Case Title: Butts v. Wyoming State Bd. of Architects

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Butts v. Wyoming State Bd. of Architects1996 WY 26911 P.2d 1062Case Number: 95-106Decided: 02/26/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

KENNETH LEROY BUTTS,  

Appellant (Petitioner), 

 

v. 

 

WYOMING STATE BOARD OF ARCHITECTS,  

Appellee (Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County, 

Edward L. 
Grant, Judge.

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Kathy Karpan of Karpan & 
White Law Offices, L.C., and William D. Bagley, Cheyenne.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General, Bill G. Hibbler, Sr. Assistant Attorney General, John S. Burbridge, 
Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne.

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief 
Justice. 

[¶1]      Kenneth L. Butts 
(Butts) appeals the Wyoming State Board of Architects and Landscape Architects 
(Board) decision to suspend his Wyoming architect license for a violation of 
WYO. STAT. § 33-4-115(a)(vii). The decision was based on the lifetime suspension 
of Butts' architect license by the state of Kentucky pursuant to a settlement 
agreement between Butts and the state of Kentucky.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Butts presents 
the following issues:

 

1. Whether the Wyoming Statutes and Board rules 
provided sufficient due process notice concerning the nature and elements of the 
offense of "plan stamping."

 

2. Was it arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of 
discretion for the Wyoming board to rubber stamp the Kentucky result without 
determining whether the same conduct violates the Wyoming statute and 
rules.

 

3. Whether the Board order is supported by 
substantial evidence.

 

[¶4]      The Board 
reiterates the issues recited by the district court in its Order Certifying Case 
to the Wyoming Supreme Court, taken from Butts' Petition for Review. We accepted 
and certified this case based upon that order.1

 

I. Whether the Board abused its discretion by 
following the mandatory provisions of its rules, Chapter XIII, Section 
12.

 

II. Whether the Board's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence.

 

III. Whether the Wyoming Architect and Landscape 
Architect Practice Act, W.S. § 33-4-101, et seq., and board rules, provide due 
process notice that a settlement agreement and order entered in another state 
might result in the loss of licensure to practice in 
Wyoming.

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]      Butts was 
previously licensed to practice architecture in all fifty states. He made his 
living reviewing architectural plans for stores in malls across the country and 
reviewing plans for prototypical buildings erected by major 
franchises.

 

[¶6]      Butts faced 
disciplinary action in Kentucky before the Kentucky Board of Examiners and 
Registration of Architects (Kentucky Board) for "plan stamping" in violation of 
K.R.S. 323.120(1)(f). Butts and the Kentucky Board entered into a settlement 
agreement and order in November, 1993. Butts did not admit or deny the 
truthfulness of the allegations or that his conduct was inappropriate in the 
settlement agreement and order. However, Butts agreed to suspension of his 
license until the end of his current licensure period, which ended June 30, 
1994, agreed not to attempt to renew his license in Kentucky, and was fined one 
thousand dollars.

 

[¶7]      The National 
Council of Architectural Registration Boards revoked its certification of Butts 
due to the Kentucky suspension and notified the Wyoming Board's administrator of 
the disciplinary action taken in Kentucky. Having heard of the Kentucky action, 
the administrator asked for and obtained certified copies of the notice of 
hearing, investigation memorandum and the settlement agreement and order for the 
Kentucky action. Based on the information from Kentucky, the Board filed a 
formal complaint against Butts, charging him with violating WYO. STAT. § 
33-4-115(a)(v) and (vii).2 The Board noticed and held a 
hearing based on the charges against Butts in Wyoming. The Board received into 
evidence a certified copy of the Kentucky settlement and order, an investigation 
memorandum from Kentucky, several exhibits presented by Butts in mitigation of 
the Kentucky "plan stamping" charge and testimony from Butts and one of his 
colleagues in Kentucky.

