Case Title: Hudson v. Old Guard Insurance Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 560, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DEVIN A. HUDSON, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 560, 2009 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  C.A. No. 08C01-024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
OLD GUARD INSURANCE  
) 
COMPANY, a foreign corporation, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  July 21, 2010 
Decided:  August 12, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and 
RIDGELY, Justices constituting the Court en banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
I. Barry Guerke (argued) of Parkowski, Guerke & Swayze, P.A., Dover, 
Delaware for appellant. 
 
 
Michael I. Silverman (argued) and D. Miika Roggio of Silverman McDonald 
& Friedman, Wilmington, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
2 
 
Underinsured motorist Betty Jean Dennis struck Devin Hudson with her car, 
when Hudson suddenly rode his bicycle into the road.  Hudson asserts that the trial 
judge erroneously (1) granted his insurer, Old Guard, summary judgment on his 
allegations that Dennis was negligent per se, (2) directed a verdict on the basis that 
Hudson had acted more negligently than Dennis, and (3) excluded Hudson’s expert 
witness’ proffered opinion testimony.  Because Dennis had no duty to anticipate 
Hudson’s darting into the road and did not otherwise act negligently, we 
AFFIRM. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Hudson darts in front of Dennis’s car 
On a clear morning, July 12, 2000, 12-year-old Hudson, rode his bicycle 
around his parents’ driveway onto Murray Road, a narrow tree-lined road with 
grass shoulders.  Hudson’s parents planned to drive to the end of the driveway, and 
then follow behind him in the van as he rode to his grandfather’s house about a 
mile away.  Hudson planned to cross the street and wait for his parents on the 
opposite side of the country road.  Meanwhile, Hudson’s fourteen year-old brother, 
Michael, was driving a riding lawn mower around the yard with his two year-old 
brother, Skyler, on his lap. 
At this time, Dennis drove eastbound on Murray Road in a 1987 Chrysler 
station wagon owned by Millsboro Auto Mart, Inc.  Eastbound traffic was light and 
3 
there was no westbound traffic in this 45 mile-per-hour speed zone.  
Approximately one half mile from Hudson’s driveway, Dennis passed a visible 
“Children Playing” sign.  Dennis testified that as she rounded the bend, 
approximately 450-600 feet from Hudson’s driveway, she noticed children at the 
end of the Hudson’s driveway.  Dennis proceeded down the straight stretch of road 
towards the Hudsons’ driveway, traveling between 35-40 miles per hour. 
As Dennis approached the end of the driveway, Hudson suddenly entered 
the road in front of Dennis’s car.  Dennis swerved to the left, but her front right 
bumper struck his bicycle.  Hudson somersaulted over the handlebars, fell onto the 
ground, 
and 
suffered 
closed 
head 
injuries, 
cognitive 
deficits, 
and 
neuropsychological damage.1 
Hudson pursues insurance through arbitration and litigation  
Through his next friend, Hudson filed suit against Dennis and Millsboro 
Auto Mart.  The parties resolved that dispute through a binding arbitration that 
awarded the insurance policy limits of $15,000 for each of the two defendants’ 
auto insurance policies. 
At the time of the accident, Old Guard provided Hudson’s parents auto 
insurance coverage.  Hudson’s parents claimed underinsured motorist benefits, but 
Old Guard denied their claim.  Upon reaching the age of majority, Hudson filed 
                                                 
1 Old Guard disputes the nature and extent of Hudson’s injuries. 
4 
suit against Old Guard for recovery of UIM benefits based on third-party 
negligence. 
In October 2008, Old Guard moved for summary judgment, contending that 
no facts of record exist that could support any third-party liability.  Hudson 
responded that he had a defensive driving expert who would testify that Dennis 
could have taken preventative actions when approaching the end of the driveway.  
The trial judge partially granted Old Guard’s motion for summary judgment, ruling 
that Dennis had not acted negligently per se by violating rules of the road codified 
in 21 Del. C. §§ 4144 and 4168.  The trial judge held that neither § 4144 nor § 
4168 imposed any per se duty upon her to sound her horn or to drive any slower 
than she actually did.  The trial judge, however, denied summary judgment with 
regard to common law negligence. 
Before trial, each side filed various motions in limine.  The trial judge 
granted Old Guard’s motion in limine to exclude Hudson’s liability expert’s 
opinion testimony, stating that a fact-finder would not need a defensive driving 
expert, and that the expert based his professional opinion on an unreliable 
methodology.  The trial judge held, however, that Hudson’s expert could testify if 
Old Guard sought to introduce evidence that Dennis did all she could to avoid the 
accident. 
5 
After Hudson presented his theory of liability to the jury, Old Guard moved 
for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 50.  The 
trial judge granted Old Guard’s motion, holding that, as a matter of law, Dennis 
had not acted negligently, and that, even if she had, Hudson had acted more 
negligently than had Dennis.  The trial judge ruled as a matter of law that Hudson 
was more than 51 percent negligent, having violated 21 Del. C. § 4133 by failing 
to yield the right of way to approaching vehicles as he entered the roadway. 
This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review a trial judge’s grant of summary judgment de novo to determine 
whether, considering the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to 
Hudson, any genuine issue of material fact existed for the jury to resolve.2  We 
review a judge’s decision to exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion.3 
ANALYSIS 
Hudson must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the elements of 
negligence: duty, breach, causation, and harm.4  Negligence per se requires the 
                                                 
2 Jones v. Crawford, C.A. No. 05C09-215, at *4 (Del. July 30, 2010) (citing Williams v. Geier, 
671 A.2d 1368, 1375 (Del. 1996)). 
3 M.G. Bancorp. v. LeBeau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. 1999). 
4 Jones, C.A. No. 05C09-215, at *4 (citing Lenkewicz v. Wilmington City Ry. Co., 74 A. 11, 12-
13 (Del. Super. 1908); Sims v. Stanley, 2008 WL 853538, at *2 (Del. Apr. 1, 2008)). 
6 
defendant to have committed an unexcused violation of a statute or regulation that 
the trial judge adopts as the standard of care.5  The General Assembly requires 
motorists to drive at a reasonable speed,6 sound the horn, and avoid colliding with 
pedestrians on the roadway.7  In ‘dart out’ cases, however, Delaware applies the 
common law rule that no one has a duty to anticipate another’s negligence.  Rather, 
we hold individuals responsible for reasonably foreseeable events,8 and we hold 
minors to the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable child of similar age and 
situation.9  Delaware applies the traditional “but for” definition of proximate 
cause.10 
1. Dennis did not act negligently per se by failing to sound the horn. 
In earlier ‘dart out’ cases, we have held that a motorist had no duty to 
anticipate a minor’s sudden move onto the road from the sidewalk.11  In Dietz v. 
                                                 
5 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B. 
6 21 Del. C. § 4168. 
7 21 Del. C. § 4144. 
8 Sirmans v. Penn, 588 A.2d 1103, 1007 (Del. 1991). 
9 Moffitt v. Carroll, 640 A.2d 169, 173 (Del. 1994) (quoting Pokoyski v. McDermott, 167 A.2d 
742 (Del. 1961)) (“The maturity and capacity of the child, [his] ability to understand and 
appreciate the danger, [his] familiarity with the surroundings, together with the circumstances 
under which the accident occurred, must all be taken into consideration in determining whether 
or not [he] was guilty of contributory negligence.”). 
10 Jones, C.A. No. 05C09-215, at *5 (citing Wilmington Country Club v. Cowee, 747 A.2d 1087, 
1097 (Del. 2000)). 
11 Dietz v. Mead, 160 A.2d 372 (Del. 1960); Pokoyski, 167 A.2d 742. 
7 
Mead, the Court held that the defendant “was not bound to anticipate that the 
minor plaintiff would suddenly dart from a place of safety out into the street, 
directly in the path of defendant's automobile, unless the circumstances were such 
as to give . . . warning that the minor plaintiff was likely to do so.”12  In Pokoyski v. 
McDermott, we held that similar “circumstances called for an immediate stop of 
the defendant's car, or a turn of the steering wheel to direct the car away from its 
path, or both, but not for a signal with the horn.”13 
Considering, as we must, the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, until he darted out in front of Dennis’s car, Hudson was not on the 
road.  Rather, Hudson rode his bicycle on the driveway, and had no shoulder to 
cross before entering the road.  He looked both ways before entering the road, but 
stated in his deposition that he did not see the oncoming car.  A reasonable driver 
would have no reason to expect that a reasonable twelve-year-old would enter the 
roadway after seeing him look in the direction of the oncoming car, and indeed 
might expect that the reasonable twelve-year-old would not enter the road after 
taking that precaution. 
                                                 
12 Dietz, 160 A.2d at 373. 
13 Pokoyski, 167 A.2d at 746.  
8 
Hudson asserts that our holding in House v. Lauritzen requires the trial judge 
to allow the jury to determine whether Dennis should have sounded her horn.14  
House does not control these facts, because in House the seven-year-old rode his 
bicycle on the road for an extended period of time before striking defendant’s car.  
That case did not involve a darter, but rather a roadway cyclist that the jury could 
have determined that the motorist had previously seen on the road.  Dennis had no 
statutory duty to sound the horn because she had no reason to believe Hudson 
would suddenly enter the roadway directly before her.  We agree with the trial 
judge’s ruling that she could not, therefore, have acted negligently per se by failing 
to sound her horn. 
2.  
Hudson acted equally or more negligently than Dennis. 
Section 4168 requires motorists to account for potentially hazardous vehicles 
or conveyances “on or entering the highway.”  Delaware tort law has long imposed 
a duty on motorists to use reasonable care, drive at a reasonable rate of speed under 
the circumstances, and slow or stop to avoid imminent danger, regardless of the 
posted speed limit.15  Motorists, however, need not slow down in anticipation of 
danger that has not yet become apparent.16  Although we require motorists to take 
                                                 
14 237 A.2d 134, 136 (Del. 1967). 
15 Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 A. 778 (Del. 1907); Lockerman v. Hurlock, 125 A. 482 (Del. 1924); 
Carnes v. Winslow, 182 A.2d 19 (Del. 1962). 
16 Williams v. Chittick, 139 A.2d 375 (Del. 1958). 
9 
greater care to protect minor pedestrians,17 the minor still has a duty to act as a 
reasonable child of similar age and situation.18 
When the trier of fact must compare a child’s negligence to that of an adult, 
Delaware courts employ a two-step analysis.  First, the trier of fact determines 
whether the child violated a standard based on the child’s age, experience, and 
situation at the time of the accident, and whether the adult violated a reasonable 
person standard of care.  Second, the trier of fact apportions the negligence, but 
without considering the age and experience of the child.19  We have held that the 
trier of fact apportions negligence only after determining duty, breach, and 
proximate causation.20 
The trial judge granted Old Guard’s motion for summary judgment, because 
he found that Hudson had acted equally – if not more – negligently than Dennis.  
Hudson rode his bicycle at home, where he had great familiarity with his parents’ 
driveway, the surrounding road, and mid-day traffic.  That Hudson looked both 
ways before riding onto the road indicates that he appreciated the risks of crossing 
the road, and that he could have seen Dennis’s car driving straight down the road 
                                                 
17 Brown v. Wilmington, 27 Del. 492, 497 (1914). 
18 Moffitt, 640 A.2d 169. 
19 Id. at 174. 
20 Id. at 175. 
10 
on a clear day.  Hudson, therefore, had the ability to appreciate his surroundings 
and the dangers that the situation presented.  By darting onto a road with no 
shoulder, just moments before a car drove along a straight and familiar section of 
that road, Hudson failed to act as a reasonable twelve-year-old would have acted in 
the same circumstances. 
Dennis, as we have discussed, had no duty to sound her horn or anticipate 
Hudson’s darting onto the road.  She drove between five and ten miles per hour 
below the posted speed limit, which provided appropriate velocity guidance on a 
clear day.  We cannot say that Dennis acted negligently under these circumstances. 
As she proceeded 450-600 feet, along the straightaway towards the 
Hudsons’ house, she and Hudson had equal opportunity to see one another.  
Hudson controlled his decision to dart onto the road, and Dennis had already 
slowed her car well below a reasonable speed for a 45-mile-per-hour speed zone on 
a clear day.21  Michael Hudson’s presence on a lawn mower may have 
compromised Devin’s ability to hear Dennis’s car, but Devin still had ample 
opportunity to see her.  If Hudson did stop to look both ways for oncoming traffic 
and Dennis saw Hudson – as each testified that they did – then Dennis might have 
reasonably expected him to have seen her and to continue waiting on the driveway.  
                                                 
21 If a motorist cannot reasonably drive five to ten miles per hour below the posted speed limit, 
along a straight section of the road on a clear day, the posted speed limits would offer no 
guidance under any circumstances. 
11 
No reasonable juror, however, could have concluded that Dennis had a duty to do 
more than she did do to avoid hitting Hudson – much less that Dennis had acted 
more negligently than Hudson.  Therefore, we agree that the trial judge properly 
entered judgment for Old Guard. 
3.  
Hudson’s purported expert sought to testify about common knowledge. 
Finally, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by excluding purported 
expert testimony about the actions a reasonably prudent defensive driver would 
take upon seeing a child on a bicycle near the roadway.  In determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony, the trial judge must weigh the following five 
factors: (1) whether the witness is qualified based on knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education; (2) whether the evidence is relevant and reliable; (3) 
whether the expert’s opinion is based upon information reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field; (4) whether the expert testimony will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue; and (5) whether the 
expert testimony will create unfair prejudice or confuse or mislead the jury.22  We 
have held that some evidence may be “commonly understood” and that putting an 
“expert label or veneer” on that evidence could prejudice the jury.23 
                                                 
22 Eskin v. Cardin, 842 A.2d 1222, 1227 (Del. 2004). 
23 Anker v. State, 913 A.2d 569 (Del. 2006) (disallowing an expert on interpersonal 
relationships). 
12 
Hudson’s expert sought to testify about a subject that falls within the 
purview of a layperson’s knowledge.  He claims expert status, based on a four-hour 
course that certified him as a defensive driving instructor, and knowledge that 
every licensed driver is charged with possessing.  He has never visited the scene of 
the accident, possessed no specialized knowledge about the relevant events, and 
admittedly did not know how close to the road the Hudson brothers were driving 
their bicycle and lawnmower. 
We, therefore, find that:  (1) the purported expert’s qualifications were 
suspect; (2) it is unclear whether he could present relevant evidence, given his lack 
of specialized knowledge of Hudson as he entered the road; (3) his methodology 
was unclear; (4) his opinion evidence would not have assisted the trier of fact 
because laypeople are equally capable of drawing reasonable inferences from the 
relevant facts; and (5) putting an “expert veneer” on this testimony could have an 
unfairly prejudicial effect on the jury.  We agree that the trial judge properly 
excluded Hudson’s purported expert testimony. 
Trial judges should grant judgment to moving parties when the parties’ 
contentions are not premised on genuine issues arising from disputed material 
facts.  This reflects efficient use of judicial resources, prompt resolution of 
litigation, and proper application of the law.  Unlike our recent decision in Jones v. 
Crawford, which involved material factual disputes and potential supervening 
13 
causation, this appeal involves a well-settled factual record and straightforward 
legal questions that the trial judge decided correctly. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the trial judge’s grant of summary 
judgment, directed verdict, and exclusion of expert testimony.