Case Title: Martin v. Beverage Capital Corporation

Citation: 353 Md. 388

Docket Number: 60/98

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1999-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Patricia Martin et al. v. Beverage Capital Corporation et al. - No. 60, 1998 Term
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol.), Labor and
Employment Article, § 9-681(d) permits additional benefits where surviving spouse
“continues to be wholly dependent” based on the decedent worker’s wages rather than the
lesser amount of workers’ compensation benefit payments.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case #_C-9523670______
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 60
September Term, 1998
________________________________________
PATRICIA MARTIN et al.
v.
BEVERAGE CAPITAL CORPORATION et al.
________________________________________
Bell, C. J.
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Murphy, Joseph F., Jr.
   (Specially Assigned)
Thieme, Raymond G., Jr.
   (Specially Assigned)
 
JJ.
_______________________________________
Opinion by Chasanow, J.
________________________________________
      Filed:  March 25, 1999
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to Maryland Code (1991
1
Repl. Vol.), Labor and Employment Article.
The other Respondents are Centennial Insurance Company, the workers’
2
compensation insurer for Beverage Capital Corporation; American Manufacturers Mutual
Insurance Company, the carrier for Sun Dun, Inc.; and Niagara Fire and Marine Insurance
Company, the insurer for Great Distribution and Warehousing, Inc.
In this appeal, we are asked to settle a dispute as to the identity of the payment source
upon which a surviving spouse, in a workers’ compensation death benefits case, must
continue to be dependent in order to receive additional benefits after the initial maximum
award of $45,000 has been paid out.  Specifically, we are called upon to determine whether
the phrase “continues to be wholly dependent,” as found in Maryland Code (1991 Repl.
Vol.), Labor and Employment Article, § 9-681(d),  refers to an ongoing dependency on the
1
deceased worker’s wages or the generally lesser amount of workers’ compensation benefits.
Patricia Martin (Petitioner) contends that in ongoing dependency determinations, “continues
to be wholly dependent” refers to the standard of living the claimant experienced while the
deceased spouse was alive; thus, she has a continued dependency on her husband’s income
at the time of his death.  Beverage Capital Corporation (Beverage Capital), Sun Dun, Inc.
(Sun Dun), and Great Distribution and Warehousing, Inc. (Great Distribution)
(Respondents)  argue, in accordance with the Court of Special Appeals, that this phrase
2
refers to the surviving spouse’s continued dependency on the workers’ compensation death
benefits initially granted.
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals and affirm the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s (Commission) finding that
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Petitioner continued to be wholly dependent on her deceased husband within the meaning
of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  In accordance with the Commission’s interpretation of
the statute and its findings of total dependency on the part of Petitioner, we hold that
“continues to be wholly dependent” as found in § 9-681(d) refers to the surviving spouse
remaining wholly dependent on the deceased spouse’s income at the time of his or her death,
and not the generally lesser amount of workers’ compensation benefits.  Thus, in making
ongoing dependency determinations, the amount earned by the deceased worker at the time
of death must be compared with the amount the claimant earns after the initial $45,000 has
been received.  In this case, Mr. Martin, the deceased spouse, earned an average of $200,000
per year prior to his accident.  In stark contrast is the average salary of Mrs. Martin, the
surviving spouse, of approximately $15,000 per year.  After Mrs. Martin received the initial
$45,000, she was still earning approximately $15,000 per year; therefore, she “continues to
be wholly dependent” if her circumstances have not changed since the initial dependency
determination was made.   
In the instant case, we need not attempt to define the exact point at which a claimant
becomes either wholly or partially self-supporting after the initial $45,000 has been paid out.
We leave to the legislature and future cases the task of determining the percentage or amount
of the deceased spouse’s average weekly income the claimant must earn in order to be found
either wholly or partially self-supporting.  With this holding we are adopting the
Commission’s interpretation and administration of the Act, which directs that Petitioner’s
workers’ compensation death benefits will not suddenly cease when some specific point in
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There is a discrepancy in the record as to the exact date of Mr. Martin’s death; it
3
appears in some documents as January 15, and in others as January 14.  In this opinion we
cite the January 15 date, as this is the date the Workers’ Compensation Commission
referenced in its initial February 1, 1994, order.
time is reached, but will instead continue so long as her dependency remains; that is, until
she remarries, dies, or the Commission decides that she has become wholly or partially self-
supporting.
I.  BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are undisputed.  On January 15, 1992, Chester Martin was
operating a helicopter in the course of his employment with Beverage Capital, Sun Dun, and
Great Distribution when it malfunctioned and he was tragically killed.   At the time of his
3
death, Mr. Martin held various executive positions with Beverage Capital, Sun Dun, and
Great Distribution.  He was President and a shareholder of Beverage Capital, the sole owner
of Sun Dun, and President of Great Distribution.
Mr. Martin was survived by Mrs. Martin.  The Martins were married on July 2, 1976,
and no children were born of the marriage.  At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Martin was
employed with Giant Food, earning approximately $18,000 per year.  In June 1987, Mrs.
Martin resigned her job with Giant Food because Mr. Martin wanted her to stay home and
not work anymore.  So that she would not have to work outside the home, the Martins agreed
that Mr. Martin would pay Mrs. Martin a salary from Sun Dun, but that she would not have
to actually do any work for the company.  In 1991, Mrs. Martin began a sideline business
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In addition, a distribution from Beverage Capital and dividends placed the Martins’
4
total family income at $357,423.
selling business forms.  Most of her customers were either businesses owned by her husband
or accounts that he helped her obtain.  Mrs. Martin received a salary from Sun Dun until
January 15, 1992, the date of Mr. Martin’s death.  After this date, the salary payments
stopped.  
For the two years prior to Mr. Martin’s death, the Martins’ finances were as follows:
1990 -- Chester Martin Income
$151,504
  Patricia Martin Income
    38,895 (Sun Dun)
  Total Family Income
 190,3994
1991 -- Chester Martin Income
$187,240
  Patricia Martin Income
    38,852 (Sun Dun)
      4,246 (Her job selling forms)
  Total Family Income
  230,338
A few months after Mr. Martin was killed, Mrs. Martin filed a dependency claim with
the Commission stating that she was “wholly dependent” on her husband at the time of his
death.  A hearing was held on January 21, 1994, and on February 1, 1994, the Commission
found Mrs. Martin to be “wholly dependent” on her deceased husband.  Pursuant to Md.
Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.), Labor and Employment Art., § 9-602 (“Average weekly
wage”) and Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 14.09.01.07, the Commission
determined that Mr. Martin’s average weekly wage was $2,850 per week ($148,200 per
year).  In accordance with the established formula, the Commission awarded Mrs. Martin
-5-
Pursuant to § 9-681(b), the death benefit “shall equal two-thirds of the average
5
weekly wage of the deceased covered employee, but may not: (i) exceed the State average
weekly wage....”  In 1992, pursuant to Md. Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.), Labor and
Employment Art., § 9-603 (“State average weekly wage”), the State average weekly wage
was $475, the maximum allowable under the statute.  Pursuant to § 9-603, this State average
weekly wage is adjusted on January 1 of each calendar year. 
In her brief to this Court, Mrs. Martin states that her income for 1994 was $7,763 and
6
for 1995 it was $13,676.  These figures vary from those cited in Beverage Capital v. Martin,
119 Md. App. 662, 672 n.7, 705 A.2d 1175, 1180 n.7 (1998), which we adopt in this
$475 for 94.736 weeks as the weekly death benefit, retroactive to January 15, 1992.  
5
Respondents filed an appeal of the Commission’s order to the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County, challenging the finding of Mrs. Martin’s total dependency.  The appeal was
decided through cross motions for summary judgment, and on February 3, 1995, the court
granted Mrs. Martin’s summary judgment motion finding that she was “wholly dependent”
on her husband at the time of his death.  Respondents did not appeal this ruling.  In
accordance with the Commission’s award, by the end of January 1994, Respondents had
made total payments to Mrs. Martin of $45,000, the maximum initial award of compensation
under § 9-681(c)(2).  They then discontinued the benefits.
 
At this point, the issue became whether Mrs. Martin continued to be wholly dependent
after she received the initial maximum benefits under § 9-681(d).  Since 1993, Mrs. Martin
has been working as an independent contractor, brokering products for Canada Dry
Corporation to Giant Food.  Her job is low paying with sporadic, non-established hours.
Mrs. Martin has earned the following since Mr. Martin’s death in January 1992:  1993 --
$11,249.50; 1994 -- 9,651.00; and 1995 -- $15,879.00.   Mrs. Martin filed issues with the
6
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opinion.  We simply point out this inconsistency for the record; it is not necessary for us to
resolve this factual dispute in order to uphold the Commission’s August 22, 1995, order.
Commission, claiming that she continued to be “wholly dependent” and seeking resumption
of the weekly death benefit payments.  On March 7, 1995, there was a hearing before the
Commission and on August 22, 1995, it ruled that Mrs. Martin continued “to be wholly
dependent on her deceased husband,” and Respondents were ordered to continue paying the
weekly benefits.  On the same day as the ruling, the Respondents filed another appeal to the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, which was also decided through cross motions for
summary judgment. 
On November 26, 1996, the circuit court granted Mrs. Martin’s motion for summary
judgment, affirming the Commission’s order and mandating the continuation of benefits.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and on February 25, 1998, the court
reversed the Commission’s order.  The Court of Special Appeals held that Mrs. Martin was
“partially self-supporting and not ‘wholly dependent’ upon Workers’ Compensation benefits
within the meaning of LE § 9-681(d).”  Beverage Capital v. Martin, 119 Md. App. 662, 683,
705 A.2d 1175, 1186 (1998)(emphasis added).  The court stated that when analyzing whether
a dependent is entitled to continue to receive workers’ compensation death benefits following
the initial award of $45,000, a determination must be made as to whether there is an ongoing
dependency on the benefits, as opposed to an ongoing dependency on the deceased worker’s
salary at the time of his or her death.  Martin, 119 Md. App. at 672-75, 705 A.2d at 1181-82.
The court went on to hold that because Mrs. Martin’s employment was not temporary,
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occasional, or minor, and that her salary constituted approximately fifty percent of the
workers’ compensation death benefits, she was no longer “wholly dependent.”  Martin, 119
Md. App. at 682-83, 705 A.2d at 1185-86.
Mrs. Martin filed a petition for certiorari in April, 1998, appealing the Court of
Special Appeals’ ruling on the issue of whether she remains wholly dependent.  We granted
certiorari.  Specifically, we are asked to determine whether “continues to be wholly
dependent” in § 9-681(d), as it pertains to a surviving spouse who has already received the
maximum initial workers’ compensation death benefits of $45,000, refers to a continued
dependency on the standard of living, in the form of the deceased worker’s salary, at the time
of the fatal injury or on the generally lesser workers’ compensation death benefits.  As the
Court of Special Appeals acknowledged, “[t]he statute does not explicitly say upon what the
surviving spouse must continue to be dependent.”  Martin, 119 Md. App. at 671, 705 A.2d
at 1180.
We reverse the Court of Special Appeals and hold that a spouse “continues to be
wholly dependent,” and therefore eligible for continuing workers’ compensation death
benefits, when he or she has an ongoing dependency on the deceased worker’s salary at the
time of death.
II.  DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A.  Statutory Interpretation
Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), which has been in existence for
-8-
over eighty years, is intended to protect workers and their families from the various hardships
that result from employment-related injuries.  Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 343, 412 A.2d
733, 734 (1980).  Specifically, “it is designed to provide workers with compensation for loss
of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury, disease or death arising out of and in the
course of employment, to provide vocational rehabilitation, and to provide adequate medical
services.”  Id.  Moreover, as we stated in Beth.-Fair. Shipyard v. Rosenthal, 185 Md. 416,
45 A.2d 79 (1945):  
“The Workmen’s Compensation Act is essentially social
legislation and the provisions thereof are to be liberally
construed.  It must be interpreted to effectuate its general
purpose and not strictly construed.  Where there is a conflict in
the Workmen’s Compensation law, questions of construction
should be resolved in favor of the claimant.”  (Citations
omitted).
185 Md. at 425, 45 A.2d at 83.
When we interpret a statute in order to effectuate its goal, our primary concern is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature.  Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429
(1995).  Regarding this task, we have previously stated:  “The search for legislative intent
begins, and ordinarily ends, with the words of the statute under review.”  Schuman, Kane v.
Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119, 668 A.2d 929, 931 (1995).  A statute may contain ambiguous
language, requiring us to look beyond its plain language to discern intent.  Where the
statutory language is unambiguous and expresses a plain and definite meaning, however, we
need not look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent.  Marriott
Employees v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997).  
-9-
In determining legislative intent, we must never lose sight of the overriding purpose
and goal of the statute.  As we observed in Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md.
505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987), the search for legislative intent is most accurately characterized
“as an effort to ‘seek to discern some general purpose, aim, or policy reflected in the
statute.’”  309 Md. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632 (quoting Melvin J. Sykes, A Modest Proposal for
a Change in Maryland’s Statutes Quo, 43 MD. LAW REV. 647, 653 (1984)).  In addition,
when interpreting a statute and determining legislative intent, “the entire statutory scheme
[must be examined], as opposed to scrutinizing parts of a statute in isolation.”  Williams v.
State, 329 Md. 1, 15-16, 616 A.2d 1275, 1282 (1992).
Once we determine that the statutory language at issue is in accordance with the
legislature’s intended purpose in enacting the statute, our task of interpretation is complete.
