Case Title: Commonwealth v. Mayotte

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11894

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11894 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LINDA MAYOTTE. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     January 7, 2016. - August 19, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Rape.  Indecent Assault and Battery.  Child Abuse.  Incest.  
Reckless Endangerment of a Child.  Intimidation of Witness.  
Evidence, First complaint, State of mind, Impeachment of 
credibility, Prior inconsistent statement.  Witness, 
Intimidation, Impeachment.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 18, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard T. Tucker, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Eric S. Brandt, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Linda Mayotte, 
of rape of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23 (three indictments); 
indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of 
fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B (five indictments); indecent 
assault and battery on a child over the age of fourteen, G. L. 
c. 265, § 13H (five indictments); incest, G. L. c. 272, § 17; 
reckless endangerment of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 13L; 
intimidation of a witness, G. L. c. 268, § 13B; resisting 
arrest, G. L. c. 268, § 32B; and unlawful possession of a 
firearm without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h).2  The victim in each of the charged sex offenses was 
her adopted son, D.M.3  The defendant challenges the convictions 
on three grounds:  (1) error in the exclusion of first complaint 
evidence relating to her defense that she was the victim, not 
the perpetrator, of rape by the complainant; (2) error in the 
exclusion of a statement proffered as evidence of the victim's 
state of mind; and (3) insufficiency of the evidence to prove 
the reckless endangerment indictment based on "serious bodily 
                                                          
 
 
2 The jury acquitted the defendant on seven additional 
indictments charging her, on a joint venture theory, with sex 
offenses committed against her adopted daughter, V.M. (a 
pseudonym), by her husband, Joseph Mayotte.  Joseph Mayotte was 
convicted of rape of a child (two indictments), aggravated rape 
of a child, indecent assault and battery on a child (three 
indictments), assault with intent to rape, incest, dissemination 
of matter harmful to a minor, reckless endangerment of a child, 
and failure to secure a firearm. 
 
 
3 A pseudonym. 
3 
 
 
injury."  The defendant also challenges her sentence, claiming 
that the judge may have been influenced by improper factors 
argued by the prosecutor.  Because the application of the first 
complaint doctrine to a defendant in a rape prosecution is a 
question of first impression, we granted the defendant's 
application for direct appellate review of all her claims. 
 
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the first 
complaint rule is a neutral rule of evidence that permits such 
testimony whenever the credibility of a sexual assault 
allegation is at issue.  Although the judge erred in ruling that 
the defendant's first complaint evidence was inadmissible as a 
matter of law, no prejudice resulted from the exclusion of the 
evidence.  We also reject the defendant's claim of error in the 
exclusion of D.M.'s statement, proffered as evidence of his 
state of mind, as it was not probative of or admissible as 
evidence of the defendant's state of mind.  We vacate the 
conviction of reckless endangerment, however, because we agree 
that the conduct proved at trial -- that the defendant 
recklessly exposed V.M. to the risk of sexual abuse by Joseph 
Mayotte -- was insufficient to establish the element of "serious 
bodily injury" required under the indictment.  Notwithstanding 
any impropriety in the prosecutor's sentencing remarks, we 
discern no basis to conclude that the judge was influenced by 
4 
 
 
those remarks in sentencing the defendant, and therefore, 
resentencing is not necessary. 
 
Background.  Based on evidence presented at trial, the jury 
could have found the following facts.  The defendant and her 
husband, Joseph, married in 1987.  After attempting to have 
biological children, the Mayottes decided to adopt in 2003.  
Approximately one year later, they adopted D.M. and V.M., 
siblings living in an orphanage in Kazakhstan.  D.M. and V.M. 
moved into the Mayotte home in August, 2004.  D.M. was twelve 
years of age, and V.M. was eight years of age. 
 
After the Mayottes told the children that Joseph's parents 
had died in the house, and that ghosts remained in the house, 
V.M. became scared of sleeping in her own room.  V.M. started to 
sleep with Joseph; the defendant no longer slept in the bedroom.  
On a regular basis, Joseph touched V.M.'s private areas, 
penetrated her vagina and anus, and made her touch his penis.  
Joseph also showed V.M. pornographic videotapes. 
 
D.M., who struggled to learn English and felt alienated at 
school, had chronic stomach pains.4  The defendant would massage 
his stomach to help him sleep.  Starting in January, 2005, the 
defendant began initiating sexual contact with D.M., including 
sexual intercourse.  According to D.M., sexual contact occurred 
                                                          
 
 
4 The pains were later diagnosed as a gall bladder 
condition, for which D.M. had surgery in 2006. 
5 
 
 
more than one hundred times between January, 2005, and the 
spring of 2007.  During this time, D.M. made no complaint of 
sexual abuse to the social worker who conducted home visits on 
behalf of the adoption agency or the counsellor he saw for 
twelve sessions.  D.M. did not disclose the alleged abuse to his 
best friend or even his sister, V.M.  The sexual contact ceased 
when the defendant became pregnant with D.M.'s child.5 
 
On June 15, 2007, V.M. told two neighbor siblings that her 
father, Joseph, had been touching her "private areas."  The 
neighbors' mother called the Department of Children and Families 
(DCF), and that night, a police officer and a social worker 
arrived at the Mayotte house to investigate.  Each child was 
asked separately if he or she had been or were being 
inappropriately touched by a parent.  Both children denied any 
such conduct.  The denials continued throughout DCF's follow-up 
visits to the house during 2007.  During one such visit, D.M. 
told an investigator that he "thought the whole thing was BS." 
 
In April, 2009, V.M. told D.M.'s girl friend about her 
father's abuse.  The girl friend's mother spoke to the defendant 
and notified DCF.  The defendant and the defendant's friend, 
Edward Kassor, questioned V.M. in front of the girl friend and 
the girl friend's mother.  DCF initiated a second investigation 
                                                          
 
 
5 The defendant gave birth on January 16, 2008.  
Deoxyribonucleic acid tests proved that D.M. was the baby's 
father. 
6 
 
 
of the family, and during a May, 2009, house visit, D.M. again 
told DCF representatives that he was not being abused. 
 
After two years of denying sexual abuse, D.M. made his 
first complaint on June 4, 2009.  He made the disclosure after 
the defendant sent him a text message threatening to report him 
to the police because he had stolen items of her jewelry.  D.M. 
was visibly upset after receiving the message and fought with 
his girl friend.  When pressed, D.M. told his girlfriend about 
the defendant's sexual acts.  The girl friend insisted that D.M. 
inform the authorities.  That same evening, DCF removed D.M. and 
V.M. from the Mayotte home. 
 
The defendant testified that she did not rape D.M. and that 
D.M. used physical force and threats to force her participation 
in sexual acts with him.  According to her testimony, D.M. 
became sexually "aggressive" in the spring of 2005.  On separate 
occasions, D.M. threw her down on the bed and pinned her arms to 
her body; grabbed her arm and forced her to the bed; and threw 
her against a bureau after she bit him while attempting to get 
away.  The defendant testified that she was "trying to still say 
no" but that "things would escalate very quickly."  She claimed 
that D.M. put his hands on her throat, placed a knife to her 
throat, and punched her.  As for the alleged threats, the 
defendant testified that D.M.'s "favorite" threat was that he 
would "go to the police and say that [she] was raping him."  
7 
 
 
According to the defendant, D.M. made this threat "[e]very time 
he didn't like [the defendant's] reaction" to his advances.  The 
defendant claimed that this ongoing threat was the reason why 
she did not make her own first complaint for almost five years 
after the alleged abuse by D.M. began.  D.M. admitted that he 
would punch holes in his bedroom wall when he was angry, but 
denied any use of force or coercion against the defendant. 
 
Discussion.  1.  First complaint doctrine.  The defendant 
filed a pretrial motion to present "first complaint" testimony 
from Kassor, in support of her theory of defense that D.M., 
"wise beyond his years," raped the defendant and controlled her 
behavior by threatening to make a false allegation of rape.  
After a hearing, the trial judge denied the motion, reasoning 
that "[t]he first complaint protocol and doctrine [were] not to 
curb any abuses of defendants being prejudiced by not explaining 
themselves.  They don't have to explain themselves.  The law 
doesn't require it, and every judge instructs a jury that they 
do not have to explain themselves.  So there's no prejudice if 
she never made a statement." 
 
On appeal, the defendant urges us to permit the application 
of the first complaint doctrine to a sexual assault defendant 
whose defense at trial is that she was the victim of a sexual 
assault by the complainant rather than the perpetrator.  She 
argues that the first complaint doctrine applies for the benefit 
8 
 
 
of any party who makes an allegation of sexual assault that is 
contested by the alleged perpetrator.  In the alternative, she 
argues that the proffered evidence is independently admissible 
as the Commonwealth "opened the door" by eliciting testimony 
from multiple witnesses that the defendant "never" complained to 
anyone about her charge that she was raped by the complainant.  
The Commonwealth counters that (1) the doctrine of first 
complaint applies only to statements made by a complaining 
witness in a sexual assault prosecution, and (2) the defendant's 
statement was inadmissible hearsay. 
 
We agree with the defendant that the first complaint rule 
is a neutral rule of evidence, applicable whenever the 
credibility of a sexual assault allegation is at issue.  In the 
circumstances of this case, however, the judge's error in 
excluding the defendant's first complaint as a matter of law did 
not result in prejudice to the defendant.  Because the 
defendant's first complaint proffer would have been insufficient 
in any event to rebut the Commonwealth's assertion that she 
"never" complained of rape by the complainant, we reject her 
claim that it was independently admissible as a prior consistent 
statement.  Last, we reject summarily the Commonwealth's 
argument that such testimony should be deemed inadmissible on 
hearsay grounds because, consistent with the purpose of the 
9 
 
 
first complaint doctrine, such evidence was not offered for its 
truth. 
 
a.  Origin of first complaint doctrine.  In resolving the 
issue before us, we are guided by what we have understood to be 
the rationale underlying the first complaint doctrine.  
Previously termed the "fresh complaint" rule, the first 
complaint doctrine is based on an English common-law assumption 
that a rape victim who did not immediately speak out about the 
sexual assault "was in effect [asserting] that nothing violent 
had been done."  Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 228-229 
(2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006), quoting Anderson, 
The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration 
Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual 
Assault, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 945, 978 & n.198 (2004).  "American 
courts, in turn, endorsed the belief that the failure of a rape 
victim to make a prompt complaint of a sexual assault was akin 
to an inconsistent statement at odds with the complainant's 
court room testimony about the rape."  King, supra at 229.  The 
fresh complaint doctrine addressed three concerns regarding 
potential juror bias in a rape prosecution:  that jurors may 
still believe that a true rape victim immediately discloses the 
assault; that jurors may draw adverse inferences from the 
absence of evidence suggesting a prompt complaint; and that 
10 
 
 
jurors remain skeptical of rape allegations.6  Id. at 230.  As a 
result, prosecutors are permitted to rebut any inference of 
fabrication with witness testimony that the complainant did in 
fact tell someone, and that the complaint was prompt or "fresh."  
Id. at 229. 
In King, 445 Mass. at 237-238, this court replaced the 
"fresh complaint" rule with the "first complaint" doctrine, in 
recognition of empirical studies showing that immediate 
disclosure of sexual assault is not universal.  We determined 
that "ostensible 'delay' in disclosing a sexual assault is not a 
reason for excluding evidence of the initial complaint; the 
timing of a complaint is simply one factor the jury may consider 
in weighing the complainant's testimony."  Id. at 242.  In 
balancing the competing interests, we limited first complaint 
testimony to that of one witness -- the first person told of the 
assault.  Id. at 243.  We were mindful that multiple complaint 
witnesses could "unfairly enhance a complainant's credibility as 
                                                          
 
 
6 Because "a child's circumstances commonly make it 
difficult, if not impossible, for the child to make a prompt 
complaint of sexual assault," Commonwealth v. Montanez, 439 
Mass. 441, 453-454 (2003) (Sosman, J., concurring), citing 
Commonwealth v. Fleury, 417 Mass. 810, 813-815 (1994), we 
expanded the fresh complaint rule to permit "a child's much 
later report of sexual assault . . . whenever there is a 
reasonable explanation for the child's failure to make a prompt 
complaint."  Montanez, supra.  We later applied this reasoning 
to adult complainants.  See Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 
240 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006). 
11 
 
 
well as prejudice the defendant by repeating for the jury the 
often horrific details of an alleged crime."  Id. 
b.  Scope of first complaint doctrine.  Although the issue 
has arisen solely in the context of a jury's assessment of the 
credibility of a complaining witness in a sexual assault 
prosecution, nothing in our jurisprudence precludes the 
application of the first complaint doctrine to a defendant in a 
sexual assault prosecution.  As demonstrated by our cases, the 
first complaint rule owes its genesis to the confluence of two 
factors:  (1) that the central issue is a sexual assault rather 
than some other nonsexual crime; and (2) the need to provide to 
the jury "as complete a picture as possible of how the 
accusation of sexual assault first arose."  King, 445 Mass. at 
247.  At its core, therefore, the doctrine exists to facilitate 
credibility determinations where an allegation of sexual assault 
is at issue.  This purpose is no less important when a jury is 
called upon to assess such an allegation made by a defendant. 
Even when the first complaint rule was assumed to be 
available only to the named complainant in a sexual assault 
prosecution, we stressed the importance of an informed 
determination of credibility:  "The doctrine . . . is not 
intended to be used as a shield to bar the jury from obtaining a 
fair and accurate picture of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief."  
Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 228-229 (2009).  In a 
12 
 
 
similar vein, we ask whether the application of the doctrine to 
a defendant in a sexual assault prosecution undermines or 
otherwise perverts this purpose.  It does not.  The issue of 
witness credibility is the same whether the person claiming such 
assault is the defendant or the complainant.  A defendant in a 
sexual assault prosecution, who claims to have been so assaulted 
by the complainant, faces the same credibility obstacle in 
proving his or her defense as the Commonwealth faces in proving 
the indictment.  In our view, therefore, the identity of the 
party making the allegation of sexual assault does not dictate 
the application of the doctrine.  The defendant is no less 
entitled than the Commonwealth to the benefit of a principle 
intended to mitigate the inherent obstacles to establishing the 
credibility of a sexual assault allegation. 
Our reluctance to limit the application of this doctrine 
for the benefit of the Commonwealth reflects the concern we 
expressed in Commonwealth v. Morales, 464 Mass. 302, 308-310 
(2013), that one-sided evidentiary rules are inherently unfair.  
In Morales, we rejected the defendant's argument that the rule 
we articulated in Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 650 
(2005) (permitting defendant to show prior acts of violence by 
victim), should apply only to the defendant.  Morales, supra at 
309.  We noted that if evidence of "prior acts of violence by 
the victim will assist a jury . . . , it follows that evidence 
13 
 
 
of [such acts] committed by the defendant will do the same."  
Id.  Thus, in deference to the same fairness concerns, we are 
persuaded that the first complaint doctrine must be neutral, and 
that it may apply whenever the credibility of a sexual assault 
allegation is a live issue in the case. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that application of the first 
complaint doctrine to defendants will cause jury confusion as 
well as create a trial within a trial.  We agree with the 
defendant, however, that such concerns do not militate against 
allowing a defendant in a sexual assault prosecution to proffer 
first complaint evidence.  The matter properly may be relegated 
to the trial judge who, in the exercise of his or her 
discretion, is adequately equipped by the existing rules of 
evidence to prevent any such confusion.  See generally Mass. G. 
Evid. §§ 403, 413 (2016).  See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 11 (a), 
(b), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1509 (2004); Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 (a) (1) (B), as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005). 
 
2.  The defendant's first complaint evidence.  Having 
determined that a defendant in a sexual assault prosecution may 
offer first complaint evidence as part of the defense to the 
charge, we review the judge's ruling to determine if it resulted 
in prejudice to the defendant.  Here, defense counsel objected 
numerous times to the judge's rulings on the defendant's proffer 
of first complaint evidence.  Counsel objected at the motion 
14 
 
 
hearing and the judge affirmatively recognized the objection on 
the record.  Counsel then renewed the objection at trial.  
Because the issue was preserved, we review the decision "to 
ensure 'that the error[s] did not influence the jury or had but 
very slight effect.'"  Arana, 453 Mass. at 228, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). 
Reviewing the error under this standard, we discern no 
prejudice to the defendant.  The defendant's proffer did not 
specify any details of the proposed testimony.  The sole 
reference to the substance of the testimony was as follows: 
"This testimony would be elicited from Edward Kassor, a close 
friend of [the defendant's]." In the absence of any necessary 
details, this proffer would have had little or no probative 
value as first complaint testimony.  Had the judge considered 
the proffer, rather than denying it as a matter of law, 
clarification would have been required.  Further inquiry would 
have revealed the defendant's equivocal statement to the police 
that she "tried to tell [her] friend Ed," which falls short of 
an affirmation that she did in fact disclose the alleged rape by 
the complaining witness.  See Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 
441, 445-446 (2008) (expressions of "unhappiness, upset or other 
such feelings" not statement of sexual assault).  Considering 
the vague nature of the defendant's proffer and the strength of 
the Commonwealth's case, we are persuaded that the omission of 
15 
 
 
her first complaint evidence "did not influence the jury or had 
but very slight effect" (citation omitted).  Flebotte, 417 Mass. 
at 353. 
As to the defendant's claim that her first complaint 
testimony was independently admissible because the Commonwealth 
"opened the door" with its questions to various witnesses, see 
Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 287, 298-299 (2009) 
(admitting statement of sexual assault for purpose of 
rehabilitation), we discern no error in the judge's exclusion of 
her statement on this ground. 
"[A] prior consistent statement made before the witness had 
incentive to fabricate may be admitted for the limited purpose 
of rebutting the claim of recent fabrication."  Commonwealth v. 
Tennison, 440 Mass. 553, 563 (2003).  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 613(b)(2) (2016).  However, "the impeachment of a witness by 
prior inconsistent statements or omissions does not, standing 
alone, entitle the adverse party to introduce other prior 
statements made by the witness that are consistent with [her] 
trial testimony."  Commonwealth v. Bruce, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 
482 (2004), citing Commonwealth v. Retkovitz, 222 Mass. 245, 
249-250 (1915). 
The defendant complains that the prosecutor elicited 
testimony from numerous witnesses, establishing that the 
defendant did not disclose the alleged rape to them 
16 
 
 
individually.  The substance and the timing of the statement are 
dispositive of this claim.  First, the statement allegedly made 
to Kassor was ambiguous, and thus not a prior consistent 
statement in that it did not explicitly assert a claim of rape.  
Indeed, the proffered statement was neither a first complaint 
nor corroboration of a first complaint.  See Murungu, 450 Mass. 
at 445-446.  Second, it was undisputed that the defendant did 
not make the statement until after D.M. had made his complaint 
and after both children had been removed from the home.  
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 430 Mass. 91, 99–100 (1999) (prior 
consistent statement made after motive to fabricate arose 
inadmissible).  Therefore, the judge committed no error in 
excluding the alleged statement from the evidence on this 
ground. 
 
3.  Exclusion of D.M.'s statement.  The defendant filed a 
separate motion in limine, seeking to introduce D.M.'s statement 
to his grandfather, "I can beat any system," as evidence 
probative of the defendant's state of mind.  More specifically, 
the defendant proffered the statement to establish that she felt 
"powerless" in her parental relationship with D.M., such that 
she succumbed to his threats and was forced into sexual conduct 
with him.  Citing Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 430 Mass. 673, 679 
(2000), the judge denied the motion on the ground that "[p]rior 
bad acts of the victim and its effect on the state of mind of a 
17 
 
 
defendant is allowed only in self-defense cases."  The judge 
ruled that defense counsel was permitted to ask D.M., "Do you 
believe you can beat any system?"  However, after D.M. 
responded, "No," counsel was not allowed to impeach him by 
calling the grandfather as a witness for that purpose. 
 
The judge properly excluded the grandfather's testimony as 
hearsay because it was not shown to relate to either D.M.'s or 
the defendant's state of mind.  Admissibility required a 
demonstrated nexus between D.M.'s statement and the defendant's 
state of mind.  On this record, however, the defendant failed to 
make an adequate showing that D.M.'s statement was related to 
the rape prosecution, that the defendant was aware of it, and 
that it was a factor in the charged conduct.  In the absence of 
these facts as a foundation for admissibility, we do not fault 
the judge's ruling that D.M.'s statement did not bear on the  
defendant's state of mind. 
 
However, we agree with the defendant that the judge should 
have allowed defense counsel to impeach D.M. with his statement 
to the grandfather.  See Commonwealth v. Mahar, 430 Mass. 643, 
649-650 (2000) (adopting proposed Mass. G. Evid. § 806 to permit 
impeachment by prior inconsistent statement).  The modified 
question, "Do you believe you can beat any system?" permitted by 
the judge did not accomplish this purpose.  Without the ability 
to establish D.M. as the declarant in boasting of his ability to 
18 
 
 
"beat any system," defense counsel lost the benefit of 
impeachment of D.M. with his prior inconsistent statement.  
Nonetheless, this limit on impeachment did not result in 
prejudice to the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Roberts, 433 
Mass. 45, 51 (2000); Commonwealth v. Smiledge, 419 Mass. 156, 
159 (1994).  In allowing the modified question, the judge "did 
not preclude all inquiry" on the issue.  Commonwealth v. Tweedy, 
54 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 60 (2002). 
 
4.  Reckless endangerment indictment.  The defendant claims 
the indictment charging reckless endangerment of a child on the 
basis of serious bodily injury was not proved and, therefore, 
the resulting conviction must be reversed.  We agree. 
 
"[A]rticle 12 of the [Massachusetts Declaration] of Rights 
. . . requires only such particularity of allegation as may be 
of service to a person charged with crime in enabling him [or 
her] to understand the charge and prepare him [or her] defense."  
Commonwealth v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 507, 509 (1914); G. L. c. 277, 
§ 34.  "An indictment conforming with the statutory form is 
sufficient."  Commonwealth v. Baron, 356 Mass. 362, 364 (1969).  
However, an indictment that entirely omits a charge or does not 
conform to the substance of the statutory language defining the 
elements of the crime does not offer a defendant adequate notice 
of the nature of the charges against him or her.  See 
Commonwealth v. Garrett, 473 Mass. 257, 267 n.12 (2015) 
19 
 
 
(indictment for armed robbery with firearm cannot support 
conviction of armed robbery with dangerous weapon). 
 
Here, a grand jury indicted the defendant on one charge of 
recklessly exposing V.M. to "a substantial risk of serious 
bodily injury," pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 13L.  The indictment 
omitted completely any reference to the alternative theory on 
which the charge might be brought, "sexual abuse" of the child.  
See G. L. c. 265, § 13L.  As defined in the statute, "serious 
bodily injury" results in "permanent disfigurement, protracted 
loss or impairment of a bodily function, limb or organ, or 
substantial risk of death."  G. L. c. 265, § 13L.  The 
Commonwealth presented no evidence at trial regarding serious 
bodily injury to V.M.  The evidence related entirely to the 
defendant's responsibility for her husband's sexual abuse of 
V.M.  The judge, however, introduced the theory that the 
defendant recklessly exposed V.M. to a substantial risk of 
"sexual abuse" during his instructions to the jury.  In doing 
so, he improperly expanded the indictment to encompass both 
theories of liability.  See Garrett, 473 Mass. at 267.  The end 
result is that the defendant was convicted of a crime for which 
she had not been indicted by a grand jury.  See Commonwealth v. 
Barbosa, 421 Mass. 547, 554 (1995) (art. 12 bars felony 
conviction without grand jury indictment).  Therefore, we 
disagree with the Commonwealth that the reckless endangerment 
20 
 
 
charge based on sexual abuse was "contextualized" by a "multi-
count indictment" that included numerous sexual assault charges.  
Due process requires that defendants be given sufficient notice 
of the charges against them, notice that was not given here.  
Farmer, 218 Mass. at 509. 
 
5.  Sentencing.  The defendant requests resentencing 
because the prosecutor made numerous improper statements at 
sentencing that potentially could have influenced the judge's 
determinations.  Specifically, the prosecution urged the court 
to "send a message to the defendants in the community of 
Worcester County" that crimes against children would not be 
tolerated.  The prosecutor also stated that the defendant had 
"lied" and had "falsely accused" the victims.  Without comment, 
the judge sentenced the defendant to three concurrent terms of 
from eighteen to twenty-two years in State prison -- lower than 
the sentence of from thirty to thirty-three years requested by 
the Commonwealth and higher than the sentence of from five to 
seven years recommended by the defendant. 
 
A sentencing judge enjoys significant latitude in 
sentencing.  Commonwealth v. Celeste, 358 Mass. 307, 310 (1970).  
We will not vacate a sentence "unless we have been able to 
identify clear legal error."  Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 
Mass. 659, 685 (1998).  Where there is a "suggestion of 
impropriety," Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 462 
21 
 
 
(2008), the judge may voluntarily and explicitly reject reliance 
on improper arguments.  See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 414 Mass. 
88, 91-92 & n.3 (1993).  However, a judge's decision not to 
disavow such arguments explicitly does not in and of itself 
provide evidence that a judge deviated from his or her duty.  
Goodwin, supra at 92. 
 
Although the Commonwealth concedes that it was improper to 
ask the judge to "send a message" to the Worcester County 
community regarding crimes against children, we are not 
persuaded that the judge considered the prosecutor's comments.  
We affirm the defendant's sentences, except as to that imposed 
on the reckless endangerment conviction. 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that a defendant may proffer first 
complaint evidence where the defendant claims to be the victim 
of sexual assault and that claim is a live issue in the case.  
The exclusion of the defendant's first complaint, however, did 
not result in prejudice.  We vacate the defendant's judgment of 
conviction as to the charge of reckless endangerment and order 
judgment for the defendant as to that charge.  We affirm the 
other judgments of conviction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.