Case Title: ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS V DIRECTOR CONSUMER & INDUSTR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 124835

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 9, 2005 
ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS,
SAGINAW VALLEY AREA CHAPTER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
 
No. 124835 
KATHLEEN M. WILBUR, DIRECTOR OF THE MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER & INDUSTRY SERVICES AND 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
MICHIGAN STATE BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION 
TRADES COUNCIL, 
Intervenor/Defendant/Appellee, 
and 
MICHIGAN CHAPTER OF THE NATIONAL ELECTRICAL 
CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Michigan
Corporation, MICHIGAN MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION, a Michigan Corporation, and
MICHIGAN CHAPTER OF SHEET METAL AIR CONDITIONING 
CONTRACTORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a Michigan Corporation 
Intervenors/Defendants/Appellees, 
and 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
MICHAEL D. THOMAS, Saginaw County
Prosecuting Attorney, 
Intervenor/Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
WEAVER, J.  
Plaintiff, 
the 
Saginaw 
Valley 
Area 
Chapter 
of 
Associated Builders and Contractors, brought this action 
for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
prevailing 
wage 
act 
(PWA).1 
Plaintiff argues that the PWA is unconstitutionally vague 
and 
constitutes 
an 
unconstitutional 
delegation 
of 
legislative authority to unions and union contractors. 
The circuit court denied defendants’ motions for 
summary disposition regarding the plaintiff’s claim that 
the PWA constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative authority and dismissed plaintiff’s vagueness 
claim. 
Defendants appealed and plaintiff cross-appealed. 
The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, 
holding that plaintiff could not seek declaratory relief 
because plaintiff had alleged no “actual controversy” under 
the Michigan court rule governing declaratory judgments, 
MCR 2.605. 
1 MCL 408.551 et seq. 
2  
 
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
hold that plaintiff has presented an “actual controversy” 
so that plaintiff can seek declaratory relief under MCR 
2.605. 
We do not address the substantive issue regarding 
the constitutionality of the PWA; instead, we remand to the 
Court of Appeals for reconsideration and resolution of the 
defendants’ appeal and plaintiff’s cross-appeal on the 
merits. 
I 
Plaintiff is the Saginaw Valley Area Chapter of 
Associated Builders and Contractors. 
Associated Builders 
and Contractors is a nonunion trade association with over 
two hundred members in the construction industry in 
thirteen Michigan counties. 
Plaintiff’s members—contractors, subcontractors, and 
builders among others—are required by the PWA to pay their 
workers not less than the wage and benefits prevailing in 
the locality on projects sponsored or financed by the 
state. The PWA provides in relevant part: 
Every 
contract 
executed 
between 
a 
contracting agent and a successful bidder as 
contractor 
and 
entered 
into 
pursuant 
to 
advertisement and invitation to bid for a state 
project which requires or involves the employment
of construction mechanics . . . and which is 
sponsored or financed in whole or in part by the
state shall contain an express term that the
rates of wages and fringe benefits to be paid to 
3  
 
 
                                                 
each class of mechanics by the bidder and all of
his subcontractors, shall be not less than the 
wage and fringe benefit rates prevailing in the
locality in which the work is to be performed.
[MCL 408.552.] 
The PWA provides further that “[a]ny person, firm or 
corporation or combination thereof, including the officers 
of any contracting agent, violating the provisions of this 
act is guilty of a misdemeanor.” MCL 408.557. 
On July 12, 2000, plaintiff brought this declaratory 
action challenging the constitutionality of the PWA. 
Plaintiff alleges that the manner in which the prevailing 
wage is determined under MCL 408.554 of the PWA constitutes 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to 
unions and union contractors.2
 Moreover, plaintiff alleges 
2 MCL 408.554 provides: 
The commissioner [the Department of Consumer
and Industry Services, now the Department of 
Labor 
and 
Economic 
Growth] 
shall 
establish 
prevailing wages and fringe benefits at the same
rate that prevails on projects of a similar 
character 
in 
the 
locality 
under 
collective 
agreements or understandings between bona fide
organizations of construction mechanics and their
employers. Such agreements and understandings, to
meet the requirements of this section, shall not
be controlled in any way by either an employee or
employer organization. If the prevailing rates of
wages and fringe benefits cannot reasonably and
fairly be applied in any locality because no such
agreements 
or 
understandings 
exist, 
the 
commissioner shall determine the rates and fringe
benefits for the same or most similar employment
in the nearest and most similar neighboring 
4  
 
