Case Title: State v. Marcus W. Johnson

Citation: 2007 WI 107

Docket Number: 2005AP001492-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 107 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1492-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Marcus W. Johnson, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 18, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 11, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
David T. Flanagan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Brian C. Findley, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For 
plaintiff-respondent 
the 
cause 
was 
argued 
by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 107
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1492-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2002CF1593) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Marcus W. Johnson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 18, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Dane County, David T. Flanagan, Judge.  Affirmed and cause 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on 
certification 
by 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06).1 
¶2 
We are asked to address whether a juvenile is entitled 
to sentence credit for the time he spends in custody under a 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version, unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
2 
 
juvenile commitment or an extension of a juvenile commitment, 
pending his conviction and sentencing on an adult charge.   
¶3 
Marcus W. Johnson (Johnson) was adjudicated delinquent 
on one count each of theft and disorderly conduct and two counts 
of battery.  He was committed to a secure juvenile institution.  
While confined under this commitment at an institution, Johnson 
committed a battery against another resident.  He was arrested 
and charged with felony battery as an adult.  He was later 
convicted and sentenced on that charge.  At the sentencing 
hearing, Johnson requested 608 days of sentence credit for his 
time in custody from his arrest until sentencing. 
¶4 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Johnson's 
request 
for 
sentence credit, concluding that the days spent in custody prior 
to sentencing on the adult battery charge were not connected 
with 
the 
battery 
charge 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155.2 
 
In 
its 
order 
denying 
Johnson's 
postconviction motion, the Dane County Circuit Court, David T. 
Flanagan, Judge, reasoned that, irrespective of the presence of 
a signature bond, Johnson's custody was not in connection with 
the battery because it was "virtually certain" that he would 
have been in custody under juvenile commitment regardless of the 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) 
provides 
that 
"[a] 
convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of 
his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection 
with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed."  
Credit is given for custody while awaiting trial, while being 
tried, 
and 
while 
awaiting 
sentencing 
after 
trial.  
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) 1., 2., and 3.   
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
3 
 
battery.  In support of its order, the court cited Johnson's 
negative pattern of behavior over the period of his juvenile 
commitment, emphasizing that Johnson had accumulated a total of 
233 charges and 497 days in security while confined under his 
juvenile commitment. 
¶5 
The court of appeals certified the case to this court 
to determine "whether time spent confined under a juvenile 
commitment should be awarded as sentence credit against an adult 
sentence."  The court of appeals noted that one of its prior 
decisions, State v. Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d 578, 593 N.W.2d 875 
(Ct. App. 1999), appeared to conflict with the basic sentence 
credit principles set forth in State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 
369 N.W.2d 382 (1985).   
¶6 
In Beets, the court determined that where an adult 
defendant was arrested for burglary while on probation for drug 
offenses, and the burglary arrest caused the defendant's 
probation to be revoked, the defendant was not entitled to 
credit on his subsequent burglary sentence for time spent in 
custody after the sentence on the drug offenses because that 
"custody" was not "in connection with the course of conduct" for 
which the burglary sentence was imposed.  The Beets court ruled 
that a sentence on one offense severs any connection with 
custody on an unrelated offense.  Id. at 379.  In Thompson, 
however, the court decided that the Beets sentence credit rule 
did not apply to confinement under a juvenile commitment because 
a juvenile commitment is not a sentence.  Thompson, 225 
Wis. 2d at 583. 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
4 
 
¶7 
In its certification, the court of appeals noted that 
"[n]ow presented with circumstances different from those in 
Thompson, [the] decision in that case seems problematic and 
possibly inconsistent with basic sentence credit principles set 
forth in cases such as [Beets]."  The court observed that 
"[u]nless there is a meaningful distinction for purposes of 
sentence 
credit 
between 
juvenile 
confinement 
and 
adult 
incarceration that we have not uncovered, it seems that either 
Beets or Thompson was wrongly decided." 
¶8 
The case before us requires that we interpret Beets 
and Thompson to determine whether Johnson should be entitled to 
any sentence credit for time in custody from his arrest until 
his sentencing on the adult battery conviction.  After careful 
examination of the cases, we conclude that it is not necessary 
for us to choose between Thompson and Beets.  Rather, we 
distinguish Thompson on its facts and hold that Beets sentence 
credit principles apply in this case.   
¶9 
Applying Beets sentence credit principles, we hold 
that Johnson is not entitled to sentence credit on the adult 
battery charge because the time he spent in custody between his 
arrest and his sentence was not custody "in connection with" the 
adult battery.  First, Johnson is not entitled to credit for 
time in custody from his arrest to the May 6, 2003, extension 
hearing in the juvenile court because, during that period, 
Johnson was subject to a juvenile commitment order based 
entirely on conduct preceding and unrelated to the adult 
battery.  Therefore, under Beets, Johnson's 2002 extension of 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
5 
 
his juvenile commitment precluded any connection to the later 
adult battery.  Second, Johnson is not entitled to credit for 
time in custody from the May 6, 2003, extension of his juvenile 
commitment up to the time of sentencing because, even though the 
adult battery was a factor in the juvenile court's decision to 
extend Johnson's juvenile supervision for another year, the 
circuit court (Judge Flanagan) determined that the juvenile 
court (Judge Nicks) would have extended Johnson's supervision 
even if that battery had never occurred.  Therefore, Johnson's 
time in custody from the extension hearing to the time of 
sentencing was not in connection with the adult battery.   
¶10 Because the circuit court's determination is supported 
by the record, we affirm the circuit court and hold that Johnson 
is not entitled to sentence credit of 608 days.  We do, however, 
remand the case to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing 
to determine the reason why Johnson spent 32 days in the Dane 
County Jail between his arrest and sentencing for the battery 
charge and whether he is entitled to sentence credit for those 
32 days.   
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶11 In June 2001 Johnson was adjudicated delinquent on one 
count each of theft and disorderly conduct and two counts of 
battery.  This adjudication led to his commitment to a secure 
juvenile institution, the Ethan Allen School (Ethan Allen).  
While at Ethan Allen, Johnson's institutional adjustment was 
reported as "poor," and he was unable to "maintain control over 
his behaviors."  In December 2001 Johnson was transferred to the 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
6 
 
Mendota Juvenile Treatment Center (MJTC).  His supervision was 
to expire on May 22, 2002; however, the Dane County Circuit 
Court, Diane Nicks, Judge (juvenile court) reviewed Johnson's 
case on May 20, 2002, and extended Johnson's supervision for a 
period of one year.  The court based its decision on Johnson's 
prior record; his various needs, such as his psychological, 
mental health, educational, and social needs; and the status of 
his progress. 
¶12 Less than two weeks later, on June 2, 2002, Johnson 
battered a resident at MJTC.  According to the Dane County 
criminal complaint, Johnson was asked by staff to leave the 
dayroom after he began looking at another resident in a 
threatening manner.  Johnson stood up as if to leave, but 
instead approached the resident and punched him in the mouth at 
least twice, causing the resident to lose two of his teeth.  
Johnson was arrested on a charge of battery on June 3, 2002.  He 
remained confined at the MJTC because the MJTC was determined 
"the best and proper facility" for Johnson to stay at that time.  
On June 13, 2002, Johnson was transferred back to Ethan Allen in 
part because of Johnson's continuing lack of progress and the 
recent battery. 
¶13 Johnson's 
initial appearance in the Dane County 
Circuit Court for the June 2002 felony battery charge was on 
July 16, 2002.  At that time the court ordered a signature bond.  
The court explained to Johnson that with the signature bond, he 
would be returned to Ethan Allen.  
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
7 
 
¶14 Johnson waived a preliminary hearing, but demanded a 
reverse waiver hearing to determine whether the circuit court 
should transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court.  On December 
5, 2002, following a hearing, Judge Flanagan denied Johnson's 
request for reverse waiver. 
¶15 At a bench trial on February 27, 2003, Judge Flanagan 
found Johnson guilty of felony battery to an inmate in a secure 
juvenile 
treatment 
facility, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.20(1) 
and 
the 
provisions 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.635 (2001-02).  He continued the signature 
bond, and Johnson was returned to Ethan Allen.  
¶16 On May 6, 2003, the juvenile court extended Johnson's 
juvenile supervision for another year.  Judge Nicks relied 
explicitly on a court report prepared by the State of Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections, Division of Juvenile Corrections 
(DOC), supporting the DOC's request for Johnson's extension.  
The report included Johnson's prior history and commentary on 
his adjustment to placement.  The report revealed that, upon 
Johnson's transfer from MJTC to Ethan Allen in June 2002, 
Johnson accumulated nine additional charges for disobeying 
orders, disruptive conduct, threats to staff, attempted battery 
to staff, creating an unsanitary condition, and inappropriate 
sexual conduct.  Between July 2002 and December 2002, Johnson 
accumulated 45 additional charges at Ethan Allen, causing 
multiple relocations within Ethan Allen to areas with increased 
security.  The report recounted Johnson's June 2002 battery and 
also noted that Johnson was charged criminally with another 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
8 
 
battery that occurred in November 2002, in Waukesha County, when 
Johnson and another resident pushed a third resident to the 
ground causing him to strike his head, and then proceeded to 
stomp on the resident. 
¶17 The report also commented on Johnson's progress:   
[Johnson] appears to be having problems in the 
classroom setting.  He continues to accumulate room 
confinement hours for not following class rules, 
disruptive behavior, disrespect to staff, lack of 
effort at school, and refusal.  Marcus appears to 
struggle with following the rules of the classroom and 
respecting those in positions of authority.  His lack 
of respect for his teachers is a serious concern and 
he will have to work hard to learn how to respect 
those with authority. 
The report noted that Johnson was meeting with his psychologist 
on a regular basis and that his sessions with the psychologist 
were working well.  Johnson also met with a psychiatrist and was 
prescribed medication for his behavioral problems.  However, 
Johnson was reported for his misuse of medication after saving 
rather than taking the medication. 
 
¶18 The report noted: 
[Johnson] continues to struggle with remaining free of 
verbally and physically aggressive behaviors.  He is 
frequently verbally aggressive and disrespectful to 
his teachers and other school personnel.  [Johnson] 
has had numerous physically aggressive incidents as 
well since his last extension hearing.  As a result of 
his inability to control his anger, [Johnson] has 
proceeded to batter t[w]o youth which subsequently has 
led to . . . two Battery by Prisoner cases pending in 
the Adult courts of Waukesha and Dane Counties.  
[Johnson] needs to get himself under control.   
The report stated that Johnson was in the AODA education program 
at MJTC; however, due to the frequency of his security 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
9 
 
confinements and numerous behavior problems, he was never able 
to successfully complete the program.  The report stated that 
Johnson had had six security confinements during the reporting 
period, but "[t]o his credit . . . he has shown some improvement 
in his behavior by remaining out of security for the last two 
months."  The report noted that Johnson had "only recently 
demonstrated 
his 
ability 
to 
interact 
at 
least 
minimally 
appropriately with his peers" and that he had "most certainly 
struggled over the last year to have positive relationships with 
his peers as . . . seen by his numerous security confinements 
and verbally and physically aggressive actions toward his 
peers." 
 
¶19 The report further noted that Johnson was working on 
improving his social skills and that much work in this area 
would be needed for a lengthy period of time.  The report 
explained why extension was appropriate: 
At 
this 
time, 
an 
extension 
of 
[Johnson's] 
Dispositional Order is appropriate.  He has not 
successfully 
completed 
any 
of 
the 
treatment 
programming deemed appropriate for him such as the 
Cognitive Intervention Program, the Anger Management 
program, Victim Awareness and the Foundations of 
Recovery AODA Program.  An extension of his commitment 
would also allow for his pending adult charges to be 
settled in the Adult courts of Dane and Waukesha 
Counties.   
¶20 The report also explained why no efforts had been made 
to return Johnson to his home: 
At this time, no efforts have been made to return 
[Johnson] to the parental home.  [Johnson] has 
consistently 
demonstrated 
behaviors 
that 
have 
warranted retention in a secure correctional facility.  
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
10 
 
When 
[Johnson] 
decides to act appropriately and 
participate in and successfully complete the treatment 
programming deemed appropriate for him, he will then 
be considered for a return to the community.  Until 
such time, [Johnson] will need to be retained within 
the confines of a secure correctional setting for the 
protection of the public. 
The report concluded with the final recommendations: 
It 
is 
respectfully 
recommended 
that 
Marcus 
Johnson's 
supervision 
with 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections, 
Division 
of 
Juvenile 
Corrections 
be 
extended for a period of one year or as much time as 
the court deems appropriate.  An extension of his 
juvenile supervision would allow an adequate amount of 
time 
for 
[Johnson] 
to 
participate 
in 
treatment 
programming as well as for an adequate amount of time 
for community supervision once he is felt to be 
appropriate for a return to the community.   
¶21 Eight months into his second extension, Johnson was 
sentenced on the June 2002 battery.  On February 10, 2004, Judge 
Flanagan sentenced Johnson to 18 months initial confinement 
followed by four-and-a-half years of extended supervision.3  
Johnson then requested 608 days of sentence credit for the time 
from his arrest to sentencing.4  The State contested Johnson's 
request, and the court ordered the parties to submit briefs on 
whether sentence credit was appropriate. 
                                                 
3 Johnson's second November 2002 battery charge was read in 
at sentencing against the wishes of the assistant district 
attorney in Waukesha County where the second offense occurred. 
4 In its certification, the court of appeals questioned 
whether Johnson should be credited with 617 days.  Because we do 
not grant sentence credit, we do not attempt to determine the 
proper calculation. 
We note that, for reasons not apparent from the record, 
Johnson did not pursue his right to a speedy trial, and the 
prosecution did not move swiftly.   
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
11 
 
¶22 On April 22, 2004, the court denied Johnson's request 
for sentence credit.  The court noted that a signature bond was 
authorized for Johnson from July 16, 2002, until his sentence on 
February 10, 2004.  The court stated that it was "aware of no 
basis whatsoever for concluding that the defendant was 'in 
custody' as to the offense in question after the opportunity for 
signature bond was provided."5  The court concluded that 
"[c]learly, there [wa]s no basis whatsoever to award credit for 
any [time] spent in custody on and after the date the signature 
bond was authorized."  
¶23 As to the period between the arrest and the signature 
bond, the court distinguished Thompson and denied sentence 
credit on the basis of "the extremely high probability" that 
Johnson would have been in custody regardless of the battery.  
The court based its decision on the presentence investigation 
report (PSI) and a February 9, 2004, email update from the DOC.  
The court noted that the PSI and email update "set out a most 
troubling picture of a virtually incorrigible young offender" 
                                                 
5 Because Johnson was on a signature bond, he was eligible 
for pretrial release on the battery charge.  This distinguished 
him from a defendant unable to post cash bail before trial.  
Johnson was not released, however, because he was subject to the 
preexisting juvenile commitment order.   
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
12 
 
and revealed that Johnson had a total of 233 charges and 497 
days in security.6   
¶24 Johnson filed a postconviction motion on March 21, 
2005, 
claiming 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
when 
it 
distinguished Thompson.  Johnson also claimed that his trial 
counsel was ineffective in not opposing a signature bond and 
then in failing to ask that the signature bond be changed to 
cash bail when it became apparent that Johnson would not be 
released from custody despite the signature bond.  Johnson also 
argued that the signature bond was a nullity due to his mental 
retardation and other intellectual deficits. 
¶25 The circuit court denied Johnson's postconviction 
motion.  The court denied the first claim because it sought to 
relitigate the issue of sentence credit that the court had 
already resolved in its April 22, 2004, order.  The court 
addressed Johnson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and 
found that trial counsel's performance was not deficient because 
the presence of cash bail would not have changed the outcome of 
the case.  The court explained that the basis for denying 
sentence credit for the period before authorization of the 
signature bond had equal application to the entire period of 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that the circuit court did not 
have the entire record before it when it denied sentence credit.  
On December 19, 2006, this court granted Johnson's motion to 
supplement the record with the May 6, 2003, extension order and 
transcript of the May 6, 2003, extension hearing.  In addition, 
the court ordered that the record be supplemented with a copy of 
the March 31, 2003, court report prepared by the Department of 
Corrections, Division of Juvenile Corrections. 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
13 
 
custody.  The court reasoned that "[h]ad the defendant been held 
on cash bail, pre-sentence credit would not have been proper 
given the virtual certainty that he would have remained in 
custody regardless."  The court quoted from the April 22, 2004, 
order 
denying 
sentence 
credit, 
which 
discussed 
Johnson's 
negative pattern of behavior over the period of his custody.  
The court also dismissed Johnson's claim that the signature bond 
was invalid due to Johnson's intellectual deficits, concluding 
that such a holding would lead to the remarkable result that a 
defendant with mental limitations would not be permitted a 
signature bond.  In addition, the court noted that the signature 
bond had no bearing on Johnson's effort to obtain sentence 
credit for the reasons previously stated. 
¶26 Johnson appealed, and the court of appeals certified 
the case to this court.  The court of appeals noted that the 
decision in Thompson might conflict with the decision in Beets, 
and therefore certified the case so that we could determine the 
proper 
method 
for 
determining 
sentence 
credit 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶27 The issue in this case requires the court to determine 
the appropriate amount of sentence credit for Johnson under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).  Such an inquiry requires the court 
to interpret Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  Statutory interpretation 
presents a question of law that we review de novo.  State v. 
Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶11, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155. 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
14 
 
 
¶28 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  We interpret statutory language 
"in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as 
part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  Where this process yields a 
plain meaning, the statute is not ambiguous and is applied 
according to this ascertainment of its meaning.  Id.  If the 
language is ambiguous, however, we look beyond the language and 
examine the scope, history, context, and purpose of the statute.  
Id., ¶48. 
 
¶29 When a circuit court makes findings of fact, the 
court's findings are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of 
review.  State v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 343, 401 N.W.2d 827 
(1987).   
ANALYSIS 
 
¶30 We begin with the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155 governs sentence credit and provides 
in pertinent part: 
(1)(a) A convicted offender shall be given credit 
toward the service of his or her sentence for all days 
spent in custody in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed.  As used in 
this 
subsection, "actual days spent in custody" 
includes, 
without 
limitation 
by 
enumeration, 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
15 
 
confinement related to an offense for which the 
offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other 
sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, 
which occurs: 
 
1. 
While the offender is awaiting trial; 
 
2. 
While the offender is being tried; and 
 
3. 
While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial.   
Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) 1., 2., and 3. (emphasis added). 
 
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) 
requires 
two 
determinations.  See State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389, 391, 362 
N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984).  The first is whether Johnson was 
"in custody."  Id.  The second is whether the custody was "in 
connection with course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed."  Id.  The parties do not dispute, and we agree, that 
time spent in a juvenile correctional facility was time spent in 
custody.  See Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a); see also State v. 
Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, ¶15, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 536 
(construing the meaning of custody in Wis. Stat. § 973.155 and 
relying on the statutory definition of custody found in the 
escape statute, Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a)).   
 
¶32 Thus, the critical question is whether the 608 days of 
presentence custody were served "in connection with the course 
of conduct for which [the battery] sentence was imposed."   
¶33 We are reminded that "[c]omputation of sentence 
credits sometimes presents complex, conflicting and confusing 
issues to a sentencing court."  State v. Demars, 119 Wis. 2d 19, 
27, 349 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1984.)  This case is no exception.  
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
16 
 
The resolution of this case turns on how narrowly or broadly we 
interpret the phrase, "in connection with the course of conduct 
for which sentence was imposed."  Under a narrow interpretation, 
Johnson would not be entitled to any sentence credit because he 
would have been in custody for the 608 days regardless of the 
June 2002 battery charge.  Under a very broad interpretation, 
Johnson would be entitled to full sentence credit because the 
June 2002 battery was always a factor in his continuing custody 
and therefore his custody was "in connection with" the June 2002 
battery, even if it was an insignificant factor in decisions to 
keep Johnson in custody.   
¶34 Under other facts and circumstances, the phrase, "in 
connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was 
imposed," has been deemed ambiguous and subject to different 
reasonable interpretations.  See Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389 at 
392.  We conclude that the phrase is ambiguous under these 
circumstances as well because it is open to more than one 
reasonable interpretation.  Consequently, we may refer to 
legislative history to discern the section's intent and purpose.  
Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶20.   
A. 
Legislative History and Purpose of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 
 
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155 
was 
enacted 
after 
this 
court's call for action in Klimas v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 244, 250-
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
17 
 
51, 249 N.W.2d 285 (1977).7  See State v. Boettcher, 144 
Wis. 2d 86, 91, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988).  Klimas was the first 
opinion of this court requiring circuit courts to credit time 
spent in custody against a sentence ultimately imposed.  See 
Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 90.  The Klimas court concluded that 
it was a violation of equal protection of the law for a court 
not to award sentence credit for time spent in custody prior to 
sentencing on account of a defendant's financial inability to 
post bail.  Klimas, 75 Wis. 2d at 245.  Although the Klimas 
holding was limited to sentence credit in cases of financial 
inability to post bail, the court encouraged adoption of a 
broader rule based on existing federal law.  Id. at 251.  The 
court noted that 18 U.S.C.A. § 3568 required sentence credit for 
all custodial time in satisfaction of the imposed sentence.  Id. 
 
¶36 The 
legislature 
responded 
by 
enacting 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  Ch. 353, Laws of 1977; 1977 S.B. 159.  
Notes of the Legislative Council make clear that the federal law 
referred to in Klimas, as well as the Model Penal Code, 
                                                 
7 Notes of the Legislative Council reveal that the need for 
state legislation was also fueled by this court's decisions in 
State ex rel. Solie v. Schmidt, 73 Wis. 2d 76, 242 N.W.2d 244 
(1976) (holding that period of 82 days spent in jail while 
awaiting probation revocation proceedings must, on due process 
grounds, be credited against the sentence to be served following 
revocation), and Kubart v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 94, 233 N.W.2d 404 
(1975) (inviting the legislature to eliminate due process 
problems caused by the statutory prohibition against crediting 
time spent in jail after sentencing but prior to arrival at the 
prison).  See Wisconsin Legislative Council Report No. 6 to the 
1977 Legislature: Legislation Relating to Credit for Time in 
Jail, 1. 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
18 
 
influenced 
the 
passage 
of 
the 
sentence 
credit 
statute.8  
Wisconsin 
Legislative 
Council 
Report 
No. 
6 
to 
the 
1977 
Legislature: Legislation Relating to Credit for Time in Jail, 2; 
see Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 92.  As stated in Floyd, 
"[u]nderlying the adoption of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 was the 
intent to bring the law of Wisconsin into conformity with the 
broad federal statute, which provided for sentence credit for 
any pre-sentence confinement period, whether arising from a 
financial inability to post bail, unwillingness to grant release 
on bail, or for the purpose of examination."  Floyd, 232 
Wis. 2d 767, ¶22 (citing Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 91-92; and 
Legislative Council Notes to 1977 Senate Bill 159, § 9).   
 
¶37 This 
court 
has 
recognized 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155 in providing sentence credit is "to afford 
fairness" and "ensure 'that a person not serve more time than he 
                                                 
8 Legislative Council notes provide: 
Senate Bill 159 would establish clear statutory 
guidelines for handling and crediting all time spent in 
confinement, regardless of the status of the person 
involved at the time of confinement.  If enacted, the Bill 
would clarify a currently unclear and chaotic area of law, 
as discussed above, and would bring Wisconsin law into 
conformity with the recommended minimum criminal justice 
sentencing standards of the American Bar Association, 
Section 7.09 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal 
Code, federal criminal sentencing procedures as set forth 
in 18 U.S.C. s. 3568 and the laws of many other states.   
Wisconsin 
Legislative 
Council 
Report 
No. 
6 
to 
the 
1977 
Legislature: Legislation Relating to Credit for Time in Jail, 2. 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
19 
 
is sentenced.'"  Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶23 (quoting Beets, 124 
Wis. 2d at 379). 
2. 
Interpretation of Beets and Thompson 
 
¶38 With this context and purpose of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 
in mind, we turn to the task given us by the certification from 
the court of appeals, namely to determine "whether time spent 
confined under a juvenile commitment should be awarded as 
sentence credit against an adult sentence."  To answer this 
question, we are called upon to examine Beets and Thompson and 
either to reconcile the seeming discrepancies between the two 
cases or to overrule one in favor of the other.  We begin with 
summaries of the two cases. 
 
¶39 In 
Beets, 
Robert 
Darnell 
Beets 
(Beets) 
was 
on 
probation for his conviction of two drug crimes when he was 
arrested for burglary and taken into custody on the burglary 
charge.  Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 374.  A few days later he was 
also in custody on a probation hold for the alleged violation of 
his probation.  Id.  About one month later, his probation on the 
drug offenses was revoked and later Beets was sentenced on the 
drug crimes.  Id. at 375.  For the period from his arrest to his 
sentencing, Beets was given credit for his custody in connection 
with the sentences on the drug crimes.  Id.   
¶40 About six months after his sentencing on the drug 
crimes, Beets pled guilty to the burglary charge and was 
sentenced to a term that was to run concurrent with the 
previously imposed drug sentences.  Id.  Beets was granted 
sentence credit toward the satisfaction of his burglary charge 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
20 
 
from the date of arrest to the date he commenced his prison 
sentence 
on 
the 
drug 
crimes.9 
 
Id. 
 
Beets 
brought 
a 
postconviction motion asserting that he was also entitled to 
credit for the period subsequent to his sentencing on the drug 
crimes while he was awaiting resolution of the pending burglary 
charge.  Id.  The postconviction motion was denied, and the 
court of appeals affirmed.  Id. at 376.   
¶41 The question before this court in Beets was: 
[W]hether a person who is on probation for an earlier 
crime 
(delivery 
of 
controlled 
substance), 
is 
apprehended for the commission of a new and separate 
crime (burglary), and then, after a period of custody 
on a probation violation hold, is revoked and is 
sentenced to state prison on the earlier drug crime is 
entitled to time credit on the burglary sentence for 
the days served under the prison sentence for the drug 
crime while awaiting trial and eventual sentencing on 
the second crime——the crime of burglary. 
Id. at 373-74.   
¶42 We concluded that Beets was not entitled to sentence 
credit on the burglary sentence for the period following his 
sentence on the drug crimes.  Id. at 374.  Beets argued that his 
custody upon being sentenced for the drug crimes was "related to 
the offense [burglary] for which the offender is ultimately 
sentenced" because it was the burglary arrest that triggered the 
revocation of his probation.  Id. at 377.  We rejected this 
argument, asserting that "the sentence on the drug charges was 
not related or connected to the burglary course of conduct."  
                                                 
9 The Beets court did not rule on the propriety of awarding 
dual credit.  State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 379 n.5, 369 
N.W.2d 382 (1985). 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
21 
 
Id. at 378.  Citing Flowers v. DHSS, 81 Wis. 2d 376, 386, 260 
N.W.2d 727 (1978), we explained that "the element of punishment 
in parole revocation is attributable to the crime for which the 
parolee was originally convicted and sentenced."  Id.  We 
continued, "'Revocation is thus a continuing consequence of the 
original conviction from which parole was granted.'"  Id. 
(quoting Flowers, 81 Wis. 2d at 386).   
 
¶43 We held that the Flowers principle, which addressed 
parole 
revocation, 
was 
equally 
applicable 
to 
probation 
revocation.  Id.  We concluded, therefore, that "any days spent 
in confinement after the revocation of probation and the 
imposition of sentence [arose] out of, and [were] connected not 
with the burglary, but with the unrelated conduct which resulted 
in the drug convictions more than a year earlier."  Id.   
 
¶44 We affirmed the court of appeals' holding "that any 
connection which might have existed between custody for the drug 
offenses and the burglary was severed when the custody resulting 
from the probation hold was converted into a revocation and 
sentence."  Id. at 379 (emphasis added).  We continued: 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
22 
 
From that time on, Beets was in prison serving an 
imposed and unchallenged sentence; and whether he was 
also awaiting trial on the burglary charge was 
irrelevant, because his freedom from confinement——his 
right to be at liberty——was not in any way related to 
the viability of the burglary charge.  His ability to 
make bail on the burglary charge became immaterial.  
Even had the burglary charge been dismissed, he would 
still have been in confinement.  Thus, there is no 
logical reason why credit should be given on the 
burglary charge for his service of sentence on a 
separate crime.   
Id.   
 
¶45 In Thompson, the court of appeals was faced with a 
similar fact situation, except that Thompson involved revocation 
of juvenile aftercare supervision (or juvenile "parole") as a 
result of a new offense committed shortly after the defendant's 
18th birthday.  In that case, Dwayne E. Thompson (Thompson) was 
arrested for operating a vehicle without the owner's consent, 
fleeing from an officer, and possession of marijuana.  Thompson, 
225 Wis. 2d at 580.  At the time of his arrest, Thompson was 
still on juvenile aftercare supervision for two counts of first-
degree recklessly endangering safety, while armed, endangering 
safety by use of a dangerous weapon, and possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a child.  Id.  Following his arrest, 
Thompson made his initial appearance, bail was set, a "hold" for 
violation of aftercare supervision was placed on Thompson, and 
he remained in adult custody at the Milwaukee County Jail.  Id.  
About a month later, Thompson's juvenile aftercare supervision 
was revoked as a result of the new offenses, and he remained in 
custody at the Milwaukee County Jail.  Id.  About two months 
later, Thompson pled guilty to the three charges.  His 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
23 
 
sentencing was adjourned; however, he remained in custody at the 
Milwaukee County Jail.  Id.  About a week later, he was returned 
to Ethan Allen to continue serving his juvenile commitment after 
revocation and to await his adult court sentencing.  Id.  
Sentencing was delayed three times.  Id. at 580-81.  About three 
months later, Thompson was sentenced for the three adult 
charges.  Id. at 581.   
 
¶46 At the sentencing, the circuit court awarded Thompson 
credit for the days spent in custody at the Milwaukee County 
Jail between his arrest and his return to Ethan Allen.  Id.  The 
court, however, denied Thompson's request for credit for the 
days spent in custody at Ethan Allen until the day of 
sentencing.  Id.   
¶47 Thompson filed a postconviction motion, which the 
circuit court denied.  The circuit court concluded that Thompson 
was not entitled to credit for time spent at Ethan Allen because 
that custody was "in connection with a juvenile commitment after 
his conduct resulted in revocation, and had absolutely no 
connection whatsoever with the course of conduct for which 
sentence was imposed in this case."  Id. at 582 (internal 
quotations omitted).   
 
¶48 The court of appeals reversed.  Thompson conceded that 
if custody at Ethan Allen constituted a sentence, then Beets 
would govern and Thompson would not be entitled to credit.  Id. 
at 583.  He argued, however, that his custody at Ethan Allen did 
not constitute a sentence and, therefore, Beets did not govern 
the case.  Id. at 583-84.  The court of appeals agreed, citing 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
24 
 
authority 
for 
the 
proposition 
that 
"a 
juvenile 
court's 
dispositional commitment of a delinquent to Ethan Allen (and, by 
extension, the commitment period following juvenile parole 
revocation) is not a 'sentence.'"  Id. at 583.   
 
¶49 In an extensive footnote, the court adopted passages 
from Thompson's brief to the effect that "although certain 
analogies 
may 
be 
drawn 
between 
adult 
sentencing, 
after 
revocation of probation or parole, and juvenile commitment, 
after 
revocation 
of 
aftercare, 
significant, 
substantive 
differences exist."  Id. at 584 n.2.  There is a difference 
between an adult whose probation or parole has been revoked and 
a juvenile whose aftercare has been revoked.  The former is 
serving a sentence and can be released only pursuant to a 
discretionary parole grant (after attaining parole eligibility) 
or upon mandatory release.  Id.  The latter can be returned to 
the community on aftercare or through a change in placement and 
is not subject to parole eligibility or a mandatory release 
date.  Id.   
 
¶50 A second difference is that an adult's criminal 
sentence is shortened by the amount of applicable sentence 
credit, but time spent in custody is not creditable against the 
juvenile delinquency commitment.  Id.   
 
¶51 A third difference is that, unlike revocation of 
parole, revocation of juvenile aftercare supervision is not 
continuing punishment for the offense that led to the juvenile's 
original delinquency adjudication.  Id.  Rather, revocation of 
juvenile aftercare is based on "the juvenile authorities' 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
25 
 
determination 
that 
[the 
juvenile's] 
new 
offense 
requires 
continuing treatment in a secured correctional facility."  Id.  
In short, "Thompson's continuing confinement in the juvenile 
system was clearly and intimately related to the pending 
charge."  Holding Thompson in juvenile custody was less for 
continuing punishment and more for continuing custody, while the 
juvenile system waited for the adult court disposition.  Id.   
 
¶52 After 
distinguishing 
Beets 
and 
noting 
these 
differences, the Thompson court likened the Thompson case to 
State v. Baker, 179 Wis. 2d 655, 508 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1993), 
in which the court concluded that the defendant was entitled to 
sentence credit for the time he was in secure juvenile detention 
awaiting waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, against the sentence 
imposed following his waiver to adult court.  Thompson, 225 
Wis. 2d at 585.  The Thompson court noted that failure to grant 
credit in this case would be "to simply accept that, whenever an 
adult charged with a crime remains under the jurisdiction of a 
juvenile court commitment, the State, unilaterally, could place 
the adult in custody at a juvenile facility while awaiting trial 
and sentencing, and could therefore preclude the sentencing 
court from awarding credit for pre-sentence custody."  Id. at 
586.  The court held that such potential manipulation of 
sentence 
credit 
was 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
intent 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  Id.  The court concluded: 
Therefore, in the unusual circumstances of this 
case, we conclude that although Thompson's time at 
Ethan Allen also could be considered to have been in 
connection with his juvenile commitment, "regardless 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
26 
 
of [that] basis for the confinement," his custody at 
Ethan Allen was "connected to the offense for which 
sentence [was] imposed." 
Id. (first emphasis added).   
 
¶53 In its certification in the present case, the court of 
appeals noted that "[u]nless there is a meaningful distinction 
for purposes of sentence credit between juvenile confinement and 
adult incarceration that we have not uncovered, it seems that 
either Beets or Thompson was wrongly decided."  We do not think, 
however, that we have to choose between Beets and Thompson to 
resolve the case before us.  We choose instead to distinguish 
Thompson on the facts and "unusual circumstances" of that case.   
 
¶54 Although the Thompson court appeared to preclude 
application of Beets on the basis that a juvenile commitment was 
not a sentence, we do not think that Thompson requires us to 
preclude application of Beets and other applicable adult 
sentencing cases to the facts and circumstances here.  This is 
so because Thompson ultimately sidestepped the application of 
Beets by distinguishing between the purpose of revocation of 
juvenile aftercare supervision and the purpose of revocation of 
probation.  See Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d at 584 n.2.  While the 
Beets court noted that revocation of probation is continuing 
punishment for the original, underlying offense, Beets, 124 
Wis. 2d at 378, the Thompson court noted that revocation of 
juvenile aftercare supervision is not continuing punishment for 
the original offense but continuing treatment required by the 
new offense.  Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d at 584 n.2.  Thus, the 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
27 
 
Thompson court concluded that Thompson's continuing confinement 
"was clearly and intimately related to the pending charge."  Id.   
 
¶55 This case does not involve revocation of juvenile 
aftercare supervision, where a juvenile who was once at liberty 
is taken into custody for a new offense.  This case involves a 
juvenile who was not at liberty but was still in custody under a 
juvenile commitment when he committed a new offense.  Therefore, 
Thompson is distinguishable.   
¶56 Nonetheless, Johnson relies on Thompson to argue that 
juvenile confinement is not a sentence and, therefore, the Beets 
rule——i.e., that a sentence on one offense severs any connection 
with custody on an unrelated offense——does not apply.   
 
¶57 We do not think, however, that the distinction between 
custody following a juvenile commitment and custody following an 
adult sentence precludes application of Beets under the facts 
and circumstances of this case.  While Thompson's rationale that 
the 
differences 
between 
revocation 
of 
juvenile 
aftercare 
supervision and revocation of parole/probation may warrant 
preclusion of Beets in certain situations, the distinction 
between custody following juvenile commitment and custody 
following adult conviction does not warrant the preclusion of 
Beets sentence credit principles to all juvenile commitments.   
¶58 Thompson noted that an adult serving a sentence could 
be released only pursuant to a discretionary parole grant or 
upon mandatory release, while a juvenile could be returned to 
the community at any time.  Id.  Johnson cites this difference 
between a juvenile commitment and an adult sentence to support 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
28 
 
his proposed bright line rule that "a juvenile held in juvenile 
corrections pending criminal sentencing is always held in 
custody in connection with the criminal charges."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Johnson argues that because a juvenile commitment is 
not a determinate sentence of fixed duration and because the 
needs 
of 
the 
juvenile 
are 
individually 
assessed, 
see 
Wis. Stat. § 938.01(2)(c) and (f), DOC authorities take pending 
criminal charges into account when deciding whether to continue 
a juvenile's confinement or to release the juvenile on aftercare 
supervision.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.357(4)(a).  Thus, Johnson 
argues, pending criminal charges are always connected to 
continued confinement in the juvenile correctional system.  
 
¶59 We fail to see how an adult indeterminate sentence, 
like the sentences in Beets, is different from a juvenile 
commitment.  Under an indeterminate sentence, individual needs 
and circumstances are assessed to determine whether to grant 
discretionary parole, much like DOC review of a juvenile 
commitment.  See Wis. Stat. § 304.06; Wis. Admin. Code PAC 
§ 1.06 (Oct., 2000); State ex rel. Clarke v. Carballo, 83 
Wis. 2d 349, 265 N.W.2d 285 (1978); State ex rel. Tyznik v. 
DHSS, 71 Wis. 2d 169, 238 N.W.2d 66 (1976).  Therefore, one 
could argue that, once a defendant becomes eligible for 
discretionary parole, all pending criminal charges are factors 
in the Parole Commission's decision to deny parole and keep a 
defendant in custody on an unrelated charge.   
¶60 Beets involved indeterminate sentences; nevertheless, 
the Beets court did not adopt the kind of blanket rule that 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
29 
 
Johnson proposes.  In fact, to adopt such a rule and hold that 
"a juvenile held in juvenile corrections pending criminal 
sentencing is always held in custody in connection with the 
criminal charges" would allow what the Beets court cautioned 
against: "affording a right to credit against confinement in 
criminal matters where the period of confinement has nothing to 
do with the matter for which sentence credit is sought."  Beets, 
124 Wis. 2d at 379.   
 
¶61 Because we see no reason to treat custody following a 
juvenile commitment or an extension of a juvenile commitment as 
fundamentally 
different 
from 
custody 
following 
an 
adult 
indeterminate 
sentence, 
we 
apply 
Beets 
sentence 
credit 
principles to the facts of this case.  To the extent that 
Thompson would preclude application of Beets under these 
particular circumstances, it goes too far.   
C. 
Application of Beets 
¶62 On a preliminary note, it should be understood that, 
to some extent, Beets does not rest on all fours with the facts 
of this case.  The Beets rule——that a sentence on one offense 
severs any connection with custody on an unrelated offense——
applies neatly in situations where the two sentences are based 
on decidedly different courses of conduct.  
¶63 Therefore, the Beets rule applies neatly in this case 
to the period of time after Johnson's arrest up until the May 6, 
2003, extension hearing.  During that time, Johnson was already 
in custody as a result of a May 22, 2002, order extending 
Johnson's placement for one year.  That order preceded the June 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
30 
 
2002 battery and was based on an entirely unrelated course of 
conduct.  Thus, under the Beets rule, the May 2002 extension 
precluded, rather than "severed," any connection to the June 
2002 battery.  The 2002 extension did not "sever" a connection 
with the battery because there never was a connection.   
 
¶64 The question of sentence credit for the time from the 
May 6, 2003, extension until the time of sentencing is not 
directly answered by application of Beets because it is not 
clear whether the custody resulting from this extension is 
connected with the course of conduct (June 2002 battery) for 
which sentence was imposed.  In a sense, the situation in this 
case implicates a situation that Beets did not address; that is, 
a situation where the acts for which the first and second 
sentences are imposed are "truly related."  See Beets, 124 
Wis. 2d at 383 (stating that "unless the acts for which the 
first and second sentences are imposed are truly related or 
identical, the sentencing on one charge severs the connection 
between the custody and the pending charges.  And the 
consequences of even that contingency [are] not clear——certainly 
not decided herein.").   
¶65 In this case, the question is not so much what happens 
when the course of conduct is related; rather, the question is 
how large a factor did the related course of conduct (the June 
2002 battery) play in the decision to extend Johnson's juvenile 
commitment in May 2003.   
 
¶66 There is no question that the June 2002 battery was 
the course of conduct for which the adult sentence was imposed.  
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
31 
 
The circuit court (Judge Flanagan) also found that the June 2002 
battery was a factor in the juvenile court's decision on May 6, 
2003, 
to 
extend 
Johnson's 
supervision 
for 
another 
year.  
However, the circuit court also found that there was an 
"extremely high probability" that Johnson's extension would have 
been extended regardless of the June 2002 battery.  In its 
postconviction order, the circuit court reiterated that sentence 
credit was inappropriate "given the virtual certainty that 
[Johnson] would have remained in custody regardless" because of 
the extension of his juvenile commitment.  
¶67 The issue, therefore, is how large a factor did the 
June 2002 battery have to play in the decision to extend 
Johnson's juvenile supervision in 2003 for Johnson's juvenile 
custody to be "in connection with" the June 2002 battery.   
¶68 To decide this issue, we must interpret the meaning of 
"in connection with."  As previously noted, this phrase has been 
deemed ambiguous under other facts and circumstances.  It is 
also ambiguous under these circumstances because it is subject 
to both a narrow and broad interpretation.  Advocating for a 
broad interpretation, Johnson cites the dictionary meaning of 
"connection" 
("being 
connected" 
or 
"an 
association 
or 
relationship") and the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee to 
support his proposition that the word "connection" applies to 
even limited relationships.  According to the Criminal Jury 
Instruction Committee, "The requirement that custody be 'in 
connection with' the course of conduct means simply that the 
custody must be, at least in part, the result of a legal 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
32 
 
status . . . stemming from the course of conduct for which 
sentence is being imposed."  Wis. JI——Criminal SM34A at IIIB 
(1995).   
¶69 Such an expansive interpretation of the phrase "in 
connection with," however, has been discounted in applicable 
case law and runs contrary to the purpose of the sentence credit 
statute.  Beets suggests that a narrower interpretation of the 
statute is appropriate.  In Beets, we applied a narrow 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 to explain why sentence 
credit was inappropriate.  We stated that, from the time Beets 
began serving his sentence on the drug charges, it became 
irrelevant that he was also awaiting trial on the burglary 
charge.  This was so 
because [Beets'] freedom from confinement——his right 
to be at liberty——was not in any way related to the 
viability of the burglary charge.  His ability to make 
bail on the burglary charge became immaterial.  Even 
had the burglary charge been dismissed, he would still 
have been in confinement.  Thus, there is no logical 
reason why credit should be given on the burglary 
charge for his service of sentence on a separate 
crime.   
Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 379. 
 
¶70 We think a similar interpretation is appropriate in 
this case to determine whether Johnson's custody was in 
connection with the June 2002 battery.  The underlying purpose 
of the sentence credit statute is to afford fairness by ensuring 
"that a person not serve more time than that for which he is 
sentenced."  Id.  A narrow interpretation of the phrase "in 
connection with" furthers this purpose.  If Johnson would have 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
33 
 
been in custody even if the June 2002 battery had never 
occurred, he is not being treated unfairly by not receiving 
sentence credit for that time.   
¶71 Thus, we must determine whether Johnson would have 
been in custody even if the June 2002 battery had never 
occurred.   
¶72 In his April 22, 2004, ruling Judge Flanagan said: 
The intent of the statute seems obvious; if the 
defendant was in custody because of the conduct which 
leads to conviction, credit should be assigned.  The 
corollary, however, appears equally plain; [i]f the 
defendant would have been in custody notwithstanding 
the conduct that led to conviction, no freedom was 
denied and no credit is due.   
. . . .  
Had there been no criminal conduct and no arrest, 
defendant Thompson would have been subject only to the 
limited 
supervisory 
custody 
of 
the 
juvenile 
"aftercare" parole. . . .   
By contrast, this defendant [Johnson] is in a 
very different circumstance.  Had he committed no 
battery [in June 2002], there is no basis upon which 
this court could even suspect that he would not have 
remained 
in 
the 
custody 
of 
the 
Department 
[of 
Corrections] on June 4th and thereafter. . . .  
. . . Only if the court ignores the extremely 
high probability that the defendant would have been in 
custody regardless of the battery, can credit be 
assigned.   
(Emphasis added.)  In denying the postconviction motion on May 
20, 2005, Judge Flanagan wrote:  
[I]t was and remains crystal clear to this court that 
defendant's behavior during the period in question was 
such that there was no reasonable possibility that he 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
34 
 
would 
have 
been 
out 
of 
custody 
but 
for 
this 
prosecution. . . .   
[H]is conduct was such that he would not have been out 
of custody even if this prosecution never took place. 
¶73 We view these statements as findings of fact, applying 
a narrow interpretation of the "in connection with" language in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155. 
 
We 
believe 
this 
interpretation 
is 
correct. 
 
¶74 The record in this case was supplemented at the 
request of the defendant after we accepted certification.  The 
supplemental material involves the May 6, 2003, hearing on the 
extension of Johnson's juvenile commitment.  When Judge Flanagan 
made his "extremely high probability" assessment about the 
likelihood of Johnson's continuing commitment, he did not have 
the May 6, 2003, extension order, hearing transcript, or the 
court report on which Judge Nicks so heavily relied when 
deciding to extend Johnson's supervision.  We described in 
detail the contents of that court report in our discussion of 
the facts.  If Judge Flanagan had had the information provided 
to Judge Nicks, that information would have fortified his 
assessment that Johnson's juvenile commitment would have been 
extended even if the June 2002 battery had not occurred.   
¶75 The DOC's recommendation to extend supervision focuses 
primarily on the 54 charges that Johnson accumulated while in 
custody, his lack of progress, and the perceived need to extend 
his supervision to allow Johnson to participate in treatment 
programming.  This is not a case where the juvenile court was 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
35 
 
simply holding Johnson in custody to see what happened on his 
battery sentence.   
¶76 We therefore affirm the circuit court's finding that 
Johnson would have been in custody even if the June 2002 battery 
had not occurred.  This finding is not clearly erroneous.  It is 
amply supported by the record.  Thus, Johnson's time spent in 
juvenile custody was not in connection with the June 2002 
battery, and he is not entitled to sentence credit under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.155 for the entire 608 days he spent in custody 
after his arrest awaiting adult sentencing.   
¶77 The fact that Johnson was on signature bond from July 
16, 2002 to February 10, 2004, is not significant in this case 
because of Johnson's preexisting juvenile commitment order. 
¶78 Although the signature bond seemingly made Johnson 
eligible for pretrial release and "severed" the connection 
between his custody and the crime, its real effect was to send 
Johnson back to Ethan Allen.  Thompson speaks of the potential 
manipulation of sentence credit by transferring a juvenile under 
adult court supervision to the custody of a juvenile commitment.  
Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d at 586.  If Johnson's placement at Ethan 
Allen had deprived him of sentence credit that he was otherwise 
due, he might have had cause to complain about the effectiveness 
of his counsel.  In this case, however, the court permitted 
Johnson to return to the institution to which he was already 
committed.  He did not lose sentence credit.  If a secure 
juvenile facility is logically the best place to maintain 
custody of a juvenile who is subject to the jurisdiction of an 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
36 
 
adult criminal court, that placement, in itself, should not 
affect the juvenile's eligibility for sentence credit.  But the 
juvenile does not have a right to remain locked up in a county 
jail so that he can earn credit against an adult sentence. 
¶79 On the other hand, when a juvenile is kept in a county 
jail in connection with the pending prosecution of an adult 
crime, he is entitled to credit against the sentence for that 
crime.  This was foreshadowed in Beets and actually applied in 
Thompson.10 
¶80 Johnson argues that he was transferred to and placed 
in the Dane County Jail in connection with the June 2002 battery 
for a total of 32 days.  The State concedes that the record is 
unclear why Johnson was held in the county jail rather than 
juvenile detention.  If Johnson was held in the county jail 
because of the pending battery charge, he is entitled to credit 
for that time against the battery sentence, notwithstanding the 
fact that he would have been in custody somewhere else.  
However, if Johnson was being held in county jail for some 
reason unrelated to his battery charge——such as his placement in 
county jail was necessary to ensure the safety of other 
juveniles in juvenile detention——then Johnson should not be 
entitled to 32 days credit because custody in the county jail 
                                                 
10 In 
State 
v. 
Thompson, 
225 
Wis. 2d 578, 
581, 
593 
N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1999), the circuit court awarded Thompson 
sentence credit for time spent in custody at the Milwaukee 
County Jail between his arrest and his return to Ethan Allen.   
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
37 
 
would not have been in connection with his June 2002 battery 
charge.11   
CONCLUSION 
 
¶81 We affirm the circuit court and hold that Johnson was 
not entitled to sentence credit for time spent in custody 
awaiting sentencing for his June 2002 battery.  First, he was 
not entitled to credit for the time in custody from his arrest 
to the May 6, 2003, extension hearing in juvenile court because 
during that period Johnson was serving a commitment based 
entirely on conduct preceding and unrelated to the June 2002 
battery.  Therefore, under Beets, Johnson's 2002 juvenile 
extension precluded any connection to custody for the later 
adult battery.  Second, Johnson is not entitled to credit for 
the period from the May 6, 2003, extension hearing up to the 
time of sentencing because, even though the adult battery charge 
was a factor in the juvenile court's decision to extend 
Johnson's juvenile supervision for another year, the circuit 
court (Judge Flanagan) determined that the juvenile court (Judge 
Nicks) would have extended Johnson's supervision even if the 
June 2002 battery had not occurred.  That determination is 
supported by the record.  Therefore, applying the reasoning in 
Beets, Johnson's custody was not in connection with the June 
2002 battery.  We remand the case, however, for the circuit 
                                                 
11 At a status conference on January 8, 2004, Johnson's 
attorney intimated that "they put him in the jail because it's 
an adult case, but because he's a juvenile, they put him in 
seg."  We remand, however, for the court to hold a proper 
evidentiary hearing on this matter.   
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
38 
 
court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 32 
days that Johnson spent in the Dane County Jail were in 
connection with his June 2002 battery charge.   
 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2005AP1492-CR   
 
 
1