Case Title: Donald R. Kitten v. State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development

Citation: 2002 WI 54

Docket Number: 2000AP003562

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 54 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3562 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Donald R. Kitten,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce 
Development,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 218 
Reported at:  247 Wis. 2d 661, 634 N.W.2d 583 
(Published) 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 24, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Donald J. Hassin   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Phil Elliott, Jr., and Elliott, Elliott & Staskunas, West Allis, 
and oral argument by Phil Elliott, Jr. 
 
For the defendant-respondent the cause was argued by David 
C. Rice, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mary Dianne Greenley, 
Michael Bachhuber, and Monica Murphy, Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy, Inc. 
 
 
2002 WI 54 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3562  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 559) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Donald R. Kitten,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin 
 
Department of Workforce Development,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 24, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   In this case, we review a court of 
appeals decision, 
Kitten 
v. 
DWD, 
2001 WI 
App 
218, 247 
Wis. 2d 661, 634 N.W.2d 583, which affirmed the administrative 
ruling of Department of Workforce Development (DWD) hearing 
examiner Alice E. DeLaO.   The hearing examiner concluded that 
Donald R. Kitten had violated the Wisconsin Open Housing Act 
(WOHA), Wis. Stat. § 106.04 (1997-98)1, when he discriminated 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.  The WOHA has 
since been renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 106.50 (1999-2000).  See 
1999 Wis. Act 82. 
No. 
00-3562   
 
2 
 
against the complainant, Spencer Cenname, on the basis of a 
perceived disability. 
¶2 
Cenname sought to rent an apartment from Kitten.  When 
Kitten found out that Cenname had previously been hospitalized 
for the eating disorder bulimia nervosa, Kitten became concerned 
that Cenname would either attempt suicide or be rehospitalized 
and therefore unable to pay the rent.  As a result, Kitten 
sought an advance payment of six months' rent from Cenname. 
¶3 
Cenname filed a complaint with the Equal Rights 
Division of the DWD claiming that Kitten had discriminated 
against him on the basis of disability.  The hearing examiner 
determined that there was not enough evidence to conclude that 
Cenname had an actual disability under the WOHA, but that there 
was sufficient evidence to show that Kitten regarded Cenname's 
eating disorder as one that substantially limited Cenname's 
major life functions.  The hearing examiner concluded that this 
qualified as a disability under the WOHA because of the 
"regarded 
as" 
clause 
in 
the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
"disability," Wis. Stat. § 106.04(1m)(g). 
¶4 
On judicial appeal, both the Waukesha County Circuit 
Court, Donald J. Hassin, Judge, and the court of appeals 
affirmed the conclusions of the hearing examiner.  On review, we 
agree, and hold that Kitten's perception of Cenname's impairment 
was sufficient to qualify as a "disability" under the "regarded 
as" provision of the WOHA.  We therefore affirm the court of 
appeals and uphold the decision of the hearing examiner. 
No. 
00-3562   
 
3 
 
I 
¶5 
We begin by recounting the facts of the case.  Because 
this is a review of an administrative hearing, we will uphold 
the hearing examiner's findings of fact as long as they are 
supported 
by 
substantial 
evidence 
in 
the 
record.  
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6).  The test is whether, taking into 
account all of the evidence in the record, "'reasonable minds 
could arrive at the same conclusion as the agency.'"  RURAL v. 
PSC, 2000 WI 129, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 676, 619 N.W.2d 888 (quoting 
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. PSC, 109 Wis. 2d 127, 133, 325 
N.W.2d 339 (1982)).  The findings of an administrative agency do 
not even need to reflect a preponderance of the evidence as long 
as the agency's conclusions are reasonable.  Chi. & N.W.R.R. 
v. LIRC, 98 Wis. 2d 592, 607-08, 297 N.W.2d 819 (1980).  If the 
factual findings of the administrative body are reasonable, they 
will be upheld. 
¶6 
Although the parties do suggest that there are some 
factual disputes in this case, we think that the findings of the 
hearing examiner are reasonable and that they are supported by 
the evidence in the record.  We therefore accept the following 
findings of fact, as made by the hearing examiner in this case. 
¶7 
On September 8, 1998, Cenname called Kitten to inquire 
about an apartment in Brookfield, which Kitten had advertised 
for rent.  Kitten told Cenname that the apartment was expensive—
—$925 a month——and that Cenname "must have a pretty good job" to 
afford the rent.  Cenname said he was not currently employed, 
but he could provide a financial statement showing he was able 
No. 
00-3562   
 
4 
 
to pay the rent.  Kitten noticed on his telephone caller 
identification device that Cenname's phone call had originated 
at the Rogers Memorial Hospital.2 
¶8 
Cenname met with Kitten the next day, viewed the 
rental property, and decided that he wanted to lease it.  
Cenname provided Kitten with a letter from his father detailing 
Cenname's financial status.  Cenname's father was an executive 
with Merrill Lynch, who also served as Cenname's financial 
advisor.  The letter showed Cenname's current account balances 
as in excess of $40,000 and noted that Cenname received an 
income of $3000 per month after taxes.  The letter further 
stated that Cenname had maintained an account with Merrill Lynch 
for over 13 years, and that Cenname's credit card bills had 
always been paid promptly.  Along with the letter, Cenname gave 
Kitten copies of his account statements, confirming that he had 
a balance of over $40,000 as of July 31, 1998.  Cenname also 
provided the names and telephone numbers of several financial 
references, including a former landlord. 
¶9 
As they prepared the paperwork, Kitten asked Cenname 
where he lived.  Cenname initially said that he was staying with 
friends.  Kitten persisted in his questioning, however, and 
Cenname eventually admitted that he was living at Rogers 
Memorial Hospital, where he was in residential treatment for an 
                                                 
2 Rogers Memorial Hospital is a specialized healthcare 
facility that provides inpatient and outpatient treatment for 
persons with certain behavioral disorders and mental illnesses.  
See http://www.rogersmemorial.org. 
No. 
00-3562   
 
5 
 
eating disorder.  Kitten and Cenname had a short discussion 
about the eating disorder, and Kitten mentioned that it looked 
like Cenname had not been eating enough. 
¶10 Kitten reviewed the lease agreement with Cenname and 
pointed out that Cenname would be required to pay one month's 
rent in advance along with a $1000 security deposit.  Kitten 
explained that any money paid on that day would be non-
refundable in the event that Cenname decided not to lease the 
apartment.  Kitten also went over several other provisions of 
the lease, including the fact that Kitten intended to run a 
credit check on Cenname before Kitten would sign the lease.  
When they finished reviewing the lease, Cenname wrote a check to 
Kitten for $1925 to cover the first month's rent and the 
security deposit.  Cenname asked Kitten for a copy of the lease, 
and Kitten told Cenname that he would send a copy by mail. 
¶11 On September 11, 1998, Kitten received a verbal credit 
report for Cenname.  The report revealed that Cenname's credit 
history 
was 
sparse, 
but 
it 
did 
not 
show 
any 
negative 
information.  The verbal report was confirmed by a written 
credit report, which Kitten received about three weeks later.  
Kitten cashed Cenname's check on September 14, 1998. 
¶12 On September 27, 1998, Cenname called to inform Kitten 
that he intended to move into the apartment on October 2, 1998.  
Cenname asked Kitten how he would get into the apartment and 
asked why Kitten had not sent him a copy of the lease.  Kitten 
said that he was concerned that Cenname might be readmitted to 
the hospital and that Kitten would not get his rent money.  
No. 
00-3562   
 
6 
 
Kitten said he would "feel better" if Cenname paid six months' 
rent in advance.  Cenname initially agreed to pay Kitten the 
advance rent because he was afraid that Kitten would not rent 
the apartment to him otherwise.  Cenname agreed to meet Kitten 
at the apartment on October 2 and asked Kitten to fax a copy of 
the lease to the hospital. 
¶13 Kitten called Cenname the next day and asked if he 
could talk to Cenname's doctor.  Cenname told Kitten that his 
treating physician was Dr. Richard Holbrook, the director of the 
Eating Disorder Center at Rogers Memorial Hospital.  Cenname 
said that he would have Dr. Holbrook call Kitten.  Cenname again 
mentioned that he was uncomfortable paying the advance rent; 
Kitten 
responded 
by 
reiterating 
his 
concern 
about 
rehospitalization.  Cenname renewed his request for a copy of 
the lease. 
¶14 On September 29, 1998, Kitten called Dr. Holbrook's 
office and left a message asking to speak with Dr. Holbrook 
about Cenname.  Deanna Mueller, the clinic's office manager, got 
the message and contacted Cenname to see if Cenname would give 
Dr. Holbrook permission to speak with Kitten.  Cenname was 
surprised 
to 
hear 
that 
Kitten 
had 
attempted 
to 
contact 
Dr. Holbrook without Cenname's approval and refused to give his 
consent. 
¶15 Cenname called Kitten and expressed his displeasure 
with Kitten's actions.  Kitten insisted that he needed to speak 
with Cenname's doctor and again insisted on a payment of six 
months' rent up front.  Later that day, Kitten finally faxed a 
No. 
00-3562   
 
7 
 
copy of the lease to Cenname.  The copy of the lease bore only 
Cenname's signature; Kitten had not signed it. 
¶16 On September 30, 1998, Cenname contacted Kitten to say 
that he would not pay the six months' advance rent and that 
Kitten did not have permission to speak to Dr. Holbrook.  Kitten 
said that his sister, a nurse, had told him that Cenname's 
condition could involve depression.  Kitten then described a 
hypothetical situation where he came to the apartment and found 
Cenname in his car, in the garage, with the door closed, and 
exhaust fumes coming from the car.  Kitten said he was concerned 
that such a situation would damage the rental unit.  Cenname 
denied being suicidal, and said that if Kitten needed more 
financial information, he should call Cenname's father. 
¶17 Later that day, Kitten called Cenname's parents' home 
in Columbus, Ohio, and spoke with Cenname's mother.  Cenname's 
father was not home at the time.  Kitten explained that he had 
two concerns about Cenname renting the apartment.  First, Kitten 
stated that he was worried that Cenname might try to commit 
suicide.  Kitten explained that the garages were attached to the 
housing units and he was worried that exhaust fumes might enter 
the other units.  Cenname's mother told Kitten that Cenname had 
been suicidal at one time, but that it was not a present 
concern.  Kitten also asked Cenname's mother if she and her 
husband were willing to co-sign Cenname's lease and be jointly 
responsible for the rental payments.  Cenname's mother assured 
Kitten that Cenname had a guaranteed income of $36,000 a year, 
No. 
00-3562   
 
8 
 
but agreed to co-sign the lease as long as Kitten informed 
Cenname that Kitten was asking them to co-sign. 
¶18 Kitten spoke with Cenname that day and told Cenname 
that he had spoken to Cenname's mother.  Kitten indicated that 
Cenname's mother had said Cenname should "choose his poison"——
suggesting that Cenname had to choose either to pay the six 
months' advance rent or to have his parents co-sign the lease.  
Cenname's mother denied having made such a statement. 
¶19 Cenname discussed the matter with a local fair housing 
organization, which encouraged Cenname to pretend to agree to 
the advance rent payment and tape record his conversation with 
Kitten.  After talking with a family attorney from Ohio and the 
treatment staff at the hospital, however, Cenname decided not to 
go through with the plan and tentatively decided to pay the 
advance rent. 
¶20 On October 1, 1998, Cenname changed his mind again, 
and refused to make the advance payment.  Cenname told Kitten 
that he planned to stick by the original agreement.  Both 
parties then agreed that "the deal was off."  Cenname asked for 
his $1925 down payment back, which Kitten refused to return.  
Kitten told Cenname that he did not intend to return the money 
because Cenname had already signed the lease. 
¶21 Cenname filed a complaint with the DWD Equal Rights 
Division alleging that Kitten had violated the WOHA by exacting 
more stringent lease terms on account of Cenname's disability.  
An investigator found probable cause for the complaint and the 
No. 
00-3562   
 
9 
 
matter was brought before a hearing examiner on the merits of 
the claim. 
¶22 After a full hearing, the hearing examiner found that 
there was insufficient evidence to show that Cenname had an 
actual disability or a record of disability.3  However, the 
examiner held that Cenname was a person with a disability within 
the meaning of the WOHA because Kitten regarded Cenname as 
disabled.  The hearing examiner also concluded that Kitten had 
violated the WOHA by exacting more stringent terms for the 
rental of a housing unit because of the perceived disability. 
¶23 Kitten was ordered to pay $12,673.67 for expenses 
incurred by Cenname as a result of the discriminatory actions, 
an amount which included the return of Cenname's security 
deposit.  Kitten was also ordered to pay $10,000 for Cenname's 
emotional distress and $5000 as a forfeiture to the State.  
Kitten sought judicial review of the decision under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 106.04(6)(j) and 227.52. 
¶24 Both the Waukesha County Circuit Court and the court 
of appeals affirmed the hearing examiner's decision.  In a 
published opinion, the court of appeals agreed with the hearing 
examiner's finding that Kitten's beliefs about Cenname's eating 
disorder qualified as a disability under the WOHA because of the 
"regarded 
as" 
clause 
of 
§ 106.04(1m)(g). 
 
Kitten, 
2001 
WI App 218, ¶30.  The court of appeals also held that there was 
                                                 
3 This was primarily due to the fact that Dr. Holbrook did 
not testify at the hearing. 
No. 
00-3562   
 
10 
 
enough evidence for the hearing examiner to conclude that Kitten 
believed 
that 
Cenname's 
condition 
substantially 
impaired 
Cenname's ability to perform major life functions.  Id. at ¶31. 
¶25 This court accepted Kitten's petition for review and 
we affirm the court of appeals' decision.  We hold that the 
hearing examiner correctly decided that Kitten's perceptions of 
Cenname qualified as a disability under the WOHA and that Kitten 
discriminated against Cenname on the basis of that perceived 
disability. 
II 
¶26 As 
with 
most 
cases 
involving 
the 
review 
of 
administrative decisions, we begin with a brief discussion of 
the standard of review.  Although we owe substantial deference 
to an administrative agency's findings of fact, the deference we 
owe to an agency's legal conclusions depends on several factors. 
¶27 When 
analyzing 
agency decisions, 
this 
court has 
generally applied three levels of deference to an agency's 
conclusions of law and statutory interpretation.  Jicha v. 
DILHR, 169 Wis. 2d 284, 290, 485 N.W.2d 256 (1992).  If the 
agency is charged by the legislature with the interpretation of 
a statute; the interpretation of the agency is long-standing; 
and the agency has experience, technical competence, and 
specialized knowledge that aid the agency in its interpretation 
and application of the statute, we have afforded the agency 
determination great weight.  Id. at 290-91; Theuer v. LIRC, 2001 
WI 26, ¶6, 242 Wis. 2d 29, 624 N.W.2d 110.  Under the "great 
No. 
00-3562   
 
11 
 
weight" standard, we will uphold the agency's decision unless it 
is unreasonable.  Theuer, 2001 WI 26, ¶14. 
¶28 If 
the 
issue 
is 
"'very 
nearly' 
one 
of 
first 
impression," we give due weight to the agency's determinations.  
Jicha, 169 Wis. 2d at 291.  Under the "due weight" standard, we 
give the agency's decision some deference if the agency's 
interpretation is reasonable and complies with the statute's 
purpose; however, we are not bound by the decision.  Brauneis v. 
State, 2000 WI 69, ¶20, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 N.W.2d 635.  If an 
alternative interpretation appears more reasonable, we are not 
required to adopt the agency's interpretation.  Id. 
¶29 Finally, when the issue is one of first impression for 
the agency and the agency lacks special expertise or experience 
in determining the question presented, we review the agency's 
interpretation de novo.  Id. 
¶30 In this case, we are presented with three questions of 
law.  First, we must decide whether discrimination based on a 
perceived disability is sufficient to trigger the protections of 
the WOHA even when the complainant has not proven an actual 
disability. 
 
Second, 
if 
we 
answer 
the 
first 
question 
affirmatively, we must decide if the perceived impairment in 
this case rises to the level of a disability for the purposes of 
the statute.  Finally, if a disability does exist under the 
statute, we must then determine if Kitten discriminated against 
Cenname on the basis of that disability. 
¶31 In weighing the standards of review, we think that it 
is appropriate to consider all three questions under the "great 
No. 
00-3562   
 
12 
 
weight" standard.  The legislature has given the DWD Equal 
Rights Division and its predecessors the responsibility for 
administering the WOHA.  Wis. Stat. § 106.04(1s).  As such, the 
Equal Rights Division has experience in deciding cases of 
discrimination based on disability and is regularly required to 
determine both if an individual's impairment rises to the level 
of a "disability" under the statute and whether a party's 
actions constitute discrimination.  We therefore find the "great 
weight" standard of review appropriate. 
A 
¶32 We first address the question of if and when housing 
discrimination based on a perceived disability is actionable 
under the WOHA.  In her decision, the hearing examiner found 
that there was not enough evidence to prove that Cenname had 
either an actual disability or a record of disability.  Both 
parties agree with this conclusion and, after a review of the 
record, so do we.  The debate arises in this case because of the 
examiner's other conclusion——that the record showed sufficient 
evidence that Kitten "regarded" Cenname as disabled.  We thus 
focus our attention on whether the hearing examiner correctly 
decided that such a "perceived" disability could trigger the 
protections of the WOHA. 
¶33 This is a question of statutory interpretation.  As 
with all questions of statutory interpretation, our goal is to 
discern the intent of the legislature.  Landis v. Physicians 
Ins. Co., 2001 WI 86, ¶14, 245 Wis.2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893.  To 
determine legislative intent, we first look to the plain 
No. 
00-3562   
 
13 
 
language of the statute.  Id.  If the legislature's intent can 
be determined from the clear and unambiguous language of the 
statute, we do not look beyond the statutory language to 
ascertain its meaning.  Id. 
¶34 For purposes of the WOHA, "disability" is defined as 
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities, a record of having such an 
impairment 
or 
being 
regarded 
as 
having 
such 
an 
impairment. . . . "  Wis. Stat. § 106.04(1m)(g).  The first two 
parts of this definition plainly require some proof of an actual 
or former impairment.  The question presented here involves the 
third part of that definition: whether the "regarded as" clause 
protects persons against discrimination based on a perceived 
disability when the complainant cannot or does not prove the 
existence of an actual disability.  We focus on the construction 
of that clause. 
¶35 Because the "regarded as" clause refers back to the 
portion of the definition that describes the requirements for an 
actual disability, we must adopt that reference as included in 
the "regarded as" definition.  Thus, to be "regarded as" 
disabled, a person must be "regarded as having a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life 
activities." 
 
"Regard" 
is 
not 
statutorily 
defined.  
However, the word's common definition, as used here, is "to look 
at from a particular point of view."  Webster's Third New 
International 
Dictionary 
1911 
(1986); 
see 
also 
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  Thus, we think the plain language of 
No. 
00-3562   
 
14 
 
the "regarded as" clause supports the notion that some form of 
perceived disability qualifies as a disability under the WOHA. 
¶36 It is not clear, however, whether the impairment 
itself must be an actual impairment or whether the impairment, 
as well as the extent of that impairment, may be merely 
perceived.  Depending on whether or not the phrase "regarded as" 
modifies 
the 
term 
"impairment," 
as 
well 
as 
the 
phrase 
"substantially limits one or more major life activities," the 
complainant's quantum of proof can vary.  For instance, a person 
might be "regarded as" disabled when that person has an actual 
impairment, which is mistakenly viewed as a substantially 
limiting condition when in reality it is not.  See Michael D. 
Moberly, Perception or Reality?:  Some Reflections on the 
Interpretation of Disability Discrimination Statutes, 13 Hofstra 
Lab. & Emp. L.J. 345, 347 n.23 (1996) (citing Bogue v. Better-
Bilt Aluminum Co., 875 P.2d 1327, 1335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)).  
Alternatively, a person might be "regarded as" disabled if that 
person has an actual impairment that does not itself limit his 
or her activities, but does limit the person's activities 
because of the attitudes and perceptions of others.  Id.  
A person might also be "regarded as" disabled if the person has 
no actual impairment whatsoever, but another person mistakenly 
believes that impairment exists, and mistakenly believes that 
the impairment substantially limits that individual's major life 
activities.  Id. 
¶37 Kitten argues that there can be no finding of a 
disability when the complainant does not prove the existence of 
No. 
00-3562   
 
15 
 
some impairment that would qualify as a disability under the 
WOHA.  Kitten notes that there was no expert medical testimony 
given at the administrative hearing and the only medical 
evidence admitted was a letter from Dr. Holbrook stating that 
Cenname had been diagnosed with bulimia nervosa4 and that Cenname 
was under Dr. Holbrook's care for that disorder.  As such, 
Kitten argues that Cenname was unable to show that he had a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or 
more 
of 
his 
major 
life 
activities, 
as 
defined 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 106.04(1m). 
 
Kitten 
emphasizes 
the 
hearing 
examiner's explicit acknowledgement that there was not enough 
evidence to show that Cenname had an actual disability or a 
record of disability. 
                                                 
4 Kitten asserted, both in his brief and at oral argument, 
that he was unable to find a medical definition for "bulimia 
nervosa," suggesting that this supported his argument that 
Cenname had not proven the existence of a disability.  We note 
that we were able to find definitions in at least two leading 
medical references with little trouble.  See Am. Psychiatric 
Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV-TR) § 307.51, at 589-94 (4th ed., text rev., 2000) 
(listing "bulimia nervosa" as an eating disorder characterized 
by 
recurrent 
episodes 
of 
binge 
eating 
and 
recurrent 
inappropriate compensatory behavior to prevent weight gain such 
as self-induced vomiting; 
misuse 
of 
laxatives, 
diuretics, 
enemas, or other medications; fasting; or excessive exercise); 
Stedman's Medical Dictionary 218 (25th ed. 1990) (defining 
"bulimia nervosa" as a "chronic morbid disorder involving 
repeated and secretive episodic bouts of eating characterized by 
uncontrolled rapid ingestion of large quantities of food over a 
short period of time, followed by self-induced vomiting, 
purging, and anorexia; accompanied by feelings of guilt, 
depression, or self-disgust"). 
No. 
00-3562   
 
16 
 
¶38 We agree with Kitten's assessment of the evidence only 
as far as it applies to proof of an actual disability or a 
record of disability under the statutory definition.  Here, 
however, the examiner held that Kitten's perceptions and beliefs 
about Cenname's depression, suicidal tendencies, and the chance 
of Cenname being rehospitalized, even if incorrect, could 
qualify as a disability under the third part of the definition——
the "regarded as" clause.  Wis. Stat. § 106.04(1m)(g).  Kitten's 
argument misses what we think is a more important inquiry here, 
which relates to Cenname's proof of an actual impairment, and 
not his proof of disability. 
¶39 There is no statutory definition of "impairment" in 
the WOHA.  However, we have previously defined "impairment" in 
the context of the WFEA to mean a "lessening, deterioration, or 
damage to a normal bodily function or bodily condition."  
La Crosse Police & Fire Comm. v. LIRC, 139 Wis. 2d 740, 759-60, 
407 
N.W.2d 510 
(1987); 
Am. 
Motors 
Corp. 
v. 
LIRC, 
119 
Wis. 2d 706, 713, 350 N.W.2d 120 (1984).  Since it is used 
similarly, we think that this definition is also appropriate for 
inquiries under the WOHA. 
¶40 The problem arises in this case because there is some 
evidence that Cenname had an actual impairment, but the hearing 
examiner never made a ruling on that issue.  The examiner only 
held that Cenname was unable to prove an actual disability.  We 
agree that the examiner's conclusion with regard to the actual 
disability was reasonable, but we are still left with the 
No. 
00-3562   
 
17 
 
question 
of 
whether 
the 
perception 
of 
an 
impairment 
is 
sufficient to trigger the protections of the WOHA. 
¶41 To answer this question, we find it appropriate to 
draw comparisons to employment discrimination cases, as we have 
not addressed the issue as it relates to the WOHA.  We focus on 
La Crosse, 139 Wis. 2d 740, where we faced a question nearly 
identical to the one presented here as it related to the 
definition of "handicapped individual" under the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act (WFEA).  In La Crosse, the complainant, Daniel 
Rusch, applied for employment with the city of La Crosse as a 
police officer.  The La Crosse Police and Fire Commission (PFC) 
recommended to the police chief that Rusch not be hired because 
of his substandard performance on a back-strength test during a 
physical examination.  Id. at 746.  After consulting with a 
physical therapist, Rusch retook and passed the back-strength 
test, but was still not placed on the police eligibility list 
because he had failed the first test.  Id. at 747.  Rusch filed 
a complaint with the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and 
Human Rights (DILHR), arguing that he had been discriminated 
against on the basis of a perceived handicap. 
¶42 The PFC argued that Rusch could not be considered a 
"handicapped individual" under the WFEA if he did not prove some 
actual impairment that rose to the level required under the 
statute.  On review, we disagreed, holding that the perception 
of a handicap was enough to invoke the statute.  Id. at 765. 
¶43 Although we did not base our holding on it, we took 
particular note of the fact that between the time Rusch filed 
No. 
00-3562   
 
18 
 
his complaint and the time the decision was issued in La Crosse, 
the 
legislature 
had 
added 
a 
definition 
of 
"handicapped 
individual" to the statute.  See ch. 334, Laws of 1981.  Under 
the new definition, a "handicapped individual" within the 
meaning of the WFEA was a person who "(a) Has a physical or 
mental impairment which makes achievement unusually difficult or 
limits the capacity to work; (b) Has a record of such an 
impairment; or (c) Is perceived as having such an impairment."  
Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8) (1983-84) (emphasis added).5  Although the 
statute was not in effect in time for us to use it in the 
La Crosse case, we noted that the history of the statute 
demonstrated the legislature's intent to codify definitions that 
had already been adopted in prior cases of this court.  
La Crosse, 139 Wis. 2d at 756; Am. Motors, 119 Wis. 2d at 712 
n.4. 
¶44 Turning back to the WOHA, we see that it contains 
language very similar to that of the WFEA definition referenced 
in La Crosse.  As we pointed out previously, a "disability" is 
defined under the WOHA as a "physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities, a record 
of having such an impairment or being regarded as having such an 
impairment. . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 106.04(1m)(g) (emphasis added).  
Although the three parts of the WOHA definition are not 
separately enumerated as they are in the WFEA, the definitions 
                                                 
5 The current version of the WFEA has changed the term 
"handicap" to "disability" but is otherwise identical to the 
statute passed in 1982.  Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8) (1999-2000). 
No. 
00-3562   
 
19 
 
still mirror each other.  Most notably, the last part of the 
WOHA definition, the "regarded as" clause, serves a similar 
purpose as the "perceived" clause in the WFEA.  In La Crosse, we 
held 
that 
the complainant 
does not 
have 
the 
burden of 
demonstrating the existence of an actual disability if a 
perceived disability can be proven.  La Crosse, 139 Wis. 2d at 
765.  We think that similar reasoning applies to the WOHA. 
¶45 In La Crosse, we held that to establish a "handicap" 
under the WFEA, the employee must show that (1) there is "a real 
or perceived impairment," and (2) the impairment is "such that 
it either actually makes or is perceived as making achievement 
unusually difficult or limits the capacity to work."  La Crosse, 
139 Wis. 2d at 760-61.  If the two questions are answered in the 
affirmative, the complainant could be considered "handicapped" 
within the meaning of the statute. 
¶46 Using 
the 
parallel 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 106.04(1m)(g), we think a similar test is appropriate to 
determine if a "disability" meets the WOHA definition.  To 
establish a disability within the meaning of the statute, the 
complainant must show (1) that he or she has an actual 
impairment, a record of impairment, or is regarded as having an 
impairment; and (2) the impairment, whether real or perceived, 
is one that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities, or is regarded by the respondent to substantially 
limit one or more major life activities.  If the complainant is 
able to prove both of these elements, the complainant will have 
demonstrated a disability under the WOHA.  This also answers our 
No. 
00-3562   
 
20 
 
original question: a perceived impairment may be sufficient to 
invoke the WOHA. 
¶47 We recognize that, at first glance, this test seems to 
create an inconsistency.  A person who is perceived as disabled, 
even if that person does not have any actual impairment, may be 
protected under the statute, while a person who has an actual 
impairment that does not rise to the level of a "disability" 
might not be protected.  However, we cannot say that this 
interpretation is at odds with the intent of the WOHA. 
¶48 As articulated by the legislature, the purpose of the 
WOHA is: 
to render unlawful discrimination in housing.  It is 
the declared policy of this state that all persons 
shall have an equal opportunity for housing regardless 
of sex, race, color, sexual orientation, disability, 
religion, national origin, marital status, family 
status, 
lawful 
source 
of 
income, 
age 
or 
ancestry . . . . [The 
WOHA] 
shall 
be 
deemed 
an 
exercise of the police powers of the state for the 
protection of the welfare, health, peace, dignity and 
human rights of the people of this state. 
Wis. Stat. § 106.04(1). 
 
The 
multi-part 
definition 
of 
"disability" satisfies this purpose in two ways.  By protecting 
persons with actual disabilities or a record of disability from 
discrimination, the WOHA guarantees those persons equal access 
to housing.  However, by supplying consequences for those who 
discriminate based on perceived disabilities as well as actual 
disabilities, 
the 
statute 
also 
helps 
combat 
incorrect 
assumptions about people with disabilities that are held by the 
No. 
00-3562   
 
21 
 
public.6  In either situation, there is harm to the person who is 
discriminated against.  As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in 
School 
Board 
of 
Nassau 
County 
v. 
Arline, 
"[S]ociety's 
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as 
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from 
actual impairment."  Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 
U.S. 273, 284 (1987).  By providing a penalty for those who 
discriminate based on perceived disabilities, the legislature 
has chosen to respond to such myths and fears in pursuit of the 
goal of open housing. 
¶49 Because 
the 
hearing 
examiner's 
conclusions 
were 
reasonable and kept with the intent of the statute, we hold that 
the hearing examiner correctly concluded that a perceived 
disability can qualify as a disability under the WOHA, even when 
no actual disability has been proven. 
B 
¶50 Having decided that a perceived disability falls 
within the WOHA's definition of "disability," we next turn to 
the question of whether the disability perceived by Kitten in 
this case rises to the level necessary to be covered by the 
                                                 
6 At oral argument, concerns were raised about punishing 
housing 
discrimination 
where 
the 
discriminator 
incorrectly 
perceives that a normally benign condition significantly affects 
a person's major life activities.  However, because the statute 
serves the dual purposes of protecting those who are actually 
disabled 
and 
combating 
incorrect 
public 
perceptions 
of 
disability, we cannot say for certain that the legislature did 
not intend such a result.  Still, we do not reach that question 
here, as the facts of this case do not fall into that category. 
No. 
00-3562   
 
22 
 
statute.  As we have already stated, in answering this question, 
we afford the decision of the hearing examiner great weight. 
¶51 We begin by restating our test articulated above: To 
prove a disability under the WOHA, the complainant must show (1) 
that he or she has an actual impairment, a record of impairment, 
or is regarded as having an impairment; and (2) the impairment, 
whether real or perceived, substantially limits one or more 
major life activities, or is regarded by the respondent to 
substantially limit one or more major life activities. 
¶52 Applying the first part of our test to the facts of 
the present case, we think that there is little question that 
Kitten perceived that Cenname had an impairment.  Even though 
the actual disability was unproven at the hearing, there was 
evidence that Kitten was aware that Cenname had been diagnosed 
with bulimia.  As a result, Kitten thought that Cenname 
necessarily suffered from severe depression, that Cenname was 
likely suicidal, and that Cenname was likely to return to the 
hospital for residential treatment.  Kitten certainly perceived 
that Cenname had a lessening of normal bodily function. 
¶53 Finding the first element met, we move to the second 
part of our test, and determine if the impairment perceived by 
Kitten was one that Kitten regarded as substantially limiting 
one or more of Cenname's major life activities.  Under this part 
of the test, because we are assessing Kitten's perception of the 
disability, we must look at the subjective beliefs of the 
respondent and, taking them as true, determine if they would 
meet the objective standard for an actual disability.  That is, 
No. 
00-3562   
 
23 
 
if Kitten's perceptions about Cenname's impairment were true, we 
must determine if one or more of Cenname's major life activities 
would be limited.  If the answer is yes, the second part of our 
test is met, and the perceived impairment is sufficient to 
qualify as a disability under the statute. 
¶54 In this analysis, we are strongly persuaded by the 
U.S. Supreme Court's discussion of disability in its recent 
holding in Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. ___, No. 00-
1089, slip op. (Jan. 8, 2002).  In Toyota, the Court addressed 
the meaning of the term "disability" under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, whose definition of the term is 
virtually identical to that in the WOHA.7  Writing for a 
unanimous 
Court, 
Justice 
O'Connor 
defined 
"major 
life 
activities" as "those activities that are of central importance 
to daily life . . . includ[ing] such basic abilities as walking, 
seeing, and hearing."  Toyota, No. 00-1089, slip op. at 12.  To 
be "substantially limited" in those activities, the individual 
must have a permanent or long-term impairment that prevents or 
severely restricts the individual from performing them.  Id. at 
12-13. 
¶55 Adopting this definition, we conclude that Kitten's 
perceptions did rise to the level where, if taken as true, 
                                                 
7 The ADA definition states, "The term 'disability' means, 
with respect to an individual (A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major 
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an 
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."  
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). 
No. 
00-3562   
 
24 
 
Cenname's major life activities would have been limited.  Kitten 
thought that Cenname's eating disorder would impair Cenname's 
ability to function to the point where he would not be able to 
live on his own.  Kitten's perception was that Cenname would 
become severely depressed to the point of being suicidal, a 
situation that would undoubtedly limit Cenname's ability to 
perform day-to-day activities.  Alternatively, Kitten thought 
that 
Cenname 
would 
have 
to 
be 
readmitted 
to 
inpatient 
residential treatment because he would not be able to carry out 
even basic daily tasks without assistance. 
¶56 We give particular weight to Kitten's perception that 
Cenname might be rehospitalized.  A patient in a residential, 
inpatient program, as opposed to an outpatient program, suggests 
that the person may be affected by a disorder to the point where 
he or she is substantially unable to function in daily life.  
See, 
e.g., 
Residential 
Eating 
Disorder 
Program, 
at 
http://www.rogersmemorial.org/Eating/eating.htm 
(last 
visited 
May 21, 2002). 
¶57 In sum, we must agree with the hearing examiner that 
Kitten's perceptions of Cenname show that Kitten regarded 
Cenname as disabled.  Consequently, applying the definition of 
"disability," we also agree with the examiner's conclusion that 
Cenname proved that he was "disabled" within the meaning of the 
WOHA. 
C 
¶58 Finally, because we hold that a disability was proven 
in this case, we must determine whether Kitten discriminated on 
No. 
00-3562   
 
25 
 
the basis of this perceived disability.  Again, we give great 
weight to the hearing examiner's reasoning and decision on this 
issue. 
¶59 Under the WOHA, no one may "[s]egregate, separate, 
exclude or treat unequally a person in the terms, conditions or 
privileges of sale or rental of housing . . . because of a 
disability . . . ." 
 
Wis. Stat. § 106.04(2r)(b)2. 
 
We 
have 
already established the existence of a disability under the 
statute, so the question that remains is whether Kitten treated 
Cenname unequally in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the 
rental of housing on account of the perceived disability. 
¶60 We think that there is more than sufficient evidence 
in the record for the hearing examiner to have found that Kitten 
discriminated based on the perceived disability in this case.  
Kitten sought six months' advance rent from Cenname, as opposed 
to the normal one month's rent and a security deposit.  By 
Kitten's own admission, seeking advance rent was not a standard 
practice.  It is easy to conclude that Kitten exacted unequal 
lease terms from Cenname. 
¶61 Still, Kitten insists that he had a legitimate reason 
to ask Cenname for the advance rent.  Specifically, he asserts 
that he was wary of Cenname's sparse credit history, as well as 
Cenname's current unemployment.  Kitten insists that his motives 
were economic, rather than based on the perceived disability.8 
                                                 
8 We note that Kitten also never asserted the defense 
outlined in § 106.04(5m)(d), which states in part: 
No. 
00-3562   
 
26 
 
¶62 Although we understand how these factors might have 
legitimately worried Kitten about renting to Cenname, we agree 
with the hearing examiner that the evidence still indicates that 
Kitten was primarily motivated by his perception of Cenname's 
disability rather than the economic factors.  There is nothing 
in the record to show that Kitten brought his concerns about the 
credit report to Cenname's attention, and the only other 
significant change between Kitten's original terms and the 
higher terms was his perception of Cenname's condition.  Kitten 
persisted in asking for the six months' advance rent despite a 
letter from Cenname's father attesting to Cenname's ability to 
pay, copies of Cenname's bank records, and a list of Cenname's 
financial references. 
¶63 Kitten's perceptions led him first to contact his 
sister, a nurse, to ask about Cenname's eating disorder.  Based 
on the information from his sister, Kitten then attempted to 
contact Cenname's doctor and Cenname's parents.  Kitten even 
asked Cenname's own mother if Cenname was suicidal.  Throughout 
his dealings with Cenname, Kitten repeatedly expressed concerns 
about 
the 
possibility 
of 
Cenname 
relapsing, 
being 
rehospitalized, or attempting suicide.  The hearing examiner's 
conclusion that Kitten discriminated on the basis of disability 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nothing in this section requires that housing be made 
available 
to 
an 
individual 
whose 
tenancy 
would 
constitute a direct threat to the safety of other 
tenants . . . if 
the 
risk 
of 
direct 
threat . . . 
cannot be eliminated or sufficiently reduced through 
reasonable accommodations. 
No. 
00-3562   
 
27 
 
was more than reasonable given the facts of this case, and we 
thus uphold the examiner's decision in that regard. 
III 
¶64 In conclusion, we hold that a perceived disability is 
sufficient to qualify as a "disability" under the WOHA.  In this 
case, the hearing examiner correctly decided that Kitten 
perceived a disability, that the perceived disability rose to 
the level required under the statutory definition, and that 
Kitten proceeded to discriminate against Cenname based on that 
perceived disability by exacting more stringent lease terms from 
him.  We therefore uphold the conclusions of the hearing 
examiner and affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
00-3562   
 
 
 
1