Case Title: State v. Massien

Citation: 2010-Ohio-1864

Docket Number: 20090825

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Massien, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1864.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1864 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MASSIEN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Massien, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1864.] 
Criminal law — Intervention in lieu of conviction — R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) — 
“Position of trust.” 
(No. 2009-0825 — Submitted January 12, 2010 — Decided May 5, 2010.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 24369, 
2009-Ohio-1521. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
A person holding a “position of trust” for the purpose of R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d) is not limited solely to public officials and public 
servants. 
2. 
A private individual holds a “position of trust” within the meaning of R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d) if he or she occupies a special relationship of trust and 
confidence equivalent to a fiduciary relationship. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
3. 
A nurse, by virtue of his or her employment in a hospital, does not occupy 
a fiduciary relationship with his or her employer. 
4. 
A nurse who steals drugs from his or her employer-hospital does not hold 
a “position of trust” within the meaning of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) and is 
not categorically ineligible for intervention in lieu of conviction. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} We are called upon solely to determine whether a nurse employed 
by a hospital who in the course of his or her employment steals drugs from his or 
her employer holds a “position of trust” within the meaning of R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d).  An offender who occupies a “position of trust” within the 
meaning of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) and whose offense relates to that position is 
ineligible to be sentenced under R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(b) and does not meet the 
requirements for intervention in lieu of conviction pursuant to R.C. 
2951.041(B)(1). 
{¶ 2} A person holding a “position of trust” for the purpose of R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d) is not limited to public officials and public servants.  However, 
it also does not apply to all positions of trust held by private individuals.  Rather, 
a private individual holds a position of trust only if he or she occupies a special 
relationship of trust and confidence equivalent to a fiduciary relationship.  A 
nurse, by virtue of his or her employment in a hospital, does not occupy a 
fiduciary relationship with his or her employer.  Therefore, a nurse who steals 
drugs from his or her employer-hospital does not hold a position of trust within 
the meaning of  R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) and is not categorically ineligible for 
intervention in lieu of conviction. 
Relevant Background 
{¶ 3} On May 16, 2008, appellee, Sally Massien, was indicted on two 
counts of theft of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1)(2), felonies of the 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
fourth degree. The state alleged that Massien stole morphine in the course of her 
employment as a nurse at a hospital in the Summa Health System by signing the 
drugs out under a patient’s identification number.  Massien initially pleaded not 
guilty but subsequently moved for intervention in lieu of conviction (“ILC”).  The 
state opposed Massien’s motion for ILC, arguing that as a nurse who stole drugs 
from the hospital in which she was employed, Massien occupied a “position of 
trust,” could not be sentenced under R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(b), and was ineligible for 
ILC pursuant to R.C. 2951.041(B)(1). 
{¶ 4} In July 2008, the trial court held a hearing and determined that 
Massien was eligible for ILC.  As required by the ILC statute, Massien retracted 
her initial plea and pleaded guilty to the charges.  The court ordered Massien to 
one year of rehabilitation.1   
{¶ 5} The state appealed the trial court’s decision granting Massien ILC 
to the Ninth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court and held that 
Massien did not occupy a position of trust by virtue of her position as a nurse at 
the hospital from which she stole the drugs.  State v. Massien, Summit App. No. 
24369, 2009-Ohio-1521, ¶ 17–19.  The state moved the Ninth District to certify a 
conflict between its decision in this case and the Tenth District’s decision in State 
v. France, Franklin App. No. 04AP-1124, 2006-Ohio-1204.  In France, the Tenth 
District held that a nurse entrusted with the care of and duty to dispense highly 
regulated substances indicted for theft of narcotics in the course of her 
                                                 
1.  In their briefs, both parties note that after this court recognized the certified conflict, but before 
the order was filed with the trial court, the trial court sealed Massien’s record, finding that she had 
successfully completed ILC.  However, even if Massien’s completion of ILC renders the issue 
moot with regard to this case, the issue before the court involves a matter of great general interest, 
as is evidenced by the fact that the court accepted jurisdiction over the same issue in State v. 
Knepper, No. 2009-1838, 124 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2010-Ohio-188, 920 N.E.2d 372, and State v. 
Hall, No. 2009-2149, 124 Ohio St.3d 1473, 2010-Ohio-354, 921 N.E.2d 245, both of which are 
held in abeyance for a decision in this case.  Because a matter of great general interest remains, we 
may proceed to resolve the issue in this case.  Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati (1987), 30 
Ohio St.3d 28, 31, 30 OBR 33, 505 N.E.2d 966. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
employment at a hospital occupied a position of trust that related to the offense 
and was not eligible for ILC.  Id. at 11–12. 
{¶ 6} The Ninth District granted the state’s motion and certified the 
following issue:  “Whether a nurse employed by a hospital who in the course of 
her employment steals drugs from the hospital holds a ‘position of trust’ under 
R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) thus making the nurse ineligible for intervention in lieu of 
conviction.”  On review of the order certifying a conflict, we determined that a 
conflict exists between the Ninth and Tenth Districts and accepted jurisdiction to 
resolve the conflict.  122 Ohio St.3d 1453, 2009-Ohio-3131, 908 N.E.2d 944. 
Analysis 
Felony-Sentencing Considerations 
{¶ 7} In enacting the felony-sentencing guidelines, the General 
Assembly declared: “The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect 
the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the 
offender.  To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need 
for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future 
crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the 
offense, the public, or both.”  R.C. 2929.11(A).  “A sentence imposed for a felony 
shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the two overriding purposes of felony 
sentencing set forth in division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not 
demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the 
victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by 
similar offenders.”  R.C. 2929.11(B). 
{¶ 8} Consistent with the sentencing principles set forth in R.C. 2929.11, 
R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) through (i) sets forth nine factors that a trial court must 
consider in sentencing an offender for fourth- and fifth-degree felonies.  If a trial 
court does not make any of the findings in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) through (i), then 
an offender is sentenced pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(b), and if the court 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
considers it appropriate, community control is the default sentence (except for 
those offenses identified as mandatory-prison offenses).  State v. Foster, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 68.  “R.C. 2929.13(B) creates a 
preference for (but not a presumption in favor of) community control (formerly 
probation) for lower-level felonies.”  Id. at ¶ 43.  However, if the trial court makes 
any of the findings set forth in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) through (i), then an offender 
is sentenced under R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(a).  After considering the seriousness and 
recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, if the court finds that a prison term is 
consistent with the principles and purposes of felony sentencing and that an 
offender is not amenable to community control, then the court shall impose a 
prison term upon the offender.  Thus, although it does not preclude the imposition 
of community-control sanctions, a finding of any of the factors set forth in R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(a) through (i) weighs against the preference for community control 
and may justify incarceration. 
Intervention in Lieu of Conviction 
{¶ 9} ILC is a statutory creation that allows a trial court to stay a 
criminal proceeding and order an offender to a period of rehabilitation if the court 
has reason to believe that drug or alcohol usage was a factor leading to the 
offense.  R.C. 2951.041(A)(1).  If, after a hearing, the trial court determines that 
an offender is eligible for ILC, then it shall accept the offender’s guilty plea, place 
the offender under the general control and supervision of the appropriate 
probation or other qualified agency, and establish an intervention plan for the 
offender.  R.C. 2951.041(C) and (D).  The intervention plan shall last at least one 
year, during which the offender is ordered to abstain from alcohol and illegal drug 
use, to participate in treatment and recovery-support services, and to submit to 
regular random testing for drug and alcohol use.  R.C. 2951.041(D).  If the 
offender successfully completes the intervention plan, the trial court shall dismiss 
proceedings against the offender without an adjudication of guilt and may order 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
the sealing of records related to the offense.  R.C. 2951.041(E).  If the offender 
fails to comply with any term or condition imposed as part of the intervention 
plan, the court shall enter a finding of guilt and impose the appropriate sanction.  
R.C. 2951.041(F). 
{¶ 10} “In enacting R.C. 2951.041, the legislature made a determination 
that when chemical abuse is the cause or at least a precipitating factor in the 
commission of a crime, it may be more beneficial to the individual and the 
community as a whole to treat the cause rather than punish the crime.”  State v. 
Shoaf (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 75, 77, 746 N.E.2d 674 (referring to a previous, 
but similar, version of R.C. 2951.041).  R.C. 2951.041 is not limited to offenders 
charged with drug offenses.  Rather, any offender charged with any qualifying 
offense may be eligible for ILC so long as the trial court has “reason to believe 
that drug or alcohol usage by the offender was a factor leading to the offender’s 
criminal behavior.”  R.C. 2951.041(A)(1).  ILC is not designed as punishment, 
but rather as an opportunity for first-time offenders to receive help for their 
dependence without the ramifications of a felony conviction.  State v. Ingram, 
Cuyahoga App. No. 84925, 2005-Ohio-1967, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2951.041(B) lists the criteria that a criminal defendant must 
meet to be eligible for ILC.  “If an offender satisfies all of the statutory eligibility 
requirements for intervention, the trial court has discretion to determine whether a 
particular offender is a good candidate for intervention.”  State v. Geraci, Franklin 
App. No. 04AP-26, 2004-Ohio-6128, ¶ 5.  Among other requirements, to be 
eligible for ILC an offender must be “charged with a felony for which the court, 
upon conviction, would impose sentence under division (B)(2)(b) of section 
2929.13 of the Revised Code or with a misdemeanor.”  R.C. 2951.041(B)(1). 
R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) 
{¶ 12} One sentencing factor that a trial court must consider pursuant to 
R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) is whether “[t]he offender held a public office or position 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
of trust and the offense related to that office or position; the offender’s position 
obliged the offender to prevent the offense or to bring those committing it to 
justice; or the offender’s professional reputation or position facilitated the offense 
or was likely to influence the future conduct of others.” 
{¶ 13} The state argues that Massien, as a nurse employed at a hospital 
who had access to highly regulated drugs, held a “position of trust” under R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d).  The state further contends that as an offender who held a 
position of trust and whose offense related to that position, Massien cannot be 
sentenced under R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(b) and is ineligible for ILC.  Contrary to the 
state’s argument, the court of appeals held that the legislature intended the phrase 
“position of trust” to apply predominantly to an offender’s public standing and, in 
limited circumstances, to private professionals traditionally thought to have a 
special relationship of trust between themselves and their victims.  2009-Ohio-
1521, at ¶ 16–17.  The court of appeals concluded that because Massien was a 
private individual who, as a nurse, did not occupy a “special relationship of trust” 
with her hospital employer, she did not hold a “position of trust” for the purpose 
of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d).  Id. at ¶ 16. 
The Phrase “Position of Trust” Is Ambiguous 
{¶ 14} R.C. 2929.13 does not define “position of trust,” nor is the phrase 
defined elsewhere in the Revised Code.  Appellate courts’ attempts to construe 
the phrase have resulted in conflicting interpretations.  On one hand, a number of 
appellate courts have held that virtually any public or private individual whose 
offense relates to a breach of any trust occupies a “position of trust” for the 
purpose of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d).  See, e.g., State v. Johnson (Dec. 8, 2000), 
Crawford App. Nos. 3-2000-15 and 3-2000-16, 2000 WL 1806505, at *7 (holding 
that a college student entrusted with school property who stole the property 
occupied a position of trust within the meaning of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d)); State v. 
Hall (2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 666, 668, 739 N.E.2d 846 (10th Dist.) (holding that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
a parent who failed to pay child support held a position of trust with respect to the 
child); State v. Painter (Mar. 29, 2002), Ashtabula App. No. 2000-A-0093, 2002 
WL 479834, at *4 (holding that the mother of minor children who failed to pay 
child support occupied a position of trust); State v. Bolin (Jan. 12, 1998), 
Clermont App. No. CA97-06-056, 1998 WL 8683, at *2 (holding that a delivery 
driver entrusted with others’ property occupied a position of trust). 
{¶ 15} On the other hand, in State v. Jones, the Second District held that 
R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) applies only to public officials and public servants and 
does not apply to private individuals.  State v. Jones (Nov. 13, 1998), Greene 
App. No. 98CA009, 1998 WL 864761, at *2.  In State v. Hall, Montgomery App. 
No. 22901, 2009-Ohio-6016, the Second District applied Jones, holding that a 
nurse employed at a hospital was a private individual, could not hold a “position 
of trust” under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d), and was not categorically ineligible for 
ILC.2 
{¶ 16} The First District adopted a third approach, noting that 
“unrestrained application of the phrase to every breach of ethical, moral, or filial 
duty by a private individual may distort the purpose of the new sentencing 
guidelines.”  State v. Brewer (Nov. 24, 2000), Hamilton App. No. C-000148, 
2000 WL 1732335, at *2.  Consistent with the purposes and principles of felony 
sentencing, the First District held that the phrase “position of trust” under R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d) applies only to private individuals in professions “traditionally 
thought to invoke a special relationship of trust – such as doctor, lawyer or 
accountant.”  State v. Condon, 152 Ohio App.3d 629, 2003-Ohio-2335, 789 
N.E.2d 696, ¶ 104.  In holding that the statutory phrase applies only to those 
private individuals who occupy a “special relationship of trust,” the First District 
adopted the standard used for determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists 
                                                 
2.  This court accepted jurisdiction over the state’s appeal in State v. Hall, No. 2009-2149, which 
is held pending our decision in this case.  124 Ohio St.3d 1473, 2010-Ohio-354, 921 N.E.2d 245. 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
and equated a “position of trust” under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) to a fiduciary 
relationship.  See, e.g., In re Termination of Pratt (1974), 40 Ohio St.2d 107, 115, 
69 O.O.2d 512, 321 N.E.2d 603 (defining a fiduciary relationship as one in which 
“special confidence and trust is reposed in the integrity and fidelity of another and 
there is a resulting position of superiority or influence, acquired by virtue of this 
special trust”).  The Seventh District adopted a similar standard, holding that 
although the phrase does not apply to “garden-variety theft” offenses, a family 
friend and personal secretary who embezzled from her boss occupied a position of 
trust because of her “special position with respect to the victim.”  State v. Boland, 
147 Ohio App.3d 151, 2002-Ohio-1163, 768 N.E.2d 1250, ¶ 69, 70 (analogizing 
R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) with the federal sentencing guidelines’ commentary 
relating to positions of “public or private trust”). 
{¶ 17} In this case, the Ninth District essentially adopted the First 
District’s limited interpretation of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d), treating the phrase 
“position of trust” as meaning a fiduciary relationship and holding that the phrase 
applies only to public officials and private professionals whose positions are “ 
‘traditionally thought to invoke a special relationship of trust’ between the 
professional-offender and the victim.”  2009-Ohio-1521, ¶ 16, quoting Condon, 
152 Ohio App.3d 629, 2003-Ohio-2335, 789 N.E.2d 696, ¶ 104.3   
{¶ 18} “When a statute is subject to varying interpretations, it is 
ambiguous and we must construe it in a manner that carries out the intent of the 
General Assembly.”  Sheet Metal Workers’ Internatl. Assn., Local Union No. 33 
v. Gene’s Refrigeration, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 248, 
2009-Ohio-2747, 910 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 29.  In construing an ambiguous statute, 
                                                 
3.   After an informal en banc review, the Ninth District reaffirmed the position it had taken in this 
case, holding that a nurse employed in a hospital does not occupy a “position of trust” under R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d).  State v. Knepper, 184 Ohio App.3d 416, 2009-Ohio-5159, 921 N.E.2d 284, ¶ 4.  
This court accepted jurisdiction over the state’s appeal in State v. Knepper, No. 2009-1838, which 
is held pending our decision in this case. 124 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2010-Ohio-188, 920 N.E.2d 372. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
among other considerations, we look to the language of the statue, the 
circumstances under which the statute was enacted, and the consequences of a 
particular construction.  Id.  Having considered the language of R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d) as a whole, the overarching felony-sentencing purposes and 
principles, and the conflicting analyses employed by the district courts, for the 
reasons set forth below, we believe that the First District’s interpretation equating 
a position of trust to a fiduciary relationship is consistent with the legislature’s 
intent in enacting R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d). 
A “Position of Trust” Under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d)  
Is Not Limited to Public Officials 
{¶ 19} R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) requires trial courts to consider whether 
“[t]he offender held a public office or position of trust.”  The statutory language 
does not illustrate a legislative intent to limit application of the section exclusively 
to public officials or public servants.  Rather, “the legislature’s use of the word 
‘or’ instead of ‘and’ in the context of this provision suggests that the provision 
was intended to apply to both public and private individuals.”   State v. Boland, 
147 Ohio App.3d 151, 2002-Ohio-1163, 768 N.E.2d 1250, ¶ 56.  If the legislature 
intended the phrase “position of trust” to apply only to public officials or public 
servants, it would have specified as much in the statutory language.  Indeed, the 
General Assembly did precisely that in the preceding statutory section, R.C. 
2929.12(B)(3), identifying as one of the seriousness factors that trial courts must 
consider whether the offender “held a public office or position of trust in the 
community,” and the offense related to that office or position.  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 20} By including the phrase “position of trust in the community,” the 
legislature reveals its intent that R.C. 2929.12(B)(3) apply only to public officials 
and other community leaders.  State v. Radcliff (Mar. 17, 1998), Franklin App. 
Nos. 97APA08-1054 and 97APA08-1056, 1998 WL 120304, at *4.  Accord,  
State v. Lamb, Wood App. No. WD-03-054, 2004-Ohio-1974, ¶ 21 (holding that 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
R.C. 2929.12(B)(3) “refers to a position of trust in the community, not the 
household”).  In contrast to its express limitation of R.C. 2929.12(B)(3), the 
legislature did not include any language in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) to signal an 
intent to limit application of the phrase “position of trust” to public officials and 
public servants. 
The Phrase “Position of Trust” Applies to Private Individuals 
Who Occupy Fiduciary Relationships 
{¶ 21} By 
including 
the 
phrase 
“position 
of 
trust” 
in 
R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d) without limitation, the General Assembly evidenced its intent 
not to limit its application to public officials.  However, we do not believe that the 
legislature intended the phrase to apply all individuals who breach any private 
expectation of trust.  An unrestrained application of the phrase “position of trust” 
to “every breach of ethical, moral, or filial duty by a private individual” is not 
consistent with the sentencing principles set forth by the General Assembly, State 
v. Brewer (Nov. 24, 2000), Hamilton App. No. C-000148, 2000 WL 1732335, at 
*2, or with the language of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1) as a whole. 
{¶ 22} The language of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1) as a whole illustrates that the 
General Assembly intended a narrow application of the phrase “position of trust.”  
The section sets forth nine sentencing factors that a trial court must consider in 
sentencing an offender for a fourth- or fifth-degree felony: 
{¶ 23} “(a) In committing the offense, the offender caused physical harm 
to a person. 
{¶ 24} “(b) In committing the offense, the offender attempted to cause or 
made an actual threat of physical harm to a person with a deadly weapon. 
{¶ 25} “(c) In committing the offense, the offender attempted to cause or 
made an actual threat of physical harm to a person, and the offender previously 
was convicted of an offense that caused physical harm to a person. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
{¶ 26} “(d) The offender held a public office or position of trust and the 
offense related to that office or position; the offender’s position obliged the 
offender to prevent the offense or to bring those committing it to justice; or the 
offender’s professional reputation or position facilitated the offense or was likely 
to influence the future conduct of others. 
{¶ 27} “(e) The offender committed the offense for hire or as part of an 
organized criminal activity. 
{¶ 28} “(f) The offense is a sex offense that is a fourth or fifth degree 
felony violation of [certain enumerated statutes]. 
{¶ 29} “(g) The offender at the time of the offense was serving, or the 
offender previously had served, a prison term. 
{¶ 30} “(h) The offender committed the offense while under a community 
control sanction, while on probation, or while released from custody on a bond or 
personal recognizance. 
{¶ 31} “(i) The offender committed the offense while in possession of a 
firearm.” 
{¶ 32} Each sentencing factor crafted by the legislature applies to a 
narrow aggravating circumstance that may justify the imposition of a prison 
sentence rather than the preferred community control for fourth- and fifth-degree 
felonies.  Each sentencing factor involves a specific, well-defined circumstance.  
In the same vein, R.C. 2929.12(B)(1)(d) identifies three distinct factors: (1) that 
the offender held a public office or position of trust and the offense related to that 
office or position, (2) that the offender’s position obliged the offender to prevent 
the offense or to bring those committing it to justice, or (3) that the offender’s 
professional reputation or position facilitated the offense or was likely to 
influence the future conduct of others.  Like the other sentencing factors set forth 
in R.C. 2929.12(B)(1), each factor under R.C. 2929.12(B)(1)(d) applies only in a 
specific and limited circumstance. 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
{¶ 33} Interpreting “position of trust” so broadly as to eliminate the 
preference for community control and render an offender categorically ineligible 
for ILC based upon a finding that the offender, as a private individual, breached 
any moral, ethical, or filial duty is not consistent with the remaining sentencing 
factors in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1) or the specific findings in (B)(1)(d).  Further, that 
interpretation is not consistent with the overarching sentencing principles, which 
require sentencing courts to consider the need for rehabilitating offenders.  R.C. 
2929.11(A). 
{¶ 34} Given the narrow application of the sentencing factors identified in 
R.C. 2929.13(B)(1) and (B)(1)(d), the presumption of community control for 
fourth- and fifth-degree felonies set forth in R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(b), and the 
overarching felony-sentencing principles, we believe that the General Assembly 
intended a limited application of the phrase “position of trust” in R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d).  Limiting the application of the section to private individuals 
who occupy a special relationship of trust and confidence equivalent to a fiduciary 
relationship and whose offense relates to that fiduciary relationship prevents the 
disqualification of persons who are not clearly meant to be excluded from ILC.  
Indeed, the state agrees and asks the court to apply this “special relationship” 
standard.  Thus, we turn to whether Massien occupied a special relationship of 
trust and confidence equivalent to a fiduciary relationship as a result of her 
employment as a nurse. 
A Nurse Employed in a Hospital Is Not a Fiduciary of His or Her Employer 
{¶ 35} “ ‘A “fiduciary relationship” is one in which special confidence 
and trust is reposed in the integrity and fidelity of another and there is a resulting 
position of superiority or influence, acquired by virtue of this special trust.’ ”  
Stone v. Davis, 66 Ohio St.2d at 78, 20 O.O.3d 64, 419 N.E.2d 1094, quoting In 
re Termination of Pratt, 40 Ohio St.2d at 115, 69 O.O.2d 512, 321 N.E.2d 603.  
“A ‘fiduciary’ has been defined as ‘“a person having a duty, created by his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit of another in matters connected with 
his undertaking.”‘ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  Strock v. Presnell (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 
207, 216, 527 N.E.2d 1235, quoting Haluka v. Baker (1941), 66 Ohio App. 308, 
312, 20 O.O. 136, 34 N.E.2d 68, quoting 1 Restatement of the Law, Agency 
(1933), Section 13, Comment a.  “A fiduciary relationship need not be created by 
contract; it may arise out of an informal relationship where both parties 
understand that a special trust or confidence has been reposed.”  Stone, 66 Ohio 
St.2d at 78. 
{¶ 36} The record does not establish that Massien breached a duty of trust 
to any patient or that any patient was harmed as a result of her actions.  Rather, 
because the alleged “position of trust” is born of Massien’s employment with the 
victim of the thefts, Summa Health System, to determine whether Massien 
occupied a “position of trust,” we must determine whether she was a fiduciary of 
Summa Health Systems by virtue of her position as a nurse.  Absent specific 
proof to the contrary, we hold that the relationship between a nurse employed by a 
hospital and the hospital in which he or she is employed is simply that of an 
employee and employer, not a fiduciary relationship. 
{¶ 37} Although some employees may have fiduciary relationships with 
their employers, “[n]ot all employees are fiduciaries.”  Laurel Valley Oil Co. v. 76 
Lubricants Co., 154 Ohio App.3d 512, 2003-Ohio-5163, 797 N.E.2d 1033, ¶ 40.  
A fiduciary relationship requires “ ‘more than the ordinary relationship of 
employer and employee.’ ”  State ex rel. Charlton v. Corrigan (1988), 36 Ohio 
St.3d 68, 71, 521 N.E.2d 804, quoting In re Termination, 40 Ohio St.2d at 114, 69 
O.O.2d 512, 321 N.E.2d 603.4  In determining whether a fiduciary relationship 
                                                 
4.  Charlton involved a determination of whether county treasurer employees were “fiduciary 
employees” and were exempt from the civil service laws under R.C. 124.11(A)(9).  However, the 
analysis regarding whether employees are fiduciaries of their employer is equally applicable in a 
private employment relationship. 
 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
exists between an employee and employer, “emphasis should be placed upon 
whether the assigned job duties require, as essential qualifications over and above 
technical competency requirements, a high degree of trust, confidence, reliance, 
integrity and fidelity.”  Charlton at syllabus.  Job duties that require a great degree 
of discretion support the existence of a fiduciary relationship, whereas assigned 
duties of a routine character do not involve the degree of discretion or trust 
necessary to be considered a fiduciary.  Id. at 71-73.  A further consideration 
involves whether the employee’s responsibility includes “daily discretionary 
decisions” affecting persons served by the employer that require the employee to 
be “of higher than normal reliability.”  Id. at 73. 
{¶ 38} Nurses are persons of “superior knowledge and skill,” who have a 
duty to their patients to employ the degree of care, skill, and diligence that a nurse 
of ordinary care should employ in like circumstances.  Berdyck v. Shinde (1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 573, 613 N.E.2d 1014, at paragraph three of the syllabus.  
However, the duty of care imposed by law on a nurse toward his or her patients 
does not create a fiduciary relationship between the nurse and his or her 
employer-hospital. 
{¶ 39} Further, a nurse’s job duties are not sufficiently discretionary to 
transform the relationship with his or her employer-hospital into a fiduciary 
relationship.  “The practice of medicine, which includes the diagnosis of an 
adverse health condition and the prescription of a course of treatment for its 
management and care, is limited by law to licensed physicians.”  Id. at 579.  
“Because they are prohibited from practicing medicine, hospitals and nurses 
cannot pass on the efficacy of a course of treatment.”  Id. at 580.  Rather, nurses 
employed by hospitals assist physicians in their treatment of the patient and “ 
‘keep the attending physician informed of a patient’s condition so as to permit the 
physician to make a proper diagnosis of and devise a plan of treatment for the 
patient.’ ”  Id. at 580, quoting Albain v. Flower Hosp. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
259, 553 N.E.2d 1038.  “The law imposes on the physician the exclusive duty to 
diagnose the patient’s adverse health condition and to prescribe a course of 
treatment for its management and care.  Nurse practitioners employed by a 
hospital to which the patient is admitted by an attending physician are under a 
duty to support that process.”  Id. at 583. 
{¶ 40} A nurse occupies a necessary and important supportive role in 
caring for patients and administering medication.  However, as is illustrated by 
the respective duties of nurses and physicians, discretion relating to the diagnosis 
and treatment of a patient is statutorily in the hands of the physician, not the 
nurse.  A nurse employed by a hospital does not occupy a position of discretion 
and, therefore, does not occupy a fiduciary relationship.  Because a nurse is not a 
fiduciary by virtue of his or her employment with a hospital, he or she does not 
occupy a “position of trust” for the purpose of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d).  Therefore, 
a nurse who steals drugs from the hospital in which he or she is employed is not 
categorically ineligible for ILC by virtue of his or her employment. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} Although a “position of trust” for the purpose of R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d) is not limited to public officials and public servants, it does not 
include all positions of trust held by a private individual.  Rather, a private 
individual holds a “position of trust” if he or she occupies a special relationship of 
trust and confidence equivalent to a fiduciary relationship.  Although a nurse 
employed by a hospital has a necessary and important supportive role in caring 
for patients and administering medication, discretionary duties regarding 
diagnosis and treatment of patients are statutorily in the hands of physicians, not 
nurses.  Consequently, Massien does not occupy a fiduciary relationship with 
Summa Health Systems by virtue of her employment as a nurse, does not hold a 
“position of trust” under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d), and is not categorically ineligible 
for ILC.  Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative. 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
CUPP, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
CUPP, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 42} I concur in the judgment; however, my reading of the statute at 
issue yields a different meaning from that of the majority. 
{¶ 43} In my view, the phrase “position of trust” for purposes of R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d) is limited to public officials, public servants, and those holding 
public “positions of trust.” The statute, R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d), provides:  
{¶ 44} “(B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2), (E), (F), or (G) of 
this section, in sentencing an offender for a felony of the fourth or fifth degree, 
the sentencing court shall determine whether any of the following apply: 
{¶ 45} * * * 
{¶ 46} “(d) The offender held a public office or position of trust and the 
offense related to that office or position; the offender’s position obliged the 
offender to prevent the offense or to bring those committing it to justice; or the 
offender’s professional reputation or position facilitated the offense or was likely 
to influence the future conduct of others.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 47} R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) addresses three situations.  It is the first 
category that is at issue in this case:5  offenders who “held a public office or 
position of trust and the offense related to that office or position.”  The statute 
uses the phrase “a public office or position of trust,” indicating that the “office” 
and the “position of trust” are both of a public nature. In this regard, the article 
                                                 
5.  The third category in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d), that “the offender’s professional reputation or 
position facilitated the offense or was likely to influence the future conduct of others,” would 
appear to be implicated by Massien’s situation, but this is not the category of the statute upon 
which the state relies. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
“a” operates as a grammatical signal that both “office” and “position of trust” are 
parallel terms modified by “public.” If “position of trust” had not been intended 
by the legislative drafters to be modified by “public,” the article “a” would have 
appeared not only before “public” but also before “position of trust.” The 
construction of the statute makes sense because a public position of trust does not 
have to be an office to fall within the statute’s ambit. Consequently, I do not 
believe that positions of trust held by private individuals which positions are not 
in the nature of a public trust are included within the first category listed in R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d). Instead, situations involving a private position of trust, like the 
one in the present case, could well fall within the third category included in the 
statutory list, that “the offender’s professional reputation or position facilitated the 
offense.” 
{¶ 48} I do not share the majority’s view that reference to offenders who 
“held a public office or position of trust in the community” in R.C. 2929.12(B)(3), 
a different statutory section, shows that the lack of the phrase “in the community” 
in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) implies a broader meaning of “position of trust” in the 
latter statute. The phrase “position of trust” appears in two separate statutory 
sections (R.C. 2929.12 and 2929.13). The wording of the two statutes, while 
similar, does not establish that R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) also applies to private 
fiduciary relationships as well as public positions of trust. To so hold is to afford 
R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) a much broader scope than R.C. 2929.12(B)(3). 
{¶ 49} The majority acknowledges that R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) does not 
evince an intention by the General Assembly to sweep all positions of trust held 
by private individuals into the “position of trust” category in R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d). However, the majority then puts its own limitation on the 
category of “positions of trust” held by private individuals. The majority holds 
that only those who hold a position akin to a fiduciary relationship are within the 
“position of trust” category. But the majority’s limitation is not expressed in the 
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
language of the statute and thus takes an unwarranted creative pen to the actual 
words used by the legislature. The more natural reading of the language of R.C. 
2929.13(B)(1)(d) is one, in my view, in which both “office” and “position of 
trust” are limited by the word “public.” 
{¶ 50} When R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) is construed to apply only to public 
offices and public positions of trust, it is unnecessary to consider, as the majority 
does, whether a private individual holds a “special relationship of trust and 
confidence equivalent to a fiduciary relationship.”  Whether or not Massien held a 
fiduciary relationship to her employer, the hospital, is not determinative of the 
question whether R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) covers Massien’s situation. 
{¶ 51} Because Massien did not hold a public office or position of trust, 
she is not within the first category of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) and thus was not 
statutorily ineligible for intervention in lieu of conviction on that basis.  For this 
reason, I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the court of appeals. 
__________________ 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard 
S. Kasay, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Brouse Law Office and Karen H. Brouse, for appellee. 
______________________