Case Title: James Earl v. Johnson & Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-31-98

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). O'HERN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The Court considers three issues in this appeal involving a workers' compensation matter: whether, in violation of the applicable statute of limitations, the worker delayed in filing an occupational disease claim for more than two years after she knew the nature of the disability and its relation to the employment; whether the worker's continuous exposure until the end of employment tolled the statute of limitations; and whether the worker's receipt of medical benefits through the employer's health-care provider tolled the statute of limitations. Joan Earl was employed as a secretary by Johnson & Johnson from 1973 to 1993. Beginning in 1985, she was assigned to work at the Kilmer House, a historic building in New Brunswick owned by Johnson & Johnson. Earl worked in the file room at the Kilmer House approximately four hours a day, five days a week, monitoring employee access to confidential files. The ventilation in the file room was poor. In addition, to protect the files from fire hazards, the file drawers were insulated with a substance later identified to contain anhydrite gypsum. The substance turned into powder whenever the files rubbed against it. The powder would spread over Earl's hands and clothing. The material safety data sheet for anhydrite gypsum indicates that inhalation of the material may irritate the upper respiratory tract. The ventilation in the office area outside the file room was also poor, the air being contaminated by stale cigarette smoke, employee's perfume, and exhaust fumes that were sucked into the building from a nearby helicopter landing. In the winter of 1988, Earl developed respiratory and sinus infections and bronchitis. She was treated by her family physician and returned to work. However, in February 1989, Earl had serious breathing difficulties while at work. She was immediately taken to her physician's office where she received an adrenaline shot. She returned to work two weeks later. Subsequently, on April 2, 1989, Earl suffered a second breathing attack. This time, she was admitted to John F. Kennedy Medical Center, where she was diagnosed as suffering from asthma. She was referred to a pulmonary specialist, who diagnosed her with asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). Ultimately, in January 1994, she was diagnosed with emphysema. After the second breathing attack, Earl asked her supervisor to change her duties. As a result, her time in the file room was significantly reduced, but she continued to handle the files on a daily basis until October 1, 1993, when her department was relocated to a new building. Earl left shortly thereafter solely because Johnson & Johnson offered her an early retirement. She maintained that she otherwise could have continued to work. On September 10, 1993, Earl filed a Claim Petition with the Division of Workers' Compensation, in which she alleged that continuous exposure to irritants at Johnson & Johnson had caused permanent pulmonary problems. Johnson & Johnson argued that Earl's claim was barred by the statute of limitations because she had become aware of her breathing condition by 1989, and at that time believed that her respiratory problems were related to her work environment. The compensation judge ruled that petitioner's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations because Earl did not become aware of the extent of her permanent loss of respiratory function until 1993. In addition, the judge ruled that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-34 because Johnson & Johnson's payment of her medical expenses constituted compensation under the statute, thus starting the running of the statute of limitations from the last medical payment. The judge found that Earl had suffered a forty percent permanent disability and awarded her $55,200. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Earl's claim was barred by the statute of limitations because she was aware in 1989 that her respiratory problems were attributable to her working environment. The court also determined that the payment of medical benefits by Johnson & Johnson's health insurance plan, without more, did not toll the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court granted Earl's petition for certification. HELD: There was an adequate basis for the compensation judge to find that Earl was not aware of the extent of her permanent loss of respiratory function until 1993, and her claim therefore was within the applicable statute of limitations. 1. In the workers' compensation context, the scope of appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the findings made reasonably could have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole. (pp. 6-7) 2. The respiratory infections, sinus infections, and bronchitis that Earl experienced beginning in 1988 did not indicate the onset of a permanent disability, thus triggering the running of the statute of limitations. (pp. 7-10) 3. Under N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, it is possible to have a work-related health problem that is not sufficiently debilitating to be compensable. Occupational diseases are often of such an insidious nature that they do not become evident until years after exposure to the cause thereof. (pp. 10-12) 4. Because the compensation judge found that Earl did not know the nature of the disability until after her employment with Johnson & Johnson had ended in 1993, she filed her claim well within the statute of limitations. (pp. 11-12) 5. Inasmuch as no decision binding on the Division of Workers' Compensation has held that continued exposure does not toll the statute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 34:15-34, the Division is free to continue to apply its administrative understanding of the statute until such time as the issue is squarely presented to a court and that court explicitly addresses the Division's interpretation. (pp. 12-16) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the judgment of the Division of Workers' Compensation is REINSTATED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. JUSTICES POLLOCK and GARIBALDI did not participate. JOAN EARL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, Respondent-Respondent. Argued March 1, 1999 -- Decided May 17, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 313 N.J. Super. 301 (1998). Allan L. Lockspeiser argued the cause for appellant (Wysoker, Glassner, Weingartner, Gonzalez & Lockspeiser, attorneys). Julie C. Blitzer argued the cause for respondent (Hill Wallack, attorneys). Craig H. Livingston submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae New Jersey State Industrial Union Council, AFL-CIO, District 15 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO and New Jersey Advisory Council on Safety and Health (Ball Livingston, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by O'HERN, J. This is a workers' compensation case. There are three issues: (1) whether, in violation of the applicable statute of limitations, the worker delayed filing an occupational disease claim for more than two years after the worker knew the nature of the disability and its relation to the employment; (2) whether the worker's continuous exposure until the end of employment tolled the statute of limitations; and (3) whether the worker's receipt of medical benefits through the employer's health-care provider tolled the statute of limitations. A favorable ruling on any one of these issues would entitle the worker to recover benefits. We find that there is a sufficient basis in the record to sustain the finding of the workers' compensation judge that the worker did not know the nature of the disability until 1993, the year a claim was filed. We will discuss only briefly the remaining issues. The compensation judge found that under Sheffield v. Schering Plough Corp., 146 N.J. 442 (1996), Johnson & Johnson's payment of Earl's medical expenses constituted compensation under the statute. The judge found that petitioner had suffered a forty percent permanent disability and awarded her $55,200. The Appellate Division reversed. 313 N.J. Super. 301 (1998). The court held that Earl's claim was barred by the statute of limitations because Earl was aware in 1989 that her respiratory problems were attributable to her working environment. The court also determined that the payment of medical benefits by Johnson & Johnson's health insurance plan, without more, did not toll the statute of limitations. We granted Earl's petition for certification, 156 N.J. 426 (1998). Because we find an adequate basis for the compensation judge to have found that Earl was not aware of the extent of her permanent loss of respiratory function until 1993, the claim was within the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse. As acknowledged by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, minor respiratory conditions are not compensable. This is because many workers suffer from occasional bronchitis or mild asthma, with no significant effect on their ability to work or their quality of life. Such ailments do not necessarily degenerate into the serious and chronic problems now experienced by petitioner. The Appellate Division held that petitioner knew the nature of her disability after her initial diagnosis and treatment in 1989. The Appellate Division's reasoning implies that once a worker has received some treatment for a work-related health problem, that worker will be deemed to have knowledge of the nature of the disability. However, as N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 specifies, it is possible to have a work-related health problem that is not sufficiently debilitating to be compensable. Earl's testimony indicated that she initially perceived her problems in that light. When asked about the 1989 diagnosis, Earl testified that her doctor was treating me for my asthma and something to do with respiratory. These statements do not indicate that petitioner knew the nature of her disability. In Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. Super. 187, 212 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 27 N.J. 398 (1958), the court stated, 'knowledge of the nature of [the] disability' connotes knowledge of the most notable characteristics of the disease, sufficient to bring home substantial realization of its extent and seriousness. Bucuk had been told that he had silicosis, but he had not been told what silicosis meant -- that he suffered from a permanent debilitating condition of the lungs caused by exposure to silica that was, in his case, accompanied by emphysema. Accordingly, the Appellate Division upheld the County Court's determination that Bucuk did not know the nature of his disability. Occupational diseases are often of such an insidious nature that they do not become evident until years after exposure to the cause thereof. Panzino v. Continental Can Co., 71 N.J. 298, 301 (1976) (quoting Sponsor's Statement to L. 1974, c. 65). Pennsylvania courts have held that their statute of limitations for occupational disease does not begin to run until 'pertinent medical diagnosis is completely established to the knowledge of the claimant' that [the] total disability is work related. Price v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 626 A.2d 114, 117 (Pa. 1993) (quoting Ciabattoni v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 125 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. 1956)). The latter court reasoned that an occupational disease is distinguishable from an accident, because an accident rises from a definite event, the time and place of which can be fixed, while [an occupational disease] develops gradually over a long period of time. Ciabattoni, supra, 125 A.2d at 368 (citations omitted). Our law does not go so far as to require an actual diagnosis, but the policy concerns are similar. Although Earl's respiratory problems began in 1989, she did not undergo PFTs at that time. The compensation judge found that petitioner did not know that her condition had deteriorated into that of a permanent disability until the 1993 PFTs and accompanying medical diagnosis. Because the compensation court found that Earl did not know the nature of the disability until after her employment with Johnson & Johnson had ended in 1993, she filed her claim well within the statute of limitations. Because of the pernicious nature of occupational diseases, the Legislature has been solicitous of workers who suffer from these ailments. Petitioner argued that it is unlikely that the Legislature would have intended to preclude a claim for an injury that had not yet occurred. Under a narrow interpretation of N.J.S.A. 34:15-34, workers who are aware that working conditions cause them to experience occasional breathing problems would be barred from bringing claims when, more than two years later, continued exposure results in emphysema. In Mikitka v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., the court reasoned that it would be an absurd result to bar claims before they even existed. 139 N.J. Super. 66, 72 (1976) (adopting rule that to know nature of the disability encompasses knowledge of both type and extent of disability when claimant suffers additional disability after original award). See also Owens-Illinois Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 437, 451 (1994) (discussing continuous-trigger theory that injury from environmental contaminants occurs during each phase of environmental exposure ). This case, however, did not involve a finding of continuing exposure to the cause of occupational injury.See footnote 1 The employer insisted that once the worker was reassigned from the file room, she was no longer exposed. The workers' compensation judge did not find that there had been continuous exposure, and neither the judge nor the Appellate Division specifically interpreted this aspect of N.J.S.A. 34:15-34 in reaching their decisions. As noted by petitioner at oral argument and in the brief of amici curiae in support of petitioner, the Division has interpreted N.J.S.A. 34:15-34 to provide an outside limit after exposure ends of two years from when the employee knew the nature of the occupationally related condition and its relationship to the employment. Such knowledge is immaterial in ongoing exposures for which a petitioner can file within two years from the last exposure. Larison v. Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co., No. 94-028570, Division of Workers' Compensation, Warren County District, Supplemental Decision (Oct. 16, 1998). Ordinarily, [a]n administrative agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to great weight. In re Application of Saddle River, 71 N.J. 14, 24 (1976). No decision binding on the Division of Workers' Compensation has held that continued exposure does not toll the statute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 34:15-34. The Division is free to continue to apply its administrative understanding of the statute until such time as the issue is squarely presented to a court and that court explicitly addresses the Division's interpretation. NO. A-31 JOAN EARL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, Respondent-Respondent. DECIDED