Case Title: In the Matter of Crucible Materials Corporation v. New York Power Authority

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 124  
In the Matter of Crucible 
Materials Corporation et al.,
            Respondents, 
        v. 
New York Power Authority,     
            Appellant.
Eileen P. Flynn, for appellant.
James J. Barriere, for respondents.
GRAFFEO, J.:
This case involves a controversy between the New York
Power Authority (NYPA) and manufacturers that participate in the
Power for Jobs (PFJ) Program.  At issue is the proper
interpretation of certain 2006 amendments to Economic Development
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Law § 189.
The Power for Jobs program was originally enacted in
1997 to ameliorate the effects of energy deregulation, which had
led to increases in energy costs and unpredictable price
fluctuations.  The initiative authorizes NYPA to procure
electricity from power producers and make it available to
businesses that elect to enter into PFJ contracts; the contracts
ensure that the businesses will receive a certain quantity of
power at a pre-determined price during a prescribed time-period. 
In exchange for receiving electricity at guaranteed prices, the
businesses agree to remain in New York and, in some cases, commit
to the creation of additional jobs.  The objective of the program
is to assist manufacturers and other commercial enterprises in
their efforts to remain competitive despite New York's relatively
high-priced energy market.  Although the legislative expectation
is that NYPA will supply power at below-market rates, the
contracts do not guarantee that result.
The program, which is codified at Economic Development
Law § 189, was initially scheduled to continue for only three
years but has been repeatedly extended and amended by the
Legislature.  When the program commenced, businesses entered into
contracts with NYPA for a three-year term and each of the first
three years was referred to as a "phase" with participants deemed
phase one, two or three depending on the year of their first
contract.  In 2000, the program was amended to add a fourth phase
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that permitted phase one participants -- whose three-year
contracts were expiring -- to extend their contracts.  As a
result of 2002 legislation, a fifth phase was authorized whereby
phase two and three customers were similarly offered contract
extensions.  Although the PFJ program has been extended since
2002, the Legislature has not characterized these subsequent
extensions as new sequential "phases" and, as a result, the last
phase was phase five, which ended in December 2005 (see Economic
Development Law § 189[e][3]).
In 2004, the Legislature again continued the program
but made significant changes so that participants were given the
option of either extending their contracts or letting them expire
in order to join an "electricity savings reimbursements" program,
referred to as the Rebate Program (see Economic Development Law 
§ 189[a][5]; L 2004, ch 59, Pt. T, § 3).  Under this alternative
to the PFJ contract, a business would purchase power directly
from a local power company and would be reimbursed by NYPA for
costs paid to the local provider that exceeded the unit cost of
power that the business had paid under phase four or five of the
program.  In other words, the rates paid under the PFJ contract
would become the baseline that prospective power costs would be
measured against and NYPA would have to cover -- in the form of a
rebate -- any excess energy costs the businesses incurred when
purchasing from local providers.  This Rebate Program ensured
that businesses that had previously participated in the PFJ
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contract program could obtain specified amounts of electricity at
prices at least as favorable as those they paid under their
expired contracts.
In 2006, due to market fluctuations, some PFJ contract
businesses incurred higher costs for energy secured through NYPA
than they would have paid if they had purchased power directly
from their local providers.  To address this situation, in August
2006, Economic Development Law § 189 was amended yet again (see 
L 2006, ch 645).  As had occurred in the past, the amendment
continued the PFJ contract program by allowing extensions of
contracts for an additional six months (setting a new sunset date
of June 30, 2007) and authorized businesses to let their
contracts lapse and opt instead to participate in the Rebate
Program.  
But the 2006 legislation added an additional paragraph
to Economic Development Law § 189(a)(5) that accomplished two
things.  First, it created a new Restitution Benefit for
participants that had paid higher energy costs under their PFJ
contracts than they would have paid by purchasing from local
providers.  The Legislature required NYPA to reimburse such
participants for the difference in costs retroactive to January
1, 2006.  Second, it provided a specific benefit to a subset of
PFJ participants -- manufacturers -- allowing manufacturers that
had renewed their contracts to withdraw their renewals and
convert to the Rebate Program without having to wait until their
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contracts expired.  What the 2006 amendment did not do, however,
was amend the rebate calculation language from the 2004
legislation, meaning that it continued to use the rates charged
in the last year of the phase four and five contracts as the
baseline for determining rebates.
After the effective date of the 2006 amendments, NYPA 
-- which had opposed this legislative proposal (see NYPA ltr in
opposition, Bill Jacket, L 2006, ch 645, at 20-24) -- advised PFJ
participants of the change in the law and gave its interpretation
of the statutory amendments.  In November 6, 2006 correspondence,
NYPA notified manufacturers with PFJ contracts that they had 10
days to make a choice between continuing their contracts and
obtaining the Restitution Benefit or ending their contracts and
joining the Rebate Program.  NYPA further explained how rebates
would be calculated, stating that it intended to use the price
that participants paid under their contracts during the 12 months
preceding conversion to the Rebate Program -- which would be
calendar year 2006 for most participants -- to determine the
baseline against which new energy costs would be compared to
determine whether a rebate was warranted.  Finally, NYPA informed
participants that restitution payments would not be made until
the last quarter of 2007.
Petitioners Crucible Materials Corp. and Syracuse
Castings Sales Corp., along with other similarly-situated
manufacturers, immediately objected to NYPA's interpretation of
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the 2006 amendments, arguing that NYPA had incorrectly read the
legislation to require participants to elect between the
Restitution Benefit and the Rebate Program when the Legislature
had intended that manufacturers should be able to take advantage
of both benefits.  They also complained about the use of calendar
year 2006 as the baseline for determining whether payments would
be forthcoming under the Rebate Program, contending that NYPA's
view was inconsistent with the language in the statute and
severely undermined the value of the Rebate Program because 2006
was the year contract participants paid above-market prices.  And
they further disagreed with NYPA's decision to delay restitution
payments until late 2007.  Given the short deadline provided by
NYPA, however, Crucible Materials and Syracuse Castings both
chose to continue their contracts and obtain the Restitution
Benefit, albeit under protest.
In February 2007, petitioners commenced this timely
Article 78 proceeding challenging NYPA's determination under
Economic Development Law § 189(a)(5), repeating the points
asserted in the letter of complaint.  After NYPA answered,
Supreme Court dismissed the petition in its entirety, crediting
NYPA's interpretation of the amendments.  The Appellate Division
modified by granting the petition in part.  It agreed with
petitioners that the 2006 amendments authorized manufacturers to
take advantage of both the Restitution Benefit and the Rebate
Program.  It further concluded that NYPA erred in selecting 2006
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No. 124
1 Petitioners have not cross-appealed and have abandoned any
claim relating to the timing of restitution payments.
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as the baseline for calculating rebates, resting its decision on
the language of the rebate calculation provision.  However, the
Appellate Division upheld as neither arbitrary nor capricious
NYPA's decision to defer payment of the Restitution Benefit until
the last quarter of 2007, reasoning that the agency had
discretion to determine the timing of payments since the
legislation did not contain a payment schedule.1  This Court
granted NYPA leave to appeal and we now affirm.
NYPA's Election of Benefits Determination:
Both parties agree that the dispute concerning whether
manufacturers could receive both restitution and rebate benefits
or had to choose between the two turns on language that was added
to Economic Development Law § 189(a)(5) in 2006.  NYPA does not
contend that its interpretation of the statute is entitled to
deference, nor is this the type of case where deference to an
administrative agency would be appropriate as it does not involve
"specialized knowledge and understanding of underlying
operational practice or entail[] an evaluation of factual data
and inferences to be drawn therefrom" (see Matter of KSLM-
Columbus Apts., Inc. v New York State Div. of Hous. and Community
Renewal, 5 NY3d 303, 312 [2005][internal quotation marks and
citations omitted]).  When interpreting a statute, "[i]t is
fundamental that a court . . . should attempt to effectuate the
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intent of the Legislature.  The starting point is always to look
to the language itself and where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain
meaning" (Pultz v Economakis, 10 NY3d 542, 547 [2008], quoting
State of New York v Patricia II, 6 NY3d 160, 162 [2006]).
Turning to the statutory scheme, since 2004 the Rebate
Program has been addressed in the first paragraph of Economic
Development Law § 189(a)(5).  The 2006 amendment added the
following paragraph to that section:
"Provided further that, notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, for the
period beginning [January 1, 2006], for
recipients who choose to elect a contract
extension, and whose unit cost of electricity
under such contract extension exceeds the
unit cost of electricity of the [local
electricity provider], the power authority
shall reimburse the recipient for all dollars
paid in excess of the unit cost of
electricity of the [local electricity
provider].  In addition, a recipient that is
a manufacturer that elected a contract
extension, may choose to withdraw such
election and instead may choose to elect an
electricity savings reimbursement upon notice
to the power authority.  Such electricity
savings reimbursement shall be calculated
according to the formula for the basic
reimbursement as explained in this paragraph"
(L 2006, ch 645, § 3 [emphasis added]).
The first sentence created a new Restitution Benefit
that allowed PFJ contract participants to recoup from NYPA
overpayments they made under their contracts retroactive to the
beginning of January 2006.  The second sentence provided a
special advantage to PFJ participants engaged in manufacturing,
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permitting them to withdraw from their contracts and join the
Rebate Program during the contract term, meaning they were not
locked into contract extensions.  And the third sentence
clarified that rebates would continue to be calculated under the
formula that was added to the statute in 2004 when the Rebate
Program was first created.
Based on the language and organization of this
provision, we see no evidence that the Legislature contemplated
that manufacturers would be required to choose between the two
programs -- to either select the Restitution Benefit or opt out
of their contracts and participate in the Rebate Program.  The
language of the amendment contains no terminology suggesting that
such an election must be made.  The second sentence -- allowing
manufacturers that have extended their contracts to withdraw the
extensions and join the Rebate Program -- begins with the words
"in addition."  This is hardly the language we would expect to
see if the Legislature intended that manufacturers must make a
choice between the benefit granted in the first sentence and the
benefit defined in the second.  If such an election of benefits
had been the objective, the second sentence would have included a
clause conditioning the "opt out" benefit; for example, it might
have read "in lieu of being reimbursed for overpayments"
manufacturers may join the Rebate Program or "manufacturers may
opt instead" to withdraw from their contracts and participate in
the Rebate Program.  NYPA asserts that the phrase "in addition"
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is merely a transition and was not meant to have any substantive
effect.  But even if we credited this argument -- and we
generally do not presume that words chosen by the Legislature
have no meaning -- it does not support NYPA's election of
benefits determination because, when the "in addition" clause is
omitted, what remains is a paragraph that defines two benefits
potentially available to manufacturers without indicating that
they are mutually exclusive.
NYPA suggests that a single manufacturer cannot qualify
for both benefits because the Restitution Benefit applies to
those with contracts and the Rebate Program applies only to those
who have opted out or not renewed their contracts.  But when the
Legislature adopted the amendments in August 2006, it made the
Restitution Benefit retroactive to January 1, 2006.  At the time
the statute became law, some manufacturers (like petitioners) had
been paying higher energy costs under their PFJ contracts than
they would have paid had they bought electricity directly from
local power companies.  Hence, they were already entitled to up
to eight months' of restitution for overpayments they had made
under their contracts (by the time NYPA implemented the statute
three months later, the value of the Restitution Benefit was
potentially even greater).  Manufacturers in this position could
conceivably receive a Restitution Benefit and then withdraw their
contract extensions (or decline to renew their contracts at the
end of December 2006) to join the Rebate Program.  Under NYPA's
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analysis, these manufacturers would have to waive their right to
a Restitution Benefit already earned in order to take advantage
of the opt out clause in the second sentence.  We do not believe
this result is required by the language in the statute. 
Nor is NYPA's view consistent with the legislative
history of the 2006 amendments.  Though not conclusive, that
history tends to support the petitioners' reading of the statute. 
The Senate sponsor explained that the legislation would "provide
reimbursements for Power for Jobs customers who paid higher than
market price rates this last winter" and "would also allow
manufacturers that are contract customers to switch to the rebate
program" (Letter of Sen. Wright, Bill Jacket, L 2006, ch 645, at
4 [emphasis added]).  Then-Assemblymember Paul Tonko, the
Assembly sponsor, noted that the legislation:
"Requires the Power Authority of the State of
New York (PASNY) to allow PFJ manufacturers
paying higher than market prices under their
PFJ contract extensions to switch to a rebate
form of the program, which would hold them
harmless against rate fluctuations and would
provide a discounted rate; and, Requires
PASNY to make up the difference between the
rates the businesses would have paid for
energy to their local utility as compared to
the higher price PASNY charged them under
their contract extensions, retroactive to
January 1, 2006" (Assembly Sponsor's Mem in
Support, Bill Jacket, L 2006, ch 645, at 5
[emphasis added]).
The phrase "the businesses" in the second sentence refers back to
the "PFJ manufacturers" cited in the first sentence -- those that
had paid higher-than-market energy prices during the winter of
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2006 under their PFJ contracts.  The Assembly sponsor's
observations make no sense if, as NYPA claims, the legislative
objective had been to have these manufacturers choose between
recouping their overpayments and prospectively joining the Rebate
Program.  The Division of Budget similarly concluded that "NYPA
must allow customers to maximize benefits by switching from the
contract extension to the rebate program and retroactively
reimburse customers that paid rates above the market price"
(Budget Report on Bills, Bill Jacket, L 2006, ch 645, at 10
[emphasis added]).  In fact, the increased costs associated with
these dual requirements led the Division to recommend that the
Governor veto the amendments (id. at 10-11). 
The bill jacket thus indicates that the Legislature
intended that benefits to PFJ participants -- particularly
manufacturers -- be extended and expanded, rather than
interrupted.  Since the Restitution Benefit was created to
provide a remedy to businesses that paid higher prices under
their PFJ contracts than they would have paid if they purchased
power from local providers, there is no reason to impose a
strained interpretation of the clause to require that these same
participants forego recoupment of those overpayments in order to
receive a future benefit.  Nor is it necessary to adopt NYPA's
view of the statute in order to avoid "double dipping" by
manufacturers since the Rebate Program grants prospective relief
while the Restitution Benefit covers overpayments already made. 
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We therefore agree with the Appellate Division that NYPA's
determination was erroneous insofar as it required petitioners to
choose between the Restitution Benefit and the Rebate Program.
NYPA's Rebate Calculation Determination:
The Rebate Program allows participants that had PFJ
contracts to decline to renew those contracts and instead
purchase power directly from local providers.  If participants
have to pay more for the power they buy from local providers than
they would have paid under the NYPA contract, NYPA is obligated
to give the participant a "power for jobs electricity savings
reimbursement" or rebate.  The rebate is the difference between
the unit cost of electricity the participant paid the provider
(on average, each quarter) and the price the participant paid
under the PFJ contract during a particular time frame.  In this
case, the parties disagree on the time frame that NYPA must use
as the baseline for comparison when calculating whether a rebate
is warranted and, if so, the amount of the rebate.
The Rebate Program was established in 2004 when the
first paragraph of Economic Development Law § 189(a)(5) was
enacted (see L 2004, ch 59, Pt. T, § 3).  The 2006 amendments
gave manufacturers that had already extended their contracts the
option of withdrawing their renewals and choosing instead to
participate in the Rebate Program.  But it did not change how
rebates are calculated, stating: "Such electricity savings
reimbursement shall be calculated according to the formula for
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the basic reimbursement as explained in this paragraph" (L 2006,
ch 645, § 3).  Thus, the amendment referred back to the formula
developed in the 2004 legislation, which requires that the price
the participant paid to a local provider be compared against "the
average unit cost of electricity such recipient paid during the
final year of the contract for power allocated under phase four
or five of the power for jobs program" (see Economic Development
Law § 189[a][5]).
In interpreting this provision as establishing that
baseline contract costs would be the price participants paid NYPA
in 2006, NYPA focused on the phrase "during the final year of the
contract," noting that those who opted out of their contracts as
a result of the 2006 amendments would be doing so at the end of
2006 (meaning the final year of the contract would be 2006). 
Objecting to this view, petitioners contended that this phrase be
read in conjunction with the language that follows it, meaning
that the baseline is "the average unit cost of electricity . . .
paid during the final year of the contract . . . under phase four
or five of the power for jobs program" (emphasis added).  They
emphasized that the Legislature did not refer only to the last
year a participant had a contract with NYPA, but instead
specifically tied the rebate to prices paid in the last year of
phases four or five of the PFJ program.
Although the legislation is certainly not a model of
clarity, we agree with the Appellate Division that the statutory
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No. 124
2 The phases are defined in Economic Development Law 
§ 189(e).  Section 189(e)(2) states: "phase four shall begin no
sooner than [January 1, 2001] and shall end on or before
[December 31, 2005]" and section 189(e)(3) directs: "phase five
shall begin no sooner than [January 1, 2002] and shall end on or
before [December 31, 2005]."
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directive that rebates be calculated based on the final year of
PFJ phases four or five precludes NYPA's reliance on 2006
contract prices.  The initial three years of the PFJ program were
referred to as phases one, two and three (see Economic
Development Law § 189[e][1]).  When it continued the PFJ program
in 2000 and again in 2002, the Legislature characterized the
contract extensions as phases four (see Economic Development Law
§ 189[e][2]; L 2000, ch 63, Pt. KK, § 4) and five (see Economic
Development Law § 189[e][3]; L 2002, ch 226, § 5), respectively. 
But when the Legislature extended and amended the program after
2002, it did not denominate new "phases."  Thus, the last phases
identified in the statutory scheme are phases four and five,
which have the same sunset date -- December 31, 2005.2  Since the
rebate calculation provision states that the baseline contract
costs will be those "paid during the final year of the contract .
. . under phase four or five of the power for jobs program," and
phases four and five terminated at the end of 2005, the baseline
year for purposes of calculation of the rebate is, at the latest,
2005.  It follows that NYPA was required to compare the costs
paid by Rebate Program participants that purchased from local
providers against the costs those participants had paid in the
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3 NYPA indicates that it has always used the rates paid in
the final year of a PFJ contract when calculating rebates.  But
this practice extends back only to 2004 since that was the year
the Rebate Program was created.  For participants that joined the
program in 2004 and 2005, NYPA's use of the prices from the last
year of the contracts -- prices from 2003, 2004 and portions of
2005 -- was consistent with the phase four and five terminology
in the statute since those phases did not terminate until the end
of 2005.  It was not until it issued its November 2006
determination stating that rebates would be calculated based on
2006 prices that NYPA ran afoul of the statutory directive. 
Petitioners, along with other similarly-situated PFJ
participants, immediately objected to NYPA's interpretation and
this litigation ensued within four months.  Hence, this is not a
case where an agency's long-standing and broadly-accepted
interpretation of a statute is being disturbed.
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last year of their contracts under phases four and five, which
for most participants -- including petitioners -- was 2005.3 
Not only is this interpretation consistent with the
plain designation chosen by the Legislature but it also comports
with the history of the 2006 amendments.  Since that legislation
was motivated, in part, by a desire to ameliorate the high prices
NYPA had charged under the contracts in the winter of 2006, it is
no surprise that the Legislature sought to ensure that the more
reasonable prices paid the year before would be the baseline for
calculating rebates.  This was a complement to the flexibility
the legislation gave manufacturers in determining whether to
continue to purchase power from NYPA under PFJ contracts or to
join the Rebate Program. 
NYPA contends that this is a "strange reading" of the
language and asserts that the statutory reference to phases four
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and five made sense in 2004 when the Rebate Program was initially
introduced because the Legislature believed that the PFJ program
would cease at the conclusion of phase five.  NYPA therefore
believes that the Legislature "overlooked" or forgot to delete
the reference to phases four and five in the first paragraph of
section 189(a)(5) when it extended the Rebate Program in 2006. 
Essentially, NYPA asks us either to ignore the "phase four and
five" language or to consider the subsequent contract extensions
as the equivalent of phase extensions, even though the
Legislature did not characterize them in this fashion (as it had
in previous amendments).  
We cannot rule out the possibility that the
Legislature's failure to delete the references to phases four and
five from the first paragraph of Economic Development Law 
§ 189(a)(5) was merely an oversight -- but there is no indication
in the bill jacket that the Legislature intended the baseline
year for purposes of the rebate calculation to be 2006.  Rather,
there is a sound basis to draw the contrary conclusion.  Whatever
the intended purpose, the fact remains that the Legislature did
not alter the rebate calculation methodology when it adopted the
2006 amendments -- to the contrary, it added language expressly
providing that rebates would be calculated pursuant to the pre-
existing formula.  As a result, petitioners were entitled to have
rebates calculated based on the rates charged under phases four
and five of the program as directed in Economic Development Law §
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189(a)(5).
Because NYPA erred when it required these manufacturers
to choose between the Restitution Benefit and the Rebate Program
and announced that their rebates would be calculated based on
2006 PFJ contract prices, those aspects of its determination were
properly annulled.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division,
insofar as appealed from, should be affirmed, with costs.
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M/O Crucible Materials Corp. v New York Power Authority
No. 124
READ, J. (dissenting in part):
When the Legislature continued the Power for Jobs (PFJ)
program in 2004, it created the new rebate benefit described in
the majority opinion.  Eligible participants were given a choice
to extend their power contracts with the New York Power Authority
(NYPA), or, alternatively, to opt out of the PFJ program and
receive the rebate, calculated in accordance with a formula in
the statute (see Economic Development Law § 189 [a] [5], as added
by L 2004, ch 59, pt T, § 3).  When the Legislature again
extended the PFJ Program in 2005, eligible participants were
afforded the same choice (see id., as amended by L 2005, ch 59,
pt P, § 2).
In 2006, the Legislature continued the PFJ program for
another six months and created one option for all PFJ customers
and a second option only available to manufacturers;
specifically, (1) customers electing a contract extension became
eligible to receive a newly created restitution benefit described
in the majority opinion; and (2) manufacturers could cancel their
contracts and receive the same type of rebate benefit made
available by the 2004 and 2005 amendments (see id., as amended by
L 2006, ch 645, § 3 [hereafter, "2006 amendments" or "the
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statute"]).  The Legislature did not amend the formula for
calculating the rebate. 
The majority concludes that PFJ customers that are
manufacturers, like petitioners, qualify under the 2006
amendments for both the restitution and the rebate benefits; and
that the baseline for calculating rebates is, at the latest,
2005.  Although I agree with the majority that petitioners were
not required to elect between the restitution and rebate
benefits, I conclude that the baseline for calculating the rebate
is the year preceding contract cancellation.
The formula for calculating the rebate measures the
former PFJ customer's power costs against "the average unit cost
of electricity [it] paid during the final year of the contract
for power allocated under phase four or five of the power for
jobs program" (Economic Development Law § 189 [a] [5]).  Economic
Development Law § 189 (e) (2) and (3) state -- and the majority
emphasizes -- that delivery of power under phases four and five
ends "on or before December thirty-first, two thousand five." 
Critically, however, other sections of the statute -- which the
majority does not mention -- demonstrate that the Legislature, in
fact, extended delivery of "power allocated under phase four or
five" beyond that date.  For example, the 2006 amendments
provided that "the term of contracts for allocations under the
fifth phase of the program shall in no case extend beyond June
thirtieth, two thousand seven" (Economic Development Law § 189
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[f], as amended by L 2006, ch 645, § 4 [emphasis added]).  Thus,
if a manufacturer withdraws its contract extension in order to
take advantage of the rebate, "the final year of the contract for
power allocated under phase four or five" is the year preceding
contract cancellation.  
This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of
the rebate, and the way in which NYPA has administered it since
2004.  The rebate was intended to guarantee that NYPA's former
PFJ customers would not pay more for electricity than they spent
in their last year in the program.  And, of course, a former
customer might pay less if able to secure a better price in the
open market from a non-NYPA energy supplier.  The rebate option
thus afforded former PFJ customers a stable, predictable
(maximum) price.
  
Concluding that "the baseline year for purposes of
calculation of the rebate is, at the latest, 2005," the majority
states that this is "no surprise" because the 2006 amendments
were "motivated, in part, by a desire to ameliorate the high
prices NYPA had charged under the contracts in the winter of
2006" (majority op at 15, 16).  This conclusion is contrary to
the statutory language, as noted above.  Moreover, the record
demonstrates only that some PFJ participants were paying more
than they would have paid their local utilities in the unusually
warm winter of 2006 (Wright Ltr, Bill Jacket, L 2006, ch 645, at
4).
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, with costs.  Opinion
by Judge Graffeo.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick,
Pigott and Jones concur.  Judge Read dissents in part in an
opinion in which Judge Smith concurs.
Decided October 20, 2009