Case Title: Green v. Toledo Hosp.

Citation: 2002-Ohio-1482

Docket Number: 2001625 and 20001694

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Green v. Toledo Hosp., 94 Ohio St.3d 480, 2002-Ohio-1482.] 
 
 
GREEN, EXR., ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. TOLEDO 
HOSPITAL ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Green v. Toledo Hosp. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 480.] 
Attorneys at law — Kala test does not apply in determining whether attorney 
should be disqualified because nonattorney employee was formerly 
employed by attorney or firm representing an opposing party — Analysis 
to be used by court in ruling on motion to disqualify attorney based on 
attorney’s employment of a nonattorney once employed by the attorney 
requesting an opposing party — Civil procedure — Pursuant to Civ.R. 
32(A)(3)(e), prior testimony of a doctor in the same case may be 
submitted in a new trial as if it were deposition testimony. 
(Nos. 00-1625 and 00-1694 — Submitted October 16, 2001 — Decided April 3, 
2002.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for 
Lucas County, No. L-97-1457. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  The Kala three-prong test does not apply in determining whether an attorney 
should be disqualified because his or her nonattorney employee was 
formerly employed by an attorney or firm representing an opposing party.  
(Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., Inc. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 
688 N.E.2d 258, distinguished.) 
2.  In ruling on a motion to disqualify a lawyer based on that lawyer’s 
employment of a nonattorney once employed by the lawyer representing 
an opposing party, a court must use the following analysis: 
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2 
 
 
(1)  Is there a substantial relationship between the matter at issue 
and the matter of the nonattorney employee’s former firm’s 
representation? 
 
 
(2)  Did the moving party present credible evidence that the 
nonattorney employee was exposed to confidential information in his or 
her former employment relating to the matter at issue? 
 
 
(3)  If such evidence was presented, did the challenged attorney 
rebut the resulting presumption of disclosure with evidence either that (a) 
the employee had no contact with or knowledge of the related matter or 
(b) the new law firm erected and followed adequate and timely screens to 
rebut the evidence presented in prong (2) so as to avoid disqualification? 
3.  Pursuant to Civ.R. 32(A)(3)(e), prior trial testimony of a doctor in the same 
case may be submitted in a new trial as if it were deposition testimony. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  On October 16, 1982, Donald Costell died, allegedly as the 
result of negligence that occurred during and shortly after his May 12, 1982 heart 
surgery.  Appellee and cross-appellant Dolores Green1 filed suit against appellants 
and cross-appellees, Dr. Robert P. Van Bergen, Dr. Harold Stevens, their 
respective professional organizations, and  Toledo Hospital. 
 
At trial in 1991, Green presented live testimony from an anesthesiologist, 
Dr. Phillip Fyman.  The defense also presented live expert testimony from Dr. 
Michael Nugent, a cardiac anesthesiologist, who was cross-examined by Green.  
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found for the defendants.  On appeal, the 
                                                          
 
1. 
This action was commenced in 1985 by Frances Costell, widow of Donald Costell, in her 
individual capacity and as executor of her husband’s estate.  Frances Costell died in 1995.  
Dolores Green, daughter of Frances and Donald Costell, continued this action in her mother’s 
place.  Gerald Costell, their son, was added as a party plaintiff to represent his mother’s estate.  
For purposes of simplicity, the name Green will be used throughout when referring to the 
plaintiffs. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
court of appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial 
based on various evidentiary errors. 
 
In January 1996, before the retrial, Green filed a motion to disqualify Dr. 
Stevens’s attorney, James R. Jeffery, and his law firm, Spengler Nathanson, 
L.L.P., because a secretary at the firm, Penelope Kreps, had previously been 
employed by Green’s attorney, E.J. Leizerman, as his secretary. 
 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing.  Kreps testified that she did not 
have any confidences or secrets about the instant litigation to share with either 
Jeffery or his firm.  She testified that she was not involved in trial preparation 
meetings or in assisting witnesses and that she had little to do with the case except 
for typing letters.  Leizerman testified that Kreps was an integral part of the “trial 
team,” who was present during all client and witness conferences and at all 
strategy.  He also testified that Kreps took notes and shared in discussions of the 
case.  The trial court overruled the motion for disqualification. 
 
At the second trial in November 1997, Green read the 1991 trial testimony 
of Dr. Fyman into the record.  There was no objection from the defense.  
However, when the defense attempted to read the 1991 trial testimony of Dr. 
Nugent into the record, Green objected, stating that the testimony could not be 
read without adequate proof of unavailability under Evid.R. 804(B)(1). 
 
The defense countered that Civ.R. 32 provided an exception for doctors.  
See Civ.R. 32(A)(3)(e).  Green did not dispute that the witness was a physician 
within the exception, only that there was inadequate proof submitted to the court 
of the witness’s unavailability under the hearsay rule.  The trial court found 
Civ.R. 32 applicable and that Dr. Nugent was “unavailable,” overruled Green’s 
objection, and allowed Dr. Nugent’s testimony to be read into the record. 
 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found for the defense.  Green 
appealed, claiming that attorney Jeffrey should have been disqualified and that 
Dr. Nugent’s testimony should not have been read into the record.  The court of 
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appeals upheld the denial of the motion to disqualify attorney Jeffrey but reversed 
the trial court’s allowance of Dr. Nugent’s testimony.  The court of appeals 
remanded the cause for a new trial. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the certification of a conflict and 
upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal and cross-appeal. 
I 
 
The first issue to be determined is whether the trial court properly denied 
Green’s motion to disqualify James Jeffery, the attorney for appellee and cross-
appellant Dr. Harold Stevens.  Green contends that Jeffery should be disqualified 
because his secretary, Penelope Kreps, formerly worked for E.J. Leizerman, the 
attorney for Green.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the motion to 
disqualify was properly denied. 
 
In 1996, the trial court found that Jeffery should not be disqualified, 
applying 
the 
substantial 
relationship 
test 
set 
forth 
in 
Baker 
v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (N.D.Ohio 1995), 893 F.Supp. 1349, 1364.  
Subsequent to the trial court’s ruling, we held in Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & 
Refining Co., Inc. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 688 N.E.2d 258, syllabus: 
 
“In ruling on a motion for disqualification of either an individual (primary 
disqualification) or the entire firm (imputed disqualification) when an attorney has 
left a law firm and joined a firm representing the opposing party, a court must 
hold an evidentiary hearing and issue findings of fact using a three-part analysis: 
 
“(1) Is there a substantial relationship between the matter at issue and the 
matter of the former firm’s prior representation; 
 
“(2) If there is a substantial relationship between these matters, is the 
presumption of shared confidences within the former firm rebutted by evidence 
that the attorney had no personal contact with or knowledge of the related matter; 
and 
January Term, 2002 
5 
 
“(3) If the attorney did have personal contact with or knowledge of the 
related matter, did the new law firm erect adequate and timely screens to rebut a 
presumption of shared confidences with the new firm so as to avoid imputed 
disqualification?” 
 
Because Kreps is a legal secretary and not an attorney, we find Kala 
instructive but distinguishable.  A crucial element of the Kala test is missing here.  
Specifically, we hold that the presumption of shared confidences that is at the core 
of Kala is inappropriate for nonattorneys.  See In re Complex Asbestos Litigation 
(1991), 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 592-593, 283 Cal.Rptr. 732; Stewart v. Bee-Dee 
Neon & Signs, Inc. (Fla.App.2000), 751 So.2d 196.  Many, if not most, 
nonattorneys at a law firm are not regularly exposed to confidential information 
about clients and their cases.  Further, to expose nonattorneys to the same 
presumption as attorneys would unfairly taint them and make it more difficult for 
them to change employment.  The California court in Complex Asbestos 
Litigation referred to such tainted nonattorneys as “Typhoid Marys.”  Id., 232 
Cal.App.3d at 596, 283 Cal.Rptr. at 746.  Nonattorneys seeking employment with 
a lawyer or law firm in sparsely populated towns and counties would be 
especially hard hit by the presumption because their former employment would 
raise the specter of disqualification.  Thus, the Kala three-prong test does not 
apply in determining whether an attorney should be disqualified because his or 
her nonattorney employee was formerly employed by an attorney or firm 
representing an opposing party. 
 
In cases involving nonattorney employees, the party moving for 
disqualification may not rely on any initial presumption, but instead must present 
evidence that the former employee has been exposed to confidential information 
in the relevant case.  Once such evidence has been presented, the court must hold 
an evidentiary hearing in which the party moving for disqualification has the 
burden of proving that the nonattorney has been exposed to relevant confidential 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
matters.  Once this showing has been made, a presumption then arises that the 
information has been disclosed to the current employer.  This presumption may be 
rebutted by showing that the challenged attorney’s law firm has put in place 
sufficient screening procedures to ensure nondisclosure, and that those procedures 
have been followed in this case. 
 
We hold that in ruling on a motion to disqualify a lawyer based on that 
lawyer’s employment of a nonattorney once employed by the lawyer representing 
an opposing party, a court must use the following analysis: 
 
(1)  Is there a substantial relationship between the matter at issue and the 
matter of the nonattorney employee’s former firm’s representation? 
 
(2)  Did the moving party present credible evidence that the nonattorney 
employee was exposed to confidential information in his or her former 
employment relating to the matter at issue? 
 
(3)  If such evidence was presented, did the challenged attorney rebut the 
resulting presumption of disclosure with evidence either that (a) the employee had 
no contact with or knowledge of the related matter or (b) the new law firm erected 
and followed adequate and timely screens to rebut the evidence presented in 
prong (2) so as to avoid disqualification? 
 
Although it applied a different test, the trial court reached the heart of the 
above test.  Both parties presented ample evidence and the trial judge determined, 
without regard to who bore the burdens of proof or persuasion,  that the 
presumption of disclosure had been rebutted.  On this issue, as the court of 
appeals stated, “we are not in a position to second-guess the trial judge’s findings 
of fact.” 
 
Since the trial court found that the presumption of disclosed confidences 
had been rebutted, we conclude that under the standard set forth today for 
nonattorney employees, any evidence that Kreps had contact with or knowledge 
of confidential information in this matter at her former employer’s firm was also 
January Term, 2002 
7 
rebutted.  We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the motion to disqualify.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals on this issue. 
II 
 
The second issue to be determined is whether the trial court erred in 
allowing the defense to introduce the testimony of a witness from a prior trial.  
Because of our ultimate holding on this issue, we will not address whether Dr. 
Nugent was “unavailable” pursuant to Evid.R. 804(B)(1).  For the reasons that 
follow, we conclude that the trial court did not err. 
 
Civ.R. 32(A) provides: 
 
“At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory 
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of 
evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, may be 
used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the 
deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any one of 
the following provisions: 
 
“* * * 
 
“(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by 
any party for any purpose if the court finds:  * * * (e) that the witness is an 
attending physician or medical expert, although residing within the county in 
which the action is heard.” 
 
The court of appeals determined that Civ.R. 32 “on its face, applies only to 
depositions.”  The court accordingly was technically correct in reversing the trial 
court’s order admitting the former trial testimony.  The court of appeals’ holding 
is in conflict with Sudbury v. Arga Co. (Dec. 2, 1985), Clermont App. No. CA85-
03-015, unreported, 1985 WL 3970. 
 
We are persuaded that Sudbury addressed the issue more equitably and 
more in keeping with judicial economy.  In Sudbury, the court of appeals stated: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“While the record of [the doctor’s] testimony [at a hearing before the 
Industrial Commission] may not have been a ‘deposition’ within the technical 
definition of that term as it is normally understood and used, the testimony does 
bear the indicia of reliability in that it was given under oath, it was subject to 
cross-examination, and it was given before an administrative body entitled to 
administer oaths and take testimony.”  Id., 1985 WL 3970, at * 2. 
 
Thus, the court held, the testimony was properly admitted in a later jury 
trial of the same claim.  As in Sudbury, the testimony in this case was given under 
oath and was subject to cross-examination.  Dr. Nugent’s testimony was even 
subject to cross-examination by the same party and the same attorney.  In 
Sudbury, the testimony was before an administrative body; here the testimony was 
before a judge in the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County. 
 
The court in Sudbury continued: 
 
“R.C. 4123.519 and Civ.R. 32 clearly demonstrate a conscious awareness 
of the difficulty and problems associated with obtaining the live testimony of 
attending physicians and medical expert witnesses.  The case at bar presents an 
example of the very situation contemplated by these exceptions to the live 
testimony of such witnesses. 
 
“While [the doctor’s] testimony is not a deposition per se, we would 
nevertheless find such testimony to be admissible since it reflects that degree of 
reliability and thoroughness associated with depositions designed to replace the 
live testimony of a witness at trial.”  Id. 
 
Green argues that allowing former trial testimony pursuant to Civ.R. 
32(A)(3)(e) poses a risk of stale testimony.  However, Green also concedes that 
upon a showing of unavailability, former trial testimony, however stale, may be 
presented.  Green also argues that depositions are more likely to be fresh than 
former trial testimony.  But given how long this case has been in the court system, 
there are depositions over ten years old that could be presented as testimony.  
January Term, 2002 
9 
Furthermore, Dr. Nugent’s testimony, even if live, would be based on the medical 
practices in place at the time of the alleged negligence, which occurred almost 
twenty years ago. 
 
We agree with the court of appeals in Sudbury that former trial testimony 
is as reliable as deposition testimony.  To advance the evident purpose of Civ.R. 
32(A)(3)(e), we hold that, pursuant to that rule, prior trial testimony of a doctor in 
the same case may be submitted as if it were deposition testimony.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on this issue. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., EDWARDS and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
Cook, J., concurs separately. 
 
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
JULIE A. EDWARDS, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, 
J. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring.  I agree with the majority’s determination that 
neither the trial court nor the court of appeals erred in regard to the 
disqualification issue.  I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that because the 
trial court properly admitted the prior trial testimony of Dr. Nugent, the court of 
appeals’ holding to the contrary warrants reversal.  I do not agree, however, with 
the majority’s reliance on Civ.R. 32(A) to reach this conclusion.  Civ.R. 32(A) 
does not apply to former trial testimony; it applies only to depositions.  This court 
should instead overrule its prior interpretation of Evid.R. 804 in State v. Keairns 
(1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 228, 9 OBR 569, 460 N.E.2d 245, and hold that the trial 
court properly admitted Nugent’s testimony under Evid.R. 804(B)(1). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
When Dr. Stevens’s counsel sought to proffer the prior testimony, the 
appellees objected on the ground of inadequate proof of unavailability as required 
by Evid.R. 804(B)(1).  Evid.R. 804(B) provides: 
 
“The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: 
 
“(1) Former testimony.  Testimony given as a witness at another hearing 
of the same or a different proceeding, * * * if the party against whom the 
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in 
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross, or redirect examination.” 
 
In Keairns, this court held that the rule “permits the admissibility at trial of 
former testimony taken at a previous trial upon a showing that the witness is 
unavailable despite reasonable efforts made in good faith to secure his presence at 
trial.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Evid.R. 804(B)(1) therefore allows 
admission of Nugent’s former testimony, which had been subject to cross-
examination at the first trial, upon a sufficient showing of his unavailability. 
 
This court has held that “[a] showing of unavailability under Evid.R. 804 
must be based on testimony of witnesses rather than hearsay not under oath unless 
unavailability is conceded by the party against whom the statement is being 
offered.”  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.  But as the dissent in Keairns 
explained, nothing in the language of the rule requires sworn testimony as to 
unavailability.  “[T]he Rules of Evidence do not compel the formal presentation 
of sworn testimony on preliminary matters affecting the admissibility of evidence 
* * *.  * * * [A]ll that is necessary is that [counsel] satisfy the trial court that the 
witness is unavailable and that a good faith attempt has been made to secure the 
witness’ attendance.  No formal testimony is necessary and, in resolving these 
preliminary questions of admissibility, the trial court is not bound by the Rules of 
Evidence.  Evid.R. 104(A).”  Keairns, 9 Ohio St.3d at 234, 9 OBR 569, 460 
January Term, 2002 
11 
N.E.2d 245 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting).  The court should therefore overrule the 
third syllabus of Keairns, as it requires more than the rule requires. 
 
Rather than disturbing the plain language of Civ.R. 32(A), this court ought 
to recognize here that the correct inquiry lies under Evid.R. 804.  And under 
Evid.R. 804(A)(4), unavailability can include situations in which a declarant “is 
unable to be present or to testify” because of “then-existing physical or mental 
illness or infirmity.”  Following counsel’s representations, the trial court here 
specifically found that Nugent was “in ill health and unable to be here.”  Although 
the trial court made this finding under Civ.R. 32(A)(3)(c) (“the witness is unable 
to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment”), that 
standard is analogous to Evid.R. 804(A)(4).  Thus, the trial court found that 
Nugent was unavailable, which under a proper construction of Evid.R. 804(B)(1) 
would permit the admission of the prior testimony. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, while I join the majority’s first two syllabus 
paragraphs, I join the majority’s disposition of the prior testimony issue in 
judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I respectfully 
concur in part and dissent in part to the opinion of the majority.  I would affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals in all respects. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
E.J. Leizerman & Associates and E.J. Leizerman, for appellees and cross-
appellants Dolores Green and Gerald Costell. 
 
Eastman & Smith Ltd., Rudolph A. Peckinpaugh, Jr., and Michael W. 
Regnier, for appellant and cross-appellee Toledo Hospital. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Spengler Nathanson, P.L.L., James R. Jeffery and Teresa L. Grigsby, for 
appellants and cross-appellees Harold R. Stevens, M.D., and Katchka, Friedman 
& Crider, Inc. 
__________________