Case Title: State v. Davie

Citation: 2002-Ohio-3753

Docket Number: 20011861

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Davie, 96 Ohio St.3d 133, 2002-Ohio-3753.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DAVIE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Davie, 96 Ohio St.3d 133, 2002-Ohio-3753.] 
Appellate procedure — Application to reopen appeal from judgment of conviction 
based on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel — Court of 
appeals’ denial of application affirmed, when — Application denied when 
applicant fails to raise a genuine issue as to whether he was deprived of 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal before the court of appeals as 
required by App.R. 26(B)(5). 
(No. 2001-1861 — Submitted May 7, 2002 — Decided August 7, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, No. 92-T-4693. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellant, Roderick Davie, a.k.a. Abdul Hakiym Zakiy, challenges 
the denial of his application to reopen his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B). 
{¶2} 
Davie was convicted of the aggravated murders of John Ira 
Coleman and Tracy Jefferys and sentenced to death.  Upon appeal, the court of 
appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence.  State v. Davie (Dec. 27, 
1995), Trumbull App. No. 92-T-4693, 1995 WL 870019.  Meanwhile, prior to 
defense counsel’s filing Davie’s notice of appeal before this court, Davie, on 
February 12, 1996, filed a pro se application for reopening pursuant to App.R. 
26(B) and State v. Murnahan (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204.  
However, the court of appeals dismissed the application in a judgment entry 
because Davie’s appeal had been filed with this court on February 26, 1996, and 
pursuant to former S.Ct.Prac.R. II(2)(D)(1), 68 Ohio St.3d CXXV, the court of 
appeals was divested of jurisdiction.  State v. Davie (July 15, 1996), Trumbull 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
App. No. 92-T-4693.  Thereafter, we also affirmed his conviction and sentence on 
November 26, 1997.  State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 686 N.E.2d 245. 
{¶3} 
On March 1, 2000, appellant filed the instant application for 
reopening with the court of appeals pursuant to App.R. 26(B) and State v. 
Murnahan, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his direct 
appeal. 
{¶4} 
In denying appellant’s application for reopening, the court of 
appeals found that Davie had failed to show good cause for filing his application 
more than 90 days after that court’s judgment was journalized, as required by 
App.R. 26(B)(2)(b).  However, notwithstanding the untimeliness of appellant’s 
application, the court of appeals reviewed Davie’s 24 assignments of error, and 
found them all to be without merit.  The cause is now before this court upon an 
appeal as of right. 
{¶5} 
We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  The two-pronged 
analysis found in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674, is the appropriate standard to assess whether Davie has raised a 
“genuine issue” as to the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in his request to 
reopen under App.R. 26(B)(5).  See State v. Spivey (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 24, 25, 
701 N.E.2d 696.  To show ineffective assistance, Davie must prove that his 
counsel were deficient for failing to raise the issues he now presents and that there 
was a reasonable probability of success had they presented those claims on 
appeal.  State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph 
three of the syllabus. 
{¶6} 
Moreover, to justify reopening his appeal, Smith “bears the burden 
of establishing that there was a ‘genuine issue’ as to whether he has a ‘colorable 
claim’ of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.”  State v. Spivey, 84 Ohio 
St.3d at 25, 701 N.E.2d 696. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
{¶7} 
Strickland charges us to “appl[y] a heavy measure of deference to 
counsel’s judgments,” 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, and to 
“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance,” id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  
“Moreover, we must bear in mind that appellate counsel need not raise every 
possible issue in order to render constitutionally effective assistance.”  State v. 
Sanders (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 150, 151-152, 761 N.E.2d 18; see, also,  Jones v. 
Barnes (1983), 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987. 
{¶8} 
We have reviewed appellant’s four propositions of law alleging, 
inter alia, deficient performance by appellate counsel.  In none of the four 
propositions of law has Davie raised “a genuine issue as to whether [he] was 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal” before the court of 
appeals, as required under App.R. 26(B)(5). (Emphasis added.) 
{¶9} 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and Luwayne 
Annos, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Kerger & Kerger and Richard M. Kerger; David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public 
Defender, and Randall L. Porter, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant. 
__________________