Case Title: Chittenden v. Waterbury Ctr. Comm. Church

Citation: 168 Vt. 478, 726 A.2d 20

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Chittenden v. Waterbury Ctr. Comm. Church  (97-235); 168 Vt. 478; 726 A.2d 20

[Filed 11-Dec-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 97-235

Eric Chittenden, et al.                         Supreme Court

                                                On Appeal from
     v.                                         Washington Superior Court

Waterbury Center Community Church, Inc.,        June Term, 1998
et al.

David A. Jenkins, J.

       Matthew C. Colburn, Law Office of Richard A. Unger, Montpelier, for
  Plaintiffs-Appellants.

       Gene Ann Condon and Albert G. Besser (Of Counsel), Stowe, for
  Defendants-Appellees.

       Thomas E. McCormick and Thomas P. Simon of McCormick, Fitzpatrick,
  Kasper & Burchard, P.C., Burlington, and Von G. Keetch and Randy Austin of
  Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Amici Curiae Church of Jesus
  Christ of Latter-Day Saints, et al.

PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Katz, Supr.
          J., Specially Assigned

       DOOLEY, J.   This case concerns a driveway that separates the Cold
  Hollow Cider Mill in Waterbury Center, one of the state's  busiest tourist
  attractions, from a neighboring church. Plaintiffs and counterclaim
  defendants Eric and Francine Chittenden are the owners of the cider mill
  business and the real property it occupies. They appeal from a judgment
  entered in the Washington Superior Court concluding that the driveway in
  question is the property of defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Waterbury
  Center Community Church, Inc., free of any claim by plaintiffs.  The heart
  of plaintiffs' case is  that they are entitled to a prescriptive easement
  over the driveway. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that (1) 12 V.S.A. § 462,
  which effectively protects property belonging to religious institutions and
  certain other entities from claims of adverse

 

  possession, violates both the U.S. and Vermont constitutions,(FN1) (2)
  notwithstanding § 462, plaintiffs enjoy an easement based on the doctrine
  of presumed grants, and (3) the church's claim of  unencumbered title to
  the driveway is barred by laches.  We affirm.

                               I.  Background

       The case was tried to the court, which issued extensive findings of
  fact, not challenged here, and conclusions of law. Accordingly, we draw our
  summary of the relevant facts from the trial court's findings.

       Plaintiffs' business, the Cold Hollow Cider Mill, operates on a 
  four-acre parcel of land located on the east side of Route 100 in Waterbury
  Center.  Bordering plaintiffs' property on the south and  also fronting on
  Route 100 is the real property owned by defendant, Waterbury Center
  Community Church, Inc., a Methodist congregation. Plaintiffs have run their
  business at its present location since April 1976, operating out of a
  series of buildings constructed in the early-to-mid-nineteenth century. 
  The church building was constructed in 1833, and the church traces its
  title to the land to a "conditional lease" executed in the following year. 
  The 1834 conveyance provides that the "premises shall be used and occupied
  by  [grantees] as a site for [a] Meeting house and necessary appendages
  thereto, and for no other purpose."

       Located between the buildings on plaintiffs' property and the  church
  building is a gravel driveway, referred to in the record as the "north
  driveway" and leading eastward from Route 100.(FN2) Branching off from the
  north driveway to the south is a second, semicircular driveway

  

  that provides direct access to the front of the church building.  The
  church uses the north driveway for vehicular access to its semicircular
  driveway as well as for parking to the north of the church building. 
  Plaintiffs use the north driveway to provide public access to their
  business.

       Since 1834, the church has held weekly religious services, additional
  services on religious holidays, and occasional weddings and funerals on its
  premises.  Church suppers have taken place there on an occasional basis
  throughout the twentieth century.  During the 1960s and 70s, church
  attendance fell off, and the condition of the church building deteriorated. 
  As a result, the church did not use the building during the winter months
  for several years.  However, use of the church building increased in the
  1980s, and it was restored.  Various outside groups such as Alcoholics
  Anonymous and Weight Watchers use the church occasionally.  The church
  holds three flea markets and three chicken pie suppers each year.  Weekly
  Sunday services generally attract between 40 and 50 worshipers.

       Plaintiffs' property was owned by Keith H. Gibbs and/or Colleen  R.
  Gibbs from 1945 to 1973, the last year in which Mrs. Gibbs occupied the
  property as a widow.  During this period, the owners used the property both
  for residential purposes and to conduct extensive commercial operations,
  including: a milk-hauling business; a dairy farm; marketing, auctioning and
  transportation of cattle; and the hauling of sand, gravel and fill.  All
  social and business invitees of the owners used the disputed driveway for
  parking and access to the rear of the property, as did their tenants and
  employees.  During this period, many large trucks used the driveway on a
  regular basis.

       From 1973 to July 1976, plaintiffs' property was occupied by  Richard
  and Linda Angelino. The Angelinos used the driveway for access for
  themselves and for tenants residing in an apartment on the premises, and
  for transporting horses onto and off the property. Farmers used the
  driveway during this period to access the Angelinos'  barn for hay storage. 
  The public was also permitted to use the driveway to gain access to farm
  pastures located to the east of the

 

  parties' property.

       Since purchasing the property in 1976, plaintiffs have used it for
  both residential and business purposes.  Their cider mill business has
  grown steadily during their ownership.  By 1994, annual visitors had
  increased to more than 250,000.  Mail-order and wholesale operations now
  account for more than half of the cider mill's business volume.

       A significant aspect of plaintiffs' business involves patrons 
  arriving by bus.  From the onset of operations through June 1991, defendant
  made no objection to buses gaining access to plaintiffs'  property via the
  north driveway.  During the first year plaintiffs operated their business,
  approximately fifty buses visited the facility.  By the late 1980s, the
  volume had increased to approximately 600 buses per year, ninety percent of
  which make their visits between late August and late October.  During this
  peak period, as many as thirty buses visit daily.  The buses unload their
  passengers on the north driveway and park behind the church on plaintiffs'
  property. Occasionally, a bus remains next to the church  with its engine
  idling to wait for another vehicle ahead of it to unload.

       Over the many years that plaintiffs or their predecessors in title
  have used the north driveway, they performed nearly all of the maintenance
  on it.  This work included grading, graveling and snow plowing, all of
  which have gradually widened the driveway approximately 1 « feet onto the
  lawn of the church.  No one associated with the church ever gave the
  plaintiffs or their predecessors permission to use the driveway and,
  indeed, no such permission was ever requested.

       The church engaged a surveyor in 1973 who determined that the north
  driveway is located entirely on the church's property.  A  second survey
  commissioned by the church in 1991 also confirmed that the church owned the
  north driveway.

       Church trustees invited plaintiffs to attend their meeting on June 13,
  1991.  At that meeting, the church trustees disclosed for the first time
  that they contended that the church owned the north driveway and that
  plaintiffs had no right to its use.  The church demanded

 

  deeded rights to parking on plaintiffs' property in exchange for  deeded
  rights to the north driveway.  Plaintiffs refused, maintaining they owned
  the driveway.  The church trustees warned the plaintiffs they would close
  off the north driveway for one complete day at some point before July 13,
  1991.

       On an unspecified date in July 1991, while the cider mill was open for
  business, one of defendant's trustees placed a barricade across the north
  driveway bearing a sign reading "driveway closed  today."  Plaintiff Eric
  Chittenden immediately removed the barricade  and placed it behind the
  church.  A similar incident occurred on Thanksgiving Day of 1991.  Twice in
  1992, work parties from the church erected fences across part or all of the
  north driveway.  On the last occasion, plaintiff had to use a forklift to
  remove the fence.  When it became clear that the church would continue to
  block the driveway, plaintiffs brought this action and sought a preliminary
  injunction.

       The complaint named as defendants the church, the chairman of its
  trustees and six other individuals whom plaintiffs contended were acting on
  the church's behalf.  Defendants counterclaimed, asserting  trespass and
  seeking a declaratory judgment in their favor on the easement issue.  In
  lieu of the requested preliminary injunctive relief, the parties agreed to
  preserve the status quo ante -- permitting plaintiffs to continue their use
  of the north driveway pending the ultimate resolution of the dispute.  The
  court bifurcated the case, deferring the issue of damages and conducting a
  bench trial to resolve the parties' competing ownership claims. Following
  trial  and the extensive findings summarized above, the court concluded
  that plaintiffs did not acquire an interest in the north driveway via
  adverse possession, a prescriptive easement or a presumptive grant. On
  motion of plaintiffs, the court amended its findings and conclusions to
  determine, in relevant part, that the equitable doctrine of laches has no
  application to this case. The court entered its judgment on May 12, 1997,
  and this appeal followed.

                  II.  Constitutionality of 12 V.S.A. § 462

       Plaintiffs' first claim on appeal is that 12 V.S.A. § 462 is 
  unconstitutional.  The trial

 

  court relied on this statute in determining that plaintiffs have no claim
  to the north driveway by adverse possession or prescriptive easement.

       Generally, Vermont law applies a fifteen-year limitation period to
  actions seeking recovery or possession of land.  See 12 V.S.A. § 502. 
  Accordingly, one who seeks to maintain a claim of adverse possession or to
  assert a prescriptive easement must demonstrate that the use or possession
  in question has outlasted this limitation period.  See Community Feed
  Store, Inc. v. Northeastern Culvert Corp., 151 Vt. 152, 155, 559 A.2d 1068,
  1070 (1989) (noting that elements of adverse possession and prescriptive
  easement claims are "essentially the same").  In this case, however, there
  is no limitation period because of the effect of 12 V.S.A. § 462.  That
  provision exempts from any limitation period all ownership claims relating
  to "lands given, granted, or sequestered or appropriated to  a public,
  pious or charitable use, or to lands belonging to the state."  Id.

       Plaintiffs contend that § 462 violates the Establishment Clause of the
  First Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as Chapter I,
  Article 3 of the Vermont Constitution because it promotes religious use of
  property over non-religious use.  We note, however, that plaintiffs rely
  exclusively on case law interpreting the United States Constitution and do
  not maintain that the Vermont Constitution affords more protection to them
  in this case.(FN3)  Accordingly, we decide the case only under federal
  constitutional law principles.

       The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
  relevant part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an  establishment
  of religion."  The prohibition expressed in the  Establishment Clause
  applies to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See
  Everson v. Board of Educ.,