Case Title: Sargent v. Town of Randolph Fire Dept. & Liberty Mutual Insurance

Citation: 2007 VT 56

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sargent v. Town of Randolph Fire Dept. & Liberty Mutual Insurance (2006-179)

2007 VT 56

[Filed 14-Jun-2007]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2007 VT 56

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2006-179

                              MARCH TERM, 2007


  Herbert Sargent                      }         APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.                              }         Department of Labor
                                       }  
  Town of Randolph Fire Department and }
  Liberty Mutual Insurance             }
                                       }         DOCKET NO. State File 
                                                            No. L-01798;  
                                                            Opinion No. 70-05 WC



             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       ¶  1.  Herbert Sargent appeals the Commissioner of Labor's denial of
  attorney's fees and costs for proceedings before the Commissioner.  Mr.
  Sargent was unsuccessful in his claim for permanent total disability
  benefits before the Commissioner, but he prevailed on that claim after a
  jury trial in superior court.  The employer paid attorney's fees and costs
  for the superior court proceedings, and the superior court remanded the
  case to the Commissioner for a consideration of fees and costs expended to
  present the case to the Commissioner.  The Commissioner denied attorney's
  fees and costs, relying on 21 V.S.A. § 678.  We hold that the Commissioner
  erred in interpreting the worker's compensation statute.  Therefore,  we
  reverse and remand the Commissioner's decision.
   
       ¶  2.  In 1997, claimant was injured on the job while volunteering
  for the Town of Randolph Fire Department.  As a result of the injuries, Mr.
  Sargent sought permanent total disability benefits.  At a hearing before
  the Commissioner on April 4, 2002, claimant offered written medical
  records, vocational rehabilitation records, and expert testimony from
  doctors.  The Commissioner denied permanent total disability benefits,
  ordered vocational rehabilitation services to resume and granted claimant a
  10% impairment rating for the spine injury and a 16% psychological
  impairment rating.  Claimant submitted a timely request for attorney's fees
  and costs pursuant to Workers' Compensation Rule 10.4000.  The request
  included 382.8 hours of attorney time, 12.9 hours of paralegal time, and
  $4,775.84 in costs incurred before the Department.  The Commissioner denied
  claimant's request for attorney's fees and costs because she found claimant
  had not prevailed in his claim for permanent total disability benefits.  

       ¶  3.  Claimant appealed to the Washington Superior Court in
  November 2002 pursuant to 21 V.S.A. § 670.  The certified questions for
  retrial by the superior court were the same as the issues presented to the
  Commissioner, specifically: "was Herbert Sargent permanently totally
  disabled as a result of his work-related injury, and if Mr. Sargent was not
  permanently totally disabled, what was the extent of his permanent partial
  impairment as a result of his work-related injury?" 

       ¶  4.  Following trial in superior court, the jury found that
  claimant was entitled to permanent total disability benefits.  In a
  judgment order dated July 13, 2005, the trial court confirmed the jury's
  verdict and ordered judgment against defendants in the amount of $40,000.00
  for reasonable attorney's fees incurred for the trial.  

       ¶  5.  Claimant then filed a motion before the Commissioner to
  recover attorney's fees and costs originally incurred before the
  Commissioner.  Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the request
  should have been made in the appeal to the trial court, and more
  importantly that claimant was not entitled to fees and costs because he had
  not prevailed before the Commissioner.  Defendants also argued that
  claimant had advanced a different reason for his permanent total disability
  at trial than he had in the hearing before the Commissioner.  At trial
  claimant called two new expert witnesses and did not call any of his
  treating physicians.  The Commissioner denied claimant's motion ruling that
  "[b]ecause the claimant did not 'prevail' at this level, he is not entitled
  to the fees incurred for the work performed here."  The ruling did not
  address whether the motion was timely made.  Claimant appeals.  

       ¶  6.  We first address the issue of timeliness.  Defendants assert
  that claimant's motion for attorney's fees was untimely because he did not
  appeal the Commissioner's original denial of fees to the superior court. 
  Claimant contends that he could not raise the issue of attorney's fees in
  the superior court because he had not yet prevailed.  See 21 V.S.A. §
  678(a), (b) (providing for award of attorney's fees if claimant prevails
  before various tribunals). 

       ¶  7.  This Court has recognized that "[a] number of federal and
  state cases have held that a request [for attorney's fees] made after a
  party prevails on appeal is timely."  Fleury v. Kessel/Duff Constr., 156
  Vt. 406, 411, 592 A.2d 904, 906 (1991) [hereinafter Felury III].  The
  request here was made shortly after claimant prevailed in superior court on
  his claim for permanent total disability.  As is discussed herein, the
  statutory scheme provides the appropriate process for seeking attorney's
  fees and costs after claimant is successful in court.  We hold that the
  motion for attorney's fees after the superior court trial was timely. 
        
       ¶  8.  Our review in workers' compensation cases is "limited to a
  review of questions of law certified by the commissioner."  21 V.S.A. §
  672.  The Commissioner certified the following questions: "Did the
  Department abuse its discretion in denying Claimant's request  for attorney
  fees for work performed at the administrative level?  Is Claimant entitled
  to costs incurred at the administrative level when he does not prevail at
  that level but later prevails on his claim in Superior Court?" (FN1)  

       ¶  9.  We afford substantial deference to the Commissioner in
  reviewing the Commissioner's interpretation of the workers' compensation
  statute.  "Absent compelling indication of error, interpretation of a
  statute by an administrative body responsible for its execution will be
  sustained on appeal."  Bedini v. Frost, 165 Vt. 167, 169,