Case Title: Osterhoudt v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC16-303

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-303 
____________ 
 
ALAN OSTERHOUDT, JR.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[March 30, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Alan Osterhoudt, Jr., seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court 
of Appeal in Osterhoudt v. State, 182 So. 3d 16 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), on the 
ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of the Second District 
Court of Appeal in Williams v. State, 198 So. 3d 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), and the 
First District Court of Appeal in Nix v. State, 84 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), 
regarding whether trial courts must individually pronounce discretionary fees, 
costs, and fines at sentencing.1  As explained below, we approve the decisions in 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  We decline to 
address the non-conflict issue. 
 
 
- 2 - 
Williams and Nix and quash the decision in Osterhoudt to the extent it is 
inconsistent with this decision. 
Osterhoudt was convicted of manslaughter with a firearm and sentenced to 
30 years’ imprisonment for the killing of his wife.  At his sentencing hearing, the 
trial judge imposed a lump sum of “approximately $956” in fines and court costs.  
The written order showed that the total included a $300 discretionary fine and $15 
surcharge, which were not individually pronounced at sentencing.  Osterhoudt filed 
a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) and appealed his 
judgement and sentence to the Fifth District, arguing that the trial court erred by 
denying his motion for mistrial and by not individually pronouncing the 
discretionary fine and surcharge at sentencing.  Osterhoudt, 182 So. 3d at 17.  The 
Fifth District affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion for mistrial and held 
that the challenge to the discretionary fine and surcharge was not preserved 
because it was only a procedural challenge.  Id. 
Conversely, the First and Second Districts have held that trial courts must 
individually pronounce discretionary fees, costs, and fines at sentencing.  In 
Williams, 198 So. 3d at 778, the Second District addressed a situation where the 
trial court orally pronounced the imposition of an aggregate fine but only later 
clarified in the written judgement that “the $1002 aggregate fine was, in part, made 
up of a discretionary fine and 5 percent surcharge, totaling $333.”  The Second 
 
 
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District held that, “[b]ecause the trial court did not make [an] oral pronouncement 
at the sentencing hearing, the discretionary fine and 5 percent surcharge totaling 
$333 cannot stand.”  Id. at 779.   
Similarly, the First District concluded that “discretionary costs must be 
orally pronounced at sentencing because such costs may not be imposed without 
affording the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard.”  Nix, 84 So. 3d at 
426.  The First District held that, on remand, the unpronounced discretionary fees, 
costs, and fines may be reimposed “after providing notice to [a]ppellant and 
following the proper procedure.”  Id. 
Consistent with the rulings of the First and Second Districts, we hold that 
trial courts must individually pronounce discretionary fees, costs, and fines during 
a sentencing hearing to comply with due process requirements.  Accordingly, we 
quash the Fifth District’s decision insofar as it conflicts with this decision.  We 
remand this case for resentencing where the trial court may reimpose the 
discretionary fine and surcharge after providing notice to Osterhoudt and following 
the proper procedure. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
- 4 - 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D13-4277 
 
 
(Hernando County) 
 
Michael Ufferman of the Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Wesley Heidt, Bureau 
Chief, and Marjorie Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent