Case Title: State of Florida v. Steven W. Montgomery

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC09-332

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-332 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STEVEN W. MONTGOMERY,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 8, 2010] 
 
LABARGA, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Montgomery v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D360 (Fla. 1st DCA 
Feb. 12, 2009).  In its decision, the district court ruled upon the following question, 
which the court certified to be of great public importance: 
IS THE STATE REQUIRED TO PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT 
INTENDED TO KILL THE VICTIM IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH 
THE CRIME OF MANSLAUGHTER BY ACT? 
 
Id. at D362.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  Additionally, 
the First District Court of Appeal certified that its decision is in direct conflict with 
the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Barton v. State, 507 So. 2d 638 
 
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(Fla. 5th DCA 1987), quashed in part on other grounds, 523 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 
1988).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  As we explain 
below, we answer the certified question in the negative and hold that the crime of 
manslaughter by act does not require the State to prove that the defendant intended 
to kill the victim.  Moreover, we approve the decision of the First District Court of 
Appeal to the extent that it held that the use of the standard jury instruction on 
manslaughter, which required that the State prove the defendant‘s intent to kill the 
victim, constituted fundamental error in Montgomery‘s case.  First, we discuss the 
underlying facts and procedural background of this case.   
Facts and Procedural Background 
Steven Montgomery (Montgomery) was charged with first-degree murder 
following the October 2005 death of Tarnesha Ellis (Ellis).  At Montgomery‘s 
2007 trial, the jury was instructed on first-degree premeditated murder and the 
lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter.  The jury 
convicted Montgomery of second-degree murder with a weapon, a first-degree 
felony punishable by life imprisonment.  Montgomery was sentenced to forty-five 
years in state prison.   
 
 
Montgomery appealed his conviction and sentence to the First District Court 
of Appeal where he raised four issues, including a challenge to the standard jury 
instruction on manslaughter.  Asserting that the crime of manslaughter by act does 
 
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not require an intent to kill, Montgomery argued that the trial court committed 
fundamental error in instructing the jury on the elements of manslaughter by act 
because the standard jury instruction required the State to prove that he intended to 
cause the death of Ellis.1  
The district court ruled solely on the issue of the standard jury instruction on 
manslaughter and held that the instruction erroneously required a finding that 
Montgomery intended to kill Ellis.  Moreover, the district court concluded that in 
Montgomery‘s case, the use of the erroneous manslaughter instruction constituted 
fundamental error.  Consequently, the court reversed Montgomery‘s conviction 
and sentence for second-degree murder and remanded the case to the trial court.  In 
doing so, the district court certified a question of great public importance and 
certified conflict with a decision from the Fifth District Court of Appeal.   
On review in this Court, the petitioner, State of Florida (the State), and 
Montgomery agree to the district court‘s holding that a finding of manslaughter by 
act does not require proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim.  They 
                                          
 
 
1.  Montgomery also raised the following issues on direct appeal: whether 
the trial court erred reversibly in restricting cross-examination of the state‘s expert 
witness as to his qualifications for rendering an expert opinion, whether the trial 
court erred reversibly in permitting the state, over objection, to call a witness for 
the primary purpose of impeaching its own witness, and whether the trial court 
erred reversibly in rejecting the special jury instruction offered by the defense 
relating to manslaughter as an act of self-defense.  
   
 
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differ, however, on the question of whether the standard jury instruction used 
during the trial constituted fundamental error in Montgomery‘s case.      
Our analysis will address three questions.  First, we address whether the 
crime of manslaughter by act requires the State to prove intent to kill the victim.  
Second, we discuss whether the standard jury instruction in Montgomery‘s case 
imposed such a requirement on the State‘s burden of proof.  Third, we discuss 
whether the use of the standard manslaughter jury instruction constituted 
fundamental error in Montgomery‘s case.   
Does the Crime of Manslaughter by Act Require Proof of Intent to Kill? 
We conclude that under Florida law, the crime of manslaughter by act does 
not require that the State prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim.  
Relevant to our conclusion is the role of intent in cases of first-degree and second-
degree murder, of which manslaughter is a necessarily lesser included offense.  In 
order to establish first-degree premeditated murder, proof of the defendant‘s intent 
to kill the victim is required.  In fact, not only must a jury find that the defendant 
intended to kill the victim, it must find that the defendant did so with 
premeditation—a heightened level of intent.  Section 782.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes 
(2005), defines first-degree premeditated murder as ―[t]he unlawful killing of a 
human being‖ that is ―perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of 
the person killed or any human being.‖  (Emphasis added.)   
 
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The element of premeditation distinguishes first-degree from second-degree 
murder.  Second-degree murder is an unlawful killing that is ―perpetrated by any 
act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of 
human life . . . without any premeditated design to effect the death of any 
particular individual.‖  § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2005).  Conduct that is ―imminently 
dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind‖ is characterized by ―an act or 
series of acts that: (1) a person of ordinary judgment would know is reasonably 
certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another, and (2) is done from ill will, 
hatred, spite or an evil intent, and (3) is of such a nature that the act itself indicates 
an indifference to human life.‖  Bellamy v. State, 977 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 2008) (quoting Duckett v. State, 686 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)).   
Manslaughter, a lesser included offense of both first-degree and second-
degree murder, is defined as ―[t]he killing of a human being by the act, 
procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without lawful justification . . . in 
cases in which such killing shall not be excusable homicide or murder.‖  
§ 782.07(1), Fla. Stat.  (2005).  Section 782.07(1) states as follows: 
(1)  The killing of a human being by the act, procurement, 
or culpable negligence of another, without lawful justification 
according to the provisions of chapter 776 and in cases in which 
such killing shall not be excusable homicide or murder, according 
to the provisions of this chapter, is manslaughter, a felony of the 
second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, 
or s. 775.084.  
 
 
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§ 782.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).  
While section 782.07(1) establishes three forms of manslaughter (by act, by 
procurement, or by culpable negligence), our present focus is on the crime of 
manslaughter by act.  We observe that the statute does not impose a requirement 
that the defendant intend to kill the victim.  Instead, it plainly provides that where 
one commits an act that results in death, and such an act is not lawfully justified or 
excusable, it is manslaughter.   
Although in some cases of manslaughter by act it may be inferred from the 
facts that the defendant intended to kill the victim, to impose such a requirement on 
a finding of manslaughter by act would blur the distinction between first-degree 
murder and manslaughter.  Moreover, it would impose a more stringent finding of 
intent upon manslaughter than upon second-degree murder, which, like 
manslaughter, does not require proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim.  
Thus, we conclude that under Florida law, the crime of manslaughter by act does 
not require proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim. 
Did the Standard Jury Instruction Require Proof of Intent to Kill? 
Next, we address whether the language in the standard jury instruction 
required proof of Montgomery‘s intent to kill Ellis.  At the time of Montgomery‘s 
trial in 2007, the standard jury instruction on manslaughter by act provided in 
relevant part: 
 
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To prove the crime of Manslaughter, the State must prove the 
following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
 
1. (Victim) is dead. 
 
 
2. a. (Defendant) intentionally caused the death of (victim). 
 
. . . . 
 
 
However, the defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter if the 
killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide as I have 
previously explained those terms. 
 
 
In order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not 
necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated 
intent to cause death.  
 
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.7 (2006) (emphasis added).2   
Both parties and the district court agree that this jury instruction required the 
jury to find that the defendant intended to kill the victim in order to convict 
Montgomery of manslaughter.  The focus of our analysis is on the second element 
of the jury instruction, which provided that the State must prove that the defendant 
intentionally caused the death of the victim.  Although the instruction also 
provided that ―it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a 
premeditated intent to cause death,‖ we conclude that this language was 
insufficient to erode the import of the second element: that the jury must find that 
                                          
 
 
2.  As noted in the district court‘s opinion, although the language used by the 
trial court did ―slightly depart‖ from the standard jury instruction, the instruction as 
given by the trial court was consistent with the standard instruction.  See 
Montgomery, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D360 n.1.   
 
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the defendant intended to cause the death of the victim.  We agree with the district 
court‘s observation in Montgomery that a reasonable jury would believe that in 
order to convict Montgomery of manslaughter by act, it had to find that he 
intended to kill Ellis.  The district court stated: 
The average juror would likely interpret the instruction as requiring an 
intent to kill, as there is no direct language regarding an intentional 
act.  The word ―intentionally‖ in the instruction modifies the word 
―caused.‖  Thus, the instruction would be naturally understood as 
requiring a finding that the defendant intended for the victim to die. 
The likelihood of such an interpretation is illustrated by the fact that 
the phrase ―intentionally caused the death of‖ is commonly associated 
with first-degree murder in charging documents. 
 
Montgomery, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D361.  Additionally, we agree with the district 
court‘s assessment that ―[t]he subsequent instruction that manslaughter does not 
require a premeditated design does not cure its defect, as both the court system and 
the average reasonable person recognize a distinction between a premeditated 
design and an instantaneous formation of intent.‖  Id. at D362.      
  Since Montgomery‘s trial, this Court has approved an amendment to the 
standard jury instruction on manslaughter by act.  The amendment, approved by 
this Court in December of 2008, added additional language to clarify that the 
requisite intent for manslaughter by act is the intent to commit an act that caused 
the death of the victim: 
In order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not 
necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated 
 
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intent to cause death, only an intent to commit an act which caused 
death.  See Hall v. State, 951 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). 
 
In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2007-10, 997 So. 
2d 403, 403 (Fla. 2008).  Thus, the relevant intent is the intent to commit an act 
which caused death, and the State is not required to prove that the defendant 
intended to kill the victim.3       
Did the Jury Instruction Result in Fundamental Error? 
Finally, we address whether the use of the standard jury instruction on 
manslaughter, which required Montgomery‘s jury to find that he intended to kill 
Ellis, constituted fundamental error.  Although the State and Montgomery agree 
that the manslaughter instruction erroneously required a jury finding that the 
defendant intended to kill the victim, the parties disagree as to whether the use of 
the erroneous instruction constituted fundamental error.  The State contends that 
notwithstanding the erroneous manslaughter jury instruction, Montgomery‘s 
second-degree murder conviction and sentence should have been upheld on direct 
appeal because the use of the manslaughter instruction did not constitute 
fundamental error.  Conversely, Montgomery argues that the use of the erroneous 
                                          
 
 
3.  In In re Amendments to Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases – 
Instruction 7.7, No. SC10-113 (Fla. Apr. 8, 2010), on our own motion, we have 
authorized the use of amended instruction 7.7 on an interim basis and have 
established a period for comments and suggestions.  
 
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instruction constituted fundamental error because it deprived him of an accurate 
manslaughter instruction during his trial for first-degree murder. 
Montgomery was entitled to an accurate instruction on the lesser included 
offense of manslaughter.  The instruction in this case, requiring the jury to find that 
Montgomery intended to kill Ellis, erroneously explained Florida law on 
manslaughter by act.  Moreover, it was ―pertinent or material to what the jury must 
consider in order to convict.‖  State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1991) 
(quoting Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. 1982)).  Thus, we conclude 
that fundamental error occurred in this case, where Montgomery was indicted and 
tried for first-degree murder and ultimately convicted of second-degree murder 
after the jury was erroneously instructed on the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter.  
We have held that ―[j]ury instructions are ‗subject to the contemporaneous 
objection rule, and absent an objection at trial, can be raised on appeal only if 
fundamental error occurred.‘ ‖  State v. Weaver, 957 So. 2d 586, 588 (Fla. 2007) 
(quoting Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002)).  Because Montgomery 
did not contemporaneously object to the manslaughter instruction, we apply a 
fundamental error analysis here.  This Court has explained the proper standard for 
determining whether an erroneous jury instruction constitutes fundamental error: 
To justify not imposing the contemporaneous objection rule, ―the 
error must reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent 
 
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that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the 
assistance of the alleged error.‖  In other words, ―fundamental error 
occurs only when the omission is pertinent or material to what the jury 
must consider in order to convict.‖  Failing to instruct on an element 
of the crime over which the record reflects there was no dispute is not 
fundamental error and there must be an objection to preserve the issue 
for appeal. 
 
Delva, 575 So. 2d at 644-45 (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 
481, 484 (Fla. 1960); Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. 1982)).   
Characterized by what it is not, manslaughter is considered a residual 
offense.  See Rojas v. State, 552 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. 1989).  Consequently, we 
have held that the failure to provide a complete instruction on manslaughter may 
constitute fundamental error.  See id. (holding that fundamental error occurred in a 
first-degree murder trial where the defendant was convicted of second-degree 
murder and where the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it could not convict 
the defendant of manslaughter if the killing was justifiable or excusable homicide).  
Cf. Pena v. State, 901 So. 2d 781, 788 (Fla. 2005) (holding that the failure to 
instruct on justifiable or excusable homicide was not fundamental error where 
manslaughter charge was three steps removed from the offense for which the 
defendant was convicted and the facts of the case did ―not support any jury 
argument relying upon the excusable or justifiable homicide instruction.‖). 
 
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Lesser Included Offenses 
Manslaughter is a category one lesser included offense of first-degree 
murder.4  At trial, the jury must be instructed on category one lesser included 
offenses; whether the jury is instructed on category two lesser included offenses 
depends on the trial judge‘s determination of whether the elements of ―category 2 
crimes may have been alleged and proved.‖  State v. Wimberly, 498 So. 2d 929, 
931 (Fla. 1986) (quoting Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) notes (2d ed. 1981).  We 
explained in Wimberly:  
A ―necessarily lesser included offense‖ is, as the name implies, 
a lesser offense that is always included in the major offense.  The trial 
judge has no discretion in whether to instruct the jury on a necessarily 
lesser included offense.  Once the judge determines that the offense is 
a necessarily lesser included offense, an instruction must be given. 
 
Wimberly, 498 So. 2d at 932.  Consequently, at Montgomery‘s trial for first-degree 
murder, the trial court was required to instruct the jury on the lesser included 
offense of manslaughter.    
Second-degree murder as a lesser included offense is one step removed from 
first-degree murder, and manslaughter as a lesser included offense is two steps 
removed from first-degree murder.  In Pena, we concluded that ―when the trial 
court fails to properly instruct on a crime two or more degrees removed from the 
                                          
 
 
4.  In first-degree murder cases, second-degree murder and manslaughter are 
category one lesser included offenses.  See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.2.   
 
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crime for which the defendant is convicted, the error is not per se reversible, but 
instead is subject to a harmless error analysis.‖  Pena, 901 So. 2d at 787.  We 
explained that  
the significance of the two-steps-removed requirement is more than 
merely a matter of number or degree.  A jury must be given a fair 
opportunity to exercise its inherent ―pardon‖ power by returning a 
verdict of guilty as to the next lower crime.  If the jury is not properly 
instructed on the next lower crime, then it is impossible to determine 
whether, having been properly instructed, it would have found the 
defendant guilty of the next lesser offense.   
 
Id. at 787.  The lesser included offense of manslaughter is just one step removed 
from second-degree murder.  Because Montgomery‘s conviction for second-degree 
murder was only one step removed from the necessarily lesser included offense of 
manslaughter, under Pena, fundamental error occurred in his case which was per se 
reversible where the manslaughter instruction erroneously imposed upon the jury a 
requirement to find that Montgomery intended to kill Ellis.5    
In conclusion, we approve the decision of the First District Court of Appeal 
to the extent that it held that manslaughter by act does not require proof that the 
defendant intended to kill the victim and concluding that in this case, the use of the 
standard jury instruction on manslaughter constituted fundamental error.  We 
                                          
 
 
5.  We note that the trial court itself expressed some concern about the 
sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction of first-degree murder.  The trial 
court‘s concern about the evidence supporting the charged offense of first-degree 
murder further underscores the importance of the jury‘s accurate instruction on the 
lesser included offenses in this case.           
 
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answer the certified question in the negative and hold that the crime of 
manslaughter by act does not require that the State prove that the defendant 
intended to kill the victim.  We further hold that the intent which the State must 
prove for the purpose of manslaughter by act is the intent to commit an act that was 
not justified or excusable, which caused the death of the victim.  Moreover, we 
conclude that the use of the standard jury instruction on manslaughter constituted 
fundamental, reversible error in Montgomery‘s case and requires that Montgomery 
receive a new trial.  Given our resolution of the certified question, we do not reach 
the certified conflict. 
It is so ordered.  
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D07-4688 
 
 
(Duval County) 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Charlie 
Richey McCoy, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
 
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Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Richard M. Summa, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent