Case Title: Lina M. Mueller v. McMillian Warner Insurance Company

Citation: 2006 WI 54

Docket Number: 2005AP000121

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 54 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP121 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Lina M. Mueller, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
McMillian Warner Insurance Company, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Merlin A. Switlick and Stephani Switlick, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Apollo Switlick and Security Health Plan of 
Wisconsin, Inc., 
          Defendants, 
 
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company, 
          Intervenor-Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 210 
Reported at: ___ Wis. 2d ___, 704 N.W.2d 613 
(Ct. App. 2005 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 25, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Vincent K. Howard   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Paul E. David and Wendorff, Ellison & David, LLP, 
Wausau, and oral argument by Paul E. David. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief by Russell 
T. Golla and Anderson, O'Brien, Bertz, Skrenes & Golla, Stevens 
 
 
2
Point; Carl L. Ricciardi and Law Offices of Carl Ricciardi, 
Appleton, and oral argument by Russell T. Golla. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III and Law Offices of William Gleisner, Milwaukee; Robert L. 
Jaskulski and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., Milwaukee, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
2006 WI 54
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP121  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV91) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Lina M. Mueller, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
McMillian Warner Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Merlin A. Switlick and Stephani Switlick, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Apollo Switlick and Security Health Plan of 
Wisconsin, Inc., 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance 
Company, 
 
          Intervenor-Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 25, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of that 
part of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing 
the judgment of the circuit court for Marathon County, Vincent 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
2 
 
K. Howard, Judge, granting summary judgment to defendants Merlin 
and Stephani Switlick.1  The circuit court dismissed plaintiff 
Lina Mueller's claims for damages against the Switlicks for 
their alleged negligence in caring for her.  We affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the 
circuit court in favor of the Switlicks. 
¶2 
The dispositive issue is whether the actions taken by 
the Switlicks between the time they initially evaluated and 
immediately assisted and treated Lina Mueller and intervened on 
her behalf and the time they called 911 six to seven hours 
thereafter constitute emergency care at the scene of any 
emergency or accident in good faith for the purpose of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.48(1) 
(2003-04),2 
the 
Good 
Samaritan 
immunity 
statute.   
¶3 
This case involves the interpretation and application 
of Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1), which establishes "Good Samaritan"3 
immunity from tort claims, to the undisputed facts in the 
instant case.  Section 895.48(1) states in relevant part: 
Any person who renders emergency care at the scene of 
any emergency or accident in good faith shall be 
immune from civil liability for his or her acts or 
omissions in rendering such emergency care. 
                                                 
1 Mueller v. McMillian Warner Ins., 2005 WI App 210, 287 
Wis. 2d 154, 704 N.W.2d 613. 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The term "Good Samaritan" derives from the New Testament 
parable in which a Samaritan was the only passer-by to aid a man 
left half-dead by thieves.  See Luke 10:25-37.   
No. 
2005AP121   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The 
Switlicks 
argue 
that 
they 
are 
immune 
from 
liability under the Good Samaritan statute for their acts or 
omissions in rendering care to the plaintiff.  In particular, 
the Switlicks argue that all their acts or omissions regarding 
the plaintiff occurred at the scene of the emergency and 
constitute emergency care rendered in good faith.   
¶5 
The plaintiff argues that the care rendered by the 
Switlicks was not at the scene of any emergency or accident.  
She further argues that the Switlicks did not provide emergency 
care or that the care they rendered ceased to be emergency care 
after 
their 
initial 
evaluation 
and 
immediate 
assistance, 
treatment, and intervention ended.   
¶6 
We hold that whatever the precise scope of "scene of 
any emergency or accident" in Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1), the phrase 
"scene of any emergency" is sufficiently broad to include the 
Switlicks' home where the injured, bleeding plaintiff arrived 
after being hurt in an incident involving an all-terrain vehicle 
(ATV) in the woods.  We further hold that, in the circumstances 
of the present case, "emergency care" under § 895.48(1) refers 
to the initial evaluation and immediate assistance, treatment, 
and intervention rendered to the plaintiff during the period 
before care could be transferred to professional medical 
personnel. 
¶7 
While the Switlicks' initial evaluation and immediate 
assistance, treatment, and intervention on behalf of the 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
4 
 
plaintiff may have constituted emergency care under the statute,4 
the care the Switlicks rendered after this initial evaluation 
and immediate assistance, treatment, and intervention and before 
Ms. Switlick called 911 six to seven hours later was not 
"emergency care."  Professional medical assistance could have 
been summoned.  When the Switlicks decided not to seek 
professional medical assistance after initially assessing the 
plaintiff's injuries and placed her in bed for continued 
observation, emergency care ceased and non-emergency care began.5  
Because a caregiver is not immunized by the Good Samaritan 
statute for non-emergency care, the caregiver is subject to the 
common-law rules governing the conduct.  It does not necessarily 
follow that the caregiver will be liable for damages under 
common-law negligence rules.  We agree with the court of appeals 
that the Switlicks are not entitled to Good Samaritan immunity 
for their non-emergency care.     
¶8 
Accordingly we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the matter to the circuit court for further 
proceedings on the plaintiff's negligence claims against the 
Switlicks.   
 
 
                                                 
4 We need not, and do not, determine whether the Switlicks 
are immune for any emergency care they may have provided; we 
have not examined whether the third element of the Good 
Samaritan statute, good faith, has been met.  
5 Whether this non-emergency care was negligent is not 
before the court. 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
5 
 
I 
 
¶9 
The following facts are undisputed for the purposes of 
the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of the Switlicks 
on their Good Samaritan defense. 
¶10 Merlin and Stephani Switlick are the parents of Apollo 
Switlick, who was 19 years old at the time of the plaintiff's 
injury.  On the day the plaintiff was injured, the Switlicks 
were hosting a party on property they owned in Lincoln County.  
The Switlicks regularly host guests at their Lincoln County 
property, and guests often spend the night in the family 
"shack," which has a number of "bunkhouse-style" bedrooms.  
Apollo arrived at the party around 2:00 p.m.  He drank what he 
described as a couple of twelve-ounce beers before 6:00 p.m. and 
a few more beers between 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.6   
¶11 The plaintiff, Apollo's girlfriend of two years, 
arrived at the party sometime between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.  
Apollo and the plaintiff went inside to play pool.  The 
plaintiff may have consumed alcohol while inside.7   
¶12 At around 10:00 p.m. Apollo and the plaintiff joined 
the Switlicks and their guests outside at a bonfire.  Apollo 
testified 
that 
once 
outside 
he 
heard 
the 
sound 
of 
a 
malfunctioning ATV and decided to go check on his sister and her 
                                                 
6 Whether the Switlicks are liable to the plaintiff for 
providing Apollo with alcohol is not currently before the court. 
7 The plaintiff's memory loss prevented her from recalling 
the events of the evening, including whether she consumed any 
alcohol.     
No. 
2005AP121   
 
6 
 
children, who had taken a family ATV to look for deer.  Apollo 
got on an ATV belonging to one of the guests.  The plaintiff got 
on behind him.  Neither wore a helmet.  After checking on his 
sister, Apollo and the plaintiff headed back to the shack on a 
trail that was not on the family property.   
¶13 On the return trip the incident that produced the 
plaintiff's injuries occurred.  According to Apollo, the ATV hit 
a stump; he then saw an overhanging branch and slammed on the 
brakes.  Apollo remembered nothing else about the incident.8  
Apollo and the plaintiff returned to the shack around 11 p.m.  
Both were bleeding and both vomited shortly after arriving.  Mr. 
Switlick observed that the plaintiff was agitated, and he 
touched her teeth to determine if any were loose.   
¶14 The plaintiff then went inside the bathroom and wanted 
to lie down on the bathroom floor.  Ms. Switlick persuaded the 
plaintiff to lie down in one of the bedrooms.  Ms. Switlick 
testified she awoke the plaintiff approximately every hour to 
check on her.  Throughout the night, the plaintiff was able to 
respond coherently to Ms. Switlick's questions.   
¶15 In the morning, after she had been in bed for 
approximately six to seven hours, the plaintiff was disoriented 
and responded to Ms. Switlick's questions by addressing Ms. 
Switlick as "mom."  As a result of the plaintiff's confusion, 
                                                 
8 Apparently 
due 
in 
part 
to 
his 
injuries, 
Apollo's 
recollection of the events leading up to the plaintiff's injury 
is incomplete. 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
7 
 
Ms. Switlick called for an ambulance.  The plaintiff suffered 
serious, continuing injuries.  
¶16 The plaintiff sued the Switlicks, alleging they were 
negligent in providing alcohol to their minor son, in failing to 
convey her to a hospital, in preventing her from obtaining 
medical treatment, and in failing to seek help for her.  
¶17 The circuit court entered a judgment dismissing the 
plaintiff's complaint, ruling that under Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1) 
the Switlicks were immune from liability for any of their acts 
or omissions occurring between the time when the plaintiff 
returned to the shack and when care of the plaintiff was 
transferred to emergency medical personnel.   
¶18 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
judgment.  The court of appeals concluded: 
[W]hen 
the 
[S]amaritan 
is 
a 
layperson, 
the 
intervention protected will ordinarily be of short 
duration and of an interim sort.  Nothing in the 
statute suggests any intention that an ordinary person 
should make care-giving decisions any longer than the 
emergency situation necessitates.  
 
 . . . . 
That nothing was done to make medical help available 
to Mueller for over six hours only underscores the 
fact that Stephani was not responding as if to an 
emergency.  Based on the undisputed facts in this 
case, the Switlicks thus did not provide any care that 
would entitle them to immunity from liability under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.48.9 
 
                                                 
9 Mueller, 287 Wis. 2d 154, ¶¶29, 35. 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
8 
 
II 
 
¶19 The dispositive issue in the present case requires us 
to interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1), the Good 
Samaritan statute, to the undisputed facts of the case.   
¶20 The interpretation and application of a statute is 
ordinarily a question of law that this court decides independent 
of the circuit court and the court of appeals but benefiting 
from their analyses.   
¶21 Because this case was decided on summary judgment and 
the material facts are not in dispute, we follow the standard of 
review set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  We determine whether 
the circuit court correctly decided an issue of law, namely the 
interpretation and application of the applicable statute, in its 
decision on the summary judgment motion.10   
III 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.48(1) states in relevant part: 
Any person who renders emergency care at the scene of 
any emergency or accident in good faith shall be 
immune from civil liability for his or her acts or 
omissions in rendering such emergency care. 
¶23 The statute sets forth three elements:  
(1) Emergency care must be rendered at the scene of 
the emergency;  
(2) The care rendered must be emergency care; and     
(3) Any emergency care must be rendered in good faith.   
                                                 
10 Prince v. Bryant, 87 Wis. 2d 662, 666, 275 N.W.2d 676 
(1979). 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
9 
 
¶24 If all three elements are met, the alleged tortfeasor 
"shall be immune from civil liability for his or her acts or 
omissions in rendering such emergency care."11  If any element is 
not met, the alleged tortfeasor is not entitled to immunity 
under the Good Samaritan statute. 
A 
¶25 We first examine the requirement that the emergency 
care must be rendered at the "scene of any emergency or 
accident."  The incident during which the injury occurred took 
place in the woods.  The Switlicks were not present at that time 
or place of the incident; they rendered care to the plaintiff 
when she returned to the Switlicks' home after the incident.   
¶26 This court has not had the opportunity to determine 
the scope of the term "scene of any emergency or accident."  
"Scene of any emergency" is not defined in the Good Samaritan 
statute.  
¶27 First, "scene of any emergency" must be broader than 
"scene of any accident."  If "scene of any emergency" meant the 
same thing as "scene of any accident," the word "accident" would 
be surplusage.  "A statute should be construed so that no word 
or clause shall be rendered surplusage and every word if 
possible should be given effect."12   
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1). 
12 Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 N.W.2d 817 
(1980). 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
10 
 
¶28 We find additional help in determining the meaning of 
"scene of any emergency" by examining the statutory history.  
Prior to 1977, when the statute protected only licensed medical 
workers, the statute contained the following definition of 
"scene of an emergency:" 
"[T]he scene of an emergency" means areas not within 
the confines of a hospital or other institution which 
has hospital facilities or the office of a person 
licensed or certified under this chapter.13 
¶29 Under this definition, the scene of an emergency was 
anywhere that emergency care was provided outside of a hospital 
or office of a licensed or certified person.  This definition, 
which was not included when the legislature adopted the present 
Good Samaritan statute, was obviously targeted at medical 
professionals, but it is helpful to our analysis.   
¶30 Also helpful in determining the meaning of "scene of 
any emergency" is the purpose of the current Good Samaritan 
statute.  The purpose of the statute is to encourage individuals 
to provide emergency care to an injured person by immunizing the 
caregivers from common-law liability if they fail to exercise 
reasonable care when rendering emergency care in good faith.  
The circuit court reasoned that to meet this statutory purpose, 
the scene of any emergency or accident should "follow the person 
in peril and in need of emergency care.  It covers the farmer 
that answers the door to find the victim of an automobile 
accident who was able to make it to his door or the driver 
                                                 
13 Wis. Stat. § 448.04 (1975-76). 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
11 
 
finding a hunter who, after falling from his deer stand, crawls 
out to a highway with his broken leg.  The fact that the site of 
the accident is some distance away does not reduce an injured 
person's need for assistance."      
¶31 We agree with the circuit court that the phrase "scene 
of any emergency" should ordinarily be interpreted to cover 
emergency care at a location where such care is needed.  
¶32 Taking into account the text, the statutory history, 
and the purpose of the Good Samaritan statute, we conclude that, 
whatever the precise scope of "scene of any emergency or 
accident," the phrase "scene of any emergency" is sufficiently 
broad to include the Switlicks' home where the injured, bleeding 
plaintiff arrived after the ATV incident.  "Scene of any 
emergency" is sufficiently broad to include in the present case 
not only the place where the incident or injury occurred but 
also the place to which the plaintiff was moved.  As the circuit 
court stated, the "scene of any emergency" may follow the 
injured person.   
¶33 We therefore conclude that the initial evaluation and 
immediate assistance, treatment, and intervention rendered by 
the Switlicks at their home occurred at the "scene of any 
emergency."14 
                                                 
14 This conclusion is consistent with that of other state 
courts that have addressed this issue.  See, e.g., Swenson v. 
Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653 N.W.2d 794, 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) 
(scene of the emergency includes motor vehicle used by Good 
Samaritan to transport injured person to hospital). 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
12 
 
B 
¶34 We next examine the second element of the Good 
Samaritan statute, namely emergency care.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 895.48(1) makes immunity contingent upon the rendering of 
emergency care.  The word "emergency" describes the nature of 
the care. The statute does not, however, define "emergency 
care."15     
                                                                                                                                                             
The concurring judge in the court of appeals concluded that 
the Switlicks did not provide emergency care at the scene of any 
emergency or accident. The judge was bothered by the time 
factor, raising the question how the concept that the scene of 
any emergency travels with the injured party "pertains to the 
entire time after Mueller was injured until she was placed in 
the ambulance some eight hours later." Mueller, 287 Wis. 2d 154, 
¶45 (Hoover, J., concurring).  
15 Two states, Oklahoma and Oregon, have defined the term 
"emergency care" as used in their Good Samaritan statutes.   
Under Oklahoma law, emergency care consists only of 
"artificial respiration, restoration of breathing, or preventing 
or retarding the loss of blood, or aiding or restoring heart 
action or circulation of blood to the victim or victims of an 
accident or emergency . . . ."  Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 76, 
§ 5(a)(2) (2005).   
Oregon Rev. Stat. § 30.800(1) (2003) defines emergency care 
as follows: 
(a) Medical or dental care not provided in a place 
where emergency medical or dental care is regularly 
available, including but not limited to a hospital, 
industrial first-aid station or a physician's or 
dentist's office, given voluntarily and without the 
expectation of compensation to an injured person who 
is in need of immediate medical or dental care and 
under emergency circumstances that suggest that the 
giving of assistance is the only alternative to death 
or serious physical after effects; or 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
13 
 
¶35 The 
circuit 
court 
declared 
that 
emergency 
care 
includes medical assistance and first aid.  The court of appeals 
concluded that when the Good Samaritan is a layperson, the 
intervention will ordinarily be of short duration and of an 
interim sort.16  
¶36 We cannot define "emergency care" with a bright-line 
rule because of the great variety of situations that may qualify 
as emergency care.  We shall, however, attempt to provide a 
flexible, broad working definition of emergency care that is 
suitable for the present case and may be suitable for a 
multitude of other cases.   
¶37 We start by defining "emergency," which means a 
sudden, 
unexpected 
happening 
or 
unforeseen 
occurrence 
or 
condition.  "Emergency medicine" means the evaluation and 
initial, rapid treatment of medical conditions caused by trauma 
or sudden illness.  A working definition of "emergency care" in 
Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1) (as it applies to a layperson) therefore 
would be care rendered by a layperson in a sudden, unexpected 
happening, occurrence or situation that demands immediate action 
until professional medical attention is available.  "Care" 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) Medical care provided voluntarily in good faith 
and without expectation of compensation by a physician 
licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners for the 
State 
of 
Oregon in 
the 
physician's professional 
capacity as a team physician at a public or private 
school or college athletic event or as a volunteer 
physician at other athletic events. 
16 Mueller, 287 Wis. 2d 154, ¶29. 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
14 
 
includes the evaluation, intervention, assistance, and treatment 
of, or intervention on behalf of the injured person, or response 
to medical conditions caused by an accident, trauma, or sudden 
illness.         
¶38 This working definition of emergency care is bolstered 
by the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1), as evidenced by the 
evolution of our Good Samaritan statute.17  
¶39 The original Good Samaritan statute, enacted in 1963,18 
provided immunity only to medical professionals who rendered 
emergency care.19  In 1977 a Good Samaritan statute was adopted 
to extend Good Samaritan protection to laypersons.20  In all 
                                                 
17 Good Samaritan laws of one type or other have been 
enacted in most if not all states.  For discussions of state 
Good Samaritan laws and cases interpreting the statutes, see, 
e.g., Velazquez v. Jiminez, 798 A.2d 51, 57-61 (N.J. 2002); W. 
Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56, at 378 
(5th ed. 1984); Eric A. Brandt, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws——
The Legal Placebo: A Current Analysis, 17 Akron L. Rev. 303 
(1983); Danny R. Veilleux, Construction and Application of "Good 
Samaritan" Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th 294 (1989). 
18 See ch. 46, Laws of 1963. 
For discussions of the Wisconsin Good Samaritan law, see 
David 
A. 
Suemnick, 
Comment, 
Wisconsin's 
"Good 
Samaritan" 
Statute, 48 Marq. L. Rev. 80 (1964); Dawn B. Lieb, Note, The 
Good Samaritan Statute, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 469 (1978).  
19 See Wis. Stat. § 147.17(7) (1965) (providing immunity to 
doctors), which states, "No person licensed under this section, 
who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an 
emergency, is liable for any civil damages as a result of acts 
or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care."  
See also Wis. Stat. § 149.06(5) (providing the identical 
immunity to nurses). 
20 See § 3, ch. 164, Laws of 1977. 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
15 
 
respects relevant to the issue presently before the court, the 
statute has remained unchanged since 1977.  
¶40 A consistent purpose of the Wisconsin Good Samaritan 
statute has been to encourage prompt care in an emergency until 
professional medical care can be obtained. 
¶41 The Legislative Council analysis of Assembly Bill 96, 
which ultimately became the Good Samaritan statute, states that 
the purpose of the bill was to overcome the "reluctance on the 
part of the general public to 'get involved' . . . ."21  The 
Legislative Council analysis goes on to state that the result of 
such reluctance is that "emergency treatment is often delayed or 
denied to many persons involved in accidents or who have 
suffered serious injury."22  The Legislative Council staff thus 
concluded that Assembly Bill 96 "would help eliminate this 
situation and would encourage the public to come to the aid of 
persons involved in accidents who need prompt emergency care.  
As a result, many lives can be saved, and serious injury or 
disability can potentially be minimized."23  
                                                 
21 Bill History, Bill Analysis prepared by Legislative 
Council Staff, at 2 (1977) (on file with Legislative Council, 
Madison, Wis.).  
22 Id.(emphasis added). 
23 Id.(emphasis added). 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
16 
 
¶42 At least one industry group, the Allied Construction 
Employers Association, agreed with this analysis of the Good 
Samaritan statute.  In a letter to the Senate committee 
reviewing the Good Samaritan law prior to its 1977 passage, 
counsel for the Association stated:  "[A]n important benefit of 
AB-96 is that it would encourage workers at a construction site 
to provide emergency first aid to an injured fellow worker until 
better health care services are available."24 
¶43 In addition, a law review commentator has suggested 
that the purpose of the Good Samaritan statute is  
to encourage lay persons and professionals to respond 
to another's need for help by granting limited 
immunity for negligent acts which might occur while 
rendering emergency assistance.  The omnibus wording 
of the current Wisconsin [G]ood [S]amaritan statute 
results from the legislature's determination that 
abrogation 
of 
potential 
tort 
liability 
for 
both 
                                                                                                                                                             
Section 895.48 is consistent with the national trend to 
mitigate the common law that dissuades volunteers from assisting 
an injured person by removing the fear of civil liability for 
prompt and immediate care.  See Street v. Superior Court, 274 
Cal. Rptr. 595, 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) ("Good Samaritan 
statutes of the type at issue here have been enacted in 
virtually every state since California initiated the concept in 
1959.  Their purpose is to eliminate the perceived inadequacies 
of the common law, under which a volunteer, choosing to assist 
an injured person, although having no duty to do so, could be 
held liable for negligence in providing such assistance."); 
Veilleux, supra note 17, § 2[a] ("After the first Good Samaritan 
statute was passed in 1959, all states have enacted some form of 
the legislation."). 
24 Letter 
from 
Tony 
Driessen, 
counsel 
for 
Allied 
Construction Employers Ass'n, to Senator James T. Flynn (chair) 
and Members of the Senate Judiciary and Consumer Affairs 
Committee (June 13, 1977), at 1 (on file with Legislative 
Council, Madison, Wis.). 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
17 
 
professionals and lay persons would encourage more 
individuals to voluntarily assist others.25 
¶44 In 
reaching 
this 
conclusion, 
the 
law 
review 
commentator quotes from a letter to her from Representative J.F. 
Rooney (whom the commentator refers to as the principal author 
of Assembly Bill 96).  Representative Rooney described the 
purpose of the statute as follows:  
In answer to your first question as to why we expanded 
the scope of the original [G]ood [S]amaritan statutes; 
it was felt that our society has become "sue happy" 
and therefore many citizens who might otherwise go to 
the aid of a fellow human being do not because of the 
fear of being sued for trying to help.  By elimination 
of the threat of lawsuit, more people would be apt to 
aid a victim.26 
¶45 A consistent theme runs through these various sources. 
The decision to extend Good Samaritan immunity beyond medical 
professionals reflects the legislative determination that the 
                                                 
25 Lieb, supra note 18, at 470-71. 
Another commentator suggested that the purpose of the 
predecessor to the current statute, which provided immunity only 
to medical professionals, was "to provide for the public welfare 
by encouraging doctors and nurses to render emergency care to 
accident victims at the scene of the accident."  Suemnick, supra 
note 18, at 81. 
26 Letter from J.F. Rooney to Dawn B. Lieb (Aug. 23, 1978) 
(on file with Marquette Law Review) (cited in Lieb, supra note 
18, at 471 n.9). 
See also Veilleux, supra note 17, § 2[a] ("The primary 
purpose of the [Good Samaritan] statutes is to encourage prompt 
emergency care by granting immunity from civil damages and 
removing the fear of liability.  The statutes generally attempt 
to eliminate the perceived inadequacies of the common-law rules, 
under which a volunteer, choosing to assist an injured person 
although having no duty to do so, was liable for failing to 
exercise reasonable care in providing the assistance."). 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
18 
 
removal of potential tort liability would encourage more 
individuals to provide immediate assistance when professional 
medical assistance is not available.  This emphasis on immunity 
for initial and immediate care reflects the legislative purpose 
to encourage such services as are necessary to stabilize an 
injured individual's health or impede an impending tragedy 
during the period before care can be transferred to professional 
medical personnel. 
¶46 In sum, as we have explained, "emergency care" under 
the statute refers only to the initial evaluation and immediate 
assistance, treatment, and intervention at the scene of an 
emergency during the period before care can be transferred to 
professional medical personnel. 
¶47 We 
therefore 
turn 
to 
the 
question 
whether 
the 
Switlicks' care of the plaintiff constituted emergency care 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1). 
¶48 In determining the immunity and liability, if any, of 
the Switlicks, the conduct of each must be separately examined, 
although we refer to both Switlicks as a unit for ease of 
reference. 
¶49 When the plaintiff returned to the shack bloodied and 
vomiting, both Mr. and Ms. Switlick may have been involved in 
the 
initial 
assessment 
of 
her 
injuries, 
the 
immediate 
assistance, treatment, and intervention, and the decision not to 
seek immediate professional medical assistance.  Ms. Switlick 
continued to monitor the plaintiff during the night.  The record 
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2005AP121   
 
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is not clear whether Mr. Switlick rendered care after the 
initial period.  
¶50 Arguably, Mr. Switlick's care may have ended when he 
finished the assessment, and he did not interact with the 
plaintiff again.  Because the Good Samaritan statute does not 
apply to any acts or omissions that occurred while not providing 
emergency care, it similarly will not protect Mr. Switlick for 
any acts or omissions that occurred after he ceased providing 
care altogether.   
¶51 On the other hand, Ms. Switlick's periodic monitoring 
of the plaintiff may have been the part of a joint effort by the 
Switlicks to care for the plaintiff, in which case Mr. Switlick 
would be entitled to Good Samaritan protection to the same 
extent as Ms. Switlick.  
¶52 In evaluating the plaintiff's condition and rendering 
to 
the 
plaintiff 
immediate 
assistance, 
treatment, 
and 
intervention, the Switlicks may have been rendering emergency 
care.  It is undisputed, however, that professional assistance 
could have been summoned immediately after the plaintiff arrived 
at the house, or at least immediately after the initial 
evaluation of the plaintiff.  Instead of summoning professional 
medical 
assistance, 
the 
Switlicks 
determined 
that 
the 
circumstances did not require trained medical professionals, and 
they decided to, and did, provide ongoing care for the plaintiff 
throughout the night.   
¶53 The Switlicks cared for the plaintiff longer than the 
initial evaluation and immediate assistance, treatment, and 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
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intervention and for longer than necessary to transfer care to 
professional medical personnel.  Therefore, after the initial 
evaluation and immediate assistance, treatment, and intervention 
that constituted emergency care, the Switlicks' assistance, 
treatment, and intervention changed from "emergency care" to 
"non-emergency care."  The care the Switlicks rendered to the 
plaintiff during the six- to seven-hour period after their 
initial evaluation and immediate assistance, treatment, and 
intervention was not emergency care.  It was just plain non-
emergency care that is not immunized under the Good Samaritan 
statute and may be subject to a negligence suit. 
¶54 The Switlicks argue that limiting Good Samaritan 
immunity to the period necessary to transfer the injured 
person's care to professional medical personnel thwarts the 
purpose of the statute 
and 
has 
the 
perverse 
effect of 
discouraging responses by creating uncertainty about whether 
immunity applies.  The legislature, however, limited immunity to 
emergency care.  In doing so, the legislature has balanced the 
public policy of encouraging individuals to provide assistance 
to those in need of immediate help with the competing public 
policy of encouraging caregivers to seek professional medical 
assistance. The statute limiting immunization to emergency care 
encourages caregivers to act without eviscerating protection to 
those who are in need of care.   
*  *  *  * 
¶55 We hold that whatever the precise scope of "scene of 
any emergency or accident" in Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1), the phrase 
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2005AP121   
 
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"scene of any emergency" is sufficiently broad to include the 
Switlicks' home where the injured, bleeding plaintiff arrived 
after being hurt in an incident involving an all-terrain vehicle 
(ATV) in the woods.  We further hold that, in the circumstances 
of the present case, "emergency care" under § 895.48(1) refers 
to the initial evaluation and immediate assistance, treatment, 
and intervention rendered to the plaintiff during the period 
before care could be transferred to professional medical 
personnel. 
¶56 We therefore agree with the court of appeals that the 
Switlicks are not entitled to Good Samaritan immunity for their 
extended care of the plaintiff.  While the Switlicks' initial 
evaluation and immediate assistance, treatment, and intervention 
constituted emergency care, the care rendered by the Switlicks 
after 
the 
initial 
evaluation 
and 
immediate 
assistance, 
treatment, and intervention for longer than the period necessary 
to transfer care to professional medical personnel does not 
constitute "emergency care."  When the Switlicks did not seek 
professional medical assistance after the initial evaluation and 
immediate evaluation, assistance, treatment, and intervention, 
emergency care ceased and non-emergency care began.  The 
Switlicks have not asserted a valid Good Samaritan defense to 
the plaintiff's negligence claims against them for non-emergency 
care. 
¶57 For the reasons set forth, the decision of the court 
of appeals is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit 
No. 
2005AP121   
 
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court to determine whether the Switlicks are liable for 
negligent non-emergency care. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
No. 
2005AP121   
 
 
 
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