Case Title: Whitney Holding Corp. v. Terry

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0075

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
WHITNEY HOLDING CORPORATION v. CLARENCE WILLIAM TERRY AND PEGGY ANN TERRY, TRUSTEES OF THE DECLARATION OF TRUST DATED FEBRUARY 27, 19902012 WY 21Case Number: S-11-0075Decided: 02/14/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
WHITNEY HOLDING 
CORPORATION,
Appellant 
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
CLARENCE WILLIAM 
TERRY AND PEGGY ANN TERRY, TRUSTEES OF THE DECLARATION OF TRUST DATED FEBRUARY 
27, 1990,
Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County
The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
 
Mistee L. Godwin and 
Dan B. Riggs, Lonabaugh & Riggs, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming; Joseph E. Jones, 
Fraser Stryker PC, Omaha, Nebraska.  
Argument by Mr. Jones.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
 
S. Thomas Throne and 
Jacob T. Haseman, Throne Law Office, P.C., Sheridan, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. Throne and Mr. 
Haseman.
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; HILL, J., files a dissenting opinion, in which KITE, 
C.J., joins.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant, Whitney 
Holding Corporation, challenges a decision of the district court quieting title 
in a certain mineral estate in favor of Appellees, Clarence and Peggy 
Terry.  Whitney claims it reserved 
the mineral interest in a Limited Warranty Deed conveying the property from 
Whitney to the Terrys.1  Whitney contends the deed is unambiguous 
and that the district court erred in considering extrinsic evidence to interpret 
the deed.  Whitney also asserts that 
the Terrys’ claim is barred by the ten year statute of limitations applicable to 
actions for reformation.  We find no 
error and affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]        
Whitney 
presents five issues:
 
1.    
Did 
the District Court err in holding that the Limited Warranty Deed was 
ambiguous?
 
2.    
Did 
the District Court err by denying Whitney’s motion in limine and by overruling 
Whitney’s objections to the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence?
 
3.    
Did 
the District Court err by considering extrinsic evidence regarding the intent of 
the parties in entering into the Limited Warranty Deed?
 
4.    
Did 
the District Court err by finding that Whitney does not own a mineral interest 
in the subject property and that Terrys own one-half of the mineral rights in 
the subject property?
 
5.    
Did 
the District Court err by failing to determine that the Terrys’ action was 
barred by the statute of limitations because they were seeking to reform the 
February 25, 1980 Deed (the “Limited Warranty Deed”), rather than quiet 
title?
 
The 
Terrys rephrase the issues:
 
1.    
Whether 
the District Court was correct in its finding that extrinsic evidence was 
admissible to discern the true intent of the parties and meaning of the Limited 
Warranty Deed.
 
2.    
Whether 
the District Court correctly concluded that the language of the Limited Warranty 
Deed was unclear and ambiguous.
 
3.    
Whether 
the District Court was correct in its determination that the Terrys were not 
barred by the statute of limitations for a reformation action because they were 
pursuing a quiet title action.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
The 
Terrys owned property located on the lower Tongue River in Sheridan County, 
Wyoming.  They owned the property 
for many years prior to entering into an agreement to sell the property to 
Whitney.  Whitney wanted the 
property in order to expand its coal mining operation in the area, and initially 
contacted the Terrys in the early 1970’s about purchasing the property.  Whitney maintained its interest and 
ultimately the Terrys agreed to sell.  
On December 17, 1979, Whitney and the Terrys entered into a Contract for 
Deed.
 
[¶4]        
In 
the Contract for Deed, the Terrys are identified as “Seller” and Whitney is 
identified as “Buyer.”  The purchase 
price for the Tongue River property was $614,750.  In the contract, the Terrys were 
provided the option of receiving the purchase price in cash, in installments, or 
by making a “like-kind” exchange.
 
[¶5]        
The 
Terrys chose the “like-kind” exchange option and informed Whitney they had 
selected the “Ranchester property” for the exchange.  The property was owned by the 
Kaufmanns.2  Prior to selecting the Ranchester 
property, the Terrys looked at several other properties but eventually settled 
on the Ranchester property for several reasons, as explained by Mrs. 
Terry:
 
A.  To begin with, it had to be a like-kind 
exchange because of the taxes and because we still wanted to ranch, and of 
course everyone talked about minerals on the lower Tongue River, so that was 
number one.  We needed a place with 
minerals.
 
Q.  All right.  And any other criteria that you relayed 
to Mr. Taylor?
 
A.  We wanted some irrigated land, and so 
that’s why we were interested.
 
Before making the 
selection, they inquired about the mineral interest in the Ranchester property. 
 According to Mrs. 
Terry:
 
Q.  And were you aware of the ownership in 
that property, who owned the minerals in that property?
 
A.  Well, we had to be explained to about 
the lifetime estate, and Mr. Zimmerman was still alive at that time, and so he 
owned half of the minerals, the Kaufmanns owned half of the minerals.  When Mr. Zimmerman died then they 
explained to us that we would receive the other half.
 
[¶6]        
After settling on the 
Ranchester property, the Terrys notified Whitney.  Whitney entered into an agreement with 
the Kaufmanns to purchase the property.  
In the agreement, the Kaufmanns are identified as “Sellers.”  Whitney is identified as “Buyer.”  The Kaufmann/Whitney agreement 
referenced a life estate in one-half of the minerals in favor of Clyde Zimmerman 
and Gladys Glasby that burdened the Ranchester property.  In the agreement, the Kaufmanns 
expressly represented that Gladys Glasby was deceased and that the life estate 
would terminate upon the death of Mr. Zimmerman.
 
[¶7]        
Closing of the 
transactions occurred on February 25, 1980.  At the closing, the Kaufmanns executed a 
Warranty Deed conveying the Ranchester property to Whitney.  Whitney, in turn, executed a Limited 
Warranty Deed conveying the Ranchester property to the Terrys.  The Terrys signed a Warranty Deed 
conveying the Tongue River property to Whitney.  At closing, the Kaufmanns received the 
balance of the $575,000 purchase price and the Terrys were paid, as “boot,” the 
sum of $39,750, representing the difference in price between the Ranchester 
property they were receiving and the Tongue River property they were selling to 
Whitney. 
 
[¶8]        
The Kaufmann Warranty 
Deed identified the Kaufmanns as “Grantors” and in the body of the deed, 
specified that the conveyance was “SUBJECT TO the reservation of coal, oil, gas 
and other minerals set forth in Exhibit 'A.’”  Exhibit A provided a lengthy legal 
description and stated the reservation as follows:
 
EXCEPTING 
AND RESERVING, HOWEVER, to the Grantors and to their heirs and assigns, one-half 
of all coal, sub-bituminous coal, lignite, oil, gas, uranium, fissionable 
materials, and all other minerals of every kind and character, contained in or 
underlying said lands, together with the right to enter thereon for the purpose 
of drilling for or mining the said coal, oil, gas, uranium, fissionable 
materials and other minerals, and the right to use so much of the surface as may 
be necessary for such purposes, provided the owner of the surface is reasonably 
compensated for any damage done thereto.
 
The Warranty Deed 
from the Kaufmanns did not mention the Zimmerman life estate. 

 
[¶9]        
In the Limited 
Warranty Deed from Whitney to the Terrys, Whitney is identified as 
“Grantor.”  The deed also contains 
an Exhibit A that is identical to the Exhibit A in the Kaufmann/Whitney Deed 
with two exceptions:  the term 
“Grantors” is changed to “sellers,” and there is a specific reference to the 
Zimmerman life estate.  It is this 
deed that is at the center of the dispute between the parties. 

 
[¶10]     
Three months after 
the closing, the Terrys executed an oil and gas lease for their mineral interest 
in the Ranchester property.  They 
also executed a Ratification of Oil and Gas Lease that had previously been 
signed by Mr. Zimmerman.  Through 
the years, the Terrys executed additional mineral leases for the Ranchester 
property.  Mrs. Terry prepared and 
recorded Affidavits of Survivorship reflecting the deaths of Mr. Zimmerman 
and Ms. Glasby and the termination of their life estate in the minerals.  There is no indication in the record 
that Whitney ever claimed any mineral interest in the Ranchester property.  
 
[¶11]     
The first inkling 
that the Terrys had of questions regarding their mineral interest came from a 
source other than Whitney.  Mrs. 
Terry testified:
 
Q.  Let’s talk about the case that’s here 
today.  What events caused you to 
initiate this quiet title action?
 
A.  All right.  Mr. Munson was an agent or he sold our 
lease to Elk Petroleum, and Elk Petroleum did some explorations and they were 
going to drag – on Friday they called and said:  “We’re going to drag a rig over on our 
six-mile area.”
 
Q.  Is the six-mile area part of the 
Ranchester property?
 
A.  Yes, yes.  For exploration purposes, and then their 
geologist called back and said:  
“We’ve hired a girl and she went deep into the records, and will you come 
in and talk to us about it?”  So 
Clarence and I went in and talked to Richard Sweeney, the geologist, and his 
solution was:  “Talk to someone from 
[Whitney] and they’ll quiet the title.”

Apparently, efforts 
to resolve the potential title problems were unsuccessful and the Terrys filed a 
“Complaint to Quiet Mineral Title” against Whitney in Sheridan County district 
court.  Whitney denied nearly all of 
the allegations of the Complaint and raised several affirmative defenses 
including an allegation that the Terrys’ claim “is barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations.”
 
[¶12]     
Prior to trial, the 
parties entered into a joint stipulation.  
In that stipulation, the parties agreed to the admissibility of several 
documents, including:  The Contract 
between Whitney and the Terrys, the Agreement for Warranty Deed between the 
Kaufmanns and Whitney, the Kaufmann Warranty Deed to Whitney, and the Limited 
Warranty Deed from Whitney to the Terrys.  
Whitney also filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude other extrinsic 
evidence that the Terrys might attempt to introduce to interpret the Limited 
Warranty Deed.  Whitney contended 
that the deed was unambiguous.  The 
Terrys resisted the motion.  They 
asserted that the deed was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was admissible 
to interpret the deed.  The district 
court took the motion under advisement and trial proceeded.  Whitney renewed its objection to 
specific extrinsic evidence throughout the trial.  At the conclusion of the trial, the 
district court determined that the Limited Warranty Deed was ambiguous and, 
after considering the language of the deed and extrinsic evidence, quieted title 
to the minerals in the Terrys.  
Whitney filed a timely appeal.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶13]     
The district court 
held a bench trial in this case.  
Consequently, we apply the following standard of 
review:
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court 
may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is 
given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence. 
Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A 
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.
 
Harber v. 
Jensen, 2004 WY 
104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004) quoting, Life Care 
Centers of America, Inc. v. Dexter, 2003 WY 
38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 389 (Wyo. 2003). See also Powder 
River Ranch, Inc. v. Michelena, 2005 WY 
1, ¶ 8, 103 P.3d 876, [879] (Wyo. 2005). . . . The district 
court’s conclusions of law are, however, subject to our de novo standard 
of review. Powder 
River Ranch, 
¶ 8, 103 P.3d at [880]; Double 
Eagle Petroleum & Mining Corp. v. Questar Exploration & Production 
Co., 2003 WY 
139, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d 679, [681] (Wyo. 2003).
 
Mullinnix 
LLC v. HKB Royalty Trust, 2006 
WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 2006). 
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶14]     
Whitney raises five 
issues in this appeal.  All of those 
issues are premised upon Whitney’s contention that the Limited Warranty Deed 
clearly and unambiguously specifies that Whitney reserved a one-half mineral 
interest in the Ranchester property.  
Whether the deed is ambiguous presents a question of law.  Treemont, Inc. v. Hawley, 886 P.2d 589, 
592 (Wyo. 1994).  We give no 
deference to a district court’s decision on an issue of law.  Id.  We determine whether a written contract 
term is ambiguous “by independently reviewing the disputed term in light of the 
actual language of the entire contract.  A term is ambiguous if, considered in 
light of the plain language of the entire contract, it is susceptible to more 
than one reasonable meaning.”  
Smithco 
Eng’g v. International Fabricators, 
775 P.2d 1011, 1019 (Wyo. 1989) (Golden, J., concurring) (internal 
citations omitted).  
 
[¶15]     
The Limited Warranty 
Deed transferring the Ranchester property from Whitney to the Terrys 
states:
 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE 
PRESENTS:
 
            
That [Whitney], for good and valuable consideration does hereby grant, 
bargain, sell and convey unto CLARENCE W. TERRY and PEGGY ANN TERRY, as tenants 
by the entirety, of Kirby Star Route, Sheridan, Wyoming 82801, all the real 
property situate in Sheridan County, State of Wyoming, described in Exhibit A 
attached hereto and made a part hereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the exceptions, 
restrictions, and reservations set forth in the Warranty Deed from Carl Kaufmann 
and Vera L. Kaufmann, husband and wife, Clifford C. Kaufmann and Rosemarie A. 
Kaufmann, husband and wife, and Carl A. Church, Jr. and Charlene Ann Church, 
husband and wife, to the Grantor 
herein, the easements and rights-of-way of record; to all mineral and oil 
royalty reservations or conveyances contained in prior instruments of record; 
and all existing mineral leases affecting said lands.
 
            
Grantor warrants title solely 
against the acts and deeds of Grantor and no 
other.
 
            
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor 
has caused this instrument to be executed by its officials this 25 day of 
February, 1980.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Exhibit A contained a 
lengthy property description and also stated:
 
EXCEPTING 
AND RESERVING, HOWEVER, to the sellers and to their heirs and assigns, 
one-half of all coal, sub-bituminous coal, lignite, oil, gas, uranium, 
fissionable materials, and all other minerals of every kind and character, 
contained in or underlying said lands, together with the right to enter thereon 
for the purpose of drilling for or mining the said coal, oil, gas, uranium, 
fissionable materials and other minerals, and the right to use so much of the 
surface as may be necessary for such purposes, provided the owner of the surface 
is reasonably compensated for any damage done thereto.
 
ALSO 
SUBJECT to that certain life estate now held by Clyde Zimmerman, as a result of 
the reservation set forth in the Warranty Deed from Clyde Zimmerman and Ada 
Zimmerman, husband and wife and Gladys Glasby, a single person, which 
reservation extends to the lands above described which are located in Township 
57 North, Range 85 West of the 6th P.M., 
and the lands above described which are located in Sections 12 and 13, Township 
57 North, Range 86 West of the 6th 
P.M.       
 
(Emphasis 
added.)
 
[¶16]     
Whitney 
contends that the term “sellers,” in the reservation clause at issue, 
unambiguously refers to Whitney.  
According to Whitney, the reference in the Limited Warranty Deed to the 
Zimmerman life estate is irrelevant to proper interpretation of the deed.  Whitney asserts that after it conveyed 
the Ranchester property to Plaintiffs under the Limited Warranty Deed, “(1) the 
Terrys owned the surface estate in the Ranchester Property, (2) Whitney owned 
one-half of the mineral rights in the Ranchester Property, and (3) Kaufmann[s] 
owned one-half of the mineral rights in the Ranchester Property subject to 
Zimmerman’s life estate.”  Under 
Whitney’s interpretation, the Terrys did not receive any mineral interest in the 
Ranchester property.
 
[¶17]     
According 
to the Terrys, the term “sellers” in the reservation at issue did not refer to 
Whitney.  It referred to the 
Kaufmanns.  The reference to the 
Zimmerman life estate was included because it limited the mineral rights to the 
Ranchester property that the Terrys were receiving in the transaction.  According to the Terrys, after the 
transaction was completed, they owned the surface estate and one-half of the 
mineral interest in the Ranchester property.  Their mineral interest was burdened by 
the Zimmerman life estate.  The 
Kaufmanns owned the other one-half of the mineral interest in the Ranchester 
property.  Whitney did not retain 
any mineral interest in the Ranchester property.
 
[¶18]     
In 
interpreting a contract we must “give effect to each 
word if possible, and we strive to avoid construing a contract so as to render 
one of its provisions meaningless, because each provision is presumed to have a 
purpose.”  Shaffer v. Winhealth Partners, 2011 WY 
131, ¶ 17, 261 P.3d 708, 713 (Wyo. 2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  At 
trial, Whitney attempted to minimize the significance of the reference in the 
deed to the Zimmerman life estate and limit the focus of the district court to 
the specific language in the reservation clause.  Understandably, the district court 
balked:
 
THE 
COURT:  So that extra language 
that’s subject to the life estate is just – I mean, it didn’t need to be there, 
it’s extra, didn’t need to be there.
 
[COUNSEL]:  Whether it needed to be there or not, I 
don’t think it’s for us to say.
 
THE 
COURT:  It’s in a critical 
document.  If I’m going to give 
meaning to something, I have to give meaning to everything, try to.  Why is it there 
then?
 
[COUNSEL]:  It could be there just to fully explain 
the status of the ownership of the minerals and the surface on that 
property.
 
THE 
COURT:  Just:  “Oh, by the way, a footnote here:  There’s a life estate hanging out there 
and it’s just good to know”?
 
[COUNSEL]:  Full disclosure of what the status of 
the ownership is.
 
But 
where this analysis ultimately gets us is that there was a reservation.  We can’t do as they ask and just pretend 
that those words don’t exist, because they do.
 
THE 
COURT:  Well, you want me to pretend 
the second half doesn’t exist, just the first half.
 
[¶19]     
The 
district court determined that the Limited Warranty Deed was ambiguous based 
upon its review of the entire document, including the reference to the Kaufmann 
Warranty Deed, the Zimmerman life estate, and the recitation in the Limited 
Warranty Deed that the conveyance was subject to “all mineral … reservations … 
in prior instruments of record.”  
The district court explained: 
 
                        
This deed has three fundamental reservations:
 
1.    
It 
specifically makes reference to “all the real property situate in Sheridan 
County, State of Wyoming, described in Exhibit A attached hereto and made part 
hereof” (emphasis added).  
Exhibit A contains two exceptions and reservations:
 
i)     
“EXCEPTING 
AND RESERVING, HOWEVER, to the sellers and to their heirs and assigns, one-half 
of all coal,” etc., and
 
ii)    
“ALSO 
SUBJECT to that certain life estate now held by Clyde Zimmerman, as a result of 
the reservation set forth in the Warranty Deed from Clyde Zimmerman and Ada 
Zimmerman, husband and wife and Gladys Glasby, a single person, which 
reservation extends to the lands above described which are located in Township 
57 North, Range 85 West of the 6th P.M. and 
the lands above described which are located in Sections 12 and 13, Township 57 
North, Range 86 West of the 6th P.M.”
 
2.    
The 
Limited Warranty Deed specifically makes reference to:
 
“SUBJECT, 
HOWEVER, to exceptions, restrictions, and reservations set forth in the Warranty Deed from Carl Kaufmann and Vera L. 
Kaufman[n], husband and wife, and Carl A. Church, Jr. and Charlene Ann Church, 
husband and wife, to the Grantor herein” (emphasis 
added).
 
The 
Warranty Deed referenced in the above language is the Warranty Deed from 
Kaufmanns to [Whitney] (Exhibit 6).  
Exhibit 6 utilizes an attached Exhibit A to describe the lands and is 
“SUBJECT TO the reservation of coal, oil, gas and other minerals set forth in 
Exhibit 'A’”.  The referenced 
Exhibit A in turn contains the following reservation:
 
“EXCEPTING 
AND RESERVING, HOWEVER, to the Grantors and to their heirs and assigns, one-half 
of all coal, etc.” Nearly identical language as set forth in the Limited 
Warranty Deed except that it uses the term “Grantors” versus 
“sellers”.
 
It 
also makes no mention of the Zimmerman/Glasby life estate.
 
3.    
Finally, 
the Limited Warranty Deed includes subject to “the easements and rights-of-way 
of record; to all mineral and oil royalty reservations or conveyances contained 
in prior instruments of record; and all existing mineral leases affecting said 
lands.”
 
Attempting 
to give meaning to each of the reservations and applying the classic law school 
“bundle of sticks” analysis quickly makes the point.  Starting with the conveyance between 
Kaufmanns and [Whitney].  Kaufmanns 
reserved one-half the minerals (Bundle 1) and conveyed the remaining sticks to 
[Whitney].  [Whitney] then conveys 
to Terrys with several reservations including the reservations of Kaufman[n] 
(Bundle 1), as well as, “all mineral and oil royalty reservations or conveyances 
contained in prior instruments of record” which could also include the prior 
reservation of Kaufman[n] (Bundle 1) and the Zimmerman/Glasby life estate 
(Bundle 2).  Then Exhibit A again 
reserves one-half the minerals and addresses the Zimmerman/Glasby life estate 
(Bundle 2).  Attempting to give 
meaning to the multiple reservations which appear to overlap and be repetitive 
prevents a clear and unambiguous determination as to what minerals were 
reserved.  Accordingly, the language 
in the Limited Warranty Deed is ambiguous and the Court denies Defendant[’]s 
Motion in Limine objecting to consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine 
the intent of the parties. 
 
(Footnote 
omitted.)  We are inclined to agree 
with the district court’s analysis.  
Additionally, we conclude that the specific language of the reservation 
clause upon which Whitney relies is ambiguous.  
 
[¶20]     
Whitney 
contends that “[n]one of the three reservations relied on by the Court make the 
language reserving one-half of the mineral rights to the seller ambiguous.”  According to 
Whitney:
 
The first reservation 
cited by the District Court has two parts.  
The first part provides that one-half of the mineral rights are reserved 
to Whitney.  The second part, 
provides that the other one-half of the mineral rights are owned by Kaufmann 
subject to Zimmerman’s life estate.  These clauses are not obscure in their 
meaning, are not indefinite, and do not have a double meaning.  They plainly state that Whitney reserves 
one half of the mineral rights and Kaufmann owns the other half. 

 
A plain reading of 
the language of the reservation does not support Whitney’s interpretation.  The first part of the reservation does 
not mention Whitney, it uses the plural term “sellers.”  The second part of the reservation 
refers only to the Zimmerman life estate.  
It does not say that the Kaufmann mineral interest is burdened by the 
Zimmerman life estate.  It does not 
even mention the Kaufmanns.  

 
[¶21]     
In addressing the 
second reservation discussed by the district court, Whitney 
asserts:
 
The second 
reservation cited by the District Court provides that Whitney’s conveyance of 
the Ranchester Property to the Terrys is subject to the reservations in the 
Warranty Deed from Kaufmann to Whitney.  
The effect of those words in the Limited Warranty Deed is that Whitney 
was not providing any more property 
to the Terrys than it received from Kaufmann.  The Warranty Deed from Kaufmann to 
Whitney provides that Kaufmann is reserving one-half of the mineral rights in 
the Ranchester Property.  Repeating 
in the Limited Warranty Deed that Kaufmann owns a one-half interest in the 
mineral rights does not render ambiguous the reservation of the other one-half 
interest in the mineral rights to Whitney. 
 
(Emphasis in 
original.)  We agree that the second 
reservation clearly and unambiguously reflects that the conveyance is subject to 
the Kaufmann reservation of a one-half mineral interest in the Ranchester 
Property.  As noted by the district 
court, the reservation clause in the Kaufmann deed makes no mention of the 
Zimmerman life estate.  Whitney’s 
position in this case is that the Kaufmann mineral interest is burdened by the 
Zimmerman life estate.  Based upon 
the language of the Kaufmann deed, it is difficult to ascertain how Whitney 
arrives at that conclusion.  
Additionally, Whitney’s concession that the reservation clause could be 
viewed as a repetition of the Kaufmann reservation dovetails with the 
interpretation of the Limited Warranty Deed presented by the Terrys.  
 
[¶22]     
The Terrys contend 
that the references in the Limited Warranty Deed to the Kaufmann reservation and 
the Zimmerman life estate are significant and necessary terms of the deed to 
reflect the mineral interest that the Kaufmanns were conveying and that the 
Terrys were receiving.  The 
Kaufmanns were reserving a one-half interest in the mineral estate and the 
Terrys were receiving a one-half mineral interest that was subject to the 
Zimmerman life estate.  The Terrys 
assert that the term “sellers” refers to the Kaufmanns, not 
Whitney.
 
[¶23]     
Whitney’s position is 
summed up in this excerpt from its brief:  

 
There is nothing 
obscure or indefinite about the language that reserved one-half of the mineral 
rights to Whitney.  The Limited 
Warranty Deed does not contain a double meaning that is open to 
interpretation.  It means what it 
says---one-half of the mineral rights in the Ranchester Property are reserved to 
the seller (Whitney).
 
Whitney employed this 
technique repeatedly at trial and continues that approach in this appeal.  It consistently treats the term 
“sellers” contained in the reservation clause and “Whitney” as synonyms.  It regularly adds the parenthetical 
(Whitney) after “sellers” even though “Whitney” is not identified in the 
reservation clause.  Whitney 
routinely changes the plural term “sellers” that is contained in the reservation 
clause to the singular “seller” and provides no explanation for the change.  Whitney has provided no authority 
governing contract interpretation that would allow adding words (Whitney) to the 
reservation clause or permit changing a plural word (sellers) to the singular 
form (seller).  Most significantly, 
Whitney never explains how it reached the conclusion that the term “sellers” 
clearly and unambiguously refers to Whitney.  When we review the entire document, as 
we are required to do, we cannot conclude that the reservation clause is 
unambiguous or that the term “sellers” clearly and unambiguously refers to 
Whitney.
 
[¶24]     
The term “sellers” is 
not defined in the Limited Warranty Deed.  
Whitney is consistently identified in the Limited Warranty Deed as 
“Grantor,” not as “sellers.”  The 
deed states that the transfer to the Terrys is “SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the … 
reservations set forth in the [Kaufmann Warranty Deed] to the Grantor herein.”  (Emphasis added.)  The deed states that “Grantor warrants title solely against 
the acts and deeds of Grantor and no 
other.” (Emphasis added.)  The deed 
concludes: “IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has caused this instrument to 
be executed by its officials.”  
(Emphasis added.)  In the 
body of the deed the singular “Grantor” is always used to refer to Whitney.  The plural “Grantors” is never 
used.  The singular form of the noun 
“Grantor” is consistent with the recognition that Whitney is a corporation.  By contrast, the reservation, which is 
at the heart of this dispute, uses the plural noun, “sellers:” “EXCEPTING AND 
RESERVING, HOWEVER, to the sellers … .”  
In sum, it is not at all clear that the terms “Grantor” and “sellers” are 
synonymous or that the term “sellers” refers to Whitney.  The term “sellers” could also plausibly 
refer to the Kaufmanns.  Because 
there is more than one reasonable interpretation, we conclude that the Limited 
Warranty Deed is ambiguous.
 
[¶25]     
After determining 
that the deed was ambiguous, the district court interpreted the deed utilizing 
the language of the deed and extrinsic evidence.  The district court concluded that the 
parties intended, and the deed reflected, that Whitney did not reserve a mineral 
interest in the Ranchester property.  
We agree with the district court.
 
[¶26]     
In the basic 
transaction between the Terrys and Whitney, the Terrys were the sellers and 
Whitney was the buyer.  The Terrys 
were selling their property to Whitney.  
The terms of the agreement were set forth in a Contract for Deed, dated 
December 17, 1979.  In that 
document, Whitney is identified as “buyer.”  The Terrys are identified as 
“seller.”  The references are used 
consistently throughout the document.  
Whitney is never identified as a “seller” or “sellers.”  
 
[¶27]     
In the Kaufmann 
contract with Whitney, the Kaufmanns are identified as “sellers” and Whitney is 
identified as “buyer.”  The 
references are used consistently throughout that document.  Whitney is never identified as a 
“seller” or “sellers.”  

 
[¶28]     
The Contract for Deed 
between the Terrys and Whitney makes it absolutely clear that Whitney was only 
to act as a conduit to facilitate the transfer of the exchange 
property:
 
Buyer 
agrees that if Seller selects the exchange property and gives notice thereof 
within the time provided, it shall purchase the selected exchange property and 
exchange the same for the above-described property.  Any value of the selected exchange 
property over and above the purchase price for the above-described property as 
provided herein shall be paid by Seller, or in the event the selected exchange 
property has a value less than the purchase price for the above-described 
property, said difference in value shall be paid by Buyer unto Seller.  Upon acquiring title to the selected 
exchange property, Buyer shall convey title thereto to Seller by special 
warranty deed and shall, at its sole expense, furnish a title insurance 
commitment sufficient to Seller insuring fee simple title to the exchange 
property in Buyer. 
 
There 
is no language in the Contract for Deed reflecting any intent that Whitney would 
retain any interest in the exchanged property. 
 
[¶29]     
Additionally, the 
course of conduct of the parties after completion of the sale is uniformly 
consistent with the Terrys’ interpretation of the deed.  Course of conduct evidence may properly 
be considered in interpreting an ambiguous contract.  B & R Builders v. 
Beilgard, 915 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Wyo. 1996).  The Terrys acted at all times as the 
owners of the mineral estate that was burdened by the Zimmerman life 
estate.  The Terrys executed and 
filed affidavits of survivorship reflecting termination of the Zimmerman life 
estate after Mr. Zimmerman died in 1988.  
They entered into several oil and gas lease agreements.  They at all times acted as owners of the 
mineral estate.  Whitney, on the 
other hand, did nothing.  It took no 
action of any kind, until this lawsuit, to reflect that it claimed any interest 
in the mineral estate.  The course 
of conduct evidence was properly relied upon by the district court to interpret 
the deed and supports the district court’s decision.
 
[¶30]     
In addition to its 
general objection to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, Whitney contends 
that evidence regarding the value of the properties was irrelevant.  We review a district court’s evidentiary 
rulings for an abuse of discretion.  
Cramer v. Powder River Coal, 
LLC, 2009 WY 45, ¶ 22, 204 P.3d 974, 981 (Wyo. 2009).  The district court succinctly explained 
the relevance in its decision letter:
 
[Whitney] served as a 
conduit to effectuate the like-kind exchange.  Particularly, the exchanged properties 
were valued and “boot” was paid to equalize the difference in values.  The values and consideration between the 
parties would not balance if one-half the minerals were not conveyed to 
Terrys.  Stated in another way, 
[Whitney] would have received something for nothing should the one-half mineral 
interest been reserved by it.
 
We agree with the 
district court.  The evidence was 
relevant.
 
[¶31]     
Finally, Whitney 
claims that the district court erred in failing to hold that the Terrys’ claim 
was barred by the ten year statute of limitations applicable to claims to reform 
a contract.  The applicability of a 
statute of limitations is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.  Ray v. St. Vincent Healthcare, Inc., 
2006 WY 98, ¶ 8, 139 P.3d 464, 466 (Wyo. 2006); McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 978 
(Wyo. 1999).
 
[¶32]     
Whitney’s assertion 
that this is an action for reformation is tied to its contention that the 
reservation at issue was unambiguous and that the Terrys sought reformation 
based upon “mistake.”  Neither 
contention has merit.  The deed is 
ambiguous, and the Terrys never sought to reform the deed because of mistake. 

 
[¶33]     
The only evidence of 
“mistake” in the trial occurred during cross-examination of the Terrys by 
counsel for Whitney.  In an apparent 
attempt to obtain a factual foundation for its statute of limitations claim, 
Whitney’s counsel sought testimony from the Terrys that the term “sellers” was 
mistakenly used in the deed.  Mrs. 
Terry testified that the term was “confusing.”
 
[COUNSEL]:  Now, if you’ll look at the last page of 
this deed, page number seven, where it says:  “Excepting and reserving to the seller 
one half of the coal and other minerals”; do you see those words at the 
top?
 
A:  Yes.
 
. 
. .
 
Q:  Well, do you believe that these words in 
the – on the last page of Exhibit 7, where it says wherein exception reserves to 
the seller one half of the minerals, do you believe those words are a 
mistake?
 
A:  I think they’re 
confusing.
 
Q:  Well, when you took – when I took your 
deposition didn’t you think that these words were a mistake?  Do you recall discussing this with me 
when we took your deposition?
 
A:  Yes.  I thought they were con – I think 
they’re confusing.  I know what was 
said and they should have been –
 
Q:  Do you recall that, in speaking to this 
particular clause, I asked you this question and you gave this answer:  “Do you believe this clause was just a 
mistake?”
 
            
“Answer:  Oh, I 
do.”
 
            
“Question:  
Okay.”
 
            
“Answer:  I absolutely 
do.”
 
A:  Okay.  The reason that I said that – can I 
explain?
 
THE 
COURT:  Well, he gets to ask the 
questions.  Your lawyer will have a 
chance to ask follow-up questions—
 
THE 
WITNESS:  Okay, thank 
you.
 
THE 
COURT:  So if he wants you to 
explain, he’ll ask you to, but he’s kind of in control of what’s 
asked.
 
THE 
WITNESS:  Okay.  I still think it’s 
confusing.
 
[COUNSEL]:  Okay.  Mrs. Terry, did – in your deposition did 
I ask those questions and did you give those answers?
 
THE 
WITNESS:  Yes.
 
Counsel 
for the Terrys followed-up on redirect:
 
[COUNSEL]:  All right.  Your Honor, that’s the same question 
[Counsel] just asked a few minutes ago.  
So back to the question:  The 
first paragraph on the last page of Exhibit 7, where it says:  “Excepting and reserving to the 
sellers.”
 
THE 
WITNESS:  I thought that they meant 
to the Kaufmanns, because the Kaufmanns reserved half and sold to [Whitney] to 
give to us half.
 
[COUNSEL]:  All right.  Now let’s look at the second 
paragraph.
 
THE 
WITNESS:  And the same thing:  Mr. Zimmerman, when he died, we were to 
receive half.
 
[COUNSEL]:  Okay. I have no further questions for 
Mrs. Terry. 
 
[¶34]     
Mr. Terry also denied 
that use of the term “sellers” was a mistake.  This short excerpt from Mr. Terry’s 
cross-examination sums up the Terrys’ position that the term “sellers” referred 
to the Kaufmanns and that it would be a mistake for the term “sellers” to be 
read as “Whitney.”
 
Q:  If you’ll turn to the last page of the 
document, I’ll read just a portion of a clause and ask you a question, if I 
may.  It says:  “Excepting and reserving, however, to 
the sellers and to their heirs and assigns one half of all coal, sub-bituminous 
coal,” and it goes on to describe other minerals.  Do you see those 
words?
 
A:  Yes.
 
. 
. .
 
Q:  Do you believe that those words that I 
read out of this deed, where:  
“Excepts and reserves minerals to the seller” is a 
mistake?
 
A:  Is the seller in that case the 
Kaufmanns?
 
Q:  No, the seller would be 
[Whitney].
 
A:  Selling it to who?
 
Q:  Selling it to you and your 
wife.
 
A:  They weren’t supposed to even be 
involved in all that, on the Kaufmann place.  Well, they had to be, I guess, but it 
wasn’t our intention that – 
 
Q:  Well, do you believe that those words in 
the deed are just a mistake?
 
A:  I’d have to say that, because they were 
just – they were just going to pick it up, buy it, and that was it and – but I 
realize they had to make a – they had to probably mention the minerals and 
everything, but I just don’t understand why they took it.  
 
Q:  Well, so to make my question a little 
more clear, do you believe that this deed, which is Exhibit 7, contains a 
mistake when it excepts and reserves any minerals at all through 
[Whitney]?
 
A:  I hope it was a mistake.3
 
[¶35]     
Both parties in this 
action were merely asking the district court to interpret the deed.  Disagreement as to the meaning of a term 
in an agreement does not convert a quiet title action into an action for 
reformation.  The Terrys’ quiet 
title action is not barred by the statute of limitations.
 
[¶36]     
In conclusion, we 
would reiterate that the fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to 
determine the intent of the parties.  
Mullinnix, ¶ 22, 126 P.3d  at 
919.  The district court properly 
determined that the Limited Warranty Deed was ambiguous and did not err in 
admitting extrinsic evidence to interpret the deed.  The language of the Limited Warranty 
Deed and the properly admitted extrinsic evidence support the district court’s 
determination that Whitney did not reserve any mineral interest in the 
Ranchester property.
 
[¶37]     
Affirmed.
 
HILL, 
Justice, dissenting, in which KITE, Chief Justice, 
joins.
 
[¶38]   I respectfully dissent from the 
majority opinion in this case.  The 
Whitney/Terry deed clearly and unambiguously reserves a one-half mineral 
interest to the seller, Whitney.  
That reservation may, very well, have been a mistake.  However, that mistake should not be 
corrected by torturing our rules of contract interpretation to essentially 
remove the reservation from the deed and allow the one-half mineral interest to 
be conveyed to the buyers, the Terrys.
 
[¶39]   Whitney conveyed the Ranchester 
property to the Terrys in a Limited Warranty Deed dated February 25, 1980, which 
stated, in relevant part:
 
. 
. . [Whitney] . . . does hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto [the 
Terrys] . . . all of the real property situate in Sheridan County, State of 
Wyoming, described in Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof, SUBJECT, 
HOWEVER, to the exceptions, restrictions, and reservations set forth in the 
Warranty Deed from [the Kaufmanns] to the Grantor herein, the easements and 
rights-of-ways of record; to all mineral and oil royalty reservations or 
conveyances contained in prior instruments of record; and all existing mineral 
leases affecting said lands.
 
            
Grantor warrants title solely against the acts and deeds of Grantor and 
no other. 
 
Exhibit 
A included a legal description of the Ranchester property, the reservation 
specifically at issue here, and a reference to the Zimmerman life 
estate:
 
EXCEPTING 
AND RESERVING, HOWEVER, to the sellers and to their heirs and assigns, one-half 
of all coal, . . . oil, gas, . . . and all other minerals of every kind and 
character, contained in or underlying said lands.
 
ALSO 
SUBJECT to that certain life estate now held by Clyde Zimmerman, as a result of 
the reservation set forth in the Warranty Deed from [Zimmerman and others] which 
reservation extends to the lands above described.
 
[¶40]   The Whitney/Terry deed, therefore, 
included a reservation to the sellers of a one-half mineral interest and gave 
notice of reservations and exceptions contained in two other deeds – the 
Kaufmann/Whitney deed and the Zimmerman/Kaufmann deed.  The Kaufmann/Whitney deed reserved to 
the Kaufmanns one-half mineral interest.  
The Zimmerman/Kaufmann deed conveyed the Ranchester property to the 
Kaufmanns and stated the following with regard to the reserved life 
estate:
 
RESERVING, 
HOWEVER, to the Grantors [Zimmerman, et al.] and to the survivor of them, for 
the term of their natural lives, one-half of all coal, oil, gas and other 
minerals contained or underlying said lands[.]
 
[¶41]   A deed is a contract and we employ 
our typical contract interpretation principles to interpret it.  Ecosystem Resources, LC v. Broadbent Land & Resources, LLC, 2007 WY 87, ¶ 9, 158 P.3d 685, 688 (Wyo. 2007); Carlson v. 
Flocchini Inv., 2005 WY 19, ¶ 15, 106 P.3d 847, 854 (Wyo. 
2005).
 
In 
considering the meaning of a contract, we focus on the parties’ intent.  If possible, we determine their intent 
from the language used in the agreement.  Where the language is clear and 
unambiguous, we limit our inquiry to the four corners of the document, giving 
the words contained therein their ordinary meaning.  The parties are free to incorporate 
within their agreement whatever lawful terms they desire, and we are not at 
liberty, under the guise of judicial construction, to rewrite the agreement. 
 It is only when a contract is 
ambiguous that we construe the document by resorting to rules of construction. 
 A contract is ambiguous if 
indefiniteness of expression or double meaning obscures the parties’ 
intent.
 
Davidson 
Land Co. LLC v. Davidson, 2011 WY 29, ¶ 14, 247 P.3d 67, 
71-72 (Wyo. 2011) (citations omitted).  
We consider parol evidence to construe a deed only if it is, first, found 
to be ambiguous on its face.  Belden v. Thorkildsen, 2007 WY 68, ¶ 16, 156 P.3d 320, 324 
(Wyo. 2007).  In other words, parol 
evidence may not be used to create an ambiguity.  Schulz v. Miller, 837 P.2d 71, 75 (Wyo. 
1992).
 
[¶42]   The district court stated that 
“[a]ttempting to give meaning to the multiple reservations which appear to 
overlap and be repetitive prevents a clear and unambiguous determination as to 
what minerals were reserved.”  The 
majority agreed with this assessment.  
“[I]f a grantor intends to keep some property 
interest when conveying the property, he 'reserves’ that interest.”  Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. v. 
South Douglas Highway Water & Sewer Dist., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 18, 173 P.3d 398, 403 (Wyo. 
2007) (emphasis in original).  
The Whitney/Terry deed, therefore, contains only one true 
reservation – the reservation of one-half minerals to the sellers in Exhibit 
A.  The remainder of the exceptions 
in the deed simply gave notice of other encumbrances by stating that the 
conveyance was “subject to” the one-half mineral interest the Kaufmanns had 
already reserved, other reservations of record and the Zimmerman life 
estate.
 
[¶43]   The district court and, apparently, 
the majority ascribe significance to the deed’s reference to the Zimmerman life 
estate and indicate that somehow renders the deed ambiguous.  The Terrys maintained that the deed 
would not have referred to the life estate unless the parties intended the life 
estate to encumber the one-half interest that supposedly transferred to 
them.  It is axiomatic that neither 
Whitney nor the Terrys had the authority to affect, in any way, the encumbrances 
or prior reservations already extant in the chain of title.  Thus, Whitney and the Terrys could not 
“assign” the life estate to either half of the minerals in the Whitney/Terry 
deed.  The only legal purpose for 
referring to the life estate was to give notice that the life estate was part of 
the chain of title.  Furthermore, 
delving into the issue of which part of the mineral estate the life estate 
burdened ignores our precedent which clearly states that quiet title actions 
involve and bind only the parties before the court.  Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶¶ 52-53, 226 P.3d 889, 911-12 (Wyo. 2010).  The life 
tenants are not involved in this matter and, from the record, it appears they 
are deceased.  As such, the life 
estate does not affect the only true reservation in the Whitney/Terry deed – the 
reservation of one-half mineral interest to the sellers.
 
[¶44]   The majority rules that the deed is 
ambiguous because the reservation in Exhibit A uses the word “sellers” instead 
of the word “grantor” like in the body of the deed.  In making that ruling, the majority 
apparently accepted the Terrys’ argument that the term “sellers” refers to the 
Kaufmanns.  While it is not artful 
to use two different terms to identify a party in a deed, there is no question 
that Whitney was the seller in the deed.  
In fact, the granting clause states:  “[Whitney] . . . does hereby grant, 
bargain, sell and convey unto [the Terrys] . . . all 
of the real property situate in Sheridan County, State of Wyoming, described in 
Exhibit A.”  To suggest that the 
Kaufmanns, who were not even parties to the deed, were the sellers defies 
logic.
 
[¶45]   The majority also finds ambiguity 
in the use of the plural “sellers” since Whitney should have been referred to in 
the singular and indicates that this reinforces the argument that the reference 
to sellers is to the Kaufmanns.  In 
considering this argument, it is important to remember that the actual grantor 
in the deed was Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc.  
Obviously, Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc. is a corporation and should have been 
referred to in the singular; however, the name of the corporation “Peter Kiewit 
Sons,” stated in the plural, lends itself to the plural reference.  Reading the inadvertent use of the 
plural to refer to Peter Kiewit Sons makes much more sense than reading that 
reference to mean, as the Terrys advocate, the Kaufmanns who were not even 
parties to the deed.
 
[¶46]   If we ignore, as the majority does, 
that the reservation in Exhibit A uses the active voice, i.e., the sellers 
“reserve,” and interpret the reservation to the sellers as simply giving notice 
of the Kaufmanns’ prior reservation of their one-half mineral interest, we 
encounter another deed interpretation problem.  Such an interpretation results in there 
being two provisions in the deed which give notice of the Kaufmanns’ reservation 
– the first one in the granting clause where specific reference is made to the 
reservation in the Kaufmann/Whitney deed and the second in Exhibit A where the 
sellers reserve the mineral interest.  
This interpretation violates a basic principle of contract 
interpretation, which requires that we give separate effect to each provision so 
as to avoid rendering a provision meaningless.  Shaffer v. WinHealth Partners, 2011 WY 
131, ¶ 17, 261 P.3d 708, 713 (Wyo. 2011).
 
[¶47]   I, therefore, disagree with the 
district court’s and majority’s conclusion that the deed is ambiguous.  There is nothing indefinite or confusing 
in the deed language that obscures the parties’ intent with regard to the 
meaning of the reservation – Whitney, the only “seller” involved in the 
Whitney/Terry deed, reserved one-half mineral interest to itself.  The majority improperly stretches the 
language and relies on implausible assumptions to conclude the deed is 
ambiguous.
 
[¶48]   Here, the seller, which unquestionably was 
Whitney within the context of the Whitney/Terry deed, reserved one-half the minerals in 
the Ranchester property.  The majority concludes, completely contrary to the deed 
language, that the parties actually intended to convey one-half mineral interest to 
the buyers.  Similarly, the Terrys’ contention that 
the reference to sellers in the deed was to the Kaufmanns makes no sense because 
the Kaufmanns were not parties to this deed and, therefore, could not reserve 
anything in it.  The district court 
and majority improperly used parol evidence to contradict the terms of the 
contract.  See, Bixler v. Oro Management, LLC, 2004 WY 29, ¶ 20, 86 P.3d 843, 850 (Wyo. 2004); Schulz, 837 P.2d  at 75.
 
[¶49]   Another problem is that much of the 
evidence and testimony offered by the Terrys at the trial and relied upon by the 
district court in reaching its decision pertained to the Terrys’ subjective 
intent with regard to the transaction.  
Peggy Terry, Clarence Terry, and their attorney testified that it was 
always the parties’ intent that Whitney simply act as a conduit in the like-kind 
exchange and transfer whatever interest it received from the Kaufmanns to the 
Terrys.  The Terrys stated that they 
were to obtain the one-half mineral interest in the property.  The district court found Ms. Terry’s 
testimony particularly credible.  
Regardless of her credibility, we have repeatedly stated that “the 
parties’ statements of what they intended the contract to mean are not 
admissible” to interpret deed language.  
Hickman v. Groves, 2003 WY 76, ¶ 13, 71 P.3d 256, 260 
(Wyo. 2003); Jacobs Ranch Coal Co. v. 
Thunder Basin Coal Co., 2008 WY 
101, ¶ 17, 191 P.3d 125, 131 (Wyo. 2008).  Thus, the parties’ statements as to 
their subjective intent were not relevant or admissible under any circumstances 
to interpret the deed.
 
[¶50]   The majority incorrectly applies 
our rules of deed interpretation to reach a desired result, that being the 
implementation of the parties’ overall intent without regard for the deed 
language.  I understand that 
sentiment; in fact, I would agree that, looking at the inadmissible parol 
evidence of the overall transaction, Whitney and the Terrys probably intended 
that the Terrys obtain ownership of the one-half mineral interest.  However, that unwritten intent is 
directly contrary to the language they used in the deed.  As such, they obviously made a mistake 
in drafting the deed.  The legal 
avenue to correct a mutual mistake in a deed is to bring an action to reform the 
deed.
 
[¶51]   “Reformation is an equitable remedy 
available in cases where a mistake in the drafting of the written contract makes 
the writing convey the intent or meaning of neither party to the contract.”  Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. W.N. McMurry Const. 
Co., 230 P.3d 312, 320 (Wyo. 
2010); Hutchins v. Payless Auto Sales, 
Inc., 2002 WY 8, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d 1057, 1063 (Wyo. 2002).  “The remedy is appropriate when a 
written instrument does not accurately memorialize the parties’ agreement.”  Sanders v. Sanders, 2010 WY 77, 
¶ 12, 234 P.3d 343, 348 (Wyo. 2010).  
A party seeking to reform an instrument must demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence: “(1) a meeting of the minds--a 
mutual understanding between the parties--prior to the time a writing is entered 
into, (2) a written contract, or agreement, or deed (3) which does not conform to the 
understanding, by reason of mutual mistake.”  Id.  
This is exactly what the Terrys are claiming in this 
case - the parties had agreed that the Terrys would receive the 
mineral interest and the deed actually executed by Whitney did not conform to 
that understanding as a result of a mutual mistake.  If we condone use of parol evidence to 
“interpret” a contract to correct an obvious mistake in the instrument, there 
will no longer be any need for the remedy of reformation.
 
[¶52]   The legal concept of reformation 
has been analyzed in cases remarkably similar to the present one.  In Town of Glenrock v. Abadie, 259 P.2d 766 (Wyo. 1953), Engelking 
agreed to sell certain property to Skinner, while reserving one-half of the 
mineral interest.  When he executed 
the deed; however, he failed to reserve the mineral interest.  Skinner then entered into an agreement 
to sell the property to the Town of Glenrock.  The agreement stated that one-half of 
the mineral rights had been reserved by Engelking and that the Town would be 
receiving only one-half of the mineral rights.  Skinner then executed a warranty deed to 
the Town without reserving any mineral rights.  After he had already transferred his 
interest in the property to the Town, Skinner gave Engelking a deed purporting 
to convey to him one-half of the minerals.  
Later, the Town conveyed back to Skinner one-half of the mineral 
interest.  Id. at 766-68.  In a subsequent quiet title action, the 
Town sought a declaration of its ownership.
 
[¶53]   We determined that a mistake had 
been made by failing to reserve Engelking’s mineral interest, and that “[s]uch 
an action is an action to correct or reform a deed.”  Town of Glenrock, 259 P.2d  at 770.  A reformation claim was, however, barred 
by the applicable statute of limitations because the limitations period began to 
run upon the recording of the deed and over thirty years had passed before the 
action to recover the mistakenly conveyed interest was commenced.  Id. at 770-72.  The only substantive difference between 
the case at bar and Town of Glenrock 
is that here a reservation was allegedly mistakenly included rather than 
omitted.  See also, Sanders, ¶¶ 11, 20, 234 P.3d  at 
346-49 (discussing plaintiffs’ efforts to reform a deed to remove a joint tenant 
whom they claimed was only intended to have survivor rights and no right to 
present possession of the property and holding that reformation was not proper 
because naming the defendant as a joint tenant in the deed was not a mutual 
mistake, even though the parties did not actually intend to give the defendant 
all of the rights of a joint tenant); Samuel Mares Post No. 8, American Legion, 
Dept. of Wyoming v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Converse, 697 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1985) 
(addressing the Legion’s contention that it had conveyed the property “to be 
used solely as an airport and if the property ever ceased to be used as such, 
the land would revert back to the Legion,” and concluding that, even if that was 
the parties’ intent at the time of conveyance, the deed was unambiguous, did not 
contain a condition subsequent, and could not be reformed some 50 years later to 
include such a condition).
 
[¶54]   In this case, the Terrys 
essentially sought to remove the mistaken reservation of a one-half mineral 
interest to Whitney.  That is a 
classic reformation action.  The 
general ten-year statute of limitations applies to actions to reform a deed, and 
the limitations period began to run when the deed was recorded.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-109 (LexisNexis 
2011).4  See also, Samuel Mares Post No. 8, 697 P.2d  at 1042; Town of Glenrock, 259 P.  at 429-30.  The Whitney/Terry deed was recorded on 
February 25, 1980; consequently, the limitations period on any claim for 
reformation or correction of the mistaken reservation had expired when the 
Terrys’ filed their quiet title action in 2009.  I would conclude that the district court 
erred by saving the Terrys from the reformation statute of limitations by 
improperly using deed interpretation principles to completely remove a mistaken, 
but clear, reservation of mineral interest.
  FOOTNOTES
1Whitney’s 
predecessor in interest, Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc., executed the relevant 
documents in this case.  In order to 
simplify the discussion, we will simply refer to Peter Kiewit and Whitney as 
“Whitney.”  Years after the 
transaction, the Terrys transferred the mineral interest into a trust.  We will refer to the Terrys and the 
trust as “the Terrys.”
 
2The Ranchester 
property was owned by “Carl Kaufmann and Vera L. Kaufmann, husband and wife; 
Clifford C. Kaufmann and Rose Marie Kaufmann, husband and wife; and Carl A. 
Church, Jr. and Charlene Ann Church, husband and wife.”  We will refer to these owners as “the 
Kaufmanns.”
3This 
exchange provides another example of the approach taken by Whitney as described 
in paragraph 23 of this opinion.
4Section 
1-3-109 states:  “An action for relief, not hereinbefore provided for, can 
only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of action 
accrues.”