Case Title: Commonwealth v. Eldred

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12279

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12279 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JULIE A. ELDRED. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 2, 2017. - July 16, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Probation.  Drug Addiction. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Concord Division of 
the District Court Department on June 13, 2016. 
 
 
A proceeding on violation of probation was heard by Sabita 
Singh, J., and a question of law was reported by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Lisa M. Newman-Polk (Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, also present) for the defendant. 
 
Maria Granik, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Amy M. Belger for Massachusetts Medical Society & others. 
 
Martha M. Coakley & Rachel C. Hutchinson for National 
Association of Drug Court Professionals. 
 
Steven Fitzgerald, pro se. 
 
Matthew R. Segal & Adriana Lafaille for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., & others. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Following a probation violation hearing, a judge 
in the District Court found that the defendant, Julie A. Eldred,1 
had tested positive for fentanyl, in violation of a condition of 
her probation requiring her to abstain from using illegal drugs.  
The judge ordered that the conditions of her probation be 
modified to require her to submit to inpatient treatment for 
drug addiction.  The defendant appeals from that finding and 
disposition.  The judge also reported a question drafted by the 
defendant concerning whether the imposition of a "drug free" 
condition of probation, such as appeared in the original terms 
of defendant's probation, is permissible for an individual who 
is addicted to drugs and whether that person can be subject to 
probation violation proceedings for subsequently testing 
positive for illegal drugs. 
 
We conclude that, in appropriate circumstances, a judge may 
order a defendant who is addicted to drugs to remain drug free 
as a condition of probation, and that a defendant may be found 
to be in violation of his or her probation by subsequently 
testing positive for an illegal drug.2  Accordingly, we affirm 
                     
 
1 We refer to Julie Eldred as the defendant, rather than the 
probationer, for purposes of consistency and clarity. 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., Center for Public 
Representation, and Prisoners' Legal Services; Massachusetts 
Medical Society, American Academy of Addiction Psychiatry, 
Association for Behavioral Healthcare, Grayken Center for 
3 
 
 
the finding that the defendant violated her probation and the 
order requiring her to submit to inpatient treatment for her 
addiction. 
 
Background and prior proceedings.  On July 18, 2016, the 
defendant was arraigned on a felony charge of larceny for 
stealing jewelry valued over $250 from the home of an individual 
for whom the defendant provided dog-walking services.  The 
defendant admitted to the police that she had stolen the jewelry 
and had sold it to obtain money to support her heroin addiction.  
On August 22, 2016, the defendant admitted to sufficient facts 
to warrant a finding of guilt.  A judge in the District Court 
continued the defendant's case without a finding, and imposed a 
one-year term of probation with special conditions related to 
her substance abuse that included requiring her to remain drug 
free, submit to random drug screens, and attend outpatient 
substance abuse treatment three times each week.3  Prior to 
accepting the terms of her probation, the defendant did not 
object to the condition that she remain drug free, or otherwise 
                                                                  
Addiction Medicine at Boston Medical Center, Massachusetts 
Organization for Addiction Recovery, Massachusetts Society for 
Addiction Medicine, Northeastern University School of Law's 
Center for Health Policy and Law, and twenty-eight others; 
Steven Fitzgerald; and the National Association of Drug Court 
Professionals. 
 
3 The special condition of probation requiring the defendant 
to remain drug free was announced in open court, and was 
included in the written probation agreement, which the defendant 
signed. 
4 
 
 
express that her diagnosis of substance use disorder (SUD) 
rendered her incapable of remaining drug free. 
 
On August 29, 2016, the defendant began outpatient 
addiction treatment at a hospital.  As a component of her 
treatment, an addiction specialist prescribed the defendant a 
medication that is used to treat symptoms of withdrawal and 
addiction to opiates. 
 
