Case Title: Commonwealth v. Watson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12616

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12616 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAVAINE WATSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 9, 2020. - April 6, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Joint Enterprise.  Intent.  Accessory and Principal.  
Evidence, Joint venturer, Intent.  Practice, Criminal, 
Instructions to jury, Duplicative convictions, Trial of 
defendants together, Question by jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 14, 2014. 
 
The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
Neil L. Fishman for the defendant. 
Darcy A. Jordan, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Javaine Watson, 
of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and of accessory 
2 
 
after the fact for the shooting death of Romeo McCubbin.1  The 
defendant seeks reversal of his convictions, arguing that (1) 
his conviction of murder in the first degree must be vacated 
because the Commonwealth did not present legally sufficient 
proof regarding deliberate premeditation or extreme atrocity or 
cruelty; (2) the jury instruction on joint venture liability 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; 
(3) this court must reverse the accessory after the fact 
conviction for various reasons; (4) the trial judge should have 
ordered the defendant's trial to be severed from that of the 
codefendants; and (5) the trial judge's answer to a question 
from the jury during deliberations was wrong as a matter of law 
and prejudiced the verdicts.  He also urges this court to 
exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to set aside 
the convictions or, alternatively, to reduce his murder 
conviction to murder in the second degree.  For the reasons 
stated infra, we affirm the defendant's conviction of joint 
venture murder in the first degree and vacate his conviction of 
accessory after the fact.  After a thorough review of the 
record, we decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
 
 
1 The defendant's three coventurers, Omar Bonner, Omar 
Denton, and Andrew Robertson, were convicted of murder in the 
first degree based on deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  The coventurers' appeals are pending. 
3 
 
§ 33E, to grant a new trial or reduce or set aside the verdict 
of murder in the first degree. 
 
Background.  At around 1:45 A.M. on December 14, 2013, the 
victim was shot multiple times, resulting in his death at the 
scene on Havelock Street.  The victim had attended an event 
earlier that night at a nightclub located at the corner of 
Havelock Street and Blue Hill Avenue in the Mattapan section of 
Boston.  A person called 911 to report the shooting, the shots 
could be heard from a local police station, and ShotSpotter2 
reported shots fired. 
 
1.  Nightclub.  An investigation revealed that Omar Bonner, 
Andrew Robertson, and Omar Denton were at the same event at the 
nightclub on the night the victim was shot.  Nadira Amoroso3 
testified that she did not see the defendant at the nightclub 
that night, but during her grand jury testimony, which was 
admitted substantively under Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 
73-75 (1984), she testified that she had seen him there that 
 
 
2 ShotSpotter uses sensors to detect a possible gunshot and 
approximates its location.  There were two ShotSpotter 
activations on December 14, 2013, at around 1:45 A.M., both in 
the vicinity of where the victim was found. 
 
 
3 Nadira Amoroso testified that she had a relationship with 
the defendant, which consisted of his visiting her at her house 
during the night a few times each week.  The defendant's parents 
testified that a different woman was the defendant's only 
girlfriend and that they did not know Amoroso.  The defendant 
argued at trial that Amoroso lied about the relationship. 
4 
 
night.  Photographs taken that night show that Bonner was 
dressed all in red, including a hat and a plaid scarf; Denton 
was dressed in a black hat and a maroon sweater over a white 
shirt; and Robertson was dressed in a hat and a dark scarf that 
covered his face. 
 
2.  Surveillance video recording.  A home surveillance 
camera mounted on a home on Havelock Street captured a recording 
of the shooting.  The Commonwealth combined the surveillance 
video footage with audio recordings from ShotSpotter and the 
police radio transmissions, and the compilation was played for 
the jury and admitted as an exhibit.  The video footage showed 
two sport utility vehicles (SUVs), whose appearances were 
consistent with the red Lincoln MKX driven by the defendant and 
the silver Toyota RAV4 driven by Bonner and Denton, going down 
Havelock Street at the same time.  Shortly thereafter, a Ford 
Explorer, later determined to be driven by the victim, went down 
Havelock Street and parked.  A person, with a scarf trailing 
from his neck, ran toward the Ford Explorer and shot ten times 
into the driver's side door and window.  An SUV, which the video 
recording showed to be consistent with the Lincoln, was driven 
up next to the Ford Explorer and stopped to let the shooter get 
into the front passenger's seat, and then was driven away.  The 
victim then rolled out of the passenger's side door onto the 
sidewalk. 
5 
 
 
About forty seconds after the first shooting, as the victim 
lay on the ground, a second person walked toward the victim.  
The second person was wearing a dark hat and a dark shirt with a 
white triangle at the collar.  The second person was followed by 
a third person, who was wearing monotone clothing.  The second 
person aimed a handgun at the victim and shot him four times.  
The third person then kicked the victim, and the two ran away.4 
 
3.  Arrest of Bonner and Denton.  As officers responded to 
the shooting, Boston police Detective Brian Smigielski5 saw a 
silver Toyota RAV4 being driven away from the location where 
shots were reported.  Smigielski followed the RAV4 to the 
driveway of a home on Wood Avenue where Bonner's family lived.  
Bonner and Denton got out of the RAV4 and ran away.  Police 
caught both men; they found a black hat, later determined to 
 
4 Two eyewitnesses also testified.  One of the occupants of 
the home with the surveillance camera was awoken by the 
gunshots.  He said he looked out of his window and saw the 
victim roll out of the vehicle onto the ground, at which point a 
man walked to the victim and shot him two or three times.  A 
different man kicked the victim, and one of the two men then 
said "dirty motherfucker."  The two men then ran toward Blue 
Hill Avenue.  Another eyewitness was at home when he heard four 
or five gunshots and from his window saw four or five flashes.  
He next saw a person in a red hooded sweatshirt and a person in 
a black jacket run toward Blue Hill Avenue.  He also saw a black 
Honda Civic and a red Lincoln MKX being driven from Havelock 
Street to Blue Hill Avenue to Baird Street, and then speed past 
his house on Baird Street. 
 
5 Brian Smigielski resigned from the Boston police 
department in 2016 after having been charged with conspiracy to 
defraud the United States, of which he was convicted. 
6 
 
contain deoxyribonucleic acid that matched Denton, and near 
Bonner they found his cellular telephone (cell phone) and a red 
hat on the ground, as well as a .380 caliber firearm in a yard 
near where he ran. 
 
When the police arrested them, Bonner was wearing a plaid 
scarf and a red shirt and Denton was wearing a maroon sweater 
over a white shirt and had left a black jacket in the RAV4. 
 
While at the police station, police recovered a cell phone 
from Denton's crotch area and overheard him tell Bonner that he 
told Bonner's sister to call "S.P." and that he had called 
"S.P." when he was in the wagon.  Bonner's sister and 
Robertson's friends knew Robertson as "Spoilers." 
 
4.  Lincoln MKX.  On December 12, 2013, Amoroso had rented 
a red Lincoln MKX.  She testified that the defendant borrowed 
the Lincoln from her at around 10 P.M. on the night of December 
13, 2013. 
 
At around 2:30 to 2:45 A.M. on December 14, 2013, police 
officers discovered an unoccupied red Lincoln MKX blocking a 
driveway in the vicinity of where they arrested Bonner and 
Denton.  The vehicle was running, the gear was in reverse, the 
driver's side window was open, and the back of the vehicle was 
against a fence post.  Police found a cell phone, with the 
number ending in 6426, on the driver's seat and a set of keys in 
the center console, both of which were later identified as 
7 
 
belonging to the defendant.  Further investigation revealed 
fingerprints, located inside and outside the Lincoln, that were 
consistent with fingerprints of the defendant and each of his 
codefendants.6  The defendant's fingerprints were located on the 
gear shift, the inside driver's side door handle, the outside 
driver's side door handle and surrounding area, and the outside 
of the front and rear passenger's side doors.  Robertson's 
fingerprints were located on the outside front passenger's side 
door and handle, the inside front passenger's side door handle, 
and the driver's side door.  Denton's fingerprints were found on 
both the inside and outside rear driver's side door handles, and 
Bonner's were found on both the outside rear passenger's side 
door and the inside rear passenger's side door handle. 
 
5.  Cell phone records.  The cell phone recovered by the 
police from the Lincoln with the number ending in 6426 (6426 
number) was registered to the defendant's stepmother, but the 
defendant used it as his cell phone.  The cell phone had contact 
information for "Big O," "Lil O," and "Sick."  Bonner's nickname 
was "Big O," and Denton's nickname was "Lil O."  The number 
associated with "Sick" was registered to an account opened for 
Robertson by Robertson's former girlfriend. 
 
 
6 An employee of the rental agency testified that the 
interior and exterior of their vehicles are generally cleaned 
before a new customer receives one. 
8 
 
 
On the night of December 13, 2013, at 10:52 P.M., the 6426 
number cell phone was used to place a call to Lil O for thirty-
four seconds; at 11:24 P.M., the same cell phone was used to 
place a call to Sick for twenty seconds; and at 11:39 P.M., the 
same cell phone received a call from Big O for almost four 
minutes.  On December 14, 2013, a call was missed on the 6426 
number from Big O at 1:44 A.M., and then the 6426 number was 
used to make three calls to Big O:  two at 1:47 A.M., and one at 
1:48 A.M.  The cell phone was not used to make or answer any 
calls after the third call to Big O.  One of the cell phone's 
missed calls was from Amoroso at 10:02 A.M. on December 14. 
 
In addition, less than three minutes before the shooting, 
Bonner's cell phone was used to call Denton's cell phone.  The 
cell phone that police recovered from Denton's crotch area had 
been used to call Sick at around 2 A.M. on December 14, 2013. 
 
In September 2013, Robertson's former girlfriend, Judith 
Nelson, opened a cell phone account for Robertson, with the 
number ending in 8764 (8764 number).  This number was listed in 
the defendant's cell phone as the contact for Sick.  Nelson 
testified that Robertson had only one cell phone, but before the 
grand jury she had testified that he had two cell phones.  
Amoroso testified that the defendant had two cell phones and 
that she spoke with him daily on the 8764 number.  Nelson 
9 
 
cancelled Robertson's cell phone service on December 15, 2013, 
at his request. 
 
An analysis of the codefendants' cell phone calling 
patterns between November 15 and December 14, 2013, revealed 
frequent contacts between the various cell phones.  These 
included 203 contacts between the 8764 number and the 6426 
number. 
 
6.  Ballistics.  The police recovered four .380 caliber 
shell casings and three live rounds of .380 caliber ammunition 
near the victim's body.  The victim was shot two times in the 
head and nine times in the rest of his body.  The medical 
examiner testified that the shots to the head were fatal and 
that the other shots were likely fatal.  She further testified 
that these wounds would have resulted in the victim's death 
within seconds to minutes. 
 
The .380 caliber bullets recovered from the victim's head 
were matched to the .380 handgun found in Bonner's flight path.  
Police recovered ten nine millimeter shell casings from the 
scene and four spent nine millimeter bullets from inside the 
Ford Explorer, and the medical examiner recovered five spent 
nine millimeter bullets during the autopsy; all were fired from 
the same nine millimeter firearm used to shoot the victim. 
 
7.  Defendant's case.  The defendant argued that Amoroso 
lied about having had a relationship with him.  He also 
10 
 
contended that Amoroso lied during her grand jury testimony by 
saying that she saw the defendant in the nightclub on the night 
of the murder.  He further argued that Amoroso claimed to 
contact the defendant on the 8764 number, which was associated 
with Robertson and Nelson, with over one hundred calls between 
her number and 8764, but that there was only one call between 
Amoroso's cell phone and the defendant's cell phone, number 
6426. 
 
The defendant called his stepmother as a witness.  She 
testified that she did not know Bonner, Denton, or Robertson and 
that she had set up and paid for the defendant's cell phone.  On 
December 14, 2013, she temporarily suspended the defendant's 
cell phone service after he asked her to do so. 
 
The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at 
the close of the Commonwealth's case, which was denied.  During 
closing argument, the defendant argued, among other things, that 
he was in a relationship with another woman, not Amoroso; 
someone else was the user of the 8764 number; and he had his own 
car and therefore did not need the rented Lincoln. 
 
After the jury convicted the defendant, he moved for 
judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, which was 
denied. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of evidence for murder in 
first degree.  The defendant first argues that there was 
11 
 
insufficient evidence to prove murder in the first degree under 
either the theory of deliberate premeditation or the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Therefore, he argues that his 
conviction of murder in the first degree must be vacated.  We 
conclude that the evidence sufficed to prove that the defendant 
committed murder in the first degree. 
 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, "[w]e 
consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 51 
(2018), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 
(1979).  "The evidence may be direct or circumstantial, and we 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth."  
Ayala, supra, citing Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32 
(2017). 
 
For murder in the first degree both under the theory of 
deliberate premeditation and under the theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, to prove the defendant guilty as a joint 
venturer, the Commonwealth had to "prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that 'the defendant knowingly participated in the 
commission of the crime charged, and that the defendant had or 
shared the required criminal intent.'"  See Commonwealth v. 
12 
 
Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 100-101 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 467 (2009). 
 
a.  Knowing participation.  The Commonwealth presented 
ample evidence that the defendant knowingly participated in the 
murder.  The jury could have inferred from Amoroso's testimony 
that the defendant was at the event at the nightclub attended by 
his coventurers, and the cell phone records and testimony 
demonstrated that he and his coventurers were associates.  The 
cell phone records among the four coventurers in the month 
leading up to the murder demonstrated their association, which 
continued right up until the time of the murder.  The cell phone 
records show, in part, that around the time of the murder, the 
defendant first missed a call from Bonner at 1:44 A.M. and then 
called him shortly thereafter.  The jury could have made the 
reasonable inference that the defendant was calling Bonner to 
let him know that he and Robertson had completed their part of 
the plan. 
 
The jury also could have made reasonable inferences that 
the Lincoln rented by Amoroso was used in the murder and that 
the defendant was the driver of the Lincoln.  Regarding the 
defendant being the driver, the jury could look to the testimony 
and evidence that he borrowed the Lincoln from Amoroso on 
December 13, 2013; that police recovered the defendant's cell 
phone and car keys in the abandoned Lincoln; and that his 
13 
 
fingerprints were found on the inside and outside of the 
Lincoln, including on the gear shift.  Regarding the Lincoln 
being the vehicle used in the murder, the jury could look to the 
evidence that the SUV the defendant borrowed was the same make, 
model, and color as the one used in the murder, and that 
fingerprints from all of the defendants were found in the 
abandoned Lincoln.  In addition, an SUV with characteristics 
matching those of the Lincoln was seen with Bonner's RAV4 on 
Havelock Street before the murder, demonstrating an association 
between the two.  And the jury could infer that an SUV with 
characteristics matching those of the Lincoln was waiting for 
the first shooter, Robertson, to shoot the victim, before 
speeding away with him. 
 
b.  Shared intent.  There was also sufficient evidence for 
the jury to find that the defendant shared the mental state of 
malice aforethought for murder in the first degree under the 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.7  See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, 414 
(2016); Commonwealth v. Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. 370, 377 
(2006). 
 
7 In a letter submitted pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 16 (l), 
as amended, 386 Mass. 1247 (1982), the defendant directed our 
attention to Commonwealth v. Colas, 486 Mass. 831, 839-841 
(2021), and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 486 Mass. 51, 61 (2020).  
We have reviewed those cases, and they do not alter our 
analysis. 
14 
 
 
i.  Deliberate premeditation.  Under the theory of 
deliberate premeditation, the Commonwealth was required to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew his 
coventurers intended to kill the victim and that he shared that 
intent.  See Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 414.  There must be some 
proof "that the defendant 'consciously . . . act[ed] together 
[with the coventurers] before or during the crime with the 
intent of making the crime succeed.'"  Id., quoting Zanetti, 454 
Mass. at 470 (Appendix).  The Commonwealth met this standard.  
First, an SUV consistent with the Lincoln, which Amoroso 
testified she lent to the defendant on the night of the murder 
and which the jury reasonably could have inferred was driven by 
the defendant, went down Havelock Street following an SUV 
matching Bonner's RAV4, shortly before the murder.  The jury 
could infer that they were conducting reconnaissance before the 
victim's arrival.  It also was reasonable for the jury to infer 
that the defendant's role was not just to be the getaway driver, 
but also to bring Robertson to Havelock Street, allow him to 
approach the victim's vehicle from behind, and block the street 
so that other vehicles could not interfere. 
 
Moreover, the jury could infer that, immediately after 
Robertson shot the victim, it was the defendant who drove the 
Lincoln next to him, Robertson got in, and they drove away.  The 
jury could infer from this chain of events that Robertson and 
15 
 
the defendant had a plan for the defendant to pick him up after 
the defendant knew the shooting was completed. 
 
In addition, we are not persuaded by the defendant's 
argument that Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, compels a different 
result.  In Gonzalez, where the defendant was convicted of 
murder in the first degree as a joint venturer under the theory 
of deliberate premeditation, we determined that the evidence was 
insufficient to allow a rational juror to find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant participated in the crime 
or that she shared the requisite mental state for deliberately 
premeditated murder.  Id. at 397, 407.  However, there are 
multiple distinguishing factors between the facts underlying 
Gonzalez and the present case.  Unlike in Gonzalez, here there 
was evidence from which the jury could infer that the 
coventurers hatched the plan during the hundreds of telephone 
calls between them in the month prior to the killing.  Further, 
the four were together at the club shortly before the murder.  
The evidence also allowed for an inference that the defendant 
conducted reconnaissance prior to the shooting, remained at the 
scene during the shooting, and picked Robertson up once the 
shooting was completed.  Finally, police found the abandoned 
Lincoln with the defendant's cell phone and keys, tying him to 
the Lincoln. 
16 
 
 
ii.  Extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Under the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, malice is defined "as an intent to 
cause death, to cause grievous bodily harm, or to do an act 
which, in the circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable 
person would have known created a plain and strong likelihood 
that death would follow."  Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. at 377.  
The Commonwealth demonstrated that the defendant shared this 
intent.  The surveillance video footage shows that after the SUV 
consistent with the Lincoln dropped Robertson off, the SUV was 
driven slowly behind him, with Robertson illuminated in the 
Lincoln's headlights.  As discussed supra, it was reasonable for 
the jury to infer that the defendant was the driver of the 
Lincoln, and it therefore also was reasonable for the jury to 
infer that the defendant saw Robertson shoot at the victim ten 
times while the victim sat in his vehicle, and therefore that he 
knew that Robertson's actions had a "plain and strong 
likelihood" of resulting in death.  Robertson's shooting the 
victim ten times from close range was disproportionate to the 
means necessary to kill the victim and, therefore, constituted 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 
Mass. 216, 227 (1983).  The defendant was responsible for 
Robertson's actions because he shared the requisite malice 
aforethought and he knowingly participated in the murder.  See 
Sokphann Chhim, supra at 379-380 ("If the [coventurer's] actions 
17 
 
warrant a finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty, the 
[defendant] is responsible for those actions"). 
 
In addition, we decline the defendant's invitation to 
change our current law regarding joint venture murder in the 
first degree under the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  
The defendant contends that it is "substantially unfair and 
unjust" that a defendant does not need to share his or her 
coventurer's intent to commit the murder in an extremely 
atrocious or cruel way.  We recently declined to impose a 
requirement that the jury find that a defendant intended to 
commit an extremely atrocious or cruel murder, and we decline to 
do so again.  See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 864-
865 (2020), and cases cited. 
 
2.  Joint venture instruction.  The defendant argues that 
the jury instruction on joint venture liability erroneously left 
the jury with the impression that they could convict the 
defendant of murder even if his role was just to be an accessory 
after the fact.  The Commonwealth counters that the judge 
provided the jury with correct and complete instructions that 
joint venture murder and accessory after the fact were distinct 
crimes with varying elements.  We conclude that the instruction 
was a correct statement of the law, and therefore there was no 
error. 
18 
 
 
"We evaluate jury instructions as a whole and interpret 
them as would a reasonable juror" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 697 (2015).  To prove a 
joint venture, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in the 
commission of the crime charged with the required intent.  
Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 467-468.  There are multiple ways for a 
defendant to participate in a crime, including by "providing aid 
or assistance . . . in escaping."  Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide 14 (2018).  To prove accessory after the fact, the 
Commonwealth must prove that after the commission of a felony, 
the defendant harbored, concealed, maintained, or assisted 
another person, with knowledge that the other person committed a 
felony and with the intent that the other person avoid or escape 
detention, arrest, trial, or punishment.  G. L. c. 274, § 4.  
Although joint venture and accessory after the fact both include 
assisting an offender with escaping, the two are distinct 
crimes, with joint venture occurring before or during the 
commission of the crime and accessory after the fact occurring 
after the commission of the crime.  Compare Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide, supra (for joint venture, sufficient 
for agreement to help "if the defendant and at least one other 
person consciously acted together before or during the crime 
with the intent of making the crime succeed" [emphasis added]), 
19 
 
with G. L. c. 274, § 4 (for accessory after fact, "[w]hoever, 
after the commission of a felony," among other things, assists 
felon with intent that he or she will avoid or escape detention 
[emphasis added]). 
 
The judge here instructed the jury on joint venture, in 
relevant part, that "the Commonwealth must prove that the 
defendant knowingly participated in the commission of the crime 
of murder" and "that he did so with the intent required to 
commit the crime."  The judge also included that the jury needed 
to find that the defendant knowingly participated in the murder 
with the intent required "before or during the crime," and that 
he had to be involved in the murder in some way, such as by 
"act[ing] as a lookout" or "provid[ing] aid or assistance in 
committing the crime or in escaping, if such help becomes 
necessary." 
 
Regarding accessory after the fact, the judge instructed 
the jury that the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 
"assisted [Robertson] following the commission of the crime" 
(emphasis added); "provided such assistance with the specific 
intent that [Robertson] avoid or escape arrest, detention, or 
prosecution"; and "rendered such assistance with knowledge of 
the identity of [Robertson] and of the substantial facts of that 
murder."  She elaborated that to meet the first element, the 
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant assisted Robertson 
20 
 
"after the commission of the crime in question" (emphasis 
added). 
 
The judge provided clear instructions regarding joint 
venture and accessory after the fact, including the relevant 
timing for each, and therefore her instructions were a correct 
statement of the law, and there was no error.8 
 
3.  Accessory after the fact conviction.  The defendant 
argues that his accessory after the fact conviction must be 
reversed.  We conclude that in these circumstances, the 
defendant could not be convicted of joint venture murder in the 
first degree and of accessory after the fact.  Therefore, we 
vacate his conviction of accessory after the fact. 
 
As stated supra, to prove accessory after the fact, the 
Commonwealth must prove that after the commission of a felony, 
the defendant harbored, concealed, maintained, or assisted 
another person, with knowledge that the other person committed a 
felony and with the intent that the other person avoid or escape 
detention, arrest, trial, or punishment.  G. L. c. 274, § 4.  To 
prove joint venture, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly participated in 
the commission of the crime charged with the required intent.  
 
8 In a second letter pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 16 (l), the 
defendant directed our attention to the joint venture argument 
in the appellate brief filed by Bonner.  We have reviewed that 
argument, and it does not alter our analysis. 
21 
 
Zanetti, 454 Mass. at 467-468.  Under the law of joint venture, 
there is not a distinction between a principal offender and an 
accomplice; all joint venturers are equal offenders.  Id. at 
464. 
 
"A defendant may not properly be convicted of a crime and 
of being an accessory after the fact to the same crime."  
Commonwealth v. Gajka, 425 Mass. 751, 754 (1997), citing 
Commonwealth v. Berryman, 359 Mass. 127, 129 (1971).  In Gajka, 
the jury returned verdicts of guilty on indictments charging 
murder, accessory after the fact to that murder, armed robbery, 
and accessory after the fact to that armed robbery, and when the 
judge considered the sentences to be imposed, he dismissed each 
accessory indictment without prejudice.  Gajka, supra.  In the 
present case, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of joint 
venture murder and accessory after the fact to that murder, and 
the judge imposed sentences for both.  Here, the evidence was 
sufficient to convict the defendant as an accessory after the 
fact, but because one cannot "properly be convicted of a crime 
and of being an accessory after the fact to the same crime," 
id., citing Berryman, supra, we vacate the defendant's 
22 
 
conviction of and sentence for accessory after the fact to the 
murder.9 
 
4.  Joint trial.  The defendant next contends that because 
he and Robertson had clearly antagonistic defenses, the judge 
abused her discretion by failing to order the trial severed.  We 
agree with the Commonwealth that the trial judge correctly 
exercised her discretion to try the defendant in a joint trial. 
 
It is presumed that "[w]hen criminal charges against two or 
more individuals 'arise out of the same criminal conduct,'" 
those individuals will be tried together.  See Commonwealth v. 
Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 542 (2011), quoting Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 9 (b), 378 Mass. 859 (1979).  A judge may order severance 
"[i]f it appears that a joinder of . . . defendants is not in 
the best interests of justice."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (d).  
Severance generally is a matter within the trial judge's 
discretion, Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 658 (1982), 
but should be ordered when (1) "the prejudice resulting from a 
joint trial is so compelling that it prevents a defendant from 
obtaining a fair trial," id., or (2) the defenses are 
"antagonistic to the point of being mutually exclusive," Siny 
Van Tran, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Bienvenu, 63 Mass. App. 
 
 
9 Because we determine that the accessory after the fact 
conviction cannot stand as a matter of law, we need not address 
the defendant's remaining arguments on this point. 
23 
 
Ct. 632, 637 (2005).  "[D]efenses are mutually antagonistic and 
irreconcilable where the 'sole defense of each [is] the guilt of 
the other.'"  Siny Van Tran, supra.  See Moran, supra at 659, 
quoting United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980) ("'[M]utual 
antagonism' only exists where the acceptance of one party's 
defense will preclude the acquittal of the other").  "Severance 
is not required where the defendants merely assert inconsistent 
trial strategies."  See Siny Van Tran, supra. 
 
The judge did not abuse her discretion in trying the 
defendants together, because the defenses were not "antagonistic 
to the point of being mutually exclusive," nor did the joint 
trial result in prejudice that prevented the defendant from 
receiving a fair trial.  See Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. at 542; 
Moran, 387 Mass. at 658-659. 
 
The defendant contends that his defense and Robertson's 
defense were mutually exclusive and that the resulting prejudice 
deprived him of obtaining a fair trial.  As relevant to 
severance, the defendant notes that at trial he argued that he 
was not involved in the murder or its planning, he attacked 
Amoroso's credibility, and he argued that the more than one 
hundred cell phone calls between the 8764 number and Amoroso 
were between Amoroso and Robertson -- not between himself and 
Amoroso.  He further notes that Robertson argued that Robertson 
24 
 
was misidentified as the first shooter and that Robertson did 
not have exclusive use of the 8764 number. 
 
Contrary to the defendant's argument, his argument at trial 
that Amoroso's testimony was false and Robertson's argument that 
it was true regarding the 8764 number did not create a 
contradiction that resulted in each defendant trying to 
inculpate the other.  Importantly, Robertson argued it was 
unclear who the user of the 8764 number was -- not that the 
defendant was the sole user.  Moreover, the records relating to 
the 8764 number were not the only piece of evidence that 
connected the defendant to the murder, as his cell phone and car 
keys connected him to the Lincoln, which was used in the 
shooting.  In addition, Robertson and the defendant both argued 
that they were misidentified and that they were not involved in 
the shooting.  There was not "a danger that the jury [would] 
feel compelled to choose between defendants rather than to 
assess the proof against each defendant separately," Moran, 387 
Mass. at 659, and for the foregoing reasons, the defendant and 
Robertson did not present defenses that were mutually 
exclusive.10 
 
 
10 We also find unpersuasive the defendant's argument that 
his trial counsel's failure to "bring the clearly unfair 
situation to the court's attention constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel."  As discussed supra, there was no error.  
See Commonwealth v. Silva, 482 Mass. 275, 288 & n.16 (2019). 
25 
 
 
5.  Jury question.  The defendant argues that reversible 
error resulted from the judge's erroneous affirmative response 
to the jury's question, "If two or more people are convicted of 
murder in the first degree through a joint venture, can they 
have different 'theories' applied to their verdict?"  We agree 
with the Commonwealth that the judge's affirmative answer was a 
correct statement of the law. 
 
"The proper response to a jury question must remain within 
the discretion of the trial judge, who has observed the evidence 
and the jury firsthand and can tailor supplemental instructions 
accordingly."  See Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 427 Mass. 484, 
488 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 807 
n.11 (1996).  The mental state for murder based on deliberate 
premeditation or on extreme atrocity or cruelty is malice 
aforethought, which the defendant must share with the 
coventurers to be guilty on a joint venture theory.  See 
Sokphann Chhim, 447 Mass. at 377, 379 (for purposes of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, malice defined "as an intent to cause 
death, to cause grievous bodily harm, or to do an act which, in 
the circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person 
would have known created a plain and strong likelihood that 
death would follow"); Commonwealth v. Serino, 436 Mass. 408, 411 
(2002) ("Malice, as it applies to deliberately premeditated 
murder, means an intent to cause death").  See also Commonwealth 
26 
 
v. Spinucci, 472 Mass. 872, 881 (2015), and cases cited (to 
convict of murder based on extreme atrocity or cruelty, "malice 
alone defines the intent that the Commonwealth must prove").  
"The jury may infer the requisite mental state from the 
defendant's knowledge of the circumstances and subsequent 
participation in the offense" (citation omitted).  Sokphann 
Chhim, supra at 377-378. 
 
Therefore, the Commonwealth must prove malice for each 
defendant, but the circumstances underlying that malice can 
differ between the defendants, leading to potentially different 
theories of murder being applied. 
 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a thorough 
review of the record, we find no reason to exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to set aside or reduce the 
murder verdict against the defendant. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's 
conviction of murder in the first degree is affirmed, and his 
conviction of accessory after the fact to murder is vacated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.