Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. DuVall

Citation: 384 Md. 234

Docket Number: 49ag/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket  AG
No. 49
September Term, 2003
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v. 
MARY I. DUVALL
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
File: December 10, 2004
1Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides:
“(a)  Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approval 
of the Commission.  Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel
shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.”
See  Rule 16-743, which specifically provides that “[t]he Commission may (1) approve
the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action.”
 
2Rule 1.4 provides:
“(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
“(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”
3Rule 1.15 provides, as relevant:
“(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a
lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the
lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained
pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. Other property
shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records
of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and
shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the
representation. 
“(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third
person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or
third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is
entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, by Bar Counsel,
acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial
Action against Mary I. DuVall, the respondent.   The petition charged that the respondent
violated Rules 1.4, Communication,2 1.15, Safekeeping Property,3 1.16, Declining or
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.”
4Rule 1.16 provides, as relevant:
*     *     *     *
“(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain
papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.”
5Rule 8.1 provides, as relevant:
“An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
*     *     *     *
“(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the
matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”  
6The petitioner also charged that the respondent “assist[ed] a person who is not a
member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice
of law,” in  violation of  Rule 5.5 (b), but withdrew it during the evidentiary hearing. 
7“A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for
which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.”
2
Terminating Representation,4 and 8.1, Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters,5 of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by Maryland Rule 16-812.6   The
respondent was also charged with violating Maryland Code (1989, 2000 Replacement
Volume) § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.7   
8Rule 16-752 (a) provides:
“(a)  Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any
circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the
record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation
with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing
of motions, and hearing.”  
9Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides:
“(c)  Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate
into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings
as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. If
dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless
the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later
than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy
of the statement to each party.” 
3
We referred the case, pursuant to Rules 16-752 (a),8 to the Honorable William B.
Spellbring, of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, for hearing pursuant to Rule 16-
757 (c).9    The respondent was not served personally, despite reasonable efforts to do so. 
Consequently, service of process was made, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-753, on Janet
Moss, Administrator of the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland.  Thereafter, an
order of default was entered against the respondent and a hearing date set.   Following the
hearing, at which the respondent not appear or participate, the hearing court, “[h]aving
considered the unrefuted averments of the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action,
along with evidence presented by the Petitioner,” found facts by the clear and convincing
standard and drew conclusions of law, as follows.
4
Findings of Facts
“The Respondent was admitted to the M aryland Bar on December 10, 1981.   By an
Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals filed March 17, 2003, she was indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law in Maryland, effective thirty days after the filing of the
opinion.   Attorney Grievance Commission v. DuVall, 373 Md. 482, 819 A. 2d 343 (2003).
The Respondent has not petitioned for reinstatement since her indefinite suspension took
effect on April 16, 2003.
“The legal representation which is the subject of the disciplinary complaint now
before the court began several years prior to the commencement of the Respondent’s
indefinite suspension.   In August, 1996, Robert Ravenscroft retained the Respondent to
provide legal advice and services pertaining to the placement of Mr. Ravenscroft’s sister,
Leah Ravenscroft, in the National Lutheran Home for the Aged in Rockville, Maryland.   At
the time of Mr. Ravenscroft’s initial contact with the Respondent, the Respondent maintained
an office for the practice of law in College Park, Maryland.
“On August 27, 1996, Mr. Ravenscroft gave the Respondent a personal check in the
amount of $1,700.00, drawn on a checking account held in the name of Leah Ravenscroft.
The memo notation on the check indicated that $200.00 was to be applied toward the “costs”
and $1,500.00 was for “fees.”   The $1,500.00 portion designated for fees was an advance
retainer to be earned by the Respondent at a billing rate of $125.00 per hour.   The
Respondent endorsed the $1,700.00 check “for deposit only.”   Although the back of the
5
negotiated check does not reflect whether the deposit was made to an attorney trust account,
there is no question that the Respondent received the funds. 
“Initially, the legal action suggested to Robert Ravenscroft by the Respondent was to
petition for a “conservatorship” of Leah Ravenscroft’s affairs.   It was later decided that such
action was not necessary, and that the Respondent instead prepared a Power of Attorney
granting Robert Ravenscroft authority to handle Leah Ravenscroft’s affairs.
“In the course of providing representation, the Respondent sent Mr. Ravenscroft two
billing statements.   The first, dated September 13, 1996, identified legal services rendered
through that date and contained an entry stating that $431.25 had been taken as a payment
from the Respondent’s escrow account for professional services rendered.   The second
billing statement, dated May 2, 1997, identified additional legal services through that date,
including the preparation of a Last Will and Testament for Leah Ravenscroft, and contained
an entry stating that $171.25 had been taken as a “payment from account” for professional
services rendered.   The second billing statement reflected that as of May 2, 1997, the
Respondent was holding a balance of client funds in the amount of $1,097.50.
“In March 1999, Leah Ravenscroft was accepted as a resident at the National Lutheran
Home in Rockville.   Robert Ravenscroft testified in this proceeding that the only additional
professional service rendered by the Respondent after May 2, 1997 was to prepare a real
Estate Power of Attorney in August 1999 related to the sale of real property owned by Leah
Ravenscroft in the District of Columbia.   The Respondent never billed Mr. Ravenscroft for
6
the preparation of that document.
“By a letter dated August 1, 2001, sent to the Respondent’s office address in College
Park, Mr. Ravenscroft requested in writing that the Respondent review her records and
refund the balance of client funds due to Leah Ravenscroft.   The Respondent did not respond
in any manner to Mr. Ravenscroft’s letter.   At various times after August 2001, Mr.
Ravenscroft attempted to reach the Respondent by telephone but was unsuccessful.  On
January 3, 2003, he learned that the respondent’s office phone number had been
disconnected.
“In a letter dated January 6, 2003, Mr. Ravenscroft wrote to the Attorney Grievance
Commission to report the Respondent’s actions and his inability to contact her.   By a letter
to the Respondent dated January 17, 2003, mailed to the Respondent’s home address in
Greenbelt, Maryland, as provided by the Client Protection Fund, Bar Counsel forwarded Mr.
Ravenscroft’s complaint and requested that the Respondent respond in writing to that
complaint within ten days.   The Respondent did not respond as requested.
“On February 5, 2003, Bar Counsel sent the Respondent a second letter asking her to
respond to Mr. Ravenscroft’s complaint by February 14, 2003.   The original of that letter
was sent to the Respondent’s home address by certified mail.   A copy was mailed by regular
first class mail.   The certified mail envelope was returned by the U.S. Postal Service with
a sticker providing a Post Office Box number in College Park.   The envelope sent by first
class mail was not returned to the office of the Attorney Grievance Commission.
7
“The Respondent has not responded to Bar Counsel’s lawful demands for information
in response to Mr. Ravenscroft’s complaint.   Such requests were made before the
commencement of the Respondent’s indefinite suspension.
“The Respondent has not accounted for the balance of Leah Ravenscroft’s advance
retainer, nor has she refunded the unearned client funds belonging to Leah Ravenscroft.
Conclusions of Law
“By failing to respond to Robert Ravenscroft’s request for an accounting of the
retainer paid on behalf of Leah Ravenscroft and not keeping him informed as to the status
of such funds, the Respondent violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 (a),
dealing with communication.   The Respondent’s failure to hold the unearned balance of the
Ravenscroft retainer separate from her own property after May 2, 1997 may reasonably be
inferred from the evidence presented.   Such conduct violated Rule 1.15 (a) of the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct.   The Respondent also violated Rules 1.15 (b) and 1.16 (d)
when she failed to promptly deliver the advance payment of fee that had not been earned to
client, Robert Ravenscroft, upon the conclusion of any active representation.
“The unearned portion of the Ravenscroft retainer held by the Respondent as of May
2, 1997 constituted “trust money” as defined in the Maryland Code, Business Occupations
and Professions Article, §10-301 (d).   As trust money, the balance of $ 1, 097.50 should
have been maintained in an attorney trust account until such funds were earned by the
Respondent as legal fees, expended as costs associated with the representation or refunded
8
to the client upon conclusion of the representation.   This court concludes that at some point
after May 2, 1997, the Respondent no longer maintained the unearned balance of $ 1, 097.50
in trust and further concludes that she used such funds, which belonged to Leah Ravenscroft,
for an unauthorized purpose in violation of §10–306 of the Business Occupations and
Professions Article.
“Finally, the Respondent violated Rule 8.1 (b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
by knowingly failing to respond to lawful demands for information from a disciplinary
authority when ignored Bar Counsel’s letter requesting a response to Mr. Ravenscroft’s
complaint.” 
As indicated, the respondent did not participate in the proceedings.   The petitioner
did not file any exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing court.   It did,
however, make a recommendation for sanction, that the respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law.   In support of the recommendation, the petitioner emphasizes that the
respondent as found by the hearing court to have “committed multiple violations of the
Rules of Professional Conduct,” including failing to account for the unearned portion of a
retainer, failing, despite being requested to do so  to refund that unearned portion to the client
and using those funds, which constituted trust funds, for a purpose other than that for which
it was entrusted to the respondent.   The petitioner also directs our attention to the fact that
the respondent has previously been disciplined and, significantly, 
“While the previous disciplinary proceeding was still pending before the Court
in early 2003, Bar Counsel received the complaint that is the subject of the
9
current proceeding.   Prior to her suspension, the Respondent ignored Bar
Counsel’s efforts to obtain information in response to the complaint filed by
Robert Ravenscroft.   She also did not respond at any stage of the subsequent
disciplinary process.”
It found it important that, unlike the current proceedings, in which the respondent did not
participate at all, in the prior proceeding, the respondent participated, offering some
explanation for her misconduct, that, at the time, her judgment was impaired by the
depression, from which she was suffering, and refunded the unearned fee to the complaining
client.    The petitioner concludes:
“Given her prior experience in the disciplinary system, the Respondent, if she
had any interest in regaining her eligibility to practice law at some point in the
future, should have recognized the importance of responding to Bar Counsel
and of answering the formal disciplinary charges related to Mr. Ravenscroft’s
complaint.  See Attorney Greivance Commission v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 475,
800 A. 2d 782, 790 (2002) (“After a disciplinary action, this Court expects a
renewed commitment to professional standards and ethical conduct.”). 
Considering her prior discipline history, the Respondent’s failure to respond
to Mr. Ravenscroft’s complaint and her apparent conversion of client funds
(the unearned retainer balance) provide sufficient grounds to impose the
ultimate sanction of disbarment.”
The petitioner might also have pointed out that, in addition to some of the same
violations found in this case, the earlier proceedings involved additional violations, at least
one of which was more serious; the respondent in the earlier  case was found to have violated
Rules of Professional conduct 1.15 (a) and (b), 1.16 (d), 8.1 (a) and (b), and 8.4 (c) and
Maryland Code (2000 Repl. Vol., 2002 Suppl.) Business Occupations and Professions
Article, § 10-306.   Pursuant to Rule 8.4 (c), the respondent was accused of, and found by the
hearing court to have, engaged “in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
10The recommendation, based on a psychiatric report diagnosing the respondent as
suffering from depression, which was causally related to the respondent’s misconduct, a
diagnosis the petitioner did not contest, was made notwithstanding the petitioner’s
unhappiness with the timing of the submission of the report,  Attorney Grievance
Commission v. DuVall, 373 Md. 482, 489, 819 A. 2d 343, 347 (2003); the report was not
produced until the hearing in the Circuit Court.    Id. at 486, 819 A. 2d at 345.
10
misrepresentation.”
In the prior case, Attorney Grievance Commission v. DuVall, 373 Md. 482, 819 A.
2d 343 (2003),  although concerned about what it characterized as the respondent’s “pattern
of dishonesty,” Id. at 347 819 A. 2d at 489, the petitioner recommended as the appropriate
sanction that the respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.10 Id. at 347,
819 A. 2d at 489.   The respondent did not appear, in that case,  at the hearing in this Court.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding some concern that the recommended sanction was not
sufficient to protect the public, the majority of the Court accepted the petitioner’s
recommendation.   Having observed, citing Attorney Grievance Commission v. Vanderlinde,
364 Md. 376,  773 A.2d 463 (2001), that “[o]rdinarily the type of conduct engaged in by
Respondent and which resulted in the violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct found here would result in disbarment,” 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. DuVall,
373 Md. at 490, 819 A. 2d at 348 , the Court explained:
“We impose an indefinite suspension in the present case solely because:  (1)
Bar Counsel, in his written Recommendation for Sanction filed in this matter
on 2 October 2002 (before oral argument), proposed indefinite suspension as
the appropriate sanction; ... (2) Respondent neither filed a contrary
recommendation as to sanction nor appeared at oral argument before this
Court; (3) Respondent may have been influenced by, or even agreed with, Bar
11
Counsel’s recommendation as to sanction and, having nothing to add, elected
not to respond or appear; ... and, (4) Respondent might have acted differently
to protect her interests had she thought disbarment was “on the table,” at least
insofar as she may have been influenced by Bar Counsel’s judgment as to what
sanction was appropriate to pursue.  We do not suggest that the Court lacks the
authority to disbar Respondent in this matter nonetheless.  Clearly Rule 16-759
(c) and the nature of the Court’s jurisdiction in attorney discipline matters,
gives the Court the authority to order any lawful sanction it deems appropriate
in a given case.  The boundaries of the Court’s discretion may not be redrawn,
as a matter of law, by a respondent’s choice not to respond to Bar Counsel’s
recommendation or not to appear at oral argument, or even by expressly
acquiescing in Bar Counsel’s recommendation of a lesser sanction than the
Court may deem appropriate.
“Our principal concern is that, on this record, Respondent’s “severe
mental illness” ... may have affected her judgment as to the prudential course
of conduct to be taken in view of the assumed exposure to the sanction she
might be facing, based on Bar Counsel’s recommendation.  Indefinite
suspension may be perceived by members of the Bar as granting slightly more
purchase from which to seek re-admission,  assuming rehabilitation, than
disbarment.  The relative professional stigma attached to indefinite suspension
versus disbarment also  may figure in a decision whether to oppose or
acquiesce.  Such reasoning in the mind of an attorney who has admitted her
misconduct and continues to fight her related mental illness may seem
reasonable.  Respondent might have resisted disbarment had Bar Counsel
sought its imposition.  While Respondent is not to be commended for her lack
of forethought in failing to grasp that the Court might not accept Bar Counsel’s
recommendation, or that it was not bound by that recommendation, we deem
it a fairer outcome, under the circumstances of this case, to adopt Bar
Counsel’s recommendation.”
Id. at 492, 819 A. 2d at 349. (footnotes omitted).  
In one of the omitted footnotes, the Court  noted the respondent’s pattern of appearing
at the Inquiry Panel hearings as evidencing the plausibility of the scenario we postulated.  Id.
at 493 n. 12, 819 A. 2d at 349 n. 12.   The Court then cautioned that, “henceforth, a failure
to respond to Bar Counsel’s recommended disposition and/or to appear at oral argument will
12
not be considered as any level of mitigation in the sound exercise of our discretion as to what
sanction is appropriate.”  Id. at 494, 819 A. 2d at 350.
We accept the petitioner’s recommendation and order the respondent’s disbarment.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE
CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE
COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT
TO MARYLAND RULE 16-715.c., FOR
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN
FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST
MARY I. DUVALL.