Case Title: MCINTOSH v GRAVELEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 11973

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
No, 11973 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1972 /" WILLIAM McINTOSH, JR.. , HATTIE ~CINTOSH , S O R E N N, BECK and D O N A L D P, MURRAY, P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, CLIFFORD GRAVELEY, Defendant and Respondent, Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Third J u d i c i a l District, Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding, Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Small, Cumins & Hatch, Helena, Montana, Floyd 0, Small argued, Helena, Montana, For Respondent : Loble, P i c o t t e and Lobl-e, Helena, Montana, Henry Loble and Peter Pauly argued, Helena, Montana, Submitted: February 18, 1972 Decided : MAR Z 3 1972. Filed: MP,R 2 3 B T ? M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion o f - t h e Court. This is a s u i t involving defendant's r i g h t t o use c e r t a i n waters of Spring Gulch, a t r i b u t a r y of Ophir Creek, i n Powell County f o r i r r i g a t i n g a t r a c t of land i n an adjacent drainage and t o change t h e point of diversion of such waters. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Powell County, t h e Hon. N a t Allen, d i s t r i c t judge pre- s i d i n g without a jury, entered a judgment of dismissal of plain- t i f f s 1 claims. From t h i s f i n a l judgment, p l a i n t i f f s appeal. The findings of f a c t of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e i n s t a n t case set f o r t h t h e s a l i e n t f a c t s involved i n t h i s appeal. Ophir Creek is a stream r i s i n g i n Powell County which flows i n a southerly d i r e c t i o n i n t o t h e L i t t l e Blackfoot River near Avon, Montana. Spring Gulch is a t r i b u t a r y of Ophir Creek flowing i n t o it from a northerly d i r e c t i o n ; it lies within t h e Ophir Creek drainage. Immediately w e s t and adjacent to t h e Ophir Creek drainage lies t h e Three M i l e Creek drainage. The waters of Ophir Creek and its t r i b u t a r i e s , including t h e waters -of Spring Gulch, were adjudicated on March 28, 1928 i n Quigley e t al. v. Victor Gold Mining Company, e t a l . , Cause # 1185 i n t h e district c o u r t of Powell County. Under t h a t decree one James McGilvray was decreed t h e r i g h t t o use 75 miner's inches of t h e waters of Spring Gulch with a p r i o r i t y a s of March 31, 1 9 1 1 "on t h e lands belonging t o him as described i n h i s pleadings * * * f o r domestic and o t h e r u s e f u l and b e n e f i c i a l purposes". The lands described i n h i s pleadings included lands i n t h e NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 26, Township 1 1 North, Range 8 West, i n Powell County. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e i n s t a n t case found, i n effect, t h a t such lands were a c t u a l l y i n t h e NE 1/4 SE 1 / 4 of s a i d s e c t i o n , township and range. A portion of these lands and o t h e r lands of McGilvray f o r which t h e o r i g i n a l appropriation w a s made, comprising i n a l l n o t less than 54 acres, are located outside t h e Ophir Creek drain- age and i n t h e Three M i l e Creek drainage. P l a i n t i f f s i n t h i s case a l l claim to be successors i n i n t e r e s t t o various decreed holders of water r i g h t s i n Ophir Creek and its t r i b u t a r i e s i n Quigley v. Victor Gold Mining Com- pany, supra. The d i s t r i c t court i n t h e i n s t a n t case, however, declined t o s o f i n d as t h e proof thereof r e s t e d e n t i r e l y upon t h e unsubstantiated o r a l testimony of t w o of t h e p l a i n t i f f s . Thus t h e nature, e x t e n t , and p r i o r i t y of p l a i n t i f f s ' water r i g h t s i n Ophir Creek and its t r i b u t a r i e s remain unknown. Defendant, on t h e o t h e r hand, is t h e acknowledged succes- sor i n i n t e r e s t to t h e lands of McGilvray f o r which t h e latter w a s decreed t h e r i g h t t o use 75 miner's inches of water of Spring Gulch with a p r i o r i t y as of March 31, 1 9 1 1 i n Quigley v. Victor Gold Mining Company, supra. The waters of Spring Gulch decreed to McGilvray, defend- a n t ' s predecessor, were o r i g i n a l l y d i v e r t e d from t h e w e s t bank o f Spring Gulch by means of "the old McGilvray d i t c h " i n a westerly d i r e c t i o n across t h e drainage d i v i d e from t h e Ophir Creek drainage t o t h e adjacent Three M i l e Creek drainage for use therein. Any f u r t h e r b e n e f i t of t h e d i v e r t e d waters was l o s t t o t h e water users i n t h e Ophir Creek drainage because such waters could not r e t u r n t o t h e Ophir Creek drainage by percolation, seepage or otherwise. Additionally, t h e waters of Spring Gulch were d i v e r t e d from t h e w e s t bank of Spring Qllch by another d i t c h known as t h e "Faisview Mine Ditcht1 which was located downstream from "the o l d McGilvray d i t c h " between t h e l a t t e r and t h e confluence of Spring Gulch and Ophir C r e e k . These waters of Spring Gulch were conveyed i n a westerly d i r e c t i o n across a s t e e p h i l l s i d e t o a p o i n t above t h e t a i l i n g dump for t h e Fairview Mine where t h e "Fairview Mine Ditch" abruptly terminated. These waters were used exclusively t o operate a b o i l e r a t the Fairview Mine which is located i n t h e Ophir Creek drainage. Since 1959 defendant has d i v e r t e d t h e waters of Spring Gulch decreed t o h i s predecessor McGilvray from a p o i n t of diversion on t h e w e s t bank of Ophir Creek located approximately one-half m i l e downstream from the confluence of Spring Gulch and Ophir Creek f o r use on various d i f f e r e n t t r a c t s of land under h i s c o n t r o l by means of d i f f e r e n t d i t c h e s and combinations of ditches. During t h e i r r i g a t i o n season of 1959 and 1960, de- fendant used a d i t c h known a s the "Ophir-Quigley" o r "Chinau d i t c h t o convey such Spring Gulch waters t o lands he owns i n t h e Ophir Creek drainage located near Blackfoot City. I n t h e f a l l of 1960 and t h e spring of 1961, defendant and p l a i n t i f f s McIntosh constructed the "McIntosh-Graveley" d i t c h , without p r o t e s t o r objection from t h e o t h e r p l a i n t i f f s , f o r t h e purpose of carrying t h e waters of Spring Gulch decreed t o defendant's predecessor McGilvray o u t of t h e Ophir Creek drainage and i n t o t h e Three M i l e Creek drainage f o r use therein. A t a l l t i m e s when water w a s a v a i l a b l e and needed during t h e i r r i g a t i o n seasons from 1 9 6 1 through 1966 and f o r a portion of t h e i r r i g a t i o n season i n 1967, defendant used an old d i t c h owned by p l a i n t i f f s McIntosh, known a s t h e "McIntoshflditch i n conjunction with t h e newly constructed "McIntosh-Grave1ey"ditch t o convey t h e waters of Spring Gulch decreed to defendant's predecessor McGilvray o u t of t h e Ophir Creek drainage and i n t o t h e Three M i l e Creek drainage f o r defendant's use t h e r e i n . I n t h e spring of 1968, defendant constructed a d i t c h known as t h e "Graveley" d i t c h o r i g i n a t i n g on t h e w e s t bank of Ophir Creek j u s t below t h e p o i n t of diversion of t h e "McIntosh" d i t c h . The "Graveley" d i t c h generally p a r a l l e l s t h e course of t h e "McIntosh" d i t c h f o r some d i s t a n c e , and a t a point where t h e "McIntosh" d i t c h courses i n a southerly d i r e c t i o n defendant has placed a siphon under t h e "McIntosh" d i t c h which connects t h e "Graveley" d i t c h constructed i n 1968 t o t h e "McIntosh-Graveley" d i t c h constructed i n 1960 and 1961. During t h e i r r i g a t i o n seasolsof 1969 and 1970, defendant has used t h i s combination of d i t c h e s t o convey t h e waters of Spring Gulch, decreed t o h i s predecessor McGilvray, o u t of t h e Ophir Creek drainage and i n t o the Three M i l e Creek drainage f o r defendant's use therein. Defendant proposes t o continue t h e use of these ditches f o r t h a t purpose. A t a l l t i m e s t h a t defendant has conveyed t h e waters of Spring Gulch by means of t h e various diversion works located on t h e w e s t bank of Ophir Creek downstream from t h e confluence of Spring Gulch and Ophir Creek, defendant has d i v e r t e d and conveyed such waters o u t of t h e Ophir Creek drainage f o r use on lands he owns i n t h e Three M i l e Creek drainage. These lands of defendant i n t h e Three M i l e Creek drainage a r e lands o t h e r than those acquired from h i s predecessor McGilvray, f o r which the o r i g i n a l appropriation was made. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t a l s o found t h a t t h e burden of defend- a n t ' s present use of t h e waters of Spring Gulch is no g r e a t e r than t h e burden of t h e o r i g i n a l use of such waters, and t h a t t h e water users of Ophir Creek and its t r i b u t a r i e s suffered no g r e a t e r i n j u r y o r detriment thereby. The only p a r t y to t h i s a c t i o n with w e i r s and measuring devices a t h i s respective points of diversion is t h e defendant. Defendant has one w e i r and measuring device a t t h e point where Spring Gulch flows i n t o Ophir Creek, and another a t h i s p o i n t of diversion on t h e w e s t bank of Ophir Creek where t h e "Graveley" d i t c h is located. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found a f a i l u r e of proof on t h e p a r t of any of t h e p l a i n t i f f s t h a t defendant is depriving them of any of t h e waters they claim under t h e decree i n Quigley v. Victor Gold Mining Company, supra. However, t h e d i s t r i c t found t h a t t h e r e a r e a c c r e t i o n s t o t h e flow of Spring Gulch below t h e o r i g i n a l p o i n t of diversion of t h e Spring Gulch w a t e r s decreed t o defendant's predecessor McGilvray. The district c o u r t found t h a t defendant was n o t e n t i t l e d t o these accretions. Accordingly, t h e district c o u r t ordered defendant t o i n s t a l l a w e i r o r measuring device a t t h e o r i g i n a l p o i n t of diversion. The d i s t r i c t court a l s o found t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s d i d not o b j e c t t o defendant's use of t h e waters of Spring Gulch, heretofore described, u n t i l t h e f i l i n g of t h e i n s t a n t s u i t on December 3, 1969. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h a t t h i s course of conduct on t h e p a r t of p l a i n t i f f s induced defendant t o expend s u b s t a n t i a l s u m s of money i n improving h i s diversion works. From t h i s t h e district c o u r t concluded t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e of equitable estoppel barred a s s e r t i o n of any claims t h a t p l a i n t i f f s might otherwise have i n t h e i n s t a n t s u i t . The i n s t a n t s u i t w a s t r i e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t without a jury i n J u l y 1970. A f t e r p l a i n t i f f s r e s t e d , defendant moved f o r a judgment of dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) of t h e Montana Rules of C i v i l Procedure, which t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted on t h e b a s i s of its findings of f a c t and conclusions of l a w . The judgment was i n favor of defendant denying a l l claims f o r relief of t h e p l a i n t i f f s , b u t required defendant t o i n s t a l l a measuring device a t t h e o r i g i n a l p o i n t of diversion of t h e McGilvray appropriation s o a s not t o b e n e f i t from down- stream accretions i n Spring Gulch t o which defendant w a s not e n t i t l e d . P l a i n t i f f s now appeal from t h i s judgment. The i s s u e s upon appeal can be summarized i n t h i s manner: (1) sufficiency of t h e evidence to support t h e findings of f a c t and judgment; (2) whether defendant had t h e r i g h t t o d i v e r t t h e waters of Spring Gulch i n t o t h e adjacent Three M i l e Creek drain- age for use t h e r e i n ; (3) whether defendant had t h e r i g h t to change the point of diversion of the Spring Gulch waters, In addition to these issues posed by plaintiffs, defendant raises the further issue as to whether estoppel and laches bar plain- tiffs' claims in any event. Directing our attention to the first issue, we note extensive exceptions by the plaintiffs to the district court's findings of fact which are incapable of complete summarization. However, the gist of plaintiffs' principal contentions in this regard can be summarized in this manner: (1) the uncontradicted evidence shows that