Case Title: JAMES URIAH RAMSDELL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-161

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
JAMES URIAH RAMSDELL V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 159149 P.3d 459Case Number: 05-161Decided: 12/28/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JAMES URIAH 
RAMSDELL,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The Honorable Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Ken Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Public Defender. 

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
David Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General.                     
            

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Mr. Ramsdell 
appeals from an order revoking his probation for failure to pay 
restitution.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Ramsdell 
presents the following issues:

 
 
Did the trial court err 
in not dismissing the probation revocation, with prejudice, due to lack of 
timely hearing?

 
 
Did the trial court err 
in revoking probation, when presented with uncontroverted evidence that Mr. 
Ramsdell was unable to pay?

 
 
The State presents an 
additional issue:

 
 
Does this Court have 
jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court erred by dismissing the August 
17, 2004, probation revocation petition without prejudice?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In 2001, Mr. 
Ramsdell pled guilty to one felony count of larceny by bailee, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(b), (c)(i) (Michie 1997).  He was sentenced to a term of two to 
five years in the state penitentiary.  
The sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation.  One of the conditions of probation 
required Mr. Ramsdell to pay restitution in the amount of $7,344.37.  His restitution payment was set at 
$125.00 per month.

 
 
[¶4]      In 2002, Mr. 
Ramsdell's probation was revoked, in part, because of his failure to meet his 
restitution obligation.  His 
original prison sentence was imposed with a referral to Boot Camp.  Mr. Ramsdell completed the Boot Camp 
program and was once again placed on probation.  Restitution was re-imposed as a 
condition of probation.  Mr. 
Ramsdell requested permission to move to the state of Washington because of 
employment opportunities available to him.  
The court granted his request.   

 
 
[¶5]      In 2004, Mr. 
Ramsdell's probation was revoked for the second time for failing to make 
restitution payments.  At the 
revocation hearing, Mr. Ramsdell requested permission to move to Idaho where he had a job 
working for his family's business.  
He offered to increase his restitution payments to "$550.00 or $600.00" 
per month.  The district court 
granted Mr. Ramsdell's request, reinstated probation, and set the new 
restitution payment at $500.00 per month.  

 
 
[¶6]      After moving to 
Idaho, Mr. 
Ramsdell made two restitution payments.  
The last payment was received on June 7, 2004.  The State filed a third petition for 
revocation on August 17, 2004, alleging that Mr. Ramsdell had failed to pay 
restitution.  

  

[¶7]      Mr. Ramsdell was 
arrested several months later on March 23, 2005.  He appeared before the circuit court on 
March 25, 2005, and was appointed a public defender at that time.  On April 7, 2005, Mr. Ramsdell appeared 
before the district court where he was advised of the allegations contained in 
the revocation petition and of his rights.  
He denied the allegations.  
The district court set bond and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for 
April 14, 2005.  

 
 
[¶8]      At the April 14th 
hearing, the State informed the court that it was not prepared to proceed 
because it had failed to notify its witnesses of the scheduled hearing.  Defense counsel orally moved for 
dismissal of the revocation petition with prejudice.  The district court granted the 
dismissal, but did so without prejudice.  
A written order granting the dismissal was never entered.  The district court did, however, enter a 
minute order releasing Mr. Ramsdell from custody.

 
 
[¶9]      The next day, the 
State re-filed its petition seeking revocation on the same grounds as alleged in 
the August 17, 2004 petition.  A 
hearing was set for April 21, 2005.  
On the day of the scheduled hearing, Mr. Ramsdell filed a Motion to 
Dismiss with Prejudice for Lack of Speedy Probation Revocation Hearing; if 
Denied then Motion to Grant Credit for Time Served Awaiting Probation Revocation 
Hearing.  The district court denied 
the motion to dismiss.

 
 
[¶10]   The evidentiary hearing was 
held.  The district court found that 
Mr. Ramsdell had willfully failed to pay his court-ordered restitution.  Mr. Ramsdell's probation was revoked and 
the district court imposed the original two to five year sentence.  Mr. Ramsdell was awarded credit for time 
served including the time he was confined while awaiting disposition of the 
August 17, 2004 revocation petition.  
This appeal followed.

 
 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   Probation revocation proceedings 
are reviewed under our abuse of discretion standard.

 
 
A district court's 
decision to revoke probation is discretionary and will not be disturbed unless 
the record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion. . . . Judicial discretion 
is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  The district court's determination that 
the probation agreement has been violated must be based upon verified facts and 
must be made pursuant to due process protections.

 
 

Anderson v. 
State, 
2002 WY 46, ¶ 25, 43 P.3d 108, 118 (Wyo. 2002) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).  To the extent that 
this appeal raises questions of law, those questions are reviewed de novo.  Johnson v. State, 2006 WY 79, ¶ 7, 137 P.3d 903, 905 (Wyo. 2006).

 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Ramsdell initially claims the 
district court erred by dismissing the August 17, 2004, revocation petition 
without prejudice.  He contends that 
a dismissal with prejudice should have been ordered because he was not provided 
a hearing within fifteen days of his first appearance after the filing of the 
petition as required by W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(4)(B)(i).  He further claims that, because the 
August petition should have been dismissed with prejudice, the State was 
precluded from filing the second petition.

 
 
[¶13]   In response, the State first claims 
that this Court is without jurisdiction to consider this issue.  The State contends that Mr. Ramsdell's 
appeal is untimely because he did not appeal from the oral ruling dismissing the 
August petition.  We reject the 
State's contention that we lack jurisdiction.  

 
 
[¶14]   On April 14, 2005, the district 
court ruled from the bench that the August petition was dismissed without 
prejudice.  A written order did not 
follow the court's oral pronouncement.  
Prior to the hearing on April 21, 2005, Mr. Ramsdell filed another motion 
to dismiss.  The district court 
orally denied the motion.  Again, a 
written order did not follow.  

 
 
[¶15]   W.R.A.P. 2.01(a) provides in 
pertinent part that "[a]n appeal from a trial court to an appellate court shall 
be taken by filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 
30 days from entry of the appealable order. . . ."  "Entry" of an order requires that the 
order be in writing and filed with the clerk of court.  See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 533 
(6th ed. 1990) (defining the term entry as "a 
setting down in writing of particulars" and/or "to file or . . . deposit").  See also, State v. Gwyther, 589 N.W.2d 575, 578 (N.D. 1999) (holding that an oral ruling is not an appealable order); 
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. West, 147 S.W.3d 72, 74 (Ky. 2004) (finding it axiomatic that the 
appealable order be in writing).  

 
 
[¶16]   Mr. Ramsdell was not required to 
appeal from the oral ruling.1  He appealed from the Order Revoking 
Probation and Judgment and Sentence.  
This order was the first written order entered after the petition for 
revocation was filed.   The 
appeal was timely and we have jurisdiction to consider this 
issue.

 
 
[¶17]   Alternatively, the State claims 
that Mr. Ramsdell received an appropriate remedy for violation of the time 
limits set forth in W.R.Cr.P. 39.2  In Reese v. State, 866 P.2d 82, 84 (Wyo. 
1993), we held that the time limits set forth in W.R.Cr.P. 39 are considered 
advisory in nature and are not mandatory.3  We explained that: 

[t]he time limits 
prescribed by Rule 39 do not establish the parameters of the district court's 
jurisdiction, since the district court retained its original jurisdiction, but 
rather seek to prevent delays in contravention of a defendant's constitutional 
right to a speedy disposition of the charges against him. Federal due process 
requires that a probationer be afforded an opportunity for a revocation hearing 
within a reasonable time after he is taken into custody. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 
2603-04, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 498 (1972).

 
 
. . . [T]he court may, as 
indicated by the rule, deviate from the prescribed times for good cause. . . 
.

 
 
We therefore conclude 
that, while the thirty and fifteen-day time limits set forth in Rule 39 should 
be adhered to, failure to do so will not divest the trial court of its 
jurisdiction, nor will it result in an automatic dismissal of the revocation 
petition.

 
 

Reese, 866 P.2d  at 84.  We have also recognized that courts are 
permitted to "tailor [a] remedy to the circumstances of each case in light of 
the harm the rule was promulgated to prevent" because the rule does not provide 
specific remedies for violations.  
Doney v. State, 2002 WY 182, ¶ 
17, 59 P.3d 730, 737 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 
[¶18]   In this case, the district court 
set the evidentiary hearing for April 14, 2005.  Mr. Ramsdell did not object to the 
court's setting.  When the State 
advised the district court that it was unable to proceed with the scheduled 
evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the petition and ordered Mr. 
Ramsdell's release from custody.  
After revoking Mr. Ramsdell's probation on April 21, 2005, the district 
court awarded Mr. Ramsdell credit for his time in custody pending disposition of 
the revocation proceedings.  

 
 
[¶19]   Both of these remedies are 
appropriate under the circumstances of this case.  See, e.g., Doney, ¶ 18, 59 P.3d  at 737 (finding 
credit for time served an appropriate remedy for the 48 day and 18 day 
violations of the time limit set forth in  
W.R.Cr.P. 39 rather than issuing a dismissal with prejudice).  Although Mr. Ramsdell urges us to 
require dismissal of the petition with prejudice, nothing in the rules or in our 
case law mandates that result.  
While we envision situations where a dismissal with prejudice might be 
appropriate, the circumstances here do not warrant it.  We find no error in the district court's 
decision to dismiss the petition for revocation without prejudice.    

 
 
Willful Failure to Pay 
Restitution 

 
 
[¶20]   Mr. Ramsdell also challenges the 
district court's determination that he willfully failed to pay his 
restitution.  He claims the State 
did not refute evidence that he was unable to pay because of his financial 
situation.  He further claims that 
because the district court did not consider alternatives to imprisonment, his 
due process rights were violated.  

 
 
[¶21]   At the evidentiary hearing, an 
employee of the Wyoming Department of Corrections testified that Mr. Ramsdell 
had not made his court-ordered restitution payments.  The State produced evidence that Mr. 
Ramsdell made only two restitution payments from the date of his last probation 
revocation through the filing of the petition to revoke.4  Once the State demonstrated a failure to 
pay, the burden shifted to Mr. Ramsdell to establish that he had an inability to 
pay restitution.  Dickson v. State, 903 P.2d 1019, 1023 
(Wyo. 1995). 

 
 
[¶22]   Mr. Ramsdell testified concerning 
the reasons for his failure to pay. According to his testimony, his family's 
business started going under after he made his last restitution payment on June 
7, 2004.  The business eventually 
closed in August 2004.  He advised 
the court that even though he knew the business was going under, he didn't look 
for another job because he didn't want to leave his family "high and dry."  Mr. Ramsdell explained:  "I mean, I could have started working 
somewhere else, but then again, I could have also lost my place to live because 
of the fact that I wasn't working with them."  He further testified that he has been 
working part-time for Clear Channel Communications.  Mr. Ramsdell also produced copies of his 
2003 and 2004 tax returns showing an annual income of $4,737.00 and $2,735.00 
respectively. 

 
 
[¶23]   At the conclusion of the probation 
revocation hearing, the district court determined that Mr. Ramsdell had 
willfully failed to pay his court-ordered restitution.  The court reasoned that Mr. Ramsdell is 
"an able-bodied man, able to make payments, able to get a job.  Just because he doesn't want to get a 
full-time job or get another job is of no concern to this Court."  We cannot say that the district court 
abused its discretion in reaching its conclusion. 

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Ramsdell did not produce any 
evidence concerning his living situation or his monthly bills.  He also did not produce any evidence 
that he had a physical or mental disability which prevented him from obtaining 
full-time employment or that economic conditions were a factor in his case.  Mr. Ramsdell's testimony indicated he 
could have found alternative employment in order to meet his restitution 
obligation, but chose not to.  As a 
result, Mr. Ramsdell did not meet his burden of establishing an inability to 
pay.  

[¶25]   In probation revocation cases, 

 
 
[a]ll that is essential 
is the court's conscientious judgment after hearing the facts that the violation 
has occurred. This should not be an arbitrary action and should include a 
consideration of both the reasons underlying the original impositions of 
conditions, the violation of these, and the reasons leading to such 
violation.

 
 

Gailey v. 
State, 
882 P.2d 888, 891 (Wyo. 1994).  In this case, Mr. Ramsdell was 
originally sentenced on October 4, 2001, at which time it was determined that he 
had an ability to pay restitution in the amount of $125.00 per month.  Thereafter, Mr. Ramsdell's probation was 
revoked twice for his failure to pay restitution.  During his second revocation hearing, 
Mr. Ramsdell represented an ability to increase his payments to "$550.00 or 
$600.00" per month.  However, he 
failed to make any payments in any amount after June 7, 2004, despite his 
continued employment with the family's business until its closure and his 
employment with Clear Channel Communications.  Mr. Ramsdell's failure to apply any of 
the funds available to him toward his restitution supports the district court's 
finding that he willfully failed to pay.  
See, e.g., Badura v. State, 
832 P.2d 1390, 1393 (Wyo. 1992) (finding appellant's failure to pay 
anything toward restitution was willful and a legitimate reason for revoking 
probation).  

 
 
[¶26]   Relying on Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672, 
103 S. Ct. 2064, 2073, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983), Mr. Ramsdell also claims that his 
due process rights were violated because the district court did not consider 
alternatives to imprisonment.  Mr. 
Ramsdell's claim is without merit.  
In Bearden, the United States 
Supreme Court held that:  

 
 
a sentencing court must 
inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully 
refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire 
the resources to pay, the court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant 
to imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing authority. If the 
probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the 
resources to do so, the court must consider alternative measures of punishment 
other than imprisonment.  

 
 

Bearden, 461 U.S.  at 672, 103 S. Ct.  at 2073.  Mr. Ramsdell 
admitted that he made no effort to look for other employment when his family's 
business started to fold.  There is 
no evidence that Mr. Ramsdell made any effort to borrow money, seek modification 
of the terms of the order, or notify the court of a change in 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Dickson, 903 P.2d  at 
1024.  

 
 
[A] probationer's failure 
to make sufficient bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order 
to pay the fine or restitution may reflect an insufficient concern for paying 
the debt he owes to society for his crime.  
In such a situation, the State is . . . justified in revoking probation 
and using imprisonment as an appropriate penalty for the offense.  

 
 

Bearden, 461 U.S.  at 668, 103 S. Ct.  at 2070.  We find no error in 
the district court's decision to revoke Mr. Ramsdell's probation and impose his 
original prison sentence.

  

[¶27]   Affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"The lack of 
writing does not mean that there is no order.  It simply means that [the appellate 
court has] no jurisdiction to review the order, because the right of appeal 
exists only from the time of entry of the order."  State ex rel. Hildebrand v. Kegu, 207 N.W.2d 658, 659-660 (Wis. 1973). 

 

2We 
question whether a violation of the time limits set forth in W.R.Cr.P. 39 
occurred.  The rule requires a 
hearing within fifteen days of the first appearance before the court.  W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(3) requires the court to 
advise the probationer of the allegations contained in the petition for 
revocation and of his or her rights at the first appearance.  The probationer is then required to 
either admit or deny the allegations.  
W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(4).  Mr. 
Ramsdell contends that his first appearance occurred on March 25, 2005, when he 
was brought before the circuit court and appointed a public defender.  A transcript of this appearance does not 
exist.  As a result, we cannot 
determine whether Mr. Ramsdell was given the W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(3) advisements at 
that time.  We can only assume that 
the sole purpose of this appearance was to bring Mr. Ramsdell before a judicial 
officer without unnecessary delay in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(2).   However, a transcript of the April 
7, 2005, hearing is contained in the record.  Mr. Ramsdell was advised of the 
allegations asserted in the petition for revocation and advised of his 
rights.  He also denied the 
allegations.  If April 7, 2005, was 
in fact the first appearance before the court as provided in W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(3), 
the hearing held on April 21, 2005, would be within the fifteen-day time period 
set forth in the rule.  This 
analysis is in accord with the district court's comments concerning this issue 
during the April 21, 2005, hearing.  
The district court commented that 

 
 
the 
reason they go to the Circuit Court is so they can get a public defender 
appointed.  It is not the first 
appearance in the District Court.  
It is simply an attempt to help the jail with its overcrowding problems 
and to move these cases along.  I 
think the first appearance under that rule would be in this court, which we call 
an arraignment for classification[] purposes.

 
 
Despite 
this discussion, the district court and the State proceeded as if a violation of 
the time limits occurred.  
Therefore, we too will proceed on that basis.

 
 

3W.R.Cr.P. 
39(a)(4)(B)(i) provides in pertinent part:

  

If the 
probationer is in custody because of the probation revocation proceedings, a 
hearing upon a petition for revocation of probation shall be held within 15 days 
after the probationer's first appearance before the court following the filing 
of the petition. If the probationer is not in custody because of the probation 
revocation proceedings, a hearing upon the petition shall be held within 30 days 
after the probationer's first appearance following the filing of the petition. 
For good cause the time limits may be extended by the 
court.

 
 

4One payment 
was in the amount of $500.00 and the other was in the amount of 
$400.00.