Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Kum

Citation: 

Docket Number: 73ag/12

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Joseph M. Kum, Misc. Docket AG No. 73, 
September Term 2012 
 
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT — DISCIPLINE — DISBARMENT — Respondent, 
Joseph M. Kum, violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4(a), 
1.15(a) and (d), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c) and (d), as well as Maryland Rule 16-607.  The 
violations stemmed from Respondent’s misappropriation of client funds, failure to properly 
maintain records of a trust account, failure to maintain reasonable communication with his 
client, and failure to respond to lawful demands for information.  The appropriate sanction 
for Respondent’s violations is disbarment. 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CAE12-40669 
Argued:  September 9, 2014 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 73 
 
September Term, 2012 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH M. KUM 
 
 
       Barbera, C.J., 
       Harrell 
       Battaglia 
       Greene 
       Adkins 
       McDonald 
       Watts,       
 
 
     JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Barbera, C.J. 
 
 
Filed:  October 28, 2014 
 
 
 
Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the “Commission”), 
acting through Bar Counsel, has filed with this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or 
Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Respondent, Joseph M. Kum.  The Petition alleged 
several violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 
in connection with two matters involving, among other misconduct, the misappropriation 
of client funds.  
We designated the Honorable Krystal Q. Alves of the Circuit Court for Prince 
George’s County (the “hearing judge”) to conduct the hearing, make findings of fact, and 
draw conclusions of law.  Respondent was served with process pursuant to Maryland Rule 
16-753.1  Respondent did not file a response to the Petition, timely or otherwise.  On June 
28, 2013, the hearing judge entered a default order against Respondent.  Respondent was 
served with the default order, notice of the initial hearing date, and, upon its postponement, 
the subsequent hearing date.  Respondent did not seek to vacate the order of default. 
The hearing was held on September 6, 2013.  Respondent did not appear at the 
hearing.  The Commission presented evidence, including the testimony of four witnesses.  
On September 18, 2013, the hearing judge issued written findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in which she concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent had 
                                              
1 Maryland Rule 16-753 provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]f after reasonable efforts 
the attorney cannot be served personally, service may be made upon the employee 
designated by the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland pursuant to Rule 16-811.4 
(a)(12), who shall be deemed the attorney’s agent for receipt of service.”  Following 
reasonable efforts to obtain personal service on Respondent, this Court, having found good 
cause, granted the Commission’s motion to permit service to be made upon Janet Moss, 
Executive Director of the Client Protection Fund, as the agent of Respondent for receipt of 
service under this Rule.   
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violated MLRPC 1.4(a) (communication); MLRPC 1.15(a) and (d) (safekeeping property); 
MLRPC 1.16(d) (declining or terminating representation); MLRPC 8.1(b) (bar admission 
and disciplinary matters); MLRPC 8.4(c) and (d) (misconduct); and Maryland Rule 16-607 
(commingling of funds).  No exceptions were filed. 
 
On September 9, 2014, this Court heard argument, at which only the Commission 
appeared.  The following day, we entered a per curiam order disbarring Respondent.  We 
explain in this opinion the reasons for that action.  
I. Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact  
Based on the evidence accepted at the September 6, 2013 hearing, the hearing judge 
set forth the following findings of fact, which we summarize. 
Respondent has been a member of the bar of this Court since December 18, 1996.  
Respondent maintained a law office with the firm of Amity, Kum & Suleman (“AKS”) in 
Prince George’s County, Maryland.  As of the date of the hearing, Respondent no longer 
maintains an office for the practice of law in the State of Maryland. 
Commingling of Trust Account Funds 
On May 2, 2011, the Commission received notification of an overdraft on an 
attorney trust account maintained by Respondent at BB&T Bank, titled “Law Offices of 
Joseph M. Kum IOLTA Acct.” (“IOLTA Account”).  AKS maintained a separate attorney 
trust account at M&T Bank, titled “Amity, Kum and Suleman, Attys.” (the “AKS Trust 
Account”).  Respondent’s IOLTA Account, however, was operated solely by him.  In a 
letter dated May 6, 2011, the Commission asked Respondent to provide an explanation for 
the overdraft, as well as financial records for the IOLTA Account.   
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Respondent replied with a letter dated May 18, 2011,2 in which he explained that a 
check for $4,172, deposited in settlement of a client’s personal injury matter, had been 
returned by the issuing bank due to a missing endorsement.  According to Respondent, 
after he learned of this fact on April 27, 2011, he transferred funds from his general account 
to cover an IOLTA Account check he had written to a client.  Respondent provided records 
to show two in-branch transfers on April 27, 2011, from his general account to his IOLTA 
Account in the amounts of $1,750 and $700, respectively.  After obtaining the required 
endorsement, Respondent re-deposited the check into the IOLTA Account.   
In two letters dated May 23, 2011 and June 29, 2011, the Commission requested 
verification that Respondent had removed the transferred funds of $1,750 and $700 from 
his IOLTA Account after he successfully re-deposited the settlement check for $4,172.  
When Respondent failed to reply to either request, the Commission informed Respondent 
on July 22, 2011 that it had docketed a complaint against him.  The Commission directed 
Respondent to provide the Commission with the requested verification. 
Respondent replied to the Commission’s letter on July 30, 2011.  He acknowledged 
receipt of the docketed complaint and provided documentation that the re-deposited 
settlement check of $4,172 had cleared on May 3, 2011, but he offered no evidence that he 
had removed the previously-transferred funds of $1,750 and $700 from his IOLTA 
Account.  Instead, Respondent acknowledged a check for $1,625 that was issued from the 
IOLTA Account to “ACC Telecom” on April 26, 2011, and he explained that he also made 
                                              
2  Respondent’s letter was actually dated “May 18, 2010,” but the Commission 
understood this to be an error. 
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transfers from his general account to cover that check.  The “ACC Telecom” check 
contained no notation identifying it as relating to a client matter. 
Sometime around August 2011, Respondent left the country to travel to Ghana.  
Jamila Nandule-Cook (“Ms. Nandule-Cook”), an intern at AKS at the time, testified that 
Respondent said that he was traveling for business and would return later in the year.  Fatai 
Suleman (“Mr. Suleman”), a member of AKS, testified that Respondent failed to provide 
any details regarding his business trip or offer any instructions on his clients’ pending legal 
matters.   
In a letter dated September 19, 2011, the Commission again asked Respondent for 
documentation verifying that the previously-transferred checks had been removed from the 
IOLTA Account, and to explain the issuance of the “ACC Telecom” check.  The 
Commission gave Respondent until October 6, 2011, to respond.  Ms. Nandule-Cook, in 
contact with Respondent regarding the Commission’s request, asked for two extensions on 
Respondent’s behalf.  On the second occasion, Ms. Nandule-Cook informed the 
Commission that unavoidable circumstances had postponed Respondent’s return to the 
United States until November 18, 2011.  The Commission granted an extension until 
December 5, 2011.  Respondent, however, did not respond to the Commission’s request.  
Respondent evidently had not returned to the United States as of the September 6, 
2013 hearing.  On March 15, 2012, Respondent was administratively suspended from 
practicing law in Maryland for the non-payment of his 2011-2012 annual assessment due 
to the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland.  In May 2012, Mr. Suleman and N. 
David Etokebe, another member of AKS, took steps to dissolve AKS.   
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Representation of David Miller 
In January 2008, David Miller (“Mr. Miller”) and three other individuals retained 
AKS to represent them in an employment-related harassment claim against the Town of 
Riverdale Park, in Prince George’s County, Maryland.  On January 3, 2008, Mr. Miller 
signed a contingent fee agreement providing for an attorney’s fee of 33.3% of any 
settlement recovery.  Although Mr. Suleman actively participated in the representation of 
Mr. Miller, Respondent was the initial attorney contacted by the clients, and he had primary 
responsibility for the representation.   
In February 2009, the four clients settled their claims for $200,000, or $50,000 per 
client, which was deposited into the AKS Trust Account.  Each client received a settlement 
disposition statement indicating that he would receive a net distribution of $33,350, 
following the deduction of an attorney’s fee of $16,650 per client. 
At the time of the settlement, Mr. Miller was incarcerated in North Carolina.  
Accordingly, he signed a power of attorney authorizing Respondent to receive and hold his 
settlement proceeds in trust.  Instead of maintaining the funds in the AKS Trust Account, 
Respondent wrote a check from that account for $33,350, made payable to “Law Offices 
Joseph M. Kum Trust Account,” with a notation that it was for Mr. Miller.   
Mr. Miller testified that he received an initial distribution of $3,333 at or about the 
time the settlement was finalized.  Mr. Miller continued to receive from Respondent 
periodic transfers totaling an additional $6,000.  Mr. Miller also authorized Respondent to 
disburse portions of his settlement proceeds to Donna Williams (“Ms. Williams”), the 
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mother of Mr. Miller’s child.  Ms. Williams received three separate payments from 
Respondent totaling $5,500.   
In early November 2011, Mr. Miller was released from incarceration and returned 
to Maryland.  On November 8, 2011, he requested the balance of his settlement proceeds 
from AKS.  Respondent was out of the country at the time, so Mr. Suleman e-mailed 
Respondent, notifying him that Mr. Miller sought his remaining recovery and requesting 
that Respondent contact Mr. Miller as soon as possible. 
On November 14, 2011, Ms. Williams received another wire transfer of $2,000 from 
Respondent and, on December 12, 2011, received an additional $5,000.  Neither Mr. Miller 
nor Ms. Williams received any additional disbursements after December 12, 2011, and Mr. 
Miller had no further contact with Respondent. 
In sum, Mr. Miller received $9,333 and Ms. Williams received $12,500 from 
Respondent, for a total of $21,833.  Respondent never did disburse the remaining $11,517 
due to Mr. Miller, nor did Respondent ever respond to Mr. Miller’s request for an 
accounting of those funds. 
In February 2012, Mr. Miller filed a complaint against Respondent with the 
Commission.  On March 19, 2012, the Commission wrote to Respondent requesting a 
response to Mr. Miller’s complaint.  Respondent did not reply to the Commission’s request.  
The Commission spoke with Judith Kum (“Ms. Kum”), Respondent’s wife, on June 21, 
2012.  Ms. Kum told the Commission’s investigator that Respondent was still in Ghana, 
and she did not know when he planned to return. 
 
 
 
II. Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law 
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The hearing judge concluded, in connection with Respondent’s handling of his 
IOLTA Account, that he had violated MLRPC 1.15(a) by “fail[ing] to create and maintain 
records concerning his BB&T trust account in accordance with the Rules in Title 16, 
Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules.”  The hearing judge concluded that Respondent 
violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing to respond to Bar Counsel’s September 19, 2011 letter, 
receipt of which he had acknowledged through his intern, Ms. Nandule-Cook.  The hearing 
judge also concluded that, “[w]hen [Respondent] transferred funds in the amounts of 
$1,750 and $700 from his personal account to his BB&T trust account[,]” he “was 
depositing personal funds into the account[,]” which, in addition to “his failure to remove 
such funds promptly and his apparent use of the funds to cover the $1,625 check written to 
‘ACC Telecom,’” constituted a violation of Maryland Rule 16-607. 
In connection with Respondent’s representation of Mr. Miller, the hearing judge 
concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a), because he “did not keep Mr. Miller 
reasonably informed and failed to comply with Mr. Miller’s reasonable requests for 
information concerning the status of his trust money after Mr. Miller was released from 
incarceration in November 2011.”  The hearing judge also concluded that, by failing to 
respond to Mr. Miller’s request for the balance of the funds that Respondent should have 
been holding in trust, “Respondent failed to safeguard client funds belonging to Mr. Miller 
in accordance with MLRPC 1.15(a).”  Respondent violated MLRPC 1.15(d) by failing to 
“deliver[] the balance of the funds to which Mr. Miller was entitled and by failing, upon 
Mr. Miller’s request, to render promptly a full accounting regarding the balance of the 
settlement proceeds[.]”  Furthermore, by traveling to Ghana without “distribut[ing] the full 
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remaining balance of Mr. Miller’s settlement proceeds,” Respondent violated MLRPC 
1.16(d).  The hearing judge also concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(c) and 
(d) by knowingly and willfully misappropriating the balance of Mr. Miller’s settlement 
proceeds in the amount of $11,517.  
III. Standard of Review 
In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court “has original and complete jurisdiction 
and conducts an independent review of the record.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Page, 
430 Md. 602, 626 (2013).  We accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact as “correct unless 
shown to be clearly erroneous.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lara, 418 Md. 355, 364 
(2011).  If no exceptions are filed, we may treat the findings of fact as established for the 
purpose of determining the appropriate sanction.  Md. Rule 16-759 (b)(2)(A).  We review 
de novo the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  Md. Rule 16-759(b)(1); Page, 430 Md. at 
626.  This is true even if, as in this case, the hearing judge entered a default order against 
the respondent.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tinsky, 377 Md. 646, 653 (2003).  The 
ultimate decision as to whether an attorney has engaged in professional misconduct lies 
with this Court.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 717 (2014). 
IV. Discussion 
Neither Respondent nor Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings 
of fact.  We therefore treat those findings as established.  See Md. Rule 16-759 (b)(2)(A).  
Likewise, neither party filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  We 
have reviewed the record, and we agree with the hearing judge’s legal conclusions that 
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Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a); MLRPC 1.15(a) and (d); MLRPC 1.16(d); MLRPC 
8.1(b); MLRPC 8.4(c) and (d); and Maryland Rule 16-607. 
MLRPC 1.4(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall . . . keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of the matter[, and] promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information . . . .”  A lawyer’s “repeated disregard” of his or her obligation to 
respond to inquiries from clients regarding the status of their cases violates MLRPC 1.4(a).  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kremer, 432 Md. 325, 336 (2013); see also Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. De La Paz, 418 Md. 534, 554 (2011) (holding that an attorney 
violated MLRPC 1.4, in part, by not responding to a client’s letters inquiring about the 
status of his case).  Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4(a) by failing to keep Mr. Miller 
reasonably informed of the status of the trust proceeds owed to him, and by failing to 
comply with Mr. Miller’s reasonable request for information concerning the status of those 
trust monies.  
MLRPC 1.15(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall hold [the] property 
of clients . . . that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate 
from the lawyer’s own property.”  MLRPC 1.15(a) also provides that client funds should 
“be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland 
Rules, and records shall be created and maintained in accordance with [those Rules].”  
Maryland Rule 16-607 in turn provides that “[a]n attorney or law firm may deposit in an 
attorney trust account only those funds required to be deposited in that account by Rule 16-
604 or permitted to be so deposited by section b. of this Rule.”  
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We have held that an attorney’s depositing both personal funds and client funds in 
a trust account to cover personal expenses is a misuse of trust funds, which “clearly 
violates” MLRPC 1.15(a) and Maryland Rule 16-607.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Kobin, 432 Md. 565, 582 (2013); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Nussbaum, 401 
Md. 612, 638–39 (2007).  Respondent violated those rules by transferring a total of $2,450 
from his personal account to his IOLTA Account, then, without promptly withdrawing 
those funds from the IOLTA Account, writing a check from that account in the amount of 
$1,625, issued to “ACC Telecom.” 
MLRPC 1.15(d) provides, in pertinent part, that “a lawyer shall deliver promptly to 
the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled 
to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall render promptly a full 
accounting regarding such property.”  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Levin, 432 
Md. 439, 444 (2012) (holding that failure to deliver promptly property belonging to clients 
and to render promptly an accounting of that property violated MLRPC 1.15(d)).  
Respondent violated MLRPC 1.15(d) by not delivering promptly to Mr. Miller the balance 
of the funds to which he was entitled, and by failing upon Mr. Miller’s request to render 
promptly a full accounting of the balance of the settlement proceeds. 
MLRPC 1.16(d) provides, in pertinent part, that, “[u]pon termination of 
representation, a lawyer shall take steps to . . . protect a client’s interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, . . . surrendering papers and property to which the client is 
entitled[,] and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned 
or incurred.”  “Where a lawyer abandons a client without notice ‘through the failure to take 
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meaningful steps in pursuit of the client’s interest, and fail[s] to return unearned portion of 
a fee paid by the client,’ he or she violates MLRPC 1.16(d).”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Costanzo, 432 Md. 233, 255 (2013) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garrett, 
427 Md. 209, 225 (2012)).  Respondent violated MLRPC 1.16(d) both by essentially 
abandoning Mr. Miller without any explanation when Respondent left for Ghana, and by 
failing to distribute to Mr. Miller the full remaining balance of his settlement proceeds. 
MLRPC 8.1(b) provides, in pertinent part, that a lawyer “in connection with a 
disciplinary matter[] shall not . . . knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for 
information from . . . [a] disciplinary authority.”  See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 174 (2010).  Respondent failed to respond to the Commission’s 
September 19, 2011 letter, receipt of which Respondent acknowledged through his intern, 
Ms. Nandule-Cook, and thereby violated MLRPC 8.1(b). 
MLRPC 8.4 provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to . . . (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation[,]” and “(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice[.]”  Misappropriation of client funds is “dishonest conduct” that also is “prejudicial 
to the administration of justice in violation of [MLRPC] 8.4(c) and (d).”  Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Zimmerman, 428 Md. 119, 132 (2012); see also Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Landau, 437 Md. 641, 652 (2014) (finding that an attorney who neither 
administered nor accounted for client funds, and instead withdrew them for personal use, 
violated MLRPC 8.4(c) and (d)). 
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Respondent failed to return Mr. Miller’s funds or provide an accounting that would 
establish distributions other than the amounts to which Mr. Miller and Ms. Williams 
testified.  Respondent thereby knowingly and willfully misappropriated the balance of Mr. 
Miller’s settlement proceeds, which amounted to $11,517.  Respondent’s misappropriation 
of Mr. Miller’s funds establishes a violation of MLRPC 8.4(c).  That conduct is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice, in violation of MLRPC 8.4(d). 
V. Sanction 
Our only remaining task is to determine the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s 
misconduct.  “The severity of the sanction for an attorney’s misconduct ‘depends on the 
circumstances of each case, the intent with which the acts were committed, the gravity, 
nature and effect of the violations, and any mitigating factors.’”  Landau, 437 Md. at 651 
(quoting Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ward, 394 Md. 1, 33 (2006)).  “[T]he primary 
purpose is to protect the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession and not 
to punish the lawyer.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474 (2002).  
The sanction should also be “aimed at deterring other attorneys from engaging in similar 
conduct.”  Id. at 474–75. 
The core of Respondent’s misconduct is the misappropriation of funds entrusted to 
him.  We have explained that, 
[i]t has long been settled that an attorney’s misappropriation of funds 
entrusted to his care, be the amount small or large, is of great concern and 
represents the gravest form of professional misconduct. The default sanction 
for ethical violations involving intentional misappropriation, or other 
intentional dishonest conduct, is disbarment.  
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Zimmerman, 428 Md. at 146 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stern, 419 Md. 525, 
558 (2011)).  Disbarment is justified in cases involving intentional misappropriation of 
client funds because “[a]ppropriating any part of those funds [for an attorney’s] own use 
and benefit without clear authority to do so cannot be tolerated.”  Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 345 (1991); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 161 (2005) (“[T]he misappropriation of entrusted funds is an 
act infected with deceit and dishonesty, and, in the absence of compelling extenuating 
circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, will result in disbarment.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 
Respondent was entrusted to hold Mr. Miller’s settlement proceeds.  Despite 
repeated attempts from Mr. Miller to retrieve the balance of the funds to which he is 
entitled, Respondent willfully failed both to administer the remaining settlement proceeds 
and to render a full accounting.  Such misconduct warrants disbarment.  See Landau, 437 
Md. at 652–53 (holding that disbarment was appropriate where the respondent, “entrusted 
with the collection of thousands of dollars owed to his client, neither administered nor 
accounted for those funds”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mitchell, 386 Md. 386, 400–
01 (2005) (holding that disbarment was merited when an attorney used a client’s settlement 
proceeds for personal expenses, “thereby denying his client that which was justly hers[]”).  
Because Respondent failed to offer any extenuating circumstances that could 
somehow have served to mitigate his misconduct, this Court finds that the appropriate 
sanction for Respondent’s misappropriation of his client’s funds, coupled with his multiple 
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other violations, is disbarment.  Accordingly, we entered the September 10, 2014 order 
disbarring Respondent and awarding costs against him.