Case Title: BRIAN CHARLES V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2004-SC-001020-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANT NQ7Z~'E NOT TO BEPUBLISHED-OPIA7ON THIS OPINIONISDESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THERULES OF CIVIL PR0CEDDURE PROHULGATEDBYTHE SUPREME COURT , CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDAND SHALL ATOTBE CITED OR USED ASAUTHORITYINANYOTHER CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE . 6$uyrrmt (fourf of 2004-SC-1020-MR BRIAN CHARLES APPELLANT APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT V . HONORABLE DOUGLAS M . STEPHENS, JUDGE 2004-C R-00204-2 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART RENDERED : JUNE 15, 2006 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict which convicted Charles of first-degree burglary, complicity to first-degree robbery, receiving stolen property valued over $300, tampering with physical evidence and being a first-degree persistent felony offender . He was sentenced to 20 years in state prison . He raises five issues : that improper hearsay evidence was admitted against him; that the complicity jury instructions were not correct ; that the burglary instruction was erroneous ; that there was insufficient proof to allow the jury to find him guilty of being a first degree persistent felony offender and that there was insufficient proof to allow the jury to find him guilty of receiving stolen property with a value over $300 . Two men broke into the victim's Crescent Springs home in the late evening or early morning hours of January 7 . Both had guns and one wore stockings on his hands . They tied up the female victim and threatened her with the guns until she provided them with her bank account PIN number . The last thing she remembered was a blow to the head . She awoke later to discover the men had taken numerous items from her home including two shotguns, consumer electronics, her automobile and several credit and bank cards . She was not able to identify either of the men who entered her dwelling . At the conclusion of the trial, the jury fixed punishment at ten years for the burglary and robbery charges and one year for receiving stolen property over $300, and tampering with physical evidence . The two ten-year sentences were enhanced to 20 years and the two one-year sentences were enhanced to five years because of the first- degree PFO charge . The sentences were to be served concurrently for a total of 20 years . This appeal followed . I . IMPROPER HEARSAY Charles presents four instances where he argues that hearsay evidence was improperly put before the jury . None of those errors are preserved by objection . It is difficult to single out the cause when a trial judge permits a prosecutor to introduce so many errors into a trial because defense counsel has raised no objections . The prosecutor first handed a document to a police officer witness . It was never identified nor admitted into evidence . The officer read from the document and was allowed to state that the DNA profile of particular samples that were found in the stolen vehicle matched that of a co-indictee named Holt . The testimony was clearly hearsay . KRE 801 . It conformed to no exception to the hearsay rule and should not have been admitted . KRE 802 . During closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to establish a connection between Holt, Charles and the crimes . He asked the jury to believe that because they had the DNA and other physical evidence related to Holt and because there was testimony that Charles was seen with Holt both before and after the break in, Charles had to be with Holt during the crime . Holt's girlfriend testified she had met Charles a few times . She testified that before the crimes were committed, Charles and Holt met and discussed something but she was unable to provide any details of that conversation . When asked specifically if she recalled Charles saying anything about what was going to happen, she responded that she did not and that she really did not hear either of the men say anything . The prosecutor then asked if she knew where the men were going . She responded "to rob the trailer park". There was no objection. Charles now complains that this was hearsay. He is not correct . The supposition is that the only way she could have known the two men were planning a robbery was if she heard them, and, therefore, was repeating the out-of-court statements . It was a question of fact and impression. She told what she personally knew or believed . There is nothing to indicate it was a repeated statement of another. There was no error . KRE 801 . Another female witness testified that Holt called her asking how to get in touch with Charles . She testified that she provided Holt with a telephone number . This was also not hearsay and was not error . KRE 801 . The final hearsay related issue brought to us by Charles involves the testimony of a police officer . The officer repeated a number of statements that have collectively come to be referred to as investigative hearsay . "[H]earsay is no less hearsay because a police officer supplies the evidence" . Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 574 S.W.2d.534 (Ky. 1988). This evidence should not have been admitted in the form it was provided to the jury . It was improper hearsay and was error . Although the two instances of the admission of hearsay evidence were not proper, Charles voiced no objection at trial . We are, therefore, required to analyze those two errors pursuant to RCr 10.26 . After a review of the record, we determine that the errors do not rise to the level that they affected Charles' substantial rights or caused manifest injustice . See Stringer v. Commonwealth , 956 S.W .2d 883 (Ky. 1997) . The single mention of the DNA evidence during closing argument did not result in a manifest injustice . The investigative hearsay evidence was for the most part cumulative of other testimony and that which was not was of minor significance and did not affect the fairness of the trial . See Brock v. Commonwealth , 947 S .W.2d 24 (Ky . 1997) . II . COMPLICITY INSTRUCTION Charles was convicted of Complicity to Commit First Degree Robbery . This claim of error was,not preserved . The instructions provided to the jury did not completely track the language of the statute . First Degree Robbery requires physical injury, being armed with a deadly weapon or using or threatening the use of a dangerous instrument against the victim . KRS 515.020 . There are numerous sample instructions available that are sufficient to properly instruct a jury . We have in the past declined to provide model instructions and we continue to do so now . The question of fact at this trial was not the injury or whether a weapon or dangerous instrument was involved . The question at the core of this trial was the identity of the persons responsible . The record contains numerous uncontroverted examples of testimony involving the use of a gun, physical injury and the use of a dangerous instrument to further the crime . The instructions provided in this trial required the jury to determine that the guilty party used or threatened the use of physical force upon the victim . Although perhaps not the best instruction that could have been used in this trial, it was sufficient . There was no evidence admitted that in any manner brought a gun, a dangerous instrument or physical injury into question . There is no question that had more complete instructions been provided, the jury would have returned the same result . See Chapman v . California , 386 U.S . 19 (1967) . Any error, if error at all, does not rise to a level causing us to reverse the conviction . III . BURGLARY INSTRUCTION Charles was convicted of First Degree Burglary . This alleged error also was not preserved . The instruction provided for this charge was not crafted in the best possible manner . One element of the instructions required the jury to find that physical injury was caused to the victim . . As with the complicity instruction discussed previously, this instruction, too, while not completely correct, was sufficient . The use of a weapon and the injury upon the victim were not contested facts . In this situation, it becomes a matter of law and not a jury question . Commonwealth v. Potts , 884 S .W .2d 654 (Ky . 1994) . The error if error at all does not require us to reverse the conviction IV . PFO EVIDENCE During the combined persistent felony offender and truth-in-sentencing phases of the trial, an officer from the Division of Probation and Parole testified as the only witness for the Commonwealth . This claim of error was not preserved . He testified that Charles had two prior convictions that were entered in the Circuit Court . He testified that Charles was over the age of 18 when each of these prior offenses was committed . He never provided testimony concerning the exact dates of the commission of the prior offenses nor whether each was a felony . At the close of the Commonwealth's testimony, certified copies of the Judgment of Conviction for each of the previous crimes were admitted into evidence . The current conviction resulted from the acts of January 7, 2004 . The five year window created by the statutes required the jury to find Charles was no longer subject to any form of legal release or was in effect free and clear of both of the prior convictions by January 7, 1999 . One of the certified Judgment of Convictions submitted as evidence does reveal that it was entered in 2001 for an offense that occurred in 2000 . It was entirely within the province of the jury to believe that Charles was serving that sentence at some point after January 7, 1999, as it was imposed in 2001 for a crime committed in 2000 . There was evidence that Charles was within the five-year Persistent Felony Offender window . The certified judgments show that he was sentenced to 15 months for one of the prior crimes and four years for the other . There was clearly evidence that he had been sentenced to more than one year for each of the prior offenses . - The testimony of the witness provided the information that Charles was over the age of eighteen when these offenses were committed . See Martin v . Commonwealth , 13 S .W.3d 232 (Ky . 1999) . Charles did not present any evidence to rebut that assertion . The witness also testified as to when Charles was born . Although never asked by the prosecutor whether Charles was twenty-one years old at the time of the trial, the jury had the birth date and could easily calculate the correct answer. There was sufficient information provided for the jury to reach reasonable conclusions whether to convict or not from the Persistent Felony Offender instructions . There was no error . V. RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY INSTRUCTIONS Charles argues that he was substantially prejudiced and denied due process of law by his conviction for receiving stolen property over $300 because the prosecution did not introduce any evidence of the value of the property he allegedly received . Charles is correct . The Commonwealth failed to introduce any evidence as to the actual value of the items taken from the victim . This issue was preserved . The trial judge noted some reservation about the value of the property but indicated there would be a determination when preparing the instructions . The trial judge then issued instructions including the instruction for Receiving Stolen Property Valued Over $300, thus overruling the motion for directed verdict. The only question left unanswered by the evidence before the jury was the actual value of the stolen property . Everything has value . The list of stolen items could easily have been interpreted by the jury to exceed a value of $300 . The Commonwealth did not, however, prove that the actual value exceeded the statutory limit . Absent that proof, the only reasonable verdict would have been a guilty verdict for the misdemeanor charge of Receiving Stolen Property Valued Under $300 . Charles was not denied any of his constitutional rights regarding due process provided by both the federal and state constitutions . We reverse so much of the judgment of conviction finding Charles guilty of the felony of Receiving Stolen Property Valued Over $300 and remand this case for re- sentencing on the misdemeanor charge of Receiving Stolen Property Valued Under $300 . The judgment of conviction is affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for sentencing consistent with this Opinion . All concur except Johnstone and Roach, JJ., who concur in result only . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT : Julie Namkin Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D . Stumbo Attorney General of Kentucky Gregory C. Fuchs Assistant Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204