Case Title: Booze v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DAVID BOOZE,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 90, 2006 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  in and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0412002779 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Petitioners Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellees,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Submitted:  November 8, 2006 
Decided:  February 13, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 13th day of February, 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
 
(1) 
David Booze appeals from judgments against him for various criminal 
offenses after a Superior Court jury trial.  Booze presents four claims of error on 
appeal:  (a) the trial judge erred when he found that a State Police affidavit in 
support of the warrant to search Booze’s home established probable cause; (b) the 
prosecutor remarked improperly and prejudicially during his opening statement; (c) 
the prosecutor interjected her personal beliefs regarding Booze’s guilt and 
misstated evidence in her opening statement and closing argument; and, (d) the 
trial judge reprimanded defense counsel in the presence of the jury thus depriving 
 
2
Booze of his right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial.  After 
reviewing the record, we find no merit to these claims and affirm.   
 
(2) 
Booze was an electrician who resided on Lindale Road in Greenwood, 
Delaware, Sussex County.  The Gerreses (Roger Gerres and his wife, Patricia 
Gerres) and the Mrosses (Carl Mross and his wife, Barbara Mross) were Booze’s 
neighbors on Lindale Road.  
 
(3) 
Beginning in 2001, Booze was involved in various incidents with the 
Gerreses and Mrosses.  In 2001, while the Gerreses were building their house, 
Booze informed the developer that the Gerreses were building their house in 
violation of the deed restrictions.  In August 2003, while Roger was cutting his 
grass, he heard a gun fire.  Roger turned, saw Booze running across his yard with a 
gun, and called the police.  When the police arrived, Booze told them that he was 
shooting at a groundhog on his property.  The police did not arrest Booze.  
 
(4) 
On August 19, 2003, the Gerreses were driving home and passed 
Booze, who was standing in front of his home.  According to the Gerreses, Booze 
gave them “the finger” and yelled obscenities at them.  Roger left his car and 
confronted Booze, where an oral altercation ensued.  Patricia claimed that she tried 
to restrain Roger; however, when she stepped on Booze’s property, Booze pushed 
his lawn mower towards her feet, causing her to step back.  Booze called the 
police, and when police arrived, he asked the police to warn the Gerreses.  Patricia 
 
3
asked the officer to inform Booze that Roger had three previous heart attacks, and 
that if Booze would leave them alone, they would leave Booze alone.   
 
(5) 
On July 8, 2004 Roger discovered shot gun pellet holes in the wall of 
his shed.  Because the holes were inches from some gasoline cans, Roger called 
police, but the police made no arrests.  On July 11, 2004, the Mrosses noticed that 
their workshop window was broken and the whole pane of glass shattered.  The 
police responded and made a report but no arrests. 
 
(6) 
On July 17, 2004, the Gerreses’s contacted Verizon telephone 
company because their phone line was not working.  A Verizon repairman 
responded to the scene and discovered that an unauthorized telephone line crossed 
with the Gerreses’s telephone lines at the street side post.  The Verizon repairman 
testified that the unauthorized line was connected to the rod that serves Booze’s 
house, and would have enabled Booze to listen to and record the Gerreses’s phone 
conversations.  According to Roger, before his home phone stopped working, he 
was surprised to hear a voice he believed to be Booze’s wife on the line.  Also, one 
of the Gerreses’s friends had called them twice to ask why Booze’s telephone 
number had appeared on her caller ID.   
 
(7) 
On July 28, 2004, Carl Mross discovered that someone had sprayed 
weed killer around the perimeter of his garden.  The police again responded, but 
did not make any arrests.  On August 28, 2004, the Mrosses and the Gerreses 
 
4
discovered that their air conditioner units had been damaged by shotgun pellets.  
On September 30, 2004, the Mrosses and Gerreses discovered that their telephone 
lines had been cut and their lines were dead.  The police responded to the scene, 
but did not make any arrests.   
 
(8) 
On October 1, 2004, Roger ran over an object with his lawn mower.  
Roger got off the mower to investigate, and he found that some metal pegs were 
embedded in the grass on Booze’s side of their shared property line.  According to 
Roger, he yelled at Booze, and Booze told Roger to “get a life” and made a throat 
slashing gesture towards Roger.  The Gerreses called police, but they did not make 
any arrests.  The police took statements from both parties.   
 
(9) 
On October 3, 2004, Carl discovered roofing nails scattered around 
his driveway.  On October 6, 2004, around 1:00 a.m., Roger noticed that his 
outside motion detector light was flashing.  Roger went to his window and saw a 
person matching Booze’s description duck around the corner of his shed.  Roger 
called Carl, and they discovered that someone had spray painted messages on their 
doors.  Roger’s garage door had a big “X” in bright red paint, followed by 
“BEWARE PN.”  The door to Carl’s workshop had been painted with the message, 
“U2 RN.”1   
                                                 
1  
Carl and Roger stated that, to them, “PN” meant “Perfect Neighbor” while “RN” meant 
either “Roger’s Neighbor” or “Red Neck.”   
 
5
 
(10) In response to these incidents, Delaware State Police installed 
surveillance equipment in the Gerreses’s shed and in the Mrosses’s attic.  On 
October 30, 2004, Roger discovered that the surveillance equipment installed in his 
shed had been smashed into pieces on the ground, and that the videotape was 
missing from its camera.  The Mrosses stated that they observed Booze installing 
his own surveillance equipment.   
 
(11) On December 2, 2004, Roger discovered a small box wrapped in clear 
tape and duct tape in his mailbox.  The printed words “BEWARE CRUISE” were 
affixed on the box.  The Gerreses were scheduled to leave the following day on a 
cruise, and Patricia had spoken about their plans on the telephone.  Roger called 
the police, and they determined that the device was a hoax and the box contained a 
piece of wooden 2" x 4."   
 
(12) Based on the foregoing facts, on December 2, 2004, the State Police 
executed a search warrant at Booze’s residence and discovered a handgun under 
Booze’s bed, numerous weapons in a gun safe, boxes of ammunition, military 
literature, fireworks, a pellet gun, cans of spray paint, an inert grenade, and 
surveillance videos from Booze’s camera.2  The police arrested Booze for 
numerous offenses.   
                                                 
2  
As a result of this search, the police obtained two additional search warrants which 
permitted them to search Booze’s home on December 3, 2004, and December 9, 2004.   
 
 
6
 
(13) At trial, Booze denied having committed any crimes.  Nevertheless, 
the jury found Booze guilty of two counts of stalking, violation of privacy, six 
counts of criminal mischief, two counts of criminal trespass in the third degree, and 
possession of fireworks.  On February 10, 2006, the trial judge sentenced Booze to 
one year and forty-five days at Level V supervision followed by probation.  Booze 
appealed.   
 
(14) Under Article IV, § 11 (1) (b) of the Delaware Constitution, our 
appellate criminal jurisdiction is limited to cases “in which the sentence shall be 
death, imprisonment exceeding one month, or fine exceeding One Hundred 
Dollars.”3  Because of this threshold criminal jurisdiction inquiry, both parties 
agree that only Booze’s stalking convictions are properly before this Court.  
Therefore, we will address issues related only to those convictions.   
 
(15) The first issue is whether the affidavit supporting the warrant used to 
search Booze’s home established probable cause.  This Court reviews the Superior 
Court’s determination of probable cause de novo when the facts are not disputed 
and only a constitutional claim of lack of probable cause is at issue.4  We review a 
                                                 
3  
Del. Const. Art. IV, § 11 (1) (b) (2004). 
 
4  
Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 296 (Del. 2006).   
 
 
7
determination that sufficient probable cause exists to issue a search warrant with 
great deference.5  
 
(16) Booze argues that “mere allegations of random speculative acts of 
criminal mischief” cannot establish probable cause to believe that the fruits, 
instrumentalities, or evidence of crimes could be found in Booze’s residence.  
Booze contends that the State Police failed to establish a nexus between the 
allegations contained in the affidavit of probable cause and the items the police 
found in Booze’s home.   
 
(17) Under the Delaware and United States Constitutions, “a search 
warrant may be issued only upon a showing of probable cause.”6  This Court 
follows the “totality of the circumstances” test in determining whether probable 
cause to obtain a search warrant exists.7  Under this test, “a magistrate may find 
probable cause when, considering the totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place.’”8 
                                                 
5  
Id.  
 
6  
Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 786 (Del. 2003).   
 
7  
Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296, see also Gardner v. State, 567 A.2d 404 (Del. 1989).   
 
8  
Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296, citing Stones v. State, 676 A.2d 907 (Del. 1996) (Order).   
 
 
8
 
(18) Here, the police had sufficient grounds to support a reasonable belief 
that Booze had committed offenses against his neighbors.  A series of incidents 
highlighted and exacerbated tensions between Booze and his neighbors.  Booze 
and the Gerreses had been involved in several fierce oral confrontations for over a 
year.  Booze also had been implicated in various incidents of criminal mischief 
directed against the Gerreses and Mrosses.  During these incidents, Booze 
displayed significant hostility toward the Gerreses and Mrosses.  Although the 
police never caught Booze in the act of committing a crime, his identity could be  
inferred from the known facts and circumstances.9   
 
(19) The State Police affidavit in support of the warrant described the 
items to be searched and seized from Booze’s residence that could be reasonably 
expected, given the nature of the crimes and the evidence that the police possessed.  
Given the nature of the crimes10 and the proximity of Booze’s residence to the 
crime scene, a reasonable person could expect to find items such as guns, spray 
paint, nails, metal pegs, weed killer, wire cutting, equipment, wood, cardboard, 
clear tape, etc. in Booze’s house.  Therefore, the affidavit supporting the warrant 
                                                 
9  
For example, in August 2003, after Roger heard shots being fired over his dead, Booze 
confessed that he had been shooting a gun in his yard.  Also, on October 6, 2004, Roger saw a 
man matching Booze’s description run from his shed into the woods.   
 
 
10  
The nature of the crimes were: shooting at Roger, shooting the air conditioning units and 
shed, spray painting garage doors, strewing nails and tacks over the Mrosses’s driveway, 
destroying the Mrosses’s garden with weed killer, tapping and cutting telephone lines, creating a 
fake bomb with duct tape and wood. 
 
9
set forth facts adequate for a neutral judicial officer to form a reasonable belief that 
Booze had committed a series of offenses and that evidence of those offenses 
reasonably could be found in Booze’s home.11   
 
(20) Alternatively, Booze argues that the police improperly omitted 
material information from the affidavit of probable cause.  Specifically, Booze 
argues, that police omitted a vandalism incident that occurred on his property.  It is 
well established that if the police omit facts that are material to a finding of 
probable cause with reckless disregard for the truth, then the omitted information 
must be added to the affidavit so that the existence or absence of probable cause 
can be re-evaluated.12  The trial judge did include and consider the omitted facts 
when reexamining the affidavit of probable cause.  After doing so, the trial judge 
properly held that the fact that Booze’s residence was only vandalized once during 
this time period did not diminish the force of the facts that supported the finding of 
probable cause.   
 
(21) The second issue is whether the prosecutor spoke inappropriately 
during her opening statement.  Defendant’s counsel objected and moved for a 
mistrial.  The standard of review on appeal from the denial of a motion for a 
                                                 
11  
Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 811 (Del. 2000).   
 
12  
Smith v. State, 887 A.2d 470, 472 (Del. 2004); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 
154 (1978). 
 
10
mistrial is abuse of discretion.13  This Court reviews a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct de novo to determine whether the conduct was improper or 
prejudicial.14 
 
(22) During her opening remarks to the jury, the prosecutor stated that 
“you will hear that as soon as the defendant was arrested, that the behavior 
stopped, that Mr. and Mrs. Mross and Mr. and Mrs. Gerres have never had a 
problem since.”  Booze characterizes this comment as “vouching” and, therefore, 
as prosecutorial misconduct amounting to a violation of his right to a fair trial.  We 
disagree. 
 
(23) In White v. State,15 this Court held that that “[i]mproper vouching 
occurs when the prosecutor implies some personal superior knowledge, beyond 
that logically inferred from the evidence at trial, that the witness has testified 
truthfully.”16  We further noted that the prosecutor in his or her closing argument is 
“allowed and expected to explain all the legitimate inferences of the appellants’ 
guilt that flow from that evidence.”17  Here, it is undisputed that the continuous 
                                                 
13  
Bugra v. State, 818 A.2d 964, 966 (Del. 2003).  
 
14  
Price v. State, 858 A.2d 930, 939 (Del. 2004).   
 
15  
816 A.2d 776 (Del. 2003).   
 
16  
Id. at 779.  
 
17  
Johnson v. State, 711 A.2d 18, 31 (Del. 1998) (quoting Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 204 
(1980)).   
 
11
incidents plaguing the Gerreses and Mrosses for almost sixteen months stopped 
after December 2, 2004, the day police arrested Booze.  Therefore, the prosecutor’s 
statement is a legitimate and logical inference form the evidence presented at trial.  
There is nothing to support Booze’s argument that the prosecutor was suggesting 
to the jury that she was aware of information, not presented to the jury, that would 
tend to support the truthfulness of the Gerreses’s and Mrosses’s testimony.  
Therefore, the trial judge did not err when he denied Booze’s motion for a mistrial 
because no prosecutorial misconduct occurred. 
 
(24) The third issue is whether the prosecutor interjected her personal 
beliefs regarding Booze’s guilt and misstated the evidence.   
 
(25) Booze claims that the prosecutor interjected her personal beliefs about 
Booze’s guilt and also misstated the evidence in both her opening statement and 
closing argument.18  Booze contends that the prosecutor expressed her personal 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
18  
In her closing argument, the prosecutor stated in relevant parts, as follows: 
 
. . . . [T]he state has relied, in large part, on circumstantial evidence in this case . . 
. . Did we catch him in the act of doing any of the vandalism acts?  No.  We 
caught him in the act of wire-tapping.  We caught him in the act of putting the 
pegs in the ground.  We caught him in the act of spray-painting that fence, his 
fence.  Not the garages, but his fence. . . . 
 
[Booze] describes [the Gerreses] as being retards from Stockley Center with their 
faces pressed up against the glass window staring at him.  How offensive, 
obnoxious, and hateful a statement is that? 
 
. . . . He did all of that.  There is no other logical explanation. . . . 
 
 
12
belief about Booze’s guilt by using the phrases “we know” and “we caught him” 
several times in her closing argument.  Booze also claims that the prosecutor 
attacked Booze personally by interjecting her own personal opinions and beliefs by 
characterizing Booze’s relationship with his neighbors as “offensive, obnoxious, 
and hateful.”   
 
(26) This Court has never “adopt[ed] a rule which says that the use of the 
word ‘I’ or ‘we’ in a closing argument is per se improper.”19  “When deciding 
whether a comment is improper prosecutorial misconduct, our cases often turn on 
the nuances of the language and the context in which the statements were made.”20  
In this case, the prosecutor’s statement was not an opinion formed from whole 
cloth.  Rather, asserting “we know” and “we caught” referred to the evidence 
introduced at trial and the legitimate inferences drawn from that evidence.  The 
prosecutor’s negative comment was an impersonal and reasonable response to 
Booze’s contemptuous language, not a statement of her personal belief or opinion 
regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence touching on Booze’s 
guilt.  The prosecutor’s statement did not cross the “line of demarcation” between 
proper and improper argument.  The trial judge properly instructed the jury, in any 
                                                                                                                                                             
[Booze] is choreographing.  He is manipulating.  He is the mastermind.  He has 
no life. 
 
19  
Brokenbrough v. State, 522 A.2d 851, 859 (Del. 1987).   
 
20  
Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 710 (Del. 2006).   
 
13
event, that they should be governed solely by the evidence and the instructions and 
that they should not consider any of the prosecutor’s personal opinions should they 
believe she had offered her personal view.21 
 
(27) Finally, Booze argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence by 
saying that police caught Booze in the act of wiretapping.  The record shows that 
police suspected Booze of wiretapping because the Verizon repairman identified 
the unauthorized telephone line coming from Booze’s house.22  In Kurzmann v. 
State, this Court held that “the prosecutor’s comments might be hyperbolic 
argument, in which the prosecutor made legitimate inferences from the evidence at. 
                                                 
21  
The trial judge instructed the jurors that they should not allow themselves to be swayed 
by sympathy or passion, but should let their verdict be the result of a fair and dispassionate 
consideration of the testimony given at trial.   The trial judge also instructed the jurors as 
follows: 
 
[The prosecutor and Booze’s defense counsel] are merely making arguments 
about what the evidence may or may not mean.  Ultimately, you folks will decide.  
So to the extent that at any time during her closing argument, [the prosecutor] 
may have expressed her personal opinion about the evidence or testimony, or 
anything else, you are to simply disregard that.  You folks will be the judges of 
the evidence and what it means and what conclusions you may draw from that.  
Similarly, I want to remind you that you make your decision in this case 
based on the evidence; not based on sympathy and not based on emotion.  
Nothing of that nature.      
 
22  
The relevant testimony from the Verizon repairman was as follows: 
 
 
I went to the telephone box, lifted off the cover and noticed that there were two 
pairs of wires on one – what is the binding post, the screws, which they are not 
supposed to . . . I found one of the pairs of wires coming from the Booze house 
was connected to the screws that serviced the Gerres house. . . . [it would enable 
Booze to] make phone called on the Gerres’, long distance calls and/or listen and 
record any of the phone calls, the Gerreses’ phone calls.  
 
 
14
. . [trial], but they are supported by the record, are not misstatements, and, in 
context, are not improper in any way.”23  Here, the prosecutor’s statement was a 
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence presented at trial and 
was not a false statement or misrepresentation of fact.   
 
(28) Booze’s final claim of error is that the trial judge openly reprimanded 
his defense counsel, in the presence of the jury, thereby depriving him of his right 
to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial.   
(29) During the cross examination of the defendant, defense counsel 
objected to the prosecutor’s question, stating: “Your Honor, is this a psychiatric 
evaluation?  I object.”  The trial judge responded: “[defense counsel], I am not 
going to tell you any more.  If you have an objection, make it.  Stop making 
comments out in open court.  I’m tired of it.  You have done it for the better part of 
two weeks.  Stop.”   
(30) During the prayer conference the next morning, the prosecutor 
brought up this incident, expressing some concern about the role of judge as 
arbitrator and defense counsel’s duty to zealously represent their clients.  Defense 
counsel replied, “. . . I don’t think that there was any tension. . . . I understand 
exactly what the Court was saying back to me, and I didn’t think it was an issue of 
                                                 
23  
903 A.2d 702, 713 (Del. 2006).   
 
15
tenseness.”  Thereafter, the trial judge and defense counsel discussed whether there 
was a need for additional jury instructions: 
Trial judge: would you like me to say anything, [defense 
counsel]? 
Defense counsel: No.  First of all, I don’t think there was any 
tension. 
Trial judge: I did admonish you in front of the jury. 
Defense counsel: But I don’t think there was any tension.  
That was an admonishment.  If I remember correctly, soon 
thereafter, you sustained one of my objections.  And, also, I 
notice you put in there – I read it last night. 
Trial judge: It is usually in the very beginning.  “You should 
not be prejudiced in any way by the attorneys making 
objections.”   
Defense counsel: I, respectfully, don’t think it has to be put in 
there.   
Trial judge: All right. 
 
 
 
(31) During his charge to the jury, the trial judge included a 
cautionary instruction.24  After carefully reviewing the record, we find that 
Booze’s defense counsel expressly declined the trial judge’s offer to give a 
                                                 
24  
The trial judge stated: 
 
 
At times, throughout this trial, I have been called upon to pass upon the question 
of whether or not certain evidence may be properly admitted.  It is the duty of a 
lawyer to object to evidence which he or she believes may not be properly 
offered, and you should not be prejudiced in any way against the lawyer who 
makes objections or the party he or she represents. . . . In admitting evidence to 
which an objection is made, I do not determine what weight should be given to 
such evidence, nor do I pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. 
 
 
16
curative instruction knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  Therefore, 
Booze waived this claim, and plain error review would be inappropriate.25   
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court’s judgments of 
conviction are AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
25  
Warner v. State, 787 A.2d 101 (Del. 2001) (Order), see also Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 
758, 764 (Del. 2006).