Case Title: Deloge v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0044

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEVEN A. DELOGE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 128Case Number: S-12-0044Decided: 09/27/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction can be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2012 

STEVEN A. 
DELOGE,
 
Appellant
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,
 
Appellee
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Laramie County
The Honorable 
Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Pro se.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey S. Pope, Assistant Attorney 
General.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant, Steven A. 
DeLoge, pled guilty to six counts of second-degree sexual assault in 2000 
and was sentenced to six consecutive life terms.  In this 
appeal, Appellant, acting pro se, challenges the district court’s denial 
of his motion to correct an illegal sentence under W.R.Cr.P. 35(a). We 
affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
Appellant presents 
the following issues:
 
1.    
Whether the district 
court correctly concluded that the claims of illegal sentence were barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata?
 
2.    
Whether the district 
court correctly denied correction of factual inaccuracies in the pre-sentence 
investigation report?
 
3.    
Whether the applied 
sentencing enhancement provision of W.S. 6-2-306(b)(i) 
creates an illegal sentence by violating the Wyoming and United States 
Constitutions?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
Appellant was 
originally charged with eleven counts of second-degree sexual 
assault.  He pled guilty to six of those counts and was 
sentenced to six consecutive life terms.  Appellant took a 
direct appeal from his convictions, arguing, among other things, that the sexual 
assault sentencing statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306, violated the double 
jeopardy clauses of the Wyoming and United States Constitutions because it 
imposed multiple punishments for the same crime.  This Court 
affirmed his convictions in DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 
155, 55 P.3d 1233 (Wyo. 2002) (DeLoge I). 

 
[¶4]        
In 2002, while his 
appeal was pending, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas.  He also filed a post-conviction motion seeking the 
return of seized property.  We affirmed the district court’s 
denial of Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, finding no “manifest 
injustice,” but remanded to the district court for a ruling on the merits of 
Appellant’s motion for return of the seized 
property.  DeLoge v. State, 2005 WY 
152, 123 P.3d 573 (Wyo. 2005) (DeLoge 
II).
 
[¶5]        
In December, 2003, 
prior to our decision in DeLoge II, Appellant also 
filed a petition for post-conviction relief in district court. The court 
dismissed the petition.  Subsequently, Appellant filed a 
petition for writ of review in this Court.  We denied that 
petition.  Appellant then filed a second petition for writ of 
review in this Court challenging the district court’s dismissal of his petition 
for post-conviction relief.  That petition was also 
denied.  Id., ¶ 5, 123 P.3d  at 
574-75.
 
[¶6]        
In 2006, following 
remand, the district court denied Appellant’s motion for return of the seized 
property.  Appellant appealed that decision. 
 We affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that 
Appellant had no right to counsel in the proceeding, but that the district court 
could not deny Appellant’s motion without evidence from the State to support the 
need for continued retention of the 
property.  DeLoge v. State, 2007 WY 
71, 156 P.3d 1004 (Wyo. 2007) (DeLoge 
III).
 
[¶7]        
Finally, in 
Appellant’s fourth appeal, we affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
Appellant’s motion because “the State did not have possession of [the property], 
sovereign immunity prevented the court from awarding him damages for the loss of 
his property, and he did not present a recognizable right to post-conviction 
preservation of exculpatory 
evidence.”  DeLoge v. State, 2010 WY 
60, ¶ 2, 231 P.3d 862, 863 (Wyo. 2010) (DeLoge 
IV).

[¶8]        
In May, 2011, 
Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under W.R.Cr.P. 
35(a).  Appellant asserted that his sentence was illegal 
because it was based on factual inaccuracies in his presentence investigation 
(PSI) report, and because the sentence was imposed in violation of his 
constitutional rights to due process, fundamental fairness, compulsory process, 
and protection against double jeopardy.  The district court 
denied the motion after concluding that Appellant’s constitutional claims were 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and that the sentencing 
judge had not relied on the alleged inaccuracies in the PSI report in 
determining Appellant’s sentence.  Appellant timely appealed 
the district court’s order.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶9]        
We apply the 
following standard of review to claims that a criminal sentence is illegal: 
 
 
Sentencing decisions 
are normally within the discretion of the trial 
court.  Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 
78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003).  “Such discretion is limited, 
however, inasmuch as a court may not enter an illegal sentence. A sentence is 
illegal if it violates the constitution or other law.”  In re CT, 
2006 WY 101, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d 643, 646 (Wyo. 2006) (internal case 
citation omitted).  Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law, 
which we review de novo. Manes v. State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 7, 
150 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo. 2007).
Endris v. 
State, 2010 WY 73, ¶ 13, 233 P.3d 578, 581 (Wyo. 2010) 
(quoting Jackson v. State, 2009 WY 82, ¶ 6, 
209 P.3d 897, 898-99 (Wyo. 2009)).  Whether a 
claim is barred by res judicata is also a question of law, 
reviewed de novo.  Winstead v. 
State, 2011 WY 137, ¶ 8, 261 P.3d 743, 745 (Wyo. 
2011).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶10]     
The doctrine of 
res judicata bars litigation of issues that were or could 
have been determined in a prior 
proceeding.  Dax v. 
State, 2012 WY 40, ¶ 9, 272 P.3d 319, 321 (Wyo. 
2012).  Four factors are examined to determine whether 
res judicata applies: (1) identity in parties; (2) identity 
in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the subject 
matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference to both 
the subject matter and the issues between them.  
Id.  Courts can correct illegal sentences 
under W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) at any time, but the bases for correcting the 
sentence remain subject to res 
judicata.  Dax, ¶¶ 9-10, 
272 P.3d  at 321. 
 If a party fails to 
show good cause why an issue was not raised at an earlier opportunity, the Court 
may decline to consider the 
issue.  Hamill v. State, 
948 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Wyo. 1997).
 
[¶11]     
Appellant 
acknowledges that he “raised on direct appeal and post conviction motion the 
issue of the constitutionality of the enhancement provision of sentencing 
statute 6-2-306(b)(i).”  He contends, however, that the 
third factor in the test for res judicata is not satisfied 
because “the subject matter of the claims [is] not identical to those previously 
raised.”  Appellant makes this assertion based solely on the 
fact that the statute which prescribed his sentence in 2000 was amended in 
2007.1  He 
claims that the legislature’s 2007 amendment “presents a completely different 
circumstance of statutory construction and legislative intent.” 
 Essentially, Appellant contends that the amendment to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 indicates that the previous version of the statute was 
unconstitutional.2  We 
disagree.  
 
[¶12]     
We note initially 
that a double jeopardy claim is not cognizable and cannot be entertained on a 
motion to correct an illegal sentence because “a double jeopardy claim brought 
in this procedural context [is] a challenge to the convictions and not to the 
sentence.”  Birr v. State, 878 P.2d 515, 516 (Wyo. 1994).  Additionally, Appellant’s claim that former Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 violates the double jeopardy clauses of the Wyoming and 
United States Constitutions is identical to the issue raised in his direct 
appeal.  With respect to Appellant’s double jeopardy claim in 
his direct appeal, we held as follows:
 
            DeLoge 
also maintains that the statute operates in a manner which violates double 
jeopardy because for at least one count he is punished twice, i.e., one 
count is used both as the underlying offense and as an offense giving rise to 
the enhancement provision. Again, we view this as mixing the concept of 
“previous” offenses used in the habitual criminal statute, with the language 
used in § 6-2-306(b)(i), “being sentenced for two (2) or more separate 
acts of sexual assault in the second degree.” Our precedents are clear that 
multiple sexual assaults are separate offenses even though they might be 
separated by only very short time periods. Frenzel v. 
State, 938 P.2d 867, 868-69 (Wyo. 
1997); Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212, 
1216-17 (Wyo. 1979). 
DeLoge I, 
¶ 12, 55 P.3d  at 1238.  The fact that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 was amended in 2007, and now provides that an enhanced 
sentence may only be imposed when the defendant has a previous conviction for a 
similar offense, does not change the nature of Appellant’s claim.  
As the State correctly points out, “Any potential constitutional defect 
with the statute existed at the time of DeLoge’s 
sentencing.”  We previously determined that the statute did 
not violate constitutional protections against double jeopardy, and the fact 
that the legislature chose to amend the statute subsequent to our decision has 
no impact on our previous judgment.  Appellant’s claim that 
the statute violated the double jeopardy clauses of the Wyoming and United 
States Constitutions was adjudicated in his direct appeal, and is barred by 
res 
judicata.         
  
[¶13]     
Appellant also 
challenges the legality of his sentence on grounds that it violates principles 
of equal protection, due process, and fundamental fairness embodied in the 
Wyoming and United States Constitutions.  Again, the 
legislative amendment to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 has no bearing on these 
claims.  Appellant could have raised these issues ten years 
ago in his direct appeal, and has failed to show “good cause” as to why he did 
not raise the claims previously.  As a result, Appellant’s 
remaining constitutional claims are also barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata.  
 
[¶14]     
In Appellant’s second 
issue, he contends that his sentence is illegal due to alleged inaccuracies in 
the presentence investigation report.  He asserts that the 
sentencing court violated W.R.Cr.P. 32 by failing to correct alleged 
inaccuracies in the PSI report and by failing to append written findings with 
respect to those inaccuracies to the report.3    Appellant 
objected to various statements contained in the PSI report at the sentencing 
hearing, and he catalogued his objections to the report in an exhibit attached 
to his motion to correct the sentence.  
 
[¶15]     
Again, Appellant’s 
claims are barred by res judicata.  
Appellant failed to raise any issue relating to the PSI report in 
his direct appeal, and is barred from litigating the issue in this 
appeal.  In an effort to show good cause as to why he did not 
raise the issue earlier, Appellant claims that he became aware that the 
inaccuracies remained in his PSI report at the time of his most recent parole 
hearing.  The report, however, has remained unchanged for the 
past ten years, and Appellant’s objections at the sentencing hearing indicate 
that he was aware of the alleged errors at that time. 
 Consequently, Appellant has failed to show good cause as to 
why he did not make this argument previously.
 
[¶16]     
Affirmed.
 
[¶17]     
FOOTNOTES
1At the 
time of Appellant’s convictions, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 (LexisNexis 1999) 
provided, in relevant part, as follows:
 
§ 6-2-306. Penalties 
for sexual assault.
 
(a) An actor 
convicted of sexual assault who does not qualify under the criteria of 
subsection (b) or (d) of this section shall be punished as follows:
. . .
 
(ii) Sexual assault 
in the second degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
twenty (20) years;
. . .
 
(b)  
An actor who is convicted of sexual assault and who does not qualify 
under the criteria of subsection (d) of this section shall be punished by the 
extended terms of subsection (c) of this section if:
 
(i) He is 
being sentenced for two (2) or more separate acts of sexual assault in the first 
or second degree;
 
(ii) He previously 
has been convicted of any crime containing the same or similar elements as the 
crimes defined in W.S. 6-2-302 [sexual assault in the first degree] 
or 6-2-303 [sexual assault in the second degree].
 
(c) An actor 
convicted of sexual assault who qualifies under the criteria of subsection (b) 
of this section shall be punished as follows:
 
(i) Sexual 
assault in the first or second degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for 
not less than five (5) years or for life;
. . .
 
(d) An actor who is 
convicted of sexual assault shall be punished by life imprisonment without 
parole if the actor has two (2) or more previous convictions for any of the 
following designated offenses, which convictions resulted from charges 
separately brought and which arose out of separate occurrences in this state or 
elsewhere:
 
(i) A crime 
defined in W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304 or a criminal statute 
containing the same or similar elements as a crime defined by W.S. 
6-2-302 through 6-2-304;
. . .
 
In 
2007, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 was amended to provide as follows:
§ 
6-2-306.  Penalties for sexual assault.
 
(a) An actor 
convicted of sexual assault under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304 
[sexual assault in the first, second, and third degrees, respectively] who does 
not qualify under the criteria of subsection (b) or (d) of this section shall be 
punished as follows:
. . 
.       (ii) Sexual 
assault in the second degree under W.S. 6-2-303 is a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not less than two (2) years nor more than twenty 
(20) years;      . . 
.       
(b) An actor 
who is convicted of sexual assault under W.S. 6-2-302 through 
6-2-304, who has previously been convicted of any crime containing the same or 
similar elements as the crimes defined in W.S. 6-2-302 through 
6-2-304 and who does not qualify under the criteria of subsection (d) of this 
section shall be punished as 
follows:        
(i) and 
(ii) Repealed by Laws 2007, ch. 159, § 3.  
(iii) Sexual assault in the first or second degree 
under W.S. 6-2-302 or 6-2-303 is a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for not less than twenty-five (25) years or for life; or
 
(iv) Sexual 
assault in the third degree under W.S. 6-2-304 is a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years.
                        
. . .
 
(d) An actor who 
is convicted of sexual assault under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, 
or sexual abuse of a minor under W.S. 6-2-316 through 6-2-317, shall 
be punished by life imprisonment without parole if the actor has two (2) or more 
previous convictions for any of the following designated offenses, which 
convictions resulted from charges separately brought and which arose out of 
separate occurrences in this state or 
elsewhere:       
(i) A 
crime defined in W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304 or a criminal statute 
from another jurisdiction containing the same or similar elements as a crime 
defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304.
. . .
 
2Appellant also 
contends that the current version of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 should be 
retroactively applied because “[t]he conviction was not final for purposes of 
application of the repealed statute to his case.”  However, 
because Appellant has presented no cogent argument or pertinent legal authority 
to support this claim, we decline to consider it.
3W.R.Cr.P. 32 
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
 
(a)   Presentence 
Investigation. —
. . .
(3) 
Disclosure.
. . .
 
(C) If the 
comments of the defendant and the defendant’s counsel or testimony or other 
information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence 
investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court 
shall, as to each matter controverted, make:
(i) A 
finding as to the allegation; 
or         
(ii) A determination that no such finding is necessary 
because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in 
sentencing. A written record of such findings and determinations shall be 
appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence investigation report 
thereafter made available to penal institutions.