Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Kovacic

Citation: 389 Md. 223

Docket Number: 11ag/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG
NO. 11
SEPTEMBER TERM, 2004
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
KRISTIN E. KOVACIC
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
 Filed: October 11, 2005
1Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides:
“(a)  Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approval 
of the Commission.  Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel
shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.” 
2Rule 1.3 requires “[a] lawyer [to] act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.”
3Rule 1.4 provides:
“(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
“(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”
4Rule 8.1 provides, as relevant:
“An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
*     *     *     *
“(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the
matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”  
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, by Bar Counsel,
acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial
Action against Kristin E. Kovacic, the respondent.   The petition charged that the  respondent
violated Rules 1.3, Diligence,2 1.4, Communication,3 and 8.1, Bar Admission and
Disciplinary Matters,4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by
Maryland Rule 16-812.
5Rule 16-752 (a) provides:
“(a)  Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any
circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the
record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation
with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing
of motions, and hearing.”  
6Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides:
“(c)  Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate
into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings
as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. If
dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless
the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later
than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy
of the statement to each party.” 
2
We referred the case, pursuant to Rule 16-752 (a), 5 to the Honorable Karen H.
Abrams, of the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County, for hearing pursuant to Rule 16-757 (c).6
Although she was served, the respondent did not file a response, prompting the entry of an
order of default, which the respondent did not move to vacate.  Following a hearing, at which
the petitioner offered, and the hearing court accepted, two exhibits, one of which was that
of the complainant, the hearing court found facts by the clear and convincing standard and
drew conclusions of law, both as follows.
“Delores Shelby, formerly known as Delores Glasper, retained Ms. Kovacic to
represent her in her divorce case against Robert Glasper, Jr., case no. CA01-1189 in the
Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County, Maryland.   A Judgment of Divorce was entered on
August 14, 2002.  Pursuant to the Judgment of Divorce, the parties were to have a backhoe
3
and grader appraised, and Mr. Glasper was to pay half of the appraised value to Ms. Shelby.
The Court retained jurisdiction for purposes of approving a Qualified Domestic Relations
Order, awarding $ 13, 237.11 to Ms. Shelby.   Ms. Kovacic was supposed to see that the
equipment was appraised and that the QDRO was submitted to the Court.
“Ms. Kovacic did not send a copy of the Judgment of Divorce to Ms. Shelby until
September 19, 2002, over a month after the Judgment had been entered.   Ms. Shelby made
numerous attempts to contact Ms. Kovacic in the ensuing months to check on the status of
the case, but Ms. Kovacic failed to respond.   Ms. Kovacic did not have the equipment
appraised and did not submit a QDRO to the Court.  Ms. Shelby wrote to Ms. Kovacic on
January  9, 2003, discharging her as counsel because she felt Ms. Kovacic had abandoned
her case.
“Ms. Shelby submitted a complaint to the Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland, which was received by the Commission on March 4, 2003.   Office of Bar Counsel
wrote to Ms. Kovacic five times, demanding that she respond to Ms. Shelby’s complaint. 
Assistant Bar Counsel called the Respondent on four occasions.   Ms. Kovacic acknowledged
receipt of the complaint.   The Commission never received a response from her prior to the
Peer Review meeting held on October 2, 2003.
“Respondent violated Rule 1.3 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct by not
acting diligently in arranging for an appraisal and preparing a QDRO.   Respondent failed
to take care of those matters although she had five months to do so after the Judgment of
7This is the second time that this case has been set for oral argument. 
Subsequently to the issuance of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
petitioner and the respondent submitted to this Court their Joint Petition For Reprimand
By Consent.   In that petition, the respondent acknowledged that the evidence the
petitioner produced was sufficient to sustain the allegations of misconduct and asserted
that she was agreeing, “freely and voluntarily without coercion or duress to the reprimand
sanction.   Rather than impose the agreed upon sanction, the Court set the matter for
hearing.   The hearing was held on April 4, 2005, at the conclusion of which, considering
the respondent’s reported medical condition and her expressed willingness to consent to
inactive status, it was understood that the option of the respondent taking inactive status
would be explored and that the Court would be apprised accordingly.  When, after sixty
days, there had been no progress in that regard, Bar Counsel, by letter dated June 14,
2005, advised the Court that, “[a]lthough Ms. Kovacic and [he] have spoken a few times
since [April 4, 2005],” he had not received a letter from her physician to confirm her
medical condition or a signed consent to inactive status and, in fact, that “Ms. Kovacic
was not certain that she wanted to consent to inactive status.”  The respondent did not
contradict these representations, although Bar Counsel’s letter noted that she had been
copied.   Therefore, the case was scheduled once again for oral argument.  
4
Divorce was entered.
“Respondent violated Rule 1.4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct by
failing to send a copy of the Judgment of divorce to her client until over a month after it was
entered and by failing to respond to her client’s inquiries about the status of the case.
“Respondent also violated Rule 8.1 (b) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
by failing to respond to numerous inquiries by the Office of Bar Counsel regarding Ms.
Shelby’s complaint.”
Neither the petitioner nor the respondent has excepted to the hearing court’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law.    Only the petitioner filed a recommendation for sanction and
appeared at the hearing.  This time,7 the petitioner’s recommendation, rather than a
5
reprimand, is that the respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.   That
sanction is required, it submits,  where, as here, the respondent abandoned her client’s  case
and there has been no showing of mitigation.   It contrasts this case with Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Tolar, 357 Md. 569, 745 A. 2d 1045 (2000), a case in which the respondent
therein committed the same violations.  This Court imposed a reprimand in that case in
consideration of the respondent’s remorse and history of rendering assistance to the Director
of the Lawyers Assistance Program of the Maryland State Bar Association.
The purpose of disciplinary proceedings and the sanctions that flow from them is well
settled.  It is, as we have stated often, to protect the public. Attorney Grievance Com'n of
Maryland v. Pennington 387 Md. 565, 601-602, 876 A.2d 642, 663-64 (2005); Attorney
Grievance Com'n of Maryland v. Kreamer,  387 Md. 503, 533-34, 876 A.2d 79, 97-98
(2005);  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Steinberg, 385 Md. 696, 703, 870 A. 2d 603, 607
(2005);  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 533, 819 A.2d 372, 375 (2003);
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224, 255, 812 A.2d 981, 999 (2002);
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474, 800 A.2d 782, 789 (2002);
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hess, 352 Md. 438, 453, 722 A.2d 905, 913 (1999); Attorney
Grievance. Comm'n v. Webster, 348 Md. 662, 678, 705 A.2d 1135, 1143 (1998); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997) .   It is not to
punish the erring attorney.  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Christopher,  383 Md. 624, 639,
861 A.2d 692, 701 (2004); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Wyatt, 323 Md. 36, 38, 591 A.2d
6
467, 468 (1991).   That purpose is achieved when sanctions are imposed that are
commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they
were committed. Awuah, 346 Md. at 435, 697 A.2d at 454; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 483, 671 A.2d 463, 480 (1996); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Myers,
333 Md. 440, 447, 635 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1994).  This is so, because such sanctions promote
general and specific deterrence,  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sliffman, 330 Md. 515, 529,
625 A.2d 314, 321 (1993); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Berger, 326 Md. 129, 131, 604
A.2d 58 (1992) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 355, 587
A.2d 511, 521 (1991)), protect the integrity of the legal profession,  Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Cassidy, 362 Md. 689, 698, 766 A.2d 632, 637 (2001), further the public's
confidence in the legal profession, Stein, 373 Md. at 533, 819 A.2d at  375 (2003);  Powell,
369 Md. at 474, 800 A.2d at 789, and take account of  the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including any mitigating factors.   See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 656, 745 A.2d 1086, 1092 (2000); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Gavin, 350 Md. 176, 197-98, 711 A.2d 193, 204 (1998).  Relevant to the question of the
existence of mitigating factors are, we have held, whether the respondent acted out of a
selfish motive,  Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 330, 786 A.2d 763,
772-73 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Jaseb, 364 Md. 464, 481-82, 773 A.2d 516,
526 (2001);  Glenn, 341 Md. at 488-89, 671 A.2d at 483, whether the attorney has remorse
for the misconduct, whether the conduct is likely to be repeated and whether the attorney has
8To be sure, the length of the untimely reply in Tolar was less than in this case;
however, the difference - four months - is not a basis for a different sanction.  Nor can a
meaningful distinction be drawn by characterizing the respondent’s conduct in this case
as an essential abandonment of her client’s case.   In Tolar, a period of some two years
elapsed before the complaint was filed with Bar Counsel, during which the attorney
intentionally did not take any action on behalf of her client. Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Tolar, 357 Md. 569, 576-79, 745 A.2d 1045, 1049-50 (2000).
7
a “prior grievance history.” Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 71, 839 A.2d
718, 724-25 (2003); Wyatt, 323 Md. at 38, 591 A.2d at 468.
This case is practically on all fours with Tolar, in which this Court imposed a
reprimand.  In that case, the respondent, as did the respondent herein, failed to complete a
QDRO, failed to communicate with her client and did not timely respond to Bar Counsel’s
inquiries,8 thus violating the same Rules, 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1 (b).  The reprimand in that case
was based largely on the respondent’s remorse, a factor that could have been, and apparently
was, explored in that case, and that sanction was imposed despite prior unreported
reprimands on the responding attorney’s record.  From the respondent’s remorse, another
factor, that a repeat of the misconduct was unlikely, admittedly not mentioned, could have
been inferred.
The record in this case contains no findings of the respondent’s remorse or of any
other mitigating factor, nor could it.   The respondent did not appear for the hearing and thus
the reasons, or motive, for her inaction were not, and could not have been, explored.   And
the Joint Petition For Reprimand By Consent does not provide enlightenment in that regard.
8
In addition to acknowledging that sufficient evidence was submitted to sustain the allegations
of misconduct and that she consented “freely and voluntarily” to a reprimand, the effects of
which she stated she knew, the respondent simply advised the Court that she “has not been
practicing law since November 2003 [and that s]he does not anticipate returning to the
practice of law in the foreseeable future.”   Nor was the Court any more enlightened by the
April 4, 2005 court proceedings.  To be sure, the Court learned that it was the respondent’s
medical condition that explained her discontinuation of the practice of law and the belief that
she would not resume soon.  That disclosure caused the Court and the parties to focus on
inactive status as the most appropriate disposition.  It did not offer any other insight into
whether there were factors mitigating the respondent’s misconduct.
The situation, therefore, is this.  The respondent, like Tolar, violated Rules 1.3, 1.4
and 8.1 (b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Unlike Tolar, she has no prior attorney
grievance history, a factor that supports a disposition similar to the one Tolar received. 
More important, however, also unlike in Tolar, there is neither a finding, nor any basis for
mitigating the respondent’s misconduct.  While the respondent represented that she was
suffering from a medical condition that caused her to cease practicing law and made her
return to the practice in the foreseeable future uncertain, the respondent has failed to submit
documentation to confirm its existence, despite having been  requested, and having agreed,
to do so.  And, according to the petitioner, the respondent now expresses uncertainty as to
her willingness to take inactive status as she previously indicated she was willing to do.
9
There simply is nothing, moreover, of record to indicate the likelihood of a repetition of the
conduct.  Accordingly, we believe that the appropriate sanction - the one that will protect the
public - is that recommended by the petitioner, the indefinite suspension of the respondent
from the practice of law.  This sanction ensures, because she can be readmitted to practice
only on order of this Court, Steinberg, 385 Md.  at 706 n. 10, 870 A.2d at 609 n.10, that the
respondent will not be permitted to practice until this Court is satisfied she is able to do so
and, further, will practice consistent with the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715, FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF 
THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRI E V A N CE
COMMISSION AGAINST KRISTIN E. KOVACIC.