Case Title: Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker

Citation: 2013 WI 91

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 91
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2067 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Madison Teachers, Inc., Peggy Coyne, Public 
Employees Local 61, AFL-CIO and John Weigman, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Scott Walker, James R. Scott, Judith Neumann 
and Rodney G. Pasch, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
Nov 21, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   This case is currently pending before us 
on a certification from the court of appeals.  Madison Teachers, 
Inc. v. Scott Walker, No. 2012AP2067 (Wis. Ct. App. April 25, 
2013).  That certification presents a number of constitutional 
questions related to the September 14, 2012, declaratory 
judgment of the Dane County Circuit Court.1  During the pendency 
of the appeal, the circuit court held Defendant-Appellants James 
R. Scott and Rodney G. Pasch (collectively, "Commissioners") in 
contempt.  Thereafter, Scott Walker, James R. Scott, Judith 
                     
1 Judge Juan B. Colas presiding.   
No. 
2012AP2067   
 
2 
 
Neumann, and Rodney G. Pasch (collectively "State Defendants") 
brought an emergency motion to stay the contempt order in the 
court of appeals, which the court of appeals denied.  The State 
Defendants now petition this court to stay declaratory judgment 
and any subsequent circuit court orders. 
¶2 
We do not rule on the stay of the September 2012 
declaratory judgment.  However, for the reasons discussed in 
this opinion, we conclude that the contempt order issued 
subsequent to the appeal from the circuit court declaratory 
judgment constituted an impermissible interference with the 
appellate jurisdiction of this court.  We therefore exercise our 
superintending authority to vacate the contempt order, which 
renders the State Defendants’ motion to stay the contempt order 
moot.   
I. BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On August 24, 2011, Plaintiff-Respondents Madison 
Teachers, Inc., Peggy Coyne, Public Employees Local 61, AFL-CIO, 
and John Weigman (collectively "MTI Plaintiffs") filed an 
amended complaint in Dane County Circuit Court seeking a 
declaration that certain portions of 2011 Wis. Acts 10 and 32 
violated the Wisconsin Constitution and asking for injunctive 
relief.  On September 14, 2012, the court issued a decision and 
order ("September 2012 declaratory judgment") that granted 
partial summary judgment to the MTI Plaintiffs.  It granted 
declaratory, but not injunctive, relief. 
¶4 
On September 18, 2012, the State Defendants timely 
filed a notice of appeal from the September 2012 declaratory 
No. 
2012AP2067   
 
3 
 
judgment.  On October 11, 2012, the record was transmitted to 
the court of appeals.   
¶5 
After appealing, the State Defendants filed a motion 
to stay the September 2012 declaratory judgment pending appeal 
in the circuit court, pursuant to Wis. Stats. §§ 808.07(2)(a)(3) 
and 809.12.  On October 22, 2012, the circuit court denied that 
motion.   
¶6 
On October 25, 2012, the State Defendants moved the 
court of appeals for a stay pending appeal, which the court of 
appeals denied. 
¶7 
On April 25, 2013, the court of appeals certified the 
appeal of the September 2012 declaratory judgment to this court.  
On June 14, 2013, we accepted certification of the appeal. 
¶8 
On April 23, 2013, just prior to certification of the 
appeal by the court of appeals, the MTI Plaintiffs asked the 
circuit court for an injunction for a second time.  On September 
17, 2013, the circuit court denied injunctive relief, reasoning 
that the State Defendants' continued enforcement of Acts 10 and 
32 against non-parties was not harming MTI plaintiffs. 
¶9 
On September 24, 2013, without moving to intervene, 
the Wisconsin Education Association Council, AFT-Wisconsin, AFL-
CIO, AFL-CIO District Council 40, SEIU Healthcare Wisconsin, 
CTW, 
CLC, 
Wisconsin 
Federation 
of 
Nurses 
and 
Healthcare 
Professionals, AFSCME, and the Kenosha Education Association 
(collectively "Non-Party Unions") moved the circuit court to 
hold the Commissioners in contempt and for remedial sanctions. 
The Non-Party Unions argued that the Commissioners' continued 
No. 
2012AP2067   
 
4 
 
enforcement of the challenged portions of Acts 10 and 32 against 
them constituted intentional disobedience of the circuit court's 
September 2012 declaratory judgment.2 
¶10 On October 21, 2013, the circuit court, in an oral 
ruling, held the Commissioners in contempt of the September 2012 
declaratory judgment.  On October 25, the circuit court filed a 
written contempt order, in which it detailed the conditions that 
the Commissioners would have to meet to purge the contempt.  
Among those conditions was a total halt to the enforcement of 
the challenged portions of Acts 10 and 32 against all non-
parties. 
¶11 On October 25, 2013, the State Defendants filed 
emergency motions in this court and in the court of appeals.  In 
the court of appeals, the State Defendants sought a stay of the 
circuit court's contempt order pending appeal, pursuant to Wis. 
Stats. §§ 808.07(2)(a)1 and 809.12.  In this court, the State 
Defendants sought an emergency stay of the effect of the 
September 2012 declaratory judgment and a stay of enforcement of 
circuit court orders issued subsequent to that judgment, 
pursuant to Wis. Stats. §§ 808.07(2)(a)1 and 809.12, which is 
now before us. 
                     
2 Several of the Non-Party Unions previously litigated the 
constitutionality of Act 10 in another court and lost on those 
challenges.  See Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 
640 (7th Cir. 2013), in which AFT-WI, AFL-CIO and Dist. Council 
40, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, participated.  
No. 
2012AP2067   
 
5 
 
¶12 On October 28, 2013, the court of appeals entered an 
order requesting a response brief from the Non-Party Unions on 
the motion for a stay of the contempt order pending appeal.  The 
court of appeals also announced its intention to decide the stay 
issue by November 4, 2013.  The next day, this court entered an 
order indicating that we would take no action on the request for 
emergency relief before us until after the court of appeals had 
issued its decision.  
¶13 On November 4, 2013, the court of appeals denied the 
State Defendants’ motion for a stay of the contempt order 
pending appeal of that order.3  On November 5, the State 
Defendants renewed their request for relief from the September 
2012 declaratory judgment in this court, and further requested 
relief from the contempt order. 
¶14 On November 7, 2013, the Non-Party Unions moved this 
court for permission to participate in oral argument and to 
intervene in the action pending before us.  On November 8, 2013, 
the Non-Party Unions filed briefs in this court.  We heard their 
positions and did not strike their briefs.  On November 8, 2013, 
we denied the Non-Party Unions’ motion because it was not timely 
brought.   
¶15 The State Defendants have brought two pending and 
related matters before this court and have asked for relief.  
First, the State Defendants ask this court to stay the circuit 
                     
3 Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Scott Walker, No. 2013AP2405 
(Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2013).   
No. 
2012AP2067   
 
6 
 
court's October 25, 2013, contempt order.  Second, the State 
Defendants request a stay of the circuit court's September 14, 
2012, declaratory judgment holding certain portions of 2011 Wis. 
Acts 10 and 32 unconstitutional.  The State Defendants list 
alternate sources of authority upon which the relief they 
request may be granted.  We now deny the State Defendants' 
motion to stay the declaratory judgment and exercise our 
superintending authority to vacate the contempt order because it 
interferes with our appellate jurisdiction. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
¶16  Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
vests 
this 
court 
with 
superintending 
authority 
over 
all 
Wisconsin courts.4  This authority "is as broad and as flexible 
as necessary to insure the due administration of justice in the 
courts of this state."  In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 520, 235 
N.W.2d 
409 
(1975); 
see 
also 
Arneson 
v. 
Jezwinski, 
206 
Wis. 2d 217, 225, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996) (our superintending 
authority "endows this court with a power that is indefinite in 
character, unsupplied with means and instrumentalities, and 
limited only by the necessities of justice").  It authorizes us 
"to control the course of ordinary litigation in the lower 
courts of Wisconsin."  Arneson, 206 Wis. 2d at 226.  Because 
this court's superintending authority flows from the Wisconsin 
                     
4 Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
provides in pertinent part: "The supreme court shall have 
superintending and administrative authority over all courts." 
No. 
2012AP2067   
 
7 
 
Constitution, the legislature may not limit that authority.  See 
State v. Pollard, 112 Wis. 232, 236, 87 N.W. 1107 (1901).    
¶17 It is well established that this court may protect its 
appellate jurisdiction by the exercise of its superintending 
authority.  See Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 433, 284 N.W. 42 
(1938) (declaring that this court "upon its own motion may 
undoubtedly 
protect 
its 
jurisdiction 
by 
the 
exercise 
of 
superintending control"); see also Prof. Jay E. Grenig, 1 
Wisconsin Pleading & Practice Forms § 2:52 (5th ed. 2013).  We 
have previously exercised our superintending authority to review 
a circuit court's order of contempt.  See State ex rel. Reynolds 
v. Cnty. Court of Kenosha Cnty., 11 Wis. 2d 560, 566, 105 
N.W.2d 876 (1960) (concluding that the "importance of the issues 
involved" 
merited 
exercise 
of 
the 
court's 
superintending 
authority).  Because the contempt order in the present case 
expanded the scope of the judgment that is before us on appeal, 
we exercise our superintending authority to vacate the contempt 
order.     
¶18 Once a Notice of Appeal has been filed with the 
circuit court and the record has been transmitted to the court 
of appeals, a circuit court's authority is limited.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.075(3) (a circuit court "retains the power to act on all 
issues until the record has been transmitted to the court of 
appeals").  "An appeal from a judgment or order strips the trial 
court of jurisdiction with respect to the subject matter of the 
judgment or order, except in certain unsubstantial and trivial 
matters,” unless explicit contrary authority is noted in the 
No. 
2012AP2067   
 
8 
 
statutes.  See In re Estate of Mayer, 29 Wis. 2d 497, 505, 139 
N.W.2d 111 (1966). 
¶19 The September 2012 judgment declared that certain 
portions of Acts 10 and 32 were unconstitutional, stating:   
For the reasons stated above, the court grants summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, denies the defendants' 
motion for judgment on the pleadings and declares that Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 
66.0506, 
118.245, 
111.70(1)(f), 
111.70(3g), 
111.70(4)(mb) and 111.70(4)(d)3 violate the Wisconsin and 
United States Constitution, and Wis. Stat. § 62.623 violates 
the Wisconsin Constitution and all [sic] null and void. This is 
a final order as defined by Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) for purposes 
of appeal. 
It did not grant the injunctive relief that MTI Plaintiffs 
had requested.    
¶20 When the circuit court issued its contempt order more 
than a year after the record had been transmitted to the court 
of appeals and after we had accepted certification of the 
appeal, it expanded the scope of the September 2012 declaratory 
judgment by granting injunctive relief to non-parties.  That is, 
by requiring the Commissioners to cease application of MERA 
against non-parties in order to purge the contempt order, the 
circuit court granted different relief than it originally 
granted in the September 2012 order.5   
                     
5 "[J]udicial remedies fall into four major categories: 
damages remedies, restitutionary remedies, coercive remedies 
(such as injunctions that are backed by the court's contempt 
power) and declaratory remedies." Johnson Controls, Inc. v. 
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶40, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257 (citing Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies, § 1.1 
at 1 (1973)).  
No. 
2012AP2067   
 
9 
 
¶21 We are mindful of the pressures a circuit court can 
face from aggressive litigation in high-profile cases.  However, 
when the appeal of a circuit court’s prior decision is pending 
before this court, the circuit court must take care to avoid 
actions that may interfere with the pending appeal.  Once an 
appeal had been perfected, the circuit court should not have 
taken any action that significantly altered its judgment.  
Accordingly, in order to assure the orderly administration of 
justice 
in 
the 
pending 
appeal, 
we 
elect 
to 
apply 
our 
superintending authority and vacate the circuit court’s contempt 
order.         
 
By the Court.—The contempt order of the circuit court is 
vacated.
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
1 
 
¶22 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and ANN WALSH BRADLEY, 
J. (dissenting).  Essential to our system of justice is 
adherence to the rule of law.  The per curiam today attempts to 
transform the rule of law into an untenable rule of defiance: 
government officials who are defendants in a case need not obey 
a court's declaratory judgment that precludes enforcement of a 
facially unconstitutional statute. 
¶23 A novel case such as this one, involving issues of 
great 
national 
importance 
and 
core 
constitutional 
rights, 
deserves a well-reasoned and well-supported decision.   Instead, 
the per curiam's numerous legal errors demonstrate a disregard 
for the law and muddy the waters of our jurisprudence.  Perhaps 
the most troubling aspect of today's decision is that the court 
inflates its own power while disrespecting the authority of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals, as well as the judicial 
process.   
¶24 The court's per curiam opinion today discards the 
longstanding law of this state.  First, it authorizes the 
executive to disobey the declaratory judgments of the judiciary.  
Second, it strips circuit courts of the ability to protect those 
judgments.  Third, it ignores our prior restraint in applying 
our broad superintending powers to ordinary circumstances.    
¶25 Further, the process utilized by the per curiam is 
fundamentally unfair.  The process denied the six respondent 
unions1 the opportunity to be heard at the oral argument 
                     
1 Wisconsin Education Association Council; AFT-Wisconsin, 
AFL-CIO; 
SEIU 
Healthcare 
Wisconsin, 
CTW, 
CLC; 
Wisconsin 
(continued) 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
2 
 
regarding their motion for contempt.  By fashioning its own 
remedy based on a novel approach neither briefed nor argued by 
anyone in this case, the per curiam has also denied the rights 
of all parties to be heard. 
¶26  The per curiam decision, contrary to the law and 
procedure of this state, leaves in its wake unanswered questions 
that will cause confusion and uncertainty.  The extreme measures 
the per curiam has taken to vacate the contempt order suggest it 
has seen fit to reach its outcome through whatever means 
necessary, rather than through the cautious and measured 
deliberation this court traditionally applies when reviewing all 
cases. 
¶27 Accordingly, we respectfully dissent.    
I 
¶28 The per curiam ignores the well-established law that 
when a declaratory judgment is entered against state officers, 
it is the practical equivalent of an injunction against those 
officers.  It is only by ignoring this well-established 
precedent that the per curiam is able to make the claim that the 
October 2013 contempt order interfered with its appellate 
jurisdiction by expanding the scope of the original declaratory 
judgment.   
                                                                  
Federation of Nurses and Health Care Professionals, AFT, AFL-
CIO; Kenosha Education Association; and District Council 40, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO.  Hereinafter, we refer to them collectively as 
"respondent unions" as did the court of appeals. See In re the 
Contempt 
in 
Madison 
Teachers, 
Inc. 
v. 
Walker, 
Case 
No. 
2013AP2405, unpublished order at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2013). 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
3 
 
¶29 If there is adherence to the rule of law, the per 
curiam's claim cannot survive scrutiny.  
¶30 The per curiam asserts that "[w]hen the circuit court 
issued its contempt order . . . , it expanded the scope of the 
September 2012 declaratory judgment by granting injunctive 
relief to non-parties.  That is, by requiring the Commissioners 
to cease application of MERA against non-parties in order to 
purge the contempt order, the circuit court granted different 
relief than it originally granted in the September 2012 order."  
Per curiam op., ¶20.   
¶31 The contempt order did not expand the scope of the 
September 2012 judgment.  There is no difference in relief.  The 
injunctive relief granted in the contempt order is legally no 
different in practical effect than the relief granted in the 
declaratory judgment.   
¶32 The United States Supreme Court has adhered to this 
rule of law for decades.2  Then-Judge Scalia aptly described it 
as follows: "[T]he  discretionary relief of declaratory judgment 
is, in a context such as this where federal officers are 
defendants, the practical equivalent of specific relief such as 
injunction or mandamus, since it must be presumed that federal 
                     
2 See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) 
(holding that the creation of potential remedies after issuance 
of the declaratory judgment pending appeal "has virtually the 
same practical impact as a formal injunction would"); see also 
Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 
Duke L.J. at 38, forthcoming 2014 ("[I]n many cases where a 
plaintiff seeks prospective relief, a declaratory judgment and 
an injunction are functionally interchangeable.  Both resolve 
uncertainty about the law and both bind the losing party."). 
 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
4 
 
officers will adhere to the law as declared by the court." 
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 
1985).  
¶33 The rationale underlying the rule that a declaratory 
judgment 
against 
a 
government 
officer 
is 
the 
functional 
equivalent of an injunction rests on the premise that the 
government official will adhere to a judicial decision declaring 
a statute facially unconstitutional. "[W]e have long presumed 
that officials of the Executive Branch will adhere to the law as 
declared by the court.  As a result, the declaratory judgment is 
the functional equivalent of an injunction." Committee on 
Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 542 F.3d 
909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008).3  
¶34 Likewise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has acknowledged 
this well-established precedent.  Just a few years ago, in an 
opinion authored by Justice Prosser, the court explained the 
import of a declaratory judgment that declares a statute 
unconstitutional on its face: "[t]he state may not enforce it 
under any circumstances, unless an appropriate court narrows its 
                     
3 See also Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, 
The 
Supreme 
Court's 
Accidental 
Revolution? 
The 
Test 
for 
Permanent Injunctions, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 203, 206, 241 (2012) 
(noting that courts have determined no additional requirements 
are needed to render a declaratory judgment effective against a 
government actor unless "a party cannot be trusted to respect 
rights in the future," thus requiring an injunction); Virginia 
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 790 (E.D. 
Va. 2010), vacated on other grounds, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 
2011) (holding that "the award of declaratory judgment is 
sufficient to stay the hand of the Executive branch pending 
appellate review"). 
 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
5 
 
application."  Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, ¶44 
n.9, 309 Wis. 2d 365, 749 N.W.2d 211 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal 
Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 236 (1994)).4 
¶35 As this court then recognized, a declaratory judgment 
that determines that a statute is unconstitutional on its face 
means that the statute "always operates unconstitutionally."  
Olson, 309 Wis. 2d 365, ¶44 n.9  Because it is always 
unconstitutional, such a declaration of unconstitutionality has 
the practical effect of an injunction as a state defendant is 
prohibited from enforcing the statute.  See Maness v. Meyers, 
419 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1975); State v. Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d 290, 
304 n.13, 577 N.W.2d 601 (1998).   
¶36 Now, the per curiam does an about-face on the law.  It 
attempts to transform the rule of law into an untenable rule of 
defiance: government officials who are defendants in a case need 
not obey a court's declaratory judgment that precludes them from 
enforcing facially unconstitutional statutes.  
¶37 "A declaratory judgment is binding on the parties 
before the court." 10B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2771 (Wright & 
Miller, 3d ed. 2013) (emphasis added).  The Commissioners were 
clearly parties before the court when the circuit court granted 
its September 2012 summary judgment determining that several 
statutory sections were facially unconstitutional and therefore 
                     
4 See also State v. Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d 290, 304 n.13, 577 
N.W.2d 601 (1998); Poe v. Gerstein, 417 U.S. 281, 281-82 (1974).  
  
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
6 
 
"null and void."5  Because the unconstitutional "null and void" 
provisions 
cannot 
be 
legally 
enforced, 
the 
defendant 
Commissioners were precluded from enforcing those provisions. 
¶38 On October 22, 2012, the circuit court reiterated the 
binding 
effect 
of 
its 
declaratory 
judgment 
upon 
the 
Commissioners by denying their motion to stay the judgment.  The 
primary ground for the denial was that if a stay were granted, 
"the plaintiffs (and tens of thousands of municipal employees) 
will have suffered irreparable harm in the form of continued 
violation of their fundamental constitutional rights by their 
government."6  Thus, the circuit court indicated that the order 
bound the Commissioners as to all municipal employees. 
¶39 On September 17, 2013, the circuit court explicitly 
told the WERC Commissioners that they "are bound by the court's 
judgment, even with respect to their actions toward non-
parties."  Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 2011CV3774, 
unpublished order at 3 (Dane Cnty. Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 2013.   
¶40 Accordingly, 
the 
contempt 
order 
prohibiting 
the 
Commissioners from enforcing the disputed provisions of Act 10 
did not expand the scope of the September 14, 2012 judgment; it 
merely restated what the WERC Commissioners already knew: the 
                     
5 The uniform declaratory judgments act makes clear that 
circuit courts "shall have power to declare rights, status, and 
other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could 
be claimed."  Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1).  The statute further 
states that the declaration "shall have the force and effect of 
a final judgment or decree . . . ." Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1).   
 
6 
Madison 
Teachers, 
Inc. 
v. 
Walker, 
No. 
2011CV3774, 
unpublished order at 6 (Dane Cnty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 2012) 
(emphasis added). 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
7 
 
statutes were null and void and they were precluded from 
enforcement as to all persons. 
¶41 This court has previously emphasized the importance of 
declaratory judgments in their effect on government actions 
towards all affected parties, not merely the parties to the 
suit: 
We have not construed Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) to 
require "that where a declaratory judgment as to the 
validity of a statute or ordinance is sought, every 
person whose interests are affected by the statute or 
ordinance must be made a party to the action." If the 
statute "were so construed, the valuable remedy of 
declaratory judgment would be rendered impractical and 
indeed often worthless for determining the validity of 
legislative enactments, either state or local, since 
such enactments commonly affect the interests of large 
numbers of people."  
Helgeland v. Wisconsin Municipalities, 2008 WI 9, ¶140, 307 
Wis. 2d 1, 745 N.W.2d 1 (quoting Town of Blooming Grove v. City 
of Madison, 275 Wis. 328, 334, 81 N.W.2d 713 (1957)).   
¶42 The per curiam holding today would seem to require 
every individual person or organization affected by Act 10 to 
litigate a separate suit, eliminating the efficiency benefits 
and practicality of declaratory judgment as applied to a 
governmental actor.  Such duplicative litigation is unworkable.7 
                     
7 Additionally, such duplicative litigation appears to be 
unnecessary because defiance, whether by government or non-
government parties, of a court's declaratory judgment appears 
exceedingly rare: 
What is quite rare is . . . the situation where a 
plaintiff wins a declaratory judgment, the defendant 
disobeys, and the plaintiff goes back to court to get 
an injunction.  In fact, the total number of cases 
with published opinions involving that fact pattern 
(continued) 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
8 
 
¶43 The oft-stated, oft-repeated legal maxim is clear: 
declaratory judgments are treated functionally as injunctions, 
when applied to governmental parties who are bound by the force 
and meaning of judgments under the law.  Contrary to the claim 
of the per curiam, the circuit court did not "fundamentally 
alter[]" the September 2012 order, per curiam op., ¶21; it 
merely sought to enforce the proper legal effect of its 
declaratory judgment.  The WERC Commissioners, who are party 
defendants, cannot enforce a statute that the judiciary has 
found facially unconstitutional. 
II 
¶44 The per curiam opinion strips not only the circuit 
court judge in this case, but all judges, of important statutory 
authority to enforce their lawful judgments.   
¶45 This case is not about whether a Dane County circuit 
court judgment can bind other circuit courts throughout the 
state.  It is not about the ability of a circuit court to bind 
non-parties to an action.  Rather, this case is about the 
ability of a circuit court judge to issue a judgment that binds 
government officials who are parties in an action before the 
court and the authority of a circuit court judge to enforce its 
judgment. 
                                                                  
under Section 2202 appears to be roughly a dozen [out 
of thousands] . . . . The meager use of this provision 
throughout its nearly eighty-year history shows that 
there 
is 
no 
pattern 
of 
disregarded 
declaratory 
judgments."   
Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 
Duke L.J. at 25-26, forthcoming 2014. 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
9 
 
¶46 Specifically, the per curiam strips the circuit court 
of its statutory authority to protect its September 14, 2012 
judgment with a contempt order, asserting that the circuit 
court's power during an appeal starts and ends with Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.075(3).  Per curiam op., ¶18.  However, it relies on the 
first portion of that subsection ("the circuit court retains the 
power to act on all issues until the record has been transmitted 
to the court of appeals") and conveniently ignores the sentence 
that follows: "Thereafter, the circuit court may act only as 
provided in subs. (1) and (4)."  Wis. Stat. § 808.075(3). 
¶47 The 
circuit 
court 
retains 
broad 
powers 
under 
subsection 
(1).8 
 
During 
an 
appeal 
a 
circuit 
court 
is 
specifically permitted to act under Wis. Stat. § 808.07(1) and 
(2).  Wis. Stat. § 808.075(1).  Wisconsin Stat. § 808.079 lists a 
                     
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.075(1) provides: "In any case, 
whether or not an appeal is pending, the circuit court may act 
under ss. 804.02(2), 805.15, 805.16, 805.17(3), 806.07, 806.08, 
806.15(2), 806.24(4), 808.07(1) and (2) and 809.12." 
   
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.07(2) states: 
 
(2) AUTHORITY OF A COURT TO GRANT RELIEF PENDING 
APPEAL. 
(a) During the pendency of an appeal, a trial 
court or an appellate court may: 
1. Stay execution or enforcement of a judgment or 
order; 
 
2. 
Suspend, 
modify, 
restore 
or 
grant 
an 
injunction; or 
3. Make any order appropriate to preserve the 
existing state of affairs or the effectiveness of the 
judgment subsequently to be entered. 
(continued) 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
10 
 
number of actions a circuit court may take during the pendency 
of an appeal, including "[m]ak[ing] any order appropriate to 
preserve the existing state of affairs or the effectiveness of 
the 
judgment 
subsequently 
to 
be 
entered." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 808.07(2)(a)3 (emphasis added).   
¶48 In this case, the circuit court used the tool of 
sanctions for civil contempt, defined under the statute as 
"disobedience, resistance, or obstruction of the authority, 
process or order of a court."  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(b).  The 
Commissioners disobeyed the order of the court by continuing to 
enforce a statute despite the declaratory judgment rendering 
that statute null and void.  The circuit court subsequently 
imposed sanctions. 
¶49 Nowhere in the statutes governing contempt does the 
law state that circuit courts' authority to "preserve the 
effectiveness of the judgment" is restricted by the pendency of 
an appeal, especially in the face of disobedience of a court 
mandate.  Indeed, for this underlying assertion, the per curiam 
points to no authority whatsoever. 
¶50 No case law requires us to hew to a formalistic 
reading of contempt that requires a formal injunction proceeding 
before contempt can lie.10  Such a requirement would severely 
                                                                  
(am) During the pendency of an appeal, the trial 
court may hear and determine a motion filed under s. 
806.07. 
10 "It does not lie in their mouths to say that they have an 
immunity from civil contempt because the plan or scheme which 
they adopted was not specifically enjoined. Such a rule would 
give tremendous impetus to the program of experimentation with 
(continued) 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
11 
 
circumscribe a court's authority to remedy a disobedience of its 
orders and judgments.  
¶51 Furthermore, the circuit court here was well within 
its authority to entertain motions by the respondent unions that 
were not parties to the original lawsuit.  The contempt statute 
specifies that one need not be a party to the action in order to 
file a contempt motion: "[a] person aggrieved by a contempt of 
court may seek imposition of a remedial sanction for the 
contempt by filing a motion for that purpose in the proceeding 
to which the contempt is related."  Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(a).  
The Wisconsin Judicial Council comments to Wis. Stat. § 785.03 
define a "person aggrieved" as follows: "Any person aggrieved by 
the contempt, even one not a party to the principal proceeding." 
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979, § 785.03, Stats. 
¶52 The circuit court is statutorily empowered to enforce 
its original declaratory judgment by any order.  If there is a 
pending appeal, it is still empowered to act under Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.07(2)(a)3.  Here, the circuit court carefully followed the 
statutory bounds of its authority pending appeal and attempted 
to manage the case to maintain the status quo.  Indeed the per 
curiam opinion cannot point to a single jurisdictional or legal 
error made by the circuit court. 
III 
¶53 The WERC Commissioners requested a stay of the 
contempt order.  The per curiam grants the Commissioners more 
                                                                  
disobedience of the law."  McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 
U.S. 187, 192 (1949). 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
12 
 
than they requested: the majority vacates the contempt order.  
Why? Because if the per curiam were to follow the rules 
applicable to a stay it would have to reach the same result as 
the court of appeals:11  "No stay."   
¶54  Thus, the per curiam, without the benefit of briefs or 
argument on the issue of superintending power and vacating the 
contempt order, vacates the contempt order under the court's 
superintending powers.12   
¶55 The per curiam doubly errs:  First, the use of the 
court's superintending power in the present case violates the 
teachings of all the cases the per curiam cites (and then some) 
about 
the 
nature 
and 
function 
of 
the 
constitutional 
superintending power.  Second, as we have discussed, no grounds 
exist, regardless of the procedural maneuver the per curiam 
uses, for this court to vacate the contempt order in the present 
case.  The circuit court acted within its statutory and 
constitutional authority to issue the contempt order. 
                     
11 In re Contempt in Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 
2013AP2405, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2013). 
 
12 In 1848, Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provided:  "The supreme court shall have general 
superintending control over all inferior courts . . . ." 
 
The present Article VII, Section 3 provides in relevant 
part:  "The supreme court shall have superintending and 
administrative authority over all courts. . . ." 
 
 
For an historical discussion of the court's superintending 
power, see James D. Wickhem, The Power of Superintending Control 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. 153. 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
13 
 
¶56 The 
per 
curiam 
opinion 
today 
sets 
a 
dangerous 
precedent:  The per curiam tosses aside procedural rules, long-
standing self-imposed limits on the court's superintending 
powers, and legal analysis and explanation in favor of a facile 
resolution, disregarding the wisdom of our jurisprudence.   
¶57 The case law admonishes us to limit use of the 
superintending power to situations in which:  
(1) 
there is no other adequate remedy, by appeal or 
otherwise;13  
(2) 
the conduct of the trial court threatens seriously to 
impose a significant hardship upon a citizen;14  or   
(3) 
it is required by the exigency of the circumstances.15   
                     
13 This court "will not exercise its [superintending] 
jurisdiction when there is another adequate remedy, by appeal or 
otherwise."  State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court of Kenosha 
County, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960); see also 
State ex rel. Hustisford Light, Power & Mfg. Co. v. Grimm, 208 
Wis. 366, 371, 243 N.W. 763 (1932) ("In the event that the 
attempt is made to invoke the superintending power to correct an 
error of the trial court, it is necessary to establish that an 
appeal from a final judgment is inadequate . . . . "). 
 
14 "[T]he purpose of [superintending] jurisdiction is the 
protection of a person in his rights as litigant."  In re 
Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 520, 235 N.W. 409 (1975) (internal 
quotations omitted) (quoting Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 
433, 284 N.W. 42 (1939)).   
 
15 This court has historically used its superintending power 
only when the exigency is of such an extreme nature as to 
justify the extraordinary superintending powers of this court.  
See State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court of Kenosha Cnty., 11 
Wis. 2d 560, 565, 105 N.W. 876 (1960) (quoting State ex rel. 
Tewalt v. Pollard, 112 Wis. 232, 234, 87 N.W. 1107 (1901)) 
("[T]his 
court 
will 
not 
exercise 
its 
[superintending] 
jurisdiction . . . unless the exigency is of such an extreme 
nature as obviously to justify and demand the interposition of 
(continued) 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
14 
 
¶58 The present case does not fit into any of these 
circumstances or any other circumstances justifying use of this 
extraordinary constitutional power to vacate a circuit court 
order before deciding the merits of the matter.   
¶59 First, 
other 
adequate 
remedies, 
indeed 
the 
very 
remedies requested by the State, exist to address the contempt 
order.  Yet the per curiam ignores these remedies without 
explanation:    
• The court may grant relief pending appeal, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.12 and Wis. Stat. § 808.07(2)(a)1.;  
• The court may issue a supervisory writ pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.71;  
• The court may take jurisdiction of the contempt 
proceedings pending in the court of appeals (case 
number 2013AP2405), on its own motion pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 809.61; or 
• The WERC Commissioners could have sought to bypass the 
court 
of 
appeals 
with 
regard 
to 
the 
contempt 
proceedings pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61.  
¶60 Second, the per curiam fails to establish that a grave 
hardship will follow unless the contempt order is vacated.16   
                                                                  
the extraordinary superintending power of the court of last 
resort of the state.")(citations omitted.). 
16 Arneson 
v. 
Jezwinski, 
206 
Wis. 2d 217, 
226, 
556 
N.W.2d 721 
(1996) 
("This 
court 
will 
not 
exercise 
its 
superintending power . . . where the conduct of the trial court 
does not threaten seriously to impose a significant hardship 
upon a citizen.")(citations omitted).  See also State ex rel. 
Hustisford Light, Power & Mfg. Co. v. Grimm, 208 Wis. 366, 371, 
243 N.W. 763 (1932) ("In the event that the attempt is made to 
invoke the superintending power to correct an error of the trial 
(continued) 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
15 
 
 
¶60 Third, no exigency or emergency exists in the present 
case to justify the use of superintending powers.  The WERC 
Commissioners 
knew 
by 
reason 
of 
the 
September 
14, 
2012 
declaratory judgment and the October 22, 2012 order17 that the 
circuit court viewed its declaration of unconstitutionality as 
binding the Commissioners across the state.  WERC's contempt 
order in October 25, 2013, did not expand the scope of the 
judgment, as the per curiam erroneously claims, per curiam op., 
¶¶17, 20.   
¶61 In addition, the WERC Commissioners requested but did 
not get stays of the circuit court declaratory judgment in both 
the circuit court and court of appeals.  The stay was first 
denied by the circuit court on October 22, 201218 and then denied 
by the court of appeals on March 13, 2013.19  The WERC 
Commissioners did not seek a stay in this court in the spring of 
2013 or appeal the denials of the stay to this court.    
¶62  The WERC Commissioners also knew that their continued 
enforcement of the null and void statute would create confusion 
across the state.  In December 2012, one year ago, over thirty 
                                                                  
court, it is necessary to establish . . . that grave hardship 
will follow a refusal to exercise the power."). 
  
17 The circuit court declared that its declaratory judgment 
affects "the plaintiffs (and tens of thousands of municipal 
employees)." Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 2011CV3774, 
unpublished order at 6 (Dane Cnty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 2012). 
  
18 Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 2011CV3774, 
unpublished order (Dane Cnty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 2012). 
19 Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 2012AP2067, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013). 
 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
16 
 
counties filed a petition with WERC asking "for a declaratory 
ruling . . . concerning the subjects of bargaining between 
municipal employees and represented employees in light of the 
Dane County Circuit Court's September 14, 2012 Final Order 
declaring 
certain 
statutory 
provisions 
of 
MERA 
unconstitutional."20    
¶63 But the WERC Commissioners did not issue a clarifying 
ruling and did not seek clarification from the circuit court 
before enforcing the statute contrary to the explicit order of 
the declaratory judgment.  Rather, WERC Commissioners just 
forged ahead enforcing a law that had been declared null and 
void, knowing the circuit court's position and the confusion of 
the municipalities. 
¶64 These circumstances do not show an emergency this 
month requiring extraordinary steps by this court.  Any 
emergency is of WERC's own making.     
¶65 As a final and important point, the per curiam opinion 
does not, and cannot, demonstrate that the contempt order 
"constituted," as it claims, "an impermissible interference with 
the appellate jurisdiction of this court."  Per curiam op., ¶2.      
¶66 On the contrary, the rights and obligations of all 
persons affected by the September 14, 2012 circuit court 
declaratory judgment remain in effect after this per curiam, 
                     
20 Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, Case No. 2013AP2405 
(Wis. Ct. App.), Affidavit of Peter G. Davis, Chief Legal 
Counsel for the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, at 7. 
 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
17 
 
regardless of vacating the contempt order.   Per curiam op., ¶2 
("We do not rule on the stay of the September 2012 declaratory 
judgment.").  Moreover, a cause of action against the WERC 
Commissioners for contempt still exists in the court of appeals. 
¶67 The only threat to or impermissible interference with 
the appellate jurisdiction of this court and the orderly 
administration of justice has been WERC's continued enforcement 
of the statutory provisions after the circuit court's September 
14, 2012 declaratory judgment declared them null and void.       
 
¶68 Nothing in the instant case compels this court to use 
its superintending power or vacate the contempt order.  The 
substance and tenor of the per curiam opinion make it appear 
that the majority, rather than the circuit court, has been 
pressured by "aggressive litigation in high-profile cases."  Per 
curiam op., ¶21. 
IV 
¶69 We turn next to the per curiam's procedural errors.   
¶70 First, the per curiam denied the respondent unions 
their fundamental opportunity to be heard in a proceeding 
regarding their dispute. By making misleading statements about 
the respondent unions' status, the per curiam attempts to 
justify this denial.  It suggests that the respondent unions are 
non-parties that needed to intervene in order to present 
arguments regarding their contempt motion.21  Per curiam op., 
¶¶9, 14.  
                     
21 For clarification, there are two related cases at issue 
here: case number 2012AP2067 and case number 2013AP2405.  Case 
(continued) 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
18 
 
¶71 The respondent unions are parties to the contempt 
proceedings and were entitled to be heard.  No one disputes that 
they are entitled to appear and argue their position——except the 
per curiam.   
¶72 In fact, when the WERC Commissioners appealed the 
finding of contempt, the Commissioners listed the respondent 
unions in the caption of the pleadings.  The court of appeals 
refers to them in its order as "respondent unions."  In re the 
Contempt 
in 
Madison 
Teachers, 
Inc. 
v. 
Walker, 
Case 
No. 
2013AP2405, unpublished order at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 
2013).22  Everyone acknowledges the respondent unions are parties 
to the contempt proceeding——except the per curiam.     
¶73 Yet, at oral argument, no person spoke on the 
respondent unions' behalf.  The respondent unions' motion to 
this court sought assurance that as a respondent in the contempt 
proceeding they would be able to speak at oral argument.  They 
wanted to argue against the Commissioners' request to stay the 
very contempt order that the respondent unions had sought and 
obtained in case number 2013AP2405.  They asked to intervene as 
parties to case number 2012AP2607 only as an alternative if 
                                                                  
number 2012AP2607 is the case before us involving review of the 
September 14, 2012 order.  Case number 2013AP2405 is an appeal 
of the October 25, 2013 contempt order and is currently before 
the court of appeals.   
 
22 Though the court of appeals also refers to them as "non-
party unions" in other portions of its order, it clarifies that 
it means "unions that were not among the original plaintiffs."  
In re the Contempt in Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, Case No. 
2013AP2405, unpublished order at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2013).   
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
19 
 
their other motion was not granted.  This court in an order 
issued late Friday night November 8, 2013, denied both requests.   
¶74 We dissented from that order, fearing that the 
respondent unions that obtained the contempt order would be 
foreclosed from defending it.  We observed that "any ruling 
regarding the contempt proceedings must include their voices."23 
¶75 What we feared has now come to fruition.  Rather than 
addressing the motion before it to stay the contempt order, the 
per curiam soldiers on and actually vacates the contempt order——
exacerbating its denial of the respondent unions' opportunity to 
be heard. 
¶76 In apparent recognition of its disregard for the due 
process rights of the respondent unions, the per curiam would 
have us believe that all is well.  It notes that earlier in the 
day on Friday, November 8 (approximately six hours before an 
order issued denying them the opportunity to be heard), the 
respondent unions filed briefs in this court.  The per curiam 
states, "We heard their positions and did not strike their 
briefs."  Per curiam op., ¶14.  However, not striking a brief is 
not the same thing as hearing the respondent unions' position. 
¶77 It's curious that the briefs would be "heard" when 
hours later an order issued that denied the respondent unions an 
opportunity to participate.  Why would members of the court read 
the briefs?  They are not briefs of amicus curiae (friends of 
                     
 
23 Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 2012AP2067, 
unpublished order (Wis. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2013) (Abrahamson, 
C.J., Bradley, J., and Crooks, J. dissenting). 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
20 
 
the court).  Nor does the per curiam view them as parties.  Does 
this mean that henceforth, members of this court will read any 
ol' brief that is filed in the office of the supreme court clerk 
even though the person or group filing the brief has no status 
or permission to file it or advance arguments?   
 ¶78 Second, the per curiam further denied all parties the 
right to be heard on the substance of the per curiam order.  
What was before this court was a request to stay the contempt 
order, not a request to vacate it.  In the four and a half hours 
of oral argument and hundreds of pages of written briefs and 
orders, no one asked for the relief fashioned by the per curiam.  
Not one mention was made of the court's superintending power. 
¶79 "Normally, a trial attorney should try his case and 
not expect the court sua sponte to try it for him."  Sass v. 
State, 63 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 216 N.W.2d 22 (1974).  If the court 
does decide to address an issue not raised by the parties, it 
should at least give them a chance to brief the issue.24  For 
example, just this week, after determining that a related issue 
                     
24 See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006) ("Of 
course, before acting on its own initiative, a court must accord 
the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their 
positions."); Bartus v. Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 176 
Wis. 2d 1063, 1073, 501 N.W.2d 419 (1993) ("We therefore urge 
the courts to exercise caution when determining an issue sua 
sponte without the assistance of supplemental briefs and to ask 
for briefs unless the matter is quite clear."); Pub. Serv. 
Employees' Union v. Wisconsin Emp't Relations Bd., 246 Wis. 190, 
198-99, 16 N.W.2d 823 (1944) ("A determination of this question 
would 
involve 
the 
decision 
of 
a 
number 
of 
matters 
of 
considerable importance. However, consideration of them is not 
urged upon us in briefs of counsel nor argued in any way. Under 
the well-established rule questions not argued will not be 
considered or decided."). 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
21 
 
needed to be decided to fully address the merits of a petition 
before us, this court issued an order requesting additional 
briefing on the newly fashioned issue.  Attorney's Title 
Guaranty Fund, Inc. v. Town Bank, No. 2011AP2774, unpublished 
order (Wis. Sup. Ct. Nov. 19, 2013).   
¶80 When a court raises an issue sua sponte, "fairness 
requires that the parties have the opportunity to develop the 
relevant facts and to present legal arguments on the issue."  
Hydrite Chem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 220 Wis. 2d 26, 50, 
582 
N.W.2d 
423 
(Wis. 
Ct. 
App. 
1998) 
(Roggensack, 
J. 
dissenting).25  Apparently the Wisconsin Attorney General agrees. 
In another case the Attorney General has argued that it is 
inappropriate for an appellate court to "restructure[] [a] case 
to reach and decide matters that were never raised by the 
parties."  State v. Purtell, No. 2012AP1307-CR, Petition for 
Review at 9 (Apr. 5, 2013).  Here, the per curiam not only 
refused to hear the arguments of one side before making its 
decision, but it also refused to hear any argument from any one 
on its newly fashioned theories and remedy. 
                     
 
25 See also Wood v. Milyard, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 
1833-34 (2012) ("[A] federal court does not have carte blanche 
to depart from the principle of party presentation basic to our 
adversary 
system. . . . 
For 
good 
reason, 
appellate 
courts 
ordinarily abstain from entertaining issues that have not been 
raised and preserved in the court of first instance.  That 
restraint is all the more appropriate when the appellate court 
itself spots an issue the parties did not air below, and 
therefore would not have anticipated in developing their 
arguments on appeal."). 
 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
22 
 
V 
 
 
¶81 The order today essentially serves as a backdoor 
ruling on a substantive matter with no mention of the far-
reaching effects of its order.  The order creates a springboard 
for future uncertainty and litigation.  Three glaring questions 
stand out: how will this affect (1) the unions that did not 
follow WERC's rules, relying on the declaratory judgment, (2) 
the unions that did follow WERC's rules, and (3) the contempt 
proceeding pending at the court of appeals? 
¶82 First: What effect does today's order have on unions26 
that did not comply with WERC's emergency rules, relying on the 
longstanding rule that government actors cannot enforce null and 
void statutes? 
¶83 What effect will the emergency rules have on unions' 
certification status?  Will they automatically be recertified 
with the declaratory judgment in place?   
¶84 When asked at oral argument what effect a stay would 
have on collective bargaining arrangements for any union that 
did not file its petition for certification by August 30, 2013, 
the State's counsel failed to answer, except to say that 
                     
26 We currently know that the Kenosha Education Association 
did not file a petition by August 30, 2013.  Madison Teachers, 
Inc. v. Walker, Case No. 2013AP2405 (Wis. Ct. App.), Affidavit 
of Timothy E. Hawks, exh. 2, at 1-3.  An e-mail from Peter Davis 
indicates that other bargaining units have inquired on this 
exact topic.  Id. at 1. 
 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
23 
 
"ignorance of the law is no excuse."27 The State's written 
filings similarly fail to answer this question. 
¶85 Second: What effect does the court's order today have 
on the certification elections for public school teacher unions 
that complied with all WERC requirements but for whom elections 
will not occur by December 1, 2013?28 
¶86 Will a failure to hold an election by December 1 
affect the 401 unions representing more than 60,000 teachers 
that filed timely petitions by August 30, 2013, and for which 
WERC had already planned elections?29  Does WERC have the 
authority to modify the statutory December 1 deadline?30   
¶87 The WERC Commissioners' filings allege that WERC 
cannot perform the mandated elections for the unions that filed 
                     
27 Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, Case No. 2012AP2067 
(Wis. 
Sup. 
Ct.), 
oral 
arg. 
at 
01:14:46 
(available 
at 
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=8148).   
 
28 The Commissioners' statutory mandate requires that all 
certification elections in a given year for general municipal 
public school employees "shall occur no later than December 1."  
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(d)3.   
 
29 See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, Case No. 2012AP2067 
(Wis. Sup. Ct.), Affidavit of Peter G. Davis, Chief Legal 
Counsel for the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, at 2. 
30 The statutes authorize WERC only to create "proper 
rules . . . to regulate the conduct of all elections . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 111.09(1). 
 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
24 
 
by August 30 if procedures do not commence by November 5, 2013.31  
That date has come and gone.   
¶88 Pursuant to the statutory language requiring that 
elections "shall occur no later than December 1,"32 must 
elections begin by December 1 or end by December 1?  The 
Commissioners' counsel's affidavit further states that "[i]f the 
elections are not held as scheduled (or at least completed 
during a 20 calendar day period ending December 1, 2013), 
compliance with the statutory mandate is not possible."33  There 
are not 20 calendar days before December 1.34  
¶89  If the affidavits are true, can elections take place 
by the statutory date?  If not, will every collective bargaining 
                     
31 See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, Case No. 2013AP2405 
(Wis. Ct. App.), Affidavit of Peter G. Davis, Chief Legal 
Counsel for the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, at 6. 
32 Wis. Stat. § 111.70(4)(d)3. 
33 See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, Case No. 2012AP2067 
(Wis. Sup. Ct.), Affidavit of Peter G. Davis, Chief Legal 
Counsel for the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, at 4 
(Oct. 25, 2013).  "For the elections to take place in accordance 
with the statutory directive, but not as scheduled, the 
Commissioners must be able to resume administering and enforcing 
the emergency rules and statute no later than November 5, 2013."  
34 The elections must provide sufficient prior notice in 
order to meet constitutional due process requirements.  See, 
e.g., R.J. Reynolds Employees Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 61 F. Supp. 280 
(M.D.N.C. 1943) (ruling that four days was not sufficient notice 
for a union election); Hall-Brooke Hosp., 267 N.L.R.B. 909 (Aug. 
26, 
1983) 
(finding 
that 
same-day 
and 
incomplete 
notice 
invalidated election results).   
 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
25 
 
agent requiring recertification be automatically recertified 
this year?35 
¶90 At oral argument, WERC's counsel left open the 
question of how the elections might or might not take place, 
when elections could occur, or what disputes might result from a 
rushed election process.36   
                     
35 WERC has previously suspended elections pursuant to a 
court order pending an appeal.  See Rule Summary, EmR 1310 
(noting "the Commissioners'  . . .  determination to suspend the 
conduct of such elections  . . .  until the federal court 
litigation was concluded"). 
  
36 The Commissioners' counsel provided scant detail about 
how these elections could occur if their time constraints are 
such as they state in their affidavits: 
We could tell you with certainty when we moved that if 
we got the order by November 5, that we'd be able to 
conduct elections by the first, but I'm afraid I 
cannot 
say 
with 
certainty 
what 
the 
Commission's 
decision will be if, say, the order came down on the 
15th.  But if you back up dates, an election could 
certainly commence by December 1st, if an order were 
issued, doing some math, by the 20th or the 21st. But 
the Commission has to meet in order to make that 
decision. 
 
Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, Case No. 2012AP2067 (Wis. Sup. 
Ct.), 
oral 
arg. 
at 
1:26:48-1:27:47 
(available 
at 
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/EventDetail.aspx?
evhdid=8148).  The Commissioners' counsel additionally failed to 
indicate what procedures might be used regarding voter rolls and 
notices: 
The Commission will have to make a decision based on 
the court's order as to what to do, but one option is 
to use what has already been in place before an 
injunction or a contempt was issued and rely on those.  
They may decide if it were consistent with this 
court's order to restart the process.  That's a 
decision they'll have to meet about and make a 
decision about based on what this court does. 
(continued) 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
26 
 
¶91 Third: How does this order affect the appeal of the 
contempt ruling currently pending at the court of appeals? 
Because the per curiam opinion is issued under case number 
2012AP2067, it is unclear what effect it necessarily has on case 
number 
2013AP2405, 
which 
addresses 
the 
contempt 
order 
specifically.  Additional briefing remains pending at the court 
of appeals. 
¶92 The court's order today fails to grapple with these 
unknown practical and legal implications.  The per curiam 
reaches its result.  Satisfied, the opinion foregoes any 
consideration of the collateral damage it has wrought. 
 
 
¶93 For 
all 
of 
the 
reasons 
set 
forth 
above, 
we 
respectfully dissent.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                                  
 
Id. at 01:13:42-01:14:03. 
No. 2012AP2067.ssa & awb 
 
1