Case Title: Wofford v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Stephanie Kay WOFFORD v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-38                                           ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered October 2, 1997


1.   Criminal procedure -- conditional plea of guilty -- general rule and
     exception on appeal -- supreme court declined to consider non-suppression
     points. -- As a general rule, one is not allowed to appeal from
     a conviction resulting from a plea of guilty or nolo
     contendere; Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b) presents an exception to
     the rule but only for the purpose of determining on appeal
     whether an appellant should be allowed to withdraw her plea if
     it is concluded that evidence should have been, but was not,
     suppressed; the supreme court, therefore, declined to consider
     two points raised by appellant that did not concern
     suppression of evidence.

2.   Search & seizure -- warrantless entry -- illegal unless State establishes
     exception. -- A warrantless entry must be viewed as illegal
     unless the State establishes the availability of an exception
     to the warrant requirement.

3.   Motions -- motion to suppress -- standard of review. -- When the
     appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion to suppress, it
     makes an independent determination based on the totality of
     the circumstances, viewing the evidence in the light most
     favorable to the State, and reverses only if the ruling is
     clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
4.   Search & seizure -- warrantless entry -- supreme court affirmed trial
     court's ruling that officers' initial entry was justified by exigent
     circumstances. -- The supreme court, citing Ark. R. Crim. P.
     14.3, which establishes the "emergency exception" to the
     warrant requirement, affirmed the trial court's ruling that
     police officers' initial entry into appellant's home was
     justified by exigent circumstances.

5.   Search & seizure -- warrantless entry -- officer's entry into bedroom
     related to objectives of authorized intrusion. -- Where one police
     officer entered appellant's bedroom in search of appellant's
     son despite a family friend's statement that he believed the
     child was already dead, this aspect of the search was
     nonetheless consistent with Ark. R. Crim. P. 14.3(a) because
     the friend's assessment of the child's condition could well
     have been incorrect; the officer's entry into the bedroom was
     clearly related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion
     into the residence.

6.   Search & seizure -- warrantless entry -- emergency exception -- police may
     seize evidence in plain view. -- Under the emergency exception, a
     warrantless entry into a home may be upheld if the State shows
     that the intruding officer had, in the language of Ark. R.
     Crim. P. 14.3(a), "reasonable cause" to believe that someone
     inside the home was "in imminent danger of death or serious
     bodily harm"; any search that follows the emergency entry may
     be upheld under this rule only if the search was "reasonably
     necessary for the prevention of such death, bodily harm, or
     destruction" and is "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies"
     that necessitated the emergency entry in the first place; the
     police may seize evidence that they observe in plain view
     while conducting legitimate emergency activities. 

7.   Search & seizure -- warrantless entry -- did not exceed scope of emergency
     that justified it. -- The record did not indicate that the police
     officers' initial entry exceeded the scope of the emergency
     that justified it; moreover, it was clear that they did not
     seize any evidence in the home, although they could have done
     so had they observed the evidence in plain view during the
     course of their legitimate emergency activities.

8.   Search & seizure -- warrantless entry -- exigent-circumstances exception
     does not require probable cause. -- While probable cause is the
     basis upon which a warrant to search may be granted, the
     exigent-circumstances exception contained in Ark. R. Crim. P.
     14.3(a) does not require an officer to have probable cause to
     believe a crime has been, or is being, committed on the
     premises for a warrantless entry.

9.   Search & seizure -- plain-view exception -- prerequisite for application. -
     - One of the prerequisites for applying the plain-view
     exception is that the initial intrusion that brings the police
     within plain view of evidence be supported, if not by a
     warrant, then by one of the recognized exceptions to the
     warrant requirement.

10.  Search & seizure -- plain-view exception -- when subsequent entry and
     plain-view seizure lawful. --  Although the supreme court could not
     say that the subsequent warrantless intrusion of two other
     police officers into appellant's home was lawful because they
     had consent or because exigent circumstances were prevailing
     at the time of their initial entry, it concluded that the
     officers' entry was lawful and that their seizure of evidence
     may have been valid under the plain-view exception; where the
     police enter a private residence in accordance with the
     emergency exception but are unable to preserve the evidence
     that they observe in plain view while rendering assistance, a
     second entry by other officers without a warrant is lawful,
     even though the emergency has passed, if the search that
     follows is restricted in nature and scope to securing the
     evidence observed in plain view by the officers who entered
     pursuant to the emergency exception.

11.  Search & seizure -- plain-view exception -- matter remanded for
     determination whether evidence seized in subsequent entry was observed in
     initial entry. -- Where the record did not establish that the
     evidence seized by the second pair of police officers was in
     fact observed in plain view by the first pair of officers, the
     supreme court remanded for the trial court to make that
     determination.

12.  Search & seizure -- plain-view exception -- inadvertency requirement
     applies to initial officers' observations and not to those of officers who
     follow. -- Another of the prerequisites for applying the plain-
     view exception is that the discovery of the evidence must be
     inadvertent; here, although the record supported appellant's
     contention that the second pair of police officers' discovery
     of the evidence in question was anything but inadvertent, the
     supreme court declared that it was clear that the inadvertency
     requirement applies to the initial officers' observations and
     not to those of officers who follow; if the items seized were
     inadvertently viewed by the first pair of officers, then it
     did not matter that the later officers entered the house with
     the purpose of seizing them.

13.  Search & seizure -- plain-view exception -- inadvertence not necessary
     condition for application. -- "Inadvertence" is not a necessary
     condition for application of the plain-view exception in any
     type of case brought under the Fourth Amendment.

14.  Search & seizure -- plain-view exception -- appellant's inadvertence
     argument rejected. -- Insofar as appellant's inadvertence argument
     concerned only the Arkansas Constitution, the supreme court
     rejected it on the basis that it is unnecessary for an officer
     who enters a residence for the purpose of continuing another
     officer's search and collecting evidence that the other
     officer observed in plain view to discover the evidence
     inadvertently.

15.  Motions -- motion to suppress -- trial court's ruling on appellant's
     statements not clearly against preponderance of evidence. -- The supreme
     court affirmed the trial court's ruling on the admissibility
     of appellant's statements because it could not say that it was
     clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

16.  Motions -- motion to suppress -- Fruit of Poisonous Tree argument rejected.
     -- To the extent that appellant's incriminating statements
     were the result of a warrantless entry justified under the
     emergency exception contained in Ark. R. Crim. P. 14.3(a),
     they are not inadmissible under a Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
     argument because the officers' entry into her home was not
     unconstitutional.

17.  Criminal procedure -- Miranda warnings required only in custodial
     interrogation. -- Miranda warnings are required only in the
     context of custodial interrogation.

18.  Criminal procedure -- when person is "in custody" for Miranda purposes --
     relevant inquiry. -- A person is "in custody" for purposes of the
     Miranda case when he or she is deprived of his freedom of
     action by formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of
     the degree associated with a formal arrest; in resolving the
     question of whether a suspect was in custody at a particular
     time, the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the
     suspect's shoes would have understood his situation. 

19.  Criminal procedure -- determination of custody -- objective circumstances.
     -- The initial determination of custody depends on the
     objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the
     subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers
     or the person being interrogated.

20.  Criminal procedure -- reasonable person in appellant's situation could not
     have believed she was restrained by police before she made initial
     statement. -- A reasonable person in appellant's situation could
     not have believed that she was restrained by the police prior
     to the time she made her initial incriminating statement where
     she had been taken to the hospital on account of her injuries
     and was not escorted there by the police and where, when the
     police entered her room, they neither arrested her nor
     indicated in any manner that she was a suspect.

21.  Criminal procedure -- custody -- confinement to hospital bed alone does not
     constitute. -- Confinement to a hospital bed is insufficient
     alone to constitute custody; there is no per se `hospital
     rule' in a custody inquiry because each case must be decided
     on its own facts.

22.  Criminal procedure -- trial court did not err in concluding appellant was
     not in custody at time of first statement. -- In the absence of other
     indicia of custody, the supreme court could not say that
     appellant's health-related confinement alone produced a
     custodial situation because her confinement was not the result
     of police compulsion; given the totality of the circumstances,
     the supreme court could not say that the trial court erred in
     concluding that appellant was not in custody at the time she
     made her first incriminating statement.

23.  Criminal procedure -- interrogating officer's failure to advise appellant
     that she could cut off questioning at any moment did not violate Miranda
     holding. -- Although the supreme court noted its view that it is
     the better practice for the police to advise an arrested
     person that he or she may cut off questioning at any moment,
     it was not prepared to say that an interrogating officer's
     failure to do so in appellant's case violated the Supreme
     Court's Miranda holding.

24.  Criminal procedure -- voluntariness and knowing and intelligent waiver are
     separate inquiries. -- The question of voluntariness and the
     question of a knowing and intelligent waiver are distinct and
     separate inquiries.

25.  Appeal & error -- appellant failed to obtain ruling on waiver -- not
     preserved for appeal. -- Where appellant failed to obtain a ruling
     on the discrete issue of the knowing and intelligent waiver of
     constitutional rights, it was not preserved for appeal, and
     the supreme court did not address it.

26.  Criminal procedure -- voluntary statement defined. -- A statement must
     be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free
     and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
     deception.

27.  Criminal procedure -- voluntariness of statement -- factors on review. --
     When the voluntariness of a statement is an issue, the
     appellate court makes an independent determination based on
     the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement
     and reverses the ruling of the trial court only if that ruling
     was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; a
     custodial statement is presumed involuntary, and the burden is
     on the State to show that the statement was voluntarily given;
     in making a determination of whether a statement was
     voluntarily made, the appellate court will consider many
     factors, among which are the age, education and intelligence
     of the accused; the length of questioning; the advice or lack
     of advice on constitutional rights; the repeated or prolonged
     nature of questioning; and the use of mental or physical
     punishment.

28.  Criminal procedure -- trial court's ruling that statements were made
     voluntarily not erroneous. -- Although appellant may have been in
     a weakened physical or mental condition at the time of making
     her statements, that fact would not render the statements
     involuntary absent a finding of police misconduct; where the
     testimony of police officers showed that appellant was alert
     in the treatment room and able to converse coherently with
     those around her; where the questioning was preceded by
     adequate Miranda warnings when necessary and was not unduly
     long; and where appellant obtained a high-school education and
     was holding down a job, the supreme court could not say, in
     those circumstances, that the trial court's ruling that the
     statements were voluntarily made was clearly against the
     preponderance of the evidence.

29.  Appeal & error -- Rule 4-3(h) -- additional review not required in appeals
     from pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. -- In appeals from pleas of
     guilty or nolo contendere, the supreme court is not required
     to undertake the additional review prescribed by Ark. Sup. Ct.
     R. 4-3(h).

30.  Appeal & error -- case remanded for determination whether first pair of
     officers observed in plain view items later seized by other officers. --
     The supreme court remanded appellant's case to the trial court
     to conduct an additional hearing to determine whether the
     first pair of officers to enter appellant's home observed in
     plain view the items later seized by a second pair of
     officers.


     Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court; Don Langston, Judge;
remanded.
     Walker, Shock & Harp, PLLC, by: J. Randolph Shock, for
appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Vada Berger, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     Stephanie Kay Wofford pleaded nolo contendere to first-degree
murder in connection with the death of her five-year-old son Mark. 
She was convicted pursuant to her plea and sentenced to life
imprisonment.  In accordance with Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b), Ms.
Wofford's plea was conditional; thus she reserved the right to
appeal from the Trial Court's denial of her motion to suppress
evidence.  The evidence in question included statements that were
either given while she was not in custody or were preceded by an
adequate Miranda warning.  We hold there was no requirement that
the statements be suppressed.      
     Also in question, however, are items of evidence seized by
police officers who entered Ms. Wofford's home without a warrant
sometime after other officers had entered without a warrant but
pursuant to circumstances the Trial Court deemed exigent.  The
question to be answered is whether the officers entering later
could properly seize items that could have been seized by the first
entering officers because they were inadvertently seen by them in
"plain view" while they were there for emergency purposes.  As
there was no testimony on the point at the suppression hearing, we
cannot determine whether the items seized were in plain view of the
officers who first entered.  We, therefore, must remand the case
for the limited purpose of determining the answer to that question. 
If it is properly determined by the Trial Court that the items
seized were seen in plain view by the officers who initially
entered Ms. Wofford's home, the conviction will be affirmed.
     Before considering Ms. Wofford's suppression arguments, we
note that she has raised two points of appeal not permitted by Rule
24.3(b) and the conditional plea arrangement.  Those arguments
concern the Trial Court's upward departure from the sentencing
guideline contained in Ark. Code Ann.  16-90-803 and 16-90-804
(Supp. 1995) and an alleged violation of Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order
#6 having to do with cameras in the courtroom.  As a general rule,
one is not allowed to appeal from a conviction resulting from a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere.  Ark. R. App. P.--Crim. 1(a). 
See Payne v. State, 327 Ark. 25, 937 S.W.2d 160 (1997).  Rule
24.3(b) presents an exception to the rule but only for the purpose
of determining on appeal whether an appellant should be allowed to
withdraw her plea if it is concluded that evidence should have
been, but was not, suppressed.  We, therefore, decline to consider
the two points that do not concern suppression of evidence.

                          1. The search
     From the home where she and her son lived, Ms. Wofford
telephoned her parents' home, which was apparently nearby in Ft.
Smith.  Ms. Wofford's sister, Amanda Hutchins, learned of the call
and believed "something was wrong."  Ms. Hutchins went to Ms.
Wofford's home where she found Ms. Wofford sitting on a couch with
blood on her wrists and clothing.  Ms. Wofford's father and
brother, along with family friend Henry McMurtery, then arrived. 
Ms. Hutchins called 911 and reported that Ms. Wofford had tried to
kill herself, that there was blood "all over," and that Ms. Wofford
had said her son would not wake up.
     Ft. Smith police officers William Ohm and David C. Boyd, Jr.,
were on patrol on Ms. Wofford's block.  They heard a dispatch and
arrived at Ms. Wofford's house almost immediately.  They understood
that a child was "down and bleeding," and they thought it might
have been as the result of a traffic accident.  Ms. Wofford's
father, sister, and brother were in the yard along with Mr.
McMurtery who waived to the police officers to follow him into the
house, saying, "They're in here."  Mr. McMurtery had not only seen
Ms. Wofford as previously described but had been to the rear of the
house and had found Mark on a bed in Ms. Wofford's bedroom with his
wrists cut and his eyes open and dilated.  
     The officers entered the house without a warrant shortly after
3 p.m. and spent ten or fifteen seconds checking Ms. Wofford's
vital signs.  Officer Boyd, Jr., remained with Ms. Wofford while
Officer Ohm followed Mr. McMurtery to the bedroom to examine Mark. 
By 3:29 p.m., Officer Ohm had determined that Mark was deceased. 
He returned to the living room and told Officer Boyd, Jr., to
secure the area.  In the meantime, Officer Boyd, Jr., had attempted
to learn what had happened from Ms. Wofford.  She appeared to be
dazed and said only, "I can't die.  I cannot die," and she asked,
"Why won't he wake up?"  When asked about her cut wrists she
replied that she had cut them with a knife that was in "the back
room."
     At around 3:40 p.m., Officer Ohm called for a supervising
officer, an additional police unit, and an emergency medical
services ("EMS") unit for Ms. Wofford.  The EMS unit arrived around
3:50 p.m.  As Officers Ohm and Boyd, Jr., were securing the
perimeter of the home, they noticed a door leading from the outside
into Ms. Wofford's bedroom.  The door appeared to have been kicked
in or struck with a sharp object.  There were drops of blood and
shattered glass.  After securing the area, Officer Boyd, Jr., began
keeping a detailed log of entries and exits.  
     At 4:00 p.m. Ms. Wofford left for a hospital emergency room in
an ambulance.  Officer Chris Boyd, Sr., had arrived at the scene at
4:05 p.m.  At 4:41 p.m. Officer Boyd, Sr., left for the hospital
where he was later to question Ms. Wofford.  On her way to the
hospital Ms. Wofford told an emergency medical technician, "He
wouldn't breathe, so, I cut his wrists to match mine."   
     At 4:05 and 4:15 p.m., respectively, Officer Risley and
Sergeant Lonetree arrived.  Officer Risley entered the home at 4:05
p.m. with other officers but withdrew because of a strong odor of
gas or petroleum.  Sergeant Lonetree had brought a video camera and
equipment to be used to gather evidence.  He was, however,
initially unable to enter the house on account of safety concerns
relating to the gas or oil fumes.  After the crime scene had been
secured, firemen arrived at 4:32 p.m. and left at 5:20 p.m. 
Personnel from the gas company arrived at 5:07 p.m., turned off the
gas, and left at 5:35 p.m.  The coroner left with Mark Wofford's
body at 5:38 p.m. 
     After receiving assurance that it was safe to enter the
premises, Sergeant Lonetree and Officer Risley did so without a
warrant.  As they walked through the rooms of the house, they took
photographs and made a videotape.  At 6:10 p.m., they seized the
first piece of evidence.  By 8:55 p.m., they had seized 29
additional items.  Sergeant Lonetree testified that the items
seized were in plain view.    
     In denying Ms. Wofford's motion to suppress the evidence
seized from her home, the Trial Court found that the officers'
initial, warrantless entry was justified by "exigent
circumstances."  The Trial Court also found the officers had
obtained "some form of consent" to enter the home.  The Trial Court
further indicated that the seizure of evidence was permissible as
it was in plain view.  Ms. Wofford contends that none of the
established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement justified the entry into, and search of, her home.

                 a.  Officers Ohm and Boyd, Jr.
     Ms. Wofford correctly states in her brief that, as Officers
Ohm and Boyd, Jr., entered her residence without a warrant, their
entry must be viewed as illegal unless the State established the
availability of an exception to the warrant requirement.  Williams
v. State, 327 Ark. 213, 939 S.W.2d 264 (1997); Willett v. State,
298 Ark. 588,