Case Title: Jarrell v. State

Citation: 212 Kan. 171, 510 P.2d 127

Docket Number: 46,920

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1973-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
212 Kan. 171 (1973)
510 P.2d 127
ROBERT LEE JARRELL, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee.
No. 46,920

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 12, 1973.
Charles Jack Curtis, of Hays, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Don C. Staab, assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Vern Miller, attorney general, and Simon Roth, Jr., county attorney, were with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FATZER, C.J.:
This is an appeal from the overruling of a motion to vacate sentence filed pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507. The appellant, Robert Lee Jarrell, raises three specifications of error  all of which raise the single contention that two of the charges against him were duplicitous and constitute double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution.
The facts are not in dispute. On August 16, 1962, Jarrell was charged by Information with four related counts arising out of a single act of violence against the same victim. Those charges were two counts of forcible rape under K.S.A. 21-424 (since repealed, see K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 21-3502), one count of assault with felonious intent under K.S.A. 21-431 (since repealed, see K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 21-3410 [c]), and one count of taking a woman for defilement under K.S.A. 21-427 (since repealed).
On September 11, 1962, the appellant, through his court appointed counsel, entered pleas of guilty to all four counts. The district court pronounced sentences of five to twenty-one years on *172 count one, five to twenty-one years on count two, one to ten years on count three, and two to twenty-one years on count four, all sentences to run consecutively.
On the following day, September 12, 1962, counsel filed a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas entered by the appellant, and instead, to enter pleas of not guilty on all four counts. One of the reasons alleged in the motion was that the appellant relied upon the representation of the county attorney that if he would enter pleas of guilty, the county attorney would recommend that the sentences imposed run concurrently. Subsequently, on September 15, 1962, the district court overruled the appellant's motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty.
The appellant appealed his convictions to the Kansas Supreme Court. (Case No. 43,389.) The records in this court show the appellant's notice of appeal was filed October 27, 1962, and that the case was set for hearing on April 2, 1963. The docket of this court shows there was nothing filed in this case. On March 21, 1963, the state moved to dismiss the appeal, and on March 29, 1963, the motion was overruled. The case was continued, and set for hearing on June 3, 1963. On that date, the appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
Later, and on August 19, 1963, the governor of Kansas commuted Jarrell's sentences to 5-21, 1-10, and 2-21 years to run consecutively, ostensibly reducing one of the forcible rape sentences to naught.
On December 13, 1971, the appellant filed this motion to vacate the sentences imposed on September 11, 1962. On December 27, 1971, the district court concluded the files and records of the case conclusively showed the appellant was entitled to no relief, and there existed no triable issues of fact which required an evidentiary hearing and determined the appellant's presence was unnecessary.
The appellant contends the third and fourth counts against him  assault with felonious intent, and taking a woman for defilement  were duplicitous and constitute double peopardy.
The provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution relating to double jeopardy have been made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707, 89 S. Ct. 2056. See, also, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 90 S. Ct. 1189, and Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 25 L. Ed. 2d 435, 90 S. Ct. 1184, reh. den. 398 U.S. 914, 26 L. Ed. 2d 79, 90 S. Ct. 1684.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section *173 10 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution provide that "no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." In an annotation following Waller v. Florida, supra (25 L.Ed.2d 968), entitled "Double Jeopardy  State Prosecutions," it is said:
This court has likewise held the state may not split a single offense into separate parts. Two or more separate convictions cannot be carved out of one criminal delinquency and where numerous charges are made, those which make up an integral part of another crime charged, in which the defendant was convicted, must be dismissed as duplicitous. (State v. Pierce, et al., 205 Kan. 433, 469 P.2d 308; State v. Campbell, 210 Kan. 265, 500 P.2d 21; State v. Ogden, 210 Kan. 510, 502 P.2d 654; State v. Cory, 211 Kan. 528, 506 P.2d 1115.)
The rule has been codified by K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 21-3107, which reads:
"(a) A lesser degree of the same crime;
"(b) An attempt to commit the crime charged;
In Cory, supra, this court said in effect that the statutory rule was consistent with the rule formerly stated in our decisional law.
*174 The rule as formulated was to place limitations upon multiplicity of convictions so that the state would be barred from splitting a single offense into separate and distinct violations. See, also, A.B.A. Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice relating to Joinder and Severance, Joinder of Offenses, Commentary, Section 1.1 (a), Severance of Offenses, Commentary, Section 2.2 (a).
As noted above, it is apparent the sentence imposed on the appellant relating to the second count of forcible rape has been commuted by the governor. Thus, we consider only the elements of the crimes charged in counts one, three, and four in reaching a conclusion concerning the merits of the appellant's contentions:
"COUNT ONE
* * *
"COUNT THREE
"COUNT FOUR
The court has consistently held that where the same conduct of an accused constitutes a violation of two statutory proscriptions, the test of duplicity is whether each of the offenses charged requires proof of an additional element of the crime which the other does not, and if an additional fact is required, the offenses are not duplicitous. (Wagner v. Edmondson, 178 Kan. 554, 290 P.2d 98; Coverly v. State, 208 Kan. 670, 493 P.2d 261; State v. Pierce, et al., supra; State v. Ogden, supra; State v. Cory, supra.) In Pierce we held:
Under the rule announced in State v. Gauger [No. 44,749], 200 Kan. 515, 438 P.2d 455, and adhered to in Campbell, this court has concluded the charge alleged in count three constitutes double jeopardy. It is clear the appellant was convicted of forcible rape and with assault with felonious intent arising out of the same transaction. Conviction of forcible rape precludes conviction of the lesser included offense, hence, the conviction in count three is barred by former jeopardy.
*176 The charge in count four raises a question not heretofore considered by this court. We have carefully reviewed the record and note with significance that the factual allegations in count one and count four do not differ. Under the facts and circumstances, this court has concluded the charge in count four contains the same elements and constitutes the same crime alleged in count one of which the appellant was convicted. We hold the charge in count four to be barred by former jeopardy.
In holding the first count to bar subsequent conviction in count four under former K.S.A. 21-427, this court has considered our previous decision in State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375, 312 P.2d 832, and has concluded the facts in the instant case are clearly distinguishable from the circumstances in Brown. Moreover, this court takes note that no question of waiver was raised below, nor has waiver been presented for our consideration. See State v. Carte, 157 Kan. 139, 138 P.2d 429, 157 Kan. 673, 143 P.2d 774; Lawton v. Hand, 186 Kan. 385, 350 P.2d 28; Hightower v. Hand, 186 Kan. 377, 350 P.2d 31.
Upon the facts in this case the appellant was charged and convicted on three counts for the same wrongdoing which constituted but one offense. In accordance with the views expressed above, the convictions and sentences on counts three and four charging the appellant with the violation of K.S.A. 21-431 and K.S.A. 21-427, respectively (since repealed), must be vacated and set aside.
It is so ordered.