Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Steve J. Polich

Citation: 2005 WI 36

Docket Number: 2003AP001071-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 36 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-1071-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Steve J. Polich, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Steve J. Polich,  
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST POLICH 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 25, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
PROSSER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
BUTLER, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2005 WI 36 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   03-1071-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Steve J. Polich, Attorney at Law:    
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
           
          Complainant,   
 
 
v. 
 
Steve J. Polich,   
 
 
          Respondent.   
FILED 
 
MAR 25, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendations of Referee Cheryl Rosen 
Weston for sanctions, pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).1  Attorney Steve 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  Review; appeal. 
 (2)  If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline. The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
2 
 
J. Polich was found to have engaged in unprofessional conduct in 
the course of his practice of law in violation of the Rules of 
Professional 
Conduct. 
 
The 
referee 
recommended 
a 
public 
reprimand and payment of an unspecified proration of the costs.   
¶2 
We 
approve 
the 
findings, 
conclusions 
and 
recommendations, and determine that Attorney Polich's misconduct 
warrants a public reprimand.  However, we disagree with the 
recommendation for a proration of costs and conclude that 
Attorney Polich should pay the entire amount.  
¶3 
Attorney Polich was licensed to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1982.  He has had prior administrative suspensions 
in 
1991 
and 
1993, 
both 
followed 
by 
reinstatement, 
for 
noncompliance 
with 
Continuing 
Legal 
Education 
(CLE) 
requirements.   
¶4 
This court adopts the referee's findings of fact 
unless clearly erroneous.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993).  No 
deference is granted to the referee's conclusions of law and 
they are reviewed de novo.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d 117, 310 N.W.2d 789 (1981).  The 
court 
may 
impose 
whatever 
sanction 
it 
deems 
appropriate 
regardless of the referee's recommendation.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 
N.W.2d 686.   
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
3 
 
¶5 
This case involves seven counts of alleged misconduct.  
Count one alleges a violation of SCR 20:1.32 (failure to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client).  
Counts two and three allege violations of SCR 20:3.33 (knowingly 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  Diligence.   
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.   
 
3 SCR 20:3.3 provides:  Candor toward the tribunal.  
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:  
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal;  
(2) fail to disclose a fact to a tribunal when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal 
or fraudulent act by the client; 
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal 
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the 
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the 
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or  
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be 
false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and 
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take 
reasonable remedial measures.  
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) apply even 
if 
compliance 
requires 
disclosure 
of 
information 
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that 
the lawyer reasonably believes is false.  
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall 
inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the 
lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an 
informed decision, whether or not the facts are 
adverse. 
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
4 
 
making a false statement of fact to a tribunal).  Count four 
alleges a violation of SCR 20:7.5(a)4 and SCR 20:7.1(a)5 (making 
a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the 
lawyer's services).  Count five alleges a violation of SCR 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:7.5(a) provides:  Firm names and letterheads.  
(a) 
A 
lawyer 
shall 
not 
use 
a 
firm 
name, 
letterhead or other professional designation that 
violates Rule 7.1. A trade name may be used by a 
lawyer in private practice if it does not imply a 
connection with a government agency or with a public 
or charitable legal services organization and is not 
otherwise in violation of Rule 7.1.  
5 SCR 20:7.1(a) provides:  Communications concerning a 
lawyer's services.  
(a) A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading 
communication 
about 
the 
lawyer 
or 
the 
lawyer's 
services. A communication is false or misleading if 
it:  
(1) contains a material misrepresentation of fact 
or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the 
statement 
considered 
as 
a 
whole 
not 
materially 
misleading;  
(2) 
is 
likely 
to 
create 
an 
unjustified 
expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or 
states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results 
by means that violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law;  
(3) compares the lawyer's services with other 
lawyers' 
services, unless 
the comparison 
can be 
factually substantiated; or  
(4) contains any paid testimonial about, or paid 
endorsement of, the lawyer without identifying the 
fact that payment has been made or, if the testimonial 
or endorsement is not made by an actual client, 
without identifying that fact. 
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
5 
 
31.10(1)6 and SCR 20:8.47 (engaging in the practice of law while 
State Bar membership is suspended for a CLE violation).  Counts 
                                                 
6 SCR 31.10(1) provides:  Noncompliance.   
(1) If a lawyer fails to comply with the 
attendance requirement of SCR 31.02, fails to comply 
with the reporting requirement of SCR 31.03(1), or 
fails to pay the late fee under SCR 31.03(2), the 
board shall serve a notice of noncompliance on the 
lawyer. This notice shall advise the lawyer that the 
state 
bar 
membership 
of 
the 
lawyer 
shall 
be 
automatically suspended for failing to file evidence 
of compliance or to pay the late fee within 60 days 
after service of the notice. The board shall certify 
the names of all lawyers so suspended under this rule 
to the clerk of the supreme court and to each judge of 
a court of record in this state. A lawyer shall not 
engage in the practice of law in Wisconsin while his 
or her state bar membership is suspended under this 
rule.  
7 SCR 20:8.4 provides:  Misconduct. 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:  
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional 
Conduct, 
knowingly 
assist 
or 
induce 
another to do so, or do so through the acts of 
another;  
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely 
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as 
a lawyer in other respects;  
(c) 
engage 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;  
(d) state or imply an ability to influence 
improperly a government agency or official;  
(e) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer 
in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of 
judicial conduct or other law; or  
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
6 
 
six and seven allege violations of SCR 22.03(6)8 (willfully 
failing to provide relevant information, to answer questions 
fully, or to furnish documents, or to misrepresent a disclosure, 
all during the course of an Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
investigation).   
¶6 
After several notices to report CLE compliance went 
unanswered, the Board of Bar Examiners (BBE) sent Attorney 
Polich a notice of noncompliance via certified mail on April 7, 
1997.  This informed him he would be automatically suspended 
from the State Bar unless BBE received his completed compliance 
forms by June 3, 1997.  Attorney Polich apparently had earned 
the necessary credits but had simply failed to report them.  
However, he never complied and on June 4, 1997, BBE sent him a 
notice of suspension via certified mail effective on that day.  
To 
date, 
Attorney 
Polich 
has 
never 
complied 
with 
the 
requirements for reinstatement. 
¶7 
Someone from Attorney Polich's office apparently knew 
that he was suspended because on March 22, 1999, one of his 
                                                                                                                                                             
(f) 
violate a 
statute, 
supreme court 
rule, 
supreme 
court 
order 
or 
supreme 
court 
decision 
regulating the conduct of lawyers; or  
(g) violate the attorney's oath.  
8 SCR 22.03(6) provides:  Investigation.   
In the course of the investigation, the respondent's 
wilful failure to provide relevant information, to 
answer questions fully, or to furnish documents and 
the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure are 
misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters 
asserted in the grievance. 
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
7 
 
employees contacted BBE to inquire about the reinstatement 
process.  That prompted another letter from BBE to Attorney 
Polich the next day reiterating that he had been suspended. 
¶8 
Despite being suspended, Attorney Polich appeared in 
Wisconsin courts in ten cases between 1998 and 2001.  One of 
these involved representation of a defendant in a Forest County 
Circuit Court civil action and forms the basis for counts one 
and seven.   
¶9 
The 
defendant 
was 
served 
with 
the 
summons 
and 
complaint on June 15, 1998.  Attorney Polich maintains that he 
had an oral agreement with the plaintiffs' original counsel that 
an answer did not have to be filed until some unspecified date 
in the future.  However, Attorney Polich and his client had a 
parting of ways, apparently as the result of losing a temporary 
injunction proceeding on July 16.  Attorney Polich claims he 
told his client to get new counsel but admits he never received 
confirmation that she indeed had done so until early September.  
Attorney Polich did not formally withdraw until September 10. 
¶10 In the meantime, contrary to his alleged understanding 
with plaintiffs' counsel, who had now been succeeded by new 
counsel with whom Attorney Polich had no understanding, the 
answer was actually due on July 30.  Attorney Polich did not 
meet that deadline but claimed that within a few days thereafter 
it became apparent to him that the substitution of counsel had 
not formally occurred and he needed to file the answer, which he 
did on August 10. 
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
8 
 
¶11 This untimely answer was later struck and default 
judgment was taken against Attorney Polich's former client which 
she unsuccessfully tried to vacate.  Attorney Polich gave the 
client and her new attorney an affidavit to support the effort 
to vacate the default judgment in which he asserted he was a 
Wisconsin licensed attorney.  The client later sued Attorney 
Polich for malpractice and he paid $50,000 to settle.  It was 
during the course of this malpractice action in 2001 that 
Attorney Polich claims he first became aware that he had been 
suspended from the practice of law in 1997.   
¶12 The referee found in favor of Attorney Polich on both 
of these counts. 
¶13 Count one alleged a lack of diligence by Attorney 
Polich for missing the deadline to answer.  The referee 
concluded that he had reason to believe that the deadline was 
actually longer than what was the case.  The referee further 
concluded that the circumstances regarding the date when the 
answer really was due was "muddied" by the client trying to 
obtain new counsel around the time the answer was due.  The 
referee stated: 
Polich had no reason to be confident in his status as 
[the client’s] counsel . . . . His client was not 
communicating with him directly . . . .  He had not 
been contacted by successor counsel.  He believed he 
had an agreement regarding an extension, but it was 
oral. . . . He may have believed that [the client] had 
replaced him . . . . Clearly, it would have been 
better for him, and his client, if such an [extension] 
agreement had been reduced to writing, . . . . 
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
9 
 
¶14 The referee was apparently influenced by the fact that 
Attorney Polich paid a substantial sum in settlement of the 
malpractice claim, which the referee concluded remedied any 
injury 
suffered 
by 
the 
client. 
 
Under 
these 
"ambiguous 
circumstances," 
the 
referee 
concluded 
there 
had 
been 
no 
violation of count one. 
¶15 Count seven was a related allegation that Attorney 
Polich lied to the OLR concerning whether he represented this 
client as of July 30 when the answer was due.  He had denied 
that he represented her at this time because it was his 
understanding that the client had obtained, or at least was 
trying to obtain, new counsel even though Attorney Polich never 
received a substitution of counsel. 
¶16 The referee concluded that even though Attorney Polich 
had not yet formally withdrawn as the client's counsel at the 
time, he nonetheless could have legitimately believed that his 
services had been terminated.  The referee concluded that 
Attorney Polich's statements to the OLR constituted "legitimate 
advocacy of an arguable legal position, to which reasonable 
persons could disagree" and could not be characterized as a 
misrepresentation. 
¶17 Counts two, three and six relate to Attorney Polich's 
failure to file the necessary verification of his CLE credits.  
¶18 Counts two and three, alleging intentional false 
statements, were resolved in favor of Attorney Polich.  The 
referee accepted his defense that his office administrative 
assistant had some mental impairment including memory lapses and 
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
10 
 
failure to timely complete tasks.  The referee also accepted his 
claim that he was personally unaware that his license had been 
suspended in 1997 until the malpractice action brought it to 
light in 2001 because the various notices and letters sent by 
BBE to his office were never brought to his personal attention.   
¶19 The referee conceded that she was initially "highly 
skeptical" of this defense, particularly given that early in 
2001 Polich had removed the statement "licensed in Wisconsin" 
from his letterhead.  But she accepted his explanation that this 
change was simply due to a lawyer leaving his office and his 
decision to stop practicing in Wisconsin, rather than an 
admission that his license had been suspended.  The referee 
noted there was no evidence from the OLR that anyone had 
personally communicated the suspension to Attorney Polich or had 
ever heard him make any admission against interest.  The referee 
further noted that the client's new counsel in this case 
considered Attorney Polich's 2001 claim that this was the first 
he heard of the suspension to be truthful.  The referee added: 
If Attorney Polich's only failure was to file a 
required form, and this fact came to his attention 
prior to the filing of the grievance, what possible 
incentive could he have for not correcting this 
error . . . I can think of no convincing explanation 
of his failure to fill out and mail a simple form 
other than the one he gave--that he thought it had 
been done. 
¶20 Count 
six 
alleged 
that 
Attorney 
Polich 
had 
misrepresented to the OLR that he was unaware of his 1997 
suspension.  As with counts two and three, the referee concluded 
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
11 
 
that OLR had not proved that Attorney Polich knew about the 
suspension prior to 2001.  Stating that the misrepresentation in 
SCR 22.03(6) requires deliberate behavior, the referee concluded 
there was no misconduct.   
¶21 The only counts in which the OLR prevailed were four 
and five, both resolved by the referee on summary judgment prior 
to the hearing.   
¶22 Count four alleged that Attorney Polich made a false 
and misleading communication about himself by using office 
letterhead in 1998 and thereafter that indicated that he was 
licensed to practice law in Wisconsin.  The referee concluded 
that since Attorney Polich had clearly received notice of his 
suspension, even though he may not personally have been aware of 
it, the office letterhead was per se false and misleading.  
¶23 Count five alleged that Attorney Polich improperly 
engaged in the practice of law during the period his license was 
suspended, which he conceded. 
¶24 In 
support 
of 
the 
recommendation 
for 
a 
public 
reprimand for the violation of counts four and five, the referee 
referred to several cases in which either a private or public 
reprimand was given for a similar situation involving practice 
during a CLE suspension.  The referee noted that the only case 
that apparently resulted in a suspension where practice during 
CLE noncompliance was present, In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Ditter, 187 Wis. 2d 337, 523 N.W.2d 105 (1994), involved 
an attorney who intentionally refused to accept notices of 
suspension and who never had the requisite number of CLE 
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
12 
 
credits.  The referee further noted that there were other cases 
resulting in suspensions where practice during a CLE suspension 
was involved but all of those involved additional unrelated 
counts. 
¶25 We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
of the referee with respect to all of these counts.  Like the 
referee, we agree with the referee that portions of Attorney 
Polich's defense are susceptible to skepticism.  However, the 
referee was best situated to judge his credibility and that of 
the other witnesses.  There is no indication that the referee's 
findings of fact that support her conclusions of law are clearly 
erroneous. 
¶26 We are troubled by Attorney Polich's repeated failures 
to comply with his CLE requirements.  There is no excuse for an 
attorney 
to 
fail 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
simple 
reporting 
requirement, much less to do so three times.  Further, his 
failure to assume personal responsibility for assuring that the 
most basic requirement for an attorney in this state is met——
active State Bar membership——is inexcusable.   
¶27 We 
are 
also 
concerned 
about 
Attorney 
Polich's 
representation of his client, which can be characterized as 
negligent, 
if 
not 
actually 
misconduct. 
 
The 
malpractice 
settlement he paid his client is ample warning of the cost of 
such negligence.   
¶28 We conclude that the public reprimand recommended by 
the referee is appropriate discipline in this case.   
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
13 
 
¶29 However, we do not agree that the OLR's costs should 
be prorated to reflect that Attorney Polich prevailed on five of 
the seven counts against him.  Although we have the discretion 
to 
apportion 
costs 
pursuant 
to 
SCR 
22.24(1),9 
we 
have 
traditionally not done so.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Pangman, 216 Wis. 2d 440, 574 N.W.2d 232 
(1998); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Preloznik, 
169 Wis. 2d 137, 485 N.W.2d 249 (1992).   
¶30 There is no indication that the costs incurred by the 
OLR in this matter were unreasonable and unnecessary.  Nor is 
there any indication that the five counts on which Attorney 
Polich prevailed could reasonably be deemed to have been without 
prosecutorial merit.  Accordingly, the circumstances before us 
do not warrant departure from the practice of assessing full 
costs against an attorney found to have engaged in at least some 
of the alleged professional misconduct.   
¶31 IT IS ORDERED that Attorney Steve J. Polich is 
publicly remanded for his misconduct.   
                                                 
9 SCR 22.24(1) provides:  Assessment of costs.   
(1) 
The 
supreme 
court 
may 
assess 
against 
the 
respondent all or a portion of the costs of a 
disciplinary proceeding in which misconduct is found, 
a medical incapacity proceeding in which it finds a 
medical incapacity, or a reinstatement proceeding and 
may enter a judgment for costs. The director may 
assess 
all 
or 
a 
portion 
of 
the 
costs 
of 
an 
investigation when discipline is imposed under SCR 
22.09. Costs are payable to the office of lawyer 
regulation. 
 
No. 
03-1071-D   
 
14 
 
¶32 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Attorney Steve J. Polich shall pay $17,498.87 to 
the OLR representing the costs of this proceeding.  If these 
costs are not paid within the time specified, and absent a 
showing to this court of an inability to pay those costs within 
that time, the license of Attorney Polich to practice law in 
Wisconsin shall be suspended indefinitely until further order of 
the court. 
 
 
 
 
No.  03-1071-D.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶33 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (concurring). 
 
My 
concurrence in OLR v. Konnor, 2005 WI 37, ¶¶___-___, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___, 
providing 
some 
context 
and 
perspective regarding costs in disciplinary proceedings, stands 
also as a concurrence in the present case. 
No.  03-1071-D.dtp 
 
 
 
1
¶34 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).  My concerns about the costs imposed in attorney 
discipline cases are set out in OLR v. Konnor, 2005 WI 37, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, released today.  Justice Butler has 
articulated his own concerns in this case.  Although I do not 
fully subscribe to Justice Butler's methodology, I share many of 
his views and concur in his proposal to remand this case to the 
referee for an apportionment of costs. 
 
No.  03-1071-D.lbb 
 
 
 
1
¶35 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (Concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). I join the court's decision and order as to 
the discipline imposed in this action. While I may not have 
reached the same conclusion as the referee with respect to each 
of the violations alleged, the referee's determinations are not 
clearly erroneous.  I write separately because I disagree with 
the court that full costs should be imposed in this case.  I 
agree with the referee's recommendation that costs should be 
prorated, but would remand this matter to the referee to 
determine what costs would be appropriate. 
¶36 Attorney Polich was charged with seven counts of 
attorney 
misconduct. 
 
We 
have 
concluded 
that 
there 
was 
sufficient evidence regarding two of those counts.  Neither of 
those counts was litigated, as the finding in count four (making 
false and misleading communications) was established by summary 
judgment and Attorney Polich admitted the violation in count 
five (improperly practicing law while suspended).  As far as the 
remaining five litigated claims are concerned, while the court 
agreed with the referee that portions of Attorney Polich's 
defenses are suspect (a viewpoint with which I concur), the 
court's per curiam opinion nevertheless adopted the referee's 
findings and conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to 
establish those counts.  Thus, Attorney Polich prevailed on all 
counts that were tried at the hearing before the referee.  In 
recommending that the costs be prorated, the referee opined that 
"clearly issues of fundamental fairness exist if the respondent 
is required to bear all of the costs of proceedings in which he 
No.  03-1071-D.lbb 
 
 
 
2
fundamentally prevails."  Per curiam op., ¶2. The court rejects 
this recommendation. Id., ¶¶2, 29-30, 32. 
¶37 While noting that we have the discretion to apportion 
costs pursuant to SCR 22.24(1), see per curiam op., ¶29, the 
court recognizes that we have traditionally not done so.  See, 
e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pangman, 216 Wis. 
2d 440, 460, 574 N.W. 2d 232 (1998); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Preloznik, 169 Wis. 2d 137, 485 N.W. 2d 249 
(1992). See also, In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kalal, 
2002 WI 45, ¶33, 252 Wis. 2d 261, 278, 643 N.W.2d 466; and In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Johnson, 165 Wis. 2d 14, 20, 
477 N.W.2d 54 (1991). The court reasons that there was no 
indication that the costs incurred by the OLR were unreasonable 
and unnecessary. Per curiam op., ¶30. The court also notes that 
the 
five 
counts 
on 
which 
Attorney 
Polich 
prevailed 
had 
prosecutorial merit. Id. The per curiam opinion concludes that 
the circumstances in this case do not warrant departure from the 
practice of assessing full costs against an attorney found to 
have engaged in at least some of the alleged professional 
misconduct.  Id.  I respectfully disagree.  
¶38 A review of the above cases suggests that the rule 
assessing full costs has been applied with little or no 
rationale. While this court certainly has the power to assess 
full costs even though an attorney has prevailed on some of the 
allegations, that does not mean that such a result is always 
right or just.  I agree with the referee that issues of 
fundamental fairness exist if an attorney is always required to 
No.  03-1071-D.lbb 
 
 
 
3
bear all of the costs of proceedings in which he or she 
prevails.  Thus, I conclude that it is appropriate to develop 
standards to guide us in determining when costs should be 
prorated in a given case.  Nevertheless, I disagree that costs  
should automatically be prorated based on the number of counts 
that have been established. 
¶39 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that on 
the issue of allocation of costs in criminal prosecutions, the 
general rule is that costs associated exclusively with the 
unsuccessful prosecution of a defendant on specific counts may 
not be assessed against that defendant. United States v. Pieper, 
854 F.2d 1020, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 1988). On the other hand, where 
evidence is introduced that relates to multiple counts, it may 
be proper to assess costs associated with the prosecution of 
both the successful and the related unsuccessful counts.  Id. 
¶40 Although 
Pieper 
does 
not 
involve 
a 
disciplinary 
proceeding and is not binding precedent from our court, I note 
that we have not established standards to guide us in applying 
SCR 22.24 (1).  Consequently, I find Pieper to be persuasive in 
this matter, and would apply its logic to the facts of this 
case.  
¶41 Attorney 
Polich 
committed 
two 
violations 
of 
professional misconduct.  Three additional allegations (counts 
two, three, and six) were substantially related to those 
violations, and the evidence overlapped as to those counts.  I 
therefore concur with the court's per curiam opinion that 
No.  03-1071-D.lbb 
 
 
 
4
Attorney Polich should pay all costs associated with the 
prosecution of counts two through six.10  
¶42 However, counts one and seven were unrelated to the 
other counts.  Because there was insufficient evidence to 
support each of those counts, it is fundamentally unfair to 
assess costs associated with those counts against Attorney 
Polich. I would therefore remand this matter to the referee to 
apportion costs and assess them against Attorney Polich only 
with respect to counts two through six.  Those costs should be 
apportioned based on the time and expenses reasonably necessary 
to prosecute each of those five counts by both OLR and the 
referee. Should it become impossible or impractical to calculate 
those costs, then the OLR costs and referee expenses should be 
mathematically prorated to reflect five out of seven counts; 
that is, five-sevenths of the OLR costs and referee expenses.  
In addition to those costs, though, I agree with the court that 
Attorney Polich must pay the entire court reporter fees.  
¶43 Supreme Court Rule 22.24 (1) clearly establishes that 
this court has discretion to apportion costs in OLR proceedings.  
The fact that we have not established standards, guidelines, and 
procedures for when we exercise that discretion does not 
                                                 
10 I recognize that an argument could be made that Attorney 
Polich should be required to pay costs and fees only for the two 
counts which were substantiated, particularly in view of the 
fact that respondent prevailed on all counts which were actually 
tried. I nevertheless favor the "substantially related" approach 
in this instance because I do not want to discourage the OLR 
from 
prosecuting 
 
allegations 
that 
are 
meritorious 
and 
substantially related to violations that have already been 
established.  
No.  03-1071-D.lbb 
 
 
 
5
abdicate our responsibility to do so in cases like this where 
discretion is warranted.  Accordingly, I would follow the 
rationale 
set 
forth in 
Pieper until 
we 
devise our own 
procedures.   
¶44 I therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of 
the per curiam opinion that assesses full costs against the 
respondent. I concur with the remainder of the decision. 
¶45  I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion. 
 
No.  03-1071-D.lbb 
 
1