Case Title: State v. Lacourse

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 75

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 75 
Docket: 
Yor-16-160 
Argued: 
December 15, 2016 
Decided: 
April 27, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
NATHAN J. LACOURSE 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Based on events occurring during his ten-year-long marriage to 
the victim, Nathan J. Lacourse was convicted after a jury trial of domestic 
violence assault, domestic violence stalking, and endangering the welfare of a 
child. 
[¶2]  Lacourse now appeals from the judgment of conviction entered by 
the trial court (York County, O’Neil, J.) as to the charge of domestic violence 
assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2016).  We conclude that the trial 
record contains insufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the conduct forming the basis for that crime occurred within the 
applicable limitations period.  We therefore must vacate the judgment of 
conviction and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal on the domestic 
 
2 
violence assault charge.  We also remand for the court to determine whether 
resentencing is necessary as to the stalking and endangering the welfare of a 
child charges. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶3]  Although, as noted above, Lacourse was also convicted of domestic 
violence stalking and endangering the welfare of a child, he challenges only 
the domestic violence assault conviction on appeal.  We therefore do not 
discuss facts relevant only to his other convictions. 
[¶4]  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the 
jury rationally could have found the following relevant facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See State v. Fay, 2015 ME 160, ¶ 2, 130 A.3d 364.  At some 
point during Lacourse’s ten-year-long marriage with the victim, Lacourse hit 
the victim with a ruler on her lower back, causing her pain and leaving a welt. 
 
[¶5]  On June 6, 2013, a York County grand jury returned an eight-count 
indictment charging Lacourse, in Count VII, with domestic violence assault 
(Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A).1  The portion of the indictment setting 
forth that charge stated: 
                                         
1  The indictment contained the following additional charges: kidnapping (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 301(1)(A)(4) (2016) (Count I); assault (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(B) (2016) (Count II); 
domestic violence terrorizing (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 210-B(1)(A) (2016) (Count III); domestic 
violence stalking (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 210-C(1)(A) (2016) (Count IV); domestic violence criminal 
 
3 
On or about August 30, 2012, in Hollis, YORK County, Maine, 
NATHAN J LACOURSE, did intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
cause bodily injury or offensive physical contact to [the victim].  
This conduct was committed against a family or household 
member as defined by 19-A M.R.S.A. §4002(4). 
 
As part of discovery, the State provided to Lacourse seventeen journals, or 
diaries, that the victim kept during the course of her relationship with 
Lacourse.  One of the journals contained an entry dated “8/23/12”2 stating 
that Lacourse struck the victim with a ruler “the other day.”  The same journal 
also contained an entry “written 8/29/12” describing an incident in which 
Lacourse squeezed the victim’s hand to the point of causing pain and would 
not let go. 
 
[¶6]  Lacourse moved for a bill of particulars pursuant to M.R. 
Crim. P. 16(c)(1) (Tower 2012-2013),3 arguing that the indictment was too 
vague for him to prepare his defense and asking the court to order the State to 
“confirm” that the domestic violence assault charge “correspond[ed] to” the 
                                                                                                                                   
threatening (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(A) (2016) (Count V); a second charge of domestic 
violence assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2016) (Count VI); and endangering the 
welfare of a child (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 554(1)(C) (2011) (Count VIII).  Title 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 554(1)(C) was amended in 2015, but the amendment is not relevant to this appeal.  See P.L. 2015, 
ch. 358, § 3 (effective Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 554(1)(C) (2016)). 
 
2  Lacourse’s assertion on appeal that this entry is dated “8/03/2012” is not supported by the 
record. 
 
3  The Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure did not take effect in York County until July 1, 
2015, after the judgment of conviction was entered in this case.  See M.R.U. Crim. P. 1(e)(3).  All 
references to court rules in this opinion are to the rules in effect when these proceedings took place. 
 
4 
incident described in the journal in which Lacourse squeezed the victim’s 
hand.  The court (O’Neil, J.) denied Lacourse’s motion. 
 
[¶7]  A jury trial was held on December 10 through December 13, 2013.  
During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor referred to an 
“instance[] of physical abuse . . . where [Lacourse] hit [the victim] with a ruler 
on her back, hard enough to leave a mark.”  In a chambers conference after 
opening statements, Lacourse argued that he had been unaware that the State 
would seek to introduce evidence of the “ruler” incident because the State had 
given him the impression, in an off-the-record conversation during the 
hearing on the motion for a bill of particulars, that the “hand squeeze” incident 
formed the factual basis for the domestic violence assault charge.  After some 
discussion, the court required the State to “pick an event,” and the prosecutor 
eventually indicated that the factual basis for the charge was “the slap with 
the ruler to her back.” 
 
[¶8]  During trial, on direct examination, the victim testified that her 
marriage to Lacourse began in August 2003 and that she left the couple’s 
home in March 2013.  She described the “ruler incident” in response to the 
prosecutor’s question, “During the course of your relationship was [Lacourse] 
ever physically abusive with you?”  The victim testified that “he did hit me 
 
5 
with a ruler once on my lower back,” but the State did not ask when the 
incident occurred, and the victim did not testify as to a specific date or time 
period.  None of the victim’s journals or journal entries was admitted in 
evidence at trial.4 
 
[¶9]  After the State rested, Lacourse moved for a judgment of acquittal, 
see M.R. Crim. P. 29, arguing, as to the domestic violence assault charge, that 
the State presented insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty.  The 
court denied the motion.  The jury found Lacourse guilty of domestic violence 
assault. 
 
[¶10]  Three days later, Lacourse filed a written motion for a judgment 
of acquittal, see M.R. Crim. P. 29(b), arguing principally that he was unfairly 
surprised at trial by the evidence about the “ruler” incident.  He also stated 
that the jury “could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
conduct took place within the statute of limitations” because “the jury was 
never presented with any testimony or evidence regarding the date of the 
                                         
4  The court and the parties did discuss the admissibility of the journals.  The court suggested 
that even if the State could demonstrate that a hearsay exception applied to portions of the 
journals, admission of a voluminous set of journal entries might pose an “unnecessary burden” on 
the jury and the trial process.  Notwithstanding this discussion, the State sought to admit, as one 
exhibit, a box of all seventeen journals.  The court rejected that approach but suggested that the 
State offer a “specifically delineate[d]” “subset” for the court’s review.  The State then proffered four 
of the journals, which “cover[ed] the periods from 2009 . . . to 2013” and comprised hundreds of 
pages of diary entries.  After reviewing the entries during a lunch break, the court ruled that they 
were inadmissible because much of the content was irrelevant and much of it did not meet the 
requirements of any exception to the rule against hearsay. 
 
6 
ruler slapping incident.”  The court denied the motion.  The court then entered 
a judgment of conviction and sentenced Lacourse on the domestic violence 
assault conviction to 364 days in jail, with all but six months suspended, and 
two years of probation with conditions that included completion of a certified 
batterer’s intervention program.5  Lacourse appealed.6   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Statute of Limitations 
 
[¶11]  The criminal code provides that “[i]t is a defense that prosecution 
was commenced after the expiration of the applicable period of limitations.”  
17-A M.R.S. § 8(1) (2016).  “The State is not required to negate any facts 
expressly designated as a ‘defense[]’ . . . unless the existence of the defense . . . 
is in issue as a result of evidence admitted at the trial that is sufficient to raise 
a reasonable doubt on the issue . . . .”  17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2012).7  Evidence 
that “make[s] the existence of all the facts constituting [a] defense a 
                                         
5  The court ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence it imposed for the 
stalking conviction, which was 364 days in jail, unsuspended.  On the conviction of endangering the 
welfare of a child, the court sentenced Lacourse to six months in jail, to be served concurrently with 
the sentence imposed on the stalking conviction. 
 
6  After we dismissed Lacourse’s initial appeal as untimely, the trial court granted his petition for 
post-conviction review and granted him the right to file a new appeal. 
 
7  Title 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) has been amended since the time of trial in this case, but the 
amendment is not relevant to our analysis.  See P.L. 2015, ch. 431, § 35 (effective July 29, 2016) 
(codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2016)). 
 
 
7 
reasonable hypothesis for the fact-finder to entertain” is sufficient to place the 
defense “in issue” within the meaning of section 101(1).  State v. Graham, 
2004 ME 34, ¶ 12, 845 A.2d 558 (quotation marks omitted).  If the evidence 
generates the defense, “the State must disprove its existence beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  17-A M.R.S. § 101(1).8  Thus, relevant to this case, if a 
statutory defense was “in issue” within the meaning of section 101(1), the 
State was required to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
[¶12]  We review the record in the light most favorable to the defendant 
to determine whether the evidence generates a particular defense.  State v. 
Gagnier, 2015 ME 115, ¶ 13, 123 A.3d 207.  “[T]he State’s burden to disprove a 
statutory defense generated by the evidence is the functional equivalent of the 
State’s burden to prove all of the elements of the offense.”  State v. Hernandez, 
1998 ME 73, ¶ 7, 708 A.2d 1022 (quotation marks omitted).  To determine 
whether the State presented sufficient evidence to disprove a statutory 
                                         
8  Since 1997, the criminal code has also provided that the court is not required to instruct the 
jury “on an issue that has been waived by the defendant.”  17-A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2012); see P.L. 
1997, ch. 185, § 1 (effective Sept. 19, 1997).  This portion of section 101(1) is irrelevant to our 
analysis for two reasons.  First, the issue in this case is not whether the court should have 
instructed the jury on the statute of limitations.  Even if it had, Lacourse would still have been 
entitled to a post-verdict judgment of acquittal, as we discuss infra.  Second, there is no evidence in 
this record suggesting that Lacourse expressly waived the statute of limitations defense.  See State 
v. Berube, 669 A.2d 170, 172 & n.2 (Me. 1995) (concluding that it was obvious error for the court to 
fail to instruct the jury on a partial statutory defense where the defendant did not assert—but also 
did not waive—the defense); cf. State v. Ford, 2013 ME 96, ¶¶ 11-17, 17 n.5, 82 A.3d 75 (declining 
to reach the question of whether self-defense and voluntary intoxication defenses were generated 
by the evidence because, in any event, the defendant expressly waived the defenses). 
 
8 
defense that has been generated by the evidence, therefore, we view the 
evidence “in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether a jury 
could rationally have found [the nonexistence of the defense] proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  State v. Adams, 2015 ME 30, ¶ 19, 113 A.3d 583 (quotation 
marks omitted); see United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the trial court 
should have granted the defendant’s statute-of-limitations-based motion for a 
judgment of acquittal). 
 
[¶13]  “A prosecution for a Class D or Class E crime must be commenced 
within 3 years after it is committed.”  17-A M.R.S. § 8(2)(B) (2012).9  
A prosecution is commenced when the relevant charging document is filed, 
17-A M.R.S. § 8(6)(B) (2016), and “[a] crime is committed when every element 
thereof has occurred, or if the crime consists of a continuing course of 
conduct, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant’s complicity 
therein is terminated,” 17-A M.R.S. § 8(6)(A) (2016).  Here, because Lacourse 
was charged with domestic violence assault as a Class D crime, see 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 207-A(1)(A), the applicable limitations period was three years, see 
17-A M.R.S. § 8(2)(B).  The prosecution was commenced when the State filed 
                                         
9  An amendment to 17-A M.R.S. § 8(2) that is not relevant to our analysis took effect two months 
before trial in this case.  See P.L. 2013, ch. 392, § 1 (effective Oct. 9, 2013) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 8(2) (2016)). 
 
9 
the indictment on June 6, 2013.  Criminal conduct occurring before June 6, 
2010, was therefore outside the limitations period. 
 
[¶14]  Viewed in the light most favorable to Lacourse, see Gagnier, 
2015 ME 115, ¶ 13, 123 A.3d 207, the victim’s direct testimony was “sufficient 
to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue” of whether the alleged criminal 
conduct occurred within the limitations period, 17-A M.R.S. § 101(1).  The 
victim testified that she and Lacourse had been married since August 2003, 
but no evidence was admitted describing when the conduct forming the 
factual basis for the domestic violence assault charge occurred.  To the 
contrary, the victim described the “ruler” incident in response to a question 
about whether Lacourse was physically abusive “[d]uring the course of [the] 
relationship.”10 
 
[¶15]  The State was therefore required to present evidence sufficient to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the incident occurred during the 
limitations period, i.e., sometime on or after June 6, 2010.  As the State all but 
conceded at oral argument, it did not do so, even viewing the record in the 
light most favorable to the State.  See Adams, 2015 ME 30, ¶ 19, 113 A.3d 
                                         
10  The State’s assertions at oral argument that in her testimony the victim described the “ruler” 
incident as occurring “later in the relationship” or “toward the end of the relationship” are not 
supported by the trial record. 
 
10 
583.11  As Lacourse argued in his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal, 
because the State introduced no evidence upon which a jury could rationally 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct at issue occurred on or after 
June 6, 2010, as opposed to at some earlier time, Lacourse was entitled to a 
judgment of acquittal.12  See State v. Borucki, 505 A.2d 89, 90-91 (Me. 1986) 
(holding that testimony that an offense occurred “in April” was sufficient to 
generate a statute of limitations defense where the dates of April 1 and 2 were 
outside the limitations period, and remanding for entry of a judgment of 
acquittal because the State presented no evidence tending to disprove the 
defense); see also State v. Thompson, 1997 ME 109, ¶¶ 1, 7-8, 10, 695 A.2d 
1174 (directing the entry of a judgment of acquittal where the evidence 
generated a statute of limitations defense but was insufficient for the jury to 
find that the crime was committed within the applicable limitations period).  
We must therefore vacate the judgment as to the domestic violence assault 
charge and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal on that charge. 
                                         
11  Despite multiple invitations from the court for the State to sufficiently narrow the range of 
journal entries it sought to introduce, the State never offered a redacted version of the journal entry 
dated “8/23/12” in which the victim described the “ruler” incident.  Neither did the State ask the 
victim, during her testimony, when the event took place, which prevented it from refreshing her 
recollection using the relevant journal entry if she did not remember.  See M.R. Evid. 612. 
 
12  Because we agree with Lacourse that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal, we do not 
address his principal arguments that the court (1) should have granted his motion for a bill of 
particulars on the domestic violence assault charge and (2) acted too late in ultimately requiring 
the State to specify the factual basis for that charge. 
 
11 
B. 
Sentencing 
 
[¶16]  Although only Lacourse’s conviction for domestic violence assault 
has been vacated, resentencing as to stalking and endangering the welfare of a 
child may be necessary to the extent that the sentences the court imposed 
were interrelated.  See State v. Carr, 1997 ME 221, ¶¶ 15-16, 704 A.2d 353; 
State v. Bunker, 436 A.2d 413, 419 (Me. 1981).  The court did not expressly 
indicate, during the sentencing hearing, whether the sentences imposed on 
the domestic violence stalking and endangering the welfare of a child charges 
were affected by the sentence imposed on the domestic violence assault 
charge.  The record does, however, suggest that the court viewed each crime 
in the context of the others.  See Carr, 1997 ME 221, ¶¶ 15-16, 704 A.2d 353.  
For example, in discussing the sentence for the stalking charge, the court 
referred to “a series of episodes” taking place over time, potentially referring 
to the “ruler” incident as one of those “episodes.”  The court also determined 
that the domestic violence assault sentence would be consecutive not because 
it stemmed from separate conduct, see 17-A M.R.S. § 1256(2)(A) (2016), but 
because the assault was particularly serious due to its role as “part of a 
pattern of a[n] exercise of extreme power and control over [the victim],” 
see 17-A M.R.S. § 1256(2)(D) (2016). 
 
12 
 
[¶17]  We therefore remand this case with instructions for the court to 
first determine whether the sentences imposed for stalking and endangering 
the welfare of a child were affected by the sentence imposed for assault.  
See Carr, 1997 ME 221, ¶¶ 15-16, 704 A.2d 353; Bunker, 436 A.2d at 419.  If 
the court determines that the sentences were interrelated, it shall resentence 
Lacourse on the stalking and endangering charges after “a new sentencing 
proceeding at which both [Lacourse] and the State may be heard.”  Bunker, 
436 A.2d at 419. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated as to Count VII.  Remanded 
for entry of a judgment of acquittal on Count VII 
and for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jamesa J. Drake, Esq. (orally), Drake Law, LLC, Auburn, for appellant Nathan J. 
Lacourse 
 
Kathryn Loftus Slattery, District Attorney, and Thomas R. Miscio, Esq. (orally), 
Prosecutorial District #1, Alfred, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number CR-2013-613 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY