Case Title: State v. Garcia

Citation: 600 P.2d 1010, 92 Wash. 2d 647

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1979-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
92 Wn.2d 647 (1979) 600 P.2d 1010 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Petitioner, v. RICARDO SOLIS GARCIA, Respondent. No. 45779. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. October 4, 1979. Jeffrey C. Sullivan, Prosecuting Attorney, and Catherine Lee Campbell, for petitioner. Dugger & Curnutt and Judy A. Dugger, for respondent (appointed counsel for appeal). WRIGHT, J. Defendant Ricardo Solis Garcia was convicted of rape in the Superior Court in Yakima County. *649 Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, Division Three, he raised several questions. All of the questions except two related to his claimed right to act as his own attorney and conduct his own defense. The other two questions related to speedy trial and Garcia's contention that he had been denied access to records and papers he claimed to have wanted for preparation of a pro se brief. If he was denied a speedy trial it was because he absented himself from the jurisdiction. CrR 3.3(h). That question was determined in the Court of Appeals and is not before us. The Court of Appeals also found that he was not denied any document which could have been useful in the preparation of the pro se brief. That question is not before us. The questions we shall consider all relate to his claim of a right to represent himself. Before the Court of Appeals, Garcia successfully argued that the trial court erred in failing to determine if he wanted to waive counsel and represent himself. That court remanded the case for a determination as to whether Garcia wished to conduct his own defense. The questions here are: (1) is a trial court required to tell a defendant of his right to conduct his own defense and to ask if he wishes to exercise it? (2) did defendant actually make a request to proceed pro se? and (3) if there was a self-representation request, was it timely? On the morning the trial was to start Garcia expressed dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel. The discussion is set out here. (Italics ours.) After the trial defendant was convicted. A careful review of the record shows that Garcia received a good, competent and skillful defense. The same conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals. [1] 1. Is the trial court required to tell defendant of his right to conduct his own defense and to ask if he wishes to exercise it? We hold there is no duty for the trial court to inform the defendant of or to ask if he wishes to exercise his right to proceed pro se. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975) does not impose these requirements. In this connection we adopt the language of Judge Green in his dissenting opinion in State v. Garcia, 21 Wn. App. 58, 583 P.2d 1253 (1978), wherein he said at page 67: In the vast majority of cases it is contrary to the best interests of a defendant to proceed pro se. Routinely *655 informing all defendants of that "right" or inquiring whether they wish to exercise it would encourage many to waive the valuable right to be represented by competent counsel. Further, a defendant cannot claim that by having counsel because he was not informed of his self-representation right or asked if he wished to waive it he has been denied a fair trial or due process. 2. Did the defendant actually make a request to proceed pro se? A careful examination of the discussion in open court will show defendant never made the required request. His appointed attorney mentioned to the court in the presence of defendant that self-representation was a possible option. Defendant himself, however, only said: The Court of Appeals majority attempted to use only a carefully edited part of this statement to indicate a desire to appear without counsel. Even the part used, which reads "But in that case I do not wish to have this attorney with me", is consistent with all defendant's other statements which indicate that though he did not want his appointed attorney, he did want another attorney. [2] Statements of desire not to be represented by a court appointed attorney do not express an intent to represent oneself without counsel. Payne v. State, 367 A.2d 1010 (Del. 1976); Perry v. United States, 364 A.2d 617 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976). Nor do these statements constitute the necessary unequivocal request for self-representation. People v. Potter, 77 Cal. App. 3d 45, 143 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). [3] 3. The record clearly shows there was not a request by defendant to proceed pro se. For that reason we do not find it necessary to decide if the request was timely. We would, however, say that timeliness must be considered on a case-by-case basis. In order to invoke the unconditional self-representation right, an unequivocal assertion of that right must be made within a reasonable time before trial. People v. Windham, 19 Cal. 3d 121, 128-29, 560 P.2d 1187, *656 1191, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 12 (1977). If the request is made shortly before or as the trial is to begin, the existence of the right depends on the facts with a measure of discretion in the trial court. State v. Fritz, 21 Wn. App. 354, 361, 585 P.2d 173 (1978). In the absence of substantial reasons a late request should generally be denied, especially if the granting of such a request may result in delay of the trial. For the reasons stated the judgment of the Court of Appeals majority is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated. UTTER, C.J., and ROSELLINI, BRACHTENBACH, HOROWITZ, DOLLIVER, HICKS, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. STAFFORD, J. (concurring in part) I concur with the majority opinion except for that paragraph numbered 3. Defendant did not request to proceed pro se. Recognizing this, the majority has conceded there is no need to decide the question of "timely request". Consequently, the matter should not have been discussed further. While timeliness is an important subject it should be left for resolution in another case. All discussion of the subject is dicta as far as this case is concerned.