Case Title: JIM LYKINS and JILL M. SELLARS V. HABITAT FOR HUMANITY, THE HEART OF WYOMING, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0045

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
JIM LYKINS and JILL M. SELLARS V. HABITAT FOR HUMANITY, THE HEART OF WYOMING, INC.2010 WY 118237 P.3d 405Case Number: NO. S-10-0045Decided: 08/18/2010
            
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2010

JIM LYKINS and JILL 
M. SELLARS,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
HABITAT FOR HUMANITY, 
THE HEART OF WYOMING, INC.,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Jim 
Lykins and Jill Sellars, pro se.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Jerry 
A. Yaap, Bishop, Bishop & Yaap, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a special 
concurrence.

 
 
*Chief Justice at 
time of expedited conference.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
In litigation 
disputing the ownership of a residential property in Casper, Wyoming, a default 
judgment was entered against the Appellants, Jim Lykins and Jill M. Sellars, and 
in favor of the Appellee, Habitat for Humanity.  Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars moved to set 
aside the default judgment.  The 
district court denied the motion, and Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars appealed 
that decision.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Mr. Lykins and Ms. 
Sellars present these issues:

 
 

1.            
Whether the District 
Court erred when it ruled that "the Defendants have failed to make the requisite 
showing of the grounds upon which the Default Judgment in this case should be 
set aside pursuant to Rules 55 and 60(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure."

 
 

2.            
Whether the District 
Court acted in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law; the District Court acted contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; the District Court acted 
without observance of procedure required by law; or the District Court ruling 
was unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(A), (B), (D), and (E) (LexisNexis 
2009).

 
 
Habitat for Humanity 
states the issues as follows:

 
 

A.           
Whether the District 
Court abused its discretion when it denied Appellants' motion to set aside the 
default.

 
 

B.           
Whether this Court 
should summarily affirm or dismiss the appeal for failure to designate or cite 
to any record on appeal as well as other disregard of the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.

 
 

C.           
Whether this Court 
should summarily affirm or dismiss the appeal since Appellants present no cogent 
argument or pertinent authorities in support of their 
position.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
According to the 
complaint filed by Habitat for Humanity, the late Vernon Christman established a 
revocable trust on July 19, 2001.  
The following month, Mr. Christman conveyed the disputed property to 
the trust.  The trust documents 
directed that the property be distributed to Habitat for Humanity at the time of 
Mr. Christman's death.  He died 
on January 7, 2009, and on April 23, 2009, Ann Marie Spencer, as trustee, 
executed a trustee's deed conveying the property to Habitat for Humanity.  Based on these documents, Habitat for 
Humanity claims ownership of the disputed property.

 
 

[¶4]        
Mr. Lykins and Ms. 
Sellars also claim ownership of the property, based on a "Purchase Offer, 
Acceptance and Receipt Agreement," dated December 2, 2008, in which they offered 
to purchase the disputed property from Mr. Christman for a total purchase 
price of $3,000.00.  Near the end of 
this document is the statement, "The undersigned seller accepts the foregoing 
offer this 1 day of December, 2008."  
The purported signature of Ms. Spencer, with the designation "POA," 
appears immediately beneath this language.

 
 

[¶5]        
Apparently Mr. Lykins 
and Ms. Sellars had possession of the property, because Habitat for Humanity 
served them with a notice to quit the premises on May 23, 2009.  In response, Ms. Sellars executed a 
document seeking "an injunction to cease and desist the transfer" of the 
disputed property, and recorded it with the Natrona County Clerk.  This document, according to the 
complaint, placed a cloud on the title.  
Habitat for Humanity contended that Ms. Sellars knew at the time she 
filed the document that the claim was groundless or false.

 
 

[¶6]        
The complaint also 
states that Habitat for Humanity filed a "Complaint in Forcible Entry and 
Detainer" in the circuit court of Natrona County on June 19, 2009, seeking 
possession of the property.  After a 
hearing on July 1, 2009, the circuit court ruled against Mr. Lykins and ordered 
his removal from the property.  It 
dismissed Ms. Sellars from the action without explanation.  The complaint alleges that the circuit 
court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to determine title to the real property.  

 
 

[¶7]        
To resolve that 
issue, Habitat for Humanity filed suit in the district court on September 9, 
2009.  Affidavits of Service 
attached to the complaint state that Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars were served on 
September 21, 2009.  Mr. Lykins and 
Ms. Sellars did not answer or otherwise respond to the complaint, and default 
was entered against them on October 16, 2009.  Following a hearing, at which Mr. Lykins 
and Ms. Sellars did not appear, the district court entered a default judgment 
against them on October 19, 2009.  
The judgment quieted Habitat for Humanity's title to the disputed 
property, divested Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars of any claimed interest in 
the property, expunged from the record the document Ms. Sellars had filed 
clouding the title, and restored possession to Habitat for 
Humanity.

 
 

[¶8]        
On October 27, 2009, 
Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, 
claiming that they had not been served with a copy of the summons.  The district court convened a hearing on 
the motion on December 18, 2009, and after considering the testimony and 
argument, it denied the motion to set aside the default judgment.  Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars filed 
this appeal.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶9]        
Whether a default 
judgment should be set aside is a decision that rests within the sound 
discretion of the district court.  
Whitney v. McDonough, 892 P.2d 791, 794 (Wyo. 1995); Vanasse v. 
Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996 (Wyo. 1993).  
Generally, the denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment is 
reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.  Whitney, 892 P.2d  at 794; Vanasse, 847 P.2d  at 
996.

 
 
We 
have said that "[a] court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances . . . and the ultimate 
issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did."  Three Way, Inc. v. Burton Enters., Inc., 
2008 WY 18, ¶ 16, 177 P.3d 219, 225 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Doenz v. Sheridan County Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 949 P.2d 464, 465 (Wyo. 1997)) (internal citations 
omitted).

Simek v. Tate, 2010 WY 65, ¶ 12, 
231 P.3d 891, 896 (Wyo. 2010).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶10]     
W.R.C.P 55(c) 
provides that, "For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default 
and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in 
accordance with Rule 60(b)."  
W.R.C.P. 60(b) provides, in relevant part:

 
 
On motion, and upon 
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons:  . . .  (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment.

 
 
Mr. Lykins 
and Ms. Sellars, as proponents of the motion to set aside the default judgment, 
had the burden of proving that they were entitled to relief under these 
rules.  Whitney, 892 P.2d  at 794, citing Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297, 301 
(Wyo. 1992).  Applying the standard 
of review set forth above, the question before us is whether the district court 
abused its discretion in ruling that Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars failed to carry 
that burden.

 

[¶11]     
Our review of this 
question is "greatly restricted" 
by the lack of a record on appeal.  
Zaloudek v. Zaloudek, 2009 WY 
140, ¶ 12, 220 P.3d 498, 502 (Wyo. 2009), quoting Arnold v. Day, 2007 WY 86, ¶ 9, 158 P.3d 694, 697 (Wyo. 2007).  
The hearing on the 
motion to set aside the default judgment was not reported.  Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars have not 
offered any alternative statement of the 
evidence that could have been settled by the district court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
3.03.  As we have explained in 
previous cases:

 
 
When 
this Court does not have a properly authenticated transcript before it, it must 
accept the trial court's findings of fact upon which it bases any decisions 
regarding evidentiary issues.  Capshaw v. Schieck, 2002 WY 54, 
¶ 21, 44 P.3d 47, 54 (Wyo. 2002).  The failure to provide a transcript does 
not necessarily require dismissal of an appeal, but our review is restricted to 
those allegations of error not requiring inspection of the transcript.  Lacking a transcript, or a substitute for 
the transcript, the regularity of the trial court's judgment and the competency 
of the evidence upon which that judgment is based must be presumed.  Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996); Combs v. 
Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 

Burt 
v. Burt, 
2002 WY 127, ¶ 7, 53 P.3d 101, 103 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

[¶12]     
According 
to the district court's decision letter, "The sole ground asserted by Defendants 
for the setting aside of the default and default judgment in this case is the 
alleged failure of service of a summons along with the complaint and other 
documents served upon Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars on September 21, 2009."  In support of this assertion, Mr. Lykins 
and Ms. Sellars submitted exhibits including copies of the complaint and other 
documents, but not the summons.  Mr. 
Lykins and Ms. Sellars asserted that these were all the documents they had 
received, and denied that they were ever served a copy of the 
summons.

 
 

[¶13]     
The district court's 
decision letter also recites that Habitat for Humanity provided two affidavits 
of service, one for Mr. Lykins and one for Ms. Sellars, both stating that the 
summons was among the documents served on them.  Habitat for Humanity also presented the 
testimony of the process server.  
According to the district court, his testimony indicated that he was an 
"extremely experienced process server," and that it was "not possible" that the 
summons was not served along with the other documents.  Based on its evaluation of the evidence, 
the district court wrote that it "strongly supports the conclusion that there 
was proper service under [W.R.C.P.] 4(d)(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons 
and of the complaint to the individual Defendants."  Because Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars 
failed to prove that they were not properly served, and did not demonstrate any 
other reason justifying relief, the district court denied the motion to set 
aside the default judgment.

 
 

[¶14]     
On 
appeal, Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars assert that the process server also testified 
that there were previous occasions on which important documents had been missing 
from papers he had served.  They 
also assert that he had been in possession of the documents for at least six 
days before serving them, making it more likely that the summons had been 
separated from the other documents when service was accomplished.  There is, however, no support in the 
record for these assertions.  If we 
assume that Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars correctly represented the process 
server's statements, then we should also assume that the district court heard 
and considered this testimony.  We 
defer to a district court's evaluation of the evidence when reviewing the denial 
of a motion to set aside a default judgment.  Whitney, 892 P.2d  at 
794.  Even if the assertions made by 
Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars are correct, and even if they were supported by the 
record, they would not provide an adequate basis for us to conclude that the 
district court abused its discretion.

 
 

[¶15]     
In the second issue 
raised by Mr. Lykins and Ms. Sellars, they ask us to review the district court's 
decision under the standards set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114.  That statute is part of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, and applies to our review of the actions of an 
administrative agency.  It does not 
apply to our review of the actions of a district court.  

 
 

[¶16]     
Finally, in its 
second and third issues, Habitat for Humanity urges summary affirmation or 
dismissal of this appeal.  We choose 
instead to affirm the district court's decision on the merits.  Affirmed.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice, specially 
concurring.

 
 
[¶17]   I concur in the result reached by 
the majority, but I would summarily affirm the district court.  No transcript or settled statement of 
the evidence has been supplied to this Court, so there is nothing available to 
us from which we may evaluate the determinations of the district court.  See W.R.A.P. 3.02, 3.03, 3.05, and Burt v. Burt, 2002 WY 127, ¶ 7, 53 P.3d 101, 103 (Wyo. 2002).