Case Title: Forehand v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 515, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KEVIN L. FOREHAND,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 515, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. 99-05-0184 and
§  95-05-1396
§
Submitted: January 28, 2002
  Decided:
March 22, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 22nd day of March 2002, upon consideration of the appellant's Supreme
Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the State's response
thereto, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Kevin L. Forehand, pled guilty in October
1995 to possession of a controlled substance within 300 feet of a park.  He was
sentenced to three years at Level V incarceration, which was suspended in its
entirety for probation.  In November 1999, Forehand pled guilty to trafficking
cocaine.  The Superior Court sentenced Forehand to a three year minimum
mandatory term at Level V incarceration, but in accordance with 11 Del. C. §
6712, diverted Forehand to the boot camp program.  In September 2001, the
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Superior Court found that Forehand had violated the terms of his probation for
both offenses and thus sentenced him to three years minimum mandatory
incarceration followed by probation.  This is Forehand’s appeal from that order.
(2)
Forehand's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Forehand's counsel asserts that, based upon a
complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable
issues.  By letter, Forehand's attorney informed him of the provisions of Rule 26(c)
and provided Forehand with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the
accompanying brief.  Forehand also was informed of his right to supplement his
attorney's presentation.  Forehand provided his counsel with two identical letters
that appear to raise two cognizable issues.  The State has responded to the position
taken by Forehand's counsel, as well as the points raised by Forehand, and has
moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment.
(3)
The standard and scope of review applicable to the consideration of a
motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a)
this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious
examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (b) this Court must
conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally
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devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an
adversary presentation.1
(4)
In the letter provided to his counsel, Forehand raises two identifiable
issues for the Court to consider.  First, Forehand complains that he should have
been permitted to complete the Level III boot camp aftercare portion of his
sentence while he was completing the Level IV Crest Program.  Forehand also
appears to assert that, because the probationary sentences on his two underlying
convictions were ordered to be served consecutively, the Superior Court could not
properly find him in violation of both probationary sentences.  We find no merit to
either contention.
(5)
The Superior Court has discretion, within the statutory limits provided
by law, to structure an offender’s sentence in a way that flows the offender through
decreasing levels of supervision.  Each component of the trial court’s sentence is
“integral” to the overall sentencing scheme.2  We find no merit to Forehand’s
contention that he should have been permitted to serve the Level IV and Level III
portions of his sentence at the same time.  Forehand admitted that never reported to
his Level III probation officer in order to begin the boot camp aftercare portion of
                                                
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
2 Nave v. State, 783 A.2d 120, 122 (Del. 2001).
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his sentence.  Accordingly, we find no error in the Superior Court’s conclusion that
Forehand violated the terms of his probation.
(6)
Furthermore, we find that the Superior Court did not err when it
adjudicated Forehand guilty of violating the terms of both of his probationary
sentences.  This Court previously has recognized that a defendant’s probationary
sentence may be terminated “at any time.”3  Accordingly, the Superior Court may
properly revoke the unexecuted portion of a defendant’s probationary sentence
before it begins.4
(7)
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that
Forehand’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable
issue.  We also are satisfied that Forehand's counsel has made a conscientious
effort to examine the record and the law and has properly determined that
Forehand could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to affirm is
GRANTED.  Appellant’s motion to withdraw is MOOT.  The judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
_/s/ Myron T. Steele__________________
Justice
                                                
3 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4333 (2001).
4 Williams v. State, 560 A.2d 1012, 1013 (Del. 1989).