Case Title: Nitschke v. Barnick

Citation: 226 N.W.2d 785

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1975-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
226 N.W.2d 785 (1975) Shirley NITSCHKE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Loyd BARNICK, Defendant-Appellant. Civ. No. 9039. Supreme Court of North Dakota. February 27, 1975. *786 Ottmar, Nething & Pope, Jamestown, for defendant-appellant. Kenneth M. Moran, Jamestown, for plaintiffs-appellees. PEDERSON, Judge. This is an action for damages arising out of an automobile collision which occurred at about 9 p.m. on January 11, 1973, on U.S. Highway 281 south of Jamestown. The Stutsman County District Court, without a jury, found that defendant was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. The court found that the plaintiff was not negligent. Judgment was entered awarding damages to the plaintiffs for their injuries resulting from the collision and for loss of services and loss of consortium, and the defendant appealed. Judgment is affirmed. The plaintiff-driver, Shirley Nitschke, was driving south from Jamestown, intending to turn east into a private driveway about four miles south of Jamestown. Shirley's passengers were her two sons, plaintiffs Landon Nitschke, 2, and Lance Nitschke, 10, and her daughter, Lynne, 15. Plaintiff Lawrence Nitschke is the husband of Shirley. Preparatory to making this left turn, Shirley commenced applying her brakes some 900 feet north of the private driveway, and testified that she engaged the left turn signal at the same time. She looked into the rearview mirror and observed headlights some distance back. She testified that before starting any left turn movement of her car, it was struck forcefully from the rear by defendant Loyd Barnick's car. Shirley and her two sons, Landon and Lance, were injured. Barnick admits his negligence, but claims that Shirley was making a left turn toward the driveway and failed to yield to him as required by Section 39-10-25, N.D.C.C., and thus was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Shirley was awarded $9,250 for pain and suffering and loss of earnings. Landon was awarded $800 for pain and suffering. Lance was awarded $800 for pain and suffering (to be corrected to $500 as agreed by plaintiffs). Lawrence was awarded $2,850 for medical expenses, incurred and to be incurred, and for loss of services and consortium. *787 Barnick claims that these awards are excessive in view of the actual injuries sustained and actual damages proved. Questions to be decided here are: I. Was the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law under the facts of this case? II. Were the damages awarded excessive in view of the injuries sustained? In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, we are restricted in our review by the provisions in Rule 52(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. With regard to the question of contributory negligence, the court's findings of fact are supported in its oral memorandum opinion in the following language: When the court reconvened on the following Monday, the court continued its memorandum opinion as follows: Barnick argues that this is reversible error and that, as a matter of law, Shirley was negligent, per se, because she violated the requirements of Section 39-10-25, N.D.C.C., and that the failure of Shirley to comply with this statute was the proximate cause of the accident. Barnick cites Muhlhauser v. Archie Campbell Construction Co., 160 N.W.2d 524, 528 (N.D.1968), in support of his position. In nonspecific terms, Muhlhauser stands for the proposition that a determination by the trier of facts (the jury in that case and the trial court in this case) will not be set aside on a review of that determination (by the trial court, under Rule 59, in Muhlhauser, and by the Supreme Court, under Rule 52(a), in this case) unless there is a clear and convincing reason to do so. The majority, in Muhlhauser, found this rule more impelling than the general rule that the granting of a new trial should not be as readily disturbed as the denial of a new trial. From our analysis we conclude that Muhlhauser has no application in this case. The record here contains substantial evidence, as set out later, supporting the findings that Shirley was not negligent. The trial court's memorandum opinion says that she was not making a left turn when she was struck. Section 39-10-25, N.D.C.C., would apply only if Shirley was making a left turn and if such was the proximate cause of the damages. Section 39-10-25, N.D.C.C., reads: In Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819, 829 (N.D.1968), we said with respect to violating rules of the road: See also, Steel v. Downs, 438 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1971), and Greene v. Werven, 275 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1960). Although the record contains conflicting testimony on some matters relating to the question of contributory negligence, Shirley did testify that: she started slowing her vehicle about 900 feet north of the intended left turn, she activated the left turn signal, she gently applied the brakes, she had not reached the point where she could make her left turn when her vehicle was struck from the rear, the collision occurred in the right lane, and her vehicle had not crossed the center line before the collision. Her testimony was supported in part by that of the investigating officer and by Barnick himself. We cannot conclude that the finding that Shirley was not negligent was clearly erroneous. Concerning the amounts awarded, the trial court, in its oral memorandum, said: In the findings of fact the court said: Judgment was entered as set forth in the factual statements above. Barnick supports his argument that the trial court erred, with a single citation of a general rule on damages from 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages, § 109, that the amount awarded for pain and suffering must be fair and reasonable, free from sentimental and fanciful *790 standards, and based upon facts disclosed. This court has considered such matters on several occasions and has expressed agreement with this general rule. In Clark v. Josephson, 66 N.W.2d 539, 548 (N.D.1954), we said: In Lake v. Neubauer, 87 N.W.2d 888, 891 (N.D.1958), we said: The testimony on medical expenses, loss of wages, pain and suffering, loss of services and loss of consortium is undisputed. Barnick challenges only the amounts awarded to Shirley, Lance and Landon for pain and suffering and to Lawrence for loss of services of and consortium with his wife. The award to Shirley was $9,250 of which $8,000 was for pain and suffering. The testimony was that she was injured: she had a banged-up knee, pain in her chest, sprain of the neck and upper part of the dorsal area, headaches, soreness of the neck, back, breastbone and ribs; that she was treated by an orthopedic surgeon, has received in excess of sixty physical therapy treatments, wore a cervical spinal collar for several months, and future problems have not been ruled out. The award to Lance was $500 for pain and suffering. The testimony was that he was injured, required treatment by an orthopedic surgeon and physical therapy treatment, had a slight concussion, still suffers headaches and dizziness, and has night-mares and emotional problems. The award to Landon was $800 for pain and suffering. The testimony was that he was injured, required hospitalization and treatment by an orthopedic surgeon at both Jamestown and Fargo, had a bruise on his face, soreness and swelling on his neck, and enlarged glands. Under the circumstances, none of these awards can be considered excessive. The award to Lawrence was in the amount of $2,850 for medical expenses incurred and to be incurred and for loss of services and consortium, of which $1,500 was for loss of services and consortium. The testimony was that Shirley was not able to continue her normal housework, including vacuuming, dishwashing, window cleaning, and lifting of children, nor was she able to drive the children and her husband to school, church and work activities, and that some of these disabilities continued as of the trial date. The only testimony with regard to loss of consortium indicated that Shirley's sex life was not the same for a number of months but returned to normal after five or six months. As a separate item, the testimony on loss of consortium was not significant; however, when added to the testimony relating to *791 loss of services, the award of $1,500 cannot be considered excessive. Although there was no valuation testimony on any item of pain and suffering, loss of services, or loss of consortium, we hold that such was not necessary. In reviewing the entire record we find testimony of substance from which the trial court could properly conclude that Shirley suffered a loss of wages and considerable pain and suffering, that Landon and Lance suffered pain and suffering, and that Lawrence was and will be required to pay for medical treatment and that he suffered a loss of services from and consortium with his wife, all as a direct consequence of the January 11 collision. Barnick has not carried the burden of demonstrating that the amounts awarded were unfair, unreasonable, tainted with sentimental and fanciful standards, and based upon other than the facts disclosed, which is the general rule that he urges us to apply, nor has he demonstrated that the amounts were clearly erroneous, which is the specific rule we must apply. Applying Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., for reasons stated herein, we hold that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous and the judgment is, in all things, affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and VOGEL, PAULSON and SAND, JJ., concur.