Case Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Lam Luong v. State of Alabama)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 03/14/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1121097
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Lam Luong
v.
State of Alabama)
(Mobile Circuit Court, CC-08-840;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-08-1219)
STUART, Justice.
1121097
In February 2008, a Mobile County grand jury charged Lam
Luong with five counts of capital murder in connection with
the deaths of his four children.  The murders were made
capital because: (1) two or more persons were killed "by one
act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct," see §
13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975; and (2) each child was less
than 14 years of age when he or she was murdered, see § 13A-5-
40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975.  Following a jury trial, Luong was
convicted of five counts of capital murder.  The trial court
sentenced Luong to death for each of the five capital-murder
convictions.  The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Luong's
convictions and death sentences, holding that the trial court
erred by refusing to move the trial from Mobile County
because, 
it 
reasoned, 
the 
pretrial 
publicity 
was 
presumptively
prejudicial and by refusing to conduct individual questioning
of the potential jurors regarding their exposure to that
publicity.  The Court of Criminal Appeals also held that the
trial court erred in denying defense counsel funds to travel
to Vietnam to investigate 
mitigation 
evidence and in admitting
into evidence during the sentencing hearing a videotape
simulation using sandbags approximately the weight of each
2
1121097
child illustrating the length of time it took for each child
to fall from the bridge to the water.   Luong v. State, [Ms.
1
CR-08-1219, February 15, 2013] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App.
2013).  This Court granted the State's petition to review the
decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  We reverse and
remand.
Facts
In its sentencing order, the trial court presented the
following facts surrounding the offenses:
"[Luong] 
met 
Kieu Phan, 
the 
children's 
mother 
in
2004.  She lived in Irvington and he was working on
a shrimp boat in Bayou La Batre.  At the time, she
was pregnant with Ryan, and although not [Luong's]
biological child, he treated Ryan as his own. 
Thereafter, [Luong] and Kieu had the three other
children, Hannah, Lindsey, and Danny.
"Some time after Hurricane Katrina in August of
2005, they moved to Hinesville, Georgia.  Kieu
worked in a nail salon and [Luong] first worked at
a car wash and then took a job as a chef at a
restaurant.  But it was also in Hinesville that
marital problems arose. [Luong] took a girlfriend,
he wouldn't work, and he was smoking crack.  Kieu
was upset by this and decided to move back to
Irvington with the children and move in with her
mother. [Luong] followed along.  This was in
December of 2007, approximately a month before he
killed the children.  Back in Irvington things did
Luong killed his four children by throwing them off a
1
bridge into the water 100 feet below the bridge.
3
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not improve.  He still had a girlfriend, still did
not work regularly, was asking Kieu and her mother,
Dung, for money, and was using the money to buy
crack and was staying out all night.  The family was
not happy with his behavior and communicated their
displeasure to him.
"Monday morning, January 7, 2008, around 8:30
a.m., [Luong] took Hannah, Lindsey, and Danny and
put them in the family van and left the house.  A
few minutes later, he returned and got Ryan.  It was
then that he made the 15-20 minute drive with his
children to the top of the Dauphin Island Bridge and
threw them to their deaths.
"Ryan Phan was 3 years and 11 months old, Hannah
Luong was 2 years and 8 months old, Lindsey Luong
was 1 year and 11 months old and Danny Luong was 4
months old.  On Jan. 7, 2008, [Luong] put them in
the family van, drove them from their home in
Irvington to the top of the Dauphin Island Bridge. 
There, he pulled the van over to the side of the
roadway and threw all four children, one by one,
over the rail, some 106 feet, to their deaths in the
water below.
"After leaving the bridge, the van was running
out of gasoline.  Luong set about trying to get gas
and then obtaining money from Kieu to buy crack. 
Several witnesses testified about their encounters
with [Luong] as he was trying to enlist their
assistance in obtaining gasoline.  They all said
that he did not appear to be under the influence of
drugs or alcohol.  A video from a Chevron gas
station also showed [Luong] attempting to obtain gas
shortly after throwing the children from the bridge. 
He did not appear at all impaired.
"[Luong's] day's travels, after killing his
children, ended around 5:30 p.m. when the van had a
flat tire and a wrecker towed him home.  Kieu's
mother, Dung, had been calling him all day to find
4
1121097
out where the children were but Luong would not
answer the phone. [Luong] informed her that he gave
the children to a woman named Kim who acted like she
knew the family and Kim had not returned the
children.  When Kieu learned of this, she insisted
he report the children missing, which he did.
"At the Bayou La Batre police station the night
of January 7, 2008, [Luong] maintained the story
that he gave the children to a woman named Kim who
never returned the children.  There were some
variations in the different versions he related, but
the essential 'theme' was that he gave the children
to a woman named Kim.
"The next day he told Captain Darryl Wilson that
if Wilson would take him to Biloxi, Mississippi,
that maybe they could find Kim.  Captain Wilson took
[Luong] to Biloxi, but after riding around for about
an hour, [Luong] stated that he did not know where
to find the children.  They returned to the Bayou La
Batre police department and shortly thereafter
[Luong] told his wife, Kieu, that the children were
dead.  He further informed Captain Wilson that the
children were in the water, and he agreed to take
Captain Wilson to the location.  [Luong] directed
Captain Wilson to the top of the Dauphin Island
Bridge and pointed out the exact locations where he
parked the van and threw the children into the water
below.
"[Luong] subsequently gave a recorded statement
in which he admitted throwing his children into the
water from the bridge.  He stated, 'My family they
make me.'  He said his family and his wife looked
down on him like he was nothing.  Captain Wilson
asked [Luong] if he contemplated killing himself
when he was on the bridge and [Luong] said he did. 
However, when Captain Wilson inquired why he did
not, [Luong] said, 'I wanted to see what my wife and
family looked like.'  Wilson replied, 'You wanted to
watch your wife's face after you told her that you
5
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had killed them?' [Luong] nodded in the affirmative
and said, 'Uh-huh.'
"Several witnesses driving across the bridge at
the time [Luong] was in the act of throwing his
children off of the bridge one at a time witnessed
various parts of the events.  Howard Yeager saw a
van matching the description of [Luong's] van on top
of the bridge during the relevant time period.  Jeff
Coolidge saw [Luong] parked in the location where
[Luong] pointed out he was parked, and saw [Luong]
throw something over the side.  As Coolidge got
closer to the van he saw three toddlers in the van. 
Alton Knight, in another vehicle, saw a van matching
the description of [Luong's] van and observed a
little girl, a toddler, with dark hair and pigtails
in the van.  (The children's grandmother, Dung,
testified that Lindsey had pigtails when she left
that morning.)  Frank Collier, who was in the
vehicle with Alton King, saw a van matching the
description of [Luong's] van and saw [Luong]
straddling the rail of the bridge.
"The next 
day 
... 
[Luong] 
was 
interviewed 
again,
and at this time he recanted his earlier statement,
and reverted back to the 'Kim' story. He smiled and
told Captain Wilson, 'If you find the bodies, then
you charge me.'
"Before any of the bodies were found, but after
he had been arrested and was in jail, Luong called
his wife from the jail and during the conversation
laughed and told her that no one would find the
children.
"A massive search effort began.  On Saturday,
January 12, 4-month-old Danny was found 12.5 miles
west of the bridge on the banks of an isolated marsh
area.  On Sunday, January 13, 3-year-11-month-old
Ryan was found 16.4 miles west of the bridge.  On
Tuesday, January 15, 1-year-11-month-old Lindsey was
found in Mississippi, 18 miles west of the bridge
6
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and five days later, on January 20, 2-year-11-month-
old Hannah was located floating in the Gulf of
Mexico, south of Venice, Louisiana, 144 miles west
of the bridge.
"The cause of death for Ryan, Danny and Lindsey
was blunt force trauma and asphyxia due to drowning. 
The cause of death for Hanna was drowning.
"....
"The most convincing evidence of Luong's guilt
was his confession to throwing his children off the
Dauphin Island Bridge, which was corroborated by
[Luong] pointing out the location of the murders,
and by witnesses who saw either him or children
matching the description of his children on the
bridge at the time he said he threw them into the
water.  This was further corroborated by the
locations where the bodies of the children were
later found."
Analysis
I.
First, the State contends that the decision of the Court
of Criminal Appeals that "Luong's case represents one of those
rare instances where prejudice must be presumed," ___ So. 3d
at ___, conflicts with Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S.
358, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010), and Ex parte Fowler, 574 So. 2d
745 (Ala. 1990).  The State maintains that the holdings of the
Court of Criminal Appeals that the 
evidence 
indicated presumed
prejudice against Luong and that his case should have been
7
1121097
transferred 
to 
another 
venue 
ignores 
two 
important 
principles:
the principal that criminal trials should be held in the
communities where the crimes occurred and the principal that
the law vests the trial court with discretion in determining
how to ensure the impartiality of a jury.  The State
acknowledges that "[i]n today's world, when a crime is
committed that is as incomprehensible as Luong's, the media
will extensively cover it as a matter of course," but it
emphasizes that "the advent of 24-hour news and the internet"
does not mean that a fair trial cannot be conducted in the 
community where the offense was committed.
In Skilling, the United States Supreme Court examined
whether the publicity attending the securities scandal
involving Enron corporation prevented an Enron executive
charged with criminal conduct from receiving a fair trial in
Houston, Texas, where Enron's corporate headquarters were
located.  The Supreme Court recognized that  media coverage of
the crimes did not alone create a presumption that a trial in
the venue where the 
offense 
was committed necessarily deprived
the defendant of due process and that "[a] presumption of
prejudice ... attends only the extreme case."  561 U.S. ___,
8
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130 S.Ct. at 2915.  The Supreme Court then examined the
pretrial publicity and alleged community prejudice in that
case, in light of the following factors:  (1) the size and
characteristics of the community where the offenses occurred;
(2) the content of the media coverage; (3) the timing of the
media coverage in relation to the trial; and (4) the media
interference with the trial or the verdict.  Skilling, 561
U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2915-17.  The Supreme Court
concluded that no presumption of prejudice existed in
Skilling.  
In Ex parte Fowler, this Court reviewed whether the trial
court exceeded the scope of its discretion in denying a
defendant's request for a change of venue for her new trial. 
This Court stated:
"It is well established in Alabama, however, that
the existence of pretrial publicity, even if
extensive, does not in and of itself constitute a
ground for changing venue and thereby divesting the
trial court of jurisdiction of an offense.  Beecher
v. State, 288 Ala. 1, 256 So. 2d 154 (1971), rev'd
on other grounds, 408 U.S. 234, 92 S.Ct. 2282, 33
L.Ed.2d 317 (1972); see, also, the cases annotated
at § 15-2-20. In Nelson v. State, 440 So. 2d 1130
(Ala. Crim. App. 1983), the Court of Criminal
Appeals correctly noted that jurors do not have to
be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved
in a particular case in order to reach an unbiased
verdict.  Quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
9
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722-23, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-43, 6 L.Ed.2d 751, 756
(1961), the court further noted:
"'"In these days of swift, widespread
and diverse methods of communication, an
important case can be expected to arouse
the interest of the public in the vicinity,
and scarcely any of those best qualified to
serve as jurors will not have formed some
impression or opinion as to the merits of
the case.  This is particularly true in
criminal cases.  To hold that the mere
existence of any preconceived notion as to
the guilt or innocence of an accused,
without more, is sufficient to rebut the
presumption 
of 
a 
prospective 
juror's
impartiality would be to establish an
impossible standard.  It is sufficient if
the juror can lay aside his impression or
opinion and render a verdict based on the
evidence presented in court."'
"440 So. 2d at 1131.  To satisfy her burden of proof
in the present case, [the defendant] had to
establish that prejudicial pretrial publicity has so
saturated [the county] as to have a probable
prejudicial impact on the prospective jurors there,
thus rendering the trial setting inherently suspect. 
This required a showing that a feeling of deep and
bitter prejudice exists in [the county] as a result
of the publicity. Holladay v. State, 549 So. 2d 122
(Ala. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd Ex parte Holladay, 549
So. 2d 135 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1012,
110 S.Ct. 575, 107 L.Ed.2d 569 (1989)."
574 So. 2d at 747-48.
Unequivocally, the record establishes that the media
coverage of these offenses and the proceedings before Luong's
trial were extensive; however, this fact alone does not
10
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support a finding of presumed prejudice.  To make such a
determination, 
this 
Court 
considers 
the 
pretrial 
publicity 
and
the alleged community prejudice in light of the Skilling
factors. 
A.  The size and characteristics of the community
where the offenses occurred.
 The record establishes that Mobile County has a large
and diverse population.  According to the 2010 census, Mobile
County was Alabama's second largest county with a population
of over 400,000 citizens.  Even though the record indicates
that a large percentage of Mobile County residents read the
local newspaper, the size of the population of Mobile County
reduces the likelihood of prejudice.  In light of Mobile
County's large population and its diverse pool of citizens,
this Court is reluctant to conclude that 12 impartial jurors
could not be empaneled.  See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,
501 
U.S. 
1030, 
1044 
(1991)(plurality 
opinion)(recognizing 
that
the likelihood of a presumption of prejudice was less because
venire was selected from pool of over 600,000 residents).  But
see Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)(finding a
presumption of prejudice in a case where the offense was
committed in a community of 150,000 residents).
11
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B.  The content of the media coverage.     
As previously observed, the record clearly establishes
that the newspaper, television, and radio coverage of the
offenses and the subsequent proceedings were extensive. 
However, as the State maintains:
"[I]f exposure to a certain level of pretrial
publicity renders a community presumptively unable
to convene an impartial jury, then no venue will be
acceptable, and no trial will be possible, in any
case that draws significant national attention."
The Court of Criminal Appeals provides a thorough summary of
the content of the articles published in the Mobile Press-
Register, the local newspaper of Mobile County, that are
contained in the record, see Luong v. State, ___ So. 3d at
___.  This Court has reviewed those articles and concludes
that, although they do not paint a flattering picture of
Luong, the media coverage mainly focused on the facts
surrounding the offenses and the proceedings of the case. 
Additionally, 
the majority of the information contained in 
the
media reports was admitted into evidence at trial.  This Court
has also reviewed the personal opinions expressed through
comments on the newspaper's Web site, the call-in telephone
line, and the editorial pages.  Although statements were made
12
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condemning Luong, other statements were made to the effect
that Luong "was entitled to his day in court."  This Court
cannot conclude that, in this age of digital communication, 
the published opinions of certain of the citizens in this
particular community constitute grounds for presuming that a
fair trial could not be conducted in Mobile County.  Cf. 
Woodward v. State, 123 So. 3d 989, 1050 (Ala. Crim. App.
2012). 
This Court has also considered Luong's argument that the
media coverage of Luong's confession and the withdrawal of his
guilty plea amounted to "the kind of deeply prejudicial
pretrial exposure that jurors cannot be 
reasonably 
expected to
ignore."  However, in light of the admission into evidence at
trial of Luong's confession in which he admitted that he 
threw his children off the bridge, the publicity about his
confession and guilty-plea proceeding did not result in a
preconceived prejudice that permeated the trial, preventing 
the seating of a fair and impartial jury.
A review of the record simply does not support a finding
that the content of the media coverage incited anger,
revulsion, and indignation to the degree that jurors chosen
from citizens of Mobile County could not determine Luong's
13
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guilt or innocence based solely on the evidence presented at
trial.
C.  The timing of the coverage in relation to the
trial.
Luong admitted to this Court that 45 of the 59 articles
published in the Mobile Press-Register and cited in the
opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals were published more
than a year before his trial.   Indeed, the record establishes
2
that the majority of the media coverage occurred during the
first month following the offenses.  The fact that the
majority of the publicity occurred more than a year before the
trial supports a conclusion that a fair and impartial jury
could be selected from the community.  See Ex parte Travis,
776 So. 2d 874, 879 (Ala. 2000)(holding that prejudice is
unlikely as a result of publicity that occurred more than a
year before the trial).
According to Luong, television coverage "continued to
2
run" in the two months before the trial.  The record, however,
provides limited information about the content of the
television coverage, and neither the transcripts nor the
videotapes of the television coverage were presented to the
trial court.  Therefore, this Court cannot evaluate the
prejudice, if any, the television coverage had upon the
community.
14
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D.  The media interference with the trial court or
the verdict.
The record establishes that the trial court ordered
certain precautions to ensure that the media did not interfere
with the trial or that media representatives did not have
contact with the jurors.  Such procedures are precisely the
type of preventive measures courts should take to avoid
tainting the jury.  Nothing in the record indicates that the
media interfered with Luong's trial.  Therefore, this factor
does not support a finding of presumed prejudice.
This Court recognizes that in Skilling the United States
Supreme Court found that the jury's acquittal of Skilling of
several counts with which he had been charged supported its
conclusion that a presumption of prejudice did not exist. 
However, in light of the facts of this case, in particular
Luong's admission that he threw each of his children off the
bridge, the fact that Luong was not acquitted of any of the
charged offenses does not either support or rebut a
presumption of jury bias or impartiality.  The evidence in
this case simply did not create any inference from which the
jury could conclude that he killed some, but not all, of his
children.  Therefore, in light of the facts of this case, the
15
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jury's verdict is not a consideration in determining the
existence of a presumption of prejudice.
E.  Additional factor raised by Luong.
This Court has also considered Luong's argument that the
"Mobile community's close involvement with the case" resulted
in prejudice that prevented a fair trial.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals relied on State v. James, 767 P.2d 259 (Utah
1989), and Rideau in reaching its conclusion that prejudice
was presumed.  After examining those cases in light of the
facts of this case, this Court concludes that those cases are
distinguishable.  
In State v. James, the size of the community and the
actions of the defendant are substantially different than
here.  The James community was much smaller than the community
in this case.  The town where the offense in James was
committed had a population of 28,880; the county had a
population of 69,200.  In this case, the populations of Mobile
and Mobile County are substantially larger.   Additionally,
3
the James community engaged in a rescue effort much more
As previously noted, Mobile County has a population of
3
over 400,000 citizens.
16
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widespread than the one in this case.  The defendant in James
played the role of victim and deceived the public by leading
the citizens to believe that the child was alive and could be
rescued, resulting in a massive search when the defendant knew
that the child was dead.  The James community searched for a
missing child reported to be alive; here, the publicity about
and search for the children occurred after the children were
dead.  Luong did not deceive the Mobile community; the
community involvement began after he admitted that the
children were dead, and the community then assisted in the
recovery of the bodies.  The small size of the community and
the actions of the defendant in James supported a finding of
presumed prejudice in light of the community's involvement in
a rescue effort and its frustration over the defendant's
deception.  In this case, the larger population of Mobile
County and the facts surrounding the involvement of the
community in the search for the bodies make these facts and
circumstances 
less 
inflammatory 
than 
the 
facts 
and
circumstances in James and did not create an environment where
prejudice must be presumed.
17
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Rideau is the "seminal" case discussing prejudice
presumed from pretrial publicity.  The evidence in Rideau
established that the offense was committed in a community of
150,000 residents and that an "out-of-court" trial of Rideau
was conducted when the media published Rideau's interrogation
and confession.  In this case, the media did not broadcast a
tape-recording of Luong's confession, and, although the media
did report on Luong's guilty-plea proceeding, the report was
objective and detailed a public event that transpired in
court.  Because Luong was not "tried" in the media and because
the community of Mobile is larger than the community in
Rideau, Rideau is  distinguishable. 
Finally, this Court has considered the decision in Wilson
v. State, 480 So. 2d 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), reversing a
trial court's order refusing to transfer a case.  The offense
in Wilson occurred in a town of less than 10,000, and the
community  encouraged the local officials to arrest the
defendant.  The evidence indicated that the public believed
that Wilson, a white male, had killed one of his employees, a
black male.  When the sheriff refused to arrest Wilson, there
was public outcry.  Evidence was presented that 20 years
18
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earlier Wilson's grandfather had been tried for the murder of
a young black activist and found not guilty.  Additionally,
testimony was presented that community talk indicated that
Wilson's trial was an opportunity to avenge the death of the
black activist at the hands of Wilson's grandfather.  The
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the record disclosed that
"bias and prejudice" against Wilson permeated the community
and that the trial court had exceeded the scope of its
discretion in denying Wilson's motion for a change of venue.
Unlike the record in Wilson, the record in this case does
not establish that bias and prejudice permeated the Mobile
community at the time of Luong's trial.  Although the facts
surrounding the offenses in this case are inflammatory, no
evidence indicates that the community demanded Luong's arrest
or that an underlying bias against Luong existed at the time
of trial. 
This Court acknowledges that the record supports a
finding that the community of Mobile grieved over the tragic
deaths of the four children.  The community exhibited its
compassion by helping to search for the children's bodies and
its generosity by raising funds to pay for funeral expenses
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for the children.  This type of  community involvement,
however, does not create a presumption of bias against Luong;
rather, it indicates the humanity and mercy of the citizens of
Mobile County.  We cannot conclude that such acts support a
finding that Luong could not receive a fair trial in Mobile
County.
After considering the pretrial publicity, the community
involvement, and the alleged resulting community prejudice in
this case, in light of the size and characteristics of Mobile
County, the content of the pretrial publicity, the timing of
media coverage in relation to Luong's trial, and the lack of
media interference with the trial or the verdict, this Court
concludes that this case does not present "one of those rare
instances where prejudice must be presumed," ___ So. 3d at
___, i.e., that the publicity was so prejudicial that the
jurors could not decide the case fairly.  Unquestionably, the
record establishes that members of the venire recalled the
offenses; however, the record does not support the conclusion
that 
the 
community's 
initial 
feelings 
of 
shock 
and
reprehensibility at the time the offenses 
were discovered were
present in the venire for Luong's trial.
20
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"If, in this age of instant, mass communication, we
were to automatically disqualify persons who have
heard about an alleged crime from serving as a
juror, the inevitable result would be that truly
heinous or notorious acts will go unpunished.  The
law does not prohibit the informed citizen from
participating in the affairs of justice.  In
prominent cases of national concern, we cannot allow
widespread publicity concerning these matters to
paralyze our system."
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 210 (5th Cir. 1975).  See
also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984)(recognizing
that "[i]t is not unusual that one's recollection of the fact
that a notorious crime was committed lingers long after the
feelings of revulsion have passed").  Therefore, this Court
holds that the trial court did not exceed the scope of its
discretion in refusing to find presumed prejudice against
Luong and refusing to transfer his case on that basis, and the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in this regard is
reversed. 
II.
Next, the State contends that the Court of Criminal
Appeals' holding that the trial court's refusal to conduct
individual voir dire of the venire concerning the effects of
the pretrial publicity on the veniremembers' capacities to be
fair precluded Luong from showing actual prejudice conflicts
21
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with cases that hold that a trial court has wide discretion in
conducting voir dire and in making determinations of juror 
bias and prejudice.  See Skilling, 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct.
at 
2917 
(recognizing 
that 
"[n]o 
hard-and-fast 
formula 
dictates
the necessary depth or breadth of voir dire" and that "[j]ury
selection ... is 'particularly within the province of the
trial judge'"); and Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1036 (noting
that the trial court must determine "did a juror swear that he
could set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case
on the evidence, and should the juror's protestation of
impartiality have been believed").  According to the State,
the trial court's use of juror questionnaires and its
questions posed to the venire adequately provided the trial
court and the parties an opportunity to determine whether the
veniremembers could base their decision on the evidence
presented at trial.  The State admits that individual voir
dire of the venire is the "preferred approach" as a matter of
policy when a case involves extensive publicity but maintains
that the trial court's procedures in this case satisfied the
requirements of the established law, adequately assessed the
risk of bias and prejudice among the veniremembers, and did
22
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not render the process of jury selection constitutionally
deficient.
To assist the trial court and the parties in determining
the effect of the pretrial publicity on the venire, the trial
court 
required 
the 
veniremembers 
to 
complete 
jury
questionnaires and then to respond to questions propounded to
the venire as a whole.  The jury questionnaire asked each
veniremember to answer the following questions:
"Did you read or hear anything concerning this
case?"
_______________
"Before coming to the courthouse?" 
_______________
"Since arriving at the courthouse?" 
_______________
"If [you have read or heard anything about this
case], what did you hear?"
The questionnaire then asked the veniremember to identify the
television programs he or she watched; the local news stations
watched; the frequency with which 
the 
veniremember watched the
news; the radio stations the veniremember listened to; and the
periodicals, 
including 
magazines 
and 
newspapers, 
the
veniremember read.  During the voir dire, the following
occurred:
23
1121097
"THE COURT: Now, listen to this question very
carefully.  Would any of you, based on what you have
read, seen, or heard, or remember could you set
those things aside and serve as a fair and impartial
juror?
"In other words, is there any member of the jury
who thinks because they have a recollection of this
case, whether it be from radio, television, or
newspaper, Internet, or any other source, that it
would be impossible for you to put that aside, lay
that aside and sit as a fair and impartial juror in
this case and base your decision only on the
evidence as you hear it in this courtroom?
"Can any of you –- or would any of you tell me
it would be impossible for you to sit as a fair and
impartial jury in this case?
"(Response.)
"THE COURT: I see a hand in the back. Could you
please stand, sir, and just give us your name and
number?
"PJ [T.]: [T], 141.
"THE COURT: Mr. [T.], you are telling me that
regardless of what you may have heard, read or seen,
you are telling me that you in no way could set that
aside and sit as a juror?
"PJ [T.]: No, sir.
"THE COURT: Thank you.  Is it 144?
"PJ [T.]: 141.
"THE COURT: All right.  The rest of you are
telling me that even though you may have heard,
read, or seen matters about this case, and you may
have had some preconceived impression or opinion,
24
1121097
based on what you have heard, read or seen, that you
could sit as a juror in this case, base your verdict
only on the evidence as it comes from the witness
stand and any evidence as it comes from the witness
stand and any evidence that may be introduced into
evidence in the form of photographs or documents or
something, and you could render a fair and impartial
verdict by setting aside any of that and base your
verdict on the evidence that you hear in this
courtroom?  You can do that?
"(No response.)
"THE COURT: If you can't, other than Mr. T.,
please raise your hand.
"(No response.)"
When Luong preserved his objection to the trial court's denial
of his motion to conduct individual voir dire with regard to
pretrial publicity, the trial court responded:
"Okay.  First of all, it's my reading of the law
that individual voir dire is not a requirement and
it is not a right.  Only where the Court feels, in
its discretion, that it is necessary to explore
other areas more thoroughly is an individual voir
dire preferable.
"Secondly, the Court has gone to a significant
length to have the attorneys for both parties
develop 
a 
lengthy 
questionnaire. 
 
And 
this
questionnaire was given to the venire on Monday, and
they were give all the time needed, and encouraged
by me to be thorough in their answers in filling out
the questionnaires.
"The Court then, at the parties' request, gave
an entire day to go through these questionnaires,
25
1121097
read them, and study them, so that they could more
intelligently strike a jury.
"The law further says, as I read it from various
cases dealing with change of venues and pretrial
publicity, that even though a person might have a
preconceived 
recollection 
based 
on 
pretrial
publicity, if they say they can put aside what they
have heard, read or seen, that's all that's
necessary, if they can render a fair and impartial
verdict based on the evidence as it is adduced at
trial.
"....
"From my reading of the law, at least the
Alabama Supreme Court is going to have to absolutely
change 180 degrees its years of precedent in saying
that I need to have or allow defense individual voir
dire.  Because no one other than Mr. [T.] indicated
that they would have any problem whatsoever in
setting aside anything that they may have heard,
read or seen."
In Ex parte Anderson, 602 So. 2d 898, 899 (Ala. 1992),
this Court provided the standard of review for a trial court's
decision regarding whether to conduct individual voir dire,
stating:
"Whether 
to 
allow 
individual 
voir 
dire
examinations is within the trial court's discretion.
Hallford v. State, 548 So. 2d 526, 538 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1988), affirmed, 548 So. 2d 547 (Ala. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945, 110 S.Ct. 354, 107
L.Ed.2d 342 (1989).  Furthermore, '"[t]he decision
of the trial court in denying individual voir dire
examination will not be disturbed absent abuse of
that discretion."' Henderson v. State, 538 So. 2d
276, 283 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), affirmed, 583 So.
26
1121097
2d 305 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908, 112
S.Ct. 1268, 117 L.Ed.2d 496 (1992)(quoting Hallford,
548 So. 2d at 538)."
The United States Supreme Court in Skilling discussed the
trial court's responsibility in selecting a 
fair 
and impartial
jury and the appellate court's deference in reviewing the
selection process when pretrial publicity is at issue,
stating:
"When pretrial publicity is at issue, 'primary
reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes
[especially] good sense' because the judge 'sits in
the locale where the publicity is said to have had
its effect' and may base her evaluation on her 'own
perception of the depth and extent of news stories
that might influence a juror.' ...  Appellate courts
making after-the-fact assessments of the media's
impact on jurors should be mindful that their
judgments lack the on-the-spot comprehension of the
situation possessed by trial judges.
"Reviewing courts are properly resistant to
second-guessing the trial judge's estimation of a
juror's impartiality, for that judge's appraisal is
ordinarily 
influenced 
by 
a 
host 
of 
factors
impossible to capture fully in the record -- among
them, the prospective juror's inflection, sincerity,
demeanor, candor, body language, and apprehension of
duty. ... In contrast to the cold transcript
received by the appellate court, the in-the-moment
voir dire affords the trial court a more intimate
and immediate basis for assessing a venire member's
fitness for jury service."
Skilling, 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 2918. 
27
1121097
In Ex parte Brown, 632 So. 2d 14 (Ala. 1992), this Court
examined whether the trial court's refusal to conduct
individual voir dire even though 
the evidence established that
the pretrial publicity with regard to the offense and the
defendant was significant denied the defendant his right to an
impartial jury.  Because Brown discusses the United States
Supreme Court decision in Mu'min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415
(1991), addressing this issue and because both cases are
analogous to this case, we quote extensively from the facts
and analysis in Brown:
"On August 10, 1987, the bodies of Linda LeMonte
and her daughter, Sheila Smoke, were found in their
home.  Dr. Allan Stillwell testified that LeMonte
died as a result of a nine-inch cut to her throat
and that Smoke died as a result of multiple stab
wounds to the chest, throat, and abdomen.  On August
12, 1987, Brown was arrested for the murders.
"Prior to voir dire of the venire, the defendant
moved for individual voir dire, based on the
pretrial publicity of the case.  The judge denied
the motion, but during voir dire asked the following
question: 'Now, ladies and gentlemen, does anyone
know anything about this case, either what you have
heard, read, know first-hand, news media, anybody
know anything about this case?' Of the 66 members of
the jury venire, 42 members (or 63%) responded
affirmatively. The trial judge then continued:
"'All right. Now, ladies and gentlemen,
those of you who stood and stated that you
had either read, heard, or talked about
28
1121097
this particular case, this is one of the
most crucial questions I have asked all
morning.  This is the question where the
seriousness of your oath will come forth. 
You will understand the seriousness of it
again, the only thing this court, –- the
thing this court is required to do, and
these lawyers are required to do, is to
strike or empanel a fair and impartial
jury.  That's what the system requires. 
That's what we intend to do.  Is there any
member of the venire who has heard, read,
talked about, knows anything about this
case, or believes that you have already
formed some opinion, have any preconceived
ideas, have [a] predisposition to the
extent that it would interfere with your
ability to go into the jury room with the
rest of the jurors, ... absorb the
evidence, listen to the evidence, weigh it,
sift through it, and, at the appropriate
time, render a fair and impartial verdict,
based on the evidence and the law that I
charge you is applicable in this case?  I'm
going to give you until 1:30 to make that
decision, because we are going to take a
lunch break.  I want to let you think about
that question because that's the crucial
question in this case, whether those that
have read or heard something about this
case, could you still be a fair and
impartial juror? Court will be in recess
until 1:30.'
"After the lunch break, the following occurred:
"'BY THE COURT:  All right, the question I
asked you just before lunch, any member of
the venire believes or those that stood
[and] said that you had heard, read, talked
about this matter, either one of you feel
that it would interfere with your ability
29
1121097
to render a fair and impartial verdict with
the rest of the jurors, after listening to
the evidence and the law that I charge you
that is applicable in this case?  If you
would, 
please 
stand. 
Any 
further
questions?'
"Defense 
counsel 
then stated 
that because 
of 
the
unusual amount of pretrial publicity and the intense
amount of interest this case had generated in the
community, he wished to individually question the
prospective jurors concerning what they had heard or
read about the case in order to determine the extent
of what the jurors knew about the case. Defense
counsel further stated that he did not believe that
the jury had been thoroughly examined on the issue
of pretrial publicity, and he added, 'Human nature
[is] such that people will not readily get up and
admit in a courtroom in front of a judge, who is the
ultimate symbol of impartiality, that they cannot be
fair ... reasonable and ... objective.'  In
response, the judge stated:
"'I have painstakingly and in great detail
voir dired this jury venire, okay? And I
believe that I have done it about as
thoroughly as it could have been done. 
Now, I don't know any other way for me to
make the jurors say pretrial publicity
would affect them other than ask them the
questions the way I have asked them.  Now,
you know, I can't, and I don't think I
should go to the extent, and I'll –- not
only the law but fairness doesn't require
me to go to extent of having carte blanche
exposition of asking the jurors questions,
especially the detailed way in which I have
voir dired this jury, and trying to seek
out, ferret out their views about certain
things.'
30
1121097
"The judge further stated that he believed that
individual voir dire was necessary only if a
prospective juror equivocated as to whether he or
she could be fair and impartial.  The trial judge
then asked the jury venire:
"'Does any ... member of the venire know of
any reason, any reason whatsoever that you
believe that you should not be selected to
serve on this jury?  If you do, stand, I'll
take you in chambers and find out what the
reason is....  Anyone has any predisposed
position about this case ...?  Anyone in
your mind feel that you could not be fair
in this matter, or render a fair, impartial
verdict?'
"In response to those questions, two of the
jurors admitted that they could not be fair and
impartial.  These jurors were excused.  The judge
denied 
defense 
counsel's 
renewed 
request 
for
individual voir dire.
"The issue before this Court is whether the
Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it held that
the instant case is distinguishable from Mu'Min v.
Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d
493 (1991).
"In Mu'Min, the following had been reported in
the news media:  (1) Mu'Min's previous criminal
history; (2) the details of the charged crime; (3)
the fact that Mu'Min had been rejected for parole
six times; (4) the details of the prior murders of
which Mu'Min had been convicted; (5) Mu'Min's prison
infractions; (6) the fact that the death penalty had
not been available at the time of the previous
murders; (7) the fact that Mu'Min had confessed to
the charged crime; and (8) the opinion of local
officials that Mu'Min was guilty. There had been 47
newspaper articles published related to the murder.
31
1121097
"Further, in Mu'Min the petitioner submitted 64
proposed voir dire questions to the trial judge and
filed a motion for individual voir dire.  The trial
judge denied the motion for individual voir dire,
but he separated the venire into panels of four to
deal with the issue of publicity.  If a veniremember
stated that he or she had acquired information about
the alleged offense or the accused from the news
media or from any other source, the judge then
proceeded to ask each person individually whether
the information he or she had received affected that
person's impartiality in the case.  The defendant in
Mu'Min argued that the judge's failure to question
the veniremembers about the specific content of the
news reports to which they had been exposed violated
his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and
his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.  The
Supreme Court held that the trial judge had only to
examine 
the 
extent 
of 
the 
exposure 
to 
the
prejudicial publicity in order to determine whether
a juror could act impartially.
"In the instant case, Brown filed a request for
individual voir dire because of the pre-trial
publicity.  The trial judge denied this request and
proceeded to ask the venire as a whole whether the
members could be impartial.  Some of the types of
pre-trial publicity involved in this case were as
follows:  (1) 53 front page newspaper articles; (2)
radio broadcasts (lead stories); (3) deputy district
attorney's statements to the effect that this case
was '[o]ne of the most graphically horrible cases
we've had since I've been a D.A.,' and that 'if any
case called for the electric chair, Brown's does';
(4) a reference by the Montgomery chief of police to
the crime scene as 'one of the most hideous ... in
this area in a long time'; (5) publication of the
details of the defendant's prior crimes; and (6)
statements by the prosecutor to the effect that the
defendant had admitted the crime.
32
1121097
"This case is virtually indistinguishable from
Mu'Min. The only meaningful factual difference
between this case and Mu'Min is that the trial judge
in Mu'Min broke the venire into panels of four to
determine whether the jurors could be impartial,
whereas in this case the trial judge asked the
venire as a whole whether the members could be
impartial.  The method of determining impartiality
is not critical.  The crucial requirement is that
the trial court get enough information to make a
meaningful determination of juror impartiality.  As
the Court in Mu'Min stated:
"'Whether a trial court decides to put
questions about the content of publicity to
a potential juror or not, it must make the
same 
decision 
at 
the 
end 
of 
the
questioning:  is this juror to be believed
when he says he has not formed an opinion
about the case?'
"500 U.S. at 425, 111 S.Ct. at 1905.
"After carefully reviewing the record, we
conclude that the trial judge acquired adequate
information from the venire to make an independent
determination as to whether the jurors would be
impartial."
632 So. 2d at 15-17.
This case is essentially indistinguishable from Brown and 
Mu'Min, the United State Supreme Court case discussed in
Brown.  Similar to the pretrial publicity in Brown and Mu'Min,
the pretrial publicity in this case included numerous
newspaper articles and radio and television broadcasts
discussing the nature of the offenses, the potential
33
1121097
punishments for the offenses, the details of the defendant's
life and his confession to committing the offenses.  Like the
trial courts in Brown and Mu'Min, the trial court refused to
conduct individual voir dire and obtained 
information 
from the
veniremembers by propounding questions to the venire to
determine whether the veniremembers would be impartial.  Just
as in Mu'Min and in Brown, the question to be answered by this
Court is whether the trial court erred by accepting, without
individual voir dire, the assurances of the seated jurors that
they could put aside what they had read or heard and render a
fair verdict based on the evidence.  
Applying the precedent of the United States Supreme Court
and this Court to the facts of this case, we cannot conclude
that the trial court exceeded the scope of its discretion in
denying Luong's request that the trial court conduct
individual voir dire.  The record indicates that the trial
court was acutely aware of the pretrial publicity, the local
reaction to the crime, Luong's reputation, and the alleged
community prejudice.  The record further reflects that the
trial court was concerned about providing Luong with a fair
and unbiased jury.  The trial court's determination that
34
1121097
individual voir dire regarding pretrial publicity was not
required was the culmination of a lengthy process that
incorporated responses to questionnaires, responses or the
lack thereof to oral inquiries about bias, and repeated
admonishments to the venire of the need for candor.  The trial
court asked the veniremembers if they could determine the case
based only on the evidence presented.  With the exception of
one veniremember, who was struck, the other veniremembers
indicated that, even though they had knowledge of the case,
they could set aside any preconceived notions and render a
fair and impartial decision based upon the evidence.  The
record does not establish that any of the seated veniremembers
indicated a potential bias based on his or her exposure to
pretrial publicity.  Only speculation and conjecture supports
a finding otherwise.  Individual voir dire is required only
when there is an indication that the assurances of the seated
jurors that they could put aside what they had read or heard
and render a fair verdict based on the evidence are not
genuine.  The record in this case indicates that the
veniremembers were  contemplative of the trial court's
questions and genuine in their responses.  Although this Court
35
1121097
may have employed different voir dire procedures, it cannot
conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
denying individual voir dire with regard to the impact of the
publicity to uncover bias.  Because the record does not
establish that the veniremembers were not forthright with
their responses that they could render a fair trial based on
the evidence, and in light of the broad discretion vested in
the trial court in conducting voir dire, the Court of Criminal
Appeals erred in holding that individual voir dire was
mandated, and its judgment in this regard is reversed.
III.  
The State further contends the Court of Criminal Appeals'
holding that the trial court exceeded the scope of its
discretion by denying Luong's counsel funds to travel to
Vietnam to interview family members to develop mitigation
evidence conflicts with Bui v. State, 888 So. 2d 1227 (Ala.
2004).   In Bui, this Court stated:  "While we recognize
defense 
counsel's 
obligation 
to 
conduct 
a 
thorough
investigation of a defendant's background, the trial court
must consider the reasonableness of the investigation."  888
So. 2d at 1230.  We further opined that "'a court must
36
1121097
consider not only the quantum of the evidence already known to
counsel, but whether the known evidence would lead a
reasonable attorney to investigate further.'"  888 So. 2d at
1230 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003)). 
Luong moved the trial court for funds for his counsel to
travel to Vietnam to investigate his childhood and to
interview 
various 
relatives, 
including 
his 
mother, 
stepfather,
and aunts in an effort to develop mitigation evidence. In
support of his motion, Luong attached  an affidavit from a Dr.
Paul Leung, a Vietnam native and a mitigation expert.  Dr.
Leung averred:
"I am of the opinion that Lam Luong's childhood and
adolescence in Vietnam is significant mitigation
evidence.  Vietnamese society is generally cruel in
its treatment of Amerasian children, especially
black Amerasians, and they are often ostracized and
banished from society.  Lam Luong is a black
Amerasian and his personal history reveals he was
treated much like other Amerasian children born
before the fall of Saigon in 1975."
The foregoing affidavit, however, does not adequately
establish that the "known evidence" would lead a reasonable
attorney to investigate further.  The affidavit presents 
generalizations about the treatment of Amerasian children in
Vietnam and does not provide any specific information about
37
1121097
Luong's childhood from which the trial court could determine
that 
additional investigation 
in 
Vietnam would yield
mitigation evidence.  Therefore, the trial court did not
exceed the scope of its discretion in denying Luong's motion. 
Moreover, the trial court did not deny Luong's motion
without providing an avenue for future relief.  The trial
court 
suggested 
that 
Luong's 
counsel 
conduct 
videoconferencing
with Luong's relatives in Vietnam to determine what, if any,
potential evidence the relatives could provide.  The trial
court further provided that, if the videoconferencing
indicated that mitigation evidence could be developed in
Vietnam, Luong could request funds for travel at a later date. 
Because the record establishes that the trial court
considered the reasonableness of Luong's request and provided
a means for Luong to develop mitigation evidence, the trial
court did not exceed the scope of its discretion in denying
Luong's request for funds for his counsel to travel to Vietnam
to investigate mitigation evidence, and the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals holding otherwise is reversed. 
IV.
38
1121097
Last, the State contends that the Court of Criminal
Appeals erred in determining that the trial court exceeded the
scope of its discretion by admitting into evidence at the
sentencing hearing a videotape of Cpt. Darryl Wilson tossing
sandbags of the approximate weight of each of the children off
the Dauphin Island Bridge and his testimony about the rate of
speed at which the children fell.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals held that 
"because there was no testimony that showed that the
experiment was similar to the actual events that
occurred on the Dauphin Island Bridge, the admission
of the evidence of Cpt. Wilson's experiment was not
relevant to or probative of the issue of Luong's
sentencing."
Luong, ___ So. 3d at ___.  According to the State, the
decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals conflicts with this
Court's decision in Ex parte Hinton, 548 So. 2d 562 (Ala.
1989), which recognizes that § 13A-5-45(d), Ala. Code 1975,
provides for the admission of "[a]ny evidence which has
probative value and is relevant to sentence."  The State
maintains that the videotape and Cpt. Wilson's testimony
demonstrated how the offenses were committed and were
probative and relevant 
to 
the jury's determination whether the
aggravating circumstance that "the capital offense was
39
1121097
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel as compared to other
capital offenses," see § 13A-5-49(8), Ala. Code 1975, was
applicable. 
This Court's review of the record indicates that although
Luong objected to the admissibility of the videotape and to
Cpt. Wilson's testimony before the sentencing hearing began,
he did not object at the time the evidence was admitted.  The
law is well established that when a party is denied relief
upon the filing of a motion in limine, the party must object
with specificity at the time the evidence is proffered at
trial to preserve the issue for appellate review.  See Parks
v. State, 587 So. 2d 1012, 1015 (Ala. 1991); and Huff v.
State, 678 So. 2d 293, 296-97 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).  Because
Luong did not object with specificity when the trial court
admitted the videotape and testimony into evidence at the
sentencing hearing, this issue is not preserved for appellate
review.  However, because Luong has been sentenced to death,
his failure to object at trial does not bar appellate review;
40
1121097
rather, this Court may conduct a review for plain error.  See
Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P.4
In Ex parte Brown, 11 So. 3d 933, 935-36 (Ala. 2008),
this Court explained:
"'The standard of review in reviewing a
claim under the plain-error doctrine is
stricter 
than 
the 
standard 
used 
in
reviewing an issue that was properly raised
in the trial court or on appeal.  As the
United States Supreme Court stated in
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105
S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the
plain-error doctrine applies only if the
error is "particularly egregious" and if it
"seriously 
affect[s] 
the 
fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings."  See Ex parte Price, 725 So.
2d 1063 (Ala. 1998).'"
(Quoting Hall v. State, 820 So. 2d 113, 121–22 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1999).) 
Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P., states:
4
"In all cases in which the death penalty has
been imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall
notice any plain error or defect in the proceedings
under review, whether or not brought to the
attention of the trial court, and take appropriate
appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such
error has or probably has adversely affected the
substantial right of the appellant."
41
1121097
Additionally, this Court recognizes that this alleged
error occurred 
during 
the sentencing hearing of Luong's trial. 
Section 13A-5-45(d), Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[a]ny
evidence which has probative value and is relevant to
sentence" is admissible during the sentencing phase of a
capital trial.  The Alabama Rules of Evidence do not apply at
sentencing.  Rule 1101(b)(3) of the Alabama Rules of Evidence
provides: 
"(b) 
Rules 
Inapplicable. 
These 
rules, 
other 
than
those with respect to privileges, do not apply in
the following situations:
"....
 
"(3) 
Miscellaneous 
Proceedings.
Proceedings for extradition or rendition;
preliminary hearings in criminal cases;
sentencing, 
or 
granting 
or 
revoking
probation; 
issuance 
of 
warrants 
for 
arrest,
criminal summonses, and search warrants;
and proceedings with respect to release on
bail or otherwise."
(Emphasis added.)  See also Whatley v. State, [Ms. CR-08-0696,
Oct. 1, 2010] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)(holding
that no rule of evidence barred the relevant testimony of the
social worker at the penalty phase because "[t]he Rules of
Evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings").  Furthermore, 
42
1121097
in Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1977), which predates
the adoption of the Alabama Rules of Evidence, this Court
stated:
"In the conduct of the sentencing hearing, the
rules of evidence should be relaxed; and, while the
criteria for aggravating circumstances are strictly
construed against the State, proof of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances may be by deposition,
written interrogatories, affidavits or by reliable
hearsay. While some discretion must of necessity be
vested in the trial judge, wide latitude should be
given the parties and their counsel in making
opening statements, proffer of evidence, and in
making 
closing 
arguments. 
Particularly, 
the
convicted defendant should not be restricted unduly;
for, literally, he is pleading for his life."
352 So. 2d at 495 (emphasis added).  
In Duke v. State, 889 So. 2d 1, 18 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002)
rev'd on other grounds, 544 U.S. 901 (2005), the Court of
Criminal Appeals held that the trial court did not exceed the
scope of its discretion by admitting into evidence during the
sentencing hearing of a capital trial a mannequin to
demonstrate the way the victims were killed.  Although this
case involves a videotape demonstrating how the offenses were
committed, we find the caselaw and reasoning in Duke
instructive.  Duke argued that the use of a mannequin, which
was not comparable to the size and physical characteristics of
43
1121097
the victims, constituted prejudice that was not outweighed by
any probative value.  In considering this issue, the Court of
Criminal Appeals stated:
"A claim of this nature is relatively rare;
however, this Court in Minor v. State, 780 So. 2d
707 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), rev'd on other grounds,
780 So. 2d 796 (Ala. 2000), addressed the use of a
doll in a capital-murder prosecution to demonstrate
how the victim's injuries may have occurred. We
stated:
"'"The 
rule 
on 
the
admissibility of experiments in
open court is stated in Shows v.
Brunson, 229 Ala. 682, 682, 159
So. 248 (1935).
"'"'Experiments 
or
tests of this character
in 
open 
court 
are
usually 
within 
the
discretion of the trial
judge, 
guided 
by 
a
sound judgment as to
whether the result will
b e  
s u f f i c i e n t l y
relevant and material
to 
warrant 
such
procedure. 22 C.J. p.
700, § 899.
"'"'Similarity 
of
conditions, and a test
that will go to the
substantial question in
hand, should appear.'
"'"See also Hawkins v. State, 53
Ala. App. 89, 93, 297 So. 2d 813
44
1121097
(1974).  Both the scope and
extent of the experiment, if
allowed, rest within the sound
discretion of the trial judge.
The exercise of that discretion
will not be reversed on appeal
unless it has been clearly and
grossly abused.  Campbell v.
State, 55 Ala. 80 (1876); C.
Gamble, 
McElroy's 
Alabama
Evidence, § 81.02(1) (3rd ed.
1977).
"'"While the conditions of
the 
experiment 
and 
of 
the
occurrence in issue should be
substantially similar, they need
not 
be 
identical. 
McElroy,
81.01(4).
"'"'A 
reasonable 
or
substantial similarity
suffices and only where
the 
conditions 
are
dissimilar 
in 
an
essential 
particular
should the evidence of
an 
experiment 
be
rejected.  If we have a
case 
wh er e  
the
conditions 
are 
not
identical, 
then 
the
dissimilarity goes to
the 
weight 
of 
the
evidence 
of 
the
experiment but not to
its admissibility.'
"'"See also Eddy v. State, 352
So. 2d 1161 (Ala. Cr. App.
1977)."
45
1121097
"'Ivey v. State, 369 So. 2d 1276, 1278–79
(Ala. Cr. App. 1979). See also, C. Gamble,
McElroy's  Alabama Evidence, § 81.02 (5th
ed. 1996).
"'However, before the demonstration,
the trial court should determine if the
prejudicial effect of the demonstration
substantially 
outweighs 
its 
probative
value.  Even if the trial court finds the
demonstration to be relevant and helpful to
the jury, the trial court may still exclude
it if the probative value is substantially
outweighed 
by 
the 
danger 
of 
unfair
prejudice. See Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid.;
McElroy § 81.02.  "The power to make this
determination is vested in the trial
court."  Hayes v. State, 717 So. 2d [30,]
37 [(Ala. Crim. App. 1997)].'
"780 So. 2d at 762–63."
889 So. 2d at 18.  Cf.  Morgan v. State, 518 So. 2d 186, 189
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987)(holding that the trial court did not
exceed the scope of its discretion in admitting into evidence
during the guilt phase of a capital trial a videotaped
reenactment of the offense).   
The question presented by the admission of the videotape
and Cpt. Wilson's testimony is whether the evidence had
probative value and was relevant to a jury determination and,
if it was probative and relevant, whether the prejudicial
46
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effect of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative
value.
The test for probativeness is whether an experiment or
demonstration is "substantially" like the real event.  I
Charles W. Gamble and Robert J. Goodwin, McElroy's Alabama
Evidence § 81.001(2)(6th ed. 2009).  This Court has viewed the
videotape, which shows the Dauphin Island Bridge and Cpt.
Wilson dropping sandbags from the bridge, and has read Cpt.
Wilson's testimony.  Cpt. Wilson testified that he "made the
sandbags to the approximate weights ... of each child" and
that he dropped the bags from the top of the bridge at that
point where Luong had stated he had dropped the children.  He
also testified that the weather on the day he dropped the
sandbags was similar to the weather on the day the offenses
were committed.  Luong did not cross- examine Cpt. Wilson
about the videotape or about whether the conditions on the day
it was made were similar to the conditions on the day of the
offenses.  The videotape was illustrative of the offenses and
relevant to the determination whether the aggravating
circumstance that the offenses were heinous, atrocious, or
cruel applied to these murders.  Considering the content of
47
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the videotape and the "relaxed" evidentiary standard during a
sentencing hearing, the  videotape had probative value and was
relevant to the determination of an aggravating circumstance. 
Moreover, this Court cannot agree with Luong that because
the videotape had a "big visual impact" the risk of prejudice
against him was extreme to the extent that it affected his
substantial rights.  Luong admitted that he threw his children
off the Dauphin Island Bridge.  The videotape demonstrated the
acts Luong admitted he committed and did not create a danger
unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed the probative
value of the evidence.  Cf.  Duke, supra (holding that the
prejudicial impact of a demonstration in open court during the
penalty phase of how the children's throats were slit did not
outweigh the probative value of the demonstration).  This
Court agrees with the trial court that the probative value of
the evidence outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice.
This 
Court 
has 
also 
considered 
the 
questionable
credibility and accuracy of Cpt. Wilson's testimony that
"objects fall at the same rate of speed, regardless of the
weight," and that the children fell at a speed of 25 mph. 
Luong had an opportunity to challenge this testimony through
48
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cross-examination, and he chose not to do so.  See Ballard v.
State, 767 So. 2d 1123, 1140 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)("'A party
is given wide latitude on cross-examination to test a
witness's 
partiality, 
bias, 
intent, 
credibility, 
or 
prejudice,
or to impeach, illustrate, or test the accuracy of the
witness's testimony or recollection as well as the extent of
his knowledge.'" (quoting Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 1276,
1327 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996))).  Therefore, in light of Luong's
acceptance of Cpt. Wilson's testimony and the fact that the
jurors observed the rate at which the sandbags fell when they
watched the videotape, this Court cannot conclude that the
admission 
of 
the 
videotape 
"seriously 
affected 
his 
substantial
rights" and "had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's
deliberations."  See Ex parte Brown, 11 So. 3d 933, 938 (Ala.
2008).  See also Ex parte Walker, 972 So. 2d 737, 752 (Ala.
2007) (recognizing that the appellant has the burden of
establishing 
prejudice relating to an issue being reviewed for
plain error). 
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
holding that the trial court exceeded the scope of its
discretion in admitting the videotape and Cpt. Wilson's
testimony into evidence is reversed. 
49
1121097
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Parker, Murdock, and Main, JJ., dissent.
Wise, J., recuses herself.*
*Justice Wise was a member of the Court of Criminal
Appeals when that court considered this case.
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PARKER, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the main opinion.  I write
specifically to address Parts I and II of that opinion.
This Court has a duty to protect the Constitution and to
uphold is provisions.
"The right of the accused to a fair and
impartial trial, or to a fair trial before an
impartial 
jury, 
is 
a 
constitutional 
right.
Regardless 
of 
all 
other 
considerations, 
it
affirmatively appears from the record before us in
its entirety that the accused did not have a trial
by an impartial jury. We cannot, if we were so
disposed, ignore the solemn duty placed upon this
court by our organic law. The  Constitution is the
supreme law of this jurisdiction, and we are
enjoined to enforce and to uphold its provisions. No
higher obligation could be placed upon us. Fidelity
to our oaths demands that we give effect to the
constitutional guaranty that every person accused of
crime has a right to a trial before an impartial
jury. We are convinced that the accused has been
denied his constitutional right. ...
"In the case of Johnson v. Craft et al., 205
Ala. 386, 87 So. 375 [(1921)], it was said:
"'The Constitution's control is absolute
wherever and to whatever its provisions
apply; 
and 
every 
officer, 
executive,
legislative, and judicial, is bound by oath
(section 279) to support the Constitution,
to vindicate and uphold its mandates, and
to observe and enforce its inhibitions
without regard to extrinsic circumstances.
It commits to nobody, officer, or agent any
authority or power whatever to change or
modify or suspend the effect or operation
of its mandates or its prohibitions.'"
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Martin v. State, 22 Ala. App. 154, 158, 113 So. 602, 606
(1926)(emphasis added), reversed on other grounds, 216 Ala.
160, 113 So. 602 (1926).  These principles compel me to
dissent from the main opinion for the specific reasons set
forth below.
I.
I dissent from the conclusion in the main opinion that
"the trial court did not exceed the scope of its discretion in
refusing to find presumed prejudice against [Lam] Luong ...." 
___ So. 3d at ___.
Under 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States
Constitution, every criminal defendant has a right to an
impartial jury.  One of the ways a criminal defendant's right
to an impartial jury can be threatened is by media coverage.
In certain cases, when extensive and inflammatory media
coverage has saturated the community, a presumption may arise
that any potential jurors are prejudiced against the
defendant. In order to ensure that a criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is protected, the
Supreme Court of the United States has developed a four-factor
test to determine whether a presumption of juror prejudice
exists in light of the specific facts of a case.  The four
52
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factors are: "(1) the size and characteristics of the
community where the crimes occurred; (2) the general content
of the media coverage; (3) the timing of the media coverage in
relation to the trial; and (4) the media interference with the
trial or the verdict."  Luong v. State, [Ms. CR-08-1219,
February 15, 2013] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2013)
(summarizing the four factors set forth in Skilling v. United
States, 561 U.S. 358, ___, 130 S.  Ct. 2896, 2915-16 (2010)).
Of critical importance in the present case is the second
factor: the content of the media coverage.  Generally, the
presumed-prejudice principle is "rarely applicable" and is
"reserved for extreme situations."  Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d
1487, 1537 (11th Cir. 1985).  However, the Supreme Court of
the United States has held that when a confession is
accompanied by media coverage of other prejudicial or
inflammatory information, prejudice is presumed.  Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963).  The media coverage in
this case, the details of which are set forth in the Court of
Criminal Appeals' opinion in Luong and discussed more
thoroughly below, warrants a presumption that the jurors,
chosen from citizens in Mobile County, were 
prejudiced 
against
Luong.
"The theory of [the trial] system is that the
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conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence, whether of private talk or public print." 
Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General of Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).  Accordingly, a trial court may,
upon motion by the defense or the prosecution, transfer a case
to another county or take any other action designed to ensure
that a fair trial may be had if there exists in the county in
which the prosecution is pending such prejudice that a fair
trial cannot be had there.  See Skilling, 561 U.S. at ___, 130
S. 
Ct. 
at 
2913 
("The 
Constitution's 
place-of-trial
prescriptions ... do not impede transfer of the proceeding to
a 
different 
district 
at 
the 
defendant's 
request 
if
extraordinary local prejudice will prevent a fair trial —- a
'basic requirement  of due process.'").
The prerequisite for obtaining a change of venue on the
ground of prejudice is that the prejudice is such that it will
prevent a fair and impartial trial in the current venue.  This
prejudice can take several forms, but the ground most commonly
advanced for a change of venue is that adverse pretrial
publicity precludes the selection of an unbiased jury.  4
Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 16.3(b), 806 (3d
54
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ed. 2007).  In other words, when pretrial publicity creates
prejudice, a change of venue may be appropriate.
Furthermore, prejudice may be presumed where "'pretrial
publicity is so pervasive and prejudicial that [a court]
cannot expect to find an unbiased jury pool in the
community.'"  House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1023-24 (10th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Goss v. Nelson, 439 F.3d 621, 628 (10th
Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169,
1181 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that court must consider whether
prejudicial inflammatory publicity regarding the defendant's
case so saturated the community as to render it virtually
impossible to obtain an impartial jury there).  To justify a
presumption of prejudice under this standard, the publicity
must be both extensive and sensational in nature.  Angiulo,
897 F.2d at 1181.
The rationale underlying the principle of presumed
prejudice is that defendants and judges "simply cannot rely on
'"jurors' claims that they can be impartial."'"  United States
v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1182 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429 (1991), quoting in turn
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984) ("[A]dverse
pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice
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in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be
impartial should not be believed.")); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d
500, 511 (9th Cir. 2011) ("We may give 'little weight' to a
prospective juror's assurances of impartiality 'where the
general atmosphere in the community or courtroom is
sufficiently inflammatory.'" (citations omitted)); United
States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1176-77 (10th Cir.
1991) ("In rare cases, the community is so predisposed that
prejudice can be presumed, and venue must be transferred as a
matter of law."); 6 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 23.2(a), 264
("[P]rejudicial publicity may be so inflammatory and so
pervasive that the voir dire simply cannot be trusted to fully
reveal the likely prejudice among prospective jurors.").  
As mentioned above, the principle of presumed prejudice
is rarely applicable and is reserved for extreme situations. 
See Hayes, 632 F.3d at 508; United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d
1121, 1143 (11th Cir. 2006); accord Skilling, 561 U.S. at ___,
130 S. Ct. at 2915 ("A presumption of prejudice, our decisions
indicate, attends only the extreme case.").  The defendant's
burden in proving presumed prejudice is, consequently,
extremely high.  McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1182.  Thus, it has been
said that to establish presumptive prejudice, the defendant
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must show that "an irrepressibly hostile attitude pervade[s]
the community" and that the publicity "dictates the
community's opinion as to guilt or innocence."  Abello-Silva,
948 F.2d at 1176.  It likewise has been said that prejudice
cannot be presumed unless the trial atmosphere has been
"'utterly corrupted by press coverage.'"  Campa, 459 F.3d at
1144 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 303 (1977)). 
The reviewing court "must find that the publicity in essence
displaced the judicial process, thereby denying the defendant
his constitutional right to a fair trial."  McVeigh, 153 F.3d
at 1181. As stated above, the Supreme Court of the United
States has considered four factors in determining whether a
trial court should presume prejudice from media coverage: (1)
the size and characteristics of the community in which the
crime or crimes occurred; (2) whether the media coverage
contained a confession or other blatantly prejudicial
information of the type readers or viewers could not
reasonably be expected to shut from sight, i.e., the general
content of the media; (3) the temporal proximity between the
media coverage and the defendant's trial; and (4) media
interference with the jury's verdict.  Skilling, 561 U.S. at
___, 130 S. Ct. at 2913-16.
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I agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' analysis of
each of the above factors.  I find the Court of Criminal
Appeals' discussion of the second prong to be particularly
persuasive in this case.
In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), the seminal
case 
concerning 
presumed 
prejudice, 
the 
defendant's 
videotaped
confession to law enforcement was broadcast on numerous
occasions over a local television station to a relatively
small community; the Supreme Court of the United States
concluded that such media coverage resulted in a "kangaroo
court" that derailed due process and quashed any hope of a
fair trial in that location.  373 U.S. at 726.  The Supreme
Court held that "the spectacle of [the defendant] personally
confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was later to
be charged," to the tens of thousands of people who saw and
heard it, "in a very real sense was [the defendant's] trial –-
at which he pleaded guilty to murder.  Any subsequent court
proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a
spectacle could be but a hollow formality."  Rideau, 373 U.S.
at 726.  The Supreme Court reached this conclusion "without
pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir
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dire examination of the members of the jury."  373 U.S. at
727.  The Supreme Court held that prejudice was presumed.
In Skilling, the Supreme Court of the United States noted
that, although the news stories regarding the defendant and
the crime were not kind by any means, they did not contain "a
confession or other blatantly prejudicial information" of the
type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to
ignore.  561 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2916.  Comparing the
content of the media coverage in Skilling to that of Rideau,
supra, the Supreme Court found that the content of the media
coverage did not warrant a presumption of prejudice. 
Skilling, 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2916.  The Supreme
Court noted in Rideau that "[w]hat the people ... saw on their
television sets was [the defendant], in jail, flanked by the
sheriff and two state troopers, admitting in detail the
commission of the robbery, kidnapping, and murder, 
in 
response
to leading questions by the sheriff."  Rideau, 373 U.S. at
725.  The Supreme Court also noted in Rideau that "[f]or
anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion cannot
be avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands of
people who saw and heard it, in a very real sense was [the
defendant's] trial -- at which he pleaded guilty to murder." 
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373 U.S. at 726.  In contrast, the Supreme Court noted in
Skilling 
that 
although 
Rideau's 
"dramatically 
staged 
admission
of guilt ... was likely imprinted indelibly in the mind of
anyone who watched it," the pretrial publicity involving
Skilling, in comparison, was less memorable, and thus less
prejudicial; Skilling did not involve any confession, much
less a blatantly prejudicial smoking-gun variety confession,
that could invite prejudgment opinions throughout the
community regarding his culpability.  Skilling, 561 U.S. at
___, 130 S. Ct. at 2916.  The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas denied Skilling's change-of-
venue motion, despite "isolated incidents of intemperate
commentary," because the media coverage "ha[d] [mostly] been
objective and  unemotional," and the facts of the case were
"neither heinous nor sensational."  561 U.S. at ___, 130 S.
Ct. at 2908.  The court concluded that pretrial publicity
concerning the case did not warrant a presumption that the
defendant would be unable to obtain a fair trial in that
venue.  561 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2909.
In Ex parte Fowler, 574 So. 2d 745 (1990), this Court
also declined to presume prejudice when the media coverage
gave only "factual and objective accounts of the events
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surrounding the petitioner's case."  574 So. 2d at 748.  The
defendant in Fowler attempted to show that there had been
extensive publicity surrounding the case in Fayette 
County 
and
that some of that publicity had spilled over into Lamar
County, the county the trial judge, upon a motion for a change
of venue, deemed appropriate in which to try the case. 
Fowler, 547 So. 2d at 749.   The defendant introduced the
results of a survey of 200 potential jurors in Lamar County. 
A majority of those who participated in the survey stated that
they had knowledge of the case.  Those who stated that they
were aware of the case also stated that they had acquired
their knowledge largely by reading articles appearing in
newspapers published in Fayette, Lamar, and Tuscaloosa
Counties, by listening to the radio, and by talking with
friends and relatives.  Of those who participated in the
survey, 46% stated that, based on what they had read or heard
about the case, they personally believed that the defendant
was not justified in killing her husband.  After carefully
reviewing the numerous newspaper articles and the transcripts
of radio broadcasts that were contained in the record, this
Court concluded that none of the media coverage was inherently
prejudicial or tended to inflame the community to rally
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against the defendant.  To the contrary, the media coverage
contained only factual and objective accounts of the events
surrounding the defendant's case and not necessarily anything
that would be unfairly prejudicial or inflammatory.  Id.
In this case, Lam Luong confessed to throwing his four
children, one at a time, off the Dauphin Island Bridge.  The
State 
emphasizes, 
however, 
that 
Luong's 
confession, 
unlike 
the
defendant's confession in Rideau, was not broadcast.  State's
brief, at p. 36.  However, Luong's guilty plea was broadcast. 
State's brief, at p. 36.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Skilling hinted
that a guilty plea, by itself, whether treated the same as a
confession or as mere "blatantly prejudicial information,"
might not be enough to warrant the presumption of prejudice
when the guilty plea is made by a codefendant; it, however,
did not address the effect of broadcasting a defendant's
guilty plea, as occurred in this case.  Skilling, 561 U.S. at
___, 130 S. Ct. at 2917 ("Although publicity about a
codefendant's guilty plea calls for inquiry to guard against
actual prejudice, it does not ordinarily –- and, we are
satisfied, it did not here –- warrant an automatic presumption
of prejudice.").
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Regardless, because the media content consisted of other
prejudicial information, not only a confession or a guilty
plea, such as "Luong's prior criminal history, ... Luong's
desire to plead guilty, Luong's decision to withdraw his
guilty plea, the community's outrage over the death of the
four children, and what the community believed should be
Luong's punishment," Luong, ___ So. 3d at ___, it is not
necessary to determine whether a confession alone has any
bearing 
upon 
the 
presumption-of-prejudice 
analysis 
and 
whether
a guilty plea is treated as a confession under Skilling.
The Court of Criminal Appeals detailed the extensive
media coverage in Luong, as follows:
"Most of the articles cited above appeared on
the front page of the [Mobile] Press-Register and
were often accompanied by photographs of the four
children, photographs of the recovery efforts, and
photographs of individuals mourning the loss of the
four victims.  It was reported on numerous occasions
that Luong had been described by the local community
as a crack addict, that the motive for the murders
was revenge, that Luong had a criminal history, that
Luong had been in trouble with the law in Georgia
and Mississippi, that Luong had been arrested in
Georgia for possessing crack cocaine, that Luong had
pleaded guilty in 1997 to possessing cocaine in the
State of Mississippi, that Luong had had another
drug charge in 2000 but that charge was dropped,
that Luong's drug problem and his behavior were
getting worse, and that Luong had said that he
wanted his case to be more famous than Virginia Tech
or September 11, 2001.
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"There were articles describing the impact of
the crime on the community and the community's
efforts to come to terms with the ramifications of
Luong's actions.  There was extensive publicity
concerning the community's involvement in the case
and 
the 
recovery 
efforts 
the 
community 
had
undertaken to find the bodies of the four children. 
At one point over 150 people, mostly volunteers,
helped with the recovery efforts, and the newspaper
asked all owners of property near the water to walk
their properties.  A local cemetery donated the
plots for the children to be buried and set aside a
plot for the children's mother.  A local school
raised money for the mother.  A permanent memorial
was erected at Maritime Park in Bayou La Batre to
honor the children.  The community was invited to
the graveside service for the children, the family
of the victims hosted an appreciation dinner for the
volunteers who had searched for the children's
bodies, and a moment of silence was observed at a
Mardi 
Gras 
parade 
to 
honor 
the 
children. 
Individuals indicated how consumed the Mobile
community had become with the tragedy and the anger
and outrage that the community felt toward Luong.
"Luong's case also received extensive local
television coverage.  Bob Cashen, news director for
local FOX affiliate WALA-TV, Channel 10, stated that
his station aired 143 news segments related to the
murders.  Christian Stapleton, the custodian of
records for local CBS affiliate WKRG, Channel 5,
stated that 442 stories had been aired concerning
the case from January 2008 through January 2009. 
Wes Finley, news director for local NBC affiliate
WPMI, Channel 15, furnished a list of 93 stories
that had been aired about the case.  WKRG also
hosted an online forum concerning the murders
entitled 'Children Thrown from the Bridge.'  One
topic in this forum entitled 'How Should the Baby
Killer be Dealt With' was viewed over 16,000 times."
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Luong, ___ So. 3d at ___ (footnote and reference to record
omitted).
Further, in support of his change-of-venue motion, Luong
presented the results of a telephone poll that had been
conducted by Dr. Verne Kennedy, the president of Market
Research Insight, Inc.  Dr. Kennedy's poll, conducted in
January 2009 of 350 people in the Mobile area, revealed that
84% of those polled had heard about the case, that 44% had
heard a great deal about the case, that 71% had a personal
opinion that Luong was guilty, and that 75% thought that other
people viewed Luong as guilty.
The media coverage in this case was extensive and
sensational; I agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals
concerning this issue and its conclusion that "Luong's case
represents one of those rare instances where prejudice must be
presumed."  Luong, ___ So. 3d at ___.  Therefore, I
respectfully dissent from the conclusion in the main opinion
that "the trial court did not exceed the scope of its
discretion in refusing to find presumed prejudice against
Luong ...." ___ So. 3d at ___.
II.
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I also dissent from the conclusion in the main opinion
that "the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that
individual voir dire was mandated ...." ___ So. 3d at ___.
Based on my conclusion that Luong put forth evidence of
pervasive prejudice against him based on the extensive and
sensational media coverage, the burden then shifted to the
State to rebut that presumption.  Campa, 459 F.3d at 1143.  In
Campa, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that "the government can rebut any presumption of
juror prejudice by demonstrating that the district court's
careful and thorough voir dire, as well as its use of
prophylactic measures to insulate the jury from outside
influences, ensured that the defendant received a fair trial
by an impartial jury."  459 F.3d at 1143.  Individual voir
dire was necessary in order to ensure that the veniremembers
selected to serve on Luong's jury held no prejudice against
him.
I note that, in Alabama, voir dire is conducted under the
discretion of the trial court and that, "'[e]ven in capital
cases, there is no requirement that a defendant be allowed to
question each prospective juror individually during voir dire
examination ....'"  Browning v. State, 549 So. 2d 548, 552
66
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(Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (quoting Hallford v. State, 548 So. 2d
526 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988)).  Additionally, according to the
United States Supreme Court, "no hard-and-fast formula
dictates the necessary depth or breadth of voir dire." 
Skilling, 561 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2917.
However, "individual questioning may be necessary under
some circumstances to ensure that all [juror] prejudice has
been exposed."  Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368, 402 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991).  Also, "questions on voir dire must be
sufficient to identify prospective jurors who hold views that
would prevent or substantially impair them from performing 
the
duties required of jurors."  Jackson v. Houk, 687 F.3d 723,
735 (6th Cir. 2012); see also 6 LaFave, Criminal Procedure §
23.2(f), 278 ("Yet another way to overcome the prejudicial
impact of pretrial publicity is by a voir dire that identifies
those prospective jurors influenced by the publicity and a
challenge procedure that eliminates all persons in that group
who actually have been biased by the publicity.").
In the present case, in light of the voluminous evidence
put forth by Luong establishing a presumption of prejudice
based on the extensive and sensational media coverage,
individual voir dire was required to ensure that Luong receive
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a fair trial by an impartial jury.  In support of my
conclusion, a comparison of two cases decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Campa,
supra, and Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1985), is
helpful.
In Campa, a case concerning whether presumed prejudice
based on extensive and inflammatory media coverage existed,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
"Once the defendant puts forth evidence of the
pervasive prejudice against him, the government can
rebut any presumption of juror prejudice by
demonstrating that the district court's careful and
thorough voir dire, as well as its use of
prophylactic measure to insulate the jury from
outside influences, ensured that the defendant
received a fair trial by an impartial jury."
459 F.3d at 1143.  The Eleventh Circuit then examined the
trial court's voir dire of the veniremembers and stated:
"The voir dire in this case was a model voir
dire for a high profile case. The court conducted a
meticulous two-phase voir dire stretching over seven
days. 
In 
contrast 
to 
the 
generalized,
pre-fabricated, and sometimes leading questions of
[a] survey [submitted by the defendant] were the
detailed and neutral voir dire questions that the
court 
carefully 
crafted 
with 
the 
parties'
assistance. In the first phase of voir dire, the
court screened 168 prospective jurors for hardship
and their ability to reach a verdict based solely on
the evidence. In the second phase, the court
extensively 
and 
individually 
questioned 
82
prospective jurors outside the venire's presence
regarding 
sensitive 
subjects 
.... 
Phase 
two
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questioning revealed that most of the prospective
jurors, and all of the empaneled jurors, had been
exposed to little or no media coverage of the case.
Those who had been exposed to media coverage of the
case vaguely recalled a 'shootdown,' but little
else. Ultimately, the court struck 32 out of 168
potential jurors (19%) for Cuba-related animus [the
defendant was Cuban], which was well within an
acceptable range."
459 F.3d at 1147 (footnotes omitted).  The Eleventh Circuit
concluded:
"In sum, the record in this case amply
demonstrates 
that 
the 
district 
court 
took
extraordinary measures to carefully select a fair
and impartial jury. The court extensively and
individually questioned the prospective jurors,
repeatedly cautioned them not to read anything or
talk to anyone about the case, insulated the jurors
from media publicity, provided the defendants with
extra peremptory challenges, struck 32 persons for
cause, and struck all of the Cuban–Americans over
the government's Batson[ v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986),] objection. Under these circumstances, we
will not disturb the district court's broad
discretion in assessing the jurors' credibility and
impartiality."
459 F.3d at 1148.
In Coleman v. Kemp, the Eleventh Circuit stated that a
presumption of juror prejudice as a result of media coverage
could be rebutted by voir dire of the members of the jury. 
778 F.2d at 1541 n. 25.  In Coleman, the defendant was charged
with murdering six individuals.  778 F.2d at 1488.  Once
charges were brought against the defendant, the defendant
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filed a motion for a change of venue, alleging that refusal to
grant the motion would deprive him of his right to an
impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; the trial
court denied the defendant's motion, and the defendant
appealed.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the "pretrial
publicity and the community's atmosphere were so prejudicial
and inflammatory that the trial court's refusal to grant the
[defendant's] motion for a change of venue deprived him of his
rights guaranteed by the Sixth ... Amendment[]."  778 F.2d at
1489.  The Coleman court concluded  that the defendant could
not receive a fair trial before an impartial jury in that
venue because of the presumption of prejudice that had arisen
as a result of the inflammatory pretrial publicity that had
saturated the community.  778 F.2d at 1537-38.  The State
argued that the transcript of the voir dire record setting
forth the "examination of the members of the jury" could rebut
any presumption of prejudice; the Coleman court agreed that
there could be such a rebuttal.  However, the Coleman court
concluded that the voir dire examinations conducted by the
trial judge were insufficient to rebut the presumption of
prejudice for two reasons.
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First, the problem with the voir dire in Coleman was that
the trial court in that case did not ask "questions which were
calculated to elicit the disclosure of the existence of actual
prejudice, the degree to which the jurors had been exposed to
prejudicial publicity, and how such exposure had affected the
jurors' attitude towards the trial."  778 F.2d at 1542. 
Instead, the trial court in that case conducted an
insufficient voir dire by asking leading questions and
inducing conclusory answers.
Second, the voir dire in Coleman was insufficient because
the trial court examined prospective jurors in the presence of
other prospective jurors who had not yet been examined.  The
Coleman court stated that preferable voir dire procedures
would have followed the American Bar Association Guidelines,
as follows: 
"'If there is a substantial possibility that
individual jurors will be ineligible to serve
because of exposure to potentially prejudicial
material, the examination of each juror with respect
to exposure shall take place outside the presence of
other chosen and prospective jurors.'"
778 F.2d at 1542.
The voir dire in the present case is more similar to the
voir dire conducted in Coleman than to the voir dire conducted
in Campa.  In the present case, the trial court failed to
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conduct a sufficient voir dire examination of each juror by
failing to obtain enough information to evaluate the degree to
which the jurors had been exposed to prejudicial publicity and
how such exposure had affected the jurors' attitudes toward
the trial.  According to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the
trial court conducted the voir dire in the following order:
"On March 9, 2009, the voir dire examination
began, and 156 prospective jurors completed juror
questionnaires 
related 
to 
Luong's 
case. 
The
questionnaire consisted of 11 pages. Question number
51 specifically asked the jurors if they had read or
heard about the case and the content of what they
had read or heard. ... Most of the jurors who
indicated that they had heard or read about the case
did not complete the question concerning the content
of what they had heard or read.
"A review of the questionnaires indicated that
of the 156 jurors who completed questionnaires, 139
of those jurors had heard about the case and only 15
had not heard about the case; 38 of the jurors who
had heard about the case responded that they had
heard or read that Luong either had confessed to the
murders or had pleaded guilty to the murders.
"After the circuit court held that it was
allowing 
individual 
voir 
dire, 
the 
following
occurred: 
"'The Court: What I am going to do is I'm
going to say: I want everybody to raise
their hand if they have heard, read, or
seen, or by word of mouth know anything
about this case.  Raise your hand.  Don't
tell me what it is.
"'We're going to take their names. 
I'm going to have them identify who they
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are 
and 
then 
we 
will 
take 
them
individually.'
"However, during voir dire examination the
circuit court merely asked the following questions
concerning pretrial publicity:
"'The Court: Okay. I have told you that
there has been media coverage from various
media outlets about this case. And I want
to see a show of hands as to who may
remember 
seeing, 
reading 
or 
hearing
anything about this case. 
"'(Response.)
"'The Court: Okay.  I Think a better
question would be -- please put your hands
down.
"'(Laughter.)
"'The Court: Who among you have not heard,
read or seen anything about this case?
"'(Response.)
"'The Court: Okay.  Could you -- Ma'am,
could you stand and give us your name and
your number?
"'[S.E.]: [S.E.], number 62.
"'The Court: Thank you, ma'am.  You may be
seated. 
"'Yes, sir?
"'[L.M.]: [L.M.], number 63.
"'The Court: Thank you very much. Okay
"'Now, listen to this question very
carefully. Would any of you, based on what
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you have read, seen, or heard, or remember,
could you set those things aside and serve
as a fair and impartial juror?
"'In other words, is there any member
of the jury who thinks because they have a
recollection of this case, whether it be
from radio, television, or newspaper,
Internet, or any other source, that it
would be impossible for you to put that
aside, lay that aside and sit as a fair and
impartial juror in this case and base your
decision only on the evidence as you hear
it is in this courtroom?
"'Can any of you -- or would any of
you tell me it would be impossible for you
to sit as a fair and impartial juror in
this case?
"'(Response.)
"'The Court: I see a hand in the back.
Could you please stand, sir, and just give
us your name and number?
"'[S.T.]: Mr. [S.T.], 141.
"'The Court: [S.T.], you are telling me
that regardless of what you have heard,
read or seen, you are telling me that you
in no way could set that aside and sit as
a juror?
"'[S.T.]: No, sir.
"'The Court: Thank you. Is it 144?
"'[S.T.]: 141.
"'The Court: All right. The rest of you are
telling me that even though you may have
heard, read or seen matters about this
case, 
and 
you 
may 
have 
had 
some
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preconceived impression or opinion, based
on what you have heard, read or seen, that
you could sit as a juror in this case, base
your verdict only on the evidence as it
comes from the witness stand and any
evidence that may be introduced into
evidence in the form of photographs or
documents or something, and you could
render a fair and impartial verdict by
setting aside any of that and base your
verdict on the evidence that you hear in
this courtroom?  You can do that.
"'(Response.)
"'The Court: If you can't, other than
[S.T.], please raise your hand.
"'(No response.)'"
Luong, ___ So. 3d at ___ (footnotes omitted).  As the Court of
Criminal Appeals noted, Luong objected to the trial court's
method of handling the issue of pretrial publicity and the
court's failure to allow individual voir dire. ___ So. 3d at
___.
Further, the trial court in this case did not follow the
American Bar Association Guideline, recommended in Coleman,
that "'the examination of each juror with respect to exposure
shall take place outside the presence of other chosen and
prospective jurors.'"  Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1542.  The trial
court questioned the prospective jurors as a whole.
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The voir dire conducted in this case is a mere shadow of
the "model voir dire for a high profile case" employed by the
federal district court in Campa.  In the present case, all 12
jurors who served in Luong's jury indicated in their juror
questionnaires that they had heard that Luong had confessed or
that he had pleaded guilty; however, none of those jurors were
questioned individually.  Instead, during the voir dire
examination, the trial court merely asked the prospective
jurors to raise their hands if they remembered seeing,
reading, or hearing anything about the case.  None of the
jurors who served on Luong's jury were questioned 
individually
concerning their exposure to pretrial publicity.  The trial
court's failure to conduct an individual voir dire of the
jurors left unrebutted the presumption that the jurors were
prejudiced against Luong based on the inflammatory pretrial
publicity that saturated the community.  In short, the trial
court did not get enough information to make a meaningful
determination of juror impartiality.
Therefore, I dissent from the conclusion in the main
opinion that "the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding
that individual voir dire was mandated." ___ So. 3d at ___.
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I also write to address the sentiment in the following
paragraph from the main opinion:
"This 
Court 
has 
also 
considered 
Luong's 
argument
that the media coverage of Luong's confession and
the withdrawal of his guilty plea amounted to 'the
kind of deeply prejudicial pretrial exposure that
jurors cannot be reasonably expected to ignore.' 
However, in light of the admission into evidence at
trial of Luong's confession in which he admitted
that he threw his children off the bridge, the
publicity about his confession and guilty-plea
proceeding did not result in a preconceived
prejudice that permeated the trial, preventing  the
seating of a fair and impartial jury."
___ So. 3d at ___.
It appears that the main opinion concludes that because
Luong was so obviously guilty it was harmless error that his
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated.  I
disagree.
In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961), the Supreme
Court of the United States noted that a "'fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.'" (Quoting In
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).)  There, when the
defendant was indicted for murder, the defendant immediately
filed a motion for a change of venue alleging that the jury
pool was highly prejudiced due to "widespread 
and 
inflammatory
publicity."  366 U.S. at 720.  The trial court granted the
defendant's motion and transferred the case to Gibson County. 
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Alleging that Gibson County was also saturated with
inflammatory publicity, the defendant filed a second motion
for a change of venue.  This motion was denied by the trial
court based on the Indiana statute that allows only a single
change of venue.  However,  based on an Indiana Supreme Court
decision that states that it is a "'duty of the judiciary to
provide to every accused a public trial by an impartial jury
even though to do so the court must grant a second change of
venue and thus contravene [the statute],'" 366 U.S. at 721
(quoting State ex rel. Gannon v. Porter Circuit Court, 239
Ind. 637, 642, 159 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1959)), the United States
Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that the media
coverage in Gibson County was extensive and inflammatory and,
thus, vacated the judgments of the Supreme Court of Indiana
and the trial court, which had denied the defendant's second
motion for a change of venue.  The United States Supreme Court
also added that only a jury, based on evidence presented in
court, can strip a person of his or her liberty and that "this
is true, regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged,
the apparent guilt of the offender or the station in life
which he occupies."  366 U.S. at 722.
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In Coleman, the defendant had been charged with six
counts of murder.  The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the State that evidence of the
defendant's guilt was overwhelming.  778 F.2d at 1541. 
However, regardless of the evidence of the defendant's guilt
in that case, the Coleman court affirmed the trial court's
holding that a presumption that the jury was prejudiced
against the defendant based on extensive and inflammatory
media coverage existed because "to hold otherwise would mean
an obviously guilty defendant would have no right to a fair
trial before an impartial jury, a holding which would be
contrary 
to 
the 
well 
established 
and 
fundamental
constitutional right of every defendant to a trial."  778 F.2d
at 1541.
In the case at hand, this Court should not simply
overlook the presumption that the jury was prejudiced against
Luong based on the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.  To do
so violates Luong's right to a fair trial before an impartial
jury.
Therefore, I must dissent.
Murdock and Main, JJ., concur.
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MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
Reading the pervasive and sensational nature of the pre-
trial publicity in this case, as summarized by the Court of
Criminal Appeals in Luong v. State, [Ms. CR-08-1219,
February 15, 2013] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2013),
and requoted near the end of Part I of Justice Parker's
dissenting opinion, ___ So. 3d at ___, as well as the polling
data referenced by Justice Parker in support of that summary,
___ So. 3d at ___, it is hard to imagine a case involving more
extensive and more prejudicial publicity or a case that would
more readily warrant a conclusion of presumed prejudice.  By
the same token, it is hard to imagine a case with a greater
need for individualized voir dire to enable a defendant to
show actual prejudice.  I recognize that we have witnessed
significant changes in news and communication technologies in
recent years; however, the fundamental and well established
constitutional principles at stake have not changed.   With
all due respect, I fear that if these principles are not to be
allowed operative effect in a case such as this one, then they
are left with little or no meaningful field of operation.
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