McGilvray, defendant's predecessor, never attempted to convey the waters of Spring Gulch into the Three Creek Mile/drainage for use on his lands there, nor was he ever decreed any right to do so under the decree in Quigley v. Victor Gold Mining Company, supra; ( 2 ) any diversion of the waters of Spring Gulch by defendant to the Three Mile Creek drainage for use on his lands there was permissive only during times when plaintiffs had no need or use for such waters; (3) defendant's change in the point of diversion saddled plaintiffs with an increased burden in exercising their water rights to their damage and detriment. At the outset we note that the decree in Quigley v . Gold Victor/Mining Company, supra, grants to defendant's predecessor McGilvray certain rights to the waters of Spring Gulch for use on certain described lands owned by him, some of which lie in the Ophir Creek drainage and some of which lie in the Three Mile Creek drainage. This decreed water right is based on an appro- priation as of March 31, 1911. The appropriation and use of the waters of Spring Gulch under the decree is for irrigation of - 8 - the entire tract of land owned by McGilvray both in the Ophir Creek drainage and the Three Mile Creek drainage, and is not limited to any particular parcel of land owned by him, The conclusion is inescapable that the appropriation and decreed water right of McGilvray covered those described parcels of land owned by him in the Three Mile Creek drainage, as well as those located in the Ophir Creek drainage. Plaintiffs sought to overcome the foregoing by testimon- ial evidence tending to prove that McGilvray did not own any land in the Three Mile Creek drainage as of the date of the ap- propriation, and that he never attempted to divert or use Spring Gulch waters on any lands in the Three Mile Creek drainage. Such collateral attack and attempted relitigation of matters concluded in the decree in Quigley v . Victor Gold Mining Company, supra, is not permissible. That decree and the issues litigated and determined therein are res judicata and binding on the parties in the instant suit, all of whom claim their respective rights herein through predecessor parties in that earlier litigation. Brennan v. Jones, 101 Mont. 550, 55 P.2d 697; Missoula Light & Water Co. v. Hughes, 106 Mont. 355, 77 P.2d 1041. Plaintiffs cite three Montana cases for the proposition that where a decree does not specifically authorize an appro- priation to remove water to an alien watershed permanently, the appropriator has no right to do so. Spokane Ranch & Water Co, v. Beatty, 37 Mont. 342, 96 P . 727; Galiger v. McNulty, 80 Mont. 339, 260 P. 401; Quigley v. McIntosh, 110 Mont. 495, 103 P.2d Spokane Ranch & Water Co, contains t h i s language, b u t suggests t h i s proposition only i n t h e context of t h e facts of t h a t case, which are f a r d i f f e r e n t from t h e f a c t s here, There, t h e court held t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge d i d not intend to g r a n t t h e r i g h t t o release t h e water permanently t o an a l i e n water- shed with regard t o a g r i c u l t u r a l water r i g h t s o r t h e same lang- uage would have been used t h e r e as i n t h e case of a p l a c e r mining water r i g h t where such r i g h t w a s granted. I n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e contrary i n t e n t i o n appearq a s t h e r i g h t t o use t h e water on land i n t h e foreign drainage is s p e l l e d o u t i n t h e decree. Galiger simply stands f o r t h e proposition t h a t waters primarily belong i n t h e watershed of t h e i r o r i g i n , i f t h e r e is land t h e r e i n which r e q u i r e s i r r i g a t i o n . Quigley stands f o r t h e proposition t h a t a water user who has been decreed t h e r i g h t to use a specifis.amount of water on given lands cannot subsequently extend t h e use of t h a t water t o a d d i t i o n a l lands not under a c t u a l or contemplated i r r i g a t i o n a t t h e t i m e t h e r i g h t was decreed, t o t h e i n j u r y of subsequent appropriators. However, t h i s p r i n c i p l e is n o t germane t o t h e i n s t a n t case, a s no i n j u r y to subsequent appropriators i n t h e drainage of o r i g i n is possible where permanent diversion of t h e waters i n t o another watershed was decreed i n t h e o r i g i n a l ap- propriation. On a number of occasions t h i s Court has recognized t h a t t h e waters of a stream located i n one drainage can be appro- p r i a t e d f o r i r r i g a t i o n purposes o r o t h e r b e n e f i c i a l uses i n - 10 - another drainage. Spokane Ranch & Water Co, v. Beatty, supra; Carlson v. City of Helena, 43 Mont. 1, 1 1 4 P. 110; Lokowich v. City of Helena, 46 Mont. 575, 129 P. 1063; Galiger v. McNulty, supra; Thrasher v. Mannix & Wilson, 95 Mont. 273, 26 P.2d 370; S t a t e ex rel. Mungas v. D i s t . C t . , 102 Mont. 533, 59 P.2d 71. Where, as here, t h e water user i n t h e drainage of o r i g i n is not i n j u r e d , he has no cause t o complain i f t h e water is devoted to b e n e f i c i a l use i n a foreign drainage. P l a i n t i f f s ' contention t h a t t h e evidence shows t h a t any diversion of t h e waters of Spring Gulch by defendant i n t o t h e Three M i l e Creek drainage f o r use on h i s lands t h e r e w a s with the permission of p l a i n t i f f s during t i m e s when p l a i n t i f f s had no need o r use f o r t h e waters is without m e r i t . The evidence simply does not s u b s t a n t i a t e t h i s contention. The most it shows i s a permissive user of a d i t c h f o r a period of t i m e t o c a r r y h i s water. Ditch r i g h t s and water r i g h t s a r e two separate r i g h t s and i n no sense synonymous. P l a i n t i f f s f i n a l l y contend t h a t t h e change i n t h e p o i n t of diversion of t h e waters from t h e w e s t bank of Spring Gulch where t h e o r i g i n a l appropriation w a s made t o t h e w e s t bank of Ophir Creek c o n s t i t u t e d an increased burden on them a s water u s e r s i n Ophir Creek. The only testimony i n t h e record support- ing t h i s is t h e i r testimony t h a t they would be saddled with t h e i r proportionate share of t h e expense of a water commissioner t o d i s t r i b u t e t h e waters i n accordance with t h e i r respective r i g h t s , I f a w e i r and measuring device is i n s t a l l e d a t t h e o r i g i n a l point of diversion t o measure t h e water to which defendant i s e n t i t l e d , a s w e l l as continuing t h e e x i s t i n g measuring device a t defend- a n t ' s present p o i n t of diversion a s required by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , it is d i f f i c u l t t o see why a water commissioner is any more necessary than i f t h e water were taken from t h e o r i g i n a l p o i n t of diversion. A s i d e from t h i s , t h e expense of employing a water commissioner does not c o n s t i t u t e t h e burden o r d e t r i - ment required to be proven by p l a i n t i f f s i n order t o p r e v a i l . other W e have examined the/zontentions of p l a i n t i f f s concern- ing sufficiency of t h e evidence and f i n d t h e f a c t s e i t h e r sup- ported by t h e evidence o r immaterial t o determination of t h i s appeal. The second i s s u e r a i s e d by p l a i n t i f f s upon appeal is whether defendant had t h e r i g h t t o d i v e r t t h e waters of Spring Gulch i n t o t h e adjacent drainage f o r use on h i s lands there. It is important t o note t h a t defendant is using t h e water f o r i r r i g a t i o n of lands i n t h e Three M i l e Creek drainage which he subsequently acquired from persons o t h e r than t h e o r i g i n a l ap- p r o p r i a t o r s and which i n no sense were t h e lands f o r which t h e o r i g i n a l appropriation was made. It should a l s o be noted t h a t t h e r e is no claim of abandonment of t h e o r i g i n a l appropriation i n t h e i n s t a n t case. Having heretofore found t h a t defendant's predecessor was granted t h e r i g h t to convey t h e waters of Spring Gulch across t h e drainage divide f o r use on h i s lands located t h e r e and de- scribed i n h i s pleadings under t h e decree i n Quigley v. Victor Gold Mining Company, supra, and it being admitted t h a t defendant here succeeded t o those r i g h t s , t h e only remaining question is whether defendant can use these waters on h i s o t h e r and d i f - f e r e n t lands located i n t h e Three M i l e Creek drainage. This question has heretofore been answered affirmatively i n a similar Montana case, Thrasher v. Mannix & Wilson, 95 Mont. 273, 277, 26 P.2d 370. There, t h e argument w a s made t h a t t h e holder of a water r i g h t e n t i t l i n g him t o t h e use of such waters on h i s lands i n an a l i e n watershed, could n o t bring a d d i t i o n a l lands i n t h e a l i e n watershed under i r r i g a t i o n with t h e waters diverted from t h e watershed of t h e i r o r i g i n . This Court dismissed t h a t contention i n these words: " * * * It appears from t h e record t h a t t h e s e new lands are outside t h e watershed of Gold Creek. From t h e testimony it appears t h a t t h e waters diverted under t h i s p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t were, and t h e c o u r t found and so adjudged i n t h e former decree, t h e waters thereby appropriated, and had been and could continue t o be, used without t h e watershed of Gold Creek. I n view of t h e s e f a c t s no i n j u r y could r e s u l t to these p l a i n t i f f s from t h i s change of use, f o r t h e use both before and a f t e r was f o r t h e same purpose; t h e r e being no opportunity f o r any of t h e p l a i n t i f f s t o enjoy any b e n e f i t s from percolating waters r e s u l t i n g from i r r i g a t i o n under t h i s r i g h t inuring t o them, a s t h e i r lands are e i t h e r a l l within t h e watershed of Gold Creek, or, i f with- o u t , a t a higher l e v e l than t h e lands of t h e defendant. " (Emphasis supplied. ) Such is t h e s i t u a t i o n here. P l a i n t i f f s could not f u r t h e r b e n e f i t from t h e waters diverted t o t h e Three M i l e Creek drain- age under t h e o r i g i n a l appropriation, s o they a r e not burdened o r damaged i n any way from i r r i g a t i o n of o t h e r lands i n t h a t drainage. The next i s s u e is whether defendant had t h e r i g h t t o change t h e point of diversion of t h e Spring Gulch waters. The c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e is s e c t i o n 89-803, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: "The person e n t i t l e d to t h e use of water may change t h e place of diversion, i f o t h e r s a r e n o t thereby i n j u r e d , and may extend t h e d i t c h , flume, pipe, or aqueduct, by which t h e diver- s i o n is made, t o any place o t h e r than where t h e f i r s t use was made, and may use t h e water f o r o t h e r purposes than t h a t f o r which it was o r i g i n a l l y appropriated." The burden of proof of i n j u r y as t h e r e s u l t of a change i n t h e p o i n t of diversion is upon those who a l l e g e i n j u r y , here t h e p l a i n t i f f s . F o r r e s t e r v. Rock Island O i l & Refining Co., Inc., 133 Mont, 333, 323 P.2d 597, and cases t h e r e i n cited. Here, p l a i n t i f f s have no adequate measuring devices t o determine with any degree of accuracy t h e amount of water they are receiving under t h e i r respective r i g h t s . It is necessary f o r them t o prove t h a t they are being deprived of waters t o which they a r e lawfully e n t i t l e d . The only proof of t h i s w a s i n regard t o t h e accretions t o t h e Spring Gulch waters below t h e p o i n t of orig- i n a l diversion. The d i s t r i c t court remedied t h i s by attaching a condition t o its decree requiring defendant t o i n s t a l l a measur- ing device a t t h e o r i g i n a l point of diversion and d i v e r t no g r e a t e r amount of water a t t h e changed diversion p o i n t on t h e w e s t bank of Ophir Creek. There is a complete f a i l u r e of proof on t h e p a r t of p l a i n t i f f s of any o t h e r damage. F i n a l l y c a s t o t h e i s s u e s of laches and estoppel, we deem it unnecessary t o discuss these i s s u e s i n t h i s opinion; n e i t h e r has been r a i s e d a s an i s s u e upon appeal by p l a i n t i f f s , appellants here. I n view of our holdings herein defendant is entitled to prevail irrespective of determination of these issues. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Associate Justice Hsn . Jack Shanstrom, District Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice Wesley Castles.