Case Title: Posey v. Posey

Citation: 545 So. 2d 1329

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1989-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
545 So. 2d 1329 (1989)
Walter POSEY
v.
Walter POSEY, Jr., et al.
87-854.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 19, 1989.
*1330 Neil Taylor, Jr., Russellville, for appellant.
Donald H. Patterson of Patterson and Jester, Florence, for appellees.
ALMON, Justice.
This appeal involves a claim by a father for rescission of deeds to his son that the father claims were executed in consideration of a promise of support. Such an action is authorized by Ala.Code 1975, § 8-9-12. There are other claims in the action below, but the trial court granted summary judgment for the son on this claim and entered a final judgment on it pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. The only issue presented is whether the father presented sufficient evidence that such a promise of support was a material consideration for the deeds to withstand the son's motion for summary judgment.
Walter Posey ("Walter Sr.") filed this action against Walter Posey, Jr. ("Walter Jr."), Walter Jr.'s wife Mary Ann Posey, and another individual who is not a party to this appeal. Walter Sr. had executed two deeds to Walter Jr. and Mary Ann. The first was executed on December 28, 1979, and the second was executed on March 21, 1987. Both deeds purported to convey a parcel of property on which was situated a motel that Walter Sr. lived in and operated.
The 1979 deed recited as consideration $10 cash, the assumption of a purchase money mortgage given by Walter Sr. to his grantor with an unpaid balance of $30,184.81, and "a second mortgage in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars to be paid periodically in even sums of ten thousand dollars or more beginning not later than the first of March 1980." The deed contained the following reservation, which we reproduce as closely as possible from the copy in the record:
The 1987 deed reads in material part:
The original complaint states that Walter Sr. seeks relief under § 8-9-12 and damages for fraud, then recites facts and allegations, including the following:
The complaint includes allegations that Walter Sr. had spent money on improvements and had paid the full amount secured by the purchase money mortgage mentioned in the first deed. It continues with allegations of Walter Jr.'s interference with Walter Sr.'s control and occupancy of the motel. Among the relief sought is that the "[c]onveyances be set aside for fraud and under other applicable law." Three amended complaints followed, but none amended the claim to have the deed set aside under § 8-9-12.
Walter Jr. filed a motion for summary judgment supported by his affidavit, which simply recited the execution and delivery of the 1987 deed and concluded: "In the opinion of the undersigned, Walter Posey (Sr.) fully comprehended what he was doing at the time he made and executed such deed and delivered the same and fully understood the nature of the act of executing and delivering such deed."
Walter Sr. executed an affidavit in response that included the following:
The trial court entered the following order after a hearing on the summary judgment motion:
The court later made this judgment final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P.
Section 8-9-12 reads:
A grantor proceeding under this section does not have to prove that the grantee fraudulently made the promise of support, or even that the grantee has breached the promise. Vaughn v. Carter, 488 So. 2d 1348 (Ala.1986); Webb v. Bank of Brewton, 265 Ala. 568, 93 So. 2d 154 (1957); McAdory v. Jones, 260 Ala. 547, 71 So. 2d 526 (1954).
The 1987 removal of the life estate reserved in the 1979 deed[1] is not necessarily evidence that a promise of support did not constitute a material part of the consideration for the 1987 deed. It has been held that a reservation of a life estate is not necessarily inconsistent with such an agreement. Vaughn v. Carter, supra; Logan v. Logan, 258 Ala. 317, 62 So. 2d 918 (1953); Walker v. Walker, 256 Ala. 195, 54 So. 2d 281 (1951). Given that such a reservation may in some cases be inconsistent with an agreement to support, it cannot be true that such a reservation is necessary to show that such an agreement was part of the consideration for the deed. Although the removal of the reservation could be considered as evidence that the 1987 deed withdrew the earlier promise of support as consideration for the transaction, that removal is not conclusive evidence of such a withdrawal, as we shall explain.
"Parol evidence may be used to prove such an agreement as consideration so long as it does not contradict a written statement of the full consideration." Vaughn v. Carter, supra, at 1350, citing Isenhower v. Finch, 278 Ala. 684, 180 So. 2d 448 (1965); Grady v. Williams, 260 Ala. 285, 70 So. 2d 267 (1953); and Dennis v. West, 248 Ala. 90, 26 So. 2d 263 (1946). The 1987 deed did not express any consideration except $10 cash and Walter Sr.'s desire to vest "full fee simple title" in Walter Jr. and Mary Ann. Thus, parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration. Massey v. Massey, 246 Ala. 396, 20 So. 2d 790 (1945). There is evidence in the record that the 1987 deed was an attempt to clear the record title so that Walter Jr. could use the property as security *1333 for a loan to make improvements on the property. We see no reason why the parties could not retain the agreement of support as between themselves and yet give Walter Jr. more marketable title. Of course, if Walter Jr. had conveyed or mortgaged the property after the execution of the 1987 deed[2] to a third party without notice of the alleged agreement, which was not reflected in the deed, Walter Sr. could not defeat such a third party's interest in the property.
The trial court, in its second finding, stated that the parol testimony of a promise of support was not clear, satisfactory, and convincing. This standard is the correct one for the finder of fact to apply to the evidence following a trial of a case such as this one. Mullinax v. Mullinax, 495 So. 2d 646 (Ala.1986); Vaughn v. Carter, supra; Entrekin v. Entrekin, 388 So. 2d 931 (Ala.1980); Cooper v. Cooper, 289 Ala. 263, 266 So. 2d 871 (1972). It is not the correct standard for summary judgment, however; the correct standard is whether, in opposition to a prima facie showing to support the defendants' summary judgment motion, Walter Sr. has produced substantial evidence to show that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists so that Walter Jr. and Mary Ann are not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P.; Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12.
The record certainly shows substantial evidence that a promise of support was a material consideration for the 1979 deed e.g., the vaguely defined $100,000 debt and the life estate, at least when viewed in light of Walter Sr.'s evidence that he continued to operate the motel, that his health was still good, that he had made more money for Walter Jr. than vice versa, and that Walter Jr. had paid neither debt mentioned. There is no evidence of any new consideration flowing to Walter Sr. for the 1987 deed, so the record would support either a finding that an earlier promise of support was a continuing consideration for the conveyance or a finding that the 1987 deed reflects an outright gift of the property. Walter Sr.'s evidence tends to preclude a finding of an outright gift. Of course, his affidavit is unequivocal that a promise of support was a material part of the consideration for the 1987 deed.
Thus, a disputed question of material fact is presented on the record, and the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for the defendants upon resolving this dispute in their favor. The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
[1]  We make no judgment as to the effect of the inartfully drafted reservation in the 1979 deed, except to say that the apparent purpose was to reserve some sort of life estate in Walter Sr. and his then-living wife.
[2]  We do not here consider the effect, if any, of Walter Sr.'s statement in his affidavit that he did not "remember the last deed being like" the 1987 deed.