Case Title: WYLIE v. CHESSER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 102015

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
WYLIE v. CHESSER  WYLIE v. CHESSER 2007 OK 81 173 P.3d 64 Case Number: 102015 Decided: 10/23/2007 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA PETE WYLIE, WANDA EVAIGE, EDDIE WHITWORTH, ROBERT MEADORS, and JIM SMITH in their official capacity as the TRUSTEES OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF FREDERICK, OKLAHOMA, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. MARGARET CHESSER, a/k/a MARGARET LAVERN CHESSER, Defendant/Appellant. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TILLMAN COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE RICHARD B. DARBY, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 Charles Chesser, a former employee of the City of Frederick, died in 1999. After he died his surviving spouse, Defendant/Appellant, Margaret Chesser, a/k/a Margaret Lavern Chesser (Appellant), sought continuation of the monthly disability benefit he had been receiving since about late 1981 under the Employee Retirement System of Frederick, Oklahoma, a System Frederick adopted by ordinance in 1966. Plaintiffs/Appellees, Trustees of the System did not grant Appellant's request; instead, they brought a declaratory judgment action against her in district court seeking a ruling she was not entitled to continuation of the benefit. Appellant answered and counterclaimed asserting she was entitled to continuation of the monthly benefit. Each side moved for summary judgment. The trial court gave summary judgment to the Trustees. Appellant appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), Division IV reversed and remanded with direction to the trial court to enter judgment for Appellant. The Trustees sought certiorari which we previously granted. We vacate the COCA's opinion and affirm the trial court judgment. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Ty Johnson, Massad, Evans & Kent, Inc., Frederick, Oklahoma for Plaintiffs/Appellees. O. Christopher Meyers, Lawton, Oklahoma for Defendant/Appellant. PER CURIAM: ¶1 This case requires a decision as to whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs/Appellees, Trustees of the Employee Retirement System of Frederick, Oklahoma in the declaratory judgment action they brought against Defendant/Appellant, Margaret Chesser, a/k/a Margaret Lavern Chesser. In the action the Trustees sought a ruling Appellant was not entitled to continuation of the monthly disability benefit her deceased husband, a former City of Frederick employee, was receiving under the System's terms when he died. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), Division IV reversed and remanded with direction to the trial court to enter judgment for Appellant. We vacate the COCA's opinion and affirm the trial court judgment. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶2 Initially we note that each side to this litigation sought summary judgment in the trial court based on the written terms of the System plan which was adopted by the City of Frederick by municipal ordinance in 1966. The parties agreed there was no substantial controversy as to any material fact and that the matter was ripe for decision as a matter of law. Our review of the record shows there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact and the case may be determined as a matter of law. We also note that the interpretation or meaning of the System's terms are before us for review, a System that as noted was adopted by municipal ordinance. ¶3 In reviewing a summary judgment grant an appellate court engages in a plenary, independent and non-deferential re-examination of the trial court's ruling, i.e., a de novo review. In re Estate of MacFarline, ¶4 The determination of legal questions involving statutory interpretation are also subject to de novo appellate review. Fulsom v. Fulsom, FACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND OVERVIEW ¶5 In 1966 the City of Frederick passed Ordinance No. 364 which adopted the System plan at issue in this case. ¶6 At some point after Charles died Appellant applied to Frederick for a continuation of the monthly disability benefit she claimed entitlement to as his surviving spouse. ¶7 Both sides moved for summary judgment, agreeing there was no material fact in substantial controversy and that the case was subject to decision as a matter of law based on the interpretation and meaning of the System's terms. To support her claim to entitlement to continuation of the monthly disability benefit Appellant places primary reliance on subsection 6.1(B)(2) of the System plan, a part of Article VI. 6.1 Spouse's Pensions A. Eligibility Requirements: 1. In-Service Death: B. Amount of Spouse's Pension: 1. In-Service Death: The problem with application of subsection 6.1(B)(2) is that there is no "Paragraph 2 of Subsection 6.1A" setting forth and spelling out the eligibility requirements necessary for a surviving spouse to receive continuation of the benefit. ¶8 In their motion for summary judgment the Trustees set forth three possible scenarios as to the reference to the non-existent paragraph 2 of subsection 6.1(A), each of which they basically argued would result in a conclusion that Appellant was not entitled to continuation of the disability benefit. ¶9 One, the Trustees in effect posited that the most logical interpretation was that the intent of the authors of the System plan was an intentional deletion of subsection 6.1(A)(2) from an earlier draft of the plan, but through oversight the authors neglected or forgot to also delete subsection 6.1(B)(2). In other words, that the System plan's authors only intended for surviving spouse benefits in the situation of an in-service death covered by subsections 6.1(A)(1) and 6.1(B)(1). ¶10 Two, that the reference to 6.1(A)(2) was a typographical error and was meant to refer to subsection 6.1(A)(1), i.e., to the in-service death eligibility requirements. The Trustees asserted that such an interpretation would be nonsensical because for a surviving spouse to be eligible for continuation of the decedent's benefit under 6.1(A)(1) the decedent must have been continuing in the active service of the City at the time of death and the employee must not have retired, i.e., requirements found in subsections 6.1(A)(1)(a) and (c), respectively; requirements that a surviving spouse like Appellant could not meet because Charles at the time of his death was not an active City employee, but had retired with a disability benefit under section 4.3 of the System plan. ¶11 Finally, the third scenario put forward by the Trustees in their summary judgment motion was that the System plan's authors intended to define eligibility requirements surviving spouses had to meet to receive continuation of the disability benefit their deceased spouse had been receiving, but through accident or oversight neglected to set forth the eligibility requirements in subsection 6.1(A)(2). The Trustees argued as to this scenario, in essence, that it would be improper for a court to set the eligibility requirements because it would place the court in the role of legislator as opposed to interpreter of the legislative will. ¶12 In her submission in response to the Trustees' summary judgment motion and in support of her own quest for summary judgment Appellant initially argued she met all the requirements of the System plan for continuation of the benefit, notwithstanding her recognition that no subsection 6.1(A)(2) existed to set forth the eligibility requirements. Although not directly stated by her, the argument appears to imply that she would meet any eligibility requirements that could have been intended or contemplated, e.g. she had not remarried, had been Charles' long-time wife and his widow at the time of death, and, in effect, she put forward in substance a fairness or equitable argument to continuation of the benefit. ¶13 Appellant also asserted several arguments purportedly supporting her claim. She posited that the System plan was to be interpreted both as a contract and as an ordinance and that she was an intended third party beneficiary thereof. She also asserted that to interpret the ordinance in such a way that would disallow her claim would produce an absurd result, would somehow not give a rational construction to the System plan and apparently that a review of the whole ordinance showed an intent to provide benefits to a surviving spouse such as Appellant. Appellant also cited Article I of the System plan, which states its purpose. Article I of the System plan states: The purpose of this System is to provide retirement and incidental benefits for all regular full-time employees of the Employer including full time elected officials, as hereinafter defined, who complete a period of faithful service and become eligible hereunder. The benefits provided by this System will be paid from a fund established by the Employer and will be in addition to the benefits employees are entitled to receive under any other programs of the Employer and from the Federal Social Security Act. This System and the related Fund forming a part hereof are established and shall be maintained for the exclusive benefit of the eligible employees of the Employer and their beneficiaries. She also took the view that although it was not possible to know why there was no subsection 6.1(A)(2), it was clear that surviving spouses of some description were intended to receive their deceased spouses disability pensions, obviously the view being based on the presence of subsection 6.1(B)(2) in the System plan. ¶14 Appellant also relied on certain statutory provisions contained in Title 15 of the Oklahoma statutes concerning interpretation of contracts that she posited, in effect, should be used to resolve in her favor any ambiguity or uncertainty concerning the reference in subsection 6.1(B)(2) to eligibility requirements meant to be contained in the non-existent subsection 6.1(A)(2). ¶15 In their reply and response to Appellant's response and motion for summary judgment the Trustees agreed that the System plan was both a contract and an ordinance, but asserted Appellant drew no distinction between interpreting the plan as either and that no substantive difference was offered by Appellant between such interpretations. The Trustees also reiterated their three possible scenarios for interpreting the reference to the non-existent paragraph 2 of subsection 6.1(A) and their view that each would result in a conclusion that Appellant was not entitled to continuation of the benefit. The Trustees, in effect, further argued that an overall view of the System plan did not evidence any intent to provide a continuation of a benefit to a surviving spouse in Appellant's situation. The Trustees also attempted to counter one or more of the positions put forward by Appellant. ¶16 After considering the parties' arguments and the record, including the evidentiary materials before it, the trial court gave summary judgment to the Trustees. In his order sustaining the Trustees' motion for summary judgment the trial court in pertinent part said the following: The Court finds that because the Employee Retirement System of Frederick, Oklahoma, makes no provision for the eligibility of a surviving spouse to receive a Post-Disability Pension, Defendant is not entitled to receive a pension based upon her deceased husband's disability payments. The Court has no explanation for why the system does not provide the eligibility requirements for a post-disability pension, but does provide for how to figure the amount of such a pension. The Court will not, however, provide and define the eligibility for post-disability benefits when the system document is silent. (italics in original). ¶17 Appellant appealed and the COCA reversed and remanded with direction to the trial court to grant judgment for Appellant. The COCA, in an unpublished opinion, basically determined that the absence of eligibility requirements created an ambiguity in the System's terms which could be repaired by judicial application of the rules of statutory construction, the same rules being applicable to municipal ordinances. The COCA said in pertinent part: The controversy between the parties arises from an ambiguity in a legislative enactment - an ordinance. "[W]hen the circumstances clearly indicate that [the legislative body] has overlooked something [then] rules of statutory construction [will be applied] in an effort to clarify and make sensible an act's purview." Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, The "principal object of statutory construction is to determine the legislative intent from an analysis of the whole act." Maule v. Independent School District No. 9, The obvious purpose of Article VI of the pension trust is to provide benefits to surviving spouses whose employee-spouse (1) has died in-service or (2) has died after receiving a disability retirement benefit. The language of subsection paragraph 6.1.B directs that the surviving spouse of a retired employee with a disability pension "shall receive" a monthly benefit equal to the monthly benefit paid to the retired employee at the time of their death. The language in paragraph 6.1.B that purports to impose eligibility requirements on this surviving spouse benefit must be treated as surplusage to the extent that it refers to eligibility requirements that are completely omitted from the pension trust. In other words, there are no express eligibility requirements for this surviving spouse benefit. We must further consider, however, whether there are implied eligibility requirements. Reading the pension trust as a whole reveals a general intent that all employees and beneficiaries who are similarly situated will be treated equally. As noted, there are only two surviving spouse benefits provided by the pension trust - one in the case of a retired employee and the other in the case of in-service death. The language of paragraph 6.1.A provides that a "surviving spouse" for purposes of the surviving spouse/in-service death benefit is one who "was not legally separated" from the employee at the time of death. To treat the surviving spouse of a retired employee with a disability pension equally with the surviving spouse of an employee who dies in service, a surviving spouse for purposes of the disability benefit must likewise be one who "was not legally separated" from the retired employee at the time of his or her death. Thus, a surviving spouse, like Mrs. Chesser, who satisfies this single, implied eligibility requirement should be paid the survivor's pension benefit that the pension trust otherwise plainly directs they "shall receive." (underlining in original). ¶18 The Trustees sought certiorari review, which we previously granted. We now hold the COCA erred and the trial court correctly abstained from providing and defining eligibility requirements for continuation of the monthly disability benefit to a surviving spouse. In that our review of Ordinance No. 364, including the System plan contained in the record before us, does not plainly, obviously or clearly show, either expressly or impliedly, what the legislative intent is or was concerning eligibility requirements for a surviving spouse to be entitled to continuation of the disability benefit being received or which was entitled to be received by a deceased former Frederick employee at the time of his or her death, it would be improper for us to hold here that Appellant is entitled to a surviving spouse pension merely because she was not legally separated from her deceased husband (as the COCA held) or to create other eligibility requirements supposedly gleaned from a review and construction of the System plan as a whole. For us to do so would involve only guesswork or conjecture and would take us out of our limited role to interpret or construe legislative intent and would place us in the status of legislator or policy maker, a position we have no authority to undertake or play. ANALYSIS ¶19 The basic rules concerning statutory interpretation are well known and have been oft stated. TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and follow the intention of the Legislature. If a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear and no occasion exists for the application of rules of construction a statute will be accorded the meaning expressed by the language used. However, where a statute is ambiguous or its meaning uncertain it is to be given a reasonable construction, one that will avoid absurd consequences if this can be done without violating legislative intent. Further, the Legislature will not be presumed to have done a vain and useless act in the promulgation of a statute, nor will an inept or incorrect choice of words be applied or construed in a manner to defeat the real or obvious purpose of a legislative enactment. Brewington When a court is called on to interpret a statute, the court has no authority to rewrite the enactment merely because it does not comport with the court's view of prudent public policy. Also, the wisdom of choices made within the Legislature's law-making sphere are not our concern, because those choices - absent constitutional or other recognized infirmity - rightly lie within the legislative domain. Head v. McCracken ¶20 The Supreme Court of North Carolina said the following in a case nearly one hundred twenty-five years ago: It is plainly the duty of the court to so construe a statute, ambiguous in its meaning, as to give effect to the legislative intent, if this be practicable. Its meaning in respect to what it has reference and the objects it embraces, as well as in other respects, is to be ascertained by appropriate means and indicia, such as the purposes appearing from the statute taken as a whole, the phraseology, the words ordinary or technical, the law as it prevailed before the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the remedy, the end to be accomplished, statutes in pari materia, the preamble, the title, and other like means. But the maening (sic) must be ascertained from the statute itself, and the means and signs to which, as appears upon its face, it has reference. State v. Partlow The court must use every authorized means to ascertain and give it an intelligible meaning; but if after such effort it is found to be impossible to solve the doubt and dispel the obscurity, if no judicial certainty can be settled upon as to the meaning, the court is not at liberty to supply, to make one. The court may not allow "conjectural interpretation to usurp the place of judicial exposition." There must be a competent and efficient expression of the legislative will. In Drake v. Drake, supra, Chief Justice RUFFIN said: "Whether a statute be a public or private one, if the terms in which it is couched be so vague as to convey no definite meaning to those whose duty it is to execute it, either ministerially or judicially, it is necessarily inoperative. The law must remain as it was, unless that which professes to change it be itself intelligible." When the statute intends to refer to and embrace within its provisions one or more of a multitude of things of the same kind, or one or more persons of many of the same name, it must do so in some way or manner, in terms, or by reasonable inplication (sic), or appropriate descriptive words, to designate what things or persons are intended by it. Else, how can the court or a ministerial officer decide what things or persons are meant? . . . The statute must speak. The legislative expression of its purpose and will must prevail; and if this does not appear with such a degree of certainty as that the court can learn what it is, the statute cannot operate. Partlow ¶21 Contrary to two of the Trustees' scenarios we find nothing in the language of Ordinance No. 364, including the System plan contained in the record, that would warrant an intelligible determination that the reference to the non-existent subsection 6.1(A)(2) was either a typographical error meant to refer to subsection 6.1(A)(1) instead, i.e., to the eligibility requirements regarding when a surviving spouse may receive benefits after the death of a City employee still active and not retired, or that the absence of subsection 6.1(A)(2) was an intentional deletion from an earlier draft of the System plan, but through oversight the authors neglected or forgot to also delete subsection 6.1(B)(2). These scenarios are based on mere guesswork and conjecture and we must deal with the plain words that are contained in subsection 6.1(B)(2). From our review of the above documents we find ourselves in agreement with Appellant who took the view that it is not possible to know why there was no subsection 6.1(A)(2), but that it is clear that surviving spouses of some description were intended to receive their deceased spouses disability pensions. In other words, because subsection 6.1(B)(2) is contained in the System plan we must assume the intent was that a surviving spouse of a former City of Frederick employee that was either receiving or was entitled to receive on the date of death a monthly disability pension was under some circumstances eligible to herself or himself receive a continuation of the monthly disability pension. ¶22 However, those circumstances are simply not discernible from the text of the documents before us and it would be mere guesswork and conjecture on our part to either add, modify or delete words from the text to either rule that no requirements are necessary except surviving spouse status or to specify additional eligibility requirements. Thus, it is not appropriate for us to either delete from subsection 6.1(B)(2) the words "who meets the eligibility requirements under Paragraph 2 of Subsection 6.1A above" or to add words specifying eligibility requirements when the municipal legislative intent as to the nature of the eligibility requirements cannot be intelligibly or reasonably discerned. For us to either proclaim no requirements are necessary except surviving spouse status or to set additional requirements in such a situation would take us out of our proper role of interpreting or construing law and inappropriately involve us in making law and/or policy decision-making, something the judiciary has no right or power to do when called upon to review a legislative-type enactment. Only when the real or obvious purpose is plain and can be exposed by review of the text (or other properly reviewable indicia of legislative intent) may an inept or incorrect choice of words, or a legislative oversight, be corrected by addition, subtraction or modification. To rule otherwise takes a court out of the appropriate judicial role. ¶23 We are not unmindful that the general rule is that pension laws, being remedial or beneficial in nature, are to be liberally construed in favor of those to be benefitted. See In re Benson, ¶24 When we read all the provisions before us we cannot say the obvious, clear or plain purpose was to allow someone in Appellant's situation to receive a continuation of her deceased husband's pension and we are left with serious doubt as to the legislative intent or will. This is particularly so given the undisputed fact that the monthly disability pension benefit was received by decedent for eighteen (18) years and a beneficiary of a normal pensioner by the rather precise terms of section 4.1 of Article IV would at most receive a continuation of the pension for sixty (60) months. Section 4.1 states: 4.1 Normal Retirement: (emphasis added). ¶25 To us, the language we have emphasized from section 4.1 appears contrary and at odds with the COCA's view that a surviving spouse of a deceased former employee that has been receiving a disability pension for a number of years (here about 18 years) is somehow similarly situated to a surviving spouse of a decedent who at the time of death was still an active City employee who had not retired, but had ten (10) years of service and, thus, would at some point be eligible to receive a pension under the System plan's terms, but received nothing because they died prior to retiring from the City's employ. Instead although we need not definitively determine it here to properly resolve this case, it seems more reasonable to us that someone in Appellant's circumstances would be more similarly situated to the beneficiary under section 4.1 where the former/retired employee who was receiving a normal pension died prior to receiving 60 months of benefits and the beneficiary under section 4.1 is entitled to receive the former/retired employee's pension payments only until a total of 60 monthly payments have been made to the former employee and the beneficiary. Thus, contrary to Appellant's contention that it would be an absurd result to deny someone in her circumstances a surviving spouse benefit, a viable argument could be made, and some might assert, that it would be an absurdity to grant her one given the terms of section 4.1. ¶26 The bottom line in this case is that because it is not obvious, clear or plain from a review of Ordinance No. 364, including the System plan, what the policy makers and drafters thereof had in mind as to whether a surviving spouse such as Appellant was or was not entitled to continuation of her deceased husband's disability pension, it is not proper for us to add, modify or delete terms from the legislative municipal scheme to award her such a pension or render her eligible therefor. To do so here would simply not be consistent with any intelligible actual expression of, or discernible implied, legislative intent or will, but would place us in the role of policy makers ourselves. It would be nothing other than a judicial usurpation of the legislative prerogative, for were we to take on such task we would be operating outside our limited role to interpret or construe what the lawmaking body has enacted and would have taken upon our own shoulders to decree what that body has itself failed to intelligibly promulgate, something given our tripartite governmental structure we have no authority or power to do. ¶27 Accordingly, the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is VACATED and the trial court judgment is AFFIRMED. ¶28 WINCHESTER, C.J., HARGRAVE, OPALA, TAYLOR, JJ., and LAVENDER, S.J., concur. ¶29 EDMONDSON, V.C.J., KAUGER, WATT and COLBERT, JJ., dissent. FOOT