Case Title: Murphy & Landon, P.A. v. Pernic

Citation: 

Docket Number: 430, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
MURPHY & LANDON, P.A.,  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 430, 2014 
 
Appellant-Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
Court Below: Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of New Castle County 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
C.A. No. N13A-03-012 FWW 
CHELSEY F. PERNIC,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee-Below,  
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  August 26, 2015 
Decided:  August 26, 2015 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, 
Justices, constituting the Court en banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED. 
 
Lauren Pisapia Cirrinicione, Esquire, Murphy & Landon, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
Appellant. 
 
Chelsey F. Pernic, Appellee-Below, Appellee, Pro Se. 
 
 
STRINE, Chief Justice, for the Majority: 
1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The appellant, Murphy & Landon, P.A. (the “Firm”), disputes the decision of the 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the “Board”) finding that Chelsey Pernic, a 
paralegal at the Firm, had not been fired for just cause and was thus entitled to 
unemployment benefits.  A Claims Deputy for the Department of Labor initially ruled for 
Pernic, and the Appeals Referee for the Department of Labor affirmed after preventing 
the Firm from submitting evidence about the full scope of Pernic‟s alleged misconduct.  
The Board then affirmed the Appeals Referee‟s decision, which the Superior Court 
affirmed once more in an effort to abide by the deferential standard of review that is 
required when reviewing decisions by the Board.    
The Firm now appeals to this Court, arguing that the Board‟s conclusions—that 
Pernic was discharged for a single violation of the Firm‟s financial policy and that she 
was not given an adequate warning—were not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.  Relatedly, the Firm contends that this error resulted in large measure because the 
Firm was unfairly restricted from presenting evidence of the broader scope of Pernic‟s 
poor job performance, including her lateness, disrespectful and uncooperative attitude, 
and shirking, in its hearing before the Appeals Referee.  It argues that the Board did not 
remedy this error because, although the Firm was allowed to present evidence of Pernic‟s 
cumulative misconduct in the Board hearing, the Board nonetheless concluded, without 
explanation, that Pernic was fired for a single incident of misconduct, a conclusion that 
was not supported by substantial evidence in the record.   
2 
 
Although our standard of review of a decision by the Board is deferential, it is not 
altogether without teeth.  In this case, the Board‟s conclusions were not rationally 
grounded in the record, and thus, we need not defer to them.  For one, the Board erred by 
deferring to the Appeals Referee‟s conclusion that the cause of Pernic‟s termination was 
her decision to pay an invoice without permission when that conclusion was inconsistent 
with substantial, unrebutted evidence, including testimony that Pernic had been warned 
about her substandard performance in several areas, and her termination letter, which 
stated that Penic was terminated for six different types of misconduct.  Unlike the 
Appeals Referee, the Board at least heard the evidence that Pernic was fired for 
cumulative misconduct, but it then failed to explain why it gave that evidence no weight 
at all, despite Pernic‟s failure to contradict it.  In other words, although the Board tried to 
cure the Appeals Referee‟s improper limitation of the record, it then failed to give any 
rational consideration to the evidence before it and deferred to the original decision made 
on what it knew to be an improperly limited record.   
The Board‟s decision that Pernic did not receive a clear warning that she could be 
terminated for another instance of misconduct is also unsupported by substantial evidence 
in the record.  The uncontradicted record evidence shows that Pernic received a warning 
that her insubordination and poor performance could lead to her termination, but she 
continued to act disrespectfully and was therefore terminated.  The Firm should not be 
penalized because it did not anticipate the precise form that Pernic‟s last act of 
misconduct would take.  Nor should it be penalized for allowing Pernic time to improve 
her deficient performance.  To do so would create a perverse incentive for an employer to 
3 
 
discharge an employee at the first instance of poor performance in order to avoid the 
outcome that the Firm suffered here.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand the judgment 
of the Superior Court affirming the Board‟s decision.   
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Pernic worked as a paralegal at the Firm from 2009 to 2010, and again from 2011 
to 2012.  Linda Ferguson, Pernic‟s aunt and the Firm‟s supervising paralegal, 
recommended Pernic for the position.  Pernic was terminated on May 11, 2012, after 
several months of poor performance.  Her termination letter stated that she had been 
terminated because of her chronic lateness;1 uncooperative attitude; rude behavior toward 
Frank Murphy, her supervising attorney; refusal to help with overflow work; and refusal 
to work overtime, as required.  The letter also stated: “[y]ou fail to take supervision and 
consequently, you take it upon yourself to make decisions and take actions without first 
checking with your supervising attorney.  Your most recent egregious example is your 
processing of an expert deposition fee for an opposing party‟s witness in the amount of 
$3,000.”2 
On May 13, 2012, Pernic filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the 
Delaware Department of Labor‟s Division of Unemployment Insurance.  In her claimant 
fact-finding questionnaire, Pernic stated that most of the reasons for her termination were 
not brought to her attention and that those that had been brought to her attention had been 
corrected.  Pernic also indicated that she had not been told that her job was in jeopardy.  
                                                          
 
1 The letter explained that despite her chronic lateness, she would leave at 5:30 PM, and thus was 
not working a full day.  
2 App. to Opening Br. at 22 (Termination letter dated May 11, 2012) (emphasis added).  
4 
 
The Firm opposed her application, claiming that it had just cause to terminate Pernic, and 
submitting a copy of her termination letter.  The Firm also stated that Pernic was warned 
in December 2011 that her job was in jeopardy due to her attendance and attitude 
problems.   
The Claims Deputy for the Department of Labor interviewed Pernic, who denied 
that she was frequently late for work and took long lunches.3  She also claimed that she 
“requested hundreds of payments” for invoices, that she did so “all the time” as “part of 
[her] job,” and was not aware that she was required to get approval from anyone.4  When 
asked if she had been warned about the conduct that led to her termination, Pernic 
admitted that she had a meeting with her supervisors, Murphy and Ferguson, in which she 
was warned that she “needed to change the way [she] spoke to [Murphy].”5  Nonetheless, 
the Claims Deputy concluded that the Firm had failed to meet its burden of showing just 
cause for Pernic‟s termination because there was no evidence that Pernic‟s behavior rose 
to the level of wanton or willful misconduct.  The Firm appealed the Claim Deputy‟s 
decision.   
A hearing before the Appeals Referee was held on August 13, 2012.  Although the 
Firm stated that there were multiple reasons for Pernic‟s termination, the Appeals Referee 
directed the parties to focus only on the last incident leading to Pernic‟s termination—
Pernic‟s unauthorized payment of $3,000 to an opposing party‟s expert—and prohibited 
                                                          
 
3 Pernic represented herself pro se in the proceedings before the Claims Deputy and the Appeals 
Referee.   
4 App. to Opening Br. at 8 (Unemployment Insurance Fact-Finding Sheet). 
5 App. to Opening Br. at 5 (Unemployment Insurance Claimant Fact-Finding). 
5 
 
the Firm from presenting evidence about the wider scope of Pernic‟s poor performance.  
The Appeals Referee also prohibited the Firm from cross-examining Pernic about her 
statements denying that she was never late to work, never took long lunches, and was 
never warned that she could be terminated.  
The Appeals Referee heard testimony from (i) Pernic‟s supervising attorney, 
Frank Murphy; (ii) Pernic‟s aunt and the Firm‟s supervising paralegal, Linda Ferguson; 
(iii) two other Murphy & Landon legal assistants; and (iv) Pernic.  Murphy testified that 
he had received and intended to oppose the $3,000 invoice from the other side‟s expert 
witness because he believed it was exorbitant.  He stated that Pernic took the invoice, 
which was addressed to him, from his inbox and authorized payment without his 
knowledge.  He also testified that Pernic‟s statement that she had routinely approved such 
invoices on her own was not true, and that paralegals were not permitted to approve 
payments without permission.   
Ferguson testified that the Firm had an unwritten policy requiring a supervising 
attorney to approve the payment of invoices, and that as far as she knew, all of the legal 
assistants, including Pernic, were aware of the policy.  She testified that when she had 
previously worked as a personnel manager at another small law firm, the firm did not put 
policies of this kind in writing.  Ferguson also testified that she had recommended to 
Murphy that he fire Pernic.  Two other legal assistants testified that they were trained to 
clear all payments with an attorney before making them, and that they had never made a 
payment without first seeking approval.    
6 
 
In her testimony, Pernic continued to contend that she regularly arranged for 
payment of invoices without obtaining attorney approval and that she was not informed 
of a firm policy requiring attorney approval of invoice payments until after she had 
arranged for payment of the disputed invoice.    
 On August 27, 2012, the Appeals Referee issued a decision in Pernic‟s favor, 
finding that the Firm had failed to provide evidence showing that Pernic received notice 
of the invoice approval policy.  The Appeals Referee thus concluded that the Firm had 
not proven that Pernic‟s actions arose to willful or wanton misconduct, because such a 
finding generally requires that the employee receive an unequivocal warning that her 
conduct could lead to dismissal.   
The Firm appealed the decision to the Board, arguing that the Appeals Referee had 
erroneously restricted the Firm from presenting evidence about the other incidents and 
issues that were the cause of Pernic‟s termination.  The Board heard the Firm‟s appeal on 
February 6, 2013 and permitted the Firm to submit evidence of the full scope of Pernic‟s 
misconduct leading to her termination.  That is, the Board appears to have tried to cure 
the Appeals Referee‟s refusal to hear relevant evidence relating to all of the reasons that 
Pernic was terminated.  But that cure was less than effective for several reasons.  One key 
reason is that at the Appeals Referee hearing, the Firm was denied the chance to cross-
examine Pernic about relevant topics, including her statements to the Claims Deputy that 
she had never been late to work, that she did not take long lunches, and that she acted 
uncooperatively.  That is because Pernic did not appear at the Board hearing.  Instead, the 
7 
 
only evidence presented at the hearing were Pernic‟s time records6 and testimony from 
Firm employees indicating that Pernic was insubordinate, and had received a clear 
warning that she could be terminated but continued to perform poorly.  For example, 
Deborah Abbott, a Murphy & Landon legal assistant who worked near Pernic, testified 
that Pernic was usually late for work, took long lunches, refused to help with overflow 
work, refused to work overtime, and was rude and disrespectful to Murphy.  She testified 
that Pernic was warned about her lateness.  
Likewise, Murphy testified that Pernic was underperforming, and that he and 
Ferguson had met with Pernic to go over her job deficiencies, inform her of what was 
required of her, and make clear that she would be fired if she did not improve.7   Pernic 
had admitted that this meeting occurred in her interview with the Claims Deputy, 
although she did not acknowledge that she was warned that she could be terminated.  
According to Murphy‟s unrebutted testimony before the Board, Pernic‟s behavior 
worsened after this meeting.8   
In response to a Board member‟s question regarding why the Firm did not fire 
Pernic sooner, Murphy stated that he was worried about creating additional problems for 
Ferguson and the Firm‟s supervising paralegal, who was suffering from multiple 
                                                          
 
6 The time records showed that in January and February 2012, Pernic did not work a full work-
day, and that she often reported six hours or less of work per day.  Once she was warned that her 
job was in jeopardy, she would add an entry for “non-billable” time to give the appearance that 
she was working a seven-and-a-half hour day, still short of her eight-hour requirement.   
7 The date of this meeting is unclear from the record.  In his testimony before the Board, Murphy 
stated that the meeting occurred a few months before her termination.  Pernic‟s fact-finding 
questionnaire referred to a meeting with Murphy and Ferguson in late September or early 
October 2011.  The Firm submitted papers referring to a meeting between Pernic, Murphy, and 
Ferguson in December 2011.    
8 See App. to Opening Br. at 118 (Tr. of Admin. Hearing, Feb. 6, 2013). 
8 
 
sclerosis, and that Pernic had been an acceptable employee until the last six to eight 
months of her employment.  Another Board member asked if Pernic was given an 
unequivocal warning that she had to improve or she would be terminated.  Murphy 
testified in response that he and Ferguson gave such a warning to Pernic “probably a 
couple months before the termination.”9  Ferguson did not testify at the Board hearing, 
but the Board had access to her testimony before the Appeals Referee, which was entirely 
consistent with Murphy‟s.  
On March 11, 2013, the Board issued its decision affirming the decision of the 
Appeals Referee and awarding unemployment benefits to Pernic.  The Board 
acknowledged that, “[i]t is clear that the Claimant was warned that she could lose her job, 
if she did not improve.”10  The Board also stated that although the invoice payment 
incident by itself was insufficient evidence of willful and wanton conduct, “the Employer 
presented evidence of conduct that . . . could constitute just cause for discharge.”11  
Nonetheless, the Board was uncertain whether the Firm‟s warning was sufficient:  
The Employer‟s case before the Board relied on cumulative misconduct as 
a basis for discharge, whereas the case before the Referee seemed to rely on 
a single incident.  Which conduct formed the basis for the warning?  If, as it 
now appears, the Claimant was warned about lateness, long lunches, and 
other performance issues, and then fired for the unauthorized payment of an 
invoice, there is a disconnect between the warning and the discharge.12   
 
                                                          
 
9 App. to Opening Br. at 123 (Tr. of Admin. Hearing, Feb. 6, 2013).   
10 App. to Opening Br. at 130 (Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board).  
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
9 
 
Of course, the only reason that the Firm focused its case before the Appeals Referee on 
the single incident of misconduct was that the Appeals Referee forced it to do so, over the 
Firm‟s objections.   
After thus determining that the Firm‟s other documented reasons for firing Pernic 
were “disconnect[ed]” to her final instance of poor performance, and that Pernic had been 
given a “mixed message” about what conduct the Firm would tolerate because of its 
desire to protect Pernic‟s aunt, the Board concluded the Firm did not have just cause to 
fire Pernic.13  In other words, rather than giving the Firm credit for patiently dealing with 
Pernic‟s subpar performance, and only terminating her after she had been given ample 
time to improve, the Board ignored the cumulative nature of Pernic‟s failings, acted as if 
her final act of misconduct was an aberration, and concluded that her termination was 
unjust.   
The Firm then appealed to the Superior Court, who affirmed the Board‟s decision 
in an order and opinion dated July 11, 2014.14  In so holding, the Superior Court noted 
that the standard of review of the Board‟s decision—whether the ruling was supported by 
substantial evidence and free from legal error—is “deferential” and thus, “the Board‟s 
decision will only be modified in extreme circumstances.”15  The Superior Court then did 
its best to adhere to that deferential standard of review.  It found that the Firm was given 
a fair hearing before the Board because the Firm was not restricted from presenting 
evidence of Pernic‟s misconduct, and the Board considered that evidence when rendering 
                                                          
 
13 Id. 
14 Murphy & Landon, P.A. v. Pernic, 2014 WL 3400997 (Del. Super. Ct. July 11, 2014). 
15 Id. at *3. 
10 
 
its decision.  It found that the Board‟s conclusions that the warning given to Pernic was 
disconnected from the cause of her firing and that Pernic may have received a “mixed 
message” were supported by the evidence in the record.16  The Superior Court concluded 
that it would not “reevaluate how the Board weighed the evidence before it.”17   
This appeal followed.    
III. ANALYSIS 
This Court‟s review of the Superior Court‟s opinion and order is limited to the 
question of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board‟s 
findings and whether such findings are free from legal error.18  Substantial evidence is 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.19  Like the Superior Court, this Court considers the record in the light most 
favorable to the party prevailing on the Board‟s appeal, here, Pernic.20  This Court does 
not weigh the evidence, determine questions or credibility, or make its own factual 
findings.21 
An employee who is discharged for just cause is disqualified from receiving 
unemployment benefits.22  Generally, there is just cause if an employee commits a 
“willful or wanton act or pattern of conduct in violation of the employer‟s interest, the 
                                                          
 
16 Id. at *2. 
17 Id. at *5. 
18 Thompson v. Christiana Care Health System, 25 A.3d 778, 782 (Del. 2011). 
19 Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994). 
20 Thompson, 25 A.3d at 782. 
21 Id. 
22 19 Del. C. § 3314(2). 
11 
 
employee‟s duties, or the employee‟s expected standard of conduct.”23  “If an employer 
consistently tolerates willful or wanton misconduct . . . the employer may not be justified 
in firing employees without first warning them that their conduct no longer is 
acceptable.”24  The employer bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the employee was terminated for just cause.25   
On appeal, the Firm argues that the Board‟s conclusions—that Pernic was 
discharged for a single violation of the Firm‟s financial policy and that Pernic was not 
given an adequate warning before she was terminated—were unsupported by the record 
and not the product of an orderly and logical deductive process.  The Firm argues that it 
was unfairly restricted from presenting evidence of Pernic‟s misconduct in its hearing 
before the Appeals Referee, and that this error was not remedied on appeal to the Board 
because the Board affirmed the Appeals Referee‟s conclusion that Pernic was fired for a 
single act of misconduct against the weight of uncontradicted evidence in the record.    
Pernic did not appear at the Board hearing, and thus, the Firm was not able to 
cross-examine her about her statements to the Claims Deputy that she had not engaged in 
misconduct and had not received an adequate warning.  Pernic has also not taken the time 
to file an answering brief to us, leaving us without any response to the Firm‟s arguments, 
even though this Court granted Pernic‟s request for an extension to allow her an 
additional month to file her answering brief.26  After the expiration of the later filing 
                                                          
 
23 Avon Prods., Inc. v. Wilson, 513 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Del. 1986). 
24 Moeller v. Wilmington Savs. Fund Soc’y, 723 A.2d 1177, 1179 (Del. 1999).  
25 Edmunds v. Kelly Servs., 2012 WL 4033377, at *2 (Del. Sept. 12, 2012). 
26 Murphy & Landon, P.A. v. Chelsey F. Pernic, No. 430, 2014 (Order) (Del. Nov. 24, 2014).  
12 
 
deadline, this Court allowed Pernic an additional week to file her brief and informed her 
that her failure to respond could result in an order against her or the imposition of a 
penalty under Supreme Court Rule 33, but Pernic still failed to submit a response.27   
Even though our standard of review of Board decisions is deferential, it is not 
meaningless, and we need not defer to findings that are not rationally supported by 
substantial evidence in the record.28  As important, our application of this deferential 
standard of review is influenced by the undisputed legal error committed by the Appeals 
Referee in inappropriately restricting the issues before her.  Therefore, in addressing 
whether the Board‟s decision is rationally supported by the record, we must consider 
whether the Board in fact redressed the legal error committed by the Appeals Referee, not 
only by allowing the relevant evidence that the Firm was restricted from presenting 
initially to be heard, but by giving rational consideration to that evidence, the failure of 
Pernic to rebut it, and the improper limitation on the Firm‟s ability to cross-examine 
Pernic in reaching its own decision.  In other words, as part of determining whether to 
defer to the Board‟s fact findings, we cannot ignore the legal error committed at the 
original hearing, but must consider whether that error was remedied adequately by the 
Board in hearing the Firm‟s appeal. 
Here, we find that the Board‟s decision to defer to the Appeals Referee‟s 
conclusion that Pernic was fired for a single incident of misconduct, which was based on 
                                                          
 
27 Because Pernic did not submit an answering brief, this Court determined that the matter would 
be decided on the basis of the opening brief and the record. 
28 See Boggerty v. Stewart, 14 A.3d 542, 550 (Del. 2011) (“Where the findings are not supported 
by substantial evidence, or are not the product of an orderly and logical reasoning process, then 
the decision under review cannot stand.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
13 
 
the Appeals Referee‟s erroneous limitation of the record, was contradicted by unrebutted 
testimony and documentary evidence.  Rather than ensuring that it reviewed the record 
fully to correct the improper evidentiary limitations imposed by the Appeals Referee, the 
Board instead disregarded large elements of the record and largely deferred to the 
decision of the Appeals Referee, which was based on her own improperly restricted 
review of the relevant evidence and issues.29  The Board could not simply ignore the 
abundant unrebutted evidence supporting the Firm‟s rendition of events without reasoned 
explanation.30  For the same reason, the Board‟s finding that Pernic did not receive an 
adequate warning that she would be terminated if she continued to engage in misconduct 
is also unsupported by the uncontradicted evidence in the record.   
i. 
Unrebutted Evidence Was Presented That Pernic Was Fired For Cumulative 
Misconduct, Not a Single Incident 
 
Although the Firm sought to introduce evidence that Pernic was fired for 
cumulative misconduct, including chronic lateness, an unwillingness to assist others, and 
a disrespectful attitude toward her supervisors, the Appeals Referee restricted the Firm 
from presenting such evidence in its hearing.  Instead, the Firm was limited to presenting 
                                                          
 
29 Cf. Boulevard Elec. Sales v. Webb, 428 A.2d 11, 15 (Del. 1981) (reversing and remanding to 
the Superior Court to remand to the Board when the Board improperly limited the scope of 
evidence to be introduced at its hearing). 
30 See Watson v. Wal-Mart Assoc., 30 A.3d 775, 779 (Del. 2011) (“Although the Board is the 
fact-finder, it is not free to ignore this evidence if it is undisputed.”); see also Pusey v. Natkin & 
Co., 428 A.2d 1155, 1157 (Del. 1981) (holding that there was not substantial evidence to support 
the Industrial Accident Board‟s ruling when the claimant produced unrebutted evidence “which 
the Board could not ignore”); Tatten Partners, L.P. v. New Castle Cnty. Bd. of Assessment 
Review, 642 A.2d 1251, 1258 (Del. Super. 1993), aff’d sub nom. New Castle Cnty. v. Tatten 
Partners, L.P., 647 A.2d 382 (Del. 1994) (holding that “the Board acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in ignoring the competent evidence brought before it by” the claimant). 
14 
 
evidence related to the incident of misconduct that immediately preceded Pernic‟s 
termination: her unauthorized payment of a $3,000 invoice. 
In allowing the Firm to submit new evidence in its hearing before the Board, the 
Board implicitly acknowledged that the Appeals Referee improperly limited her inquiry 
to focus only on that incident.  We agree with the Board that the Appeals Referee erred 
by limiting the record, when substantial evidence, including Pernic‟s termination letter, 
suggested that she was fired for misconduct that had occurred over several months.  And 
although the Board attempted to cure the Appeals Referee‟s improper restriction of the 
record, the Board then deferred to the Appeals Referee‟s conclusion that Pernic was fired 
for a single instance of misconduct without any explanation.31  That conclusion was not 
rationally supported by the evidence before the Board.  For example, Pernic‟s termination 
letter stated “the reasons for your termination are many” and then listed six specific types 
of misconduct.32  Several witnesses also confirmed that Pernic was terminated because of 
her inadequate performance over six to eight months.   
The Board made no attempt to address the Firm‟s substantial and uncontradicted 
evidence that showed that Pernic was terminated for her cumulative misconduct, nor did 
it explain why it deferred to the Appeals Referee‟s conclusion that Pernic was fired for a 
single incident.  Thus, this Court cannot defer to the Board‟s conclusion because it does 
not reflect a rational consideration of the record evidence and it compounded, not cured, 
                                                          
 
31 App. to Opening Br. at 131 (“If, as it now appears, the Claimant was warned about . . . [her 
performance issues] and then fired for the unauthorized payment of an invoice, there is a 
disconnect . . . .”).   
32 App. to Opening Br. at 22.  
15 
 
the Appeals Referee‟s original error: improperly restricting the Firm‟s ability to present 
relevant evidence.33    
ii. Uncontradicted Evidence Supports the Conclusion That Pernic Received a Clear 
Warning That She Could Be Terminated 
 
In addition, there is substantial, uncontradicted record evidence showing that 
Pernic received a clear warning that she would be terminated if she continued to engage 
in misconduct.  As the Board itself stated, “[i]t is clear that the Claimant was warned that 
she could lose her job, if she did not improve.”34  Nonetheless, the Board determined that 
there was a disconnect between the Firm‟s warning, which focused on Pernic‟s “lateness, 
long lunches, refusal to work extra hours, and other performance issues,” and her ultimate 
termination after she paid an invoice without authorization.35   
We cannot defer to this conclusion for two reasons.  First, it is grounded in the 
assumption that Pernic was fired for a single incident of misconduct, which, as discussed, 
is not rationally supported by the evidence in the record.  Second, even if we were to 
assume that Pernic was fired solely because she paid an invoice without permission, 
substantial evidence suggests that the Firm‟s warning put her on notice that an act 
involving lack of proper respect toward her supervisors could lead to her termination.36   
                                                          
 
33 Cf. 19 Del. C. § 3320(a) (“The [Board] shall remand a case to the appeal tribunal to 
supplement the existing evidence when it is determined to be insufficient to form a substantial 
basis for a decision.”). 
34 App. to Opening Br. at 131. 
35 Id.  
36 We note that Pernic‟s testimony that as a paralegal, she was entitled to approve invoices for 
her supervising attorney is not intuitively plausible.  It would be odd for a law firm to allow any 
legal assistant, without attorney supervision, to approve an invoice that would ultimately be paid 
by a client.  Moreover, in this instance, the invoice was addressed to Murphy and placed in his 
inbox.  Pernic took it out of his inbox without permission.  Presumably, it was put in Murphy‟s 
16 
 
As the Superior Court noted, the inquiry into whether a warning is sufficient to put 
the employee on notice is “very fact specific.”37  For example, in Optima Cleaning 
Systems, Inc. v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, the Superior Court explained: 
[A]n employer’s warning is not necessarily limited to putting the employee 
on notice of the impropriety of the specific conduct that led to the warning.  
For example, if an employee is cited for failing to wear a tie, he may be 
unsuccessful in arguing that he did not receive a warning for subsequently 
failing to shine his shoes.  This is especially true if the employee was aware 
that he was obligated to shine his shoes.  Arguably, the two violations are 
different.  However, both violations involved the employee‟s attire, and the 
employee had notice that improper attire was unacceptable.38  
 
The Board‟s finding that the Firm was required to inform Pernic what the “trigger” 
for her discharge would be “in terms of timing, conduct, or failure to improve” is an 
unreasonable requirement and contrary to Delaware law.  An employer need not specify 
the types of conduct that could lead to termination so long as the employee is aware that 
certain types of conduct are improper and prohibited.39   The employer is only required to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
inbox so that he could consider how it should be addressed, and if and to what extent it should be 
challenged or paid. 
37 Murphy & Landon, P.A. v. Pernic, 2014 WL 3400997, *5 (Del. Super. Ct. July 11, 2014). 
38 2010 WL 5307981, at *4 (Del. Super. Dec. 7, 2010) (emphasis added).  The two cases that the 
Superior Court relied on to find that the Firm‟s warning was inadequate are distinguishable from 
this case.  In Ortiz v. UIAB, this Court concluded that the employer did not have just cause to 
dismiss an employee for lateness because he was never warned that his lateness, which had been 
condoned for several months, would result in his termination.  317 A.2d 100, 101 (Del. 1974).  
Under the “exceptional” circumstances of that case, this Court found that “a single unambiguous 
warning that proscribed conduct will not be tolerated, and discharge would be the consequence,” 
was required.  Id.   
 
In Weaver v. Employment Security Commission, the Superior Court similarly determined 
that an employer had not shown just cause to fire an employee because it did not provide any 
evidence showing that the employee was warned that he would be fired because of his lateness.  
274 A.2d 446 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).   Here, by contrast, the uncontradicted evidence before the 
Board showed that Pernic received a warning that her behavior could lead to termination.    
39 See Optima Cleaning Systems, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Board, 2010 WL 5307981, at 
*3 (Del. Super. Dec. 7, 2010) (internal citations omitted) (“[B]ecause it is unlikely that an 
17 
 
show that the employee was warned that a general category of misconduct “was 
unacceptable.”40    
Here, the Firm presented abundant, uncontradicted evidence that Pernic was 
sufficiently warned that her behavior was unacceptable.  Although the Appeals Referee 
erroneously refused to hear evidence from the Firm about anything other than the invoice 
incident, Pernic admitted to the Claims Deputy that she had received a warning about her 
subpar job performance.  On appeal, the Board tried to cure the Appeals Referee‟s error 
by allowing the parties to present evidence of Pernic‟s other misconduct leading to her 
termination.  Accordingly, at the Board hearing, Murphy testified that he had warned 
Pernic clearly and unequivocally that she would be terminated if she continued to engage 
in misconduct and insubordination.  A paralegal, Deborah Abbott, confirmed that Pernic 
had been warned about her bad behavior.  But because Pernic did not attend the Board 
hearing, she was not subject to cross-examination by the Firm or the Board about her 
version of events.  Nor has Pernic submitted an answering brief before this Court, and as 
a result, has not presented evidence contradicting the Firm‟s evidence that she was given 
a clear warning that her conduct could result in termination.   
Thus, the record includes substantial, uncontradicted evidence that Pernic was 
warned that her uncooperative attitude and insubordination toward her supervising 
attorney was unacceptable, and that if she continued to act inappropriately, she would be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
employer has created policy that prohibits the gamut of unacceptable employee conduct, an 
employee may be terminated, with just cause, for conduct that generally is adverse to the 
employer‟s interest, the employee‟s duties, or the employee‟s expected standard of conduct.”).   
40 Id. at *4. 
18 
 
terminated.  Her decision to take mail from her supervising attorney‟s inbox and pay a 
$3,000 invoice without seeking his permission is the same type of disrespectful conduct 
that she was warned not to continue.  But the Board gave no weight to this uncontradicted 
evidence, and instead faulted the Firm for failing to predict that Pernic‟s next act of 
misconduct would involve taking an invoice about of Murphy‟s inbox and paying it 
without authorization.  The Board‟s insistence that the Firm be Nostradamus was 
unreasonable and imposes an inequitable burden on employers.   
Likewise, the Board seems to have reasoned that because Pernic‟s misconduct 
justified the Firm in terminating her earlier, the Firm did not have just cause for doing so 
later, when yet another example of her poor performance was discovered.  The Board 
thus penalized the Firm for its decision to be patient with Pernic, who had been an 
acceptable employee before the last few months of her employment, out of a desire to be 
sensitive to Pernic‟s aunt.  The Board‟s reasoning thus creates a perverse incentive for 
employers that risks harm to employees.  Under the Board‟s approach, an employer will 
find it safer to fire an employee immediately upon the first instance of misconduct rather 
than give the employee an opportunity to redeem himself.  We decline to endorse such an 
incentive scheme. 
Because the Board‟s conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence, and 
were the result of the Appeals Referee‟s error in limiting the evidentiary record, we 
reverse the order and opinion of the Superior Court and remand to the Board for a hearing 
consistent with this opinion.  In view of Pernic‟s refusal to participate before the Board or 
this Court, the Board shall enter a judgment in the Firm‟s favor if she does not appear or 
19 
 
participate on her own behalf and subject herself to cross-examination in any further 
proceedings.  Although Pernic has no duty to obtain counsel, she is bound to either 
prosecute her claim or withdraw it.        
 
 
20 
 
VAUGHN, Justice, dissenting:  
 
The Majority, claiming to be bound by a deferential standard of review, has 
determined that the Superior Court erred by affirming the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeals Board‟s (“UIAB” or the “Board”) judgment.  But the Superior Court was 
obligated to affirm the Board‟s judgment so long as it was: (1) supported by substantial 
evidence; and (2) free from legal error.41  The record, taken as a whole, clearly shows that 
the trial court properly adhered to this standard of review and correctly affirmed the 
Board‟s decision.   
Our review on appeal is the same as that of the Superior Court.42  This Court is 
prohibited from weighing the evidence, determining questions of credibility, or making 
its own factual findings.43  The Majority, however, has chosen to disregard this standard 
of review and replace the UIAB‟s factual findings with its own.  By usurping the Board‟s 
role as factfinder, the Majority has created a standard providing significantly less 
deference than our precedent demands.44  It has also erroneously found that the UIAB‟s 
conclusion was legally flawed.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                          
 
41 Tulou v. Raytheon Serv. Co., 659 A.2d 796, 802 (Del. Super. 1995).  
42 Whitney v. Bearing Const., Inc., 2014 WL 2526484, at * 2 (Del. May 30, 2014) (“Board 
decisions are reviewed using the same standard at both the Superior Court and the Supreme 
Court. We review legal issues decided by the Board de novo and „factual findings to determine 
whether they are supported by substantial evidence.‟”) (quoting Scheers v. Indep. Newspapers, 
832 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Del. 2003)).   
43 Thompson v. Christiana Care Health Sys., 25 A.3d 778, 782 (Del. 2011).   
44 Evans v. Tansley, 1988 WL 32033, at *2 (Del. Mar. 29, 1988) (“The law in Delaware is clear 
regarding appeals from the UIAB to Superior Court.  The credibility of witnesses, the weight of 
their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are for the UIAB to 
determine.  The Superior Court is only to determine whether there is satisfactory proof to support 
21 
 
I. 
The “Substantial Evidence” Standard of Review 
Our review of an appeal from the UIAB to the Superior Court is limited to a 
determination of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the 
UIAB‟s findings and whether such findings are free from legal error.45  Substantial 
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”46  While substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, it is 
less than a preponderance of the evidence.47  Like the Superior Court, this Court 
considers the record in the light most favorable to the party prevailing on the UIAB 
appeal.48  We do not “„weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make 
[our] own factual findings.‟”49  “Questions of law are reviewed de novo.”50 
II. 
Analysis 
The Superior Court concluded that the UIAB‟s determination was supported by 
substantial evidence and that Murphy & Landon (the “Firm”) failed to meet its burden of 
proving Pernic was terminated for just cause.  Under the standard of review by which 
both this Court and the Superior Court are bound, I find no error in the trial court‟s 
decision.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a factual finding.”) (citations omitted); Scheers, 832 A.2d at 1246-47 (“This Court, replicating 
the role of the Superior Court, reviews de novo legal issues decided by the Board, and reviews 
factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence.  Substantial 
evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion.”) (citations omitted).  
45 Thompson, 25 A.3d at 781-82.   
46 Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994). 
47 Falconi v. Coombs & Coombs, Inc., 902 A.2d 1094, 1098 (Del. 2006).  
48 Thompson, 25 A.3d at 782. 
49 Id. (quoting Falconi, 902 A.2d at 1098).   
50 Camtech Sch. of Nursing & Technological Scis. v. Del. Bd. of Nursing, 2014 WL 4179199, at 
*1 (Del. Aug. 22, 2014).   
22 
 
The Majority, however, takes issue with the following factual findings made by 
the Board: (1) Pernic was terminated for the single incident of paying a $3,000 invoice 
without first acquiring authorization from her supervising attorney; and (2) Pernic never 
received an unambiguous warning that paying invoices without first receiving 
authorization would result in her termination.  After thoroughly reviewing the record, I 
believe both of these findings are supported by substantial evidence.  Additionally, the 
Majority concludes that the Board erred as a matter of law when it found that the Firm 
was required to provide Pernic with a specific warning that she could be fired for 
violating the Firm‟s unwritten financial policy. I believe this conclusion is in direct 
contradiction to Delaware law.   
Pernic’s Failure to Appear Before the UIAB and Contest This Appeal is Not Dispositive 
 
At the outset, it is important to note that Pernic‟s failure to appear before the 
UIAB, while unwise, is not dispositive for the purposes of this appeal.  The Board was 
permitted to hear the Firm‟s appeal with or without Pernic present and consider the entire 
record before the Appeals Referee, which included Pernic‟s testimony.51  Similarly, her 
                                                          
 
51 See 19 Del. Admin. C. § 1201-4.2 (“Presence of parties required.  All parties to the appeal shall 
be present at the Board‟s hearing.  Failure to appear within 10 minutes of the time indicated on 
the Notice may result in the Board hearing the appeal in absence of the delinquent party or, if the 
delinquent party is the appellant, dismissal of the appeal.”).  In the last paragraph of its opinion, 
the Majority instructs the Board to enter a judgment in favor of the Firm if Pernic does not 
appear at a new hearing.  This instruction is clear error.  See id.  The presence of the Appellee at 
the hearing before the Board is not legally relevant.  If an appellee fails to appear at a hearing 
before the Board, the Board may proceed to hear the appeal in the appellee‟s absence.  There is 
no precedent for dismissal of the employee‟s petition for benefits if the employee is the appellee 
simply because the employee failed to appear.   
23 
 
ill-advised decision to not partake in the appeals process should not weigh into this 
Court‟s final determination.52    
The UIAB’s Finding That Pernic Was Fired Solely for Violating the Firm’s Financial 
Policy is Supported by Substantial Evidence 
 
Turning to the merits of the case, it is clear that the Appeals Referee improperly 
limited the Firm from presenting evidence of Pernic‟s cumulative misconduct.  The 
Board, however, cured this error by allowing the Firm to present additional evidence of 
the reason or reasons for Pernic‟s discharge.53  The Majority contends that although the 
Board heard this additional evidence, it failed to give it sufficient consideration.  It bases 
this assumption on the belief that the evidence presented supported only one reasonable 
result: Pernic was fired for her cumulative misconduct, which culminated in her paying 
an invoice without supervisor permission.   
I disagree.  “[A] Board‟s finding of fact is given a high level of deference at both 
the Superior Court and Supreme Court.  Overturning a factual finding of the Board may 
only be done „when there is no satisfactory proof in favor of such a determination.‟”54  
                                                          
 
52 See Moore v. Owens, 2009 WL 3298139, *1 (Del. Oct. 14, 2009) (affirming the trial court‟s 
decision despite the Appellee‟s failure to file an answering brief on appeal); see also Sullivan v. 
Mayor of Elsmere, 23 A.3d 128, 132 (Del. 2011) (“[We review administrative agency decisions] 
to determine whether [the Board] acted within its statutory authority, whether it properly 
interpreted and applied the applicable law, whether it conducted a fair hearing and whether its 
decision is based on sufficient substantial evidence and is not arbitrary.”) (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
53 See Bilski v. Bd. of Med. Licensure & Discipline, 2014 WL 3032703, at *7 (Del. Super. June 
30, 2014) (finding that the Hearing Officer‟s improper reliance on nonbinding guidelines and the 
officer‟s subsequent flawed factual findings were cured by the Board‟s deliberations on the 
record), aff’d, 2015 WL 2452821 (Del. May 20, 2015).   
54 Whitney v. Bearing Constr., Inc., 2014 WL 2526484, at* 2 (Del. May 30, 2014) (quoting 
Wyatt v. Rescare Home Care, 81 A.3d 1253, 1259 (Del. 2013)); Steppi v. Conti Elec., Inc., 2010 
WL 718012, at *2 (Del. 2010) (“Only when there is no satisfactory proof in favor of a factual 
24 
 
This Court‟s sole responsibility on appeal is limited to determining whether there is 
substantial evidence supporting the Board‟s conclusions.55  Our duty ends there and does 
not include weighing evidence or determining what testimony the Board should have 
credited.56  
In Optima Cleaning Systems, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., the Superior 
Court addressed a UIAB appeal with facts very similar to the case at bar.57  In Optima, 
the employer offered evidence that the employee had engaged in cumulative misconduct, 
which the employer argued was the reason for his termination.58  The Appeals Referee 
disagreed and concluded that the employee was terminated solely for what was labeled a 
“key incident.”59  The Referee went on to find that the “key incident” was not an act of 
willful and wanton conduct and thus the employee was not fired for just cause.60 
On appeal to the UIAB, the Board affirmed the Referee‟s decision.  In so doing, 
the Board described the employee‟s repeated misconduct leading up to the “key incident” 
as consisting of “various and wide-ranging issues.”61  It also observed that the employer 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
finding of the Board may the Superior Court, or this Court for that matter, overturn it.”) (quoting 
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 67 (Del. 1965)).    
55 Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66 (“Although our Courts have expressed it in various ways, we think 
the sole function of the Superior Court, as is the function of this Court on appeal, is to determine 
whether or not there was substantial competent evidence to support the finding of the Board, and, 
if it finds such in the record, to affirm the findings of the Board.”).   
56 See Williams v. Auto Zone, 2013 WL 6662859, at *4 (Del. Super. Dec. 16, 2013) (“[T]he 
Court must show deference toward the Board‟s fact-finding and its application of those facts to 
the appropriate legal standards.”).   
57 Optima Cleaning Sys., Inc. v. UIAB, 2010 WL 5307981 (Del. Super. Dec. 7, 2010).  
58 Id. at *1-2.  
59 Id. at *2.  
60 Id. at *2. 
61 Optima Cleaning Sys. Inc., 2010 WL 5307981 at *3.   
25 
 
could have terminated the employee for these incidents, but chose not to do so.62  With 
respect to the “key incident,” the Board agreed that it “was an isolated inadvertence, 
rather than the product of willful or wanton behavior.”63   
The employer then appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the factual 
findings of the Board.  The court reasoned:  
The Board considered [the employee‟s] repeated misconduct, 
concluding that the “numerous reprimands and warnings beginning 
in October 2005[] deal with various and wide-ranging issues.”  As a 
result, the Board determined that [the employer] did not terminate 
[the employee] as a result of his extensive track-record. Rather, it 
found that the key incident prompted [his] termination.  Therefore, 
the Board considered all of the relevant evidence, giving little weight 
to [the employee‟s] repeated misconduct.  To the extent that [the 
employer] challenges the weight that the Board gave to this 
evidence, such a determination is within the province of the Board.  
The Court does not weigh evidence, determine questions of 
credibility or make its own factual findings.64 
  
 
The reasoning set forth in Optima is equally applicable to the facts of this case.  
Murphy testified that he and Ferguson had a meeting with Pernic at the Firm “a couple 
months” before she was fired to warn her that her cumulative misconduct, which included 
tardiness, a disrespectful and uncooperative attitude, and refusal to perform duties 
consistent with her job, could ultimately lead to her being fired.65  Like the employer in 
Optima, the Firm alleged that it was Pernic‟s cumulative misconduct that led to her 
                                                          
 
62 Id. at *2.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at *3.  
65 Murphy testified that he and Ferguson had a private meeting with Pernic at which they went 
over “her chronic lateness, her taking too much time for lunch, her uncooperative attitude, her 
refusal to work overtime . . . .  And we told her clearly and unequivocally that this is part of your 
job responsibilities.” Appellant‟s Op. Br. App. at A123. 
26 
 
employment being terminated.  The Board disagreed and determined that it was Pernic‟s 
unauthorized paying of the $3,000 invoice in violation of the Firm‟s unwritten financial 
policy that was the “key incident” and sole reason for her firing.66  This factual 
determination was squarely within the purview of the Board and can only be overturned 
if it is not supported by substantial evidence.    
The record shows that the Board‟s finding was supported by substantial evidence.  
Although it is possible that the Firm‟s decision to fire Pernic was based on her 
cumulative misconduct, a reasonable person could also conclude that her discharge 
stemmed solely from her alleged intentional breach of the Firm‟s unwritten financial 
policy.  Based on the Firm‟s own employees‟ testimony, Pernic was a subpar worker who 
repeatedly acted rudely to her supervising attorney, took late lunches, failed to appear on 
time, and refused to perform tasks within the scope of her responsibility.  But rather than 
terminating her employment for these acts, the Firm consistently tolerated Pernic‟s 
misconduct.  It was not until Pernic‟s direct, and allegedly knowing, breach of the Firm‟s 
financial policy did the Firm decide to terminate her employment.   
The UIAB considered these facts and came to a conclusion that is far from 
inconceivable.  Despite the Majority‟s assertion, there is no evidence in the record that 
the UIAB “failed to give any rational consideration to the evidence before it.”67  The 
Board allowed the Firm to offer all the evidence it wished to offer and independently 
considered it.  While it is true that the Firm offered more evidence than Pernic, including 
                                                          
 
66 Pernic paid the invoice on April 12, 2012, exactly one month before she was fired.   
67 Majority Opinion at 2.  
27 
 
the testimony of three other paralegals who worked at the Firm, the UIAB is “free to 
accept and reject testimony, accept the credibility of witnesses and weigh evidence as it 
sees fit.”68  It was thus permitted to believe Pernic‟s testimony over the Firm‟s other 
employees.69  It was also free to determine that Pernic‟s termination letter was written 
with an eye toward the present litigation and accordingly give it little or no weight.  
It cannot be said that the Board‟s decision was unreasonable merely because this 
Court would have reached a different conclusion.70  To hold otherwise contradicts the 
well-established and extremely deferential standard of review this Court must apply in an 
appeal from an administrative agency.71  A “reasonable mind” could determine that the 
Firm tolerated Pernic‟s subpar performance due to her family connections with the firm72 
and prior satisfactory work,73 but would not tolerate an intentional breach of a known 
company policy.  Thus, under the “substantial evidence” standard of review, the Superior 
                                                          
 
68 Finestrauss v. Phillips, 2002 WL 382858, at *3 (Del. Super. Mar. 8, 2002) (citing Evans v. 
Tansley, 540 A.2d 1088 (Del. 1988)).  
69 Johnson, 213 A.2d at 67 (“Admittedly, the record in this [case] is full of contradictions . . . but 
this is not to say that the claimant‟s case is thereby completely to be disbelieved.”).   
70 Finestrauss, 2002 WL 382858, at *2 (“[The reviewing court] will give deference to the 
expertise of administrative agencies and must affirm the decision of an agency even if the court 
might have, in the first instance, reached an opposite conclusion.”).   
71 Johnson, 213 A.2d at 67 (finding that the Superior Court judge erred by usurping the Board‟s 
role as fact-finder and weighing the evidence, determining the question of credibility 
of witnesses he had not heard, and reversing the award in the face of evidence which, if accepted, 
would have supported the employee‟s claim). 
72 Pernic was Ferguson‟s niece.  Murphy testified that he chose not to fire Pernic for her 
cumulative misconduct for two reasons, the first being that it would cause “repercussions with 
[her] family.” Murphy went on to state: “I was . . . concerned as to the repercussions for Ms. 
Ferguson.  I will tell you the repercussions for Ms. Ferguson having had to, as [Pernic‟s] 
supervisor, participate in her firing has been terrible on the personal side for her.” Appellant‟s 
Op. Br. App. at A121-22.   
73 Murphy testified that the second reason he chose not to fire Pernic for her cumulative 
misconduct was that “[she was not] always a terrible employee” and when she first started with 
the Firm she “showed a lot of motivation and . . . effort.”  Appellant‟s Op. Br. App. at A122.  
28 
 
Court did not err by affirming the UIAB‟s finding that Pernic was fired solely for paying 
the invoice.   
The Conclusion That Pernic Was Not Warned She Could Be Fired for Paying an Invoice 
Without Murphy’s Approval Is Supported by Substantial Evidence 
     
The Majority also takes issue with the UIAB‟s factual finding that Pernic did not 
receive an unambiguous warning that an invoice paid without approval of the supervising 
attorney was a violation of Firm policy and would lead to termination.  The Majority 
contends that Pernic did receive adequate warning that her action could lead to her 
termination.  This argument, however, is only applicable by extension of the Majority‟s 
first factual finding, i.e., Pernic was fired due to her cumulative misconduct and not for 
the single act of paying the invoice.  The Majority‟s conclusion that Pernic was provided 
sufficient warning would thus only be correct if a “reasonable mind” could not find that 
she was fired solely for paying the invoice.  As discussed above, the Appellant has failed 
to satisfy that high burden here. 
In the alternative, the Majority contends that even if Pernic was terminated solely 
for paying the invoice, there is no disconnect between that act and the prior, general 
warning she received.  But, as will be discussed infra, because the Firm fired Pernic 
solely for paying the invoice, it was required to show that it provided her with an 
unambiguous warning that paying invoices without authorization could lead to her being 
fired.  There is no evidence on the record showing that such a warning was given.   
When Ferguson and Murphy met with Pernic months before her termination, they 
warned her that her tardiness, disrespectful attitude, long lunches, and refusal to do work 
29 
 
for which she was responsible could ultimately lead to her being fired.74  Neither Murphy 
nor Ferguson warned Pernic that the unauthorized payment of an invoice could lead to 
her being fired.  In fact, the Firm‟s financial policy was never even mentioned.  Pernic 
testified as much in front of the Appeals Referee, stating that she received no warning 
regarding the payment of invoices and was unaware that she could be fired for violating 
the Firm‟s unwritten financial policy.75 
Moreover, the only evidence the Firm offered to show that Pernic was even aware 
of the unwritten financial policy was Ferguson‟s testimony that she believed “th[e] policy 
was part of [Pernic‟s] learning process.”76  Conversely, Pernic testified that she was 
unaware of the financial policy, received no formal training, and had paid “hundreds of” 
invoices without receiving any type of warning that her conduct was prohibited.77  She 
also testified that Ferguson had directly told her that she could pay the invoices without 
approval “as long as they were correct.”78  Although the Firm rebutted this testimony 
with evidence of its own, the UIAB, acting within its role as factfinder, chose to believe 
Pernic.  The evidence presented was sufficient for a “reasonable mind” to determine that 
                                                          
 
74 Murphy testified his meeting with Pernic lasted over an hour, they discussed her cumulative 
misconduct, and that he and Ferguson told Pernic that “you can lose your job if you don‟t 
straighten yourself out.” Appellant‟s Op. Br. App. at A123.  
75 The firm did not document the existence of the meeting with Pernic and failed to make any 
record of what was discussed.     
76 Appellant‟s Op. Br. App. at A56.   
77 Appellant‟s Op. Br. App. at A66.  In her testimony before the Appeals Referee Pernic stated: 
“If I had done it hundreds of times throughout the two years that I worked there, then I would 
expect that somebody would have caught onto it and that I would have gotten a warning, a verbal 
warning, a written warning, something, but I wasn‟t.”  Pernic also stated: “The invoices would 
come in and I would pay them because that‟s what I was told to do by all the other people I 
worked with.”  Appellant‟s Op. Br. App. at A65, A67.    
78 Appellant‟s Op. Br. App. at A66.   
30 
 
Pernic was not warned she could be fired for paying unauthorized invoices and was 
unaware of the unwritten financial policy‟s existence.   
The Majority avoids reaching this conclusion by again improperly making its own 
factual finding.  Specifically, the Majority accepts as true Murphy‟s testimony that Pernic 
went into his office and took the invoice out of his mailbox without his permission to pay 
it.79  The Majority concludes that this act falls within the general warning that Murphy 
gave Pernic to cease all disrespectful behavior.  Pernic, however, testified that she 
received the invoice directly and did not take it out of Murphy‟s mail.80  The Board 
considered this conflicting evidence and found that Pernic was fired because she 
breached the financial policy by paying the invoice.  The Board did not find that Pernic 
stole the invoice out of Murphy‟s inbox or that she knowingly acted in violation of 
company policy.  It was the duty of the Board to determine whose testimony was credible 
and reach a reasonable conclusion based on that testimony.  Because the Board satisfied 
that standard here, I find no error in the Superior Court‟s affirmance.    
 
 
                                                          
 
79 In Mazzetti & Sons, Inc. v. Ruffin, the employee appealed a Superior Court decision reversing 
an Industrial Accident Board decision that awarded him worker‟s compensation.  The employee 
alleged that the Superior Court “improperly acted as a fact finder and then substituted its own 
findings of fact for those of the Board.”  On appeal, this Court agreed, discussed the deferential 
standard of review that is “substantial evidence,” and reversed the trial court‟s decision. 437 
A.2d 1120, 1121-22, 1124-27 (Del. 1981). 
80 Pernic testified: “This invoice was not in his inbox . . . . Because I never put invoices in his 
inbox because they would get lost, and then they would be gone, and then we wouldn‟t pay them, 
and then we would get a late fee . . . .”  Appellant‟s Op. Br. App. at A68-69.   
31 
 
The UIAB Did Not Err as a Matter of Law by Determining That the Firm Was 
Required to Warn Pernic of the Consequences of Violating the Firm’s Unwritten 
Financial Policy 
 
Finally, the Majority contends that the Board erred as a matter of law when it 
determined that the Firm was required to inform Pernic what the “trigger” for her 
discharge would be “in terms of timing, conduct, or failure to improve.”81  As the 
Majority holds, “An employer need not specify the types of conduct that could lead to 
termination so long as the employee is aware that certain types of conduct are improper 
and prohibited.”82  Moreover, the “[v]iolation of an established employer policy may 
constitute just cause to terminate an employee . . . [only if the employee is] aware that the 
policy exists and that a violation of the policy may result in termination.”83   
The Majority, again making its own factual finding, has determined that Pernic 
had knowledge of the unwritten policy and thus received adequate warning.  The Board, 
however, made no such finding.84  As discussed above, Pernic testified that she was 
unaware of the Firm‟s unwritten policy and never received a warning regarding the 
unauthorized payment of invoices.  The Firm was required to show that Pernic had 
                                                          
 
81 Majority Opinion at 16.  
82 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).   
83 Optima Cleaning Sys. Inc, 2010 WL 5307981 at *3; see also McCoy v. Occidental Chem. 
Corp., 1996 WL 111126, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 7, 1996) (“Violation of a reasonable company 
rule may constitute just cause for discharge, but the employee must be aware that the policy 
exists and may be cause for discharge.”).  
84 In its decision, the Board stated: “Where the company policy has been clearly communicated 
to the employee, the employer has given adequate notice to justify termination.”  The Board 
went on to find that the payment of a single invoice, without approval, in violation of an 
“unwritten policy” is clearly insufficient evidence of willful and wanton conduct.  Appellant‟s 
Op. Br. App. at A130.     
32 
 
knowledge of the unwritten financial policy to justify her termination,85 and it was within 
the purview of the Board to accept or reject the Firm‟s testimony.  Because the Board‟s 
factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be said that its legal 
conclusion was erroneous.86   
III. 
Conclusion 
The UIAB considered all of the evidence regarding Pernic‟s misconduct, the 
counseling she received for her deficient performance, and the actual cause of her 
termination.  After reviewing the conflicting evidence, the Board chose to accept Pernic‟s 
testimony as credible.  Such was the Board‟s right as factfinder.  The Majority has 
rejected the Board‟s findings not because there is “no satisfactory proof in [their] favor,” 
but merely because it disagrees with them.87  I adhere to the deferential standard of 
review that governs administrative agency appeals and find that the Board‟s judgment 
was supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error.  Accordingly, I dissent.   
 
                                                          
 
85 See Smoot v. Comcast Cablevision, 2004 WL 2914287, at *4 (Del. Super. Nov. 16, 2004) (“An 
employee‟s violation of a company policy of which that employee is aware may create just cause 
for termination of employment.”) (citing Fader v. Burris Foods., 1997 WL 366889, at *2 (Del. 
Super. May 14, 1997)).   
86 Admittedly, the Board‟s opinion should have provided more clarity regarding what rule of law 
it was relying on to affirm the Appeals Referee‟s decision.  Nevertheless, the Board reached the 
correct legal conclusion and its decision should be affirmed on appeal.    
87 See Steppi, 2010 WL 718012, at *2 (quoting Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66).