Case Title: Turner v. State

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 62

Docket Number: 76465

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2020-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
436 Nev., Advance Opinion @Z-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STEVEN TURNER, No. 76465
Appellant,

vs. FILED

THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. OCT 01 2020

 

cae
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury

verdict, of conspiracy to commit burglary, attempted burglary while in
possession of a firearm or deadly weapon, two counts of attempted murder
with use of a deadly weapon, and battery with use of a deadly weapon
resulting in substantial bodily harm. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Mark B. Bailus, Judge.

Affirmed.

Darin F. Imlay, Public Defender, and Deborah L. Westbrook, Chief Deputy
Public Defender, Clark County,
for Appellant.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
Attorney, and John T. Niman, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

 

 
OPINION
By the Court, SILVER, J.:

Under Bruton v. United States, the admission of a nontestifying
codefendant’s inculpatory statement that expressly implicates the
defendant violates the Confrontation Clause. 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968).
In this case, we are faced with an issue of first impression regarding the
preservation of a Bruton challenge—appellant asserts that his
Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton were violated when the district
court admitted his codefendant’s statements, but the State contends that
the appellant waived any Bruton challenge. We agree that under these
particular facts, appellant waived the Bruton challenge. Appellant's actions
‘of cooperating to redact the statements, agreeing to the redacted
statements’ admission, indicating an intent to no longer pursue the Bruton
challenge, and failing to thereafter object to the statements showed a lack
of intention to preserve the argument for appeal. And although we agree
with some of appellant's other points of error, we ultimately affirm the
verdict, as those errors were harmless and do not amount to cumulative
error warranting reversal.

FACTS

Eric Clarkson heard noises on his back patio, just outside his
bedroom window, around 3:30 a.m, That patio was covered and screened,
and separated from the rest of the backyard. The lights inside his house
were off, and through the window, Clarkson was able to see a young man,
although he could not see the intruder’s face. Clarkson called 9-1-1 and
alerted his housemate, Willoughby Potter de Grimaldi. Grimaldi looked out
the window and, like Clarkson, saw a man on the patio but could not see his

face. Grimaldi noted the intruder was wearing a cap and appeared to be

 

 
cocking a shotgun. Someone then began to beat on the front door, and
Grimaldi looked out a window to see another man, who ran away down the
street. Grimaldi also thought he saw a third man pass by his bedroom
window.

Officers Robertson and Grego-Smith arrived approximately five
minutes after receiving the call from dispatch and approached the house
quietly. They briefly checked the sides of the house before Clarkson let
them inside. Leaving the lights off, the officers moved through the home
and opened the back door to check the backyard. The intruders immediately
opened fire. At least two bullets flew into the home before the officers could
react, narrowly missing Grimaldi and Clarkson. One shot crossed the room
while the other exploded mid-air, blowing shrapnel throughout the area.
Grimaldi described one shot as appearing as a “shooting star” while the
other exploded like “fireworks.” The officers could hear that one of the shots
was from a high-powered rifle. Another bullet hit Officer Robertson in the
upper thigh, severely damaging his femur. Officer Robertson collapsed
while Officer Grego-Smith returned fire.

Additional officers arrived on the scene with a K-9, who located
Clemon Hudson in the backyard. Officers approached to find Hudson lying
on the ground, injured, with a shotgun between his legs. Officers also began
patrolling a mile-wide perimeter around Clarkson’s home, looking for other
suspects. After someone reported a suspicious person traveling through a
backyard, officers located appellant Steven Turner walking down a street
within the perimeter. He was bleeding and had what appeared to be a bullet
wound to his leg, although Turner told officers he had been injured while
jumping over a fence. Officers transported him to UMC, where doctors,

including Dr. Amy Urban, examined him for a possible gunshot wound.

 

 
Doctors found shrapnel in Turner's leg and noted the presence of “stippling”
on his leg, foot, and ankle.

Back at Clarkson's home, officers found a damaged 12-gauge
Mossberg pump-action shotgun, an SKS Yugo Rifle, and a Beretta handgun
in the patio area. Officers also located Hudson's vehicle, with the keys in
the ignition, outside Clarkson's home. Inside the car they found two cell
phones, a gun magazine, a loose round cartridge, and Turner's two dogs. A
later trace of one of the phones led to Turner's residence. Officers also
recovered surveillance video showing Turner traversing yards, parking lots,
and fences on foot immediately after the incident.

‘Turner and Hudson each gave voluntary statements to police,
admitting to going to the home to steal marijuana. Each blamed the other
for contriving to burglarize the home and for bringing the guns. Turner
told detectives he followed Hudson over the wall, through the yard, and up
to the patio area, The shooting then broke out, and Turner claimed he fled
the yard and waited on a couch in a nearby backyard for a time before
setting out for a friend's house, at which point he was apprehended. Turner
admitted seeing the SKS in Hudson’s car. He told detectives the SKS had
previously been stolen from his uncle and accurately described the gun to
detectives, but he denied bringing the gun. Turner claimed the burglary
was Hudson's idea, and Hudson carried both the SKS and the shotgun.
‘Turner denied ever holding or firing a weapon at the scene. He also denied

working with a third person during the crime. Hudson, meanwhile, blamed

1Although Turner and Hudson each referred to the other by his street
name when speaking to police, the parties do not contest that each was
referencing the other, and we therefore use their given names.

 

 
‘Turner for contriving to burglarize the home and stated they both fired the
‘weapons at police.

‘Turner and Hudson were indicted and tried jointly. The State
charged them under three alternate theories: directly committing the
crimes, aiding or abetting, and conspiracy. ‘Turner conceded to committing
conspiracy and attempted burglary but contested the remaining charges.
At trial, he argued that he merely went to the house and stayed at the back
of the yard, and that he ran when the shooting broke out. ‘Turner also
argued that three or more people had been in the yard that night, that he
did not match the descriptions of the intruders, and that the State failed to
connect him to the crimes.

Hudson and Turner filed a pretrial motion to sever, arguing
that their statements to detectives inculpated each other such that a joint
trial would violate Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The district
court initially denied the motion without prejudice, and the State redacted
the statements to remove names and, to the extent possible, references to
other persons. At subsequent status checks, Turner agreed with the State's
redactions but proffered additional redactions, and later he stated “we've
submitted our proposed redactions. If Your Honor is inclined to not sever
the case we would. ..I guess not renew.” ‘The court indicated it would
review the redacted statements, and Turner and the State continued to
work toward satisfactory redactions.

At a later status check, Turner acknowledged receiving and
reviewing the redacted statements and stated that while he no longer
challenged the admission of his own statements, he “may have some
additional motion practice in the case” regarding his Bruton challenge to

the admission of Hudson's statements.

 

 
‘Turner did not renew the motion to sever. At trial Turner
requested a limiting instruction, and the district court accordingly
instructed the jury to use Hudson's statements only as evidence against
Hudson. Turner did not object to the statements’ admission. Turner's
redacted statements were likewise admitted into evidence.

State witnesses could not link the DNA or fingerprint evidence
recovered from the scene to Turner. However, they found Hudson’s DNA
on blood splatters and a beanie hat found at the scene, as well as his right-
hand fingerprints on the Mossberg shotgun. Firearms and toolmark expert
Anya Lester compared the guns to evidence found at the scene and
described her process for test firing a gun: shooting the gun into a water
tank and then examining the fired bullets and ejected cartridges. She
determined that the Mossberg shotgun had been fired at the scene but was
unable to test that gun because it had been damaged. While Lester could
not conclusively establish that someone fired the SKS at the scene, she
testified the cartridge and ammunition evidence was consistent with the
SKS having been fired. Lester also opined that both guns would require
two hands to fire, and explained the SKS had a trigger pull of approximately
five pounds. Lester further addressed skin stippling from a gunshot, as did
Dr. Amy Urban. Dr. Urban also testified to Turner's injury and the skin
stippling on his leg.

The State used the stippling evidence during closing argument
to counter Turner's defense that he had stayed in the back of the yard away
from the shooting, by arguing that the stippling placed Turner closer to the
gunfire, The State used Turner's and Hudsor
only two people committed the crime and that Turner was the other person
‘mentioned in Hudson's redacted statements.

 

statements to argue that

 

EE EL EE

 
‘The jury convicted Turner and Hudson on all counts, and the
court sentenced Turner to an aggregate total of 480 months in prison with
parole eligibility after 168 months. Turner moved for a new trial, in
relevant part on grounds that the district court should have severed the
trial and that the joint trial violated Bruton, but the court denied the
motion. Turner appeals.?

DISCUSSION

In this opinion, we first address the circumstances under which
a party preserves a Bruton challenge for appeal, and we conclude Turner
waived those arguments here. We next consider whether the district court
improperly admitted Lester's and Dr. Urban’s expert testimony regarding
stippling. We agree that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting Lester’s unnoticed stippling testimony, but the error was
harmless in light of Dr. Urban’s testimony and the medical records, and
‘Turner fails to show plain error as to Dr. Urban’s testimony. Finally, we
address whether the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct and
conclude that while there were several instances of misconduct, it was
ultimately harmless in light of the evidence adduced at trial. For those

same reasons, we conclude cumulative error does not warrant reversal.

*This case is before this court on a petition for review of a decision by
the court of appeals.

Turner also argues that the presence of uniformed officers in the
courtroom prejudiced the proceedings and warrants reversal. However, the
mere presence of officers in a courtroom does not demonstrate prejudice,
and the record is insufficient for us to determine whether prejudice
otherwise resulted here. See Jones v. Davis, 890 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir.
2018). We therefore do not reach this issue. See Johnson v. State, 113 Nev.
772, 716, 942 P.2d 167, 170 (1997) (“We cannot properly consider matters
not appearing in [the] record.”).

 

 
Whether Turner waived his Bruton argument

Bruton provides that the admission of a nontestifying
codefendant's inculpatory statement that expressly implicates the
defendant violates the Confrontation Clause. 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968).
‘Turner argues that allowing Hudson's redacted statements at the joint trial
violated his constitutional rights pursuant to Bruton. The State counters
that Turner waived his Bruton challenge by stating, before trial, that he
had no objections and then failing to object during trial to the statements’
admission. Turner contends that he preserved the Bruton challenge by
filing a motion to sever, expressly reserving the right to re-raise the
argument later, and moving for a new trial.

The arguments raise a novel issue for this court. Namely,
whether a defendant waives or forfeits a Bruton argument where the
defendant moves to sever the trial on Bruton grounds but thereafter
cooperates to redact the statements and neither objects to the statements
at trial nor renews the Bruton argument before the admission of the
statements to the jury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit addressed a similar situation in United States v. Sarracino, 340 F.3d
1148 (10th Cir. 2003). ‘There, three defendants were jointly tried. Id. at
1158. One defendant moved for severance before trial under Bruton, which
the court denied. Id. The defendant thereafter agreed to cooperate with the
other defendants and the State to redact the challenged statements and did
not object to the statements’ admission at trial. Jd. at 1159. But when
agreeing to cooperate with the efforts to redact the statements prior to trial,
the defendant clarified on the record that he did not waive his objection to
the joint trial by cooperating. Jd. The Tenth Circuit concluded that, under

 

 
these facts, the defendant's pretrial “position was clear” and that counsel
did not waive the severance issue before trial. Id. As to whether failure to
object at trial caused waiver, the court called the issue “close” but ultimately
concluded the argument was “sufficiently preserved” without further
explanation. Id.

Similarly, the California Court of Appeal considered whether a
defendant waived a Bruton challenge by failing to object at trial. People v.
Archer, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 230, 233 (Ct. App. 2000). There, the prosecutor
moved to enter the codefendant’s redacted statement into evidence. Id.
Defense counsel objected prior to trial and unsuccessfully moved to sever
the trial. Id. While the appeals court did not provide a detailed explanation,
the court concluded “in the context of the pretrial proceedings” that
counsel's pretrial actions sufficiently preserved the argument for appeal.
Id, Conversely, in United States v. Kaatz, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit concluded the admission of a codefendant’s incriminating statement
did not warrant reversal where no defendant objected before or during trial
or moved for severance. 705 F.2d 1237, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 1983).

From these cases, we conclude that cooperating with efforts to
redact inculpatory statements and thereafter failing to raise an objection at
trial does not per se waive a Bruton argument. However, as addressed in
Sarracino, the record must show that the defendant intended to preserve

the argument for appeal despite the cooperation and lack of an objection at
trial. 340 F.3d at 1159. It follows then, that if the record does not show the
defendant intended to preserve the argument, the argument is forfeited or
waived. See id. For example, in Sayedzada v. State, the court of appeals
considered waiver in the context of juror challenges for cause. 134 Nev. 283,
286, 419 P.3d 184, 189 (Ct. App. 2018). There, the defendant initially

 

 
challenged a juror for cause but thereafter did not renew the challenge, and
the court considered the issue waived on appeal. Id. at 286, 288, 419 P.3d
at 189, 190. In addressing the policy concerns supporting waiver under
those facts, the court explained that “[plarties should not be able to
strategically place questionable jurors on the jury as a means of cultivating
grounds for reversal should the verdict be unfavorable.” Id. at 287, 419 P.3d
at 190.

Our decision in Jeremias v. State offers additional guidance.
134 Nev. 46, 412 P.3d 43 (2018). There, the defendant argued that the
district court's decision to exclude his family members from the courtroom
during voir dire prejudiced him. Id. at 49, 412 P.3d at 47. But the defendant
did not object to the decision in the district court, and we construed that
failure as intentional. Id. at 52, 412 P.3d at 50. In so doing, we
distinguished between invited error (an affirmative action by the defendant
that introduces the error), waiver (an intentional relinquishment of a
known right), and forfeiture, which from Jeremias can be described as the
intentional failure to object, having full knowledge of the relevant facts, Id.
at 52-53, 412 P.Sd at 50. Specifically, we explained that the defendant
forfeited his argument where the subject events happened in open court; the
prosecutor relayed the reasons for his actions to the defense attorney; the
defendant said nothing; and the decision to not object appeared, from the
circumstances, to be intentional. Id. at 52, 412 P.3d at 50. Similar to
Sayedzada, we warned against correcting errors on appeal where to do so,
under the circumstances, “would encourage defendants who are aware their
rights are being violated to do nothing to prevent it, knowing that they can

obtain a new trial as a matter of law in the event they are convicted.” Id.

 

 
From these cases, we extract the following rule: where the
defendant moves to sever trial on Bruton grounds but the district court
determines the statements can be sufficiently redacted, the defendant does
not necessarily waive the Bruton challenge by thereafter participating in
the efforts to redact the statements. Nevertheless, to clearly preserve a
Bruton challenge for appellate review in this context, a defendant must
formally object, on the record, after the parties have agreed upon redactions
and prior to the district court’s admission of a codefendant'’s statement. We
note that determining whether a defendant preserves a Bruton argument
for appeal is a highly fact-based inquiry that must be considered under the
totality of the circumstances. Yet clarifying the objection on the record after
a statement has been redacted by the court adequately preserves the
objection for appellate review, as it clarifies that the defendant does not
waive the argument and prevents unnecessary confusion. Cf. BMW v. Roth,
127 Nev. 122, 136-38, 252 P.3d 649, 658-59 (2011) (holding that the mere
filing of a motion in limine does not serve as a continuing objection to an
attorney's violation of an order in limine and that a contemporaneous
objection is required at trial “to prevent litigants from wasting judicial,
party, and citizen-juror resources”).

Our holding here resolves two concerns. First, it recognizes
that the law favors joint trials, Jones v. State, 111 Nev. 848, 853, 899 P.2d
544, 547 (1995), and encourages defendants to collaborate in redacting
statements. Second, our holding prevents defendants from strategically
withholding a Bruton argument in the hopes that, if the defendant is
convicted, Bruton will provide grounds for a new trial following a reversal
on appeal. See, e.g., Sayedzada, 134 Nev. at 287, 419 P.3d at 190; Jeremias,
134 Nev. at 52, 412 P.3d at 50; BMW, 127 Nev. at 137, 252 P.3d at 659 (“The

 

 
courts cannot adopt a rule that would permit counsel to sit silently when an
error is committed at trial with the hope that they will get a new trial
because of that error if they lose.” (quoting U.S. Aviation Underwriters v.
Olympia Wings, Inc., 896 F.2d 949, 956 (5th Cir. 1990))).

‘Turning to the case at hand, we conclude the record shows
‘Turner waived his Bruton argument. Although Turner moved to sever trial
and raised the Bruton argument below, Turner did not clarify, on the record,
that he wished to preserve that argument for appeal after satisfactory
redactions had been made by the parties. To the contrary, after Turner and
the State agreed upon redactions, defense counsel acknowledged that
‘Turner had no further challenge to the redacted statements, and nothing in
the record shows that Turner renewed his objection before the admission of
Hudson’s statements. Under these particular facts, we decline to consider
‘Turner's arguments or correct any Bruton error.
Whether the district court erroneously admitted unnoticed expert testimony

‘Turner next argues that the district court improperly admitted
firearm and toolmark expert Anya Lester's unnoticed expert testimony
regarding stippling. He further argues that the district court also
improperly allowed Dr. Amy Urban, Turner's treating physician at UMC, to
testify, where the State did not notice that expert. We generally review a
district court’s decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse of discretion.
Mathews v. State, 134 Nev. 512, 514, 424 P.3d 634, 637 (2018). However,
we address for plain error alleged errors raised for the first time on appeal.
See Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 533, 188 P.3d 60, 71 (2008) (holding
that the failure to object below generally waives an argument on appeal,

absent plain error).

 

 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
   
  
  
  

We explained in Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 498.99,
189 P.3d 646, 650-51 (2008), that district courts must ensure experts are
sufficiently qualified before permitting the witness to testify as an expert:

‘To testify as an expert witness under NRS 50.275,
the witness must satisfy the following three
requirements: (1) he or she must be qualified in an
area of “scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge” (the qualification requirement); (2) his
or her specialized knowledge must “assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue” (the assistance requirement); and
(3) his or her testimony must be limited “to matters
within the scope of [his or her specialized)
knowledge” (the limited scope requirement).

Id, at 498, 189 P.3d at 650 (alteration in original) (quoting NRS 50.275).

Our statutes also require parties to disclose expert witnesses
and provide a brief statement of the expected substance of the expert's
testimony at least 21 days before trial. NRS 174.234(2). Further, each
party has a continuing duty under NRS 174.234 to provide written notice of
any expert or expert testimony the party intends to call or introduce during
its case-in-chief “as soon as practicable after the party determines that the
party intends to call an additional witness.” NRS 174.234(3). Although the
law favors allowing even late-disclosed witnesses to testify in criminal
cases, Sampson v. State, 121 Nev. 820, 827, 122 P.3d 1255, 1260 (2005),
courts should exclude an undisclosed witness if the State's failure to notice
that witness or the content of the witness's testimony constitutes bad faith,
NRS 174.234(3).

By mandating that parties disclose both the expert witness and
the content of the witness's testimony, NRS 174.234 also serves to prevent
trial by ambush. “Trial by ambush traditionally occurs where a party
withholds discoverable information and then later presents this

13,

 

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Delain bs A Iaaewe ind Sea GEE ce Ce
information at trial, effectively ambushing the opposing party through
gaining an advantage by the surprise attack.” Land Baron Invs., Inc. v.
Bonnie Springs Family Ltd. P’ship, 181 Nev. 686, 701 n.14, 356 P.3d 511,
522 n.14 (2015). We note NRS 174.234 is the criminal procedural rule
equivalent to NRCP 16.1(a), which requires civil litigants to disclose expert
witnesses and the content of the experts’ testimony at least 30 days before
trial. Such rules “serve[ } to place all parties on an even playing field and
to prevent trial by ambush or unfair surprise.” Sanders v. Sears-Page, 131
Nev. 500, 517, 354 P.8d 201, 212 (Ct. App. 2015); of: R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v.
CU Interface, LLC, 606 F.3d 262, 271 (6th Cir. 2010) (addressing the federal
procedural rule requiring parties to disclose expert witness opinions and
explaining that the reports must explain how and why the expert reached
the opinion the expert intends to testify to, to avoid an ambush at trial).
Anya Lester's stippling testimony

During the State’s case-in-chief, the prosecutor asked Lester
“{w)hat is stippling?” She answered that stippling is “small marks that you
could get on your skin if—if you're shot, you have a gunshot wound. And
powder stippling in particular is if that powder hits your skin. You get, like,
little scratches or bruises where that powder would impact your skin.” The
State then asked whether there was a particular range or distance
associated with stippling, and Lester stated that it was difficult to give an
exact number because of the variables involved. When the State asked
whether she had ever seen a case of stippling from more than 24 inches
away, Lester began to answer with “liJn my limited experience with
stippling,” and Turner objected on grounds that Lester was not noticed or
qualified to “talk about medical terminology and what may occur when a

bullet impacts a human being.”

 

 
Voicing concern over Lester's limited experience, the court
conducted voir dire outside the jury’s presence. Lester stated she had
training on stippling and “distance determination from gunshot residue,
primarily from a 2011 training that was not disclosed on her curriculum
vitae (CV). She admitted to having limited experience with stippling and
acknowledged the State asked her to look into stippling the day before she
testified. Turner protested that Lester was only disclosed as a firearm and
toolmark expert, not an expert on soft tissue damage to skin resulting from
a gunshot. Turner asked for a continuance, which the court denied. The
district court then allowed the prosecutor to ask Lester to define and explain
stippling. Lester also opined that stippling happens at a close-to-
intermediate range, and on redirect, she clarified that, in her experience,
she had seen stippling occur “from a near-contact shot out to approximately
36 inches.”

We agree with Turner that the district court abused its
discretion in admitting Lester's stippling testimony. The prosecutor elicited
the stippling testimony during the State's case-in-chief in violation of NRS
174.234(2)'s requirement that the State disclose the substance of any expert
testimony it will offer during the case-in-chief. While the State noticed
Lester as an expert in firearms and toolmarks, it did not notice her as an
expert on stippling on human skin. Lester's CV did not mention that her
training included stippling, instead focusing on her expertise in analyzing
guns and matching expended bullets to firearms. Accordingly, while the
defense was on notice that Lester would try to match expended bullets to

‘The record shows that the State first mentioned the stippling issue
to Lester the day before she testified.

 

 
firearms from the crime scene, the defense was not on notice that Lester
would testify regarding any type of stippling on human skin from gunshot
residue.

Moreover, we believe that the record shows Lester was
‘unqualified as an expert under Hallmark to testify to the substance of the
effect of stippling on skin. Lester explained that she had training regarding
gunfire and gunshot residue. Lester's training with firearms and gunshot
residue may have qualified her as an expert for purposes of defining
stippling as it pertained to firing a bullet from a distance into a wall or other
such surface as she testified to on voir dire; however, she was clearly
unqualified as an expert in the area of testifying as to stippling of human
skin from a gunshot wound. Here, the only relevance called into question
by the defense was skin stippling as to Turner's gunshot wound. Because
Lester admitted she had only limited experience in that area—and did not
explain how her firearms training qualified her as an expert as to skin
stippling—we conclude the district court erred by allowing Lester to testify
as an expert as to skin stippling from gunshot wounds.

‘The problematic aspects of Lester's testimony do not end based
on her being unqualified, however, as this situation can be fairly
characterized as trial by ambush. Notice of the stippling evidence was
important to the defense’s preparation, where Turner's theory of the case
was that Hudson alone was responsible for bringing the weapons to
Clarkson's house and that no evidence placed any of the guns in Turner’s

hands during the crime. The skin stippling evidence, viewed in light of the

 

 
other evidence, strongly suggested Turner shot the SKS. Allowing Lester
to testify to skin stippling without notice effectively prevented Turner from
preparing for cross-examination. It also prevented Turner from obtaining—
or even consulting—a rebuttal expert.

Although Lester's stippling testimony is deeply troubling, we
nevertheless conclude the error does not warrant reversal. Turner's own
inculpatory statements placed him on or near the patio when the shooting
started, and the unobjected-to medical records of Turner established the
presence of skin

 

ypling. Moreover, Dr. Urban’s testimony, discussed
farther below, that stippling is caused by “gas and debris” from a gunshot,
independently suggested Turner was close to one of the firearms at the time
the shooting broke out. Accordingly, the errors here were ultimately
harmless. See NRS 178.598 (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”); see also
Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 69-70, 17 P.3d 397, 407-08 (2001) (reviewing
improperly admitted testimony for harmless error where that testimony
‘was “supported by other credible evidence”).
Dr. Amy Urban’s testimony
We next consider whether the district court abused its

 

discretion by admitting Dr. Urban’s testimony. Turner did not object below,
and accordingly we review for plain error. See Browning, 124 Nev. at 533,
188 P.3d at 71 (“Generally, the failure to object precludes appellate review
absent plain error.”).

SNamely, other evidence showed that both the SKS and the Mossberg.
were shot at the same time, that Hudson shot the Mossberg, and that only
‘Turner and Hudson were present during the crime.

 

 
‘The State called Dr. Urban after Turner asked the court to take
judicial notice of the medical dictionary definition of stippling and the State
disagreed with that definition.’ Dr. Urban defined stippling and testified
to Turner's medical treatment. Dr. Urban testified that Turner’s wound
showed stippling, which she defined as “little black marks that go around
the skin of a wound from a gunshot wound. It’s from high-pressure gas and
debris.” Turner's medical records, which the parties stipulated to admit,
noted stippling to his lower leg, ankle, and foot, as well as shrapnel in his
leg.

We conclude Turner fails to show plain error here. Turner's
medical records were admitted into evidence before Dr. Urban testified, and
those records listed Dr. Urban as Turner's treating physician and detailed
the presence of skin stippling on Turner. Because Dr. Urban testified to
medical records that were already admitted into evidence, her testimony
relaying what was already in the medical records did not affect Turner's
substantial rights. Cf. Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 818-19, 192 P.3d 721,
729 (2008) (concluding the State's failure to notice an expert was not plain
error where appellant did not show the testimony prejudiced his substantial
rights); Jones v. State, 113 Nev. 454, 467-68, 937 P.2d 55, 63-64 (1997)
(agreeing the prosecutor improperly questioned an expert against the

"We note Deputy District Attorney Giordani misrepresented to the
district court judge that “we have our doctor (Urban, she’s noticed.” This
was false. Although the State noticed Officer Robertson's treating doctors,
the State never noticed Turner's treating doctors, nor did the State detail
pursuant to statute Dr. Urban's expected testimony or that she would
testify to the appearance of stippling around Turner's gunshot wound.

 

 
court's directive, but concluding the improper questions did not result in

unfair prejudice in

 

cht of the evidence).
Whether prosecutorial misconduct warrants reversal

‘Turner raises numerous instances of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct during closing arguments, which he argues cumulatively
warrant reversal.’ In evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we use
a two-step analysis and determine, first, if the conduct was improper, and
second, if the improper conduct warrants reversal. Valdez v. State, 124 Nev.
1172, 1188, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008). Harmless error does not warrant
reversal, and if the defendant fails to object below, we review only for plain
error. Id, at 1188, 1190, 196 P.3d at 476-77. Even if the errors individually
do not warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of the errors may warrant
reversal if they collectively violated the defendant's right to a fair trial. See
id. at 1195, 196 P.3d at 481. “When evaluating a claim of cumulative error,
we consider the following factors: (1) whether the issue of guilt is close,
(2) the quantity and character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the crime
charged.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have carefully reviewed the record and agree there were
multiple instances of misconduct.* First, the prosecutor invited the jurors

"Because Turner does not argue that the errors individually warrant
reversal, we do not consider them individually for harmless or plain error.
We note, however, that Turner failed to object to several of these errors
below. See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008)
(explaining the standard of review).

We address only the statements that we conclude constituted
misconduct. As to the remaining allegations of misconduct, we have
reviewed the record and conclude the prosecutors’ arguments were not
improper in light of the evidence adduced at trial and Turner's admissions.

 

 
to feel “good” about convicting defendants who shoot police officers.
Although Turner did not object to the prosecutor's argument, we agree it
‘was improper, as these comments “appealed to juror sympathies by
diverting their attention from evidence relevant to the elements necessary
to sustain a convietion.” See, eg., Pantano v. State, 122 Nev. 782, 793, 138
P.3d 477, 484 (2006) (concluding that it was misconduct for the prosecutor
to argue for the jury to find the defendant guilty in order to make the
parents of the victim feel better, as making the parents feel better was not
an element of the crimes charged). Furthermore, the prosecutor also
improperly invited the jury to consider issues not in evidence by arguing the
State could have charged Turner with additional crimes and implying the
prosecutor believed Turner was guilty of additional, uncharged crimes. See
id. (holding that it is “always improper” for the prosecutor to give a personal
opinion regarding the defendant's guilt); see also Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1192,
196 P.3d at 478 (recognizing a prosecutor must “not inject his personal
opinion or beliefs” into the trial). Next, the prosecutor disparaged defense
counsel and the defense by arguing that there was no evidence of a third
intruder and that Turner's defense that a third person committed the
crimes simply ‘came into [defense counsel's) head,” where eyewitness
Grimaldi testified that he observed a possible third intruder. See, eg.,
Butler v. State, 120 Nev. 879, 898, 102 P.3d 71, 84 (2004) (explaining that
“{dlisparaging remarks directed toward defense counsel have absolutely no
place in a courtroom, and clearly constitute misconduct,” and that
disparaging legitimate defense tactics is also misconduct (internal
quotation marks omitted)), Finally, the prosecutor's argument that Turner
knew Clarkson and Grimaldi were unarmed and therefore vulnerable

amounts to prosecutorial misconduct because that argument was not

 

 
one a

 

supported by evidence. See Williams v. State, 103 Nev. 106, 110, 734 P.2d
700, 703 (1987) (“A prosecutor may not argue facts or inferences not

 

supported by the evidence.

Reviewing the above errors cumulatively, under these specific
facts, we conclude that the errors do not warrant reversal. Substantial
evidence implicated Turner. First, Turner admitted going to the residence

with Hudson to do a “lick,” i.e., to steal marijuana. He also admitted that

 

guns were in the car, including the SKS, which he recognized as his uncle's
gun, and he accurately described the SKS to detectives, although he denied
using the firearm. Turner’s dogs and cellular phone were found in the car
located at the crime scene. The victims’ detailed testimonies regarding the
gunfire showed that two weapons were fired simultaneously. Significantly,
despite the locations where both firearms were discovered, we note that the
SKS had a trigger pull of approximately five pounds, and testimony adduced
at trial sufficiently established that one person could not have fired both the
automatic weapon and the rifle simultaneously. Evidence linked Hudson
to the Mossberg,” supporting that Turner had fired the SKS. When officers
found Turner nearby, he had shrapnel in his leg and stippling wounds."

8We also note the prosecutor's argument that the “only result” that
‘can come from “shooting at two human beings” “is death” was inarticulate
to the extent it suggested that shooting a gun could have no outcome other
than murder.

10Hudson's fingerprints were on the Mossberg, Hudson’s DNA was on
‘a bloodied beanie found at the scene, and a victim testified that the person
cocking the Mossberg was wearing a hat.

While we acknowledge that the improperly admitted evidence was
used to establish the distance at which stippling may occur, other properly
admitted evidence nevertheless established the link between a gunshot and

 
Finally, in Turner's statement to the police, he denied working with a third
person, and his own statements placed him on or near the patio when the
shooting broke out.

‘This evidence collectively supports that Turner intentionally
‘went to the crime scene with the SKS to commit a violent crime and that he
shot the SKS before dropping the gun and fleeing the scene. Accordingly,
although there were several instances of flagrant prosecutorial misconduct,
and although the charges here are grave, we conclude reversal is not
warranted. See Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1195, 196 P.3d at 480 (“This
error . .. did not infect the trial with unfairness so as to affect the verdict
and deny [appellant] his constitutional right to a fair trial.”)

CONCLUSION

‘Turner waived his Bruton argument below, and we therefore
decline to address that argument on appeal. We agree the district court
improperly admitted Anya Lester’s expert testimony regarding skin
stippling, but we conclude that error was ultimately harmless. Similarly,

we agree that the prosecutor advanced several improper arguments during

skin stippling, and the jury could infer from that evidence that the stippling
‘occurred because Turner was in close proximity to a gun when it fired.

For the same reasons, we reject Turner’s argument that the
cumulative effect of all errors at trial warrants reversal. While we are
deeply troubled by those errors, most notably the admission of Lester's
testimony regarding skin stippling, and while the charges here are serious,
we conclude cumulative error does not warrant reversal in light of the
evidence against Turner. See Valdez, 124 Nev. at 1195, 196 P.3d at 481.

 

 
closing, but we conclude those statements do not rise to cumulative error

warranting reversal under the particular facts of this case. Accordingly, we

QeGeD J.

affirm the verdict.

Biver
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