Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF DSB, minor child: JA V. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0097

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE INTEREST OF DSB, minor child: JA V. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2008 WY 15176 P.3d 633Case Number: S-07-0097Decided: 02/08/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

IN 
THE INTEREST OF DSB, minor 
child:JA,Appellant(Respondent),v.STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,Appellee(Petitioner).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable  Scott W. Skavdahl, 
Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Orintha 
E. Karns of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Ellen Rutledge, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stacey L. Obrecht, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. 
Rutledge.      

 
 

Guardian 
Ad Litem:

Mary Ann 
Budenske, PovertyLawCenter of 
Wyoming, Inc., Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      JA (Mother) 
appeals from the juvenile court's ruling that she neglected her minor son, DSB 
(the child).  She claims the 
juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the neglect action 
instituted by the State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services (DFS) 
because the adjudicatory hearing was not held within 90 days after the original 
petition was filed.     

 
 
[¶2]      We conclude the 
juvenile court did not lose jurisdiction to consider the neglect action under 
the circumstances of this case and affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Mother presents 
the following issues for review:

 
 

A.                 
Does 
a violation of the statutorily mandated ninety (90) day time limit within which 
a juvenile court must hold an adjudicatory hearing result in a loss of subject 
matter jurisdiction?

 
 

B.                 
In 
the alternative, what is the appropriate remedy for a violation of the 
statutorily mandated ninety (90) day time limit within which a juvenile court 
must hold an adjudicatory hearing?

 
 
DFS 
phrases the issues as:

 
 

I.                    
Whether 
this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal due to appellant's failure to 
file a notice of appeal in Juvenile Action No. 9903.

 
 

II.                  
Whether 
subject matter jurisdiction, after being acquired, is lost from failure to 
adhere to the statutory procedural requirements.

 
 

III.                
Whether 
the juvenile court abused its discretion in dismissing the first action without 
prejudice?

 
 
The 
guardian ad litem also presented a brief on appeal but did not identify any 
additional or different issues.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      The underlying 
facts of this case generally are not important to the resolution of this 
appeal.  We will, therefore, only 
relate those aspects of the facts and course of proceedings that are pertinent 
to the issues presented.  

 
 
[¶5]      On October 16, 
2006, the child was placed in protective custody because Mother left him with an 
elderly gentleman who suffered from dementia and Alzheimer's disease.   DFS filed a petition on October 
18, 2006, alleging that Mother had neglected the child.  At the shelter care hearing held that 
same day, the juvenile court gave DFS legal and physical custody of the 
child.  The court scheduled the 
initial hearing for November 3, 2006, at which time Mother was to admit or deny 
the allegations of the neglect petition.  
She did not appear at that hearing.    

 
 
[¶6]      Mother finally 
appeared for her initial hearing on November 27, 2006, and formally denied the 
allegations of the neglect petition.  
The juvenile court scheduled the adjudicatory hearing for January 31, 
2007105 days after the petition was filed.  Two days before the adjudicatory 
hearing, Mother filed a motion to dismiss the case.  She argued that the juvenile court had 
lost subject matter jurisdiction over the neglect action under the relevant 
Wyoming 
statutes because more than 90 days had passed since the petition was filed and 
the neglect action should be dismissed with prejudice.      

 
 
[¶7]      The juvenile 
court held a hearing on Mother's motion to dismiss at the time scheduled for the 
adjudicatory hearing.  After 
reviewing the statutory language and the course of proceedings in the case, the 
juvenile court concluded that dismissal of the petition was appropriate.  It ruled, however, that the dismissal 
would be without prejudice and allowed DFS to re-file the case.  DFS did so immediately, and a combined 
initial and adjudicatory hearing was held later that day.    

 
 
[¶8]      After the 
combined hearing, the juvenile court found that the child had been neglected by 
Mother.  Mother filed a notice of 
appeal in the second case, appealing from the juvenile court's order after the 
initial and adjudicatory hearing.  
Although she attached the order dismissing the first case without 
prejudice as an appendix to her notice of appeal, she did not expressly state 
that she was appealing that order.    

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
1.         
Appellate Jurisdiction 

 
 
[¶9]      Initially, we 
must consider DFS's claim that we do not have jurisdiction over the questions 
presented here because Mother did not appeal from the order dismissing the first 
case without prejudice.  This issue 
implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court.  Subject matter jurisdiction is an issue 
of law that may be raised at any time by any party or by the court on its own 
motion.  Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Campbell County, 
2006 WY 44, ¶ 36, 132 P.3d 801, 813 (Wyo. 2006); Wooster v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 1, 
2005 WY 47, ¶ 33, 109 P.3d 893, 902 (Wyo. 2005).    

 
 
[¶10]   In general, jurisdiction is "the 
power to hear and determine the matter in controversy between the parties." McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1290 
(Wyo. 
1980).  It is "conferred when a 
court has general power over matters of the type involved in the particular 
case; the proceeding is initiated in the particular manner required; and there 
is notice to the parties."  DB v. State of Wyo., Dep't of Family 
Servs. (In re MFB), 860 P.2d 1140, 1146 (Wyo. 1993); McGuire, 608 P.2d  at 1290.  Subject matter jurisdiction, 
specifically, is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class of 
which the proceeding belongs."  DF v. MLM (In re MKM), 792 P.2d 1369, 
1373 (Wyo. 
1990).  Subject matter jurisdiction 
either exists or it does not, and "before proceeding to a disposition on the 
merits, a court should be satisfied it does have the requisite 
jurisdiction."  Id.  
With regard to appellate jurisdiction, W.R.A.P. 1.03 states in 
relevant part:  "The timely filing 
of a notice of appeal, which complies with Rule 2.07(a), is 
jurisdictional."  W.R.A.P. 2.07(a) 
requires that the appellant identify in the notice of appeal the judgment or 
appealable order appealed.  

 
 
[¶11]   As indicated above, Mother only 
appealed from the order following the combined initial and adjudicatory hearing 
in the second case.  Although she 
attached the order dismissing the first case to her notice of appeal, she did 
not indicate that she was appealing from that order.  DFS claims that Mother failed to comply 
with W.R.A.P. 1.03 because she did not appeal from the order dismissing the 
first case and her "entire argument" relates to that case as opposed to the 
second case.  We disagree.  

 
 
[¶12]   As explained in more detail below, 
Mother claims that the juvenile court lost subject matter jurisdiction over the 
entire neglect action because it failed to hold a hearing within 90 days of the 
filing of the original petition.  
That argument carried forward in the second case.  The juvenile court recognized the 
continued viability of the subject matter jurisdiction issue in the second case 
and stated:  

 
 
            
Any objections at this time [to] proceeding forward to adjudication, 
understanding, Counsel, that the prior objection and request for the matter to 
be dismissed with prejudice would remain of record[?]  And, obviously, I understand you're not 
waiving that objection that you made in that previous case and would allow that 
argument to be incorporated by reference here for purposes of the dismissal that 
it should have been with prejudice in [the first action].

 
 
[¶13]   We, therefore, conclude that the 
issue of whether the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
neglect action was effectively joined in the second case and this Court has 
jurisdiction to consider the issue despite the fact that Mother did not file a 
notice of appeal of the order dismissing the first case without prejudice.  

            
   

            
2.         Juvenile Court's Jurisdiction Over Neglect 
Action

 
 
[¶14]   The Wyoming constitution and statutes grant the 
juvenile courts subject matter jurisdiction over neglect matters.  Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 29 authorizes the 
legislature to create juvenile courts as needed and provides that "[s]uch courts 
shall have such jurisdiction as the legislature may by law provide."  Pursuant to the Child Protection Act, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-3-401 through 14-3-440 (LexisNexis 2007), the juvenile 
courts have jurisdiction over neglect proceedings.  Thus, the juvenile court had "the power 
to hear and determine the general class of cases in which this proceeding 
belonged."  DB, 860 P.2d  at 1147.  See also, JW v. State ex rel. LaramieCounty Dep't of Public Assist. & 
Social Servs. (In re WM), 778 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Wyo. 1989); DF, 792 P.2d  at 1373.  The question in this case is whether the 
juvenile court lost subject matter jurisdiction over the entire neglect action 
when it failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in the 
statutes.

 
 
[¶15]   Section 14-3-426 articulates the 
procedural requirements for initial appearances on child neglect petitions.  That section states in relevant 
part:

 
 
(a) At 
their initial hearing, which may be held after a shelter care hearing or a 
transfer hearing, the child and his parents, guardian or custodian shall be 
advised by the court of their rights under law and as provided in this act.   They shall also be advised of the 
specific allegations in the petition and given an opportunity to admit or deny 
them.   . . . 

 
 
            
(b) If the allegations of the petition are denied, the court may, with 
consent of the parties, proceed immediately to hear evidence on the petition or 
it may set a later time not to exceed sixty (60) days for an adjudicatory 
hearing, unless the court finds good cause to delay or postpone the 
hearing.  In no case shall the court hold the 
adjudicatory hearing more than ninety (90) days after the date the petition is 
filed.  Only competent, relevant 
and material evidence shall be admissible at an adjudicatory hearing to 
determine the truth of the allegations in the petition.  If after an adjudicatory hearing the 
court finds that the allegations in the petition are not established as required 
by this act, it shall dismiss the petition and order the child released from any 
shelter care  (emphasis 
added).

 
 

Id.  See also, § 14-3-409(c) (delineating the 
same time requirements when the allegations are denied during a shelter care 
hearing).  

 
 
[¶16]   Mother claims that the failure of 
the juvenile court to hold an adjudicatory hearing within 90 days of the filing 
of the original petition resulted in a loss of subject matter jurisdiction over 
the entire neglect matter.  We must 
interpret the relevant statutory provisions to determine whether the legislature 
intended to revoke the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction under these 
circumstances.  

 
 
[¶17]   In resolving this issue, we review 
the juvenile court's decision de novo 
by applying our well established rules of statutory interpretation.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Dep't of Revenue, 2007 WY 43, ¶ 9, 154 P.3d 331, 334 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 
"We look 
first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute 
is ambiguous. A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that 
reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and 
predictability.  Conversely, a 
statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to 
varying interpretations. If we determine that a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute."

 
 

RME 
Petroleum Co. v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue, 2007 
WY 16, ¶¶ 25, 28, 150 P.3d 673, 683-84 (Wyo. 2007) (citations 
omitted).

 
 

Id., ¶ 13, 
154 P.3d  at 335.  

 
 
   "When the language is not clear or 
is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief the statute was intended to 
cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the 
state, the conclusions of law, and other prior and contemporaneous facts and 
circumstances, making use of the accepted rules of construction to ascertain a 
legislative intent that is reasonable and consistent." 

 
 

State ex 
rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983).  

            

Id., 
¶ 15, 
154 P.3d  at 335.  The question of 
whether a statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the 
court.  Id., ¶ 13, 154 P.3d  at 335.  
  

 
 
[¶18]   The statutory language regarding 
the time for holding an adjudicatory hearing is plain and unambiguous.1  Sections 14-3-409(c) and 14-3-426(b) 
clearly state that "in no case" shall a hearing be held more than 90 days after 
the petition was filed.  Thus, under 
the clear language of the statutes, after a respondent denies the allegations of 
a neglect petition, the juvenile court must hold an adjudicatory hearing no 
later than 90 days after the petition was filed.  

 
 
[¶19]   Unfortunately, the statutes do not 
include a statement of the appropriate remedy for failing to follow the 
statutory deadline.  DB involved a prior statute which stated 
that, if the allegations of the petition were denied, the juvenile court was 
required to "set" an adjudicatory hearing within "a time not to exceed sixty 
(60) days."  DB, 860 P.2d  at 1148.  In response to the appellant's claim 
that the juvenile court had lost subject matter jurisdiction over the neglect 
proceeding by failing to meet the statutory deadline, we stated that an 
unequivocal expression from the legislature is required before a juvenile court 
loses subject matter jurisdiction over a neglect action for a violation of the 
statutory language and that no such unequivocal expression was included in the 
statutes in effect at that time.  
Id. at 
1149.  

 
 
[¶20]   Likewise, §§ 14-3-409 and 14-3-426 
do not state that the failure to hold an adjudicatory hearing within 90 days 
results in a loss of subject matter jurisdiction over the alleged incident of 
neglect; nor, do they state that the action cannot be dismissed without 
prejudice and re-filed.  Thus, there 
is no unequivocal language in the relevant statutes stating that the juvenile 
court loses subject matter jurisdiction to consider the alleged neglect, such 
that a dismissal with prejudice is required, when the statutory deadline is 
violated.  

 
 
[¶21]   We presume that the legislature is 
aware of all existing law on a particular subject relating to a newly enacted or 
amended statute.  Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 1383, 1388 
(Wyo. 
1991).  When it was considering the 
provisions of the Child Protection Act, which was originally adopted in 1997 and 
has since been amended, the legislature was presumably aware of our statement in 
DB that in order to establish that a 
court loses jurisdiction over a matter for violation of a statutory deadline an 
unequivocal expression of that intent is necessary.  The language adopted by the legislature 
in §§ 14-3-409 and 14-3-426 did not accomplish that result. 

            

            
3.         
Remedy for Violating Statutory 
Deadline

 
 
[¶22]   Having concluded that the juvenile 
court did not lose subject matter jurisdiction over the neglect action, we turn 
to the question of the appropriate remedy when the statutory deadline is 
violated.  In order to give effect 
to the statutory language in §§ 14-3-409 and 14-3-426, the juvenile court in 
this case decided the appropriate remedy was to dismiss the neglect petition 
without prejudice and give DFS the opportunity to re-file the charges.  Mother argues that if DFS is allowed to 
re-file the charges after the original 90 day deadline has expired, the purpose 
of the deadline is undermined.  We 
agree that statutes must be construed in light of their objective purposes. 
 DF,792 P.2d  at 1374.  We do not, however, agree that allowing 
the juvenile court to dismiss the petition without prejudice and give DFS the 
opportunity to re-file the neglect charges undermines the purposes of the 
relevant statutes.  

 
 
[¶23]   The purpose of the 90 day deadline 
is, obviously, to ensure a relatively speedy resolution of child protection 
matters to reduce the amount of uncertainty in the child's life and prevent an 
undue infringement on the constitutionally protected parent-child 
relationship.  However, as is 
obvious from its title, the overriding purpose of the Child Protection Act and 
similar statutes is to protect children.  
See DF, 792 P.2d  at 1374 (discussing the 
purposes of the statutes in effect at that time).  

 
 
[¶24]   Moreover, in DB we recognized that the parties have 
some responsibility for making sure the statutory deadline is followed.  We stated that the proper remedy for the 
juvenile court's failure to set a timely hearing is "a motion to the juvenile 
court for a prompt hearing" and, if such a motion is not acted upon in a timely 
fashion by the juvenile court, a "petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be 
filed in this court seeking release of the minor."  DB, 860 P.2d  at 1150.  We do not believe that the legislative 
modification to the statute after DB, 
which requires that the adjudicatory hearing be held within 90 days after 
the petition is filed, completely 
relieved the parties of the obligation to ensure the statutory deadlines are 
followed.  

 
 
[¶25]   By dismissing the petition without 
prejudice, the juvenile court placed the burden on DFS to re-file the 
charges.  Although it did not happen 
in this case, DFS may, in some instances, decide not to re-file the neglect 
allegations, resulting in an end to the action.  Moreover, as recognized in DB, the parent has a responsibility to 
seek a timely resolution of the matter.  
To allow a parent to delay the proceedings, fail to call the court's 
attention to the timing problem, and then qualify for a dismissal of the 
proceedings with prejudice when the juvenile court fails to meet the statutory 
deadline would certainly undermine the goal of protecting children.  Although we were interpreting a 
different statute in DF, 792 P.2d  at 
1374, our observation in that case that "[w]e cannot think of a result more 
absurd than to cause a vulnerable child to become unprotected while under the 
protective wing of our court system" is still accurate.  The juvenile court's decision to dismiss 
the action without prejudice placed the burden on DFS to re-file the charges and 
encourages parties to draw the court's attention to a timing problem, while 
discouraging parents from taking actions to delay the proceedings in hopes of 
securing a final dismissal of the action.  

 
 
[¶26]   Finally, in a vague argument, 
Mother suggests that the juvenile court's decision to remedy the statutory 
violation by dismissing the action without prejudice and giving DFS the 
opportunity to re-file the charges violated her due process rights.  The party claiming a due process 
violation has the burden of demonstrating a protected interest and that "such 
interest has been affected in an impermissible way."  DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re "H" 
Children), 2003 WY 155, ¶ 38, 79 P.3d 997, 1008 (Wyo. 2003).  "Actions infringing upon the 
parent-child relationship may affect fundamental rights, thereby entitling 
parents to due process."  Id., ¶ 39, 79 P.3d  at 
1008.

 
 
[¶27]   Mother's argument is a procedural 
due process argument, focusing on the delay in adjudication and the effect that 
such a delay may have on her ability to take the steps necessary to accomplish 
reunification with the child.  We 
have said that reasonable notice and the opportunity for a fair hearing are the 
touchstones of procedural due process.  
Chevron, ¶ 31, 154 P.3d  at 
341.  In this case, despite the fact 
that the adjudicatory hearing was delayed, Mother was provided with those 
protections.  

 
 
[¶28]   Moreover, Mother made no showing 
that the technical statutory violation restricted her efforts toward 
reunification with the child.  In 
fact, there is no indication in the record that she was prejudiced in any way by 
the delay in holding the adjudicatory hearing.  Thus, Mother has not established that 
her right to due process of law was affected in an impermissible way.  See generally, DH, ¶ 48, 79 P.3d  at 1011 
(indicating that appellant had failed to establish a procedural due process 
violation, in part, because she did not show that she was prejudiced by the 
procedures used in her case).2   

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶29]   The plain language of the Child 
Protection Act does not unequivocally state that the juvenile court loses 
subject matter jurisdiction over the incident of neglect when it violates the 
statutory requirement that an adjudicatory hearing be held within 90 days after 
the petition was filed.  Moreover, 
the legislature did not state that the petition could not be dismissed without 
prejudice and re-filed.  The 
juvenile court gave due attention to the 90 day deadline, while still protecting 
the child, by dismissing the petition without prejudice and giving DFS the 
opportunity to re-file the neglect allegations.

 
 
[¶30]   Affirmed.  

            

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1DFS directs 
us to cases from other jurisdictions to aid in the interpretation of the 
Wyoming 
statutes at issue here.  We do not 
find these cases to be particularly helpful because of the vagaries in statutory 
language.

  

2Our rulings 
effectively dispose of all of Mother's appellate issues.  Consequently, we will not consider DFS's 
additional argument that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by 
dismissing the first case without prejudice.