Case Title: State ex rel. Repp v. Best

Citation: 2023-Ohio-3924

Docket Number: 2022-1463

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Repp v. Best, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3924.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3924 
[THE STATE EX REL.] REPP v. BEST ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Repp v. Best, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3924.] 
Quo warranto—Prohibition—Relator failed to allege facts showing that judicial 
office is being unlawfully held and that he was entitled to hold the office—
Relator’s suspension from practice of law created vacancy in judicial office 
under R.C. 1901.10(B), thereby allowing governor to appoint another 
person to the office under Article IV, Section 13 of Ohio Constitution—
Motion for judgment on pleadings granted and quo warranto claim 
dismissed—Prohibition claim and other requests for relief dismissed sua 
sponte. 
(No. 2022-1463—Submitted June 27, 2023—Decided November 2, 2023.) 
IN QUO WARRANTO and PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relator, Mark Repp, was elected in 2019 to a six-year term as a 
municipal court judge.  Less than two years into the term, this court found that Repp 
had engaged in professional misconduct and suspended him from the practice of 
law for one year.  When Repp then failed to perform his official duties for more 
than six months, the judicial office he held was declared vacant.  The governor 
appointed Rhonda Best to fill the vacancy. 
{¶ 2} Repp seeks a writ of quo warranto to oust Best from the judicial office 
and to declare him the rightful holder of the office.  He also seeks a writ of 
prohibition against the members of the Tiffin City Council who declared the 
judicial office vacant, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief.  Respondents, 
Best, the city of Tiffin, and the city council members, filed an answer to Repp’s 
complaint and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which Repp opposes.  We 
grant respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismiss Repp’s quo 
warranto claim, and dismiss all the other claims sua sponte. 
Background 
{¶ 3} In November 2019, Repp was elected to a six-year term as the only 
full-time judge of the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court.  The term expires in 
December 2025.  In November 2021, this court suspended Repp from the practice 
of law for one year and suspended him from judicial office for the duration of his 
suspension.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Repp, 165 Ohio St.3d 582, 2021-Ohio-3923, 
180 N.E.3d 1128, ¶ 33.  The former chief justice of this court assigned other judges 
to temporarily serve on the municipal court through November 8, 2022. 
{¶ 4} In June 2022, the Tiffin City Council passed an ordinance declaring 
that under R.C. 1901.10(B), “a vacancy in the office of judge exist[ed]” due to 
Repp’s absence from official duties for more than six consecutive months.  In 
November 2022, Governor Mike DeWine appointed Best to fill the vacancy.  An 
election to fill the unexpired term is scheduled for November 2023. 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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{¶ 5} Repp was reinstated to the practice of law on November 29, 2022.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Repp, 170 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2022-Ohio-4239, 210 N.E.3d 
560, ¶ 3.  On November 30, he filed this original action, seeking a writ of quo 
warranto to oust Best from office.  He argues that his suspension from the practice 
of law did not create a vacancy in the judicial office within the meaning of R.C. 
1901.10(B).  He also seeks a writ of prohibition, declaratory judgment, and 
injunctive relief.  Respondents filed an answer to Repp’s complaint and a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings.  This court then directed the parties to file 
supplemental briefs addressing the following question: 
 
When a judge is absent from office as result of a six-month 
suspension from the practice of law, does that suspension result in a 
R.C. 1901.10 “vacancy,” given the removal procedures in Ohio 
Constitution, Article II, Section 23; Ohio Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 17; and R.C. 3.07 through R.C. 3.10? 
 
169 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2023-Ohio-1027, 206 N.E.3d 716. 
Analysis 
Quo warranto 
{¶ 6} To state a claim for a writ of quo warranto here, Repp must allege 
facts showing that the judicial office is being unlawfully held and exercised by Best 
and that he is entitled to hold the office.  See State ex rel. Paluf v. Feneli, 69 Ohio 
St.3d 138, 141, 630 N.E.2d 708 (1994).  The sole issue is whether Repp’s 
suspension from the practice of law created a vacancy in the judicial office under 
R.C. 1901.10(B), thereby allowing the governor to appoint Best to the office under 
Article IV, Section 13 of the Ohio Constitution.  “A vacancy in the office of 
[municipal-court] judge exists upon the death, resignation, forfeiture, removal from 
office, or absence from official duties for a period of six consecutive months * * * of 
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the judge * * *.”  R.C. 1901.10(B).  “A vacancy resulting from the absence of a judge 
from official duties for a period of six consecutive months shall be determined and 
declared by the legislative authority.”  Id. 
{¶ 7} Repp does not dispute that the Tiffin City Council is the appropriate 
legislative authority to determine and declare a vacancy resulting from a judge’s six-
month absence from the Tiffin-Fostoria Municipal Court or that he had been absent 
from his official duties for more than six months when the city council declared him 
absent.  He argues, however, that R.C. 1901.10(B) does not apply here because the 
statute does not expressly state that a vacancy may arise when a municipal-court 
judge is unavailable due to a suspension.  We reject this argument because nothing 
in R.C. 1901.10(B) suggests that the reason for a judge’s absence is relevant to its 
provisions.  Under the statute, it matters only whether the judge was absent from his 
or her official duties for at least six consecutive months. 
{¶ 8} According to Repp, his argument is bolstered by R.C. 1901.121(A)(1), 
which provides: 
 
If a vacancy occurs in the office of a judge of a municipal 
court that consists of only one judge or if the judge of a municipal 
court of that nature is incapacitated or unavailable due to 
disqualification, suspension, or recusal, the chief justice of the 
supreme court may assign a sitting judge of another court of record 
or a retired judge of a court of record to temporarily serve on the 
court * * *. 
 
Repp correctly observes that R.C. 1901.121(A)(1) differentiates between a vacancy 
in a judicial office and a judge’s unavailability due to suspension.  Emphasizing this 
distinction, he insists that the city council could not have properly declared a vacancy 
in the judicial office when he was unavailable due to suspension.  But the statute 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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does not describe mutually exclusive circumstances.  In fact, by operation of R.C. 
1901.10(B), one circumstance (a judge’s unavailability) may—but does not 
always—lead to the other (the vacancy of a judicial office).  Here, Repp’s persistent 
unavailability for six months due to his suspension caused a vacancy in the judicial 
office to exist under R.C. 1901.10(B). 
{¶ 9} Repp also argues that there was no vacancy in the judicial office under 
R.C. 1901.10(B), because the former chief justice of this court assigned other 
judges to temporarily serve on the municipal court during his suspension.  This 
argument overlooks the plain language of R.C. 1901.10(B), which provides that a 
vacancy existed when “the judge”—that is, Repp—was absent from his official 
duties for six consecutive months.  The former chief justice’s assignments of other 
judges “to temporarily serve on the court,” R.C. 1901.121(A)(1), did not forgive 
Repp’s absence from his official duties or fill the judicial office. 
{¶ 10} Repp further argues that the city council’s declaration of a vacancy 
under R.C. 1901.10(B) removed him from office.  He contends that R.C. 
1901.10(B) and the city council’s ordinance declaring the vacancy violate the 
principle of separation of powers and infringe on this court’s authority to regulate 
the practice of law under Article IV, Sections 2(B)(1)(g) and 5(B) of the Ohio 
Constitution.  Section 2(B)(1)(g) gives this court original jurisdiction over 
“[a]dmission to the practice of law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all 
other matters relating to the practice of law.”  Section 5(B) requires this court to 
“make rules governing the admission to the practice of law and discipline of persons 
so admitted.” 
{¶ 11} Repp’s argument lacks merit because the city council did not remove 
him from office.  “Remove” means “to force (one) to leave a place or to go away,” 
as in “to dismiss from office.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1921 
(2002).  The city council did not find that Repp had engaged in wrongdoing or force 
him out of office.  Rather, it “determined and declared” under R.C. 1901.10(B) that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Repp had not performed his official duties for six consecutive months.  
Accordingly, we hold that Repp has not shown that R.C. 1901.10(B) or the city 
council’s ordinance infringes on this court’s exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the 
practice of law. 
{¶ 12} Because the city council did not remove Repp from office, we 
answer the supplemental-briefing question in the affirmative.  If a judge is absent 
from his or her official duties for at least six months—for whatever reason—the 
appropriate legislative authority is allowed to declare the judicial office vacant 
under R.C. 1901.10(B).  When a legislative authority makes such a declaration, the 
procedures in Article II, Section 23 and Article IV, Section 17 of the Ohio 
Constitution and R.C. 3.07 through R.C. 3.10—all allowing for the forcible 
removal of a person from office—do not come into play. 
{¶ 13} Repp argues that the city council’s declaration of a vacancy was an 
act of removal, but that conclusion has no foundation in R.C. 1901.10(B).  In 
substance, Repp is asking this court to create an exception to the statute, suggesting 
that his absence from his official duties was not a true absence under the statute 
because it was involuntary.  But R.C. 1901.10(B) provides that a vacancy exists 
upon the judge’s “death, resignation, forfeiture, removal from office, or absence 
from official duties for a period of six consecutive months.”  There are several ways 
that a judicial office may become vacant—some by the judge’s choice, some not.  
Under the statute, when the judge has been absent from his or her official duties for 
six consecutive months, a vacancy in the judicial office exists.  The reason for the 
judge’s absence does not matter. 
{¶ 14} As a final matter, Repp argues that R.C. 1901.10(B) is 
unconstitutional because it allowed for his removal from office without the due-
process protections afforded by several constitutional and statutory provisions.  We 
reject this argument for two reasons.  First, as discussed above, the city council did 
not remove Repp; it merely found that he had been absent from his official duties for 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
7 
six months.  This quo warranto case affords Repp due process to contest the city 
council’s action.  And second, Repp was afforded due process through the 
disciplinary process.  He was given a full opportunity to answer the disciplinary 
complaint against him and to be heard before he was suspended from the practice of 
law. 
{¶ 15} Accordingly, we grant respondents’ motion for judgment on the 
pleadings and dismiss Repp’s quo warranto claim. 
Other claims 
{¶ 16} Respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings does not address 
Repp’s prohibition claim or his other requests for relief.  We dismiss all the other 
claims in our review under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04(C). 
{¶ 17} Repp seeks a writ of prohibition against the city and its council 
members.  The “first and fundamental element” of a prohibition claim is the 
exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power.  State ex rel. Save Your Courthouse 
Commt. v. Medina, 157 Ohio St.3d 423, 2019-Ohio-3737, 137 N.E.3d 1118, ¶ 26.  
Repp alleges that the city council exercised quasi-judicial power by removing him 
from office.  But “quasi-judicial authority” refers to “the power to hear and 
determine controversies between the public and individuals that require a hearing 
resembling a judicial trial.”  State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 87 
Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 908 (1999).  “When a public entity takes official 
action but does not conduct proceedings akin to a judicial trial, prohibition will not 
issue.”  Save Your Courthouse Commt. at ¶ 27.  Repp, therefore, fails to state a 
claim for a writ of prohibition. 
{¶ 18} Repp also asks us to declare that R.C. 1901.10(B) is unconstitutional 
and that the city council’s ordinance is invalid or unconstitutional.  We do not have 
original jurisdiction over declaratory-judgment claims.  State ex rel. JobsOhio v. 
Goodman, 133 Ohio St.3d 297, 2012-Ohio-4425, 978 N.E.2d 153, ¶ 14.  Repp also 
asks for an order “prohibiting further implementation and execution of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Ordinance.”  But we lack original jurisdiction to grant a prohibitory injunction.  State 
ex rel. Esarco v. Youngstown City Council, 116 Ohio St.3d 131, 2007-Ohio-5699, 
876 N.E.2d 953, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 19} Accordingly, we sua sponte dismiss the complaint to the extent it 
seeks a writ of prohibition, declaratory judgment, or injunctive relief. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 20} For the reasons stated above, we grant respondents’ motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and dismiss Repp’s quo warranto claim.  We dismiss all 
the other claims sua sponte. 
Cause dismissed. 
FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, C.J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DETERS, J. 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and 
DETERS, J. 
_________________ 
 
KENNEDY, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 21} I agree with the other dissenting opinion’s analysis.  I write 
separately to make a few points. 
{¶ 22} As the other dissent notes, the Ohio Constitution provides three ways 
that Ohio judges may be removed from office.  First adopted in the 1851 
Constitution, Article IV, Section 17 allows judges to be removed by a concurrent 
resolution passed by a two-thirds vote of each house of the General Assembly.  Also 
adopted in 1851, Article II, Section 24 states that judges “may be impeached for 
any misdemeanor in office.”  And in 1912, the people of Ohio adopted Article II, 
Section 38, which empowers the General Assembly to pass laws providing for the 
prompt removal of judges from office “for any misconduct involving moral 
turpitude or for other cause provided by law.”  (Emphasis added.)  However, as the 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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other dissent points out, a statute enacted pursuant to Section 38 must provide for 
removal of a judge “upon complaint and hearing.” 
{¶ 23} At issue in this case is R.C. 1901.10(B), which governs when a 
vacancy in the office of municipal-court judge occurs, including an “absence from 
official duties for a period of six consecutive months” as “determined and declared 
by the legislative authority.”  This language has been substantively the same since 
it was first enacted as Section 1590 of the General Code in 1951.  See Am.S.B. No. 
14, 124 Ohio Laws 589, 596. 
{¶ 24} Initially, it is unclear whether the General Assembly has the 
authority to decide that a judicial office is vacant based on an absence for six 
months.  Article IV, Section 13 of the Ohio Constitution provides for the filling of 
a judicial office that is vacant, but it neither says when a judicial office is vacant 
nor that an office may be deemed vacant “as provided by law.”  By comparison, 
Article III, Section 17 states that a vacancy occurs in the office of governor or 
lieutenant governor “because of the death, conviction on impeachment, resignation, 
or removal of the persons elected to those offices.”  Absence from official duties 
does not appear to result in a vacancy in the office of governor or lieutenant 
governor. 
{¶ 25} Ultimately, it is not necessary to decide whether the General 
Assembly has the authority to enact legislation under which a judicial office may 
be deemed vacant because of an absence from official duties.  R.C. 1901.10(B) 
goes further than just doing that.  It says that the legislative authority shall 
determine and declare when “[a] vacancy resulting from the absence of a judge 
from official duties for a period of six consecutive month” exists.  As the other 
dissenting opinion recognizes, this essentially provides for the removal of a sitting 
judge.  That is, the judge continues to hold office notwithstanding an absence from 
official duties for six consecutive months until the legislative authority takes action 
to determine and declare that the office is vacant.  This statutory removal process 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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is unconstitutional.  It could only be enacted under authority of Article II, Section 
38 of the Ohio Constitution, yet R.C. 1901.10(B) does not provide a “complaint 
and hearing” for determining and declaring a judicial office vacant as is expressly 
required by Section 38. 
{¶ 26} We are left with R.C. 1901.121(A)(1), which provides for the chief 
justice of the Ohio Supreme Court to assign a sitting judge or a retired judge to 
temporarily serve on a single-judge municipal court when there is a temporary 
vacancy because a judge is “unavailable due to disqualification, suspension, or 
recusal.”  In this case, relator, Judge Mark Repp, alleges, and the respondents admit, 
that the former chief justice appointed acting judges to take Judge Repp’s place 
while he served his suspension.  And because Judge Repp was not legally removed 
from office under one of the three mechanisms provided by the Ohio Constitution, 
he was eligible to retake his seat when his suspension from the practice of law 
terminated. 
{¶ 27} For these reasons, I would grant a peremptory writ of quo warranto 
declaring that Judge Repp is the rightful holder of the office of judge of the Tiffin-
Fostoria Municipal Court.  Because the majority does not do that, I dissent. 
DETERS, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 28} The Ohio Constitution sets rules about how elected judges may be 
removed from office.  The question in this case is whether a judge may be removed 
through procedures other than those set forth in the Constitution.  I would hold that 
he may not be.  Because we are bound to follow the Constitution, I would grant the 
writ of quo warranto.  I dissent from the majority’s decision to do otherwise. 
Methods of Removal Established by the Ohio Constitution 
{¶ 29} The Ohio Constitution establishes three methods for the removal of 
judges from office.  All require some type of adjudicatory process.  First, judges 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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“may be impeached for any misdemeanor in office” by a majority of the House of 
Representatives.  Ohio Constitution, Article II, Sections 23 and 24.  Impeachments 
shall be tried by the Senate, Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 23, and a judge 
“shall be liable to indictment, trial, and judgment,” Ohio Constitution, Article II, 
Section 24.  A two-thirds vote in the Senate is required for conviction.  Ohio 
Constitution, Article II, Section 23.  “[J]udgment shall not extend further than 
removal from office, and disqualification to hold” public office.  Ohio Constitution, 
Article II, Section 24. 
{¶ 30} Second, judges may be removed from office through a concurrent 
resolution passed by a two-thirds vote of each house of the General Assembly.  
Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 17.  This method of removal requires that a 
complaint be filed and that the judge be provided with notice of the complaint and 
an opportunity to be heard.  Id. 
{¶ 31} Finally, the Constitution authorizes the legislature to adopt laws 
“providing for the prompt removal from office, upon complaint and hearing, of all 
officers, including * * * judges” for “misconduct involving moral turpitude or for 
other cause provided by law.”  (Emphasis added.)  Ohio Constitution, Article II, 
Section 38.  These laws are “in addition to impeachment or other method[s] of 
removal authorized by the constitution.”  Id. 
{¶ 32} Exercising this authority, the legislature adopted an adjudicatory 
removal process in R.C. 3.07 through 3.10.  “Any person holding office in this state 
* * * who willfully and flagrantly exercises authority or power not authorized by 
law, refuses or willfully neglects to enforce the law or to perform any official duty 
imposed upon him by law, or is guilty of gross neglect of duty, gross immorality, 
drunkenness, misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance is guilty of misconduct in 
office” and may be removed from office.  R.C. 3.07.  These removal proceedings 
begin with the filing of a complaint in the common pleas court of the county in 
which the judge resides (except when the judge is a common-pleas-court judge).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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R.C. 3.08.  The complaint must be signed by at least 15 percent of the qualified 
voters of the political subdivision in which the judge holds office.  Id.  The removal 
proceedings are to be tried by a judge unless a jury is demanded.  Id.  If a jury is 
demanded, at least nine members of the jury must find that at least one count of the 
complaint is true to remove the judge from office.  Id.  If a verdict of removal is 
entered, the judge “shall have judgment of forfeiture of said office with all its 
emoluments entered thereon against him, creating thereby in said office a vacancy 
to be filled as prescribed by law.”  R.C. 3.07. 
The Removal of Judge Repp 
{¶ 33} Judge Repp was not removed through any of these three 
constitutionally prescribed means.  Instead, this court suspended him from the 
practice of law for one year.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Repp, 165 Ohio St.3d 
582, 2021-Ohio-3923, 180 N.E.3d 1128, ¶ 33.  Then, the Tiffin City Council 
declared a vacancy for his position and the governor appointed a replacement.  The 
majority goes along with this.  I don’t see how we can. 
The Majority Opinion 
{¶ 34} The majority tries to get around the constitutional requirements by 
relying on R.C. 1901.10(B). That provision provides: 
 
A vacancy in the office of judge exists upon the death, resignation, 
forfeiture, removal from office, or absence from official duties for a 
period of six consecutive months, as determined under this section, 
of the judge and also by reason of the expiration of the term of an 
incumbent when no successor has been elected or qualified.  A 
vacancy resulting from the absence of a judge from official duties 
for a period of six consecutive months shall be determined and 
declared by the legislative authority. 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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The majority reasons that as a result of our suspension of Judge Repp, he was absent 
from his official duties for six months, and therefore the Tiffin City Council was 
authorized to declare a vacancy in the office.  Under this logic, because there was 
a vacancy, the governor had the authority to fill the position.  See Ohio Constitution, 
Article IV, Section 13 (“In case the office of any judge shall become vacant, before 
the expiration of the regular term for which he was elected, the vacancy shall be 
filled by appointment by the governor, until a successor is elected and has qualified 
* * *”). 
{¶ 35} The problem is that our Constitution has set forth specific procedures 
by which a judge may be removed from office.  None of those procedures were 
followed here.  The majority says that the constitutional provisions “do not come 
into play” because Judge Repp was absent from his office.  Majority opinion, ¶ 12.  
It contends instead that R.C. 1901.10(B) controls.  But, of course, in our system the 
Constitution trumps statutory law.  See State v. Saffell, 35 Ohio St.3d 90, 92, 518 
N.E.2d 934 (1988) (holding that a trial judge was not “required to request the 
assignment of a visiting judge pursuant to R.C. 1901.10” because “assignment of 
such visiting judges is primarily and constitutionally within the discretion of the 
Chief Justice of this court”).  When the Constitution charts a course that must be 
followed, the legislature cannot simply create an alternative one.  See State ex rel. 
Weinberger v. Miller, 87 Ohio St. 12, 26-27, 99 N.E. 1078 (1912) (“[T]he written 
Constitution of the state is the paramount law, and * * * it is the duty of the court 
to sustain the paramount law and refuse to enforce any and all legislation in 
contravention thereof.  Any other course would lead to the destruction of the 
Constitution”); Switzer v. State ex rel. Silvey, 103 Ohio St. 306, 312, 133 N.E. 552 
(1921) (“Where Constitutions speak, statutes should be silent”). 
{¶ 36} The Constitution does allow the legislature to enact laws providing 
for the removal of elected officials, including judges.  But that authority comes with 
an important caveat: the General Assembly may only enact laws providing for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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removal “upon complaint and hearing,” Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 38.  
Because R.C. 1901.10(B) does not contain a complaint and hearing procedure for 
declaring a vacancy in the office of judge, it cannot be a source of authority for the 
removal of a judge from office. Moreover, by authorizing the legislature to enact 
laws that provide for removal through “complaint and hearing,” the Constitution 
necessarily prohibits the legislature from enacting laws that provide for removal 
without “complaint and hearing.”  See State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Davis, 55 Ohio St. 
15, 22, 44 N.E. 511 (1896) (“The provisions of the constitution and enactments in 
conflict with them cannot stand together”). 
{¶ 37} The text of R.C. 1901.10(B) makes clear that the statute was not 
meant to be a source of authority for removing judges.  Rather, the statute 
enumerates “forfeiture” and “removal from office,” among the circumstances that 
create a vacancy in a judicial office.  The three constitutional provisions all 
explicitly provide for “removal”; R.C. 3.07 through 3.10 provide for both 
“removal” from and “forfeiture” of office.  Thus, R.C. 1901.10(B) provides a 
mechanism to declare a vacancy once removal has occurred through the 
constitutional process; it is not a mechanism to sidestep the Constitution. 
{¶ 38} The majority says that the “absence from official duties for a period 
of six consecutive months” provision in R.C. 1901.10(B) applies to any absence 
regardless of whether the absence was voluntary or involuntary.  Majority opinion 
at ¶ 13.  Thus, the majority contends that Judge Repp’s involuntary absence 
resulting from this court’s suspension of him triggered the removal power.  I 
disagree with this reading.  The explicit provision in R.C. 1901.10(B) for “death, 
resignation, forfeiture, [and] removal from office” suggests that the “absence from 
official duties” provision applies only to voluntary absences.  But this dispute about 
statutory construction is largely beside the point.  To read the provision as the 
majority suggests would elevate the statute above the Constitution.  And that we 
cannot do.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (because 
January Term, 2023 
 
 
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a written constitution is “fundamental and paramount law,” “an act of the 
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void”). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 39} There are three constitutional mechanisms to remove a judge from 
office: impeachment, concurrent resolution, and a removal proceeding in the 
common pleas court.  None were followed in this case.  Because the Constitution 
trumps statutory law, I would grant the writ of quo warranto.  Because the majority 
does otherwise, I must dissent. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and DETERS, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter Co., L.P.A., and Christopher J. Weber; and 
Montgomery Jonson, L.L.P., and Lisa M. Zaring, for relator. 
Squire Patton Boggs (U.S.), L.L.P., Steven A. Friedman, and Rebecca W. 
Haverstick, for respondents. 
Mayle, L.L.C., Andrew R. Mayle, and Ben Padanilam; and Albrechta & 
Coble, Ltd., Joseph F. Albrechta, and Chris Liebold, urging dismissal for amicus 
curiae, Alexandra Orta. 
_________________