Case Title: STATE v KELLER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13073 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - ROBERT A. KELLER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert J. Boyd, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Graybill, O s t r e m , Warner & Crotty, Great F a l l s , Montana Gregory Warner argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Lon J. Maxwell, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana James Masar, Coumty Attorney, Deer Lodge, Montana Daniels and Mizner, Deer Lodge, Montana Ted L. Mizner appeared, Deer Lodge, Montana Submitted: May 25, 1976 Decided : AUG 2 0 19% Filed: AUbZO1976 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant a p p e a l s from h i s c o n v i c t i o n of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide i n t h e s t r a n g u l a t i o n d e a t h of h i s w i f e following t r i a l by jury i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r Powell County. O n March 16, 1974, t h e nude body of t h e deceased, G l o r i a Keller, was found between Avon and E l l i s t o n i n Powell County, Montana, hidden i n a n o l d r u s t e d c a r body. D r . John P f a f f , a f o r e n s i c p a t h o l o g i s t , concluded d e a t h was by s t r a n g u l a t i o n by her b r a s s i e r e found wrapped around her neck. an apparent common law Defendant Robert K e l l e r and G l o r i a K e l l e r r e s i d e d in/re- l a t i o n s h i p a s husband and w i f e s i n c e 1964, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r f i v e c h i l d r e n , t h e two e l d e s t by previous marriage of G l o r i a Keller. B r i e f l y s t a t e d , t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e was t h a t G l o r i a had disappeared t h e evening of February 3 , 1974, a f t e r l e a v i n g t h e family home i n E a s t Helena with Robert i n t h e family pickup t r u c k ; t h a t t h e pickup was a t t h e home t h e n e x t day; t h a t a s t u b from a parking t i c k e t involving t h e t r u c k , issued some months e a r l i e r , was found near t h e scene of t h e c r i m e ; t h a t t h e de- composition of t h e body was such t h a t it p o s s i b l y could have l a i n a t t h e scene of t h e c r i m e s i n c e February 4, 1974; t h a t R o b e r t ' s l a t e r a c t i o n s were c o n s i s t e n t with knowledge t h a t G l o r i a would n o t r e t u r n ; and t h a t samples of h a i r and candy taken from de- c e a s e d ' s sweater found with t h e body matched samples of h a i r and candy taken from t h e family pickup t r u c k and samples of d e f e n d a n t ' s h a i r . The S t a t e a l s o introduced evidence of p r i o r m a r i t a l d i s p u t e s . The t r a n s c r i p t of testimony by Gary K e l l e r , t h e c o u p l e ' s n i n e year o l d son, given a t t h e preliminary hearing on May 10, 1974, was read a t t h e t r i a l t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e family had chicken f o r d i n n e r February 3 , before h i s mother's disappearance. The autopsy of deceased showed she had e a t e n chicken less than two hours before death. This testimony was given by a n i n e year o l d c h i l d r e c a l l i n g what he had e a t e n f o r d i n n e r more than t h r e e months previously. Gary d i d n o t appear a t t h e t r i a l , and testimony showed he was i n Wyoming. Defendant presented a defense of a l i b i b u t was unable defense t o p r e s e n t t h e testimony of two/witnesses he attempted t o subpoena t o c o r r o b o r a t e h i s testimony a s t o h i s whereabouts f o r t h e hours of 7:00 t o 10:OO p.m. February 3, 1974. Robert t e s t i f i e d t h a t Gloria drove them i n t o Helena i n t h e pickup and l e t him o u t t o go i n t o a bar t o buy c i g a r e t t e s ; and t h a t when he g o t o u t and walked t o t h e b a r , she drove o f f and d i d n o t r e t u r n . Robert t e s t i f i e d t h a t he then walked home t o E a s t Helena and t h a t when he g o t t h e r e , about 10:OO p.m., t h e t r u c k was t h e r e w i t h t h e keys i n it b u t Gloria was gone. Todd Keller, eleven y e a r s o l d , t h e e l d e s t c h i l d , testi- f i e d t h a t h i s mother had r e t u r n e d , picked up some c l o t h e s , and l e f t again. H e a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had helped f i x Hamburger Helper f o r t h e family d i n n e r t h a t evening, February 3. Robert t e s t i f i e d he s a w Gloria t h r e e days l a t e r r i d i n g i n a c a r w i t h another man on t h e v i a d u c t between Helena and E a s t Helena b u t was unable t o follow t h e c a r because of t h e median d i v i d e r . Gloria had l e f t t h e family unannounced on numerous o t h e r occasions f o r periods of a week t o a month o r more without l e a v i n g word of her whereabouts. During t h o s e p e r i o d s Robert took c a r e of t h e f i v e c h i l d r e n a s he d i d on t h i s occasion u n t i l h i s a r r e s t . Defendant seeks r e v e r s a l on t h e following grounds: (1) That t h e d e l a y of 326 days between a r r e s t and t r i a l denied defendant h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l , ( 2 ) The p r o s e c u t i o n ' s nondisclosure of evidence c o n t r a r y t o t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r t o produce; ( 3 ) Evidence i l l e g a l l y seized from t h e family pickup t r u c k should have been excluded; ( 4 ) That it was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r t o admit evidence of a previous i n c i d e n t involving defendant and a gun; (5) Improper conduct of t h e jury foreman; and (6) I n s u f f i c i e n c y of evidence t o support t h e c o n v i c t i o n . The f i r s t i s s u e on appeal is whether a d e l a y of 326 days, o r n e a r l y eleven months from d e f e n d a n t ' s a r r e s t u n t i l t r i a l , deprived defendant of h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . W e hold it d i d under t h e circumstances here. The r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l i s mandated by t h e S i x t h Amendment t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s and A r t i c l e 11, Section 24 of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , which s t a t e s : " I n a l l c r i m i n a l prosecutions t h e accused s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o * * * a speedy p u b l i c t r i a l * * * . I ' I n applying t h i s guarantee t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s of each c a s e , t h i s Court has adopted t h e balancing test t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court described i n Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L Ed 2d 101, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972). See S t a t e v . Steward, Mont . , 543 P.2d 178, 181, 32 St.Rep. 1185 (1975); and S t a t e ex rel. Sanford v. D i s t r i c t Court, decided J u l y 8 , 1976, Mont. - P.2d , 33 St.Rep. 644. The four f a c t o r s t o be considered a r e : (1) Length of d e l a y , ( 2 ) reason f o r d e l a y , ( 3 ) d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t , and ( 4 ) p r e j u d i c e t o t h e defendant. D i r e c t i n g our a t t e n t i o n f i r s t t o t h e l e n g t h of t h e d e l a y w e note t h a t Robert Keller was a r r e s t e d March 21, 1974,and t r i a l began February 10, 1975, n e a r l y 1 1 months l a t e r . This d e l a y was presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l , and t r i g g e r e d t h e balancing of f a c t o r s . See Steward where 12 months between a r r e s t and a r r a i g n - ment was held t o be presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l ; S t a t e ex rel. Sanford where 10 months between arraignment and t r i a l was held t o be presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l d e l a y ; and F i t z p a t r i c k v. C r i s t , 165 Mont. 382, 388, 528 P.2d 1322 (1974), where 7 months w a s held " * * * long enough t o s h i f t t o t h e s t a t e t h e burden of explaining t h e reason f o r t h e delay and showing absence of prejudice * * *. " One of t h e major purposes of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision is t o guard a g a i n s t delay, both t o p r o t e c t t h e defendant's r i g h t s and t o f u r t h e r t h e S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t s i n criminal prosecutions. A s was s a i d i n Barker a t page 1 1 0 : "The r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l i s g e n e r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from any of t h e o t h e r r i g h t s enshrined i n t h e Constitution f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e accused. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e general concern t h a t a l l accused persons be t r e a t e d according t o decent and f a i r procedures, t h e r e i s a s o c i e t a l i n t e r e s t i n providinq a speedy t r i a l which e x i s t s separate from, and a t times i n opposition t o , t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e accused. The i n a b i l i t y of c o u r t s t o provide a prompt t r i a l has contributed t o a l a r g e backlog of cases i n urban c o u r t s which, among o t h e r things, enables defendants t o nego- tiate more e f f e c t i v e l y f o r p l e a s of g u i l t y t o l e s s e r offenses and otherwise manipulate t h e system. In a d d i t i o n , persons released on bond f o r lengthy periods awaiting t r i a l have an opportunity t o commit o t h e r crimes. * * * Moreover, t h e longer an accused i s f r e e awaiting t r i a l , t h e more tempt- ing becomes h i s opportunity t o jump b a i l and escape. F i n a l l y , delay between a r r e s t and punishment may have a detrimental e f f e c t on r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . " * * * F i n a l l y , lengthy p r e t r i a l d e t e n t i o n is c o s t l y . * * * In a d d i t i o n , s o c i e t y l o s e s wages which might have been earned, and it must o f t e n support f a m i l i e s of incarcerated breadwinners." (Emphasis supplied.) In h i s concurring opinion i n Barker, a t page 121 J u s t i c e White emphasizes one of t h e major purposes i n p r o t e c t - ing t h e accused. Wholly a s i d e from p o s s i b l e prejudice t o a de- fense on t h e m e r i t s , t h e accused w i l l be s u b j e c t t o s u b s t a n t i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on h i s l i b e r t y pending t r i a l , e i t h e r i n j a i l o r while f r e e on bond, "I * * * t h a t may d i s r u p t h i s employment, d r a i n h i s f i n a n c i a l resources, c u r t a i l h i s a s s o c i a t i o n s , s u b j e c t him t o public obloquy, and c r e a t e anxiety i n him, h i s family and h i s f r i e n d s . ' U.S. v. Marion, 4 0 4 U.S. 307, 320 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ." I n summary criminal charges should not be brought u n t i l > t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o b e l i e v e a c r i m e has been committed by t h e person charged and u n t i l t h e prosecution i s prepared t o proceed within a reasonable t i m e . Delay a l s o hampers t h e l i b e r t y of p o s s i b l e witnesses and impairs t h e i r memory, t h u s impairing both t h e prosecution and t h e defense i n t h e i r q u e s t of t h e t r u t h . W e recognize t h a t d e l a y may be used a s a defense t a c t i c . Where t h e record s t r o n g l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e defendant d i d n o t want a speedy t r i a l , w e would be r e l u c t a n t t o r u l e t h a t he has been denied t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t . See Barker a t page 120. Such i s n o t t h e c a s e here. I n considering t h e reason f o r t h e d e l a y i n t h i s case, w e observe t h a t t h e preliminary hearing w a s n o t held u n t i l seven weeks a f t e r a r r e s t . The S t a t e contends t h i s time was necessary f o r defendant t o o b t a i n counsel. However, it appears defendant was a b l e t o o b t a i n counsel within 1 6 days a f t e r h i s a r r e s t , and no v a l i d excuse f o r t h e remaining f i v e week d e l a y is shown. The preliminary hearing was held May 10. The o r d e r of t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t binding defendant over t o d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s dated August 15, fourteen weeks l a t e r . The j u s t i c e c o u r t de- layed its d e c i s i o n a f t e r t h e preliminary hearing u n t i l it could r e c e i v e l a b o r a t o r y r e p o r t s . Neither t h e r e s u l t s of t h e tests nor t h e i t e m s t e s t e d w e r e properly admitted i n evidence. Also see s e c t i o n 95-902, R.C.M. 1947 and s e c t i o n 95-1202, R.C.M. 1947, which d e c l a r e t h e j u s t i c e of t h e peace s h a l l hold a preliminary examination within a reasonable t i m e and s h a l l hear t h e evidence without unnecessary delay. I n any event, t h e l a b o r a t o r y r e s u l t s were dated May 16, 1 9 7 4 , from t h e S t a t e Criminal I n v e s t i g a t i o n Laboratory i n Missoula, and June 25, 1974, from t h e Criminal Detection Laboratory Center f o r t h e Oregon S t a t e Department of S t a t e P o l i c e . Y e t t h e o r d e r binding defendant over t o d i s t r i c t c o u r t w a s n o t signed u n t i l August 15, 1 9 7 4 . The j u s t i c e c o u r t docket, on t h e c o n t r a r y , i n d i c a t e s t h a t defendant was bound over t o d i s t r i c t c o u r t and t h e papers given t o t h e county a t t o r n e y on J u l y 5, 1974. I f t h i s be t h e c a s e , t h e Information f i l e d on August 29 was f i l e d more than 30 days a f t e r t h e defendant was held t o answer, i n d i r e c t v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 95-1302, R.C.M. 1947. The S t a t e has shown no v a l i d j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e more than f i v e months d e l a y between a r r e s t , March 21, and f i l i n g of charges i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t on August 29, 1974. The S t a t e o f f e r s a s f u r t h e r excuse a crowded c o u r t docket and t h e u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of a c o u r t r e p o r t e r . This is n o t a v a l i d excuse because t h e u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r such circumstances must rest with t h e government r a t h e r than w i t h t h e defendant. See S t a t e v. Steward, Mont. , 543 P.2d 178, 181, 32 St.Rep. 1185; Strunk v. United S t a t e s , 412 U.S. 434, 436, 37 L Ed 2d 56, 60, 93 S.Ct. 2260 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, s u p r a , Dickey v . F l o r i d a , 398 U.S. 30, 37, 26 L Ed 2d 26, 90 S.Ct. 1564 (1970). The S t a t e a l s o suggests t h a t d e l a y was caused by defend- a n t ' s motions r e q u i r i n g r e s e a r c h , hearing and determination. It cannot be s e r i o u s l y contended t h a t defendant has f i l e d any motions f o r t h e purpose of delay. Defendant f i l e d motions f o r d i s m i s s a l , production of evidence, and suppression of evidence on t h e day charges w e r e f i l e d i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t , a motion f o r rehearing on October 23, and p r e t r i a l motions a f t e r t h e t r i a l d a t e had been set. It does n o t appear t o u s t h a t t h e t i m e reasonably taken up by d e f e n d a n t ' s good f a i t h motions excuse t h e d e l a y i n t h i s case. Furthermore, t h e S t a t e ' s a c t i o n s i n withholding n o t i c e of w i t - nesses, withholding evidence, and otherwise delaying proceedings w e r e t h e fountainhead of d e f e n d a n t ' s motions. Defendant has a s s e r t e d t h e r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l on a t l e a s t four occasions by an a p p r o p r i a t e motion t o d i s m i s s be- ginning May 2 9 , 1974, and continuing through t r i a l . F i n a l l y , p r e j u d i c e t o t h e defendant has r e s u l t e d from t h e d e l a y i n t h i s c a s e . This Court has followed Barker i n i d e n t i f y i n g t h r e e f a c t o r s t o be considered with r e s p e c t t o p r e j u d i c e t o t h e de- f endant : " * * * (i) t o prevent oppressive p r e t r i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n ; (ii) t o minimize a n x i e t y and concern of t h e accused; and (iii) t o l i m i t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e defense w i l l be impaired. * * * I 1 Barker a t 118, Steward a t 183, S t a t e ex rel. Sanford a t 647. The united S t a t e s Supreme Court went on t o say i n Barker a t 118: " * * * F i n a l l y , even i f an accused i s n o t i n c a r c e r a t e d p r i o r t o t r i a l , he i s s t i l l disadvantaged by r e s t r a i n t s on h i s l i b e r t y and by l i v i n g unde;r.a cloud of a n x i e t y , s u s p i c i o n , and o f t e n h o s t i l i t y . " With r e s p e c t t o t h e t h r e e s p e c i f i c p r e j u d i c i a l f a c t o r s : (1) Robert Keller was held i n j a i l f o r f o r t y days a f t e r a r r e s t . When he was r e l e a s e d on bond, he was required t o remain on h i s b r o t h e r ' s ranch near Cutbank, Montana. ( 2 ) For f i v e months Robert d i d n o t know i f he would be required t o defend himself on t h e charges i n d i s t r i c t c o u r t . H e s t a t e d t h a t during t h e t i m e before t r i a l he had t o send h i s c h i l d r e n o u t of Montana t o l i v e with o t h e r r e l a t i v e s because of t a l k going around. ( 3 ) Actual p r e j u d i c e t o h i s defense on t h e m e r i t s re- s u l t e d from t h e delay. Two witnesses t h a t could p o s s i b l y have v e r i f i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s a l i b i could n o t be found t o be served w i t h subpoenas and had apparently moved o u t of t h e s t a t e . Determin- a t i o n of t h e f a c t u a l i s s u e of what t h e family had f o r d i n n e r February 3, 1974, and how long t h e v i c t i m had been dead could only become more d i f f i c u l t with t h e passage of t i m e . Also, t h e c o u r t had reserved determination of t h e i s s u e s of l e g a l i t y of searches u n t i l testimony could be introduced a t t h e t r i a l . Inquiry i n t o t h e l e g a l i t y of t h e searches and i n t o what was seized was hampered by t h e f a u l t y memories of t h e o f f i c e r s involved. I n summary, a f t e r considering a l l t h e circumstances and t h e f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h i n Barker, w e hold t h a t t h e r e has been an excessive delay; t h a t t h e S t a t e has n o t made a showing of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r such delay; t h a t defendant has c o n s i s t e n t l y a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l , and t h a t some p r e j u d i c e has r e s u l t e d by reason of t h e delay. It could be argued from t h e record before u s t h a t t h e r e a l reason f o r t h e delay w a s a l a c k of evidence on t h e p a r t of t h e prosecution. I f t h i s be s o it provides a p a r t i c u l a r l y com- p e l l i n g reason f o r d i s m i s s a l . To approve of delay where t h e r e i s an appearance t h a t it i s due t o lack of s u f f i c i e n t evidence i n t h e hands of t h e S t a t e would be t o condone unwarranted and u n j u s t plea bargaining leverage f o r t h e S t a t e . By delaying t h e proceedings, t h e S t a t e can pressure t h e defendant i n t o a p l e a i n order t o r i d himself of t h e onus of t h e pending charge and t o r e t u r n a s soon a s p o s s i b l e t o a normal way of l i v i n g . This r e l i e v e s t h e S t a t e of its o b l i g a t i o n t o develop its c a s e t o t h e p o i n t where it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Unjustified delay can be a f r i g h t f u l weapon f o r t h e S t a t e and a disarming weapon f o r t h e defendant. The proper adminis- t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s t h e withdrawing of t h i s weapon from t h e hands of both. Two other wide-spread concerns with undue delay should be noted. Delayed criminal j u s t i c e proceedings a r e undermining public confidence i n t h e system i t s e l f . J u s t i c e delayed may n o t only be j u s t i c e denied but j u s t i c e brought s e r i o u s l y under question. The backbone of law enforcement and t h e j u s t i c e system is p u b l i c support. The c o u r t s must n o t permit t h e e r o s i o n of t h a t support by p e r m i t t i n g unnecessary d e l a y between charge and c o n v i c t i o n o r r e l e a s e . The o t h e r concern i s t h a t d e l a y may s e r i o u s l y erode t h e d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t of t h e c r i m i n a l law. It i s f o r c e f u l l y argued by e x p e r t s i n t h e f i e l d of c o r r e c t i o n s t h a t t h e promise of s u r e and speedy j u s t i c e may be a t l e a s t a s e f f e c t i v e a s long, c o s t l y sentences i n discouraging c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . I f t h i s be s o , and a t l e a s t t o some degree it seems unarguable, then c e l e r i t y i n c r i m i n a l proceedings becomes n o t only an instrument of j u s t i c e b u t a v a l u a b l e t o o l f o r c o r r e c t i o n s . These reasons f o r l i m i t i n g t h e t i m e f o r c r i m i n a l proceed- i n g s have been recognized f o r many y e a r s elsewhere and have been a c t e d upon i n t h e f e d e r a l j u s t i c e system and i n many s t a t e s . I n 1968 t h e American Bar Association House of Delegates approved and set c e r t a i n standards f o r speedy t r i a l a f t e r lengthy r e s e a r c h by t h e a s s o c i a t i o n ' s p r o j e c t on standards f o r c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e . Standard 2.1, a s adopted, provides: "A d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l should be expressed by r u l e o r s t a t u t e i n t e r m s of days o r months running from a s p e c i f i e d event. C e r - t a i n p e r i o d s of necessary d e l a y should be ex- cluded i n computing t h e t i m e f o r t r i a l , and t h e s e should be s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d by r u l e o r s t a t u t e i n s o f a r as is p r a c t i c a b l e . " (ABA compil- a t i o n , Pg. 276, (1974)) I n 1967 The P r e s i d e n t ' s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of J u s t i c e recommended a normal period of f o u r months f o r t h e processing of f e l o n y prosecutions (The Challenge of C r i m e i n a Free S o c i e t y , pg. 1 5 5 ) . I n 1973 The National Advisory Commission i n Criminal J u s t i c e Standards and Goals set a s t e r n e r standard: "The period from a r r e s t t o t h e beginning of t r i a l of a felony prosecution g e n e r a l l y should n o t be longer than 60 days." (Standard 4 . 1 , Courts) The f e d e r a l "Speedy T r i a l A c t of 1974" (P.L. 93-619, 93rd Congress, S. 754, Jan. 3, 1975) commands t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s t o commence t r i a l w i t h i n 60 days from arraignment on information o r indictment (18 U S C 3 1 6 1 ( c ) ) . Periods of d e l a y a r e permitted under s p e c i f i e d circumstances (18 U S C 3161 ( h ) ) . The s a n c t i o n is d i s m i s s a l (18 U S C 3162 ( a ) (1) ) . I n t h o s e s t a t e s which have adopted s p e c i f i c l i m i t a t i o n s by r u l e o r s t a t u t e , t h e t i m e range v a r i e s on felony p r o s e c u t i o n s from 7 5 days t o s i x months (see "Commentary" on Standard 4 . 1 , Courts, NAC, supra. ) . A f t e r more than a year of r e s e a r c h and c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e Courts Task Force of The Montana Study on Criminal J u s t i c e Standards and Goals concluded t h i s year i n i t s Standard 4 . 1 : " I f t h e defendant pleads n o t g u i l t y he s h a l l be t r i e d a s soon a s p o s s i b l e a f t e r such p l e a . The t r i a l d a t e s h a l l be set, by t h e judge, w i t h i n 60 days of t h e p l e a u n l e s s good cause i s shown by t h e prosecution o r t h e defendant why he should n o t be brought t o t r i a l w i t h i n t h a t period. * * *" The group, c o n s i s t i n g of a d i v e r s e s e l e c t i o n of l e a d i n g members of t h e bench and b a r , law enforcement agencies and c o r r e c t i o n s personnel, a l s o concluded t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n was n o t necessary f o r implementation. They noted: " * * * T r i a l judges may e s t a b l i s h t h e s e g u i d e l i n e s f o r t h e i r c o u r t s , o r The Montana Supreme Court, a c t i n g under t h e i r supervisory a u t h o r i t y , may e s t a b l i s h such requirements. The l a t t e r would be most p r e f e r a b l e , a f f e c t i n g a l l of t h e s t a t e c o u r t s uniformly and simultaneously." (Implementation, Std. 4 . 1 , s u p r a ) . This Standard, t o g e t h e r w i t h i t s implementation suggestion, has been adopted by The Montana J u s t i c e P r o j e c t Council. Having determined t h a t defendant has been denied h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l , t h e next q u e s t i o n is whether d i s m i s s a l of t h e charges i s t h e proper remedy. The Supreme Court of t h e United S t a t e s addressed t h i s q u e s t i o n i n Strunk v. United S t a t e s , 412 U.S. 434, 439, 37 L Ed 2d 6 1 , 56,/93 S.Ct. 2260. I n Strunk t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t upheld de- f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n t o d e n i a l of speedy t r i a l . A s a remedy it deducted t h e amount of d e l a y from t h e l e n g t h of h i s sen- tence. The Supreme Court held t h a t d e n i a l of speedy t r i a l mandated d i s m i s s a l i n t h e s e words: " * * * By d e f i n i t i o n , such d e n i a l i s u n l i k e some of t h e o t h e r guarantees of t h e S i x t h Amendment. For example, f a i l u r e t o a f f o r d a p u b l i c t r i a l , an i m p a r t i a l j u r y , n o t i c e of charges, o r compulsory s e r v i c e can o r d i n a r i l y be cured by providing t h o s e guaranteed r i g h t s i n a new t r i a l . The speedy t r i a l guarantee recognizes t h a t a prolonged d e l a y may s u b j e c t t h e accused t o an emotional stress t h a t can be presumed t o r e s u l t i n t h e o r d i n a r y person from u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n t h e prospect of f a c i n g p u b l i c t r i a l o r of r e c e i v i n g a sentence longer t h a n , o r consecutive t o , t h e one he is p r e s e n t l y serving--uncertainties t h a t a prompt t r i a l removes. ( C i t i n g c a s e s . ) * * * " * * * It i s t r u e t h a t Barker d e s c r i b e d d i s m i s s a l of a n indictment f o r d e n i a l of a speedy t r i a l a s an ' u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y severe remedy'. Indeed, i n p r a c t i c e , 'it means t h a t a defendant who may be g u i l t y of a s e r i o u s crime w i l l go f r e e , without having been t r i e d . ' 407 U.S., a t 522, 33 L Ed 2d 101. But such severe remedies a r e n o t unique i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l standards. I n l i q h t of t h e p o l i c i e s which u n d e r l i e t h e r i q h t t o a speedy t r i a l , d i s m i s s a l must remain, a s Barker noted, ' t h e only p o s s i b l e remedy.'" (Emphasis supplied.) Strunk v . U.S. a t Page 61. This remedy conforms with t h a t recommended by t h e American Bar Association i n i t s Speedy T r i a l Standard 4 . 1 and w i t h t h e f e d e r a l s t a t u t e (18 U S C 3162). There a r e a d d i t i o n a l independent grounds t h a t r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l i n t h i s case. Defendant o b j e c t e d t o t h e S t a t e withhold- ing evidence i n v i o l a t i o n of a c o u r t o r d e r t o produce evidence, t o t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d evidence, and t o t h e admission of p r e j u d i c i a l evidence concerning a previous i n c i d e n t involving a gun. Each of t h e s e t h r e e c o n t e n t i o n s is independent grounds f o r r e v e r s a l . I n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o produce evidence of any admissions o r statements by t h e defendant, a l i s t of a l l p o s s i b l e prosecution w i t n e s s e s , a l l evidence intended f o r i n t r o d u c t i o n by t h e prosecution, and t h e r e s u l t s of a l l tests whether f a v o r a b l e o r not. The prosecution f a i l e d t o provide t h i s information. The prosecution d i d n o t r e v e a l t h e r e s u l t s of t h e l a b o r a t o r y tests u n t i l s h o r t l y before t r i a l . Notice t h a t t h e two e x p e r t witnesses who conducted t h e s e tests would t e s t i f y , was n o t given u n t i l t h e day of t r i a l a s t o one,and f o u r days before t r i a l a s t o t h e o t h e r , even though t h e s e r e s u l t s w e r e i n t h e hands of t h e prosecution months b e f o r e t h e motion t o produce was granted. Notice of t h e witnesses who would p r e s e n t a major p o r t i o n of t h e prosecution c a s e was n o t given i n some c a s e s u n t i l t h e day of t r i a l and i n o t h e r c a s e s u n t i l a few days before t r i a l . It appears t h a t t h e s h e r i f f was i n possession of numerous a r t i c l e s taken i n s e a r c h e s , b u t unknown u n t i l a f t e r t r i a l when evidence was ordered t o be r e t u r n e d . I t appears t h a t he d i d n o t make a proper r e t u r n on t h e s e a r c h warrant and t h a t he d i d n o t make a n inventory of a r t i c l e s taken on t h e search warrant o r consent searches o r otherwise. The only inventory f i l e d was f i l e d a f t e r t r i a l . The defense questioned t h e s h e r i f f a t t h e preliminary hearing and deposed him 10 days before t r i a l i n e f f o r t s t o l e a r n of any statements by defendant o r o t h e r evidence i n t h e hands of t h e S t a t e . Y e t a t a p e recording of defendant was f i r s t revealed a t t h e t r i a l i n testimony by t h e s h e r i f f i n r e b u t t a l t o defend- a n t ' s testimony. The s h e r i f f made t h e recording two days a f t e r a r r e s t while defendant was i n custody without a i d of counsel. The f a c t t h a t a w i t n e s s would be presented t o t e s t i f y t o a p r i o r t h r e a t by defendant was n o t revealed p r i o r t o t r i a l . Defendant's e f f o r t s t o discover and examine p o s s i b l e evidence before t r i a l and t o determine t h e l e g a l i t y of t h e i r taking were completely f r u s t r a t e d . The a c t i o n s of t h e prose- c u t i o n i n withholding evidence and n o t i c e of witnesses were c o n t r a r y t o t h e c o u r t ' s order t o produce and c o n t r a r y t o t h e i n t e n t and purpose of T i t l e 95, Chapter 18, Production and Suppression of Evidence, Montana Code of Criminal Procedure. Additionally, t h e s h e r i f f confiscated defendant's t r u c k t h e day a f t e r arrest and transported it from East Helena t o Deer Lodge without defendant's knowledge. He attempted t o remove t h e t a i n t of i l l e g a l i t y by a consent form signed by defendant four days l a t e r t h a t does not purport t o be r e t r o a c t i v e . Defendant's s i g n a t u r e was obtained a f t e r search of t h e t r u c k while defendant was held i n j a i l i n t h e absence of counsel. Material obtained from t h i s t r u c k was t h e s u b j e c t of t h e laboratory t e s t s and was introduced i n evidence over defendant's objection. This m a t e r i a l was i l l e g a l l y obtained, and i t s admission i n evidence and t h e expert testimony and laboratory tests concerning it was p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . F i n a l l y , t h e prosecution introduced testimony describing defendant's a r r e s t some weeks p r i o r t o t h e a l l e g e d homicide when he attempted t o confront h i s wife. A t t h a t t i m e defendant w a s a r r e s t e d on an a s s a u l t complaint made by her two months p r i o r t o t h e i n c i d e n t i n question. The a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r discovered de- fendant was carrying a concealed p i s t o l and charged him with t h a t offense. There i s not s u f f i c i e n t s i m i l a r i t y between t h a t i n c i d e n t involving t h e concealed gun and t h e charges of death by strangu- l a t i o n i n t h i s case. S t a t e v. Jensen, 153 Mont. 233, 455 P.2d 631, and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e . Such evidence of o t h e r wrongful a c t s tends t o e x c i t e prejudice and mislead t h e jury from t h e r e a l p o i n t i n i s s u e . S t a t e v. Merritt, 138 Mont. 546, 549, 357 P.2d 683 and authorities cited there. Also, " * * * the defendant is entitled to be informed of the crime charged so as to prepare his defense and proof of other crimes subjects him to surprise and defense of multiple collateral or unrelated issues." Jensen at page 238. Its admission was prejudicial error. In view of our ruling on the first four grounds of appeal, it becomes unnecessary to consider the final two speci- fications of error. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the Information ordered dismissed with prejudice. Hon. Gordon Bennett sitting for Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison Justice M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison concurring and dissenting: I concur i n t h e r e v e r s a l of t h e conviction on t h e grounds s t a t e d by t h e majority as t o i s s u e s two, t h r e e and f o u r , but I must state m y d i s s e n t as t o i s s u e one, t h a t of speedy t r i a l , and not returning t h e c a s e t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r r e t r i a l . Without i n any way denigrating t h e conclusions reached by t h e majority, I a m of t h e opinion, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of t h e f a c t w e have r e c e n t l y completely reviewed and adopted a New Criminal Code covering both t h e substantive procedural law and have a l s o adopted a new Constitution, t h a t w e should leave t o t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t h e adoption of standards f o r what c o n s t i t u t e s a "speedy t r i a l " . What t h i s Court has done r e c e n t l y i n t r y i n g t o follow t h e d i c t a t e s of t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court's opinion i n Barker v. Wingo i n our opinions i n S t a t e v. Stewart and S t a t e ex rel. Sanford v. D i s t r i c t Court may well be e s t a b l i s h i n g by j u d i c i a l d i c t a t e a standard not acceptable t o our lawmakers. I do not read i n t o t h e Barker decision t h a t which i s here found by t h e majority. Even though t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n its e f f o r t t o say what c o n s t i t u t e d a "speedy t r i a l " by s e t t i n g up c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a t o judge a claim of d e n i a l , it is of import t o note t h a t t h e decision does not e s t a b l i s h d e f i n i t e t i m e l i m i t s f o r determining when t h e r i g h t has been denied. A l l t h e Court d i d was t o draw a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l blue p r i n t t o assist us i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e l i m i t s . They l e f t t o u s t o decide, on a case by case basis, t h e cases t h a t w e must judge using a s a balancing test " i n which t h e conduct of both t h e prosecution and t h e defendant are weighed." J u s t i c e Powell, writing f o r a unanimous court i n Barker, found t h a t t h e r e w e r e t h r e e ways i n which t h e r i g h t of speedy t r i a l d i f f e r s inherently from other c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t h a t p r o t e c t an accused. F i r s t , t h e r i g h t involves considerable s o c i e t a l i n t e r e s t s a p a r t from those of t h e accused and t h e general concern f o r a f a i r system of criminal j u s t i c e . Second, t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y from o t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of an accused i n t h a t its d e n i a l is not always detrimental t o t h e accused. Third, t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l is more i n d e f i n i t e than o t h e r procedural r i g h t s . A s noted previously Barker does n o t provide much guidance f o r lower c o u r t s i n determining whether a speedy t r i a l w a s denied an accused. The opinion f a i l s t o e s t a b l i s h g u i d e l i n e s o r pro- cedures t o implement t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . Rather, t h e c o u r t adopted an ad hoc balancing test a s being c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y appropriate f o r a r i g h t t h a t i s n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t i v e . I n s o doing it r e j e c t e d two i n f l e x i b l e approaches; one, t h e establishment of a s p e c i f i c t i m e l i m i t ; second, t h e "demand-waiver" r u l e . The c o u r t i n Barker, i n adopting t h e ad hoc balancing t e s t d i r e c t s a c o u r t faced with t h e speedy t r i a l i s s u e i n t h e problem of weighing t h e following f a c t o r s : (1) Length of delay; ( 2 ) reason f o r delay; ( 3 ) defendant% a s s e r t i o n s of h i s r i g h t s ; and ( 4 ) prejudice t o t h e defendant. In so doing they set t h e s t a g e f o r t h e development of procedural and s u b s t a n t i v e standards by e i t h e r t h e c o u r t s o r t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . This being a substan- t i v e matter it should be considered by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . I n New J e r s e y t h e c o u r t has adopted a r u l e t h a t would a l l e v i a t e t h e d i f f i c u l t y t h i s Court f i n d s i t s e l f i n i n considering what amounts t o a speedy t r i a l . New J e r s e y Rule 3.25.2 e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a f t e r s i x months following accusation, a c o u r t of its own motion o r t h a t of t h e defendant may s e t t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l on a c e r t a i n day. I f t h e case i s not t r i e d on t h a t day, t h e c o u r t may dismiss t h e charge and t h e dismissal o p e r a t e s as an a c q u i t t a l . Should t h e l e g i s l a t u r e f a i l t o consider t h i s problem a t its next session I would favor adopting a r u l e , s i m i l a r t o t h a t of New Jersey, under our r u l e making power, but I would f i r s t let them consider t h e problem. I would r e v e r s e t h e conviction and send it back f o r a new t r i a l . M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles dissenting: I d i s s e n t . Although I c e r t a i n l y agree with t h e majority statements concerning delay i n j u s t i c e a s being a detriment t o public support f o r t h e j u s t i c e system, I think those statements are misapplied here. The majority a t t r i b u t e s t h e e n t i r e 1 1 months between a r r e s t and t r i a l as delay brought on by t h e s t a t e . Surely t h i s i s not c o r r e c t . The preliminary hearing t i m e w a s a t de- fendant's request and possibly t o h i s advantage. Crowded c o u r t calendars a r e a f a c t , and t h e defendant's use of p r e t r i a l motions a r e l e g i t i m a t e but a r e not chargeable a g a i n s t t h e state. I f e a r t h a t t h i s Court's opinion w i l l r e s u l t i n continuous jury t e r m s being required throughout Montana f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e accused without regard t o c o s t s t o t h e taxpayers o r whether any prejudice t o a f a i r t r i a l r e s u l t s . M y own experience i n d i c a t e s t h a t delay i s t o t h e defendant's advantage r a t h e r than prejudice. The o l d defense play of l e t t i n g t h e g r a s s grow green over t h e grave of t h e victim w i l l now be enhanced by t h i s decision. I concur i n J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison's d i s s e n t on i s s u e No. 1. I would a f f i r m t h e judgment, b u t s i n c e t h e majority opinion reverses and dismisses on t h e i s s u e of speedy t r i a l , t h e g r a t u i t o u s observations t h e r e a f t e r on t h e o t h e r i s s u e s a r e d i c t a only, and I s h a l l not elaborate on m y reasoning.