Case Title: Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist.

Citation: 

Docket Number: Yor-10-237

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME 95 
Docket: 
Yor-10-237 
Argued: 
January 12, 2011 
Decided: 
August 25, 2011 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
 
MIDDLESEX MUTUAL ASSURANCE COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
MAINE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT NO. 43 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
 
[¶1]  The appeal in this subrogation action presents the question of whether 
negligent conduct by students that causes damage to a motel where the students 
were lodging while competing in a school-supported event renders the students’ 
school district liable to repay the motel’s insurance company for the damages 
caused by the students.   We hold that because the school district did not undertake 
to be responsible to pay damages in a subrogation action, the insurer’s action 
against the school district is barred.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 
Superior Court. 
[¶2]  Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company, the property insurer for the 
Sanford Super 8 Motel, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court (York 
County, Fritzsche, J.) granting Maine School Administrative District No. 43’s 
 
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(MSAD 43) motion for summary judgment.  Middlesex contends that the court 
erred in granting summary judgment because MSAD 43 violated an implied 
contractual obligation, enforceable in this subrogation action, to pay damages 
when student wrestlers from MSAD 43 negligently damaged the motel property.  
Middlesex also argues that the court erred in restricting its ability to conduct 
pretrial discovery, including its ability to depose one of MSAD 43’s employees, in 
its action against MSAD 43. 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
 
[¶3]  The following facts are supported by the record.  Middlesex Mutual 
Assurance Company is the property insurer for the Sanford Super 8 Motel.  On 
January 2, 2009, the wrestling coach for MSAD 43 rented several rooms at the 
motel on behalf of MSAD 43’s wrestling team, which was participating in a 
tournament in the area.  The coach signed a “Super 8 Reservation/Guest Room 
receipt.”  The relevant portions read:   
I AUTHORIZE ALL CHARGES RELATED TO MY STAY TO BE 
CHARGED TO MY CREDIT CARD.  ALSO IF STAYING IN A 
NON SMOKING ROOM, SMOKING IS PROHIBITED.  THERE 
WILL BE A CHARGE OF $100 IF WE FIND EVIDENCE OF 
SMOKE.  PLEASE SIGN HERE TO ACKNOWLEDGE OUR NON 
SMOKING POLICY.  
  
Also printed on the receipt is a notice, which reads: 
 
This franchised hotel is independently owned and operated.  You 
agree personally to pay all charges incurred during your stay, in 
 
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advance if asked, even if your credit card or billed party doesn’t pay 
[the] hotel, abide by posted procedures for safekeeping valuables and 
house rules and vacate by departure date and time above.  Hotel may 
refuse service and is not responsible for property damage or loss.  
Your party assumes all risks of personal injury unless caused by 
hotel’s sole negligence.  Notify the front desk of any special 
assistance needs. 
 
[¶4]  Nothing in the contract addressed the MSAD 43’s responsibility to the 
motel’s insurer in a subrogation action for any damage the room occupants might 
cause.  The coach did not sign any other documents when he signed in to the 
motel. 
 
[¶5]  Four members of MSAD 43’s wrestling team stayed in room 216.  At 
some point that night, the team members in room 216 turned on the shower, 
blocked the ventilation system, and used the motel’s hairdryer to create a makeshift 
sauna to help one of their teammates “make weight” for the next day’s match.  As 
a result of the students’ actions, the motel’s sprinklers activated. 
 
[¶6]  Middlesex paid out $10,693.68 to repair the damage caused by the 
students’ actions.  It then exercised its right of subrogation pursuant to its 
insurance contract with the motel to seek to recover compensation from those 
responsible for the loss. 
 
[¶7]  Middlesex filed a complaint against MSAD 43, alleging that MSAD 43 
is liable “for breach of contract, based upon [MSAD 43’s] failure to protect and 
safeguard the property from damage during the period of occupancy and to refrain 
 
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from activities that would damage the property.”  Because the Maine Tort Claims 
Act, 14 M.R.S. §§ 8101-8118 (2010), effectively bars any tort-based claims against 
MSAD 43, Middlesex, appropriately, is not asserting any tort-based claims, such as 
negligence or negligent supervision, in this action against MSAD 43.  
 
[¶8]  MSAD 43 answered Middlesex’s complaint and asserted several 
defenses.  Four of MSAD 43’s affirmative defenses rest on the Maine Tort Claims 
Act, 14 M.R.S. §§ 8103, 8104, 8105, 8107, 8113, 8116. 1   MSAD 43 also denied 
any responsibility for the damages caused and disavowed any negligence in the 
incident.  MSAD 43 claimed that Middlesex had failed to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, that it was “not subject to respondeat superior or agency 
liability,” and that Middlesex was barred from recovering from MSAD 43 in this 
subrogation action. 
 
[¶9]  Middlesex filed a discovery request, asking MSAD 43 to produce all 
documents that would support MSAD 43’s defenses.  MSAD 43 filed a motion for 
summary judgment, supported by documents, including two affidavits, the check 
MSAD 43 used to pay for the rooms, the printout the coach signed at the motel, a 
Sanford Police Department report, and a printout of the “limits of liability” as 
promulgated by MSAD 43’s own insurance carrier, Argonaut Group.  MSAD 43 
                                         
1  MSAD 43’s claims that this action is barred by the Maine Tort Claims Act are off point.  The Maine 
Tort Claims Act is inapplicable to actions based on contract. 
 
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alleges that “[n]one of the documents attached to [Middlesex’s] Complaint 
establish a contractual obligation to safeguard and protect property during the 
occupancy of Room 216.” 
 
[¶10]  Middlesex sought to depose the coach and a representative from 
MSAD 43.  MSAD 43 objected.  Following a telephonic hearing the court ruled:  
[A]s it does not appear that either the wrestling coach or a 
representative of the school district can provide any information 
regarding the nature of and terms of any contract between the motel 
and the district[,] their depositions will not be held.  The documents 
concerning a contract have already been disclosed and the remaining 
issues are best dealt with through briefs. 
 
[¶11]  After the court granted MSAD 43’s motion for summary judgment, 
Middlesex brought this appeal. 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
[¶12]  We review a ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo.  
Dyer v. Dep’t of Transp., 2008 ME 106, ¶ 14, 951 A.2d 821.  Summary judgment 
is appropriate when the parties’ statements of material facts and the record 
evidence to which the statements refer, considered in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party, demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
that is in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 ME 20, ¶ 11, 989 A.2d 733; Dyer, 2008 ME 106, 
¶ 14, 951 A.2d 821.   
 
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[¶13]  Middlesex argues that MSAD 43 “is liable for the damage to the 
[m]otel property, on the basis of breach of contract because there was an implied 
obligation to protect and safeguard the motel’s property.”  There is no express 
provision in the document the coach signed that would give rise to contractual 
liability of the type alleged by Middlesex.  Because there is no express contract, 
what Middlesex really contends is that a rental contract for a hotel room, without 
any express term in the room rental, includes, as a matter of law, terms that: (1) the 
room occupant, or the person who pays for the room, is responsible for any 
damages caused by negligent use of the room; and (2) the hotel’s insurer may bring 
a subrogation action against the room occupant or person responsible for payment 
to collect such damages. 
[¶14]  The motel itself initiated no negligence action against the individuals 
whose negligence caused the damage.  Instead, consistent with common business 
practice, the motel’s insurer paid the claim, and then, pursuant to the subrogation 
clause of its insurance contract with the motel, assumed the motel’s claim and sued 
MSAD 43.   
[¶15]  We addressed such a claim in North River Insurance Co. v. Snyder, a 
subrogation action, much like the action here, in which a property owner’s insurer 
brought a subrogation action against a tenant for fire damage caused by the 
 
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tenant’s babysitter’s negligent disposal of a cigarette.  2002 ME 146, ¶¶ 3, 4, 
804 A.2d 399.  In North River, we held that “[w]hen the lease does not contain an 
express agreement addressing the issue of subrogation in the event of a negligently 
caused fire by a tenant, . . . a landlord’s insurer may not proceed against the tenant 
as subrogee.”  Id. ¶ 16.   
[¶16]  North River was before us on a question certified by the United States 
District Court that posed the following question:  “May a residential tenant be 
liable in subrogation to the insurer of a landlord for damages paid as a result of 
fire, absent an express agreement to the contrary in a written lease?”  Id. ¶ 1.  We 
answered the question as follows: “No, a residential tenant may not be held liable 
in subrogation to the insurer of the landlord for damages paid as a result of a fire, 
absent an agreement to the contrary—that is, absent an express agreement in the 
written lease that the tenant is liable in subrogation for fire damage to the 
apartment complex.”  Id. 
[¶17]  Our reasoning for that result followed substantial precedent in other 
states indicating that insurance companies, in subrogation actions, would not be 
allowed to shift a loss to a premises occupant, absent an express agreement by the 
premises occupant.  We observed that even if the occupant negligently caused the 
damage, the occupant was considered a co-insured of the property owner, absent 
 
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an express agreement to the contrary, because the occupant had effectively 
purchased the insurance to protect the property as part of the rent payment, and, as 
a matter of economic efficiency, both owner and occupant should not be required 
to purchase insurance to cover the same risk.  Id. ¶¶ 12-16 (citing DiLullo v. 
Joseph, 792 A.2d 819, 822-23 (Conn. 2002); GNS P’ship v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 
1157, 1162, 1164 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 
(Okla. Cir. App. 1975)).  See also Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801, 
808-14 (Md. 2005) (surveying precedent regarding occupant responsibility in 
subrogation actions).   
 
[¶18]  Respecting our jurisprudence regarding the circumstances in which a 
subrogation action may be brought against a premises occupant for negligent 
damage to a premises, there is no basis to import into this contract MSAD 43’s 
assumption of liability in the subrogation action for damages arising from tortious 
acts for which Middlesex seeks recovery. 
 
[¶19]  The Superior Court did not err in granting summary judgment. 
 
[¶20]  Because summary judgment was appropriately granted as a matter of 
law, we need not address the separate discovery issue, other than to observe that 
the issues upon which discovery was sought could not have informed the legal 
issues which support our decision. 
 
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The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney for Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company: 
 
Jeffrey T. Edwards, Esq.   (orally) 
Preti Flatherty Beliveau & Pachios, LLP 
One City Center 
PO Box 9546 
Portland, Maine  04112-9546 
 
 
Attorneys for School Administrative District No. 43: 
 
Michael E. Saucier, Esq. 
Sarah Yantakosol Gayer, Esq.   (orally) 
Thompson & Bowie 
Three Canal Plaza 
PO Box 4630 
Portland, Maine  04112 
 
 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number CV-2009-159 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY