Case Title: Edgin v. Entergy Operations, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michele EDGIN and Tracy Edgin v. 
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

97-264                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered January 22, 1998


1.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- standard of review. -- The standard for
     appellate review of a summary judgment is whether the
     evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of
     the motion left a question of material fact unanswered and, if
     not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
     matter of law; once the moving party has established a prima
     facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must
     meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a
     material issue of fact; this court views the evidence in a
     light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was
     filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving
     party.

2.   Contracts -- contract made for benefit of third party is actionable by
     third party. -- A contract made for the benefit of a third party
     is actionable by the third party.

3.   Master & servant -- employer may not contractually absolve itself in
     advance for employee's injuries caused by employer's negligence. -- The
     common law pertaining to master and servant has long
     recognized that an employer or master may not, by contract in
     advance, absolve itself from liability for injuries sustained
     by its employee or servant that are caused by the employer's
     or master's own negligence; such agreements have been
     considered to be void as against public policy.

4.   Master & servant -- agreement by which employee relinquished additional
     claims for injuries against employer's clients not void per se. -- Where
     an agreement between appellant and her employer did not
     purport to absolve the employer of any and all liability but
     instead provided that in exchange for employment, the employee
     would relinquish any additional claims for work-related
     injuries that were covered by workers' compensation benefits
     against the employer's clients or customers, the agreement was
     not by virtue of its contents per se void as being against
     public policy.  

5.   Contracts -- contracts exempting party from future negligence liability
     strictly construed. -- Contracts that exempt a party from
     liability for future negligence are not favored by the law and
     are strictly construed against the party relying on them. 

6.   Contracts -- contracts exempting party from future negligence liability
     must set out what liability is to be avoided. -- The rationale behind
     invalidating agreements purporting to release a party for its
     own negligence before liability arises is based upon the
     strong public policy of encouraging the exercise of care;
     while it is not impossible to avoid liability for negligence
     through contract, to avoid such liability, the contract must
     at least clearly set out what negligent liability is to be
     avoided.

7.   Master & servant -- agreement between appellant and employer was clear and
     unambiguous -- only released clients from liability for injuries covered
     by workers' compensation. -- The supreme court was persuaded that
     the agreement between appellant and her employer was clear and
     unambiguous and only released the employer's clients from
     liability for work-related injuries sustained by its employees
     that were covered by the workers' compensation statutes; by
     signing the employment application, an employee was not
     forfeiting his or her right to receive any compensation for
     work-related injuries; rather, the employee was merely
     agreeing to waive an additional remedy against the employer's
     client in exchange for employment with the employer; in this
     respect, the supreme court could not say that the agreement
     violated public policy by discouraging the employer or its
     clients from exercising reasonable care; nor could the court
     say that the language of the agreement did not clearly
     identify what the employee was giving up in exchange for
     employment; the employer was not attempting to escape
     liability entirely but was, instead, attempting to shield its
     clients from separate tort liability for those injuries
     covered by workers' compensation.
8.   Master & servant -- agreement between appellant and employer precluded
     appellant from bringing suit against employer's client. -- The supreme
     court, rejecting appellant's argument that the agreement
     between her and her employer contained factually inaccurate
     information to the effect that any work-related injury was
     covered by workers' compensation, observed that when the
     agreement was read in toto, it was clear that the employee
     agreed to waive any rights that she might have to bring suit
     against a client of her employer only if the injuries
     sustained by the employee were in fact covered by workers'
     compensation; where there was no dispute that appellant
     received workers' compensation benefits for the injuries in
     question, she was precluded, under the terms of the agreement,
     from bringing suit against her employer's client. 

9.   Appeal & error -- supreme court will not reverse absent specific objection.
     -- An appellant must make a specific objection that apprises
     the trial court of his or her current argument and may not
     change the argument on appeal; absent such a specific
     objection informing the trial court of the nature of the error
     alleged on appeal, the supreme court will not reverse.


     Appeal from Pope Circuit Court; John S. Patterson, Judge;
affirmed.
     Dunham & Faught, P.A., by: James Dunham, for appellants.
     Huckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Tilley, P.A., by: Julia L.
Busfield, for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellants Michele and Tracy Edgin filed a negligence action
against Appellee Entergy Operations, Inc., for injuries that
Michele Edgin sustained while working at Entergy's nuclear plant in
London as a security guard.  During the time she was working at the
nuclear plant, Michele Edgin was employed by the Wackenhut
Corporation.  Appellants appeal the order of the Pope County
Circuit Court granting Entergy's motion for summary judgment. 
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on the basis of an agreement contained in Michele Edgin's
employment application, which forecloses any action by Edgin
against Wackenhut's clients for injuries sustained by her that are
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.  This question is
one of first impression; hence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to
Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(17)(i).  We find no error and affirm. 
     The amended complaint reveals the following facts.  On or
about April 15, 1995, Appellant Michele Edgin was employed by
Wackenhut as a security officer.  Wackenhut had been employed by
Entergy to provide security services at its nuclear plant in
London.  Edgin had been assigned to work at Entergy's nuclear plant
and was to perform security checks on the doors inside the plant. 
She was trained to go through the door, make sure that the door was
secured, make her presence known, and then move on to the next door
to be checked.  Each door to be checked was pressurized by creating
a vacuum from the inside.  On the date in question, Edgin was
making a routine check of one of the doors when, upon trying to
open the door, she found that the pressure was too high and that
the door could not be pulled open.  While attempting to open the
door a second time, the vacuum on the other side of the door
slammed the door shut, causing Edgin to lose her grip and her body
to slam against an iron object behind her.  As a result, Edgin
suffered physical injuries.  
     Edgin alleged in her complaint that Entergy had sole and
exclusive control on the amount of pressure to be placed inside
each door.  She alleged further that the door she was trying to
open when she was injured had been "written up" on at least two
previous occasions as being difficult to open or for having caused
false alarms for one reason or another.  Edgin alleged that Entergy
had a duty to keep the pressure adjusted so that routine security
checks could be made by employees of Wackenhut, and that the breach
of this duty was the proximate cause of her injuries.  Edgin
alleged damages for injuries to her lower back in excess of $9,000,
a loss of earnings and earning capacity in excess of $100,000, and
expenses for pain and suffering in excess of $50,000.  Tracy Edgin
claimed that as a result of the injuries to his wife, he had
sustained a loss of consortium entitling him to damages in excess
of $50,000.  
     Entergy filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that
Michele Edgin was an employee of Wackenhut at the time of the
accident and that she had already received workers' compensation
benefits for her injuries.  Entergy contended that the claim was
barred because Edgin had signed an agreement in consideration of
her employment in which she specifically waived and forever
released any right that she might have had in the future to make
claims or bring suit against any client of Wackenhut for damages
based upon injuries covered under workers' compensation laws. 
Exhibit "A" attached to the motion for summary judgment was a
photocopy of the agreement, contained on the last page of Edgin's
employment application, which provides in pertinent part:
     (2)  in recognition of the fact that any work related
     injuries which might be sustained by me are covered by
     state Workers' Compensation statutes, and to avoid the
     circumvention of such state statutes which may result
     from suits against the customers or clients of Wackenhut
     based on the same injury or injuries, and to the extent
     permitted by law, I HEREBY WAIVE AND FOREVER RELEASE ANY
     RIGHTS I MIGHT HAVE to make claims or bring suit against
     any client or customer of Wackenhut for damages based
     upon injuries which are covered under such Workers'
     Compensation statutes.

Entergy also argued that Tracy Edgin's claim of loss of consortium
was derivative of and extinguished by the release and waiver signed
by Michele Edgin.  The trial court granted Entergy's motion, and
this appeal followed. 
     The standard for appellate review of a summary judgment is
whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in
support of the motion left a question of material fact unanswered
and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.  R.J. Jones Excavating Contr., Inc. v. Firemen's
Ins. Co., 324 Ark. 282, 920 S.W.2d 483 (1996).  Once the moving
party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary
judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and
demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact.  Pugh v.
Griggs, 327 Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445 (1997).  This court views the
evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the
motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the
moving party. Id.  
     The sole issue on appeal is whether the agreement signed by
Michele Edgin is enforceable by Entergy.  It is a well-settled
principle of law that a contract made for the benefit of a third
party is actionable by such third party.  See, e.g., Howell v.
Worth James Constr. Co., 259 Ark. 627,