 

[¶8]      The Board 
suspended Butts' architect license in Wyoming until December 31, 1995, and 
ordered that his license not be considered for reinstatement for a minimum of 
three years from that date. The Board based the suspension on a violation of 
WYO. STAT. § 33-4-115(a)(vii) and Board Rules, Chapter XI, Section 1(g),3 because the Kentucky settlement 
agreement and order suspended his license in Kentucky. Butts filed a petition 
for review to the district court. The district court certified the issues to 
this Court pursuant to WYO.R.APP.P. 12.09(b).

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]      WYO. STAT. § 
33-4-108 (Supp. 1995) provides: "All decisions of the board involving the 
granting, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension or withdrawal of a license 
shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act." Therefore, judicial review of the actions of the Board is made 
pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. In Devous v. Board of Medical Examiners, 
845 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1993), we described the scope of appellate review for agency 
actions conducted pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. We began 
by quoting the statutory language of WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) 
(1990):

 

To the extent necessary to make a decision and when 
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error. The reviewing court shall:

 

(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed; and

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;

 

(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege or immunity;

 

(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or 
limitations or lacking statutory right;

 

(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

Devous, 
845 P.2d  at 414.

 

[¶10]   An agency's factual finding will be 
set aside if it is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. "This court will defer to a hearing 
officer's findings of basic fact if there is substantial evidence and will not 
substitute our judgment for that of an agency." City of Casper v. Haines, 886 P.2d 585, 
587 (Wyo. 1994). We have defined substantial evidence as:

 

relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might 
accept in support of the conclusions of the agency. The entire record is to be 
examined to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the agency's 
findings. The reviewing court does not substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency with respect to findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence.

 

Devous, 
845 P.2d  at 414 (citations omitted).

 

[¶11]   The party challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence has the burden of demonstrating the agency's 
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. If the agency action is supported by 
substantial evidence, its decision should be reversed only for errors of law. Id. If the agency did not apply the 
correct rule of law, or applied it incorrectly, this Court does not defer to the 
agency's conclusion. Id. The agency's 
errors of law are corrected by this Court. Id.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶12]   In light of this Court's standard 
of review for agency decisions, we turn to the Board's December 1, 1994, order. 
The conclusion of law applicable to this appeal held: "The action by the 
Kentucky Board amount [sic] to violations of W.S. § 33-4-115(a)(vii) and Board 
Rules, Chapter XI, Section 1(g)." The Board's order clearly states the reason 
for its decision. Despite Butts' exhortations to the contrary, the Board's 
decision was based on its finding of a violation of WYO. STAT. § 
33-4-115(a)(vii), not (v). The copy of the settlement agreement, which suspended 
Butts' license in Kentucky, provided sufficient evidence that Butts' license was 
suspended in Kentucky.

 

[¶13]   Butts contends the Board is 
required to substantiate the underlying basis for the suspension of his license 
in Kentucky before it revoked his license based on a reciprocal statute. This 
presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law. Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game 
and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993). Statutory language may be 
either ambiguous or unambiguous. Id. 
at 1043.

 

A 
"statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able 
to agree as to its meaning with consistenc[y] and predictability." "[A] statute 
is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations." "[W]hether an ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law 
to be determined by the Court."

 

On numerous occasions the Court has, over its long 
history, consistently followed a general rule that if the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the Court may not resort to application of rules of 
construction.

 

Id. 
(quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyo. 
State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219-20 (Wyo. 1991) (citations 
omitted)).

 

[¶14]   The statute before us, WYO. STAT. § 
33-4-115(a)(vii) (Supp. 1995), reads:

 

(a) 
The board may take disciplinary actions, singularly or in combination, against a 
licensee upon a finding of:

 

. . . .

 

(vii) Suspension or revocation of licensure by 
another state; . . . .

 

[¶15]   The statute providing for 
reciprocal suspension or revocation of an architect license is not ambiguous. 
The terms are not vague or subject to different interpretations. If another 
state revokes or suspends licensure, the board may take disciplinary action. 
Subsection (b) of WYO. STAT. 33-4-115 (Supp. 1995) 
provides:

 

(b) Before refusing to issue a license, suspending or 
revoking a license for any reason set forth in this section the board shall 
notify the person as required in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. If 
the applicant or licensee requests a hearing before the board, the board shall 
hold a hearing in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act.

 

[¶16]   The Board in this case gave Butts 
notice of the complaint against him, held a hearing, and found that Butts' 
license to practice architecture was suspended or revoked in Kentucky. The Board 
then imposed sanctions pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 33-4-115(b). Nothing in the 
statute requires the Board to prove the underlying basis for Kentucky's action 
against Butts.

 

[¶17]   Butts did not attempt to challenge 
the authenticity or validity of the settlement agreement during the hearing. He 
does not argue that he was denied his right to notice and a hearing. However, he 
contends his right to due process was violated because WYO. STAT. § 
33-4-115(a)(v) is vague and ambiguous, both on its face and as applied to him, 
thereby denying him sufficient notice that his actions may result in suspension 
of his license in Wyoming. WYO. STAT. § 33-4-115(a)(v) did not form the basis 
for the Board's sanction against Butts; therefore, his arguments concerning WYO. 
STAT. § 33-4-115(a)(v) are without merit in this case. Further, due process 
rights are not violated when the Board considers a sister state's revocation or 
suspension of an architect's license as long as the Board meets requirements of 
notice and a hearing. See Johnston v. 
State Bd. of Medical Education and Licensure, 49 Pa.Cmwlth. 9, 410 A.2d 103, 
105 (1980); Shoenhair v. Bureau of 
Professional and Occupational Affairs, 74 Pa.Cmwlth. 217, 459 A.2d 877, 879 
(1983); Marek v. Bd. of Podiatric 
Medicine, 16 Cal. App. 4th 1089, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474, 478-79 
(1993).

 

[¶18]   Butts also contends the discipline 
invoked by the Board was too harsh. Butts was allowed to present mitigating 
testimony to the Board in the hearing, before the Board issued its order. The 
legislature has vested the Board with the responsibility of taking disciplinary 
action against those who violate WYO. STAT. § 33-4-115. Absent a showing that 
the Board's actions violated WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c), this Court will defer to 
the findings and expertise of the Board in determining appropriate disciplinary 
action. The actions of the Board are presumed to be correct and Butts did not 
overcome this presumption. Devous, 
845 P.2d  at 416 (citing Fallon v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 441 P.2d 322 (Wyo. 
1968).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶19]   The Wyoming State Board of 
Architects and Landscape Architects acted within its authority when it suspended 
Butts' architect license based on a suspension or revocation in another 
state.

 

[¶20]   Affirmed.

 

Footnotes

1 We note that Butts failed to present 
the first issue stated in his Petition for Review, either in his brief or at 
oral argument. This Court will not consider issues unsupported by cogent 
argument or pertinent authority. Earlywine v. Peterson, 885 P.2d 861, 864 
(Wyo. 1994). Therefore we decline to consider "[i]s a decision of the Board not 
in compliance with the mandatory provision of Chapter XIII, Section 12 of its 
own Rules void?"

2 WYO. STAT. § 33-4-115(a)(v) and (vii) 
(Supp. 1995) provide:

(a) The board may take disciplinary 
actions, singularly or in combination, against a licensee upon a finding 
of:

. . . .

(v) Affixing, or permitting to be 
affixed, a seal upon a document which the architect or landscape architect was 
not responsible for preparing;

. . . .

(vii) Suspension or revocation of 
licensure by another state; . . . .

3 Chapter XI, Section 1(g) of the Board's 
rules provides:

Section 1. 
Grounds. Each of the following acts are grounds for refusal, suspension or 
revocation of license pursuant to W.S. 33-4-115 and these 
regulations:

. . . .

(g) Suspension or revocation of 
licensure by another recognized jurisdiction. . . .

Rules and Regulations of the Wyo. State 
Bd. of Architects and Landscape Architects, Ch. XI, § 1(g) (June 18, 1992).