Case Title: CENTRAL IND. R. CO. v. Anderson Banking Co.

Citation: 247 N.E.2d 208, 252 Ind. 270

Docket Number: 20,246

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1969-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
252 Ind. 270 (1969)
247 N.E.2d 208
CENTRAL INDIANA RAILWAY CO.
v.
ANDERSON BANKING CO., ADMIN. OF ESTATE OF JONES, ETC.
No. 20,246.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed May 12, 1969.
*271 Wilbur F. Pell, Jr., Pell & Matchett, Shelbyville, Russell E. Stewart, Stewart & Austin, of counsel, Anderson, for appellant.
Howard S. Young, Jr., Thomas J. Young, H. Harold Soshnick, Paul T. Brenton, Indianapolis, for appellees.
ARTERBURN, J.
This case comes to us on petition for rehearing upon a previous denial of transfer from the Appellate Court. See opinion of Appellate Court reported in 240 N.E.2d 840.
The appellee, The Anderson Banking Company, as Administrator of the estate of James Edward Jones, brought this action against appellant, Central Indiana Railway, and American Transport Company as joint tort-feasors for damages caused by the alleged wrongful death of appellee's decedent, whose death resulted from a nighttime collision between a truck owned by American Transport and the side of the caboose of a train owned by Central Indiana Railway Company. A trial by jury resulted in a verdict for appellee-plaintiff and judgment was rendered accordingly. Appellant, Central Indiana Railway, appealed from the overruling of its motion for a new trial. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court.
The driver of the truck did not appeal, but the railroad company did, on the ground that there was no negligence shown as to it. The trial court below gave an instruction to the effect that the jury could not consider whether or not the railroad had a duty to establish flashers at the crossing and put reflectors on the side of the cars. The Appellate *272 Court affirmed the trial court. The result of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court is correct, but certain language used by the Appellate Court in this opinion is erroneous, namely:
The effect of this language was to admit that the trial court made a mistake by not withdrawing the issue of the railroad's alleged negligence in not providing flashers or reflectors to warn oncoming traffic, but to further say that the error was rendered harmless by the court's subsequent instruction that the railroad was under no duty to provide flashers or reflectors.
Four states, Pennsylvania, New York, West Virginia and Wisconsin, adhere to the minority view expressed by the Appellate Court that denies the jury the right to ascribe negligence to a railroad company for failure to warn oncoming traffic of the presence of a train on the crossing. The Indiana view is illustrated by New York Central R.R. Co. v. Casey (1938), 214 Ind. 464, 468, 14 N.E.2d 714:
The majority rule is given in 24 A.L.R.2d 1169, 1170:
Indiana has within the last few years showed a tendency to move away from the strict adherence to the minority view and toward the modern view. In Budkiewicz v. Elgin, Joliet, and Eastern Ry Co. (1958), 238 Ind. 535, 150 N.E.2d 897, this Court stated the general rule that a driver of a car is not bound under an absolute rule to see every object of danger in or on the highway and could therefore recover from the railroad for damages incurred when a vehicle driven by him collided with a "cut of cars" standing on the railroad where it intersected the public highway. The concurring opinion construed the decision as placing railroads under the same duty to use due care as it placed upon motorists using the highways. *274 The reasons given for imposing the same duty on both were:
The next departure from strict adherence to the so-called "minority rule" was in the concurring-dissenting opinion to the case of Tyler, etc. v. Chicago Eastern Ill. Ry. (1960), 241 Ind. 463, 490, 173 N.E.2d 314:
This departure was further amplified by the language on page 493:
In light of the foregoing discussion the better rule to adopt is the "majority rule" which allows liability to be imposed absent a statutory requirement if the facts of the particular case are such as to give the railroad the duty to warn the traveling public of the extra-hazardous nature of the crossing. The question of the presence of an extra-hazardous crossing could be left to the jury's determination.
In the present case there was evidence introduced to show that the railroad crossing was at the bottom of a dip in the highway with the road sloping upwards to the south and north of the tracks, that the crossing was not illuminated in any way, and that two buildings obstructed the view of the crossing. This evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to determine that this crossing was dangerous to an extra-hazardous extent and to infer this knowledge to the railroad. Applegate v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. (1948), 334 Ill. App. 141, 78 N.E.2d 793; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Elk Refining Co. (1950), CA 4th W. Va.), 186 F.2d 30; Tanzi v. New York Cent. R. Co. (1951), 155 Ohio St. 149, 98 N.E.2d 39, 24 A.L.R.2d 1151.
There was also evidence introduced in this case that the appellant Railway Company's rules required that the engineer and fireman light five minute fuses prior to reaching this highway and drop them on the highway as the engine crossed it. Evidence was also introduced that the railroad provided the engineer and fireman with "a flashlight type light" with which they could warn motorists. The highway involved was a heavily travelled one and the train crew had on at least *276 one previous occasion put out flares. These rules were on file with the Public Service Commission, were posted on the bulletin board of the Railway Company and discussed at safety meetings.
We disapprove the language of the Appellate Court quoted above, yet since the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, we deny transfer, and the petition for rehearing thereon.
DeBruler, C.J., and Jackson and Givan, JJ., concur. Hunter, J., dissents with opinion.
HUNTER, J.
I agree with the majority opinion that the better rule is to allow the jury to determine whether the appellant had a duty to use warning devices at its railroad crossings.
I dissent to a denial of transfer only because I believe that the testimony and exhibits showing that the railroad had installed automatic signals after the accident should not have been admitted. Furthermore, I do not believe that a subsequent instruction to the jury that they disregard this evidence in determining the appellant's negligence can realistically remove this factor from the subjective deliberations of the factfinders and thereby cure the original error. Evidence of improvements made subsequent to the accident to prevent a recurrence of a similar injury should not be admitted except when the relevance of such evidence outweights its prejudicial impact to the jury. A contrary rule can only discourage a litigant from affecting meaningful measures to prevent future injuries until after its liability on the original accident has been finally determined. Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Clem (1890), 123 Ind. 15, 23 N.E. 965.
NOTE.  Reported in 247 N.E.2d 208.