Case Title: McCone v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-50

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
McCone v. State1993 WY 168866 P.2d 740Case Number: 93-50Decided: 12/30/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Henry 
McCONE,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Leonard 
D. Munker, State Public Defender, Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, argued, and 
Bobbi Renner, Laramie, representing appellant.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Barbara L. Boyer, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, representing 
appellee.

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR, JJ., and McEWAN, District Judge 
(Retired).

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Henry L. McCone 
was convicted of four counts of making terroristic threats in violation of W.S. 
6-2-505, for telephone calls made to the Bethesda Care Center and a police 
dispatcher in Laramie, Wyoming. On appeal he raises issues concerning: (1) 
vagueness and overbreadth, (2) jurisdiction and venue, (3) due process in 
identifying McCone, (4) instructing the jury on the law of the case and on 
lesser included crimes, (5) witnesses commenting on another's credibility, (6) 
victim impact testimony, (7) other bad acts testimony, (8) hearsay, (9) closing 
arguments, and (10) sufficiency of the evidence.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      McCone presents 
the following issues:

ISSUE 
I

Whether 
Wyoming Statute § 6-2-205 [sic] is unconstitutional because it is vague and 
overbroad.

ISSUE 
II

Whether 
the Second Judicial District Court had jurisdiction and was proper 
venue.

ISSUE 
III

Whether 
Appellant was denied due process when witnesses identified his voice from 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures.

ISSUE 
IV

Whether 
Appellant was denied a fair trial when the trial court incorrectly instructed 
the jury on the law of the case.

ISSUE 
V

Whether 
the district court denied Appellant the right to a fair trial when it refused to 
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of threatening telephone 
calls.

ISSUE 
VI

Whether 
witness testimony concerning the credibility and truthfulness of the appellant 
was error per se.

ISSUE 
VII

Whether 
the prosecution violated Wyoming Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 by eliciting 
improper victim impact testimony at trial.

ISSUE 
VIII

Whether 
the trial court erred when it allowed evidence of Appellant's other bad acts 
under Wyoming Rules of Evidence 404(b).

ISSUE 
IX

Whether 
the trial court erred when it ruled that Officer Marti's report was inadmissible 
under W.R.E. 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay 
rule.

ISSUE 
X

Whether 
Appellant was denied his right to a fair trial when the prosecutor made improper 
remarks in closing arguments. 

ISSUE 
XI

Whether 
the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Appellant committed terroristic threats.

I. 
FACTS

[¶4]      On July 19, 1992, 
the Bethesda Care Center (Bethesda), a nursing home in Laramie, Wyoming, 
received two unusual phone calls. Lori Middleton (Middleton), a staff nurse at 
Bethesda, answered both of these calls. Middleton testified that the first call 
(hereinafter call # 1) came around 8:00 p.m. from a male calling himself 
Antonio, who asked to speak with Teresa Landkamer (Landkamer), another Bethesda 
employee, about bad checks. Landkamer could not come to the phone, and the 
conversation ended. At around 9:40 p.m. that same evening, Antonio called again 
(hereinafter call # 2) asking to speak with Landkamer. Middleton described the 
30 to 40 second conversation as follows:

I 
told him [the caller] that she was working and I could give her a message. He 
told me that he wanted to talk to the [expletives] and if I didn't get her on 
the phone he would come up there and blow my [expletive] head 
off.

Middleton 
put the caller on hold, but he hung up before Landkamer could come to the 
phone.

[¶5]      Immediately after 
call # 2, Middleton contacted the Laramie police; and the Bethesda facility was 
secured through a "lock down" procedure. A Laramie police officer came to the 
facility and interviewed Middleton that same evening.

[¶6]      The following 
day, July 20, 1992, Bethesda received two more threatening calls. The first was 
answered by Nesta Patzer (Patzer), Bethesda's office manager, and the second by 
Laura White-Mohseni (White-Mohseni). Patzer testified that the caller on the 
first call on July 20 (hereinafter call # 3) threatened to place a bomb at 
Bethesda within 24 hours if the caller did not get his money. White-Mohseni 
described the second call on July 20 (hereinafter call # 4) as 
follows:

This 
is Tonio from Denver, unless Teresa Landkamer pays 2,000 owed for cocaine I will 
place a bomb in Bethesda Care Center within 24 hours.

After 
these calls, the police were contacted; and Officer Donnelly, a Laramie police 
officer trained in explosives and bomb threat management, visited 
Bethesda.

[¶7]      While 
investigating at Bethesda on July 20, Officer Donnelly interviewed Landkamer. 
She suggested that McCone could be the caller because she had received harassing 
phone calls from McCone, her ex-boyfriend, in the recent past. Landkamer, within 
an hour after Officer Donnelly arrived at Bethesda, retrieved a tape recording 
she had made previously of a phone conversation with McCone. Officer Donnelly 
then played this tape for White-Mohseni, the receiver of call # 4, in an 
enclosed office at Bethesda. White-Mohseni testified that when she listened to 
the tape she was not aware whose voices were on the tape but that she later 
learned they belonged to Landkamer and McCone. She also testified that she 
identified the male voice on the tape as the same voice she heard on call # 4. 
That evening, the Laramie police placed an officer at Bethesda for 
security.

[¶8]      On July 21, 1992, 
the Laramie police dispatcher received another threatening phone call concerning 
Bethesda (hereinafter call # 5). This time the caller stated that a bomb would 
go off in 56 minutes at Bethesda. Bethesda was contacted and immediately began 
evacuating the facility's 120 patients. Officer Donnelly was also contacted and 
dispatched to Bethesda, where he stopped the evacuation because he believed the 
threat was a hoax. Donnelly and some of Bethesda's staff searched the facility 
and located nothing unusual, and then Donnelly went to the Laramie Police 
Dispatch Center.

[¶9]      Like all calls 
received by the Laramie police dispatcher, call # 5 was recorded. After 
returning to the dispatch center, Officer Donnelly listened to the tape 
recording of call # 5 and recognized the caller as McCone based upon past 
encounters with McCone. Later that day, Officer Donnelly and another officer 
arrested McCone at his residence in Laramie. McCone was released the following 
day, July 22, 1992.

[¶10]   The day after McCone's release, 
Bethesda received another call (hereinafter call # 6), during which the caller 
threatened to bomb Bethesda every two weeks until the caller received his money. 
This call was received by Patzer, and she identified the caller as the same one 
who called when she answered call # 3 on July 20. After call # 6, McCone was 
arrested again and subsequently charged with four counts of making terroristic 
threats based on call # 2, call # 4, call # 5 and call # 6. After a two and a 
half day jury trial, McCone was convicted on all four 
counts.

II. 
DISCUSSION

A. 
VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH

[¶11]   McCone asserts that W.S. 6-2-505(a) 
(1988) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Wyoming Statute 6-2-505(a) 
provides:

     (a) A person is guilty 
of a terroristic threat if he threatens to commit any violent felony with the 
intent to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of 
public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in 
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such 
inconvenience.

McCone 
argues that because the statute employs both specific intent and general intent, 
and because the phrase "serious public inconvenience" and the term "threat" are 
not defined, then the ordinary person must speculate as to what conduct is 
prohibited.

[¶12]   When we review a statute for 
vagueness, we begin by determining whether the statute may be challenged 
"facially" or only as it applies to the challenger's conduct. Ochoa v. State, 
848 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 (Wyo. 
1988)). We review a statute "facially," i.e., we examine the statute in light of 
how it might be applied to situations other than the challenger's, only if the 
statute "reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct," or 
if the statute specifies no standard of conduct at all. Griego, 761 P.2d  at 975 
(quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1982)), see also Ochoa, 848 P.2d  
at 1363. McCone asserts that W.S. 6-2-505(a) should be reviewed "facially" 
because it reaches a substantial amount of protected speech such as "practical 
jokes and groundless threats" and because it specifies no standard at 
all.

[¶13]   The fundamental right to speak 
freely, as embodied in the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and Art. 1 § 20 of our Wyoming Constitution, is not without its 
limits. John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 16.12 at 957 
(4th ed. 1991 Hornbook Series); Robert B. Keiter and Tim Newcomb, The Wyoming 
State Constitution at 59 (1993); see also Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771, 774-75 
(Wyo. 1991). Generally, government is prohibited from proscribing speech and 
expressive conduct based upon disapproval of the speech's or conduct's content; 
however, "restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which 
are `of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality,'" are permitted. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 
112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542-43, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S. Ct. 766, 769, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942)). Speech 
which causes a clear and present danger to society is not protected. 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919); Nowak 
and Rotunda, § 16.12 at 957. Clearly, what the legislature intended to prohibit 
through W.S. 6-2-505(a) were violent threats which subject society to clear and 
present danger. The example the statute presents, a threat to commit a 
violent felony with the intent to cause evacuation of a building, cannot be 
categorized as a "practical joke" or a "groundless threat." Simply because 
creative minds are able to devise a scenario where a statute could be used to 
punish constitutionally protected conduct does not mean the "statute reaches a 
substantial amount of protected conduct." Wyoming Statute 6-2-505 does not reach 
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct.

[¶14]   Wyoming Statute 6-2-505 is not a 
statute which has no standard at all. A statute employs a standard, for purposes 
of vagueness, if "`by [its] terms or as authoritatively construed [it 
applies] without question to certain activities, but whose application to other 
behavior is uncertain.'" Griego, 761 P.2d  at 976 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 577-78, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 1249, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1974)). Clearly the terms 
of this statute apply to certain activities, i.e., threatening to bomb a public 
facility with the intent to force evacuation of that 
facility.

[¶15]   Since we have determined that W.S. 
6-2-505 does not reach a "substantial amount of protected conduct" and that it 
is not a statute with no standards at all, our review of the statute is limited 
to a determination of whether it is unconstitutionally vague as it applies to 
McCone's conduct. To determine whether W.S. 6-2-505 is unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to McCone, "we must decide whether the statute provides sufficient 
notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that [McCone's] conduct was illegal 
and whether the facts of the case demonstrate arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Griego, 761 P.2d  at 976. In determining whether W.S. 6-2-505 
provides sufficient notice, we look to the statutory language and previous court 
decisions which have limited or applied the statute. Id.

[¶16]   Since this court has never 
interpreted or reviewed application of W.S. 6-2-505, we begin by examining the 
language of the statute and McCone's conduct which gave rise to his four 
convictions. The statute prohibits threatening to commit a violent 
felony:

(1) 
with intent to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of 
public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, 
or

(2) 
in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such 
inconvenience.

McCone 
was charged with threatening to commit a violent felony in reckless disregard of 
causing serious public inconvenience, such as evacuation of a building, etc. 
McCone asserts that a person of ordinary intelligence is not put on notice as to 
what "serious public inconvenience" entails. Although the phrase "serious public 
inconvenience" is not specifically defined, the statute provides an example - 
evacuation of a building, etc. In the case of McCone's charged conduct - an 
imminent bomb threat directed at a nursing home facility - a person of ordinary 
intelligence would be aware that a serious public inconvenience, such as 
evacuation of the nursing home's elderly patients, could occur and therefore 
also understand that his or her conduct violated W.S. 6-2-505. In addition, the 
record does not reflect arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Therefore, we 
hold that W.S. 6-2-505, as it was applied to McCone's conduct, is not 
unconstitutionally vague.

[¶17]   Statutes which target unprotected 
speech "but could be construed as impermissibly constraining some protected 
[speech] must be substantially overbroad to facially void the statute." Ochoa, 
848 P.2d  at 1364. Since we have already determined that W.S. 6-2-505 does not 
reach a substantial amount of protected conduct, it is clear that the statute is 
not substantially overbroad and therefore is not facially overbroad. Village of 
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S.  at 494, 102 S. Ct.  at 1191.

[¶18]   McCone does not argue that W.S. 
6-2-505 is overbroad as it applies to his charged conduct. In fact, in his 
brief, McCone "concedes that bomb threats or threats to physically hurt a 
person, made in a serious and imminent context, are not protected speech." This 
is exactly what W.S. 6-2-505 forbids and precisely what McCone accomplished by 
threatening to bomb Bethesda and shoot one of Bethesda's 
employees.

B. 
JURISDICTION & VENUE

[¶19]   McCone next argues that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction and did not have proper venue over the case 
because neither the place where the crimes were committed nor the corpus delicti 
of the crimes were ever established. Concerning venue, W.S. 1-7-102 (1988) 
provides:

     (a) Every criminal 
case shall be tried in the county in which the indictment or offense charged is 
found, except as otherwise provided by law.

     (b) When the location 
of a criminal offense cannot be established with certainty, venue may be placed 
in the county or district where the corpus delicti is found, or in any county or 
district in which the victim was transported.

The 
Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1, § 10, provides in part:

     In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right * * * to a speedy trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have 
been committed. When the location of the offense cannot be established with 
certainty, venue may be placed in the county or district where the corpus 
delecti [delicti] is found, or in any county or district in which the victim was 
transported.

[¶20]   McCone asserts that the place of 
origin of each of these threatening phone calls is where the offenses were 
"found" or "committed," and since the places of origin for the calls were never 
established, then venue is proper only where the corpus delicti was found. 
However, the location of each of the charged crimes, i.e., where they were found 
or committed, was established with certainty. Although the phone calls may have 
originated elsewhere, each phone call was received and heard within Albany 
County.

[¶21]   In Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 
(Wyo. 1981), we held that Wyoming had jurisdiction to try an individual for 
accessory to murder when the accessorial acts were committed through a phone 
line into Wyoming. In reaching that conclusion we stated:

Many 
accessorial acts were actually committed in Wyoming in that it was in this state 
that the numerous phone calls were completed just as surely as though the 
appellant was standing on Wyoming soil when he communicated his requests and 
instructions to his agents and they were carried out. The telephone transmitted 
his presence into this jurisdiction where he could manipulate and play his local 
pawns.

Hopkinson, 
632 P.2d  at 100.

[¶22]   This reasoning applies equally to 
the facts of this case. McCone, regardless of where he dialed the phone, was 
transmitted into Albany County by the telephone, where his words were heard and 
had effect. See also State v. Levand, 37 Wyo. 372, 380-81, 262 P. 24 (1927) 
(holding that venue for a criminal libel prosecution is proper where the alleged 
libel was printed or circulated). McCone's actions, theoretically, are no 
different than the famous law school hypothetical where one person shoots from 
one jurisdiction and hits another person who is located in a different 
jurisdiction. In that scenario it has been held that the state where the 
criminal act takes effect, i.e., the bullet entering the victim, has 
jurisdiction and venue. Simpson v. State, 17 S.E. 984 (Ga. 
1893).

[¶23]   Therefore, we hold that W.S. 
1-7-102 and Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution grant venue and 
jurisdiction in the county where McCone made the phone call or where the phone 
call was received because the threats took effect in the county where they were 
received.

C. 
IDENTIFICATIONS

[¶24]   McCone claims that he was denied 
due process of law when the district court admitted pre-trial and in-court voice 
identifications because they were obtained through unnecessarily suggestive 
procedures and were unreliable. This court follows the United States Supreme 
Court's two-pronged approach when determining whether witness identifications 
violate due process. Green v. State, 776 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 1989); Sears v. 
State, 632 P.2d 946, 948-49 (Wyo. 1981). First, we determine whether the 
identification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive, i.e., was the procedure 
surrounding the identification suggestive and if so were there good reasons why 
less suggestive procedures were not used. See generally, Wayne R. LaFave and 
Gerald H. Israel, 1 Criminal Procedure § 7.4(b) at 581 (1984) (citing Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967)). Second, if we 
determine that the identification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive, we 
look to the totality of the circumstances to discern whether the unnecessarily 
suggestive identification was otherwise reliable.  Green, 776 P.2d  at 756.  In other words we

weigh 
a number of factors against the corrupting influence of the identification 
procedure. We consider whether time and environmental conditions gave the 
witness an ample opportunity to view the perpetrator of the crime at the scene. 
We also examine the degree of the witnesses' attention to the perpetrator at 
that time, giving due regard to whether the witness was casually or intimately 
involved in the criminal event, and whether the witness had any special training 
or experience in making observations or identifications. Next, we analyze the 
accuracy of any description the witness may have given prior to identifying a 
suspect, in terms of the time lapse between the event and the description, the 
extent of the characteristics described, and the extent to which those 
characteristics peculiarly identify the suspect. Finally, we consider the 
certainty with which the witness identified the suspect and the time that 
elapsed between the criminal encounter and the later 
identification.

Green, 
776 P.2d  at 756. If we conclude that the identification was unnecessarily 
suggestive and not sufficiently reliable, then admission of the identification 
is violative of due process.

[¶25]   McCone asserts that several 
pre-trial identifications and several in-court identifications violated due 
process. The pre-trial identifications were made by Patzer, White-Mohseni and 
Officer Donnelly. On July 20, 1992, Landkamer provided Officer Donnelly with a 
tape recording of an alleged conversation between Landkamer and McCone. Officer 
Donnelly played that tape for both Patzer and White-Mohseni, both of whom 
identified the male voice on the recording as the same voice from the 
threatening phone calls they received while at Bethesda. Landkamer's tape was 
the only male voice played for purposes of these identifications, and both 
Patzer and White-Mohseni may have been aware of who was on the tape before 
listening to the tape. Officer Donnelly's pre-trial identification was based on 
a comparison of the dispatcher's recording of call # 5 and past encounters he 
had with McCone.

[¶26]   These identification procedures 
were suggestive because they involved only one voice, not a line-up of voices, 
and because Patzer and White-Mohseni may have known it was McCone's voice before 
listening to the tape. The State claims that these suggestive identifications 
were necessary because an emergency situation existed due to the nature of the 
crimes. A number of courts have held that "on-the-scene identification 
procedures [made] shortly after the crime" are suggestive but not unnecessarily 
and therefore are not violative of due process. State v. Walton, 424 N.W.2d 444, 
447 (Iowa 1988) (citing Johnson v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 726 (11th Cir. 1987)); see 
also Sears v. State, 632 P.2d  at 949 (citing Bates v. United States, 405 F.2d 1104, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).

[¶27]   In Walton, a police officer 
arranged a brief telephone conversation between the suspect and a police 
dispatcher within an hour of a previous incriminating call made by a male caller 
to the dispatcher. After the arranged conversation was completed, the dispatcher 
was able to positively voice identify the suspect as the male caller who had 
previously called the dispatcher and incriminated himself. Walton, 424 N.W.2d  at 
446. The Iowa Court upheld the admission of the voice identification because a 
quick voice comparison was needed while the dispatcher had a fresh memory of the 
original male caller's voice. Id., at 447.

[¶28]   In Sears, this court 
stated:

     Even without an 
emergency in the nature of the questionable survival of the witness, 
on-the-scene identifications by virtue of a one-man show-up are generally 
allowed. Importance is attached to the necessity to exonerate those enmeshed in 
the incident because of their proximity to it or because of other indications of 
possible involvement, and importance is also attached to the fresh memory of the 
witness and the necessity for immediate action by the 
police.

Sears, 
632 P.2d  at 949. This is one of those situations where an "on-the-scene one-man 
show-up" was necessary because the witnesses had only brief conversations with 
the caller and a voice comparison would be most reliable if their memories were 
still fresh and because an emergency existed in preventing imminent threats of 
violence. Therefore, we hold that these pre-trial identifications made by 
Patzer, White-Mohseni and Officer Donnelly were suggestive out of necessity and 
their admission into evidence was not violative of due 
process.

[¶29]   Even if these pre-trial 
identifications were unnecessarily suggestive, under the totality of the 
circumstances, their suggestiveness did not outweigh their reliability because: 
(1) both Patzer and White-Mohseni were direct aural witnesses to the threats 
which were the bases for two of McCone's convictions; (2) Patzer and 
White-Mohseni both received violent threats, which would suggest a high degree 
of attention and Officer Donnelly had several past law enforcement encounters 
with McCone, also suggesting a high degree of attention; (3) Patzer and 
White-Mohseni made comparisons within an hour of receiving the threatening calls 
and Officer Donnelly within a couple of hours of call # 5, and (4) each of these 
pre-trial identifications was positive at the time they were 
made.

[¶30]   McCone also asserts that several 
in-court identifications violated due process. The only in-court identification 
which appears unnecessarily suggestive was completed by witness Middleton, who 
had not made a pre-trial identification. During her direct testimony, Middleton 
listened to the police dispatcher's tape of call # 5 and then identified the 
male voice heard on that tape as the same voice she heard when answering call # 
2. Middleton's in-court identification's reliability outweighed whatever 
suggestiveness may have existed because she had ample opportunity to hear the 
voice of the caller during call # 1 and call # 2, her degree of attention was 
high due to the threatening nature of call # 2, and she was positive in her 
identification at trial.

D. 
INSTRUCTIONS

[¶31]   McCone argues that the district 
court erred when it instructed the jury concerning the elements of W.S. 6-2-505 
and when it refused to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense. It is 
essential that the jury be instructed on the required elements of the crime 
charged and a failure to do so may amount to plain error. Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 662 (Wyo. 1993). Since McCone failed to preserve this alleged error at 
trial, we search only for plain error. Id.

[¶32]   Instructions Nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15 
covered the required elements of each count of W.S. 6-2-505 with which McCone 
was charged. W.S. 6-2-505 provides:

     (a) A person is guilty 
of a terroristic threat if he threatens to commit any violent felony with intent 
to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly or facility of public 
transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in 
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such 
inconvenience.

Each 
of the four instructions which described the elements of W.S. 6-2-505 included, 
as the third element, the following statement of the law:

3. 
In reckless disregard of the risk causing the evacuation of a building or 
otherwise causing a serious public inconvenience.

McCone 
asserts that "reckless disregard" does not apply to the phrase "evacuation of a 
building" because of the use of the disjunctive term "or." The State counters, 
arguing that McCone's argument would render the term "otherwise" superfluous and 
meaningless.

[¶33]   The State's argument is correct. 
The conduct proscribed by the statute is twofold. First, it proscribes a 
threat to commit any violent felony with the intent to cause evacuation of a 
building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation, or otherwise 
to cause serious public inconvenience. By the use of the term "otherwise," 
the statute implies that "evacuation of a building, place of assembly or 
facility of public transportation" are illustrations of a "serious public 
inconvenience." This construction is supported by the American Law Institute, 
Model Penal Code § 211.3, which is substantially similar to W.S. 6-2-505 and 
from which W.S. 6-2-505 was drafted. See, Theodore E. Lauer, Goodbye 3-Card 
Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, 19 Land & Water L.Rev. 107, 134 
(1984).

[¶34]   Model Penal Code § 211.3 provides: 

A 
person is guilty of a felony in the third degree if he threatens to commit 
any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another or to 
cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public 
transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in 
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or 
inconvenience. [emphasis added]

Comment 
2 of Model Penal Code § 211.3 states as follows:

     Specifically, the 
section requires that the actor threaten to commit a crime of violence. These 
include the homicide and assault offenses, some versions of rape and other 
sexual crimes, kidnapping, robbery, and arson. The actor must communicate threat 
of such harm with a purpose to cause terror or serious public inconvenience or 
at least in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such harms. The 
provision specifies "evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of 
public transportation," as an illustration of serious public inconvenience. 
[emphasis added]

[¶35]   The second proscribed conduct is 
a threat to commit any violent felony in reckless disregard of the risk of 
causing such inconvenience. The term "such inconvenience" refers to the 
previously mentioned "serious public inconvenience." As we have already stated, 
"evacuation of a building, etc." is an illustration of a "serious public 
inconvenience." Therefore, "evacuation of a building, etc." can be substituted 
for "such inconvenience." Hence, one who threatens to commit a violent felony in 
reckless disregard of the risk of causing evacuation of a building is guilty of 
a terroristic threat under W.S. 6-2-505, and the court's instructions were not 
plainly erroneous.

[¶36]   McCone also asserts that the 
district court erred in denying his request for an instruction on the elements 
of W.S. 6-6-103(b)(ii) (threatening telephone calls) as a lesser included crime. 
At the time this case was tried, one statute was necessarily included in another 
and therefore, a lesser included crime if "the elements of the lesser offense 
[were] identical to part of the elements of the greater offense." Eatherton v. 
State, 761 P.2d 91, 94 (Wyo. 1988). Explained in other words, "every element of 
the lesser offense must be included in the greater, that is one cannot commit 
the greater offense without also necessarily committing the lesser offense." 
Craney v. State, 798 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Seeley v. State, 715 P.2d 232, 238 (Wyo. 1986)). Recently, in State v. Keffer, we adopted the 
statutory elements test for determining when one statute is necessarily included 
in another statute; it provides:

"one 
offense is not `necessarily included' in another unless the elements of the 
lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense. Where the 
lesser offense requires an element not required for the greater offense, no 
instruction is to be given * * *".

State 
v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1134 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716, 109 S. Ct. 1443, 1450, 103 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1989)). Under either of 
these tests, W.S. 6-6-103 is not a lesser included crime of W.S. 
6-2-505.

[¶37]   W.S. 6-6-103(b) (1988) 
provides:

     (b) A person commits a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both, 
if:

* 
* * * * *

     (ii) He telephones 
another and threatens to inflict injury or physical harm to the person or 
property of any person.

Not 
all of the elements of W.S. 6-6-103(b)(ii) are found within W.S. 6-2-505. 
Wyoming Statute 6-6-103(b)(ii) requires (1) an actor, (2) who telephones 
another, and (3) threatens to inflict injury or physical harm to the person or 
property of another. The elements of W.S. 6-2-505, with which McCone was 
charged, were: (1) an actor, (2) who threatens to commit a violent felony, (3) 
in reckless disregard of the risk of causing the evacuation of a building or 
otherwise causing a serious public inconvenience.

[¶38]   The State can prove W.S. 6-2-505 
without proving W.S. 6-6-103. For example, if the State proves that a person 
threatened a violent felony in reckless disregard of the risk of causing an 
evacuation, they have proved the elements of W.S. 6-2-505 but not the elements 
of W.S. 6-6-103 because there is no proof that the threat was telephoned. 
Therefore, the elements of W.S. 6-6-103 are not identical to nor a subset of the 
elements of W.S. 6-2-505, and W.S. 6-6-103 is not a lesser included crime. The 
district court properly refused McCone's requested lesser included 
instruction.

E. 
TESTIMONY ON WITNESS CREDIBILITY

[¶39]   During the cross-examination of 
Officer Donnelly, McCone's counsel questioned Donnelly about the initial arrest 
of McCone and the following exchange occurred:

[McCone's 
Counsel]: Your testimony was that you approached his residency and you then 
placed him under arrest before you spoke with him?

[Officer 
Donnelly]: That's correct.

[McCone's 
Counsel]: Then after he was arrested he agreed - after he was arrested, he 
agreed to talk to you?

[Officer 
Donnelly]: That's correct.

[McCone's 
Counsel]: So did you ever ask him where he was on the afternoon of the 19th or 
the 20th or 21st or any of those?

[Officer 
Donnelly]: No, I did not.

[McCone's 
Counsel]: Why?

[Officer 
Donnelly]: I've never known him to tell the 
truth.

[McCone's 
Counsel]: Your Honor, I move for a mistrial at this point. [emphasis 
added]

McCone 
asserts that Officer Donnelly's statement, "I've never known him to tell the 
truth," was error because it invaded the province of the jury - witness 
credibility. McCone is correct, witness credibility "is the exclusive province 
of the jury"; and neither expert nor lay witnesses should be permitted to 
testify that another witness is or is not telling the truth. Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo. 1988); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo. 1989); see 
also Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6661 at 
323-26 (1992 interim edition).

[¶40]   The State argues that even assuming 
Officer Donnelly's comment was error, it was invited by the defense counsel. A 
testimonial error is considered invited where the objectionable testimony is 
responsive to a question posed by the objecting party's counsel. Pack v. State, 
571 P.2d 241, 247 (Wyo. 1977) (citing State v. Maggard, 104 Ariz. 462, 465, 455 P.2d 259, 262 (1969)). When on cross-examination counsel asks "why," he opens 
the door for a range of responses that are almost without limit which, because 
the question is open and so broad, almost always can be said to be responsive. 
Officer Donnelly's answer, from his viewpoint, was clearly responsive to 
counsel's question. Nevertheless, the above does not give license to law 
enforcement representatives to in bad faith volunteer seemingly prejudicial 
information. What happened here did not violate the rule nor did it involve 
serious prejudice. See Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1339 (Wyo. 1992). In 
this case the police officer was asked to volunteer his personal reason for a 
course of action and did so. Counsel is hardly in a position to 
complain.

[¶41]   Invited errors are "not normally 
grounds for reversal unless they go beyond a pertinent reply or are necessarily 
prejudicial." Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Wyo. 1979). Officer 
Donnelly's statement was responsive; and because the trial court immediately 
instructed the jury to ignore Officer Donnelly's opinion on McCone's veracity, 
it was not necessarily prejudicial.

F. 
VICTIM IMPACT TESTIMONY

[¶42]   McCone argues that testimony 
concerning the individual reactions of Middleton, Patzer, White-Mohseni and 
Bethesda residents were improper victim impact statements (VIS) because it was 
irrelevant or its probative value was outweighed by its prejudice. The State 
claims the testimony was probative of "the risk of causing a public 
inconvenience."

[¶43]   As recognized by the parties, the 
key inquiry on the admissability of VIS during the guilt phase of a criminal 
trial is relevancy. Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 534 (Wyo. 1993). "VIS may be 
irrelevant if offered during the guilt phase of the trial as proof of" the 
victim's loss, the physical, emotional, or psychological impact of the victims, 
or of "the effect upon the family. Yet it may be relevant if offered for another 
proper purpose." Barnes, at 534.

[¶44]   The testimony in this case was 
relevant because it was probative of the risk of serious public inconvenience 
and was not unduly prejudicial. The testimony described the atmosphere at 
Bethesda as well as individual reactions of the residents and the employees at 
Bethesda after the calls were made. Contrary to McCone's assertion, the 
reactions of individual residents and employees demonstrated how the public - 
the residents and employees - was inconvenienced and the seriousness of that 
inconvenience. The district court neither abused its discretion nor violated a 
clear rule of law when it admitted testimony concerning the impact of these 
threatening calls on the individuals at Bethesda.

G.W.R.E. 
404(b)

[¶45]   McCone asserts that the district 
court erred in admitting testimony by Landkamer alleging that McCone continually 
harassed her for months before the calls to Bethesda, testimony that her car 
tires were slashed and McCone was the only person angry with her, and a tape 
recording of McCone allegedly threatening Landkamer over the phone. McCone 
argues that this other bad acts evidence was more prejudicial than probative 
based on the five factor balancing test.

[¶46]   Wyoming Rules of Evidence 404(b) 
provides:

Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

If 
a legitimate basis exists for the trial court's admission of evidence of other 
bad acts, the trial court will not have abused its discretion. Wehr v. State, 
841 P.2d 104, 108 (Wyo. 1992). In addition to the exceptions listed in W.R.E. 
404(b), evidence of other bad acts is admissible "if it `forms part of the 
history of the event or serves to enhance the natural development of the 
facts.'" Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 49 (Wyo. 1986). But the probative value 
of this evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. Id., at 50. In 
determining the admissibility of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence we weigh the following 
five factors:

1. 
The extent to which the prosecution plainly, clearly, and convincingly can prove 
the other similar [bad acts];

2. 
The remoteness in time of those [bad acts] from the charged 
offense;

3. 
The extent to which the evidence of other [bad acts] is introduced for a purpose 
sanctioned by W.R.E. 404(b);

4. 
The extent to which the element of the charged offense, that the evidence is 
introduced to prove, is actually at issue;

5. 
The extent to which the prosecution has a substantial need for the probative 
value of the evidence of the other [bad acts].

Dean 
v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 606 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶47]   Landkamer's testimony about past 
threats and the tape recording was both clear and convincing. Landkamer was the 
direct object of the harassment and directly participated in the taped 
conversation. The harassment and the recorded threats occurred within the 
several months leading up to the calls to Bethesda; thus they were not too 
remote. Both the harassment testimony and the tape recording were introduced for 
reasons other than to prove McCone's character and conformity therewith. The 
tape and the testimony concerning harassment were offered to prove identity, and 
identity was a material issue at trial. Landkamer's testimony that McCone had 
been harassing her for several months and the tape recording, combined with the 
fact that in several of the threatening phone calls the caller specifically 
asked for Landkamer, strongly connects McCone to the Bethesda calls. Since the 
identity of the perpetrator was difficult to prove and a material issue, there 
was a substantial need for this evidence. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it admitted the tape recording and Landkamer's testimony about 
McCone's past harassment.

[¶48]   The testimony concerning the 
slashing of Landkamer's tires was clear in establishing that it actually 
happened, but it was not very convincing concerning who actually slashed the 
tires. The tire slashing incident was close enough to the charged conduct, two 
weeks after. If the evidence had been stronger in connecting McCone to the 
slashing, then it may have been probative of his anger at Landkamer - which 
infers motive for the Bethesda calls - and of a course of conduct; however, 
there is no evidence that McCone slashed the tires. Therefore, the admission of 
the tire slashing evidence was an abuse of discretion by the district court 
because it violated W.R.E. 404(b). However, we cannot conclude that the jury 
would likely have reached a different verdict had this evidence been 
excluded.

H. 
HEARSAY

[¶49]   McCone asserts next that the 
district court erred when it excluded, as hearsay, a police report prepared by 
an unavailable police officer which allegedly stated that call # 6 was made from 
Cheyenne, Wyoming. Before proceeding to review this issue, we note that the 
record on appeal does not include a copy of this report. While we do not 
disregard this issue completely, we note that "`it is properly [McCone's] burden 
to bring to us a complete record on which to base a decision,'" and without the 
report our review is limited to what we find in the transcript. Matter of Estate 
of Manning, 646 P.2d 175, 176 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Wyo. 1979)).

[¶50]   McCone argues that this police 
report was admissible under W.R.E. 803(6). Wyoming Rules of Evidence 803(6) 
provides:

     The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness:

* 
* * * * *

     (6) Records of 
regularly conducted activity. - A memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and 
if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the 
method or circumstances or preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The 
term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not 
conducted for profit[.]

Therefore, 
to be admissible, the following is required: (1) testimony by the custodian of 
the report or another qualified witness which demonstrates (2) that the report 
was made at or near the time (3) by a person with knowledge or made from 
information transmitted by a person with knowledge, (4) that it was the regular 
practice of the Laramie police to make such a report, and (5) that this report 
was kept in the course of such regularly conducted business practices of the 
Laramie police. See Generally, McCormick on Evidence §§ 287-92 at 266-78 (4th 
ed. 1992). The report is not admissible, even if it fits the exception, if a 
lack of trustworthiness is indicated by the source of the report's information 
or by the methods or circumstances surrounding preparation of the 
report.

[¶51]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion by excluding this report because there was no testimony as to 
whether it was made by someone with knowledge or made from information 
transmitted by a person with knowledge. The police officer who made the report 
was no longer with the Laramie Police Department and did not testify at trial. 
Instead, McCone's counsel tried to establish sufficient foundation through 
Officer Donnelly, but Officer Donnelly could only state that the other officer 
made the report on the day of call # 6 and did not comment on whether that 
officer had knowledge of the information or whether someone with knowledge of 
the information transmitted it. McCone argues that it is sufficient to establish 
this "personal knowledge" factor by showing that the Laramie police regularly 
base these reports upon transmission from a person with knowledge. See McCormick 
§ 290 at 275 ("evidence that it was someone's business duty in the 
organization's routine to observe the matter will be prima facie sufficient to 
establish actual knowledge"). However, we can find no such evidence in the 
testimony.

I. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT

[¶52]   During his closing argument, the 
county prosecutor commented a number of times on the credibility of the 
witnesses from the trial, including McCone. McCone's counsel thrice objected to 
these comments, and those objections were sustained. McCone asserts that these 
comments so violated his due process right to a fair trial as to amount to 
reversible error.

[¶53]   We review the entirety of a closing 
argument to determine whether it was proper. Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125, 
1127 (Wyo. 1992). Wide latitude should be afforded counsel in commenting on the 
evidence; and "absent a clear or patent abuse of discretion," the trial court's 
decision will not be disturbed. Id.

[¶54]   "The purpose of closing arguments 
is to allow counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence." 
Virgilio, 834 P.2d  at 1127 (citing Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 605 (Wyo. 
1984)). The scope of closing arguments is limited "to preserve the prerogatives 
of the jury." Barela v. State, 787 P.2d 82, 83 (Wyo. 1990). More specifically, 
limiting closing argument is an effort to assure that statements made by counsel 
are not considered evidence by the jury. Id. Thus, in closing argument, counsel 
is "entitled to reflect upon the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from 
that evidence in order to assist the jury in its function." Armstrong v. State, 
826 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298, 1301-02 
(Wyo. 1982)).

[¶55]   In the case where a prosecutor is 
commenting on witness credibility, i.e., calling the defendant a liar, we have 
upheld such comment when the evidence supports a reasonable inference that the 
defendant is a liar. Barela, 787 P.2d  at 84 (citing Barnes v. State, 642 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Wyo. 1982)). However, we are concerned with the 
following:

     When the prosecutor 
asserts his credibility or personal belief, an additional factor is injected 
into the case. This additional factor is that counsel may be perceived by the 
jury as an authority whose opinion carries greater weight than their own 
opinion: that members of the jury might be persuaded not by the evidence, but 
rather by a perception that counsel's opinions are correct because of his 
position as prosecutor, an important state official entrusted with enforcing the 
criminal laws of a sovereign state. While the prosecutor is expected to be an 
advocate, he may not exploit his position to induce a jury to disregard the 
evidence or misapply the law.

Barela, 
787 P.2d  at 83-84 (citing Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d at 166). Within these 
guidelines we now examine the prosecutor's closing 
argument.

[¶56]   It is necessary to quote several 
sections of the prosecutor's closing argument to properly understand its impact. 
We begin when the prosecutor was discussing McCone's 
testimony:

[L]et's 
talk about the defendant's testimony. Now, you could assess his demeanor on the 
stand, his credibility, his motive or feelings of revenge. That instruction was 
read to you by His Honor. Let me take one other excerpt that I want to share 
with you. If you believe from the evidence in this case that any witness 
willfully and corruptly swore falsely to any material facts in this case then 
you are at liberty to disregard all or any part of his testimony. Did you 
feel the defendant ever told the truth? I could not write as fast as Mr. McCone 
could lie. [emphasis added]

McCone's 
counsel objected, it was sustained, and the court asked the prosecutor not to 
"inject personal opinion relative to trustworthiness and trustfulness." The 
prosecutor then continued and discussed inconsistencies in McCone's testimony 
including a discussion about a discrepancy concerning McCone's age, which went 
as follows:

     He further offered an 
explanation as to why the computer may have his birthday wrong. He said, well, 
that's my brother, my brother Henry. Okay. You have another brother named Henry 
McCone. He's like my other brother Darrel on that Bob Newhart. My other brother 
named Henry McCone, so you're stating, sir, that that would confuse our computer 
system in Laramie? Does your brother live here in Laramie? No he lives in 
Massachusetts. I mean, he has a child. His wife has custody of that child which 
she kidnapped the child, he told us. As you listen to these stories and Mr. 
McCone, you begin to think that Mr. McCone lies so often that he - [.] 
[emphasis added]

McCone's 
counsel abruptly objected and again was sustained. Lastly, the prosecutor 
states:

Finally, 
he tells you that it's not his voice on the tape that Teresa had. He says that's 
out of character, because, he says, I'm not profane. I don't use vulgarity. I 
handed him a letter which he admitted he authored, and after some denial, he 
said yes, it contains profanity and vulgarity. Another inconsistency, ladies 
and gentlemen. The truth and Mr. McCone are strangers. [emphasis 
added]

Again 
McCone's counsel objected and was sustained.

[¶57]   In McCone's testimony he denied 
having made the phone calls, presented alibis and denied that his voice was on 
Landkamer's tape recording, which was all contradictory to the State's evidence. 
Thus, witness credibility was an important factual issue at the trial. The 
evidence supported a reasonable inference that McCone was lying and that 
Landkamer was telling the truth. Both, the discrepancies in McCone's testimony 
and the fact that there was a tape recording which was alleged to be McCone's 
voice and the opportunity for the jury to listen to McCone's voice on the stand 
and compare the two, reasonably support the inference that he was lying. As we 
said in Barela, "when there is express contradictory testimony, as there was 
here, the inference that at least one of the witnesses is lying is a reasonable 
one." 787 P.2d  at 84. The prosecutor's closing argument was, therefore, not 
improper.

J. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

[¶58]   McCone's final argument asserts 
that insufficient evidence was presented to support the elements of McCone's 
identity as the caller and that McCone acted in reckless disregard of the risk 
of causing evacuation of a building or otherwise causing a serious public 
inconvenience. When reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, we view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether it 
is sufficient to "form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 669 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Broom 
v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 1985)).

1. 
Call # 2 (Count I)

[¶59]   The evidence demonstrated that call 
# 2 was received by Middleton and consisted of a threat to go to Bethesda and 
blow Middleton's head off. At trial Middleton identified the voice on the police 
dispatcher tape as the same voice as that from call # 2, and Officer Donnelly 
testified that the voice on the dispatcher tape was that of McCone's. This was 
sufficient evidence to form the basis of a reasonable inference that McCone was 
the caller on call # 2.

[¶60]   McCone also argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that he acted in 
"reckless disregard of the risk of causing evacuation or serious public 
inconvenience" for call # 2. Middleton's testimony concerning what the caller 
said - "get her on the phone [or I will] come up there and blow [your] 
[expletive] head off" - was sufficient for the jury to infer that the caller 
acted in "reckless disregard of the risk of causing evacuation or a serious 
public inconvenience." Although the threat in call # 2 was directed at an 
individual not at the facility, the risk that the call would likely cause 
evacuation or similar serious public inconvenience remained substantial; as was 
demonstrated by the testimony, which revealed that immediately after this call 
the care for the residents was reduced, the police were summoned to Bethesda and 
the facility was, very uncharacteristically, locked down. In light of that risk, 
the jury could infer that making the call was reckless. Therefore, there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to convict McCone of making a terroristic 
threat based on call # 2 (Count I).

2. 
Call # 4 (Count II)

[¶61]   Call # 4 was received by 
White-Mohseni and consisted of a threat to bomb Bethesda within twenty-four 
hours. White-Mohseni identified McCone as the caller in call # 4 by identifying 
the voice on Landkamer's tape, which voice Landkamer testified was McCone's, as 
the same voice in call # 4. This was sufficient for the jury to find that McCone 
was the caller in call # 4.

[¶62]   Concerning proof of the element of 
"reckless disregard of the risk of causing evacuation or serious public 
inconvenience," this time the risk of causing evacuation or serious public 
inconvenience was even higher because the threat was very imminent and aimed at 
the entire facility. Therefore, the contents of this call were sufficient to 
form the basis of an inference that McCone recklessly disregarded the risk of 
causing an evacuation beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. 
Call # 5 (Count III)

[¶63]   Call # 5, like call # 4, was an 
imminent bomb threat directed at Bethesda and was received and recorded by the 
Laramie police dispatcher. There was sufficient evidence to identify McCone as 
the caller in call # 5 based on the tape recording made of the call and Officer 
Donnelly's identification of McCone as the voice on the tape. In addition, the 
recording of call # 5 was played to the jury and the jury heard McCone's voice 
during his testimony.

[¶64]   Similar to call # 4, we find that 
the evidence of call # 5 provides sufficient basis to form an inference of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the element of "reckless disregard of the risk of 
causing evacuation or a serious public inconvenience." Once again, the threat 
that a bomb would detonate within an hour at Bethesda made the risk of causing 
evacuation or serious public inconvenience high; thus, the making of that threat 
recklessly disregarded that risk.

[¶65]   Therefore, we find that sufficient 
evidence was presented to support the jury's conviction of McCone for call # 5 
(Count III).

4. 
Call # 6 (Count IV)

[¶66]   Call # 6 was made to Bethesda and 
involved a threat to place a bomb at the facility every two weeks. Call # 6 was 
received by Patzer. At the trial Patzer testified that the caller of call # 6 
was the same person who appeared on Landkamer's tape. Landkamer identified 
McCone as the person on her tape. That is sufficient to support a reasonable 
inference of McCone's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

[¶67]   Like the previous calls threatening 
a bombing, the content of this call demonstrated reckless disregard of the risk 
of causing evacuation or serious public inconvenience. Again the threat appeared 
to be imminent because the caller did not specify when he would set the first 
bomb, although he did say he would continue to bomb every two 
weeks.

DISPOSITION

[¶68]   We affirm McCone's 
convictions.