Case Title: Rodgers v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC17-1050

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1050 
____________ 
 
 
JEREMIAH M. RODGERS,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[February 8, 2018] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Jeremiah M. Rodgers, a prisoner under sentence of death who waived a 
penalty phase jury, appeals the circuit court’s summary denial of a postconviction 
motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 seeking 
sentencing relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. 
State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017).  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.1   
                                          
 
1.  We review the summary denial of a postconviction motion de novo.  
Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904, 911 (Fla. 2013). 
 
 
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We have consistently held that the Hurst decisions do not apply to 
defendants, like Rodgers, who waive a penalty phase jury.  See, e.g., Mullens v. 
State, 197 So. 3d 16, 40 (Fla. 2016) (affirming the death sentence of a defendant 
who waived a penalty phase jury and explaining that a defendant “cannot subvert 
the right to jury factfinding by waiving that right and then suggesting that a 
subsequent development in the law has fundamentally undermined his sentence”), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 672 (2017); Brant v. State, 197 So. 3d 1051, 1079 (Fla. 
2016) (concluding that the Mullens Court’s holding in the context of a direct 
appeal “necessarily preclude[s]” a defendant who waived a penalty phase jury from 
raising a Hurst claim on postconviction). 
Rodgers, however, seeks to avoid this result by attacking the waiver itself, 
arguing that an evidentiary hearing is required to determine if a recently diagnosed 
condition of gender dysphoria, which Rodgers contends existed at the time of the 
waiver, but went undiagnosed by prior evaluators, rendered Rodgers incompetent.  
We agree with the circuit court that the time for Rodgers to contest the prior 
competency determination has passed.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1).  This 
Court has long since affirmed Rodgers’ waiver of a penalty phase jury, see 
Rodgers v. State, 3 So. 3d 1127, 1131-33 (Fla. 2009), and Rodgers has not 
proffered any newly discovered evidence that would warrant revisiting the validity 
of this waiver.  Cf. Raleigh v. State, 932 So. 2d 1054, 1060 (Fla. 2006) 
 
 
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(recognizing a “narrow exception to th[e] general procedural bar” of allowing an 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)-type claim of inadequate mental health 
assistance that should have been raised on direct appeal to instead be raised on 
postconviction for only those cases involving “psychiatric examinations so grossly 
insufficient that they ignore clear indications of either mental retardation or organic 
brain damage”) (quoting State v. Sireci, 502 So. 2d 1221, 1224 (Fla. 1987)). 
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial. 
 
It is so ordered.  
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, 
JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
The issue in this case is whether Rodgers’ waivers of the right to a penalty 
phase jury and the right to postconviction proceedings and counsel should be 
rendered invalid because Rodgers was suffering from undiagnosed and untreated 
gender dysphoria2 when he made the waivers.  See Rodgers v. State (Rodgers III), 
                                          
 
2.  The American Psychiatric Association defines “gender dysphoria” as “a 
conflict between a person’s physical or assigned gender and the gender with which 
he/she/they identify.”  What is Gender Dysphoria?, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, 
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-
dysphoria (last visited Nov. 8, 2017). 
 
 
 
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No. SC11-1401, 104 So. 3d 1087, 2012 WL 5381782, *1-2 (Fla. Oct. 17, 2012) 
(unpublished); Rodgers v. State (Rodgers II), 3 So. 3d 1127, 1130 (Fla. 2009).  
Because both the trial court and this Court were aware of Rodgers’ long history of 
mental illness in determining Rodgers’ competency to make the waivers and in 
reviewing Rodgers’ waivers, respectively, I agree that Rodgers’ waivers remain 
valid and, therefore, he is not entitled to Hurst3 relief.  See Silvia v. State, No. 
SC17-337 (Fla. Feb. 1, 2018); Mullens v. State, 197 So. 3d 16, 38-40 (Fla. 2016).  I 
write separately to emphasize the troubling history of Rodgers’ mental illness.  
Direct Appeal in 2006 
Rodgers pleaded guilty as a principal to the first-degree murder at issue in 
this case.  Rodgers v. State (Rodgers I), 934 So. 2d 1207, 1210 (Fla. 2006).  
Rodgers then attempted to withdraw his plea and later waived his right to a guilt 
phase jury trial, again entering a plea.  Id. at 1214.  After pleading guilty, Rodgers 
was sentenced to death following the jury’s 9-3 recommendation for death.  Id. at 
1213.   
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision prohibiting 
Rodgers from withdrawing his plea, finding that “Rodgers understood at the time 
of his plea that his attorneys disagreed on whether he should enter the plea.”  Id. at 
                                          
 
 
3.  Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2161 (2017); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).   
 
 
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1216.  As to Rodgers’ sentence of death, this Court reversed and remanded for a 
new penalty phase after determining that the trial court erred in excluding evidence 
related to two potential mitigating circumstances regarding domination by the 
codefendant.  Id. at 1219-20.  As to the mitigation, including Rodgers’ difficult 
childhood and his long history of suicide attempts, this Court explained: 
Angela Mason, a social worker, reviewed a variety of records from 
schools, institutions, hospitals, and law enforcement agencies.  The 
records contained reports that Rodgers was given his first beer at two 
years of age and that he reported sexual abuse by his mother 
numerous times, starting at age three.  At fourteen, Rodgers reported 
that his mother had full sexual intercourse with him on multiple 
occasions, first getting him high on marijuana that was laced with 
formaldehyde.  Although Child Protection Services was called about 
the abuse, Mason was unable to find any investigative report.  
Another report stated that Rodgers’ father threatened to shoot him and 
put an unloaded gun to Rodgers’ head.  At school, Rodgers was 
placed in a class for severely emotionally disturbed children.  Rodgers 
attempted suicide five times by the age of thirteen, including slitting 
his wrists in a bathtub which left physical evidence. 
David Foy, a professor of psychology at Pepperdine University, 
reviewed Rodgers’ medical records and testified that six out of the six 
classic risk factors for mental illness existed in Rodgers’ childhood 
home life. Rodgers was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Dr. Sarah Deland, a psychiatrist, testified as an expert regarding 
Rodgers’ mental health.  Dr. Deland stated that Rodgers’ diagnoses 
were post-traumatic stress disorder, disassociative disorder, substance 
abuse in remission, and borderline personality disorder.  She testified 
in depth about these particular diagnoses and how Rodgers’ life events 
shaped his development. 
Id. at 1213.  The Court concluded: “Given the extensive mitigation which 
was presented in the case, including Rodgers’ significant mental health history, we 
cannot say that the State has shown that there is no reasonable possibility that the 
 
 
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error in excluding this evidence did not contribute to the sentence of death.”  Id. at 
1219-20 (emphasis added). 
Direct Appeal from Resentencing in 2009 
 
On remand for resentencing, Rodgers waived his right to a penalty phase 
jury.  Rodgers II, 3 So. 3d at 1130.  Rodgers also waived his right and did not 
allow his attorneys to present evidence of mitigation other than his own testimony.  
Id.  The trial court again imposed a sentence of death.  Id. at 1128. 
On appeal, this Court determined that Rodgers “clearly showed the capacity 
to appreciate the proceedings and the nature of possible penalties; he showed that 
he understood the adversarial nature of the legal process; he manifested appropriate 
courtroom behavior; and he was able to testify in a relevant manner.”  Id. at 1132-
33.  Accordingly, this Court affirmed Rodgers’ sentence of death.  Id. at 1135.   
Postconviction 
After this Court affirmed his sentence of death following resentencing, 
Rodgers waived the right to postconviction proceedings and counsel.  Rodgers III, 
2012 WL 5381782, at *1.  Following a Durocher4 hearing, the trial court “found 
Rodgers competent and issued an order discharging counsel and dismissing the 
proceedings.”  Rodgers III, 2012 WL 5381782, at *1. 
                                          
 
 
4.  Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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Rodgers’ discharged counsel appealed to this Court, challenging the trial 
court’s competency finding.  Id. at *1-2.  Reviewing the record, which contained 
evidence of severe mental illness, this Court denied counsel’s claim, stating that 
Rodgers had previously been found “competent to: (1) plead guilty to the crime for 
which [Rodgers] was convicted and sentenced to death, and (2) waive [the] right to 
a penalty phase jury during [the] second penalty phase, and this Court affirmed on 
direct appeal.”  Id.  Also, the Court noted that “two mental health experts examined 
Rodgers in preparation for the Durocher hearing, and both determined that 
Rodgers was competent.”  Id. at 2.  
This Case 
Rodgers now asserts that, for most of his life, he has suffered from 
undiagnosed and untreated gender dysphoria, which undermines the trial court’s 
and this Court’s former findings of competency in determining that his waivers 
were valid.  However, Rodgers does not raise his condition of gender dysphoria as 
a claim of newly discovered evidence or ineffective assistance of counsel.  See per 
curiam op. at 2. 
From the age of 14, Rodgers spent most of his life incarcerated with mental 
illness.  In fact, Rodgers and his codefendant, Lawrence, who Rodgers testified 
“appealed to [his] angry side,” Rodgers II, 3 So. 3d at 1130, met in a mental 
hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida.  Rodgers I, 934 So. 2d at 1209.  
 
 
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While in State custody, at the age of 14 and again at the age of 18, Rodgers 
attempted self-castration.  Amici Curiae Br. of Am. Civil Liberties Union 
Foundation & Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla. (ACLU Br.) at 5.  Shortly before 
waiving the right to postconviction proceedings and counsel, Rodgers wrote letters 
to defense counsel stating that Rodgers’ gender identity disorder was the driving 
force behind Rodgers’ desire to die, stating that “gender dysphoria and the trauma 
and excruciating pain of [Rodgers’] life ha[d] caused [Rodgers] to lose [the] will to 
live and to choose death over life.”  Id. at 8.  In other words, Rodgers waived both 
the right to a penalty phase jury and the right to postconviction while struggling 
with the effects of his untreated gender dysphoria.  Id. at 6-7.   
According to the record, untreated gender dysphoria can cause severe harm 
and lead to suicidality and debilitating depression.  ACLU Br. at 4; see Appellant’s 
Initial Br. at 10.  In fact, when Rodgers pleaded guilty, Dr. Fredderic J. Sautter, 
Ph.D. (a psychologist), opined in his report that Rodgers’ plea may have been 
influenced by his mental illness and “wish to die.”  Appellant’s Second Resp. to 
State’s Mot. Suppl. R. & Withdrawal Req. for Protective Order at 12, Rodgers v. 
State, No. SC01-185 (Fla. July 12, 2004).  Likewise, the ACLU suggests that 
Rodgers may have waived the penalty phase in an effort to commit suicide by 
execution to escape the pain of the untreated condition.  ACLU Br. at 2.  
 
 
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Therefore, Rodgers’ reported suicidality, self-mutilations, and severe depression 
are consistent with the severe symptoms of untreated gender dysphoria. 
CONCLUSION 
While it appears that untreated gender dysphoria has been a factor in 
Rodgers’ mental health issues, this Court has already considered and affirmed 
Rodgers’ waivers of a penalty phase jury, as well as postconviction proceedings 
and counsel, with a record indicating severe mental illness.  Thus, the recent 
specific diagnosis of gender dysphoria, not raised as a newly discovered evidence 
claim, does not invalidate Rodgers’ waivers.  Therefore, I agree with the majority 
that Rodgers is not entitled to have his waivers set aside.  
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Santa Rosa County,  
John F. Simon, Jr., Judge - Case No. 571998CF000274XXAXMX 
 
Billy H. Nolas, Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Office of the Federal Public Defender, 
Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Appellee 
 
Nancy G. Abudu, Daniel B. Tilley, and Jacqueline Nicole Azis of ACLU 
Foundation of Florida, Inc., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc.