Case Title: RONALD A. BUSH V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-191

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
RONALD A. BUSH V. STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION2005 WY 120120 P.3d 176Case Number: 04-191Decided: 09/19/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

 
 
RONALD 
A. BUSH,

 
 
Appellant

(Employee/Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex. rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Objector/Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

David M. 
Gosar, Jackson, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Ronald 
Bush alleges he injured his ankle out of and in the course of his 
employment.  The Workers' 
Compensation Division (the Division) denied Mr. Bush's claim for benefits.  After a contested case hearing, the 
denial of the claim was upheld on the grounds that Mr. Bush did not meet his 
burden of proving the injury arose out of and in the course of employment.  Mr. Bush appealed to the district court, 
which affirmed the hearing officer's decision.  Mr. Bush now appeals to this Court.  This Court finds that the order denying 
benefits to Mr. Bush is facially insufficient to permit review.  We therefore reverse the district court 
and remand with directions to vacate the order denying 
benefits.

 
 
 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]           
Mr. Bush 
requests this Court determine whether the decision by the Workers' Compensation 
Division denying benefits is supported by substantial 
evidence.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
Mr. Bush 
injured his ankle.  According to Mr. 
Bush, he injured his ankle while at work on July 3, 2002.  July 3 was the start of a long holiday 
weekend, and Mr. Bush left work early that day as prearranged with his 
boss.  The next day, July 4, Mr. 
Bush went to the emergency room of the local hospital.  The emergency room notes reveal that 
X-rays were negative.  Mr. Bush 
informed his employer of his ankle injury on the next work day, July 8.  Mr. Bush consulted with an orthopedic 
surgeon on Monday, July 15.  The 
doctor informed Mr. Bush that Mr. Bush had torn ligaments and a widening of the 
ankle mortis.  Mr. Bush filed an 
injury report on July 18.  When Mr. 
Bush filed a claim for benefits, the Division objected to the claim, stating 
that it did not believe the injury occurred at work.1

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶4]           
This 
Court does not afford any special deference to the district court's decision 
when it reviews a matter initiated before an administrative agency.  Rather, this Court reviews the case as 
if it came directly from the administrative agency.  Hicks v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div., 2005 WY 11, ¶16, 105 P.3d 462, 469 (Wyo. 2005).  The scope of our review, therefore, is 
defined by Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005), which provides as follows:

 
 
(c) To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.  In making the 
following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts 
of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 

[¶5]           
Since 
both parties presented evidence at an administrative hearing, we review the 
entire record to determine if the agency findings are supported by substantial 
evidence.  See Newman v. State ex. rel. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶¶8-26, 49 P.3d 163, 166-73 (Wyo. 2002).  The review of this Court for substantial 
evidence entails reviewing

 
 
the 
record as a whole to determine whether the agency's findings of fact are 
supported by substantial evidence.  
Holding's Little America v. Board 
of County Commissioners of Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1983), appeal 
after remand 712 P.2d 331 (1985); Toavs v. State By & Through Real Estate 
Commission, 635 P.2d 1172 (Wyo. 1981).  Substantial evidence in this context 
means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion."  State ex rel. Workers' Compensation v. 
Ohnstad, 802 P.2d 865 (Wyo.1991); Shenefield v. Sheridan County School District No. 1, 544 P.2d 870, 
874 (Wyo.1976), quoting from Howard v. 
Lindmier, 67 Wyo. 78, 214 P.2d 737, 740 (1950).  Findings of fact are supported by 
substantial evidence if, from the evidence preserved in the record, we can 
discern a rational premise for those findings. ANR Production Co. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas, 800 P.2d 492 (Wyo.1990); Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866 
(Wyo. 
1990).  

 
 
Mekss v. 
Wyoming Girls' School, State of Wyo., 813 P.2d 185, 200 (Wyo. 1991).

 
 
 
 
Denial 
of Benefits

 
 

[¶6]           
The 
hearing officer denied Mr. Bush's claim for benefits based upon his 
determination that Mr. Bush had not adequately proven that his ankle injury 
arose out of and in the course of employment.  In his order denying benefits, the 
hearing officer concluded that Mr. Bush "has not met his burden of proof; 
specifically [Mr. Bush] has not shown that this medical condition is 
work-related . . . .  [Mr. Bush] 
engaged in activity that could have resulted in the injury he claims.  I do not find his testimony to be 
credible and do not find his explanation of the sequence of events to be 
consistent or believable."  

 
 

[¶7]           
The 
hearing officer presented the following pertinent findings of basic fact in 
support of his conclusion:

 
 
2.  Employee/Claimant 
left work early on July 3, 2002, because it was a holiday and he had arranged to 
do so.

 
 
3.  Employee/Claimant 
told the Employer on July 8, 2002, that he had hurt his ankle on July 3, 2002, 
while on duty as a truck driver.

 
 
4.  Employee/Claimant 
saw Dr. Jarrard in the Emergency Room on July 4, 2002, for an injury to his 
ankle.  Ex-rays [sic] taken at that 
time did not show a fracture or dislocation.

 
 
5.  Employee/Claimant 
saw Dr. Michael Ford [an orthopedic surgeon] on July 15, 
2002.

 
 
6.  Dr. 
Ford diagnosed a widening of the ankle mortis and torn 
ligaments.

 
 
7.  Employee/Claimant 
filed a report of injury on July 18, 2002.

 
 
8.  Employee/Claimant 
participated in several activities during the July 4, 2002, weekend and the 
following week including driving in a Demolition Derby on July 13, 2002, and a 
concert on July 3, 2002, where he assisted one of the bands.  

 
 

[¶8]           
We need 
not decide whether these facts are supported by substantial evidence because 
these basic facts do not support the hearing officer's conclusion.  Most obviously, the hearing officer 
makes no findings of fact regarding any evidence presented by Mr. Bush, and 
therefore there is nothing for the hearing officer to disbelieve.  Even more fatal is the lack of any 
findings of fact on key material issues.  
For instance, the question of whether an employee's injury arose out of 
and in the course of employment is a question of fact.  Goddard v. Colonel Bozeman's Restaurant, 
914 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Wyo. 1996).  The finder of fact must determine the 
time and cause of a compensable injury.  
Torres v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2005 WY 7, ¶17, 105 P.3d 101, 110 (Wyo. 
2005) (citing Iverson v. Frost 
Construction, 2003 WY 162, ¶16, 81 P.3d 190, 195 (Wyo. 2003)).  The order in question is devoid of any 
factual finding as to either the time or cause of injury.2  

 
 

[¶9]           
A 
hearing officer is required to support his conclusions with adequate findings of 
fact.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-110 (LexisNexis 2005).  A 
hearing officer has "the duty to make findings of basic facts upon all of the 
material issues in the proceeding and upon which its ultimate findings of fact 
or conclusions are based.  Unless 
that is done there is no rational basis for judicial review."  Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 446 P.2d 550, 
555 (Wyo. 
1968).  In order for this Court to 
have a rational basis upon which to conduct a review:  

 
 
All of 
the material evidence offered by the parties must be carefully weighed by the 
agency as the trier of the facts; conflicts in the evidence must be resolved, 
and the underlying or basic facts which prompt the ultimate conclusion on issues 
of fact drawn by the agency in sustaining the prima facie case made, or in 
rejecting it for the reason it has been satisfactorily met or rebutted by 
countervailing evidence, must be sufficiently set forth in the decision 
rendered.  

 
 

Id. 
at 557. 

 
 

[¶10]       
In the 
instant case, the order contains no indication that the hearing officer 
carefully considered and weighed all material evidence offered by the 
parties.  Besides the documentary 
evidence introduced by both parties, Mr. Bush's case consisted of five live 
witnesses and the proffered (and accepted) written testimony of two other 
witnesses.  The Division presented 
the testimony of two live witnesses.  
As far as the order reflects, none of the evidence thus generated 
received any consideration.  

 
 

[¶11]       
Both 
parties in their respective briefs to this Court reference various facts beyond 
those found by the hearing officer that allegedly can be discerned from the 
record.  Such an approach is 
inappropriate.  

 
 
[A]ppellate 
briefing is not the place to articulate sufficient findings of fact.  It is not the duty of this court to 
analyze and assess evidence presented to an administrative body to determine the 
weight to be given evidence or the credibility to be afforded witnesses.  

 
 

Billings 
v. Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters and Guides, 2001 
WY 81, ¶19, 30 P.3d 557, 567 (Wyo. 2001).  
The district court also improperly referred to extraneous facts in its 
decision affirming the order.  A 
reviewing court has authority only to review an agency decision, not to make the 
decision for it.  To follow the 
approach taken by both the parties and the district court, this Court would have 
to imply findings of basic facts from ultimate findings and then search the 
record for support of these implied basic facts.  This we will not do.  Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 446 P.2d  at 
555.  See also Scott v. McTiernan, 974 P.2d 966, 973 
(Wyo. 1999) 
(case remanded because, although sufficient factual basis for the agency 
determination may exist in the record, "that factual basis was not included in 
the formal findings of fact.")  The 
agency, as the finder of fact, is obligated to make explicit findings of basic 
facts supporting its ultimate determination.  

 
 

[¶12]       
In the 
instant case, rational review by this Court is precluded by the hearing 
officer's complete lack of factual findings on issues material to Mr. Bush's 
claim for compensation.  This Court 
cannot uphold an agency action based solely upon unsupported conclusions.  Veile v. Bryant, 2004 WY 107, ¶22, 97 P.3d 787, 798 (Wyo. 2004).  Since 
the instant order contains no findings that adequately explain the rationale for 
the agency's decision, the agency decision must be vacated.  Davis v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, 
¶10, 88 P.3d 481, 486 (Wyo. 2004).  
The ultimate decision returns to the hands of the hearing 
officer.

 
 
If the 
record before the agency does not support the agency action, if the agency has 
not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot 
evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the 
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for 
additional investigation or explanation. The reviewing court is not generally 
empowered to conduct a de novo 
inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on 
such an inquiry.  

 
 

Florida 
Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S. Ct. 1598, 1607, 
84 L. Ed. 2d 643 (1985).  The matter 
is hereby remanded to the hearing officer for findings of supplemental facts and 
the entry of a new, more complete order either affirming or denying 
benefits.  Scott, 974 P.2d  at 
973.

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶13]       
The 
hearing officer utterly failed in his duty to present this Court with an order 
containing sufficient information by which it can determine how the hearing 
officer came to his ultimate decision.  
His ultimate conclusions are unsupported by any fact as found by the 
hearing officer, leaving this Court with no rational basis upon which to review 
the order.  Such a peremptory order 
cannot be allowed to stand.  We 
hereby reverse the order of the district court and remand this case to the 
district court with directions to vacate the order denying benefits.  Further, the district court is to remand 
the case for supplemental findings of fact or other proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The Division 
also claimed that Mr. Bush failed to timely report his injury to his employer 
and failed to timely file an injury report with his employer and the Division in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a).  Although the hearing officer addressed 
the statute, he did not base his decision denying benefits upon the provisions 
of § 27-14-502 and its potential consequences.  Therefore, the timeliness of Mr. Bush's 
reporting is not at issue.

 
 

2The only finding by the 
hearing officer that even mentions where and when the injury occurred is the 
finding that "Employee/Claimant told the Employer on July 8, 2002, that he had 
hurt his ankle on July 3, 2002, while on duty as a truck driver."  What Mr. Bush reported to his employer, 
however, is irrelevant to findings of basic fact regarding whether the injury 
occurred out of and in the course of employment.  The comment that Mr. Bush engaged in 
other activities that could have caused the injury is nothing more than pure 
speculation.