martin’s new counsel filed a Motion to Reinstate, which the 
Court of Special Appeals denied, and then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which 
this Court denied.  Thus, because of Ucheomumu, Martin lost the opportunity to challenge 
- 39 - 
on appeal an order that was unfavorable to her in a child custody case.   
We note seven aggravating factors.  First, Ucheomumu has prior attorney discipline.  
Although the discipline was imposed after the events that underlie this case, the prior 
misconduct that resulted in that discipline occurred before the misconduct in this case.  Just 
two years ago, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ucheomumu, 450 Md. 675, 717, 150 
A.3d 825, 849-50 (2016), this Court unanimously indefinitely suspended Ucheomumu 
from the practice of law in Maryland with the right to apply for reinstatement after ninety 
days, with reinstatement conditioned on him “provid[ing] the Attorney Grievance 
Commission and Bar Counsel with appropriate documentation showing the existence and 
maintenance of an attorney trust account.”  To date, Ucheomumu has not been reinstated.  
In Ucheomumu, id. at 701-12, 150 A.3d at 840-47, this Court concluded that 
Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.4(b) (Communication), 1.5(a) 
(Unreasonable Fees), 1.15(a), 1.15(c) (Safekeeping Property), 1.16(d) (Termination of 
Representation), 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions), 3.4(a), 3.4(d) (Fairness to 
Opposing Party and Counsel), and 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the 
Administration of Justice), former Maryland Rules 16-604 (Trust Account—Required 
Deposits) and 16-606.1 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping), and Md. Code Ann., 
Bus. Occ. & Prof. (1989, 2010 Repl. Vol.) § 10-306 (Trust Money Restrictions). 
Ucheomumu’s facts are as follows.  In July 2010, an individual asked Ucheomumu 
to represent an LLC that he controlled.  See id. at 685, 150 A.3d at 831.  Ucheomumu 
drafted a retainer agreement, which the individual signed on the LLC’s behalf.  See id. at 
685, 150 A.3d at 831.  The retainer agreement stated that the LLC would pay Ucheomumu 
- 40 - 
a nonrefundable retainer in the amount of $10,000, and that he would bill the LLC $195 an 
hour.  See id. at 686, 150 A.3d at 831. 
From July 2010 through December 2012, Ucheomumu performed various legal 
services for the individual and two LLCs that he controlled.  See id. at 686-87, 150 A.3d 
at 831-32.  During this timeframe, Ucheomumu did not maintain an attorney trust account.  
See id. at 686, 150 A.3d at 831.  Ucheomumu deposited all of the individual’s and the 
LLCs’ payments into his general bank account.  See id. at 686-87, 150 A.3d at 831-32.  
The payments included funds that were earmarked for third parties, such as other lawyers.  
See id. at 687, 150 A.3d at 832.  Aside from his bank records and a single invoice, 
Ucheomumu did not keep contemporaneous records of the individual’s and the LLCs’ 
payments.  See id. at 686, 150 A.3d at 831. 
On behalf of one of the LLCs, Ucheomumu filed a complaint against a company 
that had paid the LLC an advance fee for a loan, not received any funds from the LLC, 
unsuccessfully sought a refund of the advance fee, and then allegedly falsely accused the 
LLC of mishandling the loan.  See id. at 689, 150 A.3d at 833.  Ucheomumu did not 
conduct any “pertinent factual investigation before filing the complaint.”  Id. at 689, 150 
A.3d at 833.  Ucheomumu failed to appear at a pretrial conference, and was sanctioned.  
See id. at 689, 150 A.3d at 833.  Ucheomumu responded to discovery requests with 
frivolous objections, and was again sanctioned.  See id. at 689-90, 150 A.3d at 833.  The 
individual who controlled the LLCs requested invoices and a complete copy of his file, 
which Ucheomumu failed to provide.  See id. at 692, 150 A.3d at 835. 
Significantly, in Ucheomumu, id. at 686-87, 150 A.3d at 831-32, Ucheomumu’s 
- 41 - 
misconduct occurred between July 2010 and December 2012, which was nearly two years 
before November 2014, when he began engaging in the misconduct that gave rise to this 
attorney discipline proceeding.  As such, Ucheomumu’s instant misconduct was not an 
aberration; instead, it was simply the latest in a pattern of misconduct that has spanned 
multiple years. 
That brings us to the second, third, and fourth aggravating factors—namely, that 
Ucheomumu committed multiple violations of the MLRPC, demonstrated a pattern of 
misconduct, and is likely to repeat his misconduct.  Both in this attorney discipline 
proceeding and in Ucheomumu, id. at 701-12, 150 A.3d at 840-47, Ucheomumu violated 
MLRPC 1.1, 1.4(b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a), 1.15(c), 1.16(d), and 8.4(d).  Given that Ucheomumu 
has violated all of these MLRPC on two occasions, it is likely that he would continue to do 
so if given the opportunity. 
Fifth, sixth, and seventh, Ucheomumu had selfish motives, refused to acknowledge 
his misconduct’s wrongful nature, and showed indifference to making restitution.  Martin 
retained Ucheomumu to represent her in the appeal, and paid him a total of $6,200. 
Ucheomumu caused the appeal’s dismissal by failing to order the transcripts.  Thus, 
Ucheomumu never earned the $6,200 that Martin had paid him.  But, after Martin 
terminated Ucheomumu’s representation, he did not refund the $6,200.  Instead, on two 
occasions, Ucheomumu offered to refund only $1,200—and his second offer was 
conditioned on Martin signing a release that would preclude her from suing him.  In other 
words, despite having engaged in inaction that ultimately caused the appeal’s dismissal, 
Ucheomumu attempted to permanently deprive Martin of $5,000 of the $6,200 that she had 
- 42 - 
paid him, as well as any amount that she could recover by suing him.  And, after the Court 
of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal, Ucheomumu misrepresented to Martin that she 
was responsible for the appeal’s dismissal, when, in fact, it was his fault.  By offering a 
negligible refund and falsely blaming Martin for his own mistakes, Ucheomumu showed 
indifference to making restitution, refused to acknowledge his misconduct’s wrongful 
nature, and demonstrated that he had the selfish motives of keeping unearned funds and 
deflecting blame for the appeal’s dismissal.10 
The hearing judge reasoned that Ucheomumu’s misconduct was mitigated by his 
“provision of some legal services [that were] related to” visitation with Martin’s children. 
Although this circumstance does not correspond to any of the mitigating factors that this 
Court or the American Bar Association has recognized, see Slate, 457 Md. at 647, 180 A.3d 
at 156; American Bar Association’s Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 9.32, we 
accept the hearing judge’s finding.11  As to other mitigating factors, although Ucheomumu 
                                              
10Unlike the hearing judge, we do not determine that Ucheomumu’s misconduct is 
aggravated by false statements during this attorney discipline proceeding.  Rather than 
constituting a factor that aggravates his misconduct, Ucheomumu’s misrepresentations to 
Bar Counsel are themselves instances of misconduct—namely, violations of MLRPC 
8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). 
11Although we accept the hearing judge’s finding that Ucheomumu’s misconduct is 
mitigated by his provision of legal services related to visitation with Martin’s children, we 
give this mitigating factor little weight.  The Attorney Engagement Agreement stated that 
Ucheomumu would represent Martin in the appeal for $10,500.  The Attorney Engagement 
Agreement did not contemplate that Ucheomumu would provide legal services related to 
visitation with Martin’s children.  After Martin terminated Ucheomumu’s representation, 
he provided her with an invoice that indicated that she owed him $10,944.50 based on an 
hourly rate of $295.  As discussed above in our analysis of Ucheomumu’s exceptions to 
the hearing judge’s findings of fact, given that he could not have provided Martin with 
more than $10,500’s worth of legal services in the appeal—as he never ordered transcripts 
(Continued...) 
- 43 - 
became a lawyer in 2009 and “was a newly admitted attorney at the time of” his misconduct 
from 2010 to 2012 in Ucheomumu, 450 Md. at 714, 150 A.3d at 848, he had been a member 
of the Bar of Maryland for more than five years at the time of the 2014 misconduct that 
gave rise to this attorney discipline proceeding.  Thus, the mitigating factor of inexperience 
in the practice of law does not apply.  Although the hearing judge in Ucheomumu expressly 
found credible testimony about Ucheomumu’s character, see id. at 715, 150 A.3d at 848, 
the hearing judge in this attorney discipline proceeding made no findings about his 
character.  Thus, the mitigating factor of good character is not applicable.  Finally, we 
disagree with Ucheomumu to the extent that he contends that his misconduct is mitigated 
by delay in this attorney discipline proceeding because of “Martin’s inability to recall 
events that [had] happened almost four years earlier[.]”  Martin’s recollection was 
sufficient for the hearing judge to make detailed findings of fact regarding Ucheomumu’s 
misconduct. 
We agree with Bar Counsel that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for 
Ucheomumu’s misconduct.  “Disbarment follows as a matter of course[] when a member 
of the bar is shown to be willfully dishonest for personal gain by means of fraud, deceit, 
cheating[,] or like conduct, absent the most compelling extenuating circumstances[.]”  
                                              
of the circuit court proceedings, filed briefs, or appeared at any oral argument—he 
necessarily billed her for legal services that were not related to his representation of her in 
the appeal.  Because Ucheomumu evidently attempted to charge Martin for legal services 
that were related to visitation with her children, and that were not mentioned in the Attorney 
Engagement Agreement, his provision of those legal services does little to mitigate his 
misconduct.  That said, in an appropriate case, a lawyer’s provision of legal services, above 
and beyond what a retainer agreement requires him or her to provide, might constitute a 
mitigating factor that is entitled to more than minimal weight. 
- 44 - 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Peters-Hamlin, 447 Md. 520, 544-45, 136 A.3d 374, 388 
(2016) (cleaned up).  After failing to order the transcripts, Ucheomumu falsely represented 
to the Court of Special Appeals that Martin’s previous counsel was to blame for the delay 
in ordering the transcripts, and he falsely represented to Martin and Bar Counsel that she 
was to blame.  Ucheomumu made these misrepresentations because he had the selfish 
motive of keeping the $6,200 that Martin had paid him.  In other words, Ucheomumu was 
“willfully dishonest for personal gain[.]”  Id. at 545, 136 A.3d at 388 (citation omitted). 
As this Court has repeatedly stated, “[h]onesty and dishonesty are, or are not, 
present in an attorney’s character.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 457 Md. 159, 
223, 177 A.3d 640, 678 (2018) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 
Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001)).  Ucheomumu made false statements to Martin, 
Bar Counsel, and the Court of Special Appeals.  Tellingly, in an e-mail to Martin, 
Ucheomumu stated: “I specifically did not want to let the Court of Special Appeals know 
that you have not paid for the transcripts because it is my duty to protect you.” 
Ucheomumu’s statement that Martin had “not paid for the transcripts” was false because 
she had paid him $3,000 for the purpose of covering the cost of obtaining the transcripts.  
Even more importantly, Ucheomumu’s statement about “not want[ing] to let the Court of 
Special Appeals know” about a significant purported fact reflects a striking willingness to 
deceive a court. 
Given the absence of significant mitigating factors, much less “compelling 
extenuating circumstances[,]” Peters-Hamlin, 447 Md. at 545, 136 A.3d at 388 (cleaned 
up), Ucheomumu’s multiple false statements, without more, would justify disbarment.  It 
- 45 - 
is even clearer that disbarment is the appropriate sanction when we take into account 
Ucheomumu’s various other forms of misconduct, including failures of competence, 
diligence, and communication, collecting an unreasonable fee, and failing to maintain 
unearned funds in an attorney trust account.  Worse still, there are seven aggravating 
factors, including prior attorney discipline, a pattern of misconduct, and likelihood of 
repetition of misconduct.  Considered together, all of these circumstances merit 
disbarment. 
Ucheomumu’s misconduct is similar to that of Aita, whom this Court unanimously 
disbarred.  See Aita, 458 Md. at 140, 181 A.3d at 796.  Both lawyers failed to perform 
extremely simple tasks; Ucheomumu failed to order transcripts, and Aita failed to inform 
her client of a hearing.  See id. at 122, 181 A.3d at 785.  Afterward, both lawyers filed 
motions in which they lied in attempts to cover up their mistakes; Ucheomumu filed a 
Motion for Extension in which he blamed Martin’s previous counsel for the delay in 
ordering the transcripts, and Aita filed a motion to reopen in which she blamed car trouble 
for her client’s failure to appear at the hearing.  See id. at 112, 181 A.3d at 780.  Both 
lawyers’ inaction resulted in the worst possible outcomes in their clients’ cases; 
Ucheomumu’s inaction caused the appeal’s dismissal, and Aita’s inaction caused the 
Immigration Court to order her client removed from the United States.  See id. at 111-12, 
181 A.3d at 779-80.  Both lawyers failed to protect their clients’ interests after the 
representations terminated; Ucheomumu failed to refund the $6,200 that Martin had paid 
him, and Aita did not provide her client’s case file to his new counsel until after Bar 
Counsel requested that she do so.  See id. at 113, 181 A.3d at 780.  Both lawyers failed to 
- 46 - 
file important documents that their clients had retained them to file; Ucheomumu never 
drafted a brief on Martin’s behalf, and Aita failed to file an application for suspension of 
removal.  See id. at 113-14, 181 A.3d at 780-81.  Both lawyers charged fees that were 
unreasonable in light of their failure to file important documents.  See id. at 135, 181 A.3d 
at 793.  Both lawyers failed to maintain unearned funds in an attorney trust account.  See 
id. at 110, 113, 181 A.3d at 779, 781.  And, both lawyers failed to keep their clients 
reasonably informed about the status of their cases, failed to respond to their clients’ 
requests for updates about their cases, and failed to properly communicate matters to their 
clients.  See id. at 134, 181 A.3d at 792-93. 
Significantly, with the exception of MLRPC 1.15(d), Ucheomumu violated all of 
the MLRPC that Aita did—namely, MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(b), 1.5(a), 
1.15(a), 1.15(c), 1.16(d), 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).  See id. at 134-35, 139, 181 A.3d at 
795, 792-93.  In addition, unlike Aita, Ucheomumu violated MLRPC 1.2(a), 1.5(b), and 
8.1(a). 
To be sure, Aita’s misconduct involved two clients, see id. at 108, 181 A.3d at 777, 
whereas Ucheomumu’s misconduct involves one client.  Aita violated MLRPC 1.15(d) and 
former Maryland Rules 16-604 and 16-606.1, see id. at 139, 181 A.3d at 795, whereas 
Ucheomumu did not.  And, there were nine aggravating factors in Aita, id. at 139, 181 A.3d 
at 795, whereas there are seven aggravating factors here.  That said, this attorney discipline 
proceeding’s circumstances warrant disbarment just as Aita’s did.  Whereas Aita lied only 
to an immigration court, see id. at 136, 181 A.3d at 794, Ucheomumu lied to Martin, Bar 
Counsel, and the Court of Special Appeals.  Unlike Aita, Ucheomumu failed to properly 
- 47 - 
communicate how he would charge fees.  And, whereas Aita had no prior attorney 
discipline, see id. at 139, 181 A.3d at 795, this Court has unanimously indefinitely 
suspended Ucheomumu from the practice of law in Maryland with the right to apply for 
reinstatement after ninety days, with reinstatement conditioned on him “provid[ing] the 
Attorney Grievance Commission and Bar Counsel with appropriate documentation 
showing the existence and maintenance of an attorney trust account[,]” Ucheomumu, 450 
Md. at 717, 150 A.3d at 849-50. 
A continuation of Ucheomumu’s existing indefinite suspension would be an 
inadequate sanction because his instant misconduct is more egregious than his previous 
misconduct.  In Ucheomumu, id. at 683-84, 712, 150 A.3d at 830, 847, Bar Counsel did 
not charge Ucheomumu with violating MLRPC 3.3, and this Court concluded that he did 
not violate MLRPC 8.4(c); by contrast, here, Ucheomumu violated both MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) 
and 8.4(c) by lying to Martin, Bar Counsel, and the Court of Special Appeals.  In 
Ucheomumu, id. at 716, 150 A.3d at 849, other than stating that Ucheomumu had “engaged 
in serious, wide-ranging misconduct, and violated numerous MLRPC, two Maryland 
Rules, and one provision of the Code of Maryland[,]” this Court did not specifically note 
any aggravating factors; by contrast, here, there are seven aggravating factors, including 
selfish motives, a refusal to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature, and likelihood 
of repetition of the misconduct. 
We agree with Assistant Bar Counsel’s assertion at oral argument that this attorney 
discipline proceeding is distinguishable from Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hecht, 459 
Md. 133, 158, 148-55, 184 A.3d 429, 444, 438-42 (2018), in which this Court indefinitely 
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suspended from the practice of law in Maryland, with the right to apply for reinstatement 
after twelve months, Ross Hecht, who violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.16(a), 
1.16(d), 3.2, 3.3, 3.4(d), 4.1, 5.5(a), 5.5(b), 8.1(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).  In a civil case, 
Hecht filed a complaint on behalf of two clients, who were friends with his wife.  See id. 
at 139, 158, 184 A.3d at 433, 444.  In a separate attorney discipline proceeding, with his 
consent, this Court suspended Hecht from the practice of law in Maryland with the right to 
apply for reinstatement after six months.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hecht, 431 
Md. 443, 66 A.3d 46 (2013).  Hecht shut down his law practice and e-mailed his two clients 
about his suspension, but he was uncertain of whether they received the e-mail.  See Hecht, 
459 Md. at 139-40, 184 A.3d at 433. 
Months later, Hecht learned that his clients had not retained new counsel or 
responded to the opposing party’s discovery requests, which upset and worried Hecht.  See 
id. at 140, 184 A.3d at 433.  One of Hecht’s clients asked about the case’s status; in 
response, Hecht did not disclose his suspension, but provided the name of another lawyer 
and suggested that she meet him to determine whether he could serve as the clients’ new 
counsel.  See id. at 140, 184 A.3d at 433.  Hecht made three additional unsuccessful 
attempts to secure new counsel for his clients.  See id. at 144, 184 A.3d at 436.  Meanwhile, 
Hecht drafted discovery documents, e-mailed them to opposing counsel, and attended 
proceedings—though he sat in the gallery, did not cross the bar of the courtroom, and did 
not address the trial court.  See id. at 140-44, 184 A.3d at 433-35. 
Opposing counsel scheduled a deposition of Hecht’s clients, one of whom informed 
Hecht that she was unavailable on the scheduled date.  See id. at 144, 184 A.3d at 435.  
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Hecht failed to inform opposing counsel of his client’s unavailability until after the 
deposition was scheduled to begin.  See id. at 144, 184 A.3d at 435.  The opposing party 
filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted.  See id. at 144, 184 A.3d at 435-
36.  Hecht paid his clients $30,000 as restitution for the case’s dismissal.  See id. at 144, 
184 A.3d at 436.  Hecht acknowledged his mistakes, and was remorseful for them.  See id. 
at 144, 184 A.3d at 436.  Multiple character witnesses, including two circuit court judges, 
testified that Hecht was competent and truthful.  See id. at 144-45, 184 A.3d at 436. 
For various reasons, Hecht is materially distinguishable from this attorney discipline 
proceeding.  In Hecht, 459 Md. at 157, 184 A.3d at 443, there were only four aggravating 
factors: prior attorney discipline, multiple violations of the MLRPC, a pattern of 
misconduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law.  By contrast, here, there are 
seven aggravating factors: prior attorney discipline, multiple violations of the MLRPC, a 
pattern of misconduct, likelihood of repetition of misconduct, selfish motives, a refusal to 
acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature, and indifference to making restitution. 
While there were “several mitigating factors” in Hecht, id. at 158, 184 A.3d at 443, 
there is only one here.  Indeed, in many respects, Hecht and this attorney discipline 
proceeding are the exact opposite with regard to mitigating factors.  Whereas the lawyer in 
Hecht “repeatedly admitted that he made mistakes” and “expressed remorse for” them, id. 
at 158, 184 A.3d at 443-44, Ucheomumu has refused to acknowledge his misconduct’s 
wrongful nature.  Whereas Hecht “did not profit from [his clients’] case,” id. at 158, 184 
A.3d at 444, Ucheomumu collected from Martin $6,200 that he never earned or refunded. 
Whereas Hecht paid his clients “$30,000 of his own money as restitution” after the trial 
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court dismissed their case, id. at 158, 184 A.3d at 444, Ucheomumu showed indifference 
to making restitution after he caused the appeal’s dismissal.  Whereas Hecht “made 
numerous unsuccessful efforts to get new counsel to represent” his clients, id. at 158, 184 
A.3d at 444, the only attempt that Ucheomumu made to remedy his failure to order the 
transcripts was to file an untimely Motion for Extension in which he lied to the Court of 
Special Appeals.  And, whereas Hecht made a “wrong decision, predicated on worry and a 
sense of loyalty for his wife’s friends,” id. at 158, 184 A.3d at 444, Ucheomumu failed to 
complete an extremely simple task—namely, ordering the transcripts—and then lied to 
Martin, Bar Counsel, and the Court of Special Appeals in an attempt to deflect the blame 
for his mistake. 
In light of all of these significant differences between Hecht and this attorney 
discipline proceeding, Hecht furnishes no support for the proposition that Ucheomumu’s 
many serious violations of the MLRPC warrant a sanction that is less than disbarment.  
Given Ucheomumu’s multiple misrepresentations and other serious misconduct, and the 
seven aggravating factors, disbarment is warranted and necessary to protect the public. 
For the above reasons, we disbar Ucheomumu. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY 
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF 
THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND 
RULE 19-709(d), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT 
IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
AGAINST 
ANDREW NDUBISI UCHEOMUMU.