Case Title: Jacobs v. Brock

Citation: 437 P.2d 920, 73 Wash. 2d 234

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1968-02-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
73 Wn.2d 234 (1968) 437 P.2d 920 JAMES JACOBS et al., Respondents, v. ELIZABETH A. BROCK, as Executrix, Appellant.[*] No. 39295. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. February 29, 1968. Conniff, Harper & Taylor, by Stanley A. Taylor, for appellant. Greenwood, Shiers & Kruse, by Leonard W. Kruse, for respondents. LANGENBACH, J.[] This is an action brought to recover upon a claim for services rendered a decedent. The claim *235 had been rejected by his estate. This is the second appeal in the same matter. The record of the first appeal is in Jacobs v. Brock, 66 Wn.2d 878, 406 P.2d 17 (1965), where the facts are set out somewhat in detail. The first trial included four claims one for an alleged agreement to leave plaintiffs-respondents certain property on Lake Crescent; one for an implied contract to pay for services performed; one for an alleged agreement of decedent to leave the wife certain property by will or memorandum attached to it; and one for return of certain personal property left in the Lake Crescent property. The first three claims were dismissed by the court in that proceeding, and appellant conceded the fourth claim. On the appeal, the court stated at 880: And on page 882, the opinion continued: The opinion then recited the decisional law applicable to this set of facts. On the retrial, the court considered the testimony of witnesses concerning the performance of services by respondents and the understanding that respondents were to receive the Lake Crescent property for their services. On that basis, they had not submitted statements or bills to Dr. Brock for payment. There was testimony on the second trial that the respondent wife had told the appellant, as well as the niece and nephew of Dr. Brock, that she did not want them to think that what she had done for the doctor was for profit. The nephew admitted that she had also told him that she felt they were entitled to the lake property for these services. At the conclusion of the trial, the court read the stipulated testimony of some witnesses at the first trial and then rendered an oral opinion. In this, it was stated: Further: The court then entered judgment for plaintiffs for $7,025.60. There were 10 assignments of error. Three of the assignments dealt with objections to the admission of evidence. It was appellant's contention that it was a violation of the deadman's statute, infra, to allow respondent James Jacobs to answer the question: "Why didn't you submit a statement to Dr. Brock?" (Answer: "I was always given the impression we were getting the lake property for looking after him.") RCW 5.60.030 provides: [1] The answer of Mr. Jacobs did not reveal a statement made by decedent nor did it relate to a transaction with decedent. In In re Wind's Estate, 27 Wn.2d 421, 426, 178 P.2d 731 (1947), this court stated: Clearly, Mr. Jacobs' statement of his own feelings or impressions does not come within this definition. Appellant further objected to the testimony of two persons regarding statements of Dr. Brock that he intended to make a gift of Lake Crescent property to respondents. The basis of her objection was that this testimony was no longer relevant since the claim of gift had been abandoned. [2] The relevancy of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Chase v. Beard, 55 Wn.2d 58, 346 P.2d 315 (1959). We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in light of the fact that Dr. Brock's intent to compensate respondents for their services was a contested matter in this case. [3] In addition, these statements made by Dr. Brock were not barred by RCW 5.60.030 for the reason that they were made to third persons. Peoples Nat'l Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 69 Wn.2d 682, 420 P.2d 208 (1966). [4] Two assignments referred to findings of fact wherein the trial court determined that respondents expected to be paid for their services, and that decedent was not the type of person who would not have paid compensation for the services performed. The court also found the number of hours that respondents performed services and a reasonable rate of compensation. These findings are supported by substantial evidence. The trial court's determination on conflicting evidence is decisive, and this court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, even if it were of the opinion that the factual dispute should have been resolved the other way. Delegan v. White, 59 Wn.2d 510, 368 P.2d 682 (1962). Accord: Magelssen v. Cox, 68 Wn.2d 785, 415 P.2d 645 (1966). [5] The last assignments of error raised the primary question as to whether, under the law, the respondents had established a contract between themselves and the doctor on which their claim might be sustained. These rules of law *239 were definitely outlined in the prior appeal of Jacobs v. Brock, supra. In that opinion, after citing these rules as laid down in Johnson v. Suddreth's Estate, 59 Wn.2d 517, 368 P.2d 907 (1962), we said, at 884: and, at 885: We conclude, as did the trial court, that respondents' evidence satisfied the requirements of the rules set out in the first appeal. The judgment is affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., ROSELLINI, HALE, and McGOVERN, JJ., concur. April 25, 1968. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 437 P.2d 920. [] Judge Langenbach is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.