Case Title: Title Max of Birmingham, Inc. v. Jeffrey T. Edwards

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1051140

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 5/18/2007 Title Max of Birmingham, Inc. v. Edwards
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1051140
____________________
Title Max of Birmingham, Inc.
v.
Jeffrey T. Edwards
Appeal from Talladega Circuit Court 
(CV-05-475)
SEE, Justice.
Title Max of Birmingham, Inc., appeals the denial of its
motion to compel Jeffrey T. Edwards to arbitrate his claims
against Title Max alleging conversion and negligence in
connection with the repossession of a 1998 model year Ford F-
1051140
2
150 pickup truck.  Because the trial court erred in failing to
compel Edwards to arbitrate, we reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural Background
Edwards entered into a pawn transaction with Title Max,
pledging a security interest in his 2000 model year Ford F-150
extended cab truck in exchange for a loan.  Edwards had a 30-
day grace period following the maturity date of the loan in
which to repay the loan and to pay the other charges.  The
agreement evidencing the transaction ("the pawn agreement")
gave Title Max the right to repossess the truck if the loan
was not repaid and the other charges paid before the
expiration of the grace period.  Edwards defaulted on the
loan.  Pursuant to its contractual right, Title Max sent its
agent, Jack Burke, to repossess the truck.  
According to Edwards, Burke arrived at Edwards's house
and informed him that he was repossessing the truck.  When the
key Title Max had given Burke to use in repossessing the truck
did not fit the door or the ignition of the truck in Edwards's
driveway, Burke had the truck towed away; the truck he had
towed was a 1998 model year Ford F-150.  Later, when Burke
realized that he had repossessed the wrong truck, he left the
1051140
3
1998 truck at a gasoline station and returned to Edwards's
house to inform Edwards of the mistake and to tell him where
he had left his truck.  Eventually, the police instructed
Burke to return the truck to Edwards, but, according to
Edwards, by that time the truck had been damaged and would no
longer start.  
Edwards sued Title Max and Burke in the Talladega Circuit
Court, alleging conversion of the 1998 truck and negligent
repossession.  Title Max moved to stay the action and to
compel binding arbitration 
pursuant 
to 
an 
arbitration
provision that Edwards had signed as part of the pawn
agreement.  The arbitration provision reads, in pertinent
part, as follows:
"For the purposes of this Waiver of Jury Trial and
Arbitration 
Provision 
(hereinafter 
'Arbitration
Provision'), the words 'dispute' and 'disputes' are
given the broadest possible meaning and include,
without limitation (a) all claims, disputes, or
controversies arising from or relating directly or
indirectly to the signing of this Arbitration
Provision, [and] the validity and scope of this
Arbitration Provision ...; (b) all federal or state
law claims, disputes or controversies, arising from
or relating directly or indirectly to this Pawn
Ticket ...; (d) all common law claims, based upon
contract tort, fraud, or other intentional torts;
... (g) all claims asserted by you individually
against us ... including claims for money damages
and/or equitable or injunctive relief; ....
1051140
4
"... This Arbitration 
Provision 
is 
made 
pursuant
to a transaction involving interstate commerce and
shall be governed by the [Federal Arbitration Act]."
The trial court denied Title Max's motion to compel
Edwards to submit the dispute to arbitration.  Title Max
appeals.
Standard of Review
"A direct appeal is the proper procedure by which to seek
review of a trial court's order denying a motion to compel
arbitration."  Homes of Legend, Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So. 2d
741, 745 (Ala. 2000); Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. P.  We review
the trial court's grant or denial of a motion to compel
arbitration de novo.  Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Inc.,
879 So. 2d 1139, 1141 (Ala. 2003).  The party seeking to
compel arbitration has the initial burden of proving the
existence of a contract calling for arbitration and proving
that 
that 
contract 
evidences 
a transaction involving
interstate commerce. 
 
Polaris Sales, 
Inc. v. Heritage Imports,
Inc., 879 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Ala. 2003).  The moving party
"'"must produce some evidence which tends to establish its
claim."'"  Wolff Motor Co. v. White, 869 So. 2d 1129, 1131
(Ala. 2003) (quoting Jim Burke Auto., Inc. v. Beavers, 674 So.
1051140
5
2d 1260, 1265 (Ala. 1995), quoting in turn In re American
Freight Sys., Inc., 164 B.R. 341, 345 (D. Kan. 1994)).  Once
the moving party meets this initial burden, the nonmovant then
has the burden to present evidence tending to show that the
arbitration agreement is invalid or inapplicable to the case.
Polaris, 879 So. 2d at 1132.
Analysis
The issue presented by this appeal is whether a court or
the arbitrators should determine the scope of the arbitration
provision in this case and whether it includes Edwards's
claims against Title Max.  Title Max argues that the parties
agreed to arbitrate the arbitrability of any dispute between
them and that the arbitration provision in the pawn agreement,
quoted in part above, is broad enough to require Edwards to
arbitrate 
his 
claims 
of 
conversion 
and 
negligent 
repossession.
Edwards argues that the property that forms the basis of his
claims against Title Max is the 1998 model year Ford F-150
truck and that there is no contract concerning that property;
he asserts, therefore, that "[t]here is no privity between the
parties concerning the transaction which gave rise to the
lawsuit."  Edwards's brief at 5. 
1051140
6
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq., provides, in pertinent part:
"A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a
transaction 
involving 
commerce 
to 
settle 
by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction ... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."
Section 2 has the effect of preempting conflicting Alabama
law, in particular § 8-1-41(3), Ala. Code 1975, which makes
predispute agreements to arbitrate unenforceable.  Garikes,
Wilson, & Atkinson, Inc. v. Episcopal Found. of Jefferson
County, Inc., 614 So. 2d 447, 448 (Ala. 1993).  It thereby
makes enforceable a predispute arbitration agreement in a
contract evidencing a transaction that involves interstate
commerce.  McCollough, 776 So.2d at 745.  
Title Max had the initial burden of producing "some
evidence" that a contract calling for arbitration exists and
that the underlying transaction involves interstate commerce.
Polaris, 879 So. 2d at 1132.  Edwards does not question that
the pawn transaction involved interstate commerce; therefore,
we turn to whether a contract requiring the arbitration of
this dispute 
exists. 
 The arbitration provision, quoted above,
1051140
7
appears in the record.  Edwards does not dispute that he
signed an arbitration provision as part of the pawn
transaction that gave Title Max a security interest in the
2000 model year Ford F-150.  The arbitration provision on its
face applies to "all claims, disputes, or controversies
arising from or relating directly or indirectly to the signing
of this Arbitration Provision" as well as to "all claims
asserted by [Edwards] individually against [Title Max]."
Title Max, therefore, has put forward sufficient evidence
indicating that it and Edwards entered into a contract that
contains an arbitration agreement.    
  
Because Title Max met its burden to prove the existence
of a contract calling for arbitration, the burden then shifted
to Edwards "to present evidence showing that the arbitration
provision in the contract does not apply to the dispute in
question."  Medical Servs., LLC v. GMW & Co., [Ms. 1041753,
December 15, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006).  Edwards
argues that the arbitration provision does not apply to "other
property" in his possession, that is, to property other than
the 2000 model year Ford F-150 truck, the title to which he
pawned when he entered the pawn agreement.  Therefore, he
1051140
8
argues, there is no contract requiring arbitration regarding
any claims he might have against Title Max and Burke relating
to the 1998 model year Ford F-150 truck.  
"[A] party who contests the existence of a contract
containing an arbitration provision cannot be compelled to
arbitrate that threshold issue because an arbitrator derives
his authority solely from the parties' agreement.  Only a
court can resolve the question whether a contract exists."
Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Ventura, 907 So. 2d 1035, 1040 (Ala.
2005).  However, Edwards does not contest that he signed a
contract with Title Max containing an arbitration provision;
instead, he essentially argues that his claims do not fall
within the scope of the arbitration provision he signed.
Arbitration is a matter of contract, and this Court applies
the ordinary state-law principles governing contracts in
construing an agreement to arbitrate.  Polaris Sales, 879 So.
2d at 1133.  "'When a court construes a contract, "the clear
and plain meaning of the terms of the contract are to be given
effect, and the parties are presumed to have intended what the
terms clearly state."'"  H & S Homes, L.L.C. v. Shaner, 940
So. 2d 981, 988 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Polaris Sales, 879 So. 2d
1051140
9
at 1133, quoting in turn Strickland v. Rahaim, 549 So. 2d 58,
60 
(Ala. 
1989)).  "'[I]n 
applying 
general state-law 
principles
of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an
arbitration agreement within the scope of the Act, due regard
must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and
ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself
resolved in favor of arbitration.'"  McCollough, 776 So. 2d at
745 (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989)). 
In Jim Burke Automotive, Inc. v. McGrue, 826 So. 2d 122
(Ala. 2002), this Court confronted the question whether the
parties intended to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability.  The
arbitration agreement there provided that the parties would
arbitrate "all disputes ... including but not limited to: the
terms of this agreement and all clauses herein contained,
their breadth and scope ...." 826 So. 2d at 132.  We held that
"[t]he language of the arbitration agreement is clear and
unmistakable evidence indicating that McGrue and Jim Burke
intended to arbitrate the question of arbitrability (i.e., the
scope, the interpretation, and the application of the
agreement) 
of 
any 
disputes 
that 
arose 
from 
their
1051140
Where contract terms are unambiguous, we do not look
1
beyond the plain language of the contract to second-guess the
10
relationship."  Jim Burke Automotive, 826 So. 2d at 132. For
this reason, we held that the trial court erred when it
decided the question of the arbitrability of McGrue's claims
against Jim Burke instead of submitting the question to the
arbitrator.
We have held that "[a] trial court should not order
arbitration of the issue of arbitrability except upon
'"clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]" evidence' that the parties
agreed to arbitrate that issue."  Jim Burke Automotive, 826
So. 2d at 132 (quoting Commercial Credit Corp. v. Leggett, 744
So. 2d 890, 892 (Ala. 1999), quoting in turn First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995))
(alterations in original).  Here, Edwards agreed to arbitrate
"all claims, disputes, or controversies arising from or
relating directly or indirectly to the signing of this
Arbitration Provision, [and] the validity and scope of this
Arbitration Provision ...."  The arbitration provision thus
demonstrates that the parties intended to arbitrate whether
the agreement applies to "any disputes that arose from their
relationship."   Jim Burke Automotive, 826 So. 2d at 127.  We
1
1051140
intentions of the parties; nor will we speculate about what
may have been the subjective expectations of the parties.  See
Harbison v. Strickland, 900 So. 2d 385, 391 (Ala. 2004)
("'[I]t is elementary that it is the terms of the written
contract, not the mental operations of one of the parties,
that control its interpretation.'" (quoting Kinmon v. J.P.
King Auction Co., 290 Ala. 323, 325, 276 So. 2d 569, 570
(1973))); Turner v. West Ridge Apartments, Inc., 893 So. 2d
332, 335 (Ala. 2004) ("'[A] court should give the terms of the
agreement their clear and plain meaning and should presume
that the parties intended what the terms of the agreement
clearly state.'" (quoting Ex parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales,
Inc., 718 So. 2d 33, 36 (Ala. 1998))); Lilley v. Gonzales, 417
So. 2d 161, 163 (Ala. 1982) ("[T]he law of contracts is
premised 
upon 
an 
objective 
rather 
than 
a 
subjective
manifestation of intent approach.").  Chief Justice Cobb, in
her special writing, suggests that this Court should exercise
a more pliable jurisprudence and look beyond the four corners
of the arbitration agreement, calculate what consequences one
of the parties likely did not foresee, and effectuate, instead
of the express terms of the contract, the "'reasonable
expectation of the parties who commit themselves to be bound
by the provisions of the arbitration agreement.'"  ___ So. 2d
at ___ (Cobb, C.J., concurring specially) (quoting Mehler v.
Terminix Int'l Co., 205 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 2000),
summarizing Leadertex, Inc. v. Morgantown Dyeing & Finishing
Corp., 67 F.3d 20, 29 (2d Cir. 1995)).  
The Supreme Court of the United States tells us that
"Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration
provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such
provisions be placed 'upon the same footing as other
contracts.'" Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681, 687 (1996) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).  Thus, because we cannot single out
arbitration clauses for special scrutiny, any rule that we
would adopt to achieve the objective of judicially altering
the terms of an arbitration agreement would necessarily apply
to all contracts.  However, the Constitution of Alabama
prohibits this Court from substituting its "belief" as to what
one of the parties did or did not intend for the express terms
11
1051140
to which both parties agreed in a contract and thereby
impairing the obligation of contracts.  Ala. Const. 1901, Art.
IV, § 95 ("There can be no law of this state impairing the
obligation of contracts by destroying or impairing the remedy
for their enforcement ....").  
The freedom of parties to contract is an important public
policy written into the state constitution and adopted by the
people of Alabama. It is a significant liberty interest that
is expressly protected in the constitution.  This Court has
recognized that "'the state constitution protects contractual
obligations from impairment by the legislature or the
judiciary, and the right of freedom of contract is a cherished
one that courts are bound to protect.'"  Ex parte Life Ins.
Co. of Georgia, 810 So. 2d 744, 751 (Ala. 2001) (quoting
Sutton v. Epperson, 631 So. 2d 832, 835 (Ala. 1993)).  
"Even under what may seem to be the most
compelling circumstances, [courts] may not 'refine
away the terms of the contract that are expressed
with sufficient clarity to convey the intent and
meaning of the parties.' Kinnon v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d [887,] 888 [(Ala.
1982)]. 'It is not a function of the courts to make
new contracts for the parties, or raise doubts where
none exist.' Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Rose's
Stores, 411 So. 2d 122, 124 (Ala. 1982)." 
Johnson v. Cervera, 508 So. 2d 257, 259 (Ala. 1987).  
Chief 
Justice Cobb's 
special writing cites as a 
model 
for
2
this Court the decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Mehler v. Terminix Int'l Co., 205
F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 2000), reciting from Leadertex, Inc. v.
Morgantown Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20, 29 (2d Cir.
1995), that "the key inquiry is what was the reasonable
12
reject the argument that the trial court should hold that the
arbitration provision does not apply because there is no
contract relating to the 1998 model year Ford F-150.   It was
2
1051140
expectation of the parties who commit themselves to be bound
by the provisions of the arbitration agreement."  The Second
Circuit, however, chose not to apply the earlier language
found in Leadertex, citing it only in a string citation
indicating 
contrary 
authority. 
 In 
Mehler, 
where 
the 
defendant
punctured a homeowner's underground heating-oil line while
performing 
a 
termite examination, 
the Second Circuit held 
that
this 
injury, 
which 
presumably 
was 
not 
specifically
contemplated by the homeowner, nonetheless was within the
scope of the arbitration agreement because 
"the arbitration clause at issue is a classically
broad one.  The clause provides for arbitration of
'any controversy or claim between [the parties]
arising out of or relating to' the Agreement. We
have previously decided that this is 'precisely the
kind of broad arbitration clause that justifies a
presumption of arbitrability.'" 
205 F.3d at 49 (citations omitted).  The arbitration provision
that Edwards executed is similarly broad.
Both this Court and the federal courts of appeals have
3
held that a court's enforcement of an arbitration agreement
does not violate the protections established by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.  See Caley
v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1371 (11th Cir.
2005).  "Nor does the fact that the appellees waived their
right to a jury trial require the court to evaluate the
agreement to arbitrate under a more demanding standard.  It is
clear that a party may waive her right to adjudicate disputes
in a judicial forum. ... [T]he 'loss of the right to a jury
trial is a necessary and fairly obvious consequence of an
agreement to arbitrate.'" Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Servicing
13
improper for the trial court to decide the issue of
arbitrability in this case because Edwards agreed to submit to
arbitration any questions regarding "the validity and scope of
this Arbitration Provision."  
3
1051140
Corp., 252 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pierson v.
Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir.
1984)); see also Burden v. Check into Cash of Kentucky, LLC,
267 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2001) (following Sydnor), and
 
Service Corp. Int'l v. Fulmer, 883 So. 2d 621, 633 n.15 (Ala.
2003)("A party may freely choose to give up his constitutional
right to a jury trial even when doing so is required to
receive some good or service ....").  Moreover, Alabama law
and policy to the contrary must yield to the federal policy.
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act "is a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, 
notwithstanding 
any 
state 
substantive 
or
procedural policies to the contrary." Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).  The
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States
prohibits this Court from rejecting those federal policies
with which it may disagree.  See U.S. Const. Art. VI.   
14
Because we hold that the parties agreed to arbitrate the
question of the scope of the arbitration provision, we do not
reach Title Max's alternative argument that the terms of the
arbitration provision are broad enough to encompass Edwards's
claims of conversion and negligent repossession.  See Jim
Burke Auto., 826 So. 2d at 132 ("Because we hold that the
trial 
court 
improperly 
decided 
the 
question 
of 
the
arbitrability of McGrue's claims against Jim Burke, we must
also hold that the issue whether those claims come within the
agreement is not before us.  That question is within the
province of the arbitrator.").
Conclusion
1051140
15
The parties agreed to arbitrate the issue of the validity
and scope of the arbitration provision contained in the pawn
agreement; therefore, the trial court erred in denying Title
Max's motion to stay the proceedings and to compel binding
arbitration.  For this reason, the order is reversed and this
case remanded with directions to grant Title Max's motion to
stay proceedings and to compel binding arbitration.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ.,
concur.
Cobb, C.J., concurs specially.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
1051140
16
COBB, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
Current Alabama law applied to the facts of the case
produces a result that is deeply troubling. It is my belief
that not only did Edwards not intend to compel his future
conversion claim to arbitration, but also current arbitration
law provides too broad an application of agreements to
arbitrate. Although I realize that well-established Alabama
law confines judicial review of a contract to the four corners
of the contract and rejects subjective review of the parties'
intent, the resulting overly broad application of arbitration
agreements, such as in the instant case, is nonetheless
unjust.
The arbitration provision here is written in an attempt
to encompass any conceivable scenario that might result in
civil litigation and to refer the dispute resulting from such
a scenario to a panel of arbitrators for resolution.  The
broad 
language 
of 
the 
arbitration 
provision 
militates 
strongly
against each citizen's right to a jury trial as guaranteed by
our state and federal constitutions.  U.S. Const, Amend. VII;
Ala. Const. 1901, § 11.  I believe that this Court's duty is
to construe strictly documents that are in plain derogation of
1051140
17
constitutional rights. However, this Court's decision to bind
these parties to arbitration based on the language of the
arbitration provision is supported by its similar holding in
Jim Burke Automotive, Inc. v. McGrue, 826 So. 2d 122 (Ala.
2002). In Jim Burke Automotive, the Court interpreted an
arbitration agreement with language similar to the language
here as holding that the parties intended to arbitrate "any
disputes 
that 
arose 
from 
[the 
parties'] 
relationship." 
826 
So.
2d at 132. Applying that caselaw to the instant case results
in a holding that the parties' agreement to arbitrate the
scope of the arbitration provision requires that the
conversion and negligent-repossession issues raised in this
case, issues that are entirely distinct from the pawn
agreement, must be submitted to binding arbitration. That
result simply flies in the face of what the parties were doing
in this pawn agreement.  It is highly unlikely that Edwards,
upon signing the instant arbitration provision, foresaw that
he was engaged in an act of interstate commerce that would
deprive him of his right to a jury trial if Title Max
wrongfully 
repossessed 
property 
to 
which 
it 
had 
no 
contractual
right. The 1998 model year Ford F-150 truck Title Max
1051140
18
wrongfully repossessed 
was 
subject to no agreement 
between the
parties. Nothing about that vehicle was related to the pawn
agreement  in this case.  
Arbitration agreements like the one at issue here compel
to arbitration almost any claim arising between the parties.
It is difficult even to imagine any legal claim that might
arise that would not be included in the arbitration provision
at hand, which covers "(d) all common law claims, based upon
contract tort, fraud, or other intentional torts; ... (g) all
claims asserted by you individually against us ... including
claims for money damages and/or equitable injunctive relief
...." Thus, this Court's deference to an unduly broad policy
in favor of arbitration provides injustice an opportunity to
prosper. If Edwards had been assaulted by the agent
repossessing the wrong vehicle, it would be unfair to compel
him to arbitrate his resulting legal claim.  If the
repossessing agent had stolen a family heirloom while on
Edwards's property, it would be unfair to compel Edwards to
arbitrate his claim against the agent.  However, in light of
Discount Foods, Inc. v. Supervalu, 789 So. 2d 842 (Ala. 2001),
in which this Court compelled to arbitration an intentional-
1051140
19
tort claim unrelated to the underlying transaction, Edwards's
consent to the plain language of the arbitration provision
indicates by the "clear and unmistakable evidence" standard
set out in Jim Burke Automotive Edwards's willingness to
submit all claims arising between the parties to arbitration.
Jim Burke Automotive, 826 So. 2d at 132. Presumably, the Court
would not permit the drafter of a contract simply to state
that the parties to the contract would thereafter be required
to arbitrate all disputes, whether related to the underlying
transaction or not. 
In Mehler v. Terminix International Co., 205 F.3d 44 (2d
Cir. 2000), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit bound the parties to arbitration after determining
that the plaintiffs' claims resulting from an accident that
occurred during the termite-extermination process were
encompassed by the arbitration agreement. However, in Mehler
the court applied a more just standard to determine the scope
of the arbitration agreement than the one this Court applies
today. The Mehler court examined the issue of the scope of the
arbitration agreement by determining if the claim arose out of
or related to the contract; in doing so, it summarized the
1051140
20
holding in Leadertex, Inc. v. Morgantown Dyeing & Finishing
Corp., 67 F. 3d 20, 29 (2d Cir. 1995), as follows:
"[T]he key inquiry is what was the reasonable
expectation of the parties who commit themselves to
be bound by the provisions of the arbitration
agreement." 
Mehler, 205 F.3d at 50. 
Justice See describes my suggestion above as advocating
the exercise of "more pliable jurisprudence," ___ So. 2d at
___ n.1; it is, however, more just jurisprudence that I
suggest. In light of the Court's longstanding tradition of
upholding just contracts, I believe that the Court should give
effect to the parties' actual intent. As I have stated, it was
not reasonable for Edwards to expect to be compelled to
arbitrate a claim regarding property to which Title Max had no
claim. In the context of this case, I believe that the waiver
of the right to a jury trial should be limited to a much
narrower construction of what relates, either directly or
indirectly, to this pawn transaction -- a construction that
would be in accord with what the parties might reasonably
expect.