Case Title: RICHARD WILLIAM DAWES, a/k/a RICHARD WILLIAM KEMP V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0211

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD WILLIAM DAWES, a/k/a RICHARD WILLIAM KEMP V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 113236 P.3d 303Case Number: S-09-0211Decided: 08/06/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

RICHARD 
WILLIAM DAWES, a/k/a RICHARD WILLIAM 
KEMP,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Mr. Dawes appeals 
from the judgment and sentence entered by the district court after a jury found 
him guilty of larceny by bailee for converting to his own use funds his employer 
had placed in a Wyoming checking account.  
In various ways, Mr. Dawes challenges the district court's authority to 
try him in Wyoming because he had never been in the state until he was 
extradited to face the charge in this case.  He also argues that, as a matter of law, 
his conviction was improper because he was listed as a joint owner on the 
account and could not, therefore, be convicted for converting money that 
belonged to him.  In a related 
issue, Mr. Dawes claims that the district court committed plain error in its 
response to the jury's question about the definition of the "owner" of the 
money.     

 
 
[¶2]      We conclude that 
Mr. Dawes was properly charged and tried in Wyoming because he converted funds 
located in this state.  In addition, 
the district court correctly allowed the jury to determine, as a matter of fact, 
whether the funds in the account belonged to Mr. Dawes or his employer.  Finally, the district court did not err 
when it responded to the jurors' question by telling them that the determination 
of who owned the money was a factual issue for them to 
decide.

 
 
[¶3]      We affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Dawes 
presents several issues on appeal:

 
 

I.              
Was 
it error for the court to entertain subject matter jurisdiction over an alleged 
crime that occurred outside the boundaries of the State of 
Wyoming?

 
 

II.            
Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Dawes' motion for judgment 
of acquittal in light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to prove 
the requisite elements of the charged crime of larceny by bailee and the 
variance between the information and proof was prejudicial to Mr. 
Dawes?

 
 

III.           
Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Dawes' motion to dismiss for 
defects in the institution of the prosecution?

 
 

IV.          
Did 
the district court commit plain error in its response to the jury's 
note?

 
 
 
 
Although 
phrased differently, the State's statement of the issues is 
similar.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Dawes was a 
California resident, and the victim, Mary Storer, lived in California during the 
winters.  In the 1990s, Ms. Storer 
employed Mr. Dawes to pay her household bills.  The original arrangement was for Ms. 
Storer to collect the bills and give them to Mr. Dawes, who took them home, made 
out the checks and returned them for her signature.    

 
 
[¶6]      Ms. Storer also 
owned a home in Saratoga, Wyoming, and spent summers there.  Payments were often late when Ms. Storer 
was in Saratoga because it took so much time to transfer the paperwork between 
California and Wyoming.  To remedy 
the situation, Ms. Storer opened a checking account at Rawlins National Bank in 
Carbon County, Wyoming.  The account 
listed Ms. Storer and Mr. Dawes as joint owners with right of survivorship and 
required only one signature to negotiate checks.  Ms. Storer transferred $5,000 per month 
into the account, although the amount was later increased to $10,000 per month 
when Mr. Dawes told Ms. Storer that the original amount was insufficient to 
cover her bills.  The address on Ms. 
Storer's bills was changed so they went directly to Mr. Dawes.  He then paid the bills and provided her 
with a monthly report.    

 
 
[¶7]      In 2008, the bank 
notified Ms. Storer that the account was overdrawn.  When she investigated the incident, she 
discovered many unauthorized transactions.  
The State charged Mr. Dawes with larceny by bailee in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(b) (LexisNexis 2009).1     

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Dawes filed 
two motions to dismiss.  The first 
challenged the district court's subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that 
Mr. Dawes had never been to Wyoming before being extradited on the larceny 
charge and he had not committed any crime in Wyoming.  He argued in his second motion that, as 
a matter of law, he could not be convicted of larceny by bailee because he was a 
joint owner of the account.  The 
district court denied both motions.    

 
 
[¶9]      At trial, the 
State presented evidence showing that between 2006 and 2008, Mr. Dawes wrote 
more than $195,000 in checks on the joint account for his personal expenses 
without Ms. Storer's approval.  The 
jury found Mr. Dawes guilty of larceny by bailee, and the district court 
sentenced him to serve two to six years in prison.  Mr. Dawes appealed.    

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 

1.    
Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction

 
 
[¶10]   Jurisdiction is a question of law 
we consider de novo, without regard 
for the district court's determination.  
Innis v. State, 2003 WY 66, ¶ 
8, 69 P.3d 413, 417 (Wyo. 2003).  
Subject matter jurisdiction is "essential to a prosecution for a criminal 
offense" and, unlike personal jurisdiction, it cannot be waived.2  Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 244 (Wyo. 
1987).  See also, Taylor v. State, 658 P.2d 1297, 1300 n.3 (Wyo. 1983).  

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Dawes maintains that the 
district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute him for 
larceny by bailee because he had never been to Wyoming and did not commit any 
part of the charged crime in Wyoming.  
Our case law reveals that the scope of a Wyoming district court's 
criminal jurisdiction is broader than Mr. Dawes acknowledges.            

 
 
[¶12]   In Rios, this Court considered the defendant's 
claim that he could not be prosecuted in Wyoming for interference with child 
custody because, at the time of the crime, neither the child nor the defendant 
had ever been to Wyoming.  Id. at 243.  We stated that, under the common law, 
"a state has power to make conduct or the result of conduct a crime if the 
conduct takes place or the result happens within its territorial limits.'"  Id. at 245, quoting W. LaFave & A. 
Scott, Criminal Law § 17 at 118 
(1972).  We noted that many states 
have exercised criminal subject matter jurisdiction beyond the common law 
precepts and held that they have jurisdiction to prosecute acts which occur 
outside the state if the criminal act "produced an effect within the 
state."  Rios, 733 P.2d  at 249.  Many states also exercise jurisdiction 
if any element of the crime occurs within the state.  Id. at 247-48.  Applying the "effect within the state" 
rationale to the facts presented in Rios, 
we concluded that Wyoming had jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. Rios for 
interference with child custody even though neither he nor the child had been to 
Wyoming.  The mother, who was the 
custodial parent, was a resident of Wyoming and was entitled to enforce the 
child custody decree in Wyoming courts.  
Thus, the effects of the defendant's criminal conduct, i.e., refusing to 
return the child to the custodial parent, were felt in Wyoming.  Id. at 250.  

 
 
[¶13]   Another case with a similar result 
is Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 
100 (Wyo. 1981).  We concluded that 
Wyoming had jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant for accessory to murder even 
though he was in California when the crime was committed and his only connection 
to Wyoming involved numerous phone calls to people in this state communicating 
his instructions to murder the victim.  
Id.  

 
 
[¶14]   More recent cases have shown the 
breadth of Wyoming criminal jurisdiction over drug transactions.  In Marquez v. State, 12 P.3d 711, 715 (Wyo. 
2000), we held the district court had jurisdiction over drug conspiracy charges 
because the defendant had conspired to deliver drugs to Wyoming, even though he 
entered into the conspiracy in New Mexico and was arrested in Colorado.  Looking at federal precedent, we ruled 
that "the trial courts of Wyoming have subject matter jurisdiction over drug 
conspiracies when the conspirators intend for the conspiracy to have an effect 
within the state of Wyoming."  Id.  Because Mr. Marquez had conspired to 
deliver controlled substances to Wyoming, he fell within Wyoming's jurisdiction 
regardless of the fact that he had not actually entered the state before he was 
arrested.  Id.  
See also, Innis, ¶ 8, 69 P.3d  at 417 (holding that the district court had jurisdiction over the drug 
conspiracy charge because the conspirators came to Wyoming to purchase an 
ingredient used to manufacture methamphetamine).  

 
 
[¶15]   Applying this precedent, we 
conclude that there were multiple bases for the district court to conclude it 
had subject matter jurisdiction over the larceny by bailee charge against Mr. 
Dawes.  First, the evidence 
established that Mr. Dawes wrote the unauthorized checks on a Wyoming bank 
account, effectively converting money located in Wyoming and depriving a Wyoming 
victim of her money.  Similar to Hopkinson, Mr. Dawes' actions outside 
the state resulted in a crime within the state.  Under common law principles, the 
district court was entitled to exercise jurisdiction because the criminal 
conduct and its result took place in Wyoming.  Moreover, as in Rios and the drug conspiracy cases, the effects of Mr. Dawes' criminal 
activity were felt in Wyoming.  The 
district court properly concluded that it had jurisdiction and denied Mr. Dawes' 
motion to dismiss the larceny by bailee charge.   

 
 

2.            
Variance 
Between the Charging Documents and Trial Proof/Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 
 
[¶16]   In a somewhat confusing argument, 
Mr. Dawes asserts that there was an unconstitutional variance between the 
charging documents, jury instructions and the evidence presented at trial 
concerning the location of the crime.  
He further claims that the State failed to prove an essential 
elementthat the crime occurred in Wyoming.  

 
 
[¶17]   Because Mr. Dawes' argument raises 
the constitutional issue of variance and questions the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we must apply both relevant standards of review.  The question of whether there was a 
variance between the charged crime and the proved crime implicates 
constitutional notice requirements, and our review is de novo.  Spagner v. State, 2009 WY 12, ¶ 14, 200 P.3d 793, 800 (Wyo. 2009).  In 
considering the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a jury's conviction, we 
apply the following standard:

 
 
[W]e 
examine and accept as true the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences 
which can be drawn from it. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by 
the defendant.  We do not substitute 
our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could 
have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This standard applies whether 
the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial.

 
 

Anderson 
v. State, 2009 
WY 119, ¶ 6, 216 P.3d 1143, 1145 (Wyo. 2009), quoting Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo. 2007).   

 
 
[¶18]   A variance occurs when "the 
evidence presented at trial proves facts different from those alleged in the 
information or indictment."  
However, reversal is not required unless the defendant "could not have 
anticipated from the indictment or information what evidence would be admitted 
at trial, or the conviction would not bar subsequent prosecution."  Spagner, ¶ 15, 200 P.3d  at 800. 

 
 
[¶19]   The information in the case at bar 
stated in relevant part:

 
 
COMES 
NOW [Prosecutor] . . . and by the authority of the State of Wyoming, informs the 
Court and gives the Court to understand that the defendant, [Mr. Dawes], by and 
between the 1st day of January 2006 and the 3rd day of October 2008, in the County of Carbon, 
in the State of Wyoming, did commit the crime of Larceny by Bailee, in that said 
Defendant, being a bailee, entrusted with the control, care or custody of the 
money of another, to wit:  [Ms. 
Storer], did, with the intent to steal or deprive the owner of the property, 
convert the property to his own or another's use, all in violation of § 
6-3-402(b), W.S. 2008.  The felony 
provisions of 6-3-402[c](i)[,] W.S. 2008 apply.

 
 
[¶20]   Instruction No. 6 set out for the 
jury the elements of the larceny by bailee charge against Mr. 
Dawes:

 
 
The 
elements of the crime of Larceny by 
Bailee, as charged in this case, are:

 
 

1.            
On 
or between January 1, 2006, and October 3, 2008,

 
 

2.            
In 
Carbon County, Wyoming,

 
 

3.            
The 
Defendant Richard W. Dawes,

 
 

4.            
While 
a bailee entrusted with the control, care, or custody of money, 
and

 
 

5.            
With 
intent to steal or deprive the owner of the money,

 
 

6.            
Converted 
the money to his own use, and

 
 

7.            
The 
value of the money converted was $1,000.00 or more.

 
 
If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant 
guilty.  

 
 
            
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the 
evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the Defendant not guilty.

 
 
As 
is apparent, the information and jury instructions did not vary; they contained 
the same elements.  Mr. Dawes was 
not subjected to an unconstitutional variance.  

 
 
[¶21]   Mr. Dawes maintains, nevertheless, 
that his prosecution was flawed because both the information and the jury 
instruction failed to allege that Mr. Dawes intended for his actions to have an 
effect in Wyoming.  He insists that 
his circumstance is analogous to Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, 66 P.3d 703 (Wyo. 2003).  In that case, 
two women visited Mr. Sanchez in California and obtained methamphetamine from 
him, which they brought to Wyoming.  
As a result, Mr. Sanchez was charged with drug conspiracy charges in 
Wyoming.  Id., ¶ 4, 66 P.3d  at 706.  

 
 
[¶22]   In response to Mr. Sanchez's 
challenge to the district court's jurisdiction, we reiterated that Wyoming 
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over drug conspiracies when the 
conspirators intend for the conspiracy to have an effect within Wyoming.  Id., ¶ 7, 66 P.3d  at 707.  Nevertheless, we reversed Mr. Sanchez's 
conviction because there was a fatal variance between the charging document and 
the trial evidence and jury instructions.  
The information charged Mr. Sanchez with conspiring in Park County to 
commit an offense within or outside of the State of Wyoming; however, it did not 
specifically charge that the conspiracy was intended to have an effect in 
Wyoming.  Id., ¶¶ 9, 15, 66 P.3d  at 708-09.  Unlike the information, the jury 
instructions stated that conviction was appropriate if the evidence proved that 
Mr. Sanchez entered into a conspiracy intended to have an effect in 
Wyoming.  Id., ¶ 7, 66 P.3d  at 707.  Thus, a fatal variance occurred which 
required reversal of Mr. Sanchez's conviction.  

 
 
[¶23]   As we have already explained, there 
was no such variance in this case; the information and jury instructions were 
substantively identical.  Moreover, 
as we described in the preceding section, the evidence established that Mr. 
Dawes wrote unauthorized checks in California which removed money from an 
account located in Wyoming.  Under 
these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that 
the conversion occurred in Carbon County, Wyoming.  

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Dawes apparently maintains that 
the State was also required to prove he formed his intent to commit the crime in 
Wyoming and that was impossible since he had never been to this state before 
these charges were brought.  
Consistent with § 6-3-402(b), the district court instructed the jury to 
determine whether Mr. Dawes had the intent to steal or deprive Ms. Storer of the 
money.  Given that the evidence 
established that the conversion actually took place in Wyoming, neither § 
6-3-402 nor common law jurisdictional concepts required that the State prove 
where Mr. Dawes formed his criminal intent.  Under these circumstances, the evidence 
was sufficient to establish the location of the crime.  

 
 

3.    
Effect 
of Joint Ownership of Account

 
 
[¶25]   Mr. Dawes claims that the district 
court erred by refusing to dismiss the charge because a joint owner of an 
account cannot be a bailee and, accordingly, cannot be charged with larceny by 
bailee for removing money from the account.  The issue of whether a joint owner may 
be charged with larceny presents a question of law which we review de novo.  See, Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, ¶ 52, 199 P.3d 1052, 1067 (Wyo. 2009); Follett v. 
State, 2006 WY 47, ¶ 10, 132 P.3d 1155, 1159 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 
[¶26]   The district court instructed the 
jury that, in order to find Mr. Dawes guilty of larceny by bailee, it had to 
determine that he was a bailee of the funds.  Jury Instruction No. 7 provided the jury 
with the following definition of bailee:  
"Bailee' means a person, other than the owner of money, who rightfully 
possesses the money."    

 
 
[¶27]   Mr. Dawes maintains that he was a 
joint owner of the account and could not, as a matter of law, be considered a 
bailee.  48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 25 (2010) states: 

 
 
In 
general, the rights of the parties to joint bank accounts are to be determined 
by the rules of contract law, and in determining such rights the intention of 
the parties is controlling.  

 
 
[E]ach 
tenant acquires a joint interest in the bank account at the time of the creation 
of the joint tenancy.  Ordinarily, 
either party to a joint account has the right during the lifetime of both 
parties to make such use of the joint account as is consistent with joint 
ownership.  While each joint tenant 
is presumed to own an equal share in the joint bank account, this presumption is 
rebuttable.    

 
 
[W]here 
a joint account is opened in both names merely for convenience in making 
withdrawals and without the intent of creating any property interests, the 
rights of each joint tenant are not the same. 

 

Generally, 
each joint tenant of a joint tenancy bank account has the power to withdraw the 
whole, or any part of, the funds in the joint account. . . .  [O]rdinarily a party to a joint bank 
account may appropriate to himself or herself all or part of the funds without 
liability to his or her co-depositor only where in fact and in law he or she is 
the real owner of the money . . . .  
[T]herefore, the right to withdraw funds from a joint account without 
accountability depends on the agreement or understanding of the 
parties.

  

(Footnotes 
omitted).  Consistent with the 
general rules recited in the foregoing passage, this Court has recognized in 
civil cases that joint owners can agree among themselves as to the use of 
jointly owned property.  See, e.g., Sanders v. Sanders, 2010 WY 77, ¶ 23, 
___ P.3d ___, ___ (Wyo. 2010); Parkhurst 
v. Boykin, 2004 WY 90, ¶¶ 29-31, 94 P.3d 450, 462-63 (Wyo. 2004).    

 
 
[¶28]   In Tennant v. State, 776 P.2d 761 (Wyo. 
1989), we confirmed that one person can be convicted for stealing funds held 
with another in a joint account.  
Mr. Tennant became acquainted with an elderly veteran, and they agreed 
that the veteran's monthly income would be deposited into a joint account from 
which Mr. Tennant would pay the veteran's bills.  In fact, Mr. Tennant spent very little 
of the money on the veteran and most of it on himself and his family.  Id.  
at 762.  We considered 
the parties' agreement with regard to the funds and held there was sufficient 
evidence to support Mr. Tennant's conviction of larceny by bailee.  Id. at 763-64.  

 
 
[¶29]   Bringing that rationale to bear in 
this case, the issue of whether Mr. Dawes was an owner of the account was a 
question of fact, rather than a question of law.  The district court, therefore, correctly 
denied Mr. Dawes' motion to dismiss and allowed the jury to determine what the 
parties intended by setting up the joint account.  

 
 

4.    
Jury 
Question

 
 
[¶30]   Finally, Mr. Dawes asserts that the 
district court committed plain error in its response to a jury question.  Because Mr. Dawes did not object to the 
district court's response to the question, our review is for plain error.  In order to demonstrate plain error, the 
appellant "must show a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated, the 
violation clearly appears in the record, and it denied him a substantial right 
to his material prejudice."  Creecy v. State, 2009 WY 89, ¶ 17, 210 P.3d 1089, 1093 (Wyo. 2009).  We 
also apply the following standards:

 
 
            
When reviewing questions involving jury instructions, we afford the trial 
court significant deference. Jury "[i]nstructions must be considered as a 
whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not be singled out 
and considered in isolation." We confine our review to a "search for prejudicial 
error." "[A]s long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire 
charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error will not be 
found."

 
 

Id., 
¶ 
18, 210 P.3d  at 1093 (citations omitted).  
See also, Snow v. State, 2009 WY 117, 216 P.3d 505 
(Wyo. 2009).  

 
 
[¶31]   One factor of the plain error test 
is satisfied in this case because the alleged error clearly appears in the 
record.  The disputed jury question 
stated:

Instruction 
# 6

 
 
#5.  Define the phrase "the owner of the 
money"

If 
the money is owned by more than one person, does the phrase apply to each 
individual owner?

 
 
The 
district court discussed the question with counsel and they agreed that the 
district court should provide the following response:

 
 
In 
response to that note, the Court instructs you that: 

 
 
The 
question of who owns the money is a factual issue for the jury to decide.  

 
 
Please 
refer to the other jury instructions given to you by the Court and resume your 
deliberations.

 
 
[¶32]   The next plain error factor we 
consider is whether the district court violated a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law in its response to the jury question.  
In Snow, we carefully analyzed 
the court's duties to instruct the jury, distinguishing between legal and 
factual matters.  Quoting the 
concurring opinion authored by Circuit Judge Tatel in United States v. Ayeni, 374 F.3d 1313, 
1320 (D.C. Cir. 2004), we stated:

 
 
Juries' 
legal questions, which are what usually prompt supplemental instructions, differ 
fundamentally from their factual questions for an obvious reason: juries do not 
serve as the "triers of law." They are not expected to divine the law for 
themselves the way they are expected to find the facts. Rather, the trial judge, 
aided by counsel, provides the jury with the proper legal standard. See, 
e.g., Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 256, 122 S. Ct. 726, 733, 151 L. Ed. 2d 670 (2002) ("A trial judge's duty is to give instructions sufficient to 
explain the law...."). Indeed, "[w]hen a jury makes explicit its [legal] 
difficulties a trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy." 
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13, 66 S. Ct. 402, 405, 90 L. Ed. 350 (1946).

 
 
By 
contrast, where a jury's questions relate to a factual matter, a substantive 
reply (whether by the judge or the attorneys) risks interfering with the jury's 
exclusive responsibility for resolving factual questions. For this reason, 
several circuits have upheld district courts that refused to answer juries' 
factual questions

 
 

Snow, 
¶ 
31, 216 P.3d  at 515.  We have 
already confirmed that the issue of whether Mr. Dawes was an owner of the funds 
in the account or a bailee of Ms. Storer's money was a question of fact.  The district court's answer to the 
jury's question was, therefore, consistent with Snow.  

 
 
[¶33]   Mr. Dawes claims that, in any 
event, the district court should have provided the jury with the dictionary 
definition of "owner."  First, we 
note that the jury did not ask for the dictionary definition of owner and there 
is no indication that it did not understand the general meaning of that 
term.  Instead, the jury was asking 
for its specific meaning within § 6-3-402(b).  "[A] trial court is under no 
obligation to define a statutory term unless the term carries a technical 
connotation different from its everyday meaning."  
Ewing v. State, 2007 WY 78, ¶ 9, 157 P.3d 943, 
946 (Wyo. 2007).  Mr. Dawes has 
not demonstrated that the term "owner" had a meaning within the statute that was 
different from its common meaning.  
The district court did not violate a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law when it did not provide the dictionary definition of the term 
"owner" or when it instructed the jury to determine the issue as a factual 
matter.

 
 
[¶34]   Affirmed.   

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 6-3-402(b) states:  

 
 

            
(b) A bailee, a public servant as defined by W.S. 
6-5-101(a)(vi) or any person entrusted with the 
control, care or custody of any money or other property who, with intent to 
steal or to deprive the owner of the property, converts the property to his own 
or another's use is guilty of larceny.

 
 

2The district court obtained personal jurisdiction over Mr. Dawes when he 
was extradited to Wyoming.  We 
explained in Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 244 (Wyo. 1987): 

 
 
A state obtains personal jurisdiction over an accused by his physical 
presence before the court without regard to the manner in which that presence 
was obtained.  Even in cases in 
which extradition is pursued, the rule is that once a fugitive has been brought 
within the custody of a demanding state through extradition he cannot attack the 
legality of that extradition or the personal jurisdiction of the court over him. 

 
 
(Citations omitted).