Case Title: In the Matter of Alan Kachalsky v. Susan Cacace

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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SSD  4
In the Matter of Alan Kachalsky,
            Appellant,
        v.
Susan Cacace, &c.,
            Respondent.
Decided February 16, 2010:  
Appeal dismissed without costs, by the Court sua
sponte, upon the ground that no substantial
constitutional question is directly involved. Chief
Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read,
Pigott and Jones concur.  Judge Smith dissents and 
votes to retain jurisdiction in an opinion.
SMITH, J. (dissenting):
I dissent because I think the dismissal of this appeal
exemplifies an amorphous definition of "substantial
constitutional question" that is at odds with CPLR 5601 (b) (1)
and the New York Constitution.  
Article 6, § 3 (b) (1) of the New York Constitution
says that appeals to this Court may be taken in civil cases and
proceedings:
"As of right, from a judgment or order
entered upon the decision of an appellate
division of the supreme court which finally
determines an action or special proceeding
wherein is directly involved the construction
of the constitution of the state or of the
United States . . . ."
CPLR 5601 (b) tracks the constitution:
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SSD No. 4
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"Constitutional grounds.  An appeal may be
taken to the court of appeals as of right:
"1.  from an order of the appellate division
which finally determines an action where
there is directly involved the construction
of the constitution of the state or of the
United States . . . ."
Neither the constitution nor the statute says that the
constitutional question involved must be "substantial," but we
have interpreted them to mean that.  And the interpretation makes
sense, if "substantial" is taken literally.  The authors of the
constitution and the statute surely did not intend to burden our
Court with appeals as of right based on questions that are
without substance, i.e., frivolous.  As Karger points out, the
substantiality requirement "is an obviously necessary safeguard
against abuse of the right to appeal on constitutional questions,
for otherwise the right to appeal would turn on the ingenuity of
counsel in advancing arguments on constitutional issues,
howsoever fanciful they might be" (Karger, Powers of the New York
Court of Appeals § 7:5, at 226 [3d ed rev]).    
But we have at times followed the practice -- one in
which, I confess, I have joined -- of giving "substantial" a much
more flexible meaning, so flexible that it confers on us, in
effect, discretion comparable to that we have in deciding whether
to grant permission to appeal under CPLR 5602.  I am convinced
that this practice is inconsistent with both the constitutional
provision and the statute implementing it.
This case illustrates the point.  Petitioner's
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SSD No. 4
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argument, rejected by the courts below, is that Penal Law
§ 400.00 (2) (f), which requires "proper cause" for the issuance
of a license to carry a concealed pistol or revolver, violates
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Two
constitutional questions are directly involved: (1) whether the
Second Amendment limits the powers of the states, as well as of
the federal government; and (2) whether a prohibition on carrying
concealed weapons without a showing of proper cause is consistent
with the Second Amendment.  I make no comment on the merits of
either issue, except to say that neither is insubstantial.  The
first is of such great substance, and current importance, that
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to consider it (McDonald
v City of Chicago, __US__, 130 S Ct 48 [2009]).  The second
issue, in light of District of Columbia v Heller (__US__, 128 S
Ct 2783 [2008]), unquestionably presents fair ground for
litigation.  On neither issue could petitioner's case, by any
remote stretch, be called frivolous or fanciful.
There is, I recognize, a perfectly reasonable argument
that, if we had discretion about whether to take up these issues
now, we should choose not to do so; it might make sense to wait
to see how the Supreme Court decides McDonald.  I would not
quarrel with that exercise of discretion, if I thought the
discretion existed.  I think, however, that petitioner has a
constitutional right to have us hear this appeal, and that's all
there is to it.