Case Title: State ex rel. Hunter v. Patterson

Citation: 1996-Ohio-203

Docket Number: 19951759

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Hunter, Appellant, v. Patterson, Judge, Appellee. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Hunter v. Patterson (1996),   Ohio St.3d        .] 
Prohibition to enjoin judge from exercising jurisdiction in a child-support 
modification motion where parties have previously agreed to and 
trial court has ordered nonbinding mediation of all postdivorce 
disputes prior to initiating court action -- Petition dismissed, when. 
 
(No. 95-1759 -- Submitted April 15, 1996 -- Decided May 29, 1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Hancock County, No. 5-95-17.  
 
In 1989, appellant, William J. Hunter, and his wife, Cathryn, entered into a 
separation agreement and property settlement.  They agreed to mediate 
postdivorce disputes before resorting to court action.  Shortly thereafter, appellee, 
Hancock County Common Pleas Court Judge John T. Patterson, issued a divorce 
decree incorporating the terms of the separation agreement and property 
settlement.  At the time of the divorce decree and at all pertinent times thereafter, 
the common pleas court has had local rules that provide that parties “may agree to 
mediate issues other than the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and 
related matters.”  (Emphasis added.)  Domestic Relations Rule 2.26B. 
 
Cathryn Hunter subsequently authorized the Hancock County Child Support 
Enforcement Agency to initiate an administrative review of the child support paid 
 
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by appellant.  Appellant refused to participate in the administrative review until 
the parties attempted mediation.  In February 1994, without first resorting to 
mediation, Cathryn Hunter filed a motion to modify child support in the common 
pleas court.  Judge Patterson overruled appellant’s motion to dismiss the 
postdivorce action and continued the case for additional proceedings on the 
motion to modify child support.   
 
In May 1995, appellant filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
Hancock County for a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, a writ of mandamus, to 
enjoin Judge Patterson from exercising further jurisdiction until mediation of the 
postdivorce issues and to compel Judge Patterson to order mediation.  The court of 
appeals granted Judge Patterson’s motion and dismissed the complaint.  The court 
concluded that appellant “has a plain and adequate remedy via appeal of the order 
denying his motion to dismiss ***.”   
 
The cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
Oxley, Malone, Fitzgerald & Hollister and Michael J. Malone, for appellant. 
 
Mark C. Miller, Hancock County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for 
appellee. 
 
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____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant asserts in his sole proposition of law that where 
parties have previously agreed to and the trial court has ordered nonbinding 
mediation of all postdivorce disputes prior to initiating court action, a writ of 
prohibition or mandamus will issue to preclude court action on a child support 
modifictaion motion until mediation has first been attempted. 
 
We review the summary dismissal of a complaint upon a finding of an 
adequate remedy at law by determining if the court of appeals abused its 
discretion.  State ex rel. Hipp v. N. Canton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 102, 103, 637 
N.E.2d 317, 318.  The term “abuse of discretion” implies that the court’s attitude 
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.  State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 223, 631 N.E.2d 150, 155.  In 
order to dismiss a complaint for a writ under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, it must appear beyond doubt from the 
complaint, after presuming the veracity of all material factual allegations and all 
reasonable inferences are made in the relator’s favor, that the relator can prove no 
set of facts warranting extraordinary relief.  State ex rel. Williams Ford Sales, Inc. 
v. Connor (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 647 N.E.2d 804, 806. 
 
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The court of appeals determined that appellant possesses an adequate 
remedy at law by appealing the overruling of appellant’s dismissal motion 
following the conclusion of the support modification proceedings.  The presence 
of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law generally precludes 
extraordinary relief in prohibition or mandamus.  State ex rel. Hunter v. Certain 
Judges of the Akron Mun. Court (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 45, 46, 641 N.E.2d 722, 
723. 
 
Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having 
general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party 
challenging the court’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law by appeal.  
Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 120, 
123-124, 656 N.E.2d 684, 686.  In addition, neither prohibition nor mandamus 
may be employed as a substitute for appeal from an interlocutory order.  State ex 
rel. Newton v. Court of Claims (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 555, 653 N.E.2d 366, 
369; State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 55, 63 O.O.2d 88, 
295 N.E.2d 659, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
It is uncontroverted that Judge Patterson possesses general subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the child-support modification proceeding.  See, e.g., Civ.R. 
 
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75(I); R.C. 3109.05.  Further, appellant does not claim that Judge Patterson 
patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, thereby rendering the availability 
of appeal immaterial.   
 
Instead, appellant claims that appeal is inadequate because it is not 
complete, beneficial, and speedy.  See State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese (1994), 
69 Ohio St.3d 176, 178, 631 N.E.2d 119, 121.  In particular, appellant asserts that 
appeal following any child-support modification would not be complete or 
beneficial because any error would not be cognizable in that appeal. 
 
Appellant’s contention is meritless.  In an appeal following a final order 
concerning the support issue, a reviewing court could determine that Judge 
Patterson erred in proceeding on the postdivorce motion without the parties’ first 
resorting to mediation.  The reviewing court could vacate any support 
modification order if it finds that Judge Patterson erred in not granting appellant’s 
dismissal motion.  This would afford appellant complete, beneficial, and speedy 
relief.  See State ex rel. Gibson v. Ray (July 18, 1995), Lucas App. No. L-95-191, 
unreported, 1995 WL 428475 (Prohibition does not lie to prevent trial court from 
ordering that issue of shared parenting be mediated because relator possesses 
adequate remedy by way of a direct appeal.). 
 
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Appellant cites State ex rel. Glass v. Reid (1991), 62 Ohio App.3d 328, 575 
N.E.2d 516, in support of his contention that appeal would not constitute an 
adequate remedy at law.  In Glass, the court of appeals granted a writ of 
prohibition to preclude reference of a medical malpractice claim to nonbinding 
arbitration, since such  reference was inconsistent with R.C. 2711.21.  The court of 
appeals determined that Glass had no adequate remedy at law by appeal from the 
ultimate disposition of his medical claim, since any error in the nonbinding 
arbitration would not be cognizable in an appeal from the judgment of the trial 
court finally deciding the claim.  Id., 62 Ohio App.3d at 332, 575 N.E.2d at 519.  
Conversely, as discussed previously, any error by Judge Patterson in proceeding 
prior to mediation on the support issue would be cognizable in an appeal 
following a judgment.  Glass is inapposite. 
 
Finally, to the extent that appellant argued below that appeal would be time-
consuming and expensive, this argument is insufficient to warrant a finding that 
the appellate remedy is inadequate and can be circumvented.  See State ex rel. 
Casey Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 
429, 432, 575 N.E.2d 181, 184; State ex rel. Gillivan v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1994), 
70 Ohio St.3d 196, 200, 638 N.E.2d 74, 77.  As noted by the court of appeals in 
 
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this case, “[t]he length and expense of litigation and attendant delays associated 
with an appeal are felt by any litigant dissatisfied by an order of the trial court that 
is not immediately appealable.”   
 
The court of appeals properly determined that it appeared beyond doubt 
from the complaint that appellant could prove no set of facts entitling him to 
extraordinary relief in prohibition or mandamus.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
did not abuse its discretion in granting Judge Patterson’s motion and dismissing 
the case.  See, e.g., Daggett, supra; State ex rel. Sobczak v. Skow (1990), 49 Ohio 
St.3d 13, 14, 550 N.E.2d 455, 456.  To hold otherwise would permit appellant to 
use prohibition and mandamus as substitutes for an appeal from an interlocutory 
order.  Id. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.