Case Title: State ex rel. Vaughn v. Money

Citation: 2004-Ohio-6561

Docket Number: 20041184

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Vaughn v. Money, 104 Ohio St.3d 322, 2004-Ohio-6561.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. VAUGHN ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. MONEY, WARDEN,  ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Vaughn v. Money, 104 Ohio St.3d 322, 2004-Ohio-6561.] 
Mandamus sought to compel earlier parole-hearing dates to reflect good-time 
credits earned under former R.C. 2967.19 — Good-time credits earned 
under former R.C. 2967.19 accelerate only the date that an offender is 
first eligible for parole, not subsequent parole-hearing dates — Court of 
appeals’ judgment denying writ affirmed. 
(No. 2004-1184 — Submitted November 30, 2004 — Decided December 15, 
2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 03AP-953. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In February 1985, appellant Angelo Vaughn was convicted of 
murder and sentenced to a term of 15 years to life in prison.  Vaughn’s murder 
sentence was to be served consecutively to a two-year definite sentence for 
another crime.  In January 2002, the Ohio Parole Board denied Vaughn parole and 
set his next parole hearing for October 2004. 
{¶ 2} In November 1988, appellant George Henderson was convicted of 
aggravated murder and sentenced to life in prison.  In October 2001, the parole 
board denied Henderson parole and set his next parole hearing for September 
2011. 
{¶ 3} In June 1990, appellant Nathaniel Kimbro was convicted of murder 
and a gun specification and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 18 years to 
life.  In April 2003, the parole board denied Kimbro parole and set his next parole 
hearing for June 2005. 
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{¶ 4} On September 25, 2003, appellants, Vaughn, Henderson, and 
Kimbro, filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County for a writ 
of mandamus to compel appellees, their prison warden, their prison-records 
supervisor, and the Ohio Adult Parole Authority, to set earlier parole-hearing 
dates to reflect the good-time credits earned by each of them.  Appellees moved to 
dismiss appellants’ mandamus complaint.  On November 6, 2003, appellants 
moved to amend their complaint to include an April 2001 affidavit of a parole-
board official that stated that an inmate’s initial parole hearing is determined by 
the minimum sentence, which is reduced by both jail-time and good-time credit.  
Appellants also requested summary judgment.  Appellees moved to dismiss 
appellants’ amended complaint.  On June 24, 2004, the court of appeals granted 
appellees’ motion and dismissed the case. 
{¶ 5} Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in dismissing their 
mandamus claim.  Appellants claim entitlement to the requested extraordinary 
relief in mandamus based on the good-time provisions of former R.C. 2967.19.  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 571, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6342, 6437.  These provisions 
apply to appellants because they were sentenced before July 1, 1996.  R.C. 
2967.021.  See, also, Section 5 of S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, as 
amended by Section 3 of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 269, 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 11,099. 
{¶ 6} Former R.C. 2967.19 provided the following good-time credit to 
be applied to an inmate’s minimum or definite sentence: 
{¶ 7} “(A)  * * * [A] person confined in a state correctional institution is 
entitled to a deduction from his minimum or definite sentence of thirty per cent of 
the sentence, prorated for each month of the sentence during which he faithfully 
has observed the rules of the institution.  * * * 
{¶ 8} “(B) * * * [A] person confined in a state correctional institution 
who is serving a sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 
twenty years of imprisonment imposed pursuant to section 2929.022 or 2929.03 
January Term, 2004 
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of the Revised Code and who is not eligible for parole before serving twenty years 
of  imprisonment under that sentence, is entitled, for faithfully observing the rules 
of the institution, to a diminution of thirty per cent of the time that is required to 
be served before parole eligibility * * * .” 
{¶ 9} Former R.C. 2967.19 applies to allow earlier parole eligibility.  See 
former R.C. 2967.13(A), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 571, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6342, 
6430 (“A prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment for a felony for which an 
indefinite term of imprisonment is imposed becomes eligible for parole at the 
expiration of his minimum term, diminished as provided in sections 2967.19, 
2967.193, and 5145.11 of the Revised Code”); see, also, former R.C. 2967.13(C); 
Gavrilla v. Leonard, Ross App. No. 01CA2638, 2002-Ohio-6144, 2002 WL 
31522443,¶ 12 (“The reasoning for [former R.C. 2967.19] reducing the minimum, 
rather than the maximum, sentence is * * * clear:  the intent was to enable earlier 
parole eligibility, not to allow prisoners to unilaterally shorten their court-
imposed sentence” [emphasis sic]). 
{¶ 10} Nothing in former R.C. 2967.19, however, warrants continued 
application of good-time credits to an inmate who has already been afforded a 
parole hearing.  See State ex rel. Perry v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., Franklin App. 
No. 03AP-1277, 2004-Ohio-4039, 2004 WL 1728603, ¶ 6 (“Former R.C. 2967.19 
provides for ‘good time’ credit solely for purposes of acceleration of the date that 
an offender is first eligible for parole; the statute does not provide for additional 
‘good time’ credit to be earned or awarded thereafter, regardless of an offender’s 
institutional record”).  A contrary construction of former R.C. 2967.19 might 
result in inmates receiving more than the 30 percent reduction in their minimum 
or definite sentences, which is expressly prohibited by former R.C. 2967.19(F).  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 571, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6342, 6439. 
{¶ 11} Moreover, even assuming that appellants were not granted all of 
the good-time credit to which they were entitled in setting their initial parole 
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hearings, the board has now held those hearings.  Because former R.C. 2967.19 
relates only to the date of the initial parole hearing, mandamus would not compel 
anything that appellants have not already received.  “Mandamus will not issue to 
compel a vain act.”  State ex rel. Cotton v. Ghee (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 54, 55, 701 
N.E.2d 989.  Appellants’ claim regarding the alleged increase in Henderson’s 
minimum sentence is similarly meritless. 
{¶ 12} Finally, the court of appeals committed no error in denying 
appellants’ motion to amend their complaint.  Like their complaint, appellants’ 
proposed amended complaint raised no meritorious claim. 
{¶ 13} Based on the foregoing, appellants have no clear legal right to 
additional good-time credits under former R.C. 2969.19 and appellees have no 
corresponding clear legal duty to provide these credits.  Neither appellants’ 
complaint nor their purported amended complaint had merit.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR 
and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
____________________ 
 
Angelo Vaughn, George A. Henderson, and Nathaniel Kimbro Jr., pro se. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Philip A. King, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellees. 
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