Case Title: Omar Blanco v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC03-1328

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-1328 
____________ 
 
OMAR BLANCO,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[April 12, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Omar Blanco, a prisoner sentenced to death, appeals the summary denial of 
his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.850.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons 
explained below, we affirm the denial of Blanco’s motion. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 14, 1982, at about 11 p.m., Blanco entered the home of John 
Ryan.  Ryan’s niece, fourteen-year-old Thalia Vezos, was in bed reading when she 
saw Blanco standing in the hallway holding a gun and carrying a brown purse 
under his arm.  Blanco entered her room, told Thalia to stay quiet, and then cut the 
telephone wires in her room.  As Blanco left Thalia’s room into the hallway, he 
immediately encountered John Ryan.  A struggle ensued during which Blanco shot 
Ryan.  Ryan fell on top of Thalia, who lay in her bed.  Before fleeing, Blanco shot 
Ryan six more times.   
Having seen the intruder for several minutes both in her room and in the 
adjacent hallway, Thalia provided police with a description of the assailant.  A 
neighbor also informed police that he saw a man wearing a gray jogging suit leave 
the property.  Shortly before midnight, an officer spotted Blanco riding a bicycle 
about one to one-and-a-half miles from the home.  The officer determined that 
Blanco matched the description provided by Thalia and the neighbor.  Blanco was 
taken to the Vezos home, where the neighbor identified Blanco “as having the 
same profile and jogging suit” as the person he saw.  A brown men’s purse 
containing Blanco’s ID papers and Thalia’s watch was found near Thalia’s 
bedroom.  The following morning Thalia identified Blanco in a lineup. 
Blanco was tried and convicted of armed burglary and sentenced to death for 
the murder of John Ryan.  On direct appeal, we affirmed the convictions and 
sentences.  Blanco v. State, 452 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181 
(1985). 1  We also affirmed Blanco’s subsequent appeal from denial of his first 
                                          
 
 
1.  Blanco raised nine issues on appeal:  the trial court erred (1) in denying 
the motion to suppress evidence, (2) in denying admission of evidence of a prior 
armed robbery committed in the neighborhood, (3) in announcing its ruling on a 
 
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motion for postconviction relief, and denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1987). 2  A federal court later vacated 
the death sentence based on ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel.  
Blanco v. Dugger, 691 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Blanco v. 
                                                                                                                                        
previously argued motion in Blanco’s absence, (4) in allowing Blanco to call 
witnesses against defense counsel’s advice, (5) in denying Blanco’s motion to 
suppress witness identification testimony, (6) in allowing the State to impeach 
Blanco with statements that had been suppressed under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), (7) in instructing the jury on burglary, (8) in sentencing Blanco 
separately for burglary where the first-degree murder conviction was based on 
felony murder, and (9) in imposing the death penalty. 
 
2.  This Court found the following claims were procedurally barred:  the trial 
court erred (1) in permitting appellant to call witnesses against the advice of 
defense counsel,  (2) by conducting critical stages of the trial in the absence of 
Blanco or an interpreter, (3) in questioning Blanco concerning the presentation of 
his defense, (4) by improperly instructing the jury on the number of jurors required 
to return a life recommendation,  (5) by improperly relying on the armed burglary 
conviction as an aggravating factor, and  (6) by improperly relying on a prior 
armed robbery conviction as an aggravating factor;  (7) the jury instructions 
unconstitutionally denigrated the jury's role in recommending life or death; and (8) 
the prosecutor used inflammatory closing arguments.  Blanco, 507 So. 2d at 1380.  
The court also affirmed denial of relief on the following claims:  that trial counsel 
was ineffective for (1) failing in voir dire to effectively deal with prejudice against 
Mariel refugees and (2) failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence, 
including failing to go to Cuba for evidence; (3) that a conflict of interest existed 
between him and defense counsel over presentation of witnesses; and (4) that he 
was incompetent to stand trial and counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this 
issue.  Id. at 1381-83. 
 
In his habeas petition, Blanco alleged most of the claims raised in the 
postconviction proceeding, claiming that appellate counsel failed to recognize 
fundamental error in trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.  Blanco, 507 So. 2d at 1384.  
We rejected this argument because rule 3.850 provides the proper remedy for such 
claims. We also rejected Blanco’s claim of entitlement to repatriation to Cuba. 
 
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Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir. 1991). 3  During the pendency of the 
resentencing proceedings, Blanco filed his third motion for postconviction relief, 
alleging newly discovered evidence.4  After holding an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court denied relief, and we affirmed.  Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 
1997). 5 
 
After a second penalty phase, the jury recommended death by a ten-to-two 
vote, and the trial court sentenced Blanco to death, based on two aggravating 
circumstances: prior violent felony and pecuniary gain and commission during a 
burglary.  Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 8 & n.5  (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 837 (1998).  We affirmed.  Id. at 8.6 
                                          
 
 
3.  In the federal habeas proceedings, Blanco raised both guilt phase and 
penalty phase issues.  The court, however, remanded for a new sentencing phase 
based only on trial court interference in the penalty phase and ineffective 
assistance of counsel in allowing trial court interference and failing to investigate 
and present mitigation. 
 
4.  In 1989, Blanco filed his second postconviction motion during the federal 
habeas proceedings, but it was dismissed as moot when the federal court ordered 
resentencing. 
 
5.  Blanco alleged newly discovered evidence based on the theory that 
Enrique Gonzales was the real killer.  Two witnesses testified they saw Gonzales 
in a bloody shirt the night of the murder.  Blanco also introduced letters of Julio 
Guerra and “Mamita” that Gonzales confessed to the crime in prison.  On appeal, 
we denied Blanco’s claim that this evidence entitled Blanco to a new trial and that 
the trial court erred in denying Blanco’s motion for disqualification.  Blanco, 702 
So. 2d at 1251-52 & n.4. 
 
6.  On appeal, Blanco raised seven issues: the trial court erred in (1) refusing 
him the mental health expert of his choice, (2) refusing to instruct on the statutory 
mitigator of extreme duress, (3) improperly giving weight to the previous jury’s 
death recommendation; (4) giving insufficient weight to the mitigating 
 
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Following his resentencing, Blanco filed a rule 3.850 motion for 
postconviction relief in which he raised twenty-two claims.  After a Huff hearing,7 
the trial court summarily denied each claim. 
II. ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Blanco raises the following issues, which we address in turn: that 
the trial court erred (A) in denying his motion to require law enforcement officers 
to run a latent fingerprint through the Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(AFIS); (B) in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding allegedly tainted 
evidence; and (C) in summarily denying most of his claims both individually and 
cumulatively. 
A. THE AFIS SEARCH 
 
During the postconviction proceedings after resentencing, Blanco filed a 
motion to require state officials to run through a national database of fingerprints 
the latent fingerprint found on Thalia Vezos’s bedroom door at the time of the 
murder.  He alleged that the print belonged to the “real” killer.  After a hearing, the 
circuit court denied the motion.  Blanco argues that (1) the trial court erred in 
                                                                                                                                        
circumstance of impoverished background; (5) that the death sentence lacked 
proportionality; (6) that the murder in the course of a felony aggravator is 
unconstitutional; and (7) that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Blanco, 706 So. 2d at 9 & n.8.   
 
7.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1983) (requiring a hearing upon 
the filing of a postconviction motion and answer to determine whether an 
evidentiary hearing is needed and to hear argument on legal issues). 
 
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denying his motion to require that an unidentified latent fingerprint found at the 
crime scene in 1982 be run through AFIS for identification; (2) that possible leads 
resulting from using AFIS would constitute newly discovered evidence; and (3) 
that the State’s failure to run the print through AFIS at this time violated Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 
(1972).  As we explain, we reject each of these contentions. 
 
A trial court’s ruling denying postconviction discovery is subject to review 
for abuse of discretion.  State v. Lewis, 656 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 1994) (holding 
that the court has inherent authority, upon good cause shown, to permit limited 
discovery on postconviction claims into relevant and material matters and that 
denial of such a motion is subject to abuse of discretion review).  The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion here.  During the 1982 guilt phase, an expert testified 
that a latent fingerprint found on the door of Thalia Vezos’s room remained 
unidentified.  He estimated that the print could have been left at least ten days 
before the murder.  No fingerprint evidence was admitted against Blanco, and 
Thalia testified that the killer wore socks over his hands.  Further, at trial Thalia 
identified Blanco, and another eyewitness identified him as matching the form he 
saw leaving the home shortly after the murder.  Blanco’s wallet and identification 
papers were found at the murder scene, and Blanco, who does not live in the area 
of the victim’s home, was arrested shortly after the murder within one-and-a-half 
 
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miles of the home.  Finally, at the hearing on the motion, Blanco admitted that his 
expert had determined that the latent print also did not match Enrique Gonzalez, a 
defense witness at trial whom Blanco has long contended is the “real” murderer.  
In addition, in his brief, Blanco admits that his expert also determined that the 
latent print did not match the fingerprints of anyone he believed to be a suspect.  
Accordingly, Blanco has not shown that his request would result in relevant or 
material evidence.  
 
The remaining claims regarding this issue are not preserved.  At the hearing 
on the AFIS motion, Blanco expressly disavowed that he was arguing newly 
discovered evidence, and he did not allege Brady or Giglio violations either.  
Accordingly, these claims are waived and we do not address them. 
B. THE EVIDENCE BOX 
At trial in 1982, the evidence showed that the killer wore socks on his hands 
and dropped them on the floor.  During postconviction proceedings, Blanco filed a 
motion to compel production of the socks, which he alleged were missing from the 
evidence box.  He further claimed that because the items in the box were not 
separately packaged, the socks were probably tainted and DNA testing was likely 
impossible.  The circuit court held a hearing, at which the court’s chief evidence 
clerk testified that the socks were in the box and were separately packaged.  He 
suggested that defense counsel may have been confused by the difference between 
 
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the number assigned the evidence at trial and the new number assigned at 
resentencing.  With the socks thus produced, the circuit court granted the defense’s 
motion to compel. 
 
On appeal, Blanco argues (1) that the trial court erred by not holding an 
evidentiary hearing on his claim that all of the evidence in the box was tainted; and 
(2) that the socks were not in the box when defense counsel originally examined it 
and that the socks probably could not be DNA tested.   
Blanco’s first argument is not preserved for review.  On appeal, Blanco 
contends that the bloody clothes of the victim were commingled with Blanco’s 
clothes.  At the hearing on Blanco’s motion to compel, however, defense counsel 
did not argue due process was violated because the evidence in the box was 
contaminated.  Nor did he present evidence or ask for a ruling on the issue. 
 
Regarding the second claim, the record shows that the clerk determined that 
the socks were in the box and defense counsel agreed that the socks produced were 
the requested evidence.  Further, at the hearing, defense counsel requested, and 
was granted permission, to review the feasibility of DNA testing.  The record 
contains no evidence that Blanco took any further action. 
On appeal, Blanco also contends that the socks cannot now be tested for 
gunshot residue.  This claim was never presented to the circuit court and is not 
 
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preserved for review.  Accordingly, as to all of these claims, Blanco has failed to 
demonstrate trial court error. 
C. SUMMARY DENIAL OF BLANCO’S TWENTY-TWO CLAIMS 
In his fourth motion for postconviction relief, Blanco raised twenty-two 
claims.  After a Huff hearing, the trial court summarily denied all of them.  Blanco 
appeals as to each claim and also argues that the trial court erred in failing to 
consider their cumulative impact. 
A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on postconviction claims 
unless the motion and record conclusively show that the defendant is entitled to no 
relief.  See Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509, 516 (Fla. 1999).  A defendant is 
entitled to no relief when his postconviction motion claims are legally insufficient, 
procedurally barred, or otherwise meritless.  Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 355 
(Fla. 2004).  Based on this standard, we deny all of Blanco’s claims, as we explain 
below. 
Procedurally Barred Claims 
Claims that could have been raised in prior proceedings are procedurally 
barred.  See Muhammad v. State, 603 So. 2d 488, 489 (Fla. 1992) (“Issues which 
either were or could have been litigated at trial and upon direct appeal are not 
cognizable through collateral attack.”).  Because this is Blanco’s fourth 
postconviction motion—although his first after resentencing—we reject the 
 
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following claims as procedurally barred: that lingering questions about the crime 
scene investigation require an evidentiary hearing to reach a final resolution; that 
the State unlawfully procured the absence of Enrique Gonzalez and Fidel Romero, 
whom Blanco claims are the actual murderers; that the trial court prevented Blanco 
from testifying during the second penalty phase; that Blanco was prejudiced by his 
absence from the courtroom during certain portions of the guilt phase; that the 
State used false or misleading evidence during the guilt phase; all guilt phase 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; issues concerning gunshot residue testing, 
which were previously raised at trial; a challenge to the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony during the guilt phase of the trial; and claims that Florida’s death penalty 
and sentencing laws are unconstitutional.  
Meritless Claims 
We find that the remainder of Blanco’s claims are meritless.  First, we reject 
Blanco’s claim that counsel told him he was not permitted to testify on his own 
behalf during the second penalty phase.  Ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  According to 
Strickland, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant 
must show (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant to 
such a degree as to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Id.  The record makes 
 
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clear that counsel made Blanco aware, in open court, of his right to testify.  
Blanco’s claim therefore fails the first prong of the Strickland test. 
We reject Blanco’s claim that penalty phase counsel failed to adequately 
investigate psychological and psychiatric mitigation evidence.  The record clearly 
demonstrates that two mental health experts presented testimony on Blanco’s 
behalf during the second penalty phase.  We also reject Blanco’s claim that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to present certain statutory and nonstatutory mitigators 
during the second penalty phase.  The record reflects that the mitigators Blanco 
argues should have been presented at his penalty phase are inconsistent with his 
theory of the case: that he is innocent of Mr. Ryan’s murder.  We therefore find 
that counsel’s performance was not deficient.  Blanco also argues that his second 
penalty phase counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of a plea deal the 
State offered, and that upon Blanco’s rejection of the deal the State acted 
vindictively in seeking the death penalty.  These claims are meritless because the 
record clearly indicates the State never offered Blanco any plea deal. 
Blanco’s claims that the trial court erred in failing to develop a record from 
which it could conduct a proportionality review and that, in affirming his 
conviction, this Court failed to include an in-depth study of its proportionality 
review, are also meritless.  Proportionality is inherently reviewed on direct appeal, 
regardless of whether such review is mentioned in this Court’s published opinions.  
 
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Patton v. State, 878 So. 2d 368, 380 (Fla. 2004).  We conducted a proportionality 
review of Blanco’s case in Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1997).  We find no 
deficiency in the record that would have precluded an effective review at that time.   
Blanco also argues that since the time of his trial DNA testing technology 
has undergone considerable development, but fails to claim what evidence should 
be submitted for further testing.  To the extent that Blanco appears to present a 
newly discovered evidence claim, such claims are governed by Jones v. State, 709 
So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).   According to Jones, in order to obtain relief on a 
claim of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must establish that (1) the 
evidence was not known at the time of trial and could not have been discovered 
through the use of due diligence, and (2) the newly discovered evidence is of such 
a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.  Blanco’s claim fails 
the second prong of the Jones test because he fails to demonstrate how improved 
DNA testing procedures would probably lead to an acquittal on retrial.  This claim 
is therefore legally insufficient and meritless.  Id.  We also reject Blanco’s claim 
that the trial court failed to cite the record in addressing each of his claims.  The 
trial court addressed each claim in its order by directly citing the record or by 
adopting portions of the State’s response.  We find no error.   
 
Because we affirm the trial court’s denial of Blanco’s twenty-two individual 
claims, his claim based on the cumulative effect of these errors must also fail.  A 
 
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claim of cumulative error is without merit where each of the underlying claims is 
without merit.  Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861, 871 (Fla. 2003).   
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of 
Blanco’s postconviction motion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Barry E. Goldstein, Judge - Case No. 82-453-CF10A 
 
Ira W. Still, III, Coral Springs, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Leslie T. Campbell, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
 
 
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