Case Title: Doud v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Doud v. State1993 WY 12845 P.2d 402Case Number: 92-107Decided: 01/22/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
 
Troy 
DOUD,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

STATE of 
Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Campbell 
County, Dan R. Price, II, J. 

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Defender Aid Program, Mike 
Matthews, Student Intern for the Defender Aid Program, and Thomas A. Thompson, 
Student Director of the Defender Aid Program, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara L. Boyer, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Michael Pauling, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director 
of the Prosecution Assistance Program, and C. Allan Perkins, Student Intern for 
the Prosecution Assistance Program, for 
appellee.

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Troy 
Doud appeals from his convictions for kidnapping in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 
6-2-201(a)(iii) (1988) and for battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-501(b) 
(1988).

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following issues for our consideration:

I. Whether there was 
insufficient evidence to support a finding that the Appellant unlawfully 
confined the victim within the appropriate meaning of Wyo. Stat. § 
6-2-201(a)(iii)?

II. Whether there was 
insufficient evidence to support a finding of the Appellant[]'s intent to 
inflict injury or terrorize?

III. Even if the Court 
finds that Appellant could have been convicted under Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-201, 
whether the conviction must be remanded in light of the undisputed evidence 
showing the presence of the mitigating factors that would require a 
resentencing?

[¶4]      When reviewing 
the sufficiency of the evidence for a criminal conviction:

"[T]his court must 
determine whether, after viewing the evidence and appropriate inferences in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime to have been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt."

Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 
1302 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Munson v. 
State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo. 1989)). After we have 
properly resolved conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prosecution, the 
record reveals:

[¶5]      Appellant and the 
victim were married for six years. During that time, they had a daughter. In 
March 1991, the victim sought a divorce and moved out of the marital home. 
Appellant retained primary custody of their daughter while the victim had 
custody of her on every other weekend. According to their custody arrangement, 
the victim was to keep her daughter over the weekend of April 13th and 14th. On 
Friday, April 12th, the victim called Appellant to tell him that the roads were 
closed due to a blizzard and that she would be unable to pick up their daughter. 
On Saturday, she attempted to contact Appellant twice but succeeded in reaching 
only his answering machine. The victim spent Saturday night with Roy Underwood, 
the man with whom she had recently become romantically involved. Finally, on 
Sunday morning, she successfully contacted Appellant. He told her to pick up 
their daughter because he wanted to leave for California on a business trip. 
After talking to Appellant, the victim borrowed a truck from Mr. Underwood's 
friend and went to pick up her daughter at Appellant's house.

[¶6]      Appellant was 
distraught because he suspected that the victim spent the night with Mr. 
Underwood. He positioned himself along the route between the Underwood house and 
his house to verify whether in fact the victim was coming from Mr. Underwood's 
house. When the victim drove past Appellant's position, he pulled out behind her 
and followed her to his house. As she pulled into his driveway, Appellant cut in 
front of her, forcing her to stop. Appellant got out of his vehicle and began 
verbally abusing the victim. A physical altercation ensued inside the victim's 
truck in which Appellant struck her with his fist. The victim attempted to get 
out on the passenger's side, but Appellant ran around and pushed her back into 
the truck. In the course of their struggle, Appellant dropped a 9 mm Beretta 
hand gun he had been carrying. When the victim saw the gun, she stopped 
fighting.

[¶7]      At this point, 
Appellant told the victim to drive, which she refused to do. Appellant got into 
the pickup on the driver's side, placed the gun on the dashboard, and started 
driving toward town. As they were driving, Appellant informed the victim for the 
first time that their daughter was not at his house but was at his parents' 
house. Appellant drove by his parents' house twice but never stopped to pick up 
their daughter. While he was driving, Appellant told the victim that, if he 
could not have her, nobody could and that she could either come back to him or 
die. The victim informed Appellant at one point that they needed to stop for 
gas. Appellant responded: "`Well, I guess we'll just drive until we run out of 
gas, and then I'll kill you and I'll kill myself.'" Appellant's threats 
continued throughout the time he was driving.

[¶8]      Appellant 
eventually drove back to his house. Appellant's hired hand, Richard Errington, 
was in the yard when they arrived. The victim started screaming to Mr. Errington 
that she needed help and that Appellant had a gun. She ran toward Mr. Errington, 
but Appellant caught up with her and started dragging her toward the house. Mr. 
Errington told Appellant not to hurt her or he would be in trouble. Mr. 
Errington explained during the trial that he did not do anything more than 
verbally warn Appellant because he worked for Appellant and was reluctant to 
interfere. Once in the house, the victim succeeded in getting the gun away from 
Appellant, and she threw it out of the house and onto the deck. Appellant 
retrieved the gun and brought it inside.

[¶9]      Appellant's mood 
became increasingly unpredictable while he kept the victim in the house. At one 
point, he made the victim remove her clothes so that he could ascertain whether 
she had had sex with Mr. Underwood. Later, Appellant gave the gun to the victim 
and told her that the only way she could leave him would be if she were to shoot 
him. When she refused to shoot him, he took the gun from her, sat on her chest, 
held the cocked gun to her head, and asked "how it felt to be dead." The victim 
thought that she was going to die. Appellant then pointed the gun at himself and 
threatened to kill himself.

[¶10]   During the course of this ordeal, 
Kelly Wardell, the individual who was supposed to go to 
California with Appellant, stopped 
by to see if Appellant was still planning to make the trip. Appellant made the 
victim wait in the bathroom while he talked to Mr. Wardell. Rather than inviting 
Mr. Wardell inside the house to talk, Appellant told him through the bedroom 
window that he could not make the trip to California because he was having an 
argument with "his wife." The victim tried to escape through the bathroom window 
while Appellant was talking to Mr. Wardell; however, Appellant pulled her away 
before she could get through the window.

[¶11]   Appellant eventually started to 
calm down and laid the gun on the kitchen table. The victim saw this as an 
opportunity to escape. She picked up the gun and told Appellant that she was 
leaving. She was near the door when Appellant went after her, telling her that 
she was a "dead bitch." Appellant was trying to take the gun away from the 
victim when she shot him in the leg. The victim later told two police officers 
that she shot Appellant in the leg because she did not know how else to stop 
him. Appellant was charged with kidnapping in violation of § 6-2-201(a)(iii) and 
aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) 
(1988). The jury was also instructed on the lesser offenses of felonious 
restraint and false imprisonment as well as reckless endangering and simple 
assault and battery. The jury found Appellant guilty of kidnapping and simple 
battery.

[¶12]   Appellant's first contention on 
appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he 
unlawfully confined the victim within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-201 
(1988). Section 6-2-201(a) provides:

(a) A person is guilty of 
kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or 
business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the removal, or if he 
unlawfully confines another person, with the intent to:

(i) Hold for ransom or 
reward, or as a shield or hostage;

(ii) Facilitate the 
commission of a felony; or

(iii) Inflict bodily 
injury on or to terrorize the victim or another.

Appellant begins 
his insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim by arguing that this Court should read 
additional language from the Model Penal Code into our kidnapping statute. To be 
guilty of kidnapping under the Model Penal Code, a defendant must "unlawfully 
confine[] another for a substantial 
period in a place of isolation." MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (emphasis added). 
Our statute establishes no durational requirement for the period of 
confinement.1

[¶13]   Appellant contends that, if the 
Court were to adopt the additional language found in the Model Penal Code, § 
6-2-201 could properly be applied only in instances of severe criminal conduct. 
When drafting the Model Penal Code, the authors' intent was to restrict the 
drastic sanctions for kidnapping to only those instances of misbehavior which 
warrant such punishment. Id. at 220. One of the ways 
the Model Penal Code distinguished between kidnapping and trivial restraints or 
restraints incidental to other crimes was by requiring the confinement to be for 
a substantial period of time. Id. at 229. Appellant points 
out that this Court has previously found the Model Penal Code's purpose to be 
persuasive when interpreting our kidnapping statute. 
Keene v. State, 812 P.2d 147, 
150-51 (Wyo. 1991). Thus, to be 
consistent with the Model Penal Code's purpose of punishing for only severe 
crimes, we should read the "substantial period" language into § 6-2-201. 
According to Appellant, our failure to read the additional language into the 
statute would result in there being no difference between kidnapping and the 
lesser offenses of felonious restraint and false imprisonment. Appellant also 
claims that, in Darrow v. State, 824 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1992), we created a 
precedent of reading additional language into our kidnapping statute when we 
adopted that part of the Model Penal Code's provision concerning confinement 
which requires that a victim be placed in isolation. 824 P.2d  at 
1270.

[¶14]   Appellant's argument has some 
persuasive appeal; however, this Court's role is not to graft additional 
language onto a statute. Wyoming's Legislature adopted a 
kidnapping statute which is similar to the Model Penal Code's definition. The 
Legislature clearly chose not to adopt that part of the Model Penal Code's 
kidnapping definition which requires that the confinement be for a "substantial 
period in a place of isolation." When the Legislature has made such a clear 
decision regarding statutory language, it would be particularly inappropriate 
for this Court to interpret the Legislature's intent as being something other 
than what is plainly stated in the statute. The fact that in Darrow we 
interpreted our statute to include an isolation requirement like the Model Penal 
Code's requirement does not mean that we should also require confinement for a 
substantial period. Darrow presented this Court with the question of whether 
confinement could mean confinement within the victim's residence. To resolve 
that issue, we held that confinement means isolation from the "usual protections 
of society" and may include confinement within the victim's home. 824 P.2d  at 
1270. The question of what confinement meant was an ambiguity which we had to 
resolve. However, in contrast, there is no ambiguity surrounding whether a 
confinement must be for a substantial period because the Legislature 
deliberately chose not to adopt the "substantial period" language. Admittedly, 
by choosing not to adopt that language, the Legislature has opened the door for 
defendants in Wyoming to be charged with 
kidnapping for a much broader range of conduct than would be possible under the 
Model Penal Code. However, that was a choice for the Legislature, not for this 
Court.

[¶15]   We also cannot agree with Appellant 
that the broad language of § 6-2-201 goes so far as to nullify any distinction 
between kidnapping and felonious restraint or false imprisonment. Kidnapping 
requires confinement with the intent to hold for ransom, to facilitate the 
commission of a felony, or to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the 
victim or another. Felonious restraint involves an unlawful restraint which 
exposes the victim to a risk of serious bodily injury. 
Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-202 (1988). 
False imprisonment requires a knowing and unlawful interference with the 
victim's liberty. Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-203 (1988). 
Unlike felonious restraint or false imprisonment, kidnapping requires 
confinement with the intent to take one of three severe actions. By requiring 
not only confinement but also the additional intent to hold for ransom, to 
facilitate the commission of a felony, or to inflict bodily injury on or to 
terrorize the victim, the Legislature made kidnapping a much more serious crime 
which is easily distinguished from felonious restraint or false 
imprisonment.

[¶16]   In this case, sufficient evidence 
existed for the jury to find that Appellant unlawfully confined the victim 
within the meaning of § 6-2-201. When the victim attempted to get out of the 
pickup truck she was driving, Appellant forced her back into the truck. She was 
then coerced into remaining in the vehicle while Appellant drove around. Later, 
Appellant dragged the victim into his house where he forced her to remain until 
she escaped by shooting him. Further evidence of the fact that she was confined 
was her thwarted attempt to escape through the bathroom window. Appellant argues 
that the victim was not truly confined because several people were aware that 
she was in his house, either through telephone calls or by personal visits with 
him. What Appellant fails to point out is that, with the possible exception of 
Mr. Errington, none of the people who called his house or stopped by were aware 
that the victim was being held against her will. As to Mr. Errington, he either 
misjudged the gravity of the situation or would not interfere because he worked 
for Appellant. A reasonable jury could have found from the evidence presented 
that the time the victim spent in the truck or in Appellant's house was 
sufficient to constitute confinement within the meaning of § 
6-2-201.

[¶17]   Appellant also claims that 
insufficient evidence existed of his intent to inflict bodily injury on or to 
terrorize the victim. The focus of his claim is that the jury could not have 
found that Appellant intended to terrorize his victim. Appellant reasons that, 
because the counts against him for aggravated assault and battery and reckless 
endangering both required the use of a gun and the jury found him guilty of only 
simple battery, the jury must have thought that he did not threaten the victim 
with a gun. According to Appellant, if the jury found that he did not threaten 
the victim with a gun, he could not have terrorized her.

[¶18]   Appellant's claim contains several 
flaws. First, § 6-2-201 requires that the defendant confine the victim with the 
intent to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize her. Appellant dismisses any 
injury to the victim as being incidental. However, a reasonable jury could have 
found sufficient evidence of Appellant's intent to inflict bodily injury on the 
victim when he struck her while she was in the pickup truck. The victim received 
two black eyes and a bloody nose as a result of Appellant striking her. Second, 
the jury could have found that Appellant's threats to kill the victim 
constituted terrorizing, even if they were not made with a gun. Driskill v. 
State, 761 P.2d 980, 982-83 (Wyo. 1988). Finally, even if 
we assume arguendo that Appellant needed to threaten the victim with the gun to 
constitute terrorizing, the jury's finding of guilt for simple battery and not 
for reckless endangering or aggravated assault and battery would not foreclose a 
finding of guilt on the kidnapping charge. In several instances, this Court has 
said that consistency in a jury's verdict is not necessary. Eatherton v. State, 
810 P.2d 93, 98 (Wyo. 1991); Lessard v. State, 
719 P.2d 227, 230-32 (Wyo. 1986). Professor Wright 
states the rule in his treatise as follows:

[¶19]   In a case in which there are 
multiple counts, each one is treated as if it were a separate indictment. The 
verdict on the various counts need not be consistent. An acquittal on one count 
does not prevent conviction on another, even though the evidence is the same and 
defendant could not have committed one crime without committing both, so long as 
the evidence is sufficient to support conviction on the count on which a guilty 
verdict was reached.

3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 514 at 14-16 (1982).

[¶20]   This case does not fit neatly 
within the general rule because Appellant was convicted for both kidnapping and 
simple battery. His acquittal on the offenses of aggravated assault and battery 
and reckless endangering was only implied. However, other courts have applied 
the rule that consistency is not required when one of the convictions is for a 
lesser offense rather than for the offense originally charged and it is argued 
that an implied acquittal is inconsistent with the remaining count. Annotation, 
Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict as Between Different Counts of Indictment or 
Information, 18 A.L.R.3d 259 at § 5 (1968); People v. Witzel, 155 Cal. App. 2d 486, 318 P.2d 136 (1957). We agree with this view. The fact that Appellant's 
acquittal on the greater offenses was implied rather than explicit should not 
alter the general rule concerning inconsistent verdicts. Thus, even if 
Appellant's use of a gun had been necessary for a conviction, the jury's finding 
of guilt on the charge of simple battery rather than aggravated assault and 
battery or reckless endangering does not present a problem.

[¶21]   The final question we must address 
is whether mitigating factors were present which require that Appellant be 
resentenced. Section 6-2-201(c) states: "If the defendant voluntarily releases 
the victim substantially unharmed and in a safe place prior to trial, kidnapping 
is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years." If 
the defendant fails to establish any one of the four elements contained in 
subsection (c), his crime becomes punishable by imprisonment for not less than 
twenty years. Section 6-2-201(d); Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 
(Wyo. 1989). 

[¶22]   The first mitigating factor to be 
considered is whether Appellant voluntarily released his victim. Appellant 
claims that he voluntarily released the victim when he allowed her to possess 
the gun. A reasonable jury could have concluded from the evidence presented that 
Appellant did not "allow" the victim to obtain possession of the gun and that he 
did not voluntarily release her. According to the victim, Appellant left the gun 
on the kitchen table. She picked up the gun and started walking toward the door. 
When she told Appellant that she was leaving, he jumped up, saying, "`No, you're 
not,'" and telling her that she was a "dead bitch." Appellant went after the 
victim and was trying to take the gun away from her when she shot him in the 
leg. By telling her that she was not leaving and by trying to take the gun away 
from her, Appellant certainly did not voluntarily release the victim. Because 
the record contained sufficient evidence showing that Appellant did not release 
his victim voluntarily, we do not need to consider whether he released her 
substantially unharmed, in a safe place, or prior to trial.

[¶23]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Appellant's claim 
focuses on the lack of sufficient evidence to support a finding of confinement. 
We note that the jury was instructed on and easily could have found Appellant 
guilty under the alternative theory that he unlawfully removed the victim "from 
the vicinity where [s]he was at the time of the removal" with the intent to 
inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize her.