Case Title: In the Matter of Carlia M. Brady

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

                 In the Matter of Carlia M. Brady (D-10-19) (083462)

Argued April 30, 2020 -- Decided August 6, 2020

PER CURIAM

       By Presentment filed with the Court in this judicial disciplinary matter, the
Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) found by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent Carlia M. Brady, formerly a Judge of the Superior Court,
violated four provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code). The ACJC unanimously
recommended the sanction of removal from judicial office.

       Respondent was sworn in as a Judge on April 5, 2013. On June 11, 2013, officers
of the Woodbridge Township Police Department (WTPD) arrested respondent at her
home for “knowingly harboring Jason Prontnicki, a known fugitive,” in her residence.
The Court suspended respondent from her judicial duties without pay and referred the
matter to the ACJC. The three criminal charges against respondent were eventually
dropped, and the Court reinstated respondent to her judicial duties in March 2018.

       In May 2018, the ACJC issued a Complaint charging respondent with conduct that
violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of
the Code. At the ACJC hearing, the following facts emerged.

      On June 10, 2013, respondent had been a Superior Court judge for approximately
two months. She and Prontnicki had been involved in a romantic relationship for about
six months, and Prontnicki was living in respondent’s home.

        On that morning, respondent appeared at WTPD headquarters to report her car
missing. She met with two police sergeants and Officer Robert Bartko. Respondent told
the officers that Prontnicki, her boyfriend, had taken one of her cars without permission.
The officers explained the procedure to file a criminal complaint against Prontnicki, but
respondent declined to do so. While respondent was at the station, officers learned there
were two open warrants for Prontnicki’s arrest, one for a violent crime, and that his
driver’s license had been suspended. The officers told respondent about Prontnicki’s
open warrants and suspended license. The police report reflects that the officers told
respondent that as “an officer of the court,” she was required to report to them “if and
when” Prontnicki returned with the car, so they could arrest him.

                                            1
        Shortly after respondent returned home, Prontnicki called her. Respondent
testified that Prontnicki told her he would return her car, that he denied knowing of any
warrants or a suspended license, and that she told him that he needed to “go to the police
and take care of it right away.” It is undisputed that -- after speaking with Prontnicki --
respondent did not call the police to advise them Prontnicki would be at her home.

       Respondent testified that, when Prontnicki arrived, he walked past her father into
the house. Respondent said she was “a little surprised and shocked and then fearful,” and
that she told Prontnicki to leave. Nonetheless, she and Prontnicki talked in her garage for
about an hour, joined by her father for the final fifteen minutes of their conversation.

      Approximately fifteen minutes after Prontnicki left her home, respondent called
the WTPD, asked to speak with Bartko, and left a message on Bartko’s voicemail.
Respondent notified police that her car had been returned, but other contents of that
message are disputed. Respondent contended before the ACJC and the Court that the
WTPD tampered with the voicemail to delete part of her message.

       The next morning, on June 11, 2013, Prontnicki called respondent, and they spoke
for more than two and a half hours. Respondent testified that during that call, Prontnicki
confirmed he would be staying with his brother and said he needed to retrieve belongings
from her home. They made an appointment for that afternoon, and Prontnicki called later
to confirm their appointment. Respondent did not notify the police after either call.

       Respondent left a second message for Officer Bartko later that afternoon,
confirming that her car had been returned. Respondent contends that the WTPD also
tampered with and intentionally deleted parts of her second voicemail. Bartko did not
retrieve either of respondent’s messages until after respondent was arrested.

       Meanwhile, WTPD officers conducted surveillance of respondent’s residence
during the afternoon of June 11, 2013. When Prontnicki left her house, a WTPD officer
arrested Prontnicki. Shortly after his arrest, members of the WTPD went to respondent’s
home and arrested her for hindering Prontnicki’s apprehension. One testified that when
respondent was arrested, she said, “I’ve been vetted, take the cuffs off.” According to the
police report, respondent directed officers to take the handcuffs off of her, then asked to
be handcuffed with her hands in front of her rather than behind her. The officers refused.

       Later that evening, officers and an assistant prosecutor presented a Superior Court
judge a complaint warrant alleging that respondent had “harbor[ed]” Prontnicki in her
residence “for approximately 1 hour and never ma[de] any attempt to contact law
enforcement.” Although one officer was aware that respondent had left voicemails for
Bartko, he did not disclose those voicemails to the judge. The judge signed the complaint
warrant. Before the ACJC, an officer conceded that the statement in the complaint
warrant that respondent never tried to contact law enforcement was inaccurate.

                                             2
       At the ACJC hearing, both respondent and the Presenter offered expert testimony
by psychologists and audio engineering experts. The ACJC found by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent violated the Code. With respect to contested facts
and the two issues that the parties’ experts disputed, the ACJC made findings in the
Presenter’s favor. The ACJC recommended respondent’s removal from judicial office.

       Respondent moved before the Court to dismiss the Presentment, or, in the
alternative, to modify the ACJC’s recommendation that she be removed from office.
After oral argument on that motion, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause denying
the motion to dismiss and requiring respondent to show cause “why she should not be
publicly disciplined through the imposition of an appropriate sanction that is less than
removal, the Court having determined on its review of the matter that the appropriate
quantum of discipline shall not include removal.”

HELD: The Court concurs in substantial part with the ACJC’s factual findings and holds
that clear and convincing evidence supports the ACJC’s determination that respondent
committed the Code violations charged. The Court modifies the ACJC’s
recommendation that respondent be removed from judicial office, however, and instead
imposes on respondent a three-month suspension from judicial duties.

1. New Jersey’s system of judicial discipline exists to preserve public confidence in the
integrity and the independence of the judiciary. To that end, every judge is duty bound to
abide by and enforce the standards in the Code of Judicial Conduct. A judge’s acts need
not be criminal in order to implicate the Code. Four provisions of the Code govern this
disciplinary matter, and the Court reviews each. (pp. 19-21)

2. After an independent review of the record presented to the ACJC, the Court finds that
the Presenter met her burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence a core allegation.
Despite ample opportunity to contact the WTPD in advance of Prontnicki’s visits to her
home on June 10 and 11, 2013, respondent declined to do so. When she did call the
police after Prontnicki’s departure on each of those two days, she was not forthcoming
about her contacts with him and did not reveal her detailed knowledge of his activities.
Whether the transcript of the voicemail is accurate or whether it is missing information
because of police misconduct, respondent was not fully forthcoming with the WTPD.
The Court does not accept respondent’s contention that she acted as she did because the
officers allegedly instructed on June 10, 2013 that she should contact police only in
specific circumstances, nor does the Court find credible that she refrained from calling
the police because she feared that Prontnicki would injure her. The evidence supports the
inference that respondent acted in the hope that she could assist Prontnicki and preserve
their relationship while maintaining her judicial career. The Court views respondent’s
comment that she was “vetted” to be a reference to her judicial status intended to
discourage the officers from handcuffing her. (pp. 21-32)

