Case Title: State v. Weisz & Sons, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Weisz & Sons, Inc.1986 WY 14713 P.2d 176Case Number: 85-210Decided: 01/21/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING; SIDNEY C. WERNER, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION AND 
FISCAL CONTROL; ROBERT SKYLES, ADMINISTRATOR, PURCHASING AND PROPERTY CONTROL; 
RANDOLPH WOOD, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; ROGER SHAFFER, 
ADMINISTRATOR, LAND QUALITY DIVISION, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

 
 
v. 

 
 
WEISZ & SONS, INC., 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF), EBY MINE SERVICES, INC., APPELLEE 
(INTERVENOR).

 
 
Appeal from the District Court,LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Allen C. Johnson, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

David H. Carmichael of 
Carmichael, McNiff & Patton, Cheyenne.

 
 
Don W. Riske, Cheyenne, for 
intervenor.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., 
ROONEY,* BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., and RAPER, 
J., Retired.

* This case was heard and 
decided prior to the retirement of Justice Rooney on November 30, 
1985.

 
 

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

 
 

[¶1.]     The State of Wyoming, appellant, Department of Environmental Quality 
(DEQ), appellant, through the Department of Administration and Fiscal Control 
(DAFC), appellant, solicited and received bids for the performance of a contract 
to inject slurry underground to backfill mine voids for subsidence control at 
Hanna, Wyoming. Weisz & Sons, Inc. (Weisz), 
appellee, was the low bidder but was disqualified by DAFC upon recommendation of 
DEQ, after evaluation of bids, for not being responsive in its bid. DEQ, through 
DAFC, then accepted the bid of the second low bidder, Eby Mine Services, Inc. 
(Eby), intervenor in the district court.1

 
 

[¶2.]     Weisz sought and 
obtained a temporary restraining order in the district court to restrain the 
appellants from awarding the contract pending a trial on the merits. After 
trial, the trial judge rendered a written opinion devoted in practically its 
entirety to an analysis of the evidence with an ultimate finding that "it was an 
abuse of discretion by the officials evaluating the bids, to hold that the 
omission of such documentation from plaintiff's bid amounted to a material 
variance sufficient to reject the bid."

 
 

[¶3.]     The district court then 
permanently enjoined appellants from awarding the contract to anyone other than 
Weisz.

 
 

[¶4.]     The appellants state 
the issues to be:

 
 
"1. Is the State of 
Wyoming immune 
from a suit such as this?

 
 
"2. If the State is not 
immune from a suit for injunction, then did the Appellee carry the heavy burden 
of proof placed on him?

 
 
"3. Could the District 
Court have treated this case as judicial review of agency action under the 
Administrative Procedures Act?

 
 
"4. As a matter of 
policy, should the courts refrain from reviewing day-to-day decisions of 
executive branch agencies when those decisions are 
discretionary?"

 
 
Weisz considers the 
issues to be:

 
 
"I. Whether sovereign 
immunity precludes district court jurisdiction over state agencies and state 
officials in `disappointed bidder cases.'

 
 
"II. Whether the district 
court may afford injunctive relief in this case, pursuant to Wyoming Statutes 
and the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure."

 
 
We are satisfied that the 
only issue is whether under the circumstances of this case the district court 
has authority to substitute its discretion for that of DAFC and DEQ and award a 
contract for injection of slurry through use of an injunction. Since our 
decision on this issue is dispositive of the appeal, we need not consider any 
other question.

 
 

[¶5.]     We will explain and 
confirm the order of reversal heretofore entered on October 31, 
1985.

 
 

[¶6.]     Legislative direction 
for state contracting appears in W.S. 9-2-1016(b)(viii) and (xiv)2 governing bidding and contracts 
required by agencies. DAFC is required to establish uniform standards governing 
such agency action and standard forms of bids and contracts "sufficiently 
designed to permit award on the basis of the lowest evaluated price as determined in 
accordance with objective, measurable criteria set forth in the invitation for 
bids." (Emphasis added.)3 DAFC followed through and adopted a 
set of purchasing rules. 

 
 

[¶7.]     The rules and 
regulations cover various statements of policy and advisories in aspects of 
procurement, such as the basic method being by competitive sealed bidding "in 
order to secure acceptable products at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayers 
of the State," the purpose being to encourage maximum open competition and "at 
the same time assure all agencies of quality supplies, materials, equipment or 
services; reasonable delivery and the best possible price." Section 3, Chapter 
II, Rules and Regulations, Department of Administration and Fiscal Control, 
Purchasing and Property Control Division. It is set out that the purpose of 
advertising a call for bids is to secure for the state the benefits from 
competition "and to prevent collusion and fraud in letting contracts." Section 
3, Chapter V, Rules and Regulations, supra.

 
 

[¶8.]     The work to be done on 
the project was made possible by a grant from the federal government, so DEQ and 
DAFC were also bound by applicable federal regulations in letting a contract. 
Such regulations appear in Circular A-102 (Revised), Uniform Requirements for 
Assistance to State and Local Governments, Office of Management and Budget, 
Executive Office of the President of the United 
States. 
Amongst the selection procedures there set out are minimum requirements for 
solicitation of offers and requiring competitive sealed bids for contracts over 
$10,000, with a public opening and "[a]ny or all bids may be rejected when there 
are sound documented business reasons in the best interest of the program." 
Procedures followed by DEQ and DAFC appear to conform to federal 
requirements.

 
 

[¶9.]     Under the working 
arrangement between DAFC and the various agencies, the agency, DEQ in this 
instance, puts together the information necessary to call for bids. DAFC 
actually handles the procurement by advertisement, receiving bids, and the 
opening. The agency requesting a call for bids is then called upon in an 
advisory capacity for its recommendations for letting a 
contract.

 
 

[¶10.]  Personnel of DEQ did not consider 
themselves technically qualified to compile the information necessary to advise 
DAFC of what was necessary to engage a qualified contractor to complete the 
slurry project. In order to provide that technical skill in drafting a call for 
bids, bidding specifications, project specifications and contract documents, DEQ 
employed the services of Midwest Mining Company. The project necessitated the 
drawing of bidding specifications and project specifications in order to obtain 
three contractors: one to drill holes from the land surface into the underground 
voids, another to gather and stockpile material for mixing with water into a 
slurry, and a third contractor to mix and inject the slurry through the holes 
and into the voids. Midwest Mining Company was to also furnish the project 
engineer on the job to coordinate the efforts of the three contractors so that, 
in the overall project, holes and materials will be available for the slurry 
contractor, as needed, to minimize down or standby time. The engineer, in 
addition, would oversee the work to assure compliance with the specifications 
and contract terms. Along with representatives of DEQ, Midwest Mining Company, 
through its engineers, was also to be part of the review process to perform the 
evaluation of bids received.

 
 

[¶11.]  In accordance with its contract, Midwest 
Mining Company made a preliminary study and survey to acquaint itself and DEQ 
personnel with the project needs. It thereupon prepared specifications, a form 
of contract, a call for bids, bidding specifications, and bid forms for bidder 
response. The resultant bulky volume was submitted to DAFC, which it approved 
and advertised by the required means for soliciting 
offers.

 
 
Five bids were 
received:

 
 
Mining Corporation               
$3,001,187.00 

Northern Improvement Co. 
  2,647,370.00 

Larry's Plumbing                   
2,594,920.00 

Eby Mine Service                  
1,775,375.00 

Weisz & Sons                                    
1,467,078.00

 
 
The engineers' 
preliminary estimate of project cost had been $2,264,950. 

 
 

[¶12.]  After evaluating the bids in accordance 
with the method of which prospective bidders were advised, in the call for bids 
furnished as part of the solicitation package, DEQ submitted the following 
report and recommendation to DAFC:

 
 
"The intention and 
interest of the State is to award this contract to the `lowest qualified 
bidder.' In order to evlauate [evaluate] qualifications of bidders, materials 
provided as set out in Sections B-1F and B-1G of the bid proposal were used to 
establish the minimum requirements of being responsible and responsive. The 
information required by Sections B-1F and B-1G must be submitted with the bid as 
set out in Sections B and C of the bid proposal. The method of evaluation 
followed Section B-1J. Because of the complexity, knowledge and skills required 
for this work, extensive evidence was required to be submitted to demonstrate 
the bidders['] capabilities and qualifications.

 
 
"Upon initial evaluation 
of the apparent low bidders' proposal, (Weisz & Sons, Inc.), the following 
concerns, as related to the requirements of Sections B-1F and B-1B [B-1G], were 
noted:

 
 
"1. The bidder was to 
provide, as part of his bid, documentation from proposed supplies [suppliers] of 
equipment commitments on the availability of equipment. This documentation was 
not in Weisz & Sons['] bid.

 
 
"2. The bidder was to 
provide, as part of his bid, information on key personnel (project manager, site 
supervisors, forman [foreman]) including, the extent that senior personnel will 
be used on the project, the experience of each person, employment history, etc. 
Weisz did provide information on personnel but failed to describe the extent to 
which each senior person would be used on the job. Because the bid was lacking 
this information, we were unable to determine if Weisz & Sons would have 
qualified personnel (supervision) at the site at all 
times.

 
 
"3. Section B-1F and 
Section I-2.2.6 requires [sic] the bidder to indicate in his bids the means by 
which the backfill which is injected will be weighed, and the method and 
frequency of calibration of the measuring device. This is a very important part 
of the contract as the bulk of payment will rely on the measurement of materials 
injected. The bid specifications of Section I-3.3.6 establish criteria for the 
weighing device and its accuracy. Weisz's bid did include the type of scale to 
be used, but did not indicate the method or frequency of 
calibration.

 
 
"4. Section B-1G of the 
bid proposal requires the bidder to attach to his bid proposal a list of all 
subcontractors and the dollar amount of work that said subcontractors will 
perform under this contract. This requirement serves two purposes; one, to 
determine if the prime contractor has chosen qualified subcontractors and two, 
to show that the prime has used responsible dollar amounts for subcontract work 
to prepare his bid. Weisz's bid contained no list of 
subcontractors.

 
 
"On August 5, 1985, 
clarification was requested from Weisz & Sons with respect to the above 
concerns. The purpose of this inquiry was to further establish the 
responsiveness of the bid, i.e. the State wished to ascertain if Weisz had this 
information in his possession when he prepared his bid. Weisz's response was 
received on August 12, 1985.

 
 
"The additional 
information submitted by Weisz & Sons clearly showed that he had not 
developed and fully considered all required information prior to preparing and 
submitting his bid. The response from Weisz did list proposed equipment 
suppliers, but did not contain documentation `from' suppliers on equipment 
availability. The submittal did contain more detailed resumes, but did not 
contain information detailing the extent senior persons would be used on the 
job. The submittal did acknowledge a subcontractor to drill water wells. This 
clearly established that Weisz & Sons is planning to use a subcontractor and 
therefore failed to properly respond to Section B-1G in the initial bid 
proposal.

 
 
"Based upon the 
cumulative nature of the deficiencies noted, we concluded that the bid submitted 
by Weisz & Sons lack[ed] the minimum evidence required to be a responsive 
bid as required by Section C. We further conclude that these deficiencies 
reflect upon the bid being responsible. The bidder's accountability and overall 
understanding of the work being bid becomes an issue. We were further unable to 
thoroughly understand and evaluate the bidder[']s qualifications to do the work. 
Therefore, we recommend that the lowest bid, Weisz & Sons be rejected.

 
 
"Upon evaluation of the 
second low bidder's proposal (Eby Mine Services, Inc.), it was found that all 
information required by Sections B-1F and B-1G were provided and that through 
these submittals and our knowledge of Eby's previous work for this program, he 
appears qualified to conduct the work. We consider the second low bid to be 
responsive and responsible and recommend that you proceed with a notice to award 
the work to Eby Mine Services, Inc. at their bid of $1,775,375.00." (Bracketed 
material added. Emphasis in original.)

 
 

[¶13.]  The Call for Bids, Section A, provided 
that

 
 
"* * * the contract, if 
awarded, shall be awarded to the bidder who, in the opinion of the Owner, is the 
lowest and most responsible and responsive bidder. The OWNER reserves the right to reject any 
bid submitted without the `Qualifications of Bidders' being fully and clearly 
set forth as required by item B-1F of the bid document." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
Section B-1F of the bid 
document in pertinent part provided that

 
 
"[e]ach BIDDER shall 
provide written evidence of his capability to perform the work called for in the 
contract including the reclamation activities defined in Section I-3. This 
evidence shall include the following:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"3. In the event that the 
BIDDER proposes to lease or otherwise acquire major equipment for the 
performance of this contract prior to the start of the contract, the BIDDER will 
additionally furnish for each such piece of equipment, details of the nature of 
the proposed acquisition, the proposed source of the equipment, the committed 
lead time for the supply of the equipment, and will provide as part of his bid, 
documentation from the proposed supplier of the equipment committing the 
availability of the equipment.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"5. A personnel list for 
the project, including a summary of the experience of senior personnel who are 
proposed for the project, including: the project manager; the site 
supervisor(s); and the foremen. At a minimum this list shall include for each 
such senior person details of: the extent to which each person is to be used in 
the project * * *."

 
 
Section B-1G of the bid 
document provided that "[t]he prime CONTRACTOR shall attach to his Bid Proposal 
a list of all SUBCONTRACTORS and the dollar amount of work that said 
SUBCONTRACTOR will perform under this contract." Section B-1I of the bid 
document provided in pertinent part:

 
 
"The State of Wyoming reserves the 
unqualified right, in its sole and absolute discretion, to reject any and all 
bids, or to accept the base bid plus any, all or neither alternate bid 
specified, which in its sole and absolute judgement will, under all 
circumstances, best serve the public interest."

 
 
Section B-1J of the bid 
document provided in pertinent part:

 
 
"The intention of the 
State is to award this contract to the `lowest qualified BIDDER.' In order to 
evaluate the bids the following process will be used:

 
 
"1. The Qualifications of 
BIDDERS will be evaluated using the materials provided as set out in Section 
B-1F to establish the BIDDERS that meet the minimum requirements of being 
responsible and responsive."

 
 
I

 
 

[¶14.]  The testimony of the principal designer 
of the bid documents, a representative of Midwest Mining Company and the one who 
would be the state's representative and engineer on the project, was essentially 
consistent with the letter recommending rejection of the Weisz bid and 
acceptance of the Eby bid. His explanation of reasons for rejection appears 
reasonable to this Court and goes to the question of 
judgment.

 
 

[¶15.]  The record transcript of the testimony of 
the Midwest Mining Company representative will be capsulized as briefly as 
possible. The bidder under Section B-1F3, supra, was required to provide, as 
part of his bid, documentation from the proposed supplier of the equipment 
committing the availability of the equipment. Weisz did not furnish such 
documentation with its bid. A telephone check with Weisz indicated such 
documents were not on hand at the time the bid was submitted. It is explained 
that a means of checking the ability of a contractor to meet the contract time 
limits is to examine the documentation to determine whether committed supplier 
of key pieces of equipment can deliver in time to meet time-of-performance 
limits. Particularly important were slurry pumps. No written commitment of any 
supplier was present with the Weisz bid. This left DEQ with the need to presume 
from the bid made any commitment of a supplier to Weisz was verbal. Experience 
had indicated such was not reliable - "notoriously optimistic" - and a written 
commitment was considered more reliable. Time of performance was particularly 
important because of the presence of two other contractors - hole drilling and 
material - whose time had to be coordinated with that of the slurry contractor. 
Other bidders who attached documentation showed six to fourteen weeks for slurry 
pump delivery, whereas the Weisz bid showed two weeks.

 
 

[¶16.]  The trial judge in his opinion letter 
found that the "request in the specifications for such documentation has not 
been shown to be based upon any rational objective to be served in the interests 
of the owner in calling for bids" and was not a "material variance sufficient to 
reject the bid."

 
 

[¶17.]  The second ground for rejection referred 
to Section B-1F5, supra, of the bid documents requiring the background and 
experience of "the project manager; the site supervisor(s); and the foremen." It 
also required details of the extent to which each such senior person was to be 
used in the project. The bid of Weisz contained the background and experience of 
the senior personnel but not the time they would be used on the project. The 
response was only that there would be "2 supervisory types on the job each day." 
A day was two shifts. It appeared from the evidence the two most experienced 
senior personnel would be on the job intermittently. Who the "supervisory types" 
were and who specifically would be on the site in charge were not 
disclosed.

 
 

[¶18.]  The Midwest Mining Company engineer who 
will be on the job all the time testified that he needed to know, in evaluation 
of the bids, who he would be working with who would be in charge for the 
contractor, and that the engineer needed to have confidence in the individual to 
be disclosed in the documents. He testified that in a "field operation, there 
are continual breakdowns and problems which require qualified senior supervisor 
attention and monitoring and action." While the parties may have agreed at the trial that the personnel of Weisz 
were qualified, the Weisz bid up for evaluation was lacking in that information. 
We cannot see from the testimony of the project engineer that he was ever 
satisfied that Weisz personnel to be on the job were qualified or even 
authorized to speak for Weisz on important overall contract requirements. The 
trial judge, in the light of the understanding that the personnel were 
qualified, as he saw it, deemed the bid responsive. That hardly follows in view 
of the specific provision of the bid document, Section B-1J, supra, which 
explains that "[t]he [q]ualifications of the BIDDERS will be evaluated using the 
materials provided as set out in Section B-1F" which required "details of: the 
extent to which each person is to be used in the project." Section B-1F5. Even 
after close examination of the transcript of testimony, we are unable to 
determine if Weisz would have qualified personnel on the site at all times, and 
who they were. They may have been qualified in their individual work but not as 
to the entire contract, which the engineer needed.

 
 

[¶19.]  Item four4 of reasons for rejection noted that 
Section B-1G required a list of subcontractors, but the Weisz bid contained 
none. The reasons for the requirement appear in the rejection advice memorandum, 
supra.

 
 

[¶20.]  The question arose because nothing 
appears in the Weisz bid as to what provision it was making for the drilling of 
two required water wells to provide water for the slurry. An examination of the 
bid does not show well drilling equipment as owned or leased by 
Weisz.

 
 

[¶21.]  At the time of bid opening, while the 
bids were still in the envelopes, Weisz discussed the water well drilling with 
Roger Russell, a well driller who was interested in the contract for drilling 
the holes through which the slurry would be injected into the underground voids. 
Russell testified that he was asked by Weisz if he was interested in drilling 
the water wells. He said he was interested if he got the hole drilling contract, 
otherwise he was not. Russell did not quote a price at the time but apparently 
has since given Weisz a price of $50 per foot or about $20,000 for drilling, 
plus the cost of pumps and other equipment. Twelve days after the bid opening, 
Weisz furnished information to DEQ that Russell would be the subcontractor to 
drill the water wells. Russell had been awarded the drilling contract on the 
Hanna project.

 
 

[¶22.]  The trial judge laid aside the 
subcontractor requirement on the basis that the testimony at trial revealed that Weisz had 
obtained a commitment to lease5 well drilling equipment from a well 
driller from Lusk and do the work itself, though that did not appear in the bid 
offer of Weisz. The trial court therefore found that there was no basis for a 
finding that the Weisz bid was not responsive.6

 
 

[¶23.]  We additionally consider it important 
that the Call for Bids, Section A, scheduled a bidders' tour of the project at 
the site in Hanna to familiarize all bidders with the various locations and 
aspects of the work and answer questions in that regard. Weisz did not attend by 
sending a representative. It did, however, inspect the site on its own. 
Attendance at the bidders' tour was not required by the bid solicitation, but to 
us failure to attend indicates indifference on the part of the bidder. If it had 
had a representative at the tour, it may have adequately prepared its 
bid.

 
 

[¶24.]  It seems then in sum that the trial court 
thought any lack of response or noncompliance with prescribed requirements of 
proposal forms by the low bidder was immaterial as long as the bidder could 
establish itself as qualified to do the work in the judgment of the court on the 
basis of post-award court proceedings. We are constrained to 
disagree.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶25.]  At the root of our decision is an 
underlying consideration of Article 2 of the Wyoming Constitution: 

 
 
"The powers of the 
government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The 
legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the 
others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted."

 
 
When a court, as part of 
the judicial branch, decides to step in and interfere with an action of the 
executive branch, it must somehow skirt around the forbidden territory under 
dominion of the executive branch. There is a very tightly circumscribed corridor 
through which the judiciary must pass before it can act to control 
representatives or agencies in their conduct of the state's 
business.

 
 

[¶26.]  Early on this Court announced some of the 
principles by which a court is governed when entering the executive sector to 
explore and pass judgment on its management of the state's affairs. In Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing 
Association, 29 Wyo. 461, 476, 215 P. 244 (1923), it was said 
that:

 
 
"* * * [I]n the absence 
of legislative provision to the contrary, courts cannot substitute their 
judgment for that of the persons and boards specifically provided for that 
purpose by the legislative department of our government, and no relief can be 
given by them in such cases in the absence of fraud, which invokes the 
principles of equity. Nor should this rule, announced by substantially all the 
courts of the land, be considered as a remarkable departure from any known 
principles. Many things, deemed unjust by a large or small proportion of the 
population, are done by, and happen under, other departments of our government, 
but are beyond the control of the courts. The judicial department has 
jurisdiction over acts that are illegally done, but to extend its power over 
acts done in good faith, pursuant to the exercise of an honest judgment, and 
within the jurisdiction of the person or persons performing them, would be, in 
the absence of legislative authorization, judicial usurpation inconsistent with 
the fundamental constitutional principle of division of power. * * 
*"

 
 
To DAFC has been 
delegated the duty of contracting on behalf of the state. No authority has been 
given to the courts to do this for it. When the district court enjoined the 
granting of the contract to any other than Weisz, it assumed the role of 
contracting delegated to DAFC within the executive branch.

