Case Title: Cahall v. Thomas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BARBARA ANN CAHALL and  
§ 
RONALD E. CAHALL,  
 
§ 
§ 
No.  303, 2005 
Plaintiffs Below,  
 
§ 
Appellants,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of the  
§ 
State of Delaware in and for 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
§ 
DEBBIE D. THOMAS,  
 
§ 
C.A. No. 01C-12-031 
§ 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted:  June 6, 2006 
         Decided:  September 5, 2006 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
Beverly L. Bove, and Vincent J. X. Hedrick, II, Esquires, of Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellants. 
 
Donald M. Ransom, and John A. Macconi, Jr., Esquires, of Casarino, Christman & 
Shalk, P. A., Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
RIDGELY, Justice: 
 
2
Plaintiffs-Appellants Barbara and Ronald Cahall appeal an award of costs by 
the Superior Court after a jury trial because the Cahalls did not accept a pre-trial 
offer of judgment made to them collectively under Superior Court Civil Rule 68.  
Plaintiffs claim that the Superior Court erred as a matter of civil procedure, or 
alternatively, as a matter of state constitutional law.  Thomas made a collective 
offer of judgment before trial instead of an individual offer of judgment to each 
plaintiff.   We hold that this offer is an insufficient predicate for cost shifting under 
Rule 68.  Accordingly, we reverse the award of costs in this case.     
I. 
The Cahalls are husband and wife.  They filed a complaint against Thomas 
asserting a claim for bodily injury of Barbara Cahall and a claim for loss of 
consortium by Ronald Cahall.  Thomas served a timely offer of judgment for 
$7,500 to the Cahalls collectively.  The Cahalls did not accept it.  The case 
proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Barbara Cahall in the 
amount of $2,500.  The jury made no award to Ronald Cahall for his loss of 
consortium claim.  The Cahalls filed a motion for additur or, in the alternative, for 
a new trial on the issue of damages.  This motion was denied by the Superior Court 
and affirmed by this Court.1  After this Court’s decision, the Superior Court 
addressed Thomas’s motion for costs.  The trial judge granted the motion in part 
                                          
 
1 Cahall v. Thomas, Del. Supr., No. 350, 2004, Holland, J., 2005 WL 1175940 (May 16, 2005) 
(Order).   
 
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and denied it in part.  The Cahalls were ordered to pay Thomas’s costs of $1,200 
for her trial expert pursuant to Rule 68, because the verdict was less than the 
collective offer of judgment.  This appeal followed.2   
II. 
 
The Cahalls do not challenge the reasonableness of the expert’s fee.  They 
argue that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law when it determined that Rule 
68 authorized the award.  We review claims of legal error de novo.   
Superior Court Civil Rule 68 provides that where a timely offer of judgment 
is not accepted prior to trial and the “judgment finally obtained by the offeree is 
not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the 
making of the offer.”3  The purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement and 
                                          
 
2  The Cahalls included in their appeal the jury’s verdict and that claim has been dismissed 
because it was untimely.  Cahall v. Thomas, 889 A.2d 966 (Del., Sept. 16, 2005). 
3 Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 68 Offer of judgment. 
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins a party defending against a claim 
may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the 
defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with 
costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves 
written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of 
acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the Clerk shall enter 
judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not 
admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by 
the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred 
after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not 
preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to another has been 
determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability 
remains to be determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an 
offer of judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is 
served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of 
hearings to determine the amount or extent of liability. 
 
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avoid litigation by prompting parties to balance the risks and costs of litigation 
against the likelihood of success at trial.4  Rule 68 does not apply unless the 
adverse party obtains a judgment that is “not more favorable” than the offer.5  If 
Rule 68 does apply, an award of costs is mandatory.6  “The trial court has no 
discretion about whether to award costs, assuming the offer of judgment was 
timely; it was rejected; and the plaintiff recovers an amount less than the offer.”7   
Thomas’s offer of judgment reads as follows:  “Defendant Debbie E. 
Thomas hereby permits judgment to be entered against her and in favor of the 
plaintiffs for the total amount of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($7,500.00) plus costs accrued to date.”  The offer does not state how much of the 
$7,500 was offered to Mrs. Cahall for her personal injury claim or how much was 
offered to Mr. Cahall for his loss of consortium claim.  The Cahalls were not given 
“a clear baseline” from which they could evaluate the merits of their individual 
                                          
 
4 Beaudet v. Thomas, 797 A.2d 678, 678 (Del. 2002) (Order); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 
(1985).  See also Gerken v. Atkinson, Del. Super., No. CIV.A. 00C-12-047, Vaughn, R.J., 2002 
WL 1832322, *1 (“The purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlements by shifting to the plaintiff 
part of the risk of proceeding with the lawsuit where it appears likely that “the plaintiff will 
obtain a judgment but the amount of recovery is uncertain.”) (quoting Delta Airlines, Inc. v. 
August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981); 13 James Wm. Moore et al., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 
68.02 (3d ed. 2002)). 
5 Hercules, 784 A.2d at 509.  See also Flood v. Riley, Del. Super., No. C.A. 00C-12-044, 
Vaughn, R.J., 2002 WL 32067553, *1 (Del. Super.) (construing Rule 68 as not applying to a 
plaintiff who received a zero verdict). 
6 Beaudet, 797 A.2d at 678 (citing Hercules, 784 A.2d at 509). 
7 Beaudet, 797 A.2d at 678. 
 
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claims.8  Nor did the collective offer allow for a specific judgment to be entered on 
each of their respective claims.  In Marek v. Chesney9 the U.S. Supreme Court 
explained: 
The critical feature of the Rule is that the offer be one that allows 
judgment to be taken against the defendant for both the damages 
caused by the challenged conduct and the costs then accrued.  
  
The jury’s verdict in this case determined the judgment of $2,500 for 
Barbara Cahall and $0 for Ronald Cahall.  Just as the final judgment in this case 
was individualized after the jury’s verdict, so too should the offer of judgment 
have been for Rule 68 to apply.   
In other cases, the Superior Court has excluded from Rule 68 joint and 
several offers of judgment10 because the offer of judgment must be individualized 
as to each plaintiff.11  We agree with the result and reasoning of those cases.  
                                          
 
8  See Gavoni v. Dobbs House, Inc., 164 F.3d 1071, 1076 (7th Cir. 1999); Thomas v. National 
Football League Players Ass’n, 273 F.3d 1124, 1128 (D.C. 2001). 
9 Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 6 (1985) (emphasis in original). 
10 Belger v. Shreeve, Del. Super., No. 95C-06-104, Cooch, J., 1997 WL 524057 at *3 n.10 (citing 
Smith v. Sante Volpe, Inc., Del. Super., C.A. No. 82C-DE-5, Babiarz, J., 1992 WL 19938; 20 
C.J.S. Costs § 43 (1990)).  See also Jones v. Elliot, 551 A.2d 62, 65 (Del. 1988) (holding that the 
noninjured spouse may pursue her separate yet derivative cause of action for loss of consortium, 
despite the fact that the injured spouse settled his personal injury claim).  
11 Sante Volpe, Del. Super., C.A. No. 82C-DE-5, Babiarz, J., 1992 WL 19938 at *1. 
Defendant's offer of judgment … was not individualized as to each claim. Specifically 
defendant offered only to allow a judgment to be taken “in favor of all of the plaintiffs 
jointly and severally, in the amount of $75,100.” None of the plaintiffs, thus, had the 
power individually to accept all or some portion of the offer of judgment so as to avoid 
trial and the possibility of the taxation of costs.  Even though all plaintiffs were members 
of the same family unit, defendants joint and several offer of judgment in effect placed 
each of them in a position of conflict of interest.  I conclude that the offer of judgment 
was not in proper form under Rule 68 and defendant may not invoke its protection. 
 
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Individualized offers further the policy of the Rule 68 to encourage settlement.  
Individualized offers facilitate a reasoned evaluation of the merits of each 
plaintiff’s claim and, if accepted, can be entered as judgments.  Although a 
defendant may still phrase an offer of settlement as a collective one to multiple 
plaintiffs, an award of costs is only available under Rule 68 where the offer is 
formally apportioned among each of the plaintiffs individually.  Since Thomas’ 
offer of judgment was not apportioned to each plaintiff individually, Rule 68 
cannot be applied in this case.  Accordingly, the Superior Court erred as a matter of 
law in granting Thomas’ motion for costs.12   
IV. 
Conclusion 
The Superior Court award of costs under Rule 68 is REVERSED.  This 
matter is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.   
                                          
 
12 Because the offer of judgment was legally insufficient under Rule 68, we need not address the 
Cahall’s alternative argument.  We note also that because this alternative argument was not fairly 
presented to the trial court, it has been waived.