Case Title: People v. Pullen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87542

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87542-Agenda 11-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
								DENNIS PULLEN, Appellee.


Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Dennis Pullen, entered a negotiated plea in the
circuit court of Bureau County. Claiming error in the sentencing,
defendant filed an amended motion to withdraw the plea. The trial
court denied defendant's motion. The appellate court reversed (304
Ill. App. 3d 294), and the State appeals to this court. The single
issue is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion
to withdraw his negotiated plea. Resolution of this issue requires
us to determine the maximum aggregate sentence when
consecutive sentences are imposed on a defendant who has
committed Class 1 or Class 2 felonies but is subject to sentencing
"as a Class X offender" (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1994))
because of prior criminal convictions.
BACKGROUND
	In June 1997 defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to
five counts of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1 (West 1994)).(1) Although
burglary is a Class 2 offense (see 720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West
1994)), defendant was required to be sentenced as a Class X
offender (see 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1994)) because of his
prior convictions, which included numerous previous felony
convictions for burglary and convictions for felony theft, reckless
homicide and driving while license revoked, second offense. By the
terms of his plea, defendant was sentenced to 15 years'
imprisonment on each of the five counts of burglary in this case.
The sentences on counts I and II ran concurrently with each other,
as did the sentences on counts III, IV, and V. However, the 15-year terms on counts I and II ran consecutively to the 15-year
terms on counts III, IV, and V, resulting in an aggregate sentence
of 30 years.
	In July 1997 defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea.
With the assistance of counsel he later filed an amended motion.
One of the contentions in the amended motion was that the 30-year
sentence was void because it exceeded the maximum permissible
term. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's order. The court
found that defendant was subject to a maximum sentence of 28
years, and accordingly the 30-year sentence was void. 304 Ill. App.
3d 294. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (see
177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and now affirm the appellate court.
ANALYSIS
	The issue in this case is whether defendant should have been
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Leave to withdraw a plea of
guilty is not granted as a matter of right, but as required to correct
a manifest injustice under the facts involved. Generally, the
decision whether to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea
under Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) is left to the discretion
of the trial court. In considering such a motion, the court shall
evaluate whether the guilty plea was entered through a
misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or if there is doubt of
the guilt of the accused and the ends of justice would better be
served by submitting the case to a trial. See People v. Hillenbrand,
121 Ill. 2d 537, 545 (1988). The court's decision is reviewed only
for abuse of discretion. See People v. Gosier, 145 Ill. 2d 127, 143
(1991); People v. Kidd, 129 Ill. 2d 432, 447 (1989).
	Defendant's primary contention is that he should have been
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his sentence exceeded
the maximum allowable sentence. If correct, this would constitute
grounds for voiding defendant's guilty plea, because entering into
a negotiated plea to serve a greater amount of time than that to
which one could legally be sentenced would constitute a serious
misapprehension of the law. Indeed, such a sentence would be void
from inception. See People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995)
(sentence which does not conform to a statutory requirement is
void). 
	The determination of the maximum sentence to which
defendant could properly be subjected turns on our interpretation
of several sections of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730
ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 1994)). As previously noted,
defendant committed five counts of burglary, a Class 2 offense. See
720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West 1994). At the time of defendant's
offenses, section 5-8-4(c)(2) of the Code provided in relevant part
that "the aggregate of consecutive sentences shall not exceed the
sum of the maximum terms authorized under Section 5-8-2 [of the
Code] for the 2 most serious felonies involved." 730 ILCS
5/5-8-4(c)(2) (West 1994). There is no dispute that section
5-8-4(c)(2) applied to defendant. Section 5-8-2 of the Code,
referenced in section 5-8-4(c)(2), allows a sentence of up to 60
years for a Class X felony, or up to 14 years for a Class 2 felony.
730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(2), (a)(4) (West 1994). Another statutory
provision relevant to this case is section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Code,
which provides that:
			"When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is
convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice
been convicted of any Class 2 or greater Class felonies in
Illinois, and such charges are separately brought and tried
and arise out of different series of acts, such defendant
shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. This paragraph
shall not apply unless (1) the first felony was committed
after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1977;
and (2) the second felony was committed after conviction
on the first; and (3) the third felony was committed after
conviction on the second." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West
1994).
There is no dispute that defendant's prior convictions required him
to be sentenced as a Class X offender pursuant to section
5-5-3(c)(8). 
	Our appellate court has reached different conclusions as to the
maximum aggregate of consecutive sentences when a defendant
commits multiple Class 1 or Class 2 felonies but must be sentenced
as a Class X offender because of prior felonies. The First District
and, in the case under review, the Third District have held that the
maximum aggregate sentence must be based on the sentences
permissible for a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, not a Class X felony.
People v. Ritchey, 286 Ill. App. 3d 848 (1997); 304 Ill. App. 3d
294. The Fourth District, however, has held that where consecutive
sentences are mandatory, a defendant who is subject to sentencing
as a Class X offender pursuant to section 5-5-3(c)(8) may
properly be sentenced to consecutive Class X terms. People v.
Stencil, 306 Ill. App. 3d 273 (1999). The Stencil court
acknowledged that its decision "arguably conflicts with the words
of the statute," but held that "defendant's consecutive sentences in
the Class X sentencing range are the punishments he deserves."
Stencil, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 279. See also People v. Perkins, 274 Ill.
App. 3d 834, 836-37 (1995) (holding that because attempted
murder is sentenced as a Class X felony, it is a Class X felony for
purposes of section 5-8-4(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)
(West 1994)) even though its offense level is unclassified and the
Criminal Code defines unclassified offenses as Class 4 felonies).
	In the exercise of statutory construction, our primary task is
to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. In
interpreting a statute we may consider the reason and necessity for
the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and its ultimate aims.
Also, we must assume that the legislature did not intend an absurd
or unjust result. However, our inquiry must always begin with the
language of the statute, which is the surest and most reliable
indicator of legislative intent. The language of the statute must be
given its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, we have no occasion to resort
to aids of construction. Nor, under the guise of statutory
interpretation, can we "correct" an apparent legislative oversight
by rewriting a statute in a manner inconsistent with its clear and
unambiguous language. People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 437
(1995); People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 195-99 (1993).
	As previously noted, there is no dispute that defendant's
maximum sentence was "the sum of the maximum terms authorized
under Section 5-8-2 for the 2 most serious felonies involved." The
question is whether the maximum permissible sentence was 120
years-the sum of the maximum permissible extended-term
sentences for two Class X offenses (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(2)
(West 1994))-or 28 years-the sum of the maximum permissible
extended-term sentences for two Class 2 offenses (730 ILCS
5/5-8-2(a)(4) (West 1994)). However, the two most serious
felonies involved in this case-indeed, the only felonies-are
burglaries. Our criminal code explicitly defines burglary as a Class
2 felony. 720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West 1994). This ends the case.
Since burglary is a Class 2 felony, the maximum sentence for
burglary is 14 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(4) (West 1994).
Accordingly, the maximum aggregate sentence was 28 years. Since
defendant was given an aggregate sentence in excess of 28 years,
his sentence was void. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d  at 113. Thus, the appellate
court was correct to vacate defendant's guilty plea. See
Hillenbrand, 121 Ill. 2d  at 545 (one ground for reversing trial
court denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea is the plea having
been entered through a misapprehension of the law).
	The State urges us to reach a different conclusion based on
section 5-5-3 of the Code, which, again, provides in essence that
a defendant convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, who has
previously twice been convicted of any Class 2 or greater Class
felony in Illinois, must be sentenced "as a Class X offender." 730
ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1994). The State contends that because
defendant was to be sentenced as a Class X offender, his offenses
should be treated as Class X felonies for purposes of determining
the maximum permissible aggregate sentence. This argument
ignores numerous previous decisions by this court as well as the
plain language of section 5-5-3(c)(8), which states that persons
subject to its provisions are to be "sentenced as a Class X
offender," not that, e.g., their offenses are to be "treated as Class
X felonies for sentencing purposes." Accordingly, this court has
repeatedly held that section 5-5-3(c)(8) does not change the
character or classification of the felonies committed. A defendant
who commits a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, even though he is subject
to sentencing as a Class X offender pursuant to section
5-5-3(c)(8), still has only committed a Class 1 or Class 2 felony.
People v. Olivo, 183 Ill. 2d 339, 340-41 (1998); People v. Thomas,
171 Ill. 2d 207, 224 (1996); People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282,
290 (1994) ("Under section 5-5-3(c)(8), a defendant's sentence is
increased because of prior felony convictions, but the classification
of offense with which the defendant is charged and convicted
remains the same"). In this case, the two most serious felonies
involved are two Class 2 felonies of burglary. Section 5-5-3(c)(8)
does not change this fact.
	The State attempts to distinguish Olivo on the basis that the
statute at issue in that case referred to the most serious felonies of
which defendant was "convicted," whereas section 5-8-4(c)(2)
mentions the most serious felonies "involved." This argument does
not address our long-standing construction of section 5-5-3(c)(8)
as leaving unaffected the classification of a defendant's offense. We
assume that the State is not advancing the contention that a
defendant may be sentenced for felonies of which he was not
convicted. We nevertheless find the argument without merit. The
most serious felonies "involved" in this case are Class 2 burglaries.
The fact that defendant was a recidivist does not change the
character of the crimes he committed. 
	In Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, the State also based an argument
on the term "involved" in section 5-8-4(c)(2). There, we
considered whether the aggregate consecutive sentence limitation
applied to offenses committed at different times. The State argued
that the only felonies "involved" were those charged as part of a
single transaction. We concluded that the plain language of the
statute did not support this interpretation and held that the
limitation did apply to offenses committed at different times. We
rejected the State's argument that this would lead to the "absurd
result of allowing a defendant to escape criminal responsibility,"
noting that it was inherent in a limitation on consecutive sentencing
that a defendant might escape punishment for one or more
convictions. We concluded that as the legislature had seen fit to
limit the total number of consecutive sentences that could be
imposed on a defendant, we would not "rewrite the statute under
the guise of statutory interpretation." Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d  at 437.
The legislature subsequently amended the statute to provide that
the limitation would not apply "for offenses that were not
committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there
was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective."
Pub. Act 90-128, § 5 (eff. July 22, 1997).
	The State's final argument is based on "the policy
considerations attendant to sentencing," citing People v. Lemons,
191 Ill. 2d 155 (2000). There, we noted that the " 'aim of recidivist
statutes is to impose harsher sentences on offenders whose
repeated convictions have shown their resistance to correction.' "
Lemons, 191 Ill. 2d  at 160, quoting People v. Robinson, 89 Ill. 2d 469, 476 (1982). However, the aim of section 5-8-4(c)(2) of the
Code, and statutes like it, is "to limit the total length of consecutive
sentences imposed on a defendant, while still fairly punishing the
defendant in relation to the severity of the crimes." Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d  at 436. Sections 5-5-3(c)(8) and 5-8-4(c)(2) of the Code serve
different purposes, and the legislature has clearly and explicitly
drawn the line as to where one policy consideration takes
precedence over the other. 
	We recognize that it may seem somewhat anomalous for
defendant to have been eligible for a longer sentence if sentenced
"as a Class X offender" for a single crime than if he were subject
to consecutive sentences for multiple crimes, which must normally
be deemed a more serious situation. This may have been a
legislative oversight. However, we are not at liberty to rewrite the
statute in the guise of interpreting it. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d  at 437,
Bole, 155 Ill. 2d  at 198-99. Additionally, because the limitation no
longer applies to "offenses that were not committed as part of a
single course of conduct during which there was no substantial
change in the nature of the criminal objective" (Pub. Act 90-128,
§5 (eff. July 22, 1997)), the recidivist criminal element is already
foreclosed from committing additional crimes in order to capitalize
on the statutory anomaly.
	The maximum length of consecutive sentences which may be
imposed on a defendant is determined with reference to the
classification of the felonies committed. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)(2),
5-8-2 (West 1994). The character and classification of the felonies
a defendant has committed remain unchanged notwithstanding that
he is subject to sentence enhancement under section 5-5-3(c)(8)
of the Code. Olivo, 183 Ill. 2d at 340-41; Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d  at
224; Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d  at 290. Accordingly, in this case,
defendant is subject to a maximum aggregate term of 28 years.
Because the sentence imposed on him exceeds that length, it is
void. Thus, the appellate court was correct in reversing the trial
court's order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Stencil, to the extent that it is inconsistent with our opinion,
is overruled. Perkins, upon which the State also relies, is
inapposite, in that it dealt with the classification of an unclassified
felony (attempted murder), whereas in this case the legislature has
explicitly classified burglary as a Class 2 felony. 720 ILCS
5/19-1(b) (West 1994). We note that the Perkins court found our
opinion in Jameson had "no application" to the case before it.
Similarly, Perkins has no application to the instant case.
	Because of our determination that defendant is entitled to
withdraw his guilty plea due to his sentence exceeding the statutory
maximum, we need not reach his alternate arguments.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons above stated, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.
	Affirmed.
1.      Defendant had initially plead not guilty to these charges. After
a jury trial he was convicted of all five counts of burglary and
sentenced to consecutive terms of 20 years' imprisonment on each
count. However, the appellate court found he had received
ineffective assistance of counsel and reversed his convictions. 
People v. Pullen, No. 3-96-0036 (May 19, 1997) (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant's negotiated
guilty plea followed the remand from the appellate court.