Case Title: REILLY v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
REILLY v. STATE2002 WY 15655 P.3d 1259Case Number: 01-149Decided: 10/17/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

VELMA 
REILLY,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 

            
Mary 
B. Guthrie, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

            
Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, 
Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

*  Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      In December 2000, 
a jury found appellant, Velma Reilly, guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-303(a) and 6-2-401(a) (LexisNexis 2001), 
kidnapping in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(d) (LexisNexis 2001), 
aggravated robbery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(c) (LexisNexis 
2001), and attempted second-degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
6-1-301(a) and 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2001).  
The district court sentenced appellant to prison terms of three to six 
years for conspiracy to commit robbery, twenty to fifty years for kidnapping, 
and ten to fifteen years for aggravated robbery, to run concurrently, and thirty 
to fifty years for attempted second-degree murder, to run consecutively to the 
other three sentences.  Appellant 
appeals her conspiracy to commit robbery conviction, arguing that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish a conspiracy and that the district court failed 
properly to instruct the jury regarding the elements of that offense.  She appeals her attempted second-degree 
murder conviction, asserting that attempted second-degree murder is a "logical 
impossibility."  Appellant does not 
appeal her aggravated robbery or kidnapping convictions.  We affirm appellant's attempted 
second-degree murder conviction, but reverse and remand for a new trial on the 
conspiracy to commit robbery charge.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The appellant 
states the issues as follows:

 

[I.]  Whether [appellant] was properly 
convicted of attempted second degree murder.

 

[II.]  Whether failure to set out the elements of 
conspiracy to commit robbery in an instruction invalidates [appellant]'s 
conviction.

 

[III.]  Whether sufficient evidence was introduced at 
trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the crime of 
conspiracy to commit robbery.

 

The State of Wyoming, as appellee, phrases the issues in 
substantially the same manner.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Appellant and her 
victim were acquaintances who lived in the same trailer park, had limited social 
contact, and at one point were co-workers.  On July 10, 2000, the victim told appellant 
she was going to a local grocery store to purchase groceries and a $272.00 money 
order to satisfy the income tax balance on some radio contest winnings.  According to the 
victim, appellant called and stated "come and pick me up, and I'll go with 
you."  At about 
11:30 p.m. that evening, the victim took her vehicle to appellant's 
residence.  
Appellant asked if her "friend," a thirteen-year-old male, could 
accompany them, to which the victim replied in the affirmative.  The victim 
testified that she had two separate envelopes in her purse, one containing 
$49.00 for groceries and the other $272.00 for the money order.

 

[¶4]      Upon reaching the 
grocery store parking lot, appellant grabbed the victim by the neck, pulled her 
to the center of the vehicle, pinned her arms, and ordered the male juvenile to 
"[g]et in the front and drive . . .."  Appellant pulled a gun, pointed it at the 
victim's head, and told the victim to cooperate "because I can shoot you."  At some point on 
rural Horse Creek Road, appellant directed the male juvenile to pull over, and 
told the victim to give appellant the "money."  The victim gave appellant the envelope 
containing $49.00, and appellant angrily stated "Well, is this it?"  The victim replied 
that it was, and appellant pulled the victim from the vehicle and told her to 
"lay face down on the ground."  Appellant shot at the victim several times, 
the victim recalling "one bullet just zing[ed] right past my head."  A detective 
testified that appellant admitted to aiming the gun at the victim's head and 
firing it four or five times.  According to the victim, appellant then 
stated "Damn you, Randy [appellant's boyfriend at the time].  You put blanks in 
this, and . . . I'll kill you, too."  Appellant yelled at the male juvenile to "get 
a tire iron," with which appellant repeatedly beat the victim on the back of the 
head.

 

[¶5]      Appellant and the 
male juvenile left in the victim's vehicle, leaving the victim alongside the 
road.  A 
passerby eventually found the victim and transported her to the emergency 
room.  The 
victim suffered multiple injuries consistent with blunt force trauma, including 
internal bleeding around her brain and ear, scalp, ear, face, hand and arm 
lacerations, bruises, and fractured fingers and hands.  Appellant was 
ultimately charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, kidnapping, aggravated 
robbery, and attempted first-degree murder.

 

DISCUSSION

 

            
Attempted Second-Degree Murder

 

[¶6]      Appellant contends 
that the elements of an attempt and second-degree murder are mutually exclusive 
and/or logically impossible, because an attempt requires that one act with a 
specific intent, while second-degree murder only requires that one act with a 
general intent.  
In support of this argument, appellant cites to cases from other 
jurisdictions, among them an attempted second-degree murder case in which the 
North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that, it is "logically impossible" for "a 
person to specifically intend to commit a form of murder which does not have, as 
an element, specific intent to kill" and that "attempted murder" is therefore 
"logically possible only where specific intent to kill is a necessary element of 
the underlying offense."  State v. Coble, 
351 N.C. 448, 527 S.E.2d 45, 48 (2000).  Appellant asks this Court to adopt a similar 
approach.  Her 
argument presents an issue of law that we review de 
novo.  Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 52 
(Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶7]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-301 states, in pertinent part:

 

            
(a)       A person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if:

 

            
(i)         
With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a 
substantial step towards commission of the crime.  A "substantial step" is conduct which is 
strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the 
commission of the crime[.]

 

According to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104, "[w]hoever 
purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is 
guilty of murder in the second degree . . .."

 

[¶8]      Appellant's claimed 
"logical impossibility" arises from the "intent" elements of these respective 
statutes.  In 
the past, crimes have commonly been categorized by whether they require a 
"specific intent" or a "general intent."  For many years, Wyoming had several pattern 
jury instructions defining and explaining the two terms, and yet, the 
differences between the concepts was not always readily discernible.

 

Realizing that the distinction between a specific intent 
crime and a general intent crime is apparently troublesome, we can perhaps 
clarify it by stating it in a somewhat different way.  When the statute 
sets out the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful act, 
without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, 
the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed 
act.  Such 
intention is general intent.  When the statutory definition of the crime 
refers to an intent to do some further act or attain some additional 
consequence, the offense is considered to be a specific intent crime and then 
that question must be asked of the jury.

 

Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1978).  Following that logic, an "attempt" is a 
"specific intent" crime in that the attempt statute requires that one act with 
the intent to commit the object crime.  On the other hand, we have held that 
second-degree murder is a general intent crime, because it requires proof only 
that the act was done voluntarily or deliberately, not that there was a specific 
intent to kill.  
Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 493 (Wyo. 
1992); Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 
830 (Wyo. 1991).

 

[¶9]      We have acknowledged 
a trend in the law to dispense with the pattern jury instructions1 defining and explaining intent due to their 
"vagueness and general failure to enlighten juries."  Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo. 
1997).  Instead, juries should be instructed as to 
the appropriate intent that is an element of the particular crime; "it is more 
important that the jury understand what exactly they [are required] to 
determine."  Id.  This is consonant with our recent holding 
that "the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary 
elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the 
circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed."  Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 
(Wyo. 2001).  The point is that attempting formally to 
distinguish between specific intent and general intent, beyond the substantive 
elements of the crime, may not be the surest way to define the nature of the 
intent that must be proven.

 

[¶10]   Our precedent reveals that Wyoming is 
not a jurisdiction that finds it "logically impossible" to attempt a general 
intent crime.  
In several opinions, we have affirmed attempted second-degree murder 
convictions.  
See, e.g., Bilderback 
v. State, 13 P.3d 249 (Wyo. 2000); Gabriel v. State, 925 P.2d 234 (Wyo. 1996); and Dichard v. State, 844 P.2d 484 (Wyo. 1992).  We have also previously recognized the crime 
of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  Warren v. State, 
809 P.2d 788 (Wyo. 1991).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a) (LexisNexis 
2001) provides, in pertinent part:

 

A person is guilty of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills 
any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either:

 

            
(i)         
Voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion[.]

 

In Warren, 809 P.2d  at 
790, Warren challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to 
convict him of attempted voluntary manslaughter, arguing that there was no 
evidence of an attempt to kill.  After stating the substantive elements of 
attempted voluntary manslaughter, this Court proceeded to evaluate the 
sufficiency of the evidence as to those elements, primarily the evidence 
supporting Warren's "attempt" to kill his victim and the accompanying inference 
regarding Warren's intent.  Id.  We concluded that 
the reasonable inference from the evidence presented was that "Warren attempted 
to kill [his victim], and a jury could so find beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id.  In the context of appellant's claimed 
"logical impossibility," particularly the intent element of an attempt versus 
that of an underlying general intent crime, attempted second-degree murder is 
indistinguishable from attempted voluntary manslaughter.  Indeed, voluntary 
manslaughter is a "lesser included offense of the crime of second degree 
murder," and is "a general intent crime that does not require a deliberate 
intent to kill."  
State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1138-39 (Wyo. 
1993).

 

[¶11]   A similar result was obtained in Compton, 931 P.2d  at 938, where a jury convicted Compton of attempted first-degree 
sexual assault.  
On appeal, he questioned the adequacy of the district court's jury 
instructions, specifically regarding the elements of attempted first-degree 
sexual assault and its requisite intent.  Id. at 939.  First-degree sexual 
assault is a general intent crime.  Id. at 941.  This Court found 
that the district court's jury instructions adequately stated the substantive 
elements of attempted first-degree sexual assault, and adequately instructed the 
jury regarding the specific intent element of an attempt.  Id. at 940-41.

 

[¶12]   Nothing about the instant case 
convinces us that we should now find it legally or logically impossible for a 
person to attempt a general intent crime.  As we said in Compton, 931 P.2d  at 940, 941 (quoting People v. 
Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004, 1007 n.4, 1008 (Colo. 1981)), the question presented to the jury in an attempt case 
essentially has two levels:  (1) whether the person had "the intent to 
perform acts which, if completed, would constitute the underlying offense'"in 
other words, did the person intend the conduct that constitutes the substantial 
step; and (2) whether the person had the intent necessary as an element of the 
underlying offense"[e]xcept for the intentional conduct constituting the 
substantial step, the requisite culpability is that provided for in the 
definition of the [underlying] offense.'"  That analysis works just as well for attempted 
crimes that traditionally have been categorized as general intent crimes as it 
does for attempted crimes that traditionally have been categorized as specific 
intent crimes.

 

            
Conspiracy to Commit Robbery

 

[¶13]   Appellant argues that the district 
court failed properly to instruct the jury on the elements of conspiracy to 
commit robbery.  
In particular, appellant contends that while the district court's 
elements instruction did contain the elements of conspiracy, that instruction 
did not include the elements of robbery and the jury instructions, even when 
viewed as a whole, therefore did "not fully and clearly describe the 
circumstances under which [appellant] could have been convicted of conspiracy to 
commit robbery."  
The State argues that the district court did instruct the jury regarding 
the elements of aggravated robbery, robbery being a lesser-included offense of 
aggravated robbery, and that the district court's elements instruction, when 
viewed as a whole, therefore correctly listed "all the elements of every offense 
charged" and sufficiently covered the issues presented at trial.  Because the jury 
reached a unanimous verdict on the aggravated robbery charge, the State asserts 
that the jury read and understood the elements of that offense, what appellant 
"stood accused of and what facts the State was advancing in support of those 
accusations," and ultimately the "commonsense relationship between the robbery 
and conspiracy to commit robbery charges against her."  If anything, 
according to the State, this potentially placed a higher burden on the 
prosecution to prove the additional element required for aggravated robbery as 
the alleged conspiracy's objective.

 

            
a)  Standard of 
Review

 

[¶14]   W.R.Cr.P. 30 (2000) provided, in 
part:

 

Before instructing the jury the court shall conduct a 
formal instruction conference out of the presence of the jury at which the court 
shall inform counsel of the proposed action upon their requests and shall afford 
them an opportunity to offer specific, legal objection to any instruction the 
court intends to give and to offer alternate instructions.  No party may assign 
as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that party 
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.

 

We have stated that

 

[t]he spirit and policy of our rules with reference to jury 
instructions is to apprise and inform the district court of the purpose of 
offered jury instructions and of objections to proposed jury instructions so 
that the court may have an opportunity to correct and amplify them before 
submission to the jury.

 

Ortega v. State, 966 P.2d 961, 966 (Wyo. 1998); see also Alberts v. State, 
642 P.2d 447, 453 (Wyo. 1982).  Accordingly, the "failure to object to 
instructions at trial before the jury begins its deliberations operates to 
preclude appellate review of those instructions, which become the law of the 
case unless a plain or fundamental error can be shown to prevail."  Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300, 1308 (Wyo. 
1988); see also Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1180 (Wyo. 1998).

 

[¶15]   Considering the spirit and policy of 
this rule, we apply the plain error standard because appellant's trial counsel 
objected only to the format of the district court's jury instruction on the 
elements of the crimes charged, rather than its substance (i.e., the particular 
elements, or lack thereof, contained in the instruction).2  To establish plain 
error, an appellant must demonstrate "that the record clearly shows an error 
that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a 
substantial right."  
Compton, 931 P.2d  at 939.

 

            
(b)  Jury Instruction on 
Conspiracy to Commit Robbery

 

[¶16]   A failure properly to instruct on an 
element of a crime can constitute plain error.  Miller v. State, 
904 P.2d 344, 349 (Wyo. 1995).  Jury instructions are "designed to inform the 
jury about the applicable law so that the jury may apply that law to its own 
findings with respect to the material facts."  Brown v. State, 
817 P.2d 429, 439 (Wyo. 1991).

 

Given this purpose, the test whether the jury has been 
instructed on the necessary elements of the crime charged is whether the 
instruction "leaves no doubt as to under what circumstances the crime can be 
found to have been committed."  Graham v. United 
States, 187 F.2d 87, 90 (D.C. Cir.1950), cert. 
denied, 341 U.S. 920, 71 S. Ct. 741, 95 L. Ed. 1353 (1951); United States v. Salliey, 360 F.2d 699, 702 (4th Cir.1966).  A failure to give any instruction on an essential element of a 
criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading 
instruction, requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction[.]  Vigil [v. State], 859 P.2d [659] at 662 [(Wyo.1993)], 
quoting Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 423 (7th Cir.1987) (emphasis added); Phillips v. State, 760 P.2d 388, 390 (Wyo.1988); Redland v. State, 766 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Wyo.1989).

 

Miller, 904 P.2d at 348 (emphasis in original).

 

[¶17]   The district court instructed the jury 
as follows regarding the elements of the crimes charged:

 

INSTRUCTION NO. 3

 

            
The four counts each charge a separate crime, all alleged to have 
occurred in the course of events described by the evidence.  Each of the counts 
must be separately considered by you.  The state must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt each of the essential elements of each of the counts.  The essential 
elements are:

 

            
For each of the counts, the first three (3) elements are:

 

            
1.  On 
or about the 10th day of July, 2000,

            
2.  In 
Laramie County, Wyoming

            
3.  The 
defendant, Velma Reilly,[3]

 

            
The other elements of the four (4) counts 
are:

 

            
AS TO COUNT I, Conspiracy to Commit a Crime:

 

            
4.  
Agreed with one or more persons

            
5.  That 
they or one or more of them would commit the crime of Robbery and

            
6.  One 
or more of them did an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement.

 

            
AS TO COUNT II, Kidnapping:

 

            
4.  
Unlawfully removed and confined [the victim]

            
5.  With 
the intent to facilitate the commission of a robbery, and

            
6.  [The 
victim] was not released substantially unharmed and in a safe place prior to 
trial.

 

            
AS TO COUNT III, Aggravated Robbery:

 

            
4.  Did 
steal, take or drive away the property of [the victim] with the intent to 
deprive her of that property, and

            
5.  In 
the course of committing this crime used or exhibited a deadly weapon.

 

            
AS TO COUNT IV, Attempt to Commit Murder in the First Degree:

 

            
4.  
Purposely; and

            
5.  With 
premeditated malice;

            
6.  
Attempted to kill [the victim].

 

            
As to each of the counts, it is not necessary that the state prove every 
fact surrounding the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt, but that it so prove 
all of the essential elements as given above.

 

            
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
these elements in each of these counts has been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty as to that count.

 

            
If you find that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt as to any count, then you should find the defendant not guilty 
as to that count.

 

(Emphasis in original.)4

 

[¶18]   This instruction leaves considerable 
doubt "as to under what circumstances the crime [of conspiracy to commit 
robbery] can be found to have been committed.'"  Miller, 904 P.2d  
at 348 (quoting Graham v. United States, 187 F.2d 87, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 
(1951)).  It is 
undisputed that the conspiracy to commit robbery portion of the instruction did 
instruct the jury as to the elements of conspiracy,5 but did not 
instruct the jury as to the elements of robbery.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(a) provides:

 

[a] person is guilty of robbery if in the course of 
committing a crime defined by W.S. 6-3-402[6] he:

 

            
(i)  
Inflicts bodily injury upon another; or

 

            
(ii)  
Threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate 
bodily injury.

 

It is clear and unequivocal that

 

[i]n a conspiracy prosecution, the jury must determine 
whether the commission of a particular crime was the objective of the 
conspiracy.  
Since the object crime in this conspiracy prosecution was [robbery], the 
court must give an instruction that defines the offense that is the subject of 
the conspiracy.

 

Miller, 904 P.2d  at 347.  Indeed, the "accused in a criminal 
prosecution, can only be convicted upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each 
element of the crime charged."  Vigil v. State, 
859 P.2d 659, 662 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶19]   The State's reliance on the aggravated 
robbery portion of the instruction is not convincing.  It is true that 
when we

 

examine jury instructions, we must look at them in their 
entirety and read them together.  Ostrowski v. 
State, 665 P.2d 471, 487 (Wyo.1983).  An error in one jury instruction can be cured 
elsewhere in the jury instructions if "the correct information is conveyed to 
the jury in a clear and concise manner so that it is unlikely that an erroneous 
impression would remain in the minds of the jurors."  United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 670 (6th 
Cir.1977)[.]

 

Vigil, 859 P.2d  at 663.  However, the aggravated robbery instruction 
is deficient for the same reason as the conspiracy to commit robbery 
instructionit does not completely set forth the essential elements of 
robbery.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(c) provides that

 

[a]ggravated robbery is a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for not less than five (5) years nor more than twenty-five (25) years if in the 
course of committing the crime of robbery the person:

 

            
(i)  
Intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury; 
or

 

            
(ii)  
Uses or exhibits a deadly weapon or a simulated deadly weapon.

 

(Emphasis added.)  The aggravated robbery instruction does 
include an element required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(c)(ii) for aggravated 
robbery, and one element of robbery (what constitutes "a crime defined by W.S. 
6-3-402"), but does not instruct the jury as to the additional element(s) of 
robbery found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(a)(i) and/or (ii).

 

[¶20]   The record clearly reflects what 
occurred at trial without resort to speculation.  The district court violated a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law by failing adequately to instruct the jury on the 
essential elements of conspiracy to commit robbery, which denied appellant the 
right to a fair trial and the right to be convicted based on a finding of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime charged.  See Vigil, 859 P.2d  at 662 and Buckles v. State, 
830 P.2d 702, 707-10 (Wyo. 1992).7  Accordingly, we reverse appellant's 
conspiracy to commit robbery conviction and remand for a new trial on that 
charge.  This 
resolution obviates the need to address the issue of sufficiency of the 
evidence.

 

FOOTNOTES

  
1W.Cr.P.J.I. 3.501 (1978) states:

 

3.501  CONCURRENCE OF ACT AND SPECIFIC 
INTENT

 

            
To constitute the crime charged there must be a union of two essential 
elements, an act forbidden by law and a specific intent.

 

            
Specific intent means more than the general intent to commit the 
act.  To prove 
a crime which involves specific intent, the prosecution must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt:

 

            
(1)        That the 
defendant did the act charged; and

 

            
(2)        That he 
did it with the specific intent described in the crime charged.  The specific intent 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as any other fact in the case.

 

W.Cr.P.J.I. 3.503 (1978) states:

 

3.503  CRIMES REQUIRING NO CRIMINAL 
INTENT

 

            
For the crime charged, the doing of the act is itself punishable as a 
crime.  The 
intent [with] which the act was committed is immaterial to guilt.

 

W.Cr.P.J.I. 3.504 (1978) states:

 

3.504  DETERMINING PRESENCE OF SPECIFIC 
INTENT

 

            
The crime charged in this case is a serious crime which requires proof of 
specific intent before the defendant can be convicted.  Specific intent, as 
the term implies, means more than the general intent to commit the act.  To establish 
specific intent the state must prove that the defendant knowingly did an act 
which the law forbids, [knowingly failed to do an act which the law requires,] 
specifically intending to violate the law.  Such intent may be determined from all the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

 

            
An act or a failure to act is "knowingly" done, if done voluntarily and 
intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent 
reason.

 

W.Cr.P.J.I. 3.505 (1978) states:

 

3.505  DETERMINING PRESENCE OF GENERAL 
INTENT

 

            
The intent with which an act was done is a condition of the mind, that is 
seldom if ever, capable of direct and positive proof.  Because we have no 
power to directly observe the condition of a person's mind, the best we can do 
is infer it from the evidence introduced.

 

            
The jury may consider the circumstances surrounding the act, the doing of 
the act itself, the manner in which it was done and the means used.

 

  
2The district court used a single jury 
instruction (Instruction No. 3) to instruct the jury as to the elements of the 
crimes charged.  
At the formal jury instruction conference, appellant's trial counsel 
placed the following objection on the record regarding that elements 
instruction:

 

            
[APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]:  And then on number  again, I'd like to 
reiterate like I discussed yesterday, for Instruction No. 3, I believe it's a 
bit confusing to have separate counts on the same page as to Count[s] I and II, 
and also I would object on the second page 

 

            
THE COURT:  
Just a minute.  
Let me slow you down a little bit.

 

            
[APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL]:  My objection is just to the format of 
Instruction No. 3, that they're all on the same page.

 

            
Appellant's trial counsel also requested that the elements instruction as 
to attempted first-degree murder include more factual particularity concerning 
what substantial steps the State alleged in the Information that appellant took 
toward the commission of that crime.

  
3Although appellant objected at trial to the 
format of this instruction, that issue was not raised on appeal.

  
4The district court gave additional jury 
instructions defining the terms used in this elements instruction, as well as 
the elements of attempted second-degree murder.

  
5Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303 provides, in pertinent 
part:

 

            
(a)        A person 
is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees with one (1) or more 
persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a crime and one (1) or 
more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement.

 

            
(b)        A person 
is not liable under this section if after conspiring he withdraws from the 
conspiracy and thwarts its success under circumstances manifesting voluntary and 
complete renunciation of his criminal intention.

  
6Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402 (LexisNexis 2001) 
provides, in pertinent part:

 

            
(a)        A person 
who steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with 
intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of larceny.

  
7The district court is not required to utilize 
Wyoming's Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, although it is worth noting that 
doing so likely would have prevented the error in this case.  W.Cr.P.J.I. 13.01 
(1996) states:

 

The elements of the crime of Conspiracy to Commit ______, 
as charged in this case, are:

 

1.         On 
or about the ___ day of ___, [200_]

2.         In 
___ County, Wyoming

3.         The 
Defendant, _______

4.         
Agreed with one or more persons

5.         
That they or one or more of them would commit the crime of ______, 
and

6.         One 
or more of them did an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement.

 

*

Use Note:  Set forth the elements of the object crime in a separate 
instruction.

*

 

(Emphasis added.)  W.Cr.P.J.I. 24.01A states:

 

The elements of the crime of Robbery, as charged in this 
case, are:

 

1.         On 
or about the ___ day of _______, [200_]

2.         In 
______County, Wyoming

3.         The 
Defendant, _______

4.         In 
the course of committing [the crime of] Larceny

[5.        Inflicted 
bodily injury upon another person.]

OR

[5.        
Threatened another person with or intentionally put him in fear of 
immediate bodily injury.]

*

 

W.Cr.P.J.I. 24.01B states:

 

The elements of the crime of Aggravated Robbery, as charged 
in this case, are:

 

1.         On 
or about the ____ day of ______, [200_]

2.         In 
______ County, Wyoming

3.         The 
Defendant, __________

4.         In 
the course of committing Robbery

[5.        
Intentionally inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily injury 
upon {another person} {________}.]

OR

[5.        Used or 
exhibited a deadly weapon or a simulated deadly weapon.]

*

Use Note:  Use the applicable option in Element 5.  Separate instructions should be 
given on:  (1) 
elements of robbery  see Instruction 24.01A.  . . .

*

 

(Emphasis added.)