See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994)(“If the language of the
statute is plain and clear and expresses a meaning consistent with the statute’s apparent
purpose, no further analysis is ordinarily required.”); Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171-
72, 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991)(“When the language is clearly consistent with the apparent
purpose of the statute and the result is not absurd, no further research is required.”).
Thus, in interpreting and determining legislative intent, we must look to the plain
language of the enactment, while keeping in mind its overall purpose and aim.  Only when
both of these tasks are done concurrently do we obtain an accurate interpretation of the
statute.  In light of these guiding principles of statutory interpretation, we now proceed to a
discussion of the Maryland law that is pertinent to our analysis of § 9-681(d).  As we do so,
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we must be keenly aware that “[t]he Workers’ Compensation statute should be liberally
construed so that any ambiguity, uncertainty or conflict is resolved in favor of the claimant,
in order to effect the statute’s benevolent purposes.”  Linder Crane Service Co. v. Hogan,
86 Md. App. 438, 443, 586 A.2d 1290, 1292 (1991)(footnote omitted).
B.  Maryland Workers’ Compensation Law
1.  Background
In Maryland, there is a two-step process for determining the initial receipt and
continuation of workers’ compensation death benefits.  The first step is to determine whether
the surviving spouse is entitled to receive benefits up to the $45,000 maximum.  Step one is
undertaken pursuant to § 9-679, “Determination of dependency,” which provides in part:
“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the Commission
shall determine all questions of partial or total dependency in
accordance with the facts of each case that existed: 
(1) at the time of the occurrence of the accidental
personal injury that caused the death of the covered employee.”
See also § 9-681(a), (b), and (c).  The second step comes into play after the initial $45,000
has been paid out.  If the claimant petitions for further benefits, step two requires the
surviving spouse to prove that he or she “continues to be wholly dependent” under § 9-
681(d).  In general, § 9-681, “Wholly dependent individuals,” governs the payment of
benefits to dependents following the death of a worker in the course of his or her
employment.  In particular, § 9-681(d) states:
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“If a surviving spouse who was wholly dependent at the time of
death continues to be wholly dependent after $45,000 has been
paid, the employer or its insurer shall continue to make
payments to the surviving spouse at the same weekly rate during
the total dependency of the surviving spouse.”
The instant case concerns step two; specifically, whether the phrase “continues to be
wholly dependent” refers to an ongoing dependency on the salary of the deceased worker at
the time of his or her fatal injury (in essence, the standard of living experienced by the
surviving spouse while the deceased employee was alive) or on the generally lesser workers’
compensation death benefits.  Most of this State’s case law regarding this two-step process
concerns step one, the determination of initial dependency.  Only two reported Maryland
appellate cases have looked at this second step of determining whether a claimant “continues
to be wholly dependent.”  See Martin, supra, and Linder Crane, supra.  While the “step one”
cases are not directly on point with the particular issue in this appeal, they provide important
guidance as to whether “continues to be wholly dependent” in § 9-681(d), step two, refers
to an ongoing dependency on the deceased spouse’s salary or on the benefits. 
The standard of review for workers’ compensation proceedings is found in § 9-745,
“Conduct of appeal proceedings.”  It provides in pertinent part:
“(b) Presumption and burden of proof. — In each court
proceeding under this title: 
(1) the decision of the Commission is presumed to be
prima facie correct; and 
(2) the party challenging the decision has the burden of
proof.
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(c) Determination by court. — The court shall determine
whether the Commission: 
(1) justly considered all of the facts about the accidental
personal injury...;
(2) exceeded the powers granted to it under this title; or
(3) misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case
decided.
***
(e) Disposition. — (1) If the court determines that the
Commission acted within its powers and correctly construed the
law and facts, the court shall confirm the decision of the
Commission.  
(2) If the court determines that the Commission did not
act within its powers or did not correctly construe the law and
facts, the court shall reverse or modify the decision or remand
the case to the Commission for further proceedings.”  (Emphasis
added).
Beyond the statutory language, further guidance of the standard of review may be
found in Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655, 399 A.2d 250 (1979), in which we stated:
“In reviewing this ruling we, as was the circuit court, are to be
guided by the general statutory command that ‘the decision[s]
of the Commission [are] entitled to prima facie correctness.’  A
court, therefore, may reverse a commission ruling only upon a
finding that its action was based upon an erroneous construction
of the law or facts....”  (Citations omitted).
284 Md. at 658, 399 A.2d at 252 (quoting in part Md. Bureau of Mines v. Powers, 258 Md.
379, 382, 265 A.2d 860, 862 (1970)). 
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2.  “Step One” Cases
Unfortunately, the Act does not define “total dependency” or “wholly dependent.”
Until June 1, 1947, when Chapter 895 of the Acts of 1947 took effect, the law presumed that
a wife was wholly dependent on her husband.  Meyler v. Mayor and City Council, 179 Md.
211, 215, 17 A.2d 762, 764 (1941).  The 1947 amendments removed the presumptions of
dependency and placed all matters of dependency within the discretion of the Commission.
§ 9-679.  We have often stated, in accordance with § 9-679, that “the question of dependency
is one primarily of fact to be decided in every case upon the facts of that case.”  Rosenthal,
185 Md. at 420, 45 A.2d at 81.
In 1941, this Court stated that the test of dependency is “not whether a claimant was
capable of supporting himself without the earnings of the workman, but whether he did in
fact rely upon such earnings for his livelihood, in whole or in part, under circumstances
indicating an intent on the part of the workman to furnish such support.”  Meyler, 179 Md.
at 217, 17 A.2d at 765.  In 1958, we defined a “dependent” within the meaning of the Act
as “one who relies wholly or in part upon a workman for the reasonable necessities of life
at the time of his accidental injury.  A legal or moral obligation to support some one does not
create dependency in the absence of actual support.”  Mario Anello v. Dunn, 217 Md. 177,
180, 141 A.2d 731, 733 (1958)(emphasis added).
Meyler, supra, was one of our early cases in which we examined the issue of
dependency in the workers’ compensation death benefits context.  In Meyler, the claimant,
who was the stepdaughter of the deceased, and her stepfather agreed that she would stay
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home and take care of her invalid mother and the home.  179 Md. at 213, 17 A.2d at 763.
Even though the claimant had previously held a factory job and was capable of supporting
herself, we held that “there is no provision in the statute requiring that a person must be
incapable of supporting himself before he can be dependent, and there is no reason to hold
that dependency should be so restricted in its meaning.”  Meyler, 179 Md. at 217, 17 A.2d
at 765.  We further stated that the “mere ability to earn a livelihood does not necessarily
preclude a person from being a dependent.”  Id.  See also Superior Builders, Inc. v. Brown,
208 Md. 539, 543, 119 A.2d 376, 378 (1956)(“[I]n construing the Act, the courts do not
demand that a claimant must show destitution to obtain an award as a total dependent.”).  We
held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the claimant was either totally
or partially dependent on the deceased and ordered a new trial.  Meyler, 179 Md. at 219, 17
A.2d at 766.
In the 1944 case of Larkin v. Smith, we examined the words “wholly dependent” as
delineated in the Act.  183 Md. 274, 37 A.2d 340 (1944).  In this case, the claimant alleged
that she was dependent on her son for financial support, even though she sometimes sold
eggs from her hens, ate occasional free meals at the restaurant where she previously worked,
and intermittently received clothing from her former employer.  Larkin, 183 Md. at 276-77,
37 A.2d at 341.  The employer/insurer (appellants) maintained that the jury should be
instructed that “if they should believe from the evidence ‘that the claimant received any
support from any source other than from [her son] at the time of his injury’” then the
claimant could not be found wholly dependent on her deceased son.  Larkin, 183 Md. at 278,
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37 A.2d at 342 (emphasis added). 
In finding the claimant to be “wholly dependent” on her deceased son, we noted that
while these words were not precisely defined under the Act, other jurisdictions had adopted
what appeared to be the following universal rule as to their meaning: 
“<Total dependency exists where the dependent subsists entirely
on the earnings of the workman; but in applying this rule courts
have not deprived claimants of the rights of total dependents,
when otherwise entitled thereto, on account of temporary
gratuitous services rendered them by others, or on account of
occasional financial assistance received from other sources, or
on account of other minor considerations or benefits which do
not substantially modify or change the general rule as above
stated.’”  (Emphasis added).
Larkin, 183 Md. at 280, 37 A.2d at 343 (quoting Bloomington-Bedford Stone Company v.
Phillips, 116 N.E. 850, 852 (Ind. App. 1917)).  See also Johnson v. Cole, 245 Md. 515, 520-
21, 226 A.2d 268, 271 (1967)(stating that aid or benefits from other sources will not negate
a finding of total dependency so long as they “do not substantially affect or modify [the
dependent’s] status toward the deceased employee”).
In adopting the above rule, we stated that we “did not think that the legislature
intended such an illiberal construction of the word ‘wholly’ as contended ... by the
appellants” and concluded that the Act “must be interpreted to effectuate its general purpose,
and not by strict rules of construction.”  Larkin, 183 Md. at 282, 37 A.2d at 344.
Similarly, in Rosenthal, supra, we also found that the claimant was totally dependent
on her deceased husband, even though she was employed at the time of her husband’s death.
In examining the particular facts of the case, as we are required to do pursuant to § 9-679,
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we found that the claimant was working outside the home “because her boy was in the Navy
and she was worried and wanted to occupy her mind ... until her son came home....”
Rosenthal, 185 Md. at 423, 45 A.2d at 82.  Therefore, we held that “the claimant’s work was
only temporary or occasional, and that her intention was to depend solely on her husband’s
income in the future as she had in the past.  So finding, the jury could decide that there was
total dependency within the meaning of the Act.”  Rosenthal, 185 Md. at 426, 45 A.2d at 84
(emphasis added).  See also Harvey v. Roche & Son, 148 Md. 363, 129 A. 359 (1925)
(recognizing that claimant, who though separated from her spouse at the time of his death
but received monthly support money from him, could be found a total dependent even though
she collected weekly rent from a boarder).
Thus, as the above cases illustrate, a claimant can be found totally dependent even
though he or she has received occasional financial aid or benefits from sources other than the
deceased employee.  Later cases somewhat restricted the above holdings, however, with the
development of the “consequential contribution” test, under which total dependency status
may be denied to dependents who make a “consequential contribution” to their own support.
Specifically, this test states that while a wholly dependent claimant “may receive temporary
gratuitous services, occasional financial assistance or other minor benefits from sources other
than the deceased workman ... he must not have had a consequential source or means of
maintenance in addition to what is received out of the earnings of the deceased.”  Mullan
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While we first mentioned the consequential contribution test in Larkin v. Smith, 183
7
Md. 274, 280, 37 A.2d 340, 343 (1944), we did not apply it until Mario Anello v. Dunn, 217
Md. 177, 183, 141 A.2d 731, 734 (1958).
Construction Co. v. Day, 218 Md. 581, 586, 147 A.2d 756, 759 (1959)(emphasis added).7
Mario Anello, supra, was the first case to apply the consequential contribution test.
In Mario Anello, Mrs. Dunn, the claimant, had pooled her significant earnings with that of
her husband’s for several years and used them to support the family.  217 Md. at 180, 141
A.2d at 733.  In finding Mrs. Dunn to be partially dependent, we held that we were “unable
to say that a jury could properly find, or infer, that her earnings were not a consequential part
of her maintenance; therefore she was not wholly dependent upon her husband.”  217 Md.
at 183, 141 A.2d at 734.
Mullan Construction, supra, following on the heels of Mario Anello, supra, also
involved a wife pooling her earnings with her deceased husband.  As in Mario Anello, we
found that Mrs. Day was partially, not totally, dependent on her deceased husband, as she
made almost fifty percent of her husband’s salary.  Mullan Construction, 218 Md. at 588,
590, 147 A.2d at 760, 761.  We held that: 
“[W]here the earnings of [Mrs. Day] were substantial, where
she did not subsist solely out of the earnings of her husband, and
where she either could not or would not account for more than
half of her net earnings, she cannot establish the status of a total
dependent by merely claiming she did not pool her earnings
with those of her husband.”  
Mullan Construction, 218 Md. at 589, 147 A.2d at 760.
In yet another pooled income case, Toadvine v. Luffman examined whether the
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deceased employee’s two minor children were totally dependent on him at the time of his
death.  14 Md. App. 333, 286 A.2d 790 (1972).  The court applied the consequential
contribution test and found that because the “mother’s contributions were a substantial
source, about 40%, of the total funds,” the children were not totally dependent on their
deceased father.  Toadvine, 14 Md. App. at 346-47, 286 A.2d at 797.  The court stated that
“[t]he mother’s contributions were regular as distinguished from occasional, permanent as
distinguished from temporary, substantial as distinguished from minor.”  Toadvine, 14 Md.
App. at 346, 286 A.2d at 797 (emphasis added).  See also Simmons v. B & E Landscaping
Co., 256 Md. 13, 15, 259 A.2d 314, 316 (1969)(upholding the trial judge’s conclusion that
“‘the mother’s contribution to this family [cannot] be deemed either occasional or
inconsequential.  She ... was and is the bulk of the support of her children.’”). 
Thus, as these “step one” cases demonstrate, a claimant can be found a total
dependent even though he or she has received occasional financial aid or benefits from
sources other than the deceased worker.  However, if these additional benefits constitute a
consequential contribution to the claimant’s own support, then a finding of total dependency
will be defeated.
3.  “Step Two” Cases
As mentioned, only two reported appellate cases have examined the issue of whether
a claimant “continues to be wholly dependent” after the sum of $45,000 has been paid.  See
Martin, supra, and Linder Crane, supra.  Linder Crane does not fully address the specific
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issue posed in the instant case, and we need not determine whether we would adopt all
aspects of its holding.  Linder Crane, however, does lend support to our, and the
Commission’s, interpretation of § 9-681(d), which is that “continues to be wholly dependent”
refers to the claimant continuing to be dependent on the salary of the deceased worker at the
time of death.
In Linder Crane the claimant was the surviving spouse of the deceased employee, who
was killed in an automobile accident during the course of his employment.  86 Md. App. at
440, 586 A.2d at 1291.  During their twenty-year marriage, Mr. Hogan supported the family
and Mrs. Hogan was a homemaker.  Id.  Mrs. Hogan began a paying job two months after
her husband’s death, due to financial necessity brought on by a dispute as to death benefit
compensability.  Linder Crane, 86 Md. App. at 440-41, 586 A.2d at 1291.  Eventually, Mrs.
Hogan was determined to be wholly dependent on her husband and was awarded the
maximum initial workers’ compensation death benefits.  Linder Crane, 86 Md. App. at 441,
586 A.2d at 1291.  She quit her job approximately two weeks after receiving the $45,000.
Id.  The benefit payments were stopped after the $45,000 had been paid, so Mrs. Hogan filed
a claim to have the benefits reinstated.  Id.  The Commission reinstated her benefits and the
circuit court affirmed, holding: “[I]t was undisputed that appellee was not working at the
time the Commission continued her benefits and that she did not work during her marriage.”
Linder Crane, 86 Md. App. at 442, 586 A.2d at 1292.  Appeal was then made to the Court
of Special Appeals.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s holding that Mrs. Hogan’s
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workers’ compensation death benefits should be reinstated.  Linder Crane, 86 Md. App. at
447, 586 A.2d at 1294.  After finding that Mrs. Hogan was wholly dependent on Mr. Hogan
for the twenty years prior to his fatal accident, and that she only worked after his death for
thirty-three months due to financial necessity, the court held that Mrs. Hogan remained
wholly dependent on Mr. Hogan.  Linder Crane, 86 Md. App. at 443-45, 586 A.2d at 1292-
94.  In examining the issue of Mrs. Hogan’s ability to earn money outside of the home, the
court referenced Meyler for the proposition that simply because a “claimant has the ability
to be self-supporting does not preclude her from being wholly dependent.”  Linder Crane,
86 Md. App. at 444, 586 A.2d at 1293.  In support of its finding of Mrs. Hogan’s total
dependency, the court focused on the private marital agreement between the Hogans, stating:
“[Mrs. Hogan] and Joseph agreed that she should ... stay home ... while he supported the
family.  This was the arrangement at the time of Joseph’s death.”  Id. (emphasis added).
Basing its holding on a “benevolent reading” of the statute, the court held that:  
“Frances’ ability to work will not prevent her from being wholly
dependent.  Moreover, the fact that Frances actually earned a
salary for thirty-three months will not prevent her from
continuing to be deemed wholly dependent, once she terminated
her employment.  The courts have been reluctant to deprive a
claimant of the rights of a wholly dependent, when otherwise
entitled thereto, on account of temporary employment which
was not intended to alter the dependency of the claimant on the
worker.”  (Emphasis added).
Linder Crane, 86 Md. App. at 444, 446, 586 A.2d at 1293, 1294.  The court further held that
Mrs. Hogan’s pressure to obtain outside employment due to necessity did not “alter the
arrangement that existed prior to Joseph’s death — that he supported the family and she
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maintained the home.”  Linder Crane, 86 Md. App. at 446, 586 A.2d at 1294. 
In ordering the continuation of benefits to Mrs. Hogan, the Linder court did not state
explicitly what the surviving spouse continued to be dependent on — the workers’
compensation death benefits or Mr. Hogan’s salary at the time of his fatal accident.  We
question, however, the Court of Special Appeals’ statement in Martin that “[t]he Linder
Crane Court looked to the income Mrs. Hogan received from Workers’ Compensation
benefits to determine whether she continued to be totally dependent after the amount of
$45,000 had been paid.”  119 Md. App. at 677, 705 A.2d at 1183.  On the contrary, we can
readily infer from the court’s emphasis on the agreement between the Hogans that existed
during their lengthy marriage, along with our prior case law and the need for a liberal
construction of the Act favoring the claimant, that the Linder Crane court found Mrs. Hogan
“continued to be wholly dependent” on the salary of Mr. Hogan at the time of his death.
C.  The Law as Applied to This Case  
In applying the Maryland law discussed supra, while concurrently reading the Act
liberally in order to effectuate its benevolent purpose of compensating injured workers and
their families, we hold that Mrs. Martin “continues to be wholly dependent” under § 9-
681(d) on Mr. Martin’s income at the time of his fatal accident.  For the reasons discussed
below, we find that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that Mrs. Martin could
only continue to receive compensation if she had an ongoing dependency on the death
benefits.  As we will elaborate infra, Mr. Martin, the deceased spouse, earned an average of
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$200,000 per year while he was alive.  In stark contrast is the average salary of Mrs. Martin,
the surviving spouse, of approximately $15,000 per year.  After Mrs. Martin received the
initial $45,000, she was still earning approximately $15,000 per year; therefore, she
“continues to be wholly dependent” if her circumstances have not changed since the initial
dependency determination was made. 
Respondents assert that § 9-681(d) is ambiguous as to the identity of the payment
source upon which the surviving spouse must continue to be dependent, but we find no
ambiguity in the statute.  Indeed, the plain language of § 9-681(d) itself states “at the time
of death” when discussing the initial determination of dependency.  Therefore, if the Act
makes the awarding of initial benefits dependent on the salary of the deceased spouse at the
time of death (see § 9-681(b)), then it is only logical and consistent that determinations of
ongoing dependency under § 9-681(d) should also depend on the salary of the deceased
spouse.  In addition, even if we did find ambiguity in the language of § 9-681(d), we must
resolve all such ambiguities in favor of the claimant, Mrs. Martin, as it was the intent of the
legislature that the Act be liberally construed to effect its broad remedial goal.  As such, we
must also examine § 9-681(d) in context of the Act’s overall remedial scheme, not in
isolation.  For example, § 9-681(a), which empowers the Commission to decide whether  the
claimant is wholly or partially dependent on the deceased employee after the worker’s death,
provides:  “If there are individuals who were wholly dependent on a deceased covered
employee at the time of death resulting from an accidental personal injury or occupational
disease, the employer or its insurer shall pay death benefits in accordance with this section.”
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(Emphasis added).  Section 9-681(c), which governs the duration of benefits, states that death
benefits are to be paid “(1) for the period of total dependency; or (2) until $45,000 has been
paid.”  (Emphasis added).
Thus, when subsection (d) is read within the overall context of § 9-681, there is no
language to indicate that the issue of total dependency after the $45,000 has been paid should
focus on a continued dependency “on the benefits.”  To the contrary, if subsection (a) is read
as a preamble to the rest of the section, including subsection (d), it plainly states that the test
for determining total dependency is “individuals who were wholly dependent on a deceased
covered employee at the time of death.”  The logical inference from this reading is that for
a claimant to continue to be wholly dependent, he or she must have an ongoing dependency
on the deceased worker’s salary at the time of death.
In the instant case, pursuant to § 9-679, Mrs. Martin’s dependency was determined
at the time of her husband’s death, which was the same time as the accident.  In the recent
case of Meadowood v. Keller, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (199__)(Slip Op. No. 52, 1998
Term), we also construed dependency in the Act to turn on the timing of the event giving rise
to the benefit.  Mrs. Keller was injured in a job-related accident and later died of an
unrelated cause.  At the time of the accident, her son was not financially dependent on her,
but he later became so after he left his job to live with and take care of her.  Using § 9-679,
which covers death benefits, as a guide in construing Md. Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1998
Supp.), Labor and Employment Art., § 9-632, which deals with permanent partial disability
benefits, we held that the dependency of Mrs. Keller’s son turned on his circumstances at the
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time of her accident and not at the time of her death.  Keller, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at
___ (Slip Op. No. 52, 1998 Term at 20).  We noted that § 9-679 mandates application of the
facts existing at the time of the accident that caused the death of the employee in dependency
determinations and held that dependency for the purposes of § 9-632 must also be
determined as of the date of the accident.  Keller, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Slip Op.
No. 52, 1998 Term at 7-8).  This Court stated:  “[W]e are unable to discern any evidence that
the Legislature desired to have the term <dependent’ mean one thing for purposes of the death
benefits and another for purposes of the survived benefit, nor have we been able to determine
any compelling reason why it would have wanted to have different standards apply.”  Keller,
___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (Slip Op. No. 52, 1998 Term at 19-20).  Like we held in
Keller, we believe that § 9-681(d) should be construed to turn on the timing of the event
giving rise to the benefit.  
Respondents further  propose that,  in determining whether Mrs. Martin “continues
to be wholly dependent,” we should look at Mrs. Martin’s current income and compare it to
the maximum benefits available under the statewide average weekly wage pursuant to Md.
Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.), Labor and Employment Art., § 9-602 and COMAR
14.09.01.07.  Respondents maintain that if Mrs. Martin’s current income constitutes a
significant percentage of the statewide average weekly wage, then she is no longer dependent
on the workers’ compensation death benefits and is therefore not wholly dependent.  We
decline to adopt Respondents’ proposed formula for calculating whether a claimant
“continues to be wholly dependent” under § 9-681(d).  Rather, the correct formula to apply
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The hypothetical reads as follows:
8
“Suppose Spouse 1 and Spouse 2 are wholly dependent on the
incomes earned by their husbands and both husbands die on the
same date.  Spouse 1’s husband earns $320,000 per year and
Spouse 2’s husband earns $40,060 annually.  Both surviving
spouses receive $475 per week in death benefits pursuant to []
§ 9-681.  If, after the insurer has paid $45,000 in death benefits
to both Spouse 1 and Spouse 2, both get a job paying $15,000
per year, Spouse 2, under [Mrs. Martin’s] formulation, would
have a much more difficult time convincing the Commission
that she continues to be wholly dependent because her $15,000
annual income is 37.5 percent of the amount that her husband
earned when he lived.  On the other hand, Spouse 1, whose
husband made eight times as much as Spouse 2’s husband,
could argue that her current income is only 5 percent of her
husband’s former salary — and thus, in comparison,
minuscule.”
Martin, 119 Md. App. at 673, 705 A.2d at 1181.
in making ongoing dependency determinations is to compare the amount earned by the
worker at the time of death with the amount the surviving spouse earns after the $45,000 has
been paid.
In Martin, the court based its holding in part on a detailed hypothetical regarding two
surviving spouses whose deceased spouses made very differing salaries when they were
alive, resulting in a more frequent finding of  “continues to be wholly dependent” on the part
of the wealthier surviving spouse.   The court stated:
8
“If we were to adopt [Mrs. Martin’s] reading of [] § 9-681(d),
persons whose spouses earn huge incomes would be more likely
to be able to convince the Commission that they continue to be
wholly dependent than those with modest income.  This would
produce an illogical and unjust result and one at odds with the
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purpose of the Act.”
Martin, 119 Md. App. at 673, 705 A.2d at 1181.
We do not feel it necessary to refute the court’s hypothetical point-by-point, but
instead rely on four safeguards to demonstrate the hypothetical’s fallacious reasoning.
Before we discuss the safeguards, however, we want to first view the hypothetical from a
different perspective.  The hypothetical can easily be seen as penalizing the spouse whose
husband earned more money, in that she will receive only eight percent of her deceased
husband’s average weekly wage in workers’ compensation death benefits as compared to the
spouse with the more modest income, who will be awarded sixty-two percent of her
husband’s salary.  In examining the instant case, it was found that two-thirds of Mr. Martin’s
average weekly wage of $2,850 at the time of his death was $1,881.  Therefore, Mrs Martin’s
weekly death benefit was $475, which was the maximum permitted under the Act in 1992.
See footnote 5, supra.  As such, Mrs. Martin was only receiving seventeen percent of her
husband’s full weekly salary in workers’ compensation death benefits; a figure nowhere near
her husband’s average weekly wage at the time of his death.
At this juncture, we wish to emphasize that we are not determining a specific income
percentage or amount at which a surviving spouse achieves a self-supporting status.  We
simply use percentages in this opinion to illustrate the major income disparity between Mrs.
Martin’s current financial situation and what her lifestyle was when Mr. Martin was alive.
In accordance with the Act and the manner in which the Commission administers it, we
maintain that Mrs. Martin’s dependent status, either total or partial, will not abruptly end at
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a particular point in time, say after she has received death benefits for a certain number of
days, weeks, months, or years.  Instead, she will continue to receive benefits so long as her
dependency on her deceased husband’s salary remains.  Under the current schema, Mrs.
Martin’s benefits will continue until she remarries, dies, or the Commission determines that
she has become either wholly or partially self-supporting.
We now turn to the safeguards that protect against the unjust awards predicted in the
Court of Special Appeals’ hypothetical by our adoption of an interpretation of § 9-681(d)
based on the deceased worker’s salary.  The first safeguard is the statutory cap on
compensation.  The cap obviates the Court of Special Appeals’ concern that a wealthy
claimant will reap an unjust award.  Under § 9-681(b), the weekly benefit may not “exceed
the State average weekly wage.”  We need look no further than the instant case to see the
curative effect of this safeguard.  Mr. Martin’s average weekly wage was found to be $1,881
(two-thirds of $2,850), yet Mrs. Martin was only receiving the statewide average weekly
wage of $475, which is the maximum allowed under the statute.  Therefore, Mrs. Martin’s
average weekly income was reduced by $1,406, a seventy-five percent reduction.
The second safeguard is § 9-679, which requires that initial dependency
determinations be based on the particular facts of each case.  Section 9-679’s mandate, that
the Commission must examine each case on its own unique set of facts, prevents the
perceived unfairness and injustice that Respondent, and the Court of Special Appeals,
maintains would result if we determine that “continues to be wholly dependent” refers to an
ongoing dependency on the deceased worker’s salary rather than the benefits.  The particular
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facts and circumstances include the wide range of salaries that may be involved from case
to case.  For this reason, it would be inappropriate for us to adopt a specific percentage under
which a dependent can earn income, relative to the deceased worker’s salary, and still be
found  “wholly dependent” by the Commission.  In this case, Mrs. Martin earns
approximately eight percent of Mr. Martin’s yearly income at the time of his death.  On its
own, Mrs. Martin’s approximately $15,000 annual salary is insufficient to compensate her
as contemplated by the legislature in enacting the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Modifying
the facts of the instant case and applying them to our own hypothetical, say that Mr. Martin
was earning $500,000 at the time of his death.  If we take eight percent of $500,000, Mrs.
Martin’s annual salary would be $40,000 per year.  Now when we apply § 9-679 and
examine the particular facts and circumstances of this hypothetical, we observe that the
Commission could well determine that Mrs. Martin is not wholly dependent, even though
her $40,000 salary would also constitute a mere eight percent of Mr. Martin’s annual salary
at the time of his death.
The third safeguard is the consequential contribution test, discussed in Part II.B.2.
supra, which ensures that total dependency will not be found if the claimant makes a
substantial contribution to his or her own support.  In applying the consequential contribution
test to this case, it is clear that Mrs. Martin’s earnings with Canada Dry do not constitute a
“consequential contribution” to the family income.  First, when we apply the correct formula,
detailed supra in this section, and compare Mrs. Martin’s current income against Mr.
Martin’s salary at the time of his death, it is obvious that the percentage of Mrs. Martin’s
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earnings when compared to Mr. Martin’s does not rise to the level of those found in the
Mario Anello, Mullan Construction, and Toadvine cases, discussed supra, so as to constitute
a consequential, substantial  contribution.  As mentioned, Mr. Martin’s weekly wage was
$2,850.  After business expenses were deducted, Mrs. Martin’s approximate weekly wages
from her Canada Dry job were as follows for the three years after her husband’s fatal injury:
1993 — $216 ($11,249.50 divided by 52); 1994 —  $186 ($9,651 divided by 52); and 1995
—  $305 ($15,879 divided by 52).  Thus, in 1993, Mrs. Martin earned eight percent of Mr.
Martin’s full weekly wage; in 1994, she earned seven percent; and in 1995, she earned
eleven percent.  Second, even if we apply the formula that the Court of Special Appeals
adopted and compare Mrs. Martin’s current income to the statewide average weekly wage,
we see that her weekly income is significantly less than the statewide average weekly wage
of $475 in 1992, a figure that increases every year and thus makes the disparity even greater
today.  From the above weekly wage calculations, it is apparent that Mrs. Martin is not
earning more than the average worker in Maryland, nor anywhere close to this average
weekly wage.  Moreover, there has been little change in Mrs. Martin’s financial
circumstances since the time when the Commission initially found her to be “wholly
dependent” on Mr. Martin in its initial death benefit compensation award of February 1,
1994.  Her personal income remains fairly static.
The final safeguard that exists to curb unfair award determinations is found in § 9-
681(j).  It states in pertinent part:  
“(j) Continuing jurisdiction of commission. — The Commission
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has continuing jurisdiction to:
(1) determine whether a surviving spouse or child has
become wholly or partly self-supporting;
(2) suspend or terminate payments of compensation.” 
Therefore, should Mrs. Martin’s financial circumstances change down the road and she
becomes either wholly or partially self-supporting, the Commission has the authority to
reduce or eliminate her benefits as necessary.
In many cases there may well be a discrepancy in the amount of ultimate benefits
awarded to a person who is wealthy and a person who is not.  In general, workers’
compensation benefits are based on the worker’s income, so there will naturally be a variable
in how much claimants receive.  However, the unfairness the court says will result if we
adopt an interpretation of continued dependency based on the deceased worker’s salary,
rather than on the death benefits, is negated by application of the above four safeguards.  The
(1) built-in protection of the statutory cap; (2) the analysis of dependency determinations on
a case-by-case basis pursuant to § 9-679; (3) the application of the “consequential
contribution” test after the initial $45,000 has been paid; and (4) the exercise of Commission
jurisdiction under § 9-681(j), as necessary, all will result in findings that are consistent and
in accordance with the benevolent purpose of the Act.  Finally, any unfairness that results
which is beyond the reach of these safeguards is for the legislature to resolve.
We now turn to a discussion of Linder Crane, which the Respondents misconstrue.
In finding that Mrs. Martin continues to be wholly dependent on Mr. Martin’s income at the
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time of his death, we note that the Martins, like the Hogans in Linder Crane, had a private
marital agreement that she would not work outside the home.  This agreement was in place
for the last several years of their marriage, including at the time of Mr. Martin’s death; thus,
it is clear that he intended to provide indefinite financial support for his wife while she took
care of the household.  Like Mrs. Hogan in Linder Crane, Mrs. Martin sought employment
due to the financial circumstances brought about by her husband’s death.
Respondents point to the “temporary employment” language found in Linder Crane
and maintain that because Mrs. Martin’s present job with Canada Dry is not temporary, as
Mrs. Hogan’s was found to be, she cannot continue to be wholly dependent on Mr. Martin.
While it is true that Mrs. Martin’s position with Canada Dry may not be temporary or
occasional, it is undisputed that her income, which has never exceeded $16,000, is a mere
fraction of what the Martin family income was when her husband was alive.  Any
contributions Mrs. Martin made to the family income, both while Mr. Martin was alive and
also after his death, were minor, insubstantial contributions.  Mrs. Martin’s job selling
business forms, which she had while Mr. Martin was alive, was purely a sideline business
that yielded no substantial income ($4,246 in 1991).  Moreover, her clients for this sideline
business derived almost exclusively from her husband’s business contacts.  In addition, the
salary she received from Sun Dun was purely gratuitous and did not in any way alter her
dependent status on her husband.
Therefore, we can analogize the “temporary employment” scenario in Linder Crane
to the major disparity that exists between Mrs. Martin’s current income and what it was
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before Mr. Martin died.  In so doing, it is obvious that Mrs. Martin’s low-paying job with
Canada Dry, with its sporadic, non-established hours, was “not intended to alter [her]
dependency ... on [Mr. Martin].”  See Linder Crane, 86 Md. App. at 444, 586 A.2d at 1293.
“Even total dependency is consistent with the receipt of some other income, if unsubstantial,
or sporadic.”  2A ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW § 63.13, at
11-134 (1989)(footnote omitted).
On a policy level, if we were to adopt Respondent’s interpretation of § 9-681(d) there
would be a disincentive for a surviving spouse, or any dependent, to work and be a
productive member of society; instead, he or she could earn more money by not working and
staying home.  At the present time, Mrs. Martin is not earning more than the benefits, so if
she had simply quit her job prior to the second workers’ compensation hearing, she would
have unquestionably been granted continuing death benefits.  Perhaps this “all or nothing”
facet of the Act is something that the legislature should address, but until it does should we
tell people in Mrs. Martin’s situation to simply quit their jobs in order to retain their
benefits?  Rather than being punished by having her benefits discontinued, Mrs. Martin
should be commended for working.  Efforts toward self-sufficiency should be encouraged,
not discouraged.
We agree with Judge Wolff’s factual finding, and the Commission’s finding and
interpretation of the statute, that Mrs. Martin’s current income level is “not sufficient to
provide her with the basic necessities contemplated by the Workers’ Compensation statute.”
While it may appear unfair to some, the reality of our capitalist system is that people earn
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We observe that our nation’s workers’ compensation laws were designed to eliminate
9
a worker’s right to recover in tort from his or her employer by providing them with
guaranteed compensation.  The quid pro quo is that the employer is insulated from tort
liability, while the employee is guaranteed compensation, albeit at a potentially lower rate.
See 1 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW § 1.20, at 2
(1990)(“[T]he employee and his dependents, in exchange for these modest but assured
[workers’ compensation] benefits, give up their common-law right to sue the employer for
damages for any injury covered by the act.”)  As such, in any given case, this tradeoff may
work to either the employer or employee’s advantage.  In the instant case, Mrs. Martin had
no right to recover in tort because Mr. Martin was killed in the course of his employment.
If Mrs. Martin had been allowed to sue in tort and had a valid claim, she would have been
able to recover not only her full pecuniary loss but other damages as well.  See Md. Code
(1998 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 3-904 (d), which states, in pertinent
part, that damages awarded under a wrongful death action
“are not limited or restricted by the ‘pecuniary loss’ or
‘pecuniary benefit’ rule but may include damages for mental
anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society,
companionship, comfort, protection, marital care, parental care,
filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or
education....”
The workers’ compensation laws, by accounting for the injured or deceased worker’s income
level, therefore retain elements of the tort system that the laws were intended to replace.
Thus, it is not unjust under the particular facts of this case that Mrs. Martin be awarded
continuing benefits as a total dependent even though she is currently employed in a low-
paying job.
vastly different amounts of money depending on their education, training, background, and
level of industriousness, among other factors.  That reality is reflected in the Act’s
recognition that even with the application of the safeguards discussed supra,
employers/insurers must still pay higher benefits to those employees, or their dependents, for
whom they have elected to compensate at a higher salary.   The fact is that Mrs. Martin’s
9
husband earned a high wage, and as a result she grew accustomed to a higher standard of
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There are other contexts where Maryland courts look to see if a person is self-
10
supporting, and in so doing the person’s status is taken into consideration.  See Md. Code
(1999 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Art., § 8-205(b)(governing awards of marital property) and
Md. Code (1999 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Art., § 11-106(b)(governing awards of alimony).
living than many experience.  While she should naturally expect a diminution in income after
her husband’s death, the disparity should not be so great that she is subsisting solely on the
income from her job as an independent contractor, which is less than ten percent of the
previous family income.  The Act clearly considers a claimant’s standard of living when
making benefit determinations; indeed, § 9-681(b) contemplates the socioeconomic status
of the dependent in making an initial award of benefits when it mandates that the average
weekly wage of the deceased be considered in any benefit determination.   See also 2A
10
ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW § 63.11(b), at 11-109
(1989)(stating that “[a] showing of actual dependency does not require proof that, without
decedent’s contributions, claimant would have lacked the necessities of life, but only that
decedent’s contributions were relied on by claimant to maintain claimant’s accustomed
mode of living”)(emphasis added)(footnote omitted).  
We also may be affronted by the particulars of the arrangement the Martins made;
specifically, the fact that in accepting a gratuitous salary from Sun Dun, Mrs. Martin was
“getting something for doing nothing.”  No matter what our personal biases are, we must not
penalize Mrs. Martin because Mr. Martin was professionally successful and financially able
to make this special arrangement with his wife.  We are still obligated to look at the facts of
each case and make not only our initial dependency determinations based on her deceased
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husband’s salary, but also any continuing dependency determinations on this basis.
Thus, when we look at the plain language of the statute in the context of its
benevolent purpose, we hold that Mrs. Martin “continues to be wholly dependent” on Mr.
Martin’s income at the time of his fatal accident.  We further hold that the correct formula
to apply in determining whether a claimant continues to be wholly dependent under § 9-
681(d) is to compare the amount earned by the worker at the time of death with the amount
the surviving spouse earns after the $45,000 has been paid.  If we adopt the Court of Special
Appeals’ interpretation, that for compensation to be continued the claimant must have an
ongoing dependency on the death benefits, untold numbers of people may be unable to
continue to receive the support they need to live.  Nothing in our case law, or the wording
of the statute itself, points to such a strict rule of construction; in fact, legislative intent tells
us that we must avoid such a narrow reading of the Act.
Furthermore, pursuant to § 9-745 (b)(1), the decision of the Commission is presumed
to be prima facie correct.  There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Commission did
not fairly consider all of the facts regarding Mr. Martin’s accidental death or that it exceeded
its powers or misconstrued the law and facts of the case.  See § 9-745 (c)(1)-(3).  Therefore,
in accordance with § 9-745 (e)(1), we shall affirm the decision of the Commission and
uphold the order of reinstatement of Mrs. Martin’s workers’ compensation death benefits.
III.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and
-36-
hold that the phrase “continues to be wholly dependent,” as found in § 9-681(d), refers to a
continued dependency on the deceased spouse’s income at the time of his or her death.  In
making ongoing dependency determinations, the amount earned by the deceased employee
at the time of death must be compared with the amount the claimant earns after the initial
maximum $45,000 has been paid.  In deference to the Commission’s interpretation of the
statute and its findings, we affirm its August 22, 1995, order, which found that Petitioner
continued to be “wholly dependent on her deceased husband.”
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS
TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.