Case Title: Riggs v. Snell

Citation: 186 Kan. 355, 350 P.2d 54

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1960-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
186 Kan. 355 (1960)
350 P.2d 54
JAMES RIGGS, Appellee,
v.
W.M. SNELL, Appellant. (DIANNA RIGGS; ROBERT M. DOLL; E.E. GILES; EDWARD E. GILES; HAROLD F. YOUNG; and, if any of the above named defendants is deceased, the respective unknown heirs, executors, administrators, devisees, trustees, creditors and assigns thereof; and the unknown heirs, executors, administrators, devisees, trustees, creditors and assigns of Georgia Elma Snell, deceased, Appellees.)
No. 41,706

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed March 5, 1960.
John A. Etling, of Kinsley, argued the cause, and W.N. Beezley, of Kinsley, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Russell L. Strobel, of Larned, argued the cause, and Roscoe E. Peterson, of Larned, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRICE, J.:
This was an action to quiet title to an interest in real estate, for partition of the land, and for an accounting of the rents and profits.
The appeal is by one of the defendants from an order overruling his demurrer to the petition.
The only question in the case is whether a deed to 320 acres of land to a husband and wife created in them a joint tenancy with right of survivorship  or a tenancy in common.
Material portions of the deed in question are as follow:
..............
On July 26, 1947, Georgia Elma Snell, one of the grantees, died intestate. Her heirs-at-law were her husband, W.M. Snell (the other grantee and defendant-appellant here), her son, James Riggs (plaintiff-appellee here), and her granddaughter, Dianna Riggs, a minor child of a prior deceased son.
The petition of James, the son, is framed on the theory that the deed in question conveyed an estate in tenancy in common; that upon the death of Georgia, intestate, her undivided one-half interest in the land descended one-half to her husband, W.M. Snell, one-fourth to him (James), and one-fourth to Dianna, the granddaughter  that is to say, following Georgia's death W.M. Snell became the owner of an undivided three-fourths interest in the land, and James and Diana were the owners of an undivided one-eighth interest each.
The point of W.M. Snell's (hereafter referred to as defendant) demurrer to the petition is that the deed in question created in him and Georgia an estate in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, that upon her death he thus became vested with the entire fee in the land, and that James and Dianna acquired no interest therein.
As previously stated, the demurrer was overruled and defendant has appealed.
*358 The parties agree that if the deed in question created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, defendant's demurrer to the petition is good  but that if it created a tenancy in common, defendant's demurrer was properly overruled.
The sole question is, therefore  which of the two estates was created by the deed?
We think the language of the deed, taken as a whole, when measured by the applicable statute, leads to but one conclusion  that is, an estate in tenancy in common was created, rather than one in joint tenancy with right of survivorship.
G.S. 1949, 58-501, in force at all times here material, reads:
The provisions of this statute leave no doubt of the fact that presumptions are almost wholly in favor of tenancies in common, and that in order to overcome such presumption the language used in a grant or devise must make it clear that a joint tenancy was intended to be created. Its provisions have been construed and applied in a number of cases.
In Bouska v. Bouska, 159 Kan. 276, 153 P.2d 923, it was held:
In Spark v. Brown, 167 Kan. 159, 205 P.2d 938, it was held:
and said:
In In re Estate of Swingle, 178 Kan. 529, 289 P.2d 778, it was held:
In the deed before us, aside from the words
found in the introductory or identification clause, there nowhere is any language descriptive of joint tenancy. In fact, in four other places language indicating an intention to convey an estate in tenancy in common is used.
In the granting clause appear the words
Following the recital of exceptions and reservations we find the words
In the habendum and warranty clause the words
appear twice.
In the face of this quoted language, may it be said that the intent to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship is clearly expressed, as required by statute? We think not.
In passing, we note that G.S. 1949, 58-501, above, was amended in 1955 (see G.S. 1959 Supp. 58-501) by adding to it a number of provisions  two of which read:
Even if otherwise applicable  and concerning which we express no opinion  the quoted additions to the statute have no application to the matter before us because of the fact the granting clause in this deed does not grant an estate in joint tenancy. That clause, as previously shown, contains words commonly used in creating tenancies in common.
In his brief defendant calls our attention to certain of the 1959 "Standards of Title Examination" adopted by the Bar Association of the State of Kansas, relating to the creation of a joint tenancy. Concededly, these "title standards" are not binding on this court  *360 but they are entitled to consideration as being the concensus and general understanding of the bar of the state on the subject. We quote material portions of them:
"7. JOINT TENANCY
7. Creation.
Defendant's reference is to 7.1 Standard B (b). Our answer to that is that there is evidence in this deed that a right of survivorship was not intended.
We consider it unnecessary to extend this opinion with a discussion of decisions from other jurisdictions bearing on the subject. Our statute and cases applying it are sufficient. The language used in this deed does not make "it clear that a joint tenancy was intended to be created"  as the statute requires.
It follows, therefore, that defendant's demurrer to the petition was properly overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.