Case Title: Ex parte Alabama High School Athletic Assn.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1160121, 1160125

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2017-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 02/24/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1160121
____________________
Ex parte Alabama High School Athletic Association and Steven
P. Savarese, its executive director
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Geneva County Board of Education and Elba City Board
of Education
v.
Alabama High School Athletic Association)
(Geneva Circuit Court, CV-16-900087)
____________________
1160125
____________________
Ex parte Alabama High School Athletic Association and Steven
P. Savarese, its executive director
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Erica L. Pogue, individually and as mother and next
friend of A.J.K., et al.
v.
Alabama High School Athletic Association and Steven P.
Savarese)
(Washington Circuit Court, CV-16-900064)
PER CURIAM.
On November 10, 2016, the Alabama High School Athletic
Association ("the Association") and its executive director,
Steven P. Savarese, filed petitions for a writ of mandamus
challenging certain conflicting orders issued by the Geneva
Circuit Court and the Washington Circuit Court.  On November
14, 2016, this Court issued an order  granting the petitions
and issuing the writs.  In that order, this Court upheld a
decision of the Association and declared the orders of the two
circuit courts to be void.  That order also stated that an
opinion of this Court would follow at a later date.
A.J.K. is a student at Washington County High School,
located in Washington County, and he played high-school
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football for the school during the 2016-2017 school year. 
During the high-school football playoffs, the Association
determined that A.J.K. was ineligible to participate on the
football team, and, because A.J.K. had participated for the
school as an ineligible player, the Association removed the
school from the playoffs.  At the request of interested
persons and entities, the Association's decision was reviewed
in both the Geneva Circuit Court and the Washington Circuit
Court.1  The Geneva Circuit Court issued an order directing
that the Association's decision be enforced, but the
Washington Circuit Court issued an order reversing the
Association's decision and prohibiting the Association from
removing Washington County High School from the playoffs.  The
Association and Savarese then filed petitions for writs of
mandamus in this Court, arguing that both the Geneva Circuit
Court and the Washington Circuit Court had 
improperly asserted
jurisdiction and asking this Court to declare void the orders
of those courts.
1The Geneva County Board of Education and the Elba City
Board of Education sought a temporary restraining order
requiring 
the 
Association 
to 
enforce 
its 
rules 
and
regulations.  Erica L. Pogue and the Washington County Board
of Education sought to overturn the Association's decision.
3
1160121, 1160125
In Scott v. Kilpatrick, 286 Ala. 129, 132-33, 237 So. 2d
652, 655 (1970), this Court stated: 
"If officials of a school desire to associate
with other schools and prescribe conditions of
eligibility for students who are to become members
of the school's athletic teams, and the member
schools vest final enforcement of the association's
rules in boards of control, then a court should not
interfere in such internal operation of the affairs
of the association. ...
"Of course, if the acts of an association are
the 
result 
of 
fraud, 
lack 
of 
jurisdiction,
collusion, 
or 
arbitrariness, 
the 
courts 
will
intervene to protect an injured part[y's] rights."
In Alabama High School Athletic Ass'n v. Rose, 446 So. 2d
1, 5 (Ala. 1984), this Court further stated:
"[A]s Kilpatrick and Kubiszyn [v. Alabama High
School Athletic Ass'n, 374 So. 2d 256 (Ala. 1979),]
indicate, the burden on the challenger to overcome
the presumption favoring the Association's absolute
authority in the conduct of its own affairs is a
heavy one.  We reaffirm the Kilpatrick test to the
effect that the Court's jurisdiction in such matters
is invoked when, and only when, the averments of
fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness are supported by
clear and convincing evidence; and the trial court's
acceptance of jurisdiction will be affirmed only
where its order makes an unequivocal factual finding
of one or more of those narrow, restrictive grounds,
founded upon clear and convincing evidence."
In this case, the requirements needed for the Geneva
Circuit Court and the Washington Circuit Court to properly
exercise jurisdiction simply were not present.  Because of the
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1160121, 1160125
nature of the relief sought and the impending high-school
football playoffs, this Court on November 14, 2016, issued an
order declaring the orders of both circuit courts void and
upholding the Association's decision removing Washington
County High School from the playoffs, and the playoffs
proceeded accordingly. 
1160121 –– PETITION GRANTED AND WRIT ISSUED BY ORDER
DATED NOVEMBER 14, 2016.
1160125 –– PETITION GRANTED AND WRIT ISSUED BY ORDER
DATED NOVEMBER 14, 2016.
Stuart and Wise, JJ., concur.  
Parker, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result in
part. 
Shaw, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.
Bolin and Murdock, JJ., dissent.
5
1160121, 1160125
SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).
I voted to concur in the result of this Court's November
14, 2016, order declaring the circuit courts' decisions to be
"null and void."  I believe that, under substantive law
discussed in Alabama High School Athletic Ass'n v. Rose, 446
So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1984), and Scott v. Kilpatrick, 286 Ala. 129,
237 So. 2d 652 (1970), the circuit courts' decisions were due
to be set aside.  I have some concerns with the concept that,
when a trial court rules contrary to that substantive law, it
lacked jurisdiction instead of simply committed reversible
error.  However, that issue is not briefed in the materials
before us; therefore, I see no need to resolve it at this
time.
6
1160121, 1160125
BRYAN, Justice (concurring in the result).
I agree that the decision of the Alabama High School
Athletic Association ("the Association") should stand, given
the prevailing law and the facts presented here.  I write
specially to argue that this Court gives too much deference to
the decisions of the Association.
In Scott v. Kilpatrick, 286 Ala. 129, 132-33, 237 So. 2d
652, 655 (1970), this Court first articulated its general rule
of judicial noninterference with the Association's decisions:
"If officials of a school desire to associate
with other schools and prescribe conditions of
eligibility for students who are to become members
of the school's athletic teams, and the member
schools vest final enforcement of the association's
rules in boards of control, then a court should not
interfere in such internal operation of the affairs
of the association. ...
"Of course, if the acts of an association are
the 
result 
of 
fraud, 
lack 
of 
jurisdiction,
collusion, 
or 
arbitrariness, 
the 
courts 
will
intervene to protect an injured part[y's] rights."
Fourteen years after Kilpatrick, in Alabama High School
Athletic Ass'n v. Rose, 446 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1984), this Court
added a requirement that one or more of the narrow
jurisdictional grounds be supported by clear and convincing
evidence.  Further, this Court required that the trial court
7
1160121, 1160125
make an unequivocal finding of a jurisdictional ground
supported by clear and convincing evidence:
"We reaffirm the Kilpatrick test to the effect that
the Court's jurisdiction in such matters is invoked
when, and only when, the averments of fraud,
collusion, or arbitrariness are supported by clear
and convincing evidence; and the trial court's
acceptance of jurisdiction will be affirmed only
where its order makes an unequivocal factual finding
of one or more of those narrow, restrictive grounds,
founded upon clear and convincing evidence."
446 So. 2d at 5. 
This creates a high jurisdictional bar for a party to
clear to get a dispute with the Association decided by a
court.  There is a presumption favoring the Association's
"absolute authority in the conduct of its own affairs," and
the burden to overcome this presumption is a "heavy one." 
Rose, 446 So. 2d at 5.  Quite simply, "normally a court in
this state has no jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding
eligibility under the rules of the [Association]."  Alabama
High School Athletic Ass'n v. Medders, 456 So. 2d 284, 286
(Ala. 1984) (emphasis added). This Court gives tremendous
deference to the Association, seemingly more so than the
deference given to some other voluntary associations.  Some
other cases involving voluntary associations do not contain
8
1160121, 1160125
the 
clear-and-convincing-evidence 
requirements 
first 
announced
in Rose.  See, e.g., Dixon v. The Club, Inc., 408 So. 2d 76
(Ala. 1981); and Wells v. Mobile Cty. Bd. of Realtors, 387 So.
2d 140 (Ala. 1980); but see Talladega Little League, Inc. v.
Anderson, 577 So. 2d 1293 (Ala. 1991) (quoting Rose and
concluding that that case, which involved a decision by a
little-league-baseball association, was no different from
cases involving the Association).  Although we have not been
asked to review our rule of judicial noninterference, I would,
if asked, argue that the deference afforded the Association be
scaled back.  I would remove the general rule of judicial
noninterference and replace it with the familiar standard of
review for the decisions of administrative agencies.   
I find instructive an opinion issued by the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma in 2013, Scott v. Oklahoma Secondary School
Activities Ass'n, 313 P.3d 891 (Okla. 2013).  Before Scott,
Oklahoma, like Alabama, had a general standard of judicial
noninterference regarding decisions of its interscholastic
association, 
the 
Oklahoma 
Secondary 
School 
Activities
Association ("OSSAA").  Similar to the caselaw in Alabama,
pre-Scott caselaw in Oklahoma provided that "courts should not
9
1160121, 1160125
intervene except to ascertain whether association proceedings
are conducted pursuant to the rules and laws of the
organization, in good faith and lawfully. Absent fraudulent,
collusive, unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious behavior,
[the Supreme Court of Oklahoma] may not overturn a voluntary
association's enforcement of its rules."  Brown v. Oklahoma
Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 125 P.3d 1219, 1224 (Okla.
2005).  When this Court adopted its rule of judicial
noninterference in Kilpatrick, it cited, among other cases, an
Oklahoma case, Morrison v. Roberts, 183 Okla. 359, 82 P.2d
1023 (1938), in support of the rule.  Although Oklahoma had a
long history of judicial nonintervention in high-school
athletics, the Oklahoma Supreme Court moved away from that
position in Scott.
The court in Scott determined that, because the OSSAA
plays a role that "goes above and beyond that of a traditional
voluntary association, closer scrutiny when reviewing its
actions is a necessity."  82 P.3d at 902.  Although there are
some differences between the OSSAA and the Association, there
are some key similarities that make Scott informative.  The
court in Scott observed that its doctrine of judicial non-
10
1160121, 1160125
intervention was based on the notion that the OSSAA is a truly
voluntary association.  However, the court then determined
that the OSSAA is not a truly voluntary association.  The
court stated that, for a decision to join an association to be
a voluntary one, "it must be done unconstrained by outside
interference and done without valuable consideration or legal
obligation."  313 P.3d at 897.  The court then noted that a
school must join the OSSAA to compete with other OSSAA schools
and that most public and private schools in the state are
members of the OSSAA.  Thus, "[s]hould the school desire the
value and enrichment its families and students receive from
interscholastic competition, it effectively has no choice but
to join the OSSAA."  313 P.3d at 898.  The court in Scott also
noted that a school that joins the OSSAA receives the valuable
consideration of the ability of its students to compete in
interscholastic athletics with other students in the state. 
In sum, the court concluded that, "[f]unctionally, membership
in the OSSAA is not a choice but a requirement."  Id.
Similarly, I do not view the Association as a traditional
voluntary association.  Under the Association's bylaws, a
school must join the Association to compete with other member
11
1160121, 1160125
schools in the Association.  The Association has over 400
public and private schools as members.  Private schools in
Alabama may have the option of joining other athletic
associations, like the Alabama Independent School Association
or the Alabama Christian Athletic Association.  However, it
appears that public schools that desire to participate in
interscholastic athletics must, as a practical matter, join
the Association.  Like the OSSAA's member schools, the schools
that choose to join the Association receive the valuable
consideration of being able to compete athletically with other
schools in the Association.  As is true of the OSSAA in
Oklahoma, the Association is in almost complete control of the
high-school athletic competition among public-school students
in Alabama.
The court in Scott also concluded that the idea that the
OSSAA might not fit within the definition of a voluntary
association was reinforced in a different context by the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Christian Heritage Academy
v. Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Ass'n, 483 F.3d 1025
(10th Cir. 2007).  In that case, the court determined that the
OSSAA was a state actor for purposes of the Fourteenth
12
1160121, 1160125
Amendment.  The court based that conclusion on the
"'persuasive entwinement of public institutions and public
officials in its composition and workings.'"  483 F.3d at 1030
(quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001)).  Similarly, in 1968, a
federal district court concluded that the Association was a
state actor under the Fourteenth Amendment in Lee v. Macon
County Board of Education, 283 F. Supp. 194 (M.D. Ala. 1968). 
I do not address whether this Court should consider the
current version of the Association a state actor for purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  I merely note that Lee offers
some support for the idea that the Association is something
other than a traditional voluntary association.
The court in Scott also observed that, "[i]n many
respects, the OSSAA already behaves like a state agency and
adheres to requirements provided by statute."  313 P.3d at
900.  In this area, admittedly, there are some distinctions
between the OSSAA and the Association.  For example, Oklahoma
statutes give the OSSAA specific authority over eligibility in
certain circumstances and subject the OSSAA's meetings to
open-meeting requirements; there 
appear 
to 
be 
no 
corresponding
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1160121, 1160125
statutes in Alabama.  However, it is still true that the
Association, like the OSSAA, is a pervasive and dominant force
in interscholastic athletics –– especially among public
schools –– in Alabama.  As the court in Scott noted: "'The
necessity of court action is apparent where the position of a
voluntary association is so dominant in its field that
membership in a practical sense is not voluntary but
economically necessary.'"  313 P.3d at 901 (quoting Board of
Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 561 P.2d 499, 504 (Okla. 1977) (finding judicial
scrutiny of the NCAA appropriate)).
The court in Scott also noted that member schools pay
fees to be members of the OSSAA.  The same is true of the
Association's member schools.  With respect to the use of
public-school funds by the Association, I find the court's
observation about the OSSAA to be apt:
"Because the source of funding of public schools is
from Oklahoma taxpayers, the State of Oklahoma has
an interest in ensuring that tax dollars are used by
the OSSAA in a manner that is not arbitrary and
capricious, but one that is fair and impartial.
Meaningful review of the OSSAA's actions is
necessary to ensure this."
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1160121, 1160125
313 P.3d at 902.  Further, the Association controls a field in
which the people of this State have a substantial interest.
The court in Scott concluded that the OSSAA should be
treated more like an administrative agency than a traditional
voluntary association.  The court concluded:
"The standard of review from Morgan[ v. Secondary
Sch. Activities Ass'n, 207 P.3d 362 (Okla. 2009)],
relied upon by the district court in making its
ruling cannot properly be applied to a nominally
voluntary association that is not truly voluntary. 
While the OSSAA is not a state agency subject to the
provisions of [Oklahoma's Administrative Procedures
Act], it is similar enough in character and in reach
that courts should apply the standard of review
provided by the [Administrative Procedures Act] in
75 O.S. 2011 § 322 for agency decisions."
313 P.3d at 902.  Similarly, although the Association is not
a State agency, "it is similar enough in character and in
reach" that a court should apply the same standard of review
applicable to agency decisions found in the Alabama
Administrative Procedure Act, § 41-22-1 et seq., Ala. Code
1975 ("the AAPA").  See § 41-22-20(k), Ala. Code 1975. 
Because the Association plays a role that "goes above and
beyond that of a traditional voluntary association," greater
scrutiny is required.  313 P.3d at 902. 
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1160121, 1160125
Under the current standard, a court may exercise
jurisdiction over a decision of the Association if the
decision is the result of fraud, lack of jurisdiction,
collusion, or arbitrariness.  Thus, a court must essentially
evaluate, to some degree, the merits of the case to determine
whether the court should even exercise jurisdiction over the
Association's decision.   It would be more straightforward ––
and, as argued above, more appropriate –– for a court simply
to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute and apply a familiar
and well settled standard of review.  To be sure, the AAPA
creates a deferential standard of review, but it is not as
deferential as the current standard applicable to the
Association.  In relevant part, the AAPA provides:
"[T]he agency order shall be taken as prima facie
just and reasonable and the court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact,
except where otherwise authorized by statute. ...
The court may reverse or modify the decision or
grant other appropriate relief from the agency
action ... if the court finds that the agency action
is due to be set aside or modified under standards
set forth in appeal or review statutes applicable to
that agency or if substantial rights of the
petitioner have been prejudiced because the agency
action is any one or more of the following:
"(1)  In violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions;
16
1160121, 1160125
"(2)   In excess of the statutory authority
of the agency;
"(3)   In violation of any pertinent agency
rule;
"(4)   Made upon unlawful procedure;
"(5)   Affected by other error of law;
"(6)  Clearly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
of the whole record; or
"(7) 
Unreasonable, 
arbitrary, 
or
capricious, or characterized by an abuse of
discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion."
§ 41-22-20(k).  This familiar standard would be easy for
courts to apply and would provide sufficient judicial
supervision of the Association, which plays a pervasive and
dominant role in high-school athletics in Alabama.
 
  
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1160121, 1160125
BOLIN, Justice (dissenting). 
This Court, by order dated November 14, 2016, upheld a
decision of the Alabama High School Athletic Association ("the
Association") and declared void the conflicting orders of the
Washington Circuit Court and the Geneva Circuit Court. The
order indicated that "[a] formal opinion of this Court will
follow at a later date."  The Court is today issuing that
opinion, and the judgment lines read: "Petition Granted and
Writ Issued by Order Dated November 14, 2016."  I dissented
from the issuance of the order; therefore, I must dissent from
the opinion issued today, although if I were voting on a blank
slate, I would concur.  
As noted in Alabama High School Athletic Ass'n v. Rose,
446 So. 2d 1, 5 (1984), "[a]thletics and athletes belong in
their own arena.  A courtroom is not the proper field of
competition. ... In other words, it's their show; let them run
it."  Recently, this Court has had several matters involving
the Association come before it.  Many, if not most of these
matters, including the present one, have dealt with the
eligibility of a student athlete to participate during a state
playoff game--specifically, the subsequent disqualification
18
1160121, 1160125
through litigation of that student athlete's team from
advancing in the playoffs.  Each time, the litigation occurs
despite this Court's precedent in Scott v. Kilpatrick, 286
Ala. 129, 237 So. 2d 652 (1970)--that a court has no
jurisdiction to interfere in the affairs of the Association
unless there exists clear and convincing evidence of fraud,
collusion, or arbitrariness on the part of the Association. 
In this case, after two circuit courts issued conflicting
orders concerning the Association's removal of Washington
County High School from the initial playoff game, the
Association postponed a scheduled playoff game pending
emergency relief from this Court.  This Court, in turn, was
forced to issue an important decision in an abbreviated time
frame, with little or no time for adequate briefing and
argument by the parties.  Moreover, any delay by this Court in
issuing a decision could have caused a domino-effect
postponement of many subsequent playoff games.  This  scenario
is terribly unfair to all involved–-the student athletes, the
coaches, the student bodies, the schools, and the affected
citizenry who love their local high-school sports. Although
the judicial system will always be open to aggrieved parties
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1160121, 1160125
and the business of the court system is the resolution of
disputes, resort to the court system may not always be the
best option.  For this reason,  I write specially to point
that surely the adults involved here, i.e., members of the
Association, acting in concert with school administrators,
coaches, teachers, as well as the parents of the players
affected, should be able to devise an agreed-upon set of rules
for a quicker, and arguably fairer, adjudication of such time-
sensitive disputes, without the schools having to resort to
injunctive relief in one or more circuit courts, from which an
appeal to this Court will surely follow.  The Association,
being in charge of the process--and not the courts--should
commit, out of fairness, to doing no less for this State's
student athletes who have spent months of out-of-class time
practicing and sacrificing to make themselves the 
best players
they can be in order to make their team successful.  
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1160121, 1160125
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent for at least two reasons.  First,
I believe that a circuit court, as the court of general
jurisdiction in this state, has jurisdiction to consider
challenges to actions of the Alabama High School Athletic
Association ("the Association").  Indeed, as noted in the
excerpts from Scott v. Kilpatrick, 286 Ala. 129, 132-33, 237
So. 2d 652, 655 (1970), and Alabama High School Athletic Ass'n
v. Rose, 446 So. 2d 1, 5 (Ala. 1984), quoted in the main
opinion, the circuit court properly may overturn decisions of
the Association in cases where there is a showing by clear and
convincing evidence of fraud, collusion, lack of jurisdiction
by the Association, or arbitrariness.2
Second, at the time this Court issued its November 14,
2016, order, I concluded that the trial courts erred as a
matter of law under the unique facts of this case in not
2I believe that the Court in Alabama High School Athletic
Ass'n v. Medders, 456 So. 2d 284, 286 (Ala. 1984), necessarily
spoke too "loosely" in referring to a court's lack of
"jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding eligibility under
the rules of the [Association]."
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1160121, 1160125
finding the decision of the Alabama High School Athletic
Association to be arbitrary.  I remain of that view.
Finally, with the exception of any implied acceptance of
the notion that the "jurisdiction" terminology in Alabama High
School Athletic Ass'n v. Medders, 456 So. 2d 284 (Ala. 1984),
accurately reflects current law, I am sympathetic to the views
expressed by Justice Bryan in his special writing.
22