Case Title: In re Torres

Citation: 177 Vt. 507, 2004 VT 66, 861 A.2d 1055

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Torres (2003-242); 177 Vt. 507; 861 A.2d 1055

2004 VT 66

[Filed 6-Aug-2004]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2004 VT 66

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-242

                             JANUARY TERM, 2004

  In re Andres Torres	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       	                               }	Chittenden Superior Court
                                       }	
                  	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 0907-00 Cncv

                                                Trial Judge: Matthew I. Katz

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendant Andres Torres appeals from a summary
  judgment order of the Chittenden County Superior Court denying his claim
  for post-conviction relief from a second degree aggravated domestic assault
  conviction under 13 V.S.A. § 1044(a)(2).  Defendant claims that the
  statute's language requires a prior domestic assault conviction, and that,
  because he had no prior domestic assault conviction, his conviction for
  second degree domestic assault must be dismissed.  We conclude that
  defendant waived his right to challenge his conviction on this ground when
  he pled guilty to the domestic assault charge.  Nevertheless, because we
  also conclude that defendant's statutory interpretation is correct, we
  remand the case for consideration of defendant's ineffective assistance of
  counsel claim.
   
       ¶  2.  On August 26, 1996, the State charged defendant with, among
  other crimes, four counts of second degree aggravated domestic assault,
  each for a separate incident on a separate day of the same week.  Pursuant
  to 13 V.S.A. § 1044(a)(2), "[a] person commits the crime of second degree
  aggravated domestic assault if the person . . . commits a second or
  subsequent offense of domestic assault, which causes bodily injury." 
  Second degree aggravated domestic assault holds an enhanced sentence of a
  maximum of five years in prison or a maximum $10,000.00 fine.  Id.; cf. 13
  V.S.A. § 1042 (penalty for domestic assault is a maximum one year in prison
  or a maximum $5,000.00 fine).

       ¶  3.  The State's information alleged defendant caused bodily harm
  to a household member and that defendant had been previously convicted of
  domestic assault on December 21, 1995.  Contrary to this allegation,
  defendant was not convicted of domestic assault in 1995 - he was merely
  arraigned for domestic assault charges that were subsequently dismissed on
  March 11, 1996.   Nonetheless, under a plea agreement with the State, in
  return for dismissal of three of the second degree aggravated domestic
  assault charges, defendant pled guilty to the fourth charge.  Defendant was
  sentenced to three to five years in prison to be served concurrently with
  another sentence. 
   
       ¶  4.  In July 2000, defendant filed a pro se petition for
  post-conviction relief (PCR) in Chittenden County Superior Court claiming
  that his attorney at the plea hearing rendered ineffective assistance of
  counsel and requesting that his conviction under § 1044(a)(2) be dismissed. 
  In his petition, defendant asserted that a person cannot be convicted under
  § 1044(a)(2) unless that person has a prior domestic assault conviction. 
  Defendant claimed his attorney failed to investigate the factual basis of
  his prior domestic assault charge and should never have advised him to
  plead guilty to that charge.  With the help of appointed counsel, defendant
  later amended his petition, adding a claim that his enhanced sentence was
  unlawful because he had no prior domestic assault conviction. 

       ¶  5.  The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that defendant
  waived his right to claim the prior conviction was nonexistent when he pled
  guilty.  Further, the State argued that even if defendant's claim had
  merit, the plain language of § 1044(a)(2) merely required defendant to have
  committed a prior domestic assault "offense" - not a conviction for that
  offense - to be charged under the statute.  The State suggested the
  Legislature intentionally distinguished between the term "offense" in §
  1044(a)(2) and the term "conviction" in § 1043(a)(3), the statute defining
  the more serious crime of first degree aggravated domestic assault. 

       ¶  6.  Without reaching defendant's ineffective assistance of
  counsel claim, the superior court granted the State's motion for summary
  judgment, holding that "[t]he plain language of the Second Degree
  Aggravated Domestic Assault statute . . . . does not require . . . a prior
  conviction."  This appeal followed.

       ¶  7.  Before turning to the merits, we note that after oral
  argument before this Court, the State made a timely motion that we take
  judicial notice of defendant's plea hearing transcript.  We grant the
  State's motion because review of the transcript is necessary to properly
  resolve this case.  This Court is permitted to take judicial notice of
  facts "not subject to reasonable dispute" when those facts are "capable of
  accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
  reasonably be questioned."  V.R.E. 201(b)(1)-(2).  The transcript at issue
  is exactly the type of document subject to judicial notice under our rules
  because it is an accurate record of sworn plea colloquy testimony. 
  Furthermore, questions regarding the validity of defendant's conviction -
  the very conviction on appeal before this Court - are accurately and
  readily resolved by reading the plea hearing transcript.

       ¶  8.  Defendant opposes the State's motion and in doing so
  mistakenly relies on Jakab v. Jakab, 163 Vt. 575,