Case Title: Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: S227243

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2017-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Filed 11/27/17 (this opn. precedes companion case S227270 also filed 11/27/17) 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
GERAWAN FARMING, INC., 
) 
 
 
) 
S227243 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F068526/F068676 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS ) 
 
BOARD, 
) 
  
 
) 
 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
) 
UNITED FARM WORKERS OF 
) 
 
AMERICA,  
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
 
In 1975, the Legislature enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act 
(ALRA) “to encourage and protect the right of agricultural employees to full 
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of 
their own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment, 
and to be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor.”  
(Lab. Code, § 1140.2; all statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 
specified.)  The ALRA established an elaborate framework governing the right of 
agricultural workers to organize themselves into unions to engage in collective 
bargaining with their employers.  (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior 
Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 398 (ALRB I); see § 1140 et seq.)  It also created the 
Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB or the Board) and granted it “specific 
powers and responsibilities of administration, particularly in conducting and 
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certifying elections and in investigating and preventing unfair labor practices.”  
(ALRB I, at p. 399.) 
 
Twenty-five years later, the Legislature determined that additional 
legislation was necessary to fulfill the goals of the ALRA because it had proven 
ineffective at facilitating the negotiation and completion of collective bargaining 
agreements.  The Legislature therefore enacted the ALRA’s “mandatory mediation 
and conciliation” (MMC) provisions to “ensure a more effective collective 
bargaining process between agricultural employers and agricultural employees.”  
(Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, § 1, p. 7401.)  In certain cases in which an employer and a 
labor union have failed to reach a first contract, either party may invoke MMC, 
which involves a mediation process before a neutral mediator.  (§ 1164 et seq. (the 
MMC statute).)  If the parties do not reach an agreement on all terms through 
mediation, the mediator resolves the disputed terms and submits a proposed 
contract to the Board, which can then impose that contract on the parties.   
 
In this case, the United Farm Workers of America (UFW) filed an MMC 
request with the Board after failing to reach a collective bargaining agreement 
with petitioner Gerawan Farming, Inc. (Gerawan).  When mediation similarly 
failed to produce an agreement, the mediator submitted a report fixing the 
contractual terms, which the Board adopted in its final order.  Gerawan petitioned 
for review of the Board’s order, contending, among other things, that the MMC 
statutory scheme was unconstitutional.  The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that 
“the MMC statute on its face violates equal protection principles” and that it 
“improperly delegated legislative authority.”  In so holding, the Court of Appeal 
adopted the reasoning of the dissent in Hess Collection Winery v. Agricultural 
Labor Relations Bd. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1611 (dis. opn. of Nicholson, 
J.) (Hess), in which the court upheld the MMC statute against a similar 
constitutional challenge (see id. at pp. 1603–1610 (maj. opn.)).  We granted 
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review to resolve this conflict, and we conclude that the MMC statute neither 
violates equal protection nor unconstitutionally delegates legislative power.   
 
We also granted review to resolve an important statutory question.  In  
arguing that the final order should be set aside, Gerawan also claimed that the 
UFW, the labor union certified as the bargaining representative under the ALRA, 
had abandoned its employees after a lengthy absence and therefore forfeited its 
status as representative.  Applying the settled rule that a union remains certified 
until decertified by the employees in a subsequent election, the Board concluded 
that the ALRA precludes employers from raising an abandonment defense to an 
MMC request.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged the validity of the general rule 
but held that an employer may raise an abandonment defense against a union’s 
demand to invoke MMC because MMC is “a postbargaining process” materially 
different from ordinary collective bargaining.  
We hold that the distinction drawn by the Court of Appeal is untenable and 
that employers may not refuse to bargain with unions — whether during the 
ordinary bargaining process or during MMC — on the basis that the union has 
abandoned its representative status.  As the Board and lower courts have 
consistently observed, the Legislature intended to reserve the power to decertify 
labor organization representatives to employees and labor organizations alone.  
Allowing employers to raise an abandonment defense would frustrate that intent 
and undermine the ALRA’s comprehensive scheme of labor protections for 
agricultural employees. 
I. 
The Legislature enacted the ALRA in 1975 to “ensure peace in the 
agricultural fields by guaranteeing justice for all agricultural workers and stability 
in labor relations.”   (Stats. 1975, 3d Ex. Sess., ch.1, § 1, p. 4013.)  “To achieve 
this goal, the act declares the right of agricultural employees to organize 
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themselves into unions and to engage in collective bargaining, free from 
intimidation by either employers or union representatives.”  (ALRB I, supra, 16 
Cal.3d at p. 398; see § 1140.2.)  In enacting the ALRA, the Legislature intended to 
fill a gap in the labor protections afforded by the federal National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA), which exempts “any individual employed as an agricultural laborer.”  
(29 U.S.C. § 152(3); see Lab. Code, § 1140.4 [defining “agricultural employee” as 
“those employees excluded from the coverage of the National Labor Relations 
Act, as amended, as agricultural employees”].)   Accordingly, the ALRA identifies 
a number of unfair labor practices and other unlawful acts (§§ 1153, 1154, 1154.5, 
1155.4, 1155.5), and empowers the Board to investigate, prevent, and remedy such 
practices (§ 1160). 
The Board’s other primary duty is to oversee and certify the results of 
bargaining representative elections.  Under the ALRA, “[r]epresentatives 
designated or selected by a secret ballot for the purposes of collective bargaining 
by the majority of the agricultural employees in the bargaining unit shall be the 
exclusive representatives of all the agricultural employees in such unit for the 
purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of 
employment, or other conditions of employment.”  (§ 1156; see § 1156.3 [setting 
forth the election process].)  The ALRA also provides a process by which 
employees may petition to decertify a labor organization as their representative.  
(§ 1156.7.)  Once a bargaining representative is certified, the ALRA requires the 
employer and the representative to “bargain collectively in good faith” in order to 
reach an agreement “with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment.”  (§ 1155.2, subd. (a).)  The obligation to bargain in good faith 
“does not compel either party to agree to a proposal.”  (Ibid.) 
In the decades that followed, it became clear that the ALRA had not 
resulted in the widespread adoption of collective bargaining agreements between 
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agricultural employers and employees.  “Between 1975 and 2001 . . . , of the 
state’s approximately 25,000 farm employers, there existed fewer than 250 signed 
union agreements and there were another 250 farms where workers voted for 
union representation but had not yet obtained a contract.”  (Broderdorf, 
Overcoming the First Contract Hurdle: Finding a Role for Mandatory Interest 
Arbitration in the Private Sector (2008) 23 Lab. Law. 323, 338.)  A substantial 
factor was “the continued refusal of agricultural employers to come to the 
bargaining table once an election has occurred,” which caused employees to 
“wait[] for years while negotiations for union contracts drag on without hope of 
progress.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 1156 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 30, 2002, p. 7 
(hereafter Sen. Bill 1156 Analysis).)  As we have recognized, “when an employer 
engages in dilatory tactics after a representation election his action may 
substantially impair the strength and support of a union and consequently the 
employees’ interest in selecting an agent to represent them in collective 
bargaining. . . .  ‘Employee interest in a union can wane quickly as working 
conditions remain apparently unaffected by the union or collective bargaining.’  
[Citations.]”  (J. R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 26 
Cal.3d 1, 30 (J. R. Norton).)  The Legislature found that in 2002, agricultural 
employers had not agreed to a contract in about 60 percent of the cases where a 
labor union had been certified.  (See Sen. Bill 1156 Analysis, supra, at p. 7 
[finding that among the 428 companies with agricultural workers who had voted 
for UFW representation, only 185 of those companies had reached a collective 
bargaining agreement with their employees]; see also Governor’s signing message 
to Leg. on Assem. Bill No. 2596 and Sen. Bill No. 1156 (Sept. 30, 2002), Sen. 
Recess J. (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) p. 6227.) 
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These concerns prompted the Legislature in 2002 to add the MMC 
provisions to the ALRA.  (§ 1164 et seq., added by Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, § 2, 
pp. 7401–7404.)  The Legislature determined there was “a need . . . for a 
mediation procedure in order to ensure a more effective collective bargaining 
process between agricultural employers and agricultural employees, and thereby 
more fully attain the purposes of the [ALRA], ameliorate the working conditions 
and economic standing of agricultural employees, create stability in the 
agricultural labor force, and promote California’s economic well-being by 
ensuring stability in its most vital industry.”  (Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, § 1, p. 7401.) 
The MMC statute sets forth a process, known as compulsory interest 
arbitration, “in which the terms and conditions of employment are established by a 
final and binding decision of an arbitrator.”  (Fisk & Pulver, First Contract 
Arbitration and the Employee Free Choice Act (2009) 70 La. L.Rev. 47, 50 (Fisk 
& Pulver).)  Unlike “grievance arbitration,” which focuses on “construing the 
terms of an existing agreement and applying them to a particular set of facts,” 
interest arbitration “focuses on what the terms of a new agreement should be.”  
(Local 58, Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Southeastern Michigan 
Chapter, Nat. Elec. Contractors Assn., Inc. (6th Cir. 1995) 43 F.3d 1026, 1030.)  
The MMC process results in “quasi-legislative action” by which “[t]he terms of 
the ‘agreement’ determined by the arbitrator [are] imposed upon [the employer] by 
force of law.”  (Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1597.) 
Either an agricultural employer or a union representative may invoke the 
MMC process by filing with the Board “a declaration that the parties have failed to 
reach a collective bargaining agreement and a request that the board issue an order 
directing the parties to mandatory mediation and conciliation of their issues.”  
(§ 1164, subd. (a).)  Labor organizations certified before January 1, 2003, like the 
UFW here, must establish the following conditions before filing the declaration:  
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“(a) the parties have failed to reach agreement for at least one year after the date 
on which the labor organization made its initial request to bargain, (b) the 
employer has committed an unfair labor practice, and (c) the parties have not 
previously had a binding contract between them.”  (§ 1164.11.)  Upon receipt of 
the declaration, “the board shall immediately issue an order directing the parties 
to” mediation before a neutral, agreed-upon mediator.  (§ 1164, subd. (b).)  
Mediation then proceeds for 30 days, which can be extended by the mediator for 
an additional 30 days.  (§ 1164, subd. (c).)  
Within 21 days after the mediation period expires, “the mediator shall file a 
report with the board that resolves all of the issues between the parties and 
establishes the final terms of a collective bargaining agreement, including all 
issues subject to mediation and all issues resolved by the parties prior to the 
certification of the exhaustion of the mediation process.  With respect to any issues 
in dispute between the parties, the report shall include the basis for the mediator’s 
determination.  The mediator’s determination shall be supported by the record.”  
(§ 1164, subd. (d).)  In crafting a determination, the mediator “may consider those 
factors commonly considered in similar proceedings, including:  [¶] (1) The 
stipulations of the parties.  [¶] (2) The financial condition of the employer and its 
ability to meet the costs of the contract in those instances where the employer 
claims an inability to meet the union’s wage and benefit demands.  [¶] (3) The 
corresponding wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment in other 
collective bargaining agreements covering similar agricultural operations with 
similar labor requirements.  [¶] (4) The corresponding wages, benefits, and terms 
and conditions of employment prevailing in comparable firms or industries in 
geographical areas with similar economic conditions, taking into account the size 
of the employer, the skills, experience, and training required of the employees, and 
the difficulty and nature of the work performed.  [¶] (5) The average consumer 
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prices for goods and services according to the California Consumer Price Index, 
and the overall cost of living, in the area where the work is performed.”  (§ 1164, 
subd. (e).) 
The MMC statute establishes a two-tiered system of review.  Within seven 
days, either party may petition the Board to review the mediator’s report on the 
ground that one or more provisions are (1) “unrelated to wages, hours, or other 
conditions of employment . . . ,” (2) “based on clearly erroneous findings of 
material fact,” or (3) “arbitrary or capricious in light of the mediator’s findings of 
fact.”  (§ 1164.3, subd. (a).)  If no petition is filed, or if the Board finds that the 
petition has not made a prima facie case for review on the grounds set forth in 
subdivision (a), then the mediator’s report becomes the final order of the Board.  
(Id., subd. (b).)  If the Board finds grounds to grant review, it shall issue a decision 
concerning the petition and, upon finding a provision in the mediator’s report to be 
unlawful on the grounds set forth in subdivision (a), shall require the mediator to 
modify the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, to meet with the parties 
for further mediation, and to submit a second report.  (Id., subd. (c).)  Either party 
may petition the Board for review of the second report.  (Id., subd. (d).)  Again, if 
no petition is filed, or if a petition is filed but does not state a prima facie case of a 
violation under subdivision (a), the report takes effect as an order of the Board.  
(Ibid.)  If a petition is subject to review under subdivision (a), the Board shall 
determine the issues and issue a final order.  (Ibid.)  Either party also may petition 
the Board to set aside the report if “(1) the mediator’s report was procured by 
corruption, fraud, or other undue means, (2) there was corruption in the mediator, 
or (3) the rights of the petitioning party were substantially prejudiced by the 
misconduct of the mediator.”  (Id., subd. (e).) 
Once the Board has issued a final order, a party may petition for writ of 
review in the Courts of Appeal or in this court.  (§§ 1164.5, 1164.9.)  Judicial 
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review is limited to “determin[ing], on the basis of the entire record, whether any 
of the following occurred:  [¶] (1) The board acted without, or in excess of, its 
powers of jurisdiction.  [¶] (2) The board has not proceeded in the manner required 
by law.  [¶] (3) The order or decision of the board was procured by fraud or was an 
abuse of discretion.  [¶] (4) The order or decision of the board violates any right of 
the petitioner under the Constitution of the United States or the California 
Constitution.”  (§ 1164.5). 
Soon after the Legislature enacted the MMC statute, agricultural employers 
challenged its constitutionality.  In Hess, the Court of Appeal rejected claims that 
the MMC statutory scheme violated principles of due process and equal 
protection, interfered with the right of contract, invalidly delegated legislative 
authority, and was vague and overbroad.  (Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1591.)  Justice Nicholson dissented, contending that the law “delegated 
legislative power unconstitutionally and violated equal protection guarantees of 
the state and federal Constitutions.”  (Id. at p. 1611 (dis. opn. of Nicholson, J.); see 
id. at pp. 1612–1617.)   
According to the UFW, the union “began renewing demands for bargaining 
with agricultural employers that had never agreed to contracts” after Hess upheld 
the MMC statute’s constitutionality.  This case arises from one of those renewed 
demands. 
II. 
Gerawan is a farming business that owns about 12,000 acres in Fresno and 
Madera Counties.  It employs thousands of direct-hire workers to grow, harvest, 
and pack stone fruit and table grapes.  In a 1990 secret election, Gerawan’s 
employees voted to be represented by the UFW.  After rejecting Gerawan’s 
challenges to the election, the Board certified the UFW as the exclusive bargaining 
representative on July 8, 1992.  (See Gerawan Ranches (1992) 18 ALRB No. 5.)  
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The Board also affirmed an administrative law judge’s finding that Gerawan had 
committed unfair labor practices during the election period.  (Ibid.)  
Several days later, Cesar Chavez, the UFW’s founder, sent a letter to 
Gerawan requesting negotiations, which Gerawan “formally accept[ed].”  The 
UFW made a renewed request to bargain in November 1994, after which the 
parties held at least one negotiation session.  The parties did not reach an 
agreement.  After the negotiation session, according to a former Gerawan 
executive, the UFW “represented that it would revise its proposal . . . and that it 
would contact Gerawan about future negotiations,” but the “UFW never contacted 
Gerawan again concerning [those] negotiations.” 
For reasons not apparent in the record, neither the UFW nor Gerawan 
attempted to communicate or restart negotiations until October 12, 2012, when the 
UFW served Gerawan with a renewed demand to bargain.  Gerawan asked the 
UFW to explain its absence between early 1995 and October 2012; the UFW 
refused.  The parties then proceeded to negotiations, holding more than 10 
bargaining sessions in early 2013.  Having failed to reach a voluntary agreement, 
the UFW filed a declaration on March 29, 2013 with the Board requesting MMC.  
Gerawan opposed the request, claiming that the statutory prerequisites had not 
been met and that the UFW had abandoned its status as the bargaining 
representative.  Several weeks later, the Board denied Gerawan’s opposition and 
referred the parties to MMC.  (Gerawan Farming, Inc. (2013) 39 ALRB No. 5.)  
The Board specifically rejected Gerawan’s claim that the “UFW abdicated its 
responsibilities” and “forfeit[ed] its status as bargaining representative,” noting 
that the Board had “considered and rejected this type of ‘abandonment’ argument” 
in the past.  (Id. at pp. 3–4, citing Dole Fresh Fruit Company (1996) 22 ALRB 
No. 4; Pictsweet Mushroom Farms (2003) 29 ALRB No. 3; San Joaquin Tomato 
Growers, Inc. (2011) 37 ALRB No. 5.)  Because the Board declined to consider 
11 
 
Gerawan’s abandonment argument, it took no evidence and made no findings 
concerning the UFW’s alleged absence. 
The parties thereafter agreed on an experienced mediator, Matthew 
Goldberg, and conducted several mediation sessions in the summer of 2013.  The 
voluntary mediation failed to produce an agreement.  As required by section 1164, 
subdivision (a), Goldberg then conducted a number of on-the-record hearings and 
submitted a report resolving the disputed terms to the Board on September 28, 
2013.  Gerawan objected to Goldberg’s report “both generally and as to its 
particular terms.”  In light of these objections, the Board remanded six provisions 
to the mediator for further proceedings.  (Gerawan Farming, Inc. (2013) 39 ALRB 
No. 16.)  The parties reached agreement on the remanded provisions, and 
Goldberg issued a second report incorporating the agreed-upon provisions.  
Neither party objected to the second report, and it took effect as the Board’s final 
order on November 19, 2013.  (Gerawan Farming, Inc. (2013) 39 ALRB No. 17; 
see § 1164.3.) 
Gerawan filed a petition for review of the Board’s final order to the Court 
of Appeal under section 1164.5, claiming that the order was invalid because the 
MMC statute is unconstitutional.  Gerawan argued that the statute violated equal 
protection and due process, invalidly delegated legislative power, and constituted 
an unconstitutional taking of private property.  Gerawan also reiterated that the 
Board’s order should be set aside because the UFW abandoned its status as the 
employees’ certified bargaining representative after a “nearly two-decade 
absence.”  The Court of Appeal granted Gerawan’s request to stay the Board’s 
final order pending the appeal. 
The Court of Appeal held that the MMC statute was facially 
unconstitutional because it “violates equal protection of the law and improperly 
delegates legislative authority.”  As to equal protection, the court adopted the 
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reasoning of the Hess dissent:  Within the class of employers covered by the MMC 
process, “ ‘each employer will be subjected to a different legislative act, in the 
form of a [collective bargaining agreement].  Thus, similarly situated employers 
are treated dissimilarly.’ ”  In the court’s view, the MMC statute’s 
“discrimination . . . is intentional because the mediator has no power to extend the 
enactment to other agricultural employers. . . . [and] the discrimination is arbitrary 
because there are no standards” ensuring that mediators will reach similar 
decisions when considering similarly situated employers.  The court 
acknowledged that section 1164 provides factors to guide the mediator’s 
decisionmaking, but held that the factors failed to “cure the fundamental equal 
protection violation” because “[i]nevitably, each imposed [collective bargaining 
agreement] will still be its own set of rules applicable to one employer, but not to 
others.” 
The court further concluded that the MMC statute unconstitutionally 
delegates legislative authority because it empowers the mediator “to establish 
employment terms that will be imposed by the force of law . . . without any 
definite policy direction, goal or standard.”  Because the section 1164.3, 
subdivision (e) “factors alone are not enough,” the law “fails to supply the 
necessary guidance to either the mediator or the Board.”  Further, the court held, 
“the delegation of powers under the MMC statute also lacks the necessary 
procedural safeguards or mechanisms to assure a fair and evenhanded 
implementation of the legislative mandate to impose a [collective bargaining 
agreement].”  The court did not resolve Gerawan’s other constitutional claims. 
Despite holding the MMC statute “constitutionally invalid,” the Court of 
Appeal also decided “the statutory issues as an alternative basis for [its] ruling.”  
The court concluded that “abandonment may be raised defensively in response to a 
union’s demand to invoke the substantial legal measures of the MMC process,” 
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notwithstanding the Board’s longstanding position that “abandonment does not 
exist unless a union is either unwilling or unable to continue to represent the 
subject employees.”  The court recognized that under its precedent holding that “a 
rebuttable presumption exists that a certified union continues to enjoy majority 
support by the employees,” an employer may not refuse to bargain under the 
ALRA by contending that the union has forfeited its representative status.  But 
because “the MMC process differs materially from bargaining and is largely a 
postbargaining process,” the court continued, “the employer’s continuing duty to 
bargain is not an impediment” to an “employer’s ability to defend a union’s MMC 
request.”  The court thus held that the Board abused its discretion by ordering 
MMC without considering Gerawan’s claim of union abandonment. 
III. 
We now consider Gerawan’s claims that the MMC statute (1) violates 
substantive due process by imposing interest arbitration without the employer’s 
consent, (2) violates equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution, 
and (3) unconstitutionally delegates legislative power.  Although we typically 
decide statutory claims before deciding constitutional claims, we discuss 
Gerawan’s constitutional claims first because the Court of Appeal held the statute 
facially unconstitutional in addition to resolving Gerawan’s statutory claim.  Were 
we to hold that abandonment is a defense under the MMC statute, our holding 
would have no import in light of the Court of Appeal’s decision without a 
determination that the statute is constitutional.  And were we to hold that 
abandonment is not a defense under the MMC statute, we would likewise need to 
address Gerawan’s constitutional claims. 
At the outset, it is important to note that the Court of Appeal held the 
statute facially unconstitutional.  Gerawan has likewise characterized its challenge 
14 
 
as a facial attack on the MMC statute and has not articulated an as-applied 
challenge based on the specific terms of the contract imposed by the Board’s final 
order.  “The standard for a facial constitutional challenge to a statute is exacting.”  
(Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 197, 218.)  Under “the strictest requirement for establishing facial 
unconstitutionality,” the challenger must demonstrate that “the statute ‘inevitably 
pose[s] a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional 
prohibitions.’ ”  (Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1126, quoting 
Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 181 (Brown).)  We have 
sometimes applied a more lenient standard, asking whether the statute is 
unconstitutional “in the generality or great majority of cases.”  (San Remo Hotel v. 
City and County of San Francisco (2002) 27 Cal.4th 643, 673 (San Remo).)  In 
claiming that the MMC statute is unconstitutional in all cases, Gerawan attempts 
to meet the strictest requirement.  But we need not decide which test applies 
because, as explained below, the statute is not facially invalid under either test. 
A. 
Gerawan’s lead argument in its briefing is that compulsory interest 
arbitration in the private sector is categorically impermissible because it forces 
employers into arbitration without their consent.  This is essentially a claim that 
the MMC statute violates substantive due process.  Although Gerawan raised 
various due process challenges below, the Court of Appeal declined to address 
them and instead found the statute unconstitutional on equal protection and 
nondelegation grounds.  Nevertheless, since the ALRB and the UFW respond to 
Gerawan’s substantive due process argument in detail here, we address the claim. 
Gerawan acknowledges that interest arbitration has “emerged as a fairly 
common feature of public sector labor relations at the federal, state, and local 
levels.”  (Weiler, Striking A New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects 
15 
 
for Union Representation (1984) 98 Harv. L.Rev. 351, 372; see Fisk & Pulver, 
supra, at pp. 50–51.)  But Gerawan contends that no state has ever imposed 
compulsory interest arbitration on private employers because doing so would be 
unconstitutional.  Gerawan places significant emphasis on a trilogy of cases from 
the 1920s that held unconstitutional a Kansas statute authorizing a three-judge 
industrial court to arbitrate employment disputes and impose wages and other 
terms of employment.  (See Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court (1923) 262 U.S. 522 
(Wolff); Dorchy v. Kansas (1924) 264 U.S. 286; Wolff Packing Co. v. Indus. Court 
(1925) 267 U.S. 552.) 
In Wolff, the high court concluded that the statute violated “the liberty of 
contract” under the Fourteenth Amendment.  (Wolff, supra, 262 U.S. at p. 544.)  
The court relied on precedent that had located “the right of the employer on the 
one hand, and of the employee on the other, to contract about his affairs” in 
substantive due process.  (Id. at p. 534, citing Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923) 
261 U.S. 525 (Adkins).)  As we have explained, “this restrictive view of the police 
power was completely repudiated” by the high court a decade later.  (Birkenfeld v. 
City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 155 (Birkenfeld); see West Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish (1937) 300 U.S. 379, 400 [overruling Adkins]; Pope, Contract, Race, 
and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude” 
(2010) 119 Yale L.J. 1474, 1543 [Wolff’s “anchorage in Fourteenth Amendment 
economic due process, never secure, has altogether washed away”].)  Thus, 
Gerawan’s claim that private-sector interest arbitration offends substantive due 
process is unpersuasive.  (See Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1598–1601.) 
Gerawan also relies on Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin (1937) 301 U.S. 1 
(Jones) and Porter Co. v. NLRB (1970) 397 U.S. 99 (Porter), where the high court 
interpreted the NLRA to prohibit compulsory arbitration.  But the high court 
16 
 
resolved these decisions on statutory grounds and said nothing about compulsory 
arbitration’s constitutionality.  (See Jones, at p. 45; Porter, at pp. 104–109.) 
The rareness of interest arbitration in the private sector likely stems from 
the high court’s determination that the NLRA, which preempts most state labor 
regulation, does not authorize compulsory arbitration.  Contrary to what Gerawan 
contends, there is no indication in the high court’s case law that compulsory 
arbitration in areas not covered by the NLRA, such as agricultural labor relations, 
would be unconstitutional.  Seeing no authority to support Gerawan’s substantive 
due process claim, we decline to find compulsory interest arbitration categorically 
unconstitutional here. 
B. 
The Court of Appeal held that the MMC statute “on its face violates equal 
protection principles” under both the federal and state Constitutions.  We conclude 
that the MMC is not facially invalid on equal protection grounds because the 
Legislature had a rational basis for enacting the MMC statute to facilitate 
collective bargaining agreements between agricultural employers and employees. 
“ ‘[I]n areas of social and economic policy,’ ” this court interpreting 
California’s equal protection clause, like the United States Supreme Court 
interpreting the federal equal protection clause, has said that “ ‘a statutory 
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental 
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is 
any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 
classification.’ ”  (Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 644 (Warden), 
quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, 313 (Beach 
Communications), italics omitted.)  Although some cases raising federal and state 
equal protection challenges may require a bifurcated analysis (see, e.g., In re 
17 
 
Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757, 843–844), Gerawan argues, and we agree, 
that the federal and state standards operate the same way here. 
“[U]nder the rational relationship test, the state may recognize that different 
categories or classes of persons within a larger classification may pose varying 
degrees of risk of harm, and properly may limit a regulation to those classes of 
persons as to whom the need for regulation is thought to be more crucial or 
imperative.”  (Warden, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 644.)  Making such regulatory 
distinctions “ ‘inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally 
strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line, and the 
fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for 
legislative, rather than judicial, consideration.’ ”  (Beach Communications, supra, 
508 U.S. at pp. 315–316.)  Where “[a]n administrative order [is] legislative in 
character,” as is the case with a Board order under the MMC statute, it “is subject 
to the same tests as to validity as an act of the Legislature.”  (Knudsen Creamery 
Co. v. Brock (1951) 37 Cal.2d 485, 494; see 2 Cal.Jur.3d (2017) Administrative 
Law § 360.)  Accordingly, we apply the same rational basis test to a final order by 
the Board imposing the mediator’s report as we would apply to a legislative act 
imposing the same. 
Gerawan does not contend that the Legislature lacked a rational basis for 
applying the MMC statute only to agricultural employers who fail to reach a first 
collective bargaining agreement.  Gerawan concedes, and we agree, that 
“differentiat[ing] between those employers with an existing [collective bargaining 
agreement] and those without . . . may bear a rational relationship to the statutory 
purpose of promoting collective bargaining.”  “First contracts create particularly 
complicated bargaining situations because the parties have less information about 
each other’s bargaining behavior than in more established relationships. . . . 
Unions face the added difficulties of navigating the immature relationship between 
18 
 
leadership and the rank and file membership and pacifying more hostile employers 
who are more likely to ‘bust the union’ because they are not used to having to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of employment. . . .  The difficulties involved in 
first contract negotiations have effects beyond the first contract because they set 
the tone for the ongoing union-management relationship.”  (Fisk & Pulver, supra, 
at p. 54.) 
These concerns were the impetus for the MMC statute’s enactment.  The 
Legislature was aware that the ALRA had failed to promote collective bargaining 
agreements, finding that almost 60 percent of union representation elections did 
not result in a first contract.  (See Sen. Bill 1156 Analysis, supra, at p. 7.)  In light 
of the “peculiar problems with the collective bargaining process between 
agricultural employers and agricultural employees” (Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1604), the Legislature reasonably could have concluded that a mediation 
process followed by binding arbitration in the event of a bargaining impasse would 
“correct” the ALRA’s failure and facilitate the adoption of first contracts (Sen. 
Bill 1156 Analysis, supra, at p. 7).  The Legislature also reasonably could have 
believed that facilitating first contracts furthers the goal of “ensuring stability” in 
the agricultural industry.  (Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, § 1, p. 7401; see Weiler, supra, at 
p. 409 [“[F]irst-contract arbitration attempts to do more than simply settle a past 
dispute: it also seeks to install the union firmly within the plant and to . . . allow[] 
employees to experience life under a collective agreement, a contract one hopes is 
attractive enough to warrant renewal.”].) 
We reject Gerawan’s argument that the MMC process is unconstitutionally 
arbitrary because it allows a “self-interested union to compel the regulation of 
individual employers of its choosing.”  The statute permits either the union 
representative or the employer to file a declaration with the Board requesting 
MMC.  (§ 1164, subd. (a).)  Even if unions are more likely to demand MMC than 
19 
 
employers, the Legislature empowered the Board, not the parties, to assess 
whether the statutory prerequisites are met before it orders MMC.  The parties 
must have never had a contract, they must have “failed to reach agreement for at 
least one year” after the initial request to bargain, and the employer must have 
committed an unfair labor practice.  (§ 1164.11; see § 1164, subd. (a).)  That 
determination is then subject to judicial review.  (§ 1164.5.)  In light of these 
criteria and the Board’s role in determining whether they are met, the fact that the 
MMC process is initiated by a party does not make it arbitrary or irrational. 
Gerawan’s primary equal protection argument is not that the MMC 
statutory scheme treats classes of employers differently, but that it discriminates 
against each individual agricultural employer within the covered class of 
employers.  The Court of Appeal accepted this argument, concluding that “[t]he 
necessary outworking of the MMC statute is that each individual employer (within 
the class of agricultural employers who have not entered a first contract) will have 
a distinct, unequal, individualized set of rules imposed on it. . . .  This is . . . ‘the 
very antithesis of equal protection.’ ”  The Court of Appeal and Gerawan invoke 
the principle that “an equal protection claim can in some circumstances be 
sustained even if the plaintiff has not alleged class-based discrimination, but 
instead claims that she has been irrationally singled out as a so-called ‘class of 
one.’ ”  (Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture (2008) 553 U.S. 591, 601 
(Engquist).) 
The high court first articulated the “class of one” theory of equal protection 
in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 528 U.S. 562 (Olech).  There, Grace 
Olech claimed that the village violated equal protection by conditioning her 
connection to the municipal water supply on the Olechs granting the village a 33-
foot easement, while only requiring a 15-foot easement from other property 
owners seeking access to the same water supply.  (Id. at p. 563.)  Olech alleged 
20 
 
that the easement demand was “ ‘irrational and wholly arbitrary,’ ” and was 
“motivated by ill will resulting” from previous litigation.  (Ibid.)  The high court 
recognized that “successful equal protection claims [can be] brought by a ‘class of 
one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently 
from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference 
in treatment.”  (Id. at p. 564.) 
But laws regulating a small number of individuals, or even a class of one, 
are not necessarily suspect.  As the high court has explained, “[t]he premise that 
there is something wrong with particularized legislative action is of course 
questionable.  While legislatures usually act through laws of general applicability, 
that is by no means their only legitimate mode of action. . . .  Even laws that 
impose a duty or liability upon a single individual or firm are not on that account 
invalid.”  (Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 211, 239, fn. 9.)  
Rather, such regulations violate equal protection only “if arbitrary or inadequately 
justified.”  (Bank Markazi v. Peterson (2016) 578 U.S. __, __, fn. 27 [136 S.Ct. 
1310, 1327, fn. 27], citing Olech, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 564.) 
In Engquist, the high court held that the “ ‘class-of-one’ theory of equal 
protection has no place in the public employment context.”  (Engquist, supra, 553 
U.S. at p. 594.)  Although it relied in part on the distinction between the 
government “as employer as opposed to sovereign,” the court also stressed the 
“core concern of the Equal Protection Clause as a shield against arbitrary 
classifications.”  (Id. at p. 598.)  Unlike the easement decision in Olech, the court 
explained, “[t]here are some forms of state action . . . which by their nature 
involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, 
individualized assessments.  In such cases the rule that people should be ‘treated 
alike, under like circumstances and conditions’ is not violated when one person is 
treated differently from others, because treating like individuals differently is an 
21 
 
accepted consequence of the discretion granted.  In such situations, allowing a 
challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a particular person would 
undermine the very discretion that such state officials are entrusted to exercise.”  
(Id. at p. 603.)  
Although Engquist’s holding was limited to the public employment context, 
our Courts of Appeal have concluded that “its reasoning applies more broadly.”  
(Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837, 
859 (Las Lomas); see Squires v. City of Eureka (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 577, 595 
[“individualized discretionary decisions will not support a class of one claim”].)  
The Ninth Circuit has also read Engquist to foreclose class of one claims against 
any “forms of state action that ‘by their nature involve discretionary 
decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments.’ ”  
(Towery v. Brewer (9th Cir. 2012) 672 F.3d 650, 660.)  Other courts have held that 
although “Engquist does not bar all class-of-one claims involving discretionary 
state action,” its reasoning may still be “properly applied outside of the 
employment context.”  (Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel (2d Cir. 2010) 
626 F.3d 135, 142; see Hanes v. Zurick (7th Cir. 2009) 578 F.3d 491, 495.) 
Applying Engquist’s reasoning, the ALRB argues that the MMC process is 
“an inherently individualized process” and thus cannot be subject to a class of one 
challenge.  We decline to address whether a class of one claim may be brought 
under the equal protection clause because even assuming that such a claim may be 
brought here, we conclude that the MMC statute does not facially violate equal 
protection.   
To succeed on a class of one claim, a plaintiff must establish that “(1) the 
plaintiff was treated differently from other similarly situated persons, (2) the 
difference in treatment was intentional, and (3) there was no rational basis for the 
difference in treatment.”  (Las Lomas, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 858, citing 
22 
 
Olech, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 564.)  There is no question that differences in 
treatment among agricultural employers under the MMC statute is “intentional” 
(Las Lomas, at p. 858), since the point of the scheme is to make agreements 
tailored to the parties’ individualized circumstances and relationships.  But 
Gerawan has failed to satisfy either of the other two requirements.   
We find unpersuasive Gerawan’s claim that the MMC statute is 
unconstitutionally arbitrary because of the “lack of any nexus between the 
statutory purpose and the distinctions drawn by any individual mediator.”  The 
purpose of the MMC statute is to promote collective bargaining and ensure 
stability in the agricultural labor force.  (Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, § 1, p. 7401.)  The 
statute accomplishes its purposes by empowering mediators to make 
individualized determinations regarding the terms of particular collective 
bargaining agreements.  These individualized determinations are rationally related 
to the Legislature’s legitimate interest in ensuring that collective bargaining 
agreements are tailored to the unique circumstances of each employer.  As the 
Board explains, “[c]ontract terms appropriate for a 25-employee family farm may 
make little sense at a 5,000-employee agricultural corporation, and reasonable 
wages and benefits will necessarily vary across company size, crop, and 
geographic region.” 
The discretion afforded to the mediator under the MMC statute is 
channeled by section 1164’s statutory factors.  As noted, the statute instructs the 
mediator to “consider those factors commonly considered in similar proceedings, 
including:  [¶] (1) The stipulations of the parties.  [¶] (2) The financial condition of 
the employer and its ability to meet the costs of the contract in those instances 
where the employer claims an inability to meet the union’s wage and benefit 
demands.  [¶] (3) The corresponding wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of 
employment in other collective bargaining agreements covering similar 
23 
 
agricultural operations with similar labor requirements.  [¶] (4) The corresponding 
wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment prevailing in 
comparable firms or industries in geographical areas with similar economic 
conditions, taking into account the size of the employer, the skills, experience, and 
training required of the employees, and the difficulty and nature of the work 
performed.  [¶] (5) The average consumer prices for goods and services according 
to the California Consumer Price Index, and the overall cost of living, in the area 
where the work is performed.”  (§ 1164, subd. (e).) 
These statutory factors serve to further the MMC’s purposes while 
minimizing arbitrary or irrational differences between the collective bargaining 
agreements imposed by the MMC process on similarly situated agricultural 
employers.  (See Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1604 [“These requirements 
reasonably ensure that contracts of different employers will be similar.”].)  We 
relied on similar reasoning in rejecting an equal protection claim in People v. 
Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821.  There, we held that the exercise of a 
prosecutor’s charging discretion did not violate equal protection principles in part 
because “numerous factors properly may enter into a prosecutor’s decision to 
charge under one statute and not another, such as a defendant’s background and 
the severity of the crime.”  (Id. at p. 838; see RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley 
(9th Cir. 2004) 371 F.3d 1137, 1154 [rejecting equal protection challenge to City’s 
expansion of coverage of living wage ordinance to “only a handful of employers” 
based on geographic, employer-size, and revenue criteria].) 
We note that section 1164, subdivision (e) provides that the mediator “may 
consider” these statutory factors.  In Hess, the court concluded that in this context 
the statute’s reference to “ ‘may’ means ‘must’ ” because “ ‘ “[w]ords permissive 
in form . . . are considered as mandatory” ’ ” when duties of public entities like the 
Board are at issue.  (Hess, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1607.)  Neither Gerawan 
24 
 
nor the Court of Appeal assigns any significance to the statute’s use of the word 
“may,” and the Court of Appeal simply assumed that a mediator “shall consider 
this list of factors.”  (Italics added.)  We need not decide how to interpret “may” as 
used in section 1164, subdivision (e), because Gerawan’s argument is that even if 
the mediator does consider the statutory factors, the factors themselves do not 
sufficiently constrain the mediator’s discretion.  As explained, we reject that 
argument. 
Gerawan further argues that “[b]ecause the statute does not pass any 
judgments as to the sort of terms that would foster collective bargaining and 
stability, a mediator could consider one employer’s wages with relation to 
‘comparable firms’ and choose to impose a wage increase, a wage decrease, or no 
change at all.”  The Court of Appeal took the same view, posing a hypothetical in 
which mediators impose collective bargaining agreements on three similar 
employers with “different terms . . . result[ing] in different wages and a different 
impact on the profit margin for each employer.” 
Arbitrary treatment is of course possible under the MMC statute, just as it is 
possible with respect to a host of governmental functions that involve 
discretionary decisionmaking.  But in order to succeed on a facial challenge, it is 
not enough to show that some hypothetical applications of the MMC statute might 
result in arbitrary or discriminatory treatment.  Instead, Gerawan must show that 
the statute “inevitably pose[s] a present total and fatal conflict” with equal 
protection principles (Brown, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 181) or, at the least, that the 
statute violates equal protection “in the generality or great majority of cases.”  
(San Remo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 673.) 
Gerawan has raised no as-applied challenge in this case, so we need not 
resolve whether an as-applied class of one challenge is cognizable in this context.  
Gerawan does not claim to have evidence that it was treated differently by the 
25 
 
mediator or the Board from similarly situated agricultural employers that have 
undergone the MMC process, or that a similarly situated agricultural employer 
even exists.  Indeed, Gerawan does not mention any specific terms of the 
mediator’s report in its equal protection argument.  And Gerawan concedes that 
the mediator was unable to find any agricultural employer that was sufficiently 
similar in terms of farm operations upon which to model the proposed collective 
bargaining agreement.  Gerawan instead chose to focus solely on the asserted 
facial unconstitutionality of the MMC statute.  Simply hypothesizing, as the Court 
of Appeal did, that differential treatment among similarly situated agricultural 
employers is possible is not enough to declare the MMC statute facially 
unconstitutional.  In sum, the statute does not facially violate equal protection 
principles. 
C. 
The Court of Appeal also held that the MMC statute improperly delegates 
legislative authority in violation of the California Constitution.  We disagree. 
“[A]lthough it is charged with the formulation of policy,” the Legislature 
“properly may delegate some quasi-legislative or rulemaking authority.”  (Carmel 
Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 299.)  
“For the most part, delegation of quasi-legislative authority . . . is not considered 
an unconstitutional abdication of legislative power.”  (Ibid.)  “The doctrine 
prohibiting delegations of legislative power does not invalidate reasonable grants 
of power to an administrative agency, when suitable safeguards are established to 
guide the power’s use and to protect against misuse.”  (People v. Wright (1982) 30 
Cal.3d 705, 712–713 (Wright).)  Accordingly, “[a]n unconstitutional delegation of 
authority occurs only when a legislative body (1) leaves the resolution of 
fundamental policy issues to others or (2) fails to provide adequate direction for 
the implementation of that policy.”  (Carson Mobilehome Park Owners’ Assn. v. 
26 
 
City of Carson (1983) 35 Cal.3d 184, 190 (Carson); Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 472, 491–492; see Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 384 (Kugler) 
[“Only in the event of a total abdication of that power, through failure either to 
render basic policy decisions or to assure that they are implemented as made, will 
this court intrude on legislative enactment because it is an ‘unlawful 
delegation.’ ”].) 
The MMC process does not suffer from either defect.  First, the Legislature 
did not leave the resolution of fundamental policy issues to others.  In ALRB I, we 
held that an ALRB regulation providing farm labor organizers a qualified right of 
access to agricultural employers’ premises did not constitute an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power.  (ALRB I, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 419.)  We 
concluded that “the ‘fundamental policy determination’ was made by the 
Legislature when that body decided, after much study and discussion, to grant to 
agricultural workers throughout California the rights of self-organization and 
collective bargaining so long denied to them under federal law.”  (Ibid.)  Because 
the access regulation “merely implement[ed]” the statutory program, “it [did] not 
amount to a ‘fundamental policy determination.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
The same is true here.  The Legislature made the fundamental policy 
determination that the MMC process was necessary “in order to ensure a more 
effective collective bargaining process between agricultural employers and 
agricultural employees, and thereby more fully attain the purposes of the 
[ALRA].”  (Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, § 1, p. 7401.)  It did so in response to evidence 
showing that the ALRA had failed in its goal of promoting the adoption of 
collective bargaining agreements by agricultural employers.  The Legislature then 
made a variety of subsidiary policy decisions concerning the necessary 
procedures, the factors channeling the mediator’s discretion, the preconditions for 
invoking the MMC process, and the extent of review by the Board and the courts.  
27 
 
(§§ 1164, 1164.3, 1164.5, 1164.11.) The Legislature tasked the mediator with 
resolving the precise terms concerning “wages, hours, or other conditions of 
employment” in a single collective bargaining agreement.  (§ 1164.3, subd. (a)(1).)  
But even with regard to those terms, the mediator’s role is limited to resolving 
only disputed terms.  (§ 1164, subd. (d).)    
Thus, the nondelegation argument here is even weaker than the one we 
rejected in ALRB I, which concerned a statewide access regulation.  As Gerawan 
concedes, the policy decisions made by the mediator relate only to the parties’ 
“economic relations” and rights.  In authorizing the mediator and the Board to 
decide the precise contours of an individual collective bargaining agreement, the 
MMC statute does not confer “unrestricted authority to make fundamental policy 
determinations” that must be left to the Legislature.  (Clean Air Constituency v. 
California State Air Resources Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 801, 816.)  In Brown, we 
dismissed an unlawful delegation challenge to statutes that allowed a 
memorandum of understanding between the Governor and an employee 
representative to supersede certain Government Code sections governing public 
employment.  (See Brown, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 201.)  We observed that the 
statutes “do not involve fundamental policy determinations, but rather relate to the 
working details of the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees 
covered by the act.”  (Ibid.)  The Legislature “may declare a policy, fix a primary 
standard, and authorize” mediators “to determine the application of the policy or 
standard to the facts of particular cases” without violating the nondelegation 
doctrine.  (Birkenfeld, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 167.) 
Second, the MMC statute does not “fail[] to provide adequate direction for 
[its] implementation.”  (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 190.)  The Legislature 
indicated that the mediator, in resolving disputed issues, “may consider those 
factors commonly considered in similar proceedings,” including the parties’ 
28 
 
stipulations; the employer’s financial condition; corresponding terms in 
comparable collective bargaining agreements, firms, or industries; the average 
consumer prices for goods and services; and the overall cost of living.  (§ 1164, 
subd. (e).)  The Court of Appeal concluded that these statutory factors do not cure 
the delegation problem because they do “not provide the mediator with any policy 
objective to be carried out or standard to be attained once those factors have been 
considered.”  But we have previously rejected the argument that such a “listing of 
factors does not adequately inform [the administrative authority] just how the 
presence of the factors under particular circumstances is to be translated.”  
(Birkenfeld, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 168.) 
In Birkenfeld, we considered a constitutional challenge to a Berkeley 
charter amendment establishing residential rent control.  The plaintiffs argued that 
the charter amendment’s provisions for adjusting maximum rents “faile[d] to 
provide sufficient standards for the guidance of the rent control board . . . and 
thereby constitute[d] an unlawful delegation of legislative power.”  (Birkenfeld, 
supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 167.)  In dismissing this challenge, we emphasized that the 
amendment directed the rent control board to consider a nonexclusive list of 
factors when reviewing petitions for rent adjustments.  (Id. at pp. 167–168.)  And 
we noted that the board was “given other significant guidance by the charter 
amendment’s statement of purpose” because “[s]tandards sufficient for 
administrative application of a statute can be implied by the statutory purpose.”  
(Id. at p. 168.)  “By stating its purpose and providing a nonexclusive illustrative 
list of relevant factors to be considered,” we concluded, “the charter amendment 
provides constitutionally sufficient legislative guidance to the Board.”  (Ibid.) 
Gerawan contends that Birkenfeld is distinguishable because the rent 
control scheme there provided a “discernible statutory objective” to guide the 
board’s consideration of the statutory factors.  But in Birkenfeld, the charter 
29 
 
amendment’s stated purpose was simply “counteracting the ill effects of ‘rapidly 
rising and exorbitant rents exploiting [the housing] shortage.’  [Citation.]”  
(Birkenfeld, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 168.)  From that stated purpose, we implied “a 
standard of fixing maximum rent levels at a point that permits the landlord to 
charge a just and reasonable rent.”  (Ibid.)  Likewise, the MMC statute expressly 
states its purpose — “to ensure a more effective collective bargaining process 
between agricultural employers and agricultural employees” (Stats. 2002, ch. 
1145, § 1, p. 7401) — from which we can imply a standard of reaching just and 
reasonable collective bargaining agreements based on relevant considerations such 
as the nonexclusive list of factors set forth in section 1164, subdivision (e).  This 
implied standard provides sufficient legislative direction to the mediator. 
Gerawan’s argument that the Legislature should determine “the specific 
formula or objective pursuant to which the delegee would operate” fares no better.  
In the rent control context, we have said the fact that an “ordinance does not 
articulate a formula for determining just what constitutes a just and reasonable 
return does not make it unconstitutional.”  (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 191; see 
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 761, 768; Fisher v. 
City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 680.)  Similarly, the high court has held in 
the ratemaking context that “[t]he Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies 
to the service of any single formula or combination of formulas.”  (Federal Power 
Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. (1942) 315 U.S. 575, 586.)  The 
Legislature here was not required to provide a specific formula for mediators to 
follow in resolving disputed terms of individual collective bargaining agreements.  
It is sufficient that the MMC statute sets forth a nonexclusive list of factors for the 
mediator to consider when developing a fair and reasonable agreement based on 
the parties’ individualized circumstances.  The Legislature has given the mediator 
constitutionally “adequate direction.”  (Carson, at p. 190.) 
30 
 
This conclusion is consistent with substantial precedent rejecting similar 
nondelegation challenges to compulsory interest arbitration in the public 
employment context.  In Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 
608, we rejected a nondelegation challenge to a Vallejo city charter provision that 
permitted an arbitral board to resolve disputed terms of employment after 
considering “ ‘all factors relevant to the issues from the standpoint of both the 
employer and the employee, including the City’s financial condition.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 622.)  We held that so long as “the arbitrators do not proceed beyond the 
provisions of the Vallejo charter, there is no unlawful delegation of legislative 
power.”  (Ibid., fn. 13.)   
“Other jurisdictions have sanctioned their compulsory interest arbitration 
schemes even though presented with less precise or even non-explicit standards 
for decision” than the type of factors set out in the MMC statute.  (City of Detroit 
v. Detroit Police Officers Ass’n (1980) 408 Mich. 410, 464–465; see, e.g., 
Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 165 v. City of Choctaw (Okla. 1996) 933 
P.2d 261, 267–268 (Choctaw); Superintending School Committee of City of 
Bangor v. Bangor Ed. Ass’n (Me. 1981) 433 A.2d 383, 387 (City of Bangor); City 
of Richfield v. Local No. 1215, Intern. Ass’n of Fire Fighters (Minn. 1979) 276 
N.W.2d 42, 47; Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Mercer 
County Improvement Authority (1978) 76 N.J. 245, 252–254; Harney v. Russo 
(1969) 435 Pa. 183, 189.)  Other compulsory arbitration statutes provide “a well-
settled list of factors” that closely resembles that set forth in section 1164, 
subdivision (e).  (Fisk & Pulver, supra, at p. 66 [citing statutes].)  “Formulation of 
rigid standards for the guidance of arbitrators in dealing with complex and often 
volatile issues would be impractical, and might destroy the flexibility necessary 
for the arbitrators to carry out the legislative policy of promoting the improvement 
31 
 
of the relationship between public employers and their employees.”  (City of 
Bangor, at p. 387.) 
Gerawan does not dispute these authorities but contends that “[t]he 
delegation issues present here are not as problematic where the employer is a 
public entity.”  It is not clear why that is so.  With regard to certain constitutional 
rights such as free speech and workplace privacy, the state may have “significantly 
greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it does when it brings its 
sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.”  (Engquist, supra, 553 U.S. at 
p. 599; see Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) 547 U.S. 410; National Aeronautics and 
Space Admin. v. Nelson (2011) 562 U.S. 134; Connick v. Myers (1983) 461 U.S. 
138.)  But whether a statute impermissibly delegates legislative power does not 
turn on that distinction.  Whether the law at issue regulates public employees, 
private employees, or nonemployment matters, the test is the same:  Has the 
Legislature “provide[d] an adequate yardstick for the guidance of the 
administrative body empowered to execute the law”?  (Clean Air Constituency v. 
California State Air Resources Bd., supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 817.)  As explained 
above, the MMC statute provides such guidance.   
In addition to sufficiently clear standards, a statute delegating legislative 
power must be accompanied by “ ‘safeguards adequate to prevent its abuse.’ ”  
(Kugler, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 376; see Birkenfeld, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 169.)  
The Board and the UFW contend that the MMC statute’s two-tiered system — 
administrative review by the Board, followed by judicial review by the Courts of 
Appeal — constitutes an adequate safeguard against “improper [collective 
bargaining agreement] terms or mediator misconduct.”  While conceding that 
judicial review can serve as a safeguard, Gerawan claims that the review 
contemplated by the MMC statute is “deferential in name, but illusory in fact.”  
The Court of Appeal likewise determined that the Board review process requires 
32 
 
“virtually a rubberstamp approval to the mediator’s reported [collective bargaining 
agreement] as long as the terms thereof have at least a small kernel of plausible 
support.”  
We agree with the Board and the UFW that the statute provides numerous 
procedural safeguards throughout the MMC process to protect the parties from 
arbitrary or unfair action.  The parties at the very beginning must agree on a 
neutral mediator; if not, the mediator will be selected from the Board’s list of nine 
mediators.  (§ 1164, subd. (b).)  A mediator who demonstrates “bias, prejudice, or 
interest in the outcome of the proceeding” shall be disqualified.  (Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 8, § 20404, subd. (a).)  Either party may petition the Board to review the 
mediator’s final report, and the Board must order the mediator to modify any 
provisions that are “unrelated to wages, hours, or other conditions of 
employment,” “based on clearly erroneous findings of material fact,” or “arbitrary 
or capricious in light of the mediator’s findings of fact.”  (§ 1164.3, subd. (a); see 
id., subd. (c).)  Further, either party can petition for the Board to set aside the 
mediator’s report and appoint a new mediator where it is established that the 
report was “procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means,” or where the 
party’s rights were “substantially prejudiced by the misconduct of the mediator.”  
(Id., subd. (e).)  If dissatisfied with the Board’s decision, either party may then 
petition for judicial review.  (§ 1164.5.)  The court has the power to reverse the 
Board’s order if it determines “on the basis of the entire record” that the Board 
acted in excess of its jurisdiction or not in the manner required by law, that the 
Board’s order was “procured by fraud or was an abuse of discretion,” or that the 
Board’s order violated the petitioner’s constitutional rights.  (Id., subd. (b).)   
These safeguards are constitutionally adequate to protect parties and 
prevent misconduct, favoritism, or abuse of power by the mediator.  Indeed, other 
courts have upheld the constitutionality of compulsory interest arbitration schemes 
33 
 
even where the statutes “expressly provided” that the arbitrator’s determination 
“was final and unappealable.”  (Mt. St. Mary’s Hospital v. Catherwood (1970) 26 
N.Y.2d 493, 514 (conc. opn. of Fuld, C.J.), citing City of Washington v. Police 
Dept. of City of Washington (1969) 436 Pa. 168; Fairview Hospital Ass’n v. Public 
Bldg. Service and Hospital and Institutional Emp. Union Local No. 113 A.F.L. 
(1954) 241 Minn. 523.)  Moreover, this case itself shows that the review process is 
not a mere “rubberstamp.”  Here the parties jointly selected a mediator, and the 
mediator conducted several on-the-record hearings before submitting a final report 
to the Board fixing the terms of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.  
After Gerawan objected to the terms of the final report, the Board remanded six 
disputed provisions to the mediator for further consideration.  The parties then 
resolved those contested terms with the mediator’s assistance.  Gerawan might not 
agree with the outcome of the MMC process, but that does not mean it was denied 
“suitable safeguards” to protect it from any abuses of that process.  (Wright, supra, 
30 Cal.3d at p. 712.) 
Gerawan argues that the MMC statute’s judicial review is additionally 
ineffective because a court would be unable “to assess whether ex parte or ‘off-
the-record’ communications ‘decisively influenced’ the mediator’s decisions.”  
But as the Board explains, ALRB regulations require the mediator to cite evidence 
in the record to support his or her final report and prohibit the mediator from 
basing any findings or conclusions on “off the record” communications.  (Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 8, § 20407, subd. (a)(2).)  Further, the regulations allow a party to 
file with the Board “declarations that describe pertinent events that took place off 
the record” in case of any alleged misconduct or improper factfinding.  (Id., 
§ 20408, subd. (a).)  Gerawan did not do so here.  The ALRB regulations provide 
additional safeguards against unfairness or favoritism. 
34 
 
In sum, the Legislature resolved the fundamental policy issues and 
provided sufficient guidance and procedural safeguards in the MMC statute.  The 
MMC statute does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority. 
IV. 
We next consider whether agricultural employers may defend against a 
union’s MMC request by showing that the union abandoned its status as 
bargaining representative.  As noted, “[a]n agricultural employer or a labor 
organization certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of a bargaining unit of 
agricultural employees” may file a declaration with the Board requesting MMC.  
(§ 1164, subd. (a), italics added.)  There is no dispute that Gerawan’s employees 
elected the UFW as their certified representative in 1992 and that no subsequent 
valid election or decertification has taken place.  But Gerawan contends, and the 
Court of Appeal agreed, that it is entitled to argue that the UFW forfeited its 
certification — and thus its ability to invoke the MMC process — because it had 
been absent from 1995 to 2012.  Because the MMC statute relies entirely on the 
preexisting ALRA certification procedures, we first recount that statutory 
backdrop before addressing whether such a defense is available. 
Section 1156 provides that “[r]epresentatives designated or selected by a 
secret ballot for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the 
agricultural employees in the bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representatives 
of all the agricultural employees in such unit for the purpose of collective 
bargaining.”  (§ 1156.)  Agricultural employers may not “refuse to bargain 
collectively in good faith with labor organizations certified” pursuant to section 
1156.  (§ 1153, subd. (e).)  Further, under the ALRA, “unlike the NLRA, an 
exclusive bargaining representative may be designated only on the basis of a secret 
representation election, and not by the presentation of union authorization cards or 
any other less reliable method sanctioned under federal law.”  (Highland Ranch v. 
35 
 
