Case Title: Hjelle v. JC Snyder & Sons

Citation: 133 N.W.2d 625

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1965-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
133 N.W.2d 625 (1965) Walter R. HJELLE, State Highway Commissioner, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. J. C. SNYDER & SONS, a partnership d/b/a Lake Park Drive In Theater, Defendant and Respondent. No. 8178. Supreme Court of North Dakota. March 11, 1965. Helgi Johanneson, Atty. Gen., and Myron E. Bothun, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for appellant. Lawrence O'Connell, Williston, for respondent. *626 ERICKSTAD, Judge. This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Williams County dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. A trial de novo is demanded. Walter R. Hjelle, State Highway Commissioner, as plaintiff, sought to enjoin J. C. Snyder & Sons, a partnership, d/b/a Lake Park Drive In Theater, whom we shall hereafter refer to as Snyder from maintaining a fence and light post which encroached 16 feet 9 inches upon the state highway right of way. In the complaint the Commissioner alleged that this encroachment was an obstruction prohibited by Chapter 24-12, N.D.C.C., and a nuisance that should be enjoined. Snyder denied that the fence and light post were an obstruction of the right of way or a nuisance and argued that therefore the complaint should be dismissed. The material portions of the pleadings follow: The pertinent parts of the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment follow: The affidavit of the Assistant District Engineer for the State Highway Department indicates that the fence "is 56 ft. in length extending onto the right of way 16'9" in a triangular fashion, the apex of such encroachment squared off to a length of 7'3"." The testimony of one of the witnesses for Snyder was that the fence was 16 inches high, painted white, and made of wooden slats, intended to divide the entering traffic from the exiting traffic; and that the light pole was constructed about ten feet from the theater's attraction board to hold a flashing yellow light, the attraction board being on Snyder's property east of the apex of the fence. The evidence thus discloses that the fence and light post are situated on highway right of way. It fails to indicate whether the state has a fee simple title or merely an easement for highway purposes in the right of way, or whether the installation interferes with the free use of the highway right of way by the public. The Commissioner's position is that it is immaterial what title the State has in the right of way or whether the installation interferes with the free use thereof by the public, the important factor being that the property is part of the state highway system. He argues that, as the fence and light post are situated on the highway right of way, they constitute an encroachment or purpresture upon the highway property in violation of §§ 24-12-01 and 24-12-02 (1, 2), N.D.C.C., and thus are enjoinable, even though they are not situated upon the traveled portion of the main highway or the traveled portion of the service or frontage road and do not interfere with the free use thereof by the public. The statutes relied upon by the Commissioner read as follows: As the highway involved here is a part of the state highway system, and as the overseer of highways has no duties in connection with the system of primary roads designated by the State Highway Commissioner as the state highway system, § 24-12-02, subsection 2, does not apply in the instant case. See § 24-03-02, N.D.C.C., *629 giving the State Highway Commissioner authority to maintain, protect, and control the highways comprising the state highway system, and § 24-01-01.1, subsection 42, defining the state highway system. Snyder's answer is that these statutes do not apply to the abutting landowner where there is no evidence that the encroachment interfered with the free use of the highway by the public. He cites a decision rendered by this court in 1943 in support of his position that the grantor retains a property right in the property subject to the highway easement. In Otter Tail the abutting landowner gave the County of Cass an additional easement for highway purposes in connection with the widening of an existing highway. At the time the easement was executed it was understood and agreed by and between the abutting landowner and the county authorities that the landowner should have the right to use the land over which the easement was granted for agricultural purposes, subject to its use for highway purposes. No part of this agreement was included in the instrument granting the easement. The county commissioners did, however, unanimously pass and enter on their minutes a resolution embodying the terms of this agreement. The litigation was between the utility company, which sought to condemn, for use of its electric transmission lines, poles, etc., a portion of the land covered by the highway easement, and the owner of the abutting land, who had given the highway easement to the county. The case at bar differs from Otter Tail in that it involves litigation between the grantee and grantor of the highway easement where the grantee seeks to enjoin the grantor from encroaching upon the property subject to the easement. Although these distinctions may be made, it should be noted that the court therein said: In Tri-State our court previously held that the owner of land abutting the highway who had given an easement for highway purposes to the county and thereafter used the land between the traveled portion of the right of way and his property line for agricultural purposes was at best a trespasser without any right. Under Otter Tail, an abutting landowner retains the right to use property subject to highway easement for any purpose which does not interfere with the use for highway purposes. The Legislature has the power, within reasonable limits, to define what constitutes such interference. Our legislature has provided that injury to a highway right of way (§ 24-12-01, N.D.C.C.) or obstruction of the free use thereof by the public (§ 24-12-02, subsection 1, N.D.C.C.) constitutes such an interference. The appellant Commissioner contends that injury or obstruction exists in this case and that therefore he is entitled to the injunction prayed for. However, in this case there is no evidence that the installation complained of constitutes an injury or obstruction in fact. The mere showing that the light post and fence were situated on the highway right of way is not proof that they obstructed or injured the highway right of way. The Commissioner's argument that a nuisance resulted from a violation of these statutes therefore also fails because of the lack of proof of injury to the right of way or obstruction of the free use of the right of way by the public. The question arises whether a nuisance existed under our statute defining "nuisance," which reads as follows: We find no evidence to indicate the existence of a nuisance thereunder. The injunction was therefore properly denied. Decision of the district court is affirmed. BURKE, C. J., and TEIGEN, J., concur. KNUDSON, J., not having been a member of the Court when the case was submitted, did not participate.