Case Title: MICHAEL LEROY HACKETT a.k.a MICHAEL LEROY HACKETT, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0163

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
MICHAEL LEROY HACKETT a.k.a MICHAEL LEROY HACKETT, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 90Case Number: S-09-0163Decided: 06/29/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
MICHAEL 
LEROY HACKETT a.k.a MICHAEL LEROY HACKETT, 
JR.,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Amy Gleason, 
Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance Program.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After a jury 
trial, Michael Leroy Hackett was convicted of one count of first degree sexual 
assault.  On appeal, he claims the 
presentence investigation report was unfairly biased against him.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Hackett presents 
one issue for our review:

 
 
The 
presentence investigation report considered and endorsed by the trial court 
constituted circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or 
conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In March of 2008, 
Michael Leroy Hackett's stepsister reported that Hackett had raped her.  After an investigation, Hackett was 
charged with first degree sexual assault, and a jury  convicted him of that single 
charge.

 
 
[¶4]      Before 
sentencing, a presentence investigation report (PSI) was ordered.  The court sentenced Hackett on July 21, 
2009, but prior to sentencing, Hackett filed his objection to the PSI.  Specifying eleven objections, Hackett 
took issue with the following: (1) sought to correct a discrepancy with his 
social security number; (2) denied ever advising the probation and parole 
officer that he understood the State would "maybe" recommend a sentence of ten 
to twelve years imprisonment; (3) sought to clarify the statement made in the 
"Defendant's Version" portion of the PSI; (4) objected to the "graphic 
statement" regarding Hackett's prior offense, on the grounds that, being derived 
from an affidavit of probable cause, it was more than a "brief statement of the 
offense," and that he had not admitted or pled guilty to all of the statements 
of offenses set forth in that document; (5) and (6) sought to correct statements 
regarding Hackett's family relationships; (7) denied that in 2002, he had 
pornography of underage females on his computer; (8) sought to expand upon the 
effects on his health resulting from an auto accident in 2001; (9) sought to add 
that Hackett's bankruptcy proceeding had been dismissed, leaving him further in 
debt; (10) argued that the drafter's "conclusion and evaluation are very 
biased," and that his continued claim of innocence should not be taken as an 
effort to minimize the offense for which he was convicted or to show a lack of 
compassion; and (11) asserted that Hackett had contributed "many worthwhile 
things to society."

 
 
[¶5]      After taking note 
of Hackett's objections, the court ruled and imposed a sentence of 15-40 years 
in prison.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      We review a 
district court's sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. Roeschlein v. 
State, 2007 WY 156, 
¶ 17, 168 P.3d 468, 473 
(Wyo. 2007).  A sentence will not be 
disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an 
abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, circumstances which 
manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public 
sense of fair play.  An error 
warrants reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's 
substantial rights.  The party who 
is appealing bears the burden to establish that an error was prejudicial. 
Id.  This Court has declined 
to reverse a sentence where the party objecting to particular portions of a PSI 
failed to demonstrate that the district court based its decision upon those 
parts of the report and the challenged comments "merely summarized what was 
apparent elsewhere in the report and provided the rationale for the agent's 
sentencing recommendation."  Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 34, 131 P.3d 963, 974 (Wyo. 2006) 
(quoting Janssen v. State, 2005 WY 123, ¶ 18, 120 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Wyo. 2006)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Hackett's 
argument focuses on two objections to his PSI that he made prior to 
sentencing:  Objection no. 4 
complained that the PSI "substitutes a graphic statement of probable cause of 
the prior offense in 2002 instead of a brief statement of the offense;"1 Objection no. 10 argues "the 
conclusion and evaluation are very biased.  
Because the Defendant maintains his innocence, he cannot be accused of 
["]lack of insight, shamelessness, and pathetic efforts toward minimizing["] and 
["]lack of compassion.["].  The 
State asserts the PSI was neither unfair nor excessively biased, nor did it 
offend the public sense of fair play.

 
 
[¶8]      The statute 
governing PSIs provides:

 
 

§ 
7-13-303. 
Investigation preceding probation or suspension of sentence.

(a)  When 
directed by the court,  . . . the 
state probation and parole officer . . . shall investigate and report to the 
court in writing:

                        
(i)  The circumstances of the offense;

(ii)  The 
criminal record, social history and present conditions of the 
defendant;

(iii)  If 
practicable, the findings of a physical and mental examination of the 
defendant;

(iv)  If 
practicable, statements from the victim; and

(v)  A 
summary of the impact of the offense on the victim.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-303 (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
[¶9]      The Wyoming Rules 
of Criminal Procedure also contain mandates regarding presentence investigation 
reports.  Rule 32(a)(1) provides 
that in all felony cases, "the Department of Probation and Parole shall conduct 
a presentence investigation and submit a report to the court."  The rule further 
provides:

 
 
(2)  Report 
-- The report of the presentence investigation shall 
contain:

            
(A)  Information about the history and characteristics of the 
defendant, including prior criminal record, if any, financial condition, and any 
circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior that may be helpful in imposing 
sentence or in the correctional treatment of the 
defendant;

            
(B)  Verified information stated in a non-argumentative style 
containing an assessment of the financial, social, psychological, and medical 
impact upon, and cost to, any individual against whom the offense has been 
committed and attaching a victim impact statement as provided in W.S. 7-21-102 
if the victim chooses to make one in writing 

            
. . . .

(D)  Such 
other information as may be required by the court.

 
 
[¶10]   With these principles in mind, we 
stated the following in Noller v. State, 
2010 WY 30, ¶ 13, 226 P.3d 867, 871 (Wyo. 
2010):

 
 
In 
considering the statutory provision and the rule, we have said that trial courts 
have broad discretion when imposing sentence to consider a wide range of factors 
about the defendant and the crime.  Thomas v. State, 2009 WY 92, ¶ 10, 211 P.3d 509, 512 (Wyo. 2009). 
 They are free, in the exercise of 
their sentencing discretion, to consider victim impact statements, PSIs and 
other factors relating to the defendant and his crimes in imposing an 
appropriate sentence within the statutory range. Garcia v. State, 2007 WY 48, ¶ 10, 153 P.3d 941, 944 (Wyo. 2007), 
citing Smith v. State, 2005 
WY 113, ¶ 37, 119 P.3d 411, 422 (Wyo. 2005).  Trial 
courts are permitted to consider a defendant's character when exercising their 
discretion to impose sentence.  Doherty, ¶ 35, 131 P.3d  at 
974.  In evaluating character, the 
trial court may consider a broad range of reports and information.  Gorseth v. State, 2006 WY 109, ¶ 15, 141 P.3d 698, 703 (Wyo. 2006). A 
defendant's cooperation with authorities and remorse for his actions are 
appropriate factors to be considered when imposing sentence. Dodge v. 
State, 951 P.2d 383, 386 
(Wyo. 1997).  A sentencing 
recommendation contained in a PSI is one of the factors that a court may 
properly consider in determining the appropriate sentence to impose.  Duke v. State, 2009 WY 74, ¶ 15, 209 P.3d 563, 569 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
In 
Noller, the appellant moved to strike 
portions of his PSI on the grounds that they were inflammatory and 
argumentative, similar to the ones complained of here.

 
 
In 
this Writer's opinion and observation, he still maintains selfish, cowardly and 
self-defeating thoughts and behaviors and appears either unwilling or unable to 
entertain true empathy for the victims, their families and their loved 
ones.

 
 

Noller, 
¶ 8, 226 P.3d  at 869.  The district court denied Noller's 
motion and sentenced him to 
terms encompassing the maximum period of incarceration on each count.  We affirmed the district court because 
when summarizing the factors that influenced its decision, the lower court 
indicated that it did not rely solely on the PSI when considering Noller's 
sentence.  Instead, the district 
court considered a variety of information and sources in imposing 
sentence, 
including Noller's character, his level of remorse for his action, the probation 
and parole agent's assessment of whether he accepted responsibility for his 
crime, victim statements, as well as the agent's sentencing 
recommendation.

 
 
[¶11]   We have encountered similar 
situations to Noller in the recent 
past. In Carothers v. State, 2008 WY 
58, ¶ 24, 185 P.3d 1, 
15 (Wyo. 2008), the defendant moved to strike from the PSI similar 
remarks to the ones made in both Noller 
and those in this case.  While 
cautioning PSI preparers to limit their reports to the factors outlined in Rule 
32(a)(2), we upheld the district court's ruling denying the motion because: 1) 
there was no showing the court relied on the challenged comments in imposing the 
sentence; 2) the comments basically repeated statements contained in the victim 
impact portion of the report and made in court during the sentencing hearing; 
and 3) the fact that the district court imposed a shorter sentence than the 
State requested suggested it was not inflamed by the comments.  Id.

 
 
[¶12]   With these cases in mind, we turn 
to the instant one.  In 2002, 
Hackett pled guilty to one charge of attempted sexual exploitation of a 
child.  The PSI in this case refers 
to that offense, and quotes at length from the charging documents in the prior 
prosecution, which detail the contents of internet communications between 
Hackett and who he believed to be a 14-year-old girl.  Hackett objected to this information 
being included in the PSI, arguing it "substitutes a graphic statement of 
probable cause of the prior offense in 2002 instead of a brief statement of the 
offense."  Hackett argues that 
because the charging document was 
quoted, he did not admit or plead to all of those statements/allegations, and 
pled only to attempted sexual exploitation and not to attempted third degree 
sexual assault.  Hackett also argues 
this language is excessive, biased, partisan and 
inflammatory.

 
 
[¶13]   While this information might have 
been quite detailed, we do not find it to be outside the scope of Rule 32's 
purview, which calls for "[i]information about the history and characteristics 
of the defendant, including prior criminal record, if any  and any 
circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior that may be helpful in imposing 
sentence or in the correctional treatment of the defendant[.]"  Given that Hackett's prior felony 
offense was both sexual and assaultive in nature, and the present offense also 
involves a sexual assault, this information was relevant.

 
 
[¶14]   Hackett also takes issue with an 
alleged "extrajudicial review" of his correspondence and computer files by the 
PSI writer.  In the personal 
history/background portion of the PSI, there is a quotation from the earlier PSI 
connected to Hackett's 2002 conviction for attempted sexual exploitation of a 
child having to do with "cyber-sex," sexually graphic content and pornographic 
images.  Hackett asserts this 
language has "very little to do with the instant offense and again is included 
only to inflame the reader."  Given 
that his 2002 offense involved the use of his computer and was sexual in nature, 
this information became relevant to sentencing in this case.  In imposing sentence, the trial court is 
given broad discretion to consider a wide variety of factors about the defendant 
and his crimes.  Gorseth v. State, 2006 WY 109, ¶ 15, 141 P.3d 698, 704 (Wyo. 2006) (in 
Gorseth, this Court approved the use of a probation report 
that referenced a prior conviction).

 
 
[¶15]   Hackett also argues that the 
characterization by the PSI writer that his efforts to minimize his culpability 
for his offense were "pathetic and shameless" demonstrates that the writer 
sought to "inflame" and to "advocate for the State."  Furthermore, Hackett asserts that 
underlining the word "rape" was also inflammatory.  We agree with Hackett that the PSI 
writer's comments were quite blunt, and once again we caution PSI agents that it 
is not their function to act as legal advocates but to be neutral participants 
and to provide the information specified in Rule 32(a)(2) for consideration by 
the sentencing court.  The comments 
in Hackett's case resemble those written in Noller and Carothers and were, in fact, written by the same agent.  We made this admonition in Noller, supra, although when that case 
was published, Mr. Hackett's case was already under review by this Court.  We will repeat it here.  In the future we expect agents involved 
in preparing PSIs to conform their comments to the requirements of Rule 32(a)(2) 
and comply with this Court's directives in this case and  in 
Carothers.

 
 
[¶16]   Even after that reprimand, and 
considering the nature of the agent's remarks in this case, after considering 
the list of Hackett's objections in context with the entire PSI, along with the 
court's comments during sentencing, we conclude that no abuse of discretion 
occurred.  The court stated in its 
sentencing order that it considered the PSI, as well as the "evidence 
produced."  In reviewing the record 
as a whole in this case, we are in agreement with the district court.  We need not consider Hackett's due 
process concerns, as the previous issue is determinative. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in considering the Presentence Investigation Report in full when 
sentencing Mr. Hackett.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Hackett points to "over 30 vulgar sexual reference to male and female 
genitalia, ejaculation, intercourse, and masturbation that are attributed to" 
Hackett.  Ironically, Hackett does 
not deny making such "vulgar" references.