Case Title: CBS, Inc. v. Labor and Industry Review Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP003707

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-3707 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
CBS, Inc., and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty  
Company,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and  
Richard Kamps,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  213 Wis. 2d 285, 570 N.W.2d 446 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 30, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 8, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick L. Snyder 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Crooks, J., (Opinion filed) 
 
 
 
Wilcox, J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by James C. Ratzel and Otjen, Van Ert, Stangle, Lieb 
& Weir, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by James C. Ratzel. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, LIRC, the cause was 
argued by Lowell E. Nass, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Richard Kamps, 
there was a brief by Scott C. Woldt and Curtis & Neal Law 
Offices, Oshkosh and oral argument by Scott C. Woldt. 
 
No.  96-3707 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-3707  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
CBS, Inc., and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty 
Company, 
 
  
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission and 
Richard Kamps, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   CBS, Inc. and Lumbermens Mutual 
Casualty Company (collectively, CBS) seek review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals.1  The court of appeals affirmed 
a  decision of the circuit court for Waukesha County, Patrick L. 
Snyder, 
Judge, 
upholding 
the 
Labor 
and 
Industry 
Review 
Commission’s (LIRC) determination that, based on the particular 
facts and circumstances, a ski injury of a traveling employee 
was compensable as an activity incidental to living within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) (1993-94).2  Because the 
scope of appellate review of the agency determination in this 
                     
1 CBS, Inc. v. LIRC, 213 Wis. 2d 285, 570 N.W.2d 446 (Ct. 
App. 1997). 
2 All future statutory references herein will be to the 
1993-94 volume unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  96-3707 
 
2 
case is limited, our conclusion is narrow.  Based upon the 
particular facts and circumstances of this case, and applying 
great weight deference, we conclude that LIRC’s interpretation 
of the statute to include Richard Kamps' knee injury as an 
activity incidental to living within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 
102.03(1)(f) is reasonable, and that there is credible and 
substantial evidence to support that determination.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
The following are the facts as found by LIRC.  In 
February 1994, CBS hired Richard Kamps (Kamps) to assist in the 
television coverage of the 1994 Winter Olympic Games in 
Lillehammer, Norway.  Kamps was to work as a "runner" for CBS on 
the bobsled and luge events from February 6 to February 27, 
1994.  Kamps’ duties required him to leave his home and stay in 
the Lillehammer area during the run of the Olympics.  CBS paid 
Kamps a daily wage, and provided meals and lodging.  On February 
21, CBS gave Kamps and his crew the day off from work.  There 
were no Olympic competitions scheduled that day for Kamps and 
his crew to cover.  During this free time, the crew members were 
free to do as they wished.3  Kamps’ immediate supervisor 
                     
3 The court of appeals made a factual finding that Kamps was 
"on call" at the time of his injury.  While we benefit from the 
legal analysis of the court of appeals, LIRC is the fact finder 
in this case.  Because LIRC did not base its ultimate factual 
finding on whether or not Kamps was "on call," and because we 
conclude that there was credible and substantial evidence to 
support LIRC's conclusion that Kamps' injury was compensable, we 
need not resolve the question of whether Kamps was "on call."  
The court of appeals erroneously relied on a factual finding not 
made by the agency. 
No.  96-3707 
 
3 
suggested that the crew go skiing as a group, which they 
ultimately did.  CBS provided the crew with transportation and 
free ski lift passes.4  Kamps did not need the lift passes to 
perform any part of his job.  While skiing, Kamps fell and 
injured his knee. 
¶3 
The record contains additional facts regarding Kamps' 
qualifications for the CBS job which support LIRC's findings.  
Prior to this injury, Kamps had worked for CBS on a number of 
other occasions since 1989.  That work included serving as a 
statistician, runner and stage manager for athletic broadcasts 
including the Super Bowl and NFL games, the World Series and 
playoff games.  Kamps testified that his strong athletic 
background in all sports helped in his positions with CBS.  That 
background included high school and college athletics, as well 
                     
4 CBS has contended throughout this case that it did not 
provide Kamps’ crew with ski lift passes.  LIRC heard evidence 
on this issue and ultimately made a finding of fact that CBS did 
provide Kamps with free ski lift passes.  Findings of fact made 
by LIRC when acting within its powers shall be conclusive in the 
absence of fraud.  See Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a). On review we 
must affirm LIRC’s decision if there is credible and substantial 
evidence supporting those findings, regardless of whether there 
is evidence to support the opposite conclusion.  See Valadzic v. 
Briggs & Stratton Corp., 92 Wis. 2d 583, 592 n.3, 593-94, 286 
N.W.2d 540 (1979); see also Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6).  Although 
the facts in the record do not plainly indicate that CBS gave 
its employees lift passes, uncontested evidence in the record 
indicates that CBS employees were able to receive free ski lifts 
and discounts on equipment rentals by displaying their CBS 
credentials.  The fact finder could reasonably infer from this 
evidence that employment by CBS played a role in Kamps' crew 
receiving free ski lifts.  See Brakebush Bros., Inc. v. LIRC, 
210 Wis. 2d 624, 630-31, 563 N.W.2d 512 (1997) (reviewing court 
accepts as conclusive any agency finding based upon a reasonable 
inference from credible and substantial evidence). 
No.  96-3707 
 
4 
as snow skiing for 16 years, and water ski performances for 17 
years. 
¶4 
The record also contains facts about Kamps' work 
detail for CBS at Lillehammer which support LIRC's findings.  
Kamps was originally hired to help cover the freestyle skiing 
event.  At some point that assignment was changed to the bobsled 
and luge events.  Kamps' duties as a production support person 
included transporting camera crews and linking those crews with 
the producer.  Kamps identified the Olympic competitors and set 
up video shots.  
¶5 
Evidence in the record also demonstrates that during 
Kamps' stay in Norway as a CBS employee, CBS provided access to 
a swimming pool and bar for its workers.  Kamps would talk with 
the athletes at night about the effect of the snow and ice 
conditions on the competition.   
¶6 
Following his ski injury, Kamps commenced a worker’s 
compensation claim with the Department of Industry, Labor and 
Human Relations (DILHR).  The administrative law judge (ALJ) 
dismissed Kamps’ application for a hearing, ruling that snow 
skiing is not usual and proper customary conduct of a traveling 
employee.  Kamps filed a petition for review by LIRC.  LIRC 
reversed the decision of the ALJ, concluding: 
 
The applicant was a traveling employe in a location 
where skiing was a reasonable form of recreation 
incidental to living.  The activity was encouraged and 
supported by the employer, even to the extent of 
providing the applicant with a free ski lift pass.  
While the applicant assumed some risk by going skiing, 
it was not an unreasonable risk nor one unexpected or 
No.  96-3707 
 
5 
unsanctioned by the employer.  Based on the particular 
facts and circumstances of this case, the commission 
finds that the applicant’s knee injury is compensable 
as an activity incidental to living, within the 
meaning of Section 102.03(f), Stats. (sic)    
¶7 
The circuit court, as well as the court of appeals, 
concluded that there was credible and substantial evidence to 
support LIRC’s findings.  Accordingly, the circuit court and the 
court of appeals affirmed the commission’s decision.  
I. 
¶8 
Findings of fact made by LIRC when acting within its 
powers are conclusive in the absence of fraud.  See Wis. Stat. § 
102.23(1)(a).  Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6) provides: 
 
If the commission’s order or award depends on any fact 
found 
by 
the 
commission, 
the 
court 
shall 
not 
substitute its judgment for that of the commission as 
to the weight or credibility of the evidence on any 
finding of fact.  The court may, however, set aside 
the commission’s order or award and remand the case to 
the commission if the commission’s order or award 
depends on any material and controverted finding of 
fact that is not supported by credible and substantial 
evidence. 
Factual findings made by the commission which are supported by 
credible and substantial evidence are conclusive.  See Brakebush 
Bros., Inc. v. LIRC, 210 Wis. 2d 624, 630-31, 563 N.W.2d 512 
(1997).  In addition, we must consider conclusive any finding by 
the commission based upon a reasonable inference from the 
credible evidence.  See Sauerwein v. ILHR Dep't, 82 Wis. 2d 294, 
300-302, 262 N.W.2d 126 (1978); Hunter v. ILHR Dep't, 64 Wis. 2d 
97, 101-02, 218 N.W.2d 314 (1974); Kraynick v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 34 Wis. 2d 107, 111, 148 N.W.2d 668 (1967).  If more 
No.  96-3707 
 
6 
than one inference can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, a 
question of fact is presented.  See Vocational, Tech. & Adult 
Educ. Dist. v. ILHR Dept., 76 Wis. 2d 230, 240, 251 N.W.2d 41 
(1977). 
¶9 
CBS urges us to review LIRC's interpretation of the 
statute, as well as its application to these facts.  Normally, 
statutory interpretation presents a question of law which a 
court reviews using a de novo standard.  See Hagen v. LIRC, 210 
Wis. 2d 12, 18, 563 N.W.2d 454 (1997) (citing Stockbridge School 
Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996)).  
Citing our decision in Nottelson v. ILHR Department, 94 Wis. 2d 
106, 115-16, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980), CBS argues that when the 
question presented is whether a particular set of facts meets a 
statutory  standard, the question is one of law.  LIRC and Kamps 
counter that in this case we are reviewing only a question of 
ultimate fact.  
¶10 A contest over whether the question presented is one 
of law or fact recurs in cases brought to this court.  
Resolution of that question is not always easy.  Indeed, our 
opinion in Nottelson fairly characterized the dilemma: 
 
One of the most troublesome issues in administrative 
law is determining whether . . . the application of a 
statutory concept to a concrete fact situation, should 
be treated as a question of fact or of law for 
purposes of judicial review.  In many cases we have 
said that the determination of whether the facts 
fulfill a particular legal standard is a question of 
law. . . . Nevertheless, merely labeling the question 
as a question of law and labeling the commission’s 
determination as a conclusion of law does not mean 
that the court should disregard the commission’s 
No.  96-3707 
 
7 
determination.  Determination[s] of [“a deviation for 
a private or personal purpose,” or of “acts reasonably 
necessary for living or incidental thereto”] call[] 
for a value judgment, and judicial review of such a 
value judgment, though a question of law, requires the 
court to decide in each type of case the extent to 
which it should substitute its evaluation for that of 
the administrative agency.  We have recognized that 
when the expertise of the administrative agency is 
significant 
to 
the 
value 
judgment 
(to 
the 
determination of a legal question), the agency’s 
decision, although not controlling, should be given 
weight. (Citations and footnotes omitted). 
Nottelson, 94 Wis. 2d at 115-117. 
¶11 When the agency uses its expertise to interpret a 
statute, we accord the agency one of two levels of deference, 
namely, “due weight,” or “great weight.”  See Hagen, 210 Wis. 2d 
at 18 (citing Jicha v. DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 284, 290-91, 485 
N.W.2d 256 (1992)).  There are four factors we use to determine 
whether great weight deference is appropriate: 
 
Great weight deference to an agency’s interpretation 
of a statute is appropriate when: (1) the agency is 
charged by the legislature with administering the 
statute; (2) the interpretation of the agency is one 
of 
long 
standing; 
(3) 
the 
agency 
employed 
its 
expertise or specialized knowledge in forming the 
interpretation; and (4) the agency’s interpretation 
will provide uniformity in the application of the 
statute. 
Id. at 18-19 (citing Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 
650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995)).   
¶12 We conclude that it is proper to apply great weight 
deference to LIRC’s interpretation of § 102.03(1)(f) in this 
case based upon the four-factor test.  The first factor is met 
by the fact that the legislature, through Wis. Stat. § 
No.  96-3707 
 
8 
102.14(1), has charged LIRC, together with the Department of 
Workforce Development (DWD)5, with administering Chapter 102.  In 
administering the chapter, courts have directed DWD and LIRC to 
interpret the statute and to make factual findings when 
determining a claimant's benefits.  Id. at 19.  The second and 
third factors are met by the fact that LIRC has interpreted the 
traveling employee provision for the last fifty-three years.  
See e.g., Armstrong v. Industrial Comm'n, 254 Wis. 174, 35 
N.W.2d 212 (1948); Hansen v. Industrial Comm'n, 258 Wis. 623, 46 
N.W.2d 754 (1951).  Finally, LIRC’s interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f) will provide uniformity in the application of the 
statute, as its judgment, rather than the judgments of various 
courts, will be uniformly applied to traveling employee cases.  
¶13 Because the proper standard of review in this case is 
great weight deference, we will affirm LIRC’s interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) if it is reasonable.  See Hagen, 210 
Wis. 2d at 20 (citing Lisney v. LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 506, 493 
N.W.2d 14 (1992)).  An unreasonable interpretation of a statute 
by an agency is one that “directly contravenes the words of the 
statute, is clearly contrary to legislative intent, or is 
otherwise . . . without rational basis.”  Id. (quoting Lisney, 
171 Wis. 2d at 506). 
II. 
                     
5 The Department of Workforce Development (DWD) was formerly 
known as the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations 
(DILHR).  See 1995 Wis. Act 289, § 275; 1995 Wis. Act 27, §§ 
9130(4), 9430(5). 
No.  96-3707 
 
9 
¶14 In this case, the parties do not dispute that Kamps 
was a traveling employee under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f).  The 
statute permits compensation to injured traveling employees 
under these circumstances: 
 
Every employe whose employment requires the employe to 
travel shall be deemed to be performing service 
growing out of and incidental to the employe's 
employment at all times while on a trip, except when 
engaged in a deviation for a private or personal 
purpose.  Acts reasonably necessary for living or 
incidental thereto shall not be regarded as such a 
deviation.  Any accident or disease arising out of a 
hazard of such service shall be deemed to arise out of 
the employe's employment. 
¶15 This provision was created to remedy situations in 
which employees, whose work required them to live away from home 
for periods of time, were not compensated for injuries sustained 
during normal activities of daily living on a business trip.  
See Neese v. State Medical Soc'y, 36 Wis. 2d 497, 504, 153 
N.W.2d 552 (1967).  The Neese court identified Creamery Package 
Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 211 Wis. 326, 248 N.W.2d 140 
(1933) as an example of an outcome that Wis. Stat. §  
102.03(1)(f) was meant to remedy.  In that case the court held 
that an employee's contraction of typhoid fever was not 
compensable because it was only conjecture that the employee 
contracted the disease during the exact time he was traveling 
for his employer.  See Creamery Package, 211 Wis. at 331-32.  
Gibbs Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 243 Wis. 375, 10 N.W.2d 
130 (1943) was another earlier failure to compensate a traveling 
employee for injury sustained during employment.  The Gibbs 
No.  96-3707 
 
10
court held that an employee's fall in the bathtub was not 
compensable because bathing does not arise out of employment.  
See 243 Wis. at 378-79. 
¶16 Because 
those 
early 
cases 
showed 
that 
"slight 
circumstances were apparently sufficient to show a 'deviation 
from 
employment,'" 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f).  Hansen v. Industrial Comm'n, 258 Wis. 623, 628, 
46 N.W.2d 754 (1951);  see also ch. 537, Laws of 1945.  The fact 
that the legislature worded the statute as a presumption in 
favor of coverage for traveling employees is a recognition of 
"the complexities of daily existence," Hansen, 258 Wis. at 626. 
 The presumption also reflects a legislative intent to "make 
liability dependent on a relationship to the job, in a liberal, 
humane fashion, with litigation reduced to a minimum."  Neese, 
36 Wis. 2d at 505 (citation omitted).  As a result of this 
change, the administrative agency and the courts came to 
acknowledge that "[d]uring the period of being at ease . . . 
[the traveling employee] is not required to seek immediate 
seclusion in a hotel and remain away from human beings at the 
risk of being charged with deviating from his employment."  
Hansen, 258 Wis. 2d at 626. 
III. 
¶17 CBS contends that skiing is not “reasonably necessary 
for living or incidental thereto” as required by Wis. Stat. § 
102.03(1)(f) because it is a recreational activity.  CBS then 
cites several cases where compensation was denied for injuries 
sustained during recreational activities.  See, e.g., Brynwood 
No.  96-3707 
 
11
Land Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 243 Wis. 380, 10 N.W.2d 137 
(1943), Schwab v. ILHR Dep't, 40 Wis. 2d 686, 162 N.W.2d 548 
(1968), and Sauerwein v. ILHR Dep't, 82 Wis. 2d 294, 262 N.W.2d 
126 (1978).  Those cases, however, are factually distinct and do 
not 
persuade 
us 
that 
compensation 
in 
this 
instance 
is 
inappropriate.  Neither Brynwood, Schwab nor Sauerwein involved 
traveling employees; therefore the presumption created by Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) did not apply in those cases.   
¶18 By 
analogizing 
the 
recreational 
activities 
of 
traveling and non-traveling employees, CBS essentially asks us 
to disregard the intent of the legislature to grant traveling 
employees broader protection for after-hours activities when 
their employment requires them to be away from home.  See 
Hansen, 258 Wis. at 628, (concluding that traveling salesman's 
death was compensable when his body was found not far from the 
restaurant where he had dined, and there was no evidence that he 
had 
abandoned 
his 
employment 
for 
a 
private 
or 
personal 
enterprise).  Moreover, because we review LIRC's determination 
based on the particular facts and circumstances of the case, we 
could not rule, as a matter of law, that a recreational activity 
such as skiing is never reasonably necessary for living, or 
incidental thereto.  See, e.g., City of Phillips v. ILHR Dep't, 
56 Wis. 2d 569, 579, 202 N.W.2d 249 (1972) ("[t]his court has 
pointedly refrained from ruling as a matter of law that 
intoxication is synonymous with personal deviation"). 
IV. 
No.  96-3707 
 
