Case Title: Bannon v. Pfiffner

Citation: 333 N.W.2d 464

Docket Number: 

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1983-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
333 N.W.2d 464 (1983) Betty BANNON, Administrator of the Estate of Gail A. Ward, Deceased, Appellant, v. Francis X. PFIFFNER, Executor of the Estate of Ann Frances Pfiffner, Deceased, Appellee. No. 67903. Supreme Court of Iowa. April 20, 1983. *465 Donald R. Breitbach and Randal J. Nigg of Reynolds, Kenline, Breitbach, McCarthy, Clemens, McKay & Nigg, Dubuque, for appellant. Michael J. Coyle of Fuerste, Carew, Coyle, Juergens & Sudmeier, Dubuque, for appellee. Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., HARRIS, McGIVERIN, and CARTER, JJ., and LeGRAND, Senior Judge. UHLENHOPP, Justice. This appeal involving a collision of two cars turns on whether a fact issue was generated on the existence of a sudden emergency. The jury could find the facts to be as follows. A valley, slightly over a half-mile in breadth, lies between two low hills on United States Highway 20 near Raymond, Iowa, east of Waterloo. Early on the afternoon of January 4, 1980, freezing rain began to fall and the highway became "kind of slushy and crunchy." At about 4:45 p.m., Gail A. Ward was driving west across the valley on her right side of the highway. Four cars were proceeding east: a van in the lead, then a car driven by Ann Francis Pfiffner, followed by the car of Jeffrey Cross and his brother, and finally the car of Leonard Cameron and his wife. These four vehicles were traveling at about 40 to 45 miles per hour on their right side of the highway, and were maintaining about the same distances apart. The eastbound cars had encountered no sliding to this point. As they traversed the crest of the west hill and proceeded east into the valley, the van went onto the right shoulder two or three times. The brake lights on Pfiffner's car then went on, and that car slid left across the paving and head-on into the oncoming Ward car, killing Pfiffner and Ward. The van, farther east, went on. Cross, to the west, was able to get his car onto the graveled right shoulder; he drove past the collision site and stopped. Cameron, behind Cross, was also able to get onto the shoulder; he stopped at or near the collision site. A deputy sheriff heard "CB chatter" about the wreck and also received an official call. He arrived very shortly from the west. *466 Three principal witnesses testified as to the condition of the highway: the deputy, Cross, and Cameron. Since the appeal turns on the sufficiency of evidence, we quote illustrative excerpts from their testimony. The deputy testified: Q. What about the other traffic that you described; how fast was it going in your lane of travel eastbound? A. We *467 were in a group of four cars, as I remember, and we were all pretty consistent with the same distance between all the cars. So, I would say we were all probably going within the same speed because nobody was gaining on nobody else. Cross estimated the distance from the west hill to the collision, and testified further: Cameron testified: At the conclusion of the evidence plaintiff moved for a directed verdict in her favor on the ground that Pfiffner was negligent as a matter of law. The trial court overruled the motion. Over plaintiff's objection, the trial court in its instructions submitted to the jury the issue of whether Pfiffner was confronted with a sudden emergency not of her own making. The jury found for defendant, the trial court dismissed the petition, and plaintiff appealed. We transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals, which held that Pfiffner was negligent as a matter of law and remanded the case to district court for trial on damages. We then granted defendant's application for further review. The appeal involves three legal questions: does substantial evidence appear (1) that Pfiffner was confronted with an emergency? (2) that the emergency was not of her own making? and (3) that she acted as a reasonably prudent person in the emergency? Violation of a statutory rule of the road constitutes negligence in itself under the venerable Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911, 915, 243 N.W. 552, 554 (1932). Formerly an exception existed when a car failed to yield half of the road by turning to the right in a meeting situation in a rural area; that was regarded as prima facie negligence. Hedges v. Conder, 166 N.W.2d 844, 850 (Iowa 1969). In cities, however, the statute at the time required driving on the right side, and driving on the left side fell under the general rule of negligence per se. Winter v. Davis, 217 Iowa 424, 435, 251 N.W. 770, 774-75 (1933). See also France v. Benter, 256 Iowa 534, 542, 128 N.W.2d 268, 272-73 (1964). The statute regarding rural areas has been changed to provide in section 321.297 of the Iowa Code (1981): As a result of this statute, driving on the left as Pfiffner did, in situations other than the statutory exceptions, is negligence per se in rural areas the same as on city streets. Kisling also held, however, that a violation of a statutory rule of the road may be legally excused in four situations, one of which is when the driver "is confronted by an emergency not of his own making, and by reason thereof he fails to obey the statute." 214 Iowa at 916, 243 N.W. at 554. Defendant claims that Pfiffner's suddenly coming upon the icy area constituted an emergency, not of her own making, and by reason of the emergency her car went into Ward's path. Defendant had the burden of proving that Pfiffner was legally excused by virtue of the emergency. Overturf v. Bertrand, 256 Iowa 596, 605, 128 N.W.2d 182, 187 (1964). In considering plaintiff's motion to direct a verdict against defendant and plaintiff's objection to the emergency instruction, we therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant. Beitz v. Horak, 271 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Iowa 1978); McCaull v. Universal Manufacturing Co., 218 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Iowa 1974). I. Sudden emergency? In the present context, two main situations may exist with respect to icy highways. In one situation the icy condition is general, and *470 the driver must be taken as being aware of it. If such a driver proceeds in normal fashion notwithstanding the ice and eventually slides on a patch of it, he cannot set up the icy condition as an "emergency." An emergency requires "an unforseen combination of circumstances" but the element of unforeseeability is missing. See definition of emergency in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1969). Such is the case of Boge v. Jack Link Truck Line, Inc., 200 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 1972). In the other situation, although the weather may be inclement, ice has not formed so far as the driver reasonably observes. He proceeds in accordance with conditions as they appear. Suddenly he encounters an unanticipated patch of ice and slides. Normally in this situation the driver may rightly claim that the decision on whether the ice was reasonably foreseeable is for the jury to make. Zell v. Luthy, 216 Kan. 697, 702, 533 P.2d 1298, 1303 (1975); Byrnes v. St. Louis County, 295 N.W.2d 517, 519-20 (Minn.1980); Hughes v. Keller, 302 Minn. 8, 14, 224 N.W.2d 738, 741 (1974); Emerson v. Eystad, 288 Minn. 401, 408, 181 N.W.2d 337, 339 (1970); Smith v. Bullington, 499 S.W.2d 649, 656 (Tenn.App. 1973); Whitley v. Patterson, 204 Va. 36, 39, 129 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1963); see Hunt v. State, 252 N.W.2d 715, 717 (Iowa 1977); Pullen v. Fagen, 204 Va. 601, 605, 132 S.E.2d 718, 721 (1963). From our review of the record, we conclude that the second situation is the one we have here. The jury could find that Pfiffner was confronted with a sudden emergency. II. Of Pfiffner's own making? On a related issue, plaintiff contends that Pfiffner made her own emergency. If a person tortiously brings about an emergency, he cannot rely on it as an excuse for resulting harm although he conducts himself properly in the emergency itself. As stated by the American Law Institute: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 296, Comment d (1977). This contention of plaintiff is intertwined with the first one. Whether Pfiffner and the other three drivers in the train of cars should have anticipated an icy area prior to arriving there, whether they should have driven slower, and whether they should have been more watchful and maintained closer control over their vehicles are all questions of reasonableness, not questions with black or white answers. We have said that such questions are particularly adapted to jury consideration, rather than to determination by the judge. Johnson v. Svoboda, 260 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Iowa 1977). We hold on this record that the question of whether Pfiffner negligently produced the emergency was one of fact. III. Due care in the emergency? Assuming that Pfiffner was confronted with an emergency and that it was not of her own making, she was not completely absolved from the exercise of care; the law required her to conduct herself as a reasonably prudent person in a similar emergency. The Institute states regarding this aspect of the emergency rule: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 296, Comment b (1977). The jury could find that the collision happened very quickly after the cars got on the ice. The evidence is sketchy because of the shortness of the time and the two fatalities in the tragedy. It does show that Pfiffner's brake lights flashed on. Perhaps Pfiffner would have stayed on her own side if she had not applied her brakes, but whether this showed lack of reasonable care, under the circumstances, was for the jury to say. Kight v. Murdock, 253 Miss. 572, 576, 176 So. 2d 320, 321 (1965); State v. Hogback Mountain Ski Lift, Inc., 122 Vt. 8, 11, 163 A.2d 851, 854 (1960); Meador v. Lawson, 214 Va. 759, 762, 204 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1974); Whitley v. Patterson, 204 Va. 36, 39, 129 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1963). After reviewing the evidence, the trial court aptly stated in this case: A similar situation involving a very short period of time existed in Murray v. Lang, 252 Iowa 260, 106 N.W.2d 643 (1960). This court held that determination of whether the actor's conduct in the emergency was reasonable was properly left to the jury. Id. at 264, 106 N.W.2d at 645. We so hold here. We uphold the judgment of the district court. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.