Case Title: Capers v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 229, 2018

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DEREK CAPERS,  
 
 
§ 
§ 
No. 229, 2018 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of the    
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
State of Delaware  
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 1406005949 (N)  
 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
  
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted: December 13, 2018 
Decided: 
February 25, 2019 
 
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of February 2019, upon consideration of the no-merit brief and 
motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c) and the State’s response, it 
appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Derek Capers, was indicted on charges of Possession of a 
Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Possession of Ammunition by a Person 
Prohibited (“PABPP”), Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon (“CCDW”), and 
Possession of Marijuana.  On May 31, 2015, Capers pleaded guilty to PFBPP and 
CCDW.  Sentencing was deferred pending a presentence investigation. 
(2) 
At the outset of the guilty plea hearing, the parties addressed an 
unresolved issue noted in the guilty plea agreement and Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty 
2 
 
Plea Form concerning the effect, if any, of Capers’ prior New Jersey drug conviction 
on the sentence to be imposed for PFBPP under 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1).1  Capers had 
two prior convictions, both in New Jersey.  The parties agreed that one of the 
convictions—aggravated manslaughter—qualified as a “prior violent felony” that 
would subject Capers to a five-year minimum-mandatory sentence under § 
1448(e)(1)(b).2  What the parties did not know was whether the second New Jersey 
conviction—a drug conviction—also qualified as a “prior violent felony.”  If it did, 
Capers would be subject to a ten-year minimum-mandatory sentence under § 
1448(e)(1)(c).3   
(3) 
As reflected in the plea agreement and confirmed at the guilty plea 
hearing, the parties determined that it would be appropriate to proceed with the plea 
colloquy and refer the unresolved sentencing question to the presentence office.  After 
discussing all of this with counsel at the guilty plea hearing, the Superior Court asked 
Capers if he still wanted to enter the guilty plea.  Capers indicated that he did.4 
(4) 
Capers’ sentencing was scheduled for June 26, 2015.  On June 25, the 
State submitted a letter indicating its disagreement with the conclusion in the 
presentence report that Capers’ New Jersey drug conviction did not qualify as a prior 
                                
1 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1) (Supp. 2019). 
2 Id. § 1148(e)(1)(b). 
3 Id. § 1148(e)(1)(c). 
4 Hr’g Tr. at 5 (May 31, 2015).  
3 
 
violent felony under 11 Del. C. § 1448(e) because it was not classified as a violent 
felony in New Jersey.  The State correctly contended that Delaware’s classification of 
the crime controlled, not New Jersey’s,5 and that the equivalent drug offense in 
Delaware was classified as a violent felony. 
(5) 
The Superior Court deferred Capers’ sentencing.  Upon further 
consideration of the issue, Capers moved to withdraw the guilty plea, asserting that the 
plea should be withdrawn because he had entered into it believing that New Jersey law 
would determine whether or not his New Jersey drug conviction was a violent felony.  
By order dated November 17, 2015, the Superior Court granted the plea withdrawal 
motion, stating that “[t]he benefit of hindsight leads the Court to conclude that it should 
not have accepted this guilty plea when there was so much unknown regarding 
defendant’s prior conviction(s) in New Jersey.”6     
 
(6) 
When Capers’ case went to trial, the jury convicted him, as charged, of 
PFBPP, PABPP, CCDW, and Possession of Marijuana.  Capers was sentenced to a 
total of twenty-three years of Level V incarceration suspended after ten years for six 
months of Level IV supervision followed by Level III probation.  This is Capers’ direct 
appeal. 
                                
5 Miller v. State, 2008 187957 (Del. Jan. 9, 2008). 
6 2015 WL 7301890, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 17, 2015).  
4 
 
(7) 
On appeal, Capers’ trial counsel has filed a no-merit brief and motion to 
withdraw under Rule 26(c).  Counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and careful 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues. Capers has 
supplemented the Rule 26(c) brief with claims that he would like the Court to consider 
on appeal.  The State has responded to the position taken by Capers’ counsel and the 
claims raised by Capers, and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(8) 
When considering a Rule 26(c) brief and motion to withdraw, our standard 
and scope of review is twofold.7   First, we must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel 
made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could 
arguably support the appeal.8     Second, we must conduct our own review of the record 
to determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable 
issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.9    
(9) 
Capers does not address his jury trial or sentencing on appeal.  Instead, he 
claims that the Superior Court erred when it permitted—at his request—the withdrawal 
of his guilty plea.  According to Capers, the Superior Court should have denied the 
motion to withdraw the plea, enforced the plea agreement—which he asserts was 
breached by the State— and imposed the five-year minimum-mandatory sentence for 
                                
7 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 
442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
8 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. at 83. 
9 Id. 
5 
 
PFBPP based on one qualifying prior violent felony.  Because Capers did not challenge 
the withdrawal of his guilty plea in the Superior Court, we review his claims for plain 
error.  “Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so 
clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the 
trial process.” 10 
(10) A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court.11  We find no error in the Superior Court’s decision permitting Capers 
to withdraw the guilty plea.12  Also, we find no support in the record for Capers’ 
assertion that the State breached the plea agreement.  Contrary to Capers’ claim on 
appeal, on the question of which minimum-mandatory sentence would apply, the 
parties did not agree that they would be bound by New Jersey law or by the answer in 
the presentence report even if it was incorrect under Delaware law.   
(11) Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that Capers’ appeal is 
wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue.  We are satisfied 
that Capers’ counsel made a conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and 
properly determined that Capers could not raise a meritorious claim on appeal. 
 
                                
10 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
11 Blackwell v. State, 736 A.2d 971, 972 (Del. 1999). 
12 Pringle v. State, 2007 WL 4374197, at *2 (Del. Dec. 17, 2007) (finding no plain error in the 
Superior Court’s decision to grant the motion to withdraw the guilty plea permitting the defendant to 
exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial).  
6 
 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of convictions is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.   
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice