Case Title: Ramos v. Brenntag Specialties, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S218176

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 6/23/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
FLAVIO RAMOS et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S218176 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/4 B248038 
BRENNTAG SPECIALTIES, INC., et al., ) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. BC449958 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In this case, a metal foundry worker who developed interstitial pulmonary 
fibrosis brought this action (along with his wife) against a variety of companies 
that supplied products for use in the foundry‟s manufacturing process, asserting 
that the suppliers‟ products, when used in their intended fashion, produced 
harmful fumes and dust that were a substantial cause of his pulmonary illness.  
Defendant suppliers demurred, relying upon the then-recent Court of Appeal 
decision in Maxton v. Western States Metals (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 81 (Maxton).  
In Maxton, the appellate court held that under the so-called component parts 
doctrine set forth in the Court of Appeal decision in Artiglio v. General Electric 
Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 830, 838-839 (Artiglio), a supplier of materials was not 
liable for injuries suffered under circumstances very similar to those involved in 
the present case.  In reliance upon Maxton, the trial court sustained defendants‟ 
demurrer without leave to amend. 
2 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal in the present case explicitly disagreed with 
the analysis and conclusion in Maxton, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 81, and held that 
the component parts doctrine set forth in Artiglio is not applicable here because 
the injury in this case had not been caused by a finished product into which the 
supplied product had been incorporated but instead by the supplied product itself 
when used in an intended fashion.  We granted review to resolve the direct conflict 
between the Court of Appeal decision in this case and the Court of Appeal 
decision in Maxton. 
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Court of Appeal 
decision in this case should be affirmed.  As the Court of Appeal explained, the 
protection afforded to defendants by the component parts doctrine does not apply 
when the product supplied has not been incorporated into a different finished or 
end product but instead, as here, itself allegedly causes injury when used in the 
manner intended by the product supplier.  Because the trial court sustained 
defendants‟ demurrer solely on the basis of the component parts doctrine, the 
Court of Appeal properly concluded that the trial court‟s dismissal of plaintiffs‟ 
action cannot be upheld.  
Although the component parts doctrine is not applicable in this case, it is 
important to recognize that many issues in this litigation remain unresolved.  
Under the facts alleged in the complaint, a supplier is liable under the product 
liability causes of action only if plaintiffs establish either (1) that the supplied 
product was defective under a design defect theory and that the defect caused the 
injury or (2) that the supplier should be held responsible for the injury under a 
duty to warn theory.  Each of those distinct legal issues (and the factual questions 
embodied within those issues) remain undecided at the current early stage of the 
present litigation.  Accordingly, our affirmance of the Court of Appeal decision 
means that the case will be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
3 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
From 1972 to 1978 and from 1981 to 2009, plaintiff Flavio Ramos (Ramos) 
worked as a mold maker, machine operator and laborer for Supreme Castings & 
Pattern Co., Inc. (Supreme Castings), a company that manufactured metal parts 
through a foundry and fabrication process.  (From 1979 to 1980, Ramos performed 
similar work for a different metal parts manufacturer.)  The second amended 
complaint alleged that while employed by Supreme Castings, Ramos worked 
“with and around” metals, plaster, and minerals supplied to Supreme Castings by 
the various companies named as defendants in this action.  One group of 
defendants (metal suppliers) supplied metal products that were melted in furnaces 
to form metal castings.1  Another group of defendants (mold material suppliers) 
supplied plaster, sand, limestone and marble that were used to create molds for the 
casting process.2  According to the second amended complaint, all defendants 
were aware of and intended that their materials would be used by Supreme 
Castings in the manner in which the materials were actually used.  The complaint 
further alleged that Ramos developed interstitial pulmonary fibrosis as the result 
of his exposure to, among other factors, fumes from the molten metal and dust 
from the plaster, sand, limestone, and marble.  The complaint sought recovery 
                                              
1  
The named metal supplier defendants are:  Alcoa Inc., Schorr Metals Inc., 
Southwire Company, Century Kentucky, Inc., and TST, Inc. 
2  
The named mold material supplier defendants are:  United States Gypsum 
Company (plaster), Westside Building Material Corporation (plaster), Porter 
Warner Industries, LLC (plaster and zircon sand), P-G Industries, Inc. (plaster and 
zircon sand), The Pryor Giggey Co. (plaster and zircon sand), J.R. Simplot 
Company (silica sand), Laguna Clay Co. (limestone), Scott Sales Co. (limestone), 
Brenntag Specialties, Inc. (limestone), and Resource Building Materials 
(limestone and marble). 
4 
from defendants based on a variety of theories:  (1) negligence, (2) negligence per 
se, (3) strict liability based on a failure to warn, (4) strict liability based on design 
defect, (5) fraudulent concealment, (6) breach of implied warranties, and (7) loss 
of consortium.   
After the second amended complaint was filed, defendants sought judgment 
on the pleadings, relying upon the then-recently decided Court of Appeal decision 
in Maxton, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 81.  The complaint in Maxton alleged that the 
plaintiff in that case “ „worked with and around‟ ” metal products that were cut, 
ground, sandblasted, welded and brazed during his employer‟s manufacturing 
process, and that allegedly as a result the plaintiff developed interstitial pulmonary 
fibrosis due to his exposure to metallic fumes and dust from the products.  (Id. at 
p. 86.)  The plaintiff in Maxton sought recovery from the suppliers of the products 
on the ground that the suppliers had provided a defective product and had failed to 
disclose the hazards of their products to plaintiff.  The defendants in Maxton filed 
demurrers and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, maintaining the plaintiff‟s 
claims were precluded by virtue of the component parts doctrine discussed in the 
prior Court of Appeal decision in Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pages 835-
839.  The trial court in Maxton agreed with defendants, and dismissed the 
complaint without leave to amend.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal in Maxton 
upheld the trial court‟s ruling, concluding that under the component parts doctrine, 
as set forth in Artiglio, the suppliers could not be held liable for any alleged injury 
to the plaintiff employee arising from the use of their products during the 
manufacturing process.  (Maxton, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 88-95 & fn. 3.) 
In the present case, the trial court, in reliance upon Maxton, supra, 203 
Cal.App.4th 81, granted defendants‟ motion for judgment on the pleadings with 
regard to the second amended complaint with leave to amend, advising plaintiffs 
that to state causes of action they must “plead around . . . Artiglio” as interpreted 
5 
in Maxton.  Plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint, to which the trial court 
sustained defendants‟ demurrers with leave to amend.  After plaintiffs filed a 
fourth amended complaint, defendants again demurred on the basis of Maxton and 
this time the trial court sustained defendants‟ demurrers without leave to amend 
and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of all defendants.   
On appeal, the Court of Appeal in the present case expressly disagreed with 
the Maxton decision and held that the component parts doctrine does not apply to 
the factual situation at issue in this case.  As described by the Court of Appeal, 
under the component parts doctrine “suppliers of component parts or raw materials 
integrated into an „end product‟ are ordinarily not liable for defects in the end 
product, provided that their own parts or materials were nondefective, and they did 
not exercise control over the end product.”  The Court of Appeal concluded that 
the component parts doctrine is not applicable here because the complaint alleges 
“that Ramos suffered injuries not from a defective „integrated product‟ that 
incorporated [defendants‟] products, but from those products themselves, which he 
used as [defendants] intended in the course of [Supreme Castings‟] manufacturing 
process.”  Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court 
judgment dismissing plaintiffs‟ action should be reversed.3 
As noted, we granted review to resolve the direct conflict between Maxton, 
supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 81, and the Court of Appeal decision in this case. 
                                              
3  
The Court of Appeal found that with respect to one of the theories set forth 
in the complaint — the negligence per se claim — the facts set forth in the 
complaint did not state a cause of action independent of the general negligence 
claim and that the demurrers were properly sustained as to the negligence per se 
claim.  Plaintiffs did not seek review of that issue in this court and thus that issue 
is not before us. 
6 
II.  When a Supplier Provides a Product to an Employer for Use in the 
Employer’s Manufacturing Process, Does the Component Parts Doctrine 
Relieve the Supplier of Liability if an Employee Is Directly Injured by the 
Supplied Product Itself When Using the Product as the Supplier Intended? 
 
In Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167 (Webb), our 
court very recently had occasion to consider a products liability issue related to, 
but distinct from, the issue presented in this case.  Webb involved the potential 
liability of a company — Special Electric — that supplied a particularly dangerous 
form of raw asbestos to Johns-Manville Corporation for incorporation into 
finished products manufactured and sold by Johns-Manville for use by consumers 
or other end users.  In Webb, we noted that California law recognizes three types 
of product defects for which a product supplier may be liable:  manufacturing 
defects, design defects, and warning defects.  (Id., at pp. 180-181.)  Because of the 
posture in which the Webb case reached our court, however, we confined our 
discussion and analysis to the supplier‟s potential liability under the warning 
defect prong.  (Id. at p. 181.) 
The duty to warn issue in Webb arose in a setting in which the supplier had 
itself provided a dangerous raw material to the manufacturer and, although the raw 
material had been incorporated into a finished product, the end user of the finished 
product had allegedly been injured by the dangerous raw material that the 
supplier had itself provided.  In analyzing the duty to warn issue, we recognized 
that the supplier‟s potential liability for failure to warn in the Webb setting, in 
which the plaintiff‟s injury was allegedly caused by the raw material in the 
finished product that the supplier had itself supplied, was distinguishable from a 
supplier‟s potential liability in a case that falls within the component parts doctrine 
as set forth in prior California decisions such as Artiglio, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th 
830. 
7 
In Webb, we explained that the component parts doctrine — as set forth in 
Artiglio and numerous other California decisions (see, e.g., O’Neil v. Crane Co. 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 335, 355; Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 
479-481; Johnson v. United States Steel Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 22, 33-34; 
Springmeyer v. Ford Motor Co. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1550) and as 
accurately reflected in section 5 of the Restatement Third of Torts, Products 
Liability — applies (1) when a supplier provides a component or raw material that 
is not itself defective (by virtue of a manufacturing, design, or warning defect), 
(2) the component or raw material is changed or transformed when incorporated 
through the manufacturing process into a different finished or end product, and 
(3) an end user of the finished product is allegedly injured by a defect in the 
finished product.  (See Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5, coms. a, b, and c, 
pp. 130-134.)  Under such circumstances, the component parts doctrine provides 
protection to the supplier of the component or raw material, subjecting that entity 
to liability for harm caused by a product into which the component has been 
integrated only if the supplier “(1) . . . substantially participates in the integration 
of the component into the design of the product; and [¶] (2) the integration of the 
component causes the product to be defective . . . ; and [¶] (3) the defect in the 
product causes the harm.”  (Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5(b);4 see Webb, 
supra, pp. 183-185.) 
                                              
4  
Section 5 of the Restatement Third of Torts, Products Liability — entitled 
Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor of Product Components for Harm 
Caused by Products Into Which Components Are Integrated — provides in full: 
 
“One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing product 
components who sells or distributes a component is subject to liability for harm to 
persons or property caused by a product into which the component is integrated if: 
 
“(a) the component is defective in itself, as defined in this Chapter, and the 
defect causes the harm; or 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
8 
In setting forth the rationale for the component parts doctrine, comment a to 
section 5 of the Restatement Third of Torts, Products Liability, explains:  “If the 
component is not itself defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to impose 
liability solely on the ground that the manufacturer of the integrated product 
utilizes the component in a manner that renders the integrated product defective.  
Imposing liability would require the component seller to scrutinize another‟s 
product which the component seller has no role in developing.  This would require 
the component seller to develop sufficient sophistication to review the decisions of 
the business entity that is already charged with responsibility for the integrated 
product.”  (Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5, com. a, p. 131.) 
In light of the scope and rationale of the component parts doctrine as set 
forth in prior California decisions and section 5 of the Restatement Third Torts, 
Products Liability, we conclude that the Court of Appeal correctly determined 
that, contrary to the decision in Maxton, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 81, the 
component parts doctrine is not applicable to the factual setting alleged in 
plaintiffs‟ complaint in this case.  Here, Ramos‟s injury was not caused by a 
finished product into which the materials supplied by defendants had been 
transformed and integrated, and thus the explanation and considerations set forth 
in comment a to section 5 of the Restatement Third of Torts are not applicable.  
Instead, the injury was allegedly caused directly by the materials themselves when 
used in a manner intended by the suppliers.  According to the allegations of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
 
“(b)(1) the seller or distributor of the component substantially participates 
in the integration of the component into the design of the product; and 
 
      (2) the integration of the component causes the product to be defective, 
as defined in this Chapter; and 
 
      (3) the defect in the product causes the harm.” 
9 
complaint, defendants did not have to guess or speculate about the type of use to 
which their materials would be put, but rather defendants were aware of and 
intended that the materials they supplied would be used in the manner in which the 
materials were actually used.5  The component parts doctrine (and the protection it 
affords to suppliers) is not addressed to such circumstances, and thus the Court of 
Appeal properly determined that the trial court erred in sustaining defendants‟ 
demurrers to the fourth amended complaint in reliance on Maxton.  We disapprove 
the decision in Maxton v. Western States Metals, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 81 
insofar as it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
To avoid any misunderstanding, we emphasize the limited scope of our 
decision in this case.  We hold only that the trial court erred in sustaining 
defendants‟ demurrer in reliance on Maxton, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 81, and that 
decision‟s reliance on the component parts doctrine.  We do not address the 
applicability or scope of other products liability doctrines that may be implicated 
in this context.  To prevail on their strict products liability claim, plaintiffs bear the 
burden of establishing either that the products supplied by defendants were 
defective by virtue of a design defect and that the defect caused plaintiffs‟ injury 
or that defendants breached a duty to provide adequate warnings of the dangers 
posed by the materials defendants supplied to Supreme Castings and that such 
failure to warn caused plaintiffs‟ injury.  (See, e.g., Johnson v. United States Steel 
Corp., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 30-39; Tellez-Cordova v. Campbell-
Hausfeld/Scott Fetzger Co. (2004) 129 Cal.App.4th 577, 579-583; Wright v. Stang 
Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1230-1236; Schwoerer v. Union 
                                              
5  
Indeed, the complaint alleges that the products supplied by a number of 
defendants were specifically designed to meet the needs of Supreme Castings‟ 
manufacturing process. 
10 
Oil Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 103, 110-114; accord, Gray v. Badger Mining 
Corp. (Minn. 2004) 676 N.W.2d 268, 275-281.)  Furthermore, one of the 
questions potentially included within the duty to warn issue is whether defendants 
could properly rely on Supreme Castings to adequately warn its employee-users of 
defendants‟ products of the dangers posed by those products.  (Cf. Webb, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at pp. 185-192 & fn. 9].)  Each of these legal issues — and the factual 
questions embodied in these issues — remain to be resolved in this case. 
 
III.  Conclusion 
For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
reversing the trial court‟s dismissal of plaintiffs‟ action on the basis of the 
component parts doctrine, is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Ramos v. Brenntag Specialties, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 224 Cal.App.4th 1239 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S218176 
Date Filed: June 23, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Amy D. Hogue 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Metzger Law Group, Raphael Metzger, Kenneth A. Holdren; Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett and Brian 
P. Barrow for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Alexander Law Group and Richard Alexander for Council for Education and Research on Toxics, Dr. 
Jerrold Abraham, Dr. Richard W. Clapp, Dr. Ronald Crystal, Dr. David A. Eastmond, Dr. Arthur L. Frank, 
Dr. Robert J. Harrison, Dr. Ronald Melnick, Dr. Lee Newman, Dr. Stephen M. Rappaport, Dr. David 
Joseph Ross and Dr. Janet Weiss as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Lynberg & Watkins, Ruth Segal and Rosemary Do for Defendant and Respondent Porter Warner 
Industries, LLC. 
 
Archer Norris, W. Eric Blumhardt, Tiffany J. Gates and Kevin L. Place for Defendants and Respondents    
P-G Industries, Inc., and The Pryor-Giggey Company. 
 
Snider, Diehl & Rasmussen, Stephen C. Snider, Trenton M. Diehl and Kristina O. Lambert for Defendant 
and Respondent J.R. Simplot Company. 
 
Gordon & Rees, Roger Mansukhani, Matthew G. Kleiner and Brandon D. Saxon for Defendant and 
Respondent Laguna Clay Company. 
 
Schaffer, Lax, McNaughton & Chen, Jill A. Franklin and Yaron F. Dunkel for Defendant and Respondent 
Scott Sales Co. 
 
Chuck Birkett Tsoong, Chuck & Tsoong, Stephen S. Chuck, Tiffany M. Birkett and Victoria J. Tsoong for 
Defendant and Respondent Resource Building Materials. 
 
Gordon & Rees, Don Willenburg. P. Gerhardt Zacher and Matthew P. Nugent for Defendant and 
Respondent Schorr Metals, Inc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – S218176 – counsel continued 
 
Counsel: 
 
Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet, Jason R. Litt; K & L Gates, Michele C. Barnes, Nicholas P. Vari, Michael 
J. Ross; Gordon & Rees, Don Willenburg, P. Gerhardt Zacher and Matthew P. Nugent for Defendant and 
Respondent Alcoa Inc. 
 
Bates Winter & Cameron, Bates Winter & Mistretta, David L. Winter and Christopher R. Robyn for 
Defendant and Respondent Southwire Company. 
 
McGuire Woods, Diane Flannery and Joan S. Dinsmore for Defendant and Respondent Century Kentucky, 
Inc. 
 
Koletsky, Mancini, Feldman & Morrow, Caldwell Law Group and Susan L. Caldwell for Defendant and 
Respondent TST, Inc. 
 
Hurrell Cantrall, Thomas C. Hurrell and Melinda Cantrall for Defendants and Respondents United States 
Gypsum Co. and Westside Building Material Corp. 
 
Sedgwick, Robert Kum, Alison K. Beanum and Mathew R. Groseclose for Defendant and Respondent 
Brenntag Specialties, Inc., and Brenntag North America, Inc. 
 
Shook Hardy & Bacon, Mark A. Behrens, Christopher E. Appel and Patrick Gregory for Coalition for 
Litigation Justice, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Snell & Wilmer, Mary-Christine Sungaila and Jenny Hua for International Association of Defense Counsel 
and Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Deborah J. La Fetra for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Arbogast Law, David M. Arbogast; The Bronson Firm and Steven M. Bronson for Consumer Attorneys of 
California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Raphael Metzger 
Metzger Law Group 
401 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 800 
Long Beach, CA  90802 
(562) 437-4499 
 
Nicholas P. Vari 
K & L Gates 
210 Sixth Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA  15222 
(412) 355-6500