Case Title: State v. Lynds

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 88-597


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

       v.                                     On Appeal from
                                              District Court of Vermont
 Glenn R. Lynds                               Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

                                              December Term, 1991


 George F. Ellison, J.

 M. Patricia Zimmerman, Windsor County Deputy State's Attorney, White River
   Junction, for plaintiff-appellee

 John J. Kennelly of Carroll, George & Pratt, Rutland, for defendant-
   appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


                     On Motion for Specificity on Remand

      DOOLEY, J.   On October 25, 1991, this Court reversed defendant's
 conviction for sexual assault because of error in allowing the State's
 expert witness to testify by deposition without being present.  We remanded
 the case to district court for a new trial.  Following the issuance of the
 opinion, the State moved that we clarify the mandate to specify that "the
 remand goes back to the time of trial and not back to the time the charges
 were filed."
      In oral argument, the State clarified that its motion was intended to
 prevent defendant from engaging in any further pretrial discovery or filing
 any pretrial motions. (FN1) The State had no reason to believe that defendant
 intended to engage in further discovery or motion practice.  Nor did it
 state any reasons specific to this case why such defense activity should be
 prohibited.  Instead it argued, without citation to any authority, that such
 pretrial motion practice or discovery is prohibited in other states when
 there is a reversal and a new trial ordered because of errors that occurred
 at trial.  Again, without citation to any authority, it argues that
 Vermont's rule is different.  It urges us to change Vermont's rule, for the
 purpose of this case, by a specific remand direction.
      The State's assertion of Vermont law on this question is erroneous,
 because we have never ruled on the nature of criminal proceedings following
 a remand.(FN2) The State's representation of the law in other jurisdictions is
 also erroneous.  The rule we apply, which is applicable in most, if not all,
 other jurisdictions  was recently detailed by the California Supreme Court:
           [Reversal and remand for a new trial] even permits
           amendment of the accusatory pleading . . . as well as
           renewal and reconsideration of pretrial motions and
           objections to the admission of evidence. . . .  Absent a
           statutory provision precluding relitigation, a
           stipulation by the parties, or an order by the court
           that prior rulings made in the prior trial will be
           binding at the new trial, objections must be made to the
           admission of evidence . . ., and the court must consider
           the admissibility of that evidence at the time it is
           offered. (Citations omitted.)

 People v. Mattson,