Case Title: Spencer v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 484, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2023-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TYREKE A. SPENCER, 
 
Defendant-Petitioner Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 484, 2022 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  C.A. No. N22C-12-071 
§  
§ 
 
Submitted: March 30, 2023 
Decided: 
May 16, 2022 
 
 
ORDER 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, 
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Tyreke A. Spencer, filed a civil complaint in the 
Superior Court seeking a declaration that his habitual-offender sentence is illegal 
and asking the court to enjoin the State from classifying one of his predicate offenses 
as a violent felony for purposes of habitual-offender sentencing.  The Superior Court 
dismissed the complaint upon initial review, concluding that the complaint was 
legally frivolous and that it was plain on the face of the complaint that Spencer was 
not entitled to relief, because his claims are not cognizable in a civil action.  Spencer 
has appealed to this Court.  The State has moved to affirm the judgment below on 
 
2 
the ground that it is manifest on the face of Spencer’s opening brief that his appeal 
is without merit.  We agree and affirm.1 
(2) 
A Superior Court jury found Spencer guilty of two counts of drug 
dealing, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony 
(“PFDCF”), and possession of drug paraphernalia.  The charges arose from conduct 
that occurred on September 6, 2016.2  The State sought habitual-offender sentencing 
for the PFDCF counts.  The State’s habitual-offender motion alleged three predicate 
offenses:  a Delaware conviction for second-degree robbery in 1998; a Delaware 
conviction for possession of a destructive weapon in 2001; and a federal conviction 
for felon in possession of a firearm in 2007.  The Superior Court declared Spencer 
to be a habitual offender and sentenced him for one of the PFDCF offenses to twenty-
five years of incarceration under 11 Del. C. § 4214(d).  This Court affirmed on direct 
appeal.3  In 2019, Spencer filed a motion for postconviction relief.  The Superior 
Court denied the motion on April 22, 2021.4  This Court dismissed Spencer’s appeal 
from that decision as untimely.5 
 
1 To the extent that the State’s motion does not fall squarely under Supreme Court Rule 25(a) or 
(b), we affirm sua sponte under Rule 25(c). 
2 Spencer v. State, 2018 WL 3147933, at *1 (Del. June 25, 2018). 
3 Id. 
4 State v. Spencer, 2021 WL 1574439 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2021). 
5 Spencer v. State, No. 178, 2021, Docket Entry No. 11 (Del. Aug. 11, 2021). 
 
3 
(3) 
On December 8, 2022, Spencer filed a civil action in the Superior Court.  
The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the State 
of Delaware was without authority to classify Spencer’s 2007 federal conviction as 
a violent felony for purposes of habitual-offender sentencing.  The Superior Court 
dismissed the complaint upon initial review, holding that Spencer’s claims were 
governed by the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and that Spencer could 
not collaterally attack his sentence through a request for a civil declaration. 
(4) 
We affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.  The court correctly 
concluded that a civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief cannot be used to 
collaterally attack a criminal conviction or sentence.6  In any event, the record of 
Spencer’s criminal case reflects that his claim that he was not subject to sentencing 
under Section 4214(d) is without merit.  Even if his federal offense did not constitute 
a predicate offense under Section 4214(d), he was eligible for habitual-offender 
sentencing under Section 4214(d) based on his two predicate state offenses.   
(5) 
The version of Section 4214(d) in effect at the time of Spencer’s 
PFDCF offense provided: 
Any person who has been 2 times convicted of a Title 11 violent felony, 
or attempt to commit such a violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of 
this title under the laws of this State, and/or any comparable violent 
felony as defined by another state, United States or any territory of the 
 
6 Cf. Morrisey v. State, 2016 WL 5899241 (Del. Oct. 10, 2016) (“[T]he Superior Court Civil Rules 
may not be used in a criminal proceeding to collaterally attack a conviction or to modify a 
sentence.” (citations omitted)).  
 
4 
United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a third or 
subsequent felony which is a Title 11 violent felony, or an attempt to 
commit such a violent felony, as defined in §4201(c), shall receive a 
minimum sentence of the statutory maximum statutory penalty 
provided elsewhere in this title for the third or subsequent Title 11 
violent felony which forms the basis of the State's petition to have the 
person declared to be an habitual criminal, up to life imprisonment . . . 
.7 
 
As noted above, in addition to the prior federal offense, Spencer had prior 
convictions in Delaware for second-degree robbery in 1998 and possession of a 
destructive weapon in 2001.  Both of those convictions constituted predicate violent 
felonies.8  Spencer’s conviction for PFDCF was therefore his third violent-felony 
conviction,9 and he was eligible for sentencing under Section 4214(d) without regard 
to his federal conviction. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
7 11 Del. C. § 4214(d) (effective July 19, 2016, to Apr. 12, 2017).  See Johnson v.  State, 2023 WL 
2671805, at *2 (Del. Mar. 28, 2023) (“[T]he version of the habitual offender statute that applies is 
the one in effect [when] the defendant committed the offense for which he is being sentenced.”). 
8 See 11 Del. C.§ 4201(c) (effective Sept. 3, 2015, to present) (designating second-degree robbery 
and possession of a destructive weapon as violent felonies). 
9 See id. (designating PFDCF as a violent felony).