Case Title: George v. Baltimore County, Maryland

Citation: 

Docket Number: 37/18

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Anne George, et al. v. Baltimore County, Maryland, et al., No. 37, September Term, 2018, 
Opinion by Adkins, J. 
 
STANDING – TAXPAYER STANDING DOCTRINE – SPECIFIC INJURY: 
To demonstrate special interest in a taxpayer standing suit, a taxpayer must (1) make a 
good faith allegation of an illegal or ultra vires act by a municipal corporation or official; 
and (2) show a “specific injury,” or that the act may injuriously affect the taxpayer’s 
property through a potential pecuniary loss or increase in taxes.  See Kendall v. Howard 
Cty., 431 Md. 590, 605 (2013).  Petitioners have established a reasonable likelihood of 
potential pecuniary harm derivative of waste and mismanagement, a nexus between that 
harm and the alleged illegal government act, and sufficiently quantified the alleged harm.  
Consequently, we hold that Petitioners have demonstrated specific injury and have 
standing under the taxpayer standing doctrine.  
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County  
Case No. 03-C-14-014041 
Argued: January 3, 2019 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
No. 37 
September Term, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNE GEORGE, et al. 
v. 
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
Adkins, Sally D.,  
     (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Adkins, J. 
Watts, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: April 1, 2019 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2019-04-01 
14:49-04:00
Taxpayer standing doctrine encourages the highest good governance standards by 
empowering stakeholder oversight of local governments.  Yet, these suits have the potential 
to substantially burden the time and treasure of local governments, impeding their efforts 
to serve the citizenry.  Maintaining a balance between these competing forces has 
sometimes resulted in varied, complicated, and seemingly contradictory legal edicts.  But 
our task, as we again address this topic, is eased by the recent and important decision in 
State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. Partnership, 438 Md. 451 (2014), which did 
much to untangle the web of taxpayer standing in Maryland.1   
With State Center as our beacon, we resolve this case in favor of Petitioners, holding 
that they possess the requisite taxpayer standing to pursue their claim against Baltimore 
County.  This is despite the County’s assertion that the “minor” harm alleged by the 
taxpayers will not cause an increase in taxes, especially considering it has not raised the 
property tax rate in 26 years or the income tax rate in 22 years.  
FACTUAL OVERVIEW AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
The present case involves three Baltimore County taxpayers, Anne George, Jody 
Kesner, and Jody Rosoff (collectively, “Petitioners” or “Taxpayers”), and their lawsuit 
against Baltimore County (“County”) and various County administrators.  Petitioners’ suit 
                                              
1 The phrasing of the issue in our order for certiorari was as follows:  
 
Can a government entity eliminate the right of taxpayers “to 
bring a lawsuit in this State to prevent waste or unlawful use of 
public property and funds,” State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington 
Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 560 (2014), by not 
increasing property tax rates for some period of time?  
 
2 
 
revolves around the County’s operation of the Baltimore County Animal Shelter (“BCAS”) 
and alleged waste at the facility.  
In December 2014, Taxpayers filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
County seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions, a declaratory judgment, and a writ 
of mandamus.  Taxpayers alleged they were entitled to bring suit under the taxpayer 
standing doctrine because they were “injured by the increased tax burden caused by [the 
County’s] illegal acts, in addition to other pecuniary injuries from having to care for 
animals that have been harmed by [the County’s] acts.”  They also claimed that various 
County actions resulted in over-expenditure on medical care and staffing and under-
collection of fees.   
In their complaint, Taxpayers alleged that the County, in its management of BCAS, 
violated numerous provisions of Baltimore County Code, Article 12.  Specifically, 
Taxpayers stated that the County failed to “[a]ppoint, train, and qualify” appropriate 
individuals to work in animal control, Balt. Cty. Code § 12-1-103(2); maintain a program 
to assist volunteers, id. § 12-1-103(3); provide appropriate facilities and care for animals, 
id. § 12-1-103(4); attempt to locate owners of stray animals, id. §§ 12-1-202(a), 12-3-
203(a); hold animals for four business days in a “humane manner,” id. §§ 12-3-201(b), 12-
3-202(b); put animals up for adoption only if they meet certain standards, id. § 12-3-204(d); 
and maintain holding facilities that meet the minimum standards of Article 12, id. § 12-6-
103.2  Taxpayers alleged that these regulations are routinely violated.  
                                              
2 Since the commencement of this action, Baltimore County Code §§ 12-3-201(b), 
12-3-202(b), and 12-3-203(a) have been repealed and replaced with new language.  
3 
 
The County responded with a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for 
summary judgment, claiming, among other things, that Taxpayers lacked standing to bring 
their claim.  The County argued that Taxpayers “failed to adequately allege any illegality 
or ultra vires act that reasonably may result in a pecuniary loss or a tax increase to survive 
[the] motion.”  The motion was accompanied by an affidavit from the Director of Budget 
and Finance for Baltimore County, Keith Dorsey (“Dorsey Affidavit”).  The Dorsey 
Affidavit asserted that Baltimore County property taxes had not been increased in 26 years, 
the income tax had not been increased in 22 years, and that BCAS constituted such a small 
fraction of the overall budget “that no taxes would be increased as a result of operation of 
the Animal Shelter.”   
Taxpayers’ response characterized the County’s motions as merely alleging a failure 
to show that taxes will increase, not rebutting Taxpayers’ charge of “other pecuniary loss.”  
Relying mainly on their complaint, the County’s motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment, and the Dorsey Affidavit, the response asserted that Taxpayers suffered a 
pecuniary loss “from the illegal expenditure of taxpayer funds,” which included the waste 
of tax-derived funds “on excess veterinary care and medications, food and other 
necessities, euthanasia, and employees.”  Moreover, with fewer animals suitable for 
adoption, Taxpayers asserted a loss of revenue from adoption and licensing fees.  
Taxpayers also alleged other pecuniary losses, separate from those involving the waste of 
tax-derived funds, caused by veterinary expenses they incurred caring for three different 
animals adopted from BCAS and allegedly mistreated while in the County’s care.  
4 
 
Significantly, on the same day that Taxpayers filed their response, they also filed a 
separate motion for preliminary injunction and request for hearing.  Attached to the motion 
were 18 separate affidavits.  We summarize the motion and affidavits as follows.  After 
adopting animals from BCAS, numerous individuals discovered that their pets were 
“severely underfed.”  There were allegations that animals had been left wet and sitting in 
pooled water, resulting in rashes, irritation, and bleeding.  Several affiants claimed that 
BCAS routinely failed to provide veterinary care, “isolate contagious animals from other 
animals,” or scan for identification microchips.  These failures resulted in deteriorating 
health conditions, unnecessary euthanasia, and animals being held in the shelter without 
their owner’s knowledge.  BCAS also failed to sterilize animals before they were offered 
for adoption.  Additionally, affiants claimed that employees and volunteers were 
improperly trained and inadequately supervised.   
At the hearing, the judge denied the motion to dismiss and focused on summary 
judgment.  On two occasions, the parties pointed the judge to the complaint and the 
preliminary injunction motion and attached affidavits for additional details regarding 
Taxpayers’ alleged injury.  There was significant debate, and some confusion, regarding 
the type of harm required to grant taxpayer standing under State Center, a leading taxpayer 
standing case authored by Judge Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. for this Court.  
The debate was twofold.  First, there was disagreement regarding the requirement 
that “the taxpayer must allege . . . a special interest distinct from the general public,” 
State Center, 438 Md. at 556 (emphasis added).  The dispute centered around the 
interpretation of the word “taxpayer” as a subset of “general public”—i.e., whether such a 
5 
 
relationship compared specific taxpayers in a political subdivision to taxpayers generally 
in the same subdivision, or specific taxpayers in the political subdivision to residents 
generally.  Second, the parties disagreed about whether the Dorsey Affidavit, stating that 
taxes had not and would not be raised, foreclosed Taxpayers’ argument that illegal County 
actions could reasonably be expected to result in “pecuniary loss or an increase in taxes,” 
id. at 557 (emphasis removed).   
In a written opinion, the hearing judge concluded that, while Taxpayers pled 
sufficient facts to withstand the motion to dismiss, the alleged pecuniary injury must be 
more developed to survive summary judgment.  The judge ruled that Taxpayers did not 
“specifically allege ‘waste of tax dollars’ in their Complaint.”  In the court’s view, 
Taxpayers’ argument centered entirely around the question of a potential tax increase or 
decrease.  Significantly, the court determined that Taxpayers never rebutted the Dorsey 
Affidavit, which “established that any alleged illegal acts have not and will not result in 
increased taxes or pecuniary loss to [Taxpayers].”  For these reasons, summary judgment 
was granted. 
In an unreported decision, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court.  
See George v. Balt. Cty., No. 47, Sept. Term 2016, 2018 WL 2948204 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
June 12, 2018).  The intermediate appellate court held that “the County’s actions were not 
reasonably likely to result in a pecuniary loss to [Taxpayers] because the County’s actions 
were not likely to affect [their] taxes.”  Id. at *5.  In dissent, Senior Judge Harrell, sitting 
by designation, stated that the majority erred when it “reduce[d] the disjunctive standard 
6 
 
of potential pecuniary loss or tax increase into a single category,” one entirely about 
taxation.  Id. at *6.  
DISCUSSION 
Standard of Review 
In Maryland, a court shall grant summary judgment only if “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and . . . the party in whose favor judgment is entered is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Maryland Rule 2-501(f).  “Whether summary 
judgment was granted properly is a question of law.”  Lightolier, a Division of Genlyte 
Thomas Grp. LLC v. Hoon, 387 Md. 539, 551 (2005).  Consequently, these determinations 
are made without deference to the deciding and reviewing courts.  See id.  “We review the 
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe any reasonable 
inferences that may be drawn from the well-pled facts against the moving party.”  Barclay 
v. Briscoe, 427 Md. 270, 282 (2012).   
Summary Judgment and Pleadings 
To determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, we must first decide 
which evidence in the record can be reviewed to make such a determination.  Taxpayers 
maintain that a material dispute exists as to whether Baltimore County wasted government 
funds through the various actions described above.  The County, on the other hand, asserts 
that Taxpayers’ response to the motion for summary judgment was insufficient, as their 
arguments are unsupported and “speculative at best.”  Taxpayers’ response, according to 
the County, did not contain the admissible evidence required under Md. Rule 2-501 and, 
therefore, failed to sufficiently rebut the Dorsey Affidavit.  
7 
 
Under Maryland Rules, “[a]ny party may file a written motion for summary 
judgment of all or part of an action on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Md. Rule 2-
501(a).  This motion must be supported by affidavit if it is: “(1) filed before the day on 
which the adverse party’s initial pleading or motion is filed or (2) based on facts not 
contained in the record.”  Id.  The County filed such an affidavit—the Dorsey Affidavit—
purporting to establish that taxes had not and would not be raised, even if the alleged 
violations were occurring.   
If the opposing party chooses to reply, it must answer, in writing, “identify[ing] with 
particularity each material fact as to which it is contended that there is a genuine 
dispute . . . .”  Md. Rule 2-501(b).  Additionally, as to these alleged material facts, the 
opposing party must “identify and attach the relevant portion of the specific document, 
discovery response, transcript of testimony (by page and line), or other statement under 
oath that demonstrates the dispute.”  Id.  “A response asserting the existence of a material 
fact or controverting any fact contained in the record shall be supported by an affidavit or 
other written statement under oath.”  Id.  We have yet to interpret the word “supported,” 
above, as meaning “attached to the responsive filing, only.”   
“[F]acts alleged in pleadings are not, by that means alone, before the court as facts 
for summary judgment purposes.  Ordinarily, mere allegations neither establish facts, nor 
show a genuine dispute of fact.”  Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md. App. 22, 27 
(1974) (citation omitted).  Still, courts should look to the “pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any” to determine whether a dispute 
8 
 
