Case Title: State ex rel. Richardson v. Gowdy

Citation: 2023-Ohio-976

Docket Number: 2023-0295

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Richardson v. Gowdy, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-976.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-976 
THE STATE EX REL. RICHARDSON v. GOWDY ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Richardson v. Gowdy, Slip Opinion No.  
2023-Ohio-976.] 
Elections—Mandamus—Writ sought to compel city council president to appoint 
clerk of council to complete recall-petition process or for board of elections 
to certify sufficiency of petition signatures—By appointing new clerk of 
council, council president performed the action relator sought to compel—A 
writ of mandamus will not issue to compel action that has been performed—
Council president had no legal duty to certify number of valid signatures on 
recall petitions—R.C. 705.92 inapplicable under facts of the case—Writ 
denied. 
(No. 2023-0295—Submitted March 21, 2023—Decided March 24, 2023.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In December 2022, East Cleveland electors began circulating petitions 
to recall three members of the East Cleveland city council.  Under the city’s charter, 
signed petitions had to be filed with the clerk of council within 30 days after filing 
with the clerk the affidavit stating the names of the council members whose removals 
were sought, East Cleveland City Charter, Section 52, and on filing of the petitions, 
the clerk had to certify whether a sufficient number of electors had signed the 
petitions, id., Section 53.  But by the time the electors had finished collecting 
signatures, the clerk-of-council position was vacant—the council president 
terminated the former clerk’s employment in early January 2023.  Relator, Terrie 
Richardson, filed this lawsuit to compel the council president to appoint a new clerk 
of council to complete the recall-petition process in time to place the recall elections 
on the May 2, 2023 primary-election ballot.  Alternatively, Richardson asserts that 
the circumstances of this case warrant bypassing the clerk’s duties under the charter 
and permitting the board of elections to certify the sufficiency of the petition 
signatures. 
{¶ 2} After this lawsuit was filed, the city council elected a new president, 
who then appointed a new clerk.  The new council president instructed the clerk to 
process the recall petitions within one week.  The appointment of the clerk of council 
moots part of the claims in this case.  As to the rest, Richardson has not shown any 
right to relief in mandamus.  Accordingly, we deny the requested writ. 
{¶ 3} Richardson also seeks awards of attorney fees and costs.  Richardson 
has filed a motion to establish the amount of security for costs.  We deny the request 
for attorney fees, but we grant the request for costs.  We grant Richardson’s motion 
to establish the amount of security for costs and waive the provision of security for 
costs. 
 
 
January Term, 2023 
 
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I.  Background 
{¶ 4} We recently explained the process for attempting to recall an East 
Cleveland officeholder: 
 
East Cleveland’s city charter establishes procedures for a 
recall against a municipal officeholder.  The charter requires the clerk 
of the city council to keep a supply of blank recall petition forms on 
hand.  East Cleveland City Charter, Section 50.  The clerk must issue 
blank forms upon receipt of an affidavit “stating the name of the 
member or members of the Council whose removal is sought.”  Id.  
From the time the affidavit is filed, the petition circulators have 30 
days to gather signatures and file the part-petitions with the clerk.  Id., 
Section 52. 
The recall process is formally initiated by the filing of the 
petition, signed by a sufficient number of electors, with the clerk.  Id., 
Section 49.  The clerk must then “certify * * * whether the signature 
of electors [on the petition] amount in number to at least twenty-five 
(25) percent of the voters voting at the last regular municipal election 
of officers.”  Id., Section 53.  If the petition contains enough 
signatures, the clerk must “serve notice of that fact upon” the 
officeholder designated in the recall petition and deliver a copy of the 
petition to “the election authorities” along with the certification 
regarding the percentage of voters who cast ballots at the last 
municipal election.  Id., Section 54. 
The officeholder designated in the recall petition may resign 
within five days of the clerk’s certification.  Id., Section 54.  If the 
designated officeholder does not resign within that five-day period, 
“the election authorities shall forthwith order and fix a day for holding 
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a recall election,” with the fixed day being no later than 90 days after 
the expiration of the five-day resignation period.  Id. 
 
(Ellipsis and brackets sic and footnote omitted.)  State ex rel. King v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-3613, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 2-4. 
{¶ 5} On December 21, 2022, Richardson and two other East Cleveland 
electors obtained blank petitions for the recall of East Cleveland city council 
members Korean Stevenson, Juanita Gowdy, and Patricia Blochowiak.  At that time, 
Tracy Udrija-Peters was the clerk of council.  On January 3, 2023, the city council 
elected Stevenson as its president.  That same day, Stevenson terminated Udrija-
Peters’s employment. 
{¶ 6} On January 20, Richardson and others submitted recall petitions for the 
three challenged council members to East Cleveland’s law director, Willa Hemmons.  
Richardson claims that they delivered the petitions to Hemmons because no one was 
serving as the clerk of council at the time.  Hemmons took the petitions to respondent 
Cuyahoga County Board of Elections.  According to Hemmons, the board’s director 
told her to certify whether the petitions contained a sufficient number of valid 
signatures.  Hemmons certified that the petitions contained sufficient valid signatures 
and filed the petitions with the board on January 24. 
{¶ 7} On February 13, during a board-of-elections meeting, Hemmons stated 
that she was not the clerk of council when she filed the petitions.  Based in part on 
that representation, the board voted not to place the recall elections on the May 2023 
ballot.  Hemmons then filed an original action against the board in the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of procedendo and a declaratory judgment that the 
recall petitions were properly submitted.  Hemmons argued that the board erred in 
refusing to place the recall elections on the May ballot. 
{¶ 8} Under R.C. 733.58, when a municipal officer fails to perform a clear 
legal duty, the city law director “shall apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for 
January Term, 2023 
 
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a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of the duty.”  If the law director fails 
to do so on written request of any taxpayer of the municipality, the taxpayer may 
initiate a suit in her own name, on behalf of the municipal corporation.  R.C. 733.59.  
On February 21, Richardson asked Hemmons to file a mandamus action to compel 
Stevenson to appoint a new clerk of council to complete the recall-petition process 
in time for placement of the recall elections on the May 2023 ballot.  Hemmons 
declined to do so, citing her direct involvement in the dispute. 
{¶ 9} On February 28, Richardson, citing R.C. 733.59, filed this action, 
seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the council president to appoint a clerk of 
council to complete the recall-petition process.  When Richardson filed her 
complaint, Stevenson was the council president.  But on March 6, Stevenson was 
replaced as president by Gowdy.  Because Gowdy is the current council president, 
she is automatically substituted for Stevenson as a respondent in this action.  See 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B). 
{¶ 10} On March 12, Gowdy appointed Eric Brewer as the clerk of council 
and instructed him “that his first priority as Clerk will be to review and process all 
pending petitions for recall and to certify to the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections 
whether there are sufficient valid signatures to justify a recall election.”  Gowdy told 
Brewer that “he [was] to complete this process within one week.” 
{¶ 11} Richardson also named the board of elections as a respondent in this 
action.  If Richardson cannot obtain a writ of mandamus against the council president, 
she seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the board to certify the number of valid 
signatures on the petitions. 
 
 
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II.  Analysis 
A.  Mandamus standard 
{¶ 12} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Richardson must prove by clear 
and convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal 
duty on the part of respondents to provide that relief, and (3) the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  See State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 
Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6, 13. 
B.  Claim against the council president 
{¶ 13} Richardson seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the council 
president to “immediately appoint a Clerk of Council to perform the ministerial task 
of certifying the number of valid signatures in each Recall Petition.”  Richardson’s 
claim against the council president is thus twofold: she seeks (1) to compel the 
council president to appoint a clerk of council and (2) to compel the clerk of council 
to certify the number of valid signatures on the recall petitions. 
{¶ 14} The first part of Richardson’s claim is moot.  By appointing Brewer 
as the clerk of council, Gowdy has already performed the action Richardson seeks to 
compel.  A writ of mandamus will not issue to compel action that has been performed.  
See State ex rel. Gantt v. Coleman, 6 Ohio St.3d 5, 450 N.E.2d 1163 (1983). 
{¶ 15} The board of elections has filed in this court a notice of additional 
litigation pending in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas and the Eighth 
District, in which Gowdy’s authority to appoint Brewer as clerk of council has been 
challenged.  The board points in the notice to a legal opinion written by Hemmons, 
in which she states that Gowdy is not the council president and lacked authority to 
appoint Brewer as clerk of council.  Richardson acknowledges these disputes but 
concedes that Brewer was duly appointed as clerk of council on March 12.  Any 
questions about the legitimacy of Brewer’s appointment, therefore, are not properly 
before us. 
January Term, 2023 
 
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{¶ 16} The second part of Richardson’s claim against the council president is 
not moot, but it fails for another reason: the council president has no legal duty to 
certify the number of valid signatures on the recall petitions.  Under Section 53 of the 
East Cleveland City Charter, the clerk of council must certify whether the signatures 
on the petitions are valid and sufficient in number.  See King, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-
Ohio-3613, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 32.  Indeed, in her reply brief, Richardson argues that 
this court should “order * * * Brewer to immediately certify the number of valid 
signatures on the Recall Petitions.”  Richardson is not entitled to the relief she seeks, 
because she is not actually attempting to enforce a legal duty belonging to the council 
president, and Brewer is not a party in this case. 
{¶ 17} For these reasons, we deny the writ of mandamus as to Richardson’s 
claim against the council president. 
C.  Claim against the board 
{¶ 18} Richardson also seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the board of 
elections “to comply with the East Cleveland Charter and R.C. 705.92 to immediately 
perform the ministerial task of certifying the number of valid signatures in each 
Recall Petition.” 
{¶ 19} Under R.C. 705.92(A), a recall petition “shall be filed with the board 
of elections.”  Richardson argues that R.C. 705.92 applies when the recall procedure 
established by East Cleveland’s city charter becomes “inoperable.”  According to 
Richardson, R.C. 705.92 applies by virtue of East Cleveland City Charter, Section 
87, which provides, “All general laws of the State applicable to municipal 
corporations now or hereafter enacted, and which are not in conflict or inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Charter, or with ordinances or resolutions hereafter 
enacted by the Council, shall be applicable to this city and all officers and 
departments thereof.”  Richardson contends that R.C. 705.92 is a general law of this 
state that applies in East Cleveland whenever there is a vacancy in the clerk-of-
council position. 
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{¶ 20} Richardson’s argument lacks merit.  R.C. 705.92 is not a law that is 
generally applicable to municipalities.  R.C. 705.91 provides that when a 
municipality’s electors are voting on a plan of government pursuant to R.C. 705.03, 
the question whether to adopt the requirements of R.C. 705.92 “shall be submitted 
* * * to the electors of the municipal corporation * * *.”  R.C. 705.91 further provides 
that R.C. 705.92 “shall go into effect and form part of any such plan of government 
only to the extent to which such section has been adopted under [R.C. 705.03].”  
(Emphasis added.)  We have stated that “[t]he clear meaning of R.C. 705.91 is that 
provisions of R.C. 705.92 go into effect only to the extent that they have been adopted 
by the voters of a municipal corporation as part of a home-rule charter.”  State ex rel. 
Lockhart v. Boberek, 45 Ohio St.2d 292, 294, 345 N.E.2d 71 (1976). 
{¶ 21} Richardson relies on State ex rel. McVey v. Banks, 12th Dist. Clermont 
No. 83-06-051, 1983 WL 4431, *2 (July 21, 1983), in which the Twelfth District 
Court of Appeals concluded that R.C. 705.91 does not require a municipality’s 
electors to expressly adopt R.C. 705.92 when the electors have adopted a plan of 
government other than one described in R.C. Chapter 705.  According to McVey, 
R.C. 705.92 “provides the statutory procedures and standards for municipal recall 
elections in cities governed by home rule city charters and other forms of government 
beyond the scope of R.C. Chapter 705.”  McVey at *2. 
{¶ 22} The analysis in McVey is not persuasive.  R.C. 705.91 provides that 
R.C. 705.92 shall become effective in a municipality “only to the extent to which 
such section has been adopted under [R.C. 705.03].”  It is undisputed that East 
Cleveland’s city charter was not adopted under R.C. Chapter 705.03.  Moreover, in 
McVey, the court of appeals held that R.C. 705.92 applied because the city charter at 
issue authorized recall elections while stating that “[t]he procedure for such recall 
shall be that provided by law.”  McVey at *1.  East Cleveland’s city charter does not 
use similar “provided by law” language. 
January Term, 2023 
 
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{¶ 23} Section 87 of the East Cleveland City Charter provides that general 
laws of the state apply to the city and its officers when they “are not in conflict or 
inconsistent with the provisions of [the] Charter.”  Richardson acknowledges that the 
recall procedures in the East Cleveland City Charter conflict with R.C. 705.92.  The 
clear conflict between the city charter and R.C. 705.92 further supports the 
conclusion that the statute does not apply to recall petitions involving East Cleveland 
municipal officeholders.  Accordingly, we deny the writ of mandamus as to 
Richardson’s claim against the board of elections. 
{¶ 24} In her reply brief, Richardson suggests that she may be entitled to a 
writ of mandamus if the board refuses to accept any certification of the petitions 
submitted by Brewer based on the board’s possible determination that Brewer was 
not properly appointed.  We do not address this concern, because it is speculative and 
beyond the scope of Richardson’s claim against the board. 
D.  Attorney fees and costs 
{¶ 25} In her claim against the council president, Richardson has requested 
awards of attorney fees and costs “on the basis of R.C. 733.59 and [the council 
president’s] bad faith actions.”  We deny Richardson’s request for attorney fees, 
because judgment is not being ordered in her favor.  See R.C. 733.61 (allowing a 
court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorney fees to a taxpayer receiving 
judgment in her favor). 
{¶ 26} Richardson, however, is entitled to an award of costs.  Richardson 
asserted a taxpayer action against the council president under R.C. 733.59.  R.C. 
733.61 provides: 
 
If the court hearing a case under [R.C. 733.59] is satisfied that 
the taxpayer had good cause to believe that his allegations were well 
founded, or if they are sufficient in law, it shall make such order as 
the equity of the case demands.  In such case the taxpayer shall be 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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allowed his costs, and, if judgment is finally ordered in his favor, he 
may be allowed, as part of the costs, a reasonable compensation for 
his attorney. 
 
This statutory language entitles Richardson to an award of costs, even without a 
judgment in her favor, if we determine that she “had good cause to believe that [her] 
allegations were well founded,” id. 
{¶ 27} As discussed above, Richardson’s non-moot claims were not well 
founded.  But it is not necessary for us to decide whether Richardson would have 
prevailed on her moot claim.  For purposes of the request for costs under R.C. 733.61, 
Richardson need only show that she had good cause to believe that her claim was 
well founded.  We conclude that she has met that burden and therefore grant her 
request for an award of costs.  We grant her motion to establish security for costs and 
waive the provision of security for costs.  See State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino, 155 Ohio 
St.3d 123, 2018-Ohio-3609, 119 N.E.3d 1238, ¶ 36. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 28} We deny the writ of mandamus and deny Richardson’s request for 
attorney fees.  We award costs to Richardson, grant her motion to establish security 
for costs, and waive the provision of security for costs.  Costs are taxed to the council 
president. 
Writ denied. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Mendenhall Law Group, Warner Mendenhall, and Logan Trombley, for 
relator. 
Kenneth D. Myers, for respondents Korean Stevenson and Juanita Gowdy. 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark 
January Term, 2023 
 
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R. Musson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Cuyahoga County 
Board of Elections. 
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