Case Title: Lynwood Williams v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
CORRECTED OPINION
____________
No. SC96546
____________
LYNWOOD WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
____________
No. SC00-258
____________
ALBERT ROGERS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[November 22, 2000]
SHAW, J.
We have for review two decisions presenting the following question certified
1  In Lambrix, this Court used the following language in rejecting an ineffectiveness claim based
on the failure of postconviction counsel to raise an issue on appeal from the denial of a rule 3.850
motion:  “[C]laims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel do not present a valid basis for
relief.”  Lambrix, 698 So. 2d at 248.
-2-
to be of great public importance:
Does the holding in Lambrix v. State, 698 So. 2d 247
(Fla. 1996),[1] when considered in light of the Supreme
Court of Florida’s pronouncement in Steele v. Kehoe,
747 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1999), foreclose the provision of a
belated appeal from the denial of a postconviction motion
when the notice of appeal was not timely filed due to
ineffectiveness of counsel in the collateral proceeding?
Williams v. State, 763 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Rogers v. State, 752
So. 2d 657, 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.
Const.  We answer the certified question in the negative, holding the issue governed
by our decision in Steele.
The petitioners seek leave to file belated appeals from the denial of their
motions for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
Williams
Petitioner Williams was convicted of first-degree murder on March 6, 1996. 
The Second District affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence on October 24,
1997.  See Williams v. State, 701 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
On May 13, 1998, Williams filed his initial 3.850 motion.  The circuit court
2  In Diaz v. State, 724 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), the Second District denied a petition
for a belated appeal based on a claim that the petitioner’s appointed counsel failed to file a notice of
appeal, upon his timely request, from a trial court’s denial of a 3.850 motion for postconviction relief. 
The Diaz court held that this Court’s language in Lambrix precluded a belated appeal from a
postconviction motion based on the alleged ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel.  In so holding, the
Second District indicated that prior to Lambrix it would have, consistent with the Fifth District’s
approach, granted relief upon a proper evidentiary showing.  See Jones v. State, 642 So. 2d 121 (Fla.
5th DCA 1994) (reversing summary denial of 3.850 motion and remanding the case for an evidentiary
hearing on petitioner’s claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to file timely notice of
appeal as requested and failing to advise petitioner of trial court’s order denying his 3.850 motion);
McLeod v. State, 586 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to
determine if petitioner, who claimed he was denied his right to appeal the denial of a 3.850 motion due
-3-
held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief on February 17, 1999.  Williams,
through his counsel, filed an untimely notice of appeal with the circuit court on
March 22, 1999.  The Second District directed Williams to show cause as to why
his appeal should not be dismissed as untimely.  In response, Williams moved for
leave to file a belated appeal.  In that motion Williams’ attorney indicated that
Williams asked him to file a notice of appeal should the postconviction motion be
denied, but he failed to do so over confusion as to the date of the trial court’s
order denying the postconviction motion.  The district court denied the motion for
belated appeal.
Following this Court’s decision in Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931 (Fla.
1999), Williams filed an amended motion for rehearing claiming that he was entitled
to a belated appeal under Steele .  The Second District, expressing doubt over the
continued validity of Diaz2 and Lambrix in light of Steele, granted Williams’
to ineffectiveness of counsel, was entitled to a belated appeal).
-4-
amended motion for rehearing and certified the instant question.  
Rogers
Albert Rogers was convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of
burglary with a battery on November 4, 1984.  Rogers’ sentence and conviction
were affirmed by the Second District without opinion on July 26, 1996.  See
Rogers v. State, 678 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).  
Thereafter, Rogers retained counsel and filed a 3.850 motion for
postconviction relief.  That motion was summarily denied by the circuit court on
December 9, 1998.  Rogers did not appeal the denial of his postconviction motion.
On October 8, 1999, Rogers filed a habeas petition pro se with the Second
District claiming that he wanted to appeal the denial of his postconviction motion
but was not properly advised by postconviction counsel as to the manner to do so. 
Rogers further claimed that he timely notified his attorney of his desire to appeal
but counsel informed him that he should waive the appeal despite counsel’s belief
that the trial court’s ruling was improper.  
The Second District, on rehearing, denied Rogers’ habeas petition and
certified the identical question it certified in Williams.  See Rogers v. State, 752 So.
2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).  
-5-
Steele v. Kehoe
In Steele the petitioner claimed that his privately retained counsel orally
agreed to file a motion for postconviction relief but failed to do so in a timely
manner.  We held that “due process entitles a prisoner to a hearing on a claim that
he or she missed the deadline to file a rule 3.850 motion because his or her attorney
had agreed to file the motion but failed to do so in a timely manner.”  Steele, 747
So. 2d at 934.  The State argues that those same due process concerns do not
pertain where the petitioners have had the opportunity to raise their claims in the
trial court in an original motion for postconviction relief.   See Steele v. Kehoe, 724
So. 2d 1192, 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (Sharp, J. concurring specially) (“Unlike
the present case, Lambrix had an opportunity to file a motion for post-conviction
relief.  In contrast, Steele’s counsel frustrated his intention to file post-conviction
relief proceedings.”) approved, 747 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1999).    We disagree.
We find the State’s attempt to distinguish Steele unavailing: “If a defendant
potentially can file a belated rule 3.850 motion due to counsel’s neglect, it should
follow that the defendant can file a belated appeal of the trial court’s denial of a rule
3.850 or rule 3.800 motion due to counsel’s neglect.”  Demaria v. State, 24 Fla. L.
Weekly D2478 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 27, 1999) review granted, 761 So. 2d 328 (Fla.
2000).  As this Court stated in State v. Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892, 896 (Fla. 1964),
-6-
and reiterated in Steele, “[postconviction] remedies are subject to the more flexible
standards of due process announced in the Fifth Amendment, Constitution of the
United States.”  We conclude that those same flexible standards of due process
which compelled our decision in Steele prevail where a defendant has timely
requested counsel to file an appeal from the denial of a 3.850 motion and counsel
fails to do so. 
Consistent with our determination in Steele, we hold that the appropriate
procedure in these cases is for the defendant to file a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.  As we noted in Steele, such a procedure is accommodated by the final
clause of rule 3.850(h), which provides:
(h) Habeas Corpus.  An application for writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply
for relief by motion pursuant to this rule shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to
apply for relief, by motion, to the court that sentenced the
applicant or that the court has denied the applicant relief,
unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the
applicant’s detention. 
(emphasis added).  See Steele, 747 So. 2d at 934; see also Medrano v. State, 748
So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. 1999) (“[U]nder Steele, a defendant . . . must petition the
court for a writ of habeas corpus citing the failure of counsel to timely file the
necessary pleadings after being asked to do so by the defendant.  Thereafter, the
3  In Steele we amended rule 3.850(b) to include subdivision (3).  See Steele, 747 So. 2d at
934.  The amended rule provides:
(b) Time Limitations.  A motion to vacate a sentence that
exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time.  No other
motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more
than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final in a
noncapital case or more than 1 year after the judgment and sentence
become final in a capital case in which a death sentence has been
imposed unless it alleges that
(3)  The defendant retained counsel to timely file a 3.850
motion and counsel, through neglect, failed to file the motion.
4  Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(j) provides in pertinent part:
(j)  Petitions Seeking Belated Appeal or Alleging      
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel.  
. . . .
(2) Contents.  The petition shall be in the form prescribed by
rule 9.100, may include supporting documents, and shall recite in the
statement of facts . . .
(F)  the specific facts sworn to by the petitioner or petitioner’s
counsel that constitute the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel or
basis for entitlement to belated appeal, including in the case of a petition
for belated appeal whether the petitioner requested counsel to proceed
with the appeal. 
-7-
court will conduct a hearing on the merits of the claim that counsel agreed to file a
3.850 motion, but failed to timely do so.”).
This case also creates the need to amend rule 3.850(g) by adding a provision
to allow a belated appeal in this circumstance, similar to our amendment of rule
3.850(b) in Steele,3 and to that provided under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.140(j).4  This amendment to rule 3.850(g) will be published in a companion
-8-
opinion.  See  Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(g), No.
SC00-1452 (Fla. Nov. 22, 2000). 
Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the
Second District’s decisions in Williams and Rogers.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
HARDING, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which WELLS, C.J.,
concurs.
WELLS, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
HARDING, J., concurring in result only.
I would decline to answer the certified question in light of this Court’s
adoption of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(g).  I would apply this rule to
these defendants.
WELLS, C.J., concurs.
WELLS, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in result only in allowing the belated appeals.
I do not agree with the reasoning of the opinion for the reason stated in
Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1999), that it is illogical and in conflict with
-9-
Lambrix v. State, 698 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1996), to allow the belated appeals on the
basis of due process.  Rather, I would adopt Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850(g) and make it applicable to these defendants.
Two Cases Consolidated
Applications for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Great Public Importance
Second District - Case No. 2D99-01282 & 2D99-3861 
(Hillsborough County)
Loren D. Rhoton of Rhoton & Hayman, P.A., Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioners
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law, and Patricia A. McCarthy, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Respondent