Case Title: Contreras By and Through Contreras v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 1

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Contreras By and Through Contreras v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 11992 WY 170843 P.2d 589Case Number: 91-251Decided: 12/10/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
James 
CONTRERAS, a minor child, By and Through his next friend and mother, Brenda 
CONTRERAS; Brenda Contreras; and Odorico Contreras, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

CARBON 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT # 1; Belinda Wells; Kathleen Shamion; and Robert V. 
Johnson, Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from District Court, CarbonCounty, Larry L. Lehman, 
J.

 Cary R. 
Alburn, III, Laramie, for appellants.

Cameron 
S. Walker (argued), and Judith A. Studer of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, 
for appellees.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE and 
URBIGKIT*, JJ., and RAPER, J. 
Ret.

* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

CARDINE, Justice.

 [¶1.]     This case involves a 
claim for damages resulting from personal injury caused by a playground accident 
at PershingElementary School. 
Appellants James Contreras, Brenda Contreras and Odorico Contreras appeal the 
order granting judgment on a jury verdict for defendants-appellees, and denying 
their motion for a new trial. At issue is whether the trial court properly 
granted partial summary judgment on appellants' negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim, and whether certain photographs offered by appellants 
were properly excluded by an order in limine.

 [¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 [¶3.]     Appellants state the 
issues as follows:

A. The 
District Court should have declined to hear Appellees' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment or, having consented to hear it, should have denied 
it.

B. The 
District Court should have declined to hear Appellees' Motion in Limine, to the 
extent that it constituted a dispositive Motion or, having consented to hear it, 
should have denied it.

C. It 
was error not to grant Appellants' Motion for New Trial.

 [¶4.]     Appellees provide the 
following, additional issues for our review:

1. Have 
appellants made sufficient offers of proof to preserve contended evidentiary 
errors on appeal?

2. Does 
this Court have jurisdiction to consider the appeal of Brenda Contreras from the 
Summary Judgment dismissing her emotional distress claim when she has never 
appealed from that Summary Judgment?

3. 
Since the evidentiary issues raised on appeal pertain exclusively to the 
condition of the school premises, should Judgment in favor of appellees Wells 
and Shamion (who had no involvement in design or maintenance of the playground) 
be summarily affirmed?

 [¶5.]     In their reply brief, 
appellants concede appellees' third issue. Therefore, the judgment in favor of 
appellees Wells and Shamion is summarily affirmed.

 [¶6.]     January 25, 1989, was a 
cold, blustery day in Rawlins, Wyoming. The weather that morning did not keep 
about 150 to 200 children from gathering, as they often did, outside PershingElementary School to play in the school 
playground before school began. The children were supervised by two school 
employees, appellees Belinda Wells and Kathleen Shamion.

 [¶7.]     The playground at 
Pershing Elementary was divided into two segments. The west end, with swings and 
other playground equipment, was where the little children played together. The 
east, or "high activity" end, was where the older children played. This 
segregation of the playground was established mostly by convention and the 
tendency of children to play with those their own age. There was no physical 
barrier of any sort between the high-activity area and the area to the west of 
it where the younger children played, although the playground supervisors did 
try to keep the younger children out of the high-activity 
area.

 [¶8.]     In the high-activity 
area there was a football field marked out in white lines. On the morning in 
question, several fifth-grade boys were playing their daily game of football on 
the field. They had been instructed to keep within the white lines. One of the 
boys, Chuck Juare, was running backwards to catch a pass when he collided with 
appellant James Contreras. James was then seven years old and in the first 
grade. James was knocked off his feet, and Chuck fell on top of him. Another 
fifth-grade boy, Nick Armijo, was shadowing Chuck in the game. After Chuck fell, 
Nick tripped over Chuck and James and fell on top of them.

 [¶9.]     Mrs. Wells, Mrs. 
Shamion, and the school principal, Robert Johnson, soon arrived at the spot 
where James Contreras lie crying and in pain. James repeatedly told Johnson that 
his leg hurt. After ascertaining that the child had no back, neck or head 
injuries, Johnson decided to take him indoors because of the cold. He carried 
James about 200 feet, first into the school building and then into the school 
office. Johnson placed James on a nurse's cot in the 
office.

 [¶10.]  Mr. Johnson's secretary called James' 
mother, appellant Brenda Contreras, to inform her that her son had been hurt. 
Mrs. Contreras drove quickly to the school. When she got out of her car in front 
of the school building, she could hear her son crying. She followed the sound of 
crying to the office, where she discovered her son lying on the cot in intense 
pain. His crying disturbed her so much that soon she too was crying. Mr. Johnson 
asked Mrs. Contreras whether she wanted an ambulance called. She said that she 
did.

 [¶11.]  When the paramedics arrived, they cut the 
leg off James' jeans to observe his injuries. They discovered that James had an 
inverted right femur, which is a very painful fracture of the longest bone in 
the human body. The femur in James' leg was visibly twisted toward the other 
leg. Mrs. Contreras was told that her son's leg was broken. James was taken to 
the hospital in an ambulance, where he was fitted with a body cast which he wore 
subsequently for two and one-half months.

 [¶12.]  James, his mother and his father all 
filed suit against Carbon County School District No. 1, Mrs. Wells, Mrs. 
Shamion, Robert Johnson, Chuck Juare and Nick Armijo. In addition to claims for 
medical expenses, home health care provided, and compensation for James' pain 
and suffering, Brenda Contreras requested in the complaint damages for the 
emotional distress she incurred at seeing her son in severe pain and worrying 
that he might be permanently deformed by the injury. The trial court entered 
judgment against Mrs. Contreras on her emotional distress claim. Nick Armijo was 
never served with process, and the claim against Chuck Juare was dismissed after 
he reached a settlement with the plaintiffs. The remainder of the claims were 
allowed to go to the jury. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the defendants on all claims.

 [¶13.]  Appellants subsequently moved for a new 
trial, on the grounds that they had wrongfully been prevented from presenting 
photographs and other evidence depicting the playgrounds and supervision 
provided at other schools in Carbon County School District No. 1. The trial 
court had excluded both photographs and testimony by the principals on these 
subjects as irrelevant. After a hearing, the trial court denied appellants' 
motion for a new trial. Appellants took timely appeal from the court's 
order.

 [¶14.]  In their first issue, appellants bring 
both procedural and substantive challenges to the trial court's order of partial 
summary judgment which disposed of Brenda Contreras' claim of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. First, appellants claim that the trial court 
should have refused to hear the motion for summary judgment because it was filed 
after the deadline provided by the court for dispositive motions and also fewer 
than ten days before the hearing. See W.R.C.P. 56(c). Second, appellants 
challenge the trial court's finding that an emotional distress claim is 
precluded by our decision in Gates v. Richardson, 
719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986).

 [¶15.]  The trial court's scheduling order 
required all dispositive motions to be filed by May 10, 1991; it set a hearing 
on these motions for June 13, 1991. Appellees mailed a copy of their motion for 
partial summary judgment to defendants on May 31, 1991, and filed it with the 
court on June 3, 1991. Appellants moved to strike the motion as untimely because 
it was not filed within the deadline for dispositive motions, or alternatively, 
to deny the motion on substantive grounds.

 [¶16.]  Appellees' motion was filed after the 
deadline provided for dispositive motions in the pretrial order. The trial court 
proceeded to hear the motion and rule on it, over appellants' objection. 
Appellants now argue that the trial court was bound by its pretrial 
order.

 [¶17.]  We have stated that a trial court has 
discretion to waive the requirements contained in its pretrial orders. Oukrop v. 
Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 233, 236-38 (Wyo. 1988); 
Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 648 P.2d 519, 
527 (Wyo. 1982); Ford Motor Co. v. Kuhbacher, 
518 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo. 1974). We will not overturn the trial 
court's ruling excusing a failure to observe its pretrial order unless there has 
been an abuse of discretion. Kuhbacher, 518 P.2d  at 1260. We hold that there was 
no abuse of discretion in this instance. The trial court could choose to hear, 
in the interest of judicial economy, an untimely dispositive motion. While it is 
a better practice for the court to adhere to its scheduling orders, we cannot 
say that appellants were unfairly prejudiced or that a manifest injustice was 
committed by the trial court's consideration of appellees' motion for partial 
summary judgment. Kuhbacher, 518 P.2d  at 1260.

 [¶18.]  More serious is the question of notice 
with respect to the motion. Appellees mailed a copy of their motion to 
appellants on May 31, 1991. The hearing was held on June 10. Wyoming Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(c), in effect at the time of the hearing, required that a 
motion for summary judgment be served at least 10 days before the hearing. Rule 
6(a) provided that

the day 
of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to 
run shall not be included.

 [¶19.]  Appellants now argue that if the date of 
service is not included as one of the computational days, service was actually 
due eleven days before June 10, 1991, 
or on May 30, 1991. If appellants' calculations are correct, appellees were one 
day late in serving their motion. Appellants urge us to remand for trial on Mrs. 
Contreras' emotional distress claim because of the one-day delay. We decline to 
do so. As will be discussed, the record shows that appellees were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on this claim. Even if this matter were now heard 
and decided in appellants' favor by a jury, the trial court would be obliged to 
enter a JNOV for appellees. Thus, remand for procedural error would be a waste 
of adjudicative resources.

 [¶20.]  In Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986), we recognized the tort of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. In order to avoid burdening our 
court system with an overbroad theory of liability, we placed limits on possible 
recovery under that cause of action. We held that only those plaintiffs could 
recover: (1) whose kinship to the accident victim would permit them to bring a 
wrongful death action; (2) who observed the infliction of serious bodily harm or 
death, or observed the serious bodily harm or death shortly after its occurrence 
but without material change in the condition or location of the victim; and (3) 
whose loved one did, in fact, sustain death or "serious bodily injury" as 
defined in the Wyoming Criminal Code. Gates, 719 P.2d  at 198-99. The trial court 
granted summary judgment here on appellants' failure to meet the second element 
of the Gates test, the immediacy of the observation.

 [¶21.]  Wyoming is one among a small number of states 
which allows recovery for the emotional distress a plaintiff experiences when 
she observes a loved one seriously injured or dead after the injury has actually 
occurred. See Annotation, Immediacy of Observation of Injury as Affecting Right 
to Recover Damages for Shock or Mental Anguish from Witnessing Injury to 
Another, 5 A.L.R.4th 833 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1991). Our immediacy test allows 
some time to elapse between the time of injury and the time of observation. Once 
the victim's condition or location has materially changed, however, the moment 
of crisis for which recovery is allowed is deemed to have passed, regardless of 
the brevity of time which has elapsed since the accident. Shock or emotional 
distress may occur after this point, but it is no longer 
compensable.

 [¶22.]  If this rule seems harsh, we must point 
out that Wyoming follows a more liberal course than do many jurisdictions, 
including California, whose landmark case of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) so heavily influenced our adoption of the 
modern version of the tort. Gates, 719 P.2d  at 195. While the California Supreme 
Court's position in Dillon was at the forefront of the law, that court, refining 
Dillon, recently rejected an emotional distress claim by a woman who arrived at 
an accident scene and found her bloody, unconscious son lying in the roadway, 
because she did not actually witness 
the accident. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 881, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (1989). This is a much harsher result than our rule requires. In fact, 
the dissent in Thing cited language from Gates as an example of the more liberal 
rule that California should have adopted. Thing, 257 Cal. Rptr.  at 892-93, 771 P.2d  at 841 (Broussard, J., 
dissenting):

"It is 
more than the shock one suffers when he learns of the death or injury of a 
child, sibling or parent over the phone, from a witness, or at the hospital. It 
is more than bad news. The kind of shock the tort requires is the result of the 
immediate aftermath of an accident. It may be the crushed body, the bleeding, 
the cries of pain, and in some cases, the dying words which are really a 
continuation of the event. The immediate aftermath may be more shocking than the 
actual impact * * *."

quoting 
Gates, 719 P.2d  at 199.

 [¶23.]  Our broader immediacy rule, which allows 
the plaintiff to recover if she observes the injury shortly after it occurs 
without material change in the attendant circumstances, was adopted from the 
Massachusetts case of Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 
(1978). Gates, 719 P.2d  at 199. Massachusetts expanded the Dziokonski rule 
early on to include emotional distress claims predicated on viewing the injured 
person at the hospital rather than at the scene. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's 
Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690, 697 (1980). On this 
point, we must decline to follow the Massachusetts rule. The shock received on 
seeing an injured loved one in a hospital setting, or lying on a cot in a 
principal's office, is of a different quality than coming upon him or her at the 
scene of the accident. In our view, Ferriter over-emphasized the factor of 
whether chronological time had elapsed since the accident and under-emphasized 
the circumstantial factors under which the observation was made.1

 [¶24.]  Turning to the circumstances of this 
case, Mrs. Contreras did not observe the infliction of her son's injuries. She 
did see him in pain shortly after the accident. However, he had been removed to 
the principal's office and was lying on a cot at the time. There had, therefore, 
been a "material change" in his location sufficient to mitigate the shock of the 
accident. While it is true that seeing her son's injuries must have been 
extremely distressing to Mrs. Contreras, a victim's loved ones are not entitled 
to recover for the emotions created by every shocking or upsetting injury to the 
victim, only to those which fall within the limitations of the cause of action 
as we have recognized it. See Thing, 257 Cal. Rptr.  at 879-80, 771 P.2d  at 
828-29. We therefore hold that Mrs. Contreras did not, as a matter of law, state 
a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because she did not 
observe the accident or observe the victim in substantially the same location 
and condition as when the accident occurred.

 [¶25.]  In their next issue, appellants challenge 
the trial court's exclusion of evidence relating to playground conditions at 
other schools in Carbon County School District No. 1. Appellants sought to 
introduce evidence of these conditions in two ways: by means of photographs of 
the playgrounds, and by direct testimony from the principals of each school. The 
court excluded the photographs in response to defendants' motion in limine. It 
also granted defendants' motion to strike the listing of the principals in an 
untimely amendment to plaintiffs' pretrial memorandum. In its order striking the 
principals as witnesses, the trial court stated:

[T]he 
Court may reconsider its ruling at trial if plaintiffs are unable to prove a 
critical element of their case without the use of an additional witness listed 
in Amendment to Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum. In that event, plaintiffs' 
counsel will notify the Court and opposing counsel immediately upon his 
recognition of the need to have such witness testify. The court will hold a 
hearing out of the presence of the jury to analyze the necessity and 
reasonableness of permitting such testimony, as well as any prejudice or unfair 
surprise that might accrue to the defendants by allowing the witness to testify. 
If the Court determines that it will permit such witness to testify, the trial 
will be recessed until defense counsel has had a full and complete opportunity 
to converse with the witness to ascertain certain the extent of his or her 
knowledge, or to depose the witness.

 [¶26.]  We recently stated our standard of review 
when evaluating the trial court's decision on admission of 
evidence:

The 
admission of evidence is controlled generally by Rules 401, 402, and 403, W.R.E. 
Rulings on the admission of evidence are within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, its rulings will 
not be disturbed. Taylor v. State, 642 P.2d 1294 
(Wyo. 1982). 
This exercise of the sound discretion of the trial court includes its 
determinations with respect to adequacy of foundation, the relevance of the 
proffered evidence, the competency of the proffered evidence, the materiality of 
the proffered evidence, and its remoteness, and the court's ruling with respect 
to any factor will be upheld on appeal absent the clear abuse of that 
discretion.

L.U. 
Sheep Co. v. Bd. of CountyComm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 673 (Wyo. 
1990).

 [¶27.]  Wyoming Rule of Evidence 402 provides 
that:

All 
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, by 
these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible.

Wyoming 
Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevant evidence":

"Relevant 
evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.

 [¶28.]  The proposed photographs, in and of 
themselves, were irrelevant to any issue at trial, particularly the issue of 
whether the Pershing Elementary 
playground was negligently constructed. All they could demonstrate was how 
other playgrounds, under different 
conditions, had been laid out. Without evidence that, under circumstances 
similar to those present at Pershing Elementary, the playgrounds pictured were 
designed differently for safety reasons pertinent to the Contreras accident, 
photographs of the other school playgrounds had no demonstrated relevance to 
this action. See Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1102 (Wyo. 1989) 
(trial court properly excluded as irrelevant evidence of farming practices on 
farms remote from those of plaintiffs). There was no abuse of discretion in 
excluding them.

 [¶29.]  If evidence was available to the plaintiffs that 
would have shown the relevance of these photographs, it should have been 
presented in the form of an offer of proof. As W.R.E. 103(a) 
provides:

Error 
may not be predicated upon a ruling which * * * excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, and

* * * * 
* *

(2) 
Offer of Proof. - In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of 
the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the 
context within which questions were asked.

 [¶30.]  Although the substance of the photographs 
was made known to the court, the substance of supporting testimony which could 
have shown them to be relevant was not. In short, appellants failed to 
demonstrate, by offer of proof, the relevance of their photographs to this case. 
Given that failure, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
the photos. See United States v. Barta, 888 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1989) (no 
abuse of discretion in excluding expert testimony where defendant failed to 
show, by offer of proof, connection between the testimony which concerned tax 
defendant's "detail phobia," and his misstatements of taxable 
income).

 [¶31.]  Appellants argue, however, that it was 
impossible for them to make an offer of proof during a telephonic pretrial 
hearing. They further note that they did not have to do so at trial because the 
Committee Note to W.R.E. 103 states that it is not necessary to "re-offer 
evidence [at trial] which has been suppressed by action of the court on a 
pretrial motion." In essence, appellants contend that they were exempted from 
making an offer of proof at any point 
in the proceedings. This can hardly be the intent of the drafters of Rule 103. 
An offer of proof is needed, in circumstances like this, to allow us to 
determine whether evidence should, in fact, have been 
excluded.

The 
offer of proof is * * * important if there is an appeal. If there is no offer of 
proof, the appellate court will have a difficult time evaluating the propriety 
and effect of the judge's ruling. With an offer of proof in the record, the 
appellate court can make much more intelligent decisions about whether there was 
error * * *.

Edward 
J. Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Foundations 19 (2d ed. 1989).

 [¶32.]  Although the pretrial conference was 
conducted by telephone, effectively precluding examination of witnesses, 
appellants could still at least have indicated who their witnesses to support 
relevance of the photos would have been and what would be the substance of their 
testimony. There is no evidence that they did so. They could also have included 
a summary of their testimony in their pretrial memorandum. The memorandum lists 
only the aerial photographer who took the photos. There was also no showing that 
the principals listed in the amendment to the plaintiffs' pretrial memorandum 
could or would testify how conditions at their playgrounds were similar to those 
at Pershing Elementary. If witnesses who could render such testimony did exist, 
the substance of their testimony has not been preserved in any way for this 
appeal. There is, therefore, no basis for us to conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion in excluding the photographs.

 [¶33.]  Appellants also complain of the exclusion 
of proffered testimony by the principals of the nearby schools. The trial court 
gave appellants the opportunity to make an offer of proof at trial as to why the 
principals' testimony was needed. Appellants declined to do so. Where a court 
gives a party seeking to admit evidence the opportunity to renew his attempt to 
have it admitted, the party cannot complain if he fails to take the opportunity 
which is offered. Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 508-09 (9th 
Cir. 1974). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing 
to allow the principals to testify.

 [¶34.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 1 Moreover, we note 
that in recent years the Massachusetts courts have shown marked 
reluctance to further broaden the horizons of emotional distress claims. See 
Stockdale v. Bird & Son, Inc., 399 Mass. 249, 503 N.E.2d 951 (1987) (no 
recovery where mother saw son's body in funeral home 24 hours after his death); 
see also Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 401 Mass. 516, 517 N.E.2d 824 (1988); Gore v. 
Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 645, 461 N.E.2d 256 (1984); 
Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 450 N.E.2d 581 (1983); Barnes 
v. Geiger, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 365, 446 N.E.2d 78 (1983), review denied 389 Mass. 
1101, 448 N.E.2d 767 (1983); Miles v. Edward O. Tabor, M.D., Inc., 387 Mass. 
783, 443 N.E.2d 1302 (1982) (denying recovery on emotional distress 
claims).