Case Title: Ex Parte Brown

Citation: 686 So. 2d 409

Docket Number: 1941150

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
686 So. 2d 409 (1996)
Ex parte Raymond Eugene BROWN.
Re Raymond Eugene BROWN
v.
STATE.
1941150.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 13, 1996.
Rehearing Denied November 22, 1996.
*411 William R. Blanchard of Blanchard & Calloway, P.C., Montgomery, and Charles P. Hollifield, Montgomery, for Petitioner.
Jeff Sessions, Atty. Gen., and William D. Little, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Respondent.
COOK, Justice.
This Court granted Raymond Eugene Brown's petition for the writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming his conviction of capital murder and his sentence of death. See Brown v. State, 686 So. 2d 385 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995).
This is the third time this case has been before us. On May 13, 1988, Brown was convicted of two capital murders, based on the deaths of Linda LeMonte and her daughter, Sheila Smoke. After the sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously recommended death by electrocution. The trial court accepted the advisory verdict and sentenced Brown to death. In Brown v. State, 571 So. 2d 345 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Brown's convictions and his sentence, holding that the trial court's refusal to individually voir dire potential jurors regarding possible prejudice from pretrial publicity had denied Brown the due process guaranteed under the United States Constitution. This Court granted the State's petition for the writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals, but after hearing oral argument quashed the writ as improvidently granted. Brown v. State, 571 So. 2d 353 (Ala.1990).
Subsequently, the State sought certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. On June 10, 1991, that Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the cause for reconsideration in light of Mu`Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 114 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1991) (addressing federal constitutional requirements as to voir dire on the issue of pretrial publicity). Alabama v. Brown, 501 U.S. 1201, 111 S. Ct. 2791, 115 L. Ed. 2d 966 (1991). On July 26, 1991, the Court of Criminal Appeals reinstated its judgment reversing the conviction and sentence. Brown v. State, 586 So. 2d 991 *412 (Ala.Cr.App.1991). On April 10, 1992, this Court reversed that judgment, holding that the trial judge's general voir dire complied with the constitutional requirements articulated in Mu'Min. Brown v. State, 632 So. 2d 14 (Ala.1992).
The Court of Criminal Appeals thereafter again remanded this cause to the trial court on the authority of Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991),[1] with directions that the State be required to justify its use of 20 of its 23 peremptory strikes to remove black veniremembers from the prospective jury panel. Brown v. State, 632 So. 2d 17 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). The trial judge conducted a hearing in accordance with the remand order and, with the following order, concluded that the State's explanations were race-neutral:
On the trial court's return to the remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Brown's conviction and sentence of death. Brown v. State, 686 So. 2d 385 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995). We have reviewed all of the issues raised by Brown. We find that many of the issues raised in this Court were adequately addressed in the January 13, 1995, opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We address the following issues:
Brown challenges the trial court's holding that the State offered race-neutral reasons for using 20 of its peremptory strikes to remove blacks from the jury venire. This Court has written:
Bui v. State, 627 So. 2d 855, 856 (Ala.1992). The Court of Criminal Appeals, in affirming *413 the trial court's findings and holding on this issue, stated, in part:
Brown v. State, 686 So. 2d  at 390-392. At the Batson hearing, the district attorney explained that he thought the evidence against Raymond Eugene Brown was overwhelming and that, in his opinion, the State's main burden at trial would be to "debunk the insanity defense." When offering his reasons for his strikes, he stated:
Supplemental Record on Return to Remand, pp. 21-26. We review the reasons given by the prosecutor in light of the trial court's finding that those reasons were race-neutral. The trial court's finding will not be disturbed unless found to be clearly erroneous:
Bui v. State, 627 So. 2d  at 859. As already noted, the trial in this case occurred in 1988, before the United States Supreme Court's decision of Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991); therefore, we are reviewing the striking of a 1988 jury that occurred without the benefits of the hindsight we now have concerning the development of the law in this area since Powers. Our analysis of the district attorney's strikes, set out below, indicates that the trial court's finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous.
The district attorney's first two strikes were against white veniremembers. The State's third strike was against Juror 127. At the Batson hearing, Mr. Evans[2] indicated that this veniremember was struck because of her age (20) and because she was single with no children. He further indicated that there was some question with regard to her employment. This Court has recognized that "the age rationale is highly suspect because of its inherent susceptibility to abuse. Batson, 476 U.S.  at 106, 106 S. Ct.  at 1728 (Marshall, J., concurring)." Ex parte Bird, 594 So. 2d 676, 683 (Ala.1991). In fact, "[a] mere summary declaration that age was a factor in the decision to strike is, therefore, constitutionally deficient and warrants reversal. Owens v. State, 531 So. 2d 22, 26 (Ala. Crim.App.1987)." Bird, at 683. Despite its susceptibility to misuse, however, this Court has also noted:
*417 Bird, at 682-83. The district attorney explained why he thought age was an important factor to consider when selecting jurors for this particular case. Again, with regard to age, the district attorney testified:
Supplemental Record on Return to Remand, pp. 25-26. In addition to Juror 127, the prosecutor indicated that the following black veniremembers were also struck, at least in part, because of their age: Juror 37 (age 26); Juror 40 (age 27); Juror 79 (age 28); Juror 117 (age 22); Juror 143 (age 21); and Juror 137 (age 21). Of those veniremembers, Jurors 127,[3] 37, 40, 117, and 143 were also single, and Jurors 37, 40, 117, 143, and 137 had no children.[4] Juror 134 (age 30), was likewise struck because she was childless and single, and Juror 71 was struck because she was single. The reasoning of the district attorney for striking single veniremembers and those with no children was the same reasoning he offered for considering age to be an important factor, i.e., that, in light of the defense of insanity in this case and because a child had been murdered, the district attorney wanted jurors with as much maturity and responsibility as possible.
Although the district attorney fully explained his reasoning and how that reasoning fit in with his trial strategy, the defense contends that the striking of these jurors is highly suspect because Juror 39 (age 23) and Juror 45 (age 23), both white, ultimately served on the jury. With regard to Juror 45, the district attorney explained:
Supplemental Record on Return to Remand, p. 63. Because he thought he had a connection with this juror and her family, we find that the prosecution's failure to strike Juror 45 was not racially discriminatory. With regard to Juror 39, the district attorney gave this reason for not striking her:
Supplemental Record on Return to Remand, pp. 62-63. Again, the district attorney articulated his reasons for not striking this veniremember, and those reasons do not support the defendant's allegations of disparate treatment on the basis of race. Juror 126 (age 26) also was not struck. The district *418 attorney gave the following reasons for not striking her:
Supplemental Record on Return to Remand, p. 64. The district attorney adequately explained his reasons for not striking Juror 126 while at the same time striking black veniremembers of a similar age.
The district attorney also struck Juror 148 (a black female) who had majored in psychology in college. In explaining his reasons for striking Juror 148, the district attorney testified:
Supplemental Record on Return to Remand, pp. 37-38. We conclude that the reasons given for striking this veniremember were race-neutral. In so holding, we also note that the district attorney's second strike was Juror 44 (a white female), whose husband was a psychologist. With regard to Juror 44, he stated:
Supplemental Record on Return to Remand, pp. 32-33. With regard to Juror 148, therefore, not only did the district attorney strike a white member of the jury venire for the same reasons, (this, in and of itself, indicates neutrality, see Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 623 (Ala.1987)), but he also explained that his trial strategy was to attack the insanity defense. A major part of that strategy included attempting to discredit theories that persons in the psychology field would tend to rely on. In that same vein, the district attorney struck all jurors who worked in or were connected with hospitals with mental facilities, including Jurors 70 and 22. We find those reasons to be race-neutral.
The district attorney said he struck Juror 44 because she had a larceny conviction and Jurors 46 and 72 because they had fraud convictions. Judge Taylor, in Spencer v. State, 659 So. 2d 1000 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), wrote:
659 So. 2d  at 1002. These strikes were clearly race-neutral.
The prosecution struck Juror 2. The district attorney testified that she was struck because she lived at the same address as a relative who had a larceny conviction.
Ex parte McNair, 653 So. 2d 353, 356 (Ala. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1121, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1084 (1995). This same veniremember also stated that she was a widow and did not want to serve "because she could not afford to take time off work." We find that the district attorney's reason for striking this veniremember was race-neutral.
The State struck Juror 28 because of her deep religious beliefs[5]; however, we note that Juror 7 (white) was also struck, at least in part, because of his religious beliefs. When questioned at the Batson hearing, Mr. Evans testified:
Supplemental Record on Return to Remand, p. 66. Such similar treatment of black and white veniremembers is evidence of neutrality. Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 623 (Ala.1987).
Juror 19 was struck because she had a 1957 liquor prohibition violation and because she had a loud voice.
Scott v. State, 599 So. 2d 1222, 1229 (Ala.Cr. App.1992), writ denied, 599 So. 2d 1229 (Ala. 1992), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 612 So. 2d 1314 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). The defense contends that the prosecution's strike of Juror 19, in particular, was racially motivated. In support of that contention, the defense points to the fact that the foreman of the jury had had a 1986 marijuana conviction and was not struck. Mr. Evans explained his failure to strike Juror 68:
Supplemental Record on Return to Remand, pp. 66-67. The defense indicated that its notes reflected that Juror 68 was not an engineer and that he had had only one year of college; however, there is no indication in the record on return to remand as to which assertion was correct, nor is there any indication *420 that the State had acted under anything other than a belief that Juror 68 was, in fact, an engineer. A prosecutor can strike based on a mistaken belief, see Taylor v. State, 666 So. 2d 36, 42 (Ala.Cr.App.1994); therefore, it is logical that a prosecutor may also decide, based on a mistaken belief, not to strike a veniremember. Because the discrepancy in the way these two jurors were treated was adequately explained, we conclude that the strike of Juror 19 was race-neutral.
Finally, the State struck Juror 87 because of a 1986 violation of the child restraint law, coupled with a minor traffic offense, and struck Juror 121 because she was employed at Brockway Glass, where the district attorney's office had conducted a major embezzlement investigation. With regard to Juror 87, the State indicated some concern regarding the child restraint violation, because the facts of this present case involved the murder of a child. With regard to Juror 121, the prosecutor indicated a pending investigation at Brockway glass. While these strikes cause us the most concern, we have considered them in light of this Court's opinion in Bui, and from the record we infer that the State did not strike these veniremembers for racial reasons. Again, we note:
Ex parte McNair, 653 So. 2d 353, 357-58 (Ala.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1121, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1084 (1995), quoting Jelks v. Caputo, 607 So. 2d 177, 179 (Ala. 1992). Considering that this case was tried before Powers v. Ohio was decided; that this case involved a white defendant and two white victims and, according to the findings of the trial court, "had no racial overtones"; that over four years had elapsed between the trial and the Batson hearing, where the district attorney was required to give his reasons for his peremptory strikes; and that three blacks served on the jury, we do not find the trial judge's ruling to be clearly erroneous.
Brown also argues that the trial court failed to "life qualify" the jury. Relying on Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1992), Brown contends that because the defense was not given the opportunity to find out if potential jurors would automatically vote for the death penalty if Brown was convicted, his sentence of death cannot stand. We disagree. In Morgan, the United States Supreme Court said:
504 U.S.  at 731, 112 S. Ct.  at 2230-31. Brown requested that the following questions be asked of the jury veniremembers (the filing that contained the questions also contained the statements included here):
With regard to the death penalty, the trial court asked the venire the following questions:
RT. 48-51. To the last two questions, there was no response from anyone on the venire. The State argues that the questions asked by the trial judge met the requirements of Morgan v. Illinois and were substantially the same initial inquiry the defense requested. Because no one responded to the questions, the State contends, there was no need to ask further questions. In addition, the State points out that Brown did not object to the failure of the court to ask "life qualifying" questions. While the failure to object does not prevent us from reviewing this issue, we review it under the "plain error" standard. Kuenzel v. State, 577 So. 2d 474 (Ala.Crim. App.1990), aff'd, 577 So. 2d 531 (Ala.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 886, 112 S. Ct. 242, 116 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1991). Pursuant to that standard, this Court has held that the failure to ask reverse-Witherspoon questions sua sponte does not rise to the level of plain error. See Dill v. State, 600 So. 2d 343, 363 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), aff'd, 600 So. 2d 372 (Ala.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924, 113 S. Ct. 1293, 122 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1993), citing Henderson v. State, 583 So. 2d 276 (Ala.Crim. App.1990). Brown requested the "life qualifying" question if there were veniremembers who answered that they were strongly in *422 favor of the death penalty. No one answered the trial court's question in the affirmative. The trial judge, therefore, in not going further with questions in that vein, was doing exactly what was requested of him by the defense. The defense did not object to the trial court's failure to question the veniremembers further; no plain error occurred.
Brown contends that the trial judge, when instructing the jury on the charges of capital murder, did not instruct the jury regarding the element of intent. Our review of the overall instructions to the jury indicates otherwise. The judge charged the jury as follows:
R.T. at 1054-57. Brown argues that while the trial judge charged the jury regarding intent as to murder, his failure to include a charge on intent as to capital murder brings this case within the purview of Starks v. State, 594 So. 2d 187 (Ala.Cr.App.1991). In Starks, Judge Bowen, writing for the Court of Criminal Appeals, stated:
*423 "Under Alabama law, there are three forms of murder: `intentional murder,' defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1); `reckless murder,' defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(2); and `felony murder,' defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(3). However, the only form of murder that will support a conviction for the capital offense with which the appellant was charged is intentional murder; neither reckless murder nor felony murder will suffice. § 13A-5-40(b); Bui v. State, 551 So. 2d 1094, 1115 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), affirmed, 551 So. 2d 1125 (Ala.1989), vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 971, 111 S. Ct. 1613, 113 L. Ed. 2d 712, remanded on other grounds, 627 So. 2d 848 (Ala.1991). See also Connolly v. State, 500 So. 2d 57, 62 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (doctrine of felony murder `has no place in securing a conviction' for capital robbery-murder), affirmed, 500 So. 2d 68 (Ala.1986); Daniel v. Thigpen, 742 F. Supp. 1535, 1549 (M.D.Ala.1990) (reckless murder not sufficient to support a conviction where defendant was charged with the capital offense of murder of a police officer under former § 13A-5-31(a)(5)).
". . . .
"At the beginning of his charge, the trial judge read the indictment, which charged the appellant with intentional murder. Shortly thereafter, however, he discussed the elements of the charged capital offense using only the term `murder.' He clearly did not include intent when enumerating the elements of the capital offense and stated that the term `murder' would be defined later. Subsequently, when he did define the term `murder,' he used both the intentional form found in § 13A-6-2(a)(1) and the felony murder form found in § 13A-6-2(a)(3). Immediately after providing this dual definition of `murder,' the trial judge referred to the charged offense of `murder occurring in the commission or attempted commission of a dangerous felony' and then the `lesser included offense of murder.' (Emphasis added.) The trial judge never instructed the jury that, in order to convict the appellant of the capital offense, it must find that he intentionally killed [the victim]. Furthermore, the trial judge failed to clearly distinguish the elements of the charged capital offense from those of the lesser included offense of felony murder."
594 So. 2d  at 193-94. As in Starks, the trial judge in this case made no reference to the element of intent when charging the jury on capital murder; however, unlike the situation in Starks, in this case there was only one definition of "murder" given to the jury that "a person commits the crime of murder if with intent to cause the death of another person he causes the death of that person, or of another person." R.T. at 1057. This definition immediately followed the charge regarding capital murder. In Starks, the instructions to the jury were confusing because the jury was given not only the definition of "murder," but also the definition of "felony murder." The Court of Criminal Appeals aptly pointed out in Starks that "the trial judge failed to clearly distinguish the elements of the charged capital offense from those of the lesser included offense of felony murder." Starks, 594 So. 2d  at 193-94. In Brown's case, however, there being no charge of felony murder to cause confusion, we conclude that the trial court's instructions, when considered in their totality, could not have caused the jury to believe that the element of intent was not a requirement for finding the defendant guilty of capital murder.
We have considered each of the issues raised in the defendant's brief and we have searched the record for "plain error." We have found no reversible error.[6] Furthermore, *424 pursuant to § 13A-5-53(b), we have independently weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and have considered the appropriateness of the death penalty in this case as compared to other capital cases. Having done so, we conclude that the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming Brown's convictions and sentence of death by electrocution should be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and ALMON,[*] SHORES, KENNEDY, INGRAM, and BUTTS,[*] JJ., concur.
MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., concur only in the result as to Issue I (the Batson issue) and concur as to the other issues.
[1]  In Powers v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may object to race-based exclusions of venirepersons through peremptory strikes whether or not the defendant and the excluded person are of the same race. The Powers decision was released after the trial in this case.
[2]  When this case was tried in 1988, Jimmy Evans was the district attorney; however, at the time of the Batson hearing, Mr. Evans was no longer district attorney, but was attorney general for the State of Alabama. For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to Mr. Evans as the district attorney, because it was in that capacity that he tried this case.
[3]  The defense attorneys contended at the hearing that their notes indicated that this juror was married. Nothing in the record indicates that at the time of the strikes the district attorney did not, in good faith, rely on the belief, albeit mistaken, that Juror 127 was single. "`"A prosecutor may strike from mistake, as long as the assumptions involved are based on an honest belief and are racially neutral."'" Reese v. City of Dothan, 642 So. 2d 511 (Ala.Cr.App.1993)." Taylor v. State, 666 So. 2d 36, 42 (Ala.Cr.App.1994).
[4]  The district attorney also apparently thought that Juror 79 did not have children. The record indicates that he may have been mistaken in that regard.
[5]  Juror 137, discussed above, was also struck, in part, because of his religious beliefs. We have already determined that the striking of that juror was race-neutral, based on his age and the fact that he had no children.
[6]  In addition to raising issues concerning his conviction and sentence, Brown also challenges the constitutionality of § 15-12-21, Ala.Code 1975, which caps attorney fees for out-of-court work in capital cases at $1,000. This challenge has been extensively discussed and has been rejected. See Smith v. State, 581 So. 2d 497, 526-29 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), reversed on other grounds, 581 So. 2d 531 (Ala.1991), relying on Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 189, 88 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1985); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 803, 100 S. Ct. 22, 62 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1979); and our more recent opinion in May v. State, 672 So. 2d 1310 (Ala. 1995).
[*]  Although Justice Almon and Justice Butts were not present at oral argument, they have listened to the tape of that oral argument.