 
                                                 
that the resulting determination is unconstitutionally 
vague because it does not provide an individual of ordinary 
intelligence notice of the conduct that, if undertaken, 
would violate the statute. 
Plaintiff named as a defendant, Kathleen Wilbur, 
former Director of the Department of Consumer and Industry 
Services (CIS), now the Department of Labor and Economic 
Growth, which oversees the implementation of the PWA. 
Because the PWA is a criminal statute, plaintiff also named 
Midland County's prosecuting attorney, who is charged with 
the enforcement and prosecution of the PWA in Midland 
County, Michigan. 
The Saginaw County prosecutor and the Michigan State 
Building & Construction Trades Council (MSBCTC) intervened 
by stipulation as defendants. Three union contractor 
associations, 
the 
Michigan 
Chapter 
of 
the 
National 
Electrical 
Contractors 
Association, 
Inc. 
(NECA), 
the 
Michigan Mechanical Contractors Association (MCA), and the 
locality 
in 
which 
such 
agreements 
or 
understandings do exist. The commissioner may
hold public hearings in the locality in which the
work 
is 
to 
be 
performed 
to 
determine 
the 
prevailing wage and fringe benefit rates. All
prevailing 
wage 
and 
fringe 
benefit 
rates 
determined under this section shall be filed in 
the office of the commissioner of labor and made 
available to the public. 
5  
 
Michigan 
Chapter 
of 
Sheet 
Metal 
& 
Air 
Conditioning 
Contractors National Association (SMACNA), also intervened 
by motion as defendants. 
The Midland County prosecutor and defendant-intervenor 
MSBCTC filed motions under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (8), and (10), 
arguing that 
the circuit court lacked jurisdiction under 
MCR 2.605(A) because plaintiff's complaint did not present 
an “actual controversy” as required by the court rule. The 
several defendants also moved for summary disposition on 
the merits. 
On December 15, 2000, the circuit court denied the 
motions for summary disposition that argued that plaintiff 
had not met the actual controversy requirement of MCR 
2.605(A). Then, on March 20, 2001, the circuit court ruled 
on the motions for summary disposition on the merits. 
The 
court granted the motions regarding plaintiff's vagueness 
challenge to the PWA. 
However, the circuit court denied 
the motions regarding plaintiff's challenge to the PWA as 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, 
thus allowing that claim to proceed. 
Defendants appealed by leave granted and plaintiffs 
cross-appealed from the circuit court’s orders. 
The Court 
of Appeals concluded that plaintiff had alleged no “actual 
controversy” under MCR 2.605(A). Accordingly, the Court of 
6  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
Appeals reversed the circuit court's denial of defendants’ 
motion 
for 
summary 
disposition 
of 
the 
claim 
of 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and, 
in plaintiff’s cross-appeal, affirmed the dismissal of 
plaintiff’s vagueness claim.3 
This Court ordered that oral argument be held with 
regard to plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal.4 
II 
This case is before us on appeals from orders 
regarding motions for summary disposition, which we review 
de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109; 597 NW2d 817 
(1999). 
The interpretation and application of court rules 
and statutes present a question of law that is also 
reviewed de novo. 
Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan 
High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 
(1991). 
III 
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment regarding the 
constitutionality of the PWA. 
A declaratory judgment is 
“[a] binding adjudication of the rights and status of 
litigants . . . [which] is conclusive in a subsequent 
3 Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued August 5, 2003 (Docket No. 234037). 
4  471 Mich 877 (2004). 
7  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
  
 
action between the parties as to the matters declared . . . 
.”5  Declaratory judgments are procedural remedies. 
They 
allow 
parties to avoid multiple litigation by enabling
litigants to seek a determination of questions
formerly not amenable to judicial determination .
. . . [6] 
The availability of declaratory judgments in Michigan 
is governed by MCR 2.605. 
The court rule provides in 
pertinent part: 
(A) Power to Enter Declaratory Judgment. 
(1) In a case of actual controversy within
its jurisdiction, a Michigan court of record may
declare the rights and other legal relations of
an 
interested 
party 
seeking 
a 
declaratory
judgment, whether or not other relief is or could
be sought or granted. 
(2) For the purpose of this rule, an action
is considered within the jurisdiction of a court
if the court would have jurisdiction of an action
on the same claim or claims in which the 
plaintiff sought relief other than a declaratory
judgment. 
The plain text of the declaratory judgment rule makes 
clear that the power to enter declaratory judgments neither 
limits nor expands the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
court.7  The court must have “jurisdiction of an action on 
5 Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 409. 
6 Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56, 65; 499
NW2d 743 (1993)(citations omitted). 
7 Id. at 65 n 9. 
8  
 
     
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
the same claim or claims in which the plaintiff sought 
relief . . . .”8    Moreover, the rule requires that there 
be “a case of actual controversy” and that a party seeking 
a declaratory judgment be an “interested party,” thereby 
incorporating traditional restrictions on justiciability 
such as standing, ripeness, and mootness.9 
This Court has described the “actual controversy” 
requirement 
of 
MCR 
2.605(A)(1) 
as 
“a 
summary 
of 
justiciability as the necessary condition for judicial 
relief.”10  Thus, 
if a court would not otherwise have subject
matter jurisdiction over the issue before it or,
if the issue is not justiciable because it does
not involve a genuine, live controversy between
interested persons asserting adverse claims, the
decision 
of 
which 
can 
definitively 
affect 
existing legal relations, a court may not declare 
8 MCR 2.605(A)(2). 
9 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
[j]usticiability is of course not a legal concept
with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific
verification. 
Its utilization is the resultant 
of 
many 
subtle 
pressures, 
including 
the 
appropriateness of the issues for decision by
this Court and the actual hardship to the 
litigants of denying them the relief sought.”
[Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 508-509; 81 S Ct 1752;
6 L Ed 2d 989 (1961).] 
10 Allstate, supra at 66. 
9  
 
   
 
   
 
  
                                                 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
the rights and obligations of the parties before
it.[11] 
The requirement that a party demonstrate an interest in the 
outcome that will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy is 
expressly subsumed in the declaratory judgment rule, which 
allows the declaration of rights of an “interested party . 
. . .”12 
This Court has held that an “actual controversy” under 
MCR 2.605(A)(1) exists 
where 
a 
declaratory 
judgment 
or 
decree 
is 
necessary to guide a plaintiff’s future conduct
in order to preserve his legal rights. . . . 
This requirement . . . prevents a court from
deciding hypothetical issues.[13] 
This 
Court 
has 
emphasized 
that 
although 
the 
actual 
controversy requirement precludes a court from deciding 
hypothetical issues, “a court is not precluded from 
reaching issues before actual injuries or losses have 
occurred.”14 
The essential requirement of the term “actual 
controversy” under the rule is that plaintiffs “plead and 
11 
Id. (citations omitted).  
12 
Id. at 68.  
13 Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588-589; 
267 NW2d 72 (1978). 
14 Id. at 589. 
10  
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
prove 
facts 
which 
indicate 
an 
adverse 
interest 
necessitating the sharpening of the issues raised.”15 
The “actual controversy” and the “interested party” 
requirements of MCR 2.605(A)(1) subsume the limitations on 
litigants’ access to the courts imposed by this Court’s 
standing doctrine. To have standing: 
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not
“conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’ 
Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury 
and the conduct complained of — the injury has to
be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e]
result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court.’ Third, it must be
‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ 
that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable
decision.’” [16] 
Yet without analysis of plaintiff’s standing under Lee 
v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726; 629 NW2d 900 
(2001), the Court of Appeals panel below concluded that 
plaintiff was not eligible for declaratory relief because 
15 Id. 
16 Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726, 739;
629 NW2d 900 (2001), quoting Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,
504 US 555, 560-561; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992).
This Court has declined to consider whether the Legislature
can confer standing more broadly than Lee’s test. 
See 
Nat’l Wildlife Federation v Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 471
Mich 608, 632; 684 NW2d 800 (2004). 
Because the PWA does 
not confer standing by its own terms, plaintiff’s standing
in this case is governed by the test adopted in Lee, supra. 
11  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
plaintiff had not established “that there was an actual or 
imminently threatened prosecution of any of its members, 
nor has plaintiff shown that a declaratory judgment or 
decree is necessary to guide its future conduct in order to 
preserve its legal rights with respect to any particular 
contract or bid.” On this basis, the Court of Appeals held 
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter a 
declaratory judgment. 
The Court of Appeals analysis 
regarding the availability of declaratory relief under MCR 
2.605 was too restrictive. 
It has been conceded by the defendant prosecutor that 
it must enforce the PWA.17
 But regardless, neither Lee, 
supra, nor the plain text of MCR 2.605 requires a plaintiff 
regulated by a criminal statute to submit evidence of a 
threat of imminent prosecution in order to establish 
standing. 
It is sufficient to establish standing under 
Lee, 
supra, 
that 
the 
members 
of 
plaintiff 
business 
association are directly regulated by the PWA and must 
conform their pay and benefit practices to that of union 
contractors on state-funded projects under the statute.18 
17 Thus, this case is distinguishable from Poe, supra
at 508, where the United States Supreme Court held that
declaratory relief was improper because there was no 
realistic fear of prosecution. 
18 MCL 408.552 and MCL 408.554. 
12  
 
   
   
                                                 
 
 
 
Plaintiff’s members suffer a concrete, rather than a 
hypothetical, injury because they either face criminal 
prosecution for a violation of the statute or must avoid 
state-funded work entirely.19  Such evidence establishes the 
existence of a legally protected interest, causation, and 
redressibility as required by Lee, supra. 
Moreover, as a previous Court of Appeals decision 
addressing declaratory relief recognized: 
“A declaratory action is a proper remedy to
test the validity of a criminal statute where it
affects 
one 
in 
his 
trade, 
business 
or 
occupation.” To afford a businessman relief in
such a situation without having first to be 
arrested 
is 
one 
of 
the 
functions 
of 
the 
declaratory judgment procedure.[20] 
We agree with the circuit court that the affidavits 
submitted by plaintiff articulate 
concrete risks of violations of the PWA as a 
result of allegedly random changes to PWA rates,
the lack of definition of PWA projects and the
absence 
of 
PWA 
statutory 
definitions 
for 
statutory language that may be material to 
enforcement of the criminal sanctions. 
Further, we agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that 
“the risks of enforcement of the statute together with the 
19 MCL 408.557. 
20 Strager v Wayne Co Prosecuting Attorney, 10 Mich App
166, 171; 159 NW2d 175 (1968)(citations omitted). 
13  
 
asserted character of the potential for violations of the 
PWA, present a justiciable controversy. 
Plaintiff’s affidavits establish precisely the kind of 
controversy that the declaratory judgment rule was intended 
to cover. 
IV  
Conclusion  
We reverse the Court of Appeals denial of declaratory 
relief 
and 
remand 
to 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
for 
reconsideration and resolution of defendants’ appeal and 
plaintiff’s cross-appeal on the merits. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS,
SAGINAW VALLEY AREA CHAPTER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 124835 
KATHLEEN M. WILBUR, DIRECTOR OF THE MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER & INDUSTRY SERVICES AND 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, 
Defendants-Appellees, 
and 
MICHIGAN STATE BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION 
TRADES COUNCIL, 
Intervenor/Defendant/Appellee, 
and 
MICHIGAN CHAPTER OF THE NATIONAL ELECTRICAL 
CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Michigan
Corporation, MICHIGAN MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION, a Michigan Corporation, and
MICHIGAN CHAPTER OF SHEET METAL AIR CONDITIONING 
CONTRACTORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a Michigan Corporation, 
Intervenors/Defendants/Appellees, 
and 
MICHAEL D. THOMAS, Saginaw County
Prosecuting Attorney, 
Intervenor/Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I prefer to grant leave to appeal in this case; 
therefore, I must respectfully dissent. 
Determining that 
plaintiff may bring an action for declaratory judgment may 
have ramifications far beyond the prevailing wage act, MCL 
408.551 et seq., and I believe that deciding this case 
without full briefing from the parties and interested amici 
is not prudent. 
Therefore, I would prefer the opportunity 
to fully explore the consequences of today’s decision 
before issuing an opinion. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
2  
 
 
 
2