Case Title: Shiel v. Rowell

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12432

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12432 
 
MARY SHIEL  vs.  JOHN ROWELL & another.1 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     March 8, 2018. - July 16, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Nuisance.  Trespass.  Real Property, Nuisance, Trespass. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Quincy Division of the 
District Court Department on July 24, 2015. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Mark S. Coven, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
William F. Spallina for the plaintiff. 
 
Daniel S. McInnis for the defendants. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  At the root of this case lies a distinctively 
neighborly type of dispute about who should have the 
responsibility for monitoring and cutting back an intruding 
                     
 
1 Keli-Jo Rowell. 
2 
 
 
tree.  The defendants, Keli-Jo and John Rowell,2 own the property 
adjacent to the plaintiff, Mary Shiel.  On the Rowells' property 
sits a one hundred foot tall sugar oak tree with branches 
reaching over Shiel's property.  Shiel filed a complaint with 
claims of private nuisance and trespass against the Rowells 
after the tree allegedly caused algae buildup on the roof of 
Shiel's home and the Rowells refused to cut it down.  Shiel 
sought money damages for the damage to her roof and an 
injunction demanding that the overhanging branches be cut back. 
 
A District Court judge dismissed Shiel's claims as 
precluded by Ponte v. DaSilva, 388 Mass. 1008, 1008 (1983) 
(individual whose property is injured by neighbor's healthy tree 
has no cause of action against landowner of property upon which 
tree lies).  The Appellate Division of the District Court 
affirmed, Shiel appealed, and we granted her application for 
direct appellate review.  Shiel concedes that Ponte is 
controlling but asks that we overrule it and related cases.  The 
Rowells urge us to ground our decision in stare decisis and not 
to disturb existing law.  We affirm. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Massachusetts rule.  The law in 
Massachusetts has long been that a landowner may not hold a 
neighbor liable for damage caused by that neighbor's healthy 
                     
 
2 The plaintiff, Mary Shiel, brings all claims against both 
defendants, so we refer to the defendants collectively as "the 
Rowells." 
3 
 
 
trees.  See Ponte, 388 Mass. at 1008; Michalson v. Nutting, 275 
Mass. 232, 232-233 (1931).  See also Kurtigian v. Worcester, 348 
Mass. 284, 290 (1965) (rule does not apply to unhealthy trees).  
In Michalson, supra at 232-233, roots from the defendants' 
poplar tree clogged the plaintiffs' sewer and drain pipes and 
cracked the plaintiffs' cement cellar, risking serious damage to 
the house's foundation.  We concluded that the defendants could 
not be held liable for that damage because "an owner of land is 
at liberty to use his land, and all of it, to grow trees."  Id. 
at 233, citing Bliss v. Ball, 99 Mass. 597, 598 (1868).  We 
recognized that the plaintiffs had the right to cut off 
intruding boughs and roots and reasoned that "it is wiser to 
leave the individual to protect himself, if harm results to him 
from this exercise of another's right to use his property in a 
reasonable way, than to subject that other to the annoyance, and 
the public to the burden, of actions at law, which would be 
likely to be innumerable and, in many instances, purely 
vexatious."  Michalson, supra at 234. 
 
We reaffirmed this rule in Ponte, where the plaintiff 
sought damages for personal injuries after slipping in her 
driveway, which was covered by debris from her neighbor's tree.  
Ponte, 388 Mass. at 1008 ("The failure of a landowner to prevent 
the blowing or dropping of leaves, branches, and sap from a 
healthy tree onto a neighbor's property is not unreasonable and 
4 
 
 
cannot be the basis of a finding of negligence or private 
nuisance").  Landowners who are disturbed by their neighbor's 
trees are not without recourse.  A property owner retains "the 
right to remove so much of the tree as overhangs his property."  
Id., citing Michalson, 275 Mass. at 233-234.  This rule has come 
to be known as the "Massachusetts rule."  See, e.g., Melnick v. 
C.S.X. Corp., 312 Md. 511, 520 (1988). 
 
2.  Hawaii rule.  Shiel urges us to adopt the so-called 
"Hawaii rule," which grants neighbors a right of action to 
resolve disputes in court over healthy trees.  It allows a 
neighbor to require that the tree owner pay for damage and cut 
back branches and roots if the tree causes, or there is an 
imminent danger of it causing, sensible harm3 to the neighbor's 
property.  Whitesell v. Houlton, 2 Haw. App. 365, 367 (1981).  
The neighbor could not hold the tree owner liable for harm 
caused by the tree casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or 
fruit.  Id.  The Hawaii rule, like the Massachusetts rule, 
allows the neighbor to retain the right to cut back overhanging 
branches or intruding roots.  Id. 
                     
 
3 The court in Whitesell v. Houlton, 2 Haw. App. 365 (1981), 
did not define "sensible harm," and no Hawaii appellate court 
opinions have defined the phrase.  The only definition of 
"sensible" in Black's Law Dictionary that could fit the context 
here is "[p]erceptible through the senses; appreciable."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1569 (10th ed. 2014). 
5 
 
 
 
Shiel contends that the Massachusetts rule is outdated and 
should be replaced by the Hawaii rule because today people are 
living in closer proximity to one another on smaller tracts of 
land than they were when the Massachusetts rule was adopted.  
She argues that trees today are more likely to cause damage to 
neighbors' property and tree owners are better able to manage 
their trees, which justifies giving parties a right of action to 
resolve disputes in court.  The Rowells urge us not to disturb 
the Massachusetts rule, based on the doctrine of stare decisis 
and because, in their view, the Massachusetts rule is more 
sensible.  They argue that there is no compelling reason to 
abandon the Massachusetts rule and that upholding precedent 
supports certainty in the law. 
 
3.  Stare decisis.  The principle of stare decisis is not 
absolute.  Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549, 562, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 979 
(2004).  "Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res judicata, a 
universal inexorable command," but "[w]hether it shall be 
followed or departed from is a question entirely within the 
discretion of the court."  Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 
U.S. 393, 405-406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoting 
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910).  However, adhering 
to precedent is our "preferred course because it promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
6 
 
 
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process."  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 
(1991).  "It also reduces incentives for challenging settled 
precedents, saving parties and courts the expense of endless 
relitigation."  Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 
2401, 2409 (2015).  "Parties should not be encouraged to seek 
reexamination of determined principles and speculate on a 
fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of 
it."  Mabardy v. McHugh, 202 Mass. 148, 152 (1909).  Reliance 
upon judicial precedent is of particular concern in "contract 
and property law cases, in which reliance upon existing judicial 
precedent often influences individual action."4  Halley v. 
Birbiglia, 390 Mass. 540, 545 (1983). 
 
We may uproot precedent when "the values in so doing 
outweigh the values underlying stare decisis."  Franklin v. 
Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 617 (1980).  Overruling precedent 
requires something above and beyond mere disagreement with its 
analysis.  Stonehill College, 441 Mass. at 588 (Sosman, J., 
concurring) ("Thus, in order to overrule a prior case, it is not 
enough that some or all of the Justices of this court have some 
intellectual or academic disagreement with the earlier analysis 
                     
 
4 We recognize that this is a tort case, but also one that 
implicates property law. 
7 
 
 
of the issue").  A lack of unforeseen problems caused by 
precedent justifies adhering to precedent unless there are 
developments that justify revisiting the law.  Id. at 588-589 
(Sosman, J., concurring) (we are "disinclined to fix something 
that is not broken"). 
 
We would discern a need to change the Massachusetts rule if 
it were outdated and no longer fit the circumstances of 
contemporary life.  "One of the great virtues of the common law 
is its dynamic nature that makes it adaptable to the 
requirements of society at the time of its application in 
court."  Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 628 (1976), quoting 
State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 
(1957).  We invite challenges to antiquated laws.  "When the 
rationales which gave meaning and coherence to a judicially 
created rule are no longer vital, and the rule itself is not 
consonant with the needs of contemporary society, a court not 
only has the authority but also the duty to reexamine its 
precedents rather than to apply by rote an antiquated formula."  
Lewis, 370 Mass. at 620, 628 (abolishing interspousal tort 
immunity, which had developed when "common law treated husband 
and wife as 'a single person, represented by the husband'" 
[citation omitted]).  Our case law reflects our adaptability to 
fit such shifting needs, even with respect to real property, 
where the rules of stare decisis are particularly important.  We 
8 
 
 
once distinguished between types of visitors5 in premises 
liability law derived from English common law, but concluded 
that the distinction could no longer be "justified in an urban 
industrial society."  Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 706-707 
(1973) (establishing common duty of reasonable care owed to all 
lawful visitors).  In the seven years following Mounsey, we 
reformed premises liability law to be consistent with this 
decision.  See Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 457 Mass. 368, 372 
(2010), citing Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162, 166 (1980). 
 
4.  Massachusetts rule is not outdated.  We see no reason 
to consider the Massachusetts rule outdated.  It may be true 
that people today are living in closer proximity to one another 
on smaller tracts of land than they were when the Massachusetts 
rule was adopted in the early Twentieth Century.  But if changes 
in property ownership would lead us to believe that tree owners 
are now better able to monitor their trees, the same would be 
                     
 
5 "If the plaintiff was an invitee, defined as a person 
invited onto the property by the property owner for the property 
owner's benefit, the property owner owed a duty to use 
reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe 
condition in view of all the circumstances, including the 
likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, 
and the burden of avoiding the risk. . . .  If the plaintiff was 
a licensee, defined as a person who entered onto the landowner's 
property for the licensee's own convenience and pleasure, the 
property owner owed a duty only to forbear from inflicting 
wilful or wanton injury on him. . . .  If the plaintiff was a 
trespasser, the property owner's only duty was to refrain from 
wanton and wilful misconduct."  (Emphases in original; 
quotations and citations omitted.)  Papadopoulos v. Target 
Corp., 457 Mass. 368, 371-372 (2010). 
9 
 
 
true for their neighbors to monitor and trim encroaching trees.  
It may be easier to recognize impending or potential harm to 
one's own property from overhanging branches and intruding roots 
than it would be for the tree owner to recognize what is 
happening next door.  And even if it is also true that trees 
today are more likely to cause property damage to neighbors' 
property, it would be "undesirable to categorize living trees, 
plants, roots, or vines as a 'nuisance' to be abated."  Melnick, 
312 Md. at 520-521. 
 
Other jurisdictions have referenced the Massachusetts rule 
as being outdated.  See Herring v. Lisbon Partners Credit Fund, 
Ltd. Partnership, 2012 ND 226, ¶¶ 19-20; Lane v. W.J. Curry & 
Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tenn. 2002); Fancher v. Fagella, 274 
Va. 549, 555 (2007).  A comprehensive analysis of the 
Massachusetts rule demands that we examine the rationale of 
other jurisdictions leading them to conclude our rule to be 
obsolete.  A fair analysis of the parties' arguments also 
requires such an analysis because the plaintiff relied heavily 
on the analysis of other jurisdictions to support her argument 
and our review of these court opinions leaves our conclusion 
undisturbed.6 
                     
 
6 Some jurisdictions note that the Massachusetts rule "has 
been" criticized for being outdated, but do not explain how 
changes in property ownership justify disregarding the 
Massachusetts rule for that reason.  See, e.g., Fancher v. 
10 
 
 
 
We agree that the traditional rule of nonliability, which 
preceded the Massachusetts rule, is outdated with respect to 
unhealthy trees.  The law arose when land was so unsettled and 
uncultivated that the burden of inspecting it and putting it in 
a safe condition would have been unduly onerous and "out of all 
proportion to any harm likely to result."  W.L. Prosser & W.P. 
Keeton, Torts § 57, at 354 (4th ed. 1971).  The increased 
feasibility of inspecting for and resolving debilitated 
conditions on one's property removes the justification for a law 
that would discourage improvements to one's land.  See, e.g., 
Young, 380 Mass. at 168 (doing away with landlord-tenant 
liability law that discouraged repairs of rented premises).  The 
same rationale does not apply to the Massachusetts rule, which 
                                                                  
Fagella, 274 Va. 549, 555 (2007) (adopting Hawaii rule after 
stating that "[t]he 'Massachusetts [r]ule' has been criticized 
on the ground that it is unsuited to modern urban and suburban 
life").  See also Herring v. Lisbon Partners Credit Fund, Ltd. 
Partnership, 2012 ND 226, ¶ 19, quoting Lane v. W.J. Curry & 
Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tenn. 2002) (criticizing Massachusetts 
rule for being outdated).  We trace this back to Lane, which 
incorrectly interpreted and quoted another jurisdiction as if it 
had criticized the Massachusetts rule for being outdated.6  Lane, 
supra, citing Chandler v. Larson, 148 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1036-
1037 (1986) ("The Massachusetts Rule, however, has been 
criticized as being outdated, having evolved in an earlier time 
when land was mostly unsettled and people lived predominately in 
rural settings").  The criticism in Chandler was that the 
"traditional rule of nonliability," not the Massachusetts rule, 
was outdated, having "developed at a time when land was mostly 
unsettled and uncultivated."  Chandler, supra at 1036, quoting 
Mahurin v. Lockhart, 71 Ill. App. 3d 691, 692 (1979).  The 
traditional rule shielded property owners, out of necessity, 
from liability for defective or unsound trees.  Chandler, supra, 
quoting Mahurin, supra at 692-693. 
11 
 
 
pertains only to healthy trees.  See Kurtigian, 348 Mass. at 
290. 
 
Shiel does not point to consequences of the Massachusetts 
rule that would not have been thoroughly appreciated by this 
court when Michalson and Ponte were decided.7  The growth of 
trees "naturally and reasonably will be accompanied by the 
extension of boughs and the penetration of roots over and into 
adjoining property of others."  Michalson, 275 Mass. at 233.  
Our resolution has been and remains to authorize the cutting 
back of overhanging branches and intruding roots. 
 
5.  Benefits of Massachusetts rule.  There are multiple 
benefits to the Massachusetts rule still relevant to 
circumstances of contemporary life.  The rule simplifies 
assignment of responsibility.  See Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 
A.2d 144, 148 (D.C. 1950) (adopting Massachusetts rule because 
it leaves "no doubt as to the rights and obligations of the 
parties").  It also minimizes legal costs to parties and the 
unnecessary burdening of courts.  Other courts have recognized 
as much.  See, e.g., Richmond v. General Eng'g Enters. Co., 454 
So. 2d 16, 17 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1984) ("It seems to us that 
the recognition of an action of this type to redress a claimed 
                     
 
7 Shiel challenges the unfairness of the Massachusetts rule 
and argues that it replaces the law of orderly judicial process 
with self-help as the only way to adjust the rights and 
responsibilities of disputing neighbors. 
12 
 
 
wrong which might otherwise be obviated by the time-honored 
remedy of self-help would represent a wasteful and needless use 
of the judicial system").  Furthermore, we were concerned in 
Michalson, 275 Mass. at 234, about vexatious lawsuits.  The 
Massachusetts rule today, just as it did when Michalson was 
decided, may prevent unnecessary legal harassment from neighbors 
who merely have an axe to grind for reasons other than purported 
tree problems. 
 
Conclusion.  For these reasons, we decline to fell judicial 
precedent and instead reaffirm the Massachusetts rule 
established in Michalson and Ponte.  We retain the law that an 
individual whose property is damaged by a neighbor's healthy 
tree has no cause of action against a landowner of the property 
upon which the tree lies.  The District Court judge's order 
allowing the defendants' motion to dismiss is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.