Case Title: Ex parte Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Sherry Knowles v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070798

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
rel: 08/15/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2008
_________________________
1070798
_________________________
Ex parte Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Sherry Knowles
v.
Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc.)
(Macon Circuit Court, CV-06-99)
WOODALL, Justice.
Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc. ("MCGP"),  petitions
this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Macon Circuit
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2
Court to vacate an order compelling MCGP to produce statements
from two of its employees in an action filed against it by
Sherry Knowles.  We grant the petition and issue the writ. 
MCGP operates a gaming facility known as VictoryLand,
where Knowles is employed.  On May 2, 2006, Knowles was
playing an electronic bingo game at VictoryLand. Knowles
alleges that while playing the game she hit a jackpot on the
machine worth $41,800,000.  According to her, the machine did
not appear to be malfunctioning when the jackpot was
indicated.
Shortly after the apparent jackpot, James Graham and
Chris Fogarty, MCGP employees, approached Knowles.  She says
that they informed her that the jackpot was "not a valid win,"
because, according to them, the machine had "malfunctioned."
The machine was "cleared," and Knowles continued to play the
same machine.  Within a few minutes, she won a jackpot of
$2,505, which MCGP paid.  Knowles made no complaint concerning
the earlier apparent jackpot and MCGP's failure to pay the
winnings, and the other employees prepared no report of the
event or their response to it.  
1070798
The purported jackpot actually occurred on May 2, 2006,
1
one week after April 25, 2006.  However, neither party makes
any issue of the discrepancy in the attorney's letter
concerning the date.
3
On May 12, 2006, MCGP received a letter from an attorney
representing Knowles.  The letter stated in its entirety:
"Please be advised that I represent Sherry
Knowles.  Please preserve all evidence relating to
her winnings on or about April 24, 2006 or April 25,
2006.
 This would include video surveillance,
[1]
evidence from computer memory and any other evidence
of any kind.  Also, we ask that there be no action
undertaken on the machine in question that would
alter or destroy any record of events occurring on
April 24th or April 25th."
The letter was seen that same day by Stanley Hubbard, the
gaming director at VictoryLand.  He, at that time, directed
Graham and Fogarty to prepare written statements concerning
their knowledge of the May 2 events involving Knowles.  The
employees prepared the statements on "incident report" forms
and submitted them to Hubbard.
On May 16, 2006, Knowles sued MCGP.  In substance, she
claimed that she had been wrongfully deprived of the jackpot
win of $41,800,000 and that she is entitled to recover
compensatory and punitive damages.  During discovery, Knowles
learned of the statements prepared by Graham and Fogarty.  She
requested copies of those statements, but MCGP objected to
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4
their production, arguing that the statements were prepared in
anticipation of litigation and, therefore, that they qualify
as work-product.  However, the trial court ordered the
production of  the statements, and MCGP then petitioned this
Court for relief.  
"The order challenged in this case involving alleged work
product ... is reviewable [by a petition for a writ of
mandamus]."  Ex parte Meadowbrook Ins. Group, Inc., [Ms.
1061493, December 21, 2007]  ___ So. 2d   ___, ___ (Ala.
2007).  However, "'this Court will not reverse a trial court's
ruling on a discovery issue unless the trial court has clearly
exceeded its discretion.'"  Id. at ___ (quoting Ex parte Ocwen
Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala. 2003)). 
MCGP insists that "the employee statements here are
protected from disclosure by the work-product privilege, as
they were prepared in anticipation of litigation."  Petition,
at 19-20.  Knowles, on the other hand, argues that MCGP "has
failed to carry its burden of establishing that the
[statements] were done in anticipation of litigation."
Knowles's brief, at 19.  We agree with MCGP.  
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5
"Documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable,
which are prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial by
or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative, are protected as work product and are not
otherwise discoverable.  See Rule 26(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P."
Ex parte Flowers, [Ms. 1061201, March 28, 2008] ___ So. 2d
___, ___ (Ala. 2008) (footnote omitted).  In this case, MCGP
objected to discovery, claiming that Graham's and Fogarty's
statements are work-product, and Knowles sought an order
compelling their production.  At that time, MCGP was required
to make an evidentiary showing of the elements of the work-
product exception.  See Meadowbrook, ___ So. 2d at ___.  Those
elements are "'"(1)[that] the materials sought to be protected
are documents or tangible things; (2) [that] they were
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial; and (3)
[that] 
they 
were 
prepared 
by 
or 
for 
a 
party 
or 
a
representative of that party."'"  Id. at ___ (quoting Johnson
v. Gmeinder, 191 F.R.D. 638, 643 (D. Kan. 2000)).  Statements
of witnesses taken in anticipation of litigation are protected
by Rule 26(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Ex parte Norfolk Southern
Ry., 897 So. 2d 290, 292-95 (Ala. 2004).  "Of course, the
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involvement of an attorney as the person taking the statement
is not a prerequisite to the qualification of the statement as
work-product."  Id. at 294.  However, it must be shown that
"it was reasonable for the [objecting party] to [assume], in
light of the circumstances [existing when the statements were
taken], that litigation could be expected."  Ex parte Alabama
Dep't of Youth Servs., 927 So. 2d 805, 808 (Ala. 2005). 
In support of its work-product claim, MCGP submitted an
affidavit from Stanley Hubbard, the management employee who
directed Graham and Fogarty to prepare their statements
regarding the events of May 2.  According to Hubbard, on May
2, Graham telephoned him "and informed [him] that the credit
meter on a machine being played by Sherry Knowles was rolling
up far in excess of the credits which can be won on that
machine."  Hubbard "instructed ... Graham to notify the
machine vendor technician."  He did not request that any
statements be prepared concerning the incident.  According to
Hubbard, Knowles made no complaint regarding the events of May
2, and, "[i]f a patron does not make a complaint, [MCGP]
employees do not complete an 'incident report' in the normal
course of business."
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7
Hubbard's affidavit indicates that his perception of the
situation changed on May 12 when he saw the letter from
Knowles's attorney.  He says that after he saw the letter he
"believed that [Knowles] was about to file a lawsuit" and
"expect[ed] a lawsuit to be imminent."  On that same date, he
instructed Graham and Fogarty to prepare the statements at
issue, "based upon [his] belief that ... Knowles was about to
file a lawsuit against VictoryLand."  In light of the
significant amount of the purported jackpot, as well as the
attorney's request that "all evidence" be preserved, it was
certainly reasonable for Hubbard to conclude that litigation
could be expected.  Consequently, MCGP's claim that the
statements are work-product is well-founded.
Knowles characterizes her attorney's letter as "a
nonthreatening 
letter 
requesting 
nothing 
more 
than
preservation 
of 
information relative to her jackpot."
Knowles's brief, at 6.  According to Knowles, the letter
"offered no threat of litigation."  Id. at 17.  Presumably,
she would have this Court hold that it was unreasonable for
Hubbard to conclude that she was planning to institute legal
action regarding "her jackpot."  However, such a holding would
1070798
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be untenable.  As Hubbard reasonably concluded, legal action
was likely, and, in fact, a complaint was filed only four days
after the letter was received.  
Knowles argues that this Court's decision in Ex parte
Cryer, 814 So. 2d 239 (Ala. 2001), supports her argument that
the employees' statements are not work-product.  In Cryer, we
held that a defendant in a medical-malpractice action "ha[d]
not satisfied her burden of establishing that her notes
[concerning the treatment of her patients] were prepared in
anticipation of litigation."  814 So. 2d at 248.  However,
unlike the situation in this case, when the doctor in Cryer
"made her notes ..., [she] did not know that [the plaintiffs]
had hired an attorney."  814 So. 2d at 247.  Although the
plaintiffs' attorney had written a letter requesting medical
records, the doctor's affidavit, unlike Hubbard's affidavit,
did not aver that the doctor was aware of the letter when she
prepared her notes.  Stated simply, MCGP carried its burden of
proof through an adequate affidavit, while the defendant in
Cryer did not.
"Even if the work-product privilege applies, Rule
26(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., recognizes an exception when the
1070798
9
party requesting the material can show substantial need
coupled with undue hardship."  Ex parte Norfolk Southern Ry.,
897 So. 2d at 295.  However, Knowles does not argue that this
exception applies here.  Indeed, she has already deposed James
Graham and, when MCGP filed its petition for a writ of
mandamus, she had scheduled the deposition of Chris Fogarty.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court
clearly exceeded its discretion when it ordered the production
of the written statements prepared by Graham and Fogarty at
Hubbard's request.  MCGP is clearly entitled to an order
directing the trial court to vacate its discovery order.
Thus, we grant the petition and issue the writ. 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.  
Cobb, C.J., and See, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.