Case Title: State v. Warden

Citation: 

Docket Number: 484A19

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 484A19 
Filed 18 December 2020 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
DAVID WILLIAM WARDEN II 
 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, 836 S.E.2d 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019), reversing a judgment 
entered on 12 September 2018 by Judge Gregory R. Hayes in Superior Court, 
Rockingham County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 17 June 2020. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Margaret A. Force, Assistant Attorney 
General, for the State-appellant. 
 
Mark Montgomery for defendant-appellee. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice. 
 
In this case, we consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the 
trial court committed plain error when it admitted improper testimony by a 
Department of Social Services (DSS) Child Protective Services Investigator who, after 
explaining that DSS will “substantiate a case” if the agency “believe[s] allegations [of 
sexual abuse] to be true,” testified that DSS had “substantiated sexual abuse naming 
[defendant] as the perpetrator.” The Court of Appeals held that because the DSS 
investigator’s testimony “improperly bolstered or vouched for the victim’s credibility,” 
and because “the credibility of the complainant was the central, if not the only, issue 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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to be decided by the jury,” the trial court committed plain error requiring a new trial. 
State v. Warden, 836 S.E.2d 880, 885 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019). Judge Young dissented. 
While agreeing with the majority that the DSS investigator’s testimony was 
improper, Judge Young concluded that defendant had failed to prove that, absent the 
improper vouching testimony, the jury likely would have reached a different result. 
Warden, 836 S.E.2d at 885 (Young, J., dissenting).  
We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals and hold today that the 
trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to introduce the DSS 
investigator’s inadmissible vouching testimony. Consistent with the precedent this 
Court established in State v. Towe, 366 N.C. 56, 732 S.E.2d 564 (2012), we hold that 
the trial court commits a fundamental error when it allows testimony which vouches 
for the complainant’s credibility in a case where the verdict entirely depends upon 
the jurors’ comparative assessment of the complainant’s and the defendant’s 
credibility. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Background 
 
Defendant is the father of two children, Virginia1 and her younger brother. 
Defendant separated from Virginia’s mother in 2011. Around Father’s Day in 2017, 
fifteen-year-old Virginia had a conversation with her paternal grandfather regarding 
their plans for the upcoming holiday. Virginia told her grandfather that she did not 
                                            
1 We refer to the juvenile by the pseudonym used at the Court of Appeals. 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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want to spend the holiday with defendant. Her grandfather became angry. In 
frustration, he shouted “It’s not like he molested y’all or anything.” Virginia became 
quiet, then told her grandfather she loved him, and hung up the phone. Later that 
day, Virginia told her mother that, on one occasion when she was nine and two 
occasions when she was twelve, defendant sexually abused her. Virginia alleged that 
each assault followed a similar pattern. Defendant would summon Virginia to his 
bedroom, force Virginia to perform oral sex on him, and then pray for forgiveness 
after the assault was over. During each of the assaults, Virginia’s younger brother 
was home but not present in the bedroom. Besides Virginia and defendant, there were 
no other direct witnesses to any of these incidents. Virginia testified that she did not 
report the assaults at the time they occurred because defendant “told me not to tell 
anybody” and she “was terrified of my dad.”  
The day after she first disclosed the assaults to her mother, Virginia’s mother 
took her to the Rockingham County Sheriff’s Office to file a report. In a statement 
she provided on 14 June 2017, Virginia described the three incidents of sexual abuse. 
After an investigation, defendant was indicted on 13 October 2018 on the charges of 
sexual offense with a child by an adult, child abuse by a sexual act, and indecent 
liberties with a child.  
At trial, the State called nine witnesses. In addition to Virginia, the jury heard 
testimony from a Detective and a Deputy Sheriff with the Rockingham County 
Sheriff’s Office who were involved in investigating Virginia’s report, Virginia’s 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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mother, Virginia’s maternal grandmother, Virginia’s paternal grandfather, the DSS 
Child Protective Services Investigator assigned to Virginia’s case, and the director of 
a child advocacy non-profit who conducted a forensic interview of Virginia. The jury 
also heard testimony from Virginia’s aunt, defendant’s sister, who testified that when 
she was around the age at which Virginia was allegedly abused by defendant, 
defendant sexually assaulted her in a manner that shared many similarities with 
Virginia’s account of defendant’s conduct. This testimony was admitted pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 8C–1, Rule 404(b) (2009). Defendant was the only witness to testify on his 
behalf. The jury found defendant guilty on all three charges. He was sentenced to 
consecutive sentences of 300 to 369 months for the sexual offense with a child by an 
adult, 29 to 44 months for the child abuse by a sexual act, and 19 to 32 months for 
the indecent liberties with a child.  
Standard of Review 
Because defendant failed to object to the DSS investigator’s testimony at trial, 
we review his challenge on appeal for plain error. State v. Hammett, 361 N.C. 92, 98, 
637 S.E.2d 518, 522 (2006). “[T]o establish plain error defendant must show that a 
fundamental error occurred at his trial and that the error ‘had a probable impact on 
the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.’ ” Towe, 366 N.C. at 62, 732 S.E.2d 
at 568 (quoting State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012)). A 
fundamental error is one “that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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(cleaned up). In determining whether the admission of improper testimony had a 
probable impact on the jury’s verdict, we “examine the entire record” of the trial 
proceedings. State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 661, 300 S.E.2d 375, 379 (1983). 
Analysis 
There is no disputing, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred in 
allowing the DSS Child Protective Services Investigator’s testimony that  
part of our role is to determine whether or not we believe 
allegations to be true or not true. If we believe those 
allegations to be true, we will substantiate a case. If we 
believe them to be not true or we don’t have enough 
evidence to suggest that they are true, we would un-
substantiate a case. . . . We substantiated sexual abuse 
naming [defendant] as the perpetrator. 
 
 “In a sexual offense prosecution involving a child victim, the trial court should not 
admit expert opinion that sexual abuse has in fact occurred because, absent physical 
evidence supporting a diagnosis of sexual abuse, such testimony is an impermissible 
opinion regarding the victim’s credibility.” State v. Stancil, 355 N.C. 266, 266–67, 559 
S.E.2d 788, 789 (2002) (per curiam). This rule permits the introduction of expert 
testimony only when the testimony is “based on the special expertise of the expert,” 
who “because of his [or her] expertise is in a better position to have an opinion on the 
subject than is the trier of fact.” State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 568–69, 247 S.E.2d 
905, 911 (1978); see also State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 889, 787 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2016). 
Thus, an expert witness’s “definitive diagnosis of sexual abuse” is inadmissible unless 
it is based upon “supporting physical evidence of the abuse.” State v. Chandler, 364 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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N.C. 313, 319, 697 S.E.2d 327, 331 (2010); see also State v. Trent, 320 N.C. 610, 614–
15, 359 S.E.2d 463, 465–66 (1987). Because there was no physical evidence that 
Virginia was sexually abused, it was error to permit the DSS investigator to testify 
that sexual abuse had in fact occurred. In addition, it is typically improper for a party 
to “s[eek] to have the witnesses vouch for the veracity of another witness.”2 State v. 
Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 334, 561 S.E.2d 245, 255 (2002); see also State v. Gobal, 186 
N.C. App. 308, 318, 651 S.E.2d 279, 286 (2007), aff'd, 362 N.C. 342, 661 S.E.2d 732 
(2008) (“[O]ur Supreme Court has determined that when one witness vouch[es] for 
the veracity of another witness, such testimony is an opinion which is not helpful to 
the jury's determination of a fact in issue and is therefore excluded.” (alterations in 
original) (cleaned up)). 
The only question for this Court to address is whether defendant has met his 
“burden of showing that [the] error rose to the level of plain error.” State v. Melvin, 
364 N.C. 589, 594, 707 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2010). Based on our precedents, we conclude 
that he has. In considering this question, the Court is bound by our prior cases. This 
Court considered the same legal question under similar factual circumstances in 
Towe. In that case, we held that the trial court committed plain error when it allowed 
the State to present inadmissible vouching testimony because, in the absence of 
                                            
2 The ultimate analysis of the appropriateness of a witness’s opinion testimony 
regarding the credibility of another witness differs depending on whether the witness is a lay 
or expert witness. Compare N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (2019) (providing the rule that applies 
to lay witness testimony) with N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (2019) (providing the rule that 
applies to expert witness testimony). 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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physical evidence of abuse, the case “turned on the credibility of the victim, who 
provided the only direct evidence against defendant.” 366 N.C. at 63, 732 S.E.2d at 
568. The Court reached that conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the State had 
also presented evidence corroborating the complainant’s testimony which supported 
the jury’s conclusion that the defendant had committed the alleged criminal acts. Id. 
The present case shares a core, determinative similarity with Towe. In both 
this case and in Towe, the “victim displayed no physical symptoms diagnostic of 
sexual abuse,” id. at 62, 732 S.E.2d at 568, and the jury’s decision to find the 
complainant more credible than the defendant clearly formed the basis of its ultimate 
verdict, id. at 62–64, 732 S.E.2d at 568–69. As the prosecutor emphasized at trial in 
this case, a guilty verdict necessarily followed from the jury’s determination that 
Virginia was credible and defendant was not: 
What this case comes down to is whether or not you believe 
[Virginia]. If you believe [Virginia], there’s no reasonable 
doubt. It really doesn’t matter if you fully believe 
[Virginia’s mother], or if you fully believe [the DSS 
investigator], or if you fully believe the Defendant’s father. 
Those are extra. Those are corroborating evidence. What 
matters is if you believe [Virginia]. If you believe what she 
says, then it happened. . . . Tell her you believe her. Tell 
her not to be afraid. Tell her not to be ashamed. Tell her 
that this Defendant is guilty of exactly what he did to her.  
 
By the prosecutor’s logic, the converse was also true. If the jury determined that 
defendant was more credible than the complainant, then the jury would have been 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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overwhelmingly likely to acquit. Thus, “the case against defendant revolved around 
the victim’s credibility.” Towe, 366 N.C. at 61, 732 S.E.2d at 567. 
The State attempts to evade Towe by pointing to other evidence presented to 
the jury in this case which, it contends, independently provided a basis for the jury’s 
decision to find defendant guilty. But the State also presented similar evidence in 
Towe, which did not detract from the Court’s holding that the trial court committed 
plain error. To be sure, other evidence presented in this case served to corroborate 
the victim’s testimony. However, there was no other direct evidence of the abuse.3 In 
Towe, as in this case, the State presented testimony from close family members 
“describing the behavior of the victim” around the time of the alleged assaults. Id. at 
63, 732 S.E.2d at 568. In Towe, as in this case, the State offered testimony from the 
victim’s aunt, admitted under N.C.G.S. § 8C–1, Rule 404(b), “describing a similar 
sexual assault on her by defendant,” Id. Therefore, under these circumstances, the 
impermissible vouching testimony “stilled any doubts the jury might have had about 
the victim’s credibility or defendant’s culpability, and thus had a probable impact on 
the jury’s finding that defendant is guilty.” Id. at 64, 732 S.E.2d at 569. By contrast, 
in cases such as Hammett where this Court has held that impermissible vouching 
                                            
3 The dissent contends that even if there is no direct evidence of the assault, “the 
statement about ‘substantiation’ was likely superfluous.” We do not agree that, in the absence 
of any direct evidence of an alleged assault, testimony from a professional investigator 
employed by a county social services agency to investigate allegations of child sexual abuse 
is “superfluous” to the jury’s ultimate determination of the complainant’s credibility and 
defendant’s guilt. 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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testimony did not rise to the level of plain error, it was because the jury’s verdict “did 
not rest solely on the victim’s credibility.” 361 N.C. at 99, 637 S.E.2d at 523. Instead, 
the State also presented evidence regarding the victim’s physical symptoms of abuse, 
as well as the defendant’s admission that he had previously engaged in conduct of a 
sexual nature with the victim. Id. 
Although there are some factual distinctions between this case and Towe, these 
factual distinctions do not alter our legal analysis. Our necessary review of the entire 
record convinces us that the State presented no evidence at trial supplying an 
alternative basis for the jury’s conclusion that defendant was guilty besides the jury’s 
determination that the complainant was more credible than defendant. Rather, the 
evidence the State presented at trial was primarily aimed at persuading the jury to 
find the complainant’s allegations more credible than defendant’s denials. For 
example, testimony from Virginia’s maternal grandmother that her behavior changed 
around the time of the alleged abuse, and testimony from Virginia’s paternal 
grandfather that “all [defendant has] done his whole life is lie and try to cheat people,” 
provided jurors with evidence suggesting that Virginia was telling the truth and 
defendant was lying, not evidence supporting an independent conclusion that the 
alleged sexual assaults did or did not occur. Similarly, while jurors were free to draw 
inferences from testimony alleging that defendant encouraged Virginia to shave her 
legs at a young age, this evidence concerned an incident that was not inherently 
sexual in nature, and the State did not otherwise thoroughly impeach defendant’s 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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denials that his conduct had any sexual aspect. Cf. Hammett, 361 N.C. at 99, 637 
S.E.2d at 523. Again, this is evidence that might lead a jury to conclude that the 
complainant was more credible than defendant, not independent proof that the 
alleged assaults occurred. Similarly, Virginia’s consistent testimony throughout trial 
and the forensic examiner’s testimony that Virginia exhibited behaviors indicating 
past abuse may have given the jury reason to believe Virginia’s allegations, but did 
not constitute evidence independent from the jury’s assessment of the complainant’s 
and defendant’s credibility. Id. (holding that admission of impermissible vouching 
testimony was not plain error because “in addition to [the victim’s] consistent 
statements and testimony that defendant had abused her sexually, the jury was able 
to consider properly admitted evidence that [the victim] exhibited physical signs of 
repeated sexual abuse”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we hold that the admission 
of the DSS investigator’s improper vouching testimony was, in the absence of 
“overwhelming evidence” directly proving defendant’s guilt at trial, plain error. 
Stancil, 355 N.C. at 267, 559 S.E.2d at 789 (per curiam). 
Nothing in this decision dispossesses the jury of its authority to find a 
defendant guilty of sexual abuse in the absence of physical evidence, based entirely 
on the jurors’ determination that a complainant is more credible than a defendant. 
Nor does our decision express any opinion about the probative value of the 
complainant’s testimony in this case or in any case. Rather, our decision reflects, and 
helps preserve, the jury’s fundamental “responsibility at trial” in our adversarial 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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system to “find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. White, 300 
N.C. 494, 503, 268 S.E.2d 481, 487 (1980) (quoting Cty. Court of Ulster Cty., N.Y. v. 
Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979)). Of course, the State is entitled to submit to the jury 
any admissible evidence that it thinks will help convince jurors to believe a 
complainant and disbelieve a defendant. But concern for the fairness and integrity of 
criminal proceedings requires trial courts to exclude testimony which purports to 
answer an essential factual question properly reserved for the jury. When the trial 
court permits such testimony to be admitted, in a case where the jury’s verdict is 
contingent upon its resolution of that essential factual question, then our precedents 
establish that the jury’s verdict must be overturned. 
Conclusion 
Absent evidence supporting the jury’s guilty verdict on a basis other than the 
jury’s relative assessment of the complainant’s and defendant’s credibility, we do not 
believe that the outcome at trial would probably have been the same if the DSS 
investigator’s inadmissible vouching testimony had been excluded. Accordingly, we 
hold that defendant has met his burden of showing that the trial court committed 
plain error. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
Justice NEWBY dissenting. 
When a defendant alleges on appeal that an error occurred at trial, but failed 
to properly object, that defendant must demonstrate that the outcome of the trial 
probably would have been different without the error. Holding that such prejudicial 
error occurred in this case, the majority seizes on one word uttered by one witness 
and decides that the State’s entire case, which was supported by abundant evidence, 
is compromised. I respectfully dissent. 
At trial, Virginia1 testified at length that defendant, her father, forced her to 
perform oral sex on him multiple times. She explained that after these assaults, 
defendant would go to another room to pray, apologize to God, and promise never to 
do it again. At the time, defendant instructed Virginia not to tell anyone about what 
happened. Law enforcement, Virginia’s mother, and two grandparents testified at 
trial for the State as well. Virginia’s maternal grandmother testified that Virginia’s 
behavior significantly changed around the time of the first assault. Virginia’s mother 
and paternal grandfather testified that even though Virginia did not get along with 
her step-mother, she often went to work with her instead of remaining at home alone 
with her father.  
Defendant’s sister testified that multiple times when she was between the ages 
of seven and twelve, defendant forced her to perform various sexual acts with him. 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile’s identity. 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
-2- 
 
After each assault, just like with Virginia, he would express remorse and pray to God 
asking for forgiveness. She testified that she kept this a secret until the age of 
fourteen because defendant told her she would get in trouble and be taken from her 
mother if she brought it up. The Department of Social Services investigator testified 
that during her interviews Virginia’s paternal grandfather, maternal grandmother, 
and mother’s fiancé all indicated that they believed Virginia. A jury convicted 
defendant of sexual offense with a child by an adult, child abuse by sexual act, and 
indecent liberties with a child.  
The majority decides that all of this evidence is not strong enough to support 
the guilty verdicts. It discards the verdicts because the DSS investigator also said 
that DSS “substantiated” Virginia’s allegations.2 The majority cites State v. Towe, 
366 N.C. 56, 732 S.E.2d 564 (2012) to frame the question around whether the case 
turns on the victim’s credibility. To the majority, the vouching testimony by DSS 
probably impacted the trial outcome because, in its view, this case turns on Virginia’s 
credibility. It therefore holds that without the testimony that DSS substantiated 
Virginia’s claims, the jury likely would not have believed Virginia and would have 
believed defendant instead. 
The majority confuses evidence that is simply relevant with evidence that is 
essential to the outcome of the case. Of course, a witness stating that Virginia’s claims 
                                            
2 All parties concede that this testimony was inappropriate. The question is whether 
it is probable that the admission of the testimony impacted the jury’s finding that the 
defendant was guilty. State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012). 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
-3- 
 
were “substantiated” could enhance the credibility of her allegations. But that does 
not mean her allegations would be unbelievable if they lacked the support of that one 
particular statement. Indeed, that notion is quite far from the truth in this case, 
where the statement about “substantiation” was likely superfluous. In context, the 
jury would have understood that statement simply to mean that DSS pursued the 
allegations, which was already obvious considering that a DSS investigator testified 
against defendant. Moreover, the DSS investigator explained that substantiation is 
for social work purposes, not trial purposes. She noted that in some cases DSS will 
substantiate but the government will not prosecute, or vice versa. With these careful 
qualifications, and the substantial additional evidence of Virginia’s credibility and 
defendant’s guilt, the majority’s position that the word “substantiate” would have 
likely changed the outcome of the trial is hard to believe. 
In addition to the explanation the jury heard about the term “substantiate,” 
the jury heard extensive testimony from several other witnesses corroborating 
Virginia’s consistent story—testimony of Virginia’s behavior change, testimony from 
an expert witness regarding delayed disclosures, and testimony of defendant’s 
demeanor during his denial of the events. Perhaps most significantly, the jury heard 
testimony from both Virginia and defendant’s sister detailing defendant’s similarly 
idiosyncratic behavior after each victim’s sexual assaults. Defendant’s modus 
operandi was well established. 
STATE V. WARDEN 
 
Newby, J., dissenting 
 
-4- 
 
Moreover, the majority misapplies our precedent from Towe. In Towe the 
challenged testimony came from an expert to whom multiple witnesses referred, 
likely leading the jury to place more value on that expert’s testimony. 366 N.C. at 58, 
732 S.E.2d at 565–66. But here no other witness emphasized the investigator’s 
testimony, and the prosecution paid little attention to it during closing arguments. 
Further, unlike the victim in Towe, whose story was inconsistent, the victim in this 
case consistently recounted the traumatic events for the entire fifteen months from 
first disclosure until trial. Finally, unlike in Towe, where the defendant chose not to 
testify, here defendant did take the stand, allowing the jury to directly evaluate his 
credibility. The expert testimony in Towe that the victim was indeed sexually abused 
was pivotal to the prosecution because the State’s evidence was weaker than here and 
the other witnesses relied on the contested expert testimony. In this case, the DSS 
investigator’s testimony that Virginia’s claims were “substantiated” was not nearly 
so critical. The rigorous plain error standard to which this Court has long adhered 
has not been met. The convictions should be upheld. 
I respectfully dissent.