Case Title: City of Oxford v. Inman

Citation: 405 So. 2d 111

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1981-10-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
405 So. 2d 111 (1981) CITY OF OXFORD v. Maurice INMAN, et al. No. 52881. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 14, 1981. McCormick & Morris, Jack McCormick, Oxford, for appellant. Jeptha C. Clemens, E. Clifton Hodge, Jr., University, for appellees. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and SUGG and HAWKINS, JJ. *112 PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court: The City of Oxford and the Anchorage Co., Inc., appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Lafayette County wherein a rezoning ordinance adopted by the City of Oxford was reversed and rendered null and void for lack of sufficient evidence to justify reclassification. Both the City and Anchorage appeal, contending the trial court committed reversible error in holding that the successful applicants for rezoning failed to sustain their burden of proof; in declaring the city ordinance null and void on the grounds the rezoning was not supported by clear and convincing evidence; and in failing to dismiss the bill of exceptions because it was untimely filed. Appellants also assert the decision below should be reversed because it is a groundless usurpation of the legislative function of the governing body of a municipal corporation; and the decision is arbitrary, capricious and manifestly contrary to reason and the great weight of the evidence. Anchorage sought to rezone 8.33 acres in the City of Oxford from A, agricultural, to R-C, multi-family residential. The property is located on the west side of Molly Barr Road between Kendall Ditch on the south and the balance of Anchorage property on the south. At the rezoning hearing, Ben Smith, Director of Planning and Development for the City of Oxford, described the changes which allegedly justified the rezoning. These changes included the rebuilding and extension of the Molly Barr Road in 1972 or 1973, the building of a low-rent housing project known as C.B. Webb Apartments, the building of a 25,000 to 30,000 foot recreational center at the junction of Price Street and Molly Barr Road, and construction of a major street across the subject property. Protestants of the rezoning live in the Garner Heights Subdivision which is adjacent to the 8.33 acres. Concerning the need for multi-family housing on a specific 8.33 acres sought to be rezoned, Smith stated: He also stated there was some land zoned R-C in the city that is vacant. Other observations he made about the changed character of the area were as follows: Immediately following the hearing on May 6, 1980, the Mayor and Board of Aldermen voted to rezone the 8.33 acres from A to R-C. Thereafter on June 3, 1980, City Ordinance No. 1980-2 was adopted. Following this adoption on June 13, 1980, Maurice Inman and other protestants filed a bill of exceptions pursuant to MCA § 11-51-75 (1972). Anchorage moved to dismiss the bill of exceptions for failure to appeal within the ten day time period prescribed by the foregoing statute. Appellants contend there was ample evidence to justify rezoning from agricultural to multi-family residential and further maintain the clear and convincing burden of proof generally applied in rezoning cases does not apply to the present case because the agricultural designation was not intended to be permanent; therefore, the presumption in favor of the original zoning should not be applicable. Assuming, but not deciding, this argument to be valid, we are of the opinion the trial court was correct in holding the evidence insufficient to warrant rezoning because appellants did not prove changed conditions in the area and public need for the rezoning on the specific 8.33 acres sought to be rezoned. In Cloverleaf Mall Ltd. v. Conerly, 387 So. 2d 736, 740 (Miss. 1980), we stated the general requirements for rezoning to be: We are of the opinion appellants failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence or *114 even by a lesser standard that the conditions had materially changed to warrant rezoning. We think the building of the C.B. Webb low-rent housing and recreational facility as well as road expansion were changes in accordance with the original zoning plan. Also there was no concrete evidence of public need for housing on the 8.33 acres sought to be rezoned, but testimony there was generally a public need for multi-family dwellings in the City of Oxford. We are of the opinion this is too vague to warrant a change in zoning. Therefore, the trial court did not err in this regard. We are further of the opinion the lower court did not usurp the municipality's legislative functions in reversing the City's rezoning ordinance. It is clearly within the judicial discretion on review to reverse a rezoning ordinance adopted on insufficient proof. Here, we believe the City of Oxford's adoption of the rezoning ordinance was based upon less than clear and convincing evidence. In Sullivan v. City of Bay St. Louis, 375 So. 2d 1200, 1201 (Miss. 1979), wherein we reversed the lower court's affirmance of a rezoning order because of insufficient evidence, we stated as follows: We also observed in Sullivan, supra at 1202, that a reviewing court "will not disturb a finding of the City that conditions have changed so as to warrant rezoning if the question is fairly debatable." We are of the opinion the question was not fairly debatable in this case; in fact, very little evidence was presented to show a material change of conditions and public need. Thus we think the lower court acted properly in its review and did not usurp the City of Oxford's legislative function. Turning to the final assignment of error, appellants assert the protestants' bill of exceptions was not timely filed and should have been dismissed by the lower court. The applicable statute, MCA § 11-51-75 (1972) provides in pertinent part the following: Appellants submit the ten day appeal period commenced running on May 6, 1980, the date the Mayor and Board of Aldermen voted orally to reclassify the property, whereas it is appellees' position the ten day period began running on June 3, 1980, the date the written ordinance was signed and adopted. We are of the opinion the filing of the bill of exceptions on June 13, 1980, was timely because the rezoning ordinance did not become effective until written, signed, and formally adopted on June 3, 1980. The statutory provision for the effective date of an ordinance is found in MCA § 21-13-11 (Supp. 1981) which states: Therefore, we are of the opinion the bill of exceptions was filed within the statutory ten day time period. AFFIRMED. SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur.