Case Title: State v. Dalton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP002483-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 85 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2483-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Patrick H. Dalton, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 377 Wis. 2d 730, 902 N.W.2d 810  
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 12, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Washington 
 
JUDGE: 
Todd K. Martens 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., dissents, joined by GABLEMAN, 
J. (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, J., dissents, joined by GABLEMAN, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed and an oral argument by Hannah Schieber Jurss, assistant 
state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed and 
an oral argument by David H. Perlman, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney 
general.
 
 
2018 WI 85
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2483-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CM117) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Patrick H. Dalton, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Patrick 
Dalton, seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals decision 
affirming his judgment of conviction and sentence and upholding 
the circuit court's order denying his postconviction motion.1  
Dalton asserts that he is entitled to withdraw his no contest 
pleas because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
                                                 
1 State v. Dalton, No. 2016AP2483-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 19, 2017) (affirming the judgment and order 
of the circuit court for Washington County, Todd K. Martens, 
Judge). 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
2 
 
move to suppress blood evidence collected without a warrant.  In 
the alternative, he argues that he is entitled to resentencing 
because the circuit court relied on an improper sentencing 
factor. 
¶2 
Specifically, 
Dalton 
contends 
first 
that 
because 
police lacked the exigent circumstances necessary to draw his 
blood without a warrant, his counsel was ineffective for failing 
to move to suppress the evidence.  He asserts next that the 
circuit 
court 
impermissibly 
lengthened 
his 
sentence 
for 
exercising his constitutional right to refuse a warrantless 
blood draw. 
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
exigent 
circumstances 
existed, 
permitting police to draw Dalton's blood absent a warrant.  
Accordingly, his counsel was not ineffective for failing to file 
a meritless motion to suppress. 
¶4 
We further conclude that the circuit court violated 
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185-
86 (2016),2 by explicitly subjecting Dalton to a more severe 
criminal penalty because he refused to provide a blood sample 
absent 
a 
warrant. 
 
Consequently, 
Dalton 
is 
entitled 
to 
resentencing. 
¶5 
Accordingly, although we agree with the court of 
appeals 
that 
Dalton's 
counsel 
was 
not 
ineffective, 
we 
                                                 
2 As relevant here, the Supreme Court in 
Birchfield 
determined that it is impermissible to impose criminal penalties 
for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood draw.  Birchfield 
v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185-86 (2016). 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
3 
 
nevertheless reverse and remand to the circuit court for 
resentencing. 
I 
¶6 
This case arises from a single car crash in the 
Village of Richfield in which Patrick Dalton (Dalton) was the 
driver.  After driving erratically and at speeds reaching 
approximately one hundred miles per hour, Dalton crashed his car 
into a ditch.  Both Dalton and his passenger were injured. 
¶7 
Washington County sheriff's deputies responded to the 
scene of the crash at 10:07 p.m. on December 12, 2013.  Upon 
arrival, the passenger in the car informed deputies that Dalton 
had been drinking and that Dalton was the driver of the car.  
When law enforcement arrived, Dalton was lying on the roof of 
the car, unconscious, and smelled of alcohol.  Dalton was taken 
about a mile from the crash scene by ambulance, where he awaited 
the arrival of a Flight for Life helicopter. 
¶8 
After 
Dalton 
was 
driven 
away 
from 
the 
scene, 
Washington County Deputy Dirk Stolz remained and took the lead 
in investigating the scene.  Deputy Stolz was accompanied by 
Deputies Charles Vanderheiden, Chad Polinske, and Michael 
Anderson.  They were later joined by Lieutenant Robert Martin.  
Ten to 15 members of the Richfield Fire Department were also 
present, working to keep the area safe and blocking traffic to 
ensure officer safety. 
¶9 
While Deputy Polinske interviewed witnesses, Deputy 
Vanderheiden left the crash scene to await the helicopter with 
Dalton, who remained in the ambulance and unconscious.  Deputy 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
4 
 
Venderheiden arrived at the landing zone at 10:37 p.m. and 
testified that it took about 45 minutes from the time he got 
there for the helicopter to arrive.  Upon its arrival, Flight 
for Life airlifted Dalton from the landing zone to Froedtert 
Hospital in Milwaukee. 
¶10 Subsequent to Dalton being airlifted from the scene, 
Deputy Vanderheiden traveled to Community Memorial Hospital in 
Menomonee Falls to speak with the passenger.  Leaving the crash 
scene at 11:14 p.m., Deputy Stolz drove to Froedtert Hospital in 
Milwaukee to reconnect with Dalton. 
¶11 When Deputy Stolz arrived at Froedtert Hospital at 
11:54 p.m., Dalton was receiving emergency treatment.  After the 
treatment was complete, Deputy Stolz was able to speak to 
Dalton, who had regained consciousness. 
¶12 Upon interacting with Dalton, Deputy Stolz observed 
that Dalton had glassy bloodshot eyes and the strong odor of 
alcohol emanating from his mouth.  Dalton also appeared 
lethargic. 
¶13 At approximately 12:05 a.m., nearly two hours after 
being dispatched to the crash scene, Deputy Stolz informed 
Dalton that he was under arrest and read Dalton the "Informing 
the Accused" form.3  Dalton refused a blood draw. 
                                                 
3 The Informing the Accused form in the record indicates 
that Deputy Stolz read to Dalton the following: 
Under Wisconsin's Implied Consent Law, I am required 
to read this notice to you: 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
5 
 
¶14 Believing that there were exigent circumstances that 
would obviate the need to obtain a warrant, Deputy Stolz then 
instructed 
a 
nurse 
to 
draw 
Dalton's 
blood, 
which 
was 
                                                                                                                                                             
You have either been arrested for an offense that 
involves driving or operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or 
you are the operator of a vehicle that was involved in 
an accident that caused the death of, great bodily 
harm to, or substantial bodily harm to a person, or 
you are suspected of driving or being on duty time 
with respect to a commercial motor vehicle after 
consuming an intoxicating beverage. 
This law enforcement agency now wants to test one or 
more samples of your breath, blood or urine to 
determine the concentration of alcohol or drugs in 
your system.  If any test shows more alcohol in your 
system than the law permits while driving, your 
operating privilege will be suspended.  If you refuse 
to take any test that this agency requests, your 
operating privilege will be revoked and you will be 
subject to other penalties.  The test results or the 
fact that you refused testing can be used against you 
in court. 
If you take all the requested tests, you may choose to 
take further tests.  You may take the alternative test 
that this law enforcement agency provides free of 
charge.  You also may have a test conducted by a 
qualified person of your choice at your expense.  You, 
however, will have to make your own arrangements for 
that test. 
If you have a commercial driver license or were 
operating 
a 
commercial 
motor 
vehicle, 
other 
consequences may result from positive test results or 
from refusing testing, such as being placed out of 
service or disqualified. 
In addition, your operating privileges will also be 
suspended if a detectable amount of a restricted 
controlled substance is in your blood. 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
6 
 
accomplished at 12:14 a.m.  A subsequent blood test indicated 
that Dalton's blood alcohol content was 0.238 grams per 100 
milliliters, nearly three times the legal limit of 0.08. 
¶15 At the time Deputy Stolz read Dalton the Informing the 
Accused form, there were nine deputy sheriffs on duty in 
Washington County, along with one supervisor.  Several of those 
who were present at the crash scene left and proceeded directly 
to other incidents that had taken place in the county that night 
requiring immediate attention. 
¶16 Deputy Polinske, who had initially responded to the 
crash scene, ended his work day at 11:00 p.m.  Deputy Anderson 
arrived on the scene at 10:15 p.m. and was cleared to leave at 
11:42 p.m.  He and one other deputy were subsequently dispatched 
to an auto theft call in the Village of Richfield. 
¶17 Lieutenant Martin arrived at the scene at 11:01 p.m. 
and was cleared to leave at 11:46 p.m.  After leaving the crash 
site he proceeded immediately to another auto accident that 
involved personal injury in which the driver had fled the scene, 
the vehicle was in the middle of the road, and power poles were 
downed.  Three additional deputies accompanied Lieutenant Martin 
to this scene. 
¶18 With Deputy Stolz in Milwaukee attending to Dalton and 
Deputy Vanderheiden in Menomonee Falls with the passenger, only 
two deputies were left to cover all of Washington County.  One 
of these deputies was assigned to the northern half of the 432 
square mile county, while the other was assigned to the southern 
half. 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
7 
 
¶19 Dalton was ultimately charged with three offenses:  
operating while intoxicated (OWI) as a second offense, operating 
with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) as a second 
offense, and operating after revocation (OAR).  Dalton entered 
no contest pleas to the OWI and OAR charges, and the PAC charge 
was dismissed and read in.4  The case proceeded directly to 
sentencing. 
¶20 At sentencing, the circuit court heard argument from 
the State and Dalton's counsel, as well as a brief statement 
from Dalton himself.  In pronouncing its sentence, the circuit 
court observed the nature of the offense, addressing Dalton: 
You certainly were driving like a maniac this night, 
and 
you 
were 
extremely 
uncooperative 
with 
the 
officers.  You could have killed your friend, you 
could have killed yourself, or you could have killed 
someone completely innocent, and you acted in total 
disregard of those risks, endangering anyone else who 
was on the road at the time. 
¶21 The circuit then proceeded to address Dalton's refusal 
to submit to a blood test: 
The other thing you did is anybody who drives a motor 
vehicle in Wisconsin impliedly consents to a blood or 
breath draw after they're arrested.  And you were 
arrested, and you disregarded that, and you will be 
punished for that today.  You don't have the right not 
                                                 
4 When the State and a defendant agree that charges will be 
read in, those charges are expected to be considered at 
sentencing.  State v. Frey, 2012 WI 99, ¶68, 343 Wis. 2d 358, 
817 N.W.2d 436.  The defendant understands that the read-in 
charges could increase the sentence up to the maximum that the 
defendant could receive for the conviction in exchange for the 
promise not to prosecute those additional offenses.  Id. 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
8 
 
to consent.  And that's going to result in a higher 
sentence for you. 
Dalton was sentenced to 180 days in jail on the OWI count and 90 
days on the OAR count, to be served consecutively. 
¶22 Dalton filed a postconviction motion seeking to 
withdraw his no contest pleas.  He asserted that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the 
evidence resulting from the warrantless blood draw.  In the 
event his ineffective assistance of counsel claim proved 
unsuccessful, 
he 
alternatively 
sought 
resentencing. 
 
He 
contended that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by explicitly punishing him for exercising his 
constitutional right to refuse a warrantless blood draw. 
¶23 The circuit court denied Dalton's motion for plea 
withdrawal without holding an evidentiary hearing.  It concluded 
"that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw 
in this case" and that therefore "trial counsel is not 
ineffective for failing to file a meritless motion[.]" 
¶24 Dalton's motion for resentencing was also denied.  In 
denying the motion, the circuit court stated, "everybody knows a 
court may not punish a person for exercise of the constitutional 
right, a right to trial, right to remain silent, but there is no 
right to refuse, so the [c]ourt has discretion and I think [has] 
the responsibility to consider a refusal an aggravating factor 
in sentencing an offender accordingly." 
¶25 Dalton appealed both the denial of his plea withdrawal 
motion and his motion for resentencing.  During the pendency of 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
9 
 
the appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Birchfield, 
136 S. Ct. 2160. 
¶26 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court.  See 
State v. Dalton, No. 2016AP6-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. July 20, 2016) (Dalton I).  It remanded the case to the 
circuit court for a Machner5 hearing and directed the circuit 
court to address Dalton's claim for resentencing in light of 
Birchfield. 
¶27 On remand, the circuit court held a Machner hearing, 
where Dalton's trial counsel testified.  Counsel stated that 
prior to entering his pleas, Dalton had raised concerns about 
the fact that the police had taken his blood without a warrant.  
Counsel researched the issue and wrote a memo for her file.  In 
discussing with Dalton whether to file a motion to suppress, 
counsel informed him that she "did not believe there was a basis 
for it, and based on reviewing the discovery in conjunction with 
the case law, and the facts surrounding the case, we talked 
about it and determined there was not a basis for suppressing 
the blood." 
¶28 Following the Machner hearing, the circuit court again 
denied Dalton's motion to withdraw his pleas, concluding that 
exigent circumstances were present.  In making this decision, it 
observed: 
                                                 
5 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979). 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
10 
 
This was a complicated and fluid situation.  There's 
potentially 
life-threatening 
injuries 
to 
the 
Defendant, injuries to another individual.  Sounds 
like a chaotic night in Washington County in terms of 
the need for law enforcement work in a variety of 
contexts 
and 
relatively 
serious 
incidents. 
 
In 
addition to the responsibilities the deputy had here 
for the traffic stop, he had to secure the accident, 
examine the scene, talk to witnesses, help get the 
Defendant out of the vehicle, get him into an 
ambulance, arrange for transport by helicopter, and 
then follow him down there promptly, and had to wait 
for him to get [] medical clearance before he could 
have contact with him.  And this happened outside of 
Washington County.  These are highly unusual factors.  
These are the kind of factors that are appropriate to 
consider 
on 
a 
case-by-case 
basis 
in 
making 
a 
determination 
about 
whether 
exigent 
circumstances 
exist. 
¶29 With regard to counsel's decision not to file a motion 
to suppress, the circuit court stated: "[counsel] considered the 
propriety of a motion to suppress here.  She decided not to file 
one, because she didn't think it had legal merit.  She talked to 
the Defendant about it before deciding."  The circuit court 
viewed counsel's decision as "the result of an exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment" and determined that her 
assistance was "not ineffective for failing to file a meritless 
motion." 
¶30 Further, the circuit court determined that Birchfield 
had no effect on its earlier sentencing decision.  It found 
Birchfield distinguishable from this case because "Wisconsin 
doesn't criminalize a refusal."  In the circuit court's view, 
"[i]ncreasing a punishment of a defendant because of his refusal 
is not the same as making that refusal a crime . . . ."  
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
11 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
motion 
for 
resentencing. 
¶31 Dalton again appealed, renewing his arguments that he 
is entitled to withdraw his plea due to ineffective assistance 
of counsel and that he is entitled to resentencing pursuant to 
Birchfield.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
concluding that "exigent circumstances existed that justified 
the warrantless draw of [Dalton's] blood, and the circuit court 
did not err in considering Dalton's refusal to the blood draw as 
an aggravating factor in sentencing."  State v. Dalton, No. 
2016AP2483-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. July 19, 
2017) (Dalton II). 
II 
¶32 This case presents Dalton's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  For a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel to be successful, a defendant must demonstrate both that 
(1) 
counsel's 
representation 
was 
deficient; 
and 
(2) 
the 
deficiency was prejudicial.  State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 74, ¶14, 
281 
Wis. 2d 595, 
698 
N.W.2d 583 
(citing 
Strickland 
v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  We need not address both 
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient 
showing on one.  Id. 
¶33 Appellate review of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact.  State v. 
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, ¶21, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  The 
circuit court's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  However, the ultimate 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
12 
 
determination of whether the attorney's performance falls below 
the constitutional minimum is a question of law we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  Id. 
¶34 To demonstrate deficient performance, a defendant must 
show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness considering all the circumstances.  
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶22, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 
N.W.2d 695 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  Counsel has a 
duty to reasonably investigate or to make a reasonable decision 
that renders particular investigations unnecessary.  Carter, 324 
Wis. 2d 640, ¶23. 
¶35 In evaluating counsel's performance, this court is 
highly deferential to counsel's strategic decisions.  State v. 
Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶26, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334.  
Counsel's performance need not be perfect, or even very good, to 
be constitutionally adequate.  State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶19, 
264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305. 
¶36 We are also asked to determine whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion at sentencing.  A 
circuit court's sentence is a discretionary decision.  McCleary 
v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).  On 
appeal, review is limited to determining if discretion was 
erroneously exercised.  State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.  An exercise of discretion is 
erroneous if it is based on an error of fact or law.  Zarder v. 
Humama Ins. Co., 2010 WI 35, ¶21, 324 Wis. 2d 325, 782 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
13 
 
N.W.2d 682.  Additionally, a circuit court erroneously exercises 
its sentencing discretion when it "actually relies on clearly 
irrelevant or improper factors."  State v. Alexander, 2015 WI 6, 
¶17, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662 (quoting State v. Harris, 
2010 WI 79, ¶66, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409). 
III 
¶37 We begin by setting forth the principles of Fourth 
Amendment law that govern blood draws in OWI cases.  Next we 
apply those principles to the facts of this case, examining 
Dalton's contention that his counsel was ineffective for failing 
to file a motion to suppress the results of the warrantless 
blood draw.  We then turn to Dalton's request for resentencing 
due to the circuit court's alleged violation of Birchfield. 
A 
¶38 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution protect 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.6  State v. Eason, 
                                                 
6 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
sets forth: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath of affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const., Amend. IV.  Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution contains substantially the same language.  See 
State v. Scull, 2015 WI 22, ¶18 n.3, 361 Wis. 2d 288, 862 
N.W.2d 562. 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
14 
 
2001 WI 98, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  Warrantless 
searches are presumptively unreasonable unless an exception to 
the warrant requirement applies.  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 
134, ¶30, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120 (citations omitted). 
¶39 An exception to the warrant requirement applies when 
there are exigent circumstances, i.e. if the need for a search 
is urgent and there is insufficient time to obtain a warrant.  
Id.  There are four circumstances which, when measured against 
the time needed to obtain a warrant, constitute the exigent 
circumstances required for a warrantless search:  (1) an arrest 
made in "hot pursuit," (2) a threat to safety of a suspect or 
others, (3) a risk that evidence will be destroyed, and (4) a 
likelihood that the suspect will flee.  State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 
24, ¶25, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621. 
¶40 In an OWI case, the natural dissipation of alcohol in 
the bloodstream may present a risk that evidence will be 
destroyed and may therefore support a finding of exigency in a 
specific case.  Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013).  
"While experts can work backwards from the BAC at the time the 
sample was taken to determine the BAC at the time of the alleged 
offense, longer intervals may raise questions about the accuracy 
of 
the 
calculation." 
 
Id. 
 
For 
this 
reason, 
exigent 
circumstances to justify a warrantless blood draw "may arise in 
the regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the 
warrant application process."  Id. 
¶41 Evidentiary rules reflect the fact that blood tests 
decrease in accuracy as more time passes.  Results of a blood 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
15 
 
test are automatically admissible to prove intoxication or 
demonstrate a prohibited alcohol concentration "if the sample 
was taken within 3 hours after the event to be proved."  Wis. 
Stat. § 885.235(1g) (2013-14).7  After this three-hour window, 
the evidence "is admissible only if expert testimony establishes 
its probative value and may be given prima facie effect only if 
the effect is established by expert testimony."  § 885.235(3). 
¶42 Yet the dissipation of alcohol in the blood does not 
create an exigency per se.  McNeely, 569 U.S.  at 144.  Rather, 
"[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect 
is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the 
totality of the circumstances."  Id. at 156. 
¶43 The test for determining the existence of exigent 
circumstances is objective.  Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶41.  
Courts must determine whether the police officers under the 
circumstances known to them at the time reasonably believed that 
a delay in procuring a warrant would risk the destruction of 
evidence.  Id. (quoting State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶30, 327 
Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463). 
B 
¶44 Here the totality of the circumstances amounted to, in 
the words of the circuit court, a "complicated and fluid 
situation" and a "chaotic night in Washington County."  Although 
McNeely establishes that exigent circumstances "may arise in the 
                                                 
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
16 
 
regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the warrant 
application process[,]" 569 U.S. at 156, the circumstances with 
which law enforcement officers were presented in this case went 
well beyond the "regular course of law enforcement." 
¶45 Events on the evening in question presented the 
officers with many moving parts that inform our analysis.  
First, there were two injured people who needed urgent medical 
attention.  A law enforcement officer "who is confronted with an 
accident 
scene[] 
should 
first 
attend 
to 
the 
emergency 
circumstances at hand."  Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶49.  The 
officers' decision to tend to Dalton and his passenger's medical 
needs at the expense of requesting a warrant was certainly 
reasonable. 
¶46 Second, there was a need to examine and secure the 
scene.  An officer's responsibilities at an accident scene 
include securing evidence and ensuring the safety of those 
traveling on the road near and through the scene.  State v. 
Howes, 2017 WI 18, ¶46, 373 Wis. 2d 468, 893 N.W.2d 812.  That 
the safety of passersby would take precedence over applying for 
a warrant is, again, reasonable. 
¶47 Third, it was imperative that law enforcement speak 
with Dalton's passenger while events were fresh in his mind.  
Just as alcohol dissipates in the blood, the memories of 
witnesses fade.  Interviewing witnesses can give officers 
necessary information to determine whether they have probable 
cause 
for 
a 
warrant 
and 
therefore 
may 
be 
a 
necessary 
prerequisite to a warrant application.  Accordingly, it was 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
17 
 
reasonable for Deputy Vanderheiden to drive to the hospital in 
Menomonee Falls to speak with the passenger before applying for 
a warrant for Dalton's blood. 
¶48 Finally, the crash at issue here was not the only 
incident requiring law enforcement attention that evening.  Four 
officers were needed to respond to an accident involving 
personal injury, a fleeing driver, a vehicle in the middle of 
the road, and downed power poles.  Two others were dispatched to 
an auto theft.  This left two deputies to patrol the entirety of 
Washington County, one assigned to the northern half and one to 
the southern half of the 432 square mile county.  Given these 
other incidents, law enforcement's actions were certainly 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
¶49 This court is not in the business of second-guessing 
law enforcement's reasonable allocation of resources in a 
complex and evolving situation.  See U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 
1, 11 (1989) (explaining that courts do not "indulge in 
unrealistic second-guessing" of police's "swift, on-the-spot 
decisions.")  When presented with multifaceted and chaotic 
circumstances like those presented here, law enforcement needs 
flexibility to determine its priorities. 
¶50 Dalton essentially contends that officers should have 
prioritized arresting him over his medical needs and the safety 
of the scene, not to mention the additional happenings in the 
county.  His assertion is unpersuasive.  Police serve a dual 
purpose at an accident scene.  They are present to investigate 
the cause of the accident and gather evidence of wrongdoing, but 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
18 
 
they are also there as first responders to injuries.  See 3 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 6.6 (5th ed. 2012) ("The 
police have complex and multiple tasks to perform in addition to 
identifying and apprehending persons committing serious criminal 
offenses[,]" including "aid[ing] individuals who are in danger 
of physical harm" and "provid[ing] other services on an 
emergency basis."). 
¶51 The 
touchstone 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
reasonableness.  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).  
Officers' prioritizing safety and medical needs over a warrant 
application 
when 
presented 
with 
these 
circumstances 
was 
reasonable. 
¶52 Given the surrounding circumstances, the dissipation 
of alcohol in Dalton's blood and the rapidly closing three-hour 
window to accomplish a presumptively admissible and accurate 
blood 
draw, 
Deputy 
Stolz 
was 
presented 
with 
an 
exigent 
circumstance.  Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1g).  Such events gave rise 
to a reasonable belief that a delay in procuring a warrant would 
risk 
the 
destruction 
of 
evidence.8 
 
See 
Tullberg, 
359 
Wis. 2d 421, ¶41. 
                                                 
8 We observe also that the record reflects that at the time 
of these events, Washington County did not have a procedure in 
place for warrants to be fully completed by email or phone.  
Deputy Vanderheiden testified that Washington County's then-
existing protocol did not include emailing a search warrant to a 
judge, conducting a telephonic search warrant, or faxing a 
warrant application.  Rather, the protocol required an in-person 
meeting with the judge that, according to Deputy Vanderheiden's 
testimony, would take about ten minutes. 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
19 
 
¶53 Consequently, a motion to suppress the blood evidence 
would have been meritless, and the failure to file it does not 
constitute deficient performance.9  State v. Cummings, 199 
Wis. 2d 721, 747 n.10, 546 N.W.2d 406.  Because we determine 
that Dalton's counsel was not deficient, we need not address the 
prejudice prong of the analysis.  State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 
100, ¶81, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93. 
¶54 We 
therefore 
conclude 
that 
exigent 
circumstances 
existed, permitting police to draw Dalton's blood absent a 
warrant.  Accordingly, his counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to file a meritless motion to suppress. 
IV 
¶55 Having determined that Dalton's counsel was not 
ineffective, we turn next to Dalton's contention that the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
at 
sentencing.  Specifically, Dalton argues that the circuit court 
impermissibly lengthened his sentence because he refused a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Accordingly, Deputy Stolz testified that in order to obtain 
a warrant, he would have needed to fill out a form and contact 
the judge by phone.  The judge would then direct him to an in-
person meeting place.  Thus, we consider Washington County's 
protocol at the time of this incident as part of the totality of 
the circumstances. 
9 Further, Dalton's trial counsel diligently researched the 
legal issue presented.  The record reflects that Dalton's trial 
counsel wrote a memo for her file on the issue of suppressing 
the blood draw evidence.  She concluded that there was no basis 
for such a motion, and after discussing the issue with Dalton, 
did not proceed with filing one. 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
20 
 
warrantless blood draw, thereby violating Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. 
2160. 
¶56 A circuit court must set forth the reasons for its 
sentence on the record.  Wis. Stat. § 973.017(10m); Gallion, 270 
Wis. 2d 535, ¶4.  In crafting a sentence, circuit courts are to 
consider the protection of the public, the gravity of the 
offense, 
and 
the 
rehabilitative 
needs 
of 
the 
defendant.  
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d  535, ¶44.  A circuit court erroneously 
exercises its discretion when it bases its decision on an error 
of law or fact.  Zarder, 324 Wis. 2d 325, ¶21. 
¶57 In 
Birchfield, 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
considered whether a law making "it a crime for a motorist to 
refuse to be tested after being lawfully arrested for driving 
while impaired" violates the Fourth Amendment's proscription 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  136 S. Ct. at 2166-
67.  The Court concluded "that motorists cannot be deemed to 
have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a 
criminal offense."  Id. at 2186. 
¶58 Moving to the final issue in its analysis, the 
Birchfield court acknowledged that "prior opinions have referred 
approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that 
impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists 
who refuse to comply."  Id. at 2185.  Yet, the court emphasized 
that criminal penalties may not be imposed for a refusal.  "It 
is another matter, however, for a State not only to insist upon 
an intrusive blood test, but also to impose criminal penalties 
on the refusal to submit to such a test."  Id.  "There must be a 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
21 
 
limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to 
have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public 
roads."  Id. 
¶59 In sum, Birchfield dictates that criminal penalties 
may not be imposed for the refusal to submit to a blood test.  
136 S. Ct. at 2185.  A lengthier jail sentence is certainly a 
criminal 
penalty. 
 
See 
Doering 
v. 
WEA 
Ins. 
Grp., 
193 
Wis. 2d 118, 
141, 
532 
N.W.2d 432 
(1995) 
(referring 
to 
imprisonment as a criminal penalty); State v. Peterson, 104 
Wis. 2d 616, 621, 312 N.W.2d 784 (1981) (same). 
¶60 In setting forth the reasons for its sentence on the 
record, the circuit court stated in relevant part: 
The other thing you did is anybody who drives a motor 
vehicle in Wisconsin impliedly consents to a blood or 
breath draw after they're arrested.  And you were 
arrested, and you disregarded that, and you will be 
punished for that today.  You don't have the right not 
to consent.  And that's going to result in a higher 
sentence for you. 
It was thus definitive in its intent to give Dalton a longer 
sentence for the sole reason that he refused to submit to a 
blood test.  This is a violation of Birchfield. 
¶61 Pursuant to the circuit court's unequivocal sentencing 
remarks, Dalton was criminally punished for exercising his 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
22 
 
constitutional right.10  Established case law indicates that this 
is impermissible.  Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 
(1965); Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 539, 550, 202 N.W.2d 406 
(1972) (explaining that "[a] defendant cannot receive a harsher 
sentence solely because he availed himself of one of his 
constitutional 
rights."); 
see 
also 
Kubart 
v. 
State, 
70 
Wis. 2d 94, 97, 233 N.W.2d 404 (1975) ("A defendant cannot 
receive a harsher sentence solely because he has availed himself 
of the important constitutional right of trial by jury."). 
¶62 The State attempts to avoid this conclusion by 
contending that refusal to submit to a blood test is not a 
stand-alone crime in Wisconsin.  It also asserts that any 
increase in a sentence within the statutorily prescribed range 
does not morph a sentencing consideration into a criminal 
penalty.  We find each of these contentions unconvincing. 
¶63 As to the State's first argument, the fact that 
refusal is not a stand-alone crime does not alter our analysis.11  
                                                 
10 Chief Justice Roggensack's dissent's reliance on South 
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 n.10 (1983), is misplaced.  
Neville was decided pre-McNeely and pre-Birchfield.  Both 
McNeely and Birchfield have had a significant effect on drunk 
driving law, and highlight the constitutional nature of a blood 
draw.  Both cases analyze breath and blood tests as Fourth 
Amendment searches and appear to supersede the statement from 
the Fifth Amendment Neville case on which Chief Justice 
Roggensack's dissent relies. 
11 The circuit court distinguished Birchfield on the basis 
that Wisconsin does not criminalize refusal.  See supra, ¶30.  
For the same reasons we refute the State's argument here, we 
find the circuit court's distinction inapt. 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
23 
 
This is not a distinction the Birchfield Court drew.  Although 
Birchfield states that "motorists cannot be deemed to have 
consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a 
criminal 
offense[,]" 
it 
also 
addresses 
the 
wider 
impermissibility of criminal penalties for refusal, not only 
criminal charges.  See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185-86. 
¶64 Dalton's sentencing transcript indicates that the 
circuit court's comments were straightforward and unequivocal.  
The circuit court plainly signaled that it was giving Dalton a 
harsher penalty because of his refusal.12  The fact that Dalton 
could not be charged with a separate crime does not change the 
fact that he explicitly received a stiffer sentence based solely 
on his refusal to submit to an evidentiary blood test. 
¶65 Second, the State asserts that refusal is a legitimate 
sentencing consideration because it reflects on the character of 
the defendant, and it may be taken into account as long as it 
does not push the punishment above the statutorily allowed 
maximum for OWI.  Accepting the State's argument would render 
the limitations of Buckner and Kubart a nullity.  Taken to its 
                                                 
12 The dissents disregard the circuit court's unambiguous 
words, instead insisting that the circuit court considered 
Dalton's refusal to submit to a blood draw as a factor 
demonstrating Dalton's disregard of the law.  See Chief Justice 
Roggensack's dissent, ¶96; Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶¶104-05.  
The record does not bear out their assertion.  The circuit court 
stated, "You don't have the right not to consent.  And that's 
going to result in a higher sentence for you."  The causal link 
between the Dalton's refusal and his lengthier sentence could 
not have been made more apparent. 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
24 
 
logical extreme, the State's argument would allow a circuit 
court to increase a sentence because a defendant exercised the 
right to a jury trial, did not consent to a search of his home, 
or exercised his right to remain silent, as long as the sentence 
is within the statutory range.  Contrarily, our case law 
indicates that a defendant may not be punished in this manner. 
¶66 The Birchfield court recognized that "[t]here must be 
a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to 
have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public 
roads."  136 S. Ct. at 2185.  The limitation it established 
directs:  no criminal penalties may be imposed for refusal.  
Here 
the 
record 
demonstrates 
that 
Dalton 
was 
criminally 
penalized for his refusal to submit to a blood draw.  By 
explicitly punishing Dalton for refusal, the circuit court 
violated Birchfield.  In denying Dalton's postconviction motion 
after remand, it made an error of law by misapplying Birchfield.  
Such error constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
¶67 We therefore conclude that the circuit court violated 
Birchfield by explicitly subjecting Dalton to a more severe 
criminal penalty because he refused to provide a blood sample 
absent 
a 
warrant. 
 
Consequently, 
Dalton 
is 
entitled 
to 
resentencing. 
V 
¶68 In 
sum, 
we 
conclude 
that 
exigent 
circumstances 
existed, permitting police to draw Dalton's blood absent a 
warrant.  Accordingly, his counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to file a meritless motion to suppress.  We further 
No. 
2016AP2483-CR 
 
25 
 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
violated 
Birchfield 
by 
explicitly subjecting Dalton to a more severe criminal penalty 
because he refused to provide a blood sample absent a warrant.  
Consequently, Dalton is entitled to resentencing. 
¶69 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals, and remand to the circuit court for resentencing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶70 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (dissenting).  The 
circuit court's sentencing of Patrick H. Dalton does not 
conflict with Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 
S. Ct. 2160 (2016) and is well within the circuit court's 
sentencing 
discretion. 
 
Because 
the 
majority 
opinion 
misunderstands the directive of Birchfield and expands the 
statutory opportunity to withdraw consent pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(4) into a constitutional right to refuse a blood draw 
contrary to South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), I 
respectfully dissent.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶71 The majority opinion ably narrates the circumstances 
surrounding Dalton's arrest and conviction for Operating While 
Intoxicated 
(OWI), 
second 
offense, 
and 
Operating 
After 
Revocation (OAR).  Therefore, I shall relate only that which is 
necessary to assist the reader's understanding of this dissent.   
¶72 Dalton was involved in a high-speed crash in which he 
and his passenger were seriously injured.  They were transported 
to two different hospitals.  Dalton exhibited overt signs of 
intoxication and Deputy Stolz arrested him for driving while 
intoxicated.  Deputy Stolz read Dalton the Informing the Accused 
form and Dalton withdrew his consent to a blood draw.   
¶73 Deputy Stolz asked a nurse to draw a blood sample and 
she did so.  Dalton had a blood alcohol level of 0.238.  This is 
nearly three times the level of 0.08 for which Dalton could have 
been 
convicted 
of 
unlawful 
intoxication. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 340.01(46m)(a) and 346.63(1)(b).  
No.  2016AP2483-CR.pdr 
 
2 
 
¶74 At sentencing after Dalton's conviction for OWI, as a 
second offense, and conviction for OAR, the circuit court 
discussed the seriousness of the accident and how Dalton could 
have killed his friend and himself.  The court commented on his 
level of intoxication and the foul language he used with the 
arresting officer, who also had assisted in securing the med-
flight that Dalton needed.  The court commented on Dalton's 
withdrawal of consent to a blood draw as additional evidence of 
Dalton's disregard of his obligations under the law.  The 
majority opinion elicits no other comment by the sentencing 
court that it concludes was objectionable.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶75 We review whether Dalton's sentencing for an OWI 
conviction 
comes 
within 
the 
proscriptions 
of 
Birchfield, 
independent of the court of appeals and circuit court's 
decisions while benefitting from their discussions.  State v. 
Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶17, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369.  We 
review a circuit court's sentencing decision under the erroneous 
exercise of discretion standard.  State v. Alexander, 2015 WI 6, 
¶16, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662; State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 
42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.   
B.  Birchfield Principles 
¶76 Birchfield is the latest United States Supreme Court 
decision in the saga of implied-consent laws.  The Birchfield 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.pdr 
 
3 
 
decision is a combination of three cases, but I will focus on 
Danny Birchfield's circumstances.1   
¶77 Coming upon Birchfield after he drove his vehicle off 
a North Dakota highway, a state trooper stopped to help. 
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2170.  It soon became apparent that 
Birchfield 
was 
intoxicated. 
 
Id. 
 
The 
trooper 
arrested 
Birchfield and informed him of his obligations under North 
Dakota law to agree to a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test 
and that refusing to submit to a blood draw would subject him to 
criminal penalties.2  Id.  Nevertheless, Birchfield refused.  Id.  
He then pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor violation of the refusal 
statute, while contending that the Fourth Amendment prohibited 
criminalizing his refusal.  Id. at 2170-71.    
¶78 The Court explained that it granted certiorari in 
Birchfield and the two companion cases "in order to decide 
whether motorists lawfully arrested for drunk driving may be 
convicted of a crime or otherwise penalized for refusing to take 
a warrantless test measuring the alcohol in their bloodstream."  
Id. at 2172.  The Court sharply focused on the Fourth Amendment 
issue.  "The question, then, is whether the warrantless searches 
at issue here were reasonable," id. at 2173, and "how the 
                                                 
1 The decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 
136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), addressed the contentions of Danny 
Birchfield, William Bernard, Jr., and Steve Beylund.  Although 
all involved implied-consent laws, all were different.  Those 
circumstances relating to Danny Birchfield are most relevant to 
my discussion.  
2 In North Dakota, criminal penalties applied to breath, 
blood and urine refusals.  Id. at 2170. 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.pdr 
 
4 
 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies to breath and blood 
tests incident to such arrests," id. at 2174.   
¶79 Although the Court approved warrantless breath tests 
for those arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, 
concluding they do not implicate any significant privacy 
concerns, id. at 2178, the Court concluded that blood draws did 
involve privacy concerns due to "significant bodily intrusions" 
required for blood draws, id.  However, the Court also concluded 
that "requiring the police to obtain a warrant in every case 
would impose a substantial burden but no commensurate benefit."  
Id. at 2181-82.  Although the Court concluded that "Birchfield 
was threatened with an unlawful search," because his refusal 
would be criminalized under North Dakota law, id. at 2186, the 
Court was less than clear about whether implied consent laws 
that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on 
motorists who refuse required a warrant for a blood draw.    
¶80 The Court seemed to approve blood draws "based on the 
driver's legally implied consent to submit to them."  Id. at 
2185.  The Court confirmed its approval of "implied-consent laws 
that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on 
motorists who refuse to comply."  Id.  Therefore, refusal to 
comply with an implied-consent law's consent to submit to a 
blood draw could be sanctioned administratively.  "Petitioners 
do not question the constitutionality of those laws, and nothing 
we say here should be read to cast doubt on them."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  
No.  2016AP2483-CR.pdr 
 
5 
 
¶81 However, the Court concluded that imposing criminal 
penalties for withdrawing consent to a blood draw went too far.  
"It is another matter, however, for a State not only to insist 
upon an intrusive blood test, but also to impose criminal 
penalties on the refusal to submit to such a test."  Id.  The 
Court then concluded that "motorists cannot be deemed to have 
consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a 
criminal offense."  Id. at 2186.   
¶82 Under the circumstances Dalton presents in the case 
before us, his refusal was not criminalized.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(4).  Rather, the misdemeanor of which Dalton was 
convicted was a consequence of his withdrawing consent that 
resulted in a revocation under § 343.305(10), which then counted 
as 
his 
second 
OWI 
conviction 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)2.  Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(f).  If his refusal 
were counted as his first OWI, there would have been no criminal 
penalties.  § 346.65(2)(am)1.   
¶83 Stated otherwise, the criminal sanction was due to 
Dalton's repetitive driving while intoxicated.  Moving to 
criminal penalties because of repetitive OWI's was noted without 
objection in Birchfield.  Id. at 2169 ("the State imposes 
increased 
mandatory 
minimum 
sentences 
for 
drunk-driving 
recidivists.").     
¶84 The majority opinion aligns Birchfield with what it 
asserts is Dalton's "more severe criminal penalty because he 
refused to provide a blood sample absent a warrant."3  The 
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶4. 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.pdr 
 
6 
 
"penalty" to which the majority refers was its own evaluation of 
the discretionary sentencing of the circuit court for Dalton's 
second OWI and first OAR convictions.  Birchfield has nothing to 
do with discretionary sentencing decisions.  It turns entirely 
on a mandatory criminal misdemeanor charge that North Dakota 
imposed for refusing to submit to a blood draw.  Id. at 2170-71.   
¶85 The majority opinion is expanding Birchfield into 
discretionary 
sentencing 
decisions 
for 
a 
repetitive 
OWI 
conviction that required a criminal penalty.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)2.  Birchfield's expansion is apparent from the 
majority opinion's definition of "criminal penalty":  "A 
lengthier jail sentence is certainly a criminal penalty."4  That 
is not how "criminal penalty" was defined in Birchfield.  There, 
the comparison was between administrative penalties for refusal 
and 
statutorily 
required 
criminal 
penalties 
for 
refusal.  
Administrative 
penalties 
for 
withdrawing 
consent 
were 
permissible and criminal penalties were not.  Id. at 2186.   
¶86 In the case before us, the majority opinion misleads 
the reader because it does not explain that Dalton did not 
receive a criminal penalty for refusing to submit to a blood 
draw.  Rather, he received a criminal penalty because he had 
committed a second OWI.  Wis. Stat. §§ 343.305(10)(b)1. and 
343.307(2)(f). 
¶87 The majority opinion doubles down on its erroneous 
conclusion of law by asserting "Dalton was criminally punished 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶59. 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.pdr 
 
7 
 
for exercising his constitutional right."5  First, the majority 
opinion contradicts the United States Supreme Court which has 
held, Dalton had no constitutional right to withdraw his consent 
that he gave when he drove his vehicle on Wisconsin highways 
after drinking to the point of intoxication.  Neville, 459 U.S. 
at 560 n.10 & 565 (explaining that "a person suspected of drunk 
driving has no constitutional right to refuse to take a blood-
alcohol test" and that the person's "right to refuse the blood-
alcohol test [] is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the 
South Dakota legislature."); see also Birchfield, 136 S. Ct at 
2186 ("the Fourth Amendment did not require officers to obtain a 
warrant prior to demanding the [breath] test, and Bernard had no 
right to refuse it.").   
¶88 Second, the cases cited by the majority do not provide 
support for the contention that Dalton had a constitutional 
right to refuse a blood test as the majority contends.  To the 
contrary, the cited cases have nothing to do with implied-
consent laws.  Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) 
involved restrictions on the constitutional right to vote 
through the use of poll taxes.  Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 
539, 202 N.W.2d 406 (1972) involved an offhand court comment at 
sentencing that Buckner contended invaded his right to remain 
silent.  Kubart v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 94, 233 N.W.2d 404 (1975) 
involved twelve separate counts of burglary, only one of which 
was tried to a jury.  The defendant contended that the eight 
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶61. 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.pdr 
 
8 
 
year sentence was harsh and an erroneous exercise of discretion 
based on his going to trial on one of the counts.  Once again 
the majority opinion tries to invoke Birchfield for purely 
sentencing decisions.  Birchfield has nothing to do with a 
circuit court's sentencing discretion. 
¶89 Also of concern is that the majority opinion could be 
read to conclude that Birchfield prohibits the misdemeanor 
penalty that Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)2. requires due to 
Dalton's revocation for refusing to take a requested test 
counting as a second OWI.  In the future, recidivists may 
withdraw consent for all tests for intoxication if their 
refusals cannot lead to criminal penalties due to OWI recidivism 
that would have been imposed upon proof of intoxication from 
actual 
blood, 
breath 
or 
urine 
tests. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 343.305(10); 343.307(1)(f) and 346.65(2)(am)2-7.   
¶90 The United States Supreme Court should consider 
granting 
review 
herein 
to 
explain 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
parameters 
of 
Birchfield 
when 
state 
law 
penalties 
for 
withdrawing consent are civil and evidentiary and criminal 
penalties occur for recidivism.  In addition, because the 
majority 
opinion 
chooses 
to 
disregard 
Neville's 
explicit 
statements that a person's refusal to permit a blood draw after 
being arrested for OWI is a matter of legislative grace not one 
of constitutional right, proof possible at OWI trials may be 
compromised by the exercise of this new Fourth Amendment right.  
These issues need attention and can receive none further in 
Wisconsin courts.  
No.  2016AP2483-CR.pdr 
 
9 
 
C.  Sentencing 
¶91 Sentencing is a discretionary decision of the circuit 
court.  Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶17.  A circuit court's 
exercise of discretion is afforded "a strong presumption of 
reasonability" because the circuit court is able to view the 
demeanor of the defendant and assess competing sentencing 
interests.  Id., ¶18.   
¶92 The focus of a sentencing court's consideration should 
be the gravity of the offense, the character and rehabilitative 
needs of the offender and the need for public protection.  State 
v. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d 655, 673, 348 N.W.2d 527 (1984).   A 
sentencing court properly exercises its discretion when it 
relies on controlling law and sets out reasoning that supports 
its sentencing.  McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 281, 182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971).  When a circuit court actually relies on 
improper factors, it erroneously exercises its discretion.  
Alexander, 360 Wis. 2d 292, ¶17.  
¶93 In 
Dalton's 
sentencing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
was 
concerned with Dalton's repeated lack of respect for the law.  
The court noted that this was Dalton's second OWI and his BAC of 
0.238 is so far above the legal limit that it evidences a 
complete disregard of his obligation to refrain from consuming 
significant alcohol before driving.  Dalton was operating after 
revocation when he incurred this second OWI offense, and he 
drove recklessly, at close to 100 miles per hour, causing severe 
injury to his passenger and himself.   
No.  2016AP2483-CR.pdr 
 
10 
 
¶94 Dalton objects to the circuit court's reference to his 
withdrawal of consent to submit to a blood draw as sufficient 
reason to remand for resentencing.  The majority opinion agrees 
with Dalton.6  However, that one comment is insufficient to show 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing 
discretion.   
¶95 The court made a record of its concerns for Dalton's 
lack of respect for the law, and failing to authorize a blood 
draw was just one such incident.  The court was concerned with 
Dalton's 
level 
of 
intoxication, 
0.238. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2m)(a) guides the effect of BAC level in sentencing.  
It provides: 
In imposing a sentence under sub. (2) for a violation 
of s. 346.63(1)(am) or (b) or (5) . . . the court 
shall review the record and consider the aggravating 
and mitigating factors in the matter.  If the amount 
of alcohol in a person's blood . . . is known, the 
court shall consider that amount as a factor in 
sentencing. 
¶96 Dalton's BAC level supports the circuit court's 
sentence as does his reckless driving and his driving after 
revocation.  All bear on Dalton's character and demonstrate that 
it will not be easy to get him to turn his conduct around.  The 
majority opinion takes the circuit court's singular statement 
about Dalton's refusal out of context.  Read within the court's 
full sentencing discussion, it was just one of many factors that 
showed Dalton's complete disregard of the law, which is 
indicative of his character.  The circuit court did not 
                                                 
6 Majority op., ¶4.   
No.  2016AP2483-CR.pdr 
 
11 
 
erroneously exercise its discretion.  State v. Salas Gayton, 
2016 WI 58, ¶¶3, 15, 370 Wis. 2d 264, 882 N.W.2d 459 (concluding 
that the circuit court's comments on Mr. Gayton's status as an 
illegal alien did not demonstrate reliance on an improper factor 
at sentencing).   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶97 The circuit court's sentencing of Dalton does not 
conflict with Birchfield and is well within the circuit court's 
sentencing 
discretion. 
 
Because 
the 
majority 
opinion 
misunderstands the directive of Birchfield and expands the 
statutory opportunity to withdraw consent pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(4) into a constitutional right to refuse a blood draw, 
I respectfully dissent.   
¶98 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶99 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  The 
majority opinion seriously errs.  Driving on a public highway is 
not a constitutional right nor is it a right at all.  When 
someone chooses to drive in the public domain, they must comply 
with state statutes commensurate with that privilege.  Our 
legislature requires, for example, a public highway driver to 
possess a valid driver's license.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.18(1).  
The consequence for not having one is a civil ticket.  See 
§ 343.18(3).  Our legislature has also determined, as many 
states have, that there are consequences for a public highway 
driver who drives intoxicated.  One consequence of doing so is 
to have impliedly consented to a blood test, provided of course 
that there is sufficient evidence that they are driving 
intoxicated.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3).  They still may 
refuse this implied consent, but, like driving without a 
license, that refusal will result in a civil ticket.  See 
§ 343.305(9).  It might be one thing if the consequence for 
refusing that test were a criminal charge, as in Birchfield v. 
North Dakota, 579 U.S. ____, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), but in 
Wisconsin, as in many states, the consequence under our implied 
consent law is civil.    
¶100 Relying on refusal to consent in determining sentence 
for an OWI does not change the civil nature of the refusal 
ticket.  Judges can and do consider a variety of factors when 
imposing sentence——including conduct that is not against the law 
at all (e.g., lack of remorse)——and the obstructive and 
prohibited behavior of refusal is but one proper consideration.  
No.  2016AP2483-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
Thus, the majority errs in concluding that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it considered Dalton's 
refusal to consent to the blood draw during sentencing because 
considering refusal to consent as a factor during sentencing is 
not the same as criminalizing refusal.  Therefore, although the 
United States Supreme Court proscribed criminalizing refusal in 
Birchfield, it did not proscribe, and in fact seemingly approved 
of, a civil penalty for refusal.  See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 
2185-86.  I therefore disagree with the majority in our case 
today for at least two reasons: first, the court interprets 
Birchfield's holding too broadly; and second, its analysis 
erroneously 
equates 
"sentencing 
factor" 
with 
a 
"criminal 
statute." 
 
In 
sum, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
today 
rewrites 
Birchfield and redrafts state statutes, and, in so doing, 
unnecessarily creates significant risk to the users of our 
public highways. 
¶101 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent,1 and I join Chief 
Justice Roggensack's call for the United States Supreme Court to 
assist the state courts with respect to this issue.     
 
                                                 
1 I do not disagree with the majority's analysis in Part 
III.B of the opinion, which concludes that Dalton's trial 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress the blood evidence because such a motion would have 
been meritless given the exigent circumstances "[giving] rise to 
a reasonable belief that a delay in procuring a warrant would 
risk the destruction of evidence."  Majority op., ¶52; id., 
¶¶53-54.  This issue, however, is not why we took this case. 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
I.  WISCONSIN CIVIL, NORTH DAKOTA CRIMINAL 
¶102 In Wisconsin, refusal to consent to a blood draw 
subjects a driver to civil, not criminal penalties.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(9).  By contrast, the North Dakota statutes at 
issue in Birchfield had made it a crime to refuse to consent.  
See 
136 
S. 
Ct. 
at 
2170 
(citing 
N.D. 
Cent. 
Code 
Ann.  
§§ 39-08-01(2), 39-20-01(3)(a)).  And the United States Supreme 
Court 
concluded 
that 
the 
North 
Dakota 
statutes 
were 
unconstitutional for that specific reason.  The Court concluded 
that "motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to 
a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense."  Id. at 
2186 (emphasis added).  Thus, Birchfield stands only for the 
narrow proposition that implied consent statutes which make it a 
crime to refuse to consent are unconstitutional, and Wisconsin's 
implied consent law, which does not make it a crime to refuse to 
consent and imposes only civil penalties for refusal, is 
therefore not unconstitutional under Birchfield.  The majority 
errs in conflating these distinctions. 
¶103 Furthermore, 
the 
Court 
in 
Birchfield 
"referred 
approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that 
impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists 
who refuse to comply," and indicated that "nothing [said] here 
should be read to cast doubt on them."  136 S. Ct. at 2185.  
Thus, Wisconsin's implied consent law, which imposes only civil 
penalties, is not only not unconstitutional under Birchfield, 
but is also seemingly approved by the Supreme Court.  Today, our 
majority rewrites the Supreme Court opinion to fit its analysis. 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
¶104 In sum, Birchfield narrowly holds only that state 
statutes which make it a crime to refuse to consent are 
unconstitutional.  That is not what we have here.  In Wisconsin, 
it is not a crime to refuse to consent; rather, Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305(9) 
imposes 
only 
civil 
penalties 
(i.e., 
license 
revocation).  Thus, Birchfield does not dictate the outcome of 
this case and the majority opinion today is at odds with, rather 
than consistent with, the United States Supreme Court.  It reads 
Birchfield too broadly and then misapplies Birchfield to send 
this case back for resentencing, requiring the circuit court to 
ignore relevant, pertinent, and objective facts that can and 
should reasonably be considered by the circuit court when 
imposing sentence on an individual who had been convicted for 
drunk driving.  
 
II.  SENTENCING FACTOR, NOT A CRIME 
¶105 The 
majority 
erroneously 
equates 
North 
Dakota's 
unconstitutional criminal statute with the factors a judge 
sentencing a drunk driver can consider——as judges have done for 
decades——namely, that the defendant refused to consent.  In so 
doing, 
the 
court 
rewrites 
Birchfield 
and 
redrafts 
state 
statutes.  The court here concludes: 
In 
sum, 
Birchfield 
dictates 
that 
criminal 
penalties may not be imposed for the refusal to submit 
to a blood test.  136 S. Ct. at 2185.  A lengthier 
jail sentence is certainly a criminal penalty.  See 
Doering v. WEA Ins. Grp., 193 Wis. 2d 118, 141, 532 
N.W.2d 432 (1995) (referring to imprisonment as a 
criminal penalty); State v. Peterson, 104 Wis. 2d 616, 
621, 312 N.W.2d 784 (1981) (same). 
Majority op., ¶59.  In so doing, the court commits error.   
No.  2016AP2483-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
¶106 First, as noted above, see supra ¶¶102-104, Birchfield 
did not broadly hold that "criminal penalties may not be imposed 
for the refusal to submit to a blood test," majority op., ¶59; 
rather, Birchfield held more narrowly that a state statute which 
made it a crime to refuse to consent to a blood draw is 
unconstitutional.  
¶107 Second, even if Birchfield stood for that broad 
proposition, reliance on refusal as a factor in sentencing still 
does not "criminalize" refusal in Wisconsin; that is, it does 
not transform Wisconsin's civil refusal statute into a crime.  
Circuit courts regularly rely on the behavior of defendants when 
imposing sentence (e.g., criminal and civil record, other 
uncharged 
crimes, 
lack 
of 
remorse, 
and 
violating 
probation/parole), and that behavior is not transformed into a 
crime, nor is it considered a criminal penalty, by virtue of its 
relevance to sentencing. 
¶108 In sum, the majority erroneously requires circuit 
courts to put blinders on, to not consider relevant, pertinent, 
and objective factors related to the particular crime before the 
court, and instead insists that it is error for a court to 
impose sentence based upon the facts of the case before it. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶109 The majority opinion seriously errs.  Driving on a 
public highway is not a constitutional right nor is it a right 
at all.  When someone chooses to drive in the public domain, 
they must comply with state statutes commensurate with that 
privilege.  Our legislature requires, for example, a public 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
highway driver to possess a valid driver's license.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 343.18(1).  The consequence for not having one is a 
civil ticket.  See § 343.18(3).  Our legislature has also 
determined, as many states have, that there are consequences for 
a public highway driver who drives intoxicated.  One consequence 
of doing so is to have impliedly consented to a blood test, 
provided of course that there is sufficient evidence that they 
are driving intoxicated.  See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3).  They 
still may refuse this implied consent, but, like driving without 
a license, that refusal will result in a civil ticket.  See 
§ 343.305(9).  It might be one thing if the consequence for 
refusing that test were a criminal charge, as in Birchfield v. 
North Dakota, 579 U.S. ____, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), but in 
Wisconsin, as in many states, the consequence under our implied 
consent law is civil.    
¶110 Relying on refusal to consent in determining sentence 
for an OWI does not change the civil nature of the refusal 
ticket.  Judges can and do consider a variety of factors when 
imposing sentence——including conduct that is not against the law 
at all (e.g., lack of remorse)——and the obstructive and 
prohibited behavior of refusal is but one proper consideration.  
Thus, the majority errs in concluding that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it considered Dalton's 
refusal to consent to the blood draw during sentencing.  
Considering refusal to consent as a factor during sentencing is 
not the same as criminalizing refusal.  Therefore, although the 
United States Supreme Court proscribed criminalizing refusal in 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
Birchfield, it did not proscribe, and in fact seemingly approved 
of, a civil penalty for refusal.  See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 
2185-86.  I therefore disagree with the majority in our case 
today for at least two reasons: first, the court interprets 
Birchfield's holding too broadly; and second, its analysis 
erroneously 
equates 
"sentencing 
factor" 
with 
a 
"criminal 
statute." 
 
In 
sum, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
today 
rewrites 
Birchfield and redrafts state statutes, and, in so doing, 
unnecessarily creates significant risk to the users of our 
public highways. 
¶111 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent,2 and I join Chief 
Justice Roggensack's call for the United States Supreme Court to 
assist the state courts with respect to this issue.  
¶112 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this dissent. 
 
                                                 
2 I do not disagree with the majority's analysis in Part 
III.B of the opinion, which concludes that Dalton's trial 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress the blood evidence because such a motion would have 
been meritless given the exigent circumstances "[giving] rise to 
a reasonable belief that a delay in procuring a warrant would 
risk the destruction of evidence."  Majority op., ¶52; id., 
¶¶53-54.  This issue, however, is not why we took this case. 
No.  2016AP2483-CR.akz 
 
 
 
1