Case Title: In re Adoption of G.D.J.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 108889

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF G.D.J.2011 OK 77Case Number: 108889; Cons. w/109018Decided: 09/20/2011THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF G.D.J., a minor child.
TESSIA BRE STUBBS, Appellant,v.TERRY PEARSON and ROBERT 
PEARSON, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, 
OKLAHOMA
HONORABLE CLARK E. HUEY
¶0 The Petitioners/Appellees, petitioned to adopt grandson, G.D.J., by filing 
a Petition for Adoption and an Application to Adjudicate Minor Eligible for 
Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother. The natural mother, 
Respondent/Appellant, contested the adoption. The trial court entered two orders 
on August 11, 2010, in favor of the Grandparents on the Application to 
Adjudicate Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother and 
one order on December 2, 2010, Order Adjudicating Minor Eligible for Adoption 
Without Consent of the Natural Mother. This is a consolidated appeal of those 
orders.
JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN 
PART; THE ADOPTION PROCESS MAY PROCEED
Rebecca N. Beason and Michael T. Beason, Altus, Oklahoma, for 
Appellant.Barry K. Roberts, Norman, Oklahoma, for Appellees.
COMBS, J.
¶1 The Petitioners/Appellees, Teryl Pearson and Robert Pearson (Pearsons) 
petitioned to adopt Teryl Pearson's (Pearson) grandson, G.D.J. (FA 2008-24, 
Jackson County, Oklahoma) by filing a Petition for Adoption, and an Application 
to Adjudicate Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother. 
The natural mother, Tessia Bre Stubbs (Stubbs), Respondent/Appellant, contested 
the adoption. The trial court entered two orders on August 11, 2010, in favor of 
the Pearsons on the Application to Adjudicate Minor Eligible for Adoption 
Without Consent of the Natural Mother and one order on December 2, 2010, Order 
Adjudicating Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother. 
This is a consolidated appeal of those orders. A final hearing on the Petition 
for Adoption has not occurred and is not the subject of this appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 On October 21, 2008, the Pearsons filed a Petition for Adoption and 
Application to Adjudicate Minor Eligible for Adoption Without the Consent of the 
Natural Mother (AWOC), in Jackson County, Oklahoma (FA 2008-24). The Pearsons 
seek to adopt Pearson's grandson, G.D.J., a child who is alleged to be of Native 
American descent (Seminole Nation). The grounds alleged for the Adoption Without 
Consent were based on the failure of Stubbs to contribute to the support of 
G.D.J., and failure to maintain a meaningful relationship with G.D.J.1 As the petition asserted, 
G.D.J. was eligible for membership in the Seminole Nation. The Seminole Nation 
and Bureau of Indian Affairs were given notice of the proceedings. 
¶3 On December 22, 2008, the Seminole Nation intervened and requested 
notification of all hearings, access to all documents submitted to the court, 
leave to submit its own reports and evidence, and leave to proceed further. On 
December 29, 2008, the Seminole Nation announced to the trial court that it 
would not seek to transfer the case to tribal court.2 The Seminole Nation has 
been given notice of all pleadings and hearings throughout the case. On March 4, 
2009, Stubbs filed her Answer to the Application to Adjudicate Minor Eligible 
for Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother, and contested the 
proceedings. Stubbs alleged that because G.D.J. is eligible for membership in 
the Seminole Nation, the state and federal Indian Child Welfare Acts apply.3
¶4 On February 3 and 24, 2009, an attorney and guardian ad litem respectively 
were appointed by the trial court for G.D.J. On November 19, 2009, Appellant 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the FA 2008-24 case on the grounds that another case 
before the same court (FA 2009-24) had already granted an order adjudicating 
G.D.J. to be eligible for an adoption without consent of the natural mother and 
was therefore res judicata.4 The trial court denied Appellants Motion to Dismiss on 
December 18, 2009.
¶5 The trial on Appellees' Application to Adjudicate Minor Eligible for 
Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother began on March 10, 2010. The 
testimony revealed Pearson provided all the support for G.D.J. since that child 
was born, including food and housing. Stubbs revealed to Pearson that she and 
G.D.J.'s father, Brantley Jones, had been using drugs and, on April 17, 2007, 
Appellees sought and obtained emergency temporary custody of G.D.J. because the 
mother was in jail on criminal charges.5 On October 6, 2008, an order was entered granting 
Pearson custody of G.D.J. This order also required Appellant to pay child 
support. Trial testimony demonstrated, during the relevant period, Appellant 
paid no money for G.D.J.'s support, and Appellant had been periodically employed 
and had income from other sources during the relevant period.6
¶6 Testimony was presented showing Stubbs had no meaningful or positive 
contact with G.D.J. Pearson kept records of Stubbs' visitations and phone calls. 
Contacts were sporadic, and there would be weeks at a time where no contact was 
made. Additional evidence indicated Stubbs had relationships with a convicted 
sex offender and another convicted felon, and G.D.J. was present during some of 
those contacts. The Pearsons presented evidence showing Stubbs had called to ask 
for visitation only five times in the fourteen months preceding the filing of 
the Petition for Adoption, and for seven of those fourteen months, she had no 
contact with G.D.J.7
¶7 At trial on March 11, 2010, Appellant's counsel demurred to the evidence. 
The grounds for the demurrer were that Pearson had gained possession of G.D.J. 
in the previous custody case (CV 2007-159) in contravention of Oklahoma law, and 
Stubbs had been ordered not to pay support in a previous paternity case (CV 
2006-335).8 Briefs were submitted, and on March 26, 2010, the 
demurrer was denied.
¶8 Following the denial of Stubbs' demurrer, Stubbs presented no evidence to 
controvert her failure to pay support during the relevant period. Stubbs 
admitted she had paid no money to the Pearsons for G.D.J.'s support, or brought 
any other items of support to the Pearsons during the relevant period.9 She did not dispute her 
violations of the law, drug use, or association with felons. Stubbs did not 
institute any court proceedings in regard to denial of visitation with G.D.J. 
during the relevant period.
¶9 The trial concluded on April 14, 2010. Appellant's counsel, having filed a 
Motion Requesting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, chose to rely on the 
trial court to draft written findings of fact and conclusions of law, and did 
not submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
¶10 On August 11, 2010, the trial court made two orders: (1) Order Addressing 
Failure to Support, 10 O.S. Section 7505-4.2(B) and; (2) Order Addressing 
Failure to Maintain Relationship, 10 O.S. Section 7505-4.2(H). In the order 
addressing failure to support G.D.J., the court found Appellant paid no support 
between August 21, 2007, and October 21, 2008; the Appellees paid one hundred 
percent (100%) of the support for G.D.J.; the agreement to pay no child support 
between the parents to G.D.J., in case CV 2006-335, did not negate her duty of 
support; Appellant had the ability to obtain gainful employment; Appellant had 
income from other unidentified sources; and was aware she had an obligation to 
support G.D.J. The trial court found the Appellees had proven, by clear and 
convincing evidence, Appellant willfully failed and neglected to contribute to 
the support of G.D.J. according to her financial ability.
¶11 In the second order addressing failure to maintain relationship, the 
trial court found, between August 21, 2007, and October 21, 2008, Appellant had 
thirteen contacts with G.D.J., no more than three times in any month, and during 
seven of the fourteen months, she had no contact with G.D.J. The trial court 
determined during two of these visits, Appellant was in the company of convicted 
felons, one of whom was a registered sex offender. The trial court found the 
contacts were neither positive nor substantial and the Appellees met their 
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, and Appellant failed to 
establish and/or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with the minor 
child, pursuant to 10 O.S. Supp. 2007, Section 7505-4.2 (H). 
¶12 On August 19, 2010, Appellant filed a motion for new trial on the grounds 
the two orders were not sustained by sufficient evidence and/or were contrary to 
law. A hearing was had on October 18, 2010, at which time Appellant raised the 
defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied the 
motion for new trial on October 20, 2010.
¶13 On October 7, 2010, Appellees filed a Motion to Settle Journal Entry and 
submitted a proposed order adjudicating G.D.J. eligible for adoption without 
consent of the natural mother. The Appellant filed her Objections and a 
Response. On November 5, 2010, Appellant filed a Petition in error with this 
Court appealing the August 11, 2010 orders.10 On November 12, 2010, Appellees filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal. On December 13, 2010, this Court denied the Motion to 
Dismiss.
¶14 A hearing was held on November 29, 2010, on the Motion to Settle Journal 
Entry, originally filed October 7, 2010. Appellees argued the August 11, 2010, 
orders were not final appealable orders. The Appellant argued the orders were 
appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 1.20(b) and Title 12 O.S. §§ 681, 696.2 and 696.3. She also argued the 
trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
1.37. 
¶15 The trial court issued an Order Adjudicating Minor Eligible for Adoption 
Without Consent of the Natural Mother on December 2, 2010. The trial court also 
issued an order on the same day stating its findings as follows:
Section 611 of Title 12 states that upon the request of a party, findings 
shall be made "upon questions of law involved in the trial." The record does not 
reflect that "questions of law" were raised, presented, or involved at trial as 
to the issues of subject matter jurisdiction or compliance with either UCCJEA or 
ICWA. Rather, the only "questions of law involved in the trial" and presented as 
contested issues and questions for the Court were: whether the natural mother 
failed to contribute to the support of the minor child as per 10 O.S. Section 
7507(sic)-4.2(B), and whether she failed to maintain a relationship as set forth 
in 10 O.S. Section 7507(sic)-4.2(H). Although the Court may have erroneously 
entitled the findings of fact and conclusions of law filed on August 11, 2010 as 
"orders", (sic) the filed document in fact reflects findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as requested by the natural mother. The Court declines to 
make further findings of fact and conclusions of law, but does on this date 
enter an Order Adjudicating Minor Eligible for Adoption without Consent of the 
Natural Mother, all for the reasons stated in the record by Attorneys Womack, 
Mills and Dresback and to memorialize by Journal Entry the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law filed on August 11, 2010..(sic)11
¶16 On December 13, 2010, this Court issued an Order denying the Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal filed on November 12, 2010. We additionally held the August 11, 
2010, orders were final orders, and the appeal may proceed. Any party who was 
aggrieved by the trial court's order concerning the Motion to Settle Journal 
Entry was authorized to file a supplemental petition in error to seek review of 
that order. Appellant then filed a Supplemental Petition in Error and a second 
Petition in Error, as well as a Motion to Consolidate the two appeals.12 This Court issued an order consolidating the two 
appeals under Case No. 108,889, on December 21, 2010.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶17 We review a trial court's judgment concerning questions of law by de 
novo review standard, without deference to the trial court's conclusion. 
In re A.N.O., 2004 OK 33, ¶3, 91 P.3d 646, 647. When making a determination of a 
child's eligibility for adoption without consent, an appellate court will review 
issues of fact under a clear and convincing standard. In re Adoption of 
C.D.M., 2001 OK 
103, ¶13, 39 P.3d 802, 807. The burden is on the party 
seeking to adopt without consent to prove such adoption is warranted by clear 
and convincing evidence. Id. "Accordingly, the decision of the trial 
court will not be disturbed unless it fails to rest on clear and convincing 
evidence." Id.
ANALYSIS
¶18 Two grounds for adoption without consent were alleged by the Pearsons. 
First, the natural mother failed to provide support during the relevant period, 
and second, she did not establish and/or maintain a substantial and positive 
relationship with the minor child, G.D.J., during the same period. Subsections B 
and H of Section 7505-4.2 of Title 10 of the Oklahoma Statutes provide:
B. Consent to adoption is not required from a parent who, for a period of 
twelve (12) consecutive months out of the last fourteen (14) months immediately 
preceding the filing of a petition for adoption of a child or a petition to 
terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 7505-2.1 of this title, has 
willfully failed, refused, or neglected to contribute to the support of such 
minor:
1. In substantial compliance with an order entered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction adjudicating the duty, amount, and manner of support, or
2. According to such parent's financial ability to contribute to such minor's 
support if no provision for support is provided in an order. For the purposes of 
this section, support for the minor shall benefit the minor by providing a 
necessity. Payments that shall not be considered support shall include, but are 
not limited to:
a. genetic and drug testing,
b. supervised visitation,
c. counseling for any person other than the minor,
d. court fees and costs,
e. restitution payments, and
f. transportation costs for any person other than the minor, unless such 
transportation expenses are specifically ordered in lieu of support in a court 
order.
The incarceration of a parent in and of itself shall not prevent the adoption 
of a minor without consent. 
H. 1. Consent to adoption is not required from a parent who fails to 
establish and/or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with a minor 
for a period of twelve (12) consecutive months out of the last fourteen (14) 
months immediately preceding the filing of a petition for adoption of the 
child.
2. In any case where a parent of a minor claims that prior to the receipt of 
notice of the hearing provided for in Sections 7505-2.1 and 7505-4.1 of this 
title, such parent had been denied the opportunity to establish and/or maintain 
a substantial and positive relationship with the minor by the custodian of the 
minor, such parent shall prove to the satisfaction of the court that he or she 
has taken sufficient legal action to establish and/or maintain a substantial and 
positive relationship with the minor prior to the receipt of such notice.
3. For purposes of this subsection, "fails to establish and/or maintain a 
substantial and positive relationship" means the parent:
a. has not maintained frequent and regular contact with the minor through 
frequent and regular visitation or frequent and regular communication to or with 
the minor, or
b. has not exercised parental rights and responsibilities.
In the present case, the fourteen-month period (relevant period) is from 
August 21, 2007, through October 21, 2008. 
¶19 A parent's consent to an adoption is not required if the parent willfully 
fails, refuses, or neglects to contribute to the support of their minor child in 
substantial compliance with a court order or according to the parent's financial 
ability to contribute to the minor's support if no provision for support is 
provided in an order.13 A parent's consent to adoption is also not required 
from a parent who fails to establish and/or maintain a substantial and positive 
relationship with the minor child.14 This is defined as not maintaining "frequent and 
regular contact with the minor through frequent and regular visitation, or 
frequent and regular communication with the minor, or has not exercised parental 
rights and responsibilities."15 The statute allows a defense to this requirement if, 
prior to the notice of the hearing on the application for adoption without 
consent, the parent can prove to the satisfaction of the court that he or she 
has taken sufficient legal action to establish and/or maintain a substantial and 
positive relationship with the minor child. Such action is based on the parent 
being denied the opportunity to have a relationship with the minor child due to 
the actions of the custodian. A parent may lose their right to consent to an 
adoption if either or both of these requirements are proven to the court by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
FAILURE TO SUPPORT
¶20 Although Stubbs admits she was employed and had other resources over the 
relevant period she did not pay any money or provide any necessities to the 
Pearsons for G.D.J.'s care .16 She asserts she had no duty to support because she was 
following a "no support" order in the paternity case which granted joint custody 
to the natural parents and stated "no support shall be owed by either Petitioner 
or Respondent." 
¶21 This Court previously addressed a similar issue in Slover v. Smith, 
1988 OK 
119, 765 P.2d 1202. In Slover the natural parents of a two-year-old son were 
divorced in 1984. The mother received custody, and the father was ordered to pay 
support. Subsequently, the parents filed a joint motion to modify custody and a 
modification order was entered which placed custody in the father and "no child 
support [was] ordered payable by either party." This Court held:
A natural parent who pays no child support in reliance on a prior 
explicit judicial exoneration of any financial obligation is neither 
refusing substantially to comply with a court order nor becomes liable to 
provide support according to one's financial ability. . . (Emphasis 
Added) 
¶22 The facts in the present case reveal there was no explicit order to pay 
support for the benefit of G.D.J. The Pearsons did not receive custody of G.D.J 
until the trial court granted emergency custody on April 17, 2007. There was no 
order adjudicating Stubbs' duty of support until October 6, 2008, when she was 
ordered to pay Two Hundred and Three Dollars ($203.00) per month to the 
Pearsons.17 Pearsons then filed, on October 21, 2008, their 
Application to Adjudicate the Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent of the 
Natural Mother alleging Stubbs' failure to support. In the present case, the 
trial court found clear and convincing evidence that she did not support G.D.J. 
according to her financial ability during the relevant period, and therefore 
granted the Pearsons Application to Adjudicate the Minor Eligible for Adoption 
Without Consent of the Natural Mother. We find the trial court erred in this 
finding. See Slover v. Smith, supra. 
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH AND/OR MAINTAIN A SUBSTANTIALAND 
POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP
¶23 Pearson initially obtained custody by virtue of an Emergency Custody 
Order entered on April 17, 2007, in CV 2007-159, originally filed by Pearson 
seeking a custody order under the provisions of 43 O.S. § 101 et seq. This emergency order was in effect 
until the October 6, 2008, final custody order and was silent as to visitation. 
The emergency order provided and authorized Pearson to "perform all necessary 
acts to care for the needs of this child, including but not limited to providing 
counseling, medical needs, enrollment of this child in school, and otherwise 
take any necessary steps to care and protect the child."
¶24 At trial on the Application to Adjudicate Minor Eligible for Adoption 
Without Consent of the Natural Mother, testimony was taken to show Stubbs had 
not established and/or maintained a substantial and positive relationship with 
G.D.J. during the relevant period. Pearson kept a calendar showing when Stubbs 
had contact with G.D.J. including phone calls made to her residence by Stubbs or 
other members of her family. 
¶25 Stubbs asserted, during the relevant period, she had been denied 
visitation. It appears from the testimony and record that this occurred in March 
and/or April, July, and August of 2008. One denial of visitation occurred when 
Stubbs was in a drug rehabilitation facility, and the other when Stubbs was 
notified by the Kiowa County Health Department that she had a positive 
tuberculosis skin test and it was being evaluated.18 Stubbs was also denied visitation another time because 
Pearson was concerned about the condition Stubbs seemed to be in on the phone 
and felt it was not in G.D.J.'s best interest to have visitation that day. The 
parties provided conflicting testimony about another time visitation was denied, 
either in March or April, when Pearson and Stubbs' mother had a heated argument. 
In March, Stubbs was allowed visitation, and during that visitation when she had 
possession of G.D.J., she was arrested at the court house in Greer County, 
Oklahoma.19 
¶26 In his August 11, 2010, order addressing failure to maintain 
relationship, and again in his December 2, 2010, order, Judge Huey found, during 
the relevant period, Stubbs had contact with G.D.J. only thirteen times, and for 
seven months, she had no contact.20 A majority of the contacts were arranged by Stubbs' 
mother and not Stubbs. The trial court found the contacts she had were neither 
positive nor substantial. During some of the contacts, G.D.J., was in the 
presence of convicted felons, one of whom was a registered sex offender, she 
caused G.D.J. to miss a birthday celebration at his daycare, she was arrested at 
a courthouse while in possession of G.D.J., and she had put G.D.J. at risk of 
exposure to communicable diseases. Also, during this time she had various 
criminal proceedings filed against her, along with outstanding bench warrants.21 Her testimony that she was prohibited from visiting or 
contacting G.D.J. was not found credible by the trial court. Additionally, the 
trial court did not find any proof she had taken sufficient legal action to 
remedy any denied opportunities to establish and/or maintain a substantial and 
positive relationship with G.D.J. 
¶27 Stubbs' attorney argues she took sufficient legal action because of the 
litigation involved in the CV 2007-159 custody case. Section 7505-4.2 (H) of 
Title 10 of the Oklahoma Statutes requires a party to prove to the satisfaction 
of the court they took sufficient legal action against a denial of an 
opportunity to establish and/or maintain a substantial and positive relationship 
with the subject minor child by the custodian prior to the date of notice of the 
hearing on the adoption without consent. The record fails to demonstrate there 
was any action taken by Stubbs against the Pearsons during the relevant period 
based upon her being denied the opportunity to establish and/or maintain a 
substantial and positive relationship with G.D.J. 
¶28 The trial court's findings that during the relevant period Stubbs did not 
maintain frequent and regular contact with the child through frequent and 
regular visitation or frequent and regular communication to or with the minor 
child, and further that she has not exercised her parental rights and 
responsibilities are clearly supported by the record. The trial court's 
conclusion, the Pearsons had established by clear and convincing evidence that 
Stubbs failed to establish and/or maintain a substantial and positive 
relationship with G.D.J., was likewise supported by the record.
¶29 We find no reason to disturb the trial court's finding that the Pearsons 
met their burden of proof that Stubbs failed to establish and/or maintain a 
substantial and positive relationship with G.D.J. over the relevant period, by 
clear and convincing evidence, and issuing an order granting the Application to 
Adjudicate the Minor Eligible for Adoption Without the Natural Mother's 
Consent.
ALLEGED ERRORS IN CV 2007-159ARE NOT APPEALABLE
¶30 Stubbs asserts errors were made in the grandparental custody case, CV 
2007-159, which was filed and remains pending at this time. She argues 
everything in FA 2008-24, the case currently on appeal, fails because of the 
mistakes made in CV 2007-159. The proceedings conducted in CV 2007-159 are 
relevant only to the extent the trial court granted the Appellees temporary 
custody in that proceeding and what, if any, legal action was taken to establish 
and/or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with G.D.J. As we have 
found above, there is no evidence during the relevant period that Stubbs ever 
sought sufficient legal action concerning any alleged denials of opportunities 
for her to establish and/or maintain a substantial and positive relationship 
with G.D.J. Arguments about alleged errors in CV 2007-159 are beyond the scope 
of this appeal.22 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE 
ACT OF 1978 (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq.)
¶31 Stubbs asserts the trial court incorrectly applied the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). She argues: 1) the requisite burden of proof on all 
issues in an adoption without consent of a natural parent is "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" rather than "clear and convincing evidence,"; 2) an adoption 
without consent of a natural parent constitutes a termination of parental rights 
as contemplated by the ICWA and; 3) in the alternative, if an adoption without 
consent is determined not to constitute a termination of parental rights the 
testimony of an expert witness at the adoption without consent hearing should 
have been required and a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof should 
have been applied to the issues in Section 1912(f) of the ICWA.
¶32 Section 1912(f) of the ICWA provides:
(a). . .In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows 
or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the 
foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights . . . 
(f). . . No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding 
in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued 
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.
¶33 The issue, whether a proceeding to determine a minor eligible for 
adoption without consent of a natural parent, is a proceeding for termination of 
parental rights. Section 1903 (1) (ii) of the ICWA in its definition of "child 
custody proceedings" defines "termination of parental rights" as ". . . any 
action resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship." In 
subdivision (iv) of this same paragraph, Congress separately defined "adoptive 
placement" as "the permanent placement of an Indian child for adoption, 
including any action resulting in a final decree of adoption."
¶34 A reading of the Oklahoma Adoption Code is relevant to a resolution of 
this question. In 1998, the Oklahoma Legislature added subsection B to Section 
7505-4.1 of Title 10 of the Oklahoma Statutes.23 Subsection B forbids combining a hearing on an 
application for adoption without consent with a hearing on the application for a 
final decree of adoption.24 This subsection further distinguishes the hearing, on 
an application for adoption without consent, from an application to terminate 
parental rights of a putative father. Subsections E, I, and J of Section 
7505-4.1 provide further:
E. At the hearing on an application to permit adoption without the consent or 
relinquishment of a parent, the court may determine whether the minor is 
eligible for adoption pursuant to Section 7505-4.2 of this title. At the hearing 
on an application to terminate the parental rights of a putative father, the 
court may, if it is in the best interests of the minor, determine that the 
consent of the putative father to the adoption of the minor is not required, and 
terminate any parental rights which the putative father may have, as provided in 
Section 7505-4.2 of this title.
I. 1. . . . b. An appeal from an order determining a child eligible for 
adoption which does not terminate parental rights may be taken in the same 
manner provided for appeals from the court as provided in this subsection. The 
failure of a parent to appeal from an order declaring a child eligible for 
adoption without consent of the parent which does not terminate parental rights 
shall not preclude such parent from asserting error in the order after the 
final decree is rendered.
2. In an appeal concerning the termination of parental rights for purposes of 
adoption pursuant to this section or from an order determining a child 
eligible for adoption which does not terminate parental rights pursuant to this 
section, the appellant's designation of record shall be filed in the trial 
court within ten (10) days after the date of the judgment or order. Appellee's 
counter designation of record shall be filed in the trial court ten (10) days 
after appellant's designation of record is filed in the trial court.
3. All appeals of cases concerning the termination of parental rights for 
purposes of adoption or an order determining a child eligible for adoption 
which does not terminate parental rights pursuant to this section shall be 
initiated by filing a petition in error in the Supreme Court within thirty (30) 
days of the filing of the order, judgment, or decree appealed from. The record 
on appeal shall be completed within thirty (30) days from the filing of the 
petition in error. Any response to the petition in error shall be filed within 
twenty (20) days from the filing of the petition in error . . . 
J. Any appeal when docketed should have priority over all cases pending on 
said docket. Adjudication of appeals and any other proceedings concerning the 
termination of parental rights or the determination that a child is eligible 
for adoption without consent which does not terminate parental rights pursuant 
to this section shall be expedited by the Supreme Court. 
(Emphasis Added)
¶35 By the very language of these subsections, only in a termination case of 
a putative father's parental rights, can a trial court simultaneously find 
consent is unnecessary, and terminate such rights. This is distinguished from a 
determination that a child is eligible for adoption without consent, which does 
not terminate parental rights.
¶36 Section 1912 of the ICWA requires the use of a "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard of proof, for certain purposes, in a proceeding to terminate 
parental rights. As discussed above, our statutes prohibit a trial court from 
taking any action that results in a termination of the parent-child relationship 
in a proceeding to determine a minor child eligible for adoption without the 
consent of a natural parent. Therefore, a "clear and convincing" standard of 
proof is all that is necessary in such a proceeding. The higher standard of 
proof is relevant to the specific determination, the continued custody of the 
child by the parent or Indian custodian, is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child. The hearing on the petition for 
adoption, which has not occurred in the present case, will be a proceeding which 
may result in the termination of a parent-child relationship, and is the only 
proceeding in which the court may grant a final decree of adoption. At the 
hearing on the petition for adoption, evidence relevant to matters included in 
subsection (f) of Section 1912 must be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt" in 
order to support a determination that parental rights should be terminated, 
including the testimony of an expert witness. 
¶37 In Merrell v. Merrell, 1985 OK 107, 712 P.2d 35, this Court considered the procedures of 
10 
O.S. Supp. 1975 Section 60.7, the predecessor to the provisions of 
10 
O.S. 2001, Section 7505-4.1. This Court determined "that it is the 
parental right of consent, rather than the absolute termination of all parental 
ties to the child, at issue in a section 60.7 hearing, we still . . . find the 
clear and convincing evidence standard . . . to be proper."25 This position was reiterated in In the Matter 
of the Adoption of J.R.M. 1995 OK 79, ¶17, 899 P.2d 1155, 1161, wherein this Court stated:
. . . Absolute termination of parental rights is not decided at the time the 
consent issue is determined. Only when the final decree of adoption is entered 
are all parental responsibilities severed . . .
¶38 For the reasons stated above, we again find that a hearing on eligibility 
for an adoption without consent is not a termination proceeding. We further find 
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof is only applicable for the 
purposes of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). Accordingly, the trial court applied the 
correct standard of proof at the hearing on the application to adjudicate minor 
eligible for adoption without consent of the natural mother. 
THE TRIAL COURT HADSUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 
¶39 Stubbs next asserts the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to 
hear the eligibility for an adoption without consent because another adoption 
case (FA 2009-24) in the same jurisdiction had already granted eligibility for 
an adoption without consent. FA 2009-24 is a second petition for adoption filed 
by the Pearsons in Jackson County and remains pending before the same judge. It 
involves the same parties and minor child and sought an order determining G.D.J. 
eligible for adoption without consent of the natural mother. On November 18, 
2009, the trial court entered a default order, in FA 2009-24, adjudicating the 
minor eligible for adoption without consent of the natural mother.26 The trial court found the natural mother had failed to 
support the minor child for a period of twelve consecutive months out of the 
last fourteen months immediately preceding the filing of the petition for 
adoption of G.D.J. Stubbs argues it is a legal impossibility for a natural 
parent to lose their ability to consent to adoption more than once on the same 
child and the trial court erred in failing to dismiss for want of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.27 Therefore, the trial court had no real ability to 
adjudicate a right previously lost, and thus lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. 

¶40 We disagree. The determination of eligibility for an adoption without 
consent is solely based on a limited time frame. Once a petition is filed, the 
relevant time period is set by the provisions of 10 O.S. Supp. 2007, Section 
7505-4.2 (B) and (H). The evidence necessary to prove whether an adoption may 
proceed without a natural parent's consent cannot deviate from the "twelve (12) 
consecutive months out of the last fourteen (14) months immediately preceding 
the filing of a petition for adoption of a child . . . " This evidence must 
show, during this relevant period, either the natural parent willfully failed, 
refused, or neglected to contribute to the support of such minor child, or 
failed to establish and/or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with 
the minor child. The evidence necessary to prove whether consent is necessary 
will concern a different timeline. Although confusing in the present case, it 
would appear the Appellees felt compelled to define a second timeline within 
which they allege the natural mother failed to support G.D.J. Such determination 
alone will not bar a court from subject-matter jurisdiction over the first 
alleged timeline.28 The trial court did not commit reversible error, as 
alleged, by prohibiting Appellant from presenting evidence concerning case 
number FA 2009-24.
¶41 Appellant additionally asserts the trial court did not have 
subject-matter jurisdiction because the Appellees failed to satisfy the 
provisions of the Oklahoma Adoption Code, 10 O.S. Supp. 2005, Section 7502-1.1 
(C)-(E)(2). Appellants "candidly" admit the Appellees satisfied the 
jurisdictional requirements of 10 O.S. Supp. 2005, Section 7502-1.1 (A)(1)(a). 
The argument appears to be, the failure of the Appellees to satisfy irrelevant 
provisions of Section 7502-1.1 (C)-(E)(2), somehow deprived the trial court of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. This argument is without merit. These subsections 
provide certain restrictions on jurisdiction when another court of this state 
has jurisdiction in a deprived action or when a custody or adoption proceeding 
is pending in a court of another state. No party asserts there is any other 
action pending in any other jurisdiction either within Oklahoma or without 
Oklahoma other than the previously mentioned case, FA-2009-24. Any failure to 
specifically make findings of the lack of any other pending matter is harmless 
at best.
¶42 The trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to subparagraph a of paragraph 
1 of subsection A of Section 7502-1.1. The statute provides:
A. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a court of this state has 
jurisdiction over proceedings to terminate parental rights and proceedings for 
the adoption of a minor commenced pursuant to the Oklahoma Adoption Code if:
1.a. Immediately preceding commencement of the proceeding, the minor lived in 
this state with a parent, a guardian, a prospective adoptive parent, or another 
person acting as parent, for at least six (6) consecutive months, excluding 
periods of temporary absence,
¶43 The Pearson's Petition for Adoption in the present action established the 
necessary facts for jurisdiction. This Court has consistently held 
subject-matter jurisdiction is invoked by the pleadings filed and where such 
pleadings state a case over which the jurisdiction of the court extends, then 
jurisdiction will attach, and the court has the power to hear and determine the 
issues.29 We find the trial court has jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of this case and the Pearsons' Petition sufficiently invoked that 
jurisdiction.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
¶44 Stubbs next argues the trial court failed in its August 11, 2010, 
and December 2, 2010, orders to make findings of fact and conclusions of law 
contrary to the provisions of 12 O.S. 2001, Section 611.30 This Court has previously held "it is not prejudicial 
error in every case to deny a request for a separate finding of fact for the 
court is not bound to make separate findings concerning immaterial facts, nor is 
the court bound to find material facts in greater detail than necessary for a 
correct decision of questions of law involved in the case in the event the 
action is reviewed by a higher court."31 The object of 12 O.S. 2001, § 611"is to enable the parties 
to have placed on the record the facts upon which the rights litigated depend, 
as well as the conclusions of law which the court drew from the facts found, so 
that exception may be taken to the views of the trial court as to the law 
involved in the trial."32 The findings of fact and conclusions of law, although 
not specifically designated as such in the orders, were sufficient to present 
the issues to this Court on appeal and failure to separately designate them also 
did not amount to prejudicial error.33
THE ORDER OF AUGUST 11, 2011,AND THE DECEMBER 2, 2010, ORDER 
WERE SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE APPEALABLE ORDERS
¶45 Appellant additionally asserts the trial court was without jurisdiction 
to issue the order of December 2, 2010, following her filing of an appeal with 
this Court concerning both August 11, 2010, orders.34 She states the trial court exceeded its jurisdictional 
authority, under Supreme Court Rule 1.37(a), in hearing and granting the 
Appellees' Motion and/or Amended Motion to Settle Journal Entry.35 Her contention is the December 2, 2010, Order 
Adjudicating Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother 
made findings of subject-matter jurisdiction not previously made by the trial 
court in the August 11, 2010, orders. On December 13, 2010, we held the August 
11, 2010, orders were appealable orders and allowed any party aggrieved by the 
decision on the Motion to Settle Journal Entry to file a supplemental petition 
in error which did occur in this case. Because the August 11, 2010, orders are 
valid appealable orders we find Appellant's arguments concerning the December 2, 
2010, Order Adjudicating Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent Of The 
Natural Mother to be moot and no further consideration is necessary by this 
Court. For all of the above reasons we affirm in part and reverse in part the 
judgment of the district court and the adoption may proceed.
JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURTAFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN 
PART;THE ADOPTION PROCESS MAY PROCEED 
¶46 ALL JUSTICES CONCUR 
FOOTNOTES
1 10 O.S. Supp. 2007, § 
7505-4.2 (B) & (H) 
2 Appellant claims the trial court erred in not 
transferring the case to tribal court. On March 16, 2009, Stubbs filed The 
Natural Mother's Motion Requesting Transfer to Tribal Court. Attached to her 
motion was an affidavit of Billye Leitka, an Indian Child Welfare Specialist for 
the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma. Billye stated the tribe had not requested a 
transfer but would be receptive if one was requested. Appellees responded citing 
§1911 of the ICWA which states "in the absence of good cause to the contrary, 
[state court] shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, 
absent objection by either parent". A hearing was held on May 5, 2009. Billye 
Leitka testified via telephone and Brantley Jones, the natural father and son of 
Pearson, testified in person. Billye said it was her understanding that if a 
parent objects, the tribe would not accept a transfer. Brantley objected to the 
transfer. The trial court then correctly held that the federal law does not 
allow a transfer to tribal court if a parent objects to such transfer. 
3 The Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act (10 O.S. §40, et seq.); Indian Child Welfare Act 
of 1978 (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq.). 
4 The FA 2009-24 case was filed by the Appellees in the 
same court on October 19, 2009, and sought an adoption without consent 
concerning a different timeline against the Appellant regarding G.D.J. 
5 Transcript of the Proceedings held on March 10, 2010, 
page 11. The custody case is case number CV 2007-159 before the same court. The 
Answer Brief was corrected to note these criminal charges were not drug-related. 

6 August 21, 2007 - October 21, 2008 (relevant period) is 
the fourteen-month period prior to the filing of the Petition for Adoption which 
is used in evaluating adoption without consent cases pursuant to 10 O.S. Supp. 
2007, § 7505-4.2. 
7 Transcript of the Proceedings held on March 10, 2010, 
page 137. 
8 CV 2006-335 was a case filed to determine custody of 
G.D.J. between Tessia Stubbs and Brantley Jones. Joint custody was awarded on 
October 18, 2006, and "no support" was ordered to be paid by either party to the 
other. 
9 Transcript of the Proceeding held on March 31, 2010, 
pages 142 and 157. 
10 Case No. 108,889. 
11 The correct citations are 10 O.S. Supp. 2007, Section 
7505-4.2 (B) and (H) not 7507-4.2 (B) and (H). 
12 The second Petition in Error was assigned to Case No. 
109,018. 
13 10 O.S. Supp. 2007, Section 7505-4.2(B) 
14 10 O.S. Supp. 2007, Section 7505-4.2(H). 
15 10 O.S. Supp. 2007, Section 7505-4.2(H)(3)(a) &(b). 

16 Transcript of the Proceeding held on March 31, 2010. 
Stubbs testified during the relevant period she was a certified nursing 
assistant. Id. at page 163. She was employed for a little over a month 
but lost her CNA job when she was charged with possession of a controlled 
dangerous substance. She testified she may have had other jobs during the 
relevant period and was able to work. Id. at page 164. Further she said 
she had money she used to buy illegal drugs Id. at page 166. She also 
testified her living expenses were paid by her parents and her father would give 
her money periodically. Id. at pages 164-165. 
17 Case No. CV 2007-159, Jackson County, Oklahoma. 
18 Kiowa County Health Department Taberculin Skin Test 
(TST) Screening Health Certificate (Petitioner's Exhibit 21). 
19 Transcript of the April 14, 2010, hearing at pages 
14-15. 
20 The thirteen were total contacts including Stubbs' 
visitation of G.D.J. and telephone contact. The months where the court found 
that there was no contact were, November 2007, April 2008, and June through 
October 2008. Respondent's Exhibit 11 (marked Defendant's Exhibit 11) indicated 
she didn't call in April 2008, because she was in jail in Greer County. Two of 
these months, July and August 2008, visitation was denied. In July 2008, Stubbs 
asked to see G.D.J. before she went into drug rehabilitation treatment. Pearson 
refused because she wanted proof Stubbs was not at risk of exposing G.D.J. to 
tuberculosis. In August, 2008, Stubbs asked Pearson to bring G.D.J. to the drug 
rehabilitation center. Pearson refused because she didn't think it was a good 
environment for G.D.J. and would be confusing for him. Later that same month 
Pearson set up visitation but Stubbs cancelled it. 
21 The warrants were in the following cases: District 
Court of Greer County, Oklahoma, Case No. CM 2007-00155 and CM 2007-00113; 
Municipal Criminal Court of the City of Norman, Oklahoma, Case No. 2007-02132. 

22 An appeal of a judgment, decree, or appealable order 
must be commenced by filing a petition in error with the Clerk of Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma within thirty (30) days from the date of such judgment, decree, or 
appealable order. 12 O.S. Supp. 2002, § 
990A. 
23 HB 2829 (1998), 2nd Regular 
Session of the Forty-Sixth Legislature; 1998 Okla.Sess.Laws c. 415, § 20. The 
predecessor to this language is found in 10 O.S. Supp. 1975, § 60.7, which was repealed in 
1997, Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 366, § 60. 
24 "B. A hearing on an application for adoption without 
consent or an application to terminate parental rights cannot be combined with 
the hearing on the application for a final decree of adoption. For good cause 
shown, a hearing on the application for a final decree of adoption may be heard 
as early as the same day as a hearing on an application to terminate parental 
rights, without prejudice to the rights of any parties to appeal from the order 
terminating parental rights." 
25 This Court and subsequent opinions of different 
Divisions of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals have found a hearing on the 
eligibility for an adoption without consent does not affect a termination of 
parental rights. Also see, the concurring opinion of Lavender, J., with whom 
Opala, J., joins, upholding the decision in Merrell; In the Matter of 
the Adoption of K.D.K, 1997 OK 69, 940 P.2d 216. The Court of Civil Appeals in 
Adoption of D.R.W., 1994 OK CIV APP 10(Div. III), 
875 P.2d 433, found that "[h]owever, obviously, in a consentless adoption the 
parent-child bond is materially altered. We fail to see a material distinction 
where the child's rights are considered." Id. at ¶7, pg. 435. This 
same Division, (Division III), later agreed with this Court's holding in 
Merrell v. Merrell, 1985 OK 107, 712 P.2d 35, that "an order determining a child 
eligible for adoption without consent of a parent does not result in a 
termination of that parent's parental rights." In the Matter of the Adoption 
of R.L.A., 2006 OK CIV APP 
138¶23, 147 P.3d 306, 311. This same court went further and said "we need not determine, 
at this time, whether such an order, or even a final order for adoption is a 
'termination of parental rights' as contemplated by 25 U.S.C. §1912(d) and §1912 
(f)." R.L.A. also held the only reasonable interpretation of 25 U.S.C. § 
1912(f) is the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof only applies to the 
specific issues in that section. Id. at ¶14, page 310. In 2008, Division 
I of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals agreed with R.L.A.in that the 
heightened standard of proof, only applies to the factual determination required 
by 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) to be made in ICWA termination cases and the state law 
mandated burden of proof of "clear and convincing evidence" applies to all other 
state law requirements for termination. In the Matter of J.S., 
2008 OK CIV APP 
15, ¶4, 177 P.3d 590, 591. We agree with those findings. 
26 Appellant's Exhibit 12 (entitled Defendant's Exhibit 
12). 
27 Stubbs filed a Motion to Dismiss in FA 2008-24 on 
November 19, 2009. A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was had on December 16, 
2009, and the trial court denied the motion in an Order entered December 18, 
2009. 
28 It should be noted the trial court granted a default 
order on the application to adjudicate minor eligible for adoption without 
consent in FA-2009-24 prior to the trial court granting the orders in the 
present case now on appeal. No appeal was taken from the order entered in 
FA-2009-24. 
29 In Re: A.N.O., A Minor Child, 2004 OK 33, ¶9, 91 P.3d 646, 649; State ex rel. Turpen v. A 
1977 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 1988 OK 38, 753 P.2d 1356; Flick v. Crouch, 1967 OK 131, 434 P.2d 256; and Metzger v. Turner, 
1945 OK 149, 158 P.2d 701. 
30 Title 12 O.S. 2001, § 611. "Upon the trial of 
questions of fact by the court, it shall not be necessary for the court to state 
its findings, except generally, for the plaintiff or defendant, unless one of 
the parties request it, with the view of excepting to the decision of the court 
upon the questions of law involved in the trial; in which case the court shall 
state, in writing, the findings of fact found, separately from the conclusions 
of law." Stubbs timely made a written request for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law prior to the trial. She also made an oral and timely motion 
requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law for the decisions to be 
rendered on the Appellees' Motion and Amended Motion to Settle Journal Entry, 
Transcript of the Proceedings on November 29, 2010, page 1, lines 22-25; page 2, 
lines 1-3. The trial court declined to make further findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in its Order of December 2, 2010. See ¶ 15 of this opinion. 

31 Davis v. School Dist. No. D-14, LeFlore 
County,1981 OK 
24, ¶5, 625 P.2d 630, 632; Tulsledo Oil Company v. State, 1963 OK 233, ¶17, 386 P.2d 161, 165; Reed v. Richards & 
Conover Hardware Co, 1941 OK 21, ¶6, 110 P.2d 603, 604; Mistletoe Express Service v. 
United Parcel service, Inc., 1983 OK 27, ¶3, 674 P.2d 1, 3. 
32 Messinger v. Messinger, 1958 OK 296, ¶5, 341 P.2d 601, 604; Mistletoe, Id. 

33 Although Court of Civil Appeals opinions are not 
precedential unless approved for publication by the Supreme Court, see, 
20 O.S. 2001, § 30.5 and Rule 1.200(c)(2), 
Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules, 12 O.S. 2001, Ch. 15, App.1, we agree with the 
findings of the Court of Civil Appeals in Newell v. Nash, 
1994 OK CIV APP 
143, ¶16, 889 P.2d 345, 349, that without a showing of a benefit or prejudice to either 
party, prejudicial error will not be found merely because the conclusions of law 
are not so identified nor separated from the findings of fact. As in 
Newell, the trial court separately numbered and stated each 
finding/conclusion. 
34 Stubbs filed her Petition in Error in case number 
108,889 on November 5, 2010. The final Order Adjudicating Minor Eligible for 
Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother was filed on December 2, 2010. On 
August 11, 2010, the trial court had issued an Order Addressing Failure to 
Support and an Order Addressing Failure to Maintain Relationship. The trial 
court stated in another December 2, 2010, Order that found the August orders 
were erroneously entitled "orders"and were actually the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law requested by the natural mother. See ¶ 15 of this opinion. 
Appellees' filed with this Court a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on November 12, 
2010. This Court issued an Order on December 13, 2010, finding the August 11, 
2010, orders were final appealable orders determining the minor child could be 
adopted without the consent of the mother. We further stated a party may file a 
Supplemental Petition in Error if they are aggrieved by any order filed by the 
trial judge which decides the Appellees' Motion to Settle Journal Entry. Stubbs 
subsequently filed a Supplemental Petition in Error and a Petition in Error 
(case no. 109,018) on December 16, 2010. The two appeals were consolidated on 
December 21, 2010. 
35 Rule1.37, Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules, 12 O.S. 2001, 
Ch. 15, App.1.
(a) Trial Court Jurisdiction.
After a petition in error has been filed, the trial court retains 
jurisdiction in the case for the following purposes:
(1) To facilitate the completion of the record and allocate the costs of its 
preparation.
(2) To grant or modify orders in regard to custody, guardianship, support, 
and maintenance.
(3) To decide motions for a new trial which assert grounds that are provided 
by 12 O.S.1991 § 
655 or a motion or petition for relief on grounds provided for by 
12 O.S.1991 § 1031 and 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 1031.1.
(4) To decide motions in regard to staying the enforcement of judgments, 
decrees or final orders or of interlocutory orders appealable by right, whether 
subject to stay of enforcement as a matter of statutory right, or subject to a 
discretionary stay order.
(5) In matrimonial litigation, to award attorney's fees for services rendered 
or to be rendered in connection with the appeal, to award alimony pending the 
appeal or to issue orders affecting the custody of children or the property of 
the parties pending the appeal. Jones v. Jones, 612 P.2d 266 (Okla.1980).
(6) To change the status of a litigant from that of next friend to guardian 
ad litem, or to appoint an attorney for such litigant and to 
impound funds that are in dispute.
(7) To take action with respect to any issue collateral to a pending 
appeal.
(8) To determine any matter ordered by the Supreme Court.
(9) To determine any issue whose resolution pending appeal is explicitly 
authorized by law.
(10) When the parties to a cause pending on appeal or on certiorari have 
agreed to a settlement of the claim and their agreement requires the trial 
court's approval, the parties may file in the Supreme Court a joint motion (a) 
for an order staying further proceedings for a period to be specified and (b) 
for leave to proceed before the trial court to secure approval of the 
settlement. If settlement is approved, a certified copy of the trial court's 
order attached to a joint motion should then be brought in this court for 
dismissal of the appeal or certiorari.
An approved settlement need not and shall not be submitted for this court's 
review in the pending appeal. If a dispute should arise over the correctness of 
the trial court's settlement approval or over any of its terms, and corrective 
relief be sought, it must be by a timely-perfected appeal form (sic) the trial 
court's order that resolved the parties' settlement dispute. Goldman v. 
Goldman, 883 P.2d 164 (Okla.1994)...