Case Title: Commonwealth v. Squires

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12086, SJC-12087

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12086 
SJC-12087 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOHN F. SQUIRES, THIRD. 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STEVEN E. ANGIER. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     October 5, 2016. - March 27, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Possession of Burglarious Instruments.  Death.  Practice, 
Criminal, Death of party. 
 
 
 
 
Complaints received and sworn to in the Dedham Division of 
the District Court Department on February 4, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before James H. McGuiness, Jr., J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kathleen J. Hill for Steven E. Angier. 
 
Carolyn L. Hely, Assistant District Attorney (Michael P.J. 
McGee, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Patrick A. Michaud for John F. Squires, III. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  After a joint2 jury trial in District Court, the 
defendants, John F. Squires, III, and Steven E. Angier, were 
convicted of walking on a railroad track, G. L. c. 160, § 218, 
and possession of burglarious instruments, G. L. c. 266, § 49.3  
The complaints arose from Norwood police officers' discovery of 
the defendants walking on the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA) commuter rail train tracks near the Norwood 
central train station.  After the officers searched the 
defendants and found tools, gloves, and two walkie-talkies tuned 
to the same channel, the defendants were arrested for walking on 
train tracks and possession of burglarious instruments.  Squires 
moved for required findings of not guilty at the close of the 
Commonwealth's case, and both defendants so moved at the close 
of all evidence; the motions were denied.4  The judge sentenced 
each defendant to a term of imprisonment in a house of 
correction for two and one-half years and imposed on each 
                     
 
2 The defendants' motions to sever on the day of trial were 
denied as untimely. 
 
 
3 The defendants do not challenge their convictions of 
walking on a railroad track.  The Commonwealth dismissed one 
count of conspiracy for each defendant. 
 
 
4 Squires's docket includes entries denoting his counsel's 
oral motions for required findings of not guilty at both the 
close of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of all 
evidence.  However, there are no such entries in Angier's 
docket.  The transcript reflects an inaudible sidebar conference 
at the close of the Commonwealth's case and that, at the close 
of all evidence, Squires's counsel again moved for required 
findings of not guilty, while Angier's counsel also so moved. 
3 
 
 
defendant a fine of one hundred dollars.5  The defendants 
separately appealed, claiming, among other things, that the 
Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain 
the convictions of possession of burglarious implements.  The 
Appeals Court affirmed in separate unpublished opinions, 
Commonwealth v. Squires, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 1102 (2016); 
Commonwealth v. Angier, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2015).  We 
allowed the defendants' applications for further appellate 
review. 
 
After the cases were entered in this court, but before oral 
argument, Angier's counsel filed a suggestion of death and moved 
to vacate his convictions.  The Commonwealth opposed the motion, 
arguing that under Commonwealth v. De La Zerda, 416 Mass. 247, 
250-251 (1993), the order allowing Angier's application for 
further appellate review should be vacated.  Because of the 
unique circumstances of this case, we address Angier's appeal on 
the merits and conclude that the Commonwealth failed to present 
sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions.  Therefore, we 
reverse and vacate the convictions. 
 
Background.  Taken in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 
(1979), the jury could have found the following facts.  On the 
                     
 
5 Angier's sentence was ordered to be served consecutively 
with the sentence he was currently serving in a house of 
correction. 
4 
 
 
evening of February 3, 2013, at or about 11 P.M., Norwood police 
Officer Derrick Wennerstrand, who was working as a plainclothes 
officer and driving an unmarked vehicle, was observing vehicle 
traffic in the area of a shopping plaza.  The businesses located 
in the plaza were closed.  He noticed a dark-colored sedan enter 
the parking lot and its two male occupants, the defendants, 
alight from the vehicle.  Officer Wennerstrand radioed for 
backup as the defendants walked through an alley into a rear 
parking lot.  Another officer arrived shortly thereafter, and 
the officers followed the footprints the defendants left in the 
fresh snow toward the MBTA commuter railroad tracks.  The 
officers were able to follow the two sets of footprints through 
a small wooded area that led to the train tracks.  As the 
officers approached the railroad tracks about five minutes 
later, they saw the defendants ahead, walking on the tracks 
heading south, away from the train station. 
 
Officer Wennerstrand noted that there were buildings on 
either side of the train tracks, but he did not observe the 
defendants veer off the tracks at any time.  The defendants were 
approximately seventy-five yards away from the officers before 
they reversed their direction and headed back toward the 
officers.  Officer Wennerstrand said, "Norwood police" and 
"Stop," but the defendants kept walking toward the officers, as 
if they were attempting to walk past the officers.  Officer 
5 
 
 
Wennerstrand again identified himself as Norwood police, holding 
up his arms, and ordered the defendants to stop; the defendants 
complied with the second order. 
 
Officer Wennerstrand first spoke with Squires, and then 
with Angier.  Squires, who was wearing black work gloves, told 
Officer Wennerstrand that the men were "just out for a stroll."  
Officer Wennerstrand was suspicious; it was past 11 P.M. and the 
temperature was below freezing that night.  Officer Wennerstrand 
searched Squires and found a walkie-talkie tuned to a particular 
channel in the pocket of Squires's jacket.  Squires was placed 
in restraints and ordered to sit on the ground. 
 
Officer Wennerstrand next addressed Angier, who was wearing 
a green and black backpack.  As Angier removed the backpack and 
placed it on the ground as ordered by Officer Wennerstrand, the 
officer heard a metal "clang" sound.  Angier stated that he had 
work tools in his backpack.  The officers searched the backpack 
and discovered a blue crowbar, a large screwdriver bar, a pair 
of black gloves, and a small red flashlight.  A search of 
Angier's person revealed a second walkie-talkie, tuned to the 
same channel as the walkie-talkie found on Squires.  Angier was 
also placed in restraints.  The police subsequently searched 
Squires's vehicle and discovered a third set of black gloves and 
a small, yellow sledgehammer.  The officers placed both 
defendants under arrest. 
6 
 
 
 
The defendants were transported to the Norwood police 
station, where Officer Dillon Haldiman inventoried the items in 
the backpack and discovered what he described as a map.  The map 
depicted an "L"-shaped space with the words "Going in" 
handwritten on the bottom next to an arrow pointing to markings 
that could represent an entrance.  More arrows were drawn 
leading to an area marked with five "X" marks.  After a jury 
trial, the defendants were convicted of walking on railroad 
tracks and possession of burglarious instruments. 
 
On further appellate review, the defendants argue that (1) 
the judge erroneously denied their motions for directed verdicts 
where the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence 
that the defendants intended to use the tools in their 
possession to break into a particular "statutory place" to steal 
money or other property or to commit some other crime; (2) the 
judge erroneously instructed the jury on possession of 
burglarious instruments, which improperly lowered the burden of 
proof; and (3) the prosecutor engaged in improper vouching 
during the closing argument, which created a substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Effect of Angier's death on the order 
granting further appellate review.  As a threshold matter, we 
first address the effect of Angier's death on the order granting 
his application for further appellate review.  After we allowed 
7 
 
 
the defendants' applications for further appellate review, but 
before oral argument occurred, Angier's counsel filed a 
suggestion of death for Angier.  Subsequently, Angier's counsel 
filed a motion to vacate judgment and remand to the District 
Court to abate the prosecution, citing Commonwealth v. Latour, 
397 Mass. 1007 (1986).  The Commonwealth opposed the motion, 
citing De La Zerda, 416 Mass. at 251, for the proposition that 
when a defendant dies while his or her case is on collateral or 
further appellate review, the order allowing the defendant's 
application for further appellate review is vacated, leaving the 
judgment of the Appeals Court intact.  However, because of the 
unique circumstances here, we depart from De La Zerda and 
address both defendants' arguments on the merits. 
 
In De La Zerda, 416 Mass. at 248, we noted that "[w]hen a 
defendant dies while his conviction is on direct review, it is 
our practice to vacate the judgment and remand the case with a 
direction to dismiss the complaint or indictment, thus abating 
the entire prosecution."  However, when a defendant dies after 
an application for further appellate review has been granted, 
but not argued, the practice has been to vacate the order 
granting further appellate review, rather than abate the 
proceeding.  Id. at 250-251.  The United States Supreme Court 
employs a similar practice, vacating the order granting 
certiorari and dismissing the petition for certiorari.  See, 
8 
 
 
e.g., United States v. Mosely, 525 U.S. 120 (1998) (per curiam).  
Nevertheless, in De La Zerda, we noted that another important 
policy interest to consider was "the interests of justice," 
which require a different outcome here (citation omitted).  See 
De La Zerda, supra at 251. 
 
Here, Angier and Squires were tried in a joint trial, but 
filed separate appeals in the Appeals Court.  Despite their 
separate appeals, Squires, pursuant to Mass. R. App. P. 16 (j), 
365 Mass. 860 (1974), incorporated by reference the arguments 
made by Angier, making no additional or different arguments of 
his own, and requested that his appeal be joined with Angier's.6  
Squires, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 1102.  Similarly, Squires 
incorporated by reference Angier's arguments in his application 
for further appellate review, as well as in his brief to this 
court.  As a result, Angier was the only defendant to present 
substantive appellate argument to this court, and thus we 
address Angier's arguments on the merits despite his death.  
Fairness dictates that Angier, even posthumously, should have 
the same outcome as Squires, especially where the defendants' 
legal arguments and factual circumstances are identical.  In 
this narrow circumstance, it is in the interests of justice to 
                     
 
6 The appeals were docketed separately but referred to the 
same panel for decision.  Commonwealth v. Squires, 89 Mass. App. 
Ct. 1102 (2016). 
9 
 
 
depart from De La Zerda and address both defendants' appeals on 
the merits. 
 
2.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendants argue that 
the judge erred in denying their motions for required findings 
of not guilty where the Commonwealth failed to provide 
sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions because it failed 
to establish that (1) the defendants possessed the ordinary work 
tools found in Angier's backpack with the intent to break into a 
statutory place, and (2) the defendants had the intent to steal 
money or other property from, or to commit some other crime in, 
such statutory place.  We agree. 
 
We review a claim of sufficiency of the evidence under the 
familiar Latimore standard, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth and ask whether the evidence 
and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom were "sufficient to 
persuade a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
existence of every element of the crime charged."  Commonwealth 
v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) 
and 460 Mass. 12 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 
Mass. 680, 686 (1979).  In order to sustain a conviction of 
possession of burglarious instruments, the Commonwealth must 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants possessed 
"an engine, machine, tool or implement adapted and designed 
for cutting through, forcing or breaking open a building, 
room, vault, safe or other depository, in order to steal 
10 
 
 
therefrom money or other property, or to commit any other 
crime, knowing the same to be adapted and designed for the 
purpose aforesaid, with intent to use or employ or allow 
the same to be used or employed for such purpose." 
 
G. L. c. 266, § 49. 
 
Where, as here, the tools or instruments possessed by the 
defendants are not by their nature burglarious, the Commonwealth 
must establish proof of the defendants' intent to use the tools 
or instruments for burglarious purposes.  In Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 355 Mass. 170 (1969), this court noted that although a 
screwdriver and a kitchen knife were not inherently burglarious 
instruments, the items could be "used for an entry to force a 
sash or a door or to slip a lock."  Id. at 176.  The fact that 
the instruments were found on the defendants at the scene of a 
burglary was dispositive in proving the defendants' intent to 
use such items for burglarious purposes.  See id. at 176-177.  
In Commonwealth v. Dellinger, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 549 (1980), 
S.C., 383 Mass. 780 (1981), the Appeals Court stated more 
succinctly the principle as it applies to facts analogous to 
this case.  "A burglarious intention can doubtless be inferred 
from mere possession of tools uniquely or very highly adapted to 
burglarious purposes . . . but an intention to use ordinary 
tools for unlawful purposes must appear clearly from the 
circumstances in which they are found."  Id. at 561.  Following 
that rule, the Appeals Court concluded that the defendants' 
11 
 
 
motions for direct verdicts were improperly denied where the 
Commonwealth failed to present evidence that the defendants 
intended to use ordinary tools found in their possession for 
unlawful purposes, even where there was evidence that the 
defendants were following and "casing" a United Parcel Service 
truck.7  Id. at 555, 561.  The court noted that "because the 
evidence did not warrant a finding that the [suspected] 
hijacking was to be executed that day, the inference that those 
were the tools to be used in the hijacking is much attenuated."  
Id. at 561.  Therefore, even where defendants are discovered 
with ordinary tools under suspicious circumstances, the 
Commonwealth must offer evidence establishing something more 
than mere suspicion -- proof beyond a reasonable doubt -- that 
the defendants intended to use the tools for burglarious 
purposes.  Compare Jones, supra, and Commonwealth v. Porter, 70 
Mass. App. Ct. 901, 902 (2007) (burglarious intent where wire 
cutters were found in between storm door and front door of home 
and defendant was apprehended at scene of attempted burglary), 
with Dellinger, supra. 
                     
 
7 Following the Appeals Court's decision in Commonwealth v. 
Dellinger, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 549 (1980), this court granted the 
parties' applications for further appellate review and decided 
the case on a different ground, expressly declining to address 
the issue of burglarious intent.  See Commonwealth v. Dellinger, 
383 Mass. 780, 784 (1981). 
12 
 
 
 
Here, the Commonwealth argues that the defendants' 
burglarious intent was readily inferable from the location where 
the police found the defendants, the late hour at which the 
defendants were discovered, the below-freezing temperatures that 
night, and the possession of the map.  We do not doubt that the 
discovery of the defendants on the railroad tracks late at night 
in freezing weather was suspicious conduct that warranted the 
threshold inquiry by the police.  See Commonwealth v. Watson, 
430 Mass. 725, 729 (2000).  But this suspicious conduct, without 
more, did not prove an intent to use the tools in their 
possession for a burglarious purpose. 
 
The discovery of the defendants walking on the railroad 
tracks was not necessarily probative of an intent to use the 
tools for burglarious purposes.  Although Officer Wennerstrand 
testified that there were businesses and buildings on either 
side of the railroad tracks, there was no evidence that the 
defendants veered off of the railroad tracks to attempt to break 
into any business, building, or depository.  Moreover, the fact 
that the defendants parked in a shopping plaza parking lot is no 
more probative of intent than their presence on the railroad 
tracks.  The Commonwealth presented no evidence to prove that 
the defendants intended to use the ordinary tools in their 
possession to break into any such "place" as specified in § 49.  
It is insufficient to merely show possession of ordinary tools 
13 
 
 
in proximity to a statutory place to establish burglarious 
intent. 
 
As to the map, the Commonwealth did not connect it to any 
particular or nearby building, room, vault, safe, or other 
depository, as contemplated by the statute.  See G. L. c. 266, 
§ 49.  See also Commonwealth v. Hogan, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 74 
(1996), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining 
"depository" as "[t]he place where a deposit is placed and kept 
. . . where something is deposited or stored as for safekeeping 
or convenience").  Although the map depicted an "L"-shaped space 
with the words "Going in" handwritten on it, there was no 
evidence that the defendants intended to use the map and the 
tools to break into a place named in § 49 with the intent to 
steal money or property therefrom or to commit some other crime.  
See Hogan, supra.  To be sure, the Commonwealth does not have to 
present evidence of the exact statutorily named place that the 
defendants intended to "steal therefrom money or other property, 
or . . . commit any other crime," G. L. c. 266, § 49, but it 
must establish the defendants' intent to steal from such a place 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Tivnon, 8 Gray 
375, 380 (1857). 
 
To infer intent from facts that establish nothing more than 
possession of the items found on the defendants would require a 
level of speculation that was properly rejected by the Appeals 
14 
 
 
Court in Dellinger, 10 Mass. App. Ct. at 561.  "[I]f, upon all 
the evidence, the question of guilt of the defendant[s] is left 
up to conjecture or surmise and has no solid foundation in 
established facts, a verdict of guilty cannot stand."  
Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 200 (1965), quoting 
Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 305 Mass. 393, 401 (1940). 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, the Commonwealth 
failed to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all of 
the elements of possession of burglarious instruments, and thus 
the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendants' 
convictions.  See Lao, 443 Mass. at 779.  Because of our 
conclusion, we need not address the defendants' other claims of 
error on the merits.  With respect to the defendants' 
convictions of possession of burglarious instruments, the 
judgments are reversed, the verdicts are set aside, and 
judgments shall be entered for the defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J. (dissenting, with whom Botsford and Lowy, JJ., 
join).  These cases turn on the question whether the defendants 
possessed work tools with the intent to break into a building, 
in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 49.  The court believes that the 
evidence, although suspicious enough to warrant a threshold 
inquiry, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for possession 
of burglarious instruments.  In my view, the Commonwealth 
established the defendants' intent to use these tools to break 
into one of the buildings on either side of the railroad tracks.  
Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
The facts of the case, considered in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, support a finding that the 
defendants intended to break into a nearby building on the night 
of their arrest.  The police discovered the defendants, late at 
night, in the freezing cold, walking down railroad tracks that 
ran between two rows of commercial buildings.  The defendants 
were in possession of a long "screwdriver/pry bar" and a 
crowbar, work tools suitable for breaking into a building.1  They 
also carried implements that could be utilized to aid in a 
burglary (a flashlight and work gloves), and walkie-talkie 
radios tuned to the same channel, presumably to alert one 
another of potential witnesses.  One of the defendants offered 
                     
 
1 The defendants left a sledgehammer behind in the back seat 
of their vehicle. 
2 
 
 
the police officers the implausible explanation that they were 
"just out for a stroll." 
 
In most cases, evidence of an individual's intent is not 
ascertainable, but must be inferred from surrounding facts and 
circumstances.  Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 125 
(2013).  The fact finder in this case did not have to look very 
far for evidence of the defendants' intent to break into a 
building.  The police found a hand-drawn map in Angier's 
backpack.2  It depicts an "L"-shaped structure with multiple 
rooms, an arrow pointing to an entrance labeled "Going in," and 
multiple arrows leading to an area denoted by a series of "X" 
marks.  The map also includes a set of parallel lines 
corresponding to the railroad tracks. 
 
The court concludes that the evidence was insufficient for 
two reasons.  First, there was no evidence that the defendants 
had veered off the railroad tracks, to the right or left, toward 
any of the commercial buildings.  Second, the Commonwealth 
failed to connect the map to any "particular or nearby" 
building.  I disagree. 
 
The crime of possession of burglarious instruments is 
"complete when the tools [are] procured with a design to use 
them for a burglarious purpose."  Commonwealth v. Faust, 81 
Mass. App. Ct. 498, 500 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Tivnon, 
                     
 
2 A copy of the map appears in the Appendix. 
3 
 
 
8 Gray 375, 380 (1857).  Although an attempt to break into a 
particular building would be evidence of the defendants' state 
of mind, it is not necessary to sustain a conviction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 144, 150-151 (2004) 
(evidence sufficient where defendants were found at 1 A.M. in 
closed State park that contained at least one building, while in 
possession of two screwdrivers, two sets of gloves, one ski 
mask, one radio, and one flashlight, although there was no 
evidence that defendants had attempted to break into any State 
park building). 
 
I also would hold, for the reasons stated above, that the 
hand-drawn map supports an inference that the defendants 
intended to break into a building.  The court recognizes that 
the Commonwealth is not required to prove the precise place that 
the defendants intended to burglarize.  A commonsense view of 
the evidence, in accordance with the Latimore standard, leads to 
the conclusion that the crudely drawn map depicts a building, 
and the defendants intended to enter that structure at a certain 
location (i.e., the point marked "Going in") and to follow the 
path designated by the arrows to the "X" marks.  See 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  Fact 
finders are not "required to divorce themselves of common sense, 
but rather should apply to facts which they find proven such 
reasonable inferences as are justified in light of their 
4 
 
 
experience as to the natural inclinations of human beings." 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Arias, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 
613, 618 (1990). 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
5 
 
 
Appendix.