Case Title: The Samuel J. Heyman 1981 Continuing Trust for Lazarus S. Heyman v. Ashland LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 279, 2021

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2022-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
THE SAMUEL J. HEYMAN 1981 
CONTINUING TRUST FOR LAZARUS S. 
HEYMAN; THE SAMUEL J. HEYMAN 1981 
CONTINUING TRUST FOR ELEANOR S. 
HEYMAN; THE SAMUEL J. HEYMAN 1981 
CON-TINUING TRUST FOR JENNIFER L. 
HEYMAN; THE SAMUEL J. HEYMAN 1981 
CONTINUING TRUST FOR ELIZABETH D. 
HEYMAN; THE LAZARUS S. HEYMAN AGE 
50 TRUST FOR ASSETS APPOINTED 
UNDER WILL OF LAZARUS S. HEYMAN; 
THE ELEANOR S. HEYMAN AGE 50 TRUST 
FOR ASSETS APPOINTED UNDER WILL OF 
LAZARUS S. HEYMAN; THE JENNIFER L. 
HEYMAN AGE 50 TRUST FOR ASSETS 
APPOINTED UNDER WILL OF LAZARUS S. 
HEYMAN; THE ELIZABETH D. HEYMAN 
AGE 50 TRUST FOR ASSETS APPOINTED 
UNDER WILL OF LAZARUS S. HEYMAN; 
THE HORIZON HOLDINGS RESIDUAL 
TRUST; RFH INVESTMENT HOLDINGS 
LLC; THE 2013 SAMUEL J. HEYMAN 1981 
CONTINUING TRUST FOR LAZARUS S. 
HEYMAN; THE 2013 SAMUEL J. HEYMAN 
1981 CONTINUING TRUST FOR ELEANOR 
HEYMAN PROPP; THE 2013 SAMUEL J. 
HEYMAN 1981 CONTINUING TRUST FOR 
JENNIFER HEYMAN MILLSTONE; THE 
2013 SAMUEL J. HEYMAN 1981 
CONTINUING TRUST FOR ELIZABETH 
HEYMAN WINTER; THE 2013 LAZARUS S. 
HEYMAN AGE 50 TRUST FOR ASSETS 
APPOINTED UNDER WILL OF LAZARUS S. 
HEYMAN; THE 2013 ELEANOR HEYMAN 
PROPP AGE 50 TRUST FOR ASSETS 
APPOINTED WILL OF LAZARUS S. 
HEYMAN; THE 2013 JENNIFER HEYMAN 
MILLSTONE AGE 50 TRUST FOR ASSETS 
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No.  279, 2021 
 
Court Below:  Superior Court  
of the State of Delaware 
 
C.A. No.  N15C-10-176 
 
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APPOINTED UNDER WILL OF LAZARUS S. 
HEYMAN; THE 2013 ELIZABETH HEYMAN 
WINTER AGE 50 TRUST FOR ASSETS 
APPOINTED UNDER WILL OF LAZARUS S. 
HEYMAN; THE 2015 HORIZON HOLDINGS 
RESIDUAL TRUST FOR LAZARUS S. 
HEYMAN; THE 2015 HORIZON HOLDINGS 
RESIDUAL TRUST FOR ELEANOR 
HEYMAN PROPP; THE 2015 HORIZON 
HOLDINGS RESIDUAL TRUST FOR 
JENNIFER HEYMAN MILLSTONE; THE 
2015 HORIZON HOLDINGS RESIDUAL 
TRUST FOR ELIZABETH HEYMAN 
WINTER; and LINDEN PROPERTY 
HOLDINGS LLC, 
 
Defendants Below, 
Appellants/Cross-Appellees, 
 
v. 
 
ASHLAND LLC, INTERNATIONAL 
SPECIALTY PRODUCTS INC., ISP 
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES INC., and 
ISP CHEMCO LLC,  
 
Plaintiffs Below, 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants. 
 
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Submitted:  June 22, 2022 
Decided:  September 12, 2022 
 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
 
 
3 
William M. Lafferty, Esquire, Miranda N. Gilbert, Esquire, John P. DiTomo, 
Esquire, Lauren N. Bennett, Esquire, Thomas P. Will, Esquire, Morris Nichols Arsht 
& Tunnell LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Robert N. Hochman, Esquire, Heather 
Benzmiller Sultanian, Esquire, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Eamon P. 
Joyce, Esquire, Sidley Austin LLP, New York, New York; Andrew J. Rossman, 
Esquire (Argued), Jonathon B. Oblak, Esquire, Nicholas Hoy, Esquire, Quinn 
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, New York, for Defendants-Below, 
Appellants. 
 
Christopher Viceconte, Esquire, Gibbons, P.C., Wilmington; Jennifer A. Hradil, 
Esquire (Argued), William S. Hatfield, Esquire, Camille V. Otero, Esquire, Joshua 
R. Elias, Esquire, Gibbons, P.C., Newark, New Jersey, for Plaintiffs-Below; 
Appellees.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VAUGHN, Justice: 
 
 
 
4 
This is a breach-of-contract dispute involving a stock purchase agreement for 
the sale of all the shares of stock of International Specialty Products Inc. 
(“International Specialty”).  The selling shareholders were nine trusts and RFH 
Investment Holdings LLC, all of whom are Appellants in this appeal (the “Heyman 
Parties”).1  The purchaser was Appellee Ashland Inc. (“Ashland”), a leading global 
specialty chemical company.  International Specialty had two wholly owned 
subsidiaries that went with the sale, Appellee ISP Environmental Services Inc. (“ISP 
Environmental”) and Appellee Chemco LLC (“Chemco”).2  ISP Environmental 
owned a property known as the Linden property, which for years had been home to 
chemical manufacturing operations and had an extensive environmental history.  As 
part of the transaction, the parties agreed that the Heyman Parties would keep the 
Linden property.  Accordingly, at the time of closing on the Stock Purchase 
Agreement, ISP Environmental caused the Linden property to be transferred to 
Appellant Linden Property Holdings LLC (“Linden Property Holdings”), the 
Heyman Parties’ designated entity for that purpose. 
A dispute has now arisen between the parties as to who is responsible for the 
 
1 At the time of the filing of the complaint, the nine seller trusts had distributed all of their assets 
and liabilities to twelve successor trusts, all of which are Appellants.  The phrase “Heyman Parties” 
will be used to refer to the Appellants without distinguishing among them, unless the context 
requires specificity. 
2 “Ashland” will be used to refer to Ashland, Inc. and to Ashland, Inc., International Specialty, ISP 
Environmental, and Chemco collectively without distinguishing among them, unless the context 
requires specificity. 
 
5 
Linden property’s pre-closing, environmental liabilities.  The parties agree that the 
Heyman Parties assumed responsibility in the agreement for the Linden property’s 
on-site environmental liabilities, that is, liability for environmental contamination 
on the property itself.  They disagree as to who is responsible for the Linden 
property’s off-site environmental liabilities, that is, liability for environmental 
contamination to areas that are not part of the Linden property but are contaminated 
because of the activities on the Linden property.  Ashland claims that under the 
agreement, the Heyman Parties are responsible for the off-site environmental 
liabilities as well as the on-site liabilities.  The Heyman Parties claim that they never 
assumed any liability in the agreement for the off-site liabilities.  The Superior Court 
agreed with Ashland and found that the Heyman Parties assumed responsibility in 
the agreement for the Linden property’s off-site environmental liabilities.  We have 
concluded, however, that under the unambiguous language of the agreement, the 
Heyman Parties assumed liability only for the Linden property’s on-site 
environmental liabilities, and the Heyman Parties did not assume any liability in the 
agreement for the property’s off-site liabilities. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
I. History of the Linden Property and Its Environmental Liabilities 
 
From 1919 to 1991, International Specialty’s predecessors, nonparties GAF 
Corporation and GAF Chemicals Corporation (collectively “GAF”), owned and 
 
6 
operated the Linden property as a home to chemical manufacturing operations.  
During the 1970s-1980s, GAF discovered contamination at the Linden property.  
The Heyman Parties acquired GAF in the 1980s.  In June 1989, the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) and GAF entered into an 
Administrative Consent Order.  The Administrative Consent Order required GAF to 
remediate “any and all pollution at the site, emanating from the site, or which has 
emanated from the site.”3  The Administrative Consent Order identified both on-site 
and off-site contamination that GAF was responsible for remediating.   
 
Once manufacturing operations ceased at the Linden property in 1991,  ISP 
Environmental became the owner of the Linden property and assumed all its 
liabilities, including those related to the Administrative Consent Order.  In 2003, the 
NJDEP approved an on-site Remedial Action Workplan for the Linden property.  
When the remediation under the Workplan was complete, NJDEP issued “No 
Further Action” letters certifying that on-site remediation was complete, and no 
future action would be taken against ISP Environmental or any successor owners of 
the Linden property for the on-site remediation ISP Environmental had completed.   
 
In June 2007, NJDEP filed a complaint against ISP Environmental for failure 
to fulfill its off-site remedial obligations at the Arthur Kill and Piles Creek 
waterways.  These areas are off-site Linden property liabilities.  In June 2011, ISP 
 
3 App. to Opening Br. at A794. 
 
7 
Environmental and NJDEP entered into a Consent Judgment that dismissed the 
claims relating to Piles Creek with prejudice but preserved the claims relating to the 
Arthur Kill waterway.  Therefore, off-site remediation under the Administrative 
Consent Order remained open and the NJDEP could still require clean-up of the 
Arthur Kill area.  
II. Ashland’s Purchase of ISP and the SPA 
 
In 2010, Ashland began considering an acquisition of International Specialty, 
and by February 2011, Ashland and the Heyman Parties had a tentative deal for 
Ashland to acquire 100% of the shares of stock of International Specialty for $3.3 
billion.  After engaging in due diligence, Ashland reduced its offer to $2.75 billion.  
The Heyman Parties rejected the revised offer and held to the $3.3 billion figure.   
 
In May 2011, Ashland and the Heyman Parties came to an agreement: 
Ashland would purchase 100% of International Specialty’s stock for $3.2 billion.  In 
exchange for the $100 million price reduction from $3.3 billion, the parties agreed 
that immediately after closing, ISP Environmental would transfer the Linden 
property and another site in Wayne, New Jersey back to entities designated by the 
Heyman Parties.4  Linden Property Holdings was the designee for the Linden 
property.   
 
The Stock Purchase Agreement was executed on May 30, 2011, and closed 
 
4 The Wayne property is not involved in this litigation. 
 
8 
on August 23, 2011.  Transfer of the Linden property from ISP Environmental to the 
Heyman Parties’ entity is addressed in Schedule 5.19 Section 2 of the agreement.  
Section 2(e) describes the Linden property liabilities being assumed by the Heyman 
Parties.  It states, in pertinent part: 
In connection with the Linden Transfer, [the Heyman 
Parties] shall assume all Liabilities to the extent related to 
or arising from or existing at the Linden Property, 
including Liabilities arising under or relating  to (i) 
Environmental Laws, provided that such Liabilities shall 
not include any off-site migration or disposal of 
Hazardous Materials from the Linden Property prior to the 
Closing, any claims or damages associated with any off-
site migration or disposal of Hazardous Material from the 
Linden Property prior to the Closing, and for the 
avoidance of doubt, any off-site contamination of soils, 
groundwater or sediments, any third party superfund sites 
including the Newark Bay Complex, any natural resources 
damages or exposure claims relating to operations or 
discharges prior to Closing . . . (the “Linden Excluded 
Liabilities”).5 
Section 2(f) of Schedule 5.19 then provides:  
In connection with the Linden Transfer, the Seller Parties 
shall be responsible, at their sole cost and expense, for 
compliance, if applicable, with any requirements of the 
Industrial Site Recovery Act (“ISRA”) and, if ISRA 
applies to the Linden Transfer, [the Heyman Parties] shall 
(i) within five (5) Business Days after execution of this 
Agreement, make any required filings or notifications 
(such as a General Information Notice, as defined under 
ISRA) to the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection (“NJDEP”), and (ii) use reasonable best efforts 
to, prior to closing, make all other filings, undertake all 
 
5 App. to Opening Br. at A908. 
 
9 
other measures, including where required undertaking any 
site investigation or Remedial Action required by ISRA. 
In addition, [the Heyman Parties] shall use reasonable best 
efforts to amend any consent decree or other binding 
agreement with any Governmental Entity relating to the 
Linden Excluded Liabilities, and to replace or substitute 
any related financial assurance (including any bond or 
letter of credit), to include the name of the [Heyman 
Parties’ designee] following the Linden Transfer and, if 
permitted by NJDEP, to remove the name of [International 
Specialty or any of its affiliates] therefrom.6 
The dispute between the parties involves the proper construction of the second 
sentence of Section 2(f).  
 
Schedule 5.19 Section 4 of the Stock Purchase Agreement also provides 
Ashland and its affiliates with indemnification for losses related to the Linden 
Excluded Liabilities.  Specifically, it requires the Heyman Parties to indemnify 
Ashland and its affiliates “from and against any and all Losses actually suffered or 
incurred . . . to the extent arising out of . . . the Linden Excluded Liabilities.”7  There 
is no corresponding provision in which Ashland agreed to indemnify the Heyman 
Parties or their designated Linden property transferee for any losses related to Linden 
property off-site liabilities.  
The actual transfer of the Linden property was executed through a 
Contribution Agreement on August 23, 2011, the same day the Stock Purchase 
 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at A909. 
 
10 
Agreement closed.  This is the only agreement signed by Linden Property Holdings.  
The Contribution Agreement defines liabilities being assumed by Linden Property 
Holdings with substantially the same language as appears in Section 2(e).  It provides 
that liabilities assumed by Linden Property Holdings  
shall not include any off-site migration . . . of Hazardous 
Materials from the Linden Property prior to the Closing, 
any claims or damages associated with any off-site 
migration . . . of Hazardous Material from the Linden 
Property prior to the Closing, and for the avoidance of 
doubt, any off-site contamination of soils, groundwater or 
sediments.8   
The Contribution Agreement does not include an analog to Section 2(f).   
III. Actions After the Acquisition 
 
Pursuant to its obligations under Section 2(f), in 2011, the Heyman Parties 
replaced certain financial assurances required by the Administrative Consent Order 
as guarantees for ongoing cleanups with a $7,744,000 letter of credit issued on behalf 
of Linden Property Holdings for operation and maintenance costs for the Linden 
property.  They also obtained the release of the original financial assurances, which 
had been posted by Chemco.9  There is a dispute between the parties as to whether 
 
8 Id. at A1206. 
9 The $7,744,000 letter of credit remained in place until 2015.  Linden Properties Holding informed 
NJDEP of is intent to terminate the letter of credit and ultimately posted a smaller amount.  That 
smaller letter of credit has been terminated.  The Superior Court found that because Linden 
Property Holdings has no longer posted financial assurances, the Heyman Parties have violated 
Section 2(f).  Whether the Heyman Parties have violated the agreement on this point as found by 
the Superior Court, and what, if any, damages Ashland might have sustained as a result thereof, 
are beyond the scope of this appeal.  The Superior Court also found that the Heyman Parties 
 
11 
the letter of credit covered all remediation requirements of the Administrative 
Consent Order or merely Linden Property Holdings’ on-site obligations.  
 
In 2012, at the request of a potential Linden property purchaser, the Heyman 
Parties attempted to terminate the Administrative Consent Order.  The NJDEP 
rejected the request, explaining that the Administrative Consent Order carried 
obligations related to Arthur Kill waterway that had not been resolved by the 2011 
Consent Judgement.  
IV. Procedural History 
 
On October 20, 2015, Ashland, International Specialty, ISP Environmental, 
and Chemco sued the Heyman Parties in the Superior Court.  Count I of the 
complaint alleged that under the terms of the Stock Purchase Agreement, the 
Heyman Parties assumed liability for environmental investigation and remediation 
of the Linden property under the Administrative Consent Order and New Jersey law, 
including both on-site and off-site contamination.  It alleged that the Heyman Parties 
had breached their obligation by failing to perform remediation of the Arthur Kill 
waterway.   
 
Both parties filed motions for judgment on the pleadings.  In rejecting both 
 
violated Section 2(f) when it did not make best efforts to amend the Administrative Consent Order 
to add Linden Property Holding or remove International Specialty.  Whether the Heyman Parties 
violated this provision of Section 2(f) and what, if any, damages Ashland might have sustained as 
a result thereof are also beyond the scope of this appeal.  
 
12 
motions, the Superior Court held that “at this stage of the proceedings, the Court is 
not comfortable that there are not ambiguities in the [Stock Purchase Agreement].”10  
The Court noted that Section 2(e)’s “all-encompassing” language “allocated pre-
closing off-site liabilities to Ashland.”11  However, the court went on to explain that 
reading 2(e) and 2(f) together, one could construe the Stock Purchase Agreement as 
allocating to the Heyman Parties off-site liabilities “relating to the [Administrative 
Consent Order],” including liabilities because of contamination to the Arthur Kill 
waterway.12 
After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment.  The Superior 
Court held, “Now that the record has been developed, the Court is comfortable that 
Schedule 5.19, including Sections 2(e) and 2(f), is unambiguous and that the 
Heyman Defendants retained all liabilities relating to the Linden Property under the 
[Administrative Consent Order].”13  The court explained that as the more specific 
provision, the language of 2(f) prevails.  The specific responsibilities that the 
Heyman Parties undertook in Section 2(f), the court found, “qualifie[d] [Stock 
Purchase Agreement] Section 2(e)’s definition of Linden Excluded Liabilities to 
include certain off-site obligations under the [Administrative Consent Order].”14 
 
10 Opening Br. Ex. A at 10.  
11 Id. at 11. 
12 Id. at 12.   
13 Opening Br. Ex. D at 23.  
14 Id. at 31. 
 
13 
Section 2(f) obligates the Heyman Parties to “use reasonable best efforts to 
amend any consent decree . . . relating to the Linden Excluded Liabilities, and to 
replace or substitute any financial assurance . . . to include the name of the [Heyman 
Parties’ designee] following the Linden Transfer and, if permitted by NJDEP, to 
remove the name of [International Specialty or any of its affiliates] therefrom.”15  
Finding that the Administrative Consent Order was a consent decree, the Superior 
Court held that the language of Section 2(f) shifted all liabilities of the 
Administrative Consent Order to the Heyman Parties.  The court then found that the 
Heyman Parties breached their obligation under 2(f) by failing to use best efforts to 
switch out the named party on the Administrative Consent Order.    
The court also found that Schedule 5.19 Section 4(a) of the Stock Purchase 
Agreement, which requires the Heyman Parties to indemnify Ashland and its 
affiliates for any losses they sustained on account of the Linden Excluded Liabilities 
but does not require Ashland to indemnify the Heyman Parties or their Linden 
property designee for any losses sustained by them on account of off-site liabilities, 
supported its interpretation of Section 2(f).  “This is contractually inconsistent with 
the idea that Ashland was responsible, even in part, under the [Administrative 
Consent Order] for actions taken by NJDEP under the [Administrative Consent 
 
15 App. to Opening Br. at A908. 
 
14 
Order] for on-site or off-site remediation.”16  The court also looked to certain 
“background facts”17 to make its ruling, including the fact that after closing, the 
Heyman Parties posted financial assurances for operation and maintenance of the 
Linden property−inferring that they took responsibility of all Administrative 
Consent Order liabilities. 
In its ruling, the Superior Court declared that the Heyman Parties must 
indemnify Ashland, pursuant to Schedule 5.19 Section 4 and Section 7.2 of the Stock 
Purchase Agreement, for amounts Ashland or its affiliates have had to pay for off-
site contamination stemming from the Linden property.  However, the court also 
found that Ashland was not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees because the Stock 
Purchase Agreement did not clearly and unequivocally shift these fees to the 
Heyman Parties.   
The Heyman Parties now appeal the Superior Court ruling and ask us to find 
that the Stock Purchase Agreement unambiguously carves out all off-site liabilities 
from its obligations and that Ashland is therefore not entitled to any indemnification.  
Ashland cross-appeals the Superior Court’s determination that it is not entitled to 
attorneys’ fees.  
 
16 Opening Br. Ex. D at 26. 
17 Id. at 22. 
 
15 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment and questions of contract 
interpretation de novo.”18  
DISCUSSION 
Delaware law “adheres to the objective theory of contracts, i.e., a contract’s 
construction should be that which would be understood by an objective, reasonable 
third party.”19  “When interpreting a contract, this Court ‘will give priority to the 
parties’ intentions as reflected in the four corners of the agreement,’ construing the 
agreement as a whole and giving effect to all its provisions.”20  Furthermore, “a court 
must determine the intent of the parties from the language of the contract.”21  This 
approach places great weight on the plain terms of a disputed contractual provision, 
and we “interpret clear and unambiguous terms according to their ordinary 
meaning.”22  Courts should also assure that “all contract provisions [are] harmonized 
and given effect where possible.”23  We do not consider extrinsic evidence unless 
we find that the text is ambiguous.24  Ambiguity is present “only when the provisions 
in controversy are reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may 
 
18 Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354, 367 (Del. 2014); Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 
2013) (en banc). 
19 Salamone, 106 A.3d at 367-68.  
20 Id. at 368. 
21 Id.  
22 GMG Cap. Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 780 (Del. 2012). 
23 Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 12-8. 1225 (Del. 2012).  
24 Exelon Generation Acquisitions, LLC v. Deere & Co., 176 A.3d 1262, 1267 (Del. 2017). 
 
16 
have two or more different meanings.”25  Critically, a contractual provision is “not 
rendered ambiguous simply because the parties in litigation differ” as to the proper 
interpretation.26  
Both the Heyman Parties and Ashland claim to offer the plain, unambiguous 
reading of Schedule 5.19 Sections 2(e) and 2(f) of the Stock Purchase Agreement.  
The Heyman Parties argue that Section 2(e) explicitly states that they assumed only 
the Linden Excluded Liabilities−a defined term that “could not more clearly have 
excluded off-site liabilities from the transfer to [Linden Properties Holding].”27  
Section 2(f), they argue, can easily be harmonized with 2(e) “by simply restricting 
[the provisions] to their respective scopes: Section 2(e) substantively divides 
liabilities, and Section 2(f) identifies procedural consequences that follow from, but 
do not alter, that division.”28 
Ashland contends that under Section 2(f), the Heyman Parties are responsible 
for all Linden property liabilities relating to the Administrative Consent Order, both 
on-site and off-site.  It contends that Section 2(f)’s requirement that the Heyman 
Parties “use reasonable best efforts to amend any consent decree . . . relating to the 
Linden Excluded Liabilities, and to replace or substitute any related financial 
 
25 Rhone–Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Del. 1992). 
26 City Investing Co. Liquidating Tr. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 624 A.2d 1191, 1198 (Del. 1993). 
27 Opening Br. at 24. 
28 Id. at 28. 
 
17 
assurance . . . to include the name of the [Heyman Parties’ designee] . . .  and, if 
permitted by the NJDEP, to remove the name of [International Specialty or any of 
its affiliates] therefrom”29 shifts all the obligations imposed by the Administrative 
Consent Order to the Heyman Parties and their designee, including the obligations 
for off-site remediation of the Arthur Kill waterway.  In other words, Ashland asserts 
that “[i]t cannot be disputed that the consequence of fulfilling the intention of Section 
2(f) would effectively leave [the Heyman Parties] and their designee as the only 
parties responsible for the obligations under the [Administrative Consent Order].”30 
We cannot reconcile the interpretation that Ashland and the Superior Court 
give to these provisions with the plain language of their text.  Sections 2(e) sets out 
the liabilities the Heyman Parties are assuming in connection with the Linden 
property.  It begins by stating that the Heyman Parties assume all liabilities arising 
from the Linden property, but then unambiguously excludes all off-site liabilities.  
After so stating, it emphasizes the point by stating that “for the avoidance of 
doubt,”31 the liabilities assumed by the Heyman parties do not include liabilities for 
off-site contamination.  Section 2(e) then defines these on-site liabilities that the 
Heyman Parties are assuming as the “Linden Excluded Liabilities.”  It refers to the 
on-site liabilities as “excluded liabilities” because they are “excluded” from all the 
 
29 App. to Opening Br. at A908. 
30 Opening Br. at 27.  
31 App. to Opening Br. at A908. 
 
18 
liabilities of International Specialty and its subsidiaries—including off-site liabilities 
related to the Administrative Consent Order—that Ashland is indirectly taking in the 
transaction through its purchase of International Specialty’s stock.  The clear intent 
of the language is that the Heyman Parties are agreeing to assume only on-site 
liabilities.   
Ashland does not take any serious issue with this reading of Section 2(e).  
Section 2(f) begins with a lengthy sentence involving New Jersey’s Industrial Site 
Recovery Act (“ISRA”).  It makes the Heyman Parties responsible for “compliance, 
if applicable, with any requirements of the [New Jersey ISRA].”32  It provides that 
“if ISRA applies to the Linden Transfer”33 the Heyman Parties shall, within five (5) 
Business Days after execution of this Agreement, make any required filings or 
notifications” to NJDEP, and “use reasonable best efforts to, prior to closing,  make 
all other filings, undertake all other measures, including where required undertaking 
any site investigation or Remedial Action required by ISRA.”34  Ashland argues that 
Section 2(f)’s allocation of “all responsibility for compliance with the ISRA” to the 
Heyman Parties provides some support for its claim that the second sentence of 
Section 2(f) allocates all responsibility for compliance with the Administrative 
Consent Order to the Heyman Parties.  However, the scope of compliance with the 
 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
 
19 
ISRA imposed on the Heyman Parties by Section 2(f), including whether it imposes 
any post-closing obligations at all, are undeveloped in the record.  The first sentence 
of Section 2(f) is of no help in ascertaining the meaning of the second sentence. 
 
The second sentence of Section 2(f) requires the Heyman Parties to use 
“reasonable best efforts” to accomplish several results.  It does not directly address 
a division of liabilities.  It does not directly add to, subtract from, or otherwise 
qualify the definition of “Linden Excluded Liabilities”—a definition which seems 
to have been set forth with considerable care in the preceding section.  Ashland 
claims that the Administrative Consent Order liabilities are swept in by Section 
2(f)’s mandate that Heyman use “reasonable best efforts to amend any consent 
decree . . . relating to the Linden Excluded Liabilities.”35  This approach to the 
second sentence would contradict Section 2(e)’s clear language.  We conclude that 
Section 2(f) cannot be given the interpretation advocated by Ashland.  Rather, the 
second sentence of Section 2(f) is one that is properly read as implementing the 
Heyman Parties’ agreement to be responsible for the Linden Excluded Liabilities.  It 
does so by requiring the Heyman Parties to use “reasonable best efforts” to take the 
steps described therein for the purpose of putting the Heyman Parties’ designee in 
the place of  International Specialty with regard to the Linden Excluded Liabilities—
i.e., the on-site liabilities.  Section 2(f) does not contradict Section 2(e) and does not 
 
35 Answering Br. at 26–27. 
 
20 
disturb the allocation of liabilities contained in Section 2(e).  The Superior Court’s 
finding that Section 2(f) allocated responsibility for the remediation of the Arthur 
Kill waterway required by the Administrative Consent Order from ISP 
Environmental to the Heyman Parties is error. 
 
This result is supported by other provisions of the Stock Purchase Agreement 
and the Contribution Agreement.  The Contribution Agreement defines the liabilities 
that are being assumed by Linden Properties Holding with language identical to the 
language in Section 2(e).  It does not have a Section 2(f) equivalent.  Ashland argues 
that the liabilities assumed by the Heyman Parties were transferred to them in the 
Stock Purchase Agreement, and because the Contribution Agreement became 
effective after closing, there was no need for the Contribution Agreement to include 
an equivalent to Section 2(f).  However, the Stock Purchase Agreement states that 
liabilities associated with the Linden property will be transferred immediately after 
closing,36 while the Contribution Agreement states that it is transferring these 
liabilities.37  Reading the Stock Purchase Agreement and the Contribution 
Agreement together supports the conclusion that the parties’ intent was to confine 
the Heyman Parties’ obligations with respect to the Linden property to on-site 
liabilities. 
 
36 App. to Opening Br. at A906 (“In connection with the Linden Transfer, the Seller Parties shall 
assume all Liabilities.”). 
37 Id. at A1206 (“The Company hereby assumes . . . all Liabilities.”). 
 
21 
 
The indemnification provision at Schedule 5.19 Section 4 also supports the 
conclusion we reach.  It obligates the Heyman Parties to indemnify Ashland for any 
losses “to the extent arising out of” the Linden Excluded Liabilities.38  Section 4 
cites the clearly defined term Linden Excluded Liabilities and does so without any 
qualifications.  The fact that Section 4 does not contain a clause giving the Heyman 
Parties or Linden Property Holdings indemnification rights against Ashland for off-
site liabilities does not change the unambiguous and plain meaning of this 
language.39     
For the reasons discussed above, we find that the Stock Purchase Agreement 
unambiguously allocates all off-site liabilities, including the Arthur Kill cleanup, to 
Ashland.  Ashland is not entitled to any indemnification for costs related to off-site 
remediation.  We need not address Ashland’s cross-appeal regarding attorney’s fees. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed 
and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
38 Id. at A909. 
39 See Alcoa World Alumina LLC v. Glencore Ltd., 2016 WL 521193, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 
8, 2016) (“[T]he interpretation of indemnification provisions cannot contradict the plain text of the 
agreement or logic of the transaction.”), aff’d sub nom. Glencore Ltd. v. St. Croix Alumina, LLC, 
150 A.3d 1209 (Del. 2016).