Case Title: State v. Bevly

Citation: 2015-Ohio-475

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Bevly, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-475.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-475 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BEVLY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Bevly, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-475.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2907.05—Mandatory prison terms—Because there is no 
rational basis for the provision in R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) that requires a 
mandatory prison term for a defendant convicted of gross sexual 
imposition when the state has produced evidence corroborating the crime, 
the statute violates the due-process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution—In cases in which a 
defendant has pled guilty, imposing a mandatory prison pursuant to R.C. 
2907.05(C)(2)(a) when corroborating evidence of the charge of gross 
sexual imposition is produced violates the defendant’s right to a jury trial 
as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
(No. 2013-0821—Submitted June 11, 2014—Decided February 11, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 12AP-471, 2013-Ohio-1352. 
_________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Because there is no rational basis for the provision in R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) 
that requires a mandatory prison term for a defendant convicted of gross 
sexual imposition when the state has produced evidence corroborating the 
crime, the statute violates the due-process protections of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
2.  In cases in which a defendant has pled guilty, imposing a mandatory prison 
term pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) when corroborating evidence of 
the charge of gross sexual imposition is produced violates the defendant’s 
right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution. 
_________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of R.C. 
2907.05(C)(2)(a), a subsection of the statute defining “gross sexual imposition,” 
which subjects an offender to a mandatory prison term when evidence other than 
the testimony of the victim is admitted in the case corroborating the violation.  
We hold that the corroborating-evidence provision lacks a rational basis for 
distinguishing between cases on the basis of the presence or the absence of 
corroborating evidence and violates the due-process protections of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  We further hold that 
in cases in which a defendant has pled guilty, imposing a mandatory prison term 
pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) when corroborating evidence of the charge of 
gross sexual imposition is produced violates the defendant’s right to a jury trial as 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
 
 
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I.  Case Background 
{¶ 2} In March 2012, appellant, Damon L. Bevly, pled guilty to two 
counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a third-
degree felony.  At the plea hearing, the state called Detective Brian Sheline, who 
testified that Bevly had confessed to the offenses.  The state also introduced a 
compact disc recording of Bevly’s alleged confession.  The state argued that 
Bevly’s confession constituted corroborating evidence, and thus a mandatory 
prison sentence was required under R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a). 
{¶ 3} Bevly argued that application of R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violated his 
right to a jury trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution1 and that the section’s requirement of a mandatory prison term when 
corroborating evidence is introduced is unconstitutional because corroboration 
bears no rational relationship to the crime’s severity.  The state responded that the 
statute did not violate the Sixth Amendment because the statutory maximum for 
the offense was not increased and the General Assembly had a rational basis to 
impose a mandatory prison sentence upon the introduction of corroboration. 
{¶ 4} The trial court agreed with Bevly.  The court could find no rational 
basis for the distinction between gross-sexual-imposition cases in which there is 
corroborating evidence and those cases in which there is none.  The court also 
concluded that a jury was required to make a finding regarding corroboration 
because introduction of this evidence enhanced the sentence from a mere possible 
prison term to a mandatory prison term.  Bevly was sentenced to three years’ 
imprisonment and five years of postrelease control. 
                                          
 
1 In this appeal, Bevly also raises challenges to R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) pursuant to Article I, 
Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.  Because the state constitutional challenges were not raised at 
the trial or appellate levels, we address only his federal constitutional claims in this opinion.  
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{¶ 5} The state appealed, arguing that its introduction of the confession 
as corroborating evidence triggered a mandatory prison sentence pursuant to R.C. 
2907.05(C)(2)(a).  2013-Ohio-1352, ¶ 7.  The Tenth District Court of Appeals 
reversed the judgment, holding that the General Assembly was justified in 
distinguishing between cases with and cases without corroborating evidence.  Id. 
at ¶ 9, 19.  In addition, the court of appeals concluded that the corroboration 
provision of R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) was a sentencing factor that need not be found 
by a jury.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 6} Bevly appealed to this court, and we initially declined jurisdiction.  
136 Ohio St.3d 1476, 2013-Ohio-3790, 993 N.E.2d 779.  On reconsideration, we 
accepted Bevly’s two propositions of law: 
 
1.  R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) treats cases where there is 
corroborating evidence differently from those where there is none.  
Because there is no rational basis for this distinction, the statute 
violates the due process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 16, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
2.  R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violates the right to trial by jury 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
 
136 Ohio St.3d 1561, 2013-Ohio-4861, 996 N.E.2d 987. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
{¶ 7} Bevly was charged with, and pled guilty to, two counts of gross 
sexual imposition pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). The penalty provision is found 
at R.C. 2907.05(C)(2) and provides:  
January Term, 2015 
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Gross sexual imposition committed in violation of division 
(A)(4) or (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree.  Except 
as otherwise provided in this division, for gross sexual imposition 
committed in violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of this section 
there is a presumption that a prison term shall be imposed for the 
offense.  The court shall impose on an offender convicted of gross 
sexual imposition in violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of this 
section a mandatory prison term equal to one of the prison terms 
prescribed in section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a felony of 
the third degree if either of the following applies: 
(a) Evidence other than the testimony of the victim was 
admitted in the case corroborating the violation. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 8} R.C. 2907.05(C)(2) thus establishes that a violation of R.C. 
2907.05(A)(4) is a third-degree felony for which there is a presumption that a 
prison term be imposed.  Pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a), the court shall 
impose a mandatory prison term when “[e]vidence other than the testimony of the 
victim was admitted in the case corroborating the violation.” 
A.  R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) lacks a rational basis for distinguishing between cases 
based upon the existence or nonexistence of corroborating evidence 
{¶ 9} Bevly argues that we should adopt the reasoning of the trial court 
and conclude that R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) is unconstitutional because there is no 
rational basis for distinguishing between cases in which there is corroborating 
evidence and those cases in which there is none.  The trial court, as Bevly notes, 
found no other statute that enhances a penalty based upon the amount of evidence 
submitted in the case.  The state counters that the General Assembly has broad 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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discretion in defining crimes and fixing punishments and that the corroborating-
evidence provision is rationally based upon the General Assembly’s desire to 
ensure that evidence other than the victim’s testimony exists before a court would 
be required to impose a prison sentence.  Although the state does not identify any 
other statute that requires corroborating evidence before an enhanced sentence is 
mandated, it notes that R.C. 2907.06(B) requires the existence of corroborating 
evidence before a defendant can be convicted of the crime of sexual imposition. 
{¶ 10} Although R.C. 2907.06(B) does contain a corroborating-evidence 
requirement, that requirement is fundamentally different from the one before us 
today because it constitutes an element of the offense.  R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) is 
unique in Ohio felony-sentencing law in that it enhances the sentence imposed on 
the offender based on the quantity of evidence presented to prove guilt. 
{¶ 11} In the context of R.C. 2907.05, the existence of corroborating 
evidence is irrelevant to the stated purposes of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 
2929.11—protecting the public from future crime and punishing the offender.  
Nor is it comparable to the factors that guide the court in imposing the appropriate 
sentence for other offenses, such as the seriousness of the offender’s conduct 
(e.g., the victim suffered serious physical or mental injury or that injury was 
exacerbated because of the victim’s age, the offender abused a position of trust, or 
the offender was motivated by prejudice) or the likelihood of recidivism (e.g., the 
criminal history of the accused and the lack of remorse).  R.C. 2929.12.  And the 
existence of corroborating evidence adds nothing to the court’s consideration of 
“the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from 
future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of 
the offense, the public, or both.”  R.C. 2929.11(A). 
{¶ 12} Further, the presentation of corroborating evidence differs from 
factors such as the use of a deadly weapon, e.g., R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), the infliction 
of physical harm, e.g., R.C. 2911.02, the quantity or type of drugs, e.g., R.C. 
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2925.11, or the value of stolen property, e.g., R.C. 2913.02, each of which 
increase the penalty used to elevate the degree of the offense in other statutes.  It 
also differs from other statutory penalty enhancements, such as specifications for 
using a firearm to facilitate the commission of an offense, R.C. 2941.145, 
participating in criminal gang activity, R.C. 2941.142, using body armor, R.C. 
2941.1411, or being a repeat violent offender, R.C. 2941.149, or a major drug 
offender, R.C. 2941.1410. 
{¶ 13} Each of those factors allows a sentencing court to gauge the 
offender’s culpability and likelihood of recidivism based on the offender’s 
conduct or criminal history.  Each also evaluates the severity of the offense based 
on the impact of the crime on the victim and society.  In contrast,  R.C. 
2907.05(C)(2)(a) arbitrarily increases the penalty for gross sexual imposition 
committed against a child, based solely on whether the state presented 
corroborating evidence—such as the testimony of a witness, DNA evidence, 
clothing samples, or a confession—to establish guilt.  But the quantity of evidence 
or the number of witnesses used to establish guilt is irrelevant to the imposition of 
punishment. 
{¶ 14} Thus, the legislature has unconstitutionally created two different 
sanctions to be imposed on offenders who commit the same crime—differentiated 
only by the quantity of the evidence presented to prove guilt.  This situation is 
impermissible because it denies due process and equal protection to those 
convicted of this criminal offense. 
{¶ 15} In State v. Thompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 560, 664 N.E.2d 926 
(1996), we explained that the rational-basis test provides that “laws passed by 
virtue of the police power will be upheld if they bear a real and substantial 
relation to the object sought to be obtained, namely, the health, safety, morals or 
general welfare of the public, and are not arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious or 
unreasonable.” 
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{¶ 16} The state maintains that R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) has a rational basis, 
in that it imposes more punishment on an offender when there is more evidence of 
guilt.  But once an accused has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an 
offense, the quantity of evidence is irrelevant to the sentence. 
{¶ 17} In addition, this statute creates a disincentive for an accused to 
confess to a crime.  Although the accused’s confession is, as the state admits, 
often “the lone available corroborating evidence” when the victim of gross sexual 
imposition is a child, this statute enhances punishment for those who confess.  
And as the trial court recognized, any law that discourages the accused from 
taking responsibility for the offense could also potentially force a child victim to 
endure a trial in order for the state to obtain a conviction. 
{¶ 18} We conclude that there is no rational basis for imposing greater 
punishment on offenders based only on the state’s ability to produce additional 
evidence to corroborate the crime.  Corroborating evidence is irrelevant to 
determining the culpability of the offender, the severity of the offense, or the 
likelihood of recidivism.  It bears no relation to ensuring that punishment is 
graduated and proportional, and it does not serve any other theory of penal 
sanctions such as retribution, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.  See generally In re 
C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 50.  And the 
corroborating evidence offered here—Bevly’s confession to police—is merely 
cumulative of his admission of guilt at the plea hearing and provides no additional 
information that proves the offense or justifies an enhanced penalty. 
{¶ 19} Thus, because R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) lacks any reasonable relation 
to the apparent goals of the statute and denies equal protection of the law to those 
convicted of a crime, it is contrary to a constitutional sentencing scheme that must 
apply equally to all convicted and avoid arbitrary or vengeful sentencing of 
selected offenders. 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
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B.  As applied, R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violates the right to trial by jury 
{¶ 20} Even if we were to hold that R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) was 
constitutional, further analysis of the statute indicates that application of the 
statute in this case also violates Bevly’s right as guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Under the low 
standard set in State v. Economo, 76 Ohio St.3d 56, 666 N.E.2d 225 (1996), 
anything other than the victim’s testimony—including Bevly’s confession—
would constitute sufficient corroborating evidence. 
{¶ 21} Bevly argues that the statute improperly and unconstitutionally 
takes away the jury’s authority to determine whether there is corroborating 
evidence, which, if found, requires a mandatory sentence.  The state counters that 
because no fact is decided in a court’s determination of whether corroborating 
evidence was admitted in the case, the statute does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial. 
{¶ 22} The Supreme Court of the United States recently provided 
guidance on this issue in Alleyne v. United States, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 
L.Ed.2d 314 (2013).  Alleyne overruled the court’s previous decision in Harris v. 
United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002).  In both 
cases, the question was whether facts increasing the mandatory minimum 
sentence were elements of the crime that must be submitted to the jury or 
sentencing factors that can be left for a judge’s determination.  The defendant in 
Harris was charged with carrying a firearm in the course of committing a drug-
trafficking crime, which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.  
The five-year sentence could be increased to seven years if it was found that the 
defendant had brandished the firearm.  Id. at 550-551.  The court affirmed the 
judgment of the court of appeals that brandishing was a sentencing factor that was 
not required to be determined by the jury.  Id. at 568-569.  In reaching this 
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conclusion, the plurality opinion explained that “the jury’s verdict has authorized 
the judge to impose the minimum with or without the finding.”  Id. at 557. 
{¶ 23} In Alleyne, the Supreme Court revisited the same statute and issue 
presented in Harris and changed its position.  This time it concluded, “Because 
the finding of brandishing increased the penalty to which the defendant was 
subjected, it was an element, which had to be found by the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Emphasis added.)  Alleyne at 2163.  Because the judge, 
rather than the jury, made the brandishing finding, the court held that Alleyne’s 
Sixth Amendment rights were violated.  Id. at 2163-2164.  The court’s reasoning 
in Alleyne contradicted its earlier reasoning, stating:   
 
When a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so 
as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a 
new offense and must be submitted to the jury.  It is no answer to 
say that the defendant could have received the same sentence with 
or without that fact. 
 
Id. at 2162. 
{¶ 24} The court explained that the analysis pertaining to factors 
increasing a minimum sentence is similar to the analysis pertaining to factors 
increasing a maximum sentence by recognizing that “if a judge were to find a fact 
that increased the statutory maximum sentence, such a finding would violate the 
Sixth Amendment, even if the defendant ultimately received a sentence falling 
within the original sentencing range.”  Id.  “The essential point,” the court 
emphasized, “is that the aggravating fact produced a higher range, which, in turn, 
conclusively indicates that the fact is an element of a distinct and aggravated 
crime.  It must, therefore, be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Id. at 2162-2163.  The court accordingly overruled Harris.  Id. at 2163. 
January Term, 2015 
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{¶ 25} Application of the principles set forth in Alleyne illuminates the 
issue whether R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violates Bevly’s right to a jury trial.  Without 
the existence of corroborating evidence, a conviction for third-degree gross sexual 
imposition under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) subjects the offender to a maximum term of 
up to 60 months in prison.  R.C. 2929.14(A)(3).  That is not a mandatory term, 
although there is a presumption that prison time will be served.  R.C. 
2907.05(C)(2).  And if the presumption is overcome, the court may impose a 
community-control sanction.  R.C. 2929.15.  But with the finding that 
corroborating evidence has been admitted, pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a), the 
offender is subjected to a maximum mandatory prison term of 60 months.  The 
corroborating evidence aggravates the prescribed punishment.  Applying Alleyne 
to this case, we conclude that the corroboration requirement in R.C. 
2907.05(C)(2)(a) is an element that would have been required to be found by a 
jury and that application of the statute in Bevly’s case violated the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial. 
{¶ 26} By its terms, R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) elevates the minimum 
sentence for gross sexual imposition pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) from a 
presumption of prison time to a mandatory prison term.  In raising the floor of the 
minimum sentence, the statute produces a higher sentencing range.  As explained 
by Alleyne, this “conclusively indicates that the fact is an element of a distinct and 
aggravated crime.”  Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2163, 186 L.Ed.2d 314. 
{¶ 27} We reject the state’s argument that under Alleyne, Bevly’s 
argument still fails because no fact is determined in the corroborating-evidence 
requirement.  According to the state’s argument, once the court determines that 
additional evidence is legally sufficient to corroborate, the evidence satisfies the 
requirement regardless of what weight the jury would actually give the evidence.  
We read the statute differently.  R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) requires a mandatory 
sentence when “[e]vidence other than the testimony of the victim was admitted in 
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the case corroborating the violation.”  It is true that corroborating evidence need 
not be independently sufficient to convict the accused or meet every essential 
element of the crime charged.  Economo, 76 Ohio St.3d 56, 666 N.E.2d 225, 
syllabus.  Nevertheless, the jury still must make a factual determination.  
Evidence is not corroborating simply because it has been admitted by the court, 
and under Alleyne the fact that corroborating evidence has been admitted is an 
aggravating fact that must be submitted to the jury.  We therefore hold that a 
finding of the existence of corroborating evidence pursuant to R.C. 
2907.05(C)(2)(a) increases the penalty to which a defendant convicted of gross 
sexual imposition is subjected and thus is an element that must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 28} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals for two reasons. 
{¶ 29} We hold that because there is no rational basis for the provision in 
R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) that requires a mandatory prison term for a defendant 
convicted of gross sexual imposition when the state has produced evidence 
corroborating the crime, the statute violates the due-process protections of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
Furthermore, because a finding of the existence of corroborating evidence 
pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) is an element that must be found by a jury, we 
hold that the application of R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) in this case violated Bevly’s 
right to trial by jury found in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution.  We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and we 
remand the case to the trial court for imposition of its sentence in accordance with 
this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2015 
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O’DONNELL, J. concurs separately. 
FRENCH, J., dissents. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring separately. 
{¶ 30} I agree with the majority that there is no rational basis for imposing 
greater punishment on offenders based on the state’s ability to produce additional 
evidence to corroborate proof of the crime.  In my view, corroborating evidence is 
different from other statutory sentencing factors that focus on the circumstances 
of the offense and the conduct and criminal history of the offender but that do not 
focus on the quantity of evidence presented to prove guilt. 
{¶ 31} This resolution renders moot the question whether the trial court’s 
factual findings also violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, and in 
my view, the majority’s discussion of that claim is superfluous to our holding.  “It 
is well settled that this court will not reach constitutional issues unless absolutely 
necessary.”  State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 
1201, ¶ 9; see also Ohioans for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Taft, 67 Ohio St.3d 
180, 183, 616 N.E.2d 905 (1993), quoting Hall China Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 50 
Ohio St.2d 206, 210, 364 N.E.2d 852 (1977) (“ ‘Ohio law abounds with precedent 
to the effect that constitutional issues should not be decided unless absolutely 
necessary’ ”). 
{¶ 32} And as Judge Roberts, now Chief Justice Roberts, explained in 
PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Adm., 362 F.3d 786, 
799 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment), “the cardinal principle of judicial restraint [is that] if it is not necessary 
to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” 
{¶ 33} Here, it is unnecessary to decide whether R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) 
implicates the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused, and therefore I would not 
address that issue as an alternative basis for resolving this case. 
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_________________ 
FRENCH, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 34} When its victims are younger than 13, the crime of gross sexual 
imposition (“GSI”) carries a mandatory prison term, as opposed to a presumption 
of prison, so long as “[e]vidence other than the testimony of the victim was 
admitted in the case corroborating the violation.”  R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a).  I 
cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that this corroboration provision 
simultaneously violates due process, equal protection, and the right to a jury trial.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
Due Process, Equal Protection, and Rational Basis 
{¶ 35} The corroboration distinction in R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) carries a 
“strong presumption of validity” and must survive a due-process or equal-
protection challenge if it rationally relates to a legitimate government purpose.  
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993).  This 
deferential rational-basis standard is “a paradigm of judicial restraint,” Fed. 
Communications Comm. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314, 113 
S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993), and “not a license for courts to judge the 
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices,” id. at 313.  “The Constitution 
presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions 
will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial 
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a 
political branch has acted.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 
97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979).  Therefore, a legislative classification 
must survive so long as a court can conceive of any “plausible” policy 
justification—regardless of whether the court views that reason as unwise, unfair, 
or illogical.  Beach Communications at 313, 314. 
{¶ 36} R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) passes this deferential standard.  The 
General Assembly rationally could have concluded that it is unwise or unfair to 
January Term, 2015 
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categorically mandate prison for every person guilty of GSI against a child victim 
and that more sentencing discretion is appropriate in cases when no evidence 
corroborated the child victim’s testimony.  By reserving the mandatory term (and 
the associated costs and resources) for convictions with the most evidence of 
guilt, the General Assembly has made a policy determination that corroboration is 
relevant to the punishment for child GSI convictions.  As the court of appeals 
recognized in unanimously upholding the statute, “It seems obvious that the 
General Assembly felt that it was better to start out with a sentence that was not 
required to be mandatory and to make the sentence mandatory only if there is 
corroborative proof beyond the alleged victim's testimony that the crime was 
actually committed.”  2013-Ohio-1352, ¶ 9.  Accord State v. Ahlers, 12th Dist. 
Butler No. CA2013-07-134, 2014-Ohio-3991, ¶ 12-13. 
{¶ 37} Reasonable minds can debate the wisdom of this policy.  See 
Antkowiak, Judicial Nullification, 38 Creighton L.Rev. 545, 548 (2005) (arguing 
that “judges should openly indulge doubts that they have about the guilt of the 
defendant as a mitigating factor in sentencing”).  Compare State v. Watson, 61 
Ohio St.3d 1, 17, 572 N.E.2d 97 (1991) (holding that “[r]esidual doubt of a capital 
defendant’s guilt may properly be considered in mitigation”) with State v. 
McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112 (1997) (abrogating Watson).  And 
as long as the question is “ ‘at least debatable,’ ” it is not subject to judicial veto 
in a rational-basis review.  Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 
464, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), quoting United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed.1234 (1938). 
{¶ 38} The majority argues only that R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) is a bad 
policy, citing its own belief that the existence of corroboration is “irrelevant” to 
punishment.  Majority opinion at ¶ 11.  As members of the judiciary, we cannot 
use rational-basis review to “substitute our personal notions of good public policy 
for” such legislative choices.  Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234, 101 S.Ct. 
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1074, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981).  Regardless, it is hardly arbitrary to subject the 
same quanta of proof to the same sentencing consequences, especially when one 
of the goals of felony sentencing is that each sentence be “consistent with 
sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”  R.C. 
2929.11(B). 
{¶ 39} Accordingly, I believe that R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) survives 
rational-basis scrutiny and does not offend due process or equal protection. 
The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial 
{¶ 40} Under the Sixth Amendment rule of Alleyne v. United States, ___ 
U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2163, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), “facts that increase 
mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury.”  This is an 
extension of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 
435 (2000), which held the same with respect to facts that increase a sentence 
beyond the statutory maximum.  Importantly, the Apprendi principle applies only 
to findings of “fact” that increase punishment, not to legal determinations that are 
necessary for punishment.  See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 213-214, 
127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (sentencing determination did not 
implicate Apprendi because it required “statutory interpretation, not judicial 
factfinding”); United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 532 (6th Cir.2013) 
(recognizing that “Apprendi does not apply to every ‘determination’ that increases 
a defendant’s maximum sentence”). 
{¶ 41} The question, then, is whether the corroboration requirement in 
R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) presents a question of “fact.”  It does not, and we explained 
why in State v. Economo, 76 Ohio St.3d 56, 60, 666 N.E.2d 225 (1996).  In that 
case, we considered the corroboration requirement of the sexual-imposition 
statute, R.C. 2907.06(B), which states that “[n]o person shall be convicted * * * 
solely upon the victim’s testimony unsupported by other evidence.”  After 
surveying cases from other jurisdictions with similar corroboration requirements, 
January Term, 2015 
17 
we concluded that corroboration “is a threshold inquiry of legal sufficiency to be 
determined by the trial judge, not a question of proof, which is the province of the 
factfinder.”  Economo at 60. 
{¶ 42} Economo is binding precedent and should be followed.  
Determining the existence of corroboration is a legal question regarding the 
quantum of evidence, one that is satisfied by even “[s]light circumstances or 
evidence which tends to support the victim’s testimony.”  Id.  The inquiry is akin 
to other evidentiary rulings within the province of the court.  See Evid.R. 
804(B)(3) (making out-of-court statements that inculpate or exculpate a criminal 
defendant inadmissible “unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate 
[their] truthworthiness”).  As stated by the “majority of jurisdictions” that had 
then considered the issue, “there is ‘nothing exceptional about a court deciding a 
question such as corroboration * * * without the jury.’ ”  Fowler v. United States, 
31 A.3d 88, 92 (D.C.2011), quoting United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 
642 (D.C.Cir.1999). 
{¶ 43} The legal question of corroboration is fundamentally different from 
the elemental fact-finding at issue in Apprendi and its progeny.  The statutes in 
those cases allowed sentencing courts to resolve disputed allegations about what 
the accused did; they did not address legal questions.  See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 468, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (statute allowing increased 
punishment upon a finding that the defendant acted with a “purpose to 
intimidate”); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 298, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 
L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (finding that the defendant acted with “deliberate cruelty”); 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 
(2005) (finding that the defendant “possessed an additional 566 grams of crack”); 
Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2156, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (finding that the defendant 
“brandished” a firearm).  By contrast, the existence of corroborating evidence 
does not require judicial overreaching into the facts defining the offense.  Indeed, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
corroboration is not a fact in this sense; it is additional proof of a fact.  See 
Black’s Law Dictionary 421 (10th Ed.2014) (defining corroboration as 
“[c]onfirmation or support by additional evidence”). 
{¶ 44} For these reasons, I would affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.  
Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Chief Counsel, Appellate Division, for appellee. 
Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and David L. Strait, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
_________________