Case Title: State ex rel. TRL by Avery v. RLP

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. TRL by Avery v. RLP1989 WY 89772 P.2d 1054Case Number: 88-253Decided: 04/17/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL. TRL, A 
MINOR, BY STEVE M. AVERY, GUARDIAN AD LITEM, APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER),

 
 
v.

 
 
RLP AND DLL, APPELLEES 
(RESPONDENTS).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofFremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Myron L. Barton, 
Riverton, guardian ad litem, Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, 
Deputy Atty. Gen., and Shirley A. Kingston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

 
 
Gary A. Barney, Lander, 
for appellee 
RLP.

 
 
Andrew Baldwin of Wind 
River Legal Services, Ft. Washakie, Kathleen Ann Mickey of Legal Services for 
Southeastern Wyoming, Inc., Cheyenne, and Elaine Bodurtha of Community Legal 
Services, Kingman, Ariz., for appellee 
DLL.

 
 
Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
LANGDON, District Judge.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal by 
the State of Wyoming from the dismissal of its action to 
set aside a prior order of the district court terminating the parental rights of 
the father in relation to his minor child. In the unusual posture of this case, 
both the father and the mother are appellees advocating the validity and 
finality of the prior termination order and the propriety of the subsequent 
dismissal of the State's attempted ameliorative action.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

 
 

[¶3.]     The State delineates 
five issues:

 
 
I. Is an order purporting 
to terminate the rights and responsibilities of a father to his minor child 
nugatory if the interests of the child were not protected in the proceedings, 
and the requirements of the termination statute were not complied 
with?

 
 
II. When the needs of the 
child require, must the State in its role as parens patriae initiate an action 
in behalf of the child, asserting his fundamental right to a parental 
relationship with his father?

 
 
III. Should it be 
possible for natural parents to bargain away the rights of their child in 
pursuit of their own interests, even though they may be adverse to those of 
their child?

 
 
IV. May the doctrine of 
res judicata apply when the prior proceeding did not address the interests of 
the real party in interest, a minor child?

 
 
V. May a child be 
deprived of paternal support and relationship because his maternal parent 
frustrates the father's rights of visitation; or are there other less harmful 
remedies?

 
 
The dispositive issue, as 
we see it, is whether the order terminating the father's parental rights is 
valid and, if not, whether it was subject to a subsequent challenge by the State 
in an action essentially seeking relief from a void judgment. The other issues 
raised by the State will not be addressed except as they relate to this 
controlling issue.

 
 

[¶4.]     The facts in this case 
primarily relate to its procedural history, and they are not in dispute. This 
case is rife with procedural irregularities,1 caused in no small measure by the 
machinations of the parents in attempting to avoid their responsibilities, 
resulting in decisions below in which the self-serving interests of the parents 
prevailed over the best interests of the child. The child was born out of 
wedlock on January 22, 1985. Shortly thereafter the mother began receiving 
public assistance from the State (AFDC). On November 13, 1985, at the behest of 
the State, the mother initiated a paternity action pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 
14-2-101 to -120 (1977) against the father, seeking a declaration of paternity, 
child support, and reimbursement to the State for support funds expended. A 
guardian ad litem was appointed for the child in accordance with § 14-2-107. 
After an informal hearing, a judgment was entered on October 28, 1986, 
establishing the father's paternity, granting primary custody to the mother with 
detailed visitation rights for the father, ordering the father to pay $138 per 
month in child support, and ordering the father to pay certain amounts in 
reimbursement to the State.

 
 

[¶5.]     The father apparently 
made only one support payment. The mother, on the other hand, allegedly denied 
the father his right of visitation. According to subsequent allegations by the 
father, the mother apparently requested that the father provide her with a 
relinquishment of parental rights and a consent to adoption. Consequently, 
counsel for the father prepared a stipulation, signed by both parents, in which 
the father agreed to execute a relinquishment of parental rights and consent to 
adoption in return for which the mother agreed that, upon delivery of same, the 
father would have no further support obligations and that the mother would pay 
the amounts assessed against the father in the parentage judgment.2 On March 4, 1987, counsel for the 
father filed a copy of this stipulation with the district court, apparently with 
a request that the court enter an order incorporating the terms of the 
stipulation.

 
 

[¶6.]     By letter dated March 
9, 1987, the district court contacted the guardian ad litem and counsel for both 
parents indicating understandable confusion as to the purpose of the 
stipulation. The letter stated in part:

 
 
I am now in receipt of a 
Stipulation terminating parental rights of the father and apparently abrogating 
all the terms of the previous Order. I do not understand this at all. I will not 
sign an order based upon that Stipulation without the approval of the Guardian 
ad Litem, and without a thorough understanding of why the Stipulation was 
entered into. It seems to me that this child is deserving of support from both 
parents and of visitation with his father as originally set up by this Court's 
Order.

 
 
The mother's counsel 
responded by letter indicating that he no longer represented the mother and that 
he had no prior knowledge of the stipulation. He further expressed the opinion 
that changing the paternity judgment would not be in the best interests of the 
child.

 
 

[¶7.]     Nothing further of 
record occurred until July 22, 1987, at which time the State filed a notice of 
delinquency indicating the father's child support obligation was in arrears and 
that income withholding would commence shortly. In a curious turn of events, the 
delinquency notice was signed by the guardian ad litem in his new capacity as 
deputy county attorney representing the State in child support enforcement 
actions. Counsel for the father responded by filing a document designated 
"PETITION TO STAY SERVICE OF ORDER FOR WITHHOLDING AND NOTICE TO PAYOR," which 
alleged that the mother had denied the father visitation, that the mother had 
sought and obtained the stipulation for relinquishment of parental rights, and 
that she had waived or was estopped from asserting a right of support.3 The petition requested entry of an 
order prepared by counsel incorporating the stipulation.

 
 

[¶8.]     The district court 
ordered a conference with counsel. On September 29, 1987, the deputy county 
attorney (formerly the guardian ad litem) and counsel for the father conferred 
with the district court in chambers. As a result of this chambers proceeding, 
the district court entered an order on October 14, 1987, ratifying the 
stipulation and expressly adjudging that the father had no past, present, or 
future support obligation for the child and ordering that, upon the delivery 
from the father to the mother of an executed relinquishment of parental rights 
and consent to adoption, the parental rights of the father were 
terminated.

 
 

[¶9.]     On March 2, 1988, the 
State filed a complaint4 styled as State of Wyoming ex rel. TRL, a 
minor, versus RLP and DLL, alleging in effect that the termination proceeding 
was defective because there was no meaningful representation of the child's best 
interests by the guardian ad litem. The complaint sought the reimposition of a 
support obligation upon the father with corresponding visitation rights - in 
essence, a revival of the original parentage judgment. The mother filed a motion 
to dismiss alleging, inter alia, a failure to appeal and res judicata. The State 
responded by brief asserting in part that its action was in the nature of a 
W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The district court appointed a 
new guardian ad litem for the child, again pursuant to the parentage statutes, 
and reassigned the case to a different judge. The father, after being located in 
Michigan, 
answered, asserted various defenses - including res judicata, and urged 
dismissal.

 
 

[¶10.]  A hearing was held before the new judge 
on July 12, 1988. The district court concluded that the child was not adequately 
represented in the prior proceeding. The district court found, however, that the 
best interests of the child had been considered in the prior proceeding, that 
the State had failed to appeal, and that the action before the court was an 
improper substitute for appeal. The State's complaint was therefore dismissed, 
and this appeal was perfected.

 
 

[¶11.]  Our inquiry initially focuses on whether 
the State could attack the October 1987 judgment in the fashion that it did. We 
agree with the district court that the State's action was unorthodox to the 
extent that it purported to initiate a new complaint in an action that already 
had been concluded. We are not convinced, however, that the State's labeling of 
the complaint is controlling, and we determine that it may properly be treated 
as a W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) motion to set aside a void 
judgment.

 
 

[¶12.]  In JHL v. BMG, 665 P.2d 491, 498-99 
(Wyo. 1983), 
we quoted with approval the following passages from 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 49 
at 347-49 (1969):

 
 
"A void judgment is not 
entitled to the respect accorded to, and is attended by none of the consequences 
of, a valid adjudication. * * * 

 
 
"Although it is not 
necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed or vacated, it is 
open to attack or impeachment in any proceeding, direct or collateral, and at 
any time or place, at least where the invalidity appears upon the face of the 
record."

 
 
In its trial brief, the 
State referred to its action as a W.R.C.P. 60(b) proceeding. W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) 
provides: "On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: * * * (4) the judgment is void." The essence of the 
State's complaint was that the October 1987 judgment terminating the father's 
parental rights was void because the child was not represented by a guardian ad 
litem. We have stated that "`the name or title of the pleading or motion may be 
disregarded if its contents make its purpose so clear that no one is misled.'" 
Walther v. Steward, 54 Wyo. 160, 171, 88 P.2d 475 (1939) (quoting Mitter v. 
Black Diamond Coal Co., 28 Wyo. 439, 445, 206 P. 152 (1922)). We think that rule 
is applicable here, and we treat the State's action as a motion under W.R.C.P. 
60(b)(4).

 
 

[¶13.]  The granting or denying of relief 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b) is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, 
and our review is limited to the question of whether there has been an abuse of 
that discretion. McBride v. McBride, 598 P.2d 814, 816 (Wyo. 1979). When the 
judgment is attacked pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), however, there is no 
question of discretion - either the judgment is void or it is valid - and, once 
the question of its validity is resolved, the trial court must act accordingly. 
Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745, 749 (Wyo. 1965).

 
 

[¶14.]  In the instant case, the October 1987 
judgment purporting to terminate the father's parental rights is void. We have 
held that in termination proceedings a guardian ad litem must be appointed to 
represent the best interests of the children involved, and the failure to 
provide such representation deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a 
termination order. P.R. v. Shannon, 726 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1986); DB v. MM, 617 P.2d 1078 (Wyo. 1980). Here, counsel 
was appointed for the child in the original paternity action. In the subsequent 
termination proceeding, however, that same counsel was present but was acting in 
the capacity of deputy county attorney representing the State in its child 
support enforcement activities. After the chambers hearing regarding 
termination, said counsel wrote to the district judge stating in part: "As we 
discussed my involvement in this matter only involves representing the State to 
recover government aid which [the mother] has received." Thus, to the extent 
that the duly appointed counsel for the child was present, he was subject to 
divided loyalties, and the child did not receive the independent representation 
mandated by the decisions of this Court. In addition to the failure to provide a 
disinterested guardian ad litem, this termination proceeding was not otherwise 
accomplished in accordance with the procedures established in the termination 
statutes, Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-2-308 to -319 (1977), and particularly § 14-2-309 
relating to the grounds for termination. No grounds for termination of the 
father's parental rights were mentioned, and there is no reason evident on the 
record why the child should be deprived of his father's financial support and 
paternal association.

 
 

[¶15.]  The termination proceeding is not saved 
by the attempt to style it as a voluntary relinquishment of custody and consent 
to adoption in accordance with Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-109 (1977). At the hearing on 
the State's action, the State described the consent to adoption as a sham. We 
agree with that characterization. Termination of parental rights is accomplished 
in Wyoming 
either by a proceeding pursuant to the termination statutes or, in the case of 
an adoption proceeding, by the entry of a final decree of adoption subsequent to 
a validly executed relinquishment of custody and consent to adoption.5 See Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-114 (1977) 
(entry of final decree of adoption ends parental rights of former 
parent).

 
 

[¶16.]  In the termination order there is no 
reference to statutory authority for the purported termination, although 
reference is made in the order to a "Consent to Adoption and Relinquishment of 
Parental Rights." It is clear, however, that adoption was never contemplated in 
this case. As argued by the State in the proceeding below, the mother has no 
plans for marriage and hence no plans for an adoption of the child by a 
stepfather. We can only conclude that the attempt by these parents to posture 
this case as an adoption case is merely an artifice designed to detour attention 
from the fact that they bargained away the fundamental rights of the child in a 
proceeding in which the child's best interests, if they were considered, were 
given short shrift. The deficiencies in the termination proceeding cannot be 
rectified by attempting to bring it within the parameters of the adoption 
statutes.

 
 

[¶17.]  In conclusion, we hold that the October 
1987 judgment and order is void for lack of jurisdiction to terminate the 
parental rights of the father in the absence of adequate representation for the 
child. We further hold that the subsequent attack on that judgment by the State 
was in the nature of a W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) proceeding for relief from a void 
judgment and that dismissal of that action was in error. As a consequence of our 
holding, the original judgment in the parentage action regains vitality, and the 
father has support obligations and visitation rights in accordance 
therewith.

 
 

[¶18.]  Reversed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 In dismissing the State's action, 
the district court aptly described the case as a "can of 
worms."

 
 

2 As gleaned from correspondence, 
comments, and allegations in the record and from reading between the lines, it 
appears that the father sought to be free of the support obligation and that the 
mother wished to receive public assistance without the annoying complication of 
having the father's support obligation entering into the equation. Thus, the 
stipulation served well the less-than-laudable purposes of the parents. The 
stipulation solved everyone's problems except, of course, the 
child's.

 
 

3 According to the State's brief, the 
mother had continued to receive public assistance and had assigned her right to 
child support to the State.

 
 

4 All court documents in this case 
were filed under the docket number originally assigned to the parentage 
action.

 
 

5 Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-110 
(1977), adoption may also be ordered without the consent of the parents or 
putative father upon grounds specified in that statute.