Case Title: DELAURENTIS v DR VAINIO

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13168 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T OF T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 BETTY and LOUIS DeLAURENTIS, P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, DR. L.E. V A I N I O ; HELEN MARIE VANIO, and G L E N N PRYOR, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellants : McCaffery and Peterson, Butte, Montana W . Il. Murray, Jr. argued, Butte, Montana For Respondents: Maurice Maffei argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: March 2, 1976 h ! A M 3 Decided . ?~r. J u s t i c e Gene 3 . 3aly .lelivereJ rhe J p i n i o n 3i- rile Lourt. This i s an appeal from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , 5ilver 3ow County, dissolving a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order and hdlding defendants not i n v i o l a t i o n of a r e s t r i c t i v e covenant ~ r o h i b i t i n g t r a i l e r s o r mobile homes being used a s permanent residences on t h e property i n question. O n June 5, 1975, p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d an action i n the d i s c r i c t court seeking an injunction t o prevent defendants from v ~ o l a t i n g a r e s t r i c t i v e covenant. The complaint alleged t h a t {)Laintiffs Betty and Louis Delaurentis, husband and wife, were t h e owners of Lot No. 6 , McNeece Addition t o the c i t y of Butte, 'vlontana. That defendants L. E. Vainio and Helen Vainio were the Jwrlers of Lot No. 5 , McNeece Addition. i t was alleged defendant 3 ~ e n n Pryor made a commitment t o purchase Lot No. 5 from de- fendants Vainio and intended t o i n s t a l l a " ~ a r r i n g t o n " double wide t r a i l e r upon a permanent foundation on Lot No. 5. The complaint further alleged t h a t the grant deeds t o both l o t s contained a r e s t r i c t i v e covenant t h a t provided: "NO t r a i l e r s o r mobile homes s h a l l be used a s a permanent residence on s a i d premises. I I Upon an a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e v i o l a t i o n of t h e covenant would cause g r e a t and i r r e p a r a b l e i n j u r y t o p l a i n t i f f s , t h e d i s t r i c t Lourt issued a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order and an order t o show cause ordering defendants t o appear f o r hearing on June 16, 1975, and t o cease and d e s i s t from i n s t a l l i n g t h e double wide t r a i l e r on t o c No. 5 i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e r e s t r i c t i v e covenant. Hearing was held on June 16, 1975, on t h e order t o show cause. Thereafter, t h e d i s t r i c t court entered judgment f o r defendants and dissolved the temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order. The court i n i t s judgment and s r d e r s a i d : I I 9 c ; I ; * t h e Barrington Home being purchased by t h e Defendant Glenn Pryor, and t o be erected upon t h e Lot owned by t h e Defendants [Vainio] i s not a t r a i l e r or mobile, but i s a modular home o r house and therefore i s not i n violation of the r e s t r i c t i v e covenant * * *. l I P l a i n t i f f s appeal from the j udgmen t . Numerous issues a r e presented f o r review by t h i s Court, but the controlling issue i s whether t h e structure intended t o be placed on Lot No. 5 i s a t r a i l e r o r mobile home. Was there s u f f i c i e n t credible evidence t o support the judgment of the t r i a l court, which was rendered without findings .of f a c t o r conclusions of law? The s t r u c t u r e i n question i s known a s a Barrington double wide "mobile home". It consists of two u n i t s , each measuring 12' wide by 64' long, and when joined form a home 24' wide by 64' long. It has a shingled roof, house-type siding, and i s a frame construction. Each u n i t was received from the manufacturer with wheels and axles and was sold t o Pryor with the wheels and axles i n t a c t . The structure was manufactured i n Idaho and was c e r t i f i e d by the Recreation and Mobile Home Department of t h a t s t a t e . The structure was purchased from Great Western T r a i l e r Sales i n Butte, Montana, and is t o be placed on a permanent con- c r e t e foundation. Defendants claim and the d i s t r i c t court found, t h a t the s t r u c t u r e i s a modular type home. Defendants give us i n t h e i r b r i e f on appeal, t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of the word "modular", taken from the l a r e s t Merriam-ltrebster dictionary: "adj. r e l a t i n g t o , o r based J L Jimensions f o r f l e x i b i l i t y and v a r i e t y i n use. I f Defendants allege t h e r e a r e t h r e e differences between a modular home and a mobile home ; (1) A modular home can be constructed i n duplicate c e s i l i o ~ ~ Jn the site by a contractor. A mobile home cannot be luplicated by a contractor because "it is made of pieces of metal ,iding and t h e roof i s one piece of s t e e l . " (2) Plodular homes have eaves twelve t o twenty-four inches wide which can be r e t r a c t e d during transportation. Mobile homes i o not have eaves because mobile homes a r e constructed s t r i c t l y of nletal and the eaves cannot be r e t r a c t e d o r folded during trans- ?oxtation. (3) The purpose of wheels and a x l e s on a modular u n i t i s CU :~iuvide an inexpensive means of transporting t h e u n i t from :he factory t o t h e d e a l e r ' s l o t and then t o the building s i t e . ! ' h e purpose of wheels and axles on a mobile home is t o provide a chassis f o r movement upon a highway. The s t r u c t u r e i n question here may very w e l l be characterized ds ,nodular under t h e limited d e f i n i t i o n provided by defendants. !hd s t r u c t u r e a l s o meets the d e f i n i t i o n of a mobile home under "lorltana s t a t u t o r y law. The Montana l e g i s l a t u r e has given t h e donstruction and Maintenance Division of the Montana Department I I .JL Administration a u t h o r i t y t o adopt a d e f i n i t i o n of mobile home" for purposes of adopting and enforcing building codes within the s t a t e . Sections 69-2105(14), 69-2122, R.C.M. 1947. Pursuant t o t h a t a u t h o r i t y t h e Construction and Maintenance Division adopted t h i s d e f i n i t i o n : "(13) Mobile home means any dwelling u n i t l a r g e r than two hundred f i f t y - s i x (256) square f e e t i n a r e a which is e i t h e r wholly o r i n s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t manufactured a t an o f f - s i t e location and any movable o r portable dwelling over thirty-two (32) f e e t i n length and over e i g h t (8) f e e t wide, constructed t o be towed on i t s own c h a s s i s and designed without a permanent foundation f o r year-round occupancy, which includes one (1) o r more components t h a t can be r e t r a c t e d f o r towing purposes and subsequently expanded f o r a d d i t i o n a l capacity, o r of two (2) o r more u n i t s separately towable b u t designed t o be joined i n t o one ( I ) i n t e g r a l u n i t , a s w e l l a s a portable dwelling composed 6f a s i n g l e u n i t . " (Emphasis supplied). MAC 2-2.10(6)-S10220 (13). See a l s o MAC 2-2.10(6)- S10180. Defendants argue t h e s t a t u t e s and cases on t h e subject predate t h e modular home concept and t h e t e r m "modular" should be construed. This i s probably t r u e , however, t h e construction should come from t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . There a r e many reasons f o r t h i s , i n addition t o t h e f a c t t h i s record does not contain expert testimony of such depth o r q u a l i t y t o permit j u d i c i a l d e f i n i t i o n . J e r r y Hanson, salesman f o r Great Western T r a i l e r Sales, who sold t h e double wide t o Glenn Pryor, does not g e t i n t o t h e subject firm enough o r with t h e kind of evidence t h a t could take it out of t h e Montana s t a t u t a r y d e f i n i t i o n . Defendants r a i s e t h e i s s u e t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ' complaint was not properly v e r i f i e d . The objection placed i n t h e d i s t r i c t court was t h a t t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n was on information and b e l i e f . The d i s t r i c t court took t h e motion under advisement and asked f o r b r i e f s and proceeded with t h e hearing. The d i s t r i c t court t h e r e a f t e r r u l e d f o r defendants on the merits and dissolved t h e temporary injunction. This had the l e g a l e f f e c t of a d e n i a l of defendantsf motion t o dismiss p l a i n t i f f s f complaint. This d e n i a l of defendantsf motion is an appealable order and cannot be reviewed on appeal from the judgment on t h e merits. L i t t l e Horn S t a t e Bank v. Gross, 89 Mont. 472, 476, 300 P. 277. I n any event, t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n requirement of section 93-4205, R.C.M. 1947, i s generally conceded t o be f o r t h e purpose o f insuring good f a i t h and t r u t h f u l n e s s on the p a r t of t h e com- plainant. Butte & Boston Consolidated Mining Co. v. Montana Ore ::he complainant t e s t i f i e d under dath on t h e matters contained i r i t h e complaint and a t t h i s juncture t h e i s s u e would become W e Find i n s u f f i c i e n t credible evidence t o support t h e c r ~ a ! . ~ c i u r t . The judgment i s reversed and remanded with d i r e c t i o n ::cj e n t e r judgment for p l a i n t i f f s . /? LL& J u s t i c e 4- M J u s t i c e s - - V ~ d n . Bernard Thomas, ~ i i t r i c t .Tudgc, s i t t i n g i n place of Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison.