Case Title: In re Conservatorship of Eric B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S261812

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of ERIC B. 
 
 
PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, as 
Conservator, etc., 
Petitioner and Respondent, 
v. 
ERIC B.,  
Objector and Appellant. 
 
S261812 
 
First Appellate District, Division Five 
A157280 
 
Contra Costa County Superior Court 
P18-01826 
 
 
April 28, 2022 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Kruger, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Moore* concurred. 
 
 
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices 
Liu and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
S261812 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
The Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act authorizes one-
year conservatorships for those gravely disabled by a mental 
disorder or chronic alcoholism.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350.)  
Conservatorship proceedings are civil in nature, so the 
constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants do not 
directly apply.  However, the Legislature has extended many of 
the same rights by statute to the commitment of persons found 
not guilty of crimes by reason of insanity (NGI’s).  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(7).)  Among those is the right not to give 
compelled testimony at trial.  (See Hudec v. Superior Court 
(2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 826 (Hudec).)  The question here is 
whether those facing conservatorship due to an inability to care 
for themselves should enjoy the same protection.  We conclude 
that, for purposes of the right against compelled testimony, the 
groups are sufficiently similar that equal protection principles 
require the government to justify its disparate treatment of 
these proposed conservatees.  However, because it is undisputed 
any error here was harmless, we need not decide what level of 
scrutiny is appropriate or whether the disparate treatment of 
conservatees can be constitutionally justified.  We affirm the 
judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The Contra Costa County Public Guardian (Public 
Guardian) petitioned for an LPS conservatorship on the ground 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
that appellant Eric B. was gravely disabled.  Appellant 
requested a jury trial on the petition and objected to giving 
compelled testimony, based on the holding in Hudec, supra, 60 
Cal.4th 815.  The court overruled the objection.  
 
Psychiatrist Michael Levin, M.D., testified that appellant 
has chronic schizophrenia.  Treatment included three 
medications, one of which required weekly white blood cell 
monitoring.  Appellant’s minimal insight about his illness made 
it difficult for him to cooperate with treatment.  When not 
housed in a treatment facility, he had failed to take his 
medication, which aggravated his symptoms.  Levin considered 
appellant gravely disabled and doubted he could provide for his 
basic needs without a conservatorship.  
 
Therapist James Grey became appellant’s case manager 
at the Concord Adult Mental Health Clinic in 2016, after 
paranoid behaviors put appellant’s subsidized housing at risk.  
Appellant had tried to change door locks and damaged his 
apartment searching for monitoring devices.  Although Grey 
arranged transportation for clinic appointments, appellant was 
usually unwilling to go.  According to Grey, appellant displayed 
the 
paranoia, 
guardedness, 
and 
agitation 
typical 
of 
schizophrenia, and his cooperation with treatment was “very 
inconsistent.”  Appellant had full bottles of medication that were 
months old and other psychiatric prescriptions went unfilled.  
The county had been serving as appellant’s money manager, 
providing him an allowance, but he often failed to cash these 
checks.  Appellant was treated as a psychiatric inpatient when 
a temporary conservatorship was ordered but was later released 
against Grey’s advice.  Within a week, he was admitted to an 
emergency psychiatric facility and was eventually transferred to 
his current placement.  Appellant remained guarded and 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
paranoid, with an extremely flat affect and disorganized 
thoughts.  He sometimes believed his mother was not actually 
his mother and that others posed a threat to him.  He had 
significant difficulty complying with treatment and medications 
and was generally unable to meet his needs for food and clothing 
without support.  
 
Called to the stand by the Public Guardian, appellant 
testified that he lived in a board and care facility and was 
previously in an intensive treatment unit.  After multiple 
questions about where he had lived, appellant remarked, “I 
didn’t know[,] T-Con had to deal with being here and being 
there.  It has nothing to do with each other.”  He knew that Grey 
believed he should be moved from a temporary to a full 
conservatorship.  Asked what he wanted to happen, appellant 
gave a rambling and partially incoherent response, asserting he 
might not need a conservatorship because, though he had a 
mental health disorder, he did not always need medications for 
it.1  He said he was told he had attention deficit disorder as a 
child.  “I just had a learning disability.  They didn’t say anything 
about anxiety disorders or any manic problem or anything else 
like that.”  He could name two of his medications but did not 
 
1  
He stated:  “Oh, I even kind of have really spoken not too 
clearly about this.  But I’m more towards the neutrality and 
leaving enough area of a cushion that I could have — so I could 
leave the temporary conservatorship because maybe it’s that I 
don’t need it.  And I know I have a mental health — mental 
health.  [¶] . . . [¶]  I know what it is.  I live with it.  I take 
medications for it.  When I know I don’t need medications, I don’t 
need medications.  [¶]  But if you will there’s always a little 
strike pad here that we can always roughly just braze and find 
out my history find out my — and my future means too.  I’m 
trying to save this for myself.”  
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
understand why he was taking them.  He believed, “[T]here’s 
just a basic medication standard issue in a given area.  And they 
hand you medication.”  Apparently referring to his inpatient 
admission, he said:  “I was admitted out of unbreeching contract.  
There’s something just going on.”  Asked to clarify this 
statement, he responded, “This is penetrating.  That’s what I 
mean.  We’ll pass on this.”  He acknowledged that he was “sort 
of still dependent” on his current program.  He had no plans for 
where he would live or how he would support himself if released 
from the conservatorship.  He thought he might get a job but 
acknowledged he had not worked since 2011.  He said he would 
take his medications but when asked how he would pay for food 
responded, “Pay for food?  Rely on the conservatorship.”  
 
The jury found appellant gravely disabled.  The court 
appointed the Public Guardian as conservator, ordered that 
appellant continue in his current placement, and restricted his 
ability to possess firearms and refuse treatment.  On appeal, 
appellant challenged the order compelling his testimony.  He 
argued that because the right to silence is statutorily provided 
in NGI extension proceedings, equal protection required that 
the same right should apply in the LPS context.  The Court of 
Appeal held that LPS conservatees are similarly situated with 
NGI’s for this purpose but ruled the error in compelling his 
testimony was harmless.  Because the Court of Appeal expressly 
disagreed with the contrary holding in Conservatorship of Bryan 
S. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 190 (Bryan S.), we granted review to 
resolve the conflict.2 
 
2  
The Public Guardian represents that the conservatorship 
at issue here terminated on June 16, 2020, rendering the appeal 
 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Overview of Relevant Civil Commitment Schemes 
 
“California 
has 
no 
fewer 
than 
nine 
involuntary 
commitment procedures that may apply to persons who have 
various mental problems, and who pose a threat to their own 
welfare or to the safety of others.  Some of these laws . . . operate 
in a manner largely independent of the criminal justice system.  
(See [Welf. & Inst. Code,] §§ 4825 [developmentally disabled 
persons . . .], 5000 et seq. [mentally ill persons under the LPS 
Act].)  Others apply depending on whether a criminal 
prosecution has occurred.”  (People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
1081, 1093 (Barrett).)  We discuss only the most pertinent 
commitment schemes here. 
 
1. 
Extended Commitments Connected to a Criminal 
 
 
Case 
 
NGI Commitments 
“A person found not guilty of a 
felony by reason of insanity may be committed to a state hospital 
for a period no longer than the maximum prison sentence for” 
the offense.  (Hudec, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 818; Pen. Code, 
§ 1026.5, subd. (a).)  Thereafter, the district attorney may 
petition to extend the NGI commitment by two years if the 
person “represents a substantial danger of physical harm to 
others” because of “a mental disease, defect, or disorder.”  (Pen. 
Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).)  The respondent has a statutory 
 
moot.  The problem frequently arises in this area of law given 
the short duration of conservatorships.  (See Conservatorship of 
John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142 fn. 2.)  Because the case 
raises important issues capable of repetition but likely to evade 
review, we exercise our discretion to decide this otherwise moot 
appeal.  (See Conservatorship of K.P. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 695, 705, 
fn. 3.) 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
right to representation by counsel and a jury trial.  (Id., 
subd. (b)(3)–(4).)  As discussed further below (see post, at pp. 13–
15), statutes also require that NGI extension hearings comply 
with certain federal and state constitutional guarantees 
applicable in criminal proceedings.  (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, 
subd. (b)(7).)  The commitment can be renewed for two-year 
periods without limitation, subject to the same procedural 
requirements.  (Id., subd. (b)(10).)  Although provided for by the 
Penal Code, NGI extension trials are considered “essentially 
civil in nature, rather than criminal, because they are directed 
at confinement for treatment rather than punishment.”  (Hudec, 
at p. 819.)  NGI’s are typically confined in state hospital 
facilities.  (See Pen. Code, § 1026, subd. (a).) 
 
Other Criminally Based Commitments   The Penal Code 
also provides for the involuntary civil commitment of violent 
offenders with mental health disorders (see Pen. Code, § 2960 et 
seq.) (OMHD’s)3 and those convicted of sexually violent offenses 
(see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) (SVP’s).  In these 
instances, the person has been convicted of serious crimes and 
incarcerated.  The civil commitment proceedings may be 
brought once the term of incarceration has ended.  (Pen. Code, 
§§ 2970, subd. (b), 2972, subd. (c); Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6601–
6603.)  In both cases, the statutes provide for renewable terms 
 
3  
Such prisoners were previously described as mentally 
disordered offenders, or MDO’s.  (See, e.g., People v. Blackburn 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1116 (Blackburn).)  The Legislature 
recently changed this terminology to “offender with a mental 
health disorder.”  (Pen. Code, § 2962, subd. (d)(3); Stats. 2019, 
ch. 9, § 7.)  In accordance with this change, we now refer to 
extension proceedings under Penal Code section 2962 as OMHD 
commitments. 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
of commitment, as well as the rights to counsel, jury trial, proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and a unanimous verdict.  (Pen. 
Code, § 2972, subds. (a)(1)–(2), (e); Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6603, 
subd. (a), 6604.)4  As does appellant, we focus our analysis 
primarily on the comparison between LPS Act commitments 
and those under the NGI scheme. 
 
2. 
LPS Act Commitments 
 
The Legislature has also enacted a civil commitment 
scheme for involuntary mental health treatment without an 
underlying criminal offense.  The LPS Act authorizes short-term 
involuntary detentions (see Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5150, 5250) 
and one-year conservatorships for those who are gravely 
disabled due to a mental health disorder or chronic alcoholism 
(see id., § 5350). 
 
When a treatment professional determines a person is 
gravely disabled and unwilling or unable to accept treatment 
voluntarily, the county’s public guardian may petition to 
establish a conservatorship.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5352; see 
Conservatorship of K.P., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 708−709.)  If 
the matter proceeds to trial and the person is found gravely 
disabled, the court appoints a conservator (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 5350), imposes “disabilities” as needed (id., § 5357), and 
determines an appropriate treatment placement (id., § 5358).  
 
4  
The original SVP statutes provided for renewable two-
year commitments.  (See People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 
1172, 1185 (McKee).)  Now, however, SVP’s are committed for an 
indeterminate period (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604) but may 
petition for discharge if they are no longer “a danger to the 
health and safety of others and . . . not likely to engage in 
sexually violent criminal behavior” (id., § 6605, subd. (a)(2); see 
id., §§ 6608–6609). 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
(See 
Conservatorship 
of 
K.P., 
at 
pp. 709–710.) 
 
A 
conservatorship terminates after one year but may be extended 
for additional one-year terms upon petition.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 5361.) 
 
The LPS Act provides for two types of conservatorships.  
The first and most common is for those who are unable to meet 
their own needs for food, clothing, or shelter due to a mental 
health disorder.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).)  
This type, which we refer to as a traditional conservatorship, is 
the kind at issue here.  Those subject to a traditional 
conservatorship have a right to be treated in “the least 
restrictive alternative placement” (id., § 5358, subd. (a)(1)(A)), 
with first priority given to their home or that of a relative (see 
id., subd. (c)(1)).  However, a significant number of these 
conservatees are placed in locked facilities, including state 
hospitals.  For example, as of February 2019, about 63 percent 
of LPS conservatees in the City and County of San Francisco 
were placed in locked facilities.  (City and County of S.F., Budget 
and Legis. Analyst’s Office, Policy Analysis Report:  Review of 
Lanterman-Petris-Short 
(LPS) 
Conservatorships 
in 
San 
Francisco (Nov. 12, 2019) p. A-11 (San Francisco Analyst’s 
Report).)  As of November 2019, LPS conservatees made up 
approximately 11 percent of the population in state hospital 
facilities, with the remainder composed of individuals whose 
commitments arose from the criminal justice system.  (Cal. 
State Auditor, Rep. No. 2019-119 (July 2020) Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act:  California Has Not Ensured That Individuals With 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
Serious Mental Illnesses Receive Adequate Ongoing Care, p. 25 
(State Auditor’s Report).)5 
 
A second type of LPS conservatorship, not at issue here, 
may be imposed when a person has been ruled incompetent to 
stand trial for a criminal accusation (see Pen. Code, § 1370) yet 
still “represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others 
by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder” (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 5008, (h)(1)(B)(iv)).  This kind of commitment is 
commonly referred to as a “ ‘Murphy conservatorship,’ ” after 
the legislator who sponsored the amendment adding this ground 
to the LPS Act.  (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 
102; People v. Karriker (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 763, 775.)  
Criminal defendants ruled incompetent for trial are initially 
committed under Penal Code section 1370.  If they do not regain 
competence within the statutory period, or if there is no 
substantial likelihood competence will be regained, the court 
will order the public guardian to initiate LPS proceedings.  (Pen. 
Code, § 1370, subd. (c)(2); see Jackson, at p. 102.)  A Murphy 
conservatorship may be imposed only if the person has been 
charged with a violent felony, a formal finding of probable cause 
supports the charge, a mental health disorder prevents the 
person from understanding the proceedings, and the person 
poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others.  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B).)6 
 
5  
We granted judicial notice of the San Francisco Analyst’s 
Report and State Auditor’s Report at the request of amici curiae 
Disability Rights California, et al. 
6  
Many of the statistics cited throughout this opinion do not 
differentiate between traditional and Murphy conservatees.  
However, it appears that Murphy conservatees make up a very 
 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
 
LPS conservatees have the right to a jury trial to 
determine whether they are gravely disabled, as that condition 
is statutorily defined.  (Conservatorship of K.P., supra, 11 
Cal.5th at p. 709; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350, subd. (d)(1).)  
They enjoy the right to counsel and a unanimous verdict based 
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  We extended these trial 
rights to the LPS context in Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 
Cal.3d 219, 235 (Roulet), reasoning that “commitment to a 
mental hospital, despite its civil label, threatens a person’s 
liberty and dignity on as massive a scale as that traditionally 
associated with criminal prosecutions.”  (Id. at p. 223; see also 
Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 425.)  “At the same 
time, a civil commitment proceeding is not a criminal 
proceeding, even though it is often collateral to a criminal trial.”  
(Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1119.)  Thus, although some 
constitutional protections have been extended from the criminal 
context based on due process concerns, “we have also found 
various constitutional protections inapplicable.”  (Id. at p. 1120.)  
For example, Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 
1015 (Susan T.) held that the exclusionary rule does not apply 
in conservatorship proceedings because the purpose of an LPS 
commitment is treatment, not punishment.  For similar reasons, 
we concluded conservatees have no constitutional right to the 
appellate review procedures of Anders v. California (1967) 386 
U.S. 738 and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.  
(Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 538–540, 543 
(Ben C.).) 
 
small proportion of the total number.  (See, e.g., San Francisco 
Analyst’s Report, supra, at p. A-11.) 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
B. 
No Constitutional Right Against Compelled Testimony in 
 
Civil Commitment Proceedings 
 
As a matter of constitutional protection, criminal 
defendants cannot be compelled to testify against themselves.  
(U.S. 
Const., 
5th 
Amend.; 
Cal. 
Const., 
art. I, 
§ 15.)7  
Furthermore, witnesses in both criminal and civil proceedings 
have the right to refuse to answer any question that might tend 
to incriminate them.  (Evid. Code, § 940.)8 
 
The constitutional right against compelled testimony has 
not been extended to civil commitment proceedings, however.  
Citing the “predominantly civil character of the proceedings,” 
this court in Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131, 137 (Cramer) 
did not extend the right to individuals who faced confinement 
under 
former 
statutes 
governing 
the 
commitment 
of 
developmentally disabled persons.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, 
former § 6500 et seq.)  We declined to analogize the proceedings 
to criminal prosecutions because the statutory scheme served 
only the purposes of “custodial care, diagnosis, treatment, and 
protection,” and the resulting commitment could not be deemed 
 
7  
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
is, of course, broader than the right not to testify against oneself 
in a criminal proceeding.  (See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
384 U.S. 436, 467.)  Here, however, we are concerned only with 
the right against giving compelled testimony at a commitment 
trial.  We need not and do not decide whether any other aspect 
of the privilege applies outside the context of a criminal 
prosecution. 
8  
Other privileges are set out in the Evidence Code and 
relate to a variety of circumstances.  (See, e.g., Evid. Code, 
§§ 954 
[attorney-client 
privilege], 
980 
[marital 
communications], 1014 [psychotherapist-patient privilege], 
1033–1034 [clergy and penitent privileges].)  None of these 
Evidence Code privileges is implicated in this appeal. 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
punishment.  (Cramer, at p. 137.)  We further reasoned that the 
individual’s testimony would provide the best evidence of 
whether commitment was necessary:  “Reason and common 
sense suggest that it is appropriate under such circumstances 
that a jury be permitted fully to observe the person sought to be 
committed, and to hear him speak and respond in order that it 
may make an informed judgment as to the level of his mental 
and intellectual functioning.  The receipt of such evidence may 
be analogized to the disclosure of physical as opposed to 
testimonial evidence and may in fact be the most reliable proof 
and probative indicator of the person’s present mental 
condition.”  (Id. at p. 139.)  Later decisions extended Cramer’s 
holding to conservatorship trials (Conservatorship of Baber 
(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542, 550 (Baber)) and LPS proceedings 
for the confinement of imminently dangerous persons9  
(Conservatorship of Bones (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1010, 
1015−1016). 
 
Further, the constitutional right against compelled 
testimony does not apply in commitment proceedings that arise 
in connection with criminal charges.  In Allen v. Illinois (1986) 
478 U.S. 364, 373–374, the high court held that the federal 
privilege against self-incrimination did not apply in proceedings 
under Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Act because the 
commitments were essentially civil in nature.  California courts 
extended Allen’s holding in the SVP (People v. Leonard (2000) 
78 Cal.App.4th 776, 792−793) and OMHD commitment 
 
9  
In addition to short-term holds for intensive treatment 
and one-year conservatorships, the LPS Act provides for 
commitments up to 180 days for individuals who present a 
substantial risk of physical harm to others as a result of a 
mental health disorder.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5300.) 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
contexts.  (People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1081–
1082; People v. Merfeld (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1446).  
These courts reasoned that the proceedings were designed only 
to determine the subjects’ status, including the potential for 
danger and need of mental health treatment, and that their 
testimony offered reliable evidence on these issues.  (See Clark, 
at p. 1082; Leonard, at pp. 792−793.) 
 
In recognition of this precedent, appellant does not claim 
he is entitled to refuse to testify as a matter of constitutional 
right.  (See Hudec, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 819.)  Instead, he 
argues equal protection principles require that he be extended 
the same statutory right not to testify that applies for NGI 
extended commitment proceedings.  “[W]hen certain due process 
protections for those civilly committed are guaranteed by 
statute, even if not constitutionally required, the denial of those 
protections to one group must be reasonably justified in order to 
pass muster under the equal protection clause.”  (McKee, supra, 
47 Cal.4th at p. 1207.)  Before turning to appellant’s equal 
protection claim, we discuss the origins and applications of this 
statutory right. 
C. 
Statutory 
Right 
Against 
Compelled 
Testimony 
in 
 
Commitment Proceedings Connected to a Criminal Case 
 
The statutory right against compelled testimony in an 
NGI extension proceeding is found in Penal Code section 1026.5, 
subdivision (b)(7).  The history of its enactment is informative. 
 
Before 1978, criminal defendants who successfully 
asserted an insanity defense were most often committed to a 
state hospital or other facility indefinitely and could be released 
only if they proved their sanity had been restored.  (Pen. Code, 
former §§ 1026, 1026a; see In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 461 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
(Moye).)10  The NGI commitment scheme was substantially 
altered thereafter in response to a series of decisions from this 
court. 
 
In companion cases dealing with the since-repealed 
Mentally Disordered Sex Offender (MDSO) law (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, former § 6300 et seq.), People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 
310, 318 held that due process required the offender’s status to 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  People v. Feagley (1975) 
14 Cal.3d 338, 349−352, 375−376 recognized the right to a 
unanimous 
jury 
verdict 
and 
disapproved 
indefinite 
commitments.  In 1977, the Legislature amended the former 
MDSO statutes to codify these holdings.  (See Moye, supra, 22 
Cal.3d at p. 464.)  The revised statutes provided for renewable 
annual 
commitments 
once 
the 
maximum 
allowable 
incarceration term had expired.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, former 
§§ 6316.1, 6316.2, subds. (a), (h).)  The statutes also provided for 
counsel, discovery, and a jury trial.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, former 
§ 6316.2, subds. (d), (e); see Hudec, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 821.)  
One provision gave MDSO’s the constitutional rights applicable 
in criminal trials.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 6316.2, 
subd. (e).)  The following year, Moye concluded equal protection 
principles required that initial NGI commitments likewise be 
limited to the maximum term applicable to the underlying 
criminal offense.  (Moye, at p. 467.) 
 
As with the MDSO decisions, the Legislature codified the 
Moye holding.  (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 1022 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 30, 1979, p. 2; 
 
10  
Indefinite commitments for outpatient treatment could 
also be ordered under certain circumstances.  (See Pen. Code, 
former § 1026.1; Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 461.) 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
Hudec, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 821.)  Penal Code, section 1026.5, 
enacted in 1979, limits initial NGI commitments to the longest 
available term of imprisonment for the underlying offense.  The 
commitment may be extended by renewable two-year terms if a 
“mental disease, defect, or disorder” renders the person a 
substantial risk of physical harm to others.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1); see id., subd. (b)(8), (10).)  Mirroring the 
former MDSO statutes, Penal Code section 1026.5 provides for 
counsel, discovery, and jury trial rights.  (Id., subd. (b)(3), (4).)  
Significantly, the statute also declares:  “The person shall be 
entitled to the rights guaranteed under the federal and State 
Constitutions for criminal proceedings.  All proceedings shall be 
in accordance with applicable constitutional guarantees.”  (Id., 
subd. (b)(7).)  In quasi-civil commitment trials, the statute 
effectively confers many of the rights available by constitutional 
mandate in criminal proceedings.11 
 
Hudec, supra, 60 Cal.4th 815 considered the scope of this 
statutory language.  Appellant Hudec acknowledged that the 
trial to extend his NGI commitment was civil in nature, and 
thus he had no constitutional right to refuse to testify.  (Id. at 
p. 819.)  Nevertheless, he argued Penal Code section 1026.5, 
subdivision (b)(7) granted him this statutory right.  (Hudec, at 
pp. 819−820.)  We agreed.  (Id. at p. 826.)  Although not every 
constitutional right from the criminal context can be sensibly 
 
11  
The distinction primarily impacts the applicable standard 
of review.  Constitutional errors require reversal if there is a 
reasonable possibility they affected the verdict (Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23–24), whereas state law errors 
require reversal only if it is reasonably probable a different 
result would have been reached absent the error (People v. 
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837). 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
imported 
into 
civil 
proceedings, 
Hudec 
concluded 
no 
inconsistency or absurdity would result from recognizing a right 
against compelled testimony in NGI commitment extension 
trials.  (Id. at p. 829.)  Because the commitment extension would 
typically be supported by other evidence (see, e.g., People v. 
Haynie (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1227), NGI commitments 
could be extended even if the respondent declined to testify.  
(Hudec, at p. 829.)  Hudec acknowledged that recognizing this 
right would sometimes exclude relevant evidence and that the 
ability to hear and observe the person’s testimony can assist the 
fact finder’s assessment of mental state.  (See id. at 
pp. 829−830.)  However, “[g]ranting that trial accuracy 
considerations arguably support compelling a committee’s 
testimony,” the court concluded, “other considerations,” such as 
fairness, “militat[ed] against such compulsion.”  (Id. at p. 830.)12 
 
After Hudec, a number of Court of Appeal decisions 
considered whether equal protection required extending the 
statutory right against compelled testimony to offenders facing 
postconviction treatment under other commitment schemes.  
These courts uniformly extended the right in SVP and OMHD 
contexts.  (See People v. Flint (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 983, 989 
(Flint) [SVP]; People v. Alsafar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 880, 
 
12  
Hudec discussed varying approaches taken in the Courts 
of Appeal grappling with just how broadly Penal Code 
section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7) should be interpreted to 
sweep.  It rejected cases employing an overly narrow 
interpretation but acknowledged that an application leading to 
absurd consequences could not have been what the Legislature 
intended.  (See Hudec, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 826–830.)  Hudec 
did not attempt to plumb the depths of the question, limiting its 
analysis to the right against compelled testimony.  We do the 
same. 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
882−883 [OMHD]; People v. Field (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 174, 
193−194 [SVP]; People v. Dunley (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1438, 
1450 [OMHD]; People v. Landau (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 850, 
865 [SVP]; People v. Curlee (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 709, 720 
(Curlee) [SVP].)  While recognizing differences between the 
statutory schemes, these courts concluded the differences were 
not dispositive.  (See, e.g., Dunley, at pp. 1449−1450.)  
Individuals in all three groups had committed criminal acts; all 
had been diagnosed with mental health disorders that made 
them potentially dangerous to others; and all were subject to 
commitment in a state facility for involuntary treatment.  (See 
Curlee, at p. 720.)  Further, the purpose of commitment in all 
three statutory schemes was the same:  “To protect the public 
from those who have committed criminal acts and have mental 
disorders and to provide mental health treatment for the 
disorders.  (See Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b); McKee[], supra, 
47 Cal.4th at pp. 1203, 1207; Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 466.)”  
(Curlee, at p. 720.) 
D. 
Extending the Statutory Right Against Compelled 
 
Testimony to LPS Commitment Proceedings 
 
The LPS Act does not include a statutory right against 
compelled testimony, nor does it contain the broad mention of 
rights set out in Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7).  
Nevertheless, appellant argues equal protection demands that 
the same right to refuse testimony applies. 
 
“Because of the fundamental interests at stake, equal 
protection principles are often invoked in civil commitment 
cases to ensure that the statutory scheme applicable to a 
particular class of persons has not treated them unfairly in 
comparison with other groups with similar characteristics.”  
(Barrett, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1107.)  An equal protection 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
analysis has two steps.  “ ‘ “The first prerequisite . . . is a 
showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects 
two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.”  
[Citations.]  This initial inquiry is not whether persons are 
similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are 
similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.” ’ ”  
(McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1202, some italics added.)  If the 
groups are similarly situated, the next question is whether the 
disparate treatment can be justified by a constitutionally 
sufficient state interest.  (See id. at pp. 1207−1209; Moye, supra, 
22 Cal.3d at pp. 465−466.) 
 
1. 
The Similarly Situated Prong 
 
Three lower court decisions have addressed whether 
traditional LPS conservatees are similarly situated with 
individuals facing an extended NGI commitment.  Bryan S., 
supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pages 196−197 concluded they are not, 
because a conservatorship may be imposed without any 
connection to a crime or any showing of danger to others, and 
conservatees may be placed in nonhospital settings.13  The Court 
of Appeal decisions here, Conservatorship of E.B. (2020) 45 
Cal.App.5th 986 (E.B.), and in Conservatorship of J.Y. (2020) 49 
Cal.App.5th 220 disagreed with Bryan S.  They concluded 
traditional LPS conservatees are similarly situated with those 
facing an NGI commitment extension because both are subject 
 
13  
Although conservatorship proceedings were initiated after 
Bryan S. was found incompetent to stand trial, it appears that 
a traditional conservatorship was ultimately imposed because 
the trial court ruled “that Bryan was gravely disabled as a result 
of a mental disorder and was currently unable to provide for 
food, clothing, or shelter.”  (Bryan S., supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 194, italics added.) 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
to involuntary confinement that could be extended indefinitely, 
and both are committed for the dual purposes of mental health 
treatment and public protection.  (See J.Y., at pp. 229−231; E.B., 
at pp. 993−994.)  We agree with these latter cases that the 
groups are similarly situated for purposes of the right not to give 
compelled testimony.14 
 
An equal protection analysis typically focuses on the 
practical consequences of a challenged law to the groups in 
question.  In McKee, for example, we concluded SVP’s and 
OMHD’s were similarly situated with regard to certain 
procedural rights because, despite their differences in other 
respects, both had “the same interest at stake — the loss of 
liberty through involuntary civil commitment.”  (McKee, supra, 
47 Cal.4th at p. 1204.)  Here, too, the most striking and decisive 
similarity between the groups is the potential loss of liberty both 
face in the proceedings at issue.  Like NGI’s, LPS conservatees 
are subject to physical confinement and the loss of many 
personal rights.  (See Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540; Roulet, 
supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 223.)  Although traditional conservatees 
are entitled to be placed in the least restrictive suitable setting 
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5358, subds. (a), (c)), the LPS statutes 
authorize confinement in a residential facility or hospital when 
appropriate (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5358, subd. (a)(2)).  Here, 
the Public Guardian’s petition for conservatorship requested 
authority to seek this most restrictive placement for appellant.  
As noted, institutional placements for LPS conservatees are 
 
14  
We consider only the first rationale articulated by E.B. 
and J.Y., recognizing that the traditional conservatorships 
under consideration here are ordinarily imposed for the 
protection of the conservatee, not the public. 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
fairly common; so much so that in July 2020 the state auditor 
criticized the long wait times LPS conservatees had to endure 
before state hospital admission.  (State Auditor’s Report, supra, 
at pp. 22–26.)  Although LPS conservatees occupied around 11 
percent of state hospital beds in 2019, the auditor reported that 
200 more were waiting for admission and, as a result, receiving 
lower levels of care than they needed.  (Id. at p. 25.) 
 
The Public Guardian concedes that LPS conservatees are 
frequently confined in locked facilities but argues the prevalence 
of 
such 
commitments 
is 
“not 
surprising” 
given 
that 
conservatorships are only ordered for individuals who are 
unable to care for themselves.  The parties do not dispute that 
there may be good reasons for such confinements, or that they 
may be necessary to provide the care and treatment a 
conservatee requires.  Both traditional LPS conservatorships 
and those relating to criminal proceedings share the goal of 
treatment, not punishment.  Nonetheless, it cannot be denied 
that “civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant 
deprivation of liberty . . . .”  (Addington v. Texas, supra, 441 U.S. 
at p. 425; see Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1119.)  “In 
addition to physical restraint, ‘[t]he gravely disabled person for 
whom a conservatorship has been established faces the loss of 
many other liberties . . . .’ ”  (Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540.)  
Apart from their possible confinement, conservatees may lose 
the rights to drive, vote, enter contracts, and make decisions 
about their treatment.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5357.)  In light 
of the potential for such a significant loss of liberty, 
conservatorship cases are governed by many of the same 
procedural protections that apply in criminal trials.  (See Welf. 
& Inst. Code, § 5350, subd. (d)(1); Ben C., at p. 541; but see Ben 
C., at p. 538 [recognizing “that the analogy between criminal 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
proceedings and proceedings under the LPS Act is imperfect at 
best” and that “not all of the safeguards required in the former 
are appropriate to the latter”]; Susan T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at 
p. 1015 [holding the exclusionary rule does not apply in 
conservatorship proceedings].) 
 
Moreover, a year-long conservatorship may be extended 
through the filing of successive petitions.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 5361.)  As a result, the LPS statutes can “assure in many cases 
an unbroken and indefinite period of state-sanctioned 
confinement.”  (Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 224.)  In San 
Francisco, 
for 
example, 
almost 
38 
percent 
of 
LPS 
conservatorships, excluding Murphy conservatorships, had been 
extended for 10 years or more as of December 2018.  (San 
Francisco Analyst’s Report, supra, at p. A-9.)  An additional 23 
percent had been extended from five to 10 years.  (Ibid.)  Thus, 
in practice, traditional LPS conservatorships can impose 
substantially the same restraint on liberty as involuntary 
commitments connected to criminal proceedings. 
 
To be sure, traditional LPS conservatees differ in certain 
respects from civilly committed NGI’s.  The latter are adjudged 
to have committed a criminal actus reus but are found not guilty 
because their insanity negates the required mens rea.  (See 
Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 466.)  While those confined as an 
SVP or OMHD have been convicted of crimes, most 
conservatorships are not based on criminal allegations.  LPS 
conservatorships are ordinarily imposed solely because a mental 
illness prevents the conservatee from providing for basic 
survival needs.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A), 
5350.)  For these individuals, “ ‘[t]he commitment is not 
initiated in response, or necessarily related, to any criminal acts 
. . . .’ ”  (Susan T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1015.)  Murphy 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
conservatorships bear a much closer resemblance to NGI 
commitments in this regard.  Murphy conservatees have been 
charged with serious felonies involving actual or threatened 
physical harm (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B)(i)–
(ii)), and, unlike the traditional LPS conservatees at issue in this 
case, their dangerousness to others is assessed in determining 
whether 
a 
conservatorship 
is 
necessary 
(see 
id., 
subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv)). 
 
Murphy 
conservatorships 
are 
comparatively rare, however, accounting for only around 2 
percent of all LPS conservatorships in San Francisco, for 
example.  (See San Francisco Analyst’s Report, supra, at p. A-
11.) 
 
It is “incontrovertible” that conservatees “do not share 
identical characteristics” with civilly committed NGI’s.  (McKee, 
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1203.)  But these differences are not 
dispositive of whether the groups are similarly situated with 
respect to the testimonial privilege.  (See ibid.)  In this part of 
an equal protection analysis, the question “ ‘ “is not whether 
persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but ‘whether 
they are similarly situated 
for purposes of the law 
challenged.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 376, 
italics added.)  “In other words, we ask at the threshold whether 
two classes that are different in some respects are sufficiently 
similar with respect to the laws in question to require the 
government to justify its differential treatment of these classes 
under those laws.”  (McKee, at p. 1202.)15  In some cases, we 
 
15  
Because an equal protection analysis considers whether 
groups are similarly situated with respect to a particular law, 
cases cited by the Public Guardian holding that conservatees or 
NGI’s are not similarly situated with other civilly committed 
 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
have concluded traditional LPS conservatees were not 
sufficiently similar to other groups in regard to a challenged law.  
For example, in Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 
253−254, we concluded individuals facing an SVP probable 
cause hearing were not similarly situated with those seeking 
habeas review of a short-term detention under the LPS Act 
because the purposes served by the standard of proof at the LPS 
hearing had no rational application in the SVP context.  Here, 
however, we reach a different conclusion. 
 
In rejecting the same equal protection challenge raised 
here, the Bryan S. court considered the purpose served by the 
testimonial privilege.  It reached back to Cramer, supra, 23 
Cal.3d 131, where we held the constitutional privilege does not 
apply in civil commitment proceedings.  Cramer explained that 
“the historic purpose of the privilege against being called as a 
witness has been to assure that the criminal justice system 
remains accusatorial, not inquisitorial.  [Citations.]  The 
extension of the privilege to an area outside the criminal justice 
system . . . would contravene both the language and purpose of 
the privilege.”  (Id. at pp. 137−138; see Bryan S., supra, 42 
Cal.App.5th at p. 197.)  After Cramer was decided, however, the 
Legislature chose to extend the privilege beyond the criminal 
justice system by enacting Penal Code section 1026.5, 
subdivision (b)(7).  We observed in Hudec that “Cramer’s 
constitutional reasoning ha[d] no bearing on the interpretation 
of” Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(7).  (Hudec, supra, 
60 Cal.4th at p. 830.)  It is likewise inapt to the equal protection 
challenge here.  The issue is not whether traditional LPS 
 
groups for purposes other than the testimonial privilege shed 
little light on the issue here.  
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
conservatees are similar to criminal defendants, but whether 
they are similar to NGI’s.  Like these conservatees, NGI’s no 
longer stand accused of crimes.  And, like conservatorships, NGI 
extension proceedings are civil in nature and examine only 
whether the statutory grounds for commitment have been met.  
(See Hudec, at p. 819.) 
 
The more precise similarity question, then, is what 
purpose does the testimonial privilege serve in civil commitment 
proceedings?  Hudec offers one answer.  Hudec acknowledged 
that testimony from those facing commitment may be 
particularly helpful in determining their mental condition but 
noted that “other considerations” might weigh against 
compelling their testimony, “notably ‘our sense of fair play 
which dictates “a fair state-individual balance by requiring the 
government . . . in its contest with the individual to shoulder the 
entire load.” ’  (Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n. (1964) 378 U.S. 
52, 55.)”  (Hudec, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 830.)  “The right to not 
be compelled to testify against oneself is clearly and relevantly 
implicated when a person is called by the state to testify in a 
proceeding to [commit or] recommit him or her even if what is 
said on the witness stand is not per se incriminating.”  (People 
v. Haynie, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230.)  The privilege’s 
role in enforcing fair play, and ensuring the government meets 
its burden, is not unique to the criminal context.  Like NGI’s, 
traditional LPS conservatees also face the prospect of extended 
involuntary confinement and the loss of other liberties. 
 
In reaching a different conclusion, the trial court here 
cited the importance of allowing the trier of fact to observe the 
“physical and mental 
characteristics” of 
the 
proposed 
conservatee.  Compelled testimony from the conservatee may 
well assist the fact finder and contribute to more accurate 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
verdicts in conservatorship trials.  (See Cramer, supra, 23 
Cal.3d at p. 139; Baber, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 550.)16  It 
might also be argued that the predicates for traditional LPS and 
NGI commitments are significantly different.  Most of those for 
whom an LPS conservatorship is sought will not have been 
subject to a criminal adjudication or any showing that they pose 
a danger to others.  As a result, they will not have undergone 
the kinds of extended restraints on liberty and resultant 
therapeutic and rehabilitative efforts extended to NGI, SVP, 
and OMHD individuals.  While we acknowledge these 
differences and note that they may bear on whether the 
disparate treatment of traditional LPS conservatees and NGI’s 
is constitutionally justified, they are not sufficient to undermine 
the two groups’ similarity for purposes of the testimonial 
privilege. 
 
Accordingly, despite their differences, we conclude NGI’s 
and traditional LPS conservatees “are sufficiently similar to 
bring into play equal protection principles that require a court 
to determine ‘ “whether distinctions between the two groups 
justify the unequal treatment.” ’  (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 
Cal.4th 1185, 1200.)”  (In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
757, 832, fn. 54.)  Conservatorship of Bryan S., supra, 42 
Cal.App.5th 190 is disapproved to the extent it conflicts with the 
views expressed herein.  
 
16  
Of course, even if it is ultimately determined that equal 
protection requires extending the statutory right against 
compelled testimony to LPS conservatorship trials, a question 
we do not reach here, recognition of that right would not 
preclude testimony from other competent witnesses or the 
admission of relevant documents bearing on grave disability. 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
 
2. 
Justification for Disparate Treatment 
 
The next step of an equal protection analysis asks whether 
the disparate treatment of two similarly situated groups is 
justified by a constitutionally sufficient state interest.  (See 
McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1207−1208.)  Varying levels of 
judicial scrutiny apply depending on the type of claim.  “[M]ost 
legislation is tested only to determine if the challenged 
classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
purpose.”  (People v. Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1200.)  
However, differences “in statutes that involve suspect 
classifications or touch upon fundamental interests are subject 
to strict scrutiny, and can be sustained only if they are necessary 
to achieve a compelling state interest.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Decisions from the Courts of Appeal have reached 
differing conclusions about the level of scrutiny appropriate for 
assessing claims of disparate treatment in civil commitments.  
(Compare Flint, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 992−993 [strict 
scrutiny] with People v. Nolasco (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 209, 225 
[rational basis].)  Because the courts below did not reach this 
prong of the equal protection analysis, arguments have not been 
well developed here concerning the proper degree of scrutiny or 
whether the government can demonstrate a sufficient 
justification for granting the testimonial privilege to NGI’s but 
not traditional LPS conservatees. 
 
Ordinarily, we would remand to the trial court for a 
hearing at which the Public Guardian would have an 
opportunity to show why the differential treatment is 
constitutionally justified.  (See McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1207−1209; see also Curlee, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 722.)  However, the Court of Appeal determined the error in 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
this case was harmless under either the state (People v. Watson, 
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836) or federal (Chapman v. California, 
supra, 386 U.S. at. p. 24) standard for harmless error.  The court 
observed that, apart from appellant’s testimony, “two other 
witnesses who were familiar with appellant . . . painted a vivid 
picture of someone who was unable to care for himself left to his 
own devices due to his mental illness.”  (E.B., supra, 45 
Cal.App.5th at p. 999.)  Appellant does not challenge that 
conclusion.  Accordingly, although we have concluded 
traditional LPS conservatees are similarly situated with NGI’s 
for purposes of the right against compelled testimony, a remand 
is not appropriate here.  Whether the government can justify its 
differential treatment of traditional conservatees with regard to 
this right must await decision in another case. 
 
 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
MOORE, J.* 
 
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
S261812 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger 
 
This case involves a federal equal protection challenge to 
the statutory procedures for establishing conservatorships for 
persons with grave disabilities.  Eric B., a potential conservatee, 
argues the statute is unconstitutional because it contains no 
right to refuse to testify akin to the statutory right enjoyed by 
NGI’s (that is, persons found not guilty of a crime by reason of 
insanity) in commitment extension proceedings.  (Compare 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350, subd. (d)(1), (2) with Pen. Code, 
§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(7).)  But the question now before this court is 
not the ultimate question whether this difference in treatment 
is constitutional.  Rather, the sole question before us concerns a 
threshold inquiry:  Whether potential conservatees are 
sufficiently similarly situated to NGI’s, for purposes of the 
challenged law, to warrant further inquiry into whether the 
differential treatment violates equal protection.  The court 
answers yes.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1, 25.)  I agree with this 
limited holding and have signed the court’s opinion. 
I write separately, however, to suggest that this threshold 
inquiry doesn’t serve much purpose.  Worse, it risks harm.  The 
simple fact that a law differently benefits or burdens two 
identifiable groups is — or at least ought to be — sufficient 
reason for us to examine whether the difference in treatment is 
consistent with equal protection.  To the extent our cases have 
taken a different approach, it is probably time to reevaluate. 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
2 
I. 
In answering the question before us, the court’s opinion 
describes a two-step approach for analyzing equal protection 
challenges.  “ ‘ “ ‘The first prerequisite . . . is a showing that the 
state has adopted a classification that affects two or more 
similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’  [Citations.]  
This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated 
for all purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for 
purposes of the law challenged.’ ” ’  ([People v. ]McKee[ (2010)] 47 
Cal.4th [1172,] 1202, some italics added.)  If the groups are 
similarly situated, the next question is whether the disparate 
treatment can be justified by a constitutionally sufficient state 
interest.  (See id. at pp. 1207−1209; [In re ]Moye[ (1978)] 22 
Cal.3d [457,] 465−466.)”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  In other 
words:  (1) Are the parties sufficiently similarly situated to call 
for further inquiry?  If no, the analysis is done.  But (2) if yes, 
can the challenged disparity be justified?  At the second step, we 
employ the familiar tiered system of scrutiny to determine the 
amount of justification required.  We apply the most lenient 
standard — so-called rational basis review — to most forms of 
differential treatment; we apply more searching scrutiny to, and 
thus require greater justification for, differential treatment that 
either infringes on a fundamental right or is based on a suspect 
or quasi-suspect classification, such as race or sex.  (People v. 
Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288–289.) 
This is the approach set out in many — though not all — 
of our recent equal protection cases.  Both parties assume it 
applies here, as did the Court of Appeal in this case, and as have 
many other California courts addressing similar questions.  
Whether the approach makes sense is a different matter. 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
3 
A. 
This two-step approach is not how equal protection 
analysis was always done in California.  This court did often 
observe that equal protection requires like treatment for those 
“similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the 
law.”  (Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California (1969) 71 
Cal.2d 566, 578.)  But we did not initially use this general 
observation about the concept of equal protection as a 
springboard for engaging in a threshold inquiry into whether 
two groups are similarly situated.  We instead described the 
relevant constitutional inquiry solely in terms of whether the 
challenged difference in treatment was justified under the 
applicable standard of scrutiny.  (Id. at pp. 578–579; see, e.g., In 
re Antazo (1970) 3 Cal.3d 100, 110–111.)   
The two-step approach appears to have emerged from two 
cases decided in the late 1970’s, both concerning challenges to 
statutes governing the treatment of juveniles.  In the first case, 
In re Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 921 (Roger S.), a minor objected 
to involuntary admission to a state mental hospital on the 
application of a parent.  He argued that he was denied equal 
protection because his admission was not conditioned on a 
finding that he was gravely disabled or a danger to himself or 
others, as it would have been for an adult or a minor ward of the 
court.  This court rejected the argument.  “ ‘[T]he Constitution,’ ” 
we observed, “ ‘does not require things which are different in fact 
or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.’ ” 
(Id. at p. 934, quoting Tigner v. Texas (1940) 310 U.S. 141, 147.)  
Given the differences between the liberty interests of children 
and adults, we concluded that minors “are not ‘similarly 
situated’ with adults for purposes of equal protection analysis.”  
(Roger S., at p. 934.)  We also found minors like Roger S. 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
4 
dissimilar from court wards, explaining that courts have options 
for the psychiatric treatment of nondangerous minors that 
parents may not.  The difference in the standards for the 
involuntary confinement of the two groups, we held, “does not in 
our view deny equal protection to either class.”  (Id. at p. 935, 
citing, inter alia, Reed v. Reed (1971) 404 U.S. 71, 75–76.) 
In the second case, In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522 
(Eric J.), this court considered a juvenile’s equal protection 
challenge to laws extending more favorable sentencing 
treatment to an adult convicted of a crime warranting 
imprisonment than to juveniles subject to confinement for 
committing the same crime.  Rejecting the claim, the court cited 
Roger S., supra, 19 Cal.3d at page 934 for the proposition that 
the “first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal 
protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a 
classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups 
in an unequal manner.”  (Eric J., at p. 530; see also id. at p. 530, 
fn. 1 [quoting, as Roger S. had, Tigner v. Texas, supra, 310 U.S. 
at p. 147 for the proposition that “ ‘[t]he Constitution does not 
require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated 
in law as though they were the same’ ”].)  We went on to conclude 
that “because minors and adults are not ‘similarly situated’ with 
respect to their interest in liberty,” and because the two groups 
“are not confined for the same purposes,” the difference in 
treatment did not violate equal protection.  (Eric J., at p. 533.) 
The two-step framework the court applies today traces 
back to this particular gloss on the United States Supreme 
Court’s admonition that equal protection “does not require 
things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law 
as though they were the same.”  (Tigner v. Texas, supra, 310 
U.S. at p. 147.)  Of course, it is not clear that either Roger S. or 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
5 
Eric J. in fact applied anything like the two-step framework; 
both cases undertook what was essentially a one-step, holistic 
inquiry into whether the challenged differential treatment 
violated equal protection.  Roger S. looked for support to Reed v. 
Reed, supra, 404 U.S. 71, a high court decision that had 
evaluated an equal protection challenge to a sex-based 
classification by asking whether the classification was justified 
in view of the state’s interests (Roger S., supra, 19 Cal.3d at 
p. 935); Eric J., in turn, looked to Roger S. 
And notwithstanding the language in Eric J. suggesting 
the existence of a preliminary “similarly situated” step as a “first 
prerequisite” to further inquiry (Eric J., supra, 25 Cal.3d at 
p. 530, italics omitted), the cases were not initially understood 
as establishing a two-step framework.  In a case decided not long 
after Eric J., this court considered an equal protection challenge 
to a decision limiting a school district election to a certain group 
of district residents, while excluding a second group.  “The first 
step in evaluating this contention,” we explained, “is to 
determine the applicable level of judicial review,” rational basis 
or heightened scrutiny.  (Fullerton Joint Union High School 
Dist. v. State Bd. of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 798 
(Fullerton).)  We dismissed the notion that Eric J. required a 
different order of operations:  “Some decisions speak of an initial 
constitutional inquiry to determine whether the groups affected 
are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the 
legislation or other state action.  (See, e.g., In re Eric J.[, supra,] 
25 Cal.3d [at p.] 531 [159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549].)  To ask 
whether two groups are similarly situated in this context, 
however, is the same as asking whether the distinction between 
them can be justified under the appropriate test of equal 
protection.  Obvious dissimilarities between groups will not 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
6 
justify a classification which fails strict scrutiny (if that test is 
applicable) or lacks a rational relationship to the legislative 
purpose.”  (Fullerton, at p. 798, fn. 19; accord, People v. Allen 
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1295 (lead opn.).) 
As time went on, however, the language of Eric J. took 
precedence over its limiting treatment in Fullerton. Courts 
repeatedly invoked Eric J.’s “first prerequisite” language and 
rejected equal protection claims on the basis that the two groups 
treated differently were insufficiently similar to one another.  
(See People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1330 [“persons 
convicted under the death penalty law are manifestly not 
similarly situated to persons convicted under the Determinate 
Sentencing Act and accordingly cannot assert a meritorious 
claim to the ‘benefits’ of the act under the equal protection 
clause”], citing Eric J., supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 530; People v. 
Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 223 [citing Eric J. for the 
proposition that “the first prerequisite to [an equal protection] 
claim is a showing that ‘the state has adopted a classification 
that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal 
manner’ ” and rejecting equal protection claim]; Coleman v. 
Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 
1125 [same]; People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 571 [same]; 
Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568–571 
[citing Eric J. and rejecting claim on ground the defendant had 
not shown unequal treatment of similarly situated groups]; 
People v. Wutzke (2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 943–944 [same]; Cooley 
v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253–254 [same].) 
The language of Eric J. was repeated from case to case.  
Eventually, shorn of context, the language morphed and 
hardened to become the first step of the formal two-step inquiry 
the court’s opinion recites today.  (See, e.g., People v. Hofsheier 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
7 
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1199–1200 [detailed analysis of the 
similarly situated requirement as a threshold matter 
independent of subsequent inquiry into justification]; People v. 
McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1202 [treating the similarly 
situated inquiry as a necessary “threshold” question]; id. at 
pp. 1202–1209 [deciding only that question and remanding for 
further proceedings on the separate question of justification].)  
Indeed, the court stopped citing Eric J. itself, simply asserting 
as a settled matter that the “initial inquiry in any equal 
protection analysis is whether persons are ‘similarly situated for 
purposes of the law challenged.’ ”  (In re Lemanuel C. (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 33, 47.)  And in some cases, the court has concluded they 
are not — a conclusion that has simply ended the equal 
protection 
analysis, 
without 
review 
of 
the 
challenged 
governmental action under any level of scrutiny.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 231; Conservatorship of 
Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 543; People v. Salazar (2016) 63 
Cal.4th 214, 227; People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 376.) 
B. 
Although the threshold similarly situated test nominally 
has its roots in United States Supreme Court case law, the high 
court itself has neither required nor applied any similar 
gatekeeping test.  Rather, in cases involving challenges to 
discrimination between identifiable groups, the court proceeds 
directly to the justification step:  It identifies the appropriate 
level of scrutiny for a particular challenged distinction and then 
examines whether the actual or potential justification for that 
differentiation is sufficient, without separately analyzing 
whether the groups receiving differential treatment are 
otherwise similarly situated.  (See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger 
(2003) 539 U.S. 306, 326–343 [determining appropriate level of 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
8 
scrutiny (strict) and moving directly to a consideration of the 
adequacy of the proffered justification]; United States v. 
Virginia (1996) 518 U.S. 515, 531–534 [same, applying 
intermediate scrutiny]; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 
(1985) 473 U.S. 432, 439–450 [same, applying rational basis 
scrutiny].) 
The high court’s cases do make clear that a similarly 
situated inquiry has a useful role to play in other kinds of 
cases — particularly cases involving so-called “ ‘class of one’ ” 
equal protection claims, “where the plaintiff alleges that she has 
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly 
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in 
treatment.”  (Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 528 U.S. 
562, 564.)  In such cases, where a plaintiff does not allege that 
she has been treated differently because of “membership in a 
class or group” (ibid.), a similarly situated inquiry helps identify 
whether the plaintiff has suffered differential treatment that 
warrants scrutiny under the equal protection clause.  (See also 
Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture (2008) 553 U.S. 591, 
601–602 [discussing “class-of-one” claims under Olech].)  But in 
a case like the one before us, as in many others, the law clearly 
treats Eric B. differently from others because of the group — 
that is, potential conservatees — to which he belongs.  The 
critical question is whether that group-based difference in 
treatment comports with equal protection principles.  In 
comparable cases, the high court has proceeded directly to this 
critical question, without first attempting to gauge the degree of 
similarity between the groups, as California courts have done. 
We are, of course, not bound to follow where the United 
States Supreme Court leads in matters of state constitutional 
law.  So if the two-step framework articulated in our cases had 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
9 
developed as an explication of unique state constitutional 
principles, there would be no need to concern ourselves with 
whether it comports with United States Supreme Court 
guidance.  But in elaborating a two-step approach, we’ve never 
invoked any special features of the state Constitution’s equal 
protection provision.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)  To the 
contrary, when urged to use that provision to articulate a unique 
set of state law specific principles, we’ve declined.  (Manduley v. 
Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 572 [rejecting 
petitioners’ invitation to rely on state constitutional principles 
and “deem[ing]” the “analysis of petitioners’ equal protection 
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution also applicable to their equal protection claim 
made pursuant to provisions in the California Constitution”]; 
see, e.g., Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 
881 [accepting “the high court’s analysis of federal . . . equal 
protection principles [as] persuasive for purposes of the state 
Constitution”].)   
It is true that while the United States Supreme Court has 
not used the same two-step approach to analyze federal equal 
protection issues, it also has never formally repudiated any such 
approach.1  But if we choose to chart a different path, we at least 
 
1  
A handful of other jurisdictions have also sometimes 
applied some version of a threshold similarly situated inquiry.  
(See, e.g., Morrison v. Garraghty (4th Cir. 2001) 239 F.3d 648, 
654; Rodriguez v. Lamer (11th Cir. 1995) 60 F.3d 745, 749; T.M. 
v. State (Fla.Ct.App. 1997) 689 So.2d 443, 444–445; Miami 
County Bd. v. Kanza Rail-Trails (2011) 292 Kan. 285, 315–316 
[255 P.3d 1186, 1207]; DuPont v. Commissioner of Correction 
(2007) 448 Mass. 389, 399–400, 403, fn. 24 [861 N.E.2d 744, 
752–753, 754–755, fn. 24]; Vison Net, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue 
 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
10 
ought to be clear that that’s what we’re doing.  Instead, our cases 
appear to assume the United States Supreme Court has pointed 
us in the direction of the two-step framework.  It has not. 
C. 
Even in this court, this two-step approach is not always 
how the equal protection analysis is done — which is to say, we 
are not always rigid or consistent in our application of the two-
step framework.  In a number of cases, we have analyzed equal 
protection questions much as Fullerton had once instructed and 
as the United States Supreme Court does regularly:  We have 
begun by asking not whether two groups are similarly situated 
but what level of scrutiny should apply.  (See, e.g., Hernandez v. 
City of Hanford (2007) 41 Cal.4th 279, 298 [“we begin with the 
question of the appropriate equal protection standard applicable 
in this case”]; Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 480 [“we 
must address plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge on the 
merits, and the threshold question we confront is which 
standard of review applies”].)  This line of cases has tackled 
equal protection questions without requiring the plaintiff to 
show, at the first step, that other groups are similarly situated.  
 
(2019) 397 Mont. 118, 124–125 [447 P.3d 1034, 1038]; cf. 
Jackson v. Raffensperger (2020) 308 Ga. 736, 741 [843 S.E.2d 
576, 581] [applying threshold similarly situated inquiry as 
matter of state constitutional law].)  That inquiry has not 
escaped criticism elsewhere.  (See, e.g., State v. Kelsey (2015) 51 
Kan.App.2d 819, 830 [356 P.3d 414, 421] (conc. opn. of 
Atcheson, J.) [noting that in Kansas — much as in California — 
a “potentially dispositive threshold test has crept fog-like into 
our cases on little cat feet.  It hasn’t a basis in generally accepted 
equal protection jurisprudence, and akin to a morning fog, it 
obscures the landscape to no particularly useful ends and 
conceivably dangerous ones”].) 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
11 
(See, e.g., People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74–75; 
California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 
177, 208–211; Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 640–
651.)     
If we have sometimes done without the two-step approach, 
the question arises whether we might always do without, or 
whether instead the approach offers some useful assistance to 
courts evaluating equal protection challenges like this one.  But 
on a brief review of the cases decided under this approach, its 
utility seems doubtful. 
The basic reason is the one Fullerton identified decades 
ago:  At least as our cases have described the approach, it is not 
clear how the threshold similarly situated inquiry differs in any 
material way from the ultimate question in a group-based 
discrimination case, except that it offers substantially less 
guidance about how to answer.  That two groups are similarly 
situated, or are not similarly situated, with respect to the 
purposes of a law is a conclusion one can only reach after 
considering the law’s aims and how the differential treatment 
relates to those aims.  Even then, the issue remains:  How 
similarly situated, precisely, relative to which aims?  These are 
questions courts already explore at the justification step, using 
the tiers of scrutiny to guide their answers.  It is unclear what 
purpose is served by asking the same questions, in a 
substantially more general way, as part of a separate threshold 
step of the analysis. 
Our cases have not, of course, treated the two prongs of 
the analysis as merely duplicative or interchangeable.  But we 
have also failed to explain in any meaningful way how the two 
prongs should differ from one another.  This has led to some 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
12 
oddities.  Take Johnson v. Department of Justice, supra, 60 
Cal.4th 871, which overruled an earlier decision finding an 
equal protection violation in the statutory requirement that 
those convicted of oral copulation with a minor, but not those 
convicted of intercourse with the same, register as sex offenders.  
(See People v. Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1185.)  Hofsheier 
found the groups similarly situated and then concluded no 
rational basis existed for treating them unequally.  Johnson 
purported to accept the similarly situated half of Hofsheier’s 
analysis, but then concluded that a rational basis existed for 
differential treatment because of relevant differences between 
the groups.  (Johnson, at pp. 882, 884–887.)  In other words, the 
groups were not similarly situated with respect to the purposes 
of the law after all.  A reader might be forgiven for experiencing 
a sense of whiplash.  (See also, e.g., In re C.B. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 
118, 134 [in the span of a few paragraphs, assuming that two 
groups were similarly situated with respect to the purposes of a 
voter initiative and then explaining how “voters rationally could 
differentiate” between them because of an interest in cost 
savings].) 
Employing a framework that contains a potentially 
duplicative step carries more risks than just the possibility of 
wasted effort or seeming inconsistencies in the analysis.  By 
adding a step not directly focused on the ultimate question of 
justification, we run the risk of mistakenly cutting off 
potentially meritorious equal protection claims.  Interposing an 
unnecessary gatekeeping inquiry always raises the possibility 
that the gate will sometimes slam shut, when the gate shouldn’t 
have been there in the first place. 
At the very least, the two-step framework creates 
unnecessary confusion.  Because it is a requirement of our own 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
13 
creation, the threshold similarly situated inquiry comes with no 
clear high court guidelines as to its proper application.  Nor have 
we offered much guidance ourselves.  This case illustrates the 
kinds of unresolved questions that courts still confront, decades 
after the inquiry first emerged in the case law.  To decide 
whether two groups are similarly situated with respect to the 
purpose of a given law, one must define what that purpose is.  
But how does one do so when the law’s purpose involves a 
balance of considerations (as laws generally do)?  Here, the 
court’s opinion says one possible purpose for conferring a 
privilege against testifying on NGI committees is a sense of fair 
play that outweighs the interest in accurate determinations.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24, citing Hudec v. Superior Court (2015) 
60 Cal.4th 815, 830.)  The court then assesses whether 
Lanterman-Petris-Short committees are similarly situated for 
purposes of the fair-play interest (maj. opn., ante, at p. 24), 
without considering whether they are also similarly situated 
with respect to the countervailing interest in accurate 
determinations.  Should the inquiry consider one, or the other, 
or both?  It seems impossible to say without knowing what the 
similarly situated test is meant to achieve.  The case law yields 
no clear answers. 
The way the court’s opinion tackles the inquiry is by no 
means wrong; the point is only that the inquiry itself injects 
unnecessary uncertainty into the law.  That uncertainty might 
be worth clearing up if the similarly situated test added 
sufficient value.  I doubt that it does. 
 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
14 
II. 
All that said, this is not the case in which to reexamine 
our equal protection framework.  The parties have not raised 
any question about that framework here; instead, in reliance on 
our current case law, they have focused entirely on the proper 
application of the similarly situated step some cases have told 
them is necessary.  The Court of Appeal decision likewise 
focused only on that step, and then, without resolving whether 
any different treatment would have been justified, found any 
potential constitutional error harmless under the circumstances 
of the case.  And — as we already knew when we granted 
review — this case is moot, so it does not make sense to press 
the issue further.  Finally, I agree that the choice of framework 
would not be outcome-determinative in any event:  Given our 
conclusion 
that 
potential 
conservatees 
and 
NGI’s 
are 
sufficiently similarly situated to warrant further scrutiny, if this 
case were to proceed, the government would be required to come 
forward with a sufficient justification, just as it would if we were 
to proceed directly to the justification inquiry. 
For all these reasons, in today’s case it makes little 
difference that we have occupied ourselves with a threshold 
inquiry into whether two groups are similarly situated.  So long 
as we continue to employ this framework, that is presumably 
how it should be; the threshold similarly situated test should not 
cut off inquiry into the core question, whether an admitted 
difference in treatment of two groups is justified under the law.  
But going forward, it is unclear why we should hold on to a legal 
test that serves so little purpose.  In an appropriate future case, 
Conservatorship of ERIC B. 
Kruger, J., concurring 
15 
we ought to consider whether it is time to let the similarly 
situated test go. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    KRUGER, J. 
We Concur: 
LIU, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Conservatorship of Eric B.   
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal   
Original Proceeding   
Review Granted (published) XX 45 Cal.App.5th 986 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S261812  
Date Filed:  April 28, 2022 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Contra Costa    
Judge:  Susanne M. Fenstermacher 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Jeremy T. Price, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Objector and Appellant. 
 
Kim Pederson and Anne Hadreas for Disability Rights California, 
California Association of Mental Health Patients’ Rights Advocates, 
California Public Defenders Association, American Civil Liberties 
Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, 
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Law Foundation of 
Silicon Valley and Mental Health Advocacy Services as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Objector and Appellant. 
 
Sharon L. Anderson and Mary Ann McNett Mason, County Counsel, 
Steven Rettig, Assistant County Counsel, and Patrick L. Hurley, 
Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning for the California State Association of Counties 
and California State Association of Public Administrators, Public 
 
 
Guardians, and Public Conservators as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioner and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Jeremy T. Price 
First District Appellate Project 
475 14th Street #650 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(415) 495-3119 
 
Patrick L. Hurley 
Deputy County Counsel 
1025 Escobar Street, 3rd Floor 
Martinez, CA 94553 
(925) 655-2251