Case Title: Russell v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 47, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ERIC D. RUSSELL,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 47, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0801028059 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                      Submitted: June 28, 2013 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 30, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 30th day of July 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Eric D. Russell, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s January 10, 2013 order denying his second motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
2
Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in 2009, Russell was found 
guilty by a Superior Court jury of Rape in the First Degree, two counts of 
Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, Indecent Exposure, Offensive 
Touching and Endangering the Welfare of a Child.  He was sentenced as a 
habitual offender to life in prison on the rape conviction2 and to consecutive 
Level V terms on the other convictions.  This Court affirmed Russell’s 
convictions on direct appeal.3  This Court also affirmed the Superior Court’s 
denial of his first postconviction motion.4 
 
(3) 
In his appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his second 
postconviction motion, Russell claims that a) his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the Child Advocacy Center 
(“CAC”) interviewer vouching for the credibility of the child victim; b) 
appointed counsel on his first postconviction motion provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to raise the vouching issue; and c) the trial judge erred 
by denying the defense motion to explore prior molestation allegations by 
the complaining witness against two other individuals. 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4214(b). 
3 Russell v. State, 5 A.3d 622 (Del. 2010). 
4 Russell v. State, 2012 WL 5417068 (Del. Nov. 5, 2012). 
 
3
 
(4) 
When considering a motion for postconviction relief pursuant 
to Rule 61, the Superior Court must first determine whether the defendant 
has met the procedural requirements of the rule before considering the merits 
of the motion.5  In this case, Russell’s claims are barred as untimely pursuant 
to Rule 61(i) (1).  Moreover, his first two claims are procedurally barred as 
formerly adjudicated pursuant to Rule 61(i) (4).   
 
(5) 
While characterized by Russell as claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, his first two claims are grounded in the same claim he 
unsuccessfully raised in his first postconviction motion---i.e. that the CAC 
interview should not have been admitted into evidence.  Because that claim 
was previously adjudicated in his direct appeal and in his first postconviction 
motion, it is procedurally barred in this proceeding pursuant to Rule 61(i) 
(4).6  Russell’s third claim of error on the part of the trial judge was not 
raised below and, therefore, will not be considered in this appeal.7   
 
(6) 
To the extent that Russell attempts to avoid the time and 
procedural bars by arguing that his claim of impermissible vouching 
amounts to a “retroactively applicable right” pursuant to Rule 61(i) (1), that 
attempt must fail.  As the Superior Court determined, Russell’s reliance on 
                                                 
5 Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996). 
6 Alternatively, to the extent that Russell’s claim may be characterized as different from 
his previous claims, it is procedurally barred as repetitive pursuant to Rule 61(i) (2). 
7 Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
 
4
Richardson v. State, 43 A.3d 906 (Del. 2012) is misplaced.  In Richardson, 
this Court held that the CAC interviewer impermissibly vouched for the 
veracity of the child victim by stating that her interviewing protocol made it 
“very obvious when [the children] are being truthful.”  In Russell’s case, the 
record reflects that both the prosecution and defense questioned the CAC 
interviewer regarding the goal of finding “the truth.”  The judge interrupted 
the examination and reiterated to the jury the long-standing principle that 
they alone were charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses.8  
Because no “new rule” was enunciated by the Court, no retroactively 
applicable right was created.   
 
(7) 
To the extent that Russell relies on Rule 61(i) (5)’s 
“miscarriage of justice” exception as a means of avoiding the time and 
procedural bars of Rule 61, that attempt also is unavailing.  Rule 61(i) (5) 
provides that the time bar does not apply if there has been a “miscarriage of 
justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental 
legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the 
judgment of conviction.”  In this case, the record does not reflect any 
constitutional violation that undermined the proceedings leading to Russell’s 
                                                 
8 Monroe v. State, 28 A.3d 418, 430 (Del. 2011). 
 
5
conviction.  As such, his claims are subject to the time and procedural bars 
of Rule 61. 
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there 
was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice