Case Title: State v. Hagberg

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: July 31, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LOUIS HAGBERG,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 2004-13017; CA A128398; SC S054997)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Submitted on the record February 14, 2008.
Kendra M. Matthews, of Ransom Blackman LLP, Portland,
submitted the brief for petitioner on review.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court, Lauren S. Holland,
Judge. 211 Or App 712, 156 P3d 174 (2007).
GILLETTE, J.
This
is a criminal case in which defendant was charged with and convicted of eight
sexual offenses committed against his girlfriend's daughter.  All of the
offenses were subject to mandatory minimum sentences and, at sentencing, the
trial court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence for each offense.  However,
the trial court also chose, over defendant's timely constitutional objection,
to make one of the sentences consecutive to another, and to make those two
sentences concurrent with the other six.  Defendant appealed to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that, under Oregon law, the trial judge could not impose a
consecutive sentence unless the judge made certain factual findings.  He
acknowledged that the judge had made the requisite findings, but he argued that
such fact-finding by a judge violated his right to a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The Court of Appeals affirmed
defendant's convictions and sentences without opinion.  
State v. Hagberg,
211 Or App 712, 156 P3d 174 (2007).  We allowed defendant's petition for review
and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. (1)
The
following facts are undisputed.  In 2004, defendant was charged with various
crimes in an eight-count indictment that included, among other things, two
counts of first-degree rape: 
"[Count 1]  The defendant, on or between
January 1, 2001 to April 27, 2004, in Lane County, Oregon, did unlawfully and
knowingly engage in sexual intercourse with [the victim], whose date of birth
is November 6, 1996 * * *.
"[Count 2]  In an act and transaction
separate and distinct from that alleged in count 1, the defendant, on or
between January 1, 2001 to April 27, 2004, in Lane County, Oregon, did
unlawfully and knowingly engage in sexual intercourse with [the victim], whose
date of birth is November 6, 1996 * * *."
(Emphasis
added.)
At
the close of the trial on those charges, the court gave the jury a standard set
of instructions describing the jury's duties.  With respect to Count 2, the
court instructed the jury as follows:
"Oregon law provides that a person commits
the crime of rape in the first degree if the person knowingly has sexual
intercourse with another person[,] and if the other person is under 12 years
old.  
"In
this case, to establish the crime of rape in the first degree, Count 2, the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in a separate and distinct act from
that alleged in Count 1, the following four elements: * * *."
The court instructed the jury as to the meaning of
"knowingly" and "sexual intercourse," but it gave no
instruction defining the concept of "separate and distinct act." 
Neither side asked for such an instruction and neither objected to the failure
to give one.  The jury returned general verdicts finding defendant guilty on
both Count 1 and Count 2, as well as on the other six counts.  It did not
return a special verdict on the "separate and distinct act"
allegation.  
At
sentencing, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences on Counts 3 through
8.  Respecting the first two counts, however, the court stated:  
"It's the finding of this court as follows
and the court's order as follows:
"With regard to Count 1, Rape in the First
Degree, you'll be sentenced to 100 months in the Department of Corrections.
"In Count 2, Rape in the First Degree,
you'll be sentenced to 100 months in the Department of Corrections.  The court
analysis is that Blakely does not apply in this case.  
"At the same time, the court, having read
the jury instructions that Count 2 is a separate and distinct act from Count 1,
the court makes that finding that it is a separate and distinct act as well.  
"The jury has made that finding in fact. 
And the court is sentencing you on Count 2 as consecutive to Count 1."
Defendant
appealed the consecutive sentences (along with other assignments of error) to
the Court of Appeals, which, as noted, affirmed without opinion.  
Before
this court, defendant argues that, under the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed
2d 435 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 124 S Ct 2531, 159
L Ed 2d 403 (2004), and this court's decision in State v. Ice, 343 Or
248, 170 P3d 1049 (2007), cert granted, ___ US ___, 128 S Ct 1657, 170 L
Ed 2d 353 (2008), any fact that increases a penalty beyond that otherwise
permissible under state law, including any fact necessary to impose a
consecutive sentence, must be admitted by the defendant or found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. (2) In this case, he contends, the jury did not make any of the findings that the
applicable statute makes essential to the imposition of a consecutive sentence
and, therefore, the trial court's ruling requiring the sentence on Count 2 to
run consecutive to the sentence imposed on Count 1 is unlawful.  
In
Oregon, a trial court's authority to impose consecutive sentences is limited by
statute.  That statute, ORS 137.123, begins by stating the general (default)
rule in ORS 137.123(1), which provides:
"A sentence imposed by the court may be
made concurrent or consecutive to any other sentence which has been previously
imposed or is simultaneously imposed upon the same defendant.  The court may
provide for consecutive sentences only in accordance with the provisions of
this section.  A sentence shall be deemed to be a concurrent term unless
the judgment expressly provides for consecutive sentences."
(Emphasis
added.)  The statute then describes the various circumstances under which the
sentencing court may impose one or more consecutive sentences:
"(2) If a defendant is simultaneously
sentenced for criminal offenses that do not arise from the same continuous and
uninterrupted course of conduct, * * * the court may impose a sentence
concurrent with or consecutive to the other sentence or sentences.
"* * * * *
"(4) When a
defendant has been found guilty of more than one criminal offense arising out
of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, the sentences imposed for
each resulting conviction shall be concurrent unless the court complies with
the procedures set forth in subsection (5) of this section.
"(5) The court has discretion to impose
consecutive terms of imprisonment for separate convictions arising out of a
continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct only if the court finds:
"(a) That the criminal offense for which a
consecutive sentence is contemplated was not merely an incidental violation of
a separate statutory provision in the course of the commission of a more
serious crime but rather was an indication of defendant's willingness to commit
more than one criminal offense; or
"(b) The criminal offense for which a
consecutive sentence is contemplated caused or created a risk of causing
greater or qualitatively different loss, injury or harm to the victim or caused
or created a risk of causing loss, injury or harm to a different victim than
was caused or threatened by the other offense or offenses committed during a
continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct."
If
a defendant is simultaneously sentenced for two convictions that "do not
arise from the same continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct," the
court "may," in the court's discretion, impose the sentences
consecutively.  ORS 137.123(2) (emphasis added).  On the other hand, if two
convictions do arise out of a "continuous and uninterrupted course
of conduct," the sentences on those convictions "shall be
concurrent" unless certain other facts are present.  ORS 137.123(4).  In
summary:  A trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences requires a
particular factual underpinning, viz., whether the two crimes did not
arise out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, or whether they
did.  But -- and this is a key to this case -- there is no factual default assumption
in the statutory arrangement:  The particular factual predicate for consecutive
sentences must be found specifically. 
In
Ice, this court considered whether and to what extent ORS 137.123 operates
to permit judicial, as opposed to jury, factfinding in a manner that violates
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  In that case,
the defendant was convicted of twice committing first-degree burglary by
entering the apartment of the victim, an 11-year-old child, with the intent to
commit sexual abuse therein.  The jury also found the defendant guilty of four
counts of first-degree sexual abuse, based on allegations that, during each
burglary, defendant committed two acts of first-degree sexual abuse by touching
different parts of the child's body.  In sentencing the defendant, the trial
court found that the first burglary charge and the two related sexual abuse
charges occurred within a single criminal episode, which ordinarily would
require that the sentences on those convictions be concurrent unless the court
made certain additional factual findings.  The trial court determined, however,
that consecutive sentences were appropriate, because it found that the burglary
and the sexual abuse were not merely incidental violations of a separate
statutory provision but, rather, indicated the defendant's willingness to
commit more than one criminal offense.  The trial court also found that the
defendant caused or created a risk of causing greater or qualitatively
different loss, injury or harm to the victim when he committed first-degree
sexual abuse than he had done in committing burglary.  In addition, the trial
court found that the second burglary was a "second separate incident"
from the first and, thus, did not "arise from the same continuous and
uninterrupted course of conduct."  The court then ordered that the
sentence on that conviction run consecutively to the other sentences.  Finally,
it ordered the sentence on one of the sexual abuse convictions during that
second burglary to run consecutive to the sentence for the second burglary,
applying the same reasoning that it had used in connection with the first
burglary.  Ice, 343 Or at 250-53.
In
considering the constitutionality of those sentences, this court observed that,
in Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that, under the Sixth
Amendment, "'[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Id.
at 262, quoting Apprendi, 530 US at 490.  After reviewing how the
Supreme Court applied that rule in subsequent cases, particularly in Blakely
and in United States v. Booker, 543 US 220, 125 S Ct 738, 160 L Ed 2d
621 (2005), this court held in Ice that the Apprendi rule applies
to Oregon's consecutive sentencing scheme as well:  
"[C]onsecutive sentencing as it occurred in the present
case clearly implicates the principles expressed in Apprendi, Blakely,
and Booker, even if it does not mirror the specific circumstances in
those cases.  It is important to recognize, in that regard, that, under ORS
137.123, consecutive sentencing in this state is not simply a matter of
judicial discretion, but can be imposed only after the sentencing judge has
made certain legislatively required findings.  * * * At least with respect to
offenses that arise out of the same continuous and uninterrupted course of
conduct, the jury's issuance of multiple guilty verdicts will only
support concurrent sentences, unless the judge makes those required findings.
"As we have suggested, that arrangement
conflicts with the principles underpinning Apprendi, Blakely, and
Booker, if not with the Apprendi rule itself.  Under the
[consecutive sentencing] statutes that we just have described, the maximum
aggregate sentence that may be imposed, based solely on the jury's verdicts and
without judicial factfinding, when a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses,
assumes that all the sentences run concurrently.  But, under the same statutes,
additional factfinding -- judicial factfinding -- is required to justify
consecutive sentencing.  Under that arrangement, a consecutive sentence
necessarily 'expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that
authorized by the jury's guilty verdict,' Apprendi, 530 US at 494, 120 S
Ct 2348, based on judicial factfinding, and thereby violates the principles
discussed in Apprendi and Blakely."
 Ice,
343 Or at 265-66 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).  
As
is evident from the foregoing quotation, the trial court in Ice
principally was relying on ORS 137.123(4) and (5), which deal with the
imposition of consecutive sentences in cases in which two offenses are part of
one continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct.  However, the trial court in
Ice also imposed consecutive sentences on the two burglaries, which the
trial court purported to do based on ORS 137.123(2) because, the trial court
found, those burglaries did not arise out of one continuous and
uninterrupted course of conduct.  On review, this court reversed both kinds of
consecutive sentences on the ground that none of the facts that the trial court
used to support either kind of sentences had been found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, as the court understood the Sixth Amendment to require.  Id.
at 267.  In so holding, this court acknowledged the possibility that certain
facts could be viewed as implicit in the jury's verdict, which arguably would
render certain of the consecutive sentences lawful.  However, in the
circumstances of that case, the court declined to address that possibility. 
The court stated, 
"One might argue that the trial court's
finding that the two burglary counts did not arise from the same continuous and
uninterrupted course of conduct inheres in the very fact that the jury found
defendant guilty of two separate counts of the same crime.  However, given that
the indictment did not specify particular dates or otherwise distinguish
between the two counts, we do not choose to analyze the case that way."
Id. at
267 n 7.
In
summary, the facts that serve as the foundation for consecutive sentences
imposed under ORS 137.123 must have been submitted to the jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.  That means that, in cases in which the trial judge
purports (as the trial judge here did) to be sentencing defendant under ORS
137.123(2), the predicate fact that the two crimes did not "arise
from the same continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct" must have
been found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  In so stating, however, we
note that, in a particular case, it may be possible to determine from a jury's
verdict that the jury actually did find those facts.  Put differently, and notwithstanding
the circumstance that the trial court purported to base the consecutive
sentences in this case on its own factual findings, the question before
the court is whether the jury itself either made the necessary findings
explicitly or, if it did not, whether it is permissible to determine from the
jury's guilty verdicts on Counts 1 and 2 that it implicitly found facts that
would support the imposition of consecutive sentences under ORS 137.123(2). 
That is, did the jury, in finding defendant guilty on both those counts,
necessarily find, inter alia, that the two crimes did not arise
out of the same continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct?  Defendant
maintains that the jury did not make that finding.
As
we have noted, the trial court purported to find facts that would bring this
case under ORS 137.123(2).  As to that inquiry, defendant acknowledges that the
jury was instructed that it was required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the acts alleged in Count 2 were "separate and distinct" from
the acts alleged in Count 1.  He contends, however, that the fact that two acts
were "separate and distinct" does not necessarily mean that they did
not occur in the same continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct.  Persons
convicted of crimes, he asserts, routinely commit multiple "separate and
distinct" criminal acts during the same continuous and uninterrupted
course of conduct.  Defendant argues that the most that can be gleaned from the
jury's verdict, given the way in which the jury was instructed, is that the
jury believed that defendant had committed two separate and distinct crimes of
first-degree rape.  And, defendant goes on, such a verdict reveals nothing
about whether the jury believed that defendant committed those two rapes in one
continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct.  It follows, defendant reasons,
that, because defendant had not admitted that the two rapes occurred in
separate criminal transactions and the jury did not find that they did, the
trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for Counts 1 and 2. (3)
The
state responds that the indictment charging defendant with offenses in this
case alleged that defendant committed the crime alleged in count 2 "[i]n
an act and transaction separate and distinct from that alleged in count
1," and that that wording "effectively alleged that [defendant]
committed those crimes during separate 'criminal episodes.'"  That phrase,
"criminal episode," is defined in ORS 131.505(4), for purposes of the
former jeopardy statutes, to mean "continuous and uninterrupted conduct
that establishes at least one offense and is so joined in time, place and
circumstances that such conduct is directed to the accomplishment of a single
criminal objective."  And, in State v. Boyd, 271 Or 558, 564, 533
P2d 795 (1975), this court held that the phrase "criminal episode" is
synonymous with the phrase "same act or transaction" as used in the
permissive joinder statute, now codified at ORS 132.560(1)(b)(B).  The state
then concludes from the foregoing that the phrase "separate act or
transaction" means "not part of the same continuous and uninterrupted
course of conduct" for purposes of the consecutive sentencing statute.  
Whatever
the merits of that argument might be in the abstract, it is beside the point
here.  As this court held in Ice, our determination of the propriety of
the court's imposition of consecutive sentences in a case like this depends on
what facts the jury necessarily found when it found defendant guilty of the
charged crimes.  The instruction that the court gave the jury on Count 2 in
this case did not use the same wording that was used in the indictment. 
Instead, it required only that the jury find that the acts committed in Count 2
were "separate and distinct" from the acts committed in Count 1. 
That instruction controlled the jury's deliberations.
We
agree with defendant that, as a matter of plain English, the fact that the
instruction on Count 2 required the jury to find that the acts alleged in one
count are "separate and distinct" from the acts alleged in another
count merely establishes that the jury found that defendant committed two distinct
crimes.  It does not convey any information about whether the jury found the
statutory prerequisite to consecutive sentencing under ORS 137.123(2) -- that
those two crimes "did not arise from the same continuous and uninterrupted
course of conduct."  It follows that that finding is insufficient to support
the court's imposition of consecutive sentences under that statutory subsection. (4)

The
state argues in the alternative that, even if the trial court did not have
authority under ORS 137.123(2) to impose consecutive sentences, the sentences
are proper under ORS 137.123(5)(a), (5) which provides:
"The court has discretion to impose
consecutive terms of imprisonment for separate convictions arising out of a
continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct only if the court finds:
"(a) That the criminal offense for which a
consecutive sentence is contemplated was not merely an incidental violation of
a separate statutory provision in the course of the commission of a more
serious crime but rather was an indication of defendant's willingness to commit
more than one criminal offense."
The
state reasons that, because the criminal offense in Count 1 was the same as the
criminal offense in Count 2, that offense, by definition, cannot have been
"merely an incidental violation of a separate statutory provision in the
course of the commission of a more serious crime."  According to the
state, if the two crimes for which consecutive sentences are contemplated are
equally serious, the trial court always has authority to impose consecutive
sentences; no additional factfinding is necessary.  
The
state's argument under ORS 137.123(5)(a) is abstractly interesting, but it
ignores or assumes away two separate Ice-related concerns.  The first
concern arises under ORS 137.123(4) and the introductory sentence to subsection
(5).  Those subsections state that a consecutive sentence under ORS 137.123(5)
may be imposed only if "a defendant has been found guilty of more than one
criminal offense arising out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of
conduct."  That predicate is factual and it may be necessary that a jury
find it beyond a reasonable doubt.  But no finding even resembling that factual
predicate was found by the jury here. (6)
That
factual predicate aside, application of subsection (5)(a) or (b) to justify
consecutive sentences requires additional factfinding that neither the trial
judge nor the jury addressed.  Because there is no arguable basis for asserting
that either the trial judge or the jury decided that defendant's crimes did not
arise out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, or that they
even thought about the issues that had to be decided under ORS 137.123(5), the
state's argument fails.
Finally,
the state -- returning to ORS 137.123(2) -- argues that any error in failing to
formally submit the issue of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct
to the jury is harmless, because this court may infer from the testimony in
this case and the manner in which the case was tried that the jury necessarily
found that the two rapes occurred on different days, which means as a matter of
law that the two crimes were not a part of one continuous and uninterrupted
course of conduct.
The
state's theory is as follows:  The victim, who was very young when the crimes
occurred, testified about a number of sexual encounters, but she could not identify
the specific dates on which defendant molested her.  She could, however,
describe the circumstances and the location of various events.  The state elected
to distinguish the incidents from one another by their location:  Count 1, the
state indicated, referred to an incident that the victim said occurred in the
living room of her residence, while Count 2 referred to an incident that the
victim said occurred in her mother's bedroom.  The victim also testified that
those events occurred on "different" days.  The state argued the case
to the jury under that formulation.
We
agree with the state that the foregoing evidence might have permitted the jury
to find that the defendant's criminal acts occurred on separate days.  There
are at least two difficulties with that approach, however,  The first is that the
jury was never told that it needed to find that fact, in connection with
assessing defendant's guilt on the two counts of rape.(7) Thus, the jury did not decide, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the two rapes
actually did occur on separate days.  Second, and of at least equal importance,
is the fact that the victim's testimony, taken as a whole, is too vague and
disjointed for this court to be able to say that, if the question had been put
to it, the jury necessarily would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
two rapes occurred on different days. (8) We therefore cannot hold that the error in failing to submit the issue to the
jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as we would have to find in order
for the state of prevail.  See State v. Bray, 342 Or 711, 724-25, 160
P3d 983 (2007) (describing standard).
In
this case, the trial court, over defendant's objection, imposed consecutive
sentences based on its own factual finding and not on facts necessarily found
by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  Imposing consecutive sentences in that
manner violated defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.  The trial court's error was then sustained by the Court
of Appeals, when it affirmed that judgment without opinion.  The case must be
remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. In his petition for review, defendant raises certain other issues. 
However, as we informed the parties when we allowed the petition for review, we
limit our review to whether the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive
sentence. 
2. In 2005, the Oregon legislature enacted a statute, now codified at
ORS 136.760 to 136.792, which provides procedures for notifying defendants of
the state's intent to use "enhancement facts" to increase the
sentence that may be imposed for a conviction, and for submission of such facts
to the jury.  This case was tried before the effective date of that statute,
and it therefore plays no role in our analysis.
3. Defendant made that point to the trial court in his sentencing
memorandum.  However, the trial court appears to have rejected it, insofar as
it based its decision to impose consecutive sentences on its own finding -- that
the acts alleged in Count 2 were "separate and distinct" from the
acts alleged in Count 1.  The trial court stated:
"At the same time, the court, having read
the jury instructions that Count 2 is a separate and distinct act from Count 1,
the court makes that finding that it is separate and distinct act as well.  
"The jury has made that finding in fact. 
And the court is sentencing you on Count 2 as consecutive to Count 1."
4. We reject the state's contention that defendant did not object to the
instruction that the jury was given or complain that it did not parrot the
statutory wording and, therefore, should not be heard to complain now if the instructions
were unclear.  Defendant was under no obligation to ensure that the jury
decided facts that would support a consecutive sentence.  In all events, his
argument is not that the instruction was unclear, but that it did not require
the jury to find the facts necessary to support the imposition of consecutive
sentences.  
5. In fact, the state indicates in its brief on the merits that it
"prefers" that this court affirm the trial court under that
subsection, rather than under subsection (2).
6. We do not here hold that the predicate finding under ORS
137.123(4) must be made by a jury.  The answer one way or the other is
debatable.  We simply note here that the state has not addressed the issue.
7. And, as we already have explained, the jury's finding that the rape
in Count 2 was a "separate and distinct" act from the rape in Count 1
did not constitute such a finding.
8. Our holding in this respect, which is limited to the arguments of the
parties, should not be read as agreeing with the idea that, as a matter of law,
criminal offenses committed on different days cannot be part of a continuous
and uninterrupted course of conduct.  They can be, depending on the attendant
circumstances.