Case Title: Diamond Surface, Inc. v. Cleveland

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-21

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Diamond Surface, Inc. v. Cleveland1998 WY 103963 P.2d 996Case Number: 97-21, 97-52Decided: 08/17/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
DIAMOND SURFACE, INC., a Minnesota Corporation; Western Gas 
Resources, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; and the State of Wyoming, 
Petitioners,

v.

Lawrence CLEVELAND, Jr. 
and Albert N. Cleveland, Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Lawrence 
Cleveland, Sr., Deceased; Wanda J. Hopkins, Personal Representative of the 
Estate of David William Hopkins, Deceased; and Tanya Michelle Kenyon, 
Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of John Allan Kenyon, 
Deceased, Respondents.

DIAMOND SURFACE, INC., a 
Minnesota Corporation, Appellant (Petitioner/Defendant),

v.

BRASEL & SIMS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation, Appellee (Respondent/Third-Party 
Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Sweetwater County, Jere Ryckman, J.

 

Gregory C. 
Dyekman and Brandin Hay of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, P.C., Cheyenne, and 
William U. Hill, Attorney General, Cheyenne, for Petitioner, State of 
Wyoming:

Richard H. 
Honaker and Michael D. Newman of Honaker, Hampton & Newman, Rock Springs, 
for Respondents.

Paul K. Knight 
and Sara E. VanGenderen of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, LLC, Jackson, for 
Appellant Diamond Surface, Inc.

Robert G. Berger 
and James L. Salmon of Lonabaugh and Riggs, Sheridan, for Appellee Brasel 
& Sims Construction Company.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This opinion 
addresses two consolidated appeals arising from lawsuits brought by, or on 
behalf of, a subcontractor's employees who were killed or injured in a pipeline 
explosion while working on a road construction project in May 1994. The lawsuits 
named as defendants the general contractor, Diamond Surface, Inc.; the pipeline 
owner, Western Gas Resources, Inc.; and the State of Wyoming. The State moved to 
dismiss the complaints against it, claiming governmental immunity. The State now 
appeals the district court's determination that the Wyoming Underground 
Facilities Notification Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 37-12-301 through 37-12-304 (Cum. 
Supp. 1995), contained an unequivocal waiver of governmental immunity. Diamond 
Surface, Inc. appeals the dismissal of its third-party complaint against the 
employer, subcontractor Brasel & Sims Construction Company, which the 
district court found to be precluded by the comparative fault statute, Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-1-109 (Rpl. June 1988).

[¶2]      Finding no 
unequivocal waiver of governmental immunity in the Wyoming Underground 
Facilities Notification Act, we reverse and remand the district court's order in 
Case No. 97-21. We further find that a claim for express indemnity, under 
limited circumstances, survives the adoption of comparative fault in Wyoming. We 
therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's dismissal of 
Diamond Surface, Inc.'s third-party claim for contractual indemnity in Case No. 
97-52, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      The State of 
Wyoming, as petitioner in Case No. 97-21, presents the following issues for 
review:

I. Did the 
Wyoming Underground Facilities Notification Act, W.S. § 37-12-301 et seq. 
(repl.vol. 1996), as it existed on May 3, 1994, expressly or impliedly waive the 
State's governmental immunity from tort liability?

II. Does any 
waiver of the State's immunity from tort liability exist within the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, W.S. § 1-39-101 et seq. (repl. vol. 1988 and cum. supp. 
1996), for the conduct alleged by Respondents in their consolidated 
complaints?

[¶4]      Respondents, 
personal representatives of the deceased employees' estates, reply with one 
issue:

Is the State of 
Wyoming immune from suit for three wrongful deaths and one bodily injury which 
resulted from the State's

failure to 
obtain a utility locate, in violation of Wyo.Stat. §§ 37-12-301 and 37-12-302 
(1978), prior to authorizing excavation directly above a natural gas pipeline 
adjoining a federal interstate highway?

[¶5]      Diamond Surface, 
Inc. (Diamond Surface), as appellant in Case No. 97-52, identifies three 
issues:

A. Whether the 
district court properly granted appellee's motion to dismiss appellant's 
third-party claim for negligence since such claim is not barred by the 
exclusivity provision of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act.

B. Whether the 
district court properly granted appellee's motion to dismiss appellant's 
third-party claim for contractual indemnity since principles of comparative 
fault do not abolish claim[s] for indemnity.

 

C. Whether the 
district court properly granted appellee's motion to dismiss appellant's 
third-party claim for equitable implied indemnity since principles of 
comparative fault do not abolish claims for indemnity.

[¶6]      Appellee, Brasel 
& Sims Construction Company (Brasel & Sims), 
responds:

I. Is Diamond 
Surface's negligence claim barred by application of Wyoming's Comparative Fault 
Statute? (Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1988)).

II. Is Diamond 
Surface's express indemnity claim barred by these same 
principles?

III. Is Diamond 
Surface's equitable implied indemnity claim barred by the existence of an 
express indemnity agreement?

II. 
FACTS

[¶7]      Diamond Surface 
contracted with the Wyoming Department of Transportation to act as the general 
contractor on a construction project which involved reconstruction and repairs 
to a shoulder section of Interstate 80 between Evanston and Green River, 
Wyoming. In turn, Diamond Surface subcontracted the dirt work and other tasks to 
Brasel & Sims. The subcontract provided that Brasel & Sims would take 
full responsibility for compliance with safety statutes, rules and regulations 
and included a provision to hold Diamond Surface harmless for "any and all loss 
or expense" and "all liability" for damages due to the negligence of Brasel 
& Sims, its agents, or employees.

[¶8]      A natural gas 
pipeline, owned by Western Gas Resources, Inc. (Western Gas), was located 
beneath the ground in the approximate area of the proposed project. The exact 
location of the pipeline was not marked, and during excavation on May 3, 1994, 
the ripper bar of a Caterpillar D-9 bulldozer hit the pipeline, causing it to 
rupture and explode. Two of Brasel & Sims' employees were instantly killed, 
and two were injured. One of the injured employees later 
died.

[¶9]      Several lawsuits, 
subsequently consolidated by the district court, were filed against Diamond 
Surface, Western Gas, and the State. The State responded with a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), asserting immunity from suit under the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-120 (1997 
& Cum. Supp. 1996). For its part, Diamond Surface filed a third-party 
complaint against Brasel & Sims, alleging claims for negligence, express 
indemnity, and equitable implied indemnity. Brasel & Sims responded with a 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, claiming immunity from suit for negligence 
under the worker's compensation statutes and asserting that the comparative 
fault statute prevented a result which would hold Diamond Surface liable for the 
negligence of Brasel & Sims.

[¶10]   A hearing was held on both motions 
to dismiss on September 18, 1996. On October 23, 1996, the district court 
converted the State's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and 
provided additional time for submission of relevant evidence and legal 
argument.

[¶11]   On November 14, 1996, the district 
court granted Brasel & Sims' motion to dismiss, based on the grounds 
asserted in the motion, to which Diamond Surface filed a timely appeal. On 
December 20, 1996, the district court denied the State's motion, finding that 
the provisions of the Wyoming Underground Facilities Notification Act, Wyo. 
Stat. §§ 37-12-301 through 37-12-304, "textually and unequivocally" waived the 
State's immunity. An order granting an interlocutory writ of review of the 
denial of the State's motion for summary judgment was issued on February 6, 
1997, and on February 25, 1997, the two cases were 
consolidated.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶12]   The dismissal of a complaint is a 
drastic remedy which should be granted sparingly. Gillis v. F & A 
Enterprises, 934 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Wyo. 1997). When reviewing a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, this court accepts all facts stated in the complaint as being true 
and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. We will sustain a 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal only when it is certain from the face of the 
complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any facts that would entitle him to 
relief. Rissler & McMurry Co. v. State, 917 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Wyo. 1996), 
cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 765, 136 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1997) (quoting Herrig 
v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487, 490 (Wyo. 1992)).

[¶13]   On review of summary judgment, we 
treat the motion as though it had been presented originally to this court. 
Havens v. Hoffman, 902 P.2d 219, 220 (Wyo. 1995). Summary judgment is properly 
granted based upon dual findings that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Teton 
Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School Dist. No. 
One, 763 P.2d 843, 847 (Wyo. 1988). When reviewing an issue of law, no deference 
is accorded to the decision of the district court. Griess v. Office of the Atty. 
Gen., Div. of Criminal Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo. 1997); Kahrs v. 
Board of Trustees for Platte County School Dist. No. 1, 901 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 
1995).

IV. 
DISCUSSION

A. CASE NO. 
97-21: GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

[¶14]   The sole issue in this appeal is 
whether governmental immunity was waived by the provisions contained in the 
Wyoming Underground Facilities Notification Act (Notification Act), in effect at 
the time of the accident.1 In essence, the State contends that 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (Claims Act) provides the exclusive basis 
for any waiver of governmental immunity pursuant to the language of Wyo. Stat. § 
1-39-104(a), which states in part: "A governmental entity and its public 
employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from 
liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112." 
The State contends that because the district court did not find a waiver of 
immunity authorized by Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-39-105 through 1-39-112, it erred in 
concluding that the State's immunity was waived.

[¶15]   The district court, however, 
implicitly determined that the Claims Act was not the only source of a waiver of 
governmental immunity. After acknowledging that the original plaintiffs made no 
claim of waiver under the Claims Act, the district court turned to Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 8, which provides that "[s]uits may be brought against the state in 
such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law direct." Finding a 
separate source of waiver in this constitutional provision, the district court 
reasoned that because Wyo. Stat. § 37-12-301(a)(iii) includes the State within 
the definition of the word "person" in the Notification Act, and because Wyo. 
Stat. § 37-12-302(f) expressly mentions liability for a "person's" negligence, 
sovereign immunity was "textually and unequivocally" 
waived.

[¶16]   There can be no doubt that the 
language of the Claims Act unambiguously expresses the intention to grant 
immunity in all but very limited circumstances. Newberry v. Board of County 
Com'rs of Fremont County, 919 P.2d 141, 145 (Wyo. 1996). We have also recognized 
the "close-ended" nature of the Claims Act. Gibson v. State Through Dept. of 
Revenue and Taxation, 811 P.2d 726, 728 (Wyo. 1991); Sawyer v. City of Sheridan, 
793 P.2d 476, 478 (Wyo. 1990); Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1299 (Wyo. 
1990), cert. granted and vacated on other grounds, 501 U.S. 1201, 111 S. Ct. 2820, 115 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1991), cert. denied 510 U.S. 813, 114 S. Ct. 60, 126 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1993); Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 709 
(Wyo. 1987). However, the resolution of the case before us does not require a 
determination of whether there can ever be a statutory waiver of immunity apart 
from those subjects covered by the Claims Act. We need look only to the language 
of the Notification Act to find that it does not contain an expression of 
legislative intent sufficient to defeat the clear and unequivocal language of 
the Claims Act. See Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Wyo. 1985) and Retail 
Clerks Local 187 AFL-CIO v. University of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884, 886 (Wyo. 
1975).

[¶17]   In the past, the legislature has 
expressed its intent to waive governmental immunity explicitly and in no 
uncertain terms. See Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-104(a); Wyo. Stat. § 21-3-129(b) (1997) 
("The defense of governmental immunity is expressly waived to the extent of any 
insurance coverage of the district involving any such alleged tort."); Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-11-110 (1997) ("[T]he state of Wyoming does hereby waive sovereign 
immunity" for bonds not to exceed $50,000.00.); Wyo. Stat. § 35-2-114(b) (1997) 
(to the extent of liability insurance, "the defense of governmental immunity is 
expressly waived."); and Wyo. Stat. § 21-3-126 (1997) ("The defense of 
governmental immunity is expressly waived" to the extent of liability 
insurance.). (Emphasis added.) In each of these statutes, the legislature has 
chosen to specifically state that governmental immunity is waived, even though 
the subject matter is arguably addressed in the Claims Act. Suffice it to say 
that when the subject matter of a statute is not within the subjects covered by 
the Claims Act, judicial construction cannot substitute for the absence of 
explicit language waiving sovereign immunity. See State Dept. of Highways v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 869 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Colo. 
1994).

[¶18]   Finding no express waiver of 
immunity within the Notification Act, and agreeing with the district court that 
no claim was presented for which immunity is waived under the Claims Act, we 
reverse the district court's order denying summary judgment in favor of the 
State.

B. CASE NO. 
97-52: THIRD-PARTY CLAIM

[¶19]   Abandoning its defense of immunity 
under the Wyoming worker's compensation statutes, Brasel & Sims asserts that 
the district court properly dismissed Diamond Surface's third-party complaint 
because the comparative fault statute2 precludes any possibility that 
Diamond Surface will be held liable for Brasel & Sims' negligence. Brasel 
& Sims reasons that because the jury will apportion fault between all the 
actors, if Diamond Surface is found liable it will be only for its own 
negligence. Diamond Surface, however, contends that it has a viable claim for 
indemnity under the express provisions of its contract with Brasel & Sims 
and the principles enunciated in Schneider Nat., Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 571 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶20]   In Schneider Nat., Inc., the owner 
of a tractor-trailer involved in a fatal accident sought third-party indemnity 
from the manufacturer of the allegedly defective trailer hitch and a road 
construction contractor that allegedly failed to perform construction in a safe 
manner. The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming dismissed 
the indemnity claim, holding that Wyoming's adoption of comparative negligence 
effectively abrogated the right to seek indemnity. On certification from the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, we determined that the comparative fault statute 
did not preclude a third-party claim in limited circumstances. Schneider Nat., 
Inc., 843 P.2d  at 578.

[¶21]   In Schneider Nat., Inc., our 
analysis began with a reiteration of the general rule of indemnity as found in 
the Restatement of Restitution § 76 (1937):

"A person who, 
in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as 
between himself and another should have been discharged by the other, is 
entitled to indemnity from the other, unless the payor is barred by the wrongful 
nature of his conduct."

Schneider Nat., 
Inc., 843 P.2d  at 572 (emphasis added). A prerequisite to a claim for indemnity 
is the existence of an independent legal relationship. " ' "under which the 
indemnitor owes a duty either in contract or tort to the 
indemnitee apart from the joint duty they owe to the injured party." ' " Id. 
at 572-73 (quoting National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. A.A.R. Western Skyways, Inc., 
784 P.2d 52, 55 (Okla. 1989) and Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well 
Cementing Co., 215 F.2d 368, 370 (10th Cir. 1954)) (emphasis added). The 
independent relationship may be established by an express indemnity agreement, 
indemnity implied from contract, or indemnity imposed by equitable 
considerations. Where there is an express indemnity provision, its parameters 
are derived from the specific language of a contract. Id. at 
573.

[¶22]   Thus, we distinguished a claim for 
indemnity based on the negligent breach of duties owed to the plaintiff, no 
longer viable under the comparative fault statute, from a claim for indemnity 
based on a negligent breach of a separate duty owed to the third-party 
plaintiff. We concluded that under circumstances enumerated in Restatement of 
Torts (Second) § 886B (1979), a claim for equitable implied indemnity survived 
the comparative fault statute. We held:

[I]ndemnity 
liability is to be allocated among the parties [to the third-party claim] 
proportionately to their comparative degree of fault in actions for equitable 
implied indemnity premised on the negligent breach of a duty between the 
indemnitor and the indemnitee. * * * Under this modified or partial form of 
equitable implied indemnity, the distinctions of "active" and "passive" 
negligence, while no longer determinative of the ability to seek indemnity, are 
factors to be weighed by the jury in assessing the percentage of fault of the 
parties [to the third-party claim]. Typically, a jury would be instructed, in a 
third-party action, that if the third-party defendant is found to have performed 
certain acts or omissions constituting negligence for which indemnity is 
permitted as a matter of law, Restatement of Torts (Second), supra at § 886B(2), 
and those acts or omissions contributed to cause the injuries and damage to the 
original plaintiff, then the third-party plaintiff should be awarded partial 
indemnity. * * * The partial indemnity award is a proportion of the total sum 
paid by the third-party plaintiff to the original plaintiff corresponding to the 
degree of fault of the third-party defendant.

Schneider Nat., 
Inc., 843 P.2d  at 578-79 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). The crux of our 
holding was that the focus of a third-party claim for indemnity is not the 
percentage of fault between all the "actors," as is a comparative fault 
determination in the underlying action, but a comparison of fault between the 
third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant premised on an independent 
duty. Therefore, to state a third-party claim for equitable implied indemnity, 
the third-party plaintiff must allege: (1) an independent relationship with the 
third-party defendant; (2) negligent breach by the third-party defendant of the 
duty created by the independent relationship; (3) under circumstances falling 
within the situations addressed in Restatement Torts (Second) § 886B(2); and (4) 
that the breach of the duty to the third-party plaintiff contributed to 
cause the injuries and damage to the original plaintiff. Schneider Nat., Inc., 
843 P.2d  at 572, 575-79.

[¶23]   In other words, in order to fully 
apportion the "fault" of an "actor" who is a third-party defendant where each of 
these elements are present, the jury must consider the consequences arising from 
two separate claims: (1) the breach of duty of all the actors to the plaintiffs 
in the original suit,3 and (2) the breach of an 
independent duty to the third-party plaintiff. If a third-party claim is not 
allowed, the jury will not have an opportunity to determine whether the 
third-party defendant (the indemnitor) negligently breached a separate duty to 
the third-party plaintiff (the indemnitee), and whether that breach of 
duty is the source of some, or all, of the damages owed by the third-party 
plaintiff to the original plaintiffs. Consequently, unless the third-party claim 
is viable, a third-party defendant is unjustly enriched to the extent that its 
negligent performance of duties owed to the third-party plaintiff is not 
determined in the underlying action.

[¶24]   In the case before us, the district 
court dismissed Diamond Surface's contractual indemnity claim based on the 
comparative fault statute. The district court then dismissed the equitable 
implied indemnity claim because "[i]mplied theories of indemnity are not viable 
in the face of an express indemnity agreement." Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag 
Industries, Inc., 662 P.2d 96, 101 (Wyo. 1983). However, our holding in 
Schneider Nat., Inc. did not limit third-party claims for indemnity to only 
"equitable" claims. Schneider Nat., Inc., 843 P.2d  at 571 n. 8. While it is true 
that equity cannot be utilized to expand or modify the express intentions of the 
parties, logic dictates that the same principles which support an equitable 
claim may be encompassed within the terms of a contract.

[¶25]   Here, the contractual indemnity 
provision unquestionably cemented an independent relationship in which the 
subcontractor, Brasel & Sims, assumed the duty to comply with all safety 
rules as well as full responsibility for the safety of its employees. It is also 
undisputed that Brasel & Sims agreed to indemnify Diamond Surface for all 
loss or expense claimed to be "due to the acts or negligence of the 
subcontractor, his agents, or employees." Diamond Surface alleges that Brasel 
& Sims breached its contractual duties by its negligent conduct, thus 
exposing Diamond Surface to possible liability to the original plaintiffs for 
which it may seek indemnity as a matter of law.4 Thus, Diamond Surface has alleged 
each element of a third-party claim for indemnity. If Diamond Surface is 
successful in proving its claims, Brasel & Sims' liability is limited to 
that part of the damages apportioned to Diamond Surface in the underlying action 
caused by Brasel & Sims' breach of the duty owed to Diamond Surface. As 
such, Brasel & Sims is indemnifying Diamond Surface according to the 
contractual terms.

[¶26]   In Schneider Nat., Inc., we stated 
that "[u]nder ideal circumstances, equitable implied indemnity claims will be 
determined as cross-claims * * * or third-party proceedings * * * while the 
original plaintiff seeks damages from all causally responsible actors in a 
single proceeding." Schneider Nat., Inc., 843 P.2d  at 579. However, we perceive 
the situation before us to be amenable to a bifurcated process or separate 
trials. To avoid confusion of issues, the jury should first determine the 
liability of Diamond Surface, if any, to the original plaintiffs. A second phase 
addressing the elements of the indemnity claim would be necessary only if 
Diamond Surface is found liable in the first phase. Assuming a second phase is 
necessary, and the jury finds that Brasel & Sims' negligent conduct breached 
a duty owed to Diamond Surface, the jury would then apportion the percentage of 
the sum paid to the original plaintiffs by Diamond Surface to the degree that 
Brasel & Sims' breach of its contractual duty caused Diamond Surface's 
liability. Bifurcation would provide additional assurance that the "fault" 
associated with the separate duties owed to the original and third-party 
plaintiffs would not overlap in an award of damages.

[¶27]   We therefore reverse the district 
court's dismissal of Diamond Surface's claim for contractual indemnity. However, 
we affirm the district court's dismissal of Diamond Surface's independent claim 
for negligence, as this is a necessary element of the indemnity claim and 
therefore subsumed therein. The third-party claim for equitable implied 
indemnity was also properly dismissed as indemnity is expressly provided for in 
the contract between the parties and its parameters are derived from the 
specific language of the contract. Schneider Nat., Inc., 843 P.2d  at 
573.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶28]   The language of the Wyoming 
Underground Facilities Notification Act does not contain a direct waiver of 
sovereign immunity, and therefore, in the absence of any waiver pursuant to the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, the State is immune from suit. Consequently, we 
reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment and remand for entry of 
judgment in favor of the State in Case No. 97-21.

[¶29]   We affirm the district court's 
dismissal of the third-party claims for negligence and equitable implied 
indemnity in Case No. 97-52. However, the third-party claim for contractual 
indemnity, on its face, asserts a viable claim for indemnity for the negligent 
breach of the duty owed by Brasel & Sims to Diamond Surface. We reverse the 
dismissal of the third-party claim for express contractual indemnity and remand 
for disposition in accordance with this opinion.

Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. 
§ 37-12-302 was amended in 1996. At the time of the accident, the statute 
provided, in relevant part:

(b) 
Architects, engineers, or other persons designing or requiring excavation shall 
obtain information from persons with underground facilities, as to the nature 
and location of underground facilities and then make such information and 
location a part of the plan by which the contractors 
operate.

(c) 
Except as hereafter provided, no person shall make or begin excavation without 
first notifying any person having underground facilities in the area of the 
proposed excavation except an employee with respect to his employer's facility. 
Notice shall be given by telephone or in person. * * 
*

(d) 
A person shall, upon receipt of the notice provided for in subsection (c) of 
this section, advise the excavator of the location and size of underground 
facilities in the proposed excavation area by marking the location of the 
facilities * * *. The person providing information shall respond no later than 
two (2) full business days after receipt of the 
notice.

* * 
*

(f) 
If information requested pursuant to subsections (c) and (d) of this section is 
not provided within the time specified therein, or if the information provided 
fails to identify the location of the underground facilities in accordance with 
subsection (d) of this section, then any person damaging or injuring underground 
facilities shall not be liable for such damage or injury except on proof of 
negligence.

(g) 
Compliance with this section does not excuse a person from acting in a careful 
and prudent manner nor does compliance with this section excuse a person from 
liability for damage or injury for failure to act.

Wyo. Stat. § 37-12-302 (Cum.Supp. 1995).

2 In 1994, 
the legislature amended the comparative fault statute, Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109, 
extending its application to strict liability, product liability, and breach of 
warranty claims. We consider here the statute in effect at the time of the 
deceaseds' injuries. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 (Rpl. June 1988) 
provided:

(a) 
Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or 
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or 
injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said person 
is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the 
person recovering.

(b) 
The court may, and when requested by any party 
shall:

(i) 
If a jury trial:

(A) 
Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount 
of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not 
a party; and

(B) 
Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault.

(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of 
fact, determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault 
attributable to each actor whether or not a party.

(c) 
The court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under subsection (b) of 
this section in proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the person 
recovering and enter judgment against each defendant in the amount determined 
under subsection (d) of this section.

(d) 
Each defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total dollar amount 
determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section in the 
percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him under paragraph (b)(i) or 
(ii) of this section.

3 The parties 
devoted substantial attention to the alleged nature of the duty owed by the 
contractor to the employees of the subcontractor. This is a subject which has 
not been decided by the district court at this point in the proceedings and we 
do not reach it here.

4 Diamond 
Surface argues that the original complaint alleges that Diamond Surface breached 
a non-delegable duty, thus creating vicarious liability under Restatement of 
Torts (Second) § 886B(2)(a). Diamond Surface also alleges that Brasel & Sims 
"created a dangerous condition of land or chattels as a result of which both 
[Diamond Surface and Brasel & Sims] [are] liable to the third person" under 
Restatement of Torts (Second) § 886B(e). We do not decide here the viability of 
the original plaintiffs' claims against Diamond 
Surface.