Case Title: Sunderman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sunderman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.1999 WY 53978 P.2d 1167Case Number: 98-75Decided: 05/10/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
MARK 
A. SUNDERMAN and JUDY K. SUNDERMAN, individually and MARK A. SUNDERMAN and JUDY 
K. SUNDERMAN, as next friend for and on behalf of their minor children MARK 
ALLEN SUNDERMAN, JR. and GABRIELLE SUZANNE SUNDERMAN, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

STATE FARM FIRE & 
CASUALTY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Albany County, The Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, 
Judge.

John E. 
Stanfield of Stanfield & Summerfield Law Office, Laramie, Wyoming, 
Representing Appellants.

George E. 
Powers, Jr. of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, Wyoming, 
Representing Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, and TAYLOR, * JJ., and BRACKLEY, D. 
J.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

TAYLOR, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      After a fire 
destroyed much of their home, appellants brought a lawsuit against their 
insurer, based in large part on the insurer's refusal to provide the funds to 
build a totally new home. After a trial to a jury, the insurer was absolved of 
all liability for its handling of appellants' claim. On appeal, appellants 
allege that numerous errors by the district court resulted in a trial atmosphere 
that precluded the jury's fair consideration of their case. Finding no merit in 
the allegations, we affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellants, Mark 
A. and Judy K. Sunderman (the Sundermans), failed to list issues on appeal in 
their opening brief. Therefore, we list only the issues as phrased by appellee, 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State Farm):

1. Did the 
district court act within its discretion in allowing State Farm to conduct 
limited cross-examination of State Farm employees, who had been called as 
witnesses by Sundermans in their case in chief?

2. Did the 
district court have discretion to review its pre-trial orders and have the 
Sundermans demonstrated any material prejudice arising from any orders issued by 
the district court upon such review?

3. Did the 
district court abuse its discretion by establishing reasonable time guidelines 
for the trial of this case and have the Sundermans demonstrated any prejudice 
arising from any such guidelines?

4. Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in limiting the parties['] use of 
post-litigation correspondence between counsel and have the Sundermans 
demonstrated any prejudice resulting from any such 
limitation?

5. Have the 
Sundermans established any basis upon which this Court could consider permitting 
an exception to the rule of harmless error?

6. Have the 
Sundermans preserved and presented a valid objection to Instruction 22, as given 
by the district court, which would require this court to overturn the jury's 
determination that the Sunderman[s'] home was in fact repairable after the 
February 17, 1994 fire?

7. Should this 
Court dismiss the present appeal and/or award sanctions as a result of the 
Sundermans' submission of a brief, which displays an apparent and conscious 
indifference to this Court's rules, requirements and 
practices?

II. 
FACTS

[¶3]      On February 17, 
1994, fire broke out in a wall near a wood stove, damaging the Sundermans' home 
in Laramie, Wyoming. The Sundermans were insured by State Farm under a policy 
that provided three types of coverage. The dwelling coverage included a 
"guaranteed replacement cost" feature wherein State Farm agreed to pay the 
reasonable costs of repairing or replacing the dwelling, if necessary, in an 
amount exceeding the policy limit. The contents of the home were covered on the 
basis of "replacement costs" up to the policy's limit. The Sundermans also had 
"additional living expenses" coverage; available to absorb additional expenses 
while their home was uninhabitable due to fire. At the time of trial, State Farm 
had paid the Sundermans a total of $176,510.85 under the three 
coverages.

[¶4]      In May 1994, the 
Sundermans notified State Farm that no repair of their home was acceptable, 
contending that Mrs. Sunderman and one or both of the children suffer from a 
condition known as multiple chemical sensitivity. According to the Sundermans, 
residual wood smoke and chemicals left in the repaired dwelling would be toxic 
to them. Therefore, nothing less than a total demolition of the structure and a 
complete replacement of their house would be sufficient.

[¶5]      State Farm 
responded by requesting some form of medical documentation of the family's 
condition. The Sundermans then contacted an attorney and future attempts to 
reconcile the dispute were unavailing when no medical records were provided.1 The Sundermans filed a complaint on 
September 22, 1994, claiming bad faith, negligent and/or fraudulent 
misrepresentation, agency liability for alleged gaps in coverage, failure to 
meet reasonable expectations, and the right to attorney fees and punitive 
damages. The "reasonable expectations" claim was dismissed pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
12 and is not under appeal here.

[¶6]      State Farm filed 
a motion for summary judgment on all claims. The motion was originally granted 
only as to the claim for negligent misrepresentation. However, pursuant to a 
scheduling order directing counsel to file all anticipated motions, State Farm 
filed a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment motion. After 
reconsideration, the grant of summary judgment was extended to include the fraud 
claim. The claims for bad faith, attorney fees and punitive damages were allowed 
to go forward.

[¶7]      Trial to a jury 
was held from November 17, 1997 through November 25, 1997. Following the close 
of the evidence, the district court granted State Farm's motion for judgment as 
a matter of law on the claims for attorney fees and punitive damages. On 
November 25, 1997, the jury returned with its verdict that State Farm had not 
violated the covenant of good faith. Judgment was entered on December 2, 1997. 
This timely appeal followed.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8]      Under W.R.E. 611, 
the district court is given broad discretion to control the manner of 
interrogation of witnesses. Seaton v. State of Wyo. Highway Com'n, Dist. No. 1, 
784 P.2d 197, 202 (Wyo. 1989). Thus, the district court's decisions on such 
matters will not be overturned in the absence of a showing that the district 
court has clearly abused that discretion. Id. "`A court does not abuse its 
discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under 
the circumstances.'" Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
891 P.2d 773, 779 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293, 1297 
(Wyo. 1991) and Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 
1980)).

[¶9]      In reviewing a 
challenge to jury instructions, we will consider both the procedural context as 
well as the substantive context. Substantive review is dependent upon a record 
that demonstrates that the objecting party preserved his objection by 
interposing a proper objection as required by W.R.C.P. 51. Hatch v. State Farm 
Fire and Cas. Co., 930 P.2d 382, 391 (Wyo. 1997). In the absence of a proper 
objection, the doctrine of plain error applies:

"[T]his court 
must be able to discern from the record, without resort to speculation or 
equivocal inference, what occurred at trial * * *. Further, the proponent * * * 
must demonstrate the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law which the 
particular facts transgress in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way. * 
* * [T]he error or defect must adversely affect some substantial right of the 
accused in order to avoid the application of the harmless error concept * * 
*."

Id. (quoting 
Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 507 (Wyo. 1977)).

IV. 
DISCUSSION

[¶10]   The majority of the Sundermans' 
arguments are presented without record support, cogent argument, or legal 
authority. They will, therefore, not be considered. Ayers v. State, 949 P.2d 469, 470 (Wyo. 1997); State ex rel. Reece v. Wyoming State Bd. of Outfitters and 
Professional Guides, 931 P.2d 958, 959 (Wyo. 1997). While only marginally 
acceptable, we will briefly address the Sundermans' arguments regarding the 
leading questions allowed on cross-examination of State Farm employees and Jury 
Instruction No. 22.

[¶11]   We find no abuse of discretion in 
the district court's allowance of the limited use of leading questions during 
the cross-examination of State Farm's employees called by the Sundermans in 
their case-in-chief. The record clearly demonstrates that such questioning was 
allowed only on foundational and undisputed issues. The proper use of the 
district court's discretion is reflected in the following discussion held 
outside the presence of the jury:

THE COURT: * * * 
Well, the rule, I think is pretty clear, and it is a discretionary thing. I note 
that we're not * * * well into [the witness] testimony at this point, and what 
we've had so far in the way of leading questions has been primarily 
foundational. And I will continue to allow leading questions, particularly as to 
foundational stuff, undisputed stuff, largely in the interests of time. We can 
save a lot of time that way.

But I do 
recognize there is a certain element of danger there if you get into substantive 
disputed areas where it would be well to have the witness testify rather than 
[appellee's counsel], and so I'm not going to allow just free hand to lead all 
the way through is what it comes down to.

Thereafter, 
objections to the leading nature of certain questions were sustained on several 
occasions. There is no indication that the district court failed to 
appropriately exercise its discretion or prejudiced the Sundermans in any way 
during trial.

[¶12]   The Sundermans' next claim is that 
the jury was improperly instructed; in the main alleging error in Jury 
Instruction No. 22. The instruction conference, recorded in its entirety, 
reflects the Sundermans' counsel's dissatisfaction with this jury instruction. 
However, it is also clear that counsel specifically promised to provide the 
district court with an alternative jury instruction the next day. No alternative 
jury instruction was submitted. In the absence of the submission of a proper 
written jury instruction, any claimed error is deemed waived. Hatch, 930 P.2d  at 
394 (quoting Triton Coal Co., Inc. v. Mobile Coal Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505, 
511 (Wyo. 1990)). Further, the Sundermans point to no clear and unequivocal rule 
of law which the particular facts transgress in an obvious way, and, therefore, 
no plain error was demonstrated.

[¶13]   We decline to impose 
sanctions.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶14]   The district court is affirmed in 
all respects.

Footnotes

1 No medical 
records of the family's alleged condition were provided at any time prior to or 
at trial.