Case Title: State v. Labella

Citation: 232 So. 2d 354

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1970-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
232 So. 2d 354 (1970) STATE of Mississippi v. Louis P. LABELLA. No. 45710. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 23, 1970. *355 A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellant. Robertshaw, Merideth & Swank, Philip B. Terney, Greenville, for appellee. JONES, Justice: Having been convicted in the Justice of the Peace Court of District three of Sunflower County, appellee appealed to the Circuit Court where a demurrer to the affidavit as amended was sustained. The State appeals, and we reverse and remand. The affidavit against appellee was drawn under Section 10223(b), Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated (1952), the pertinent part of which reads as follows: The affidavit as amended charged: The appellee says the affidavit is defective because it does not charge appellee knew of Clegg's action. There are certain rules of law permeating this entire case. In misdemeanors, all who aid, incite, participate or abet the commission of such crime as well as those who perpetrate same are guilty as principals. Hathorn v. State, 246 Miss. 135, 149 So. 2d 845 (1963); Smith v. State, 221 Miss. 184, 72 So. 2d 215 (1954); State v. Treweilder, 103 Miss. 859, 60 So. 1015 (1912); suggestion of error overruled, 60 So. 1039 (1913); Reed v. Greenville, 83 Miss. 192, 35 So. 178 (1903); Johns v. State, 78 Miss. 663, 29 So. 401 (1900). It is not necessary that he be present at the commission of the crime. Noble v. State, 221 Miss. 339, 72 So. 2d 687 (1954); Smith v. State, 221 Miss. 184, 72 *356 So. 2d 215 (1954); Kittrell v. State, 89 Miss. 666, 42 So. 609 (1906). Under the above decisions, all who incite, participate in, or abet the commission of a crime are principals. Since, under this law, the appellee was a principal, he might be indicted as a principal and convicted as such on proof of aiding in, abetting or inciting the crime. Goss v. State, 205 Miss. 177, 38 So. 2d 700 (1949). The manner or means employed generally need not be averred. 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 131, p. 1023 (1944). Neither do matters of evidence need averment, nor those of defense negation. 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations §§ 115, 116, p. 996 (1944). Under these laws, the words "* * * by his servants or agents, to-wit: one, Curtis Clegg * * *" are surplusage and were not necessary to be included in the affidavit. The affidavit did not charge that Clegg was an employee and gave beer to a minor, for which appellee was responsible. It charges that Labella "did * * * unlawfully sell, give or furnish * * *" beer to the minor. (emphasis added). This is a direct charge that Labella himself did it. He could not do it unlawfully unless he knew what he was doing. As stated, the indictment could have been drawn omitting the surplus words and have been a perfectly good indictment. Generally, an indictment which is substantially in the language of the statute is sufficient. In State v. Coltharp, 176 Miss. 883, 889, 170 So. 285, 286 (1936), this Court said: Appellee places reliance upon Kittrell v. State, 89 Miss. 666, 42 So. 609 (1906). It was held in that case that there is no variance between an indictment charging a defendant with the unlawful selling of intoxicants and proving that sale was made by defendant's employee acting for the defendant with his knowledge and consent. In the Kittrell case, the Court gave an instruction for the State that a merchant is liable for the acts of his clerk in the unlawful sale of liquor even if the sale was made without his knowledge or consent, and that if the facts existed, the jury should find him guilty. In that case the indictment was based solely on the ground that the defendant "did unlawfully sell and retail intoxicating liquors without a license." Speaking for the Court, Judge Calhoon said: Under this case it is clear that lack of knowledge is a defense and a question of fact to be submitted to the jury. In Smith v. State, 221 Miss. 184, 72 So. 2d 215 (1954), appellant was convicted for transporting whiskey through Forrest County when he was not present in said county. The proof showed that the one that actually transported the whiskey was doing so for Vardaman Smith. This indictment under the wording of the statute involved is not required to charge appellee with knowing that the employee sold or gave the beer to the minor. The statute does not use the word "knowing" and besides the affidavit here involved is so worded as to show that the defendant knew of the employee's activities. In State v. Brunjes, 187 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Mo. App., 1945), the Missouri court held: *358 In the same case of Brunjes, the court quoted from another Missouri case as follows: In Territory of Hawaii v. Santana, 37 Haw. 586, 587 (1947), defendant was charged with soliciting or abetting in soliciting for unlawful intercourse. The court said: Error was alleged in that the charge against the defendant did not allege that he knew the place to which he drove people was a place of prostitution. The court, in considering the indictment, said: In Bosco v. State, 157 Md. 407, 409, 146 A. 238, 239 (1929), the court said: In United States v. Okin, 154 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D.C., 1955), citing authorities therefor, the court said: Gillespie v. State, 147 Md. 45, 61, 127 A. 727, 733 (1924) has this to say on the matter: The demurrer to the indictment in the present case should have been overruled because: (1) the statement that the appellee did the act through his servant, an employee, Clegg, was surplusage and could have been omitted from the indictment; (2) the indictment eliminating the words quoted is in the words of the statute; (3) the question of knowledge of the acts of Clegg would be a question of fact to be submitted to the jury as a defense; (4) the allegation that he did this act through Clegg would be a matter of evidence; and (5) the words that the appellee "did * * * unlawfully sell, give or furnish" the minor beer implies a knowledge of the acts of the servant. The words that he did unlawfully by his servant or agent sell, etc. implies knowledge that his agent was so doing. The case is reversed and remanded. Reversed and remanded. GILLESPIE, P.J., and PATTERSON, INZER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.