Case Title: Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6724

Docket Number: 2019-1274

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6724.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6724 
OHIOANS FOR CONCEALED CARRY, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE CITY OF 
COLUMBUS ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus, Slip Opinion 
No. 2020-Ohio-6724.] 
Civil law—Before an Ohio court may consider the merits of a legal claim, the 
person seeking relief must establish standing—Court of appeals’ judgment 
affirmed. 
(No. 2019-1274—Submitted July 8, 2020—Decided December 18, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 18AP-605, 2019-Ohio-3105. 
________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we determine whether appellants, Ohioans for 
Concealed Carry, Inc. (“OCC”) and Buckeye Firearms Foundation, Inc. (“BFF”) 
(collectively, “appellants”), have standing to bring an action seeking declaratory 
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and injunctive relief against appellees, the city of Columbus and Columbus City 
Attorney Zach M. Klein (collectively, “the city”) regarding two firearm-related 
ordinances that appellants allege are unlawful under R.C. 9.68.  Because we 
conclude that appellants have not established standing in this case, we affirm the 
judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. 
I.  Relevant Background 
{¶ 2} In May 2018, the Columbus City Council passed Columbus 
Ordinance 1116-2018.  This ordinance, among other things, enacted two provisions 
of the Columbus City Code (“C.C.C.”) relevant to this case, C.C.C. 2323.13 and 
2323.171.  C.C.C. 2323.13 is the city’s weapons-under-disability ordinance and 
prohibits individuals who have been previously convicted of a misdemeanor 
domestic-violence offense from possessing a firearm, C.C.C. 2323.13(A)(3).  
C.C.C. 2323.171 makes it a misdemeanor, C.C.C. 2323.171(B), for a person to 
“knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use an illegal rate-of-fire-acceleration firearm 
accessory,” C.C.C. 2323.171(A).  According to the city, this ordinance is directed 
at firearm accessories known as “bump stocks.”  See C.C.C. 2323.171(C)(1). 
{¶ 3} A little over a month after the city enacted these ordinances, 
appellants and Gary Witt, a member of OCC and a resident of Columbus, filed a 
complaint against the city seeking an injunction against enforcement of the 
ordinances as unconstitutional, based on the argument that they are preempted by 
R.C. 9.68—a statute pertaining to ensuring that the laws throughout Ohio regarding 
the right to bear arms are uniform—and seeking a declaratory judgment that C.C.C. 
2323.13 and 2323.171 violate R.C. 9.68.  The complaint asserted that appellants 
were not-for-profit Ohio corporations and were composed of firearm owners across 
Ohio, “including members who [were] taxpayers of the [c]ity of Columbus.” 
{¶ 4} The complaint asserted two causes of action.  In the first, appellants 
and Witt sought injunctive relief against enforcement of the ordinances through a 
statutory-taxpayer action, as permitted by R.C. 733.59.  In support, appellants and 
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Witt alleged that the implementation of the ordinances “resulted in, or is 
imminently likely to result in, the misapplication (and an inappropriate and 
unlawful expenditure) of funds of the City, by virtue of efforts by the City to 
advertise and promote the Ordinances, enforce the Ordinances, implement the 
Ordinances and defend the Ordinances.”  They also asserted that the ordinances 
were “an abuse of the City’s home rule power” and “involved, or [were] reasonably 
likely to involve, execution of contracts with third parties concerning the 
advertisement, enforcement, and implementation of the unlawful provisions 
therein, including but not limited to contracts for public defenders for indigent 
defendants charged with violating the Ordinances.”  Appellants and Witt alleged 
that they were seeking “to enforce the public right of the people to keep and bear 
arms and all peripheral rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution of Ohio, the 
Constitution of the United States of America and R.C. 9.68.” 
{¶ 5} In the second cause of action, appellants and Witt asserted they were 
entitled, pursuant to R.C. 9.68, to a declaration that the ordinances are unlawful, 
“as well as every other ordinance enacted, promulgated and/or maintained by 
Defendant City that purports to regulate the right of a person to possess, purchase, 
sell, transfer, transport, store, or keep any firearm, part of a firearm, its components 
and ammunition.”  Appellants and Witt also requested an award of attorney fees 
under R.C. 9.68. 
{¶ 6} In tandem with filing the complaint, appellants and Witt also moved 
for a temporary restraining order against the city and a preliminary injunction, both 
of which sought to preclude the city from enforcing C.C.C. 2323.13 and 2323.171.  
The trial court granted the temporary restraining order, enjoining the city from all 
enforcement activity associated with C.C.C. 2323.13 and 2323.171.  In opposition 
to the preliminary-injunction motion, the city argued, in part, that appellants and 
Witt had little chance of success on the merits because they lacked standing to bring 
their claims. 
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{¶ 7} After a hearing on the preliminary injunction, the trial court held that 
Witt had taxpayer standing under R.C. 733.59.  Because the city’s ordinances 
“directly impact the rights” of appellants’ members, the trial court also found that 
appellants had organizational standing.  The trial court ultimately found C.C.C. 
2323.171 to be unconstitutional and granted a permanent injunction enjoining its 
enforcement.  However, the trial court denied injunctive relief regarding C.C.C. 
2323.13. 
{¶ 8} On appeal, the city challenged the trial court’s finding that appellants 
and Witt had standing.  The Tenth District Court of Appeals agreed with the trial 
court that Witt had taxpayer standing for injunctive relief under R.C. 733.59, but 
concluded that appellants had failed to establish that they had standing under R.C. 
733.59, R.C. 9.68, or  R.C. Chapter 2721, Ohio’s Declaratory Judgment Act.1  
2019-Ohio-3105, 140 N.E.3d 1215, ¶ 46 (10th Dist.). 
{¶ 9} Appellants sought discretionary review, and we accepted the 
following proposition of law: “A nonprofit firearms-rights association has standing 
to challenge as unconstitutional municipal ordinances that violate R.C. 9.68 by 
maintaining an action for declaratory and injunctive relief under R.C. 9.68, R.C. 
733.59, and/or Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2721.”  See 157 Ohio St.3d 1495, 2019-
Ohio-4840, 134 N.E.3d 1210. 
{¶ 10} On December 18, 2019, while this appeal was pending, the city 
repealed C.C.C. 2323.171.  See Columbus Ordinance 3189-2019.  The city 
explained in its merit brief that it repealed the ordinance because the United States 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives had issued a rule stating 
                                                 
1.  The court of appeals also found that OCC and BFF failed to establish standing under the public-
right doctrine.  However, we declined review of appellants’ proposition of law challenging this 
holding.  In addition, appellants concede in their reply brief that “no ‘public rights’ standing 
argument is present in this appeal.”  Thus, we do not address the public-right-standing doctrine in 
this decision.   
January Term, 2020 
 
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that a firearm with a bump-stock accessory was a “machinegun,” the possession of 
which is already a felony under federal and state law. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 11} As a threshold matter, we address the city’s assertion that appellants’ 
claims regarding C.C.C. 2323.171, the bump-stock ordinance, are moot because 
that ordinance was repealed while this appeal was pending.  Appellants argue that 
because the city has not repealed the weapons-under-disability ordinance, C.C.C. 
2323.13, and there is also a reasonable probability that the city will attempt to enact 
a similar ordinance to the bump-stock ordinance in the future, this appeal is not 
moot.  Moreover, appellants argue that they may still be entitled to an award of 
attorney fees under R.C. 9.68(B).  We find that the issue whether appellants have 
standing remains relevant to the resolution of attorney fees related to appellants’ 
challenge to C.C.C. 2323.171.  Thus, we proceed to determine the question of 
standing. 
A.  Standing 
{¶ 12} It is well established that prior to an Ohio court’s considering the 
merits of a legal claim, “the person or entity seeking relief must establish standing 
to sue.”  Ohio Pyro, Inc v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal, 
115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27.  At a minimum, 
common-law standing requires the litigant to demonstrate that he or she has 
suffered (1) an injury (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly 
unlawful conduct and (3) is likely to be redressed by the requested relief.  Moore v. 
Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 22.  Standing 
does not turn on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims but rather on “whether the 
plaintiffs have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that 
they are entitled to have a court hear their case.”  ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. 
JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, ¶ 7.  Standing 
may also be conferred by statute.  Middletown v. Ferguson, 25 Ohio St.3d 71, 75, 
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6
495 N.E.2d 380 (1986).  Whether appellants have established standing is a question 
of law, which we review de novo.  See Moore at ¶ 20, citing Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs. v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 13} Standing “ ‘ “is not dispensed in gross,” ’ ” it must be demonstrated 
for each claim and each form of relief.  Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. v. Kasich, 153 
Ohio St.3d 157, 2018-Ohio-441,102 N.E.3d 461, ¶ 30, quoting Davis v. Fed. 
Election Comm., 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.E.2d 737 (2008), 
quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 
(1996), fn. 6.  Here, appellants asserted two claims for relief in their complaint: 
(1) a statutory-taxpayer action for injunctive relief under R.C. 733.59 and (2) a 
declaratory-judgment action based on the argument that R.C. 9.68 provides them 
the right to challenge the ordinances.  Appellants assert that as nonprofit firearms-
rights associations, they have standing to challenge municipal ordinances that 
violate R.C. 9.68.  They do not, however, seek to establish standing through 
traditional common-law principles.  Instead, appellants claim that they have 
standing through three alternative, statutory means: (1) statutory standing under 
R.C. 9.68, (2) taxpayer standing under R.C. 733.59, and (3) statutory standing 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
B.  Standing Under R.C. 9.68 
{¶ 14} Appellants assert several theories of standing under R.C. 9.68.  We 
first address appellants’ argument in their complaint that R.C. 9.68 provides them 
with standing because it “provides Plaintiffs a private right of action to challenge 
any ordinance, rule or regulation in conflict with it.” 
{¶ 15} R.C. 9.68(A) states that the right to keep and bear arms is a 
“fundamental individual right” that is a “constitutionally protected right in every 
part of Ohio.”  R.C. 9.68(A) also identifies the “need to provide uniform laws 
throughout the state” regulating the ownership and possession of firearms.  The 
former version of R.C. 9.68(B), which was in effect at the time this case was filed, 
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also stated: “In addition to any other relief provided, the court shall award costs and 
reasonable attorney fees to any person, group, or entity that prevails in a challenge 
to an ordinance, rule, or regulation as being in conflict with this section.”2  Sub.H.B. 
No. 347, 151 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8138, 8140. 
{¶ 16} Appellants assert that R.C. 9.68(B)’s reference to “any person, 
group, or entity that prevails in a challenge to an ordinance,” means that anyone 
may challenge an ordinance as being in conflict R.C. 9.68, and that the statute 
thereby confers standing.  The Tenth District rejected this argument, however, 
noting that R.C. 9.68 is silent regarding standing or creating a cause of action.  We 
agree with the court of appeals. 
{¶ 17} As this court noted in ProgressOhio.org, Inc., a statute’s silence “as 
to who has standing to maintain a constitutional challenge to the legislation does 
not render the statute ambiguous,” nor “will we read the statutory silence as clearly 
expressing an intention to abrogate the common-law requirements for standing.”  
139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, at ¶ 22.  Thus, even if we 
read the language in former R.C. 9.68(B) to imply the availability of a cause of 
action to challenge an ordinance, that would not abrogate the need for a “person, 
group, or entity” to establish standing for purposes of pursuing a civil action under 
that statute. 
{¶ 18} Appellants also argue that they have standing under R.C. 9.68 to 
challenge the ordinances in this case because they have established standing in 
                                                 
2.  The General Assembly amended R.C. 9.68 in 2019, and the amendment became effective while 
this appeal was pending.  2018 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 228.  As amended, R.C. 9.68(B) expressly states 
that “[a] person, group, or entity adversely affected by any manner of ordinance, rule, regulation, 
resolution, practice, or other action enacted or enforced by a political subdivision in conflict with 
division (A) of this section may bring a civil action against the political subdivision seeking damages 
from the political subdivision, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, or a combination of those 
remedies.”  However, we limit our analysis to former R.C. 9.68(B) because that was the version in 
effect when appellants filed their complaint.  See R.C. 1.58(A)(1) (“The reenactment, amendment, 
or repeal of a statute does not * * * [a]ffect the prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken 
thereunder”). 
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other cases challenging different ordinances.  Indeed, appellants assert that this 
court’s review of the merits in cases like Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. 
Clyde, 120 Ohio St.3d 96, 2008-Ohio-4605, 896 N.E.2d 967, in which OCC was a 
party, have already implicitly recognized OCC’s standing under R.C. 9.68.  We 
reject this argument. 
{¶ 19} This court’s decision in Clyde has no bearing on the standing 
analysis in this case.  In Clyde, OCC filed an action seeking an injunction and an 
order striking down a municipal ordinance that prohibited the carrying of concealed 
handguns in Clyde city parks.  Id. at ¶ 1, 19.  This court ultimately concluded that 
the ordinance was unconstitutional under the Home Rule Amendment, Article 
XVIII, Section 3, of the Ohio Constitution, because the ordinance was an exercise 
of the municipality’s police power that conflicted with a general law.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
{¶ 20} The fact that a party has established standing in a prior case does not 
establish the party’s standing in every case filed thereafter.  The question of 
standing depends on whether the plaintiffs have alleged some basis—grounded in 
common or statutory law—that entitles them to have a court hear their case.  See 
State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 
178-179, 298 N.E.2d 515 (1973), quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 
S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, 641 (1972) (“ ‘Where the party does not rely on any 
specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of 
standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a “personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 
L.Ed.2d 663 [1962], * * * as to ensure that “the dispute sought to be adjudicated 
will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as a 
capable of judicial resolution,” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 
L.Ed.2d 947 [1968] * * *’ ” [ellipses added in Dallman]).  Thus, standing must be 
determined on the allegations presented in each case. 
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{¶ 21} Finally, appellants also seem to contend that they have standing 
simply because they are entitled to relief under R.C. 9.68 on the merits of their 
challenge.  Specifically, appellants argue in their merit brief that “[w]hether any 
Plaintiff owned or planned to own any of the several firearm components banned 
by the City * * * is entirely beside the point.  Columbus undid what the General 
Assembly did in enacting statewide preemption.”  As we stated above, however, 
standing does not turn on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims but rather on “whether 
the plaintiffs have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy 
that they are entitled to have a court hear their case.”  ProgressOhio.org, Inc., 139 
Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, at ¶ 7. 
{¶ 22} In sum, we find no basis under former R.C. 9.68, which was in effect 
at the time this case was filed, to conclude that appellants have established standing 
in this case. 
C.  Taxpayer Standing Under R.C. 733.59 
{¶ 23} Appellants next argue that they have standing under R.C. 733.59 to 
bring a taxpayer action for injunctive relief.  When a statute provides for judicial 
review, “ ‘the inquiry as to standing must begin with a determination of whether 
the statute in question authorizes review at the behest of the plaintiff.’ ”  
Middletown, 25 Ohio St.3d at 75-76, 495 N.E.2d 380, quoting Sierra Club, 405 
U.S. at 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636.  Accordingly, we begin with R.C. 
733.59, which sets forth the prerequisites for a taxpayer’s action:  
 
If the village solicitor or city director of law fails, upon the 
written request of any taxpayer of the municipal corporation, to 
make any application provided for in sections 733.56 to 733.58 of 
the Revised Code, the taxpayer may institute suit in his own name, 
on behalf of the municipal corporation. 
 
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“Taxpayer,” as used in R.C. 733.59, contemplates and includes “ ‘any person who, 
in a private capacity as a citizen, elector, freeholder or taxpayer, volunteers to 
enforce a right of action on behalf of and for the benefit of the public.’ ”  State ex 
rel. White v. Cleveland, 34 Ohio St.2d 37, 40, 295 N.E.2d 665 (1973), quoting State 
ex rel. Nimon v. Springdale, 6 Ohio St.2d 1, 215 N.E.2d 592 (1966), paragraph two 
of the syllabus. 
{¶ 24} Nowhere within the complaint do appellants allege that they are 
citizens, electors, freeholders, or taxpayers themselves.  Instead, they allege that 
they are “not-for-profit Ohio corporation[s]” composed of “firearm owners across 
the state of Ohio, including members who are taxpayers of the City of Columbus.”  
Nevertheless, appellants argue that they have associational standing under R.C. 
733.59 by virtue of Witt’s individual-taxpayer standing.  Associational standing is 
for organizations who sue on behalf of their members.  See Peoples Rights Org., 
Inc. v. Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir.1998) (“An association * * * can have 
standing as a representative of its members”).  Notably, however, appellants’ 
complaint does not allege that they are bringing a taxpayer action on behalf of Witt.  
The complaint alleges that the letter sent to initiate the taxpayer action, as required 
under the statute, was sent by “Plaintiff OCC and Plaintiff BFF, on behalf of 
themselves, and Plaintiff Witt on behalf of himself.”  (Emphasis added.)  Here, it is 
clear that appellants are suing on behalf of themselves.  As a result, Witt’s 
individual-taxpayer standing does not confer standing upon appellants. 
{¶ 25} Appellants also argue that the Tenth District’s judgment must be 
reversed because although the court stated that “Ohio courts have implicitly 
recognized the standing of associations in statutory taxpayer actions,” 2019-Ohio-
3105, 140 N.E.3d 1215, at ¶ 37, it ignored appellants’ associational standing.  And 
allowing this judgment to stand would “undo legions of cases,” including State ex 
rel. Fisher v. Cleveland, 109 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-1827, 845 N.E.2d 500.  We 
disagree. 
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{¶ 26} Our decision in Fisher addressed only the specific standing 
argument that had been presented in that case; namely, whether relators had 
asserted a matter that concerned a public right or benefit.  “A taxpayer action is 
properly brought only when the right under review in the action is one benefitting 
the public.”  Id. at ¶ 10.  In Fisher, the civil suit had been initiated by an individual, 
Robert Fisher, and the Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 93 of the 
International Association of Fire Fighters.  Our analysis did not reach the issue 
whether the Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters had properly asserted standing 
as a taxpayer, either alone or on behalf of its individual member, because we 
concluded that the action did not affect a public right.  Id. ¶ 14. 
{¶ 27} Here, appellants fail to identify the other cases that are purportedly 
among the “legions” we would have to undo if we affirmed the court of appeals’ 
judgment.  Nonetheless, we note that the court of appeals recognized that the cases 
it cited in support of its statement that Ohio courts have implicitly recognized the 
standing of organizations in taxpayer actions did not “directly address standing nor 
inform what the associations alleged in their complaints, i.e., did they allege they 
met the definition of taxpayer,” 2019-Ohio-3105, 140 N.E.3d 1215, at ¶ 37.  Nor 
did the cases address associational standing.  See id., citing State ex rel. Jones v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 124 Ohio App.3d 184, 187, 705 N.E.2d 1247 (1st 
Dist.1997); Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn. v. Mentor, 108 Ohio App.3d 373, 380, 670 
N.E.2d 1042 (11th Dist.1995). 
{¶ 28} The court of appeals also cited Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. 
Cleveland, 2017-Ohio-1560, 90 N.E.3d 80 (8th Dist.).  We find this case 
instructive.  In Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc., the Eighth District noted that 
the requirement in R.C. 733.59 that a written request be served on the city law 
director asking that he or she initiate suit on behalf of the city is a mandatory 
prerequisite to a taxpayer action.  Id. at ¶ 42.  But OCC had sent the letter on the 
individual plaintiff’s behalf, and R.C. 733.59 “does not authorize taxpayer actions 
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by proxy,” id. at ¶ 43, and OCC “is not an individual taxpayer or citizen,” id. at 
¶ 44.  For these reasons, the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s determination 
that the individual plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a taxpayer action because he 
did not properly initiate the taxpayer action.  Id. 
{¶ 29} Here, the complaint alleged that Witt sent the letter to initiate the 
taxpayer action on behalf of himself, and Witt’s taxpayer action in this case is 
proceeding.  And the complaint alleged that appellants sent the letter to initiate the 
taxpayer action “on behalf of themselves.”  Thus, appellants have not alleged a 
taxpayer action on Witt’s behalf.  Because they are not taxpayers in their own right, 
they have not established standing to bring a taxpayer action for injunctive relief 
under R.C. 733.59 to challenge the ordinances.   
  
D.  Standing Under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
{¶ 30} Appellants also assert that they have standing under R.C. 2721.03 to 
seek a declaration that the ordinances are unlawful.  R.C. 2721.03 pertains only to 
“person[s] whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a 
constitutional provision, statute, * * * [or] municipal ordinance.”  The three 
prerequisites to declaratory relief include “(1) a real controversy between the 
parties, (2) justiciability, and (3) the necessity of speedy relief to preserve the 
parties’ rights.”  ProgressOhio.org, Inc., 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 
N.E.3d 1101, at ¶ 19; see also Moore, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 
N.E.2d 977, at ¶ 49. 
{¶ 31} Appellants argue that these requirements apply to them and that the 
traditional standing requirements must “yield” here because they are seeking a 
declaration that the city’s ordinances are unconstitutional.  Consequently, 
appellants argue that they do not need to show that they have actually been injured 
or that they have suffered any particularized harm.  Additionally, appellants assert 
that they do not need to wait for the ordinances to be enforced before challenging 
the constitutionality of the ordinances. 
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{¶ 32} Although a declaratory-judgment action generally contemplates that 
the action is brought before an injury-in-fact has occurred, a plaintiff must 
nonetheless demonstrate “actual present harm or a significant possibility of future 
harm to justify pre-enforcement relief.”  Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. Columbus, 
152 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir.1998).  Certain impending injury is sufficient to obtain 
preventative relief; a plaintiff need not wait for an injury to actually occur.  Id. 
{¶ 33} In Peoples Rights Org., Inc., the plaintiffs challenged in federal court 
a Columbus City Code provision that prohibited the sale, transfer, acquisition, or 
possession of any assault weapon.  Id. at 527-528.  The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals concluded that the individual plaintiffs established standing to pursue their 
declaratory-judgment action based on a significant possibility of future harm.  Id. 
at 530-531.  The court also determined that the organization plaintiff established 
associational standing.  Id. at 531.  A review of the allegations in the complaint is 
instructive. 
{¶ 34} In that case, the organization plaintiff, Peoples Rights Organization, 
Inc. (“PRO”), and two of its members brought a pre-enforcement action seeking a 
declaration that a Columbus City Code provision prohibiting assault weapons was 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 526.  PRO alleged that its members owned firearms that 
may have been defined as “assault weapons” under the ordinance.  Id. at 528-529.  
They also alleged that members had not registered their firearms, because they were 
unsure whether they qualified as “assault weapons” under the ordinance.  Id. at 528.  
The complaint alleged that the individual plaintiffs and members of PRO owned 
semiautomatic handguns and that they could not determine whether those weapons 
constituted “assault weapons” under the ordinance.  Id.  One of the individual 
plaintiffs alleged that he owned a rifle with a detachable magazine, which he 
believed was the only magazine that would fit the rifle, but that he could not 
determine whether that weapon constituted an “assault weapon” under the 
ordinance.  Id. 
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{¶ 35} Here, in stark contrast, the only allegation in appellants’ complaint 
relating to firearms is that appellants’ members own firearms.  The complaint 
contains no allegation that the members own firearms with bump stocks or some 
other accessory that could be considered within the purview of the ordinance.  It 
also lacks any allegation that the members wish to own bump stocks.  And there is 
no allegation that members offer bump stocks for sale.  The complaint similarly 
contains no allegations specific to the weapons-under-disability ordinance.  For 
example, there is no allegation that any of appellants’ members have been charged 
with or convicted of a misdemeanor offense of domestic violence.  The complaint 
is simply devoid of any allegation on which we could conclude the significant 
possibility of future injury.3   
{¶ 36} In Peoples Rights Org., Inc., the Sixth Circuit noted, “It is clear from 
the complaint the predicament that [the plaintiffs] face.”  Id., 152 F.3d at 528.  Here, 
however, appellants have alleged no predicament.  Nonetheless, in support of their 
cause of action for declaratory relief, they allege that they are entitled to a 
                                                 
3.  The first dissenting opinion suggests that because this case has proceeded past the close of the 
pleadings, the standing inquiry resembles the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C).  Applying that standard, that dissent concludes that the city has failed to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants cannot prove that any of their members have 
been injured by the ordinance because “it is possible” appellants could prove that a member has 
been harmed by the ordinances.  Dissenting opinion of Kennedy, J., at ¶ 54.  But the standard for 
motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) is still grounded in the pleadings.  
Indeed, “[t]he trial court must limit its inquiry to the material allegations in the pleadings—accepting 
those allegations and all reasonable inferences as true—and, if it is clear from the pleadings that 
plaintiff could prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief, judgment on the pleadings is 
appropriate as a matter of law.”  Fisher v. Ahmed, 2020-Ohio-1196, 153 N.E.3d 612, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.).  
Here, there are no allegations in the complaint on which to base the first dissenting opinion’s 
assumptions about appellants’ potential proof of harm.  Moreover, “[w]hile the proof required to 
establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, * * *, the standing inquiry remains focused on 
whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was 
filed.”  Davis v. Fed. Election Comm., 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008).  
We also note, as does the first dissenting opinion, that appellants presented no evidence of standing 
at the trial court’s hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction.  In fact, appellants asserted 
that no evidence was required to rebut the city’s standing challenge and that the issues to be argued 
at the hearing were appellants’ and Witt’s “legal standing and the efficacy of the claims raised in 
the [c]omplaint.”  
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
declaration that the ordinances, “as well as every other ordinance enacted, 
promulgated and/or maintained by Defendant City that purports to regulate the right 
of a person to possess, purchase, sell, transfer, transport, store, or keep any firearm, 
part of a firearm, its components and ammunition” are unlawful.  As we stated in 
ProgressOhio.org, Inc., an “idealistic opposition” to a challenged law is 
insufficient to establish standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act.  139 Ohio 
St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 37} Appellants also argue in their merit brief that Ohio’s Declaratory 
Judgment Act broadly authorizes actions for declaratory relief predicated on 
constitutional or nonconstitutional grounds, and that such relief “should be 
employed to ensure the City’s unconstitutional Ordinances will not subject firearms 
owners to new municipal criminal penalties.”  The general availability of an action 
for declaratory relief to challenge an ordinance is not the subject of this appeal.  
This appeal relates to appellants’ standing to pursue such relief.  The strength of 
the merits of a claim for declaratory relief is not relevant to a plaintiff’s burden to 
establish standing.  Standing depends on “whether the plaintiffs have alleged such 
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that they are entitled to have a 
court hear their case.”  ProgressOhio.org, Inc. at ¶ 7.  Thus, we decline the 
invitation to establish a blanket rule that a certain plaintiff will always have standing 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act to challenge municipal ordinances under R.C. 
9.68.  We conclude that in this case, on the allegations in the complaint and on the 
arguments presented, appellants have not established standing. 
E.  Appellants’ Future Ability to Establish Standing Is Not Before this Court 
{¶ 38} Both dissenting opinions suggest that appellants could demonstrate 
standing based on harm to one of their members by the city ordinances.  Dissenting 
opinion of Kennedy, J., at ¶ 54; dissenting opinion of DeWine, J., at ¶ 64.  In doing 
so though, each dissenting opinion implicitly acknowledges that appellants have 
not alleged or proved a basis for standing in this case at this time. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
{¶ 39} In an attempt to circumvent this fact, the second dissenting opinion 
fashions a newly minted argument that offers appellants an opportunity to reargue 
their standing case with the benefit of the court’s collective agreement that they 
have not alleged a proper basis for standing.  This approach not only would relieve 
appellants of their well-established burden to establish standing and present the 
court with a justiciable claim, but also would provide appellants with an 
unprecedented belief that even if they cannot establish standing on their asserted 
theory, they can try again on remand. 
{¶ 40} At every level, appellants have argued that they have standing under 
R.C. 9.68 to pursue injunctive and declaratory relief without having to demonstrate 
harm.  Indeed, in appellants’ reply brief to this court, they made the following 
statements: (1) “The City’s arguments about the standing of [appellants] under R.C. 
9.68 fail because the requirements for standing do not require actual injury or 
particularized harm for relief from the City’s firearm Ordinances” and (2) “Neither 
[appellant] need demonstrate that its members own guns.  * * * The interest in 
uniformity is, in and of itself, sufficient to create standing * * *.”  And even though 
the claim for injunctive relief may proceed on Witt’s taxpayer standing under R.C. 
733.59, appellants’ proposition of law is seeking a broad, bright-line rule that “[a] 
non-profit firearms-rights association has standing to challenge as unconstitutional 
municipal ordinances that violate R.C. 9.68 by maintaining an action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief under R.C. 9.68, R.C. 733.59, and/or Ohio Revised 
Code Chapter 2721.”  (Emphasis added.)  Appellants have requested that this court 
reverse the Tenth District’s standing decision on its merits, not because it was 
“premature,” dissenting opinion of DeWine, J., at ¶ 58.  We should not allow a 
party another opportunity to establish standing on remand after the issue was 
argued by the parties and determined by the court. 
{¶ 41} Moreover, the second dissenting opinion states that appellants “were 
never individually put to the burden of proving standing in the proceeding below.”  
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
Dissenting opinion of DeWine, J., at ¶ 63.  Yet appellants had ample opportunity 
to prove standing below; first in their complaint and again when the city challenged 
their standing in its memorandum in opposition to a preliminary injunction.  
Nevertheless, the dissenting opinions assert that the city missed the boat for not 
challenging standing via the proper procedural vehicle or failing to “show beyond 
doubt,” dissenting opinion of Kennedy, J., at ¶ 54, appellants lacked standing when 
it is the plaintiff’s burden to allege a basis for standing.  See also dissenting opinion 
of DeWine, J., at ¶ 63; Albanese v. Batman, 148 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-5814, 
68 N.E.3d 800, ¶ 24 (“To have standing, the party bringing the action must assert 
a personal stake in the outcome of the action” [emphasis sic]); Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) 
(emphasizing that a plaintiff’s burden to establish standing is “an indispensable part 
of the plaintiff’s case”). 
{¶ 42} But contrary to the second dissenting opinion’s suggestion, there is 
no magical moment during litigation that a plaintiff is relieved of its burden to 
establish standing.  It is a “jurisdictional requirement” that must be met for a party 
to maintain a lawsuit.  Dallman, 35 Ohio St.2d at 179, 298 N.E.2d 515.  Thus, 
standing “may be raised at any time during the pendency of the proceedings,” New 
Boston Coke Corp. v. Tyler, 32 Ohio St.3d 216, 513 N.E.2d 302 (1987), paragraph 
two of the syllabus, including by a reviewing court sua sponte, Dallman at 178 (this 
court sua sponte raising the issue of standing and dismissing the appeal based on a 
party’s failure to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings). 
{¶ 43} Further, the case at hand is different than Planned Parenthood of 
Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908 (9th Cir.2004), on which the second dissenting 
opinion relies to promote such a view.  In that case, the district court explicitly 
declined to decide whether Planned Parenthood had standing, because another 
plaintiff had standing to sue, and Planned Parenthood requested that the Ninth 
Circuit do the same, decline review of its standing, in an attempt to have the merits 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
of the appeal decided.  Id. at 917-918.  The trial court here made no such caveat as 
to appellants’ standing, and appellants have argued the exact opposite on appeal, 
asserting that they have standing under the theories asserted and that the Tenth 
District should affirm their own standing to bring their claims for declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 
{¶ 44} In sum, there is no basis for a remand on standing here.  We have 
not identified an error in the Tenth District’s decision nor have we announced a 
new test or standard for the lower courts to apply.  The threshold requirement that 
a plaintiff must establish standing is far from a new concept in the law.  See 
Dallman at 179 (“It is an elementary concept of law that a party lacks standing to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has * * * some real interest in the 
subject matter of the action”).  To hold as we do today, that appellants have not met 
that threshold requirement does not deprive them of another opportunity to seek 
relief from the city ordinances under R.C. 9.68.  Our holding simply means that 
they, like every plaintiff who files a lawsuit, must establish standing to maintain 
their suit.  See Clifton v. Blanchester, 131 Ohio St.3d 287, 2012-Ohio-780, 964 
N.E.2d 414, ¶ 15, quoting State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 
86 Ohio St.3d 451, 469, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999) (“ ‘It is well established that 
before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking 
relief must establish standing to sue’ ”).  Here, appellants adopted a flawed theory 
of standing and continued to rely on it throughout the adversarial process.  Because 
their theory is incorrect in this case, we cannot remedy it here.  For whatever case 
appellants may file in the future, they will have the benefit of this court’s decision 
today as well as the dissenting opinions’ observations on how to properly establish 
standing. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 45} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that appellants have not 
established standing under R.C. 9.68, R.C. 733.58, or R.C. Chapter 2721 to 
challenge the ordinances.  Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. 
Judgment affirmed. 
FRENCH, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FISCHER, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 46} Because appellees, the city of Columbus and Columbus City 
Attorney Zach M. Klein (collectively, “the city”), cannot demonstrate beyond 
doubt that appellants, Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc., and Buckeye Firearms 
Foundation, Inc., can prove no set of facts establishing that they have standing to 
sue on behalf of their members, I dissent and would reverse the judgment of the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissing the associations from this litigation and 
would remand this matter for a trial on the merits of the request for a permanent 
injunction. 
{¶ 47} In May 2018, Columbus City Council passed Ordinance 1116-2018, 
which enacted Columbus City Code (“C.C.C.”) 2323.13 (penalizing the possession 
of weapons by (1) those who have been convicted of various felony offenses that 
are not barred by state law, (2) those who have been convicted of misdemeanor 
domestic violence, and (3) those who are subject to certain domestic-violence 
protection orders) and 2323.171 (criminalizing the possession of firearm 
components such as bump stocks, which accelerate the rate of fire). 
{¶ 48} Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Buckeye Firearms, and Gary Witt—a 
member of Ohioans for Concealed Carry and a resident of Columbus—filed a 
complaint seeking a permanent injunction and a motion seeking a preliminary 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
injunction against the city’s enforcement of the new ordinances, asserting that the 
ordinances conflicted with R.C. 9.68, a general law permitting Ohioans to possess 
firearms, firearm parts, firearm components, and ammunition “[e]xcept as 
specifically provided by the United States Constitution, Ohio Constitution, state 
law, or federal law.” 
{¶ 49} Relevant here, the city responded by asserting that Ohioans for 
Concealed Carry and Buckeye Firearms had failed to sufficiently allege that any of 
their members would have standing to sue to enjoin the ordinances, and at the 
preliminary-injunction hearing, the parties did not present any evidence on the issue 
of associational standing.  The trial court found that Ohioans for Concealed Carry, 
Buckeye Firearms, and Witt had standing to sue, and it permanently enjoined the 
city from enforcing the bump-stock ban, C.C.C. 2323.171, but denied the request 
to enjoin enforcement of the weapons-under-disability law, C.C.C. 2323.13. 
{¶ 50} The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 
judgment and remanded the case to the trial court, concluding that the trial court 
erred in granting a permanent injunction when the matter had been set for a hearing 
on the request for a preliminary injunction.  2019-Ohio-3105, 140 N.E.3d 1215, 
¶ 57, 59 (10th Dist.).  It also held that Ohioans for Concealed Carry and Buckeye 
Firearms lacked standing to sue on behalf of their members.  In so holding, the court 
of appeals looked only to the complaint and held that the associations had not 
adequately alleged that their members would have had standing to sue in their own 
right.  Id. at ¶ 45. 
{¶ 51} Standing is established “in the same way as any other matter on 
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of 
evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.”  Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).  Therefore, 
the stage of the proceeding (such as on a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment 
January Term, 2020 
 
21 
on the pleadings, or a motion for summary judgment) dictates the standard of 
review. 
{¶ 52} The court of appeals reviewed the sufficiency of the complaint’s 
allegations when analyzing whether Ohioans for Concealed Carry and Buckeye 
Firearms have standing to sue on behalf of their members.  However, it failed to 
apply the applicable standard of review.  When a defendant challenges the adequacy 
of a complaint after the close of pleadings, a court construes as true the material 
allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from them in favor 
of the nonmoving party and decides whether it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts entitling it to relief.  State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. 
Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 569-570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). 
{¶ 53} An association has standing to bring a lawsuit on behalf of its 
members when (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own 
right, (2) the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, 
and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation 
of individual members in the lawsuit.  State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State, 
153 Ohio St.3d 1, 2018-Ohio-555, 100 N.E.3d 391, ¶ 18.  An association suing as 
a representative of its members must have “at least one member with standing to 
present, in his or her own right, the claim (or the type of claim) pleaded by the 
association.”  United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown 
Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996).  However, 
a member is not required to be a named plaintiff.  See id. at 547, fn. 2 (standing was 
not defeated when a union was the named party and the trial court had denied a 
motion to amend the complaint to add members); see also Food & Water Watch at 
¶ 18 (associational standing may apply when neither the claim asserted nor the 
relief requested requires the participation of individual members). 
{¶ 54} The city has failed to show beyond doubt that Ohioans for Concealed 
Carry and Buckeye Firearms cannot prove that any of their respective members 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
have been injured by the ordinances.  The complaint describes both entities as 
associations of firearm owners and Columbus taxpayers, and it alleges that they 
“seek to enforce the public right of the people to keep and bear arms and all 
peripheral rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution of Ohio, the Constitution 
of the United States of America and R.C. 9.68.”  It is possible that they could prove 
that at least one member from each association has been harmed by the ordinances, 
either because he or she has been prohibited from owning or possessing a rate-of-
fire acceleration device or because he or she has been disarmed in Columbus by 
virtue of a disqualifying conviction or a domestic-violence protection order.  
Similarly, it is possible that they could prove that they each have a member who 
has been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under those ordinances or who 
objects to spending tax dollars to enforce them. 
{¶ 55} “[A] plaintiff or relator is not required to prove his or her case at the 
pleading stage and need only give reasonable notice of the claim.” State ex rel. 
Harris v. Toledo, 74 Ohio St.3d 36, 37, 656 N.E.2d 334 (1995).  The associations 
have met that burden here. 
{¶ 56} Lastly, the fact that the Columbus City Council repealed C.C.C. 
2323.171 (the bump-stock ban) after we accepted jurisdiction in this case does not 
render any part of this case moot.  As the United States Supreme Court has 
explained, “[t]he voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily 
render a case moot because a dismissal for mootness would permit a resumption of 
the challenged conduct as soon as the case is dismissed.”  Knox v. Serv. Emps. 
Internatl. Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 
(2012).  Such “maneuvers designed to insulate a decision from review by [a court] 
must be viewed with a critical eye.”  Id.  And here, the associations have a 
continuing interest in vindicating their standing to challenge criminal ordinances 
that limit their members’ right to keep and bear arms and a continuing interest in 
seeking an award of attorney fees, costs, and nominal damages if they succeed in 
January Term, 2020 
 
23 
the trial court.  See R.C. 9.68; Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 
U.S. 299, 308, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986), fn. 11. 
{¶ 57} I therefore would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
dismissing Ohioans for Concealed Carry and Buckeye Firearms from the lawsuit.  
Because this court did not accept any other issue for review, this matter should be 
remanded to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the request for a 
permanent injunction. 
_________________ 
 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 58} In my view, it was premature for the Tenth District Court of Appeals 
to determine that Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc., and Buckeye Firearms 
Foundation, Inc. (collectively, “the gun-rights groups”), lack standing.  I would 
leave that matter for further proceedings in the trial court.  I dissent from the 
majority’s decision to do otherwise. 
{¶ 59} The procedural posture of this case is unique.  Gary Witt and the 
gun-rights groups filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the city’s enforcement of two 
Columbus code provisions.  At the same time, the gun-rights groups and Witt filed 
a motion for a preliminary injunction.  After a hearing on the motion, the trial court 
permanently enjoined the city from enforcing Columbus City Code 2323.171.  
Importantly, at no point in the trial court did the city move to dismiss the gun-rights 
groups or Witt from the lawsuit for lack of standing.  It did argue generally, 
however, that injunctive relief should be denied because all the parties lacked 
standing. 
{¶ 60} On appeal in the Tenth District, the city argued that the trial court 
should not have granted the injunction, because none of the parties had standing.  
The Tenth District concluded that Witt had standing to maintain a claim under R.C. 
733.59.  2019-Ohio-3105, 140 N.E.3d 1215, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.).  The court of appeals 
also determined that the trial court should not have issued a permanent injunction 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
when the matter had been set for a hearing on only a preliminary injunction.  Id. at 
¶ 56-57.  As a consequence, it remanded the matter to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
{¶ 61} The city did not challenge the holding that Witt possessed standing.  
So we must assume for present purposes that the court of appeals’ decision on that 
issue was correct.  Curiously, though, after concluding that Witt had standing, the 
Tenth District then concluded that the gun-rights groups did not have standing.  Id. 
at ¶ 46.  This was unnecessary.  On a claim for injunctive relief, only one plaintiff 
needs to establish standing to assert a claim in order for a court to have subject-
matter jurisdiction over the claim.  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006), 
fn. 2 (noting that the court of appeals did not determine whether other plaintiffs had 
standing, because the presence of one plaintiff with standing is sufficient to make 
a case justiciable); Beaver Excavating Co. v. Testa, 134 Ohio St.3d 565, 2012-Ohio-
5776, 983 N.E.2d 1317, ¶ 16 (“[I]t is sufficient for purposes of jurisdiction that at 
least one plaintiff has standing for the claims of the remaining plaintiffs to be heard 
and the court to proceed to decide the case on the merits”).  Based on the 
determination by the court of appeals that Witt had standing, the trial court had the 
authority to issue injunctive relief.  So there was no need for the court of appeals to 
decide whether the gun-rights groups possessed standing. 
{¶ 62} The majority argues that a remand would relieve “appellants of their 
well-established burden to establish standing and present the court with a justiciable 
claim.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 39.  Indeed, the authority cited by the majority deals 
largely with whether a claim is justiciable.  See id. at ¶ 41, citing Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).  But of 
course, “justiciablity” is not the issue here.  Because we must assume that Witt had 
standing, the claim is justiciable.  See Dept. of Commerce v. United States House 
of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 330-334, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999) 
January Term, 2020 
 
25 
(holding that the presence of one plaintiff with standing is all that is needed to make 
claim justiciable, and finding it unnecessary to consider the standing of the other 
plaintiffs). 
{¶ 63} It is of course true that even though only one plaintiff need have 
standing for a court to issue injunctive relief, a court may still dismiss parties 
without a personal stake in the outcome.  See Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. 
Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 918 (9th Cir.2004), fn. 6 (noting that because one plaintiff 
had standing, there was no reason to consider the standing of the other plaintiffs for 
purposes of appeal, but on remand, the district court may need to determine whether 
the party was a proper plaintiff because only proper parties may enforce an 
injunction).  But the problem that I have with the majority’s decision to affirm the 
court of appeals’ dismissal of the gun-rights groups as parties for lack of standing 
is that the groups were never individually put to the burden of proving standing in 
the proceeding below.  The city did not move to dismiss any of the plaintiffs from 
the lawsuit for lack of standing nor did it move for summary judgment as to any of 
the plaintiffs.  The city did argue that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant 
injunctive relief because all three of the plaintiffs lacked standing, but all that was 
necessary to defeat this argument was a showing that any one plaintiff had standing. 
{¶ 64} As the other dissent points out, it may be possible for the gun-rights 
groups to establish associational standing by showing that they have a member who 
has been injured or threatened with injury by the Columbus provisions.  Dissenting 
opinion of Kennedy, J., at ¶ 54.  The matter is being remanded to the trial court.  If 
the city believes there are grounds to dismiss the gun-rights groups from the case 
for lack of standing, it can file an appropriate motion, the gun-rights groups can 
respond, and the trial court can rule accordingly. 
{¶ 65} A remand that allows for the possibility of further proceedings on 
the standing issue seems particularly appropriate here.  The court of appeals 
reversed the judgment granting a permanent injunction because the trial court’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
consolidation of the matter with the preliminary injunction deprived the city of “a 
full and fair opportunity to present evidence.”  2019-Ohio-3105, 140 N.E.3d 1215, 
at ¶ 57.  The gun-rights groups deserve the same consideration. 
{¶ 66} I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the 
gun-rights groups from the action for lack of standing and remand the matter to the 
trial court.  Because the majority does otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
 
FISCHER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Haynes, Kessler, Myers & Postalakis, Inc., David S. Kessler, Stephen P. 
Postalakis, and Eric B. Hershberger; and Barney DeBrosse, L.L.C. and Derek A. 
DeBrosse, for appellant Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. 
James P. Sean Maloney; and Ronald Lemieux, for appellant Buckeye 
Firearms Foundation, Inc. 
Zach Klein, Columbus City Attorney, Richard N. Coglianese, City Solicitor 
General, and Lara N. Baker-Morrish, for appellees. 
_________________