Case Title: Groff v. SIAC

Citation: 246 Or. 557, 426 P.2d 738

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1967-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reversed with instructions April 19, 1967.
*558 Donald J. Howe, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General and Wallace Carpenter, Assistant Attorney General, Salem.
Phil H. Ringle, Jr., Oregon City, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Misko, Njust & Ringle, Oregon City.
Before PERRY, Chief Justice, and SLOAN, GOODWIN, LUSK and FORT, Justices.
REVERSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
FORT, J. (Pro Tempore).
This case is brought by the plaintiff for alleged aggravation of an injury to her back and legs for which she had previously received a final award of "* * * 20% permanent partial disability * * * on account of her unscheduled injuries." The defendant denied the claimed aggravation. The case was duly tried and submitted to a jury which returned into a court a verdict for the defendant Commission.
Thereafter the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on the ground of "Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party * * *" under ORS 17.610(2). The court allowed the motion and the defendant has appealed from that order.
*559 In order to determine the correctness of the ruling it is necessary to set forth portions of the evidence sequentially. The problem arises out of the calling and examination of a witness. Miss Kissling, the witness in question, was called by the defendant during its case in chief.
During the examination of the plaintiff during her case in chief, she was asked several questions, both on cross examination and on redirect examination, concerning her acquaintance with Miss Kissling, all without any objection whatever. The record in this connection first shows the following questions on cross examination by defendant's attorney and her answers:
Next on redirect examination by her own attorney she testified:
During defendant's case in chief it called as a witness in its behalf the aforementioned Miss Kissling, now because of recent marriage, named Virginia Janssen. The record, after identifying the name and address of the witness, shows the following:
Thereafter out of the presence of the jury and, so far as relevant to the problem presented, the following took place:
Plaintiff then objected on the ground it was a privileged communication. The court, after stating:
later ruled:
*563 Plaintiff then moved for a mistrial. The court ruled:
No error has been assigned as a result of this ruling.
The jury was then brought back, and the case proceeded. No further questions were asked of the witness, and she was excused. The case was shortly thereafter submitted to the jury, which returned into court a verdict in favor of the defendant Commission.
Following entry of judgment thereon plaintiff filed her motion for a new trial upon the grounds of misconduct of the prevailing party.
In ruling on the motion for a new trial the court stated:
The transcript reveals no attempt here "to introduce into evidence records of the Public Welfare Commission." No such exhibits were marked, identified or referred to in the evidence. The affidavit of plaintiff's counsel accompanying the motion for a new trial states only:
ORS 411.320 provides:
We have held that the privilege conferred thereby is not an absolute one, regardless of who may claim it.[1] Reese in The Oregon Lawyer's Trial Book, Evidentiary *565 Privilege in Oregon, ch 3, § 3.47 (1967), referring to ORS 411.320 states:
Litigation is deeply involved in the search for truth. The method it has chosen for its discovery is that of reliable evidence in an adversary setting. The proper assertion of a privileged communication may be expected in any case to be an inhibiting limitation upon the discovery therein of the truth.[2] The legislature, however, has concluded that confidentiality of certain relationships is of greater importance than permitting the invasion thereof in the litigation process.
1, 2. Because of this inhibiting effect upon their basic function, the courts do not and cannot lightly permit its assertion.[3] The burden is on him who seeks its invocation to show that both the one asserting a privilege and the nature of the testimony offered are within the ambit of the statute according the privilege. No such showing was made here.
3. The regulation of the Welfare Department we think correctly reflects an awareness of this. It directs its staff members when called as a witness to:
It is for the court, and only for the court, to say in any proceeding before it whether or not evidence is privileged. The statute in question extends its protection of privilege both to applicants for and recipients of public assistance. The evidence here did not establish that the plaintiff was a recipient of public assistance, nor so far as the record reveals, was she at any time the welfare worker was at her home. The plaintiff did not establish that she was for herself at any time an applicant for public assistance. She made no offer of proof thereof.
The testimony sought to be elicited thus appeared to come from contacts resulting from the Welfare Department's involvement in providing either care or guidance and control for plantiff's three-year-old grandchild. Neither her son nor her daughter-in-law lived with her, so far as can be determined from the record. Plaintiff herself testified that Miss Kissling never came to her home to see the child, only to see the child's parents, and that plaintiff's own association with her was limited to making "arrangements for her to come to our place" to meet the parents of the child, apparently as a common meeting place.
The record does not establish here that the plaintiff was within the ambit of the statute even to entitle her to a claim of privilege under ORS 411.320. It was her burden to do so. Furthermore, even assuming there was evidence that plaintiff was a recipient of public assistance, the record here is insufficient to determine what, if any, portions of the welfare caseworker's proffered testimony might have been admissible.
4. Finally it should be observed that the right to *567 claim this privilege, as with others, can be waived by the person entitled to claim it.[4] Here the plaintiff in her case in chief on redirect examination herself told of her relations with Miss Kissling. All of the evidence surrounding plaintiff's relationship with Miss Kissling offered during her case in chief was either brought out by plaintiff herself or came in without objection.
5. Here, however, we are not concerned with whether the court correctly excluded the testimony of Miss Kissling. The question here is whether there was misconduct of the prevailing party in calling Miss Kissling as a witness. We are of the opinion that there was not. The order granting the motion for a new trial is reversed with instructions to reinstate the judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury.
Reversed with instructions.
[1]  Chandler v. State, 230 Or 452, 370 P2d 626 (1962).
[2]  Coles v. Harsch, 129 Or 11, at 27, 276 P 248 (1929).
[3]  Hurley, Privileged Communications in Oregon, 36 Or L Rev 132 at 160 (1956-57).
[4]  Hurley, Privileged Communications in Oregon, 36 Or L Rev 132 at 160 (1956-57).