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 848, 859.)  To that end, the 
ALRA makes it unlawful for an employer to “recognize, bargain with, or sign a 
collective-bargaining agreement with any labor organization not certified” through 
the procedure for a secret election.  (§ 1153, subd. (f).) 
Soon after the ALRA’s enactment, the Board considered whether an 
employer has a continuing duty to bargain with a union certified as the exclusive 
bargaining representative where an agreement has not been reached by the end of 
the initial year of certification.  (Kaplan’s Fruit & Produce Co. Inc. (1977) 3 
ALRB No. 28 (Kaplan’s Fruit).)  The employers in that case had pointed to 
section 1155.2, which provides that if the Board finds that the employer had failed 
to bargain in good faith with the certified union, then the Board may “extend the 
certification for up to one additional year, effective immediately upon the 
expiration of the previous 12-month period following initial certification.”  
(§ 1155.2, subd. (b).)  “[I]f ‘certification’ lapses after one year,” the employers 
argued, their “duty to bargain [under section 1153, subd. (e)] must also lapse.”  
(Kaplan’s Fruit, at p. 2.)  The Board rejected that argument, relying on NLRB 
precedent holding that “ ‘a certified union, upon expiration of the first year 
following its certification, enjoys a rebuttable presumption that its majority 
representative status continues.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Terrill Machine Co. (1969) 173 
NLRB 1480.)  Certification under the ALRA, the Board explained, creates a “duty 
to bargain” that has no time limit, as well as an “election bar,” set out in section 
1156.6.  (Kaplan’s Fruit, at pp. 2–3.)  Section 1155.2’s extension procedure 
concerns only the election bar, which seeks “to bind employees to their choice of 
bargaining agent for a period of time sufficient to allow the bargaining relationship 
to mature and bear fruit”; it does not concern the employer’s duty to bargain.  
(Kaplan’s Fruit, at p. 4.) 
36 
 
The Board also based its decision on the policies underlying the ALRA.  
Accepting the argument that an employer’s bargaining obligation lapsed one year 
after certification would “in effect require annual elections at every organized 
ranch in the State.”  (Kaplan’s Fruit, supra, 3 ALRB No. 28 at p. 2.)  This would 
“strike at the Act’s central purpose of bringing ‘certainty and a sense of fairplay’ ” 
to agricultural relations by “inhibit[ing] good faith bargaining” and “promot[ing] 
strikes by placing the union under great time pressure to obtain an agreement 
before its certification lapses.”  (Id. at pp. 5–6.)  The Board concluded that the 
Legislature could not have intended “to make the process of collective bargaining 
into a kind of sporting event in which the parties play against each other and 
against a clock at the same time.”  (Id. at pp. 6–7.)  In Montebello Rose Co. v. 
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 1 (Montebello), the court 
upheld the Board’s interpretation that “the employer’s duty to bargain . . . 
continues until such time as the union is officially decertified as the employee 
bargaining representative pursuant to the provisions of sections 1156.3 or 1156.7.”  
(Id. at pp. 23–24.)  This interpretation “appear[ed] to be true to the underlying 
purpose of the [ALRA] as a whole — to promote stability in the agricultural fields 
through collective bargaining.”  (Id. at p. 29.)   
The Court of Appeal in F & P Growers Assn. v. Agricultural Labor 
Relations Bd. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 667 (F & P Growers) considered a related 
question:  whether an employer may refuse to bargain with a union representative 
when it reasonably believes that the union has lost the support of a majority of its 
employees.  (Id. at pp. 670–671.)  Agreeing with the Board, the court held that an 
employer could not raise a “good faith doubt of majority support” defense under 
the ALRA, even though NLRB precedent provided such a defense under the 
NLRA.  (Id. at p. 678; see Nish Noroian Farms (1982) 8 ALRB No. 25.)  In so 
holding, the court pointed to several critical differences between the ALRA and 
37 
 
NLRA.  First, although the NLRA permits employers to “voluntarily recognize 
and bargain with a labor union that has demonstrated its majority status by means 
other than an election” (F & P Growers, supra, at p. 674, citing NLRB v. Gissel 
Packing Co. (1969) 395 U.S. 575), the ALRA specifically prohibits an employer 
from bargaining with a nonelected union (§ 1153, subd. (f)).  Second, whereas the 
NLRA permits employers to petition to conduct an election for a representative, 
the ALRA allows only employees or labor unions to petition for an election.  
(Compare 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) with Lab. Code, § 1156.3.)  Third, under the 
ALRA, only employees or labor organizations can move to decertify a union 
representative.  (F & P Growers, at pp. 675–676, citing § 1156.7.)   
 These differences, the court explained, “show[ed] a purpose on the part of 
the Legislature to prohibit the employer from being an active participant in 
determining which union it shall bargain with in cases arising under the ALRA.”   
(F & P Growers, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 676.)  Permitting an employer to 
“rely on its good faith belief in order to avoid bargaining with an employee chosen 
agricultural union” would allow the employer to “do indirectly . . . what the 
Legislature has clearly shown it does not intend the employer to do directly.”  (Id. 
at pp. 676–677.)  The court observed that unique features of “the California 
agricultural scene” — such as “rapid turnover” of agricultural workers, many of 
whom are temporary noncitizens who do not speak English — gave “all the more 
reason for the Legislature to decide to remove the employer from any peripheral 
participation in deciding whether to bargain with a particular union.”  (Id. at 
p. 677.)  The “legislative policy” of the ALRA, the court concluded, is that “the 
unions [should] be chosen solely by the employees and not the employers.”  (Id. at 
p. 678.) 
In accordance with this precedent, the Board has consistently determined 
that an employer may not refuse to bargain with a union on the ground that it has 
38 
 
“abandoned” its status as representative.  (See Dole Fresh Fruit Company, supra, 
22 ALRB No. 4; Bruce Church, Inc. (1991) 17 ALRB No. 1; Lu-Ette Farms, Inc. 
(1982) 8 ALRB No. 91.)  Under these decisions, a union, once certified, remains 
the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative until it is decertified or until 
the union is unwilling or unable to represent the bargaining unit.  Following the 
MMC statute’s enactment in 2003, the Board has continued to apply this “certified 
until decertified” rule in deciding that employers may not raise union 
abandonment as a defense to requests for MMC.  (See Gerawan Farming, supra, 
39 ALRB No. 5 at pp. 3–4; San Joaquin Tomato Growers, Inc., supra, 37 ALRB 
No. 5 at pp. 3–4; Pictsweet Mushroom Farms, supra, 29 ALRB No. 3 at pp. 10–
11.) 
The Court of Appeal did not dispute the validity of the precedent above or 
the “well-settled rule” that “an employer must continue to bargain in good faith 
with the originally certified union.”  But it held that employers may raise an 
abandonment defense against a union’s request for MMC because “the MMC 
process differs materially from bargaining and is largely a postbargaining 
process.”   
In evaluating this argument, we note that although “we take ultimate 
responsibility for the interpretation of a statute, we accord significant weight and 
respect to the longstanding construction of a law by the agency charged with its 
enforcement.”  (In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1082.)  Here, the 
Board, as the agency charged with the ALRA’s administration, “is entitled to 
deference when interpreting policy in its field of expertise.”  (J. R. Norton, supra, 
26 Cal.3d at p. 29.)  We must give significant weight to its determination that 
under the ALRA, employers may not invoke abandonment as a defense to the 
MMC process.  (See Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 
39 
 
321, 325 [“[T]he administrative interpretation of a statute will be accorded great 
respect by the courts and will be followed if not clearly erroneous.”].) 
Moreover, “when the Legislature amends a statute, we presume it was fully 
aware of the prior judicial construction.”  (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 
Cal.4th 563, 572.)  Likewise, “ ‘[t]he Legislature is presumed to be aware of a 
long-standing administrative practice. . . .  If the Legislature, as here, makes no 
substantial modifications to the [statute], there is a strong indication that the 
administrative practice [is] consistent with the legislative intent.’ ”  (Thornton v. 
Carlson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1257 (Thornton); see In re Dannenberg, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1082; Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of 
Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 21 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  At the time of the 
MMC statute’s enactment, the Legislature was aware that both the Board and the 
courts had consistently affirmed the ALRA’s “certified until decertified” rule.  In 
adding the MMC provisions to the ALRA statutory scheme, the Legislature 
included no provisions concerning certification or abandonment; it merely 
provided that the labor union must be “certified as the exclusive bargaining 
agent,” thus incorporating the existing ALRA certification procedures.  (§ 1164, 
subd. (a).)  The Legislature offered no indication that it intended the MMC statute 
to depart from more than two decades of precedent and provide employers with a 
novel abandonment defense. 
As noted, the Board rejected the abandonment defense in MMC 
proceedings after the MMC statute’s enactment in 2002.  (San Joaquin Tomato 
Growers, Inc., supra, 37 ALRB No. 5 at pp. 3–4; Pictsweet Mushroom Farms, 
supra, 29 ALRB No. 3 at pp. 10–11.)  Yet in subsequent amendments to the MMC 
statute, the Legislature took no action to modify or overrule the Board’s 
interpretation.  (See Stats. 2003, ch. 870, § 1; Stats. 2011, ch. 697, § 4.)  This 
provides additional evidence that the Board’s construction of the MMC statute is 
40 
 
consistent with the Legislature’s intent.  (See Thornton, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1257.) 
The Court of Appeal’s contention that the MMC process falls “outside the 
ordinary bargaining context” lacks support in the MMC statute.  Rather, the text 
and structure of the statute indicate that the MMC process is a continuation of the 
ordinary bargaining process.  The Legislature enacted the MMC statute in order to 
“ensure a more effective collective bargaining process between agricultural 
employers and agricultural employees”  (Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, § 1, p. 7401, italics 
added), and the MMC process begins only after a union representative or an 
employer makes “a renewed demand to bargain” (§ 1164, subd. (a), italics added).  
Moreover, the MMC statute requires that the parties, with the assistance of the 
mediator, conduct considerable negotiation before the interest arbitration phase.  
(§ 1164, subd. (c).)  In many cases, the parties may reach a voluntary agreement 
on all or most of the disputed terms before the mediator writes a final report or 
before the ALRB issues its final order. 
Further, compulsory interest arbitration is not wholly distinct from 
“normal” bargaining because it imposes contract terms on the parties.  The 
availability of interest arbitration, as an ultimate recourse, is itself a bargaining 
tool that the Legislature believed would facilitate resolution of disputes and 
consummation of first agreements.  (Stats. 2002, ch. 1145, § 1, p. 7401; Sen. Bill 
1156 Analysis, supra, at p. 7.)  Other courts have similarly described interest 
arbitration “not as a substitute for collective bargaining, but as an instrument of the 
collective bargaining process.”  (City of Bellevue v. International Assn. of Fire 
Fighters, Local 1604 (Wash. 1992) 831 P.2d 738, 742; see Borough of Lewistown 
v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. (Pa. 1999) 735 A.2d 1240, 1244 [“[T]he 
collective bargaining process under Act 111 includes binding interest arbitration 
where impasse is reached in negotiations.”]; Choctaw, supra, 933 P.2d at p. 267 
41 
 
[“This bargaining process now includes the right to binding mandatory interest 
arbitration . . . .”].) 
Seizing on a single sentence in the Board’s 1977 decision in Kaplan’s 
Fruit, the Court of Appeal suggested that the “Board’s own precedent reflects 
[that] any process by which the parties are compelled to agree to imposed terms 
. . . does not fit into the parameters of bargaining under the ALRA.”  But Kaplan’s 
Fruit does not stand for that broad principle.  In the course of holding that 
employers have a continuing duty to bargain with a union representative, the 
Board merely described the contemporary state of the law, which at that time did 
not provide for interest arbitration:  “Nothing we declare in this opinion alters the 
statutory protection given to employers.  Their duty to bargain, no matter how 
long its duration, does not compel them to agree to a proposal.”  (Kaplan’s Fruit, 
supra, 3 ALRB No. 28 at p. 7.)  When the Legislature later enacted the MMC 
statute, it expanded the “duty to bargain” to include the MMC process. 
Finally, even if the MMC process “differs materially from bargaining,” as 
the Court of Appeal found, neither Gerawan nor the Court of Appeal has identified 
any statutory language, legislative history, or other evidence suggesting that the 
Legislature intended “bargaining” to be treated differently from so-called 
“postbargaining.”  Whether abandonment should be recognized as a defense in the 
latter context but not the former is a question for the Legislature, not the courts. 
Our conclusion is consistent with the purposes of the ALRA and the MMC 
statute.  The ALRA created a state policy “to encourage and protect the right of 
agricultural employees to full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing, . . . and to be free from the 
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the 
designation of such representatives.”  (§ 1140.2.)  “[T]he Legislature’s purpose in 
enacting the ALRA was to limit the employer’s influence in determining whether 
42 
 
or not it shall bargain with a particular union . . . [and] remove the employer from 
any peripheral participation.”  (F & P Growers, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at pp. 676–
677.)  Allowing an employer like Gerawan to avoid MMC by purporting to assert 
the interests of its employees in claiming that the union representative had 
abandoned its employees would permit the employer to “do indirectly . . . what the 
Legislature has clearly shown it does not intend the employer to do directly.”  (Id. 
at p. 677.) 
Indeed, the very purpose of the MMC statute was to revive long-dormant 
relationships between agricultural employers and labor unions in order to facilitate 
the adoption of first collective bargaining agreements.  The Legislature was 
troubled by employers’ “continued refusal[s] . . . to come to the bargaining table 
once an election has occurred,” which caused employees “to languish without the 
negotiated contracts they have elected to secure.”  (Sen. Bill 1156 Analysis, supra, 
at p. 7.)  Thus, the MMC statute was enacted with an understanding that the MMC 
process would be available to unions that had long ago reached an impasse with 
employers and were unable to resume negotiations — in other words, unions that 
are likely to have less of a presence at the employer precisely because no 
collective bargaining agreement yet exists. 
In the face of the strong legislative policy against employer participation in 
the union selection process, Gerawan argues that “the employer’s ability to raise 
the abandonment defense [against the MMC statute] is . . . the only way to protect 
the workers’ right to choose.”   The Court of Appeal similarly concluded that 
“employees’ right to a representative of their own choosing would be seriously 
jeopardized in the situation of abandonment by a union where . . . the absentee 
union suddenly reappeared on the scene to demand the MMC process.”   
But the ALRA contains a comprehensive set of protections for employees 
who no longer wish to be represented by the certified labor union.  The employees 
43 
 
or a rival labor union may petition for a new election to decertify or replace the 
existing union representative.  (§§ 1156.3, 1156.7.)  “So long as the employees can 
petition for a new election if they wish to remove the union, the employer has no 
real cause for concern about whether it is bargaining with the true representative 
of its employees.”   (Montebello, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at p. 28.)  Indeed, 
Gerawan’s employees did file a petition to decertify the UFW.  Although the 
Board later set aside that decertification effort because it found that Gerawan 
“unlawfully inserted itself into the campaign” (Gerawan Farming, Inc. (2016) 42 
ALRB No. 1, p. 8), the fact that the employees mounted such an effort 
demonstrates that employees have recourse beyond an employer’s ability to raise 
an abandonment defense. 
The Court of Appeal opined that the “rapid timeframe” of the MMC 
process would mean that decertification “would often be too late.”  But the ALRA 
requires that the Board set an election within seven days from receiving a 
decertification petition.  (§ 1156.3, subd. (b).)  By contrast, a union representative 
generally may not request MMC until 90 days after its renewed demand to 
bargain, and even after that, the statute requires at least 30 days of mediation.  
(§ 1165, subds. (a), (c).)  Employees thus have a considerable amount of time in 
which to deliberate and organize for purposes of decertification.  In this case, for 
example, the UFW filed its renewed demand to bargain on October 12, 2012, and 
the mediator did not issue his final report until almost one year later, on September 
28, 2013.  Moreover, an initial collective bargaining agreement does not last 
forever.  The contract imposed by the Board’s final order here, for example, has a 
three-year term.  If the employees are dissatisfied with either the collective 
bargaining agreement or their union’s representation, then they can petition to 
decertify the union in the third year of that term.  (§ 1156.7, subd. (c).) 
44 
 
An additional protection against unexplained union absences is that “a 
union disclaimer of interest or union defunctness” terminates the union’s 
certification as bargaining representative.  (San Joaquin Tomato Growers, Inc., 
supra, 37 ALRB No. 5 at p. 3; Pictsweet Mushroom Farms, supra, 29 ALRB No. 
3 at p. 6.)  Thus, under the Board’s precedent, employees are entitled to select a 
new union representative when its existing representative has suffered an 
“institutional death” and is therefore unable to represent the employees.  
(Picstweet Mushroom Farms, supra, 29 ALRB No. 3 at p. 6.) 
Finally, under the ALRA, an agricultural employer can file an unfair labor 
practice charge against a certified union representative who “refuse[s] to bargain 
collectively in good faith.”  (§ 1154, subd. (c).)  In addition, the Board has held 
that the “[f]ailure of a union to respond within a reasonable time will constitute a 
waiver of the right to bargain over a proposed change in terms and conditions of 
employment.”  (Dole Fresh Fruit Company, supra, 22 ALRB No. 4 at p. 18.)  An 
employer thus has multiple options to defend against “what may appear to be a 
derelict or defunct incumbent union.”  (Id. at p. 16.)  What an employer cannot do 
under the ALRA is unilaterally declare that it will refuse to engage with the union 
because it believes the union has abandoned its employees.  This is true whether in 
response to an initial demand to bargain, a renewed demand to bargain, or a 
request to refer the parties to MMC.  In all cases, the ALRA reserves the power to 
select the union representative to the employees and labor organizations alone. 
In sum, we hold that an employer may not defend against a union’s MMC 
request by challenging the union’s certification as bargaining representative on the 
basis of abandonment.  The Board did not abuse its discretion when it declined to 
consider Gerawan’s abandonment argument. 
45 
 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
KLINE, J.*
                                              
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division 
Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 236 Cal.App.4th 1024 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S227243 
Date Filed: November 27, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael P. Mallery; Irell & Manella, David A. Schwarz; Georgeson, Belardinelli and Noyes, Georgeson & 
Belardinelli, C. Russell Georgeson; Barsamian & Moody and Ronald H. Barsamian for Petitioner and for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Luke A. Wake; Damien M. Schiff; Benbrook Law Group, Bradley A. Benbrook, Stephen M. Duvernay; 
Walter & Wilhelm Law Group, Paul J. Bauer; McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth and 
Anthony Raimondo for National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Cato 
Institute, California Farm Bureau Federation, California Fresh Fruit Association, Western Growers 
Association and Ventura County Agricultural Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Walter & Wilhelm Law Group, Paul J. Bauer; Raimondo & Associates, Anthony Raimondo, Gerardo V. 
Hernandez and Jasmine Shams for Silvia Lopez as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
 
Carl G. Borden, Robert P. Roy, John C. Eastman, Anthony T. Caso and Jason E. Resnick for Western 
Growers Association, California Farm Bureau Federation, Agricultural Council of California, California 
Citrus Mutual, California Grape and Tree Fruit League, Grower-Shipper Association of Santa Barbara and 
San Luis Obispo Counties, Nisei Farmers League, and Ventura County Agricultural Association as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Carl G. Borden for California Farm Bureau Federation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Robert P. Roy for Ventura County Agricultural Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and 
for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
John C. Eastman and Anthony T. Caso for Center of Constitutional Jurisprudence as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Petitioner and for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Page 2 – S227243 – counsel continued 
 
Counsel: 
 
Jason E. Resnick for Western Growers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gregory D. Brown, Deputy State Solicitor General, Douglas J. Woods, Assistant Attorney 
General, Constance L. LeLouis, Mark R. Beckington and Benjamin M. Glickman, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Martínez Aguilasocho & Lynch, Mario Martínez, Thomas P. Lynch, Edgar I. Aguilasocho; Altshuler 
Berzon, Scott A. Kronland, Danielle Leonard and Jonathan Weissglass for Real Party in Interest and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David A. Schwarz 
Irell & Manella 
1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900 
Los Angeles, CA  90067-4276 
(310) 277-1010 
 
Benjamin M. Glickman 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 210-6054 
 
Mario Martínez 
Martínez Aguilasocho & Lynch 
P.O. Box 11208 
Bakersfield, CA  93389 
(661) 859-1174