Case Title: Wooten v. Knisley

Citation: 1997-Ohio-390

Docket Number: 19960185

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
WOOTEN ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. KNISLEY, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as Wooten v. Knisley (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 282.] 
Torts — Unauthorized removal of timber from private property — Criminal 
conviction is not a prerequisite to the imposition of civil liability for treble 
damages under R.C. 901.51. 
A criminal conviction, resulting from a violation of R.C. 901.51, is not a condition 
precedent to an award of treble damages in a civil cause of action against a 
defendant who has recklessly, and without privilege, cut down, destroyed, 
girdled or otherwise injured trees standing or growing on the land of another 
or upon public land. 
(No. 96-185 — Submitted April 2, 1997 at the Athens County Session — Decided 
July 16, 1997.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Highland County, No. 94-CA-858. 
 
George and Alma Wooten, appellants, own a one-hundred-twelve-acre tract 
of land situated in Highland County, Ohio.  The Wootens’ property is adjacent to a 
tract of land owned by Linda Ballentine and Alberta Hill.  In 1988, the two tracts 
were separated by a natural boundary (a creek) and a woven wire fence. 
 
Rodney Knisley, appellee, is a sawmill operator who purchases and harvests 
growing stands of timber.  In 1988, Larry Black worked for Knisley as a “timber 
spotter,” i.e., a buyer’s agent assigned to locate commercially valuable timber 
available for sale.  In June 1988, Black contacted Hill and inquired whether Hill 
and Ballentine would sell some of the timber on their property.  The Hill and 
Ballentine property containing the timber adjoined the Wootens’ land.  Hill 
expressed an interest in selling the timber and granted Black permission to inspect 
the trees.  Hill advised Black of the boundaries between the Hill/Ballentine 
property and the Wootens’ property.  Additionally, Black had a tax map which 
2 
indicated the proper boundaries between the properties.  However, Black 
apparently erred in determining the true boundaries between the properties.  Thus, 
when Black inspected the timber, he also inspected timber growing on the 
Wootens’ land. 
 
In July 1988, Black showed Knisley the timber he had spotted, including a 
stand of timber that was actually located on a section of the Wootens’ property.  
On July 17, 1988, Hill and Ballentine entered into a timber sales agreement with 
Knisley.  Knisley agreed to purchase timber from Hill and Ballentine for $25,000.  
Thereafter, Black and Knisley marked the area they intended to cut and harvest, 
which included a stand of timber growing on the Wootens’ property.  The 
Wootens were not aware of Knisley’s plans and never authorized him to remove 
any trees from their property. 
 
During the latter part of July 1988, Knisley’s employees commenced timber 
cutting operations on the Hill/Ballentine property.  In August 1988, the Wootens 
became concerned that the logging operations were coming too close to their 
property line.  Therefore, the Wootens hired surveyors to clearly mark the 
boundary between their property and the Hill/Ballentine property.  On or about 
August 30, the surveyors discovered that the logging operations had extended onto 
the Wootens’ property.  Knisley was informed of the trespass, but instructed his 
crew to continue the logging operations.  By the time the Wootens were able to 
stop Knisley from encroaching on their land, Knisley had impermissibly removed 
approximately one hundred sixty-eight trees from an 8.2-acre section of the 
Wootens’ property. 
 
On April 6, 1989, the Wootens (“appellants”) filed a complaint in the Court 
of Common Pleas of Highland County naming, as defendants, Knisley, Black, 
Hill, Ballentine, and an independent contractor who had been involved in the 
3 
logging operations.  In the complaint, appellants sought recovery for trespass and 
for the unauthorized removal of the timber from their property.  Appellants also 
sought punitive damages against Knisley and others.  On April 24, 1990, 
appellants amended their complaint to add, among other things, a claim against 
Knisley and Black for treble damages to which appellants claimed entitlement 
under R.C. 901.51.  The claim for treble damages was set forth in the second count 
of the amended complaint.  Additionally, appellants added an allegation to their 
claims of trespass that Hill and Ballentine had “intentionally or negligently 
represented that they owned Plaintiffs’ trees,” and that such representations had 
caused or contributed to the trespass and the resulting damage to appellants’ 
property. 
 
Knisley and Black moved to dismiss appellants’ claim for treble damages, 
arguing that recovery of treble damages under R.C. 901.51 is authorized only if 
criminal liability has first been determined under that statute.  The trial court 
granted the motion and dismissed the second count of appellants’ amended 
complaint.  Additionally, Knisley and Black filed a motion in limine to preclude 
appellants from introducing any evidence at trial “relating to the alleged cost of 
restoration or replacement of the trees allegedly cut by the defendant Rodney 
Knisley, his employees or agents, and as to aesthetic damages.”  The trial court 
granted the motion in limine, holding that proof of damages at trial would be 
limited to evidence concerning the commercial value of the trees taken from 
appellants’ property or the diminution in the fair market value of appellants’ land. 
 
Prior to trial, appellants dismissed their cause of action for trespass against 
defendant Black.  Additionally, appellants stipulated that Knisley and Black did 
not act as the agents, employees or servants of either Hill or Ballentine in 
conducting the cutting operations on appellants’ property.  In March 1994, 
4 
appellants’ claim for trespass against Knisley and their claims against Hill and 
Ballentine proceeded to trial by jury.  At trial, Knisley stipulated liability for the 
trespass to appellants’ property.  At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court 
instructed the jury that damages for the trespass were to be measured by the 
diminution in the fair market value of appellants’ land, but that the jury could, in 
the alternative, award appellants the stumpage value of the trees that were cut 
and/or removed from their property.1 
 
The jury returned a verdict for $10,000 in favor of appellants on their cause 
of action against Knisley, but determined that appellants were not entitled to an 
award of punitive damages.  In response to written interrogatories, the jury 
determined that $10,000 represented the stumpage value of the timber removed 
from appellants’ property, and that the unauthorized removal of the timber had 
caused no decrease in the fair market value of appellants’ land.  Additionally, the 
jury returned a separate verdict in favor of Hill and Ballentine on the claims that 
appellants had asserted against them.  After the jury had returned its verdicts, 
appellants moved for a trebling of the jury award under R.C. 901.51.  The trial 
court denied the motion, stating:  “This matter having been resolved by the Court’s 
prior ruling wherein [appellants’] Second Cause of action seeking treble damages 
was struck, the motion is moot and should be and is denied.”  In accordance with 
the jury’s verdicts, the trial court entered judgment against Knisley and in favor of 
appellants for $10,000, and entered judgment in favor of Hill and Ballentine on all 
of appellants’ claims. 
 
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in 
part and reversed it in part.  The court of appeals determined that the trial court 
had erred in finding that appellants were entitled to seek recovery for damages 
based only on either the stumpage value of the cut timber or the diminution in the 
5 
value of their land.  Specifically, the court of appeals held that appellants “were 
also entitled to seek restoration damages in lieu of the diminution in market value 
or damages measured merely by stumpage value.”  Therefore, the court of appeals 
remanded the cause for a new trial on the issue of damages, and for appellants to 
elect between damages measured by the stumpage value of the severed trees, by 
the decrease in fair market value of appellants’ land, or by the costs of restoring 
the land to a reasonable approximation of its former condition.  However, the 
court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in all other respects, 
including the trial court’s findings that appellants were not entitled to treble 
damages pursuant to R.C. 901.51.  On the issue of treble damages, the court of 
appeals stated, “We believe, as did the trial court, that in light of the language of 
the statutes in question [R.C. 901.51 and 901.99], the better approach is to require 
a criminal conviction under R.C. 901.51 and 901.99 before permitting a 
consideration of treble damages pursuant to R.C. 901.51.  Once criminal liability 
has been established, R.C. 901.51 then provides that in addition to criminal 
penalties, the violator is liable in treble damages for the injury caused.”  
Thereafter, the court of appeals, finding its judgment on this issue to be in conflict 
with the decisions of the Twelfth Appellate District in Miller v. Jordan (1993), 87 
Ohio App.3d 819, 623 N.E.2d 219, and Hecker v. Greenleaf Village Dayton Fin. 
Serv. Corp. (Feb. 7, 1994), Warren App. No. CA93-05-041, unreported, 1994 WL 
37469, and the decision of the Fifth Appellate District in Kilgore v. Schindler 
(July 24, 1989), Richland App. No. CA-2665, unreported, 1989 WL 87039, 
entered an order certifying a conflict.  The cause is now before this court upon our 
determination that a conflict exists. 
___________________ 
 
James D. Hapner, for appellants. 
6 
 
Coss & Greer and Rocky A. Coss, for appellee. 
___________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The question that has been certified for our consideration is 
“whether R.C. 901.51 requires a criminal conviction before treble damages may be 
imposed pursuant [to] that section of the Revised Code.”  For the reasons that 
follow, we find that a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite to the imposition of 
civil liability for treble damages under R.C. 901.51. 
 
R.C. 901.51 provides: 
 
“No person, without privilege to do so, shall recklessly cut down, destroy, 
girdle, or otherwise injure a vine, bush, shrub, sapling, tree, or crop standing or 
growing on the land of another or upon public land. 
 
“In addition to the penalty provided in section 901.99 of the Revised Code, 
whoever violates this section is liable in treble damages for the injury caused.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
At the time of the trespass and the unauthorized removal of appellants’ 
trees, former R.C. 901.99 provided that “[w]hoever violates section 901.51 of the 
Revised Code is guilty of a minor misdemeanor.”  (136 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1238.)  
R.C. 901.99(A) currently provides that “[w]hoever violates section 901.51 of the 
Revised Code is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.” 
 
R.C. 901.51 was enacted effective January 1, 1974, as part of Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511 also repealed R.C. 
2907.44.  R.C. 901.51 contains remnants of the repealed R.C. 2907.44,2 but also 
contains a number of substantive additions.  Most notably, R.C. 901.51 creates a 
remedy of treble damages for violations of the statute.  Specifically, the second 
paragraph of R.C. 901.51 provides that in addition to the criminal penalty 
provided in R.C. 901.99, “whoever violates [R.C. 901.51] is liable in treble 
7 
damages for the injury caused.”  Thus, while R.C. 901.51 retained all pertinent 
vestiges of the former law insofar as the unauthorized destruction of trees may be 
prosecuted as a criminal offense, R.C. 901.51 also created a new statutory remedy 
of treble damages for violations of the statute.  The issue here is whether that 
statutory remedy may be pursued in a civil cause of action for trespass involving 
the reckless and impermissible cutting of trees where the defendant in the civil 
action has not been prosecuted and convicted for a criminal violation of the 
statute.  In other words, is a criminal conviction a condition precedent to the 
imposition of liability for civil treble damages under R.C. 901.51?  We answer that 
question in the negative. 
 
The court of appeals held that a criminal conviction for a violation of R.C. 
901.51 is a necessary predicate to an award of treble damages under that statute.  
In so holding, the court of appeals relied heavily on Allen v. Sowers Farms, Inc. 
(July 19, 1982), Defiance App. No. 4-81-19, unreported, 1982 WL 6837, wherein 
it is stated that: 
 
“It is obvious from the fact that R.C. 2907.44 was repealed and R.C. 901.51 
enacted to replace [the repealed] R.C. 2907.44 that the first paragraph of R.C. 
901.51 was adopted to preserve a separate criminal offense and penalty for acts of 
trespass related to growing things on another’s land over and above the mere act 
of entry upon that land.  As a criminal offense it is necessary for due process * * * 
that there be a charge by affidavit or indictment together with trial with the usual 
safeguards of a jury, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, etc.  The first paragraph of 
R.C. 901.51 does not purport to create a cause of action for civil liability enforced 
by separate complaint in a civil court tried as other civil actions. 
 
“Although penalty for the criminal offense defined by the first paragraph of 
R.C. 901.51 is measured and imposed by R.C. 901.52 [sic, R.C. 901.99], it is 
8 
imposed for the criminal acts of recklessly cutting down, destroying, girdling, or 
otherwise injuring a vine, bush, shrub, sapling, tree, or crop standing or growing 
on the land of another or upon public land. 
 
“The second paragraph of R.C. 901.51 then provides that in addition to such 
penalty for these criminal acts the violator is liable in treble damages for the injury 
caused.  In effect, the landowner * * * is given a civil cause of action, not for the 
criminal acts of trespass, of cutting, etc., but for damages for the injuries caused by 
such criminal acts of trespass.  Thus, it is not only * * * that treble damages cannot 
exist in addition to a penalty unless that penalty first exists but even more 
explicitly treble damages cannot be determined ‘for the injury caused’ by criminal 
acts until those acts have been first determined to be criminal by virtue of the 
criminal process.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 28-30, 1982 WL 6837, at *12.  See, also, 
Peterson v. First Americable Corp. (Jan. 20, 1989), Trumbull App. No. 4026, 
unreported, 1989 WL 4278 (adopting the rationale of Allen that liability for treble 
damages cannot be imposed under R.C. 901.51 for the reckless and impermissible 
cutting or girdling of trees where the trespasser had not been charged and 
convicted in a criminal case for violating R.C. 901.51); and Johnson v. Cline (Feb. 
6, 1992), Fairfield App. No. 10-CA-91, unreported, 1992 WL 34044 (same 
principles). 
 
Conversely, several Ohio appellate courts have determined (either expressly 
or by implication) that R.C. 901.51 does not require a prior criminal conviction 
before treble damages may be awarded pursuant to that statute in a common-law 
cause of action for trespass involving the reckless and impermissible removal of 
shrubs or trees.  See, e.g., Hecker, Warren App. No. CA93-05-041, unreported, at 
3, 1994 WL 37469, at *1 (holding that “R.C. 901.51 requires a trial court to award 
treble damages for the injury caused by recklessly cutting or destroying trees or 
9 
shrubs on the land of another, regardless of whether there has been a prior criminal 
conviction.”); Kilgore, Richland App. No. CA-2665, unreported, at 7, 1989 WL 
87039, at *3 (recognizing that “the language of the statute providing that ‘in 
addition to the penalty * * *’ treble damages may be awarded does not require 
prerequisite or consecutive application,” and that “[i]f the legislature wanted to 
require criminal prosecution as a precondition to the award of civil treble 
damages, [it] could have said so.”); and Miller, 87 Ohio App.3d 819, 623 N.E.2d 
219.  See, also, Denoyer v. Lamb (1984), 22 Ohio App.3d 136, 140-141, 22 OBR 
375, 380-381, 490 N.E.2d 615, 620-621 (recognizing that R.C. 901.51 creates a 
new right to treble damages for the reckless and unauthorized cutting of trees 
which may be properly asserted in a civil cause of action against the trespasser.). 
 
We are persuaded by those decisions which have recognized that R.C. 
901.51 does not require a criminal conviction as a precondition to the award of 
civil treble damages under that statute.  The first paragraph of R.C. 901.51 
prohibits, among other things, the reckless cutting of trees standing or growing on 
the land of another or upon public land.  The second paragraph of the statute 
simply provides that “[i]n addition to the penalty provided in section 901.99 of 
the Revised Code, whoever violates this section [R.C. 901.51] is liable in treble 
damages for the injury caused.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 901.51 clearly does not 
say that the right to civil treble damages is conditioned upon a criminal conviction 
or the imposition of a criminal penalty authorized by R.C. 901.99.  Therefore, in 
our judgment, an interpretation of R.C. 901.51 requiring a criminal conviction as a 
necessary precondition to an award of civil treble damages reads requirements into 
that statute that do not otherwise exist. 
 
The language and history of R.C. 901.51 clearly indicate that the statute was 
enacted by the General Assembly to create a new and independent right to civil 
10 
treble damages for any violation of that statute.  Under the express terms of the 
statute, liability for treble damages is “[i]n addition to” (not dependent upon) the 
criminal penalties authorized by R.C. 901.99.  We believe that if the General 
Assembly had intended to require that a criminal conviction must precede 
imposition of civil liability for treble damages under R.C. 901.51, it would have 
specifically stated that requirement in clear and unmistakable language.  For 
instance, R.C. 901.51 could have been enacted to read:  “In addition to the penalty 
provided in section 901.99 of the Revised Code, whoever is convicted of a 
violation of this section is liable in treble damages for the injury caused.”  This or 
similar language would have clearly indicated that a conviction is a prerequisite to 
liability for treble damages.  However, R.C. 901.51, as enacted, contains no such 
statement of legislative purpose. 
 
Moreover, appellants contend, and we agree, that a criminal conviction 
should not be viewed as a prerequisite to an award of treble damages under R.C. 
901.51 because, among other things, the availability of treble damages would rest 
entirely upon the discretion of a prosecutor to prosecute an alleged violation of 
R.C. 901.51.3  We are convinced that the General Assembly did not intend to make 
the remedy of civil treble damages under R.C. 901.51 dependent upon the 
discretion of a prosecuting authority, who may or may not be inclined to prosecute 
each and every alleged transgression of R.C. 901.51.  If we were to follow the 
reasoning of the court of appeals in the case at bar, the decision of a prosecutor to 
forgo prosecuting a criminal violation of R.C. 901.51 would foreclose an 
aggrieved landowner from receiving treble damages to which he or she would 
otherwise be entitled under the express terms of the statute. 
 
Accordingly, we specifically reject the analysis of the court of appeals that 
R.C. 901.51 requires a criminal conviction before treble damages may be imposed 
11 
for a violation of that statute.  We find that a “violation” of R.C. 901.51 can be 
proven either in a criminal proceeding or as part of a traditional common-law 
cause of action for trespass involving the impermissible felling of trees.  
Obviously, a criminal conviction for a violation of R.C. 901.51 would be 
necessary for imposition of the criminal penalties authorized by R.C. 901.99.  
However, proof of a specific violation of R.C. 901.51 in either a civil action (by a 
preponderance of evidence) or a separate criminal proceeding (by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt) gives rise to a right to treble damages under R.C. 901.51. 
 
Here, the trial court held that appellants were not entitled to treble damages 
under R.C. 901.51, since appellee Knisley had never been prosecuted and 
convicted for a criminal violation of that statute.  Therefore, the trial court 
dismissed the second count of appellants’ amended complaint wherein appellants 
had asserted a claim for treble damages based upon R.C. 901.51.  We find that the 
trial court erred in this regard, and that the court of appeals erred in affirming the 
judgment of the trial court on this issue.  Appellants were entitled to prove a 
violation of R.C. 901.51 in conjunction with their common-law cause of action for 
trespass to establish Knisley’s liability for treble damages under R.C. 901.51. 
 
The court of appeals has determined that this cause must be remanded to the 
trial court for a new trial on the issue of damages and for appellants to select 
between the alternative theories of recovery outlined in the court of appeals’ 
opinion.4  On remand, we instruct the trial court that appellants are also entitled to 
a trial on their claim for treble damages against Knisley.  Knisley has already 
stipulated that he trespassed upon appellants’ land and that he impermissibly felled 
appellants’ trees.  Therefore, the only remaining issue to be decided regarding 
Knisley’s potential liability for treble damages under R.C. 901.51 is whether he 
“recklessly” cut down appellants’ trees in violation of the statute.  If, on remand, 
12 
the trier of fact determines that Knisley’s conduct was reckless and, therefore, 
violative of R.C. 901.51, any damages awarded are to be trebled by the trial court 
pursuant to R.C. 901.51.  Finally, to avoid any confusion on remand, we instruct 
the trial court that the term “recklessly,” as that term is used in R.C. 901.51, has 
the same meaning in a civil claim for treble damages under R.C. 901.51 as it does 
in a criminal proceeding involving a violation of that statute.  Specifically, the 
term “recklessly,” as it is used in R.C. 901.51, is defined in R.C. 2901.22(C).5 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on the sole 
question that has been certified for our determination and remand this cause to the 
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We hold that a 
criminal conviction, resulting from a violation of R.C. 901.51, is not a condition 
precedent to an award of treble damages in a civil cause of action against a 
defendant who has recklessly, and without privilege, cut down, destroyed, girdled 
or otherwise injured trees standing or growing on the land of another or upon 
public land. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
The trial court defined “stumpage value” as “the price the Plaintiffs would 
have received if they had sold someone the right to cut and remove those trees.” 
2. 
Former R.C. 2907.44 provided: 
 
“No person, without lawful authority, shall cut down, destroy, or injure a 
vine, bush, shrub, sapling, or tree standing or growing upon the land of another, or 
13 
sever from the land of another, injure, or destroy a product standing or growing 
thereon, or other thing attached thereto. 
 
“Whoever violates this section shall be fined not more than one hundred 
fifty dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both.”  (1953 H.B. No. 1.) 
3. 
We also note, in passing, the following assertions set forth in appellants’ 
reply brief: 
 
“[I]n this particular case a reading of the statute [R.C. 901.51] that allows 
only prosecution at the discretion of the prosecutor is outrageous.  Appellee’s 
defense attorney also is [and for sixteen years has been] the county prosecutor.  To 
presume that he would prosecute a man he has been hired to defend is senseless, 
irrational and unethical.  Had the Prosecutor truly believed that R.C. 901.51 
required a criminal conviction he would have realized that he faced a potential 
conflict of interest and should, at the very least, have removed himself from the 
case.” 
4. 
We recognize that the appellants’ actual damages for the destruction of their 
trees have already been determined by a jury under one of the alternatives listed by 
the court of appeals, i.e., stumpage value.  We do not mean to preclude appellants, 
on remand, from electing to accept that award and use it as a basis for applying the 
treble damage factor, if treble damages are found to be proper. 
5. 
R.C. 2901.22(C) provides that: 
 
“A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the 
consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to 
cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature.  A person is reckless 
with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the 
consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such circumstances are 
likely to exist.” 
14 
 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  Because I conclude that it was not the intent of the 
General Assembly in drafting R.C. 901.51 to provide a separate civil treble 
damages remedy independent of a criminal charge and conviction, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
The statute at issue in this case does not explicitly state whether it intends a 
criminal conviction to be a prerequisite to the award of treble damages.  It does, 
however, state that the treble damages remedy is “[i]n addition to” the criminal 
penalty provided for in R.C. 901.99.  The question, then, is the interpretation of 
“[i]n addition to,” and whether that language adds anything to the meaning of the 
statute.  I would hold that it does. 
 
In my opinion, the common and ordinary meaning of the language of R.C. 
901.51 suggests only one interpretation:  that the General Assembly did not intend 
the creation of an independent civil cause of action. 
 
The majority opinion focuses on only part of the statutory language in 
holding that the General Assembly did intend to create an independent cause of 
action.   Likewise, the majority underplays the importance of the words “[i]n 
addition to” in order to reach its conclusion.  Indeed, under the majority opinion, 
the phrase “[i]n addition to” is reduced to mere surplusage.  The majority 
construes R.C. 901.51 as if it had simply read, “Whoever violates this section is 
liable in treble damages for the injury caused.”  The statute, however, does not so 
read.  It provides rather:  “In addition to the penalty provided in section 901.99 of 
the Revised Code, whoever violates this section is liable in treble damages for the 
injury caused.” 
 
We do not construe statutes so as to render statutory language meaningless.  
“[I]t is the duty of courts to accord meaning to each word of a legislative 
15 
enactment if it is reasonably possible so to do.  It is to be presumed that each word 
in a statute was placed there for a purpose.”  State ex rel. Bohan v. Indus. Comm. 
(1946), 147 Ohio St. 249, 251, 34 O.O. 151, 152, 70 N.E.2d 888, 889.  In order for 
the words “[i]n addition to” to have meaning, there must be an antecedent to the 
treble damages clause, which, in this case, is the criminal penalty clause.  Had it 
not intended the criminal penalty to be a condition precedent to an action for treble 
damages, the General Assembly would surely have simply provided for treble 
damages without qualification. 
 
The majority contends that because R.C. 901.51 does not expressly say that 
the right to civil treble damages is conditioned on the imposition of a criminal 
penalty authorized by R.C. 901.99, the statute must be held to have created a 
separate civil treble damages remedy independent of a criminal charge and 
conviction.  Such reasoning has never been the rule of this court and should not be 
the rule in this case. 
 
Rather than pronouncing that all causes of action not expressly denied in a 
statute are thereby created, a reasonable and restrained judiciary must resist the 
temptation to find new statutory causes of action in ambiguous text and must 
resolve to await explicit language from the General Assembly before attributing to 
that body the intent to establish a new cause of action.  This principle is 
particularly compelling where, as here, the law already provides other means of 
compensating an injured party. 
 
As the court of appeals correctly stated, its holding is buttressed by the fact 
that the R.C. 901.51 remedy is not the only remedy available to a party injured by 
the tortious destruction of the party’s trees.  A civil action for trespass and 
conversion, including the possibility of punitive damages, is available to such a 
plaintiff independent of R.C. 901.51.  Such an action, by definition, will 
16 
adequately compensate the successful plaintiff for his or her loss.  The further 
objectives served by a treble damage award — more formidable deterrent effect, 
penalization of the wrongdoer, and incentive for injured parties to bring lawsuits 
— can reasonably be interpreted as an appropriately harsher response by the 
General Assembly to conduct that rises to the level of a criminal offense and is 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding. 
 
The majority also states that both the language and the history of R.C. 
901.51 clearly indicate that the statute was enacted “to create a new and 
independent right to civil treble damages for any violation of that statute.”  No 
support is offered for the conclusory statement that the history of R.C. 901.51 
bolsters the majority’s conclusion, nor has my research uncovered any such 
historical underpinning. 
 
The General Assembly is fully able to expressly establish new causes of 
action.  It has not done that in R.C. 901.51, and it is the duty of this court to apply 
the statute accordingly. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals and hold that R.C. 901.51 requires a criminal prosecution and conviction 
before treble damages may be sought in a civil action. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.