Case Title: Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Large

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5482

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Large, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5482.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5482 
TRUMBULL COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. LARGE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Large,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5482.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Neglect—mishandling of client funds—Failure to give 
notice of license suspension—Two-year suspension, partially stayed. 
(No. 2012-0691—Submitted July 11, 2012—Decided November 29, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-027. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Harold Large of Warren, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0068732, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1997.  
On April 11, 2011, the relator, Trumbull County Bar Association, filed a four-
court complaint against Large for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.  
Large was previously disciplined in Supreme Court case No. 2009-0041, 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Large, 122 Ohio St.3d 35, 2009-Ohio-2022, 907 N.E.2d 
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1162.  In the current complaint, the first three counts allege neglect of client 
matters, the mishandling of client funds, and the failure to give notice of the 
suspension in case No. 2009-0041.  The fourth count alleges misrepresentations 
of fact in connection with seeking reinstatement after his suspension in case No. 
2009-0041. 
{¶ 2} A hearing was held before a panel of the Board of Commissioners 
on Grievance and Discipline on January 25, 2012.  At that hearing, relator 
presented witness testimony and exhibits in support of the charges against Large.  
The panel’s findings and conclusions, which were adopted by the board, included 
the following:  (1) three violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (a lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), (2) misconduct 
involving the maintenance of client funds in trust accounts in violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a), (c), and (d), and (3) with respect to two of the four counts, 
conduct that violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), (d), and (h) in that the conduct was 
dishonest, that it was prejudicial to the administration of justice, or that it 
reflected adversely on the respondent’s fitness to practice law.  In considering 
mitigating and aggravating factors, the panel and the board found no mitigating 
factors, and identified seven aggravating factors.  The board recommends a two-
year suspension with six months stayed.  We concur. 
Misconduct 
1. Background 
{¶ 3} After attending the University of Akron Law School, Large 
worked in the Summit County Public Defender’s Office during his final year of 
law school.  Thereafter, he worked at a firm called Buckley & George, after 
which he embarked on a solo practice, which continued up to the time of the 
hearing.  Large characterized his practice as a general practice with about 50 
percent domestic and juvenile court cases. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
2. Count I:  The Ward matter 
{¶ 4} Christina Ward first met with Large on October 26, 2007, and on 
June 19, 2008, she retained him to file a divorce action on her behalf in the Lake 
County Common Pleas Court.  Ward paid Large a $2000 retainer fee for the 
purpose of having Large file and prosecute a divorce action, and she testified that 
she never received a written fee agreement.  Large testified that he prepared and 
signed two alternative agreements, but he could not produce either.  Large 
deposited the retainer not in a trust account but in his business operating account, 
an act for which Large could offer no explanation. 
{¶ 5} Ward wanted to delay the filing of the divorce case until early July 
2008, after she had moved out of the family home.  Large did finally file the 
divorce case in September 2008, but only after Ward became dissatisfied after a 
number of calls to Large’s office, during which she would speak to secretaries but 
not with Large himself.  Large did not return any of those calls.  The secretaries 
sometimes told Ward that the case had already been filed. 
{¶ 6} On September 22, 2008, Ward sent a fax in which she fired Large, 
demanded the return of the retainer, and stated that Large was “no longer 
authorized to do anything” on her behalf.  After that, Large did call Ward, and he 
asked that she take one more day to reconsider terminating the representation.  
Ward did so, but she decided she wanted to go through with firing Large and told 
him so the next day.  Ward did not receive anything back from Large until 
February 2009, however.  At that later time her file was forwarded to her new 
attorney and she received a refund check of $1,007.50. 
{¶ 7} On September 23, 2008, Large filed the divorce complaint in spite 
of the September 22, 2008 fax’s instruction that he was not authorized to act in 
her behalf.  Large claims not to have been aware of the fax until after he filed the 
complaint.  In spite of Ward’s September 2008 decision to terminate Large, he did 
not file his motion to withdraw as counsel until October 15, 2008, and when he 
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did so, he served the motion on the husband but not on Ward herself.  The motion 
to withdraw premised Large’s withdrawal on Ward’s being injured, but made no 
mention that Large had been terminated for inactivity.  Although Large testified 
that Ward had indicated the injury as a reason for his withdrawal, the panel found 
that the testimony was not credible. 
{¶ 8} Between September 2008 and February 2009, when Large finally 
returned some of the retainer and forwarded the file, Ward called Large ten times 
to request that the fee and the file be returned, but she never received a return 
phone call. 
{¶ 9} In December 2008, Ward filed a grievance against Large.  Large 
received two letters from the relator’s grievance committee, one in December and 
one in January, but did not act to refund Ward’s money or return the file in her 
case until late February.  Then, in March 26, 2009, Large furnished the bar 
association grievance counsel some but not all requested information.  The panel 
found that Large’s testimony in extenuation lacked credibility. 
{¶ 10} The board concluded that with respect to the Ward matter the 
relator had shown by clear and convincing evidence that Large violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing a client”), 1.15(d) (“a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or 
third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled 
to receive”), 1.15(a) (“A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that 
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the 
lawyer’s own property,” and such funds are to be kept in a trust account), 1.15(c) 
(“A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that 
have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned 
or expenses incurred”), 8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”), 8.4(d) (prohibiting “conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice”), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting “conduct 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law”).  The board also 
found a violation of Gov.Bar V(4)(G) (an attorney shall not neglect or refuse to 
assist in a grievance investigation ).  We concur with the board’s findings. 
3. Count II:  The Natali matter 
{¶ 11} On August 14, 2008, Jennifer Natali retained Large to assist her in 
filing for bankruptcy.  Large told Natali the fee would be $1,300 and that the case 
would not be filed until the retainer was paid in full.  Natali paid one $500 
installment at the initial meeting and then paid in full on April 9, 2009.  Large 
claims that there was a fee agreement but could not produce one.  He deposited 
the retainer amounts into his business operating account. 
{¶ 12} After paying, Natali heard nothing from Large.  Large did not file 
the bankruptcy. 
{¶ 13} On May 6, 2009, this court suspended Large from the practice of 
law.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Large, 122 Ohio St.3d 35, 2009-Ohio-2022, 907 
N.E.2d 1162.  Thereafter, Large failed to inform Natali that he had been 
suspended from the practice of law, thereby depriving her of the opportunity to 
obtain new counsel. 
{¶ 14} On July 30, 2009, Natali filed a grievance against Large.  In an 
August 12, 2009 letter to the investigator, Large acknowledged the grievance and 
stated that he would contact Natali and arrange for other counsel to file the 
bankruptcy.  Eleven weeks later, on October 28, 2009, Large informed Natali of 
his suspension and recommended an attorney that Natali might hire to file the 
bankruptcy. 
{¶ 15} In the meantime, Natali had contacted a different attorney and paid 
that attorney $1,500 to file the bankruptcy.  It is unclear whether Large spoke with 
Natali again, but it is undisputed that Large was not able to refund Natali’s 
retainer when he became aware of the grievance, nor was he able to return it when 
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she hired another attorney.  In fact, Large did not refund Natali’s retainer until 
April 22, 2010. 
{¶ 16} With respect to the Natali matter, the board found that the relator 
had shown clear and convincing evidence that Large violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (a 
lawyer should act with diligence and promptness), 1.15(a), (c) and (d) (a lawyer 
should keep fees paid in advance in a trust account and withdraw from the 
account only as fees are earned).  By failing to adequately respond to the 
investigator’s inquiries, the board found, Large also violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) 
(an attorney shall not neglect or refuse to assist in a grievance investigation).  The 
panel did not, however, find violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), (d), or (h) with 
respect to the Natali matter, and it ordered those charges dismissed.  We concur in 
the findings of the board. 
4. Count III:  The Burk matter 
{¶ 17} In January 2009, Robert Burk retained Large to modify or 
terminate his child-support obligation.  Burk paid Large a $475 retainer so that 
Large would file the appropriate documentation.  Large did not have a written fee 
agreement with Burk.  Before undertaking the filing of the motion on behalf of 
Burk, Large had served as a court-appointed counsel for Burk in defending a 
charge of contempt for failure to pay child support. 
{¶ 18} On March 16, 2009, Large filed a motion to modify and/or 
terminate Burk’s child-support obligation.  Then Large notified Burk that a 
hearing had been scheduled by the court for June 18, 2009. When on May 6, 
2009, Large was suspended from the practice of law, he notified neither Burk nor 
the court of the suspension. 
{¶ 19} On June 18, 2009, Burk appeared at court for the motion hearing, 
but Large did not appear.  The court determined that Large had been suspended 
and informed Burk of that fact at the hearing.  Because Burk was unable to 
proceed without counsel, the court granted a continuance of the hearing to 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
September 10, 2009.  At the September hearing, the court granted Burk’s motion, 
thereby terminating his child-support obligation, and made the order retroactive to 
June 1. 
{¶ 20} Despite the relief he obtained at the September 2009 hearing, Burk 
pointed out that because the support obligation remained in effect longer than 
necessary, the child-support enforcement agency had continued to deduct the 
prescribed amount from Burk’s wages and to pay the amount to Burk’s former 
spouse during June, July, and August 2009.  Burk also contended that had he been 
represented at the June 10 hearing, the order would have been made effective as 
of March 16, 2009, thereby saving Burk an unnecessary period of paying child 
support.  Burk additionally underwent the seizure of his income-tax refund in the 
sum of $1,178, which Burk contended would not have occurred had the 
termination of his support obligation become effective at the earlier date.  Finally, 
Burk had to apply to the Client Security Fund to recover the $475 retainer that he 
had had paid to Large. 
{¶ 21} Large admits that he failed to inform Burk of his suspension from 
the practice of law and that he did not file the appropriate paperwork with the 
court.  Relator asserts that Burk was irreparably harmed by Large’s omissions.  
Large suggests, however, that the June 1 date set by the court reflected a 
computation that combined the emancipation of the child with the payoff of 
arrearages, so that amounts withheld from Burk for June, July, and August were 
part of the payoff of arrearages. 
{¶ 22} The board found that relator had proved by clear and convincing 
evidence a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring diligence and promptness in 
representing the client) and 1.4(a)(3) (a lawyer shall keep the client reasonably 
informed about the status of the matter).  Large admitted and the board also found 
a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c) (legal fees paid in advance must be deposited 
in the client trust account).  As for the charged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) 
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and (h), the panel found insufficient evidence and therefore dismissed the charge.  
We concur with the findings of the board with respect to the Burk matter. 
5. Count IV:  The suspension/reinstatement matter 
{¶ 23} The complaint also averred that Large had violated the court’s 
order suspending him from the practice of law and made misrepresentations in 
connection with his reinstatement. 
{¶ 24} The court’s order in Disciplinary Counsel v. Large required Large 
to perform certain acts within 30 days of its issuance.  It imposed on Large the 
standard obligations in that context, calling on him to do the following: 
 
(1) notify all clients in pending matters of the suspension 
and advise them to seek legal services elsewhere,  
(2) deliver to all clients being represented in pending 
matters any papers or other property pertaining to the client,  
(3) refund any part of fees or expenses paid in advance that 
are unearned or not paid and account for any trust money or 
property in the possession or control of the respondent,  
(4) notify opposing counsel or adverse parties of the 
respondent’s disqualification in pending litigation and file a notice 
of disqualification with the court or agency before which litigation 
is pending,  
(5) send all required notices by certified mail with a return 
address where communications may thereafter be directed to 
respondent,  
(6) file an affidavit of compliance with the Supreme Court 
clerk and the disciplinary counsel that proves service of required 
notices and sets forth an address where respondent may receive 
communications, and  
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
(7) retain and maintain a record of the various steps taken 
pursuant to the suspension order. 
 
{¶ 25} As part of his application for reinstatement after the earlier 
suspension, Large submitted an affidavit under oath that he had complied with the 
court’s suspension order and that “[t]here is no formal discipline pending.”  
Relator contends that Large did not comply with certain provisions of the order, 
and Large presented 68 notices filed with various courts and clients informing 
them of the suspension  and disqualification. 
{¶ 26} The board found that Large failed to return property, files, and the 
unearned retainer to Natali and Burk within the required time frame, that Large 
never informed Natali or Burk of his suspension and the need to seek other legal 
counsel, and that Large failed to file a notice of suspension and disqualification 
with the Trumbull County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division.  
Based on those findings, the board found violations of Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a) (a 
lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements to a tribunal). 
{¶ 27} But the panel dismissed the allegation of a violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4.  Specifically, with respect to Large’s statement that no formal 
discipline was pending, the panel found merit to the distinction between formal 
disciplinary proceedings initiated by a complaint on the one hand, and the 
pendency of an investigation of a grievance on the other.  Because Large 
confronted an investigation rather than a complaint, the panel concluded that he 
did not make a misrepresentation in that regard. 
{¶ 28} We concur with the board’s findings regarding Count IV of the 
complaint. 
Aggravating and mitigating factors 
{¶ 29} The board found no mitigating circumstances, but did identify no 
fewer than seven aggravating factors consistent with BCGD Proc.Reg. 10: 
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 Pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), the board took into 
consideration Large’s prior one-year suspension for failure to file 
returns and pay income taxes. 
 Pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), the board found that 
Large had acted with a selfish motive in filing Ward’s divorce 
complaint after she had sent the termination by fax.  The board 
also faulted Large’s continued efforts to represent Ward as 
showing a selfish motive. 
 Pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), the board noted a 
pattern of misconduct in that Large had taken fees from three 
clients and had failed to perform the work. 
 Under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(e), the board found that Large 
failed to cooperate with the disciplinary process by neglecting the 
letters sent by investigators and by failing to comply with their 
requests. 
 The board additionally found that Large, under BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(f), submitted false evidence and made false statements 
during the disciplinary process, noting the motion to withdraw that 
Large filed in the Natali matter, plus certain testimony during the 
disciplinary hearing that lacked truthfulness. 
 Under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(g), Large has also refused to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of some of his conduct, 
particularly in regard to his attempt to blame his staff in the Ward 
matter and his assertion that he provided proper representation to 
Burk despite the failure to inform the client of his suspension from 
the practice of law. 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
 Under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(h), the board found that Large’s 
clients found themselves vulnerable and were forced to represent 
themselves or obtain new counsel.  The clients also suffered harm 
in having to wait for return of money and files—indeed, in Burk’s 
case, reimbursement came from the Client Security Fund, not from 
Large. 
 
{¶ 30} We conclude that the board properly identified and weighed the 
aggravating circumstances in the case. 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 31} The panel evaluated the evidence before it, considered Large’s 
citation to six disciplinary cases in support of a fully stayed suspension, and 
concluded that the present case did not appear to come within the ambit of the 
facts presented in the case law.  The panel then noted that relator requested a two-
year suspension with no stay at all and pointed to a lack of case law to support 
that suggestion. 
{¶ 32} The panel considered that Large’s reinstatement filing along with 
his other rule violations presented a unique set of circumstances that did not 
justify an indefinite suspension but that did support a period of actual, unstayed 
suspension.  Accordingly, the panel recommended a two-year suspension, with no 
stay. 
{¶ 33} After considering the panel’s recommendation, the board adopted 
the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.  But the board recommends a 
two-year suspension with six month stayed on the condition that Large reimburse 
the Client Security Fund for any money paid to Large’s clients. 
Large’s Objections 
{¶ 34} Large objects to serving a two-year suspension with six months 
stayed.  First, Large attempts to refute the finding of a selfish motive with respect 
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to filing the Ward divorce case after being told that he was terminated.  Large 
asserts that because the complaint had already been drawn up, he had already 
done the work.  Large asserts a nonselfish motive in filing the complaint after he 
had been fired:  he thereby spared effort on the part of Ward’s new attorney. 
{¶ 35} On the basis of the entire record, however, we agree with the 
board’s finding of a selfish motive.  Large overlooks the board’s finding that his 
testimony about when he became aware of the fax lacked credibility.  Also, the 
long delay in returning money and legal files is consistent with the board’s theory 
that Large was attempting to cut himself back in on a representation from which 
he had been terminated. 
{¶ 36} Similarly, with respect to the Burk matter, Large asserts that he 
forgot that Burk’s case was still pending.  But again we conclude that the totality 
of the circumstances justified the board in not placing the failure to notify in the 
category of mere oversight.  First, the panel and the board have questioned the 
credibility of Large’s assertions at the hearing, and we see no basis for calling the 
determination into question.  Second, the Burk matter turns not solely on the 
failure to notify but on the other attendant violations:  the failure to place money 
in the trust account and the failure to refund the money, or some of it, given the 
limited services Large was able to perform.  Third, there is the element of actual 
harm to Burk on account of the delay in terminating his child-support obligation, 
which Large’s testimony did not succeed in refuting and for which Burk received 
no restitution.  Finally, there is the pattern of misconduct that the board found 
based on the totality of the circumstances presented. 
{¶ 37} Under all these circumstances, we reject Large’s objections and 
adopt the recommendation of the board. 
Disposition 
{¶ 38} Based on the foregoing reasoning, we adopt the findings, 
conclusions, and the sanction recommended by the board.  We therefore order that 
January Term, 2012 
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John Harold Large be suspended from the practice of law for two years with the 
final six months stayed on the following conditions:  that he commit no further 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct or the Rules for the Government 
of the Bar and that he refund to the Client Security Fund within 90 days of the 
date of this order any amounts paid by that fund to his clients.  Costs will be taxed 
to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Randil F. Rudloff and Edward L. Lavelle, for relator. 
 
John B. Juhasz, for respondent. 
______________________