Case Title: WILLIAM TANDY RODEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0233

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIAM TANDY RODEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 11225 P.3d 497Case Number: S-08-0233Decided: 02/05/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
WILLIAM 
TANDY RODEN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender's Office; Diane E. Courselle, Faculty Director, Zane A. Gilmer, 
Student Intern, and Jodanna L. Haskins, Student Intern, of the Defender Aid 
Program.  Argument by Ms. 
Haskins.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1] 
     A jury convicted 
Appellant William T. Roden of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, two 
counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault and 
battery.  Roden seeks reversal of 
those convictions, asserting numerous evidentiary errors at trial.  We will affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Roden presents 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
The State's introduction of alleged other bad acts by William Roden, 
despite its failure to notify the defense of its intent to use 404(b) evidence, 
resulted in reversible error.

 
 
II.         
The trial court committed plain error by allowing the State to elicit 
testimony from witnesses that they pled guilty to charges similar to that for 
which William Roden was on trial and which arose out of the same criminal 
transaction.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On September 9, 
2007, Ryan Ott gave his girlfriend, Keyla Hodges, $5,000.00 he had received from 
Roden, along with $5,000.00 of his own money, and sent her to buy a pound of 
methamphetamine.  When Hodges 
returned an hour later, she had neither the money nor the drugs in her 
possession.  This incited Ott to 
devise a plan to recover either the money or the drugs.  

 
 
[¶4]      Ott had Hodges 
show him where the alleged failed drug deal occurred.  After identifying the location, Ott went 
to Roden's shop to enlist his assistance in the recovery.  Roden and Ott discussed their options 
and then drove to the home they believed belonged to Nathan Luth and Dusty 
Henderson  the two men from whom Hodges claimed she had attempted to purchase 
the methamphetamine earlier that day.  
They then broke a window and entered the home, only to discover they had 
the wrong residence.  

 
 
[¶5]      After realizing 
their mistake, Roden and Ott left the area and picked up Hodges, who then 
assisted the men in locating the correct house.1  Upon arriving at the location, they 
parked their vehicle across the street and discussed their plans for retrieving 
the money.  During that discussion, 
Hodges described the layout of the house and the possible location of the 
occupants.  She also informed the 
men there was a sword located near the front door and that there were dogs in 
the house.  Thereafter, Ott armed 
himself with a shotgun, and the two men, both disguised in bandanas and hoodies, 
exited the vehicle and entered the residence.  

 
 
[¶6]      Once inside, 
Roden grabbed the sword Hodges had described.  The two men then went to Henderson's 
bedroom, kicked in the door, and ordered Henderson to follow them.  In the process, Ott struck Henderson in 
the forehead with the barrel of the shotgun, causing a large gash that 
ultimately required fourteen stitches.  
The men then proceeded across the hall to Luth's bedroom, where they also 
kicked in the door, struck Luth in the head with the shotgun, and ordered him to 
accompany them.  Roden and Ott 
escorted the men downstairs to the living room and directed them to lie down on 
the floor.  While Ott held Luth and 
Henderson at gunpoint, Roden ransacked the house to find the money.  When Roden's efforts proved 
unsuccessful, the men demanded the location of the money and hit, kicked and 
threatened Luth and Henderson with the shotgun and sword.  After a period of time, Roden and Ott 
realized that Luth and Henderson did not have the money and left the residence, 
taking with them, among other things, the sword, Luth's cell phone and iPod, and 
drug paraphernalia.  The men 
returned to their vehicle, where Hodges was waiting, and the threesome drove 
away from the scene.  

 
 
[¶7]      Ott and Hodges 
were arrested a few weeks later in South Dakota.  During an interview following her 
arrest, Hodges implicated herself, as well as Roden and Ott, in the robbery of 
Luth and Henderson, and provided police with the location of the stolen 
sword.  Based on Hodges' statements 
and the post-robbery investigation, the State charged Roden with conspiracy to 
commit aggravated robbery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-303(a) and 
6-2-401(a) and (c) (LexisNexis 2009), two counts of aggravated robbery under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-401(a) and (c) (LexisNexis 2009), and two counts of 
aggravated assault and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) and (b) 
(LexisNexis 2009).  A jury later 
convicted Roden on all five counts, and the district court imposed an overall 
prison sentence of thirty to fifty years.  
This appeal followed.  
Additional facts will be set forth as needed in our discussion of the 
issues.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      Where an 
objection is posed, we review a trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of 
discretion. 

 
 
A 
trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to 
considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  
"[A]s long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's 
ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on appeal."  Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 20, 142 P.3d 1134, 
1140 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 

Leyva 
v. State, 
2007 WY 136, ¶ 17, 165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2007).  If we conclude the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence, we must then consider whether the error was prejudicial or 
harmless.  W.R.A.P. 9.04.  

 
 
[¶9]      When no objection 
is lodged in the trial court to the evidence challenged on appeal, we apply our 
plain error standard of review.  
Plain error will not be found unless:  (1) the record clearly shows the alleged 
error; (2) the party claiming the error demonstrates a violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law; and (3) the party proves the violation adversely 
affected a substantial right resulting in material prejudice.  Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d 793, 
797-98 (Wyo. 2006).  Whether an 
error is reviewed on the basis of plain error or on the basis of harmless error, 
our primary focus is whether the appellant's case was so seriously prejudiced by 
the error that he was denied a fair trial.  
Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543, 
554 (Wyo. 2005); Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d 143, 157 (Wyo. 2004). This 
involves a determination as to whether, "based on the entire record, a 
reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict 
might have been more favorable to the accused."  Lopez, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d  at 157.  The burden of establishing prejudicial 
error rests upon the appellant.  Butcher, ¶ 39, 123 P.3d  at 
554.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
W.R.E. 
404(b) evidence

 
 
[¶10]   At the time of Roden's trial, 
W.R.E. 404(b) provided:2

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 
 
Under 
the rule, evidence of specific instances of misconduct is admissible if it 
serves to prove matters other than a defendant's bad character.  Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 1202, 
1207 (Wyo. 2007); Gleason v. State, 
2002 WY 161, ¶ 17, 57 P.3d 332, 339 (Wyo. 2002).  The list of allowable purposes for which 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible under W.R.E. 404(b) 
is not exclusive.  Gleason, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d  at 340.  The "core principle of W.R.E. 404(b) is 
that the defendant in a criminal case should not be convicted because he is an 
unsavory person, nor because of past misdeeds, but only because of his guilt of 
the particular crime charged.'"  Leyva, ¶ 19, 165 P.3d  at 452 (quoting 1 
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:21, at 691-92 (3d 
ed. 2007)). 

 
 
[¶11]   Relying on W.R.E. 404(b), Roden 
asserts reversible error occurred when the State, on three separate occasions, 
elicited testimony concerning other instances of misconduct.  Specifically, Roden takes exception to 
testimony that: (1) he and Ott previously bought and sold methamphetamine 
together; (2) he and Ott were well acquainted from past instances of selling 
drugs and stolen goods; and (3) he and Hodges previously used drugs together in 
a Rapid City, South Dakota, motel room.  
Roden contends he timely objected to the introduction of that evidence 
via his filing of a pretrial demand for notice of the State's intent to 
introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), citing Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d 483, 491 
(Wyo. 2002) (holding that where a defendant files a pretrial demand for notice 
of intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the same shall be treated 
as a timely objection to the introduction of such evidence); see also Williams v. State, 2004 WY 117, ¶ 12, 99 P.3d 432, 439 (Wyo. 2004).  He further contends his demand for 
notice triggered a mandatory procedure wherein the State was required to provide 
the district court with sufficient evidence to satisfy the test for 
admissibility articulated in Huddleston 
v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1502, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 
(1988), and adopted by this Court in Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo. 1996), 
which the State failed to do prior to the introduction of the challenged 
testimony.

 
 
[¶12]   At the outset, we cannot agree with 
Roden that his pretrial demand for notice constituted a proper objection to the 
challenged testimony.  If a demand 
for notice is to be treated as an objection to the admissibility of W.R.E. 
404(b) evidence, it follows that the demand, like other evidentiary objections, 
must be made in the trial court.  
Here, the demand was filed in the circuit court rather than the district 
court with exclusive jurisdiction over the criminal trial.  Because Roden failed to file his demand 
in the court of competent jurisdiction, the demand was a nullity as pertains to 
the district court proceedings.  
Having reached this conclusion, and noting that Roden did not otherwise 
object to the challenged testimony at trial, we are now left to ponder whether 
plain error occurred in its admission.  
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude it did 
not.

 
 
[¶13]   Roden first alleges error occurred 
in the State's elicitation of testimony from Ott indicating Roden "had 
previously been involved with Ott buying and selling methamphetamine."  We have meticulously reviewed the 
portions of trial transcript cited by Roden on this contention of error, but we 
are unable to find such testimony offered by Ott.  Since the challenged testimony is not 
clearly reflected in the record, we have no evidentiary basis upon which to 
assess whether plain error occurred in this instance.

 
 
[¶14]   Roden's second instance of error 
concerns Ott's testimony that he was acquainted with Roden from past instances 
of selling drugs and stolen goods.  
The State asserts that no error can be predicated on this testimony 
because Roden opened the door to the prosecutor's line of questioning that 
resulted in its introduction.  The 
State cites Lawrence v. State, 2007 
WY 183, ¶ 14, 171 P.3d 517, 
521-22 (Wyo. 2007), wherein we stated:

 
 
"This 
Court has recognized that a defendant may open the door to otherwise 
inadmissible testimony when he inquires about a particular subject," including 
evidence of prior criminal misconduct.  
Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1998); see also Espinoza v. State, 969 P.2d 542, 546 (Wyo. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 818, 120 S. Ct. 59, 145 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1999).  "When 
the defendant initiates a line of questioning, the prosecutor is entitled to 
make a permissible inquiry without crossing into prosecutorial overkill."  Espinoza, 969 P.2d  at 546.  

 
 
It 
is usually a basic function of redirect examination to allow a witness to 
explain his testimony elicited on cross-examination. . . . The opening of the 
door concept, however, reaches further and is an extension of that familiar 
rule.  Succinctly stated, the 
"opening the door" rule is that a party who in some way permits the trial judge 
to let down the gates to a field of inquiry that is not competent but relevant 
cannot complain if his adversary is also allowed to avail himself of the opening 
within its scope.  

 
 

Sanville 
v. State, 
593 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Wyo. 
1979).

 
 
[¶15]   In analyzing Roden's complaint and 
the State's response, we must consider how the challenged testimony arose, 
placing it in proper context.  The 
record reveals Ott testified during the State's case-in-chief that, on September 
9, 2007, Roden gave him $5,000.00 for the purpose of purchasing a pound of 
methamphetamine.  During 
cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to discredit Ott's testimony by 
asking the following questions:

 
 
Q.        Going 
back to the early days of September, 2007, just before the robbery, how long had 
you known Billie Roden?

 
 
A.        A 
couple of months.

 
 
Q.        You 
had known him a couple of months, and yet he gave you $5,000 in cash to go make 
a drug deal; is that correct?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
sir.  

 
 
In 
response to defense counsel's cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited the 
following information on redirect examination:

 
 
Q.        Now, 
[defense counsel] talked to you about the fact that it was puzzling that you 
would receive $5,000 from Mr. Roden on September 9th, in cash to get methamphetamine.  At that point in time, did you trust Mr. 
Roden?

 
 
A.        Yes, 
sir. 

 
 
Q.        Did 
Mr. Roden appear to trust you? 

 
 
A.        Yes, 
sir. 

 
 
Q.        Why 
was that? 

 
 
A.        
Because we had been in business doing things together for a couple 
months, and we made a lot of money together. 

 
 
Q.        Had 
the two of you been together almost continually for that two months? 

 
 
A.        Yes, 
sir. 

 
 
Q.        And 
when you say you made a lot of money together, would you describe for us the 
activity that you and Mr. Roden engaged in to make that money? 

 
 
A.        
Selling drugs and stealing things. Or I would steal things and he would 
sell them. 

 
 
Q.        And 
was it unusual for you to give money to Mr. Roden? 

 
 
A.        No, 
sir. 

 
 
Q.        Was 
it unusual for Mr. Roden to give you money? 

 
 
A.        No, 
sir. 

 
 
Q.        Was 
$5,000 an unusual amount of money for the two of you to exchange? 

 
 
A.        No, 
sir.  

 
 
[¶16]   After careful consideration, we 
must agree with the State that the prosecutor's line of questioning on redirect 
was permissible under the circumstances.  
When Roden's trial counsel made an issue of the plausibility of Ott's 
testimony concerning the nature of the money exchange, he opened the door for 
the prosecutor to inquire as to the nature and extent of Roden's and Ott's 
relationship, including information relating to the types of transactions in 
which the two men engaged.  The 
prosecutor's line of questioning merely sought to clarify their relationship and 
to refute defense counsel's implication that it was unlikely Roden would have 
given Ott $5,000.00 for a drug deal after knowing him for only a few 
months.  The prosecutor limited his 
inquiry to the amount of information necessary to demonstrate why it was not 
uncommon for Ott and Roden to exchange large sums of money, and "did not cross 
the line between permissible inquiry and prosecutorial overkill."  Lawrence, ¶ 14, 171 P.3d  at 522.  We find no error in this 
instance.

 
 
[¶17]   Roden's final contention of error 
stems from Hodges' testimony that she recognized him from a prior encounter in 
which they used drugs together in a Rapid City, South Dakota, motel room.  That testimony arose during the 
following exchange on direct examination:

 
 
Q.        Now 
earlier in your testimony you told us that initially when you saw the second 
person, you didn't know who they [sic] were?

 
 
A.        
Yes.

 
 
Q.        And 
then at some point later you learned who that person was?

 
 
A.        
Yes.

 
 
Q.        When 
did that happen?

 
 
A.        It 
happened after we had jumped in the pickup. After they jumped in the pickup from 
the robbery.

 
 
Q.        
Describe for us what happened at that time.

 
 
A.        Um, I 
said, well, it is about time I introduced myself. I am Keyla. And the guy in the 
passenger seat turns around and he goes, yeah, I know who you are. I said, oh 
yeah? And he goes yeah. And he takes off his mask and bandana around [his] eyes 
and mouth, and it was William Roden. And I had known him previously from hanging 
out with Dusty and me. And we had gotten high in a motel in a Ramada motel in 
Rapid City.   

 
 
[¶18]   We agree Hodges' testimony about 
the drug use was evidence of uncharged misconduct.  However, we disagree it was 
intentionally solicited by the prosecutor.  
As indicated, the prosecutor simply asked Hodges about the timeline and 
the events giving rise to her identification of Roden as Ott's companion in the 
robbery.  The supplemental 
information about the drug use was a spontaneous offering by Hodges, seemingly 
designed to support her identification of Roden.  In light of the facts, we decline to 
fault the prosecutor.

 
 
[¶19]   Even assuming error occurred in 
this instance, we are unable to discern any resulting prejudice.  The testimony was isolated, and the 
South Dakota incident was not further mentioned during the trial.  Additionally, the jury had before it 
other evidence of Roden's drug use.  
Thus, the challenged testimony was merely cumulative.  In sum, we do not believe this 
infinitesimal testimony had a substantial effect on the jury's determination of 
Roden's guilt.

 
 

Testimony 
of Convictions

 
 
[¶20]   In the State's case-in-chief, the 
prosecutor elicited testimony from Ott that he had been convicted of grand 
larceny and armed robbery.  
Similarly, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Hodges regarding the 
fact she had pled guilty to the crime of robbery.  Hodges testified that her conviction 
stemmed from a robbery that occurred on September 10 in which Roden was a 
participant.  Roden contends it was 
reversible error for the prosecutor to elicit such testimony from Ott and 
Hodges.  According to Roden, the 
testimony impermissibly suggested to the jury that it could infer his guilt on 
the charged crimes because his confederates had been convicted of offenses 
arising out of the same circumstances.

 

[¶21]   Roden acknowledges he did not 
object to the challenged testimony and, consequently, bears the burden of 
demonstrating plain error to succeed on his claim.  As previously discussed, plain error 
requires Roden to show, by reference to the record, a violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law and material prejudice.  Miller, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d at 797-98; see also Capshaw v. State, 11 P.3d 905, 911 (Wyo. 2000); Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 535 
(Wyo. 2000).  In order to show the 
error was prejudicial, warranting reversal of his convictions, Roden must 
demonstrate he was not allowed a trial on its own merits.  Mazurek, 10 P.3d  at 
536.

 
 
[¶22]   We need spend little time on the 
first prong of the plain error test as the record clearly reflects the testimony 
alleged as error.  As to the second 
prong, Roden finds the clear and unequivocal rule of law he claims was violated 
in Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979).  The rule in Kwallek upon which he relies states that 
"when two persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out of the same 
circumstance, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against the 
other."  Id. at 1375.  The rationale for the rule is that 
evidence of a witness' guilt for an offense arising out of the circumstances 
leading to the defendant's trial implies the defendant is also guilty.  Such an implication violates a 
defendant's right to a trial on its own merits.  Id. at 1375-76.  In short, the Kwallek rule precludes the State from 
presenting in its case-in-chief evidence of a co-conspirator's/accomplice's 
guilty plea or conviction on a related offense as circumstantial evidence of the 
defendant's guilt.

 
 
[¶23]   In this case, we have no trouble 
concluding Hodges' testimony violated the clear and unequivocal rule set forth 
in Kwallek.  Her testimony explicitly linked her 
robbery conviction to the same robbery for which Roden was on trial.  However, we cannot reach the same 
conclusion about Ott's testimony.  
His testimony, as elicited by the prosecutor, merely indicated he had 
been convicted of grand larceny and armed robbery.  Ott did not testify on direct 
examination that his convictions were related to, or stemmed from, the same 
circumstances underlying the charges Roden was defending against at trial.  Under these circumstances, we cannot 
conclude a clear transgression of the Kwallek rule occurred with respect to 
Ott's testimony.

 
 
[¶24]   Regardless of the propriety of both 
Ott's and Hodges' testimony, applying the factors set forth in Mazurek, 10 P.3d  at 539, we agree with 
the State that Roden has not shown material prejudice resulting from its 
admission.  The testimony was not 
extensive, and proof of Roden's guilt was substantial.  We find the strength of the State's 
evidence would have sufficed even in the absence of the challenged 
testimony.  Additionally, we can 
plainly gather from the record that the conviction evidence was not introduced 
for an improper purpose or deliberately placed before the jury to divert 
attention to extraneous matters.  We 
also note the convictions were not improperly emphasized by the prosecutor or 
otherwise used as substantive evidence of Roden's guilt.3  Consequently, we find it unlikely that 
the jury took undue notice of that evidence in assessing Roden's guilt or 
innocence on the charged crimes.

 
 
[¶25]   Further, we recognize, as we did in 
Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 970 (Wyo. 1996), 
that, because the jury's attention was not inordinately directed to the improper 
evidence, this case is distinguishable from Kwallek.  See also Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶¶ 29-30, 180 P.3d 212, 221-22 (Wyo. 2008); 
Adams v. State, 2003 WY 152, ¶ 30, 79 P.3d 526, 535 
(Wyo. 2003); Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶ 42, 46 P.3d 298, 306 (Wyo. 2002).  In Kwallek, we concluded prejudice resulted 
because the trial court twice overruled the defendant's objection concerning the 
admission of his co-conspirator's guilty plea and, consequently, the jury may 
have been left with an improper impression by the judge's rulings.  We concluded it was probable 

 
 
the 
jury was left with the impression that, since the total evidence connected the 
defendant with [his co-conspirator] in the altercation with [the victim], the 
court must have wanted the jury to understand that, since [the co-conspirator] 
had pleaded guilty, it must be that the defendant is also 
guilty.

 
 

Kwallek, 
596 P.2d  at 1376.  Obviously, such 
did not occur in this case, as no objections were posed by Roden to the 
admission of Ott's and Hodges' testimony.

 
 
[¶26]   After careful consideration of all 
the evidence, we are convinced the error asserted by Roden was harmless.  We therefore hold no plain error 
occurred in this instance warranting reversal of Roden's 
convictions.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   Roden has failed to convince this 
Court that reversible error exists with respect to any of the issues raised in 
this appeal.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The events that transpired at the Luth and Henderson residence occurred 
during the late hours of September 9 or the early morning hours of September 10, 
2007.  

 
 

2The rule has since been amended to require the State, upon request by the 
accused, to "provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if 
the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of 
any such evidence it intends to introduce at 
trial."

 
 

3Roden particularly points to the prosecutor's remarks in closing argument 
that Ott admitted to the robbery and that "it is now the time for this jury to 
hold [Roden] accountable for what he has done" as evidence the convictions were 
impermissibly used as substantive evidence of his guilt.  However, when the remarks are viewed in 
proper context, it is clear the prosecutor was not referring to Ott's 
convictions but, rather, to Ott's trial testimony wherein he implicated both 
himself and Roden in this robbery.