Case Title: McGEE v BURLINGTON NORTHERN INC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 1 3 4 6 2 IPJ THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1977 DONALD R. McGEE, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, BURLINGTON N O R T H E R N I N C . , a c o r p o r a t i o n , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Ilonorable N a t A l l e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Gough, Shanahan, Johnson and Waterman, Helena, Montana C o r d e l l Johnson argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Hoyt and Bottomly, Great F a l l s , Montana John C. Hoyt argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: October 7 , 1977 Decided: NOV 1 5 1 C J n dUV 1 , 5 / / F i l e d : M r , Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court : This is the second appeal t o t h i s Court of an action for damages i n i t i a ted by Donald R. McGee against Burlington Northern, Inc,, as a result of injuries sustained i n an accident occurring on November 4, 1971. The f i r s t jury t r i a l resulted i n a verdict for plaintiff McGee i n the amount of $525,000, That verdict was appealed by defendant and t h i s Court held defendant was negligent as a matter of law, but remanded the case for r e t r i a l on the issues of damages and contributory negligence. McGee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 167 Mont. 485, 540 P. 2d 298 (1975). P l a i n t i f f t s petition for rehearing was denied by t h i s Court on September 12, 1975. P l a i n t i f f t s subsequent petition t o the United States Supreme Court for a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i was denied. McGee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 423 U.S. 1074, 96 S.Ct. 857, 47 L ed 2d 83(1976). Retrial of the cause before a jury began April 27, 1976 in the District Court, Cascade County. Following t r i a l , the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $618,000. Judg- ment was entered. Defendant's motion for a new t r i a l was denied. Defendant appeals from the judgment. The facts developed a t r e t r i a l are: O n the evening of November 4 , 1971, p l a i n t i f f was a member of the t r a i n crew engaged in yard switching a t the station of Omak, Washington. Plaintiff was the "swingman" i n charge of carrying out the orders contained i n the switching list. The remainder of the crew was composed of a conductor, an engineer, a flagman responsible for stopping and making f a s t those cats which were switched onto a different t r a c t , and a head brakeman, who operated the switching mechanisms. Just prior t o the accident, the switch engine was on the main line, facing east. A boxcar was coupled i n front of the engine, and a chip car coupled directly t o the front of the boxcar. Plaintiff determined that t o successfully accomplish the switch, it would be necessary to "kick" the chip car upgrade, along the main line. The switch would then be thrown, such that the engine and the boxcar could proceed off the main line and onto the passing track. It was dark, and switching was being accomplished by way of railroad lantern signals. Plaintiff f i r s t gave a "kick" sign to the engineer. A s the engine moved forward, p l a i n t i f f attempted t o pull the lever which would release the coupling mechanism and, when the engine stopped, send the chip car up the main line. The pin i n the coupling mechanism did not pull, so the engine was stopped. Plaintiff then applied some different pressures and was eventually successful i n pulling the pin. The pin, however, did not remain i n the "up" position. During the second attempt t o "kick" the car, p l a i n t i f f was forced t o run alongside the car while holding the lever i n the "up" position. The car was "kicked" along the main l i n e t o a point where the flagman "chopped" the wheels t o prevent it from rolling back down the grade. The engine and boxcar were positioned such that the frontwheels of the boxcar were directly over the switch points. Plaintiff t e s t i f i e d he was unaware of t h i s fact. There is a conflict in the evidence as t o what signal p l a i n t i f f then gave t o the engineer. Plaintiff t e s t i f i e d he gave "a l i t t l e backup sign." The engineer t e s t i f i e d that the next signal he received was a "come ahead" sign. According t o p l a i n t i f f , he then told the head brakeman the engine and boxcar were to be moved onto the passing track, and the brakeman acknowledged verbally. The brakeman failed t o recall the exchange, but was aware the engine and boxcar were t o move onto the passing track. H e could not throw the switch, however, because of the positioning of the front wheels of the boxcar. In any event, plaintiff began walking east along the south side of the main line and called t o the flagman, " W e are going to pull the pass.'' The flagman raised and lowered h i s lantern i n acknowledgement. P l a i n t i f f , interpreting t h i s according t o railroad signal movements a s a "come ahead" signal, relayed it t o the engineer. The flagman was, a t that time, walking down the passing track, out of the sight of the engineer. After relaying the signal, plaintiff was standing along the south side of the main line, facing east, away from the oncoming t r a i n movement, and was studying the switch list b'y the light of h i s lantern. A s he became aware the boxcar was passing him, he was struck from behind by a s t e e l door handle protruding from the side of the boxcar. Plaintiff was forced t o the ground and sustained serious injuries t o h i s back, neck and l e f t knee as a result, There were no direct witnesses t o the accident it- self. Plaintiff has been unable t o work since the accident. Retrial was before the District &urt of Cascade County, the Hon. Nat Allen presiding. Defendant admitted l i a b i l i t y on the case and the t r i a l proceeded on the issues of damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) and the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FsAA), and contributory negligence. Following deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff i n the amount of $618,000 and judgment was entered thereon. The District Court denied defendant's subsequent motion for a new t r i a l . This appeal followed. The issues presented for review are: 1. Did counsel for plaintiff i n f i n a l argument, i n effect, improperly urge the jury t o assess punitive damages against defendant? 2. Did the t r i a l ' c o u r t e r r in submitting the issue of a FSAA violation t o the jury? 3. Did the t r i a l court e r r in giving and refusing certain instructions? 4 . Did the t r i a l court e r r in permitting p l a i n t i f f t o introduce into evidence, over objection, a surveillance report compiled by defendant? 5. Did the t r i a l court e r r in allowing improper febuttal testimony offered by p l a i n t i f f ? 6. Was the verdict excessive, as a result of passion o r prejudice? Issue 1. Defendant Burlington Northern argues the closing statement of p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel contained statements which, i n effect , were arguments for punitive damages, impermissible under the holding of t h i s Court i n the f i r s t McGee appeal. The jury, it i s maintained, was incensed and prejudiced as a result. The record indicates the remarks complained of were: "* * * H o w can the railroad be encouraged t o do these things right? H o w can they be encouraged not t o allow rules violations? H o w can they be encouraged t o protect t h e i r men? Well, one way is by your verdict i n t h i s case. "The railroad is not cheap when it comes to spending money on such things a s surveillance -- surveillance of one of i t s own employees, that it injured through its own gross and wilful and rotten negligence * * *." Defendant objected, on the ground the argument went t o punitive damages, an impermissible element of damages i n a F E U case, citing as authority the f i r s t McGee opinion. The objection was overruled. Defendant's subsequent motion for a mistrial on t h i s basis was denied. Following the courts ruling, t h i s exchange be- tween the court and defense counsel occurred: "THE COURT: No. The Court thinks you' r e being completely -- you're misconstruing what he said completely. H e never used the word 'punitive' o r any synonym thereof i n h i s argument, did he? "MR. JOHNSON: No, he didn't, Your Honor. ''THE COURT: And the Jury would f a i l t o recognize your motion i f they heard it i n front of the jury as being applicable t o the facts. "Your motion i s denied." This Court recently considered the effect of insertion of the element of punitive damages into the t r i a l of a FELA action. Torchia v. Burlington Northern, Inc . , Mont . 9 568 P.2d 558, 34 St.Rep. 1011 (1977). I n Torchia, we held that offered evidence, argument and instructions relating to punitive damages or the concept of "gross and willful negligence", while having no place i n a F E L A action, were not a ground for reversal, a s the evidence failed t o establish conduct which would have supported an award of punitive damages, and the jury failed t o award them. Upon a review of the instant record, it is clear the element of punitive damages, apart from the possible connotations of counsel's statements s e t forth above, was wholly absent a t the r e t r i a l . This issue we specifically met i n Torchia, adversely t o the defendant's position. H i l l v. Chappel Bros. of Montana,Inc., 93 Mont. 92, 18 P.2d 1106 (1932). Issue 2. Defendant also maintains that the t r i a l court should have granted its motion for a directed verdict on the issue of the alleged F S A A violation. The core of its argument is that there was no showing that the automatic coupler was defective by F S A A standards, o r that there existed a causal relationship between the alleged defect and plaintiff ' s injury, both elements being required under cases interpreting the perti- nent provision of the FSAA, 45 U.S.C. 5 2 . During the course of t r i a l , plaintiff attempted t o show that the automatic coupler mechanism between the boxcar and the chip car was defective, i n that it would not remain uncoupled during normal switching operations. Such failure was alleged to have made necessary the second "kick" and caused the wheels of the boxcar t o come t o r e s t on the switch points, such that the engine proceeded along the wrong track, eventually leading t o p l a i n t i f f ' s injury. Defendant produced a witness i n its case-in-chief, one Orville Busch, who participated in an inspection of the car in- volved i n the accident. H i s duties, as an employee of defendant, were t o inspect and repair freight and passenger cars and deter- mine whether the cars satisfied F S A A standards. Busch t e s t i f i e d that, upon h i s inspection, the coupler worked properly and no portions of the mechanism were bent, broken o r missing. H e concluded the coupler was nondefective and, therefore, did not violate the FSAA. However, upon cross-examination, Busch indicated that where there is no abnormal condition affecting the automatic coupler mechanism, primarily its being under "stress" a t the time of the attempted release, it is a violation of the F S A A i f it f a i l s t o uncouple. Throughout the t r i a l , however, it was emphasized by p l a i n t i f f that the coupler was not under s t r e s s but, rather, under compression, as the cars were being pushed, not pulled, by the engine. The relevant section of the FSAA, 45 W . S . C . 9 2 , provides: "Automatic couplers. It shall be unlawful foy any common carrier engaged i n interstate commerce by railroad t o haul o r permit t o be hauled or used on its line any car used i n moving interstate t r a f f i c not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars." The principal p=@se i n the enactment of 45 U.S.C. 42 was t o eliminate the various risks attendant to manual coupling and uncoupling of railroad cars, which required the employees t o go between the ends of the cars. Gentle v. Western & A.R.R., 305 U.S. 654, 59 S.Ct. 252, 83 L ed 424 (1939). The safety require- ments of the a c t have been held t o apply t o uncoupling operations as well a s coupling operations. Louisville & N.R.Co. v. United States, 98 C.C.A. 664, 174 F. 1021 (Ala.1909); Phillips v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., C.A. Va. 1973, 475 F.2d 22. The duty of the railroad t o provide automatic couplers which both couple and uncouple properly is absolute, without regard t o negligence o r the normal efficiency of the couplers. Affolder v. N e w York C. & St.L.R.Co., 339 U.S. 96, 70 S.Ct. 509, 94 L ed 683 (1950). The fact the coupler functioned properly before o r a f t e r the incident i n question i s immaterial. Carter v. Atlanta & St. A.B .Ry.Co., 338 U.S. 430, 70 S.Ct. 226, 94 L ed 236 (1949) ; Phillips v. Chesapeake & O.Ry. Co., supra. By the weight of authority, an injured employee must, as a prerequisite t o recovery, demonstrate that the violation of the F S A A was a proximate cause of h i s injury. Cobb v. Union Ry. Co., 318 F.2d 33 (C.A. Tenn. 1963), cert.den. 375 u.S. 945, 84 S . C t . 352, 1 1 L ed 2d 275 (1963). Here, p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony clearly indicated the coupling device was nonoperative a t the time of the incident, forcing him t o hold the lever in an "up" position while running along the side of the car. Based upon the cited authority above, t h i s i n i t s e l f was a violation of the FSAA. The fact the coupler appeared non- defective upon inspection by witness Busch is immaterial. Further, it i s evident the coupling mechanism was not under "stress" o r other abnormal condition a t the time of the attempted kick, There- fore, we conclude there was sufficient evidence of a F S A A viola- tion t o submit the issue to the jury. It was also uncontroverted that had the coupler operated correctly, the boxcar bearing the handle which struck p l a i n t i f f would have stopped well short of the switch points upon the f i r s t kick operation. The boxcar would then have proceeded up the passing track, and p l a i n t i f f would have escaped injury, despite the protruding door handle. This, we find was a sufficient showing of proximate cause. The issue of the alleged F S A A violation was therefore properly submitted t o the jury and we refuse t o disturb any findings or conclusions drawn by the jury i n t h i s regard, Issue 3. Defendant argues thatwrious errors allegedly committed by the t r i a l court i n giving and refusing certain in- structions constitute grounds for reversal. W e disagree. Defendant contends the t r i a l court erred in refusing t o give its proposed instruction No. 19 on the ground that it was repeti- tious of courts Instruction No, 18. Defendant ' s proposed ins truc- tion No. 19 reads : "In order for you t o find i n favor of plaintiff McGee on h i s claim of a Safety Applicance Act violation, plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence not only that there was a violation of the Safety Appliance Act, but also that the violation caused h i s injury i n whole or i n part. I f the injury resulted from some other cause, then you must find for defendant on the Safety Appliance Act feature." Court's Instruction No. 18 states: "You are instructed that plaintiff McGee also claims that defendant railroad violated a law of the United States known a s the Safety Appliance Act as explained t o you more fully i n other instructions. Plaintiff McGee claims that h i s injuries resulted i n whole or i n part from that violation. "Defendant has also denied that it committed any Safety Appliance Act violation. "Defendant also claims that even i f it did violate any of the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act, p l a i n t i f f McGee's injuries did not result in whole o r in part from the violation. "These conflicting claims and denials present issues that you must decide." A s previously stated, recovery for a F S A A violation i s predicated upon a showing of: (1) A violation of the a c t , and (2) injury proximately caused thereby. These elements appear i n both instructions, although phrased differently. When two analogous instructions are, a s here, offered, the trial court is vested with the discretion t o give the instruction representing the best statement of the law t o the jury. Demaree v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 162 Mont. 47, 508 P.2d 570 (1973). Insofar as defendant's offered instruction appears t o l i m i t the concept of "proximate cause" to one of "sole cause'' it was confusing, misleading and an incorrect statement of the law. Such instructions were properly refused. Long v. Byers, 142 Mont. The t r i a l court also refused defendant's proposed instruc- tion No. 2 5 A concerning the impact of income taxes upon the damage award. Defendant aserts i t s proposed instruction was based upon the authority of the recent F E L A case of Burlington Northern Inc. v. Boxberger, 9th C i r . 1975, 529 F.2d 284, and its refusal was error. I n rejecting the instruction, the t r i a l court was i n accord with the majority of decisions on the point. See: Torchia v. Burlington Northern, Inc., supra. W e reaffirm our prior boldin'g_;"- that future income tax l i a b i l i t y i s an improper con- sideration i n formulating an award for loss of future earnings. Bracy v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 136 Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848 (1959). Defendant further argues the t r i a l court erroneously gave an instruction which constituted a comment on the .evidence, in effect directing the jury t o find for p l a i n t i f f on the issue of the F S A A violation. The instruction in question, given as Court's Instruction No. 20 states: "The Safety Appliance Act imposes an absolute duty, not based on negligence, upon the railroad to provide its cars with an uncoupling device which operates e f f i - ciently a t the time of the accident. I f you should find from the evidence that plaintiff operated the uncoupling device i n the usually accepted and customary manner and the uncoupler failed t o immediately respond i n an e f f i - cient manner, the railroad was i n violation of the Safety Appliance Act. It is no defense that the railroad had no knowledge of a particular defect i n the uncoupling device a s the railroad i s charged with knowledge of the defect a s though it actually had it. It i s immaterial that no defect was found i n the uncoupling device. "It is immaterial that the uncoupler functioned properly before o r a f t e r the accident. "If you should find that the railroad violated the Safety Appliance Act, then you may not reduce p l a i n t i f f ' s damages on account of any contributory negligence on the part of p l a i n t i f f . "Should you find a violation of the Safety Appliance Act, the only further question insofar a s the Safety Appliance Act i s concerned is did the violation play any part, no matter how small, i n producing the injury." Defendant's objection t o t h i s instruction is without merit. The instruction i s a correct restatement of a l l relevant rules emerging from accepted case authorities. Plaintiff submitted t o the jury evidence tending t o prove an actionable F S A A violation and was entitled t o an instruction adaptable t o h i s theory of the case. Williams v. Montana National Bank of Bozeman, 167 Mont. 24, 534 P.2d 1247 (1975); Meinecke v. Skaggs, 123 Mont. 308, 213 P.2d 237 (1949). The t r i a l court also gave, as Court's Instruction No. 4, an instruction concerning p l a i n t i f f ' s use of ordinary care t o avoid known dangerous conditions tortiously created by defendant. Defendant argues the instruction is an incorrect statement of the law, confusing, and inapplicable t o the facts of the case. The instruction refers t o contributory negligence, poten- t i a l l y a t issue i n the instant case. Plaintiff steadfastly maintained h i s absolute lack of f a u l t i n bringing about the injury. The instruction is i n accord with the theory a s advanced by p l a i n t i f f . The giving of such instruction is not reversible error, absent a showing that the jury was misled by it. O'Brien v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 145 Mont. 13, 400 P.2d 634 (1965). Issue 4. During p l a i n t i f f ' s case, the t r i a l court permitted introduction, over objection, of the body of a surveillance report compiled by defendant's claims department. The report had been properly discovered and was considered by p l a i n t i f f t o be helpful t o h i s case. Defendant had, i n advance of t r i a l , sought a motion in limine t o prevent introduction of the report. The motion was denied. Defendant now puts forward t h i s permitted introduction a s error. Defendant maintains the sole purpose for the report is its use f o r possible impeachment of a p l a i n t i f f ' s t r i a l testimony concerning h i s injuries, i n a personal injury o r related action. Defendant urges the report i n t h i s case, containing no potential impeachment material, should hot have been admitted into evidence. W e cannot sustain such a position. - 12 - Certainly, an essential issue of p l a i n t i f f ' s case was whether he was injured and, i f so, t o what extent. Here, t h a t de- fendant engaged in surveillance, a common practice i n similar actions, indicates that defendant hoped t o demonstrate the contrary. Evidence may be both relevant and irrelevant, depending upon the purpose for which it is offered, and the f a c t o r facts it is t o prove. Here, plaintiff offered the surveillance report, properly discovered, a s proof of the fact and extent of h i s injuries. Section 93-401-27, R.C.M. 1947, provides, i n part: 'I* * * evidence may be given upon a t r i a l of the following facts : "1. The precise fact i n dispute. "15. Any other facts from which the facts i n issue are presumed o r are logically inferable. "16. Such facts as serve t o show the credibility of a witness * * *.I1 The report was clearly relevant t o p l a i n t i f f ' s proof of injuries under subsections 1 and 15, section 93-401-27. W e find it was admissible, t o the same extent it would have been admissible had the results been favorable t o defendant and the report offered t o impeach p l a i n t i f f ' s credibility under subsection 16, section 93-401-27. Issue 5. Defendant next contends the t r i a l court erroneously permitted improper rebuttal testimony by p l a i n t i f f ' s witness i n the f i e l d of economics. Counsel for defendant was permitted, by stipulation, t o read into the record during the course of defendant's case, figures concerning the average income tax t o which p l a i n t i f f ' s annual income would be subject. O n rebuttal, p l a i n t i f f was allowed t o introduce testimony from an economics expert regarding the impact of income taxes. Counsel for p l a i n t i f f was permitted, over objection, t o question the witness concerning the future earnings of a hypothetical railroad employee i n the position of p l a i n t i f f , for purposes of foundation. Plaintiff had not introduced similar testimony i n h i s case-in-chief. Defendant's argument i n t h i s regard is that, having limited its testimony t o matters involving the effect of income taxation alone, p l a i n t i f f ' s rebuttal testimony should have been restricted t o rebutting some portion of defendant's offered evidence. It i s argued the permitted testimony f a r exceeded the scope of the direct testimony introduced by defendant. Admission of rebuttal evidence is a matter resting largely within the discretion of the t r i a l court. Only when it is shown that such discretion has been abused, w i l l the decision be reviewed. State Highway Commission v. Ostwalt, 153 Mont. 83, 454 P.2d 605 (1969); Morrison v. City of Butte, 150 Mont. 106, 431 P.2d 79 (1967). The generally accepted test for determining whether certain rebuttal evidence i s proper is whether it tends t o counteract new matters offered by the adverse party. Gustafson v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 137 Mont. 154, 351 P. 2d 212 (1960). Here the subject of the e f f e c t of income taxation upon p l a i n t i f f ' s earning capacity was f i r s t developed by defendant, during the course of its case. W e hold the subject of p l a i n t i f f ' s earnings and potential tax l i a b i l i t y was sufficiently "opened up" and that the testimony offered by p l a i n t i f f on rebuttal was proper. W e find no abuse of discretion on the part of the t r i a l court in admitting such testimony. Issue 6. Finally, defendant contends the verdict should be overturned by t h i s Court as being excessive, resulting from passion o r prejudice. It i s submitted the cumulative effect of the numerous alleged t r i a l errors engendered an atomosphere of prejudice against defendant and, further, there i s no credible evidence i n the record t o support a verdict as large a s $618,000. The proper standard for determining whether the evidence presented by a plaintiff i n a F E L A action is sufficient t o support a verdict is set forth in Torchia v. Burlington Northern, Inc., supra, quoted from Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S. C t . 740, 90 L ed 916,923 (1946): ' I ' * * * Only where there is a complete absence of probative facts t o support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear. But where * * * there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is free t o discard o r disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court' s function is exhaus ted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent * * *. '" 34 St.Rep. 1016; 568 P.2d 563. The FEU standard outlined above is no less applicable t o F S A A actions o r a combined action under both acts, as here. W e have, i n t h i s opinion, determined there was sufficient admissible evidence of a F S A A violation and resulting damage for submission of the issue t o the jury. P l a i n t i f f ' s evidence of the F E L A violation was uncontradicted a s was h i s evidence concerning the various items of damage, including pain and suffering. None of the damage figures so introduced were con- tested by defendant during the t r i a l . W e can discern no basis on defendant's f i n a l issue t o disturb the verdict of the jury. The judgment entered upon t -,verdict i s affirmed. t , ,\\ W e Concur: Hon. u a m e s Sorte, District Judge, s i t t i n g ~ O L M ~ . Chief Justice Paul G. Hatfield.