Case Title: Andrews v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC17-1034

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1034 
____________ 
 
U’DREKA ANDREWS, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[May 17, 2018] 
 
POLSTON, J. 
 
In this review of the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in Andrews v. 
State, 218 So. 3d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), we consider whether indigent 
defendants represented by pro bono counsel should be treated the same as 
defendants represented by private counsel or public defenders, both of whom do 
not have to reveal details about their hiring of experts to the prosecution.    
Specifically, the First District certified the following question: 
WHETHER AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT WHO IS 
REPRESENTED BY PRIVATE COUNSEL PRO BONO IS 
ENTITLED TO FILE MOTIONS PERTAINING TO THE 
APPOINTMENT AND COSTS OF EXPERTS, MITIGATION 
SPECIALISTS, AND INVESTIGATORS EX PARTE AND UNDER 
SEAL, WITH SERVICE TO THE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE 
 
 
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COMMISSION AND NOTICE TO THE STATE ATTORNEY’S 
OFFICE, AND TO HAVE ANY HEARING ON SUCH MOTIONS 
EX PARTE, WITH ONLY THE DEFENDANT AND THE 
COMMISSION PRESENT. 
 
218 So. 3d at 470.1  We answer the certified question in the affirmative and, 
therefore, quash the First District’s decision and remand Andrews’ case for 
resentencing. 
BACKGROUND 
U’dreka Kynshere Andrews was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, 
and robbery and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the first-
degree murder conviction.  Andrews was 17 years old at the time she committed 
the offenses.  Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a 
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for 
juvenile offenders.”  After Miller, this Court remanded Andrews’ case for 
resentencing.  Andrews v. State, 177 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 2015). 
 
Prior to the resentencing hearing, Andrews’ pro bono counsel filed a motion 
for an ex parte hearing regarding the appointment of experts for the Miller juvenile 
resentencing hearing.  Defense counsel argued that he was requesting public funds 
for experts and that he sought an ex parte determination because he did not “think 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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the State should be involved in the process of the defense having experts.”  The 
trial court denied the motion for an ex parte hearing without explanation. 
 
Andrews’ counsel filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the First District, 
asserting that the hearing regarding experts should be ex parte because the 
discussion of experts might reveal the defense’s trial strategy to the State.  The 
First District denied the petition but also certified the above question.  Andrews, 
218 So. 3d at 470. 
ANALYSIS 
Andrews argues that “comparable defendants represented by private counsel 
would not be required to divulge details to the prosecution regarding the hiring of 
experts, nor would similarly-situated defendants who are represented by the Office 
of the Public Defender or the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional 
Counsel.”  We agree with Andrews.2 
 
To be entitled to public funds for the appointment of an expert, the Eleventh 
Circuit in Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted), 
ruled that an indigent “defendant must show the trial court that there exists a 
reasonable probability both that an expert would be of assistance to the defense and 
that denial of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.”  And 
                                          
 
 
2.  Because the certified question is solely a legal issue, our review is de 
novo.  See Haygood v. State, 109 So. 3d 735, 739 (Fla. 2013). 
 
 
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in San Martin v. State, 705 So. 2d 1337, 1347 (Fla. 1997), this Court explained 
that, when evaluating whether a trial court abuses its discretion in refusing public 
funds, “courts have applied a two-part test:  (1) whether the defendant made a 
particularized showing of need; and (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by 
the court’s denial of the motion requesting the expert assistance.”  
In making a showing of particularized need, a defendant may be required to 
expose privileged information or attorney work product, depending on the type of 
expert assistance requested.  Requiring a defendant to reveal to the prosecutor the 
name of an expert witness whom the defendant may wish to consider calling, along 
with the reasons why this witness may be of value to the defense, is “contrary to 
the work-product doctrine because it would serve to highlight the thought 
processes and legal analysis of the attorneys involved.”  State v. Williams, 678 So. 
2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); see also State v. Rabin, 495 So. 2d 257, 262 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (explaining that opinion work product, which includes the 
attorney’s theories concerning the case, “is absolutely, or nearly absolutely, 
privileged”).  Even if the defendant is only required to disclose the expert’s name 
and area of expertise, that is information that the State would otherwise not be 
entitled to know at that stage.  In fact, the State’s presence at the hearing puts the 
defendant in the difficult situation of having to choose between fully supporting 
the motion for the appointment of an expert and not revealing information to the 
 
 
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State that it would not otherwise be privy to.  And as Judge Wolf explained, 
“[n]on-indigent and, more importantly, other indigent defendants represented by 
public defenders can obtain expert witnesses and investigative support without 
revealing their thought processes in front of the prosecuting authority.”  Andrews, 
218 So. 3d at 472 (Wolf, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Additionally, depending on the reason for the expert requested, it is possible 
that a defendant may be forced to disclose self-incriminating information, in 
violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.  See Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 
2d 114, 120 (Ala. 1996) (“Requiring an indigent defendant to prematurely disclose 
evidence in a hearing where the state is present encroaches on the privilege against 
self-incrimination, which applies at all stages of a criminal proceeding.”).  This 
privilege against self-incrimination is not limited to “evidence which may lead to 
criminal conviction, but includes information which would furnish a link in the 
chain of evidence that could lead to prosecution, as well as evidence which an 
individual reasonably believes could be used against him in a criminal 
prosecution.”  Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975). 
Accordingly, ex parte hearings are necessary in this context to protect 
indigent defendants’ rights.  Federal law and other states also require ex parte 
hearings in this context.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1); United States v. 
Abreu, 202 F.3d 386, 391 (1st Cir. 2000); Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 2d at 120; 
 
 
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Brooks v. State, 385 S.E.2d 81, 84 (Ga. 1989); McGregor v. State, 733 P.2d 416, 
416 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 192-94 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that indigent defendants represented by 
private counsel pro bono are entitled to file motions pertaining to the appointment 
and costs of experts, mitigation specialists, and investigators ex parte and under 
seal, with service to the Justice Administrative Commission and notice to the State 
Attorney’s Office, and to have any hearing on such motion ex parte, with only the 
defendant and the Commission present.  Accordingly, we answer the certified 
question in the affirmative, quash the First District’s decision below, and remand 
Andrews’ case for resentencing in accordance with this decision. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and LAWSON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
First District - Case Nos. 1D16-733 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
 
 
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Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and 
Crystal McBee Frusciante of Frusciante Law Firm, P.A., Sunrise, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Sonya Rudenstine, Gainesville, Florida, and Whitney Untiedt of Akerman, LLP, 
Miami, Florida; and Roseanne Eckert of FIU College of Law, Miami, Florida, 
 
Amici Curiae Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the 
Florida Juvenile Resentencing and Review Project