Case Title: Tatum v. Yost

Citation: 

Docket Number: 399, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SUSAN TATUM,1 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 399, 2006  
 
Respondent Below, 
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Family Court of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
State of Delaware in and for New  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
KEVIN YOST, 
§ 
File No.    CN94-06703 
 
§ 
Pet. Nos. 05-27827 (RSC) 
 
Petitioner Below, 
§ 
06-08633 (custody mod.)  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 11, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 15, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 15th day of August 2007, having considered the opening brief 
filed by Susan Tatum through her counsel and the pro se answering brief 
filed by Kevin Yost, it appears to the Court that: 
 
 
(1) 
This appeal is from the Family Court’s decision of June 27, 
2006, on Susan Tatum’s motion for modification of custody and Kevin 
Yost’s petition for a rule to show cause (“RSC”). The Court has concluded 
that this matter must be remanded for further proceedings. 
                                                 
1 By Order dated March 27, 2007, the Court sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the 
parties.  Del. Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
 
2
 
(2) 
Tatum and Yost have joint custody of their two sons.  Kevin 
will turn fifteen this month, and Karl is twelve.2  In 1998, Yost was granted 
primary residential placement of both boys, and Tatum was awarded 
visitation.3  Since 1998, Tatum and Yost have litigated custody and 
placement issues. 
 
(3) 
In 2004, Tatum filed a motion for modification of custody.  
Tatum sought shared residential placement on a week-to-week basis.  In 
December 2004, the Family Court determined that Tatum and Yost should 
share residential placement on an alternating six-month basis beginning July 
2005.4  Tatum was granted the boys’ placement for the first six months on 
the condition that she provided information to the Court by January 2005.5  
In the interim, Tatum and Yost were required to comply with the prior 1998 
order granting residential placement to Yost and visitation to Tatum. 
 
(4) 
In February 2005, the Family Court stayed the December 2004 
order until further notice, on the basis that Tatum had not submitted the 
                                                 
2 The Court has sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties’ children.  Del. Supr. Ct. 
R. 7(d). 
3 Tatum v. Yost, Del. Fam. Ct., CN94-06703, Pet. No. 97-06955, Waserstein, J. (May 28, 
1998). 
4 Tatum v. Yost, Del. Fam. Ct., CN94-06703, Pet. No. 02017, Waserstein, J. (Dec. 29, 
2004). 
5Tatum was required to provide the Court with an official report outlining the 
probationary status of her roommate. 
 
3
information that was due in January 2005.6  As a result of the stay, the 
December 2004 order did not take effect in July 2005 and the prior 1998 
order remained in full force and effect. 
 
(5) 
Under the 1998 order, Tatum was allowed five weeks of 
visitation in the summer.  Tatum did not return Kevin and Karl to Yost at the 
conclusion of the 2005 summer visitation.7 
 
(6) 
In late August 2005, Yost filed a RSC petition against Tatum.  
In early September 2005, Yost reclaimed Kevin and Karl when he picked 
them up early from school.  Yost was successful in restoring residential 
placement with Karl.  Kevin, however, resisted the change and returned to 
Tatum’s residence.8 
 
(7) 
The Family Court learned of Kevin’s de facto placement with 
Tatum at a March 17, 2006 hearing on Yost’s RSC.9  The Court directed that 
Tatum and Yost seek counseling for Kevin and take turns taking Kevin to 
counseling appointments. 
                                                 
6 Tatum v. Yost, Del. Fam. Ct., CN94-06703, Pet. No. 04-02017, Waserstein, J. (Feb. 14, 
2005). 
7 Tatum later contended that she did not understand and/or was not aware that the Family 
Court had stayed the December 2004 order. 
8 Yost testified that Kevin “threw a terrible tantrum” and was “hell bent on going back to 
his mother’s residence.”  Hr’g Tr. at 14 (Mar. 17, 2006). 
9 Tatum appeared with counsel at the hearing and was represented by counsel at all 
subsequent hearings. 
 
4
 
(8) 
The Family Court adjourned the March 17 RSC hearing for the 
purpose of reviewing Kevin’s school records.  The Court reconvened the 
hearing on March 30, 2006.  Tatum appeared at the March 30 hearing; Yost 
did not.10 
 
(9) 
On March 21, 2006, Tatum filed a motion for modification of 
custody.11  Tatum sought “full custody and residential placement” with 
                                                 
10 At the March 30 hearing, Tatum testified that (i) Kevin was residing with her and was 
scheduled to go to his first counseling appointment the following week; (ii) Karl was 
spending alternate weekend visitation with her and was otherwise residing with Yost in 
accordance with the 1998 order; and (iii) Yost had not picked Kevin up for his most 
recent weekend visitation.  
11 Hearing transcripts in the Family Court record reflect that Tatum’s motion for 
modification of custody was not unexpected.  The March 17, 2006 hearing transcript 
provides: 
[TATUM’S COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, if I could get some guidance.  Are you 
saying that you want a petition for custody hearing started? 
THE COURT:  If that’s what your client wants then she has to file a petition. 
 
*      
*      
*   
THE COURT:  So I will reschedule the rule to show cause to look at the 
reports cards and then if your client wishes to have a petition for custody 
filed and you arrange for [Yost] to pick up the papers we’ll consolidate 
both things. 
 
* 
* 
*   
THE COURT:  In the event that mother files a[n] affidavit for modification 
of custody, that latter shall be heard at the same time as the rule to show 
cause if service has been made on father.  Sir, if he files a petition for 
custody modification and he calls you on the telephone or you go to his 
office and pick it up. 
See Hr’g Tr. at 15, 17, 32 (Mar. 17, 2006).  The June 23, 2006 hearing transcript 
provides: 
THE COURT:  Did mom file for custody? 
[TATUM’S COUNSEL]:  Yes, Your Honor.   
See Hr’g Tr. at 5 (June 23, 2006). 
 
5
“liberal visitation” for Yost or, in the alternative, shared residential 
placement in accordance with the December 2004 order. 
 
(10) The Family Court conducted a hearing in June 2006 on Yost’s 
RSC petition and Tatum’s motion for modification of custody.  Tatum 
appeared at the hearing; Yost did not.12 
 
(11) By order dated June 27, 2006, the Family Court ruled on Yost’s 
RSC petition and Tatum’s motion for modification of custody.  “Given 
[Yost’s] default,” the Court reimposed the December 2004 order effective 
July 2006 but with one significant change.  The Court ruled that Tatum and 
Yost would share residential placement of Karl but not Kevin.  The Court 
granted primary residential placement of Kevin to Tatum.  This appeal 
followed. 
 
(12) Tatum makes three arguments in her opening brief on appeal.  
Tatum argues that the Family Court committed reversible error when it 
decided her motion for modification of custody in the absence of a best 
interest analysis under title 13, section 722 of the Delaware Code.  Next, 
Tatum argues that the June 27, 2006 decision should be reversed because it 
ruled that Kevin and Karl should be separated for six months of every year.  
                                                 
12 At the June 23, 2006 hearing, Tatum testified that (i) Kevin was continuing to reside 
with her and that Karl was residing with Yost; (ii) Karl was regularly spending alternate 
weekend visitation with her; and (iii) Yost had been taking Kevin to every other 
counseling appointment but had not picked Kevin up at all for alternate weekend 
visitation. 
 
6
Third, Tatum argues that the Family Court’s decision should be reversed for 
its failure to award her full custody and primary residential placement of 
both boys despite having declared Yost in default. 
 
(13) Yost filed a pro se answering brief.  Yost’s position is as 
follows: 
I [Kevin Yost], father of [Kevin Yost and Karl 
Yost] contest that the mother [Susan Tatum] is and 
has been in contempt of court from start to present 
in these proceeding.  A simple background check 
of the kids while in her custody will show that.  
I’m in agreement with [Kevin] living with his 
mother and [Karl] living with father as is at present 
and [Karl] has improved greatly. 
 
