Case Title: Killington, Ltd. v. State of Vermont

Citation: 164 Vt 253, 668 A.2d 1278

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
KILLINGTON_V_STATE.94-516; 164 Vt 253; 668 A.2d 1278

[Filed 13-Oct-1995]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-516


Killington, Ltd.                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Rutland Superior Court


State of Vermont and                              March Term, 1995
Town of Mendon



David A. Jenkins, J.
  Frank P. Urso, Killington, John J. Zawistoski and Allan R. Keyes of Ryan
  Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, and Michael M. Berger of Berger & Norton,
  Santa Monica, California, for plaintiff-appellee

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Ron Shems, John H. Hansen
  and Mark J. DiStefano, Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier, for
  defendant-appellant State of Vermont

       Nancy Corsones and Christopher Corsones of Corsones & Corsones,
  Rutland, for defendant-appellant Town of Mendon

       Lewis Milford, Richard S. Emmet and Elizabeth R. Thagard, Montpelier,
  for amicus curiae Conservation Law Foundation

       Patrick W. Hanifin and Stephen S. Ostrach of New England Legal
  Foundation, Boston, Massachusetts, for amicus curiae Vermont Farm Bureau
  Federation



PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., Bryan, Supr. J. and Morris, D.J., 
          Specially Assigned



       MORSE, J.   The State of Vermont and the Town of Mendon appeal the
  superior court's ruling that Killington, Ltd.'s regulatory taking claim is
  ripe for litigation.  Killington claims that acts and decisions by the
  State and Mendon, taken individually and together, constitute a regulatory
  taking of its land.  The trial court granted an interlocutory appeal to
  this Court on the ripeness issue.  We reverse.

 

                             I.  State's Actions

                                     A.

       In 1982, Killington bought for development as a ski area 1600 acres of
  land in Parker's Gore East in Mendon.  The land was intended as an
  extension to Killington's existing ski operation.  In early 1986,
  Killington applied to the District I Environmental Commission for a permit
  to build a four-acre snowmaking pond on its land next to the Parker's Gore
  East land. The Commission ordered Killington to submit a master plan
  showing its intended development of the Parker's Gore East area. 
  Killington declined the request, and sought a preliminary injunction in
  Rutland Superior Court to compel a merits hearing without a master plan. 
  The court dismissed Killington's complaint due to its failure to exhaust
  administrative remedies.

       Killington then appealed the Commission's master plan order to the
  Environmental Board, which ordered the Commission to hold a factual hearing
  on the scope of Killington's application.  After hearing, the Commission
  again decided that absent a master plan from Killington, the Commission
  could not adequately determine the cumulative impacts of the snowmaking
  pond.  The Commission found that Killington intended to use the pond to
  service new ski runs to be developed in Parker's Gore East.  Operating
  under this assumption, the Commission denied Killington's Act 250
  application under criterion 8A because the project would endanger necessary
  bear habitat.(FN1)  In its order, the Commission indicated that it would

 

  reconsider Killington's application if Killington showed that it had
  no other viable sources of water for snowmaking and that the ski resort
  would be financially jeopardized by limiting the size of its snowmaking
  facilities.  The Commission further noted that future applications for
  development in Parker's Gore East would have to contain an impact study and
  mitigation plan demonstrating that the development would not significantly
  disturb the critical bear habitat.

       Killington appealed to the Board for a de novo hearing under 10 V.S.A.
  § 6089(a)(3). The Board ruled initially that Killington's pond proposal
  should be considered independently rather than as a part of a future ski
  development of Parker's Gore East.  The Board concluded, nevertheless, that
  the pond would impact wildlife resources in Parker's Gore East.  It found
  that Parker's Gore East contains a rare stand of beechnut-producing trees,
  a wetland area, and other trees that sustain twenty to thirty black bears,
  and that the pond would destroy the wetland and imperil the
  beechnut-producing trees, compromising a necessary bear habitat.

       The Board then denied Killington's application under criterion 8A,
  finding that (1) Killington presented no credible evidence of public
  benefit to outweigh the public loss; (2) Killington lacked mitigation
  proposals for the replacement of lost wetlands and the preservation of the
  beechnut-producing trees; and (3) Killington failed to demonstrate its lack
  of acceptable alternative sites for snowmaking facilities.  Killington
  appealed the Board's decision to this Court, and we held that the Board's
  findings supported its conclusions.  In re Killington, Ltd., 159 Vt. 206,
  216-17, 616 A.2d 241, 248 (1992).

       In November 1986, Killington filed a second Act 250 application with
  the Commission, this time seeking to harvest timber on approximately 700
  acres of land above 2500 feet in Parker's Gore East.  The Commission found
  that although the logging project would comply with criteria 1-7 and 9-10,
  it would endanger necessary bear habitat, triggering analysis of criterion
  8A and its subcriteria.  The Commission concluded that Killington could log
  Parker's Gore East if it implemented mitigation measures to protect the
  bears' food source and travel corridor; otherwise, the permit was denied.

 

       On appeal, the Board affirmed the Commission's finding that the
  logging operation threatened the bear habitat, and denied the application
  because Killington had not provided either a master plan for the operation
  or any mitigation proposals.  The Board indicated that it would reconsider
  the application if Killington provided information as to the timing of the
  operation, the size and shape of the clear cuts, the location of the cuts,
  and the identification of trees that would be retained.  Killington did not
  appeal the Board's decision, nor did it provide the Board with the
  requested information.

       In July 1993, Killington sought a permit to extend the construction
  completion date for snowmaking facilities on ski trails already located in
  Parker's Gore East.  The snowmaking facilities had been approved in three
  permits issued before the Commission and Board determined that a necessary
  wildlife habitat existed in the area, but apparently Killington had not
  begun construction of the permitted snowmaking facilities.  Noting that the
  Board had found Parker's Gore East to contain a necessary bear habitat, the
  Commission ruled that Killington could construct snowmaking facilities in
  that area only if Killington prohibited skiing on trails there after April
  1 of every year.  The condition was not acceptable to Killington, and
  consequently the permit was denied.  No appeal was taken to the Board.

       Killington brought the present action in August 1993.  Killington
  claims that previous decisions by the Commission, Board, and this Court bar
  Killington from using the land for its only reasonable, economically viable
  use -- skiing.  Consequently, Killington seeks monetary compensation from
  the State and Mendon under the takings clause of Chapter I, Article 2 of
  the Vermont Constitution.(FN2)  The State and Mendon moved to dismiss the
  case pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), arguing that the court lacked
  subject matter jurisdiction because Killington's

 

  claim was not ripe, and that Killington had failed to state a claim
  upon which relief could be granted.  Killington filed a motion for summary
  judgment.  The trial court denied the motions.

                                B.

       Whether a regulatory takings claim resulting from an Act 250 denial is
  ripe for litigation must be determined by the two-part test set out in
  Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,