Case Title: Korn v. Marvin Fives Food Equip.

Citation: 362 Pa. Super. 559, 524 A.2d 1380

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1987-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
362 Pa. Superior Ct. 559 (1987) 524 A.2d 1380 Jonathan KORN, Appellant, v. MARVIN FIVES FOOD EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, Cleveland Range, Inc., Foxcroft Square Pavilion, Inc., t/a Benjamin Fox Pavilion a/k/a Foxcroft Square Company and Norman Goldstein, Appellees. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 12, 1987. Filed April 23, 1987. *560 Larry Glass, Philadelphia, for appellant. Anne Matchulet, Philadelphia, for Marvin Fives, appellee. Robert E. Hall, Philadelphia, for Cleveland, appellee. Before McEWEN, MONTEMURO and ROBERTS, JJ. MONTEMURO, Judge: Jonathan Korn, plaintiff/appellant, takes this appeal from the Order transferring his cause of action from Philadelphia to Montgomery County on the ground of forum non conveniens. Plaintiff/appellant filed his complaint in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on March 26, 1986 against Marvin *561 Fives Food Equipment Corp., Cleveland Range, Inc. (hereinafter Cleveland Range), Foxcroft Square Pavilion, Inc., t/a Benjamin Fox Pavilion, a/k/a Foxcroft Square Company (hereinafter Foxcroft) and Norman Goldstein. Marvin Fives is a Pennsylvania corporation with its office in Philadelphia; Norman Goldstein is a Philadelphia resident; Foxcroft is a Pennsylvania corporation with its office in Jenkintown, Montgomery County and Cleveland Range, Inc., is an Ohio corporation doing business in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff/appellant alleged in his complaint that Marvin Fives sold a food steamer, manufactured by Cleveland Range, to the Renaissance Restaurant located at the Foxcroft premises in Jenkintown, Montgomery County. Norman Goldstein, it is alleged, installed the steamer. On May 9, 1984, the steamer exploded and plaintiff/appellant, an employee at the restaurant, was seriously injured. Plaintiff/appellant's cause of action is founded on product liability. On March 13, 1986, approximately two weeks before plaintiff/appellant filed his lawsuit in Philadelphia, a lawsuit was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County in connection with the same accident that is the subject matter of plaintiff/appellant's lawsuit in Philadelphia County. The plaintiffs in the Montgomery County action are: Gerald Nabit, Gary Nabit, Renaissance at the Pavilion, Inc., and Switchville Tavern, Inc., and the named defendants are: Marvin Fives Food Equipment Corp., Foxcroft Square Apartment, Inc.,[1] Foxcroft Square Pavilion, Inc., Foxcroft Square Company, a Partnership, Norman Goldstein and Cleveland Range Company, Inc. The plaintiffs in the Montgomery County case allege property damage as well as personal injuries arising out of the explosion of the food steamer at the Renaissance Restaurant. Defendant/appellee, Cleveland Range, filed a motion to transfer under Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d)(1), requesting a transfer of the action to Montgomery County for the convenience of *562 the parties and witnesses.[2] Subsequently, the motion to transfer was joined by the other defendants, with the exception of Norman Goldstein. The motion to transfer was granted and plaintiff/appellant's timely filed motion for reconsideration of the transfer Order was denied. This appeal followed. Plaintiff/appellant has presented essentially only one claim for our review. He claims that because defendants/appellees presented no evidence upon which the trial court could have concluded that the parties and witnesses would be inconvenienced if the action remained in Philadelphia, the order transferring the action to Montgomery County solely on the basis of the motion and answer and the existence of a similar action in Montgomery County constituted an abuse of discretion. We agree and therefore reverse.[3] In a recently filed unanimous panel opinion of this court, Satterlee Petty v. Suburban General Hospital, et al., ___ Pa.Super. ___, 525 A.2d 1230, 1231-1233 (1987), we set forth certain legal principles which are just as applicable here: We note that in the case sub judice, Cleveland Range also labeled its request for transfer a "Motion" rather than a "Petition." Applying the above principles to this case, we are compelled to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in transferring the action to Montgomery county. *566 In its motion to transfer, defendant/appellee Cleveland Range alleged in pertinent part that: the vast majority of the witnesses in both the Philadelphia Lawsuit and the Montgomery County law suit reside in Montgomery County; that both lawsuits concern common issues of fact and of law with respect to negligence and strict liability; that both lawsuits arise from the same accident; that Montgomery County is the more convenient forum for the lawsuit begun in Philadelphia; and that each of the four defendants is represented by the same counsel in both lawsuits. Plaintiff/appellant in his answer to transfer motion denied that the vast majority of witnesses reside in Montgomery County and that the more convenient forum was Montgomery County. Plaintiff/appellant also alleged in his answer that although there were similarities in the two complaints, there were also a great many differences. Further plaintiff/appellant alleged that Philadelphia was the more convenient forum and that there should be no consolidation with the Montgomery County action. Plaintiff/appellant, in New Matter, alleged that discovery was necessary for the motion to be decided; that all the individual plaintiffs reside in Philadelphia; that the movants' attorneys are located in Center City Philadelphia along with plaintiff/appellant's attorney; that the movants' expert witness is from Cleveland, Ohio; that the accident site is physically closer to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas than it is to the Montgomery County Courthouse by nearly 20 minutes travel time; that plaintiff/appellant's injuries were treated in Philadelphia and that his expert witness is on the border of Philadelphia and Montgomery Counties. Defendant/appellee then denied each and every allegation contained in the new matter. Contrary to the rule set forth in Hosiery Corporation of America v. Rich, 327 Pa.Super. 472, 475, 476 A.2d 50, 51 (1984), the trial court granted the transfer without the taking of evidence by deposition or otherwise on disputed issues of fact. Nor did the trial court make a finding that the transfer was more convenient for both parties to the *567 action or their witnesses. See Nicolosi v. Fittin, 434 Pa. 133, 135, 252 A.2d 700, 701 (1969) (Emphasis in original). We refuse to sanction the transfer of a cause of action premised on the convenience of the parties or witnesses on the mere allegation, specifically denied by plaintiff/appellant, of the petitioner. Since the trial court had no evidence of convenience of parties or witnesses, it must have relied solely on the fact that there was a pending action in Montgomery County ". . . which invokes substantially the same claim. . . ." (Trial Court Opinion at 3). We find no basis in the law for such a transfer; indeed, if that were the law, the paramount rule that "a plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to weighty consideration and should not be lightly disturbed," Fox v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, supra, would be effectively negated whenever another plaintiff filed a complaint on facts arising out of the same incident in a different county. Such a result would be ludicrous. In Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 158 (3rd Cir. 1980), we find further instruction: Id. at 160, 161 (citations omitted). Here, the trial judge without any discussion of such a showing and without any reference to the elements which affect the private interests of the litigants or the public interest, merely granted the motion to transfer on the basis of the pleadings and the various memoranda of law in support of and opposed to the transfer. Defendant/appellee, Cleveland Range, had the opportunity to prove by competent evidence that a transfer of the *568 cause of action from Philadelphia County to Montgomery County would best serve the convenience of the parties or witnesses. It failed completely. That being so, the trial judge had no reliable information to use in weighing the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and consequently his grant of the transfer motion was an abuse of discretion. We reverse. Order reversed. Jurisdiction is relinquished. [1] We note that Foxcroft Square Apartment, Inc., is not a defendant in the Philadelphia lawsuit. [2] Cleveland Range also requested the trial court to consolidate the two actions, which the court quite properly we believe, refused to do. The court's denial of the request to consolidate has not been appealed and is not before us. [3] An order changing venue, although interlocutory, is appealable. Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) provides: "An appeal may be taken as of right from an order in a civil action or proceeding changing venue, transferring the matter to another court of coordinate jurisdiction, or declining to proceed in the matter on the basis of forum non conveniens or analogous principles." Consequently, the order transferring venue is properly before this court for our review.