Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Powell

Citation: 369 Md. 462

Docket Number: 1ag/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
 OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 1
September Term, 2001
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v.
ROBERT D. POWELL
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
 
Filed: June 13, 2002                  
1Maryland Rule 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property) provides as follows: 
“A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation
separate from the lawyer’s own property.  Funds shall be kept
in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter
600 of the Maryland Rules.  Other property shall be identified
as such and appropriately safeguarded.  Complete records of
such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the
lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after
termination of the representation.”
2Maryland Rule 16-607 (Commingling of Funds) provides as follows:
“a.  General Prohibition.  An attorney or law firm may deposit
in an attorney trust account only those funds required to be
deposited in that account by Rule 16-604 or permitted to be so
deposited by section b. of this Rule.
b.  Exceptions.
1.  An attorney or law firm shall either (A) deposit into an
attorney trust account funds to pay any fees, service charges,
or minimum balance required by the financial institution to
open or maintain the account, including those fees that cannot
be charged against interest due to the Maryland Legal
Services Corporation Fund pursuant to Rule 16-610 (b)(1)(D),
or (B) enter into an agreement with the financial institution to
have any fees or charges deducted from an operating account
maintained by the attorney or law firm. The attorney or law
firm may deposit into an attorney trust account any funds
expected to be advanced on behalf of a client and expected to
be reimbursed to the attorney by the client.
2.  An attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust
account funds belonging in part to a client and in part
presently or potentially to the attorney or law firm. The
The Attorney Grievance Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a petition
with this Court for disciplinary action against Robert D. Powell, respondent, alleging
violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter “MRPC”).  The
Commission charged respondent with violating MRPC Rules 1.15(a) (Safekeeping
Property),1 Rule 16-607 (Commingling of Funds),2 8.4(c) and (d) (Misconduct),3 and 8.1(a)
portion belonging to the attorney or law firm shall be
withdrawn promptly when the attorney or law firm becomes
entitled to the funds, but any portion disputed by the client
shall remain in the account until the dispute is resolved.
3.  Funds of a client or beneficial owner may be pooled and
commingled in an attorney trust account with the funds held
for other clients or beneficial owners.”
3Maryland Rule 8.4 provides as follows:
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:  
(c)  engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d)  engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice.”
4Maryland Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) provides as
follows:
“An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a
lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: 
(a)  knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or 
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the
matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”  
2
and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters).4  This Court referred the matter to Judge
Paul A. McGuckian of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to conduct an evidentiary
hearing and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Maryland
Rules 16-709 (b) and 16-711 (a). 
Judge McGuckian made the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
“Procedural Background
3
“On February 27, 2001, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland ordered that the charges contained in the Petition for
Disciplinary Action filed by the Attorney Grievance
Commission of Maryland, Petitioner, in this matter be
transmitted to this Court to be heard and determined in
accordance with Maryland Rule 16-709 et seq.  On April 20,
2001, the Respondent, Robert D. Powell, was served with the
Petition for Disciplinary Action, the Order of the Court of
Appeals, a Writ of Summons issued by the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County directing Respondent to file a written
response to the Petition within fifteen (15) days of service.  On
April 20, 2001, Respondent was also served with Petitioner’s
Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions of Fact and
Genuineness of documents and a Request for Production of
Documents.  On May 14, 2001, Respondent’s Answer was
filed.
“On June 14, 2001, Petitioner filed a Motion for
Sanctions Upon Respondent’s Failure of Discovery.
Respondent did not oppose this Motion.  On July 27, 2001, this
Court granted Petitioner’s Motion and entered an Order
4
directing that the Petitioner’s Request for Admission of Facts
and Genuineness of Documents be admitted, that the responsive
pleading filed by Respondent be stricken, that Respondent be
prohibited from introducing at trial any evidence to oppose the
claims of Petitioner as set forth in the Petition for Disciplinary
Action, and that judgment by default be entered against the
Respondent and in favor of the Petitioner finding that the Rules
of Professional Conduct have been violated as alleged in the
Petition for Disciplinary Action.
“Findings of Fact
“This Court finds the following facts have been
established by clear and convincing evidence:
“The respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar on
April 2, 1974.  He currently maintains an office for the practice
of law in Montgomery County, Maryland.
“On or about June 10, 1998, Bar Counsel received a
notice dated June 5, 1998 from Crestar Bank of an overdraft on
an attorney trust account entitled ‘Law Offices of Robert D.
Powell, P.C.,’ account number 209300191 (hereafter ‘the trust
account’).  Thereafter, on or about June 11, 1998, Bar Counsel
5
sent a copy of the overdraft notice to the respondent and
requested that respondent provide a full explanation for the
overdraft and financial records such as client ledger cards,
deposit slips, canceled checks, and monthly bank statements for
each month from January 1998 to June 1998.  The respondent
was also asked to respond within ten (10) days of the receipt of
Bar Counsel’s letter.  Respondent received Bar Counsel’s letter
on June 15, 1998. 
“On or about June 22, 1998, respondent wrote to Bar
Counsel and falsely represented that the overdraft was the result
of a bank error, and that he had asked the bank to verify this
information, withdraw its Notification of Account Status of
June 5, 1998, and communicate directly with Bar Counsel’s
office.  Thereafter, Bar Counsel received no communication
from Crestar Bank.  
“On or about July 17, 1998, Bar Counsel sent another
letter to respondent and advised that the file on the overdraft
would remain open until supporting documentation was
forwarded to Bar Counsel.  This letter was received by
respondent on August 11, 1998.  Bar Counsel did not receive a
6
reply from respondent, and, on or about August 24, 1998, Bar
Counsel sent another letter to respondent and advised that, if
Bar Counsel did not receive an explanation for the overdraft
within ten (10) days, he would docket the file because of
respondent’s failure to respond.  The letter was delivered to the
respondent on August 24, 1998.
“Bar Counsel received a letter from respondent dated
September 1, 1998 in which respondent again falsely
represented that the overdraft was the result of a bank error.
Respondent’s explanation was that on June 5, 1998, he went to
the bank to make a deposit.  Due to a long line, a bank officer
agreed to complete the transaction for him.  He left a check and
a deposit ticket with this bank employee at about 10 a.m. on
Friday, June 5, 1998.  That transaction, however, was not
credited to the account until Monday, June 8, 1998.  
“Respondent failed to provide with his letter of
September 1, 1998 the documents previously requested by Bar
Counsel in letters dated June 22, July 11, July 27 and August
24, 1998.  
7
“On September 23, 1998, Bar Counsel sent another letter
to respondent notifying him that the matter had been formally
docketed and an investigation would be conducted.  Bar
Counsel for the fourth time requested monthly bank statements,
deposit slips, client ledger cards, and canceled checks for the
trust account and asked that respondent identify the
source/sources of funds deposited into the trust account for the
period January 1 through September 23, 1998.  Respondent
failed to respond to this letter.  
“On October 16, 1998, Bar Counsel sent another letter to
respondent and requested for the fifth time that respondent
provide, within five (5) days, the financial records itemized in
the September 23, 1998 letter.  On or about October 28, 1998,
respondent sent Bar Counsel a letter and enclosed with this
letter copies of bank statements for the trust account for the
period January through September 1998 and photocopies of the
front and back of canceled checks covered by the statements.
“In his letter of October 28, 1998, respondent
acknowledged that he deposited personal funds to the trust
account.  Respondent falsely stated in this letter that there were
8
no client funds in the account during the period in question.  In
this letter, respondent also represented that he had deposited
funds into the trust account from the sale of property owned by
his father.  These deposits were made in December 1997 and
January 1998.
“Respondent represented in the October 28, 1998 letter
that he thereafter transferred some of the funds to accounts in
his and his father’s name at Crestar Bank.  Respondent falsely
represented that these accounts were jointly titled.  
“Bank records obtained pursuant to Bar Counsel
subpoena demonstrate that the transactions conducted on June
5, 1998 by Respondent were as follows:  Respondent wrote a
check in the amount of $2,500 payable to himself on Crestar
Bank account number 86405-5684, entitled ‘Ralph Piccola
POA Robert D. Powell’; deposited $1,100 of these funds to the
trust account; deposited $1,200 of these funds to an account at
Crestar Bank titled ‘Law Office of Robert D. Powell, P.C.’; and
received $200 in cash.  The records reflect that these
transactions occurred at approximately 4:05 p.m.  Ralph Piccola
is the name of the respondent’s late father.
9
“Bank records obtained pursuant to Bar Counsel
subpoena also reveal that respondent continued to use the
account titled in his late father’s name, an interest bearing
money market account, long after his father’s death on or about
March 2, 1998.  Respondent failed to remove his father’s social
security number as the tax identification number on this
account.  
“The bank records also demonstrated that respondent
used both the trust account and the account titled in his father’s
name for personal and business expenses, thereby
misrepresenting the character and ownership of these accounts
in order to avoid the claims of creditors.  
“Respondent failed to respond in a timely manner to Bar
Counsel’s requests for records relating to his trust account.    
“Respondent failed to open an estate to probate the funds
remaining in the account titled in his father’s name at the time
of his father’s death.  
“Conclusions of Law
10
“The Court finds clear and convincing evidence that the
following Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)
were violated:
“The respondent deposited earned fees and money he
received from his father into a bank account he titled as an
attorney trust account.  He used this account for personal and
business purposes.  Such conduct constitutes clear and
convincing evidence of commingling in violation of both
MRPC 1.15(a) and Maryland Rule 16-607.
“Not only did respondent misuse his attorney trust
account, he also used an account titled in the name of his father
for personal and business purposes after his father’s death in
March 1998, thereby misrepresenting the ownership of the
funds in both these accounts.  Even though there were funds in
the father’s account at the time of his death, respondent failed
to open an estate to probate these assets.  This Court finds that
respondent engaged in this conduct in an effort to hide assets
from creditors’ collection efforts.  Such conduct provides clear
and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and or misrepresentation in
11
violation of MRPC 8.4(c).  Such deceptive and dishonest
conduct by a member of the Bar has a negative impact on the
image and perception of the legal profession and is clear and
convincing evidence that respondent engaged in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of MRPC
8.4(d).
“When asked to explain the cause of the overdraft on his
attorney trust account, the respondent first delayed in providing
the requested records and then, in his letter of October 28, 1998,
made false statements of material fact to Bar Counsel
concerning the transactions conducted on June 5, 1998.  His
representation that he had a single deposit to make on the
morning of Friday, June 5, 1998, which, due to a bank error, did
to get credited until the following Monday was shown to be
false by the bank’s records which establish that he made two
deposits and a cash withdrawal after 4 P.M. on Friday, June 5,
1998.  There is clear and convincing evidence that respondent
violated MRPC 8.1(a) and (b) by knowingly making false
representations of material facts and failing to timely respond to
demands for information from Bar Counsel.”  
5After a petition for disciplinary action has been filed, discovery is governed by
Title 2, Chapter 400.  See Rule 16-756.  Rule 2-433 provides sanctions for discovery
failures.  Rule 2-433(a) provides as follows: 
“(a) For certain failures of discovery. Upon a motion filed
under Rule 2-432 (a), the court, if it finds a failure of
discovery, may enter such orders in regard to the failure as
are just, including one or more of the following: 
(1) An order that the matters sought to be discovered, or any
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purpose of the action in accordance with the claim of the
party obtaining the order;. 
(2) An order refusing to allow the failing party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that
party from introducing designated matters in evidence; or. 
(3) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying
further proceeding until the discovery is provided, or
dismissing the action or any part thereof, or entering a
judgment by default that includes a determination as to
liability and all relief sought by the moving party against the
12
Throughout Bar Counsel’s investigation, respondent failed to provide Bar Counsel
with requested documents related to the trust account and his financial records.  After Bar
Counsel filed the Petition for Disciplinary Action, respondent filed an answer, but failed to
respond to the request for admission of facts and genuineness of documents, interrogatories,
or request for production of documents.  It is apparent from the record, findings of fact and
conclusions of law that as a result of respondent’s blatant disregard of Bar Counsel’s request
for discovery in these proceedings, Judge McGuckian granted the relief sought by Bar
Counsel and prohibited respondent from presenting any evidence at the proceeding.5  Bar
failing party if the court is satisfied that it has personal
jurisdiction over that party. If, in order to enable the court to
enter default judgment, it is necessary to take an account or to
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any
matter, the court may rely on affidavits, conduct hearings or
order references as appropriate, and, if requested, shall
preserve to the plaintiff the right of trial by jury.”
6Respondent argued that the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were
not based on evidence, but merely upon an Order of Default.  Respondent is incorrect. 
Respondent admitted at the Inquiry Panel hearing that until recently, he did not know that
it was impermissible to use a trust account as a personal account.  In addition, petitioner’s
Exhibit No. 1, received as evidence by the hearing judge, consisted of respondent’s bank
records, correspondence between Bar Counsel and respondent, respondent’s law office
records for the trust account, and the transcript of the June 22, 2000 inquiry panel
hearing in this matter.  Judge McGuckian found that “the averments of Bar counsel
[were] amply documented in Exhibit 1.”
13
Counsel then introduced into evidence documents marked as Exhibit No. 1, a request for
admission of fact and genuineness of documents, and proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law.  Judge McGuckian permitted respondent to argue in response to the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, but precluded respondent from testifying
or otherwise presenting any evidence.  Judge McGuckian found that the averments of Bar
Counsel in its petition were well supported by Exhibit No.1.6  
The matter was set for a hearing before this Court on February 28, 2002.  Neither
party filed any exceptions to Judge McGuckian’s findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Respondent appeared pro se and addressed the default found by Judge McGuckian.  He
explained to this Court that he did not satisfy petitioner’s discovery requests because he had
7In response to petitioner’s request for production of documents, respondent
refused to produce any documents.   In his written response, he indicated that Bar
Counsel had the documents already, and that as to other bank accounts, he was searching
for the records and would supply them when he found them.  Bar Counsel maintains that
14
not received the motion from Bar Counsel with respect to discovery or Order of July 27th,
2001.  He also advised this Court that his medical problems interfered with his participation
in this case and that he was prepared to provide discovery and to defend the matter on the
merits.  In response thereto, this Court deferred a decision in this matter in order to give
respondent an opportunity to comply with the discovery requests of Bar Counsel and to file
his answers with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals on or before April 22, 2002.  Respondent
was advised, by Order of this Court, that in the event he filed the answers within the
specified time, this Court would again refer the matter to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County for an evidentiary hearing as to the charges contained in the petition for disciplinary
action.  Respondent also was advised that if he failed to file the answers within the
appropriate time, this Court will proceed to consider the case on the present state of the
record and enter its disposition in the matter.
On April 23, 2002, one day late, respondent filed his responses to petitioner’s
discovery requests.  In response thereto, Bar Counsel filed a motion requesting this Court
to strike the untimely answers on the grounds that the answers were untimely, incomplete,
not in compliance with the rules governing discovery, evasive, and in one instance,
demonstrably false.  We agree with Bar Counsel that respondent has failed to satisfy his
obligation to provide the requested information.7  Respondent was uncooperative with Bar
it has never received any documents from respondent.  Interspersed throughout his
answers, respondent asserted, without merit, that petitioner’s requests were overbroad,
not relevant, not within the scope of Bar Counsel’s inquiry, not applicable, or that
sometime in the future, the information would be provided.
Examples of respondent’s answers to petitioner’s request for admission of facts
and genuineness of documents are as follows:
Request no. 22:  Admit that respondent deposited personal funds into
Crestar Account Number 209300191.
Response:  Objection.  This question is overbroad. 
Request no. 40: Admit that respondent failed to open an estate to probate
the funds remaining in the account titled in the name of Ralph Piccola at
the time of his death.
Response:  Objection based on relevance. 
Examples of respondent’s answers to interrogatories are as follows:
Request no. 13: Identify by account number and title any and all bank
accounts on which you had signatory authority at Crestar Bank during the
period January 1, 1997 through February 28, 2001.
Response: . . . .  There is an additional account at Crestar which will be
identified as soon as I locate the records.
Request no. 16:  Identify the source of each deposit to the Crestar Bank
account titled “Law Offices of Robert D. Powell, P.C.,” number
209300191 during the period January 1997 through June 30, 1998.
Response:  These records are being sought and this answer will be supplemented.
Request no. 21: If you did not admit that the Inquiry Panel transcript
attached as Exhibit 19 to Petitioner’s Request for Admission of Facts and
Genuineness of Documents was accurate, state each inaccuracy and provide
your reasons for believing the transcription is inaccurate.
Response:  Objection.  Overly Broad.
Examples of respondents response the requests for production of documents are as
follows:
Request no 13: Copies of all written communications with Crestar Bank
relating to Accounts Number 86405-5684, 209300191 and 209163488,
during the period January 1, 1997 through February 28, 2001.
15
Response:  Whatever documents exists are within the confines of my
office, and will be provided when found.
8An attorney is required to cooperate with Bar Counsel during the investigative
process.  Once a petition for disciplinary action is filed, an attorney is obligated to
provide requested discovery in accordance with the Maryland Rules of Procedure.  We
pointed out in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 255, 760 A.2d 1108,
1119 (2000) that “[t]he practice of law carries with it special responsibilities of self-
regulation, and attorney cooperation with disciplinary authorities is of the utmost
importance to the success of the process and the integrity of the profession.”  In this
regard, we noted, quoting from the Washington Supreme Court in In re Clark, 663 P.2d
1339 (Wash. 1983), as follows:
“The [disciplinary authority’s] investigation of a complaint is
an integral part of the machinery for handling charges
regarding the ethics and conduct of the attorneys admitted to
practice before this court.  Public confidence in the legal
profession, and the deterrence of misconduct, require prompt,
complete investigations.  The process of investigating
complaints depends to a great extent upon an individual
attorney's cooperation.  Without that cooperation, the
[disciplinary authority] is deprived of information necessary
to determine whether the lawyer should continue to be
certified to the public as fit.  Obviously, unless attorneys
cooperate in the process, the system fails and public
confidence in the legal profession is undermined.  If the
members of our profession do not take the process of internal
discipline seriously, we cannot expect the public to do so and
the very basis of our professionalism erodes.”
Id at 1341-42.
16
Counsel during the investigative stage of these proceedings, and continued to stonewall Bar
Counsel’s efforts to gain discovery throughout these proceedings.8  Accordingly, we shall
consider this case on the present state of the record and the findings of fact and conclusions
of law of the hearing judge as set forth on October 24, 2001.   
17
The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had
violated MRPC 1.15(a), 8.1(a) and (b), 8.4(c) and (d), and Rule 16-607 as alleged by Bar
Counsel in the petition for disciplinary action.  Based upon our independent review of the
record, we agree with the findings and hold that Bar Counsel presented clear and convincing
evidence of respondent’s wrongdoings.   
We turn now to the appropriate sanction.  Bar Counsel recommends disbarment as
the appropriate sanction.  
In imposing discipline on an attorney for violation of the MRPC, the primary purpose
is to protect the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession and not to punish
the lawyer.  See, e.g.,  Attorney Grievance Comm’n. v. Snyder, 368 Md. 242, 793 A.2d 515
(2002).  Attorney disciplinary proceedings also are aimed at deterring other attorneys from
engaging in similar conduct.  
It has long been the position of this Court that disbarment is the appropriate sanction
for intentional dishonest conduct.  See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Vanderlinde, 364
Md. 376, 773 A.2d 463 (2001).  In cases warranting disbarment, such as those involving
intentional dishonesty, fraud, misappropriation and the like, we will not accept as
compelling extenuating circumstances “anything less than the most serious and utterly
debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the ‘root
cause’ of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney’s utter inability to conform his
18
or her conduct in accordance with the law and with the MRPC.”  Id. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at
485. 
Respondent engaged in intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation.  He failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel and when given the opportunity
by this Court to comply with Bar Counsel’s request, he again refused to provide the required
information.  The hearing judge found that respondent deposited earned fees and money he
received from his father into a bank account titled as a trust account.  Respondent used this
account for personal and business purposes.  Respondent used an account titled in the name
of his father for personal and business purposes after the death of his father, thereby
misrepresenting the ownership of the funds.  He did not open an estate to probate these
assets.  Respondent engaged in this conduct in an effort to hide assets from his creditors.
Respondent’s trust account was overdrawn, and when asked by Bar Counsel to explain the
cause, he delayed in providing the requested information and later provided false
explanations. 
In determining an appropriate sanction, an attorney’s prior discipline history is an
appropriate consideration.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Franz, 355 Md. 752, 736
A.2d 339 (1999).  After a disciplinary action, this Court expects a renewed commitment to
professional standards and ethical conduct.  Respondent was previously sanctioned in 1992
and received an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply in not less than six months
for conduct amounting to negligent misappropriation of client funds.  
19
Respondent has presented no mitigating circumstances to justify a sanction less than
disbarment.  The appropriate sanction in this case is disbarment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.  RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
T H E 
C L E R K  
O F  
T H I S  
C O U R T,
I N C L U D I N G  
C O S T S  
O F  
A L L
T R A N S C R I P T S ,  
P U R S U A N T  
T O
MARYLAND RULE 16-715(C), FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGM ENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF 
THE 
ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST
ROBERT D. POWELL.