Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Eichenberger

Citation: 2016-Ohio-3332

Docket Number: 2015-1315

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Eichenberger, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-3332.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-3332 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. EICHENBERGER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Eichenberger, Slip Opinion No.  
2016-Ohio-3332.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the 
Rules for the Government of the Bar—Two-year suspension with one year 
stayed on condition. 
(No. 2015-1315—Submitted December 16, 2015—Decided June 14, 2016.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2014-045. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Raymond Leland Eichenberger III of Reynoldsburg, 
Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0022464, was admitted to the practice of law in 
Ohio in 1980.  In a June 2014 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged 
Eichenberger with professional misconduct arising from an overdraft of his client 
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trust account, his use of his client trust accounts as a personal bank account, and his 
failure to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation. 
{¶ 2} The parties entered into stipulations of fact and mitigation and 
submitted 27 stipulated exhibits to the panel of the Board of Professional Conduct 
assigned to hear the case.  Based on those stipulations and Eichenberger’s 
testimony, the panel found that he failed to hold client funds in a trust account 
separate from his own property, he knowingly failed to respond to a demand for 
information by a disciplinary authority, he engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation, and his conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice.  
The panel therefore recommended that Eichenberger be suspended from the 
practice of law for two years with one year stayed. 
{¶ 3} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, misconduct, and 
aggravating and mitigating factors but recommended that Eichenberger be 
suspended from the practice of law for two years with no stay and that certain 
conditions be placed on his reinstatement. 
{¶ 4} Eichenberger objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, 
arguing that they are not supported by the evidence and that relator violated his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the law by failing to 
give him notice of a subpoena that relator had issued for his banking records.  He 
also objects to the board’s recommended sanction.  We overrule these objections 
and adopt the board’s findings of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating 
factors.  Nonetheless, we conclude that a two-year suspension with one year stayed, 
as recommended by the panel, is the appropriate sanction for Eichenberger’s 
misconduct. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} On May 9, 2013, relator received a notice from PNC Bank that there 
had been an overdraft of Eichenberger’s client trust account on May 2, 2013.  The 
notice identified a $1,275.68 debit by “PAYDAYADV CASHNETUSA” as the 
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cause of the overdraft and stated that the item had been returned with no charge.  
The following month, relator sent Eichenberger a letter inquiring about the 
overdraft and requesting copies of the monthly statements for his client trust 
account for the month before the overdraft, the month of the overdraft, and the 
month after the overdraft—i.e., the April, May, and June 2013 statements. 
{¶ 6} Eichenberger submitted a written response in which he stated that the 
overdraft was the result of an unauthorized attempt to make a withdrawal from an 
inactive account that he was in the process of closing.  He advised relator that he 
had opened a new client trust account at the same bank in March 2013 and provided 
only the first page of the March 2013 statement for that new account. 
{¶ 7} In a second letter of inquiry, relator requested additional information 
and reiterated his request for the April, May, and June 2013 bank statements for the 
account affected by the overdraft.  Eichenberger responded, stating in part, “I would 
once again emphasize to you, and state that you are missing the point, because, 1) 
this was a fraudulent and unauthorized transaction on an old account that was not 
even being used at the time, and 2) virtually all of the funds in my trust account at 
any given time are retainers being earned by me and not client funds.”  He also 
enclosed a copy of a letter he wrote to his bank on March 13, 2013, to report a 
fraudulent and unauthorized check in the amount of $30 and a photocopy of a 
portion of an April 30, 2013 bank statement for his former client trust account in 
which the Automated Clearing House (“ACH”) portion of the statement was blank. 
{¶ 8} Relator’s third letter of inquiry requested a more detailed explanation 
of the transaction that caused the May 2013 overdraft, client ledgers documenting 
the April 2013 activity for his new client trust account, and information regarding 
ACH deductions that had been redacted from the partial bank statement he had 
previously provided.  Relator also requested additional bank statements and client 
ledgers for the new client trust account and informed Eichenberger that if he did 
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not provide the requested information, relator would consider issuing a subpoena 
for the bank records of both accounts. 
{¶ 9} In his response to relator’s third letter of inquiry, Eichenberger stated: 
 
As th[e] transaction [that caused the May 2013 overdraft] 
was not initiated by me, in the way of writing a check or personally 
initiating a withdrawal, it is very unfair to attempt to blame the 
situation on me, or to attempt to state that I caused a deficiency in 
the bank account balance. 
* * * 
The fact that the account was, for all practical purposes 
closed and dormant at the time of this occurrence, also makes your 
inquiry more than a little silly. 
 
He declined to provide bank statements for the new trust account, because there 
were no allegations of wrongdoing with respect to that account, and stated, “I find 
your threats to subpoena my bank records to be totally out of line and offensive.  
The authority of your office in this simple and easily explained matter surely can 
not extend to such overly broad and invasive limits.” 
{¶ 10} Thereafter, relator subpoenaed two years of bank records of 
Eichenberger’s client trust accounts, which showed that he had issued more than 
200 checks and authorized electronic debits for personal and business expenses 
from those accounts.  While Eichenberger issued some checks to himself, numerous 
checks were issued to utility companies, various retailers, a storage facility, the 
landlord for his law office, and a racing stable that Eichenberger owned.  There 
were checks for golf trips as well as tickets to a golf tournament and to the 
symphony.  Eichenberger paid his 2012 federal and state income taxes, issued 
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checks and monthly electronic debits for life-insurance premiums, and made a 
partial payment for his malpractice insurance—all from his client trust accounts. 
{¶ 11} On April 1, 2014, relator wrote to Eichenberger and asked him to 
explain his use of his client trust accounts for personal transactions.  In his response, 
Eichenberger stated: 
 
I repeat that the funds in my trust account are uniformly 
almost always retainers that have been or will be earned quickly, and 
that the funds belong to me personally. 
The funds are never withdrawn from the account until they 
are due and payable to me. 
Therefore, the transactions that you mention in your letter 
are draws of my earned fees, and involve my personal income to use 
as I see fit. 
 
{¶ 12} The board found by clear and convincing evidence that Eichenberger 
improperly used his client trust accounts for personal and nonclient-related business 
expenses—engaging in more than 200 improper transactions between September 
2012 and October 2013—and that this conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) 
(requiring a lawyer to hold funds belonging to a client or third party in a client trust 
account separate from his own property).  Based on his repeated and consistent 
refusals to provide copies of his client-trust-account records during both the 
investigative and litigation phases—even after the panel chair ordered him to 
produce information and recommended that this court find him in contempt for his 
failure to produce requested documents—the board found that Eichenberger also 
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violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) and former Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G)1 (both requiring a 
lawyer to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation). 
{¶ 13} In addition, the board found that Eichenberger repeatedly made 
material misrepresentations in his correspondence with relator in a deceptive and 
willful effort to conceal the irregularities in his client trust accounts.  The board 
also found that he altered bank statements that he provided to relator by 
intentionally and deceptively redacting incriminating information in an effort to 
conceal transactions that he knew were inappropriate.  Because the redacted 
information was in the middle of the page and affected only data that was damaging 
to his claims, the board was not persuaded by Eichenberger’s claims that the 
omission was the result of a copy error.  The board also found that even after the 
redaction came to light, Eichenberger took no action to rectify the situation and 
showed no remorse for his intentional and willful alteration of records.  The board 
therefore found that Eichenberger’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation).  Moreover, the board found that Eichenberger’s lack of 
cooperation was prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
{¶ 14} Eichenberger objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct 
on two grounds.  He first argues that the board should have dismissed the complaint 
because relator failed to notify him that a subpoena had been issued to his bank to 
obtain his client-trust-account records and that this key evidence was therefore 
                                                 
1 Effective January 1, 2015, the provisions previously set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) are codified 
in Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G). 140 Ohio St.3d CXIX. 
 
 
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obtained in violation of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection 
under the law. 
{¶ 15} Eichenberger does not challenge relator’s authority to issue a 
subpoena for his trust-account records before filing disciplinary charges against 
him.  He does not identify any statute or rule that would require relator to provide 
him with notice that such a subpoena had issued.  Nor does he acknowledge that 
Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme Court of Ohio Procedural 
Regulation (“BPCSC Proc.Reg.”) 6(A) provides:  “A subpoena shall be issued upon 
application of the special investigator, respondent, or authorized representative of 
the relator and submission of a praecipe to the director.  A notice of subpoena is not 
required to be issued to the respondent unless probable cause has been found.” 
{¶ 16} Instead, Eichenberger broadly asserts that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution require a disciplinary authority to 
give an attorney notice and an opportunity to be heard when the authority issues a 
subpoena for the attorney’s bank records—even if the subpoena is issued before 
probable cause has been found. 
{¶ 17} But not all governmental actions require the procedural safeguards 
of a judicial hearing.  The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that 
due process is an elusive concept with boundaries that vary according to the specific 
factual context to which it is applied.  Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442, 80 
S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960).  While acknowledging that adjudicative 
proceedings that result in binding determinations affecting the legal rights of 
individuals require procedures traditionally associated with the judicial process, the 
court noted that it has not required the full panoply of judicial procedures in the 
context of administrative investigations.  Id. 
{¶ 18} The court reinforced this principle in Secs. & Exchange Comm. v. 
Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 104 S.Ct. 2720, 81 L.Ed.2d 615 (1984), when 
it held that the Securities and Exchange Commission was not required to provide 
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notice to the target of an investigation upon issuing to third parties subpoenas for 
information.  In reaching that conclusion, the court determined that no statute or 
rule required the commission to give notice.  Id. at 741, 744-745.  The court also 
considered and rejected various constitutional arguments raised by the target of the 
investigation at issue, finding that (1) the issuance of a subpoena to a third party 
does not compel the target of the investigation to be a witness against himself in 
violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, id. at 742, citing 
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976), 
and Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-329, 93 S.Ct. 611, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 
(1973); (2) the target of an administrative investigation cannot invoke the Fourth 
Amendment to protect information or records that the target has conveyed to a third 
party (even if there was an understanding that the communication was to be 
confidential) if the third party later conveys the information or records to law-
enforcement authorities, Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc. at 743, citing United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct.1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976); (3) the Due Process Clause 
is not implicated when an administrative agency subpoenas evidence without 
notifying the target because an administrative investigation adjudicates no legal 
rights, Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc. at 742, citing Hannah at 440-443; and (4) the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply until criminal proceedings are initiated, Jerry 
T. O’Brien, Inc. at 742, citing Hannah at 440, fn. 16. 
{¶ 19} Here, relator issued an investigative subpoena for bank records 
regarding Eichenberger’s client trust accounts before relator filed a formal 
complaint and sought a probable-cause finding from the board.  As such, relator’s 
conduct occurred in the scope of an investigation rather than in an adjudicative 
proceeding.  Thus, on the authority of Hannah and Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., we 
conclude that relator did not impinge on Eichenberger’s constitutional right to 
procedural due process by failing to provide him with contemporaneous notice that 
he had issued a subpoena for bank records concerning Eichenberger’s client trust 
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accounts.  We conclude that Eichenberger’s equal-protection claim also lacks merit 
because at the time relator subpoenaed his banking records, he was not similarly 
situated to other attorneys already formally charged with ethical violations—
persons who would be entitled to notice of subpoenas issued at the relator’s request 
by virtue of their status as parties to an adjudicative proceeding.  See Park Corp. v. 
Brook Park, 102 Ohio St.3d 166, 2004-Ohio-2237, 807 N.E.2d 913, ¶ 19, quoting 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (“ ‘The 
Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications.  It simply keeps 
governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all 
relevant respects alike’ ”). 
{¶ 20} Next, Eichenberger contends that relator failed to establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that he engaged in the charged misconduct, because the 
board’s findings were based primarily on allegations that he wrote client-trust-
account checks to third parties to pay personal expenses for himself and the 
operation of his law office.  He argues that those checks were paid with earned 
fees—not client funds—and that because the checks could have properly been 
issued directly to him, relator failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
he commingled personal and client funds.  He further contends that relator 
presented no evidence that he intentionally altered his bank records and that his 
zealous representation of his own interests did not rise to the level of a failure to 
cooperate in the disciplinary proceedings. 
{¶ 21} We find these arguments to be without merit.  There is ample 
evidence in the record to show that Eichenberger improperly commingled personal 
and client funds in his client trust accounts.  The evidence shows that he deposited 
personal funds into his client trust accounts.  It also shows that he carried blank 
client-trust-account checks in his pocket at all times to cover incidental personal 
expenses and that on some occasions, he issued those checks without consulting 
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anything but his own memory to determine whether the account contained 
sufficient earned fees to cover the checks. 
{¶ 22} And although Eichenberger testified that the redaction of his bank 
statement was nothing more than a copy error, the panel did not find that testimony 
to be credible.  In light of Eichenberger’s false statements that the debit that caused 
the overdraft was “fraudulent and unauthorized”—when the evidence demonstrated 
that it was actually an authorized electronic payment of his payday loan—and his 
repeated refusal to comply with relator’s requests for information, the record does 
not weigh heavily against the panel’s credibility determination.  Nor does the record 
support Eichenberger’s claim that his actions were the result of zealous self-
representation rather than recalcitrance.  Therefore, we defer to the panel’s 
credibility determination and overrule Eichenberger’s objection in this regard.  See, 
e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 2008-Ohio-91, 880 
N.E.2d 467, ¶ 39, citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-
Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 23} Having overruled Eichenberger’s objections, we adopt the board’s 
findings of fact and misconduct in this case. 
Sanction 
{¶ 24} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties the lawyer violated and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 
2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  We also weigh evidence of the aggravating 
and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 
115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 25} As aggravating factors in this case, the panel found that 
Eichenberger acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, demonstrated a pattern of 
misconduct, committed multiple offenses, showed a lack of cooperation in the 
disciplinary process, submitted false evidence and statements regarding his 
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misconduct, and engaged in other deceptive practices during the disciplinary 
process.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2), (3), (4), (5), and (6).  And although not 
charged in relator’s complaint, the panel attributed aggravating effect to 
Eichenberger’s conduct displaying a clear disregard for Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2) 
(requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for each client on whose behalf funds are 
held), 1.15(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for the lawyer’s client 
trust account, setting forth the name of the account, the date, amount, and client 
affected by each credit and debit, and the balance in the account), and 1.15(a)(4) 
(requiring a lawyer to maintain all bank statements, deposit slips, and canceled 
checks, if provided by the bank, for each bank account).  The panel found that 
despite relator’s repeated requests, Eichenberger produced no records to 
demonstrate any attempt at compliance with these rules. 
{¶ 26} The only mitigating factor found by the panel was that Eichenberger 
did not have a prior disciplinary record.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1). 
{¶ 27} In determining the appropriate sanction for Eichenberger’s 
misconduct, the panel found Disciplinary Counsel v. Dockry, 133 Ohio St.3d 527, 
2012-Ohio-5014, 979 N.E.2d 313, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Riek, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 46, 2010-Ohio-1556, 925 N.E.2d 980, to be instructive. 
{¶ 28} Dockry deposited personal funds into his client trust account, used 
the account to pay personal and business expenses, and borrowed client funds from 
the account to cover a deficiency in his personal checking account.  Dockry at  
¶ 6-8.  He also failed to maintain required records regarding the client funds he held 
and failed to properly reconcile his client trust account.  Id. at ¶ 8.  We found that 
although Dockry acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, see former BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), he did not have a prior disciplinary record, made restitution, 
cooperated with the disciplinary proceedings, and presented evidence of his good 
character and reputation apart from the charged misconduct, see former BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), (d), and (e).  Dockry at ¶ 23.  Citing the abundance of 
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mitigating factors and the relative absence of aggravating factors, we suspended 
Dockry for one year but stayed the entire suspension on the conditions that he 
submit to one year of monitored probation and commit no further misconduct.  Id. 
at ¶ 26-27. 
{¶ 29} Like Eichenberger and Dockry, Riek commingled personal and 
client funds in his client trust account, paid his personal expenses directly from the 
account, and overdrew it on four occasions.  Riek at ¶ 4.  After depositing a 
settlement check made payable to one of his clients, Riek used the majority of the 
proceeds to pay himself and various personal expenses, causing a check he issued 
to the client to be dishonored.  Id. at ¶ 6-7.  But Riek’s misconduct was more serious 
than that of Dockry, because he also lied to the client about the reason the check 
was dishonored, id. at ¶ 7.  Based on his misconduct, the presence of several 
mitigating factors, and the absence of any aggravating factors, we suspended Riek 
for 18 months with 12 months stayed on the condition that he commit no further 
misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 11 and 14. 
{¶ 30} Noting that Eichenberger’s misconduct involved not only the 
inappropriate use of his client trust account but also his deliberate and systematic 
attempts to deceive relator through noncooperation, deception, and fraud, the panel 
found his conduct to be more egregious than that of both Dockry and Riek.  The 
panel therefore recommended that we suspend Eichenberger from the practice of 
law for two years with one year stayed, that he be assigned a mentor to provide 
oversight of his client trust account, and that he be required to attend a continuing-
legal-education (“CLE”) course on law-firm financial management. 
{¶ 31} The board, however, rejected the panel’s recommended sanction in 
favor of a two-year suspension with no stay while also including the requirements 
recommended by the panel.  The board states that its recommendation is based on 
(1) Eichenberger’s “failure for nearly 35 years of practice to adhere to the 
requirements for maintaining separation between his personal funds and funds 
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belonging to his clients,” (2) his “deceptive and deceitful action of altering bank 
records provided to Relator in an attempt to conceal inappropriate transactions,” (3) 
“positions taken by him during the disciplinary proceedings that are clearly without 
merit and contrary to the requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct,” (4) 
“his failure to appreciate or acknowledge the wrongfulness of his misconduct,” and 
(5) “his repeated and flagrant disregard for his duty to cooperate in the disciplinary 
proceedings.” 
{¶ 32} In support of this recommendation, the board cites Cleveland Metro. 
Bar Assn. v. Gruttadaurio, 136 Ohio St.3d 283, 2013-Ohio-3662, 995 N.E.2d 190.  
We found that Gruttadaurio placed into his business and personal bank accounts a 
client fee he had received pursuant to a flat-fee arrangement and that he also 
neglected the client’s legal matter, failed to return the unearned portion of his fee 
after the client terminated his representation, failed to disclose that he did not 
maintain professional liability insurance, and made false statements about his 
conduct to the relator’s investigator.  Finding that his conduct was most analogous 
to that of attorneys who have taken their clients’ money, failed to perform promised 
legal work, and then failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation, 
we indefinitely suspended him from the practice of law.  Id. at ¶ 50-51. 
{¶ 33} Eichenberger objects to the board’s recommended sanction and 
argues that he should receive no more than a public reprimand for his misconduct, 
because the checks he wrote to third parties from his client trust account represented 
earned fees, there is no evidence that any clients were harmed by his actions, and 
he has had no other disciplinary violations in his 35 years of practice. 
{¶ 34} We do not find Eichenberger’s argument persuasive given his refusal 
to cooperate in relator’s investigation, as evidenced by his refusal to produce 
requested and highly relevant documents and his failure to acknowledge his 
deliberately false and deceptive statements throughout this proceeding.  Nor are we 
persuaded that all of the funds Eichenberger distributed to third parties had been 
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earned at the time he distributed them given his failure to produce any records 
tending to support his testimony in that regard—records that the Rules of 
Professional Conduct required him to maintain.  Nonetheless, we conclude that the 
panel’s recommended sanction of a two-year suspension with one year stayed, plus 
the completion of a CLE course on law-firm financial management and a period of 
monitored probation is the appropriate sanction in this case. 
{¶ 35} Accordingly, Raymond Leland Eichenberger III is suspended from 
the practice of law in Ohio for two years with the second year stayed on the 
condition that he engage in no further misconduct.  If Eichenberger fails to comply 
with the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the entire 
two-year suspension.  Prior to reinstatement to the practice of law, Eichenberger 
shall be required to complete a CLE course related to law-office financial 
management, and upon reinstatement, he shall serve one year of monitored 
probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21), to be focused on the management 
of his client trust account.  Costs are taxed to Eichenberger. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., dissent and would not stay any portion 
of the suspension imposed on respondent. 
_________________ 
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Michelle R. Bowman, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Raymond Leland Eichenberger III, pro se. 
_________________