12
¶19 Next, CBS disagrees with LIRC's present application of 
the statutory presumption in favor of traveling employees.  CBS 
argues that Kamps engaged in a deviation from employment for a 
private or personal purpose.  CBS contends that there was no 
relationship between Kamps’ skiing and the employment purpose 
that CBS had for its runners.  To support this contention, CBS 
analogizes to several cases where the traveling employee was 
found to have engaged in a deviation for a private or personal 
purpose.  CBS cites Neese, 36 Wis. 2d 497, where a hospital 
relations consultant was injured while traveling 30 miles out of 
his way to eat at a particular restaurant, despite the fact that 
other satisfactory restaurants were closer.  The Neese court 
held that the employee was not engaged in an act reasonably 
necessary for living or incidental thereto.  See id. at 507. 
¶20 CBS also cites Dibble v. DILHR, 40 Wis. 2d 341, 161 
N.W.2d 913 (1968), where a salesman was killed in an automobile 
accident after driving away from his motel several hours after 
completing his sales calls for the day and after having numerous 
drinks in a lounge.  The Dibble court held that the employee's 
alcohol indulgence was not an act reasonably necessary or 
incidental to living.  Dibble, 40 Wis. 2d at 350.  The analyses 
in both Neese and Dibble demonstrate that even when a traveling 
employee engages in a deviation for a personal or private 
purposes, the agency or reviewing court must still consider 
whether the deviation is an act reasonably necessary for living 
or incidental thereto.  
No.  96-3707 
 
13
¶21 CBS also argues that Kamps' skiing was not usual and 
proper to his employment purpose, and thus is not compensable.  
Hansen provides that for an injury to be compensable, the worker 
must be doing the “usual legitimate things incidental to daily 
existence.”  Hansen, 258 Wis. at 626.  CBS points to Simons v. 
Industrial Commission, 262 Wis. 454, 55 N.W.2d 358 (1952) and 
Tyrell v. Industrial Commission, 27 Wis. 2d 219, 133 N.W.2d 810 
(1965), as examples of injuries held noncompensable because at 
the time of injury the employee was not engaged in an activity 
usual and proper to his employer's purpose.  
¶22 In comparing the facts of prior cases to the facts at 
 bar, CBS fails to address the level of deference we accord 
LIRC's determinations.  We are well aware that in some cases 
injuries sustained during recreational activities have been 
compensable, see, e.g., Phillips, 56 Wis. 2d at 576 (concluding 
that it would be speculative to find a deviation from employment 
when employee was hit by a car early in the morning, after 
stopping for a late night snack and visiting several taverns), 
and in others they have not.  Compare Phillips with Dibble, 40 
Wis. 2d at 350-51.  The focus of our inquiry on review is not 
whether recreational downhill skiing by a traveling employee is 
generally 
compensable. 
 
Rather, 
our 
focus 
is 
on 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
LIRC's 
determination, 
based 
upon 
the 
particular facts and circumstances in this case.  Because we 
afford LIRC great weight deference, we must affirm its decision 
if it is reasonable.  See Hagen, 210 Wis. 2d at 20.  LIRC's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) is unreasonable only 
No.  96-3707 
 
14
if it "directly contravenes the words of the statute, is clearly 
contrary to legislative intent, or is otherwise . . . without 
rational basis."  Id. (citation omitted).  
V.  
¶23 We conclude that LIRC's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f) is a reasonable one.  LIRC’s interpretation does 
not contravene the words of the statute, is not contrary to the 
provision's legislative intent, and has a rational basis.  The 
statute creates a presumption that a traveling employee performs 
services incidental to his employment at all times on a business 
trip until he returns from the trip.  See Lager v. ILHR Dep't, 
50 Wis. 2d 651, 658, 185 N.W.2d 300 (1971) (citations omitted). 
 The burden of proving a personal deviation on the trip by the 
employee is upon the party asserting the deviation.  See id. 
LIRC's conclusion that Kamps' downhill skiing was incidental to 
his employment, and that CBS did not meet its burden of 
overcoming this presumption, is supported by credible and 
substantial evidence.  That evidence includes the fact that on 
the day of injury, Kamps learned that there were no competitions 
scheduled for his crew to cover.  While CBS gave Kamps and his 
crew permission to do as they pleased, the ski trip took place 
at the suggestion of Kamps' supervisor.  Additionally, the group 
used CBS vehicles to take them to the ski area. 
¶24 The legislature created Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) with 
the intent to give traveling employees broader protection when 
their employment caused them to be away from home.  See Hansen, 
258 Wis. at 628; see also Neese, 36 Wis. 2d at 508.  Moreover, 
No.  96-3707 
 
15
we have consistently held that "work[er]'s compensation law must 
be liberally construed to include all services that can be 
reasonably said to come within it."  Black River Dairy Products, 
Inc. v. ILHR Dep't, 58 Wis. 2d 537, 544, 207 N.W.2d 65 (1973) 
(citation omitted).  LIRC's determination is consistent with 
that legislative intent to give traveling employees broader 
protection when working away from home.  It is undisputed that 
Kamps' employment with CBS caused him to be away from home for a 
period of approximately three weeks.  CBS agreed to pay Kamps a 
flat daily rate for each day he was in Lillehammer.  Kamps only 
went skiing on the day of the accident because CBS did not 
assign his crew to cover an Olympic event that day.  Kamps 
remained in the Olympic competition area during the time he went 
skiing, and was skiing with his supervisor and members of his 
crew.  
¶25 Finally, 
LIRC’s 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f) 
recognizes 
that 
the 
presumption 
keeps 
the 
traveling 
employee 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
employment 
while 
conducting usual, legitimate acts incidental to daily existence. 
 In this 
case, Kamps' 
employment 
with CBS 
took him to 
Lillehammer, Norway.  His assignment was to help cover winter 
sporting events, and his employer provided him with lodging on a 
ski hill.  In addition, at somewhat short notice Kamps was 
advised that he and his crew did not have to cover an event that 
day, but could spend the day as they pleased.  Kamps went 
skiing, at the suggestion of his supervisor, in the company of 
his coworkers, transported to the ski site by vehicles provided 
No.  96-3707 
 
16
by 
the 
employer. 
 
These 
facts 
constitute 
credible 
and 
substantial evidence on which LIRC based its interpretation that 
skiing was a usual, legitimate act incidental to Kamps' daily 
existence while a traveling employee for CBS under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f). 
¶26 In 
affirming 
LIRC’s 
factual 
findings 
and 
interpretation, the court of appeals gave some weight to the 
particular location of Kamps' traveling employment assignment. 
The court of appeals concluded that "there was sufficient 
credible evidence for LIRC to conclude that skiing was a 
reasonable 
form 
of 
recreation 
incidental 
to 
living 
in 
Lillehammer,"  CBS, Inc. v. LIRC, 213 Wis. 2d 285, 294, 570 
N.W.2d 446 (Ct. App. 1997).  In upholding LIRC's conclusion, the 
court of appeals also relied on foreign cases such as Proctor v. 
SAIF Corp., 860 P.2d 828 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) and Lewis v. 
Knappen Tippets Abbett Eng'g Co., 108 N.E.2d 609 (N.Y. 1952), as 
well as commentary in 2 Arthur Larson, Larson's Worker's 
Compensation Law, § 25.23(c) at 5-310, 5-311 (May 1997 Cum. 
Supp.). 
¶27 We agree that while the location of the traveling 
employee's work assignment is a factor in determining the 
reasonableness of his or her activity conducted there, it is not 
the only factor upon which the agency may base its determination 
of reasonable activity incidental to living.  In this case, LIRC 
considered other factors, including employer support for Kamps' 
activity. 
No.  96-3707 
 
17
¶28 In summary, LIRC's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 
102.03(1)(f) is reasonable, and therefore is entitled to great 
weight deference.  Even if we would be inclined to reach a 
different conclusion than did LIRC based on these facts, we have 
previously held that: 
 
In cases where the evidence is evenly balanced and an 
inference may be drawn one way as easily as another, 
the scale should be turned in favor of the claimant, 
principally because it was the intent and purpose of 
the act to bring border-line cases under it and to 
close up avenues of escape which would naturally be 
suggested to those seeking to evade liability under 
the act. 
Phillips, 56 Wis. 2d at 580.  Under the particular facts and 
circumstances of this case, and applying great weight deference, 
we conclude that LIRC reasonably interpreted Kamps' ski injury 
as an act "reasonably necessary for living or incidental 
thereto."  Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f), and that there is credible 
and substantial evidence to support that determination. 
VI. 
¶29 Although we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals which upheld LIRC's determination, we must address 
language of the appellate decision which can be read as going 
beyond the factual and legal determinations made by LIRC.  We 
have already addressed the court of appeals' erroneous finding 
that Kamps was "on call" at the time of his ski injury.  See 
supra, n. 3.  We also must point out the broad statement that 
"[a]ctivities considered usual and proper include recreation."  
CBS, 213 Wis. 2d at 290.  While we agree that in some cases, 
No.  96-3707 
 
18
including this one, recreational activities have been considered 
usual and proper under the statute, to the extent the court of 
appeals concluded as a matter of law that a traveling employee's 
recreational activities always fit the presumption of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f), we overrule that language. 
¶30 We also agree with CBS' criticism of the court of 
appeals' adoption of LIRC’s statement that "the risks of skiing 
were not unreasonable, nor were they unexpected or unsanctioned 
by CBS," CBS, 213 Wis. 2d at 294, insofar as the statement 
appears to articulate a new test for compensability under the 
traveling employee doctrine.  This statement is not part of the 
presumption and exceptions thereto set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f), nor does our case law make the inquiry of 
whether a traveling employee's activity involves risks expected 
or 
sanctioned 
by 
the 
employer 
determinative 
of 
workers 
compensation coverage.  We decline to read into the statute such 
a requirement. 
¶31 Nonetheless, 
as 
demonstrated 
above, 
LIRC’s 
interpretation that Kamps' ski injury was an act reasonably 
necessary for living or incidental thereto was a reasonable one, 
supported by credible and substantial evidence, and without 
reliance on the “unexpected or unsanctioned risk” inquiry. 
¶32 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 96-3707.npc 
 
1 
¶33 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (Concurring).  I agree with the 
mandate in this case.  I write separately to address the 
applicable standard of review, and to state my concern with the 
rigid restrictions placed on a court reviewing decisions of the 
LIRC involving the application of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f).   
¶34 In this case, the parties disagree regarding whether 
the issue presented involves a question of fact or a question of 
law.  Kamps and LIRC argue that the issue of whether Kamps' 
skiing injury is an activity incidental to living in accord with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f) 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
fact.  
Conversely, CBS argues that the issue presents a question of 
law.  The majority acknowledges this disagreement, and concludes 
that the issue in this case presents a question of law.  See 
Majority op. at 7.  In reaching this conclusion, however, the 
majority fails to address several cases from this court which 
state that LIRC's application of § 102.03(1)(f) presents a 
question of fact. 
¶35 Cases from this court reviewing decisions involving 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f)the 
"traveling 
salemen's 
statute"have consistently "analyzed those questions as factual 
determinations that would be sustained if the [LIRC] findings 
were based on credible evidence or reasonable inferences."  
Sauerwein v. DILHR, 82 Wis. 2d 294, 300, 262 N.W.2d 126 (1978). 
 See, e.g., Tyrrell v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 219, 222, 
133 N.W.2d 810 (1965)(Affirming a decision of the LIRC, 
concluding that a LIRC decision under § 102.03(1)(f) involves a 
question of fact which will be affirmed if there is "any 
No. 96-3707.npc 
 
2 
credible evidence or reasonable inference drawn therefrom to 
support the finding." (emphasis supplied)); Hunter v. DILHR, 64 
Wis. 2d 97, 102, 218 N.W.2d 314 (1974)(same); Lager v. DILHR, 50 
Wis. 2d 651, 658, 185 N.W.2d 300 (1971)(same); Dibble v. 
Industrial 
Comm'n, 
40 
Wis. 2d 
341, 
346, 
161 
N.W.2d 
913 
(1968)(same).  Review of a decision of the LIRC applying 
§ 102.03(1)(f) only presents a question of law where the facts 
are undisputed and only one reasonable inference can be drawn 
therefrom.  See, e.g. Neese v. State Medical Soc'y of Wisconsin, 
36 Wis. 2d 497, 509, 153 N.W.2d 552 (1967).  Because the facts 
in this case are in dispute, the LIRC's conclusion regarding the 
application of § 102.03(1)(f) appears to be a finding of fact, 
based upon the previous decisions of this court.    
¶36 The 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
has 
afforded 
reviewing 
courts extremely limited authority in reviewing decisions of the 
LIRC, particularly where a court reviews findings of fact.  As 
stated by the majority, "[t]he findings of fact made by the 
[LIRC] acting within its powers shall, in the absence of fraud, 
be conclusive."  Wis. Stat. § 102.23(1)(a).  Further, "[i]f the 
[LIRC's] order or award depends on any fact found by the [LIRC], 
the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the 
[LIRC] as to the weight or credibility of the evidence on any 
finding of fact."  Wis. Stat. § 102.23(6).  Even where a 
reviewing court has determined that the LIRC's findings are not 
supported by credible and substantial evidence, § 102.23(6) 
states that a reviewing court may only remand the case to the 
LIRC for further development of the record. 
No. 96-3707.npc 
 
3 
¶37 Practically, the language of Wis. Stat. § 102.23 
provides for review of an LIRC decision only in "very limited 
situations." Goranson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 552, 289 N.W.2d 
270 (1980).  As stated by the majority, this restrictive 
statutory language has been interpreted by this court to "create 
a presumption that an employee who sets out on a business trip 
in the course of his employment performs services arising out of 
and incidental to his employment until he returns from his 
trip."  Lager, 50 Wis. 2d at 658 (citing Tyrrell, 27 Wis. 2d 
219; Armstrong v. Industrial Comm'n, 254 Wis. 174, 35 N.W.2d 212 
(1948)).    
¶38 The statutes involved, and corresponding case law from 
this court, virtually prohibit any meaningful judicial review of 
a factual decision of the LIRC, except in rare circumstances, 
such as fraud.  The result of this body of law is "that the 
findings of the [LIRC] must be upheld upon appeal even though 
they may be contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance 
of the evidence."  Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. ILHR Dep't, 76 
Wis. 2d 210, 215, 251 N.W.2d 69 (1977)(emphasis supplied)(citing 
R.T. Madden, Inc. v. ILHR Dep't, 43 Wis. 2d 528, 548, 169 N.W.2d 
73 (1969); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. ILHR Dep't, 43 Wis. 2d 
398, 404, 168 N.W.2d 817 (1969)).   
¶39 I 
recognize 
that 
"[t]he 
legislative 
purpose 
in 
restricting judicial review in worker's compensation cases is to 
limit appeals and protracted litigation in the interest of 
attaining speedy justice for the employee."  Goranson, 94 
Wis. 2d at 553 (citations omitted).  In an effort to expedite 
No. 96-3707.npc 
 
4 
the interests of justice, however, I conclude that judicial 
review of the LIRC's application of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) 
has been limited to the extent that it is essentially negated.  
Such limited judicial review works to insulate from close 
scrutiny those decisions of the LIRC that are arguably unjust as 
well as those that are just. 
¶40 As stated, the majority concludes that the issue 
involves the LIRC's interpretation of a statute and, therefore, 
the appropriate standard of review is to afford great weight to 
the LIRC's decision.  This may be a more reasoned approach than 
the approach previously set forth by this court in cases such as 
Sauerwein, Tyrrell, Hunter, Lager, and Dibble, which review 
decisions of the LIRC involving Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f).  The 
majority's approach would also alleviate some of my concerns 
about the restrictive appellate review regarding LIRC's findings 
of fact.  See Wis. Stat. § 102.23.  However, the majority's 
approach is not supported by precedent from this court.  
¶41 Any deviation from precedent should be considered only 
through a thorough analysis and overview of the law as it 
currently exists. 
"[T]he doctrine of stare decisis . . . is a doctrine 
that demands respect in a society governed by the rule 
of law."  Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 (1983), overruled on 
other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  Such 
"fidelity to precedent" helps to ensure that the 
existing law will "not be abandoned without strong 
justification."  State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 
441, 
551 
N.W.2d 
591 
(1994)(Abrahamson, 
J., 
concurring), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 2245 
No. 96-3707.npc 
 
5 
(1995).  When existing law "is open to revision in 
every case, 'deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of 
judicial 
will, 
with 
arbitrary 
and 
unpredictable 
results.'"  Citizens Utility Bd. v. Klauser, 194 
Wis. 2d 484, 513, 534 N.W.2d 608 (1995) (Abrahamson, 
J. dissenting) (citation omitted).  Unless there is a 
compelling reason to divert from its precedent, a 
court 
should 
abide 
by 
the 
precedent 
it 
has 
established. 
State v. 
Carter, 
208 Wis. 2d 
142, 
162, 
560 
N.W.2d 256 
(1997)(Steinmetz, J. dissenting).  Without any discussion of the 
existing case law, which is contrary to the standard of review 
advanced by the majority, the majority has failed to show a 
"compelling reason to divert from [this court's] precedent."  
Id.  
¶42 In arguing that the LIRC's decision under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(1)(f) presents a question of law, CBS cites this 
court's decision in Nottelson v. ILHR Dep't, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 287 
N.W.2d 763 (1980).  However, the application of § 102.03(1)(f) 
was not at issue in Nottelson.  Rather, Nottelson involved, in 
part, "the meaning of the legal concepts 'voluntary termination' 
and 'good cause attributable to the employing unit' as used in 
sec. 108.04(7)(a), (b), Stats."  Nottelson, 94 Wis. 2d at 115.  
¶43 Similarly, the majority cites Hagen v. LIRC, 210 
Wis. 2d 12, 18, 563 N.W.2d 454 (1997), for its conclusions that 
the issue presented in this case is a question of law.  Hagen 
involved the application of Wis. Stat. § 102.52(1).  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) was not addressed in this court's decision 
in Hagen. 
No. 96-3707.npc 
 
6 
¶44 In conclusion, I agree with the mandate affirming the 
decision of the LIRC.  I write only to state that, based upon 
existing case law, the issue in this case presents a question of 
fact.  I also write to state my dissatisfaction with the 
restrictive standard of review to which this court is bound in 
reviewing decisions of the LIRC, particularly those involving 
the application of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f). 
¶45 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this concurrence.