Case Title: Elsaesser v. Gibson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 47687

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2021-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket Nos. 47687/47884/48132 
 
 
FORD ELSAESSER, in his capacity  
as Personal Representative of the  
Estate of Victoria H. Smith, 
 
     Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
DAVID GIBSON, an individual, dba  
BLACK DIAMOND COMPOST  
PRODUCTS, 
 
     Defendant-Appellant. 
______________________________ 
 
FORD ELSAESSER, in his capacity  
as Personal Representative of the  
Estate of Victoria H. Smith, 
 
     Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
VERNON K. SMITH, III, an individual, 
 
     Defendant-Appellant. 
______________________________ 
 
FORD ELSAESSER, in his capacity as  
Personal Representative of the Estate  
of Victoria H. Smith, 
 
     Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,  
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;  
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho  
professional service corporation, 
 
     Defendants-Appellants. 
_______________________________________ 
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Boise, February 2021 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: April 9, 2021 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
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From the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County. Steven Hippler, District Judge. Case No. 47687. 
From the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County. Samuel Hoagland, District Judge. Case No. 47884. 
From the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County. Michael J. Reardon, District Judge. Case No. 48132. 
The judgments of the district courts are affirmed.  
Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, PC, Boise, for Appellants. Vernon K. Smith 
argued. 
Givens Pursley LLP, Boise, for Respondent. Alexander P. McLaughlin argued. 
 
_______________________ 
 
BURDICK, Justice. 
This is an appeal from three separate judgments, certified as final pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54(b), ejecting three non-beneficiary parties from the property of an estate. 
The personal representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (“the Estate”) brought three 
separate ejectment actions against the Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC, and Vernon K. 
Smith Law, PC (collectively “VK Law”); David R. Gibson; and Vernon K. Smith, III (“Vernon 
III”),1 after each party refused his demands to vacate their respectively occupied properties. 
None of the parties are beneficiaries of the Estate.  
The district courts granted partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of the personal 
representative in all three actions, entering separate judgments ejecting Gibson, Vernon III, and 
VK Law from the Estate’s properties. On appeal, Appellants raise numerous issues relating to the 
personal representative’s authority to eject them from the properties. Ford Elsaesser,2 who is now 
the personal representative of the Estate, argues on appeal that the district courts did not err in 
                                                 
1 The facts of these consolidated cases involve three members of the same family. Victoria H. Smith is the mother of 
Vernon K. Smith, Jr., who is the attorney for all three parties on appeal, including his son, Vernon K. Smith III. In 
an effort to avoid confusion, we refer to Victoria H. Smith by her first name, Vernon K. Smith, Jr. as simply 
“Vernon,” and Vernon K. Smith III as “Vernon III” throughout this opinion. 
2 On October 7, 2020, Ford Elsaesser was substituted as the real party in interest after he succeeded Noah G. Hillen, 
the previous personal representative. 
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granting partial judgment on the pleadings because he had sufficient power over Estate property 
to bring an ejectment action on the Estate’s behalf. We affirm. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This consolidated appeal centers on three parcels of real property that are part of Victoria 
H. Smith’s Estate. Victoria passed away on September 11, 2013. After Victoria’s passing, the 
magistrate court overseeing the probate proceedings invalidated both her will and a series of 
transactions transferring all of her assets to a limited liability company owned by Vernon after a 
successful challenge by Vernon’s brother. In accord with its decision, the magistrate court 
entered an order and judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b) vesting all of the 
Estate’s real and personal property in the personal representative of the Estate. The three parcels 
of real property that are the subject of this appeal were included in the Rule 70(b) Judgment. 
A. Gibson’s possession and refusal to vacate the Gowen Property: Case No. CV01-19-
10368. 
Since 2004, Gibson has been in possession of a portion of a 520-acre parcel of land in 
Ada County (the “Gowen Property”), described as “Ada County Assessor’s Parcel No. 
S1505220000, in the Northwest 1/4 of Section 5, Township 2N, Range 2E, Boise Meridian, 
located off Pleasant Valley Road southwest of its intersection with West Gowen Road.” Gibson 
operates a waste processing and composting facility on a small portion of the property, 
ostensibly for the purpose of spreading compost over the entire 520-acre parcel. Gibson does not 
own the property, but he claims that Victoria gave him permission to operate the facility, and that 
he now has the permission of one of Victoria’s heirs, Vernon. 
Reasoning that he needed to sell the Gowen Property to “(1) pay the taxes that will be 
owing to the I.R.S. in the amount of approximately $9 million, (2) pay ongoing Estate expenses, 
and (3) generate monies to effectuate a distribution to the heirs[,]” the personal representative 
moved the court handling the probate case to allow him to sell the property. After a hearing, the 
court determined that the personal representative had demonstrated good cause to sell the 
property and granted the motion. Deciding that Gibson’s presence on the Gowen Property would 
make it more difficult to sell, the personal representative sent Gibson a letter on December 21, 
2018, demanding that he cease all operations and vacate the property by January 31, 2019. 
Gibson did not vacate the Gowen Property by the January 31 deadline and the personal 
representative subsequently filed an action against Gibson in district court, asserting four claims: 
(1) ejectment; (2) declaratory judgment to quiet title to Estate property; (3) trespass; and (4) 
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unjust enrichment. After the pleadings were served, the personal representative moved for partial 
judgment on the pleadings with respect to the ejectment claim, arguing that he was the owner of 
the Gowen property pursuant to the Rule 70(b) Judgment. The personal representative filed his 
own declaration in support of the motion. In response, Gibson argued (1) that the Rule 70(b) 
Judgment did not transfer title of the Estate’s property to personal representative; (2) that to the 
extent it was intended to do so, the Rule 70(b) Judgment was invalid; and (3) that the personal 
representative did not otherwise have the authority to maintain an ejectment action under the 
Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”). In his reply memorandum, the personal representative argued 
that in addition to the Rule 70(b) Judgment, the UPC granted him sufficient power over Estate 
property as the personal representative to maintain an ejectment action for recovery of the 
property.  
On September 30, 2019, the district court held a hearing on the personal representative’s 
motion and subsequently granted partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of the personal 
representative on the ejectment claim. In its memorandum decision and order, the district court 
reasoned that the personal representative had the authority to maintain an ejectment action to 
recover possession of the Gowen Property because the Estate’s ownership of the property had 
been restored and the Rule 70(b) Judgment and UPC provided the personal representative of an 
estate the same power over estate property “as an absolute owner would have.” Shortly 
thereafter, the district court entered a judgment, certified as final under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b), ejecting Gibson from the Gowen Property. Gibson filed a “Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment under Rule 59(e), I.R.C.P.” Over a month after filing the motion, he filed a 
“Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Court Decision and Motion to Amend 
Judgment under Rule 59(e), I.R.C.P.” Noting the “procedural oddity” of Gibson’s filings, the 
district court treated the motion as both a motion for reconsideration under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11.2 and a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
59(e). The district court denied both motions without a hearing.  
Gibson timely appealed. 
B. Vernon III’s possession and refusal to vacate the Raymond Property: Case No. 
CV01-19-10367. 
Since 2006, Vernon K. Smith, III has possessed a residential property in Boise, Idaho (the 
“Raymond Property”) where he lives with his family. Over the years, he has worked to renovate 
and restore the property. Vernon III does not own the property, but he claims the prior owner, 
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Victoria (his grandmother), gave him permission to reside there. He claims that he now has the 
permission of Vernon as one of Victoria’s heirs. 
On December 11, 2018, the personal representative sent a thirty-day notice to Vernon III, 
terminating any lease or other right that Vernon III had to possess the property. The notice 
indicated that it would become effective January 31, 2019, and demanded that Vernon III vacate 
the Raymond Property no later than that date. Despite the personal representative’s demands, 
Vernon III refused to surrender possession or vacate the premises. 
Like in the action against Gibson, once the January 31 deadline had passed, the personal 
representative filed an action against Vernon III asserting four claims: (1) ejectment; (2) 
declaratory judgment to quiet title to Estate property; (3) trespass; and (4) unjust enrichment. 
After the pleadings were served, the personal representative moved for partial judgment on the 
pleadings with respect to the ejectment claim. In support of his motion, the personal 
representative argued that he was the owner of the Raymond Property pursuant to the Rule 70(b) 
Judgment and that, irrespective of the judgment, the UPC provided him with the authority as 
personal representative of the Estate to maintain an ejectment action.  
Similar to the action against Gibson, the personal representative also filed his own 
declaration in support of the motion. In his declaration, the personal representative explained that 
as long as Vernon III was in possession of the Raymond Property, he would be unable to “collect 
rent for, sell, or otherwise account for the [property,]” which he needed to do “to exercise [his] 
duty to administer the Estate on behalf of its heirs.” Furthermore, the personal representative 
explained that he was “charged with liquidating Estate property in an expeditious manner and 
distributing the same to the Estate’s heirs.” 
The district court held hearings on the motion on December 3, 2019, and January 14, 
2020, and subsequently granted partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of the personal 
representative on the ejectment claim. Applying reasoning similar to that in the action against 
Gibson, the district court determined that the personal representative had the authority to 
maintain an ejectment action to recover possession of the Raymond Property because the Rule 
70(b) Judgment made him the owner of the property in his capacity as personal representative of 
the Estate. The district court further reasoned that the UPC provided the personal representative 
of the Estate with “the same power over the title to the property of the estate that an absolute 
owner would have,” which included the authority to bring an ejectment action against Vernon 
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III. On February 28, 2020, the district court entered a judgment, certified as final under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), ejecting Vernon III from the Raymond Property. 
Vernon III timely appealed. 
C. VK Law’s possession and refusal to vacate the VK Law Property: Case No. CV01-
19-20686. 
Since approximately 1971, VK Law has operated out of a portion of a mixed-use building 
situated on real property commonly known as 1900 West Main Street, Boise, Idaho (the “VK 
Law Property”). VK Law is a law firm owned and operated wholly by Vernon. VK Law does not 
own the VK Law Property, but Vernon has operated several iterations of the firm out of an office 
within the building for nearly fifty years. 
On September 11, 2019, the personal representative sent a thirty-day notice to VK Law, 
terminating any lease or other right that the firm had to possess the VK Law Property. The notice 
indicated that it would become effective October 31, 2019, and demanded that VK Law vacate 
the VK Law Property no later than that date. Despite the personal representative’s demands, VK 
Law refused to surrender possession or vacate the premises. 
Once the October 31 deadline had passed, the personal representative filed an action 
against VK Law asserting four claims: (1) ejectment; (2) declaratory judgment to quiet title to 
Estate property; (3) trespass; and (4) unjust enrichment. Like in the other cases, after the 
pleadings were served, the personal representative moved for partial judgment on the pleadings 
with respect to the ejectment claim. The personal representative argued that he was the owner of 
the VK Law Property pursuant to the Rule 70(b) Judgment and that, irrespective of the judgment, 
the UPC provided him with the authority as personal representative of the Estate to maintain an 
ejectment action against VK Law.  
Like in the other actions, the personal representative filed his own declaration in support 
of the motion. The declaration was nearly identical to his declaration in the Vernon III case, 
explaining that VK Law’s possession of the VK Law Property prevented him from “collect[ing] 
rent for, sell[ing], or otherwise account[ing] for” the properties. He claimed that he needed to do 
so “to exercise [his] duty to administer the Estate on behalf of its heirs.” Finally, the personal 
representative again explained that he was “charged with liquidating Estate property in an 
expeditious manner and distributing the same to the Estate’s heirs.” 
On May 5, 2020, the district court held a hearing on the motion and subsequently granted 
partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of the personal representative as to the ejectment 
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claim. Like in the actions against Gibson and Vernon III, the district court determined that the 
personal representative had the authority to maintain an ejectment action to recover possession of 
the VK Law Property. Specifically, the district court reasoned that, under the UPC, the personal 
representative held “the same power over the [VK Law Property] that an absolute owner would 
have.” The district court further reasoned that the Rule 70(b) Judgment gave him sufficient 
power of ownership to maintain an ejectment action. Accordingly, on June 11, 2020, the district 
court entered a judgment, certified as final under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), ejecting 
VK Law from the VK Law Property. 
VK Law timely appealed. 
II. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the district courts err in granting partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of the personal 
representative in each ejectment action after determining that an estate’s personal representative 
has the authority to eject an unwanted party from estate property? 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“After the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial, a party may move for 
judgment on the pleadings.” I.R.C.P. 12(c). On such a motion, “[i]f . . . matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for 
summary judgment under [Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 [where] [a]ll parties must be given 
a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” I.R.C.P. 
12(d). “A judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as a ruling on 
summary judgment.” State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007) (citing 
Trimble v. Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 302, 939 P.2d 1379, 1381 (1997)). A grant of summary 
judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a). “For purposes of a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party admits all the allegations of the 
opposing party’s pleadings and also admits the untruth of its own allegations to the extent they 
have been denied.” Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 474, 163 Idaho at 1186 (citation omitted). Where 
there are no disputed issues of material fact, the remaining question is one of law, over which 
this Court exercises free review. Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 
29, 30 (1994) (citing Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 
1365, 1367 (1994)). 
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IV. 
ANALYSIS 
In an ejectment action, the plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) ownership of the 
property, (2) possession by the defendant, and (3) refusal to surrender possession by the 
defendant. Pro Indiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Tr., 131 Idaho 741, 745, 963 P.2d 1178, 1182 
(1998) (citing Petty v. Petty, 70 Idaho 473, 479–80, 223 P.2d 158, 161–62 (1950)). Furthermore, 
the plaintiff “must recover upon the strength of his own title, and not upon the weakness of that 
of his adversary.” Miller v. Lewiston-Clarkston Canning Co., 35 Idaho 669, 673, 209 P. 194, 195 
(1922) (citation omitted). 
As to the second and third elements, Gibson and Vernon III concede that they are in 
possession of the Gowen and Raymond Properties and have refused to surrender such 
possession. VK Law, on the other hand, makes several vague statements in its briefing to the 
effect that Vernon himself is in possession of the VK Law Property, as opposed to the law firm. 
VK Law also states at one point that Vernon “wants the entities to remain in possession of the 
property.” However, VK Law has not argued that the district court erred in finding that the firm 
is in possession of the VK Law Property, nor does VK Law cite any authority that would support 
the position that a limited liability company or professional corporation does not possess real 
property when it maintains offices on the property and conducts its business therefrom. In fact, 
other than several vague statements to the effect that VK Law is operating on the property 
through Vernon’s possession, VK Law fails to make a cogent argument on the possession 
element. Therefore, we will not consider the issue because it has not been properly raised on 
appeal. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (citing Randall v. 
Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975) (“Where an appellant fails to assert his 
assignments of error with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those 
assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court.”)).  
Therefore, the remaining issue in each case is whether the district court correctly 
determined that the personal representative had satisfied the ownership element of an ejectment 
action. 
A. The Rule 70(b) Judgment is valid.  
We begin by addressing the effect of the Rule 70(b) Judgment, entered by the magistrate 
court in the estate proceedings, which was discussed at length by the parties in the ejectment 
actions before the district courts and before this Court on appeal.  
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b) allows a court to enter a judgment divesting any 
party’s title to real or personal property and vesting it in another. The Rule 70(b) Judgment that 
was entered in the estate proceedings divested Vernon, his sister, and any entities controlled by 
them of any interest in Victoria’s property and vested such property in the personal 
representative of the Estate in his capacity as personal representative.3 
Appellants would have us draw a distinction between the personal representative of the 
Estate and the Estate itself, arguing that the language of the Rule 70(b) Judgment purports to vest 
ownership of the properties in the personal representative, as opposed to placing them back 
within the Estate. Based upon this distinction, Appellants argue that the Rule 70(b) Judgment is 
void because the magistrate court did not have the authority to grant ownership of the property to 
the personal representative. However, the district courts did not make such a distinction in 
describing the Rule 70(b) Judgment in each ejectment action below.  
For example, in the memorandum decision in the ejectment action against Gibson, the 
district court explained that the Gowen Property was owned by the Estate, but later stated that 
the Rule 70(b) Judgment “clearly gives [the personal representative] ownership of the Gowen 
Property[.]” In the action against Vernon III, the district court explained that the personal 
representative of the Estate sought to eject Vernon III “from property that is owned by [the 
Estate].” However, the district court also explained that, pursuant to the UPC and the Rule 70(b) 
Judgment, the personal representative was the owner of the Raymond Property “in his capacity 
as the personal representative of [the Estate].” Finally, in the action against VK Law, the district 
court simply stated that, pursuant to the UPC and the Rule 70(b) Judgment, the personal 
representative was either the “owner” of the VK Law Property “and/or [held] the same power 
that an owner would have over the same.” Thus, in each case, the district courts referred to the 
property as being owned by the Estate and/or the personal representative interchangeably. 
After the magistrate court overseeing the estate proceedings invalidated Victoria’s will 
and set aside the property transfers made by Vernon, it entered an order appointing Noah G. 
Hillen as the Estate’s personal representative. The purpose of the subsequently entered Rule 
70(b) Judgment was to vest the properties in Hillen in his newly appointed status as personal 
representative rather than his previous status as the Estate’s special administrator. It is of no 
                                                 
3 That Rule 70(b) Judgment was appealed, by Vernon, and upheld by this Court in Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 
Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018). 
10 
 
consequence that the language of the judgment vested the properties in Hillen in his capacity as 
the personal representative, rather than in the Estate itself. When dealing with third parties, a 
personal representative is merely a proxy for the estate. He can sue and be sued on behalf of the 
estate (I.C § 15-3-703(c)), employ appraisers on behalf of the estate (I.C. § 15-3-707), and 
otherwise conduct business relevant to administration of the estate. See I.C. § 15-3-715 
(providing personal representatives with the authority to receive or retain assets, exercise the 
same power as the decedent in the performance of contracts, satisfy charitable pledges made by 
the decedent, acquire or dispose of estate assets, abandon estate property, enter into leases, and 
engage in many other activities on behalf of the estate which he represents).   
Furthermore, despite Appellants’ stance that the Rule 70(b) Judgment somehow divested 
Vernon of his interest in the Estate as one of Victoria’s heirs, the corresponding order makes 
clear that the judgment was merely clearing title to the properties so that they could be 
administered as part of the Estate. Thus, Vernon’s interest in estate property as an heir to the 
Estate was unaffected by the Rule 70(b) Judgment. As such, the combined effect of the 
magistrate court’s order and the Rule 70(b) Judgment was to ensure that all of Victoria’s 
property, including the property that had been invalidly transferred by Vernon through his power 
of attorney, was restored to the Estate for administration by the personal representative. 
Therefore, we turn to the Uniform Probate Code to determine whether the district court correctly 
determined that an estate’s personal representative has sufficient power over estate property to 
maintain an ejectment action on the estate’s behalf. 
B. The UPC authorizes a personal representative to maintain an ejectment action. 
Property administered as part of an estate is governed by the UPC. See I.C. §§ 15-1-101 
to 15-7-701. Idaho Code sections 15-3-701 to 15-3-721 govern the duties and powers of a 
personal representative over estate property. Specifically, Idaho Code section 15-3-711 provides 
that a personal representative’s powers include “the same power over the title to property of the 
estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and 
others interested in the estate.” In each ejectment action below, the district court reasoned that 
section 15-3-711 provided the personal representative with sufficient power of ownership over 
estate property to bring an ejectment action against unwanted parties. We agree. 
The objective of statutory interpretation is “to derive the intent of the legislative body that 
adopted the act.” State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015) (quoting State v. 
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Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361, 313 P.3d 1, 17 (2013)). Interpretation of a statute begins with its 
plain language. Id. The statute is considered as a whole, with each word being given its “plain, 
usual, and ordinary meaning[].” Id. Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect; the Court need not go beyond the plain 
meaning of the statute. Id.   
The plain language of Idaho Code section 15-3-711 directly addresses a personal 
representative’s power over estate property. Though section 15-3-711 does not vest title to estate 
property in the personal representative, it specifically grants “the same power” over estate 
property as would be enjoyed by an “absolute owner.” I.C. § 15-3-711 (emphasis added).  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Absolute” as “[f]ree from restriction, qualification, or 
condition.” Absolute, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Thus, the plain meaning of the 
term “absolute” is unrestricted or without limitation. When something is absolute, there are no 
conditions attached and its effect remains undiminished. In other words, an individual who has 
the same power over property as an absolute owner has the same power as an unrestricted owner, 
whose ownership of the property has no qualifications, limitations, or conditions. Therefore, for 
the duration of his appointment, a personal representative has effectively the same power as an 
owner would have. An absolute owner would undoubtedly have sufficient power over his own 
property to maintain an action for ejectment. Thus, the plain language of Idaho Code section 15-
3-711 provides a personal representative with sufficient power of ownership over estate property 
to maintain an ejectment action on the estate’s behalf.  
Though we need not look beyond the plain language of the statute to resolve this case, we 
note that the official comment to section 15-3-711 confirms our reading of the plain language of 
the statute. The official comment states: 
The personal representative is given the broadest possible “power over title”. [sic] 
He receives a “power”, [sic] rather than title, because the power concept eases the 
succession of assets which are not possessed by the personal representative. Thus, 
if the power is unexercised prior to its termination, its lapse clears the title of 
devisees and heirs . . . . The power over title of an absolute owner is conceived to 
embrace all possible transactions which might result in a conveyance or 
encumbrance of assets, or in a change of rights of possession. The relationship of 
the personal representative to the estate is that of a trustee . . . . Interested persons 
who are apprehensive of possible misuse of power by a personal representative 
may secure themselves by use of the devices implicit in the several sections of 
Parts 1 and 3 of this Article. See especially Sections 3-501, 3-605, 3-607 and 3-
611. 
12 
 
I.C. § 15-3-711 cmt. (emphasis added). The comment elaborates on what is meant by “the same 
power” as an “absolute owner,” describing the power of a personal representative as “the 
broadest possible ‘power over title.’” Id. Furthermore, the comment explains that the power of an 
absolute owner is conceived to include “all possible transactions which might result . . . in a 
change of rights of possession.” Id. An action for ejectment is precisely such an action.  
In addition to section 15-3-711, Idaho Code section 15-3-709 expressly provides that, 
“every personal representative has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the 
decedent’s property” if in his personal judgment, possession by him is necessary for the purposes 
of estate administration. The section further explains that a personal representative “may 
maintain an action to recover possession of property[.]” I.C. § 15-3-709. An ejectment action is 
the quintessential action to recover possession of property. See 28A C.J.S. Ejectment § 1 (2021). 
Therefore, Idaho Code section 15-3-709 further clarifies that a personal representative may 
pursue an ejectment action to recover possession of estate property. 
 
Faced with the plain language of the statute, Appellants make two arguments, both of 
which are unpersuasive. First, Appellants argue that, under section 15-3-101 of the UPC, title to 
estate property vests in the heirs of the decedent immediately upon her death. Indeed, Idaho 
Code section 15-3-101 provides that “[u]pon the death of a person, his separate property 
devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by his last will, or . . . in the absence of 
testamentary disposition to his heirs[.]” However, the same provision also plainly states that 
devolution of the decedent’s property is “subject to . . . administration.” I.C. § 15-3-101.  
Appellants also cite to Lemp v. Lemp, which predates the enactment of the UPC, in 
support of this argument. 32 Idaho 397, 184 P. 222 (1919). To the extent that it conflicts with the 
UPC, this Court’s opinion in Lemp is no longer good law. However, in our view, the case is 
consistent with the modern statute. Like the UPC, Lemp describes the administrator of an estate 
as holding estate property in trust for its beneficiaries, subject to the estate’s administration. 
Compare Lemp, 32 Idaho at 401, 184 P. at 223 (explaining that an estate’s administrator or 
executor “is not the owner of any part of the estate,” but “holds it in trust for the parties entitled 
to it, subject to the purposes of administration”), with I.C. § 15-3-101 (describing an intestate 
estate’s property as devolving to the heirs upon death of the decedent, subject to administration). 
Therefore, both the statute and the case law cited by Appellants plainly state that any interest that 
13 
 
vests in an estate’s heirs upon the death of the decedent is nonetheless subject to the personal 
representative’s power of administration. 
Second, Appellants argue that the UPC limits the authority of a personal representative 
by requiring him to act only to the extent “necessary for the administration of [the] property in 
the interests of creditors and other interested persons.” They cite to Idaho Code sections 15-3-
703, 15-3-709, and 15-3-711 in support of their argument. Indeed, a personal representative owes 
fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of an estate, such as exercising his authority under the UPC 
in the beneficiaries’ best interest. I.C. § 15-3-703. However, Appellants are not beneficiaries or 
creditors of the Estate. The duties owed by personal representatives under Idaho Code section 
15-3-703 are owed to creditors and other parties interested in the Estate’s administration, not 
unwanted possessors of the Estate’s property. See id. Therefore, Idaho Code section 15-3-703 
does not establish any duty owed to Appellants. 
Furthermore, when it comes to recovering possession of estate property, section 15-3-709 
provides a personal representative with discretion in deciding whether to take possession of 
estate property or to leave it in the possession of an individual who is presumptively entitled to 
possession.  That statute provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by a decedent’s will, every personal representative 
has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the decedent’s property, 
except that any real property or tangible personal property may be left with or 
surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto unless or until, in the 
judgment of the personal representative, possession of the property by him will be 
necessary for purposes of administration . . . .  
I.C. § 15-3-709 (emphasis added). Use of the word “may” and the phrase “in the judgment of the 
personal representative” in describing a personal representative’s power to allow continued 
possession of or recover possession of property demonstrates a clear intent that the personal 
representative has discretion in exercising that power. Thus, the decision of whether to leave 
Appellants in possession of the Estate properties was one for the personal representative to make.  
Finally, Appellants argue that the personal representative’s decision to eject them from 
the Estate’s properties constitutes a breach of fiduciary duties owed to Vernon as an heir under 
Idaho Code section 15-3-703. However, we decline to discuss whether the personal 
representative’s conduct gives rise to a breach of fiduciary duties claim because the issue is not 
before this Court on appeal. The sole claim in each case upon which the district courts granted 
partial judgment on the pleadings was for ejectment. The corresponding judgments, certified as 
14 
 
final pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), only address Elsaesser’s ejectment claims. 
Therefore, we will not opine as to any potential breach of fiduciary duties claim.  
 
In sum, the plain language of the UPC grants a personal representative sufficient power 
over title to estate property to bring an ejectment action on the estate’s behalf. Accordingly, the 
district courts did not err in entering partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Estate’s 
personal representative. 
C. Attorney’s fees on appeal. 
Elsaesser requests attorney’s fees on appeal in all three cases pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 12-121. Appellants argue that no party is entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal. 
Idaho Code section 12-121 allows for the award of attorney’s fees where a case is 
“brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”  “An action is 
frivolous and unreasonable ‘when an appellant has only asked the appellate court to second-
guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has failed to show that the district court 
incorrectly applied well-established law.’” Wilson v. Mocabee, 167 Idaho 59, 70, 467 P.3d 423, 
434 (2020) (quoting Clark v. Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., 163 Idaho 215, 230, 409 
P.3d 795, 810 (2017)). “Fees will generally not be awarded when good faith arguments are made 
on appeal.” Id.  
We conclude that this appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. Each of the Appellants, Gibson, Vernon III, and VK Law, made nearly identical 
arguments on appeal. Appellants’ arguments regarding the powers of a personal representative 
over estate property were so plainly contradicted by the UPC that even the most basic reading of 
the statute renders them untenable. Accordingly, we award attorney’s fees to Elsaesser in each of 
the three consolidated appeals discussed in this opinion. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the district courts did not err in granting partial judgment on the 
pleadings in favor of the Estate’s personal representative in each ejectment action. Accordingly, 
the district courts’ judgments ejecting Gibson from the Gowen Property, ejecting Vernon III 
from the Raymond Property, and ejecting VK Law from the VK Law Property are affirmed. 
Costs and attorney’s fees are awarded to Elsaesser in each case. 
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BRODY, MOELLER, and Justice Pro Tem 
HORTON CONCUR.