Case Title: Hirsch v. State

Citation: 279 So. 2d 866

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1973-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
279 So. 2d 866 (1973)
Nancy HIRSCH, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 43202.

Supreme Court of Florida.
June 20, 1973.
Rehearing Denied July 25, 1973.
*867 Clyde Ellis and Catherine Wings Slocum, of Johnson, Ellis, Slocum & Petersen, Gainesville, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Michael M. Corin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
MAGER, Judge.
This cause is before this Court on certiorari granted to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District in Hirsch v. State, 268 So. 2d 441 (Fla.App. 1973), which it is contended conflicts with the decisions of this court in Kellum v. State, 104 So. 2d 99 (Fla.App. 1958), Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1960), Findley v. State, 124 Fla. 447, 168 So. 544 (Fla. 1936), and Norris v. State, 158 So. 2d 803 (Fla.App. 1963) cert. discharged 168 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1964). We have considered the cases cited for conflict and have determined that we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution 1973, F.S.A.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of the crime of perjury. The incidents upon which the conviction was predicated arose during a hearing on a motion for a new trial filed in connection with the prosecution of an assault case by the state against one Janice Harvey. The said Janice Harvey was convicted of aggravated assault and during the hearing on the motion for new trial petitioner allegedly falsely swore that she observed an assistant state attorney enter the jury-room at the time the jury was deliberating during the Harvey trial. The petitioner had apparently executed an affidavit in support of such allegations; because the truth of the allegations contained therein became at issue, a separate hearing was held thereon ultimately resulting in an information being filed against petitioner and her subsequent conviction.
At petitioner's trial, the state introduced evidence as follows: (1) testimony by the bailiff of the Harvey jury that the prosecutor did not enter the jury-room, (2) testimony by each of the six jurors constituting the jury panel at the Harvey trial unequivocally testifying that the prosecutor did not enter the jury-room, (3) testimony by the prosecutor himself that he did not enter the jury-room.
The state also presented the testimony of one Beverly Ann Jones (sister of the victim in the Harvey case) and Mrs. Alberta Daniels (mother of Beverly Ann Jones) which related to certain telephone conversations between the aforementioned and a person identifying herself as one Connie Canney. The substance of their testimony was to the effect that a person identifying herself as Mrs. Canney had attempted to persuade them to get witnesses at the Harvey trial to change their testimony so that Janice Harvey would not have to go to jail.
The witnesses indicated that they did not know nor had ever seen the petitioner until the time of her perjury trial. The foregoing testimony (which might reflect an attempted subornation of perjury by Mrs. Canney) was admitted into evidence at petitioner's trial, over her objection, purportedly for the purpose of suggesting that petitioner might have come under the influence of Mrs. Canney.[1]
*868 On appeal the district court, first district, affirmed the conviction finding that the aforementioned testimony was neither hearsay nor prejudicial. A comprehensive dissenting opinion was written by Judge Rawls.
In rejecting any claim of hearsay and prejudice the majority decision stated:
In refuting the state's theory and the rationale of the majority decision, Judge Rawls observes in part:
Upon a careful review of the record in light of the applicable judicial decisions we are of the view that the dissenting opinion of Judge Rawls has properly characterized the effect of such evidence as being hearsay and prejudicial and the cause should have been reversed for a new trial.
Any reliance upon this court's decision in Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. den., 361 U.S. 847, 80 S. Ct. 102, 4 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1959), as a basis upon which such evidence and testimony can be considered as admissible is simply misplaced. In reaffirming the rule laid down *869 in Williams this court observed in Ashley v. State, Fla. 1972, 265 So. 2d 685, at p. 693:
The Williams rule simply does not apply because the case sub judice does not involve "other crimes committed by a defendant". The testimony sought to be elicited in the petitioner's trial dealt, if anything, with an alleged criminal act committed not by petitioner but rather by a third party (Mrs. Canney). See Kellum v. State, supra. The determination of the admissibility of the testimony in dispute must be resolved by a consideration of basic fundamental rules of evidence.
It is interesting to note that even under the Williams rule evidence which is relevant is inadmissible if its sole purpose is to "show the propensity of the accused to commit the instant crime charged." If the aforementioned objectionable testimony did not directly involve the petitioner and if it had no tendency to demonstrate the commission of a collateral (related) crime what purpose then could such evidence serve except to suggest a tendency, inclination, ergo propensity of the petitioner to have committed the crime for which he was charged? See Williams v. State, supra; see also Anthony v. State, 246 So. 2d 600 (Fla.App. 1971).
As this court observed in Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958), the essential elements of the crime of perjury are the (1) willful, (2) giving of false testimony, (3) on a material point, (4) in a judicial proceeding, (5) by a person to whom a lawful oath has been administered. Nowhere in this definition is "motive" a required element. The fact that the petitioner may have been "motivated" to commit perjury at the behest of the alleged activities of a Mrs. Canney are neither relevant, material or competent to the essential ingredients in the crime of perjury.[2]
It is also interesting and persuasive to observe that the conviction in Gordon v. State was reversed because of the admissibility of testimony bearing striking similarity in substance to the case sub judice. In Gordon the state sought to introduce testimony to show that certain "loans" were made to one King suggesting that *870 such money was either the source of funds utilized by King to bribe one Tillett, or implying the violation of the election code by King. (Gordon and King were appealing the conviction of the crime of subornation of perjury). This court observed in part at p. 535:
The admission of the testimony in question was prejudicial and constituted reversible error. Accordingly, the decision sub judice is quashed and returned to the district court with instructions to remand to the trial court with directions that petitioner be granted a new trial.[4]
CARLTON, C.J., and ERVIN, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
[1]  The state sought to link up petitioner with Mrs. Canney by offering testimony that Mr. and Mrs. Canney had visited the Public Defender's office inquiring whether it would be material if a witness observed the prosecuting attorney go into the jury-room. The state also introduced evidence to show that petitioner's car was seen parked in front of Mrs. Canney's house subsequent to her release on bond.
[2]  The substance of the testimony in question is as Judge Rawls characterized "the rankest of hearsay", see note 4, 268 So. 2d 444. The asserted relevance of the evidence was "illusory, fancied, supposititious or unsubstantial", Headrick v. State, 240 So. 2d 203 (Fla.App. 1970).
[3]  In summarizing its decision in Gordon v. State, supra, this court concluded in part: "(c) Reversible error was committed in permitting the witness Tillett to testify with reference to his conferences and conversations out of the hearing of any of the appellants. Many of these conversations were pure hearsay and the others mentioned in the opinion were totally immaterial to the issues involved in the trial... . (e) Reversible error was committed by allowing into evidence the testimony of witnesses Smith and Tomasello with regard to cash loans to appellant King and the sources of the money." 104 So.2d at p. 542.
[4]  Inasmuch as this court has directed that a new trial be granted for those reasons set fourth in this opinion it becomes unnecessary to consider petitioner's allegation of error with respect to the trial court's denial of a jury instruction on inadvertence or mistake.