Case Title: City of Urbana v. Andrew N.B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95408, 95803

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos 95408, 95803 cons.-Agenda 7-November 2003.
THE CITY OF URBANA, Appellee, v. ANDREW N.B.,
Appellant.-THE CITY OF CHAMPAIGN, Appellee, v. MONTRELL
D.H., Appellant.
Opinion filed June 24, 20004. 
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	In separate proceedings, Andrew N.B and Montrell D.H., both
minors, entered uncounseled guilty pleas to violating municipal ordinances
in the Cities of Urbana and Champaign and received dispositions of court
supervision. When they violated the terms of their supervision, the Cities
filed contempt petitions. The trial court found the minors in contempt and
sentenced them to detention; the appellate court affirmed. The minors
appealed, and we consolidated their cases. For the reasons that follow,
we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND
	Though the facts in each case are similar, we review them separately
to set the stage for our analysis.
Andrew N.B.
	On April 20, 2001, the City of Urbana filed a complaint in the
Champaign County circuit court against 12-year-old Andrew N.B.,
alleging that he had committed theft in violation of the municipal code. See
City of Urbana Code of Ordinances §15-32(a)(1) (1980). Specifically,
Andrew stole a hundred dollar bill from his grandmother. A violation of
this ordinance is punishable by a fine not exceeding $500, by restitution,
or by court supervision "as defined in the Uniform Code of Corrections."
See City of Urbana Code of Ordinances §§1-10(b), (f), (g) (1980).
	Andrew, accompanied by his father, appeared with an unspecified
number of others, both minors and adults, charged with ordinance
violations at a Champaign County circuit court call referred to as "city
court." The trial court told the assembled defendants, "I'm going to advise
you as to what the charges are, what the possible penalties are, and then
I'm going to need to know what you wish to do"-plead guilty or not guilty.
The court directed those who wanted to plead guilty to read a document
detailing their rights. When the court called Andrew's case, it described
the charge against him and the range of punishments: a fine of up to $500,
community service, and other conditions, such as attending school, as
ordered by the court. Andrew pleaded guilty. After admonishing him
about the consequences of his plea, the trial court accepted it. The City
recommended a "sentence" of one year of court supervision under
"standard conditions of minding the household rules, attending school
without unexcused absences and without any disciplinary problems." The
City acknowledged that Andrew had returned $90 to his grandmother, but
asked for restitution of the remaining $10, as well as an apology letter. The
court followed the City's recommendation and added:
			"What you need to understand is that if you don't do these
things and come back here, the City can ask that you be held in
contempt. And that's different than what you're here for. You
can't be locked up right now. But if you're found to be in
contempt of court, I can put you in the Detention Center for six
months. *** And you have to go to school there, and you won't
be late to school there.
			So you have a choice to make. You're either going to do it
the way you should do it or you're going to do it anyway except
you're going to be locked up."
	Andrew chose the latter option within a week. He skipped school on
May 4, 7, and 8 and visited Springfield on May 8 without his mother's
permission. The City filed an indirect criminal contempt petition and
waived any detention greater than six months or any fine greater than
$500, and the trial court appointed counsel for Andrew.
	Andrew filed a motion to dismiss the City's petition for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Andrew asserted that the Juvenile Court Act
of 1987 is implicated once a minor faces incarceration. Under the Act, the
court must conduct an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the
minor should be made a ward of the court before sentencing the minor to
detention. Here, according to Andrew, the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because it lacked "the power to determine whether the minor
should be adjudged a ward of the court. *** The contempt power may
not be used to enforce supervisory orders on a minor until the minor has
been adjudicated a ward of the court."
	The trial court denied Andrew's motion, stating,
		"We are not proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act. We are
proceeding in a violation of an appropriate order which the court
can enforce. That is the contempt power. It is the inherent power
of the court. It is not a criminal law violation. It is not categorized
as a felony or misdemeanor or anything else. *** Because the
defendant violates an otherwise valid court order, does that now
mean-I think what the defendant is arguing is you have to drop
back and file a juvenile petition in this matter for contempt and I
don't believe that that's what the Juvenile Court Act says to be
able to have somebody incarcerated. And I think the court
inherently can enforce its orders without having a juvenile petition
filed."
The court then found Andrew in contempt for violating the terms of his
court supervision and sentenced him to 12 months' probation and 180
days' detention-eight days to be served immediately, and the remainder
subject to remission. For subsequent violations of the court's order,
Andrew served an additional 47 of the 180 days.
	Andrew appealed, arguing, inter alia, that section 5-125 of the
Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-125 (West 2002)), which allowed
the City to file its own ordinance violation complaint rather than ask the
State to file a delinquency petition, violates equal protection and due
process. The appellate court affirmed. 335 Ill. App. 3d 180. The court
held that section 5-125 does not violate equal protection. 335 Ill. App.
3d at 187. The court posited two minors-one subject to a delinquency
petition and one subject to a municipal ordinance violation complaint-and
stated:
		"The two minors are [not] in the same situation. Unlike the minor
in the city's case, the minor in the juvenile case faces a possibility
of detention for up to 30 days [citation], removal from the
custody of his or her parents or guardians [citation], and
placement into the custody of some other person or agency
[citation]. *** The legislature could have reasonably concluded
that the minor in juvenile court should have the right to appointed
counsel and the other minor should not, because the minor in
juvenile court faces weightier potential consequences." 335 Ill.
App. 3d at 186-87.
	The appellate court further held that section 5-125 does not violate
due process. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 188. The court noted that, although the
City prosecuted Andrew for theft, "the trial court did not sentence him to
incarceration for that offense, and incarceration was not even a possibility
under the ordinance." 335 Ill. App. 3d at 188. "Supervision was not
imprisonment," and because the sixth amendment bestows a right to
counsel only when the defendant receives a sentence of actual
imprisonment, due process did not require appointed counsel when
Andrew entered his guilty plea. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 188.
	We granted Andrew's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315.

Montrell D.H.
	On June 28, 2001, the City of Champaign filed a complaint against
15-year-old Montrell D.H., alleging that he had violated curfew. See
Champaign Municipal Code §23-211(b) (1985). A violation of this
ordinance is punishable by a fine not exceeding $750, by 20 to 100 hours
of public service work, by restitution, or by court supervision "as defined
in the Uniform Code of Corrections." See Champaign Municipal Code
§§1-21(b), (e), (f) (1985). The Code itself does not provide for
incarceration, but it does note that a person who fails to pay a fine may be
"subsequently incarcerated for contempt of court." Champaign Municipal
Code §1-21(g) (1985).
	Like Andrew, Montrell appeared in city court with his mother and an
unspecified number of others charged with ordinance violations. The trial
court advised the assembled defendants of their right to present evidence,
confront witnesses, and testify on their own behalf, as well as their right to
retained counsel, noting, "This is not a case where I can appoint a Public
Defender to represent you." The trial court called Montrell's case and
described the charges against him. Montrell pleaded guilty; the court
admonished him about the consequences of his plea and accepted it. The
City recommended a sentence of six months of court supervision and 20
hours of public service. The City also asked the court to order Montrell
not to violate any criminal statutes or municipal ordinances, to attend
school, and to follow household rules, including the curfew imposed by his
mother. The court followed the City's recommendation.
	Just more than a month later, Montrell left home without permission
for 11 days between August 3 and August 14, 2001. On August 14, he
stole two compact discs, a T-shirt, and a pair of shorts from a discount
store. He again left home without permission for five days between August
17 and August 22, 2001. The City filed an indirect criminal contempt
petition, and the trial court appointed counsel for Montrell.
	Montrell filed a motion to dismiss the City's petition, echoing the
subject matter jurisdiction arguments made by Andrew: "The Juvenile
Court Act specifically precludes minors from being jailed unless they are
delinquents or a ward of the court. The Municipal Court lacks jurisdiction
to place a minor in the Juvenile Detention Center because only minors who
are delinquents or wards of the court can be placed there." The court
denied Montrell's motion to dismiss, found him in contempt for violating
the terms of his court supervision, and sentenced him to 12 months'
conditional discharge and 60 days' detention-three days to be served
immediately, and the remainder subject to remission.
	Montrell appealed, arguing that section 5-125 of the Juvenile Court
Act violates equal protection and due process. The appellate court
followed its earlier decision in Andrew's case and affirmed. In dissent,
Justice Cook argued that section 5-125 mandates any detention of a
juvenile for a municipal ordinance violation must comply with the
protections offered by article V of the Act:
			"It makes sense that a minor can be prosecuted for a minor
municipal ordinance violation just like anyone else, without the
necessity of commencing a Juvenile Court Act proceeding. The
juvenile defendants in these cases [Andrew and Montrell],
however, were not prosecuted just like anyone else. The court
did not employ indirect criminal contempt as a method to collect
the fine, but as a substitute juvenile court, as a means of guiding
the actions of the juvenile defendants. The court's actions seem
well-intentioned but the court should not have evaded the
provisions of the Act. An indirect criminal contempt proceeding
is essentially a misdemeanor criminal proceeding. [Citation.] The
Act must be followed if a juvenile is prosecuted for a criminal
misdemeanor.
			Even more basically, how can an ordinance violation with a
maximum punishment of a $75 [sic] fine be transformed, by
going the indirect criminal contempt route, into an offense
carrying at least 8 days of jail time and perhaps 180 days of jail
time? The court is entitled to take reasonable steps for the
collection of the $75 [sic] fine but that was not its goal in these
cases." 336 Ill. App. 3d 558, 560-61 (Cook, J., dissenting).
	We granted Montrell's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.
315) and consolidated the two cases.

ANALYSIS
	Andrew and Montrell raise three issues: (1) whether section 5-25
violates equal protection, (2) whether their uncounseled guilty pleas
violated due process, and (3) whether these pleas violated Supreme Court
Rule 403, section 113-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725
ILCS 5/113-5 (West 2002)), and section 1-5 of the Juvenile Court Act
(705 ILCS 405/1-5 (West 2002)).
	As the Cities correctly note, Andrew and Montrell did not raise their
third issue below; accordingly, our review of that issue is waived. See
Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 383 (1996) (" '[w]here the appellant in the appellate court fails to
raise an issue in that court, this court will not address it' "), quoting
Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 209
(1983). Further, juveniles subject to criminal proceedings have a right to
counsel under Rule 403 (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 403 ("A person under the age
of 18 years shall not, except in cases in which the penalty is by fine only,
be permitted to enter a plea of guilty *** unless he is represented by
counsel in open court")) and section 113-5 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (see 725 ILCS 5/113-5 (West 2002) ("No person under the
age of 18 years shall be permitted to plead guilty *** except where the
penalty is by fine only unless he is represented by counsel in open court")).
Both the rule and the statute apply only to criminal defendants prosecuted
by the State under the Criminal Code of 1961. These protections do not
apply to defendants, like Andrew and Montrell, charged with municipal
ordinance violations. See 725 ILCS 5/102-15 (West 2002) (defining
"offense" for the Code of Criminal Procedure as "a violation of any penal
statute of this State"); City of Chicago v. Wisniewski, 54 Ill. 2d 149,
153 (1973); see also Village of Midlothian v. Walling, 118 Ill. App. 2d
358, 363 (1969).
	Finally, under section 1-5 of the Act, minors also have a right to
counsel. See 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2002) ("No hearing on any
petition or motion filed under this Act may be commenced unless the
minor who is the subject of the proceeding is represented by counsel").
Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, however, section 1-5 does not give
minors "the right to counsel at all proceedings," but only proceedings
under the Act. Andrew and Montrell were not prosecuted for a municipal
ordinance violation by the State, the only party entitled to bring a petition
under the Act, but by the Cities outside the Act. Section 1-5 provides no
statutory right to counsel for these minors. We turn to the attendant
constitutional issues.
	Andrew and Montrell contend that section 5-125 violates equal
protection because it allows municipalities to treat similarly situated minors
differently. Specifically, they argue that section 5-125 allows municipalities
to choose arbitrarily between referring ordinance violations involving
minors to the State for prosecution under the Act, which offers procedural
protections including the right to appointed counsel (see 705 ILCS
405/5-101(3) (West 2002) (in delinquency proceedings, "minors shall
have all the procedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings, unless
specifically precluded by laws that enhance the protection of such
minors"), or filing their own ordinance violation complaints under the
Municipal Code, which offers no such procedural protections.
	Section 5-120 of the Act gives exclusive jurisdiction over
delinquency proceedings to juvenile courts: "[N]o minor who was under
17 years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecuted under
the criminal laws of this State," except as provided in four related statutory
sections, including section 5-125. 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2002).
Section 5-125, entitled "Concurrent jurisdiction," provides:
			"Any minor alleged to have violated *** a municipal or
county ordinance, may be prosecuted for the violation and if
found guilty punished under any statute or ordinance relating to
the violation, without reference to the procedures set out in this
Article, except that any detention, must be in compliance with
this Article." 705 ILCS 405/5-125 (West 2002).
Thus, under section 5-125, the Cities could pursue their own cases
against the minors as an alternative to requesting the State commence
delinquency proceedings against them.
	Equal protection guarantees that similarly situated individuals will be
treated similarly, unless the government demonstrates an appropriate
reason to do otherwise. See People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 176-77
(2003) ("Generally, equal protection requires the government to treat
similarly situated people in a similar manner"). The shorthand we have
developed for the degree of deference we give in evaluating the
appropriateness of such a reason is the term "scrutiny." In cases like one
before us, where the statutory classification at issue does not involve
fundamental rights, we employ so-called rational basis scrutiny and ask
only whether the challenged classification bears a rational relation to a
legitimate purpose. In re Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548, 562
(2000); People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 15-16 (1999).
	As the Cites observe, the Municipal Code provides for two types of
ordinance violations: those punishable by "fines or penalties as may be
deemed proper" (see 65 ILCS 5/1-2-1 (West 2002)) and those
punishable by incarceration (65 ILCS 5/1-2-1.1 (West 2002)).
Prosecution of the latter offenses, like prosecution under the Act, involves
heightened procedural protections. 65 ILCS 5/1-2-1.1 (West 2002)
("The prosecution shall be under and conform to the rules of criminal
procedure"). That is, the available protections, including the right to
appointed counsel, track the available punishments: where incarceration
or detention is a sentencing option under either the Municipal Code or the
Juvenile Court Act, the General Assembly has provided the right to
counsel. The General Assembly also has decided to allow municipalities
to proceed outside the Act and its concomitant protections when charging
minors with ordinance violations that do not involve detention. As the
appellate court in Andrew's case aptly noted, prosecution by the State
under the Act for an ordinance violation has more serious potential
consequences for a minor-placement in the custody or guardianship of a
suitable relative, other person, or agency (see 705 ILCS
405/5-710(1)(a)(ii), 5-740 (West 2002)); substance abuse assessment
and treatment (see 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(iii) (West 2002));
placement in the guardianship of the Department of Children and Family
Services (see 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(iv) (West 2002)); detention in
a "juvenile detention home" for "a period not to exceed 30 days" (see 705
ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(v), 5-105(7) (West 2002)); suspension of driving
privileges (see 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(vii); and medical procedures
to have street gang tattoos removed (see 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(ix)
(West 2002))-than a quasi-criminal prosecution by a municipality outside
the Act. See 335 Ill. App. 3d at 186-87; see also In re Jesus R., 326 Ill.
App. 3d 1070, 1073 (2002) (noting that delinquency proceedings are
"strikingly similar to adult criminal proceedings" (emphasis omitted)). The
legislature had a reasonable basis to make this distinction.
	The dissent cites sections 5-710(1)(a)(viii) and 5-710(7) (see 705
ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(viii), 5-710(7) (West 2002)) for the proposition
that, in this case, "detention would not have been available," but those
sections do not support its argument. First, section 5-710(1)(a)(viii)
addresses detention under section 3-6039 of the Counties Code (see 55
ILCS 5/3-6039 (West 2002)), which the parties do not cite or discuss
and, consequently, which the dissent cannot seriously contend is at issue
in this case. Second, section 5-710(7), which prohibits commitment of a
minor the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, "for a period of
time in excess of that period for which an adult could be committed for the
same act," does not affect the trial court's power to sentence a minor to
detention in a juvenile detention home apart from the Department of
Corrections. See 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(v), 5-105(7) (West 2002).
	Further, the dissent's oversimplified and nearly tautological view that
"section 5-125 violates equal protection because it allows minors such as
defendants, prosecuted in municipal court, to be treated differently than
minors prosecuted under the Act" misses the black-letter lesson that equal
protection does not prohibit differential treatment per se, but rather
arbitrary differential treatment. As one hornbook states:
			"The equal protection clause guarantees that similar individuals
will be dealt with in a similar manner by the government. It does
not reject the government's ability to classify persons or 'draw
lines' in the creation and application of laws, but it does
guarantee that those classifications will not be based upon
impermissible criteria or arbitrarily used to burden a group of
individuals." J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on
Constitutional Law 519 (1978).
We simply conclude that, here, differential treatment in providing
appointed counsel to minors prosecuted by the State under the Act, but
not to minors prosecuted by the Cities outside the Act, was not arbitrary.
Section 5-125 does not violate equal protection.
	Andrew and Montrell entered uncounseled guilty pleas to violating
municipal ordinances, received dispositions of court supervision, violated
the terms of their supervision, and received sentences of detention for
indirect criminal contempt following a hearing where they were
represented by counsel. Andrew and Montrell argue that this procedure
violates due process. Andrew and Montrell distill their argument: "Because
the imposition of a sentence of supervision opened the door to the findings
of indirect criminal contempt, the right to counsel attached at the
underlying offense."
	As we have noted, the constitutional right of an indigent defendant to
receive appointed counsel is not absolute. People v. Lynn, 102 Ill. 2d 267, 274 (1984). In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 538, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 2012 (1972), the United States Supreme
Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may
be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor,
or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." In Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 389, 99 S. Ct. 1158,
1162 (1979), the Court held that "the central premise of Argersinger-that
actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere
threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual
imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of
counsel." Thus, under Argersinger and Scott, the denial of the right to
appointed counsel precludes the imposition of a jail sentence for an
indigent misdemeanor defendant. This rule requires the trial court to look
ahead: the court knows at the time of trial that it may not imprison the
defendant unless the defendant was represented by counsel. Argersinger,
407 U.S.  at 40, 32 L. Ed. 2d  at 540, 92 S. Ct.  at 2014. Here, Andrew
and Montrell did not receive sentences of detention, or even probation.
Thus, they were not entitled to appointed counsel when they pleaded
guilty. See City of Danville v. Clark, 63 Ill. 2d 408, 413 (1976)
("Argersinger *** is not applicable to ordinance violation prosecutions
punishable by fine only"). Their uncounseled guilty pleas did not violate
due process.
	Though the constitutional issues raised by Andrew and Montrell both
fail, we feel constrained to use our supervisory authority to reach another,
nonconstitutional, issue implicated in this case, but not addressed by the
parties. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §16 ("General administrative and
supervisory authority over all courts is vested in the Supreme Court");
Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts v. State & Municipal
Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union, Local 726, 167 Ill. 2d 180,
192 (1995). Our supervisory authority extends to "the adjudication and
application of law and the procedural administration of the courts."
Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 528 (1997). Though we exercise this
authority only in exceptional circumstances (Statland v. Freeman, 112 Ill. 2d 494, 497 (1986)), we have grave concerns about the procedures
employed in these cases and believe that they warrant correction (see
McDunn v. Williams, 156 Ill. 2d 288, 303 (1993) ("The supervisory
authority is primarily directed to the court and its decision")).
	The trial courts in these cases imposed supervision. The Illinois
Municipal Code does not specifically refer to supervision as a possible
disposition for ordinance violations, but a municipality may provide "fines
or penalties as may be deemed proper" for ordinance violations. 65 ILCS
5/1-2-1 (West 2002). The Cities here provided for supervision "as
defined by the Unified Code of Corrections."
	Under the Unified Code of Corrections, "supervision" means "a
disposition of conditional and revocable release without probationary
supervision, but under such conditions and reporting requirements as are
imposed by the court, at the successful conclusion of which disposition the
defendant is discharged and a judgment dismissing the charges is entered."
730 ILCS 5/5-1-21 (West 2002). Section 5-6-1(c) of the Code
provides that "[t]he court may, upon a plea of guilty or a stipulation by the
defendant of the facts supporting the charge or a finding of guilt, defer
further proceedings and the imposition of a sentence, and enter an order
of supervision of the defendant," if the defendant has not been charged
with certain Class A misdemeanors or a felony. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(c)
(West 2002).
	The trial court must defer entering any judgment on the charges until
the end of the supervision period. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(d) (West 2002).
At that time, if the defendant has successfully complied with all the terms
of supervision, the court must discharge the defendant and dismiss the
charges. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(e) (West 2002). If the defendant has
violated a term of supervision, the court, on a petition by the State, may
continue supervision or impose "any other sentence that was available
[under the Code] at the time of initial sentencing." 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(e)
(West 2002). Supervision, thus, is similar to a continuance, with a
dismissal of the charge against the defendant conditioned upon compliance
with the terms of release set by the court. See People v. Roper, 116 Ill.
App. 3d 821, 824 (1983).
	Clearly, Andrew and Montrell violated the terms of their supervision,
triggering the Cities' contempt petitions.(1) Though we have sanctioned trial
courts to use their contempt powers to enforce orders of supervision
entered under the Juvenile Court Act (see In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d 36, 43
(1981)), the trial courts here did not impose supervision under the Act. If
they had, the minors would have enjoyed the benefits of counsel at the
outset.
	The dissent seems to argue that the judges of the Champaign County
circuit court can do what they did as a proper use of the contempt power,
but that the "root problem" is the fact that the minors did not receive
appointed counsel in the initial proceedings. The dissent bases its position
on Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 152 L. Ed. 2d 888, 122 S. Ct. 1764 (2002), which, it asserts, requires appointed counsel at the stage
"when guilt was determined and the conditions of supervision imposed"
and the defendants "became vulnerable to detention."
	In Shelton, an indigent defendant was charged with misdemeanor
assault, an offense punishable by a maximum of one year of imprisonment
and a $2,000 fine. The defendant represented himself and was convicted.
The trial court sentenced him to 30 days' imprisonment, but suspended
that sentence and placed him on two years' unsupervised probation. The
defendant appealed, arguing that his conviction and suspended sentence
violated the sixth amendment because he did not receive appointed
counsel at trial.
	The United States Supreme Court defined a suspended sentence as
"a prison term imposed for the offense of conviction. Once the prison term
is triggered, the defendant is incarcerated not for the probation violation,
but for the underlying offense." Shelton, 535 U.S.  at 662, 152 L. Ed. 2d 
at 898, 122 S. Ct.  at 1770. That is, a conviction which results in a
suspended sentence results in imprisonment. Shelton, 535 U.S.  at 662,
152 L. Ed. 2d  at 898, 122 S. Ct.  at 1770. Because the defendant did not
receive appointed counsel, the Court found a sixth amendment violation
and affirmed a lower court decision vacating the defendant's suspended
sentence.
	Here, unlike the defendant in Shelton, the minors were not given
suspended sentences of imprisonment, but instead court supervision. That
is, they were not sentenced at all. In Shelton, the Court addressed a
similar disposition in discussing an argument that some jurisdictions cannot
bear the costs of appointed counsel in all cases where the defendant
receives a suspended sentence. The Court observed:
		"Although [these jurisdictions] may not attach probation to an
imposed and suspended prison sentence, States unable or
unwilling routinely to provide appointed counsel to
misdemeanants in Shelton's situation are not without recourse to
another option capable of yielding a similar result.
			That option is pretrial probation, employed in some form by
at least 23 States. [Citation.] Under such an arrangement, the
prosecutor and defendant agree to the defendant's
participation in a pretrial rehabilitation program, which
includes conditions typical of post-trial probation. The
adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence for the
underlying offense then occur only if and when the
defendant breaches those conditions. [Citations.]
			*** [T]his system reserves the appointed-counsel
requirement for the 'small percentage' of cases in which
incarceration proves necessary [citation], thus allowing a State
to 'supervise a course of rehabilitation' without providing a
lawyer every time it wishes to pursue such a course [citation].
*** [P]retrial probation also respects the constitutional
imperative that 'no person may be imprisoned for any offense ...
unless he was represented by counsel at his trial[ ]' [citation]."
(Emphasis added.) Shelton, 535 U.S.  at 671-72, 152 L. Ed. 2d 
at 903-04, 122 S. Ct.  at 1774-75.
	The Court in Shelton did not include Illinois among the 23 states that
offer pretrial probation, but its description of pretrial probation squares
with our description of supervision. See 730 ILCS 5/5-1-21 (West
2002); cf. 730 ILCS 166/1 et seq. (West 2002) (Drug Court Treatment
Act, which allows circuit courts to establish, inter alia, "pre-adjudicatory
drug court programs"). The dissent describes pretrial probation as "a
consensual proceeding which anticipates the cessation of prosecution."
This describes supervision as well. Pretrial probation, like supervision, is
a disposition without a sentence of incarceration and does not require
appointment of counsel.
	Read correctly, Shelton offers no support to the defendants. The
"root problem" is not the fact that the minors did not have appointed
counsel; they were not entitled to lawyers at the initial proceedings. The
root problem is that, fundamentally, prosecuting minors for contempt when
they violate the terms of their court supervision misapprehends the nature
of supervision and abuses the power of contempt.
		"[S]upervision as practiced in cases dealing with minors has been
used as a mechanism after a trial where the proffered evidence
shows that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged. The
entry of the finding of guilty by the trial court is then delayed with
defendant's consent and he is placed on supervision for a
specific period of time.
			When a trial court places a minor on supervision, it is with the
hope of rehabilitating him. If at the termination of the supervision
period, there is reason to believe that the defendant has been
rehabilitated, the finding of guilty is not entered and the defendant
is discharged, for the purpose of supervision is to save the minor
a criminal record. However, if the court is advised at any time
during the period of supervision of activities which demonstrate
a defendant's misbehavior or lack of cooperation with an
appointed supervisory agency, the court may then enter its
finding of guilty ***." People v. Parr, 130 Ill. App. 2d 212, 217
(1970).
	Supervision, accordingly, is not probation:
		"In probation proceedings, sentences are imposed without
deferment, thus encumbering the probationer with an immediate
record. On the other hand, in supervision the proceedings are
deferred, the sentence is in a state of suspense, and no sentence
or judgment will ever be entered if the defendant complies with
the conditions." A. Teton, Crime without Conviction:
Supervision without Sentence, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 547,
561 (1986).
See also H. Sullivan, Supervision Comes to All of Illinois, 65 Ill. B.J.
190 (1976) (referring to supervision as a "disposition," not a sentence).
	The recourse for a violation of the terms of supervision is a petition
to revoke supervision, asking the court to lift the continuance, restart the
case from the finding of guilt, and impose a sentence on the original
offense. Thus, a contempt proceeding to prosecute a violation of
supervision is "unnecessary in fact and inappropriate in theory." 19 J.
Marshall L. Rev. at 562; see In re T.V.P., 90 Ill. App. 3d 800, 801
(1980) (noting that "a contempt sanction *** for a juvenile subject to a
supervisory order should seldom be imposed"); see also People v.
Mowery, 116 Ill. App. 3d 695, 704 (1983) ("The inherent power of
contempt is a powerful one; it is not to be used lightly nor when other
adequate remedies are available"). To hold a defendant in contempt for
violating an order deferring judgment misapprehends the nature of the stick
associated with the carrot of supervision. When a court imposes
supervision, it strikes a deal with the defendant. The judge, in effect, says,
"Abide by the terms of your supervision, or the court will lift the de facto
continuance and sentence you," not "Abide by the terms of your
supervision, or the court will find you in contempt and detain you."
	Like a juvenile offender sentenced to probation, Andrew and
Montrell knew that a violation of the terms of their supervision could result
in a detention sentence, but unlike a juvenile offender sentenced to
probation, Andrew and Montrell were never sentenced. Their cases were
continued with conditions. When they violated these conditions, the Cities
did not ask for the cases to proceed to sentencing, but instead asked for
detention. As the Cities acknowledge, "There is no possibility of
incarceration for the ordinance violations under [t]he Cities' Codes. ***
In other words, no violation of an Urbana or Champaign [m]unicipal
ordinance can result in incarceration for the offense itself." Accordingly,
Andrew and Montrell were incarcerated for violating a court order
entered on a municipal ordinance violation for which they could not have
been sentenced to detention. In effect, the Cities expanded the sentencing
options available to the trial courts by pursuing contempt sanctions.
In Champaign County, a parallel juvenile justice system exists. See
In re K.S.Y., 93 Ill. App. 3d 6, 7 (1981). The Cities and the Champaign
County circuit court have created a two-tiered procedure in which the
Cities can bypass the protections of the Juvenile Court Act by filing a
concurrent jurisdiction complaint against minors charged with municipal
ordinance violations, obtain an order of supervision against such minors,
then press contempt proceedings which result in detention when the
minors violate the conditions of their supervision. This "system" might be
a very good way to deal with recalcitrant minors as a matter of public
policy; as a matter of law, it is improper because it substitutes a contempt
proceeding for punishment under the municipal codes. It defies reason that
municipal ordinance code violations prosecuted outside the Act which
themselves are not punishable by imprisonment become punishable by
imprisonment simply because the trial court ordered minors to abide by
conditions unrelated to the initial violations. We hold that, in the absence
of a statute allowing such a procedure, contempt may not be used as
punishment for minors who violate orders of supervision entered on
municipal ordinance violations which themselves do not permit
imprisonment.
	The dissent ignores the disastrous effects left in the wake of the result
it advocates. If we were to hold, as the dissent would, that the defendant
in every case involving a municipal ordinance violation-from traffic
violations to nuisance violations to curfew violations-would be entitled to
appointed counsel in every case where the trial court imposes supervision,
simply because a violation of supervision could bring a jail sentence for
contempt, already scarce resources better spent providing counsel to
felony offenders and misdemeanants subject to imprisonment would be
dissipated. This is a perversion of the sixth amendment. Rather than torture
the Constitution, we prefer to correct a tortured use of court supervision
and contempt.
	Our decision to deal with the unique problems posed by the
Champaign County approach to ordinance violations by fashioning a
unique remedy with our supervisory authority was necessitated in part by
our duty to adhere to the law as we found it. The dissent, finding a
constitutional violation where none exists, would have us rewrite section
1-5 or section 5-125 of the Act to create a right to counsel where the
General Assembly has not done so, simply to avoid the constitutional
issues here. The dissent apparently is not satisfied with the very clear result
of the defendants' constitutional challenges and ask us to resort to judicial
legislation rather than apply the law. We decline this invitation.
	The Cities must request that the State proceed under the Juvenile
Court Act, where minors have greater procedural protections, including
the right to appointed counsel, if they want to transform guilty pleas to
offenses like stealing $100 and staying out after curfew into sentences of
detention. "The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense
and to prepare and submit it. The child 'requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.' " (Emphasis added.)
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 551, 87 S. Ct. 1428,
1448 (1967), quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 77 L. Ed. 158, 170, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932). This statement is particularly true
when minors admit the charges against them. See In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 397 (1977) ("courts can *** rely upon the protection which a minor
receives through the representation of counsel in assuring that the
admissions are voluntary and are not made in ignorance of his rights").

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons that we have discussed, we reverse the appellate
court's decisions, vacate the circuit courts' orders finding Andrew and
Montrell in contempt and sentencing them to detention, and remand to the
circuit court to allow the Cities to file petitions to revoke supervision or to
request that the State file delinquency petitions in these cases.

Appellate court judgments reversed;
circuit court judgments vacated;
causes remanded.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	At issue in these consolidated cases is section 5-125 of the Juvenile
Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-125 (West 2000)), which allows the
prosecution of a municipal ordinance violation in either the juvenile division
or another division of the circuit court. If the State proceeds against the
minor under the Juvenile Court Act, the minor is afforded "all the
procedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings," including the right to
counsel. 705 ILCS 405/5-101(3) (West 2000). If the minor is
prosecuted in a division other than the juvenile division, judges have
proceeded on the assumption that the minor does not benefit from these
procedural protections. The majority holds that section 5-125 does not
violate equal protection. The majority also holds that section 5-125 does
not deny defendants due process of law by subjecting them to prosecution
without benefit of counsel. Having found the statute constitutional, the
majority necessarily holds that the prosecution of defendants in a division
of the circuit court other than the juvenile division, and the ensuing orders
of supervision, were proper. Surprisingly, the majority then proceeds to
use this court's supervisory authority to hold that the circuit court could
not use its contempt power to vindicate its authority and obtain
defendants' compliance with the orders of supervision. The majority
vacates the circuit court's orders finding defendants in contempt and
sentencing them to detention, and remands the causes to the circuit court
so the cities may file petitions to revoke the orders of supervision or
request that the State file delinquency petitions against defendants.
	For several reasons, I cannot join the majority opinion. First, I
believe that section 5-125 violates equal protection because it allows
minors such as defendants, prosecuted in municipal court, to be treated
differently than minors prosecuted under the Act. Second, I believe that
principles of due process mandated appointment of counsel for defendants
at the initial proceedings. Rather than find the statute unconstitutional, the
majority unnecessarily infringes upon the circuit court's contempt power.
The majority fails to recognize the root problem at issue, that is the lack
of representation for defendants at the initial proceedings. Lastly, I believe
that, pursuant to section 1-5 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/1-5 (West
2000)), defendants were entitled to appointed counsel at the initial
proceedings. Had the majority construed section 1-5 so as to afford
defendants the right to counsel, an interpretation supported by the plain
language of the Act, the majority would have had no occasion to consider
the constitutional challenges to section 5-125 or to use the court's
supervisory authority to restrict the circuit court's use of its contempt
power.
	As noted above, the majority finds that section 5-125 does not
violate equal protection. The majority bases its holding upon a finding that
defendants are not similarly situated to minors prosecuted under the
Juvenile Court Act. The majority observes that a minor prosecuted under
the Act may be placed in a different home environment; may be required
to undergo substance abuse assessment and treatment; may be required
to remove gang tattoos; may lose driving privileges; and may be placed in
a juvenile detention home. Slip op. at 8-9. The majority concludes that
prosecution by the State under the Act for an ordinance violation has more
serious potential consequences for a minor than a quasi-criminal
prosecution by a municipality outside the Act, and, consequently the
legislature had a reasonable basis to provide heightened safeguards to a
minor prosecuted under the Act. Slip op. at 9.
	At the outset, the majority does not explain why some minors are
prosecuted under the Juvenile Court Act and others are not. The minors
have committed the same infractions. A decision is then made that some
of the minors will be prosecuted under the Act, and others will be
prosecuted by the municipality. A difference in treatment is already
apparent. I also question the premise that a minor prosecuted by a
municipality is not entitled to counsel because the minor does not face
serious consequences. As illustrated by the orders of supervision entered
in the cases at bar, and the relevant statutory provisions on supervision,
the consequences to the minor are all too real. Like a minor prosecuted
under the Act, the minor prosecuted by a municipality may have to make
restitution; attend school; attend a nonresidential program for youth; reside
with his parents or in a foster home; perform community service; undergo
treatment for drug and alcohol abuse; and undergo medical, psychological
or psychiatric treatment. See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1 (West 2002). In
addition, a minor prosecuted by a municipality may be ordered to pay a
fine and court costs; pay a fee of $25 for each month of supervision; work
or pursue a course of study or vocational training; contribute to his own
support at home or in a foster home; support his dependents; comply with
the terms of an order of protection; refrain from entering into a designated
geographic area; refrain from having any contact with certain specified
persons or particular types of persons; refrain from the use of drugs;
refrain from operating any motor vehicle not equipped with an ignition
interlock device; attend or reside in a facility established for the instruction
or residence of defendants on probation; and submit to such other
conditions as the court imposes. See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1 (West 2002).
Lastly, the minor may be subject to electronic home detention for repeated
violation of the conditions of supervision. See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4 (West
2002); 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-1 et seq. (West 2002).
	The majority finds relevant that the minor prosecuted under the Act
may be placed in the guardianship of the Department of Children and
Family Services. Presumably such placement is in the best interests of the
minor. See 705 ILCS 405/1-2 (West 2002) (purpose and policy of the
Juvenile Court Act); 705 ILCS 405/1-3(8) (West 2002) (defining
guardianship of the person of a minor as the "duty and authority to act in
the best interests of the minor"). Moreover, prosecution outside of the Act
and placement of the minor on supervision may be used in a subsequent
proceeding to make the minor a ward of the court and place him in the
guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services. See 730
ILCS 405/5-105 (West 2002) (defining delinquent minor as "any minor
who prior to his or her 17th birthday has violated or attempted to violate,
regardless of where the act occurred, any federal or State law, county or
municipal ordinance"). I note that, in the case at bar, Andrew was made
a ward of the court and placed on probation on July 30, 2001.
	The majority also finds relevant that detention, pursuant to section
5-710(1)(a)(v) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-710(a)(v) (West 2002)), is
a sentencing option available to the court when a minor is prosecuted in
the juvenile division.(2) I acknowledge that section 5-710(1)(a)(v) provides
for a term of detention. However, under the circumstances at bar,
detention would not have been available. Section 5-710(1)(a)(viii) of the
Act provides that a minor may be
			"put on probation or conditional discharge and placed in
detention under Section 3-6039 of the Counties Code for a
period not to exceed the period of incarceration permitted
by law for adults found guilty of the same offense or offenses
for which the minor was adjudicated delinquent, and in any event
no longer than upon attainment of age 21; this subdivision (viii)
notwithstanding any contrary provision of the law." (Emphasis
added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(viii) (West 2000).
Furthermore, section 5-710(7) instructs that
			"In no event shall a guilty minor be committed to the
Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division for a period of
time in excess of that period for which an adult could be
committed for the same act." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS
405/5-710(7) (West 2000).
Defendants were prosecuted for municipal ordinance violations. The
ordinances at issue do not provide for a term of incarceration. See City of
Urbana Code of Ordinances §§1-10, 15-32 (1980); Champaign
Municipal Code §§1-21, 23-211 (1985). It follows that upon a finding
of guilt, defendants would not be subject to detention under section
3-6039 of the Counties Code or placed in the custody of the Department
of Corrections, Juvenile Division, because an adult committing the same
infraction would not be committed to the Department for any length of
time.
	In my view, section 5-125 would not violate equal protection only
if the court construes section 1-5 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/1-5 (West
2000)) as giving minors the right to counsel at all proceedings, whether in
the juvenile division or in another division of the circuit court.
	Having rejected defendants' equal protection challenge to section
5-125, the majority holds that due process does not require additional
protections for minors who are prosecuted for violations of municipal
ordinances in divisions of the circuit court other than the juvenile division.
The majority states:
		"In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 389,
99 S. Ct. 1158, 1162 (1979), the Court held that 'the central
premise of Argersinger-that actual imprisonment is a penalty
different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment-is
eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment
as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of
counsel.' Thus, under Argersinger and Scott, the denial of the
right to appointed counsel precludes the imposition of a jail
sentence for an indigent misdemeanor defendant. This rule
requires the trial court to look ahead: the court knows at the time
of trial that it may not imprison the defendant unless the
defendant was represented by counsel. Argersinger, 407 U.S. 
at 40, 32 L. Ed. 2d  at 540, 92 S. Ct.  at 2014. Here, Andrew
and Montrell did not receive sentences of detention, or even
probation. Thus, they were not entitled to appointed counsel
when they pleaded guilty. See City of Danville v. Clark, 63 Ill. 2d 408, 413 (1976) ('Argersinger *** is not applicable to
ordinance violation prosecutions punishable by fine only'). Their
uncounseled guilty pleas did not violate due process." Slip op. at
10-11.
	By finding that section 5-125 does not violate constitutional
principles the majority necessarily holds that the prosecution of defendants
in a division of the circuit court other than the juvenile division, and the
orders for supervision which followed, were proper. The majority finds
itself in a predicament, however, because of the obvious plight of the
minor defendants. The majority expresses "grave concerns about the
procedures employed in these cases" and expresses its belief that the
procedures "warrant correction." Slip op. at 11. The majority proceeds
to do so, through the use of the court's supervisory authority, by
invalidating the lower court's use of contempt proceedings. Slip op. at 17-18.
	At the outset, the majority acknowledges that the circuit court may
use its contempt powers to enforce orders for supervision entered under
the Juvenile Court Act. Slip op. at 12. The majority notes, however, that
the circuit court did not impose supervision upon defendants under the
Juvenile Court Act. Slip op. at 12. The majority opines:
			"Like a juvenile offender sentenced to probation, Andrew and
Montrell knew that a violation of the terms of their supervision
could result in a detention sentence, but unlike a juvenile offender
sentenced to probation, Andrew and Montrell were never
sentenced. Their cases were continued with conditions. When
they violated these conditions, the Cities did not ask for the cases
to proceed to sentencing, but instead asked for detention. As the
Cities acknowledge, 'There is no possibility of incarceration for
the ordinance violations under [t]he Cities' Codes. *** In other
words, no violation of an Urbana or Champaign [m]unicipal
ordinance can result in incarceration for the offense itself.'
Accordingly, Andrew and Montrell were incarcerated for
violating a court order entered on a municipal ordinance violation
for which they could not have been sentenced to detention. In
effect, the Cities expanded the sentencing options available to the
trial courts by pursuing contempt sanctions.
			In Champaign County, a parallel juvenile justice system exists.
[Citation.] The Cities and the Champaign County Circuit Court
have created a two-tiered procedure in which the Cities can
bypass the protections of the Juvenile Court Act by filing a
concurrent jurisdiction complaint against minors charged with
municipal ordinance violations, obtain an order of supervision
against such minors, then press contempt proceedings which
result in detention when the minors violate the conditions of their
supervision. This 'system' might be a very good way to deal with
recalcitrant minors as a matter of public policy; as a matter of
law, it is improper because it substitutes a contempt proceeding
for punishment under the municipal codes. It defies reason that
municipal ordinance code violations prosecuted outside the Act
which themselves are not punishable by imprisonment become
punishable by imprisonment simply because the trial court
ordered minors to abide by conditions unrelated to the initial
violations. We hold that, in the absence of a statute allowing such
a procedure, contempt may not be used as punishment for
minors who violate orders of supervision entered on municipal
ordinance violations which themselves do not permit
imprisonment." Slip op. at 16-17.
The majority fails to take into consideration the unity of the court system
and the traditional use of the contempt power to enforce a court order.
	The Illinois Constitution provides that all circuit courts have original
jurisdiction over all justiciable matters except where the supreme court is
specified to have original and exclusive jurisdiction. People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 221-22 (1991), citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9.
Furthermore, it is the circuit court, as a whole, which is vested with
jurisdiction rather than a particular division of the circuit court. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d  at 222; People v. DeJesus, 127 Ill. 2d 486, 498 (1989). Juvenile
court is a division of a single unified circuit court and whether a minor is
tried in juvenile or criminal court is a matter of procedure, not jurisdiction.
P.H., 145 Ill. 2d  at 222; DeJesus, 127 Ill. 2d  at 498; In re Greene, 76 Ill. 2d 204, 213 (1979).
	From the unified structure of the circuit court follows uniformity in the
use of the court's contempt power. A judge sitting in the juvenile division
of the circuit court holds a person in contempt of court based upon the
circuit court's inherent power to vindicate its authority and enforce its
orders. Likewise, a judge sitting in another division of the circuit court
holds a person in contempt of court based upon the circuit court's inherent
power to vindicate its authority and enforce its orders. The judge in the
juvenile division does not exercise the contempt power pursuant to any
particular grant in the Juvenile Court Act. Rather, the judge exercises the
contempt power as an alternate remedy to the provisions of the Juvenile
Court Act. This court has heretofore explained these concepts in In re
Baker, 71 Ill. 2d 480 (1978), and In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d 36 (1981).
	In In re Baker, 71 Ill. 2d  at 480, the State filed a petition for rule to
show cause why respondent, a minor otherwise in need of supervision,
should not be held in contempt of court. Respondent moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the exclusive remedy for violation of a court
order was a further proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1975, ch. 37, par. 702-3(d)). The trial judge held that sections
2-2(b) and 2-3(d) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37,
pars. 702-2(b), 702-3(d)) were unconstitutional legislative attempts to
abridge the court's contempt powers, held respondent in contempt,
adjudged her a delinquent, and placed her on probation. On appeal to this
court, the State argued that the Juvenile Court Act and the contempt
power were not mutually exclusive and the circuit court's use of the
contempt power was appropriate as an alternative to the remedy provided
in the Juvenile Court Act. This court agreed with the State and explained:
		"A court is vested with inherent power to enforce its orders and
preserve its dignity by the use of contempt proceedings.
[Citations.] Because such power inheres in the judicial branch of
government, the legislature may not restrict its use. [Citations.]
That limitation upon legislative action does not, however,
preclude the legislature from providing an alternative statutory
solution, and that, in our opinion, is the effect of sections 2-2(b)
and 2-3(d). Therefore, the circuit court erred in finding these
sections of the Juvenile Court Act unconstitutional.
			While not now disputing the existence of the contempt power,
respondent urges its exercise in the circumstances of this case
was unnecessary and erroneous. Her thesis is that since the
legislature decided to provide a particular remedy for the
violation of a court order, its decision should be respected.
Respondent notes that the court's solution to the runaway
problem-placing her on probation with the Department-could
have been as well accomplished by proceeding under section
5-2(1)(b)(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37, par. 705-2(1)(b)(1)).
The flaw in this argument is the fact that respondent agrees that
the alternative procedures are available to the court. Since the
contempt power exists and there is a factual basis for that
holding, the order cannot be said to be erroneous simply because
an alternative route to the same objective was available. The trial
court made a specific finding that the alternative remedy was
'without sufficient deterrent effect,' and respondent has
presented nothing which convinces us of any impropriety in that
finding." In re Baker, 71 Ill. 2d  at 484-85.
	In In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d 36, the minor failed to attend school as
directed by the trial court in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act,
and was found in contempt of court. The court placed the minor on
probation for a year, ordered him to serve 19 days in a detention center,
and again ordered that the minor attend school. The minor failed to attend
school and was the subject of a second petition for contempt, which
resulted in another order of probation and detention for a period of 60
days. On appeal, the minor argued that he was not subject to a
dispositional order of probation under the Juvenile Court Act and the
court lacked the authority to accomplish indirectly, by way of contempt,
that which it could not do directly under the Juvenile Court Act. This court
found the minor's arguments unpersuasive. Noting there was a specific
order that the minor attend school, the court stated:
		"The contempt proceedings initiated March 5, 1979, were filed
because of a violation of this interim order, the validity of which
has not been challenged by the parties to this appeal. This,
therefore, is not a case governed by the Juvenile Court Act.
Rather, the propriety of placing this minor on probation depends
upon the court's power to impose punishment for contempt for
the violation of its order.
			Courts have the inherent power to enforce their orders by
way of contempt. [Citations.] The power to punish for contempt
does not depend on constitutional or legislative grant. Because
the power to enforce court orders through contempt proceedings
inheres in the judicial branch of the government, the legislature
may not restrict its use." In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d  at 41.
The court therefore held that finding a minor in contempt and placing the
minor on probation as punishment for contempt are alternate procedures
to those provided in the Juvenile Court Act for dealing with minors who
contumaciously violate lawful court orders. In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d  at 42-43.
Further, the court held that the trial court could impose incarceration for
contempt. In doing so, the court rejected the minor's argument that the
trial court could not impose incarceration because, under the Juvenile
Court Act, the trial court was not authorized to incarcerate a minor for
violating an order of the court. In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d  at 44-45.
	The majority cites In re G.B. for the proposition that a trial court may
use its contempt powers to enforce orders for supervision entered under
the Juvenile Court Act. Slip op. at 12. The majority then notes the trial
courts here did not impose supervision under the Juvenile Court Act. Slip
op. at 12. This distinction is invalid, however, because the trial court's
power to enforce an order for supervision, or any other order, stems not
from the Juvenile Court Act but from the judiciary's inherent power to
enforce its orders through contempt proceedings.
	The majority reasons further:
		"To hold a defendant in contempt for violating an order deferring
judgment misapprehends the nature of the stick associated with
the carrot of supervision. When a court imposes supervision, it
strikes a deal with the defendant. The judge, in effect, says,
'Abide by the terms of your supervision, or the court will lift the
de factor continuance and sentence you,' not 'Abide by the
terms of your supervision, or the court will find you in contempt
and detain you.' " Slip op. at 15-16.
It bears repeating that the majority sanctions the use of the contempt
power by the juvenile court to enforce orders for supervision. Thus, the
majority holds that the juvenile court may find "a defendant in contempt for
violating an order deferring" a resolution of a prosecution. Slip op. at 15.
I note that the circuit court is a unified court system and a juvenile has
neither a common law nor a constitutional right to adjudication under the
Juvenile Court Act. P. H., 145 Ill. 2d  at 223. Consequently, this court
cannot "sanction" the use of the contempt power to enforce an order by
one division of the circuit court (see slip op. at 12) while disallowing its use
by another division of the circuit court.
	The majority concludes "[i]t defies reason that municipal ordinance
code violations prosecuted outside the Act which themselves are not
punishable by imprisonment become punishable by imprisonment simply
because the trial court ordered minors to abide by conditions unrelated to
the initial violations." Slip op. at 16. Such is the nature of contempt,
however, that a trial court may sentence a litigant to time in jail in a civil
proceedings (Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n, 139 Ill. 2d 24 (1990); Del Dotto v. Olsen, 257 Ill. App. 3d 463 (1993)), or in the
prosecution of an offense for which a term of incarceration is not available
(In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d at 44-45).
	In ruling that the trial courts could not use contempt proceedings to
enforce the orders of supervision, the majority fails to take into
consideration the unity of the court system and the power inherent in the
circuit court, as a whole, to enforce court orders. The majority sows
confusion by approving the use of contempt proceedings in one division
of the circuit court and not another.(3) The majority's reasoning also
highlights troubling inconsistencies in the proffered analysis on the need for
appointed counsel to represent minor defendants.
 	As noted above, the majority holds that section 5-125 does not deny
defendants due process of law because defendants were not entitled to
representation by counsel at the initial proceedings, that is, at the
prosecutions of the municipal ordinance violations. However, the majority
sanctions the circuit court's use of the contempt power to enforce orders
for supervision entered under the Juvenile Court Act while disallowing the
use of the contempt power to enforce orders for supervision entered
outside of the Juvenile Court Act. The motivating factor for the difference
in treatment seems to be the lack of counsel at the initial proceedings
against minor defendants. The majority states:
		"Though we have sanctioned trial courts to use their contempt
powers to enforce orders of supervision entered under the
Juvenile Court Act (see In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d 36, 43 (1981)),
the trial courts here did not impose supervision under the Act. If
they had, the minors would have enjoyed the benefits of counsel
at the outset." Slip op. at 12.
Yet later in the opinion, the majority emphasizes the need for
representation of minor defendants at the initial court proceedings:
		" 'The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist
upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether
he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child
"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him." ' (Emphasis added.) In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 551, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1448
(1967), quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 77 L. Ed. 158, 170, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932). This statement is
particularly true when minors admit the charges against them.
See In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 397 (1977) ('courts can ***
rely upon the protection which a minor receives through the
representation of counsel in assuring that the admissions are
voluntary and are not made in ignorance of his rights')." Slip op.
at 17-18.
The majority's solicitude for defendants' lack of counsel at the initial
proceedings contrasts sharply with the majority's ruling that defendants
were not entitled to representation by counsel at those proceedings. The
inconsistency in the majority's reasoning is further highlighted by the fact
that defendants were represented by counsel at the contempt
proceedings. See slip op. at 2, 5. It is only at the initial proceedings,
where the majority holds due process did not mandate appointment of
counsel, that defendants did not have counsel appointed by the courts.
	Having showcased the disparities in Champaign County's "parallel
juvenile justice system," the majority could have construed section 1-5 or
section 5-125 so as to afford minors counsel in the prosecution of
municipal ordinances. Construing the provisions in that manner would have
eliminated the constitutional issues these cases present. See Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 173, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576, 588, 121 S. Ct. 675,
683 (2001) (" '[w]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, [courts] will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress' "); quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 99 L. Ed. 2d 645, 654 S. Ct. 1392, 1397 (1988); In re
Application for Judgment & Sale of Delinquent Properties for the
Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161, 168 (1995) ("If there is doubt as to the
construction to be given a legislative enactment, the doubt must be
resolved in favor of an interpretation which supports the statute's validity
(see Rehg v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 152 Ill. 2d at 512);
statutes will be construed to avoid an unconstitutional result (see Sayles
v. Thompson (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 122"). In this regard, I base my position
upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 152 L. Ed. 2d 888, 122 S. Ct. 1764 (2002), where the Court
required counsel for the defendant even though the defendant received a
suspended sentence and was not actually incarcerated.
	Defendant Shelton appeared pro se at a bench trial for a
misdemeanor. The trial court convicted him of the misdemeanor and
sentenced him to a 30-day jail term. However, the trial court suspended
the sentence and placed Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation,
conditioned on the payment of court costs, a $500 fine, reparations of $25
and restitution of $516.69. Shelton appealed his conviction and sentence
on sixth amendment grounds. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that
Shelton could not be sentenced to a term of imprisonment absent
provision of counsel. Accordingly, the court affirmed Shelton's conviction
and the monetary portion of his punishment, but invalidated the suspended
prison sentence. See Alabama v. Alabama, 535 U.S.  at 658-660, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 896, 122 S. Ct. 1768.
	In the Supreme Court, Shelton argued that an indigent defendant may
not receive a suspended sentence unless he is offered or waives the
assistance of counsel. The Court agreed, explaining:
			"In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963),
we held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to
state-appointed counsel, firmly established in federal-court
proceedings in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),
applies to state criminal prosecutions through the Fourteenth
Amendment. We clarified the scope of that right in Argersinger,
holding that an indigent defendant must be offered counsel in any
misdemeanor case 'that actually leads to imprisonment.' 407
U.S., at 33. Seven Terms later, Scott confirmed Argersinger's
'delimit[ation],' 440 U.S., at 373. Although the governing statute
in Scott authorized a jail sentence of up to one year, see id., at
368, we held that the defendant had no right to state-appointed
counsel because the sole sentence actually imposed on him was
a $50 fine, id., at 373. 'Even were the matter res nova,' we
stated, 'the central premise of Argersinger-that actual
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere
threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound and warrants adoption
of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right
to appointment of counsel' in nonfelony cases. Ibid.
			"Subsequent decisions have reiterated the Argersinger-Scott
'actual imprisonment' standard. See, e.g., Glover v. United
States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) ('any amount of actual jail
time has Sixth Amendment significance'); M.L. B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) (constitutional line is 'between criminal
proceedings that resulted in imprisonment, and those that did
not'); id., at 750 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment) ('The
Court in Scott, relying on Argersinger[,] drew a bright line
between imprisonment and lesser criminal penalties.'); Lassiter
v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18,
26 (1981). It is thus the controlling rule that 'absent a knowing
and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense ... unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.'
Argersinger, 407 U.S., at 37.
			***
			Applying the 'actual imprisonment' rule to the case before us,
we take up first the question we asked amicus to address:
Where the State provides no counsel to an indigent defendant,
does the Sixth Amendment permit activation of a suspended
sentence upon the defendant's violation of the terms of
probation? We conclude that it does not. A suspended sentence
is a prison term imposed for the offense of conviction. Once the
prison term is triggered, the defendant is incarcerated not for the
probation violation, but for the underlying offense. The
uncounseled conviction at that point 'result[s] in imprisonment,'
Nichols, 511 U.S., at 746; it 'end[s] up in the actual deprivation
of a person's liberty,' Argersinger, 407 U.S., at 40. This is
precisely what the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in
Argersinger and Scott, does not allow." Shelton, 535 U.S.  at
661-62, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 897-98, 122 S. Ct.  at 1769-70.
Declaring itself satisfied that Shelton was entitled to appointed counsel at
the critical stage when his guilt or innocence of the charged crime was
decided and his vulnerability to imprisonment was determined, the Court
invalidated Shelton's suspended jail term.
	Returning to the cases at bar, the trial courts did not merely require
that defendants pay a fine. Rather, the trial courts sentenced defendants
to terms of supervision conditioned upon defendants attending school and
meeting certain other requirements. As the majority opinion notes:
"Andrew and Montrell knew that a violation of the terms of their
supervision could result in a detention sentence." Slip op. at 16. The fact
that the trial courts contemplated additional punishment, whether that
punishment be termed punishment for contempt of court or punishment for
violation of the conditions of supervision, can be seen clearly from this
exchange between the trial court and Andrew:
			"THE COURT: Now, all I'm ordering you to do is what a kid
your age is supposed to do. Follow the rules at home, go to
school, not being in any trouble at school. You're there to learn.
That's why there's no suspensions, no detentions, no truancy, no
tardy. And this is for a year; so this is going to be for all next
year, too. Do you understand that?
			[ANDREW]: Yes.
			THE COURT: What you need to understand is that if you
don't do these things and come back here, the City can ask that
you be held in contempt. And that's different than what you're
here for. You can't be locked up right now. But if you're found
to be in contempt of court, I can put you in the Detention
Center for six months. And at the Detention Center, which
you need to understand we have a brand new one which is
bars and cinder blocks, that aside from going to school and
maybe a half hour a day of recess type situation where you
are in a controlled environment, there are no TVs, there are
no radios in your room. If you don't go to school, there is
nothing to do. And you have to go to school there, and you
won't be late to school there.
			So you have the choice to make. You're either going to do it
the way you should do it or you're going to do it anyway
except you're going to be locked up. Any questions about
that?
			[ANDREW]: No.
			THE COURT: So it's up to you. You know what you should
do. There is no question that you know what you should do. You
just don't like your situation and you're acting out and this is
going to stop because it doesn't help you at all. Do you
understand me?
			[ANDREW]: Yes.
			THE COURT: Do everything you're supposed to, you're
done with this matter in a year. If you don't, you're going to be
brought back here. And I want to make sure you understand
what's going to happen. That's why I told you. Any questions
about that?
			[ANDREW]: No." (Emphases added.)
Not surprisingly, when Andrew skipped school and visited Springfield
without his mother's permission, the trial court sentenced him to probation
and 180 days' detention, 8 days to be served immediately, and the
remainder subject to remission. Andrew served an additional 47 days of
detention because of subsequent violations of the conditions imposed by
the court.
	As in Shelton, defendants were entitled to representation by counsel
at the initial court proceedings. It is at this stage, when guilt was
determined and the conditions of supervision imposed, that defendants
became vulnerable to detention. The obvious intent to further punish
defendants through the imposition of detention made representation
necessary. As the majority aptly noted in discussing defendants' due
process challenge, the trial court must look ahead: the trial court knows at
the time of trial that it may not imprison the defendant unless the defendant
was represented by counsel. See slip op. at 10-11.
	Noting that Shelton does not mandate appointment of counsel in
cases involving pretrial probation, the majority maintains that appointment
of counsel is likewise not mandated in cases involving supervision. See slip
op. at 14. The majority's attempt to equate supervision with pretrial
probation is unavailing. As the Court observed in Shelton, 535 U.S.  at
671-72, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 904, 122 S. Ct.  at 1774-75, pretrial probation
is a consensual proceeding which anticipates cessation of prosecution:
		"Under such an arrangement, the prosecutor and defendant
agree to the defendant's participation in a pretrial rehabilitation
program, which includes conditions typical of post-trial
probation. The adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence
for the underlying offense then occur only if and when the
defendant breaches those conditions."
The defendant agrees to the tolling of the statute of limitations for the crime
and to a waiver of the right to a speedy trial. The prosecution agrees to
dismiss all charges upon the defendant's successful completion of the
terms of probation. Adversarial proceedings are held in abeyance. A
conviction and sentence are not entered unless the defendant violates the
terms of probation and either pleads guilty or is found guilty after trial. See
Conn. Gen. Stat. §54-56e (2003) ("Any such defendant shall appear in
court and shall, under such conditions as the court shall order, be released
to the custody of the Court Support Services Division ***. If the
defendant refuses to accept, or, having accepted, violates such conditions,
the defendant's case shall be brought to trial" (emphasis added));
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §170.55(3) (McKinney Supp. 2004) ("Upon or
after arraignment in a local criminal court upon an information, a simplified
information, a prosecutor's information or a misdemeanor complaint, and
before entry of a plea of guilty thereto or commencement of a trial
thereof, the court may, upon motion of the people or the defendant and
with the consent of the other party, or upon the court's own motion with
the consent of both the people and the defendant, order that the action be
'adjourned in contemplation of dismissal,' as prescribed in subdivision
two" (emphasis added)). In contrast, adversarial proceedings precede
imposition of an order of supervision. The trial court accepts the
defendant's guilty plea or finds the defendant guilty after a bench trial or
trial by jury. As the majority concedes, upon violation of the terms of
supervision, the court restarts the case from the finding of guilt and
imposes a sentence on the original offense. See slip op. at 15. The
defendant is not allowed to go behind the guilty plea or have the court
vacate the conviction.
	The majority insists that the description of pretrial probation as "a
consensual proceeding which anticipates the cessation of prosecution"
applies to supervision as well. Slip op. at 14. Not to belabor the point,
however, supervision imposed under the Unified Code of Corrections
follows an adjudication of guilt. The majority perhaps confuses supervision
under the Code with supervision under the Juvenile Court Act. Section
5-615 of the Juvenile Court Act provides in part:
			"(1) The court may enter an order of continuance under
supervision for an offense other than first degree murder, a Class
X felony or a forcible felony (a) upon an admission or stipulation
by the appropriate respondent or minor respondent of the facts
supporting the petition and before proceeding to adjudication,
or after hearing the evidence at the trial, and (b) in the absence
of objection made in open court by the minor, his or her parent,
guardian, or legal custodian, the minor's attorney or the State's
Attorney.
			(2) If the minor, his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian,
the minor's attorney or State's Attorney objects in open court to
any continuance and insists upon proceeding to findings and
adjudication, the court shall so proceed.
* * *
			(7) If a petition is filed charging a violation of a condition of
the continuance under supervision, the court shall conduct a
hearing. If the court finds that a condition of supervision has not
been fulfilled, the court may proceed to findings and
adjudication and disposition." 705 ILCS 405/5-615 (West
2002).
Thus, it is a continuance under supervision, pursuant to section 5-615 of
the Juvenile Court Act, which shares common features with pretrial
probation. Andrew and Montrell were not prosecuted under the Juvenile
Court Act. Rather, they were prosecuted by the municipalities and the
circuit court imposed supervision under the Uniform Code of Corrections.
	The majority's use of the court's supervisory authority to arrive at a
desired result is even more lamentable because the majority could also
have effectuated relief for defendants through statutory construction.
Defendants maintain that the Juvenile Court Act governs the manner in
which juveniles are to be treated in the trial courts of Illinois. Defendants
note that section 1-5 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/1-5 (West 2000))
affords minors the right to counsel in proceedings under the Act.
Defendants acknowledge that section 5-125, a provision found in article
V of the Act, allows prosecution of minors for violations of municipal
ordinances in divisions of the circuit court other than the juvenile division,
and further provides that said prosecutions may be done without reference
to the procedures set out in the article. Defendants believe section 5-125
is a limitation on the procedures contained in article V of the Act and not
a limitation on the rights afforded minors pursuant to section 1-5 of the
Act. The State counters that defendants have waived this argument. The
State argues further that section 1-5 of the Act does not apply to
prosecutions of minors outside of the Act.
	Although the majority rejects defendants' argument, I believe that the
plain language of the Act supports defendants' position. Article I of the
Act contains general provisions applicable to all articles of the Act.
Section 1-5 of article I affords the minor the right to be represented by
counsel in proceedings under the Act. Article V of the Act is devoted to
the problem of juvenile delinquency. Section 5-125 of article V provides
that a minor may be prosecuted and punished for a violation of a municipal
ordinance without reference to the procedures set out in the article. Given
that section 5-125 specifically refers to the procedures under article V,
and given that article V contains various procedures applicable solely to
delinquent minors, it follows that section 5-125 is a limitation on the
procedures available to delinquent minors under article V as opposed to
procedures generally available to minors pursuant to section 1-5 of article
I. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect
to the intent of the legislature. People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 414
(2003); Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320
(2003). Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
only legitimate function of the courts is to enforce the law as enacted by
the legislature. Midstate, 204 Ill. 2d  at 320, Henrich v. Libertyville High
School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 391 (1998).
	In further support of defendants' argument, I note that earlier versions
of section 5-125 provided for prosecution and sentencing of the minor for
an ordinance violation "without reference to the procedures set out in [the]
Act." See 705 ILCS 405/5-4(2) (West 1994); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch.
37, par. 702-7. As part of the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of
1998, the statute was amended to read that prosecution and sentencing
of a minor for an ordinance violation shall be "without reference to the
procedures set out in this Article [V]." See 705 ILCS 405/5-125 (West
2000). It is a maxim of statutory construction that "an amendatory change
in the language of a statute creates a presumption that it was intended to
change the law as it theretofore existed." Weast Construction Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 102 Ill. 2d 337, 340 (1984). In amending section
5-125, the legislature must have intended to effectuate change.
	Lastly, I note that certain provisions in article V refer to the Act in
general as opposed to procedures available under article V. See 705
ILCS 405/5-150, 5-410 (West 2000). In contrast, other provisions in
article V, including section 5-125, refer to procedures under the article.
See 705 ILCS 405/5-135 (West 2000). The legislature presumably
differentiated between the provisions for a purpose.
	Because the majority fails to properly construe section 1-5, the
majority is constrained to address the constitutional challenges defendants
raise and use the court's supervisory authority with the results noted
above.

CONCLUSION
	The cases at bar present a problem not with the use of the contempt
power but with the lack of representation at the initial court proceedings.
It must be remembered that the minor defendants were represented by
counsel at the contempt proceedings. Defendants, however, appeared
without aid of counsel at the initial proceedings and pled guilty to the
charges against them. The majority's solicitude for defendants should be
translated into representation where it was needed, that is, where the
minor defendants pled guilty and were exposed to punishment. The
majority forgoes the opportunity to render moot the constitutional
challenges to section 5-125 by construing section 1-5 so as to afford
defendants the right to counsel. Instead, the majority attempts to provide
help through the use of this court's supervisory authority, disallowing the
use of the contempt power in one division of the circuit court but not
another. In doing so, the majority creates confusion and unduly infringes
upon the use of the contempt power by the circuit court. I respectfully
dissent.
	 
	 
1.          Contrary to the Cities' assertions, the contempt proceedings were not separate from 
the ordinance violation proceedings; the Cities filed their contempt petitions under the same case numbers as the ordinance violations. "[I]ndirect 
criminal contempt is a separate and distinct proceeding in and of itself and is not part of the original case being tried when the 
contemptuous act occurred." People v. Budzynski, 333 Ill. App. 3d 433, 438 (2002), citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359, 375, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2456 (1990).
2.                 
            
             
  I suggest that a minor, like Montrell, who committed a curfew violation could not have been subjected to detention at 
any stage of prosecution since the infraction would not have been illegal if committed by an adult. See 705 ILCS 405/14.1 (West 2002) ("any 
minor accused of any act under federal or State law, or a municipal ordinance that would not be illegal if committed by an adult, cannot be 
placed in a jail, municipal lockup, detention center or secure correctional facility"); 705 ILCS 405/5401 (West 2002) .
3.        The 
majority's directive that the circuit court may not use the contempt power in a prosecution outside the Act may also conflict with 
legislative intent. Section 561 of the Unified Code of Corrections provides that the "Chief Judge of each circuit shall adapt a system of 
structured, intermediate sanctions for violations of the terms and conditions of a sentence of probation, conditional discharge or 
disposition of supervision." 730 ILCS 5/561 (West 2002). Pursuant to section 564 and 58A1 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/564, 58A1 (West 
2002)), intermediate sanctions shall include a term of electronic home detention. Clearly, the legislature intended that the circuit court 
have at its disposal a variety of tools and sanctions to use in dealing with recalcitrant minors.