Case Title: Simmers v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Simmers v. State1997 WY 105943 P.2d 1189Case Number: 96-276Decided: 08/21/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

THOMAS SIMMERS,  

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

THE STATE OF WYOMING,  

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Laramie County 

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Jason M. 
Tangeman, Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. 
Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Sr. Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Sr. Assistant 
Attorney General; Mary Beth Wolff, Special Assistant Attorney 
General.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Thomas Simmers 
(Simmers) appeals from the judgments and sentences1 convicting him of twelve counts of 
second degree sexual assault in violation of WYO. STAT. § 6-2-303(a)(v). Based 
on testimony concerning his conduct with three young victims, a jury found him 
guilty of all charges brought against him. Simmers claims his two confessions 
were involuntary and should have been suppressed, the trial should have been 
severed as to each victim, the court erred in admitting improper hearsay 
testimony and the young victims were not competent to testify in court. Finding 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit any legal errors, we 
affirm the judgments and sentences.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant Simmers 
submits the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the appellant's confession to Detective 
Bilkie was involuntary thus violating the appellant's right against 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution?

II. Whether statements made by the appellant to 
Deputy Crowder while the appellant was being processed for incarceration should 
have been suppressed as they were involuntary and violated the appellant's right 
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution?

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing Susan Kotowicz, a licensed social worker, to testify to hearsay 
statements made [by] the child victim SS?

IV. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to 
sever the three charges of second degree sexual assault?

V. Whether the trial court erred in finding the child 
witness[es] AJ and AB competent to testify at trial?

 

[¶3]      In its brief, 
Appellee State of Wyoming presents the following statement of the 
issues:

I. Did the district court properly refuse to suppress 
the statements Appellant made to law enforcement?

II. Did the district court err in allowing Susan 
Kotowicz to testify regarding the statements made to her by one of the child 
victims?

III. Did the district court properly deny Appellant's 
motion to sever the criminal cases for purposes of trial?

IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion in 
allowing the child victims, AJ and AB, to testify at 
trial?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      While watching a 
television show concerning child sexual abuse, AJ told his mother that he had 
been forced to suck Simmers' penis at the day care run by Simmers' mother. On 
December 11, 1995, AJ's father reported the incident to the Cheyenne Police 
Department. When an officer contacted Simmers concerning AJ's allegations, 
Simmers denied them and provided a statement to that effect. Shortly thereafter, 
a Cheyenne police detective asked Simmers to come to the police station for a 
follow-up interview, and Simmers complied with that 
request.

 

[¶5]      At the beginning 
of the interview, the detective informed Simmers of the allegations against him 
and advised him of his Miranda 
rights, both verbally and in writing. Simmers stated that he understood his 
rights and signed a written waiver of rights form. Simmers then agreed to talk 
to the detective regarding the charges against him.

 

[¶6]      Simmers initially 
denied the allegations against him; however, as the interview progressed, he 
asked the detective to turn off the tape recorder. While the tape recorder was 
turned off, Simmers and the detective discussed potential consequences, 
including the likelihood of probation, if the allegations were true. The 
detective told Simmers that probation is always a possibility. After an eighteen 
minute break, the tape recorder was turned back on and Simmers then admitted 
that, on four separate occasions, Simmers had asked AJ to suck his penis. 
Simmers acknowledged that AJ did not appear to like what occurred. He also 
admitted that he told AJ not to tell anyone about what 
happened.

 

[¶7]      When the 
detective asked Simmers if this conduct happened with any other children, 
Simmers first asked for something to drink. The detective turned off the tape 
recorder. After a nine minute break, the tape recorder was turned back on and 
Simmers admitted to numerous other incidents involving the other two victims, SS 
and AB. Simmers reported details similar to the incidents with AJ. Simmers 
admitted to making SS suck his penis on three occasions and to making AB suck 
his penis on five occasions. On a later date, the detective interviewed AB. He 
also obtained video taped interviews of AJ and SS, using the children's parents 
to conduct the interview.

 

[¶8]      Simmers was 
arrested on December 27, 1995, and transported to the Laramie County Detention 
Center. He seemed extremely upset while he was being processed for 
incarceration, or "booked," by the sheriff's deputy. The deputy performed a 
routine risk assessment of Simmers, whereupon Simmers admitted he was 
considering suicide. The deputy took Simmers into an interview room and, while 
trying to calm him, suggested that Simmers remember that he had not been 
convicted of the crimes he was charged with yet. At that point Simmers admitted 
his guilt to the deputy. The deputy advised Simmers not to say anything which 
might further incriminate him.

 

[¶9]      Simmers filed 
several motions before trial, including a motion to suppress, as involuntary, 
the statements he made to the detective, a motion to sever the cases as to each 
child for trial purposes and a motion for a hearing to determine whether the 
minor victims were competent to testify at the trial. The motions to sever and 
to suppress were denied after a hearing. Before allowing the testimony of the 
child victims, the district court held a hearing to determine their competency 
to testify concerning the alleged criminal offenses. The court found AJ and AB 
sufficiently competent to testify, but disallowed the testimony of SS. In lieu 
of direct testimony from SS, the district court, over Simmers' objection, 
allowed a licensed social worker to testify regarding the statements made to her 
by SS.

 

[¶10]   At trial AB and AJ testified about 
their encounters with Simmers, and the social worker testified about statements 
made to her by SS. The detective and the sheriff's deputy also testified about 
the incriminating statements Simmers made to them. Finally, AJ's father, SS's 
father, and AB's mother testified that the children were enrolled at the 
Simmers' day care during the time periods the sexual assaults were alleged to 
have occurred. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all twelve counts against 
Simmers. This appeal timely followed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Statements to Law Enforcement 
Officials

 

[¶11]   In Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S. Ct. 445, 88 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1985), the United States Supreme Court determined 
that voluntariness of a confession is a legal question meriting independent 
consideration, not a factual issue which we presume is correct. Stone v. State, 745 P.2d 1344, 1348 
(Wyo. 1987). Therefore, we undertake a de novo review of a district court's 
ruling on a motion to suppress a statement for involuntariness. State v. Evans, No. 96-104, 944 P.2d 1120 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Stone, 745 
P.2d at 1348). However, factual findings made by the district court on a motion 
to suppress are not disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Evans at 1124. 
In light of the trial court's opportunity to hear the evidence and assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the district court's determination. Witt 
v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 140 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 
218 (Wyo. 1994)).

 

[¶12]   Simmers claims that his confession 
to the detective was involuntary because it was the product of police coercion 
and deception. He contends that he was coerced into confessing by the 
detective's non-adversarial, friendly interrogation style and by a promise of 
leniency in sentencing, specifically a mention of the possibility of probation. 
Simmers also argues that the court improperly applied a reasonable person 
standard when it determined his statement was voluntary because his impaired 
mental ability led him to believe he had been promised probation, even though a 
reasonable person of ordinary intelligence may not have believed he had been 
promised probation.

 

[¶13]   The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 6 and 11 of the 
Wyoming Constitution require confessions, admissions and statements to be 
voluntary. See Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Wyo. 1996); Black v. 
State, 820 P.2d 969, 971 (Wyo. 1991); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 1780, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964). Satisfying the requirements set out in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), does not resolve the question of 
voluntariness. Evans at 1125. "A 
confession may be found involuntary because of the means used to obtain it." Id; see also Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 387 (Wyo. 1992) (State must prove that statement was not obtained in 
violation of the Miranda doctrine and 
that the statement was given voluntarily, citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
163, 107 S. Ct. 515, 519, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986)). A coerced confession is 
considered untrustworthy and cannot be used for any purpose in a trial against 
the person making the statement. Evans at 1125.

 

[¶14]   The voluntariness of an accused's 
statements is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation. Witt, 
892 P.2d  at 139. Statements are voluntary if they are "the product of a free and 
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception." Id. (citing Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 664 (Wyo. 
1993), which quotes Frias v. State, 
722 P.2d 135, 142 (Wyo. 1986)). "[S]tatements [made] by the police to the effect 
that it would probably go easier for the accused if [he] cooperated have been 
declared innocent and constitutionally acceptable." Witt, 892 P.2d  at 139. 
"Emotionalism, confusion, and subjective perception do not necessarily 
invalidate a statement or confession." Vena v. State, 941 P.2d 33, 37 (Wyo. 
1997). The burden rests with the State to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the voluntariness of the accused's statements. Dodge v. State, 562 P.2d 303, 308 (Wyo. 
1977).

 

[¶15]   Simmers contends the district court 
should have applied a subjective standard to determine whether his statement was 
made voluntarily. He claims that, based on his testimony that he thought the 
detective promised him probation, the district court should have found his 
statement was involuntary. Although courts have considered the accused's age, 
intelligence, education, physical and mental characteristics, and amount of 
experience with the criminal justice system in determining whether a confession 
was voluntary, see e.g. Evans at 
1126-1127, and cases cited therein; United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 
1466 (10th Cir. 1993); Miller v. 
Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 606-07 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S. Ct. 585, 93 L. Ed. 2d 587 (1986), consideration of those personal characteristics does 
not relegate the determination of voluntariness to the defendant's subjective 
beliefs.

 

[¶16]   The Colorado Supreme Court has 
delineated several factors the trial court might consider under the totality of 
the circumstances:

[T]he atmosphere and events surrounding the 
elicitation of the statement, such as the use of violence, threats, promises, 
improper influence or official misconduct, the conduct of the defendant before 
and during the interrogation and the defendant's mental condition at the time 
the statement is made[,]

Evans at 
1125 (quoting People v. Pearson, 725 P.2d 782, 783 (Colo. 1986));

whether the defendant was in custody or was free to 
leave and was aware of the situation; whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any 
interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived Miranda rights; whether the defendant 
had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to the 
interrogation; whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an 
interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or implied threat or 
promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style employed by the 
interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and place of the 
interrogation; and the defendant's mental and physical condition immediately 
prior to and during the interrogation, as well as educational background, 
employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system.

Evans at 
1126 (quoting People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1991)).

 

[¶17]   Given the totality of the 
circumstances in the case at bar, the district court properly determined that 
Simmers' statements were voluntary. Simmers went to the police station 
voluntarily, was advised of and clearly understood his Miranda rights, and chose to speak with 
the detective. The interview was friendly, not adversarial, and lasted 
approximately one hour. Simmers was aware of the purpose of the interrogation, 
to determine if he sexually assaulted AJ. He also was informed of the possible 
penalties involved if he was found guilty of such conduct.

 

[¶18]   Additionally, we note the following 
facts from the taped conversation between Simmers and the detective. Simmers 
initially agreed to talk to the detective after being advised of his rights, 
including his right to an attorney, and made statements consistent with 
understanding those rights. Simmers came up with his own, fairly elaborate 
explanation for AJ's allegations. When questioning became more specific, Simmers 
claimed a lack of memory. When confronted with the specific allegations and an 
explanation from the detective that it was best for him to be honest and get 
things out in the open now, Simmers asked the detective to turn off the tape 
recorder.

 

[¶19]   Simmers recalled asking all three 
victims to suck his penis and that none of them liked it. He admitted telling 
the victims not to tell anyone what he had done to them. Simmers also 
acknowledged that it was his fault. At the end of the interview, Simmers stated 
that there were no other victims, that it would not happen again and that he 
needed to get some help. Although the record indicates Simmers was not 
experienced with law enforcement and was of below average intelligence, there is 
no evidence in the record tending to indicate that Simmers was unusually 
susceptible to coercion or easily influenced by the 
detective.

 

[¶20]   Finally, during the taped 
interview, after the tape was turned back on and before Simmers confessed, 
Simmers indicated that no promises or guarantees were made to him by the 
detective. At the motions hearing on the motion to suppress, Simmers testified 
that the detective told him he had a good chance at getting probation. The 
detective testified, both at the hearing and at trial, that he only told Simmers 
that probation is always a possibility. The district court then found that the 
detective told Simmers that he simply had a chance at probation which, the court 
noted, is true under the law in Wyoming. The district court also found that the 
detective did not mislead Simmers. "[R]esolution of conflicting evidence is 
within the province of the [district] court, and its findings must be given 
great weight when considered in light of its opportunity to hear and observe the 
witnesses." Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Wyo. 1996) (citations omitted). Considering the totality of the 
circumstances in this case, the district court correctly determined that 
Simmers' confession was voluntary.

 

[¶21]   Simmers' assertion that his 
statements to the detective concerning SS and AB should have been suppressed 
because the detective failed to re-advise him of his rights are also without 
merit. Simmers presents no pertinent legal authority concerning the need to 
re-advise a suspect of Miranda rights 
before pursuing further information regarding other similar criminal offenses in 
the same interview. "We have made it clear cogent argument or authority is 
essential to appellate review." Farbotnik 
v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 606 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶22]   Simmers also argues that his 
statement, "Why not? I'm guilty of the charges I was brought in on," to the 
deputy in the detention facility during the booking process was improperly 
admitted into evidence because it was involuntary. Simmers claims he made the 
statement during an unlawful custodial interrogation because he was not properly 
advised of his rights. The booking process is obviously done while the defendant 
is in custody, that is not disputed. However, "interrogation" is defined as 
"words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known 
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Wells v. State, 846 P.2d 589, 593 (Wyo. 
1992) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291, 302, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1690, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980) (emphasis 
omitted)). "A statement that is not the product of interrogation or compulsion 
attributable to authorities or some other improper action is voluntary and 
admissible." Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 828 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Griffin v. 
State, 749 P.2d 246, 254 (Wyo. 1988)).

 

[¶23]   At trial the deputy testified that 
he was concerned about Simmers because Simmers told him he was contemplating 
suicide. The deputy explained that he told Simmers that he had a lot to lose and 
nothing to gain if he was going to hurt himself and that he hadn't even been 
proven guilty of the charges, so he should relax and calm down. At that point 
Simmers made the statement, "Why not? I'm guilty of the charges I was brought in 
on." The deputy immediately told Simmers not to talk anymore because he would 
have to testify against him in court about anything Simmers 
said.

 

[¶24]   Simmers' statement to the deputy 
was a spontaneous remark made during an attempt to calm Simmers down during the 
intake process. The deputy's actions and questions were not directed toward 
obtaining evidence against Simmers and were not reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response. The statement was given voluntarily. The district court 
properly admitted the incriminating statement made by Simmers during the intake 
process.

 

Hearsay Testimony

 

[¶25]   Simmers claims the trial court 
improperly admitted the content of statements made by the victim, SS, through 
the hearsay testimony of a social worker. Rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 956 (Wyo. 
1996). We will not overturn a trial court's discretionary decision unless the 
court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason and could not rationally 
conclude as it did. Id. at 956-57. 
"[D]ecisions of the trial court with respect to the admissibility of evidence 
are entitled to considerable deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate 
basis for the trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal." 
Id. (quoting Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339, 343 
(Wyo. 1990) (citations omitted)).

 

[¶26]   When the trial court determined SS 
was not competent to testify at trial, the State asked that the social worker 
who counseled all three victims be permitted to testify regarding statements 
made to her by SS. After hearing arguments from both parties, the trial court 
determined the social worker's testimony was admissible pursuant to our ruling 
in Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010 
(Wyo. 1993), and Wyoming Rule of Evidence 803(4).

 

[¶27]   Hearsay is ordinarily inadmissible; 
however, it may be admitted if it falls within one of the exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. Betzle, 847 P.2d  at 1015. Wyoming Rule of Evidence 803(4) 
provides:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
even though the declarant is available as a witness:

* 
* * * * *

(4) Statements 
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. - Statements made for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or 
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general 
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment[.]

 

[¶28]   We have held that statements made 
by an abused child to a medical professional or professional counselor may be 
admitted into evidence provided the expert's testimony provides the proper 
foundation - that the victim's statements were consistent with the purposes for 
which the witness became involved with the victim, and the witness relied on the 
statements in connection with diagnosis and treatment of the victim. Betzle, 847 P.2d  at 1017; Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190, 196 (Wyo. 
1995). This test was adopted "to assure such hearsay testimony conforms with the 
policy of the rule before the testimony is admitted." Betzle, 847 P.2d  at 
1017.

 

[¶29]   The State properly laid its 
foundation prior to the hearsay testimony in question. The social worker was 
SS's counselor, and she testified that the statements were made for the purpose 
of diagnosis and treatment. The statements described the inception and general 
character of the external source of SS's symptoms, were reasonably pertinent to 
her diagnosis and treatment, and were consistent with the purpose for which the 
witness became involved with the victim. Further, the social worker relied upon 
the statements for diagnosis and treatment. Therefore, in accordance with our 
previous cases, the trial court properly admitted the social worker's testimony 
concerning statements SS made to her during treatment. See e.g., Owen, 902 P.2d at 195-96; Betzle, 847 P.2d  at 
1017.

 

Failure to Sever Trial

[¶30]   Simmers claims he was prejudiced by 
the trial court's failure to sever the three criminal actions against him 
because of the cumulative nature of the evidence and the confusion caused by the 
jury's inability to separate the evidence in reaching a verdict with respect to 
each child. The denial of a motion for severance is within the sound discretion 
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of 
that discretion. Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 247 (Wyo. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985). Joinder is 
proper absent compelling reasons for severance because "[j]oint trials serve the 
public interest by expediting the administration of justice, reducing docket 
congestion, conserving judicial time as well as that of jurors along with 
avoiding the recall of witnesses to duplicate their performances." Id. Any 
prejudice caused by joinder must be weighed against the economy in judicial 
administration provided by joinder. Dorador v. State, 768 P.2d 1049, 1052 
(Wyo. 1989) (citing Lee v. State, 653 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Wyo. 1982)).

 

[¶31]   The rules pertaining to joinder and 
severance of criminal cases are contained in Rules 8(a), 13 and 14 of the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 13 conditions the joinder of offenses 
charged in separate informations on the same circumstances which would permit 
joinder of counts within a single information. WYO. R.CRIM. P. 13. That is, if 
the offenses are of the same or similar character or constitute part of a common 
scheme or plan, the offenses may be tried together as if charged in a single 
information. WYO. R.CRIM. P. 8(a). Rule 14 allows the court to order separate 
trials if either party is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses. WYO. R.CRIM. P. 
14.

 

[¶32]   When the district court denied 
Simmers' motion for severance, it found:

I think that the evidence in this case will show that 
the offenses charged, certainly they are [of] the same or similar character. 
They are based on the same transaction in the sense that we have a day care 
center and access, matters of that nature, or are based upon two or more actions 
or transactions connected together or constituting a part of a common scheme or 
plan.

I am satisfied that the three cases were properly 
joined, so I am going to deny the motion to sever.

 

[¶33]   We cannot say the trial court 
abused its discretion in so finding. The testimony concerning the other victims 
would have been admissible in separate trials as 404(b) evidence to show motive 
or a common scheme or plan. Simmers has failed to provide us with a factual 
basis for his claim that the jury was confused by joinder of the charges. 
Simmers was not prejudiced by joinder of the trials for the three criminal 
actions against him.

 

Victims' Competency to 
Testify

 

[¶34]   Simmers claims two of the victims, 
AB and AJ, were not competent to testify and the district court erred in 
allowing them to testify. Determining whether a child is competent to testify is 
committed to the discretion of the trial court, and that determination will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be clearly erroneous. Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 579 
(Wyo. 1994). The trial court's findings are given considerable deference since 
the court is in a better position to observe and judge the demeanor of the 
witness. Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 
880 (Wyo. 1987).

 

[¶35]   The Wyoming Rules of Evidence 
provide that "[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise 
provided in these rules." WYO. R. EVID. 601. A person is generally competent to 
testify if he can understand, receive, remember and narrate impressions and is 
sensible to the obligations of the oath taken before testifying. Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 
1984). "Intelligence, not age, is the guiding criteria in determining the 
competency of a witness." Baum, 745 P.2d  at 879.

 

[¶36]   We have adopted a five-part test 
for determining the competency of a child witness:

(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the 
truth on the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the 
occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression 
of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the 
occurrence; (4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; 
and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about 
it.

Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d  at 585.

 

[¶37]   Simmers claims that AJ's testimony 
was not an independent recollection of the sexual abuse because AJ sat on his 
mother's lap while testifying. However, Simmers does not claim, nor does the 
record show, that AJ's mother helped him with his testimony in any way or that 
AJ would have been unable to testify in the absence of the comfort and 
familiarity of his mother's lap. The district court did not abuse its discretion 
when it found AB and AJ competent to testify at trial.

 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

 

[¶38]   Finally, Simmers contends the State 
lacked sufficient evidence, in the absence of his confessions, to convict him of 
the twelve counts of second degree sexual assault. Independent proof of the corpus delicti must exist apart from a 
defendant's extra-judicial confession in order to prove commission of a crime. 
Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d  at 1021-22. 
However, that corroborating evidence need only consist of substantial evidence 
that the offense has been committed, so that the evidence as a whole proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 
93, 75 S. Ct. 158, 164-65, 99 L. Ed. 101 (1954); United States v. Clark, 57 F.3d 973, 976 
(10th Cir. 1995); Evans v. United 
States, 122 F.2d 461, 465 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 698, 62 S. Ct. 478, 86 L. Ed. 558 (1942).

 

[C]orroborating evidence is adequate if it "supports 
the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of the 
truth" of the confession. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93, 75 S. Ct. 158, 
164, 99 L. Ed. 101 (1954). The quantity and type of independent corroborating 
evidence depends upon the facts of each case. Id. However, circumstantial 
evidence can be used to corroborate a confession.

Clark, 57 F.3d  at 976.

 

[¶39]   In the case at bar, Simmers 
admitted to having all three victims suck his penis while they were attending 
his mother's day care. At trial AB and AJ testified to sexual contact between 
themselves and Simmers. Although AB never acknowledged placing her mouth on 
Simmers' penis, her testimony established that sexual contact occurred with 
Simmers. That testimony sufficiently corroborated Simmers' confession. AJ also 
testified that Simmers made him, SS and another child put their mouths on 
Simmers' penis at the babysitter's house. The social worker testified that SS 
told her that Simmers made SS suck his penis. Taken as a whole, the evidence in 
the record established, for purposes of corroboration, the commission of the 
crimes for which Simmers was convicted. See Betzle, 847 P.2d  at 
1021-22.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶40]   The district court properly 
admitted the two inculpatory statements Simmers made to law enforcement 
officers. The charges were properly joined for one trial and the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the trials. The district court 
did not abuse its discretion when it allowed two of the child victims and the 
social worker to testify against Simmers. The jury was presented with sufficient 
corroborating evidence to convict Simmers of twelve counts of second degree 
sexual assault. We affirm.

1 Simmers was charged with and convicted 
of twelve counts of second degree sexual assault, consisting of the following: 
Criminal Action No. 23-361, four counts of second degree sexual assault against 
AJ; Criminal Action No. 23-362, three counts of second degree sexual assault 
against SS; and Criminal Action No. 23-363, five counts of second degree sexual 
assault against AB. In each individual criminal action against him, he was 
sentenced to serve eight to ten years on each count, the sentences on each count 
to run concurrently. However, the eight to ten year sentences from the three 
criminal actions are to run consecutively, for a total sentence of twenty-four 
to thirty years.