Case Title: In Re: Standard Jury Instructions In Criminal Cases – Report No. 2007-10

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC07-2324

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Supreme Court of Florida  
No. SC07-2324 
IN RE: STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES—  
REPORT NO. 2007-10.  
[December 11, 2008] 
PER CURIAM. 
The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal 
Cases (Committee) has submitted proposed changes to Standard Jury Instructions 
in Criminal Cases 7.7 – Manslaughter; 8.9 – Culpable Negligence; and 6.6 – 
Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter, and requests that the Court authorize the 
amended standard instructions for publication and use.1 The Committee published 
the proposals for comment in The Florida Bar News prior to submission to the 
Court.  Having considered the Committee‟s report and the comments filed, as well 
as oral arguments presented to the Court on June 13, 2008, we do not approve the 
1. We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Committee‟s proposals as submitted.  We do, however, authorize for publication 
and use instruction 7.7 as modified. 
DISCUSSION 
The Committee proposed amending instruction 7.7, Manslaughter, by 
replacing the term “intentionally” with “knowingly or consciously” to remove the 
requirement of an intentional act that caused or resulted in the victim‟s death.  We 
do not approve the Committee‟s proposal.  Rather, we modify instruction 7.7 as 
follows: 
In order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is 
not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a 
premeditated intent to cause death, only an intent to commit an 
act which caused death. See Hall v. State, 951 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2007). 
We authorize publication and use of the instruction as modified. 
In its proposal amending instruction 8.9, Culpable Negligence, the 
Committee suggested language that appears to not be in accord with our decision 
in State v. Greene, 348 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1977).  In Greene, we upheld the 
constitutionality of the culpable negligence statute, section 784.05, Florida 
Statutes, stating that “reckless indifference or grossly careless disregard of the 
safety of others is necessary to prove „culpable negligence.‟”  Id. at 4. Greene 
relied upon Russ v. State, 191 So. 296 (Fla. 1939), where we defined “culpable 
negligence” as 
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a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of human 
life or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects; or that 
entire want of care which would raise the presumption of indifference 
to consequences; or such wantonness or recklessness or grossly 
careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or that 
reckless indifference to the rights of others, which is equivalent to an 
intentional violation of them. 
Greene, 348 So. 2d at 4 (quoting Russ, 191 So. at 298).  The Committee‟s proposal 
would remove from the instruction‟s definition of “culpable negligence” the terms 
“reckless” and “wanton.”  For these reasons, we do not approve the proposal. 
The Committee also proposed eliminating the intent element from 
instruction 6.6, Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter, consistent with its proposal to 
amend the manslaughter instruction.  We do not approve the Committee‟s proposal 
for instruction 6.6 as well.  See Taylor v. State, 444 So. 2d 931, 934 (Fla. 1983) 
(“[A] verdict for attempted manslaughter can be rendered only if there is proof that 
the defendant had the requisite intent to commit an unlawful act.”). 
PUBLICATION AND USE 
We hereby authorize the publication and use of amended instruction 7.7 – 
Manslaughter, as modified and set forth in the appendix to this opinion.  In doing 
so, we express no opinion on the correctness of this instruction and remind all 
interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or 
alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instruction.  We 
further caution all interested parties that any notes and comments associated with 
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the instruction reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily 
indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability.  New 
language is indicated by underlining.  The instruction as set forth in the appendix2 
shall be effective when this opinion becomes final. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., did not participate. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
Original Proceeding – Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases 
Judge Terry David Terrell, Chair, Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases, First Judicial Circuit, Pensacola, Florida, and Judge 
Bradford L. Thomas, First District Court of Appeal, Tallahassee, Florida, 
for Petitioner 
Stephen Krosschell of Goodman and Nekvasil, P.A., Clearwater, Florida, and Bob 
Dillinger, Public Defender, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Clearwater, Florida, 
as Opponents 
2. The amendments as reflected in the appendix are to the Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal cases as they appear on the Court‟s website at 
www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/instructions.shtml.  We recognize 
that there may be minor discrepancies between the instructions as they appear on 
the website and the published versions of the instructions.  Any discrepancies as to 
instructions authorized for publication and use after October 25, 2007, should be 
resolved by reference to the published opinion of this Court authorizing the 
instruction. 
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APPENDIX  
7.7 MANSLAUGHTER 
§ 782.07, Fla. Stat. 
To prove the crime of Manslaughter, the State must prove the following 
two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1.  
(Victim) is dead. 
Give 2a, 2b, or 2c depending upon allegations and proof. 
2.  
a. 
(Defendant) intentionally caused the death of (victim). 
b.  
(Defendant) intentionally procured the death of (victim). 
c.  
The death of (victim) was caused by the culpable negligence 
of (defendant). 
However, the defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter if the killing 
was either justifiable or excusable homicide as I have previously explained 
those terms. 
Give only if 2(a) alleged and proved, and manslaughter is being defined as a 
lesser included offense of first degree premeditated murder. 
In order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not 
necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated intent 
to cause death, only an intent to commit an act which caused death. See Hall 
v. State, 951 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). 
Give only if 2b alleged and proved. 
To “procure” means to persuade, induce, prevail upon or cause a 
person to do something. 
Give only if 2c alleged and proved. 
I will now define “culpable negligence” for you.  Each of us has a duty 
to act reasonably toward others.  If there is a violation of that duty, without 
any conscious intention to harm, that violation is negligence.  But culpable 
negligence is more than a failure to use ordinary care toward others.  In order 
for negligence to be culpable, it must be gross and flagrant.  Culpable 
negligence is a course of conduct showing reckless disregard of human life, or 
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of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or such an entire 
want of care as to raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to 
consequences, or which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly 
careless disregard for the safety and welfare of the public, or such an 
indifference to the rights of others as is equivalent to an intentional violation 
of such rights. 
The negligent act or omission must have been committed with an utter 
disregard for the safety of others.  Culpable negligence is consciously doing an 
act or following a course of conduct that the defendant must have known, or 
reasonably should have known, was likely to cause death or great bodily 
injury. 
§ 782.07(2)-(4), Fla. Stat.  Enhanced penalty if 2c alleged and proved.  Give 
a, b, or c, as applicable. 
If you find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, you must then 
determine whether the State has further proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that: 
a.  
(Victim) was at the time [an elderly person] [a disabled adult] 
whose death was caused by the neglect of (defendant), a caregiver. 
b.  
(Victim) was a child whose death was caused by the neglect of 
(defendant), a caregiver. 
c.  
(Victim) was at the time [an officer] [a firefighter] [an emergency 
medical technician] [a paramedic] who was at the time 
performing duties that were within the course of [his] [her] 
employment.  The court now instructs you that (official title of 
victim) is [an officer] [a firefighter] [an emergency medical 
technician] [a paramedic]. 
Definitions.  Give if applicable. 
Child@ means any person under the age of 18 years. 
AElderly person@ means a person 60 years of age or older who is 
suffering from the infirmities of aging as manifested by advanced age, organic 
brain damage, or physical, mental, or emotional dysfunctioning, to the extent 
that the ability of the person to provide adequately for the person=s own care 
or protection is impaired. 
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ADisabled adult@ means a person 18 years of age or older who suffers 
from a condition of physical or mental incapacitation due to developmental 
disability, organic brain damage, or mental illness, or who has one or more 
physical or mental limitations that restrict the person=s ability to perform the 
normal activities of daily living. 
“Facility” means any location providing day or residential care or 
treatment for elderly persons or disabled adults.  The term “facility” may 
include, but is not limited to, any hospital, training center, state institution, 
nursing home, assisted living facility, adult family-care home, adult day care 
center, group home, mental health treatment center, or continuing care 
community. 
As applied to an Elderly Person or a Disabled Adult. 
“Caregiver” means a person who has been entrusted with or has 
assumed responsibility for the care or the property of an elderly person or a 
disabled adult.  “Caregiver” includes, but is not limited to, relatives, court-
appointed or voluntary guardians, adult household members, neighbors, 
health care providers, and employees and volunteers of facilities. 
As applied to a Child. 
ACaregiver@ means a parent, adult household member, or other person 
responsible for a child=s welfare. 
§ 825.102(3)(a) or § 827.03(3)(a), Fla. Stat.  Give 1 or 2 as applicable. 
“Neglect of [a child”] [an elderly person”] [a disabled adult”] means: 
1.  
A caregiver=s failure or omission to provide [a child] [an elderly 
person] [a disabled adult] with the care, supervision, and services 
necessary to maintain [a child’s] [an elderly person’s] [a disabled 
adult’s] physical and mental health, including, but not limited to, 
food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, and 
medical services that a prudent person would consider essential 
for the well-being of the [child] [elderly person] [disabled adult]; 
or 
2.  
A caregiver’s failure to make reasonable effort to protect [a child] 
[an elderly person] [a disabled adult] from abuse, neglect or 
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exploitation by another person. 
Repeated conduct or a single incident or omission by a caregiver that 
results in, or could reasonably be expected to result in, a substantial risk of 
death of [a child] [an elderly person] [a disabled adult] may be considered in 
determining neglect. 
Definitions.  As applied to Designated Personnel.  
§ 112.191 and § 633.35, Fla. Stat.  
“Firefighter” means any full-time duly employed uniformed firefighter 
employed by an employer, whose primary duty is the prevention and 
extinguishing of fires, the protection of life and property therefrom, the 
enforcement of municipal, county, and state fire prevention codes, as well as 
the enforcement of any law pertaining to the prevention and control of fires, 
who is certified by the Division of State Fire Marshal of the Department of 
Financial Services, who is a member of a duly constituted fire department of 
such employer or who is a volunteer firefighter. 
§ 943.10(14), Fla. Stat. 
“Officer” means any person employed or appointed as a full-time, part-
time, or auxiliary law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional 
probation officer. 
§ 401.23, Fla. Stat. 
“Emergency Medical Technician” means a person who is certified by 
the Department of Health to perform basic life support. 
§ 401.23, Fla. Stat. 
“Paramedic” means a person who is certified by the Department of 
Health to perform basic and advanced life support. 
Lesser Included Offenses 
MANSLAUGHTER - 782.07 
CATEGORY ONE 
CATEGORY TWO 
FLA. STAT. 
INS. NO. 
None 
Vehicular homicide 
782.071 
7.9 
Vessel homicide 
782.072 
7.9 
(Nonhomicide lessers) 
Attempt 
777.04(1) 
5.1 
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Aggravated assault 
784.021 
8.2 
Battery 
784.03 
8.3 
Assault 
784.011 
8.1 
Culpable negligence 
784.05 
8.9 
Comment 
In the event of any reinstruction on manslaughter, the instructions on 
justifiable and excusable homicide as previously given should be given at the same 
time. Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1965). 
In appropriate cases, an instruction on transferred intent should be given. 
Trial judges should carefully study Eversley v. State, 748 So.2d 963 (Fla. 
1999), in any manslaughter case in which causation is an issue to determine if a 
special jury instruction on causation is needed. 
To be found guilty of Aggravated Manslaughter, there is no statutory 
requirement that the defendant have knowledge of the classification of the victim; 
therefore, the schedule of lesser included offenses does not include Aggravated 
Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer, Aggravated Assault on a Law Enforcement 
Officer, Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer, or Assault on a Law Enforcement 
Officer.  Those offenses have a different definition of officer.  Additionally, the 
excluded lesser included offenses require proof of knowing that the commission of 
the offense was on an officer who was engaged in the lawful performance of a 
legal duty. 
This instruction was adopted in 1981 and amended in 1985 [477 So.2d 985], 1992 
[603 So.2d 1175], 1994 [636 So.2d 502], 2005 [911 So.2d 1220], and 2006 [946 
So.2d 1061] and 2008. 
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