Case Title: Wagner v. Wagner

Citation: 85 N.J. 93

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1980-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
#23689-a-PER CURIAM  
 
2006 SD 31 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
OF THE 
 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
AMY WAGNER 
n/k/a AMY LYNGSTAD,  
 
 
 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
   v. 
 
MICHAEL WAGNER, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
YANKTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
HONORABLE LEE D. ANDERSON 
Judge 
 
*  *  *  * 
 
 
AMY LYNGSTAD 
Yankton, South Dakota 
 
 
 
 
Pro se plaintiff and 
appellee. 
 
 
MICHAEL WAGNER 
Yankton, South Dakota 
 
 
 
 
Pro se defendant and 
appellant. 
 
*  *  *  * 
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS 
ON FEBRUARY 13, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         OPINION FILED 03/29/06 
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#23689 
 
PER CURIAM   
 
[¶1.]  
Michael Wagner (Wagner) appeals the modification of his child support 
obligation.  We affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
[¶2.]  
Wagner and Amy Lyngstad Wagner (Lyngstad) were married on May 
12, 1990.  They were divorced on March 16, 1999.  Lyngstad was awarded sole 
custody of the couple’s two children, and Wagner was ordered to pay child support.  
Since that order, Wagner and Lyngstad have continued to litigate child support.  
Nine petitions for modification of child support have been filed, the most recent 
being March 11, 2005.   
[¶3.]  
A hearing on the latest petition was held before a referee.  The referee 
filed findings and an order recommending a child support obligation of $597 per 
month.  Wagner objects to three of the referee’s findings.  The relevant parts of 
those findings are:  
(3) [Lyngstad] … earns $9.00 per hour and works 40 hours a 
week.  From January 1, 2005, through April 9, 2005, she earned 
bonuses … in average of $191 a month.  
 
(4) [Wagner] failed to submit any information regarding his income 
and he refused to answer any questions regarding his income.  
Department of Labor records reflect that … Wagner was paid the sum of 
$8,084 from October 1, 2004, through December 31, 2004, which is an 
average of $2,695 per month.... 
 
(7) Neither party requested deviation from the child support schedule.  
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
[¶4.]  
Wagner’s specific objections are that:  a) the referee committed perjury 
relating to finding 3 (Lyngstad’s hours of work) and finding 7 (request for a 
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deviation), and Lyngstad committed perjury on her financial statement; b) a writ of 
mandamus should have been issued for the arrest of the referee and Lyngstad for 
the alleged perjury; c) Lyngstad had federal felony convictions, and therefore, her 
petition should have been denied; and d), with respect to finding 4, it was improper 
for the referee to independently obtain evidence of Wagner’s income from 
Department of Labor records.  The circuit court held a hearing on these objections 
and issued an order affirming the referee’s report in all material respects.1  Wagner 
appeals.   
Decision 
[¶5.] 
It is well settled that we review a child support referee’s findings 
of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and questions of 
law are fully reviewable.  Mixed questions of law and fact are 
classified as questions of law and are reviewable de novo.  In 
addition, when the circuit court has adopted a child support 
referee’s findings and conclusions, we apply the clearly 
erroneous standard of review to the findings and give no 
deference to conclusions of law.  Further, in applying this 
standard, we will not reverse findings of fact unless we are left 
with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.   
 
Mathis v. Mathis, 2000 SD 59, ¶7, 609 NW2d 773, 774 (internal citations, 
alterations, and quotation marks omitted).  
a)  Alleged Perjury 
[¶6.]  
Wagner makes three allegations of perjury: one against Lyngstad and 
two against the referee.  Wagner claims that Lyngstad committed perjury on a 
financial statement that was attached to her petition for child support modification.   
                                            
1. 
The circuit court did, however, correct one conceded mistake with respect to a 
health insurance deduction.  With the correction, Wagner’s final child 
support obligation was $562 per month. 
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On the financial statement, the following question concerning health insurance was  
asked:  “Do you have health insurance available for dependents through your 
employer”?  Wagner alleges that Lyngstad committed perjury in answering “no” to 
this question.   
[¶7.]  
However, a review of the hearing transcript reflects that Lyngstad was 
simply confused in answering this question: 
Referee: 
And then I see that you have medical and dental 
insurance deductions from your pay? 
Lyngstad: 
That’s correct.  
Referee: 
Do those insurance plans [referring to Lyngstad’s 
employment plan] cover the children? 
Lyngstad: 
No, they do not cover the children, because at this time I 
did not elect to do that because they have insurance 
through their father. 
  
(Emphasis added.)  This testimony, and a further exchange between the referee and 
Lyngstad, reveal that Lyngstad answered “no” on her financial statement only 
because the children were covered by Wagner’s plan, and therefore, there was no 
elective coverage available for the children under her plan at the time she completed 
her financial statement.  Considering the entire record, there is no evidence of a 
knowing and intentional misstatement of material fact.  See SDCL 22-29-1.  
[¶8.]  
Wagner next claims that the referee committed perjury by entering 
finding of facts 3 and 7.  In finding 3 the referee found that Lyngstad worked forty 
hours a week.  Wagner alleges perjury because there is documentary evidence (pay 
stubs) reflecting that on two occasions Lyngstad worked less than forty hours. 
However, when asked how many hours she normally worked each week, Lyngstad 
testified:  “I am normally supposed to get forty hours.  The last couple weeks it has 
been a little bit slower.  They’re renegotiating a contract … [n]ormally forty, yes, 
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that is correct.”  Thus, Wagner’s allegation of perjury on this finding is totally 
without merit.   
[¶9.]  
In finding 7 the referee found that neither party requested a deviation 
from the basic support schedule.  With respect to this finding, Wagner correctly 
points out that Lyngstad requested a deviation on her petition, but the referee 
found that “no party requested deviation.”  However, in reviewing this issue we note 
that SDCL 25-7-6.102 only allows a referee to address deviations when one has been 
“raised” by a party and only upon the entry of specific findings following the 
hearing.  In this case, the record reflects that although Lyngstad requested a 
deviation on her written application, she did not preserve the issue at the hearing 
by producing evidence or making a request for a deviation.  Therefore, finding 7 
simply explains why the referee did not address deviations.  In essence, Lyngstad’s 
initial request was withdrawn because she failed to preserve it at the hearing.  
Under these circumstances, the referee’s finding was correct.  
b)  Writ of Mandamus 
[¶10.]  
“[A] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will issue only 
when the duty to act is clear[.]”  Baker v. Atkinson, 2001 SD 49, ¶16, 625 NW2d 
265, 271.  “To prevail in seeking a Writ of Mandamus, the petitioner must have a 
clear legal right to performance of the specific duty sought to be compelled and the 
respondent must have a definite legal obligation to perform that duty.”  Id. 
                                            
2.  
SDCL 25-7-6.10 provides in part:  “Deviation from the schedule in § 25-7-6.2 
shall be considered if raised by either party and made only upon the entry of 
specific findings[.]” 
 
 
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(emphasis in original) (citing Sorrels v. Queen of Peace Hosp., 1998 SD 12, ¶6, 575 
NW2d 240, 242).  However, “[a] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest 
in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”  Linda R. S. v. Richard D. and 
Texas, 410 US 614, 619, 93 SCt 1146, 1149, 35 LEd2d 536 (1973).  Therefore, 
Wagner, as a “citizen[,] lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting 
authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” 
Id.  For that reason, Wagner had no legal right to the issuance of a writ of 
mandamus from the circuit court.  He also had no right to a writ of mandamus 
because his claims of perjury are meritless.   
c)  Federal Felony convictions 
[¶11.]  
Wagner alleges that Lyngstad has federal felony convictions, and 
therefore, her request for modification should be denied.  However, a child support 
proceeding only determines the amount of money necessary to support a child, and 
the support amount is not based on the character of the parents.  Furthermore, 
there was no factual dispute in the hearing that was resolved on Lyngstad’s 
credibility.  Therefore, absent an issue of credibility, Lyngstad’s criminal 
convictions, if any, were not material in this child support proceeding.  Wagner’s 
argument is without merit. 
d)  Wagner’s Wages 
[¶12.]  
In his last issue, Wagner argues that the referee erred in 
independently obtaining evidence of Wagner’s wages from a source outside the 
hearing.  In the referee’s defense, the record reveals that Wagner was completely 
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uncooperative and in fact obstructive in determining his employment and wages at 
the hearing, as is demonstrated by the following exchange: 
Referee: 
State your full name. 
Wagner: 
Mike Wagner. 
Referee: 
Where do you live? 
Wagner: 
I’ll plead the fifth. 
Referee: 
Well, Mr. Wagner, you can’t plead the fifth on your 
address.  There are no criminal proceedings pending in 
this court, so you’re not incriminated in any way by 
stating your address.  So, what’s your address? 
Wagner: 
None. 
Referee: 
You’re not living at 809 Burgess Road, Yankton, South 
Dakota? 
Wagner: 
At times, but not always. 
Referee: 
Well, okay, for purposes of this hearing it suffices that 
that’s where you’re living, and you’re single, correct? 
Wagner: 
Yeah. 
Referee: 
And you’re employed, right? 
Wagner: 
I’m not answering it. 
Referee: 
Well, isn’t it true that you’re employed by a company 
called Kohlberg Pioneer, Incorporated? 
Wagner: 
Not answering it. 
Referee: 
Okay, well, you don’t have to answer it.  I know that 
that’s the case, Mr. Wagner. 
Wagner: 
How do you know that? 
Referee: 
Because I checked. 
Wagner: 
Why did you check?  You’re the Referee. 
Referee: 
Because I figured you might be uncooperative.  And are 
you willing to tell what your rate of pay is? 
Wagner: 
She’s been convicted of identity theft.  She’s taken out 
credit cards in my name before.  I’m not giving you 
identity information so she can do it again. 
Referee: 
Okay.  So would you – or then can I interpret that as 
meaning you’re not going to tell me your wages from over 
at Pioneer? 
Wagner: 
Nope. 
Referee: 
Okay.  For the record, according to the Department of 
Labor records from the period of – 
Wagner: 
I object to this. 
Referee: 
Well, your objection is noted, but it’s overruled.  The 
record reflects that from the period of October through 
December of 2004, Mr. Wagner was paid $8084 from 
Kohlberg Pioneer, Incorporated, which amounts to 
monthly gross income average of $2695. 
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Thus, because Wagner refused to disclose his wage information, the only 
information available to the referee was what the referee had obtained from the 
Department of Labor records.  Those records indicated that Wagner’s wages 
averaged $2695 per month.3 
[¶13.]  
 Additionally, while Wagner obstructed all efforts to determine his 
wage information and whether he was employed, he simultaneously sought a 
deduction for his contributions to his employer’s 401(k) plan.  But, in pursuing that 
deduction, he did not submit verifying pay stubs apparently because they would 
have revealed his wages.  
[¶14.]  
However, in the subsequent appeal to the circuit court, Wagner was 
granted his request to submit a pay stub to verify his 401(k) contributions.  And, on 
this occasion, Wagner again attempted to hide his wages, this time by submitting a 
pay stub on which his wage information was “whited out.”  Nevertheless, upon 
receiving the pay stub, the circuit court viewed it closely and observed that 
notwithstanding the attempt to obliterate the wage information, the wages were 
readable through the white out.  That pay stub also confirmed the referee’s finding.  
Once the court circuit disclosed that it could verify Wagner’s earnings through his 
own exhibit, Wagner then attempted to withdraw the exhibit, informing the court  
that it could not receive any new evidence at the hearing.  Thus, the circuit court, in 
its memorandum decision, correctly observed what Wagner was attempting to do:  
                                            
3.  
The referee verbally provided the information.  There was no evidence 
describing how the information was obtained.  
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Clearly, Mr. Wagner wants to have it both ways.  On the 
one hand he would like to have some consideration for his 
retirement contributions, but he doesn’t feel the court should 
have the readily available payroll information in his possession 
to verify his gross income.  Mr. Wagner has proceeded in an 
uncredible manner.  Once Mr. Wagner became aware that the 
court could verify that his gross earnings were in fact in the 
amount that the [r]eferee determined from the Department of 
Labor records, he has determined that he should withdraw the 
evidence which he offered to the court as part of his objections 
and he continues to do his best to hinder the [r]eferee and the 
court from obtaining the truth. 
 
The circuit court ultimately affirmed the referee’s finding on wages. 
  
[¶15.]  
Now on appeal, Wagner claims that the circuit court’s child support 
order was erroneously based upon information that the referee had obtained from 
the Department of Labor outside of the hearing process.  We do not, however, reach 
this issue because Wagner has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  “The party alleging 
error on appeal must show … error affirmatively by the record and not only must 
the error be demonstrated but it must also be shown to be prejudicial error.”  
Tovsland v. Reub, 2004 SD 93, ¶15, 686 NW2d 392, 398 (citing City of Sioux Falls v. 
Kelley, 513 NW2d 97, 104 (SD 1994)).  “Error is prejudicial when, in all probability 
… [i]t produced some effect upon the final result and affected rights of the party 
assigning it.”  Novak v. McEldowney, 2002 SD 162 ¶7, 655 NW2d 909, 912 
(emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
[¶16.]  
Here, Wagner failed to demonstrate prejudice because even if the 
referee erred in the procedural manner by which he obtained the wage information, 
Wagner agreed that the referee’s substantive wage information was correct.  
Wagner’s agreement occurred when he requested the referee to give him the 
deduction for his 401(k) retirement plan contributions.  When informed that the 
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referee would need to know Wagner’s income from employment before the referee 
could calculate the deduction, Wagner stated “[y]ou just stated my income from my 
job.”  The referee then explained “I know what your income as reported in 2004 by 
the Department of Labor, and that’s the only information I have.  I’m giving you an 
opportunity to give me further information.  If you don’t want to, then I won’t take 
it.”  Wagner then replied “[i]t’s five percent off of what it says there [referring to the 
Department of Labor wage information].”  Thus, Wagner agreed that the 
Department of Labor information was correct.  And, because Wagner agreed that 
the substantive wage information was correct, the referee’s procedural method of 
obtaining it had no effect on the final result.  Therefore, Wagner was not prejudiced 
by the procedure utilized by the referee.4 
Motion for costs and damages 
[¶17.]  
Wagner filed an appellate motion for “costs” and “damages.”  SDCL 15-
30-65 sets forth the “costs” that may be allowed to the prevailing party on an appeal 
to this Court.  Because Wagner has failed to prevail on any issue, he is not entitled 
to costs.  Furthermore, his alleged “damages” are not recoverable under SDCL 15-
30-6.  His motion is denied. 
[¶18.]  
Affirmed. 
                                            
4.  
We express no opinion on the propriety of this procedure. 
 
5.  
SDCL 15-30-6 provides in part:  
 
Costs on appeal to the Supreme Court shall be allowed to the prevailing party 
in civil actions and special proceedings, provided, however, that the cost of 
printing or reproducing briefs as set out in … and the cost of transcripts … 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
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[¶19.]  
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP, ZINTER 
and MEIERHENRY, Justices, participating. 
 
________________________ 
(. . . continued) 
are recoverable only if the required proof of such costs is filed with the clerk 
of the Supreme Court prior to entry of the court’s decision. …