Case Title: Wendy S. DeHart v. Wisconsin Mutual Insurance Company

Citation: 2007 WI 91

Docket Number: 2005AP002962-FT

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 91 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2962-FT 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Wendy S. DeHart and Gary C. DeHart, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Medical Benefits Administrators, 
          Subrogated Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 129 
Reported at: 294 Wis. 2d 387, 719 N.W.2d 518 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Langlade   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert A. Kennedy, , Jr. 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, and BUTLER, Jr., JJ., join the dissent.  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Randall Skiles and Skiles Law Office, Madison, and oral 
argument by Randall M. Skiles. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by Lance 
Trollop and Bremer & Trollop Law Offices, S.C., Wausau, and oral 
argument by Lance Trollop. 
 
 
2007 WI 91
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2962-FT  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV203) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wendy S. DeHart and Gary C. DeHart, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
Medical Benefits Administrators, 
 
          Subrogated Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
decision of the court of appeals that reversed and remanded the 
circuit court's summary judgment1 concluding that the motor 
vehicle insurance policy provided to Wendy and Gary DeHart (the 
DeHarts) 
by Wisconsin Mutual Insurance Company (Wisconsin 
Mutual) did not provide uninsured motorist (UM) coverage for 
                                                 
1 Judgment of the Circuit Court for Langlade County, Judge 
Robert Kennedy, Jr. presided. 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
2 
 
Wendy's automobile accident.  The court of appeals decided that 
the physical contact element of a "hit-and-run accident" under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. (2005-06)2 was met and the statute 
mandates UM coverage if the unidentified motor vehicle struck 
another vehicle before forcing Wendy's vehicle off the road.  
DeHart v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WI App 129, ¶¶1, 16, 294 
Wis. 2d 387, 719 N.W.2d 518.  Since the court of appeals also 
concluded there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the unidentified vehicle actually made physical contact 
with the other vehicle, it remanded the cause to the circuit 
court for further proceedings.  Id., ¶17.  
¶2 
We conclude that the physical contact element for a 
"hit-and-run 
accident" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
requires:  (1) a "hit" by the unidentified motor vehicle, or 
part thereof, and (2) a "hit" to the insured's vehicle by 
another vehicle or part thereof, but not necessarily by the 
unidentified vehicle.  Since Wendy's vehicle was not "hit," 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. does not mandate UM coverage in this case.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Wendy was involved in an automobile accident on a two-
lane highway in Langlade County, Wisconsin, on December 6, 2000.  
Wendy's vehicle was following vehicles driven by Donna Brewer 
and Charlotte Ellwitz.  An unidentified vehicle, which was 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
3 
 
traveling toward Wendy and the other vehicles, crossed the 
center line and proceeded toward Brewer's vehicle.  The DeHarts 
contend that the unidentified vehicle hit Brewer's vehicle, 
striking off the driver's side mirror.  However, Wisconsin 
Mutual disagrees and argues that Brewer is not positive that the 
mirror was struck off by the unidentified vehicle.  In any 
event, the unidentified vehicle continued to travel in the 
oncoming lane of traffic toward Ellwitz's vehicle, forcing 
Ellwitz to pull over and nearly stop, and then continued toward 
Wendy's vehicle, forcing Wendy to lose control of her vehicle 
and travel off the road.  The unidentified vehicle did not make 
physical contact with Wendy's vehicle, nor did any other 
vehicle.  The unidentified vehicle then left the scene and 
positive identification of the vehicle or its driver has never 
been made. 
¶4 
Since identification of the driver of the unidentified 
vehicle could not be made, the DeHarts filed a lawsuit in 
Langlade County against their insurer, Wisconsin Mutual, seeking 
UM benefits under their own policy3 for damages caused by the 
unidentified vehicle.4  Wisconsin Mutual moved for summary 
                                                 
3 The Wisconsin Mutual policy defines an uninsured motor 
vehicle as including "[a] hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or 
owner is unknown and which strikes:  (i) you or a relative, (ii) 
a vehicle which you or a relative are occupying, or (iii) your 
insured car."  Wisconsin Mutual policy, part C, section (2)(c). 
4 Damages alleged in the Complaint included, in part, money 
damages for medical expenses for Wendy DeHart's injuries and for 
the loss of her services, society, and companionship.  
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
4 
 
judgment, contending that there was no coverage because no 
vehicle struck Wendy's vehicle.  The circuit court granted 
summary judgment, denying UM coverage for Wendy's accident and 
dismissing the DeHarts' complaint.   
¶5 
The 
DeHarts 
appealed, 
arguing 
that 
because 
the 
unidentified motor vehicle struck Brewer's vehicle and then 
forced Wendy's vehicle off the road, it is an unidentified motor 
vehicle involved in a hit-and-run accident under Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  Therefore, the statute mandates coverage.  
The court of appeals recognized that "Wisconsin courts have 
consistently concluded the term 'hit-and-run' is unambiguous and 
includes a physical contact element."  DeHart, 294 Wis. 2d 387, 
¶5. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
interpreted 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. to mandate coverage in this case if the 
unidentified motor vehicle actually made physical contact with 
Brewer's vehicle.  Id., ¶14.  Since the court of appeals 
concluded that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to 
whether the unidentified vehicle did so, the court of appeals 
remanded for further proceedings.  Id., ¶¶6, 17.   
¶6 
We granted Wisconsin Mutual's petition to review the 
decision of the court of appeals.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶7 
We review a grant of summary judgment independently, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  Green 
Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 
(1987).  In determining whether summary judgment should be 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
5 
 
granted, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party.  Kraemer Bros., Inc. v. United States Fire 
Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 567, 278 N.W.2d 857 (1979) (citing 
Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-58 (1970)). 
¶8 
To determine whether summary judgment is appropriate 
in this case, we interpret Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  The 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review 
independently, "but benefiting from the analyses of the court of 
appeals and the circuit court."  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 
N.W.2d 110. 
B. 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
¶9 
Wendy's accident may be covered by the Wisconsin 
Mutual policy if the policy language requires coverage or if 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32 requires coverage.  Coverage not included in 
an insurance contract may be "compelled and enforced as though a 
part thereof where the inclusion of such coverage is required by 
a properly enacted statute."  Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. 
Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶13, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 
(quoting Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 
53, 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969)); see also Wegner v. Heritage Mut. 
Ins. Co., 173 Wis. 2d 118, 124, 496 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1992) 
("Every policy of auto insurance issued in Wisconsin must 
provide at least as much protection as the statute, although 
insurers may broaden the coverage.").   
¶10 In this case, the DeHarts concede that Wendy's 
accident is not covered by the policy language, which requires 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
6 
 
the unidentified vehicle to strike the insured, the insured's 
vehicle, or a vehicle in which the insured is an occupant.  
Therefore, the question we must decide is not the proper 
construction of the policy language, but what the statute 
requires.  As such, "the reasonable expectation of the insured 
regarding the language of the policy is not relevant to our 
analysis."  Romanshek, 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶13 (quoting Smith v. 
Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 127, ¶27, 239 Wis. 2d 646, 619 
N.W.2d 882).  
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(1) requires every policy of 
insurance issued or delivered in Wisconsin to contain certain 
provisions.5  One of the mandatory provisions is UM coverage 
under § 632.32(4)(a), which provides: 
1. 
For the protection of persons injured who 
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or 
operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death 
resulting therefrom, in limits of at least $25,000 per 
person and $50,000 per accident. 
2. 
In this paragraph "uninsured motor vehicle" 
also includes: 
. . . 
b. 
An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a 
hit-and-run accident. 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) (emphasis added).   
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(1) states:  "Except as otherwise 
provided, this section applies to every policy of insurance 
issued or delivered in this state against the insured's 
liability for loss or damage resulting from accident caused by 
any motor vehicle, whether the loss or damage is to property or 
to a person." 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
7 
 
C. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
¶12 In 
this 
case, 
we 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. to determine whether coverage for Wendy's 
accident 
is 
mandated. 
 
"[T]he 
purpose 
of 
statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it 
may be given its full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "[S]tatutory interpretation 
'begins with the language of the statute.'"  Id., ¶45 (quoting 
Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 
N.W.2d 659).  If the words of a statute have a plain meaning, we 
ordinarily stop our inquiry and apply the words chosen by the 
legislature.  Id.  The statutory language is given its common 
and ordinary meaning unless there are technical or specially-
defined words or phrases.  Id.  "[A] statute is ambiguous if it 
is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed 
persons in two or more senses."  Id., ¶47.  If a statute is 
ambiguous, the court may examine extrinsic sources, such as 
legislative history.  Id., ¶48.  The court may also consult 
legislative history "to confirm or verify a plain-meaning 
interpretation."  Id.¸ ¶51. 
¶13 We have interpreted Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. in 
prior cases and recently reaffirmed our 20-plus years of 
precedent establishing that the phrase "hit-and-run accident" is 
unambiguous and includes a physical contact element.  Romanshek, 
281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶¶20, 31 (citing Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶11; 
Hayne v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 68, 74, 339 N.W.2d 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
8 
 
588 (1983)).6  We quoted Hayne, our first case interpreting 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b., as follows: 
[T]he statutory language of sec. 632.32(4)(a)2.b., 
Stats., is unambiguous.  We therefore arrive at the 
legislature's intent by according the language its 
common and accepted meaning.  As previously noted, the 
common and accepted meaning of the term "hit-and-run" 
includes an element of physical contact.  Section 
632.32(4)(a)2.b. mandates coverage only for "hit-and-
run" 
accidents 
involving 
an 
unidentified 
motor 
vehicle.  The clear statutory language of sec. 
632.32(4)(a)2.b. reflects a legislative intent that 
the statute apply only to accidents in which there has 
been physical contact.   
Id., ¶20 (quoting Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 74).   
¶14 The issue in this case is not whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. requires physical contact, but rather, what 
that requirement entails.  Summary judgment may be granted to 
Wisconsin Mutual if the facts, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the DeHarts, do not meet the physical contact 
requirement 
for 
a 
"hit-and-run 
accident" 
under 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  The facts viewed in the light most favorable 
to the DeHarts are that an unidentified vehicle crossed the 
center line, hit Brewer's vehicle and then continued to travel 
in the oncoming lane of traffic, forcing Wendy to lose control 
of her vehicle and travel off the road.  Under this factual 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
also 
requires 
an 
unidentified motor vehicle and that the unidentified motor 
vehicle runs from the scene of the accident.  Progressive N. 
Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶31, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 
N.W.2d 417 (citing Smith v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 127, 
¶10, 239 Wis. 2d 646, 619 N.W.2d 882).  In the case before us, 
these elements are not at issue. 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
9 
 
scenario 
the 
unidentified 
vehicle 
"hit" 
another 
vehicle; 
therefore, the issue we face is whether the phrase "hit-and-run 
accident" in § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. requires a "hit" to the insured 
vehicle.7    
¶15 Although we have established that the term "hit-and-
run" unambiguously includes an element of physical contact, we 
recognize 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
does 
not 
specifically define "hit-and-run."  The Legislative Council Note 
in § 632.32, ch. 102, Laws of 1979, adopted by the legislature, 
explains the legislative intent for not including a definition 
for "hit-and-run" by stating:  "A precise definition of hit-and-
run is not necessary for in the rare case where a question 
arises the court can draw the line."  Accordingly, the term 
"hit-and-run" has been construed on a case-by-case basis.  
Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶13.  Prior decisions explaining and 
interpreting the physical contact requirement are instructive to 
our determination in this case. 
¶16 The first case in which we interpreted Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. and established that the statute requires 
physical contact was Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 69.  In Hayne, "[t]he 
sole issue on appeal [was] whether sec. 632.32(4)(a)2.b., 
                                                 
7 The DeHarts contend that based on the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. the term "hit-and-run" requires a 
"hit" only by the unidentified vehicle and not a "hit" to the 
insured vehicle.  The statute refers to "[a]n unidentified motor 
vehicle involved in a hit-and-run accident."  § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  
We do not believe the phrase "hit-and-run accident" is so 
limited in this context based on our interpretation of the 
language in our cases discussed later in this opinion. 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
10 
 
Stats., requires uninsured motorist coverage for an accident 
involving an insured's vehicle and an unidentified motor vehicle 
when there was no physical contact between the two vehicles."  
Id.  The insured swerved to avoid an oncoming vehicle, lost 
control of his vehicle, and the vehicle overturned.  Id.  There 
was no physical contact between the insured's vehicle and the 
unidentified vehicle.  Id.  We held that the insured's accident 
was 
not 
covered 
under 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
because, 
after 
examining dictionary definitions of "hit-and-run," we concluded 
that the common and accepted meaning of the statutory language 
unambiguously included an element of physical contact that was 
not met where the vehicles did not make physical contact.  Id. 
at 73-74.  We further explained what physical contact means by 
stating that "the plain meaning of the phrase 'physical contact' 
is apparent and requires a hit or touching between the 
vehicles."  Id. at 78. 
¶17 While we did not need to resort to legislative history 
because we concluded the statute was unambiguous on its face, we 
noted that the statutory history supported our conclusion that 
the statute did not provide coverage when there was no physical 
contact between the vehicles.  Id. at 76.  Prior to the 
enactment of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b., UM coverage was 
provided under Wis. Stat. § 204.30(5) (Supp. 1965), but did not 
include a provision for uninsured motor vehicles involved in 
hit-and-run accidents.  Id. at 77-78.8  In Amidzich, a case 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 204.30(5)(a) and (b) (Supp. 1965) 
stated, in relevant part: 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
11 
 
decided prior to the enactment of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. that 
involved an accident similar to Hayne where there was no 
striking or actual collision, we denied UM coverage under the 
terms of the policy because the definition of "hit-and-run" 
required physical contact.  Amidzich, 44 Wis. 2d at 50.9   We 
concluded the phrase "physical contact" plainly meant that 
"there 
be 
an 
actual 
striking 
between 
the 
'hit-and-run 
                                                                                                                                                             
(5) 
Uninsured 
motorists 
coverage. 
 
(a) 
No 
automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy 
of insurance insuring against loss resulting from 
liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death 
suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be 
delivered or issued for delivery in this state with 
respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally 
garaged in this state unless coverage is provided 
therein or supplemental thereto in limits for bodily 
injury or death in the amount of $10,000 per person 
and $20,000 per accident under provisions approved by 
the commissioner of insurance, for the protection of 
persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to 
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death resulting therefrom.  The 
named insured has the right to reject such coverage 
. . . . 
(b) For purposes of this coverage, 'uninsured 
motor vehicle' includes an insured motor vehicle if 
before or after the accident the liability insurer of 
the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
9 In Amidzich, we were interpreting the automobile liability 
policy language, which defined a "hit-and-run automobile" as "an 
automobile which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out 
of physical contact of such automobile with the insured or with 
an automobile which the insured is occupying at the time of the 
accident."  Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 
45, 50, 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969).   
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
12 
 
automobile' and the insured's vehicle, at least in a situation 
where only two vehicles are involved."  Id. at 51.   However, we 
noted that "[p]ersuasive arguments could be made that statutory 
requirements to afford coverage to the plaintiff should be 
provided.  The present statute [sec. 204.30(5)], however, does 
not require such coverage."  Id. at 54. 
¶18 Subsequent 
to 
our 
decision 
in 
Amidzich, 
the 
legislature created Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. to include 
"[a]n unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-and-run 
accident" as an uninsured motor vehicle.  Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 
82 (citing ch. 102, sec. 171, Laws of 1979).  We explained that 
the legislature was presumed to have acted with full knowledge 
of our interpretation of "hit-and-run" in Amidzich, which 
required physical contact.  Id. at 84 (citing Glinski v. 
Sheldon, 88 Wis. 2d 509, 519-20, 276 N.W.2d 815 (1979)).  
Therefore, we concluded that the legislature was aware that most 
insurance policies with the term "hit-and-run" required an 
element of physical contact and if the legislature had wanted to 
change that provision it could have done so, but it did not.  
Id.  We stated that the legislature had a choice between two 
policies:  (1) "define uninsured motor vehicle to include an 
unidentified motor vehicle involved in an accident, regardless 
of whether physical contact occurred;" or (2) "define uninsured 
motor vehicle to include an unidentified motor vehicle involved 
in a 'hit-and-run' accident."  Id.  Since the legislature chose 
the latter, physical contact is required by § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  
Id. 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
13 
 
¶19 In Hayne, we rejected the insured's argument that the 
term 
"hit-and-run" 
should 
include 
"miss-and-run" 
accidents 
because other jurisdictions had concluded that their UM statutes 
did not "connote physical contact."  Id. at 75.  We noted that 
in other states, statutes impose "a duty on a driver involved in 
an accident to stop, provide certain information, and render 
aid."  Id.  However, Wisconsin's version of these statutes is 
entitled "Duty upon striking person or attended or occupied 
vehicle."  Id. (quoting Wis. Stat. § 346.67 (1981-82)).  We 
quoted § 346.67(1)(a) (1981-82), which stated, in part:  "he 
shall give his name, address and the registration number of the 
vehicle he is driving to the person struck . . . ."  Id.  
Therefore, we concluded that "[t]he reference to 'striking' in 
sec. 346.67 supports our conclusion that the plain meaning of 
'hit-and-run' in sec. 632.32(4)(a)2.b. includes a physical 
contact element."  Id.   
¶20 The dissent in Hayne argued that several policy 
arguments supported including miss-and-run accidents within the 
term "hit-and-run accidents" under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  
Id. at 93-95 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).  The majority 
recognized the policy arguments favoring UM coverage, but 
concluded it could not "change the wording of a statute by 
liberal construction to mean something that the legislature did 
not intend, or that the plain language of the statute will not 
support.  The legislature can, if it so desires, amend the 
uninsured motorist statute to reflect those policy arguments."  
Id. at 85 n.11 (citation omitted). 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
14 
 
¶21 After our decision in Hayne, the court of appeals 
decided Wegner, where three vehicles were traveling southbound 
on a highway that had three lanes and each vehicle was traveling 
in a different lane.  Wegner, 173 Wis. 2d at 121.  The car in 
the far left lane suddenly swerved into the path of the van 
traveling in the middle lane, causing the van to swerve into the 
far right lane where the Wegners were traveling.  Id.  The 
Wegners were forced off the highway and struck a railroad 
crossing tower.  Id.  The unidentified motor vehicle did not 
make physical contact with any other vehicle.  Id.  However, 
there was a factual dispute regarding whether the van, whose 
driver was identified, struck the Wegners' car.  Id. 
¶22 The court of appeals, relying on our decision in 
Hayne, concluded that coverage was not provided under the UM 
insurance laws because the unidentified motor vehicle did not 
actually "hit" another vehicle.  Id. at 120, 125-27.  The court 
stated that "the only reasonable reading of the statute is that 
the unidentified vehicle must be involved with the physical 
contact.  This reading would preserve the justification for the 
physical contact requirement, i.e., the prevention of fraudulent 
claims."  Id. at 127. 
¶23 We 
once 
again 
interpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. in Smith, where the insured was driving his 
vehicle in the right lane of the interstate.  Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 
646, ¶3.  A tractor-double trailer, driven in the middle lane by 
an identified driver, was struck on the left side by an 
unidentified vehicle, forcing the tractor-trailer to the right 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
15 
 
and into the insured's vehicle.  Id.  We concluded that when an 
unidentified vehicle strikes a second vehicle, which in turn is 
propelled into the insured's vehicle, the physical contact 
requirement of "hit-and-run" is satisfied.  Id., ¶2.   We 
examined the plain language of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. and noted the 
following: 
Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. defines an 
uninsured motor vehicle as "an unidentified" vehicle 
"involved in a hit and run accident."  The use of the 
word "involved" does not strike us as a word that 
should be narrowly applied only to a hit-and-run 
accident involving a direct hit to the insured 
vehicle.  Here, the unidentified vehicle was clearly 
"involved": 
it 
precipitated 
the 
accident 
through 
contact with the intermediate vehicle. 
Id., ¶12. 
¶24 We relied on Hayne, Amidzich, and Wegner, which we 
classified as the cases in the "miss-and-run series," to explain 
the physical contact requirement.  Id., ¶¶15-21.  However, we 
distinguished those cases because in Smith, "the unidentified 
vehicle had contact with the intermediate vehicle, which in turn 
had contact with the insured vehicle."  Id., ¶21 (emphasis 
added).  Therefore, we concluded that the miss-and-run cases did 
not foreclose an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4) that 
mandated coverage because, unlike miss-and-run accidents, the 
insured's vehicle was actually hit by another vehicle involved 
in a chain-reaction type of collision.  Id.   
¶25 We also relied on another series of cases involving 
flying objects or auto parts to consider whether the physical 
contact element was satisfied.  Id., ¶¶22-27 (citing Theis v. 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
16 
 
Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 15, 232 Wis. 2d 749, 606 N.W.2d 
162, and Dehnel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 Wis. 2d 
14, 604 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1999)).  In Dehnel, a chunk of ice 
fell off an unidentified semi-trailer and broke the insured's 
windshield, which caused injury to the driver.  Dehnel, 231 
Wis. 2d at 15.  The court of appeals interpreted the physical 
contact requirement under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. to mean 
a "'touching between the vehicles.'"  Id. at 22 (quoting Hayne, 
115 Wis. 2d at 78).  Since the vehicles did not touch, the court 
concluded insurance coverage was not mandated by the statute.  
Id.   
¶26 However, we distinguished Dehnel in another flying 
object case, where an insured's vehicle was struck by a leaf 
spring, a part of a semi-tractor, which was propelled by a 
passing 
unidentified 
semi-tractor 
through 
the 
insured's 
windshield, injuring the plaintiff.  Theis, 232 Wis. 2d 749, 
¶¶4-5.  It was not clear whether the spring came off of the 
passing semi-tractor or came off of another unidentified vehicle 
and was then propelled by the passing unidentified semi-tractor.  
Id.  We distinguished Dehnel on the basis that in Theis, "a 
piece detached from an unidentified motor vehicle was propelled 
into the plaintiff's motor vehicle by an unidentified motor 
vehicle." Id., ¶25.  We further explained that "Wisconsin cases 
have interpreted the hit-and-run provision of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4) to require physical contact between an insured's 
motor vehicle and an unidentified vehicle, they have not 
interpreted the statute to negate 'physical contact' between the 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
17 
 
insured's motor vehicle and a part of an unidentified motor 
vehicle."  Id., ¶26.   We ultimately concluded that mandating 
coverage for this type of accident was consistent with the 
purposes of § 632.32, which include preventing fraud and 
compensating an injured person who is the victim of an uninsured 
motorist's negligence to the same extent as if the uninsured 
motorist were insured.  Id., ¶¶28-31.   
¶27 In analyzing whether the chain-reaction type of 
collision in Smith met the physical contact requirement, we 
recognized that our decision in Theis was a "consideration of 
the public policy issues undergirding [uninsured] motorist 
coverage."  Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶24.  We decided the same 
method of analysis was applicable in Smith as we had used in 
Theis.  Id., ¶25.  We then concluded that the policy concern 
underlying the physical contact element, to prevent fraudulent 
claims from being brought by insured drivers who are involved in 
an accident of their own making, was satisfied where the 
unidentified motor vehicle hit an intermediate vehicle, which in 
turn hit the insured's vehicle.  Id. (citing Theis, 232 Wis. 2d 
749, ¶30 n.10).  Likewise, the second policy concern, "'to 
compensate an injured person who is the victim of an uninsured 
motorist's negligence to the same extent as if the uninsured 
motorist were insured,'" was also satisfied by a chain-reaction 
type of collision.  Id., ¶26 (quoting Theis, 232 Wis. 2d 749, 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
18 
 
¶28).10  Therefore, based on the language of the statute and the 
public 
policy 
concerns, 
we 
concluded 
the 
chain-reaction 
collision met the physical contact requirement for a "hit-and-
run" 
and 
coverage 
was 
mandated 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  Id., ¶28. 
¶28 As stated above, we most recently reaffirmed and 
discussed 
the 
physical 
contact 
element 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. in Romanshek, which involved an accident 
where an unidentified vehicle turned in front of the insured's 
motorcycle 
causing 
the 
insured 
to 
lose 
control 
of 
the 
motorcycle, fall to the ground and suffer injuries.  Romanshek, 
281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶3.  There was no physical contact between the 
unidentified vehicle, or any part thereof, and the insured's 
motorcycle.  Id.  However, the insured argued that our decision 
in Hayne requiring physical contact under § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
"has been eroded to the point that it has no meaning," and 
therefore, it should be abandoned.  Id., ¶¶5, 11.  After 
reviewing Wisconsin case law, we rejected this argument because 
we 
have 
consistently 
adhered 
to 
the 
interpretation 
of 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. that requires physical contact.  Id., ¶35.  
                                                 
10 The final public policy issue we discussed was "honoring 
the reasonable coverage expectations of the insured."  Smith v. 
Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 127, ¶27, 239 Wis. 2d 646, 619 
N.W.2d 882.  However, as we already noted, the reasonable 
expectation of the insured is applied only when the language of 
the insurance policy is interpreted and is not relevant to an 
analysis of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  Id. (citing Kremers-
Urban Co. v. Am. Employers Ins., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 735, 351 
N.W.2d 156 (1984)). 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
19 
 
Furthermore, we recognized that "[t]he cases in which we found 
that UM coverage was mandated by § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. all involved 
circumstances where an unidentified vehicle, or part thereof, 
made contact with the insured's vehicle or where an unidentified 
vehicle was 'involved' in an accident in which there was 
physical contact."  Id., ¶39.   
¶29 The insured also argued that we should abandon our 
holding in Hayne requiring physical contact because a majority 
of other states hold that physical contact "is an impermissible 
limitation on uninsured or unknown motorist statutes and is 
against public policy."  Id., ¶40 (citation omitted).  We 
rejected that argument, emphasizing that we are bound by our own 
precedent.  Id., ¶41.  We also explained that "stare decisis is 
particularly 
controlling 
where 
the 
legal 
rule 
impacts 
contractual relationships and has been relied upon by industry" 
and "where a court has authoritatively interpreted a statute 
because the legislature remains free to alter its construction," 
such as in this case.  Id., ¶¶44-45 (citations omitted).  We 
also recognized that other states had rejected the physical 
contact requirement when we established that requirement in 
Hayne.  Id., ¶49.  As such, we concluded that the insured did 
not meet his burden to provide "sufficient justification to 
overturn 20 years of jurisprudence construing a statute."  Id., 
¶46.   
¶30 We also concluded that the doctrine of legislative 
acquiescence was applicable because we had explained to the 
legislature how to alter the statute to mandate coverage for 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
20 
 
miss-and-run accidents if it chose to do so.  However, the 
legislature has not amended the statute.  Id., ¶¶56-57.  In 
addition, we rejected the insured's argument that requiring 
physical contact was contrary to the legislative intent of Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  Id., ¶59.  We stated that "the 
physical contact requirement derives from the plain meaning of 
the 
term 
'hit-and-run' 
in 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b., 
it 
cannot 
contravene the legislative intent; it is the legislative 
intent."  Id.   
¶31 The insured's final argument was that because the 
insurer conceded that the insured was not attempting fraud, the 
sole reason for the physical contact requirement, the rule 
should not apply.  Id., ¶61.  We rejected this argument because: 
While this court may mold and develop common-law 
doctrines to best effectuate the purpose for which 
they were designed, when applying statutes we do not 
carve out exceptions to a clear, unambiguous provision 
anytime a party argues that a particular result does 
not comport with what they assert to be the subjective 
intentions of the legislators in enacting the overall 
statutory scheme.   
Id., ¶63.  Therefore, we reaffirmed that the phrase "hit-and-
run" in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. requires physical contact 
and does not mandate coverage for miss-and-run accidents.  Id., 
¶66. 
¶32 Based on our review of Wisconsin case law, we conclude 
that for an accident to meet the physical contact element of a 
"hit-and-run" under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b., there must be 
both (1) a "hit" by the unidentified vehicle, or part thereof, 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
21 
 
and (2) a "hit" to the insured by another vehicle or part 
thereof, but not necessarily by the unidentified vehicle.11  
There is no precedent for coverage under § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
without both a "hit" by an unidentified vehicle, or part 
thereof, and a "hit" to the insured vehicle.12  As we discussed 
in Romanshek, we are bound by our own precedent.  Id., ¶41. 
¶33 We have interpreted the physical contact element to 
require a "touching between the vehicles."  Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d 
at 78; see also, Dehnel, 231 Wis. 2d at 15.  The requirement 
that there be a "hit" by the unidentified vehicle was emphasized 
by the court of appeals in Wegner, and is an assumed fact for 
purposes of summary judgment in the case before us.  We have 
also focused on the requirement that there be a "hit" to the 
insured's vehicle in prior cases, although that "hit" need not 
be by the unidentified vehicle.  Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶21 
(distinguishing its conclusion from miss-and-run cases because 
the insured's vehicle was actually hit by an intermediate 
vehicle).   
¶34 Similar to the facts of the chain-reaction collision 
in Smith, in this case, for purposes of summary judgment, we 
                                                 
11 Accordingly, if the insured's vehicle hit a culvert or 
another object, but did not make contact with another vehicle or 
part thereof, coverage is not required by § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  
12 We recognized in Romanshek that "[t]he cases in which we 
found that UM coverage was mandated by § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. all 
involved circumstances where an unidentified vehicle, or part 
thereof, made contact with the insured's vehicle or where an 
unidentified vehicle was 'involved' in an accident in which 
there was physical contact."  Romanshek, 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶39.   
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
22 
 
assume the unidentified vehicle "hit" a third vehicle.  The 
DeHarts argue that since we held that contact between an 
unidentified vehicle and a third vehicle satisfies the physical 
contact element in Smith, we should also mandate coverage in 
this case.    However, we disagree with the DeHarts' contention 
because in Smith, we focused on the fact that there was a "hit" 
to the insured's vehicle.  Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶8.  As we 
discussed above, Smith was distinguished from "miss-and-run" 
cases, where coverage is not mandated, on the basis that "the 
unidentified vehicle had contact with the intermediate vehicle, 
which in turn had contact with the insured vehicle."  Id. at ¶21 
(emphasis added).  Therefore, the facts in this case do not meet 
the physical contact element of a "hit-and-run" as discussed in 
Smith because there was no "hit" to Wendy's vehicle.   
¶35 Wendy's vehicle was not involved in a hit-and-run 
accident, but rather a type of miss-and-run accident, which we 
have established does not mandate coverage under Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  See Hayne, 115 Wis. 2d at 75; Romanshek, 281 
Wis. 2d 300, ¶35.  We recognize that in this case we are 
assuming that the unidentified vehicle made physical contact 
with another vehicle, and therefore, the unidentified vehicle 
did not "miss" hitting another vehicle altogether.  However, 
like the insureds' vehicles in the miss-and-run cases, Wendy's 
vehicle was forced off the road by the unidentified vehicle, but 
was not "hit" by the unidentified vehicle, any part thereof, or 
another vehicle.  Therefore, like Hayne and Romanshek, the 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
23 
 
physical contact element of a "hit-and-run accident" under 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. is not met and UM coverage is not mandated.   
¶36 We also conclude that the public policy concern to 
prevent fraud is supported by our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  The purpose of the physical contact element 
is to prevent fraudulent claims from being brought by insured 
drivers who are involved in an accident of their own making.  
Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶25; Theis, 232 Wis. 2d 749, ¶30 ("[T]he 
purpose for interpreting a 'hit-and-run accident' as requiring 
physical contact between the insured and the unidentified motor 
vehicle is to prevent a fraudulent claim about a phantom motor 
vehicle 
when 
the 
insured's 
loss 
of 
control 
causes 
the 
accident.")   
¶37 The DeHarts argue that since Wisconsin Mutual does not 
allege that Wendy is guilty of fraud, the purpose of the statute 
is satisfied without requiring a "hit" to Wendy's vehicle.  We 
faced a similar argument in Romanshek.  Romanshek, 281 Wis. 2d 
300, ¶61.  In Romanshek, the insured stated that the insurer 
conceded that he was not attempting to perpetrate a fraud and 
since the sole reason for the physical contact requirement was 
to avoid fraudulent claims, the rule should not apply.  Id.  We 
rejected that argument because "no change in the law is 
justified simply by a 'case with more egregious facts.'"  Id. 
(citations omitted).  Accordingly, our interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. furthers the purpose to prevent fraud 
because even though fraud may not be an issue in this case, 
fraudulent claims by insureds will not be prevented in other 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
24 
 
cases if a "hit" to the insured vehicle is not required.  There 
would be no way to confirm that the accident in which the 
insured vehicle was involved was due to an unidentified vehicle 
and not the insured's own fault.    
¶38 The DeHarts also argue that coverage is supported by 
the public policy concern of compensating "an injured person who 
is the victim of an uninsured motorist's negligence to the same 
extent as if the uninsured motorist [was] insured."  Theis, 232 
Wis. 2d 749, ¶28; see also Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶26.  The 
court of appeals in this case stated that its "conclusion that 
coverage applies if there was contact between the unidentified 
vehicle and the Brewer vehicle allows the DeHarts to recover 
their damages to the same extent as if the driver whose 
negligence started the chain of events was identified and 
insured."  DeHart, 294 Wis. 2d 387, ¶16.   
¶39 As we have done in our past decisions, we again 
recognize that "[i]t may very well be good public policy to 
mandate UM coverage for an insured in a miss-and-run accident."  
Romanshek, 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶65.  We once again invite the 
legislature to amend Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. if it 
disagrees 
with 
our 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statute. 
 
See 
Romanshek, 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶65.  The legislature has amended 
another provision of the mandatory UM law, but "has not seen fit 
to make any change to § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. and overturn this 
court's interpretation of the phrase 'hit-and-run.'"  Id., ¶57 
(citing 1995 Wis. Act 21, § 2, which amended § 632.32(4)(a)1.).  
Accordingly, we will continue to require the physical contact 
No. 
2005AP2962-FT   
 
25 
 
element of a "hit-and-run accident" under § 632.32(4)(a)2.b., 
which we have interpreted as requiring both a "hit" by the 
unidentified vehicle, or part thereof, and a "hit" to the 
insured's vehicle by another vehicle or part thereof, although 
not necessarily by the unidentified vehicle. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶40 We conclude that the physical contact element for a 
"hit-and-run 
accident" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
requires:  (1) a "hit" by the unidentified motor vehicle, or 
part thereof, and (2) a "hit" to the insured's vehicle by 
another vehicle or part thereof, but not necessarily by the 
unidentified vehicle.  Since Wendy's vehicle was not "hit," 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. does not mandate UM coverage in this case.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶41 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  The court 
is asked whether the policyholder, DeHart, is entitled to 
uninsured motorist insurance coverage, a question that requires 
statutory interpretation.  The majority opinion fails to engage 
in proper statutory interpretation and fails to provide DeHart 
with the insurance protection to which she is statutorily 
entitled.  For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  
¶42 I first comment on the holdings of the majority 
opinion and then the text of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a).  After 
that I discuss why the prior case law does not govern the 
instant case.  Finally, I discuss the policy reasons supporting 
my interpretation of the statute. 
I 
¶43 The majority opinion's holding is stated in two 
different ways:  In ¶¶2, 32, and 40 the majority opinion 
requires that there be a "hit to" the policyholder's vehicle.  
In contrast, the implication of note 12 in ¶32 is that if the 
policyholder's vehicle makes contact with another vehicle or 
part thereof, the policyholder may be covered under the 
uninsured motorist policy.  
¶44 Suppose, for example, if after swerving to miss the 
unidentified motor vehicle that had struck a different vehicle's 
side view mirror, DeHart's vehicle had then struck another 
vehicle.  There would be a "hit by" the unidentified motor 
vehicle and a "hit by" DeHart's vehicle, but no "hit to" 
DeHart's vehicle. 
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
2 
 
 ¶45 A hit to the policyholder's vehicle is different from 
a 
hit 
by 
the 
policyholder's 
vehicle. 
 
A 
hit 
to 
the 
policyholder's vehicle is different from the policyholder's 
vehicle making contact with another vehicle.  The majority 
opinion does not address this significant distinction. 
¶46 Furthermore, 
although 
Smith 
v. 
General 
Casualty 
Insurance Co., 2000 WI 127, 239 Wis. 2d 646, 619 N.W.2d 882, 
upon which the majority opinion relies, involved a "hit to" the 
policyholder's vehicle, the text of Smith also speaks of an 
intermediate vehicle having "contact with" the policyholder's 
vehicle.  Majority op., ¶34. 
¶47 The minimum expectation for a decision of this court 
is that the holding be clear.  Unfortunately, the decision of 
the court in the instant case does not meet that expectation.  
II 
¶48 I turn to the text of the statute.  The text of Wis. 
Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) does not require either a hit to the 
policyholder's vehicle or contact between the policyholder's 
vehicle and another vehicle.  Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) 
mandates insurance coverage to a policyholder entitled to 
recover damages from an owner or operator of an uninsured motor 
vehicle.  Subdivision (4)(a)2.b. includes in the definition of 
an uninsured motor vehicle "[a]n unidentified motor vehicle 
involved 
in 
a 
hit-and-run 
accident" 
(emphasis 
added).  
Consequently, the statute mandates insurance coverage to a 
policyholder entitled to recover damages from the operator of an 
unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-and-run accident. 
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2. reads as follows: 
(4) Required Uninsured Motorist and Medical Payments 
Coverage. 
 
Every 
policy 
of 
insurance . . . that 
insures 
with 
respect 
to 
any 
motor 
vehicle . . . against loss resulting from liability 
imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by 
any person arising out of the . . . use of a motor 
vehicle shall contain therein . . . :  
(a) Uninsured motorist.  
1. For the protection of persons injured who are 
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or 
operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death 
resulting therefrom, in limits of at least $25,000 per 
person and $50,000 per accident. 
2. In this paragraph "uninsured motor vehicle" also 
includes: 
a. An insured motor vehicle if before or after the 
accident the liability insurer of the motor vehicle is 
declared 
insolvent 
by 
a 
court 
of 
competent 
jurisdiction. 
b. An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-
and-run accident. 
¶50 The 
term 
"hit-and-run" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. acts as a qualifying phrase requiring the 
unidentified vehicle to come into physical contact with another 
vehicle.  Nothing in subdivision (4)(a)2.b. of the statute 
suggests that the unidentified motor vehicle's contact has to be 
with the policyholder's vehicle.  Indeed, nothing in subdivision 
(4)(a)2.b. requires a "hit" to the policyholder's vehicle at 
all, by any vehicle or part thereof, or contact between the 
policyholder's vehicle and another vehicle.  Thus, according to 
the statute, the policyholder need not have a hit-and-run 
accident with the unidentified motor vehicle, or be hit by 
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
4 
 
another vehicle or part thereof, or have contact with another 
vehicle.  To be protected under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a), the 
policyholder need only be legally entitled to recover damages 
from the operator of an unidentified motor vehicle involved in a 
hit-and-run accident.  Should the unidentified motor vehicle 
ever be identified, DeHart would be legally entitled to recover 
damages from the operator of this vehicle if she proved the 
facts she now asserts.   
¶51 If the legislature wanted to require the unidentified 
vehicle to hit the policyholder's vehicle, it could have so 
stated.  The legislature could have used language like that 
found in DeHart's insurance policy, which defines an uninsured 
motor vehicle as including "[a] hit-and-run vehicle whose 
operator or owner is unknown and which strikes: (i) you or a 
relative, (ii) a vehicle which you or a relative are occupying, 
or (iii) your insured car."  Wisconsin Mutual policy, Part C, 
section (2)(c) (emphasis added).1  Although the legislature 
required a hit-and-run accident, it did not require a direct hit 
                                                 
1 The parties, the majority opinion, and I agree that the 
specific language of DeHart's insurance policy does not provide 
coverage under the facts of this case.  Coverage not included in 
an insurance contract may, however, be "compelled and enforced 
as though a part thereof where the inclusion of such coverage is 
required by a properly enacted statute."  Progressive N. Ins. 
Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶13, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 
N.W.2d 417 (quoted source omitted); majority op., ¶9. 
The effect of the majority opinion at ¶18 (and its reliance 
on the legislative history set forth in Hayne v. Progressive N. 
Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 68, 76-85, 339 N.W.2d 588 (1983)) is to 
amend the statute to conform in large part to the insurance 
policy.  
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
5 
 
or strike to the policyholder or the policyholder's vehicle by 
the unidentified vehicle, another vehicle, or any part thereof, 
or contact between the policyholder's vehicle and any other 
vehicle. 
¶52 DeHart alleges that her vehicle was forced off the 
road by an unidentified motor vehicle that had just struck 
another vehicle and was fleeing the accident scene.2  DeHart 
asserts she suffered damages because of this unidentified motor 
vehicle that was involved in a hit-and-run accident.   
¶53 Plain and simple, if the facts as alleged are true, 
DeHart 
suffered 
damages 
caused 
by 
the 
operator 
of 
the 
unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-and-run accident; 
the statute entitles her to recovery under uninsured motorist 
coverage.   
III 
¶54 The majority opinion narrowly focuses on prior case 
law interpreting the statutory words "hit-and-run accident." 
Consequently, the majority opinion disregards the key statutory 
words, namely "involved in."  The majority opinion loses sight 
of the fact that the policyholder suffered damages caused by "an 
unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-and-run accident."  
                                                 
2 The unidentified vehicle was still in the process of 
"running," given the alleged proximity between the hit and 
DeHart's vehicle.  A different result might occur if DeHart's 
vehicle had been forced off the road by the unidentified vehicle 
miles away from the hit-and-run accident with a third party 
vehicle. 
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶55 Our prior cases focused on whether a hit-and-run 
accident had occurred.3  This case is different.  Unlike our 
prior hit-and-run cases, without question there was a hit-and-
run accident in the present case.  The hit-and-run accident was 
between the unidentified motor vehicle and the third-party 
vehicle whose side view mirror was damaged.  Majority op., ¶13 
n.6, ¶32.4  
¶56 Similarly, the instant case does not fit into our 
prior "miss-and-run" cases.  In those cases there was no "hit" 
by the unidentified motor vehicle (or any part thereof) with any 
vehicle.5  In the present case, the unidentified motor vehicle 
hit a third-party vehicle whose side view mirror was damaged.  
¶57 The majority opinion can be described as a miss-and-
run decision, missing the legal issue presented by the facts of 
this case and running with a different legal issue.  The 
majority opinion refuses to give meaning to the statutory 
                                                 
3 The legislature did not define "hit-and-run" for purposes 
of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  The Legislative Council Note in § 632.32, 
ch. 102, Laws of 1979, adopted by the legislature, explains that 
"A precise definition of hit-and-run is not necessary for in the 
rare case where a question arises the court can draw the line."  
Accordingly, "hit-and-run" has been construed on a case-by-case 
basis.  Smith v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 127, ¶13, 239 
Wis. 2d 646, 619 N.W.2d 882; majority op., ¶15. 
4 Both the majority opinion and I accept for purposes of 
review that the unidentified motor vehicle struck a third party 
vehicle before forcing DeHart's vehicle off of the road.  
DeHart's insurance company, however, continues to dispute this 
fact. 
5 See, e.g., Hayne v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 115 
Wis. 2d 68, 75, 339 N.W.2d 588 (1983); Progressive N. Ins. Co. 
v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶35, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417. 
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
7 
 
language, 
in 
effect 
rendering 
the 
words 
"involved 
in" 
superfluous.  I disagree with this approach.  
¶58 This court recognized the importance of the words 
"involved in" in Smith v. General Casualty Insurance Co., 2000 
WI 127, 239 Wis. 2d 646, 619 N.W.2d 882.  The court explained 
that "[t]he use of the word 'involved' does not strike us as a 
word that should be narrowly applied only to a hit-and-run 
accident involving a direct hit to the insured vehicle.  Here, 
the unidentified vehicle was clearly 'involved': it precipitated 
the accident through contact with the intermediate vehicle."  
Smith, 239 Wis. 2d 646, ¶12.  The Smith court clearly recognized 
that the statutory words "involved in" require an expansive 
interpretation.  Smith equated the words "an unidentified motor 
vehicle is involved in a hit-and-run accident" with the words 
"an unidentified motor vehicle precipitated the accident through 
contact with the intermediate vehicle."   
¶59 The Smith court concluded that the policyholder had 
been hit indirectly by the unidentified motor vehicle, and that 
it did not need to go any further in its analysis of the words 
"involved in."  Smith is informative in providing guidance about 
the words "involved in" but does not provide an answer to the 
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
8 
 
present case because the facts are dissimilar.  The present case 
forces the court to address the issue that Smith left open.6 
¶60 If the majority opinion were to examine the entire 
statutory text and not just the hit-and-run language, the 
majority opinion would conclude that the statutory language is 
clear: Uninsured motorist coverage is mandated when damage to 
the policyholder results from an unidentified vehicle "involved 
in" a hit-and-run accident.  The majority opinion would further 
conclude that the present case fits the statutory requirements. 
DeHart's damage resulted from an unidentified vehicle that was 
"involved in" a hit-and-run accident. 
¶61 I cannot join the majority opinion, which relies 
solely on cases that have interpreted and applied only the "hit-
and-run" language in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  These hit-
and-run and miss-and-run cases unfortunately have encrusted the 
                                                 
6 Notably, language in Progressive Northern Insurance Co. v. 
Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417, a miss-
and-run case, also leaves open the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. that would allow DeHart to recover uninsured 
motorist coverage under the circumstances of the present case.  
The Romanshek court explained that "[t]he cases in which we 
found that UM [uninsured motorist] coverage was mandated by 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b. 
all 
involved 
circumstances 
where 
an 
unidentified vehicle, or part thereof, made contact with the 
insured's 
vehicle 
or 
where 
an 
unidentified 
vehicle 
was 
'involved' in an accident in which there was physical contact."  
Romanshek, 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶39 (emphasis added).  Here, the 
unidentified vehicle was "involved" in an accident in which 
there was physical contact, which subsequently caused damage to 
DeHart.  But the majority opinion at ¶¶28, 32 n.12, although 
twice quoting this text of Romanshek, is so fixated upon the 
interpretation of "hit-and-run" that it fails to recognize how, 
even under the precedent it claims it is bound to, DeHart is 
entitled to coverage. 
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
9 
 
plain language of the statute, obstructing the majority's 
ability to see the language of the statute.  The majority 
opinion claims it is following stare decisis.  Majority op., 
¶29.  It is not.  Rather, the majority opinion chokes the text 
of the statute with inapposite case law.  Only by returning to 
the statutory text itself can this court engage in a proper 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a)2.b. that gives full 
effect and meaning to all of the words of the statute.  
IV 
¶62 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) has been, and should 
be, 
interpreted 
in 
light 
of 
the 
public 
policy 
concerns 
underlying the statute. 
 
¶63 The underlying purpose of uninsured motorist coverage 
is to compensate "an injured person who is the victim of an 
uninsured motorist's negligence to the same extent as if the 
uninsured motorist were insured."7  If the operator of the 
unidentified motor vehicle were insured, DeHart would have a 
good claim.  By properly recognizing that the damage DeHart 
suffered stems directly from an unidentified motor vehicle 
involved in a hit-and-run accident, the court will accord DeHart 
the coverage the legislature mandated. 
 
¶64 Furthermore, the court has declared that a "public 
policy concern . . . of primary relevance to our analysis" in 
                                                 
7 Theis v. Midwest Security Ins. Co, 2000 WI 15, ¶28, 232 
Wis. 2d 749, 606 N.W.2d 162; Smith v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 
WI 127, ¶26, 239 Wis. 2d 646, 619 N.W.2d 882; majority op., ¶38. 
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
10 
 
uninsured motorist cases is "that of preventing fraud."8  See 
majority op., ¶37. 
¶65 Fraud is not a concern in the present case because 
there was a hit-and-run accident.9  Witnesses exist and physical 
evidence should be available.  The genuineness of DeHart's claim 
can be tested at trial, during which DeHart has the burden of 
proof.  Preventing fraudulent claims based on "phantom" vehicles 
should 
not 
motivate 
the 
court's 
interpretation 
when 
an 
unidentified motor vehicle is "involved in a hit-and-run 
accident." 
* * * * 
¶66 On 
review 
of 
the 
text 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 632.32(4)(a)2.b., the facts of the instant case, prior case 
law, and the public policies underlying the statute, I conclude 
that DeHart is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage.  When an 
unidentified vehicle strikes a vehicle and flees the hit-and-run 
accident scene, and another vehicle, like DeHart's, suffers 
damage as a result of the hit-and-run accident, the owner of the 
damaged vehicle (here DeHart) is entitled to uninsured motorist 
coverage pursuant to the clear language of § 632.32(4)(a)2.b.  
Neither a "hit to" the policyholder's vehicle by any vehicle or 
any part thereof nor contact between the policyholder's vehicle 
and another vehicle is statutorily required. 
                                                 
8 Smith v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 127, ¶25, 239 
Wis. 2d 646, 619 N.W.2d 882. 
9 Wisconsin 
Mutual 
concedes 
DeHart 
is 
not 
making 
a 
fraudulent claim. 
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶67 I would not, however, grant summary judgment to either 
party on the record before us.  I agree with the court of 
appeals that material facts are in dispute, including whether 
the unidentified motor vehicle struck the side view mirror of 
the other vehicle and whether the hit-and-run accident caused 
DeHart's damage.  I would therefore remand the cause to the 
circuit court for trial.  
¶68 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion. 
 
No.  2005AP2962-FT.ssa 
 
 
 
1