Case Title: State ex rel. Auglaize Mercer Community Action Comm., Inc. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm.

Citation: 1995-Ohio-180

Docket Number: 19950368

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1995-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Auglaize Mercer Community Action Commission, Inc., 
Appellant, v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, Appellee. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Auglaize Mercer Community Action Comm., Inc. v. Ohio Civ. 
Rights Comm. (1995),          Ohio St.3d         .] 
Mandamus to compel Ohio Civil Rights Commission to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on attorney fees under R.C. 119.092 -- Writ denied, when. 
(No. 95-368 -- Submitted July 26, 1995 -- Decided October 11, 1995.) 
 
Appeal  from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD06-802. 
 
On April 27, 1990, J. Lee Grant filed a charge with appellee, Ohio Civil 
Rights Commission (“commission”), alleging that appellant, Auglaize Mercer 
Community Action Commission, Inc. (“AMCAC”), had engaged in unlawful 
discriminatory practices.  AMCAC is a nonprofit corporation formed as a 
community action commission pursuant to R.C. 122.69.   
 
After the commission determined that there was probable cause to support 
Grant’s charge, and attempts at conciliation failed, the commission issued a 
complaint.  A hearing on the case was held before Franklin A. Martens, the Chief 
Hearing Examiner of the commission.  At the hearing, AMCAC was represented 
# 9776 
2
by private counsel. Thereafter, the hearing examiner issued a report recommending 
that the commission dismiss the complaint.   
 
On June 14, 1993, AMCAC filed an “application for allowance of 
compensation and reimbursement of expenses on behalf of attorney for the 
respondent,” purportedly in accordance with R.C. 119.092.  The commission 
subsequently accepted the hearing examiner’s recommendation and dismissed the 
case.  By letter dated February 18, 1994, AMCAC requested the hearing examiner 
to schedule a hearing on its application for attorney fees under R.C. 119.092.  The 
hearing examiner responded by stating in a letter to AMCAC’s counsel: 
 
“The Hearing Unit no longer has jurisdiction over the above captioned case.  
Our jurisdiction ended when the Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner’s 
Report. 
 
“For your information, I am also not aware of any statutory authorization to 
award fees and costs to a prevailing Respondent in an administrative proceeding 
before the Commission. 
 
“If you wish to pursue this matter further, I suggest you do so through 
Commission counsel.”   
# 9776 
3
 
After it became apparent that the commission would not hold a hearing on 
AMCAC’s request for attorney fees, AMCAC filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County for a writ of mandamus compelling the commission 
to hold a hearing pursuant to R.C. 119.092.  The parties filed motions for summary 
judgment and stipulations of fact.  On January 19, 1995, the court of appeals 
granted summary judgment in favor of respondent and denied the writ of 
mandamus.   
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
Benjamin F. Yale & Associates Co. and Benjamin F. Yale. for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Nancy Holland Myers, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling the 
commission to hold an evidentiary hearing on attorney fees under R.C. 119.092, 
AMCAC had to establish (1) a clear legal right to a hearing, (2) a corresponding 
legal duty on the part of the commission to hold a hearing, and (3) the lack of an 
adequate remedy at law.  See State ex rel. Shimola v. Cleveland (1994), 70 Ohio 
# 9776 
4
St.3d 110, 112, 637 N.E.2d 325, 326.  Further, Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before 
summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine 
issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that 
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most 
strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the 
nonmoving party.  State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn.(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 631 N.E.2d 150, 152. 
 
The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of the commission 
and denied the writ requested by AMCAC for the following reasons:  (1) AMCAC 
failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus compelling the 
commission to conduct a hearing on AMCAC’s request for reimbursement of 
attorney fees because the commission is not an “agency” for purposes of R.C. 
119.092; (2) AMCAC had an adequate remedy at law under R.C. 4112.06 to 
review of the final order of the commission refusing to hold a hearing on 
AMCAC’s attorney-fees request; and (3) AMCAC was not entitled to attorney 
fees because the commission did not initiate the charge of unlawful discriminatory 
practices which was subsequently dismissed. 
# 9776 
5
 
AMCAC asserts in its first proposition of law that the court of appeals erred 
in determining that it was not entitled to a writ of mandamus on the basis that the 
commission is not an “agency” for purposes of R.C. 119.092. 
 
R.C. 119.092 provides: 
 
“(B)(1) Except as provided in divisions (B)(2) and (F) of this section, if an 
agency conducts an adjudication hearing under this chapter, the prevailing 
eligible party is entitled, upon filing a motion in accordance with this division, to 
compensation for fees incurred by that party in connection with the hearing.  *** 
 
“(2) Upon the filing of a motion under this section, the request for the award 
shall be reviewed by the referee or examiner who conducted the adjudication 
hearing or, if none, by the agency involved.  In the review, the referee, examiner, 
or agency shall determine whether the fees incurred by the prevailing eligible 
party exceeded one hundred dollars, whether the position of the agency in 
initiating the matter in controversy was substantially justified, whether special 
circumstances make an award unjust, and whether the prevailing eligible party 
engaged in conduct during the course of the hearing that unduly and unreasonably 
protracted the final resolution of the matter in controversy.  The referee, examiner, 
or agency shall issue a determination ***.”  (Emphasis added.) 
# 9776 
6
 
Initially, we note that AMCAC’s prayer for relief was limited to a writ of 
mandamus compelling the commission to hold a hearing on its request for attorney 
fees under R.C. 119.092.  AMCAC claims that “R.C. 119.092 clearly requires that 
the Commission hold the hearing on attorney[] fees.”   
 
However, R.C. 119.092 does not require a hearing on the motion for 
attorney fees.  Instead, R.C. 119.092 requires only a “review” by the referee or 
examiner who conducted the adjudication hearing.  AMCAC cites no authority to 
the contrary.  Therefore, although “it may be good practice to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on the [R.C. 119.092] motion for attorney fees,” the 
commission and/or its hearing examiner did not possess a clear legal duty to do so 
even assuming, arguendo, that R.C. 119.092 is applicable to the commission’s 
proceedings.  See Vierow & Lepp, Ohio Administrative Law Guide and Directory 
(1994) 60, Section T 5.08(C). 
 
Further, as the court of appeals correctly determined, the commission is not 
an “agency” for purposes of R.C. 119.092.  Under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, R.C. Chapter 119, “agency” is defined in R.C. 119.01(A) to include (1) 
agencies specifically named; (2) the “functions of any *** commission of the 
government of the state specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13 of 
# 9776 
7
the Revised Code”; and (3) administrative agencies with the authority to issue, 
revoke, suspend or cancel licenses.  See Plumbers & Steamfitters Commt. v. Ohio 
Civ. Rights Comm. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 193, 20 O.O.3d 200, 200-201; 421 
N.E.2d 128, 129; State ex rel. Citizens for Van Meter v. Ohio Elections Comm. 
(1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 289, 292-293, 604 N.E.2d 775, 777.  As the parties 
concede, the commission is neither an “agency” specifically enumerated in R.C. 
119.01(A) nor an agency with licensing functions. 
 
Accordingly, the parties dispute if the commission is an agency under R.C. 
119.01(A) for purposes of an R.C. 119.092 motion for attorney fees under the 
remaining definitional category, i.e., whether the functions of the commission 
regarding the award of attorney fees under its enabling legislation, R.C. Chapter 
4112, are made specifically subject to R.C. 119.092. 
 
“In construing a statute, a court’s paramount concern is the legislative intent 
in enacting the statute.  *** In determining legislative intent, the court first looks 
to the language in the statute and the purpose to be accomplished.”  State v. S.R. 
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595, 589 N.E.2d 1319, 1323.  The literal language 
of the pertinent statutes must be enforced whenever possible.  Cablevision of the 
Midwest v. Gross (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 541, 544, 639 N.E.2d 1154, 1156. 
# 9776 
8
 
Only R.C. 4112.05(G) and 4112.05(I) specifically subject the commission to 
pertinent provisions of R.C. Chapter 119.  Plumbers & Steamfitters, supra, 66 
Ohio St.2d at 194, 20 O.O.3d at 201, 421 N.E.2d at 130.  R.C. 4112.05(G) subjects 
the commission to R.C. Chapter 119 provisions concerning the issuance of cease 
and desist orders following the commission’s determination that a respondent has 
engaged in, or is engaging in any unlawful discriminatory practice.  R.C. 
4112.05(I) subjects the commission to R.C. Chapter 119 provisions concerning 
modifying or setting aside any finding or order made by the commission under 
R.C. 4112.05. 
 
Neither R.C. 4112.05(G) nor 4112.05(I) subjects the commission to R.C. 
119.092 requirements concerning an award of attorney fees in connection with 
adjudication hearings.  Instead, R.C. Chapter 4112 provides an award of attorney 
fees only if it finds an unlawful discriminatory practice pertaining to housing 
under R.C. 4112.02(H).  See R.C. 4112.05(G)(1). 
 
AMCAC claims that R.C. 119.092 is a remedial statute which should be 
liberally construed in its favor.  R.C. 1.11; see, also, Collyer v. Broadview Dev. 
Ctr. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 445, 450, 611 N.E.2d 390, 393.  However, “‘[t]here 
is no need to liberally construe a statute whose meaning is unequivocal and 
# 9776 
9
definite.’”  See State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension 
Fund Bd. of Trustees (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 66, 647 N.E.2d 486, 489, quoting 
Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Ins. Guar. Assn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 525, 634 
N.E.2d 611, 614.  The meaning of R.C. 119.092 and its inapplicability to the 
commission’s proceedings against AMCAC are unambiguous under the pertinent 
statutes.  AMCAC’s first proposition is meritless. 
 
Therefore, the court of appeals did not err in granting summary judgment in 
favor of the commission and denying the extraordinary relief requested by 
AMCAC.  Based on our disposition of AMCAC’s first proposition of law, its 
remaining propositions are moot. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and 
COOK, JJ., concur.