Case Title: SECURA Insurance v. Lyme St. Croix Forest Company, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP000299

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 103 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP299 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
SECURA Insurance, A Mutual Company, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
Lyme St. Croix Forest Company, LLC, Lyme St. 
Croix Land Company LLC, St. Croix Forest 
Products LLC, American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company, Safeco Insurance Company of America, 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, Wisconsin 
Mutual Insurance Company, Erie Insurance Group, 
Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, USAA Casualty 
Insurance Company, Western National Insurance 
Company p/k/a Western National Assurance 
Company, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Farmers  
Insurance Exchange, Sentry Insurance Company, a 
mutual company, Jeremiah Nelson, Amy Nelson, 
Steigerwaldt Tree Farms, LLC, Steigerwaldt Land 
Services, Inc., LFF III Timber Holding, 
Frankenmuth Insurance Company, General Casualty 
Company of Wisconsin, Regent Insurance Company,  
Continental Western Insurance Company, Foremost 
Insurance Company of Grand Rapids Michigan, 
Foremost Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company, West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, 
American Family Home Insurance Company, 
Integrity Mutual Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Hanover Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 378 Wis. 2d 740, 905 N.W.2d 843 
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
October 30, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 5, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Douglas 
 
JUDGE: 
Kelly J. Thimm 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
 
2 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant—cross-respondent-petitioner, 
there were briefs filed by Patryk Silver and Borgelt, Powell, 
Peterson & Frauen, S.C., Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument 
by Patryk Silver. 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant, there was a 
brief filed by Douglas M. Raines, Heidi L. Vogt, and von Briesen 
& Roper, S.C., Milwaukee, with whom on the brief were Timothy F. 
Casey, Patrick D. Crandell, and Collins Einhorn Farrell PC, 
Southfield, Michigan. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief filed by 
Nicholas D. Harken, Eugene M. LaFlamme, and McCoy Leavitt Laskey 
LLC, Waukesha, with whom on the brief were Erik J. Pless and 
Everson, Whitney, Everson & Brehm, S.C., Green Bay.  There was 
an oral argument by Eugene M. LaFlamme. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Insurance Alliance by Linda S. Schmidt, James A. Friedman, and 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison. 
  
 
 
2018 WI 103
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP299 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV174 & 2014CV361) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
SECURA Insurance, A Mutual Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
 
Lyme St. Croix Forest Company, LLC, Lyme St. 
Croix Land Company LLC, St. Croix Forest 
Products LLC, American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company, Safeco Insurance Company of America, 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, Wisconsin 
Mutual Insurance Company, Erie Insurance Group, 
Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, USAA Casualty 
Insurance Company, Western National Insurance 
Company p/k/a Western National Assurance 
Company, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, Sentry Insurance Company, a 
mutual company, Jeremiah Nelson, Amy Nelson, 
Steigerwaldt Tree Farms, LLC, Steigerwaldt Land 
Services, Inc., LFF III Timber Holding, 
Frankenmuth Insurance Company, General Casualty 
Company of Wisconsin, Regent Insurance Company, 
Continental Western Insurance Company, Foremost 
Insurance Company of Grand Rapids Michigan, 
Foremost Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company, West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, 
American Family Home Insurance Company, 
Integrity Mutual Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Hanover Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
OCT 30, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
SECURA 
Insurance, A Mutual Company, seeks review of an unpublished, per 
curiam decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit 
court's interlocutory order that determined the fire at issue 
constituted multiple occurrences instead of a single occurrence.1  
The court of appeals reasoned that under Secura's commercial 
general liability (CGL) policy there was an occurrence each time 
the fire spread to a new piece of real property and caused 
damage.  Therefore, the court concluded that the $2 million 
aggregate limit applies rather than the $500,000 per-occurrence 
limit for property damage due to fire arising from logging and 
lumbering operations. 
¶2 
Secura asserts that the court of appeals erred, and 
that pursuant to the "cause theory," the fire constitutes a 
single occurrence.  Despite the fact that the fire crossed 
several property lines, Secura contends it was a single, 
uninterrupted cause of the alleged damages. 
                                                 
1 SECURA Ins. v. Lyme St. Croix Forest Co., LLC, No. 
2016AP299, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2017) 
(affirming in part and reversing in part an order of circuit 
court for Douglas County, Kelly J. Thimm, Judge). 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
3 
 
¶3 
We conclude that the fire at issue constitutes a 
single occurrence pursuant to the CGL policy.  Consequently, the 
$500,000 per-occurrence limit for property damage applies. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
I 
¶5 
On May 16, 2013, a fire broke out on forest land owned 
by Lyme St. Croix Forest Company (Lyme St. Croix).  Known as the 
"Germann Road Fire," it burned 7,442 acres over the course of 
three days.  Real and personal property belonging to many 
individuals and businesses sustained damage. 
¶6 
The fire allegedly began in the cutting head of a 
piece of logging equipment known as a feller buncher, owned by 
Ray Duerr Logging, LLC (Duerr).  Flames quickly spread from dry 
grass to a pile of recently felled jack pine and subsequently 
into the surrounding forest. 
¶7 
At the time of the fire, Secura insured Duerr under 
both a CGL policy and an umbrella policy.  The CGL policy 
contained a $2 million general aggregate policy limit, and a $1 
million per-occurrence limit.  However, the CGL policy also 
incorporated a "Logging and Lumbering Operations Endorsement."  
Pursuant to this endorsement, the per-occurrence policy limit is 
reduced to $500,000 for property damage "due to fire, arising 
from logging or lumbering operations . . . ." 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
4 
 
¶8 
Secura brought this declaratory judgment action to 
determine its coverage obligations with respect to Duerr.2  
Moving for declaratory judgment and partial summary judgment, 
Secura argued that the Germann Road Fire was a single 
occurrence.  Consequently, it advanced that the $500,000 policy 
limit from the Logging and Lumbering Operations Endorsement was 
applicable, rather than the $2 million aggregate limit.  Secura 
also contended that the umbrella policy afforded no coverage for 
the damage from the fire. 
¶9 
The circuit court rejected Secura's argument regarding 
the applicable policy limit.  Relying on Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Falk, 2014 WI 136, 360 Wis. 2d 67, 857 N.W.2d 156, the circuit 
court concluded that "although there was one uninterrupted cause 
of the fire, each 'seepage' of fire onto another's property 
constitute[d] a separate occurrence for purposes of the policy."  
However, the circuit court agreed with Secura that its umbrella 
policy provided no coverage for any damages. 
¶10 Two parties sought leave to appeal the circuit court's 
order, and the court of appeals granted an interlocutory appeal.3  
                                                 
2 Secura initially filed its complaint in Outagamie County.  
Venue was transferred to Douglas County, where the action was 
ultimately consolidated with a related suit filed by two 
property owners who alleged damage from the Germann Road Fire. 
3 See Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2) (2015-16) (explaining that the 
court of appeals will grant an interlocutory appeal if an appeal 
will "[m]aterially advance the termination of the litigation or 
clarify further proceedings in the litigation; [p]rotect the 
petitioner from substantial or irreparable injury; or [c]larify 
an issue of general importance in the administration of 
justice"). 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
5 
 
Secura appealed the circuit court's determination as to the CGL 
policy limit.  Hanover Insurance Company (Hanover), Lyme St. 
Croix's insurer, challenged the circuit court's conclusion that 
the umbrella policy provided no coverage. 
¶11 The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in 
part.  It affirmed the circuit court's determination regarding 
the CGL policy, concluding that the circuit court properly 
applied the $2 million aggregate policy limit.  SECURA Ins. v. 
Lyme St. Croix Forest Co., LLC, No. 2016AP299, unpublished slip 
op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2017).  Like the circuit court, 
the court of appeals relied principally on Falk, 360 Wis. 2d 67, 
determining that "there was an 'occurrence' each time the fire——
fueled and expanded by the consumption of new materials——spread 
to a new piece of real property and caused damage."  SECURA 
Ins., No. 2016AP299, unpublished slip op., ¶17. 
¶12 However, the court of appeals reversed the circuit 
court's determination that the umbrella policy provided no 
coverage.4  Neither party, however, petitioned this court for 
                                                 
4 Before the court of appeals, Hanover argued against the 
application of an exclusion in the umbrella policy stating that 
the liability policy did not apply to "'Property damage' arising 
out of injury or damage to or destruction of standing timber or 
timberlands, including the loss of use thereof, caused by fire 
and arising out of operations performed by or on behalf of any 
insured."  SECURA Ins., No. 2016AP299, unpublished slip op., 
¶22.  The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's grant of 
summary judgment as to the umbrella policy, and remanded for a 
factual determination of what damages, if any, were sustained to 
an approximately 30 to 40 yard segment of real property that 
burned before the fire became a standing timber fire.  Id., ¶29. 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
6 
 
review of the portion of the court of appeals' decision 
regarding the umbrella policy.  Accordingly, we do not address 
the issue.5 
II 
¶13 We are asked to review the determination of Secura's 
motions for declaratory and summary judgment, which requires us 
to 
interpret 
the 
parties' 
written 
insurance 
contract.  
Interpretation of an insurance contract presents a question of 
law.  American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Girl, Inc., 2004 
WI 2, ¶23, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65. 
¶14 When a ruling on a motion for declaratory judgment 
depends on questions of law, we review the ruling independently 
of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  Gister v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WI 86, 
¶8, 342 Wis. 2d 496, 818 N.W.2d 880. 
¶15 Similarly, we review a summary judgment decision 
independently, applying the same methodology as the circuit 
court.  Shugarts v. Mohr, 2018 WI 27, ¶17, 380 Wis. 2d 512, 909 
N.W.2d 402.  Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. 
                                                 
5 See 
Novell 
v. 
Migliaccio, 
2008 
WI 
44, 
¶65, 
309 
Wis. 2d 132, 749 N.W.2d 544 (a party that fails to file a 
petition for cross-review does not preserve those issues for 
supreme court review); Priesler v. General Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 
WI 135, ¶59, 360 Wis. 2d 129, 857 N.W.2d 136 (explaining that 
this court regularly "decline[s] to consider issues not raised 
in petitions for review"). 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
7 
 
III 
¶16 This case presents the issue of whether the Germann 
Road Fire constitutes a single occurrence for purposes of the 
CGL policy, or whether there was instead a new occurrence each 
time the fire crossed a property line.  Initially, we set forth 
the language of the CGL policy.  Next, we adduce the principles 
of law that guide our analysis.  Finally, we apply the language 
of the policy and those principles of law to the facts of this 
case. 
A 
¶17 We begin with the language of the insurance policy.  
Generally, we interpret a policy's terms as they would be 
understood from the perspective of a reasonable person in the 
position of the insured.  Shugarts, 380 Wis. 2d 512, ¶20 (citing 
Frost ex rel. Anderson v. Whitbeck, 2002 WI 129, ¶20, 257 
Wis. 2d 80, 654 N.W.2d 225).  Specifically, in the context of 
determining the number of occurrences, we have framed this query 
in terms of the "average person."  Welter v. Singer, 126 
Wis. 2d 242, 251, 376 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Falk, 
360 Wis. 2d 67, ¶¶66-67; Plastics Eng'g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 2009 WI 13, ¶38, 315 Wis. 2d 556, 759 N.W.2d 613. 
¶18 The CGL policy covers "bodily injury" or "property 
damage" that is "caused by an 'occurrence' . . . ."  An 
"occurrence" is defined in the policy as "an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same 
general harmful conditions." 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
8 
 
¶19 As relevant here, the policy contains two monetary 
limits.  First, there is a general aggregate limit of $2 
million.  This limit applies regardless of the number of covered 
occurrences.  Second, the policy's "Logging and Lumbering 
Operations Endorsement" contains a $500,000 per-occurrence limit 
that applies "as respects 'property damage' due to fire, arising 
from logging or lumbering operations . . . ." 
¶20 We must determine which of the two policy limits 
applies.  If the Germann Road Fire is a single occurrence, then 
the lesser $500,000 limit applies.  On the other hand, if there 
is a new occurrence each time the fire crosses a property line, 
as the court of appeals concluded, then the $2 million limit 
applies. 
B 
¶21 We turn next to adduce the principles of law that 
guide our analysis.  In determining whether an event constitutes 
a single occurrence or multiple occurrences, we look to the 
"cause theory."  Olsen v. Moore, 56 Wis. 2d 340, 349-51, 202 
N.W.2d 236 (1972); Falk, 360 Wis. 2d 67, ¶66 (citing Plastics 
Eng'g Co., 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶35).  Pursuant to the cause theory, 
"where a single, uninterrupted cause results in all of the 
injuries 
and 
damage, 
there 
is 
but 
one 
'accident' 
or 
'occurrence.'"  Welter, 126 Wis. 2d at 250.  If "cause and 
result are 'so simultaneous or so closely linked in time and 
space as to be considered by the average person as one event,'" 
then only a single occurrence has taken place.  Falk, 360 
Wis. 2d 67, ¶66 (citing Welter, 126 Wis. 2d at 251).  "If, 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
9 
 
however, that cause is interrupted or replaced by another cause 
the chain of causation is broken and more than one accident or 
occurrence has taken place."  Olsen, 56 Wis. 2d at 349. 
¶22 By following the cause theory, Wisconsin courts 
disavow the opposing "effect theory."  Olsen, 56 Wis. 2d at 351; 
see also Arnold P. Anderson, Anderson on Wisconsin Insurance Law 
§ 2.66 (7th ed. 2015).  The effect theory suggests that the 
wording "each accident" "must be construed from the point of 
view of the person whose property was injured."  Anchor Cas. Co. 
v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1949); see Olsen, 56 
Wis. 2d at 
347 
(explaining 
that 
"[a] 
small 
number 
of 
jurisdictions subscribe to the 'effect theory' of liability"). 
¶23 Accordingly, pursuant to the effect theory, there is 
an occurrence when the separate property of each claimant is 
damaged.  Anchor Cas. Co., 178 F.2d at 324-25.  Under this 
theory, "[i]f one cause operates upon several at one time, it 
cannot be regarded as a single incident, but the injury to each 
individual is a separate accident."  Id. at 325. 
C 
¶24 Finally, we apply the language of the policy and the 
above principles of law to this case.  Both the circuit court 
and court of appeals purported to apply the cause theory.  Each 
relied heavily on Plastics Eng'g Co. and Falk to reach the 
conclusion that the Germann Road Fire constituted multiple 
occurrences, with a new occurrence arising each time the fire 
crossed a property line.  Those two cases, along with Welter, 
126 Wis. 2d 242, are particularly instructive. 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
10 
 
¶25 In Plastics Eng'g Co., the insured manufactured and 
sold asbestos-containing products for over twenty years.  315 
Wis. 2d 556, ¶6.  Multiple claimants sued the insured, asserting 
causes of action for bodily injury or wrongful death that arose 
from exposure to asbestos-containing products.  Id.  "In 
general, the claimants allege[d] that they were injured by their 
first exposure to asbestos, but their asbestos-related injuries 
did not manifest until long after their exposure to asbestos."  
Id.  "The claimants' exposures allegedly occurred at different 
times and at different geographical locations."  Id. 
¶26 This court determined that multiple occurrences arose.  
Id., ¶40.  We explained that "each individual claimant's 
injuries stem from the continued and repeated exposure to 
asbestos-containing products.  Thus, under the policy language 
and the cause theory, each claimant's repeated exposure is one 
occurrence."  Id., ¶39. 
¶27 Arriving at this result, the Plastics Eng'g Co. court 
contrasted the facts of that case with those of Welter, 126 
Wis. 2d 242.  Plastics Eng'g Co., 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶¶37-38.  In 
Welter, a driver struck a bicyclist, stopped, and then drove 
forward, dragging the bicyclist beneath the car.  126 Wis. 2d at 
246.  The driver stopped again, then moved the car forward about 
a foot.  Id.  Finally, the driver got out of the car and a 
second driver got in, who attempted to free the bicyclist from 
under the car by backing up about ten feet.  Id. 
¶28 The court of appeals in Welter determined the entirety 
of this event to be a single occurrence.  Id. at 245.  Applying 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
11 
 
the cause theory, it wrote that "[i]f cause and result are so 
simultaneous or so closely linked in time and space as to be 
considered by the average person as one event," there is only 
one occurrence.  Id. at 251.  "The fact that there were multiple 
injuries and that they were of different magnitudes and that 
injuries extended over a period of time does not alter our 
conclusion that there was a single occurrence.  As long as the 
injuries stem from one proximate cause there is a single 
occurrence."  Id. at 250-51 (quoting Appalachian Ins. Co. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
¶29 In contrast, the exposures to asbestos at issue in 
Plastics Eng'g Co. were not closely linked in either time or 
space.  315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶6.  There, numerous individuals 
sustained injuries at varying geographic locations over a period 
of years.  Id. 
¶30 More recently, in Falk, the insured spread liquid cow 
manure on farm fields as fertilizer.  360 Wis. 2d 67, ¶5.  
Several neighbors alleged that the manure contaminated their 
wells.  Id., ¶6. 
¶31 Applying the cause theory, this court determined that 
"[b]ecause 
the 
occurrence 
under 
the . . . policy 
is 
well 
contamination, not manure application, there was an occurrence 
each time manure seeped into a unique well."  Id., ¶67.  "As 
such, 
an 
'average 
person' 
would 
not 
consider 
the 
well 
contamination to be one event because manure had to seep into 
each individual well for the alleged contamination to occur."  
Id.  "Further, because the manure had to seep into each 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
12 
 
individual well, rather than seep into one well which 'fed' the 
other wells, it cannot be said the seepage was 'so simultaneous 
or so closely linked in time and space as to be considered by 
the average person as one event.'"  Id. 
¶32 Here, the court of appeals concluded that Falk 
controlled.  It analogized the fire at issue to the seepage of 
manure that occurred in Falk.  The court of appeals' approach is 
unpersuasive for several reasons. 
¶33 First, 
there 
are 
significant 
factual 
differences 
between a forest fire and the seepage of manure into a well.  
When determining whether there is one occurrence or multiple 
occurrences, we must take into account elements of time and 
geography.  Specifically, a single occurrence takes place if the 
cause and result were "so simultaneous or so closely linked in 
time and space as to be considered by the average person as one 
event . . . ."  Plastics Eng'g Co., 315 Wis. 2d 556, ¶38 
(quoting Welter, 126 Wis. 2d at 251). 
¶34 In Falk, the manure seeped over the course of an 
unspecified period of time.6  Conversely, the fire in this case 
burned continuously for three uninterrupted days.  A three-day 
fire in a discrete area caused by a single precipitating event 
would reasonably be considered by the average person to be one 
                                                 
6 The Falk decision explains that the insured spread the 
manure in "early 2011" and the DNR notified the insured of well 
contamination complaints by letter dated May 23, 2011.  Wilson 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk, 2014 WI 136, ¶¶5-6, 360 Wis. 2d 67, 857 
N.W.2d 156. 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
13 
 
event.  Regardless of how many property lines the fire crossed, 
the damage closely follows the cause in both time and space. 
¶35 Rather than being analogous to Falk, this case is more 
akin to Welter.  In Welter, there may have been "multiple 
injuries" that were of "different magnitudes" over a short 
period of time, but that fact did not alter the court's 
conclusion that there was a single occurrence.  See Welter, 126 
Wis. 2d at 250 (citing Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d at 61).  
"As long as the injuries stem from one proximate cause there is 
a single occurrence."  Id. at 250-51.  The same is true here.  
In both cases, an average person would view the cause and result 
as a single event. 
¶36 Second, the court of appeals' analysis, although 
purporting to apply the cause theory, in practice presents an 
application of the effect theory rejected by this court.  
According to the court of appeals, "the fire had to spread to 
each piece of real property for another property owner to suffer 
property damage due to the fire."  SECURA Ins., No. 2016AP299, 
unpublished slip op., ¶21.  By focusing not on the cause of the 
damage, but on the effect on individual property owners, the 
court 
of 
appeals 
strayed 
from 
this 
court's 
established 
methodology for determining the number of occurrences.  See 
Olsen, 56 Wis. 2d at 349-51. 
¶37 Third, the court's focus in Falk was primarily on the 
insurance 
policy's 
pollution 
exclusion, 
which 
the 
court 
determined 
to 
bar 
coverage, 
rather 
than 
the 
number 
of 
occurrences that took place.  Falk, 360 Wis. 2d 67, ¶3.  The 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
14 
 
record in Falk lacked detail regarding the spreading of the 
manure and the eventual seepage.  Id., ¶¶5-6; see supra ¶32 n.6.  
Accordingly, the Falk court devoted only two paragraphs to the 
cause theory analysis.  See Falk, 360 Wis. 2d 67, ¶¶66-67. 
¶38 Finally, the court of appeals' decision appears to 
occasion arbitrary and unreasonable consequences.  It is 
arbitrary to determine the number of occurrences solely from the 
number of owners whose property is damaged.  Under the court of 
appeals' analysis, the fire could have burned exactly the same 
amount of land over exactly the same amount of time, but if all 
the land were owned by one person instead of several, the fire 
would constitute but one occurrence.  Such a result would force 
the insurer to pay more in the event that the same amount of 
land burned is split among several owners. 
¶39 Further, the court of appeals determined that "there 
was an 'occurrence' each time the fire——fueled and expanded by 
the consumption of new materials——spread to a new piece of real 
property and caused damage."  SECURA Ins., No. 2016AP299, 
unpublished slip op., ¶17.  This premise appears to lead to 
unreasonable results.  It is the nature of a fire to "fuel and 
expand by the consumption of new materials."  If it is an 
occurrence each time a fire refuels and expands, then a fire, 
which is constantly refueling and expanding, will necessarily 
result in an unfathomably large number of occurrences regardless 
of how many property lines it crosses.  A court's interpretation 
of an insurance policy should avoid unreasonable results.  
No. 
2016AP299 
 
15 
 
Blasing v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 73, ¶43, 356 Wis. 2d 63, 
850 N.W.2d 138. 
¶40 Our conclusion that the fire here constitutes a single 
occurrence is buttressed by decisions from other jurisdictions 
likewise determining a fire destroying the property of multiple 
claimants to be a single occurrence.  See Denham v. La Salle-
Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 1948) (explaining 
that a fire that damaged property in numerous hotel rooms was a 
single occurrence); Barrett v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 264 
F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1959) (concluding that there is "no 
merit" to the contention that a single fire that damaged 
property owned by seven different tenants in a building was 
seven accidents within the meaning of the policy); Tri-State 
Roofing Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 139 F. Supp. 193, 198 
(W.D. Pa. 1955) (determining, on rehearing, that a fire damaging 
eleven properties that began with an overturned pot of tar was a 
single occurrence); Travelers Indem. Co. v. New England Box Co., 
157 A.2d 765, 769 (N.H. 1960) (concluding that a fire spreading 
to several properties is a single occurrence because "reasonable 
persons would regard [it] as one accident, no matter how many 
persons should become involved") (citation omitted). 
¶41 In sum, we conclude that the Germann Road Fire 
constitutes a single occurrence pursuant to the CGL policy.  
Consequently, the $500,000 per-occurrence limit for property 
damage applies. 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
16 
 
¶42 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and 
remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No. 
2016AP299 
 
 
 
1