Case Title: Ex parte Road Gear Truck Equipment, LLC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1170238

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2019-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: November 15, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1170238
____________________
Ex parte Road Gear Truck Equipment, LLC
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Deborah Dement et al.
v.
Road Gear Truck Equipment, LLC)
(Marshall Circuit Court, CV-17-21)
PER CURIAM.
Road Gear Truck Equipment, LLC ("Road Gear"), a
corporation based in 
Franklin County, petitions this Court for
1170238
a writ of mandamus directing the Marshall Circuit Court to
vacate its order denying Road Gear's motion to transfer the
underlying action to the Franklin Circuit Court and to enter
an order transferring the action. We deny the petition.
I.  Facts
The complaint describes the incident underlying this
action:
"On March 22, 2017, Vernon Dement was operating
a 1994 Kenworth tractor trailer pulling a log [load]
along Hobbs Island Road in Madison County, Alabama.
While traveling west along Old Highway 431, Mr.
Dement's log truck entered a curve to the left
entering Hobbs Island Road and over turned, stopping
the forward motion of the truck. The cab guard on
the 
truck 
was 
defective 
and/or 
unreasonably
dangerous in that it allowed the cargo of logs to
crash into the passenger compartment, crushing Mr.
Dement to death inside the vehicle, and injuring
Mrs. Dement who was a passenger in the truck. The
cab 
guard 
was 
defective 
and/or 
unreasonably
dangerous in that it was improperly manufactured
and/or designed and lacked proper warnings. The
failure of said cab guard was a direct and proximate
cause of the death of Mr. Dement and the injuries to
Mrs. Dement."
Road Gear 
manufactures trucking 
equipment, including "cab
guards" designed to prevent passengers in tractor-trailer
trucks from being injured by shifting loads.  It is undisputed
that Road Gear's principal place of business is located in
Russellville in Franklin County.
2
1170238
On August 4, 2017, Deborah Dement filed this action in
the Marshall Circuit Court on behalf of herself and in her
capacity as the personal representative and administrator of
the estate of her deceased husband against Road Gear and
fictitiously named defendants.  Dement alleged that her
injuries and the death of her husband were caused by Road
Gear's negligence and wantonness and that Road Gear was liable
under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine
("the AEMLD").  Dement alleged in her complaint that venue was
proper in Marshall County because she resided in Marshall
County and Road Gear "does business in Marshall County." 
On September 6, 2017, Road Gear filed a motion for a
change of venue in which it contended that venue was not
proper in Marshall County because, it said, Road Gear did not
conduct business in Marshall County.  Road Gear argued that
venue was proper in either Madison County, the location of the
accident, or in Franklin County, the location of Road Gear's
principal place of business, where the subject cab guard was
designed and manufactured.  In support of its motion, Road
3
1170238
Gear filed an affidavit from its general manager, Jason Gist,
in which he stated, in part:
"2.  Road Gear has its principal place of business
in Russellville, Franklin County, Alabama. Road
Gear's registered agent for service of process is
located in Russellville, Franklin County, Alabama.
"3.  Road Gear does not have any agents in Marshall
County, Alabama.
"4.  Road Gear does not have any stores, dealers,
salesmen, affiliates or subsidiaries in Marshall
County, Alabama.
"5.  All activities of Road Gear involving the
design, manufacture, and inspection of Road Gear
equipment occurs in Russellville, Franklin County,
Alabama.
"6.  Road Gear sells and distributes its equipment
through various truck dealers, trailer dealers
and/or aftermarket truck/trailer part dealers, none
of which are located in Marshall County, Alabama."
After Dement filed an amended complaint, Road Gear filed
a renewed motion for a change of venue in which it reiterated
its contention that venue was improper in Marshall County. 
On October 19, 2017, Dement filed a response in
opposition to Road Gear's motion for a change of venue in
which she contended that venue was proper in Marshall County
because, she said, Road Gear did business in Marshall County
through 
FleetPride, Inc. 
("FleetPride"), which 
sells 
truck 
and
4
1170238
trailer parts and has a store in Albertville in Marshall
County ("the Albertville FleetPride store").  Dement filed
three affidavits in support of this contention.  The first
affidavit, from her attorney's private investigator, Brian
Sims, stated, in part:
"1.  Prior to August 1, 2017, I called Road Gear
Truck Equipment LLC about purchasing a cab guard. I
was told by 'Anthony' that I would have to make my
purchase 
from 
Road 
Gear's 
exclusive 
dealer
'FleetPride'.
"2.  On or before August 1, 2017, I went to the
FleetPride dealership located at 8941 US Highway 431
North in Albertville, Marshall County, Alabama.
"3.  While at the FleetPride location, I asked
whether the dealership sold Road Gear Equipment
Company, LLC products. I was informed that they did
sell Road Gear Equipment Company, LLC products and
I was provided with a quote for a Road Gear cab
guard size 68x70 with a window and chain rack and
tray and mounting kit. ...
"4.  The FleetPride dealer also showed me a Road
Gear catalog related to the Road Gear products they
sold and we used it to select the cab guard model
for the quote I received.
5.  Subsequently, I purchased a Road Gear cab guard
from FleetPride located in Marshall County, Alabama.
..."1
1A copy of the check Sims wrote to purchase the cab guard
is dated September 22, 2017.
5
1170238
The two other affidavits Dement submitted in support of
her contention that Road Gear does business in Marshall County
were from employees of the Albertville FleetPride store.
Bradley Hooper's affidavit stated:
"1.  I am an Alabama resident and I have worked for
FleetPride Truck and Trailer Parts in Albertville,
Alabama for 10 years.
"2.  The FleetPride location where I work is an
authorized dealer for Road Gear Truck Equipment LLC.
FleetPride where I work has sold Road Gear products
and been an authorized dealer for Road Gear as long
as I have been employed with FleetPride."
FleetPride employee Adam Bridges's affidavit was nearly
identical to Hooper's affidavit except that Bridges stated
that he had worked at the Albertville FleetPride store for
four years.
On October 20, 2017, Road Gear filed a reply to Dement's
response to its motion for a change of venue, and Road Gear
attached a second affidavit from Gist.  In addition to
reiterating some observations from his original affidavit,
Gist stated:
"3.  I have viewed the Road Gear equipment rack that
has been made the basis of this lawsuit.  I observed
that the equipment rack bore serial number 638.  A
true and correct copy of a photograph of the portion
of the equipment rack made the basis of this lawsuit
bearing serial number 638 is attached hereto as
6
1170238
Exhibit 'A'.  From review of Road Gear's records, I
have determined that the subject equipment rack was
sold and delivered to the original purchaser in
Russellville, Franklin County, Alabama.
"4.  Additionally, all acts with regard to the
design, manufacture, assembly, distribution and sale
of the equipment rack bearing serial number 638
occurred at Road Gear's facility in Russellville,
Franklin County, Alabama.
"5.  Road Gear does not have any agents, authorized
to act on behalf of or bind Road Gear in any
fashion, in Marshall County, Alabama.
"6.  Road Gear does sell and distribute its
equipment through various vendors, including truck
dealers, 
trailer 
dealers 
and/or 
aftermarket
truck/trailer parts dealers.  Fleet Pride Truck &
Trailer Parts is one such aftermarket parts dealer
to whom Road Gear sells its equipment.
"7.  With regard to the particular piece of
equipment made the basis of this litigation, bearing
serial number 638, Road Gear did not sell it to
Fleet Pride in Albertville, Alabama.
"8.  Fleet Pride in Albertville, Alabama is not set
up as a customer in Road Gear's database of
customers.
"9.  Road Gear does not have any control over which
of Fleet Pride's 262 store front locations Fleet
Pride sells Road Gear's equipment.
"10.  Road Gear has one place of business which is
located in Russellville, Franklin County, Alabama.
All of Road Gear's business records, design records,
production equipment, manufacturing facility and
personnel are located in Russellville, Franklin
County, Alabama."
7
1170238
Also on October 20, 2017, the trial court held a hearing
on Road Gear's motion for a change of venue.  Following the
hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it asked
for additional briefing on the issue of what constitutes doing
business by agent for purposes of determining venue.
On October 30, 2017, Road Gear filed an evidentiary
supplement to its motion for a change of venue.  The
supplement included a copy of the sales order from Sims's
purchase of a cab guard, which showed that the sale was made
to FleetPride in Irving, Texas, and then shipped to the
Albertville FleetPride store.  Road Gear also attached a third
affidavit from Gist.  In his third affidavit, in addition to
reiterating some 
observations 
made 
in 
his 
previous 
affidavits,
Gist stated:
"2.  Road Gear has never authorized anyone, at any
store or otherwise, in Marshall County, Alabama to
sell products as a dealer on its behalf.
"3.  Road Gear has never conferred any authority, by
word or act, upon any individual or company in
Marshall County, Alabama.
"4.  Road Gear does not have a sales team in
Marshall County, Alabama, nor a sales team or sales
persons that visit Marshall County, Alabama.
"5.  Road Gear does have a sales team located
exclusively in Franklin County, Alabama.
8
1170238
"6.  Road Gear does not have any employees or
personnel who live or work in Marshall County,
Alabama.
"7.  To the best of my knowledge, Road Gear has
never directly marketed to any consumers in Marshall
County, Alabama.
"8.  All of Road Gear's transactions end at its
point of sale.  Road Gear ships its products to its
purchasers F.O.B. Russellville, Alabama 35653,
and/or F.O.B., Origin Freight Prepaid.
"....
"11.  Road Gear does not own or lease any
facilities, offices, real property, or post office
boxes in Marshall County, Alabama and maintains no
records, documents, or files in Marshall County,
Alabama.
"12.  Road Gear does not do business with regularity
in Marshall County, Alabama and was not doing
business by agent in Marshall County, Alabama when
the complaint at issue was filed.
"13.  With regard to the piece of equipment
purchased by Plaintiff's investigator, Brian Sims,
from Fleet Pride Albertville, Alabama, a true and
correct copy of the Sales Order Acknowledgment for
said order has been attached hereto as 'Exhibit 1'. 
This Sales Order Acknowledgment is a business record
made, kept and maintained in the ordinary course of
business 
by 
Road 
Gear. 
 
The 
Sales 
Order
Acknowledgment identifies the purchaser as Fleet
Pride, P.O. Box 43369, Irving Texas, 75014-3369, not
Fleet Pride Albertville.  Further the Sales Order
Acknowledgment identifies the date of sale as
September 18, 2017. It also identifies the transfer
of ownership of the items shipped as 'FOB Freight
Collect'.
9
1170238
"14.  Road Gear does not operate a delivery service,
but instead utilized a third party carrier for its
shipping.  Thus, Road Gear did not send a truck to
Marshall County with the item purchased by Brian
Sims from Fleet Pride Albertville."
On October 31, 2017, Road Gear filed a second evidentiary
supplement to its motion for a change of venue to which it
attached an affidavit from FleetPride's regional vice
president for the Southeast, Harold Johnson, who stated:
"1.  I am a Regional Vice President for the
Southeast for FleetPride, Inc.  In that capacity, I
am 
the 
person 
responsible 
for 
the 
regional
management for all FleetPride Stores in ... Alabama,
... including the Fleet Pride Store located in
Albertville, Marshall County, Alabama.
"2.  I am familiar with the products stocked by
FleetPride 
and 
the 
stores 
located 
in 
the
above-listed states.  I am also familiar with the
entities from whom FleetPride obtains it products,
which entities FleetPride utilizes as stocking
vendors, and for which entities FleetPride acts as
an authorized dealer.  I am also familiar with which
entities 
FleetPride 
designates 
as 
preferred
suppliers.  To my knowledge, FleetPride does not
routinely stock any equipment manufactured by Road
Gear, nor does FleetPride routinely sell equipment
manufactured by Road Gear.  FleetPride is not an
authorized dealer for Road Gear, and does not act as
an agent for Road Gear in any capacity.  Road Gear
is 
not 
a 
preferred 
supplier 
of 
FleetPride.
Occasionally, FleetPride will purchase products from
Road Gear for resale to FleetPride customers.
"3. Generally, sales of Road Gear equipment by
FleetPride occur when a customer comes to one of our
stores and asks to procure a particular piece of
10
1170238
equipment.  From review of our sales records,
FleetPride, Albertville has sold one equipment rack
manufactured by Road Gear in the last year.  This
sale occurred on September 22, 2017.
"4.  With regard to Fleet Pride employees Bradley
Hooper and Adam Bridges, neither employee had
authority to bind FleetPride, Inc. in any type of
agency relationship or preferred vendor relationship
at any time.  Any representation made by Hooper and
Bridges as to an agency or authorized dealer type of
relationship was not made with the permission,
authority, or on behalf of FleetPride."
Also on October 31, 2017, Road Gear filed a motion to
strike the affidavits from FleetPride employees Hooper and
Bridges.  In the motion, Road Gear contended that the
employees had been misled by Sims.  In support of its motion,
Road Gear attached new affidavits from Hooper and Bridges,
dated October 30, 2017, in which they appeared to recant much
of what they had stated in their earlier affidavits.  Hooper's
affidavit stated, in part:
"1.  I am employed by FleetPride, Inc. in
Albertville, Alabama, as a Counter Parts Sales Lead,
Senior.  I have been so employed for the past ten
years.  In June or July of 2017, a person I now
believe to be Brian Sims came to my place of
employment in Albertville, Alabama.  Mr. Sims
advised that he wanted to purchase a piece of
equipment from Fleet Pride.  We do not have the
equipment he requested in stock in the store, but I
issued a quote for the price of the product and Sims
left the store.
11
1170238
"2.  Thereafter, Mr. Sims returned to FleetPride and
asked if I would sign a document because he said he
needed it as a 'receipt' to provide additional
documentation of the fact that he had purchased the
piece of equipment.  I did not write the affidavit
and did not contribute to the language he wrote in
the affidavit, with the exception of providing Mr.
Sims with the number of years that I had worked at
FleetPride.  I did not understand the affidavit to
be for the purpose of addressing the business
relationship or 'agency' relationship between my
employer, FleetPride, and Road Gear Truck Equipment.
I am not authorized by my employer, FleetPride,
Inc., to bind my employer in any fashion with regard
to any type of agency relationship, business
relationship or dealership relationship.
"....
"4.  To my knowledge, FleetPride in Albertville does
not regularly sell or stock equipment manufactured
by Road Gear.  Had I known that Mr. Sims intended to
use my affidavit to claim FleetPride was an agent of
Road Gear Truck Equipment, I would not have signed
the affidavit since I am not authorized to bind
FleetPride in that manner.
"5.  To the extent that the Affidavit that I
originally 
signed 
for 
Mr. 
Sims 
states 
that
FleetPride 
sold 
him 
a 
piece 
of 
equipment
manufactured by Road Gear such statements are true
and correct.  Any statement regarding FleetPride
being an agent or authorized dealer for Road Gear
was made without my understanding as to the meaning
and purpose of said statements, and such statements
are not my testimony.
"6.  I am aware that FleetPride does not stock Road
Gear Equipment, either on a regional warehouse level
or in the Albertville store.  In the past year, I
can only recall Fleet Pride Albertville selling one
equipment rack manufactured by Road Gear, and that
12
1170238
was the rack purchased by Mr. Sims in September
2017."
Bridges's 
affidavit 
contained 
substantially 
similar
information.
On December 4, 2017, the trial court entered an order
denying Road Gear's motion for a change of venue and its
motion to strike the affidavits filed by Dement.  The order
did not detail the trial court's reasoning.
Road Gear subsequently filed a timely petition for a writ
of mandamus challenging the denial of its motion for a change
of venue and its motion to stay discovery.  On February 20,
2018, this Court stayed all proceedings in the trial court
pending the disposition of the mandamus petition.  On
September 4, 2019, this Court held an oral argument on the
issues presented in this petition.
II.  Standard of Review
"'"The proper method for obtaining
review of a denial of a motion for a change
of venue in a civil action is to petition
for the writ of mandamus." Ex parte Alabama
Great Southern R.R., 788 So. 2d 886, 888
(Ala. 2000).  "Mandamus is a drastic and
extraordinary writ, to be issued only where
there is (1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
13
1170238
(3)  the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court." Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So.
2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995).  Moreover, our
review is limited to those facts that were
before the trial court.  Ex parte National
Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala.
1998).
"'"The burden of proving improper
venue is on the party raising the issue and
on review of an order transferring or
refusing to transfer, a writ of mandamus
will not be granted unless there is a clear
showing of error on the part of the trial
judge."  Ex parte Finance America Corp.,
507 So. 2d 458, 460 (Ala. 1987).  In
addition, this Court is bound by the
record, and it cannot consider a statement
or evidence in a party's brief that was not
before the trial court. Ex parte American
Res. Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 932, 936 (Ala.
1995).'
"Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089,
1091 (Ala. 2002)."
Ex parte Tyson Chicken, Inc., 72 So. 3d 1, 2 (Ala. 2011).
III.  Analysis
Road Gear contends that the trial court clearly erred in
failing to find that venue in Marshall County is improper and
in refusing to transfer the case to Franklin County. 2
2We note that, in oral argument before this Court, Road
Gear contended that Franklin County, and not Madison County,
was the proper venue for this case.
14
1170238
"'The question of proper venue for an action is
determined at the commencement of the action.' 
Ex parte Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532, 534 (Ala. 2001); see
also Rule 82(d)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.  'If venue is
not proper at the commencement of an action, then,
upon motion of the defendant, the action must be
transferred to a court where venue would be proper.'
Ex parte Overstreet, 748 So. 2d 194, 196 (Ala.
1999)."
Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Ala.
2002).
Section 6–3–7, Ala. Code 1975, governs venue for actions
against corporate defendants.  That section provides:
"(a) All civil actions against corporations may
be brought in any of the following counties:
"(1) In the county 
in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of real property that is
the subject of the action is situated; or
"(2) 
In 
the 
county 
of 
the
corporation's principal office in this
state; or
"(3) In the county in which the
plaintiff resided, or if the plaintiff is
an entity other than an individual, where
the plaintiff had its principal office in
this state, at the time of the accrual of
the cause of action, if such corporation
does business by agent in the county of the
plaintiff's residence; or
"(4) If subdivisions (1), (2), or (3)
do not apply, in any county in which the
15
1170238
corporation was doing business by agent at
the time of the accrual of the cause of
action."
(Emphasis added.)  Under § 6-3-7(a)(3), venue is proper in
Marshall County only if, at the commencement of the action
(August 4, 2017), Road Gear "d[id] business by agent" in
Marshall County. 
A.  Ex parte Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc.
We note at the outset that, while this petition was
pending, this Court decided Ex parte Mercedes-Benz U.S.
International, Inc., [Ms. 1170623, Jan. 4, 2019] ___ So. 3d
___ (Ala. 2019).  In Ex parte Mercedes-Benz, this Court held
that Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. ("MBUSI"), an
automobile manufacturer whose principal place of business is
located in Tuscaloosa County, was not "doing business by
agent" in Jefferson County even though MBUSI purchased
essential supplies for its manufacturing business from a
supplier located in Jefferson County.  The Court concluded
that MBUSI "was created to manufacture automobiles," which
occurs in Tuscaloosa County, and that "[b]y contracting with
its suppliers of automotive parts ... MBUSI is exercising a
corporate power that is 'merely a necessary incident' to its
16
1170238
business of manufacturing automobiles; it is not performing a
business function for which it was created."  Ex parte
Mercedes-Benz, ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting Farmers' & Ginners'
Cotton Oil Co. v. Baccus, 207 Ala. 75, 77, 92 So. 4, 5
(1921)).  In other words, in Ex parte Mercedes-Benz the Court
determined that purchasing supplies for the manufacturing
process was not a corporate act that could be used to
establish venue for a suit against MBUSI.  In reaching that
conclusion, the Court expressly overruled Ex parte Scott
Bridge Co., 834 So. 2d 79 (Ala. 2002).  Because of the
possibility that our decision in Ex parte Mercedes-Benz could
impact our analysis of the proper venue for this case, we
asked the parties for additional briefing with respect to the
potential impact of Ex parte Mercedes-Benz on the outcome in
this case.  
Road Gear argues that the foregoing holding from Ex parte
Mercedes-Benz supports its position because 
"[t]his Court pointed out that the problem with
Scott Bridge is that when applied to MBUSI, its
reasoning could create proper venue all over the
State of Alabama, as MBUSI buys supplies from over
100 different suppliers in the state.  Similarly, in
our case, if the sale of goods to a retail consumer
by a third party satisfies the requirement of a
corporation's 'exercising the function for which the
17
1170238
corporation was created' such reasoning could create
proper venue in any county where Road Gear products
can be found, potentially all over the state of
Alabama."  
Road Gear's supplemental brief, p. 6.  Road Gear insists that
it "is in the business of manufacturing truck equipment."  Id. 
Although Road Gear concedes that "one of [its] ultimate goals
... is to sell its products," Road Gear observes that it does
not sell its products to the general public but, rather, to
other businesses.  Id. at 6-7.  Thus, Road Gear argues, the
location where a Road Gear product is ultimately sold to a
consumer should be irrelevant to determining venue in a suit
against Road Gear involving one of its products.  In essence,
Road Gear is contending that consumer sales are "incidental"
to its corporate purpose, and so those sales should not be
viewed as an aspect of Road Gear's "doing business" for
purposes of determining venue.  
We conclude that the Mercedes Benz Court's analysis with
respect to the purchase of supplies in relation to a
manufacturer's corporate purpose has no application in this
case because, as Dement observes, "this case involves the sale
of [Road Gear's] products in [Marshall C]ounty."  Dement's
supplemental brief, p. 5 (emphasis added).  For more than a
18
1170238
century, this Court has held that the sale of products is
typically a function for which a manufacturing business is
created.  In International Cotton-Seed Oil Co. v. Wheelock,
124 Ala. 367, 370–71, 27 So. 517, 518 (1900), the Court
explained:
"Not every act done within the corporate powers
will constitute the business meant by the [venue]
statute.  In Sullivan v. Timber Co., [103 Ala. 371
(1894)], this court, construing this statute,
approved the test laid down in Beard v. Publishing
Co., 71 Ala. 60 [(1881)], where in defining the acts
of business meant by the constitutional requirements
of foreign corporations doing business in this State
it was said:  'There must be a doing of some of the
works or an exercise of some of the functions for
which the corporation was created to bring the case
within the clause.'  In applying that test it may
not always be easy to distinguish between acts done
in the exercise of corporate functions and those
done merely within corporate powers.  In the case at
bar the chartered purposes of the defendant are not
disclosed by the record except as they may be
inferred from the business in which it was engaged.
From the proof on that subject it appears that the
sale of its products is as much an exercise of
defendant's 
corporate 
functions 
as 
is 
their
manufacture.  The disposition of products is
ordinarily a function necessary to the continued
operations of a manufacturing corporation."
(Emphasis added.)  The Court quoted this passage with approval
in Ex parte Harrington Manufacturing Co., 414 So. 2d 74, 76
(Ala. 1982).  See also Ex parte Peabody Galion Co., 497 So. 2d
1126, 1129 (Ala. 1986).  
19
1170238
In short, this Court has repeatedly stated that product
sales ordinarily constitute one of the functions for which a
manufacturing corporation is created.  
This Court's holding in
Ex parte Mercedes-Benz turned on the distinction between the
"incidental" act of purchasing supplies and MBUSI's core
purpose of manufacturing automobiles.  Therefore, this
conclusion of the Mercedes-Benz Court has no bearing on
whether Marshall County -- the location of the Albertville
FleetPride store where Road Gear products may be purchased --
is a proper venue for this case.
Road Gear also contends that the Mercedes-Benz Court's
analysis regarding the sale of Mercedes automobiles to a
separate corporation is applicable to Road Gear's sale of
truck parts to FleetPride.  Specifically, in Ex parte
Mercedes-Benz the plaintiff argued that MBUSI did business in
Jefferson 
County 
because 
"some 
of 
the 
vehicles 
it
manufacturers are eventually sold to the public at 
dealerships
in Jefferson County."  Ex parte Mercedes-Benz, ___ So. 3d at
___.  The Mercedes-Benz Court rejected this argument because,
it said, "[t]here is no evidence indicating that MBUSI is
involved in the retail sale of any Mercedes-Benz vehicles." 
20
1170238
Id.  Instead, all vehicles were "sold to Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC ('MBUSA'), a separate legal entity with its principal
place of business in Atlanta, Georgia.  It is MBUSA who
controls the distribution or sale of Mercedes-Benz vehicles." 
Id.
Road Gear argues that its business model is analogous to
MBUSI's because, it says, it "sells its products through
intermediaries.  Just as MBUSA buys cars from MBUSI, a
separate corporation, unrelated to MBUSI, so too 
do 
FleetPride
... and other vendors buy products from Road Gear, which are
then sold to the public."  Road Gear's supplemental brief,
p. 2.  Road Gear adds that FleetPride "controls where and how
products it purchases from Road Gear and other manufacturers
are sold and distributed among its 262 stores."  Id.  
Dement counters that Road Gear's sales are more retail-
oriented than Road Gear tries to make them appear when it
emphasizes that all sales occur at the point of origin, i.e.,
Road Gear's manufacturing plant in Franklin County.  Dement
argues that,
"in Ex parte Mercedes-Benz, Defendant MBUSI sold all
of its vehicles in mass to MBUSA, a separate
corporate entity.  It was MBUSA who decided which
retail store received the vehicles and the quantity
21
1170238
of vehicles.  Defendant MBUSI was simply a wholesale
manufacturer.
"There is no evidence before this Court that
Road Gear mass produces its products.  There is no
evidence before this Court that Road Gear sells its
products in mass to large retail chain stores.
Instead, Road Gear targets the market of its after-
market dealers by providing them catalogs of its
products so that consumers can order specific Road
Gear products.  Road Gear in turn then ships its
product directly to the forum county.  Thus, Road
Gear 'directs' the arrival of its products to the
forum county."
Dement's supplemental brief, pp. 16-17.
We see no need to evaluate whether Road Gear operates as
a wholesale manufacturer or as a retail manufacturer because
this portion of Ex parte Mercedes-Benz referenced by the
parties essentially turned on the fact that MBUSA was not
MBUSI's "agent" for venue purposes.  See Ex parte Mercedes-
Benz, ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting Ex parte Tyson Chicken, Inc.,
72 So. 3d 1, 3 (Ala. 2011), for the proposition that "'[t]he
language of the statute –- "does business by agent in the
county of plaintiff's residence" -- implies more than the
undirected arrival in the county of the plaintiff's residence
22
1170238
of products produced by the defendant corporation'").3  We
address that issue in part B of the analysis.
B.  Is FleetPride Road Gear's "Agent" for Business in Marshall
County?
Road Gear contends that the evidence submitted to the
trial court clearly shows that Road Gear does not do business
by agent in Marshall County because:  its principal place of
business is in 
Franklin County; all the design, manufacturing,
and testing of its products occurs in Franklin County; Road
Gear's only sales team is located in Franklin County; Road
Gear does not have any employees who live or work in Marshall
County; Road Gear has no real property and maintains no
records or files in Marshall County; Road Gear does not
directly market to consumers in Marshall County; and all Road
Gear transactions end at the point of sale in Russellville,
including the sale of the cab guard that is the subject of
this action.
Dement counters that the evidence shows that Road Gear
does business by agent in Marshall County through the
Albertville FleetPride store.  She argues that FleetPride is
3If MBUSA had been MBUSI's agent, then obviously the fact
that MBUSI-manufactured automobiles ended up being sold in
Jefferson County would not be "undirected."
23
1170238
Road Gear's agent because, she says, Road Gear is in the
business of selling truck parts that it manufactures and the
Albertville FleetPride store is the "means" by which Road Gear
sells its products in Marshall County.  For support for her
argument, Dement relies upon Ex parte Peabody Galion Co.,
supra, the case that is the genesis of the "means" test of
establishing agency for venue purposes.
Peabody Galion concerned a wrongful-death action in which
Willie G. Walker, a sanitation worker employed by the City of
Tuskegee, was killed when a garbage truck backed over him. 
The truck was equipped with an "E Z Pack" rear-loading
compaction unit that did not have a "back-up" alarm.  The
compaction unit was manufactured by Peabody Galion Company
("Peabody"), a Delaware corporation that was qualified to do
business in Alabama but had no business offices in the State. 
Peabody sold all of its equipment through distributors,
including its codefendant Truck Equipment, the exclusively
authorized Peabody dealer in Alabama.
Walker's personal representative filed the action in
Macon County.  Peabody filed a motion contending that venue in
Macon County was improper, and Peabody sought the transfer of
24
1170238
the case to Jefferson or Montgomery County.4  Peabody
contended that the trial court erred in concluding that venue
was proper in Macon County simply because Truck Equipment sold
one of Peabody's E Z Packs to the City of Tuskegee.  This
Court concluded, however, that Truck Equipment was Peabody's
agent for doing business in Alabama, and, in so concluding,
the Court stated:
"Peabody's lack of control over Truck Equipment's
method of conducting its business cannot be used by
Peabody as the basis for claiming Truck Equipment is
not an agent of Peabody.  Clearly, it is through the
sales efforts of its exclusively authorized Alabama
distributor, Truck Equipment, that Peabody was able
to sell an 'E Z Pack' unit to the City of Tuskegee;
therefore, Truck Equipment was the means by which
Peabody was able to do business in Alabama.
Therefore, in the sense here relevant, Truck
Equipment was the agent of Peabody."
497 So. 2d at 1129 (final emphasis added). 
Dement argues that just as Truck Equipment was the means
by which Peabody did business in Macon County, FleetPride is
the means by which Road Gear does business in Marshall County.
4Peabody 
conceded 
that 
it 
did 
business 
in 
Jefferson County
through Truck Equipment, whose principal place of 
business was
located in Birmingham, which is where Peabody representatives
would meet with Truck Equipment representatives when they
would travel to Alabama.  Peabody also conceded that it did
business in Montgomery County, the address of its registered
agent for service of process.
25
1170238
She contends that, just as in Peabody Galion the fact that
Truck Equipment was an independent business did not prevent it
from being Peabody's agent for venue purposes, the fact that
FleetPride is an independent business not controlled by Road
Gear should not prevent FleetPride from being considered Road
Gear's agent in Marshall County. 
Road Gear responds that Peabody Galion is distinguishable
on several grounds.  First, Peabody was a foreign corporation
whose only means of doing business in Alabama was through its
"exclusively 
authorized 
Alabama 
distributor, 
Truck 
Equipment." 
Ex parte Peabody Galion Co., 497 So. 2d at 1129 (emphasis
omitted).  In contrast, Road Gear is a domestic corporation
whose principal place of business is in Franklin County. 
Second, unlike Peabody, which conceded that Truck Equipment
was its only authorized dealer in Alabama, Road Gear did not
concede that FleetPride was its authorized dealer or even that
it had any authorized dealers.  Third, Road Gear argues that
the characteristics of the relationship between Peabody and
Truck Equipment that the Peabody Galion Court highlighted do
not exist between Road Gear and FleetPride.  For example, the
Peabody Galion Court observed that "Peabody does ... require
26
1170238
its distributors[, including Truck Equipment,] to maintain a
minimum inventory of Peabody parts, to be trained to perform
repairs on Peabody equipment, and to engage actively in the
sale and distribution of Peabody products within a designated
area."  497 So. 2d at 1128.  
Unfortunately for Road Gear, the distinctions it notes
between this case and the Peabody Galion decision do not
warrant ignoring the "means test" enunciated in Peabody
Galion.  The fact that Peabody was a foreign corporation is
irrelevant because Alabama law makes no distinction between
foreign and domestic corporations with regard to venue.  See
Ex parte Fontaine Trailer Co., 854 So. 2d 71, 78 (Ala. 2003)
(observing that "'[t]he Alabama Constitution of 1901, as
amended by Amendment No. 473, makes venue the same for
domestic and foreign corporations and requires that they be
treated identically for venue purposes'" (quoting Ex parte
Allen, 655 So. 2d 962, 963 (Ala. 1995))).  Gist's and
Johnson's testimony that FleetPride was not an authorized
dealer of Road Gear products was disputed by the original
affidavits of FleetPride employees Hooper and Bridges.  
27
1170238
As for the characteristics of the relationship between
Peabody and Truck Equipment, the Peabody Galion Court listed
those for support of the fact that Truck Equipment was the
means by which Peabody did business in Alabama; the Court
never indicated that those same characteristics were required
for any entity to be the means by which a corporation does
business in a particular county.  Even though some of those
characteristics evinced a right of control by Peabody over
Truck Equipment, this Court has subsequently noted:
"Peabody tells us that for the purpose of venue, the
element of control, or lack thereof, of the
principal over its agent is not determinative.  ... 
If the entity is the 'means' by which the principal
is able to do business in a particular county, then
the entity is the 'agent' of the principal for venue
purposes."
Ex parte Charter Retreat Hosp., Inc., 538 So. 2d 787, 789–90
(Ala. 1989).  In other words, as Peabody Galion itself
explained: 
"Whether an entity is an agent of a ...
corporation, as contemplated by the Constitution and
the [venue] statute, is not tested by the standard
for determining agency in the context of a
principal/agent relationship with the attendant
burden of the doctrine of respondeat superior (e.g.,
civil and criminal 
liability imputed to the
principal for the wrongful acts of the agent
committed 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
agent's
employment)."
28
1170238
497 So. 2d at 1128–29.
Having concluded that Peabody Galion is applicable, the
only remaining question is whether the Albertville FleetPride
store is the means by which Road Gear does business in
Marshall County?  See Charter Retreat Hosp., 538 So. 2d at 790
("If the entity is the 'means' by which the principal is able
to do business in a particular county, then the entity is the
'agent' of the principal for venue purposes.").  That question
must be answered in the affirmative, given that the evidence
reveals that customers are able to purchase Road Gear truck
parts at the Albertville FleetPride store by ordering them
through a Road Gear catalog.  Accordingly, for purposes of
determining venue, FleetPride is 
Road Gear's "agent" for doing
business in Marshall County. 
C.  Does Road Gear Regularly Do Business in Marshall County?
Road Gear also contends that, even if FleetPride is
considered Road Gear's agent for venue purposes, venue still
would not be proper in Marshall County because, it says, Road
Gear has demonstrated that it did not regularly do business
there at the time Dement filed her action. 
29
1170238
"To establish that a corporation does business
in a particular county for purposes of venue, past
isolated transactions are inconclusive.  Ex parte
Harrington Mfg. Co., 414 So. 2d 74 (Ala. 1982).  A
corporation does business in a county for purposes
of § 6–3–7 if it performs with some regularity in
that county some of the business functions for which
the corporation was created."
Ex parte Elliott, 80 So. 3d 908, 912 (Ala. 2011).
Gist testified that "Road Gear does not do business with
regularity in Marshall County"; that "Road Gear does not have
any stores, dealers, salesmen, affiliates or subsidiaries in
Marshall County"; that "Road Gear does not have any agents in
Marshall County"; and that "[a]ll of Road Gear's transactions
end at its point of sale," which is its principal place of
business in Russellville.  Also, according to Johnson, the
only Road Gear cab guard the Albertville FleetPride store sold
in the year Dement filed her action was the one ordered by
Sims.  Road Gear argues that this evidence demonstrates that
Road Gear did not regularly do business in Marshall County at
the time the suit was filed.
The problem for Road Gear is that Dement countered Road
Gear's evidence with the original affidavits of FleetPride
employees Hooper and Bridges.  As Dement notes, those
affidavits "established that FleetPride in Albertville has
30
1170238
been selling Road Gear products for as much as 10 years."
Dement's respondent brief, p. 18.  Furthermore, as Dement also
observes, 
Johnson's 
testimony 
about 
the 
Albertville 
FleetPride
store's sales of Road Gear equipment was "carefully crafted
and limited" to avoid any statement about the "many other
products" Road Gear sells.  Id. at 18, 19.  She observes that
"[n]one of [Road Gear's] supporting evidence or affidavits
attempt to address what other Road Gear products have been
sold in the last ten years by the FleetPride location in
Marshall County."  Id. at 19.
It is true that Hooper's and Bridges's subsequent
affidavits appear to undermine their earlier testimony, but
that simply raises an issue of fact; it does not settle that
Road Gear did not regularly do business in Marshall County.
Likewise, the number of cab guards the Albertville FleetPride
store sold does not dispositively speak to the regularity of
Road Gear's overall business in Marshall County.  "The burden
of proof on factual issues in a venue dispute is upon the
party or parties challenging venue in the forum."  Ex parte
Wiginton, 743 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Ala. 1999).  Thus, it was
Road Gear's responsibility to establish that it did not
31
1170238
regularly do business in Marshall County by countering
Dement's evidence with specific evidence.  Road Gear could
have introduced its own sales records or at the least had
Johnson testify with respect to FleetPride's sales of other
Road Gear equipment. Road Gear could have taken depositions of
key witnesses.5 Instead, Road Gear's evidence, taken together
with Dement's evidence, leaves open the possibility that Road
Gear regularly did business in Marshall County at the time the
suit was filed.  As we observed in setting out the standard of
review:  "The burden of proving improper venue is on the party
raising the issue and on review of an order transferring or
refusing to transfer, a writ of mandamus will not be granted
unless there is a clear showing of error on the part of the
trial judge."  Ex parte Tyson Chicken, Inc., 72 So. 3d at 2
5Parties are entitled to conduct discovery related to the
issue of venue.  See, e.g., Ex parte Michelin N. America,
Inc., 56 So. 3d 604, 612 (Ala. 2010) (quoting with approval
the observation in 14D Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller,
and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Jurisdiction § 3829 (2007), that "'[o]n occasion a party who
has raised a proper objection to venue will make use of
discovery before pressing for a decision on the venue
objection'"). Accordingly, depositions of the individuals who
provided affidavits could have been taken, and 
the 
conflicting
facts and inferences perhaps could have been resolved, or at
least the deposed individuals would have been subject to
cross-examination.
32
1170238
(internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).  
Road Gear
failed to establish that the trial judge committed a clear
error with respect to the issue of the regularity of Road
Gear's business in Marshall County.  
IV.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude, based on the
materials before us, that FleetPride was Road Gear's "agent"
in Marshall County for purposes of determining venue and that
Road Gear failed to show that it did not regularly do business
in Marshall County at the time the suit was filed.  Therefore,
under § 6-3-7(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, venue is proper in
Marshall County, and the trial court did not err in denying
Road Gear's motion to transfer the action to Franklin County. 
Accordingly, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
PETITION DENIED.
Stewart, J., concurs.
Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur in the
result.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin and Sellers, JJ., dissent.
Shaw, J., recuses himself.
33