Case Title: State v. Salas-Juarez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S058190

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: December 16, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent
on Review,
v.
LUIS ALBERTO SALAS-JUAREZ,
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC
063530FE; CA A135010; SC S058190)
En
Banc
On
review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued
and submitted September 13, 2010.
Brian
Patrick Conry, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on
review.
Joanna
L. Jenkins, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief was John R. Kroger, Attorney General.
GILLETTE,
J.
The
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal
from Jackson County Circuit Court, Raymond B. White, Judge. 230 Or App 580, 217
P3d 264 (2009).
GILLETTE,
J.
The
issue in this criminal case is whether the trial court erred in refusing to
allow the jury to hear that a participant in a knife fight that led to murder
charges against defendant had made a threatening statement, earlier in the
evening, about wishing to "slash" someone.  After a jury convicted defendant of murder
and attempted murder, he appealed, assigning error to the trial court's ruling
excluding that statement.  The Court of
Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions without opinion.  State
v. Salas-Juarez, 230 Or App 580, 217 P3d 264 (2009).  We allowed defendant's petition for review,
and now reverse the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court
of Appeals.  
In
the early hours of August 13, 2006, defendant and another man, Russell, engaged
in a fight on a street in Medford with a group of eight people.  During that fight, one member of the group, Mark
Lunsford, was fatally stabbed.  All
participants in the fight admitted to having been drunk, and each described the
events from his or her own perspective. 
Nonetheless, a picture of what happened that evening eventually
emerged.  According to Russell, the group
first had crossed paths with him around 2:35 a.m. and had shouted racist
slogans at him, implying that Russell was himself a racist.  Russell exchanged words with the group, but
all parties continued walking.  A few
minutes later, Russell encountered defendant, a Hispanic man, walking in a
direction that would cause him to encounter the group.  Russell stopped defendant and told him that
there were "racist people" nearby. 
The content of the rest of Russell's conversation with defendant is in
dispute, but it is undisputed that defendant and Russell soon approached the
group and verbally confronted them. 
Defendant, who was wearing a light colored long-sleeved shirt over a
sleeveless white tank top, took off the outer shirt, removed his belt and began
swinging the belt around.  One of the
members of the victim's group, Taylor, also took off his belt and began to
swing it around.  Russell then pulled out
a knife and began lunging with it.  
A
number of witnesses testified that, within moments of the start of the fight, defendant
stabbed Lunsford and chased another of the group, Crowley, lunging at him with
a knife.  Crowley testified that he was
able to avoid being stabbed by defendant and eventually punched defendant in
the side of the head, knocking him down. 
Another member of the group, Barnett, testified that he threw a rock at
defendant's head to distract him from Crowley, although he was not sure whether
he had hit defendant with it.  In any
event, by that time, someone had called for police assistance and the
authorities were on their way.  Defendant
ran away, with two other members of the victim's group -- Thomas Lunsford (the
victim's brother) and Ricks -- pursuing him through the streets of
Medford.  Police officers had responded
to the emergency call, and defendant ran directly toward them.  Thomas Lunsford, on seeing the officers, put
his head down and turned to walk in a different direction.  The officers took both defendant and Thomas Lunsford
into custody.  
Meanwhile,
Russell had run off in another direction. 
His identity was not known to defendant, the victim's group, or the
police.  All of the participants in the
fight described the second instigator (Russell) as a white "punk rock guy"
with a shaved head, wearing a black t-shirt with a punk rock band logo on
it.  
After
the stabbing, the victim's friends flagged down a car that was passing by.  The driver of that car, Vissar, happened to
be a member of a punk rock band that had been playing in the night club where
Russell had spent the evening before the fight. 
The police eventually described the second instigator to Vissar, who thought
that the second instigator was Russell. 
Vissar remembered Russell because Russell had been dancing by himself in
a conspicuous manner close to the stage during the performance and also had
engaged a couple of the band members in conversation.  One of the band members remembered Russell's first
name; another mentioned the name of a band in which Russell had played.  With those leads, the police were able to
track Russell down within a few days after the fight.  
While
the police were interviewing the band members to discover Russell's identity, one
member of the band, Stewart, told the officers about a statement that Russell
had made at the club regarding the bartender's son, a person who had no
involvement with the later events.  The
bartender's son was extremely drunk and belligerent, and was picking fights
with various people over the course of the evening.  At one point, Stewart saw the bartender's son
and Russell bump shoulders and exchange glares; the two did not, however,
engage in any actual fight or lengthy verbal exchange.  Later, when the band was taking a break,
Russell sat down at a table with Stewart and began making conversation,
complimenting him on the music.  Russell
mentioned the incident with the bartender's son.  Stewart responded by asking Russell, "Well,
did you just tell him to go [perform an unlikely sexual act]?"  Stewart stated that Russell replied that the
bartender's son "was really starting to irritate him and piss him off, and
he wanted to slash him."  When Russell
made that statement, Russell lifted his shirt and showed Stewart a knife, which
Stewart described as a black "Rambo-style" fixed-blade knife, about
six to seven inches in total length, in a sheath attached to his belt.  
Immediately
after the fight, the police conducted a thorough search of the entire area to
locate the knife that had been used in the stabbing.  The officers scoured the area where the fight
took place and retraced the path that defendant had taken when he ran from the
scene.  They used a metal detector to search
the ground, and even searched the roof of a nearby building, but did not find a
knife.  They did, however, find defendant's
shirt, parts of defendant's belt and belt buckle, Taylor's belt and belt
buckle, and a large rock such as Barnett described throwing.  
Several
days later, the police learned Russell's identity and contacted him.  Russell initially declined to talk to the
officers; eventually, however, officers were able to interview him.  Russell told them about the events leading up
to the fight.  His story to that point
was consistent with the other witnesses' descriptions of the events.  In describing the fight, Russell admitted
that he had had a knife and that he pulled it out and waved it around.  He stated that someone punched him on the side
of the head and knocked him down.  While
he was falling or when he was on the ground, something -- which Russell
surmised to be a rock -- landed on the ground nearby.  He stood up, heard someone yell, "He's
been stabbed," and ran away.  He
stated that he did not stab anyone with his knife.  He also stated that he did not see defendant
wield a knife, nor did he see defendant stab anyone.   
Officers
obtained a warrant to search Russell's home. 
During the search, they found, among other things, a t-shirt and shorts
that appeared to be those that Russell had been wearing on the night of the
fight, together with a folding knife with a black handle.  The items were folded neatly and placed
together in a drawer.  The clothes had
not been washed.  Testing later revealed
that Russell's own blood was on his shorts, but none of the victim's blood was
found on any of Russell's clothing or on the knife.  Russell later identified the knife as the one
that he had used in the fight.  He
testified that the knife was clipped to the inside of his pocket, and that he
removed it and opened it during the fight. 

Defendant
was charged with the murder of Mark Lunsford and with the attempted murder of
Crowley.  At the trial, defendant's
theory of the case was that the witnesses were mistaken in identifying
defendant as the stabber, and that Russell was the person who had stabbed Mark
Lunsford and tried to stab Crowley.  The
parties agreed that evidence concerning how Russell was identified as the
second individual involved in the fight that night was relevant.  The parties also agreed that the fact that
Russell was seen with a knife earlier in the evening of the fight was
relevant.  Thus, the state informed the
court that it intended to present the testimony of the band members to explain
how they had helped to lead the police to Russell and to establish that Russell
had a knife, and that Russell also would be called to testify.  
Defendant
also wanted to offer Russell's statement about wanting to "slash" the
bartender's son.  Defendant contended
that that statement was admissible under OEC 404(3) to show Russell's motive or
intent to kill Mark Lunsford.(1)  The state opposed admission of the statement.  The trial court ultimately ruled that the
statement did not show motive or intent to kill Lunsford, and therefore was not
admissible.  
During
the trial, two band members testified about remembering Russell at the club
that night, describing his enthusiastic dancing in front of the stage and his
apparent enjoyment of the music.  Both
band members stated that Russell appeared to be having a good time.  In compliance with the trial court's earlier
ruling, the witnesses were not asked and did not testify about the incident
with the bartender's son or Russell's statement.  Stewart did testify that Russell 
"had a knife on his side that he decided to like flash
me.  * * * He just picked his shirt up
like that and drop[ped] it like that."
Stewart then went on to describe the knife.  
After
the state completed its direct examination of Stewart, defense counsel argued outside
the presence of the jury that defendant should be entitled to impeach Stewart
by bringing up the incident with the bartender's son.  He argued that the defense had never heard before
that moment that Russell appeared to be having fun at the bar, and that he
should be permitted to impeach the statement that Russell was having fun with
the fact that, in that context, Russell had gotten into a confrontation with
the bartender's son and had said that he wanted to "slash" him.  The trial court observed that it could not
actually be a surprise to anyone that Russell was having a good time at the bar
and ruled that it was "not proper impeachment."  
The
trial progressed.  Among other things, the
state presented the testimony of several of the individuals who had been with
the victim at the time of the stabbing who testified that they saw defendant
stab Mark Lunsford, and that, after initially behaving aggressively, Russell
just stood to the side while the fight was taking place.  Through cross-examination, defense counsel
was able to draw out the following facts, among others, in support of
defendant's theory of the case:  
Although Crowley remembered punching defendant
in the side of the head and Barnett remembered throwing a rock at him,
defendant did not appear to be injured when he was arrested.  Moreover, although Russell testified that, in
the course of the brawl, he had been punched in the side of the head, that an
object had hit the ground near him and he had surmised that a rock had been
thrown at him, and that he had been injured, none of the members of the
victims' group remembered fighting with Russell.  
Although Barnett testified at the trial that he
saw defendant stab Lunsford, he initially told the police that Russell was the person
with the knife and the person who had stabbed the victim.  
Although Thomas Lunsford, the victim's brother,
testified at trial that he saw defendant stab the victim, he initially told a
police officer that he had been walking in front of the rest of the group
before the fight occurred, that he had heard someone yell from behind him that
his brother had been stabbed, and that he rushed back to the group and found
his brother bleeding.    
None of the victim's blood was found on
defendant's clothing.
The state presented witnesses who testified
that, two weeks before the fight, defendant bought a knife with a sheath depicting
the Mexican flag and that he wore it on his belt all the time.  No such knife ever was found, despite an exhaustive
search.  The sheath was not found either,
notwithstanding the fact that defendant's belt and belt buckle were found at
the location of the fight.  
Russell admitted to a friend the day after the fight
that he "may have" stabbed someone during the fight, although he was
not sure.
At the conclusion of the state's
case, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state's
evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the
charged offenses.  The trial court denied
the motion.  Ultimately, the jury found
defendant guilty of the murder of Mark Lunsford and of the attempted murder of
Crowley.  Defendant appealed his
convictions to the Court of Appeals, which, as noted, affirmed without opinion.  
On
review in this court, defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding
the evidence that Russell had stated, earlier on the evening of the stabbing,
that he wanted to "slash" the bartender's son.  Defendant's argument is two-fold:  He contends that Russell's statement about
wanting to slash the bartender's son shows that, earlier in the evening,
Russell was in an angry mood resulting from his confrontation with the
bartender's son, and his manifestation of that anger was a desire to resort to
his knife.  That, according to defendant,
explains why Russell later instigated a fight against eight other people, and amounts
to a "motive" to use the knife on someone else less than an hour and
a half later.  For that reason, he
argues, the statement is relevant and admissible under OEC 404(3).  In addition, defendant argues that the
statement about being "irritated" and "pissed off" and
wanting to slash the bartender's son flies in the face of Russell's testimony,
and that of band members Stewart and Vissar, that Russell was in a happy, "mellow"
mood when he was at the club before the fight. 
Therefore, defendant asserts, he should have been permitted, under OEC
613, to use Russell's prior inconsistent statement to impeach the testimony of Stewart,
Vissar, and Russell that Russell was having fun at the club.(2)
We
begin at the beginning.  As noted, defendant
informed the court in a pretrial hearing that he intended to offer evidence
that Russell had stated that he wanted to "slash" the bartender's
son.  Under OEC 402, that evidence was
admissible if it was relevant and not excluded by Oregon evidence rules, by
Oregon statutory and decisional law consistent with those rules, or by
constitutional considerations.(3)  The first question, then, is whether that
evidence was relevant.  
As
we have often stated, the threshold for admission of evidence on grounds of
relevance is low:  "[E]vidence is
relevant so long as it increases or decreases, even slightly, the probability
of the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action."  State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 238, 986 P2d 5 (1999); accord State v. Hampton, 317 Or 251, 255, 855 P2d 621 (1993); OEC 401
(relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence").  Indeed, in considering that matter, the
inference that the proponent of the evidence wishes to be drawn from the
evidence need not be the necessary, or even the most probable, one.  Hampton,
317 Or at 255 n 8.  
Thus,
the question is whether Russell's statement increased, even slightly, the
probability that Russell was the person who stabbed Mark Lunsford.  Russell responded to an altercation with the
bartender's son by stating he wanted to "slash" that individual.  Stewart testified in the offer of proof that
he took Russell's statement seriously enough to alert the bartender, who then
sent her son home in a taxi.  One
inference that the jury was entitled to draw from Russell's reaction to the
seemingly minor altercation with the bartender's son was that Russell was in an
angry frame of mind on the night in question. 
That may not be the only inference that could be drawn, given the other
evidence of Russell's behavior at the club, but it is a permissible one.  Russell's statement, therefore, was at least
some evidence of his general state of mind at the time that he made the
statement.  
That
evidence then must be considered together with the evidence that, an hour and a
half later, Russell recruited defendant to confront the victim and his friends
and instigated the fight with them.  From
Russell's later actions, the jury further reasonably could infer that Russell's
state of mind was an ongoing one.  Put
another way, the jury reasonably could conclude that Russell's general state of
mind on the night in question was such that, when he was offended, he would
respond in anger and with a willingness to "slash" his offender.  
Those
inferences, in turn, would make it more probable that Russell slashed at Mark
Lunsford with his knife and less probable that Russell simply stood by while
defendant and the victim's friends were engaged in the fight, as Russell later
claimed.  So viewed, the evidence of
Russell's expressed state of mind was relevant to the central dispute in the
case:  Which person -- defendant or
Russell -- stabbed Mark Lunsford?
The
evidence being relevant, it was admissible unless excluded by some other rule,
law, or case.  OEC 402.  As discussed above, defendant claimed that
Russell's statement was admissible under OEC 404(3), while the state claimed
that it was not.  That rule
provides:  
"Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
Although defendant, in his argument to the trial court,
implicitly conceded that Russell's statement about wanting to slash the
bartender's son was a "wrong" or an "act" under OEC 404(3),
we do not find it necessary to resolve that issue.  Instead, we shall assume that the statement
was an "act" within the meaning of OEC 404(3), and concern ourselves
with whether evidence of that "act" was nonetheless admissible under
the rule.  See State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397, 409, 963 P2d 667 (1998) (using
such an approach).  We conclude that it
was.  Defendant's trial strategy, as we
understand it, was to create a reasonable doubt as to his own guilt by
suggesting to the jury that Russell was the perpetrator.  As we have explained, evidence of Russell's
state of mind would permit the jury to conclude, through a short series of
inferences, that Russell stabbed Mark Lunsford. 
The evidence of Russell's state of mind thus not only was relevant, it
was critical to defendant's case.  
In
arguing to the contrary, the state acknowledges that evidence tending to show that
Russell was "in an angry mood" or had a generalized desire to engage
in violence would be relevant to establish a motive to engage in violence a
short time later.  But what the state
fails to acknowledge, and what we think is clear, is that Russell's statement
about wanting to "slash" the bartender's son an hour and a half
before was such evidence.  That is, it was evidence from which the jury
reasonably could infer that Russell was generally in an angry or violence-prone
mood -- especially when it is coupled with his later behavior in instigating
the fight with the victim and the victim's friends and recruiting defendant to
join him in that fight.
The
remaining question is whether any error in excluding the statement was
harmless.  The state argues that the
tenuous relevance of the statement to defendant's case was rendered negligible
by other evidence.  In particular, the
state relies on the fact that defendant admitted that he agreed to go with
Russell to confront the victims, he admitted to provocative words and deeds
with respect to the victim's group, and multiple other witnesses identified
defendant as one of the two instigators of the fight.  The state also emphasizes that the jury heard
far more relevant and specific evidence of Russell's motive with respect to the
particular victims in the case.  For
example, Russell admitted that he was intoxicated the night of the fight.  He admitted that, immediately before the
fight, he engaged in a provocative and heated verbal exchange with the group,
which involved accusations of racism.  He
admitted that he was sufficiently provoked by that encounter that he stopped
defendant on the street, described the group as racists, and essentially
recruited defendant to confront them. 
The jury also heard evidence that Russell (and defendant) ran at the
group, shouting obscene insults and provoking a fight.  Russell himself testified that he was
involved in the fight and that he pulled out his knife and poked at people with
it.  The state argues that, given those
circumstances immediately surrounding the fatal fight, whether Russell had a
prior, generalized angry state of mind sheds little light on the question of
who stabbed Mark Lunsford.  That is, once
Russell and defendant were in the heat of the battle, Russell's previously
expressed desire to "slash" the bartender's son was of little
probative value in determining who in fact stabbed the victim.
We
think that that argument points precisely the other way.  The evidence against defendant, while significant,
was not overwhelming.  Given the evidence
that pointed to Russell as the actual perpetrator, we cannot conclude that the
additional evidence of Russell's statement, which suggested an angry state of
mind, would not have tipped the balance toward a reasonable doubt as to
defendant's guilt.  The jury could, for
example, reasonably have inferred that the angry state of mind that Russell's
statement suggested persisted over the next hour and a half, and that it
therefore was unlikely that Russell would have "stood by," as he
claimed he did, once the fight began in earnest.  Reasonable doubt may be built upon such a
foundation of fact and inference.  The
jury should have heard about the statement; its exclusion was not harmless.
The
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. OEC 404(3) provides:  
"Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
2. Defendant also makes various
constitutional arguments that he did not raise in the trial court.  We do not consider those unpreserved
arguments in this opinion.  
3. OEC 402 provides: 
"All
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Oregon
Evidence Code, by the Constitutions of the United States and Oregon, or by
Oregon statutory and decisional law.  Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible."