Case Title: Gallagher a/k/a Freeman v. Long, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 102, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ROBERT GALLAGHER a/k/a 
BOBBY FREEMAN,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD LONG, as Trustee for the 
Richard S. and Cynthia Long Trust, 
and LGF ENTERPRISES, LLC,  
 
           Defendants Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 102, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below-Court of Chancery 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  C.A. No. 8181 
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 17, 2013 
Decided: April 30, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 30th day of May 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellees’ motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The plaintiff-appellant, Robert Gallagher, has filed an appeal 
from the Court of Chancery’s February 28, 2013 order granting the motion 
to dismiss of the defendants-appellees, Richard Long and LGF Enterprises, 
LLC (collectively, “Long”).  Gallagher also appeals from the Court of 
Chancery’s denial of his motions for recusal and for oral argument.  Long 
 
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has moved to affirm the judgment of the Court of Chancery on the ground 
that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without 
merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in or about 2006, Long filed a 
complaint for specific performance in the Court of Chancery alleging that 
Gallagher, who had entered into a joint venture called LGF Enterprises, LLC 
(“LGF”) with Long and a Ms. Franklin, failed to make certain celebrity 
memorabilia available to be photographed and insured in preparation for 
exhibition at a hotel in Las Vegas.  Gallagher moved to dismiss the 
complaint.  Long, in turn, moved for an order compelling inspection of the 
memorabilia.   
 
(3) 
A hearing was scheduled in the Court of Chancery.  Neither 
Gallagher nor Franklin appeared.  The Court of Chancery denied Gallagher’s 
motion to dismiss and granted Long’s motion to inspect the memorabilia.  
Later, when Gallagher and Franklin refused to permit the inspection, the 
Court of Chancery held them in contempt and ordered them to return the 
items of memorabilia they had removed.   
 
(4) 
When Gallagher and Franklin failed to comply with the Court 
of Chancery’s order, Long sought another order holding them in contempt 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
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and the dissolution of LGF.  The Court of Chancery again found Gallagher 
and Franklin in contempt and ordered that an auction of the memorabilia be 
held in order to reimburse, to the extent possible, the $1.2 million Long had 
invested in LGF.  Gallagher appealed and this Court affirmed.2  The auction 
took place on June 26 and 27, 2009.  The record reflects that Gallagher was 
duly notified of the auction, Long received the proceeds of the auction and 
LGF was dissolved in February 2010. 
 
(5) 
 In January 2013, approximately three and a half years after the 
auction, Gallagher filed another complaint against Long in the Court of 
Chancery alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the 
liquidation of LGF.  Gallagher also sought oral argument and the recusal of 
the Chancellor, who issued the contempt orders, on the ground that the 
Chancellor is biased against him.  Long then filed a motion to dismiss 
Gallagher’s complaint.  In its February 28, 2013 order, the Court of 
Chancery denied Gallagher’s motions for oral argument and recusal of the 
Chancellor and granted Long’s motion to dismiss on the ground of laches. 
 
(6) 
In this appeal from the Court of Chancery’s February 28, 2013 
order, Gallagher claims, in essence, that the Chancellor erred and/or abused 
                                                 
2 Gallagher v. Long, Del. Supr., No. 383, 2007, Jacobs, J. (Nov. 6, 2007). 
 
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his discretion when he denied Gallagher’s motions for oral argument and 
recusal and granted Long’s motion to dismiss. 
 
(7) 
Gallagher’s first claim is that the Chancellor abused his 
discretion when he denied the motions for oral argument and recusal.  
Whether to grant a motion for oral argument is within the discretion of the 
Court of Chancery.3  As noted by the Chancellor, the record in this case was 
adequate to render a decision on the motions and, therefore, it was 
unnecessary to schedule oral argument.  We find no abuse of discretion on 
the part of the Chancellor in so deciding.  Moreover, the Chancellor properly 
engaged in the two-part analysis required by this Court in determining that 
recusal was not required.4  We, therefore, find no error or abuse of discretion 
on the part of the Chancellor in denying Gallagher’s motion for recusal.  
 
(8) 
Gallagher also claims that the Chancellor erred when he 
dismissed the complaint.  This Court reviews de novo the Court of 
Chancery’s decision to dismiss a complaint on the ground of laches.5  
Dismissal of a complaint on the ground of laches requires the establishment 
                                                 
3 Ch. Ct. R. 7(b) (4). 
4 Home Paramount Pest Control v. Gibbs, 953 A.2d 219, 222 (Del. 2008) (on a motion 
for recusal, the judge must be satisfied, as a matter of subjective belief, that he can decide 
the matter free of bias or prejudice and also must be satisfied that there is no appearance 
of bias sufficient to cast doubt on the judge’s impartiality). 
5 Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 182 (Del. 2009). 
 
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of a) knowledge of the claim by the plaintiff; b) unreasonable delay in 
bringing the claim; and c) resulting prejudice to the defendant.6   
 
(9) 
In this case, Gallagher’s complaint alleged a breach of fiduciary 
duty on the part of Long in connection with the auction of the celebrity 
memorabilia.  The record reflects that the auction took place approximately 
three and a half years previously and that Gallagher was notified of it.  
Moreover, in accordance with the Court of Chancery’s order, Long received 
the proceeds of the auction.  Finally, LFG, the joint venture that had been 
formed to market the memorabilia, was dissolved approximately three years 
before Gallagher’s complaint was filed.  Our de novo review reveals no error 
on the part of the Chancellor in dismissing Gallagher’s complaint as barred 
by laches under these circumstances.     
 
(10) It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 210 (Del. 2005). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Court of Chancery is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice