Case Title: Cal. Charter Schs. Ass’n v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S208611

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
Filed 4/9/15 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CALIFORNIA CHARTER SCHOOLS 
) 
ASSOCIATION, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S208611 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/5 B242601 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL 
) 
DISTRICT et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC438336 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In 2000, California voters enacted Proposition 39, which requires school 
districts to share their facilities with charter schools so that charter school students 
have access to facilities ―reasonably equivalent‖ to those available to other public 
school students.  (Ed. Code, § 47614, as amended by Prop. 39, as approved by 
voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000).)  In 2002, the State Board of Education (Board) 
issued regulations on how to implement this requirement.  For more than a decade, 
the Board‘s regulations and the underlying mandate of Proposition 39 have been 
the subject of considerable litigation.  (See, e.g., Bullis Charter School v. Los Altos 
School Dist. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1022 (Bullis); New West Charter Middle 
School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 831; 
Ridgecrest Charter School v. Sierra Sands Unified School Dist. (2005) 130 
Cal.App.4th 986; Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union 
 
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High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139; Sequoia Union High School Dist. 
v. Aurora Charter High School (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 185.) 
This case, an action for declaratory relief, concerns the meaning of a Board 
regulation that governs the allocation of classrooms to charter schools.  The 
regulation requires a school district to count the number of classrooms in certain 
―comparison group schools‖ and to divide the average daily attendance (ADA) of 
students at those schools by the number of classrooms.  The resulting 
ADA/classroom ratio dictates how many classrooms the district must provide to a 
charter school that requests facilities. 
In allocating classrooms to charter schools, the Los Angeles Unified School 
District (District) uses what it calls ―norming ratios,‖ which purport to establish 
throughout the District a uniform student/teacher ratio in a given grade level.  The 
District contends that its use of these districtwide ratios, rather than ratios 
developed from counting classrooms in comparison group schools, satisfies the 
Board‘s regulation and provides reasonably equivalent facilities to charter schools.  
The District further contends that the classrooms to be counted are only those that 
are, in the words of the applicable regulation, ―provided to‖ K-12 students, and not 
classrooms that are dedicated to other uses, such as preschool or adult education. 
The California Charter Schools Association (CCSA) contends that the 
District violates the applicable regulation by using districtwide norming ratios 
rather than counting classrooms in comparison group schools to determine the 
allocation of classroom facilities.  CCSA also contends that under the applicable 
regulation, the classroom count used to determine the ADA/classroom ratio must 
include some classrooms dedicated to preschool instruction or adult education as 
well as some classrooms used for noninstructional purposes.  According to CCSA, 
the District‘s norming ratios improperly reduce the number of classrooms to which 
charter schools are entitled. 
 
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We agree with CCSA that the District‘s use of norming ratios, rather than 
counting classrooms in comparison group schools, violates the regulation 
governing the allocation of classrooms to charter schools.  At the same time, we 
agree with the District that in allocating classrooms to charter schools, it must 
count only those classrooms provided to K-12 noncharter students and not 
classrooms dedicated to other uses.  However, counting classrooms provided to K-
12 students is not tantamount to counting classrooms staffed by teachers.  The 
District‘s equation of the two in its norming ratios is another reason why those 
ratios do not comply with the Board‘s regulations.  The District must therefore 
prospectively modify its approach to allocating classrooms to charter schools. 
I. 
The Charter Schools Act of 1992 seeks ―to provide opportunities for 
teachers, parents, pupils, and community members to establish and maintain 
schools that operate independently from the existing school district structure.‖  
(Ed. Code, § 47601.)  Charter schools are public schools ― ‗free from most state 
laws pertaining uniquely to school districts.‘ ‖  (United Teachers of Los Angeles v. 
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 504, 521.)  The freedom 
granted to charter schools is intended to promote choice and innovation, and to 
stimulate ―competition within the public school system.‖  (§ 47601, subd. (g).)  
Like other public schools, charter schools are ―accountable for meeting 
measurable pupil outcomes.‖  (Id., subd. (f).) 
Charter schools receive state funding primarily based on the number and 
type of students they serve.  (Ed. Code, § 47633.)  Because charter schools have 
limited means of obtaining public funds to cover the cost of facilities, they often 
must rely on school facilities within the control of the school districts they 
compete with.  Before the adoption of Proposition 39, a charter school was entitled 
―to use, at no charge, facilities not currently being used by the school district for 
 
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instructional or administrative purposes, or that have not been historically used for 
rental purposes.‖  (Former § 47614, as added by Stats. 1998, ch. 34, § 15, p. 202.)  
In other words, charter schools had access only to public school facilities that 
districts weren‘t using. 
 
Proposition 39 changed the way school districts must share facilities with 
charter schools.  It amended Education Code section 47614 (hereafter section 
47614) so that it now reads in relevant part:  ―(a) The intent of the people in 
amending Section 47614 is that public school facilities should be shared fairly 
among all public school pupils, including those in charter schools.  [¶] (b) Each 
school district shall make available, to each charter school operating in the school 
district, facilities sufficient for the charter school to accommodate all of the charter 
school‘s in-district students in conditions reasonably equivalent to those in which 
the students would be accommodated if they were attending other public schools 
of the district.  Facilities provided shall be contiguous, furnished, and equipped, 
and shall remain the property of the school district.  The school district shall make 
reasonable efforts to provide the charter school with facilities near to where the 
charter school wishes to locate, and shall not move the charter school 
unnecessarily.‖  Section 47614 further provides in part:  ―Each year each charter 
school desiring facilities from a school district in which it is operating shall 
provide the school district with a reasonable projection of the charter school‘s 
average daily classroom attendance by in-district students for the following year.  
The district shall allocate facilities to the charter school for that following year 
based upon this projection.‖  (§ 47614, subd. (b)(2).) 
 
Subdivision (b)(6) of section 47614 provides that the ―State Department of 
Education shall propose, and the State Board of Education may adopt, regulations 
implementing this subdivision, including but not limited to defining the terms 
‗average daily classroom attendance,‘ ‗conditions reasonably equivalent,‘ ‗in-
 
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district students,‘ ‗facilities costs,‘ as well as defining the procedures and 
establishing timelines for the request for, reimbursement for, and provision of, 
facilities.‖  This rulemaking authority ―complements [the Board‘s] general 
authority in [Education Code] section 33031 to ‗adopt rules and regulations not 
inconsistent with the laws of this state . . . (c) for the government of the day and 
evening elementary schools, [and] the day and evening secondary schools . . . .‘ ‖  
(California School Bds. Assn. v. State Bd. of Education (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 
530, 542.)  
Pursuant to this regulatory authority, the Department of Education proposed 
and the Board adopted regulations to implement Proposition 39.  The regulations 
included California Code of Regulations, title 5, section 11969.3, which provides 
the means for determining ―whether facilities provided to a charter school are 
sufficient to accommodate charter school students in conditions reasonably 
equivalent to those in which the students would be accommodated if they were 
attending public schools of the school district providing facilities, as required by 
Education Code section 47614(b).‖  (All citations to regulations are to this title 
unless otherwise indicated.) 
According to the regulation, ―[t]he standard for determining whether 
facilities are sufficient to accommodate charter school students in conditions 
reasonably equivalent to those in which the students would be accommodated if 
they were attending public schools of the school district providing facilities shall 
be a comparison group of district-operated schools with similar grade levels.‖  
(§ 11969.3, subd. (a)(1).)  ―The comparison group shall be the school district-
operated schools with similar grade levels that serve students living in the high 
school attendance area . . . in which the largest number of students of the charter 
school reside.  The number of charter school students residing in a high school 
attendance area shall be determined using in-district classroom ADA projected for 
 
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the fiscal year for which facilities are requested.‖  (Id., subd. (a)(2).)  When 
students in a district do not attend high school based on attendance areas, ―the 
comparison group shall be three schools in the school district with similar grade 
levels that the largest number of students of the charter school would otherwise 
attend.  For school districts with fewer than three schools with similar grade 
levels, the comparison group shall be all schools in the school district with similar 
grade levels.‖  (Id., subd. (a)(3).) 
Subdivision (b)(1) of section 11969.3 (hereafter section 11969.3(b)(1)) 
provides that the ADA/classroom ratio in the comparison group schools dictates 
the number of classrooms a school district must allocate to a charter school:  
―Facilities made available by a school district to a charter school shall be provided 
in the same ratio of teaching stations (classrooms) to ADA as those provided to 
students in the school district attending comparison group schools.  School district 
ADA shall be determined using projections for the fiscal year and grade levels for 
which facilities are requested.  Charter school ADA shall be determined using in-
district classroom ADA projected for the fiscal year and grade levels for which 
facilities are requested.  The number of teaching stations (classrooms) shall be 
determined using the classroom inventory prepared pursuant to California Code of 
Regulations, title 2, section 1859.31, adjusted to exclude classrooms identified as 
interim housing.‖  (§ 11969.3(b)(1).)   
California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 1859.31 (hereafter section 
1859.31) is a regulation implementing the Leroy F. Greene School Facilities Act 
(Ed. Code, § 17070.10 et seq.), which governs the allocation of state funds for 
school facilities construction.  The regulation requires preparation of a school 
district inventory of classrooms to determine funding eligibility for facility 
construction and modernization.  Under section 1859.31, ―[t]he district shall 
prepare a gross inventory consisting of all classrooms owned or leased in the 
 
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district . . . .‖  Included in this inventory are any classrooms ―for which a contract 
was signed for the construction or acquisition of facilities‖ or ―for which 
construction work has commenced‖ at the time of application for funds requested 
under the act; classrooms used as ―shops, science laboratories, computer 
laboratories, or computer classrooms‖; classrooms ―used for preschool programs‖; 
classrooms ―converted to any non-classroom purpose including use by others‖; 
and classrooms ―included in a closed school.‖  (Ibid.) 
In addition to the classroom sharing requirement of subdivision (b)(1) of 
section 11969.3, subdivision (b)(2) of the same regulation provides for the 
equitable sharing of ―specialized classroom space, such as science laboratories,‖ 
and subdivision (b)(3) addresses the sharing of ―non-teaching station space‖ such 
as kitchens and administrative space. 
To be eligible for the allocation of classrooms and other space in public 
schools, a charter school must submit a request for facilities documenting its 
projected ADA and other pertinent information by November 1 of the year before 
the school year for which the facilities are requested.  (§ 11969.9, subds. (b), (c).)  
By the following February 1, the school district receiving the request must make a 
preliminary space allocation proposal that ―[at] a minimum‖ ―shall include (1) the 
projections of in-district classroom ADA on which the proposal is based, (2) the 
specific location or locations of the space, (3) all conditions pertaining to the 
space, including a draft of any proposed agreement pertaining to the charter 
school‘s use of the space, and (4) the projected pro rata share amount and a 
description of the methodology used to determine that amount.  The district shall 
also provide the charter school a list and description of the comparison group 
schools used in developing its preliminary proposal, and a description of the 
differences between the preliminary proposal and the charter school‘s facilities 
request . . . .‖  (Id., subd. (f).)  After the charter school has had an opportunity to 
 
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respond to the proposal, the district must make a final space offer to the charter 
school by April 1, and the charter school must notify the District whether it 
accepts the offer within 30 days or by May 1, whichever is later.  (Id., subds. (g)–
(i).) 
II. 
CCSA is a nonprofit charter school membership organization whose 
members include several charter schools in the District.  On May 17, 2007, CCSA 
filed two lawsuits against the District, claiming that the District had failed to 
comply with Proposition 39 in extending facilities offers to charter schools.  On 
April 22, 2008, CCSA and the District entered into a settlement agreement to 
resolve those lawsuits. 
Paragraph 3 of the settlement agreement states:  ―Provided that a CCSA 
member charter school submits [a] future facilities request that is legally sufficient 
under Proposition 39 and any Proposition 39 implementing regulations in effect at 
that time, LAUSD shall make a facilities offer to that charter school that complies 
with Proposition 39 and any Proposition 39 implementing regulations in effect at 
that time.  This obligation shall apply to requests for facilities that are submitted 
for the 2008-2009 school year, shall inure to the benefit of all CCSA member 
charter schools . . . , and shall continue for the term of this Agreement [i.e., until 
June 30, 2013].‖ 
On May 24, 2010, CCSA filed a complaint in superior court against the 
District, alleging breach of the settlement agreement (first cause of action) and 
violation of Proposition 39 (seventh cause of action).  The complaint sought 
specific performance, a permanent injunction, appointment of a special master, 
and declaratory relief.  CCSA filed a motion for summary adjudication of the first 
and seventh causes of action, which the trial court granted in part.  The trial court 
ordered the District to extend facilities offers to all charter schools that submitted 
 
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legally sufficient facilities requests for the 2011–2012 school year and to make 
Proposition 39-compliant facilities offers to all CCSA member charter schools that 
submit legally sufficient facilities requests for future school years until the end of 
the settlement agreement.  The trial court denied CCSA‘s requests for injunctive 
and declaratory relief.  The District did not challenge this order. 
On May 17, 2012, CCSA filed a motion to enforce the trial court‘s order 
with regard to the District‘s facilities offers for the 2012–2013 school year.  
According to CCSA, those offers, which were based on the District‘s norming 
ratios, failed to provide facilities to charter schools in the same ADA/classroom 
ratio as those provided to students attending comparison group schools, as 
required by section 11969.3(b)(1).  The District‘s 2011–2012 budget described the 
norming ratio as follows:  ―Most District schools receive their base allocations of 
teachers, school administrators, school clerical positions, and various resources on 
the basis of Board-approved ‗norms,‘ which determine the resources to be 
allocated individual schools.‖  In response to charter school requests for facilities, 
the District explained that ―consistent with norming ratios used for District 
students, the District provides classrooms to Charter School students at a ratio of 
24:1 for grades K-3; 30.5:1 for grades 4-6; 28:1 for grades 7-8; and 30:1 for grades 
9-12.‖  According to the District, the norming ratios are an appropriate way to 
ensure that the ADA/classroom ratio in each charter school is reasonably 
equivalent to the ADA/classroom ratio in comparison group schools.  By contrast, 
CCSA argued that the District‘s approach did not make use of comparison schools 
as section 11969.3 requires and excluded classrooms that should have been 
counted, thereby improperly inflating the ADA/classroom ratio used to determine 
the number of classrooms provided to charter schools.  
Consistent with the level of generality at which the litigation was 
conducted, the trial court did not determine whether a particular charter school 
 
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was entitled to more classrooms.  Instead, the trial court ordered that ―in 
determining the number of teaching stations to provide to charter schools 
requesting facilities under Prop. 39, [the District] must comply with Section 
11969.3(b)(1) of the Prop. 39 Implementing Regulations, and must not use 
‗norming ratios‘ to reduce teaching stations offered to charter schools in the 
future.‖ 
The District appealed this order, and the Court of Appeal sided with the 
District.  The court acknowledged that ―the regulatory language explicitly states 
that ‗the number of teaching stations (classrooms) shall be determined using the 
classroom inventory prepared pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 2, 
section 1859.31, [fn. omitted] adjusted to exclude classrooms identified as interim 
housing . . . .‘  The regulations have a clear formula that does not rely on how 
many students a district decides to put in each classroom as a district-wide 
average, but rather on how many students and classrooms, whether they are used 
as classrooms or not, the district has in the relative comparison group schools.‖  
But the court ultimately focused on this sentence in section 11969.3(b)(1):  
―Facilities made available by a school district to a charter school shall be provided 
in the same ratio of teaching stations (classrooms) to ADA as those provided to 
students in the school district attending comparison group schools.‖  (Italics 
added.) 
Drawing ―a distinction between facilities that are ‗provided‘ and ‗classroom 
inventory,‘ ‖ the court held that the District is required to count only those 
classrooms actually provided to K-12 students in deriving the ADA/classroom 
ratio used to allocate classrooms to charter schools.  ―If we were to adopt the 
analysis proffered by CCSA,‖ the court explained, ―it may well have anomalous 
results.  For example, the District would have to count classrooms that have been 
contracted for but not yet built and classrooms at closed school sites.  ‗It is well 
 
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established that a statute open to more than one construction should be construed 
so as to avoid anomalous or absurd results.‘ ‖  The court concluded that ―[t]he 
District‘s use of norming ratios is consistent with the intent of Proposition 39‖ to 
ensure that ―the charter school‘s in-district students are being accommodated in 
conditions reasonably equivalent to those in which those students would be 
accommodated if they were attending other public schools of the District.‖ 
We granted review. 
III. 
We note at the outset that neither party raises mootness as a bar to our 
deciding this case.  Although this litigation primarily concerned the allocation of 
facilities to charter schools in the 2012–2013 school year, the trial court‘s 
declaratory relief order prohibiting the District from using norming ratios will 
govern responses to future facilities requests.  In that sense, this case is not moot.  
In any event, the legality of a school district‘s offer of facilities to charter schools 
in a given school year is an important question that is likely to recur yet evade 
review because of the relatively short duration of the academic year for which a 
facilities offer is made.  (See People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1217–
1218; Bullis, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1032–1035.)  Indeed, the same dispute 
is likely to recur between the parties to this litigation with each new school year.  
(See Bullis, at p. 1034.) 
In addressing this dispute, we are mindful of the limited scope of the issue 
presented.  The controversy here is not over whether a particular charter school 
was offered the right number of classrooms.  Rather, CCSA requests declaratory 
relief with respect to the meaning of the pertinent regulations.  The question before 
us is whether the District‘s use of norming ratios complies with Proposition 39 
(§ 47614) and the implementing regulations (§ 11969.3).  In passing judgment on 
cases requesting declaratory relief, we decide only actual controversies and refrain 
 
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from issuing advisory opinions.  (See Pacific Legal Foundation v. California 
Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170; Selby Realty Co. v. City of San 
Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 117.) 
A. 
As noted, section 11969.3, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 11969.3(a)) 
provides that ―[t]he standard for determining whether facilities are sufficient to 
accommodate charter school students in conditions reasonably equivalent to those 
in which the students would be accommodated if they were attending public 
schools of the school district providing facilities shall be a comparison group of 
district-operated schools with similar grade levels.‖  (§ 11969.3(a)(1).)  The 
regulation defines comparison group schools as ―the school district-operated 
schools with similar grade levels that serve students living in the high school 
attendance area . . . in which the largest number of students of the charter school 
reside‖ (§ 11969.3(a)(2)) or, if a district‘s students do not attend high school based 
on attendance areas, the ―three schools in the school district with similar grade 
levels that the largest number of students of the charter school would otherwise 
attend‖ (§ 11969.3(a)(3)).  (See Bullis, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1054–1055.) 
In proposing the comparison group methodology in section 11969.3, the 
Department of Education in its Final Statement of Reasons said:  ―Subdivision (a) 
identifies a comparison group of school district facilities for use in determining 
whether a facility proposed for a charter school is reasonably equivalent to the 
school district facilities that charter school students would otherwise attend.  
Specifically, the subdivision requires that the comparison group consists of 
schools with similar grade levels that serve students living in the high school 
attendance area in which the largest number of charter school students reside.  The 
subdivision establishes a standard that is a middle ground between a comparison 
group that consists of all district-operated schools and a comparison group that 
 
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consists of one to three schools.  Using all district-operated schools as the 
comparison group would present administrative and data problems for school 
districts.  In addition, for large school districts, using all district-operated schools 
as the comparison group would result in a standard that might be significantly 
different than the neighborhood schools the charter school students would 
otherwise attend.  (This is because in large school districts the conditions in 
schools may vary widely from neighborhood to neighborhood.)  Using one to 
three schools would result in a group that is too small and would result in 
problems agreeing on the group selected.‖  (Cal. Dept. of Ed., Final Statement of 
Reasons, drafted in support of regs. promulgated under Prop. 39 (2002), pp. 5–6 
(Final Statement of Reasons).)   
The District in its briefing contends that using districtwide student/teacher 
norming ratios instead of counting classrooms in comparison group schools does 
not violate section 11969.3(a):  ―[T]he District‘s norming ratio is a control that 
ensures the number of students to classrooms provided each District school is 
consistent by grade level.  Therefore, the charter school‘s comparison group 
schools will have a reasonably equivalent ratio of students-to-classrooms to the 
norming ratios at which the charter school was allocated District facilities.‖  At 
oral argument, the District maintained that the regulation does not require it to use 
the comparison group method to derive the ADA/classroom ratio; instead, the 
regulation only requires the District to be able to demonstrate that the facilities it 
offers to charter schools are equivalent to what it would have offered if it had used 
the comparison group method.  In support of this position, the District quotes 
section 11969.3(a), which speaks of the comparison group as the ―standard for 
determining whether facilities are sufficient to accommodate charter school 
students in conditions reasonably equivalent to those in which the students would 
be accommodated if they were attending public schools of the school district 
 
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providing facilities.‖  (§ 11969.3(a)(1), italics added.)  The District reads this 
language to mean that the comparison group can be a retrospective ―standard for 
determining‖ whether facilities provided to charter schools meet the reasonable 
equivalence standard.  Further, the District says it has met the standard here, citing 
a document produced during this litigation that shows 12 facilities offers in which 
the number of classrooms provided to charter school students is reasonably 
equivalent to the number provided to noncharter public school students at 
comparison group schools. 
But nothing in the record suggests that the 12 facilities offers are 
representative of the scores of offers made by the District or that the District 
identified those 12 offers using a valid sampling methodology.  More 
fundamentally, the District is mistaken about the role of comparison group schools 
in the regulatory scheme.  Section 11969.9, which sets forth the procedures that 
school districts must follow in making facilities offers, requires that ―the district 
shall . . . provide the charter school a list and description of the comparison group 
schools used in developing its preliminary proposal‖ in response to a charter 
school‘s facilities request.  (§ 11969.9, subd. (f).)  This provision makes clear that 
the comparison group method cannot be used merely as a retrospective standard 
for determining reasonable equivalence; it must be used by school districts in 
developing their facilities offers to charter schools.  The regulations prescribe a 
specific, transparent method for deriving the ADA/classroom ratio to be applied in 
allocating classrooms to charter schools, thereby allowing charter schools and the 
public to readily verify whether a district has complied with the regulation.   
The District‘s alternative would require a charter school either to simply 
accept the District‘s assurance that its norming ratios produce reasonable 
equivalence in facilities between the charter school and its comparison group 
schools, or to compel the District through litigation to demonstrate reasonable 
 
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equivalence.  We doubt this is what the Board had in mind when it adopted section 
11969.3(a).  Indeed, the Department of Education and the Board explicitly rejected 
a districtwide approach akin to the District‘s norming ratios in favor of the 
comparison group method.  As noted, the department reasoned that in ―large 
school districts, using all district-operated schools as the comparison group would 
result in a standard that might be significantly different than the neighborhood 
schools the charter school students would otherwise attend‖ ―because in large 
school districts the conditions in schools may vary widely from neighborhood to 
neighborhood.‖  (Final Statement of Reasons, supra, at pp. 5–6.)  The regulation 
thus requires a more localized approach. 
The District‘s norming ratios may be more administratively efficient and 
may reflect a desirable goal of making student/teacher ratios uniform throughout 
the District.  And it may be that a school district and a charter school can agree on 
a method of allocation that is more efficient than one involving the comparison 
group method.  (See § 11969.1, subd. (b) [―If a charter school and a school district 
mutually agree to an alternative to specific compliance with any of the provisions 
of this article, nothing in this article shall prohibit implementation of that 
alternative . . . .‖].)  But the District may not unilaterally impose on charter schools 
a method of determining ADA/classroom ratios that is at odds with the governing 
regulation.  To the extent the District believes the comparison group method is too 
burdensome, it should address that concern to the Board or to the Legislature. 
We hold that the District must comply with section 11969.3(a) by using 
comparison group schools in calculating the number of classrooms it will make 
available to charter schools in response to a facilities request.   
B. 
We now turn to the parties‘ dispute over which classrooms must be counted 
in determining the ADA/classroom ratio pursuant to section 11969.3(b)(1).  CCSA 
 
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highlights section 11969.3(b)(1)‘s directive that ―[t]he number of teaching stations 
(classrooms) shall be determined using the classroom inventory prepared pursuant 
to California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 1859.31, adjusted to exclude 
classrooms identified as interim housing.‖  CCSA argues that this language 
requires school districts to count classrooms strictly according to the section 
1859.31 inventory, which accounts for all classrooms built or contracted for, no 
matter what their use.  At the same time, CCSA appears to acknowledge that the 
breadth of the section 1859.31 inventory will improperly inflate the classroom 
count from the standpoint of ensuring reasonable equivalence in the allocation of 
classrooms to charter and noncharter public schools.  To address this overbreadth, 
CCSA argues that the section 1859.31 inventory may be adjusted in a number of 
ways.  We find CCSA‘s approach unpersuasive because none of its proposed 
adjustments is anchored in a plausible reading of section 11969.3(b)(1). 
When interpreting a statute, ― ‗[w]e begin with the text of the statute as the 
best indicator of legislative intent‘ [citation], but we may reject a literal 
construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute or that 
would lead to absurd results‘ [citation].‖  (Simpson Strong-Tie Company, Inc. v. 
Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 27.)  Likewise, when interpreting a regulation, we 
begin with its text, but we may reject a literal construction contrary to the 
legislative intent apparent in the statute that the regulation is implementing.  The 
fundamental mandate of Proposition 39 is that school districts must make 
available to charter schools operating in the district ―facilities sufficient for the 
charter school to accommodate all of the charter school‘s in-district students in 
conditions reasonably equivalent to those in which the students would be 
accommodated if they were attending other public schools of the district.‖  
(§ 47614, subd. (b), italics added.)  The Board, in issuing implementing 
 
17 
 
regulations, had considerable discretion to prescribe how school districts are to 
satisfy this requirement. 
As noted, the section 1859.31 inventory was originally intended to govern 
the allocation of funds for construction of new facilities, not the allocation of 
reasonably equivalent facilities to charter schools and other public schools.  
Reading section 11969.3(b)(1) to require a classroom count that is strictly based 
on the section 1859.31 inventory would require the District to count classrooms 
already provided to charter schools.  While conceding that including such 
classrooms would improperly inflate the count, CCSA says the District could 
exclude such classrooms from the ADA/classroom ratio or, in the alternative, 
count the classrooms and add the ADA of any charter schools to the ratio‘s 
numerator.  But this proposed adjustment appears entirely ad hoc; it is not rooted 
in any reasonable construction of section 11969.3(b)(1).  It is, in CCSA‘s words, 
―a practical solution to the extent an impractical situation arises after the 
Implementing Regulations have been honestly interpreted.‖   
CCSA also contends that unbuilt classrooms should be excluded, even 
though section 1859.31, subdivision (a) provides that a classroom inventory 
―shall‖ include classrooms ―for which a contract was signed for the construction or 
acquisition of facilities or for which construction work has commenced‖ at the 
time a school district applies for funds to build new classrooms.  In support of its 
position, CCSA cites the Board‘s Final Statement of Reasons, which says that ―to 
account for the possible addition of schools and classrooms to the school district‘s 
inventory, the comparisons are calculated based on the projected number of 
teaching stations and projected ADA.‖  (Final Statement of Reasons, supra, at 
p. 6, italics added.)  
But section 11969.3(b)(1) makes clear that the ADA/classroom ratio is to 
be derived from ―ADA projected for the fiscal year‖ and classrooms ―determined 
 
18 
 
using the classroom inventory prepared pursuant to . . . . section 1859.31, adjusted 
to exclude classrooms identified as interim housing.‖  Section 11969.3(b)(1) 
makes no mention of the projected number of teaching stations.  The section 
1859.31 inventory requires counting unbuilt classrooms, whether projected to be 
completed in the relevant school year or not, even though counting such 
nonexistent classrooms does not further Proposition 39‘s goal of reasonable 
equivalence in facilities between charter and noncharter public schools.  CCSA 
proposes no plausible interpretation of section 11969.3(b)(1) that permits 
exclusion of classrooms included in the section 1859.31 inventory. 
CCSA would also exclude certain classrooms used for preschool or adult 
education, relying on California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 1859.32 
(hereafter section 1859.32).  That regulation provides that after the gross section 
1859.31 classroom inventory has been prepared, it ―will be reduced‖ by excluding 
certain categories of classrooms, including any classroom to be ―used exclusively 
for regional occupational centers, regional occupational programs, child care, 
preschool and/or Adult Education Programs, and [that] was built or acquired with 
funds specifically available for those purposes.‖  (§ 1859.32, subd. (f).)  But 
section 11969.3(b)(1) prescribes use of ―the classroom inventory prepared 
pursuant to . . . section 1859.31,‖ not use of the section 1859.31 inventory subject 
to the adjustments set forth in section 1859.32.  Further, even if it were reasonable 
to construe section 11969.3(b)(1)‘s reference to section 1859.31 as incorporating 
the adjustments in section 1859.32, the implication of CCSA‘s argument is that 
classrooms used exclusively for preschool or adult education purposes should be 
excluded from the ADA/classroom ratio only if those classrooms were ―built or 
acquired with funds specifically available for‖ preschool or adult education 
purposes.  (§ 1859.32, subd. (f).)  This limitation, which has to do with a district‘s 
eligibility for school construction funds, seems arbitrary from the standpoint of 
 
19 
 
promoting reasonable equivalence in facilities for charter and noncharter public 
schools. 
C. 
It is thus clear that the section 1859.31 inventory does not by itself provide 
a classroom count that furthers Proposition 39‘s goal of ensuring ―reasonably 
equivalent‖ facilities for charter and noncharter public schools.  (§ 47614, 
subd. (b).)  In approaching this issue, the District contends that the classroom 
inventory requirement of section 11969.3(b)(1) must be read in light of the 
regulation‘s first sentence, which says:  ―Facilities made available by a school 
district to a charter school shall be provided in the same ratio of teaching stations 
(classrooms) to ADA as those provided to students in the school district attending 
comparison group schools.‖  (Ibid., italics added.)  According to the District, only 
classrooms in the inventory that are ―provided to‖ noncharter public school K-12 
students in the District must be counted.  On this view, unbuilt classrooms, 
classrooms already used by charter schools, and classrooms dedicated to 
preschool, adult education, or other uses besides K-12 education are not ―provided 
to‖ such K-12 students and thus need not be counted in determining the 
ADA/classroom ratio under section 11969.3(b)(1). 
We agree with this reading of section 11969.3(b)(1).  Although section 
11969.3(b)(1) says ―[t]he number of teaching stations (classrooms) shall be 
determined using the classroom inventory prepared pursuant to . . . section 
1859.31,‖ the sentence of 11969.3(b)(1) that specifically addresses the allocation 
of facilities to charter schools refers to ―those [classrooms] provided to students in 
the school district attending comparison group schools.‖  (Italics added.)  This 
language is naturally read to mean that the classrooms to be counted in deriving 
the ADA/classroom ratio for allocating facilities to charter schools comprise a 
subset of the classrooms counted in the section 1859.31 inventory — namely, 
 
20 
 
―those provided to‖ noncharter K-12 public school students in the district.  
(§ 11969.3(b)(1).)  As noted, if the classroom count were based solely on the 
section 1859.31 inventory, it would include various classrooms that should be 
excluded for purposes of ensuring reasonable equivalence in charter and 
noncharter public school facilities.  Counting only ―those [classrooms] provided 
to‖ noncharter K-12 public school students in the district avoids this problem and, 
unlike the ad hoc adjustments proposed by CCSA, hews closely to the text of 
section 11969.3(b)(1). 
Classrooms used for preschool or adult education, or by other charter 
schools are not ―provided to‖ a district‘s noncharter K-12 public school students.  
Proposition 39 sought to level the playing field for charter and noncharter public 
schools with respect to facilities for K-12 education.  There is no indication that 
Proposition 39 was intended to affect or account for the practice of school districts 
allowing their facilities to be used for educational or community programs other 
than their own K-12 educational program.  Indeed, the 2008 settlement agreement 
between CCSA and the District acknowledges that preschool and adult education 
programs ―may remain in the space they currently use.‖ 
However, accepting the District‘s position that the term ―provided to‖ 
limits the scope of section 11969.3(b)(1) does not completely resolve the 
controversy before us.  CCSA argues in its briefing that even if reasonable 
equivalence is keyed to classrooms ―provided to‖ noncharter K-12 public school 
students, the District‘s norming ratios still produce an undercount because they 
―are based on the number of teachers LAUSD decides to hire for a school year, not 
on a calculation of the classrooms LAUSD actually has available for use.  LAUSD 
ignores the fact that a classroom can be ‗provided‘ to students even if it does not 
have an assigned teacher (e.g., by using an unstaffed classroom as a study room).‖  
We agree.  The fact that a classroom is not staffed by a teacher does not, by itself, 
 
21 
 
mean that it should not be counted as a classroom in determining the 
ADA/classroom ratio.  A classroom that is used for K-12 student activities may 
qualify as a classroom ―provided to‖ K-12 students, even if it is not staffed by a 
teacher specifically assigned to that classroom.  Because the District‘s norming 
ratios are essentially student/teacher ratios, they may undercount to some degree 
classrooms provided to K-12 students and therefore do not comply with section 
11969.3(b)(1)‘s method of counting classrooms. 
This understanding of the term ―provided to‖ is consistent with the 
Legislature‘s conception of charter schools as public schools that ―operate 
independently from the existing school district structure.‖  (§ 47601.)  The 
Legislature authorized the creation of charter schools in order to promote choice, 
innovation, and competition on the premise that charter schools, while remaining 
accountable for student outcomes, would be largely free to adopt different 
educational approaches and make different decisions than those made by the 
school districts in which they operate.  Counting only those classrooms staffed by 
an assigned teacher would effectively impute to charter schools the same staffing 
decisions made by the District.  But there is no reason to think a charter school 
would necessarily use classrooms in the same way that the District does.  
In sum, we hold that counting classrooms ―provided to‖ district students for 
purposes of section 11969.3(b)(1) is not the same as counting only those rooms a 
district elects to staff with a teacher.  Nor is it the same as counting all rooms 
listed in the section 1859.31 inventory, although the inventory provides a starting 
point.  Resolving what classrooms are ―provided to‖ district students for purposes 
of calculating the ADA/classroom ratio for a particular school may depend on site-
specific factors.  Because the parties have not asked us to resolve any concrete 
dispute over the allocation of particular classrooms to a particular charter school, 
we decline to opine with any greater specificity here.  We do not address whether, 
 
22 
 
for example, a room formerly used for K-12 classroom instruction but now used to 
store K-12 school supplies is a teaching station ―provided to‖ students under 
section 11969.3(b)(1), a ―specialized classroom space‖ under section 11969.3, 
subdivision (b)(2), or a ―non-teaching station space‖ under section 11969.3, 
subdivision (b)(3), or whether it fits multiple categories.  The proper classification 
of a disputed classroom or facility will ordinarily require a developed factual 
record that this declaratory relief action does not present. 
CONCLUSION 
In responding to a charter school‘s request for classroom space, a school 
district must follow a three-step process.  First, the district must identify 
comparison group schools as section 11969.3(a) prescribes.  Second, the district 
must count the number of classrooms in the comparison group schools using the 
section 1859.31 inventory and then adjust the number to reflect those classrooms 
―provided to‖ students in the comparison group schools.  Third, the district must 
use the resulting number as the denominator in the ADA/classroom ratio for 
allocating classrooms to charter schools based on their projected ADA.  Here, the 
District‘s use of norming ratios departs from the required procedure by failing to 
use comparison group schools and by equating classrooms ―provided to‖ students 
with classrooms staffed by teachers.  In responding to future facilities requests, the 
District must count classrooms in a manner that conforms to the regulation. 
 
23 
 
For the reasons above, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
1 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion California Charter Schools Association v. Los Angeles Unified School District 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 212 Cal.App.4th 689 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S208611 
Date Filed: April 9, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Terry A. Green 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
David R. Holmquist, Mark S. Fall, Nathan A. Reierson; Orbach, Huff & Suarez, David M. Huff, Steven 
Graff Levine, Marley S. Fox and Joanna Braynin for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Burke, Williams & Sorenson and John R. Yeh for California School Boards Association Education Legal 
Alliance and California State PTA as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Drociak, Yeager & Associates and Kenneth C. Yeager for Los Angeles NAACP as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Andra Donovan for San Diego Unified School District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
Jacqueline P. Minor and Michael L. Smith for Oakland Unified School District as Amicus Curiae on behalf 
of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Ricardo J. Soto, Julie Ashby Umansky, Phillipa L. Altmann; Latham & Watkins, James L. Arnone, 
Winston P. Stromberg, Vanessa C. Wu and Michele L. Leonelli for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Laws Office of Michael F. Keeley and Michael Keeley for Excellent Education Development as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Mark G. Kisicki and Erin L. Brinkman for Rocketship 
Education as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, John C. Lemmo and Gregory V. Moser for Bullis Charter School as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Meriem L. Hubbard and Joshua P. Thompson for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – S208611 – counsel continued 
 
Counsel: 
 
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, Gregory V. Moser and Adriana R. Sanchez for National Alliance 
for Public Charter Schools as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Law Offices of Young, Minney, and Corr, Paul C. Minney and Kathleen M. Ebert for Reed Hastings as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Irell & Manella, David A. Schwars and Zachary T. Elsea for Richard J. Riordan as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David M. Huff 
Orbach, Huff & Suarez 
1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 575 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 788-9200 
 
James L. Arnone 
Latham & Watkins 
355 South Grand Avenue 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-1560 
(213) 485-1234