Case Title: CLARK v. EDENS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 108187

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
CLARK v. EDENS  CLARK v. EDENS 2011 OK 28 Case Number: 108187 Decided: 04/12/2011 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. PETER ANDREW CLARK, Petitioner/Appellant, v. JAMIE MICHELLE CLARK EDENS, Respondent/Appellee. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE P. THOMAS THORNBRUGH, TRIAL JUDGE ¶0 Ex-husband sought declaratory judgment that his presumptive paternity of a child born during the marriage was not rebutted by a finding in the divorce decree that there were no children born of the marriage. The trial court denied ex-husband relief and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. On certiorari review, we vacate the Court of Civil Appeals opinion and reverse and remand for further proceedings. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Andrew B. Morsman, P. Gae Widdows, Bonham & Howard, PLLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Petitioner/Appellant. Robert Perugino, Lawrence R. Murphy, Jr., Robinett & Murphy, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Respondent/Appellee. REIF, J.: ¶1 This case concerns a dispute between divorced parties over the ex-husband's paternity of a child born during the marriage. The parties, Peter Andrew Clark and Jamie Michelle Clark Edens, were married from October 10, 1998, until their divorce on September 6, 2002. Ms. Edens gave birth to one child, M.A.C., on January 8, 2001, during the parties' marriage. Mr. Clark contends he is the presumptive father of the child under ¶2 Mr. Clark sought a declaratory judgment that he is the presumptive father of M.A.C. based upon (1) M.A.C.'s birth during the marriage, (2) the designation of Mr. Clark as M.A.C.'s father on the birth certificate, and (3) his payment of child support and exercise of visitation from the time of the divorce in September 2002 to June 2009, when Ms. Edens discontinued visitation. Ms. Edens resisted the declaratory judgment based on (1) a genetic test within two years of M.A.C.'s birth showing Mr. Clark was not the biological father, (2) a divorce petition filed by Mr. Clark (later dismissed) that stated, "Of the marriage, no children have been born," and (3) the "no children" finding in the divorce decree that was entered upon her petition and Mr. Clark's waiver. ¶3 The trial court denied declaratory relief to Mr. Clark, ruling (1) the divorce petition filed by Mr. Clark was a waiver of his claim to paternity, and (2) the decree of divorce rebutted any presumption of paternity that might otherwise have existed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Upon certiorari review, we conclude that Mr. Clark is entitled to the declaratory relief. ¶4 A declaratory judgment suit may be either legal or equitable, depending upon the essential nature of the case. Carpenter v. Carpenter, ¶5 Once invoked in a proper proceeding, equity will administer complete relief on all issues formed by the evidence regardless of whether the pleadings specifically tendered them for resolution. Estate of Bartlett, ¶6 The relief sought by Mr. Clark is in the nature of a judicial declaration of rights under a divorce decree, much like the father's quest for relief in Carpenter. Although Carpenter involved a foreign divorce decree, we agree with Justice Doolin's special concurring comment that good reasons exist to generally permit declaratory judgments where a party's rights or duties determined by a prior judgment have become ambiguous. Carpenter, ¶7 In a divorce case, statutory law directs that a party seeking a divorce "must state whether or not the parties have minor children of the marriage." ¶8 In addition, the finding that "there are No child(ren) of the marriage" cannot preclude Mr. Clark from enforcing the statutory presumption of paternity, because the issue of his paternity for any children born during the marriage was not before the court or actually litigated. The divorce was granted upon Ms. Eden's petition and Mr. Clark's waiver. The Court of Civil Appeals has held that a finding of no children born of the marriage does not preclude the husband from establishing paternity to a child who was, in fact, born during the marriage where the issue of paternity was not actually litigated. See Cornelius v. Cornelius, ¶9 Based on the foregoing considerations, Mr. Clark was entitled to declaratory relief that the divorce decree did not preclude him from enforcing the presumption of paternity under ¶10 In denying declaratory relief, the trial court also ruled Mr. Clark waived his claim of paternity by filing a petition (later dismissed) that stated "Of the marriage, no children have been born." Even though this allegation is certainly inconsistent with Mr. Clark's present claim of presumptive paternity, this allegation was not an effective waiver of the presumption of paternity. ¶11 First, the parents are not the only parties affected by the presumption of paternity. The presumption is a matter of public policy intended for the benefit and protection of children "born during the marriage." A right based on a statute that contains provisions founded upon public policy cannot be waived by a private party, if such waiver thwarts the legislative policy the statute was designed to effectuate. Parker v. Ind. Sch. Dist. I-003 of Okmulgee County, Oklahoma, 82 F.3d 952, 954 (10th Cir. 1996). ¶12 Additionally, the equitable principle of waiver cannot be invoked where the Legislature has provided a specific procedure by which a husband can deny paternity. The statutory procedure applicable to the case at hand was set forth in ¶13 Finally, the "no children" allegation in Mr. Clark's divorce petition did not constitute a waiver in the sense of judicial estoppel. A party is not barred by judicial estoppel from asserting a position in a subsequent case that is different from an allegation made in a petition filed in a previous case where the previous case is dismissed without granting any relief. Harrell v. Horton, ¶14 In reaching the foregoing conclusions, we are cognizant the parties agree a genetic test was performed within two years of M.A.C.'s birth and that this test excluded Mr. Clark as the biological father of M.A.C. We are also cognizant that paternity "may" be established by genetic tests. ¶15 First, the record is devoid of any information about the genetic test in question other than the parties' agreement that there was a test and the results. More importantly, Ms. Edens did not present the test to a court or administrative tribunal to establish parental obligations on the part of the natural father. Instead, she acted as if the genetic test did not exist and allowed Mr. Clark to continue in a parental role. For almost seven years after their divorce, Ms. Edens allowed Mr. Clark visitation and accepted support from him in the form of monetary payments and insurance coverage for M.A.C. Under the facts of this case the equitable concept of estoppel should be applied to prevent Ms. Edens from asserting the genetic test at this time as a ground for rebutting the presumption of paternity. ¶16 Between Mr. Clark and Ms. Edens, equity calls for the presumption of Mr. Clark's paternity for M.A.C. to be recognized and enforced under the facts and circumstances of this case. We hold and declare that Mr. Clark is entitled to exercise parental rights to M.A.C. based upon the child's birth during the marriage, the presumption of paternity set forth in CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. ¶17 COLBERT, V.C.J., WATT, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, and GURICH, JJ., concur. ¶18 KAUGER, J., concurs in result. ¶19 TAYLOR, C.J., and WINCHESTER, J., dissent. FOOT