Case Title: Ranches v. City and County of Honolulu. ICA s.d.o., filed 02/16/2007 [pdf], 113 Haw. 330. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 06/22/2007 [pdf].

Citation: 115 Haw. 462

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
+*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS**

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

 

‘o0o==~

JERRY RANCHES AND RIZALINA RANCHES,
Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellants

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, i
Respondent /Defendant appellee e

 

and

 

JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10;
DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE NON-PROFIT ENTITIES 1-10;
‘and DOE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants
No. 27846

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. No, 04-1-1274)

ocTosER 5, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J,
Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellants Jerry Ranches (Jerry)
and Rizalina Ranches (collectively, Petitioners] filed an

application for writ of certiorari! on May 16, 2007, requesting

 

+ Pursuant to Havas" Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-59 (Supp. 2006),
42 party may appeal the decision of the intermediate appellate court (the ICK)
oniy by an appiiestion to this court fora writ of certiorari, Sea HRS § 602
59(a).. In determining whether to accept or reject the epplication for writ of
certicrari, this court reviews the ICA decision for:

(2) Grave errors of law or of facts or
(2) Gbvicus inconsistencies in the dectaion of the [ICA]
vith that of the supreme court, federal decisions, or
Tee own decision,
‘and the magnitede ef such errors or inconsistencies
(wontinved. «1

 
   

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that this court review the judgment of the Intermediate Court of

App

 

1s (the ICR) filed on April 16, 2007, ieeued pursuant to its
Summary Disposition Order (S00) filed on February 16, 2007,”
affirming the March 15, 2006 judgment of the first circuit court?
(the court) in favor of Respondent/Defendant-Appellee City and
County of Honolulu (Respondent) in a slip and fall case.
Respondent filed a memorandum in opposition to the
application for certiorari. In the opposition memorandum
Respondent initially contend that Petitioners’ petition should be

denied because it “does not contain any basis for review that is

new or different than his [sic] request for review to the [ICA].
However, Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 40.1
(2007) does not require a new basis for review in order for a

petition to be accepted.*

(continued)
Gictating the need for further appeal.

BRS § 602-S9(b). The grant or denial of a petition for certiorari is
discretionary with this court. gge HRS § €02-59(a)

+ the $00 was issued by Chief Judge Janes S. Burns and Associate
Judges John $.W. Lin and Craig #. Nakamura.

> the Honorable Randal K.0, Lee presided.
+ WRAP Rule 40.1 (4) states:

(2) Contents, The application for a writ of certiorari
shell not exceed 12 pages and shall contain in the folloxing
order!

(2) A short and concise statenent of the questions
presented for decision, set forth in the most general terme
Possible. The statenent of a question presented will be
Seemed £0 incluce every subsidiary question fairly comprised
therein. Questions not presented according to this
parsgragh Will be disrecsrdes. The supreme court, at its
Option, may notices plain error not presented.

(2i"A statenent! of prior proceedings in the case

(3) A short statement of the case containing the facts

(eontinved,

 

 
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‘The requirements in HRS § 602-59(b) are “directed only
to the application for the writ, It is not descriptive of the
scope of review determinative of the [s]upreme [c]ourt’s decision
to grant or deny certiorari. The (s]upreme {cJourt’s power in
that regard is intended to simply be discretionary.” State v
Chong, 86 Hawai'i 262, 283 n.1, 949 P.2d 122, 123 n.1 (1997)
(emphasis and citations omitted). Accordingly, Petitioners are
not required to provide a “new or different” basis for review in
their petition.

I.

Petitioners present the following questions for this
courts decision: (1) [whether] the definition of what
constitutes 2 subsequent remedial measure under Hawai'i law
[should be clarified]; and (2) whether actions taken by
[Respondent] in preparation to refinish a floor prior to a slip
and fall incident can be defined as subsequent remedial
measures.” (Emphasis in original.)

In.

The following pertinent matters are from the petition

and opening brief.

(Petitioners) filed their Complaint . . . on July 13,
2004, alleging that on May 26, 2003, (Jerry) slipped and
fell’ immediately inside the entrance to the men’s restroom
‘at Eva Beach Park due to conditions on the floor which posed
fn unreasonable risk of harm.

“1 -continvea)
Imatersal. to the consideration of the questions presented.
(4) A brief srgunent with supporting authorities. A.
copy of the challenged opinion, dispositional order, of
Fullng of the [ICA] shall be attached as an appendix.

 

 

 

3
 

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Qn January 21, 2006, {Respondent filed various
notions’ in Motion in Limine Ro. 2
Exclusion of all Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures
the concrete slab to drain water away fron the door.

‘On February 7, 2006(, Petitioners) filed (a)
Menorandum in Gppositien 6 (Respondent's) Motion in Linine
Worl.

 

 

(Emphases added.)

At trial the following evidence was adduced and events

transpired, according to Petitioners.

[Petitioners] were occasional users of Ewa Beach Park.
«The restroom .". + has no roof and the walls. we
Constrsctes of concrete block. (Jerry) walked paste
Shower and into the docrway which required him to take an
ineediate left turn ang right torn. As soon as [Jerry] nade
the lefe turn his right foot slipped and he fell. [Jerry]
hoted that the floor under him was smooth snd worn. Tt hed
Previously been painted but the paint had worn off...
[ije wes sitting in a puddle after he fell. There were no
Greing in the floor ang walls of the men's’ restroom
1s {O)n the day of the incident, ager cabato)
iniezed the nen’ restroom st approximately 12:00 p.m.
tipon’entering the men's restroom, Mr. Cabato saw a puddle of
Water. The floor "had sone green moss end mildew.” Mr.
sbato authenticated a photograph of the shower pipes
without the water “on” and that photogreph was sdmitted as
Exhibit P-€5. Mr. Cobato testified that the floor felt
slippery in the aves where he found (Jerry) still on the
floor after his fall.
fs. Stacey Kahue ((Rahve)} .; . had testified at
la} deposition as” (Respondents Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure) Rule 30(b) (6) witness regarding "any and all
nodificaticns and/or repairs to the men’s restfoan and
Adsscent shower area at Eva Beach Fark from May 26, 1998 up
fo and including the current date.”
‘Sn offer of proof that [Kshse] woule' tests

 

     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

work a2 the pro‘ect sanacer for Arakaki Contracting which
cestroce ..—. which beaan-orior to (ersy'sl fall on
tity 26,2005, Th addition to testifying regarding

~ the resurfacing work which the floor was determined to
Fequire because of its worn, weathered and smooth condition,
[Kehue] would testify regarding photographs he took of the
Condition of the restrooms which were submitted to
[Respondent] prior to the subject incident.

    

 

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ould Jead “directly to the issue of the resurtacina of the
Res el obiectio aclu
otect, hese actions fore th
‘The _{clourt had decned the cost incident resurfacing to bes
cee eint Lenedlal seasure in ite ruling on (Respondent
Gotion in Linine Noi. . and it extendea that derinition
to inclade events witch occurred prior to the subject

 

Sneidene.

 

(Baphases added.)

As set forth by Respondent, fa) jury [trial had)
conmenc{ed) on February 27, 2006, and end{ed] on March 3, 2006,
with the jury's verdict in favor of [Respondent]. [Petitioners]
appealed from the judgment entered on the jury's verdict. On
February 16, 2007, the [ICA] entered its [S00] affirming the
sudgnent.

ur.

With regard to the two questions posed in the petition,
Petitioners are generally correct in that the “(ICA] simply
states that it affirms the March 15, 2006 judgment” and
“[tyherefore it is impossible for Petitioners to specifically
address any flaws in the ICA's reasoning.” The ICA did say:

Generally, we agree with the following statement made
by [Respondent] in the answering brief:
‘The only tesves which shosld be considered by this
Tejourt are the following: 1)
= if the resus’ he nen

 

ing, 2] the exclusion of evidence regarding the
operation of the showerhead and the slope of the
Concrete shower, ped

$00 at 3 (emphasis added).
Ww.
As to their first question, Petitioners cite the

following text of HRE Rule 407.
 

POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*##

 

nen, after an event,
taken previously, would hi

lures are taken which, if
je made the event less likely to

 

 

weal scence oF culpabl
fheevent. ‘This rule does not Tequire the exclusion of
Gvidence Of subsequent measures when offered for ancthe:
Purpose, such as proving @ dangerous defect in products
Tiability cases, ownership, control, or feasibiliey of

precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.

 

 

 

(Emphases added.) The Commentary to HRE Rule 407 states in
pertinent part as follows:

This rule is similar to [Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE) ] 407, ‘the Advisory Conmittes’s Note to which points
out: ~The’ rule incorporates conventional doctrine which
excludes evidence of subsequent renedial messures as proof
of an scmission of fault..." The. . - around tor

‘suclusion rests on 2 social oolicy of encoureaing people to

‘in turtherance of added safety. The courts have applies
thie principle to exclude evidence of subsequent repairs,
Installation of = ‘in company rules,
land discharge of employees,
Tule is brosd enough to. encomps

Tals rule ie limited seri
evidence when offered as proof of
Conduct. “The second sentence of the rule lists some of the
Sther purposes for which this evidence nay be admitted. The
Yule varies from [FRE] ¢07 in the addition of “dangerous

in products liability cases” af one permissible

Ray be oamiteed.

 

   

 

  

 

     

(Emphasis added.) (£11ipses points in original.)
As to the first question Respondent reiterates in its

response to Petitioners’ petition that “the basis for

[Respondent’s] motion vas not only HRE 407 (subsequent renedial

measures), but also HRE 403 (exclusion of relevant evidence due

 

 

+ Thus under limited circunstances, subsequent measures were ruled
adnissible in order to prove the existence of defects in a product in two
Hewai'i cases. In Am, road. Cos, v. Kenai Air of Hawaii, Inc., 67 Haw. 219,
228, 686 P.26 1, 7 (2580), this court held that the lower court erred in
Fejécting Kenai's “offer of proof related to measures allegedly taken to
Fenedy the problem of unexpected power failures in the particular model of

 

 

 

In In xe Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 665 F. Supp. 1454 (D. Haw.
2086}, the federal court followed the Fationaie set forth in Kenai, holding
that the “state of the art” theory as 2 defense to strict liability for

estes cleins was inadnissible because "the product's design 1s considered
at the tine of triai not at the tine of nanofactore. [HRE] 407 allows the
jury to consider eubsequent renediel measures at proof of @ dangerous defect.
Agi at 1657 (esting Renal, €7 How. at 223, 686 F.2d at 9)

 

 

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to prejudice).”* Respondents argue that “the [court] ruled that
the evidence of the subsequent floor resurfacing was precluded by
HRE 403{, thus t]here is no need in this case for (this clourt to

define subsequent remedial measures, as that w

 

not the basis
for the (court’s] ruling.”

In response, Petitioners said in their reply brief that
Respondent’s failure to respond to the HRE 407 issue, and
subsequent redirection towards an HRE 403 analysis exemplifies
Respondent's lack of understanding of the “trial court’s ruling
and the interrelationship of Rules 407 and 403 regarding the
resurfacing project." The question of whether further
explication is needed regarding HRE Rule 407 is subsumed in
Petitioners’ second question.

v.

Preliminarily it should be noted that “[t]he bar of
[Rlule 407 is specific and unambiguous: Evidence of subsequent
remedial measures ‘is not admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct.'” Addison M. Bowman, Hawai'i Rules of Evidence
Manual $ 407-1 (3d ed. 2006). The term “subsequent” indicates

that the measure in question must have been undertaken “after

* im connection with this question, Respondent said in its answering

brief that it does not take a position on the HAE Rule {07 argument. Instead,
Respondent contended that the court algo based its decision on HAE Rule 403
grounds. HRE Role ¢03 states in part that “evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice(.]" “Respondent algo declared that under HRE Role 401, evidence
Pertaining to the resurfacing of the men’s bathroom is not relevant beceuse it
Goes not shave a tendency to neke the existence of any fact that is of
Consequence to the determination of the action more probable or lees probable
than st would be without the evidence.”

 

 

 

   

 

 

7
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[the] event,” which is “the occurrence that caused the death or

injury cited in the current complaint.” Id, (brackets in

original). This rationale tracks interpretations of FRE Rule
4077 as in Moulton v, Rival Co,, 116 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1997)

(admitting evidence of prior accidents vas not an abuse of

 

discretion); and Traylor v. Husavarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 733
(eh Cir. 1993) (stating that “remedial measures were taken
before rather than after the ‘event,’ which in an accident case
the courts have invariably and we think correctly understood to
mean the accident” (citations omitted) ).

HRE Rule 407, entitled “[slubsequent renedial measures”
(emphasis added), provides in relevant part that “[wJhen, after
an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct in connection with the event.” The word
“remedial” means “intended for a remedy or for the removal or
abatenent of a disease or of an evil.” Wl ts Thix
Dictionary 1920 (1993) (emphasis added). Thus, a “measure” is
“remedial” if it is intended to address the occurrence of an

event by making the event less likely to happen in the future.

7 tt may be noted that “[HRE 407) {a simiiar te [FRE] 407" but
vvaries from [FRE] 407 in the addition ‘dangerous defect in products liability
fone permissible purpose for which remedial measures nay be
Comentary to HRE Rule 407. The Variance between HRE 407 and FRE
407 does not affect the analysis herein, because the instant case does not

Involve products Iiability,

     
‘S*4POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS#*

 

Therefore, measures that are taken after an event but that are
predetermined before the event are not “remedial” under HRE Rule
407, because they are not intended to address the event. See

Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 651 P.2d 85

(holding that the city’s ordering and installation of traffic

 

600 (Kan. 1982)

signal control devices at an intersection where the plaintiff had

been injured were not “remedial” because the city’s actions “had

been predetermined . . . many, many months prior to [the]
accident,” and the city had “merely completed something which had

started long before the plaintiff's accident” (first emphasis
added and following emphases in original)}; 23 Charles Alan
Wright 6 Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure

§ 5283, at 104-05 & 105 n.43 (Ist ed. 1980) (observing that when
FRE Rule 407 is read to require a “causal relationship” between
the accident and the measures, “exclusion would not be required
where the motivation for the renedial measure was not the
prevention of a recurrence of the accident in issue,” such as
where “the defendant undertook repairs as a result of an earlier
accident”).' Because such measures are not “remedial,” it
follows that evidence of such measures is not inadmissible under

the plain language of HRE Rule 407.

+ ansofar as ERE Rule 407 is similar to ite federal counterpart,

interpretations of the federal rule by treatises and cases are instructive.
See, Qua, Stave v, Viset, 98 Hawal't 94, 108, 19 P.3a 42, $3 (2001)
([Slecause the BRE are patterned on the [FRE]... , construction of the
federal counterparts of the WRE by the federal courts’ is instructive, but
obviously not binding on our courts." (Citations omitted.)); Nskagsus w
nana, 52 Haw. 379, 368-89, ¢77 P.24 611, 617 (1970) (felicwing a treatise on
fegersi procedure in interpreting Hawai Rules of Civil Procedure Rule $9)

 

 

 

 

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vi.

In their appeal, Petitioners contended that “different
standards of review must be applied to trial court decisions
regarding the admissibility of evidence, depending on the
requirements of the particular rule of evidence at issue.”

(Citing Kealoha v. County of Hawaii, 74 Haw. 308, 319, 944 P.2d
670, 676 (1993).

 

nen application of a particular evidentiary rule can yield
only one correct result, the proper standard for appellate
Feview is the right/wrong standard: However, the
traditional abuse of discretion standara should be
in the cae of those rules of evidence that require &
“juagnent call" on the part of the trial courts

    

 

nied

        

Kealoha, 74 Haw. at 319-20, 644 P.2d at 676.
Petitioners correctly submit that “decisions regarding
the aduissibility of evidence under [HRE Rule 407), such as the
decision to exclude [Kshue’s] testimony and other evidence of the
resurfacing project, should be reviewed under the right /wrong
standard as 2 measure taken is either a subsequent remedial
measure(,] or it is not.” However, the standard of review for
exclusion of evidence under HRE 403 is the abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Rabe, $ Haw. App. 251, 264, 687 P.2d 554, 563
(2984) (citation omitted). Evidentiary decisions based on this
rule, “which require a ‘judgment call’ on the part of the trial
court, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Walsh vy. Chan,
80 Hawai's 212, 215, 908 P.2d 1198, 1201 (1995) (citation
omitted). Under an abuse of discretion standard, as Petitioners

set forth,

10
SWAT'T REPORTS 28D PACIFIC REPORTER*##

 

 

[t]he trial court abuses ite discretion if it bases its
ruling on an erroneous view of the law of on a clearly
erronecus secerenent of the evidence. Oftice of Hawaiian
Aefaies v State, 110 Hawai'i 338, 351, 133 F-3a 767, 780
(2006) {citing Bancer Ins. Coz, Hinshaw, 103 Hawai" 26,
30, 79 P.3d 119, 123 (2003) (citation omitted) }. Abuse of
Giseretion occurs when “the trisl court nas clearly exceeded
tthe bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of
lew or practice to che substantial detrinent Of @ party
litigant.” 1d.

 

 

 

vit.
AL

As to the second question, Petitioners acknowledge that
they must “prove both the existence of a condition which posed an
unreasonable risk of harm and that [Respondent] knew, or should
have known of the unreasonable risk, and that it failed to take
reasonable steps to eliminate the risk or adequately to warn
users againet it.” (Citing Corbett v, Ass'n of Apartment Owners:
of Wailua Bayview Apartments, 70 Haw. 415, 417, 722 P.2d 693, 695
(1989).). According to Petitioners, Respondent

determined that it was neces:

 

ry to resurface the floor of

the men's restroom ot Eva Seach Park. It hired Arakaki
Construction to re

 

irface the floor with a slip reasatent,
‘Rrakaki Construction began to execute
1e part of that work,

  

the

Ticor of the subject men's restroon.

 

(Emphasis added.) They state that “[Kahue’s] precluded testimony
was highly relevant on all of these issues.”*
Petitioners maintain that “[nJone of these actions had

anything to do with the happening of (Jerry's) fall.

 

* in that regard Petitioners aesert that “under [HRE) Rule 407 an
‘action taken prior to sn event cannot be a subsequent venedial measure(, and)
Ss 2 subsequent action, which is taken pursuant to @ predetermined course
Of aétion is not # subsequent remedial measure.”

   

   

n
 

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[Respondent] would not . . . have been discouraged or affected in
any way, by the prospect of admissibility at a trial arising from
an incident yet to occur or unknown at the time.” Thus,
Petitioners maintain, the excluded evidence “was highly probative
of the substantial risk of harm and notice which they were
required to prove as elements of their clains.”
5

Petitioners urge this court to adopt the analysis set
forth in several cases that support their position that “Rule 407
Limits its scope to evidence of measures which were taken
‘subsequent’ to the date of the incident which gave rise to the
Litigation.” As set out by Petitioners, in Ravond v. Raymond
Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (Ist Cir. 1991),

a side loader . . . identified as Model 75 was involved in
the subject accident. (Zd.] at 1523. Subsequent to the
Eble of Model. 75, but prior to [plisintiff’s injury, the
3

fondant rade design modifications in ite subsequent Medel
which "were on the drawing board prior to the
manufacture of Model 78." Id. The trial court did not
Edit evidence regarding these modifications, but the (first
Clizcuit concluded that *[a}ay reliance upon’ 407 at all,
however, wae misplacedt 1”

  

 

 

They cite the following statement from Raymond.

o
Sevent* The term “event” refers to th
Becident that precipitated the suit. Roberts v.
Hnrnischtecer Corp, 901 F.2d 42, 44 net (sth Cir. 1909);
96 F.2d 17, 21 (4th Cir.

 

 

see),

‘Id. (emphasis added). This is an accurate assessment of the
holding in Raymond and establishes a clear before and after

“event” delineation. In accordance with this rationale, actions

 

taken by Respondent prior to Jerry's fall would not be afforde

12
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protection under HRE 407, because the policy considerations
behind the statute would not apply as set forth infra.”

‘The rationale for this interpretation, Petitioners
urge, is in Cupp v. AMTRAK, 138 $.W.3d 766, 776 (Mo. Ct. App.
2004). In that case, the plaintiff argued that “the evidence did
no more than reiterate the existence of conditions that Antrak
was aware of prior to the accident and measures Amtrak had

planned to take prior to the accident.” Id." The court of

appeals “agree[d],” stating as follows:

‘the. sey ration tudin =
‘accident resedial measures does not appl if the measures In
Etestion were planned, provided for or undartaran prior to
she-accident, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is te
fan eigen and has been induced

By the accident to sake the repair to prevent further
Injury. A defendant who is swore of the problen and has
propoted measures for remediation

Id. (citations omitted) (emphases added). Similarly, it does not

appear Respondent can benefit from the protections of HRE 407

 

* — fowever, Bawmond held that “[t]he district court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling that the Nodel 76 evidence vas only parainally relevant
ane excluding the evidence under (FRE] Rule 403.” 938 F.2d at 1522 (footnote
‘Onittes) (emphasis added), The first circuit explained that

 

 

the question of strict Liability in New Hampshire centers on
the level of dangerousness of the product et the tine of
Sele. for this reason, the introduction of evidence of
vresaceiden on e

he ae

 

 

‘Eo tne defendant
and mislesding to the jury for determining the question

‘sf sanufactore end sale

ds at 1524 (citation omitted) (emphases adéed). Contrastingly, in the
{nitant cose, the pre-sceident neatures were not made after the resurfacing of
the subject floor, but were mage in contemplation ef the resurfacing and,
arguably, were more then “marginally relevant.”

 

in missouri, “[tJhe rule regarding the admissibility of
post-accident remedial neatures con best be stated by reference to (FRE Role)
Sortai" pollard ve Ashby, 298°S.W.20 394, 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).

13

 

 
 

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simply because it vas in the middle of the resurfacing project
when the accident took place.

Also, Petitioners

 

ly on Schneck. As previously
noted, in that case claims against the city and a power company
arose out of a motorcycle accident which occurred on July 11,
1976, as the result of inadequate traffic signals. 651 P.2d at
588-89. Objection was made to admission of “the date the new

signalization equipment was ordered, July 13, 1976, and the date

  

it was finally installed, March 24, 1977[.]” Id. at 599.

However, the trial court noted that “the installation of traffic

control devices . . . was conduct that had been predetermined
+ many, many months prior to this accident!.]” Id, at 600

(emphases added). Evidence of the city’s pre-accident plan to
install traffic signals, the installation of which took place
after the accident, was held to be admissible. Id, the
Schmeck court reasoned that because the city’s actions were
determined prior to the accident, “the [city] merely completed
something which had been started long before the plaintiff's

accident. Thus, this evidence could not be characterized as

 

% kan. stat. Ann. § 60°:
remedial conduct” states!

 

1 (2006) which pertains to “Subsequent

When after the occurrence of an event renedial or
precautionary measures Gf taken previously
Would have tended to mal yent less Likely to occur,
evicence of such subsequent measures is not sduissible to
Prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the

   

 

1s
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subsequent remedial conduct.” Id, (emphases in original)."

Finally, Petitioners cite Rollins, in which the
district court allowed all evidence of repair prior to the
accident to be admitted, but precluded admission of evidence of
that same repair that occurred after the incident.

[alii evidence of discussions, drafts, proposals,
deliberations of actual alterations of repairs regarding
Gither the haroware of the procedures involved with the
operation of the ship-tovshere power cable connection that
Securred prior to the incident on August 11, 1986 will be
Sdaitted. “this evidence is not governed by’ Rule 407 and is
highly probative as to notice and knowledge of the potential
dangers of the ship-to-shore hardware and procedures
Evidence of actual repairs, alterations or procedural
Changes made after August il, 1986 ere inadnissible,

 

 

761 F. Supp. at 940-41 (emphases in original). The Rolling court
explained that evidence of prior measures directly connected to
the accident are “highly probative as to notice and knowledge of
the potential dangers[.]” Id. However, the Rollins court did
not allow evidence which occurred after the accident to be
admitted under FRE 407. Id. at 941. It said that “[e]vidence of

actual repairs, alterations or procedural changes made after

 

% — Schneek noted that even though the trial court “really ha(d) @

even finding the installation of traffic control devices was rene

Shed been predetermined... prior to this scci
serait nonetheless limites the use of such evidence. Schueck, 651
at’ 600. The trial court instructed the jury thet Lt "could not use anything
that happened after the date of the accident for the apportionment of
Liability or fault,” although it could be used "ro show a condition that
existed.” Id. (enphasis added). The Schaeck court, without discussion,
‘Seened to accept the trial court's rationale ang further explained that the
‘siso sdnissible te show “contrel(, which} was s major issue.”

‘et, control is not an issue in the present case. In addition,
‘G07 provides that evicence of subsequent renedial measures may be
Introduced to! prove "a dangerous defect in products liability cases,
Ounershipy control, of feasibility of precestionsry neasures, Sf controverted,
oF inpeachnent™ but not "to show a condition that existed.” Thos, vnile we
Sore with the Schreck court that repairs to which a defendant has committed
Before an accident But which are not completed until after the accident are
not “subsequent renedisl measures”, the evicence in this case is not
Sdniseible unger any exception to the general exclusionary role recognized in
this. jurisdiction

     

 

 

       

 

 

as
‘***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERM+®
August 11, 1986 are inadmissible.” Id, (emphasis in original)."

 

Rolling noted, however, that subsequent matters may be admissible
under exceptions to Rule 407. Id,'*

‘The reasoning of the Schmeck court is persuasive,
Actions contemplated and commenced prior to the “event” required
by HRE Rule 407 cannot be considered “remedial” in the sense
contemplated by that rule. Moreover, the exclusion from evidence
of post event measures does not serve the policy underlying Rule
407 of removing any detrimental effect that such repairs would
have on a defendant in subsequent litigation inasmuch as the

repairs were contemplated before the accident.

 

“Rolling steted that

[tIhis policy [onder FRE Rule 407} is not served by
adnitting evidence of subsequent repairs, even if the
Gecision to make such repairs was msde prior to the incident
being litigated. ‘Once an accident occurs, there 18 even
hore reasch to encourage defendants to take renedial

Defendants should not fear that if 1itigation
‘after a particular incident, any renedial measures
token will be admitted to prove their negligence.

 

  

761 F. Supp. at 940.

% The Bolling court said:

‘Tis [clourt, however, makes 2 reservation in accord
with Role 407. Subsequent repairs, alterations, or
Procedural changes nay be adnissibie if offered to prove
Sunership, control or feasibility of precautionary measure,
Sf such te controverted. Moreover, defendants should be oh
notice that such evidence may also be acnitted if necessary
for inpeachsent purposes or if plaintiff seeks to admit the
evidence for reasons other then to denonstrate tre
Gefendente’ cvlpabiisty.

Kika, 455 F.2d 392,) 386 ((sth Cir. T97d)) (in certain
Limited instances, ‘however, the policy favoring the repair
of dangerous conditions 18 overcome by the duty of courts to
ellow litigants to bring the facts of the situation to tre
tention of the jury where they are otherwise Felevant end
Probative.").

  

 

 

 

761 F. Supp. at 942.

16
FOR FUELICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**#

 

In that light, a rule excluding from evidence measures

 

contemplated before the “event” but completed afterwards as set
forth in Bolling, without more, is unconvincing. Bolling did not
explicate the rationale underlying its view that there was “more
reason to encourage defendants to take remedial measures”,
Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 940 (emphasis added), after an “event”
although the measures had already been initiated prior to the
event. On that point, the reasoning set forth in Cupp is
significantly more persuasive. HRE Rule 407 was designed to
encourage defendants who are first notified of a dangerous
conditions to make repairs, without fear of prejudicing their
defense in ensuing Litigation. Tt was not, however, designed to
protect defendants who knew of a condition, had initiated steps
to renedy it, but did not finish before an innocent party was
injured. See, Cupp, 138 $.W.3¢ at 776 ("The purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to protect a defendant who has been first
alerted to the possibility of danger after an accident... . A
defendant who is aware of the problen . . . prior to the accident
is not entitled to the sane protection.”)

vain.

In sum and based on the foregoing, the measures taken
by Respondent in thie case that began prior to Jerry's accident
and continued thereafter cannot be characterized as either
subsequent or remedial and, therefore, cannot be precluded under
HRE Rule 407, notwithstanding the fact that they were completed
after Jerry's accident. To the extent the court excluded such
‘s/+F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS
evidence on HRE Rule 407 grounds, it reversibly erred, and

insofar as the ICA premised its judgment on such a ruling, the
TCA gravely erred.
rm.

As previously noted, in its opposition memorandum
Respondent argues pre-accident evidence was nevertheless
excludable “on the basis of HRE 403.” HRE 403 provides that
“{a}ithough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”

At trial, Respondent's memorandum in support of Motion
in Limine No. 1 Re: Exclusion of all Subsequent Remedial
Measures, stated that its HRE 403 arguments were made in the
alternative.

Assuming arquendo that thie [clourt allows inte
evidence testimony of photos of the resurfacing of the floor
or the cut ade near the entrance of the men’ # restroom or
the feasibility of precautionary measures despite the
underlying policy and purpose of Rule 407 of the (HRE], any
testineny of photos of the resurfacing or cut near the
entrance of the men's restroom

nder Hule 403 of the [HRE].
(Emphasis added.) Respondent argued with respect to Motion in

Limine No. 1, that

 

[t]he introduction of testimony with recerd to the

Eequrtacing of the floor of the nen's restroom or the
fegeabiisty of rectutionsty measures will enly serve te

Moreover, the introduction of this evidence will confuse the
jury with regard to the iseves in this case.

(Emphasis added.)

18
‘s+470R PUBLICATION IN MEST’S AWAIT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER#*#

 

‘The arguments made by Respondent during the motion in

Limine hearing similarly indicated that “{alny reference to the

because it wou!
ublic policy. i the resu
would be more prejudicial than it would be probative to the

city.” (Emphasis added.) The court apparently agreed, ruling
that,

(vlader Rule 407 and Rule 403, 407, subsequent renedial

he pad was done after this incident. The court finds that
Sliowing teatineny and or evidence regarding the resurfacing
find the cut from the pad,

the prebstive value, so therefore, the court will grant
‘notion in linine nutber one.

(Emphases added.)

x,

‘The court also ruled at trial on exclusion of Kahu

 

testimony. According to Respondent,

linen the esue [of excluding evidence of subsequent renedial
nesoures) was revisited doring the trial, the [court]
Sliowes the picture requested by (Petiticners), but
Sustained the objection as to the testinony of witness
Kehoe, fineing that "given the nature of his testimeny and
Balancing it ageinst the probative and prejedice to show the
weight of the evidence, the (court finds that the prejudice
Dstweight any probative value of his testimony end,
therefere, will not allow [Kahue's) testimony.”

 

pon objection to Kahue’s testimony, Petitioners made the
following offer of proof:

It 4s cur intention to call [Xahue], who is currently an
employee with the City and County ef Honcluis, as a witness
ecegtity reaarding the werk that he did back in January of

‘Out purpose in Calling
TKenue] would be to a

specifically with respect to photographs in Exhibit Nunber
Poe, and £2 elicit testimony’ from kahve) regarding the’

 

as
‘S*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER!*#

 

ature of the protect that Arakaki Construction was involved
h_spacificaliv the resurfacing of the flocr thst uae

rs ie preiect- He hed an
inspector, Allison Ayabe, who was his contact with the
Departnent of Design and Construction, with whom he wae in
contact to report on the progress of the project.

(Emphases added.) The court sustained the objection, statin

 

‘The (court further finds, that given the nature of his
Testimony and balancing it against the probative and
prejudice to show the weight of the evisence, the [elourt
Finds thet the prejudice outweighs eny probative value of
Ais testimony and, therefore, will not allow (Kanue's]
testimony es to where he was’ working.

 

 

The court was not specific in its ruling as to the reasons for
sustaining the objection.
AL
Respondent argued in its answering brief that because
witness Kahue could not specifically recall the condition of the
men’s restroom, his testimony was irrelevant and not highly
probative as to the need to repair the floor. Second, Respondent

argued that the offer of proof regarding Kahue’s testimony did

 

not prove that the resurfacing of the men’s restroom would have
“eliminated the allegedly dangerous condition." Third,
Respondents contended that Petitioners failed to establish an
evidentiary link by not retaining an expert to support their
position that the resurfacing would have prevented Jerry's
accident. In conclusion, Respondent maintained that if the pre~
accident events are admitted, “[t)he jury may . . . improperly
concludle] that [Respondent] found that the restroom floor was
defective and that the resurfacing project was performed to

remedy this defective condition.” Respondent argues that thus

20
‘ss4POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**#

 

“the [court] did not abuse its discretion when it precluded
evidence of the resurfacing of the men’s restroom floor and the
testimony of [Kahue].”
B,

In response, Petitioners submitted in their reply brief
‘that Kahue’s testimony regarding the resurfacing project “would
have been damaging to the City’s case [but] would not constitute
‘unfair prejudice’ under [HRE] Rule 403.” Petitioners quote from
the Advisory Committee Notes to FRE Rule 403 which states that
“unfair prejudice” in this rule “means an undue tendency to
suggest a decision on an improver basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one.” (Emphasis added.)

Petitioners also rely on Kaeo v. Davis, 68 Haw. 447,
454, 719 P.2d 387, 392 (1986), which states that “evidence with a
capacity for unfair prejudice cannot be equated with testimony
simply adverse to the opposing partys for evidence is only
material if it is prejudicial in some relevant respect[,]” and
United States v, Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980), for
the proposition that “[e]vidence is prejudicial only when it
tends to have some adverse effect upon a [party] beyond tending
to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into
evidence.”

Petitioners asserted that “the only dancer of ‘unfair

dice’ addi he tet hi

widence wae a ur set

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI' REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER!+#

 

evidence of a subsequent remedial measure which it considered to
be an improper basis{,]” (emphasis added), as it had expressed in
its ruling on Respondent’s motion in Limine no. 1. Petitioners
claim that “{t)here is no indication in the record that the
[court] vas concerned with any other possible prejudicial effect
of the testinony of (Kahue) regarding the resurfacing project.”
Accordingly, Petitioners argue the court’s analysis

under HRE Rule 403 was “fatally flawed," because “[Kahue’s]
testimony regarding the resurfacing project which began before

the subject incident was not evidence of a subsequent renedial

 

measure under Rule 407." This is correct. With respect to HRE
403, neither Respondent nor the court identified the specific
prejudice that would befall Respondent, except that evidence of
the pre-accident resurfacing would prejudice Respondent.

However, such evidence is not excludable on HRE Rule 403 grounds
merely because the effect of admitting such evidence might
engender an adverse view of the City’s conduct, but must be
unfairly prejudicial. See discussion infra.

Second, as to the dangerous condition and (apparently
expert) issue(s) Petitioners contend that it was “{not] necessary
for Kshue’s testimony to ‘establish that the resurfacing would
have eliminated the allegedly dangerous condition,’” in order to

be admissible." Petitioners submit that there is no authority

at may be noted that no authority is cited for the proposition
that expert witness opinion is required as part of the proof ins e1ip and
fall case

22
 

'FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER'

 

to support Respondent’s position. Rather, Petitioners claim that

“[e}he evidence was adnissible, at a minimum, to establish notice
+ that the defendant knew, or should have known, of the

unreasonable risk of harm.” (Citing Corbett, 70 Haw. at 417, 772

P.2d at 695.).

 

Respondent cites Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am,
Ince, 104 F.3d 472, 481 (1st Cir. 1997), to support exclusion of
evidence of the resurfacing project under HRE Rule 403. In that
case, the plaintiff brought a strict liability claim against
Mercedes-Benz after the automobile she parked and exited rolled
back, injuring her. Id, at 474-75. The Bogosian court stated
that “[a]lthough [the first circuit] has recognized that (FRE)
407 applies to strict liability cases, . . . it does not apply
where, as here, the modification took place before the accident
that precipitated the suit.” Id, at 481 (citing Raymond, 938
F.2d at 1523).

The Booosian court observed that “[iJn cases such as
this, the district court may, if necessary, exclude evidence of
the remedial modification by resort to its considerable
discretion under [FRE] 403, which permits exclusion of relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury.” Id.
(citations omitted). It was further noted that because

[a) strict Liability claim centers on the condition of the

preduct at the tine it leaves the seller's handste} ©.
the introduction of evidence of sre-accisent design

23
‘*++FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER**#

 

Of the allegedly defective prodoct may reason
to the defendant and misieading to the

jury for determining the question whether the product wa

nseascnably dangerous st the tine of manufcture and sale.

Ids (citation omitted) (emphases added) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).

‘The Eogosian court concluded that because “the jury had
before it uncontroverted evidence that Mercedes-Benz could have
implenented the modification during the relevant time frame[,]
any evidence that Mercedes-Benz, in fact, later modified its
vehicles risked the danger that ‘jurors would too readily equate
subsequent design modifications with admissions of a prior
defective design.’” Id, (citation omitted). Thus, Bogosian
held that “the district court did not abuse its considerable
discretion” in refusing to allow the plaintiff to question
Mercedes-Benz’s only witness regarding a modification that had
taken place subsequent to the sale of the car but prior to the
plaintiff's accident because the plaintiff “was attempting to
create a feasibility dispute where there was none.” Id. at 481-
82.

Unlike Bogosian, in this case, the evidence of the
measures taken by Respondent that began prior to Jerry's accident
were not “uncontroverted.” Instead, those measures were
probative of proving the existence of a condition which arguably
posed an unreasonable risk of harm and that Respondent knew, or

should have known created an unreasonable risk, but failed to

24
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S NAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC-REFORTER*+#

 

reasonably eliminate or to adequately warn users about.” See
Corbett, 70 Haw. at 417, 722 P.2d at 695. Moreover, unlike
Rogosian, this is not @ case where proposed modifications to the
product or site were made after the product or site had passed
into the control of the consumer or user. The product liability
situation in Bogosian is simply not relevant to the slip and fall
situation where the premises always remained in control of
Respondent, Therefore, contrary to Respondent’s contention,
Rogosian does not support excluding the measures pursuant to HRE
Rule 403.

on the other hand, a8 noted before, the Rollins court
admitted “all evidence of discussions, drafts, proposals,
deliberations or actual alterations or repairs” that occurred
prior to the incident inasmuch as that evidence was “not governed
by [FRE] Rule 407 and [was] highly probative as to notice and
knowledge of the potential dangers[.]" 761 F. Supp. at 940-41.
However, in Rollins, that court also rejected the defendant's FRE
403 argument as to subsequent repairs allowed under any
exceptions in FRE 407, It was stated that

Itihe fact that such evidence may “hurt” the defendants’
case does not nean that its protative value is outweighed by
ite prejudicial effect. “Untair prejudice” as used in [FRE]
Role. 403 ie not to be equated with testimony sisply adverse
fo the opposing party. Virtually all evidence is

% he question of whether notice shovld be attributed to Respondent
would, as other facts, rest Gn the fact Finder's determination of credibility
ee the weight to be given such evidence, See State v. fastmen, 6) Hawa:

13, TettsBS'etbertnf es" soe “tecacing chee sedieariay it ae’ within the
province of the "fact“finder te assess the credipility of witnesses and to
Fesolve ali questions of fect” (eitation omitted) )

 

The commentary to HRE Rule 403 states that “(this rule is
Adentical with (FRE) 403,”

25
‘**7OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND FACIPIC REPORTER*!

Ss

prejudicial or it isn’t material. The prejudice must be
unfair.

 

Ada at 941 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (some internal
quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in this case, admitting the
measures taken by Respondent would not be unfair to Respondent,
but would be “highly probative as to notice and knowledge of the
potential danger(.J” Id, at 940-41.

Therefore, the court incorrectly excluded evidence of
the resurfacing project on HRE 403 grounds, because the project
commenced before the subject accident and the evidence was not
subject to HRE 407 exclusion or the policy considerations
thereunder, Such evidence was probative at least as to notice.
Under these circumstances, admission of the evidence would not
have been unfairly prejudicial, as the court apparently believed.
CE. Cupp, 138 S.W.3d at 776 (defendant who has proposed measures
prior to accident not entitled to bar against post accident
remedial evidence); Rollins, 761 F. Supp. at 941 (rejecting FRE
403 argument as precluding subsequent measures into evidence
under exceptions to FRE 407); Schneck, 651 P.2d at 600 (evidence
of defendant's pre-accident remedial plan and predetermined post
accident conduct admissible in evidence).

xz.

Respondent also declared that under HRE Rule 401,
evidence pertaining to the resurfacing of the men’s bathroom is
not relevant because it does not “have a tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

26
 

POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAMAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*##

of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” However, based on the foregoing,
Respondent's pre-accident plans to resurface the bathroom would
have a tendency to make the existence of notice of a dangerous
condition -- an element of the negligent action -- more probable
than it would be without the evidence. See Cupp, 138 $.W.3d at

776 (defendant aware of problem not entitled to bar of pre~

 

accident measures); Rolling, 761 F. Supp. at 940-41 (pre-accident

measures highly probative as to notice and knowledge of danger).

Accordingly, such pre-accident plans would appear to be relevant.
xin.

For the foregoing reasons, the ICA’s April 16, 2007
judgment and the court's March 15, 2006 judgment are vacated and
the case is remanded to the court for disposition consistent with
this opinion.

Mark F. Gallagher (Zan DP

wrhattoen with nim on
the appiication) taw Offices Bir Hoderinae~
Sf ran Mattoch,, for

Petitioners/
Plaintiffe-appellants.

 

-
Marie Manuele Gavigan, — Aw tw
Deputy Corporation 22

counsel (Carrie K.S.

Okinaga, Corporation Yow €. Dufbgith +

Counsel, with her on the
response) for Respondent/
Defendant-Appellee.

27