Case Title: Alexander v. State

Citation: 667 So. 2d 1

Docket Number: 92-KA-00010-SCT

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1995-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
667 So. 2d 1 (1995) John P. ALEXANDER v. STATE of Mississippi, Carmen Gettis Castilla and Mississippi State Parole Board. No. 92-KA-00010-SCT. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 30, 1995. Dan R. Wise, Hattiesburg, for Appellant. Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Deirdre McCrory, Sp. Asst. Attorney General, Jackson, for Appellee. EN BANC. HAWKINS, Chief Justice, for the Court: The present case was considered by this Court in Alexander v. State of Mississippi, *2 Carmen Gettis Castilla and Mississippi State Parole Board, No. 92-KA-00010 (decided December 8, 1994). After full consideration, we hereby grant the State's Petition for Rehearing. Therefore, this Court's original opinion is hereby withdrawn and the following opinion is to be substituted therefore. In 1978, Alexander was convicted of murder in the Circuit Court of Hinds County and ordered to serve a life sentence in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. This Court subsequently affirmed the conviction and sentence in Alexander v. State, 358 So. 2d 379 (Miss. 1978). Alexander was paroled in August of 1984. On September 23, 1986, Alexander was arrested and charged with simple assault. He was convicted of that charge on September 26, 1986, in the Forrest County Justice Court. Alexander was returned to Parchman prison on October 3, 1986. After being duly noticed, Alexander was given a parole revocation hearing on October 27, 1986. Alexander received from the Board a notice concerning this hearing, which stated in part: Alexander's parole was revoked by Order dated October 27, 1986. On November 3, 1986, Alexander perfected an appeal of the simple assault conviction to the Forrest County Court. The county court thereafter on August 4, 1987, entered an Order dismissing the simple assault charges. In January of 1991, Alexander filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Circuit Court of Sunflower County, challenging the revocation of his parole. Alexander received notice for a hearing on the Motion, signed by Magistrate Betty W. Sanders, and a hearing was held on April 24, 1991. After considering all the evidence, the circuit court denied Alexander's petition. Alexander thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration. This motion was also denied by the lower court. Aggrieved by the lower court's dismissal of his claim, Alexander filed notice of appeal to this Court and presented the following for review: By Order of this Court, dated April 14, 1994, the record for the case sub judice was supplemented by Judge Howard Q. Davis's subsequent order as follows: Alexander filed a response to this Court's remand for supplementation, stating there was neither a transcript of the county court proceedings nor a record of Alexander's parole revocation hearing. Notwithstanding Alexander's assertion, a transcript of the parole revocation hearing was indeed forwarded to this Court pursuant to the April 14, 1994 Order.[1] The State in its Petition emphasizes the following exchange the transpired during the course of Alexander's parole revocation hearing: During the course of the parole revocation hearing held on October 27, 1986, it was in fact determined that Alexander had discontinued certain medications sometime prior to his father bringing the simple assault charges in Forrest County Justice Court in September, 1986. An unidentified woman commented at the hearing that "[t]his was a justice court conviction. The time for his appeal has not elapsed and he has signed an appeal bond today to appeal that conviction to the county court." She further stated that she "would like to have John released to have some treatment rather than have his parole revoked." In addition, Alexander's parole officer believed he was doing very well and faithfully reported in. There was a great deal of discussion about Alexander ceasing to take his medication and whether this action was approved by his treating physicians. The chairman presiding at this hearing stated: A female voice, again unidentified, stated that she thought that "Mr. Alexander was concerned to make clear to this board that he took this action in filing the simple assault charge as a preventative measure that he was not concerned to have John charged with the assault charge." The Parole Board revoked Alexander's parole in October, 1986. Alexander, in turn, filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the circuit court in 1991. The admission by Alexander concerning the simple assault charge that was brought in the Forrest County Justice Court, together with the other material before this Court requires that the circuit court's order denying Alexander's petition for post-conviction relief be affirmed. The relevant authority for such decision is set forth in the discussion that follows. Alexander, in both his petition to the circuit court and his direct appeal to this Court, *4 argues that his parole was unlawfully revoked due to the fact that the county court ultimately dismissed the charges which originally resulted in the justice court conviction. Alexander questions the validity of the justice court conviction and further argues that the county court's subsequent action of dismissing the charges serves to nullify the earlier justice court conviction. This argument focuses on the fact that the county court conducts a de novo review. In part Alexander relies on §§ 11-51-81 through 11-51-91 of the Mississippi Code of 1972. These sections provide the framework for appeals in and from the lower courts. However, nothing in these statutes specifically supports Alexander's assertions and arguments. In addition, Alexander cites Moore v. Ruth, 556 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Miss. 1990), for the proposition that "where a parolee is subsequently acquitted or found not guilty of a felony for which parole has been revoked, this State must prove facts and circumstances, apart from an arrest, charge or conviction, which warrant revocation of parole." The State counters this argument by relying on the fact that Alexander failed to sustain his requisite burden of factually showing that the revocation of his parole was predicated exclusively on his justice court conviction. Moore v. State, 587 So. 2d 1193, 1197 (Miss. 1991). This Court's holdings in the Moore v. State and Moore v. Ruth cases are applicable to the case sub judice. In Moore v. Ruth, 556 So. 2d 1059 (Miss. 1990), this Court discussed the applicable standard for revocation of parole: 556 So. 2d at 1061 [emphasis in original]. From the record it appears that the Parole Board hearing, conducted to determine whether to revoke Alexander's parole, focused on both the justice court conviction and whether Alexander ceased taking his prescribed medication. The substance of Alexander's responses during the parole revocation hearing support the actual violation of condition five of his parole agreement. We find such evidence to comport with the law set forth in Moore v. Ruth, which requires a showing "that he has violated the terms and conditions of his parole." Id. at 1061. Condition five required that Alexander "live and remain at liberty without violating the law." Whether or not Alexander's parole was lawfully revoked turns on whether there was a sufficient showing that Alexander violated this condition. We find that the complete record of the parole revocation hearing supports the notion that the revocation was proper as it pertained to the conviction obtained in justice court and later appealed to and dismissed by the county court. We further find based on the record through supplemental documents, filings, and the State's Petition for Rehearing that the Board did not rely solely on Alexander's justice court conviction as a violation of condition five of the parole agreement. We have before us now a clear and unambiguous admission by Alexander that he was found guilty of simple assault and that he understood the nature of these charges. In Moore v. Ruth, 556 So. 2d at 1062, this Court said: "[t]he acquittal on the criminal charge means at the very least that, before the accused's parole may be revoked, the State must offer actual proof that he committed an act violating the terms and conditions of his parole, and the mere fact that he was arrested and charged with rape may hardly suffice." Further, in Moore v. State, 587 So. 2d 1193, 1196 (Miss. 1991), we stated that "[b]efore one *5 released on parole may be returned to custody, it must be shown that he has violated the terms and conditions of parole. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-27 (Supp. 1989)." Id. at 1196. In the case sub judice, the record of the hearing along with Alexander's admission points to the conviction in justice court as a valid basis for the revocation of Alexander's parole. There was a conviction at the justice court level, which distinguishes it from the "acquittal" category set forth in Moore. This Court finds persuasive, Alexander's comments made during the hearing. Such amounts to actual proof that Alexander violated the terms and conditions of his parole. This in addition to the justice court conviction supports the circuit court's ruling. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court's denial of Alexander's petition for post-conviction relief. The order of the lower court stated in part that: Alexander contends that because his arguments are predicated on an unlawful revocation of his parole, his motion and appeal are specifically excepted from the three-year filing requirement set forth in § 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 1993). This section states in part that: The State counters this argument, stating that the lower court was correct in determining Alexander's motion was time-barred under § 99-39-5 (Supp. 1993). The State, in its brief, supports both sides of this argument by stating: Alexander was convicted of simple assault in 1986 and his appeal in county court was final on August 4, 1987. If we assume that the three-year limitation is applicable to his case, Alexander had until August 3, 1990, to file under the PCR act. Alexander filed on January 11, 1991. However, because Alexander sought to challenge the revocation of his parole, his cause of action indeed fit squarely within the exception of § 99-39-5(2). The motion and relief requested by Alexander was incorrectly deemed time-barred by the lower court. After additional analysis and review, we find that the actions and rulings of the Sunflower Circuit Court based on Alexander's justice court conviction of simple assault and parole revocation hearing were proper. The conviction was deemed a violation of condition five of Alexander's parole agreement, which required that he "live and remain at liberty without violating the law." It is apparent that Alexander was cognizant of these charges and that he further admitted his guilt. Therefore, we affirm the ruling of the Sunflower Circuit Court. As to the second issue raised by Alexander, the lower court was incorrect in deeming his motion time barred under § 99-39-5(2). This case falls squarely within the enumerated exception pertaining to "unlawfully revoked" parole. AFFIRMED. DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur. McRAE, J., concurs in result only. BANKS, J., concurs with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN and McRAE, JJ. BANKS, Justice, concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority because, in my view, the record supports the conclusion that the Parole Board relied upon the failure to take medication giving rise to the circumstances leading to the justice court conviction rather than the fact of conviction standing alone. I do not agree with the majority opinion insofar as it may be read to assert that a justice court conviction, which is later rendered nugatory by an appellate acquittal on the charge, is sufficient, standing alone for the revocation of parole. There is little to distinguish an acquittal at the county or circuit court level following a justice court conviction from an acquittal at the circuit court level following a felony charge. In either event, if revocation is based on the fact of the charge or even a conviction subject to de novo consideration, as opposed to an independent finding of conduct violative of parole, revocation should be set aside. Moore v. Ruth, 556 So. 2d 1059 (Miss. 1990). SULLIVAN and McRAE, JJ., join this opinion. [1] The transcript does not list the members or persons present at the time the transcript was made.