Case Title: THOMAS H. LUEDTKE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-144

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
THOMAS H. LUEDTKE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 98117 P.3d 1227Case Number: 04-144Decided: 08/22/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
THOMAS 
H. LUEDTKE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant 
Attorney General.                  

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Thomas H. Luedtke 
appeals his felony convictions for forgery and attempting to obtain possession 
of a controlled substance by prescription fraud.  Mr. Luedtke contends that the district 
court improperly permitted a witness, not on the State's original witness list, 
to testify and erred when it supplied the jury with a supplemental instruction 
during deliberations.  Mr. Luedtke 
also challenges the district court's denial of his motion for new trial.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Luedtke 
states the issues as follows:

  

1.                  
Whether 
the trial court erred in permitting the testimony of Dr. Patrick Murray, 
pharmacist, depriving appellant his constitutional right to due process and a 
fair trial.

 
 

2.                  
Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion when it supplied the jury with a 
supplemental jury instruction while they were 
deliberating.

 
 

3.                  
Whether 
the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for new 
trial.

 
 

4.                  
Whether 
the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial based on 
cumulative error.

 
 
The 
State substantially agrees with Mr. Luedtke's statement of the 
issues.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On July 12, 2003, 
Mr. Luedtke developed a migraine headache while at work.  He took two doses of Imitrex, but the 
medication provided no relief.  Mr. 
Luedtke's foreman transported him to the hospital.  At the hospital, Mr. Luedtke received a 
shot of Demerol for pain and Vistaril to prevent nausea.  He then rested and was observed for 
approximately 40 minutes before being released from the hospital.  He was given a prescription for 8 pills 
of Demerol or its generic equivalent, Meperidine.  

 
 
[¶4]      After leaving the 
hospital, Mr. Luedtke went to a pharmacy.  
On the way to the pharmacy, he changed the prescription increasing the 
number of pills from 8 to 18.  Mr. 
Luedtke presented the modified prescription at the pharmacy.  He left the pharmacy before the 
prescription was filled, but told a pharmacy employee that he would return for 
the prescription.

 
 
[¶5]      The prescription 
tendered by Mr. Luedtke raised concerns at the pharmacy.  Dr. Murray, the pharmacist on duty, 
telephoned the hospital regarding the prescription.  Laury Johnson, the physician's assistant 
who wrote the prescription, confirmed that the prescription was for 8 
pills.  The police were 
contacted.   

 
 
[¶6]      Officer Scott 
Jones of the Casper Police Department investigated.  He located Mr. Luedtke and asked Mr. 
Luedtke to accompany him to the Casper Police Department to discuss the event in 
more detail.  Mr. Luedtke 
agreed.  At the police station, 
after being advised of his rights and signing a waiver, Mr. Luedtke admitted 
altering the prescription.  He was 
charged with forgery and prescription fraud.

 
 
[¶7]      On January 22, 
2004, the State filed its original list of anticipated witnesses.  The State did not designate Dr. Murray 
as a potential witness.  On January 
26, 2004, the morning of trial, the State submitted an amended witness list that 
included Dr. Murray.  According to 
the State, it did not learn of Dr. Murray until Friday, January 23, 2004, while 
interviewing one of the other witnesses, Jim Brown, a pharmacy technician.  The State called Dr. Murray as its first 
witness.  Mr. Luedtke objected, 
claiming inadequate notice and surprise.  
The district court overruled the objection and allowed Dr. Murray to 
testify.

 
 
[¶8]      During 
deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the district court regarding the 
meaning of the word "defraud."  
After consulting with counsel, the district court provided the jury with 
a supplemental instruction over Mr. Luedtke's objection.  The district court advised the jury that 
"[w]ith intent to defraud' means to act willfully and deliberately and with the 
specific intent to deceive or cheat."

 
 
[¶9]      The jury returned 
a verdict of guilty on both counts.  
Mr. Luedtke filed a motion for new trial alleging unfair surprise 
regarding Dr. Murray's testimony and prejudice from the supplemental 
instruction. The district court denied the motion for new trial and entered its 
judgment and sentence.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
A.  Admissibility of Dr. Murray's 
Testimony

 
 
[¶10]   Rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶39, 67 P.3d 1207, ¶39 (Wyo. 2003).  We will 
not disturb such rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Id.  An abuse of discretion occurs when it is 
shown that the trial court reasonably could not have concluded as it did.  Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶13, 84 P.3d 320, ¶13 (Wyo. 2004).  We will find 
an abuse of discretion only when the trial court "acts in a manner which exceeds 
the bounds of reason under the circumstances."  Hilterbrand v. State, 930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo. 
1997).

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Luedtke claims the district 
court abused its discretion when it allowed Dr. Murray to testify.  Mr. Luedtke argues that he was 
"ambushed" by the State because the State failed to disclose Dr. Murray's 
identity prior to the morning of trial.  
He contends that he was prejudiced because he did not have an opportunity 
to adequately prepare for Dr. Murray's testimony.  Mr. Luedtke also asserts that Dr. 
Murray's "surprise" testimony prejudicially impacted his trial 
strategy.

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Luedtke does not claim that the 
State failed to comply with any order of the court for designating 
witnesses.  No such order was 
entered.  Additionally, Mr. Luedtke 
does not direct us to any legal authority which required the State to file a 
list of witnesses absent a court order requiring witness designation.  We also note the original witness list 
was filed on January 22, 2004 - four days before the scheduled start of the 
trial.  Mr. Luedtke does not claim 
any prejudice resulting from the timing of the filing of the initial witness 
list.  

 
 
[¶13]   The State concedes that Dr. Murray 
was not identified on its initial list.  
According to the State, Dr. Murray's name was omitted from the initial 
list because it did not know of the existence of Dr. Murray.  In its original list, the State 
identified Jim Brown as the pharmacist.  
In the course of trial preparation on Friday, January 23, 2004, the State 
learned that Mr. Brown was a pharmacy technician.  Mr. Brown advised the State that Dr. 
Murray was the pharmacist on duty at the time Mr. Luedtke presented the 
prescription.  The following 
business day, Monday, January 26, 2004, the State served Mr. Luedtke with its 
amended witness list in which it identified Dr. Murray as the pharmacist and 
changed Mr. Brown's designation to pharmacy technician.

 
 
[¶14]   Mr. Luedtke received the amended 
witness list prior to the commencement of trial.  He did not request a continuance.  The State mentioned Dr. Murray as a 
potential witness in voir dire and during its opening statement.  Mr. Luedtke did not raise any 
objection.  On at least two 
occasions prior to the State calling its first witness, the court asked counsel 
if there were any additional issues that the court needed to address.  Mr. Luedtke made no mention of any 
issues relating to Dr. Murray.

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Luedtke waited until Dr. Murray 
was called as the State's first witness to bring the matter to the court's 
attention.  When Dr. Murray was 
called as a witness, the following exchange occurred:

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Thank you, Your Honor.  The State of Wyoming would first call 
Mr. [sic] Patrick Murray.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, before this 
witness testifies --

THE 
COURT:  One moment, 
Counsel.

 
 
(The 
following proceedings were held at the bench between the Court and counsel, out 
of the hearing of the jury:)

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, as the Court 
notes, I was advised of this witness this morning just prior to jury 
selection.  So I would object to this witness as 
I haven't had any time to prepare.  
I haven't had any statements from this witness, and I don't know what 
this witness would testify about.  
So I object.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  Are there any statements that witnesses 
have given to the State?

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  No.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  I'll overrule the 
objection.

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Other than I've interviewed him in 
preparation for his testimony.  But 
as far as testimony being given to law enforcement, no.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  Okay.  There's [sic] no statements given to the 
law enforcement?

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  No, there are none from any of the 
witnesses except for Officer Jones.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  I will overrule the 
objection.

 
 
[¶16]   Mr. Luedtke does not claim that the 
State was aware that Dr. Murray was a potential witness prior to January 23, 
2004.  The thrust of Mr. Luedtke's 
claim of "ambush" is that the State should have disclosed its intent to call Dr. 
Murray on Friday or Saturday rather than Monday.  Mr. Luedtke attempts to bolster his 
claim of prejudice by asserting that Dr. Murray's testimony was critical to the 
State's case.  

 
 
[¶17]   The legal proceeding against Mr. 
Luedtke was initiated on July 30, 2003.  
In his Affidavit Supporting Complaint filed on that date, Officer Jones 
identified the prescription at issue, the pharmacy (Bi-Rite Drug) and the 
physician's assistant who issued the prescription.  The affidavit mistakenly identified Mr. 
Brown as the "Bi-Rite Pharmacist."

 
 
[¶18]   In its original witness list, the 
State identified Mr. Brown as a potential witness.  The designation 
stated:

 
 
3.  Jim Brown, Pharmacist, formally employed 
by Bi-Rite Drug.  Such witness may 
offer testimony as an expert witness, and would testify that the prescribed 
medication, Meperidine, is a Schedule II controlled 
substance.

 
 
[¶19]   On January 23, 2004, while 
interviewing Mr. Brown, the State learned that he was not the pharmacist on duty 
at the time of the incident.  Mr. 
Brown advised the State that he was a pharmacy technician and identified Dr. 
Murray as the pharmacist.  On the 
next business day, the State served defense counsel with its amended witness 
list. 

 
 
[¶20]   We have previously recognized the 
general rule that the State cannot intentionally withhold the identity of a 
witness from the defense.  Jackson v. State, 522 P.2d 1286, 1288 
(Wyo. 
1974).  We have also indicated that 
it is improper for the prosecution to "engage in gamesmanship in discovery 
matters."  Emerson v. State, 988 P.2d 518, 525 
(Wyo. 
1999).  

 
 
[¶21]   In Emerson, appellant filed a motion for 
discovery which requested the opportunity to inspect a padlock alleged to have 
been cut in the course of a burglary.  
A discovery order was entered allowing inspection.  The prosecution did not produce the 
padlock until three days prior to trial.  
Appellant immediately moved for a continuance based upon the State's 
delay in producing the evidence for inspection.  The district court denied the 
motion.  We affirmed the decision 
denying the continuance stating:

 
 
In this 
case, there is no evidence that the government purposely ambushed the defense 
when it produced the padlock only days before trial.  Therefore, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the defense motion that this evidence be 
suppressed.

 
 
Moreover, 
Appellant has not shown that he was materially prejudiced because he was not 
able to examine the padlock earlier.  
Appellant does not now identify--nor did he identify at trial or in his 
motion for a new trial--who the witness might be who would allegedly testify 
that the condition of the lock is material.  Thus, Appellant's argument is founded on 
speculation that such a witness may exist.  
This is insufficient to show that he was materially prejudiced by the 
fact that the lock was not produced until the Friday before 
trial.

 
 

Emerson, 
988 P.2d  
at 525.

 
 
[¶22]   In this case, as in Emerson, there is no evidence that the 
State "purposely ambushed" Mr. Luedtke.  
In Emerson, months passed 
between the discovery request, the order of production and the production of the 
padlock by the State.  In this case, 
the delay is one weekend.

 
 
[¶23]   The lack of prejudice to Mr. 
Luedtke becomes apparent when the testimony of Dr. Murray is placed in proper 
context.  Mr. Luedtke contends that 
Dr. Murray's statements amounted to key testimony because Dr. Murray was the 
only eyewitness who could place Mr. Luedtke at the pharmacy, describe his 
demeanor, and testify about whether Mr. Luedtke decided to cancel the filling of 
the prescription.  Our review of the 
record does not support Mr. Luedtke's contentions.

 
 
[¶24]   Dr. Murray testified that he saw 
Mr. Luedtke drop off the prescription at the pharmacy:

 
 
DR. 
MURRAY:  He dropped a prescription 
off, I do believe, to Jim Brown.  
Jim Brown picked it up.  I 
saw him drop it off to Jim and bring it back to me to fill 
it.

 
 
However, 
Dr. Murray was not the only witness who placed Mr. Luedtke at the pharmacy.  During his trial testimony, Mr. Luedtke 
admitted that he presented the prescription to the 
pharmacy:

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  So you handed the 
prescription to Bi-Rite?

 
 
MR. 
LUEDTKE:  
Uh-huh.

 
 
Officer 
Jones also placed Mr. Luedtke at the pharmacy by testifying regarding admissions 
made by Mr. Luedtke:

 
 
OFFICER 
JONES:  Once he got to Bi-Rite he 
told me he had gone to the counter, given the person at the counter the 
prescription and wanting [sic] the prescription to be 
filled.

 
 
[¶25]   Mr. Luedtke also claims that Dr. 
Murray was the only witness to testify regarding his demeanor.  Dr. Murray testified that Mr. Luedtke 
was "moving around fine" and that he didn't observe any type of impairment in 
his speech or movement.  In addition 
to Dr. Murray's testimony, two other witnesses testified as to their 
observations of Mr. Luedtke.  Ms. 
Johnson testified that Mr. Luedtke was not deficient in his mental status before 
he left the hospital.  She testified 
that Mr. Luedtke was not impaired, walked with a normal gait, and his speech was 
not slurred.  Ms. Johnson testified 
that she would not have let Mr. Luedtke leave the hospital if he was "loopy" at 
all.  Officer Jones also provided 
testimony that Mr. Luedtke exhibited no signs of impairment while he was 
observing Mr. Luedtke.

 
 
[¶26]   Lastly, Mr. Luedtke claims that Dr. 
Murray was the only witness to testify regarding Mr. Luedtke's intention to 
cancel the prescription.  Once 
again, however, Mr. Luedtke fails to recognize the existence and significance of 
his own testimony.  Mr. Luedtke 
admitted that he told the pharmacist that he would return for the 
prescription:

 
 
MR. 
LUEDTKE:  [T]he pharmacist came out 
and hollered at me and said, hey, are you going to come back and get this.  And I said yes, I am, or probably 
something to that effect. . . . I remember them hollering at me.  I just didn't want to - - at that point 
I pretty much decided I wasn't going to come back and get it because I would 
probably get in trouble if I did.  
And I just didn't want him to be mad at me, I guess.  I don't know what I was thinking but I 
said, yeah, I'll be back.

 
 
[¶27]   Based upon the foregoing, we find 
no abuse of discretion by the district court in allowing Dr. Murray to 
testify.  Additionally, we note that 
Mr. Luedtke's failure to request a continuance provides further justification to 
reject Mr. Luedtke's assertion of error relating to the testimony of Dr. 
Murray.  Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶19, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶19 (Wyo. 2002). 

 
 
B.  Supplemental Jury 
Instruction

 
 
[¶28]   Mr. Luedtke challenges the district 
court's decision to provide the jury with a supplemental jury instruction.  We afford the trial court significant 
deference when reviewing claims of error involving jury instructions.  Lapp v. State, 2004 WY 142, ¶7, 100 P.3d 862, ¶7 (Wyo. 2004).  We have previously 
noted:

 

A trial 
court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the 
instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant 
issue, reversible error will not be found.  
Instructions must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, 
or parts of them, should not be singled out and considered in isolation.  Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶5, 46 P.3d 298, ¶5 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Ogden v. 
State, 2001 WY 109, ¶8, 34 P.3d 271, ¶8 (Wyo. 2001); Coburn v. State, 2001 WY 30, ¶9, 20 P.3d 518, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001); Merchant v. 
State, 4 P.3d 184, 190 (Wyo. 2000)).  
Prejudice will be determined to exist only where an appellant 
demonstrates that the instruction given confused or misled the jury with respect 
to the proper principles of law.  Black v. State, at ¶16 (citing Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo. 
2000); Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 
916 (Wyo. 2000)).

 
 

Giles v. 
State, 2004 
WY 101, ¶14, 96 P.3d 1027, ¶14 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 
[¶29]   During its deliberations, the jury 
sent a note to the district court which stated, "[w]ith regard to instruction 
no. 11, what is a legal description of defraud with regard to item no. 4 as it 
applies to this case?"1  After conferring with counsel and noting 
defense counsel's objections, the district court provided a response to the jury 
in the form of supplemental instruction 21 which stated, "[w]ith intent to 
defraud' means to act willfully and deliberately and with the specific intent to 
deceive or cheat."  The instruction 
was read to the jury in open court and the jury was provided a written copy of 
the instruction.  The district court 
advised the jury:

 
 
In 
response to your question, the Court has prepared a supplemental jury 
instruction.  I'd ask the bailiff to 
distribute that.  The supplemental 
jury instruction provides as follows:  
With intent to defraud means to act willfully and deliberately and [sic] 
the specific intent to deceive or cheat.

 
 
That is 
what I can give you in response to your question.  And I would ask you to review that as 
well as all other jury instructions and recall that you not put undue emphasis 
on any one particular instruction, that you need to review them . . . and 
consider all those instructions together as a whole.

 
 
[¶30]   Mr. Luedtke alleges that the 
supplemental instruction confused the jury.  He relies upon our holding in Lapp to support his contention.  His reliance is 
misplaced.

 
 
[¶31]   In Lapp, the defendant asserted that the 
district court committed plain error when it failed to provide a definition 
instruction of "intent to defraud."  
We affirmed the conviction and held that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion by failing to provide the challenged jury instruction.  We stated:

 
 
In the 
context of the instructions as a whole, we conclude the term "intent to defraud" 
does not have a technical meaning so different from its ordinary meaning as to 
require an instruction defining it.  
Particularly in the context of the evidence presented here, the words 
"intent" and "defraud" are self-explanatory.  Even if they were not, the instructions 
given, considered together, adequately informed the jurors what they needed to 
find to support a guilty verdict.  
We conclude no violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
committed, and there was no plain error.

 
 

Lapp, 
¶16.

 
 
[¶32]   Mr. Luedtke urges us to extend this 
holding in Lapp to a finding of error 
in this case.  We decline to do 
so.  In Lapp, we also recognized that it is not 
error to provide a definition instruction in an appropriate case.  Lapp, ¶15 (citing Henderson v. State, 976 P.2d 203, 
208-209 (Wyo. 1999); Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 644-645 
(Wyo. 1985) 
(Rose, J., dissenting)).  The 
language of the supplemental instruction challenged by Mr. Luedtke is identical 
to instructions provided in Cronin v. 
State, 678 P.2d 370, 371 (Wyo. 1984) and Broom.  We found no error relating to the 
instruction in those cases.

 
 
[¶33]   In Lapp, we reiterated that "the decision 
to give or refuse an instruction on the definition of a term used in describing 
an element of an offense was within the latitude afforded to the district court 
to tailor the instructions to the circumstances of the case."  Lapp, ¶11.  In this case, the discussion regarding 
the need for a supplemental jury instruction was prompted by a question from the 
jury.  The district court met with 
counsel to discuss the appropriate response.  The district court considered several 
responses including defense counsel's suggestion that no additional instruction 
be provided.  Ultimately, the 
district court chose an instruction identical to one given in Cronin.  While the district court was not 
required to provide the supplemental instruction, it was not prohibited from 
doing so.  We find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's decision to respond to the jury's inquiry by 
giving the supplemental instruction.

 
 
[¶34]   Mr. Luedtke also contends that the 
supplemental instruction confused the jury because it overlapped other 
instructions or intruded upon the instructions previously agreed upon and 
given.  Specifically, Mr. Luedtke 
claims that the supplemental instruction infringed upon the definition of intent 
provided by instruction 19.2  We disagree.

 
 
[¶35]   The supplemental instruction 
provides a definition of "intent to defraud" that is not contained in 
instruction 19 or elsewhere in the jury instructions.  The instruction does not conflict with 
any other instruction.  The jury was 
specifically reminded by the district court that they must continue to review 
and apply the "instructions together as a whole."  Based upon the foregoing, we are unable 
to find any prejudicial error to Mr. Luedtke predicated upon the supplemental 
instruction provided to the jury.

 
 

C.  Motion for New Trial

 
 
[¶36]   We review the decision to grant or 
deny a motion for new trial by applying an abuse of discretion standard.  Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶12, 46 P.3d 309, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002).  Mr. 
Luedtke contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion for a new trial.  He supports 
his contention by reiterating the arguments which he advanced regarding the 
testimony of Dr. Murray and the supplemental jury instruction.  He also asserts cumulative error.  His claim of cumulative error rests upon 
these same two issues.  A claim of 
cumulative error cannot be recognized where there is no underlying error to 
support it.  Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754, 767 
(Wyo. 
1993).  Similarly, because we have 
rejected Mr. Luedtke's claims of error regarding the testimony of Dr. Murray and 
the supplemental jury instruction, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's denial of Mr. Luedtke's motion for new trial.  

 
 
[¶37]   The judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1Jury 
instruction 11 stated:

 
 
The 
elements of the crime of Forgery, as charged in Count I of this case, may be 
proved in one or both of two ways:

 
 
Under 
Theory One, such elements are:

1.   On or about the 12th day 
of July, 2003;

2.   In Natrona County, Wyoming;

3.   The Defendant, Thomas H. 
Luedtke;

4.   With intent to 
defraud;

5.   Altered the writing of another, 
to-wit:  a prescription issued by 
Laury Johnson, P.A.; 

6.   Without 
authority.

 
 
OR

 
 
Under 
Theory Two, such elements are:

1.        
On or 
about the 12th day of July, 
2003;

2.        
In 
Natrona County, Wyoming;

3.        
The 
Defendant, Thomas H. Luedtke;

4.        
With 
intent to defraud;

5.        
Uttered 
any writing;

6.        
Which 
the defendant knew to have been altered without authority.

 
 
If you 
find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the elements of 
either theory has proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the 
defendant guilty under such theory.

 
 
If, on 
the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of 
these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the defendant not guilty.

 
 

2Jury 
instruction 19 stated:

 
 
The intent 
of a person with the knowledge that a person possesses at any given time may not 
ordinarily be proved directly because there is no way of directly scrutinizing 
the workings of the human mind.  In 
determining the issue of what a person knew or what a person intended at a 
particular time, you may consider statements made or acts done or omitted by 
that person and all other facts and circumstances received in evidence which may 
aid in your determination of that persons [sic] knowledge or intent.  You may infer, but you are certainly not 
required to infer, that a person intends a natural and probable consequences 
[sic] of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted.  It is entirely up to you, however, to 
decide what facts to find from the evidence received during this 
trial.