Case Title: Parker v. Warren

Citation: 

Docket Number: 060085

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
MARY C. PARKER 
 
v.  Record No. 060085     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
January 12, 2007 
JAMES E. WARREN, JR., PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF 
ARTHUR JAMES RUSSELL, DECEASED 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY 
N. Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge 
 
In this personal injury action, the trial court concluded 
that Code § 8.01-229(B)(2)(b) contained a "scrivener's error" 
and could not be applied as written.  Applying its 
construction of that statute, the trial court dismissed the 
motion for judgment as barred by the statute of limitations.  
For the reasons stated below, we will reverse the judgment of 
the trial court because there is no "scrivener's error" in 
Code § 8.01-229(B)(2)(b) and the section does not apply to the 
motion for judgment in this case. 
On May 23, 2002, Mary C. Parker filed a motion for 
judgment against Arthur James Russell for personal injuries 
arising out of a June 12, 2000 motor vehicle accident.  
Russell subsequently died on October 15, 2003.  James E. 
Warren, Jr. qualified as personal representative of Russell's 
estate on November 17, 2004.  On May 5, 2005, the trial court 
granted Parker's motion to substitute Warren, the personal 
 
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representative of Russell's estate, as the defendant in her 
personal injury action. 
Warren filed a special plea to the statute of limitations 
arguing that, under Code § 8.01-229(B)(2)(b), Parker was 
required to substitute the decedent's personal representative 
as the party defendant before the expiration of the 
limitations period or within two years after the date the 
motion for judgment was filed, whichever occurred first.  
Thus, according to Warren, the latest date for substituting 
him as the defendant was May 23, 2004 and, consequently, the 
action was not timely.  Parker replied to the special plea 
asserting that Code § 8.01-229(B)(2)(b) did not apply in this 
case and that the substitution was timely made. 
Following argument of counsel, the trial court concluded 
that the Code section did apply although it contained a 
"scrivener's error."  The trial court "corrected" that error 
and dismissed the motion for judgment as untimely.  We awarded 
Parker an appeal. 
Discussion 
At issue in this appeal are two subparagraphs of Code 
§ 8.01-229(B)(2).  Those subparagraphs provide as follows:  
a.  If a person against whom a personal action may 
be brought dies before the commencement of such 
action and before the expiration of the limitation 
period for commencement thereof then a claim may be 
filed against the decedent's estate or an action 
 
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may be commenced against the decedent's personal 
representative before the expiration of the 
applicable limitation period or within one year 
after the qualification of such personal 
representative, whichever occurs later. 
 
b.  If a person against whom a personal action may 
be brought dies before suit papers naming such 
person as defendant have been filed with the court, 
then such suit papers may be amended to substitute 
the decedent's personal representative as party 
defendant before the expiration of the applicable 
limitation period or within two years after the 
date such suit papers were filed with the court, 
whichever occurs later, and such suit papers shall 
be taken as properly filed. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
At trial and before this Court, Warren argued that 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) both reference circumstances in 
which the defendant dies before the litigation is commenced, 
but establish separate limitations periods for filing the 
litigation.  Accordingly, he argued that applying the language 
of the subparagraphs as written would create an absurdity.  
Furthermore, Warren argued, the General Assembly would not 
enact two provisions addressing the same circumstances.  To 
avoid such a result and harmonize the two subparagraphs, 
Warren contended that the provisions of subparagraph (b) 
should apply when the defendant dies after the action was 
commenced.  The trial court, apparently agreeing with Warren, 
held that the word "before" in subparagraph (b) was a 
"scrivener's error" and should have been "after."  Applying 
 
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that construction, the trial court found that Parker's 
substitution of Warren as a defendant was untimely because it 
occurred more than two years after the litigation was filed.* 
 
Statutory construction is a question of law which we 
review de novo on appeal.  Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 
227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2006).  Courts are required to apply 
the plain language of a statute when possible and may not 
rewrite it.  Halifax Corp. v. Wachovia Bank, 268 Va. 641, 653, 
604 S.E.2d 403, 408 (2004).  When, however, the language of a 
statute is ambiguous or appears to be inconsistent with other 
portions of the statute, courts are required to harmonize any 
ambiguity or inconsistency in the statute to give effect to 
the General Assembly's intent without usurping "the 
legislature's right to write statutes."  Boynton, 271 Va. at 
229-30, 623 S.E.2d at 927. 
Applying the plain meaning of the subparagraphs at issue, 
we conclude that they do not address identical circumstances 
and therefore do not create different limitations periods for 
identical circumstances.  Subparagraph (a) provides an 
expanded limitation period for filing suit against the 
personal representative of a defendant who died before the 
                     
* There is no transcript of the hearing and the statement 
of facts does not recite the attorneys' arguments or the 
rationale of the trial court.  Nevertheless, the parties do 
not dispute that these arguments were made in the trial court. 
 
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litigation was filed.  This subparagraph does not address what 
effect, if any, a plaintiff's pleading naming a deceased 
defendant would have on the running of the statute of 
limitations.  Subparagraph (b), added in 1991, addresses this 
situation.  See 1991 Acts ch. 693. 
Prior to the enactment of subparagraph (b) in 1991, 
Virginia law provided that a suit filed against a deceased 
party was a nullity and, as such, could not operate to toll 
the statute of limitations.  See, e.g., Rennolds v. Williams, 
147 Va. 196, 198-200, 136 S.E. 597, 597-98 (1927).  
Furthermore, because the personal representative was a person 
distinct from the decedent, the mistaken naming of the 
decedent was not a misnomer and substitution of the personal 
representative did not relate back to the initial filing of 
the lawsuit.  See Rockwell v. Allman, 211 Va. 560, 561, 179 
S.E.2d 471, 472 (1971).  Thus, if a litigant filed a personal 
action against a defendant who, possibly unbeknownst to the 
plaintiff, had died, that action was a nullity and the statute 
of limitations would continue to run.  Subparagraph (b) 
addresses this circumstance by providing that a suit filed 
against a defendant who was deceased when the action was filed 
could be amended to substitute the decedent's personal 
representative and would be considered timely filed if the 
 
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substitution occurred within two years of the original filing 
date. 
For these reasons, subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Code 
§ 8.01-229(B)(2) are not ambiguous or inconsistent and do not 
create an absurdity.  Accordingly, there is no basis for 
applying rules of statutory construction and the trial court 
erred in holding that subparagraph (b) contained a 
"scrivener's error" requiring the substitution of the word 
"after" for the statutorily prescribed "before."  
As written, subparagraph (b) applies in circumstances in 
which a decedent dies before a personal action against him is 
commenced.  Russell died after Parker filed her motion for 
judgment.  Therefore, subparagraph (b) of Code § 8.01-
229(B)(2) does not apply in this case, and Warren's plea to 
the statute of limitations based on this subparagraph should 
have been denied.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment 
of the trial court dismissing Parker's motion for judgment and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded.