Case Title: State v. Brower

Citation: 

Docket Number: 266, 2008

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 266, 2008 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Cr. I.D. No. PN07-02-1446 
JASON T. BROWER, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
     Submitted:  March 25, 2009 
 
 
 
 
        Decided:  May 5, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and 
REMANDED. 
 
 
Paul R. Wallace, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
James J. Haley, Jr., Esquire, Ferrara & Haley, Wilmington, Delaware, 
for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
The defendant, Jason Brower, was charged by indictment with 
Manslaughter1 for recklessly causing the death of Chinsu Park Un during a 
high-speed drag race in Newark.   A jury convicted Brower of the lesser 
offense of Criminally Negligent Homicide.2  After trial, the Superior Court 
ruled on its own initiative that it should have instructed the jury sua sponte 
on the lesser offenses of Vehicular Homicide in the Second Degree3 and 
Operation of a Vehicle Causing Death4 and ordered a new trial.   
Pursuant to title 10, section 9902(d) of the Delaware Code, the State 
appeals from the trial court’s judgment granting the defendant a new trial.5  
The State claims that the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that it 
was obligated to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser offenses of 
Vehicular Homicide in the Second Degree and Operation of a Vehicle 
Causing Death.  The State asserts that the Superior Court was required to 
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of Criminally Negligent 
Homicide once the State requested the instruction and the trial court 
determined there was a rational basis in the evidence to support that 
instruction.  But, under the “party autonomy” approach embodied in 
                                          
 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 632. 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 631. 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 630. 
4 Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 4176A. 
5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 9902(d). 
 
3
Delaware case law, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury sua 
sponte on additional lesser offenses that neither party requested.  We have 
concluded that the State’s argument is correct. 
Delaware follows the “party autonomy” approach to lesser-included 
instructions.  We conclude that although the instructions were proper, the 
trial court erred as a matter of law when it ruled post-trial that it should have 
instructed the jury sua sponte on lesser-included offenses not requested by 
either party.  Therefore, we remand Brower’s case to the Superior Court for 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.6   
Facts 
 
 
On the morning of November 11, 2006, Jason Brower and Christopher 
Monaco engaged in a drag race on Elkton Road in Newark, Delaware, that 
resulted in Monaco’s car colliding with a car driven by Chinsu Park Un.  
The collision caused Park Un’s death.  Monaco was indicted for Murder in 
the Second Degree.7  He pleaded guilty to Manslaughter and testified for the 
State in Brower’s trial.   
                                          
 
6 See, e.g., Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 759-60 (Del. 2005) (explaining that trial judge 
instructed the jury on the correct standard but later erred as a matter of law after receiving 
the jury’s recommendation, stating that “the error’s effects are limited solely to the trial 
judge’s final sentencing decision, and do not affect the jury’s findings,” and remanding to 
the trial court “for the limited purpose of resentencing under the appropriate standard”). 
7 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 635. 
 
4
Brower was indicted for Manslaughter.  At Brower’s trial, the State 
presented evidence that on that Saturday morning, Brower drove his silver 
Nissan 350Z to the Newark Car Wash on Elkton Road and washed his car in 
one of the self-service bays.  After he was finished, Brower left the car wash 
and made a right-hand turn onto Elkton Road.  Witnesses observed Brower 
spin his wheels and squeal his tires as he drove away at a fast speed, causing 
his car to “fishtail.”   
After turning onto Elkton Road, Brower got into the left lane and 
stopped at the red light at the intersection of Park Place.  Monaco, driving a 
blue Saturn, was stopped next to Brower in the right lane.  Brower and 
Monaco revved their engines at the light as if they were going to engage in a 
street race.  Soon after, the two cars were seen driving down Elkton Road at 
a high speed in an apparent race.  Brower’s silver Nissan was in the lead and 
passed through the intersection at Casho Mill Road just seconds before 
Monaco’s car collided with Park Un’s car.  Brower drove away from the 
scene, driving on shoulders in an effort to avoid pursuit.  After the accident, 
Brower did not park his car in his driveway, where he normally parked it, 
apparently in an attempt to conceal the car. 
Monaco testified at trial that he did not know Brower but noticed 
Brower’s car when it stopped next to Monaco’s car at the intersection of 
 
5
Elkton Road and Park Place.  When the light turned green, Monaco testified 
that Brower “floored it” and they began to race at a high speed.  Brower was 
in the lead until just a moment before the collision.  At the intersection of 
Casho Mill Road, Brower’s car swerved to the left abruptly and stopped.  
Monaco testified that he saw Park Un’s car turning in front of him but at that 
point he could do nothing to avoid the collision.  The record reflects that  
Monaco’s car was traveling at a rate of 101 miles per hour two seconds 
before the collision and 92 miles per hour one second before. 
At trial, Brower testified that he had witnessed the collision but denied 
that he had engaged in a drag race with Monaco.  Brower testified that he 
and Monaco happened to be washing their cars at the car wash at the same 
time that morning, but were strangers.  He also testified that he noticed 
Monaco’s blue Saturn was stopped next to his car at the light at the 
intersection of Elkton Road and Park Place.  Brower testified that when the 
light turned green, he “put it to full throttle, peddle fully depressed to the 
floor, first gear, through second, shifted into third gear and just coasted,” and 
continued to the next red light at the intersection of Elkton Road and Thorn 
Lane.   
Brower testified that he had no sense of whether or not Monaco’s car 
was following his car.  As he approached the intersection of Casho Mill 
 
6
Road, at a speed of 65 miles per hour, he saw a mini van turn right onto 
Elkton Road from Casho Mill Road and get in the left lane, ahead of him.  
Brower braked.   
About the same time, a silver Mercedes, driving from the opposite 
direction on Elkton Road, turned left onto Casho Mill Road in front of 
Brower’s car.  Brower braked harder.  Brower then watched Monaco’s blue 
Saturn speed past his car and collide with the Mercedes, driven by Park Un.  
Brower testified that he did not stop at the crash scene because he “is not 
very good at stress” and he did not call the police to report the accident 
because he “did not think it was a big deal.”   
At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Brower moved for a 
judgment of acquittal as a matter of law.  Brower argued that the State had 
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Brower caused the death of the victim, because Brower’s act of 
speeding was wholly unrelated to Monaco’s actions that caused Park Un’s 
death.  The Superior Court denied the motion. 
During the prayer conference, the State requested an instruction on the 
lesser-included offense of Criminally Negligent Homicide.  Brower opposed 
the State’s request, again arguing that there was insufficient evidence that 
Monaco and Brower had acted in concert and, that therefore, there was no 
 
7
rational basis in the evidence for an instruction on the lesser-included 
offense.  Brower wanted to proceed on an “all-or-nothing” strategy because 
he was concerned that his fleeing from the scene might cause the jury to be 
unsympathetic and want to convict him of something.  The trial court found 
that a rational basis existed to grant the State’s request to instruct the jury on 
the lesser offense of Criminally Negligent Homicide – the only lesser 
offense requested by either party.  The jury convicted Brower of Criminally 
Negligent Homicide. 
Brower filed a timely post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal, 
arguing there was no rational basis in the evidence for the Criminally 
Negligent Homicide instruction.  The trial court denied Brower’s motion, 
holding that the facts presented at trial supported a charge of Criminally 
Negligent Homicide.  The trial court then ruled on its own initiative that it 
should have sua sponte given additional instructions on Vehicular Homicide 
in the Second Degree and Operation of a Vehicle Causing Death, and 
ordered a new trial.  Relying on this Court’s opinion in Lilly v. State,8 the 
trial court ruled that “[o]nce a request is made to instruct on lesser included 
offenses and the evidence supports such an instruction, the Court is required 
                                          
 
8 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055 (Del. 1994). 
 
