Case Title: In Re Estate of Kennington

Citation: 204 So. 2d 444

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1967-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
204 So. 2d 444 (1967) In re ESTATE of John Andrew KENNINGTON, Deceased. DEPOSIT GUARANTY NATIONAL BANK, Executor, v. Mrs. Mignon T. KENNINGTON. No. 44538. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 28, 1967. *445 Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Henley, Jones & Henley, A.Y. Harper, Jackson, for appellant. Cox, Dunn & Clark, Green, Green & Cheney, Jackson, for appellee. SMITH, Justice: This is an appeal by Mrs. Ardath E. Kennington, Deposit Guaranty National Bank, as executor of the Estate of John Andrew Kennington, deceased, Mrs. Marian Kennington Stevens, John Kennington Stevens and Michael David Stevens from a decree of the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County entered in a suit begun by appellee, Mrs. Mignon T. Kennington, as complainant, in which they were defendants and cross-complainants. By her bill of complaint, Mrs. Mignon T. Kennington sought to enforce against the estate of her former husband, the late John Andrew Kennington, a marital settlement contract, entered into during the pendency of her divorce action against him, which provided, among other things, that he make payments to her of $750 per month until her death or remarriage. In their answer, appellants challenged her right to the relief sought because, they alleged, (1) there was no legal consideration for the contract, and (2) the monthly payments, having been incorporated in the divorce decree, in which she had been granted a divorce from Kennington, were merged into such decree so that the obligation lost its contractual character, became alimony and terminated upon Kennington's death. The cross-bill reiterated the statements contained in the answer, charged that there had been material changes in the status of the parties since the entry of the divorce decree, and alleged that the court, under Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 2743 (1956), should modify the decree so as to accord with such changed status. Alternatively, the court was asked to reduce or commute the obligation and to require complainant to accept, in lieu of the monthly payments, a lump sum based upon her life expectancy and probability of remarriage as shown by standard statistical tables. On appeal, for the first time, appellants urge an additional objection to the enforcement of the contract, and now argue that it was part of a collusive agreement between the parties, conditioned upon divorce, and, therefore, was void. After some fifteen years of marriage, Mrs. Mignon T. Kennington and John Andrew Kennington had separated. She filed a bill against him for separate maintenance and a decree was entered in 1951 granting the prayer of her bill. In 1954 Mrs. Kennington brought suit against her husband for divorce and alimony. In this suit each party was represented by distinguished and able counsel. While the case was pending, after considerable negotiation, a settlement of all issues, save that of divorce, was agreed upon by the parties. This agreement was incorporated in a written contract, prepared and approved by respective counsel for the parties. The contract was entitled "Full Marital Settlement Agreement." The enforcement of one of the provisions of this contract, as embodied in its paragraph (e), is the subject of the present litigation. The relevant portions of paragraph (e) are as follows: Following its execution, the contract was submitted to the court for approval, and, several days later, the issue of divorce was tried and a decree was entered granting Mrs. Mignon T. Kennington a divorce from John Andrew Kennington. This decree incorporated the findings of the court with respect to the above contract, as well as this order of the court: There was no appeal from the decree. From the date of the entry of the decree in 1954 until his death in November of 1965, John Andrew Kennington recognized the validity of the obligation which he had assumed and faithfully made all payments as he had contracted to do. Moreover, he also recognized the validity of the divorce decree by contracting two subsequent marriages, the last of which was to the appellant, Mrs. Ardath E. Kennington, who was his fourth wife and to whom he was married at the time of his death. After hearing the case, the chancellor delivered an opinion in which the facts are summarized: It will be noted that the issues raised by appellants' pleadings, are, first, there was no legal consideration for the contract, and second, by having the court approve the contract and insert in the divorce decree its provision for monthly payments, such payments became alimony and subject to modification by the court under changed circumstances, and terminated upon Kennington's death. In addition, it is now urged that the contract, having been made in contemplation of divorce, was fraudulently collusive. This argument is based in large measure, upon this paragraph contained in it. Leaving out of consideration appellee's objection that this is a new question, not raised in the court below, and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, there was no proof to support the charge unless the mere making of the contract is sufficient to give rise to a presumption of collusion. Collusion must relate to the divorce issue and, if present, not only would render the agreement void, but would invalidate the divorce decree. There was appended to the divorce bill the affidavit required by Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 2737 *448 (Supp. 1966), "that it is not filed by collusion with the defendant, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, but that the cause or causes for divorce stated in the bill are true as stated." Moreover, section 2737 provides that no bill for divorce shall be taken as confessed, but shall be heard or determined upon the merits. It will be presumed from the entry of the decree that the court did its duty, that the ground for divorce was duly proven and that the divorce was not the result of collusion. Collusion, which is a form of fraud, will not be presumed, but must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In Foster v. Wright, 240 Miss. 566, 571, 127 So. 2d 873, 875 (1961), this Court said: In Logue v. Logue, 234 Miss. 394, 398-399, 106 So. 2d 498, 499 (1958), this Court said: The last paragraph quoted from Logue is applicable to the facts of this case. Nor was it established that no consideration flowed to John Andrew Kennington under the contract. Kennington's obligations to his wife were defined and limited to those stated in the contract which were to be in lieu of those imposed upon him by law, and otherwise he was released. This was a sufficient legal consideration moving to Kennington to support the contract. When the contract was executed, Mignon T. Kennington was his wife and was the aggrieved party in the divorce action. At the time, Kennington's estate was valued at one and one-half million dollars. His misconduct had not relieved him from any of his obligations, notwithstanding the fact that, by reason of her subsequent divorce, she forfeited the right to claim a share of his estate. The second question raised by the pleadings and argued on this appeal is that the monthly payments constitute alimony and, therefore, either (1) terminated at Kennington's death, or (2) are subject to modification under changed circumstances following his death. While complete unanimity is lacking in the decisions of the courts of the country on the subject, we think the better reasoned cases, as well as the weight of *449 authority, support the validity of contracts such as that under review in this case. Nor can we say that such a contract violates any public policy of the State. A contract under which the husband obligates himself to make periodic payments to his wife so as to bind his estate after his death would seem to have a salutary purpose. It is nearer within that category of public policy which obligates the husband to support and provide for his wife and which underlies the statutory policy giving her the right to renounce his will if an attempt is made to exclude her from a share in his estate. Neither the approval of the contract by the trial court nor the incorporation in the decree of its provisions relating to the monthly payments, had the effect of stripping the obligation of its contract character, or converting the payments to alimony, which terminated at Kennington's death, or which were subject to modification. In 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 911 (1966) is found the following: It was the manifest intention of the parties that the obligation to make the payment should survive the death of Kennington. Also, the contract contained an express provision against merger. In 2 Lindey, Separation Agreements and Ante-Nuptial Contracts, section 31 (1967), it is stated: The same author later had this to say: The contract expressly defines the nature of the obligation as understood and agreed upon by the parties: The claim was duly probated by appellee as a debt against Kennington's estate. Unmatured installments are within the scope of Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 573 (1956), and should be dealt with as provided in that section. We have reached the following conclusions: The relief sought by appellee was in the nature of the specific performance of the contract and her bill contained an offer to do equity. Courts of equity have certain discretionary power in the matter of decreeing the specific performance of contracts and they may and should make equitable modifications in the form of relief granted where to do otherwise would result in undue hardship or injustice. Section 573 is indicative of a public policy of the State favoring the early closing of the estates of decedents as against delays on account of unmatured claims. In 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 875 (1966), it is said that the court has power in a proper case to commute such an unmatured claim to a lump sum payment equal to its present market value. In 18 A.L.R.2d 1140 (1951), it is said: Therefore, the decree of the chancellor, upholding the validity of the contract and sustaining appellee's claim against the estate of John Andrew Kennington, will be affirmed. However, we think that Section 573, supra, as well as the principles of equity, require that the claim, as to future or unmatured payments, be commuted to a lump sum equal to its fair cash value. The case will be remanded for the *451 limited purpose only that a determination may be made by the chancellor of the fair cash value of the claim upon the basis of evidence to be submitted on that question by either party. Affirmed as to liability and remanded for the limited purpose stated in the opinion. ETHRIDGE, C.J., and RODGERS, BRADY and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.