Case Title: State v. Comeau

Citation: 233 Neb. 907, 448 N.W.2d 595

Docket Number: 

State: nebraska

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Date: 1989-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
448 N.W.2d 595 (1989) 233 Neb. 907 STATE of Nebraska, Appellant, v. Charles A. COMEAU, Appellee. STATE of Nebraska, Appellant, v. Larry L. RUSH, Appellee. Nos. 89-186, 89-187. Supreme Court of Nebraska. December 1, 1989. *596 Robert M. Spire, Atty. Gen., and William L. Howland, and Kent D. Turnbull, Lincoln County Atty., and John H. Marsh, Lincoln, for appellant. Kent E. Florom, Lincoln County Public Defender, for appellees. Robert I. Eberly, Lincoln, and Robert Dowlut for amici curiae National Rifle Ass'n of America and Nebraska Rifle and Pistol Ass'n. Jerry Soucie for amicus curiae Nebraska Criminal Defense Attys. Ass'n. HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ. BOSLAUGH, Justice. These cases involve an interpretation and application of the "Right to Bear Arms" amendment to the Nebraska Constitution, which was proposed by the initiative process and adopted at the general election on November 8, 1988. Article I, § 1, of the Constitution of Nebraska, as amended, now provides as follows: In case No. 89-186, the defendant, Charles A. Comeau, was charged with possessing a firearm from which the manufacturer's identification marks or serial numbers had been removed, defaced, altered, or destroyed. The defendant filed a "demurrer" which alleged that the information failed to state a crime because Neb.Rev. Stat. § 28-1207 (Reissue 1985), under which the defendant was being prosecuted, was now unconstitutional. Treating the demurrer as a motion to dismiss, the trial court sustained it and dismissed the information. In case No. 89-187, the defendant, Larry L. Rush, was charged, as a habitual criminal, with being a felon in possession of a firearm having a barrel less than 18 inches in length. The defendant filed a "demurrer" which alleged that the information failed to state a crime because Neb.Rev. Stat. § 28-1206 (Reissue 1985), under which the defendant was being prosecuted, was now unconstitutional. Treating the demurrer as a motion to dismiss, the trial court sustained it and dismissed the information. The State then commenced proceedings under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2315.01 (Reissue 1985) to review the orders dismissing the informations. In this court the cases have been consolidated for briefing and argument. It is fundamental that a statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of establishing unconstitutionality is on the party attacking its validity. In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Sim, 225 Neb. 181, 403 N.W.2d 721 (1987). Unconstitutionality must be clearly established before a statute will be declared void. State v. Copple, 224 Neb. 672, 401 N.W.2d 141 (1987). Essentially, the question presented by these appeals is whether the amendment prevents the Legislature from passing any laws regulating the possession of firearms. *597 The defendants contend that the amendment must be read literally and that the language which states that the right to keep and bear arms is "inalienable" and shall not be "infringed" by state statute or local ordinance prevents any regulation by the Legislature of the right to possess arms. The defendants concede that the use of weapons may be regulated, but argue that mere possession may not be. The State contends that the plain meaning of the amendment is that the right to keep and bear arms is limited to "lawful purposes." Lawful purposes are not defined in the amendment except as "for security or defense of self, family, home, and others, and for lawful common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful purposes...." The State argues that in the exercise of the police power, the Legislature may define what purposes are lawful purposes. The police power is an attribute of state sovereignty, and, within the limitations of state and federal Constitutions, the state may, in its exercise, enact laws for the promotion of public safety, health, morals, and generally for the public welfare. Finocchiaro, Inc. v. Nebraska Liq. Cont. Comm., 217 Neb. 487, 351 N.W.2d 701 (1984). There are very few rights which are absolute, and this is of necessity. In every phase of everyday experience, there are extremes beyond which some restraint or regulation is necessary for the common good. Even in those cases where statutes have been held to be invalid because in conflict with a constitutional provision concerning the right to keep and bear arms, many courts have recognized that the right is not absolute. In City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139 (W.Va.1988), in which the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held a statute requiring a license to carry certain weapons invalid, the court said: Our research has revealed that courts throughout the country have recognized that the constitutional right to keep and bear arms is not absolute, and these courts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote the safety and welfare of its citizens. See, e.g., Bristow v. State, 418 So. 2d 927, 930 (Ala.Crim. App.), cert. denied (Ala.1982); People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 102-03, 544 P.2d 385, 390-91 (1975); State v. Rupp, 282 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Iowa 1979); In re Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Minn.1980); State v. Angelo, 3 N.J.Misc. 1014, 1015, *598 130 A. 458, 459 (1925); State v. Dees, 100 N.M. 252, 254-55, 669 P.2d 261, 263-64 (Ct.App.1983); Commonwealth v. Ray, 218 Pa.Super. 72, 79, 272 A.2d 275, 279 (1970); Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865, 871 (Wyo.1982). We stress, however, that the legitimate governmental purpose in regulating the right to bear arms cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle the exercise of this right where the governmental purpose can be more narrowly achieved. City of Lakewood, supra. (Emphasis supplied.) 377 S.E.2d at 145-49. If the use of arms is subject to regulation, then regulation of the right to possession may be the only practical way to make an effectual regulation of the use. For example, if the use of arms by persons of unsound mind is to be prohibited, probably the only effectual way to prevent their use is to prohibit the possession of arms by such persons. It is well known that the identification and tracing of a weapon is an important factor in solving crimes involving the use of a weapon. It is for that reason that identifying marks are sometimes removed from weapons. It would be of little use to prohibit the use of weapons from which identifying marks have been removed if the possession of such weapons is lawful. The most effective way to prevent the use of such weapons is to prohibit their possession. Similarly, the most effective way to prevent the use of handguns by felons is to prohibit the possession of handguns by felons. We think the better view is that reasonable regulation of the possession of arms is not prohibited by the amendment. *599 In People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a statute prohibiting possession of guns by persons convicted of a felony was not invalid under a constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to bear arms. The Colorado constitutional provision was as follows: Colo.Const. art. II, § 13. However, not all constitutional rights are absolute. Mosgrove v. Town of Federal Heights, 190 Colo. 1, 543 P.2d 715 [1975]; Stapleton, Jr. v. Dist. Ct., 179 Colo. 187, 499 P.2d 310 [1972]; Anderson v. People, 176 Colo. 224, 490 P.2d 47 [1971], cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1042, 92 S. Ct. 1316, 31 L. Ed. 2d 583 [1972]; United States v. Akeson, 290 F. Supp. 212 (D.Colo.1968); Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 258 F. Supp. 515 (D.Colo.1966). When rights come into conflict, one must of necessity yield. The conflicting rights involved here are the individual's right to bear arms and the state's right, indeed its duty under its inherent police power, to make reasonable regulations for the purpose of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the people. Cottrell v. Teets, 139 Colo. 558, 342 P.2d 1016 [1959]; Denver v. Denver & Rio Grande Co., 63 Colo. 574, 167 P. 969 [1917], aff'd 250 U.S. 241, 39 S. Ct. 450, 63 L. Ed. 958 [1919]; The People v. Hupp, 53 Colo. 80, 123 P. 651. "* * * To limit the possession of firearms by those who, by their past conduct, have demonstrated an unfitness to be entrusted with such dangerous instrumentalities, is clearly in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare and within the scope of the Legislature's police power." People v. Trujillo, 178 Colo. 147, 497 P.2d 1 [1972]. 190 Colo. at 102-03, 544 P.2d at 390-91. In State v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d 481 (N.D.1987), the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that a statute prohibiting possession of firearms by convicted felons did not violate that state's constitutional guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms. *600 The constitutional provision was as follows: 415 N.W.2d at 483. The North Dakota court also cited People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975), with approval. We conclude that the statutes in question are reasonable regulations of the right to keep and bear arms and the judgments dismissing the informations were erroneous. Since the defendants have not been placed in jeopardy, the cause in each case is remanded for further proceedings. EXCEPTIONS SUSTAINED, AND CAUSES REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.