Case Title: Gammon v. Boggs

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 152 
Docket: 
Kno-18-129 
Argued: 
November 6, 2018 
Decided: 
November 15, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
EARL GAMMON et al. 
 
v. 
 
ROBIN E. BOGGS et al. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
[¶1]  In this dispute over the location of the boundary between the land 
of Earl and Mary Gammon and the land of Leland E. Boggs II, Leland and 
Robin E. Boggs1 appeal from a judgment entered by the Superior Court (Knox 
County, Stokes, J.) declaring the location of that boundary line.  The Boggses 
contend that the court erred by (1) denying their motion to continue when they 
were unprepared for trial; (2) restricting a previously designated expert to 
providing rebuttal testimony when that expert had withdrawn and they had 
designated a different expert for trial; (3) finding that, in addition to having 
proved record ownership of the land in dispute, the Gammons had alternatively 
                                         
1  Robin E. Boggs is the son of Leland Boggs II.  He is a party to this case because he lives on the 
parcel of his father’s land that is the subject of this dispute.   
 
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proved title by adverse possession; and (4) denying the Boggses’ motion for 
additional findings of fact pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).   
 
[¶2]  The points on appeal generally address discretionary decisions 
made by the trial court in its management of the proceeding.  Review of the 
record, the docket entries, the several decisions of the trial court, and the briefs 
of the parties on appeal demonstrates that the litigation was highly contentious.  
Because of lack of cooperation between the parties, delays by the parties in 
preparing and providing discovery material, and a change of counsel by the 
Boggses, the trial court, on several occasions, appropriately exercised its 
discretion to grant requests to continue previously set trial dates and discovery 
deadlines.   
 
[¶3]  The court set a final trial date of December 19, 2016.  Trial was held 
over six days, December 19-21, 2016, and February 1-3, 2017.  Reflecting its 
experience over the course of the litigation, the court, in its opinion, observed:  
It was obvious to the court during the trial of this matter that the 
Gammons’ and Boggs’ families held strong feelings of antipathy 
towards each other.  The court was dismayed by the fact that the 
attorneys for the parties appeared to have assumed that antipathy 
towards each other.  Indeed, the court felt compelled on more than 
one occasion to remind counsel of their professional responsibility 
to conduct themselves in a civil and appropriate manner during the 
trial.   
 
3 
 
[¶4]  Commendably, the court had kept the case on track through 
considerable effort involving hearings, telephone conferences, and written 
orders.   
[¶5]  In his brief on appeal, after acknowledging the trial court’s 
accommodation of some of the points argued in the Boggses’ post-judgment 
motions, the Boggses’ counsel argues that “[t]his still leaves Boggs 
disadvantaged by, after a noisy withdrawal by his original attorney just before 
trial, having to proceed without an expert surveyor witness and with 
replacement counsel unprepared to try this boundary dispute.”  Later in the 
brief, counsel asserts that “Boggs was forced to proceed unprepared through 
no fault of Boggs” and that, after his previous expert withdrew, counsel was 
compelled “to scramble to find a replacement expert, . . . who . . . never had time 
to prepare.”   
[¶6]  Such claims about a trial court’s case management practices, taken 
on their face and out of context—as such claims are sometimes asserted—can 
make a trial court’s case management efforts seem callous and in disregard of 
the trial court’s obligation to try to achieve justice through due process of law.  
Adding context may—as here—demonstrate a very different series of events. 
 
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[¶7]  The docket entries reflect that the complaint in this matter was filed 
on February 26, 2015.  The Boggses’ latest trial counsel, who continues as 
counsel on appeal, first entered his appearance in the case on May 2, 20162—
seven and one-half months before the actual first day of trial, certainly not “just 
before trial,” as counsel asserts in his brief to us.  In fact, because prior counsel 
had withdrawn, the court had removed the case from the May trial list and 
continued the trial, ultimately setting the December trial date.   
[¶8]  The record further reflects that by June 17, 2016, six months before 
the first day of trial, at the Boggses’ request and over objection from the 
Gammons, the Boggses’ counsel had identified the replacement expert—
although counsel’s brief to us indicates that counsel had some concern as to 
whether the expert chosen would or could adequately prepare for trial in the 
ensuing six months.  It is not at all clear why six months would not be enough 
time to retain and prepare an expert to testify in a boundary dispute case, and 
counsel’s claims to the contrary and his placement of blame on the trial court 
are neither persuasive nor credible. 
                                         
2  At oral argument, the Boggses’ counsel indicated that he entered his appearance on 
April 27, 2016.   
 
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[¶9]  Contrary to the Boggses’ contentions, the trial court committed no 
error, nor did it abuse its discretion, either in its case management orders or in 
its findings and conclusions.  First, after the case had been pending for nearly 
twenty-two months and the court had already granted the Boggses’ several 
requests for continuances and enlargements of time, the Boggses’ continued 
lack of preparation was not a substantial reason to allow further delay.  See 
Fox Island Granite Co. v. Am. Granite Mfrs., Inc., 2006 ME 14, ¶¶ 4-8, 
890 A.2d 700.   
 
[¶10]  Second, the Boggses’ late attempt to use their prior, withdrawn, 
expert witness for nonrebuttal purposes when the replacement expert had 
been designated was in contravention of the court’s scheduling order, which 
allowed only one expert per issue, and it would have resulted in unfair 
prejudice to the Gammons.  See M.R. Civ. P. 16(d) (authorizing the court to 
sanction a party for failing to comply with the requirements governing pretrial 
procedure); M.R. Evid. 403; Spickler v. York, 566 A.2d 1385, 1389 (Me. 1989).   
 
[¶11]  Third, the court’s judgment contains adequate findings of fact to 
support its alternative finding that the Gammons established title by adverse 
possession.  See Harvey v. Furrow, 2014 ME 149, ¶¶ 11-19, 107 A.3d 604.   
 
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[¶12]  Fourth and finally, the court’s judgment provides a sufficient basis 
to inform the parties of its reasoning and allows for informed appellate review; 
it was, therefore, not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny the Boggses’ 
motion for additional findings.  Their proposed findings were simply attempts 
to reargue points or have the court provide further explanation of its decision.  
See Wandishin v. Wandishin, 2009 ME 73, ¶ 19, 976 A.2d 949; Sewall v. 
Saritvanich, 1999 ME 46, ¶¶ 9-10, 726 A.2d 224.  
 
[¶13]  We again remind counsel that hyperbole, ad hominem attacks, and 
a manufactured sense of outrage, while possibly desired by clients, are not only 
routinely unpersuasive, but may in fact detract from any actual solid legal 
argument made by counsel. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert W. Kline, Esq. (orally), Kline Law Offices LLC, Portland, for appellants 
Robin E. Boggs and Leland E. Boggs II 
 
Patrick J. Mellor, Esq. (orally), Strout & Payson, P.A., Rockland, for appellees Earl 
Gammon and Mary Gammon 
 
 
Knox County Superior Court docket number RE-2015-5 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY