Case Title: Petrosinelli v. PETA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 061785

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JOSEPH G. PETROSINELLI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 061785 
 
 
 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    April 20, 2007 
PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF 
ANIMALS, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
David T. Stitt, Judge 
In this appeal, we consider the judgment of the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County which found Joseph G. Petrosinelli in 
civil contempt and awarded monetary sanctions against him.  For 
the reasons set forth below, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
I. BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
This appeal arises from litigation in two similar lawsuits 
brought by the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. 
(“PETA”).  PETA initially filed a motion for judgment on May 30, 
2002 against Kenneth Feld, Richard Froemming, Joel Kaplan, 
Charles Smith and three “John Doe” defendants, alleging 
statutory and common law conspiracy and misappropriation of 
trade secrets (“PETA I”).  In response to Feld’s demurrer, he 
was nonsuited on July 25, 2003.1 
                                                 
1 By the time of the nonsuit as to Feld, PETA I had 
materially changed because Froemming had died, Kaplan proceeded 
pro se, and Smith asserted any claims against him had been 
discharged in bankruptcy. 
 
2
PETA filed a second motion for judgment on January 26, 
2004, naming Feld and three “John Doe” parties as defendants, 
alleging that Feld, CEO of Feld Entertainment, Inc., parent 
company of Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus, Inc., 
conspired and wrongfully took trade secrets and documents from 
PETA in an effort to thwart PETA’s animal protection work (“PETA 
II”).  Throughout PETA II, Feld was represented by several 
attorneys, including Petrosinelli. 
On February 27, 2004, Feld moved to consolidate PETA I and 
PETA II for trial and discovery, which motion the circuit court 
denied.2  In September 2004, Feld again moved to consolidate PETA 
I and PETA II, which the circuit court took under advisement.3 
On December 2, 2004, PETA issued a subpoena to depose 
Steven Kendall, a resident of Pennsylvania, in PETA I.4  Kendall 
failed to appear at the scheduled deposition, but he made a 
written agreement with PETA to appear in Alexandria, Virginia at 
the office of PETA’s counsel on February 11, 2005 at 10:00am for 
a deposition in PETA I. 
                                                 
2 An order entered on April 16, 2004 by Judge Gaylord L. 
Finch, Jr. provided “the motion to consolidate the matter for 
trial and discovery is denied.” 
3 Judge Dennis J. Smith issued an order on September 24, 
2004, which provided that Feld’s “Renewed Motion to Consolidate 
is taken under advisement.” 
4 Steven Kendall was allegedly an undercover operative 
working on behalf of Feld Entertainment to infiltrate PETA and 
similar organizations.  Kendall authored a book that contained 
potentially damaging information about Feld and Feld 
Entertainment, Inc. 
 
3
On December 9, 2004, at a hearing in response to Feld’s 
renewed motion to consolidate which had been taken under 
advisement, the circuit court entered an order consolidating 
PETA I and PETA II for purposes of trial, but not for discovery.5  
During the December 9, 2004 hearing, Petrosinelli orally 
requested that although discovery would not be consolidated, the 
parties should be notified when discovery was occurring in 
either PETA I or PETA II, even though Feld was no longer a party 
in PETA I.  The circuit court denied Petrosinelli’s request but 
invited the parties to revisit the issue, stating that they “are 
welcome to raise these issues again, because I’ll be a lot 
deeper into the discovery.” 
On December 29, 2004, Feld filed a motion for permission to 
access discovery in PETA I, which PETA opposed.  At a January 
21, 2005 hearing on the motion, Petrosinelli reiterated his 
request on behalf of Feld to have access to discovery in PETA I.  
The circuit court reaffirmed that PETA I and PETA II would be 
joined for trial but separated for purposes of discovery, 
stating 
this really is about the third iteration of a very 
similar motion, and that doesn’t even include the 
hearing before Judge Smith where he took the matter 
under advisement. . . . 
                                                 
5 Judge David T. Stitt issued the December 9, 2004 order and 
all subsequent orders in this case. 
 
4
I exercise my discretion by again refusing . . . 
to join [the two cases] for discovery, and the motion 
for access to discovery . . . is denied.6 
On February 3, 2005, Feld issued a subpoena in PETA II to 
depose Steven Kendall, requesting that he appear at the office 
of Blankingship & Keith, P.C. in Fairfax, Virginia on February 
11, 2005 at 10:00am.  The subpoena was signed by William B. 
Porter, another attorney representing Feld, but at 
Petrosinelli’s direction and with his knowledge of the PETA 
deposition of Kendall already scheduled in PETA I for the same 
date and time, at the office of PETA’s counsel in Alexandria. 
Kendall’s attorney responded on February 8, 2005 by sending 
letters to PETA and Feld indicating that Kendall would make 
himself available for a single deposition.7  PETA responded the 
next day by letter to Kendall’s attorney accusing Feld and 
Kendall of “engaging in a conspiracy to obstruct justice” 
because of the deposition scheduling. 
PETA immediately moved in the circuit court to quash Feld’s 
subpoena of Kendall in PETA II.  On February 9, 2005, the 
circuit court conducted an emergency hearing by telephone 
                                                 
6 The circuit court issued an order on January 24, 2005, 
which stated that Feld’s “Motion for Access is DENIED for the 
reasons stated from the bench.” 
7 Identical letters were sent to Feld and PETA, which 
stated: “Inasmuch as the subject matter of both depositions will 
be the same, we will be available to sit for one deposition and 
will submit to questions posed by you and [opposing counsel]” 
(emphasis in original).  
 
5
conference call on PETA’s motion.  The circuit court quashed 
Feld’s subpoena of Kendall in PETA II and instructed that the 
PETA deposition of Kendall in PETA I continue as scheduled. 
PETA drafted an order to reflect the circuit court’s 
ruling, but Feld objected to some of the proposed language.  
Specifically, Feld objected to language in the proposed order 
stating Feld’s subpoena of Kendall was “a circumvention of prior 
rulings in this case” and that the “previously noticed 
deposition [on PETA I] shall proceed.”  When the parties did not 
reach agreement, PETA forwarded the proposed order as drafted to 
the circuit court along with the comments submitted by Feld.  On 
February 15, 2005, the circuit court entered the order as 
originally drafted by PETA, including the language to which Feld 
objected. 
On February 18, 2005 PETA filed an ex parte petition for a 
rule to show cause in PETA II as to why Porter and Petrosinelli 
should not be held in contempt for violating the circuit court’s 
order of January 24, 2005 and similar orders dated April 16, 
2004 and December 9, 2004.  The petition for the rule to show 
cause included an affidavit from PETA’s counsel, Philip J. 
Hirschkop, detailing how Porter and Petrosinelli allegedly 
violated the referenced orders. 
On March 14, 2005, the circuit court issued a rule to show 
cause in PETA II stating “that an order of this Court was 
 
6
apparently violated.”  The rule directed Porter and Petrosinelli 
to “show cause why they should not be held in contempt for 
violating this Court’s orders of January 21, 2005, April 16, 
2004 and December 9, 2004.”8  On April 8, 2005, Feld filed a 
motion to vacate the rule to show cause, or, in the alternative, 
a response to the rule, with affidavits from Petrosinelli and 
Porter attached. 
On May 25, 2005, the circuit court conducted a hearing on 
the rule to show cause and Feld’s motion to vacate the rule to 
show cause.9  Judge Stitt held Petrosinelli in contempt under the 
rule to show cause for issuing the Kendall subpoena.  Although 
Judge Stitt discussed the April 16, 2004 and December 9, 2004 
orders, he made specific reference to the January 24, 2005 order 
and stated: 
That is a clear order denying access to discovery 
and what was done with this subpoena to Kendall was 
precisely an attempt to access discovery in [PETA I].  
There’s no other way to fairly characterize it.  
That’s what it was, just a blatant violation of that 
order. 
                                                 
8 Although the rule to show cause recites an order dated 
January 21, 2005, the actual order was signed on January 24, 
2005, which memorialized the court’s ruling at the January 21, 
2005 hearing denying Feld’s motion for access to discovery.  See 
also supra note 6. 
9 The circuit court also considered other motions, but those 
motions are the subject of a separate appeal brought by Feld in 
Williams & Connolly, LLP v. People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals, 273 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2007), which is also 
decided this day. 
 
7
And I do find there was contempt pursuant to 
Virginia Code Section 18.2-456(5).10  This was 
disobedience by an officer of the court of an order of 
the court. 
The rule to show cause against Porter was dismissed.11 
On August 18, 2005, the circuit court conducted a further 
hearing and reaffirmed its May 25, 2005 ruling from the bench 
holding Petrosinelli in contempt,12 and ordered him to pay 
sanctions of $11,305.00 to PETA, all of which were memorialized 
in an August 26, 2005 order. 
Petrosinelli filed a notice of appeal with the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Code § 19.2-318 regarding the civil contempt 
sanction.  We certified Petrosinelli’s appeal in the Court of 
Appeals for review pursuant to Code § 17.1-409(A) and (B). 
                                                 
10 Code § 18.2-456(5) provides that “The courts and judges 
may issue attachments for contempt, and punish them summarily 
[for] [d]isobedience or resistance of an officer of the court, 
juror, witness or other person to any lawful process, judgment, 
decree or order of the court.” 
11 Petrosinelli admitted that he asked Porter to issue the 
Kendall subpoena.  The court noted that Porter was “a young 
attorney, a former law clerk to this court, [and] he’s obviously 
not calling the shots in this case, and I appreciate Mr. 
Petrosinelli taking the responsibility for having told him to 
issue the subpoena.”  Petrosinelli responded to the circuit 
court’s ruling with a motion for reconsideration of the finding 
of contempt, but the circuit court denied the motion. 
12 Judge Stitt confirmed at the August 18, 2005 hearing that 
the contempt proceeding against Petrosinelli was civil contempt: 
“if I were going to proceed with criminal sanctions . . . I 
would let everybody know and refer the matter to the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney.  I obviously haven’t done that and so I 
don’t think there’s any question that we’re only proceeding on 
civil sanctions at this point.” 
 
8
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
A court has discretion in the exercise of its contempt 
power.  Sapp v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 415, 425, 559 S.E.2d 645, 
650 (2002); see also Leisge v. Leisge, 224 Va. 303, 309-10, 296 
S.E.2d 538, 541 (1982).  It “is within the discretion of the 
trial court” to conduct civil contempt proceedings, Arvin, Inc. 
v. Sony Corp. of America, 215 Va. 704, 706, 213 S.E.2d 753, 755 
(1975), thus we review the exercise of a court’s contempt power 
under an abuse of discretion standard.  Tonti v. Akbari, 262 Va. 
681, 687, 553 S.E.2d 769, 772 (2001). 
 
Because the “judicial contempt power is a potent weapon,” 
Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine 
Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967), our centuries-old 
jurisprudence has long provided that “contempt lies for 
disobedience of what is decreed, not for what may be decreed.”  
Taliaferro v. Horde, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 242, 247 (1822). 
Additionally, “before a person may be held in contempt for 
violating a court order, the order must be in definite terms as 
to the duties thereby imposed upon him and the command must be 
expressed rather than implied.”  Winn v. Winn, 218 Va. 8, 10, 
235 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1977).  Thus, “there must be an express 
command or prohibition” which has been violated in order for a 
proceeding in contempt to lie.  French v. Pobst, 203 Va. 704, 
710, 127 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1962). 
 
9
 
The March 14, 2005 rule to show cause stated that 
Petrosinelli “apparently violated” the circuit court’s prior 
orders of January 24, 2005, April 16, 2004 and December 9, 2004 
(the “three orders”) by issuing the Kendall subpoena.  The 
August 26, 2005 order finding contempt simply stated, “Joseph G. 
Petrosinelli is adjudged in contempt” but did not identify which 
order or orders were found to be the source of the contempt. 
 
At the May 25, 2005 hearing on the rule to show cause, the 
circuit court discussed the three orders but emphasized the 
January 24, 2005 order as a particular order Petrosinelli 
violated because that order was “a clear order denying access to 
discovery and what was done with this subpoena to Kendall was 
precisely an attempt to access discovery in [PETA I]. . . .  
That’s what it was, just a blatant violation of that order.”  
The court then concluded “that there was contempt pursuant to 
Virginia Code Section 18.2-456(5).”  We therefore review the 
language of the three orders to determine whether the circuit 
court abused its discretion in adjudging Petrosinelli in 
contempt. 
 
Each of the three orders is short, with the pertinent 
adjudication of the court stated in one sentence.  The January 
24, 2005 order provides only that Feld’s “Motion to Access is 
DENIED for the reasons stated from the bench.”  The April 16, 
2004 order states only that Feld’s “Motion to consolidate the 
 
10
matter for trial and discovery is denied.”  The December 9, 2004 
order states only that “Feld’s Motion to Consolidate is granted 
as to trial, but denied as to discovery.” 
 
Petrosinelli contends, as he did in the circuit court, that 
he did not violate any of the three orders.  Petrosinelli argues 
that no order of the court barred a subpoena to depose Kendall 
in PETA II.  Because Kendall was a Pennsylvania resident, 
Petrosinelli avers that the distinct possibility existed in 
which Feld would be unable to depose Kendall at all if he failed 
to act when he did.  By issuing the subpoena in PETA II, 
Petrosinelli argues he was attempting in good faith to follow 
the court’s orders while also preserving Feld’s right to take 
the deposition of a key witness.  As Kendall would agree to sit 
for only one deposition, Petrosinelli contends Feld faced the 
likely result that a Pennsylvania court would protect Kendall 
from multiple depositions on essentially the same subject matter 
as represented by PETA I and PETA II.  If that occurred, 
Petrosinelli argues, PETA would have the benefit of Kendall’s 
deposition in PETA I to use in PETA II, but Feld would have been 
foreclosed from that information. 
Petrosinelli also contends that the circuit court 
inappropriately relied on a mere implication that he could not 
depose Kendall as its basis for holding him in contempt.  
Petrosinelli insists that by issuing a separate subpoena 
 
11
deposition to Kendall, he was in compliance with the circuit 
court’s ruling that discovery be separate between PETA I and 
PETA II. 
 
In response, PETA asserts that Petrosinelli was found in 
contempt because he “engineer[ed]” a consolidated deposition 
with Kendall for PETA I and PETA II in direct violation of the 
three orders.  PETA insists that it is crucial to consider the 
context of the circuit court’s third denial of consolidated 
discovery in the January 24, 2005 order, when examining whether 
Petrosinelli acted contemptuously.  PETA avers that the three 
orders provided Petrosinelli with explicit notice of what was 
required of him, yet Petrosinelli willfully defied the orders 
and effectively attempted to consolidate discovery.  Because the 
circuit court’s January 24, 2005 order included language that 
the court had denied consolidated discovery “for the reasons 
stated from the bench,” PETA contends this provided Petrosinelli 
with sufficient notice of what was required.  Finally, PETA 
argues that even if Petrosinelli did not violate explicit orders 
of the circuit court, his “egregious misbehavior in obstructing 
the administration of justice by causing the Kendall deposition 
subpoena to be issued” at the same date and time but at a 
different location as the deposition for PETA I, constitutes 
contempt. 
 
12
 
We agree with Petrosinelli.  In reviewing the three orders, 
we do not find an express prohibition on the issuance of a 
subpoena to Kendall by Feld or any other party.  The three 
orders did not expressly command or prohibit Petrosinelli from 
acting to depose a witness, and Petrosinelli issued the subpoena 
only in PETA II.  The text of the three orders is devoid of any 
prohibition regarding the issuance of a subpoena to Kendall or 
any other person. 
A court generally speaks through its written orders.  
McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463, 469, 552 S.E.2d 364, 367 
(2001).  We presume that the written orders accurately reflect 
what transpired during the court’s proceedings.  Waterfront 
Marine Constr. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups, 
251 Va. 417, 427 n.2, 468 S.E.2d 894, 900 n.2 (1996).  While a 
court’s contempt power encompasses written orders as well as 
“oral orders, commands and directions of the court,” Robertson 
v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 537, 25 S.E.2d 352, 359 (1943), a 
duty that arises by implication cannot sustain a finding of 
contempt.  See, e.g., Winn, 218 Va. at 10-11, 235 S.E.2d at 309.  
If there was any prohibition upon Petrosinelli against 
subpoenaing Kendall for a deposition in PETA II, such a duty 
was, at best, an implication from general remarks of the court 
made in prior hearings.  Petrosinelli was never explicitly 
prohibited by a court order from issuing the Kendall subpoena.  
 
13
Mere implication of a duty cannot form the basis of a contempt 
judgment.  Id. 
Rather, the three orders, each of which denied joint 
discovery in PETA I and PETA II, “merely declare[d] the rights 
of the parties without an express command or prohibition.”  
French, 203 Va. at 710, 127 S.E.2d at 141.  As we stated in 
French, “there must be an express command or prohibition” to 
support a finding of contempt.  Id.  No such express command or 
prohibition exists that prohibited Petrosinelli from issuing the 
subpoena to Kendall. 
Thus, after a review of the three orders, we hold that the 
circuit court abused its discretion when it adjudged 
Petrosinelli in contempt of court.  Petrosinelli’s subpoena to 
Kendall in PETA II was not a violation of any express order of 
the court and thus could not be an act of contempt as a matter 
of law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will therefore reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court, which adjudged Petrosinelli in 
contempt, and we will vacate the award of sanctions against 
Petrosinelli individually in the amount of $11,305.00 and enter 
final judgment in favor of Petrosinelli. 
Reversed and final judgment.