Case Title: State v. Bell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP002668-CR, 2015AP002667-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 28 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Gerrod R. Bell, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 373 Wis. 2d 310, 895 N.W.2d 104 
(2017 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 10, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 23, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Monroe 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Rosborough 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, C.J. withdrew from participation.  
ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by and an oral argument by Suzanne L. Hagopian, assistant 
state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general.  There was an oral argument by Daniel 
J. O'Brien. 
 
 
2018 WI 28
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR   
(L.C. Nos. 
2001CF239 & 2001CF249) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Gerrod R. Bell,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
APR 10, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   Gerrod Bell says he is entitled to 
a new trial because the first one, which resulted in convictions 
for the sexual assault of two victims, was unfair——a violation 
of his due process rights.  He believes it was unfair because 
the State told the jurors they could not find him not guilty 
unless they thought the victims lied about the sexual assaults, 
and that they should not disbelieve the victims because there 
was no motive for them to lie.  This, he says, shifted the 
burden 
of 
proof 
and 
distorted 
the 
jury's 
credibility 
determinations.  He also claims the jury based its verdict, at 
least in part, on inadmissible evidence contained in two 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
2 
 
exhibits sent to the jury room during deliberations.  We 
conclude that Mr. Bell is not entitled to a new trial and affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals.1 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The State charged Mr. Bell with sexually assaulting 
two victims——T.P., who was fourteen years of age at the time, 
and her older sister, A.L., who was then seventeen.  The 
incidents came to light when, in August of 2001, T.P.'s mother 
reported to Sergeant Dale Stickney of the Sparta Police 
Department that Mr. Bell, a family friend, had sexually 
assaulted T.P. in the backyard of T.P.'s home after a birthday 
party for A.L. 
¶3 
Detective LaVern Erickson and a social worker met with 
T.P. 
to 
interview 
her 
about 
the 
incident. 
Subsequently, 
Detective Erickson questioned A.L. about her sister's sexual 
assault.  In the course of that interview, A.L. revealed to 
Detective Erickson that she had herself been the victim of three 
sexual assaults by Mr. Bell, all of which had occurred around 
the time of the incident with T.P.2  Approximately five months 
                                                 
1 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals, State v. Bell, Nos. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2016), affirming the 
Monroe 
County 
Circuit 
Court's 
denial 
of 
Mr. 
Bell's 
postconviction 
motion. 
 
The 
Honorable 
Michael 
Rosborough 
presided over both the jury trial and the postconviction motion. 
2 It is somewhat unclear whether A.L. revealed all of this 
conduct during the course of a single interview with Detective 
Erickson; however, it appears that she reported these three 
incidents within approximately one to two weeks of T.P. having 
reported her assault. 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
3 
 
after reporting these incidents, A.L. further disclosed that Mr. 
Bell had also sexually assaulted her in the bathroom of her 
mother's home in early July 2001——prior to the incidents she had 
previously reported and prior to the sexual assault of T.P.  Of 
the four incidents, only the one occurring in the bathroom 
involved sexual intercourse. 
¶4 
The State initiated two cases against Mr. Bell, one 
for each of the victims, but joined them for trial.3  With 
respect to T.P., the State charged Mr. Bell with one count of 
sexual assault as a persistent repeater contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.225(2)(a) (2001-02),4 939.50(3)(bc), and 939.62(2m) (Count 
1); one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child as a 
persistent 
repeater 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 948.02(2), 
939.50(3)(c), and 939.62(2m)(b)2. (Count 2); and one count of 
misdemeanor bail jumping as a repeater contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 946.49(1)(a), 939.51(3)(a), and 939.62(1)(a) (Count 3).  With 
respect to A.L., the State charged Mr. Bell with two counts of 
sexual assault as a persistent repeater contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.225(2)(a), 939.50(3)(bc), and 939.62(2m) (Counts 1 and 
2);5 and two counts of attempted second degree sexual assault as 
                                                 
3 Monroe County Circuit Court Case No. 2001CF239 (T.P.); 
Monroe County Circuit Court Case No. 2001CF249 (A.L.). 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 Count 1 pertained to sexual contact without consent by use 
of threat or force and Count 2 pertained to non-consensual 
sexual intercourse with use of threat or by force. 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
4 
 
a persistent repeater contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225(2)(a), 
939.50(3)(bc), and 939.62(1)(c) (Counts 3 and 4).  Before 
submitting the case to the jury, the circuit court dismissed 
Count 3 for lack of sufficient evidence, and then dismissed 
Count 4 at the State's request.  
¶5 
During deliberations, the jury requested that certain 
documents be delivered to it for review.  Two of the documents 
indicated that T.P. had not had sexual intercourse until she was 
assaulted by Mr. Bell.  Neither the prosecutor nor defense 
counsel asked for that information to be redacted from the 
exhibits. 
¶6 
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts 
submitted to it, and Mr. Bell received his sentence in due 
course.  He then moved to vacate the judgments of conviction and 
requested 
a 
new 
trial 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 
809.30(2)(h) (2015-16)6 on July 13, 2015.7  His motion claimed he 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2)(h) (2015-16) provides: 
Notice of appeal, postconviction or postdisposition 
motion.  The person shall file in circuit court and 
serve on the prosecutor and any other party a notice 
of 
appeal 
or 
motion 
seeking 
postconviction 
or 
postdisposition relief within 60 days after the later 
of the service of the transcript or circuit court case 
record. 
 
The 
person 
shall 
file 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction or postdisposition relief before a 
notice of appeal is filed unless the grounds for 
seeking relief are sufficiency of the evidence or 
issues 
previously 
raised. 
 
A 
postconviction 
or 
postdisposition motion under this section may not be 
accompanied by a notice of motion and is made when 
filed.  A notice of appeal filed under this section 
(continued) 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
5 
 
did not receive a fair trial because:  (1) the prosecutor's 
comments regarding motive and evidence of lying during closing 
argument shifted the burden of proof; and (2) the jury was 
allowed to view two inadmissible exhibits during deliberation.8  
As to his first argument, Mr. Bell argued he was entitled to 
relief based on the plain error doctrine or ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and as to his second argument, he sought 
relief based on the interests of justice or ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The circuit court conducted a Machner9 
hearing at which trial counsel testified.  The court denied the 
motion because it concluded the trial was free from harmful 
                                                                                                                                                             
shall conform to the requirements set forth in s. 
809.10. 
7 The 
procedural 
history 
in 
these 
cases 
is 
long, 
complicated, and but for the portions we have recounted, not 
relevant to the issues sub judice.  For our purposes, it will 
suffice 
that 
the 
case 
is 
before 
us 
on 
direct 
appeal, 
notwithstanding the nearly 13 years between the verdict and Mr. 
Bell's postconviction motion. 
8 Mr. Bell also sought resentencing on Count 1 in the case 
related to T.P. (2001CF239). He asserted that if the court 
denied his request for a new trial, he was entitled to 
resentencing on this count because the persistent repeater had 
been incorrectly applied.  The persistent repeater had also been 
applied incorrectly to Counts 1 and 2 in the case related to 
A.L. (2001CF249), which error was corrected in 2014.  At the 
conclusion of the postconviction motion hearing, the circuit 
court agreed that resentencing on Count 1 in 2001CF239 would be 
necessary in the event the appellate courts upheld Mr. Bell's 
convictions.  The resentencing issue is not currently before 
this court. 
9 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
6 
 
error.  The court of appeals affirmed, and we granted Mr. Bell's 
petition for review. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
Mr. 
Bell 
asks 
us 
to 
review 
the 
State's 
trial 
commentary under the plain error doctrine or, alternatively, for 
a determination that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  With respect to his attorney's failure to request 
redaction of the exhibits sent to the jury room, he asks us to 
determine only whether he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
¶8 
The "plain error" Mr. Bell claims is at issue is a 
violation of his due process rights, which is a question of law 
we review de novo.  State v. Burns, 2011 WI 22, ¶23, 332 
Wis. 2d 730, 798 N.W.2d 166.  However, we will not remedy errors 
under this doctrine unless they are "obvious and substantial[,]" 
and "so fundamental that a new trial or other relief must be 
granted even though the action was not objected to at the time."  
State v. Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, ¶21, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 
N.W.2d 77 (citation and internal marks omitted). 
¶9 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents 
a mixed question of fact and law.  State v. Tourville, 2016 
WI 17, ¶16, 367 Wis. 2d 285, 876 N.W.2d 735.  We will not 
reverse the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Id.  We independently review, as a matter of 
law, whether those facts demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Id.   
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
7 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶10 Mr. Bell says his right to a fair trial was violated 
by:  (1) the State's trial commentary, which he believes 
improperly shifted the burden of proof to him; and (2) the 
jury's 
review 
of 
certain 
unredacted 
documents 
during 
deliberations.   We will address each issue in turn. 
A. 
The State's Trial Commentary10 
¶11 The essence of Mr. Bell's argument is that the State 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof by framing this case 
as a binary proposition:  The jury must convict him if it 
believes the victims, and may find him not guilty only if it 
does not.11  Mr. Bell maintains there are other reasons the jury 
legitimately could have chosen to acquit him, and so the State's 
commentary misstated the law.12  Because the defense did not move 
for a mistrial on that basis, this alleged error was not 
                                                 
10 When we refer to the State's "trial commentary," we mean 
it to include comments and questions during voir dire, the 
opening 
statement, 
examination 
of 
witnesses, 
and 
closing 
arguments. 
11 Mr. Bell says the State compounded this error by also 
telling the jurors they should not believe the victims unless 
they could discern a reason for them to lie.   
12 Mr. Bell's brief purports to identify other reasons the 
jury could have acquitted him, but each one was just a different 
way of describing the jury's failure to believe the victims' 
testimony. 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
8 
 
preserved for appellate review.13  Mr. Bell says we should 
nonetheless reach and decide this issue under our "plain error" 
doctrine, or conclude that the failure to request a mistrial 
deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel during the 
trial. 
¶12 The "plain error" doctrine allows us to review errors 
even when they were not properly preserved at trial.  State v. 
Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶29, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115; see also 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 901.03(4) 
(2015-16) 
("Nothing 
in 
this 
rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial 
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the 
judge.").  To qualify for this doctrine's application, however, 
the error "must be 'obvious and substantial[,]'" and "'so 
fundamental that a new trial or other relief must be granted 
even though the action was not objected to at the time.'"  
Jorgensen, 310 Wis. 2d 138, ¶21 (citation and one set of marks 
omitted).  We employ this doctrine sparingly.  Id. 
¶13 We can also address unpreserved claims of error if the 
error is of such a nature that it deprived the defendant of "the 
                                                 
13 See State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶86, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 
613 N.W.2d 606 (defendant who objects to a prosecutor's closing 
argument but fails to timely move for a mistrial waives his 
objection to the prosecutor's closing argument statements); 
State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 
N.W.2d 727 ("It is a fundamental principle of appellate review 
that issues must be preserved at the circuit court.  Issues that 
are 
not 
preserved 
at 
the 
circuit 
court, 
even 
alleged 
constitutional errors, generally will not be considered on 
appeal."). 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
9 
 
effective assistance of counsel."  See Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).  If the failure to move for a mistrial 
based on the State's trial commentary comprised deficient 
performance, and that deficiency was prejudicial, Mr. Bell would 
be entitled to a new trial.  See  id. at 687; State v. Pitsch, 
124 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).   
¶14 There can be neither a deficiency nor plain error, 
however, unless the State's trial commentary was improper.  
Therefore, whether we analyze this case under the "plain error" 
doctrine or as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, our 
first step is to determine whether the State's trial commentary 
was improper.  If it was, our analysis would then turn to 
whether counsel's failure to request a mistrial:  (1) was an 
error so obvious, substantial, and fundamental that a new trial 
is necessary; or (2) comprised deficient and prejudicial 
performance. 
¶15 We begin with the fundamental tenet that Mr. Bell is 
guaranteed the right to due process of law.  See U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . . . deprive any person of 
life, 
liberty, 
or 
property, 
without 
due 
process 
of 
law . . . ."); Wis. Const. art. I, § 8 ("No person may be held 
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of 
law . . . .").  This guaranty extends to the State's comments 
during trial:  "When a defendant alleges that a prosecutor's 
statements and arguments constituted misconduct, the test 
applied is whether the statements 'so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
10 
 
process.'"  Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, ¶43 (quoting State v. 
Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶88, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606) 
(some internal marks omitted); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (same).  
¶16 These due process considerations do not, however, 
prevent the State from energetically pressing its case.  The 
State's attorney is free to "prosecute with earnestness and 
vigor——indeed, he should do so."  Berger v. United States, 295 
U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  But in conducting a trial, he must keep in 
mind that he represents "a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern 
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution 
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be 
done."  Id.  For that reason, "while he may strike hard blows, 
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty 
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to 
bring about a just one."  Id. 
¶17 Mr. Bell says the State struck foul blows in his 
trial, the result of which was that he bore the burden of 
proving to the jury he was not guilty——a burden that does not 
belong to him.  The burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt belongs to the State.  Barrera v. State, 109 Wis. 2d 324, 
329, 325 N.W.2d 722 (1982) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
(1970)) ("The state bears the burden of proving all elements of 
a crime beyond reasonable doubt."); see also State v. Kuntz, 160 
Wis. 2d 722, 736, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991) ("It is axiomatic that 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
11 
 
the State must prove all the elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt to convict a defendant.").  Specifically, Mr. 
Bell says the State's comments throughout trial (including its 
closing argument) required the jury to convict him unless he 
could prove the victims lied about the sexual assaults and 
prevented the jury from questioning the victims' veracity unless 
it could divine a reason for them to lie.   
¶18 We cannot, of course, look at the State's comments in 
isolation.  We must examine them in the context of the entirety 
of the trial——including the nature of the defense Mr. Bell 
presented.  It is fair to say that in evaluating Mr. Bell's 
claim, context is everything. 
1. 
The Trial 
¶19 To provide the proper context, we will recount, at 
length, the relevant parts of the trial proceedings.  The 
purpose for doing so is to compare the State's commentary 
against the relevant facts and law.  Our analysis will inquire 
into whether there is such a meaningful discrepancy between the 
two that it could have caused the jury to convict Mr. Bell 
without finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Mr. Bell 
says 
the 
State's 
improper 
commentary 
started 
with 
the 
examination of potential jurors, so we will begin there. 
a. 
Voir Dire 
¶20 The 
prosecutor 
introduced 
the 
idea 
that 
people 
generally don't lie without reason early in the proceedings.  He 
queried the prospective jurors closely on the truthfulness of 
teenagers and the reasons they might lie.  For example, he asked 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
12 
 
if any of the prospective jurors had "ever known a teenager to 
lie[,]" whether anyone had "ever not known a teenager to have 
lied[,]" and "what are some of the typical things you might 
expect a teenager to lie about?".  After hearing from 
prospective jurors who acknowledged that teenagers likely do lie 
in some circumstances but are less likely to do so in others, 
the prosecutor asked: 
Would everybody agree here that——that, though, that if 
you're going to lie, you're going to have a reason 
like jealousy of some sort; there's going to be a 
reason why you would lie?  Everybody agree with that?  
Everybody is nodding their head. 
¶21 The prosecutor then asked "what are some reasons that 
a teenage girl might falsely accuse someone of sexual assault?"  
One juror responded that a teenage girl might lie for 
"attention," another answered "[l]ack of understanding of the 
gravity of accusing someone," another answered "revenge," and 
one prospective juror responded that teenage girls might lie 
about a sexual assault if they were afraid "that they'd get in 
trouble with their parents for having sex in the first place if 
they got caught."  So the State asked the prospective jurors if 
they would "expect there would be some evidence that somebody 
would have a reason to lie?  There would be some sort of 
evidence that this person would have a reason to lie about——[.]"  
Two prospective jurors responded that they would expect there to 
be some type of evidence that the person had lied.  The State 
cautioned 
the 
prospective 
jurors 
they 
would 
hear 
jury 
instructions telling them that they would not be allowed to 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
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speculate and that their verdict would need to be based on 
evidence or the lack of evidence. 
¶22 The 
defense 
was 
similarly 
interested 
in 
the 
prospective 
jurors' 
impression 
of 
teenagers' 
truthfulness.  
After asking each prospective juror the ages of their children, 
he asked "How many people believe that a child 14 years old, 18 
years old can——can lie about a sexual assault?"  He then 
reminded 
the 
prospective 
jurors 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
had 
mentioned the concept of someone omitting certain details and 
asked if "anybody [has] heard of lying by omission?"  He pursued 
this theme as he inquired into:  (1) whether the jurors believed 
that someone might lie because she does not understand the 
repercussions; (2) whether someone might tell a lie and then 
continue telling the lie because it is too difficult to 
backtrack; and (3) whether someone might "lie to gain attention 
because they want the love and attention from that person[.]" 
b. 
Opening Statements And Evidence Adduced at Trial 
¶23 During his opening statement, defense counsel signaled 
that he would be concentrating on the victims' veracity.  Part 
of his remarks referred to testimony that he said would 
establish T.P. had lied about the amount of alcohol she drank on 
the night of the assault, that she lied about the assaults 
having occurred, that A.L. had admitted prior to trial that she 
previously lied about how much alcohol T.P. consumed the night 
of the assault, and concluded by telling the jury that "the 
evidence will show at the end of this, that in fact . . . [T.P.] 
and [A.L.] did not know what the truth is." 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
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¶24 Central to the State's case was the testimony of T.P. 
and A.L., who testified extensively and in great detail about 
the sexual assaults.  T.P. not only recounted details of the 
actual assault, she also described the circumstances surrounding 
it.  So, for example, she testified that on the day Mr. Bell 
sexually assaulted her, she had multiple alcoholic beverages and 
felt intoxicated at some point during the evening.  T.P. then 
explained that when her mother asked her to go make sure the 
bonfire was out, Mr. Bell came out and sat on the picnic table 
with her.  She then gave a moment by moment description of how 
Mr. Bell sexually assaulted her.  She said that, afterwards, Mr. 
Bell demanded that she tell no one what he had done and warned 
her that if she did, it would happen again. 
¶25 Mr. Bell's counsel questioned T.P. closely.  Part of 
the cross-examination focused on potential motives for lying.  
So, for example, he obtained T.P.'s admission that she "ha[d]n't 
had the best life" and that she had received comfort and 
attention from her mother, and others, after reporting the 
assaults.  He also took direct aim at her credibility, getting 
her to admit she had previously lied about the amount of alcohol 
she had consumed on the night of the assault and that——despite 
her earlier statements——she was, in fact, intoxicated at some 
point that evening.  T.P. also confirmed she had previously lied 
regarding the extent of her knowledge about sexual matters, and   
defense counsel also identified other discrepancies between 
T.P.'s trial testimony and her previous statements. 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
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¶26 A.L. provided testimony both about the evening her 
sister was assaulted and about her own assaults.  With respect 
to T.P.'s assault, she said there was alcohol at her (A.L.'s) 
birthday party, that she (A.L.) had "a slight buzz," and that 
T.P. had been drinking, too, and was "kinda tipsy."  A.L. said 
she (A.L.) left the party at some point with Mr. Bell and three 
other men and that they were "getting stoned," and she explained 
that after the group returned to the house around 7:00 p.m., she 
and one of the other men left again around midnight.  When she 
returned shortly thereafter, she noticed a change in T.P.'s 
countenance and described her as seeming more sober and "off to 
herself."   
¶27 A.L. also testified that she herself had been sexually 
assaulted by Mr. Bell on four occasions.  She said three of the 
assaults occurred around the time Mr. Bell assaulted T.P.  The 
fourth assault (the one she did not originally report to the 
police) involved sexual intercourse (unlike the other three 
events).  She said she did not initially report this assault 
along with the others because she was "ashamed to talk about" it 
and "didn't want to remember it."  Additionally, she said Mr. 
Bell had threatened to do the same thing to her sister if she 
told anyone what had occurred. 
¶28 During his cross-examination of A.L., Mr. Bell's 
counsel focused on her credibility.  He questioned her about 
discrepancies between her trial testimony and the statements she 
gave to police and her preliminary hearing testimony as to what 
occurred on the night Mr. Bell had non-consensual sexual 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
16 
 
intercourse with her, and he also questioned A.L. about whether 
she had previously lied about how much alcohol she consumed on 
the night of T.P.'s sexual assault.  A.L. confirmed she had 
previously lied about the amount she consumed because she was 
afraid of getting in trouble for drinking.  A.L. also confirmed 
that after reporting the first three incidents involving Mr. 
Bell——which did not include sexual intercourse——she had lied to 
investigators when she told them that no other incidents had 
occurred.  When asked whether her mother had been supportive of 
her after she had reported the fourth incident, A.L. confirmed 
that she had been and that her mother's support "was different" 
from what she had experienced in the past. 
¶29 Dr. Ann Budzak, the pediatrician who examined T.P., 
also testified.  She explained that although she performed a 
pelvic exam of T.P., she did not perform a forensic exam——which 
would include collecting specimens such as hair and semen if 
possible——because the exam occurred approximately five weeks 
after the alleged assault.  Dr. Budzak further testified that 
based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there was 
evidence that T.P. may have had sexual intercourse at some point 
because she had tolerated the pelvic exam and because there was 
a lack of hymenal tissue.  She also testified, however, that a 
lack of hymenal tissue "is not specific or proof of having had a 
penetration experience such as sexual intercourse" and that 
although that was generally the most common explanation for its 
absence or disruption, "there are other ways hymenal tissue can 
be disrupted[.]" 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
17 
 
¶30 Through cross-examination, defense counsel elicited 
that Mr. Bell had told the police he had not assaulted T.P. and 
A.L.  In an attempt to bolster the credibility of this 
statement, defense counsel called Sergeant Stickney as a witness 
to recount Mr. Bell's offer to undergo a Computer Voice Stress 
Analysis.  According to Sergeant Stickney, measuring the stress 
in an individual's voice can help in determining whether the 
person is telling the truth.  However, Sergeant Stickney never 
followed up on Mr. Bell's offer to take the test.  Defense 
counsel also attacked A.L.'s credibility by calling a private 
investigator to explain how the physical layout of the bathroom 
where A.L. said she had been sexually assaulted contradicted her 
testimony. 
c. 
Jury Instructions 
¶31 Prior 
to 
closing 
arguments, 
the 
circuit 
court 
instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
Consider only the evidence received during this 
trial 
and 
the 
law 
as 
given 
to 
you 
by 
these 
instructions and from these alone, guided by your 
soundest reason and best judgment, reach your verdict. 
. . . . 
The burden of establishing every fact necessary 
to constitute guilt is upon the State.  Before you can 
return a verdict of guilty, the evidence must satisfy 
you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
guilty. 
If you can reconcile the evidence upon any 
reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's 
innocence, you should do so and return a verdict of 
not guilty. 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
18 
 
The term "reasonable doubt" means a doubt based 
upon reason and common sense.  It is doubt for which a 
reason can be given, arising from a fair and rational 
consideration of the evidence or lack of evidence.  It 
means such a doubt as would cause a person of ordinary 
prudence to pause or hesitate when called upon to act 
in the most important affairs of life. 
A reasonable doubt is not a doubt which is based 
on mere guesswork or speculation.  A doubt which 
arises merely from sympathy or from fear to return a 
verdict of guilt is not a reasonable doubt.  A 
reasonable doubt is not a doubt such as may be used to 
escape the responsibility of a decision. 
While it is your duty to give the defendant the 
benefit of every reasonable doubt, you are not to 
search for doubt.  You are to search for the truth. 
¶32 The court defined evidence as:  (1) "the sworn 
testimony of witnesses, both on direct and cross-examination"; 
(2) "exhibits the court has received"; and (3) "any facts to 
which the lawyers have agreed or stipulated or which the court 
has directed you to find."  The court emphasized that the 
"[r]emarks of the attorneys are not evidence" and that while the 
jury should "[c]onsider carefully" the closing arguments, the 
attorneys' "arguments and conclusions and opinions are not 
evidence." 
¶33 The court also identified the various factors the jury 
should consider in determining a witness's credibility and the 
weight to give the witness's testimony.  Among the factors the 
court 
identified 
were 
"possible 
motives 
for 
falsifying 
testimony" and "all other facts and circumstances during the 
trial which tend to either support or to discredit the 
testimony."  In doing so, the court instructed the jury to use 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
19 
 
"your common sense and experience.  In everyday life you 
determine for yourselves the reliability of things people say to 
you.  You should do the same thing here." 
d. Closing Arguments 
¶34 As the prosecutor commenced his closing argument, he 
reminded the jurors of the instructions they had just heard.  He 
then reprised the theme of his case:  The jury shouldn't return 
a verdict of "not guilty" unless it believed T.P. and A.L. had 
lied: 
I think it's interesting to start from this point of 
view.  What must we believe, what things must we 
believe for the defendant to be not guilty?  After 
hearing all the evidence that we've heard, what are 
the things that we must believe true if he is not 
guilty? 
 
First of all, when it comes to [T.P.], who's 13 
[sic], that she first lied to Sergeant Stickney about 
the defendant raping her.  We have to believe that she 
then proceeded in the videotape that occurred over two 
days——one of those videotapes we saw, the first one——
that she then lied to the social worker . . . about 
the rape.  That the defendant, when the defendant 
assaulted her. 
 
We then have to believe that she lied to us.  You 
have to believe that. 
 
We have to then believe when we look at [A.L.] 
and her testimony, we would have to believe if the 
defendant is not guilty, that she first lied to 
Detective LaVern Erickson when she told him about the 
incident on the couch when the defendant held her down 
and grabbed her breast.  And that the first thing that 
she came forward with. 
 
The other instances when they were investigating 
the night of the party, we have to believe she lied 
about that. 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
20 
 
At that point, trial counsel objected; however, the circuit 
court overruled the objection and the prosecutor resumed his 
argument: 
We must believe that she [A.L.] lied to Detective 
LaVern Erickson about that.  We must believe then six 
months later, for some reason, she just decided to 
pile on another story and that she lied to Sergeant 
Stickney when he said there was a pool of tears, there 
was a wet spot there when she got done testifying——or 
telling him about the rape in the shower on July 2d.  
We have to believe that she lied about that. 
 
And we have to then believe that she lied at the 
preliminary hearing back in February of this year when 
she had to discuss both of those instances. 
 
We have to believe that she lied to us over the 
course of two days when she was up there for a number 
of hours, that she intentionally lied to us this week.  
That's what we'd have to believe. 
The prosecutor further argued that, to believe T.P. and A.L. 
were lying, the jury would have "to believe that those two 
girls, [A.L. and T.P.] are simply two of the best actors——or 
actresses we have ever seen.  Could Meryl Streep have done any 
better?  The reason their testimony is so compelling is because 
they weren't acting." 
¶35 The prosecutor encouraged the jurors not to disbelieve 
the victims unless they found a motive to lie.  He said that "if 
somebody is going to lie about something, they're going to have 
a reason.  They're going to have some evidence of that reason."  
He argued that in this case, however, defense counsel had "no 
idea" why A.L. and T.P. might lie and that because he had no 
idea, he "just begins to speculate.  He just begins to make 
guesses after he says he has no idea why [T.P.] would make this 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
21 
 
up."  The prosecutor further argued that "[i]f a person lies 
about something, they must have a reason.  And the reason why 
there is no evidence in this case about why anybody would lie is 
because they're not lying.  [T.P.] and [A.L.] are not lying." 
¶36 Defense counsel's closing argument focused exclusively 
on whether T.P. and A.L. should be believed.  He argued that the 
police had not thoroughly investigated T.P.'s and A.L.'s 
allegations and that "much like the Salem Witch Trials of 1962 
(sic), certain people were believed and that was it, that was 
all that was necessary.  And apparently, unfortunately——
unfortunately for [Mr.] Bell, that it was assumed that the girls 
were telling the truth."  Trial counsel also juxtaposed A.L.'s 
testimony about the layout of the bathroom where one of the 
sexual assaults occurred with the testimony of the private 
investigator Mr. Bell hired to argue that A.L. had been lying 
and that she had "change[d] her story."  Defense counsel's 
argument became even more pointed, asserting that "it [the 
sexual assaults] never happened.  The reason why it doesn't make 
sense is it just didn't happen."  Revisiting each of the 
victim's allegations, he told the jury "[t]his never happened" 
or "[i]t didn't happen."  
¶37 Defense counsel also told the jury that A.L. and T.P. 
had ample motive to lie.  He explained that in light of their 
"difficult life," "lying becomes easy" and eventually turns into 
"a way of survival."  In regard to T.P., defense counsel argued 
that she had 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
22 
 
learn[ed] that she can manipulate what happens to her, 
she can manipulate not going to school, she can 
manipulate trying to get closer to mom and so lying 
becomes an easy thing.  Lying can be a daily event for 
an individual like that, like protecting others, 
protecting themselves, can be a cry for attention, so 
I don't have to do something such as go to school, so 
they'll allow me to do something. 
 
Lying can be out of jealousy, lying can be out of 
hurt, lying can be for revenge and a lie is out of 
control.  And that's what's happened here.  The lies 
have become so deep and so out of control that you 
can't bring it back.  You can't expose what the truth 
is and that the truth that this never happened; you 
can't because you would be the scorn of all.  And in 
fact, maybe her actions tell you so much by saying I 
don't want to pursue this thing. 
Defense counsel further argued: 
That's what this is all about; a life where lies don't 
mean anything, they don't mean anything to these girls 
because they've had to live that life the entire time.  
It's a way to protect themselves, it's their shield.  
And so it's easy for them that they can look you in 
the eye and I'm not lying, no, it was one wine 
cooler. . . .  
 . . . . 
 
They put on a mask.  He——[the prosecutor] talks 
about Meryl Streep and great actresses.  They've had 
to act their whole life;  . . . .  They're crying for 
help; it's easy to act. 
¶38 On 
rebuttal, 
the 
prosecutor 
dismissed 
defense 
counsel's theories about why A.L. and T.P. might lie as "[p]ure 
speculation, pure speculation, pure speculation" and argued that 
there simply was "no testimony that they were lying.  There's no 
evidence that they were lying."  The prosecutor also told the 
jurors 
that 
the 
jury 
instructions 
precluded 
them 
from 
speculating and engaging in "sheer guesswork." 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
23 
 
2. 
Propriety of the State's Trial Commentary 
¶39 Although there are boundaries on what prosecutors may 
say during trial, we leave them plenty of room to address the 
facts and law. "Counsel is allowed considerable latitude in 
closing arguments, with discretion given to the trial court in 
determining the propriety of the argument."  State v. Burns, 
2011 WI 22, ¶48, 332 Wis. 2d 730, 798 N.W.2d 166.  A "prosecutor 
may comment on the evidence, detail the evidence, argue from it 
to a conclusion and state that the evidence convinces him and 
should convince the jurors."  State v. Draize, 88 Wis. 2d 445, 
454, 
276 
N.W.2d 784 
(1979) 
(citation 
and 
internal 
marks 
omitted).  "The prosecutor should aim to 'analyze the evidence 
and present facts with a reasonable interpretation to aid the 
jury in calmly and reasonably drawing just inferences and 
arriving at a just conclusion upon the main or controlling 
questions.'"  Burns, 332 Wis. 2d 730, ¶48 (quoting Draize, 88 
Wis. 2d at 454).  But a prosecutor cannot suggest that the jury 
consider facts not in evidence.  Burns, 332 Wis. 2d 730, ¶48.   
¶40 Because people are endlessly inventive, and each trial 
is unique, it is impossible to describe in detail the outer 
parameters of proper trial commentary.  However, based on what 
we said in Draize and Burns, we may conclude that those 
boundaries extend at least far enough to encompass fair 
characterizations of the law and the state of the evidence.  If 
the prosecutor steps across the permissible boundary, we must 
then determine whether the incursion is so significant (either 
alone or in combination with other infractions) that it renders 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
24 
 
the entire trial unfair.  "When a defendant alleges that a 
prosecutor's statements constituted misconduct, the test we 
apply is whether the statements so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process."  Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶88 (internal marks and 
citations omitted); see also State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶96, 
361 Wis. 2d 529, 861 N.W.2d 174 (quoting Mayo, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 
¶43) ("'[T]he [challenged] statements must be looked at in the 
context of the entire trial.'"). 
¶41 With that context, we are now prepared to assess Mr. 
Bell's claim that the State's comments deprived him of the due 
process of law.  Mr. Bell says the improper commentary fell into 
two categories.  The first comprised the prosecutor's statements 
that the jurors had to believe T.P. and A.L. were lying before 
they could find him not guilty (the "must believe" statements).  
The second category contained those statements in which the 
prosecutor claimed that people generally do not lie without 
reason, and that if the victims had no motive to lie, they 
should be believed (the "motive" statements).  Mr. Bell has not 
identified any Wisconsin case addressing the propriety of 
statements of this nature, nor have we found any.  So we will 
resolve this matter by drawing on the general principles 
enunciated above and the wisdom we find in other jurisdictions. 
a. 
The "Must Believe" Statements 
¶42 As 
is 
apparent 
from 
our 
recitation 
of 
trial 
highlights, the prosecution and defense theories of the case 
were mirror-images:  The prosecution said T.P. and A.L. were 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
25 
 
telling the truth, the defense said they were not.  But they 
agreed that the resolution of that contest would decide the 
case.  The prosecutor said it would be improper for the jury to 
find Mr. Bell not guilty unless the victims lied, while the 
defense said such a finding was necessary because they did.  
¶43 Mr. Bell pursued a reasonable, but narrowly focused 
strategy.  He did not argue that T.P. and A.L.'s description of 
events failed to satisfy the statutory elements of the crimes 
with which he was charged.  He did not argue mistaken identity 
or assert that someone else bore responsibility for the 
assaults.  He did not argue the actions had been misconstrued.  
He said they never happened.  The only evidence he adduced at 
trial related to the victims' credibility, and all of his 
efforts went into showing that T.P. and A.L. could not be 
believed.  Through comments in voir dire, the outline of the 
case 
provided 
in 
opening 
statements, 
the 
examination 
of 
witnesses, and closing arguments, the defense offered the jury 
one reason, and one reason only, for acquitting him——to wit, the 
untruthfulness 
of 
the 
victims. 
 
This 
is 
not 
just 
our 
characterization of the record, it is Mr. Bell's own description 
of his defense strategy:  "The entire defense was aimed at 
establishing reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds about the 
sisters' accusations, by vigorous cross-examination of A.L. and 
T.P. to establish inconsistencies and to show that they had been 
encouraged by their mother to lie about T.P.'s drinking." 
¶44 Consequently, we must determine whether there is any 
meaningful distinction in this case between the defense's 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
26 
 
assertion that the jury must find Mr. Bell not guilty because 
the victims lied and the prosecution's argument that the jury 
may not make such a finding unless they did.  This is not just a 
quibble over semantics.  The two propositions implicate the 
logical 
distinction 
between 
those 
conditions 
that 
are 
"sufficient" to reach a conclusion versus those that are merely 
"necessary" (but not sufficient).   
¶45 An example of the latter condition would be a case in 
which the victim is the sole source of evidence for some (but 
not all) of the elements of the crime.  In that situation, her 
testimony is necessary to convict the defendant, but not 
sufficient——the State must still present evidence in support of 
the remaining elements from other sources.  Viewing the same 
scenario from the defendant's perspective illustrates the 
asymmetrical 
nature 
of 
"sufficient" 
conditions. 
 
It 
is 
sufficient for an acquittal that he convince the jury not to 
believe the victim, because that negatives the elements of the 
crime for which she was the sole source of evidence.  But it is 
not necessary for the jury to disbelieve the victim, because (in 
this example) there were other elements of the crime the State 
had to establish, and the jury could legitimately conclude the 
State failed to do so.  The logical prerequisites for each 
party's success are asymmetrical because it is necessary for the 
State to succeed with respect to each element, while it is 
sufficient for the defense to succeed with respect to just one. 
In this category of cases, the State may not suggest the jury 
should not return a verdict of "not guilty" unless it concludes 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
27 
 
the victim lied.  Such a suggestion would be an improper 
shifting of the burden of proof because although the victim's 
untruthfulness was a sufficient condition for acquittal, it was 
not necessary. 
¶46 There is a different category of cases, however, in 
which the logical prerequisites for each party's success are 
symmetrical.  This category comprises situations in which, for 
example, the State need only prove the truth of one condition to 
obtain a conviction.  From the State's perspective, that 
condition is both necessary and sufficient.  Unlike the prior 
category of cases, the defendant's perspective is the mirror 
image——an acquittal is not possible unless that one condition is 
not true.   That is to say, it is not just sufficient that the 
one condition be untrue, it is also necessary. 
¶47 Mr. Bell presents us with just such a case.  Here, 
that one condition was whether the victims were telling the 
truth.  If they were, their testimony satisfied all of the 
elements of the crimes with which Mr. Bell was charged.  
Therefore, the only way Mr. Bell could have won an acquittal 
would have been to falsify that condition——that is, convince the 
jury that the victims lied.  Mr. Bell offered the jury no 
weakness 
in 
the 
State's 
case 
other 
than 
the 
victims' 
credibility.  Even now, he does not tell us how (absent jury 
nullification) 
the 
jury 
could 
have 
acquitted 
him 
if 
it 
nonetheless believed the victims.  And jury nullification is not 
an option——there is no right to have the jury disregard the law 
or evidence.  State v. Bjerkaas, 163 Wis. 2d 949, 960, 472 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
28 
 
N.W.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1991) (the defendant has no "right to have 
a jury decide a case contrary to law or fact, much less a right 
to an instruction telling jurors they may do so or to an 
argument urging them to nullify applicable laws."); see also 
United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 1988) ("It 
[the jury] has the power to acquit on bad grounds, because the 
government is not allowed to appeal from an acquittal by a jury.  
But 
jury 
nullification 
is 
just 
a 
power, 
not 
also 
a 
right . . . .") (emphasis omitted); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 
("An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to 
the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, 
whimsy, caprice, 'nullification,' and the like.  A defendant has 
no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a 
lawless decision cannot be reviewed. The assessment of prejudice 
should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is 
reasonably, 
conscientiously, 
and 
impartially 
applying 
the 
standards that govern the decision.") (analyzing prejudice under 
ineffective assistance of counsel).  Therefore, the jury's 
resolution of the case had to follow its conclusion regarding 
the victims' veracity.   
¶48 The authorities Mr. Bell cited do not persuade us 
because they are not in the same logical category as this case.  
In United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1978), for 
example, the prosecution's case depended not just on the 
witnesses' 
honesty, 
but 
also 
on 
the 
accuracy 
of 
their 
observations and the inferences they concluded from them.  As 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
later 
characterized 
that 
case, 
the 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
29 
 
prosecutor's error was in telling the jury there was only one 
way to reach acquittal, when in fact the evidence gave them 
other paths to that end: 
Not content to let the jury decide the case according 
to the judge's instructions, he set up a "false 
dilemma" by informing the jury that they had to choose 
between two and only two options——either the defendant 
was lying or all the federal agents were lying——when 
in fact the jury had more options than only those 
two . . . ." 
United States v. Amerson, 185 F.3d 676, 687 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(citing Vargas, 583 F.2d at 387). 
¶49 The prosecutor's argument in United States v. Cornett, 
232 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2000), suffered the same deficiency as 
the one in Vargas.  The Cornett jury could have acquitted the 
defendant on the charge he unlawfully possessed a firearm if it 
concluded that what the law enforcement officer observed did not 
amount to possession of a firearm.  Because the jury could 
acquit without believing the officer had lied, the prosecutor's 
statement to the contrary was error.  Likewise, the defendant in 
United States v. Reed, 724 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1984), faced 
multiple counts of wire fraud in which the State's case relied 
not just on the honesty of its witnesses, but the rational 
inferences one could derive from their testimony.  Therefore, it 
was error for the prosecutor to argue that the jury could acquit 
only if the jury "determine[s] that [the defendant] is telling 
the truth and that all [the government witnesses] are lying to 
you."  Id. at 681.  As in Vargas and Cornett, the jury could 
have believed the witnesses but acquitted anyway because they 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
30 
 
did not agree with the conclusions the witnesses drew from what 
they observed.14 
¶50 We see support for the propriety of the prosecutor's 
trial commentary in the principles described in Amerson and 
United States v. Sandoval, 347 F.3d 627, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2003).  
In Sandoval, the prosecutor said "'Well, you would have to 
conclude that the police officers were not telling the truth if 
you're going to accept the defendant's testimony.'"  Id. at 632.  
The court said this was in the nature of "ask[ing] the jury to 
                                                 
14 Most of the other cases on which Mr. Bell relies are not 
in the same logical category as his because they describe 
circumstances in which the jury could have acquitted the 
defendant 
based 
on 
something 
other 
than 
the 
witness's 
untruthfulness.  See, e.g., United States v. Richter, 826 
F.2d 206 (2nd Cir. 1987) (prosecutor's argument that jury could 
determine defendant was "not telling . . . the truth" because 
that would mean the two FBI agents had "committed perjury" was 
"patently misleading" because resolution of the "fundamental 
issue" did not "hinge[] upon the veracity of the FBI agents."); 
State v. Albino, 97 A.3d 478 (Conn. 2014) (despite concluding 
defendant was not deprived of a fair trial, prosecutor's 
argument that jury would "have to find that every single person 
in this case is wrong" in order to find defendant not guilty 
precluded jury from reaching reasonable reconciliations of 
conflicting testimony); People v. Dace, 604 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1992) (court explained that "the jury could have 
believed 
some 
of 
the 
witnesses 
and 
still 
have 
believed 
defendant's 
testimony 
that 
he 
did 
not 
sexually 
assault 
L.R."); State 
v. 
Graves, 
668 
N.W.2d 860 
(Iowa 
2003) 
(prosecutor's statement that if the jury believed the officer's 
testimony then "there is no question [defendant] is guilty as 
charged" was improper because even if jury believed officer's 
testimony 
regarding 
defendant's 
residency, 
defendant's 
"residency alone would not support a guilty verdict on the 
possession-with-intent-to-deliver 
charge."). 
 
The 
remaining 
cases Mr. Bell cited provide insufficient information for us to 
identify the logical category into which they would fit. 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
31 
 
weigh the credibility of the witnesses."  Id.  Similarly, in 
Amerson, the prosecutor said the jury couldn't "'believe the 
testimony of these police officers and believe the defendant's 
testimony at the same time.'"  185 F.3d at 680.  The Amerson 
court said this was "a mere statement of fact, which was no 
different than stating to the jury that they had a chance to 
determine whether the officers or the defendant was telling the 
truth and that it was up to the jury to determine who was more 
credible when applying the . . . jury instructions . . . ."  Id. 
at 687. 
¶51 The key to both Amerson and Sandoval is that when the 
prosecutor's statements are fairly characterized as impressing 
on 
the 
jury 
the 
importance 
of 
assessing 
the 
witnesses' 
credibility, there is no error.  That is the practical effect of 
the prosecutor's commentary in this case.  The parties did not 
offer competing story lines, nor did the defense advance an 
alternative version of the events described by T.P. and A.L.  
There was the truth of the events the victims described, or the 
lack of truth.  The verdict would necessarily follow the option 
chosen by the jury.  Therefore, because Mr. Bell is in the 
category of cases in which the verdict will necessarily follow 
the jury's determination of the victims' credibility, the 
State's argument that the jurors should not find Mr. Bell not 
guilty unless they conclude T.P. and A.L. lied is equivalent to 
asking the jurors to carefully weigh the victims' credibility. 
¶52 We conclude that the State's "must believe" commentary 
was not improper; that does not, however, end our inquiry, as we 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
32 
 
must also consider whether the prosecutor's "motive" statements 
were improper. 
b. The "Motive" Statements 
¶53 Mr. 
Bell 
characterizes 
the 
prosecutor's 
"motive 
statements" as instructing the jury that it could not disbelieve 
the victims unless there was evidence of a motive for them to 
lie.  We do not believe this fairly characterizes the nature of 
these statements.  Taken as a whole, the prosecutor was 
undoubtedly encouraging the jurors not to disbelieve the victims 
unless they found evidence of a motive to lie.  But such an 
argument is in an entirely different category from an assertion 
that they cannot disbelieve the victims without such evidence.  
The first category comprises persuasion, while the second 
relates to purported statements of the law. 
¶54 Both the prosecutor and defense counsel spent time 
during voir dire questioning prospective jurors about the 
reasons a person might lie.  Defense counsel used cross-
examination to suggest some motives for lying, including a 
desire for parental attention and sympathy, and avoiding 
responsibility for misdeeds.  The statements that come closest 
to Mr. Bell's claim of error took place during closing 
arguments.  There, the prosecutor made statements such as "if 
somebody is going to lie about something, they're going to have 
a reason.  They're going to have some evidence of that reason."  
Additionally, 
he 
argued 
that 
"[i]f 
a 
person 
lies 
about 
something, they must have a reason.  And the reason why there is 
no evidence in this case about why anybody would lie is because 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
33 
 
they're not lying."  Defense counsel responded by describing 
various reasons the victims might have lied, including jealousy, 
hurt, revenge, and a perceived need for survival.  The 
prosecutor, during rebuttal, told the jurors that defense 
counsel was inviting them to speculate about the motives to lie 
and that the jury instructions say they must not speculate. 
¶55 We agree with the court of appeals that it is a matter 
of general life experience that people normally do not lie 
without reason:  "It is common sense that people do not lie 
unless there is a reason behind the lie. That is, at least 
ordinarily, and arguably by definition, a lie is the result of a 
decision to convey a falsehood."  
State v. Bell, Nos. 
2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶32 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2016).  All but one of the prosecutor's 
"motive" statements consist of observations about this common-
sense principle and an encouragement not to discard it as they 
weighed the victims' credibility.  That is, the comments fell 
into the category of persuasion. 
¶56 The one comment that fell into the "statements of law" 
category 
was 
the 
prosecutor's 
admonition 
that 
the 
jury 
instructions did not allow the jurors to speculate with respect 
to a witness's credibility.  Mr. Bell says they may, and directs 
our attention to the jury instruction's description of what may 
be considered in weighing a witness's credibility: 
It is the duty of the jury to scrutinize and to 
weigh the testimony of witnesses and to determine the 
sole effect of the evidence as a whole.  You are the 
sole 
judges 
of 
the 
credibility, 
that 
is, 
the 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
34 
 
believability, of the witnesses and of the weight to 
be given to their testimony. 
In determining the credibility of each witness 
and the weight you give to the testimony of each 
witness, consider these factors:  whether the witness 
has an interest or lack of interest in the result of 
this trial; the witness' conduct, appearance, and 
demeanor on the witness stand; the clearness or lack 
of clearness of the witness' recollections; the 
opportunity the witness had for observing and for 
knowing the matters the witness testified about; the 
reasonableness of the witness testimony; the apparent 
intelligence of the witness; bias or prejudice, if any 
has been shown; possible motives for falsifying 
testimony; and all other facts and circumstances 
during the trial which tend either to support or to 
discredit the testimony.  Then give to the testimony 
of each witness the weight you believe it should 
receive. 
There is no magic way for you to evaluate 
testimony; instead, you should use your common sense 
and experience.  In everyday life you determine for 
yourselves the reliability of things people say to 
you.  You should do the same thing here. 
¶57 This instruction does not suggest the jury may 
speculate about witness credibility.  It gives examples of 
considerations that may affect the jurors' judgment about the 
witness's credibility, amongst which are the possible motives 
for 
falsifying 
testimony, 
and 
"all 
other 
facts 
and 
circumstances" that "either support or discredit the trial 
testimony."  This is not an invitation to speculate, nor does it 
endorse the creation of discrediting evidence ex nihilo.  As in 
all other aspects of the case, the jury must consider the 
witnesses' testimony in light of the admissible evidence and 
reasonable inferences, all as directed by their "common sense 
and experience." 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
35 
 
¶58 Mr. Bell says our decision in Vill. of Bangor v. Hussa 
Canning & Pickle Co., 208 Wis. 191, 242 N.W. 565 (1932), 
recognizes 
the 
jury's 
right 
to 
speculatively 
discount 
a 
witness's credibility.  There, we observed that "[i]n a jury 
trial there are a great many factors, some of them very subtle, 
which, consciously or unconsciously, influence the juror's mind 
in judging the credibility of witnesses and resolving the merits 
of the case."  Id. at 198.  True enough, but just because the 
evidence's effect is subtle does not make the jurors' response 
to it a matter of speculation. 
¶59 The prosecutor did not shift the burden to Mr. Bell by 
encouraging the jury not to discount the victims' testimony in 
the absence of a motive to lie.  This was persuasion, not a 
statement of the law.  Nor was his admonition that the jurors 
must not speculate, even with respect to matters of credibility, 
erroneous.  Consequently, having determined that neither the 
"must believe" nor the "motive" statements were improper, Mr. 
Bell has identified no error to which we may apply the "plain 
error" doctrine, and no cognizable deficiency in his counsel's 
performance at trial.  That necessarily means we need not 
consider whether, if they had been improper, it would have been 
so 
obvious, 
substantial, 
and 
fundamental 
that 
it 
would 
necessitate a new trial under our "plain error" doctrine.  It 
also 
means 
Mr. 
Bell's 
counsel 
could 
not 
have 
performed 
deficiently (on this issue) because Mr. Bell would not have been 
entitled to a mistrial even if he had requested it.  See, e.g.,  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (to prove deficiency, defendant must 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
36 
 
establish "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment."). 
B. The Jury's Review of Unredacted Exhibits 
¶60 Mr. Bell's final challenge to his convictions is that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek redaction 
of information from two of his exhibits that suggested T.P. had 
not been sexually active prior to the assault.  The statements 
at issue are brief.  Mr. Bell's challenge to the first exhibit——
a transcript of T.P.'s taped statement to Sergeant Stickney——
relates to the following exchange: 
[Sergeant Stickney]:  "Had you ever had sex before 
that point?" 
[T.P.]:  "No." 
As to the second exhibit, Sergeant Stickney's written report 
recounting the interview with T.P., Mr. Bell challenges the 
following commentary: 
She is 14 years old but seemed to have very little 
knowledge about sex.  She had told me she had never 
had sex before. 
She also could not say if he ejaculated or even if she 
knew what that meant.  I tried to explain and she said 
she did not think he did but was not sure. 
¶61 The 
Sixth 
Amendment15 
guarantees 
to 
a 
criminal 
defendant "the effective assistance of counsel."  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 686.  A successful attack on counsel's performance 
                                                 
15 See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
37 
 
requires that the defendant establish both that trial counsel 
performed deficiently and that the deficiency was prejudicial.  
See Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 633; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
697. 
¶62 The first prong requires us to compare counsel's 
performance to the "wide range of professionally competent 
assistance."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  Only if his conduct 
falls outside that objectively reasonable range will we conclude 
that counsel performed deficiently.  State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 
111, ¶19, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.  To show prejudice 
(the second prong), a defendant must establish "'a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.'"  Pitsch, 
124 Wis. 2d at 642 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  "A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  A 
lack of confidence arises when "'counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable.'"  Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 
369 (1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  If the 
defendant fails to prove one element, it is unnecessary to 
address the other.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
¶63 Mr. Bell says the two documents at issue contained 
evidence made inadmissible by Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b) (the 
"Rape Shield" statute), which precludes admission of "any 
evidence" of the complainant's "prior sexual conduct."  Prior 
sexual conduct includes a lack of sexual conduct, meaning that 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
38 
 
evidence that a complainant had never had sexual intercourse is 
inadmissible.  State v. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d 150, 159, 330 
N.W.2d 571 (1983).  This prohibition extends to indirect 
references to a complainant's lack of sexual experience or 
activity.  Id.  Evidence of this nature is prohibited because it 
"is generally prejudicial and bears no logical correlation to 
the complainant's credibility."  Id. at 156.  The rule applies 
to adolescents as well as adults.  See State v. Mitchell, 144 
Wis. 2d 596, 601, 424 N.W.2d 698 (1988).   
¶64 Both the prosecutor and defense counsel had the 
opportunity to review the requested exhibits and to redact them 
as they saw fit before they went to the jury room.  Defense 
counsel and the prosecutor agreed to redact information from 
exhibits other than the ones at issue.  Defense counsel did not, 
however, seek redaction of the exhibits about which Mr. Bell is 
now concerned.  At the December 2015 Machner hearing, defense 
counsel could not specifically recall why he did not seek 
redaction of these exhibits and speculated that he believed the 
unredacted statements would bolster the inconsistencies in 
T.P.'s testimony. 
¶65 We agree with Mr. Bell that these exhibits should not 
have been submitted to the jury without redaction.  It is well-
established that the type of information Mr. Bell challenged is 
generally inadmissible, and defense counsel acknowledged as much 
at the Machner hearing, stating that he may have "goofed up" in 
not requesting redaction.  Defense counsel's attempt to explain 
his possible rationale for failing to do so was hampered by the 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
39 
 
passage of time——13 years between the trial and the Machner 
hearing.  The result is that we have insufficient information to 
conclude that there was no deficiency in defense counsel's 
performance.16  
For the sake of the remaining analysis, 
therefore, 
we 
will 
assume——without 
deciding——that 
his 
performance was deficient. 
¶66 To succeed with his challenge Mr. Bell must also 
establish that the deficient performance was prejudicial.  We 
conclude the circumstances do not support such a conclusion. 
¶67 Mr. 
Bell 
primarily 
argues 
that 
the 
unredacted 
information was prejudicial because it "was likely to arouse 
sympathy for [T.P.] and undercut defense counsel's contention 
that she was uncooperative because the assault never occurred" 
and that in light of Dr. Budzak's testimony regarding T.P.'s 
lack of hymenal tissue, evidence that T.P. "had not had sexual 
intercourse until she was assaulted by [Mr.] Bell undermines 
confidence in the outcome."  This lack of confidence, Mr. Bell 
says, arises because the combination of Dr. Budzak's testimony 
and the inadmissible evidence "created a strong inference that, 
because [T.P.] had never before had intercourse, the destruction 
                                                 
16 Our review of the record confirms that defense counsel 
was aware of the Rape Shield statute at the time of trial, at 
least generally speaking:  On the second day of trial, prior to 
reprising A.L.'s testimony, he sought permission to address 
A.L.'s prior sexual conduct on cross-examination despite being 
aware that the "Rape Shield exists . . . ."  The court ruled 
that it would not allow him to do so based on the Rape Shield 
statute. 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
40 
 
of her hymen occurred during the only time she had intercourse, 
and that was the assault by Bell."  We disagree. 
¶68 The connection between Dr. Budzak's testimony and the 
statements at issue——that T.P. had not had sexual intercourse 
prior to the sexual assault——was not the subject of argument, 
and neither the prosecutor nor trial counsel drew any such 
connection for the jury.  Moreover, careful review of Dr. 
Budzak's trial testimony weakens Mr. Bell's argument.  While Dr. 
Budzak did testify that based on T.P.'s exam "[i]t would be 
likely" that T.P "had had sexual intercourse" at some point in 
her life and that her conclusion was based on T.P.'s "lack of 
hymenal tissue and her ability to tolerate the exam easily[,]" 
she also explained that because approximately five weeks elapsed 
between the assault and the exam, there simply was no way to 
confirm that the sexual intercourse was the result of a sexual 
assault.  She likewise did not confirm whether it is possible to 
pinpoint when the hymenal tissue became disrupted.  Moreover, 
Dr. Budzak explained that a lack of hymenal tissue does not 
conclusively prove an individual has had sexual intercourse 
because there are other explanations as to why that tissue is 
absent or disrupted.  Therefore, the fact that the physical exam 
indicated T.P. may have had sexual intercourse at some point in 
her life does not necessarily establish that she did have sexual 
intercourse.  And even if this established that she had had 
sexual intercourse, it is entirely incapable of identifying with 
whom she had it.  Nor can it even establish that the hymenal 
tissue was disrupted as a consequence of the sexual assault, as 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
41 
 
opposed to sexual intercourse prior to that date, or during the 
five weeks between that date and the examination.  Therefore, 
this evidence does not make it any more likely that the sexual 
intercourse——assuming it occurred——was with Mr. Bell. 
¶69 At best, Mr. Bell posits that the jury——without any 
prompting by trial counsel or the prosecutor——may have drawn a 
connection between Dr. Budzak's testimony and the inadmissible 
evidence.  This is too speculative to conclude that Mr. Bell 
suffered any prejudicial effect at all, particularly because Dr. 
Budzak's testimony and the exhibits at issue pertained only to 
T.P. and said nothing of A.L.'s assault.  This error was not so 
serious that it deprived Mr. Bell of a fair trial, so it does 
not shake our confidence in the outcome.  Therefore, although it 
was error for the jury to view the statements alluding to T.P.'s 
lack of sexual intercourse prior to the sexual assault, there is 
no reasonable probability that, but for defense counsel's 
deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been 
different.  So we conclude that Mr. Bell did not receive 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney allowed 
defense exhibits to go to the jury room without redaction of the 
inadmissible evidence. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶70 The State's trial commentary was not improper, which 
means there is no error, plain or otherwise, for us to address.  
That also means the State's commentary cannot serve as the basis 
for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  With respect 
to the inadmissible evidence submitted to the jury in two of the 
 
 
 
No. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR 
   
 
42 
 
defense's 
exhibits, 
we 
conclude 
there 
is 
no 
reasonable 
probability that redacting that evidence would have changed the 
result of the trial.  Accordingly, we conclude Mr. Bell received 
a fair trial and is not entitled to a new one; we therefore 
affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶71 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J., 
withdrew 
from 
participation. 
¶72 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J., did not participate. 
Nos.  2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶73 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I write 
to clarify why I join the court's opinion. In this writing I 
intend to concisely highlight the main holdings of the opinion. 
¶74 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the 
court of appeals, State v. Bell, Nos. 2015AP2267-CR and 
2015AP2668-CR, unpublished slip. op., (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 
2016), affirming the Monroe County circuit court's1 denial of 
Gerrod Bell's ("Bell") postconviction motion for a new trial. 
¶75 In a consolidated criminal action by the State, Bell 
was charged with seven crimes relating to the sexual assaults of 
two minors, A.L. and T.P.  Majority op., ¶4.  The case proceeded 
to trial.  At different points during the trial, the prosecutor 
made a number of statements regarding witness credibility to the 
effect that (1) to find Bell not guilty the jury must believe 
that T.P. had lied (the "must believe" statements), and (2) to 
believe that T.P. had lied, there had to be evidence of a reason 
to lie (the "motive" statements).  Majority op., ¶41.  Defense 
counsel objected to these statements during the State's closing 
argument, but failed to properly preserve the objection by 
moving for a mistrial before the jury rendered its verdict.2  
                                                 
1 The Honorable Michael Rosborough presided. 
2 During the State's closing argument, when it was going 
through its litany of "must believe" statements, defense counsel 
objected: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I'm concerned 
about how he's presenting this because I think he's 
reversing the burden of proof. 
(continued) 
Nos.  2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
Additionally, when reviewing exhibits requested by the jury, 
defense counsel failed to request the redaction of two exhibits 
that tended to establish T.P.'s "prior sexual conduct," which is 
inadmissible evidence pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b) (the 
"Rape Shield" statute).  The jury ultimately found Bell guilty 
of all counts. 
¶76 After the judgments of conviction were entered, Bell 
filed 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
(Rule) 
§ 809.30(2)(h) seeking a new trial.  See majority op., ¶6.  The 
circuit court denied Bell's motion for a new trial because it 
found that the prosecutor's statements did not violate Bell's 
constitutional rights given the totality of the circumstances at 
                                                                                                                                                             
(continued) 
[STATE]: No I'm not Your Honor; I'm simply—— 
THE COURT: Well, this is argument; I think the 
jury understands that.  It's not evidence and there 
has to be some latitude for advocacy during the course 
of argument.  I'm not convinced that what he's saying 
is going beyond that at this point.  And, of course, 
you still have the opportunity to get up there and 
make your presentation.   
So let's proceed with that in mind.   
As a procedural matter, this was insufficient to preserve the 
issue for direct appeal.  See State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, 
¶86, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606 (concluding that the 
defendant's 
failure 
"to 
make 
a 
timely 
motion 
for 
mistrial . . . before the jury returned its judgment constitutes 
a waiver of his objections to the prosecutor's statements during 
closing arguments"); see also majority op., ¶11 n.13.  Bell 
acknowledges that this procedural requirement was not met, which 
is why he must raise the issues before the court in the context 
of plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Nos.  2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
trial, namely that the jury had been properly instructed.  Bell 
appealed. 
¶77 The court of appeals affirmed.  See Bell, unpublished 
slip op., ¶3.  The court of appeals held that the prosecutor's 
statements were not misstatements of law; rather, the statements 
were a characterization of the evidence that was responsive to 
the defense's theory.  Id., ¶36.  Because it concluded that 
there was no error, the court of appeals did not reach the 
issues of whether the error was sufficient to entitle Bell to a 
new trial on the basis of plain error or ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  Similarly, the court of appeals held that defense 
counsel's failure to request redaction of the exhibits was not 
ineffective assistance of counsel because the jury's review of 
unredacted exhibits did not result in prejudice.  Id., ¶¶38, 48.  
Bell petitioned for review.   
¶78 On review, we consider three issues: (1) Whether the 
prosecutor's statements constitute plain error so as to entitle 
Bell to a new trial; (2) whether Bell is entitled to a new trial 
because defense counsel's failure to properly preserve objection 
to 
the 
prosecutor's 
statements 
constitutes 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel; and (3) whether Bell is entitled to a new 
trial because defense counsel's failure to request redaction of 
the exhibits constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
I 
¶79 We consider first whether the prosecutor's statements 
constitute plain error so as to entitle Bell to a new trial.  We 
conclude that the prosecutor's "must believe" statements were 
Nos.  2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
not improper, and, therefore, that there was no error, because 
their practical effect was only to "impress[] on the jury the 
importance of assessing the witnesses' credibility."  Majority 
op., ¶51.  We further conclude that the prosecutor's "motive" 
statements were not improper, and, therefore, that there was no 
error, because either they were not statements of law at all or 
they were not misstatements of law.  Majority op., ¶¶55-57, 59.  
Thus, we conclude that Bell is not entitled to a new trial 
because there was no error.  Majority op., ¶70.  Here, I strive 
to clarify why the "must believe" statements do not amount to 
error.  
¶80 Where witness testimony is the only evidence presented 
at trial, and, if credible, it is sufficient to prove guilt, it 
is not an error which requires reversal for the prosecutor to 
argue that, to find the defendant not guilty, the jury must 
believe the witnesses are lying.  Majority op., ¶46.  Here, this 
is true for two reasons.  First, the prosecutor's arguments are 
not evidence.  The court instructs the jury in that respect, and 
we properly rely on the assumption that the jury follows the 
instructions of the court.  See, e.g., State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 
12, ¶41, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399.   
¶81 Second, the witnesses' testimony——the sole evidence in 
this case——is sufficient to prove guilt; that is, it provides 
sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt on every 
element the State is required to prove.  Majority op., ¶46.  
While the jury could believe the witnesses and conclude the 
defendant is not guilty because the State has not met its burden 
Nos.  2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
of proof, the jury will still need to assess the witnesses' 
credibility and determine what weight to attach to that 
testimony.  In other words, the jury is instructed to determine 
who is believable and it is not beyond the jury's ability to 
discern which witnesses the State hopes the jury will find 
credible.  We presume "that the decisionmaker is reasonably, 
conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that 
govern the decision";3 that is, a defendant cannot argue that a 
lawless jury is a possibility that renders otherwise sufficient 
evidence, insufficient.  Majority op., ¶47.  
¶82 I also agree with the majority that Vargas,4 Cornett,5 
and Reed6 are all distinguishable, in part because, in those 
cases, the credibility of the witnesses' testimony was not 
determinative of guilt.  Majority op., ¶¶48-49; id., ¶49 n.14.  
I further recognize that, where the credibility of a witness' 
testimony is not the only thing at stake, the jury could find 
the defendant "not guilty" for some other reason, for example, 
if additional evidence offered is unpersuasive or persuasive.  
Thus, it could be a misstatement of law in those circumstances 
to say that to find the defendant not guilty, the jury must 
believe the witnesses are lying.  Majority op., ¶45. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984). 
4 United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1978). 
5 United States v. Cornett, 232 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2000). 
6 United States v. Reed, 724 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1984). 
Nos.  2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
¶83 But that is not the circumstance here, and Amerson7 and 
Sandoval8 provide additional support for the conclusion that the 
prosecutor's statements were not improper because these cases 
demonstrate that the statements may be properly characterized as 
"impressing on the jury the importance of assessing the 
witnesses' credibility."  Majority op., ¶51.  In fact, that is 
what the prosecutor did here.  The State impressed on the jury 
the apparent fact that the jury must determine the credibility 
of the witnesses and the weight to attach to their testimony.  
It urged the jury to do what the jury already knew the State 
wanted the jury to do.  It was hardly a secret who the 
prosecutor hoped the jury would believe.  But, unlike improperly 
vouching for a witness, the prosecutor here was merely telling 
the jury what it already knew: the State wanted the jury to find 
its witnesses credible. 
¶84 In sum, I conclude that the prosecutor's "must 
believe" statements were not misstatements of law, especially in 
this case, where the witnesses' credible testimony is alone 
enough for the State to prove guilt, and is, in fact, the only 
proof offered.  Majority op., ¶¶46-47.  Additionally, the 
practical effect of the statements was only to "impress[] on the 
jury the importance of assessing the witnesses' credibility," 
majority op., ¶51, telling the jury what it already knew.  The 
State's case rested on the jury believing a particular witness, 
                                                 
7 United States v. Amerson, 185 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 1999). 
8 United States v. Sandoval, 347 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2003). 
Nos.  2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
but the prosecutor was not stepping into the shoes of the jury 
to tell them whom to believe.  The State was instead describing 
the duty of the jury to determine what testimony they find more 
appealing to their good judgment and common sense. 
II 
¶85 We consider second whether Bell is entitled to a new 
trial because defense counsel's failure to properly preserve 
objection to the prosecutor's statements constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  We conclude that Bell's defense counsel 
did not perform deficiently in failing to move for a mistrial 
prior to the verdict on the basis of the prosecutor's statements 
because the prosecutor's statements were not objectionable 
error.  Majority op. ¶59.  Thus, we conclude that Bell is not 
entitled to a new trial because there is no ineffective 
assistance of counsel where there is no deficient performance.  
Majority op., ¶70. 
III 
¶86 We consider third whether Bell is entitled to a new 
trial because defense counsel's failure to request redaction of 
the exhibits constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Although we hold that allowing the jury to review unredacted 
versions of the exhibits was error because admission of such 
evidence is prohibited under Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b), majority 
op., ¶65, we conclude that the error was harmless because Bell's 
argument that the jury may have inferred T.P.'s prior sexual 
history from Dr. Budzak's testimony and the inadmissible 
contents of the exhibits is too speculative.  Majority op., ¶69.  
Nos.  2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
Thus, we conclude that Bell is not entitled to a new trial 
because there is no ineffective assistance of counsel where the 
error does not prejudice the defendant.  Majority op., ¶70. 
¶87 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
No. 
2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶88 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
At 
the 
foundation of our system of justice lies the principle that 
defendants do not have to prove their innocence.  State v. 
Sawyer, 266 Wis. 494, 506, 63 N.W.2d 749 (1954).  In fact, a 
defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence and need not 
present any evidence at all at trial.  See Johnson v. State, 85 
Wis. 2d 22, 27, 270 N.W.2d 153 (1978); State v. Johnson, 11 
Wis. 2d 130, 134, 104 N.W.2d 379 (1960). 
¶89 As a corollary to this foundational principle, the 
State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every 
fact necessary to constitute guilt.  State v. Schulz, 102 
Wis. 2d 423, 427, 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981); In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970).  This burden remains with the State 
throughout the entirety of trial, and cannot be shifted to the 
defendant.  Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d at 427. 
¶90 Despite these well-established principles, the State 
in this case argued to the jury that the defendant has a burden 
to present evidence and convince the jury of the victims' motive 
to lie.  Because the statements made during voir dire and 
closing 
argument 
misstated 
the 
law 
governing 
a 
jury's 
consideration of evidence and impermissibly shifted to the 
defendant a burden he does not carry, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶91 A jury convicted Bell of the sexual assault of two 
underage victims, T.P. and A.L.  At trial, Bell's defense 
focused largely on the credibility of the victims.  Both Bell 
and the State presented extensive argument on this subject. 
No. 
2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶92 The question is whether certain arguments made by the 
State, referred to by the majority as the "must believe" 
statements and the "motive" statements, crossed the line so as 
to impermissibly shift the burden of proof from the State to the 
defendant.  Because it is dispositive, I focus my analysis on 
the "motive" statements only. 
II 
¶93 The "motive" statements framed the State's entire 
case.  Setting the stage during voir dire, the prosecutor asked 
the jury panel, "Would everybody agree here that . . . if you're 
going to lie, you're going to have a reason like jealousy of 
some sort; there's going to be a reason why you would lie?" 
¶94 Probing 
further, 
the 
prosecutor 
then 
posed 
the 
question to individual jurors, "Would you expect there would be 
some evidence that somebody would have a reason to lie?  There 
would be some sort of evidence that this person would have a 
reason to lie[.]"  Conflating the burden of proof jury 
instruction with the instruction on credibility of witnesses, 
the prosecutor began to instruct the jury panel on the law.  He 
advised that the "jury instructions on reasonable doubt" do not 
allow the jury to speculate, and that the jury must instead 
No. 
2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
"just look at the facts, the evidence or lack of evidence in 
this case" with regard to witness credibility.1 
¶95 During closing argument, the State built on the theme 
introduced in voir dire, repeatedly contending that there was no 
evidence demonstrating that the victims had lied.  Majority op., 
¶¶34-35.  It advanced that in the absence of such evidence the 
jury should believe the victims.  See id., ¶35.  Specifically, 
the State argued to the jury, "if somebody is going to make a 
flat out lie about something, they're going to have a reason.  
They're going to have some evidence of that reason."  The State 
further asserted that Bell "has no idea why [the victim] would 
make this up.  He says that repeatedly and he . . . just begins 
to speculate." 
¶96 The State suggested next that if no evidence was 
presented regarding the victims' motive to lie, then the jury 
would be left with only speculation as to their credibility.  It 
contended that Bell "just begins to make guesses after he says 
he has no idea why she would make this up."  In concluding this 
segment of its closing argument, the State reiterated, "If a 
person lies about something, they must have a reason.  And the 
reason why there is no evidence in this case about why anybody 
would lie is because they're not lying." 
                                                 
1 The jury instruction on burden of proof indicates that 
"[a] reasonable doubt is not a doubt which is based on mere 
guesswork or speculation."  Wis JI——Criminal 140 (2000).  But 
when the prosecutor spoke of speculation and evidence, he was 
speaking not of the ultimate burden of proof on the State to 
prove 
guilt 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt, 
but 
of 
witness 
credibility, thus conflating the two instructions. 
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¶97 Following Bell's closing argument, the State returned 
for rebuttal.  It doubled down on its previous arguments, 
asserting "[t]here's never testimony they were lying because 
[they have a bad life].  There's no testimony they were lying 
for any other reason.  There's no testimony that they were 
lying.  There's no evidence that they were lying. . . . And 
we're supposed to look at the evidence or lack of evidence."  
The State then admonished the jury that it is forbidden from 
speculating as to why the victims would lie. 
¶98 According to the State, who has to come up with this 
important evidence of motive?  The State?  Certainly  not.  
Rather, according to the State's distortion of the burden of 
proof instruction, it is the defendant who must introduce this 
evidence.  Yet, a theory of defense that the witnesses are lying 
should not be transformed into a shift of the burden of proof, 
requiring that the defendant offer evidence of motive to lie. 
¶99 The majority, however, does not see a problem with the 
prosecutor's statements, contending that "it is a matter of 
general life experience that people normally do not lie without 
reason:  It is common sense that people do not lie unless there 
is a reason behind the lie.  That is, at least ordinarily, and 
arguably by definition, a lie is the result of a decision to 
convey a falsehood."  Majority op., ¶55 (quoting State v. Bell, 
Nos. 2015AP2667-CR & 2015AP2668-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶32 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2016)).  In the majority's view, the 
State's arguments "fell into the category of persuasion" because 
they "consist of observations about this common-sense principle 
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and an encouragement not to discard it as [jurors] weighed the 
victims' credibility."  Id. 
¶100 However, what becomes apparent upon reading the 
transcript 
in 
this 
case 
is 
that 
the 
State 
essentially 
misinformed the jury that it could not find the victims lacking 
in credibility unless Bell presented "evidence" of their motive 
to lie.  Such an assertion is legally incorrect.  Pursuant to 
well-established precepts, Bell need not do anything of the 
sort.  See Sawyer, 266 Wis. at 506. 
¶101 Even accepting the majority's dubious premise that 
there is always a reason behind an untruthful statement, such a 
premise does not require that a defendant present evidence of a 
witness's motive to lie.  Indeed, as observed above, the 
defendant has no burden to present any evidence whatsoever, let 
alone evidence proving a motive.  See Johnson v. State, 85 
Wis. 2d at 27. 
¶102 Here the State's remarks are akin to those at issue in 
U.S. v. Smith, 500 F.2d 293 (6th Cir. 1974).  In Smith, the 
prosecutor made the statement in closing argument "that the jury 
should 'require' the defendants to present a 'reasonable 
explanation' of the meaning of taped wiretap evidence, other 
than the criminal meaning he ascribed to the conversations[.]"  
Id. at 294.  In other words, the prosecutor implored the jury to 
require the defendant to present evidence, shifting the burden 
of proof.  See id. 
¶103 The Smith court determined that "[t]he challenged 
comments of the prosecutor were clearly improper argument."  Id. 
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at 295.  The remarks "had the effect of shifting the burden of 
proof from the government to the defendants and abrogating the 
presumption 
of 
innocence 
to 
which 
[the 
defendants] 
were 
entitled."  Id. at 294. 
¶104 In reaching this result, the Smith court forewarned 
that "[i]t is, of course the duty of the prosecutor to advance 
the government's cause with force and persuasiveness.  However, 
this duty includes concerns in addition to mere advocacy."  Id. 
at 295.  Specifically, the prosecutor is entrusted with "the 
responsibility 
of 
observing 
in 
practice 
the 
principles 
considered under our system to be essential to a fair and just 
criminal procedure[,]" thereby protecting the constitutional 
right to due process.  Id. 
¶105 Smith is not alone in distinguishing between lawful 
advocacy and an unlawful shift of the burden of proof.  Courts 
around the country have determined that a shift of the burden of 
proof to the defendant constitutes a denial of the required 
"fair and just criminal procedure."  See, e.g., People v. 
Santana, 255 P.3d 1126, 1130 (Colo. 2011) (explaining that it is 
impermissible for a prosecutor to "shift the burden of proof 
through argument or comment"); People v. Fyda, 793 N.W.2d 712, 
723 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) ("A prosecutor may not imply in 
closing argument that the defendant must prove something or 
present a reasonable explanation for damaging evidence because 
such an argument tends to shift the burden of proof."); State v. 
Roman Nose, 667 N.W.2d 386, 399 (Minn. 2003) ("[A] prosecutor 
may not comment on a defendant's failure to call witnesses or to 
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contradict testimony because such comments might lead the jury 
to believe that the defendant has a duty to call witnesses or 
bears some burden of proof."). 
¶106 I agree with the majority that, "while [a prosecutor] 
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul 
ones."  Majority op., ¶16 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 
U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).  However, the majority errs in its 
application of this principle. 
¶107 Like the blows landed by the prosecutor in Smith, the 
jabs the State takes in this case are foul.  They constitute a 
"clearly improper argument" that "shift[s] the burden of proof 
from the government to the defendants and abrogate[s] the 
presumption of innocence" to which Bell is entitled.  See Smith, 
500 F.2d at 294-95.  In short, Bell has no burden of proof, yet 
the State's comments placed one on him. 
¶108 The error here is not a mere evidentiary error.  
Rather, it constitutes a violation of the due process right to a 
fair trial by distorting the burden of proof jury instruction, 
thus shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. 
¶109 When 
a 
defendant 
alleges 
that 
a 
prosecutor's 
statements constituted plain error, as does Bell, the burden is 
on the State to prove that the error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶29, 301 
Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115.  Because I determine that on this 
record the State has failed to make such a showing, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
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