Case Title: People v. Caro

Citation: 

Docket Number: S106274

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
SOCORRO SUSAN CARO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S106274 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
CR47813 
 
 
June 13, 2019 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
S106274 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
In April 2002, defendant Socorro Susan Caro was 
sentenced to death for killing three of her four children.  This is 
her automatic appeal.  We affirm the judgment below.   
I. 
BACKGROUND 
Caro and her husband, Dr. Xavier Caro (Xavier1), had four 
children:  Xavier (known as “Joey”), Michael, Christopher, and 
G.C.  On November 22, 1999, Joey, Michael, and Christopher 
were shot to death in the family home in Camarillo, California.  
Joey was 11, Michael was 8, Christopher was 5, and G.C. was 1.  
The Ventura County District Attorney filed a felony complaint 
against Caro on December 17, 1999, and an information on April 
24, 2000.  Caro was charged with three counts of murder (Pen. 
Code, § 187, subd. (a))2 while personally using a firearm 
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and a multiple-murder special 
circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)).  Caro pleaded not guilty, 
and not guilty by reason of insanity. 
At trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Caro’s 
husband.  Xavier met Caro in 1979 during her externship in his 
rheumatology medical practice.  They began dating in 1980 and 
                                        
1  
We refer to Caro’s husband by his first name to avoid 
confusion. 
2  
All subsequent unlabeled statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
married in 1986.  At the time of the shootings, Caro’s parents 
lived in the couple’s nearby second home and Caro’s mother, 
Juanita, would often stay over to help with the children. 
Early on in their relationship, Caro began working as 
Xavier’s office manager.  In August 1999, Xavier fired Caro 
because, according to Xavier, she had been providing more 
money than expected to her parents while allowing the medical 
office’s rent to go unpaid.  Xavier had also been having an affair 
with someone who worked in his office.  Xavier and Caro had 
discussed divorce at various points in their relationship, and 
after firing Caro, Xavier consulted a divorce lawyer.  Xavier 
testified he did not actually want a divorce.  Indeed, Xavier 
thought their marriage had improved after Caro and he agreed 
in August 1999 to go to counseling, and Caro agreed to take 
Prozac. 
On the night of the shootings, November 22, 1999, Xavier 
returned from work between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m.  Xavier had 
dinner with Caro, and they drank margaritas.  Joey made a 
negative comment about his parents’ drinking.  Xavier and Caro 
argued:  Xavier wanted to discipline Joey, but Caro did not.  
Later, after Xavier removed the television and videogame 
system from Joey’s room as punishment, Xavier and Caro 
continued their argument.  Caro accused Xavier of not loving 
her, and not respecting her.  Xavier said he was leaving.  Caro 
grabbed him by the shoulders, slid to the floor, and held his 
ankles as he pulled away from her.  Juanita came up the stairs 
and yelled, “Get out, you brute.”  Xavier entered the garage, got 
in his 1989 maroon Mercedes, and drove away. 
Juanita’s testimony about the end of the fight that evening 
was similar, though she testified that Xavier kicked Caro “on 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
the legs” when Caro was on the ground.  Juanita told police that 
after Xavier left, Caro said, “Now, Mom.  I have no money now.  
I don’t know what I’m going to do,” and “Mom, we’re going to 
starve now.”  Caro also told Juanita that night, “Well, I guess 
I’m crazy like he says I am” and “Mom, he says I’m crazy.”  
Around 9:00 p.m., Juanita left the house to return to her home. 
Caro seemed normal.  Juanita returned a few minutes later 
because she forgot her glasses and left again soon after. 
Xavier testified that he drove to his office in Northridge, 
which was 40 to 46 minutes away from the house.  Caro called 
Xavier multiple times on his car phone and at the office.  When 
Xavier answered the phone at the office, Caro was crying and 
agitated and asked Xavier to come home.  Caro then calmly 
stated, “That’s the thing I’ve always admired about you, X.  You 
always know the difference between right and wrong.”  Phone 
records show that Xavier made an unanswered call home at 9:53 
p.m. from the office.  Xavier testified that he left the office 
around 10:30 p.m. to return home.  As he left the building, 
Xavier saw a big white truck parked outside the gate, a truck 
that, according to the guard records, entered the hospital at 
10:25 p.m.  Time-stamped videotapes from security cameras at 
Xavier’s work showed a vehicle similar to Xavier’s car arriving 
at 9:24 p.m. and leaving at 10:36 p.m. 
When Xavier returned home, he found Caro lying on her 
right side in a semifetal position on the floor of their master 
bedroom.  Xavier noticed a bloodstained froth around her mouth 
and thought she had overdosed.  Xavier called 911 from a phone 
in the bedroom at 11:21 p.m.  He told the operator that Caro 
might have overdosed or slit her wrists.  Xavier rolled Caro onto 
her back and noticed a .38-caliber revolver underneath Caro, 
and several expended shell casings.  Xavier had previously 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
purchased the gun for Caro, along with a gun for himself, for 
self-defense.  Xavier picked up the gun and saw a single shell 
casing in the five-round cylinder. 
The 911 operator asked if there were any children in the 
house.  Xavier went to Joey’s bedroom and found him lying face 
up covered in blood.  Xavier checked for a pulse but found none.  
He then entered Michael and Christopher’s room and saw them 
lying together in the bottom bunk of the bunk bed.  Their faces 
were ashen and neither boy was breathing.  Xavier returned to 
the master bedroom and told the 911 operator that his children 
had been shot.  Xavier kicked Caro and yelled at her. 
The 911 operator asked how many children were in the 
home.  Xavier went to G.C.’s crib, found G.C. unharmed, and 
told the 911 operator, “We’ve got one alive here.”  Xavier picked 
up G.C. and went to check the other children again.  Joey and 
Christopher were not breathing, but Michael was taking deep 
gasping breaths.  Xavier attempted to perform CPR on Michael, 
until a fragment of Michael’s skull came off in his hands.  Xavier 
ran out of the room and told the 911 operator that first 
responders needed to get there fast.  He called Juanita on a 
second phone line at 11:26 p.m. and told her that Caro “shot the 
babies.”  Xavier went to the front door where he encountered two 
Ventura County Sheriff’s deputies, who ordered him outside.  
Xavier had G.C. in his arms and was distraught.  
When officers found Caro in the master bedroom, she was 
surrounded by several pools of blood, a pool of vomit, and 
expended shell casings.  Caro was airlifted to a hospital.  
Meanwhile, back at the family’s home, Juanita had arrived.  In 
a conversation between Xavier and Juanita that an officer 
recorded, Xavier alternated between a calm and visibly upset 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
demeanor.  He stated:  “Why did she do this?”; “She killed my 
best friend.  She killed my Joey”; and “She wasn’t messing 
around.  She shot them all in the head.” 
Xavier testified that he always kept the guns in a gun safe, 
and Caro did not have the combination.  In 1994 or 1995, 
following an argument, Xavier came home to find Caro holding 
a gun at the top of the stairs in the house.  Xavier grabbed Joey 
and left, but came back when Caro called and said she would 
leave the gun in plain view for Xavier to recover. 
Caro underwent surgery on the night of the shootings for 
a gunshot to the head.  Caro also had bruising on her right bicep, 
bruising on the inside of her thighs, and a fractured foot that 
was swollen and bruised.  The forepart of the foot had broken 
away from the middle part of the foot and was repaired 
surgically a week later.  Such an injury most commonly occurs 
by landing on a pointed foot so that the foot is twisted, which 
can happen when falling down stairs.  The injury may also occur 
from a person falling on his or her foot with the person’s own 
weight, or if someone else stands on the foot as the person falls. 
The day after the shootings, Detective Cheryl Wade went 
to Caro’s hospital room and recorded the entire two-and-a-half 
to three-hour visit.  Wade asked Caro if she had taken a fall, and 
Caro said she was not sure and could not remember.  Caro said 
at one point that she “might have fallen down the stairs,” and 
that she was bruised by “wrestling with a boy.”  But she 
reiterated on multiple occasions that she did not remember how 
she had been hurt.  A defense expert enhanced the audiotape 
and believed Caro said, “You have to ask the boys” rather than 
“wrestling with the boys.”   
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
Detective Wade told Caro that her boys had been hurt, 
that they had died, and that Caro was a suspect.  Caro began 
crying and screaming.  Caro asked what Xavier had said and 
asked where G.C. was located and whether he was okay.  
Detective Wade later brought Juanita into Caro’s room and 
recorded Juanita’s conversation with Caro.  Caro said that “X is 
going to need somebody.”  Juanita asked, “Why did you do this?”  
Caro replied, “My babies.  My babies.  I’m sorry.  I’m sorry.” 
Lisa VanEssen worked at Xavier’s office.  She testified 
that Caro had previously said she did not think Xavier loved her 
and was worried that Xavier would leave her and the boys with 
nothing.  Around September 1999, VanEssen asked Caro how 
she was and Caro replied, “Not good.  Sometimes I think it would 
just be better if I wasn’t here.”  When VanEssen reminded Caro 
of her “four boys that need [her],” Caro replied, “What would it 
matter?” 
Investigators found a gun safe in Caro and Xavier’s master 
bedroom closet; the safe showed pry marks that could not be 
dated.  The door to the gun safe could be opened without 
entering a combination.  There were no testable fingerprints on 
the gun, but the gun was also stained, so it was unlikely the gun 
had been wiped down.  Caro and Xavier both had gunshot 
residue on their right hands, but only swabs of Caro’s hands 
showed blood.  At some point in the night, Xavier rinsed his 
hands without using soap. 
In the master bedroom, investigators found bullet 
fragments or evidence of bullet fragments on the floor, on the 
bed, in the wall above the bed, and in the ceiling.  A forensic 
scientist opined that the wall and ceiling damage was consistent 
with the gun being held to the side of Caro’s head, and fired in 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
an upward direction.  The doctor who performed surgery on Caro 
on the night of the shootings confirmed that the bullet had 
traveled “upward on the side of the defendant’s head.”  
Investigators found two bloody handprints on the 
doorjamb between Joey’s bedroom and the bathroom that 
matched Caro’s hand, and blood above one of the handprints 
matched Joey’s blood.  Stains on the pajama shorts and T-shirt 
Caro was wearing tested positive for blood.  DNA testing 
matched some of the stains to Joey, some to Christopher, and 
some to Caro.  According to a forensic scientist, projected blood 
caused some of the stains on Caro’s shorts.  He opined that one 
of the stains on Caro’s shorts contained Christopher’s brain 
matter, and a piece of Joey’s scalp may have caused one of the 
other stains.  Two blood stains in the master bathroom 
contained Joey’s blood, one of those stains had potential 
contributions from Christopher.  Material under Caro’s 
fingernails tested positive for blood and contained DNA from 
Caro, Joey, and Christopher. 
Various blood stains were found on Xavier’s sweatpants, 
shirt, and jacket.  Blood stains on Xavier’s sweatpants, G.C.’s 
socks, the carpet, and the stair railing matched Michael’s DNA.  
Most were transfer stains, but drops of blood caused stains on 
Xavier’s sandals and on the knee of his sweatpants. 
Based on blood spatter patterns, Rod Englert, a crime 
scene reconstructionist, opined that Joey was facedown in bed 
when shot.  He testified that Michael was face up when shot.  
Christopher, who was sleeping next to Michael, sat up and was 
shot twice, as the first shot failed to kill him immediately.  The 
jury saw an animation depicting Englert’s opinion on how the 
shootings of Michael and Christopher occurred.  Englert 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
testified that the inner thigh of Caro’s shorts showed a high 
velocity spatter — the kind associated with gunshots.  Englert 
opined that the person wearing the shorts shot Christopher and 
he expressed confidence “beyond a reasonable degree of 
certainty.”  Englert found transfer stains and no evidence of 
blood from a gunshot on Xavier’s jacket.  Englert concluded that 
the person wearing the jacket was “not involved” in “a shooting.”  
He concluded gunshot spatter did not cause the blood stains on 
Xavier’s pants and sandals. 
Two officers interviewed Xavier on November 23, 1999, at 
5:30 a.m. at the family home.  Xavier indicated Caro was taking 
Prozac, she had attention deficit disorder, had been drinking 
margaritas, and agreed with the officer that the alcohol and 
Prozac may have had a synergistic effect.  At some point, he told 
officers he had prescribed the Prozac to Caro.  Around 7:00 p.m., 
officers escorted Xavier into his closet and let him obtain some 
items before he went to a hotel, but the officers did not catalogue 
items Xavier took from the house. 
The defense presented evidence that the white truck 
Xavier saw outside the gate while leaving the hospital had 
entered hospital grounds around 10:00 p.m., that Joey and 
Michael had died at 10:00 p.m. or later, and that it only took 30 
minutes to drive home at night — implying Xavier had enough 
time to kill the children and shoot his wife before the 11:21 p.m. 
call to 911.  Defense expert Herbert MacDonnell reviewed the 
forensic evidence.  He examined the shorts Caro was wearing 
under a microscope and did not find any high velocity impact 
spatter or mist.  He did find projected blood on the inner crotch 
but opined that it was not the result of the shootings because of 
the confined spread of the stains and the small amount of blood.  
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
MacDonnell found transfer stains on Xavier’s jacket, socks, and 
pants. 
Dr. Frederick Lovell, a medical examiner, reviewed 
evidence concerning Caro’s head wound.  He testified that the 
gun was held tightly against Caro’s head, at a right angle to the 
bone above Caro’s ear.  The gun would have been pointed “[v]ery 
slightly downward.”  When asked how Dr. Lovell would explain 
a bullet fragment found in the ceiling, he testified to previously 
saying that he did not know how it got there.  He testified that 
it was “highly unlikely” that the gunshot wound was self-
inflicted.  It would have been difficult to hold the gun against 
the skull at the slightly downward angle.  The bruises on Caro’s 
arms were consistent with finger grab marks.  A criminalist 
found hair in Caro and Xavier’s master bedroom that looked like 
it had been pulled out, though some, maybe all, of the hair 
belonging to Caro came out by the force of the gunshot. 
The defense presented a number of character witnesses.  
They testified that Caro was an admirable, friendly, nice person 
who loved her children.  Caro’s parents testified about their 
financial arrangements with Xavier and Caro.  Juanita testified 
that, after the shootings, Xavier told her:  “Wait til you hear the 
911 call, Juanita.  You’re gonna blow your mind.”  Later, Xavier 
told Juanita, step by step, how Caro killed the boys. 
Caro testified in her own defense.  Caro was forthcoming 
with Xavier about expenditures while she served as office 
manager, and wrote checks to her parents for family trip 
expenses only after discussing them with Xavier.  Caro was sad, 
but not angry, about being fired as office manager and losing 
control of the family finances in August 1999.  Caro had no hard 
feelings toward her friend VanEssen, who replaced Caro as 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
office manager.  Caro never talked to VanEssen about killing 
herself.  Xavier prescribed Prozac to Caro in August 1999 and 
increased her dosage in September or October 1999.  Caro also 
took diet pills. 
Caro and Xavier were having marriage difficulties.  In 
June 1999, Caro stayed at a hotel for three days to get away 
from the family.  In August 1999, after Xavier fired Caro, he told 
Caro that they should separate.  Later that month, Xavier told 
Caro that he was going to a divorce lawyer and discussed with 
Caro division of assets.  Caro did not believe Xavier kept the 
appointment with the divorce lawyer, but later found notes from 
the meeting.  Caro wanted to make the marriage work and was 
unaware of Xavier’s affair. 
Xavier had purchased Caro a firearm for home protection, 
as well as lessons for her to learn how to use the gun.  Xavier 
never told Caro the combination to the gun safe and would get 
the gun out for her before he would go out of town.  Caro would 
pop the safe open with the prong end of a hammer to put the gun 
back.  Caro had not fired the gun since before Christopher was 
born and denied ever brandishing it at Xavier.   
Caro had only partial memories of the day on which the 
shootings occurred.  She remembered the fight she had with 
Xavier.  She remembered Xavier saying he was leaving, and she 
thought he meant he was leaving for good, though Caro did not 
remember Xavier actually leaving to go to the office.  Caro could 
not remember what she wore that night.  But she would not have 
been wearing the shorts she was found in because they were 
maternity shorts that were too big for her.  She had never seen 
the T-shirt she was found wearing.  Her last memory of that 
night was standing in the master bedroom closet, looking at a 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
pitcher of margaritas.  Caro had no memory of hurting her 
children.  When she woke up she thought they had been in a car 
accident because she was injured, and Detective Wade said the 
boys were hurt.  When she was told her boys were dead, she did 
not know how they died.  Caro was sure she did not kill her 
children. 
On November 5, 2001, the jury found Caro guilty of three 
counts of first degree murder, found the firearm enhancements 
true, and found true the multiple-murder special circumstance.  
On November 6, 2001, Caro withdrew her plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity.  
The penalty phase began on November 27, 2001.  In 
aggravation, the prosecution presented evidence of prior acts 
that Caro allegedly committed.  On June 30, 1992, Caro and 
another woman argued over a parking space.  Caro ended up 
grabbing the other woman by the hair with both hands and 
pulling her head against the inside of the woman’s half-open 
driver-side window.  In August 1988, during an argument, Caro 
punched Xavier in the face and fractured her knuckle.  In 1996 
or 1997, Caro gave Xavier a black eye by hitting him, possibly 
with her hand or possibly by throwing a jewelry box.  In the late 
1990s, Caro threw a necklace box at Xavier and hit him in the 
eye, causing a retinal tear that required laser eye surgery.  Caro 
threw a “C” battery at Xavier during an argument in the late 
1990s that tore a hole in the screen door.  During an argument 
sometime between 1997 and 1999, Caro threw a three-pound 
box of hot rollers at Xavier, which missed and broke the 
bathroom mirror.  At another time in the late 1990s, Caro threw 
pizza, dishes, and silverware on the floor during an argument 
before approaching Xavier with a butter knife.  Xavier stated 
that he did not hit Caro during these incidents.  On cross-
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
examination, the defense elicited from Xavier occasions when he 
was physically violent with Caro, including one time when he 
punched Caro, causing her to fall “like a sack of potatoes.” 
Xavier narrated a family video showing scenes of the three 
boys who had been killed.  Xavier testified about the boys and 
their character traits. 
In mitigation, the defense presented evidence that Caro 
was a happy, obedient child.  Her parents never used physical 
punishment.  Caro played basketball and volleyball, was a 
cheerleader, and graduated from high school with a “C” average.  
Xavier was the second boyfriend Caro ever had.  Caro’s first 
boyfriend testified that she was never violent with him or 
anyone else.  Extended family members described Caro as a 
good, patient mother.  Caro’s cousin, a pastor, and the Ventura 
County Jail chaplain, testified that Caro was a person of 
compassion, caring, and genuine Christian faith.  Caro never 
admitted in her confidential sessions with the pastor and 
chaplain to killing her children.  The children’s teachers 
testified that Caro spent hours volunteering in her children’s 
classrooms, and observed that she was a friendly, caring, and 
affectionate mother. 
Caro had a blood-alcohol level of 0.138 percent on the night 
of the shootings.  According to a defense toxicology expert, Caro 
would have been staggering, would have felt sedated, and would 
have been impaired in her ability to process information.  Her 
blood tested positive for Prozac and Xanax.  Caro suffered from 
depression at the time of the shootings.  A forensic psychiatrist 
attributed the killings and suicide attempt mostly to Caro’s 
depression.  He believed Caro fell in the class of depressed and 
suicidal women who “primarily commit[] suicide” and kill their 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
children as “a secondary act” to “prevent something bad from 
happening to the children they love.”  A clinical neurologist 
testified that Caro suffered residual brain effects seven months 
after the shootings.  He diagnosed Caro with chronic depression 
accompanied by mood congruent psychotic features, alcohol 
dependence, alcohol abuse, and a dependent personality.  The 
neurologist believed Caro had amnesia resulting from her brain 
trauma and the combination of drugs she took.  In the 
neurologist’s view, Caro was incapable of appreciating the 
nature and consequences of her actions on the night of the 
shootings. 
On December 10, 2001, following the penalty phase, the 
jury returned a verdict of death.  On April 5, 2002, the trial court 
denied a motion for new trial and a motion to modify sentence.  
The trial court sentenced Caro to death on each count of murder, 
with concurrent sentences of 25 years to life for the firearm 
enhancements. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Jury Screening Issues 
i. 
Caro’s Presence for Stipulated Excusals of Jurors  
Caro contends she was entitled, as a matter of 
constitutional and statutory law, to be present when counsel for 
both sides discussed juror hardship in chambers and agreed by 
stipulation to excuse 62 potential jurors in an e-mail to the trial 
court.  Jury screening in this case began on July 17, 2001.  On 
that day, the trial court started introducing groups of 
prospective jurors to the facts of the case, soliciting applications 
for hardship excusals, and directing prospective jurors to fill out 
comprehensive juror questionnaires.  The next day, the parties 
and the trial court discussed the prospect of stipulating to the 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
excusal of some jurors for cause.  On July 23, 2001, the 
prosecution stated it had begun “informal discussions with the 
defense” about jurors “who both sides think will be challenged, 
likely successfully, for cause.”  Later that day, the trial court 
scheduled the parties to return on July 27, 2001, to address such 
stipulations.  Defense counsel indicated she would exchange her 
list of potential “for cause” stipulations with the prosecution.  On 
July 26, 2001, defense counsel sent an e-mail to the trial court 
identifying 62 prospective jurors both parties agreed the court 
could excuse “due to either hardship or cause.”  Fourteen of the 
excusals included the notation “(hardship).”  The e-mail did not 
indicate specific reasons for the remaining 48 prospective jurors.  
On July 27, 2001, the trial court stated that the e-mail 
stipulation had been filed and placed in the record.  Caro was 
present at the proceedings before and after the e-mail 
stipulation.  We assume Caro was absent from the informal 
discussions and agreement on stipulations.   
Caro argues she had the right to be present for these 
stipulation discussions and the stipulations.  The federal 
Constitution provides a defendant the right to be present if “(1) 
the proceeding is critical to the outcome of the case, and (2) the 
defendant’s presence would contribute to the fairness of the 
proceeding.”  (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 781-782.)  A 
defendant’s right to be present under the California 
Constitution and section 977, subdivision (b)(1) is similar.  
(People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 74 (Ervin) [proceeding 
must have a “reasonable, substantial relation to [a defendant’s] 
opportunity to defend the charges against him”]; People v. 
Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 742.)  The burden is on a 
defendant to show that the “ ‘absence prejudiced his case or 
denied him a fair and impartial trial.’ ”  (Ervin, at p. 74; People 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1233-1234 (Virgil).)  We reject 
general claims that a defendant might have provided useful 
input as “unduly speculative.”  (Virgil, at p. 1234; see also People 
v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 89 (Benavides).)   
Caro fails to distinguish our prior decisions denying 
similar claims.  In Ervin, the defendant challenged his absence 
from counsels’ jury “screening” discussions about stipulating to 
the excusal of “prospective jurors whose questionnaires showed 
they were probably subject to challenge and excusal.”  (Ervin, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 72.)  We found that the defendant’s 
presence at such discussions “would have served little purpose.”  
(Id. at p. 74.)  The same is true here.  Caro argues “she might 
have discouraged” the stipulated excusals.  But even if such an 
argument could establish that Caro’s presence was necessary, 
such a contention does not establish prejudice:  It is “unduly 
speculative” because nothing in the record indicates Caro would 
have actually discouraged the stipulations.  (Virgil, supra, 51 
Cal.4th at p. 1234.) 
Caro asks us to reconsider our precedent in light of the 
Washington Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Irby (2011) 170 
Wash.2d 874 [246 P.3d 796].  But in Irby, neither the parties nor 
their attorneys were present on the first day of jury screening, 
when the trial court administered juror questionnaires.  (Id., 
246 P.3d at pp. 798-799.)  During that first day, the trial court 
e-mailed the parties and suggested that reason existed to excuse 
certain jurors — some for cause.  (Ibid.)  The e-mail indicated 
that the trial court wanted to confirm the excusals that same 
day, and the parties agreed by e-mail to dismiss some of the 
suggested jurors within the hour.  (Ibid.)  Irby is distinguishable 
from this case.  The trial court here did not rush an out-of-court 
for-cause jury excusal proceeding within an hour, nor did it 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
otherwise fail to provide a material opportunity for Caro to even 
see the prospective jurors.  Irby thus gives us no occasion to 
reconsider our precedent in this case.  We conclude the parties’ 
stipulation to excuse jurors by e-mail did not violate Caro’s right 
to be present or cause her prejudice. 
ii. 
Stipulation To Excuse Prospective Jurors 
Caro asserts the trial court erred by accepting the parties’ 
stipulated excusals, identified in defense counsel’s July 26, 
2001, e-mail, without further inquiry.  She argues that the trial 
court should have determined whether each juror was properly 
excusable for cause.  She contends the trial court’s failure to 
make these determinations led to the improper excusal of 
qualified jurors and produced a biased jury.  
We find Caro’s challenge to the stipulation procedure 
forfeited and without merit.  Although Caro attempts to 
characterize trial counsel’s e-mail and subsequent conduct 
otherwise, we find it clear in the record that counsel stipulated 
to these excusals.  Counsel then expressed no objection to the 
court’s dismissing the listed prospective jurors based on the 
parties’ agreement.  These actions forfeited her challenges on 
appeal.  (E.g., People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527 (Duff); People 
v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 161 (Booker); see also People v. 
Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 38; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 
Cal.4th 1027, 1061 (Mitcham).)   
Even if Caro’s argument were not subject to forfeiture, we 
find it unpersuasive on the merits.  As we have held time and 
again, trial courts commit neither constitutional nor statutory 
error 
when 
they 
permit 
counsel 
to 
prescreen 
juror 
questionnaires and stipulate to juror dismissals.  (See, e.g., Duff, 
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 540; Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
88-89; Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 73.)  Stipulations benefit all 
parties “by screening out overzealous ‘pro-death’ as well as ‘pro-
life’ venirepersons, and by substantially expediting the jury 
selection process.”  (Ervin, at p. 73.)  Here, as in other cases 
where we have found no error, “once the preliminary screening 
process had concluded, the court and counsel then conducted the 
usual voir dire examination of the remaining prospective jurors 
in selecting the actual jurors who would serve on defendant’s 
jury.”  (Ibid.)  Caro fails to establish error on these facts or 
persuade us to overrule our prior precedent. 
Finally, to the extent Caro complains that this procedure 
resulted in the improper excusal of jurors for cause, she is not 
entitled to relief.  (See People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 
1052-1053 (Potts); Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 540; Booker, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 161; Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 
1061.) 
iii. Dismissal of Two Prospective Jurors for Cause 
 
Caro argues the trial court improperly dismissed 
Prospective Jurors J.W. and D.S. for cause because of their 
views on the death penalty.  Prospective jurors in a capital case 
who oppose the death penalty are not automatically disqualified 
“simply by virtue of their personal views on that punishment.”  
(People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 656.)  A trial court 
should only dismiss a prospective juror for cause if the juror’s 
views would “prevent or substantially impair” that juror from 
carrying out their duty.  (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 
50, 78 (Lancaster).) 
a. Standard of Review 
 
On appeal, we review the trial court’s “for cause” juror 
excusals deferentially.  If the juror’s voir dire responses conflict 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
or are equivocal, we accept the trial court’s findings if supported 
by substantial evidence.  (E.g., People v. Duenas (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 1, 10 (Duenas).) 
Initially, Caro disputes this standard of review, asserting 
the trial court deserves no deference here because it 
misunderstood the applicable law.  (Cf. People v. Cunningham 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 664 [de novo review appropriate where 
trial court applied incorrect standard in determining whether 
racial 
discrimination 
motivated 
prosecutor’s 
peremptory 
strike].)  At times, the trial court described the inquiry as 
concerning whether a juror could be “neutral” as between life 
imprisonment without parole or death.  We agree with Caro that 
on their own, such statements could misleadingly suggest a 
juror cannot serve if he tends to disfavor the death penalty.  
Instead, “[t]he critical issue is whether a life-leaning prospective 
juror — that is, one generally (but not invariably) favoring life 
in prison instead of the death penalty as an appropriate 
punishment — can set aside his or her personal views about 
capital punishment and follow the law as the trial judge 
instructs.”  (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1065 
(Thompson).) 
Nonetheless, we find that in context, the trial court’s 
statements about neutrality were consistent with the proper 
inquiry:  whether the prospective juror could “faithfully and 
impartially” follow the law (Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 
1066; accord, Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 78), and 
“ ‘conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, 
including the death penalty where appropriate’ ” (Thompson, at 
p. 1064).  In discussing whether J.W. could be “neutral,” the trial 
court expressed doubt that J.W. could “reasonably consider both 
punishments” as instructed by the court.  The court, too, 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
considered D.S.’s “ability to be neutral” to mean his ability to 
“give serious consideration to both potential punishments.”  
When the court explained the purpose of voir dire to prospective 
jurors on several occasions, it conveyed –– correctly –– that it 
could only accept “jurors who will not vote automatically for or 
against the death penalty.”  The court also emphasized that 
jurors did not need “to choose between religious and ethical 
beliefs” and “the law,” as long as they nonetheless “obey[ed] and 
follow[ed] the law.”  Moreover, we note the trial court did not 
excuse all jurors who had misgivings about the death penalty.  
In reviewing the sum of voir dire, we believe the trial court 
properly focused the inquiry on whether a juror could “weigh[] 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case and 
determin[e] whether death is the appropriate penalty under the 
law” (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 447), not just their 
personal views on the death penalty.  Accordingly, we now turn 
to whether substantial evidence supported the excusals of J.W. 
and D.S. 
b. Prospective Juror J.W. 
Prospective Juror J.W. stated in his questionnaire that he 
“strongly support[s]” the death penalty where “clearly 
warranted.”  He believed the death penalty was sought “[t]oo 
seldom.”  J.W. indicated that the death penalty should not 
automatically apply for the murder of children because it 
“depends on circumstances,” though he “tend[s] to favor” the 
death penalty in such cases.  Nonetheless, J.W. wrote that he 
“can’t help but have [a] gut reaction against [application of the 
death penalty to women] — unless clearly warranted.”  J.W. 
wrote that his wife was “adamantly against” the death penalty.  
J.W. indicated that he would be able to listen to all the evidence 
and give honest consideration to both death and life, but also 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
wrote that “a conviction with death penalty could damage my 
marriage.  My wife has deep convictions.” 
During voir dire, J.W. stated that his views had changed 
since filling out the questionnaire.  He stated that “it’s very 
unlikely I would vote for the death penalty in this case, but it’s 
not impossible” because of “[p]ersonal concerns and just 
convictions.”  When defense counsel asked him to explain, J.W. 
stated, “I haven’t changed my convictions regarding the death 
penalty per se.  Knowing what I know about this case and just 
being honest, I think it would be difficult for me to apply it.”  
J.W. stated that he did not have preconceived notions about the 
case, could conceive of a case where he would impose the death 
penalty, and stated he could be fair and impartial to both sides.  
But he indicated that his wife’s opposition to the death penalty 
“might” affect him.  J.W. told his wife that he might sit as a juror 
on a capital case but did not give her any other details about the 
case.  When asked if he could set aside his wife’s beliefs, J.W. 
stated, “I think so, but it’s — it’s a very difficult decision, and 
when there are personal ramifications, it’s hard to guarantee.”  
When pushed whether he could “forget about” his wife’s 
opinions, he said, “Yes.” 
The prosecutor asked J.W. whether he could go with 
imposing the death penalty and then go home to his wife.  J.W. 
responded, “The reason I mentioned what I did is I know it 
would be okay in the short-term, and the long-term effects on 
our relationship would be, in my opinion, unpredictable.”  J.W. 
said, “Yes,” when asked whether the effects on his relationship 
were something he would worry about while acting as a juror.  
When asked whether that was “something that perhaps would 
impair your ability to impose death in a case that called for it,” 
J.W. replied, “Perhaps.”  When asked if he could personally 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
impose the death penalty, J.W. said he easily could do so in a 
case like the Oklahoma City bombing, but followed up by saying, 
“I guess — I’m sorry.  Also old-fashioned.  The thought of 
imposing the death penalty on a woman is an effort.”  When 
pushed on whether he could impose the death penalty on Caro 
after 
hearing 
about 
her 
background, 
he 
responded, 
“Theoretically, yes.  I said it wasn’t impossible.  I do think the 
probability is low.”  He stated that he could impose death in a 
case involving a triple murder if he “heard enough factors that 
led me to think it was the right thing to do.”  He stated that he 
would balance the aggravating and mitigating factors and could 
“[c]ertainly” impose death based on a single overwhelming 
aggravating factor, “depend[ing] on [his] judgment.” 
The prosecution challenged J.W. for cause, and the trial 
court excused J.W. because of his statements that he was 
unlikely to impose death and his feelings about imposing death 
on women.  Based on J.W.’s responses, the trial court concluded 
J.W.’s “mind-set” would “substantially impair[] his ability” to 
“reasonably consider both punishments as a reasonable 
possibility in this case.”  The trial court also relied on the fact 
that J.W. violated the court’s admonition not to talk about the 
case by telling his wife that he might sit as a juror in a capital 
case. 
Substantial evidence in the record supports J.W.’s excusal 
for cause.  J.W. said he would worry about potential damage to 
his relationship with his wife when acting as a juror and said 
that it “[p]erhaps” would impair his ability to “impose death in 
a case that called for it.”  We disagree with Caro that 
Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 requires the juror’s own 
views, not those of a third party such as his wife, to prevent or 
substantially impair his performance.  This is an overly rigid 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
reading of Witt.  The inquiry is whether “the trial judge is left 
with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be 
unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.”  (Id. at p. 
426.)  On this record, J.W.’s marital concerns justified such an 
impression.  
In addition, J.W. had a “gut reaction” against imposing the 
death penalty against a woman, a belief he stated in his 
questionnaire and repeated, unprompted, when asked whether 
he personally could impose death on a person.  We acknowledge 
that J.W. gave statements indicating he would weigh the factors 
and impose death according to his judgment, but given the trial 
court’s superior position to evaluate the juror’s demeanor, tone 
of voice, and as the trial court put it here, his “mind-set,” we do 
not “interfere with the trial court’s resolution of” conflicting 
statements.  (Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 80; People v. 
Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 60.)  This is especially true because 
J.W. contrasted his ability to impose the death penalty in a case 
like the Oklahoma City bombing with this case — one involving 
a woman — where he only “[t]heoretically” could impose the 
death penalty. 
Given the substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s 
determination, we defer to its conclusion that J.W.’s statements 
amounted to substantial impairment.  
c. Prospective Juror D.S. 
 
Prospective Juror D.S. stated in his questionnaire that the 
death penalty “should be used only in the most extreme cases[.]  
I do not believe that killing the defendant is a solution for the 
first killing, so I would strongly object to the death penalty 
unless overwhelmingly convinced of intent free of mental 
impairments.”  D.S. wrote that he supported life imprisonment 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
without the possibility of parole “over the death penalty.”  He 
indicated that he did not believe the death penalty serves any 
purpose.  D.S. thought the death penalty was sought “[t]oo often” 
and “[r]andomly,” and that it is applied to “[t]oo many minorities 
and women, few white men.”  When asked whether D.S.’s 
feelings about the death penalty were so strong that he would 
always vote against the death penalty, he placed a question 
mark in the “No” checkbox and wrote, “But almost always.”  D.S. 
similarly indicated he “would require sufficient evidence to 
convince me that the death penal[ty] will serve a purpose beyond 
retribution.”  When asked if he could listen to all the evidence 
and instructions and give honest consideration to both death 
and life imprisonment without parole, he placed a question 
mark in the “No” checkbox and wrote that he “would begin from 
the position that life without parole is enough punishment and 
no more is needed.”  However, D.S. saw no reason why he could 
not be a fair and impartial juror. 
 
During the defense’s voir dire, D.S. stated, “If I 
understand the proceeding correctly, I would have no objection 
to deciding guilt or innocence.  But when we got to the next 
phase, I would have some very definite thoughts on it.”  When 
defense counsel asked whether D.S.’s thoughts would prevent 
him from keeping an open mind and considering all the 
evidence, D.S. replied, “I have some feelings that it seems to me 
might be in — in conflict with — I don’t know with what . . . .”  
After another question, he continued, “The problem is probably, 
it seems to me, that the — the problem is that I believe that a 
killing is a killing is a killing, and to kill a second time for 
vengeance because the first killing occurred is ridiculous unless 
there is proof offered that — that it would protect society, and 
then of course I think society comes first.  [¶]  So I — it’s a 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
complicated thing, and I would — I don’t know exactly how to 
answer your question.”  In response to a later question, he 
reiterated that he would not impose the death penalty unless 
there was a threat to society.  Nonetheless, D.S. responded 
“[s]ure” when asked whether he would weigh the evidence and 
could 
impose 
death 
if 
the 
aggravating 
circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  But he indicated that 
he was “not sure what those two terms mean” and that he 
“might not understand it.” 
 
During the prosecution’s voir dire, when asked whether 
D.S. could “ever impose death” in “this case,” D.S. responded, “I 
have yet to hear anything.”  D.S. also noted there “[c]ertainly” 
existed a case where he would be able to impose death.  D.S. 
indicated that his ability to vote for death in the case depended 
on the prosecution showing more than a “simple set of facts.”  
The prosecutor then asked D.S. whether life in prison would 
accomplish the goal of protecting society from a threat.  D.S. 
replied, “Aren’t you saying that — in other words, you can’t 
prove that it — that it’s a threat to society, that the only thing 
you can prove is an actual murder and you want me to forecast 
what I would judge on what you may or may not prove?  I can’t 
do that.”  When pushed further on whether he could impose 
death on a person if life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole would protect society, D.S. said, “Even — okay.  That’s a 
tough one.  There would be — it would be very difficult. . . .  Very 
difficult.  I don’t know exactly what the answer is.  But I 
certainly will say it will be very difficult.”  D.S. said he did not 
“have an answer,” whether there was any justification for the 
death penalty besides “protecting society.”  He said he could 
impose death on another human.  When asked if he could impose 
death on a defendant knowing the other option was life 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
imprisonment without parole, D.S. said, “I can’t answer that 
kind of question.  That’s too ethereal.”  When pushed further on 
this topic, D.S. responded, “I cannot say that absolutely I would 
never do it” and that “[i]t’s possible.  But I certainly have 
expressed hesitation.” 
 
The prosecutor challenged D.S. for cause.  The trial court 
excused D.S. because of his hesitation to impose the death 
penalty and the limited society-protection rationale, which the 
court believed D.S. “unequivocally stated” would be “the only 
time” he would vote for death.  Based on D.S.’s questionnaire 
and voir dire answers, the court “was left with the definite 
impression that the prospective juror would be unable to 
faithfully and impartially apply the law.”  The trial court 
specifically noted D.S. “hesitated” when faced with the 
possibility that life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole would satisfy D.S.’s society-protection rationale. 
 
After weighing the relevant information, the trial court 
determined that D.S.’s views substantially impaired his ability 
to set aside his personal beliefs and consider both sentencing 
options.  Substantial evidence supports this conclusion.  In his 
questionnaire, D.S. gave equivocal responses about his ability to 
vote for death.  He believed he could be a fair and impartial 
juror, but also indicated that he would “almost always” impose 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  D.S. later 
wrote that it would be “very difficult” to impose the death 
penalty.  These written answers certainly “are not magic 
phrases,” and would not alone support the conclusion that he 
was substantially impaired.  (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
646, 697 (Roldan); see also People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 
21, 41 [where questionnaire responses do not “ ‘clearly reveal’ ” 
an inability to perform the juror’s duties, the trial court must 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
examine the juror in court to ascertain the juror’s true state of 
mind]; see also People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 415.)  
Here, however, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
conclusion that D.S.’s questionnaire, combined with his 
repeatedly equivocal voir dire responses on whether he could 
consider both punishments, reflected that impairment.  (See, 
e.g., Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 12 [“Comments that a 
prospective juror would have a ‘hard time’ or find it ‘very 
difficult’ to vote for death reflect ‘a degree of equivocation’ that, 
considered ‘with the juror’s . . . demeanor, can justify a trial 
court’s conclusion . . . that the juror's views would “ ‘prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a 
juror . . . ’ ” ’ ”]; Roldan, at p. 697.) 
Caro argues that D.S.’s responses show the picture of a 
thoughtful person who had not prejudged the evidence.  But 
D.S.’s thoughtfulness could be reasonably understood to indicate 
unsureness whether his beliefs would allow him to ever impose 
the death penalty in a particular case.  (Duenas, supra, 55 
Cal.4th at pp. 11-12 [“Many prospective jurors . . . ‘ “simply 
cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their 
bias has been made ‘unmistakably clear’ ” ’ ”].)  As the trial court 
noted, that equivocation became especially pronounced when 
the prosecution pointed out that life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole might eliminate any potential threat to 
society.3  (Cf. People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 847 
                                        
3  
D.S.’s statement that he would only consider the death 
penalty if the defendant is a danger “to society” is ambiguous as 
to whether he meant society outside of prison or inside prison as 
well — though at one point he acknowledged that he may be 
talking about “danger to the public.”  The jury can consider 
 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
[upholding juror excusal where answers could “hardly have been 
more equivocal”]; cf. People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 
1342 (McKinzie) [upholding for cause excusal of jurors who 
would only impose the death penalty in narrow circumstances 
not at issue in the case].)  In these circumstances, we defer to 
the trial court’s determination that D.S. would have been 
substantially impaired in carrying out his duties in the penalty 
phase.  
iv. 
Prosecution’s Files on Prospective Jurors 
Caro contends that the trial court should have required 
the prosecution to turn over its investigatory materials on 
prospective jurors.  The trial court agreed with the prosecution 
that such materials were undiscoverable work product.  In 
People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, we gave trial courts 
“discretionary authority to permit defense access to jury records 
and reports of investigations available to the prosecution.”  (Id. 
at p. 767.)  In June 1990, California voters approved Proposition 
115, which added section 1054.6 to the Penal Code.  It provides 
that “[n]either the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney is 
required to disclose any materials or information which are 
[privileged] work product . . . .”  (§ 1054.6.)  For purposes of 
section 1054.6’s discovery bar, work product includes a writing 
“that reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, 
                                        
future dangerousness in prison (People v. Medina (1995) 11 
Cal.4th 694, 766-767), but the prosecution cannot present expert 
testimony on that issue (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 
610).  Regardless, D.S.’s responses at the very least show that 
he was not sure whether dangerousness in prison would ever 
allow him to impose the death penalty. 
 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
or legal research or theories . . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., former 
§ 2018, subd. (c), now § 2018.030, subd. (a); see Pen. Code, 
§ 1054.6; People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 355 & fn. 14.)  
We need not decide whether the discovery request here solely 
sought work product or encompassed non-work-product 
material because any potential error was harmless.  For any 
error of this type, it is “ ‘entirely speculative whether denial of 
access caused any significant harm to the defense.’ ”4  (People v. 
Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 227; accord, Murtishaw, at p. 767.)  
We deny Caro’s claim on that basis. 
B. Issues at Trial 
i. 
Clothing Seized from Emergency Room 
Caro argues the trial court erred by allowing the 
introduction of the clothing that Caro was found wearing the 
night of the shootings.  In the alternative, Caro argues her trial 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not moving to 
suppress this evidence.  On the night of the shootings, 
emergency medical personnel brought Caro from her home to 
the 
hospital 
emergency 
room 
on 
two 
different 
                                        
4  
Nor has Caro persuaded us she is entitled to the limited 
remand procedure used to remedy error under Pitchess v. 
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.  In that context, a limited 
remand for the defendant to establish prejudice is appropriate 
because the reviewing court has already determined the 
defendant demonstrated “good cause” for the discovery 
requested below — including that the discovery is material to 
the litigation.  (See People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179-
181; City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 
85 [“The information sought must . . . be ‘requested with 
adequate specificity to preclude the possibility that defendant is 
engaging in a “fishing expedition.” ’ ”].)  Caro made no such 
showing here. 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
“backboards” — flat, firm boards used to safely transport 
injured patients.  Deputy Jeffrey Miller arrived at the hospital 
after Caro.  Miller found Caro’s shirt, pajama shorts, and 
underwear — which looked as if medical personnel had cut them 
off of Caro’s body — spread out on one of these backboards.  
Miller seized this clothing and gave it to a field evidence 
technician.  
Caro argues that the trial court should have excluded the 
clothing-related evidence because Miller did not have a warrant.  
Caro concedes, however, that defense counsel never brought a 
suppression motion related to this evidence or objected to its 
introduction on these grounds.  This claim is thus forfeited.  (See 
People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 80.) 
In the alternative, Caro argues that her counsel at trial 
was ineffective for failing to bring a suppression motion.  To 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Caro must show that 
her counsel’s performance was deficient and that she suffered 
prejudice from the deficient performance.  (Strickland v. 
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692.)  On direct appeal, if 
the record “ ‘sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act 
in the manner challenged,’ ” we must reject the claim “ ‘unless 
counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, 
or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ”  
(People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936.)  Where a defendant 
claims ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to 
litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, Strickland ’s performance 
prong 
requires her to 
show 
that 
it 
was objectively 
unreasonable — “that is, contrary to prevailing professional 
norms” — to forgo the motion.  (Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 
477 U.S. 365, 385 (Kimmelman); see also People v. Lopez (2008) 
42 Cal.4th 960, 966 (Lopez) [the defendant bears the burden of 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
30 
showing counsel’s performance “ ‘ “fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness [¶] . . . under prevailing professional 
norms” ’ ”].)  Examining the Fourth Amendment claim’s merit 
has a role to play here.  For example, “[c]ounsel is not ineffective 
for failing to make frivolous or futile motions.”  (People v. 
Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122.)  The prejudice prong of 
Strickland then requires the defendant to “prove that [the] 
Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a 
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 
different absent the excludable evidence.”  (Kimmelman, at p. 
375; accord, People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 652 
(Coddington); People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 576 
(Wharton).)   
Caro fails to establish that a motion to suppress the 
clothing would have been meritorious.  Under the plain view 
doctrine, an officer may seize an item without a warrant if (1) 
the officer was lawfully in a place where the object could be 
viewed; (2) the officer had a lawful right of access to the seized 
item; and (3) the item’s evidentiary value was immediately 
apparent.  (See Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 136-
137; Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 586-587; 
Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321, 327; People v. Bradford 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1295; see also U.S. v. Cellitti (7th Cir. 
2004) 387 F.3d 618, 623.)  The doctrine does not amount to a full 
exception to the warrant requirement, but merely allows a 
warrantless seizure where an officer lawfully views, and can 
lawfully 
access, 
contraband 
or 
incriminating 
evidence.  
(Bradford, at p. 1295; Horton, at p. 137, fn. 7 [holding that even 
if incriminating evidence is in plain view in a suspect’s home, an 
officer cannot enter the home and seize the contraband without 
a warrant, absent exigent circumstances].) 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
31 
In this situation, the incriminating nature of the 
clothing –– covered in bloodstains after the shooting –– was 
immediately apparent.  Caro raises the possibility that because 
she had shot herself in the head, the stains could have been her 
own blood.  Yet that possibility does not eliminate the strong 
likelihood that some of the stains would link her or some as-yet-
unidentified assailant to her or her sons’ injuries. 
Given the clothes’ evidentiary value, trial counsel would 
need to establish Officer Miller did not have lawful access to 
them in order to block their admission from trial.  But the record 
is inconclusive on this point, as it fails to reveal where Miller 
was when he saw and seized the clothing from the board on 
which emergency personnel transported Caro.  That ambiguity 
makes it quite difficult to assess the legality of Miller’s actions 
viewing and seizing Caro’s clothes.  On this record, then, we 
cannot say the plain view doctrine was inapplicable, and Caro 
has not carried her burden to “establish that [her] Fourth 
Amendment claim ha[d] merit.”  (Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th 
at p. 652.)  
ii. 
Fifth Amendment Challenge to Caro’s Hospital 
Room Statements 
Caro argues that two statements she made to Detective 
Wade at the hospital should have been excluded from trial 
because (1) she did not receive the warnings required under 
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and (2) the 
statements were involuntary.  The day after the shootings, Caro 
was moved to an intensive care unit (ICU) room after her 
surgery.  In the afternoon, Wade arrived in plain clothes, and 
hospital personnel removed Caro’s breathing tube.  Wade began 
sitting with Caro and stayed with her, or near her room, for two 
and a half to three hours before providing Caro Miranda 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
32 
warnings.  Detective Rivera was also present in plain clothes.  
Wade recorded her conversation with Caro by placing a tape 
recorder on top of one of the machines near Caro’s bed, or at 
times, on the bed itself.  Wade spent much of the interview 
getting Caro ice chips, adjusting pillows, helping Caro sit up or 
change positions, and relating information to nurses, such as the 
fact that Caro wanted medication or that she was in pain.  
Intermittently with this care, however, Wade asked Caro what 
happened.  Caro was in pain during much of the discussion with 
Wade, but the level of pain seemed to decrease when the nurse 
gave Caro a codeine injection.  Before the nurse gave the 
injection, she asked if Wade was “getting much” from Caro and 
checked in with Wade to make sure she would not “mess up 
[Wade’s] thing” by giving the injection.  Wade responded that 
the nurse should do “what [the nurse] would normally do.” 
The two statements in dispute occurred at different times.  
At some point in the first hour and a half of questioning, before 
the codeine injection, Caro stated that she “might have fallen 
down the stairs,” but also indicated that she did not remember.  
About 45 minutes after the codeine injection, Detective Wade 
heard Caro say she was bruised by “wrestling with a boy.” 
After the second statement, Detective Wade continued to 
ask Caro questions about what happened, but Caro indicated 
that she did not remember, and asked whether her boys and 
Xavier were there.  Wade told Caro that her boys were hurt and 
asked if she knew how they were hurt.  Caro asked if it was 
“something serious.”  Wade told Caro that she was investigating 
the death of Caro’s boys, and that Caro was suspected of hurting 
them.  Wade then gave Caro Miranda warnings, and Caro 
invoked her right to counsel. 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
33 
In addition to Detectives Rivera and Wade, a psychologist 
hired by the district attorney, Susan Ashley, was present for 
much of the pre-Miranda-warning interview.  After Caro said 
she might have fallen down the stairs, she noticed Dr. Ashley in 
the room, and asked who she was.  Wade identified her as 
“Doctor Ashley” to Caro and may have mentioned she was a 
psychologist from the district attorney’s office.  Caro also noticed 
a man from the district attorney’s office standing outside her 
door at one point, and Wade told her who he was.  Caro asked 
why he was there and Wade told her he “was here because you 
got hurt.  And we’re trying to figure out what happened.”  After 
the first statement, but before the second, Caro asked a nurse 
why Wade was there, and the nurse responded, “I don’t 
know. . . . I’m not involved with that.” 
The evidence showed that Detective Wade failed to give 
Caro Miranda warnings before the two statements at issue.  
Nonetheless, it also showed that she did not threaten or make 
promises to Caro.  The trial court also found that Wade did not 
interfere with Caro’s medical treatment and did not do 
“anything to overcome the will of” Caro.  The trial court ruled 
that Caro was not in custody for purposes of Miranda during the 
Wade interview, and that Wade did not coerce an involuntary 
statement from Caro.  Caro now challenges both rulings.  
Before they begin custodial interrogation of a suspect, the 
police have an obligation to deliver Miranda warnings.  This 
familiar admonition warns the suspect of the right to remain 
silent, that any statement may be used as evidence against him 
or her, and that the suspect has a right to the presence of a 
retained or appointed attorney.  (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 1370, 1399-1400 (Leonard).)  The warning is meant to 
protect the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination, which 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
34 
is jeopardized by the inherently coercive nature of police 
custodial questioning.  (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 478-
479.)  
The purpose of Miranda guides the meaning of the word 
“custody,” which refers to circumstances “that are thought 
generally to present a serious danger of coercion.”  (Howes v. 
Fields (2012) 565 U.S. 499, 508-509.)  Such a danger of coercion 
is usually present where there has been a “ ‘ “formal arrest or 
restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree associated with 
a formal arrest.’ ”  (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 
830, quoting California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125; 
see also People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 394-395.)  The 
key question is whether, under all of the objective 
circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position 
would have felt free to terminate the interrogation.  (Leonard, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400; Howes, at p. 509; Thompson v. 
Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 112.)  But even if a person’s freedom 
of movement has been curtailed, an “additional question” arises:  
“whether the relevant environment presents the same 
inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house 
questioning at issue in Miranda.”  (Howes, at p. 509; see also id. 
at p. 510 [discussing Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420].)  
All objective circumstances of the interrogation are relevant to 
this inquiry, including the site of the interrogation, the length 
and form of questioning, and whether the officers have conveyed 
to the subject that their investigation has focused on him or her.  
(See Stansbury, at pp. 831-832.)  This initial custody 
determination does not depend on “the subjective views 
harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being 
questioned.”  (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 323.)  
We have not explicitly discussed the custody analysis in a 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
35 
medical setting, but a handful of courts have addressed the 
issue.  (See People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1091; 
U.S. v. Martin (9th Cir. 1985) 781 F.2d 671, 672-673; U.S. v. 
Infante (1st Cir. 2012) 701 F.3d 386, 397-398; U.S. v. Robertson 
(10th Cir. 1994) 19 F.3d 1318, 1320-1321; U.S. v. Jamison (4th 
Cir. 2007) 509 F.3d 623, 629-633; U.S. v. New (8th Cir. 2007) 
491 F.3d 369, 374; Wilson v. Coon (8th Cir. 1987) 808 F.2d 688, 
689-690; Reinert v. Larkins (3d Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d 76, 85-87.) 
Statements 
taken 
in 
violation 
of 
Miranda 
are 
inadmissible in the government’s case-in-chief.  The prosecution 
may still use such statements for impeachment purposes.  (E.g., 
People v. Pokovich (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1240, 1247; People v. Peevy 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1193.)  What the government may not 
use against a defendant for any purpose are any of her 
involuntary 
statements. 
 
We 
consider 
statements 
involuntary — and thus subject to exclusion under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution –– if they 
are the product of “coercive police conduct.”  (People v. Williams 
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 437.)  We evaluate this question by 
looking to the totality of the circumstances to determine 
“whether the defendant’s ‘ “will has been overborne and his 
capacity 
for 
self-determination 
critically 
impaired” ’ by 
coercion.”  (Id. at p. 436.)  The presence of police coercion is a 
necessary, but not always sufficient, element.  (Ibid.)  We also 
consider other factors, such as the location of the interrogation, 
the interrogation’s continuity, as well as the defendant’s 
maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health.  
(Ibid.) 
When Detective Wade delayed giving Miranda warnings 
to Caro, she tread on perilous ground.  True, Caro was not 
directly restrained by officers or informed she was under arrest.  
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
36 
And she eventually received Miranda warnings — though only 
after two and a half hours of Wade’s off-and-on questioning.  
Hospital staff moved freely in and out of her hospital room.  
Wade’s urging one nurse to do “what [the nurse] would normally 
do” and the somewhat intermittent nature of Wade’s presence 
and questioning as hospital personnel tended to Caro or Caro 
rested may well have indicated to a reasonable person that she 
could be left to herself, if desired.  And yet certain exchanges 
between Wade and the staff, and between Wade and Caro 
herself, may have suggested to a reasonable person that the 
police exercised some authority over whether she could 
terminate the interview.  Specifically, we note the constant 
presence of one or more law enforcement officers and the 
suggestion of two staff members that they would not, or could 
not, interfere with the interview.  Caro was also isolated from 
friends and family.   
Such circumstances heighten the risk of coercion.  In 
Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, the high court concluded 
a hospitalized suspect did not give voluntary statements after 
an officer engaged in “virtually continuous questioning” of a 
suspect who had requested to be left alone.  (Id. at p. 401.)  
Because the officer persisted despite Mincey’s being “weakened 
by pain and shock” and “barely conscious,” and the “clear” 
indications “Mincey wanted not to answer” his questions (id. at 
p. 401), the court concluded Mincey’s “will was simply 
overborne” (id. at pp. 401-402). 
The record of the trial court’s decision indicates it made a 
contrary finding here — that Wade did not do “anything to 
overcome” Caro’s will or interfere with her medical treatment.  
Unlike the defendant in Mincey, Caro gave no clear indications 
prior to the challenged statements that she wished to end her 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
37 
interaction with Wade.  But unquestionably, Caro’s situation 
here constrained her physical mobility:  she was confined to her 
ICU bed with a broken foot and a drain in her head from brain 
surgery performed just hours before.  She was fatigued and in 
significant pain.  While a defendant’s “compromised physical 
and psychological condition” alone will not render her 
statements involuntary (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 
471), that condition is relevant to the inquiry and presents an 
opportunity for abuse.     
Whether the extent of Detective Wade’s engagement was 
sufficient to violate Caro’s constitutional rights is not a question 
we need to resolve.  Even assuming the interview violated 
Miranda or the statements were involuntary, their admission 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The prosecution 
introduced the two statements to disprove the theory that 
Xavier inflicted the injuries.  The prosecution also used these 
statements to argue that Caro remembered killing her children 
and was lying about her amnesia.  But in retrospect, taking into 
account the full record of the proceedings, these statements did 
not have high value in the overall evidentiary calculus. 
For completeness, the jury heard testimony on Caro’s 
other statements to Detective Wade before and after indicating 
she could not remember what happened.  This included Wade’s 
testimony that earlier in their conversation, she asked Caro 
whether she had “take[n] a fall or something,” and Caro asked 
Wade what had happened.  In addition, both statements had 
plausible alternative explanations consistent with the defense’s 
theory and Caro’s purported lack of memory.  Caro’s statement 
that she “might” have fallen down the stairs did not foreclose 
the possibility that Xavier caused her falling down the stairs — 
the prosecution’s theory that she fell down the stairs while 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
38 
“running through that house quite angry” was entirely 
speculative.  And the defense presented testimony that, in an 
enhanced version of the tape, Caro was saying, “You have to ask 
the boys” rather than “wrestling with a boy.”  There was also 
evidence in the record that Xavier had kicked Caro “on the legs” 
and in the “buttocks,” presenting a potential alternative 
explanation for Caro’s bruises.  Given the potential to reconcile 
the challenged statements with Caro’s stating she could not 
remember what happened, we think it unlikely the jury put 
much weight on them as proving Caro remembered the killings. 
Had these statements been omitted, moreover, it would 
have been unlikely to affect consideration of the case’s 
compelling forensic evidence.  Expert testimony about the 
bloody clothes Caro was found wearing provided a wealth of 
incriminating information.  Five blood stains on her shorts 
matched Christopher’s DNA profile — Joey and Caro potentially 
contributed minor amounts of DNA to one of these stains each.  
One of these stains was yellow and appeared to be brain matter.  
Three other stains on Caro’s shorts matched Joey’s DNA.  Some 
of the stains on the shorts appeared to come from projected 
blood.  A prosecution witness testified that gunshot mist likely 
produced one of the stains that matched Christopher’s blood.  
While a defense expert testified that it was a stain more 
consistent with a beating, the defense expert acknowledged that 
the only evidence of violence against the children in the case 
involved gunshots.  The shirt Caro was found wearing had 29 
blood stains — two matched Joey’s DNA, with Christopher and 
Michael as possible minor contributors, a control sample taken 
for one stain matched Christopher, and 19 stains matched 
Caro’s DNA profile.    
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
39 
Evidence gleaned from the house completed the 
evidentiary picture.  Two bloody handprints matching Caro 
were on the door jamb in the bathroom between Joey’s room and 
Michael and Christopher’s room.  Blood on the doorframe next 
to the hand prints tested positive for Joey’s blood, with minor 
contributions from Christopher.  Blood on the sink in the 
bathroom matched Joey’s DNA, and one sample also had a 
potential minor contribution from Christopher.   
Further circumstantial support came from expert 
testimony regarding Caro’s own gunshot wound.  Prosecution 
experts opined that the bullet damage found in the ceiling and 
in the wall above the bed was consistent with the gun being fired 
at an upward angle.  The surgeon who operated on Caro testified 
that the bullet travelled upwards, and all of the bullet fragments 
were above the bullet hole in Caro’s head.   
In contrast, the evidentiary support for the defense’s 
alternative theory, which identified Xavier as the shooter, was 
comparatively weak.  It ultimately did not sway the jury to 
doubt Caro’s guilt, and we are convinced excluding the 
challenged statements would not have made a difference.  A 
defense expert opined that Caro did not shoot herself because 
the gun was held at an awkward, downward angle.  But he did 
not have “the slightest idea” how a bullet fragment hit the 
ceiling.  Prosecution and defense experts agreed that the blood 
stains on Xavier’s sweatpants, shirt, and jacket were almost 
certainly transfer stains.  There was one projected bloodstain on 
Xavier’s sweatpants, matching Michael’s DNA.  But as one 
expert testified, it was unlikely any of the stains came from the 
type of high-velocity spatter typically associated with shooting 
someone at close range.  This would not have supported a 
conclusion that Xavier shot Michael.  Instead, it was consistent 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
40 
with Xavier’s testimony that he had tried to give CPR to Michael 
and was carrying G.C., whose socks had become soaked in 
Michael’s blood.  Moreover, tests found gunshot residue, but no 
blood, on swabs of Xavier’s hands — though Xavier testified he 
rinsed them at some point in the night.  On the other hand, a 
swab of Caro’s right palm did show the presence of blood.   
Finally, the evidence showed that Xavier did not have 
much time between when he arrived home and called 911.  A 
vehicle similar to Xavier’s Mercedes entered the parking area at 
9:24 p.m. and left at 10:36 p.m.  The surveillance tape captured 
no 
other 
Mercedes 
leaving 
during 
the 
relevant 
timeframe — making defense counsel’s assertion that Xavier 
left earlier implausible.  The evidence largely showed that it 
takes 40 to 46 minutes to drive from Xavier’s office to the family 
home — only one witness, Caro herself, testified to a shorter 
time (30 minutes).  And the 911 call was at 11:21 p.m.  Based on 
the prosecution’s evidence, Xavier would have only 5 minutes 
maximum between arriving home and calling 911.  If the jury 
accepted Caro’s self-serving estimated driving time, he still 
would have no more than 15 minutes.  A reasonable jury would 
not have believed Xavier shot his wife and children, hid all the 
blood evidence that might link him to the crime, and staged 
blood evidence corroborating his testimony within that window.  
Even if the jury accepted the possibility of this unlikely sequence 
of events, it stood at odds with the forensic evidence. 
In considering the picture that emerges from this 
evidence, we are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
jury would not have reached a different result in this case had 
the court excluded the challenged statements. 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
41 
iii. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failure To 
File a Fourth Amendment Pretrial Suppression 
Motion  
Caro argues her counsel was constitutionally ineffective 
for failing to bring a pretrial suppression motion based on the 
Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  Caro asserts 
that such a motion could have challenged the introduction of 
(1) Caro’s bloody clothing; (2) the scrapings of Caro’s hands and 
feet after bags were placed over her appendages to preserve 
evidence; (3) photographs of Caro during surgery; (4) bullet 
fragments removed from Caro’s head; (5) statements Caro made 
in the surgery recovery room; and (6) statements Caro made in 
her ICU room.  
While she was unconscious, Caro was transported from 
the crime scene to the hospital.  There, Caro’s clothes were cut 
off and left on the backboard used to transport her, where an 
officer recovered them.  A surgeon removed bullet fragments 
from Caro’s head.  Detective Rivera and forensic criminologist 
Debra Schambra were in scrubs and present during the surgery.  
Pictures taken by Rivera, Schambra, and other officers were 
admitted into evidence.  After the surgery, a nurse gave the 
bullet fragments to Rivera, who later gave them to Schambra.  
Before the surgery, hospital staff placed bags over Caro’s hands 
and feet to preserve evidence, and in the recovery room, 
Schambra took fingernail scrapings and performed a gunshot 
residue test.  Rivera testified to statements Caro made in the 
recovery room and her ICU room.  Later, Detective Wade asked 
Caro a number of questions in her hospital room, and Dr. 
Ashley, a psychologist, listened to a portion of that questioning. 
We have already addressed Caro’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim arising from the failure to move to suppress Caro’s 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
42 
bloody clothing.  In this part, however, we address a different 
set of issues implicated by Caro’s arguments.  The Fourth 
Amendment limits searches and seizures where a defendant has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or item 
seized.  This encompasses the defendant’s property and 
possessory interests (see People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 
122), but also any privacy expectation “ ‘that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable’ ” (Carpenter v. United States (2018) 
___ U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 2206, 2213]).  So we must examine what 
reasonable expectation of privacy Caro had in her physical 
person and in other areas of the hospital, such as the operating 
room, the recovery room, and her ICU room. 
Caro’s primary contention is that Detective Wade violated 
the Fourth Amendment by entering her ICU room and then 
making observations and hearing Caro’s statements, both before 
and after the administration of Miranda warnings.  (See People 
v. Cook (1985) 41 Cal.3d 373, 381 [“the police may not intrude 
into a hospital room” to see or hear the activities within “simply 
because hospital personnel routinely go in and out”].)  Three 
statements were admitted from Wade’s conversation with Caro:  
Caro indicated that she may have broken her foot by falling 
down the stairs; that she might have gotten hurt by “wrestling 
with a boy”; and after receiving Miranda warnings and invoking 
her right to a lawyer, Caro spontaneously asked about where 
G.C. was located (and not about the other children).   
As we earlier concluded, the first two statements were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Any claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on these statements necessarily fails 
for the same reason.  (See, e.g., Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 
576 [defendant must show prejudice to prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel].)  We also conclude that 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
43 
excluding the third statement, concerning G.C., would not 
produce a reasonable probability of a different result in light of 
the compelling forensic evidence and implausibility of the 
defense’s alternative theory.  Counsel’s failure to have these 
statements excluded on Fourth Amendment grounds or 
otherwise did not prejudice Caro. 
Caro also asserts pictures taken of her in the operating 
room and in the recovery room violated her Fourth Amendment 
rights.  At least one state has held that a defendant has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in an operating room because 
of “a patient’s traditional surrender to his or her physician of the 
right to determine who may and may not be present during 
medical procedures.”  (State v. Thompson (Ct.App. 1998) 222 
Wis.2d 179, 192 [585 N.W.2d 905].)  But even though Caro may 
have had no dominion over the operating and recovery rooms, 
concerns about incursions on the privacy we maintain in our 
bodies are heightened during medical procedures.  (See, e.g., 
Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 907, 917 [citing cases where pictures of a patient in a 
hospital constituted an actionable intrusion upon seclusion 
under tort law].  But see Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. (2009) 47 
Cal.4th 272, 294, fn. 9 [indicating that state tort law privacy 
rights are not necessarily coextensive with the 4th Amend.].)   
Nonetheless, we need not consider whether or in what 
circumstances the government’s taking of surgical images may 
invade a defendant’s privacy.  Caro fails to adequately explain 
why the exclusion of these pictures would have, with a 
reasonable probability, altered the outcome of the case.  Caro’s 
bloodstained clothes, with the high-velocity spatter and the 
potential piece of scalp, also established Caro’s presence around 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
44 
her children when they were shot, and, in the testimony of the 
prosecution expert, that she pulled the trigger. 
Caro 
similarly 
offers 
only 
cursory, 
unpersuasive 
arguments regarding any prejudice from the fingernail scraping 
and gunshot residue evidence police collected.  To the extent 
those fingernail scrapings indeed showed the blood of Caro’s 
children, there was other evidence that Caro came in contact 
with her children’s blood. 
Caro also points to Detective Rivera’s presence in the 
recovery room and the ICU room.  Rivera testified to Caro’s 
demeanor when he asked her questions, and when her surgeon 
asked her questions.  But Caro fails to prove prejudice:  her 
nurse and surgeon testified to Caro’s demeanor in these 
timeframes, so there is not a reasonable probability that the 
exclusion of Rivera’s testimony on these issues would have 
affected the outcome of the case.   
Finally, Caro argues that the recovery of bullet fragments 
from her head during surgery was an illegal seizure.  The Fourth 
Amendment limits only governmental activity.  (See, e.g., 
United States v. Jacobsen (1984) 466 U.S. 109, 113.)  Thus, the 
removal of a bullet by medical personnel acting independently 
of law enforcement directives does not implicate the rights 
therein.  A hospital nurse handed the bullets from Caro’s head 
over to the police, and Caro fails to address whether the nurse 
was acting at the request of officers when doing so.  (See 
Massachusetts v. Storella (1978) 6 Mass.App.Ct. 310, 315-316 
[345 N.E.2d 348] [upholding finding that nurse was not a 
government agent in similar circumstances].)  Nor does she 
explain why she retained a property interest or reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the fragments once removed.  (See, e.g., 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
45 
Commonwealth v. Johnson (Pa. 1999) 727 A.2d 1089, 1098 
[holding the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
with respect to a bullet removed from him during surgery].)  And 
even if officers improperly seized the fragments, Caro fails to 
meaningfully address any resulting prejudice.   
Caro argues that the evidence addressed here was 
cumulatively prejudicial.  But for some she fails to show that the 
evidence should have been excluded, and she does not persuade 
us other allegedly excludable evidence was cumulatively 
prejudicial.  Caro’s Strickland claim must fail.  (See 
Kimmelman, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 375.) 
iv. 
Denial of Request for Continuance 
 
Caro argues the trial court abused its discretion and 
violated due process by failing to continue a hearing on a motion 
to strike evidence that Caro asked about G.C.  At trial, on 
September 17, 2001, Detective Wade testified that Caro asked 
about where G.C. was located, but not the three children who 
had been killed.  On the next day of trial, September 18, 2001, 
Caro moved to strike Wade’s testimony about G.C., asserting the 
statement violated Miranda and her Fourth Amendment right 
to privacy.  Caro’s Miranda argument asserted that Wade 
elicited the statement about G.C. by interrogation after Caro 
invoked her right to counsel.  The Fourth Amendment argument 
asserted that Wade’s presence in the hospital room violated 
Caro’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The hearing on the motion spanned over three days.  The 
hearing began on the afternoon of the next day, September 19, 
2001.  The prosecution called Detective Wade to testify.  The 
defense’s cross-examination of Wade went long, so the trial court 
continued the hearing to the following morning.  The following 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
46 
day, September 20, 2001, the defense cross-examined Wade for 
a short amount of time in the morning and in the afternoon.  
During the afternoon cross-examination, the trial court asked 
defense counsel for a time estimate on any further evidence in 
the hearing.  Defense counsel indicated that she needed 20 
additional minutes to cross-examine Wade, and 10 to 15 minutes 
to present the testimony of Nina Priebe, a social worker who 
worked at the hospital.  Because of Ms. Priebe’s limited 
availability, defense counsel requested — and the trial court 
allowed — the hearing to continue to the following morning 
rather than later that day.  The trial court did so with some 
trepidation, given the potential unavailability of prosecution 
witnesses the following week.  
The next morning, on September 21, 2001, Priebe testified 
that she was a social worker at the hospital, and worked in the 
ICU on the day Detective Wade questioned Caro.  Priebe heard 
screaming from Caro’s room (likely right after Wade told Caro 
that her children had died), but did not go in because a nurse, 
Debbie Anderson, had told her that “police had asked us not to 
comfort” Caro.  The prosecution objected on hearsay grounds, 
and the trial court sustained the objection. 
After Priebe’s testimony, defense counsel stated that she 
wanted to call Nurse Anderson as a witness, but indicated that 
she had been unable to contact her, and wanted to consult with 
an investigator.  Anderson had testified in the case previously 
as a prosecution witness.  But defense counsel stated she had 
been unable to contact Anderson because the only contact 
information defense counsel had was Anderson’s work phone 
number, and Anderson had not been to work the prior two days.  
The court denied the request because “[a]ll parties knew today 
was the day we were going to have the hearing”; defense counsel 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
47 
“had ample opportunity to have [her] witnesses present[;] . . . 
[a]nd the Court ha[d] been I believe extremely generous in 
allowing time for this hearing and for other hearings that have 
been occurring at the — the last minute.”  Caro now argues the 
denial of a continuance was an abuse of the trial court’s 
discretion and a violation of due process. 
 
The decision to continue a hearing so a party can secure 
the presence of a witness is one within the trial court’s 
discretion.  (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 504.)  A trial 
court does not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance 
unless the defendant establishes good cause for a continuance.  
(Ibid.)  Good cause requires a defendant to show that he or she 
exercised due diligence in pursuing the witness’s presence, the 
witness’s expected testimony was material and not cumulative, 
the testimony could be obtained within a reasonable time, and 
the facts the witness would provide could not otherwise be 
proven.  (Ibid.) 
 
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  As 
the trial court observed, counsel for both parties knew that the 
final part of the hearing would occur on September 21, 2001, a 
schedule somewhat determined by prosecution witness 
availability.  Defense counsel did not raise the possibility of 
calling Anderson until the last minute.  And Priebe’s testimony 
that Anderson said that police told Anderson hospital staff 
should not comfort Caro was clearly hearsay if offered for the 
truth of the fact that police made that statement to Anderson.  
So counsel could have predicted the need for Anderson’s 
testimony.  Defense counsel asserted that she had no way of 
contacting Anderson because she had not been at work for two 
days, but defense counsel failed to explain what steps she had 
taken to contact Anderson, when those efforts were made, and 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
48 
whether Anderson could be found in a reasonable time.  Defense 
counsel also failed to argue that Anderson was the sole witness 
who could establish a police policy against comforting Caro that 
night.  So the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
a continuance.   
 
Moreover, the trial court denied the motion to strike 
because (1) the statement at issue was “spontaneous” rather 
than the result of an interrogation under Miranda, and (2) the 
court had no jurisdiction to hear the Fourth Amendment issue.  
Anderson’s testimony that police told hospital staff not to 
“comfort” Caro would have been irrelevant to the resolution of 
these issues.  The trial court also concluded the statement was 
spontaneous and “voluntarily [made] by” Caro.  Caro contends 
that Anderson’s proposed testimony that hospital staff were 
asked to refrain from comforting Caro is relevant to whether 
Caro’s spontaneous statement uttered after the Miranda 
warning was involuntary.  Although such proposed testimony 
may be relevant in principle, it does not support Caro’s 
contention in this case because Caro’s statement was still a 
spontaneous utterance, not the product of police coercion.  (See 
Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 167.)   
Nothing in the record shows that officers sought to limit 
Caro’s medical care or access to an attorney, and at the time the 
statement was made, Detective Wade was actively trying to find 
Caro’s mother so that she could come comfort Caro.  Caro’s 
further contention that the testimony may have justified 
reconsideration of the trial court’s prior Miranda and 
voluntariness findings is purely speculative.  If Anderson’s 
testimony would have warranted such an action, counsel might 
have obtained a declaration from Anderson and moved for 
reconsideration of the court’s prior Miranda ruling, but did not 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
49 
do so.  So the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate 
any constitutional rights by failing to grant the continuance. 
v. 
Exclusion of Evidence Assertedly Implicating 
Right to Present a Defense 
a. Records from Xavier’s Therapist 
Caro argues that the trial court erred by refusing to review 
and order the disclosure of records from Xavier’s visits to a 
therapist.  Before trial, Caro subpoenaed records maintained by 
Xavier’s therapist.  The therapist moved to quash the subpoena, 
relying on the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the right to 
privacy.  The therapist also argued that Caro did not have the 
right to pretrial in camera review of the records under People v. 
Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117 (Hammon).  Xavier supported 
the therapist’s motion.  Caro opposed the motion.  After a 
hearing, the trial court found that the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege applied and that our decision in Hammon prevented 
pretrial disclosure of privileged information.  The trial court also 
found that Caro failed to establish “good cause” because she had 
not shown a “reasonable likelihood that the documents in 
question contain information that is both material and favorable 
to the defense and that the same or comparable information is 
not obtainable from nonpriv[i]leged sources.” 
Before us, Caro argues she has a federal and California 
constitutional right to an in camera hearing to examine Xavier’s 
psychotherapy records, based on her right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses.  Caro contends that our decision in 
Hammon, which rejected such an argument, was wrongly 
decided.  In Hammon, we declined to provide a pretrial right to 
discovery under the confrontation clause, and instead found that 
any such right under the confrontation clause attaches at trial.  
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
50 
(Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1127-11288.)  Although the 
advent of digitized, voluminous records may conceivably raise 
new and challenging issues in this context, we decline to 
reconsider 
Hammon 
on 
these 
facts, 
which 
involve 
psychotherapy records from the relatively short period of time 
from August 4, 1999, to November 22, 1999.  Moreover, Caro 
does not argue that the lack of pretrial discovery prejudiced her 
ability to request psychotherapy records at trial, or somehow 
altered her trial strategy.  Nor does Caro argue on appeal that 
any requests for psychotherapy records were improperly denied 
at trial.  In addition, Caro’s primary contention on appeal that 
the records might have shown that Xavier fired Caro to 
consummate his affair rather than to fix the office’s finances is 
speculative at best.  We cannot conclude that the trial court’s 
ruling interfered with Caro’s right to confrontation in this case. 
b. Admission of Child Autopsy Photos 
Caro argues that four admitted autopsy photos showing 
the victims’ wounds were so gruesome and inflammatory that 
their admission was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code 
section 352.  The trial court has broad discretion over the 
admission of photographs that are alleged to include disturbing 
details.  (Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 713; see also People v. 
Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 353-354.)  We routinely uphold 
the admission of autopsy photos to establish the placement of a 
victim’s wounds and clarify the testimony of prosecution 
witnesses.  (See, e.g., McKinzie, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1351-
1352.)  The prosecution is not limited to proving its case “solely 
from live witnesses; the jury is entitled to see details of the 
victims’ bodies to determine if the evidence supports the 
prosecution’s theory of the case.”  (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 557, 624.)   
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
51 
The prosecution sought to introduce 14 autopsy photos.  
The trial court excluded four of these photos as unduly 
prejudicial and cumulative.  It allowed the introduction of the 
remaining 10 photographs.  Caro now challenges four of the 10 
admitted photographs.  People’s exhibit 40A was a close-up 
picture of the gunshot wound to Joey’s head, showing some 
tearing around the wound, which a prosecution witness used to 
opine that the gun was touching Joey’s head when fired.  
Similarly, People’s exhibit 42B was a close-up picture of the 
wound to Michael’s head, which similarly was used by an expert 
to opine that Michael suffered a contact gunshot wound because 
of visible hemorrhaging and tearing around the wound.  People’s 
exhibit 44B showed a large, gaping torn injury in Christopher’s 
head, which demonstrated the damage caused by two gunshot 
wounds.  People’s exhibit 44C was a closer view of the wound 
Christopher suffered, which a prosecution witness used to 
explain how the bullet entered and exited Christopher’s skull. 
Each of these photos served an evidentiary purpose by 
supporting the expert’s explanation of how the shootings 
occurred.  Although the cause of death was not disputed at trial, 
these photos provided valuable context for understanding how 
the expert reached her conclusions about the nature of the 
shootings.  (See Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 170 
[“photographs of murder victims are relevant to help prove how 
the charged crime occurred”].)  Photographic evidence that Joey 
and Michael were killed by contact gunshot wounds and that 
Christopher 
was 
shot 
twice 
tended 
to 
demonstrate 
premeditation, deliberation, and the intent to kill.  Moreover, we 
cannot conclude that these photos were unduly prejudicial.  
Although these photos constituted graphic images of gunshot 
wounds, even showing the insides of the victims’ heads in the 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
52 
case of exhibits 42B and 44B, we do not believe they were “ ‘so 
gruesome as to have impermissibly swayed the jury.’ ”  (People 
v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 243, italics added.)  The 
pictures were limited to the result of the gunshot wounds 
themselves.  They included no gratuitous details, unlike the 
pictures at issue in cases where courts have found an abuse of 
discretion.  (See, e.g., People v. Marsh (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 
987, 996 [finding prejudicial photos of a child’s dangling bloody 
scalp with, in the background, the child’s blood-spattered torso 
“with the ribcages rolled back to expose the bowels”].)  On 
balance, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
considerable discretion in finding that the prejudice arising from 
the photographs did not substantially outweigh their probative 
value. 
c. Rulings on the Parties’ Objections 
Caro argues that the trial court erred in sustaining 
multiple prosecution objections and overruling multiple defense 
objections at trial.  We review evidentiary rulings, including 
ultimate rulings on whether evidence should be excluded as 
hearsay, for abuse of discretion.  (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 79, 131, 132.)  When a hearsay exception requires 
foundational findings of fact, we review such findings for 
substantial evidence.  (Id. at p. 132.) 
First, Caro contends that the trial court erred by allowing 
Xavier to testify that Caro gave more money to her parents than 
was documented by the checks in evidence.  A lay witness must 
have personal knowledge of the facts to which he or she testifies.  
(Evid. Code, § 702.)  Xavier testified “those checks represent only 
a fraction of what was paid to [Caro’s parents] over that period 
of time for their expenses.”  Caro contends the prosecution laid 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
53 
insufficient foundation of Xavier’s personal knowledge of how 
much Caro paid to her parents.  But the prosecution established 
earlier that Xavier reviewed his corporate and personal finances 
in August 1999, which established a foundation for Xavier’s 
personal knowledge.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion. 
Second, Caro argues that the trial court erred by not 
allowing defense counsel to cross-examine Xavier about the 
location where he had sex with Laura G., the woman with whom 
he was having an affair, after the shootings.  After the trial 
began, Xavier told the prosecution that he had sex with Laura 
at the Marriott Hotel where Xavier stayed for two or three 
months.  Laura told the police that she and Xavier had not had 
sex at the Marriott Hotel, but had continued their affair.  At 
trial, Xavier denied having sex with Laura at a hotel — a 
statement inconsistent with his prior statement.  The trial court 
excluded this evidence because it considered the continued 
affair — but not its precise location — relevant to the case.  The 
trial court alternatively excluded the evidence because its 
probative value was substantially outweighed by “its undue 
influence, bias, and consumption of time” under Evidence Code 
section 352.  The trial court has broad discretion to exclude 
impeachment evidence where the subject matter is “collateral” 
with “no logical bearing on any material, disputed issue.”  
(People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 152.)  The location of 
a witness’s affair may be relevant in some cases.  But here, Caro 
sought to establish a potential motive for Xavier to kill his 
children by showing the continued affair.  Caro did not argue 
below, and fails to argue on appeal, how the location would be 
relevant to anything except Xavier’s inconsistency and 
credibility on that issue.  Moreover, given its collateral nature, 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
54 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by alternatively 
excluding the evidence under section 352.  This is especially true 
because other evidence was elicited from Xavier showing the 
relationship continued soon after the shootings:  He testified 
that he kissed Laura and was still in love with her in December 
1999 or January 2000.  The precise location of the affair’s 
continued consummation was a minor collateral issue.  The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion.   
Third, Caro argues that the trial court erred by allowing 
prosecution expert Edwin Jones to testify that the prosecution 
made Caro’s underwear available to the defense.  In 
Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at page 606, we held the work 
product privilege is violated where the prosecution asks 
questions that “invit[e] the jury to infer that . . . other [defense] 
experts were not called because their testimony would not be 
favorable.”  Here, Jones was a prosecution forensic scientist who 
testified on defense cross-examination that he examined Caro’s 
underwear on July 10, 2001.  Defense counsel asked if that was 
the first time Jones had examined the underwear, and he 
replied that he examined it “on a date earlier than that when 
other examiners were looking at [it],” those other examiners 
being “Richard Fox or Herb MacDonnell.  One of those two or 
both.”  On redirect, the prosecution asked, “[W]ho is Richard 
Fox?” and defense counsel objected to the question under 
Coddington.  Though, defense counsel said she would not object 
to testimony that the prosecution made the underwear available 
to the defense.  The trial court sustained the objection.  The 
prosecution then asked Jones if he “provide[d] access to that 
particular item to defense experts?”  He replied, “Yes,” and 
defense counsel did not object.  Defense counsel waived a claim 
challenging this question by saying she would not object to 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
55 
testimony that the prosecution made the underwear available to 
the defense.  To the extent the question that was asked exceeded 
the scope of the waiver, Caro forfeited any claim by failing to 
object.  (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1365.)  
Moreover, the testimony was admissible.  (See People v. Scott 
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 489.)  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion.   
Fourth, Caro contends the trial court abused its discretion 
by not allowing a police officer to testify that Xavier told him 
that a psychotherapist advised Xavier to increase Caro’s Prozac 
dosage.  Defense counsel proffered this testimony to impeach 
Xavier’s testimony on what he told police about Caro’s Prozac 
and to show that Xavier was trying to convince the police that a 
professional agreed with the increased Prozac prescription.  
Earlier in the trial, defense counsel had asked Xavier, “Did you 
tell the police when you were interviewed initially that your 
psychologist had prescribed Prozac for Cora?”5  Xavier 
responded, “I don’t recall if I used those words when I spoke to 
the sheriff’s department.”  When asked if he had discussed 
Prozac with the police, Xavier stated, “To the best of my 
recollection, I mentioned to [the police] that Cora had been 
started on Prozac by me.”  Xavier denied that he tried to 
intentionally mislead the police about who prescribed the Prozac 
to Caro. 
The trial court held that the police officer could not testify 
to Xavier’s statement to police that a psychotherapist had 
advised Xavier on prescribing Prozac to Caro.  According to the 
trial court, this was not an inconsistent statement that fell 
                                        
5  
Trial witnesses at times referred to Caro by her nickname, 
“Cora.” 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
56 
within a hearsay exception.  To the extent this testimony was 
proposed for purposes of showing Xavier’s attempt to seem more 
credible to police, the trial court held that, on the record before 
the court, Caro had not established a statement that implied 
such an attempt.  Indeed, defense counsel indicated that they 
had not yet “gotten to” that part of the transcript of the police 
interview.  
We conclude any error was harmless.  If the evidence was 
admitted for its truth, it would not have harmed — and may 
have bolstered — Xavier’s credibility, as evidence that he 
received advice about Caro’s Prozac.  Moreover, the purported 
inconsistency in the statement would have been unlikely to alter 
the jury’s evaluation of Xavier’s credibility because defense 
counsel’s question about what Xavier told police was general, 
and he added the caveat that he was responding to the “best of 
[his] recollection.”  This evidence also would not have provided 
much support to the defense theory that Xavier sought to 
manipulate the police.  Xavier simultaneously told police that 
he was the one who actually prescribed the Prozac; the advice of 
a family therapist not allowed to prescribe Prozac herself would 
not have added much legitimacy to his decision.  Therefore, 
there is no reasonable probability this evidence would have 
changed the trial’s outcome. 
Fifth, Caro argues that the trial court erred by excluding 
the defense’s proposed question to Caro, during direct 
examination, about whether Xavier told her he had kept his 
appointment with a divorce lawyer.  On defense objection, the 
trial court held that the question called for hearsay and the 
answer would not be relevant to Caro’s proposed inconsistent 
statement hearsay exception theory.  Some questions later, Caro 
testified to believing Xavier had not kept the appointment with 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
57 
the divorce lawyer based on Xavier’s statements to her.  Caro 
argues on appeal that this was the nonhearsay purpose for 
which the excluded testimony should have been admitted.  But 
since this fact was established by the later testimony, no 
possible prejudice arose from the prior ruling. 
Sixth, Caro argues that the trial court erred by allowing 
Detective Wade to testify to what Juanita said about Caro’s 
statements.  In the hospital, Juanita asked Caro, “Why did you 
do this?” and then said a prayer over Caro.  During the prayer, 
Caro said “My babies.  My babies.  I’m sorry.  I’m sorry.”  The 
prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Juanita’s later 
statement to Wade that recounted Caro saying that she was 
“sorry for what happened to my babies.”  Defense counsel 
objected that the testimony constituted Juanita’s speculation 
about why Caro was sorry.  The trial court disagreed and found 
that Juanita was not speculating, but rather was attributing the 
statement to Caro.  In context, the trial court reasonably 
interpreted Juanita’s statement as reporting what she thought 
Caro had said in response to her question asking why Caro did 
it.  To the extent another interpretation was possible, we cannot 
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by resolving 
this factual dispute in a reasonable manner.  (See People v. 
Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 429 [“The court’s ruling did not 
fall outside the bounds of reason”].) 
Seventh, Caro argues that the trial court should have 
allowed her to introduce transcript excerpts containing 
statements Xavier made to Juanita after the shootings.  In a 
conversation recorded by Deputy Anthony Tutino, Xavier told 
Juanita the following:  “[Caro] shot them in the head.  She 
wasn’t messing around.”  Defense counsel argued that this 
statement was relevant inconsistent statement evidence 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
58 
because Xavier had never specifically testified about observing 
where Joey was shot in his direct testimony.  Defense counsel 
also contended that this statement showed that Xavier had 
greater knowledge about how the children died than he should 
have had based on his direct testimony.  The trial court 
ultimately denied the motion as to these transcript excerpts.  
Even if the trial court erred by excluding this evidence, any such 
error was harmless.  Deputy Tutino had earlier testified to this 
same statement during the prosecution’s case, and defense 
counsel ultimately referenced it during jury argument.  
Admitting a transcript of Xavier’s exact words in addition to 
Tutino’s testimony would have been largely cumulative and 
unlikely to affect the outcome of the case.   
d. Exclusion of Written Statement in Police Report  
Caro argues the trial court erred by excluding a statement 
in a police report.  Deputy Tutino wrote — in a paragraph 
concerning statements Xavier made to Juanita in the garage the 
day after the shootings — that “[Caro] told Xavier that she had 
killed all the kids.”  The prosecution argued that admitting this 
statement would violate the rule against hearsay because it was 
an out-of-court statement to be admitted for the truth of the 
matter asserted.  This statement implicates three potential 
hearsay statements:  the first level is Caro’s supposed statement 
to Xavier that she killed the children; the second is Xavier’s 
assertion that Caro made the statement; and the third is 
Tutino’s writing about what Xavier said. 
Caro contends that the purpose for admitting the 
statements only implicated the third level of hearsay — the 
police report itself.  Caro argues that the first two levels of 
hearsay could be avoided because the statement would not have 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
59 
been admitted for the truth of Caro committing the murders, or 
for the truth of Caro telling Xavier she committed the murders.  
Instead, Caro argues that Xavier’s statement would have shown 
Xavier’s attempt to place blame on Caro and impeach his 
credibility.  Regarding the police report, Caro argues that it fell 
within Evidence Code section 1237, which provides a hearsay 
exception for past recollections recorded.  The trial court found 
that this exception did not apply. 
The Attorney General does not defend the trial court’s 
exclusion of the statement, but rather argues that any error was 
harmless.  We agree any error was harmless for the limited 
purposes for which the statement would have been admitted.  
The statement’s purpose was to impeach Xavier’s testimony 
about what he said in the garage and to show that he was trying 
to lay blame on Caro.  This statement that Tutino wrote down, 
but did not remember, and which was not on the tape recording 
of the conversation in the garage, had low evidentiary value.  
Juanita also never testified that Xavier made such a statement 
to her, and Xavier did not remember making the statement.  The 
jury would be unlikely to find Xavier measurably less credible 
had this statement been admitted.  Moreover, the theory that 
this statement showed Xavier’s attempt to lay blame on Caro 
does not hold up under scrutiny.  It is unclear why Xavier would 
tell Juanita — but not the police — that Caro admitted to the 
crime if he shot his family and was trying to blame Caro.  So for 
the limited purposes for which the statement would have been 
admitted, we conclude that any error was harmless.  
e. Cumulative Error and Right To Present a 
Defense 
 
Caro argues the trial court’s evidentiary errors are 
prejudicial when considered cumulatively, and also violated her 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
60 
constitutional right to present a defense.  To the extent we 
assumed error, but found harmlessness with respect to Caro’s 
evidentiary arguments, we do not find that those errors are 
cumulatively prejudicial.  Those assumed errors involved 
evidence that was so minor that it was unlikely to have affected 
the case, even in the cumulative, and did not affect Caro’s right 
to present a defense.  (See People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
96, 114 [“ ‘generally, violations of state evidentiary rules do not 
rise to the level of federal constitutional error’ ”].) 
vi. 
Admission of Computer Animation 
Caro argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing the prosecution to show the jury a computer animation 
depicting the opinion of Rod Englert, a blood spatter expert, on 
how the shootings of Christopher and Michael occurred.  We 
review a trial court’s decision to admit demonstrative evidence 
for abuse of discretion.  (Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 21.)  
Before trial, the prosecution moved to introduce the computer 
animation, and the defense opposed.  The prosecution argued 
the animation was admissible as a visual depiction of Englert’s 
expert opinion on what happened.  Regarding prejudice, the 
prosecution asserted the animation would not show highly 
emotional details of the crime, such as the victims’ facial 
expressions and Winnie the Pooh paraphernalia.  At the trial 
court’s request, the prosecution played and narrated the 
animation for the court.  The trial court found the animation to 
be admissible demonstrative evidence to the extent it 
represented only the prosecution expert’s proposed testimony.  
Because Englert could not confirm whether Christopher’s eyes 
were open during the shootings, the trial court ordered the 
prosecution to show them closed in the animation.  The trial 
court also required Englert to provide a declaration confirming 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
61 
that the final version of the animation depicted his 
understanding of the evidence.  The prosecution shared a copy 
of the final version of the animation with the defense. 
The computer animation was presented to the jury in eight 
scenes during expert testimony by Englert, who spoke after each 
scene.  The animation featured three-dimensional, mannequin-
like recreations designed with relevant details, such as clothing 
and hair.  Englert testified that the animation illustrated his 
opinion of how the shootings had to occur to produce the 
bloodstain patterns on the clothing that Caro was found wearing 
the night of the shootings.  The court also delivered a cautionary 
instruction about the animation to the jury multiple times over 
the course of trial.6 
                                        
6  
One of these instructions read:  “This is an animation 
based on an expert’s opinion.  [¶]  The computer animation we 
have here is nothing more than that, an illustration of the 
expert’s opinion.  You are instructed to treat it no differently 
than you would any chart or diagram of the evidence.  [¶]  The 
animation is not intended to be a film of what actually occurred, 
nor is it an exact re-creation.  Therefore, there may be facts that 
are not exactly accurate or not exactly as they occurred but may 
be reasonably close.  [¶]  It is important to keep in mind that an 
animated video is not an actual film of what occurred, nor is it 
intended to be an exact, detailed replication of every detail of 
every event or every movement.  It is only an aid to giving you 
an overall view of the particular version of the events, based on 
particular viewpoints or particular interpretations of evidence 
made by an expert witness.  [¶] . . . In determining what weight 
to give to any opinion expressed by an expert witness, you 
should consider the qualifications and believability of the 
witness, the facts and materials upon which each opinion is 
based, and the reasons for each opinion. . . .” 
 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
62 
We allow the admission of a computer animation as 
demonstrative evidence of expert testimony, but only if certain 
conditions are met.  The animation must accurately depict an 
expert opinion, the expert opinion must fairly represent the 
evidence, the trial court must provide a proper limiting 
instruction, and the animation must be otherwise admissible 
under Evidence Code section 352.  (See Duenas, supra, 55 
Cal.4th at pp. 20-25.)  Caro contends the computer animation 
here is inadmissible under section 352.  We disagree.   
Evidence Code section 352 provides that a court “may 
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) 
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial 
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of 
misleading the jury.”  Caro argues that unlike in Duenas, where 
the cause of death was in dispute, the animation here is only 
minimally probative because only identity was disputed at trial.  
But Caro forgets that the animation had more than minimal 
probative value on the issue of identity.  The animation 
illustrated the expert’s opinion that the blowback of blood from 
a gunshot to Christopher’s head was consistent with the 
bloodstain patterns on Caro’s, not Xavier’s, clothes.    
It is true that courts must be mindful of the powerful 
impact computer animations may have on jurors.  The potential 
for such impact does not, however, create “an unjustified ‘air of 
technical and scientific certainty’ ” if accompanied by proper 
limiting instructions.  (Duenas, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 23.)  The 
trial court gave such limiting instructions here.  They informed 
the jury that the animation merely illustrated the expert’s 
opinion, it did not exactly recreate the events on the night of the 
shootings, and it was the jury’s role to evaluate the expert’s 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
63 
opinion and its factual basis.  While Caro argues that these 
cautionary instructions were ambiguous as to the animation’s 
purpose, the instructions were quite clear:  They stated that the 
animation was an aid for understanding an expert’s opinion.   
Further, the content of the computer animation is not 
itself so graphic that prejudice arising from those details 
substantially outweighs the animation’s probative value.  The 
animation 
featured 
mannequin-like 
representations 
of 
Christopher and Michael, with some facial features, hair, and 
clothing.  The animation showed each gunshot fired, and the 
pattern of blood distribution after the gunshots, which was 
necessary to depict Englert’s testimony.  It featured only one 
personal possession of the children, a doll on the side of the bed 
that Christopher’s blood had dripped on.  While a slow-motion 
visual depiction of two killings is indeed disturbing, the 
animation did not include highly emotional details, such as 
graphic images of the damage wrought by the bullet entry 
wounds, the children’s facial expressions, or other superfluous 
elements to tug on the heartstrings of the jury.  (See People v. 
Hood (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 965, 972.) 
Caro also argues the animation was prejudicial because it 
was cumulative of other evidence.  But in Duenas, we rejected a 
similar argument because it “misapprehend[ed] the animation’s 
role as demonstrative evidence.  The animation was not offered 
as substantive evidence, but as a tool to aid the jury in 
understanding the substantive evidence.”  (Duenas, supra, 55 
Cal.4th at p. 25.)  Here, the animation is similarly not 
cumulative, as it is demonstrative evidence illustrating expert 
testimony 
— 
such 
demonstrative 
evidence 
provides 
noncumulative value over the testimony itself by encapsulating 
what may otherwise be a confusing series of events.  Because 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
64 
whatever prejudice arising from the computer animation did not 
substantially outweigh its probative value, we conclude the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion. 
vii. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Caro argues that the prosecution committed misconduct 
by making certain statements in the closing arguments of the 
guilt and penalty phases of trial.  Under California law, to 
establish reversible prosecutorial misconduct a defendant must 
show that the prosecutor used “ ‘deceptive or reprehensible 
methods’ ” and that it is reasonably probable that, without such 
misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would 
have resulted.  (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 298 
(Riggs).)  A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the federal 
Constitution if the behavior is “ ‘so egregious that it infects the 
trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of 
due process.’ ”  (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 733 
(Redd).)  To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for 
appeal, a defendant must object and request an admonition.  
(E.g., id. at p. 734; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.)  An 
exception exists where the objection and request for admonition 
would have been “futile or ineffective.”  (Riggs, at p. 298.)   
a. Guilt Phase Closing Argument 
Caro contends that the prosecutor committed five 
instances of misconduct during closing arguments of the guilt 
phase.  To establish misconduct, Caro must show “ ‘a reasonable 
likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable 
fashion.’ ”  (Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1036.)  
First, Caro argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched 
for Xavier’s truthfulness by asserting that he was “honest” and 
that he “testified truthfully.”  But Caro failed to object to these 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
65 
statements and request an admonition, so the claim is forfeited.  
(Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 298.)  Moreover, any misconduct 
was harmless.  The comments were brief, and several were 
“followed immediately by references to evidence bearing on 
witness credibility.”  (People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 
1236.)  The substantial physical evidence against Caro also 
corroborated Xavier’s version of events over hers.  And both 
parties and the trial court’s instructions repeatedly emphasized 
to the jury that witness credibility was solely theirs to decide.  
Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable probability 
that the prosecutor’s comments affected the outcome. 
Second, Caro argues that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by describing Xavier as “stifl[ing] sobs” and 
“crumpl[ing] over in pain” during his testimony.  The statement, 
she contends, was impermissible because these physical cues 
are not in the record.  Because defense counsel did not object or 
request an admonition on this issue, the claim is forfeited.  
(Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 746.)  Moreover, there was no 
misconduct.  The demeanor of a witness is “rarely reflected in 
the record” (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 516), but 
is a proper factor for the jury to consider when assessing the 
witness’s credibility (People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 
1205-1206; see also Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (a)). 
Third, Caro contends that the prosecutor improperly 
expressed a personal opinion in closing argument.  She said, 
“And Deputy Tutino heard [Xavier] say again and again, ‘She 
killed my best friend.  She killed my best friend.’  [¶]  You know 
that [Xavier] was talking about Joey.  Like any father [Xavier] 
would want to believe that he loved all of his children equally.”  
She then began to say, “I’m sure he did a great job making each 
child feel loved and feel — ” when defense counsel objected on 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
66 
the ground that the prosecutor was expressing a personal 
opinion, and the trial court sustained the objection.  
The prosecutor then went on to argue the following:  “But 
as difficult as it is to say, you can tell from the state of the 
evidence that [Xavier] had a special place for Joey.  Joey was the 
one who made [Xavier] a father for the first time.  Joey was the 
one who was most like a person.  He was the oldest at the time.  
[¶]  And when [Xavier] sat there in his family room saying, ‘She 
killed my best friend,’ he was talking about Joey.  That’s 
probably why he was the defendant’s first target.”  Caro asserts 
this second statement, too, was the prosecutor’s own opinion and 
not permissible argument on the evidence.  
As to the first statement about making each child feel 
loved, counsel objected but did not request an admonishment.  
As to the second statement, Caro did not object.  Both omissions 
forfeit any challenge to these statements.  (Riggs, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at p. 298.)  And the alleged misconduct was, in any 
event, so minimal as to have no reasonable probability of 
affecting the outcome. 
Fourth, Caro asserts that the prosecutor improperly relied 
on facts not in evidence by arguing that Sergeant Timothy 
Lorenzen was the lead investigator but was not called in the 
prosecution case because he only had a limited set of duties.  
Caro argues that this was an improper way to explain the reason 
why the prosecution did not call Lorenzen to testify, and that 
the actual reason was that he was impeachable for cheating on 
an exam.  But Caro failed to object to the argument regarding 
Lorenzen at trial; so the claim is forfeited.  (Riggs, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at p. 298.)  Plus, any error was harmless because the 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
67 
reason for not calling Lorenzen was a tangential, minor issue 
that would not have affected the outcome of the case. 
Fifth, Caro argues the prosecutor improperly insulted the 
role of the defense by arguing that the prosecution’s burden was 
to “prove to 12 jurors beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of the 
allegations against a defendant,” while all the defense had to do 
was “confuse one of you.”  The prosecutor went on to say, “That’s 
the tactic that many defense attorneys employ.  Confusion.  
Throw up smoke.  Try and mislead jurors.  And maybe, by 
chance, they’ll get lucky and get one.”  The prosecutor later said, 
“I just ask that you not be the one that the defense is trying to 
target for confusion.”  Caro failed to object to this argument, so 
the claim is forfeited.  (Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 298.)  In 
any event, we do not forbid prosecutors from arguing that the 
defense case seeks to confuse the jury.  (See People v. Kennedy 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 626.)  And the prosecutor was permitted, 
as she did immediately after these statements, to “highlight the 
discrepancies between [defense] counsel’s opening statement 
and the evidence.”  (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 
847.)  We find no misconduct under these circumstances. 
b. Penalty Phase Closing Argument 
Caro contends — in a summary bullet-point list — that the 
prosecutor committed 15 instances of misconduct during the 
penalty phase closing argument.  Given the summary nature of 
her contentions, Caro fails to assert precisely why the 
statements were misconduct or cite relevant authority.  She also 
does not argue how these statements prejudiced her, except by 
asserting that all of the prosecutorial misconduct claims were 
cumulatively prejudicial.  The failure to “ ‘offer any authority or 
argument in support of [her] claim[s]’ ” would justify us 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
68 
“declin[ing] to address these contentions.”  (People v. Foster 
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1352 (Foster).)  Regardless, Caro 
concedes that defense counsel did not object to the following 
statements, thus forfeiting her claim:  (1) the assertion that 
Christopher was trying to “get away from his killer” and was 
“fighting . . . for his life”; (2) the assertion that Christopher 
“saved [G.C.]’s life by making her shoot [Christopher] twice, 
using up the bullet that was probably meant for [G.C.]”; (3) the 
statement that “[a]ll murders are committed when people are 
going through bad times in their lives”; (4) descriptions in the 
penalty phase of Xavier’s testimony as truthful or honest; and 
(5) statement’s that the dead children “would have been 
successful” and “would have been wonderful.”  (Riggs, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at p. 298.)   
For the following statements, Caro objected but failed to 
request an admonition:  (1) the prosecutor asked the jury to cry 
for the boys; (2) the prosecutor misstated the law by asserting 
that every factor in the penalty phase must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt (and the jury instructions later stated the 
correct standard); (3) the prosecutor stated that the defense had 
“chang[ed] [its] story” in the penalty phase; (4) the prosecution 
referred to a witness as a “bought-and-paid-for defense expert”; 
and (5) the prosecution argued Caro was not someone who 
“wound up selling dope at age twelve to put food in her mouth, 
getting hooked on drugs.”  That failure forfeits her claims.  (Duff, 
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 567.)  With regard to the final statement 
about getting “hooked on drugs,” Caro points out that the 
prosecutor continued by arguing that Caro was not “a poor 
inner-city kid who never had a chance.”  But Caro failed to object 
or request an admonition as to that subsequent statement, 
forfeiting the claim.  (Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 298.)  
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
69 
Moreover, any potential misconduct in these statements was 
ultimately harmless. 
Caro also raises a number of claims where the trial court 
overruled objections or rejected requests for admonitions.  First, 
Caro contends that the prosecutor relied on facts not in evidence 
when she argued, “This defendant’s situation is really not that 
much different from other people who are facing difficult 
relationships or failed marriages.  [¶]  In fact, hers was a lot 
better.”  The prosecutor continued, “The only real emotional 
disturbance or strain that separates this defendant from any 
other woman or any man who’s facing a failing marriage is her 
vanity.  Her pride. . . .”  Caro objected, and the trial court 
overruled the objection.  We find no misconduct.  These 
references to how other women react to similar circumstances 
draws on “ ‘common knowledge’ ” or “ ‘common experiences.’ ”  
(People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 908.) 
Second, the prosecutor incorrectly argued to the jury that 
appellant’s toxicology screen did not test positive for Xanax.  The 
trial court overruled a defense objection.  But no possible 
prejudice arose from this statement because the prosecutor 
subsequently admitted its mistake to the jury, and the parties 
stipulated to the presence of Xanax in Caro’s bloodstream. 
Third, the prosecutor argued that the trial court could 
consider sympathy for Caro in mitigation, but not sympathy for 
her family.  Defense counsel objected on the ground that this 
was a misstatement of law, and the trial court overruled Caro’s 
objection.  The prosecutor did not misstate the law.  (See People 
v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 456 (Ochoa); see also People v. 
Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 87-89.)  Caro’s citation to Cullen v. 
Pinholster (2011) 563 U.S. 170 is unavailing because it was an 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
70 
ineffective assistance of counsel case based on a 1984 trial, 
before we held in Ochoa that the jury could not consider 
sympathy 
toward 
a 
defendant’s 
family 
in 
mitigation.  
(Pinholster, at pp. 176, 191.)  This argument was not 
misconduct. 
Fourth, the prosecutor told the jurors to imagine 
themselves as Christopher in bed, feeling safe, before he was 
shot by Caro.  Caro’s objection was overruled.  This argument 
was not misconduct.  It is not improper for a prosecutor to “invite 
the jurors to put themselves in the place of the victims and 
imagine their suffering.”  (People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
1187, 1212.) 
Finally, the prosecutor stated that Caro “slaughtered” the 
boys.  Caro failed to object, but later requested the jury be 
admonished that the term “slaughter” was improper.  The trial 
court refused.  This statement was not misconduct because the 
word “slaughter” is a fair description of what happened to the 
children — the killer shot three children in the head, in their 
beds, at point-blank range.  The prosecutor is, to a point, allowed 
to use “colorful language to explain the prosecutor’s view of the 
evidence.”  (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 163 (Rundle).)  
On the facts of this case, saying “slaughter” was not misconduct.   
In addition, Caro contends that defense counsel’s failure 
to object or request an admonition to the above statements 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.  
But we regularly reject such claims on direct appeal where, as 
here, the record sheds no light on why defense counsel failed to 
object or request an admonition.  (People v. Gray (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 168, 207.)  This is not the rare case where there “could 
be no satisfactory explanation” for the failure to object or request 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
71 
admonitions, which may have arisen from a desire not to call 
attention to the allegedly faulty arguments.  (Ibid.)  The failure 
to object only rarely constitutes ineffective representation.  
(Ibid.)  And Caro fails to demonstrate that the exclusion of the 
statements would have, with a reasonable probability, changed 
the outcome.  We therefore reject Caro’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. 
viii. 
Penalty Phase Factor (b) Evidence 
 
Caro argues that there was insufficient evidence to allow 
admission of her prior criminal acts at the penalty phase of trial, 
and that the evidence presented was insufficiently specific to 
give Caro a fair opportunity to defend against the accusations 
concerning those acts.  As a result, she contends that the 
evidence of prior acts violated her right to due process, to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses against her, and to a 
reliable determination of penalty under the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.   
Section 190.3, factor (b) allows the jury to consider as 
aggravation evidence “[t]he presence or absence of criminal 
activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted 
use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use 
force or violence.”  To present such evidence at trial, the 
prosecution must provide the defendant notice of the evidence 
to be introduced and the opportunity to confront the available 
witnesses.  (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 136-137; see 
also Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 183.)  Additionally, to 
consider this evidence in aggravation, the jury must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Caro committed these 
prior acts.  (Yeoman, at p. 137.)  If these three requirements are 
satisfied, the jury may consider a defendant’s prior criminal acts 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
72 
without violating his or her rights to due process, a speedy trial, 
or a reliable penalty determination.  (Id. at p. 136.)  The 
remoteness of the prior criminal acts then affects their weight 
in aggravation rather than their admissibility.  (Id. at p. 137.) 
 
Caro first asserts that the notice given to her about the 
evidence to be presented, and the evidence eventually 
presented, deprived her of notice of the allegations and an 
opportunity to present a meaningful defense.  For many of the 
seven prior acts presented in the penalty phase, the notice and 
testimony did not identify the specific timeframe when the event 
occurred.  We rejected a similar claim in Rundle where the 
defendant argued that the section 190.3, factor (b) evidence 
relating to the defendant’s ex-wife amounted merely to a 
“nonspecific series of acts occurring over a period of several 
months, without providing exact dates upon which specific acts 
of forcible sodomy or oral copulation occurred.”  (Rundle, supra, 
43 Cal.4th at p. 182.)  We held that the relevant inquiry is 
whether the three requirements set forth in Yeoman are 
satisfied.  (See Rundle, at pp. 183-186 [requiring less notice of 
timeframes in penalty phase where the point is the evaluation 
of the defendant’s character, not the establishment of a 
particular act].)  Here, Caro had notice of the incidents at issue 
and evidence to be presented against her and had the 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.  Moreover, defense 
counsel asserted the incidents would be “disputed and 
contested,” the credibility of the witnesses would be “vigorously 
attacked,” and “there are some very significant defenses to acts 
[the prosecution] claimed occurred.”  The jury was also 
instructed to only consider the evidence in aggravation if it 
found the prior acts true beyond a reasonable doubt.  Our 
precedent does not require more.  (See ibid.)   
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
73 
 
Caro also contends that there was insufficient evidence for 
the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that many of the 
incidents occurred because they were supported only by Xavier’s 
uncorroborated testimony.  We have previously rejected similar 
claims based on a witness’s lack of trustworthiness in the section 
190.3, factor (b) context.  (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 
564.)  Rather than rendering factor (b) evidence inadmissible, 
the untrustworthiness of a witness’s testimony goes to its weight 
and can be shown through cross-examination and other 
evidence.  (Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 184-185.)  Neither 
the lack of specific dates nor the character of the evidence 
presented caused the evidence to be insufficient as a matter of 
law.  (Id. at p. 185.) 
Caro requests we require trial courts to hold hearings to 
determine whether the evidence is sufficient for a jury to find a 
prior violent offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Trial courts 
have discretion to hold such a hearing.  (See People v. Phillips 
(1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, fn. 25; see also People v. Friend (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 1, 87; People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 849.)  
Caro argued here that a hearing was necessary because she 
planned to impeach the prosecution’s evidence and present 
defenses.  But the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
finding the prosecution’s proffered evidence sufficient without a 
hearing and allowing the jury to evaluate the defense response.  
And to the extent Caro argues that the probative value of the 
prior act evidence was not substantially outweighed by undue 
prejudice under Evidence Code section 352, that claim fails.  The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that these prior 
acts were not “particularly prejudicial” in comparison to the 
offense 
of 
conviction, 
especially 
under 
the 
somewhat 
circumscribed Evidence Code section 352 analysis for Penal 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
74 
Code section 190.3, factor (b) evidence.  (People v. Box (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 1153, 1201.) 
 
Finally, Caro asks us to reconsider Rundle because of the 
danger that jurors will credit vague, uncorroborated prior acts 
when introduced with more specific, corroborated prior acts.  
But we perceive no such danger where jurors receive 
instructions to only consider a prior act in aggravation if proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Because the requirements in 
Yeoman and Rundle were satisfied, we reject Caro’s section 
190.3, factor (b) claim. 
C. Juror Misconduct and Related Motion for New 
Trial 
i. 
Dismissal of Juror During Deliberations  
Caro argues that the trial court erred by dismissing Juror 
No. 9 for his statements to Juror No. 11 outside of the 
deliberation room.  In the alternative, Caro argues that if there 
was sufficient evidence for Juror No. 9’s dismissal, then the trial 
court should have also dismissed Juror No. 11, who was part of 
the conversation with Juror No. 9.  Caro also contends that the 
trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on the 
jurors’ posttrial declarations about their conversation. 
 
On November 2, 2001, the jury foreperson submitted a 
note to the trial court stating that one of the jurors was a holdout 
who was refusing to deliberate.  Because this note came on a 
Friday, the trial court decided to excuse the jury and conduct an 
inquiry the following Monday.  But before excusing the jury, the 
trial court admonished the jury:  “I need to give you the 
admonition you’ve heard so many times before, but you need to 
hear it again.  [¶]  And that is you cannot discuss this case 
outside the presence of the jury room with the other 11 or 12 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
75 
jurors. . . .  You’re not to deliberate upon the case any further 
during the weekend, and the only time you can discuss the case, 
deliberate the case is when you’re back in the jury room Monday 
and all 12 jurors are present in the jury room.”  
 
The following Monday, the trial court called in the jury 
foreperson, who indicated that the juror at issue was no longer 
refusing to deliberate.  The parties did not pursue the issue 
further.  But defense counsel also raised a new issue discovered 
by a defense investigator, who saw Juror No. 9 and Juror No. 11 
speaking in the parking lot the previous Friday evening after 
the jury was excused.  Defense counsel requested an inquiry. 
The trial court first examined Juror No. 9.  When asked 
whether there was any discussion about the case between Juror 
No. 9 and Juror No. 11, Juror No. 9 said, “There was.  There was 
one line, I think.  One or two lines.  That’s correct.”  When the 
trial court asked Juror No. 9 to describe the discussion he 
related the following:  “The comment which was discussed 
between myself and the one juror only . . . was in regards to the 
emotionalism of what was going on in the jury room and the fact 
that emotions were very highly charged.  [¶]  We were — there 
was some personal stuff said, which made it difficult for 
deliberations to take place, and there was also a comment in 
regards to the personal — or not personal, excuse me, in regards 
to the emotional state, which sounds really bad, but it was — in 
fact, the exact quote was in regards to the defendant.  And it 
would have been ‘she had to be emotional on that night.’  And 
my response to that was that I agree.”  Juror No. 9 said that was 
the only discussion of the case.  When asked whether Juror No. 
9 or Juror No. 11 had initiated the conversation about the case, 
Juror No. 9 said, “It very well could be me, sir,” but he could not 
remember.  Juror No. 9 remembered telling Juror No. 11 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
76 
regarding the deliberations that “it’s not productive when 
people’s tempers get so flared up they start to use personal 
attacks and stuff like that.” 
The trial court then called Juror No. 11.  When asked 
whether the case was discussed in the parking lot, Juror No. 11 
said, “Not specifically, no.”  When asked whether they spoke 
about the deliberations, Juror No. 11 said, “Sort of.”  Juror No. 
11 explained, “Basically, he thanked me for taking the time to 
listen . . . and to understand his perspective of things.”  Juror 
No. 11 indicated this was the only discussion about the case and 
that she did not advocate for Juror No. 9 to do anything during 
the deliberations.  
Defense counsel requested the discharge of Juror No. 9 
because he “knowingly and willingly violated” the trial court’s 
specific orders and “attempted to engage another juror in 
discussions about the emotional state of Mrs. Caro” in order to 
“convince her of his position . . . .”  Defense counsel argued, “I 
want [Juror No. 9] off.  He’s deliberately and intentionally 
violated his oath as a juror.  I just couldn’t be more concerned 
about it.”  The prosecution agreed to the removal of Juror No. 9 
so long as Caro personally consented to the discharge, and Caro 
consented.  The trial court then discharged Juror No. 9, finding 
“good cause” because of his “flagrant violation of the court’s 
order regarding discussing the matter outside the presence of 
the jury room with another juror and discussing subject matter 
that is indeed in the court’s opinion deliberations on evidence 
received in this case.”  
The trial court then invited the parties “to raise any issues 
regarding Juror No. 11.”  The prosecutor raised concerns about 
removing Juror No. 9, but not Juror No. 11, if there was “two-
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
77 
way participation” in the parking lot conversation.  Defense 
counsel and the prosecutor agreed that they did not hear 
evidence that Juror No. 11 had made a comment about Caro’s 
emotional state on the night of the shootings.  Defense counsel 
also stated that Juror No. 11 seemingly did not understand that 
Juror No. 9 was attempting to gain support for his position, and 
that “she didn’t offer any information about the case or discuss 
any of the facts of the case.”  The trial court agreed, and 
explained, “I took [Juror No. 11]’s comments to be it was [Juror 
No. 9] who was the initiator of the conversation and [Juror No. 
11] was kind of stuck and being nice.”  The trial court stated it 
was not finding that Juror No. 11 discussed the case and noted 
that “no one is asking to excuse Juror No. 11.  I presume if the 
parties felt there was something inappropriate in what she said, 
I would have heard it by now.”  After a recess, the trial court 
stated that it “was satisfied that nothing has occurred that 
would jeopardize [Juror No. 11]’s ability to continue to be a fair, 
impartial juror for both sides.”  The trial court asked the parties 
if they wanted to be heard, and neither defense counsel nor the 
prosecutor requested that Juror No. 11 be removed. 
Following the penalty phase verdict, Caro filed a motion 
for new trial.  Among other issues, Caro contended, through a 
declaration from Juror No. 9, that Juror No. 11 should have been 
removed for misconduct.  Juror No. 9 declared that he and Juror 
No. 11 had “continued with the conversations that we had 
started in the deliberation room” as they walked to their cars, 
and that he did not remember who “initiated the topic of the 
deliberations or trial.”  Juror No. 9 wrote that he told Juror No. 
11 that he “appreciated that she discussed the case calmly 
without flying into a tantrum as others had done” and that there 
was “mutual discussion revolving around the events that took 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
78 
place that day.”  According to Juror No. 9, they went on to 
discuss Caro’s state of mind.  Juror No. 9 “made the point that 
Cora was of the opinion that her husband was going to leave her 
and the boys.  He had done it before and he was just going to do 
it again.  The e-mails and interviews showed this. . . .  This 
might cause us to question the motive presented by the 
prosecution.”  According to Juror No. 9, Juror No. 11 said that 
this “ ‘was just the last straw for Cora,’ ” that Xavier was going 
to leave her again, and this time Caro could not stand it.  Juror 
No. 11 then said “in a raised voice with some animation in the 
arms, ‘Well [Juror No. 9], you know she had to be emotional that 
night.’ ” 
The prosecution submitted a declaration from Juror No. 
11.  She stated, “On the evening of the fourth day of 
deliberations, [Juror No. 9] and I walked to our cars together in 
the parking lot.  [Juror No. 9] brought up the topic of the 
deliberations.  He made comments about how difficult 
deliberations were, and that the deliberations had gotten 
personal.  He stated that the deliberations had become too 
emotional.  I said something to the effect of, ‘Well it had to be an 
emotional night, so it’s understandable that we’re emotional in 
there.’ ”  Juror No. 11 also denied waving her arms when making 
this statement, referencing Caro’s mental state on the night of 
the shootings, or discussing any of the evidence related to the 
case.  
The trial court denied Caro’s motion for new trial.  It 
expressed general agreement with the prosecution’s argument, 
which included an assertion that Juror No. 11’s declaration, 
rather than Juror No. 9’s declaration, accurately represented 
the events in the parking lot.  The trial court then found that 
Juror No. 9’s declaration did not differ substantially from the 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
79 
statements uncovered in the inquiry at trial, and that Juror No. 
11’s declaration was consistent with what the court uncovered 
in the inquiry.  The trial court noted that neither party 
requested Juror No. 11’s discharge and that it was now 
“disingenuous” for the defense to assert that Juror No. 11 
committed misconduct.  The trial court also found that, if there 
was misconduct, it was not “inherently and substantially likely 
to have influenced” Juror No. 11, and it was not “substantially 
likely” that she was biased against Caro because of the 
conversation.  The trial court later found that, in general, Juror 
No. 9 “infers motive or intent or conduct which a better factual 
analysis would not show that that was the import of that 
statement or the intent of the conduct or the motive of the 
person who made the statement.”  The trial court characterized 
this as, to some extent, a credibility finding with respect to Juror 
No. 9, who “just assumes things and perhaps believes them to 
be accurate when in fact a further analysis would reveal they’re 
not accurate.” 
Regarding the dismissal of Juror No. 9, Caro has waived 
her claim of error.  Defense counsel affirmatively sought to 
discharge Juror No. 9 because the juror committed intentional 
misconduct.  She did not seek a mistrial based on Juror No. 9’s 
discharge.  Having forcefully argued for Juror No. 9’s dismissal, 
Caro cannot now complain that the trial court erred in siding 
with her.  (See People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49 [counsel 
invited error by affirmatively challenging juror]; People v. 
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1029 [claim of improper 
juror discharge waived where “defense counsel not only did not 
object to the substitution of the juror or move for a mistrial, but 
sought to have her excused”].)  
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
80 
Caro argues in the alternative that if the claim was 
forfeited, defense counsel’s choice to seek Juror No. 9’s removal 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  But Caro must 
show that her counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, 
counsel’s performance must fall “ ‘ “below an objective standard 
of 
reasonableness 
[¶] . . . under 
prevailing 
professional 
norms.” ’ ”  (Lopez, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 966.)  It is undisputed 
that Juror No. 9 committed misconduct.  Without a more 
compelling argument, it is difficult to conclude a lawyer’s 
attempt to remove a juror who clearly committed misconduct — 
an attempt to preserve the integrity of the jury — constitutes 
constitutionally deficient performance.  Regardless, there may 
have been plausible strategic reasons for seeking Juror No. 9’s 
removal that are not apparent on direct appeal.  (Ochoa, supra, 
19 Cal.4th at p. 445; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
264, 266.)  So we cannot conclude that seeking to remove Juror 
No. 9 constituted deficient performance.   
Caro next contends that even if the trial court was right to 
remove Juror No. 9, it should have also removed Juror No. 11 
because she was equally culpable.  To the extent Caro argues 
that the trial court should have removed Juror No. 11 during 
trial, defense counsel’s failure to object or request a mistrial 
forfeited that argument.  (See People v. Williams (2013) 58 
Cal.4th 197, 289 (Williams); Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 
1340-1341; People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 950.)  And 
to the extent Caro raises an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim for not seeking Juror No. 11’s dismissal, even assuming 
there was good cause for such a dismissal, the record is 
insufficient to evaluate trial counsel’s tactical choice.  (See 
People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 266.)   
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
81 
Nonetheless, Caro brought a new trial motion arguing 
that a declaration of Juror No. 9 showed that Juror No. 11 
committed misconduct.  We only disturb a trial court’s decision 
on a motion for new trial if the ruling constitutes “a manifest 
and unmistakable abuse of . . . discretion.”  (People v. 
Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 140.)  If the motion is based 
on juror misconduct, we accept the trial court’s factual findings 
and credibility determinations if supported by substantial 
evidence, but exercise “independent judgment” to determine 
whether the misconduct was prejudicial.  (People v. Dykes (2009) 
46 Cal.4th 731, 809 (Dykes).)  Juror misconduct raises a 
presumption of prejudice.  Still, we evaluate the entire record to 
determine if, on the whole, there was a “ ‘substantial 
likelihood’ ” of prejudice in the form of “ ‘actual[] bias[] against 
the defendant.’ ”  (In re Boyette (2013) 56 Cal.4th 866, 890, italics 
omitted.)   
As an initial matter, the trial court found that Juror No. 
9’s declaration did not substantially differ from the evidence at 
trial.  Although some differences existed — Juror No. 9 asserted 
a longer, heated conversation than what he testified to at 
trial — the trial court’s finding that there was no substantial 
difference makes sense in light of its credibility determinations 
about Juror No. 9.  The trial court agreed generally with the 
prosecution’s arguments on the motion for a new trial, which 
included an assertion that Juror No. 11’s, rather than Juror No. 
9’s, declaration was accurate, and the trial court later found that 
Juror No. 9 lacked credibility.  The trial court’s findings 
implicitly rejected the additional details Juror No. 9 included in 
his declaration and showed acceptance of Juror No. 11’s version 
of events, which comported with the evidence at trial.  Caro 
argues that Juror No. 11’s declaration differed from her trial 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
82 
court statement, because she did not previously mention that 
she had told Juror No. 9 it had to be “an emotional night.”  But 
the declaration was consistent with Juror No. 9’s statement at 
trial that he had “agreed” with Juror No. 11’s assertion that 
“ ‘[Caro] had to be emotional on that night.’ ”  Although Juror 
No. 9’s earlier account indicated that Juror No. 11 may have 
spoken about Caro’s emotional state, and Juror No. 11’s 
declaration contained a more general statement about an 
“emotional night,” the trial court clearly felt that Juror No. 9 
lacked credibility, so this minor difference does not make the 
later declaration inconsistent.  We conclude the trial court’s 
finding — that there was no substantial difference in the 
declarations’ versions of events — was supported by substantial 
evidence.7   
As a result, the trial court found that any juror misconduct 
was not inherently and substantially likely to have influenced 
Juror No. 11, and it was not substantially likely that she was 
biased against Caro because of the parking lot conversation.  We 
find no abuse of discretion.  The trial court found at trial that 
Juror No. 9 initiated a conversation with Juror No. 11 who “was 
kind of stuck and being nice.”  And the trial court implicitly 
                                        
7  
The lack of credible new evidence alone may have been 
sufficient to deny the motion for new trial, given defense 
counsel’s failure to object to, and her approval of, Juror No. 11’s 
presence on the jury.  (Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1341; cf. 
People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 486; Cowan v. Superior 
Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 392; Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation 
Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 103.  But see People v. Adame 
(1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 402, 410.)  Nonetheless, the trial court 
merely stated it was “disingenuous” to raise the new trial motion 
without new evidence and did not rule based on that fact.  We 
do the same. 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
83 
affirmed that finding by indicating that neither of the posttrial 
declarations altered its perception of what had happened.  Juror 
No. 11’s declaration thus supported the trial court’s 
understanding of what occurred.  The trial court’s finding that 
Juror No. 11 was “kind of stuck and being nice” and the 
generalized, innocuous nature of her responsive statement to 
Juror No. 9 counters any implication that Juror No. 11 was 
actually biased against Caro.  (See In re Boyette, supra, 56 
Cal.4th at p. 889; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1309.)   
Caro additionally contends that Juror No. 11 was actually 
biased because she did not disclose her statement that it had to 
be “an emotional night” at trial.  But this precise theory of 
misconduct was never raised to the trial court, so is forfeited.  
(Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 808, fn. 22.)  Moreover, Juror No. 
11 did disclose that they had “[s]ort of” discussed deliberations, 
and that Juror No. 9 had thanked her for listening to him during 
deliberations.  Omitting this mostly innocuous comment in 
response to the judge’s question, “[D]id you discuss with him 
further about the deliberations?” may have been inadvertent 
and not misconduct.  But to the extent it was misconduct, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding no actual 
bias — the omission was minor, and Juror No. 11 was candid in 
her declaration.  (See People v. Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 
1309.) 
ii. 
Posttrial and Pre-sentencing Destruction of 
Dismissed Jurors’ Notes 
Caro asserts that by destroying Juror No. 9’s notes after 
his dismissal, the trial court deprived Caro of evidence 
supporting claims of juror misconduct in her motion for a new 
trial and violated Government Code former section 68152, 
subdivision (e)(1).  After the conclusion of the penalty phase, on 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
84 
February 1, 2002, Caro filed a motion for the release of Juror 
No. 9’s notes as evidence of prejudicial jury misconduct.  At the 
hearing on the motion, the trial court indicated that it had no 
such notes.  The bailiff testified that when Juror No. 9 was 
excused for juror misconduct, the bailiff told him that he could 
pick up the notes at the close of trial.  The notes were kept in 
the jury room in the meantime.  After the trial, Juror No. 9 
called the court twice and arranged times to pick up the notes 
but did not show up either time.  The trial court judge was going 
to go on vacation for three weeks after these two dates, and the 
bailiff decided it would be best to destroy the notes rather than 
leave them in the courtroom.  Because Juror No. 9 had failed to 
pick up the notes on the dates he said he would, the trial court 
agreed with the bailiff’s suggestion.  The bailiff destroyed Juror 
No. 9’s notes (along with the notes for Alternate Juror No. 2 and 
Alternate Juror No. 5).  The trial court’s standard practice was 
to destroy juror notes after trial. 
This 
practice 
did 
not 
violate 
any 
statutory 
or 
constitutional principles.  Government Code former section 
68152, subdivision (e)(1) required the trial court to preserve 
“court records” on a permanent basis.  (See Stats. 1998, ch. 931, 
§ 236, pp. 6523-6524; id., ch. 932, § 34.5, p. 6816.)  But the 
definition of “court records” found in Government Code former 
section 68151, subdivision (a) (Stats. 1996, ch. 1159, § 14, pp. 
8475-8476) and former section 68152, subdivision (j) (Stats. 
1998, ch. 931, § 236, pp. 6526-6527; id., ch. 932, § 34.5, pp. 6817-
6818) does not mention juror notes.  Instead those provisions 
refer to official documents of the kind that would be filed with 
the court or an administrative agency, not a juror’s informal 
notes on the trial.  (See Gov. Code, former §§ 68151, subd. (a), 
68152, subd. (j); see also id., §§ 68151, subd. (a), 68152, subd. (g) 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
85 
[similar current version of these provisions].)  And even 
assuming “court records” can be construed to include juror notes 
and that such notes are discoverable, Caro has failed to 
demonstrate any prejudice.  Caro’s motion for new trial 
contained a declaration from Juror No. 9 and there is no 
evidence to indicate that Juror No. 9 was unable to remember 
his experiences during the trial.  Accordingly, we deny Caro’s 
claim regarding the destruction of Juror No. 9’s notes.  
iii. Exclusion of Defense Witness on Motion for New 
Trial 
 
Caro argues the trial court erred by not allowing the 
defense to call certain witnesses at a hearing on the new trial 
motion.  The prosecution submitted declarations from all 12 
jurors in its opposition to the defense’s motion.  Juror No. 9’s 
declaration 
included 
the 
statement, 
“One 
day 
during 
deliberations, we asked the bailiff if we could see [a photograph 
of Xavier’s car leaving his office’s parking lot on the night of the 
shootings] projected on the wall and she stated that we could 
only have the evidence we already had back in the jury room.”  
The alleged request was never communicated to the parties.  In 
a morning hearing, the court reported that the bailiff had 
informed the court such a request never occurred.  Defense 
counsel requested to examine the bailiff, who testified that such 
a request was never made.  Defense counsel then asked to call 
Juror No. 3 — the jury foreperson — to testify to what occurred, 
based on defense counsel’s “belie[f]” that Juror No. 3 would 
testify “that a conversation did take place with the bailiff 
regarding getting an additional item of evidence or an 
opportunity to view the photograph projected on the wall and 
that in fact a response was made.”  The prosecution argued that 
such testimony was irrelevant because Juror No. 9 was later 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
86 
excused, causing deliberations to begin anew after the alleged 
request.  The trial court observed that nothing in Juror No. 3’s 
declaration indicated he would provide material testimony on 
this issue.  Based on the evidence the parties had provided so 
far, the court tentatively found the alleged request did not occur.  
The trial court stated it would permit the defense to provide 
additional submissions but emphasized its intention to resolve 
the matter that day. 
Later that day, defense counsel proffered written 
summaries of interviews with Juror No. 10 and Juror No. 9.  The 
first allegedly stated that Juror No. 10 remembered Juror No. 9 
making some sort of request to the bailiff.  The second allegedly 
indicated that Juror No. 2 remembered Juror No. 9 asking for a 
photograph of Xavier’s car and a note or sticker in the 
windshield of the car.  Based on this proffer, defense counsel 
requested permission to file additional juror declarations, 
including the still-outstanding declaration anticipated from 
Juror No. 3, or, as an alternative, to call Jurors No. 9 and No. 10 
to the stand.  The prosecutor asserted the new information was 
not specific enough to support further hearing on the matter and 
renewed her argument that the issue was irrelevant.  The trial 
court agreed and denied the defense’s request to file additional 
declarations or call more witnesses.  It faulted defense counsel 
for failing to timely submit any declarations after receiving 
permission to do so at the morning hearing. 
Caro asserts the requested testimony would have shown 
that the bailiff violated section 1138 by failing to notify counsel 
of the alleged request.  The government argues, and Caro does 
not dispute, that Caro did not raise this purported violation as 
a basis for her new trial motion.  The trial court could not have 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
87 
committed error by declining to take additional evidence on an 
issue irrelevant to the motion. 
Even assuming Caro’s motion incorporated the section 
1138 claim and that it was a cognizable ground for obtaining a 
new trial, she fails to show prejudice entitling her to relief.  (See 
People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 667 [trial court may grant 
new trial motion only if the defendant demonstrates reversible 
error]; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1027 [“ ‘[a] 
conviction will not be reversed for a violation of section 1138 
unless prejudice is shown’ ”].)  Suppose Caro’s proffered juror 
testimony convinced the court that Juror No. 9 had indeed 
requested the enlarged photo.  Her theory of prejudice is that 
Juror No. 9 believed the timestamped photo did not in fact show 
Xavier’s car.  Juror No. 9 therefore doubted the prosecutor’s 
timeline establishing Xavier’s whereabouts the night of the 
shootings.  Had he been able to show other jurors a bigger image 
of the photo before the trial court discharged him for 
misconduct, at least one other juror might have shared his doubt 
about the timeline and the ultimate question of Caro’s guilt.  But 
Caro offers no more than speculation that the projected photo 
would confirm Juror No. 9’s suspicions, that such confirmation 
had a reasonable likelihood of affecting jury deliberations after 
Juror No. 9’s departure, or that the photo mattered to any 
remaining juror. 
The trial court did not err in declining to hear additional 
witnesses on this matter.  
D. Other Issues 
i. 
California’s Death Penalty Statute 
Caro raises a number of constitutional challenges to 
California’s death penalty scheme that we have rejected on 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
88 
multiple prior occasions.  We are not persuaded to reconsider 
our precedent.  (People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th 402, 488.)  
We find no basis to conclude the state’s death penalty scheme 
violates the federal Constitution by failing to:  adequately 
narrow the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty (see, 
e.g., id. at p. 488); require written findings from the jury during 
the penalty phase (see, e.g., id. at p. 490); impose a standard of 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” on jury findings in the penalty 
phase (see, e.g., id. at p. 489; People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 
50); instruct the jury on any burden of proof in the penalty phase 
(see, e.g., Winbush, at p. 489); adequately narrow the 
aggravating circumstances the jury can consider (see, e.g., ibid.); 
require jurors to find aggravating factors unanimously (see, e.g., 
id. at pp. 489-490); inform the jury that the mitigating factors 
need not be found unanimously (see, e.g., id. at p. 490); place the 
burden of persuasion on the prosecution (see, e.g., Williams, 
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 294); instruct the jury on a presumption 
of life (see, e.g., People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 415-
416); inform the jury it could impose a life sentence even if 
aggravation outweighed mitigation (see, e.g., People v. Page 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 58); instruct the jury to impose a life 
sentence if mitigation outweighed aggravation (see, e.g., id. at 
p. 57); inform the jury not to consider the deterrent effect or cost 
of the death penalty (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535,  
590-591); adequately narrow prosecutorial discretion as to who 
is charged with capital crimes (see, e.g., People v. Weaver (2001) 
26 Cal.4th 876, 992); or require either “intercase proportionality 
review” or “the disparate sentence review that is afforded under 
the determinate sentence law” (People v. Williams (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 1166, 1205).  Nor did the trial court err by instructing 
the jury using adjectives such as “extreme” and “substantial” in 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
89 
the list of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. Boyce (2014) 59 
Cal.4th 672, 724), by instructing on inapplicable sentencing 
factors (see, e.g., ibid.), or by instructing the jury to impose 
death where “warrant[ed]” (ibid.).  The standard the jury uses 
to determine the penalty is not unconstitutionally vague.  (See, 
e.g., ibid.).  We have also repeatedly denied claims based on 
principles of equal protection (see, e.g., Winbush, at p. 490) and 
evolving standards of decency and international norms (see, e.g., 
ibid.). 
ii. 
Cumulative Error 
Caro contends that even if the asserted errors are 
harmless individually, they require reversal when considered 
cumulatively.  We assumed error on the claim that the 
prosecution should have provided its investigatory material 
about prospective jurors, as well as many of Caro’s evidentiary 
and prosecutorial misconduct challenges.  But no subset of these 
potential errors, or their asserted cumulative effect, requires 
reversal.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J.  
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. SOCORRO CARO 
S106274 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
Today’s opinion declines to decide whether the admission 
of statements from Detective Cheryl Wade’s interview of 
defendant Socorro Caro in the hospital on November 23, 1999, 
was unconstitutional and instead finds any error harmless.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 32–41.)  Although I agree that admission 
of the statements was harmless, I see no reason to leave readers 
wondering whether a constitutional violation occurred here. 
Detective Wade conducted a three-hour interview of Caro 
in the intensive care unit (ICU) a few hours after Caro had 
undergone emergency surgery for a gunshot wound to her head.  
Throughout the interview, Caro was bedridden, isolated from 
family and friends, in continuous pain, intermittently 
unconscious, under the influence of medication, encumbered by 
tubes, monitors, and intravenous lines, and suffering from a 
major foot fracture that had not yet been treated.  Encountering 
Caro in this weakened state, Detective Wade sought to establish 
rapport by acting as Caro’s caregiver and medical advocate, 
without revealing to Caro (until the end of the interview) that 
Caro was a murder suspect and that Wade was there to take 
recorded statements that could be used, and were used, against 
Caro in a capital trial. 
I would hold that statements obtained under such 
circumstances are not “voluntary” — that is, they are not “ ‘ “the 
product of a rational intellect and a free will” ’ ” — and their 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
2 
admission for any purpose violates due process of law.  (Mincey 
v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398 (Mincey).)  Moreover, 
Detective Wade gave no Miranda warning until the final 
minutes of the interview.  (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 
436 (Miranda).)  Because no reasonable person in Caro’s 
position would have felt “ ‘at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation and leave’ ” (Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) 541 
U.S. 652, 663 (Yarborough)), Caro’s statements prior to the 
warning were also inadmissible under Miranda. 
The police, responding to the murder of three children, 
understandably wanted answers.  But the law provides 
safeguards against “ ‘interrogation techniques’ ” that, “ ‘as 
applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are 
so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be 
condemned.’ ”  (Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 163 
(Connelly).)  The hospital interview here crossed the line, and 
we should not hesitate to say so. 
I. 
“A statement is involuntary if it is not the product of ‘ “a 
rational intellect and free will.” ’  (Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at 
p. 398.)  The test for determining whether a confession is 
voluntary is whether the defendant’s ‘will was overborne at the 
time [s]he confessed.’ ”  (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 
404 (Maury).)  We ask “ ‘ “whether the influences brought to 
bear upon the accused were ‘such as to overbear petitioner’s will 
to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-
determined.’ ”  In determining whether or not an accused’s will 
was overborne, “an examination must be made of ‘all the 
surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation.’ ” ’ ”  (Ibid.)  It is the 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
3 
state’s burden to show the voluntariness of the suspect’s 
statements by a preponderance of the evidence.  (Connelly, 
supra, 479 U.S. at pp. 168–169.) 
The high court’s decision in Mincey is instructive here.  
That case also involved a detective’s hospital interview of a 
murder suspect.  A few hours before the interview, at the 
murder scene, the police had “found Mincey lying on the floor, 
wounded and semiconscious.”  (Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 
387.)  At the hospital, Mincey received emergency treatment and 
was placed in the ICU.  “He had sustained a wound in his hip, 
resulting in damage to the sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of 
his right leg.  Tubes were inserted into his throat to help him 
breathe, and through his nose into his stomach to keep him from 
vomiting; a catheter was inserted into his bladder.  He received 
various drugs, and a device was attached to his arm so that he 
could be fed intravenously.”  (Id. at p. 396.) 
Evaluating these circumstances, the high court said:  “It 
is hard to imagine a situation less conducive to the exercise of ‘a 
rational intellect and a free will’ than Mincey’s.  He had been 
seriously wounded just a few hours earlier, and had arrived at 
the hospital ‘depressed almost to the point of coma,’ according to 
his attending physician.  Although he had received some 
treatment, his condition at the time of [Detective] Hust’s 
interrogation was still sufficiently serious that he was in the 
intensive care unit.  He complained to Hust that the pain in his 
leg was ‘unbearable.’  He was evidently confused and unable to 
think clearly about either the events of that afternoon or the 
circumstances of his interrogation, since some of his written 
answers were on their face not entirely coherent.  Finally, while 
Mincey was being questioned he was lying on his back on a 
hospital bed, encumbered by tubes, needles, and breathing 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
4 
apparatus. He was, in short, ‘at the complete mercy’ of Detective 
Hust, unable to escape or resist the thrust of Hust’s 
interrogation.”   (Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at pp. 398–399, 
fns. omitted; see id. at pp. 401–402 [“Mincey was weakened by 
pain and shock, isolated from family, friends, and legal counsel, 
and barely conscious, and his will was simply overborne.”].) 
The circumstances here are similar.  Detective Wade 
interviewed Caro on the afternoon of November 23, 1999, less 
than 12 hours after Caro had undergone emergency 
neurosurgery for a life-threatening gunshot wound to the head.  
At 11:31 p.m. the previous night, police officers had found Caro 
lying unresponsive on the floor of her bedroom in a pool of blood 
and vomit, with a bullet wound to her head, following a 911 call 
by her husband.  Paramedics transported Caro to the hospital 
by emergency airlift.  At 2:30 a.m., a neurosurgeon performed 
emergency surgery to remove bullet and bone fragments 
embedded two centimeters into Caro’s brain.  The surgeon 
described the wound as “a large stellate explosion-type injury in 
the right parietal area where the scalp is literally blown apart, 
and there was no entrance or exit; it was a single large wound, 
and underneath it there was a compound depressed skull 
fracture which pushed the outer table of the bone into the brain.”  
According to the surgeon, the procedure included excision of 
“[a]pproximately four by five centimeters” of skull as well as a 
“[m]inimal amount” of brain. 
When Detective Wade arrived at Caro’s hospital room 
between 12:40 p.m. and 1:00 p.m., Caro was lying intubated in 
the hospital’s ICU with a drain in her head, a breathing tube 
down her throat, binders on her hands to prevent her from 
pulling out the drain, and multiple intravenous lines (IVs) in her 
body.  She had received a codeine shot roughly 90 minutes 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
5 
earlier and appeared to Detective Wade to be under the 
influence of medication. 
 
In addition to the head injury, Caro had suffered a 
Lisfranc fracture in one of her feet that had not been treated at 
the time of the interview.  As Caro’s orthopedic surgeon 
described it, “the forepart of her foot, the part that begins at the 
top of the arch and continues out to the toes, was broken away 
from the middle part of the foot, the part that makes up the top 
of the arch.”  During the interview, Detective Wade observed 
that Caro’s foot “[l]ooks pretty swollen.” 
A transcript and audio recording of the interview are part 
of the publicly accessible record in this case.  (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 2.550(c).)  At the start of the interview, medical 
personnel removed Caro’s breathing tube and suctioned out the 
back of her mouth.  Caro’s distress during this procedure is 
evident from sounds of coughing, choking, and gasping on the 
audio recording of the interview.  Throughout the three-hour 
interview, 
Caro 
was 
bedridden 
and 
required 
medical 
interventions.  Hospital staff took an X-ray of Caro’s foot, and a 
doctor examined the foot and told her she would need additional 
surgery after her brain injury had stabilized.  Nurses placed a 
potassium IV in Caro’s thumb, which caused a continual 
burning sensation; physically moved Caro in order to adjust her 
drain, causing significant pain; aided her in taking pain 
medication; administered a second codeine injection; and 
administered a blood draw.  In addition to the drain in her head 
and the IVs, Caro at various points had an oxygen tube in her 
nose, an oxygenation monitor on her finger, an ice pack on her 
foot, compression stockings on her legs, and an ice pack on her 
arm to ease pain from the potassium IV. 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
6 
Caro complained of severe pain continuously during the 
interview.  At times, she was reduced to sobbing, moaning, or 
exclaiming, “It hurts, hurts, hurts, hurts, hurts” or “Ow, ow, 
ow.”  She expressed pain from the removal of the breathing tube 
and the removal of tape from her face.  Three times, she 
complained of pain in her head.  Twice, she indicated her throat 
was sore.  Seven times, she reported serious pain in her neck 
and shoulders.  Eleven times, she complained of severe pain 
from the potassium IV.  Her broken foot was swollen and sore, 
and the doctor’s physical examination of the foot caused her 
pain.  At one point, Caro reported feeling pain “all over.”  Her 
back hurt.  Her ears hurt.  Her hands hurt.  Her right arm and 
the inside of her thighs were bruised.  She complained of 
discomfort from the oxygenation monitor on her finger, the 
compression stockings on her legs, the patches on her skin for 
monitoring vital signs, and the oxygen tube in her nose, which 
she tried to remove at least three times.  In all, Caro expressed 
pain through words or moans at least 55 times during the 
interview. 
Moreover, Caro drifted in and out of consciousness, 
especially after she received the second codeine injection.  At 
times, her pain and fatigue reduced her to nonverbal 
communication.  At one point, she told Detective Wade, “I’m 
doing my best so I can go to bed.”  A few minutes later, Caro 
appeared to fall asleep, prompting Detective Wade to ask, “Are 
you awake?  Socorro?  So we can talk to you?  Are you awake so 
I can talk to you?”  In her debilitated condition, Caro repeatedly 
expressed confusion and inability to recall what happened the 
previous night or why she was injured.  In the middle of the 
interview, she could not remember Detective Wade’s name.  She 
exhibited no awareness that her children had been killed, 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
7 
instead telling Detective Wade at one point that she believed 
they were at home with their grandmother.  (At the penalty 
phase, a neuropsychologist gave unrebutted testimony that 
Caro suffered from continued amnesia about the events of that 
evening seven months later due to the combination of her brain 
injury and the alcohol and medication in her system when the 
events occurred.)  
Thus, Caro was interrogated when she was “seriously . . . 
wounded” (Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 401), “weakened by 
pain” (ibid.), “on the edge of consciousness” (ibid.), and 
“evidently confused and unable to think clearly about either the 
events of [the previous night] or the circumstances of [her] 
interrogation” (id. at p. 398).  Caro was also “isolated from 
family, friends, and legal counsel” throughout the interview.  
(Id. at p. 401.)  In Mincey, the high court concluded that in light 
of Mincey’s “debilitated and helpless condition” (id. at p. 399), 
“his will was simply overborne” (id. at pp. 401–402) by the 
detective’s “virtually continuous questioning” for four hours 
despite Mincey’s several requests to be let alone (id. at p. 401).  
Here, Detective Wade subjected Caro to repetitive and “virtually 
continuous questioning” for three hours (ibid.), and although the 
interrogation did not proceed in the face of a direct request to 
stop, an unmistakable element of “improper influence” is 
evident in the interaction.  (Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 404 
[“A confession may be found involuntary if . . . secured by the 
exertion of improper influence.”].) 
Interrogation 
tactics 
that 
exploit 
a 
suspect’s 
vulnerabilities may render statements involuntary.  “[A]s 
interrogators have turned to more subtle forms of psychological 
persuasion, courts have found the mental condition of the 
defendant a more significant factor in the ‘voluntariness’ 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
8 
calculus.”  (Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 164.)  One form of 
psychological pressure is a “false friend” technique in which the 
officer misleads the suspect into believing the officer is 
protecting her best interests.  (State v. Rettenberger (Utah 1999) 
984 P.2d 1009, 1016–1017.)  Another is manipulation through 
misrepresentation of fundamental aspects of the interrogation.  
(State v. Eskew (Mont. 2017) 390 P.3d 129, 135–136.) 
Throughout the interview here, Detective Wade presented 
herself to Caro as a supportive caregiver and advocate for Caro’s 
medical needs and recovery.  From the beginning, Detective 
Wade addressed Caro with terms of endearment (“Honey,” 
“Hon”) and spoke words of support and encouragement as Caro 
struggled with her physical condition (e.g., “You’re doing great” 
“Just relax” “Feels good to take a breath, huh?” “You’re doing 
terrific” “I know it hurts but you’re doing great” “Everything’s 
looking great”).  In multiple interactions, Detective Wade 
assumed a caregiving role and projected a unity of interest with 
Caro.  She reminded Caro not to pull out the drain in her head 
(“I know you know. . . .  [I]t just makes me feel better to remind 
you.”).  She adjusted Caro’s pillow and helped her roll over in 
the bed (“There you go. . . .  Is that better?”).  She repeatedly fed 
Caro ice chips (“Here you go, Hon.  Open up.  How’s that?  Is 
that better?”).  She placed an ice pack on Caro’s arm.  She called 
a nurse to obtain medication when Caro requested it.  She 
helped untangle Caro’s medical wires.  She even adjusted Caro’s 
robe for her.  And she repeatedly urged Caro to rely on her for 
any needs (“If you need anything just let me know, okay?” “You 
need something?” “Is that pillow bothering you?” “You want . . . 
another ice chip?” “Can I get you anything else?” “Do you need 
anything else?” “I’ll just help you out, okay?” “Well, I know 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
9 
you’re not alright.  I’m sorry to say that but if there’s anything I 
can get you, you let me know, okay?”).   
At no point did Detective Wade give Caro privacy in 
medical treatment or in discussion with medical personnel 
about her condition.  To the contrary, Detective Wade interposed 
herself between Caro and the hospital staff.  She communicated 
with the medical team on Caro’s behalf, alerting them to pain in 
Caro’s shoulders and conveying Caro’s answers to questions 
posed by the orthopedist.  At various points, Detective Wade 
projected a measure of control over Caro’s medical care.  
Hospital staff even conferred with Detective Wade before 
providing Caro with a codeine shot:  A nurse told Detective 
Wade that she (the nurse) recognized Caro was “hurting and 
uncomfortable” and “would like to give her something for the 
pain,” “but I don’t want to mess up your thing.”  Wade eventually 
responded, “All right.  If that’s what you would normally do, 
then go ahead.”  The nurse noted that Caro was “just constantly” 
saying that “everywhere hurts” and that she (the nurse) had 
“been trying to put it off.”  After some discussion, Detective 
Wade said, “Right.  Right.  So go ahead.”  
On the surface, much of Detective Wade’s interaction with 
Caro resembled the type of encouragement and comfort that a 
family member or friend would ordinarily provide to a fragile 
patient.  In fact, however, Caro was isolated from her family and 
friends, and Detective Wade was not there to be Caro’s friend.  
She was there to obtain recorded statements from a murder 
suspect and to elicit potentially incriminating information that 
could be used, and was used, to try the suspect for capital 
crimes.  Notwithstanding her apparent solicitude for Caro’s 
well-being, Detective Wade’s interests were plainly adverse to 
Caro’s. 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
10 
Moreover, Detective Wade deliberately kept Caro in the 
dark about the fundamental context of the interrogation, i.e., 
that Caro’s children were dead and Caro was a suspect.  Only at 
the end — after hours of seemingly supportive and ingratiating 
talk — did Detective Wade reveal to Caro:  “[R]ight now I’m 
conducting . . . an investigation into the death of your boys . . . .” 
and “Now, you’re suspected of hurting your boys.”  Detective 
Wade then gave Miranda warnings, and Caro invoked her right 
to counsel.  Upon grasping that her boys were dead, Caro let out 
a series of audible gasps and cries over the course of several 
minutes in a chilling denouement to the interrogation. 
In sum, it does not take much for a police interrogation to 
overbear the will of a person in an intensive care unit who, as a 
result of a gunshot wound to the head and emergency 
neurosurgery, is experiencing severe pain and intermittently 
losing consciousness.  By acting as Caro’s caregiver and 
advocate while withholding the fundamental context of the 
interrogation, Detective Wade exerted improper influence over 
a gravely injured and weakened suspect.  Caro did not directly 
ask to stop the interview (until the end), but she repeatedly said 
she was in pain and wanted to sleep.  While allowing Caro to 
sleep at various 
points, 
Detective Wade 
“ceased 
the 
interrogation 
only 
during 
intervals 
when 
[Caro] 
lost 
consciousness or received medical treatment, and after each 
such interruption returned relentlessly to [her] task.”  (Mincey, 
supra, 437 U.S. at p. 401.)  It is not plausible to describe 
submission to such interrogation by anyone in Caro’s condition 
as “voluntary” in any meaningful sense of the word.  (See 
Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 163 [voluntariness inquiry must 
examine “ ‘interrogation techniques . . . as applied to the unique 
characteristics of a particular suspect’ ”]; Miller v. Fenton (1985) 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
11 
474 U.S. 104, 116 [voluntariness inquiry must examine 
“techniques for extracting the statements, as applied to this 
suspect”].)  Although the trial court opined that Detective Wade 
did not do “anything to overcome” Caro’s will, the voluntariness 
of a suspect’s statement, “to the extent the interview is tape-
recorded,” is “subject to our independent review.”  (People v. 
Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1177.)  I would hold that 
admission of Caro’s statements for any purpose offends due 
process of law. 
II. 
Caro’s statements were also inadmissible during the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief for a separate reason:  They were 
obtained before Detective Wade informed Caro of her Miranda 
rights.  (See Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600, 608 
[“Miranda conditioned the admissibility at trial of any custodial 
confession on warning a suspect of h[er] rights:  failure to give 
the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before 
custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any 
statements obtained.”].) 
To determine whether an individual is in custody for 
Miranda purposes, we ask “ ‘first, what were the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those 
circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she 
was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ”  
(Yarborough, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 663; see Miranda, supra, 384 
U.S. at p. 444 [“By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning 
initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way.”].)  When urging the admissibility of statements 
obtained through police questioning without Miranda warnings, 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
12 
it is the state’s burden to establish that the suspect was not in 
custody.  (See People v. Davis (1967) 66 Cal.2d 175, 180–181.) 
In this case, several factors would have caused a 
reasonable person in Caro’s position to believe that law 
enforcement was in control of the interaction and that she was 
not free to terminate the interrogation and leave.  The 
interrogation occurred in a hospital ICU; Detective Wade’s 
assertive presence in an intimate environment where visitation 
is typically reserved for family and friends is itself significant.  
There is no evidence that she or other members of the Ventura 
County Sheriff’s Department ever asked for Caro’s permission 
to be present.  And as noted, Detective Wade did not step out or 
step aside, or offer to do so, when Caro was undergoing medical 
treatment or having conversations with hospital staff about her 
bodily condition and medical needs.  Even the hospital staff 
seemed to regard Detective Wade as having a measure of control 
over Caro’s medical care, as indicated by the conversation in 
which a nurse told Detective Wade that she (the nurse) wanted 
to give Caro a codeine shot “but I don’t want to mess up your 
thing.” 
In addition to Detective Wade, other law enforcement 
personnel were present.  Detective Jose Rivera of the sheriff’s 
department had been stationed by Caro’s bedside or outside her 
room from the time Caro emerged from surgery, and he stayed 
there throughout the interrogation.  A deputy district attorney 
also stood outside the glass door to Caro’s room. At one point, 
Caro asked about him, and Wade responded, “He’s with the DA’s 
office.”  A psychologist hired by the district attorney’s office, Dr. 
Susan Ashley, was present as well.  
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
13 
Further, Caro was “isolated from family, friends, and legal 
counsel.”  (Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 401.)  From the time she 
regained consciousness after neurosurgery, Caro’s only 
interactions (besides speaking to Detective Wade and briefly to 
Detective Rivera) were with medical personnel, and even in 
those interactions, Detective Wade several times interposed 
herself as Caro’s caregiver or advocate.  (See Miranda, supra, 
384 U.S. at p. 445 [“incommunicado interrogation of individuals 
in a police-dominated atmosphere” carries substantial risk of 
Fifth 
Amendment 
violation 
“without 
full 
warnings 
of 
constitutional rights”].) 
The circumstances of the interview were entirely 
consistent with the nature of Detective Wade’s assignment that 
day:  Caro was suspected of murdering her children, and 
Detective Wade was at the hospital to find out from Caro what 
had happened.  It is hard to imagine that law enforcement 
officers, less than 24 hours after a triple murder, would have 
allowed a key suspect to leave their presence, and the whole 
context of the interaction would have made clear to a reasonable 
person in Caro’s position that she was not “ ‘at liberty to 
terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ”  (Yarborough, supra, 
541 U.S. at p. 663; cf. U.S. v. Martin (9th Cir. 1985) 781 F.2d 
671, 673 [“If the police took a criminal suspect to the hospital 
from the scene of a crime, monitored the patient’s stay, stationed 
themselves outside the door, arranged an extended treatment 
schedule with the doctors, or some combination of these, law 
enforcement restraint amounting to custody could result.”].)  
The only reason for delaying the Miranda warning appears to 
have been Detective Wade’s determination to elicit statements 
from Caro before revealing to her that her children had died and 
that she was suspected of harming them. 
PEOPLE v. CARO 
Liu, J., concurring 
14 
The control exercised here by law enforcement in its 
interaction with a bedridden, isolated, and severely injured 
suspect underscores the involuntariness of any statements 
obtained.  Simple, lawful alternatives were available.  Caro was 
not going anywhere, and the police had appropriately 
sequestered her in the ICU.  Detective Wade could have waited 
to interview her until her condition had stabilized and she was 
fully awake, alert, and not in serious pain.  Further, Detective 
Wade could have provided Caro with Miranda warnings at the 
outset of an interview, as the law requires.  The state has not 
advanced any argument based solely on the fact that a murder 
had been committed, nor could it.  Just as there is no “ ‘murder 
scene exception’ ” to the Fourth Amendment — that is, a 
warrantless search “[i]s not constitutionally permissible simply 
because a homicide ha[s] recently occurred” — there is no 
homicide exception to the Fifth Amendment or to the guarantee 
of due process of law.  (See Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 395.)  
Caro’s statements were inadmissible, and I would so hold. 
In all other respects, I join today’s opinion. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Caro 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S106274 
Date Filed: June 13, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Ventura 
Judge: Donald D. Coleman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Tracy J. Dressner, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters and Ronald S. Matthias, Assistant Attorneys General, 
Joseph P. Lee and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Tracy J. Dressner 
2629 Foothill Boulevard, #324 
La Crescenta, CA  91214 
(818) 426-0080 
 
Chung L. Mar 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6169