On September 2, 2016, only eleven days after the case had 
been continued without a finding and the probation had been 
imposed, the defendant tested positive for fentanyl, following a 
random drug test administered by her probation officer.  The 
probation officer encouraged the defendant to enter inpatient 
treatment, but the defendant allegedly refused.  The probation 
officer then filed a "Notice of Probation Detention Hearing"4 
with the District Court.  The detention hearing was conducted on 
the same day as the defendant's positive drug test because, as 
her probation officer testified, the defendant's parents were 
out of town and "it was the Friday before Labor Day and [the 
probation officer] felt that [the probation officer] couldn't 
                     
4 According to Rule 5(a) of the District/Municipal Court 
Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings (LexisNexis 2016), a 
probation detention hearing "may be conducted to determine 
whether a probationer shall be held in custody pending the 
conduct of a probation violation hearing.  The issues to be 
determined at a probation detention hearing are whether probable 
cause exists to believe that the probationer has violated a 
condition of the probation order, and, if so, whether the 
probationer should be held in custody." 
5 
 
 
have [the defendant] leave [the probation officer's] office 
testing positive for Fentanyl." 
 
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the judge, 
who was the same judge who had accepted the defendant's plea and 
imposed the conditions of probation, determined that there was 
probable cause to believe the defendant had violated the "drug 
free" condition of her probation by using fentanyl.  Because 
defense counsel was not able to secure a placement for the 
defendant at an inpatient treatment facility, the judge ordered 
that the defendant be held in custody until a placement became 
available.  The defendant was released into an inpatient 
treatment facility after ten days in custody. 
 
On November 22, 2016, a different District Court judge 
presided over the defendant's probation violation hearing.  
Despite conceding that she had used fentanyl, the defendant 
contested that she had violated the terms of her probation.  The 
defendant argued, for the first time, that she had been 
diagnosed with SUD, which rendered her incapable of remaining 
drug free.  In the defendant's view, her use of drugs could not 
constitute a wilful violation of her probationary condition to 
remain drug free.  She submitted several affidavits from experts 
in support of her claim; however, no expert testimony was 
offered at the hearing to opine on SUD or its potential effects 
on the brain. 
6 
 
 
 
The judge determined that the defendant had violated the 
drug free condition of her probation by testing positive for 
fentanyl.  The defendant filed a motion to vacate the condition 
of probation requiring her to stay drug free, arguing that the 
condition violated various State and Federal constitutional 
rights.  That motion was denied.  The judge then modified the 
conditions of the defendant's probation by adding the condition 
that she continue inpatient treatment.  The judge also allowed 
the defendant's motion to report to the Appeals Court the 
question concerning the imposition of the condition of probation 
that the defendant remain drug free.  We granted the defendant's 
motion for direct appellate review.5 
 
Discussion.  1.  The reported question.  The judge sought 
to report the question to the Appeals Court under Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004).  It is doubtful she 
had the authority to do so.  Rule 34, like the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure generally, applies only in criminal cases.  The matter 
before the judge -- a probation violation hearing -- was not a 
criminal matter.  See Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 
124-125, 129 (2010).  Moreover, the reported question, as it was 
                     
 
5 After we granted the defendant's motion for direct 
appellate review of the question reported to the Appeals Court, 
the defendant separately appealed from the decision that the 
defendant was in violation of probation.  We transferred that 
appeal to this court on our own motion and consolidated the two 
matters. 
7 
 
 
originally formulated, contains a factual conclusion about the 
science of addiction that was not resolved at the trial court 
level.  See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 467 Mass. 746, 753 n.7, 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 224 (2014) ("We answer only the 
reported question of law, not the question of fact"); 
Commonwealth v. Yacobian, 393 Mass. 1005, 1005-1006 (1984) 
(declining to rule on questions of law predicated on unresolved 
factual issues).6  Nevertheless, this question presents issues of 
significant magnitude that require resolution, especially where 
they have been fully briefed and at least one issue appears to 
be moot.  We therefore employ our general superintendence power 
to address the matter.  See Cobb v. Cobb, 406 Mass. 21, 24 n.2 
(1989).  See also Commonwealth v. Doe, 420 Mass. 142, 145-146 
(1995), overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 
Mass. 296 (2014).  But first, in order to make the question one 
                     
6 In its original form, the reported question presumes that 
there is a scientific consensus concerning SUD's impact on the 
brain, particularly how it affects an individual's ability to 
abstain from using drugs.  Embedded within the question, which 
was drafted and submitted by the defendant, is the conclusion 
that this scientific issue was resolved in the defendant's 
favor.  This issue, however, was not subject to adversarial 
scrutiny, let alone resolved.  This is elucidated by the fact 
that the parties and amici present varying models of addiction 
and varying conclusions concerning the science of addiction.  
For example, the defendant advances a model of addiction where 
addiction is understood as a brain disease that deprives an 
individual of his or her free will to abstain from using drugs.  
In contrast, the Commonwealth advances a behavioral model of 
addiction which postulates that SUD may affect an individual's 
urge to use substances, but it does not render that individual 
without the free will to use substances. 
8 
 
 
that can be answered on the record before us, we reformulate the 
reported question as follows: 
"Where a person who committed a crime is addicted to 
illegal drugs, may a judge require that person to 
abstain from using illegal drugs as a condition of 
probation?  If that person violates the 'drug free' 
condition by using illegal drugs while on probation, 
can that person be subject to probation revocation 
proceedings?  Additionally, at a detention hearing, if 
there is probable cause to believe that a person with 
a 'drug free' condition of probation has violated that 
condition by using an illegal drug, may that person be 
held in custody while awaiting admission into an 
inpatient treatment facility, pending a probation 
violation hearing?" 
 
 
As explained infra, given relevant statutes, and court 
rules and policies, coupled with the goals of probation, we 
answer each portion of the reformulated question in the 
affirmative. 
 
The circumstances of the defendant's case exemplifies why 
the imposition of a drug free condition of probation and the 
enforcement of such a condition are permissible within the 
confines of the probation process.  From crafting special 
conditions of probation to determining the appropriate 
disposition for a defendant who has violated one of those 
conditions, judges should act with flexibility, sensitivity, and 
compassion when dealing with people who suffer from drug 
addiction.  The rehabilitative goals of probation, coupled with 
the judge's dispositional flexibility at each stage of the 
process, enable and require judges to consider the unique 
9 
 
 
circumstances facing each person they encounter -- including 
whether that person suffers from drug addiction.  This 
individualized approach to probation fosters an environment that 
enables and encourages recovery, while recognizing that relapse 
is part of recovery. 
 
2.  Probation.  a.  Disposition.  As an alternative or 
supplement to incarceration, probation is "a legal disposition 
which allows a criminal offender to remain in the community 
subject to certain conditions and under the supervision of the 
court."  Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 111 (1990).  
The primary goals of probation are twofold:  rehabilitation of 
the defendant and protection of the public from the defendant's 
potential recidivism.  Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 15 
(2010).  Commonwealth v. Lapointe, 435 Mass. 455, 459 (2001) 
(other goals include "punishment, deterrence, and retribution" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
"The success of probation as a correctional tool depends on 
judges having the flexibility at sentencing to tailor probation 
conditions to the circumstances of the individual defendant and 
the crime that he [or she] committed."   Goodwin, 458 Mass. at 
16.  See Lapointe, 435 Mass. at 459 (judge may consider factors 
not relevant at trial, such as hearsay information about 
defendant's character, behavior, and background).  Authority to 
tailor probation conditions is found in G. L. c. 276, § 87, 
10 
 
 
which states that a judge may impose "such conditions as [the 
judge] deems proper."  See Boston Municipal Court and District 
Court Sentencing Best Practice Principles 5.  See also Criminal 
Sentencing in the Superior Court:  Best Practices for 
Individualized Evidence-Based Sentencing 8 ("Special conditions 
of probation should be narrowly tailored to the criminogenic 
needs of the defendant/probationer while providing for the 
protection of the public and any victim"). 
 
Where, as here, addiction is an underlying issue in a 
criminal case, the special conditions "may include, but shall 
not be limited to, participation by [the defendant] in 
rehabilitative programs."  G. L. c. 276, § 87A.  Indeed, in 
1998, this court, in collaboration with the Trial Court, issued 
standards on substance abuse.  See Supreme Judicial Court 
Standing Committee on Substance Abuse, Standards on Substance 
Abuse (April 28, 1998) (Substance Abuse Standards).  They 
established a "systemwide policy designed to enhance the 
judiciary's response to the impact of substance abuse on [our] 
courts."  Id. at 4.  The standards created a framework that 
would "promote public safety, provide access to treatment, 
protect due process, reduce recidivism, [and] ensure offender 
accountability" (emphasis added).  Id. at 5.   One of the 
standards addressed directly the issue of requiring a defendant 
to remain drug free, stating, "[O]nce [a] judge has concluded 
11 
 
 
that a party's substance abuse is a factor in the case, in 
supervising criminal . . . cases and in establishing court 
ordered substance abuse conditions, the judge should 
specifically and unambiguously prohibit the party from all use 
of alcohol an illicit drugs" (emphasis added).  Id. at 27.  The 
standards also recognize that relapse is a "common" problem and 
judges "should . . . employ strategies consistent with public 
safety to prevent it" (emphasis added).  Id. at 3. 
 
For these reasons, judges have great latitude in imposing 
conditions of probation, and those conditions are enforceable 
"so long as the condition is 'reasonably related' to the goals 
of sentencing and probation."  Commonwealth v. Obi, 475 Mass. 
541, 547 (2016), quoting Lapointe, 435 Mass. at 459.  Even where 
a condition of probation affects a constitutional right, it is 
valid if it is "reasonably related" to the goals of sentencing 
and probation, in light of the defendant's underlying crime and 
her particular circumstances.  See Commonwealth v. Power, 420 
Mass. 410, 416-417 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996); 
Lapointe, supra.  Although random drug and alcohol testing 
constitutes a search and seizure for constitutional purposes 
under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, such 
testing is nonetheless a permissible condition of probation so 
long as it is reasonably related to legitimate probationary 
goals.  Commonwealth v. Gomes, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 857, 859 
12 
 
 
(2009).  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 
332-333 (2004) (alcohol-free condition of probation permissible 
when reasonably related to characteristics of defendant and 
underlying crime).  See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660, 664,665 (1962) ("There can be no question of the authority 
of the State . . . to regulate the . . . use of . . . drugs 
[through, inter alia] a program of compulsory treatment for 
those addicted to narcotics[,] . . . [even requiring] 
involuntary confinement [and] penal sanctions for failure to 
comply with established compulsory treatment procedures" 
[quotations and citation omitted]). 
 
When a defendant is released on probation, his or her 
liberty interest is conditional and depends on that defendant's 
compliance with the conditions imposed by the sentencing judge.  
Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 Mass. 61, 64 (2006); Durling, 407 
Mass. at 115.  "If a defendant violates one or more conditions 
of probation, a judge may revoke his probation and sentence him 
to a term of imprisonment for his underlying conviction, or 
return the defendant to probation, with new or revised 
conditions."  Goodwin, 458 Mass. at 15.  A defendant who 
violates probation is not being punished for violating a 
condition of probation, but rather "the defendant is essentially 
being sentenced anew on his [or her] underlying conviction."  
Id. at 17. 
13 
 
 
 
Here, the defendant pleaded guilty to larceny and admitted 
that her drug use motivated her to commit the crime.  The 
sentencing judge imposed the special conditions that the 
defendant remain drug free, continue outpatient drug treatment, 
and submit to random drug screens.  The conditions directly 
addressed the defendant's personal circumstances and, 
significantly, her stated motivation for committing the crime -- 
purchasing illegal drugs.  See Goodwin, 458 Mass. at 16.  Not 
only were these conditions tailored to the characteristics of 
the defendant and the underlying crime, they furthered the 
rehabilitative goal of probation by facilitating treatment for 
the defendant's drug addiction.  These conditions also furthered 
the goal of protecting the public, because each condition 
addressed the fact that the defendant's drug use motivated her 
to commit the crime.  We note that the defendant does not claim 
or point to anything in the record that shows that, before 
agreeing to her probationary conditions, she objected, informed 
the judge that she had been diagnosed with SUD, or otherwise 
notified the judge that she would be unable to abide by the drug 
free condition of probation.  See Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 
Mass. 86, 93 (2016) (by agreeing to abide by probationary 
condition of no marijuana use, defendant agreed to be subject to 
probation revocation for noncompliance).  See also Obi, 475 
14 
 
 
Mass. at 549  (defendant waived challenge to probationary 
condition that was not raised at sentencing). 
 
The defendant argues that because she suffers from SUD, 
requiring her to remain drug free sets her up for 
unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment when the 
inevitable relapse occurs.  As discussed, revoking or modifying 
conditions of probation is not a punishment for drug use but for 
the underlying crime.  See Goodwin, 458 Mass. at 17.   We also 
agree with the Commonwealth that the defendant's claim of SUD 
rests on science that was not tested below.  Nor do we agree with 
the defendant that the requirement of remaining drug free is an 
outdated moral judgment about an individual's addiction.  
Rather, informed by the substance abuse standards discussed 
supra, the requirement is based on the judge's consideration of 
the defendant's circumstances and that she committed the 
underlying crime to support her drug use. 
 
 The judge here did not abuse her discretion by imposing 
the special condition of probation requiring the defendant to 
remain drug free. 
 
b.  Probation violation proceedings.  i.  Detention 
hearing.  Where there is reason to believe that a defendant 
violated a condition of probation, a probation officer may 
initiate probation violation proceedings.  See Rule 4(b) of the 
District/Municipal Court Rules for Probation Violation 
15 
 
 
Proceedings (LexisNexis 2016) ("Violation proceedings shall be 
commenced by the issuance by the Probation Department of a 
Notice of Probation Violation and Hearing").  A detention 
hearing is conducted where the probation department seeks to 
have a defendant held in custody for some period of time pending 
a final probation violation hearing.  See Rule 5(a) of the 
District/Municipal Court Rules for Probation Violation 
Proceedings.  The issues to be decided at the detention hearing 
are "whether probable cause exists to believe that the 
probationer has violated a condition of the probation order, 
and, if so, whether the probationer should be held in custody."  
Id. (question of revocation or other disposition not at issue).  
See Commonwealth v. Puleio, 433 Mass. 39, 41 (2000) (defendant 
may be held in custody pending completion of final probation 
violation hearing). 
 
Where the judge determines that the allegation is supported 
by probable cause, the judge must then consider a number of 
factors in determining whether the defendant should be held in 
custody pending the final probation violation hearing: 
"(i) the probationer's criminal record; (ii) the nature 
of the offense for which the probationer is on probation; 
(iii) the nature of the offense or offenses with which 
the probationer is newly charged, if any; (iv) the nature 
of any other pending alleged probation violations; (v) 
the likelihood of [the] probationer's appearance at the 
probation violation hearing if not held in custody; and 
(vi) the likelihood of incarceration if a violation is 
found following the probation violation hearing." 
16 
 
 
 
See Rule 5(c) of the District/Municipal Court Rules for 
Probation Violation Proceedings.  Much like the judge's 
individualized analysis of the defendant's circumstances in 
setting the terms of probation, a judge at this stage must 
consider the particular circumstances facing a defendant, as 
well as the safety of the public. 
 
Trial court judges, particularly judges in the drug courts, 
stand on the front lines of the opioid epidemic.  Judges face 
unresolved and constantly changing societal issues with little 
notice and, in many situations, without the benefit of 
precedential guidance.  In circumstances where a defendant is 
likely addicted to drugs and the violation in question arises 
out of the defendant's relapse, judges are faced with difficult 
decisions that are especially unpalatable.  This is particularly 
true at a detention hearing where a judge must decide whether 
the defendant should be detained prior to a final violation 
hearing.  The core of this dilemma is that although probation 
violations often arise out of a defendant's relapse, we 
recognize that relapse is part of recovery.  See Standards on 
Substance Abuse, supra at 5 ("Treatment does not always work the 
first or even the second time, [and] relapse should not be cause 
for giving up on a substance abuser").  To achieve this delicate 
balance, judges must have the authority to detain a defendant 
17 
 
 
facing a probation violation based on illicit drug use pending a 
final violation hearing for the safety of the defendant and the 
community.  See Rule 5 of the District/Municipal Court Rules for 
Probation Violation Proceedings.  Such decisions should be made 
thoughtfully and carefully, recognizing that addiction is a 
status that may not be criminalized.  See Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (unconstitutional to 
criminalize status of addiction).  But judges cannot ignore the 
fact that relapse is dangerous for the person who may be in the 
throes of addiction and, often times, for the community in which 
that person lives. 
 
Here, on the Friday before the Labor Day weekend, the 
defendant tested positive for fentanyl.  After the defendant 
rejected inpatient treatment, and with her home support network 
unavailable, the defendant's probation officer initiated the 
probation violation proceedings and moved for a detention 
hearing that day.  At that hearing, the judge determined that 
there was probable cause to believe the defendant had violated 
the drug free condition of her probation, based on the results 
of the drug test.  The judge first sought to have the defendant 
admitted to an inpatient treatment facility pending her final 
violation hearing; however, a placement was not immediately 
available.  To stabilize the defendant's situation, the judge 
held her in custody until a placement at an inpatient treatment 
18 
 
 
facility became available.  This decision clearly encompassed 
the factors enumerated in Rule 5(c) of the District/Municipal 
Court Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings, particularly 
the nature of the offense for which the defendant was on 
probation and the nature of the alleged violation, while 
furthering the overarching goal of preserving the safety of the 
public and welfare of the defendant.  The judge was faced with 
either releasing the defendant and risking that she would suffer 
an overdose and die, or holding her in custody until a placement 
at an inpatient treatment facility became available. 
 
The defendant claims that the judge's decision to detain 
her constituted a punishment for her relapse and positive drug 
test.7  We do not agree. 
                     
7 We note that neither the limited facts in this case nor 
the law of the Commonwealth supports the defendant's assertions 
that addiction has been criminalized or that relapse is being 
punished.  The case before the court is unlike Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 665-668 (1962), where the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that a statute criminalizing the 
status of being "addicted to the use of narcotics" was 
unconstitutional.  The Court in Robinson emphasized that the 
unconstitutional statute at issue did not criminalize the use of 
narcotics, but rather the status of being addicted to narcotics.  
Id. at 666.  In contrast, here the defendant was subject to 
probation revocation proceedings due to her use of an illegal 
drug.  Robinson is inapposite to our analysis because this case 
represents an appropriate exercise of judicial power at each 
stage of the probation proceedings, not the criminalization of 
the defendant's status.  Id. at 665 (reciting actions State may 
take to regulate narcotic drugs including involuntary 
confinement for compulsory treatment and penal sanctions for 
failure to comply with treatment). 
19 
 
 
 
Revocation proceedings are not part of a criminal 
prosecution.  See Durling 407 Mass. at 112, citing Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).  The decision to hold the 
defendant in custody is akin to a bail decision, and no final 
determination has been made concerning whether she violated a 
condition of probation.  See Rule 5 of the District/Municipal 
Court Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 30 (1986) (disposition of 
probation does not punish act prompting probation violation 
proceedings, and arises from "underlying offense for which a 
probationary sentence originally was imposed").  Moreover, here 
the judge detained the defendant because a placement at an 
inpatient treatment center was not available.  Although we 
recognize that the number of inpatient treatment placements is 
limited, the resolution of that problem concerns public policy 
and cannot be addressed by a judge.  Detaining a defendant may 
be permissible to protect the public and the defendant.  See 
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (imprisoning person afflicted with 
addiction is cruel and unusual punishment only where person 
"never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty 
of any irregular behavior there").  The judge did not abuse her 
discretion in detaining the defendant pending a probation 
violation hearing. 
20 
 
 
 
ii.  Probation violation hearing.  Following an initial 
determination at a detention hearing that there is probable 
cause to believe that a condition of probation was violated, a 
defendant is entitled to a final probation violation hearing to 
determine whether a violation occurred, and, if so, what effect 
the violation will have on his or her status.  See Rule 6 of the 
District/Municipal Court Rules for Probation Violation 
Proceedings. 
 
The probation violation hearing is comprised of two 
distinct phases: (1) the adjudicatory phase, and (2) the 
dispositional phase.  See Rule 6(b) of the District/Municipal 
Court Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings.  See also 
Commonwealth v. Joyner, 467 Mass. 176, 189-191 (2014).  In the 
adjudicatory phase the judge must "determine, as a factual 
matter, whether the defendant has violated the conditions of his 
[or her] probation."  Commonwealth v. Pena, 462 Mass. 183, 187 
(2012), quoting Durling, 407 Mass. at 111.  "A defendant can be 
found in violation of a probationary condition only where the 
violation was wilful."  Commonwealth v. Henry, 475 Mass. 117, 
121-122 (2016).  See Commonwealth v. Canadyan, 458 Mass. 574, 
579 (2010) (absent evidence of wilful noncompliance, defendant 
could not be found in violation of condition of probation).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Poirier, 458 Mass. 1014, 1016 (2010) 
(defendant not responsible for inability to comply with 
21 
 
 
condition where probation department failed to provide needed 
equipment).  Further, a violation of a probationary condition 
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Holmgren, 421 Mass. 224, 227 (1995).  See also 
Rule 6(c) of the District/Municipal Court Rules for Probation 
Violation Proceedings. 
 
At a probation violation hearing, both parties "shall be 
permitted to present evidence relevant to the issue of the 
alleged violation [and] shall be permitted to cross-examine 
witnesses produced by the opposing party."  Id.  The distinction 
between the adjudicatory and dispositional phases is important 
because the "factual decision that a probation violation has 
occurred in no way compels an order of revocation."  Rule 5 of 
the District/Municipal Court Rules for Probation Violation 
Proceedings comment (2000), at 80.  Therefore, judges must be 
precise in bifurcating the adjudicatory phase of probation 
violation proceedings from the dispositional phase. 
 
Where a violation has occurred, the judge must determine 
the appropriate disposition for the defendant.  See Pena, 462 
Mass. at 187.  See also Rule 6(b) and (d) of the 
District/Municipal Court Rules for Probation Violation 
Proceedings.  Permissible dispositions include revoking the 
defendant's probation and sentencing the defendant for the 
underlying crime, modifying the terms of the defendant's 
22 
 
 
probation, or reprobating the defendant on the same conditions 
of probation.  Rules 8(d), 9(b) of the District/Municipal Court 
Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings.  See Pena, supra.8  
The defendant, in either scenario, is not being punished for 
violating the probationary condition that triggered the 
revocation or modification, but rather for the original 
conviction  See Odoardi, 397 Mass at 30.  See also Commonwealth 
v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559, 564 (2009) (penalties for probation 
revocation attributed to original conviction, not to probation 
violation).  In other words, when a defendant's probation is 
revoked because he or she has "abused the opportunity given him 
to avoid incarceration," Rubera v. Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 177, 
181 (1976), by violating a condition of probation, the defendant 
is imprisoned not for the act or acts that prompted revocation 
of probation, but rather, the defendant "is being punished for 
the underlying offense for which a probationary sentence 
originally was imposed."  Odoardi, supra. 
 
After a violation is found, "[h]ow best to deal with the 
probationer is within the judge's discretion."  Durling, 407 
Mass. at 111.  In determining the appropriate disposition, the 
                     
8 A house of correction sentence may also be suspended.  A 
suspended sentence, however, limits the judge's options should 
there be a violation of probation after a suspended sentence has 
been imposed, because, under Commonwealth v. Holmgren, 421 Mass. 
224, 228 (1995), "when probation is revoked, the original 
suspended sentence must be imposed." 
23 
 
 
court shall consider "such factors as public safety; the 
circumstances of any crime for which the probationer was placed 
on probation; the nature of the probation violation; the 
occurrence of any previous violations; and the impact of the 
underlying crime on any person or community, as well as 
mitigating factors."  Rule 8(d) of the District/Municipal Court 
Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings.  The defendant is 
entitled to show that there was a "justifiable excuse for any 
violation or that revocation is not the appropriate 
disposition."  Pena, 462 Mass. at 188, quoting Black v. Romano, 
471 U.S. 606, 611, 612 (1985).  See United States v. Morin, 889 
F.2d 328, 332 (1st Cir. 1989) (during second stage of probation 
revocation proceeding, defendant "has the right to address the 
court and present it with mitigating circumstances"). 
 
"Where a defendant has violated a condition of his [or her] 
probation, a judge's authority to modify or add conditions of 
probation is nearly unlimited should the judge decide not to 
imprison the defendant but to return him [or her] to probation."  
Goodwin, 458 Mass. at 17.  At the dispositional phase, a judge's 
decision to modify the defendant's probation following a 
violation must consider both the welfare of the defendant and 
the community.  Id. at 16, quoting Buckley v. Quincy Div. of the 
Dist. Court Dep't, 395 Mass. 815, 818 (1985).  Where probation 
is modified, the defendant is essentially being resentenced on 
24 
 
 
his or her underlying conviction, and the judge may impose any 
conditions of probation that could have been imposed at the 
original sentencing.  Goodwin, supra at 17. 
 
The defendant contends that the District Court judge erred 
in finding that she violated the drug free condition of her 
probation because the violation was not wilful.  In the 
defendant's view, her purported inability to refrain from using 
drugs is tantamount to a homeless probationer not being able to 
comply with a condition of probation because of the 
circumstances inherent in that homelessness.  Canadyan, 458 
Mass. at 579.  In Canadyan, we concluded that the defendant did 
not commit a wilful violation of probation for failing to wear 
an operable global positioning system (GPS) monitoring device 
because the evidence conclusively established that the defendant 
was homeless and that the homeless shelter he was staying at 
could not accommodate the technological requirements of the GPS 
equipment.  Id. at 578-579.  Therefore, "there was no evidence 
of wilful noncompliance."  Id. at 579.  Accord Henry, 475 Mass. 
at 121-122 (no wilful violation of condition of probation 
requiring payment of restitution where defendant lacked ability 
to pay);  Poirier, 458 Mass. at 1016 (no wilful violation of 
condition of probation requiring defendant to wear GPS device 
where probation department did not have such device available). 
25 
 
 
 
Although the appellate record before this court is 
inadequate to determine whether SUD affects the brain in such a 
way that certain individuals cannot control their drug use, 
based on the evidence presented to the judge who conducted the 
violation hearing, that judge did not abuse her discretion in 
concluding that there was a wilful violation of the defendant's 
drug free probationary condition.  The affidavits submitted by 
the defendant in support of her position that her violation was 
not wilful because SUD affects the brain in such a way that 
certain individuals cannot control their drug use did not 
require the judge to accept her argument.  We conclude that, 
based on the evidence presented at the violation hearing, the 
judge did not err in concluding that the defendant violated the 
drug free condition of her probation by testing positive for 
fentanyl. 
 
After determining that the defendant violated the 
conditions of her probation, the judge had the authority either 
to revoke the defendant's probation, reprobate her on the same 
conditions, or modify her probationary conditions to further the 
welfare of both her and the public.  See Goodwin, 458 Mass. at 
17.  The judge chose to modify the defendant's probation, 
requiring that she continue inpatient treatment.  This 
modification furthered the rehabilitative goal of probation and 
demonstrated that the judge was not discounting the defendant's 
26 
 
 
addiction.  The defendant does not challenge this condition on 
appeal.  Furthermore, this was not punishment for the 
defendant's positive drug test, rather the defendant was being 
reprobated on her original admission to sufficient facts.  See 
id. at 17.  Accordingly, we conclude that the judge did not 
abuse her discretion in modifying the defendant's probation to 
require inpatient treatment and that it was permissible in these 
circumstances to detain the defendant until an inpatient bed was 
available. 
 
Conclusion.  We conclude that, based on the evidence 
presented at each stage of the probation process and for the 
reasons described above, the judge did not abuse her discretion 
in concluding the defendant violated her probation.  We further 
answer the reported question, as we have reframed it, in the 
affirmative:  (1) where a person who commits a crime is addicted 
to illegal drugs, a judge may require that person to remain drug 
free as a condition of probation; (2) a person may be subject to 
probation violation proceedings for violating the drug free 
condition of probation by subsequently testing positive for 
illegal drugs; and (3) in the appropriate circumstances, a judge 
has discretion at a detention hearing to hold the defendant, who 
has tested positive for illegal drugs in violation of the drug 
free condition of probation, pending a probation violation 
hearing.  We further conclude that the actions of the District 
27 
 
 
Court judges and the probation department involved in this case 
were exemplary.  They embodied the flexibility, sensitivity, and 
thoughtfulness in furtherance of the overarching goal of 
probation -- to rehabilitate rather than incarcerate whenever 
possible, while fulfilling their duty to protect the public.  
See Goodwin, 458 Mass. at 15. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judge's finding that the 
defendant violated her probation and the order requiring her to 
submit to inpatient treatment for her addiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.