Case Title: CLINGMAN v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
CLINGMAN v. STATE2001 WY 4623 P.3d 27Case Number: 00-118Decided: 05/10/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                         

  

WAYNE W. 
CLINGMAN,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

  

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Kenneth E. Stebner, Judge

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Assistant Appellate Counsel 

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director of the Prosecution Assistance 
Program; and Sean Persin, Student Intern 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J.; GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.; and DAN SPANGLER, D.J. 
(RET.)

 SPANGLER, 
D.J. (RET.), 
delivered the opinion of the Court; and GOLDEN, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion in which LEHMAN, C.J., joined.

  
            
SPANGLER, District Judge (Retired).

 [¶1]            
Appellant 
Wayne W. Clingman entered a guilty plea to the charge of taking immodest, 
immoral, or indecent liberties with a minor under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) 
(LEXIS 1999) and was sentenced to a prison term of three to five years.  He appeals from the Judgment and 
Sentence and an order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  We affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]            
Appellant 
states these issues:

 

I.  Did the State breach its plea agreement 
with Appellant and violate his due process rights?

 

II.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion 
in denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his plea after 
sentencing?

 

 

THE PLEA 
AGREEMENT

 

[¶3]            
Appellant 
and the State entered into a plea agreement contained in a letter from the 
prosecutor to Appellant's attorney.  
The pertinent portion of the agreement states:

 

2.  Following 
your client's plea of guilty and preparation of Presentence Investigation, the 
State will appear at sentencing and specifically limit our argument to the facts 
of this particular case, and the general purposes of sentencing.  That is, we will not argue to the Court 
that a particular sentence should be imposed, nor insist or suggest to the Court 
during our argument that probation should not be imposed, nor 
alternatively that incarceration must be imposed.  That would be the sole limitation on our 
argument, and as you know under Rule 11 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and the law of sentencing generally, the State cannot agree to 
withhold information, etc. from the Court.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶4]            
When a 
plea of guilty rests to any significant degree on a promise or agreement by the 
State, that promise must be fulfilled.  
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971); Clouse v. State, 809 P.2d 791, 795 (Wyo. 
1991).  Whether the prosecutor has 
violated the plea agreement is a question that is reviewed de novo.  United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1442 (10th Cir. 1995).

 

 

THE 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT

 

[¶5]            
Appellant 
complains that six comments made at sentencing by the prosecutor violated the 
plea agreement.  The first comment 
referred to statements by the child's family in the victim impact 
statement:  "And, of course, the 
aunt, of course, and the mother certainly don't want him incarcerated, as that's 
understandable.  Just as 
understandable as the victim impact is, that they want and believe it's 
appropriate to have him incarcerated."  
This was part of the record before the trial judge.  Simply referring to these matters does 
not constitute an argument for imprisonment or against 
probation.

 

 

SEX 
OFFENDER PROGRAMS

 

[¶6]            
Appellant 
argued for probation and sex offender treatment in the community.  The prosecutor 
responded:

 

I would 
note that there is a treatment argument made, probation and treatment.  Again, just for the Court's knowledge 
and background, the Court knows there is a sex offender program in place, in 
fact the only one in Carbon County in place is in place within the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  The Department of 
Corrections runs one there.  I 
checked as early as January to ensure it is operating there still, and it 
is.  It is the only one still 
operating in the county.  That's 
just for your information in assessing what it is you can 
do.

 

The plea 
agreement noted that the State could not agree to withhold information from the 
district court.

 

[¶7]            
This 
subject was addressed in the case of Jackson v. State, 902 P.2d 1292, 
1294 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted):

 

Efforts 
by the State to provide relevant factual information are not tantamount to 
taking a position on the sentence and will not violate a plea agreement. . . . 
Thus, if the State is aware that the court lacks certain relevant information, 
the prosecutor has the duty, as an officer of the court, to bring that 
information to the attention of the court.  
In this case, the State promised to "stand silent" at the time of 
sentencing.  That promise, however, 
did not require the prosecutor to withhold from the district court pertinent 
information on appellant's background and character.

 

As in 
the Jackson case, the prosecutor in this instance did not violate the 
agreement by providing this information on treatment 
programs.

 

 

THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION

 

[¶8]            
Appellant 
argues that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by referring to a 
statement in a psychological evaluation that he probably was denying the full 
extent of his offense.  Pointing out 
that Appellant had not told the psychologist or the probation officer that his 
semen was on the child's clothing, the prosecutor stated:

 

You 
don't see that in the PSI or in the evaluation, and this evaluation was done at 
his request.  It does a risk 
assessment, I will talk about that in a minute.  It notes something important for you to 
weigh, that is any time a Defendant minimizes over and over again, including to 
an evaluator, how much does that weigh?  
Does that weigh in favor of incarceration or probation, and possibly of 
rehabilitation and treatment if you're not owning up?

 

This is 
a reference to records before the district court.  It is not an argument for a particular 
sentence nor is it a suggestion that probation should not be imposed or 
incarceration must be imposed.

 

 

THE 
PRESENTENCE REPORT

 

[¶9]            
The 
presentence investigation recommended that Appellant be incarcerated.  In that regard, the prosecutor 
said:  "The PSI, after thoughtful 
evaluation of what the Defendant said, the charging documents, and whatever 
background they knew and the lengthy victim impact statements represented there, 
recommend incarceration."  
Appellant's objection to this statement is not well founded.  The prosecutor was only repeating a 
recommendation that had been made in a document before the district 
court.

 

 

THE 
CHARGING DOCUMENTS

 

[¶10]        
Appellant 
claims that the plea agreement was breached when the prosecutor made this 
statement about the facts of the case:

 

This 
doesn't mean it's a maybe, it isn't.  
Well, do we believe a 4-year-old?  
It's true, it happened.  
[Appellant] admits it, and we are only talking about what he admits.  On the one hand he's here about indecent 
liberties.  You see the factual 
basis.  On the other hand, you can 
see from the charging documents a suggestion of anal intercourse was actually 
had, anal injury to the child.  We 
are not going down that road, we are not talking about 
that.

 

The 
information referenced by the prosecutor was contained in the affidavit filed by 
the complaining police officer.  
These matters were also mentioned in the presentence investigation.  The plea agreement permitted the State 
to argue the facts of the case.  
Thus, these statements do not violate the 
agreement.

 

 

TREATMENT 
OPTIONS

 

[¶11]        
Appellant 
takes issue with this remark by the State which was in response to his argument 
that he could be treated in the community:

 

Rehabilitation, 
of course, is an aspect.  It's an 
aspect that I suggest to you, of course I think it's fair to suggest it.  [Appellant's counsel] said probation, 
the evaluation said treatment in the community is possible.  My only comment about that is treatment 
is also possible and in place inside the custody of the 
penitentiary.

 

As noted 
earlier, this statement only provides information to the district court about 
the location of a treatment program.  
It is not an argument for or against a particular 
sentence.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶12]        
We do 
not find that the State breached the plea agreement.  The statements in question provided 
information, discussed the facts, or referred to written materials before the 
district court.  The prosecutor did 
not argue that a particular sentence should be imposed.  He did not insist or suggest that 
probation should not be imposed or that incarceration must be imposed.  

 

[¶13]        
Appellant 
also contends that the district court erroneously denied his motion to withdraw 
his plea of guilty.  The motion was 
based upon the same issues discussed above.  The State counters that this issue is 
not properly before us because Appellant did not file a notice of appeal from 
this ruling.  Given our conclusion 
that the prosecution did not breach the plea agreement, it is not necessary for 
us to resolve the jurisdictional issue.  
The motion to withdraw the plea rests upon the same issue decided 
adversely to Appellant in this opinion.

 

[¶14]        
Therefore, 
the Judgment and Sentence is affirmed.

  

GOLDEN, 
J., 
specially concurring, with whom LEHMAN, C.J., 
joins.

 

[¶15]       
I write 
separately to address several matters not touched upon by the Court's 
opinion.  First, in the State's 
briefing a question is raised whether Clingman's appeal of the district court's 
April 12, 2000, order denying his post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea is properly before the Court.  
The State does not question that Clingman has properly and timely 
perfected his appeal from the district court's judgment and sentence which was 
filed March 6, 2000; his notice of appeal from that judgment and sentence was 
timely filed April 6, 2000, and expressly referenced the March 6 judgment and 
sentence.  The State points out, 
however, that Clingman did not file a notice of appeal from the district court's 
order dated April 12, 2000, which denied his post-sentencing motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea.  

 

[¶16]       
Responding 
to the State's argument on this point, Clingman asserts that he filed his 
post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea on March 8, 2000, when the 
district court retained jurisdiction over his case, and before he filed his 
notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence.  He further asserts that his notice of 
appeal from the judgment and sentence encompasses all of the district court's 
interlocutory rulings, including that court's post-notice of appeal order 
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  I am not so sure.  His assertion that his April 6 notice of 
appeal from the March 6 judgment and sentence encompasses the district court's 
later April 12 order denying his March 8 motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
strikes me as inherently illogical.  
He does not support his assertion with pertinent 
authority.

 

[¶17]       
The time 
for appeal commences to run from the date of entry of judgment.  W.R.A.P. 2.03(b).  In a criminal case, the running of the 
time for appeal is not terminated by the filing of a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea.  W.R.A.P. 2.03(a); Jessen 
v. State, 622 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981).  An order denying a post-sentencing 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a final appealable order.  W.R.A.P. 1.05(c); and see, e.g., 
Johnson v. State, 922 P.2d 1384 (Wyo. 1996); Jackson v. State, 902 P.2d 1292 (Wyo. 1995); and Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 20 (Wyo. 1993).  Because Clingman did not appeal the 
district court's order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, this 
Court has no jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that order.  That result, of course, has no adverse 
effect on Clingman's properly and timely perfected appeal of the March 6, 2000, 
judgment and sentence.  In that 
appeal, he raises the same substantive issue that he raised in his 
post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea, namely, whether the State 
breached the plea agreement upon which Clingman relied when he pleaded guilty to 
one charge of indecent liberties.

 

[¶18]       
I now 
turn to that issue.  In the State's 
briefing, it weakly implies that Clingman has waived the issue of the State's 
breach of the plea agreement because he "made no objection to the State's 
arguments at the sentencing hearing."  
The State does not, however, develop the point with either cogent 
argument or supporting authority.  
Although this Court has no precedent directly on point, "[o]ur general 
rule is that we will not consider issues not raised in the court below.  There are only two exceptions to that 
rule:  when the issue raises 
jurisdictional questions or it is of such a fundamental nature that it must be 
considered."  Cooper v. Town of 
Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1208 (Wyo. 2000) (citations omitted).  In the usual case, the litigants in the 
district court are in the best position to know if error has occurred.  They are expected to apprise the 
district court of the perceived error by means of the appropriate objection 
together with the supporting reasons.  
Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512, 519 (Wyo. 1982), 
overruled on other grounds, 653 P.2d 145 (Wyo. 1998).  Having been so apprised, the district 
court is able to consider the objection and the perceived error in the context 
of the immediate situation and make an informed ruling.  That would seem to be especially 
efficacious in a situation like the one here, where the prosecutor's alleged 
breach of a plea agreement by way of remarks made in a sentencing hearing occurs 
before the very eyes of the court.  
Having said that, it should be asked whether the prosecutor's alleged 
breach of a plea agreement "is of such a fundamental nature that it must be 
considered" even though the defendant failed to raise the issue in the district 
court.  That answer seems to be 
given in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971):

 

           
This phase of the process of criminal justice, and the adjudicative 
element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards 
to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances.  Those circumstances will vary, but a 
constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise 
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled.

 

Id. at 
262, 92 S. Ct.  at 499.

 

[¶19]       
Because 
both the State and the defendant, as well as this Court in its opinion, rely on 
authority of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for the standard of review to be 
applied in this appeal, it should be noted in passing, before leaving this issue 
of waiver, that a split of authority exists in the federal circuits concerning 
the waiver issue in the plea agreement breach context.  United States v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 1167, 1170 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 893 (2001).  The Tenth Circuit holds 
that a defendant who fails to raise in the district court the prosecutor's 
alleged breach does not waive that issue on appeal.  Id. at 1170.  That court identifies the breach claim 
as a question of law to be afforded de novo review.  Id. 

 

[¶20]       
If we 
are going to adopt the Tenth Circuit's standard of review, let us be clear what 
it is:

 

           
We apply a two-step analysis to determine if the government breached a 
plea agreement:  "(1) we examine the 
nature of the government's promise; and (2) we evaluate this promise in light of 
the defendant's reasonable understanding of the promise at the time the guilty 
plea was entered."  United States 
v. Brye, 146 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 1998).  Principles of general contract law guide 
our analysis of the government's obligations under the agreement.  See id. Thus, in assessing 
whether the government has breached the agreement, we look to the express terms 
of the agreement and construe any ambiguities against the government as the 
drafter of the agreement.  See 
id.; United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999).  This court also has explained 
that:

The 
government breaches an agreement not to oppose a motion when it makes statements 
that do more than merely state facts or simply validate facts found in the 
Presentence Report and provides a legal characterization of those facts or 
argues the effect of those facts to the sentencing judge.

Brye, 146 F.3d  at 1211 (internal citation and quotations omitted).

 

Peterson, 225 F.3d  at 1170-71.

 

[¶21]       
A 
prosecutor who drafts a plea agreement containing the terms found in the one we 
review today should pay particular attention to two principles of this 
standard:  (1) the court looks to 
the express terms of the plea agreement and construes any ambiguities against 
the government as the drafter of the agreement; and (2) the government breaches 
such an agreement when it provides a legal characterization of facts found in 
the presentence report or argues the effect of those facts to the sentencing 
judge.

 

[¶22]       
In the 
record of the case we review today, there is a presentence report and a report 
from the defendant's psychological evaluators.  They contain facts suggesting criminal 
behavior of the defendant in addition to that which forms the basis of the one 
charge of indecent liberties to which the defendant pleaded guilty.  Further, they contain facts suggesting 
the defendant was minimalizing his behavior and not yet facing up to it.  When asked by the sentencing judge about 
these reports, the defendant did not object to their contents.  Because the plea agreement called for 
the prosecutor to modify the charging information to reflect only the one count 
of indecent liberties, and he did so, arguably the facts surrounding that single 
charge established the boundaries beyond which the prosecutor could not safely 
stray.  But for the defendant's 
failure to object to the contents of the above-mentioned reports, the prosecutor 
was on thin ice in commenting on the facts contained in those reports.  That the prosecutor might not be able to 
comment on those facts does not mean that the sentencing judge cannot 
independently know about and consider them in imposing sentence.  Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 
1207-08 (Wyo. 1987). The point is, however, if the government has promised to 
comment about only "the facts of this particular case," perhaps an ambiguous 
phrase, the court may confine such comments to the facts surrounding the single 
count in the modified information.  
A prosecutor who strays from such confinement needlessly risks much.  For example, in Santobello, the 
government's breach of the plea agreement was inadvertent, and the sentencing 
judge strongly declared he was not influenced by the prosecutor's remarks; 
nevertheless, the court reversed and remanded the conviction.  404 U.S.  at 263, 92 S. Ct.  at 499.  In the words of the morning roll-call 
police sergeant in the old television show "Hill Street Blues," let's be careful 
out there.