8
to instruct so the jury may consider all lesser included offenses that would be 
supported by the facts.”9 
The State moved for reargument.  The trial court denied the State’s 
motion and again ordered a new trial.  The State appealed to this Court 
pursuant to title 10, section 9902(d) of the Delaware Code, which permits 
the State to appeal from a trial court’s order granting the defendant a new 
trial.10 
The State’s Argument 
 
In this appeal, the State claims that the trial court erred in concluding 
that it was obligated to instruct the jury on lesser offenses other than those 
requested.  The State asserts that the defendant chose an “all-or-nothing” 
strategy and the State requested a jury instruction on only one lesser offense, 
i.e., Criminally Negligent Homicide.  The State contends that after the trial 
court found a rational basis in the evidence to instruct the jury on the single 
lesser offense requested by the State, the trial court was required to give an 
instruction only on that requested offense.  The court was not required to 
instruct on lesser offenses not requested by either party.  Therefore, the State 
                                          
 
9 State v. Brower, 2008 WL 888409, at *2 (Del. Super.) (citing Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 
1055 (Del. 1994)).  
10 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 9902(d) (“The State shall have an absolute right to appeal to 
an appellate court from any order entered in a lower court which grants an accused . . . a 
new trial.”). 
 
9
argues, the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury only on the 
lesser offense of Criminally Negligent Homicide, and should not have 
ordered a new trial. 
Standard of Review 
 
 
The Superior Court’s decision to instruct the jury on lesser-included 
offenses presents a mixed question of fact and law.11  This Court applies a 
deferential standard of review to the trial judge’s factual findings, which will 
not be disturbed on appeal if they are based on competent evidence and not 
clearly erroneous.12  Once the historical facts have been determined, this 
Court considers whether the trial judge correctly applied the law to those 
factual findings.13  That is a question of law entitled to de novo review.14   
Party Autonomy Approach  
Lesser-Included Instructions 
 
The common law doctrine “that one indicted for a greater offense can 
properly be convicted of an uncharged lesser-included offense”15 has been 
                                          
 
11 Burrell v. State, 953 A.2d 957, 960 (Del. 2008) (citing Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 
750 (Del. 2006); Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del. 1990)). 
12 Burrell v. State, 953 A.2d at 960 (citing Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988); 
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996) (finding of historical fact); Brown 
v. State, 897 A.2d at 750)). 
13 Burrell v. State, 953 A.2d at 960 (citing Brown v. State, 897 A.2d at 750; Lopez v. 
State, 861 A.2d 1245, 1249 (Del. 2004)). 
14 Id. 
15 State v. Cox, 851 A.2d 1269, 1271 (Del. 2003) (citing Hagans v. State, 559 A.2d 792, 
800-01 (Md. 1989)). 
 
10 
codified in title 11, section 206 of the Delaware Code.16  Section 206 
obligates the trial court to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense if 
“there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the 
included offense.”17   
In Delaware, however, the trial judge does not consider whether there 
is a rational basis in the evidence to instruct the jury on a lesser-included 
offense “unless requested to do so by a party.”18  Under this “party 
autonomy” approach, the burden is initially on the parties, rather than the 
trial judge, to determine whether an instruction on a lesser-included offense 
should be considered as an option for the jury.19  The trial judge should not 
give an instruction on an uncharged lesser offense if neither side requests 
such an instruction20 because to do so would “interfere with the trial 
strategies of the parties.”21    
In State v. Cox, this Court, quoting from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, explained the rationale of the 
party autonomy approach, as follows: 
                                          
 
16 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206. 
17 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206(c). 
18 State v. Cox, 851 A.2d at 1272. 
19 Id. at 1273. 
20 Id. at 1272-73 (citing Hagans v. State, 559 A.2d at 804). 
21 Id. at 1272; see also Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1357-58 (Del. 1992). 
 
11 
In general the trial judge should withhold charging on lesser 
included offense unless one of the parties requests it, since that 
charge is not inevitably required in our trials, but is an issue 
best resolved, in our adversary system, by permitting counsel to 
decide on tactics.  If counsel asks for a lesser-included-offense 
instruction, it should be freely given.  If it is not requested by 
counsel, it is properly omitted by the trial judge, and certainly 
should not be initiated by the judge after summations are 
completed, except possibly in an extreme case.22 
 
In this case, the State believed there was a rational basis in the 
evidence to acquit Brower of the charged offense of Manslaughter and to 
convict him of the lesser offense of Criminally Negligent Homicide.  
Accordingly, the State asked the trial court to instruct on that lesser offense.  
Brower did not want any lesser-included instructions.  Instead, he chose an 
“all-or-nothing” tactic, insisting that the jury be instructed only on the 
charged offense.23  This “all-or-nothing” strategy is often employed where 
the defendant believes that the State has not successfully proven the 
elements of the charged offense and seeks a full acquittal.24  Because the 
State requested an instruction on the lesser offense of Criminally Negligent 
Homicide and the trial court found a rational basis in the evidence to support 
the instruction, and because the defendant did not request any lesser-
                                          
 
22 Id. at 1273 (quoting Walker v. United States, 418 F.2d 1116, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 
(citations omitted)). 
23 See, e.g., State v. Cox, 851 A.2d at 1271. 
24 The decision to waive included offense instructions involves an in-depth discussion of 
the trial evidence and defense tactics between counsel and client.  The trial court should 
accept the defendant’s decision to waive such instructions.  See, e.g., State v. Wallace, 
475 N.W.2d 197, 200-01 (Iowa 1991). 
 
12 
included offense instructions, the trial court properly instructed the jury only 
on the lesser-included offense requested by the State.   
Sua Sponte Instructions  
Contravene Party Autonomy 
 
The Superior Court’s post-trial ruling – that once it granted the State’s 
request to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of Criminally Negligent 
Homicide, it was obligated to also instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser 
offenses of Vehicular Homicide and Operation of a Vehicle Causing Death – 
misapplies two prior decisions of this Court.  First, the language in State v. 
Cox that a lesser-included offense instruction “should not be initiated by the 
judge after summations are completed, except possibly in an extreme case,” 
does not provide an exception to the party autonomy approach’s general 
prohibition against giving sua sponte instructions on lesser offenses.  The 
quoted language simply explains that a trial judge should not deviate from 
the procedural rule that the trial court must inform the parties prior to closing 
arguments of the jury instructions it intends to give.25  Our holding in Cox 
does not contemplate that the trial judge will instruct the jury on a lesser-
                                          
 
25 Del. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 30 (“The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the requests [for jury instructions] prior to their arguments to the jury.”); see also 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(b) (“The court must inform the parties before closing arguments how 
it intends to rule on the requested instructions.”) 
 
13 
included offense sua sponte.  The purpose of the party autonomy rule would 
be defeated by an exception to the sua sponte prohibition.26 
 
Brower chose to submit the case to the jury “all or nothing” for 
Manslaughter.  Once the State requested the instruction on the lesser offense 
of Criminally Negligent Homicide and the trial court found a rational basis 
in the evidence to acquit Brower of Manslaughter and convict him of 
Criminally Negligent Homicide, the trial court was obligated to instruct only 
on Criminally Negligent Homicide.27  Brower’s decision to forego any other 
lesser instructions was a tactical one – not to expose his “unsympathetic” 
acts to a jury that might be “influenced to find him guilty of something.”  
Instructions on additional lesser-included offenses would have increased 
Brower’s exposure to alternative convictions where he consistently argued 
that he was not criminally liable.  Therefore, it would not have been proper 
for the trial court to contravene the defendant’s strategy by giving the 
additional instruction sua sponte.28   
                                          
 
26 State v. Cox, 851 A.2d 1269, 1273-74 (Del. 2003). 
27 Wiggins v. State, 902 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Del. 2006). 
28 Hagans v. State, 559 A.2d 792, 804 (Md. 1989) (“The better view, we believe, is that 
the trial court ordinarily should not give a jury an instruction on an uncharged lesser 
included offense where neither side requests or affirmatively agrees to such instruction.  
It is a matter of prosecution and defense strategy which is best left to the parties.  There is 
no requirement that the jury pass on each possible offense the defendant could have 
committed.”). 
 
14 
Second, Lilly v. State does not hold that when a party requests an 
instruction on a specific lesser-included offense the trial court must sua 
sponte instruct the jury on any other possible lesser-included offenses.29  In 
Lilly, this Court considered whether the trial judge properly denied the 
defendant’s request for an instruction on Vehicular Homicide in the First 
Degree as a lesser-included offense to the charge of Murder in the Second 
Degree.30  The indictment charged the defendant with Murder in the Second 
Degree.31  The trial judge instructed the jury on Murder in the Second 
Degree and the lesser offenses of Manslaughter and Criminally Negligent 
Homicide.32  The jury convicted the defendant of Murder in the Second 
Degree.33   
In his direct appeal, the defendant in Lilly argued that the trial court 
erred when it ruled that Vehicular Homicide in the First Degree was not a 
lesser-included offense to Murder in the Second Degree.34  The issue in Lilly 
was whether the requested offense of Vehicular Homicide in the First 
Degree constitutes a lesser-included offense to the charge of Murder in the 
Second Degree.   
                                          
 
29 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055 (Del. 1994). 
30 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d at 1060. 
31 Id. at 1056-57. 
32 Id. at 1061-62. 
33 Id. at 1056. 
34 Id. at 1060. 
 
15 
In the Lilly case, this Court did not consider the question of whether 
the trial court should have sua sponte instructed the jury on the lesser 
offense of Vehicular Homicide absent a request from a party.  Instead, this 
Court explained that the defendant had requested an instruction on Vehicular 
Homicide.  We determined that Vehicular Homicide is a lesser offense to the 
charged offense of Murder in the Second Degree, and that there was a 
rational basis in the evidence to support such an instruction.  Therefore, in 
Lilly, this Court held that the trial court was obligated to instruct the jury on 
the defendant’s requested lesser offense of Vehicular Homicide but the 
erroneous failure to give that instruction was harmless under the facts of that 
case.35     
In Brower’s case, the trial court concluded that “the Lilly decision 
appears to require the Court sua sponte to [instruct on Vehicular Homicide 
in the Second Degree and Operation of a Vehicle Causing Death]” because, 
“[o]nce a request is made to instruct on lesser included offenses and the 
evidence supports such an instruction, the Court is required to instruct so the 
jury may consider all lesser included offenses that would be supported by 
the facts.”36  Our holding in Lilly does not impose that obligation.37  The trial 
                                          
 
35 Id. at 1062-63. 
36 State v. Brower, 2008 WL 888409, at *2. 
 
16 
court was only required to instruct the jury on Criminally Negligent 
Homicide because Criminally Negligent Homicide was the only lesser 
offense requested by a party.  Therefore, the trial court erred by granting 
Brower a new trial based on its reading Lilly to require a sua sponte 
instruction on lesser offenses other than those requested by a party.   
Conclusion 
 
 
We ratify and reaffirm our adherence to the party autonomy rule.38  A 
trial judge is only obligated to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense 
if a party requests an instruction on that specific lesser-included offense39 
and there is a rational basis in the evidence to support the instruction.40  A 
trial judge should not instruct the jury sua sponte on lesser-included offenses 
that neither party requests, because that would contravene the autonomy of 
the parties to choose their trial strategies.41  Accordingly, the Superior 
                                                                                                                             
 
37 See, e.g., Chao v. State, 604 A.2d at 1357-58 (explaining that the trial court need not 
engage sua sponte in an exacting examination to attempt to determine what lesser offense 
instructions might apply). 
38 State v. Cox, 851 A.2d 1269, 1273-74 (Del. 2003). 
39 Id. 
40 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206(c). 
41 Hagans v. State, 559 A.2d at 804 (“When counsel for both sides consider it to be in the 
best interests of their clients not to have an instruction, the court should not override their 
judgment and instruct on the lesser included offense.”). 
 
17 
Court’s judgment granting Brower a new trial must be reversed.42  This 
matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.   
   
 
  
                                          
 
42 The defendant originally filed a cross-appeal in this matter.  This Court lacks 
jurisdiction.  This Court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant’s appeal until the 
defendant has been sentenced by the trial court or the trial court otherwise issues a final 
order or judgment.  Del. Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(ii), 6(b)(ii) and 7(b); Eller v. State, 531 A.2d 
951 (Del. 1987).  In this case, the State initiated its appeal, pursuant to title 10, section 
9902(d) of the Delaware Code, following the Superior Court’s post-trial dismissal of 
Brower’s convictions and order of a new trial, and before the Superior Court sentenced 
Brower or issued a final judgment of conviction or acquittal.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 
9902(d).  Accordingly, Brower acknowledges that his cross-appeal must be dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction.