Case Title: J C v Eleventh Jud Dist Court

Citation: 2008 MT 358

Docket Number: 4e3f966f-70ba-4140-88a5-e96ccc92831a

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 2008-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED

OP 08-0411 eas
aE TLED
OCT 22 2008
Potitsones, OPINION
* and

FLATHEAD COUNTY, THE HONORABLE
‘TED 0. LYMPUS,

Respondent.
{1 1C. the mother of eight-year-old JR., filed with this Court a Petition for Writ of
Supervisory Control pursuant to M. R. App. P. 14, on September 2, 2008. In her petition,
J.C. alleges that she has been deprived of her right to parent JR. because of the Amended
Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and for Adoption filed by G.R. and PR,
J.R's aunt and uncle. J.C, further alleges that Respondent has issued unlawful and
‘unconstitutional ex parte and other orders adversely affecting her parental rights.
{2 On September 3, 2008, we ordered Respondent to prepare, file and serve a
summary response to J.C.’s petition. We also granted G.R. and P.R. time to file a
summary response should they choose to do so. In addition, we ordered that all
proceedings in the underlying District Court cause be stayed pending further order of this
Court
18 Pursuant to our Order, Respondent filed a Summary Response to Petition for Writ
of Supervisory Control on September 15, 2008 To date, G.R. and PR. have not
responded.

Factual and Procedural Background
4 1C. is the sole surviving parent of eight-year-old J.R. J.R.'s birth father was killed
in 1999 when J.C. crashed the vehicle in which she, JR.'s father, and another of J.C.’s
children were riding. J.C. was pregnant with JR. at the time, The wreck killed all but
1.C. and her unborn child, LR. J.C. is now married to M.W. M.W. and J.C. have lived
together since J.R. was one month old.

5 In 2005, .C. drove the getaway car in a botched armed robbery. J.R. and his half
brother were unrestrained in the back seat ofthe vehicle when J.C. crashed the car into a
tree. J.C. was taken to jail and the children were placed in foster care by the Department
‘of Public Health and Human Services. J.C. pled guilty to felony criminal endangerment
for her rollin the armed robbery. She received a ten-year suspended sentence in Flathead
‘County Cause No. DC 05-090A. ‘The sentencing court wamed J.C. that if she violated

 

 

her probation, she would serve the entire ten years. J.C. ultimately agreed to allow .R.’s
half-brother to move with his father to South Dakota, but J.C. declined to relinquish JR.
their offers to assist her

 

to his aunt and uncle despi
16 Less than a year after J.C. received her suspended sentence, she admitted to

 

violating her probation by drinking and driving. Her suspended sentence was revoked
and she was transported to the women’s prison in Billings to serve her full sentence.
Before she went to prison, J.C. executed a Durable Power of Attorney enabling M.W. to
hhandle her financial affairs. Although J.C, made no provision for JR. in the power of
attomey, she left JR. in M.W.’s care. M.W. is himself on probation for failing to register
in Montana as a violent offender.

{7 On November 21, 2007, G.R. and P.R. filed a Petition for Termination of Parental
Rights requesting that the court permanently terminate J.C.'s parental rights to J.R. and
‘order the adoption of J.R. by G.R. and PR. G.R. and P.R. also filed a Motion for
‘Temporary Care pending the disposition of their petition. ‘That same day, Judge Lympus
issued an order removing J.R. from M.W.’s care and placing him in the temporary care of
G.R. and P.R., who reside in Middleton, Idaho.

{8 On December 11, 2007, J.C. filed a motion to dismiss the petition to terminate hee
parental rights alleging that G.R. and P.R, do not qualify as persons entitled by the

 
adoption statutes to file such a petition as they do not mect any of the standing
requirements. However, the following day, J.C. signed an agreement wherein she
“voluntarily and unequivocally” relinquished her parental rights to J.C. and consented “to
both the permanent transfer of legal and physical custody to, and the adoption of” JR. by
GR. and PR. J.C. was represented by counsel at the time she entered into this
agreement

19 Eight days later, on December 20, 2007, J.C. revoked her consent and moved to
dismiss the Order for Temporary Care. She also requested that the court impose
sanctions against G.R, PR. and their counsel on the grounds that the Motion for

 

‘Temporary Care “was not warranted by existing law and was filed for the improper
purpose of depriving a parent of her constitutionally protected right to parent her child.”
‘That same day, M.W. filed a Cross-Petition for Step-Parent Adoption.
{10 A hearing on the issue of temporary care took place on March 25, 2008. J.C.
testified from prison via videoconference. G.R., P.R., and M.W. testified as well. At the
time of the hearing, G.R. and P.R. filed a motion to amend their Peti
of Parental Rights to add a reference to § 40-6-233, MCA (2007), giving relatives within
the third degree the right to bring an action alleging abuse of parental authority. The
‘court allowed the filing of the amended petition. On May 5, 2008, J.C. filed a motion to
dismiss the amended petition arguing that a parental abuse action is a distinct and
separate action which does not confer standing under the adoption statutes.
{11 The District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on
June 11, 2008, wherein the court determined that G.R. and P.R. had standing to bring the
petition. The court ordered that J.R. remain in the temporary care of G.R. and P.R.
pending a hearing on the termination of J.C.’s parental rights. ‘The court also denied
J.C.'s motion for sanctions. ‘Therealter, J.C. filed her Petition for Writ of Supervisory
Control with this Court. A hearing on the termination of J.C.’s parental rights was to be
conducted by the District Court on September 10, 2008, but that action has been stayed
‘pending the outcome of J.C.’s petition.

Discussion

 

 

nn for Termination

  
12 Article VII, Section 2(2) of the Montana Constitution gives this Court general
supervisory control over all other courts. This supervisory control is, however, an
“extraordinary remedy” that is to be exercised only in “extraordinary circumstances.”
Miller v. Eighteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 2007 MT 149, § 16, 337 Mont. 488, ¥ 16, 162
P3d 121, $116 (citing Evans v. Montana Eleventh Jud. Dist. Court, 2000 MT 38, 4 15,
298 Mont. 279, § 15, 995 P.2d 455, 4 15; Park v. Stxth Judicial Dist. Court, 1998 MT
164, $13, 289 Mont. 367, 4] 13, 961 P.2d 1267, $13). Consequently, we exercise

 

 

supervisory control only when a district court is proceeding under a mistake of law and,
in so doing, is causing a gross injustice, and where the normal appeal process is not an
adequate remedy. Miller, 416. Moreover, we make our determination regarding the

 

exercise of supervisory control on a case-by-case basis. Miller, $16 (citing Inter-Fluve v.
Eighteenth Jud, Dist, Court, 2005 MT 103, 4 17, 327 Mont. 14, § 17, 112 P.3d 258,917;
Dusek v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 2003 MT 303, 6, 318 Mont. 166, $6, 79 P.3d 292,
16).

{13 We hold that the case sub judice meets the requirements for the exercise of
supervisory control on the following bases. First, had the lower court proceedings in this
‘matter not been stayed pending our determination of J.C.’s petition, J.C.’s fundamental
right (o parent her child may well have been terminated. Second, the issue of whether

 

GR. and PR. have standing to bring their petition is a purely legal one, Third, the
District Cour is proceeding under a mistake of law regarding G.R. and P.R.’s standing in
this matter resulting in a gross injustice to J.C. and J.R. Finally, this case presents
a parent's fundamental constitutional

 

constitutional issues of statewide importance—i
right to parent her child.
{4 Accordingly, we assume supervisory control over this matter to consider the issue
raised by J.C.’s petition: Whether G.R. and P.R. have standing to bring their Amended
Petition to Terminate Parental Rights and for Adoption.

Standing
{15 Standing refers to the threshold justiciability requirement that a plaintiff have a
personal stake in a particular ease, Ballas v. Missoula City Bd. of Adjustment, 2007 MT
299, $ 14, 340 Mont. 56, § 14, 172 P.3d 1232, § 14 (citing Bowen v. McDonald, 276
Mont. 193, 201-02, 915 P.2d 201, 206 (1996)). If a plaintiff lacks standing, a court
cannot grant relief because a justiciable controversy does not exist. Ballas, § 14 (citing
Powder River County v. State, 2002 MT 259, $101, 312 Mont. 198, § 101, 60 P.3d 357,
101).

{16 Inher Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, J.C. argues that G.R. and P.R. lack
standing because they are not persons entitled to bring a
§ 421-107, MCA. Instead, this statute provides that a child may be placed for adoption

 

jon for adoption pursuant to

only by:
(a) the department or another agency to which the child has been
relinquished for purposes of adoptior
(b) the department or another agency expressly authorized to place
the child for adoption by a court order terminating the relationship between
the child and the child’s parent or guardian;
(€) the child's parents; or
(4) a guardian expressly authorized by the court to place the child
for adoption.
Section 42-1-107(2), MCA. Clearly, a child’s aunt and uncle are not parties authorized
by the statute to place the child for adoption,
{17 Additionally, § 42-1-107(1), MCA, provides that “[aJn adoption decree may not be
centered if the child who is the subject of an adoption proceeding is not legally free for
adoption.” And, “{a] child is not legally free for adoption until the parental rights of the
birth parent or parents have been terminated by a court: (1) as provided in (Title 42}; [or]
(2) pursuant to Title 41, chapter 3...” Section 42-2-602, MCA.
{18 However, Title 42, chapter 2, MCA, specifies that adoption proceedings should be
based on the consent of the birth parent and that controversies regarding termination of
parental rights should be a separate and distinct action. To that end, the Official

 

 

Comments to Title 42, chapter 2, MCA, provide:
It is the theory of this act that the adoption proceedings should be
based on consent, Only then can the adoption court devote its entire
attention to the inquiry whether the adoptive home will serve the best
interests of the child and whether the child is properly placed in the
adoptive home.

Under this theory controversies respecting the termination of
parental rights should be settled in other proceedings in a court with
Jurisdiction of the parties before the adoption proceedings are brought.
Once the parental rights are terminated the adoption court in the adoption
proceedings has no other function in this respect except to recognize that
the parental rights have been legally terminated by consent or by the order
‘of a court of competent jurisdiction, followed by consent of a person,
agency or court having authority to consent.

It has been suggested that a procedure should be provided in the
adoption act to terminate parental rights where the consent cannot be
obtained, Aside from the jurisdictional and procedural difficulties this
would entail, itis subject to basic policy objection. The issues to be tried
in a controversy over the termination of parental rights, ic. the degree of
unfitness of a parent, are quite different than the inquiry properly before an
adoption court. The two should not be mixed. The trial of controversial
issues over parental rights should not cast an influence in the adoption
proceedings where the sole inquiry should be the future best interests of the
child.

Consequently, the determination of parental rights is left to be settled
under the laws of the various states, and until terminated, by consent or by a
court order in a court having jurisdiction of the parties under laws provid
therefore, there can be no adoption proceedings. {Emphasis added.]

 

 

 

{19 In this case, the District Court determined that G.
their Petition for Termination of Parental Rights as they are prospective adoptive parents
pursuant to Title 42, part 6,' and § 40-6-233, MCA. However, a petition for termination
of parental rights under Title 42, chapter 2, part 6, may only be brought by “[tJhe
department, a licensed child-ple
relinguishment is issued, oF 4 guardian with custody of the child.” Section 42-2-603(2),
MCA (emphasis added). In this case, G.R. and PLR. are not the department, a licensed
child-placing agency or guardians with custody of the child. And, although J.C.

and P.R. had standing to file

  

1B agency, the prospective adoptive parent to whom the

 

" Since chapter 2 is the only chapter in Title 42 that contains a part 6, we conclude that
the District Court was referring to Title 42, chapter 2, part 6, MCA.

6
originally agreed to relinquish her parental rights to G.R. and P.R., J.C. subsequently
revoked that agreement contending that she was not adequately counseled as required by
§ 42:2-409, MCA. Hence, contrary to the District Court's assertions, Title 42, chapter 2,
part 6, MCA, does not give G.R. and P.R. standing to file a termination for parental rights
since they are not “prospective adoptive parent{s] to whom [a] relinquishment [has been]
issued.” Section 42-2-603(2), MCA.

{20 Relying on Girard v. Williams, 1998 MT 231, 291 Mont. 49, 966 P.2d 1155, G.R.
and P.R. argue that a finding of unfitness under Montana's Adoption Act (Title 42)
presents a statutory exception to the requirement that the natural parents consent to the
adoption of their child. However, this Court noted in Girard that a court may properly
‘make a determination that a child is abused, neglected or dependent only in a proceeding
instituted pursuant to, and in conformity with, the provisions of Title 41, chapter 3, MCA.

Girard, § 46 (citing In re Guardianship of D.T.N., 275 Mont, 480, 485, 914 P.24 $79,
582 (1996); Matter of Guardianship of Aschenbrenner, 182 Mont. $40, $51, $97 P.2d
1136, 1163 (1979); Henderson v. Henderson, 174 Mont. 1, 9, 568 P.2d 177, 181 (1977).

We stressed in Girard that “{s]uch determinations—or other interjections of abuse and
neglect considerations—are inappropriate and, indeed, erroneous as a matter of law if
made in other types of statutory proceedings relating to the custody of children.” Girard,
146.

{21 Moreover, under Title 41, chapter 3, MCA, a petition for termination of parental
rights based on abuse or neglect of a child may only be brought by the county attorney,
the attomey general, or an attomey hired by the county, Section 41-3-422(2), MCA.
Consequently, under the clear wording of this statue, G.R. and P.R. do not have standing
to bring a petition for termination of parental rights based on abuse or neglect of JR.

{22 In addition, the District Court has wrongly interpreted § 40-6-233, MCA, as
ranting standing to G.R. and P.R. Section 40-6-233, MCA, provides:

 

 

 

The abuse of parental authority is the subject of judicial cognizance
in a civil action brought by the child or by its relative within the third
degree or by the county commissioners of the county where the child
resides. When the abuse is established, the child may be freed from the
dominion of the parent and the duty of support and education enforced. A
parent or guardian of a child has the right to give the child medicine
prescribed for the child, and exercise of the right is not an abuse of parental
authority. [Emphasis added.]
‘The District Court interpreted this statute to mean that a “relative within the third
degree,” such as G.R. and P.R., could bring an action terminating parental rights when
Physical abuse or neglect of a child has been established. On the contrary, § 406-233,
MCA, refers to the abuse of “parental authority” and that the “duty of support and
education” may be enforced once the child is freed from the dominion of the parent.
‘Thus, this statute refers to parental authority for making decisions regarding the support
and education of a child. ‘This interpretation is supported by the placement oft
in the Family Law section of the MCA under the part regarding the Obligations of
Parents (Title 40, chapter 6, part 2). ‘This interpretation is further buttressed by the statute
immediately following § 40-6-233, MCA, which provides:

‘The authority of the parent ceases:

(1) upon the appointment, by a court, of a guardian of the person of
achild;

(2) upon the marriage of a child; or

G) upon its attaining majority.

 

statute

Section 40-6-234, MCA. Certainly, if § 40-6-233, MCA, referred to the physical abuse
or neglect of a child, the Legislature would not have contemplated that that abuse could
continue until the child marries or atains majority, And, as noted previously, Title 41,
chapter 3, MCA, is the proper section of the MCA under which a petition for termination
of parental rights should be brought and that code section does not contemplate that
relatives of a child may file the petition. Such a petition may only be brought by the
‘county attorney, the attorney general, or an attomey hired by the county.

{23 Based on the foregoing, we hold that the District Court erred in determining that
GR. and P.R. had standing to bring their petition for termination of J.C.’s parental rights
to JR. and in giving temporary care of JAR. to G.R. and PR, However, since J.C. is
‘currently serving a ten-year sentence in the Montana Women’s Prison and will be unable

  
to cate for JR. for an extended period of time, and since M.W. has had no contact with
J.C. oF LR. in several months and his whereabouts are unknown, the court should appoint
GR. and PR. guardians of IR. pursuant to § 72-5-222(1), MCA, and the County
‘Attomey and the Department of Public Health and Human Services should initiate
appropriate procedures under Title 41, chapter 3, MCA.

Sanctions
{24 The District Court also denied J.C.’s request for sanctions under M. R. Civ. P. 11
Which provides, in pertinent part:

‘The signature of an attomey or party constitutes a certificate by the signer
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best
of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
‘200d faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
Jaw, and that itis not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,

  

425 Based on the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that G.R. and P.R. brought
their action for an improper purpose. It appears from the record before us that their only

‘motivation was to provide J.R. with a safe, loving and stable environment in which to live

 

‘given J.C.’s inability to parent J.R. due to J.C.’s lengthy incarceration. Moreover, we
hhave stated that “to avoid sanctions under [M. R. Civ. P. 11},

 

is not necessary that a
party be correct in his or her interpretation of the law, but only that the party make a good
faith argument within his or her view of the law.” In re Custody of R.R.K., 260 Mont.
191, 203, 859 P.2d 998, 1006 (1993) (citing In re Adoption of R.D.T., 239 Mont. 33, 36,
778 P.24 416, 418 (1989). We conclude here that G.R. and P.R. did present a good faith
argument, albeit, ultimately, an incorrect one. Therefore,

$26 IT IS ORDERED that 1.C’s Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control is
GRANTED.

{27 ITISFURTHER ORDERED that J.

 

.’s request for sanctions is DENIED.
28 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the District Court's order granting temporary,
care of JR. to G.R. and P.R. is vacated. This case is remanded to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with this Order.

29 ‘IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court serve a copy of this
‘Order upon all counsel of record, Flathead County Attorney Ed Corrigan, DPPHS Chief
‘Legal Counsel Russ Cater, and the Hon. Ted O. Lympus, District Judge, Presiding, under
‘Cause No, DA-07-80 (A).

DATED this 92" day of October, 2008,

Testice

 

10