Case Title: First National Bank of Denver v. Allard

Citation: 513 P.2d 455

Docket Number: C-324

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1973-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
513 P.2d 455 (1973) The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF DENVER, Executor of the Estate of Hazel M. Lindl, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Martin R. ALLARD et al., Respondents. No. C-324. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. July 30, 1973. Rehearing Denied September 10, 1973. *456 Moran, Reidy & Voorhees, John R. Moran, Jr., Denver, for petitioner. Warberg & Mast, Fort Collins, Cosgriff, Dunn, French & Seavy, V. G. Seavy, Jr., Eagle, for respondents. GROVES, Justice. This is an action to quiet title to an undivided 17/25 interest in the oil, gas and other minerals underlying 14,000 acres of the 70 Ranch in Weld County. In 1944 the late Hazel M. Lindl acquired this mineral interest by mineral deed. At the same time, the remaining 8/25 interest in the oil, gas and other minerals was conveyed to Hazel C. Manning. In 1961 by deed without warranty or reservation an undivided 57.2763% interest in the 14,000 acres was conveyed to Mrs. Lindl. The owners of the remainder of the surface and Mrs. Lindl by statutory form warranty deed conveyed the 14,000 acres in 1965. This deed contained the following language: The statute providing for statutory form warranty deed reads as follows: Whatever interest passed under the 1965 deed later, by mesne conveyances, vested in the defendants. In 1969 Mrs. Lindl brought this action, contending that she had not conveyed the undivided 17/25 mineral interest by the 1965 deed, but rather had retained it. She died pendente lite and her executor, the plaintiff bank, was substituted. The trial court held for the plaintiff, i.e., that the 17/25 mineral interest had been reserved and stated: The Court of Appeals reversed, 31 Colo. App. 391, 506 P.2d 405, holding that Mrs. Lindl had conveyed the 17/25 mineral interest. The latter ruling we affirm. We are presented with three alternatives: (1) to rule that that language of paragraph (i) or the 1965 deed, immediately following "SUBJECT, HOWEVER, TO", makes the deed ambiguous, with resulting remand for the taking of evidence as to intent; (2) to find the conveyance unambiguous and hold that it reserved the 17/25 mineral interest to Mrs. Lindl; or (3) to find that language of the deed unambiguous and rule that it did not reserve the mineral interest. We join both courts below in finding that the deed is unambiguous, and join the Court of Appeals in adopting the third alternative immediately just stated, i.e., that the deed conveyed Mrs. Lindl's mineral interest. In Brown v. Kirk, 127 Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 1045 (1953), it was stated: We believe that the language plainly refers to "transfers" of any interests to third persons, and does not express an intention to reserve minerals to the grantors. Generally, *458 when grantors intend to reserve or retain something, they specifically say so. This was not the case here. Instead, this wording protected Mrs. Lindl against any warranty of minerals in another, viz. the outstanding 8/25 mineral interest conveyed to Hazel C. Manning. This determination is strengthened by the fact that paragraphs (ii) and (iii) of the 1965 deed relate to lack of warranty as to interests held by third persons. Judgment affirmed. ERICKSON, J., does not participate.