Case Title: Orme v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC2022-0338

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2023-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2022-0338 
____________ 
 
RODERICK MICHAEL ORME, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
May 18, 2023 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
 
 
Roderick Michael Orme appeals the sentence of death imposed 
at his second resentencing for the 1992 first-degree murder of Lisa 
Redd, a nurse personally known to Orme.1  In the proceeding below, 
Orme waived the right to a penalty-phase jury, and the trial judge 
imposed the death sentence after finding that three aggravating 
factors were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and far outweighed 
certain mitigation.  Because the two issues Orme raises on appeal 
are foreclosed by this Court’s jurisprudence, we affirm. 
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
 
The facts relating to the murder are set forth in this Court’s 
opinion in Orme’s direct appeal of his conviction and sentence.  
Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 260-61 (Fla. 1996).  In short, Redd’s 
body was found in Orme’s motel room soon after a “disoriented” 
Orme appeared at a substance abuse recovery center in Panama 
City and wrote down the motel name and room number.  Id. at 260.  
Among other things, Orme was charged with and convicted of first-
degree murder.  Id. at 260-61.  The jury recommended death by a 
vote of seven to five, and the trial court sentenced Orme to death 
after finding that three aggravators—(i) committed in the course of a 
sexual battery; (ii) heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (iii) 
committed for pecuniary gain—were proven and outweighed the 
mitigation.  Id. at 261.  This Court affirmed in 1996.  Id. at 264. 
This Court has since granted Orme two new penalty-phase 
proceedings, including the one at issue here.  In 2005, this Court 
ordered Orme’s first new penalty phase after determining Orme had 
been “denied effective assistance of counsel during the penalty 
phase of his trial.”  Orme v. State, 896 So. 2d 725, 731 (Fla. 2005).  
The new penalty phase again resulted in an affirmed death 
 
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sentence, this time based on an eleven-to-one jury recommendation 
of death and on the trial court’s finding of the same three 
aggravators as in the initial penalty phase.  Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 
536, 542-43, 553 (Fla. 2009).  In 2017, this Court then ordered a 
new penalty phase based on Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), as 
interpreted by Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded 
from in part by State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020).  Orme v. 
State, 214 So. 3d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 2017). 
In the instant penalty-phase proceeding, Orme waived a 
penalty-phase jury, the presentation of mitigating evidence, and his 
presence.  During the bench trial, the State argued for the same 
three aggravators, the trial court took judicial notice of the entire 
case file, and the State introduced victim impact statements.   
At the Spencer2 hearing, defense counsel asked the court to 
consider Justice Breyer’s opinion dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari in Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Mem.).  There, 
Justice Breyer, relying in part on Justice Stevens’ memorandum 
respecting the denial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 
 
 
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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(1995) (Mem.), argued that the Court should have considered the 
petitioner’s claim “that the Constitution forbids his execution after a 
delay of [23 years on death row].”  Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  Here, citing Justice 
Breyer’s dissent in Elledge, defense counsel stated “that delays 
such as the one [that] has happened in Mr. Orme’s case -- we’re 
talking approximately 29 years -- violate or can violate the Eighth 
Amendment.”   
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ultimately imposed a 
sentence of death.  In the written sentencing order, the court found 
the three aggravators had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
assigning them weight as follows: (1) committed while engaged in 
the commission of any sexual battery (great weight); (2) committed 
for pecuniary gain (great weight); and (3) HAC (very great weight). 
The trial court also found the following mitigating 
circumstances had been established, giving them weight as follows: 
(1) lack of significant criminal history (little weight); (2) Orme’s 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired 
(little weight); (3) Orme’s childhood (little weight); (4) “some extent of 
 
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mental disturbance” (some weight); (5) Orme’s previous relationship 
with his ex-wife and child (little weight); (6) Orme’s remorse during 
the proceedings (little weight); and (7) the contribution of Orme’s 
mental health diagnosis to his substance abuse (some weight). 
In the end, after finding that the three aggravators—“both 
collectively and individually”—were “sufficient to warrant the death 
penalty” and “far outweigh[ed] the mitigating circumstances,” the 
trial court imposed a sentence of death.  According to the court, 
death was “the only appropriate penalty.”  Orme now appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
Orme first argues that “the totality of the circumstances”—
including “the 30-year delay between offense and [current] 
sentencing,” his successful challenges of both previous death 
sentences, and his purported reformation—render his death 
sentence cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the 
Florida Constitution.  Although “no federal or state court has 
accepted the argument that a prolonged stay on death row 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,” Booker v. State, 969 
So. 2d 186, 200 (Fla. 2007), Orme insists that his so-called Lackey 
 
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claim is different.  We are not persuaded by Orme’s arguments and 
instead adhere to our established precedent rejecting so-called 
Lackey claims. 
 
We have repeatedly rejected similar claims, including in cases 
involving death-row stays that exceeded Orme’s thirty years.  See, 
e.g., Long v. State, 271 So. 3d 938, 946 (Fla. 2019) (affirming 
summary denial of this claim where Long had spent “more than 30 
years . . . on death row,” and reasoning that this Court has 
“repeatedly rejected similar claims”); Ferguson v. State, 101 So. 3d 
362, 366 (Fla. 2012) (rejecting this claim by a defendant 
“incarcerated on death row for over three decades,” and noting this 
Court has “repeatedly rejected this claim for sentences of similar 
length”).  Indeed, in the postconviction context, we have repeatedly 
described this claim as “facially invalid,” including in a case in 
which the defendant had successfully challenged his death 
sentence not twice but four times.  Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d 380, 
389 (Fla. 2003).  Orme’s decades on death row do not render his 
current death sentence violative of the Eighth Amendment.  We 
thus reject Orme’s claim. 
 
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In his second and final issue, Orme argues that although the 
trial court found three aggravators were proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, were “sufficient to warrant the death penalty,” 
and “far outweigh[ed] the mitigating circumstances,” the trial court 
nevertheless fundamentally erred by failing to expressly make the 
sufficiency and weighing determinations “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Orme, who waived a penalty-phase jury, argues that 
because section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2022), does not allow a 
death sentence to be imposed unless the court determines that 
sufficient aggravating factors exist that outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances, then these determinations—like the finding of an 
aggravator—must be found beyond a reasonable doubt.  Orme’s 
argument is without merit. 
As an initial matter, section 921.141 itself does not impose 
any “beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement on the trial court’s 
sufficiency and weighing determinations.  See § 921.141(3)(b), (4), 
Fla. Stat.  Instead, the statute “subject[s] only the trial court’s 
finding of the existence of at least one aggravating factor to the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.”  Lawrence v. State, 
308 So. 3d 544, 552 n.8 (Fla. 2020) (citing § 921.141(3)(b), Fla. 
 
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Stat. (2018)).3  So, Orme’s argument unsurprisingly finds no 
support in the statute. 
Orme’s argument also fails under our recent caselaw, which 
consistently holds that the sufficiency and weighing determinations 
“are not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of 
proof.”  Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 886 (Fla. 2019); see also, 
e.g., Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040, 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing 
Rogers and holding “that these determinations are not subject to 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof”); Davidson v. 
State, 323 So. 3d 1241, 1247 (Fla. 2021) (rejecting “the faulty 
premise that the sufficiency and weighing determinations of section 
921.141 are subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard”); 
Bell v. State, 336 So. 3d 211, 217 (Fla. 2022) (rejecting the 
argument that “the weighing determinations in section 921.141 are 
subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard”).  We decline 
Orme’s invitation to revisit this precedent.   
 
 
3.  In cases involving a penalty-phase jury, section 921.141 
similarly imposes a “beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement only 
on the jury’s finding of an aggravator and not on the jury’s 
sufficiency and weighing determinations.  Compare § 921.141(2)(a), 
Fla. Stat., with § 921.141(2)(b)2., Fla. Stat. 
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Orme’s sentence of 
death. 
 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, 
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Bay County 
 
Brantley S. Clark Jr., Judge 
Case No. 031992CF000442XXAXMX 
 
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, 
Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Steven Woods, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee