Case Title: Candelaria v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-49

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Candelaria v. State1995 WY 66895 P.2d 434Case Number: 94-49Decided: 05/05/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Ruben 
Joseph CANDELARIA, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Leonard D. Munker, State 
Public Defender, and Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., 
Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Attorney Gen., D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Asst. Atty. 
Gen., and Mary Beth Wolff, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Ruben 
Candelaria appeals from his conviction for two counts of homicide by 
vehicle.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

Issues

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents five issues:

[¶4]      Issue 
I.

Did the trial court err when it failed to suppress 
the results of the second drug test performed on the 
Appellant?

[¶5]      Issue 
II.

Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's 
theory of the defense instructions thus depriving Appellant of his 
constitutional right to due process?

[¶6]      Issue 
III.

Whether the Appellant's convictions must be reversed 
in accordance with this Court's decision in Bearpaw v. State, 803 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶7]      Issue 
IV.

Did the trial court err when it allowed a State's 
witness to testify in violation of a sequestration order?

[¶8]      Issue 
V.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
sentencing the Appellant to the maximum term of two consecutive 
years?

Facts

[¶9]      During the 
evening of March 15, 1993, Appellant borrowed his cousin's car and drove around 
Cheyenne with several of his friends. Appellant had received his driver's 
license only four days earlier, and he had driven the car, which had a manual 
transmission, for the first time only three days before. Throughout the evening, 
Appellant dropped off some of the passengers and picked up others. Appellant and 
several of the passengers drank beer and smoked marijuana, and some of the 
passengers warned Appellant to pay attention to his driving and to watch the 
road. At around midnight, Appellant began driving fast and swerving at the 
mailboxes located along the side of the road. The passengers yelled at 
Appellant, and one of them again warned him to "quit driving 
crazy."

[¶10]   Appellant eventually lost control 
of the car south of Cheyenne on Wyoming Highway 223. The car left the pavement 
and traveled along the dirt shoulder. It returned to the pavement; swerved 
twice, leaving tire marks on the pavement; left the pavement a second time; and 
rolled down an embankment which was eighteen feet deep. All four occupants were 
ejected. Two passengers were killed while Appellant and the third passenger 
survived. None of the passengers was wearing a seat belt.

[¶11]   The prosecution filed an amended 
information which charged Appellant with two counts of aggravated homicide by 
vehicle as defined by WYO. STAT. § 6-2-106(b)(ii) (Supp. 1994). After a four-day 
trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of homicide by vehicle pursuant to WYO. 
STAT. § 6-2-106(a) (Supp. 1994). The district court sentenced Appellant to serve 
two consecutive terms of one year each in the county jail,1 and Appellant brought this 
appeal.

The Blood 
Test

[¶12]   Appellant contends that the 
district court violated W.R.E. 401, 402, and 403 when it failed to suppress the 
results of the second test made on the blood sample which had been taken from 
him at the hospital on the morning after the accident. Specifically, Appellant 
claims that the evidence was irrelevant and that the evidence prejudiced him 
unfairly and confused the jury. Appellant asserts that this error cannot be 
considered as being harmless.

[¶13]   "Questions of admissibility of 
evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decisions 
will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion." Furman v. Rural 
Electric Company, 869 P.2d 136, 140 (Wyo. 1994). We recently summarized W.R.E. 
401 and 402:

Evidence is relevant if it tends to make any fact of 
consequence more or less probable than it would be without that evidence. All 
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, by 
[the Wyoming Rules of Evidence], or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

869 P.2d  at 140 (citations 
omitted). See W.R.E. 401, 402. W.R.E. 403 provides:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.

[¶14]   On the morning after the accident, 
a Wyoming highway patrolman obtained a sample of Appellant's blood. The Wyoming 
state health laboratory tested part of the sample for the presence of alcohol 
and sent another part of the sample to Analytitox, a Colorado laboratory, so 
that Analytitox could test the blood for the presence of metabolites of 
marijuana. The results of the test performed by Analytitox were negative because 
the amount of marijuana in the sample was below Analytitox's cutoff level. 
Approximately three and one-half months later, the prosecutor requested that a 
second test be made on the blood sample for the presence of metabolites of 
marijuana. Chemitox, another Colorado laboratory, performed the second test. 
Chemitox found a slightly greater amount of marijuana metabolites than 
Analytitox had found, and the results from the Chemitox test were consistent 
with the active use of marijuana. The defense counsel objected to the admission 
of the results of the second test as evidence, and the district court overruled 
the objection.

[¶15]   The evidence which showed that 
Appellant's blood contained traces of marijuana was relevant. The prosecution 
had presented evidence which indicated that the presence of marijuana in 
Appellant's blood could have impaired his driving ability. Evidence which 
demonstrated that Appellant's driving ability was impaired could lend support to 
the conclusion that Appellant was driving his vehicle in a reckless manner 
pursuant to § 6-2-106(b)(ii).2 See, e.g., Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 706-07 (Wyo. 1992) (evidence of cocaine metabolites would be relevant 
in an aggravated-vehicular-homicide prosecution).

[¶16]   The evidence did not unfairly 
prejudice Appellant or confuse the jury. Appellant's trial counsel effectively 
cross-examined Chemitox's owner, and he presented testimony from Analytitox's 
supervisor, who explained why the results of the first test were negative. In 
addition, the results of the second test merely confirmed the testimony from 
several eyewitnesses who had seen Appellant smoke marijuana on the night of the 
accident. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
allowing the prosecution to present the results of the second test which had 
been made on the blood sample.

[¶17]   Appellant alleges that the 
admission of the second test results offends the public's sense of fair play and 
placed the State at an unfair advantage since the prosecutor had made his 
request for the second test during a continuance which he sought as a result of 
witnesses not being available. Appellant does not present any pertinent 
authority in his brief for this claim. It is not our function to formulate a 
party's argument, and we consistently refuse to consider arguments which are not 
supported by cogent argument or pertinent authority. McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry 
Co., 886 P.2d 595, 597 n. 2 (Wyo. 1994).

Instructions

[¶18]   Appellant alleges that the district 
court committed reversible error when it refused to give two instructions to the 
jury which Appellant characterizes as being theory-of-the-defense instructions. 
Although the defense counsel presented the two proposed instructions in writing 
to the district court during the instruction conference, the record does not 
contain either of the proposed instructions. The transcript of the instruction 
conference, however, provides us with a description of the two instructions 
which is sufficient to permit us to address this issue.

[¶19]   A defendant has the right to have 
instructions on [his] theory of the case presented to the jury when the proposed 
instructions sufficiently inform the jury of [his] theory of defense and when 
competent evidence supports the law expressed in the requested instructions. The 
trial court may, however, properly refuse to give a requested instruction, even 
though it is correct, when other instructions have been given which sufficiently 
cover the principles which are being offered in the requested 
instruction.

Gilliam v. State, 890 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Wyo. 1995) (citation omitted).

A. "Intervening Cause" 
Instruction

[¶20]   The first instruction proposed by 
the defense defined the term "intervening cause." The district court gave the 
following instruction to the jury:

INSTRUCTION NO. 4.1

The "proximate cause" of an injury is that cause 
which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, 
and without which the injury would not have occurred, the injury being the 
natural and probable consequence or result of the wrongful 
act.

Negligence on the part of a victim is not a defense 
to criminal prosecution and does not excuse any criminal acts on the part of a 
defendant. The State is required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it 
was the criminal act on the defendant's part that was the proximate cause of the 
death of [the two passengers].

The actions of the victim may be considered whenever 
those actions have a bearing upon the alleged conduct of the defendant. The actions of the victim may be considered 
in deciding the question of whether the defendant's wrongful act was the 
proximate cause of the victim['s] death.

(Emphasis added.) Appellant 
concedes that this instruction was correct, but he claims that it was 
inadequate. He argues that the jury should have been instructed that the 
victims' negligence in failing to wear seat belts could be used as an 
intervening cause. We disagree.

[¶21]   Even if the proposed instruction 
correctly defined the term "intervening cause," such an instruction was not 
necessary. The last sentence of Instruction No. 4.1 adequately informed the jury 
that it could consider the victims' actions in determining whether Appellant's 
wrongful act was the proximate cause of the victims' deaths. See Buckles, 830 P.2d  at 707-08. The district court properly refused to give the 
intervening-cause instruction. See Gilliam, 890 P.2d  at 
1109.

[¶22]   Appellant contends that, since the 
instruction which defined the term "intervening cause" is missing from the 
record, we must reverse his convictions in accordance with our holding in 
Bearpaw v. State, 803 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1990). In Bearpaw, trial counsel for the 
defendant failed to file a designation of the record on appeal, and a transcript 
of the proceedings could not be obtained. 803 P.2d  at 75-77. We stated: "This 
court cannot rationally analyze the merits of any potential defense within the 
concepts of adequacy of representation without a comprehensive record." 803 P.2d  
at 78. Here, the only missing item is the text of the proposed instruction which 
defined intervening cause. Since we have been able to glean the nature of the 
proposed instruction from the transcript of the instruction conference and since 
the instructions which the district court gave to the jury are contained in the 
transmitted record, we have had no trouble analyzing the merits of Appellant's 
argument in this case. The record in this case is sufficiently complete to 
permit both effective assistance of appellate counsel and due process. See 
Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 598, 601 (Wyo. 1993).

B. "Conduct" Instruction

[¶23]   The second instruction proposed by 
the defense defined the term "conduct." The proposed instruction stated that 
"the conduct, which is referred to in the . . . instruction [which defined the 
elements of the offense], is the Defendant's driving." Appellant claims that 
this is a correct statement of the law and that the absence of the instruction 
improperly permitted the jury to conclude that Appellant's alcohol and marijuana 
use was the proximate cause of the accident.

[¶24]   Section 6-2-106 defines the crimes 
of homicide by vehicle and aggravated homicide by vehicle. That section provides 
in part:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section, a person is guilty of homicide by vehicle . . . if he operates or 
drives a vehicle in a criminally negligent manner, and his conduct is the 
proximate cause of the death of another person. Evidence of a violation of any 
state law or ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the 
regulation of traffic, except for evidence of a violation of W.S. 10-6-103, 
31-5-233 and 41-13-206, is admissible in any prosecution under this 
subsection.

(b) A person is guilty of aggravated homicide by 
vehicle . . . if:

(ii) He operates or drives a vehicle in a reckless 
manner, and his conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another 
person.

Since the district court 
gave instructions to the jury which accurately described the elements of 
homicide by vehicle and aggravated homicide by vehicle according to the language 
found in § 6-2-106,3 the district court properly refused 
to give Appellant's proposed instruction. See Gilliam, 890 P.2d  at 
1109.

Sequestration Order

[¶25]   Appellant asserts that the district 
court erred when it allowed the State's rebuttal expert witness to testify after 
the district court had entered a sequestration order. Appellant argues that 
allowing the State's rebuttal witness to testify after he had listened to the 
testimony of one of Appellant's expert witnesses was an "egregious violation" of 
W.R.E. 615.

[¶26]   W.R.E. 615 
provides:

At the request of a party the court shall order 
witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, 
and it may enter the order on its own motion. This rule does not authorize 
exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee 
of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its 
attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to 
the presentation of his cause.

The language of W.R.E. 615 
is plain; it contemplates sequestration of each witness during the testimony of 
the other witnesses. Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350, 352 (Wyo. 1989). The rule 
is designed to prevent the parties from tailoring their testimony to conform to 
prior testimony and to assist the fact finder in detecting falsehoods and 
testimony which is less than candid. Id. In the context of W.R.E. 615(3),4 we have 
stated:

A 
party who contends that the presence of a witness is essential to the 
presentation of his cause must bear the burden of supporting that allegation and 
showing why the policy of Rule 615 in favor of sequestration is 
inapplicable.

Stone v. Stone, 745 P.2d 1344, 1350-51 (Wyo. 1987). We have also stated:

[P]ermitting witnesses to testify who have been in 
the courtroom in violation of a sequestration order is a matter addressed to the 
sound discretion of the court and . . . we [will] reverse only for an abuse of 
that discretion.

Lauthern, 769 P.2d  at 
352.

[¶27]   In this case, the district court 
entered a sequestration order at the conclusion of the opening statements. 
During its case-in-chief, the prosecution called two expert witnesses who 
testified about the speed at which the car was traveling. The first expert 
testified that the car was traveling 65 to 66 miles per hour when it was leaving 
the marks on the pavement. The second expert testified that the speed of the car 
was "in the 60s" when it was leaving the tire marks. The defense also presented 
an expert during its case-in-chief. He testified that the car was traveling 
approximately 60 miles per hour when it first left the 
road.

[¶28]   After the defense rested, the 
prosecutor called a rebuttal expert witness who had been present in the 
courtroom during the testimony of the defense expert. The rebuttal expert 
testified that the speed of the car was 70 to 75 miles per hour when it first 
left the road. When the prosecutor called the rebuttal expert witness, the 
defense counsel objected, citing the sequestration order. The district court 
stated:

I 
believe that the sequestration rule does not apply to experts. You can have an 
expert sit in and listen to the testimony of another expert. I think the rule is 
designed more for fact witnesses who purport to give testimony as to specific 
things they observed. That's my understanding of the rule. But you are objecting 
and I'll overrule the objection.

[¶29]   The district court's reasoning is 
inconsistent with the plain language of W.R.E. 615. The prosecutor made no 
attempt to show that the presence of the rebuttal expert witness had been 
essential, and the district court did not determine whether the expert's 
presence had been essential. See Stone, 745 P.2d  at 1351. The district court's 
ruling was, therefore, erroneous, and it constituted an abuse of discretion. We 
conclude, however, that the error was harmless. An error warrants reversal only 
when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights. Price 
v. State, 807 P.2d 909, 913 (Wyo. 1991); W.R.Cr.P. 52(a); W.R.A.P. 9.04. The 
party who is appealing bears the burden to establish that an error was 
prejudicial. Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 550 (Wyo. 1993). Appellant has 
failed to demonstrate how the testimony of the rebuttal witness was prejudicial. 
Even if the jury accepted the testimony of the defense expert witness that the 
car was traveling approximately 60 miles per hour, ample additional evidence 
indicated that Appellant was criminally negligent pursuant to § 
6-2-106(a).

Sentence

[¶30]   Appellant contends that the 
district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to serve two consecutive 
terms of one year each in the county jail. He claims that the district court 
used "aggravators" which the jury had refused to accept in its verdict and that 
the district court thereby rested its sentencing decision on an improper 
premise. We disagree.

[¶31]   We do not set aside a sentence 
which is within the legislatively mandated minimum and maximum terms in the 
absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Eustice v. State, 871 P.2d 682, 684 
(Wyo. 1994).

"A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts 
in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is 
whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it 
did."

Gailey v. State, 882 P.2d 888, 891 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980)). 
A defendant has the burden to establish that the sentencing court in fact rested 
the sentence on false or improper premises. Van Riper v. State, 882 P.2d 230, 
239 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶32]   Appellant cites to a portion of the 
comments made by the district court at the sentencing 
hearing:

When you turn to the facts of the case, . . . I think 
with technical accuracy the jury's decision refers to it as an accident. [The 
prosecutor] disputes that characterization. I think it may be a case where one 
attempts to say too much about something by simply affixing a label, whether 
it's a mere accident or an aggravated accident, whatever one calls it. The facts 
are that [Appellant] was driving too fast although the evidence, as I recall, 
was not that there was extraordinary speed involved, but certainly in excess of 
the speed limit. He had been swerving and dodging mailboxes, generally engaging 
in what I think any reasonable person would consider quite reckless driving, and 
then, of course, there was the fact of the consumption of alcohol and marijuana. 
So there, of course, is some culpability on [Appellant's] part, whether someone 
calls it an accident or not.

The district court used the 
term "reckless," which is an element of aggravated homicide by vehicle. See § 
6-2-106(b)(ii). We have reviewed all the comments which the district court made 
at the sentencing hearing, and, when we consider the context in which the term 
"reckless" was used, it becomes clear that the district court did not disregard 
the jury's finding that Appellant was not guilty of aggravated homicide by 
vehicle. Although the district court may have misspoken, this solitary use of 
the word "reckless" did not constitute a false or improper premise. The district 
court based its sentencing decision in part upon the deaths of the two victims 
and a prior incident in which Appellant had been arrested for drinking under 
age, careless driving, and attempting to elude the police. The sentence imposed 
did not exceed the legislatively mandated maximum sentence, and, under the 
circumstances, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.

Conclusion

[¶33]   We have found no reversible error 
in any of the issues which were raised by Appellant; therefore, his convictions 
are

[¶34]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES 

1 The district court suspended 
Appellant's sentence as to Count II and ordered that, after he had finished 
serving his sentence for Count I, Appellant be placed on probation for a period 
of one year with one of the probation terms being that he be referred to a 
community corrections facility.

2 Although the evidence of Appellant's 
marijuana use was admissible to prove the crime defined by § 6-2-106(b)(ii), it 
was not admissible to prove the crime defined by § 6-2-106(a). See § 6-2-106(a) 
(citing WYO. STAT. § 31-5-233 (1994)). The defense counsel, however, did not 
request a limiting instruction pursuant to W.R.E. 
105.

3 The district court gave the following 
instructions to the jury on the elements of the 
offenses:

INSTRUCTION NO. 
3

The necessary elements of the crime of 
aggravated homicide by vehicle are:

.           
.           
.           
.           
.

1.         That 
on March 16, 1993;

2.         
[Appellant] was driving a motor vehicle;

3.         In 
Laramie County, Wyoming;

4.         In a 
reckless manner; and

5.         
[Appellant's] conduct was the proximate cause of the death of another 
person. . . .

INSTRUCTION NO. 
5B

The essential elements of the crime of 
vehicular homicide are:

1.         That 
the crime occurred in Laramie County on or about March 16, 1993; 
and

2.         That 
[Appellant] did;

3.         Drive 
a vehicle in a criminally negligent manner;

[4].       And that the 
conduct was the proximate cause of the death of 
another.

4 The prosecution did not have W.R.E. 
615(1) available to it because the State is not a natural person, nor did it 
have W.R.E. 615(2) available to it for the rebuttal expert because the 
prosecutor had already designated a different witness to serve as the 
prosecution's representative.