Case Title: Joe Johnson Co. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Control

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Joe Johnson Co. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Control1993 WY 103857 P.2d 312Case Number: 92-187, 92-188Decided: 07/23/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOE JOHNSON CO., 

Petitioner 
(Petitioner/Contestant),

v.

WYOMING STATE BOARD OF 
CONTROL,

 Respondent 
(Respondent),

and

S.Y. Ranches, Inc., 

Respondent 
(Respondent/Contestee).

JOE JOHNSON CO., 

Petitioner 
(Petitioner/Contestant),

v.

 WYOMING STATE BOARD OF 
CONTROL,

 Respondent (Respondent).

Appeal from the state 
Board of Control.

 

Rex E. Johnson, 
Wheatland, for Joe Johnson Co., petitioner.

Frederick E. 
Chemay, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Wyoming State Bd. of Control, 
respondent.

Frank J. Jones, 
Wheatland, for S.Y. Ranches, Inc., respondent.

 

Before MACY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, CARDINE, and GOLDEN, JJ. and BROWN, Ret. J.

BROWN, Justice 
(Retired).

[¶1]      Petitioner Joe 
Johnson Co. seeks review of two orders of the State Board of Control (Board) 
denying its petitions for declaration of abandonment of certain ground water 
rights attaching to lands owned by respondent S.Y. Ranches, Inc., and other 
parties who did not appear to contest the matter. We affirm.

[¶2]      Johnson presented 
the following issues for review:1

1. Does Johnson have 
standing to seek a declaration of abandonment of the ground water wells set 
forth in the two Petitions for Abandonment which it filed?

2. Did the State Board of 
Control, hereinafter referred to as "Board", err in finding that Johnson did not 
have standing to seek a declaration of abandonment?

3. Is the Board's 
decision supported by substantial evidence?

[¶3]      Johnson has a 
ground water right with an appropriation priority date of March 27, 1989. This 
appropriation, known as the Eydie Lee Johnson No. 2 well, is relied on by 
petitioner to establish standing for its two petitions, identified in this court 
as No. 92-187 and No. 92-188.

[¶4]      The water rights 
sought to be abandoned in Docket No. 92-187 are two appropriations owned by S.Y. 
Ranches, Inc. These wells are commonly known as the "Bowen Wells." These wells 
are north of the North Laramie River.

[¶5]      The petition in 
Docket No. 92-188 involved three appropriations owned by the Farmers' Home 
Administration (FHA), United States of America. The United States declined to 
appear at the hearing in opposition to the petition. These wells are referred to 
as the "G.E. Wells."

[¶6]      It is undisputed 
that all the wells involved in these petitions draw from the same aquifer (the 
Arikaree formation, also know as the "Red aquifer") for their source of water, 
and that the Eydie Lee Johnson No. 2 Well was junior in priority to each of the 
appropriations sought to be abandoned.

[¶7]      In support of its 
petitions for declaration of abandonment, Joe Johnson Co. offered the testimony 
of Joe Johnson, Sr., President of Joe Johnson Co. Regarding potential benefit or 
injury, Mr. Johnson's testimony consisted of the assertion that Joe Johnson Co. 
stood to benefit by the abandonment of the appropriations in question because 
there would be fewer senior appropriators ahead of Joe Johnson Co. drawing from 
the aquifer. Mr. Johnson testified that no studies were performed with regard to 
injury, and he offered no specific testimony as to whether Joe Johnson Co. was 
then using ground water which would be withdrawn to the company's detriment by 
the five wells subject to the petitions if they were reactivated. Also, no 
testimony was offered to show whether, or in what amounts, the reactivation of 
the five wells might affect the Eydie Lee Johnson No. 2 Well.

[¶8]      Johnson also 
offered documentary evidence in support of its petitions through its request 
that the Board take administrative notice of several orders of the State 
Engineer and the Board of Control, along with the record of proceedings 
supporting each order. The Board granted that request and considered those 
materials. These records are from three separate proceedings which were held 
before the State Engineer and the Board of Control in the late 1970's and early 
1980's. These proceedings were: (1) Johnson application; (2) Basin Electric 
Power petitions for a change in use from irrigation to industrial; and (3) the 
creation of the Platte County control area.

I.

[¶9]      The Board 
concluded that the enhancement of a petitioner's relative priority without a 
showing of potential tangible benefit or injury was insufficient to sustain the 
petitioner's standing to seek the abandonment of the water rights at issue. The 
Board found that Johnson failed to produce any direct evidence regarding the 
potential effect of reactivating the Bowen wells and the G.E. wells.

[¶10]   The Board also concluded that the 
additional evidence it noticed did not support Johnson's standing and found that 
the evidence contained no specific analysis of the wells involved. The Board 
also found that the wells studied or involved in the Johnson application were 
not sufficiently similar to the wells involved in this case to support the 
conclusion that the results of those studies were applicable in this case. The 
Board found that the record of the Basin Electric applications contained no 
evidence pertaining to ground water effect resulting from the operation of any 
wells. Finally, the Board found that the record of the creation of the Platte 
County Control Area contained no evidence as to specific well-to-well 
interactions.

[¶11]   We defer to the Board's specialized 
knowledge and expertise regarding the use and nonuse of water and the 
technicalities involved in irrigation. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. 
Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., 475 P.2d 548, 549 (Wyo. 1970); Wheatland Irrigation 
District v. Pioneer Canal Co., 464 P.2d 533, 543 (Wyo. 1970); Laramie Rivers Co. 
v. Le Vasseur, 65 Wyo. 414, 202 P.2d 680, 694-95 (1949). Such deference is 
particularly appropriate when the Board's actions, as in this case, involve an 
area of such technical complexity as ground water. When deferring to an agency's 
experience and expertise, we will not disturb the agency's decision except 
"where it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on the 
record." Vandehei Developers v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, 790 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶12]   Other standards of reviewing agency 
action which may have some peripheral application here are:

Substantial evidence is 
defined by this court as "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept 
in support of the conclusions of the agency." The substantial evidence standard 
also requires that there be more than a scintilla of evidence. It is not 
required that the proof attain such a degree of certainty as to support only one 
conclusion to the exclusion of all others. Once the measure of evidence has 
surpassed the scintilla threshold, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent 
conclusions from the entire record does not mean that the conclusion drawn by 
the administrative agency is not supported by substantial evidence. Even where 
this court, after reviewing the record, arrives at a different conclusion, the 
court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency's as long as the 
agency's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.

Department of 
Employment, Labor Standards Div. v. Roberts Construction Co., 841 P.2d 854, 857 
(Wyo. 1992) (citations omitted).

[¶13]   It is not disputed that the 
circumstances here are covered by the basic abandonment of water rights 
statutes, Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-401 (Supp. 1992).2 The controlling portion of the 
statute, however, is Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-401(b), which provides in 
part:

When any water user who 
might be benefitted by a declaration of abandonment of existing water rights or 
who might be injured by the reactivation of the water right, desires to bring 
about a legal declaration of abandonment, he shall present his case in writing 
to the state board of control. * * * The following persons have standing to 
petition the state board of control to declare the abandonment of existing water 
rights under this section:

(i) Any person who has a 
valid adjudicated water right or is the holder of a valid permit from the same 
source of supply which is equal to or junior in date of priority to the right 
for which abandonment is sought; or

(ii) The holder of a 
valid water right entitled to surplus water under W.S. 41-4-318 through 
41-4-324, petitioning to abandon a water right from the same source of supply if 
the right sought to be abandoned has a priority date of March 1, 1945, or 
earlier.

[¶14]   In an effort to reconcile what we 
have said in prior cases with the circumstances of this case, petitioner at oral 
argument advanced a rather novel notion regarding the construction of Wyo. Stat. 
§ 41-3-401(b). Petitioner argued that this section provided for two classes of 
persons or entities that could seek abandonment under the statute. According to 
petitioner, one class was provided for in the first sentence of Wyo. Stat. 
41-3-401(b), that is, those who might be benefitted by a declaration of 
abandonment or who might be injured by reactivation of the water right. The 
other class of persons or entities who could seek abandonment according to 
petitioner were those who possess a valid water right of equal or junior 
status to the water right sought to be abandoned and that the water right 
relied upon by the petitioner and the water right for which a declaration of 
abandonment is sought are from the same source of supply.

[¶15]   Petitioner in the case before us 
has standing to pursue an abandonment petition by virtue of Wyo. Stat. § 
41-3-401(b)(i). However, it must additionally show a benefit or injury according 
to the statute.3

[¶16]   It is an elementary rule of 
statutory construction that statutes must be construed so that no part is 
rendered inoperative or superfluous. State ex. rel. Wyoming Worker's Comp. Div. 
v. Mahoney, 798 P.2d 836, 838 (Wyo. 1990). Accordingly, we read Wyo. Stat. § 
41-3-401(b), as amended, to confer standing to petition for abandonment upon a 
water user who alleges and proves two essential facts: (1) that he possesses a 
valid water right of equal or junior status to the water right sought to 
be abandoned; and (2) that the water relied upon by the petitioner and the water 
right for which a declaration of abandonment is sought are from the same 
source of supply. A showing of the two essential facts indicated above are 
sufficient to establish standing to present an abandonment petition to the Board 
of Control. However, in order to prevail on the petition, it must be shown that 
petitioner stands to benefit from a declaration of abandonment or to sustain 
injury by reactivation of the contested water right.

[¶17]   Petitioner does not seriously 
contend that it demonstrated a tangible benefit or injury; rather, petitioner's 
principal argument is that with regard to ground water, benefit or injury is 
virtually impossible to prove and that special rules of statutory construction 
should accommodate this circumstance. The Board concedes that the proof of 
benefit or injury is more difficult with respect to ground water.4

[¶18]   The petitioner's position as stated 
in its brief is:

[T]he statutory language 
"might be benefitted or injured" would be fully satisfied by the improvement of 
its priority within the water source. * * *

* * * The statute does 
not limit the "might be benefitted" requirement to a simple increase in water 
availability. An appropriator "might" be benefitted if there were fewer 
individuals who had standing to object to a change of use or a change of 
location.

[¶19]   There is nothing in the abandonment 
statutes to support petitioner's argument. The first sentence in Wyo. Stat. § 
41-3-402(a) (Supp. 1992) clearly says that the statutes apply to appropriations 
from the surface, underground or reservoir water sources. See fn. 2, 
supra.

[¶20]   Reduced to its simplest terms, the 
question for our resolution is: "Is relative improvement in priority sufficient 
to establish benefit or injury for purposes of abandonment under the statute 
(Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-401)?" We determine that improvement of priority is not 
sufficient.

[¶21]   We have never specifically 
addressed the relative improvement of priority argument before. However, we 
believe that prior cases support our determination here. In Schulthess v. 
Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 559 (Wyo. 1992), we said:

[T]his court, and others, 
has repeatedly interpreted Wyoming's abandonment statutes to require that a 
petitioner have a "tangible" as opposed to a "theoretical" interest at stake to 
establish standing. See, e.g., Hagie v. Lincoln Land Co., 18 F. Supp. 637, 639 
(D.Wyo. 1937) * * *; Laramie Rivers Co. v. Wheatland Irr. Dist., 708 P.2d 20, 30 
(Wyo. 1985) * * *; Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 
320, 342, 92 P.2d 572, 580 (1939) (door is not open for just anybody to initiate 
abandonment proceedings). Under Wyoming's present abandonment statute, the 
"tangible interest at stake" requirement necessitates that Carollo allege and 
prove a reasonable likelihood that the abandonment of Schulthess' water rights 
will either benefit or injure his surplus water right. See Wyo. Stat. § 
41-3-401(b).

[¶22]   In a long line of cases, we have 
repeatedly held that the petitioner must show he had a water right that would be 
affected in some discernible manner by the declaration of abandonment. Laramie 
Rivers Co. v. Wheatland Irrig. Dist., 708 P.2d 20 (Wyo. 1985); State Board of 
Land Commissioners v. Lonesome Fox Corp., 707 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1985); Platte 
County Grazing Ass'n v. State Board of Control, 675 P.2d 1279 (Wyo. 1984); 
Cremer v. State Board of Control, 675 P.2d 250 (Wyo. 1984); Michell Irrig. Dist. 
v. Whiting, 59 Wyo. 52, 136 P.2d 502 (1943); Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. 
Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572 (1939). See also Hagie v. Lincoln 
Land Co., 18 F. Supp. 637 (D.Wyo. 1937). The foregoing cases suggest that the 
petitioner can show benefit sufficient to establish standing if it can show that 
the exercise of its water right might be facilitated by the abandonment, or 
changed to its advantage, in the sense that it would be enabled to make use of 
water that would not otherwise be available if there is no abandonment. 
Petitioner points out that the cases cited immediately above were decided under 
the law as it existed before the effective date of the amendment of Wyo. Stat. § 
41-3-401(b). Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-401(b)5 was amended as follows: Subsection 
(b), first sentence, substituted "benefitted" for "affected" and inserted "or 
who might be injured by the reactivation of the water right"; third sentence 
added "for public hearing" to the end of the sentence; penultimate sentence 
added "under this section" to the end of the sentence; and added the last 
sentence, including subsections (i) and (ii). Petitioner reads more into the 
amendment than is justified. We see nothing in the amendment that relieves a 
petitioner of showing a benefit or injury that was consistently required in the 
abandonment cases that we have cited.

[¶23]   Under petitioner's theory, a junior 
appropriator of water from the North Platte River in Saratoga could seek 
abandonment of a senior appropriator in Torrington. In this scenario, the junior 
appropriator would be able to eliminate a senior appropriator and thus 
theoretically improve his priority within the water source (North Platte River). 
We determine that improvement of priority is too speculative, uncertain and 
tenuous to demonstrate a benefit.

[¶24]   In summary, we hold that petitioner 
had standing to present a petition for abandonment to the Board of Control; 
however, it failed on the merits to show it stands either to benefit from a 
declaration of abandonment or to sustain an injury by reactivation of the 
contested water right. Furthermore, we hold that a relative improvement in 
priority, standing alone, is not sufficient to show a benefit.

II.

[¶25]   Petitioner raises a substantial 
evidence issue. In its brief and at oral argument, appellant said very little, 
if anything, about its sufficiency of evidence issue. We would be justified in 
giving this issue a short shrift because of lack of authorities and cogent 
argument. Matter of Adoption of BBC, 831 P.2d 197, 202 (Wyo. 1992). In any case, 
this appears to be a catch-all or throw-away issue.

[¶26]   In Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. 
Public Service Commission of Wyoming, 662 P.2d 878 (Wyo. 1983), we held that the 
burden of proving a lack of substantial evidence is upon the party appealing the 
agency's determination. This issue, as phrased by petitioner, suggests that the 
burden be turned around and that it is the Board's burden to produce evidence 
that the petitioner did not produce sufficient evidence.

[¶27]   The Board pointed out and 
demonstrated the deficiencies in petitioner's proofs and brought to our 
attention law that supported its determination. We do not know what negative 
evidence the Board could have produced to show that petitioner did not meet its 
burden. In this case, there is very little, if any, conflicting evidence. There 
may be a difference of opinion regarding legitimate inference that could be 
drawn from the evidence; however, different inferences that may be drawn from 
the same facts do not render the determination of the Board flawed. Department 
of Employment, Labor Standards Div. v. Roberts Construction, Co., 841 P.2d 854.

[¶28]   Petitioner has failed in its burden 
of proof on the sufficiency of evidence issue as well as the principal 
issue.

[¶29]   Affirmed.

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶30]   I am satisfied that in this 
instance, in both proceedings, the State Board of Control held a full statutory 
hearing and ruled there was insufficient evidence of potential benefit or 
injury, thus disposing of the abandonment proceedings on the merits. I am in 
complete agreement with the opinion of the court, and I concur in 
it.

[¶31]   My examination of the pertinent 
statutes persuades me there is a legislative policy foreclosing unlimited 
retention of unused water rights. Such rights are considered to be abandoned, 
and the holder forfeits "all water rights and privileges appurtenant thereto." 
WYO. STAT. § 41-3-401(a) (Supp. 1992) provides, in pertinent part:

Where the holder of an 
appropriation of water from a surface, underground or reservoir water source 
fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to use the water therefrom for 
the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated, whether under an 
adjudicated or unadjudicated right, during any five (5) successive years, he is 
considered as having abandoned the water right and shall forfeit all water 
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto.

WYO. STAT. § 
41-3-402(a) (Supp. 1992) then provides, in pertinent part:

When any appropriator has 
failed, intentionally or unintentionally, to use any portion of surface, 
underground or reservoir water appropriated by him, whether under an adjudicated 
or unadjudicated right, for a period of five (5) successive years, the state 
engineer may initiate forfeiture proceedings against the appropriator with the 
state board of control, to determine the validity of the unused 
right.

While another 
water user may have difficulty in establishing benefit or injury with respect to 
an unused water right, the state engineer does not have to meet that burden, and 
the right may be forfeited as a matter of appropriate management and regulation. 
Such efforts would be appropriate to meet the policy concerns expressed in the 
dissenting opinion. While traditionally the state has relied upon adversary 
proceedings between users of water to address abandonment, in view of the burden 
imposed upon a junior appropriator that this case recognizes, the state engineer 
may be obliged to pursue the statutory forfeiture proceedings.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶32]   I concur in the opinion of the 
court now holding that appellant had standing to present his case in writing to 
the State Board of Control but dissent from the opinion of the court affirming 
the decision of the Board of Control which was not on the merits of the 
case.

[¶33]   The essential task presented in 
this case was a determination of legislative intent in amending W.S. 41-3-401(b) 
(Cum.Supp. 1992) in the following manner:

When any water user who 
might be benefitted by a declaration of abandonment of existing water 
rights or who might be injured by the reactivation of the water right, 
desires to bring about a legal declaration of abandonment, he shall present his 
case in writing to the state board of control. The board has exclusive original 
jurisdiction in water right abandonment proceedings. The board shall, if the 
facts so justify, refer the matter to the superintendent of the water division 
where the abandonment is claimed to have occurred for public hearing. The 
total absence of water to divert during an irrigation season precludes the 
inclusion of any such period of nonuse resulting therefrom in the computation of 
the successive five (5) year period under this section. The following persons 
have standing to petition the state board of control to declare the abandonment 
of existing water rights under this section.

(i) Any person who has a 
valid adjudicated water right or is the holder of a valid permit from the same 
source of supply which is equal to or junior in date of priority to the right 
for which abandonment is sought; or

(ii) The holder of a 
valid water right entitled to surplus water under W.S. 41-4-318 through 
41-4-324, petitioning to abandon a water right from the same source of supply if 
the right sought to be abandoned has a priority date of March 1, 1945, or 
earlier. 
[emphasis added]

[¶34]   The legislature must have intended 
some change in prior law, both statutory and case law, by the amendment. The 
intent, after amendment of W.S. 41-3-401(b), seems clearly to be that 
one

(a) who has a valid, 
adjudicated water right

(b) from the same source 
of supply, and

(c) which is equal to or 
junior in date of priority

has 
standing.

[¶35]   The issue of standing is the 
only issue presented to us by appellant for determination. That is because 
the Board ruled against appellant upon the Board finding that appellant had no 
standing to bring his case. My preference would be that, having held that 
appellant had standing to present his case to the Board, that this case be 
remanded and appellant be allowed to present such evidence or additional 
evidence to establish that he might be benefitted by the abandonment and that 
the Board's decision on that question then be on the merits.

[¶36]   I have some difficulty that our 
state of law is such that a holder of a water right might retain that right 
forever without ever having to use it.1 That can occur unless a holder of a 
junior water right can show benefit by abandonment or detriment. It is said our 
present state of law avoids disputes over water among neighbors. I question that 
policy statement. Disputes over water among neighbors are legion, never ending, 
intense, sometimes violent. Perhaps a bright line, clear "use the water or lose 
it" policy would lessen the struggle over precious water. At least all would 
understand clearly what is necessary to retain a water right. The present state 
of law does little more than protect vested interests that tie up water rights 
without using them, water rights that might go otherwise to beneficial use. If a 
holder of a water right does not use it for five years when water is available, 
that water right apparently is not needed. What good reason is there for denying 
abandonment? I can think of none. Our policy should be "use it or lose 
it."

[¶37]   This case involves underground 
water. The wells in question have not been pumped for more than five years. That 
is admitted. In some cases the pumping equipment and sprinklers have been 
removed from the wells and the land. If these wells were abandoned, some other 
landowner might seek a well permit for water that could be put to beneficial 
use. Surely that policy better serves our state, its citizens and our need to 
put water to beneficial use. With old well water rights existing in perpetuity, 
ready to be reactivated at any time, interest in other development is 
lost.

[¶38]   Finally, I recognize that when this 
appellant who has standing presents his case to the Board, it may, under the 
present state of law, find that he might not be benefitted by abandonment or be 
injured by reactivation of the water right and decide the case against 
appellant. While my preference is that abandonment results from nonuse, I 
recognize that is not the present state of law when abandonment is sought by a 
junior appropriator.

[¶39]   Because I would remand this case to 
be decided on the merits, I dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 The issues set out by 
the Board are:

I. 
Whether the improvement of relative priority, through the elimination of a 
senior ground water appropriation, by itself, is insufficient to provide the 
benefit needed to establish standing to seek a declaration of abandonment of a 
ground water right pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-401 (Supp. 1992).

II. 
Whether substantial evidence in the record supports the Board of Control's 
conclusion that petitioner/contestant Joe Johnson Co. failed to carry its burden 
of proving that it met the injury/benefit requirement of the abandonment statute 
and that it therefore has no standing to seek a declaration of abandonment of 
the water rights which are the subject of its petitions, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
§ 41-3-401 (Supp. 1992).

The 
issue set out by respondent S.Y. Ranches, Inc., is:

Does Johnson have 
standing to seek a declaration of abandonment of the ground water wells set 
forth in the two Petitions for Abandonment which it filed?

2 Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-401(a) 
provides in part:

Where the holder of an 
appropriation of water from a surface, underground or reservoir water source 
fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to use the water therefrom for 
the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated, whether under an 
adjudicated or unadjudicated right, during any five (5) successive years, he is 
considered as having abandoned the water right and shall forfeit all water 
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto.

3 The State Board of 
Control heard the merits of petitioner's petition, then determined that 
petitioner did not have standing to petition the Board. The Board was justified 
in its concept of standing because of what we have said in other cases regarding 
standing. Even though the Board was confused about standing, it reached the 
correct result.

4 The Board, in its brief, 
favors us with a lengthy scientific discussion regarding the reasons why 
demonstrating a benefit or injury is difficult regarding ground water as opposed 
to surface water. The Board indicates, however, that scientific methods do exist 
to predict ground water movements.

5 Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-401(b) 
(Supp. 1992) (emphasis added) (after amendment) states:

When any water user who 
might be benefitted by a declaration of abandonment of existing water 
right or who might be injured by the reactivation of the water right, 
desires to bring about a legal declaration of abandonment, he shall present his 
case in writing to the state board of control. The board has exclusive original 
jurisdiction in water right abandonment proceedings. The board shall, if the 
facts so justify, refer the matter to the superintendent of the water division 
where the abandonment is claimed to have occurred for public hearing. The 
total absence of water to divert during an irrigation season precludes the 
inclusion of any such period of nonuse resulting therefrom in the computation of 
the successive five (5) year period under this section. The following persons 
have standing to petition the state board of control to declare the abandonment 
of existing water rights under this section:

(i) Any person who has a 
valid adjudicated water right or is the holder of a valid permit from the same 
source of supply which is equal to or junior in date of priority to the right 
for which abandonment is sought; or

(ii) The holder of a 
valid water right entitled to surplus water under W.S. 41-4-318 through 
41-4-324, petitioning to abandon a water right from the same source of supply if 
the right sought to be abandoned has a priority date of March 1, 1945, or 
earlier. [Effective May 23, 1985]

Wyo. Stat. § 41-3-401(b) 
(1977) (emphasis added) (before amendment) stated:

When any water user who 
might be affected by a declaration of abandonment of existing water 
rights, desires to bring about a legal declaration of abandonment, he shall 
present his case in writing to the state board of control. The board has 
exclusive original jurisdiction in water right abandonment proceedings. The 
board shall, if the facts so justify, refer the matter to the superintendent of 
the water division where the abandonment is claimed to have occurred. The total 
absence of water to divert during an irrigation season precludes the inclusion 
of any such period of nonuse resulting therefrom in the computation of the 
successive five (5) year period.

 

Footnote for the 
Dissent

1 I recognize that W.S. 
41-3-402(a) (Cum.Supp. 1992) allows the state engineer to seek abandonment of 
water rights if he chooses to do so. But, being practical, I know that he is not 
going to run around the state abandoning unused water rights. First, he has more 
pressing, current business; and, secondly, if the unused water rights are not a 
current problem, why bother? So, why not allow a party, with standing, who has 
an interest, to do what the state engineer can do - seek abandonment of unused 
water rights - and at no cost to the State? This is not a novel idea. I 
recommend it to the legislature. The practical effect of the present state of 
law is that old, unused water rights will continue to exist forever.