Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM COLE GRANT

Citation: 

Docket Number: 119500

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice  
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JULY 15, 2004 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 119500 
WILLIAM COLE GRANT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
KELLY, J.  
This is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Defendant was convicted by a jury on three counts of 
criminal 
sexual 
conduct 
involving 
two 
sisters. 
His 
convictions were based largely on testimony of the older 
girl who stated that defendant had severely injured her 
during an incident of sexual misconduct. 
Defendant 
maintained that he was innocent and that the injury this 
girl sustained was caused by a bicycle accident, as she had 
originally related. 
Defendant’s counsel failed to adequately interview 
members of the family who were present on the day of the 
 
 
 
                                                 
incident. 
He did not determine if in fact the alleged 
bicycle accident had caused the older girl’s injury. 
On 
the basis of well-established law, we hold that counsel’s 
failure to investigate and substantiate defendant’s primary 
defense was not a strategic decision, erroneous only in 
hindsight. 
It was a fundamental abdication of his duty to 
conduct a complete investigation, and it restricted his 
ability to make reasonable professional judgments and put 
forth his case. 
As a consequence, defendant was deprived 
of a substantial defense and of the effective assistance of 
counsel. 
We reverse the convictions and remand the case 
for a new trial. 
I 
The facts in this case were developed at trial and 
through several posttrial hearings before the trial court.1 
A detailed understanding of them and when they were 
presented is necessary to fully evaluate the appeal. 
At 
the time of the alleged incident, defendant was living with 
his girlfriend at her parents’ home. 
The sisters are his 
girlfriend’s nieces. 
They alleged that defendant sexually 
1 Chief Justice Corrigan accuses us of “rel[ying] on
factual inaccuracies.” 
Post at 1. Yet, she fails to
identify any of them. We believe that the record relied on 
here has been accurately stated. 
2  
 
 
 
abused them on two occasions. 
The first time was at a 
birthday party for their grandfather, when the older of 
them was about eight years old. She alleged that defendant 
forced her to have intercourse with him. 
The second 
allegation was that defendant sexually touched both girls 
in a closet about a year later. 
On the day of the first alleged incident, the older 
girl was severely injured. 
She suffered a tear from the 
rear of her vaginal opening to her anus. 
She told her 
family and her treating doctor that she had injured herself 
in a bicycle accident. 
The examining doctor described the 
injury as a “clean” tear, consistent with a straddle 
injury, rather than a ragged tear consistent with abuse. 
This doctor prepared an initial report of his examination 
that included the older girl’s statements. 
He prepared a 
subsequent report that concluded that, alternatively, her 
injury could have been caused by sexual abuse. 
After the second alleged incident, which occurred 
about a year later, the older girl told a friend that 
defendant had had intercourse with her. 
The friend told 
her mother, who called child protective services. 
In 
connection with the resulting investigation, the girls’ 
father took them to a second doctor. 
During the older 
girl’s examination by this doctor, she said that defendant 
3  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
had 
raped, 
then 
threatened 
her, 
demanding 
that 
she 
fabricate the bicycle accident to explain her injury. This 
doctor also prepared a report of her examination of the 
complainants, which she provided to the police officer who 
was investigating the alleged abuse. 
The prosecutor proceeded to trial on the theory that 
the bicycle accident was a fabrication. 
The older girl 
testified that her injury was the result of sexual abuse by 
defendant. 
She testified that there had never been a 
bicycle accident at all. 
The prosecutor’s evidence also 
included testimony by both examining doctors and the 
investigating officer. In closing argument, the prosecutor 
emphasized that defendant had presented no eyewitness 
testimony to support the occurrence of a bicycle accident. 
Before trial, defense counsel had available to him at 
least three sources of information about the charges 
against defendant.2  (1) He had a copy of the first doctor’s 
first report, and knew about or had a copy of his second 
report. 
(2) He knew about and possibly had a copy of the 
second doctor’s report. 
(3) He had a list given him by 
2 We rely on trial testimony to evaluate this case. We 
do not premise our analysis on an assumption about the
contents of only one document, as Justice Weaver implies.
Post at 2. 
4  
 
 
 
defendant of at least twelve people associated with the 
girls or defendant to interview for information or as 
witnesses. 
Defense counsel’s investigators interviewed only two 
or three of these people. 
None of them had seen the 
alleged bicycle accident. Counsel did not direct his 
investigators to inquire whether the people interviewed 
could name anyone who had seen it or knew more about it. 
Consequently, 
he 
failed 
to 
learn 
that 
there 
were 
eyewitnesses. 
Two of the sisters’ cousins could have 
testified that, on the day of the alleged incident, they 
saw the older girl injure her genital region in a bicycle 
accident. 
Defense counsel proceeded to trial on a three-pronged 
theory: (1) defendant did not commit the crimes, if they 
even occurred; (2) the injury to the older girl was the 
result 
of 
the 
bicycle 
accident; 
and 
(3) 
this 
girl 
habitually made up things. 
He argued that, despite the 
absence of eyewitness testimony, several witnesses said 
they had heard about the accident, not from the older girl, 
but from her brother. 
The jury convicted defendant as 
charged. 
Defense counsel learned of the potential eyewitnesses 
at the time of sentencing. 
The girls’ aunt approached 
5  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
counsel and told him that her sons, their cousins, had 
witnessed the accident. Defense counsel’s motion to reopen 
proofs, presumably to present newly discovered evidence, 
was denied. 
Defendant then retained different counsel who sought a 
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.3 
During a lengthy hearing in the trial court, the cousins 
testified that they witnessed the older girl injure herself 
in the bicycle accident. 
However, the trial court 
determined that the exculpatory evidence would have been 
merely cumulative. 
On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals found that 
counsel could have discovered and produced the evidence at 
trial using reasonable diligence. Hence, defendant was not 
entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence. 
But, the Court did find that the evidence was 
3 For a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly
discovered evidence, defendant had to show that 
(1) 
the 
evidence 
itself, 
not 
merely 
its 
materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly
discovered 
evidence 
was 
not 
cumulative; 
(3)
including the new evidence upon retrial would
probably cause a different result; and (4) the 
party could not, using reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced the evidence at trial.
[People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 118 n 6; 545
NW2d 637 (1996).] 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
material and not cumulative. 
It remanded the case for a 
Ginther4 
hearing 
regarding 
whether 
counsel 
had 
been 
ineffective 
for 
failing 
to 
discover 
or 
present 
the 
evidence. 
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued May 16, 
2000 (Docket No. 214941). 
By the time the Ginther hearing was held before the 
trial court, the two cousins only vaguely recalled the 
incident. 
This is not surprising considering that the 
alleged accident had occurred more than five years earlier 
when they were about ten and six years old. 
The trial 
court 
ruled 
that 
the 
evidence 
was 
not 
sufficiently 
probative to support a determination that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to ascertain and introduce it. 
It 
appears that the trial court’s decision was based on the 
fact that the witnesses were unable to remember the 
incident clearly at the time of the Ginther hearing. 
Defendant again appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, 
apparently analyzing only the Ginther hearing testimony, 
agreed with the trial court that the evidence “would not 
have 
been 
of 
substantial 
benefit 
to 
the 
defense.” 
Unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
issued May 1, 2001 (Docket No. 214941). 
4 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
7  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
Defendant sought leave to appeal in this Court, 
requesting a new trial on alternate theories: either the 
eyewitness testimony of the bicycle accident was newly 
discovered evidence, or defendant had been denied the 
effective assistance of counsel by counsel’s failure to 
produce eyewitnesses at trial. 
At oral argument before 
this Court, defense counsel conceded that this evidence 
would have been discoverable with reasonable diligence and, 
therefore, was not “newly discovered.” 
We consider only 
whether defendant was deprived of the effective assistance 
of counsel. 
II 
Whether a person has been denied the effective 
assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and 
constitutional law. 
A judge must first find the facts, 
then must decide whether those facts establish a violation 
of the defendant’s constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. 
People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 139; 
659 NW2d 611 (2003). We review a trial court’s findings of 
fact for clear error. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 
640 NW2d 246 (2002).5 Questions of constitutional law are 
5 Although we must defer to the trial court’s findings
made at the hearing held pursuant to People v Ginther 390 
(continued…) 
8  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
reviewed de novo. Tolksdorf v Griffith, 464 Mich 1, 5; 626 
NW2d 163 (2001). 
III 
In 
People 
v 
Pickens,6 
this 
Court 
adopted 
the 
ineffective assistance of counsel standard that the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
established 
in 
Strickland 
Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 
(1984). 
Accordingly, 
to 
demonstrate 
ineffective 
assistance, a defendant must show that his attorney’s 
performance 
fell 
below 
an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness. 
The 
defendant 
must 
overcome 
the 
presumption that the challenged action could have been 
sound trial strategy. 
Id. at 689, see also People v 
Carrick, 220 Mich App 17, 22; 558 NW2d 242 (1996). 
A 
reviewing court must not evaluate counsel’s decisions with 
the benefit of hindsight. 
Strickland, supra at 689. 
On 
the other hand, the court must ensure that counsel’s 
Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), we do not afford blind 
actions 
provided 
the 
representation that is 
criminal prosecution. 
defendant 
his cons
with 
tituti
the 
onal 
modicum 
right in 
of 
a 
(continued…) 
deference when the trial court applies the wrong legal
standard. 
6 446 Mich 298; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). 
9  
v 
 
 
 
 
“[S]trategic choices made after less than complete 
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations 
on investigation. . . . [C]ounsel has a duty to make 
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision 
that 
makes 
particular 
investigations 
unnecessary.” 
Strickland, supra at 690-691. 
The defendant must show also that this performance so 
prejudiced him that he was deprived of a fair trial. 
Pickens, supra at 338. 
To establish prejudice, he must 
show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have 
been different but for counsel’s errors. Strickland, supra 
at 694. 
A reasonable probability need not rise to the 
level of making it more likely than not that the outcome 
would have been different. 
Id. at 693. 
“The result of a 
proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the 
proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel 
cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have 
determined the outcome.” Id. at 694. 
A 
In 
this 
case, 
counsel’s 
performance 
was 
not 
objectively reasonable. 
Defendant was facing three counts 
of sexual misconduct. 
Two of them were founded wholly on 
the sisters’ statements implicating defendant. 
The third 
10  
 
 
 
  
 
and most serious of them was founded on the older girl’s 
statements and an underlying physical injury. 
The best 
refutation of all the charges would have been strong 
substantive evidence that the older girl’s injury was 
caused by something or someone other than defendant. 
Had 
that charge been defeated, then the other two would have 
been greatly weakened, given the questionable credibility 
of the two girls as witnesses. 
The development of defense 
counsel’s trial strategy had to consider these facts. 
His 
failure to conduct a more thorough investigation to uncover 
evidence to support an alternate causation theory was 
objectively unreasonable. 
A sound trial strategy is one that is developed in 
concert with an investigation that is adequately supported 
by reasonable professional judgments. 
Counsel must make 
“an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, 
pleadings and laws involved . . . .” Von Moltke v Gillies, 
332 US 708, 721; 68 S Ct 316; 92 L Ed 309 (1948). 
This 
includes pursuing “all leads relevant to the merits of the 
case.” Blackburn v Foltz, 828 F2d 1177, 1183 (CA 6, 1987). 
We 
evaluate 
defense 
counsel’s 
performance 
from 
counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and 
in light of the circumstances. 
Strickland, supra at 689. 
Thus, counsel’s words and actions before and at trial are 
11  
 
 
 
the most accurate evidence of what his strategies and 
theories were at trial. 
At the Ginther hearing before the trial court on 
defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
defense counsel responded to questioning. He said that his 
theory had been that the older girl was in the habit of 
telling lies and could not be trusted. 
His “main thrust 
was that this girl was a liar” and he “welcomed” her 
testimony that she had lied about the bicycle accident. 
She had been, he theorized, either injured in a bicycle 
accident or by a sexual assault, but, regardless, was 
falsely accusing defendant. 
Yet, counsel did not think it necessary to be prepared 
to prove the occurrence of the bicycle accident in order to 
substantiate his theory that it had caused the injury. 
He 
felt that additional witnesses would not be vital. 
He 
failed to contact most of the persons whose names defendant 
had provided for his own defense. 
He failed to inquire 
whether anyone in the family had seen and could testify 
about the fact of the alleged bicycle accident and its role 
in causing the injury. He failed to act on statements from 
the witnesses that he did interview that the girls’ brother 
may have seen the accident. 
12  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Justice Weaver disagrees that defense counsel thought 
the occurrence of the accident was disputed because he 
testified at the Ginther hearing on his own effectiveness 
that “'The accident was not disputed. 
The girl never 
disputed it.'” 
Post at 2. 
However, his subjective belief 
was unreasonable. 
Counsel had readily available to him information that 
should have prompted further inquiries. 
For example, 
defense counsel admitted at the Ginther hearing that the 
first doctor’s initial report said that the injury was not 
caused by sexual abuse.7
 When that doctor testified at 
trial, he stated that the older girl had told him “[t]hat 
she was riding a bicycle and slipped and had a straddle 
injury . . . .” 
The girl told the second doctor that she 
had not been injured in a bicycle accident. 
This doctor 
testified that the older girl said that 
7 In addition, defense counsel also contacted other
doctors 
regarding 
possible 
causes 
of 
the 
older 
complainant’s injury. 
However, those doctors were unable
to conclusively determine the cause of the injury. Even if 
they had, they would not have been able to testify at trial
because they had not examined the girl. 
Thus, because no
doctor definitively determined the cause of the injury
independent of the girl’s statements, counsel needed a
witness who saw the girl injure herself in a bicycle
accident. 
Chief Justice Corrigan’s distinction between
counsel’s failure to find “a” witness versus “any” witness
is meaningless. 
Post at 13. 
“A” and “any” are synonyms.
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1995). 
13  
 
 
                                                 
she had been told by this person who abused her
not to tell anyone because . . . he would hurt
her and he threatened her . . . and so she told 
[the first doctor] that this was a bike accident
and this was the story she was told to give him
by this abuser. 
It is reasonable to infer that the doctors' testimony was 
based on their patient histories and the reports they had 
prepared. 
That evidence shows that the girl had made 
conflicting statements about the cause of her injury. 
The officer investigating the alleged abuse had “asked 
that a letter be dictated” of the results of the 
examination, which the doctor did. On cross-examination of 
this witness, defense counsel referred to a notation he had 
made in his copy of this doctor’s report, indicating that 
he had seen it before trial. 
Hence, defense counsel had 
seen both reports before trial. 
This testimony clearly demonstrates8 that the two 
doctors’ reports showed conflicting causes of the injury 
and conflicting statements by the older girl. Hence, 
defense counsel knew or should have known before trial that 
the cause of the injury was in question. 
Chief Justice Corrigan, post at 12 n 2, and Justice 
Weaver, post at 2, criticize the majority for relying on 
8 We do not “speculat[e]” about the contents of these
reports, as Justice Corrigan argues post at 12 n 2. 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the second doctor’s report. 
We find that it was 
unreasonable for defense counsel to rely on the older 
girl’s anticipated testimony at trial to refute the 
allegation that defendant had caused her physical injury. 
It would have been unreasonable even if the second doctor’s 
report had not indicated that the girl was changing her 
story and even if defense counsel had lacked the report. A 
central element of his defense was that the girl had 
falsely accused defendant. 
It was not reasonable for 
counsel to rely on part of her testimony to establish an 
important fact while hoping to show her a liar as to the 
rest. 
Also contrary to Chief Justice Corrigan’s assertions, 
post at 14, defense counsel acknowledged that it was 
important to establish that the bicycle accident occurred. 
He came to this realization in the course of the Ginther 
hearing. Defense counsel was asked: 
Q. 
Would it have been important for the
jury to hear testimony, in your opinion, on 
behalf of Mr. Grant, that they observed vaginal
bleeding from this bicycle accident or . . . 
A. Yeah. If . . . 
Q. . . . bleeding in that area? 
A. 
Right. 
But your question was about
witnesses to the accident. 
You’re, you’re not
asking about witnesses to the bleeding. 
So the 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
answer to the witnesses, the accident, no, that
was not important. 
Later in the hearing, defense counsel was asked: 
Q. Counsel? The issue, as you say, was not
the accident. 
The issue was the cause of the 
bleeding. 
A. Correct. 
Q. If you had an eyewitness who was able to
not only say, “I saw the accident,” which you say
is elementary because it’s, it’s irrelevant. But 
he can say, “I saw the accident,” and, and “I saw
the cause of the bleeding” that occurred from the
bicycle accident. 
Would that type of eyewitness
have been important to the defense? 
That the 
injury was sustained by the accident and not by
criminal sexual conduct? 
A. A, a, a civilian eyewitness can say that
that’s what caused the bleeding? 
I don’t think 
any such thing existed. 
Q. 
Well, let me ask you, sir, if you put a
witness on the stand and that witness says, “I
saw the little girl riding her bicycle.” 
“And I 
saw her get into an accident and I saw her
bleeding afterwards.” 
Would that have been 
relevant to this defense? 
A. 
If such a witness existed, I guess so,
yeah.[9] 
Despite his later characterization of his decision­
making as “informed,” we cannot conclude that counsel’s 
9 We disagree with Chief Justice Corrigan’s statement
that the eyewitnesses’ testimony could have “undermined”
defendant’s defense. Post at 2. We cannot imagine in what
sense testimony proving that the girl was lying when she
said that defendant caused her injuries could have done
anything other than benefit defendant. 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
failure to investigate the alleged bicycle accident was in 
pursuit of a trial strategy, erroneous only in hindsight. 
People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 122-123; 545 NW2d 637 
(1996). 
Because counsel failed to prepare himself, he failed 
to appreciate his client’s predicament: without direct 
evidence of the accident that caused the older sister’s 
injury, his defense was merely a credibility contest 
between a little girl and an accused rapist. Witnesses who 
saw the older sister descend a hill on a bicycle, fall, and 
return 
with 
blood-soaked 
pants 
could 
have 
provided 
substantive evidence that abuse did not cause her injury.10 
10 Chief Justice Corrigan, post at 19-27, suggests that
the eyewitnesses’ testimony would not have been of much
assistance to defendant because their testimonies at the 
Ginther hearing were inconsistent. The boys had difficulty
remembering whether the older girl was wearing blue jeans
or sweat pants at the time of the accident, which had
occurred several years earlier. 
This does not foreclose 
the conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that
the 
outcome 
would 
have 
been 
different 
if 
they 
had 
testified. 
This testimony would have been the only
substantive evidence presented at trial of the occurrence
of the accident. 
As explained beginning at p 21, the
failure to present it prejudiced defendant. 
Moreover, the trial court determined this evidence
would not have been of assistance to defendant because it 
was 
merely 
cumulative 
as 
well 
as 
because 
it 
was 
inconsistent. As the Court of Appeals recognized, there is
a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different with the testimony. 
P 24. 
Some internal 
(continued…) 
17  
 
 
                                                 
The only evidence that the prosecutor presented to prove 
these three counts was the testimony and statements of the 
two girls and the fact of the older girl’s physical injury. 
Counsel’s lack of forethought is critical considering 
that, as he himself opined, in cases like this, the 
defendant practically has to be proven innocent to be 
acquitted. 
Given these circumstances, a defense founded 
solely on credibility was sorely vulnerable to defeat. 
We also note that this is not an instance in which 
counsel failed to discover facts after a reasonable inquiry 
that would have caused an effective attorney to inquire 
further. 
As stated,11 at no time did counsel direct his 
investigators to ask whether anyone had seen the bicycle 
accident. Cf. Wiggins v Smith, 539 US 510; 123 S Ct 2527; 
156 L Ed 2d 471 (2003)(failure to investigate). 
His 
failure to conduct an investigation to determine if known 
witnesses had direct evidence to substantiate his defense 
was objectively unreasonable. 
See Frazier v Huffman, 343 
F3d 780, 795 (CA 6, 2003). 
It is even more so where his 
witnesses testified that they had heard about the accident 
(continued…) 
inconsistencies are expected when children recall an  
incident long past.  
11 See p 5. 
18  
 
 
                                                 
from the girls’ brother. 
He should have recognized that 
his witnesses could not give substantive evidence of the 
accident based on another’s out-of-court statements. 
MRE 
802. 
Moreover, this is not a case of counsel disregarding 
one possible, alternate theory of defense in favor of a 
better 
one, 
after 
finding 
the 
first 
“contradictory, 
confusing, incredible, or simply poor.” 
Pickens, supra at 
325. 
As stated above, counsel’s theory was that the girl 
was a liar and had falsely accused defendant. 
This was a 
sound defense strategy.12  Had it been fortified by adequate 
investigation, it would have shown the weakness in the 
prosecutor’s case, and it could have made a difference in 
the verdict. See my discussion beginning at p 21. 
This case differs from one in which there has been a 
failure to call witnesses whose potential testimony defense 
counsel already knows. Cf. People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115; 
545 NW2d 637 (1996); People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590; 623 
NW2d 884 (2001). 
Here, counsel did not interview half of 
the people whom defendant identified as potentially having 
12 Thus, we do acknowledge the merit in defense 
counsel’s trial strategy, contrary to the assertions of
Chief Justice Corrigan, post at 17. 
However, we also
recognize its fatal shortcomings. 
19  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
helpful information.13  He did not know what testimony these 
witnesses would give. 
He did not know where they had been 
or what they had seen. 
The fact that defense counsel obtained no substantive 
evidence of the cause of the older sister’s injury shows 
that his investigation was incomplete. 
He relied on the 
girl’s own, already recanted explanation. His decision not 
to 
call 
as 
witnesses 
the 
individuals 
identified 
by 
defendant 
was 
not 
based 
on 
objectively 
“reasonable 
professional judgments.” 
Consequently, his trial strategy 
was unreasonable under these circumstances. 
B 
The failure to make an adequate investigation is 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
if 
it 
undermines 
confidence in the trial’s outcome. 
Carbin at 590. 
Counsel’s failure to investigate his primary defense 
prejudiced defendant. 
It adversely affected the outcome, 
depriving defendant of a fair trial. 
In light of the 
evidence 
presented 
at 
trial, 
there 
is 
a 
reasonable 
probability that the outcome would have been different. 
13 Chief Justice Corrigan forgives defense counsel’s
failure because some witnesses were uncooperative. Post at 
10-11. 
However, counsel did not even attempt to contact
many of the known witnesses. 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
It was critical to defendant’s theory to show that the 
older sister had been injured in a bicycle accident. 
At 
trial, counsel tried belatedly to establish in the jury’s 
mind the idea that the bicycle accident was real rather 
than a mere story told by a frightened girl. But, the jury 
heard no direct evidence that the girl's injury could have 
been occasioned by a bicycle accident. 
Most of the 
evidence 
defense 
counsel 
attempted 
to 
elicit 
to 
substantiate 
the 
occurrence 
of 
the 
accident 
was 
inadmissible as hearsay. The evidence that defense counsel 
did present concerned the girl’s bleeding, serving only to 
underscore the severity of her injuries. 
Later, the 
prosecutor’s closing argument emphasized the defense’s lack 
of evidence. 
On appeal from the trial court’s denial of defendant’s 
motion for a new trial, the Court of Appeals correctly held 
that the cousins’ testimony was not cumulative. It was the 
best evidence available in support of defendant’s theory. 
Eyewitness descriptions of the accident would have given 
independent support to defendant’s theory that the injury 
was caused by a bicycle accident, not by sexual misconduct. 
As the Court of Appeals explained, the girls’ cousins’ 
testimony ”could have transformed a defense theory without 
any substantiation to a theory supported by observation of 
21  
 
 
 
eyewitnesses.” 
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued May 
16, 2000 (Docket No. 214941), p 2. 
Hence, it was more 
probative than the older girl’s own earlier statements or 
the statements of the other witnesses presented at trial, 
which were admissible only for impeachment. 
As the Court 
of 
Appeals 
recognized, 
“[t]his 
testimony 
was 
not 
corroborative; 
it 
would 
have 
materially 
changed 
the 
quality, as opposed to the quantity, of the evidence 
supporting defendant’s theory.” Id. 
Had the jury heard the cousins’ testimony about the 
alleged accident, the nature of the defense would have 
changed from an unsubstantiated argument to the jury. 
It 
would have become a direct attack on the factual basis of 
the prosecution’s primary charge grounded in credible 
testimony. 
The testimony of the two eyewitnesses would have 
demonstrated that the older girl’s physical injury was the 
result of a bicycle accident, not sexual abuse. 
It would 
have greatly undermined the older girl’s credibility and 
strongly suggested that she was fabricating horrific 
stories about defendant. 
Had the eyewitnesses testified, the prosecutor’s only 
remaining evidence of these three counts would have been 
22  
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
the testimony of the younger girl.14
 After hearing the 
older sister’s other claims, which were fanciful,15 the jury 
reasonably would have disbelieved the younger sister’s 
allegations. She might not have testified.16 
The trial court considered the hearsay evidence that 
was presented at trial about the accident and concluded 
that additional evidence of the same nature would have been 
merely cumulative. 
It failed to consider the trial 
evidence in favor of defendant when it determined whether 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would 
have been different. Strickland at 694. 
For instance, the older girl “was not crying” when she 
was examined by the first doctor and she was not “afraid.” 
She was “less nervous than most kids that age” and was not 
14 Chief Justice Corrigan cites the testimony of the
prosecution’s other witnesses to assert that there was a
mountain of evidence against defendant. 
Post at 3-7. 
However, all their testimony about the cause of the injury
derived from the older girl’s statements. 
Once her 
accusation was undermined with evidence that an accident 
injured 
her, 
the 
prosecutor’s 
case 
would 
have 
been 
substantially weakened. 
15 The older girl said that the sexual attack “felt
weird” rather than painful. 
She also said that the first 
doctor took her baby out. 
16 These paragraphs analyze the effect of this fact on 
defense counsel’s decisions. 
They do not “ignore” it, as
Chief Justice Corrigan claims. Post at 2. 
23  
 
 
 
 
“particularly under stress or nervous.” 
The doctor was 
later asked: 
Q. 
And the observations that you made were
consistent with [the older girl’s] report of an
accident from a fall on a bicycle. 
Isn’t that 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
The doctor concluded, on the basis of the girl's calm 
emotional state and the physical characteristics of the 
injury, that sexual abuse was not involved. 
The younger girl testified that she and her sister 
voluntarily “sat on [defendant’s] lap” after one of the 
alleged CSC-II incidents. 
They also failed to tell their 
father or uncle what had allegedly just occurred, although 
they were there with defendant and the girls. 
Defendant’s 
girlfriend testified that he had “never done anything” to 
the girls. 
The older girl was “always hanging around with 
[defendant] and sitting on his lap” and never acted afraid 
of him. 
The girls’ grandfather also testified that the 
attitude of the girls towards defendant never changed. 
At the Ginther hearing, the trial court failed to 
recognize that the question was not whether the cousins’ 
testimony was probative. 
The question was not, as Chief 
Justice Corrigan implies in her dissent, post at 4-5, 
whether the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable 
24  
 
 
juror to find guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." 
People v 
Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 640; 614 NW2d 78 (2003). 
If that 
standard obtained at a Ginther hearing, an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim would fail in almost every 
instance. 
The question was whether there was a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different had defense counsel adequately investigated the 
facts before developing his strategy. 
After the Ginther hearing, when denying defendant’s 
motion for a new trial, the trial court improperly relied 
on counsel’s expertise and performance in past cases to 
evaluate his performance in this case. 
It noted that 
defendant’s counsel was experienced in criminal defense 
work. 
The dissent succumbs to the same mistake.  It is 
irrelevant 
that 
counsel 
“expended 
twice 
his 
normal 
resources on this case . . . .” Post at 10. When defense 
counsel agreed to represent defendant, he committed himself 
to conducting an adequate investigation of the case. 
The 
resources he devoted to other cases are irrelevant to 
assessing the performance of his duties in this case. 
If the eyewitnesses had testified, the older sister’s 
testimony that she was injured by sexual abuse would have 
been refuted. 
This would have seriously impeached her 
testimony regarding the other incidents of abuse that 
25  
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
allegedly occurred more than a year later. 
It would have 
corroborated the testimony that defendant had a positive 
relationship with the girls. 
Considering the evidence admitted for and against 
defendant, there is a reasonable probability that defendant 
would not have been convicted as charged. 
The trial court 
failed to appreciate that counsel’s failure to investigate 
and substantiate the defendant’s primary defense was a 
fundamental abdication of counsel’s duty to conduct a 
complete investigation. 
It deprived his client of a 
substantial defense. 
Consequently, we find that defendant 
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. 
Because his convictions are not founded on a fair trial, 
they cannot stand.17 
IV 
In conclusion, defense counsel failed to investigate 
and substantiate defendant’s primary defense. 
There is a 
reasonable probability that the result of this trial would 
have been different had the evidence in question been 
17 We concede that an unfavorable result is not enough
to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. However,
an unfavorable result may be enough where a defendant can
demonstrate a reasonable probability that a more favorable
result would have been reached. 
26  
 
 
 
presented. This failure was not a strategic decision, 
erroneous only in hindsight. 
We hold that counsel’s failure to conduct a complete 
investigation was a fundamental abdication of duty that 
prejudiced defendant, depriving him of a fair trial. 
Accordingly, the convictions are reversed and the case 
remanded for a new trial because of the ineffective 
assistance of defendant’s counsel. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh 
27  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 119500 
WILLIAM COLE GRANT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
TAYLOR, J. (concurring). 
I concur in the result of Justice Kelly’s opinion. 
I 
reach this conclusion not, as the dissents suggest, on the 
basis of hindsight, but on the fact that defense counsel 
was faced with a first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC 
I) charge in which it was not simply a “who do you believe” 
contest between an injured girl and the defendant where she 
says it happened and he says it did not.  Rather, it was a 
“who do you believe” contest plus the prosecution had the 
additional evidence of a savage vaginal injury that surely 
would make a lot of people think that criminal sexual 
conduct happened unless there was another explanation for 
the injury. 
While it is not ineffective to say the injured girl is 
a liar and always had been (especially given the other two 
 
 
 
 
charges), that defense will only cover the usual case that 
turns on credibility and for which there is no physical 
evidence. 
Where there is such incriminating evidence and 
the injured girl is now asserting that defendant, and not a 
bicycle accident, caused her injury, an investigation to 
find witnesses to the bicycle accident is required. 
To 
fail to do so is not a reasonable, professional judgment. 
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 690-691; 104 S Ct 
2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). 
Clifford W. Taylor
Stephen J. Markman 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 119500 
WILLIAM COLE GRANT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CORRIGAN, C.J. (dissenting). 
Although this fact-specific case has no majority 
opinion 
and 
therefore 
lacks 
any 
jurisprudential 
significance, I cannot join in the opinion of Justice KELLY 
or Justice TAYLOR because their analyses depart from settled 
principles regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. The opinions of Justice 
KELLY and Justice TAYLOR conclude that defense counsel is 
constitutionally ineffective if counsel’s chosen strategy 
does not produce a favorable outcome for the defendant. 
Justice KELLY’s opinion relies on factual inaccuracies, 
omissions, and speculation and fails to observe case law 
from both this Court and the United States Supreme Court. 
Applying that law to the facts, I conclude that defendant 
has not overcome the strong presumption that defense 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
counsel’s decision to not interview certain witnesses was 
strategic. Rather, the evidence shows that defense counsel 
chose not to interview the contested witnesses because 
their testimony was not necessary to his chosen trial 
strategy 
and 
could, 
in 
fact, 
have 
undermined 
it. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
I. FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
A detailed understanding of the trial is necessary to 
fully evaluate whether defense counsel was ineffective. 
Defendant was charged with one count of first-degree 
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), and two counts 
of second-degree criminal sexual conduct for conduct 
involving his girlfriend’s nieces.  Justice KELLY appears to 
ignore this crucial fact in her opinion: 
defendant was 
facing three counts of criminal sexual conduct, not only 
the one count involving the severe injury to the older 
sister. 
All the evidence presented and decisions made by 
defense counsel must therefore be evaluated in light of the 
three counts. 
The prosecution proved that defendant had sexually 
penetrated the older sister, causing a severe injury to her 
2  
 
 
 
                                                 
vaginal wall,1 and that defendant had also touched both 
sisters on a later occasion. 
Regarding the charge of 
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, the older sister 
testified that she originally told everyone, including the 
emergency room doctor who treated her, that she had been 
injured in a bicycle accident. 
She admitted that she had 
lied about the bicycle accident. 
Instead, defendant had 
injured her when he penetrated her. 
She stated that 
defendant told her to say she was injured in a bicycle 
accident. 
The sisters’ father’s testimony regarding the first­
degree criminal sexual conduct charge was particularly 
noteworthy. 
The father was present at the home when the 
older sister appeared with her injuries. 
He testified 
that, before anyone knew the extent or cause of the older 
sister’s injuries, defendant spontaneously insisted he had 
not hurt her: 
Q.
 Okay, and when you got ready to leave
for the hospital, you—you and [the defendant’s
girlfriend, who was the sisters’ aunt] took [the
older sister]. Is that right? 
A.  Well that young man over there come over
there crying to [defendant’s girlfriend] saying I 
1 The older sister underwent surgery under general
anesthesia that required twenty stitches to repair an 
episiotomy-like rip. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
didn’t do this, I didn’t do that, and they know
right off the bat that I was going to take care
of it my own way. 
The sisters’ father further testified: 
Then when we came back—when I came back 
[defendant] 
goes—he 
goes 
running 
to 
[his
girlfriend] saying that he didn’t—[the older 
sister’s father’s] going to think the wrong [sic,
thing] about me. What do you expect I’m going to
think? 
If something’s happened to [the older
sister], I’m going to think it unless I know what
happened. Then he goes crying over there to [his
girlfriend] and [his girlfriend] comes over and
says 
I 
got 
something 
to 
tell 
you. 
Bill 
[defendant] didn’t touch. . .Bill didn’t touch
[the older sister]. 
Then I had [the older 
sister] to psy—psychology and— 
Q.  What are talk— 
A.
 We’re talking about the bike accident.
You brought up the subject so I’m just telling
ya’. 
Regarding the charges of second-degree criminal sexual 
conduct, both sisters testified that defendant had touched 
them inappropriately in a bedroom in their father’s 
apartment. 
Their testimony was corroborated by their 
father, who testified that defendant went alone to the part 
of the apartment where the girls were playing and was gone 
from the kitchen for about five to ten minutes. 
In her opinion, Justice KELLY repeatedly insists that 
the “only evidence” of the three counts of criminal sexual 
conduct was the sisters’ statements and testimony. This is 
patently false. 
The prosecution presented no fewer than 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
eight witnesses during the two-day trial, including two 
physicians, the sisters, a friend of the older sister (who 
corroborated the older sister’s testimony), the mother of 
the older sister’s friend (who also corroborated the older 
sister’s testimony), the sisters’ father (whose testimony 
was 
outlined 
above), 
and 
the 
officer 
who 
initially 
investigated the complaints. 
When discussing the evidence 
presented at trial, the prosecution should be afforded 
every supportive inference that can be drawn from this 
evidence. 
Justice KELLY, however, simply denies that 
evidence existed at all. 
This selective recitation of the 
facts is misleading. 
The defense theory at trial was twofold: (1) that 
defendant did not commit the offenses and had no knowledge 
of them, and (2) that the older sister habitually lied and 
could not be trusted. 
The defense presented three 
witnesses. 
The first was the sisters’ grandfather and defendant’s 
girlfriend’s father. 
He lived at the house where the 
first-degree 
criminal 
sexual 
conduct 
occurred. 
He 
testified that defendant was never alone with the older 
sister and that the bicycle in question was like a 
unicycle, with the front broken off. 
He testified that he 
saw the older sister playing with the bicycle on previous 
5  
 
 
 
 
occasions, although he was not home at the time of the 
accident. 
The older sister’s brother, however, told him 
about the bicycle accident. The grandfather testified that 
the older sister had never told him about any sexual abuse 
and that she never acted as though she was afraid of 
defendant or did not like him. 
The second defense witness was the older sister’s 
uncle and defendant’s girlfriend’s brother. 
He also 
testified that defendant was never alone in the house and 
that, to his knowledge, defendant never watched the older 
sister alone. 
Moreover, the older sister never acted 
frightened or uncomfortable around defendant and she never 
mentioned any abuse or inappropriate behavior to him. 
Although he had not seen the bicycle accident, the older 
sister’s brother also told him about it. 
He saw the older 
sister after she was injured and knew she was being 
transported to the hospital. 
He also saw defendant after 
the older sister went to the hospital and did not remember 
defendant having any blood on his shirt. 
The last witness was the older sister’s aunt and 
defendant=s girlfriend at the time of the offense. She and 
defendant had a child together, for whom defendant paid 
child support. 
She testified that defendant was never 
alone in the house and that it was “absolutely impossible” 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
for defendant to have ever been alone with the older 
sister. 
Further, although she had not witnessed the 
bicycle accident, she did accompany the older sister to the 
hospital. 
The older sister’s brother also told her about 
the bicycle accident. 
Further, defendant=s clothes had not 
been disturbed and she did not see blood on any of his 
clothing. Finally, she testified that the older sister had 
never come to her about any abuse or inappropriate behavior 
and that the girl liked defendant and always wanted to be 
around him. 
In his closing statement, defense counsel argued that 
defendant did not commit the offenses and that the older 
sister, for whatever reasons, had lied. 
He pointed out 
numerous inconsistencies in the girl’s testimony, including 
her insistence that she had been eight months pregnant and 
had the baby taken out of her at the hospital. 
Finally, 
defense counsel also made strategic use of the fact that 
none of the defense witnesses had witnessed the bicycle 
accident. 
He noted that the witnesses had all heard about 
the accident from the older sister’s brother, rather than 
from the older sister herself. 
The jury convicted 
defendant on all counts. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. 
THE LAW REGARDING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
I agree with Justice KELLY that in People v Pickens, 
446 Mich 298; 521 NW2d 797 (1994), this Court adopted the 
standard of ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in 
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 
2d 674 (1984). 
To prove ineffective assistance, a 
defendant must show that his attorney’s performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but 
for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability 
that 
the 
result 
of 
the 
proceeding 
would 
have 
been 
different. 
“Reasonable probability” is defined as “a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” Strickland, supra at 694 (emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, Justice KELLY gives only lip service to 
the strong presumption that counsel’s actions were sound 
trial strategy, and that “every effort [must] be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . . .” Id. 
at 689. 
See also People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 
NW2d 694 (2000), (“[A] defendant must overcome the strong 
presumption that his counsel’s action constituted sound 
trial strategy under the circumstances.”); 
People v Hoag; 
460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999) (the law affords a strong 
presumption 
that 
counsel’s 
actions 
constituted 
trial 
8  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
strategy). 
In 
evaluating 
a 
claim 
of 
ineffective 
assistance, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance 
must be highly deferential” and should refrain from second­
guessing counsel’s chosen trial strategy. 
Strickland, 
supra at 689 (emphasis added). 
Counsel’s performance must 
be evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the 
alleged error and in light of the circumstances. Id.  This 
deferential standard of review exists because “it is all 
too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it 
has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act 
or omission of counsel was unreasonable.” Id. 
B. INVESTIGATION AND STRATEGY 
Rather than apply this deferential standard of review, 
Justice KELLY has twisted the law to place the burden on the 
defense counsel to defend his chosen strategy. 
In fact, 
Justice KELLY goes further and holds that, because defense 
counsel’s strategy was not ultimately successful, it cannot 
even be considered reasonable. Ante at 11. In so holding, 
Justice KELLY completely ignores counsel’s testimony in the 
hearing held pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 
212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
Justice KELLY concludes that 
“[counsel 
here 
was 
not] 
disregarding 
one 
possible, 
alternate theory of defense in favor of a better one 
9  
 
 
 
 
. . . .” 
Ante at 19. 
This conclusion is not supported by 
the record evidence. 
Defendant’s 
trial 
counsel, 
David 
I. 
Goldstein, 
testified at the Ginther hearing. Goldstein expended twice 
his normal resources on this case: although he customarily 
used only one investigator for each case, he assigned two 
investigators to defendant’s case because the witnesses 
were so uncooperative. 
Justice KELLY’s assertions that 
counsel had information “readily available” to him and 
“failed to contact most of the persons whose names defense 
had provided for his own defense,” ante at 12, are 
misleading and unfounded. 
Goldstein testified at length 
regarding his difficulty in finding any defense witnesses 
who would cooperate. 
In fact, as stated below, Goldstein 
provided documentary evidence of his repeated attempts to 
contact potential defense witnesses and the many ways those 
attempts were rebuffed or ignored. 
He stated that the 
investigators 
finally 
interviewed 
the 
older 
sister’s 
grandfather, uncle, and defendant’s girlfriend, but only 
after considerable effort. 
The witnesses, particularly 
defendant’s girlfriend, would not return calls or keep 
scheduled appointments. 
He offered physical exhibits, 
including interviews notes and office records, to support 
this testimony. 
The defense witnesses defense counsel was 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
able to contact even ignored a trial subpoena, forcing him 
to obtain a material witness warrant to ensure their 
presence at trial. 
Defense counsel could not force the 
possible defense witnesses to cooperate; he was limited by 
the witnesses’ marked refusal to cooperate. 
The defense theory was that defendant did not commit 
the crime. 
At the time of the trial, Goldstein did not 
believe that establishing the accident was going to be a 
problem because the older sister had acknowledged the 
bicycle accident. Until the trial began, Goldstein was not 
aware that the older sister was denying the bicycle 
accident: 
A. 
I didn’t think we needed to prove that
the accident occurred because I didn’t think the 
occurrence of the accident was in dispute. 
Q. 
Did you, did, the nature of the injury
was in dispute, however? Wasn’t it? 
A. 
The nature of the injury, but not the
accident itself.[2] 
2 Justice KELLY relies on a police report to prove that
Goldstein knew that the older sister had made inconsistent 
statements regarding the nature of her injuries. 
This 
police report is not in the record before us. 
Justice 
KELLY’s 
assertions 
regarding 
this 
missing 
report 
are 
baffling. 
Justice KELLY also repeatedly insists that 
defense counsel’s access to two doctor’s reports should
have prompted further inquiry. 
These reports are also not
in the record before us. 
If the missing police report and
the other missing reports identified by Justice WEAVER are so 
crucial to Justice KELLY’s determination of this case, the
(continued…) 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Goldstein testified that he did not consider it 
important to the defense to obtain eyewitnesses to the 
accident because of the older sister’s admission and 
because “a layperson observing an accident can’t testify as 
to the extent of injuries.” 
He stated that he already had 
witnesses to testify about the amount of blood: 
[P]roving the existence of the . . . 
accident was not significant. 
We had [the
uncle]. 
We had the, we had the statement of the
girl. 
[The uncle] saw the blood. 
Nobody was
disputing the bleeding. 
So proving that was not
. . . a critical issue. 
The critical issue was 
relating that to the, to the charge. . . . 
And a . . . lay witness can’t do that. 
Goldstein explained that, given the anticipated testimony 
of Dr. Bond of a credible report of sexual abuse, he did 
not feel it was necessary to interview or call eyewitnesses 
to the bicycle accident: 
If the doctors are going to testify that the
bicycle accident did not cause that injury,
what’s the point of proving that there was an
accident? 
He explained that he made the tactical decision to not 
contest the medical experts because he could not find any 
(continued…)
proper course is not to “infer” the contents of the missing
reports, but to remand to the trial court to reconstruct
those 
reports. 
Justice 
KELLY 
refuses 
to 
remand 
to 
reconstruct these reports; instead, she simply bases her 
analysis on nothing more than mere speculation. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
medical experts who would testify for the defense without 
having examined the older sister at the time of the injury. 
Justice KELLY implies, ante at 13 n 7, that the fact that 
defense counsel was unable to find any doctors to testify 
should somehow have prompted some further inquiry regarding 
the 
cause 
of 
the 
older 
sister’s 
injuries. 
This 
mischaracterizes 
Goldstein’s 
testimony 
at 
the 
Ginther 
hearing. 
Goldstein did not testify that he could not find 
a doctor who could conclusively determine the cause of the 
older sister’s injuries; rather, he testified that he could 
not find any doctor who could form any opinion because the 
doctors had not had an opportunity to personally examine 
the older sister. 
I fail to understand how the fact that 
no doctor would testify without personally examining the 
older sister should have prompted further inquiry in the 
cause of the accident on the part of defense counsel. 
Rather, because he could not find any medical experts to 
testify, Goldstein was unable to choose any trial strategy 
that 
involved 
contradicting 
the 
prosecution’s 
medical 
experts. 
Further, Goldstein testified that one of the defense 
strategies was to argue that the older sister “had a habit 
of making things up.” 
Thus, when the prosecutor opened 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
with the statement that the older sister was now denying 
there was an accident, he felt it strengthened the defense: 
But you know, . . . since our position was
the girl was a liar, I welcomed [the prosecutor]
getting up and saying that the girl had lied. 
He testified: 
A. 
Our, the tactical decision was made 
that our main thrust was that this girl was a
liar. 
That if she was, if she was in fact
sexually assaulted it wasn’t by Bill Grant. 
Q. 
And would have trying to attack the
conclusions of the doctor or fight about a 
bicycle accident, would that have detracted from
the defense that the victim was a liar? 
A. 
It could of, it could have. 
I mean 
obviously I can’t read a jury’s mind. 
But it 
could have. 
Q. 
But in your mind, it would have been a
tactical decision to pick one defense and keep 
hitting that rather than a shotgun? 
A. 
Well, our defense all along was, we
don’t know if she was sexually assaulted or not.
But if she was, it wasn’t Bill Grant. 
You know,
that we, that we didn’t know whether she was or
she wasn’t because she had, she had a tendency to
lie. But in any case, it wasn’t Bill Grant. 
Thus, he specifically considered the effect of the older 
sister’s contradictory testimony and chose, as a matter of 
strategy, to highlight the inconsistencies and use it to 
the defense’s advantage. 
Goldstein also testified that he knew of the existence 
of the mother of the boys who allegedly witnessed the 
14  
 
 
 
bicycle accident before trial and knew that she had 
witnessed the older sister’s injury. 
He stated, however, 
that he was not aware that the boys claimed they had 
witnessed a bicycle accident until he received a letter 
from their mother after the trial. 
He explained that he 
did not interview or call the boys’ mother because, as far 
as he understood it, her testimony was that she saw the 
bleeding, and he already had two witnesses who testified 
they saw the bleeding. 
Further, Goldstein stressed that 
because the defense theory was that even if the older 
sister 
had 
been 
sexually 
assaulted, 
it 
was 
not 
by 
defendant, so establishing the existence of a bicycle 
accident was not crucial. 
In short, defense counsel explained that: 
(1) he 
strategically chose to focus on two themes—that whatever 
had happened to the older sister, defendant was not 
involved, and that the older sister was a liar; (2) he made 
the further strategic decision not to pursue a theory that 
would have required presenting evidence regarding the 
existence of the bicycle accident, on the grounds that the 
conflicting stories strengthened the theory that the older 
sister was a liar and could possibly distract the jury from 
his chosen trial strategy; and (3) he chose to not 
interview the contested witnesses because their testimony 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
was either irrelevant to his defense (whether the bicycle 
accident had actually happened) or cumulative (the extent 
of the older sister’s injuries). 
Defense counsel further 
testified 
that 
he 
chose 
his 
defense 
strategy 
after 
considering that he could not present any medical testimony 
to rebut the prosecution’s medical testimony that the older 
sister’s injuries were consistent with sexual assault. 
It is clear that defense counsel did not interview the 
contested witnesses because, at the time he was preparing 
for trial, he had no reason to think those witnesses would 
enhance his chosen trial strategies. 
Further, it is clear 
that defense counsel did not interview the witnesses during 
the trial because he believed that the older sister’s 
testimony that she had lied about the bicycle accident only 
strengthened his defense. 
Justice KELLY’s failure to acknowledge such trial 
strategy 
is 
puzzling. 
Justice 
KELLY 
also 
fails 
to 
acknowledge or apply the deferential standard required by 
Strickland. 
Rather than shunning hindsight and reviewing 
counsel’s actions from counsel’s perspective at the time of 
the alleged error in light of all the circumstances, 
Justice KELLY summarily concludes that defense counsel was 
ineffective because his strategy did not prove successful. 
This holding cannot be squared with our Sixth Amendment 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
jurisprudence. 
“[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a range 
of reasonably competent advice and a reliable result. 
It 
does not guarantee infallible counsel.” People v Mitchell, 
454 Mich 145, 171; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). 
Further, Justice KELLY gives only lip service to the 
fact that defense counsel was not preparing for a trial in 
which the sole count was the first-degree criminal sexual 
conduct charge. 
Rather, defense counsel had to prepare a 
defense that addressed all three charges against defendant. 
He was repeatedly frustrated in his investigatory efforts 
by lack of cooperation from the ostensible witnesses. 
He 
did not have the benefit of perfect hindsight, nor did he 
have unlimited time and resources. 
Rather, he had to make 
his own “reasonable professional judgments” regarding “the 
limitations on investigation,” including the “reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” 
Strickland, supra at 690-691. 
C. REASONABLE PROBABILITY 
In addition to ignoring the deferential standard of 
judicial review of trial strategy involving the multiple 
charges against defendant, Justice KELLY also ignores the 
definition 
of 
“reasonable 
probability.” 
“Reasonable 
probability” does not mean that a majority of this Court 
finds the testimony of the contested witnesses compelling. 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Rather, as explained above, “reasonable probability” means 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.3
 Defendant has simply presented what could have 
been an alternate trial strategy; he has not met his burden 
of demonstrating a sufficient probability that the actual 
strategy 
chosen 
by 
his 
counsel 
actually 
undermined 
confidence in the outcome of his trial. 
Further, any determination of “reasonable probability” 
must take into account the entire record, including all 
the evidence produced regarding the three counts against 
defendant. 
Given 
the 
sisters’ 
father’s 
devastating 
testimony 
that 
defendant 
spontaneously 
protested 
his 
innocence before anyone knew the extent or cause of the 
older 
sister’s 
injuries, 
and 
given 
the 
corroborated 
testimony of both sisters regarding the second-degree 
criminal sexual conduct charges, one cannot conclude that 
defense counsel’s decision not to pursue the bicycle 
accident issue with exhausting detail undermines confidence 
in the outcome. 
After reviewing the full record, I cannot conclude 
that defense counsel’s actions constituted anything less 
3 Justice KELLY attempts to recharacterize this standard
as “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Nowhere do I argue,
however, that the standard is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
than sound trial strategy. 
Applying the correct standards 
of review and placing the burden on defendant reveals that 
defendant 
has 
not 
demonstrated 
that 
defense 
counsel 
committed any error at all, let alone an error that would 
undermine confidence in the outcome. 
III. RETRIAL 
I also note that, if there is a retrial, the evidence 
regarding the bicycle accident that Justice KELLY finds so 
compelling will be subject to intense scrutiny, given the 
lack of any coherent testimony regarding the alleged 
bicycle accident. 
In the characterizations of the testimony regarding 
the alleged bicycle accident, Justice KELLY willfully omits 
the many inconsistencies that arose during the testimony. 
A full review of the testimony, as outlined below, 
demonstrates that the testimony was conflicting, confusing, 
and actually undermined the testimony of the defense 
witnesses at trial. 
Had defense counsel presented such 
testimony at trial, the jury would have been presented with 
five defense witnesses, two of whom contradicted the 
testimony of the other three. 
I fail to see how the 
decision to present a coherent, unified defense theory to 
the jury constitutes ineffective assistance. 
19  
 
 
  
 
 
  
A. THE INITIAL TESTIMONY REGARDING THE BICYCLE ACCIDENT 
After the verdict was rendered, but before sentencing, 
new defense counsel moved for a new trial on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence. 
The new evidence presented at 
the motion relevant to this appeal was that the sisters’ 
cousins witnessed the bicycle accident that defendant had 
alleged caused the older sister’s injuries. 
The cousins’ 
testimony, however, was confusing and contradictory. 
At the time of the first-degree sexual criminal 
conduct offense, the boys were six and eight. Their mother 
testified that she had not witnessed the bicycle accident, 
but that her children had. 
She testified that she was in 
the bathroom with defendant’s girlfriend helping the older 
sister 
after 
she 
was 
injured 
and 
acknowledged 
that 
defendant’s girlfriend would have known of her presence and 
made the same observations. 
The cousins’ mother also 
stated that the rest of the family knew she was at the 
house on the day of the accident and also knew that her 
children were there. 
She testified that she was aware of 
the trial and stated that she told defendant=s mother about 
her presence in the bathroom and her children=s presence at 
the accident on the second day of the trial. 
The older cousin testified that he saw the older 
sister’s bicycle accident and saw her get injured. 
He 
20  
 
 
 
 
testified that, after the accident, the older sister did 
not cry or scream and walked by herself up to the house, 
where defendant’s girlfriend took her into the bathroom. 
He testified that the older sister was wearing light blue 
jeans, but that the jeans turned dark after the accident 
because of all the blood. 
He testified that the older 
sister got hurt on the bicycle handles. 
He specified that 
he was at the bottom of the hill when the older sister got 
hurt and that no one was at the top of the hill. 
He 
testified that defendant’s girlfriend would have known that 
he was at the house and that he was also playing with the 
bicycle when the accident occurred. 
He also stated 
repeatedly that he never told his mother or anyone else 
about the accident and insisted that if his mother said 
otherwise, she would be wrong. 
The younger cousin testified that he knew he was at 
the hearing to testify about the bicycle accident, although 
he insisted no one told him that. He stated that the front 
wheel on the bicycle was broken off, but that the 
handlebars were intact. He testified that he saw the older 
sister running down the hill with the bicycle and that she 
fell on some metal when she let go of it and got hurt in 
her private part. 
The younger cousin testified that after 
she got hurt, the older sister just got up and walked to 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
the house. 
After repeated questioning, he testified that 
he specifically remembered that the older sister had been 
wearing blue sweat pants, and not jeans, and that the sweat 
pants were torn in the front. 
The younger cousin also 
testified that, contrary to the older sister’s uncle’s 
testimony at trial, the uncle was not at the home on the 
day the accident happened and that, if he said differently, 
the uncle would be wrong. 
Thus, the boy’s testimony 
contradicted that of one of the key defense witnesses at 
trial. 
The younger cousin testified that defendant’s 
girlfriend and the older sister’s grandfather would have 
known he was at the house on the day of the accident and 
that they all knew he was with the older sister when the 
accident happened. He also testified both that he had told 
someone about the bicycle accident a couple minutes after 
it happened and that he never told anyone about the bicycle 
accident at all. 
After the hearing, the judge denied the motion for new 
trial and sentenced defendant to fifteen to forty years for 
the first-degree criminal sexual conduct count and ten to 
fifteen years for the two counts of second-degree criminal 
sexual conduct. 
22  
 
 
  
 
   
  
                                                 
B. SUBSEQUENT TESTIMONY REGARDING THE BICYCLE ACCIDENT 
The cousins testified again at the Ginther hearing, 
and their testimony at the Ginther hearing contradicted 
much of the testimony given previously at the hearing 
regarding the motion for a new trial.4 
The older cousin testified that the bicycle was like a 
unicycle and that it was not possible to ride it. 
Instead, 
people 
ran 
behind 
the 
bicycle 
holding 
the 
handlebars. 
Contrary to his testimony at the motion for a 
new trial, the older cousin testified, “But I didn=t see her 
get hurt on the bike, though.” (Emphasis added.) 
He 
further testified, “I didn=t see the bike part hit her, but 
I knew where she was hurt at.” He also testified that the 
older sister did not walk up the hill as he had previously 
testified, but instead that her mother and an aunt went 
down the hill and got her. The older cousin testified that 
the hill was over fifty feet long and that he was at the 
top of the hill at the time of the accident, not at the 
4 Justice KELLY’s characterization of the trial court’s 
decision at the Ginther hearing is also misleading. 
The 
trial court gave a very detailed decision, finding not that
the boys were unable to remember clearly at the time of the
Ginther hearing, but that the court did “not believe that
the witnesses, Mr. Goldstein is alleged to have failed to
interview, would have been of assistance to the Defendant
and would have directly exculpated the Defendant on the
CSC-I offense. . . .” 
23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bottom of the hill as he had previously testified. 
He 
testified that he talked to his mother about the accident 
shortly after it happened, but later said he didn=t remember 
whether he talked to her or not. 
Finally, he also 
testified that on the morning of the hearing he was talking 
with his mother and grandmother “about how the jury screwed 
up.” He stated: 
Q. 
Okay. 
You chatted with somebody this
morning about this? 
A. 
Just about B well, rumor B well, what I
heard about the jury and how they messed and that
was about it this morning. 
Q. 
Your mom told you what this was all
about? 
A. 
Yeah. 
Q. 
Okay. She told you why you were here? 
A. 
Um hm. 
Q. 
Yes? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
Okay. And she told you what to say? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
Okay. What did she tell you? 
A. 
She told us that we=re going here to see
if we can help Bill. [Emphasis added.] 
The 
younger 
cousin 
testified, 
contrary 
to 
his 
brother’s testimony, that both he and defendant actually 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rode the bicycle the day of the accident. 
This testimony 
placed defendant at the scene of the injury and directly 
contradicted with the testimony of all of the defense 
witnesses at trial, who had testified that defendant was 
not at the scene when the older sister was injured.  He 
testified that the bicycle had both a seat and pedals, 
again contrary to his brother’s testimony. 
He testified 
that, contrary to his previous testimony, the older sister 
was riding the bicycle and not running behind it. 
He 
stated that he was at the top of the hill with his brother 
at the time of the accident, and that the older sister was 
injured by the handlebars on the bicycle, not by the pile 
of metal at the bottom of the hill as he had previously 
testified: 
Q. 
Okay. 
So [the older sister] didn=t run 
into a pile of metal at the bottom of the hill? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
That didn=t happen? 
A. 
Right. That did not happen. 
Finally, when the younger cousin was questioned about 
the older sister=s clothes, the following exchange took 
place: 
Q. 
[The older sister] was wearing clothes? 
A. 
Yes. 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q. 
Do you remember if she had on long
pants or short pants? 
A. 
She had on long pants. 
Q. 
Okay. 
A. 
And I only know that they were blue. I 
don=t know if they were sweat pants or jeans. 
I 
have no idea. 
Q. 
What made you say that about sweat 
pants or jeans? 
A. 
Because she had a pair of sweat pants
and she had a pair of jeans and I know they were
both blue. 
Recall that, at the motion for a new trial, the 
younger cousin had insisted that the older sister was 
wearing sweat pants and not jeans, and that he knew the 
difference between the two. 
He was the only person to 
testify that the older sister was not wearing jeans. 
His 
spontaneous statement that he no longer knew if the older 
sister was wearing sweat pants or jeans prompted the 
following exchange: 
Q. 
Okay. 
Did your mom or anybody in your
family talk to you about what you were going to
testify to today? 
A. Only my mom. 
Q. 
Okay. 
What did your mom talk to you
about? 
A. 
She said I was testifying to see if I
could get Grant-Bill Grant out. 
Q. 
Get Bill Grant off? 
26  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
A. 
Um hm. [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, the boys’ testimony gave no coherent explanation 
of whether they actually saw or remembered the alleged 
accident, how the alleged accident occurred, where the 
alleged accident occurred, or who was present when the 
alleged 
accident 
occurred. 
Given 
the 
numerous 
inconsistencies in the boys’ testimony regarding the 
bicycle accident and the boys’ testimony that they were 
trying to “help” defendant or “get [defendant] out,” the 
boys’ testimony on retrial will be subject to impeachment. 
Given the inherent problems in using this testimony, it 
will be 
certainty 
accident. 
difficult 
any details 
on retrial to 
surrounding 
establish 
the alleged bicycle 
with any 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In her opinion, Justice KELLY ignores both the facts 
and the law. 
Rather than placing the burden on defendant 
to demonstrate the ineffective assistance of his counsel 
and reviewing defendant’s claim with the strong presumption 
that counsel’s actions constituted sound trial strategy, 
the opinions of both Justice KELLY and Justice TAYLOR 
conclude, in hindsight, that, because those justices would 
have 
presented 
a 
different 
strategy, 
counsel 
was 
27  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ineffective. 
This is an unprecedented and unwarranted 
departure 
from 
our 
Sixth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
Application of the law to the facts of this case compels 
the conclusion that counsel thoughtfully chose a trial 
strategy and pursued that strategy.  Counsel’s contested 
actions were all deliberately chosen to execute counsel’s 
chosen strategy. 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate any 
error by his counsel, let alone one that undermined 
confidence in the outcome. Rather, all defendant has shown 
is an unfavorable result. 
Until today, an unfavorable 
result was not enough to demonstrate ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
With all respect due the opinions of Justice 
KELLY and Justice TAYLOR, I believe it still is not. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 119500 
WILLIAM COLE GRANT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding 
that the defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 
The older sister initially told everyone, including 
her treating physician, that she had been injured in a 
bicycle accident. 
At trial, the older sister testified 
that there had been no bicycle accident and that her injury 
had resulted from defendant’s sexual assault. 
The lead 
opinion’s finding that defense counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective is based on defense counsel’s pretrial failure 
to investigate to determine if the bicycle accident had in 
fact occurred. 
The lead opinion’s basic premise is unsupported 
because there is nothing in the record to show that defense 
counsel knew of the older sister’s inconsistent statements 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
before trial. 
The lead opinion relies on one source of 
information——a report by the second doctor——to support its 
theory that defense counsel knew or should have known 
before trial that the older sister had given inconsistent 
statements about the cause of her injury before trial. 
This report by the second doctor is not in the record 
before us. 
No one testified about the contents of the 
referenced report, nor was the report admitted into 
evidence. 
The lead opinion’s assertion that the second 
doctor’s report may have indicated that the older sister 
had inconsistently described the cause of her injuries is 
mere speculation, unsupported by the record. 
Rather, the evidence properly before us indicates that 
defense counsel had no reason to know that the older sister 
would testify that there had been no bicycle accident. 
In 
the 
June 
7, 
2000, 
Ginther1 
hearing 
defense 
counsel 
repeatedly testified that the accident was not disputed: 
Q. 
Would 
it 
have 
been 
of 
assis-, 
of 
assistance to have an eyewitness to the accident? 
A. Only if it was disputed. 
The accident 
was not disputed. 
The girl never disputed it.
[The sisters’ uncle] testified what he, or was
willing to testify to what he observed. 
And it, 
1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and one of, one of the things that he observed
was the girl saying, “I had an accident.” 
* * * 
Q. Alright. 
Maybe to the extent that it
might have assisted in the defense of the 
position 
that 
any 
injuries 
that 
the 
girl
sustained, she sustained as a result of the 
bicycle accident? 
A. 
No. Maybe to the extent if the, if the
accident was disputed, helping the jury decide
whether the accident actually occurred or not.
But there was no dispute that the girl said to
[her uncle], in [her uncle’s] presence and in the
presence of his sister, that she fell. 
She had 
an accident. So that issue was not in dispute. 
* * * 
A. No, my te-, my statement all this morning
has been that I didn’t think we needed to prove
that the accident occurred because I didn’t think 
the occurrence of the accident was in dispute. 
The excerpts from the Ginther hearing that the lead 
opinion quotes, ante at 15-16, to support the proposition 
that “defense counsel acknowledged that it was important to 
establish that the bicycle accident occurred” actually 
demonstrate that prior to trial defense counsel did not 
know that it would be important to establish that a bicycle 
accident had occurred. 
Further, on January 24, 2001, defendant filed a 
“proposed statement of facts” with the circuit court. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant’s proposed statement of facts included two points 
which indicated that the trial counsel did not know before 
trial that the accident was disputed: 
31. Goldstein [trial counsel] did not call
an eye witness to the bike accident at the trial
and did not think that an eye witness would have
been of any assistance to him since he believed
that the bike accident was not disputed by the
alleged victim. 
32. Goldstein did not believe that an 
eyewitness to the bike accident was important for
purposes of linking the alleged victim’s injury
to the bike accident since he felt that such an 
eyewitness would have only been important to the
Defendant’s defense if the bike accident itself 
was in dispute, TR 40, and that the only thing an
eyewitness to the bike accident could testify to
was 
that 
the 
accident 
occurred. 
TR 
91. 
Goldstein, however, did not believe that the bike
accident was in dispute or that the same was
“relevant.” TR 40; 89; TR 110. 
The filing concluded with the plea that “Defendant 
hereby requests that this Honorable Court adopt the above 
reference facts as the relevant facts applicable to the 
issue of whether or not Defendant’s trial attorney was 
effective, as limited by the Court of Appeals.” 
January 
24, 2001, proposed statement of facts. 
I agree with Chief Justice Corrigan and Justice Young 
that defendant did not meet his burden of showing that his 
attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s errors, there is 
4  
 
 
 
 
a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298; 
521 NW2d 797 (1994) (adopting the Strickland v Washington, 
466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 [1984], standard 
of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
There is no 
evidence in the record before us to show that defense 
counsel knew of the older sister’s inconsistent statements 
before trial; rather, the evidence properly before us 
indicates that defense counsel had no reason to know that 
the older sister would testify that there had been no 
bicycle accident. I would affirm the decision of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 119500 
WILLIAM COLE GRANT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
YOUNG, J. (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. 
I believe that the wisdom of 
deferring to the trial court's determination whether 
ineffective assistance of counsel has been demonstrated is 
a sound policy. See People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 
Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d 822 (2000). The trial court, which 
has first-hand knowledge of the witnesses and the conduct 
of the trial, is in the best position to assess not only 
whether defense counsel's trial performance has been 
deficient, but whether any such deficiency might have 
altered the outcome of the trial. 
As is aptly demonstrated by the number and variety of 
opinions this case has generated, this case is one that is 
highly fact-sensitive and productive of no clear precedent 
that can provide guidance for future cases. 
Because I do 
 
 
 
not 
believe 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
erred 
in 
its 
determinations on the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the several hearings it conducted on this 
question, I would affirm the convictions. 
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
2