Case Title: THOMAS D. NEWMAN v. AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK ; THOMAS D. NEWMAN and JANE RASMUSSEN v. JOE AND GLORIA GEMELLI

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
THOMAS D. NEWMAN v. AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK ; THOMAS D. NEWMAN and JANE RASMUSSEN v. JOE AND GLORIA GEMELLI1989 WY 182780 P.2d 336Case Number: 89-137, 89-138Decided: 10/04/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
THOMAS D. NEWMAN, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

THOMAS D. NEWMAN AND JANE 
RASMUSSEN, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

JOE AND GLORIA GEMELLI, 
APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

Thomas D. 
Newman, pro 
se.

A. Joe Hageman, 
Laramie, for appellant, Jane 
Rasmussen.

John B. Rogers 
of Rogers & McElhaney, Cheyenne, for appellee, American Nat. Bank. 

Don W. Riske and 
Stephen M. Kissinger of the Law Office of Don W. Riske, Cheyenne, for appellees, Joe and Gloria 
Gemelli.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ., and ROONEY, Ret.J.

ROONEY, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
summary judgment in favor of junior mortgagees, such judgment being premised on 
the proposition that, after foreclosure by the senior mortgagee, the junior 
mortgages were validated through payment of the redemptive amount by the 
mortgagor to the senior mortgagee in return for a certificate of redemption and 
the certificate of sale.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant Newman 
mortgaged non-agricultural real property owned by him in LaramieCounty as follows:

1. On April 15, 1985, to 
the Equality State Bank to secure a note for $25,000.

2. On July 3, 1985, to 
appellee American National Bank to secure a note for 
$6,870.03.

3. On April 1, 1987, to 
appellees Joe and Gloria Gemelli to secure a note for 
$18,000.

The same were 
properly made of record with the CountyClerk of LaramieCounty.

[¶4.]     On April 1, 1988, the 
Equality State Bank foreclosed its mortgage pursuant to a power of sale 
contained therein, and such bank purchased the property at the sale, receiving a 
certificate of sale from the sheriff.1 Then, on May 4, 1988, for value, 
the Equality State Bank assigned such certificate of sale to appellees Joe and 
Gloria Gemelli. On June 30, 1988, and in consideration of $29,079.73 (the amount 
bid at the sheriff's sale plus interest at the rate of 10% per annum from date 
of sale), appellees Joe and Gloria Gemelli assigned the certificate to the 
mortgagor, appellant Newman.2 On July 31, 1988, appellant Newman 
assigned the certificate to appellant Rasmussen. On August 2, 1988 (immediately 
after the expiration of the statutory period for redemption), a sheriff's deed 
was issued to appellant Rasmussen.

[¶5.]     On February 24, 1987, 
and prior to the third mortgage to Joe and Gloria Gemelli, appellee American 
National Bank filed a complaint in the district court against appellant Newman 
to foreclose its second mortgage. On September 16, 1988, appellees Joe and 
Gloria Gemelli filed a complaint in the same court against appellants Newman and 
Rasmussen to nullify and declare void the transfer of the certificates of sale 
from appellees Joe and Gloria Gemelli to appellant Newman and from appellant 
Newman to appellant Rasmussen, alleging that the transfers were obtained through 
fraud. They also requested judicial foreclosure of their third mortgage. The two 
cases were consolidated by the district court for all 
purposes.

Validity of the Junior 
Mortgages

[¶6.]     Appellants argue that 
the junior mortgagees forfeited any right under their mortgages by not pursuing 
the statutory scheme of redemption, i.e., by not having certified the redemption 
and by not recording it.3 Appellants fail to give proper 
consideration to the fact that a certificate of redemption and assignment of the 
certificate of sale was issued to the mortgagor, appellant Newman, within the 
statutory time period for doing so. The consideration therefor was exactly that 
directed by statute to accomplish a redemption. As statutorily mandated, such 
payment renders void "the sale and certificate."4 Additionally, since the certificate 
was only a lien on the property (Powers v. Pense, 20 Wyo. 327, 123 P. 925 
(1912)), with the legal title still being in appellant - mortgagor Newman, the 
acquisition by Newman of the certificate (an equitable interest) merged the two 
interests and the equitable interest was discharged. Arnold v. Nichols, 25 
Wyo. 458, 172 P. 335 (1918).

"Joinder of the ownership 
in land and of the lien thereon in one person creates a merger and terminates 
the lien.

"A merger may arise under 
three circumstances: (a) Where mortgagee acquires the fee; (b) Where the 
mortgagor acquires the mortgage; and (c) Where a third party acquires both the 
mortgage and the fee."

Thompson on Real 
Property, § 4798 at 46 (1981 Supp.) (footnotes omitted).

[¶7.]     W.S. 1-18-108 providing 
for recordation of an assignment of a certificate of purchase does not have 
pertinency to this matter. Its purpose is to give constructive notice to anyone 
concerning the status of ownership or other interest in 
"lands."

"Each and every deed, 
mortgage, instrument or conveyance touching any interest in lands, made and 
recorded, according to the provisions of this chapter, shall be notice to and 
take precedence of any subsequent purchaser or purchasers from the time of the 
delivery of any instrument at the office of the register of deeds (county 
clerk), for record."

W.S. 
34-1-121(a).

[¶8.]     In this instance, 
appellants had actual notice concerning such 
status as it pertained to the mortgages. Appellant Newman was a party to all 
three mortgages. He was aware of the foreclosure, of the sale of the certificate 
of sale to Joe and Gloria Gemelli and of the subsequent sale of it to him. 
Appellant Rasmussen in her counterclaim recited full knowledge of the status of 
the mortgages and of the certificate of sale.

[¶9.]     Where there is actual 
notice, constructive notice becomes unnecessary. Globe Mineral Co. v. Anderson, 
78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957); Western 
Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1960).

[¶10.]  Since the payment made by 
mortgagor-appellant Newman for the assignment of the certificate of sale and 
certificate of redemption made void the sale and certificate,5 the rights and obligations of 
junior mortgagees should be as they were before the sale. Additionally, public 
policy requires such validation or revival of junior mortgagees. The potential 
for a mortgagor to eliminate junior mortgagees by allowing a foreclosure by the 
senior mortgagee and then purchasing the certificate of sale issued to the 
senior mortgagee is a solid basis for such public policy.

[¶11.]  In summary, when a mortgagor acquires the 
equitable interest of the senior mortgagee before it ripens into legal ownership 
of the property, such interest merges with the mortgagor's legal title, and the 
senior mortgage ceases to exist. Such is equivalent to a redemption under W.S. 
1-18-103(a) and liens of junior mortgagees are validated. Accordingly, the 
following provisions of the summary judgment properly reflect the rights and 
relationship of the parties:

"1. That Sheriff's Deed 
to Defendant Jane L. Rasmussen should be, and is hereby, declared null, void and 
of no effect.

"2. Title to the subject 
property lies in Defendant Jane Rasmussen, subject to the second mortgage of 
Plaintiffs Joe and Gloria Gemelli and the first mortgage of Plaintiff American 
National Bank.

"3. That mortgage from 
Defendant Thomas D. Newman to Plaintiffs Joe and Gloria Gemelli should be, and 
is hereby, judicially foreclosed. That mortgage from Defendant Thomas D. Newman 
to Plaintiff American National Bank should be, and is hereby, judicially 
foreclosed.

"4. Judgment is entered 
against Defendant Thomas D. Newman and in favor of Plaintiffs Joe and Gloria 
Gemelli in the amount of Nineteen Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine Dollars and 
Seven Cents ($19,659.07), plus interest thereon from and after December 19, 1988 
at the rate of Four Dollars and Ninety-Six Cents ($4.96) per day, plus Three 
Thousand Two Hundred Ninety-Eight Dollars ($3,298.00) for said Plaintiffs' costs 
and attorney's fees in collecting those amounts due and owing under the terms of 
that promissory note and mortgage from Defendant Thomas D. Newman. Judgment is 
entered against Defendant Thomas D. Newman and in favor of Plaintiff American 
National Bank in the amount of Twelve Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Four Dollars 
and Ninety-Nine Cents ($12,654.99) plus interest thereon accruing thereon at the 
rate of Two Dollars and Ninety-Six Cents ($2.96) per day from and after April 
17, 1989.

"5. Upon entry of this 
Order, the subject property is to be advertised and sold pursuant to W.S. 
1-18-101 et seq."

 

Summary Judgment Without 
a Motion for Such

[¶12.]  Appellants also question the ability of 
the district court to enter a summary judgment in favor of appellee American 
National Bank absent a motion for such. In its order granting motions for 
summary judgment, the district court concluded in part:

"There exist no issues of 
material fact and Plaintiffs Joe and Gloria Gemelli and American National Bank 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Their Motion for Summary Judgment 
are granted and Defendant Jane Rasmussen'[s] Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied. There exist no issues of material fact regarding Plaintiff American 
National Bank's right to judgment. Though it has not moved for Summary Judgment, 
the Court may grant Summary Judgment to a non-moving party when it is entitled 
to the same and to not do so would result in the waste of judicial 
resources."

[¶13.]  We agree. Although the entry of a summary 
judgment absent a motion therefor should be a rare occurrence, the entry of a 
summary judgment in favor of a party plaintiff who moved for such and a failure 
to do likewise in favor of another party plaintiff who did not move for such, 
but who is subject to the same material facts and legal issues, would result in 
additional proceedings on issues already decided in the matter and a "waste of 
judicial resources."

[¶14.]  In this case, motions for summary 
judgment were made by (1) appellees Joe and Gloria Gemelli against appellant 
Newman, (2) appellees Joe and Gloria Gemelli against appellant Rasmussen, (3) 
appellant Rasmussen against appellees Joe and Gloria Gemelli, and (4) appellant 
Newman against appellee American National Bank. As noted, the case of Newman v. 
American National Bank was consolidated by the district court with that of 
Newman and Rasmussen v. Joe and Gloria Gemelli.

Issue of Material 
Fact

[¶15.]  Appellant Newman lists as an issue 
whether or not the summary judgment in favor of Joe and Gloria Gemelli is proper 
"when there is a genuine issue of material fact as a matter of law, as shown 
throughout the pleadings," but he does not designate or specify the material 
fact over which there is disagreement, nor does he argue the issue. In his 
motion for summary judgment against appellee American National Bank, appellant 
Newman states that "[t]here is no issue as to any material fact" - a position 
contrary to that alleged with reference to this issue. This court will not 
consider or respond to issues alleging error which are not supported by cogent 
argument and proper citation of authority or which are not clearly defined. 
Hance v. Straatsma, 721 P.2d 575 (Wyo. 1986); 
Tremblay v. Reid, 700 P.2d 391 (Wyo. 1985); 
Haddenham v. Board of County Commissioners of CarbonCounty, 679 P.2d 429 (Wyo. 1984) and cases cited 
therein.

[¶16.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 1-18-102 
provides:

"When real property is 
sold by virtue of an execution, order of sale, decree of foreclosure or 
foreclosure by advertisement and sale, the sheriff or other officer, instead of 
executing a deed to the premises sold, shall give to the purchaser of the lands 
a certificate in writing describing the property purchased and the sum paid 
therefor, or if purchased by the plaintiff in execution or by the mortgagee, the 
amount of his bid. The certificate shall state that the purchaser is entitled to 
a deed for the property at the expiration of the period of redemption, unless 
the property is redeemed prior to that date as provided by law. The sheriff or 
other officer shall record in the office of the recorder of the county a 
duplicate of the certificate, signed and acknowledged by him, and the 
certificate or a certified copy thereof is admissible as evidence of the facts 
therein contained."

2 This is the transaction 
most pertinent to this appeal. W.S. 1-18-103(a) provides:

"Except as provided with 
respect to agricultural real estate, it is lawful for any person, his heirs, 
executors, administrators, assigns or guarantors whose real property has been 
sold by virtue of an execution, decree of foreclosure, or foreclosure by 
advertisement and sale within three (3) months from the date of sale, to redeem 
the real estate by paying to the purchaser, his heirs, executors, administrators 
or assigns, or to the sheriff or other officer who sold the property, for the 
benefit of the purchaser, the amount of the purchase price or the amount given 
or bid if purchased by the execution creditor or by the mortgagee under a 
mortgage, together with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from 
the date of sale plus the amount of any assessments or taxes and the amount due 
on any prior lien which the purchaser paid after the purchase, with interest. On 
payment of this amount the sale and certificate granted are 
void."

W.S. 1-18-104 
reads, in pertinent part:

"(a) If no redemption is 
made within the redemption period provided in W.S. 1-18-103, any judgment 
creditor of the person whose real estate has been sold, or any grantee or 
mortgagee of the real estate or person holding a lien on the real estate sold is 
entitled to redeem the same on or before the thirtieth day after the expiration 
of the applicable redemption period provided in W.S. 1-18-103, by complying with 
subsections (b) and (c) of this section.

"(b) The redemptioner 
shall pay to the purchaser or to the officer conducting the sale, the amount bid 
with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of sale, and the 
amount of any assessments or taxes and the amount due on any prior lien which 
the purchaser may have paid after the purchase, with interest. If the purchaser 
also has a lien prior to that of the redemptioner, the redemptioner shall also 
pay the amount of the lien with interest.

"(c) The redemptioner 
must produce for the purchaser from whom redemption is sought or for the officer 
who conducted the sale:

"(i) A copy of the 
judgment under which the right of redemption is claimed, duly certified by the 
clerk of the court in which the judgment was entered, or if redemption is sought 
under a mortgage or other lien, a copy of the mortgage or other lien certified 
by the clerk of the county; or

"(ii) A copy of any 
assignment necessary to establish the claim; and

"(iii) An affidavit by 
himself or his agent showing the amount actually unpaid and due on the 
lien.

"(d) If the property is 
redeemed, another redemptioner may within thirty (30) days from the last 
redemption again redeem from the last redemptioner by paying the amount of the 
last redemption together with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum from the 
date thereof, and the amount of any assessment or taxes which the last 
redemptioner may have paid and the amount of any lien held by the last 
redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The property may again, and as 
often as any redemptioner desires, be redeemed from any previous redemption 
within thirty (30) days from the last redemption. If no redemption is made 
within thirty (30) days after the applicable redemption period provided in W.S. 
1-18-103, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a sheriff's deed to the 
property, or if so redeemed, whenever thirty (30) days has elapsed and no other 
redemption has been made, the last redemptioner or his assignee is entitled to a 
sheriff's deed."

3 W.S. 1-18-108 
provides:

"Every certificate given 
by any officer to any purchaser under W.S. 1-18-101 through 1-18-110, is 
assignable by endorsement under the hand of the purchaser, his heirs, executor, 
administrator or assignee. Every person to whom the certificate is assigned is 
entitled to the same benefits therefrom in every respect that the person named 
would have been if the certificate had not been assigned, including a deed if 
the property is not redeemed as provided by law."

4 See last sentence of 
W.S. 1-18-103(a) - note 2, supra.

5 See last sentence in 
W.S. 1-18-103(a) - note 2, supra.