Case Title: State v. Castleman

Citation: 2024 ND 93

Docket Number: 20230371

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 2024-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA 2024 ND 93 State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Brent Castleman, Defendant and Appellant No. 20230371 Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, the Honorable Joshua B. Rustad, Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice. Stephenie L. Davis, Assistant State’s Attorney, Minot, ND, for plaintiff and appellee. Kyle R. Craig, Minot, ND, for defendant and appellant. 1 State v. Castleman No. 20230371 Jensen, Chief Justice. [¶1] Brent Castleman appeals from a district court’s judgment, entered following a guilty plea. On appeal, Castleman asserts the court erred in denying his motion to sever into separate proceedings multiple offenses and grant relief from prejudicial joinder of the offenses. We affirm. I [¶2] In July 2022, the State charged Castleman with 13 separate offenses, which included: stalking, a class A misdemeanor in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(c)(1); harassment, a class B misdemeanor in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-07(1)(b); tampering with physical evidence, a class A misdemeanor in violation of N.D.C.C § 12.1-09-03; and 10 counts of disobedience of a judicial order, a class A misdemeanor in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-10-05. Castleman filed a motion for relief from prejudicial joinder in October 2022, requesting the 13 counts all be severed into individual trials. The district court denied Castleman’s motion, finding as follows: Although the charges relate to different dates, times, and locations, it appears that witnesses to many of the charges would be the same. It also appears that all charges are connected with a common scheme or plan. Judicial economy would be best served by trying the charges together, and it does not appear to the Court that Defendant would be prejudiced by one trial. [¶3] Castleman subsequently entered conditional Alford pleas under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) on the charges of stalking, harassment, tampering with physical evidence, and three counts of disobedience of a judicial order, and the balance of the charges were dismissed. When entering the guilty pleas, Castleman reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to sever. 2 II [¶4] Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 8, a “complaint may charge a defendant in separate counts with two or more offenses if the offenses charged . . . are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” The purpose of Rule 8 is to provide judicial convenience and economy. State v. Wamre, 1999 ND 164, ¶ 30, 599 N.W.2d 268. However, “[i]f the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, a complaint, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the prosecution, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 14(a). [¶5] In reviewing a decision to consolidate charges for separate offenses we have recognized the following standard of review: A decision to consolidate offenses at trial is left to the discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse a trial court’s decision only if there is a clear abuse of discretion. Under Rule 14, an aggrieved defendant may seek relief from prejudicial joinder, but has the burden of demonstrating substantial prejudice from a consolidated trial. The defendant’s burden is arduous. A mere showing that a separate trial would have provided a better chance of an acquittal will not suffice. State v. Freed, 1999 ND 185, ¶ 11, 599 N.W.2d 858 (cleaned up). A court abuses its discretion by acting in an “arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” State v. Archambault, 2022 ND 198, ¶ 5, 982 N.W.2d 8 (quoting State v. Kolstad, 2020 ND 97, ¶ 26, 942 N.W.2d 865). [¶6] Castleman argues the offenses should not have been joined because the prejudice is extreme and the charges involved various offenses involving different victims, occurring at different times, locations, and methods of contact. He further argues that the district court’s decision is conclusory, amounting to nothing more than a recitation of N.D.R.Crim.P. 14. 3 [¶7] Castleman’s request for relief to the district court was limited to a request to separate all 13 counts into individual trials, specifically stating during the argument, “[o]ur position is, is that they should all individually stand or fail on their own merits, that he should be entitled to separate trials on each and every one of these allegations.” During Castleman’s argument to the court, he failed to raise any specifics as to what prejudice would occur or indicate what hindrance joining the charges would have on his ability to defend against any of the charges. Instead, he made naked assertions that prejudice may occur based on the number of offenses being charged, the jury would “be overwhelmed with just the sheer number of charges, and they [would] convict,” the jury “[would not] look at the evidence,” and joinder would impede his ability to testify regarding some offenses, but not all of the offenses. The record does not support a finding, as urged by Castleman, that he suffered substantial prejudice as a result of the joinder. [¶8] The district court’s findings are brief, but all are supported by the record. The findings include the following: although the charges related to different dates, times, and locations, the witnesses to many of the charges would be the same; all charges were connected with a common scheme or plan; judicial economy would be best served by trying the charges together; and Castleman would not be prejudiced by one trial. With the exception of whether he would be prejudiced by the joinder, Castleman does not directly challenge any of the findings. Given those findings, and Castleman’s lack of evidence to the contrary, we conclude the court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, the court’s decision was the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination, and the court did not misinterpret or misapply the law. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Castleman’s motion to sever and allowing the charges to be joined in a single action. III [¶9] Castleman failed to provide a record sufficient to support a finding he would have been substantially prejudiced by the joinder of the offenses at trial. The district court’s findings are sufficient to support its decision and we 4 conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Castleman’s request to sever the charges into thirteen different trials. We affirm. [¶10] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. Daniel J. Crothers Lisa Fair McEvers Jerod E. Tufte Douglas A. Bahr