Case Title: People v. Hill

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91329

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 91329-Agenda 11-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								CHAD HILL, Appellee.



	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:


	In this case, we review the circuit court's finding that section
12-11(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS
5/12-11(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999)), as amended by Public Act
91-404 (Pub. Act 91-404, §5, eff. January 1, 2000), violates the
separation of powers clause and the proportionate penalties clause
of the Illinois Constitution. Section 12-11 of the Code contains
one of the so-called "15/20/25-life" mandatory add-on sentences
implemented by our legislature.
	In March 2000, the State filed an information alleging that
defendant, Chad Hill, committed the offense of home invasion
while armed with a firearm in violation of section 12-11(a)(3). In
October 2000, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information,
primarily arguing that section 12-11(a)(3) violates the Illinois
Constitution's separation of powers clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
II, §1) and the proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §11).
	In March 2001, the circuit court heard defendant's motion and
verbally indicated that it would find the amended statute
unconstitutional on both bases and that a written order would
follow. In April 2001, the court granted defendant's motion and
issued written findings. We reverse and remand.

I. ANALYSIS
	This court has a duty to affirm a statute's constitutionality and
validity if reasonably possible. People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 144
(1995). Legislative enactments, including those that impose
criminal penalties, are entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality. See People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1981). A party challenging a statute bears the burden of
proving its invalidity. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d  at 144. A circuit court's
finding that a statute is unconstitutional is reviewed de novo. See
People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).
	The applicable version of section 12-11 of the Code, as
amended by Public Act 91-404, establishes the crime of home
invasion in pertinent part as follows:
			"(a) A person who is not a peace officer acting in the
line of duty commits home invasion when without
authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of
another when he or she knows or has reason to know that
one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly
enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such
dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to
know that one or more persons is present and
				(1) While armed with a dangerous weapon, other
than a firearm, uses force or threatens the imminent use
of force upon any person or persons within such
dwelling place whether or not injury occurs, or
				(2) Intentionally causes any injury, except as
provided in subsection (a)(5), to any person or persons
within such dwelling place, or
				(3) While armed with a firearm uses force or
threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or
persons within such dwelling place whether or not
injury occurs, or
				(4) Uses force or threatens the imminent use of force
upon any person or persons within such dwelling place
whether or not injury occurs and during the commission
of the offense personally discharges a firearm, or
				(5) Personally discharges a firearm that proximately
causes great bodily harm, permanent disability,
permanent disfigurement, or death to another person
within such dwelling place.
			***
			(c) Sentence. Home invasion in violation of subsection
(a)(1) or (a)(2) is a Class X felony. A violation of
subsection (a)(3) is a Class X felony for which 15 years
shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by
the court. A violation of subsection (a)(4) is a Class X
felony for which 20 years shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of
subsection (a)(5) is a Class X felony for which 25 years or
up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of
imprisonment imposed by the court." 720 ILCS 5/12-11
(West Supp. 1999).(1)
	Defendant attacks section 12-11(a)(3)'s validity on two
general bases. First, defendant points to article II, section 1, of the
Illinois Constitution, commonly referred to as the separation of
powers clause. This clause states that"[t]he legislative, executive
and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise
powers properly belonging to another." Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1.
Defendant asserts that section 12-11(a)(3), by imposing
mandatory add-on sentences, violates the separation of powers
clause because it divests the circuit court of its discretionary power
to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
	Second, defendant relies on article I, section 11, of the Illinois
Constitution, commonly referred to as the proportionate penalties
clause. This clause states in pertinent part that "[a]ll penalties shall
be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and
with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship."
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. Defendant contends that section
12-11's add-on sentencing scheme violates the proportionate
penalties clause because it imposes a penalty that is cruel,
degrading, and shocking to the moral conscience. Defendant
further contends that section 12-11 is unconstitutional because it
mandates a penalty more severe than that imposed for more
serious crimes.
	As a threshold matter, we note that defendant asks us to
review section 12-11's add-on sentencing scheme in its entirety.
Citing People v. Palkes, 52 Ill. 2d 472 (1972), defendant argues
that section 12-11's unconstitutional infirmities are so pervasive
as to render the entire statute invalid. We reject defendant's
request. A defendant does not ordinarily have standing to
challenge a statute as it might be applied to others in different
circumstances. People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 644 (2000).
Defendant was charged under section 12-11(a)(3) (carrying a 15-year add-on sentence) and therefore defendant has no standing to
challenge section 12-11(a)(4) (carrying a 20-year add-on sentence)
and section 12-11(a)(5) (carrying a 25-year-to-life add-on
sentence).(2) As we shall discuss, we find no infirmities present in
section 12-11(a)(3) and we decline defendant's request that we
search for a constitutional violation elsewhere. Thus, we only
consider the constitutionality of section 12-11(a)(3).

A. Separation of Powers
	Defendant first argues that section 12-11(a)(3) violates the
separation of powers clause. Specifically, defendant argues that
section 12-11(a)(3)'s mandatory add-on sentence of 15 years
usurps the judiciary's sentencing power by removing its ability to
consider aggravating and mitigating factors and to fashion a
sentence that is tailored to the circumstances of the offense. We
disagree.
	In reaching its conclusion, the circuit court found as follows:
			"The additional sentence required by the statute is an
impermissible exercise of the judicial power and is in
violation of the Illinois Constitution. The statute directs
this [c]ourt to increase [d]efendant's sentence after the
[c]ourt imposes a sentence. The sentencing scheme in 720
ILCS 5/12-11 gives sentencing power to the legislature
that is not appropriate for the legislature to possess.
			The legislature is imposing a restriction on this [c]ourt
of its inherent power [sic] to sentence a defendant because
it mandates this [c]ourt to perform a specific result [sic].
There is no consideration given in aggravation or
mitigation which this [c]ourt is required to consider. The
statute compels this [c]ourt to increase the sentence after
this [c]ourt has made its determination; thus, this [c]ourt
has no discretion in considering the evidence from the
case and independently arriving at a sentence mandated by
the legislature with the minimum and maximum
guidelines previously set. [Citations.]"
	We disagree with the circuit court's conclusion for two
reasons. First, we disagree with the circuit court's conclusion that
section 12-11(a)(3)'s 15-year add-on sentence removes the
discretionary component from the judiciary's sentencing power.
Prior to the amendment, a defendant convicted of home invasion
while armed with a firearm faced a class X felony sentence of 6 to
30 years. Section 12-11's 15-year mandatory add-on sentence
essentially raises the original sentencing range of 6 to 30 years to
a range of 21 to 45 years. Thus, the circuit court retains the ability
to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. Unquestionably,
the legislature could have simply chosen to increase directly the
original sentencing range to 21 to 45 years instead of
implementing the add-on scheme. We find no substantive
difference between that scenario and the legislature's decision to
impose the mandatory add-on sentence.
	Second, we find that mandatory sentencing schemes do not
inherently usurp the judiciary's power to impose a sentence. This
court has repeatedly recognized that the legislature has the power
to define criminal conduct and to determine the nature and extent
of criminal sentences required to protect society. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d
at 144-45; People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 205 (1984); People ex
rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1981); People v.
Williams, 66 Ill. 2d 179, 186 (1977); People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240 (1962); People v. Landers, 329 Ill. 453, 457 (1927).
	We have previously held that the legislature acts within its
power when it imposes mandatory sentences. For example, in
People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 208 (1984), this court examined
the constitutionality of a mandatory life sentence. We rejected
defendant's separation of powers argument, finding that the
legislature's power necessarily includes the authority to establish
mandatory minimum sentences, even though such sentences, by
definition, restrict the inquiry and function of the judiciary in
imposing sentence. We stated that "when legislatures exercise
their acknowledged power to fix punishments for crimes they
necessarily limit the discretion of courts when imposing sentence."
Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d  at 208. In reaching this conclusion, we noted
one of our previous cases, People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d 531, 549 (1979). In that case, we observed:
		" 'The legislature may authorize the court to exercise
broad discretion in the imposition of sentences by
providing for the fixing of sentences within prescribed
minimum and maximum years. Or the legislature may
restrict the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing,
such as by providing for mandatory sentences.' " Taylor,
102 Ill. 2d  at 208, quoting Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d  at 549.
We also noted in Taylor that mandatory sentencing is not a novel
concept and that such sentencing schemes exist in a majority of
states. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d  at 208.
	Similarly, in People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235 (1995),
defendant argued that his mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment, mandated by the Habitual Criminal Act (currently
720 ILCS 5/33B-1 (West 2000)), improperly divested the
judiciary of its sentencing power. We rejected defendant's
separation of powers argument in that case. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 
at 248-50. Accord People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 345-46
(1984).
	The United States Supreme Court has also rejected the
constitutional necessity for discretionary sentencing ranges. See
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 114 L. Ed. 2d 524, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991). In Chapman, the Court stated as follows:
		"Such a sentencing scheme-not considering individual
degrees of culpability-would clearly be constitutional.
Congress has the power to define criminal punishments
without giving the courts any sentencing discretion.
[Citation.] Determinate sentences were found in this
country's penal codes from its inception [citation] and
some have remained until the present. [Citations.] A
sentencing scheme providing for 'individualized
sentences rests not on constitutional commands, but on
public policy enacted into statutes.' " (Emphases added.)
Chapman, 500 U.S.  at 467, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 539, 111 S. Ct.  at 1928, quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 990, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2964-65 (1978)
(plurality opinion).
	Indeed, discretionary sentencing power did not always lie
squarely within the judiciary. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364-65, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714, 725-26, 109 S. Ct. 647, 650-51 (1989), the United States Supreme Court examined the roots of
discretionary sentencing in federal law and noted that, historically,
the scope of judicial discretion with respect to sentencing has been
subject to legislative control. At one time, Congress embraced a
fixed-sentencing scheme. Congress eventually abandoned the
rigidity of fixed-sentencing and implemented a system of
punishment ranges. Mistretta, 488 U.S.  at 364, 102 L. Ed. 2d  at
726, 109 S. Ct.  at  651. In more recent days, significant reforms in
the criminal justice system have reintroduced mandatory
sentencing schemes. See Mistretta, 488 U.S.  at 365-67, 102 L. Ed. 2d  at 726-27, 109 S. Ct.  at 651-52.
	Defendant correctly notes that this court has previously
rejected legislative encroachments on the judicial power.
Defendant cites O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital, 112 Ill. 2d 273
(1986) (voiding statute restricting circuit court's ability to render
judgment of dismissal); People v. Flores, 104 Ill. 2d 40 (1984)
(voiding statute limiting a circuit court's ability to proceed with a
trial in absentia); People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155 (1982) (finding
that statute requiring a sentencing judge to explain the reasons for
imposing a particular sentence was not mandatory); Murneigh v.
Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287 (1977) (voiding statute mandating
instances were the circuit court must utilize its judicial contempt
power); Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145 (1952) (voiding
statute restricting circuit court's ability to render judgment of
dismissal); People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596 (1942) (voiding statute
authorizing correctional facility personnel to treat a sentence as a
mere recommendation). Defendant argues that those cases support
his argument that section 12-11(a)(3)'s mandatory add-on
sentencing scheme unconstitutionally usurps the judiciary's power.
	We reject defendant's reliance on O'Connell, Flores,
Murneigh, Agran, Davis, and Montana. Unlike the legislative
encroachments we examined in those cases, the intrusion in this
case does not rise to an unconstitutional level. See Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d  at 207 (similarly distinguishing Davis). The legislature
possesses the limited power to impose a limitation on the
judiciary's sentencing power in this context. See Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d  at 208 (finding that the legislature may exercise its power to fix
punishments in such a way that it necessarily limits the judiciary's
discretion in imposing sentence).
	We also reject defendant's reliance on People v. Perruquet,
68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977), citing People v. Bolyard, 61 Ill. 2d 583,
589 (1975), where we stated that a proper sentence must be "based
upon the particular circumstances of each individual case." We
deem Perruquet distinguishable. First, Perruquet did not involve
a separation of powers issue. Second, the statute we examined in
Perruquet was punishable with a broad sentencing range. Clearly,
if the legislature provides a broad sentencing range, it provides the
judiciary with similarly broad sentencing discretion. See Cousins,
77 Ill. 2d  at 549. That discretion necessarily entails not only the
ability to consider aggravating and mitigating factors, but also the
duty to consider such factors. See Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d  at 154.
When the legislature implements a mandatory sentencing scheme,
however, it necessarily restricts the judiciary's discretion and its
ability to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. See Taylor,
102 Ill. 2d  at 208; Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d  at 549.
	We conclude that defendant has failed to show that the
legislature exceeded its authority in implementing section
12-11(a)(3)'s mandatory add-on sentencing scheme. Generally,
aggravating and mitigating factors need not necessarily be a part
of the sentencing equation if the legislature deems such factors
inappropriate. The legislature has the power to fix the sentence for
a crime and, in turn, limit the scope of judicial discretion with
respect to imposing the sentence. See Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d  at 208;
accord Mistretta, 488 U.S.  at 364, 102 L. Ed. 2d  at 725-26, 109 S. Ct.  at 650-51. The add-on sentencing scheme falls within that
power. Section 12-11(a)(3), as amended, does not place an
unconstitutional limit on the judiciary's power to adjudicate,
pronounce judgment, impose sentence, interpret the law, or carry
it into effect.
	For these reasons, we find that section 12-11(a)(3) does not
violate the separation of powers clause.

B. Proportionate Penalties Clause
	We next consider whether section 12-11(a)(3), as amended by
Public Act 91-404, violates the proportionate penalties clause. We
conclude that it does not.
	With respect to defendant's disproportionate penalties clause
argument, the circuit court found as follows:
			"This add-on sentence violates the Proportionate
Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution. The
Proportionate Penalties Clause requires that all penalties
shall be determined both according to the seriousness of
the offense and with the objective of restoring the
offender to useful citizenship.	
			Currently the Home Invasion statute carries a
[15/20/25-life] enhancement penalty when [the] offender
possesses a firearm, discharges a firearm and/or injures an
occupant of the dwelling. Presently the Home Invasion
statute provides a lesser penalty for an offender who
intentionally causes any injury, with the exception as
provided in subsection (a)(5) to any person in the
dwelling. Said offender is subject to a sentence of
imprisonment for six (6) to thirty (30) years. An offender
who enters a dwelling while armed with a firearm and
threatens the imminent use of force is subject to a
minimum sentence of imprisonment of twenty-one (21)
years. The statute creates greater penalties for offenses
which cause less harm. [Citation.] The statute, when
compared with other related statutes, is clearly
disproportionate." (Emphasis in original.)
	Again, we disagree with the circuit court's conclusion. In
People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462 (1998), we noted three
separate tests used to identify a proportionate penalties clause
violation. First, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties
clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the
offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.
Second, a penalty is invalid under the proportionate penalties
clause where similar offenses are compared, and conduct that
creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is
punished more severely. Third, there is a violation of the
proportionate penalties clause when identical offenses are given
different sentences. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 474.
	Defendant argues that section 12-11(a)(3) violates the
proportionate penalties clause under the first and second tests. We
examine these arguments in turn.
	We first consider whether section 12-11(a)(3) mandates a
penalty that is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to
the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the
community. We find that it does not.
	Defendant correctly states that the sentence mandated by
section 12-11(a)(3) is severe. Following imposition of the
mandatory add-on, a person convicted under this subsection is
subject to a prison term of 21 to 45 years. We find, however, that
the sentencing range is not so severe as to render the amended
statute unconstitutional.
	First, contrary to the assertion made in defendant's brief,
home invasion is not a property crime. Section 12-11 contains no
elements relating to theft, vandalism, or the like. 720 ILCS
5/12-11 (West 2000). Home invasion is a crime that protects
persons from intruders. That is why our statutory scheme
specifically categorizes home invasion as an offense directed
against the person.
	Second, as previously stated, the legislature has the power to
determine the nature and extent of criminal sentences required to
protect society. Its decisions are entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d  at 542. Against this
backdrop, we cannot conclude that the legislature's decision to
impose a 21-to-45-year sentence for the crime of home invasion
violates the proportionality clause. A home should be one's
sanctuary, a place where he or she should feel safe. See People v.
Harris, 147 Ill. App. 3d 891, 896 (1986) (Pincham, J., dissenting).
We are reluctant to second-guess the legislature's determination
that an offender who enters another person's home while carrying
a firearm should be subject to a severe penalty. This is particularly
true when one considers the extreme danger arising from the
presence of a firearm during the commission of a crime. In sum,
we are not persuaded that section 12-11(a)(3) mandates a penalty
that is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the
offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.
	We next consider whether section 12-11(a)(3) violates the
proportionate penalties clause because it mandates a penalty that
is more severe than that imposed for similar yet more serious
crimes. Specifically, defendant argues that section 12-11(a)(1)
(home invasion while armed with a dangerous weapon other than
a firearm) and section 12-11(a)(2) (home invasion and causing
injury) mandate a Class X felony sentence of 6 to 30 years when
force is used or injury occurs. In contrast, section 12-11(a)(3)
(home invasion while armed with a firearm) mandates a Class X
felony sentence of 6 to 30 years plus an additional 15 years even
if the offender merely threatens the use of force. Thus, defendant
argues, section 12-11(a)(3) imposes a more serious penalty for
merely threatening the use of force (a less serious crime), while
sections 12-11(a)(1) and 12-11(a)(2) impose a less serious penalty
when force or injury actually occurs (more serious crimes). We
reject defendant's argument on this point.
	When considering a proportionality clause challenge based on
the second test, we conduct a two-step, cross-comparison analysis.
First, we consider whether the purposes of the compared offenses
are distinct such that comparative proportionality review is not
appropriate. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 484; People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 506 (1997). Second, if the purposes are deemed related,
we consider whether the offense with the harsher penalty is more
serious than the offense with the less severe penalty. Lombardi,
184 Ill. 2d  at 484-85.
	The determination of whether a particular offense is more
serious than another is not limited to an examination of the degree
of harm inflicted. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d  at 146. While that is a relevant
consideration, the legislature may consider other factors such as
the frequency of the crime and the high risk of bodily harm
associated with it. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d  at 146, citing People v. Bales,
108 Ill. 2d 182, 196 (1985). Also, the legislature may perceive a
need to enact a more stringent penalty provision in order to halt an
increase in the commission of a particular crime. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 
at 146, citing People v. Johns, 153 Ill. 2d 436, 449 (1992), quoting
People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 320 (1985). As an institution,
the legislature is better equipped than the judiciary to identify and
remedy the evils confronting our society and is more capable of
gauging the seriousness of an offense. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d  at 319;
Lee, 167 Ill. 2d  at 145; Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 502-03. Thus, courts
will generally defer to the legislature's judgment that a particular
offense is more serious than another. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d  at 502-03.
As with any challenge to a statute's validity, defendant bears the
burden of establishing each prong of this test. See Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 
at 144.
	Initially, the State argues that "a cross-comparison analysis of
different versions of an offense found in the same statute cannot
be done." We disagree. That our courts have focused on the
comparison of different offenses does not necessarily foreclose a
cross-comparison of different subsections with a single statute. In
fact, the State has not offered a single persuasive reason for us to
reject the cross-comparison analysis in this case except to note that
we have never previously applied it in this context. We disagree
with the State's argument on this point. We have never applied the
cross-comparison analysis in this context because we have never
been faced with the issue. In any case, we can discern no reason to
abandon our previous approach merely because the two provisions
at issue are found within the same statute.
	That is not to say, however, that we need not adapt the cross-comparison analysis to a same-statute inquiry. While we would
ordinarily compare the purposes of two separate statutes, we must
narrow our focus in this case and compare the purposes of the
specific provisions contained in the same statute and determine
whether they are sufficiently distinct such that proportionality
review is inappropriate.
	This court has previously held that the purpose of the home
invasion statute is to protect the safety of persons in their homes.
Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 484. However, we made that
determination based on an earlier and substantially different
version of section 12-11, existing prior to the amendment
implemented in Public Act 91-404. That version of section 12-11
provided in pertinent part as follows:
			"a) A person who is not a peace officer acting in the
line of duty commits home invasion when without
authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of
another when he or she knows or has reason to know that
one or more persons is present or he or she knowingly
enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such
dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to
know that one or more persons is present and
			1) While armed with a dangerous weapon uses force or
threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or
persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury
occurs, or
			2) Intentionally causes any injury to any person or
persons within such dwelling place.
			***
			c) Sentence. Home invasion is a Class X felony." 720
ILCS 5/12-11 (West 1996).
Thus, the 1996 version of section 12-11 did not provide for
mandatory add-on sentences nor did it distinguish between home
invasions committed with a firearm and those committed without
a firearm.
	As we shall explain, the applicable version of section 12-11
is substantially different from the 1996 statute we examined in
Lombardi. Therefore, our present inquiry must focus on the
amended version of section 12-11 and whatever change of
purpose the legislature contemplated, if any. The language of a
statute is the best indication of the legislature's intent and the
statute's purpose. See Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d  at 477. The current
version of section 12-11 essentially retains the two subsections
contained in the 1996 statute. The first, section 12-11(a)(1),
applies where a defendant armed with a dangerous weapon, other
than a firearm, uses force or threatens the imminent use of force,
whether or not injury occurs. Section 12-11(a)(2) generally applies
where a defendant causes injury. Both of these sections carry a 6-to-30-year sentence. The only substantive change in these
subsections is that the 1996 version of section 12-11(a)(1) did not
contain the "other than a firearm" language. See 720 ILCS
5/12-11 (West 1996).
	In passing Public Act 91-404, the legislature essentially
added three additional classifications to section 12-11. All three
of these new classifications relate to firearms. Section
12-11(a)(3) applies where a defendant, while armed with a
firearm, uses or threatens force regardless of whether injury
occurs. That section carries a 6-to-30-year sentence plus a
mandatory add-on of 15 years. Section 12-11(a)(4) applies
where a defendant actually uses or threatens imminent force,
whether or not injury occurs, and defendant personally
discharges a firearm. That section carries a 6-to-30-year sentence
plus a mandatory add-on of 20 years. Finally, section
12-11(a)(5) applies where a defendant personally discharges a
firearm and causes great bodily harm, permanent disability,
permanent disfigurement, or death to another person. That
section carries a 6-to-30-year sentence plus a mandatory add-on
of 25 years to life.
	By comparing section 12-11's current and previous forms, it
becomes clear that the legislature, while not labeling it as such,
essentially in tended to break the offense of home invasion into
two distinct categories: offenses committed without a firearm and
offenses committed with a firearm. With respect to the former, we
conclude that the purpose of subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2) is still to
protect the safety of persons in their homes. This is obvious when
one notes the similarities between the earlier version of section
12-11 and the language found in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2).
With respect to the latter, there is no question that subsection
(a)(3) is still intended to protect people in their homes. Subsection
(a)(3), however, has a second, more specific purpose. The
legislature clearly added subsection (a)(3) in an effort to deter the
use of firearms in conjunction with home invasions. Thus,
subsection (a)(3) is intended to protect the safety of people in their
homes from intruders carrying firearms and to deter such
offenders by imposing a particularly severe penalty.
	Our conclusion is supported by the legislative history of
Public Act 91-404. Public Act 91-404 was unanimously passed
by our legislature and mandates stricter sentences for enumerated
crimes when they are committed with a firearm. The amendments
impose the 15/20/25-life add-on sentencing scheme on the
offenses of aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2000));
aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3 (West 2000));
home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11 (West 2000)); aggravated
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14 (West 2000));
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1
(West 2000)); armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2000)); and
aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 2000)).
Thus, Public Act 91-404 included a package of amendments
implementing sweeping changes to criminal sentences for the
purpose of deterring and penalizing the illegal use of firearms.
	One of the bill's sponsors, Senator Dillard, stated during the
legislative debates that the add-on sentencing scheme contained in
the package of amendments would "send a very strong message
that we will not tolerate the use or possession of a firearm when
committing a crime in Illinois and that anybody that has one is
going to do significant, significant time." 91st Ill. Gen. Assem.,
Senate Proceedings, March 25, 1999, at 286 (statement of Senator
Dillard). Senator Dillard added:
			"The purpose behind the sentence enhancement *** for
the use of a firearm in the commission of specified serious
felonies is to deter the use of firearms in the commission
of those violent and serious crimes. *** It's the intent of
this bill that additional firearm enhancements are
necessary and appropriate for deterring use of a firearm in
the commission of our most serious offenses." 91st Ill.
Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, March 25, 1999, at
286-87 (statements of Senator Dillard).
	While one might properly conclude that the general purpose
of the statute as a whole has not changed, we nevertheless find that
the new firearms provisions serve a second, more specific purpose
and target a unique type of danger. Given the pervasive and
enhanced danger arising from an intruder's possession of a
firearm, the legislature's superior position to identify and address
the evils of gun-related violence, and the presumptive
constitutionality of a legislative enactment, we conclude that the
purpose of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are sufficiently distinct
from that of subsection (a)(3) to make proportionality review
inappropriate.
	We therefore conclude that defendant has failed to carry his
burden of proving that section 12-11(a)(3) violates the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

II. CONCLUSION
	Defendant has failed to show that section 12-11(a)(3)'s add-on sentence of 15 years' imprisonment violates the separation of
powers clause. We find that section 12-11(a)(3)'s add-on
sentencing scheme does not completely divest the circuit court of
its ability to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. Further,
a mandatory sentence is not per se unconstitutional.
	Defendant has also failed to show that section 12-11(a)(3)
violates the proportionate penalties clause. We find that a 21-to-45-year sentence for violating section 12-11(a)(3) is not cruel or
degrading, nor does it shock the moral conscience. We further find
that the firearms provision contained in section 12-11(a)(3) has a
distinct purpose from sections 12-11(a)(1) and 12-11(a)(2) such
that proportionality review is inappropriate.
	For these reasons, we reverse the circuit court and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
 
1.    1We note that, subsequent to the amendment at issue here, the
legislature amended the home invasion statute again in Public Act
91-928 (Pub. Act 91-928, §5, eff. June 1, 2001). That amendment
occurred after defendant's alleged conduct occurred and, in any event,
does not impact the issues in this case.
2.      2We are mindful that section 12-11(c) of the Code (720 ILCS
5/12-11(c) (West 2000)) actually contains section 12-11's sentencing
provision. For purposes of clarity, however, we refer instead to the
individual subsections that trigger subsection (c)'s mandatory add-on
sentences.