Case Title: Cotton v. Brow

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cotton v. Brow1995 WY 155903 P.2d 530Case Number: 95-32Decided: 09/14/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Michael 
H. COTTON, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Ed 
W. BROW, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Michael 
H. Cotton, pro se, for Appellant.

Richard 
G. Miller, Casper, for Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Michael 
Cotton appeals from the declaratory judgment which extinguished his interest in 
a contract for deed.

[¶2]  We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Cotton sets forth 
three questions for our review in his brief which he entitled "Peremptory Writ 
of Error":

1. 
Did the District Court [err] in its failure to acknowledge Michael Cotton's Sui 
Juris Status which was declared and affirmed? 

2. 
Did the District Court [err] in its failure to act Sua Sponte to protect Michael 
Cotton's Rights in its fictitious presumption that Michael Cotton was bound by 
the same rules and procedures of all other Parties In Interest, after Michael 
Cotton continually objected to the Titles of Nobilities imposed upon 
him?

3. 
Did the District Court [err] in failing to require revenue agent Gary Warner to 
establish LAWFUL scope of authority operating in the situs of Natrona County, 
Wyoming against property of a non-federal person?

FACTS

[¶4]      Cotton entered 
into a contract for deed on July 29, 1988, to purchase property located in 
Casper from the Wyoming Community Development Authority (the WCDA). In May 1993, 
the Internal Revenue Service (the IRS) gave notice that it had seized Cotton's 
interest in the contract for deed because Cotton had not paid his internal 
revenue taxes. The IRS sold Cotton's interest in the contract for deed on June 
2, 1993, to Appellee Ed Brow at a public auction.

[¶5]      Brow brought an 
action for a declaratory judgment in the district court because Cotton refused 
to relinquish possession of the property and the WCDA declined to complete an 
assignment of the contract for deed to Brow. After holding a bench trial, the 
district court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of Brow, declaring that 
Cotton had no further interest or legal right in the contract for deed and 
ordering him to dispossess himself of and remove himself from the property. The 
district court also directed the WCDA to complete an assignment of the contract 
for deed to Brow. Cotton appealed to this Court.1

DISCUSSION

[¶6]      Cotton presents 
three "questions" for our review on appeal. We cannot readily discern from his 
brief what errors Cotton is claiming that the district court made. After having 
reviewed his entire argument, we believe that he may be generally contesting the 
district court's jurisdiction over him because he claims that he occupies a 
special "sui juris" status.2

[¶7]      The district 
court attained personal jurisdiction over Cotton when Cotton was personally 
served with process within the district court's jurisdiction. W.R.C.P. 
4.

Personal 
service achieves jurisdiction for the forum court over the subject matter and 
the listed defendants by issuance of a summons by the clerk of court and service 
by the sheriff or other authorized person, W.R.C.P. 4(c), on the individual or 
entity to be found within the jurisdiction pursuant to W.R.C.P. 4(d). . . 
.

WR 
v. Lee (In re DG), 825 P.2d 369, 374-75 (Wyo. 1992). Cotton waived his right to 
contest the district court's jurisdiction over his person when he failed to 
contest that jurisdiction. See Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Wyo. 
1988); see also Gookin v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, 826 P.2d 229 (Wyo. 1992). Cotton affirmatively invoked the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state when he filed his brief on appeal. See Global Shipping and 
Trading, Ltd. v. Verkhnesaldincky Metallurgic Company, 892 P.2d 143, 146-47 
(Wyo. 1995).

[¶8]      Unlike personal 
jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Brunsvold v. State, 
864 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1993); DB v. State Department of Family Services (In re 
MFB), 860 P.2d 1140, 1146 (Wyo. 1993). A challenge to the subject matter 
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any time during the proceeding. Makinen 
v. PM P.C., 893 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Wyo. 1995). "`Jurisdiction of the 
subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to 
which the proceedings in question belong.'" Booth v. Magee Carpet Company, 548 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Wyo. 1976) (quoting Murrell v. Stock Growers' Nat. Bank of 
Cheyenne, 74 F.2d 827, 831 (10th Cir. 1934)). See also DB, 860 P.2d  at 
1146.

[¶9]      Pursuant to 
Article 5, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution, the district court has 
original jurisdiction over all actions which are "not otherwise provided for." 
See Glover v. State, 860 P.2d 1169, 1173-74 (Wyo. 1993). The Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act, as it has been adopted in Wyoming, allows the district courts to 
determine and declare the interests of the parties to contracts and in property 
located in Wyoming. WYO. STAT. §§ 1-37-102, -103 (1988). See, e.g., Hronek v. 
Saint Joseph's Children's Home, 866 P.2d 1305 (Wyo. 1994). Brow asked the 
district court to proclaim that Cotton's interest in the contract for deed had 
been extinguished by Brow's purchase at the public auction. The district court 
was well within its jurisdiction when it declared the respective parties' 
interests in the property and in the contract for deed.

[¶10]   Cotton has failed to provide any 
cogent argument or pertinent authority to support his other general claims of 
error. We, therefore, refuse to consider the remainder of Cotton's claims on 
appeal. McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 886 P.2d 595, 597 n. 2 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶11]   Brow requests that we award costs 
and fees to him pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05 on the basis that reasonable cause 
did not exist for Cotton's appeal. We agree and hereby certify that reasonable 
cause did not exist for Cotton's appeal because he failed to provide the Court 
with cogent argument or pertinent authority to support his claims of error and 
his brief did not meet the requirements of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Phifer v. Phifer, 845 P.2d 384, 387 (Wyo. 1993). Brow shall submit a 
statement of his costs and attorney's fees to this Court; we will make an 
appropriate award of costs and fees after we have reviewed Brow's 
submission.

CONCLUSION

[¶12]   We hold that the district court had 
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this case and that the 
district court did not err when it entered the declaratory judgment in favor of 
Brow.

[¶13]  Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 
Although the WCDA was not listed in the caption of the case as being a party to 
the appeal, it filed a brief and designated itself as an appellee.

2 
The term sui juris is defined as: "Of his own right; possessing full social and 
civil rights; not under any legal disability, or the power of another, or 
guardianship." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (5th ed. 1979).