exists.  Cox v. Sandler’s, Inc., 209 Md. 193, 197 (1956) (emphasis added).  This means that 
courts should review any filing that shows, “in detail and with precision, by facts 
admissible in evidence,” Mullan Contracting Co. v. IBM Corp., 220 Md. 248, 257 (1959) 
(citations omitted), that there is a genuine dispute.  We have before deemed it appropriate 
to consider supplemental affidavits filed separately from the plaintiff’s response and prior 
to a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.  See Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 
273 Md. 1, 20 (1974).   
The Circuit Court opinion granting summary judgment states that Taxpayers “did 
not provide a counter-affidavit or an affidavit pursuant to Md. Rule 2-501(d),” allowing 
for “affidavits of defense not available.”  Whether or not this is strictly true, Taxpayers 
submitted 18 affidavits with their motion for preliminary injunction, which was filed on 
the same day as the response to the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.  These 
affidavits were referenced in the motions hearing, but never mentioned in the judge’s final 
opinion.  So long as these affidavits meet the standard set forth in the Maryland Rules,3 
they should be factored into the overall summary judgment determination.  
Keeping in mind the filings that the Circuit Court had at its disposal at the point of 
the hearing, we must determine whether they create a genuine dispute of material fact.  
Specifically, we must decide whether Taxpayers’ allegations satisfy the specific injury 
requirement, discussed in detail below.  We turn to that question now.   
                                              
3 Maryland Rule 2-501(c) provides: “An affidavit supporting or opposing a motion 
for summary judgment shall be made upon personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts 
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit.”  
9 
 
Taxpayer Standing Doctrine 
Taxpayer standing doctrine permits a taxpayer to “invoke the aid of a court of equity 
to restrain the action of a public official, which is illegal or ultra vires and may injuriously 
affect the taxpayer’s rights and property.”  Inlet Assocs. v. Assateague House Condominium 
Assn., 313 Md. 413, 440–41 (1988) (citation omitted).  Such a distillation has come to seem 
oversimplified, as the doctrine has grown and become “disorganized” and, “at times, 
seemingly contradictory . . . .”  State Center, 438 Md. at 540–41.  In State Center, Judge 
Harrell, writing for this Court, clarified some aspects of taxpayer standing that we discuss 
further below.  In his words, “[T]he conceptual basis of the doctrine is that the action is 
brought by complainants, as taxpayers and on behalf of all other similarly situated 
taxpayers.”  Id. at 547 (emphasis omitted).  
The taxpayers, in essence, are asserting the rights of their government against local 
administrators.  Thus, we have likened the taxpayer suit to a derivative shareholder suit, 
the shareholders of a government being the taxpayers.  See id. at 541.  In this way, 
Maryland has “gone rather far in sustaining the standing of taxpayers” to sue for illegal or 
ultra vires acts, compared to other jurisdictions.  Inlet Assocs., 313 Md. at 441 (citation 
omitted).  
There are two broad requirements to successfully assert taxpayer standing.  The first 
requirement is taxpayer status.  To establish eligibility to bring the suit, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that: (a) “the complainant is a taxpayer,” and (b) “the suit is brought, either 
expressly or implicitly, on behalf of all other taxpayers.”  State Center, 438 Md. at 547.  In 
this case, the parties do not contest that Taxpayers have sufficiently pled this element.  
10 
 
The second broad requirement is that parties must assert a “special interest,” 
alternatively referred to as the “special damage” requirement.  Special interest requires a 
taxpayer to allege: “[(1)] an action by a municipal corporation or public official that is 
illegal or ultra vires[;] and [(2)] that the action may injuriously affect the taxpayer’s 
property, meaning that it reasonably may result in a pecuniary loss to the taxpayer or an 
increase in taxes.”  Kendall v. Howard Cty., 431 Md. 590, 605 (2013) (citation omitted).  
These are known as the (1) “illegal or ultra vires act” prong, and (2) the “specific injury” 
prong.  See State Center, 438 Md. at 555–56.  
The illegal or ultra vires act prong “has been applied leniently and seems rather easy 
to meet . . . .”  Id. at 556.  Plaintiffs must simply “allege, in good faith, an ultra vires or 
illegal act by the State or one of its officers . . . .”  Id.  The County does not contest that 
Taxpayers have successfully met this element of taxpayer standing.  Taxpayers have made 
good faith claims of illegality by enumerating several alleged violations of Article 12 of 
the Baltimore County Code.  
The specific injury prong is more opaque, and often proves a “stumbling block.”  Id. 
at 572.  Plaintiffs establish specific injury by demonstrating the appropriate type of harm, 
a nexus between the illegal or ultra vires act and the alleged harm, and some modest 
showing regarding the degree of harm.  See id. at 560.  
Type of Harm 
The heart of both parties’ substantive arguments lies in the “type of harm” alleged.  
Taxpayers argue that the Court of Special Appeals erred in conflating “pecuniary loss” and 
“increase in taxes” by ignoring the disjunctive, “or.”  They characterize State Center, when 
11 
 
read as a whole, as supporting the idea that “a waste of already-collected funds can ‘affect’ 
taxes just as much as an ensuing rate hike.”  Treating an increase in taxes as a necessary 
element to establish taxpayer standing, Taxpayers argue, would unduly limit the doctrine.  
The County retorts that Taxpayers failed to present any well-pleaded facts of 
taxpayer waste.  They assert that Taxpayers’ allegations are generalized, not based on 
personal observation, and fail to allege any pecuniary loss.  To support this position, the 
County argues that only three of the animals identified in the complaint had any direct 
personal contact with Petitioners.  Thus, according to the County, Taxpayers’ harms also 
were not distinct from those of the general public.   
To demonstrate the type of harm necessary for specific injury, plaintiffs must show, 
first, that they “reasonably may sustain a pecuniary loss or a tax increase,” Inlet Assocs., 
313 Md. at 441 (citation omitted), and, then, that they have a “special interest distinct from 
the general public,” State Center, 439 Md. at 556. 
Taxpayers have been consistently required to establish “that the action being 
challenged results in a pecuniary loss or an increase in taxes.”  Id. at 556–57 (citation 
omitted).  We agree with Judge Harrell’s dissent in the Court of Special Appeals, as it 
reinforces the importance of the disjunctive “or” in the foregoing standard.  Yet, in 
assessing standing, we have never asked for more than a “potential” showing of such 
harms, id. at 559, and have “exhibited great leniency in [our] interpretation of ‘potential 
pecuniary loss,’” id. at 561 (citations omitted).  Thus, a reasonable possibility of either 
pecuniary loss, or a tax increase, must be shown.  
12 
 
Moreover, “[t]his Court has recognized repeatedly that taxpayers have the right to 
bring a lawsuit in this State to prevent waste or unlawful use of public property and funds.”  
Id. at 560 (emphasis removed).  We have stated that an illegal or ultra vires act can cause 
pecuniary harm in the form of “an assessment of property or . . . the levy, collection, 
expenditure, appropriation, or diversion of public taxes.”  Ruark v. Int’l Union of Operating 
Eng’rs, 157 Md. 576, 590 (1929).  Consequently, raising taxes is not the only valid type of 
harm that can be alleged.   
We have spilled much ink delineating the line between sufficient allegations of 
waste resulting in potential pecuniary loss, and those that are too speculative.  Early on, in 
Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud, 162 Md. 419, 427 (1932), we held that “taxpayers interested in 
avoiding the waste of funds derived from taxation” could bring suit to enjoin a “void 
referendum.”  This case has been described as among the more “lenient interpretations” of 
potential pecuniary loss.  State Center, 438 Md. at 563.  Again, in James v. Anderson, 281 
Md. 137, 142 (1977), we decided that allegations of decreased efficiency resulting from an 
ultra vires act were enough to maintain a suit.  Yet, in Floyd v. Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore, ___ Md. ___, ___ (2019), Maj. Slip Op. at 32–33, we reined in any speculation 
that a potential need to fend off charges of illegality is sufficient to confer standing.  
Instead, we decided that to allow the threat of lawsuit, itself, to provide the necessary 
pecuniary loss would be circular and insufficiently concrete.  Floyd, Maj. Slip Op. at 33.  
Thus, we narrowed the universe in which waste results in an adequate claim of pecuniary 
loss.  
13 
 
The County claims that Taxpayers inadequately raise the issue of taxpayer waste.  
We disagree.  In their response to the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, 
Taxpayers specifically allege that “the County wastes taxpayer derived funds through 
numerous specific violations of law . . . .”  Examples of such waste include excess 
expenditures on veterinary care, food, and medications; the cost of maintaining animals 
that, if cared for properly, would be eligible for adoption; lost revenue due to these non-
occurrent adoptions; and excessive staffing resulting from an inadequate volunteer 
program.  Taxpayers’ complaint also specifically alludes to “other pecuniary injuries,” 
beyond increased taxes, and claims that various County actions result in over-expenditure 
on medical care and staffing and under-collection of fees—i.e., waste.  
The County points us to the line in State Center providing that “the issue is not what 
‘type’ of harm is sufficient necessarily, but rather a much more forgiving question of 
whether the type of harm is one that may affect the complainant’s taxes.”  438 Md. at 565.  
They argue that this demonstrates that a tax increase, or threat of one, is required for 
taxpayer standing.  Our interpretation of State Center differs somewhat, as we view the 
term “affect” in a slightly broader context.  To limit the type of harm that can “affect” taxes 
only to harms that actually result in tax increase is to ignore the statement—ten words 
earlier—that the standard elucidated is a “much more forgiving” one.  It is sufficient for a 
given harm to affect taxes by increasing them.  But, such an effect is not necessary.  We 
are willing to recognize substantial waste in government operations, even without potential 
tax increase, as a pecuniary loss sufficient to confer standing.  This is because taxpayers, 
as “shareholders,” are reasonably entitled to a sound and careful use of funds.  
14 
 
This analysis sheds light on why the Circuit Court erred in placing almost total 
reliance on the Dorsey Affidavit, concluding that it “established that any alleged illegal 
acts have not and will not result in increased taxes or pecuniary loss to [Taxpayers].”  The 
Dorsey Affidavit certainly establishes that Baltimore County has not raised the property 
tax rate in 26 years and has not increased the income tax rate in 22 years.  The affidavit 
also appears to appropriately contextualize the “Animal Services Program” within the 
broader County budget.4  Yet, it does not address whether the government expenditure was 
wasteful.  
Taxpayers’ 18 affidavits, on the other hand, relate to the issue of waste.  Upon 
review, the affidavits state the following facts, at least for the purposes of a summary 
judgment motion.  First, affiants attested that multiple animals were not sterilized, and any 
record of sterilization was inadequate.  Multiple affiants also alleged personal knowledge 
of animals that BCAS never scanned for microchips, and, at least one animal is alleged to 
have been euthanized as a result of this failure.  Many allegations related to generally 
inadequate veterinary care, food, and water supply.  Specifically, water appeared to have 
been inaccessible to many animals.  Many affiants stated that animals recovered or adopted 
from BCAS were ill.  Moreover, others observed that BCAS failed to separate sick animals 
from healthy ones.  Numerous individuals observed damp conditions and sitting water on 
                                              
4 We doubt, however, whether an affidavit stating that taxes will not rise in the future 
can establish that fact.  Moreover, we also question whether any statement about future 
unsettled Baltimore County tax policy is within the cognition of any lay witness or 
admissible as evidence in court, as required under Md. Rule 2-501(c).  Such a statement is 
highly speculative.   
15 
 
the floors of the shelter.  Finally, affiants claim that there were too few qualified staff and 
an inadequate volunteer program.  
Consequently, Taxpayers contend, the County has wasted taxpayer funds.  They 
claim that the County’s actions “increase the number of animals that must be housed at 
BCAS and therefore impose increased maintenance costs.”  Such actions allegedly are 
wasteful in that they impose expenses on the public purse “for materials like medications 
for animals that avoidably fall ill and euthanizing agents for animals that are unnecessarily 
euthanized.”  Finally, Taxpayers assert, with fewer animals suitable for adoption, the 
County lost revenue from adoption and licensing fees.  These allegations of waste amount 
to substantial inefficiency and unlawful misuse of public property and treasure, regardless 
of whether they are likely to cause an increase in taxes.  Taxpayers have successfully 
alleged that, because BCAS’s ineffectual management resulted in the provision of more 
expensive shelter services and decreased revenue, its use of taxpayer funds was wasteful.  
As discussed previously, Taxpayers must also establish a “special interest” in the 
wasted funds that is “distinct from the general public.”5  State Center, 438 Md. at 556.  We 
have explained that entitlement to sue is based on the taxpayer’s “equitable ownership of 
[public] funds and their liability to replenish the public treasury.”  Id. at 558–59 (cleaned 
up).  Surely the “taxpayer” to which we referred means any individual who may be liable 
                                              
5 “The distinction between resident and taxpayer is significant,” and has been 
subject to much consternation.  State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 
451, 559 n.65 (2014).  To illuminate this distinction, we provided that, “[a] party may be a 
resident of the State (and, thus, have a ‘general interest’ in the State’s actions), but not be 
a taxpayer whose pecuniary interest would be affected by that action (and, thus, not have 
the requisite ‘special interest’).”  Id.   
16 
 
to replenish the relevant fisc.  Conversely, the “general public” includes all those not 
subject to such liability.  Hence, “taxpayer” means those in the relevant jurisdiction subject 
to the taxation which is alleged to have been increased or wasted, while the “general public” 
amounts to those who are not subject to such taxation.  
To explain, the taxpayers presently at issue are all those liable to replenish the fisc, 
via taxation, from which BCAS is funded, as this is the money that is allegedly being 
misused or wasted.6  Here, this includes any Baltimore County taxpayer contributing to 
general fund tax revenues, as BCAS operates using monies supplied from the Baltimore 
County general fund.  The “general public,” on the other hand, includes all those not subject 
to such liability.  Thus, the taxpayers of Baltimore County, as represented by the present 
Petitioners, are sufficiently distinct from the general public.7  
Nexus 
We have recognized that the plaintiff must also clearly demonstrate a nexus between 
“the potential pecuniary damage and the challenged act.”  Floyd, Maj. Slip Op. at 31–32.  
As part of this showing, “the taxpayer must be asserting a challenge and seeking a remedy 
                                              
6 For information regarding the taxes levied on Baltimore County residents, see Tax 
Rates, Balt. Cty. Gov’t (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.baltimorecountymd.gov/Agencies/
budfin/taxpayerservices/taxrates.html [archived at https://perma.cc/V4H3-N6DT].  They 
include a real property tax, personal property tax, public service taxes, and income tax.  
 
7 This explains the statement by Judge Harrell (ret.), in dissent, that he was “not 
certain . . . that the individual actual expenditures incurred by [Taxpayers] who claimed to 
have spent them should receive much weight in the analysis of standing.”  See George v. 
Balt. Cty., No. 47, Sept. Term 2016, 2018 WL 2948204, at *6 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 
12, 2018).  Rather, such harm is more appropriate for a private action.  
 
17 
 
that, if granted, would alleviate the tax burden on that individual and others[.]”  State 
Center, 438 Md. at 572.  The County argues that Taxpayers never established such a nexus. 
We do not agree.   
As described at length above, Taxpayers allege a nexus between the potential 
pecuniary damage—waste of government resources within a program funded from a pot 
that Petitioners are liable to replenish—and the challenged illegal act—the alleged 
violations of Article 12 of the Baltimore County Code.  We refer again to the above analysis 
to illuminate this point.  As their remedies, Taxpayers seek a declaratory judgment, writ of 
mandamus, and preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining the alleged illegal 
activity.8  It is self-evident that if waste and mismanagement at the shelter existed, any such 
relief would alleviate same.   
Degree of Harm 
Finally, there must be some modest showing regarding the degree of harm suffered 
by the taxpayers.  “It is well-settled that the individual’s monetary burden does not need to 
be calculable at the time of filing suit.  Equally well-settled, however, is the requirement 
that there must be a ‘clear showing’ that a monetary burden is alleged.”  State Center, 438 
Md. at 580.  Uncertainty surrounding the potential loss to the taxpayer is not disqualifying, 
                                              
8 Taxpayers seek no monetary damages.  This action is typical of taxpayer suits, and 
indeed, taxpayer standing presupposes that only declaratory and injunctive relief will be 
permitted, and not money damages or attorney’s fees.  See Citizens Planning & Hous. Ass’n 
v. Cty. Exec. of Balt. Cty., 273 Md. 333, 339 (1974) (“[T]he principle has become 
established that a taxpayer may invoke the aid of a court of equity to restrain the action of 
a public official or an administrative agency . . . .”).  The absence of monetary relief 
curtails the likelihood of frivolous taxpayer suits.  
18 
 
as this uncertainty “is the reason that we do not require taxpayers to demonstrate in the 
pleading the exact pecuniary loss or increase in taxes.”  Id. at 577.  
To be sure, there must be some degree of certainty that the loss experienced by 
taxpayers is not zero.  The Dorsey Affidavit confirms that the operational budget for the 
Animal Services Program is approximately $2,260,631 per fiscal year.  Waste of funds in 
the manner described and failure to collect adoption and license fees certainly demonstrate 
some monetary burden.   
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Taxpayers have established pecuniary harm derivative of waste and 
mismanagement, a nexus between that harm and the alleged illegal government act, and 
sufficiently quantified the alleged harm.  For these reasons, we hold that Taxpayers have 
demonstrated specific injury and, thus, possess standing to pursue their claim under the 
taxpayer standing doctrine.  Consequently, the motion for summary judgment should have 
been denied.  We reverse the Court of Special Appeals and remand to that Court with 
instructions to reverse the Circuit Court and remand to it for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.   
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO 
REVERSE 
THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
FOR 
BALTIMORE 
COUNTY 
AND 
REMAND 
TO 
THAT 
COURT 
FOR 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT 
HEREWITH.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY 
RESPONDENT.  
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 37 
 
September Term, 2018 
______________________________________ 
 
ANNE GEORGE, et al. 
 
v. 
 
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al. 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Adkins, Sally D. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Concurring Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: April 1, 2019 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
Case No. 03-C-14-014041 
Argued: January 3, 2019  
 
Respectfully, I concur.  I agree with the Majority that, under the circumstances of 
this case, Anne George, Jody Kesner, and Jody Rosoff (together, “Petitioners”) satisfied 
the requirements of taxpayer standing, and that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
improperly granted the County’s motion for summary judgment.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 18.  
More particularly, I agree with the Majority that Petitioners have satisfied the specific 
injury prong of the special interest requirement.  See id.  I write separately, however, 
because, from my perspective, the specific injury that Petitioners alleged, as described by 
the Majority, is not pecuniary loss, but rather a potential increase in taxes.  In other words, 
in my view, consistent with case law, pecuniary loss is not the equivalent of a potential 
increase in taxes; instead, pecuniary loss could encompass circumstances that do not 
involve a potential increase in taxes, as pecuniary loss and an increase in taxes are distinct 
types of harm.  
The majority opinion defines taxpayer standing as consisting of two broad 
requirements—“taxpayer status” and “special interest[.]”  Id. at 9-10.  “Taxpayer status,” 
or establishing eligibility to bring a suit, requires that a complainant demonstrate that the 
complainant is a taxpayer, and that “the suit is brought, either expressly or implicitly, on 
behalf of all other taxpayers.”  Id. at 9 (cleaned up).  To satisfy the “special interest” 
requirement, the complainant must allege both “an action by a municipal corporation or 
public official that is illegal or ultra vires” and “that the action may injuriously affect the 
taxpayer’s property, meaning that it reasonably may result in a pecuniary loss to the 
taxpayer or an increase in taxes.”  Id. at 10 (cleaned up).  With respect to the latter “specific 
injury” prong, a complainant “establish[es] specific injury by demonstrating the 
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appropriate type of harm, a nexus between the illegal or ultra vires act and the alleged 
harm, and some modest showing regarding the degree of harm.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
Although phrased slightly differently, in Joan Floyd, et al. v. Mayor and City 
Council of Baltimore, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.3d ___, No. 35, Sept. Term, 2018 (Md. 2019), 
we describe taxpayer standing in a similar manner.  In Floyd, Slip Op. at 15, we explain: 
As an initial matter, a complainant must demonstrate that he, she, or 
it is eligible under the taxpayer standing doctrine; specifically, to establish 
eligibility to maintain a suit under the taxpayer standing doctrine, a 
complainant must allege two things: (1) that the complainant is a taxpayer; 
and (2) that the suit is brought, either expressly or implicitly, on behalf of all 
other taxpayers. 
 
(Cleaned up).  And, we further explain that a complainant must show a special interest in 
the subject matter of the suit distinct from that of the general public by alleging both an 
illegal or ultra vires action by a municipal corporation or public official and “that the action 
may result in a pecuniary loss to the taxpayer or an increase in taxes.”  Id. at 15-16 (cleaned 
up).  As to the “specific injury” prong, in Floyd, id. at 16, we state that a complainant must 
show “that the action being challenged results in a pecuniary loss or an increase in taxes[,]” 
and “[t]he harm alleged must be particularized and pecuniary, as opposed to harms to the 
general public[.]”  (Cleaned up).  And, significantly, in Floyd, id. at 16, we point out that 
“there must be a nexus between the showing of potential pecuniary damage and the 
challenged act.”  (Cleaned up).  Thus, the majority opinion in this case and in Floyd both 
set forth the same requirements for taxpayer standing. 
The circumstances of this case, however, differ from those of Floyd in terms of what 
is under consideration.  In Floyd, id. at 30-31, the taxpayers alleged a theory of pecuniary 
- 3 - 
loss or increase in taxes that was vague and not easily understandable; and, among other 
things, they alleged that adoption of the zoning map by ultra vires or illegal means would 
potentially create costs related to defending against challenges to the comprehensive 
rezoning and zoning map.  Under those circumstances, in Floyd, id. at 29-30, we concluded 
that the taxpayers failed to show a special interest in the subject matter of the case that was 
distinct from that of the general public because they failed to sufficiently allege pecuniary 
loss or an increase in taxes.  In Floyd, this Court was not confronted with defining 
“pecuniary loss.”  By contrast, in this case, Petitioners have alleged taxpayer standing 
based on preventing waste or unlawful use of public property and funds.  See Maj. Slip Op. 
at 1 n.1, 3-4.  What is at issue in this case is whether an allegation of pecuniary loss that is 
separate from an actual increase in taxes is sufficient to show taxpayer standing and 
whether the losses that Petitioners alleged—including, among other things, veterinary 
expenses, and loss of revenue from adoption and licensing fees—constitute such pecuniary 
losses. 
I agree with the Majority that Petitioners sufficiently alleged taxpayer standing, but 
for different reasons.  The Majority holds that Petitioners “have established pecuniary harm 
derivative of waste and mismanagement, a nexus between that harm and the alleged illegal 
government act, and sufficiently quantified the alleged harm.”  Id. at 18.  In so holding, the 
Majority takes great pains to point out that pecuniary loss and an increase in taxes are 
distinct types of harm.  For example, the Majority explains: 
Taxpayers have been consistently required to establish that the action 
being challenged results in a pecuniary loss or an increase in taxes.  We agree 
with Judge Harrell’s dissent in the Court of Special Appeals, as it reinforces 
- 4 - 
the importance of the disjunctive “or” in the foregoing standard.  Yet, in 
assessing standing, we have never asked for more than a potential showing 
of such harms, and have exhibited great leniency in our interpretation of 
potential pecuniary loss[.]  Thus, a reasonable possibility of either 
pecuniary loss, or a tax increase, must be shown. 
 
Id. at 11 (cleaned up) (emphasis in original).  The majority opinion expressly acknowledges 
that “raising taxes is not the only valid type of harm that can be alleged.”  Id. at 12.  I fully 
agree with Majority on this point. 
In reading the majority opinion, however, it becomes clear that the Majority 
describes potential pecuniary loss as a circumstance in which there is a potential for an 
increase in taxes, but where the increase has not actually occurred; i.e., in my view, despite 
taking care to distinguish between pecuniary loss and an increase in taxes, the Majority 
appears to, at the end of the day, equate the two.  For example, the Majority states: 
Consequently, [Petitioner]s contend, the County has wasted taxpayer 
funds.  They claim that the County’s actions “increase the number of animals 
that must be housed at [Baltimore County Animal Shelter] and therefore 
impose increased maintenance costs.”  Such actions allegedly are wasteful in 
that they impose expenses on the public purse “for materials like medications 
for animals that avoidably fall ill and euthanizing agents for animals that are 
unnecessarily euthanized.”  Finally, [Petitioner]s assert, with fewer animals 
suitable for adoption, the County lost revenue from adoption and licensing 
fees.  These allegations of waste amount to substantial inefficiency and 
unlawful misuse of public property and treasure, regardless of whether they 
are likely to cause an increase in taxes.  [Petitioner]s have successfully 
alleged that because [Baltimore County Animal Shelter]’s ineffectual 
management resulted in the provision of more expensive shelter services and 
decreased revenue, its use of taxpayer funds was wasteful.   
 
Id. at 15.  Although the Majority indicates that these allegations of waste may result in 
pecuniary loss regardless of whether they are likely to increase taxes, what the Majority 
describes as waste are actually expenses or lost revenue that could potentially result in an 
- 5 - 
increase in taxes.  Stated otherwise, these are circumstances that could lead to an increased 
tax burden, but, in this case, have not yet done so. 
 
Similarly, as to the Dorsey Affidavit,1 the Majority expressly concludes: 
We doubt[] whether an affidavit stating that taxes will not rise in the 
future can establish that fact.  Moreover, we also question whether any 
statement about future unsettled Baltimore County tax policy is within the 
cognition of any lay witness or admissible as evidence in court, as required 
under Md. Rule 2-501(c).  Such a statement is highly speculative. 
 
Maj. Slip Op. at 14 n.5.  As I see it, ultimately, the Majority attempts to have it both ways 
by claiming that potential pecuniary loss and a potential increase in taxes are different types 
of harm—and I quite agree with the Majority on this point—yet, acknowledging that the 
waste alleged by Petitioners may result in a potential increase in taxes.  The Majority 
provides no definition of pecuniary loss other than to imply that it may be different than a 
potential increase in taxes, and proceeds to identify as pecuniary loss circumstances such 
as “waste” that may result in an increase in taxes.  I would simply acknowledge that 
Petitioners have alleged conditions that could have resulted in an increase in taxes, but did 
not, and thus have satisfied the special injury necessary for taxpayer standing.  
 
In State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 556-57, 92 A.3d 
                                              
1The majority opinion describes the Dorsey Affidavit as an affidavit from the 
Director of Budget and Finance for Baltimore County that 
 
asserted that Baltimore County property taxes had not been increased in 26 
years, the income tax had not been increased in 22 years, and that [Baltimore 
County Animal Shelter] constituted such a small fraction of the overall 
budget “that no taxes would be increased as a result of operation of the 
Animal Shelter.” 
 
Maj. Slip Op. at 3. 
- 6 - 
400, 463 (2014), with respect to taxpayer standing and specific injury, this Court reiterated 
the well-settled principle that a complainant must allege “a special interest distinct from 
the general public” by “showing that the action being challenged results in a pecuniary loss 
or an increase in taxes.”  (Cleaned up).  A “special interest that is distinct from the general 
public” may be “the increased burden of taxation[,]” i.e., alleging a potential increase in 
taxes is sufficient.  Id. at 557, 92 A.3d at 463 (cleaned up).  We emphasized that a 
complainant “is not required to allege facts which necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
taxes will be increased; rather[,] the test is whether the taxpayer reasonably may sustain a 
pecuniary loss or a tax increase—whether there has been a showing of potential pecuniary 
damage.”  Id. at 559, 92 A.3d at 464 (cleaned up). 
In State Ctr., id. at 583, 92 A.3d at 479, this Court “conclude[d] that [the plaintiff]s 
pleaded [the] taxpayer standing doctrine sufficiently[.]”  We determined that there was a 
nexus between the plaintiffs’ allegations of taxpayer harm and the allegedly illegal acts of 
public officials.  See id. at 577, 92 A.3d at 475.  And, we noted that the plaintiffs had 
alleged that: the project at issue was expected to cost $1.5 billion; a State agency had 
assumed the obligation to design, finance, construct, operate, and maintain an underground 
garage for the project, and agreed to contribute up to $28 million in taxpayer funds toward 
the cost of the garage design and construction; and issuance of $33 million in bonds 
supported by taxpayer revenues to build the parking garage had been approved.  See id. at 
577, 92 A.3d at 475.  Moreover, the plaintiffs had alleged that they would “uniquely bear 
the excessive costs” and increased taxes as a result of the State’s failure to use a competitive 
bidding process.  Id. at 579, 92 A.2d at 476-77.  We determined that these “allegations 
- 7 - 
[were] sufficient” to establish a nexus.  Id. at 580, 92 A.3d at 477.  Finally, we stated that, 
although a plaintiff must make “a clear showing that a monetary burden is alleged[,]” a 
taxpayer is “not required to prove an exact amount of pecuniary damage that he[,] she[, or 
it] will suffer.”  Id. at 580, 92 A.3d at 477.  As such, we determined that the plaintiffs had 
“pleaded sufficiently a loss of revenue from the public funds as contributed by them as 
taxpayers.”  Id. at 581, 92 A.3d at 478.  Stated otherwise, alleging a potential increase in 
taxes is sufficient to satisfy the specific injury prong.   
Here, although the Majority does not rule out the possibility that pecuniary loss 
could be different than a potential increase in taxes, the situation in this case is that the 
Majority describes the pecuniary loss alleged by Petitioners by stating: “We are willing to 
recognize substantial waste in government operations, even without potential tax increase, 
as a pecuniary loss sufficient to confer standing.  This is because taxpayers, as 
‘shareholders,’ are reasonably entitled to a sound and careful use of funds.”  Maj. Slip Op. 
at 13.  Clearly, the County’s sound and careful use of funds is necessary to avoid a potential 
increase in taxes.  Similarly, the Majority states that Petitioners “allege a nexus between 
the potential pecuniary damage—waste of government resources within a program funded 
from a pot that Petitioners are liable to replenish—and the challenged illegal act[.]”  Id. at 
17.  With these observations, the Majority likens pecuniary loss to a potential increase in 
taxes.  The Majority also recounts Petitioners’ allegations as including increased 
maintenance costs, taxpayer expenses for items such as medications, and lost revenue from 
adoption and licensing fees.  These additional costs and lost revenues are circumstances 
that could theoretically result in an increase in taxes.  For these reasons, the Majority is 
- 8 - 
correct that Petitioners have sufficiently established taxpayer standing.  To the extent that 
the majority opinion expressly states that pecuniary loss and an increase in taxes are distinct 
harms, and does not rule out that pecuniary loss could be different from a potential increase 
in taxes—i.e., that pecuniary loss is not limited to a potential increase in taxes—I agree.   
Significantly, in this case, in the Court of Special Appeals, in a dissenting opinion, 
Judge Glenn T. Harrell, Jr., indicated the same—that pecuniary loss and an increase in 
taxes are distinct types of harm—explaining: 
 [T]he Majority opinion in its analysis reduces the disjunctive standard of 
potential pecuniary loss or tax increase into a single category—it is all about 
taxation.  Although I understand that the name of the legal concept at issue 
is “taxpayer” standing, that does not mean (or justify) collapsing the 
alternative basis of “potential pecuniary loss” into the separate category of 
increased taxation. 
 
The cases, albeit without crystal clarity, distinguish that “potential 
pecuniary loss” is indeed a separate category for standing from increased 
taxation.  For example, the Court of Appeals, in James v. Anderson, 281 Md. 
137, 377 A.2d 865 (1977), held that alleging a “decrease in efficiency which 
would result from the alleged [governmental] ultra vires acts” was “sufficient 
for a taxpayer of the county involved to maintain a suit.”  281 Md. at 142, 
377 A.2d at 868.  The bar is not set high in meeting this standard.  In Sun 
Cab Co. v. Cloud, 162 Md. 419, 159 A. 922 (1932), the Court of Appeals 
demonstrated great leniency in accepting as sufficient a plea of potential 
pecuniary loss where a plaintiff claimed an interest in avoiding waste of 
public funds by local government in conducting an arguably invalid 
referendum vote.  162 Md. at 426, 159 A. at 925. 
 
Anne George, et al. v. Baltimore Cty., Md., et al., No. 47, Sept. Term, 2016, 2018 WL 
2948204, *6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 12, 2018) (Harrell, J., dissenting) (last alteration in 
original).  In analyzing the allegations in this case, Judge Harrell recognized that some of 
the Petitioners had alleged pecuniary losses distinct from increased taxes, stating: 
[Petitioners] allege that Baltimore County was grossly defective and/or 
- 9 - 
inefficient in its operation of its Animal Shelter, all of which resulted in the 
unnecessary or exorbitant expenditure of public funds and even direct 
personal pecuniary losses to citizens who ended-up having to obtain proper 
veterinary case (or euthanasia) for adopted animals who had been neglected 
or mistreated at the Shelter.  Mr. Dorsey’s (the County’s Budget & Finance 
Director) affidavit, in which the circuit court and the Majority opinion place 
much stock, made no attempt to counter [Petitioners’] claims of potential or 
actual pecuniary loss, except as to the unlikelihood of increased or decreased 
taxes.  I conclude that [Petitioners] demonstrated sufficiently a triable 
controversy. 
 
Id.  (footnote omitted).  I agree with Judge Harrell’s well-reasoned assessment of the case. 
In any event, I am in agreement with the Majority’s apparent conclusion that 
alleging circumstances that involve a potential increase in taxes is sufficient to satisfy the 
specific injury prong of the special interest requirement, and that, here, Petitioners have 
done so and have otherwise satisfied the requirements to establish taxpayer standing.  
Whether the harm is described as pecuniary loss or a potential increase in taxes, it is enough 
under the circumstances of this case. 
For the above reasons, respectfully, I concur.