 
(14) Appellate review of an appeal from a Family Court custody 
decision extends to the facts and the law.13  To the extent the Family Court’s 
decision implicates rulings of law, our review is de novo.14  Findings of fact 
are not disturbed unless they are found to be clearly erroneous and justice 
requires that they be overturned.15 
 
(15) When deciding residential custody, or when otherwise making a 
substantial change in a child’s living arrangement, the Family Court is 
required to determine what is in the best interests of the child.16  The Court 
                                                 
13 Wife (J.F.V.) v. (Husband O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979).   
14 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
15 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983) 
16 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 722 (1999 & Supp. 2006) (governing best interests of 
child). 
 
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is required make a best interests determination even when one of the parties 
is in default.17   
 
(16) The Family Court determines a child’s best interests by 
considering “all relevant factors” including eight factors that are listed in 
title 13, section 722 of the Delaware Code.18  The Court considers and 
balances the best interest factors “in accordance with the factual 
circumstances of the evidence presented.”19  
 
(17)   It is generally preferable for the Family Court to explicitly 
refer to the statutory factors of section 722 when determining the best 
interests of a child.20  “This Court cannot conduct a meaningful appellate 
review of a permanent custody judgment unless the Family Court sets forth a 
                                                 
17 Harper v. Harper, 826 A.2d 293, 296 (Del. 2003). 
18 The statutory best interest factors are (a) the wishes of the child’s parents as to his 
custody and residential arrangements; (b) the wishes of the child as to his custodian and 
residential arrangements; (c) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with other 
relatives with whom he lives; (d) the child’s adjustment to his home, school and 
community; (e) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; (f) past and 
present compliance by both parents with their rights and responsibilities to their child;  
(g) evidence of domestic violence; and (h) the criminal history of any party or any other 
resident of the household.  Del. Code Ann. tit., 13 § 722(a). 
19 Fisher v. Fisher, 691 A.2d 619, 623 (Del. 1997).  
20 Compare Fisher v. Fisher, 691 A.2d 619 (Del. 1997) (remanding for new hearing and 
explicit reference to section 722 criteria when the Family Court had made a dramatic 
change in the children’s current living arrangement), and Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185 
(Del. 1991) (concluding that the Family Court decision under peculiar circumstances of 
case demonstrated satisfactory implicit application of the statutory factors of section 
722). 
 
8
complete analysis of the consideration it gave to all of the factors in [s]ection 
722.”21    
 
(18) Title 13, section 729 of the Delaware Code sets forth the legal 
standards applicable to a motion seeking modification of custody or 
residential placement.22  When considering a motion to modify that is filed 
two years or more after the Court’s most recent custody/residential 
placement order, the Court is required to determine the motion in accordance 
with the best interest factors of section 722.23  When considering a motion to 
modify that is filed less than two years from the Court’s most recent 
custody/residential placement order, the Court is not required to make a best 
interest analysis unless, after a hearing, it has made a threshold 
determination that continuing enforcement of the prior custody/residential 
placement order may endanger the child’s physical health or significantly 
impair his or her emotional development.24 
 
(19) In this case, when considering Tatum’s 2004 motion for 
modification of custody and issuing its December 2004 order, the Family 
Court was appropriately guided by the statutory framework governing the 
modification of prior custody/residential placement orders.  After 
                                                 
21 Fisher v. Fisher, 691 A.2d 619, 623 (Del. 1997). 
22 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 729 (1999). 
23 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 729(c)(2)(c). 
24 Del. Code Ann., tit. 13, § 729(c)(1). 
 
9
determining the applicable legal standard under section 729, the Court 
considered and referred, at least implicitly, to the best interest factors of 
section 722.  
 
(20) This Court has concluded that the Family Court should have 
applied the statutory factors governing the modification of prior 
custody/residential placement orders explicitly when considering Tatum’s 
2006 motion for modification of custody.  Accordingly, the Court will 
remand this matter to the Family Court for reconsideration of Tatum’s 2006 
motion for modification of custody. 
 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is 
REMANDED to the Family Court for reconsideration of Tatum’s 2006 
motion for modification of custody and an evidentiary hearing thereon.  
When deciding the motion, the Family Court should consider the facts 
adduced at the hearing in June 2006 as well as the evidence admitted at the 
remand hearing regarding the present circumstances of the parties and their 
children.  The hearing should take place within thirty days of the date of this 
Order.  Jurisdiction is not retained. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice