Case Title: People v. Romero

Citation: 

Docket Number: S055856

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
Filed 8/27/15 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S055856 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
ORLANDO GENE ROMERO and  
) 
CHRISTOPHER SELF, 
) 
 
)      
Riverside County 
                      Defendants and Appellants.      )   
Super. Ct. No. CR46579 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
 
Defendants Orlando Gene Romero and Christopher Self were convicted of the first 
degree murders of Joey Mans, Timothy Jones, and Jose Aragon, the willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated attempted murders of Kenneth Mills, Paulita Williams, and Randolph 
Rankins, the attempted robbery of Kenneth Mills and Vicky Ewy, shooting at the vehicle 
occupied by Kenneth Mills and Ewy, the mayhem of Kenneth Mills, the second degree 
robberies of William Meredith, Jerry Mills, Sr., Jerry Mills, Jr., and Albert Knoefler, the 
second degree burglary and vandalism of Magnolia Center Interiors, and receiving stolen 
property.  (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 205, 211, 459, 496, 594, subd. (b)(2), 
664.)  The juries2 also found true robbery-murder special-circumstance allegations as to 
all three murders, two multiple-murder special-circumstance allegations for each murder, 
and arming enhancement allegations.  (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17)(i), 12022, 
                                              
1 
All further undesignated statutory references are to this code. 
2 
Defendants were tried jointly before separate juries.   
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subd. (a)(1).)  Self was also convicted of the willful, deliberate, and premeditated 
attempted murder and second degree robbery of John Feltenberger and the kidnapping for 
robbery and second degree robbery of Alfred Steenblock, and the jury found true great 
bodily injury enhancement allegations as to the crimes against Feltenberger and Kenneth 
Mills and arming enhancement allegations.  (§§ 187, subd. (a), 209, subd. (b), 211, 664, 
12022, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7.)  Romero was also convicted of the kidnapping for robbery 
and second degree robbery of Robert Greer, the second degree robbery of Roger 
Beliveau, and receiving stolen property (Feltenberger‘s ammunition pouch), and the jury 
found true arming enhancement allegations.  (§§ 209, subd. (b), 211, 496, 12022, subd. 
(a)(1).)  The juries returned death verdicts, and the trial court entered judgments of death.  
This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a); § 1239, subd. (b).)  For the 
reasons that follow we reverse Self‘s conviction and sentence for Knoefler‘s robbery, 
vacate five multiple-murder special-circumstance findings for each defendant, and 
otherwise affirm the judgments.  
I.  FACTS 
A. 
Guilt Phase 
 
1. 
Prosecution case 
In 1992, defendants and brothers Romero and Self3 engaged in a two-month crime 
spree.  They were joined at times by Jose Munoz, who pled guilty and testified against 
defendants at trial,4 and Daniel Chavez, whose case was severed before trial.  Defendants 
were also implicated by their recorded statements to police, which were played for the 
jury, and by witness identification and physical evidence.   
                                              
3 
At some point Self changed his last name from Romero to that of their stepfather, 
Phillip Self.   
4 
In exchange for Munoz‘s testimony and agreement to plead guilty to the first 
degree murders of Aragon, Mans, and Jones, the attempted premeditated murder of 
Feltenberger, the robberies of Feltenberger, Knoefler, and Meredith, and the attempted 
robbery of Kenneth Mills and Ewy, the prosecutor agreed to seek a sentence of 51 years 
to life in prison for Munoz, and request Munoz serve his sentence out of state.   
3 
 
a. Meredith robbery  
On October 8, 1992, about 10:30 p.m., defendants and Munoz robbed William 
Meredith and stole his 1991 Nissan Pathfinder.  They subsequently made a withdrawal 
and a charge on Meredith‘s Visa card.   
b. Mans and Jones murders 
In the early hours of October 12, 1992, defendants, Munoz, and Chavez noticed 
Timothy Jones and his best friend Joey Mans in a car at a hilltop area near Lake 
Mathews.  Romero and Munoz ordered the men out of the car at gunpoint.  Romero told 
Mans to relax and everything would be all right, and had Mans lie down on the ground 
next to Jones.  Romero told Chavez to ―[s]hoot,‖ adding, ―[s]omething like this.‖  
Romero shot Mans in the back, killing him.  He attempted to shoot Jones, but the gun 
malfunctioned.  Jones got up and ran down the hill, and defendants ran after him.  Self 
beat Jones with his fists and a pipe and shot him four times, killing him.  Defendants stole 
the victims‘ car keys and a box containing boots, shoes, magazines, and toiletries.   
c. Kenneth Mills and Ewy assault 
On October 22, 1992, between 11:30 p.m. and midnight, Kenneth Mills and his 
girlfriend Vicky Ewy took a drive to look at the lightning.  Defendants and Munoz pulled 
up beside them and Self shot Mills, who was driving, in the face.  Defendants continued 
to chase them until Mills turned onto a golf cart path.  Mills permanently lost vision in his 
right eye.   
d. Williams and Rankins attempted murders 
In the early morning hours of October 26, 1992, Randolph Rankins was 
unsuccessful in purchasing methamphetamine for defendants and Munoz.  Romero said 
he would ―be seeing‖ Rankins later; defendants and Munoz then left.  Romero told Self 
and Munoz that if Rankins did not refund their money, they should ―take him out,‖ and 
Self agreed.  About an hour later, Rankins was with acquaintance Paulita Williams in her 
car at the intersection of Alexander Street and Myron Street in Riverside County.  
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Williams was trying to back up to make a turn she had missed.  Defendants‘ car appeared 
and blocked Williams‘s car, and Munoz and Self got out.  As Munoz began shooting, 
Rankins escaped from the car.  The bullets struck Williams in her left side and shattered 
the driver and passenger windows.  Self, who appeared to be smiling, began stabbing 
Williams in the arm.  Munoz pushed Self away and shot Williams.  Williams suffered a 
punctured lung and three cuts on her hand and arm, including a nine-inch-long gash on 
her arm that required about 80 stitches.  One of the bullets left a deep gash on her back 
about six inches long and an inch and a half wide, and pellets were embedded in her 
spine, shoulder bone, and muscle.  Williams still felt the pellets constantly and could not 
bear weight on her shoulders.   
e. Magnolia Center Interiors burglary and vandalism 
On the night of November 13, 1992, defendants broke into Magnolia Center 
Interiors in Riverside.  File drawers were emptied, fire extinguishers were sprayed on 
fabric samples, and glue was sprayed into computers, telephones, fax machines, and 
calculators.  Words similar to ―You‘re going to die‖ were written on a sonogram picture 
of the shop owner‘s unborn son and the picture was stabbed with a sharp object.  The 
words ―Just when you thought‖ and the number ―666‖ were written on the wall and the 
words ―Now you die‖ were written in the bathroom.  The store safe was closed but its 
combination lock was missing and its hinges had been tampered with.  A pair of bolt 
cutters was found by the safe and several screwdrivers and chisels had been ―beaten flat,‖ 
as though ―somebody was pounding‖ on the hinges ―trying to pull the hinge pins out.‖  A 
set of unlabeled master keys to offices around the city and a set of keys to the shop van 
were taken, along with personal objects.   
f. 
Steenblock kidnapping and robbery 
On November 18, 1992, about 1:15 p.m., Alfred Steenblock was eating lunch in his 
1992 Pontiac Grand Prix parked at the Mission Grove Plaza shopping center in Riverside.  
5 
 
Self approached Steenblock, pointed a gun at his face, and told him to move over.  Self 
drove Steenblock to an empty field.  Another car followed and parked behind them, and 
two men, including Chavez, got out.  Self demanded Steenblock‘s wallet, took out his 
automated teller machine (ATM) card, and asked for his personal identification number 
(PIN).  He also took about $80 in cash and Steenblock‘s watch.  The men instructed 
Steenblock to get out of the car, walk into the field, and stay there for an hour, and then 
left, taking Steenblock‘s car.  Steenblock‘s partially stripped car was later recovered in a 
rural area of Mead Valley.   
g. Knoefler robbery 
On November 20, 1992, about 3:30 p.m., Albert Knoefler was tending beehives at 
Markham Street and Washington Street in Riverside County.  Parked nearby was his 
1987 pickup truck.  Romero approached Knoefler, struck up a conversation about the 
bees, and walked around the bee yard.  Romero then brandished what appeared to be a 
sawed-off shotgun and demanded the keys to Knoefler‘s truck.  Munoz appeared wearing 
a ski mask.  Romero said he needed money for gas, and Knoefler handed him about $50.  
The men left in the truck.  The truck was stripped and found several weeks later.   
h. Robbery of Jerry Mills, Sr., and Jerry Mills, Jr. 
On November 21, 1992, about 12:45 p.m., Jerry Mills, Sr., and his 15-year-old son, 
Jerry Mills, Jr., were engaged in target practice shooting about two miles south of the 
Perris Airport in Riverside County.  A gray hatchback pulled up and Self pointed a 
shotgun at Mills.  Defendants and Chavez got out of the hatchback and took from Mills 
his pickup truck, along with a Colt Gold Cup .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol, a Ruger 
.22-caliber semiautomatic pistol, a Ruger .22-caliber convertible Western-style single 
action revolver, a Ruger 10/22 semiautomatic rifle with a dark mahogany stock and a 
scope, a ―banana clip‖ or curved 25-round magazine, a 10-round magazine for the rifle, 
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an ammunition box, toolbox, and about $150.  Mills‘s abandoned truck was found a half-
hour later.   
i. 
Aragon murder 
On November 25, 1992, 22-year-old Jose Aragon was practicing motorcycle stunts 
in San Timoteo Canyon in Riverside County.  Defendants and Munoz engaged Aragon in 
friendly conversation and, after Aragon showed them some stunts, Self shot him.  
Romero picked Aragon up and asked:  ―How does it feel to get shot?  Does it burn?‖  
Romero placed Aragon in the bed of his (Aragon‘s) pickup truck.  Munoz asked him for 
his keys and wallet, and Self told Aragon to tell him his ATM access code or he would 
kill him.  After Aragon gave Self the code, Self put his gun to Aragon‘s ribs and fired 
repeatedly.  Aragon was shot 11 times; all wounds were inflicted before and contributed 
to his death.   
Defendants and Munoz stole Aragon‘s wallet, toolbox, and Craftsman socket set.  
As they drove off, Self laughed and said, ―Oh, wow, you should have seen the hole it 
made.‖  Self made a circle with his fingers about two and a half inches in diameter.  
Defendants and Munoz withdrew $300 from Aragon‘s bank account at two different 
ATM‘s and ate lunch at Coco‘s restaurant.   
Aragon‘s body was discovered later that afternoon by a 10-year-old boy.  Two red 
plastic fragments consistent with a 20-gauge sabot shotgun round manufactured by BRI 
were found in his body.  Jose Munoz was videotaped making one of the ATM 
withdrawals, later arrested, and gave a statement to police that led to defendants‘ arrest.   
j. 
Feltenberger attempted murder and robbery 
On November 30, 1992, about 4:00 a.m., off-duty Ontario Police Sergeant John 
Feltenberger was driving his 1991 red Geo Metro coupe in Moreno Valley near his home.  
He was not armed or in uniform.  A white car appeared and drove parallel to 
Feltenberger, matching his speed each time he slowed down or accelerated.  Feltenberger 
7 
 
thought it might be his newspaper carrier, and pulled to the side of the road; the white car 
stopped beside him.  Self got out of the passenger side of the white car carrying a silver 
or chrome sawed-off shotgun.  He opened the driver‘s door and demanded Feltenberger 
get out of the car and give Self his wallet.  The wallet was in Feltenberger‘s back pocket, 
but he said it was in the back of his car.  The men switched positions so Feltenberger was 
outside facing the car.  Feltenberger ignored Self‘s demands for the wallet and, with his 
hands raised, started to back away from Self.  When Feltenberger was about 10 feet 
away, he heard a voice from the white car in which Munoz was sitting say, ―Kill him.‖  
Feltenberger said, ―Nobody has to get hurt,‖ and threw the wallet to Self.  The voice 
inside the car again said, ―Kill him.‖  Self said, ―I ought to shoot you,‖ and shot 
Feltenberger in the chest.  Feltenberger collapsed and Self drove off in the Geo Metro.  
Feltenberger was bleeding and his lung had collapsed, but he managed to reach a 
neighbor‘s house and obtain aid.  At the hospital Riverside County Sheriff‘s Deputy 
David Green saw medical personnel remove a small piece of red plastic measuring about 
two inches by one inch from Feltenberger‘s right arm.  In his ―thousands‖ of times firing 
a shotgun, Green had never seen a similar object in a round.  A different deputy sheriff 
saw a red plastic object under Feltenberger‘s shirt in his chest area.  Feltenberger was in 
intensive care for three days and hospitalized for about 10 days.   
Both the red material observed by the deputies and the red sabot material found in 
Aragon‘s body were identified at trial as consistent with a BRI 20-gauge sabot shotgun 
round.  The pathologist who performed Aragon‘s autopsy testified that injuries from 
sabot rounds are uncommon.   
In his statement to police, Self admitted shooting Feltenberger with a 20-gauge 
sawed-off shotgun and taking his car.  Feltenberger testified that when his car was 
returned to him in January 1993, it was missing his flashlight, ammunition pouch, and 
axe.  In Romero‘s statement to police he admitted that the ―pouch‖ he had had come from 
the Feltenberger incident.  Munoz testified he and Self found the ammunition pouch in 
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Feltenberger‘s car, and that Romero later ―took it‖ because it fit the magazines for his 
.45-caliber weapon.   
k. Greer kidnapping and robbery 
On December 5, 1992, about 8:00 p.m., Robert Greer withdrew cash from an ATM 
at the corner of Alessandro Boulevard and Trautwein Road in Riverside.  As he returned 
to his 1992 Honda Accord EX, Romero, wearing a ski mask, brandished a gun and told 
Greer to throw him his car keys.  Romero ordered Greer to sit on the passenger side of 
the car.  As Romero drove, he kept the gun pointed at Greer.  The gun was a dull gray or 
silver and appeared to be a semiautomatic, ―like a .45‖ caliber.  They drove about nine 
miles to a remote area in Mead Valley.  Romero took Greer‘s car, about $40, and Greer‘s 
driver‘s license and ATM card.  He asked for Greer‘s PIN number, and $800 was later 
withdrawn from Greer‘s bank account.  Greer walked about two miles to a house where 
he contacted police.   
l. 
Beliveau robbery 
On December 7, 1992, about 12:45 a.m., Roger Beliveau was in an unlit restroom at 
Hunt Park in Riverside.  Romero approached him and Beliveau heard the sound of a 
round being chambered in a semiautomatic pistol.  Romero told Beliveau to give him his 
car keys and he would not get hurt.  He then told Beliveau to wait in the restroom for five 
minutes and drove off in Beliveau‘s maroon 1978 Ford LTD.  Romero stopped at the end 
of the parking lot, where another man threw trash bags into the back of the car; the two 
men then left.  Police later found Beliveau‘s ransacked car in a shopping center at 
Alessandro Boulevard and Trautwein Road in Riverside.   
m. Romero’s escape attempt 
In April 1994 Arthur Dicken was housed in a Riverside jail cell next to a cell 
housing Romero and Michael Aragon (who was no relation to murder victim Jose 
Aragon).  During the nighttime between April 1 and April 14, 1994, Dicken observed 
9 
 
Romero and Aragon cutting the two bottom bars of their cell door with a hacksaw blade.  
Romero told Dicken he was planning to escape by taking the nighttime deputy hostage, 
threatening him with a shank, and leaving the jail.  Dicken observed Romero with a four- 
to six-inch-long sharpened metal piece or shank and Aragon with a makeshift spear.  
Romero and Aragon hid the damage to the bars by taping and painting them.  Jail 
personnel learned of the planned escape and Romero and Aragon were moved to a 
different cell.  Inspection of the two bars revealed they were completely cut through and 
could be removed by hand to create a space large enough for an inmate to leave the cell.  
A weapon was found in the cell.   
n. Self’s escape attempt 
On December 16, 1994, about 1:00 a.m., Riverside County Deputy Sheriff Scott 
Collins noticed a car parked near the jail in a lot reserved for authorized vehicles.  The 
window for the ground floor cell in which Self was incarcerated was visible from the 
car‘s location.  When the driver, Romero‘s girlfriend, Sonia Alvarez, was asked what she 
was doing there she gave several different explanations and was arrested.  Sheriff‘s 
deputies inspected Self‘s cell and found gouges in and around the rear window and 
concrete chips on his bed below.  A welded bracket from a cage around Self‘s television 
set had been removed and was found under the television.  Self had an inch-long cut on 
one finger and redness on both hands.   
 
2. 
Defense case 
Defendants rested without presenting evidence. 
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B. 
Penalty Phase 
 
1. 
Prosecution case 
a. Victim impact evidence5 
(1) Jose Aragon 
Lydia Roybal-Aragon, Jose Aragon‘s stepmother, married Jose‘s father when Jose 
was about 13.  The family lived in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  In 1985, they moved to 
Redlands, California.   
Lydia described Jose as a ―kind,‖ ―gentle soul‖ who ―never hurt anybody.‖  At the 
time of his death, Jose was a 22-year-old senior engineering student at California State 
Polytechnic University.  He was a dedicated student and studied constantly.  Jose‘s 
favorite activity was motorcycle riding, and he had received numerous competition 
trophies.  Jose was close to his siblings. 
Lydia described how the family learned of Jose‘s murder and its effect on them.  
After Jose‘s death, his father and brothers Steven and Carlos isolated themselves and 
rarely interacted with the family.  His father lost interest in his job, about which he had 
previously been passionate, and Steven suffered from insomnia.  Jose‘s younger sister 
Laura started to misbehave and had difficulty completing her schoolwork.   
Leighette Hopkins, Jose‘s friend since high school, described Jose as a calm and 
friendly person who made people laugh.  He was a bright and hard-working student who 
took time to help Leighette study for a chemistry test the night before he died.   
Stephanie Aragon, Jose‘s younger sister, testified that when their parents divorced 
Jose and Steven moved to California with their father.  Stephanie, who was then seven 
years old, stayed in New Mexico with her mother.  Stephanie saw Jose about four times a 
year.  Jose was quiet and shy and protected her.   
                                              
5 
Because some witnesses and victims shared surnames, for clarity we refer to the 
victims and witnesses by their first names in this portion of the opinion.  
11 
 
(2) Joey Mans 
Catherine Mans, Joey Mans‘s mother, testified he was her only son and had five 
sisters.  He was 26 years old when he died.  Joey was generous, polite, smart, and 
protective of his family.  He was mechanically inclined and could fix anything.  
Catherine did not attend Joey‘s funeral because she did not ―want to see [her] son in a 
box,‖ and had never visited his grave.  She ―almost died [her]self,‖ felt angry all the time, 
quit her job, and had been prescribed tranquilizers.   
Angela Mans, younger than Joey by six years, testified her brother was kind and 
gullible.  He loved to draw and play guitar and work on cars.  When Angela saw Joey in 
his casket, he ―looked so scared,‖ so she knew he was afraid when he died.  Because of 
fear she would be similarly attacked, for two months she did not leave her home except to 
go to work, and four years later at the time of her testimony she still did not go out at 
night.  Their father had not celebrated Christmas in three years because the family was 
not ―complete.‖  Every year on Joey‘s birthday, Angela and other family members 
brought to his grave and released a number of balloons corresponding to what his age 
would have been.   
(3) Timothy Jones 
James Jones, Timothy Jones‘s father, testified that Timmy had a brother, a sister, 
and two stepbrothers.  He was 22 years old when he died.  Timmy was the ―[m]ost 
wonderful kid in the world,‖ who was kind and generous and ―would do anything for 
you‖ and ―didn‘t hate anyone.‖  James could not understand ―how they could take his 
life.‖  James had visited Timmy the night before he died.  ―[L]ike always,‖ Timmy told 
James, ―I love you, Pop,‖ and hugged him goodbye.  James next saw Timmy in the 
funeral parlor and wished he could have died instead of him.   
Timmy‘s parents divorced when Timmy was about seven years old and the children 
lived with their father.  Shortly after Timmy‘s death, his mother had a stroke and died 
about two years later.   
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b. Unadjudicated criminal activity 
(1) Romero 
On September 22, 1993, Rodney Medeiros, who was incarcerated with Romero, 
received food from the commissary.  Romero and other inmates demanded Medeiros give 
them his food and beat him when he refused.  He was treated for a week in the medical 
ward.   
On October 6, 1993, about 9:20 p.m., inmate Walter Jutras was sleeping in his cell.  
He awoke when Romero put his knee on the back of his neck.  Romero and another 
inmate repeatedly struck him.   
On October 27, 1993, Riverside County Sheriff‘s Deputy George Munoz removed 
Romero from his jail cell and told him to empty his pockets.  Romero removed a 
sharpened toothbrush that could be used as a weapon.  In a box of his belongings Munoz 
found a broken hairbrush handle that appeared to have been sharpened.   
On September 3, 1994, and October 29, 1994, shanks were found in Romero‘s one-
man cell.   
On June 12, 1994, Romero lured fellow Riverside jail inmate Olen Thibedeau to his 
cell and stabbed him in the stomach with a spear more than four feet long.  Thibedeau 
was facing charges of child molestation and was later convicted of those crimes.   
On February 8, 1995, Romero visited with Stephanie Stinson, the mother of his son, 
and their conversation was recorded and a portion played for the jury.  Romero said:  ―I 
don‘t like violence.  I try to avoid it.  But when they stick a child molester next door to 
me [and] expect me not to do something, I‘ll be his friend, talk to him real nice, bring 
him close to the door, and then make him a little spear about this long, about this skinny, 
that‘s real hard and won‘t bend.  You put a pencil at the end of it and strips of wood.  
[¶] . . . [¶]  Stick him in his neck.‖   
Between October 1994 and March 1995, Romero squirted urine from a bottle on 
inmate Tyreid Hodges, who had been charged with child molestation, stepped on a carton 
13 
 
of feces splattering them on Hodges, and ―squished‖ a shampoo bottle containing urine, 
causing it to hit Hodges.  He also threw a hairbrush at Hodges.   
(2) Self 
Milton Solorzano attended high school with Self.  On May 22, 1992, while 
Solorzano was standing in the lunch line, Self charged toward him.  Solorzano moved out 
of the way and Self hit his head on the wall.  Solorzano grabbed Self and held him in a 
headlock for about two minutes until a teacher came.  Self repeatedly tried to hit 
Solorzano with his fist and said:  ―I‘m going to get you.  Let me go.‖   
On June 24, 1993, Self and another inmate approached inmate Oswaldo Vazquez 
and asked him to massage their backs.  Vazquez refused.  Self threatened Vazquez with a 
pencil and said he would stab Vazquez in the neck if he did not give Self a massage.  
Vazquez massaged Self‘s back.  Self then told Vazquez to suck his penis.  Vazquez 
declined, and Self and another inmate beat him while a third inmate stood guard.  
Vazquez had a scar near his eye as a result of the attack.   
On September 19, 1993, a shank was found in Self‘s box of personal belongings.  
On November 25, 1994, three shanks were found in Self‘s one-man cell.   
On May 30, 1994, Self punched inmate Mario Garcia Pescador in the mouth and left 
eye.  One or two other inmates joined Self.  The victim received six stitches above his 
eye.   
On June 5, 1994, about 1:00 a.m., Riverside County Sheriff‘s Deputy Manuel 
Correa responded to inmate Jacob Aramburo‘s screams for help.  Aramburo was sobbing 
on the floor of his cell in a fetal position.  He had a cut on the back of his head, scrapes 
on his back and chest, and pain in his left shoulder and lower back, and the right side of 
his face was swollen.  Aramburo shared the cell with other inmates including Self.  Self‘s 
knuckles were red and he had a fresh cut on one knuckle.   
14 
 
On July 22, 1994, Riverside County Sheriff‘s Deputy Alfonso Campa responded to 
calls for help from inmate Richard Reyes.  Reyes was missing several teeth and bleeding 
from his lip and gum, had red marks on his face, and looked scared.  Campa examined 
the other inmates in Reyes‘s cell.  Self was bleeding from a puncture wound on one of his 
knuckles and his other knuckles were red.  None of the other inmates had marks on their 
hands.  On July 24, 1994, Self told his mother in a recorded conversation that was played 
for the jury that he had ―busted out‖ an inmate‘s ―two teeth.‖   
 
2. 
Defense case 
a. Both defendants 
Maria Self, defendants‘ mother, testified that defendants‘ biological father was 
Orlando Romero, and she was married to their stepfather, Phillip Self.  Maria was 17 in 
1968 when she married 22-year-old Orlando.  They were married for six years and had 
four sons; she was pregnant with Self when she filed for divorce.   
Maria never smoked, drank alcohol, or used drugs when she was pregnant with 
defendants.  Orlando never worked.  He was physically abusive to Maria, and once put a 
gun to her face and said he should kill her.  On another occasion he threatened the entire 
family by filling the house with thick smoke and refusing to let them leave.  Both 
Orlando and Maria had frequent affairs.  At one point Maria called 911 and told the 
dispatcher she was ―going to kill them all because [she] couldn‘t handle them.‖  On 
cross-examination she said that although she spoke to the dispatcher for over two 
minutes, and cried hysterically that she was going to kill all of her children, no police 
officer ever came to her house to investigate.   
After Maria left Orlando, she and her sons moved to Modesto for about four years.  
Maria did not work, and she abused alcohol and drugs, including methamphetamine, in 
front of the children.  She was also physically and verbally abusive to the boys, and never 
hugged them or told them she loved them.  When Self was about two years old, she 
15 
 
slashed his face and the children were removed from her custody.  About a year later, the 
children were returned to her.  On cross-examination, Maria said she had struck Self with 
a broken fly swatter, he had one cut, and she did not seek medical attention for him.  
Maria agreed with the prosecutor that she had been distraught and told a counselor at the 
department of mental health she was ―in a bad way‖ and ―needed somebody to help [her] 
with the children.‖  The following day her children were placed with relatives.   
At some point the family left Modesto and moved to Turlock for about a year.  
Maria continued to drink and she also used methamphetamine and LSD.  The family then 
moved to Stockton, where they lived with a heroin addict and dealer.  Romero was in 
school, but she never visited the school or asked about his homework.  Romero closely 
resembled his biological father, and Maria frequently reminded him of this circumstance 
and said that she hated his father.   
The family then returned to Riverside.  Maria continued to use drugs and did not 
monitor the children‘s school work.  Between the time Maria married Orlando and when 
she married Phillip Self, she had been in about 10 relationships.  After her divorce from 
Orlando the family moved frequently, living in 10 or 11 different places.   
On cross-examination Maria agreed with the prosecutor that shortly after returning 
to Riverside she met and moved in with her current husband, Phillip Self.  Romero was 
about eight years old and Self about five years old.  Phillip was very good to the boys.  
He took them fishing, showed them how to change a tire, and treated them as his own 
children.  Maria agreed with the prosecutor that Phillip was ―the best thing that ever 
happened to [her],‖ and said that when she would try to abuse alcohol or drugs, ―he 
wouldn‘t let [her].‖  Maria and Phillip had two girls together, and Maria had tried to be a 
good parent to them.   
When Romero was 14, he asked to live with his father.  Maria allowed him to go, 
but believed her ―baby [was] gone . . . into somebody‘s hands who really doesn‘t care 
about him.‖  When Romero became involved with drugs, Maria told him she would help 
16 
 
him in any way she could to get off drugs.  She tried to arrange for him to go to the 
treatment program Teen Challenge, but there was a long waiting list.   
When Self was about 14 or 15 years old he lived with Maria‘s niece for about four 
months and then came home; at some point he also lived with his father.  Self began 
using drugs and alcohol.  Maria sent him to a Chino drug rehabilitation center for two 
weeks.  Afterward, Self did ―much better.‖  He was home-schooled and received good 
grades.  Self relapsed, however.  Maria had two small girls in the house and did not want 
them to see their brothers abusing these substances, so she told Self he had to leave and 
sent him to live with her friend Charlene.  Self later lived with Maria‘s mother.  Maria 
testified that Self ―does beautiful artwork.‖   
Maria loved defendants.  Since their arrest three and a half years earlier, Maria had 
spent much of her time crying and praying.   
Anthony Self, defendants‘ older brother, testified he had enlisted in the Army at the 
age of 18 and reenlisted for another four years when he was 22 years old.  He was a 
combat engineer and paratrooper in the 27th Engineer Battalion at Fort Bragg, cleared 
mine fields during Desert Storm, and supervised other soldiers.   
When Anthony was about eight years old, he and his family lived with Bobby 
Guzman.  Guzman once disciplined Self by making him stand in a corner for two hours 
with soiled underwear on his head.  At some point Maria married Phillip Self, whom the 
boys liked, and whom Anthony considered his father.   
Anthony and his brothers would frequently send Self to fight the next-door neighbor 
to ―see what he could take.‖  Anthony experimented with drugs in high school and once 
gave Self heroin when he was in elementary school.  Maria and Phillip were unaware of 
his drug use.  On cross-examination Anthony agreed he had never mentioned giving Self 
heroin to any of the investigators he had spoken to before trial.  Maria told the boys to 
avoid drugs and both she and Phillip would have been very upset if they had learned 
Anthony had been drinking alcohol in high school.   
17 
 
When the boys upset Maria she would ―lash out at us with whatever she had in her 
hand,‖ such as a fly swatter or broom.  She once threw a knife at Anthony, hitting him 
with the handle.  On cross-examination Anthony testified it was important to Maria that 
the boys did well in school and she wanted them to attend school and complete their 
homework.   
Anthony used the last name Self because his biological father was ―really never any 
part of our lives‖ and did not provide any financial support.  He said, ―We lived pretty 
much in poverty with my mother raising us.‖  When Phillip Self joined the family he was 
very good to the boys, taking them fishing and supporting them and showing Anthony 
how to work on cars.   
b. Romero 
Carmen Burrola, Maria Self‘s sister and Romero‘s aunt, testified that when Romero 
was in about the second grade, he and his brother Anthony stayed with her and her 
husband and daughters for about two years because Maria had a ―nervous breakdown.‖  
Romero was kind and polite.  Burrola and her husband took the boys to Disneyland and 
other amusement parks and to the mountains.  Burrola gave the boys chores to do, tried to 
teach them right from wrong, and gave them advice on how to navigate life‘s problems.   
Burrola had never seen Maria abuse the boys.  Burrola knew Orlando, Romero‘s 
biological father, and characterized home life with him and Maria as ―[a]wful.‖  She 
recalled Orlando ―drunk, . . . just lying there, not doing nothing.‖  Phillip Self was a good 
man who was ― [v]ery patient‖ with the boys and very good to Maria.  Burrola was very 
sad and surprised when she heard Romero was charged with murder because he ―was 
always a good boy‖ and ―very respectful.‖   
Mona Suzette Quezada, Romero‘s cousin, had worked for the Riverside Transit 
Agency for eight years.  She was 10 years older than Romero and grew up with him.  She 
described him as a quiet child.  Their grandparents lived in the area on a small farm.  At 
18 
 
times when she was 10 to 12 years old, she and her grandparents would pick up Romero 
and his siblings either because they were not being taken care of or because Maria was 
upset with Romero‘s father.  On those occasions Romero and his siblings often did not 
have ―decent food to eat,‖ and sometimes were without electricity.  Her grandmother was 
very good to Romero and his siblings when they were at her house.  Quezada was very 
surprised when she heard Romero was charged with murder because it ―was totally out of 
character.‖   
Margaret Lopez, Romero‘s aunt and godmother, took care of Romero for two 
months when he was about a year and a half old.  She did not have a lot of contact with 
Romero when he was a child.  When he was a teenager Romero visited her whenever he 
could and was respectful.  She was shocked when she heard he was charged with murder 
because he was a ―good kid‖ and ―wouldn‘t do what they are saying.‖   
Corinna Leon, Romero‘s cousin, took care of him frequently when he was young.  
As a teenager Romero was quiet and kind and interacted well with her children.  At some 
point as a teenager he had a girlfriend and a baby of his own and Corinna saw him less 
frequently.  When Romero‘s mother Maria returned from ―up north,‖ she was not ―taking 
care of the boys,‖ although Corinna could not recall any particular incident when they 
were not fed or clothed.  
Catherine Mejia, Romero‘s cousin, lived with Romero for about three months in 
1990.  Romero was quiet, happy, and nice.   
Christine Arrabito testified that she had attended school with Romero from 
elementary through high school.  After high school Romero lived with Arrabito and her 
family in Perris for about a month.  Later that same year he lived with her and her family 
in Pacifica for about five months, saying he ―really wanted to . . . change‖ and wanted a 
―fresh start.‖  Although he held various jobs, he did not pay his share of the rent or phone 
bill and was asked to leave.  On cross-examination Arrabito did not recall telling an 
investigator that Romero said he and his friends would beat up people who ―piss[ed] him 
19 
 
off.‖  She relayed Romero‘s description in high school of watching the drivers of 
expensive cars for a long period of time before stealing their cars.  She believed her 
family had given Romero a chance in Pacifica and he had misused it and taken advantage 
of them.  After that she did not want anything to do with him.   
Janice Babish, Arrabito‘s mother, testified that Romero came to live with them in 
Pacifica because he ―felt like he needed to turn his life around‖ and thought it would help 
to leave the Riverside area.  On cross-examination Babish said Romero would claim to be 
still working at a job after he had been fired so Babish would think he was still earning 
money.  When he left their home he said he would pay the family back for his phone bill 
but never did.   
Sheila Torres, Romero‘s cousin and a California deputy labor commissioner, was 
two years older than Romero‘s mother.  Once when she and her grandparents took 
groceries over to Romero‘s house, his father Orlando was passed out in the house.  Her 
cousins were toddlers and were outside playing in a field.   
Torres said at one point Romero‘s mother Maria Self came to live with her while 
Romero lived with another family.  For about a year Maria occasionally dated a heroin 
dealer, Henry Alvarado.  Torres was upset and spoke to Maria because Alvarado ―had no 
redeeming qualities.‖  Torres also witnessed Maria throw objects at her sons.  She 
commented, ―it seemed like [Maria] was either riding them for something or not paying 
any attention to them at all.‖  Maria ―was always comparing [Romero] to his father‖ and 
―telling him that he wouldn‘t amount to anything.‖   
Torres also said she had a brother who committed suicide, a niece who was beaten 
to death, and a great-uncle, whom neither she nor defendants had met, who was convicted 
of murder.   
20 
 
c. Self 
Sheriff‘s Deputy John Bianco worked at the Robert Presley Detention Center, where 
Self was housed in a cell by himself.  For two hours a day he could leave the cell and use 
art supplies.  The jury was shown several pieces of Self‘s artwork.   
Margaret Louie, Self‘s high school art teacher, testified that Self had voluntarily 
participated in creating a mural to honor an art teacher who had died, and had drawn a 
cover for a school literary magazine.  She described Self as ―[v]ery talented, very 
motivated,‖ and someone who always volunteered.   
 
3. 
Rebuttal 
a. Both defendants 
Robin Levinson, a defense private investigator, conducted a taped interview of 
Maria Self on June 8, 1993, and had a transcript prepared.  When Maria was asked if she 
used drugs around her children, she said she had never used drugs or been drunk in front 
of them but rather always tried to shield them.   
Levinson had also interviewed Christine Arrabito.  Arrabito said Romero told her he 
and his friends would beat up individuals who made them angry, but she never saw this 
quality in him and thought it was ―all talk.‖   
b. Romero 
Maria Self, defendants‘ mother, testified she did not recall telling an investigator 
during a taped interview that Romero‘s ―attitude was very bad,‖ ―he never wanted to take 
responsibility for anything that he did,‖ and he did poorly in school.  When asked if it 
was true Romero never wanted to take responsibility for his actions, Maria replied, 
―Well, he may have not liked to, no, but sometimes he did.‖  On cross-examination she 
agreed with defense counsel that if something had been Romero‘s fault, she would ―just 
beat him.‖   
Robin Levinson testified Maria Self had said during her taped interview:  ―His 
attitude was very bad.  It was like he never wanted to take responsibility for anything that 
21 
 
he did.  It was always somebody else‘s fault.  He denied things that would be in front of 
somebody‘s face and he would still deny it.  He didn‘t want to get up in the morning.  He 
didn‘t do well in school.  He did very poorly.‖  On cross-examination, Levinson noted 
Maria had also said Romero ―had very low self-esteem, even though he was the best 
looking kid on the block.‖   
II.  DISCUSSION6 
A. 
Pretrial Issues 
 
1. 
Challenges to juror questionnaire  
Self contends that asking each prospective juror to identify on the juror 
questionnaire his or her race and ethnic background led to the improper discharge of 
prospective jurors based on race and ethnicity and resulted in the selection of a biased 
jury that violated Self‘s right to a representative cross-section of the community.7  Before 
                                              
6 
Before turning to defendants‘ claims, we address three preliminary matters.  First, 
defendants each make a blanket statement they join in all issues raised by each other that 
may accrue to their benefit.  We have recently strongly disapproved of this practice.  
(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363–364 (Bryant, Smith 
and Wheeler).  As in Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, however, we will assume defendants 
have complied with California Rules of Court, rules 8.630(a) and 8.200(a)(5), in order to 
avoid further delay.  (Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, at p. 364.)   
 
Second, ―as to many claims defendants allege for the first time that the error 
complained of violated their federal constitutional rights.  To the extent that in doing so 
defendants have raised only a new constitutional ‗gloss‘ on claims preserved below, that 
new aspect of the claims is not forfeited.  However, ‗[n]o separate constitutional 
discussion is required, or provided, when rejection of a claim on the merits necessarily 
leads to rejection of [the] constitutional theory . . . .‘ ‖  (Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, 
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 364.)   
 
Finally, Romero‘s first ―claim‖ presents no claim of error but is simply a lengthy 
exegesis on how ―any substantial error could have affected the penalty verdict.‖  Absent 
reference to a claim of error, it is difficult to meaningfully assess or respond to his 
discussion.  Where relevant, we invoke the proper standard of prejudice for that asserted 
error, and nothing in Romero‘s discussion persuades us to revisit these standards.   
7 
Question 1.D. read:  ―Your race and ethnic origin: _____.‖   
22 
 
jury selection defendants unsuccessfully objected to the use of a juror questionnaire 
because in their view it would be used by the prosecutor to strike any prospective juror 
expressing ―even a minimal reservation about imposing the death penalty.‖  Once the 
questionnaire was drafted, Self objected to a question regarding the then recent 
O.J. Simpson trial.  Self did not object to the question regarding the prospective juror‘s 
race and ethnic background, and the claim is therefore forfeited.   
Self further contends use of the jury questionnaire to dismiss 56 prospective jurors 
was unconstitutional.  Several of these prospective jurors were questioned on voir dire, 
and in any event, Self stipulated to the dismissal of all of them and the claim is therefore 
forfeited.  Although the trial court at times commented on the prospective jurors who had 
been stipulated for excusal, these statements were not findings.  As we have explained:  
―A court may allow counsel to prescreen juror questionnaires and stipulate to juror 
dismissals.  [Citations.]  When prospective jurors are formally dismissed pursuant to 
stipulation rather than cause, the trial court makes no findings, and we have nothing we 
can review.  [Citation.]  Consequently, a stipulation to the excusal of jurors forfeits any 
subsequent objection to their omission from the jury pool.‖  (People v. Duff (2014) 58 
Cal.4th 527, 540; see People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 159 [―We previously have 
barred belated challenges to stipulated excusals of prospective jurors‖].)  Unlike in 
People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 444–445, 448, on which Self relies, the 
prospective jurors here were not excused over Self‘s objection but rather with his 
consent.   
 
2. 
Asserted prosecutorial misconduct  
a. Assertedly racially biased voir dire 
Self contends during voir dire the prosecutor improperly and repeatedly asked 
Hispanic prospective jurors more ―probing and detailed questions‖ than he asked 
Caucasian prospective jurors in a successful effort to eliminate ―all eligible, qualified 
23 
 
Hispanic prospective jurors from the final jury pool.‖  As Self concedes, he did not object 
below on the ground the prosecutor‘s voir dire was racially biased and the claim is 
therefore forfeited.  Such a failure ―deprives the trial court of the opportunity‖ to create a 
record and to ―correct potential error in the first instance.‖  (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 415, 481; id. at pp. 481–482 [failure to press for a ruling on a Wheeler8 motion 
forfeits the issue on appeal]; see People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 984 [failure 
to make a Wheeler motion at trial ―forfeits the issue on appeal‖]; People v. Gallego 
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 166 [no error appears when the defendant ―failed even to raise a 
Wheeler claim, let alone establish a prima facie case of misuse of peremptory 
challenges‖].)  Contrary to Self‘s assertion, nothing in Catchpole v. Brannon (1995) 36 
Cal.App.4th 237, 244 (disapproved in People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1006, 
fn. 4), which concerned a litigant‘s claim of judicial partiality for the first time on appeal, 
compels a different result.   
Self further contends in his reply brief that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the asserted misconduct.  ―Obvious reasons of fairness militate against 
consideration of an issue raised initially in [a] reply brief . . . .‖  (Varjabedian v. City of 
Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11.)  Moreover, ―deciding whether to object is 
inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.‖  
(People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502 (Hillhouse).)  Here, because no 
prosecutorial misconduct claim was raised below, we have no record—such as the 
prosecutor‘s reasons for the manner in which any particular prospective juror was 
questioned—on which we can assess Self‘s claim.  (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 264, 266–267 [ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally properly 
decided in a habeas corpus proceeding rather than on appeal].)   
                                              
8 
People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.  
24 
 
b. Assertedly misleading comments about mitigation 
Self contends the prosecutor misrepresented the nature of mitigating evidence 
during voir dire.  We disagree.   
The prosecutor said to one group of prospective jurors:  ―You may hear evidence in 
mitigation, things, perhaps the defendant was a war hero.  Perhaps he saved his platoon in 
the Persian Gulf and received a Silver Star.  Perhaps he once pulled a family from a 
burning car.  Perhaps he once gave bone marrow in a transplant so that a child could 
survive.  Perhaps you may hear evidence that would make you have sympathy for him, 
all of which you can consider in making your [penalty] decision.  And there is only one 
decision to make when you are in the penalty phase, that is between life without parole or 
death.  There is no other option in the penalty phase.‖  He made similar comments on 
other occasions, at times using hypothetical examples of Self being a scout leader or 
soccer or Little League coach and having a positive effect on young people.   
Defense counsel said to one group of prospective jurors:  ―[W]e would present 
mitigating factors, things that we would want you to consider in terms of making this 
decision, and those mitigating factors can be anything.  There ha[ve] been previous 
examples given by [the prosecutor] of . . . doing a heroic act, for example, or saving 
somebody from a burning car, a burning building, providing a bone marrow transplant.  
What I am telling you is, I don‘t want you to have any preconceived notion as to what 
mitigating factors might be present.  If the only people that deserve life without parole 
would be heroes, nobody would probably receive it.  Do you follow me?‖  He informed a 
different group of prospective jurors ―[m]itigating factors . . . can be anything positive‖ 
about Self and another ―[m]itigating factors are anything that may tend to mitigate 
against what took place‖ including ―[p]ositive things about‖ Self.   
At the end of the penalty phase the trial court instructed the jury that a ―mitigating 
circumstance is any fact, condition, or event which, as such, does not constitute a 
justification or excuse for the crime in question, but may be considered as an extenuating 
25 
 
circumstance in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty.‖  It further 
instructed the jury a mitigating circumstance did not have to be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt; the jury need not unanimously agree on the presence of a mitigating 
factor before a juror could consider it; the mitigating circumstances read were merely 
examples and a juror could ―also consider any other circumstances relating to the case or 
to the defendant as shown by the evidence as reasons for not imposing the death penalty‖; 
a juror could find a mitigating circumstance existed if there was any evidence, however 
weak, to support it; any mitigating circumstance could outweigh all the aggravating 
factors; the jury could reject death as a penalty based solely on sympathy or compassion 
resulting from the mitigating evidence; and the jury could decide even in the absence of 
any mitigating evidence that the ―aggravating evidence is not comparatively substantial 
enough to warrant death.‖ 
Self did not object to the prosecutor‘s statements or seek an admonition, and no 
exception to the general rule requiring an objection and request for admonition is 
applicable.  The claim is therefore forfeited.  (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 
841 (Samayoa).)   
It is also meritless.  Self contends that the prosecutor‘s comments were improper 
because they ―permitted the jury to infer that only highly or strongly mitigating evidence 
would be worthy of consideration in deciding penalty and that [Self] was required to 
introduce‖ such evidence ―to counter any evidence in aggravation [and] to establish that 
he did not warrant death.‖  There is no reasonable likelihood the jury so construed the 
prosecutor‘s comments.  (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 667 [―When 
attacking the prosecutor‘s remarks to the jury, the defendant must show‖ in the context of 
the whole argument and the instructions there was ― ‗a reasonable likelihood the jury 
understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous 
manner.‘ ‖].)  Here, defense counsel on at least one occasion corrected and clarified the 
prosecutor‘s remarks through his own voir dire comments.  (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 
26 
 
Cal.4th 598, 636.)  More critically, the trial court‘s instructions at the end of trial fully 
informed the jury that it could consider in mitigation any circumstance—no matter how 
weak the evidence of that circumstance—relating to the case or to Self, and could find 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole the appropriate penalty even in the 
absence of any mitigating evidence.   
Self further contends that the prosecutor improperly insinuated that Self ―bore a 
heavy burden of proof in order to obtain a sentence less than death.‖  Nothing in the 
prosecutor‘s remarks referred to a burden of proof and, once again, the trial court 
exhaustively instructed the jury on the proper definition and use of mitigating evidence.  
In his reply brief Self asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
prosecutor‘s challenged comments.  There was no misconduct and therefore no 
deficiency on counsel‘s part in failing to object.   
 
3. 
Evidence of Feltenberger’s attempted murder  
Defendant Romero contends the trial court erred in admitting ―gruesome‖ evidence 
of Feltenberger‘s attempted murder to prove Romero received the victim‘s stolen 
ammunition pouch.  (§ 496; see ante, at pp. 6–8.)  He asserts his ―guilt of the uncontested 
receiving charge was clear without the attempted-murder testimony, so the error could 
not have affected that determination,‖ but the testimony was prejudicial at the penalty 
phase.  We disagree.  
Before opening statements, the prosecutor moved to have the juries for both 
defendants hear Feltenberger testify.  The trial court admitted Feltenberger‘s testimony, 
but directed defense counsel to prepare a limiting instruction, and admonished the 
prosecutor not to in any way suggest Romero was involved in Feltenberger‘s shooting.  
Before Feltenberger testified, the trial court instructed the Romero jury:  ―You are about 
to hear evidence in the form of testimony from John Feltenberger.  This evidence is not 
being offered to show that the defendant Orlando Romero is involved in the alleged 
27 
 
robbery and attempted murder of Mr. Feltenberger.  On the contrary, there will be no 
evidence provided that Mr. Romero was . . . involved in this incident.  Instead, this 
evidence is being offered as it relates to Count XX, receiving stolen property.  You are to 
consider it solely as it relates [to], one, whether the property was in fact stolen, and, two, 
whether Mr. Romero had knowledge that the property was stolen.‖  After Feltenberger‘s 
testimony, Romero unsuccessfully moved to preclude testimony by other witnesses 
describing the investigation into the Feltenberger shooting, including the discovery of the 
red sabot material found in Feltenberger.  At the close of the guilt phase the trial court 
gave Romero‘s jury a limiting instruction similar to that given before Feltenberger‘s 
testimony.   
Here Romero asserts only that the evidence was prejudicial at the penalty phase, and 
we therefore need not consider whether it was properly admitted at the guilt phase.  
Assuming, therefore, without deciding, that evidence of the details of the attack on 
Feltenberger was improperly admitted, there is no reasonable possibility a different 
penalty verdict would have resulted absent admission of this evidence.  (See People v. 
Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448.)  Both before Feltenberger‘s testimony and at the close 
of the guilt phase the trial court instructed the jury the evidence was not being offered to 
show Romero was involved in the robbery or attempted murder of Feltenberger and there 
was no evidence Romero was involved in this incident.  We presume the jury understood 
and followed this instruction.  (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1178.)  
Moreover, other evidence demonstrated Romero‘s role in the brutal and unprovoked 
murders of Aragon, Jones, and Mans, and the attempted murders of Kenneth Mills, 
Williams, and Rankins, as well as his in-custody violence against Medeiros, Jutras, 
Thibedeau, and Hodges.  In addition, the jury acquitted Romero of the Steenblock 
robbery and kidnapping charges, showing it carefully evaluated the evidence.   
28 
 
 
4. 
Joinder and severance  
Romero contends that joinder of the Magnolia Center Interiors (Magnolia Center) 
burglary (predicated on entry with intent to steal and vandalize) and vandalism charges 
and the receiving stolen property (Feltenberger‘s ammunition pouch) charge with the 
remaining counts was ―statutorily unauthorized‖ under section 954.  Defendants further 
contend the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to sever the Magnolia 
Center charges from the remaining charges, and Romero asserts the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to sever the charge of receiving stolen property from the remaining 
charges against him.  We disagree.   
Before trial, Self, joined by Romero, moved to sever the murder counts from the 
remaining charges.  Defendants focused particularly on severing the murder counts from 
the counts involving the attempted murders of Feltenberger and Williams.  The motion to 
sever did not contest that the statutory requirements for joinder had been met.  The trial 
court denied the motion.   
Because it generally promotes efficiency, joinder of charges is ― ‗preferred by the 
law.‘ ‖  (People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 493 (Hartsch).)  When the statutory 
joinder requirements are met, a defendant can demonstrate error in a ― ‗ruling allowing 
joint trial . . . only by making a ―clear showing of prejudice . . . .‖ ‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  As can be 
seen, defendants did not claim joinder of any of the counts was statutorily unauthorized.  
Under section 954, this claim is therefore forfeited.   
Even had the claims of improper joinder not been forfeited, they would have lacked 
merit.  The charges were properly joined because they were ―connected . . . in their 
commission‖ within the meaning of section 954.  Charges are so connected if ― ‗ ―there is 
a common element of substantial importance in their commission.‖ ‘ ‖  (Alcala v. 
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1218, italics omitted.)  Here, the crimes all 
occurred within a two-month time period and, as the trial court observed, each involved a 
felonious intent to obtain property.  (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1054–
29 
 
1058, 1074–1075 [petty theft charge was properly joined with unrelated murder, robbery, 
and vehicle-taking charges because the petty theft, robbery, and vehicle-taking charges 
involved ―the common characteristic of the wrongful taking of another‘s property‖]; 
People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 160 [crimes were connected in their 
commission when committed in close timeframe of three days and many of the crimes 
involved the felonious intent to obtain property].)  Contrary to Romero‘s contention that 
the ―tenor‖ of the Magnolia Center burglary was vandalism, not theft, defendants were 
charged with burglary premised in part on entry with an intent to steal.  Moreover, the 
evidence demonstrated defendants made a concerted but unsuccessful effort to break into 
the Magnolia Center store safe and stole other items from the store.  Neither the 
circumstance that defendants also committed vandalism nor the minimal worth of the 
objects taken obviated their intent to steal.   
Nor did defendants move to sever the Magnolia Center burglary and vandalism 
charges from the remaining counts, or Romero move to sever the charge of receiving 
stolen property from the remaining charges against him.  The trial court has ―no statutory 
duty to order severance on its own motion.‖  (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 
851.)  Defendants‘ claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance 
are therefore also forfeited.  (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 439 [―defendant is 
limited on appeal to arguing that the trial court erred in failing to sever the charges‖ in the 
manner ―requested at trial‖]; see People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 163 [―defendant 
has forfeited this issue on appeal because he failed to assert this ground at the time his 
severance motion was heard by the trial court‖].)  
Even assuming the claim is preserved, no abuse of discretion is demonstrated.  ―The 
party seeking severance has the burden to establish a substantial danger of prejudice 
requiring the charges to be separately tried.  [Citation.]  Refusal to sever may be an abuse 
of discretion where (1) evidence of the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-
admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the 
30 
 
jury against the defendant; (3) a ‗weak‘ case has been joined with a ‗strong‘ case or with 
another ‗weak‘ case, so that the ‗spillover‘ effect of aggregate evidence on several 
charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the 
charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case.  
[Citation.]  If evidence on each of the joined crimes would have been admissible in a 
separate trial of the other crimes, then such cross-admissibility ordinarily dispels any 
inference of prejudice.‖  (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 281–282.)   
Here, Self‘s counsel conceded at the hearing on the motion to sever the murder 
counts from the remaining counts that the evidence in ―these cases‖ was ―cross-
admissible,‖ and Romero‘s counsel ―[j]oin[ed]‖ those remarks.  On appeal, however, 
defendants claim the evidence was not cross-admissible.  ―We need not affirmatively 
decide, however, whether the evidence would have been cross-admissible in separate 
trials because, as defendant[s] acknowledge[], lack of cross-admissibility is not 
dispositive of whether the court abused its discretion in denying severance.‖  (People v. 
Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1201, citing § 954.1.)  Considering the remaining three 
factors, we conclude no prejudice is demonstrated.  Evidence of the murders, the burglary 
and vandalism of Magnolia Center, and Romero‘s receipt of stolen property was strong.  
Nor was evidence of the Magnolia Center crimes or Romero‘s receipt of stolen property 
more inflammatory than evidence defendants had callously murdered three young men, 
and attempted to murder three other individuals.  Moreover, ―[e]ven where the People 
present capital charges, joinder is proper so long as evidence of each charge is so strong 
that consolidation is unlikely to affect the verdict.‖  (People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
398, 423.) 
Self further contends joinder of the Magnolia Center crimes, in hindsight, produced 
gross unfairness amounting to deprivation of a fair trial or a denial of due process at the 
guilt phase because evidence of the details of the vandalism ―rais[ed] the possibility the 
jury [would] be swayed by the evidence of defendant‘s bad character.‖  The evidence 
31 
 
Self murdered three individuals was strong and indeed is not challenged on appeal.  
There is therefore no reasonable probability Self would not have been found guilty of 
these murders had the jury not heard the evidence regarding the Magnolia Center crimes.  
Likewise, and contrary to defendants‘ contention, joinder of the Magnolia Center 
crimes, in hindsight, did not produce gross unfairness amounting to deprivation of a fair 
trial or a denial of due process at the penalty phase.  Given the brutal circumstances 
underlying their three murder and three attempted murder convictions, and Self‘s 
additional conviction for the attempted murder of Feltenberger, there is no reasonable 
possibility that a different verdict would have resulted had the jury not heard evidence of 
threatening graffiti and the stabbing of a sonogram photograph during the Magnolia 
Center burglary and vandalism.  To the extent Romero asserts a similar claim regarding 
joinder of the receipt of stolen property charge, we have already concluded that even 
assuming evidence of the details of the attack on Feltenberger were improperly admitted, 
there is no reasonable possibility a different penalty verdict would have resulted absent 
admission of this evidence.  (See ante, at pp. 26–27.) 
B. 
Guilt Phase Issues 
 
1. 
Accomplice corroboration  
The trial court instructed the jury that Jose Munoz was an accomplice as a matter of 
law as to certain crimes, including the crimes against Kenneth Mills and Vicky Ewy 
(counts V-VIII), and Knoefler (count XV), and ―his testimony [was] subject to the rule 
requiring corroboration.‖9  (§ 1111; see ante, at pp. 3, 5.)  Self contends Munoz‘s 
                                              
9 
The court instructed Self‘s jury: 
 
―A defendant cannot be found guilty based upon the testimony of an accomplice 
unless such testimony is corroborated by other evidence which tends to connect such 
defendant with the commission of the offense. . . .  To corroborate the testimony of an 
accomplice there must be evidence of some act or fact related to the crime which, if 
believed, by itself and without any aid, interpretation, or direction from the testimony of 
the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime 
32 
 
testimony was not corroborated and therefore his convictions for the crimes against 
Kenneth Mills, Ewy, and Knoefler must be reversed.  He further contends the evidence 
was insufficient to establish his guilt as an aider and abettor of the crimes against 
Knoefler.  We conclude Munoz‘s testimony was corroborated as to the crimes against 
Kenneth Mills and Ewy, but not as to the robbery of Knoefler.  We therefore reverse 
Self‘s conviction and sentence for Knoefler‘s robbery.   
Section 1111 provides in part:  ―A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of 
an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect 
the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient 
if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.‖  The 
requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated is an ― ‗exception[]‘ to the 
substantial evidence‖ rule.  (People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1137.)  It is based 
on the Legislature‘s determination that ― ‗because of the reliability questions posed by‘ ‖ 
accomplice testimony, such testimony ― ‗by itself is insufficient as a matter of law to 
support a conviction.‘ ‖  (Ibid.; see People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261.)  
Section 1111 does not affect the admissibility of accomplice testimony but rather 
                                                                                                                                                  
charged.  However, it is not necessary that the evidence of corroboration be sufficient in 
itself to establish every element of the crime charged or that it corroborate every fact to 
which the accomplice testifies.  In determining whether an accomplice has been 
corroborated, you must first assume the testimony of the accomplice has been removed 
from the case.  You must then determine whether there is any remaining evidence which 
tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.  If there is not such 
independent evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the 
crime, the testimony of the accomplice is not corroborated. If there is such independent 
evidence which you believe, then the testimony of the accomplice is corroborated.  If the 
crimes charged in the Information except Counts XI–XIV, XVI, XVII, and XX–XXIII 
[were] committed by anyone, the witness Jose Munoz was an accomplice as a matter of 
law and his testimony is subject to the rule requiring corroboration.  The testimony of an 
accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust.  This does not mean that you may arbitrarily 
disregard such testimony, but you should give to it the weight to which you find it to be 
entitled after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the 
case.‖  (Italics added.) 
33 
 
―reflects a legislative determination of how accomplice testimony must be treated.‖  
(Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 434; see id. at pp. 453–454; People v. 
Bowley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 858.)   
Thus, for the jury to rely on an accomplice‘s testimony about the circumstances of 
an offense, it must find evidence that ― ‗without aid from the accomplice‘s testimony, 
tend[s] to connect the defendant with the crime.‘ ‖  (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
472, 505 (Abilez); see People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 543.)  ―The entire conduct 
of the parties, their relationship, acts, and conduct may be taken into consideration by the 
trier of fact in determining the sufficiency of the corroboration.‖  (People v. Rissman 
(1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 265, 278; see People v. Trujillo (1948) 32 Cal.2d 105, 111 
(Trujillo) [―The prosecution is not required to single out an isolated fact which in itself, 
unrelated to other proven facts, is considered to be sufficient corroboration‖].)  The 
evidence ―need not independently establish the identity of the victim‘s assailant‖ (Abilez, 
at p. 506), nor corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies (Davis, at p. 543), 
and ― ‗may be circumstantial or slight and entitled to little consideration when standing 
alone‘ ‖ (Abilez, at p. 505).  ―The trier of fact‘s determination on the issue of 
corroboration is binding on the reviewing court unless the corroborating evidence should 
not have been admitted or does not reasonably tend to connect the defendant with the 
commission of the crime.‖  (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 986.)10 
                                              
10 Although similarities between the circumstances of the crime—as evidenced 
either by the physical evidence or a witness‘s testimony—and an accomplice‘s testimony 
cannot be relied on under section 1111 to corroborate the accomplice‘s testimony, these 
similarities nevertheless do play a role.  Even after deciding an accomplice‘s testimony is 
corroborated, the jury is instructed to view it with caution.  Similarities between the 
accomplice‘s account and the physical evidence or a victim‘s description of the crime 
logically are considered in assessing that credibility.   
34 
 
a. Crimes against Kenneth Mills and Ewy 
Kenneth Mills testified that on October 22, 1992, between 11:30 p.m. and midnight, 
he and his girlfriend Vicky Ewy took a drive to look at the lightning.  Mills was driving.  
As they drove down Moreno Beach Drive, a dark grey or blue hatchback coming in the 
opposite direction made a U-turn and began to drive in front of them.  At the next stop 
sign the cars were next to each other, and the other car turned on its high beams and 
followed the victims.  As Mills started to turn right, he saw for ―no more than a second‖ 
the silhouette of a car next to him, and a ―person from the waist up out of the‖ front 
―passenger window pointing a gun at me.‖  The gun fired, hitting Mills in the face, and 
Mills sped away.  He could not see out of his right eye and the vision in his left eye was 
blurry.  The assailants continued to chase them until Mills turned onto a golf cart path 
near three model homes, one of which had all its lights on.  Mills permanently lost vision 
in his right eye.  A bullet hole was found in the top of the driver‘s window of Ewy‘s car 
and another hole near the bottom of the passenger window.  Twenty-gauge plastic 
shotgun wadding was found on the passenger side floor.  Shotgun pellets, too damaged 
for their size to be determined, were found in the passenger door.   
Munoz testified that on or about the night of October 22, 1992, he was riding with 
defendants in Romero‘s girlfriend Sonia Alvarez‘s Dodge Colt in an isolated area past 
Moreno Valley and near Lake Perris.  Romero was driving, Munoz was in the passenger 
seat, and Self was in the backseat.  They had Self‘s sawed-off shotgun and a ―single shot‖ 
rifle and were ―going out stealing.‖  They saw Ewy‘s red car, which Munoz identified at 
trial, and turned around.  They pulled up alongside the car at a stop sign, and Munoz ―was 
ready to get out . . . [and] carjack them.‖  But Romero said, ―Shoot ‘em,‖ and Self 
climbed out of the backseat window on the driver‘s side and fired the shotgun across the 
top of the Colt at the victims.  The bullet hit the victims‘ driver‘s window, and the 
victims drove away.   
35 
 
Munoz‘s testimony was corroborated in part by the circumstance that 20-gauge 
shotgun wadding was found in Ewy‘s car on the passenger side floor.  Self admitted in 
his statement to police that he had possessed a 20-gauge shotgun for about a month 
before he shot Feltenberger on November 30, 1992, and victim Jerry Mills, Sr. identified 
Self as the person holding a shotgun in that robbery.  ―Possession of a gun similar to that 
used in the commission of the crime has been deemed competent corroborative 
evidence . . . .‖  (People v. Henderson (1949) 34 Cal.2d 340, 343; id at pp. 344, 346 
[accomplice testimony corroborated in part by the circumstance the defendant purchased 
a .410 shotgun the day before the attempted robbery in which such a shotgun was used]; 
see Trujillo, supra, 32 Cal.2d at pp. 111-112 [accomplice testimony corroborated in part 
by evidence the bullet that killed the victim could have come from the gun the defendant 
admitted was in his possession before the crime and which was found in his room after 
his arrest].)  
In his statement to police Self also admitted purchasing 20-gauge shells for the 
shotgun about two weeks before the attack on Feltenberger, and appeared to say that 
before this purchase he ―had shells to the gauge, this other guy, but those . . . weren‘t the 
same ones, we got those mixed up.‖  Thus, although it is unclear, the jury could infer Self 
not only had 20-gauge shells before he purchased the one used on Feltenberger, but that 
he had used 20-gauge shells on another ―guy.‖   
Munoz‘s testimony was further corroborated by the circumstance that about a month 
later, on November 30, 1992, he and Self attacked and robbed Feltenberger in a manner 
similar to that of the attack on Kenneth Mills and Ewy.  (People v. Washington (1969) 
71 Cal.2d 1061, 1093 [accomplice‘s testimony corroborated by the testimony of 
numerous witnesses who identified the defendant as a participant in similarly perpetrated 
robberies on the same night and in the same vicinity as the robbery to which the 
accomplice testified, and a witness‘s identification of the car being driven away from the 
scene of the robbery ―matched the description of the car given by other victims as the one 
36 
 
in which defendant was riding‖]; People v. Barillas (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1021 
[proof the defendant ―committed three robberies or attempted robberies earlier that same 
evening using the same white pickup and having the same coperpetrator‖ in part 
corroborated accomplice testimony]; People v. Blackwell (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 313, 
320–321 [―similarity in the commission of crimes in a given locality is itself a 
circumstance tending to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice‖]; People v. 
Comstock (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 287, 298 [―Proof that a defendant committed other 
recent and similar offenses tending to show a consistent plan or method of misconduct‖ 
may corroborate accomplice testimony].)  Here, in both the attack on Kenneth Mills and 
Ewy and the attack on Feltenberger, the victims were driving in isolated areas late at 
night when a car suddenly appeared and drove beside them before the shotgun attack.  
Although Feltenberger pulled over before he was shot, he only did so because he mistook 
the perpetrators‘ car for that of his newspaper carrier; indeed, Self said in his statement to 
police, Munoz ―saw [Feltenberger] and tried to cut him off.‖  Feltenberger identified Self 
as the person who shot him with a shotgun, and Self admitted to police he was with 
Munoz that night and wounded Feltenberger with his 20-gauge shotgun.  
In sum, Munoz‘s testimony was corroborated as to the crimes against Kenneth Mills 
and Vicky Ewy.   
b. Robbery of Knoefler 
Self contends no evidence corroborated Munoz‘s testimony that Self was ―even in 
the car or otherwise present at the scene‖ of Knoefler‘s robbery.  We agree.   
Knoefler testified that on November 20, 1992, about 3:30 p.m., he was tending 
beehives at Markham Street and Washington Street in Riverside County.  Parked nearby 
was his 1987 pickup truck.  A man approached Knoefler, struck up a conversation about 
the bees, and walked around the bee yard.  Knoefler testified he ―seemed to be [a] pretty 
nice guy.‖  The man then brandished what appeared to be a sawed-off shotgun and 
37 
 
demanded the keys to Knoefler‘s truck.  Knoefler gave him the keys.  Another man 
wearing a ski mask appeared.  The first man said he needed some money for gas, and 
Knoefler handed him about $50.  The men left in the truck.   
Munoz testified that during the daytime on or about November 20, 1992, he was 
riding in Alvarez‘s Colt with defendants and Chavez.  They were ―going to go steal,‖ and 
were carrying Self‘s 20-gauge shotgun and perhaps another weapon.  They noticed the 
beekeeper, and decided to send Romero, carrying Self‘s shotgun, to see what valuables 
the man had.  After a few minutes, Munoz, wearing a mask, went to see what ―was taking 
him so long‖ and hid when he heard Romero and the beekeeper talking.  Romero told the 
―old man‖ he needed his truck, and the man said, ―I was wondering why you were being 
so nice to me.‖  Munoz appeared and Romero told the man ―I‘m going to need gas 
money,‖ and the man offered Romero $25.  Romero said he wanted all of it, and the man 
gave him about $75.  Munoz and Romero then left in Knoefler‘s truck and drove back to 
the Colt.  Self and Chavez, in the Colt, followed Romero and Munoz to an open field.  
Romero and Munoz pushed the truck down an embankment, then got into the Colt and 
left the area.   
Although a shotgun was used in the robbery, and Self admitted in his statement to 
police that he had possessed a shotgun for about a month before he shot Feltenberger on 
November 30, 1992, there is no dispute Romero, not Self, was holding the shotgun when 
Knoefler was robbed.  Thus, this circumstance does not corroborate Munoz‘s testimony 
that Self was present at the robbery.  (See People v. Robinson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 373, 379, 
398 [the defendant‘s fingerprints on a car associated with the murder did not connect the 
defendant to the murder given both the defendant and the car‘s recent owner were 
frequent visitors to the defendant‘s cousin‘s apartment and there was no evidence as to 
when the fingerprints were left on the car].)  
38 
 
In her brief the Attorney General asserts Munoz‘s testimony is ―largely corroborated 
by Knoefler‘s testimony; specifically, that Romero, armed with a shotgun, and Munoz, 
arriving a bit later, robbed him of his cash and fled in his truck.‖  We disagree. 
As noted above, section 1111 provides that an accomplice‘s testimony is not 
corroborated by evidence that ―merely shows the commission of the offense or the 
circumstances thereof.‖  In other words, an accomplice‘s testimony is not corroborated by 
the circumstance that the testimony is consistent with the victim‘s description of the 
crime or physical evidence from the crime scene.  Such consistency and knowledge of the 
details of the crime simply proves the accomplice was at the crime scene, something the 
accomplice by definition admits.  Rather, under section 1111, the corroboration must 
connect the defendant to the crime independent of the accomplice‘s testimony.  
As originally enacted in 1872, section 1111 provided:  ―A conviction cannot be had 
on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence which in 
itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient, if it 
merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof.‖  (Ann. Pen. 
Code (1872) p. 390.)  A note following section 1111 in the annotated Penal Code cites 
and quotes from People v. Ames (1870) 39 Cal. 403.  In Ames, the robbers were disguised 
and used numbers during the robbery to refer to one another.  (Id. at pp. 403–404)  At one 
point a robber was referred to as ―Charley‖ and the speaker immediately substituted the 
term ―Number Three.‖  (Ibid.)  One of the robbers testified at trial that the defendant 
Charles Ames was known as ―Charley,‖ and during the robbery was designated ―Number 
Three.‖  (Id. at p. 404.)  This court reversed the judgment against the defendant, stating:  
―[T]he corroborating evidence must, of itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the 
accomplice, tend, in some degree, to connect the defendant with the commission of the 
offense.  It need not, of course, be sufficient to establish his guilt; for, in that event, the 
testimony of the accomplice would not be needed.  But it must tend, in some slight 
39 
 
degree at least, to implicate the defendant.  . . .  [A]side from the testimony of the 
accomplice, and laying that entirely out of view, there was no evidence whatever in this 
case ‗tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.‘  The fact that 
one of the robbers was addressed as ‗Charley,‘ and again as ‗Number Three,‘ and that 
they designated each other by numbers, no more tends, of itself, to connect the defendant 
with the crime than it would . . . any one else.‖  (Id. at pp. 404–405.)   
In 1911, the statute was revised, as relevant here, to its present form (except for the 
substitution in 1915 of ―it‖ for ―he‖ in the first clause).  (Stats. 1911, ch. 292, § 1, p. 484.)  
This court subsequently held that the 1911 amendment did not change the meaning of the 
statute.  (People v. Robbins (1915) 171 Cal. 466, 473–474.)  Our cases continue to refer 
to the requirement that the corroborating evidence ― ‗must, without aid from the 
accomplice‘s testimony, tend to connect the defendant with the crime‘ ‖ (Abilez, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 505), and Self‘s jury here was so instructed.11  (See ante, p. 31, fn. 9.) 
We conclude Munoz‘s testimony that Self robbed Knoefler was not corroborated.  
Reversing this conviction does not affect the penalty judgment because, given the nature 
of Self‘s additional crimes, there is no reasonable possibility the penalty judgment would 
have been different had he not been convicted of Knoefler‘s robbery.  Given that we 
reverse Self‘s conviction for the Knoefler robbery, we need not address Self‘s further 
claim that no substantial evidence supports his conviction for this offense under a theory 
of aiding and abetting.   
                                              
11 
In People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 100, this court stated a witness‘s 
description of the events that led to a stabbing closely matched the accomplice‘s version 
of events, and this ―evidence was enough to connect defendant with the killing and 
therefore to support the credibility‖ of the accomplice.  In Miranda, however, in addition 
to the similarity in detail between the witness‘s and the accomplice‘s accounts, the 
witness observed the defendant hold a knife to the victim‘s throat and then follow the 
victim down the street.  (Id. at p. 93.)  Such evidence independently linked the defendant 
to the stabbing.   
40 
 
 
2.  Evidence of Romero’s attempted escape  
Defendant Romero contends that the trial court erred in admitting escape evidence 
because it amounted to no more than planning and did not constitute an attempt.  We 
disagree.   
Before trial the prosecutor moved to admit escape evidence at the guilt phase.  
Romero unsuccessfully opposed the motion on the ground that it was unduly prejudicial 
under Evidence Code section 352.12   
― ‗Evidence of a planned escape permits an inference of consciousness of guilt, even 
if the escape was not actually attempted.‘ ‖  (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 
1205.)  Moreover, here there was substantial evidence of an attempted escape.  Although 
the terms ―escape‖ and ―attempted escape‖ are ―not statutorily defined, case law has 
defined ‗escape‘ as the unauthorized or ‗ ―unlawful departure of a prisoner from the 
limits of his custody.‖ ‘  [Citations.]  ‗The crime is completed when the prisoner wilfully 
leaves the prison camp, without authorization . . . .‘ ‖  (People v. Bailey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
740, 748–749 (Bailey).)  Attempted escape requires ―a specific intent to escape‖ and ― ‗a 
direct, unequivocal act to effect that purpose.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 749.)   
Here, Romero‘s intent to escape was demonstrated by his statement to fellow inmate 
Dicken that he was planning to escape by taking the nighttime deputy hostage, 
threatening him with a shank, and leaving the jail.  Romero also committed acts to 
effectuate this intent when he obtained hacksaw blades, completely severed the bars to 
his cell, creating a hole large enough to escape, and armed himself.  (See People v. 
Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 954–955 (Mason) [noting the defendant attempted to 
escape once by sawing loose on two sides the metal screen that covered his cell window 
                                              
12 
Evidence Code section 352 provides:  ―The court in its discretion may exclude 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its 
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger 
of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.‖   
41 
 
and again by making a three- by three-inch cut in the replacement screen]; compare 
People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 91, 94 (Lancaster) [mere possession of a 
handcuff key ―was not sufficient to establish an escape attempt‖].)  As the Attorney 
General observes, Romero ―did everything but actually escape from his cell.‖   
Romero contends that this evidence shows he only prepared to escape but did not 
attempt to escape because ―he had not started going anywhere.‖  We have previously 
rejected this view.  ― ‗The introduction into the concept of attempt to escape of a 
requirement of intentionally doing an act, the direct, natural and probable consequence of 
which, if successfully completed, would be an escape, too narrowly limits the application 
of the statute.  Such an act could be to pass part way through a door, window or other 
opening to the outside of the place of confinement before falling back, being pulled back 
or disabled.  [¶] . . . [¶]  The Legislature has not proscribed the doing of any single 
defined act as an attempt to escape.  Many acts, including some non-criminal in 
themselves, might be conducive toward carrying out an intention to escape, and the scope 
of the statute proscribing such an attempt should not be limited to specifically designated 
acts.‘  [Citation.]  Thus, the heightened mental state required for an attempt to escape 
serves to ‗separate[] criminality itself from otherwise innocuous behavior.‘  (United 
States v. Bailey [(1980)] 444 U.S. [394,] 405.)‖  (Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 750–
751.)  
 
3. 
Asserted prosecutorial misconduct  
Self contends the prosecutor repeatedly vouched for the credibility of Jose Munoz 
during his opening statement and closing argument.  Not so. 
Self did not object to the prosecutor‘s statements or seek an admonition, and no 
exception to the general rule requiring an objection and request for admonition is 
applicable.  The claim is therefore forfeited.  (Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841.)   
42 
 
It is also meritless.  ―A prosecutor is prohibited from vouching for the credibility of 
witnesses or otherwise bolstering the veracity of their testimony by referring to evidence 
outside the record.‖  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 971 (Frye).)  ―However, so 
long as a prosecutor‘s assurances regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of 
prosecution witnesses are based on the ‗facts of [the] record and the inferences 
reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal knowledge or belief,‘ 
[his] comments cannot be characterized as improper vouching.‖  (Ibid.)  Here, the 
prosecutor simply advanced the view Munoz was credible based on the evidence, which 
is permissible.   
Self further asserts counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor‘s 
statements.  For example, Self contends effective counsel would have objected when the 
prosecutor improperly referred to Munoz‘s statement to police, thus implying that 
evidence the jury had not seen established Munoz‘s veracity.  Contrary to Self‘s 
implication, the jury heard nearly all of Munoz‘s statement, and the remainder was 
described by the interviewing officer.  There was no misconduct, hence there was no 
valid basis for objection.  
 
4. 
Asserted instructional error  
a. Accomplice instructions  
Self contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte it could 
not aggregate evidence or incidents to corroborate the accomplice testimony of Munoz 
and to determine guilt.  There was no error.   
The trial court instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 17.02:  ―Each 
count charges a distinct crime.  You must decide each count separately.  The defendant 
may be found guilty or not guilty of any or all of the crimes charged.  Your finding as to 
each count must be stated in a separate verdict.‖  Self contends the court, sua sponte, 
should have modified this instruction to tell the jury it ―must decide each count separately 
43 
 
on the law and the evidence applicable to it, including the evidence required to 
corroborate the accomplice‘s testimony.‖   
Self has forfeited this claim by failing to request a modification of CALJIC 
No. 17.02.  (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 579 [the defendant‘s failure ―even to 
propose a modification of CALJIC No. 17.02, or to propose an additional instruction‖ 
forfeited the instructional error claim].)  
The claim also lacks merit.  The instructions given informed the jury of the offenses 
for which Munoz was an accomplice as a matter of law, and that his testimony as to 
certain charged offenses must be ―corroborated by other evidence which tends to connect 
such defendant with the commission of the offense.‖  (Italics added.)  They further 
provided, ―To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice there must be evidence of 
some act or fact related to the crime which, if believed, by itself and without any aid, 
interpretation, or direction from the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the crime charged.‖  (Italics added.)  This language 
informed the jury that evidence corroborating Munoz‘s testimony was required for each 
count as to which Munoz was an accomplice as a matter of law.  Contrary to Self‘s 
assertion, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have understood the 
instructions to mean it could ―use[] Feltenberger‘s corroborating testimony as to counts 
XVIII and XIX to find the requisite corroboration on unrelated counts V through VII,‖ or 
treat ―Munoz‘s accomplice testimony as to counts I and II‖ as ―corroborated by the 
victim‘s testimony in the unrelated . . . Meredith robbery (count IV) or by‖ Rankin‘s 
testimony regarding the shooting in counts IX and X.   
Self further contends that in the absence of his proposed instruction the jury likely 
would ―treat evidence of [Self‘s] involvement on some counts as evidence of his guilt on 
other, unrelated counts charged against him.‖  To the extent Self claims the jury could not 
consider evidence on one count to prove his guilt on other counts we reject the claim.  
(See People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 760–761 [trial court properly refused to give 
44 
 
proposed instruction that each count must be proven independently of the other counts 
because the evidence was cross-admissible and the jury was instructed in the language of 
CALJIC No. 17.02].)  
b. CALJIC No. 3.02  
Romero contends instruction in the language of CALJIC No. 3.02 creates an 
unconstitutional mandatory presumption that aiding and abetting a robbery in which 
murder was a natural and probable consequence is equivalent to aiding and abetting 
murder, and thus ―effectively require[s]‖ the jury to presume ―intent to encourage or 
facilitate a murder.‖13  We need not address this issue because the jury here was also 
instructed on felony murder based on robbery and found true robbery-murder special-
circumstance allegations as to all three murders.14  We can deduce from these special 
                                              
13 
The court instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 3.02:  ―One who 
aid[s] and abets another in the commission of a crime is not only guilty of that crime but 
is also guilty of any other crime committed by the principal which is a natural and 
probable consequence of the crime[] originally aided and abetted.  In order to find the 
defendant guilty of the crime of murder . . . as an aider and abettor, you must be satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt:  One, the crime of robbery or attempt[ed] robbery was 
committed; Two, the defendant aided and abetted such crime; Three, a co-principal in 
such crime committed the crime of murder, and, Four, the crime of murder was a natural 
and probable consequence of the commission of the crime of robbery or attempt[ed] 
robbery.‖   
14 
The trial court instructed the jury:  ―The unlawful killing of a human being, 
whether intentional, unintentional, or accidental, which occurs during the commission or 
attempted commission of the crime as a direct causal result of robbery is murder of the 
first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime.  The 
specific intent to commit robbery and the commission or attempted commission of such 
crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  If a human being is killed by any one 
of several persons engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the crime of 
robbery, all persons who either directly and actively commit the act constituting such 
crime, or who with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime and 
with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of 
the offense aid, promote, encourage, or instigate by act or advice its commission, are 
guilty of murder in the first degree whether the killing is intentional, unintentional, or 
accidental.‖   
45 
 
circumstance findings that the jury necessarily found Romero guilty of first degree 
felony-murder under section 189.  (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1019.)  
Under the felony-murder rule those who commit enumerated felonies are ― ‗strictly 
responsible for any killing committed by a cofelon, whether intentional, negligent, or 
accidental, during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the felony.‘ ‖  (People v. 
Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 943.)  Thus, there was no need for the jury to find, as 
Romero contends, an ―intent to encourage or facilitate a murder.‖ 
The felony-murder rule operates independently from an ―aider and abettor‘s liability 
for murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.‖  (People v. Chiu 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 166.)  To the extent the jury understood it also needed to find ―the 
crime of murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the crime 
of robbery or attempt[ed] robbery‖ because it was instructed in the language of CALJIC 
No. 3.02, Romero could have only benefitted from this ambiguity.   
c. Reasonable doubt instruction  
Defendants contend instruction in the language of CALJIC No. 2.90 does not 
adequately define reasonable doubt.  Self additionally contends such instruction in 
conjunction with other jury instructions impermissibly undermined and diluted the 
prosecutor‘s burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.15  We disagree. 
                                              
15 
Both juries received the standard instruction on reasonable doubt.  The court 
instructed Romero‘s jury:  ―A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent 
until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.  This presumption places 
upon the People . . . the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows:  It is not a mere possible doubt, because 
everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.  It is 
that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the 
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an 
abiding conviction of the truth of the charge.‖  A virtually identical instruction was given 
to Self‘s jury.   
46 
 
The court‘s instruction properly defined the prosecution‘s burden of proof.  (People 
v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 391–392 [upholding instruction substantially similar to 
that given here] (Brown); see Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 14–15 [―An 
instruction cast in terms of an abiding conviction as to guilt, without reference to moral 
certainty, correctly states the government‘s burden of proof‖].)  Thus, contrary to Self‘s 
assertion, there is no reasonable likelihood the jurors understood the instruction to mean 
―they must articulate reason and logic for their doubt . . . before such doubt[] could be 
considered sufficient to acquit.‖  (See People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 879 
(Capistrano).)  Nor, as he also asserts, does the instruction erroneously inform the jury 
that reasonable doubt is ―not a mere possible doubt‖ (Capistrano, at p. 880) or err in the 
use of the term ―until‖ instead of ―unless‖ when it provides ― ‗[a] defendant in a criminal 
action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved‘ ‖ (People v. Lucas (2014) 
60 Cal.4th 153, 295–296 (Lucas); People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 812).  
Contrary to his assertion, CALJIC No. 2.90 is not wanting because it does not expressly 
state ―that the accused need not present any evidence for the jury to have a reasonable 
doubt,‖ given there is no reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instruction to 
mean Self had the burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt of 
his guilt.  (Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 974.)  Further, and contrary to Romero‘s 
assertion, changes in the instruction after the crime and before trial deleting reference to 
moral evidence and moral certainty do not implicate due process and ex post facto 
concerns.  (Brown, at pp. 390–392.) 
―[W]e have previously considered and rejected the argument‖ that instruction in the 
language of CALJIC No. 2.90 in conjunction with other instructions ―improperly 
dilute[s] the constitutional requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  
(People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 885 (Vines) [rejecting challenge to CALJIC 
Nos. 2.01, 2.21.2, 2.27]; see People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 479 [rejecting 
challenge to CALJIC No. 1.00]; People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 826–828 
47 
 
[rejecting challenges to CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.11, 2.21.2]; People v. Roberts (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 271, 314–315 [no possible prejudice in giving over the defendant‘s objection 
CALJIC Nos. 2.60 and 2.61 concerning a defendant‘s right not to testify].)  Self 
―advances no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior rejection of challenges to these 
instructions, and we decline to do so.‖  (Vines, at p. 885.)   
d. Error in allowing jury to make two special circumstance findings as 
to each murder count  
Romero contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury to make two multiple-
murder special-circumstance findings as to each count of murder.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)  
The Attorney General concedes the error.  We agree, and vacate five duplicative 
multiple-murder special-circumstance findings for each defendant.  (People v. Hardy 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 191, 216.)  Contrary to Romero‘s assertion, he was not prejudiced by 
the duplicative findings.  Rather, we apply the settled rule that ―the jury‘s consideration 
of duplicative multiple-murder special circumstances is harmless where, as here, the jury 
knows the number of murders on which the special circumstances are based.‖  (People v. 
Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 855.)   
 
5. 
Validity of section 190.2, subdivision (d)  
Romero contends that section 190.2, subdivision (d), enacted in 1990 by Proposition 
115, is invalid because Proposition 114, also on the 1990 ballot, received more votes.  
We have previously rejected this argument and Romero cites no persuasive reason to 
revisit our conclusion.  (People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 621–622; Yoshisato v. 
Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978, 989–992.) 
48 
 
C. 
Penalty Phase Issues 
 
1. 
Assertedly biased jurors  
Self contends that Jurors Nos. 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 1416 were ―strongly in favor of 
the death penalty and should have been dismissed for cause‖ because they were actually 
biased against him on the penalty issue.  The claim is forfeited because Self challenged 
only one of these jurors (Juror No. 8) for cause, and did not use an available peremptory 
challenge to remove that juror.17  (People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 25–26 
[failure to use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror forfeits a claim the 
trial court erred in denying a challenge for cause against the prospective juror]; People v. 
Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 48 (Coffman and Marlow) [failure to 
challenge for cause purportedly biased jurors ―forfeit[s] any appellate claim of error in 
the seating of those jurors‖].)  Nor did Self object to the jury as finally constituted.  
(People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 130; People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 
1239.) 
In an appropriate case, a forfeited claim of juror bias can be asserted on appeal 
under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Self further contends trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to challenge for cause and then excuse by peremptory challenge 
Juror Nos. 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, and 14.  ―[A] prospective juror may be challenged for cause 
based upon his or her views regarding capital punishment only if those views would 
‗ ― ‗prevent or substantially impair‘ ‖ the performance of the juror‘s duties as defined by 
the court‘s instructions and the juror‘s oath.‘  [Citation.]  A prospective juror who would 
be unable conscientiously to consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including, when 
appropriate, the death penalty, is properly subject to excusal for cause.  [Citation.]  Our 
                                              
16 
Juror No. 14, originally an alternate, served on the jury during both the guilt and 
penalty phases.   
17 
We disapprove any language to the contrary in People v. Whalen (2013) 56 
Cal.4th 1, 51.   
49 
 
review of the record confirms that none of the [eight] jurors who defendant asserts were 
biased would have been properly excused under this standard, as each expressed a 
willingness to consider all the evidence presented before reaching a decision as to 
penalty.  Counsel therefore did not perform deficiently in not challenging those jurors for 
cause.‖  (Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 48.)   
Nor on this record has Self demonstrated counsel was ineffective in not removing 
these jurors by peremptory challenge.  (People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 911 
[―Because the use of peremptory challenges is inherently subjective and intuitive, an 
appellate record will rarely disclose reversible incompetence in this process‖].)   
 
2. 
Evidentiary issues  
a. 
Victim impact evidence  
Before the penalty phase began, Self, joined by Romero, unsuccessfully moved to 
exclude all victim impact evidence.  Self here contends that the trial court erroneously 
admitted victim impact evidence, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
offering and then arguing this evidence.  Both defendants challenge the quantity and 
content of the evidence.  We reject the claims.   
―In a capital trial, evidence showing the direct impact of the defendant‘s acts on the 
victims‘ friends and family is not barred by the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the 
federal Constitution.  (Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825–827.)  Under 
California law, victim impact evidence is admissible at the penalty phase under section 
190.3, factor (a), as a circumstance of the crime, provided the evidence is not so 
inflammatory as to elicit from the jury an irrational or emotional response untethered to 
the facts of the case.‖  (People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1180 (Pollock).)  We 
conclude neither the federal nor the state standard was violated here. 
Defendants contend that the victim impact evidence was ―excessive, improper, 
inflammatory, and highly prejudicial.‖  Defendants did not object at any time during the 
50 
 
testimony, and this claim is therefore forfeited.  (People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 
357 (Wilson) [failure to object to victim impact testimony as exceeding the scope of 
§ 190.3, factor (a) forfeits the claim].)  Self‘s motion in limine sought to broadly exclude 
all victim impact evidence on constitutional grounds, and did not specifically object to 
the admission of any particular witness‘s testimony anticipated in this case.  (See 
generally People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 189–190.)  Thus denial of the motion in 
limine did not make objection during testimony redundant, but rather it was incumbent on 
defendants to object if they believed the testimony actually presented was ―excessive, 
improper, inflammatory, and highly prejudicial.‖  (See id. at p. 190.)   
The claim is also meritless.  A total of six witnesses were presented from the 
families and friends of the three murder victims.  (See ante, at pp. 10-11.)  The testimony 
took place on a single day before both juries and spans 96 pages of the reporter‘s 
transcript.  Twelve photographs of Jose Aragon or aspects of his life, nine of Joey Mans, 
and seven of Timothy Jones, were admitted.  The evidence can scarcely be characterized 
as ―excessive.‖   
Moreover, the content of the testimony was neither inflammatory nor unduly 
prejudicial.  ― ‗[U]nless it invites a purely irrational response, evidence of the effect of a 
capital murder on the loved ones of the victim and the community is relevant and 
admissible under section 190.3, factor (a) as a circumstance of the crime.  [Citation.]  The 
federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is so unduly prejudicial as to 
render the trial fundamentally unfair.‘ ‖  (Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 889.)  Here, the 
testimony fell well within these bounds and was similar to that we have previously 
upheld.  (See People v. Murtishaw (2011) 51 Cal.4th 574, 579, 581–582, 595; People v. 
Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 296–298; People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 779–
783 (Dykes); Wilson, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 357.)  Contrary to Self‘s contention, that the 
witnesses described events that occurred before or after the murders was proper.  (Brown, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 397–398.)  Their recollections ―simply served to explain why 
51 
 
they continued to be affected by [the] loss and to show the ‗victim[s‘] ―uniqueness as . . . 
individual human being[s].‖ ‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 398, quoting Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 
U.S. at p. 823.)   
Self relies on comments made by the trial court during record correction six years 
after trial.  While addressing requests to settle the record as to gestures by attorneys or 
witnesses during the five-month trial the court commented it did not think it was 
―possible or realistic for us to go that far back in time to remember what a witness was 
pointing at or what type of gesture they were making or what type of demeanor they were 
demonstrating.‖  The court stated that although it had some independent recollection of 
events during trial they were ―few and far between.‖  It did recall certain events, 
including when the victim impact testimony was presented, saying it was a ―very painful 
and agonizing [day] for everyone who was in the courtroom,‖ ―there wasn‘t a dry eye in 
the courtroom,‖ and ―[t]hat‘s the day that I will always have with me.‖  These comments 
do not demonstrate that the victim impact evidence was unduly prejudicial or that ―the 
court‘s impartiality was undermined‖ by the evidence.  Indeed, trial courts must be aware 
of juror and spectator reactions as part of their diligent trial management, and we 
presume they are capable of setting this information aside when rendering their rulings.  
(See People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 365.)  Moreover, the callous and 
unprovoked nature of the murders understandably triggered an emotional reaction in the 
persons who testified and those observing in the courtroom, but this did not render the 
testimony inflammatory or unduly prejudicial.  (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 
132, 134 [―The record does not support defendant‘s suggestion that after hearing the 
victim impact testimony the jurors were so overwhelmed by emotion that they were 
unable to make a rational determination of penalty,‖ where ―at least two of the jurors had 
been in tears‖ at the break and ―defendant had been ‗crying and sobbing‘ as well‖]; 
Wilson, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 357 [approving admission of evidence of victim‘s 
― ‗understandable human reactions‘ ‖]; see generally People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 
52 
 
Cal.4th 327, 368 (Zamudio) [―Although jurors must never be influenced by passion or 
prejudice,‖ ―the requested instruction is misleading to the extent it indicates that emotions 
may play no part in a juror‘s decision to opt for the death penalty‖].)   
Self also contends that ― ‗expansive‘ ‖ victim impact evidence ― ‗will inevitably 
make way for racial discrimination to operate in the capital sentencing jury‘s life or death 
decision.‘ ‖  Relying on Turner v. Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28, he further asserts racial 
prejudice will remain undetected, and that this ―danger is particularly acute where the 
jury, as here, is virtually all Caucasian—as were two of the victims—and [Self] is 
Hispanic.‖  In Turner v. Murray, which involved ―a black man sentenced to death for the 
murder of a white storekeeper,‖ the high court held the trial court erred in failing to allow 
questioning of prospective jurors on the issue of racial prejudice.  (Turner, at pp. 29, 33, 
36–37.)  Self fails to demonstrate how Turner bears on the issue of admission of victim 
impact evidence, or otherwise supports his assertion that the victim impact evidence here 
―invited both arbitrary or invidious comparisons and, especially in cross-racial cases like 
this one, arbitrary comparisons tainted by racial bias against Hispanics.‖   
Self further contends that victim impact evidence should be limited to 
(1) ―testimony from a single witness,‖ (2) testimony that ―describes the effect of the 
murder on a family member who was present at the scene during or immediately after the 
crime,‖ and (3) ―consequences that were known or reasonably apparent to the defendant 
at the time he committed the crime or were properly introduced to prove the charges at 
the guilt phase of the trial.‖  We have previously rejected all of these contentions, and 
Self cites no persuasive reason to revisit our conclusion.  (See, e.g., People v. Trinh 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 245–246; Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1183.)   
Self further contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by offering this 
evidence and then relying on it during closing argument.  We have concluded this 
evidence was properly admitted.  Hence the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by 
relying on it during closing argument.   
53 
 
b. Evidence of assault on Tyreid Hodges, attempted escape, and shank 
possession  
Defendant Romero contends that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his 
assault on Tyreid Hodges, attempted escape, and shank possession.  (See ante, at pp. 8-9, 
12-13.)  The evidence was properly admitted.   
(1) Hodges 
Romero contends that ―[n]othing done to Hodges was a violent crime‖ within the 
meaning of section 190.3, factor (b).  Romero told Hodges that ―if he had his way about 
it . . . he would . . . take [Hodges] out.‖  Romero squirted urine from a bottle on Hodges, 
stepped on a carton of feces, splattering the contents on Hodges, and ―squished‖ a 
shampoo bottle containing urine, causing it to hit Hodges.  He also threw a hairbrush at 
but missed Hodges.  These actions were assaults and batteries and hence admissible 
under section 190.3, factor (b).  (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1197–1198 
[deputy‘s testimony about the ―defendant‘s assault upon him with a container filled with 
urine and feces was admissible‖]; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 868 [each 
instance when the defendant ―threw water, urine, scouring powder, bleach, and other 
substances at correctional officers . . . constitute[d] a battery‖ and was admissible under 
§ 190.3, factor (b)]; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 960-961 [―throwing a cup 
of urine in a person‘s face is a battery, since ‗[a]ny harmful or offensive touching 
constitutes an unlawful use of force or violence‘ and thus a battery under section 243‖ 
and is admissible under § 190.3].) 
(2) Attempted escape 
Romero asserts that the jury was erroneously permitted to use evidence of his 
attempted escape in aggravation at the penalty phase because it was merely a planned and 
not an attempted escape.  (See Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 94 [mere preparation for 
escape is insufficient under § 190.3].)  Because we have previously concluded the 
54 
 
evidence here demonstrated an attempted escape (see ante, pp. 40–41), this contention 
fails.   
Romero further contends that the escape evidence did not demonstrate an express or 
implied threat of force or violence under section 190.3, factor (b).  He did not object on 
this basis below, and the claim is therefore forfeited.  It is also meritless.  Although 
evidence of attempted escape alone is not admissible under section 190.3, factor (b), here 
the evidence indicated Romero not only planned to escape by taking the nighttime deputy 
hostage and threatening him with a shank, he was also observed with a shank, and a 
weapon was found in his cell.  That is sufficient.  (Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 954–
956 [escape evidence admissible under § 190.3, factor (b) when ―an escape from the 
administrative segregation cell would almost certainly have involved defendant in a 
confrontation with a guard‖].)   
Romero further contends trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 
evidence of the escape attempt at the guilt phase on the ground the evidence ―had no 
legitimate use‖ at the penalty phase.  The evidence was admissible; therefore, he 
establishes no deficiency on counsel‘s part in failing to object on this basis. 
Romero also contends that instruction in the language of CALJIC Nos. 6.00, 6.01, 
and 6.02 ―fail[ed] to ensure that the jury understood that the purported escape attempt 
could not be weighed as a circumstance in aggravation if it was only preparation.‖18  Not 
                                              
18 
The court instructed the jury:  ―An attempt to commit a crime consists of two 
elements, namely, a specific intent to commit the crime and a direct but ineffectual act 
done towards its commission.  In determining whether or not such an act was done, it is 
necessary to distinguish between mere preparation, on the one hand, and the actual 
commencement of the doing of the criminal deed, on the other.  Mere preparation which 
may . . . consist of planning the offense or of devising or obtaining or arranging the 
means for its commission, is not sufficient to constitute an attempt.  However, acts of a 
person who intends to commit a crime will constitute an attempt where those acts clearly 
indicate a certain, unambiguous intent to commit that specific crime.  Such acts must be 
an immediate step in the present execution of the criminal design, the progress of which 
would be completed unless interrupted by some circumstance not intended in the original 
55 
 
so.  The court instructed the jury mere preparation was ―not sufficient to constitute an 
attempt,‖ and further required the jury—in order to find Romero had committed 
attempted escape by force or violence—to find Romero‘s ―acts clearly indicate[d] a 
certain, unambiguous intent to‖ escape and were ―an immediate step in the present 
execution of the criminal design, the progress of which would be completed unless 
interrupted by some circumstance not intended in the original design.‖  It is not clear 
whether instruction in the language of CALJIC No. 6.00 is consistent with our recent 
discussion of attempted escape in Bailey, supra, 54 Cal.4th 740, but to the extent the 
court‘s instructions were too stringent, Romero could have only benefitted from the error.  
(See id. at p. 749 [stating attempted escape requires ―a specific intent to escape‖ and ― ‗a 
direct, unequivocal act to effect that purpose‘ ‖]; and see id. at p. 750 [noting ― ‗[t]he 
introduction into the concept of attempt to escape of a requirement of intentionally doing 
an act, the direct, natural and probable consequence of which, if successfully completed, 
would be an escape, too narrowly limits the application of the [escape] statute‘ ‖].)   
(3) Shank 
Romero contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence he possessed shanks in 
jail.  Romero did not challenge the admission of this evidence below, and the claim is 
therefore forfeited.  It is also meritless.  ― ‗It is settled that a defendant‘s knowing 
possession of a potentially dangerous weapon in custody is admissible under [section 
190.3,] factor (b).  Such conduct is unlawful and involves an implied threat of violence 
                                                                                                                                                  
design.  A person who has once committed acts which constitute an attempt to commit a 
crime is liable for the crime of attempted escape by force or violence even though he does 
not proceed further with the intent to commit the crime, either by reason of voluntarily 
abandoning his purpose or because he was prevented or interfered with in completing the 
crime.  If a person intends to commit a crime but, before committing an act toward the 
ultimate commission of the crime, freely and voluntarily abandons the original intent and 
makes no effort to accomplish it, such person has not attempted to commit the crime.‖   
56 
 
even where there is no evidence defendant used or displayed it in a provocative or 
threatening manner.‘ ‖  (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1002.)   
c. Exclusion of mitigating evidence  
Romero contends the trial court erroneously excluded his mother Maria Self‘s 
testimony that as a child she had been raped repeatedly by two of her brothers.   
During Maria‘s direct testimony, she said her relationship with two of her brothers 
was ―not good‖ because she ―was afraid of them.‖  When counsel asked why she was 
afraid, the prosecutor‘s relevance objection was sustained.  At sidebar, counsel said he 
was eliciting testimony Maria had been raped by her brothers for seven years starting 
when she was six years old.  The court stated Maria‘s engaging in abusive behavior 
toward her sons was relevant, but the reason why she was abusive was not relevant.  
After hearing further argument, the court ruled such testimony was not relevant ―at this 
point in time‖ because it did not ―relate to factors in mitigation for the defendants.‖  Even 
if the evidence were relevant, the court found it ―highly prejudicial‖ because it would 
confuse and mislead the jury, and therefore also excluded it under Evidence Code section 
352.  The court further stated that if on cross-examination it appeared the prosecutor 
raised ―any issues that might open the door to her giving this testimony on redirect,‖ it 
would reconsider its ruling.  Counsel did not raise the issue after Maria‘s cross-
examination.   
― ‗The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer in a capital 
case not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence, that is, 
evidence regarding ―any aspect of a defendant‘s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than 
death.‖ ‘  [Citation.]  ‗Nonetheless, the trial court still ― ‗determines relevancy in the first 
instance and retains discretion to exclude evidence whose probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the probability that its admission will create substantial danger of 
57 
 
confusing the issues or misleading the jury.‘ ‖ ‘  (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 
287, 320; see Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 12 [‗The Eighth Amendment does 
not establish a federal code of evidence to supersede state evidentiary rules in capital 
sentencing proceedings.‘]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604, fn. 12 [‗Nothing in 
this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence 
not bearing on the defendant‘s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his 
offense.‘].)‖  (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1128.) 
Here, evidence defendant Romero‘s mother had been raped as a child had no 
bearing on his character, record, or the circumstances of the offense.  The court therefore 
did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence.   
 
3. 
Asserted prosecutorial misconduct  
Romero contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when he misled the court 
about his intended use of Romero‘s statement to his girlfriend Stephanie Stinson, and 
then used the statement to argue Romero‘s future dangerousness.  There was no 
misconduct. 
As noted above, on June 12, 1994, Romero lured fellow Riverside jail inmate Olen 
Thibedeau to his cell and then stabbed him in the stomach with a spear more than four 
feet long.  (See ante, p. 12.)  Thibedeau was facing charges of child molestation and was 
later convicted of these crimes.  On February 8, 1995, Romero visited with Stephanie 
Stinson and their conversation was recorded.  Romero said:  ―I don‘t like violence.  I try 
to avoid it.  But when they stick a child molester next door to me [and] expect me not to 
do something, I‘ll be his friend, talk to him real nice, bring him close to the door, and 
then make him a little spear about this long, about this skinny, that‘s real hard and won‘t 
bend.  You put a pencil at the end of it and strips of wood.  [¶] . . . [¶]  Stick him in his 
neck.‖   
58 
 
At the hearing on whether to admit Romero‘s statement to Stinson, the prosecutor 
observed that on cross-examination the defense had ―made quite an effort to impugn . . . 
Thibedeau‘s credibility.‖  The prosecutor contended that Romero‘s later statement to 
Stinson was an admission that ―he did[] exactly what . . . Thibedeau said.‖  The trial court 
admitted the statement to rehabilitate Thibedeau.   
During closing argument, the prosecutor said Romero ―has shown in jail since his 
arrest that he is not done hurting people, that he still wants to kill and rob and terrorize 
and hurt.‖  He described Romero‘s attempted escape in which he planned to threaten a 
guard with a shank, his possession of shanks in jail, the robbery and beatings of Medeiros 
and Jutras, and the battery of Hodges with urine and feces.  The prosecutor then said, 
―And he tried to run a spear through . . . Thibedeau.‖  After describing the incident, the 
prosecutor said:  ―He is proud of it.  Romero is proud of it.  You heard him fondly 
remembering this event on tape.‖  He played the tape of Romero‘s statement to Stinson, 
and said:  ―He is so proud.  Mr. Romero gives you your verdict right there.  You can‘t 
expect him not to do something like this.  He said it, ‗But when they stick a child 
molester next door to me and not expect me to do something . . . .‘  He is telling you what 
to expect from him.  You don‘t need a crystal ball to know what to expect from Mr. 
Romero in the future.‖  The prosecutor subsequently argued:  ―Look at how he acted 
when he was free.  He murdered people.  When he had everything to lose, he murdered 
people.  Look at how he acted in the jail when he had this trial pending and he had 
something to lose.  How is he going to act when he has nothing left to lose, when he has 
got LWOP and they can‘t do anything else to him?  It‘s an American Express card for 
violence.‖  The prosecutor also noted that Romero would come into contact with ―nurses, 
clerks, guards, counselors, [and] other inmates,‖ and said:  ―[W]hat we know about him is 
that he likes to hurt people.  The best predictor of the future is the past.  He has 30, 40, 50 
years of victims ahead of him if he has an LWOP, if he has life without parole.‖  The 
59 
 
prosecutor also said, ―Consider 50 years of what you have seen of the last three years.  
Don‘t let the price of your compassion be another victim.‖   
On appeal, Romero expressly does not challenge admission of his statement to 
Stinson.  Rather he contends that the prosecutor deceived the trial court by successfully 
seeking admission of the statement to rehabilitate Thibedeau‘s credibility and then using 
the statement instead to improperly argue future dangerousness and urge the jury to 
consider an aggravating factor not listed in section 190.3.   
Romero cites no authority for the novel proposition a prosecutor commits 
misconduct during closing argument by drawing a reasonable inference from properly 
admitted evidence if he did not mention the inference at the time admissibility was 
sought.  Rather, the crux of Romero‘s claim is that future dangerousness is an 
aggravating factor not listed in section 190.3 and therefore improperly relied on by a 
prosecutor during argument.  Romero correctly notes this court has never delineated why 
there is no conflict between the circumstance that section 190.3 sets forth an exclusive 
list of aggravating factors, not expressly including future dangerousness, and our line of 
cases holding ―[p]rosecutorial argument regarding a capital defendant‘s future 
dangerousness is permissible if . . . it is based on evidence of the defendant‘s conduct 
rather than expert opinion.‖  (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 364.)  We now do 
so. 
The circumstances of a defendant‘s crimes, his unadjudicated violent conduct, and 
his violent conduct underlying a prior conviction, are aggravating factors under section 
190.3, factors (a), (b), and (c).  (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 889.)  A 
prediction that a defendant will be dangerous in the future based on evidence admitted 
under factors (a)–(c) is not itself a fact or an aggravating factor.  It is an inference drawn 
from the aggravating evidence, and is properly argued by a prosecutor and considered by 
the jury in making its penalty determination.  (See People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 
745, 797 [if the jury interpreted the trial court instruction ―to mean that ‗no evidence was 
60 
 
introduced regarding the defendant‘s propensity to violence if in prison because the 
defendant‘s propensity for violence in prison is irrelevant,‘ then it would have failed to 
consider a relevant consideration in selecting the penalty‖].)  As the high court has 
recognized, ― ‗any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person‘s probable future 
conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose.‘ ‖  
(California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992, 1002.)  And as the Attorney General observes, 
our cases stand ―for the unsurprising proposition that the prosecution may make 
reasonable inferences from properly admitted evidence to argue for imposition of the 
death penalty.‖19   
― ‗[W]e have held that at the penalty phase of a capital case the prosecutor may not 
introduce expert testimony forecasting that, if sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole, a defendant will commit violent acts in prison . . . .‘ ‖  (People v. Michaels (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 486, 540.)  ―[T]here is a significant difference between an inference which a 
juror may or may not draw and a direct expression of expert opinion.  The expert‘s 
authority and experience may persuade the jurors to a conclusion they would not reach on 
their own.‖  (People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1029.)   
Accordingly, the prosecutor‘s argument here did not urge the jury to consider an 
aggravating factor not listed in section 190.3.  Rather, the prediction of future 
dangerousness was supported by the evidence, properly argued by the prosecutor, and 
properly considered by the jury.   
                                              
19 
In Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 321, we stated, ―The trial court properly refused 
defendant‘s instruction that possible belief or predictions about a defendant‘s future 
dangerousness are not to be considered for any purpose because the standard jury 
instructions do not permit ‗the jury to believe defendant‘s future dangerousness could be 
an aggravating factor.‘ ‖  An instruction such as that requested in Lucas would be 
inappropriate because the jury may consider a defendant‘s future dangerousness.  To the 
extent Lucas could be read to mean a jury may not consider a defendant‘s future 
dangerousness, it is disapproved.  (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th 153.) 
61 
 
 
4. 
Asserted instructional error  
a. Victim impact  
Defendants contend the trial court erroneously refused to give a limiting instruction 
regarding the victim impact evidence.  We disagree. 
Defendants requested the court instruct the jury:  ―Evidence has been introduced for 
the purpose of showing the specific harm caused by the defendant‘s crime.  Such 
evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be considered by you to divert your 
attention from your proper role of deciding whether defendant should live or die.  You 
must face this obligation soberly and rationally, and you may not impose the ultimate 
sanction as a result of an irrational, purely subjective response to emotional evidence and 
argument.  On the other hand, evidence and argument on emotional though relevant 
subjects may provide legitimate reasons to sway the jury to show mercy.‖  The trial court 
denied the request, finding the proposed instruction was argumentative, a misstatement of 
the law, and duplicative.  We have previously concluded that a substantially similar 
instruction was ―argumentative‖ (Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 510–511) and 
―misleading to the extent it indicates that emotions may play no part in a juror‘s decision 
to opt for the death penalty‖ (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 368).  ―We have also held 
that the standard instructions given here, including CALJIC No. 8.85, adequately convey 
to the jury the proper consideration and use of victim impact evidence.‖20  (People v. 
                                              
20 
As we have observed, ―CALJIC now includes a standard instruction explaining the 
permissible use of victim impact evidence consistent with our case law:  ‗Victim impact 
evidence has been received in this trial for the purpose of showing, if it does, the 
financial, emotional, psychological or physical effects of the victim‘s death on the family 
and friends of the victim[s].  You may consider this evidence as part of the circumstances 
of the crime in determining penalty.  Your consideration must be limited to a rational 
inquiry, and must not be simply an emotional response to this evidence.  These witnesses 
are not permitted to offer any opinion as to what is the appropriate penalty in this case.‘  
(CALJIC No. 8.85.1 (Spring 2010 new) (Spring 2014 ed.) . . . .‖  (People v. Boyce (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 672, 689, fn. 11.) 
62 
 
Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 197.)  Defendants cite no persuasive reason to revisit 
these conclusions.  
b. Coperpetrator’s sentence  
Romero contends the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury it could 
consider Munoz‘s sentence as a mitigating factor.  ―We have consistently held that 
evidence of an accomplice‘s sentence or of the leniency granted an accomplice is 
irrelevant at the penalty phase because ‗ ―it does not shed any light on the circumstances 
of the offense or the defendant‘s character, background, history or mental condition.‖ ‘  
[Citations.]  Nothing in Parker v. Dugger (1991) 498 U.S. 308, relied on by defendant, 
compels a different result.‖  (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 549.)  Moreover, 
the court permitted counsel to remind the jury of Munoz‘s sentence so long as he did not 
―compare it to what the defendants could possibly receive as a sentence in this case.‖   
c. Reasonable doubt  
Romero challenges the reasonable doubt instruction on the same grounds as in the 
guilt phase.  (See ante, pp. 45–47.)  We reject the claim for the same reasons stated 
above.   
d. Challenge to CALJIC No. 8.87  
Romero contends instruction in the language of CALJIC No. 8.8721 was unfairly 
one-sided, implied a unanimity requirement for mitigating evidence, and directed a 
verdict on whether the unadjudicated criminal conduct was violent.  We have repeatedly 
                                              
21 
The court instructed the Romero jury that evidence had been introduced to show 
Romero had committed ―assault, battery, robbery, attempted escape by force or violence, 
and possession of a deadly weapon in jail.‖  It then instructed the jury:  ―Before a juror 
may consider any of such criminal acts or activity as an aggravating circumstance in this 
case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant Romero 
did in fact commit such criminal acts or activity. . . .  It is not necessary for all jurors to 
agree.  If any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that such criminal activity 
occurred, that juror may consider that activity as a fact in aggravation.  If a juror is not so 
convinced, that juror must not consider that evidence for any purpose.‖   
63 
 
rejected similar challenges, and do so again here.  (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
1104, 1139–1140 [instruction regarding lack of unanimity requirement for mitigating 
evidence not required, nor does the prosecution receive preferential treatment in the 
absence of such an instruction]; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 720 
[―CALJIC No. 8.87 is not invalid for failing to submit to the jury the issue whether the 
defendant‘s acts involved the use, attempted use, or threat of force or violence‖].)  
Moreover, following the court‘s instructions to the Romero jury, Romero‘s counsel 
indicated only Self requested (and received) an instruction providing, ―There is no need 
for the jurors to unanimously agree on the presence of a mitigating factor before 
considering it.‖   
e. Challenge to CALJIC No. 8.88  
Defendants challenge the court‘s instruction in the language of CALJIC No. 8.88 on 
grounds we have repeatedly rejected.  Contrary to their assertion, the language ―so 
substantial‖ and ―warrants‖ in that instruction is not impermissibly vague.  (People v. 
Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 56 (Dement).)  ―The instruction is not constitutionally 
flawed because it fails to inform the jury that if it determines the mitigating factors 
outweigh the aggravating factors, it is required to return a sentence of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.‖  (Ibid.)   
 
5. 
Constitutionality of the death penalty statute  
Defendants contend California‘s death penalty statute and implementing instructions 
are constitutionally invalid in numerous respects.  We have repeatedly rejected similar 
claims, and defendants provide no persuasive reason to revisit our decisions.   
We ―reject the claim that section 190.3, factor (a), on its face or as interpreted and 
applied, permits arbitrary and capricious imposition of a sentence of death . . . .‖  (Dykes, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 813; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975–976, 
978.)  ―[T]he death penalty statute is not unconstitutional because it does not require 
64 
 
‗unanimity as to the truth of aggravating circumstances, or findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt that an aggravating circumstance (other than § 190.3, factor (b) or (c) evidence) has 
been proved, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death 
is the appropriate sentence.‘  [Citation.]  Nothing in Cunningham v. California (2007) 
549 U.S. 270, Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 
536 U.S. 584, or Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, affects our conclusions in 
this regard.  [Citations.]  No burden of proof is constitutionally required, nor is the trial 
court required to instruct the jury that there is no burden of proof.‖  (Dement, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at p. 55.)  The trial court need not instruct there is a presumption in favor of a 
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  (People v. Adams (2014) 
60 Cal.4th 541, 581.)   
The trial court was not required to ―delete inapplicable factors from CALJIC 
No. 8.85‖ (People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 701) or ―instruct that the jury can 
consider certain statutory factors only in mitigation‖ (People v. Valencia (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 268, 311).  ―Written findings by the jury during the penalty phase are not 
constitutionally required, and their absence does not deprive defendant of meaningful 
appellate review.‖  (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1097.)  The jury may 
properly ―consider a defendant‘s unadjudicated criminal activity.‖  (People v. Martinez 
(2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 968.)  ―Use of the adjectives ‗extreme‘ and ‗substantial‘ in section 
190.3, factors (d) and (g) is constitutional.‖  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 57.)   
― ‗The federal constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, and 
against cruel and unusual punishment [citations], do not require intercase proportionality 
review on appeal.‘  [Citations.]  Moreover, ‗capital and noncapital defendants are not 
similarly situated and therefore may be treated differently‘ [as to written jury findings, 
unanimity on aggravating factors, and the use of unadjudicated criminal activity] without 
violating‘ a defendant‘s right to equal protection of the laws, due process of law, or 
65 
 
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.‖  (People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 
924, 971; see Capistrano, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 881.)  
Defendants contend their death sentences violate international law and therefore 
their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.  
They point to no authority ―prohibit[ing] a sentence of death rendered in accordance with 
state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.‖  (Hillhouse, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 511.)  
 
6. 
Cumulative prejudice  
Defendants contend the cumulative effect of guilt and penalty phase errors requires 
us to reverse the judgments.  We have found error only in Self‘s conviction for the 
robbery of Albert Knoefler and the duplicative multiple-murder special-circumstance 
findings for both defendants, and where we have assumed error regarding the admission 
of evidence of Feltenberger‘s attempted murder before Romero‘s jury and the escape 
instructions given to Romero‘s jury we have concluded there was no prejudice.  We 
further conclude this error and any assumed error are not prejudicial when considered 
cumulatively. 
66 
 
 
DISPOSITION 
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse Self‘s conviction and sentence on count 
XV, the robbery of Albert Knoefler, vacate five multiple-murder special-circumstance 
findings for each defendant, and otherwise affirm the judgments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Romero & Self 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S055856 
Date Filed: August 27, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Ronald L. Taylor 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael P. Goldstein, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Orlando 
Gene Romero. 
 
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Christopher 
Self. 
 
Edmund G. Brown., Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens, Ivy B. Fitzpatrick and 
Theodore M. Cropley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael P. Goldstein 
P.O. Box 30192 
Oakland, CA  94604 
(510) 910-7220 
 
William D. Farber 
369-B Third Street, #164 
San Rafael, CA  94901 
(415) 472-7279 
 
Theodore M. Cropley 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2286