 
 

[¶27.]  This Court in years past has consistently 
held that courts are warranted in setting aside action of an administrative 
agency only where its action is arbitrary or fraudulent or where there is an 
illegal exercise of discretion. Bixby v. 
Cross, Wyo., 384 P.2d 710 (1963); Marathon Oil Company v. Welch, 
Wyo., 379 P.2d 832 (1963). Banzhaf v. Swan Company, 
60 Wyo. 201, 148 P.2d 225 (1944), approved Miller v. Hurley, 37 Wyo. 344, 262 P. 238 
(1927). In Miller, when it was 
contended that the court must grant a lease of state lands to one or the other 
of the parties, this Court responded by saying it had no power to lease state 
lands but that such power was vested in the state land board which had wide 
discretion. The Court went on to comment that if that discretion by means of a 
simple lawsuit and an appeal can be taken away from the board and vested in the 
district court, then the discretion of the land board amounts to nothing; it is 
an empty thing - a delusion - its discretion is wiped out. Miller held that the 
agency's discretion should be controlling except in the case of an illegal 
exercise thereof or in case of fraud or grave abuse of such discretion.7 The burden is on the complainant of 
proving that the agency's action is an illegal exercise of discretion, arbitrary 
or fraudulent. Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, Wyo., 
527 P.2d 432 (1974); Marathon Oil Company v. Welch, 
supra.

 
 

[¶28.]  Running through those cases we find words 
of description such as dishonesty, bad faith, illegality, and oppressiveness on 
the part of the agency. The term "abuse of discretion" in its application to 
agency conduct carries with it a connotation of illegal and other conduct 
smacking of censurable behavior, justifying judicial 
intervention.

 
 

[¶29.]  We are unable to find from the statutes, 
applicable case law, rules and regulations, and the record on appeal that the 
procedures followed by DAFC and DEQ in seeking bids and awarding the contract to 
be any other than lawful, reasonable, and in the exercise of honest judgment, 
good faith, and accepted competitive bid practices. Under those circumstances, 
the judiciary of this state cannot interfere and substitute its judgment for 
that of the responsible agency or perform the duties properly belonging to DAFC 
in the awarding of a contract.

 
 

[¶30.]  W.S. 9-2-1016(b)(xiv)(A) directs that 
competitive sealed bidding shall be utilized so as to permit award of a contract 
on the basis of the "lowest evaluated 
price" (emphasis added) determined in accordance with "objective, measurable 
criteria set forth in the invitation for bids." DAFC's call for bids provided in 
Section B-1F that specific written evidence of capability to perform the work be 
furnished and, in particular in question here, that documentation to establish 
availability be furnished by the supplier of equipment. Also required were a 
list of senior personnel and details as to the extent that person or those 
persons were to be used in the project, a list of subcontractors with dollar 
amount of work, and list of persons who would furnish leased equipment and its 
availability. Bidders were advised by the bid documents that "[q]ualifications 
of BIDDERS will be evaluated using the 
materials provided as set out in Section B-1F to establish the BIDDERS that 
meet the minimum requirements of being responsible and responsive." (Emphasis 
added.) Behind the bid specifications were a legitimate material reason and a 
purpose. They were not idle requirements but designed to create a basis for 
evaluation. Weisz nevertheless failed to provide that information in its bid. 
DEQ evaluated the bids as required by statute using the measurable criteria set 
out. It did so openly after notice to bidders of the method to be followed. 
There was no underhanded, dishonest or bad-faith behavior by its personnel, and 
it followed the law to the letter.

 
 

[¶31.]  Other circumstances such as the failure 
of Weisz to appear at the bidders' tour of the project (though not required) and 
submission of a bid response that, to the project engineer, appeared to have 
been hastily drawn may have influenced the judgment of the bid evaluators. The 
combination of those circumstances, and failure to supply the requested 
documentation making the bid irresponsive, could well demonstrate an attitude of 
indifference and cast a shadow on the responsibility of the low bidder. We are 
satisfied that these are matters of judgment with which the judicial branch may 
not interfere. The judicial branch has no authority to award contracts; that 
rests within the executive branch of government, and DAFC, with the advice of 
DEQ, in particular in this case.

 
 

[¶32.]  We would add that the call for bids 
reserved the right to reject any bid submitted without the qualifications of the 
bidder being fully and clearly set forth as required by Section B-1F of the bid 
document. Call for Bids, Section A, supra. Bidders were not misled. If a bidder 
chooses to ignore bid requirements and it has approval of the judiciary, then 
that constitutes active interference with the executive branch and nullifies the 
competitive bid process, taking away the usefulness of measurable criteria 
required by the legislature.

 
 

[¶33.]  It is the responsibility of the public 
agency, which is charged with contracting, to accept that bid which, in its 
judgment, would provide the best project for the money. Inherent to its duties, 
presumed superior knowledge, and expertise, the responsible public authority 
must have wide latitude in which to exercise its judgment as to the best means 
of accomplishing that objective, and courts are reluctant to enjoin such 
administrative functions in the absence of dishonesty, fraud, collusion, or lack 
of good faith. Clayton v. Salt Lake City, 15 Utah 2d 57, 387 P.2d 93 (1963). The money 
amount of the bid is not the sole criteria. There must also be conformity with 
the bidding specifications. Albert F. 
Ruehl Co. v. Board of Trustees of Schools for Industrial Education, 85 N.J. 
Super. 4, 203 A.2d 410 (1964); Township of Hillside v. Sternin, 25 N.J. 317, 136 A.2d 265 
(1957).

 
 

[¶34.]  It is a general rule that bids for public 
contracts must substantially comply with the requirements of the specifications 
for bidding and the directions to prospective bidders. The determination as to 
whether these requirements are satisfied and the awarding of a contract are acts 
of discretion which will be enjoined only if done illegally, arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or unreasonably. Gridley v. 
Engelhart, S.D., 322 N.W.2d 3 (1982); Conduit and Foundation Corporation v. 
City of Philadelphia, 41 Pa.Cmwlth. 641, 401 A.2d 376 (1979); Bud Johnson Construction Co., 
Inc. v. Metropolitan Transit Commission, Minn., 272 N.W.2d 31 (1978); LeCesse Bros. Contracting, Inc. v. Town 
Board of Town of Williamson, 62 A.D.2d 28, 403 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Kelly v. Zamarello, Alaska, 486 P.2d 906 
(1971); Wester v. Belote, 103 Fla. 
976, 138 So. 721 (1931); Maryland 
Pavement Co. of   Baltimore  City v. Mahool, 110 Md. 397, 72 A. 833 
(1909). We find this rule to be within the perimeter of Wyoming precedent.8

 
 

[¶35.]  A potential contractor is free not to bid 
if it is dissatisfied with bidding requirements. No useful purpose would be 
served if a bidder can ignore the bidding specifications. One who chooses his 
own course is in effect no bidder at all.

 
 

[¶36.]  The reason for the rule is expressed in 
Inn Operations v. River Hills Motor Inn 
Company, 261 Iowa 72, 152 N.W.2d 808, 817 
(1967):

 
 
"Public policy underlies 
the requirements of competitive bidding. The purpose of the statute is that each 
bidder, actual or possible, shall be put upon the same footing. * * * If any 
bidder is relieved from conforming to the conditions which impose some duty upon 
him, or from strict performance of the terms of the invitation to bid, such 
bidder is not contracting in fair competition with those bidders who propose to 
be bound by all conditions. * * *"

 
 
In Superior Oil Company v. Udall, 409 F.2d 1115, 
133 U.S.App.D.C. 198 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in an opinion by now Chief Justice 
Burger, the court emphasized the importance of strict compliance with bidding 
requirements and quoted with approval from an opinion by the comptroller 
general:

 
 
"`[T]he strict 
maintenance of the competitive bidding procedures required by law is infinitely 
more in the public interest than 
obtaining a pecuniary advantage in individual cases by permitting practices 
which do violence to the spirit and purpose of the law. * * *'" (Emphasis in 
original.) 409 F.2d  at 1119-1120.

 
 
The court went on to 
say:

 
 
"The requirement of 
steadfast compliance with competitive bidding procedures * * * is an 
indispensable ingredient to the maintenance of competitive bidding processes 
which will engender public confidence and that of persons dealing with the 
Government." 409 F.2d  at 1120.

 
 
To permit a court to 
override the discretion of DAFC and DEQ in their respective roles of being 
charged with selecting a contractor to inject slurry, under the circumstances of 
this case, would destroy the competitive nature of the bidding process and 
render the bidding specifications a nullity.

 
 

[¶37.]  The project engineer for DEQ spent 
several months examining and surveying the project site, in drafting plans and 
specifications, and in dividing up the total project into three phases of hole 
drilling, material and slurry injection, with each phase having to be closely 
coordinated with the others. Based on that, the bidding documents were prepared. 
DEQ was well aware of its needs and what was required to accomplish the 
necessary work. It was the agency which was responsible for the contracts being 
effectively performed and the state and federal governments getting their 
money's worth. Its requirements for a bid proposal were rationally designed 
around a goal of efficiency and close coordination by the participating 
contractors. Preparation of the bidding documents, evaluating the proposals, and 
awarding the contracts were all matters within the expertise of DEQ and its 
professional engineers employed to do what they did in discharging their 
responsibility. DAFC relied upon that expertise in awarding the slurry 
contract.

 
 

[¶38.]  To plunge the courts into the evaluation 
process of bidding and awarding of contracts will lead to interminal delays. The 
judicial process does not lend itself to the solution of such problems. In those 
administrative functions entrusted to state agencies giving rise to litigation, 
courts should confine themselves to the interpretation of statutes, rules, 
regulations, contracts, and documents within their competence and with which 
courts regularly deal and have specialized knowledge and 
experience.

 
 

[¶39.]  We hold that DAFC and DEQ were not guilty 
of fraud, acting arbitrarily, or engaging in the illegal exercise of discretion. 
They were honestly, fairly, and in good faith performing their statutory duties. 
We further hold that under the facts of this case, the trial judge should have 
deferred to the judgment and discretion of DAFC and DEQ and had no authority to 
award a contract.9

 
 

[¶40.]  Reversed.

 
 

1 While Eby is named in 
the caption of this case as an appellee, its position is the same as that of 
appellants. Eby did not appeal from the district court's grant of a permanent 
injunction which set aside the award of contract to it. It appears that this 
Court through oversight permitted Eby to file a brief and appear and present 
oral argument which we must now disregard. A nonappealing party cannot attack a 
judgment. Doenz v. Garber, Wyo., 665 P.2d 932 
(1983). Eby will, however, as a nonappealing party have any benefits flowing to 
it from this Court's decision. Kure v. Chevrolet Motor Division, Wyo., 581 P.2d 603, 610 
n. 9 (1978).

 
 

2 W.S. 9-2-1016(b)(viii) 
and (xiv) direct that DAFC shall:

 
 
"(b) * * * The department 
through the purchasing and property control division 
shall:

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(viii) Establish uniform 
standards governing bidding, blanket agreements, contracts, services and 
estimating procedures for obtaining supplies, materials, equipment or services 
required by agencies;

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"(xiv) Establish and 
adopt standard forms and procedures providing that bids or contracts for 
supplies, materials or services shall be awarded through the use of competitive 
sealed bidding, competitive negotiation, noncompetitive negotiation or small 
purchase procedures as hereafter provided:

 
 
"(A) Bids or contracts 
for supplies, materials or services in excess of one thousand five hundred 
dollars ($1,500.00) shall be made by competitive sealed bidding when the 
configuration or performance specifications, or both, are sufficiently designed 
to permit award on the basis of the 
lowest evaluated price as determined in accordance with objective, measurable 
criteria set forth in the invitation for bids, and when available sources, 
the time and place of performance, and other conditions are appropriate for the 
use of competitive sealed bidding; * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

3 Contrary to the position 
of Weisz, an invitation or call for bids is not itself an offer, but rather the 
bid is an offer which creates no right until accepted. Rapp v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 527 P.2d 651 (1974); 
Mottner v. Town of Mercer Island, 75 Wn.2d 575, 452 P.2d 750 (1969).

 
 

4 We will skip 
consideration of item three in that appellants at the trial abandoned any 
reliance on the matter of calibration of weighing 
equipment.

 
 

5 We note here that 
Section B-1F3 of the bid documents, supra, required that in the event the bidder 
proposed to lease major equipment, details of the acquisition, source, and 
committed lead time were to be supported by documentation from the proposed 
supplier. Such information did not appear in the Weisz 
bid.

 
 

6 In Florida, by statute, the 
contractor shall not remove or replace subcontractors listed in the bid 
subsequent to the list being made public at the bid opening, except upon good 
cause shown. Factors underlying the policy of listing subcontractors are 
prevention of bid shopping, protection of subcontractors, eliminating the 
advantage of late submission, and ensuring the integrity of the subcontractors' 
work. E.M. Watkins & company v. Board 
of Regents, Fla.App., 414 So. 2d 583 (1982).

 
 

7 Other Wyoming cases 
enunciating the same doctrine as those cited in this paragraph are: Bucknum v. Johnson, 21 Wyo. 26, 127 P. 904 (1912); Baker v. Brown, 12 Wyo. 
198, 74 P. 94 (1903); Cooper v. 
McCormick, 10 Wyo. 379, 69 P. 301 (1902); State ex rel. Marsh v. State Board of Land 
Commissioners, 7 Wyo. 478, 53 P. 292 (1898).

 
 

8 We have considered Centric Corporation v. Barbarossa & 
Sons, Inc., Wyo., 521 P.2d 874 (1974). It appears to stand 
alone in Wyoming jurisprudence. We agree with its 
denial of an injunction but otherwise find that it furnishes no guidelines of 
value in disposition of the appeal now before us. Its holding must be closely 
confined to its specific facts which are not comparable to those now before 
us.

 
 

9 This opinion confirms 
and explains the order of reversal and vacation of injunction entered on October 
31, 1985.