Case Title: McDaniel v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5474

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1981-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
McDaniel v. State1997 WY 117945 P.2d 1186Case Number: 96-323Decided: 10/01/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

DONALD EUGENE McDANIEL, 

Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 The 
Honorable Barton R. Voigt, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna 
Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Jason M. Tangeman, Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Colleen K. Coebergh, Special Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant Donald 
Eugene McDaniel was convicted on two counts of first degree sexual assault and 
received consecutive sentences of not less than fifteen years in the state 
prison. He contends that his conviction should be reversed and the case against 
him dismissed for violation of his statutory and constitutional right to a 
speedy trial.

 

[¶2]      We affirm the 
conviction and sentence.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      McDaniel and the 
State agree that this case presents this issue for our 
review:

 

Whether the appellant's guarantee to a speedy trial 
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Art. 1, § 10 
of the Wyoming Constitution, and Rule 48 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure was violated?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      McDaniel was 
arrested on charges of first degree sexual assault on December 21, 1995, and 
arraigned in district court on January 8, 1996. At the arraignment, defense 
counsel requested to peremptorily disqualify the trial judge, but the judge 
refused to act on an oral motion and instructed that the motion be filed in 
writing. Defense counsel filed that motion the next day, January 9, 1996, and 
also filed motions for speedy trial, discovery, and intent to introduce Rule 
404(b) evidence. Also on January 9, the trial judge whom the defense had moved 
to disqualify entered an order setting trial for March 11, 
1996.

 

[¶5]      In the middle of 
February, the prosecution notified the defense that the clerk of court required 
it to submit an order for a change in judges, and the case was assigned to a new 
judge on February 22, 1996. Immediately recognizing that a speedy trial concern 
was presented, the new judge met with counsel on February 23, 1996, and sent 
them a letter on February 26 indicating that the court's schedule would not 
accommodate a trial setting within 120 days of McDaniel's January 8 arraignment. 
Accordingly, the court determined that it would invoke WYO. R.CRIM. P. 
48(b)(4)(B)(iii) to exclude from the 120-day calculation the days spent waiting 
for the assignment order.

 

[¶6]      Over three weeks 
later, on March 19, 1996, McDaniel filed an objection to extending the speedy 
trial date but did not file a request for setting. At a hearing on March 27, 
1996, the court heard the objection along with other defense motions. Trial was 
set for and held on June 26, 1996, which was 170 days from the date of 
McDaniel's arraignment. McDaniel was unable to post bond during this period and 
remained incarcerated.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Compliance With Procedural 
Rule

 

[¶7]      At the hearing on 
McDaniel's objection to extending the speedy trial date, the court invoked Rule 
48 to extend the speedy trial date. Rule 48 is a procedural rule designed to 
protect a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1370-71 (Wyo. 1996). Included within the rule are the factors to be 
considered in evaluation of a constitutional speedy trial claim. This Court, as 
with other procedural rules, will examine claims based upon procedural 
violations of the rule. Id.

 

RULE 48. Dismissal.

* 
* *

(b) Speedy 
trial.

(1) It is the responsibility of the court, counsel 
and the defendant to insure that the defendant is timely 
tried.

(2) A criminal charge shall be brought to trial 
within 120 days following arraignment unless continued as provided in this 
rule.

(3) The following periods shall be excluded in 
computing the time for trial:

(A) All proceedings related to the mental illness or 
deficiency of the defendant;

(B) Proceedings on another 
charge;

(C) Delay granted by the court pursuant to paragraph 
(4) or (5);

(D) The time between the dismissal and the refiling 
of the same charge; and

(E) Delay occasioned by defendant's change of counsel 
or application therefor.

(4) Continuances not to exceed six months from the 
date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court as 
follows:

(A) On motion of defendant supported by affidavit; 
or

(B) On motion of the attorney for the state or the 
court if: 

(i) The defendant expressly 
consents;

(ii) The state's evidence is unavailable and the 
prosecution has exercised due diligence; or

(iii) Required in the due administration of justice 
and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced; 
and

(C) If a continuance is proposed by the state or the 
court, the defendant shall be notified. If the defendant objects, the defendant 
must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the 
defense.

* 
* * *

WYO. R.CRIM. P. 
48.

 

[¶8]      The record shows 
that a jury trial was set for March 11, 1996, but could not begin because the 
defense requested a new judge. There was a 45-day delay waiting for the 
assignment of a new judge. The judge extended the speedy trial date on February 
26, the defense objected on March 19, and a hearing was held on March 27 on this 
objection and several other defense motions. After ruling on those motions, the 
court set a trial date. The parties devote a great portion of their briefs 
arguing whether or not the defense should be charged with these several delays 
for purposes of speedy trial analysis. Our review of the court's ruling at the 
March 27 hearing indicates that the court invoked Rule 48 based on the exception 
found in 4(B)(iii) which allows a continuance when required for the due 
administration of justice and there is no substantial prejudice to the 
defendant. The court found that it had properly notified the parties by letter 
on February 26 that it intended to impose a continuance as permitted by Rule 48 
and ruled that the continuance was proper because the delay caused by the 
defense requesting a change in judges resulted in the court's inability to 
schedule a three-day trial until June 25. It was within the court's discretion 
to determine that these circumstances required the continuance, and its ruling 
will be upheld on appeal because the trial court complied with the rule, and 
trial was held within six months from the date of 
arraignment.

 

[¶9]      The court found 
that the defense alleged substantial prejudice solely because of pretrial 
custody and ruled that did not show unfair prejudice. On appeal, McDaniel 
contends the district court incorrectly determined he did not suffer prejudice 
from the delays. He asserts that the record reveals that his defense was 
impaired because the memories of the victim and another key prosecution witness 
had become stale at the time of trial, making them unreliable and untrustworthy. 
We understand McDaniel's point is that these witnesses were evasive about the 
details of their accusations against him making it difficult to present accurate 
facts to the jury; however, it is usually the case that an unreliable accuser 
works to the benefit of the accused. The record reveals that defense counsel 
sought to impeach these witnesses with inconsistencies and argued the 
unreliability and untrustworthiness of these witnesses' memories to the jury 
during closing arguments. We will not find that delay resulted in impairment of 
defense in these circumstances but will, instead, recognize that it was the 
prosecution's case which was weakened and delay benefitted the defense. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2187, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). We agree with the district court's 
ruling that Rule 48 permitted the continuance.

 

Compliance With 
Constitution

 

[¶10]   It is also necessary that the 
courts examine speedy trial issues in light of the constitutional factors which 
provide the underpinnings of the rule. Hall, 911 P.2d  at 1370. The four factors 
to be considered in evaluation of a constitutional speedy trial claim are: (1) 
the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion 
of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 1370-71 (citing Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 
(Wyo. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971, 93 S. Ct. 2164, 36 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1973)). "However, when the length of the 
delay is neither `presumptively prejudicial' nor significantly long, no further 
analysis is warranted." Phillips v. 
State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272, 277 
(Wyo. 1991)). 

 

[¶11]   The time from the first charge to 
the time of trial was a total of 188 days. A 45-day delay was caused by the 
request for a change in judges, and a 30-day delay ensued when the defense filed 
a motion objecting to extending the speedy trial date, and it and other defense 
motions were heard at a hearing on March 27. We do not fault McDaniel for filing 
these motions; however, we do not accept the contention that the government 
bears the blame for the delays which followed the filing of these motions. 
Delays attributable to the defendant are subtracted from the computation. See Phillips, 835 P.2d  at 1069. After 
deducting the delays attributable to the defendant, only 113 days passed between 
the date of arrest and the time of trial. Considering our rule imposes a 120-day 
deadline, we do not find that 113 days is significantly long and hold that 
McDaniel's right to a speedy trial was not violated.

 

[¶12]   The conviction is 
affirmed.