Case Title: Heinrich Schepers GmbH & Co. v. Whittaker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 091840

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
HEINRICH SCHEPERS GMBH & CO., KG 
 
v.  Record No. 091840       
    OPINION BY  
CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY ROUNTREE HASSELL, SR. 
SHERMAN WHITAKER 
November 4, 2010 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
James C. Hawks, Judge1 
 
I. 
In this appeal we consider whether a plaintiff, who had 
waived his right to a jury during a prior trial, was entitled 
to a jury upon the reversal of the judgment in the prior trial 
and a remand of the proceedings to the circuit court for a 
trial limited to the issue of damages. 
II. 
This is the second occasion in which this case is before 
this Court.  Sherman E. Whitaker was injured when working as a 
longshoreman on a boat docked in Portsmouth, Virginia.  The 
boat was owned by Heinrich Schepers GmbH & Co., KG, a German 
corporation (Heinrich). 
Whitaker filed a motion for judgment in the Circuit Court 
of the City of Portsmouth, alleging that Heinrich’s negligence 
caused his injuries.  Whitaker sought damages of $74,000, in an 
effort to prevent Heinrich from removing the action filed in 
                     
1 Judge J. A. Cales, Jr., made the ruling that is the 
subject of this appeal, even though Judge Hawks entered the 
final judgment of $5 million in favor of the plaintiff. 
the circuit court to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia based on diversity jurisdiction.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).  Heinrich filed its notice of 
removal to the federal district court late.  Heinrich signed a 
consent order that remanded the case to the Circuit Court of 
the City of Portsmouth. 
Subsequently, Whitaker filed a motion to amend his ad 
damnum clause from $74,000 to $2.5 million.  The circuit court 
denied the motion and ruled that the original motion for 
judgment seeking damages of only $74,000 was filed in bad faith 
because the ad damnum clause was below the federal diversity 
jurisdictional amount of $75,000 for the purpose of evading 
federal court jurisdiction, and that Heinrich was prejudiced by 
this bad faith action. 
We denied Whitaker’s petition for an interlocutory appeal 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-670.1.  Whitaker v. Heinrich Schepers 
GMBH & Co. KG, Record No. 061672 (January 9, 2007).  
Thereafter, Whitaker filed another motion to increase the ad 
damnum clause to $5 million, and the circuit court denied the 
motion for the reasons previously stated.  Whitaker then 
requested to try the case before the court, rather than before 
a jury, because his damages were in excess of the ad damnum 
clause of $74,000, and Whitaker argued that the court should 
either grant his renewed request to amend the ad damnum clause, 
 
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or enter a judgment for an amount that “would fairly and 
reasonably compensate Mr. Whitaker for his injuries.” 
The following colloquy occurred during the first trial 
among the circuit court and counsel: 
 
“THE COURT:  I think for the record there 
are two things I can do so you don’t have to.  
I’m going to note your continuing objection to my 
failure to allow you to increase the [ad damnum]. 
 
 
“[WHITAKER’S COUNSEL]:  Yes, sir.  Thank 
you. 
 
 
“THE COURT:  And I think also, as I 
understood what you said the other day, and I 
think we should put this on the record, the only 
reason we’re not going with a jury is because of 
that ruling, and I think you should put your 
position on the record just to protect your 
position. 
 
 
“[WHITAKER’S COUNSEL]:  Yes, sir.  We’re 
proceeding without a jury today by agreement of 
counsel that this is a case that has [an] 
extensive number of witnesses, extensive amount 
of medical testimony and extensive amount of wage 
and expert testimony, and in lieu of going 
through all that procedure, since it appears as 
though the amount sued for is going to limit us, 
that in the present posture of the case, we have 
agreed to put on the evidence in this case to 
establish negligence, proximate cause and 
damages.  Because, as the case presently stands, 
regardless of what the Court finds, it can only 
enter judgment in an amount sued for, and, 
therefore, we are preserving our position with 
respect to that objection [by] putting on 
evidence at [trial] sufficient for the Court to 
make rulings and decisions on those issues. 
 
 
“THE COURT:  But for that ruling, you would 
be requesting a jury? 
 
 
“[WHITAKER’S COUNSEL]:  Absolutely. 
 
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“[HEINRICH’S COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, briefly, 
I’m in agreement with [Whitaker’s counsel] to the 
extent this Court’s rulings are abundantly clear 
and the reasons for [that] are contained in the 
record and we don’t need to rehash that.  Suffice 
it to say that, in light of the fact that the 
plaintiff has sued for $74,000 and in light of 
the fact that the Supreme Court has denied the 
petition for interlocutory appeal, essentially 
validating Your Honor’s prior rulings on this 
issue, then it is my client’s intention – let me 
put it this way:  My client is not going to 
contest.  They’re willing to have judgment 
entered against them for $74,000, and in light of 
the interest of judicial economy as well as the 
savings and convenience of the various witnesses, 
we have agreed not to put on any evidence, and, 
essentially, for that reason we will not be 
contesting liability knowing that the judgment is 
limited to the amount sued for, $74,000. 
 
During this colloquy, counsel for Heinrich did not inform the 
court that it was waiving its right to a jury trial in this 
proceeding based upon any agreement with opposing counsel. 
Heinrich made a motion for the entry of summary judgment 
against itself, but the court considered evidence and entered 
judgment in favor of Whitaker for $74,000.  Whitaker appealed 
the judgment to this Court. 
A. 
In Whitaker v. Heinrich Schepers GMBH & Co. KG, 276 Va. 
332, 661 S.E.2d 828 (2008), this Court observed that Whitaker 
had sent Heinrich answers to interrogatories in April 2004 that 
indicated his damages were in excess of $75,000.  For example, 
Whitaker stated that he had incurred lost wages in excess of 
 
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$57,000, and he expected to incur future lost wages in excess 
of $450,000.  We noted that “[a]lthough Heinrich received 
‘other papers’ indicating the damages claimed exceeded $75,000, 
it did not file a notice of removal with the federal court 
until December 14, 2004, well beyond the 30-day limitations 
period available to him under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).”  Id. at 
337, 661 S.E.2d at 830. 
We held: “[T]he [circuit] court’s finding of prejudice was 
based on an incorrect factual premise and denying Whitaker’s 
motion to amend the [ad damnum] clause on this basis was an 
abuse of discretion.”  Id. at 338, 661 S.E.2d at 830.  We 
reversed the judgment of the circuit court, and we remanded the 
case so that Whitaker would have the opportunity to amend the 
ad damnum clause.  Id. at 338, 661 S.E.2d at 830-31. 
We specifically stated in our opinion that, “[i]n light of 
our decision we need not consider Whitaker’s remaining claim 
that the denial of his motion to amend denied his right to have 
the amount of damage determined by a jury.”  Id. at 338 n.3, 
661 S.E.2d at 831 n.3.  We also held that further proceedings 
in this case “will be limited to the issue of damages, as the 
[circuit] court’s decision on liability [was] not . . . 
challenged by either party.”  Id. at 338, 661 S.E.2d at 831. 
During the first trial, Whitaker argued that the circuit 
court’s denial of his motion to increase the ad damnum violated 
 
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his constitutional right to a jury trial.  Additionally, in his 
brief to this Court after the first trial, Whitaker argued: 
“Because he was limited to a verdict of $74,000 under the 
[circuit] court’s order, Whitaker was denied the right to have 
a jury determine his actual damages.  Because this was a 
violation of Whitaker’s constitutional right, this Court should 
reverse the [circuit] court’s [judgment].”2  Interestingly, in 
its brief filed with this Court after the first trial, Heinrich 
did not argue that Whitaker had waived his right to a jury 
trial, even though Heinrich’s brief contained a discussion of 
the right to a jury trial. 
Assuming that Heinrich questioned the legal conclusions in 
our decision in Whitaker, supra, Heinrich did not file a 
petition for a rehearing requesting this Court to reconsider 
its holding on liability and the Court’s conclusion that the 
Court would not consider Whitaker’s claim that he was entitled 
to demand a jury trial if this Court permitted him to increase 
the ad damnum clause. 
B. 
                     
2 We note that in Virginia, the right to a trial by jury 
is sacred.  Va. Const. art. I, § 11 (“in controversies 
respecting property, and in suits between man and man, trial by 
jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred”); 
Code § 8.01-336; see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 262 Va. 
661, 670, 553 S.E.2d 760, 764 (2001). 
 
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Upon remand, Heinrich made a motion to strike Whitaker’s 
demand for a jury trial.  Heinrich’s counsel stated that 
“Whitaker offered to waive his right to trial by jury in 
exchange for Heinrich’s concession of liability.” 
Responding, Whitaker stated:  
 
“The issue that [Heinrich] raises is one of 
waiver.  The Supreme Court has remanded this case 
on the issue of damages, and, therefore, the 
Court has jurisdiction on the issue of damages.  
And under those circumstances, a renewed request 
for a jury trial is proper under the mandate of 
the Supreme Court. 
 
“The plaintiff demands a jury trial on the 
issue of damages.  We have a statutory and 
constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue 
of damages, and there was no waiver in this case. 
 
“The transcript of the previous proceeding, 
which I have attached to my motion, of this 
trial, which took place on March 7th, 2007, is 
very clear.  In fact, it can’t be any clearer.  
The Court, [on] page three, said[:] [‘A]nd I 
think also as I understood what you said the 
other day – and I think we should put this on the 
record – the only reason we are not going with a 
jury is because of that ruling [on amending the 
ad damnum clause], and I think you should put 
. . . your position on the record just to protect 
your position.[’] 
 
“It was the Court who was protecting 
plaintiff’s right to a jury trial.  And the Court 
went on to protect the plaintiff’s right to a 
jury trial on the next page [when] the Court 
said: [‘]But for that ruling, you would be 
requesting a jury.[’] 
 
. . . . 
 
 
“And under the circumstances I have 
protected that right.  There is no waiver.  I 
made clear at the previous trial that I was 
absolutely demanding a trial for a jury, but for 
the previous rulings of the Court, which made 
 
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judicial economy and the reasons to expedite that 
proceeding very clear to the Court.  It was very 
clear on the record.  There is no waiver.  We 
request a trial by jury.” 
 
Heinrich’s counsel argued in the circuit court that once a 
litigant waives the right to a jury and the case is remanded, 
the waiver remains intact.  Rejecting Heinrich’s position, the 
circuit court ruled: 
 
“Well, my problem is . . . the understanding 
that I had throughout, and I think it’s clear 
from the record.  I don’t know what understanding 
you had.  I don’t know what – I believe it was 
the same understanding [Whitaker’s counsel] had.  
I don’t know – I can’t go into your mind and know 
what understanding you had, but, clearly, that 
the waiver was one of accommodation and 
conditioned on my ruling being correct. 
 
“I just don’t think it was a clear waiver.  
I don’t think it was a waiver that was meant to 
go beyond that particular proceeding.  I think 
the idea of the waiver, and my understanding 
throughout the whole thing that – and if I got 
reversed, that it would be a jury trial.  I had 
no question in my mind until I got your motion, 
honestly. 
 
“And I think it’s skilled lawyering on your 
part.  I think you should follow it up and maybe 
you’ll get me twice on the same case, and I will 
be famous for that. 
 
“I really do believe that [Whitaker’s 
counsel] protected his client’s right to a trial 
by jury.  And I’m going to overrule your motion.”  
 
Therefore, a jury trial was held in which Whitaker was awarded 
a judgment in the amount of $5 million.  We granted Heinrich an 
appeal. 
III. 
Heinrich assigns the following error on appeal: 
 
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“The trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Heinrich’s Motion to Strike the Jury 
Demand after remand, since Whitaker had 
previously agreed to waive his jury right in 
exchange for Heinrich’s agreement to forego its 
defense on the issue of liability.” 
 
Heinrich’s assignment of error does not reflect the circuit 
court’s ruling, and hence, the assignment of error is barred by 
Rule 5:17(c) that requires an appellant to assign error to the 
specific ruling of the circuit court.  Covel v. Town of Vienna, 
280 Va. 151, 163, 694 S.E.2d 609, 616 (2010); Smith v. 
Mountjoy, 280 Va. 46, 52-53 n.4, 694 S.E.2d 598, 602 n.4 
(2010).  In State of Maine v. Adams, 277 Va. 230, 241-42, 672 
S.E.2d 862, 868 (2009), this Court held: “A party who asks this 
Court to consider whether a circuit court’s holding was 
erroneous is required to assign error to the challenged holding 
so that it may be identified properly for our consideration.”  
The circuit court did not rule, contrary to Heinrich’s 
assignment of error, that the right to a jury trial, once 
waived, could only be reinstated upon the circuit court’s 
exercise of discretion nor did it find that Whitaker had 
previously agreed to waive his right to a jury trial in 
exchange for Heinrich’s agreement to forego its defense on the 
issue of liability.  Thus, Heinrich’s assignment of error lacks 
legal efficacy. 
 
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As we have already noted, the circuit court’s actual legal 
ruling upon remand, which is unchallenged, was that Whitaker’s 
waiver of his right to a jury trial was limited to the first 
trial.   
 
We have stated that: 
 
“Waiver is the voluntary and intentional 
abandonment of a known legal right, advantage, or 
privilege.  Weidman v. Babcock, 241 Va. 40, 45, 
400 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1991); Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 
412, 425, 362 S.E.2d 699, 707 (1987).  The 
essential elements of waiver are knowledge of the 
facts basic to the exercise of the right and 
intent to relinquish that right.  Weidman, 241 
Va. at 45, 400 S.E.2d at 167; Fox, 234 Va. at 
425, 362 S.E.2d at 707.  Waiver of a legal right 
will be implied only upon clear and unmistakable 
proof of the intention to waive such right for 
the essence of waiver is voluntary choice.  
Weidman, 241 Va. at 45, 400 S.E.2d at 167; May v. 
Martin, 205 Va. 397, 404, 137 S.E.2d 860, 865 
(1964).” 
 
Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 622-23, 499 S.E.2d 
829, 833 (1998); see also Baumann v. Capozio, 269 Va. 356, 360, 
611 S.E.2d 597, 599 (2005); Virginia Tech. v. Interactive 
Return Service, 267 Va. 642, 651-52, 595 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2004); 
Stuarts Draft Shopping Ctr. v. S-D Assoc., 251 Va. 483, 489-90, 
468 S.E.2d 885, 889-90 (1996); Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. 
Co., 211 Va. 579, 583, 179 S.E.2d 466, 469 (1971); May v. 
Martin, 205 Va. 397, 404, 137 S.E.2d 860, 865 (1964). 
 
We have also held that: 
 
“Essential elements of the doctrine [of 
waiver] are both knowledge of the facts basic to 
 
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the exercise of the right and the intent to 
relinquish that right. . . . A waiver of legal 
rights will be implied only upon clear and 
unmistakable proof of the intention to waive such 
rights; the essence of waiver is voluntary 
choice.  May v. Martin, 205 Va. 397, 404, 137 
S.E.2d 860, 865 (1964).” 
 
Weidman, 241 Va. at 45, 400 S.E.2d at 167. 
 
We observed over a century ago that “[n]o [person] can be 
bound by a waiver of his rights, unless such waiver is 
distinctly made, with full knowledge of the rights which he 
intends to waive; and the fact that he knows his rights, and 
intends to waive them, must plainly appear.”  Wilson v. 
Carpenter, 91 Va. 183, 192, 21 S.E. 243, 246 (1895).  We have 
also held that: “Usually, proof of waiver is a question for the 
trier of fact.”  Management Enterprises v. The Thorncroft Co., 
243 Va. 469, 474, 416 S.E.2d 229, 232 (1992). 
 
The record in this appeal supports the circuit court’s 
finding that Whitaker intended to limit his waiver of a jury 
trial only to the first trial.  The same circuit court judge 
presided over both hearings in each trial related to the jury 
waiver issues.  Heinrich does not challenge the facts that 
support the circuit court’s finding of a limited waiver. 
 
As we have already stated, the circuit court ruled: 
“I just don’t think it was a clear waiver.  
I don’t think it was a waiver that was meant to 
go beyond that particular proceeding[, the first 
trial].  I think the idea of the waiver, and my 
understanding throughout the whole thing [is] 
 
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that – and if I got reversed, that it would be a 
jury trial.  I had no question in my mind 
. . . .” 
 
Simply stated, the circuit court made an unchallenged factual 
finding that the waiver of the right to a jury trial was 
limited to the first trial, and as the Court of Appeals stated 
in Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 520, 529, 518 S.E.2d 
330, 334 (1999): “A limited waiver, by its terms, will limit or 
specify the period to which it applies.”  Accordingly, the 
circuit court properly held that Whitaker was entitled to 
demand a jury trial in the proceeding held upon remand. 
 
Heinrich’s remaining arguments are either without merit or 
procedurally barred because they were not raised in the circuit 
court. 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment 
of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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