Case Title: Richard A. Pulaski Construction Co., Inc. v. Air Frame Hangars, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-40-07

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 40 September Term 2007 RICHARD A. PULASKI CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. AIR FRAME HANGARS, INC., COUNTY OF MERCER, CHARLES B. YATES, WILLIAM C. and CATHERINE DALTON, GARY and SUSAN SMOTRICH, ROBERT BAUS, TUDOR CORPORATION, WILLIAM and PHYLLIS GLATZ, CLEMENT ZILKA, WALTER KNOUSE, WILLIAM HOLT, AIRTEX PRODUCTS, INC., WASHINGTON ROAD ASSOCIATES, WEEKEND AIR CHARTER SERVICE, INC., NICHOLAS ESPOSITO, BRETT NORTGREN, ROBERT and JEANETTE AGSTER, MERCER COUNTY GENERAL AVIATION HANGAR CONDOMINIUM COMPLEX ASSOCIATION, JAMES A. MEHLING and KAREN F. RITTERSON, Defendants, and BRUCE W. RITTERSON Defendant-Appellant. Argued April 7, 2008 Decided July 1, 2008 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Debra J. Foca argued the cause for appellant. Robert T. Lawless argued the cause for respondent (Hedinger & Lawless, attorneys). JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we consider whether New Jersey recognizes a cause of action in prima facie tort and, if so, the contours of that cause of action. Assuming, without deciding, that our common law may admit of a cause of action for prima facie tort, it is solely a gap-filler. That is, the availability of the prima facie tort doctrine is limited exclusively to those instances of intentional and culpable conduct unjustified under the circumstances that, as a threshold matter, do not fall within a traditional tort cause of action. That s Section 870, which the Court would be prepared to instruct the jury if it got to that point as to what plaintiff needs to prove in order to hold [defendant] liable. [(Editing marks added).] The case was tried without a jury, and the sole issue was whether defendant was liable to plaintiff under a prima facie tort theory. Plaintiff presented persuasive proofs that, following defendant s acknowledgement of receipt of plaintiff s construction lien claim and after plaintiff had filed its arbitration demand, defendant nevertheless transferred title to nine of the aircraft hangar condominiums to third party purchasers. The evidence showed that, in each affidavit of title executed in respect of a title transfer, defendant -- in his representative capacity as Air Frame s president -- stated under oath that Air Frame was not aware that anyone has filed or intends to file a mechanic s lien or building contract relating to this property[;] that [n]o one has notified [Air Frame] that money is due and owing for construction work on this property[;] that Air Frame had not allowed any interests (legal rights) to be created which affect its leasehold interest or use of this property[;] that [n]o other persons have legal rights in this property[;] and that Air Frame did not have any pending lawsuits or judgments against it or other legal obligations which may be enforced against this property[.] The trial court credited plaintiff s proofs and found significant problems with [defendant s] credibility[.] It found that there was a deliberate effort made to get those closings done without having to pay [plaintiff], and that it was intentional on the part of [defendant], and he was able to get the money. In that factual context, the trial court defined its task as [h]ow can somebody swear to something that s a lie and nonetheless get away with it. It reasoned that where there is a false swearing, and it s done intentionally to get the closings done, and apparently in part to keep [plaintiff] at bay and see what happens, buy himself some more time, . . . it is the highly unusual circumstance where you can find a prima facie tort. Relying on the Restatement s iteration of the tort, it explained that you do a balancing test, and has there been an injury to another[,] followed by look[ing] at the culpable character of the actor s conduct, and the unjustifiable character of his conduct under the circumstances. Determining that this is an unusual case that falls into the prima facie tort requirements, the trial court stated that it was going to rely upon the unusual, extraordinary remedy of a prima facie tort . . . with full recognition that it is an extraordinary remedy[.] It concluded that based upon the conduct in this case, [that remedy] is justifiable. Defendant moved for a new trial and plaintiff cross-moved for entry of final judgment. Denying defendant s new trial motion, the trial court noted that it had found on the record that [defendant] was not a credible witness[,] and that [t]his is a case where the feel of the case by the trial [j]udge was that [defendant] could not be trusted. The trial court entered final judgment in plaintiff s favor in the amount of $105,932, the contract balance prayed for in the third amended verified complaint, $19,155 in pre-judgment interest, and an additional $20,269.01 in counsel fees. See footnote 7 Defendant appealed and, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial court. Defendant sought certification, inquiring whether as a matter of public policy and general public importance, should prima facie tort be a remedy for a construction lien claimant who forfeits its right to a lien claim under the construction lien statute[.] We granted that petition, 192 N.J. 479 (2007), and, for the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the cause for the entry of judgment in defendant s favor. [Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 266 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 22 N.J. 220 (1956) (citations, internal quotation marks, and internal editing marks omitted).] Quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts 870 (1979), this Court has noted that [o]ne who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances. This liability may be imposed although the actor s conduct does not come within a traditional category of tort liability. Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 522 (1998) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 870 (1979)). Defining that [a] prima facie tort cause of action would encompass the intentional, willful and malicious harms that fall within the gaps of the law[,] Taylor observed that [p]rima facie tort claims have been most frequently permitted only in the limited situations in which plaintiffs would have no other causes of action. Id. at 523 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That said, Taylor explicitly decline[d] . . . to recognize a claim in prima facie tort. Ibid. The Restatement (Second) of Torts 870 reporters notes explain that t he courts in New York have raised an elaborate structure of prima facie tort. That elaborate structure under New York law maintains that the doctrine of [p]rima facie tort affords a remedy for the infliction of intentional harm, resulting in damage, without excuse or justification, by an act or a series of acts which would otherwise be lawful. The requisite elements of a cause of action for prima facie tort are (1) the intentional infliction of harm, (2) which results in special damages, (3) without any excuse or justification, (4) by an act or series of acts which would otherwise be lawful. A critical element of the cause of action is that plaintiff suffered specific and measurable loss, which requires an allegation of special damages. [Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349, 354-55 (N.Y. 1985) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] See also Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that under New York law, [t]he elements for such a tort are: (1) intentional infliction of harm; (2) resulting in special damages; (3) without excuse or justification; (4) by an act that would otherwise be lawful[;] that [t]he touchstone is disinterested malevolence , meaning that the plaintiff cannot recover unless the defendant s conduct was not only harmful, but done with the sole intent to harm[;] and that motives other than disinterested malevolence, such as profit, self-interest, or business advantage will not suffice under the doctrine of prima facie tort (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Other jurisdictions -- Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio and Texas -- likewise have recognized that tort. See, e.g., Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (defining elements of prima facie tort as 1. Intentional lawful act by the defendant[;] 2. An intent to cause injury to the plaintiff[;] 3. Injury to the plaintiff[; and] 4. An absence of any justification or an insufficient justification for the defendant s act ); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 315 (Mo. 1993) (same); Schmitz v. Smentowski, 785 P.2d 726, 734-35 (N.M. 1990) (holding that [t]o constitute a prima facie tort , the tort-feasor must act maliciously, with the intent to cause injury, and without justification or with insufficient justification and explaining that [t]he theory underlying prima facie tort is that a party that intends to cause injury to another should be liable for that injury, if the conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances ) (citations omitted); Sulphur Springs Realty v. Blackstone, 453 N.E.2d 1279, 1284 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (defining prima facie tort as the intentional infliction of injury upon another without excuse or justification by an act which in and of itself may not be unlawful (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (holding that [t]he basic elements of the Prima Facie Tort cause of action that are apparently emerging include: 1) an intent to injure on the part of the defendant; 2) a lack of justification in so acting; and 3) special damages, alleged with particularity ). SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-40 SEPTEMBER TERM 2007 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court RICHARD A. PULASKI CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. AIR FRAME HANGARS, INC., et al., Defendants, and BRUCE W. RITTERSON, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 1, 2008 Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY