Case Title: State v. Tatro

Citation: 161 Vt. 182, 635 A.2d 1204

Docket Number: 92-443

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_TATRO.92-443; 161 Vt. 182; 635 A.2d 1204

[Filed 29-Nov-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-443


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Addison Circuit

 Joshua A. Tatro                              October Term, 1993


 David A. Jenkins, J.

 John T. Quinn, Addison County State's Attorney, Middlebury, and Gary
   Kessler, State's Attorneys' and Sheriffs' Department, Montpelier, for
   plaintiff-appellee

 E.M. Allen, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney,
   Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of driving
 under the influence of alcohol in violation of 23 V.S.A. { 1201.  The
 conviction was his sixth offense, and the court sentenced him pursuant to 23
 V.S.A. { 1210(d).  We affirm.
      Central to the appeal is the testimony of Victor Sears, who was one of
 the first persons to arrive at the scene of the accident, which occurred
 within a few hundred yards of Sears' father's residence.  Sears observed
 that two persons were seated in the right front passenger seat, one on top
 of the other.  He testified that the person on top, later identified as
 defendant, had his feet over the center console and placed in the area of

 

 the accelerator on the driver's side of the vehicle.  The person underneath
 defendant had his torso and feet placed "as you would expect any passenger
 to be."  Sears said that he believed that the person under defendant might
 not be breathing and that he saw a "starred" or cracked windshield.  Sears
 then asked defendant to identify who was driving the vehicle.  His purpose
 in asking the question was to determine if the person under the defendant
 had hit the windshield, to assess the importance of immobilizing his spine.
 He added that at the time he asked defendant the question, he intended to
 treat only the other person.  At the time, Sears' medical training consisted
 of a basic CPR course, taken in connection with military service, and
 current enrollment in a "first-responder" training program.  He stated that
 his actions in assisting at the accident scene were those of a citizen; he
 was not acting as a member of any rescue squad or fire department.
      Before trial, defendant moved to exclude Sears' testimony as privileged
 communication between doctor and patient under V.R.E. 503 and 12 V.S.A. {
 1612.  He argued that Sears had referred to the accident victims as
 "patients" during discovery and that his true purpose in questioning
 defendant at the scene was to determine the medical condition of the car's
 occupants.
      The court denied the motion, explaining that defendant's statement to
 Sears as to who was driving was not a communication "made for the purpose
 of diagnosis or treatment of his physical, mental, dental, or emotional
 condition," within the meaning of V.R.E. 503(b).  When defendant objected at
 trial to Sears' testimony about defendant's statements at the scene, the
 court ruled "that the witness is not within the privilege -- merely because

 

 he is an exceptional citizen and has undertaken CPR training, and was acting
 as a rescuer."
      After the jury found defendant guilty of driving under the influence,
 the State was permitted to introduce certified copies of court records,
 indicating that a person with defendant's name and same date of birth
 previously had been convicted of DUI five times.  The two oldest
 convictions, in 1956 and 1977, simply contained a record of the conviction,
 but two convictions in 1980 and one in 1987 each contained a judge's
 certification that the pleas of guilty/nolo contendere were knowing and
 voluntary.  After further deliberations, the jury found that defendant had
 been previously convicted of driving under the influence on five occasions.
 The present appeal followed.
      Defendant has the burden of proving that the physician-patient
 privilege existed between witness Sears and himself and that the
 communication sought to be protected was privileged.  See State v. Sweet,
 142 Vt. 238, 239,