                                            3
3. Relying only on clear and convincing evidence, the Court views respondent’s
communications with the WTPD on June 10 and 11, 2013 to fall short of the high
standards imposed by the Code. Respondent was undoubtedly in a difficult situation
during the two days at issue here, and it is understandable that she was upset as those
disturbing events unfolded. As a judge, however, respondent was not at liberty to address
her circumstances with only herself and her personal relationships in mind. The public
has the right to expect that when police officers are searching for a fugitive accused of a
violent crime and a judge has detailed knowledge of the whereabouts, activities and
immediate plans of that fugitive, the judge will take prompt and decisive action to ensure
that law enforcement is fully informed. There is no exception to that principle when the
judge and the fugitive have a personal relationship. Respondent did not meet the high
standard imposed on the judiciary, and she did not discharge her responsibility to the
public. Although the Court considers respondent’s comment that she had been “vetted”
and her direction to the officers about handcuffing improper, that portion of the evidence
is far less important to the Court’s determination than the evidence regarding
respondent’s communications with the WTPD and her representations about the WTPD’s
alleged directive not to call police except under specific conditions, which the Court does
not find credible. In sum, based on a de novo review of the record, the Court finds clear
and convincing evidence that respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1
and 2.3(A); and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code. (pp. 32-35)

4. In considering the appropriate sanction for respondent’s violation of the Code, the
Court weighs the aggravating and mitigating factors collected in In re Subryan,  187 N.J. 139, 153-54 (2006). The aggravating factor of public policy -- in this instance the public
policy of ensuring the safety of a community by promptly arresting suspects in violent
crimes -- weighs in favor of a significant sanction. Because respondent handled her
communications with the WTPD in a manner “unbecoming and inappropriate for one
holding the position of a judge,” id. at 153, the Court considers that aggravating factor as
well. The Court also considers mitigating factors. This was the first ethics complaint
against respondent, who had been on the bench for only two months when these incidents
occurred. The Court acknowledges the emotional stress that respondent experienced on
June 10 and 11, 2013, and in the nearly five years of criminal proceedings that followed,
and the profound impact the events at issue have had on her life and career. The Court
sees no evidence, however, that respondent has a “sincere commitment to overcoming the
fault” in this case. Id. at 154. Balancing the applicable aggravating and mitigating
factors, the Court modifies the sanction of removal recommended by the ACJC and
imposes a three-month suspension on respondent. (pp. 36-39)

       Respondent is suspended from judicial duties for a period of three months.

       JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA, concurring, would remove Judge Brady from the
bench. But, because the Court’s Order to Show Cause took away removal from the bench as
a potential sanction, Justice Fernandez-Vina concurs with the majority’s decision.

                                             4
         JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, is of the view that, based on the record, Judge Brady
did not harbor a fugitive or obstruct a police investigation. Nor did her conduct demean the
judiciary. Justice Albin stresses that Judge Brady’s conduct should not be viewed from the
sterile, twenty/twenty perspective of hindsight, but rather from that of a vulnerable human
being, fatigued and frightened, in the grip of overwhelming stress, who, in the moment, made
decisions that, even if flawed, do not rise to a level that warrants discipline. In Justice
Albin’s view, Judge Brady is the victim of a misguided and failed criminal prosecution that
has left her career as a judge in ruins and of a disciplinary review that has overlooked police
malfeasance, her good-faith efforts, and the human element. Because he does not believe
that the charges against Judge Brady have been sustained by clear and convincing evidence,
Justice Albin finds that the imposition of discipline is not justified.

      JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, dissenting, is not persuaded there is clear and convincing
evidence in this record to sustain disciplinary charges.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and SOLOMON join in the
Court’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA filed a concurrence. JUSTICES
ALBIN and LaVECCHIA each filed a dissent. JUSTICE TIMPONE did not
participate.

                                              5
                   SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                         D-
10 September Term 2019
                                     083462

                                 In the Matter of

                              Carlia M. Brady,

                        a Judge of the Superior Court

                          of the State of New Jersey

                On an Order to Show Cause Why Respondent
               Should Not Be Publicly Disciplined through the
             Imposition of an Appropriate Sanction that does not
                   include Removal from Judicial Office.

                   Argued                       Decided
                April 30, 2020                August 6, 2020

           Maureen G. Bauman, Designated Presenter, argued the
           cause on behalf of the Advisory Committee on
           Judicial Conduct.

           Respondent argued the cause on her own behalf.

                                 PER CURIAM

     By Presentment filed with the Court in this judicial disciplinary matter,

the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) found by clear and

convincing evidence that respondent Carlia M. Brady, formerly a Judge of the

Superior Court, violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A);

                                        1
and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code). The ACJC

unanimously recommended the sanction of removal from judicial office.

      We concur in substantial part with the ACJC’s factual findings and hold

that clear and convincing evidence supports the ACJC’s determination that

respondent committed the Code violations charged. We modify the ACJC’s

recommendation that respondent be removed from judicial office, however,

and instead impose on respondent a three-month suspension from judicial

duties.

                                      I.

                                      A.

      Respondent, who was admitted to the Bar in 1997, was sworn in as a

Judge of the Superior Court on April 5, 2013.

      On June 11, 2013, officers of the Woodbridge Township Police

Department (WTPD) arrested respondent at her home in Woodbridge. She was

charged in a complaint warrant with hindering the apprehension of another, in

violation of  N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3, by “knowingly harboring Jason Prontnicki, a

known fugitive,” in her residence.

      The following day, this Court suspended respondent from her judicial

duties without pay and referred the matter to the ACJC. In accordance with its

policy regarding disciplinary proceedings against judges charged with criminal

                                      2
offenses, the ACJC took no action on the referral of the disciplinary matter

pending completion of the criminal proceedings.

      After respondent’s criminal matter was transferred from Middlesex

County to Somerset County, a grand jury indicted respondent on three charges:

second-degree official misconduct in violation of  N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(b), third-

degree hindering apprehension or prosecution in violation of  N.J.S.A. 2C:29-

3(a)(1), and third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution in violation of

 N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(2). The trial court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss

the official misconduct charge but denied her motion to dismiss the hindering

apprehension or prosecution charges. The State appealed the dismissal of the

official misconduct charge, and respondent appealed the denial of her motion

to dismiss the other charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s

determinations and remanded the matter to the trial court for further

proceedings. State v. Brady,  452 N.J. Super. 143, 174 (App. Div. 2017).

      The State moved to dismiss with prejudice the remaining two counts of

the indictment. On March 2, 2018, the trial court granted that motion, thus

concluding the criminal proceedings against respondent.

      On March 6, 2018, this Court reinstated respondent to her duties as a

Superior Court judge.

                                       3
                                       B.

                                       1.

      On May 4, 2018, the ACJC issued a Complaint charging respondent with

conduct that violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); and

Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code. In her Answer, respondent denied violating

any provision of the Code.

      Pursuant to Rule 2:15-3(b), four members of the ACJC conducted a

seven-day hearing on the matter. Other participating members of the ACJC

reviewed the record and briefs. At the hearing, the Presenter called five fact

witnesses and two expert witnesses. Respondent, represented by counsel,

testified and called two fact witnesses and two expert witnesses.

                                       2.

      We summarize the factual evidence presented to the ACJC based on the

record of the hearing.

      On June 10, 2013, respondent had been a Superior Court judge for

approximately two months. She and Prontnicki had been involved in a

romantic relationship for about six months, and Prontnicki was living in

respondent’s home. According to respondent’s testimony before the ACJC,

she was undergoing medical treatment in order to have a child with Prontnicki,

and was told by her physician that she might be pregnant.

                                       4
      On the morning of June 10, 2013, respondent appeared at WTPD

headquarters, and stated that she wanted to report her car missing. At the

police station, she met with Sergeant James Mullarney, Sergeant Walter

Bukowski, and Officer Robert Bartko.1

      Respondent told the officers that Prontnicki, her boyfriend, had taken

one of her cars without permission. According to respondent, after giving a

false account of her vehicle’s location, Prontnicki had admitted loaning it to a

friend who lived in Bayonne. Respondent indicated that she and Prontnicki

had spent two hours the previous night driving around Bayonne and Jersey

City looking for the missing car. She stated that when she left Prontnicki in

Jersey City to return to her home, she told him that if she did not hear from

him by 10:00 a.m. about the status of her car, she would report the vehicle as

stolen. Respondent informed the officers that she had not heard from

Prontnicki since she had dropped him off in Jersey City.

      The officers explained to respondent the procedure to file a criminal

complaint against Prontnicki, but respondent declined to do so. She indicated

that she preferred to file a complaint against Prontnicki’s friend in Bayonne,

1
  Officer Bartko testified that when he returned to WTPD headquarters from
patrol to process respondent’s complaint, he was told by another officer that
respondent was a Superior Court judge. The record does not reveal how the
officers learned that information.
                                        5
whom she believed had her car, but officers could not find any record of a

person with the name that respondent provided them.

       While respondent was still at the police station, officers learned that

there were two open warrants for Prontnicki’s arrest. One of those warrants

arose from the armed robbery of a pharmacy in Old Bridge on April 29, 2013,

in which the perpetrator allegedly threatened a pharmacist with a crowbar,

demanding drugs. The officers also learned that Prontnicki’s driver’s license

had been suspended. The officer told respondent about Prontnicki’s open

warrants and suspended license. The police report reflects that the officers

told respondent that as “an officer of the court,” she was required to report to

them “if and when” Prontnicki returned with the car, so that they could arrest

him.

       Respondent reported to two friends that morning by text that she had just

learned that Prontnicki had threatened a pharmacist with a crowbar on April

29, 2013. Respondent sent a text message to one of those friends stating that

when the incident at the pharmacy had occurred, Prontnicki “was already

staying with me and I was a judge.” She added, “I can’t have him in my house

cos I wud now be harboring a criminal . . . I wud have to report him.”

       At 1:11 p.m., shortly after respondent returned to her home, Prontnicki

called her. Respondent testified that Prontnicki told her that he had her car

                                         6
and would return it, and that she told Prontnicki that police officers had

advised her that he had outstanding warrants and a suspended license.

According to respondent, Prontnicki denied knowing of any warrants or a

suspended license, and she told him that he needed to “go to the police and

take care of it right away.” Respondent testified that Prontnicki said he would

bring back her car first, and she told him “fine, it would be nice if you brought

back [the] car, but you can’t come in my house.”

      Immediately following that call, respondent texted her friend that

Prontnicki “just called to tell me he got the car and will bring it home .” She

added that she had told Prontnicki “he can’t stay with me cos he has a warrant

out for his arrest and I am required to notify authorities when I know someone

has a warrant[.] So I told him he must leave after he drops the car off as I

must go to the police[.]”

      It is undisputed that -- after speaking with Prontnicki -- respondent did

not call the police to advise them that Prontnicki would be at her home. She

explained that the officers had “told me not to call until if and when he gets

back to the house or I know his exact location.” She stated that based on her

“interaction” with the police, “it seemed to me the police were not interested in

going out unless they can just take him and not have to do any kind of

surveillance or anything.”

                                        7
      Respondent then called her parents and asked them to meet her at her

house, and they did so.

      At approximately 3:00 p.m., Prontnicki arrived at respondent’s home.

According to respondent, Prontnicki rang the doorbell, and when her father

answered the door, Prontnicki walked past her father into the house.

Respondent said she was “a little surprised and shocked and then fearful,” and

that she told Prontnicki to leave. Nonetheless, after Prontnicki walked through

the house to the garage, she followed him. Respondent testified that

Prontnicki said he was unwilling to leave her home immediately because it was

raining. She and Prontnicki then talked in her garage for about an hour, joined

by her father for the final fifteen minutes of their conversation. By

respondent’s account, Prontnicki denied having outstanding warrants and

suggested to respondent that the police might be “trying to get you because

you’re a judge.”

      Eventually, Prontnicki used respondent’s cellphone to call his brother,

and his brother drove to respondent’s home and picked him up. Shortly

thereafter, respondent called Prontnicki and they spoke briefly.

      At 4:36 p.m. on June 10, 2013, approximately fifteen minutes after

Prontnicki left her home, respondent called the WTPD, asked to speak with

Bartko, and left a message on Bartko’s voicemail. The contents of that

                                        8
message are disputed. According to the audio recordings that the WTPD

produced, respondent’s June 10, 2013 voicemail message stated:

            Hi, um, Officer Bartko, this is Carlia Brady. I
            submitted, I sat with you to fill out incident report
            number 13065290/1 um with regard to the unlawful
            taking of my car. Um, I just wanted to report to you
            that, um, Jason Prontnicki, the suspect, um, actually
            returned it just now. Um, it is in my driveway. I
            haven’t inspected it yet cause it’s raining and I didn’t
            bring it into my house because I don’t want it in my
            house unless I can inspect it. Um, I just wanted to let
            that be known. Also, to let you know since there’s a
            warrant out for his arrest, he is not with me, but he is in
            Woodbridge cause he left, um, my property so please
            give me a call back. I, we need to know whether an
            amended report needs to be redone, um, or added,
            whatever I needed to do. Please give me a call back
            [telephone number]. Carlia Brady, [telephone number].

      Respondent contended before the ACJC, and contends before this Court,

that the WTPD tampered with the voicemail to delete part of her June 10, 2013

voicemail message. At the ACJC hearing, respondent was asked to describe

what she had said on the portion of the voicemail that she claims was deleted.

She testified that she thought she said that Prontnicki was not with her but with

his brother who shares his last name and “lives in Woodbridge about a mile

away. I don’t have his exact address or I don’t know his exact address, but it’s

by the ShopRite and ice cream parlor area. Please give me a call back and I’ll

give you as much detail as possible.” Respondent’s mother testified that she

                                        9
heard respondent provide that information while leaving her voicemail for

Bartko.

      At 10:07 the next morning, June 11, 2013, Prontnicki called respondent,

and they spoke for more than two and a half hours. Respondent testified that

during that call, Prontnicki confirmed he would be staying with his brother in

Woodbridge and said he needed to retrieve belongings from her home.

Respondent testified that Prontnicki said his brother -- not Prontnicki himself -

- would pick up the belongings. According to Prontnicki -- as recorded in a

statement to police -- he contacted respondent early in the afternoon of June

11, 2013 to confirm that she would be home between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.

that day so he could pick up his belongings. Based on telephone records, that

call occurred at 1:49 p.m. on June 11, 2013. Respondent did not notify the

police after either call.

      According to respondent’s texts to her friend that afternoon, Prontnicki

attempted to reassure her that he had done nothing unlawful and that their

relationship could be salvaged. Her texts state that Prontnicki identified two

other men as the actual perpetrators of the robbery, that he denied that there

were any warrants for his arrest or that his license was suspended, that he said

he would turn himself in and cooperate with police, that he reassured her that

                                       10
he would “fix everything,” and that if he and respondent had a child, he would

arrange for a relative to pay support for that child.

      Respondent texted her friend stating that Prontnicki “can’t stay in my

house cos he has an arrest warrant right now and I have a duty as a judge to

report all crimes and anyone with an arrest warrant. So he is at his brother’s

house.” A short time later, she told the friend that when Prontnicki assured her

that there was no warrant for his arrest, she responded that “without written

verified proof he and I can’t be seen or stay at my house together.”

      At 3:31 p.m. on June 11, 2013, respondent left a second voicemail

message for Bartko. According to the audio recordings that the WTPD

produced, the second voicemail stated:

            Hi, good afternoon, Officer Bartko, this is Carlia Brady,
            um, I filled out a police report with you two days ago
            regarding my, um, car that was, uh, I, you know, I was
            trying to say it was stolen. Um, I don’t know if you got
            my message yesterday, but the car has been returned by
            Jason Prontnicki. I have it, um, I just wanna amend the
            police report and I need to know whether I should come
            in and amend that and when, um, you’re available so I
            can get an amended report, or if you can call me and let
            me know when I can pick up an amended report to
            reflect the car has been returned. Obviously um, I have
            my property back, so, um, please give me a call . . . [two
            telephone numbers]. It’s Carlia Brady. Thank you.

      Respondent contends that the WTPD also tampered with her June 11,

2013 voicemail, and that officers intentionally deleted a portion of that
                                        11
voicemail. She identifies the deleted content as “something to the effect of

you didn’t call me back, I left you message yesterday with -- I want to update

the whereabouts of Jason Prontnicki, the fugitive, and I don’t know who else

to call. You were the person I know of, you’re on the police report, something

to that effect.”

      Bartko, who rarely received voicemails on his extension at WTPD

headquarters and checked his voicemail only at the beginning of his four days

on duty in accordance with WTPD procedure, did not retrieve either of

respondent’s messages until after respondent was arrested.

      Undetected by respondent, WTPD officers conducted surveillance of her

residence during the afternoon of June 11, 2013. According to the WTPD, at

3:48 p.m., driven by his brother, Prontnicki arrived at respondent’s home. He

entered the garage and spoke with respondent. While his brother waited in his

car, Prontnicki remained in respondent’s home for about an hour. Prontnicki

then left with a duffel bag and was driven away by his brother. Shortly

thereafter, a WTPD officer stopped the vehicle and arrested Prontnicki. As

those events transpired, respondent remained at home, texting a friend; she

repeated that she and Prontnicki “can’t be seen together or stay at my house

together.”

                                      12
      Shortly after Prontnicki’s arrest, Sergeant Brian Murphy, Detective

Chris Lyons, and Officer Sean Grogan of the WTPD went to respondent’s

home and arrested her for hindering Prontnicki’s apprehension. According to

respondent and one of the officers, respondent told the officers that she had

called the police department twice. One officer testified that when respondent

was arrested, she said, “I’ve been vetted, take the cuffs off.” According to the

police report, respondent directed officers to take the handcuffs off of her, then

asked to be handcuffed with her hands in front of her rather than behind her.

The officers refused both requests.

      Respondent was escorted to Bartko’s patrol car, and he drove her to the

police station. In comments recorded in the patrol car, respondent told Bartko

that she might be pregnant and that Prontnicki was the father. She said that, in

light of Prontnicki’s denial that there was a warrant for his arrest, she did not

“know who to believe.” Respondent said, “All I did was help this person. He

was my boyfriend. There was never any incident before this.” Before the

ACJC, respondent stated that her comment about “help” for Prontnicki referred

to his living at her home, not to any “help” given to him after she learned of

the warrants for his arrest.

      After escorting respondent to the processing room at WTPD

headquarters, Bartko retrieved the voicemails and listened to them with other

                                        13
officers. Murphy directed that the voicemails be recorded as potential

evidence, and they were recorded on a digital recorder. Before the ACJC, the

testifying officers denied respondent’s allegation that they tampered with the

voicemail evidence.

      Later that evening, Murphy, Grogan, and an assistant prosecutor went to

the home of a Superior Court judge. The officers presented to the judge a

complaint warrant alleging that respondent had “harbor[ed]” Prontnicki in her

residence “for approximately 1 hour and never ma[de] any attempt to contact

law enforcement.” Although Murphy was aware that respondent had left

voicemails for Bartko the previous day and that afternoon, he did not disclose

those voicemails to the judge. The judge signed the complaint warrant.

Before the ACJC, Murphy conceded that the statement in the complaint

warrant that respondent never tried to contact law enforcement was inaccurate .

                                       3.

      The parties presented expert reports to the ACJC with respect to

respondent’s two core defenses to the charges: that her actions following the

disclosure of Prontnicki’s arrest warrants were attributable to a temporary

mental health condition that had since been successfully treated, and that the

WTPD tampered with the recordings of her June 10, 2013 and June 11, 2013

voicemails by deleting portions of those voicemails.

                                       14
      With respect to the first defense, respondent presented the testimony of

Peter P. Oropeza, Psy.D. Dr. Oropeza testified that “stressors” -- including

respondent’s memory of domestic abuse in a prior relationship, sleep

deprivation, a lack of food, and the disclosures about Prontnicki’s behavior --

significantly impacted respondent’s decision-making on June 10 and 11, 2013.

Dr. Oropeza opined that, due to those stressors, respondent was “at times

thinking irrationally,” that she showed early symptoms of trauma and other

conditions, and that she feared that Prontnicki would harm her. Dr. Oropeza

opined, however, that in the years since the events at issue, respondent

underwent mental health treatment. He testified that at the time of the ACJC

hearing she appeared “able to perform her duties” as a Superior Court judge.

      In rebuttal, the Presenter offered the testimony of Carla Rodgers, M.D., a

psychiatrist. Dr. Rodgers opined that it was impossible for a mental health

professional to render a retrospective diagnosis of respondent’s mental

condition on June 10 and 11, 2013, and that respondent’s conduct on those

dates could not be attributed -- to a reasonable degree of medical probability --

to “stressors.”

      To support her contention that the WTPD deleted portions of the

voicemails that she left for Bartko, respondent offered the report of Arlo West ,

                                       15
a forensic audio expert. 2 West opined “to a high degree of audio engineering

certainty” that the copies of the voicemails obtained from the WTPD’s internal

voicemail system and from the WTPD’s “NICE” Inform System 4.1, a

computer system, were not authentic copies. Citing “gaps” in those copies,

West opined that they contained “a re-recording of an edited version” and

appeared to be “masking attempt[s].” He also opined that the copies of the

voicemails obtained from the “NICE” computer system were “an inauthentic

rendering of the [v]oicemails” and “an edited version.”

      In rebuttal, the Presenter submitted to the ACJC the report of a forensic

audio expert, Bruce Koenig. Koenig opined that the recordings were authentic

clones of the original voicemail recordings and that they “revealed no

discontinuities, deletions, additions, or other types of events indicative of

editing processes.” He stated that what West viewed as “gaps” in a portion of

the voicemails recorded on the NICE recording system were a function of that

system’s “Activity Detector” system, which allows the recording of only

“active audio” and the compression of periods of silence between “active”

segments.

2
  The parties agreed to rely only on the reports of their forensic audio experts,
and not to call those experts as witnesses during the hearing before the ACJC.
                                        16
                                         4.

      The ACJC found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent

violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); and Canon 5, Rule

5.1(A) of the Code. With respect to contested facts and the two issues that the

parties’ experts disputed, the ACJC made findings in the Presenter’s favor.

      In its Presentment, the ACJC addressed the key question of respondent’s

communications with the police on June 10 and 11, 2013. It found clear and

convincing evidence that in respondent’s communications with the WTPD, she

had “attempted to evade her ethical obligations . . . by offering the police

intentionally vague and irrelevant information about [Prontnicki’s] known

whereabouts to appear cooperative while willfully withholding relevant

information,” thereby placing “a greater emphasis on her personal concerns

than her ethical constraints as a jurist.”

      Finding the testimony of respondent and her mother as to the contents of

her voicemails and the opinion of her forensic audio expert not to be credible,

the ACJC rejected respondent’s contention that the WTPD altered the

voicemails. It also discounted the contention of respondent and her expert, Dr.

Oropeza, that she acted out of fear that Prontnicki would harm her.

      Finally, the ACJC found that respondent’s comment during her arrest

that she had been “vetted” was a “direct reference to her judicial office” and

                                         17
that when she requested that the officers dispense with their practice of

handcuffing an arrestee, she sought preferential treatment because of her

office. The ACJC based its ultimate recommendation, however, on the timing

and substance of respondent’s communications with the WTPD about

Prontnicki prior to her arrest, not her comments during her arrest.

      Based on its finding that respondent violated the Code, the ACJC

recommended respondent’s removal from judicial office.

                                       C.

      Pursuant to Rule 2:15-16, respondent moved before this Court to dismiss

the Presentment, or, in the alternative, to modify the ACJC’s recommendation

that she be removed from office. After oral argument on that motion, the

Court entered an Order to Show Cause denying the motion to dismiss and

requiring respondent to show cause, in accordance with Rule 2:15-17(b)(2),

“why she should not be publicly disciplined through the imposition of an

appropriate sanction that is less than removal, the Court having determined on

its review of the matter that the appropriate quantum of discipline shall not

include removal.” Respondent appeared on the return date of the Order to

Show Cause and presented argument to the Court.

                                       18
                                        II.

                                        A.

      New Jersey’s system of judicial discipline exists “to preserve 'public

confidence in the integrity and the independence of the judiciary.’” In re

Russo, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op. at 21) (quoting In re Seaman,  133 N.J. 67, 96 (1993)). To that end, “[e]very judge is duty bound to abide by and

enforce the standards in the Code of Judicial Conduct.” In re DiLeo,  216 N.J.
 449, 467 (2014). The Code does not enumerate every specific act that can

constitute judicial misconduct; it is instead “a general statement of standards

and goals, admirably serving the purpose of providing guidance to judges in all

matters precisely because of the generality of its provisions.” Id. at 467-68

(quoting In re Alvino,  100 N.J. 92, 102 (1985)).

      As this Court has observed, “because judges are in the public eye,

'everything [they] do can reflect on their judicial office’ and has the potential

to erode public confidence.” In re Reddin,  221 N.J. 221, 228 (2015) (alteration

in original) (quoting In re Blackman,  124 N.J. 547, 551 (1991)). “No power is

greater, nor its responsibilities more awesome, than that given a judge.” In re

Samay,  166 N.J. 25, 43 (2001) (quoting In re Coruzzi,  95 N.J. 557, 563

(1984)). “That awesome power is bestowed upon a judge on the condition that

                                        19
the judge not abuse or misuse it to further a personal objective such as a

vendetta or to help a friend.” Id. at 43.

      A judge’s acts need not be criminal in order to implicate the Code;

“[c]onduct that in itself does not constitute a criminal offense may be violative

of standards governing performance, warranting discipline or removal for

cause.” In re Yaccarino,  101 N.J. 342, 353 (1985).

      Four provisions of the Code govern this disciplinary matter. 3

      Canon 1, Rule 1.1 provides that “[a] judge shall participate in

establishing, maintaining and enforcing, and shall personally observe, high

standards of conduct so that the integrity, impartiality and independence of the

judiciary is preserved.”

      Canon 2, Rule 2.1 requires that a judge “act at all times in a manner that

promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity and impartiality of

the judiciary, and . . . avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”

Rule 2.1 applies to a judge’s personal conduct in addition to his or her judicial

activities. As the Comment to that Rule explains,

            [a] judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of
            impropriety and must expect to be the subject of

3
  The Rev.sed Code of Judicial Conduct became effective on September 1,
2016, after the events at issue here. With no objection from respondent, the
ACJC found that there were no substantive distinctions between the prior Code
and the Revised Code that were relevant to this matter, and decided this matter
under the Revised Code. We also apply the Revised Code.
                                       20
            constant public scrutiny. This principle applies to both
            the professional and personal conduct of a judge. A
            judge must therefore accept restrictions on personal
            conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
            ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.

                                   *    *     *

            With regard to the personal conduct of a judge, an
            appearance of impropriety is created when an
            individual who observes the judge’s personal conduct
            has a reasonable basis to doubt the judge’s integrity and
            impartiality.

      Canon 2, Rule 2.3(A) prohibits judges from “lend[ing] the prestige of

judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or

others,” or allowing others to do so.

      Finally, Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) requires judges to “conduct their

extrajudicial activities in a manner that would not cast reasonable doubt on the

judge’s capacity to act impartially as a judge, demean the judicial office, or

interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.”

                                        B.

                                        1.

      Guided by the applicable provisions of the Code, we review de novo the

record presented to the ACJC. In re Williams,  169 N.J. 264, 271 (2001);

Seaman,  133 N.J. at 74. In that review, we independently determine “whether

                                        21
the record demonstrates conduct that departed from the strictures delineated in

the Canons of Judicial Conduct.” In re Perskie,  207 N.J. 275, 289 (2011).

      We apply the clear-and-convincing standard of proof. R. 2:15-15(a); In

re Boggia,  203 N.J. 1, 12 (2010). “Clear-and-convincing evidence is that

which produce[s] . . . a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the

allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and

convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitancy, of the precise facts at issue.” Williams,  169 N.J. at 271 (alterations

in original) (quoting Seaman,  133 N.J. at 74). That standard is exacting; “the

seriousness of [an allegation of judicial misconduct], and the possible

consequences to the judge, require that we have a clear and accurate

understanding of facts that may give rise to discipline.” Id. at 272.

                                         2.

      We do not share the dissent’s view that every factual assertion made by

respondent during her testimony before the ACJC is to be credited, or its rejection

of all testimony that contradicts an assertion made by respondent. See, e.g. post at

___ (slip op. at 9-12, 14-20, 28-31). Instead, after an independent review of the

record presented to the ACJC in accordance with the clear-and-convincing burden

of proof, we concur with some of the ACJC’s factual findings, and decline to adopt

others.

                                         22
      We find that the Presenter met her burden to prove by clear and convincing

evidence a core allegation. Despite ample opportunity to contact the WTPD in

advance of Prontnicki’s visits to her home on June 10 and 11, 2013,

respondent declined to do so. When she did call the police after Prontnicki’s

departure on each of those two days, she was not forthcoming about her

contacts with him and did not reveal her detailed knowledge of his activities.

      When respondent left WTPD headquarters on June 10, 2013, she knew

that Prontnicki stood accused of a violent robbery and was considered a

fugitive. As she revealed to a friend, respondent was concerned that

Prontnicki committed the alleged offense while he was living at her home and

that the incident occurred after she became a judge.

      Nonetheless, respondent did not prioritize law enforcement’s urgent

need to locate and arrest Prontnicki over personal considerations. Instead, she

strategized about how to avoid circumstances that, in her view, would trigger a

duty to advise the police of his whereabouts. Respondent concluded that if

Prontnicki continued to stay at her home, she would have to “report him,” and

thus decided that he must move to another residence. Her reasoning provides

important context for what occurred that afternoon and the following day.

      It is undisputed that at 1:11 p.m. on June 10, 2013, Prontnicki called

respondent. Respondent concedes that she learned on that call that Prontnicki

                                       23
would come to her home later that day to return her car. The record reveals

part of their conversation. As respondent advised a friend, she told Prontnicki

in that telephone call that his continued residence in her home would require

her to contact the police, as she considered herself “required to notify

authorities” when she knew “someone has a warrant.” She said that she had

told Prontnicki that he “must leave after he drops the car off as I must go to the

police.”

      It is undisputed that respondent did not notify the WTPD about the

telephone call and Prontnicki’s planned visit later that afternoon, thus

forfeiting an opportunity for the police to arrest him immediately. She made

no attempt to contact the WTPD prior to Prontnicki’s anticipated arrival.

      Prontnicki did not leave respondent’s home immediately after returning

her missing car, as respondent had said she would insist. He stayed at

respondent’s home with her and her parents for more than an hour, spending

most of that time in a private conversation with respondent in her garage and,

at one point, using her cellphone to call his brother. Respondent called the

WTPD about fifteen minutes after Prontnicki’s departure, and left the first of

her two voicemails for Bartko.

      Respondent and her mother testified that respondent informed the WTPD

on that voicemail that Prontnicki was staying with his brother, and that she

                                       24
provided the brother’s name and the approximate location of his home.

Respondent claims that the WTPD tampered with the recording to remove that

portion of her voicemail. The WTPD denied that allegation, and the parties’

forensic audio experts sharply disputed the technical evidence on the alleged

tampering in the reports submitted to the ACJC.

      We do not premise our conclusion on a determination as to which

forensic audio expert’s report presented to the ACJC is the more persuasive.

Whether the transcript of the voicemail is accurate or whether it is missing

information because of police misconduct, respondent was not fully

forthcoming with the WTPD. Her undisputed comment on the voicemail that

Prontnicki “is in Woodbridge cause he left, um, my property” suggests that she

had only a vague notion of his general location based on her car’s

reappearance at her Woodbridge home. Even in her version of the voicemail,

respondent did not disclose that Prontnicki had been at her home for more than

an hour, that she had an extended conversation with him during that visit, or

that she had spoken with him twice that day by telephone. Viewed in

conjunction with respondent’s contemporaneous texts to her friends, either

version of the voicemail confirms that respondent’s priority was not public

safety, but her personal concerns.

                                       25
      The record of what occurred the following day, largely undisputed,

underscores respondent’s approach to the situation that confronted her. That

morning, she and Prontnicki spoke by telephone for two and a half hours.

Respondent told her friends that on that protracted telephone call, she and

Prontnicki discussed respondent’s potential pregnancy, he “[t]old me he is

sorry 30000 times,” he said he knew who had committed the armed robbery,

and he attempted to salvage their relationship.

      As confirmed by respondent’s texts and comments to Bartko after her

arrest, Prontnicki’s assurances left her uncertain as to whether he had

committed a crime or had outstanding warrants; as she later told Bartko, she

did not “know who to believe.” Addressing her friend, she defined her duty as

a judge to require that she “report all crimes and anyone with an arrest

warrant,” and suggested again that the solution to her quandary was to make

sure that Prontnicki did not live at her home. She did not, however, consider

herself obligated to report Prontnicki’s call to her, and she did not contact the

WTPD in the wake of that call.

      There is no clear and convincing proof that during respondent’s

telephone call with Prontnicki on the morning of June 11, 2013 he made

concrete plans to visit respondent’s home and retrieve his belongings.

Prontnicki, however, told police that he called respondent at 1:49 p.m. and

                                        26
advised her that he would arrive at her home between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. If

Prontnicki’s statement is correct, respondent had reason to anticipate that

Prontnicki would shortly reappear, yet she made no effort to alert the WTP D.

The officers learned about Prontnicki’s visit to respondent’s home that

afternoon only because they conducted surveillance.

      Just before Prontnicki arrived, respondent left her second message for

Bartko, this one focused on her expressed intent to “amend the police report”

on the theft of her car to reflect the fact that Prontnicki had returned it. Even if

we assume for purposes of our analysis that the voicemail actually contained

the additional information that respondent contends was deleted from it, it

would be only slightly more informative than the version reflected in the

transcript. Respondent does not contend that she told Bartko of Prontnicki’s

impending visit or their hours of conversation that day; instead, she claims

only that she said she wanted to update Bartko about Prontnicki’s whereabouts

and had the name of no other WTPD officer but Bartko. Even in respondent’s

version of her voicemail, she did not reveal to the police Prontnicki’s calls or

visits to her home. Had the police not initiated surveillance, they would have

lost a second opportunity to arrest Prontnicki.

      Respondent asserts that two factors prompted her decision not to alert

the WTPD of Prontnicki’s contacts with her: the officers’ alleged instructions

                                        27
on June 10, 2013 that she contact police only in specific circumstances, and

her fear that Prontnicki would harm her. We consider each in turn.

      The police report states that at WTPD headquarters, officers reminded

respondent “of her status as an officer of the Court, that it was incumbent upon

her to report to the Police if and when [Prontnicki] came back with the car that

he was there, in order for us to arrest him.” According to Mullarney, he and

Bukowski told respondent that “when you get in touch with him again and he

comes back with this car,” she “ha[d] to call us,” because it was “incumbent”

on her as “an officer of the court” to “tell somebody this guy’s wanted for a

robbery and he’s got my car.”

      Respondent testified before the ACJC that one of the officers told her to

call them “if and when [Prontnicki] gets home and we’ll go out there.”

According to respondent, she asked the officers whether they wanted her to

call “when this person’s right in front of me in my presence indicating I don’t

want to get killed,” and “they said no, just call when you know his exact

location,” which she interpreted to mean she did not “need to have him in my

house” when she made the call.

      Respondent, however, told her psychologist, Dr. Oropeza, that “the

police had said for her to call if and when [Prontnicki] was at the house, at her

                                       28
house,” and that meant to her that she should call when Prontnicki “literally”

was at her home.

      In oral argument before this Court, respondent initially said that officers

directed her not to contact WTPD before Prontnicki arrived at her house, but

also stated that they instructed her that she should call police only if Prontnicki

arrived at her home or she knew his exact location at the time of the call.

Respondent speculated that the officers instructed her not to call them other

than in those circumstances because they wanted to avoid the necessity of

conducting surveillance before arresting Prontnicki.

      Respondent’s contention that the officers discouraged her from

informing them about the current activities of a fugitive suspect in an armed

robbery unless one of two conditions were met is contrary to the police report

and the officers’ testimony. Moreover, if the WTPD instructed respondent as

she claims they did, she disregarded those instructions. Not only did

respondent fail to alert the WTPD prior to either of Prontnicki’s visits to her

home that he would be there shortly, but she also did not report her extensive

in-person and telephone conversations with Prontnicki to police after the fact.

We do not accept respondent’s contention that she acted as she did because of

a directive from the WTPD.

                                        29
      Nor do we find credible the assertion of respondent, supported by the

opinion of her expert psychologist, that she refrained from calling the police

because she feared that Prontnicki would injure her. We view the clear and

convincing evidence to belie that assertion.

      Alerted that Prontnicki would be at her house to return her car on the

afternoon of June 10, 2013, respondent did not call the police or leave the

premises; instead, she summoned her parents to her home. After Prontnicki

arrived, respondent spoke with him for over an hour, all but the last portion of

that time alone with him in her garage. Respondent spent hours on the

telephone with Prontnicki over the two-day period at issue in this matter. As

respondent reported those conversations to her friends, a remorseful Prontnicki

profusely apologized for having put respondent in a difficult situation, vowed

to resolve his legal problems and repair their relationship, and discussed the

prospect that he and respondent would have a child.

      Most significantly, although respondent had advance warning of

Prontnicki’s arrival at her home on the afternoon of June 11, 2013 to collect

his belongings, she took no precaution to protect herself from potential harm.

She did not seek the protection of the police. She did not leave Prontnicki’s

belongings outside the house and depart the premises. Instead, she waited

alone in her home for his arrival.

                                       30
      The evidence simply does not support respondent’s assertion that her

actions on June 10 and 11, 2013 were prompted by fear, and we do not find

that claim credible.4

      In short, clear and convincing evidence supports the Presenter’s

contention that respondent disclosed very little of what she knew about

Prontnicki’s location, activities, and plans to the police. The evidence

supports the inference that respondent acted not at the direction of the police

or because she feared harm, but in the hope that she could assist Prontnicki and

preserve their relationship while maintaining her judicial career.

      Finally, we briefly address respondent’s comments during her arrest on

June 11, 2013. There is clear and convincing evidence that respondent

asserted at the time of her arrest that she had been “vetted,” and requested that

she not be handcuffed after her arrest or that she be handcuffed with her hands

in front of her, not behind her.

      It is clear that respondent’s comment that she had been “vetted” was not

an attempt to reveal her judicial status to the WTPD officers; the evidence

4
   We are mindful of respondent’s testimony before the ACJC that she was the
victim of domestic violence in a prior relationship. Although we make no factual
findings about the allegation, in light of the testimony, we do not assert that
respondent was obligated to contact police while Prontnicki was in her home.
There was ample time before Prontnicki arrived on both June 10 and June 11, 2013
for respondent to alert police of his impending visits.
                                           31
shows that as of the previous day, the officers already knew that respondent

was a Superior Court judge, and alluded to her judicial status in the police

report. There is, however, a factual dispute as to the import of that comment.

The Presenter contended and the ACJC concluded that respondent stated she

had been “vetted” to remind the officers of her judicial status and secure

favorable treatment. Respondent insists that her reference to being “vetted”

was nothing more than an effort to reassure the officers that she represented no

threat to their safety.

      Considering respondent’s statement that she had been “vetted” in

conjunction with her demands not to be handcuffed or to be handcuffed in a

certain manner, we view that comment to be a reference to respondent’s

judicial status, intended to discourage the officers from handcuffing her in

accordance with their normal procedures.

                                       3.

      Relying only on clear and convincing evidence, we view respondent’s

communications with the WTPD on June 10 and 11, 2013 to fall short of the

high standards imposed by the Code. Respondent clearly understood that the

charges against Prontnicki were serious and that the police viewed public

safety to be at risk while he remained at large. Yet she disclosed only minimal

information about her extensive contacts with Prontnicki. Based on her

                                       32
conversations with Prontnicki, her texts to her friends, and her

communications with the WTPD, it is apparent that respondent’s priorities

were her personal concerns -- particularly her relationship with Prontnicki --

not her duty to the public.

      Respondent was undoubtedly in a difficult situation during the two days

at issue here. Alarmed by the disappearance of her car and exhausted from

searching for it, and believing that she might be pregnant with a child fathered

by Prontnicki, she was shocked by the officers’ revelation of his outstanding

warrants and suspended driver’s license. It is understandable that respondent

was upset as those disturbing events unfolded.

      As a judge, however, respondent was not at liberty to address her

circumstances with only herself and her personal relationships in mind. The

WTPD was searching for an individual who allegedly robbed a pharmacy by

threatening a pharmacist with a crowbar. A judge had found probable cause

and issued a warrant for his arrest, and WTPD officers were charged to

execute that warrant in the interest of public safety. It was incumbent on

respondent to fully cooperate with law enforcement in their search for

Prontnicki, notwithstanding her distressing personal circumstances.

      As the evidence makes clear, respondent did not do so. Respondent

declined to call the police station prior to Prontnicki’s visits to her home,

                                        33
where officers could have arrested him. In her two voicemails to the WTPD,

she detailed her intention to amend the complaint she had made the previous

day, stressing that Prontnicki had returned her car and suggesting that the

situation was resolved. At best, her communications to law enforcement were

perfunctory and vague. Those communications stand in stark contrast to the

candid and detailed accounts she provided by text to her friends, in real time.

      Moreover, while leaving a voicemail for a specific officer is an

important first step, it is not the only method of alerting a police department

about an important development in the investigation of a violent crime.

Respondent could have contacted the officers by using WTPD headquarters’

general telephone number, calling 9-1-1, or visiting the headquarters as she

had done only hours before.

      The public has the right to expect that when police officers are searching

for a fugitive accused of a violent crime and a judge has detailed knowledge of

the whereabouts, activities and immediate plans of that fugitive, the judge will

take prompt and decisive action to ensure that law enforcement is fully

informed. There is no exception to that principle when the judge and the

fugitive have a personal relationship.

      Respondent did not meet the high standard imposed on the judiciary, and

she did not discharge her responsibility to the public. An individual who

                                         34
observed respondent’s personal conduct on the relevant days would have “a

reasonable basis to doubt the judge’s integrity and impartiality.” Code of

Judicial Conduct, cmt. 3 on Canon 2, Rule 2.1.

      As noted, we do not find credible respondent’s repeated claim that

WTPD officers prohibited her from contacting them unless Prontnicki was at

her house or she knew at the moment of her call exactly where he was. That

informs our consideration of this matter. See Russo, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op.

at 25) (“Respondent’s explanations under oath about what occurred also reveal

a lack of candor on multiple occasions, which factors into our judgment in this

matter.”).

      Although we consider respondent’s comment that she had been “vetted”

and her direction to the officers about handcuffing improper, that portion of

the evidence is far less important to our determination than the evidence

regarding respondent’s communications with the WTPD and her

representations before the ACJC and this Court about the WTPD’s alleged

directive to her not to call police except under specific conditions.

      In sum, based on our de novo review of the record, we find clear and

convincing evidence that respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1; Canon 2,

Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code.

                                        35
                                        III.

      We consider the appropriate sanction for respondent’s violation of the

Code.5 That inquiry “requires more than establishing some instance or

instances of unethical conduct” and warrants “a more searching and expansive

inquiry . . . carefully scrutiniz[ing] the substantive offenses that constitute the

core of respondent’s misconduct, the underlying facts, and the surrounding

circumstances in determining the nature and extent of discipline.” Seaman,

 133 N.J. at 98 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Collester,  126 N.J. 468,

472 (1992)).

      The Court has identified aggravating and mitigating factors that may be

relevant to a given case:

             “Among the surrounding circumstances to which we
             give heed are . . . considerations of public policy,”
             including the State’s commitment to ending gender
             discrimination and, particularly, sexual harassment.
             Other relevant considerations include “whether the

5
  Respondent’s judicial service ended on April 4, 2020, when her seven-year
term as a Superior Court judge expired without reappointment. See N.J.
Const. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 3 (providing that Supreme Court justices and Superior
Court judges “shall hold their offices for initial terms of 7 years and upon
reappointment shall hold their offices during good behavior”). We retain the
authority to discipline her for her conduct during her service. See, e.g., In re
Breslin,  162 N.J. 190, 191 (2000) (imposing sanction of removal on former
Municipal Court judge); In re D’Ambrosio,  157 N.J. 186, 187 (1999) (publicly
reprimanding Superior Court judge who had resigned from judicial office); In
re Imbriani,  139 N.J. 262, 263-67 (1995) (imposing sanction of removal on
retired Superior Court judge).
                                         36
            misconduct involves a misuse of judicial authority[,] . .
            . is unbecoming and inappropriate for one holding the
            position of a judge, . . . [or] has been harmful to others.”
            On the other side of the scale we weigh whether “a
            matter represents the first complaint against a judge, . .
            . the length and . . . quality of the judge’s tenure in
            office, [the judge’s] personal and professional
            reputation, [his or her] sincere commitment to
            overcoming the fault, [and his or her] remorse and
            attempts at apology or reparations to the victim.” “We
            have also found relevant consideration of whether a
            judge found guilty of misconduct will engage in similar
            misconduct in the future, or whether the inappropriate
            behavior is susceptible to modification.”

            [In re Subryan,  187 N.J. 139, 153-54 (2006) (alterations
            in original) (quoting Seaman,  133 N.J. at 98-100).]

      In this matter, the aggravating factor of public policy -- in this instance

the public policy of ensuring the safety of a community by promptly arresting

suspects in violent crimes -- weighs in favor of a significant sanction. Because

respondent handled her communications with the WTPD in a manner

“unbecoming and inappropriate for one holding the position of a judge,” id. at

153, we consider that aggravating factor as well. 6

6
  Like the ACJC, whose recommendation of removal “does not turn on the
events related to [r]espondent’s reactions to being handcuffed upon her arrest,”
we do not consider those events in assessing the aggravating factors relevant to
this matter.
                                        37
      We also consider mitigating factors. This was the first ethics complaint

against respondent, who had been on the bench for only two months when

these incidents occurred. We acknowledge the emotional stress that

respondent experienced on June 10 and 11, 2013, and in the nearly five years

of criminal proceedings that followed, and the profound impact the events at

issue have had on her life and career. See Williams,  169 N.J. at 279 (noting

that the respondent in that matter had “already paid a heavy price for her

intemperate behavior.”).

      We see no evidence, however, that respondent has a “sincere

commitment to overcoming the fault” in this case. See Subryan,  187 N.J. at
 154. Indeed, during oral argument before this Court, respondent identified

only one action that she should have taken and did not take: she said that she

should have sought the advice of the Assignment Judge of the vicinage in

which she served. Respondent otherwise expressed no regrets about her

actions during the critical two days. Accordingly, we do not consider remorse

and a determination to avoid any similar concerns in the future -- factors that

have weighed against serious sanctions in other cases -- to constitute

mitigating factors in this matter.

      Balancing the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, we modify

the sanction of removal recommended by the ACJC and impose a three-month

                                       38
suspension on respondent. We view that sanction to be commensurate with the

conduct proven by clear and convincing evidence and to further our

disciplinary system’s purpose of preserving public confidence in the judiciary.

                                      IV.

      Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that there is

clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.1;

Canon 2, Rules 2.1 and 2.3(A); and Canon 5, Rule 5.1(A) of the Code. We

find that the appropriate discipline is a three-month suspension.

      So Ordered.

       CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON and SOLOMON
join in the Court’s opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA filed a concurrence.
JUSTICES ALBIN and LaVECCHIA each filed a dissent. JUSTICE TIMPONE
did not participate.

                                       39
                                 In the Matter of

                                 Carlia M. Brady,

                          a Judge of the Superior Court

                           of the State of New Jersey

                  JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA, concurring.

      I concur with the majority’s thorough de novo factual findings and analysis

of Carlia M. Brady’s conduct.

      I previously dissented from the Court’s March 10, 2020 Order to Show

Cause, which took away removal from the bench as a potential sanction.

      I would dissent from the majority’s determination that Carlia M. Brady’s

conduct warrants only a three-month suspension. I agree with the ACJC’s well-

reasoned Presentment recommending removal from the bench.

      I also find that the majority’s analysis today equally supports removal from

the bench beyond a reasonable doubt. Since removal from the bench is not

available as a sanction, I concur with the majority’s decision. See Mathews v.

United States,