Case Title: The People v. Robinson

Citation: 2011 NY Slip Op 07147

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 159  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Terrance D. Robinson,
            Appellant.
Bruce Evans Knoll, for appellant.
David Costanzo, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed
and a new trial ordered. 
On February 16, 2006, while on duty in the City of
Hudson, Officer Jason Finn observed a vehicle pull away from a
parked position without using a turning signal.  He also noticed
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No. 159
excessive smoke emanating from the vehicle's tailpipe.  Shortly
thereafter, Officer Finn stopped the vehicle.  Defendant, the
vehicle's operator and sole occupant, abruptly exited the vehicle
and walked towards a nearby store.  Officer Finn repeatedly
instructed defendant to return to the vehicle, but defendant
refused, becoming argumentative and hostile.  Officer Finn
advised defendant that he was under arrest for obstructing
governmental administration and resisting arrest.  The officer
remained with the vehicle, but subsequently learned that the
vehicle's registered owner, defendant's cousin, was not present
at the scene.  Because he did not possess the keys and the
vehicle was parked in a no-parking zone, Officer Finn decided to
impound the vehicle.  Prior to the tow truck's arrival, Officer
Finn conducted an inventory search, discovering a loaded revolver
under the driver's seat.  Defendant was charged with criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law § 265.02).  
At trial, Officer Finn testified that, after explaining
to defendant that he was being charged with possessing a loaded
firearm, defendant responded, "it wasn't armed, but that's okay,
possession is nine/tenths of the law."  Defendant recounted a
slightly different version of the same conversation, testifying
that he told the officer "that I wasn't armed with anything.  He
said, I don't know what kind of games you playing here.  Then I
asked him, who is going to be my attorney because I know for a
fact that nine/tenths of the law is possession."  The People
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objected to defense counsel's subsequent question, "Why did you
say if you recall nine-tenths of the law -- possession is
nine-tenths of the law?"  County Court sustained People's
objection to that question.  Following summations, County Court
instructed the jury on the automobile presumption, stating that
all persons occupying a vehicle are presumed to possess a firearm
found within the vehicle (see Penal Law § 265.15).  The jury
found defendant guilty.  
The Appellate Division affirmed.  The court determined
that while County Court erroneously denied defendant an
opportunity to explain the statements he allegedly made to the
police, any such error was harmless considering the overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt.  A Judge of this Court granted
leave to appeal and we now reverse.  
The primary issue before us is whether County Court's
error in sustaining the prosecutor's objection to defense 
counsel's question of defendant was harmless.  
This Court has stated that "[t]he paramount purpose of
all rules of evidence is to ensure that the jury will hear all
pertinent, reliable and probative evidence which bears on the
disputed issues" (People v Miller, 39 NY2d 543, 551 [1976]; see
also People v Yazum, 13 NY2d 302, 304 [1963]).  Here, the
Appellate Division properly found that County Court erred when it
denied defendant an opportunity to explain fully the statements
he made while in police custody since defendant's statements were
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No. 159
both pertinent and probative.  
We conclude however that the error was not harmless. 
An error is harmless only when there is "overwhelming proof of
the defendant's guilt" and no significant probability that the
jury would have acquitted the defendant were it not for the error
(People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 242 [1975]; see also People v
Arafet, 13 NY3d 460, 467 [2009]).  Here, the evidence against
defendant was not overwhelming.  It was not defendant's vehicle. 
He had been driving it for only a short period of time prior to
the traffic stop, and then only to take someone to the train
station.  Several different family members had access to the
vehicle prior to defendant's use on this occasion.  In light of
this, defendant's potentially inculpatory statements about the
revolver were the sole evidence tending to establish that he knew
that the revolver was in the vehicle when he was stopped. 
Because defendant was not allowed the opportunity to explain
those statements, the jury was left to reconcile the automobile
presumption with the officer's account of defendant's ambiguous
statements.  Considering that defendant's explanation may have
created doubt in the jury's mind sufficient to rebut the
automobile presumption, resulting in an acquittal, it cannot be
said that the error was harmless.  
Defendant's remaining contentions lack merit.  
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Order reversed and a new trial ordered, in a memorandum.  Chief
Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott
and Jones concur.
Decided October 13, 2011
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No. 159